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mi.vToO~:v ap.a p.axotVTO. But the Punic line was not necessarily at right angles to the centre, i.e. advancing in column. See further v. 82. 9 n. 5. £1T(1TAovs: naues rostratas (Casaubon): cf. so. 6. Also found in Philo Mech. Belop. 104. 16. 'Avvwv 6 .•. Aetcp9ds Tft 1Ta.pa.Tn~e~: cf. 19. 8 ff. 6. :AJ.LLAKa.s o 1TEpt TT-jv T vv5a.p(5a. v .oyia) against 'tragic historians'. Paton misses the sense. 15. SLa TTJV TLfLa.tou ••• ilyvoLa.v: if P. reverted to the subject in his polemic against Timaeus in book xii, the passage has not survived. On Timaeus see i. 5· r n.
l. 2].
II
THE FIRST PUNIC \VAR
known as SdK1TAovs, so putting his oars out of action, ftET
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
l. JO. ]
at Ecnomus (on the horse see Thiel, Hist. 216-I7). Probably between 2,ooo and 3,ooo marines went down in the 24 ships lost at Ecnomus (28. 14) ; and the original total of soldiers on board was c. 27 ,6oo (i.e. 9,2oo permanent garrison from Italy and c. I8,4oo embarked in Sicily from the legions there). Since 40 ships remained behind in Africa, the 210 which returned (for the total of 250 see 25. 7--9 n.) would require 8,4oo marines and the 40 at Clupea some I,6oo, as permanent garrison, i.e. Io,ooo in all. This figure, taken from the c. 25,ooo which survived Ecnomus, gives almost exactly Regulus' rs,ooo. Manlius' return is dated to autumn (256) by Zon. viii. I3· He triumphed: 'cos. de Poeneis naualem egit VIII k .. .' (act. tr.). 30-34. Reg1dus in Africa: in contrast to 29, which is written from the Roman point of view, and probably comes from Fabius, chs. 3o34 seem to follow Philinus almost exclusively, as can be seen from a comparison "'ith Diodorus, from the stress on the Carthaginian point of view, and from the exaltation of Xanthippus, a Greek (like Philinus) in Punic service. Cf. De Sanctis, iii. r. 226-7; Bung, I I r-rs (contra Laqueur, RE, 'Philinus', col. 2186, who argues for contamination of Fabius and Philinus). 30. 1. 1t.aopou~a.v ~ea.t BwaTa.pov: Hasdrubal, son of Hanno, here makes his first appearance; he plays an important role down to his execution in 25I (d. 40. r-Is). Bostar is not otherwise known: he may be the Vodostor (or Bodostor) who died from ill-treatment in Roman captivity, c. 243 (Diod. xxiv. 9· I, 12). Orosius (iv. 8. r6) speaks of Hasdrubales duo. The divided command was unusual, though not unprecedented; Meltzer, ii. 72· 2. e~ouAeueTo f1ET0. Twv 1rept Tov A.aopou~a.v: 'with Hasdrubal and his staff' (Paton), 'with Hasdrubal and his colleague' (Shuckburgh); but Polybian usage sanctions the simple translation 'with Hasdrubal'. 5. 1rpos m)1uv A.8Uv: not mentioned elsewhere; the nominative is therefore irrecoverable. It is perhaps identical with the Roman town of Uthina (modern Oudna), about IS miles south of Tunis, and somewhat east of the Wadi Meliane and the railway from Tunis to Pont du Fahs and Zaghouan. Meltzer, ii. 569-70; De Sanctis, iii. I.
•47 n. 5·
7. acflUfj OE Ta.is ta.uTWV OuVUf1EO'~V : the folly of the Carthaginians prior to Xanthippus' arrival (d. 32. 2) is part of Philinus' version; but the Punic generals may have feared the superiority of the Roman infantry on the plains (De Sanctis, iii. r. I47-8). That they did not have to wait for a Greek to tell them that cavalry and elephants are most useful on level ground had already been observed by :Mommsen, Rom. Gesch. i. 523 n. Zon. viii. 13 mentions this battle; so too Oros. iv. 8. I6 and Eutrop. ii. 21. 3 (with exaggerated Punic losses from Livy). 8g
l.
30. Ij
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
15. TuvTJTos: Tunis lay at the mouth of the R. Catada, on a slight eminence between a lagoon, modern El Bahira (on the north-east), and a salt marsh, modern Sebka es Sedjoumi (on the south-west): d. 73· 5, 1Tapd. r0v :\lpv1JV (the lagoon). It played a prominent part in any fighting near Carthage (Diod. xiv. 77. J, xx. 8. 7, etc.). Its distance from Carthage is given as 120 stades = r8·5 km. (67. IJ, xiv. 10. 5); but Livy, xxx. 9· II makes it 15 milia passuum. 31. 4. aywvtwv ••• J..L~ O'UJ..L~TI KTA.: the motivation here contradicts that in the rest of the tradition. Here l~egulus takes the initiative 'With peace terms, lest he be superseded; elsewhere it is unanimously stated that the Carthaginians took the initiative from weariness (Oros. iv. g. r; Zon. viii. 13; Diod. xxiii. r2. r), and that Regulus' command was prolonged against his wishes (Livy, ep. r8; Frontin. Strat. iv. 3· 3; Val. Max. iv. 4· 6). The latter statement is probably part of the Regulus saga; but the harshness of the terms offered by Regulus suggests that the Carthaginians did in fact make the offer, and this version, which is in Diodorus, \.\'as probably that of Philinus. P.'s stress on Regulus' fear of supersession may come from Fabius (De Sanctis, iii. 1. 227; Gelzer, Hermes, 1933, 140 n. :2, who compares ii. 27. 5, 34· r (not a good parallel), and Livy, viii. 30. 9), or may indeed be a general deduction from similar situations of which he was cognizant (e.g. that of Flamininus, xviii. rr. z); Zon. viii. I7 attributes the same motives to Catulus in 24r; and indeed the situation was inherent in a system of annual commands. T. Frank (CAH, vii. 683) offers a pretty example of compromise: 'he announced his readiness to receive offers of peace.' On the phrase rrJV Jmyparf;ijv rwl' 1Tpayparwv see ii. 2. 9 n. 5. -rb j30.pos Twv emTay!J-0.-rwv: according to Dio, fg. 43· 2:2~23 (who alone records them), they required the payment of an indemnity, the surrender of Roman and ransoming of Punic prisoners, and also the evacuation of Sicily and Sardinia, the signing of a foedus iniquum, the surrender of the whole Punic fleet but for one ship, and an undertaking to furnish a squadron of fifty vessels for Rome at any time upon demand. This version is accepted by Meltzer (ii. 299, 570-1), Arnold (Oorzaak, 71), and Frank (CAH, vii. 683, 'Dio's account may be correct, and as such a fair commentary on the consul's stupidity'); but (a) it is not clear by what channel Dio could have obtained a faithful record, (b) if the annexation of Sardinia was envisaged in 256, its omission from the Treaty of Catulus is odd (62. 8~ 63. 3). Hence Dio's account is probably to be rejected. The harsh terms are also mentioned by Diod. xxiii. r:2. r5; Eutrop. ii. 2r. 4; Oros. iv. 9· I; Zon. viii. IJ. In fact a successful outcome at this stage was mled out, since the Romans were bound to demand, and the Carthaginians bound to reject, the evacuation of Sicily. 90
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
1.32. 9
8 . .ivSpwSws •.. Kat yevva~ws: this praise of the Carthaginian aw{8pwv (on which see 21. 6 n.) reveals the source, Philinus (d. 14. 3). 32. 1. =:av9~n..rrov ..• Antte5at!Jovwv: Diod. xxiii. I-J.. 1 calls him a Spartiate, which would fit the words rii> AaKWVtKij> aywyij;:; J.LISTEOXTJKOTa (a training still admired, though its rigours were much diminished, Plut. Ag£s, 5); he was a mercenary (cf. Diod. xxiii. 15. 7), despite Eutropius (ii. 21. ..J.) and Appian (Lib. 3), who make him an
ally sent by Sparta, and Oros. iv. 9· z, who calls him Lacedaemoniorum regem. For a useful summary of the history of Spartan mercenaries in the Hellenistic period see Launey, i. IIJ ff. 5. auT
L 32. 9
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
Xanthippus' victory (De Sanctis, iii. I. 150-I n. 13)· The Roman tradition (Appian, Eutropius, Orosius) gives Regulus 3o,ooo to 32,ooo men; but even with Libyans he can hardly have raised his rs,ooo to more than 2o,ooo. 33. 6. Ti]v •.• .p&.Xa.yya. Twv Ka.pxTJSovlwv: citizen-soldiers, who only come into the picture when Africa is invaded. Meltzer (ii. rr6-r7, 508--9) estimates that two-thirds of the Punic force was made up of citizen troops. 9. Taus ypocr.pop.axous: the uelites,lit. 'javelin-fighters'. See vi. 2r. 7 n. The UTJp.£1:at are 'maniples'; meaning primarily uexillum, this word is also extended to refer to the soldiers serving beneath it. 10. TfjS ••• rrpbs Ta OT)p(a. p.axTJs SeoVTWS .•• EO'Toxa.crp.evol: P. here seems oblivious of the lesson of Zama, that elephants should be met with an open formation. But he had no first-hand experience of elephants, since these were last used in a major battle at Magnesia: Griffith, 214. 34. 2. cruvelj!o.PTJO'O.V TOlS orrhots KTA.: d. Caesar, BC, iii. 92· 5: 'neque frustra antiquitus institutum est ut signa undique concinerent clamoremque uniuersi tollerent; quibus rebus et hostis terreri et suos incitari existimauerunt.' De Sanctis (iii. r. 227) questions the accuracy of P.'s comment (from Philinus) for soldiers carrying leather shields; but it was always possible to strike the iron boss or rims (vi. 23. 4-5). 4. Twv p.tcrOo,Popwv: i.e. on the Carthaginian right (d. 33· 7). These were apparently the mercenaries of Xanthippus, who did his best to rally them (Diod. xxiii. 14. 2); DeSanctis, iii. I. 152 n. 15. 5. Twv ••. Ka.Ta To us iXe,Pa.vTa.s Ta.xOevTwv: according to 33· 6 the elephantS had been posted 7Tp0 7TaUTj<; Ti]<; Ovvap.€ln<; lv fLETWmp, and SO opposite the whole Roman front. P. must therefore mean 'of those left drawn up opposite the elephants' after the legion on the left had broken away in pursuit of the Carthaginian right. 6. KuKXoup.evot rro.vTo.x68ev u1To Twv trrrrewv: De Sanctis (iii. r. 152) suggests that the Carthaginian cavalry attacked the Roman legions in the flank and rear only after a successful pursuit of the horse (§ 3) ; this would explain how the Roman left had the chance to break away against the mercenaries.
35. Reflections on the fate of Regulus. In this chapter P. singles out the double peripeteia of Regulus and of Carthage under Xanthippus as an example of the moral uses of history (d. r. z), which allows the reader to gain his experience vicariously. Regulus, inexorable in his terms when victorious, but soon after forced to sue for terms from his Punic captors, illustrates the peripeteia wrought by a fortune, 92
THE FIRST PU:'{IC WAR
I. 35
which is conceived as a force which suddenly reverses one's lot at the moment of extreme prosperity (~
\
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'tt
I
..1...1
~
I
tf
..,.
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I
Vl"'ptv Ka' TTJV EsOVO'Lal! 't'EpEW, 7rpoa't'TJPTJ/LfiJJOS E'O.VTOV TTJV O'!JyYVWp.TJV Kal TOJJ avy~<•xwpT}p.lvov Tofs tlTTTatKomv E',\r::ov (§ 4); and likewise he stresses the role of a single man in raising up Carthage: 'TTapaSo[ov yap lrf>ali'ETo mi.au• el "11'poayEvop.lvou Tois KapxTJoovlot> ivos p.avov dvop6s, TTJALKUVTTJ Ttlll' oAwv ,;ylveTO p.e-rafloJ.~ KTA. (§ s). Diodorus, it is true,
introduces an idea not present in P. when he makes Regulus' overbearing conduct, WUTE TO ••. ocup.oVLOV vr::p.euijaat (§ 2), the 'metaphysical' cause of his reversal, for there is no trace in P. of the notion that Regulus' peripeteia was due to his arrogance (so, correctly, Balsdon, CQ, 1953. 159 n. 2, criticizing what I wrote in CQ, 1945, 10); but whether this was cut out of a common source by P. (who adopts the view that a peripeteia follows upon hybris only in one passage, xxvii. 8. 4), or Diodorus added it (he is fond of the theme: cf. xxvii. 6. 2, 15. 2, xxxi. rr. 3), it seems probable that both P. and Diodorus are here follo>Ving a common source, Philinus. It is not an argument against this hypothesis th:at P. has parallels elsewhere both for his view of Tyche and his stress on the role of one man (cf. viii. 3· J, 7· 7, ix. 2:::. I, 2:z. 6, xxxii. 4· 2) for both are common (for the latter cf. Plut. lrfor. 325 A, ann Ennius, 'unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem'). This conclusion is rejected both by Bung (us n. 3) and by Pedech (REA, r95Z, 255-{i). Pedech asserts (a) that the word TVXTJ as well as the theme of the caprice of fortune are both absent from Diodorus (Philinus), (b) that for Philinus the example of Xanthippus illustrates not the triumph of the individual but the victory of intelligence and skill over brute force. But: (a) though Diodorus does not use the word TUXTJ• he attributes Regulus' downfall to TO Satp.ol•Lov (§ 2) ; and there is no reason to think that he distinguished between the two any more than does P. (d. i. 84. Io); (b) the second distinction is artificial, for Diodorus stresses the words Jvos p.6vov avSpos and P. quotes Euripides' words on €v aorf>ov povJ.wp.a. The power of the individual resid.es in his intelligence. The slightly different attitude towards Tyche's role in the two authors is mentioned above; it is no serious obstacle to the view that the common source is Philinus, and Bung's thesis that Diodorus has introduced Polybian material in the middle of his Philinian account is not well grounded. P. here makes no reference to the famous legend of Regulus' visit to Rome on a peace-mission, under oath to return to Carthage if he failed, and of his return and death by torture; and had he 93
I. 35
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
known of it, he must have made some mention of it in this d~dactic passage. It seems well established that this story was wholly legendary, and invented by annalists to cover up the well-founded tradition that after Regulus' (natural) death in captivity, his widow tortured two Punic prisoners held in the custody of the Atilii, so that one died (Diod. xxiv. 12). There is an excellent analysis of the growth of the Regulus legend by Klebs, RE, 'Atilius (51)', cols. 2088-92: see also DeSanctis, iii. 1. I54-6. T. Frank has argued for the authenticity of the peace-mission (CP, I926, 311 ff.); but the legend seems to stand or fall as a whole. 4. To 1ra.p' Eupl1TH5n: Nauck, fg. no. 3 from the Antiope, a frequently quoted line (d. Plut. M or. 790 A; Sex. Emp. adu. math. i. 279; Galen, Protrept. I3; Eustath. ad Iliad. ii. 372, p. 240. 42; Themistius, or. I6, p. 207 D), which refers to the strength of autocracy as against ochlocracy. P. quotes Euripides elsewhere at v. 106. 4 and xii. 26. s. and perhaps echoes him at xv. 33· I; but he may owe his acquaintance to some collection of passages (Wunderer, ii. 57-58). 7. OuE'Lv y4ip llvnJV Tpcmwv KTA.: cf. 1. 2 for the theme: for the parallel in Philinus here see Diod. xxiii. 15. 4: Tot<; 8~ lStot<; avp.r.nl>p.aat TOV<; a.\.\ov<; JS{oag<e p.hpw 9povELV Jv Tat<; Jgovafat<;. On npayp.anK-l] taTop{a (§ 9) see 2. 8 n. 36. 3. cf>Oovous • • • OLa.~oA.O.s: these reflections may also echo Philinus, whose interest in mercenary captains (cf. 43· 2 ff.) perhaps indicates another Greek in Carthaginian service. But the theme appears elsewhere in P.: cf. vii. 8. 4, ix. ro. 6. 4. £npos •.. A.Oyos: for the version that the faithless Carthaginians drowned (or tried to drown) Xanthippus on his way home see Zon. viii. 13; Val. Max. ix. 6. ext. I; Sil. It. vi. 682; App. Lib. 4; Tzetzes, Hist. iii. 38o-6 = Diod. xxiii. I6. But if this is what P. had in mind, he clearly disbelieved it. That the Xanthippus whom Ptolemy III appointed governor of the newly-won prouinciae lrans Euphraten before June 245 (Hieron. in Daniel. xi. 7---9) is the same man, was suggested by Droysen, iii. 1. 386 f., and half accepted by DeSanctis, Atti Ace. Torino, 1911-I2, 963 ('forse'), but remains uncertain: cf. Bengtson, Strat. ii. 84, iii. 172-3. If it is true, P. may have resen:ed his (lost) €npo<; Aoyo<; for some context treating Egypt. 7. ITjv yEvvmoT'lTa. Ka.i. ToAfJ-a.v: it has been suggested by Cichorius, 41-42, that Naevius, fg. 42-43 ~for. refers to these Roman survivors. The lines
'seseque ei perire mauolunt ibidem, quam cum stupro redire ad suos popularis' (fg. 42) are thought to imply the rejection by the garrison of a Punic offer of ships to transport them to Sicily (though in fact the Romans had 94
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
I. 36. II
their own forty vessels); and 'sin illos deserant fortissumos uiros magnum stuprum populo fieri per gentes' {fg. 43) suggest some opposition at Rome to the sending of a relief expedition. Neither detail is in P.; but whereas the first contradicts his statement that the Carthaginian object was to reduce the garrison,not to let it get away (§6), the second is at least consistent with P.'s version that news of the disaster reached Rome before the expedition of 255 set sail. 9-10. The rival fleets in 255. The Punic figure of 2oo is usually accepted as inherently probable: the difficulties in the Roman figure have been discussed at 25. 7--{) n. :Meltzer (ii. 307) would reconcile the figures here with the losses in the subsequent storm (37· 2) by raising the latter from 364 to 464; Frank (CAH, vii. 684 n. r) and DeSanctis (iii. I. 157 n. 25) prefer to accept Diodorus' figure (Diod. xxiii. r8. r) of 24 prizes at C. Hermaea rather than P.'s n4, and assume some Roman losses--Orosius mentions 9-to reduce the resulting 374 to 364. But it is difficult to accept a fleet of 350 ships for the relief expedition; and the subsequent erection of a columna rostrata on the Capitol (Livy, xlii. 2o. r) and the granting of a triumph to both consuls (celebrated in January 253, after their year as proconsuls in Sicily) favours the higher figure for the Punic prizes, as does the description of the victory as €g icpoSov Kat r)q.8iw; (§ n). Tarn's solution, to reduce the figures for the relieving fleet, thus seems the most probable. As we saw (25. 7~9 n.) the error of an additional roo vessels goes back to P.'s source for Ecnomus. In fact, the relieving fleet will have been 2ro, not 250 strong, for 40 ships had been left behind at Aspis (29. 9). According to Zonaras (viii. 14), these ships arrived to join the main fleet during the battle. Laqueur's explanation of the discrepancy, namely that the figure in 36. ro is from Philinus and that in 37· 2 from Fabius (RE, 'Philinos', col. 2187), rests on a fallacious criterion for isolating passages derived from Philinus. 10. MapKov At(-!iAwv Ka.l. Iepou~ov 4>oAoutov: the consuls for A.U.c. 499 = 255/4 B.C., M. Aemilius M.f. Ln. Paullus and Ser. Fulvius M:.f. M.n. Paetinus l\obilior {Klebs, RE, 'Aemilius {rq)', cols. sso~r; Munzer, RE, 'Fulvius (97)', cols. 269~7o). E1TAeov 1ra.pn TlJV ILKEAia.v: the compression may be to compensate for the long account of Ecnomus (Tarn, JHS, 19o7, 53). Zon. viii. 14 records that the fleet, overtaken by a storm, put in at and occupied Cossyra (modern Pantelleria), which was recovered by the Carthaginians the following year. This is confirmed by the consuls' triumph which each of them 'procos. de Cossurensibus et Poeneis naualem egit' (act. tr.), in January 253. 11. TouTous (-!EV ••• Tpe"'a(-ievol: this battle off C. Hermaea (cf. 29.2) is also described by Diod. xxiii. r8. I; Zon. viii. 14; Eutrop. ii. 22. I; 95
!. 36.
I I
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
Oros. iv. 9· 5 f. According to Zonaras it was laxupd vauJLaxla, and this version, including the 24 Punic losses instead of II4 (Diodorus), probably goes back to Philinus. 12. -rovs 8' ~~~ AL~on ... veo.v(O"~
37. 1. 1Tp00'fl£€o.vns TU TW\1 Ko.f!o.pwo.(wv xwpq;: i.e. towards c. Pachynus. 2. Roman losses: see above 36. 9-10 n. Eutrop. ii. 22. 3 and Oros. iv. 9· 8 also record So ships surviving, but give the total fleet as 464 and 300 ships respectively. The losses are given in Diod. xxiii. r8. I as 340 warships and 300 transports sunk. 4. fl~ 1TAE'i:v 1rapO. T~\1 e~w 1TAeup6.v: a criticism which evidently entered the tradition later, since, with Lilybaeum, Drepana, and Panormus in Punic hands, ancient methods of navigation allowed the Romans no choice of route besides that round C. Pachynus. Meltzer, ii. 308; DeSanctis, iii. r. rs8. T~v f!EV ooSe1rw I
settings of constellations, and other astronomical phenomena with which changes of weather were believed to be connected, in this case the risings of Orion and Sirius. Such phenomena are discussed in the weather-calendar appended to the Eisagoge of Geminus (d. Tittel, RE, 'Geminos (r)', cols. 1035-6), in which JmaTJJLaaf.a appears to denote specifically a phenomenon heralding bad weather (as here). In Eisagoge, 17 Manit. Geminus insists that such calendars have only empirical, and no scientific, value-a point of view in advance of that expressed here. flETa.~u ••• Ti}S '.Qp(wvos ~
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
I. 38.
I
before sunrise'. By the setting of a star (cf. iii. 54· r) P. means the date at which it first sets before sunrise, having hitherto become inv1.sible while still above the horizon. This is Ptolemy's third O'X.TJJl.anap.
H
97
I. 38.
I
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
Lilybaeum (42. 7 ff.); on this see especially Thiel, Iiist. 252 n. 6n. The 2oo ships of § 3 never appear to accomplish anything, and Tarn (]HS, r9o7, 56) is probably right in thinking that they were really transports used to convey Hasdrubal. He is wrong, however, in supposing that this is implied by P., who, judging from the text, pretty clearly took them to be warships prepared after Hasdrubal's crossing (cf. too 38. r, vavnt<
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
I. 39· 1
'Panormos (15)', cols. 668-77 (with earlier bibliography). Columba has argued that both the IlaAatd. 7TOA<s- (dpxala m5Ats-, Diodorus; aKpa, Zonaras) and the Nia '1TOA£S' (EKTOS' 'lTOAts, Diodorus; KllTw 1TOAts, Zonaras) are contained within the central area (modern Cassaro) west of the (then much extended) harbour (the Kala), and between two streams, the Fiume del Papireto on the north and the Fiume di Mal Tempo on the south; and that the Old To·wn lay at the west end of this oval enclosure, in a district of about 10 ha. known as the Galea. But it seems unlikely that the original Phoenician settlement was so far away from the sheltered harbour; and Cassaro with its 43 ha. seems very small for Old Town and New Town together. Hence it seems likely that Cassaro was the Old Town (Cassaro AI Qa$r. 'the fortress'), and that the New Town lay south of the Fiume di Mal Tempo, towards, and probably including, the modern Kalsa. See De Sanctis, iii. 1. r6o-1 n. 33· The assault is described also in Diod. xxiii. r8. 3-5, after his mention of the Roman seizure of Cephaloedium (modern Cefalu) and an unsuccessful attempt on Drepana; and by Zon. viii. 14. According to Diodorus 14,ooo escaped from the Old Tmm by paying a two minae ransom, and the remaining 13,ooo were enslaved: this would include former slaves (De Sanctis). Only Scipio triumphed procos. de Poetteis X k. april. (hence :zs:z); consequently, despite P., Atilius did not share in the assault on Panormus (Zonaras also speaks of I17TaTot). 10. nwE1TAEUO'(l,V d':i TTJV 'Pti>JLTJV: before this Soluntum (ro miles east of Panormus), Tyndaris (12 miles west of Mylae), and three other places came over (Diod. xxiii. 18. 5: leta, Petra, and Imachara); and the Carthaginians under Carthalo took, and, being unable to hold it, burnt Agrigentum (Diod. ibid.), and recaptured Cossyra (Zon. viii. 14).
39. 1. fvluo'i I10poulhLO'i M:o.l f6.1o'i IEjl'lrpWvLo'i: the consuls for
A.U.C. SOl = 253/2 B.C., Cn. Servilius Cn.f. Cn.n. Caepio and c. Sempronius Ti.f. Ti.n. Blaesus (Munzer, RE, 'Servilius (43)', col. 178o; 'Sempronius (28)', cols. IJ68-9)· Eutropius (ii. 23), Orosius (iv. 9· 10), and Zonaras (viii. 14) agree in putting both consuls in charge of the fleet; but as in the former year, only one consul triumphed, Sempronius, cos. de Poeneis k. april. (i.e. 252). Probably Servilius operated in Sicily with Cornelius Asina, the proconsul; De Sanctis, iii. 1. r63. Eutropius and Orosius put the size of the fleet at 26o ships: Tarn (] HS, 1907, 55) makes it 220 as in the previous year (on his calculation cf. 38. 5 n.). Zon. viii. 14 records a fruitless attack on Lilybaeum, probably true, as the Romans could now, since the capture of Panormus, take the northern route round Sicily (§ 5). The policy of using the fleet to raid Africa instead of pressing on with combined operations against western Sicily seems to have been a serious error, even on the assumption that the raids were designed to stimulate
99
J. 39·
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native revolts and to hinder the Punic naval programme; see Thiel, Hist. 247-8, J23· 2. TTJV Twv AwTotfl6.ywv vf)crov: cf. xxxiv. 3· I2. The identification of Meninx (modern Djerba, off the Tunisian coast, about 35 miles south-west of Gabes} with the Homeric island was made by Eratosthenes (Pliny, Nat. hist. v. 41); and the name Lotophagitis was extended to the Lesser Syrtis (Strabo, xvii. 834; Eustath. ad Dion. Perieg. 198 (GGM, ii. 252); Agathem. v. 22 (GGM, ii. 483)); Schwabe, RE, 'Lotophagitis', col. ISIS· The raids made en roztte for Meninx are exaggerated by Eutropius and Orosius into the capture of plurimae cittitates with much plunder. 3. 1rpo
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
I. 40.
I
C.n. Cotta and P. Servilius Q.f. Cn.n. Geminus (Klebs, RE, 'Aurelius (94)', cols. 2481-2; Munzer, RE, 'Servilius (6z)', cols. 1795-6). 10. Tijs ••. Oo.XaTTTJS ••• ~'II"Etcpa.Touv: echoing Philinus: on the true picture cf. 38. 1-4 n. On this occasion the Romans sent reinforcements with a convoy of only sixty ships (§ 8) ; and for whatever reason their enemy made no effective moves against them. 12. £'ITt So' evLo.u·mvs: apparently the two years following the wreck off C. Palinurus, viz. 252 and 251 (De Sanctis, iii. r. r65 with n. 46, who, however, is surely wrong in speaking of 'consul years' (cf. 39· IS n.}: for the source is Philinus). ~!eltzer (ii. 574-6) dates the two years from Hasdrubal's arrival in Sicily to the battle of Panormus (2s2-june zso); but the change seems to date from the resumption of a naval policy (§ IS), the thing P. is interested in. 13. 0Eplla.v ••• KaL A.mapav: so too Diod. xxiii. 19. 20, who also mentions an unsuccessful attack on Heirkte. On Lipara see zr. 5, 24. 13; on Tbermae (of Himera: c£. Zon. viii. 14) see 24. 4· Zon., ibid., dates the capture to the consulship of Aurelius and Servilius (252/1), and this is confirmed by the coins struck in imitation of those of Lipara by L. Aurelius Cotta, consul in 65 B.C. Aurelius triumphed 'cos. de Poeneis et Siculeis idibus apriL' (z51). 15. r aLOV J\T0..LOV tca.i Aeotuov MaXLOv: the consuls for A.U.C. 504 zso/49 B.C. were experienced in naval warfare-C. Atilius Regulus, the victor of Tyndaris (25. In.) and L. Manlius Vulso, ·who shared in that at Ecnornus (26. I I n.). The building of tbe fleet will obviously have begun before 11ay, as an integral part of the policy ..........~.,_,.,,"'"' in the election of these two men; but the words Ka:racrn}crai!TES' crTpaTY)yous mean simply 'electing as consuls'; and De Sanctis (iii. r. 263) is forcing the Greek when he translates 'appointing as commanders of the fleet', i.e. after their entry into office (crTpetTY)y&> is used in this sense only when there is no ambiguity, e.g. II, 3. 59· 8; but for a parallel to this passage cf. 52. s). DeSanctis is misled by his desire to postpone Roman activity till after the end of the two 'consul years' 2s2/1 and 251/o (39· 12 n.). 'ITEVT~tcovTa. aK6.
40. 1.
IOI
I.
40. I
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
G1Cjla.too1711s TllS auy~eojlLS-i)s: d. 17. 9; it was June: but of which year? The battle of Panormus is variously dated to 251 (Mommsen, Holm, Reuss (Phil., r9or: less certainly 1909)) and 250 (Meltzer, Beloch, De
Sanctis, Frank, Luterbacher, Scullard). Furius' departure would naturally point to 25o: but against this it has been argued (r) that Caedlius fought as consul; so Florus, i. r8. 27; Eutrop. ii. 24; Oros. iv. 9· 14; and less definitely, Frontin. Strat. ii. 5· 4; Pliny, Nat. hist. vii. 140; Diod. xxiii. 2r; (z) that there is a tradition of peace negotiations after the battle; but that as Caecilius triumphed in early September 250, his successors must have left Rome no later than the end of July, thus leaving no room for such negotiations in 250. De Sanctis (iii. I. 262-3) has shown that the tradition that Caecilius fought as consul derives from Livy, who elsewhere confuses consuls and proconsuls at this time; and the peace embassy is part of the Regulus myth, and quite worthless (35 n.). Moreover, the 251 dating has its own difficulties, best set out by Leuze (Phil., 1907, 137-9; but his own dating of the battle to April or early May zso involves translating dKp.a{ovmy; ri)s avyKop.tSijs 'when the time of harvest should be at hand', op. cit. 145-6). The date of the battle, then, was June 250, probably after the entry of the new consuls into office (though this is not to be deduced from 39· 15). 4. StO. TWV an:vwv El$ TTjv na.vopjltTw: d. Diod. xxiii. 21, S"t Tfjs 1J£1ttvomJTws Svaxwp{as ~lt8£v Els 'T(J II&.vopp.ov. Probably the route via Iaitia (modern S. Giuseppe, 15 miles south-west of Palermo) over into the valley of the Orethus (modern Oreto, Tdv 7Tpb Tijs 1TDA£ws 7ToTap.ov), which reaches the sea through the plain of the Conca d'Oro, just south of Palermo. 6-16. The battle of Panormus. Diod. xxiii. 21 records how the Carthaginians' Celtic mercenaries contributed to the disaster by their drunkenness; Zon. viii. 14 gives the Punic fleet a sensational but ineffective part in operations (accepted by Thiel, Hist. 261-2), and describes how Metellus eliminated a potential fifth column, and later transported his captured elephants across the Straits of Messana {cf. Pliny, Nat. hist. viii. r6; Frontin. Strat. i. 7· r). Eutrop. ii. 24 and Oros. iv. 9· 15 give Punic losses as 2o,ooo (out of 3o,ooo: Orosius); and Orosius records that Hasdrubal was condemned to death. 10. Toi<;
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
I. 41. 4
is variously given as 142 or qo (Pliny), r2o (Livy, Seneca, Zonaras), 104 (with 26 killed: Orosius), roo (Florus), and 6o (Diodorus). They were butchered in the circus; and henceforth coins of the Caecilii Metelli frequently display an elephant; cf. B.M.C. Rom. Rep. i. xss-6, ii. 3S7 J 570. 41. 2. 1T6.Aw i1Teppwa9"1aav •.. tcaTA Tl)v t~ O.px* 1Tpo9Emv: 'they were again encouraged to send out ... in accordance with their original plan'. See 20. 7 for this plan: abandoned after the shipwreck of 39· 6, it was resumed as a policy of desperation (39· 14-rs) after a two years' interval (39· 12). The victory of Panormus led the Romans to pursue it with the hope of bringing the war to a successful conclusion. The change in policy has already been recorded (39· rs): the important thing here is the change in spirit. 3. l11TAEOV ••• StaKOO'l(11S vauaiv: having been mentioned in 39· rs, the consuls are not named here. P.'s total of 2oo ships (also in Oros. iv. 10. z) depends on his belief that the total in 2S4 was 300 (38. 7); this figure was reduced to ISO by the losses off C. Palinurus (39· 6) and is now raised to 200 by the building of an additional so {39· 15). These figures are consistent, and probably go back to Fabius; but they are probably all So too large, since the 220 ships of 254 almost certainly included the So surviving from the storm (37· 2). Hence the real figure for 2so D.c. is 120 ships (cf. Thiel, Hist. 88-Sg). Philinus in Diodorus (xxiv. 1. 1) gave 240 quinqueremes and 6o cerwri (light warships; cf. Livy, xxiii. 34· 4; App. Lib. 75), an exaggeration. De Sanctis (iii. r. 171 n. 6s) wavers between the view that P. has 'corrected' this figure from Fabius and that the words (t.:ai n7'1'a.pdKoV7'a) have fallen out of his text; and he mentions 2oo ships on p. 166 and 240 on p. r68. In fact P.'s figures are quite consistent; but wTong. Philinus' total may be due to confusion with the combined total for Claudius' and Junius' squadrons in 249 (so Thiel, His!. 257 n. 63z); but this is quite uncertain. 4. lhos ••• TETTapEcrtcm5ktcaTov: it is the departure of the consuls of 250/49 for Sicily which-probably following Philinus (CQ, 1945, P. so dates. If Ap. Claudius crossed to Messana in fate summer, 264 (s. I-S n.), the departure of Atilius and Manlius shortly after the battle of Panormus (June zso) will still be in the fourteenth year of the war. Supporting his view that Ap. Claudius crossed in spring 263, Beloch (iv. 2. 285-6) argues that P. can never have mentioned what year it is in connexion \vith an event occurring at the end of a year: P., he insists, must have referred the beginning of the siege of Lilybaeum to the fifteenth year, if in fact his (i.e. Philinus') 'years of the war' began in late summer. But both Beloch and DeSanctis, whom he is criticizing, miss the point that it is not the siege of Lilybaeum which matters to P. and is being dated here: it is the 103
L 41. 4
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
active resumption of a naval policy, a critical moment (cf. 41. 2 n.). Since this came clearly within the fourteenth year, P.'s date is without difficulty. 6. cicj:opfltJV: 'military base': cf. Thuc. i. 90. 2, T~v ••• IkAo7TOW'f/aov ••• €cf>aaav .•• d.cf>opf-L¥ LKav~v li£lvat. Understand: 'if Lilybaeum fell'. -rrXY)v Ape-rravwv: modern Trapani, lay at the west end of Sicily, about 20 miles north of Lilybaeum (42. 7 ff.). Drepana was one of the most important remaining Punic bases. (The plural form is more correct: in Diod. xxiii. 9 To .1p~7Tavov may be the peninsula.) 42. 1-7. Geography of Sicily and Lilybaeum. The comparison with the Peloponnese, clearly intended for Greek readers (cf. 3· 8), perhaps hints at the tradition that Sicily too was once part of the mainland, Rhegium being the 'town of the break-through' (Myvvf.Lt) : Aesch. fg. 402 (Strabo, vi. 258); Diod. iv. 85. 2 f.; authorities quoted by Ziegler, RE, '£LK<)..{a ', col. 2467. Though superficially plausible (Cuntz, 71), P.'s account of the shape and bearings of Sicily is faulty. The direction of the three capes is given as: Pachynus 7rpos f-LW"fJf.LfJplav, south (§ 4). Pelorias Els Tns apKTOVS KEKALf-L~l!OV, north (§ s), Lilybaeum ds xaf.LEptvas Mans, south-west (qualified as 'turned towards Libya': § 6). The two latter bearings are found elsewhere. Pelorias is the north tip of the island in Strabo, vi. 265 and Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 87, though in fact it is not so far north as the Phalacrian Promontory (Ptol. Geog. iii. 4· 2), modern C. Rasocolmo, ro km. to the northwest; and of Lilybaeum Strabo, ibid., writes, Tp{TrJ o' iaTLV (axpa) ~ 7Tpoa<x~s Tfj AtfJvv. {JAl7TOVaa 7Tp6s TUVT'f!V apa Kat T~l! XHf-L
(modern C. Boco) is the most westerly tip of Sicily. Both Strabo and Pliny make Pachynus project east towards Greece; and the explanation of their bearings (which derive from Poseidonius) is that the island has been distorted thus: Pe!orias
r/Pachynus
.N.
t
lt7ybaeom//
The real east-south-east side is here represented as north-north-east, the north side as north-west, and the south-west side as southeast; the island is about 90° out of true position, and the distortion perhaps goes back to Eratosthenes, who placed Rome, Messana, and Carthage on a single meridian (Strabo, i. 93), which implies that the north coast of Sicily runs virtually north-south (map in Thomson, 142 ), and the other sides with corresponding errors. Despite his correction 104
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
L 42.7
of Pachynus, which lies 1rpos fWJYJfLflplav, P.'s account especially of Lilybaeum suggests that he is partly the victim of the same distorted picture. Ziegler, loc. cit., cols. 2468~, 247r. 4. To ILt<~Au(ov TrEAa.yos: Strabo, vi. 265, also makes Pach_y'llus extend into the Sicilian Sea, which washes the northern part of the shore between Pachynus and Lilybaeum (the southern part being washed by the Libyan Sea); see the diagram above. (In ii. r23, where he follows a better tradition for the bearings of the capes, he defines the Sicilian Sea on the west by C. Pachynus, by Locri Epizeph_yTii in Italy, and by the west end of Crete.) To P. the Sicilian Sea was separated from the Ionian Sea in the north by C. Cocynthus (ii. 14. 5); and it included the Gulfs of Corinth and Ambracia (iv. 63. s. v. 3· g, 5· IJ). Whether its southern boundary was a line going east from Pachynus (so Burr, 54-56) is by no means clear. Ziegler, Joe. cit., cols. 247I-2. 5. op(~El ••• TO Trpos 8uO'El<; !J.Epos: P. has a correct picture of the Straits of Messana as running north-south. His 12 stades are in Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 73 (cf. iii. 86: MD passus); and in Ps.-Scyla.x, 13 (Pelorias to Rhegium, rather too little). The narrowest width today is 17! stades; but there may have been an increase since ancient times (so Ziegler, loc. cit., coL 2473; Holm, Gesch. Sic. i. 328, is dubious). 6. TOLS ••• nKpWTTJp(OLS: c. Bon and c. Farina: see iii. 22. 5 n. (a). The distance to Africa is variously given as r,soo stades (Strabo, vi. 267; Eustath. ad Dion. Perieg. 473 (GGM, ii. 306); !tin. Ant. 494). and r8o milia passuum (Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 87). P.'s figure of r,ooo stades (i.e. IIS miles or 125 milia passuum) is nearest to the actual distance of 140 km. (c. 88 miles). Ziegler, RE, 'Lilybaeum (r)', col. 542. &ta.LpEi: ••• To ALf3utcbv tcal. To Ia.p&~ov Traayo<;: the reference to the mare Sardoum raises difficulties. The sea north (here read north-west) of Sicily is the Tyrrhenian Sea, ii. 14. 4, r6. r, iii. 6r. 3, no. 9; and the mare Sardown lay west of Sardinia (ro. 5 n.; cf. Herod. i. r66). Ziegler (RE, EtKr:.Ala, coL 2471) argues that P.'s meaning is 'that Lilybaeum marks the eastern terminus of the line of demarcation between the Libyan and Sardinian Seas', and quotes Eratosthenes (ap. Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 75). But why should such a line of demarcation extend 200 miles east of Sardinia, when the Sardinian Sea lay to its west? 7. TroAts OfLWVVfLOS: Lilybaeum, modern Marsala, the main centre of Punic Sicily. P. may have visited it en route for Africa in 149, and perhaps on his return in 146 (d. xxxvi. II. r for his broken-off journey thither) ; but his detailed account of the topography is not without difficulties, and though De Sanctis (iii. I. 228) speaks of the 'fleeting impressions of a traveller who once landed at Lilvbaeum', it is unlikely that these lines were written after his visit. Cf. Cuntz, 105
0 w
2. LILYBAEUM.
to6
Based on Freeman
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
L 42. n
J. Schubring, Phil. xxiv, 1866, 62 ff.; Freeman, History of Sicily, iv. 93 ff. (map on p. 74). Diod. xxiv. I-4 precedes his account of the operations with the statement that at some unspecified date (but evidently recently: cf. 39· 12) Selin us had been destroyed by the Carthaginians and its population transferred to Lilybaeum. On the operations here P., like Diodorus, seems to follow Philinus; but not exclusively (cf. Bung, 57-58). The discrepancies between P. and Diodorus (cf. Pedech, REA, I952, 258-62) are explicable on the assumption of a different selection of material and the correction of Philinus' figures from Fabius in P. Tcici>p'l.J !3a.llEL4: 6o cubits wide and 40 deep (Diod. xxiv. 1. 2) ; a cubit is about 1! ft. T£vaymw EK lla.AciTT1)S: cf. 46. 9· The ancient harbour had an artificial mole north of the town (the modern one lies south of Marsala); on the shoals cf. Virg. A en. iii. 706, 'uada dura ... saxis Lilybeia caecis'. £LS To(,s ALp.tvo.s: 'into the harbour' (not plural): cf. Schweighaeuser, Lex. Polyb. s. v. ALJ.L~v. 8. 1Tpoucnpa.T01T£8£0uo.vTE<; ••• oi 'Pwp.a.'LoL: their numbers are a problem. Philinus (Diod. xxiv. 1. I) made them 11o,ooo, of which at least 84,ooo were no doubt ships' crews and marines (he assumed a :fleet of 240 ships: 41. 3 n). In addition there were the land forces (41. 4), which Orosius (iv. Io. 2) not unreasonably reckons at four legions. On the other hand, the fleet was in reality only 120 ships strong. In 45· 8, where the defenders are reckoned at 2o,ooo, the attackers are only €-n 7TA<'lov>. This would appear to rule out Thiel's belief (Hist. 263) that they came to 3o,ooo. The probability is that P. is not including oarsmen in his purview. Four legions of 3,ooo gives 32,ooo men; 1oo marines for I20 ships another I2,ooo. But both figures may well have been smaller, and the effective soldiers (excluding ships' crews) outside Lilybaeum probably came to 35,ooo-4o,ooo men. For Roman losses see 42. 12 n. The Roman fortifications are mentioned by Diod. xxiv. I. I, -.Yjv J.LEV yijv am) 8a>..d.cra'1]> tl> 80.>..aaaav
69-71; and, for the topography,
7dfpo/ U7TtoT£fxwav. 9, 1TpOUKnTnUK£UatovTE<; • , , a£l TOlS li'TTOKELj.LEVOL<;: 'constantly
adding something to what they had already constructed' (Shuckburgh). (In xxi. 11. 6 :rrpoaKa-raaK£Vd,£tv means 'to create new (kings) in addition to those already existing'.) Paton's translation, 'gradually advancing from the base thus acquired', gives the false impression that the southern tower 7Tp6> -ro At{3vK6v m£>..ayo> fell; the fall of the six adjacent towers suggests that this was not so. 11. T~JV j-1-Lullocpopwv elc; p.up£ouc;: 'about Io,ooo', partly Greeks, partly Celts (43· 4, 48. 3), under Himilco (who is otherwise unknown). Diod. xxiv. 1. I gives 7,ooo foot and 7oo horse, later reinforced by 4,ooo under Adherbal (Diod. xxiv. I. 2; below, 44· I n.); P. probably rounds off these u,7oo to 1o,ooo (Thiel, Hist. 263-4). 107
I.
{2. 12
THE FIRST PUNIC "\VAR
12. ouS€v 1TO.pEAEL1T~ TWV SuvaTWV: P.'s UVTotKOOop.wv is expanded in Diod. xxiv. 1. 2 (cf. Zon. viii. 15), which records the building of a second wall (behind that linking the six towers) ; Diodorus gives the exaggerated figure of 1o,ooo Roman casualties, and attributes a further 1o,ooo deaths (§ 4) to an epidemic caused by an exclusively meat diet. 43. Alexan saves the Carthaginians from the treachery of their mercenaries. This incident, which is described at quite disproportionate length, is clearly from Philinus (that 43-48 are taken from this source is generally admitted; De Sanctis, iii. 1. 228; Gelzer, Hermes, 1933, 141; Bung, 56: contra Pedech, REA, 1952, 258 ff.). The loyalty of a Greek in Punic service, who had helped Agrigentum, naturally appealed to the historian of that city; and the Achaean historian was sufficiently interested to allot this digression to a fellow-countryman. The story occurs, with slight variations, in Zon. viii. 15. The identification of the incident at Agrigentum has caused difficulties. The 'mercenaries of Syracuse' are apparently the Mamertini (7. 2 n.) who, either before or after seizing Messana, made several similar plundering expeditions; cf. Diod. xxiii. 1. 4 (destruction of Gela and Camarina). It has been suggested, however, that the incident here mentioned is that in ii. 7· 7, where Gallic mercenaries in Carthaginian pay plunder Agrigentum (which became Punic shortly after Pyrrhus' departure): De Sanctis, iii. 1. 91-92; Kirchner, RE, 'Alexan (1}', col. 1471; Beloch, iv. 1. 558 n. 2. But P. speaks definitely of Syracusan mercenaries, and he says that Alexan saved Agrigentum (whereas the Gallic mercenaries plundered it). Consequently, the two incidents must be distinct. The present one is linked with the death of the tyrant Phintias, c. 28o, by "Meltzer (ii. 544); and Holm (Gesch. Sic. ii. 487} puts it even earlier, before the Mamertini broke away from Syracuse, i.e. before 288-283. But a date before 280 would perhaps make Alexan rather old for a mercenary captain. 2. 1ra.pa0"1TovSe~v: used by P. to describe the seizure of Messana and Rhegium by mercenary garrisons: cf. 7· 2, 7· 8, 10.4,43· 7, iii.26. 6. But it can also refer to any treacherous onslaught; cf. ii. 7. 6, 46. 3, 58. 4, 6o. J, xxxiii. 10. J, xxxviii. 7· 10. Reuss, Volk. Grund. 71 n., '1Tapaa1Tovoefv • • • ist im allgemeinen ein Ausdruck fiir ein unredliches Verhalten'; cf. Hesselbarth, 86. 4. >\vv(~av TOV utov TOU >\vv(~ou: 24. 5-7 n.; cf. 18. 7 n. Nothing further is known of the son. 8. To us voflous Kat -nlv EA~u9Epta.v: suggests a time when Agrigentum was independent. 44. 1. >\vv£!3o.v, Ss ~v 1l.fltAKou ••• u~o<; KTA.: from Oros. iv. 10. 2, 'Hannibale qui Hamilcaris filius fuit uicti' (where uicti evidently I08
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
I. 45· 9
refers to Ecnomus (26. r) and Adys (3o. 5}), this Hamilcar is clearly the commander in these battles {24. 3 n.}, who since Regulus' defeat had been active in reducing the revolted Numidians and Moors (Oros. iv. 9· 9). Diod. xxiv. r. 2 mentions 4,ooo reinforcements under Adherbal; and the name cannot be a copyist's slip; cf. Zon. viii. 15, JtpS€f3a.v Q't)v vava11T/..El(TTatS: ••• atmv dyoJaa.~s: Kat XP~fl.a.Ta {and Dio's source was not Diodorus). The discrepancy can be explained in various ways. There may have been two separate expeditions; or P. may have 'corrected' Philinus from Fabius (though this is unlikely for a detail of this kind). But the most likely explanation is that Adherbal was in charge of the expedition, but went on to Drepana (46. r), leaving Hannibal (Tp•~pa.pxos: Ka1
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
46. 3. w~ ll.v EKO.TOV Ka.l E'lKOO'~ O'TtLO~a.: about 25 miles, a figure rather on the low side; cf. Meltzer, ii. 326-7. 46.4--47. 10. The blockade-running of Hannibal 'the Rhodian'. De Sanctis (iii. r. 228) suggests that Philinus, to whom this meticulous detail is ultimately due, was perhaps an eyewitness and shared the ; so too Cuntz, 69. It must go back ultimately to an eyewitness, whether Philinus or his source. Xicknames were common at Carthage, where the same personal names were used to excess; and these are often taken from some locality; cf. ix. 25. 4, MO:yuwos 'ToiJ l.:auvl'Tou 1rpooayopevopivou; xxxvi. 5· 1, Maywva -rcivBpl:rrwv. \Vere such names hereditary, like Roman cognomina? A Punic emissary to Alexander's court, named Hamilcar, was nicknamed Rhodanus (Oros. iv. 6. 21; cf. lustin. xxi. 6. r) or Rodinus (Frontin. Strat. i. 2. 3). If the real form was Rhodius (or the Punic equivalent), he may be an ancestor of this Hannibal. 46. 9. errTepwKuia.t: cf. §II, 7TT€pt.!Joas -r~v vauv. The phrase means 'to have the oars stretched out like wings ready to strike thewater': cf. Plut. Anton. 63; Eurip. I.T. 1346. 47. 2. E1TE~T· ll.v ••• emrrpoa6et:v O.rra.a~: 'coming from the direction of Italy he would keep the sea-tower on his bows, so as to cover the whole line of the city's towers in the direction of Africa'. The words dm~ -rwv • •. fLEpwv can hardly go with -rdv 7Tllpyov (as Paton). The seatower is not that mentioned in 42. 8, but another at the western extremity of the fortifications (Meltzer, ii. 577). Hannibal sailed in along a line which kept this tower covering other towers on the south side; he came 'from the Italian direction', i.e. from the north (for the sake of the manceuvre; that the Aegates Islands were north-west of Lilybaeum (so Cuntz, 69) is irrelevant). Though P. does not say so, at some point Hannibal must have swerved left from the above course to enter the harbour: the use of the towers as sights was to evade the shoals (Twv 1rpof5paxiwv). lumpoolhrv, 'to cover one thing by another', is Schweighaeuser's certain emendation. 3. XWVVUEW ••• errexECp'J0'<1V: cf. Diod. xxiv. I. z; the Romans had already sunkrs cercuri in the entrance (r. r), but without completely blocking it. 7. eK Ka.Ta.~oXfjs: either 'anew' (cf. 8), i.e. after the Romans had for some time made no attempt to take him (Paton and Shuckburgh) ; or 'from the start', i.e. starting the moment he left harbour (Reiske); or 'deliberately' (so LSJ, quoting xxiv. 8. 9, where, however, the sense 'from the outset' is equally in place). Schwcighaeuser, in Lex. Polyb. Ka-raf5ol.:r], finally comes down in favour of a most forced interpretation: 'uidensquadriremem,quaeolim simul cumipso (et cum ipsius naui) primum e statuminibus in mare excurrerat (cui us structura adeo probe ei nota erat)'. Reiske's interpretation seems the most likely; but there are probably overtones from the other two. IIO
I. 48.
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
2
10. KUPLEOC1
48. 2. y(vETa.l TL!) aVE!J.OU Q'TaO'L!): cf. 75· 8, ix. 25. 3. v. 5· 3. TWV 'ETY}alwv ifo7J araa£V Jx6vrwv. Paton and Shuckburgh translate a storm of wind', 'a turbulent storm of wind', Schweighaeuser uenti tempestas -but wrongly, as he later realized. d.v£p.ov arams has three meanings: the first, 'a dropping, cessation of the wind', may be neglected here; the second is that found in the three Polybian passages mentioned above, 'the direction, state of the wind' or simply 'the wind in a certain direction'. Finally, by a metaphor taken from civil discord, it may mean' seditio uentorum, a squall'. This is the sense in Alcaeus, fg. 30 Diehl, davvv£TY}p.£ TWV avl.p.wv aramv (which Heracleitus, alleg. Homer. s. p. 6 ed. Bonn., took as an allegorical reference to the rvpavv£Kai rapaxui at Mytilene); so too Aesch. P. V., 1086, d.vl.p.wv 71'V€Jp.ara . . . aramv avT{TI'VOOV d.TI'o0E£KVJp.eva. Similarly in Virgil (Aen. i. I48) the quelling of the storm by Neptune is likened to the calming of seditio in a city. But in all these examples there is a clash of winds; and this idea is quite inappropriate here, where the plan of the Greek mercenaries depends solely on the fact that the wind is blowing steadily from the city towards the Roman camp, so that it becomes an ally in spreading the fire and driving the smoke and sparks in the faces of the defenders (§ 6, vmj Tfj-; Els avroi:J<; rp€pop.EV7J'> Atyvvos). As Schweighaeuser points out in his commentary, the idea of force and violence is separately expressed and need not be present in araa,.,, which therefore means uenti directio. Suidas, s.v. an:lmv, referring to this passage, says that the word is applied JTI'i Tl'voijs f3wlov avl.p.ov ; but there is no evidence for this meaning unless there are conflicting winds. Translate 'a steady wind' (correct in LSJ). Diod. xxiv. 1. 3 also records the incident. Tas Twv ll"lXa.v"lf.£6.Twv rrpoaa.ywy6.s: 'the apparatus for advancing the engines' (Paton): less satisfactory Schweighaeuser (in his note ad loc.), in ipsas machinas quae admouebantur. In xiv. Io. 9 the sense is abstract: 7rpoaaywylis TWV opyavwv, 'the bringing up of siege engines'; but here P. refers to uineae, etc., under shelter of which the engines were advanced. See next note. Tas aToas ~haaa.AE{n;w: uineas concutere. A uinea is a shed or penthouse to protect men of a besieging force. Caesar, BC, ii. 2. 3, similarly calls it a porticus. In xxi. 28. 4 P. refers to a arod which Livy, xxxviii. 7· 6, translates by uineae. See Veith in KromayerVeith, Heerwesen, 444· I
III
m.1000
----
0
tt!JliH!!j
3·
Il2
1 km. I
Roman
flflet
Carthag/nian flee/;
THE BATTLE OF DREPANA.
Based on Kromayer
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
I. 49· 6
5. TlJV ... vo~l]v Tau 'n'Upos: 'the action of the flames' (Paton). For this metaphor of grazing cf. xi. 4· 4· 8. E-rr! TE Taus ~oTJBouVTGS KGi T~v TWV ~pywv 8Ln+Oop4v: 'against the rescuers and to secure the destruction of the works'. i7Tt is used in two different senses. 9. Ta aT\J1TTJ Twv ~
113
I. 49· 6
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
neither P. nor Diodoms. On the number of ships involved see sr. uI2 n. For discussion see Rodgers, Greek and Roman Naval ·warfare (U.S. Naval Institute, I937). 297--9; Thiel, Hist. 275-81. 50. 5. eAa.~E T~v du.:wu1-1ov ••• Ta~LV: Drepana lies on a small peninsula extending to the west and prolonged in a south-westerly direction by rocks and small islands: see the maps in Kromayer, AS, iii. I, and in Enc. it. s.v.; there is a map of the battle in KromayerVeith, Schlachtenatlas, Rom. Abt. i, Blatt r. The harbour opens to the south and is covered by the island of Colombaia; having cleared it Claudius reformed his line with the right flank hugging the coast south of the harbour mouth, and himself on the left. But Adherbal's five ships succeeded in getting between him and the open sea. 9. JLEyaAa. , •• ~AMTw9fjva.L: the Roman fleet had been mana:uvred into the situation of the Punic left at Ecnomus, 28. Ion.
51. 6. To'L<; 1rpo'ITi'ITTOUO'L Twv SLwKovTwv: 'the foremost of their pursuers'; Paton's 'the ships that pursued and fell on them' translates the MS. reading 7rpomrl7TTovat (but he prints the generally accepted emendation of Hervagius). 9. SLEK'ITAe'Lv ••• o'ITep ••• tun 'ITpaKnl<wTa.Tov: a classic mana:uvre, but never employed by the Romans. Indeed in Hellenistic times it tended to disappear with the adoption of boarding tactics, though the Rhodians used it successfully at Chios (xvi. 4· I4); 27. 11 n.; Tarn, HMND, I44 ff. 11-12. Size of the Roman squadron. P. gives the total of ships escaping as about 30, and 93 Twv .\o£7Twv as captured. Tam (]HS, I9o7, 54 ff.} assumes that these figures together give the size of the Roman squadron; and, indeed, if P.'s 7TEpl rpuf.Kovra vi}E'> are really 27 (as they well might be), the total of 120 is precisely the number of ships available since the building of so in 250 (cf. 41. 3 n.). Against this is the reference to many sinkages in § 6 (7ro,\,\d ... ij3a7Tn~ov); but as Thiel (Hist. 279 n. 7I6) points out, 'the character of the inshore battle does not admit of the sinking of a large number of ships'. P., who believed that Claudius had 2oo ships (41. 3) would be naturally disposed to exaggerate the number of sinkages; the few which really took place may well be included in the 93 captured. Diodoms (xxiv. 1. s} reckons the Roman total as 2Io and the losses at 117. De Sanctis (iii. r. 170-I n. 65) adds in Io ships which appear in a corrupt passage at the end of Diod. xxiv. 1. 5, to give the Romans a total of 22o, and assumes that of the squadron of 240 which Philinus gave Claudius (Diod. xxiv. 1. I) 20 ships had been left behind at Lilybaeum; but P. (49· 3) says that Claudius proposed sailing from Lilybaeum to Drepana 7Tavn rep ar6Ao/, and it is dangerous to use the Io ships as part of any argument (cf. Thiel, Hist. 28o n. p6). De
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
I. 52. 5
Sanctis also suggests that the n7 lost vessels are obtained by subtracting the 93 which P. gives as captured from 210: but these II7 are not simply sinkages, but losses in general, and probably represent Philinus' exaggerated version of those losses. As we saw (4r. 3), Philinus' figures are to be rejected. Other f1gures, which can be neglected, are: escaped, 30 (Eutropius, Orosi us), 20 (Frontinus); sunk, 120 (Schol. Bob.), Ioo (Eutropius); captured, 9o (Eutropius). P. gives no losses of men. Orosius (iv. Io. 3) records 8,ooo dead and 2o,ooo prisoners; and the latter figure receives slight confirmation from Diod. xxiv. r. 5 (2o,ooo losses; the 35,ooo dead and an equal number of prisoners of Diod. xxiv. I. u may be ignored). Roman losses were probably reduced through survivors-marines more easily than rowers -swimming ashore (51. 12). No figures survive for the Punic side. 52. 3. JlEyaAQ.L') tT}Jl(nL') KQ.LKLVOUVOL') KpL9ELS nEpLtE'ITEO'EY: the initiative came from two tribunes, and the movement against Claudius was apparently popular. P. probably follows a Roman tradition here (Bung, 63 n. I, is less certain); for other sources on his downfall see the authorities quoted at 49· 6-51. 12 n. According to Valerius Maximus he was charged with perduellio but acquitted; Schol. Bob. records a second trial on a reduced charge and a fine aeris grauis cxx milibus. Modern historians have judged him less harshly. Tarn (JHS, r9oj, 54) suggests that he attacked hoping to forestall the arrival of the reinforcements under Carthalo, of which he knew (53· 2 n. : Meltzer (ii. 326) thinks they came before the battle; but the order is clear from Diodorus); and though his tactics were faulty, the general plan was by no means ill-conceived; De Sanctis, iii. I. 170; Scullard, Hist. 168. 5. AeuKlov 'louvLov: in fact Claudius' colleague for 249/8, not his successor, 49· 3 n. Beloch (iv. :z. 289) suggests in explanation of P.'s error that Iunius did not come to Sicily till spring 2¥, after the consuls for 248/7 had already been elected; and that P. confused him with one of these. But after Iunius' naval disaster (54· 8} Claudius was constrained to appoint a dictator, and named M. Claudius Glicia, whom the Senate rejected (Livy, ep. 19); A. Atilius Caiatinus (24. 9 n.) was then appointed in his stead. But, if Iunius did not leave for Sicily till spring 248, there is no time for this before I May (and little before I8 June, which is Beloch's Julian equivalent for I May in accordance with his unacceptable view of the calendar) ; and it is unlikely that the Senate would have required the nomination of a dictator if the consular year was almost at an end. Further, Iunius' considerable activity after the naval catastrophe suggests that he came out to Sicily in 249. De Sanctis (iii. I. 263-4) suggests that he arrived in the second half of the summer, and so in the sixteenth year of the war by Philinus' calculations (41. 4). This II.)
I. 52. 5
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
would explain how P.'s error arose; and since, if Iunius already knew of his colleague's disaster, it is hard to understand his decision to send half his fleet ahead without adequate protection (52. 7; cf. Meltzer, ii. 330; Reuss, Phil., I90I, 119), it is possible that when he sent the ships on from Messana he had not yet heard of the defeat at Drepana. No conclusions as to date can be drawn from the reference to corn in 52. 8 ; there is no evidence that it was part of the 249 harvest (so Meltzer, ii. 330). Ta~ onapx£a~: here 'corn allowance'; on the various meanings of this and similar words see 66. 3 n. 6. &no ... 'TOu aTpaTo11'Hiou: perhaps Lilybaeum is meant (so Paton): but if any of the 6o ships which joined Iunius in Sicily (cf. 52. 5, 52. 6; Diod. xxiv. 1. 9 also gave him a total of I2o, i.e. I3 burnt+105 sunk+2 survivors) were from Lilybaeum, they left before Drepana, for aftenvards Carthalo and his fleet lay between Lilybaeum and Messana (Tarn, J HS, I9o7, 55 n. 38) ; and that the 30 survivors (51. n) had not got away to Messana is clear from 53· 3 f. Thiel (Hist. 88) suggests that the 6o ships which joined Iunius at .Messana were in fact allied auxiliaries; and he despairs of finding any reasonable sense for the words am:\ TOV UTpaT07dSov. KaLpou~: a loose link; but here correct, for Iunius cannot have reached Sicily much later than the battle of Drepana (52. 5 n.). 2. Kap90.Awva: in 254 Carthalo had relieved Drepana, after sacking Agrigentum (Diod. xxiii. I8. 2-3): 38. 7 n., 38. Ion. Diodorus (xxiv. 1. 6-7) dates his arrival at Drepana in 249 (with 70 ships and supplies) after the naval battle; between the two he relates the dispatch of Hannibal (cf. 44· I) to seize a Roman convoy off Panormus. Carthalo appears to be Aclherbal's subordinate. Sou~ TpLaKOVT11 vau<;: the size of Aclherbal's fleet at this time is not recorded; but it seems likely that the Punic fleet at Drepana was smaller than the Roman, though in view of its success perhaps not very much smaller (cf. Tarn, JHS, I9o7, 54-55). It is possible that Claudius attacked when he did in order to forestall the arrival of the 70 reinforcements, fearing that he would then be outnumbered (Thiel, Hist. 272; above, 52. 3 n.). Hence Tarn's figure of Ioo (before the arrival of Carthalo) is likely to be about right (Thiel, Hi st. 266 n. 667). 7. oA[ya •.• Ta flEV a1I'OO"TI'a0'11<;, Ta OE O'UVTptljia~: 'contented himself with either towing off or breaking up some few of the vessels' (Shuckburgh). Schweighaeuser omits dMya from his translation, Paton takes it with a1roamiaas- only; the point is that the total Roman loss was small. Diod. xxiv. 1. 7 gives some sunk and five dragged off. 10. 1rp6<; n 11'0ALu!-lnnov: according to Diod. xxiv. I. 7 the fleets
53. 1. Ka'Ta ••• Touo; all'Tou<;
II6
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
sighted each other near Gela, and this roadstead was off Phintias (modern Alicata), east of the river Himera, and opposite Mt Ecnomus. Diodorus puts Carthalo's fleet at 120 ships. 13. bMyu Twv ••• TrAOt{)JV 6.Troamia!lvT£i: according to Diodorus (loc. cit) the Carthaginians sank so transports and I7 warships, and put 13 warships out of action. P. omits these Roman losses (which were probably not in Fabius), evidently because he mistrusts Philinus; cf. De Sanctis, iii. I. 233-4. Thiel argues that they should be accepted (Hist. 285 n. 731); but P.'s account of the quaestors falling back on shore fire from catapults to defend their ships is plausible, and would explain Carthalo's failure .
•
54. The shipwreck off Caman:na. According to Diod. xxiv. I. 7-9, Carthalo retired to the R. Halycus (modern Platani) near Heraclea Minoa to attend to his wounded. Iunius advanced to Phintias, where he was joined by the remnants of the first convoy, but on sighting the Punic fleet burnt the r3 damaged vessels and set off back for Syracuse; overtaken near Camarina o;l, T~v yfjv Ko.Tlcjwyt£ 7tpos T(l1TOt!S' Tpax£i:s Kat vif;a/..wSets. A storm got up, Carthalo rounded Pachynus and was saved; Iunius lost all his transports, and all but 2 of his ro7 warships. P.'s account is quite different. Here, too, Carthalo puts into a river, unnamed; but as he hopes to prevent a union between the two Roman squadrons (§ 2), this can hardly be the Halycus, about 45 miles north-west of the scene of the disaster. After Iunius has anchored off the dangerous coast (§ 3), Carthalo gains a cape from which he can watch both squadrons (§ 5) ; the storm breaks and Carthalo escapes as in Diodorus. The discrepancy is clear; and since the Carthaginian standpoint in P. prevents our assuming that he is giving Fabius' version, the likelihood is that he has merely 'corrected' Philinus, Diodorus' source, and that his version is a contamination with Fabian tradition. In fact, he must have felt Philinus' account to be less probable on comparing the two; and his refusal to identify the scene of the first disaster with Phintias, and the river whither Carthalo retired as the Halycus, is probably deliberate. We are not justified in rejecting P.'s considered account in favour of an abridged version of Philinus (certainly abridged: e.g. Diodorus has no reference to Iunius' putting in at Syracuse, xxiv. r. 8). Thiel (Hist. 287 n. 734) defends Diodorus' version from Philinus against P.'s on the assumption that the latter gives an account contaminated with Fabius (which may well be true) and that Fabius has concealed the Roman losses in the quaestars' squadron at Phintias; and he deduces all the other variants in P.'s account from this 'original sin' of Fabius. Carthalo must have tried to destroy some of the Roman ships; and 'it is absurd to suppose he could not destroy them'. In fact, he did not-thanks to II7
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
the catapults (53· IJ n.). P. is therefore to be followed. Cf. Meltzer, ii. 33I-2, 579; and for the topography, J. Schubring, Phil., I873, 504 ff., especially 526; Rh. Mus., I873, 137 f. Schubring thinks Iunius took refuge in the harbour of Caucana, a little south-east of Camarina, while Carthalo anchored off the promontory of Bucra (modern Braccetto). Other sources for the shipwreck are Eutrop. ii. 26. 2; Oros. iv. ro. 3; Zon. viii. 15; Iunius was said also to have disregarded the auspices, and subsequently to have committed suicide: Cic. nat. deor. ii. 7; de diu. ii. 7I; Val. Max. i. 4· 4; Minuc. Felix, 7. 4, 26. 2. The date cannot be fixed with certainty; Meltzer (ii. 33o) makes it July, like that of 255 in the same waters (37· I), but this is not compelling, since storms are not limited to that month. 2. O'TJJLTJVavToov Twv aKo1Twv •.• TTJV &m4>6.veLa.v: this seems to exclude the view that Carthalo was at the Halycus. 6. 1TEptaTaaEOOS ••• oAoaxepEaTepa.s! 'a peril of some magnitude'; contrast 32. 3 and 35· ro, where 1T£pfarar:ns = 'situation, Circumstances'. On this word see Strachan-Davidson, II.
55. 2. Ka.pxTJS6vLOL s~ Tils JLEV 9a.AaTTTJS &Kup(EUOV: but they never exploited this superiority, perhaps because they were occupied for several years with war in Africa, where Hanno took Hecatompylus (73. I n.). It is possible that Hanno, a later enemy of the Barcid family, stood for a policy of African expansion rather than foreign conquests in the interests of the merchant class (T. Frank, CP, 1926, 313-I4; CAH, vii. 689); this would be a situation not unlike that which developed between the Senate and equites at Rome 150 years later. See also De Sanctis, iii. r. I79; Tarn, ]HS, 1907, 56. Bung (65 n. 4) follows Campe's view that the words KapxTJMvtot •.• d.m).\m~ov are an interpolation, but quite unnecessarily. 7. "Epu~: modern Mte San Giuliano. It is 75I m. above sea-level, and manifestly not the next highest mountain in Sicily after Etna (3,3I3 m.); for one cannot distinguish J.tEY£0os, bulk, and uifios, height, with Biittner-Wobst (Klio, I905, 95-96). On its topography see Kromayer (AS, iii. r. 25 ff.), who explains the mistake as easily made if one approaches Trapani from the sea, when Mte San Giuliano stands out in imposing isolation. (But P.'s own visit will probably have been later than the composition of this passage; Cuntz, 7o.) The vast height of Eryx becomes an established tradition; cf. Solin. 5· 9; Virg. A en. xii. 701; Val. Flacc. ii. 523. Here the north coast of Sicily correctly 'faces Italy' (42. 1-7 n.). 8. T6 TTlS :t\.4>po~HTT)s .•• ~ep6v: a temple of great antiquity and betraying, by its system of temple-prostitution, an eastern origin. Diod. iv. 83 describes it in Roman times; and Pans. viii. 24. 6 compares it to the temple of Aphrodite at Paphos. Its goddess, whom the Phoenicians identified with Astarte, was linked with Venus in II8
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
L 56. r
Roman legend; and the founding of the temple was attributed to Aeneas (Virg. A en. v. 759 ff.; cf. i. 570; Mela, ii. II9; etc.). Later Venus Erycina was one of the most venerable deities at Rome, especially when she could be linked significantly with the gens Julia (e.g. Hor. Odes, i. 2. 33). Jessen, RE, 'Erycina', cols. 562-5; Hiilsen, RE, 'Eryx (I)', cols. 6o2-4. On the plunder of this temple by Gallic mercenaries see ii. 7. 8. 9. t\8E 1TOAlS U1T' aun1v TTJV Kopu
I. 56. r
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
i.e. in the eighteenth year of the war (which began in late summer 264; 4r. 4 n., 5· r-s n.). De Sanctis, iii. I. 253. This chronology is confirmed by the later course of Hamilcar's command; 56. II, he was axt"86v lrr£ Tp&; EVLCWTOUS on Heircte (247/6, 246/s. 245/4); sS. 6, the struggle continued for two years more on Eryx, until the war was settled by other means (244/3, 243/2). This brings us to the arrival of Lutatius Catulus in Sicily in 242 (which signifies the Roman resumption of a naval policy after a five years' lapse (59· I n.)-for this, not the battle of the Aegates Islands {so Beloch, iv. 2. 285), is the decisive point to P. (d. 20. 8)). See DeSanctis, loc. cit.; Luterbacher, Phil., r9o7, 419-20. 3. KO.TO.O"Upa.s ••• TTJV AoKp(lia. KO.l TTJV BpETT~a.vtiv xwpa.v: following up similar raids by Carthalo in 248 (Zon. viii. r6; Oros. iv. ro. 4). The Romans replied with citizen colonies at Alsium {247) and Fregcnae (245) on the Etruscan coast (VeiL Pat. i. 14. 8). TOv t1rt TTjs EpKTijs AEY61-'evov To1rov: 'the so-called position near (above?) Heircte'. (Diodorus reads 'EpKml or 'EpKn) (xxiL ro. 4, xxiii. zo) and Hultsch adopts Tats ElpKm"i:s here). Heircte is thus the name of a strong-point, applied by extension to the hill above. This hill is usually identified with :Mte Pellegrino, the 6oo m. hill which rises in isolation to the north of Panormus; d. J. Schubring, H~'sto rische Topographic von Panormos, i (Progr. Liibeck, 187o), 24 ff.; Holm, Gesclt. Sic. i. rs. 334 f.; iii. 28 f., 354 ; De Sanctis, iii. I. I8I n. 83; K. Ziegler, RE, 'Heirkte', col. 2645; Cary, IJR, 155 n. 17. However, there are strong arguments against this identification; and Kromaycr (AS, iii. r. 4 ff.} has a cogent defence of the view that Heircte is Mte Castellacio, an 890 m. hill about ro km. north-west of Palermo, and more particularly of the fort which he would locate in the pass which lies between the north-east spurs of Mte Castellacio and Mte Gallo, just above (and south of} the modern coastal village of Sferracavallo (the name Heircte will then mean 'obstruction' (in the pass)). Thus F.'s description of Heircte as lying between Eryx and Panormus, though highly inaccurate (and a sign of F.'s meagre knowledge of Sicilian geography when he was writing this), is perhaps less unsuitable to Mte Castellacio than to Mte Pellegrino. The perimeter of the mountain {§ 4), roo stadcs (u! miles), corresponds fairly closely to that of the plateau of Mte Castellacio, but it is a third too much for that of Mte Pellegrino (Holm, Gesch. Sic. i. 15), which Kromayer makes only n! km. (7-7! miles). The convenient harbour (§ 7) is hard to identify if Heircte is .Mte Pellegrino. Meltzer (ii. 341-2) speaks of Mondello to the north-west; but the connexion between :Mondello and the mountain is difficult. DeSanctis (loc. cit.) therefore follows G.M. Columba, and locates it in the bay of Palermowhich can hardly be feasible. But on the view that Heircte is Mte Castellacio, the harbour will be that at! sola delle Femmine. Finally, the
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
I. 5 8.
I
phrase 1rpos Tds 1T£Aa.yEovs 1rlloLas Ell>vw> KdJ-Lello> (§ 4), though usually taken (since Schweighaeuser) as 'well placed to receive the breezes' (and regarded as an example of P.'s belief that climate affects men's characters; cf. Class. et med., r948, 178-8r), probably means 'lying well-protected against the sharp sea-winds' ; and this applies far more to Mte Castellacio than to Mte Pellegrino. Frank (CAll, vii. 6go) puts the choice between Mte Pellegrino and Mte Billiemi (a col and slope 2 km. east of Mte Castellacio); but Kromayer's identification seems in all respects the most satisfactory. 11. va.pa.aTpa.TovEOEuaciv1'wv ••• tv 'Laws vivTE aTa.8(o~<;: the Romans' position cannot be located; nor is one to suppose that they maintained the same camp for three years. 57. The fighting romzd II eircte. The details of this protracted struggle are compressed into this general characterization, whereas P.'s sources no doubt emphasized details; some fragments of these are preserved in Diod. xxiv. P. uses metaphors taken from athletes elsewhere, perhaps ii. 65. rr, xvi. 28. 9 (runners in the stadium), xxvii. g. 2 (boxing), xxxix. r. 8 (pancration or boxing); shorter examples, xxix. 8. s. 8. g, 17. 4. xxxviii. 18. 8. They clearly reflect his own interests, and it is unnecessary to assume Isocratean or Stoic influence (so von Scala, 22; and, with reservations, Wunderer, iii. rr2). 2. T(;'w vuv AeyotJ-EvWv aTpa.ntywv: P. has mentioned only Hamilcar and L. Iunius Pullus; but Iunius had probably left the scene before Hamilcar arrived (55· Ion.). In fact Hamilcar's activity on Heircte coincided with a succession of consuls in Sicily, L. Caecilius Metellus and N. Fabius Buteo (247/6), M'. Otacilius Crassus and M. Fabius Lidnus (246/5), M. Fabius Buteo and C. Atilius Bulbus (245/4). That P.'s metaphor has led him into a careless expression is more likely than a fault in the text (aTpaTwv, aTparWJ-LaTwv, and a-rparo1riDw11 have been suggested: but AEyoJ-Levwll is against such an emendation, and the language of 57 is more appropriate to two individuals than two armies; the comparison of the two sides begins in 58). 6. a.t ••• 8uvcitJ-ElS ••• E;JlcitJ-~).o~: Kromayer (AS, iii. I. ron. r) estimates Hamilcar's force on Heircte at 15,ooo-zo,ooo men. TU TE Ka.Ta TOU<; xd.pa.Ka.<.;: 'their camps' (not 'trenches'. Paton). 58. l. wcrm;p 0,ya.9o<; j3pa.~EUT~S ~ TIJXTJ: i.e. in Order to Secure a decision between the closely matched pair, Fortune as umpire redefines the terms of the conquest, so as to render it a more severe test. The word f3paf3eveu• is often used with rvx11 (e.g. xxvii. r6. 4, xxix. 27. r2); but the full metaphorical force is not necessarily felt. The phrase is found in Diodorus not only in a Polybian passage (xxviii. 4), but elsewhere (xiii. 53· 2 (Timaeus?), xxxiv. 27 (Poseidonius ?). Elsewhere P. makes Tyche distribute prizes (iii. 6J. J, 121
I. 58.
I
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
xv. 9· 4, to. s. xxxii. 4· 3) and crowns (ii. 2. 10). In such passages the personification is formal and rhetorical; it represents part of the common reservoir of expression on which P. drew. Siegfried, 81, ' ... pure metaphor, springing for the most part from an atmosphere heightened to match the situation'. See above, p. 25 n. r. 1Tapa~6Aws: 'in a remarkable manner' {Strachan-Davidson); 'by a bold stroke' (Shuckburgh) : Paton's 'unexpectedly' does not quite get the sense. 2. Twv 'Pwllalwv Tov "EpuKa. TllpoOVTwv: i.e. at the temple of Venus, and on the slope from Drepana, 55· ro. KaTEAa~ETo Tt,v ,.6}\w: evidently in 244, judging by the order of events in Diodorus, who {xxiv. 8--9) adds that Hamilcar slew the Roman garrison, and transferred the inhabitants (such as had returned, presumably, 24. 8 n.) to Drepana. Following Kromayer, De Sanctis (iii. I. 183) puts the Punic landing at modern Tonnara di Bonagia, north of Eryx. Already Hamilcar had made one attempt to ease the blockade of Drepana by an unsuccessful attempt on the island of Pelias (modern Columbara) at the harbour-entrance, which had been seized by N. Fabius Buteo, the consul for 247 (Zon. viii. r6). 3. 1Tapa~oAWS •• , {J1TOJlEVEW Kat ~ho.kLV5UVEUELV 'ITOALOpKOUJlEVOUS; 'a siege of the Romans ... supported by them with extraordinary hardihood and adventurous daring' {Shuckburgh). Paton is here quite misleading: 'the Romans-a thing they had never expectedremained besieged and in considerable peril'. 5. 1Epov ~1Toh1uo.v Tov a-Te
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
I. 59· 6
already in Plato, Theaet. 164 c, need be neither a borrowing from Fabius (so \Vunderer, iii. ros; Gelzer, Hermes, 1933, 141), nor a proof of Stoic influence (von Scala, 327: d. Epictet. ii. 2, 13, iv. r. 124; Clem. Al. Paed. iii. r8, p. 262 P.). P. could surely draw on his own experience. The parallel is closely developed ; the loss of the use of their "rings corresponds to the five-year duel on land, the death grapple to the new naval policy culminating in the battle of the Aegates Islands. 8. i!ws O.v cuhofJ-aTws ~
ET1'J crxeSov ~bYJ 'II'EVTE: from the shipwreck off Camarina in 249. to the new decision (of winter 243/2) is in fact six complete years. P.'s error
is due to his identification of the period of land activity with Hamilcar's command in Sicily, i.e. 247-243; and this identification is made easier because P. imagines Iunius Pullus to be Claudius' successor, and hence dates his shipwreck to 248 (52. 5 n.). P.'s view that the Romans had envisaged finishing the war by land fighting is dismissed by Thiel (Hist. 333 n. 85r) as nonsensical. 2. ou 'll'poxwpouv auTo'Ls Toupyov: the motive alleged is the same as that which led to the change of policy before Drepana (39· 14; cf. 41. 2 n.). 4. er~avTEs Tois ~I( TTJS TUXYJS aufJ.'II'TWJJ.aaw: i.e. the shipwrecks off Camarina (255) and C. Palinurus (253), 37· r-2, 39· 6-7. ~AaTTw9evTEs TU 1repi Ta Api'll'ava vaut:J.ax£~: in 249; 49· 7 f. But an equal motive was the second shipwreck off Camarina the same year (SS· r-2); its omission here helps P. to make a rhetorical distinction between the blows of Fortune and the blows of the enemy. 6. ~v Se ••• To 1rAeiov o/uxot:J.ax(a: 'in this undertaking resolution had to supply for the most part the want of material resources' (Strachan-Davidson). ifivxof-Laxla means fighting by the aid of the psyche, not to save it (as Paton, who translates 'a struggle for existence'). The source for this characterization may well be Fabius; but the concept appears elsewhere in P., e.g. ii. 30. 7 (on the Celts), iii. 9· 7 (on Hamilcar): cf. Gelzer, Hermes, 1933, 141. T~v n7.1v 1rpoeaTwTwv O.vSpwv ••• <JitAOTL(J-tav I
I. 59· 6
THE FIRST PUKIC WAR
iii. I. :z:z8 (d. 184 n. 87, where he observes that P.'s account of this 'sacrifice' on the part of the senators is much exaggerated; 'in fact the sacrifice of the Athenian trierarchs at the end of the Peloponnesian \Var was proportionately much heavier'), and Thiel, Hist. 303, who points out that P.'s words do not exclude an interestbearing loan. 8. Suucoalwv 1TAOlwv: probably Fabius' figure. The annalistic tradition gave 300 (Eutrop. ii. 27. I; Oros. iv. ro. 5; auct. de uir. ill. 41); also Diod. xxiv. II. I, adding 700 transports. Tam (]HS, 1907, s6) estimates the total Roman fleet (including the ships surviving after Drepana) at about 220; but the Romans probably did not include the 20 survh'ing ships built on a heavier model than their new fleet (Thiel, }fist. 93, 305 n. 786). 1Tpos TTjv ToG 'Polilou va.Ov: cf. 47. 1o n. This new fleet of lighter vessels was necessarily committed to Punic tactics (d. Thiel, Hist. 304). raLOV AuTaTLov: 'appointing c. Lutatius to the command', cf. 6o. 3, II. 2 n., 39· 15 n. The consuls for A.U.c. 512 =- 242/I B.C. were C. Lutatius C.f. C.n. Catulus and A. Postumius A.f. L.n. Albinus (Munzer, RE, 'Lutatius (4)', cots. zo68-71; 'Postumius (3o)', col. 902). The plebeian pontifex maximussecured the command for the plebeian Lutatius by forbidding Postumius, as flamen Martialis, to leave Rome (Livy, ep. 19, xxxvii. 51. r-2; VaL Max. i. r. 2; Tac. Ann. iii. 71; Munzer, Adelsparteien, 261); the command was shared by Q. Valerius Falto, the praetor urbanus (Val. Max. ii. 8. :z; Zon. viii. 17), who celebrated a naval triumph pro praetore ex Sic::lia in 241/o (act. tr.). 9. 1TO.VTOS O.vo.I<£XWPTJKOTOS Ets TTjv ot~eEio.v ToG ••• vo.uTLKOu; the reasons behind this policy can only be the object of speculation. Frank (CAli, vii. 691-2) attributes it to the ascendancy of Hanno and the anti-Barcan faction, De Sanctis (iii. 1. 185) to Hamilcar himself, who 'had let himself become so engrossed in his guerilla warfare around Eryx and Heircte that he lost sight of the primary importance of controlling the seas'; against the latter view see Thiel, 1list. 306. 60-61. Battle of the Aegates Islands. The substantial agreement with Diod. xxiv. I I points to the continued use of Philinus as P.'s main source (though he corrects the numbers from Fabius, 6r. 6 n.); see also Zon. viii. 17. Eutrop. ii. 27. 2 dates the battle VI idus martias, i.e. ro March; Zon. viii. 17 puts it at the end of Lutatius' consulship; and the act. tr. give him a naval triumph de Poenis ex Sicilia as proconsul on 4 October 241. Beloch (iv. 2. 261-2) argues that Lutatius did not reach Sicily till April 241 (59· 8, apxof-Livr;r; TfjS' 8epda.:;), and that at this time 10 March fell in May (Jul.); but De Sanctis (iii. 1. 264-7) shows that, if Lutatius went out in April, it would have been impossible for the battle to take place before July at the earliest.
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
I. 6I. 6
P.'s account is indecisive. But it seems unlikely that the Carthaginians could have been ready as quickly as Beloch suggests, despite the stress on their speed in§ 2; they must have needed a considerable time, perhaps even six months (Luterbacher, Phil., 424). Hence De Sanctis's arguments seem conclusive. And if P. narrative nowhere makes dear that a winter intervened between Lutatius' arrival and the battle of the Aegates Islands, he was perhaps misled by stress on the speed of Punic preparations in Philinus, who may have used this theme partly to excuse the defeat {cf. 6r. 4, uAiw-; avaO'K'If7'a). It may be assumed that Lutatius left for Sicily in summer, 242, and won his victory in March 241 {Meltzer, ii. 347-9; DeSanctis, iii. r. 264-7; Munzer, RE, 'Lutatius (4)', col. 2069; Frank, CAH, vii. ; Scullard, Hist. qo). Reuss (Phil., r9or, r2r-6) has argued that the battle was in 242, largely on the basis of a synchronism in ii. 43· 6; but this can be otherwise explained (see ad loc.), and Reuss's theory is too ruthless towards the other evidence to be seriously considered. 60. 3. 'Avvwva: perhaps the vanquished general at Agrigcntum (r8. 8), who was defeated at Ecnomus (28. 1 ff.); but Punic precedent would not lead us to that he survived this second defeat (he returned to Carthage, Zon. viii. r2), and this is probably another:man. 6. cpopov nV€j.lOV ••• Kai. AO.j.l1Tpov: 'a fresh (AafL7rpov) and favourable (,Popov) wind'; cf. 44· 3. ovp~ov Kal AtlfL7rpov aVEfLOV, with the same Sense; XXXi. 15. 8, rpop011 UliEfLOV. 7. auAAoyL~Of-LEvos KTh.: Lutatius is made to foresee Hanno's purpose as expressed in § 3 (d. 27. r for an example of the same technique). The source is probably Philinus; cf. Klotz, La nMtvelle Clio, 1953, 238. 10. E1Tl. 1-l(a.v vaGv: 'in line one deep', 26. I 2 n.
61. 1. Ka8EAOf-L£VoL Tous la-rous: they were sailing, not rov.ing, as this was faster with a favourable wind; cf. Caesar, BC, iii. 26, for the example of the Pompeian squadron under saiL For fighting, the fuller control by oars was essential. See Strachan-Davidson, ad lac. 6. Losses in the battle. P. gives the Punic losses as so ships sunk and 70 captured with their crews; the prisoners amount to nearly Io,ooo (§ 8). Diod. xxiv. r x. 1 gives II7 ships lost, 20 of them with their crews; and 6,ooo prisoners (i.e. 300 for each of zo crews) according to Philinus, 4,040 according to others (but De Sanctis, iii. I. 235 emends to give 6,ooo Carthaginians and 4,o4o Tuw lT€pwv, i.e. c. Io,ooo in all). The annalistic tradition (Eutrop. ii. 27. 2; Oros. iv. Io. 7) gives 63 ships taken, 125 sunk, 32,ooo prisoners, and I_),oooI4,ooo killed. Diodorus makes the Punic fleet 25o ships, excluding transports; the annalistic tradition raises it to 400 or even 6oo, to make the Roman victory the more glorious. two separate methods 125
I. 6r. 6
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
of calculation Tam (JHS, 1907, 56-57) arrives at a total of c. qo. Diodorus puts the Roman losses (including damaged ships) at So, the annalistic tradition at only 12. F.'s total of Punic losses (so+7o = r2o) does not differ greatly from Diodorus' total of rq; and Jacoby, FGH, 174 F 5 (commentary), suggests that Diodorus' figure of 2o ships lost with their crews may be corrupt, and that in fact P. is here reproducing Philinus (cf. Reuss, Phil., r9or, 146). Alternatively, P. may have corrected Philinus' figures from Fabius, as he has done elsewhere. 7. ~'ITa.pafl.-;:vov ToOs luTous: a very difficult, if not impossible, manceuvre at sea; perhaps the Punic ships got away with the aid of the dolon, a subsidiary sail attached to the foremast (d. Thiel, Hist. 314 n. 8r8). 62. 1. Ta.~s flEV opfla.L's Ka.l TaL's 4nAonf11a.~s KTA.: 'as far as resolution of mind and will to conquer went, they were still ready to fight on'. Paton's translation, 'had they let themselves be guided by passion and ambition', introduces a critical note absent from a phrase which echoes Philinus' defence of the Carthaginians' courage. Similarly P. gives full credit to Hamilcar (§§ 3-5; d. 6o. 8, iii. 9· 7, and Diod. xxiv. 5· r-2); whereas to the Roman annalistic tradition Sicily was nimis celeri desperatione rerum concessam (Livy, xxi. r. 5); Reuss, Phil., 1901, 147; DeSanctis, iii. 1. 229. 7. '1Tpo9uflws o.-;:~a.flivou Ta 'ITa.pa.Ka.AOlJj.L€Va.: according to Diod. xxiv. 13 Lutatius demanded the surrender of arms and deserters, according to Nepos, Ham. r. 5, the laying down of arms; the source is probably Philinus. But when Hamilcar refused, Lutatius seems not to have pressed these demands, perhaps because he wished to anticipate his successor's arrival in concluding terms (Zon. viii. 17; the demand, here mentioned, that Hamilcar and his forces should pass under the yoke, is improbable). TOLO{IT(oJV nvwv uuv9YJKWV: F.'s source for the text of this preliminary draft treaty is unknown. The words TowvTwv nvwv are no indication of a literary source (so Thommen, Hermes, 1885, 203: d., however, iii. 22. 4, 24. 3, where the source is documentary) ; but the general absence of hiatus (Hultsch, Phil., 1859, 288-319) indicates that P. is not reproducing any document uerbatim (see Schulte, 19 f.). Probably the account goes back ultimately to a document, but through Fabius; though in view of the probable origin of F.'s account of the Punic treaties in iii. 22 ff., direct access to a documentary source is possible (De Sanctis, iii. I. 229). N aevius, fg. 49 and so Mor. are concerned with this treaty (d. Cichorius, so-52; Taubler, Hermes, 1922, 156 ff.; E. Fraenkel, RE, 'Naevius', Suppl.-B. vi, col. 639) but do not necessarily derive from the same source as P. See further iii. 27. 1-6 nn. for the emended treaty. Meltzer, De pace a.u.c. SIJ inter I:Z6
THE FIRST PUXIC WAR
L 63.4
Romanos Poenosque constituta (Festschr. des \Vettiner Gymnasiums zu Dresden, r884); Ttiubler, r88 ff.; Vorgesch. 108 ff. 8. M.v Kal T~ OTJIJ-
63. 1. ou 1Tpo
L 63. 1
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
shorter, but no less in scope and significance.) (b) The light thrown on the special characteristics of the two powers (13. 12) : the moral aspects are discussed (64. s-6), and also the political institutions of Rome, which will be treated below (book vi). Thus P. stresses both the moral and the political virtues of Rome at the outset (contra Komemann, Phil., 1931, 175; cf. CQ, 1943, 81). The reference back is underlined by the phrase 'Pwrtaf.o•s Kct~ KapxTJSovlo~s avo-Tas 7T€p/. .EoKr).to.s m5A
o...
128
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
I. 63. 9
7. ))..vnyovou Ka.l nTOAE!L(I.LOU Ka.~ ATI!L'lTPLOU: e.g. Salamis (Jo6), where Demetrius Poliorcetes defeated Ptolemy I, Cos, Andros, and Ephesus (Egyptian defeats: all three dates uncertain: see A. Momigliano and P. Fraser, CQ, 1950, 107-18; E. Manni, Athen., 1952, 182 ff.; Treves, Eujorione, 75-83, 124-8 (with notes)). v~;pt TouTwv {aTopftaavTa.s: 'if they were to read the account of this war' (Strachan-Davidson : cf. Schweighaeuser; for this sense of laTop£iv cf. ii. 6z. 6, xii. 3· 5; perhaps ii. 17. 2) ; 'if they had to tell the story of this war' (cf. 13. j) (Shuckburgh). But the latter interpretation involves taking 'l"oos 8avp.d~oVTa:; as historians; whereas it is clearly with readers of history that P. is concerned. Paton's translation is satisfactory, 'if they inquired into the history of this war'. 8. ou8' O.v ... 8uv119t:t11 ••• EUpEiV: for the claim cf. 2 nn. Indirectly P. is here challenging comparison with Herodotus and Thucydides. On the change from trireme to quinquereme see Tarn, liMN D, 122 ff. 9. TO vpoTE9€v ft!LiV ~s npxf\s: in 3· g-Io P. undertook to explain the grounds (ri<{>opfLal) which led the Romans to conceive the ambition of a world-empire, and gave them the means to acquire it. The First Punic \Var, and especially Roman naval policy, provide the answer. Not by chance, nor by purely fortuitous circumstances (rox"7 and Ta.vT<~fLarov are virtually synonymous: cf. x. 2. s. xv. 16. 6, xxi. z6. 16, xxxi. 30. J. and other passages quoted in Siegfried, 6o--66 ; Susemihl, ii. Ioi n. 79 compares Arist. Phys. ii. 4--6), but by deliberately schooling themselves amid dangers, the Romans conceived their ambition (€7re{3a.Aovro . • • 'ToAfL'Y]pws) and accomplished it (Ka8lKovro rfjs 1rpo8laews). Thus this passage was clearly written in close relationship to 3· 7-10, part of the introduction to books i and ii (cf. Shorey,CP, 1921, 282). von Scala (182), Susemihl (ii. non. 104), and Cuntz (46) have argued that it represents a later stage in P.' s thought, when he has modified or rejected his belief in the power of Fortune (cf. ii. 38. 5). The assumption is unnecessary and unconvincing. P.'s concept of Tycke varies from one part of his work to another; but even so positive a concept as that of 4· 4 is complementary to a belief in causation, and not exclusive of it. In the case of the Roman Empire P. was faced with a dilemma, and the present passage is his solution. The rise of Rome to world dominion was the act of Tyche (4. 1 ff.); yet if it was that and nothing more, P.'s history had no lesson to teach. The answer to this aporia is that Fortune favoured the Romans because they were worthy. It was the a<{>opwd as analysed in the First Punic War which marked them out to become the proteges of Fortune, so that the rise of Rome to world power defined itself as the main-stream of history and the will of Providence. It was no doubt from a similar passage in book vi, now lost, that Cicero borrowed the statement (de re pub. ii. 30) that 'non fortuito K
129
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
populum Homanum, sed consilio et disciplina confirmatum esse nee tamen aduersante fortuna' (where nott fortuito does not exclude the positive aid of fortuna, just as here ov -r6X'll does not exclude the guidance of 4· 1 :ff.). See above, pp. 2I-22, Ka.9a1TEp €vaol 5oKouaL -rldv 'EAAt}vwv: who they are is uncertain. P. may be thinking of some of the unidentified writers on the Roman constitution, attacked in 3-4 (if these were Greeks); or he may simply be referring to orally expressed opinions. 64. 1. olJ-r' O.v 1TA1]pldaa.a ••• ou-r' avt:mAEuaa.a ..• 0UV1]9E~ev: the promised discussion has not survived among our fragments of book vi, but the difficulty appears to be in assembling the crews rather than in building the ships. The passage is of interest as an indication that at the very outset of his history P. was awake to signs of deterioration at Rome after her acquisition of world dominion, i.e. after 167 (KtrKpa.T7JICO'T€S 'TWV oAwv). 3-4. Twv 1TEpl a.1hfjc; uuyyEypo.cjll)-rwv: who these authors were, whether Greeks or Romans, is not known. For the utilitarian criterion applied to their work (uMws- dvw¢f.Mj) see 1. In. 6. Tous ye JlTJV O.vSpa.s: 'individual soldiers'. P. here puts his finger on an essential factor in the Homan victory, the quality of the citizen troops compared with the mercenaries of Carthage. ~lltAKa.v ••. Tov BapKa.v (mKa.AoullEvov KTA.: the full description both identifies Hamilcar and prepares the ground for the later discussion of the causes of the Second Punic War; cf. iii. 9· 6, where the description recurs in that context. The phrase KaTa ¢va'" is used by P. (I) in contrast to Ka.Ta (Um.v, 'natural' as opposed to 'adoptive' (e.g. iv. 2. s, cf. iv. 25. 6 (Philip V of .l\facedon, natural son of Demetrius II, but adopted son of Doson), xviii. 35· 9, xxxi. 25. Io, 26. I {Scipio and Fabius the natural sons of L. Aemilius Paullus)); (z) to express genuine relationship where it is called in question, i.e. 'natural' as opposed to 'supposititious' {without reference to legitimacy) (e.g. xxx. 2. 6, Eumenes' successor his son K!ua ¢Jaw, though not as yet recognized as such (dva.oeoe,yptf"o>)). But in the case of Hannibal and Hamilcar P. frequently uses the phrase {iii. 9· 6, 12. 3, cf. xi. 2. 2, Hasdrubal is Hannibal's brother Ka'Ta ¢6a~v), though there was never any question of adoption or doubt concerning Hannibal's direct descent from Hamilcar. Hence the meaning (as in xxxi. 13. 3) seems to be no more than 'own'. 65-88. The Carthaginian Mercenary War
Besides P. there is the account in Diod. xxv, which is usually assumed to be derived directly from P. (Mommsen, Rom. Forsch. ii. 266; Schwartz, RE, 'Diodorus (37)', col. 689; De Sanctis, iii. I. 130
THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR
1. 65.
s
385 n. 10); but the theory of a common source for P. and Diodorus has been put forward by Meyer (Kl. Schr. ii. 357) and by Laqueur (RE, 'Philinos (8)', col. 2I9o), who believe this source to be Philinus (cf. Unger, Rh. Mus., I879, 90-105). For the view that Philinus wrote a monograph on the First Punic ·war, however, see 14· n n. P.'s source is on this assumption unidentified. He is a military historian, rather less competent than Philinus, but sharing his enthusiasm for the Barca family, and hostile to the mercenaries (whose case is consequently to be recovered only by conjecture).
65. 2. 1TOAEJJ-05 £JJ-cpUAl05: cf. iii. 9· 9, lp.
I. 65- 5
THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR
(c) It gives a clear picture of the difference between barbarians and civilized men (a subject in which P. was interested, cf. iv. 20-21). (d) It is the key to an understanding of the causes of the Hannibalic War. In fact the link with the Hannibalic War is very tenuous, and amounts to no more than the Roman seizure of Sardinia during the Libyan War (88. 8 n.; but in iii. ro. 4 this seizure is admittedly regarded as the greatest cause of the Hannibalic War); Laqueur, 159. Having decided on a detailed account of the Libyan War, P. is determined to justify it in terms of the whole work. Laqueur's view that the Libyan War was a later addition to the Histories may be neglected. 7. €K TTJS Ton 11"£pLaTna£ws: 'from the circumstances of that war' (cf. 35· 1o); or 'from the danger Carthage underwent' (cf. iii. II2. 9). On the two meanings of 7rEpla-ramo: in P. see Strachan-Davidson, II-12.
9. Ka.l1ra.pa To'Ls 11"£11"0A£!1TJKOan•: i.e. many combatants in the Second Punic War were still alive. P. appears to be referring to general discussions on the causes of the war such as had continued since the works of Fabius Pictor and writers on Hannibal (iii. 6. r ff.); it is not necessary to see here a reference to the sharp debates on war-guilt which arose from 152 onwards, when the text of the treaties was circulating in senatorial circles (iii. 21. 9-10 n.); so Taubler, Vorgesch. 8 (see rather Thommen, Hermes, r885, 201-2). The present passage is likely to have been written long before 152. 66. l. cm£9£To Ttl" cl.pxfJv: the mercenaries thought that he resigned voluntarily; cf. 68. 12, where, however, Do~<Eiv seems to imply that this was not so. De Sanctis (iii. r. 383 n. 3) argues that Hamilcar's appointment would automatically terminate with the end of the war in Sicily; but it seems more probable that he was ousted by political opponents (Meltzer, ii. 369; Veith, AS, iii. 2. 525 f.). o €1rl TTJS 11"0A£WS cnp«TTJyos rEaKwv: evidently the man who took part in the preliminary peace negotiations (Diod. xxiv. 13) ; he is important in the opening stages of the Mercenary War. Niese, RE, 'Geskon (3)', cols. 1322-3. 3. Ta 1rpoaocji£LA0!1£VO. TWV otjlwv(wv: 'the pay owing to them' (the compound verb has no special significance). o.f;wvtov (from o.f;ov, 'relish'), perhaps originally soldiers' slang, had become the regular word for the classicalJ.naOo> in Hellenistic times, and it frequently occurs on papyri and inscriptions. Normally it is distinct from cn-rwvtov, a cash allowance in lieu of rations, and atToJu-rpla, rations in kind (68. 9 n.). Another word, at-rapxla, has a looser use; sometimes, as in UPZ, i. 16. 7, it covers both wages and ration-allowance, IJ2
THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR
I. 67. 6
but elsewhere (e.g. § 6; xi. 25. ro, 28. 3; SyU. 421, l. 38) it is the equivalent of &,Pwvtol', 'pay'; and in v. so. r f. it is uncertain whether it means pay, ration-allowance (cf. 52. s), or both. There was no technical expression for the whole of a soldier's allowance (wages+ rations) ; hence the use of the part for the whole. Griffith, 2j4--6; Launey, ii. 725 ff. 4. ixottEvo~ Tc.uTTJ'i Tfj~ ivvo(c.s: the validity of this motivation, presumably from P.'s source, can no longer be tested. Meltzer (ii. 370 ff.) argues that Gisgo had no choice but to convey 2o,ooo men in detachments (so, too, De Sanctis, iii. 1. 383 n. 4); and this seems likely, despite the argument of Veith (AS, iii. 2. 527 n. r) that the provision of sufficient transports would have constituted no difficulty for Carthage. 6. I(KKc.v: Sicca Veneria, a Roman colony under Octavian, lay a little over roo miles (the itineraries made it r22 miles) south-west of Carthage, on the site of the modern El Kef, at the terminus of the road from Tunis through Medjez el Bab. El Kef is still known locally as 'Shikka-Benar'; Dessau, RE, 'Sicca Veneria', col. 2187. Here Carthaginian matrons prostituted themselves in the temple of Venus (Val. Max. ii. 6. rs, who attributes the custom to Cirta); no doubt a licentious atmosphere prevailed. xpuaouv: sc. O'Ta.-n]pa. This payment was evidently as ration-money. The gold stater normally weighed the same as the silver didrachm, and the Carthaginians used a Phoenician standard independent of those current in Greece. Head (877-8o) gives examples of Punic coins of this period, on the standard of a drachma of 59 gr. 7. Ta<; t:ivoaKeuO.s: cf. § 9; 68. 3· Literally 'baggage', the word becomes a technical term in the Hellenistic age, and covers a soldier's private possessions, including persons, e.g. wife, mistress, servants. Holleaux, Etudes, iii. 15-26, especially 19 ( = REG, rg26, 355--66). ll. TTJ'i eaoll~""l'> .•• ivc.vop9waew~: 'the gain that was due to them'; cf. v. 88. 3, xxvii. 7· 12, xxx. r6. 2, for this sense of brav6p8wats, which is missed by Paton and omitted by LSJ. 67. 1. :&.vvwva: called 'the Great' by App. Hisp. 4 and Zon. viii. 22;
leader of the anti-Bardne faction. He survived the Second Punic War. Lenschau, RE, 'Hanna (r4)', cols. 2355-7· To j30.pos TWv +opwv: i.e. the tribute due to Rome (cf. Gsell, iii. roz; Schweighaeuser, grauitatem. tributorum caussatus: Paton and Shuckburgh both translate incorrectly 'taxes'). In xviii. 44· 7 (s.c. dealing with Macedonian tribute after Cynoscephalae) Ka'Ta cfo6povs means 'by instalments', and the plural here may carry a similar meaning. 6. li.1To9"lpLoua9a,: 'be rendered savage'. A favourite word; cf. 70. r, 79· 8, 8r. 5, 8r. 9, iii. 6o. 6, vi. 9· 9, xv. 22. 5· 11'apaaTC.TLKTJV .•. 8u~9eaw: 'a desperate state of mind'.
I. 67. 7
THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR
7. f.u;€A.A.f)VES: Tarn (Bactria, 38) discusses the word (he finds only three other examples: Plut. Crass. 31. r; Hellanicus, FGIJ, 4 F 7I a; Syll. 495, 1. 114): it implies a type of half-breed no longer felt to be Greek, and so despised. Cf. Gsell, ii. 389. The linguistic confusion was an important factor (cf. So. 5). But the sending of Hanno, who had been responsible for the heavy taxation in Libya and the suppression of the recent revolt and capture of Hecatompylus (72. r-3, 73· r), was even more decisive in causing disaffection; for Hanno was known as Hamilcar's opponent (d. 55· 2 n.). Veith, AS, iii. 2. 528. A£(3ut:s: cf. Diad. xxv. 2 (who adds (/>olvtK<S, i.e. Libyphoenicians, by error). Here the Libyans appear, not as subject-allies, but as mercenaries. The reference to increased taxation (72. r ff.) perhaps supports Griffith's suggestion (219-20) that before or during the First Punic War the Carthaginians had substituted a cash tribute for compulsory service among their Libyan subjects, thus leaving the Libyans free to enlist as mercenaries. 13. hrt T<e ••• TuVfJTL: cf. 30. 15, xiv. ro. 5· The mercenaries were encamped near the town (cf. 73· 3), at a point identified by Veith (AS, iii. 2. 530) v:ith Belvedere Park, north of the city. The number of mercenaries is also given by Nepos, Ham. z. z. 68. 5. C..yopO.s Etc1TE!1-1fovns: here O.yopa£ is the technical term for a market set up by the authorities in which the soldiers can spend their amlma (66. 3 n.). In the Egyptian papyri the word has sometimes this sense, sometimes that of 'payment in kind', virtually equivalent to atTOJME-rpta (68. 9 n.), though not restricted to corn. P. often uses it in the broad sense of 'food-supplies', e.g. r8. 5. 52. 5, 82. 6, etc. (cf. Griffith, z8o). For the practice of holding an agora with reduced see Launey, ii. 740, commenting on OGIS, 266, an inscription the agreement between Eumenes I and his revolted troops; in this, as at Carthage, the soldiers appear to fix the price. 6. TO tca.O' €tc6.0'T'fiV tlll-Epav • • • ~1TLVoou11-evov: f.m- here means 'in addition', as in § 8, br{Bruvav, 'they advanced farther' (in their demands). 8. TC~v n0vEW1-wv ~1T1TWV ••• Tas O.s(as: since this is regarded as outrageous, the probability is that Carthage had provided the horses in the first instance (Griffith, 289; d. 28r, n. r; this appears to have been the Ptolemaic practice). 9. Tijs ••• a~Toll-ETpta.s ••• 1"1)v !1-t:YLO'T'fiV ••• T~ll-'l": certain rations (atTOfLE-rpla)-normally paid in advance-were still owing to the mercenaries: and this debt they now demanded should be paid in money. As in all cases of adaeratio, the question arose: At what rate should the debt in corn be transmuted into a debt in cash? The mercenaries answer: At the highest rate reached by corn during the IJ4
THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR
I. 70.3
war. This is the meaning accepted by Paton, Shuckburgh, and Schweighaeuser; so, too, Launey (ii. 729, 'le versement en especes du ble qu'on leur doit'). It is clearly preferable to the explanation of Griffith (288-g), viz. that the mercenaries had already been paid a ration-allowance, but now demanded supplementation sufficient to bring up all past payments to the level represented by the amount paid when commodities were at their dearest. This seems too outrageous a demand even for the mercenaries in the situation described ; and it involves translating atTOf.Lt:Tpla 'ration-allowance' (though elsewhere Griffith commits himself to the correct view that a
0
.:fJ/).L1T1TOS'.
12. ~aAAt:: an exaggeration; it is clear from 8o. 6 that they were mostly acquainted with Carthaginian. U11'0 TWV aptuTWV: at this time the midday meal. 70. 3. Twv AL~vwv ooo€1rw KEKOJlLCYJlfvwv ,.Q.s uLTa.pxla.s: the fact that the o!/JWVLOV had been paid (6g. 3) SUggestS that atTapxJa~ are here the 'ration-allowance' : so Griffith, 289; and cf. 66. 3 n. On the other hand it is possible that there is some ground for Spendius' allegation that 135
I. 70. 3
THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR
the Carthaginians were trying to drive a wedge between the Libyans and the rest, and that the Libyans had not yet received their pay. This would imply a degree of Carthaginian treachery which F.'s source has obscured. M6.9w ToY ITrpUTT}yov: ironical. There is no basis for Meltzer's view (ii. 374) that Gisgo's answer was meant to be conciliatory. See De Sanctis, iii. I. 385. 6. 1rnpO. TO. KOLVU Twv 6.v8p6nrwv (9'1: such €67] included respect for heralds (ii. 8. 12), and those who surrendered in battle (xxxviii. 8. 2). From similar references it is possible to reconstruct F.'s conception of international law and a natural ius gentium; see von Scala, 299-324. What oaths the mercenaries swore is left vague. 7. il ... AL~UI<:os ~mKA118Ets -rroAEJ-LOS: P. prefers the form At{:lvKO> 1Tollt:JJ-o>, IJ. J, 88. 5, ii. r. 3, iii. 27. 7; cf. Diod. xxvi. 23; App. Hisp. 4· Livy uses the phrase Africum bellum, xxi. I. 4, 2, r, 4I. 12. 9. Tftv 'ITuKT}V ••• Tous 'I'II''II'UKpha.s; Utica lay on the (then) coast, c. zo miles north-west of Carthage, on the outer spurs of a hill running south-west to north-east, the modern Djebel Menzel Roul (or Ghoul); it was subject to Carthage, but enjoyed special privileges (Meltzer, ii. 75 ff.). The Hippacritae are the inhabitants of Hippo Diarrhytus (modern Bizerta), which was earlier known as Hippou Acra (Diod. XX. 55· 3; Ps.-Scylax (GGM, i. 89). III gives both e lmrov aKpa and" l1T1TOU (' 11T1TciJV Muller) 1TOIIt>); cf. Step h. Byz. "11T1TOU aKpa, 1r6Ats At{.M7]s· J trot..lT7]S 'lmraKp{T7]>· P.'s circumlocutions (cf. 82. 8, 88. 2) suggest some embarrassment about the name of the town. The name Hippo Diarrhytus is not attested before the Roman period. From 77· I it appears that Spendius besieged Utica, and Mathos Hippou Acra. 71. 1. Tous ••• KUT' tSiuv ~£ous ••• 8uga.yny6vns: 'support life individually' (cf. iii. 4· 6, vi. 48. 3, 48. 7); hardly, with Paton, 'depend for their private supplies'. For y~:vJn)JJ-aTa, 'harvests', see the interesting note in Welles, 323, s.v. yiv7]JJ-a. 6. va.uTLKfJ Sova.1.uc;: 'a naval force, sailors', cf. 41. z. ou 1rAo£wv Ka.TUc::rKeu-rl: in 21. 1, 22. 3 (and elsewhere) ~ TwJJ 1rAolwv KaTaaKt:v~ is 'the construction of ships'. Here Schweighaeuser argues that, as in ii. 23. IO (where MSS. vary between trapa<:rKE:tnJv and KaTaaKw~v), KaTaaKw~ means 'supply', and he translates 'they had no supply of ships'. This seems preferable to Paton, 'nor the material left to construct (a fleet)'. o6Se xopT}yLWv 8L6.8£c::rLs: 'no arrangement for supplies' (StrachanDavidson). This seems satisfactory; Paton translates 'no means of providing supplies', and Shuckburgh 'no store of provisions ready'. 72. 1. EOAOyous !36
O.~op!-'cl.s:
'a reasonable pretext'.
THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR
I. 73·
I
1ta.pc:upouJlt;VO~ ••• TWV aAAwv 11'QVTWV TWV 1
2.
exemptions to the townsmen. There is no other evidence on the rate of taxation among the Libyan subjects; but if the burden of the peasants was increased proportionately to that of the townsmen, the normal exaction was evidently a quarter of all crops. Meltzer, ii. 85. Ta.'ls 'll'ohEo': cf. 86. I. These 1r6.\ns-, simple settlements, some fortified, are mentioned in the treaty between Hannibal and Philip V of Macedon, vii. 9· 5· Strabo reckons 300 of them (xvii. 833; cf. Flor. i, r8. rg; Oros. iv. 8. 8), Diod. xx. 17. 6 over 200. Details of their taxation are unknown. Meltzer, i. 381, 426, ii. 496. 3. TWv ••• O"Tpa.T,ywv: evidently the regular governors of the Carthaginian territories in North Africa. See 67. I for Hanno rov imdpxoVTa UTparTJyov f!v rfj .thf36rJ. He was followed by Hamilcar Barca, after the conclusion of the Mercenary War (Diod. xxv. 8), and Hamilcar was subsequently UTpaTTJyos in both Spain and Africa, like Hasdrubal and Hannibal after him (iii. 33· n.). These rrrparTJyol are distinct from the individuals whom Aristotle describes as sent out from Carthage i1TL rds 7TOA€tS' (Pol. ii. II. rs. 1273 b, viii (vi). 5· 9· 1320 b), and perhaps represent a borrowing from the equipment of the Hellenistic states, where a crrparTJy6s held a military command within a prescribed territorial sphere. See H. Bengtson, Aegyptus, 1952, 3i8-82, with the qualifications advanced by A. Aymard, REA, 1953, 138-9. Other minor Punic governors are known; Diod. xvi. 9· 4 (cf. Plut. Dian, 25) records an bnrmiTTJs governing a subject town in Sicily, and in the second century a f3o~8a.pxo> seems to exercise a territorial function (App. Lib. 68; but the f3o-t)8apxos- in 79· 2 (below) is a Carthaginian captain over mercenaries). 1'0\:S I
73. 1. Ta ~
4·
SITUATION OF CARTHAGE
THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR
I. 74· 3
which lay on a high plateau (828 m.) at a point a little over the Algerian frontier, commanding a wide district. Cf. H. Treidler, RE, 'Theveste', cols. 249~52. 3. Eis EvTa p.upuJ.Sas Al~uwv: clearly exaggerated; Veith, AS, iii. 2. 568; De Sanctis, iii. 1. 386 n. 11. Since Spendius had a little over rs,ooo at Utica (76. r), and the armies at Hippou Acra and Tunis had less difficult tasks, and are therefore likely to have been smaller, De Sanctis sets 4o,ooo as a maximum for the total insurgent forces; within these there will have been an increase in the number of native Libyans, and a reduction through losses in that of trained mercenaries. P. gives other figures at 77· 4, 78. 9. 84. 3, and 85. 7 (the two last also exaggerated). 4-5. Situation of Carthage. Since P.'s time the coast round Carthage has changed considerably, mainly through the accretion which had already then begun (75· 8), especially to the north of Carthage, between the town and C. Farina (Ras Sidi Ali el Mekki). Carthage lay on a peninsula stretching due east into the Gulf of Carthage, the KoA1ros of § 4· The northern promontory of the peninsula is C. Camart; and the south side of the peninsula is washed by the Alp.,v7) (§ 4), to which entrance is made between two narrow spits of land. The isthmus linking the city with the mainland (laep.,6s, § 5; avx.Jv, 75· 4; d. App. Lib. 95) is here reckoned at 25 stades, i.e. 4·6 km. (The view of Schulten (AA in ]DAI, 1913, 249), that the la(}p.,os was the neck of the sand-bank of La Goletta, which helps to close the lagoon El Bahira to the so.uth of Carthage, is refuted by Kromayer, GGA, 1917, 451 ff.) The extent of the Punic city is still controversial. See R. Oehler, RE, 'Karthago', cols. 2150-224; A. Audollent, Carthage romaine (Paris, 1901), 143-323; H. P. Hurd, The Topography of Punic Carthage (Williamsport, U.S.A., 1934); H. H. Scullard, OCD, 'Carthage (Topography)'; D. B. Harden, GAR, 1939, 1-12. On Tunis see 30. 15 n.; on Utica, 70. 9 n. 74. 2. i~opp.l]aas S€ p.ETa TTJS Suvcip.Ews:: Hanno can scarcely have been in a position to send aid to Utica before spring, 240; Meltzer, ii. 375-6. De Sanctis (iii. 1. 386-7), who argues, reasonably, that Hanno's force does not appear to have exceeded that of Spcndius, who was in charge at Utica with rs,ooo men (76. r), reckons it at the same figure (against Veith (AS, iii. 2. 566-7), who, arguing from the forces raised at Carthage against Agathocles, makes it 3o,ooo). 3. ds 'ITuKTJV 1rapa~o1181Jaas: along the coast, avoiding Tunis (Meltzer, ii. 376; Veith, AS, iii. 2. 531). Gsell (iii. 107 n. 6) suggests he went by sea; but 73· 6 does not imply the complete isolation of Carthage by land, and to transport roo elephants by sea would have been no easy manceuvre. The criticism of Hanno reflects P.'s proBarcine source ; despite his discomfiture he retained his freedom of 139
L 74· 3
THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR
movement. Cf. De Sanctis, iii. I. 387 n. 14. On the battle of Utica see Veith, AS, iii. z. 53r. 4. EK TTjs r.oXews: 'out of Utica', not 'from Carthage' (as Paton and Shuckburgh); d. § 12 for the artillery which Hanno had brought lK Tfj;; 'TI'oAew> and added to his own; moreover, '11'p6 Tfj;; r.6t\ew;; in the same sentence clearly refers to Utica. The story of the loss of the siege-engines may be una inve1tzione maligna (De Sanctis, iii. I. 387 n. I4). 6. r.pos Twa. Mcpov £puJlvov ~
THE CARTHAGINIAN }'!ERCENARY WAR
I. 75Jl
the east prevents it debouching in (and silting up) the shallow harbour of Porto Farina. In the third century B.C. it skirted the north flank of the Djebel Ahmor and Djebel Naheli, to enter the Gulf of Tunis in an east-north-east direction at a point just north of the modem salt lake, Sebka er Riana (then open sea). The mouth was thus about u miles south of its present position. Gsell, ii. 143-4. 1nos ••. y~cj>upo.s: its situation is controversiaL If the road from Carthage to Utica ran over the Djebel Naheli and through La Sebbala (which lies in the north entrance to the gap between the Djebel Naheli and Djebel Ahmor}, it must have crossed the Bagradas about a mile north-west of La Sebbala, and about 5 miles from its mouth. The modern Tunis-Bizerta road follows the same route (though of course it crosses the river much farther north, owing to the shift in the river's course). However, this assumption raises difficulties (cf. Gsell, iii. III n. 2). Presumably Hamilcar started upstream immediately after crossing the river (§ ro); but before he reached the mercenaries' bridge-head he was met not only by troops from there, but also by those who had come 12 miles from Hippou Acra, after hearing of the crossing from a messenger who had himself covered those 12 miles. Yet Veith's position for the bridge-head (as described above; cf. AS, iii. 2, map u, c, g) is only two hours' march upstream. Hence Gsell locates the bridge-head farther south, near Henchir Bou Djaoua, west of Djebel Ahmor, and about 12 miles from the river mouth. The battle he places north of Sidi Tabet, about 4-5 miles due west of La Sebbala. This hypothesis implies that the bridge lay, not on the Utica road, but on one leading southwest to the xwpa or the upper waters of the Bagradas towards Sicca Veneria, and hence that the important Utica road crossed the river north of La Sebbala by a ford or ferry-which is hard to believe. A possible explanation is that P.'s pro-Barcine source has exaggerated the surprise element in Hamilcar's crossing, and that the insurgents from both Utica and the bridge-head were in motion long before it was completed; but the nearer troops (whose numbers P. exaggerates, 76. r n.) may have hesitated to act alone against a superior force. On this hypothesis Veith's topography can be reconciled with the course of the battle. 11'0AlV rn' O.UTfji ~K080j.l"lKbTCI.S: cf. Gsell, iii. IIO, 'les cantonnements constituaient une sorte de ville'. According to 76. r this camp acted as headquarters for an army of about ro,ooo. For P.'s use of the word 1TOA£s for something much smaller than a city see Poseidonius' criticism in xxv. r (Strabo, iii. 163) ; cf. 72. 2 for the m)A,.,,s of Libya. 8. Ka.TO. TLVa.<; aVEj.lWV OTQaU~: cf. 48. 2 n. Probably the east ·winds; Gsell, iii. uo, on the authority of Bernard, Bull. de geog. historique, I9II 1
9.
213.
To'Ls lv Tfi 1roA~l
tent Tots
U11'Eva.vT{oLS:
which city? Schweighaeuser r ..p
l.tS-9
THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR
and Paton leave this undetermined, but Shuckburgh translates with some probability: 'to the surprise of the citizens of Utica as well as of the enemy'. That the news reached Utica quickly is clear from the arrival of forces from there (76. 1). 76. 1. Numbers of the insurgents. Since Spendius was later prepared to follow Hamilcar's Io,ooo with only 8,ooo (77. 4-5), it is improbable that he had recently been defeated (and sustained losses amounting to 8,ooo) when facing him with 25,000. DeSanctis (iii. I. J88 n. I7) suggests plausibly that the real total of insurgents involved in this battle was not more than Is,ooo. 2-9. The battle of the Bagradas. P.'s account does not permit a wholly satisfactory reconstruction. Hamilcai, he says, was advancing upstream, with elephants in front, cavalry and light-armed behind, and heav-y-armed in the rear (§ 3). On seeing the enemy ready to attack, he ordered the whole army to face about (avaa'Tp'if>•w, § 4), and the front ranks (i.e. elephants, cavalry, and light-armed) to retire quickly; those in the rear (who now had their backs to the enemy) he wheeled round (€~ lrrunpoif>ij<> TrEpunrwv, § 5) and drew up facing the enemy. The mercenaries now pressed on against the Carthaginians in some disorder, but Hamilcar's cavalry, having retreated almost to the hoplites (aw.:yylaai!'Tas Tols 7rapa'TETayfL'"ots, § 7), suddenly turned about once more and resisted (JK fL<ETa{1o>..ijs irrrorn1jvat, cf. xviii. 30. 4, T~v Els To!Jmcr8"v fL"Ta{lo>..~v), while the rest of the Punic forces advanced against the enemy, who fled in confusion. Such is P.'s account; but he leaves it fai from clear what precisely happened to the heavy-armed. lmuTpo>~ and 7rfi.ptcr7raafL1)s (cf. x. 23. 3, xii. 18. 3) signify movements in drill, by which a body of troops wheel round through 90° and I8o respectively (see Schweighaeuser on x. 23. 3); but Je l.Trtcrrpoif>ij<> 7r!ptcr7rwv most probably means that the heavyaimed troops, who had their backs to the enemy, were wheeled round (Veith (AS. iii. z. 534-5 and map 12 c, g) thinks to the left) through goo, and then turned left to face the enemy; thus the column had turned through goo and each individual through I8o 0 , since they were now in line. Veith thinks that this manceuvre enabled them to catch Spendius' troops from Utica in the left flank. Other writers have suggested other, less probable, interpretations. C. G. Guichard, M lmoires militaircs sur les Grecs et les Romains, i (Lyon, 176o), 17-25, propounded an involved scheme by which the hoplites divided into columns to let the retiring vanguaid pass through. De Sanctis (iii. I. 388 and n. 17) believes that P. has misunderstood his source, and that in fact Hamilcar, having drawn on the enemy by a mock retreat of the vanguaid, drew up his rear in battle order on the flanks of his retreating troops. Gsell (iii. I II n. I) supposes that the hoplites were ordered to advance obliquely, some to the right, and some to the 0
142
THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR
I. 78.
IZ
left, to meet the two insurgent forces. All these theories go beyond what P. records. The feigned retreat seems certain. It was a difficult manceuvre, which Hannibal later used to great effect in conjunction with such outflanking as De Sanctis postulates for this battle. In fact the last stages of the battle of the Bagradas may have contained the germs of the tactics Hamilcar's son later perfected; but the text does not enable such a hypothesis to be proved. 2. U1Tou8fi 1TUpTJyyuwv &f1a 1TapaKaAouVTES a~as aihous! 'they eagerly passed on the watchword for battle, at the same time exhorting each other.' 1rapt:yyvav is 'to pass the word along the line'; d. vii. IS. 4· 9. ot 8' €1rl. TTJV 1rpos 'lniKn 1Tapef1{3oAt]v: this suggests that Spendius (who subsequently took the greater part of his army from the camp at Tunis, not at Utica, 77· 4) did not abandon the siege of Utica; and the defection of the town (82. 8) points to continued pressure. Hence the statement (75· 3) that by the present action Hamilcar :D\vat: T~v Tfj> 'Inlwq> 1TOALopKlav seems to be part of the pro-Barcine exaggerations of P.'s source. 11. TTJS ••• 8uaeAmaT(as: d. 71. 2. 77. 1. b 8€ MaOws ••• E1TEjlEvev: he had been in charge at Hippou Acra ab initio, 70. 9 n. Mathos' advice is the reverse of that given by Xanthippus to the Carthaginians (3o. 7 n.), the relation of forces being reversed. 4. TOUS (-lET' AuTap(ToU raM.TaS: on the desertion of their companions to the Romans (§ 5), after failure to seize Eryx and hand it over to them, see ii. 7. 8 and Zon. viii. I6; at an earlier date they had tried to seize Agrigentum and plundered it (d. 43 n., ii. 7· 7). They were originally 3,ooo strong (ii. 7· 7); and evidently about I,ooo deserted at Eryx, since the remnants of these, now Soo, turn up in the pay of the Epirotes (ii. 5· 4). On the camp at Eryx see 58. 2 n. 6. Ev TWl 1TE8L'l,l 1TUVTaxOOev apEal 1TEplEXOf1EV'l;): not identifiable. Veith (AS, iii. 2. 539 ff. and map 12 a and d) locates it in the valley of Khangat el Hadjaz, beneath the north slope of Djebel Ressas, between Creteville and Grombalia, c. 20 miles south-east of Tunis. But as Hamilcar's object was to relieve Hippou Acra (and perhaps Utica too, 76. 9 n.) a site north of the Bagradas is perhaps more probable; DeSanctis, iii. I. 389 n. 19. 78. 1. 1TaTplKTJV EXWV auaTaUlV! 'having ancestral ties of friendship'; d. xxiv. 6. 6, SuJ. Ta> 1TpoyovtKa> avaTaaH> 1rpo> T~v f3aaLJ.,{av. 7. UUCfTUIJTJCTOflEVOS aUT~: 'to join his CaUSe'; d. iii. 68. 8, iV. I. 6, for the idea of alliance. Paton, less probably, follows Casaubon and translateS: 'to introduce himself' (d. aVa.-aaL> in § 2). 12. et; j1Up1ous ••• ets TnpaKlOXlMous: these figures, especially the 143
I. 78. 12
THE CARTHAGINIAN
MERCE~ ARY
WAR
former, seem exaggerated in the interest of Harnilcar's reputation. See De Sanctis, iii. 1. 389 n. 20. 79. 1. KaTa . . . Tous auTous Kalpous: that the revolt of the Sardinian mercenaries occurred at the time of the second battle between Hamilcar and Spendius is confirmed by the story of the letter (§ 8). 2. Tiw ••• ~o~8apxov Bwcnapov: a Punic captain of foreign auxiliaries (72. 3 n.); on which acropolis he was shut is not clear. 3. 'Avvwva: it is improbable that he is the Hanna who secured a victory in Sardinia in 258 (Zon. viii. 12) and had fought earlier in Sicily {18. 8), as De Sanctis (iii. 1. 397) suggests. That Hanno is unlikely to have long survived Ecnomus, 6o. 3 n. 5. ~~E1TEaov ••. ElS TTJV 'ITaXiav: see 83. 11, 88. 8. The date of this expulsion, and of the appeal to Rome, is not certain, for in 83. 11 it is mentioned in a digression. It seems not unlikely, however, that the appeal to Rome was in 239, after Hamilcar had destroyed Spendius (85. 5 ff.) and the mercenary cause was declining in Africa; De Sanctis, iii. 1. 398. 6. TTI 1ToAuav9pw1TL~ ••• Sla+.Epouaa: an exaggeration (cf. Beloch, Bevolkerung, 445), perhaps copied from Timaeus, the main source for the early history of the island (J. Geffcken, Timaios' Geographie des Westens (Berlin, I892), 52 ff.); cf. Paus. x. 17. I, p.iydJos .•• Ka~ EfJOmp.ovW.v • .. op.of.a Tats p.cf)..,ara d1Tatvovp.lvats (from Timaeus). The other \\•ri.ters to whom P. refers cannot be identified, unless one is Myrsilus of Methymna (cf. Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 85), whom Sallust probably used for details in book ii of his Histories; Philipp, RE, 'Sardinia', cols. 2481-2. 8. M0.9ws: not evidence that the insurgents had abandoned the siege of Hippou Acra (so Meltzer, ii. 381). The site of the meeting is not known (though it was not in the camp near Tunis, 79· 14) ; but Mathos may well have come over to it from Hippou Acra, if indeed he was present. Veith (AS, iii. 2. 543 n. I} thinks that he was not (the plural Elm}yayov in § 9 could include Spendius and Autaritus) ; and he certainly did not speak at the meeting. 9. tils a1TEaTaX.Uvov tJ1To Twv ••• atpEncnwv: P. alleges that he was a fake; cf. § 14· The arrest of Gisgo and those with him is related Ill 70. 4·
14. 1rapa1rA,ala • . . Staaa+wv: 'bearing a dispatch containing similar warnings' (Shuckburgh). For Otaaa4>dv 'to give instructions' (especially by letter) cf. § IO, iv. 26. 3· 80. 1. ~+' Bv ••• ~mf3aAwv: 'speaking next in succession'. d1rf.+acc. 'following after', not uncommon in P. (cf. xxviii. 4· 4), is omitted from LSJ. 6. o' 1TAEiaTOl auvEaalvoVTo TD SlaAEKT'tl: 'Phoenician was the
THE
CARTHAGINIA~
MERCENARY WAR
I. 8z. 6
language to which the largest number of men ... could listen with satisfaction' (Shuckburgh). Cf. Soph. Ant. 1214, 7m.t6ds- p.~ aa.lve• ¢86yyos: the compound verb is not found elsewhere. 81. 5-11. Reflections o·n the brutality of the mercenaries. The soul can have diseases comparable to ulcers and tumours (Twv •.• Du<:iiw ~ Tdl€1-1-EVOt TTJV TOtG.UTTjV TOA!-'-~V: 'imagining that such recklessness is to their credit'. 10. Tpoq,T)v EK 1T~(8wv K~Kt}v: on the importance of education for the civilizing of manners cf. iv. 20-21 (on music and the men of Cynaetha). In vi. I I a 7 Tarquin was successful p.a).wTa Sta T~v iK 1ra£8wv dywyr/JJ; and in xxiv. 7· I Chaeron of Sparta is criticized as 8r]p.on;c:fjs aywyfj~ T€Twxws. Prusias' faults are due to a lack of 7Tat8c:la~ Kal
•
,
•
•
-
A
•
82. 1. Tov 1-1-ev 1a.vvwv~ 1Tpos ~a.uTov EKaAH: this union of the two armies was a vital step in the campaign; De Sanctis, iii. 1. 390 n. 21. 6. EK Twv ••• 'EJ41Top(wv: Emporia was the district around SyTtis Minor, the modern Gulf of Qabes; cf. iii. z:;. 2, xxxL 21. I; Livy, xxix. 25. 12, on the fertility of this area, the granary of Carthage (Pliny, Nat. hist. v. 24, xvii. 41, xviii. 94). Gsell, ii. 127-8. L
I. 82. 7
THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR
7. Ta S€ Ka.Ta T'i-Jv Ia.pSova.: 79· I-7· The loss is mentioned here again partly to reinforce the story of the sudden 7Ta>.lppota Twv 7TpayfLaTwv (§ 3), and partly because it made the loss of supplies from Emporia doubly disastrous. 8. Tous Ka.T' >\ya.9oK}..Ea. Ka.Lpoos: Diod. xx. 54-55 describes the long resistance of Utica; but both towns fell to Agathocles in 307/6, whereas others held out (DeSanctis, iii. 1. 44 n. 12o). TTJV 'Pw...,a.twv E~oSov: there is no suggestion elsewhere that Regulus' expedition threatened Utica or Hippou Acra. 10. TOUS ••• 1TO.pa.~E~OTJ9TJKOTO.S ••• a1TOKTE~VO.VTES: Veith (AS, iii. 2. 543) places this massacre at Utica: but P. leaves the matter open. 12. >\vv(~a.v: perhaps the friend of Adherbal, who ran the Roman blockade at Lilybaeum in 250/49 (44· I ff.): but the identification is quite uncertain. 83. 2-4. Hiero's policy. The praise of his whole-hearted collaboration with Rome in I6. 11 probably follows Fabius Pictor; the more sophisticated comment here may be P.'s own. Gelzer, Hermes, 1933, 138.
5-11. Roman support for Carthage: cf. iii. 28. 3· The Roman tradition
on the events here described is given, with some distortion, in Zon. viii. 17; App. Lib. 5; Sic. 2. 3; Nep. Ham. 2. 3; Val. Max. v. I. I; Eutrop. ii. 27. It is unlikely that the Romans in fact authorized the recruiting of mercenaries by Carthage in their territory. 8. 5La }..6you: such Punic prisoners as were still unransomed after the First Punic War (2,743 in number, according to the Roman tradition; Eutrop. ii. 27; Val. Max. v. 1. I) were exchanged for these Italians (iii. z8. 3). 11. Ka.9' ov KO.lpov ••• a1TEO'TTJO'O.V: 79· 5 n. The appeal was in fact some little time after the revolt. Twv 5' 'ITuKa.twv ~YXELpLtoVTwv O'~cis: probably after Spendius' death (86. 4), and not (so 0. Gilbert, Rom u. Karthago (Leipzig, 1876), 49) before Utica went over to the mercenaries. To have accepted the Utican offer would have been a breach of the Treaty of Catulus, with its rfoJ..la clause (62. 8). 84. 3. ~;is 1TEVTa.KLO'jJ-uptous: unlikely in reality to have been more than zo,ooo (d. 73· 3 n.): the figure is exaggerated in the interest of Hamilcar. On the insurgents' tactics cf. 77· 2 ff. 6. ~jJ-1TELpLa. jJ-E9oSLKTJ Ka.i O'Tpa.nwTLKTJ SUva.jJ-LS: cf. iii. I05. 9 for a similar contrast; in ix. 14. 1-4 ~fL7THpla fLE8ofmcr}, 'experience scientifically acquired' (e.g. geometry and astronomy), is distinguished from aTpanwnK~ Tpt{Jr), 'routine experience of a soldier', obtained partly by doing the job oneself (avTovpyla) and partly by inquiring from others ([aTopla). Together these qualities make the general. In the interest q6
THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR
I. 86. r
of his contrast P. here minimizes the importance of a-rpa.-rtw-rt~<~ -rpt{3~ (which can be 'unreasoning'). Diod. xxv. 4· 2-3 copies the passage. 7. Ev Ta.is ~ta.TO. JL.ipo<; XfnLO.~'i: 'separate actions', as opposed to 'fullscale battles' (ev -rot> o>.oaxEptUL l
I. 86. 3
THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR
3. tca-rcl. -rTjv lnro KapxTJSOvo~ 1TA£upcl.v: i.e. north of the town, on the shores of El Bahira, the lagoon before Tunis. Hamilcar was to the south and the only land communication was round the inner lake, the Sebka es Sedjoumi (cf. 30. IS n.), a distance of IS miles. The Carthaginians of course controlled the shorter communications across El Bahira. 6. -rpuitcov-ra -rwv KapxYJSov[wv -rou~ E'll'lcp«v£u-rcl.-rou~: there is no reason to think these were the thirty members of the Carthaginian gerousia, who had come out to superintend Spendius' execution (so Meltzer, ii. 40). 7. TYJ~ TUXT)~ .•• evaAXcl.~ SLSOUO"T]~ &.cpopp.cl.~ KTX.: here Tyche is a power which delights in change for its own sake, especially when the peripeteia carries an ironic flavour. This is the aspect of Tyche stressed by Demetrius of Phalerum, xxix. 21; and it is not peculiar to P. See von Scala, I64, I/4-S; Siegfried, 75; Walbank, CQ, I945. 6; above, p. IS. 9. '~~'Po~ -rt;i u-rop.an -rou 'II'OT«p.ou: apparently in order to maintain his communications with Carthage, and those of Carthage with the interior.
87. 3. -rpul.tcov-ra -rij~ y£pouuia~: cf. 2r. 6 n. Perhaps the smaller body is here indicated, and all its members visited Hamilcar (Meltzer, ii. 40). Clearly this move represents a growth in the power of Hanno's faction (for his previous dismissal, cf. 82. r2), probably since the setback before Tunis, for which Hamilcar must have been held responsible: Meltzer, ii. 386; Veith, AS, iii. 2. 556-7; De Sanctis, iii. r. 394· The metaphor of olov €axa-r'r)v -rp€xovus -rav-r'rJ" (from the games) occurs also at xviii. 49· r. 7. '11'£pi ••• -rt,v AE'II'TLV: Leptis (or Lepcis) minor, the Phoenician town c. 20 miles south-east of Sousse, where Hannibal landed in 203 (Livy, xxx. 25. 12). The war of movement had recommenced, and evidently Mathos had abandoned Tunis. 8. EKKU~£U£LV U'II'Ep TWV oXwv: for this common metaphor cf. ii. 63. 2 n., iii. 94· 4· 9-10. The last battle. Neither the site nor the numbers involved are known. Veit.h (AS, iii. 2. 565ft.) gives the Carthaginians 4o,ooo, the insurgents 3o,ooo; see his table, p. 57r. 88. 3-4. p.EyaATJV ••• SLa.cpopcl.v ~ f.'ETj)LOTTJ~: a moral not wholly confirmed by the treatment of lJtica and Hippou Acra; for lJtica at least was restored to its former privileged position (vii. 9· 5, 9· 7, treaty between Hannibal and Philip V). 6. ot VEOL: soldiers, like vwviaKot: cf. v. 26. 8. 7. The length of the war. Diod. xxv. 6 gives £-r'r) -rEaaapa Kat p..ijvas TEauapas, Livy, xxi. 2. I, quinque annos. P. may be reckoning from q8
THE CARTHAG-INIAN MERCENARY WAR
I. 88.8
autumn 241 to the end of 238 (De Sanctis, iii. I. 396 n. 3o) : in this case Livy' s iive years probably cover the whole period from the end of the First Punic War to Hamilcar's crossing into Spain. But Diodorus' figures (for what they are worth) are not easily explained. De Sanctis's suggestion that 'il primo TEI7Ua.pa e forse una dittografia del secondo' is not very persuasive. An alternative explanation is that the three years four months are reckoned from the outbreak of fighting at the beginning of 240 until the early summer of 237; Diodorus will be including the preliminaries of 241, and Livy's fl.ve years will be a rounding off of this figure (so Ed. Meyer, Kl. Schr. ii. 382 n. 2). Though neither view can be regarded as certain, the second is perhaps rather more likely; for its implications for the chronology of the annexation of Sardinia see below,§ 8 n. The internal chronology of the war is past recovery. De Sanctis, loc. cit., dates the sending of Hanno to Utica to spring 240 (73 ff.), and the last campaign to 238 (87. 6 ff.); but on Meyer's chronology the latter will be in 237. DeSanctis puts the battle of the Bagradas in 240 (75), and the rebel concentration at Tunis, and the battle of the 'Saw' (85), in 239. But this is all hypothetical. 8. Roman annexation of Sardinia. On hearing of the Roman expedition the Carthaginians evidently sent an embassy to Rome announcing their claim to the island and intention of recovering it (§ 9); whereupon the Romans, alleging their preparations to constitute hostile action directed against themselves, passed a war-resolution (§ to), which was conveyed to Carthage in the form of a rerum repetitio (either ... or ... ) by senatorial legati (see iii. ro. r n., 20. 6 n.}. Upon the Carthaginians' accepting the terms(§ rz, E£gaVTE>: -roi,; t
I. 88.8
THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR
A possible explanation of the divergent traditions for the year in which Sardinia was annexed may be that the original Roman expedition, undertaken on the invitation of the mercenaries (§ 8), was dispatched in Gracchus' consulship (whether in fact the Mercenary War in Africa was already over or not; KaTa Tdv KatpJv TovTov is a loose copula}, but the Roman ultimatum to Carthage and the renunciation of any claim to the island did not occur until the consular year 237/6 (probably summer 237, since peace will have been restored before Hamilcar crossed into Spain in autumn 237, ii. r. 5). Such an hypothesis would explain how the acquisition of the island could be dated either to 238/7, when the expedition was sent, or to 237/6 when its annexation was formally conceded. (ii) The mercenary appeal described in § 8 is clearly subsequent to that of 83. I r, which the Romans rejected. Evidently the Romans had now decided, belatedly (see below), to make the Tyrrhenian Sea a mare clausum by striking before Carthage could recover her strength (Scullard, Hist. r8o). Later propaganda strove to justify the Senate's action in one of two ways: (a) A version, combated by P. in iii. 28, and probably deriving from Fabius Pictor (Gelzer, Hermes, 1933, 142; Bung, 17, thinks rather of Cato), represented the cession of Sardinia as compensation for the seizure of Italians who had carried materials to the rebels during the Mercenary War (83. 7); when the Carthaginians subsequently manned a fleet to recover the island, the Romans were obliged to declare war. Cf. App. Hisp. 4; Lib. 5, 86; Dio, fg. 46; Zon. viii. r8. (b) A later annalistic account associated the ceding of the island with the Treaty of Catulus, Livy, xxii. 54· n, cf. xxi. 40. 5 (contrast xxi. r. 5); Ampel. 46. 3; Eutrop. iii. 2. 2; Oros. iv. II. 2; auct. de uir. ill. 41. 2. But in fact the Roman decision to annex the island was evidently taken after the Treaty of Catulus, for had its acquisition seemed desirable in 241, there was nothing to prevent the Romans from insisting on it. (Mommsen's view that the Carthaginians would have fought on to save Sardinia (Rom. Gesck. i. 543· 4) is unconvincing; and Heuss's suggestion that the popular rejection of the preliminary agreement (63. r) had something to do with Sardinia (HZ, 1949-so, 492) is unsupported by the sources. Cf. Taubler, V orgesch. r6 ff.; Ed. Meyer, Kl. Schr. ii. 384. The reference to Sardinia in Regulus' peace terms (31. 5 n.) is part of the untrustworthy account in Dio. 11. Tov vponpfJvivov voAEJ.lov: the Mercenary War (not the First Punic War, as Laqueur, :to). 12. A,.EaTf)crav T"i~ Iap5ovo~ KTA.: P. has a slightly fuller account of these events in iii. ro. 1-3. ,.poa£8f)Ka.v: 'they agreed to pay in addition' (sc. to the former indemnity, cf. iii. ro. 3. 1rp6; Toi:; 1rponpov).
BOOK II l. Risumi of Book I; Hamilcar in Spain
1. 3. Ttt va.pO.J..oya Twv ~pywv: 'its dramat!c surprises' (Paton). nl lpya are, strictly, the warlike acts on both sides; but 1Tap&.Jo.oyo> is 'unexpected' (cf.i. I.4n.) ratherthan 'monstrous' (soSchweighaeuser: 'facta immania'), an idea already expressed in &.aef3~fLaTa. P. gives especial prominence to the paradoxical elements in the Mercenary War. Cf. Feldmann, 37· 4. ~<E4>aJ..a.1wSw~ . • • ~wtljla.uovn:s: on the summary character of books i and ii see i. 13. 7~. and, for the contrast with the fuller treatment of the history proper (&.1ro8e~1mK~ lcrropia), below, 37· 3; d. iii. I. 3· ' E~ •t BPX"l~ ' ~ wpovEow: '"' 5; P. refers to his scheme as set KaTa.' TfJV Cf . 1.. out at i. 13. 2-5. 5. EU9tw
II.
I.
6
HAMILCAR IN SPAIN
the straits (cf. Meltzer, ii. 4oo); but Lenschau (RE, 'Hamilkar', col. 23o6) and Gsell (iii. 124-5) think he marched to the straits. civEKTii.To: 'set about recovering'; on the earlier Punic empire in Spain see i. Io. 5 n. 7. ~T, crxeSov €vvia.: cf. Livy, xxi. 2. I; Nepos, Ham. 4· 2. Hamilcar died ten years before the outbreak of the Hannibalic War (iii. Io. 7). and so in 229; his governorship is therefore from 237 to 229. 1roAAous .•• 1fOLTjcra.s 'IJ3Tjpwv l111'1')Koous: Meltzer (ii. 399) compares the career of Caesar in Gaul, both militarily and as an example of a military autocrat relying on popular support to counter a landed aristocracy which mistrusted him. Records are slight. Diod. xxv. ro. I relates a victory over the Turdetani, the east coast Iberians, and Celtic (Celtiberian ?) mercenaries. The foundation of Acra Leuce (Alicante) probably marked the limit of Hamilcar's advance, Diod. xxv. Io. 3· See Schulten, CAH, vii. 786-7. 7-8. KC.TEcrTpeljse Tov J3tov ci~iws KTA.: according to Diod. xxv. 10. 3-4 (d. 12, 19, Tzetzes) the king of the Orissi (Oretani; cf. P. iii. 33· 9) marched to relieve Helice (? Ilici, modern Elche), which Hamilcar was besieging, and in the subsequent flight the latter was drowned, still fighting and attending to his family's safety, in an unnamed river (Tzetzes calls it the Ebro) which was in flood (i.e. it was winter, 229/8). Livy, xxiv. 41. 3, puts the disaster near Castrum Album (Alicante ?) . This account, though anti-Barcine, is not inconsistent with P., who prefers to stress Hamilcar's death KaTa Tdv Tov Ktv3uvov Katp6v. A stratagem recorded by App. Hisp. 5; Zon. viii. r8; and Frontin. Strat. ii. 4· 17, will not :fit into Diodorus' account. P.'s high praise of Hamilcar seems to have penetrated the Roman tradition, despite the hatred of his son. Thus Cato crowns a list of those who were happier than kings with the name of Hamilcar (Plut. Cato mai. 8. 14). 9. TTJV .•• UTpa.T1'}yia.v .•• 1ra.pi8ocra.v :A.aSpou~~: on the Carthaginian urpaTT]yia in Spain see Bengtson (Aegyptus, 1952, 378-82); it was in effect a provincial governorship. ol Kap)(1]36vwt is vague; but Diod. xxv. 12 suggests that, like Hannibal later (cf. iii. 13. 4), Hasdrubal was :first acclaimed by the troops in Spain and his appointment subsequently ratified at home (iii. 13. 3). In the distorted account of App. Hisp. 4, Hasdrubal is a popular leader who supported Hamilcar at the time of his impeachment; for his marriage to Hamilcar's daughter see iii. 12. 3; Diod. xxv. ro. 3; App. Hann. 4· The antiBarcine account which made him Hamilcar's minion (Livy, xxi. 3-4; Nepos, Ham. 3) may be neglected. He had been back once to Carthage since 237, to quell a Numidian rising (Diod. xxv. ro. 3; Frontin. Strat. iv. i. 18); but the story of an attempted coup (iii. 8. 2) is suspect as part of the anti-Barcine tradition adopted by Fabius. For his later career see I3 and 36 below. 152
HAMILCA.l't IN SPAIN
II.
2.
4
Tc{l ••• TPlTJpa.px
entrusted to a close friend of the general; d. i. 44· r. 2-12. The First lllyrian vVar (231-228) This war is important to P.'s main theme (2. 2), as it first brought the Romans east of the Adriatic. For the greater part {2-{). 8, 9~10) his source is apparently Greek, and the narrative is strongly pre~ judiced against Aetolia (d. 2. 6-4. s); but 8 and II~I2 represent a Roman tradition, which may well be Fabius (so most historians, e.g. Taubler, Beloch, Gelzer, Holleaux). Bung, 184~. while accepting Fabius as a possible source for u-rz, is impressed by Bauer, who (AEM, r895, 136-47) rather improbably associates the pro-Roman version of 8 with the propagandist account of the affair given by Roman legati in Achaea (u. 4). There are secondary accounts in Dio, fg. 49 (cf. Zon. viii. r9), very unreliable, and App. Ill. (wellinformed on Illyria, but contaminated by annalistic inventions); see Holleaux, 78 n. 2 (worthlessness of Dio); Fluss, RE, 'Teuta', cols. u4o-2; Zippel, 46 ff. On the war in general see Holleaux, Etudes, iv. 9~25 ( REG, 1930, 243-{)r), for chronology; CAH, vii. 822 ff. (with bibliography, 931~3); E. Badian, BSR,, 1952, 72-9,3 with bibliography; G. Walser, Historia, ii, 1954. ,)o8~r8 (preferring Appian toP.); Thiel, Hist. 344 ff. (arguing against Holleaux that the Senate was seeking a chance to intervene). 1. 1. KaTO. 8~ Tous Kalpous TOuTous: a loose synchronism, for Hamilcar died in winter 229{8, whereas the Roman crossing (d. rr. r) was in spring 229, a date confirmed by Holleaux (Etudt's, iv. 9--2.5) against Beloch, who argues (iv. 2. 262-3; cf. Bung, r86) for z28, on the assumption of two to three months' retardation in the Roman calendar. Among other arguments, Holleaux points out that the expedition followed close on Paxos (ro. r, rr. r), which must be in 229, since by zz8 the Achaeans had broken with Aetolia {as Beloch later admitted; Holleaux, op. cit., zs n. 3); also that Demetrius II died early in 229 (44. 2 n.), about the time of the Roman expedition. 2. TTJV ••• ,.p69eow T~V ftf.li!TEpav: i.e. to show the growth of world affairs into an organic whole, i. 3· 3 ff., 4· I ff. In ii. I. 4 rrp69ems was rather the plan of the contents. avs11ow Ka.t KaTaaKe.uf]v: 'formation and growth', with hysteron proteron to avoid hiatus, cf. JI. 2, 3.5· 2, 41. 6, iii. 5· 3, i4· 3, xxiii. r6. 8. av~T)at> refers to the new links established by Rome in Illyria (though there were no territorial acquisitions after this war). 4. 'Aypwv o ... J)acnAEus: the ruler over a group of tribes around Scodra, and the Bay of Rhizon (Cattaro), who lived by piracy, carried out in light galleys (lemhi). His expanded realm controlled a large area from Dalmatia southwards, and included most of the 1 53
II. z. 4
THE FIRST ILLYRIAN WAR
Greek colonies on the Dalmatian islands, Pharos, Black Corcyra (Korcula), but not Issa (cf. vii. 9· IJ). Dio, fg. 49· 2-3 (cf. Zon. viii. 19) calls Agron king of the Ardiaei, and this is accepted by De Sanctis (ill. I. 294 n. 76) ; it is more likely than the suggestion of A. Gitti (Historia, 1935, I83-204) that he came from the Labeates, a tribe never mentioned at this period. The Ardiaei were, however, only part of his realm. See Zippel, 43 ff. ; and, for the dynastic table, Lenschau, RE, 'Pleuratos', cols. 237-8. 5. Allf.l.ll"'Piou Tou ~.Ahnrou 1Ta.Tp6~: Demetrius II, son of Antigonus Gonatas, king of :Macedon, 240/39-229. Philip was his son by the Epirote princess Phthia (v. 89. 7 n.). ME8u.wiol~ lm' AlTw).wv 1TOAlopteoup.~vol~: shortly before 23I a republican revolution had swept Epirus, overthrowing the royal house (Justin. xxviii. 3; Polyaen. viii. 52; Paus. iv. 35· 3), the Epirotes sought Achaean and Aetolian alliances (6. I), and Acarnania declared its independence. In 231 (DeSanctis, iii. I. 293 n. 73 for the date) the Aetolians began the siege of 1\ledion, on the frontier of central Acarnania. (1\ledion, the 1\ledeon of Thuc. iii. Io6. 2, lay on the southeast slope of a fertile ridge, fifteen minutes south of the modern village of Katouna; for its remains see Leake, NG, iii. 503, cf. 575-6; Heuzey, 347 ff.). As an enemy of Achaea and Aetolia (44. I, 46. I, xx. 5· 3) it was in Demetrius' interest to send aid; but communications were difficult and he was occupied against the Dardanians (Trogus, Prol. 28; Justin. xxviii. 3· 14; Livy, xxxi. 28. 2), and so he hired the help of the Illyrians for Medion. This device does not stand alone; the Phocian pirate Ameinias had helped Gonatas to take Cassandreia (Polyaen. iv. 6. 18), and the Cretan pirates were later to help Philip V against Rhodes (xiii. 5· I). 8. auvd.ljta.VTo~ Tou xpovou Twv cipxa.lpEaW..W: the annual election of Aetolian magistrates at Thermum was at the time of the autumn equinox (iv. 37· 2). The year is probably 231, since the fighting and compact in Epirus is :230, and the Roman invasion 229. Autumn 232 is not impossible, but unlikely, since Agron died immediately after the fall of 1\ledion (4. 6), yet his death was unknown to the Roman ambassadors (Dio, fg. 49· z)~indeed App. IU. 7 makes them find him still alive. DeSanctis, iii. I. 293 n. 73· Beloch's date of autumn 230 (iv. r. 636; 2. 531-2) assumes that the Roman invasion was in 228. 2. 9-4. 5. 1be account of the Aetolian peripeteia is developed by P. as anexampleofasuddenchangeoffortune,andalsoasawelcomerebuffto his old enemies, the Aetolia.ns (despite their alliance with Achaea, 6. 1 ). 2. 9. TftV E:mypa.~T)v TWV
THE FIRST ILLYRIAN WAR
II. 4· 5
example is Pausanias' inscription on the tripod dedicated at Delphi after Plataea: 'E>v\-,)vwv dpx7Jyo> E'TTEt trrpaTov a!.\.we M-,)Swv Ilawav{a,; (/>o{{Jtp f-Lvfif-L' avH17)KE T<:ille (ap. Thuc. i. 132. 2). 10. 1TEpl8eiva.l ••• TOV aTE~a.vov: for Fortune as the bestower of (metaphorical) crowns cf. v. 42. 8. 3. l. Ka.86.1rep ~Bos icnlv AiTwXoi:s: cf. iv. 67. 1 for the taking of office immediately on election. 1rpos rqv MeSua~v£a.v: though Medion is not a coastal town (xviii. 40. 5; Livy, xxxvi. n. 10), its territory may well have reached the Ambracian Gulf between that of Thyrrheum and the valley of Limnaea. The 'part nearest to the city' is probably the bay of Loutraki, about 7 miles from the town. 3. 2. Ka.Ta a1Te(pa.s: i.e. in small companies (d. ii. 66. 5, iii. rg. 5), probably kinship groups, like those envisaged in Homer, Iliad, ii. 362-3, where Agamemnon is advised Kpiv' avllpa> Ka"Ta
Likewise among the German tribes 'non casus nee fortuita conglobatio turmam aut cuneum facit, sed familiae et propinquitates' (Tac. Germ. 7· 3). In recent times the Albanians, descendants of Agron's Illyrians, fought in tribes and 'bairaq'( smaller kinship groups), and the Montenegrin Slavs in 'bratstva' (brotherhoods). 5. T~ 1rXT)8el KO.t T~ ~dopEL TTJS O'UVTdo~EWS: the Illyrian armour was heavy; cf. 66. 5, where Illyrian troops alternate with bronze-shielded Macedonians; 68. 5, g, for the weight of their arms and formation (uVvTa{L,;).
4. 3. rijs TUXTJS ••• evSeLKVUf.LEvT)S TTJV a.uTTjS 8Uva.f.LLV: for Tyche as a power punishing pride and delighting in sensational reversals see i. 35· z; 86. 7; above, pp. 18-rg. For the phraseology see also xi. 5· 8, xxiii. 10. r6, xxix. 19. 2 (where, as in i. 4· 5. Tyche is a play-producer). The phrase ovva.f-L'V • . • ivllnKVI.If-LEVlJ appears at xxix. 21. 5 in a quotation from Demetrius of Phalerum; and the present incident is paralleled, reflections and all, at xxx. ro. r-2, where, after Pydna, Aemilius Paullus appropriates and turns to his OY/11 honour the columns Perseus was constructing at Delphi. 5. G.v8pbi1Tous l>vTa.s: a communis locus (cf. Herod. i. 32; [Soph.] O.T. 1528-3o), cf. 7· I, iii. 31. 3, viii. 21. II, xv. 1. 8, xxi. 14. 4, xxiii. 12. 4, xxiv. ro. n, xxxviii. 20. 3. and several passages in Diodorus drawing on P.; d. von Scala, 165--6. It is common to both Stoic (e.g. [Heraclit.] Ep. 78. IS Bywater) and Peripatetic (e.g. Plut. Mor. 104 A, drawing here on Demetrius of Phalerum) sources. 155
rr. 4 . 6
THE FIRST ILLYRIAN WAR
6. I.I.ET~AAO.SE Tbv ~{ov: in autumn ZJI, €v o>.lyatS' ~p,lpat> after the battle. 7. T ~uTa 8lo.8Esai.I.Ev'1 Tbv ••• xe~pLafL6v: in fact as regent and guardian for Pinnes, the young son of Agron and a secondary wife Triteuta, who subsequently married Demetrius of Pharos; Zon. viii. I9; Dio, fg. 49· J, 53; App. Ill. 7; Livy, xxii. 33· 5 (a tradition independent of P.). In controlling the kingdom (Ta Trpri.yp,a.Ta, cf. i. zo. ::z n.) Teuta uses the normal Hellenistic council of rfoO.oL, found in the courts of all the major powers; cf. v. :z. In. P. follows a tradition on Teuta (d. Dio, fg. 49· 2-5; Zon. viii. I9) which attributes her policy to supposed feminine characteristics of headstrong emotion and lack of reason (cf. § 8, 8. 12), which are typical of Hellenistic historical writing of the more sensational kind. But the collaboration with Scerdila1das (5. 6) shows that the expedition of 230 (§ 9) was part of a policy of planned expansion into Epirus, preceded by attacks on Elis and .Messenia, both partly under Aetolian influence (iv. 59· I, etc., Elis; iv. 3· g, Messenia). Ill:yTian raids had extended as far as Laconia (Plut. Cleom. Io. n). Badian, BSA, 1952, 73· Ka.n~ ciJowtKTjV: the capital of the new federal Epirote republic (d. 2. 5 n.), a town in Chaonia about 8 miles inland from modern Saranda; cf. Syll. 653 A, 4, Td Kowdv Twv 'H1rnpwTWV [Twv] 1T£pt tl>owlt
5. 3.
156
THE FIRST ILLYRIAN WAR
II. 6. 8
the boundaries of Atintania see rr. II n.). However, the ceding of the area by the Romans to Philip in 205 (Livy, xxix. 12. 13) suggests that it had recently been Macedon ian; and Antigoneia looks like an Antigonid foundation (cf. Jones, Greek City, 13) despite Beloch's suggestion that Pyrrhus founded it, and named it after his late wife Antigone, to protect the gorges and northern frontiers of his kingdom (iv. 2. 381). Cary suggested (/Jist. 4oo) that Gonatas took Atintania from Epirus after Alexander II's intervention in the Chremonidean Vvar, and that Demetrius II restored it as compensation for the divorcing of Phthia; but it is now clear that Phthia was never divorced (Tarn, Ferguson Stttdies, 1940, 483 ff.), and Macedonian concessions to Epirus about 233 would be odd. Nevertheless, a very recent acquisition of Atintania by Epirus is not to be excluded; it may, for example, have been garrisoned during the period of joint hostility against the Aetolians, and retained when Demetrius came to terms with lli}Tia (to envisage but one out of several possibilities). But, in any case, its possession by Epirus at this date is assured. Twv ••• tCaTA TdS <j>uAa~
157
II. 6.9
THE FIRST ILLYRIAN WAR
9. aUj.Lj.LO.XlO.V ••• t-Ln' )\Ka.pvcivwv 1rpos Tous 'IXXupious: on the Acarnano-Illyrian alignment see 2. 5 ff. The date of this Epirote treaty, which will have pleased Demetrius II of Macedon, was summer or autumn 230. As its price the Epirotes seem to have ceded Atintania to Teuta (from whom the Romans took it the next year, II. n; cf. vii. 9· IJ); Holleaux, Rome, non. I; Beloch, iv. 2. 384; BusoltSwoboda, ii. I476 n. 4· Ambracia and Amphilochia may now have broken away from Epirus and joined Aetolia; cf. iv. 61. 6; Beloch, ibid.; Flaceliere, 252. P.'s didactic digression (6. 9-7. I2) is clearly prompted by his irritation, as an Achaean, at the desertion from the Achaeans (the Aetolians matter less) to the Illyrian side. 7. 6. TT)v a.&hoO TOO auan\j.LO.TOS ~KE(vou 1rpoa.ipeaLv: 'the conduct and reputation of that very band'. '"poalpm's is used by P. to mean either 'reputation' (e.g. ix. 9· 10) or 'conduct' (e.g. xviii. 3· 3); and often, as here, both meanings are present. avarTJp,a is 'a body of soldiers'; cf. i. 81. u, etc. On the history of these Gauls see Jullian, il. 327; Griffith, 252-3; Launey, i. 517; how they had originally betrayed their own friends and kinsmen (§ 6) is unknown. 7. Sui. To Ka.TmEiyea8a.L 1roA€t-L
8. l. Tous 11'Aotto ...€vous: 'traders (by sea)': see Schweighaeuser, Lex. Polyb. s.v.; iv. 42. 7 n. These traders were mainly from the Greek cities of southern Italy; see J. Hatzfeld (Les trafiquants italiens dans l'orient hellinistique (Paris, I9I9)) on their activities. 3. 1ra.pa.Kouovns ••• Twv EyKa.AouvTwv: this is the official Roman version of their reluctance to intervene in the eastern Mediterranean, probably received from Fabius (cf. 2-I2 n.). r a:iov kO.l AEUkLOV KopoyKa.vious: the annalistic version (cf. App. Ill. 7 ; Dio, fg. 49· I-z; Zon. viii. I9) tells how the people of Issa (cf. § 5), molested by Agron, threw themselves on the mercy of Rome. The Coruncanii were accordingly sent, and both a Coruncanius and I
58
THE FIRST ILLYRIAN WAR
II. 8.8
Cleemporus of Issa were murdered by Illyrian pirates. (There are more fantastic details in Livy, ep. 20; Florus, i. 21. 3; Oros. iv. 13. 2; and Pliny, Nat. kist. xxxiv. 24 calls one of the legati P. lunius.) The annalistic account is accepted by DeSanctis (iii. I. 295) and Walser (Historia, ii, 1954. 308-18), but looks like an example of the old legend that the Romans waged only iusta bella, and generally to defend allies. In fact Issa did not join the Romans until 229 (n. 12); for Gelzer (Hermes, 1933, 143) is not convincing, when he argues that Fabius omitted the story of lssa (like that of the Acarnanian embassy; 12. 7 n.) because it damaged his picture of Rome fighting to avenge an outrage, and exposed her to a charge of meddlesomeness. The object of the embassy is likely to have been a general reconnoitring visit (~1rlaKe!f;w 7TOt1Jaop.lvou~); see Badian, BSA, 1952, 76, and in general Munzer, RE, 'Coruncanius (1 and z)', col. 1663; Zippel, 47-50; Holleaux, Rome, 23 n. 6; Niese, ii. 281 n. 5· 5. E11'0AlopteEl Tijv "lava.v: Issa is an island off the Dalmatian coast, west of Pharos, modern Lissa; Fluss, RE, 'Issa', Suppl.-B. v, cols. 346-so. It had never formed part of Teuta's kingdom (d1re£8etv is 'refused to submit'). The Roman arrival was probably in autumn, 230 (Holleaux, CAH, vii. 831), and the interview here most likely gave rise to the false tradition (8. 3 n.) that the Issaeans provoked Roman intervention by their appeal and deditio (Treves, Athen., 1934, 387 n. 1). 8. teolvyj JlEv ••. t&'~ yf. JA-1\": Elizabeth I of England likewise gave letters of marque to her privateers and dismissed protests with contempt (De Sanctis, iii. I. 295). Treves has argued (Athen., 1934, 388 ft.) that Teuta was making a conciliatory offer of aat!Ala, and Badian would justify the Illyrian piracy as in order against Italian blockade-runners. But the Italian traders were not necessarily blockade-runners, nor could the Romans admit the Illyrian claim to blockade all states they were attacking; and Treves' view is hard to accept, since Teuta admitted her inability to control unofficial piracy. Hence an offer of davAla.----even if it is to be deduced from the equivocation P. reports--would have been farcical. P.'s account must be read as a whole, and clearly he believed himself to be recording an insult. The reliability of his narrative is another matter, and turns on the reliability of the Fabian version. Certainly the retort of the younger Coruncanius (probably Lucius; De Sanctis, iii. I. 295 n. 87) has the appearance of a post eventum invention designed to glorify the victim of the subsequent outrage and to reaffirm Roman regard for wrongs committed upon subjects~in short it is part of the Fabian tradition; see Treves, Athen., 1934, 389. Badian (BSA, 1952, 77), following Holleaux (Rome, 99), argues that the Roman reply was in fact a rerum repetitio ; but normally at this time a rerum repetitio was preceded by a conditional war-motion in the Senate and the !59
II. 8. 8
THE FIRST ILL YRIAN WAR
comitia (cf. CP, 1949, 15 ff.), and there is no evidence that the Coruncanii were authorized to do more than reconnoitre (contra Holleaux, Rome, 'f), who thinks that despite P.'s account they had the duty of delivering an ultimatum). Teuta's phraseology is ironically echoed by Coruncanius, e.g. KaT' Ullav &DtK~fJ.aTa Kowfi .•• 1TEtpaa6fJ.l£(Ja • , • § 10. 13. itrl Tfi tra.pa.vo.-~~ TtlS yuva.~Kos: 'at the outrage committed by a woman'.
9. 1. Tfjs l:Jpa.s ~trlYEVOf.\WrJS: i.e. spring 229. Tcuta's policy probably represents a determination to win bases in preparation for an inevitable war (so Treves, Athen., 1934, 391; Badian, BSA, 1952, 77). rather than evidence that she had no idea it was coming (Holleaux, Rome, 101). 2. ~iLO. tropou: 'straight across the high sea', cf. i. 39· 6. This gives a better contrast to putting in at Epidamnus than does the translation 'through the strait (sc. of Corcyra)' (so Paton). Cf. Schweighaeuser, ad loc. Corcyra and Epidamnus were independent Greek cities. 8. :4troAAwvui.Ta.L: the independent city of Apollonia lay just north of the Aous mouth. Its appeal to Achaea and Aetolia, rather than Rome, seems proof that the embassy sent to Rome c. 266 (VaL Max. vi. 6. 5; Dio, fg. 42; Zon. viii. 7; Livy, ep. 15) had had no political sequel; De Sanctis, ii. 428; Holleaux, Rome, 1-5. 9. Tas ... va.us Ka.Ta.+pa~eTous: on the meaning see i. 20, 13 n. 10. 1. 1T€pl TOUS Ka.Aoup.Evous na.€ous: there are two islands, Paxos and Antipaxos, lying 5 miles south of Corcyra, opposite the Acheron mouth; cf. Pliny, Nat. hist. iv. 52. See Johanna Schmidt, RE, 'Paxoi', cols. 2437~8; Hammond, ]HS, 1945, 27 and map (Pl. I). 3. t~ru~a.vTES To us • • • AEJ.I~ous O.vO. Tena.pa.s: lashed together in fours, the light lembi (i. zo. 13 n.) gained in bulk and stability, and once the enemy's beak was embedded in the side of one of the outer ships, boarding became possible. The manreuvre is significant for the general change over to boarding tactics about this time, and points to considerable naval adaptability on the part of the Illyrians. Tarn (HMND, 145) observes that in the First Punic War 'the Roman sword beat the Carthaginian ram'; the Illyrian victory at Paxos underlined the same lesson. 5. trAoiwv •.• TETp'l")plKwv: on these ships see i. 20. 9 n.; so too for the quinquereme. MO.pyos o Ka.puvEos: on his earlier career see 41. 14 (assassination of the tyrant of Bura, 27 5/4), 43· 2 (first holder of the single generalship, 255/4). Later overshadowed by Aratus, he is only mentioned again here, dying a hero's death at an advanced age. As commander of the 160
THE FIRST ILL YRIAN WAR
II.
I I.
5
quinquereme he was probably navarch of the Achaean squadron (Niese, ii. z83). See Kroll, RE, 'Margos (1)', col. 1709. On the phrase -;rdvTa Td O[Ka'a Tij> KO,Vij> .•. 1rf'1TO'"f/Ktf>'i (cf. iii. JI6. 9), Which iS typical of the phraseology of contemporary laudatory inscriptions, see Schulte, 52. 8 • .AT)IJ.tlTp~ov Tov ILj)cip~ov: Demetrius was apparently a Greek (or possibly a hellenized Illyrian) who governed Pharos (modem U:sina or Hvar) as Teuta's vassal; Gitti (BHlt. comm. Rom., 1935, 13) argues less probably that he was a private citizen of Pharos. 11. 1. K!lTU 8~ Tous ulJTous KaLpoos: d. 2. I n. rvaaos }lEV 1Lj)6Xou~os ••• A3Xos &~ noaTO}ltOS: Cn. Fulvius CnJ. Cn.n. Centumalus and L. Postumius A.f. A.n. Albinus, the consuls for A.u.c. 525 = 229/8 B.c. The correct praenomen is attested for Postumius by Livy, xxii. 35· 6, xxiii. 24. 3, and by the Fast. Cap. P.'s error in giving him his father's praenomen may go back to an error in Fabius or, more probably (cf. Bung, r86 n. 2), is attributable to a }{S. fault. See Munzer, RE, 'Fulvius (42)', coL 235; 'Postumius (4o)', col. 912; Beloch, iv. 1. 665. 4. iv Ota~oXa'Ls wv: Treves (Athen., 19,34. 389---90) argued that Demetrius had already made contact with the envoys of zJo, who at Issa were not far from Pharos. But Badian (BSA, I95z, 77 n. 19) points out that P. clearly distinguishes his contacts with Rome from the disfavour which led to them, and suggests that Demetrius may have been intriguing to obtain the guardianship of Pinnes (which he subsequently obtained by marrying Triteuta; Dio, fg. 53). 5-12. Illyrian towns and tribes join Rome. Corcyra (§ 5), Apollonia (§ 8), Epidamnus (§ ro), the Parthini (§ n), the Atintanes (§ u), and lssa (§ u) made acts of dedit£o to Rome. P. here translates fides by 1rlcrn<;, amicitia by if>,).{a; on the latter relationship, which came into existence with the act of deditio, but did not necessarily imply the making of a joedus, see A. Reuss (Grtmdlagen, 78-s3). All {except Issa, on which see below) feature in the treaty of 215 between Philip V and Hannibal as if subject to Rome (vii. 9· 13). Their subsequent status is not, however, wholly clear. Taubler's belief (i. zs) that they received libertas precaria by a Roman decree (so too Holleaux, CAH, vii. 836) has been refuted by the arguments of Reuss (Grundlagen), demolishing the conception of a category of dediticii with precaria libertas. That they were free is confirmed by App. Ill. 8, 'Pwp.a'io' ..• K.!pKvpo.v p.ev KO.t l11Tolu\wvlav a
161
II.
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5
THE FIRST ILLYRIAN WAR
Details are as follows : Corcyra, Apollonia, and Epidamnus retained coining rights, and minted victoriates, drachmae, those for Corcyra having the inscription ROMA (d. Mommsen, Geschichte des romischen Miinzwesens (Berlin, 186o), 394 ff.; Zippel, 90; B.l~·f.C. Rom. Rep., ii. 196-7). It is convincingly argued by Badian (BSA, 1952, Son. 5) that these coins were struck by Corcyra at the request of Rome, 'probably ... to pay Roman troops in the East'; d. De Sanctis (iii. 1. 302 n. 97), who emphasizes the Greek initials of the minting magistrate. Pliny, Nat. hist. iv. 52, refers to Corcyra as a free city; but the coarse remark recorded by Strabo, vii, fg. 8, £Aw(Npa KopKvpa, x€r o1rov 8€Aetr;, may go back to the fourth century or earlier, either 426 (Bursian, ii. 362 n. 2), 372 (De Sanctis, iii. 1. 302 n. 97) or perhaps 353, when the anti-Athenian party was in power (Dem. xxiv. 202). Apollonia (see above for App. Ill. 8) now became the main point for the landing of Roman armies east of the Adriatic (e.g. Livy, xxx.i. 18. 9, 40. 6, xlii. 18. 3, etc.), though in 205 P. Sempronius landed at Epidamnus (subsequently called Dyrrhachium: Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 145), as did M. Lucretius in 171 (Livy, xxix. 12. 3, xlii. 48. 7). Issa later contributed a useful naval contingent to the Roman fleet (Livy, xxxi. 45· 10, xxxii. 21. 27, xxxvii. 16. 8, xlii. 48. 8). The setting up of this protectorate (the extent of which should not be exaggerated; Badian, BSA, 1952, 78) ensured command of the straits against further piracy. Its basis was the loose relationship of amicitia, which applied the Roman concept of clientela in the sphere of foreign policy. 'The freedom of the Illyrian cities ... leads directly to the Isthmian proclamation (sc. of 196)' (Badian, op. cit. 81). Against Holleaux's thesis (Rome, 109-12) that the Romans were looking beyond Illyria to Macedon see the compelling arguments of Cary (History, 406), who shows how little the Adriatic concerned the Antigonids prior to Philip V. 5. wa.pa.KATJ9Evns: 'encouraging each other' (Emesti, Schweighaeuser, Treves, who makes it reinforce opo6vpao6v), or 'invited (by the Romans)' (Casaubon, Paton, Niese (ii. 283 n. 2)). Schweighaeuser argues that subsequent events showed that Roman exhortation was unnecessary; but the Corcyraeans would not know the procedure of deditio without some explanation and encouragement (for Greek confusion on this matter d. xx. 9· 10 ff., xxxvi. 4). Hence the second version is preferable. (It carries no implications for a Roman policy of imperialism, as Kolbe, 5.-B. Heidelberg, 1933/4,4, 27n. 3.) The views here attributed to the Corcyraeans (plav ... aacp6.Aetav) arc part of the Roman propagandist version of events. 7. Roman land forces. These 2o,ooo foot and 2,ooo horse, like Fulvius' 2oo ships (II. 1), indicate the serious Roman view of the war. But Holleaux is not convincing (Rome, 102 n. 3) in his thesis not only r6z
THE FIRST ILL YRIA:.T WAR
II.
II.
15
that these preparations preceded the death of Demetrius II (as they did) but that they were designed to meet a possible Macedonian attack in support of the Illyrians; cf. Badian, BSA, 1952, 76-77. 10. Tous etO"w To1Tous Tfls 'l).i..upioos: not the inland districts, but those parts of Teuta's kingdom lying in the farther recesses of the Adriatic (Zippel, sr); cf. Zon. viii. Ig, Ta xwpla 11"op87]Q'&vTWV Ta mfpa)la. The Ardiaei (the tribe to which the royal family belonged: Dio, fg. 49· 2) were at this time widely extended, and the Romans will not have sailed as far as the Narenta (modem Neretva). their original home; Tomaschek, RE, 'Ardiaioi', col. 6r5. The fate of the Ardiaeans whom the Romans reduced is uncertain; they were perhaps assigned to the Parthini or to Demetrius of Pharos (Badian, BSA, 1952,78 n. 26). 11. na.p&(vwv ..• )\TWTUVW\1: the Parthini seem to have occupied the hinterland of Dyrrhachium, as far south as the Apsus (modern Devol), and eastward towards Lake Lychnidos (Dio, xli. 49· 2; xlii. xo. 1; App. Bell. civ. v. 75; Strabo, vii. 326; Livy, xliv. 30. 13). See Tomaschek, RE, 'Parthini', cols. 2029 ff. The Atintanes (see 5· 6 n.) dwelt inland behind Apollonia and Oricum, as far south as Dodona (Ps.-Scyl. z6, a corrupt passage). Thus Atintania included the lower Aous valley, along ·with that of the Drynos, and the fortress-town of Antigoneia (Tepeleni); cf. 5· 6 n. 12. Tous 'IO'O'a.tous: cf. Zon. viii. rg. The siege lasted from autumn 230 (8. 5) until midsummer, 229; there is no need to assume a break after the Roman demarche and a resumption after Paxos, with Treves (Athen., 1934, 387 n. r). The absence of lssa from the treaty of 215 (vii. 9· 13-14) gives no grounds for accepting any part of the annalistic account of the preliminaries of the war (8. 3 n.) (so Zippel, 47· 92-93; De Sanctis, iii. 1. 301 n. g6) nor yet for assuming a joedus aequum with Rome (DeSanctis, ibid.). See Holleaux. Rome, xo6 n. 3· 13. 1TEpl NouTp(a,v: Dio, fg. 49· 7, 1T
o
163
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THE FIRST ILLYRIAN WAR
ei.~ Tov ~p~wva.: unknown. Tomaschek (RE, 'Arbon', col. 419) suggests a connexion with Albanopolis (Ptol. Geog. iii. 12. :zo), modern Arbunr;, near Kruja (which Anna Comnena (xiii. s) calls TO }ip{Jav&v); this would be the earliest reference to the modern name 'Albania'. But it seems more probable that this is a distorted reference to Narona, a Dalmatian town opposite Pharos, and near the sea (Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 142; further references and sketch-map in l\L Fluss, RE, 'Narona', cols. 1743-55; 'Teuta', col. n46), as Schweighaeuser suggested. 16. Ets Tov 'Pltova.: modern Risano, at the head of the Bay of Cattaro, which P. (like Ps.-Scylax, 24) calls & 'Pitwv wo-rafL&s:; cf. Apoll. Rhod. iv. 5I6; Steph. Byz.: Bov8G-'J, £x£1 S' E7Tt TOV fLVXOV 'Pltova 1ToAw Kat TrOTafLo" OfLciWvfLov, where, however, the gulf and the wo-rafLos seem to be distinguished. Hence it is argued by D. Vouksan (Albania, 193z, 77 n. r, plan on p. 78) that 'la riviere, dont la source se trouve aujourd'hui dans une caverne situee au-dessus de Risan, devait etre alors plus abondante que de nos jours et traverser la ville ancienne qui s' etendait en partie sur un emplacement que la mer a maintenant conquis'. But this hardly fits P. and Ps.-Scylax. See in general Oberhummer, RE, 'Pl,wv, cols. 937--9· The words dvaKexwpTJKOS dwo Tijs OaAaTTTJ> signify 'at a distance from the sea', i.e. at the head of the gulf (or supposed river), rather than 'high up above the sea' on a craggy eminence (Treves). 17. fLEyciX,v a.uT~ 1T£pL9ilvTEs 8uva.aTEia.v: P. is clearly thinking of a long-term settlement, and not a mere temporary arrangement (so Badian, BSA, 1952, 79); but he exaggerates Demetrius' Svvaa-reia (contrast App. Ill. 8, .JTJfLTJTplcp o' laTH' a xrupia jlta06v £Sormv Tfj;; 7Tpoooalas). Its extent is unknown; but until he increased his power by marrying Triteuta, Pinnes' mother (4. 7 n; Dio, fg. 53) he probably possessed little more than Pharos and a few coastal places (Beloch, iv. r. 666; Holleaux, Rome, 105; CAH, vii. 835; Badian, op. cit. So), which joined Rome after Teuta's flight from Issa. These possessions can hardly have extended as far south as Lissus (De Sanctis, iii. r. 302 n. 98); cf. Gitti (Bull. comm. Rom., 1935, 14), who, however, includes the Ardiaei in Demetrius' domains.
12. 1-1. q,oAouLos rls T~v •pWfLTJV ciw.E1rAeuae: because Fulvius celebrated a naval triumph pro cos. ex Illurieis on zr June 228, De Sanctis (iii. r. 297 n. 89) suggested that P. has confused the two consuls, and that it was Postumius who returned to Rome in 229. But Holleaux, who was first inclined to reject the reference in the act. tr. (Rome, 102 n. 6), and later accepted De Sanctis's thesis (CAH, vii. 835 n. z), has shown (Etudes, iv. x. 22 ff. REG, I9JO, 258 ff.) that postponed triumphs are relatively common, and may spring from a variety of causes-illness, political opposition, etc. ; 164
THE FIRST ILLY RIAN WAR
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12.
4
in such cases there was a precedent for the late consul's taking a purely formal proconsulship for his triumph, like L. Scipio in 189 (Livy, xxxvii. 59· 6; A. M. Colini, Bull. comm. Rom., 1928, 269-74). Postumius received no triumph at all, though P. gives him the greater credit. Had his losses been too heavy? So Munzer (RE, 'Postumius (4o)', col. 913); but there is no evidence that he rather than Fulvius was responsible for the losses in n. IJ. 3. Sla.1TpEaj3Euaa..,.€v1J 1rpos Taus 'Pw.,.a.(ous: i.e. to Postumius at Epidamnus (§ 4). Peace terms with Teuta. P.'s source was assumed by Valeton (:zo6) and von Scala (:z68) to be the Achaean record office; Schulte (4o) thought it was the Roman records. It is indeed possible, though not very likely, that the Achaeans filed the report made to them by Postumius (§ 4; Bauer, AEM, r895, 137). But it is improbable that P. carried out detailed research for these introductory books, and in any case be is unlikely to have had access to the Achaean record office when he was writing them. His most probable source is Fabius Pictor. (r) 4>opous ••. olanv: probably an indemnity, payable in instalments, like that imposed on Carthage after the First Punic War (i. 62. 9); cf. Beloch, iv. I. 666 n. 1; Holleaux, Rome, 105 n. 5· The amount is not recorded. Livy, xxii. 33· 5 probably refers to a new, but similar, indemnity imposed in 219. (2) 1Ta0'1'JS T' 6.va.xwp~anv '~'il'> 'l>.>.upt8os 1TA~v b>.(:ywv Tlnrwv: according to Appian, Ill. 7, the Romans permitted Pinnes T'i]v a'M:'lv i4ypwvos dpx~v ;X"'v, and Teuta accepted these terms. Probably this means that Teuta agreed to surrender the regency (to Demetrius) and withdraw to a 8vva.a-rda. (as P. here implies). Cf. Dio, fg. 49· 7, 'ITaVTeAws Ka-r€SEuJE Jcal T~v tipx~v &.
II.
12.
4
THE FIRST ILLYRIAN WAR
Zonaras (viii. r9) records how at Athens 77oAtTdas atf>wv Twv ,.., p,vanJPlwv JhET~axov. De Sanctis (iii. z. 438 n. 98) would reduce this to a grant of 77potevla; but it should probably be rejected outright (d. Niese, ii. 285 n. 4; Taubler, i. zr6; Ferguson, 21o n. 3, 256 n. 2; Holleaux, Rome, II7 n. r). There is no reason to regard these embassies as anti-)facedonian. Those to Achaea and Aetolia were a purely formal exchange of courtesies, without any political sequel (Holleaux, Rome, II3 ff.); and those to Corinth (an Achaean city, not competent to engage in independent political exchanges) and to Athens will have been motivated by the prestige and perhaps the commercial power of these two cities (Beloch, iv. 1. 667). Moreover, there was little to fear from Macedon in 228, when the regent Doson (guardian to Philip since Demetrius II's death in spring 229 (44. z n.)) was facing a Dardanian invasion and the Aetolian seizure of much of Thessaly (cf. Walbank, Philip, Io-n). In fact, our sources have no reference to Macedon in this context. 4. -rrpos n ·TOu<; Ahw?.ou<; Ka.i. To Twv :A..xa.lwv (8vo<;: who had sent help to the Corcyraeans at Paxos (9. 8 ff.). Since the death of Demetrius II their alliance had been dissolved de facto, if not openly denounced (below, 45-46 nn.). The purpose of the Roman visit was partly formal, partly propagandist; Roman policy in lllyria was portrayed as defending the ius gentium against Illyrian 11apavop,la (n. 5)· Cf. Gelzer, Hermes, H)33· I32. 7. €n S' rnmAoKt, p.t:TU -rrpE:O'~ELCl<;: this statement contradicts Iustinus' account (xxviii. 1. 5 ff.) of an Acarnanian appeal to the Senate, and a Roman demarche in Aetolia, c. 239, which was brusquely rejected. Iustinus' story is accepted by De Sanctis (iii. I. zj8 n. I), Meyer (Kl. Schr. ii. 382 n. r), Kolbe (S.-B. Heidelberg, 1933/4, 4. 26), and Beloch (iv. r. 634 n. 3, 'P. kann seine Grtinde gehabt haben, den diplomatischcn MiBerfolg der Romer zu verschweigen'). Gelzer (Hermes, 1933. 144) suggests that Fabius, P.'s source, was reluctant to spoil his picture of the First Illyrian \Var with an earlier story of Roman interference and failure; but Iustinus' account is vague and inaccurate, and the arguments against its authenticity are strong; cf. Holleaux, Rome, 5-22; Treves, Rend. Line., 1932, 196-7. P. is thinking of political contacts, and this passage does not bear on the authenticity of the tradition of a fifthcentury embassy to Greece to gather materials for the Twelve Tables (Livy, iii. 31 ff.; Dion. Hal. x. 52, 54). 8. -rrpos KopwEILou<; Kal. -rrpos ;t!.STJva.(ous: here 'Pwp,aio£ means 'the Senate' ; Holleaux, Rome, I r4 n. 2. On the purpose of the visit see 12. 4-8 n. That the Romans made a formal proclamation at the Isthmian Games (De Sanctis, iii. r. 303) is an assumption not warranted either by this passage or by Zon. viii. r9 (which merely confirms the admission of the Romans to the festival, adding that 166
THE FIRST ILLYRIAN WAR
II. 13.2
Kat aTa8wv Jv airr
13. Hasdrubal in Spain (229-221) The source remains pro-Barcine (d. Gelzer, Hermes, 1933, rs8-iJ). The reference to the Ebro Treaty {§ 7) makes an artistic transition to the Gallic \Vars (14-35), but leaves Hasdrubal's death and Hannibal's succession to the command for 36. I-2. On Hasdrubal's achievements see also Diod. xxv. II. I, 12; App. Hisp. 6; Zon. viii. 19; below, iii. 13. 2 n. 13. 1. EV ••• TOUTOLS a1TEAl-rroJ.LEV Ta KO.Ta T~V 'I~TjpLa.V: see I. 9· Illyrian events have been brought down to the date of Hasdrubal's death (>vinter 229) and P. returns to the Spanish field. Paton's translation, 'we have said nothing of affairs in Spain during these years' (231-228?), is plainly absurd. Ka.pxTJSOva. ••• Ka.Lv~v v6ALv: P. uses both names, cf. iii. 13. 7, 15. 3, 17. I, etc. (Kmv~ 1ToAts-), x. 6. 8, IS· 11, etc. (Kapx:rJ:Sdw) ; an apparent exception is explicable as a gloss, iii. 39· 6 n. The former is a translation, the latter an adaptation of the Phoenician Qart-Chadasht 'New Town' (Ehrenberg, Karthago, 13). New Carthage was founded (cf. Diod. xxv. I2; Zon. viii. 19) about 228 on the site of the older Phoenician settlement Mastia (d. iii. 24. 4 n.), which notably resembled that of Carthage itself. 'This city ... was better placed than Alicante to keep in touch with Africa, because it was nearer and possessed a magnificent harbour, the best on the east coast of Spain, indeed one of the best harbours in the world' (Schulten, CAH, vii. 788).
2. T~v 9£mv ••• Ka.t T~v XPELa.v: cf. x. 9 ft. for the topography; in x. 11. 4 P. states that he writes airr61TTat y"yov6ns. If he visited New Carthage while in Spain with Scipio in 151 (cf. iii. 4-5 n., § 3 (ii), 57-59 n.; De Sanctis, iii. 1. 212), that statement was probably inserted in book x before publication (for composition, though not publication, had certainly progressed beyond book x by then). It would not, however, follow that the present passage is also a later insertion (Susemihl, ii. 110 n.), for P. can have intended writing an account of New Carthage before seeing it personally. If he also 167
II.
13. 2
HASDRUBAL IN SPAIN (229-221)
discussed its advantages relative to Spain and Africa, his account has not survived. 3. wpf1TJ11C1V hrt To 11'o)\u11'payf1oV€~v Ta KaTa Ti]v 'I~TJp(av: despite P.'s suggestion that the Senate ('Pwp,atm} had hitherto neglected Spanish affairs, Dio's account (fg. 48: probably based on Coelius Antipater; Taubler, Vorgesch. 82) of a Roman embassy to Hamilcar in 231, to question Punic activities in Spain, is quite credible (De Sanctis, iii. 1. 411 n. 59; rejected by Holleaux, Rome, 123 n. 4) ; Hamilcar justified them by the need to raise money to pay the Roman indemnity. The Romans may have entered into their alliance with Saguntum now; but this is far from certain (13. 7 n. (d), iii. 15. I n.). 4-5. Roman policy. P. here implies that the Senate was resolved to act against the Punic empire in Spain, but for reasons of expediency, connected with the Gallic danger, 'smoothed down Hasdrubal' (§ 6} and persuaded him to sign an agreement (§ 7); once free to act, the Romans would proceed against Carthage without scruple (§ 5, lmTaTTHv 7} TToAEp,Ew}; cf. 22. 9-11. In both passages Hasdrubal's empire is a threat to be countered as soon as circumstances allow. This probably makes Roman policy more clearly defined than it really was at this date. 4. Et5 To f-LEynATJV X€~pa KaTauKw0.uau8al: 'to build up a powerful dominion' (Paton), 'the opportunity of consolidating their power' (Shuckburgh), 'creuisse opes Carthaginiensium' (Schweighaeuser), 'per costruirsi un impero' (Treves). But f-1-"YclA'IJ X"tp is 'a large body of men' (cf. i. 44· 7; Herod. vii. I$7. etc.; LSJ, s.v. X"tp, v). P. is considering the danger to Rome inherent in a large army recruited in Spain, and hence interprets Roman action as defensive; cf. iii. 10. 6, the Carthaginians ..-avTats ••• Tais X"pai mant5aavns- .,iJ8apaws €vl.f3'rJaav .,;, T6v ... 7TOA€f.WV. Translate, therefore, 'to build up and equip a large body of troops'. 6. Ka.Tao/TjuavT£5 .•. Kat 1rpauvavTES Tov ~uopoul3av: in contrast to their policy in 231 (r3. 3 n.). P.'s expression does not imply protracted negotiations (Meyer, Kl. Schr. ii. 341), but merely proposals which would seem acceptable to Hasdrubal. 7. The Ebro treaty: cf. 22. 11, iii. 15. 5, 21. I, 27. 9, 29. 2-3, 30. 3· This agreement (avv8i]Kat here and (by implication) in iii. 30. 3. elsewhere, more accurately, 6p,oAoy{at, 8w[.WAoyl)aoo:•s) was made between Hasdrubal and representatives of the Senate, probably between autumn 226 and spring 225 (cf. 23. 6 n.), in view of the Gallic danger, which culminated in 225 (DeSanctis, iii. 1. 4I2 n. 62). Controversy surrounds both the content and the significance of the treaty, and also its role in the diplomatic exchanges which preceded the Hannibalic War. (a) Content. P. mentions only one clause, 'that the Carthaginians were not to cross the Ebro in arms'. But it has been widely argued 168
HASDRUBAL IN SPAIN
(229--221)
II. 13.7
(e.g. by Otto, Groag, Hallward, Treves) that a complementary clause limited the Romans in an identical fashion. Certainly it is hard to believe that the Romans were not bound by such a clause; though many of those historians who do not admit the existence of this (e.g. De Sanctis, Momigliano, Taubler, Schulten), assume that the treaty recognized a Carthaginian right to advance up to the Ebro (Taubler (Vorgesch. 49-5o) argues that this right was accorded in a separate, parallel document agreed by the Romans). Thus on either interpretation the treaty looks like a concession to Carthage, recognizing what had been, or was on the point of being, achieved in Spain south of the R. Ebro. It has frequently been argued (e.g. by De Sanctis, Taubler, Altheim) that the treaty does not demarcate spheres of influence, since this was not a Roman conception at this time; but it can hardly have left either side free to strike alliances or develop commercial contacts across the Ebro, merely limiting military activity (so T. Frank; on this see :Meyer, Kl. Schr. ii. 363 n. 2). To be effective an alliance must allow for the sending of military assistance, and against this the treaty established the Ebro as a substantial barrier. Further, if (as has been plausibly suggested, e.g. by T. Frank and DeSanctis) the driving force behind Rome was Massilia, with which Rome had long enjoyed friendly relations (Diod. xiv. 93· 5; Strabo, iv. r8o; Iustin. xliii. s) and had struck an alliance in the period since the First Punic \Var (Livy, xxi. 20. 8, socii; cf. Philipp, RE, 'Massalia', col. 2132), she would hardly view with equanimity Carthaginian penetration in the areas around her colonies of Rhode (Rosas) and Emporiae (Ampurias), which lay on the coast between the Ebro and the Pyrenees. T. Frank (CAH, vii. 8ro) even suggests that Massilia was a party to the pact, but of this there is no evidence; on the other hand, Schulten's objection (CAH, vii. 788), that the surrender of her colonies south of the Ebro must have left Massilia discontented, is not very substantial, since these had probably gone already (iii. IJ. 2 n.). On balance, therefore, it seems probable that the Romans accepted a limiting clause like that restricting Carthage. (b) Form and validity. The treaty was apparently agreed between Hasdrubal and a senatorial commission. Presumably it was ratified in Rome (contra Taubler, Vorgesch. 49), and from the Roman point of view counted as a valid treaty. But in reply to the alleged Carthaginian argument (see iii. zr. r n.) that it either was nonexistent, or else had never been ratified at Carthage and hence was not valid, the Romans, instead of contradicting the assertion, merely argued that ratification at Carthage was superfluous (cf. iii. 29. 3, ath-OTEAW> brot~(FO.TO ras DJWAoylas }luSpov~as). This suggests that, although the Barcids were normally accompanied by Councillors from Carthage (cf. iii. zo. 8, TOV> fLET' ath-oiJ crvv,Spov>, 71. 5, vii. 9· I, 169
II. 13. 7
HASDRUBAL IN SPAIN (zzg-221)
yepovcnacrrai, signatories to the treaty between Hannibal and Philip V), the Ebro treaty was not ratified at home; cf. Taubler, i. 95· Probably the Barcids had power to make local agreements of this nature (De Sanctis, iii. I. 414 n. 66), a convenient arrangement, which would leave the Carthaginian senate free to repudiate them afterwards. On their side the Romans were playing for time, and, provided Hasdrubal observed the agreement until the Gauls had been defeated, preferred not to press for any formal ratification. Hence the treaty is to be regarded, at least on the Carthaginian side, as a purely local arrangement, and not as an additional clause to the treaty of 24I. (c) Significance. For the Romans, the treaty removed the risk of a Carthaginian alliance with the Gauls, and enabled them to reserve the 'Spanish problem' to a later date; they could thus look forward to rounding off their Italian frontiers, and extending their interests to southern Gaul and northern Spain without encountering the Carthaginians (22. Io-n). On Hasdrubal's side, the treaty recognized the Carthaginian right to advance to the Ebro, though Punic arms had not yet penetrated so far; De Sanctis (iii. I. 4I2) estimates that they had not yet reduced half the area south of the Ebro. It must, therefore, be a largely subjective judgement to decide whether the agreement was a diplomatic triumph for Rome (Mommsen) or Carthage (Egelhaaf). (d) The Ebro treaty and Saguntum. Some years before Hannibal succeeded to the command (2I9) the Iberian city of Saguntum had struck an alliance with the Romans (iii. 30. I, 1TAelouw ~Twtv 7}81) 1TpoTEpov TWV KaT' YJ.wi{Jav I
HASDRUBAL IN SPAIN {22g-zzr)
II. I3. 7
armed assistance; if made earlier (e.g. in 231), it is less clear how it stood in relation to the treaty. Hallward has argued (CAH, viii. 28) that 'the alliance was not invalidated by the Ebro treaty, which, however, carried with it the implied obligation on Rome not to use the town as an instrument to hinder Carthaginian expansion within the sphere recognized as open to her'. De Sanctis (Problemi, 168 ff. ; cf. Hesselbarth, 85, 90) believes that the Ebro treaty virtually sacrificed Saguntum to Hasdrubal. Probably the position was never clarified. But at bottom the Saguntine alliance and the Ebro treaty were irreconcilable; and in the last resort the Romans had no legal redress against a Punic attack on the town, for which the implications of the Ebro treaty were sufficient justification. W. Kolbe (S.-B. Heidelberg, 1933/4, 4, 21 ff.) has argued that the Ebro treaty automatically included allies of both sides, and so gave Saguntum the protection accorded to the allies mentioned in the treaty of 241 (to which he regards the Ebro treaty as a pendant). But the Ebro treaty contained no such clause covering allies, as far as we know (Bikerman, Rev. phil., 1936, 284-8). Moreover, the allies in 241 were actually specified and a list was appended to the treaty (cf. iii. 21. 5; Taubler, Vorgesch. 63 ff.; Meyer, Kl. Schr. ii. 368). Hence there are no grounds for supposing that the Ebro treaty sanctioned the Saguntine alliance. Recently Carcopino has argued (REA, 1953, 258-93) that there were two Ebros, and that Hasdrubal's treaty concerned the southern one, the R. Jucar (Sucro); his thesis implies an unbelievable lack of clarity in P., who is supposed to have been aware of the homonyms, and it is unlikely to win any adherents. (e) Later distortions. In the course of the second century violent discussions on the question of the responsibility for the Hannibalic War gave disproportionate attention to the Ebro treaty; and it became part of the Roman case to prove that Hannibal's attack on Saguntum was, somehow, a breach of this treaty. This confusion sprang from the fact that the Roman declaration of war at Carthage (iii. 20-21, 33) gave to the attack on Saguntum, for reasons of policy, a prominence which really belonged to the crossing of the Ebro, especially if this (despite iii. 40. 2; cf. iii. 20. 6 n.) really preceded the sending of the Roman embassy; and Cato's accusations against the Carthaginians as constant treaty-breakers (HRR, i. 8r, 84) may mean that he played a large part in shaping the Roman version (Gelzer, Phil., 1931, 266--9 = Vom r6mischen Staat (Leipzig, 1943), 86 ff.; Hermes, 1933, 16o). To support this version the terms of the treaty were distorted, either by the insertion of a special clause excepting Saguntum from the treaty, or by locating Saguntum north of the Ebro; and the words T~V J.L~V aAATJV , lfJwtav 7TaptatW1TWV (§ 7) (i.e. they omitted all reference to the rest of Spain) perhaps represent Polybian polemic against the first of these distortions 171
II. IJ. 7
HASDRUBAL IN SPAIN (229-221}
(Otto, HZ, 145, 1932, so1). The second error is, however, to be found in P.'s own discussion (in iii. 15. s. 30. 3, and perhaps iii. 61. 8 and iv. 28. 1). Examples of these distortions are App. Hisp. 7; Hann. 2; Lib. 6 (Saguntum and 'other Greek [sic] towns in Spain' appeal to Rome; the Senate sends envoys to Carthage and makes an agreement which lays down the Ebro as the frontier between the two empires, but guarantees that Saguntum and the Greek towns shall be free and autonomous. This version also puts Saguntum north of the Ebro); Livy, xxi. z. 7, ' . . . Saguntinisque mediis inter imperia duorum populorum libertas seruaretur'; cf. 44· 6; Zon. viii. 21, £~atp€TOvs £1rmot~Kwav. Though important as contributions to the arguments which began soon after the Hannibalic ·war and reached their climax shortly before 150 (iii. zg. 1 ff.), these versions are irrelevant to the treaty itself. The bearing of the treaty on the question of responsibility for the war is discussed below (iii. 21. 1 n.). (f) Bibliography. See the works quoted in CAH, viii. 724-5, and Scullard, His!. 197 n. 1; add: G. De Sanctis, Riv. ji.l., 1932, 426-7; W. Kolbe, S.-B. Heidelberg, 1933/4, 4 (cf. E. Bikerman, Rev. phil., 1936, 284-8; P. Treves, REA, 1935. 136-7); C. J. C. Arnold, Oorzaak en Schuld van den Tweeden Punischen Oorlog (Amsterdam, 1939); G. Giannelli, Roma nell' eta delle guerre puniche (Bologna, 1938) (cf. J. Vogt, Gnomon, 1940, 16-17); F. Altheim, Epochen, ii. 51 ff.; J. Carcopino, REA, 1953, 258-93; F. M. Heichelheim, Historia, 1954, 211-19. e1rt 'II"OAEI-1~: stressed by Taubler (Vorgesch. 61 f.) as evidence that
only military expeditions across the Ebro were meant; but this thesis is not sufficient to reconcile the treaty with the Saguntine alliance (above (d)). The phrase £1ri 1roMp.ftJ occurs frequently in treaties of this period; cf. Schulte, 72-73. 14-35. Rome and the Gauls
The Gallic invasion of 225 gives P. occasion to outline the previous history of the Gauls in Italy, prefixing a geographical survey of Cisalpine Gaul (14-17). In i. 6. 8 the Celts were excepted from the peoples of Italy mastered before the Roman crossing into Sicily. Thus the present digression falls into place as part of the story of how the Romans amassed sufficient resources to justify their ambitions for world-dominion (i. 3· 10); in addition it is relevant to Hannibal's invasion (14. 2). 14. 1. To TllS 1rpoKa.Ta.crKEu1ls otKEi:ov: on its summary character cf. i. IJ. 8, 65 . 5 , ii. I. 4, 35. 10, 40. 4· 14. 4-17. 12. The geography of Cisalpine Gaul. This account of the district and its inhabitants is a minor masterpiece, and derives in part from P.'s own inquiries; for the geometrical simplification of 172
ROME: AND THE GAULS
the shape of Italy and the Po valley cf. i. 42. I-7 (Sicily). It has been argued that P. did not leave Italy during his internment, and hence that he writes from some earlier source (Cuntz, 72 f.); but it seems certain that some at least of P.'s western journeys took place during his detention in Italy, and he may have \'isited Cisalpine Gaul in ISO, accompanying Scipio Aemilianus back from service in Spain (xxxv. 4; cf. Nissen, Rh. M1,s., 1871, 271; De Sanctis, iii. I. 2o8 ff.). In that case his account (if based on autopsy) would be an insertion roughly contemporary with iii. 22 ff. (on the Punic treaties). On the other hand, P. may very well have visited Cisalpine Gaul previously (cf. Thommen, Hermes, I885, 204), and no safe conclusions are to be dra\.\n on the date of composition. 14. 4. T~ ax~~-ta:n TptyU~vou8ous: a very forced and schematic description; the representation of Italy as a triangle is criticized in an eloquent chapter of Strabo (v . .zro), who, however, speaks of the vertex at the Sicilian strait. Evidently P.'s scheme had been borrowed and improved. That P. was aware of the real shape of the peninsula is clear from xxxiv. II. 2 (Strabo, v. 2n). T~v ••• 'lrA..:upuv •.• T~v 1Tpbs civa.ToAus K£KAL!-tEV11V: the east coast extends to Cape Cocynthus (§ s) by ignoring the heel and the Gulf of Tarentum. ;; T' 'lovLo'> 'ITopo'> ~ea.l ••• b Ka.Tu Tov :.\8pia.v ~c:oArro'): on these terms see Partsch, RE, 'Adria', cols. 417-I8; Biirchner, RE, 'Ionisches Meer', col. 18<}7; Burr, 59-67; R. L. Beaumont, ]HS, 1936, 203-4. (a) Adriatic Sea. For the periphrasis cf. I6. 4, 7; elsewhere 6 >l8p{a,; (i. 2. 4, ii. IJ. s, etc.) or d KaTd T~v Jloptav KOA7TDS' (d. § u, where Nissen (It. Land. i. 91) wrongly sees a reference to the town). Beaumont, loc. cit., derives the name from the R. Adrias. In the early fifth century Hecataeus (FGH, 1 F IOI-I02 b) used it of the whole sea south to Epidamnus; but others restrict it to the waters around the Po estuary and the lands of the Veneti (Herod. i. I6J, iv. 33. v. 9; Eurip. Hippol. 736). ToP. it stretched as far as Hydruntum in south-east Calabria, opposite the Acroceraunian range in Epirus, vii. 14 d, x. I. 7; cf. Strabo, vii. 317; Mela, ii. 67; Pliny, Nat. hi st. iii. 100. (b) 'IOvw> 1Topo,;. For the form cf. Pindar, Nem. 4· 53 (linking it with Dodona) and P. v. no. 2. Hecataeus (FGH I F 91) uses •lovto> KOA7To> for the whole Adriatic ; and this is normal fifth-century usage. In the fourth century the Ionian and Adriatic seas were distinguished; the latter included all waters as far south as the Straits of Otranto, while the Ionian Sea was a subdivision, connoting that part of it south of Mons Garganus (Strabo, ii. 123, vii. 317). Later the Ionian Sea came to include waters outside the Adriatic, and is used for the Sicilian Sea (see below; Mela, ii. 37; Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 100, iv. 9); and the term 'Adrias' also covered waters far to the 173
II. I4. 4
ROME AND THE GAULS
south of the modern Adriatic. But the distinctions were not sharp, and Ps.-Scylax, I4 and 27, identifies the Ionian and Adriatic seas. Here P. refers especially to the Straits of Otranto and the waters to the south of them (d. § s); in v. IIO. 2 he describes Sasona (off Valona) as lying KaTa T~v daf3o>..~v T~v Ei<; Tdv '!6vwv 776pov (i.e. to one approaching from the Adriatic). Beaumont, loc. cit., is incorrect in saying that P. uses the terms Ionian and Adriatic indifferently, though this became the usage under the Roman Empire. Ti]v Se 1rpos f1Ea1Jflf3pta.v Ka.t Suaflas T£TPO.flf1E"1J": correctly, facing south-west. To I~K£A~Kov Ka.L T upp1JVLKOV 1TEAa.yos: on the Sicilian sea d. i. 42. 4 n. The Tyrrhenian or Etruscan sea (d. i. Io. s), the Roman mare inferum, included those waters between the west coast of Italy and the islands of Sicily, Corsica, and Sardinia. To P. it extends north to the foot of the Alps; d. I6. I, iii. 110. 9. xxxiv. Io. 18. Burr, 72-74. The Sicilian sea enters the picture only for the short stretch between Rhegium and C. Cocynthus (see next note), which P. here includes in the west coast. 5. TO 1TpOKELf1EVOV aKpwt"TjpLOV ••• KoKuv9os: identified with Capo s. Maria di Leuca, at the southern tip of Calabria, by Ziegler (RE, I;tK€Ala, col. 2472; cf. Burr, ss) since in X. I. 2 the whole coastal stretch from Rhegium to Tarentum faces the Sicilian sea. But elsewhere P. calls this cape axpa 'la7Tvyla (x. I. 8, xxxiv. II. u), and the likelihood is that he is using a different source for his schematic account here from that used in x. r. The most probable identification for Cocynthus remains the Punta di Stilo, on the Bruttian promontory between Caulonia and the Gulf of Squillace, of which the Punta forms the southern extremity; this is confirmed by Pliny, Nat. kist. iii. 95, and by the fact that the Itinerarium Antoninum, u4, records a place Cocintum, 22 (or I2: the reading is dubious) miles from Squillacium (~issen, It. Land. ii. 2. 948--9). C. Cocynthus marked the southern limit of the Ionian sea; but what P. regarded as the corresponding limit on the Epirote coast is not clear. 6. Ti]v 1TO.pa T£ Tas apKTOUS KO.L Ti]V f1Eaoya.~a.v 1Ta.pa.TelVOuaa.v: 'bordering on the interior to the north'. The wa6yata is the interior of Europe (cf. iii. 47· I), not the Po valley (so Treves); the Po valley appears as something new in § 7. 1] Twv ~A1rewv 1ra.pwpe~a.: P. makes the Alps begin near Massilia (d. iii. 47· 4). This is not because he includes the hills between the Rhone and the Var, but because (as§ 12 makes clear) he believes the plain of the Po to extend to a point roughly above Massilia, where Alps and Apennines join (§ 8). The same misapprehension appears in reference to the Anares, who live on the south bank of the Po (17. 7), and also t.t~ t.taKpav a7To Maaaa>..{a> (32. r). Herod. iv. 49 knows of a tributary of the Danube called Alpis, and Lye. Alex. 1361 has I74
ROME AND THE GAULS
II. q. u
Ed)..mo.; otherwise this is the first extant historical reference to the Alps, which probably attracted notice as a result of Hannibal's crossing (iii. 47 ff. with references to P.'s predecessors). See Partsch, RE, 'Alpes', cols. 1599'-I6oo. Tov Tou 'ITO.VTOOS :.\8p(ou 11ux.6v: i.e. the Gulf of Venice (or more specifically the Gulf of Trieste}. The gap here mentioned is probably the coastal strip below the hills of the Carso, which lie parallel to the shore north-east of Trieste. The Alps were usually reckoned as running from the junction with the Apennines at the Colle di Cadibona (490 m.), north of the Vada Sabatia (modern Vado) (Cic. Ad jam. xi. 13· 2; Strabo, iv. 2or-2, v. 211; Ptol. Geog. iii. L 40}. to the Ocra Pass between Aquileia and Emona in the east (Strabo, iv. 202, 207, v. 2ll). 7. apeTfl KO.t p.ey~Oe~ s~a.+~povTa.: 'surpassing in fertility and size'. For this sense of &.pE"r?) cf. 15. 1, 17. I, iii. 34· 2, 34· 8, 48. rr, xii. 3· r. oua. 'II'E'!TTwKev l)'l!'b TTJV ~!LETEpa.v li7Top(a.v: not unambiguous. The analogy of the use of the phrase in xv. 9· 5 and iv. 2. 2 supports the translation 'which falls within the scope of my history'. But Schweighaeuser takes it as 'which have fallen within the scope of my inquiries', i.e. which I know of from autopsy or by report. Either meaning is appropriate; and perhaps P. does not always closely distinguish the aspect of collecting material from that of recording it, when he uses the word l0'7'opla. 8. Tij<; •.• 'II'Eplypa.+ouutjs ypa.!LJ-Lils: 'of the line enclosing these plains'. Ko.l is 'likewise'; as well as Italy as a whole, Cisalpine Gaul is also triangular. 9. e1rt 8lO')(lAtous Ka.t 8~a.Koa(ouo; aTa.8£ous: cf. xxxiv. ro. 17· 2,200 stades (i.e. about 250 miles) is a serious underestimate. Coelius and Timagenes reckoned the distance from the Varin Provence to the Arsia on the east coast of !stria as 975-x,coo milia passuum, which is excessive unless the watershed is followed (Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 132). Partsch, RE, 'Alpes', col. 16oo. 10. Tov :c\1TEw~vov f.1Tl TPLIYXlA(ouo; ~sa.Kou(ous: the name was originally applied to the range from the Alps to Ancona, and P. was perhaps the first to use it of the full length of the Apennines (d. 16. 4). Here he is calculating from the supposed junction with the Alps (see§ 6 n.) to the point where the Apennines leave the Po plain, due west of Sena (43" 45' north; cf. § n n.); for this distance 3,6oo stades (4oo miles) is not far out. 11. ~mo 1roAews I~VtJ<;: as in x6. 5 and 19. IJ, Sena Gallica (modem Sinigaglia) is the southern limit of the plain. Geographically Ariminum, sc miUa passuum farther north, makes a better limit, since here the spurs of the mountains come close to the sea ; and in iii. 6I. Il 86. 2, Ariminum iS the last town in the plain (cf. 2I. 5). But for most of the second century, probably till 133, the political 1
175
II. 14.
II
ROME AND THE GAULS
boundary of Italy was the R. Aesis, between Sena and Ancona; for the change to the Rubicon see iii. 61. 11 n. Here P. reckons the distance from Sena to the head of the Adriatic (Aquileia?) as about 2,5oo stades (c. 28o miles} ; for a closer estimate in milia passuum see xxxiv. II. 8 n. -TYJV 1r
15. 1. "TE"T"Tclpwv o~ohwv • , • laoKpL8ov: 'the price of wheat was four obols per Sicilian medimnus, that of barley two obols, a metretes of wine costing the same as a medimnus of barley'. A Sicilian medimnus was c. 5I'5 litres or c. ui gallons (nearly If bushels}, a metretes c. 8i liquid gallons. In Lusitania, either now or a little later (xxxiv. 8. 7-8), a medimnus of barley cost I drachma (i.e. 6 obols), of wheat 9 (Alexander, i.e. Attic) obols, and a metretes of wine cost a drachma, here too being laoKpdlov. Mattingly (]RS, 1937. IOI ff.) argues that P. equates the drachma with 12! asses (rather than Io asses, i.e. I denarius); but this would imply that P. was reckoning with Aeginetic drachmas, whereas xxxiv. 8. 7-8 points to the AtticAlexander standard. (Elsewhere (OCD, 'Coinage (Roman)', 210) Mattingly equates the drachma with the denarius.) In § 6 the equation of 2 asses with the obol is probably an approximation, since if the denarius of Io sextantal asses (introduced about I87 (Mattingly and Robinson, P BA, I932, 211 ff.) and established by 170 (Mattingly, ]RS, 1945, 76)) was equal to the drachma of 6 obols, t as would equal 1~ obol, which could easily be translated as t obol. A century later (Cic. Verr. iii. 72, 84, I74, etc.) the admittedly low price of Sicilian wheat :fluctuated between 2 and 3 sestertii per modius, i.e. 12 to 18 sestertii per medimttus; this indicates clearly the cheapness of F.'s figure of 4 obols, i.e. 2f sestertii per medimnus. These north Italian prices, and the slightly higher ones from Spain, are partly due to exceptional glut conditions; but in general the low price at this date is connected with the unfavourable conditions for export, heavy freight charges, and the Apennine barrier between the Po valley and Rome, as well as with an undeveloped state of the world market, which still allowedgreatlocal price-fluctuations. See Hultsch, RE, 'Frumentum', cols. I46-8; Frank, ES, i. 196; Chilver, 129-30. On the production of corn in Cisalpine Gaul see iii. 44· 8; Strabo, v. 218; Pliny, Nat. hist. xviii. IOI; Cassiod. Var. xii. 27; Nissen, It. Land. i. 444 ff. 2. tM\iou yE i!YJ" Ka.t K€-yxpou: 'millet and panic'. £AvJ.Lo> is Italian millet, Setaria italica (cf. Theoph. HP, viii. 1. I, I. 4; Dsc. ii. 98), Ktyxpor; is Panicum miliaceum, common millet (d. Theoph. ibid.; Dsc. ii. 97). Of the Po valley Strabo writes (v. 2I8} £an Sk Kai KEyxpo4>6por; Sta4>£pov-rwr; Std -r~v £Vuiiplav (perhaps utilizing P.-so Chilver, I3o-but he gives greater detail). 176
ROME AND THE GAULS
II. I6. a
3. -rrAtwTwv yap .:,·iKwv ttpelwv K011'Toj.L£vwv: 'though large numbers of swine are slaughtered for food'. tEpEtov can be used of any animal slaughtered for human consumption; cf. Xen. Cyrop. i. 4· 17 (of game). 8~6, TE Tn!l , • • TrClpa.&to-E~!l: 'for the feeding both Of private individuals and of the army'. The abstract meaning 'provisioning' (so Ernesti; cf. P. Petr. 3, p. 133 (3rd cent. B.c.)) seems more appropriate here than 'stores, storehouses' (Schweighaeuser, cf. iii. 102. ro). 4. Til!l K«Tn j.Llpos tuwvla.s KTA.: 'the cheapness of each separate article of food'. 5. otJ uuj.L+wvouvn~; 11'epl. Twv t<«T: for further details of the course of the Rhone see ill. 47· 1-5. 49; Strabo, iv. r83--6. P. correctly describes it as flowing along the north side of the Alps (before it turns south at Lyons). T a.upiut
177
IL 16.
:t
ROME AND THE GAULS
domination, but of it little is kno>vn. As a frontier town and natural operational base for Roman armies attacking the Ligurians it was counted part of Italy, and so of Etruria, perhaps from z8r onwards; cf. 27. r. DeSanctis, iii. r. 290 n. 6o; Banti, RE, 'Pisae', cols. 1756 ff. ews TTJS J\ppTJTlVWV xwpa.s: Arretium, modern Arezzo, lies besid~ the watershed between Arno, Tiber, and Chiana, half-way between Florence and Perugia, on the Umbrian march. See Nissen, It. Land. ii. 315. Arretium was one of the twelve original cities of Etruria. 3. ~sT\s Sf: TuppTJvol: the Etruscans, who gave their name to the Tyrrhenian sea, inhabited the region within the rivers Arno and Tiber, from Pisa to the Tiber mouth. 1'oo-.ms Sf: cruvExeis ••• "OJ.L~po~: the Umbrians were an Italian people to whom, like the Ligurians, tradition accredited much wider bounds than those they occupied in historical times (cf. Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. rr2; Dian. Hal. i. rg. r; DeSanctis, i. roz). Strabo (v. 214) and Pliny (Nat. hist. iii. ns) make the Adriatic coastal towns of Ravenna and Butrium Umbrian; and some \vriters placed the Metaurus in Umbria (cf. De Sanctis, iii. 2. 565). Further, the existence of a R. Umbra and a tractus Umbriae (Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 51), together with other evidence (cf. P. Ducati, Le problilme itrusque (Paris, 1938), 66-68) points to their having once inhabited what was later Etruria. To P., however, the Umbrians are an inland people dwelling between the Tiber and the Apennines in an area which embraces the valleys on either side of the range. Nissen, It. Land. i. soz-8. 4. a1TEXWV TTJS KO.T0. 1'0V :ASpla.v 9a.Acl.TTT)S KT~.: 500 stades are just under 6o miles. P. exaggerates the abruptness in this change of direction. From the beginning of the Apennines above Genoa as far as Iguvium (Gubbio) and the head-waters of the Tiber and Metaurus the direction is fairly consistently south-east; the range then broadens and runs slightly east of south to the latitude of Rome, after which it breaks up into a series of massifs continuing to Reggio di Calabria. P.'s account places the angle north of Sena Gallica; it is in fact well to the south of that latitude. 5. €1rl. OaAa.TTa.v Ka.t 1ro~LV ••• I1\VTjv: on Sena as P.'s southern coastal limit to the plain of the Po see q. I I n. 6-15. This detailed description of the l)o is the earliest extant, accurate, account. The name Eridanus was originally given to a fabulous amber-producing river of north Europe (Herod. iii. rrs), which Aeschylus fg. 73 (Pliny, Nat. hist. xxxvii. 32) identified with the Rhone. Later, under the influence of Pherecydes (FGH, 3 F 33 c), Aeschylus transferred the Eridanus to the area of the Po (cf. Pliny, .Nat. his!. xxxvii. 31); and to many later \vriters (cf. Strabo, v. us) it remains 1TA"f)crlov TOV Ild.oou. It was probably Apollonius Rhodius (iv. 627) who first identified the Eridanus with the Po, perhaps misled by Euripides (Hippol. 735 ff.) into imagining a 178
ROME AND THE GAULS
II. 16. ro
bifurcation of Rhone and Po. For the legends attached to the Eridanus (and so to the Po) see Ps.-Scyl. 20, Ps.-Scymn. 395 ff., Diod. v. 23. 3· For full discussion see Philipp, RE, 'Padus', cols. 2179 ff. R. L. Beaumont, ]HS, 1936, 197, is misleading. 6 . .)vo Twv rroLTjTWV ••• 9puhouJ.L£Vos: cf. iv. 70. 8 (on the Erymanthus). P. is hinting at the myth of Phaethon and his sisters(§§ 13 ff.). The story is told by Hesiod (fg. 199 Rzach), but P. is probably not referring directly to his version. More probably his criticisms are aimed at sensational historians who retailed this material borrowed from the poets; cf. 17· 6 n. See CQ, 1945, 8 n. s. and, against von Scala (73, Son. 2}, Wunderer (ii. 45-46}. EXEl J.LEv Tas v11yas arro Twv 1-.A.vEwv: on the course of the Po see Nissen (It. Land. i. 183-91). It rises in a boggy valley, the Piano del Re (1,952 m.) at the foot of Monte Viso (Mons Vesulus). voLOUJ.LEVOS Tijv puow ws evl. J.LE
II.
I6. IO
ROME AND THE GAULS
that navigability began at Placentia. Nowadays the Po is usually reckoned as navigable from Casale. Cf. Philipp, RE, 'Padus', col. 2r88. 11. KO.Tu Touo;; ttpoaayopEuofJkvouo;; T pLya~oAouo;;: otherwise unknown, but dearly in the neighbourhood of Ferrara. Nissen, It. Land. i. 205, ii. 21J f. To .,.iv llTEpov .•• naSOa: the name Padua or Padusa was applied to the Po di Primaro, and more specifically (cf. Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 119 ff.) to a branch of it which diverged south-east from Spina to Ravenna, and was also known as the ostium M essanicum. On the Padua (Padusa) see Catullus (95· 7-8), 'at Volusi annales Paduam morientur ad ipsam et laxas scombris saepe dabunt tunicas', and Virgil (Aen. xi. 457), 'piscosoue amne Padusae dant sonitum rauci per stagna loquacia cycni'. See Philipp, RE, 'Padus', cols. 2179, 2191-2; 'Padusa', cols. 2292-3. 12. B68Ey~eos: on the authority of Metrodorus of Scepsis, Pliny (Nat. kist. iii. 122) states that the name is Ligurian and means ]undo caretts; thus Bodincomagus is an older name for Industria, ubi praecipua altitudo incipit (but magus is Celtic). Bodincus was evidently the Ligurian name for the upper waters of the Po (cf. CIL, vi. 2613), while farther down it bore the Celtic, or more probably Venetie, name of Padus. See Weiss, RE, 'Ligures', coL sz6; Philipp, RE, 'Padus', cols. 2178-9; Nissen, It. Land. i. r83. 13-15. The story of Phaethon; place of myth in history. Above, § 6. The story of Phaethon, his death from Jove's thunderbolt while driving the chariot of his father the sun-god, and the metamorphosis of his sisters into poplars and their tears into amber {cf. Ovid, M etam. ii. 364-{)), is found with variants from the time of Hesiod, and was widely treated by writers and poets (Diod. v. 23). See the discussion by Wilamowitz, Hermes, r8SJ, 3¢--434; C. Robert, ibid., 434-41; G. Turk, RE, 'Phaethon', cols. rsoS ff. These stories P. (like Strabo, v. 215) considers inappropriate to history. But so too did Timaeus, if he is the source of Diodorus' account (cf. Diod. v. 23. 5; Mullenhoff, i. 474-6); and in fact P.'s attack on Timaeus (§ rs) is for his ignorance of the area, not for sensationalism (cf. Pedech, LEC, I956, 19 n. sS). For P.'s stress on the distinction between tragedy and history see further iv. 40. 2 n.; 1 HS, 1938, s6 ff. and CQ, 1945, 8 ff., and the passages there quoted. 13. Touc; jlEAavE(.,.ovo.o;;: Treves suggests an ironical echo of Timaeus' poetical vocabulary; but though Aeschylean (Eumen. 370), the word appears later in prose, in Dionysius and Iosephus, and may well have lost its poetical flavour by P.'s time. 180
ROME AND THE GAULS
II. l7.
I
14. TTJV Tpa.yuc-T)v Ka.l. Ta.uTfi 1rpoaeoLKu'i:a.v 6:\11v: 'material of a tragic character and similar to this legend'. T~ Tfj~ 1rpoKa.Ta.aKEufjo; ykvf:L: 'the character of my introduction'. The rrpo~<:a.Ta.a~<:ev~ covers books i-ii (i. 3· ro), and being written summarily (i. 13. 8, ii. 14. r) affords no space for detailed polemic (a~
17. 1. To 1ra.Aa.Lov Evk11ovTo Tupp11voC: the problem of Etruscan origins still arouses violent controversy. Herodotus (i. 94) brought them from Asia Minor, and they themselves accepted this version; cf. Tac. Ann. iv. 55· Dionysius, on the other hand (i. 27-30), claimed them as autochthonous. Modern views are surveyed by R. S. Conway (CAH, iv. 383 ff.), who favours an eastern origin, by H. Last (CAH. vii. 379 ff.), who makes them a mixture of autochthonous elements \\ith Indo-European immigrants from the north, and by DeSanctis (i. 124 ff., 429 ff.), who supports the theory of northern immigration. For a short summary see Scullard, Hist. 15 f.. and, for a complete survey of the history of the problem and the evidence, P. Ducati, Le probteme itrusqtw (Paris, 1938). Ducati argues that the Etruscans are a mixture of native Umbrians using the Villanovan iron-age technique with Tynhenians who brought Aegean cults, culture, and language by sea from Asia Minor. But a recent theory of C. F. Hawkes (Proc. Prehist. Soc., 1948, 205-r6), brings down the date of the Iron Age in Italy to after the arrival of the Etruscans about 8oo, and attributes the impulse of it to them. M. Pallottino, The Etruscans (London, 1955), 46-73, restates the problem as one of ethnic formation out of mixed elements within Etruria. Livy (v. 33· 7) describes the Etruscan advance north over the Apennines into the Po valley, and this was apparently about 525. The Etruscans occupied Felsina (Bologna) and spread to Parma, Mantua, and Melpum (near Milan), and to the Adriatic at Atria and Spina in the Po mouth; but their domination was interrupted by the coming of the Gauls about 450 (cf. DeSanctis, ii. I59-
xpovou~ Ka.t
Ta
4>X£ypa.uJ. ••• TB 'lrEpl
Ka.'lr~"lV
KO.L NwA"lv:
the Etruscans' advance south was in the late seventh century. Seizing Rome they went by the Liris valley into Campania, and there founded a league of twelve cities (Strabo, v. 242). In particular their presence is attested at Nola and Capua (which they are said to have founded: Veil. Pat. i. 7 (contrast Cato, fg. 69 Peter) ; Strabo, ibid.; d. Heurgon, 62 ff.), at Herculaneum and Pompeii (Strabo, I8I
II. I7.
1
ROME AND THE GAULS
v. 246-7), and at :Macrina, which they founded on the Gulf of Salerno (Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 7o). But in 524 they were defeated by Aristodemus of Cumae (Dion. HaL vii. 3-n); and their sway in Latium was broken, traditionally in 509, with the expulsion of the Tarquins from Rome. On this sec Altheim, Epochcn, i. 89 ff. To later writers the Phlegraean plain is the volcanic area between Cumae, the Gulf of Pozzuoli, and the Gulf of Naples; but P. understands the whole Campanian plain. See iii. 91. 7, where the Phlegraean plain leads to a discussion of the story of the battle of the gods 7ra.pil "TOL> p:v9oyparpou,, just as the Padane plain brought up criticism of the story of Phaethon. Here, too, Timaeus is the source; see Diod. iv. 21. 7, d. v. 71. 4; :Nissen, It. Land. i. 267. The ferti]ity of the plain is attested by Strabo (v. 243). 3. itc f.Htcpiis vpoTaaEws: P. appears to recall the story recorded {and rejected) by Livy (v. 33· 1-4; cf. Plut. Cam. IS; Dion. HaL xiii. 10-n; Cato, fg. 36 Peter), that the Gauls were :first brought into Cisalpine Gaul by a man from Clusium, named Arruns, who showed them wine, figs, and olives, to enlist their aid against the Lucumo, who had seduced his wife. This story implies a date a little before the capture of Rome in 390; but the movement of Sabellian peoples down the highlands towards Campania from c. 450 onwards suggests Gallic penetration of north Italy by then (cf. DeSanctis, ii. r61). However, Livy's account of a series of invasions from the time of Tarquinius Priscus (v. 34; cf. lustin. xx. s. xxiv. 4) is a tissue of inaccuracies; see Meyer (v. 151 ff.), and de Navarro (CAH, vii. 6off.), who discusses the invasion in the light of archaeology. 4. 'II'Ept TclS &.va.ToAas TOV n6.8ou: 'near the source of the Po'. Paton confusedly adds a reference to the east. A6.m teat AE(3EKlOt •.• "lvao~pES: the Aaot are probably the Laeui of Livy (v. 35· z) and Pliny (Nat. hist. iii. 124), though to Pliny they are Ligurians. The AE{31Kwt will then be the Libui of Livy (ibid. ; d. Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 124, Libicii; Ptol. Geog. iii. 1. 32). These tribes inhabited the valleys of the lower Ticinus and the Sesites (modern Sesia) respectively; Vercellae was the capital of the Libicii (Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 124). P.'s description of these tribes as the first ncar the source of the Po supports the view (cf. 16. 6 n.) that he identified the Dora Baltea with this source. The Insubres, one of the most important tribes of the plain, had their capital at Mediolanum (cf. 34· 10), and Philipp has argued (RE, 'Insubres', col. 1590) that they controlled several neighbouring peoples, including the Laevi and the Anares (cf. § 7). This might explain how the Laevi, a Ligurian people, are reckoned here as Celts, and also why Ptolemy (Geog. iii. r. 29) counts their capital, Ticinum, an lnsubrian town. See Nissen, It. Land. ii. 177-fJ· P. makes the Insubres neighbours of the Taurini (iii. 6o. 8). 182
ROME AND THE GAULS
II. 17. 7
rovojl6.Vo': the Cenomani (d. Livy, v. 34-35; Strabo, V. 216; Ptol. Geog. iii. I. 27) dwelt rather closer to the Alps than P. suggests. Their lands stretched from the Ollius (Oglio) to the Athesis (Adige), and their towns were Brixia, Verona, Cremona, and {according to Ptolemy) Bergamum, Mantua, and Tridentum. See Nissen, It. Land. ii. 195 f.; Hiilsen, RE, 'Cenomani (3)', cols. r899-rgoo. 5. Oa:.tveTol: the Veneti dwelt between the Adige, the Po, the Adriatic, and {to the east) the lower waters of the Tagliamento (Tiliaventus); to the north they reached the Alps. See Strabo, v. 214; Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 126; Nissen, It. Land. i. 488 ff.; De Sanctis, i. 155 ff.; Whatmough, Foundations, I7I-8J. Our knowledge of Venetie derives largely from funerary and votive inscriptions, and its origins are still debated; the view that it is akin to lllyrian (cf. R. S. Conway, The Prae-ItaUc Dialects, i (London, 1933), I-2oi), is now generally rejected (cf. 1\-L S. Beeler, The Venetie Language (Berkeley 1949); H. Crabe, S.-B. Heidelberg, 1950, 3, 'Das Venetische', P. Kretschmer, Glotta, 1943, 134-68; recent survey in M. Lejeune, Rev. phil., 1951, 202-4). The first arrival of Venetie culture in Italy is usually dated about rooo B.C. ; see Ninck, 178. 6. ot Tpay't'SlGyp6.cl>oL: 'tragic poets', as in iii. 48. 8 (with similar criticism). However, P. usually employs the word TEpaTela. in connexion with 'tragic' historians (d. ii. 58. 12, 59· 3, iii. 58. 9, xv. 34· 1), and in vii. 7· I the whole phrase rroAvv rwa • .• TEpa.Tdav is repeated of historians who have written sensational accounts of Hieronymus of Syracuse. Here too, then, P. may be hinting at historians, (cf. Wunderer, ii. s6-57). One legend of this area brought Antenor from Troy, along with the Eneti of Paphlagonia, to found Patavium (cf. Strabo, v. 212, xiii. 6o8; Virg. Aett. i. 242 ff. (with Servius); Livy, i. I; DeSanctis, i. rs6-7) but P. may also be thinking o[ some of the current 'wonder-tales', of hens that laid twice a day, sheep that lambed twice a year, with huge litters, the fifty towns of the Veneti, and the richness of the soil (:\issen, It. Land. i. 492). 7. 1l.vapes: cf. 32. r, 34· 5· The MSS. give a variety of forms, and "AvapEs- is due to Mommsen (RG, 554 and 558); recently G. Patroni (Rend. Ac.ltalia, 4, 1942-3, uo-23) has defended 'Ananes'. Mommsen (CIL, v, p. 828) suggested an identification with the Marici, who helped to found Ticinum (Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 124); but the Anares lived south of the Po between it and the Trebia. See Philipp, RE, 'Massalia (z)', cols. 2152-3 {with the criticism below, 32. In.); Hiilsen, RE, 'Anamares', cols. 2055-6; Mullenhoff, ii. 251"· BoioL ••• Alyyow.:s ••• Itjvwves: Livy (v. 35· z) relates how the Boii crossed the Great St. Bernard (Poeninus), found the area between the Po and the Alps inhabited, and crossed the river to seize modern Emilia, where they occupied Felsinaandrenamed it Bononia; cf. Ruge, RE, 'Boii (r)', cols. 630 ff. (with details of other branches I
183
II. I7. 7
ROME AND THE GAULS
in Germany). At the same time the Lingones, a branch of a people
dwelling about the head-waters of the Marne, Meuse, and Saone, took the low land south of the Po towards Ravenna and Ariminum. The Senones, a branch of those established between the Loire and the Seine, reached Italy last (Livy, v. 35· 3) and occupied the socalled ager Gallicus on the coast between Ravenna and Sena Gallica, driving the Umbrians into the Apennines. On their later clash with Rome see 19. 10. Cf. Keune and Philipp, RE, 'Senones', cols. 1474 ff. 9. Til'> Aol"'l"ij<; K:a.TaaKEuils O.!loLpol: 'without knowledge of the other arts of civilization'. For this sense of KaTaa'KEtnJ, 'instruction, acquired skill. culture' (not in LSJ) cf. xi. 8. I, rijs EK Tot.bov (nuv 07TDJkVTjttchwv) KaTaG'KEv~s, 'lessons from memoirs'. Paton's translation 'furniture' is derived from that of Schweighaeuser (corrected in the Lex. Polyb.). P. means 'civilized arts other than building walled towns' (implied from the previous phrase). On the primitive culture of the Gauls see C. J ullian, i. 36o ff. 10. To aTL~a.8oK:oLTE'iv: 'lying on litter', i.e. to eat as well as sleep. Cf. Strabo, iii. 155 (of the Spanish Bastetani); Diod. v. :28 (of the Transalpine Gauls). Diodorus (ibid.) also mentions their meateating; d. Poseidonius ap. Athen. iv. 151. oih' E"'I"WTTJ!lTJS ••• oun ToEXVTJ'>: an exaggeration, as Treves observes. The Gauls had considerable skill in metallurgy; d. 33 below; Diod. v. 27 for gold ornaments. 11. KD.T
ROME
A~D
THE GAULS
II. 18.6
2. 1-uml. 8€ Twa. xpovov KT)..: on F.'s date (387/6) see i. 6. 1-2, and below, 22. 5 n.; and on the Gallic catastrophe in general Meyer (Kl. Schr. ii. 307 ff.), L. Homo (CAH, vii. 554 ff., with misleading remarks on F.'s sources), F. Schachenneyr (Klio, 1930, 277-305), and Altheim (Epochen, i. 163 ff.). F.'s account, based on Fabius, heads the tradition. Diodorus (xiv. IIJ-I4) probably gives the early annalistic tradition (but not Fabius, as Mommsen (Rom. Forsch. ii. 297 ff.) argued). The later versions in Livy (v. 33-55), Plutarch's Camillus, and Dionysius, Appian, and Dio, build up the figure of Camillus, who is unimportant in Diodorus, and wholly omitted by Polybius (cf. Momigliano, CQ, 1942, III ff.). Tous I'£T<1 TooTwv wa.pa.Ta.~a.l'evous : no other source mentions allies at the Allia, but later tradition may well have preferred to mitigate the disaster by stressing Roman isolation. On the battle of the Allia (I8 July, a dies nefastus) see Homo (CAH, vii. 561 ff.), and De Sanctis (ii. x66 ff.). To Homo's bibliography on the problem of the battle-site (ibid. 920) add Kromayer (AS, iv. 449 ff.) and Schachermeyr (Klio, I9JO, 277 ff.), both favouring the left bank. TpLat rijs l'a.XTIS ~p,epa.ls uO'T£pov ~ so too Diodorus (xiv. us: with exclusive reckoning), Plutarch (Cam. 22) and Verrius Flaccus (in Gell. v. 17. 2). Only Livy (v. 4I. 4) enlivens the story by making the Gauls reach Rome the next day. Later legends elaborated the defence of the Capitol (Livy, v. 43· r ff., 47· Iff.); but perhaps no serious attempt was made against it (DeSanctis, ii. 175-6). 3. T~v 0ll£v£Twv E:l'f3a.MvTWv: the authenticity of this attack, otherwise unattested, has been questioned; and Livy (v. 48. I) makes a pestilence among the Gauls play a similar role in drawing them off. But such an· attack is quite plausible, and no more of a coincidence than the Illyrian invasion which drew Antigonus Doson north after Sellasia (below, 7o. 1). Whether true or not, the story belongs to an earlier layer of the tradition than that which emphasizes Camillus' last-minute rescue (cf. Livy, v. 49). wot,a6.1'£VOL auv&'Y]Ka.s wpos 'Pwl'a.(ous: cf. i. 6. 3 n. for the ransom. which was probably paid; for the Gallic claim see below, 22. 5· 4. 9c;wpouvns tK wapa.9£a£ws: 'observing from close at hand' (d. 17· 3) or 'witnessing in comparison with their own' (cf. i. 86. 7 and passim); a small distinction since proximity encourages comparison. 5. TO. K(lTcl Tovs AaTlvous a09Ls wpciyl'aTa. auvt:O'Tftaa.VTo: see i. 6. 4-6n. 6. ~T£L TpLa.KoO'T~: the chronology of the fourth-century Gallic wars is difficult. It may perhaps be assumed (though not with certainty) (a) that F.'s intervals refer to consul years (not Olympiad years, as Leuze, ]ahrzahlung. 125, argues), (b) that, as in i. 6. 2, l'. is here making 387/6 the date of the seizure of Rome, (c) that he identifies the Attic year 387/6 with the consul year 386 (cf. De Sanctis, i. 185
II. 18. 6
ROME AND THE GAULS
13 n. z). The intervals listed between the Gallic debacle and Sentinum in 295 (19. 5), viz. 30 I2 add Up to only 89 years, whereas from 386 to 295 should be 91 years. The problem is therefore twofold, (a) to account for the two missing years, (b) to reconcile P.'s date of 386 for the Gallic attack with the Varronian 390. For discussion see Niese (Hennes, 1878, 401-r3), L"nger (Hermes, r879, 77--92), Seeck (ibid. Mommsen (Rom. Forsch. ii. 297-38r), Leuze (]ahrzahlung, r2o--45), De Sanctis (ii. 259-6o; cf. i. r3 n. 2), Beloch (RG, 132-43, 314). The four years' discrepancy between the Polybian and Varronian dates for the capture of Rome may be due either to the omission by Polybius' source of the four years in which dictators and their magistri equitum appear as eponymous in the Fasti, viz. 333, 324, 309, and 301 (Livy omits these years), or to the expansion of one year's 'anarchy' to five in the annalistic account of the Licinio-Sextian rogations (viz. 375-371, cf. Livy, vi. 34-42; De Sanctis, ii. 214). Diodorus (xv. 75· r) records only one year's O.va.pxta; but there is no reason to associate his version of the annals with Fabius. Consequently either explanation must be regarded as possible. The two missing years are explained by Beloch on the assumption that the date 387/6 for the capture of Rome came from Timaeus (d. i. 6. 2 n.), but that Fabius put it in 384. In fact, Fabius' date is not known for certain; but if he dated the first plebeian consul (366) twenty-two years after the Gallic capture (Gell. v. 4· 3, duouicesimo), he can hardly have put the latter in 384. In 19. 5-7 P. reckons the interval between Sentinum and the appearance of the Gauls at Arretium as ten years; it was in reality eleven (295-284). This suggests that P.'s figures may in some cases represent a round number, or be based on a reckoning which excludes both terms; but if so, he is not himself awake to the discrepancy, and no distinction is to be made between such phrases as lnt rptaKocrr(j> (r8. 6) and lrYJ Tptd.KoV"Ta. (r9. r) (so Leuze, ]ahrzahlung, 125). Correlation with Livy and the triumphal Fasti is of little use, since Livy at least contains frequent doublets and improvisations. In these circumstances the following table is merely one possible arrangement of the data: Reference Capture of Rome r8. 2
+
Gauls before Alba Gauls invade and retire Peace made Successful invasion
299
Sentinum . Gauls at Arretium
295 284
331
18. 6 ~T€L TpLaKOCfT{j> 18. 7
Livy records no Gallic invasion in 356; but the ravaging of the ager Albanus in 36o (Lh'Y, vii. rr. 3) is thirty years after his date for r86
ROME AND THE GAULS
II. I9. 5
the seizure of Rome, and may refer to this expedition if P.'s chronology has omitted the four 'dictator-years'. 7. t~ ~TrL~oA.1ls ~TEpa.s: 'making another attempt'. This third invasion, forty-two years after the capture of Rome, has nothing corresponding in Livy. However, Livy (vii. 23-24) records an invasion in 350, and the act. tr. assign a triumph to the consul M. Popillius Laenas [de G]alleis; and Beloch has suggested (RG, 137-8) a confusion with Popillius' next consulship in 348 (Beloch prefers Diodorus' date, 347) for the invasion. If the four 'dictator-years' are omitted, 348 becomes 344, which would fit P. But this is highly hypothetical. 9. Tpmt
II. 19.5
ROME AND THE GAULS
and Samnites on the east slope of the Apennines in south Umbria. It was the advance-party which was defeated. Livy (x. 25. u, 26. 7 ff.) has transferred this battle to Clusium in Etruria, qtwd Camars olim appellabant (25. n); but his account, which contains other inaccuracies, cannot stand against that of P. Cf. De Sanctis (ii. 355 n. 2), Beloch (RG, 440) and Adcock (CAH, vii. 6r2). 6. TrpoatlAovuc-ljaa.V"rES 1rpos -ro ••• EAa-r-rw11a.: 'displaying a victorious spirit in the face of the reverse'. ~v -rfi -r<71v IEV"rWO.TWV xwp~: Sentinum lay on the eastern slope of the Apennines on a tributary of the Aesis, about 30 miles north of Camerinum. The Romans employed the two consular armies of Q. Fabius Maximus Rullianus and P. Decius Mus, four legions in all (1riic~ -rofs- a-rpa-ro'tTtOots), some JO,ooo-J6,ooo men. This victory over the 'last resistance of Italian particularism' (De Sanctis) became famous in popular tradition, especially for the deuotio of Decius Mus (cf. Munzer, RE, 'Decius (16)', col. 2284). 7. lha.yEvo!L~vwv 8e TraAlv ETwv 8~Ka.: the Fasti and Livy (ep. 12; cf. Oros. iii. 22. 13) agree in making L. Caecilius MetellusDenter consul in 284, but attribute his death to a praetorship in 283. Mommsen (Rom. Forsch. ii. 365-77) analysed the tradition and showed how the events of Caecilius' consulship were transferred to a supposed praetorship in 283, in the interest of a patriotic compression. This analysis (which is not superseded by a brief and misdated reference in St.-R. ii. 195 n. r) has persuaded both De Sanctis (ii. 376 n. 2) and Beloch (RG, 133) to reject Livy; and indeed rrrpa:rr;yos is consul in P. (see Lex. Pol_vb. s.v.). Against the annalistic version is the unusual appointment ofM'. CuriusDentatus as what would be praetor suffectus (§ 8), if in fact Caecilius was praetor, whereas in P.'s account his appointment will be as consul suffectus (see further§ 8 n.). (In itself, Caecilius' military command as praetor would not be unparalleled at this date; cf. Broughton (i. r88-9), adducing the case of Ap. Claudius Caecus, who held a military command as praetor in 295.) That P. took Caecilius to be consul in 284, and not praetor in 283, is shown by the present reference to ten years, which can be applied to the period 295-284, by the exclusion of both terms, but hardly to 295-283. r a.XO.-ra.l • . • TrOAlOpK~O"OVTES Ti]v :A.pp"lTLVWV 11'0AlV: the Senones, as the later narrative shows. On Arretium see 16. 2 n. Avoiding Umbria, the Senones had traversed the Apennines to win allies in Etruria. 8. AeuK£ou ••• -rEAEU'I'Tjaa.V"ros: he had two legions (Oros. iii. 22. IJI4) and lost seven military tribunes and IJ,ooo men. The defeat was followed by a general revolt of Etruscans, Samnites, Lucanians, and Bruttians (Livy, ep. 12; Oros. iii. 22. 13-14; Augustine, CD, iii. I7)· 188
ROME AND THE GAULS
II.
2.0. I
MO.vtov hnKaTiiO'T'I'lO'a.v T6v K6pl0v: M'. Curius Dentatus was one of the most notable figures of this period and had terminated the Third Samnite War successfully in 290 (cf. Munzer, RE, 'Curius (9)', cols. 1841-5). The later tradition, which dated Caecilius' death to 283, makes him praetor suffectus (above 19. 7 n.). According to this version Caecilius' death was avenged the same year by the victory of P. Cornelius Dolabella, the consul, at Lake Vadimo over the Senones (cf. Broughton, i. r88-9). It has been argued by E. T. Salmon (CP, 1935, 23-31) that both the annalistic version and that of Fabius (i.e. of P.) distort the real course of events, so as to bring the Roman revenge immediately after the setback at Arretium; in one case (Fabius) the revenge was moved back into 284 (and attributed to Curius), in the other (Livy) the defeat was retarded until 283 (and Caecllius becomes a praetor). If this plausible thesis is correct, Dentatus' victory (§ u) is apocryplml; and indeed its disappearance from the later tradition is inexplicable on any other assumption. 9. ~'ll'awlAoVTo Tou~ Tp.!O'~£LS: a not impossible, but perhaps unlikely story; d. 8. 12. See Beloch (RG, 454) and Salmon (CP, 1935, 31 n. 39). The story is probably part of Fabius' version leading to a bellum iustum. TaJ..arlo. is here Cisalpine Gaul; d. 24. 8, etc. 10. 0'11'0 Tov 8ull'ov EK X"'POS ~'II'LO'Tpa.Tc;uO"u!l'.!vwv: 'immediately in their anger' ; the narrative implies that it is still 284. 11. Tfj~ •.• xwpa,~ ... EYKPUTELS: viz. the territory of the Sen ones, the later ager Gallicus (see 21. 7 n., and above, 17. 8 n.). 12. 6.TotK£uv ~O'T£lAUV TTJV I1Jv11v: Livy (ep. n) also associates the founding of Sena Gallica with Curius Dentatus, but dates it after his first consulship (29o). If Curius' victory of 284 is apocryphal (19. 8 n.), the founding of Sena drops out of this year. It may have taken place in 283 after the victory at Vadimo ; but there must be some good reason why both traditions associate it with Curius. Therefore, since it seems perverse to postpone its foundation till Curius' third consulship in 274, with which no authority associates it (so Beloch, RG, 453-4), Livy's date is probably to be accepted. Its foundation implies the ceding of land by the Senones, but not necessarily their defeat and complete expulsion; and this may well have followed the peace which must have been made after Sentinum; see De Sanctis (ii. 358 n. r). P. mentions Sena above (&.prlws) at 14. II and 16. 5·
20. 1. ol S( Boi:o,: though P. mentions no date, he is evidently referring to the next year, 283, when the consuls were P. Cornelius Dolabella and Cn. Domitius Calvinus Maximus. The later tradition makes Dolabella victorious at Lake Vadimo over the Senones, not 189
II.
20. I
ROME AND THE GAULS
the Boii (on the latter see r7. 8 n. and 20. 4 n.); and if the Boii suffered so severely in 283, it is hard to comprehend their confronting the Romans again in 282 (2o. 3). The probability is that P.'s Fabian account, having destroyed the Senones in 284 (19. u), required a new foe for Dolabella's victory in 283. See Sahnon (CP, 1935. 24 ff.). 1ra.pa.tmAiaa.VTES T uppTJvous: Beloch (RG, 451) argues from the site of the battle that these were primarily from Volsinii; but the Gauls may well have attracted allies from a wider area, as they advanced south, and in 28o the consul Ti. Coruncanius triumphed over Vulci as well as Volsinii, and in 281 Q. Marcius Philippus de Etrusceis, which suggests a wider coalition. 2. T-ijv 'OO.S11-ova. ••• ALjlVTJV: Lake Vadimo (V adimonis lac-us, the modern Laghetto di Bassano) lies on fiat ground west of the Tiber, some 42-43 miles due north of Rome. For a description see Pliny, ep. viii. 20; Nissen, It. Land. ii. 342. 4. T~ Ka.T.i ,...68a.c; tvmuT~: viz. 282, in the consulship of C. Fabricius Luscinus and Q. Aemilius Papus. It is recorded in Frontinus (Strat. i. 2. 7) that 'Aemilius Paulus [sic] consul bello Etrusco apud oppidum coloniam' fought against the Boii; and the reference is probably to this campaign. Beloch (RG, 454) would emend coloniam to Vetuloniam or Statoniam, others to Populoniam; but Salmon (CP, 1935, 26-2i) suggests that the colonia is Sena Gallica, and locates the battle on the fringe of Cisalpine Gaul, a possible interpretation, even if Sena was founded not one but eight years previously (19. 12 n.). Aemilius' campaign is also mentioned by Dionysius (xix. 13. r), who places it in Etruria; and this is perhaps less easily reconciled with a Roman (presumably offensive) action in the north-east. 6. Synchronisms : see i. 6. 5 n. Pyrrhus' crossing was in 01. 124, 4 = 281/o (in fact May 28o), the Gallic destruction in 01. 125, 2 = 2i9/8 (probably autumn 279). On the reasonable assumption that consul years are equated with the Olympiad year in which they begin, the peace with the Boii in 282 was, by inclusive reckoning, three years before Pyrrhus' crossing and five years before the Gallic rout at Delphi. 7. AotjlLKTJV TWa. ••• StMeatv: 'epidemic', a medical term; cf. 31. ro, (used literally). For this sense of Stci8mt> cf. jo. 6, viii. 12. 3. and the examples quoted by Welles, 324-5. In afflicting the Gauls thus Tyche is playing the role of capricious deity; cf. CQ, 1945, 6; above, p. 18. 8-10. General observations on the Gallic campaigns. The long duel (§ 8, .iyc.)vwv), drawn out for over a century, had toughened the Romans psychologically and physically; they could be neither daunted by horrors nor worn out by hardships. This fitted them to contest Italy with Pyrrhus, and to struggle with Carthage for Sicily; cf. i. 6. 6 (Italy), and the parallel reflections (i. 63. 9) on the schooling 190
ROME AND THE GAULS
II.
2I.
5
of the First Punic War, which led the Romans to aim at universal dominion, and accomplish that aim. Here too P. is again stressing the function of his introduction (d. i. 3· 9-ro) in explaining the basis on which Rome advanced to world-domination. For the phrase &.B>.TJTa.i TEA~:tat y~:yov6T~:s- cf. i. 6. 6 (and, for the metaphor, i. 59· 12). The Gallic and Etruscan wars take their place in the steady, fated advance of Rome to world-empire; and this phase in the reduction of the Gauls is rounded off with the words T~v ••• TOAfLa.V •.• Ka.Ta.7rA7)~&fL~:vot, which recalls (and reverses) the words Tfj T6AfLTI Ka.Ta.TrmA7)yfLlvm with which it opened (18. r). 21. 1. ETTJ ••• 'ITEVTE t<:a.i TETTa.pat<:ovTa: calculated inclusively by Mornmsen (Rom. Forsch. ii. 362) as 281-237, with the appearance of the Gauls at Ariminum (§ s) in 236. But the forty-five years must be reckoned from 282, the year of the peace (2o. 6), and are therefore 282-238; and P.'s date for the events at Ariminum is consequently 237, which is confirmed by his dating Aemilius Lepidus' consulship (232) five years later (21. 7). (Alternatively P. may be reckoning exclusively, 282-237, with events at Ariminum still in the latter year.) P.'s account of a single campaign in 237 conflicts with the annalistic tradition of a three years' war under the consuls of 238, 5; Eutrop. iii. 2; 237, and 236 (Zon. viii. 18; Oros. iv. r2. 1; Flor. i. Livy, ep. 20), with the Ariminum incident in 236 5 n.). P.'s dates for the remaining Gallic incidents (cf. r8. 6 n.) are: Reference
Gauls at Arretiurn Vadimo . Defeat of Boii. peace Gauls at Ariminum .
284
19. 7
:z83
20. r-2
282
20.
237
2 I. I,
232 2 25
21.
interval omitted
4, 6 TijJ KaTd. Troaas Jv,avTij!
4-5 €T7) 1TWTE Kal TET'Tapa· KOV'Ta
Division of Ager Gallicus Gallic tttmultus
7 €-r~:t 7rEf.L1t'To/ 23. I l-rn ... oyoocp (sic)
The failure of the Gauls to exploit Roman embarrassment during the First Punic War is discussed by De Sanctis (iii. r. 28o), who suggests that it was due to a successful Roman policy of appeasement coupled with Carthaginian failure to develop the necessary contacts and to buy Gallic help. 3. Ta Ka.6EaTWTa. KtVE~v: 'to disturb the equilibrium', viz. the peace of 282. P. ignores the events of 238, which the annalistic tradition, probably following Valerius Antias, magnifies into an astounding victory (after defeat) for the consul, P. Valerius Falto. 5. ~Pll-'tvou: on its site see 14. II n. It was originally Umbrian (Strabo, v. 2Ij), but a Latin colony was set up in 268 (Yell. Pat.
IL 21.5
ROME AND THE GAULS
i. 14. 7); cf. U. Ewins, BSR, 1952, 54· Zonaras (viii. r8) adds details suggesting that the dispute of the Gauls, ending in a pitched battle, was the direct result of a policy of delay and temporizing on the part of the consuls. The Fabian account in P. is very different. Fear of the Gauls ensured the dispatch of a legion from Rome; but on learning of the Gallic broil it returned. Yet clearly the same occasion is meant; and if the date is 237, Zonaras' error may derive from some confusion between the consuls L. Cornelius Lentulus Caudinus (237) and P. Cornelius Lentulus Caudinus (236). 7, iTEI 1!'€f1VT'e , , , KO.TEKATJpOUXT)O'U\1 • , , T~\1 nu(E\IT~\IT)\1 , , , xwpa.v: the reference to the consulship of M. Aemilius Lepidus fixes the year as 232. Cicero (de sen. II; cf. acad. ii. 13), drawing on Atticus, makes it 228, perhaps confusing the second consulship of Q. Fabius Maximus with his first, during which Flaminius entered office (Niccolini, F asti dei tribuni della plebe (Milan, 1934), 88-89); in any case, it is agreed that P.'s date is preferable; d. DeSanctis (iii. 1. 333 n. 181); Mommsen (Rom. Forsch. ii. 401 n. 23); and other authorities quoted by Aymard (REA, 1943, 219 n. 1). Cicero describes Flaminius' bill as the 'lex de agro Gallico et Piceno uiritim diuidundo' (Brut. 57). On the ager Galticus between the Aesis and Ariminum see 17. 8 n.; the Senones were completely expelled after Vadimo (or, according toP., the year before; cf. 19. n). It is described by Cato (fg. 43 Peter): 'ager Gallicus Romanus uocatur, qui uiritim cis Ariminum datus est ultra agrum Picentium.' The ager Picenus, as this quotation indicates, is normally placed south of the Aesis; but it also indicates that Picenum in this sense was excluded from Flaminius' distributions. Nor is there any evidence for the expulsion of the Picentes (on Strabo, v. 251 see Beloch, RG, 475). Moreover, it appears from Livy (ep. 15, Ariminum in Piceno) that P. was not alone in identifying the ager Gallicus and the ager Picenus. The likelihood is therefore that, despite Cicero's formula, Flaminius' bill dealt only with the ager Gallicus; cf. Frank (ES, i. 61) and Beloch (RG, 475-{)); contra De Sanctis (iii. I. 333 n. 184); on the geography, Nissen (It. Land. ii. 377). 8. r a.tou .ACI.JJ-LVlou TC.UTT)\1 TTJ\1 8TtJJ-a.ywy(a.v dO'T)YTJO'UJJ-EVOU: c. Flaminius was a plebeian and a nouus homo. His land measure was designed to restore the firm link between the Roman proletariat and the land, and therein foreshadowed the work of the Gracchi. It met with strong opposition from the senate, which had profited by the occupation of public land, and was eventually carried by Flaminius as tribune in the popular assembly (Cic. de inu. ii. 52; Livy, xxi. 63. 2; VaL Max. v. 4· 5). On Flaminius see Munzer (RE, 'Flaminius (2)', cols. 2496ff.), and on his land bill Frank (CAH, vii. 8o6-7; ES, i. 6o-{)I), De Sanctis (iii. 1. 332-4), Meyer (Kl. Scltr. ii. 39o-3), Fraccaro (Athen., 1919, 76 ff.), K. Jacobs (Caius Flaminius
ROME AND THE GAULS
II. zr. 9
(diss. Leiden, Hoorn, 1937), 37 ff.). P.'s hostile attitude towards Flaminius (cf. 33· 7 ff., iii. 8o, 8z ff.) seems to reflect the hostility of his senatorial opponents transmitted through Fabius Pictor (cf. Gelzer, Hermes, I933, I5o; Klotz, Wj, 1946, 156; contra Bung, I74 n. 3). Why does he regard the land-bill as 'the first step in the demoralization of the people'? The ·view of Ed. Meyer (Kl. Schr. i 2 • 374; cf. Unger, Phil., I88z, 6I7 n. rs), that P. inserted this passage after the Lex Sempronia of Tiberius Gracchus in 133, has been widely accepted by Cuntz, De Sanctis, Bung, and others. But probably too much has been read into P.'s words. ~ €7TI. ro X"'ipov TOV o-.jp.ov OtaCl'Tporf.'lj is simply the outburst of popular assertiveness associated especially with Flaminius' career, which ended in the fiasco of the aequatum imperium of Fabius and Minucius (iii. 103. 4), and the election of such leaders as Flaminius and Varro who, at Trasimene and Cannae, were responsible (in the eyes of the Senate) for bringing Rome within an inch of ruin. Clearly P. had an exaggerated picture of the role of the tribunate at this time (cf. iii. 87. 8), and an exaggeration of Flaminius' maleficent role fits excellently the strange observations on the tribunate at vi. I6. 3-5 (q.v.). Flaminius is further attacked for precipitating the Gallic tumultus of zzs. Against this it has been urged that the tumultus did not occur for seven years (z3. In.), and that when it did come, it took the traditional form of a plundering expedition, not prepared to try the final issue (z6. 4 ff.); see Meyer (Kl. Schr. ii. 395), De Sanctis (iii. 1. 305), and Frank (CAH, vii. 8o7). But, as Gelzer points out (Hermes, I933. ISo), the implementation of the bill took a considerable time, the rallying of Gauls from both sides of the Alps was necessarily slow, and the Romans had anticipated trouble for several years (13. s); and certainly Flaminius is subsequently associated with a policy of expansion in north Italy. 1lv s,; KO.L 'Pwfla.(o~~ ••• «Jla.TEOV apxTJYOV KTA.: 'which we must admit to have proved for the Romans virtually .. .' (so Schweighaeuser, Shuckburgh, Paton, Treves, taking •pwp.aiotr; as dative of disadvantage) or 'which even the Romans must virtually admit .. .' ('Pwp.alotr; dative of the agent with rf.arlov). The second is highly improbable, but is apparently the interpretation of Frank, who writes (CAH, vii. 8o6), 'we hear ... that the Senate considered it a measure which began "the demoralisation of the people" '. But if 'Pwp.almr; were 'the Senate', it would be rather P.'s than Flaminius' contemporaries. On the use of wr; e7ror; Ei7TEtv to soften an expression (here of criticism) see Wunderer (i. 5 n. 1). 9. oux uTr£p TJYEflOVLa.~ En KTA.: the motivation of the Gallic action is probably from Fabius' indictment of Flaminius' policy; though in fact the establishment of further colonies would have aroused Gallic 0
193
II.
21.
9
ROME AND THE GAULS
apprehension equally. The words rov rrpo; a.irrov; rroAEJLOV indicate that the Gauls regarded the land distribution as a preliminary to offensive warfare. In 22. I eUNw; is an exaggeration from the same source.
22. 1. '11'pOaa.yopwo~£vous , . . r O.LO'aTOUS: a misstatement from Fabius; cf. Oros. iv. 13. 5 (Fabius, fg. 23 Peter), 'maxime Gaesatorum, quod nomen non gentis sed mercennariorum Gallorum est'. The word derives from ya.i:ao;, a javelin or throwing-spear (cf. vi. 39· 3, xviii. r8. 4; Diod. xiii. 57; P.Teb. 230 (2nd cent.)), a word of Celtic origin (d. Serv. ad A en. vii. 664; Nonius, p. 555, quoting A en. viii. 661-2, on the Gauls attacking the Capitol, 'duo quisque Alpina coruscant I gaesa manu').
P. uses both the -a.1 and -o1 endings, Strabo, Plutarch, and other Greek writers use -at, and the Latin form is always Gaesati. On the etymology, which connects with words both Celtic and Germanic, see A. Holder (Altceltischer Sprachschatz, i (Leipzig, 1896), 1517 ff.), and R. Much (German. Forsch., 1925, 26); cf. Irish gai, gae, 'spear'; OHG ger, etc. In Caesar (BG, iii. 4· 1) the Celts of Canton Valais use gaesa; and the Gaesatae here come from the Rhone, which may include the uallis Poenina (cf. F. Stahelin, Die Schweiz in riimischer Zeit 3 (Basel, 1948}, 33 n. 1}, and not merely the middle and lower Rhone (R. Heuberger, Klio, 1938, 72-8o). The gaesum was always distinct from the Roman pilum, though Greek writers often use the word for any foreign spear; see Fiebiger (RE, 'gaesum', cols. 463-4). That Gaesatae came to mean 'Celtic mercenaries' is true (cf. Plut. Marc. 3}, and Much (ZDA, 1932, 43) compares the meaning 'bodyguard' acquired by oopv>opo;. Much and other Germanists (followed by Degrassi) have argued that they were Germans because (a) the act. tr. record a triumph of Marcellus in 222 'de Galleis Insubribus et Ger(manis'}, (b) Livy (xxi. 38. 8} describes the area north of the Great St. Bernard Pass as inhabited by gentes semigermanae. But the act. tr. here probably contain an error introduced in the time of Augustus (cf. 0. Hirschfeld, Kl. Schr. (Berlin, r9r3). 365 ff.; Stahelin, loc. cit.), and Livy's reference also suggests an anachronism, since the extended use of the name Germani does not appear before the first century (Stahelin, op. cit.}. Heuberger (loc. cit.) believes the Gaesatae are 'warriors', who joined in the expedition for plunder, not as mercenaries; and he rejects P.'s explanation out of hand. In imperial times we hear of a ue[xi]llatio Retorum Gaesa[torum] (Dessau, ILS, 2623; cf. CIL, vii. roo2, viii. 2728); and Strabo (v. 212) mentions Gaesatae who accompanied the Senones in attacking the Romans and seems to regard them (v. 2r6} as a Celtic tribe inhabiting the Po valley. For discussion of the problems 194
ROME AND THE GAULS
II. 23. 4
involved see Meyer (Kl. Schr. ii. 229-30 n. 4), Stahelin (loc. cit.), R. Much, Germ. Forsch. (1925), 26-Qr, 'Der Eintritt der Germanen in die Weltgeschichte'; ZDA, 1932, 17-46 'Die Gaesaten'; H. Jacobsohn, ZDA, 1929, z2o-r; R. Heuberger, Klio, 1938, 6o-8o 'Die Gaesaten'; Degrassi, Inscr. It. xiii. r. sso. 4. olJ j.t6vov EVLK"l<TilV KTA.: at the Allia; cf. r8. 2-3. 5. £8EAovTi Klli J.lETa xapLToc.;: in fact after the payment of a ransom, r8. 3 n. The figure of seven months was well established in the tradition. The dies Alliensis was r8 July, the siege in autumn (Plut. Cam. z8) and the relief in February (in the calendar of Polemius Silvius on id. feb.; cf. CIL, i 2 • I,' p. 259); cf. Mommsen, Rom. Forsch. ii. 328 n. ~· · 7. Ka.Tn 8E To us KllLpouc.; TOuTouc.;: a vague transitional phrase, perhaps deliberately so. KllTilJ.lllV'I"EUOJ.lEVOL To J.lEAAov: 'surmising what would happen', i.e. in contrast to what they heard (dKov6vTES); cf. Arist. Rhet. 1368 a 3I, £K nov 7Tpoyeyov6nuv Td. j.dlloVTa KG.TG.fW-VTEV6p.tiVOf, Kplvop.Ev. Meyer (Kl. Schr. ii. 394 n. I) translates erfuhren durch Weissagungen, and sees a reference to the burial alive of a Gallic and Greek couple in the forum Boarium in response to a Sibylline oracle (Plut. Marc. 3· 6; Dio, fg. so; Zon. viii. I9; Oros. iv. 13. 3) in 228 (ct. Gelzer, Hermes, I933· ISI n. r). But this sense would be without parallel. 8. aTpa.TO'II'E81l Kll'l"a.ypaq,ELv: ten in all, two for each consul (24. 3), two to guard Sicily and Tarentum (z4. 13), and four in reserve at Rome (24. 9). 10. we.; KilL '11'p6a8Ev iJjiiv ELP"lTilL: IJ. s-7 (with note). 23. 1. 86va.J.lLV 'll'oAunMj KilL ~llpEillv: 'a richly-equipped and powerful army', cf. xxxi. I7. 4. ef.'Vf,K~V X€fpa. f3a.pEia.v. Naturally some were light-armed (cf. 27. 6); hence f3a.pt'ta.v is not 'heavy-armed'. ~TEL , , • oy86fl': the year is 225 (cf. ZJ. 5 n.), the eighth after 232 by inclusive reckoning. See 2r. In., 21. 7· 2. ol 8' OOEVE'I"OL KilL r OVOj.taVOL ••• TOUTOLS EtAOVTO
II. 23
5
ROME A ;.rD THE GAULS
5-6. AEliiCLOv ••• Ail'iAtov KTA.: the consuls for A.U.c. 529 225 B.C. were L. Aemilius Q.f. Cn.n. Papus and C. Atilius M.f. M.n. Regulus {§ 6). Cf. Klebs, RE, 'Aemilius (ro8)', cols. 575-6; 'Atilius (.;3)', cols. zoBs-6. Aemilius was sent to Ariminum to defend the ager Gallicus; he triumphed in 224 'de Galleis III nonas mart.' (act. tr.). Atilius was son of the famous Regulus of the First Punic War (i. 26. n ff.). His presence in Sardinia creates a problem. There seems no good reason to question P.'s statement (so Beloch, Hermes, 1922, rz8 f., criticized by Meyer, Kl. Sckr. ii. 396 n. 2); and though the Romans may have been taken by surprise, either through neglect of the northern danger (Holleaux, 123 n. 3) or because they did not foresee where the blow would fall (Gelzer, Hermes, 1933, rso n. s), it seems more likely that Atilius was sent to guard against a possible Punic attack (d. 24. 13 n.). He will have been recalled when the news of the Ebro treaty, sworn probably between autumn 226 and spring zzs (13. 7 n.), secured the Romans against any move by Hasdrubal (27. 1); see Treves ad loc. Zonaras (viii. 19) records a rising in Sardinia which may also connect with Atilius' presence there. The name of the praetor (ita1TtAl'KVS in Greek, since he had six axes and fasces) in Etruria is not recorded. 9. O.va.cflEf>EW •• , O.woypa.cJ!a~ Twv £v Tals TjALKLa.ls: 'to supply lists of men of military age', viz. of the iuniores, from 18 to 46 years inclusive; cf. vi. 19. 5; Mommsen (Rom. Forsch. ii. 404), and StrachanDavidson (28). The details of Roman preparations do not suggest that they were caught by surprise. 24. Roman and Italian forces in 225. P.'s figures evidently go back through Fabius to the actual Ka-raypa¢at, and are mainly reliable (d. §§ u-r2 nn.):
(a) Troops in arms (§§ 3-9, 13)
Infantry With the consuls (four legions} Sabines and Etruscans Umbrians and Sarsinates Veneti and Cenomani In Sicily and Tarentum (two legions) Reserve at Rome (four legions)
20,8oo
I,200
8,400 20,000
400
JO,OOO 2,000 lso,ooo+ 4,ooo 20,000 20,000
I
z,ooo
ROME AND THE GAULS
II. 24
(b) Men capable of bearing arms (§§ ro-12, 14) -
1
Romans
Allies
--····
Romans and Campanians Latins Samnites Iapygians and Messapians Lucanians . Marsi, Marrucini, Frentani, Vestini
I
Infantry
Cavalry
250,000
23,000
.. .. .. .. ..
I 250,000
Total
Infantry
Cavalry
..
..
. . !! .. .. ..
8o,ooo ]0,000 50,000 30,000
r6,ooo 3,000
..
20,000
4,000
250,000
35,000
23,000
I
5,000 ],000
···--·
(c) Polybius' total (§ r6: for the figures in § IS see ad loc.) Infantry
Cavalry
700,ooo+
70,000
For discussion see Mommsen (Rom. Forsch. ii. 382-4o6; St.-R. iii. 575 n. 2), Beloch (Bevolkerung, 355-70; I B, 93 ff.), Strachan-Davidson (22-32), De Sanctis (ii. 385 n. I, 462; iii. 330), T. Frank (CAH, vii. 8U-I2; ES, i. sB-59), Veith (Heerwesen, J05-7L Gelzer (Hermes, I935· 273 ff.), and earlier works quoted by Liebenam (RE, 'dilectus', cols. 6o8 ff.). The main problem is whether the troops in arms are included in, or additional to, those capable of bearing arms. On the assumption that the latter is the case, the sum of the separate items adds up to P.'s total, viz.
Romans: in arms not summoned Allies: in arms not summoned
Infantry
Cavahy
49,200 250,000 I50,000 250,000
3,100 23,000 8,ooo 35,000
__T_o_ta_l____________________~__6_9_9_,2__ o~~9,IOO
Whether or no any addition be made to allow for allies with the legions in Sicily, and for cavalry of the Umbrians, Sarsinates, Veneti, and Cenomani (omitted by P.), clearly these totals correspond closely to P.'s 7oo,ooo infantry and 7o,ooo cavalry. On this assumption, which is M:ommsen's, the whole levy of north Italy was called out, and therefore did not figure under (b); and the contingents actually serving from south Italy are included in the figures of allies with the consuls or in reserve at Rome (§§ 4 and 9), since these forces 197
II. 24
ROME AND THE GAULS
represented contingents from all parts of Italy in addition to the
levee en masse in the north.
On the other hand, the phrasing of §§ IO and I4 (KaTo:ypa<{;ai. s· &.v-ryv€x01JG'O.V ••• , 'Pwttalwv o€ I(O.t Kattrravwv f] 7TA1J0vs ••• ) suggests that P. is recording the full muster for the areas in question, not that muster less troops already serving; and the round figures (25o,ooo Roman and Campanian infantry, 25o,ooo south Italian infantry) look like a maximum based on the Ko.Ta:ypap~ rather than such a maximum less a specific number already serving. Further, it is improbable that the figures under (a) represent a roo-per-cent. turn-out, for instance, the 54,ooo Sabines and Etruscans who marched to Rome (§ 5). Consequently Strachan-Davidson supposes the figures in (a) to be included in (b), but suggests that P. has omitted those from north Italy who were liable to serve but not actually on service; by subtracting the 558,ooo Romans, Campanians, and south Italians from P.'s total of no,ooo, he reaches a figure of 2rz,ooo north Italians liable for service. 1 The truth seems to be that P. has been less logical than either Mommsen or Strachan-Davidson demands. His totals must represent the sum of his individual items- the correspondence is too close for any other assumption; but what he has given is this. For the north Italians who fought as national armies (Sabines, Etruscans, Umbrians, Sarsinates, Veneti, and Cenomani) he records the numbers actually fighting {probably a high percentage of the whole) ; here he has drawn no distinction between the number fighting and the possible maximum. He also the number of Romans serving in the legions, and of the allied auxiliaries attached thereto, whether from north or south Italy (§§ 3-4, 9, IJ). Further he gives the total number of Roman adult male citizens (§ 14), perhaps from the census lists. But for south Italy, which had to be included in a picture of the full strength of Italy at the time of the Second Punic War(§§ I-2), his only figures were those of the Kamypa.pal, and these he gave unaltered (for he cannot have known how many of these were serving as auxiliaries with legions). Finally, P. added up all these figures to give a grand total for Italy. This total omits all north Italians not on service and counts south Italians acting as auxiliaries with the legions twice over; it also counts twice over those Romans and Campanians actually serving in the legions, and ' One may ignore Orosius 7) who gives the number of Roman and Campanian infantry as i.e. 348,200. Mommsen emends this to CCLXXxxvmrcc, i.e. Z99,2oo, which exactly fits his calculations. But Beloch (Bevolkeru~tg, 363) follows Niebuhr (RG, ii'. 8r) in emending to ccxxxxvmcc, which on the assumption that (b) includes (a) is perhaps a more accurate veTsion of P.'s zso,ooo. And indeed Orosius' figure of 23,6oo Roman cavalry is closer to P.'s 23,000 than the 26,roo required by Mommsen's theory. I-<)8
ROME AND THE GAULS
II. 24. 3
the Sabines may also be counted twice since they were full citizens (24. 5 n.). Can the real total be recovered? There are the following basic figures: Infantry
Cavalry
Romans and Campanians available South Italians available
250,000 250,000
North Italians on service .
500,000 9o,ooo+
58,ooo S,ooo (estimating the cavalry for Umbrians, etc., at 4,000)
59o,ooo+
66,ooo
23,000 35,000
····-------·
To these totals add (a) an unknown proportion of the 6o,ooo foot and 4,ooo horse serving with the consuls and at Rome, to represent north Italians included in those figures; (b) a similarly unknown, but probably smaller, proportion of the auxiliaries attached to the legions guarding Sicily and Tarentum, representing north Italians; perhaps the total for all these auxiliaries, whatever their origin, may be reckoned at about ro,ooo foot and r,ooo horse, though this is a guess (Mommsen estimated the total number of north Italians under both these heads as 19,ooo out of 75,ooo, but this is also a guess); (c) the adult males of military age from north Italy not on service. It is clear that these figures are past recovery; but P.'s total looks like a slight overestimate. P.'s source was Fabius; and his total of 8oo,ooo, as recorded by Eutropius (iii. 5) and Orosius (iv. IJ. 6) is clearly a rounding off of P.'s no,ooo. Ultimately going back to Fabius too are Diodorus (xxv. r3: 7oo,ooo foot and 7o,ooo horse under arms), Pliny (Nat. hist. iii. 138: 7oo,ooo foot and 8o,ooo horse under arms) and Livy (ep. zo: 8oo,ooo in all). This suggests that P. has followed Fabius closely, and that he too gave a picture of the potential power of Rome at the time of the Hannibalic War. The errors of calculation probably also go back to Fabius. For the relation of P.'s figures to the third century census lists see § 14 n. Fabius' figures omit the Greeks of south Italy (who were exempt from all military service) and the Bruttians (who were used in a menial capacity); cf. Frank (ES, i. 58), who does not, however, consider the real problems of this chapter. · 3. J.lETu J.lEv 8~ T<7JV urr6.Twv ••• TETTapa. (7Tpa.T6rre8a: i.e. each consul had an army of two legions (Paton's error ('four legions each') is reproduced by Frank, ES, i. 58). The normal complement at this time was 4,ooo-4,2oo foot and 3oo horse (i. r6. 2, vi. 20. 8--9) ; these legions are over-strength, an indication of the crisis (cf. vi. zo. 8). 199
II. 24. 4
ROME AND THE GAULS
4. au!ll..l.o.xo~ S€ 11e8' EKO.TEpwv ..• ot auv6.Jlll>w: 'the allied forces in both consular armies together' (not 'in each consular army': so Paton, and Frank, loc. cit.). According to P. (vi. 26. 7) the allied infantry normally equalled the Roman in number, and the cavalry were three times as many; but before the Social War the allies complained that 'duplici numero se militum equitumque fungi' (Vell. Pat. ii. rs. 3)· Here the allies provide 30,000 foot and 2,000 horse to the Romans' 2o,8oo and r ,2oo; at Rome (§ 9) the proportions are similar, and for the infantry fit Velleius rather than P. In the second century the later books of Livy show two allies being normally enrolled to one citizen (cf. vi. 26. 6--9 n.; Strachan-Davidson, 27); and calculations based on Livy, Appian, and P. (F. Frohlich, Die Gardetruppen der romisclten Republik (Aarau Programm, r882), 6) show that between 296 and r68 allied infantry usually preponderated. 5. eK: Tou K:a.~pou: 'at once, in haste' (cf. x. 43· g, xviii. 26. 8). Schweighaeuser corrected in his Lex. Polyb. his translation 'necessario tempore'; but this has misled Treves ('in que! frangente'), while Paton mis-translates 'temporary assistance'. Shuckburgh's 'for that special occasion', can be supported from vi. 32. 3· Io.~£vwv Ka.t TuppTJvwv i'IT1l'el:s KTA.: the Sabines, an ancient people of central Italy (cf. Strabo, v. 228, r.aAcuoraTov y~os ... Kai aU76x8ovES') and the reputed forebears of the Samnites, dwelt in the Apennines east of the Tiber and Nar, and north of the Anio (Nissen, It. Land. ii. 46.1 ff.; Beloch, RG, ssz). Since they had possessed ciuitas sine suffragio since 290 (Livy, ep. II; VeiL Pat. i. r4. 5; Florus, i. ro; auct. de uir. ill. 33· 3) and full citizenship since 268 (Veil. Pat. i. r4. 7), their mention along with the Etruscans (on whom see r7. r n.) suggests that in the crisis of this year geographical considerations were paramount and led to the calling out of the Sabini along with the socii {so Mommsen, St.-R. iii. 575 n. 2). 6. TOuTous ..• 1rpoeK:6.81aa.v: an army of so,ooo foot and 4,ooo horse (the equivalent of five legions with their auxiliaries) seems very large to entrust to a praetor (d. De Sanctis, iii. r. 307 n. ro7 ). It is possible that Fabius has confused the praetor's force with the maximum levy; but reductions in number (Beloch, IB, 94, would reduce the praetor's army to two legions) must be wholly arbitrary. 7. o{ ••. "Oil~poL Ka.l Ia.paLV6.To~: see 16. 3 n. (Umbrians). Sarsina, Plautus' home (d. Mostell. no), lay on the head-waters of the R. Sapis, to the north of the ager Gall!'ezts, in Umbria; its inhabitants (usually Sarsinates though Pliny (1\'at. h1:st. iii. II4, etc.) and inscriptions have Sassinates) were forcibly enrolled in the alliance and separated from Umbria in 266. Perhaps they originally controlled the whole Sapis valley, with the (later extinct) Sappinates and the tribus Sapinia (d. Livy, xxxi. 2. 6, xxxiii. 37· x). See :Kissen, It. Land. ii. 378, and Philipp, RE, 'Sarsina', cols. so-sr. Beloch (IB, 99) 200
ROME AND THE GAULS
would raise P.'s figure of zo,ooo for these tribes. On the Veneti and Cenomani see I 7. 4-5 n., ZJ. z n. P. has omitted the cavalry of all these four peoples; on the normal ratio this would come to about 4,000 horse in all. Their function in the Roman plan (§ 8) was to carry out a diversionary offensive against the Boii in Emilia. 10. ICO.Ta.ypo.cJ>a.l. S' ilVfJVEX9TtaO.\I: the aTToypwpal of ZJ. 9· The subsequent figures represent maximum levies: see z4 n. AaTlvwv .•• Ia.uv~Twv: after the dissolution of the Latin League in 338, Latini (nomen Latinum, socii nominis Lat1:ni) included (a) the original Latin and Hernican states which had not been incorporated in Rome, (b) the Latin colonies scattered throughout Italy, whose citizens had Latin status. 'Since the Latin Name lacked a specific territorial unity, the term was inevitably interpreted in a political and social sense alone, as meaning persons of a certain status' (Sherwin-White, 95; see especially 91 ff.). It seems unlikely, therefore, that only Latin colonies are here included (Beloch, IE, 99). Samnite territories (cf. i. 6. 4 n.) had been much limited since the Samnite and Tarentine Wars by the planting of Roman and Latin colonies (Beloch, RG, 539·-44); Beloch argues (IE, <)8) that their numbers here include the Hirpini, and perhaps the people of Nola, Nuceria, and even Sidicinum. 11. 'la.'ITuywv ~eal MEaaa'ITU.>v: terms with a somewhat fluid connotation. In iii. 88. 3 the Messapians are part of the Iapygians; here Iapygia probably signifies Apulia (v.ith the Apuli, Daunii, and Peucetii), and Messapia Calabria (with the Sallentini). All these tribes are closely related in tongue and culture. See Philipp, RE, 'Iapyges', cols. 727 ff.; M. Mayer, RE, 'Messapia', cols. IIiS ff.; De Sanctis, ii. 462 n. 3· Since 16,ooo horse is disproportionate to so,ooo foot, it has been widely emended to 6,ooo (Beloch, Eevolkerung, i. 359; IE, 9i; DeSanctis, ii. 462 n. 3; Treves ad Joe.). 12. AEu~eavwv: the Lucanians, Roman allies since the late fourth century, dwelt among the southern Apennines between the R. Silurus {modern Sele) just north of Paestum and the R. Laos (Laino) on the west coast, and between the R. Crathis (Crati) and the R. Bradanus (Bradano) on the Gulf of Tarentum. They had already lost Paestum, where a Latin colony was founded in 273; and their small levy may be due to many of the people's being subject to the Greek cities of the gulf (Nissen, It. Land. i. 535). P.'s figure was questioned byBeloch(Rh. Af.us., r877, 247), but unjustifiably (Mommsen, Rom. Forsch. ii. 394 n. 1z). See further Beloch, RG, 591 ff.; Honigmann, RE, 'Lucania', cols. 1541 ff. Mapawv ••• Mo.ppouKlvwv ••• cj)~pEVTclVWV ••• o.:,.,aT(vwv : tribal confederations of the central Apennines. The Marsi, of Sabine origin, lived around the Fucine Lake and the upper Liris valley. The Marrucini were to the north-east of the Marsi, between the mountains 201
II.
24. 12
ROME AND THE GAULS
and the Adriatic, south of the R. Aternus; their capital was Teate (modem Chieti). The Oscan-speaking Frentani dwelt along the coast south of the Marrucini, as far as the R. Tifernus (or the R. Frento, if one includes the Larinates Frentani). These peoples joined the confederacy in 304 (Diod. xx. ror. 5; Livy, ix. 45· r8; Beloch, RG, 403}. and the Vestini, who lived along and to the north of the R. Aternus, in 302/r (Livy, x. 3· r). The Paeligni, who lived between the Marsi and Marrucini (cf. Li-v-y, viii. 29. 4; DeSanctis, ii. 462 n. 3), though not mentioned here, are probably included in P.'s calculations (Beloch, Bevolkerung, 365). Twenty thousand infantry seems a small number for these Abruzzi tribes, and Reloch (Bevolkerung, 36o; I B, 97--98; cf. DeSanctis, ii, 462 n. 3) suggests that it should be changed to 4o,ooo, which would restore the normal ratio of r : ro between horse and foot. See further Nissen (It. Land. i. srs-18, 527-8). 13. Ka.l. ~v :IlKEMliJ- Ka.L T6.pa.VTl: Tarentum, the principal harbour in south Italy (x. 1), and Sicily both needed protection in case of any move from Carthage. These legions were slightly under strength in cavalry. 14. 'Pw!lo.lwv 8i Kal Ka!l1Tavwv iJ 1TATJ8U'>: these figures probably indude those serving in the legions (24 n.). They must be considered in conjunction with the third-century census figures for Roman citizens: 292,234 (Livy, ep. 16; cf. Eutrop. ii. r8 (text uncertain; cf. DeSanctis, ii. 425 n. 3) .} 297,797 (Livy, ep. r8.) 241,212 (Livy, ep. 19.) 26o,ooo (Hieron. in Euseb. Chron. ii. 123 (Euseb. ibid. 122 gives 25o,ooo).) 270,713 (Livy, ep. 20 (text uncertain).) 137,108 (Livy, xxvii. 36. 7; cf. Frank, ES, i. 56-57·) 2q,ooo (Livy, xxix. 37· s-6.) Against Mommsen's view that these are figures for iuniores only, i.e. men between r8 and 46 (Rom. Farsch. ii. 398 f.; St.-R. ii. 411 n. r) see the arguments of Strachan-Davidson (28 ff.) and Beloch (Bevolkerung, 3IZ ff., 343 ff.). Beloch discusses other theories, and recently Schultz (Mnem., 1937, 161 ff.) has argued that the figures excluded men over 6o. But the most probable view is that they include all adult male citizens. The likelihood is that P.'s figures here are on the same basis, and include both smtiores and iuniores (unlike those for the allies: 23. 9 n.); but whether the ciues sine suffragio (Campanians, Hernicans, etc.) were included in the census is not certain. Clearly P. has given a round figure, and it is possible that he (or his source) has adjusted the census figure to allow for ciues sine suffragio and 202
ROME AND THE GAULS
II. 25. 6
men serving abroad (and so excluded from the census). But these would probably more or less cancel out the number of men over military age included in the census figures, which is what P. most likely gives. His total would fit very well into the list of figures for the third century, 273,000 compared with 270,713 in 234. See Frank (CAH, vii. 8n; ES, i. 58-59), Beloch (op. cit., supra; IB, 96), De Sanctis (ii. 463 n. r), Gelzer (Hermes, 1935, 27,3). On Orosius (iv. 13. 7) see footnote to 24 n.; clearly it must be omitted from consideration in this context. 15. To Kco+6.Aa.Lov T~lV !lEY trpoKa.9"1J.Livwv Tijs 'Pw!ll]S 5uv6.f1Ewv: how these 15o,ooo+ foot and 6,ooo horse 'stationed before Rome' are to be calculated is not clear ; and on any method this figure for thecavalry seems too small. Beloch (I B, 94) argues that the 15o,ooo are a reduction of the twelve legions with their auxiliaries which P. found in Fabius (assuming two under the praetor in Etruria: see 24. 6 n.); but (a) the total of twelve is only achieved by a forced reckoning, (b) P. speaks of over 15o,ooo foot, (c) Beloch himself admits 6,ooo horse to be too few. Mommsen (Rom. Forsch. ii. 38g-go) observed that these figures are not relevant to an account of the strength of the forces facing Hannibal; hence they are best regarded as a gloss (with Hultsch, Blittner-Wobst, and Strachan-Davidson). The words to be bracketed are [K£]. 17. €AaTTous .•• 5uY!lup(wv: on Hannibal's numbers see iii. 35· 1 n.; cf. iii. 33· r8. Here P. neglects his 6o,ooo cavalry. aa.+iuTEpov EKtrmf)uEL Ka.Ta.voEiv: 'it will be possible to win a clearer understanding'; for the impersonal use of EK7TOt£'i cf. xxix. 8. ro.
25. 2. Kl\ouaLov: Clusium (modern Chiusi) lay in the Clanis valley (Val di Chiana) on the route from Rome to Arretium, the later Via Cassia; at r6o km. from Rome it is a long three days' march, and De Sanctis (iii. r. 308 n. w8) suggests emending to 'five', i.e. E for r. But the tradition would exaggerate the proximity of the danger. 3. ol 5' ••• ES U'ITOO'Tpo+ijs a'ITTJVTWV: cf. iii. 14. 5· The Roman forces under the praetor (24. 6) were evidently stationed near Clusium or Perusia, so as to keep in touch with the two legions of Aemilius Papus, the consul, at Ariminum (23. 5). In case of need Aemilius could march south through the Fnrlo Pass to Iguvium and Perusia (cf. z6. r ff.). 6. ti>s etrt .•. 4'a.tuoAav: 'towards Faesulae'; Faesulae is So miles from Clusium and the Gauls obviously did not march there overnight (if Casanbon's emendation of mho~ to ain-ov is to be accepted, P. has not fully understood Fabius). De Sanctis (iii. 1. 3o8) suggests the feigned retreat was only as far as Montepulciano in the Val di Chiana. 7Tap£vl{1al.ov is 'they encamped' (cf. i. 77· 6) or 'they drew up 20}
II. 25.6
ROME AND THE GAULS
for battle' (d. v. 69. 7); § 10 suggests that the second is the meaning here (Schweighaeuser). 26. 1. AEuK,oc; AiJ.LiAtoc; ••• 1Ta.pfjv ~oTJ8wv: having come through the Cales gap into the upper Tiber valley (zs. 3 n.). His arrival ~:ifrvxws ds- oiovra Katpov dramatically foreshadows the approaching peripeteia of T elamon. 2. O.vo1TAouc;: 'to facilitate their progress and mitigate their situation in the case of capture' (Treves). 5. To Twv o-WJ.LclTwv Ka.i 8pEJ.LJ.Lchwv 1TATj8oc;: 'the number of prisoners and cattle'. Paton translates awJ.tam 'slaves'; but in P. it is more often used of prisoners, whether free or slaves. Cf. 6. 6,awJ.taTa oovAtKa and €AEv8~:pa, and Schweighaeuser, Lex. Polyb. s.v. 7. Ka.Ta T~v ~VTJpoia-Tou yvwJ.LTJV: Fabius no doubt had information of this conference from Gallic survivors after Telamon. But either he, or possibly P. abbreviating his account, has failed to appreciate the extent to which the Gauls still controlled events. Their present camp was well to the north of Clusium ; they next appear marching north up the Etruscan coast towards Telamon, which lies on a latitude approximately 40 miles south of Clusium. They had thus made a vast sweep to the south-east, perhaps to avoid central Etruria (DeSanctis, iii. r. 309), but certainly with scant respect for Aemilius, who could do little more than hang on their heels in anticipation of 'Fabian' tactics (§ 8). 1Tpofjyov 1TO.pa 86.Aa.TTO.V s,a. TTJS T uppTJVWV xwpa.c;: 'they advanced through Etruria along the sea-coast.' The point at which they reached the coast can only be surmised; De Sanctis (iii. 1. 309) suggests the mouth of the Albegna near Orbetello, but they may have gone farther south. Eventually they would have returned through Liguria or up the Arno valley. 27-30. The battle of Telamon. The source is Fabius (d. Bung, 172). Conflicting details occur in Zonaras (viii. zo) and Orosius (iv. 13. 8), both of whom make Atilius perish in a separate struggle. Whether certain votive offerings discovered at Telamon are connected with the battle is not certain: cf. DeSanctis (iii. 1. 312 n. 1n). 27. 1. EK Ia.pOOVO') ... r 6.i'oc; ~TLALO<; ••• EL<; n£o-a.c; KO.T0.1TE1TAEUKWS: cf. 23. s-6 n. Pisa (16. 3 n.) was not a natural port to use for communications v.·ith Corsica, and its choice here was based on sound strategy. By cutting off the Gauls from Liguria and the north, Atilius made the victory of Telamon possible (though he could hardly have foreseen their choice of the coast road). 2. TEA«J.LWVa. TTJS TuppTJv£a.s: the Etruscan town lay not at the modem Talamone (Nissen, It. Land. ii. 308--9) but farther to the east
ROME AND THE GAULS
II. 29. 8
at Poggio di Talamonaccio, on the right bank of the R. Osa; see Gamurrini (Not. d. scav., r888, 682 ff.), Philipp (RE, 'Telamon (4)', cols. 192-3). ot 1rpovoj1EUOVTE\i: 'their foragers' (not 'their advanced guard' (Paton)). The Romans normally sent an advanced guard to discover a camping ground (vi. 41. r); but on this occasion it was early in the day (cf. § 6, T~v vvKm, the previous night), and though the Romans were not strong on reconnaissance (cf. iii. 83 ff. for Trasirnene), Atilius' 7Tporrop
II.
]0. I
ROME AND THE GAULS
30. 1. To us d.KovnaTas: cf. iii. 65. 3 ff., 69. 8; they are iaculatores, javelin-throwers, whom P. often mentions as ypoa,Pof-Laxo~. the equivalent of uelites (cf. i. 33· 9 n.) . .EvEpyo'Ls Ka.i 'II'UKvo'Ls: 'thick and fast' (not, as Paton, 'well-aimed'). 3. TOU ra.Xa.nKOU 8upEou: cf. Livy, xxxviii. 21. 4 (of the Galatians), scuta tonga ... et ... plana. The oval Gallic 8vpEo<; is frequently represented on ancient monuments; cf. P. R. von Bienkowski, Die Darstellung der Gallier in der hellenistischen Kunst (Vienna, 19o8), figs. ro4, ro7, 109, nr, IIJ, 121; and other works quoted by Launey (REA, 1944, 222 n. r). It was too narrow to cover the massive bodies of the Gauls; cf. Plutarch (Philop. 9) on the Achaean shields, prior to Philopoemen's reforms: dnnoTim 8ta T~v AE1rTDT'1JTa Kal aTEvwTipot<; Tov 1TEpurriX\nv TU adJj.LaTa. 7. E'll'' !aov Ta.'Ls !Jruxa.'is: for the factor of morale cf. 35· 8, i. 59· 6 (where, in the rfroxoJLaxla which ended the First Punic War, the Romans had also a worthy opponent), and iii. 9· 7· 8. Schweighaeuser fills the lacuna exe·m.pli gratia: . . . JLEya>.~v Otatfoopav [ifxovaL 'PwJLalw;;, OLa TO TOVTWV JLiV TOV 8vpEOV oAov TO (JWJLU aKE1TEtV, Tov 8€ Ta>.aTLKov {JpaxvTEpov Elvat, Kai Dta TO T~v 'PwJLatK~v JLEV (Kal T~v JLEV 'PwJLULK~V Hultsch) J.Ldxatpav Kal TO KlVTIJJLU 8uJ4>Dpov KaL Kamrf>opdv N; dJL,Po£v Toi:v JLEpofv {Jlawv] lxnv, KTA. For the substance of this see 33· 5, iii. 114. 2 ff., vi. 23. 7, fg. 179. J.Lq6.X1Jv is to be taken with fna
ROME AND THE GAULS
II. 32.
I
of the Via Flaminia. Diodorus' statement that he invaded the Po valley as proconsul may be neglected, for he triumphed as consul. 5. To ••• Kn1TET6>Atov: Florus {i. zo) and Dio (fg. so. 4; cf. Zon. viii. 20) have a story that the Gauls had sworn an oath not to doff their belts or breastplates till they entered the Capitol (uncaptured in 387); this they fulfilled as prisoners in Aemilius' triumph. The UTJJLt/iat are Gallic standards; on the p.a.wiKa' see 29. 8 (where the definition might have come more appropriately). 8. tenTEA1T£crnvTES' 'Pwjln£ot 5uv..)crecr9nL • • • tK~aAeiv: just as the capture of Agrigentum inspired them with the ambition to seize all Sicily (i. zo. In.). This schematic development of Roman ambitions is probably P.'s own, rather than the work of Fabius Pictor (Heuss, HZ, 169, 1949-5o, 488 n. r, against Gelzer, Hermes, 1933, 151). Ko'(vTov CI>6Xoutov tent T£Tov M&-Atov: T. Manlius T.f. T.n. Torquatus and Q. Fulvius M.f. Q.n. Flaccus, the consuls of A.U.C. 530 224 B.C. The same pair had been elected censors in 231, but abdicated owing to a flaw in their election. That both were sent to Cisalpine Gaul is proof of the seriousness of the Roman effort. See Munzer, RE, 'Manlius (8z)', cols. 1207--9; 'Fulvius (59)'. cols. 243-6. 9. ds n)v 'PwJ.la£wv enuTOUS' 8ovva.t 1T'Lcrnv: this is an act of deditio (n. 5-12 n.). Orosius' story (iv. 13. n), that the Po was crossed, 23,ooo Insubrians slain, and s.ooo taken prisoner, is probably an annalistic invention (nothing to correspond appears in the act. tr.). It is very unlikely that the Romans crossed the Po in this year. See DeSanctis, iii. I. 313 n. 1q.. 10. els TEAOS G'!TpnKTOV dxov: if T6v • •• AoL7r6v xp&vov is the object of 11:lxov, arrpai<.'TOV is predicatiVe, if an adverbial aCCUSative, arrpaKTOV is also adverbial. The sense is the same in either case. 32. 1. no1T'ALOS Cl>ooptos teal r
II. 32.
2
ROME AND THE GAULS
2. Ka.Tcl TclS auppola.s TOU T' :t\Soa. Ka.i n&Sou: they crossed the Po at its junction with the Addua (modern Adda) between Placentia and Cremona. 3. Aa.(3ovTt:S SE wAfJyas KTA.: this defeat and agreement {which left Flaminius free to march away and link up with the Cenomani) make little sense. Probably the defeat is an exaggeration and the agreement a fiction {§ s); and Flaminius' original object was to join the Cenomani. The distortion, De Sanctis suggests (iii. r. 314 n. II7), is a reflection of the senatorial hostility towards him which permeates our sources, including Fabius; see 21. 8 n. 4. Tov KAouuLov woT«JlOV: should be the modern Chiese, a tributary of the Oglio; but this and not the Chiese formed the western limit of Cenomani country (17. 4 n.), and perhaps the name of the tributary has been applied to the main stream (M:ommsen, CIL, v. 413 n. 2; Nissen, It. Land. ii. 196 n. 2), either inadvertently or following contemporary usage. 6. Tns xpuuO.s O'TJJlEL«s: these standards were dedicated to Minerua, or her Celtic equivalent, of whom Caesar writes (BG, vi. q. 2) that 'Mineruam operum atquc artificiorum initia tradere'. She was, v..Tites Jullian (L 357), 'deesse de Ia guerre et de victoire, qui rappelait ala fois Bellone, Athene ou Minerve'. They were suspended in one of her temples, perhaps at the Insubrian capital of Mediolanum (so Schweighaeuser). The word dKw7}Tous has special point since KU'Ei:v was the technical expression for removing sacred objects from temples (cf. Thuc. i. 143. I, ii. 24. I, vi. 70. 4; see Schweighaeuser on Appian, B.C. ii. 41). In this case the Insubres removed the standards as a source of divine protection. \Vunderer's emendation av~K~Tou. (i. 72-73) is to be rejected. See also R. Hercod, 87. 8. T~\1 Tt: r a.Aa.nKTjv tHlEula.v: 'the treachery of the Gauls' ; cf. iii. 49. 2. 70. 4, 78. 2. Paton translates diJw{av 'fickleness' and Treves 'instability, inconstancy' (quoting Caesar's estimate of Gauls as ever eager for novelty, BG, iii. ro. 3, iv. 5· r). But toP. the meaning is stronger, positive treachery rather than negative instability. See Schweighaeuser, Lex. Polyb. &.iJwia, commenting on fg. I a (B-W), 'certe grauius quid P. TI)v diJwlav dicere consueuit quam rif311{5ato77jTa id est leuitatem et inconstantiam'. 9. EVTos Tou woTO.JlOU: i.e. on the right bank of the river. This should be the Clusius (= Oglio, 32. 4 n.), but P.'s topography here is not very clear. The Cenomani were dispatched to the left bank. 33. The battle against the Insubres. The account follows the anti~ Flaminian tone of 21. 7--9 and 32. 3· The innovation of the military tribunes, which is never heard of again, seems invented to contrast with Flaminius' incompetence. On P.'s picture of 1<1aminius, which remains consistent down to his death at Trasimene, see Gelzcr 208
ROME AND THE GAULS
II. 33· 9
(Hermes, 1933, 152-3); and on this passage De Sanctis (iii. 1. 315). P. omits the sensational prodigies, and the letter of recall sent by the Senate to Flaminius, and left unopened until after the battle, which adorn the Livian tradition; cf. Plut. Marc. 4; Fab. 2; Zon. viii. 20; Oros. iv. 13. 12-14; Livy, xxi. 63. z, 63. 7, 63. 12, xxii. 3· 4, 3· r3. See DeSanctis, iii. 1. 314 n. 115. 3 • .,.o.is t
;g a7Torrn:i<JEWS'.
6. Et< lho.Xt)+Ewc;: bp9o.is X~flEVOL To.ic;: fL«xa.(po.~c;:: £K Sw.A'lj,PEws, punctim, 'with a thrusting stroke', see Schweighaeuser's long note ad loc. By dp6ats P. may mean that the swords were kept straight, i.e. that the movement, punctim, was along the line of the sword, or alternatively that the Roman swords did not bend. 7 . .,.c, .,.Tjc;: 'PwfLO.i:t<"lc;: flGXlJi 'llhov: room to manreuvre in all directions, including backwards, was essential to manipular fighting; cf. xviii. 25. 4 for the retreat of the Roman left £7Tt TToi'la at Cynoscephalae (Meyer, J(l. Schr. ii. 214 n. 3). The tactic of retiring in battle against the Gauls is discussed by Kromayer (AS, iii. I. 368 ff.). 9. €va.vfiADov Eic;: TT)v 'PwfL"lv: Flaminius triumphed by a popular vote VI idus mart. (222) de Galleis, and "Furius Jill t"dus mart. de Gatleis et Liguribus (act. tr.). Their victories were celebrated on coins 4866
p
209
H. 33· 9
ROME AND THE GAULS
(see B.M.C. Rom. Rep. ii. zj8, z83); and according to Livy (xxiii. 14. 4) the spoils were sufficient to arm 6,ooo men. 34. 1. MapKOS K>.uoliLOS KUt rva.·.:os KopYtlALOS: M. Claudius M.f. M.n. Marcellus and Cn. Cornelius L.f. L.n. Scipio Calvus, consuls A.U.c. 532 222 B.C. Both were to have outstanding careers against Hannibal: see Munzer, RE, 'Claudius (z2o)', cols. 2738-55; Henze, RE, 'Cornelius (345)', cols. 1491-2. Since the previous year's consuls abdicated after their triumphs (Livy, xxi. 63. 2; Plut. Marc. 4· 3, 6. r; Zon. viii. .zo), they probably entered office on the Ides of March; and this seems to have remained the regular date for entry into office until I53· See De Sanctis, iii. I. 316 n. 122; Mommsen, St.-R. i. 598 f.; Broughton, ii. 638-9. There is some evidence that P.'s account is somewhat weighted in favour of Cornelius, at Marcellus' expense, perhaps because of his connexion with the Scipionic family (Munzer, art. cit.). 4. 1T6Aw !A.xippuc.;: the Tabula Peutingeriana puts Acherrae 22 miles from Laus Pompeii {Lodi Vecchio) and 13 from Cremona; it lay on the Addua a little above its confluence with the Po, and corresponds to Gera near Pizzighettone. See Nissen, It. Land. ii. rg2. 5. K>.aaTlBLOv: Clastidium, modern Casteggio, in the territory of the Anares (17. 7, 32. 1-z), lay on the fringe of the hills south of the Po, between I ria (Voghera) and Ticinum (Pavia). See iii. 69. I for its capture by Hannibal; Nissen, It. Land. ii. 271. 6. Ka.t TLVas Twv m;tLKwY: 6oo, according to Plutarch (Marc. 6. 6), who also records that Marcellus took two-thirds of the cavalry. Plutarch (Marc. 6--7) gives a fuller account of this battle than P., very favourable to Marcellus, and probably containing annalistic accretions; see DeSanctis, iii. r. 317 n. u.7. It may be deliberately (34· In.) that P. omits the gaining of spolia opima by Marcellus in his duel with the Insubrian chieftain Viridumarus (act, tr.; Livy, ep. 20; Florus, i. 20. 5; Eutrop. iii. 6; Oros. iv. r3. rs; Ampel. 2I; Val. Max. iii. 2. 5; Frontin. Strat. iv. 5· 4; auct. de uir, ill. 45· r; Plut. Marc. 7--8; Rom. r6. 7-8; comp. Pelop. et Marc. r. z; Serv. ad Aen. vi. 855; also celebrated by many poets including Naevius in his play Clastidium, and Propertius (iv. Io. 39 ff.); see too B.M.C. Rom. Rep.i. 567). 8. a.thoi:s Toi:s t1T1T£ilaw ••• 1Tpoam:cr6VTwv: by extending his cavalry line Marcellus avoided the risk of being outflanked (Plut. Marc. 6. ro). 9 . .,ts Tov 1TOTO.f10Y: its identity is not clear; the Po is 8 miles north of Casteggio. 10. Mc;~ho>.a.vov: the Insubrian capital (17. 4 n.), modern Milan, on the site of Etmscan Melpum (r7. r n.), which the Gauls destroyed in 3¢ (Nepos ap. Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 125). Cf. Nissen, It. I.and. ii. r8o ff.; Philipp, RE, 'Mediolanum (r)', cols. 91-95. 210
ROME AND THE GAULS
II. 35· 4
15. o S£ fvO.i:os ..• To MtSt6Aa.vov ttAt: after glossing over Scipio's rashness in advancing to Milan with only a third of his cavalry, and underlining his success in rallying his shaken force, P. omits to mention that it was only after Marcellus rejoined him that Milan fell. See Plut. Marc. 7; Eutrop. iii. 6; Oros. iv. 13. 15; Zon. viii. 20. 35. 1. mivTa. •.• hrhptljlav TOL'i 'Pwp.a£oto;: by deditio; how far miv 7TOt1Ja€LI' vmaxvovp./vwv (34• 1) had fallen Short of readineSS to Carry this out is not clear. But obviously both consuls and the war-party were bent on a military demonstration. 2-10. The importance of the Gallic wars. P. underlines the lesson for the benefit of Greek readers (§ 9). It is (a) that in such incidents Fortune and the unexpected play a large part (§§ s. 8). cf. 4· s. (b) that a policy based on courage and reason will outmatch one based on passion (§§ 3, 8). Such digressions are a regular feature of P.'s method; d. i. 65. 5-9 (lessons of the Mercenary War), 84. 6----9 (lessons of Hamilcar's success), iii. 21. 9-10 (reasons for surveying the Romano-Carthaginian treaties in full) ; these examples could be multiplied. 2. TWV .•. lmoAXufL£vwv tca.L 11'a.paTa.TTOfL£vwv: hysteron proteron to avoid hiatus; cf. 2. 2 n. oliSEvos Ka.Ta.SE£aTEpos TWV ~aTOPTJfL£vwv: this is a common To7To:> of ancient historians; cf. Thuc. i. 1. 2, 21. 2 (the Peloponnesian vVar the greatest and most memorable). P. uses it repeatedly; cf. i. 63. 4 f. (comparison with the Persian and Peloponnesian wars), 88. 7 (the Mercenary War the cruellest ever fought), iii. 1. ro (the period of fifty-three years, 22o-167, more packed with serious events than any other); on its usual character see v. 33· I. Lorenz (99 n. 228) quotes examples from later historians. 3. 9ufL~ fLO.AAov ~ AoytafL~ ~pa.~E..)Ea9a.t: cf. 30. 4, V7ro ToiJ 8vp.oiJ Kal ri}> .i.\oytaT{as-, 35· 8. The sentiment is very typical of P. For the metaphor of the umpire in {Jpa{J€!Jw8at cf. i. 58. 1. 4. a.uTous .•• €€wa6£vTa.'i: Cisalpine Gaul was pacified in the two decades following the peace of 201; but details are not contained in the surviving parts of P. The Boii were defeated in 191 (Livy, xxxvi. 38. s-7). and Strabo (v. 213, 216) records their expulsion to the Danube area; but according to Livy (xxxvi. 39· 3) they merely had to cede Bononia and half their land, and Strabo's story may be a false deduction from the presence of Boii in Bohemia. Strabo (ibid.) also records the annihilation of the Senones and Gaesatae; but the Insubres (who were defeated in 197, Livy, xxxii. 30-31) continued, he says, to inhabit their own lands. Pacification was assisted by colonization. In 190 the Latin colonies at Cremona and Placentia (iii. 40) were reinforced (Livy, xxxvii. 46. 9-47. 2), a Latin colony was sent to Bononia in 189 (Livy, xxxvii. 57· 7-8), and two citizen 211
11. 35· 4
ROME AND THE GAULS
colonies were established at Mutina and Panna in r83 {Livy, xxxix. 55· 7-8). Roads too were built, the Via Flaminia from Arretium to Bononia, and the Via Aemilia from A.riminum to Placentia, both in 187. P., like Strabo, has, however, exaggerated the extent to which the Gauls were physically expelled. When Strabo (v. 247) says that the Samnites £g£Trmov from Pompeii, he is apparently referring to their ejection from political control; and J. Whatmough would save F.'s credit with the argument (Harv. Stud., 1944, 8z-8s) that £gwa8l!'r«s has a similar meaning here. But when P. writes avv8w;p1}aavus .•. lgwafl£vms, there can be little doubt what he means. He is, however, incorrect. Hundreds of tombstones with Celtic names dating mainly from imperial times are only the most striking of the evidence proving that the Gauls were not expelled, but romanized; cf. Chilver, 71-8.), and on the settlement in general, De Sanctis, iv. r. 41o-17; T. Frank, CAH, viii. 326 ff. 1TA-i]v b'Alywv T61Twv ••• ICELfl~vwv: P. will be thinking especially of the tribes at the head of the Po valley, the Salassi (xxxiv. ro. r8), who were only partially subdued in 143, and perhaps the Taurini (r5. 8 n.); see DeSanctis, iv. r. 417· TTJV -~ cipxfts i~oSov ••• nis J.lETci TauTu 1Tpa~ELS ••• '~'TJ" TEAEuTutuv t~uvuaTuow: three interpretations are possible: (a) the invasion of 387, the intervening events, the final tumultus of 225 (giving lgavaO"TaaLs this sense with Schweighaeuser); (b) the invasion of 225, the loss and recovery of Cisalpine Gaul, and the final expulsion of the Gauls (£gavaO"TaaLs as in 2r. 9: so Casaubon, Paton, Treves, LSJ, etc.); (c) the invasion of 387, the intervening campaigns (including 225), and the final expulsion. The last seems most probable, since it indudes the whole story of the Gauls in Italy (as P. did in this section and the later lost parts together). Against (a) is the improbability that £gavci.O"TaaLS means tumultus, and against (b) the improbability that the invasion of 225 would be called~ £g dpxf}s lcpoSos immediately after a survey going back to the capture of Rome. 5. Tu TmuiJ,-' ~1TELa6SLu Ti)ll TUXTJS: lusus jortunae, Schweighaeuser (cf. Hor. Od. ii. I, 3, ludumque Forttmae), 'such episodes in the drama of Fortune', Shuckburgh. In his commentary Schweighaeuser suggests that P. means an interlude, dravm from the material provided by Fortune, and inserted as a digression by the author in his history. But it is improbable that P. admitted any part of his work to be without relevance to his design (which he had already (i. 4· r) identified with the design of Tyche). The 'episodes' are rather the interludes provided by Fortune herself in her role as play-producer {on which see i. 4. 4 n. and CQ, I945, 9 n. I; to the passages there quoted add fg. :nz). Strachan-Davidson (ad loc.) suggests that 'the incident of the Gallic invasion is looked upon as a sort of by-play coming between the great Acts of the Punic tragedy, which is the main business of TvxrJ 212:
ROME AND THE GAULS
II. 35· 9
at this period'. But the episodes include the whole series of Gallic invasions of Italy from 387 to the expulsion from the Po valley. They are interludes because they interrupt the direct development of Roman power, to which (despite such a passage as 31. 8) they con· tribute nothing; and yet they are the work of Tyclre, since in their ups and downs, their paradoxical and sensational features, they reveal her typical handiwork. Such interludes, irrelevant interrup· tions, must be faced and mastered; how to meet them is P.'s lesson here (§ 8). 7. 'I"OU'ii 'ri}v nc:pawv ~cJ>o&ov ••• 1((1,' r a.Aa.'!"WV ••• O.ya.yOv'!"a.'ij: Herodotus (cf. i. 63. 8 n.) and Ephorus (praised in v. 33· z) both dealt with the Persian Wars, though Ephorus' work has survived only in the popular abridgement of Diodorus. \Vhom P. has in mind for the Gallic attack on Delphi (cf. i. 6. 5 n., ii. zo. 6) is uncertain, for all our accounts are secondary (Diodorus, Iustinus, and Pausanias), and their sources are not determined. Timaeus may have touched on the subject (so A. Schmidt, Abhandlungen zur alten Geschichte (Leipzig, r888), 3 ff.); and Demetrius of Byzantium, who wrote thirteen books on 'the crossing of the Galatians from Europe into Asia' (Diog. Laert. v. 83) may have included the attack on Delphi. Pausanias' source is especially good (Tarn, AG, 439-42) and may be either Timaeus or, as Segre thought (Historia, r927, r8-4z), Hieronymus of Cardia. 1'0U'ii inrEp Tfjs Kowfls 1'WV 'EAA.t1vwv ~AEu9Ep(a.s O.ywva.s: the old catchword of 'Greek freedom' was as popular and as elastic in the second century as in the fifth; since P. has no difficulty in reconciling it with Macedonian domination in the fourth century and Roman in the second (cf. xviii. 14. 6; CQ, 1943, 7-13), his argument here is perhaps 'singularly frigid and rhetorical' (Treves, ad loc.). Laqueur (275) argues that this passage (35· 4 ff.) is anti-Roman in implication: not so, for throughout the Romans are clearly the civilized element repelling barbarism, not barbarians themselves. 8. TJ ••• a.ipEats Ka.~ liuvnJ.ltS: 'devotion and might'; alternatively a.tp~a<;; may be 'resolve' (consilit~m, Schweighaeuser). Schweighaeuser takes Svvap.t;; to mean 'ability', sollertia (d. i. 84. 6). But the phrase there is crrpa77JYLK~ Svvap.LS'; alone, ovvap.LS' seems to require the more usual meaning. For the stress on reason cf. § 3· 9. c) &' a'ITO r a.Aa.1'WV cJ>6l3os .•. Ka.8' TiJ.lii'ii ••• E~~'ITATJ~E TOUS EAATJVCI.S: P. is thinking specifically of the Galatian wars in Asia Minor in the second century; cf. iii. 3· s. xxi. 41. z, ~x&.p71r:ra.v ••. brl -rij! Tdv a1r6 -rwv {Japf3dpwv ain-ot.;; cpofJov ii
2Il
ROME AND THE GAULS
II. 35· 9
his exile; they have no bearing on the date of composition of the present passage. 10. TTjv O'ITi!p TOUTWV t~t]yqaw: Tov.rwv will be masculine, not neuter (as Paton) ; cf. 14. r, {nr£p wv (i.e. the Celts) SoKEt p.ol x.p*np.ov Elvat • •• 1rm~uauiJa, T~v ig~'}"T}uw, to which P. here clearly refers back. 36. Hannibal succeeds Hasdrubal in Spain (zZI) 36. l. ETTJ Xt:tpiaa.s oKTw: viz. 229-221 ; cf. I. 7 for the earlier date. Diodorus (xxv. rz) makes it nine years, but only by inclusive reckoning. SoA.ocj:.ovTJ8ds ••• om) TLvos Kt:AToO To y£vos: a perhaps less reliable, but early, Greek version (Diod. xxv. 12; Livy, xxi. 2. 6; VaL Max. iii. 3, ext. 7; App. Hisp. 8; Hann. 2; Iustin. xliv. 5· 5, d. z. 4) records that Hasdrubal was murdered by an Iberian slave {Iustinus) during a hunt (Appian) to avenge his master (Appian, Iustinus, Livy) ; the slave died smiling (Iustinus, Livy) under torture (Appian, Iustinus, Livy). De Sanctis (iii. 2. 18r) attributes this story to Coelius Antipater. 2. ollx ouTw Sul. Twv 'ITOA£Jliwv IIpywv KTA.: cf. Livy, xxi. 2. 5, 'plura consilio quam ui gerens, hospitiis magis regulorum conciliandisque per amicitiam principum nouis gentibus quam bello aut armis rem Carthaginiensem auxit'. 3. ol. Ka.pxTJSOvtot: see iii. 13. 4 n. ; Hannibal was the choice of the troops, subsequently ratified by the people. No distinction is made here, where oi Kapx.TJS6vw• are 'the authorities at home' (not, as Laqueur (r5) argues, the Carthaginian army; cf. iii. q. u). Laqueur believes Fabius to be P.'s source; it must be the pro-Barcine source followed in r and 13. A.wi~q. ..• ovTt v£tr: the eldest son of Hamilcar Barca. He was 9 when he accompanied his father to Spain in 237 (r. 6), and so about 25 now (in 221). Cf. Diod. xxv. 19 (Tzetzes, Ch. i. 27 f.); Nepos, Hann. 3· 2, 'minor quinque et uiginti annis natus'; Zon. viii. 21, et ... Kai ErKouw e'Twv yEyovws. Eutrop. iii. 7· 2 ('annum ... uicesimum') is probably corrupt. See Lenschau, RE, 'Hannibal (8)', cols. 2323-4. s~a. TTJV li'ITOcj:.a.woJlEVTJV ••• nyx!vota.v KTA.: Hannibal had served continuously under Hamilcar and Hasdrubal. The story of his return to Carthage, whence Hasdrubal recalled him after 229 (Livy, xxi. 3· 2ft.), is obviously sheer slander; and the tricnnitltn, which he is alleged to have served under Hasdrubal (Livy, xxi. 4· ro), may be a reduplication of the three years spent as independent general in Spain before crossing the Pyrenees (DeSanctis, iii. 1. 415 n. 6g). 4. SiiAos ~v
etc
TWV i'ITlVOTJJlnTWV m)AEC:JlOV i~o(awv 'PWJlO.lOtS: a
view not confirmed by the evidence quoted. Hannibal's first two campaigns (iii. r3. 5-14. ro) are merely part of the general policy of consolidating Punic power south of the Ebro; and in iii. 14. ro P.
HANNIBAL SUCCEEDS HASDRUBAL IN SPAIN (221) II. 37
insists that until his third campaign Hannibal avoided giving the Romans any pretext for war. See Kromayer, HZ, 103, I909· 252-3; Otto, HZ, 145, 1932, 504-5. P. is here giving the Roman version, which made the 'wrath of the Barca family' the main cause of the war (cf. iii. 9· 6); hence (§ 6) the Carthaginians appear as the aggressors, 'forming designs' and 'eager to be avenged for their reverses in Sicily', and the war is treated as inevitable {§ 7, where the propagandist Version is thinly disguised:unde(thelwords TOt) Op8w) f11<01TOUfL.§...Ot>).
37-70. Events in Greece: rise of the Achaean League; the Cleomenean War P. closes his 1Tpo~
II. 37
EVENTS IN GREECE
method in these chapters see Lorenz, 3I; but the argument of Siegfried (Io2 ff.) that P. regards the union of the Peloponnese under Achaea as the realization of a Stoic ideal ('ein verkleinertes Abbild der stoischen Kosmopolis') is unconvincing. 37. 1. Ka"Ta Si "Tous au"Tous Kmpous: a loose sy'Il.chronism. The Social War (iv. 3· I ff.) began in late spring 220. On Philip see iv. 2. 5 and below, ii. 70. 8. Cil-ia. "To~s lii.A.ots aui-LI-Lcixots: the members of the Kotvry avp.p.axla. founded by Antigonus Doson; cf. 54· 4 n. The so-called Social War takes its name from this avp.p.axla which fought the Aetolians; see i. 3· I, iv. 3· I ff. 2. Ka.1'a 1'0 auvexes 1'TJS 1TpoKa.1'a.aKeuTjs: 'next in the series of events described in my introduction'; the phrase goes with ijKop.Ev. P. is referring to the scheme for the introduction enumerated in i. 3· 8-Io. 1'0u Seu1'€pou auO""Tav"Tos • . • 1TOAEj.Lou : it began with the siege of Saguntum in spring 2I9 (iii. 17· In.). On the name 'Hannibalic War' cf. i. 3· 2 n. Ka.1'a ••• 1'-f)v E~ apxfis 1Tpo9EO'LV: cf. i. 3· I-2, iv. 2. I. "Tfjc:; ia.u"Twv auV'Ta~ews: 'my own narrative' (€a.v-rwv = ~p.wv a.v-rwv; cf. Thuc. i. 82. I). 3. 1'f)S a1!'0SELK1'LKfjS l0'1'0pLa.S: 'detailed history', cf. iii. I. 3, fJ.fiT• a1ToSEl~Hos-. P. uses .i7ToSHKTtK6s- to mean 'supported by full reasons, tracing cause and effect' (cf. iii. 31. 12), and opposes 'apodeictic' narrative to an account consisting of mere assertions (iv. 40. I) or, as here, to the 1TpoKaTaO'KEv1} of books i-ii, which is KE
THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR 11.37·8
6. Twv tea.Tel. ~v ;t..a(o.v ••• Af.yuTrTOv tcTA.: the Seleudd and Ptolemaic kingdoms interested P. less than Macedon and Achaea (cf. De Sanctis, Riv. jil., 1934, u8). The reasons he gives for omitting them (despite § 3} from the 7rpoKaTao-Ke~ are: (r} their history before 220 has often been told and is therefore familiar; (z) their history after 220 has shown no surprising changes of fortune (unlike Achaea and Macedon); §§ 7--9· s~a. TO Ti]v ••• LO'Toplo.v UTfO TrAeu)vwv EICOE86ae
II. 37· 8
EVENTS IN GREECE
Achaea is thus an illustration of the general statement there made; and since that was accompanied by a reference forward to full treatment later (aa(f,ianpov f.v &£poLc; D7JAwaop.Ev), th
THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR IL37·ro
League Hoard (Num. Notes and Monographs, 74; New York, 1936), 7 ff., 30 (nos. r62-97), Plate IV. (e) ~pxoum, ~ouA£uTa.is, ~LKa,aTa.i'~ To is a.uTois: this triple distinc-
tion of magistrates, deliberative organ, and judiciary goes back to Aristotle (Pol. vi (iv.} 14· 2. 1298 a: 2v 11-~v ·rl To fJouA.t:u6/l-Evov 7TEpl Twv J<:DWWV, OEVTEpov 8~ TO 7TEpt TaS' apxas •••• TpLTOV 8~ TL TO Ot~ea,ov} and does not correspond exactly with the modern division, popularized by Montesquieu, into legislative, executive, and judicial (see (against Aymard, ACA, 158 f.) Newman, Politics of Aristotle (Oxford, 1902}, iv. 236 commenting on Aristotle, loc. cit.); but the comparison with Aristotle shows that under 'deliberative' are included several functions today classified as legislative. G.pXOIIT£!> (v. I. 6, I. 9, XXii. IO. IO ff., I2. j) is a general term for magistrates; elsewhere they are called oi 7TpawTWTES' ToiJ Ttliv 11xa~wv 7TOALTEV/.LilTDS' (ii. 46. 4), al avvapx£aL (xxvii. 2. II, Xxxviii. IJ. 4, IJ. 5), and oi avvapxoi!TE> (xxiii. !6. 6). The term at avvapxLaL, suggestive of a collegiate organization (Aymard, ACA, 322), is perhaps the official title. A board was formed of the aTpaT'T)yo> and ten Sa/1-Lovpyo{ (xxiii. 5· r6; J. Bingen, BCH, 1954, 402-7, no. r8, ll. 3-4; for the number see Livy, xxxii. 22. :z). In addition there were inferior magistrates, the hipparch (v. 95· 7), secretary (ii. 43- r), under-general (iv. 59· 2). and admiral (v. 94· 7, 95· n). See Freeman, HFG, 219 ff. fJovA.wml are members of the fJovAIJ (cf. Bingen, op. cit., no. 18, l. :z); but what the Achaean {3ovA7] was is a problem linked with that of the avvooos. The Achaeans had two kinds of assembly, the a6yd7JTos, meeting at irregular intervals, and the a6vooo<;, which met at regular times throughout the year. Until recently the a6vo&a> was generally held to have been a representative body, consisting of deputies from the various cities, acting a.<; a council or fJouA~ (cf. Tarn, CAH, vii. 738). It has, however, been argued by Aymard that both auvoOO> and UUyi<:A7]TO> describe a primary assembly open to all citizens, and that P. used {JavA.~ as a synonym for awoi'ios. If this were so, {Jov"AwTal here would be merely those citizens who attended the primary assembly (Aymard, ACA, 157-8). Against this, Cary suggested (]HS, 1939, 154-5; cf. EHR, 1914, 209-2o) that the a6vo8os was a 'bicameral body' consisting of a primary assembly and a fJovA!J of the normal type; and C. A. Robinson (The Greek Political Experiettce. Studies in honour ofW. K. Prentice (Princeton, 1941), ros) argued that a auvoSas was a joint meeting of magistrates and {JavA~. The weak point in Aymard's case was his assumption that a primary assembly de iure, being attended by only a limited number. was treated as a {JavA~ de facto; and recently, starting out from the observation (CP, 1945, 65---97) that the representative council was regarded as normal machinery in federal states of the second century (cf. xxxi. 2. 12, S7Jil-a«paTLKijs x:a.t aw£opta«17> 7TOALnlas)--a 219
II. 37· ro
EVENTS IN GREECE
view challenged by Aymard (CP, 1950, 103-7) as exaggerated-, Larsen has proceeded to a new, full, analysis of Polybius' terminology, and has produced a theory which has the merit of simplicity and seems to cover all the evidence (Representative Government, 75-xos). A .Wvo3os-, he argues, is simply 'a meeting'. Until about zoo, Achaean .Wvo3ot consisted (as Cary had said) of both the boule (Council) and the ecclesia (Assembly), but after zoo of the boule alone. In the second century the eccles£a was summoned only to debate war or alliance, or on instructions from the Roman Senate (xxii. 10. Io--Iz, 12. 6); in short, Achaea enjoyed representative government by a boule perhaps elected on a system of proportional representation (op. cit. 83-84). This boule possessed legislative, and not merely probouleutic powers, such powers in short as were exercised by the populus at Rome (vi. 14. 4ft.). Irregular meetings of either boule or ecclesia (or both) were probably termed auyKJ.:qrm, though P. does not use aVyKA'l)To> of an irregular meeting of the eccles1:a (perhaps because it is his usual term for the Roman Senate: cf. Larsen, 91). Achaean 3tKaaTal appear in xxxviii. 18. 3, condemning a magistrate to death; but the federal assembly could transform itself into a court of justice (xxiii. 4· 5, 4· 14, xxiv. 9· 13; Livy, xxxix. 35· 8, 36. z (cf. Paus. vii. 9· 2), xliL 51.8; Syll. 49o,ll. 4-5. See further Aymard, ACA, 182 n. 4). The 3tKaaTal mentioned in xxviii. 7· 9 are not Achaean, but Rhodians called in to arbitrate (cf. Holleaux, E'tudes, i. 441-3). Naturally judicial rights within the separate cities were not suspended; d. Aymard, ACA, 167 n. 5· Siegfried (1o3) quotes, as evidence that P. saw Achaea as a microcosm of the Stoic cosmopolis, Zeno (SV F, i. z6z) : ••• tva fL~ l(aTd 7TdA€tS" [L'l)3~ ~eanl &)[LOUS' olKwfLEV, l3lot> EKaaTot Stwpta[Livot 3t~ealm>, d.A.M 7TiiVTM aJJOpwwov<; ~YWfLEOa D'l)[LdTaS' Kat 7TDAl7'f1S, EtS' (j£ fllo>
il
Kal KOCTfLO>, wcrrrep d.yiAl]S' CTUVVDfLOV Vd[L
Such parallelism as exists with P.'s account of the League seems purely coincidental, and not significant. 10. TouTo To J.L.\pos: 'this undertaking' (Strachan-Davidson), i.e. the achieving of unity, rather than 'this land', i.e. Achaea {Treves). 11. Sta.AAnTTEW Tov flit J.LIB.~ 1TOAE!.IIS 8ui9Eaw ~xnv: it fell short of being a single city by not having a single walled enclosure for all its inhabitants (as for example Athens had a 1T<.plf1o.\os (Thuc. i. 89. 3) which served the people of Attica). Aristotle (Pol. iii. 3· 4-5. 1276 a) says that it is not the wall that makes the city, since you might build a wall round the Peloponnese. P.'s remark here looks like an answer; but P. is not envisaging a wall all round the Peloponnese (despite Paton's translation, cf. Larsen, Robinson Studies, Sro n. 55), and it is doubtful whether P. knew the Politics. TdAAa. ••• eKUaTol<; -ra.1ha KO.L 1ra.pa.1rAT)a1a.: i.e. in all other respects the inhabitants of the Peloponnese enjoy similar institutions both 220
THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR
II.38.6
federally and within the separate cities. On democracy within the confederacy (of which nothing is said here) see 38. 6 n. 38. 4. vuv £u8oKouaw ••• JUiTEL>.f)