Front Matter Source: AJS Review, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1996), pp. i-273 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Association for Jewish Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1486651 . Accessed: 11/07/2011 16:15 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup. . Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact
[email protected].
Cambridge University Press and Association for Jewish Studies are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to AJS Review.
http://www.jstor.org
AJS VOL. XXI,NO. 1 1996
t111 TheJournalof the Associationfor JewishStudies
('I
REVIE
Volume XXI, Number 1
1996
FORJEWISHSTUDIES ASSOCIATION WALTHAM,MASSACHUSETTS
AJS Review EDITOR:
NormanA. Stillman,University of Oklahoma ASSOCIATEEDITORS:
Nehama Aschkenasy,University of Connecticut,Stamford Rela Geffen, GratzCollege RobertGoldenberg,State University of New Yorkat Stony Brook Joel Kraemer,University of Chicago BenjaminC. I. Ravid, BrandeisUniversity MarshaRozenblit, University of Maryland CORRESPONDINGEDITOR:
Lloyd P. Gartner,Tel-Aviv University BOOKREVIEWEDITOR:
Gary Rendsburg,Cornell University EDITORIALASSISTANT:
John Borrego The AJS Review (ISSN 0364-0094) is published twice annually by the Association for Jewish Studies. Manuscripts for consideration should be sent to Prof. Norman A. Stillman, History Department, 455 W. Lindsey, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK 73019-0535. Books for review should be sent to Prof. Gary A. Rendsburg, Dept. of Near Eastern Studies, 360 Rockefeller Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y. 14853-2502. ? 1996 by the Association for Jewish Studies MANUFACTUREDIN THE UNITED STATESOF AMERICA
AJS REVIEW THE JOURNAL OF THE ASSOCIATIONFOR JEWISHSTUDIES VOLUME XXI, NUMBER 1, 1996 Articles 1
L. RUBENSTEIN JEFFREY
An EschatologicalDrama:Bavli AvodahZarah2a-3b 39
JAMESA. DIAMOND The Use of Midrash in Maimonides' Guide of the Perplexed: Decoding the Duality of the Text
61
TAMARRoss Between Metaphysical and Liberal Pluralism: A Reappraisalof Rabbi A. I. Kook's Espousal of Tradition
Review Essays 111
GARYA. RENDSBURG
The SheffieldDictionaryof ClassicalHebrew 119
FELDMAN SEYMOUR
JudahHalevi's TheKuzariin French Book Reviews 125
Isaac Rabinowitz. A Witness Forever: Ancient Israel's Perception of Literature and the Resultant Hebrew Bible JEROMEA. LUND
127
David M. Gunn and Danna Nolan Fewell. Narrative Art in the Hebrew Bible ORAHORNPROUSER
129
Jon D. Levenson. The Death and Resurrection of the Beloved Son: The Transformation of Child Sacrifice in Christianityand Judaism FREDERICK GREENSPAHN
ii
CONTENTS
132
Brian Peckham. History and Prophecy: The Development of Late Judean Literacy Traditions EHUDBEN-ZVI
134
Frederick J. Murphy. Pseudo-Philo: Rewriting the Bible SUSAN F. MATHEWS
139
BernardGrossfeld. The TargumSheni to the Book of Esther: A Critical Edition Based on MS. Sassoon 282 with Critical Apparatus GARYA. RENDSBURG
142
Hannah K. Harrington. The Impurity Systems of Qumran and the Rabbis: Biblical Foundations MARTIN S. JAFFEE
145
ElishaQimronandJohnStrugnell,in consultationwith Y. Sussmann, andwith contributionsby Y. SussmannandA. Yardeni.QumranCave 4:V. Miqsat Ma'ase ha-Torah GARYA. RENDSBURG
148
Daniel Boyarin. A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of Identity MARTHAHIMMELFARB
151
Rivka Ulmer. The Evil Eye in the Bible and in Rabbinic Literature ALANJ. YUTER
153
Martha Himmelfarb. Ascent to Heaven in Jewish and ChristianApocalypses DAVIDHALPERIN
157
Samuel Tobias Lachs. Humanism in Talmudand Midrash RICHARDA. FREUND
159
Michael Chernick. Gezerah Shavah: Its Various Forms in Midrashic and Talmudic Sources HERBERT BASSER
164
Howard Eilberg-Schwartz. God's Phallus: And Other Problems for Men and Monotheism STANLEYN. ROSENBAUM
CONTENTS
166
iii
Norman Roth. Jews, Visigoths and Muslims in Medieval Spain: Cooperation and Conflict BARBARAH. GRANT
169
David S. Katz. The Jews in the History of England, 1485-1850 SHELDONROTHBLATT
171
Raphael Patai. The Jewish Alchemists: A History and Source Book FRANCISCOMORENO-CARVALHO
174
Jason P. Rosenblatt. Torah and Law in "Paradise Lost" ANNEKROOK
176
Frank Felsenstein. Anti-Semitic Stereotypes: A Paradigm of Otherness in English Popular Culture, 1660-1830 DANIELSCHWARTZ
181
182
James F. Harris. The People Speak! Anti-Semitism and Emancipation in Nineteenth Century Bavaria URIR. KAUFMANN Haim Avni. Argentina and the Jews: A History of Jewish Immigration VICTORA. MIRELMAN
184
David Aberbach. Realism, Caricature, and Bias: The Fiction of Mendele Mocher Sefarim ANITANORICH
187
Yehuda Friedlander.Bemistarei Hasatira: Hebrew Satire in Europe in the Nineteenth Century YUDITHNAVE
190
Benjamin Harshav. Language in Time of Revolution GEORGEJOCHNOWITZ
193
Steven M. Lowenstein. The Berlin Jewish Community:Enlightenment, Family and Crisis, 1770-1830 VICKICARON
iv
CONTENTS
200
Gary Phillip Zola. Isaac Harby of Charleston, 1788-1828: Jewish Reformer and Intellectual IRVING KATZ
202
Avraham Barkai. Branching Out: German-Jewish Immigration to the United States, 1820-1914 HENRYD. SHAPIRO
204
Leonard Dinnerstein. Antisemitism in America STUARTE. KNEE
206
Sharman Kadish. Bolsheviks and British Jews: The Anglo-Jewish Community,Britain and the Russian Revolution DAVIDCESARANI
209
Robert J. Brym. The Jews of Moscow, Kiev, and Minsk: Identity, Antisemitism, Emigration ALEXANDERORBACH
210
Robert A. Everett. Christianity without Antisemitism: James Parkes and the Jewish-Christian Encounter HAROLDKASIMOW
213
Milton Shain. The Roots of Antisemitism in South Africa HASIADINER
215
GertrudeSchneider. Exile and Destruction: The Fate ofAustrian Jews, 1938-1945 MICHAELR. MARRUS
216
Benjamin Ish-Shalom. Ray Avraham Itzhak HaCohen Kook: Between Mysticism and Rationalism L. MILLEN ROCHELLE
219
Monty Noam Penkower. The Holocaust and Israel Reborn: From Catastrophe to Sovereignty DONNAROBINSONDIVINE
CONTENTS
221
V
Eliezer Schweid. Wrestling Until Day-Break: Searching for Meaning in the Thinking on the Holocaust MICHAELBERENBAUM
223
Nitza Ben-Dov. Agnon's Art of Indirection: Recovering Latent Content in the Fiction of S. Y Agnon STEPHENKATZ
227
Collected Studies
257
Books Received
ace,White
Blackf
Noise
JewishImmigrantsin the HollywoodMeltingPot Michael Rogin The tangled connections that have bound Jews to AfricanAmericansin popular cultureand liberalpoliticsare at the heart of MichaelRogin'sarrestingand unnerving new book. A Centennial Book,$24.95 cloth,illustrated
Pseudo-fHecateus, "On the Jews" Legitimizingthe Jewish Diaspora
Bezalel Bar-Kochva
Bar-Kochvaattempts to overcome the stalemate over the authenticityof "On the Jews". His convincinglyarguedstudy proves the forgery of the book, and suggests a source for the text and cultural setting that explainsits conception. Hellenistic Culture & Society,$55.00cloth,illustrated
European and the
Jewry
first
Robert Chazan
Crusade
New in paper-"A significantand innovativestudy of the events in 1096 and their meaningfor Jewish-Christian relations."-ReligiousStudiesReview Winner, 1987 NotionalewishBookAwardinjewish $17.95 paper History,
Founder
of
flasidism
A Quest for the Historical
Moses
the
and
Mendelssohn
fnlightenment
Religious
David Sorkin
"Sorkinhas establishedhimself as one of the most insightfulscholarsof modern Jewishintellectualhistory.Now Moses Mendelssohnreinforceshis position as one of the most outstandingJewish historiansof his generation." -David N. Myers,UCLA $40.00cloth
Ba'al Shem Tov
Moshe Rosman "Thesubject is crucial;the approachis bold and brilliantlychosen. The result is a persuasiverevisionof a fundamental chapter in the Jewish experience." -Gershon Hundert, McGillUniversity Contraversions, $45.00 cloth
of Saudrde andtheJwishQuestion Brazil
a
Toward
of
Definition Antisemitism
Gavin I. Langmuir
New in paper-"The learning,passion and unflinchingintegrityMr.Langmuirhas devoted to unravelingthe historyof antisemitismshow why he is a teacher of legendaryreputation,as well as a scholar of highdistinction." -New YorkTimesBookReview $17.95 paper Atbookstores ororder1-800-822-6657.
ofLotinAmerfArn StIes New EngwlndCounfl
$42.00 loth,$18.00paperilust0ated
UNIVIRSITY
Of
(l f
ORNIA
PRIS
City of Stone
TheHiddenHistoryof Jerusalem Meron Benvenisti "Amongthe very best booksever writtenon Jerusalem.... A book which is indispensiblefor of ourunderstanding whatJerusalemhas meant and meansto Israelisand Palestinians,and how the 'Jerusalem problem'might be resolvedfor the mutualbenefitof all its residents." -Richard Hecht, coauthorof ToRuleJerusalem
.•lm
.:
a..
.~
. ,,
..
..
II
,.S
.....
From City of Stont
$24.95 cloth, illustrated
Comrades and Enemies
Jews in the Notarial
Araband JewishWorkersin Palestine, 1906-1948 Zachary Lockman "Animpressiveachievement,subtle, nuanced,andyet firmlygroundedin a massof well-weightedandwellinterrogatedarchivaldocumentsand memoirs. It is clearlythe best book yet writtenon MandatoryPalestine." -Juan Cole, Universityof Michigan
LatinateWills in Mediterranean Spain, 1250-1350 Robert 1. Burns, S.J. and illuminating,informed "Fascinating by outstandingscholarlyanalysis.... With his deft touch, Burnsopens a most unusualwindowon the realitiesof medievalIberianJewishlife." -Robert Chazan,authorof European JewryandtheFirstCrusade
$60.00 cloth, $25.00 paper
$45.00 cloth
Culture
The Rabin Memoirs New Photographs, andan Afterword An ExpandedEditionwithRecentSpeeches, Yitzhak Rabin Afterwordby YoramPeri YitzhakRabin'smemoirs,firstpublishedin 1979 but long out of print,arenow availablein this expandededition. His memoirsareimportantnot only for the insider'sview they offeraboutIsraeland the MiddleEast,but also for providinga very humanportraitof a heroicworldleader. $40.00 cloth, $16.95 paper,illustrated
New Beginnings
TheSkirball MuseumCollectionsand InauguralExhibition Edited by Grace Cohen Grossman The SkirballMuseumin LosAngelesis home to one of the most significant Judaicaartcollectionsin the Western Hemisphere.This volumeto discusses the museum'soriginsand its extensive collections,which encompassfour thousandyearsof Jewishhistorical experience. $50.00 cloth, $24.95 paper,illustrated
The Cross and the Pear Tree A SephardicJourney Victor Perera Newinpaper-"Astrangeandwondrous journey,a kindof Sephardic'Roots,': the chronicleof two paralleljourneys, one outward,the other inward.... The outwardjourneyof Perera'sbook illuminatescenturiesof Sephardic historythroughthe prismof one Chronicle prolificfamily."-SanFrancisco Review
The Selected Poetry of YehudaAmichai Newly RevisedandExpandedEdition WithFortyNew Poems Translatedby ChanaBlochand StephenMitchell "Yehuda Amichai'ssplendidpoems, refinedand cast in the desperate foundriesof the MiddleEast,wherelife and faitharealwaysat stake,exhibita majesticand Biblicalrangeof the topographyof the soul."-Anthony Hecht Literature of theMiddleEast,$14.95 paper
The Selected Poetry of Dan Pagis Translatedby StephenMitchell Introductionby RobertAlter "Thepoemsglow with pleasurein themselves.One can heara kindof laughterresonating,as if having surpassedthe momentand its trial, havingpresentedsufferingyet having set distancefromit throughthe mediumof his art."-David Ignatow Literature of theMiddleEast,$14.95 paper
$14.95 paper,illustrated
On the Marginsof Modernism Decentering LiteraryDynamics Chana Kronfeld "Amilestonein the studyof modernJewishliterature.It seriouslyengagesand recontextualizesall the scholarshipthat camebefore,andby so doing sets it on a new course:applyinga rigorousdefinitionof modernismyet insistentupon methodologicaldiversity;deeplygroundedin Hebrewcultureyet unabashedly -David G. Roskies,authorof AgainsttheApocalypse diaspora-centered." $45.00 cloth, $18.00 paper Contraversions,
At bookstoresor order1-800-822-6657.
OF CALIFORNIA PRESS UNIVERSITY
An Eschatological Drama: Bavli Avodah Zarah 2a-3b Author(s): Jeffrey L. Rubenstein Source: AJS Review, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1996), pp. 1-37 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Association for Jewish Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1486652 . Accessed: 11/07/2011 16:15 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup. . Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact
[email protected].
Cambridge University Press and Association for Jewish Studies are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to AJS Review.
http://www.jstor.org
AN ESCHATOLOGICALDRAMA: BAVLI AVODAH ZARAH 2a-3b by L. RUBENSTEIN JEFFREY Thehomilynearthebeginningof TractateAvodahZarahof theBabylonian Talmud,folios 2a-3b, surelymustbe numberedamongthe most fascinating rabbiniccompositions.A brilliantcreationof the rabbinicimagination,the homily depicts the inaugurationof the "worldto come." A richly detailed eschatologicaldramaunfolds as God places a Torahscroll in his lap and summonsthose who busied themselveswith Torahto collect theirreward. Whilerabbinicliteratureteemswithstaticdescriptionsof thegloriousmiracles that await the righteousin the next world and parallelillustrationsof the painfulsufferingsthe wicked shouldexpect,extendednarrativesof the initial stages of the process are rare.Not the natureof the worldto come, but the test for admissionis the subjectat hand. Scholarshave been intriguedmore by the form of the homily than its content,more by the typical talmudicfeaturesthanthe vivid eschatological scene.' In classic talmudic style the homily meandersover three pages, repeatedlyinterruptedby latercomments,glosses, and observations.At the slightestprovocationthe Talmudfindsgroundsto object,happilyproceedsto 1. A. Hilvitz, "Le-harkavahshel derashatha'aggadabe-reshmasekhet'avodahzarah," Sinai 80 (1977): 119-140; R. Hammer,"ComplexFormsof AggadahandTheirInfluenceon Content,"Proceedingsof the AmericanAcademyfor JewishResearch48 (1981): 186 and n. 4; W. Bacher, 'Aggadat'amora'e 'eresyisra'el (Tel Aviv: Devir, 1924):vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 327 n. 6; J. Heinemann,Derashotbe-sibburbi-tequfatha-talmud(Jerusalem: MossadHaravKook, 1982), pp. 67-69; J. Neusner,TheBavli'sMassiveMiscellanies:TheProblemof Agglutinative Discourse in the Talmudof Babylonia(Atlanta:ScholarsPress, 1992), pp. 49-71; L. Jacobs, "IsraelandtheNations:A LiteraryAnalysisof a TalmudicSugya,"Tel-Aviv Review2 (1989/90): 372-383.
AJS Review 21/1 (1996): 1-37
1
2
JEFFREY L. RUBENSTEIN
sort out the difficulty,and then abruptlyreturnsto the narrativeflow. Contradictorytheologicalpositionsare constantlyimportedfromothertalmudic passages.The Talmuddoes not so muchpausefor orderlyscrutinyaftereach stage of the dramaas bubble over with chaotic enthusiasm,interpolating a brief interjectionor extendeddigressionat every opportunity.Of course this discursiveform characterizestalmudiclegal debates,which routinely departfromthe mainissue to takeup minortangents,call uponcontradictory sources or paralleltalmudicpassages, and graftlater strataof commentary uponthe interchangesof earlierauthorities.Whilethe textureof the passage is thereforefamiliar,the applicationof standardlegalprocedureto a narrative, homiletic source, though hardlyunprecedented,is rarelydevelopedto this extent.The interpolations,moreover,are mostly Aramaic,while the homily appearsin Hebrew,so the two can be separatedeasily.2The passage thus presentsa paradigmaticexampleof the multi-tieredtalmudicstyle in aggadic material. To a certainextent, then, study of the noteworthyform has preempted analysis of the content itself. But there is more to it than this. The eschaThe nationsof the world tological vision is triumphalistand particularistic. receive no portionin the world to come. Since they have not fulfilledthe Torahin this world, God rejects them in the next. In the final scene God laughsat theirfailurein a mocking,derisivemanner.Suchthemesdo not sit well with those interestedin depictingrabbinictheologyin an enlightened, universalistic,and noble manner.It is not surprisingthatthe standardworks on rabbinictheologyconvenientlyomit mentionof the homilyin discussions of eschatology or gentiles. George Foot Moore devotes a large chapterof but his classic workon Judaismto "TheHereafter:MessianicExpectations," 2. The version of the midrashin Tanhumna, ?9 (Berlin, 1927), pp. 651-652 (= Shofetintm ?9, ed. S. Buber [Vilna, 1885], 5:31-32) alreadyremovesthe Aramaic Shofetintm Tanhumna, additions,althoughsome would claim that the Tanhumna preservesthe homily from another source.In any case, Israelibn Al-Nakawa,Menoratha-Ma'or,ed. H.G. Enelow(New York: Bloch, 1929), 3:212, who clearly knew the Bavli version,removedthe additions.Hilvitz, also separatesthe "talmudicexpansions"fromthe "originalversion."However, "Le-harkava," while excising the Aramaic,he misleadinglyincludes the Hebrewmidrashimgraftedfrom elsewherein his "originalversion."See, e.g., p. 15. A. Mishcon,the translatorof the tractate in the Soncino series, accuratelymarksoff the additionswith parentheses('AbodahZarah [London:Soncino Press, 1935], pp. 2-8). Isaac HirschWeiss, Davar 'al 'odot ha-talmud 'intyakholhu letargentkol sorkho(Pressburg,1885), an essay devotedto the difficultiesof translatingthe multi-tieredtalmudicstyle in an intelligiblemanner,presentsourhomilyamong his examples.Hirschseparatesthe glosses andprintsthemin the marginsin differenttype.
AN ESCHATOLOGICAL DRAMA
3
neglectsthe expectationsof ourhomily.3Loewe, in his introductoryessay to A RabbinicAnthology,brieflyalludesto our homilist'snegativeview of the Romans,but passes over their eschatologicalfate.4Nor do the chapterson "TheLife to Come"and "The Gentiles"containany hint.5NeitherUrbach nor Schechtermentionsthe homily at all.6 Such aversion is unfortunate.Removing the later accretionsuncovers a beautifully organized, skillfully woven drama.7A spectrumof literary techniquesproducesa tightstructureandinternalresonancesthathelpconvey the message of the homily.The homily combinesirony,humor,andsatirein a masterfulfashion.In additionto these aestheticqualities,the particularistic vision is interestingin its own right, and provides one voice among the pluralisticand unsystematicrabbinictheologies. Of special interestis the motif of the sukka,which plays an importantrole in the dramaand sparked theologicalreflectionin later sources about the meaningof the festival of Sukkot.8 This essay comprisesa literaryanalysisandclose readingof the homily. After presentinga translation,the first section examinesthe structureand literaryfeatures.The next part probes the biblical verses that providethe frameworkfor the drama.The main sectionprovidesa close readingof the homily which exploresthe meaningandrelatesthe structureto the content. 3. George Foot Moore, Judaism in the First Centuriesof the ChristianEra, 3 vols. (Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress, 1927),pt. VII, "TheHereafter," pp. 279-396. 4. C. G. MontefioreandH. Loewe,A RabbinicAnthology(London:Macmillan,1938),pp. lxxxvi. 5. The authorsdo cite the traditionthat "a gentile who occupies himself with Torahis like a High Priest,"which appearsamongthe laterinterpolationsas an objectionto the view expressedin the homily (p. 559). 6. E. Urbach,TheSages: TheirConceptsandBeliefs,trans.I. Abrahams(Jerusalem: Magnes Press,1979);SolomonSchechter,Aspectsof RabbinicTheology(New York,Macmillan,1909). 7. By "drama"I simply meana compositionin proseor versepresentinga storyinvolving conflictor contrastof characterwhichincludesdialogueandaction.I do notmeanthatthestory was (or was meantto be) actedon the stage,i.e., a play. 8. The homilywas clearlya favoriteamongJewsthroughout the MiddleAges, preservedin the latermidrashiccollectionsandcited by medievalauthors.It appearsin Tanhuma, Shofetim ?9, 651-652; Tanhumna, Shofetim?9, ed. Buber,5:31-32; Pesiqta de-RavKahana(hereafter PRK), "AlternativeParsha,"ed. B. Mandelbaum(New York:Jewish TheologicalSeminary, 1987), 2:452; Yalqutha-Makhiri'al Yishayahu(Berlin, 1893), pp. 138-140; YalqutShimoni, Isaiah,?452; Bet ha-Midrash,ed. A. Jellinek(Jerusalem,1938), 6:50; Al-Nakawa,Menorat ha-Ma'or,3:212. For medievalhalakhicsources,see below,n. 83.
4
JEFFREYL. RUBENSTEIN
The finalsection attemptsto go beyondthe literaryanalysisto determine whatcan be saidof the SitzimLebenof thehomily.Oneof themainproblems in the studyof homileticalmidrashim-andmidrashin general-is the lackof context.Whilesomehomilieshavebeenassembledin thePesiqta'otandother collectionsorganizedaccordingto the cycle of festivalsandspecialSabbaths, others,such as our case, were incorporatedinto the BabylonianTalmudand similardocuments,andhaveretainedlittleevidenceof theirprovenance.The lack of contextmakesit difficultto correlatethe themesandmotifswith any widerbackgroundand impedesfull understanding of the homilies.Although it cannot be proved conclusively,there is good reasonto believe that our whichallows homilywas deliveredon the festivalof Sukkot,a determination for a greaterappreciationof its message.The internalliteraryanalysisand the assignmentto Sukkot,based primarilyon externalconsiderations,shed of the homily, light uponeach other,andtogetherenhanceourunderstanding the festival, and eschatologicalthought. The Homily9
R. HaninabarPapa,and some say R. Simlai,'oexpounded(darash): In the world to come, the Holy One, blessed be He, will bringa Torah scroll and set it in his lap, and say: "Leteveryonewho busiedhimselfwith this come and take his reward."Straightawayall the nationsof the world assemble and come [before God] in confusion,as it says, All the nations assembleas one (Isa 43:9). God says to them:"Do not enterbefore me in confusion. Ratherthe nations should enter one by one, togetherwith their scribes,"as it says, The peoples gather (Isa 43:9),1 and people means a kingdom, as it says, One people shall be mightier than the other (Gen 25:23).
Straightawaythe Kingdomof Rome entersfirst.The Holy One, blessed be He, says to them:"Withwhathaveyou busiedyourselvesin this world?"12 They say to him:"Masterof the universe.Weestablishedmanymarketplaces. 9. The translation that follows is based on MS Paris 1337, although I have occasionally adopted the reading of the JTS and Munich 95 manuscripts (JTS 44830; facsimile edition, ed. Shraga Abramson [New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1957]). Only the major variants are noted. 10. In MS JTS "R. Shela." 11. So MS M. MSS Paris and JTS: "All the nations assemble as one, the peoples gather." 12. So MS JTS. "In this world" is missing in MS Paris. In MS M it appears in the margin.
AN ESCHATOLOGICAL DRAMA
5
We built many bath-houses.We accumulatedmuchgold and silver.And we only did all this so thatIsraelcould busy themselveswith Torah."The Holy One, blessed be He, says to them:"Completeidiots!' Everythingyou made was done exclusively for yourselves. You made marketplacesso that you could place prostitutesthere,bath-housesto makeyourselvesbeautiful.I am responsiblefor gold and silver, as it says, Silver is mine and gold is mine (Hag. 2:8). Are there none among you who speak this?",as it says Who among you declared this? (Isa 43:9),14 and this refersto Torah,as it says, This is the TorahwhichMoses brought(Deut4:44). Straightaway theydepart fromHim dejectedly. The Kingdomof Persiaentersafterher. The Holy One, blessed be He, says to them: "Withwhat have you busied yourselves?"They say to him: "Weconstructedmanybridges.We conqueredmanycities. We foughtmany wars. And we only did all this so that Israel could busy themselveswith Torah."The Holy One, blessed be He, says to them:"Everythingyou made was to satisfy your own needs. You made bridgesso thatyou could collect tolls, cities so thatyou could impose forcedlabor.I am responsiblefor war, as it says, TheLordis a man of war (Exod 15:3).Are therenone amongyou who speak this?",as it says Whoamongyou declaredthis? (Isa 43:9), and this refersto Torah,as it says, This is the TorahwhichMoses brought(Deut 4:44). Straightawaythey departfromHim dejectedly. The same thing [occurs]with each andevery nation. They say to him:"Masterof the Universe.Did we ever accept[theTorah] andthennot fulfill it?"He says to them:"Letus hear of the thingsthathave thatyou did accept,when happened(Isa43:9).51Those seven commandments did you fulfill them?" They say to him, "Masterof the Universe. Israel, who accepted [the Torah],when did they fulfill it?" He says to them, "I testify for Israelthat they fulfilled the Torahin its entirety."They say to him, "Masterof the Universe. Can a fathertestify for his son, as it says Israel is myfirstborn son (Exod4:22)?"He says to them,"LetHeavenandEarthcome andtestify for Israelthatthey fulfilledthe entireTorah."They say to him, "Heavenand Eartharenot impartialwitnessesas it says,Ifl hadnot establishedmyeternal 13. "Completeidiots"is missingin MS Paris. 14. In Isaiah:"Whoamongstthenm can speakthis?" 15. Lit., "[Whoamongthem]foretoldto us the thingsthathave happened."
6
L. RUBENSTEIN JEFFREY
covenant,I would not havefashioned heaven and earth (Jer 33:25)."16He says to them,"Letthose amongyou come forthandtestifyfor Israelthatthey fulfilledthe Torah.Let Nimrodcome and testify for Abrahamthathe was neversuspectedof idolatry.LetLabantheArameancome andtestifyforJacob thathe was never suspectedof stealing.Let the wife of Potipharcome and testify for Josephthathe was never suspectedof sin.'7Let Dariuscome and come testify for Daniel thathe never neglectedprayer.Let Nebuchadnezzar and testify for Hananiah,Mishael,and Azariahthatthey neverbowedto the idol. Let Eliphazthe Temanite,Bildadthe Shuhite,Zopharthe Naamathite, and Elihu ben Barachelthe Buzite testify for Israel that they fulfilled the entireTorah,"as it says, Let themgive theirtestimonyand be vindicated(Isa 49:3).18
They say to Him, "Give it to us anew, that we may do it." He says to them,"Completeidiots! He who preparedon the eve of the Sabbathwill eat on the Sabbath.But he who did not prepareon the eve of the Sabbath,how will he eat on the Sabbath?Nevertheless,I have a simpleprecept,which is called sukka.Go and do it." Straightawayeach andevery one makesa sukkaon the roof of his house, and the Holy One, blessed be He, makes the sun blaze upon them as in .the summerseason. Straightawayeach and every one kicks his sukkaand departs,as it says, Let us breakthe cords of theiryokes (Ps 2:3). And the Holy One, blessed be He, sits and laughs,as it says, He who sits in heaven laughs(Ps 2:4). Structureand LiteraryDevices In order to interpretthe homily and appreciateits message fully, it is necessaryto dissectthe structureandanalyzethe literaryfeaturesandpoetics. The Talmudbegins our narrativewith the standardformulathatintroducesa homily (derasha):"RabbiSo-and-soexpounded(darash)."The composition mustthereforebe understoodas an exegesis of Scripture,notas a free-flowing 16. Lit., "As surely as I have establishedMy covenantwith day and night-the laws of heavenand earth-so I will never rejectthe offspringof Jacoband My servantDavid."The midrashturnsthe verse on its head:God only createdthe worldfor the sake of the Torah,his covenantwith his people. 17. So MS JTS andMS Paris('avera).In MS M: 'erva-sexual immorality. 18. So MSS JTS andM. MS Parisadds:"This[thoseprovedrighteous]refersto Israel."
AN ESCHATOLOGICAL DRAMA
7
legend or folktale. While the homilistbringsnumerousverses into play,his primarytext is Isa 43:9, the firstversehe cites, andto whichhe returnsno less thanfive times. He links variousstages of the dramato clausesof the verse, therebycreatinga frameworkfor the actionand simultaneouslyallowingfor the developmentof an imaginativesaga, quite free from the scripturalbase. After exhaustingthe clauses of Isa 43:9 he shifts to Ps 2:3-4 as the text for the final stages of the drama.Otherverses cited serve as prooftextsfor argumentsmade by participantsin the drama,not as bases for stagesof the dramaitself." Thus miscellaneousversescomprisethe dialoguebetweenthe parties,while Isa 43:9 and Ps 2:3-4 govern the course of the action.20In this way the clauses of the expoundedtexts providethe primaryelementsof structure. The scripturalcitationsprovidebutpartof the structure,for severalstages of the dramalack connectionto clauses of the expoundedtexts. Additional structureis createdby a numberof techniquesthatcomplementtheexposition of the verse. Chief amongthese is the repetitionof unitsof three.21Thereare three majorscenes: the initial trial of the nations,theirobjectionsto God's justice, and theirfailureto observethe commandmentof sukka.Both Rome and Persia cite three of their accomplishments:marketplaces,bath-houses, and money for the Romans;bridges,cities, and war for the Persians.In his rejectionof their claims, God repeats this threefoldlitany.Three national gatheringsapproachGod: the Romans,the Persians,andthenthe rest of the nations,althoughonly the encountersof the RomansandPersiansarefleshed out.22 19. However, the homilist himself cites Gen 25:23 to prove that "people"refers to a kingdomandDeut 4:44 to provethat"this"refersto Torah. 20. God cites a clause fromIsa 43:9 in his responseto the firstquestionof the nations(did we ever acceptthe Torahandnot fulfillit?). 21. Thiswas notedby Heinemann,Derashot,p. 68. Onthreefoldstructures, see L. Ginzberg, GinzeShechter,vol. 1 (New York,1927), p. 24, who notes,"threeexamplesof this matterare broughtin the passage,as is typicalof the aggadaandthe halakha."ShammaFriedman,"Some Structural Patterns of Talmudic Sugiot," Proceedings of the Sixth World Congress of Jewish
Studies, vol. 3 (Jerusalem,1975), pp. 391-396 (Hebrew),demonstratesthat units of three characterizenumeroussugyot in the BabylonianTalmud.See too Friedman,"Pereqha'ishah rababa-bavli,"Mehqarimu-Meqorot,ed. H. Dimitrovksi(Jerusalem,1977),pp. 316-319, and the referencesthere. 22. The brief sentence, "The same thing [occurs]with each and every nation,"which I have labeledA2' in the outlinebelow,echoes the initialconfusedgatheringof nations,A'.
8
JEFFREYL. RUBENSTEIN
Units of threerecurin the secondsection,the extendeddialoguebetween the nationsand God. The nationsput forwardthreearguments:(1) We were never offered the Torah,(2) Israelnever fulfilledit, (3) Give us the Torah now so thatwe can fulfillit. The secondargumentitself includesthreestages. FirstGodpreparesto testifyfor Israel,thenHeavenandEarth,andfinallythe nationsthemselves.Six times-twice three-God commandsrepresentatives of variousbiblical nationsto appearand testify concerningIsraeliteheroes or the entirepeople. The finalsectionalso includesa triplet:God enjoinsthe nationsto buildsukkot,causesthe sunto blazeuponthem,andlaughsat their folly. A thirdelementof structuredevolves fromthe repeateduse of particular verbs.The roots"come"(bw') and"enter"(kns),andtheircounterparts, "go" (hlk) and "depart"(ys') occur regularly,and signal a shift from one stage of the dramato the next. At the outset God invites the nationsto come and receive theirreward.23 They come in confusion,whereuponGod commands that they enter in an orderlymanner.The Romansenter first.They depart dejectedlyand the Persiansenter.They too depart.In the next sectionGod invitesHeavenandEarthto come andtestify,andthencommandsthe nations of the nationsshouldcome to come themselves.Six times the representatives andtestify.Towardthe end, God tells the nationsto builda sukka,andorders thattheygo anddo so. Whereasat thebeginningof thedramaGodsummoned the nationsto come before him, he now dismissesthem fromhis presence. Unableto standthe heat,the nationskick theirsukkotanddepart,the familiar verb calling to mind theirearlierdeparturein dejection.The coming,going, entering,anddepartingmove the narrativealong,makingthe audienceaware that one scene has ended and the next is beginning.Recall that the entire dramatakes place in the world to come, and the focus on who entersand who leaves is quite to the point. Here structureand contentintersect;the markersof stages in the dramaconvergewith the themesthe homilistseeks to emphasize. A second set of recurringverbs includes "give" (ntn), "receive"(qbl) "fulfill"(qym),and "make,do" ('sh). God rebukesthe RomansandPersians thatwhat they made only servedtheirown interests.The nationsobjectthat they never receivedthe Torahand thereforedid notfulfill it, thenthatIsrael, who did receive the Torah,neverfulfilled it. Variouspartiesare called to 23. In the Bible bw' is sometimes a technical term meaning "come for judgment." See Ps 143:2, Job 9:32, 22:4.
AN ESCHATOLOGICAL DRAMA
9
testify thatIsraeldidfulfill the Torah.The Isaianprooftextfor the testimony readsthatthey "givewitness."At this pointthe nationsbeseechGod to give them the Torahnow so that they may do it. God then ordersthem to make a sukka, and each makes one on the top of his roof. The makingof the sukkarecalls God's accusationthatthey "made"the bridgesandmarketsfor theirown needs. It createsa parallelbetweenthe two events,andinvites the audienceto compareand contrastthem.Below we considerthe implications in greaterdetail. Finally, the repetitionof adverbsand interrogativeparticleslends the compositiongreatercoherence.Many of the scenes are introducedwith the adverb"straightaway" (miyyad),whichconveysa senseof urgencyandalmost franticaction. It encouragesthe audienceto make connectionsbetween the actions introducedby the adverb.At the outset, "straightaway" the nations enterto collect theirreward;at the conclusion,"straightaway" they kick their sukkot and leave. This macro inclusio both contraststhe beginningscene with the denouementandgives the compositioncoherence.The interrogative particlekelum,which does not translate,introducesmost of the questions. Godrhetoricallyasks the RomansandPersians,"Aretherenone(kelumyesh) amongyou who speak this?"Laterthey innocentlyask God, "Didwe ever (kelumqibbalnuha)accept [the Torah]"andthenrhetoricallyquestionGod's proposedwitnesses,"Cana (kelumyesh) fathertestify... ?"As we shall see, this parallelinterrogativeformcoheresnicely with the courseof the drama. This analysisof the literarydevices andstructuraltechniquessuggeststhe following structure: I. God Judgesthe Nations A. In the worldto come, God bringsa Torahandsays, "Let everyone who busied himself with this come and take his reward" A'. Straightaway,the nationscome in confusion, All the nations assemble as one (Isa 43:9a)
A2. God says: Completeidiots. Enter not in confusion, The peoples gather (Isa 43:9b)
B. Straightaway,Rome enters. B2. God says: Withwhathave you busiedyourselvesin this world?
10
JEFFREYL. RUBENSTEIN
B3. Rome answers 1. marketplaces 2. bath-houses 3. silver and gold B3'. God's rejection 1. marketplacesfor prostitutes 2. bath-housesfor self-beautification 3. gold and silver are mine (Hag 2:8) B2'. God: (kelum) Are therenone who speakthis? Who among you declared this? (Isa 43:9c)
B'. Romansdepart dejectedly C. Persiaenters. C2. God says: "Withwhathave you busiedyourselves?" C3. Persiaanswers 1. bridges 2. cities conquered 3. war C3'. God's rejection 1. bridgesfor tolls 2. cities for forcedlabor 3. war is mine (Exod 15:3) C2'. God: (kelum) Are therenone who speakthis, Who among you declared this? (Isa 43:9c)
C'. Persiansdepart dejectedly [A2'.]The same thing [occurs]with each andevery nation. II. The NationsDisputeGod'sJustness A. Nations:(kelum) Did we receive it andnot fulfill it? A'. God:Whendid you fulfill the commandments you received? Let us hear of the things that have happened (Isa 43:9d)
B. Nations:Did Israel,who received the Torah,fulfill it?
11
AN ESCHATOLOGICALDRAMA
B'. God: I will testify thatIsraelfulfilled the Torah. B2. Nations:(kelum) Cana fathergive evidencein favorof his son? (Exod 4:22) B2'. God:Let HeavenandEarthtestifythatIsraelfulfilledtheTorah. B3. Nations:HeavenandEarthare involved(Jer33:25). B3'. God: You come and testify 1. Let Nimrodcome and testifyfor Abraham 2. Let Labancome and testify for Jacob 3. Let Potiphar'swife come andtestifyfor Joseph 4. LetNebuchadnezzar come andtestifyforHananiah,Mishael, and Azariah 5. Let Dariuscome andtestify for Daniel 6. Let Eliphaz,Bildad,Zophar,andElihucome andtestifyfor all Israelthatthey fulfilled the whole Torah-, Let them give their testimonyand be vindicated(Isa 43:9e) C. Nations:Give us Torahnow andwe will do it. C'. God:Completeidiots! He who prepareson the eve of the Sabbath... III. The NationsRejectTorah A. God: Nevertheless,I have an easy commandment,called sukka,Go and do it. A'. Straightaway the nationsgo and make sukkoton theirhouses. B. God causes the sun to blaze uponthem. B'. Straightaway they kick theirsukkotanddepart, Let us break the cords of their yokes (Ps 2:3)
C. God laughs, He who sits in heaven laughs (Ps 2:4) Biblical Background
Before turningto the dramaitself, we must examinethe biblicalverses that comprise its framework.Isaiah 43:9, the primarytext of the homily,
12
L. RUBENSTEIN JEFFREY
The nationsand initiatesa propheticdiscourseknown as a "trialspeech."24 theirgods confrontIsrael and her God in a type of hypotheticaltrial.Each side bringsargumentsthatthey worshipthe truegod. Inevitablythe prophet the falsehood provesIsrael'scase with irrefutablearguments,demonstrating of the opposingclaim. [43:9] All the nationsassembleas one, the peoplesgather.
Whoamongthemdeclaredthis,foretoldto us thethingsthathavehappened? Letthemgivetheirtestimony andbe vindicated, Thattheymaysay,"Itis true." [43:10] My witnessesare you, declaresthe Lord,
MyservantwhomI havechosen. Totheendthatyou25 maytakethoughtandbelievein Me, Andunderstand thatI amHe: BeforeMeno godwasformed,andafterMeno oneshallexist[43:11]NonebutMe,theLord. BesideMe,nonecangranttriumph. [43:12] I alone foretoldthe deliveranceandI broughtit to pass;
I announced it, andno strangeGodwasamongyou.
So you are my witnesses,declaresthe Lord,andI am God.
The nations gather togetherfor the trial. They are challengedto provide evidencethattheirgods accuratelyforetold"this,"presumablythe imminent redemptionof Israel,or other "thingsthathave happened"in the past. The prophetinvites them to bring witnesses as to the abilityof theirprieststo foretellthe futureandthe divinityof theirgods. The implication,of course,is thatthey cannot.While the nationshave no witnesses,God designatesIsrael as his. Israelknew of the "deliverance,"the redemptionfrom Egypt,which had been foretold-byGod and subsequentlyoccurred.By Israel'stestimony the prophetestablishesthe reality,power,and supremacyof his God. Isaiah 40-66: A trans.D. Stalker(Philadelphia: 24. See ClausWestermann, Conmnzentary, Alten Testament(Munich:Chr.KaiserVerlag, WestminsterPress, 1969);idem, Forschunganm 1964), pp. 135-144; idem, Old TestamentForm Criticism,ed. JohnH. Hayes (San Antonio: zu Deuterojesaja(Munich, TrinityUniversityPress, 1974), pp. 165-167; J. Begrich,Studiunm 1920),pp. 26-48. 25. Most scholarssuggestthat"you"shouldbe emendedto "they."See JohnL. McKenzie, SecondIsaiah, AnchorBible 20 (GardenCity,N.Y.:Doubleday,1968),p. 52, andsee the note in the New JPStranslation.
AN ESCHATOLOGICAL DRAMA
13
The reading "they"at the end of verse 9 is problematic,for it seems that the nationsmust prove to themselves.Westermannthereforetranslates reading"we"for "they":the nationsmustbringus (= Israel)proofthattheir gods are real.26On the otherhand,in the following verse the reading"you" (to the end thatyou may take thought)is difficult,andmost scholarsemend "they(= the nations)."For if Israelsuppliesthe witnesses,it cannotbe the audienceas well. The rabbis, of course, could not emend in this manner, and retainedthe received text. As we shall see, the homilistplays uponthis confusionof who testifiesfor whom, uponthe differentways of interpreting the scene.27 This passagesharesstandardfeatureswithothertrialscenes,in whichthe nationsassemblefor a trialand are invitedto statetheircase.28But not once does the Bible make known their claims. In the propheticview, of course, they have nothingto say, since theirgods do not exist. Some trialscenes are followed directly by a series of rhetoricalquestionsabout what the pagan gods ever foretold or did; the absence of a responseproves the falsity of their beliefs. The scenes always proceeddirectlyto prove Israel'scase by detailingthe events thatGod foretoldand the miraculousevents wroughtby God. Ourtext is particularlydramaticin thatIsraelherselftakescenterstage as a witness to reportGod's miracles.The biblicalneglectof the arguments of the nationsis the homilist'spoint of departure.He fills in the gaps in the text, imagininghow a full transcriptof the trialwouldread.
Isaiah 40-66, p. 120. D. KarlMarti,Das BuchJesaja(Tilbingen:J. C. B. 26. Westermann, Mohr,1900),pp. 297-298, suggeststhatthesubjectswitchesfromthenationsto theirwitnesses: "Letthem(the nations)bringtheirwitnessesandbe justified,andthey (thewitnesses)maysay, 'So it is.' " 27. Note thatthe talmudicsugya immediatelyprecedingthe homily,bAZ 2a, contemplates differentinterpretationsof this clause ("let them give their witnesses .. .") and various identificationsof the witnesses. 28. Cf. Isa 41:21-29: "Submityourcase, says the Lord;Offeryourpleas,says the Kingof Jacob.Let themapproachandtell us whatwill happen.Tell us whathasoccurred,or announce what will occur, that we may know the outcome . . ." Isa 41:1-5: "Standsilent beforeMe, coastlands,and let nationsrenew their strength.Let them approachto statetheircase; let us come forwardtogetherfor argument.Who has rouseda victoryfromthe East,summonedhim to His service?[Who]has deliveredup nationsto him, andtroddensovereignsdown?"See too Isa44:6-8, 45:20-25; Begrich,Studiunm, pp. 19-42, andWestermann, Forschung,pp. 134-137.
14
L. RUBENSTEIN JEFFREY
The versesfromPsalms2 derivefroma relatedbiblicalscene.The setting is not a trial scene but a battle.29Nationsassemblenot to debatewith Israel but to destroyher: [1] Whydo nationsassemble,andpeoplesplotvainthings. [2] Kingsof theearthtaketheirstand, andregentsintriguetogetheragainstthe Lordandagainsthis anointed? [3] "Letus breakthe cordsof theiryokes, shakeoff theirropesfromus!" [4] He who sits enthronedin heavenlaughs; the Lordmocks at them. [5] Then He speaksto themin anger,terrifyingthemin His rage. "ButI have installedmy king on Zion, My holy mountain!" [6] Let me tell of the decree;the Lordsaid to me, "Youare My son, I have fatheredyou this day." Most scholars suggest that the psalm originally served as a liturgy at the inauguration ceremony of the Israelite king or at its annual reenactment.30 In the cyclical, mythic view of time, the nations periodically revolt against God and his elected monarch. To "breakthe cords" and "shake off ropes" express
the motif of a subject'srebellionagainsthis lord.Godreactsfirstby mocking their futile efforts, and then with rebuke and frightful anger. He proclaims that he has selected the Israelite king, while the king happily announces that God has called him "son." The rest of the psalm warns the nations of the consequences of rebellion and of the awesome power of God. For the biblical
authors,the trialandrebellionscenesdemonstratetheincontrovertible reality, power, and sovereignty of God and the grounds for confidence in their leader. With his midrashic approach to the Bible, the homilist links Ps 2 and Isa 43:9-15, reading the two texts in light of each other. Both Ps 2:1-2 and Isa 43:9 use the terms "nations" (le'ummim) and "peoples" (goyim), and both depict a gathering, so the intertextual signals are strong. The homilist expounds Isa 43:9 for the action of the trial and Ps 2:3-4 for the nations' Die ZionstheSee GuntherWainke, 29. In technicalterminology,the sceneis a Vilkerkamnpf ologie der Korachiten,BZAW97 (Berlin:AlfredTipelmann,1966),pp. 74-92; R. J. Clifford, The Cosmic Mountain in Canaan and the Old Testament,HSM 4 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University,1972), pp. 152-154. trans. Hilton C. Oswald (Minneapolis: 30. H.-J. Kraus,Psalms 1-59: A Connmmentary, and the literature see 123-135, cited; S. Mowinckel,The Psalms in 1988), Augsburg, pp. Israel'sWorship,trans.D. R. Ap-Thomas(Oxford:Blackwell,1962),pp. 1:46-50, 62-63.
AN ESCHATOLOGICAL DRAMA
15
rejectionof the sukkaand God's mockinglaugh. Yet the courtroomsetting anddebatedrawas muchinspirationfromPs 2 as fromthe Isaiantrialscene. In the propheticdiscoursethe nationsdo not act or argue.The homilisttakes from Ps 2 the notion that the nationsarticulatetheirclaims andtake action. The propheticchallenge to "declarethis" is takenup in Psalms,wherethe nations "plot" (yehggu), literally "speak,"vain things. And the word for "assemble"in Psalms (ragshu)has the sense of gatheringwith schemesand plots, as in the Aramaiccognate in Dan 6:7 and 6:16.31The homilist fills in the missing trial speeches of the prophetby drawingon the aggressive conductdescribedin the psalm. While the dramaof the homily bearssome affinitiesto the confrontation scenes of the Bible, the transformation of certainelementsunderscoresthe distancebetweenbiblicaland rabbinicconcerns.The issue at the Isaiantrial is the true Lord, whetherthe God of Israelor the gods of the nations,and the proof seems to be illustratedboth for Israel and for the nations.For the rabbinichomilist this is no longer the issue. When God ushersin the world to come, his reality cannotbe doubted.The nationsdo not come to demonstratethe powerof theirgods,-butto presenttheirmeritsbeforetheGod of Israel.Moreover,the homilistconsidersit inconceivablethatthe nations even contemplatea rebellion.They acknowledgeGod's sovereigntyand at best hope to convincehim thatthey deservea reward.Theirproclamationto "breakthe cords"no longer expresses a revolt againstGod, but ratherthe inabilityto observethe preceptthey triedto fulfill. The crucialturnis the shift in who serves as witness for whom. In the Bible God appointsIsrael as witnesses that he is the trueGod. They bring testimonythat God is trustworthyand faithful,that he foretoldthat which subsequentlyhappened.In the homilyGod servesas a witnessthatIsraelwas a faithfulpeople, fulfillingwhatit accepteduponitself. IronicallyIsrael,far shortof servingas the starwitness,plays no activerole in the drama.While in the Bible the nationsare called to bring testimonyof the power of their gods but cannot, in the homily the nationsare forced to testify that Israel fulfilledthe Torah,and do so.
31. In the formhargishu.ThereDarius'sministersconspireto chargeDanielwithviolating the law, much as the nationsaccuse Israelin the homily.(Ragshuis translated"assemble"in the New JPS;"be in an uproar"in the old JPS. See the standardbiblicaldictionaries.)
16
JEFFREY L. RUBENSTEIN
TheMeaningandMessage At this pointwe arebetterprepared to focuson the homilyitself.The to R. b. is attributed Hanina Palestinian aggada Papa,a third-generation If the attributions can be amora,or R. Simlai,of the secondgeneration." creation. trusted,we aredealingwitha third-century The homilylaunchesabruptlyinto a description of the adventof the events: worldto come.Conspicuously absentarepreparatory eschatological in of the world the the battles heavens, apocalyptic signs powers, appearance of the earth.Perhapstheseoccurredin of the Messiahor reconfigurations a "messianicera"priorto the "worldto come";in anycase, theyarenot the interestof our homilist.He announceswithgreatconfidencethatthe worldto comebeginswithGodplacinga scrollof theTorahin his lapand invitingthosethat"busiedthemselveswiththis"to comeforthandcollect theirreward.Quintessential rabbinicutopia:TorahandTorahaloneearns entryto theworldto come.Themoodis notoneof terrorandawe,as might be expectedon JudgmentDay,but of serenityandcalm.The imageof a evokes Torahscrollin God'slapor"bosom," as heqwouldliterallytranslate, Such an almostfemininesenseof motherwithchild,of love andintimacy.33 a placidsceneconflictswiththeurgencyof theeventathand;thosewhofail aredeniedaneternalreward,andperhapsshouldexpectdivinepunishment. Clearlythe pointof the homilyis not to terrifythe audienceinto greater withominouswarningsof theirfatein thehereafter. observance Eagerto collectthereward,allnationscrowdbeforeGod.Themoodsudto hurried denlyshiftsfromtheserenityandorderof thedivineproclamation actionandconfusion.Thenationsrespondimmediately; they "straightaway" desistfromtheirthis-worldly andenterthe divinearena.Here enterprises the homilist links his descriptionto the text and revealsthe fact that he is expoundingScripture.He expoundsthe phrase"thenationsassembleas one" to mean that they all mix togetherin one indiscriminatemass. The second clause of the verse describes a reorganizationof the initial assembly,this
timewitheachnationgroupedindependently. Betweenthe two stagesthe
homilistsuppliesa divine rebukeat the disorderlyassembly.God commands thateach nationappearin orderlyfashiontogetherwithits scribes.The initial 32. The JTS manuscripthas R. Shela,probablya corruptionof R. Simlai. 33. Rabbisare routinelydescribedas carryinga Torahscroll in theirbosom.See e.g. bAZ 18a,bSuk41b, and mSot 7:7.
AN ESCHATOLOGICAL DRAMA
17
confusionin the ranksof the nationshintsthatthey areill-preparedfor what is to follow, and that the reorganizationwill prove ephemeral.That God orderseach to bring its "scribes"containsa similarhint. Essentialto the properfunctioningof the court, scribes recordthe proceedingsand ensure thatno evidence is neglected.The scribesof each nationpresumablybring the recordof its meritoriousdeeds.Yetthe termsoferim,"scribes,"also refers to the precursorsof the rabbis,"theearly scholarswho were called soferim and in a wider sense to all because they countedthe lettersof the Torah,"34 sages. They are the trueclass who "busiedthemselveswith Torah,"and it is self-evidentthatthe nationshave no such scribesto bringthemmerit. The prooftextfrom Gen 25:23 thatthe term"people"in Isa 43:9 refers to a "kingdom"containsanotherhint of what is to come. Since Gen 25:23 uses the same term, le'om, as Isa 43:9, it is not clear at first what the prooftextaccomplishes.By rabbinicconvention,however,the "twopeoples" in God's prophecyto Rebecca refer to the descendantsof Jacob and Esau, IsraelandEdom,identifiedwith Rome.The le 'omof Gen25 thustriggersthe associationof Israel and Rome, two nationalentities,and indicatesthatthe nationsdivideinto sovereigngroups.3But theresonancesof theprooftextare muchdeeper.The prophecyrelatesto the strugglebetweenJacoband Esau, betweenIsraelandRome,andpromisesthatone side "wouldbe mightierthan the other."The second half of the verse continuesthat"theoldershall serve the younger."So Rome will serveIsrael-but when?ForcenturiesIsraelhad servedits Romanmasters,andnothingindicatedthatthe situationwas likely to change anytime soon. By the thirdcenturytherewas not even much of a struggle;the last Jewish revolt, underBar Kochba,over a centurybefore, hadbeen disastrous.The homilistforeseesthe fulfillmentof the prophecyin eschatologicaltimes, in the very dramahe narrates.At thattime the Romans claim they did everythingin this world so thatIsraelcould busy itself with Torah;they pretendto have servedIsrael.The real struggleoccurs,then,not as a militaryconfrontationbetweenkingdoms,but as a courtroomactionin which the Romans and other nationsindict Israel.And then the prophecy will be fulfilled as Israel triumphsover the nations. At this point in the 34. bQid30a. 35. The glossatoradds in Aramaic,"andwe translate[in the Targum]One kingdomwill be strongerthan the other,"to clarifythe sense of the prooftext.This does a disserviceto the homily,for theallusionto the Targumdivertsattentionfromtheallusionto thestrugglebetween RomeandIsrael,which is the maintheme.
18
JEFFREYL. RUBENSTEIN
narrative,however,the audiencedoes not yet knowhow the dramawill end. The allusionto the unfulfilledprophecycreatestensionandexpectations.As the dramaunfolds,the tensionis progressivelyresolvedand the audienceis reassuredthatGod's prophecywill come true. The stage set, the preliminariesconcluded,the courtin session, Rome enters first (sec. I B). Rulersof a massive empireand the mightiestnation on earth,they might well expect commensuratestatusin the worldto come. God now asks them directlywith whatthey have "busiedthemselves"in this world.Yet the Romansknow thatGod has establishedthe Torahas the sole criterionfor reward,and it is Israel,not Rome, thathas fulfilledthe Torah. They can neitherdispute the divinely ordainedmeasurenor claim to have occupiedthemselveswith Torah,so theyfall backon a convolutedargument. bath-houses,silverand Proudlylistingtheiraccomplishments-marketplaces, in that these gold-they suggest they engaged enterprisesin orderthatIsrael could busy herselfwith Torah.They claim to have providedthe institutional frameworknecessaryfor societyto functionandthematerialsupportrequired for study.As a result of Rome's achievements,Israelwas able to purchase herfood, clothing,andothermaterialgoods in the markets,anddid not have to spend time and energy to procurethem.Rome also built the bath-houses thatcivilized people require.In essence they arguefor vicariousmerit,and so lose the case fromthe outset.Goddispensesthe argumentwitha summary judgment. Marketplacesharborprostitutes,and bath-housescater to the self-indulgent.Rome's truemotives emerge:this-worldlypleasures-sexual gratification,pamperingthe body, money to pay for such delights. God rejects the achievementsof gold and silver, declaringthat he ultimately controlsprosperity,and thereforeRome's fortunesconfer no merit. Rome dedicateditself not to Torahbut to self-interest,and so its preeminentstatus in this world means nothing in the next. Note that the depictionof God has alreadyturnedto thatof an imposing,terrifyingjudge. God firstinvited the nations,then mildly rebukedthem, and now insults them as "complete idiots." Afterrejectingthe Romans'roundaboutclaim,Godfocuses on theirlack of Torah.Witha rhetoricalquestion,God half-inquiresandhalf-decreesthat none of the Romans"speakthis."Here the homilistcites the next clause of his verse as prooftext,"Whoamongthemspeaksthis."Isaiahchallengedthe nationsto provethattheirgods hadforetold"this,"thismiracle,theimminent returnfrom exile. For the homilist,however,"this"refersnot to an earlier
DRAMA AN ESCHATOLOGICAL
19
prophecybut to Torah,and the challengeis whetherthe Romanscan claim observanceof Torahas thebasisfortheirreward.He takesa minorlibertywith "whoamongthem"to the biblicaltext by changingthe originalthird-person "whoamongyou" in orderto framea directdialogue.36The homilistproves that"this"refersto TorahfromDeut 4:44, "Thisis the TorahthatMoses set before the childrenof Israel."Beyond the elegantDeuteronomicprooftext, the demonstrativepronoun"this"echoes bothGod'sinitialinvitationto those who have occupied themselves "with this" to collect theirrewardand the directquestionto the Romansabouttheiractivitiesin "this"world. "This" Torahshouldhave been fulfilledin "this"world."Straightaway" theyentered, and "straightaway" the Romansleave dejectedly. As the Romans leave the Persiansenter,equally eager to collect their reward.The homilistrefersto the SasanianBabylonians,whoseempirespread over the otherhalf of the civilized world.37While the Jews of Palestinelived in Romanterritory,the BabylonianJewishcommunitieslived underSasanian hegemony.For centuriesthe two empiresstruggledfor controlof the known world. During the thirdcentury,when our homilistlived, the Romansand "Persians"foughtmajorbattlesin 231-33, 253-260, andagainin 283-284.38 Mastersof a vast empire,the Persiansalso anticipatecommensuratestatus in the world to come. They cannot, any more than the Romans,claim to have fulfilled the Torah, and so argue for vicariousrewardon the basis of the bridges they built, the cities conqueredand the wars fought. God dismisses their claims with disdain, emphasizingagain that their pursuits were self-serving.Bridgessupplythemwith tolls, andconqueredcities with forced labor. They use their militarypower to gain worldly riches. Their success in battlemeritsno reward,for God determinesthe outcomeof wars. Again the homilist emphasizesthatsuperficialsigns of divine favor-silver, gold, and military triumphs-prove nothing about the true merit of those who possess them. Neither the Romanpursuitof pleasurenor the Persian obsessionwithpowerdeservesreward.ThePersians,too, do notspeak"this," and "straightaway" departempty-handed.The same outcome,the homilist assuresus, awaitsthe othernations. 36. Assumingthe homilist'stext matchedthe Masoretictext here. 37. "Persian"in the BabylonianTalmudrefers to the contemporaryBabylonians.See I. Gafni, TheJews of Babyloniain the TalmudicEra (Jerusalem:ZalmanShazarCenter,1990), p. 156 (Hebrew). 38. The Sasaniansheavilydefeatedthe Romansin 260 C.E.If thehomilistlivedat this time, it explainswhy he attributedclaims of militaryprowessto the "Persians," not the Romans.
20
JEFFREY L. RUBENSTEIN
The next scene (II) revealsa shift in tactics.The nationsno longerclaim to havefulfilledthe Torahin the past,butquestionthefairnessof thestandard. True,they neverobservedthe Torah,but they neveracceptedit either,so the criterionfor rewardis unfair.God rejectsthis approachby chargingthatthe andfailedto fulfillthem. nationsreceivedthe seven Noahidecommandments The homilistingeniouslyreturnsto the next clause of Isa 43:9 as prooftext. "Letus hear of the things that have happened,"the propheticchallengeto the nations to announceprevious events their gods foretold,becomes an indictmentof their behavior.The nationscannot speak of the things they acceptedin the past, the ancientNoahidecode, becausethey did not obey thosecommandments.Note thatthe homilymarksthe new scene andshiftof tacticswith a reversalof roles.The nationsnow makethe accusationsandask the questions,while God,whojust beforethis appearedas indomitable judge, responds.An echo of God's questionto the nations,with the interrogative particlekelum,resoundsin the nations'probingof God andits parallelform. The best defense is a good offense. The nationssomehowbecomethejudge of the fairness of God's standards,and God, at least temporarily,allows himself to be relegatedto defendant.For a momentthe homilistpermitsthe nationsthe delusionthatthey standon a parwith God andmayquestionhim as equals. This reversaland the cross-examination of God contributeto the of and to the movement the add rapid homily atmosphereof a trial.39 The shift in tactics and role-reversalcome to the fore with the next question and response. No longer defending themselves,the nations ask whetherIsraelever fulfilledthe Torah.This chargeseemstotallyoutof place, for the issue is whetherthe nationsdeservea rewardor not. Froma strictly juridicalpoint of view, the questionis completelyirrelevant.Whetheror not Israelfulfilledthe Torahshouldonly affect its rewardin the worldto come, not thatof the nations.Moreover,in the firstscene the nationsclaimedthat their building enterprisesallowed Israel to fulfill the Torah,and that they deservedvicariousmeriton thataccount.Suddenlyto claim thatIsraelnever observedthe Torahsubvertstheirinitialargument.Whatvicariousmeritcan exposesonce againthefutilityof their theynow claim?The self-contradiction charges.It signalsthatthe attemptat role-reversal,at posingasjudgeof God's 39. This reversalbotheredthe traditionalcommentators.See the commentary in 'En Ya'akov(New York,1980), to AZ 3a, pp. 12b-13a:"Thesematters H.iddushei require ha-Ge'oninm explanation.How can God,who is witnessandjudge,debate(lefalpel'asnto)withthenations?" This reaction,of courses,fails to appreciatethe satiricalandhumoroustone.
DRAMA AN ESCHATOLOGICAL
21
justice, is anotheraspectof theirconfusiondescribedat the initialgathering. At the same time it points to the homilist'sreal interest.The trial pertains as much to the merit of Israel as the bankruptcyof the nations.And the vindicationof Israeltakesplace in a most ironicfashion.Withoutassembling in the multitude,gatheringas a nation,or recountingits accomplishments, withouteven appearingin person,Israelreceivesa favorablejudgment. The homilistbuilds to this climax withexquisitetechnique.God answers the nationsby testifying thatIsraelfulfilledthe whole Torah.The emphasis on the "Torahin its entirety"contrastswith the inabilityof the nationsto fulfill even the seven Noahidecommandments.Hereanothertactichas been and only dug a deeperhole. The nationsplay theirnewly counterproductive found role as judge to the extreme,disqualifyingGod's testimony.God has called Israel his "firstbornson," and of course the testimonyof relativesis inadmissible.Relegatedfromhis role as judge, God even loses credibilityas a witness.40When God summonsHeavenand Earthto testify for Israel,the nationsagaindisqualifythe witnesses,rulingthattheyare"interested parties" who owe their existence to Israel'smaintainingher covenantwith God by fulfillingthe Torah.Again the nationsdo a disserviceto theircase, for they admitthatIsraelhas a special relationshipwith God andthatthe worldonly exists for the sake of the Torah.The more they arguetheir own case, the morethey emphasizethe supremacyof Israel. The disqualificationof witnessesprovestheirultimateundoing,for God thenhas no recoursebut to summonthe nationsthemselvesas witnesses.The reversaltakes a full turn,with the nations,who had usurpedthe positionof judge, now forcedto testify againstthemselves.Withsix hortatorysentences God invokesrepresentativesof biblicalpeoplesto witnessthatIsraelfulfilled the Torah.Originallythe nations"came"forwardto collectreward;now they are summonedto "come"andjustify Israel'sclaim to reward.The formulaic pattern"Letx testify abouty that he did not do z" withoutinterruptionor objection,by farthe longestspeechof the homily,relentlesslyhammershome the vindicationof Israel.And the culmination,which thendeviatesfromthe formulato the general admissionthat all Israel"fulfilledthe entireTorah," echoes God's attemptedinitial testimony.The homilist arrivesat the final clause of his verse: "Let them give theirtestimonyand be vindicated,that 40. The dismissalof God's testimonyrecallsthe famousmidrashof the "Ovenof Achnai," bBM 59b. The rabbisrejectGod's testimonythatR. Eliezer'sopinionis correcton the grounds thatthe Torahis "notin Heaven."
22
L. RUBENSTEIN JEFFREY
they may say, 'It is true."'Where Isaiah summonedthe nations to bring witnesses on their own behalf and vindicatetheir gods, in the homily the nationsproducewitnesseson behalfof God andvindicateIsrael;theyconfess that what God asserted-that Israel fulfilled the Torah-is true. This turn completes the dramaticinversionof the biblical paradigmin which Israel servesas witness for God. In the rabbinicversionof the trial,firstGod,then the nations,witness thatIsraelfulfilledthe Torah. The characterssummonedto testify are chosenprimarilyfor theirmultinationalprofiles:Chaldean(Nimrod),Aramean(Laban),Egyptian(Potiphar's Mede(Darius),anda somewhatobscure wife), Babylonian(Nebuchadnezzar), in for additional cosmopolitanflavor-Temanite, quartet,clearly brought and A true Buzite.41 Naamathite, Shuhite, gatheringof nations.Yetthe figures were carefullyselected.These villainsendeavoredto preventbiblicalheroes fromobservingtheTorahor falsely accusedthemof sin. Nimrod,accordingto legend,castAbrahaminto a furnaceandpersecutedhimin otherwaysin order to compelhim to worshipNimrod'sgods.42LabanrepeatedlychangedJacob's wages andthenaccusedhim of stealingthe householdgods.43Potiphar'swife attemptedto seduceJoseph,then falsely accusedhim of tryingto rapeher.44 Nebuchadnezzar,outragedthat Hananiah,Mishael,and Azariahrefusedto AfterDarius worshipthe golden idol, threw them into a blazing furnace.45 commandedthat all prayersbe directedto him, he forced Daniel into the lion's den for prayingthreetimeseach day to God.46Eliphaz,Bildad,Zophar, andElihu,Job'sfour"comforters," chargedthathis sufferingmusthavebeen causedby sin, andincessantlyharanguedhim to confesshis misdeeds.47 They too falsely accused a biblical hero of transgressingGod's law, and thus it is fittingfor them to testify thatall Israelobservedthe entireTorah.Laban, Potiphar'swife, and Job's companionsare transformedfromprosecutorsto witnessesfor the defense. Obviouslythe impactof these specificcharacters 41. The four servedas Job's "comforters." Eliphazthe Temanite,Bildadthe Shuhite,and ZophartheNaamathiteappeartogetherin Job2:11.ElihubenBaracheltheBuzite,theiryounger colleague,surfacesin Job 32. 42. Pirqede-Rabi'Eli'ezer?26. Andsee LouisGinzberg,LegendsoftheJews(Philadelphia: JewishPublicationSociety, 1909-38), 1:197-203 andnotes. 43. Gen31:7, 30. 44. Gen 39:14-18. 45. Dan 3:13-23. 46. Dan 6:8-24. 47. Job 3 ff.
AN ESCHATOLOGICAL DRAMA
23
is much greaterthan would have been the case had Jethrothe Midianite or King Hiram of Syria, staunchallies of Israel, testifiedon its behalf.48 The membersof the subpoenaedgroupnot only confirmIsrael'sfidelitybut betraythe falsenessof theirown case. FarfromhavinghelpedIsraelto fulfill the Torah,as they initially claim, the nationsrepeatedlystrove to prevent Israelfrom observingthe commandments.Farfromnot havingfulfilledthe Torah,as the nationssubsequentlyargue,Israeldid so underthe mosttrying circumstances,even at the risk of life itself. Andjust as thesevillainsfalsely accused Jacob, Joseph, and Job of crimes, so the nations' argumentsare exposed as baseless. The satiricalelement of the first scene, the confused appearanceof the nations and their "dejected"departure,deepenswith the The nationsare not only liarsand scoundrels, self-incriminatingtestimony.49 but buffoons. The testimony, moreover, reveals that the nations never fulfilled the Noahidecommandments,the secondpotentialbasisfor reward.The specifics of their testimonythat Israel refusedto sin reveal thatNimrod,Nebuchadnezzar, and Darius worshippedidols or false gods, and that Potiphar's wife tried to commit adultery.Both idolatryand sexual immoralityviolate the Noahide prohibitions.50 Once again, the nationsdrive a stake through their own collective heart. They confirm God's pronouncementthat they never observedeven the minimalcommandmentsdemandedof them. This of testimonyessentiallyserves as a nationalsidduqha-din,the "justification the divine decree"traditionallyrecitedat burials."Weknow,God, thatyour judgmentis righteous;you arejustifiedwhen you speak,andpurewhen you judge, and it is not for us to questionyour decreesof judgment,"runsthe standardformula.Since the nationsdo questionGod'sjusticeandprotestthe divine verdict,God has themjustify theirown fate. In this worldthe nations violatedthe commandments,in the next they rebelagainstthe divineverdict. But in the end they will justify the justness of God. As Isaiahprophesied, they will say "Itis true."God is the truejudge, the dayyan'emet.51 48. Maharsha,in his commentary,asks why Balaam,a trueprophetof the nations,is not called to witness.Certainlyhe is preciselythe typeof "expertwitness"whosetestimonywould be most compelling.But unlikethe characterssummoned,he nevercompelledIsraelto violate the Torah. 49. Heinemann,Derashot,p. 67 emphasizesthe satiricaltone. 50. tAZ 8:4. 51. The indictmentof the nationshides one ironictwist. In the courseof the dialoguethe nationstwice quote Scriptureto disqualifyGod and then Heavenand Earthfrom testifying.
24
JEFFREY L. RUBENSTEIN
Having failed to demonstrateeither their own worthinessor Israel's unworthiness,the nationsare reducedto entreatfor one morechance.At this point the roles again reverseand returnto those of the openingscene. The nationsappearas waywardchildren,pathetic,humiliated,while God returns to the role of the powerfuljudge. His patiencetriedlong enough,God again insults the "completeidiots" before him and rejects their miserableplea. Only those who observedthe Torahin this world,who prepared"onthe eve of the Sabbath,"enjoy a rewardin the world to come. The analogydraws At uponthe familiartropeof the Sabbathas a "hintof the worldto come."52 the same time, it emphasizesthe correspondencebetweenobservanceof the commandmentsand entryinto the worldto come. Preparingfor the Sabbath, not the constructionof marketsandbridges,was the appropriate provision. The last scene (III) completesthe role-reversal.Again God initiatesthe action (A, B, C) and the nationsrespond(A', B'), as they did at the outset. Firstthe nationscame and recountedwhat they had done, to no avail; now they go and try to do what they neglected,but of coursetheireffortsprove futile. In his infinitemercy,God proposesa "simple"preceptto the nations, the commandmentof the sukka,orderingthem "to go and do it." Clearly the sukka stands for the entire Torahby synechdoche.By observingthis one "simple"commandment,the nations can prove their merit and claim a share of the eschatologicalreward.Of all the commandmentsthat the homilist could have selected as the test for the nations,the choice of the sukkacan hardlybe serendipitous.Indeed,the sukkarepresentsthe complete opposite of the accomplishmentsof which the nations boasted. Bridges, bath-houses,andcitieswerethegloryof antiquity.Marketplaces marketplaces, with columnedpromenadesandpavedstreets;bridgesthatingeniousRoman
Whereasat the outsetGod hadaccusedthe nationsof not "speakingthis,"meaningTorah,here the nationsproficientlycite the text. Apparentlythey have learnedsomethingof the holy writ. Thenagain,in rabbinicmidrasheverybody-and everything-quotes verses:Romanofficials, Satan,infants,cows, even the personifieddays of the week. In othermidrashimthe "nations of the world"routinelyquote Scripture,and perhapswe shouldunderstandtheirunexpected familiaritywith Torahin this context. See Y. Heinemann,Darkheha-'Aggadah(Jerusalem: MagnesPress, 1974),pp. 39-43. Moreover,by citingTorahthe nationsagainsubverttheirown cause. Theirmasteryof the text and exegeticaladroitnesscompromisethe initialdefensethat they had neverreceivedthe Torah. 52. bBer57b; cf. bShab 118a,mTam7:4.
DRAMA AN ESCHATOLOGICAL
25
engineersextendedto dazzling spans;53bath-houseswith marblepools and mosaics, adornedwith beautifulstatues;cities with amphitheaters, fora,and structures the of porticoes-these magnificent separated splendor Roman civilization from the barbarianworld.54The sukka,on the other hand,is a simplehut,stark,fragile,andcommonplace.Isaiahcomparesthedowntrodden stateof Israelto the abandoned"sukkain a vineyard,"andAmosthebreached Davidic kingdom to "a fallen sukka.""Unlike a bridge, bath-house,or marketplace,a sukkacan be easily erectedand quicklydestroyed.It has no aestheticvalue. The sukkais thefunctionalas well as thestructural oppositeof thenations' A sukka does not a forum for commercial building enterprises. provide like a bridge, nor interactions,like a market,nor facilitatetransportation, providefacilities for ablutions,like a bath-house.Nor does a sukkaallow its buildersto harborprostitutes,collect tolls, levy forcedlabor,or pamper themselveswith hot andcold baths,steamrooms,andsaunas.A sukkasimply providesa little shelterfromthe sun or rain.And the festivalsukkadoes not even do that.For duringthe festival,when one is commandedto dwell in the sukka,he is not out in the fields with no alternativeshelter,but withina step of his house, a far more insulatedshelterfromheatandrain. This incongruitybetween the majesticstructuresof the nationsand the flimsy sukka creates the irony that lies at the heartof the homily.56Those who build such edifices shouldcertainlybe able to follow God'sinstructions withoutdifficulty.To observe the commandmentof dwelling in a sukkais easy. Nothing more is requiredthan to sit in it and be. Hence the homilist dubsthe sukkaa "simpleprecept.""57 It demandsno travel,no labor,no effort; one neednot do anything.Comparedwiththe effortrequiredto buildbridges, 53. Althoughthe homilistattributesthe bridgesto the Persians,the Romanswerefamous for theirengineeringskill. 54. ComparebShab 33b: "Once R. Yehuda,R. Yose, and R. Shimonsat together,and Yehudab. Gerim [= proselytes]sat among them. R. Yehudaopened:'How pleasantare the waysof thisnation[Rome].Theyestablishedmarkets,theyestablishedbridges,theyestablished bath-houses.'R. Yose was silent. R. Shimonb. Yohaianswered:'Everythingthey madewas done exclusively for their own needs. They establishedmarketsto place prostitutesthere. Bath-houses,to adornthemselves.Bridges,to collect taxes .. 55. Isa 1:8, Amos 9:11. 56. Cf. Maharshaad loc. 57. A glossatorinterpolated,"Andwhy did he call it a misvahqalah?Since it is inexpensive."This is one possiblemeaningof miisvahqalah,as in mHul12:5,"Anmisvah qalahwhich [costs]aboutan 'issar."But the termoccursfrequentlyin tannaiticandamoraicsourceswitha rangeof differentmeanings.The failureof the nationsbotheredtheglossator:If Godmadeit so
26
JEFFREY L. RUBENSTEIN
conquercities, wage war, or administermarketplaces,simply to sit in the sukkais effortless.While the nations"straightaway" are able to constructa sukka,they proveunableto dwell there.To test theirnewfoundreligiouszeal, Godcausesthe sunto blazeuponthem.Facedwiththisdiscomfortthenations not only exit abruptly,but also kick theirsukkotin disgust.For the festival sukkais completelyotherworldly,functioningonly as a meansto fulfill the no this-worldly commandmentof God. It conveys no self-aggrandizement, the muchmore who no benefit. those construct pleasure, tangible Ironically impressivemarketsand bridges cannot observe the simple preceptof the sukka.The contrastbetweenthe sukkaandthe otheredificesis the difference betweenotherworldlydedicationand this-worldlysuccess,betweenworship of God and self-satisfaction,betweenvanity and Torah,betweenIsraeland the nations. At this point the homilistmoves from the Isaianverse to Psalms2. The nationshave lost the trialandnow rebelagainstthe commandment proposed by God. Of course the homilisthas shiftedfar fromthe biblicalview, which envisions an actual revolt against the Lord and his anointed,to a childish smackat the sukkaGodinstructedthemto build.Whenthe nations"breakthe cordsof theiryokes,"theybreakfreefromthe yokeof thekingdomof heaven, not from subjugationto the Israeliteking. In bothcases the harmlessrevolt only inducesGod to laughat the futile struggle.Againthe ironyis beautifully conveyed.While God testifies thatIsraelobservedthe entireTorah,all 613 commandments,the nationsdid not observethe seven they werecommanded in this world, nor even the one "simple"preceptin the eschaton.Yet they demanda reward!God has good reasonto laughat theirfolly. Besides the shift in base text from Isaiah to Psalms, the linguistic parallelsand structureswiftly press the homily to its conclusion.The two hot thatthe nationswere forcedto abandontheirsukkot,how couldthe sukkabe considereda "simple"precept?He chose a secondarymeaningimportedfrommHul.Butthismissesthepoint of the aggadaand destroysthe irony.Saul Lieberman,"Persecutionof the JewishReligion," Salo WittmayerBaron Jubilee Volume(Jerusalem and New York:American Academy for Jewish
Research,1974), pp. 213-236 (Hebrew),likewiseconcludesthatthe originalsense of misvah althoughhis explanationof the phrase qalah here is not "an inexpensivecommandment," is implausible.Rabbi Shlomo Goren, "Ha-'Universaliutve-ha-yihudha-ruhanishe-be-hag ha-sukkot,"Mahanayim50 (1961): 8, writingon a somewhatdifferenttopic,comments:"The Do all the explanationof the Talmud,'since it is an inexpensivenmisva,'is incomprehensible. of Sukkot?... And thereare other otherJewishfestivals cost more thanthe commandments of the sukka!" commandments which cost less thanthe commandment
AN ESCHATOLOGICAL DRAMA
27
"straightaway"sthat introducethe nations' last acts of "going"to build the sukka and then "departing"(III, A', B') echo the two "straightaway"s that introducedtheir confused "coming"and reorganized"entrance"(I, A', B'). The approachand departureare expressedwith perfectsymmetry.Yet withinthe thirdsection, the tripartitestructureof God actingandthe nations respondingabruptlybreaks off with God's final laugh (C), which receives no answer.This structuralanomalycoheres perfectlywith the point of the homily.Whenall is said anddone, the nationscannotrespond.Thereremains for them neitherobjection,dispute, plea, argument,nor questionof God's judgment.The dramais over. A Homilyfor Sukkot Such then are the results of a close reading of the homily. Can we press further?To do so would requireadditionalinformationaboutthe Sitz im Leben-the audience in attendance,the place delivered,the immediate concernsof the community,the dategiven--data unfortunately notpreserved in the historicalrecord.Yet, while absolutecertitudeis unattainable,there are groundsto determinethe time of yearthe homilistpreached.Clearlythe motif of the sukkapoints to the festival of Sukkot.58 It is difficultto believe 58. D. Rosenthal,"TheTorahReadingin the AnnualCycle in the Landof Israel,"Tarbiz 53 (1984): 144-147 (Hebrew),assignsthe homilyspecificallyto the festivalof SimhatTorah, whichhe claimswas observedannuallyat theendof Sukkotin third-century Palestine,opposing the scholarlyconsensusthatthe festival is of Babylonianoriginanddevelopedonly in geonic times. Rosenthalwas commentingon an articleby EzraFleischer,"A List of EarlyHolidays in a Piyyut by Qiliri," Tarbiz52 (1983): 223-272 (Hebrew),who claimed that a recently discoveredpiyyutmentionedSimhatTorah,andconcludedthatthe festivalwas alreadyknown in Palestinein the sixth or seventhcentury.Rosenthalsuggeststhatthe focus on fulfillingthe commandments is appropriatefor the completionof the Torahreadingcycle markedby Simhat Torah,and points out thatIsa 43:9, the scripturethe homilistexpounds,occursin the haftara forparashatbereshitaccordingto the Babylonianlectionarycycle. Thisconclusionseems less compellingthan the assignmentto Sukkot.The themeof fulfillingcommandmentsis always appropriate,and a homily thatpraisedthe meritsof Torahwould suit any weekday,Sabbath, or festival.Both RosenthalandFleischerhave been criticizedby MenahemZvi Fox, "Insights on the Palestiniancustomof SimhatTorah,the SabbathThatCoincideswith the New Moon, and the Days of Awe,"Sinai 103 (1989): 81-84 (Hebrew).Fox rejectsthe putativereference to SimhatTorah,but recognizesthe thematicconnectionbetweenthe homilyand Sukkot.He suggests that the motif of an assemblyof nationsderives from the haqhel ceremony(Deut 31:10-13), the septennialTorah-reading assemblythattook place on Sukkot.This suggestion
28
JEFFREY L. RUBENSTEIN
thata homilistwouldgrantthe sukkasuch a centralrolein a lessondelivered on anotherholidayor an ordinarySabbath. It is not only the motif of the sukka,but the entireeschatologicalvision thatconnectsthe homily to Sukkotandits themes.The homilydrawson the last chapterof Zechariah,which was read as the haftaraon Sukkot.59 The prophetforetellsa revolt of the nationsagainstJerusalemin which the city is destroyedand half the people exiled. God and the divine minions then defeatthe nations,reconstitutethe Temple,andmiraculouslyreconfigurethe surroundingterrain.The conclusionwarnsthat those nationswhich fail to make an annualpilgrimageto Jerusalemon Sukkotto bow beforethe Lord of Hosts will not receive rain. Our homilisthas retainedthe eschatological worldviewinto role of Sukkotbut translatedthe propheticTemple-oriented the rabbinicTorah-centeredvantage,refractedbiblical eschatologythrough the prism of the rabbinicworld to come, and replaceda vision of limited universalismwith a particularistic eschatologicaltriumph.Whilethe prophet foresees the nationsgatheringand attackingJerusalem,the homilistreduces the hostile assemblyto a mob scene pleadingfor reward,just as he did with the belligerentplottings of Ps 2. WhereZechariahchargesthe nations to performa Templeceremonyon Sukkotin orderto receivetheirreward,the homilist has them observe a commandmentof the Torahpertainingto the festival.Wherethe prophetpromisesbounteousrainin theeschatologicalera, the homilistassuresan undefinedrewardin the worldto come. Andwhile the visionarybelieves that the remainingnationswill comply and acknowledge the supremacyof God, the homilistextendsthe nations'rebellionto the bitter end:theyfail to fulfillthe commandmenteven in eschatologicaltimeandearn no reward.Zech 14 is essentiallythe subtextof the homily.Togetherthe two visions comprisea type of culturaldialoguewhichmeditateson the eschaton has a greatdeal of merit.The homilyprojectsthe haqhelassemblyto the eschaton,wherethe issue becomesrewardfor the studyof Torah,whichJews havemeritedthroughtheirseptennial motif, similarto those, as we shall see gatherings.This is a type of measure-for-measure below, thatcharacterizethe midrashimfor Sukkot.Heinemann,Derashot,p. 68, also assigns the homily to Sukkot,andconjecturesthatIsa 43 mayhave servedas the haftara. 59. This was noted by Bacher, 'Aggadat,p. 329 n. 2. ActuallyR. Abrahamb. Nathanof Lunel,SeferHa-Manhig,ed. Y Raphael(Jerusalem:MossadHaravKook, 1978), 2:408, ?46, andSimhahb. Samuel,MahzorVitryed. S. Hurwitz(Berlin:H. Itzkowski,1893),2:443, ?381, both noted the connectionas well, for both relateZechariah'sprophecyto the homily.Like Ps 2, Zech 14 is a Vilkerkampf, see Whinke, Zionstheologie,pp. 77-79. (Zech 14 is generally attributedto a laterprophet,a deutero-or trito-Zechariah.)
DRAMA AN ESCHATOLOGICAL
29
and the fate of the gentile nations. Thus it was probably on Sukkot, when the congregation recited Zech 14 as the haftara, that the homilist articulatedhis version. The theme of eschatological competition between Israel and the nations supports the link to Sukkot. Consider the following midrash found among the collection of homilies designated for Sukkot in Pesiqta de-Rav Kahana 27:2. Delights in your right hand are victory6 (Ps 16:11). ... R. Avin said: [It is a
parable]like two who appearbeforethejudge, andwe do notknowwhichone is the victor.When one of them carriesoff the palm (bayyin),then we know that he is the victor.So, too, when Israeland the heavenlycounterparts (sare) of the nationsenterbefore the Holy One on Rosh Hashana,bringingcharges (meqatregin)againsteach other,we do not know whichones are victors.But when Israel departfrom the presenceof the Holy One with their lulavs and theiretrogsin theirhands,we know thatIsraelarethe victors.6' R. Avin, like our homilist, pictures a heavenly trial between Israel and the nations, who enter before God the judge on Rosh Hashana. God releases the verdict of the heavenly trial on Sukkot, revealing his true judgment, whatever the illusory situation on earth. In this world the nations appear to have prevailed over Israel, but in the heavenly spheres the opposite is the case. R. Avin compares the lulav with the bais (= bayyin), the later Greek term for "palm,"62and interprets the ritual waving of the lulav as a victory parade.63In Hellenistic and Roman times palms were routinely given to 60. Lit., "delightsareever (nesah)in yourrighthand."The passageinterpretsnesahin the sense of "victory." 61. PRK 27:2, 404-407. A slightly differentform of the midrashappearsin Leviticus Rabba30:2, ed. M. Margoliot(Jerusalem,1953-60), p. 694. For full analysis,see JeffreyL. Rubenstein,TheHistoryof Sukkotduringthe SecondTempleandRabbinicPeriods(diss.;Ann Arbor:UniversityMicrofilms,1992), pp. 432-434. 62. The classical Greektermfor "palm"is phoenix.Latersourcesuse bais or baion, from a root borrowedfrom Egyptian.See Paulys Real-encyclopaedie der klassischenAltertumwisJ. B. Metzler,1894-1959)20, 1, p. 386, s.v. senschaft,ed. A. PaulyandG. Wissowa(Stuttgart: phoenix. 63. Cf. 2 Macc 10:7. The Hasmoneantriumph,followingthe rededicationof the Temple, was celebratedwith palm branches:"Bearingwands (thursoi)wreathedwith leaves and fair boughsandpalms,they offeredhymnsof praiseto Himwho hadprosperedthecleansingof his own place."See too Targumn Shenito Esther3:8: "[theJews] destroythe orchardsby breaking down the hedges and not takingcare, and they makefor themselvesa hosha'ana,saying, 'As does the king in his [triumphal]ceremonies,so do we.'" (Hosha'anahere is a synonymfor
30
L. RUBENSTEIN JEFFREY
victoriousathletes,64so the palm becamethe outstandingsymbolof victory in classical culture65 and in Jewish-Hellenisticliterature.66 Althoughthe trial is not specifically set in eschatologicaltime, but seems to be an annual event, there is no doubt that it also points to the eschaton.The "heavenly counterparts"annually rehearsethe judgment that will take place at the eschaton.Then the true victors reap their rewardand fully celebratethat which the lulav ritualsymbolizesannually. The court setting recalls the juridicalenvironmentof our homily. The phrase "bringingcharges"before God suits the nations' arguments,their accusationthat Israel never fulfilled the Torah,and their objectionsto the
lulav,as foundin othersources.)The triumphator usuallyheld a myrtlebranchin his righthand duringthe triumphalprocession. 64. Pausanius,PeriegaraVII 48, 2, notes, "At most games,however,[thevictor]is given a crown (stephanon)of palm, and at all a palm is placed in the right hand of the victor" (Loeb ed., trans.W. H. S. Jones [Cambridge,1935], 4:137.) Suetonius,Caligula32, 2 relates thatCaligula,afterkilling a gladiator(who intentionallyfell), "ranaboutwith a palmbranch as victors do" (Loeb ed., trans.J. C. Rolfe [London,1914]). Numerousimperialinscriptions dedicatinggames includea provisionthatthe victorsbe awardedpalms. 65. Plutarch,Quaest. Conyv. VIII, 4, 723B, relatesa discussionin which his companions considerthe question:"Why,at the variousathleticfestivals differentkinds of wreathsare awarded,but the palm-frondat all of them?"(Loeb ed., transF. Babbitt[Cambridge,1927], Cicero,Rosc. 145)."Palm,"in fact,becamesynonymouswithvictoryin laterclassicalliterature. 6.17: aliter plurintmarunt palmarumnvetus ac nobilis gladiator habetur ("The first is reputed to
be a famousandexperiencedgladiator,who has won manyvictories[palms]";Loebed., trans. J. H. Freese [London,1930], 6:137). Plutarch,Stoic. Repugn.1045D:"if two racershave run a dead heat, is it permissible. .. thatthe umpirerewardthe palm to whicheverhe pleases?" In races first place was called "firstpalm."Cf. Vergil,Aeneid5:339: "Euralusdartsby and, winningby grace of his friend,takes first,and flies on amid favouringapplauseand cheers. Behindcome HelymusandDiores,now thirdpalm(nunctertiapalnma, Diores;Loebed., trans. H. Fairclough,[London,1935]). Apuleis,Metaniorphoses 2, 4 calls the goddessof victorythe "palm goddess": attolerabant statuas palmeris deae facies. During triumphal processions the
wore a tunic adornedwith palm leaves, the tunicapalmata.See Livy, Ab Urba triumphator Condita X 7, 9.
66. In 1 Macc 13:51, Simoncelebratedthe purificationof the Akrawith "praiseandpalm branchesandharpsandcymbalsandviols andhymns,andwith songs."Judithandthe women rejoicingwith her carriedbranchesin theirvictoryparade,althoughthese are not specifiedas palms;Jud 15:12-13. In John 12:13the people greetJesuswith palmsas he entersJerusalem. In Testamentof Naphtali5:4 Levi receivestwelve datepalmsas a symbolof power.
DRAMA AN ESCHATOLOGICAL
31
validity of the witnesses.67The same verbs of "entering"the trial and then "departing"afterthe verdictappear.Wherethe homily depictsthe Romans, Persians,andothernationsdepartingdejectedly,the midrashportraysIsrael's victoriousexit. While our homily depictsthe failureof the nationsto reside in sukkotand theirdismissalby God, R. AvinpicturesIsraelcarryinglulavs as a sign of a divinely recognizedvictory.He essentiallypicks up whereour homily leaves off. Both homilistsdeploy the festival symbolsto expressthe sametheme.The sukkaprovidesthe groundfor Israel'sreward,herfidelityto God againstthe revolt of the nations,while the lulav symbolizesthe reward, her victoryover the nationsin the worldto come.68 The sun blazing upon the nations' sukkotparallelsanothermotif found in midrashimrelated to Sukkot. Several sources envision God providing miraculoussukkot for the righteousin the world to come. In one version God forms the sukka from the skin of Leviathan,the primordialmonster 67. In the homily Israel does not bring charges.The dialogue takes place exclusively between God and the nations.In LeviticusRabbaboth Israeland the nationsbringcharges beforeGod. 68. See too the expansionof this midrashin MidrashTehillim17:5,ed. S. Buber(Vilna, 1891), p. 126: "What is the reason for Delights in Your right hand are victory (Ps 16:.11)?
Just as accordingto the custom of the world, when two charioteersrace in the hippodrome, which of them receives a palm (bain)? The one who wins. Thus on Rosh Hashanaall the peopleof the worldcome like contestantson paradeandpass beforeGod, andthe childrenof Israelamong all of the people of the world also pass beforehim like troops.When the first day of Sukkotcomes, however,all the childrenof Israel,adultsandchildren,takeup lulavsin the right hand and etrogs in their left, and then all the people of the worldknow thatin the judgmentIsraelwas proclaimedvictorious."In the ByzantineEmpireracesbetweencharioteers representingdifferentreligions were indeed seen as symbolic of a strugglefor superiority. See YaronDan, "CircusFactions(Blues and Greens)in ByzantinePalestine,"TheJerusalem CathedraI, ed. Lee Levine (Jerusalem,1981), pp. 105-119: "Whenrivalswere membersof differentreligions,the victoryof theirchariotswas viewedas a victoryfor theirreligion.Thus In one raceheld in fourth-century Gaza, triumphalso servedas a valuableformof propaganda. a Christiannamed Italicuscompetedagainsta paganwho was one of the heads of the city government.... The race,in effect, representeda strugglebetweenpaganismandChristianity. The victoryof Italicus'schariotwas considereda victoryof Jesusover Mamas,the god of the city (Marnasvictus est a Christo).Malalasreportsthatin Neapolis,the victoryof a Christian charioteernamedNicias over Samaritanand Jewishentriesso enragedJulianus,the leaderof the Samaritanrevolt (529), thathe orderedNicias be killed"(p. 107). On Jewishparticipation in chariotraces, see p. 106 n. 4. Yaronalso arguesthatthe "Samaritan riots and rebellionat Caesareavery likely began duringthe chariotraces, or at least were connectedin one way or anotherwith the hippodrome"(p. 117; the riots occurredin 555). The midrashbeautifully incorporatesthis culturalsymbolisminto its promiseof eschatologicalvictoryfor the Jews.
32
JEFFREY L. RUBENSTEIN
whose flesh God servesat the eschatologicalbanquet.69 Anotherversioncalls the eschatologicalsukka the "sukkaof Sodom,"which was formed from seven types of trees.70In a late versionthe eschatologicalsukkaprotectsthe righteousfrom the fires of judgmentday. R. Levi said, "Whoeverfulfilsthe commandmentof sukkain this world,God says, 'Since he observed the commandmentof sukka in this world, I will protecthim from the fire of the Day to Come.'" R. Yannaiand Resh Laqish said, "Behold the Day to Come, burning like an oven" (Mal 3:19).71
NotethatR. Levi appliestheclassicrabbinic"measure-formeasure"principle those who observe the commandment of the sukkain (midakenegedmida): this world will be rewardedwith a protectivesukkaon the Day to Come. Those who neglectedthe sukkain this world,like the nationsin our homily, remainunprotectedand suffer divine punishment.The "alternativeparsha" of the Pesiqta de-Rav Kahana portrays that punishment explicitly. In the worldto come, whatdoes the Holy Onedo? He exposesthe heavens,as it says, The Heavens shall be rolled up like a scroll (Isa 34:4), and takes it [the
sun] out fromunderits sheath(nashtiqo),andit will come forthin all its power and avenge the wicked, as it says, Behold the Day to Come, burning like an oven. All the arrogant and all the doers of evil shall be straw, and the day that is coming shall burn them to ashes and leave of them neither stock nor boughs
(Mal 3:19). At thattime God will makea sukkafor the righteousand protect themin it, as it says, He will shelterme in his pavilion(sukko)on an evil day (Ps 27:5), and so And it serves as a sukkafrom heat by day (Isa 4:6), from the
fire of that"Day."72 The midrash finds a basis for the protective sukka in Ps 27 and Isa 4, which speak of God sheltering his people in a metaphoric pavilion (sukko) 69. bBB 75a;PRK455 and456. bBB 74b mentionsthebanquet.See too the eschatological huppot(canopies)of bBB 75a; PesiqtaRabbati?37, ed. MeirIsh-Shalom(Vienna,1880),pp. 163a;LeviticusRabba25:2, 570. 70. PRK454-455. See too Tanhuma,'Emor?22, 496: "TheHolyOne saidto Israel.In this worldI toldyou to makea sukkato repayme forthe good I did foryou, as it says, Youshall live in boothsseven days ... In orderthatfuturegenerationsmayknowthatI madethe Israelite people live in booths(Lev 23:42-43). But in the futureworldI will appearin my kingdomand protectyou like a sukka,as it says,And it serveas a sukkafrom heatby day (Isa4:5)." 71. YalqutShimoni,'Emor,?753, p. 408; PRK452. 72. PRK452-453.
AN ESCHATOLOGICAL DRAMA
33
or an eschatologicalcloud-sukka.The authorconnectsthe "evil day"of Ps 27:5 to the "Day to Come"of Mal 3:19, and relatesthe two images to the fate of the two sides. While the wickedburnin the firesof judgmentday,the righteousareprotectedin a divinesukka.Now thecompilerof the"alternative parsha"juxtaposesthese traditionswith a paraphraseof our 'AvodahZarah and homily, indicatingthat he understoodthe traditionsas complementary, the vision. Where the leaves simultaneouslyextending eschatological homily off with God makingthe sun blazeuponthe nationsto forcethemto abandon theirsukkot,the Pesiqta traditionportraysthe next scene of the drama.The blazingsun is the sourceof the firesMalachiprophesiesforjudgmentday.73 The sunnot only causesthe nationsto abandontheirsukkot,butalso provides the means of punishment.The Pesiqta imaginesthat the rewardfor Israel, unspecifiedin the homily, takes the formof a protectivesukkabestowedby God in returnfor observingthe commandmentof sukka.Israeltoleratedthe discomfortsof heat and rain when they residedin sukkotin this world, so they are shelteredfromthe searingheatof judgment.This imageaddsa new dimensionto the symbolism of the sukka.The sukkasymbolizesnot only Israel'sdedicationto Torah,but the form of Israel'seschatologicalreward. WhereR. Avin interpretedthe lulav as a victorysymbolof the eschatological triumphIsraelwouldenjoy,the Pesiqtarendersthe sukkaa symbolof Israel's rewardand the nations'punishment.74 The nationsalso figurein anotherSukkotmidrash,the famoustradition that connects the seventy bullocks sacrificedduringthe eight days of the festival with the seventy nations. [A] R. Alexandraisaid:It is like a king who held a celebration.For the seven days of the feast the king's son was busy with the guests.Afterthe seven days
of feastingthekingsaidto his son,"Myson.I knowthatforthesevendaysof
the feast you were busy with the guests. Now you and I will rejoicetogether,
andI willnottroubleyoumuch,justonechickenandonelitraof meat."Thus forthesevendaysof feastingIsraelis busywiththesacrifices forthenations.
73. It should be noted thatMal 3:10-24 was the haftarafor the intermediateSabbathof Sukkotin the Palestinianlectionarycycle; see CharlesPerrot,"TheReadingof the Bible in the AncientSynagogue,"Mikra,ed. M. J. Mulder,CRINTII/1 (Philadelphia: FortressPress, 1988), p. 147. The traditionswhich connect Malachi'sblazingfire to the sun of the homily clearlyassociatedthe homily with Sukkot. 74. See the medievalsources,below n. 83, which also relatethe homilyto Sukkot.
34
L. RUBENSTEIN JEFFREY
[B] as R. Pinhassaid:"AllthoseseventybullsthatIsraelusedto sacrifice on Sukkotcorrespond(keneged)to the seventynations,since the world will neverbe emptyof them." [C] What is the reason? They answer my love with accusation, and I
muststandjudgment(Ps 109:4).7We areconfidentof thejudgment. [D] Whenthe seven days of the festivalareover,the Holy One says to Israel, "My sons. I know that for the seven days of the festivalyou were busy with the sacrificesof the nations.Now I andyou will rejoicetogether,andI will not troubleyou except with one bull andone ram."76 Num 29:12-34 mandates that seventy bulls be sacrificed over the seven
days of Sukkotand one bull on Shemini 'Aseret,the Eighth-DayAssembly. The midrash correlates the seventy bulls with the proverbial seventy nations
of rabbinic thought, and the one bull with Israel. The meaning of the "correspondence"of sacrifices and nations is not completely clear, but based
on the parable,it seems that it serves to includethe nationsin the Sukkot festivities.The nationsparticipate,at least vicariously,in the culticjoy and Templecelebrationsthroughoutthe week of Sukkot.77 Althoughon Shemini and Israel the tradition God nevertheless rejoice alone, 'Aseret projectsan inclusive,somewhatuniversalistview. Sukkotis a festivalatwhichthenations are represented. They are honored guests who participateand contributeto the King's celebration. In Zech 14 the nations make the pilgrimage to Jerusalem and bow before God, and here sacrifices are offered on their behalf.
Sections [B] and [C] interruptthe flow of the parable,and seem to comprisean independenttraditioninterpolatedfrom anothersource.Later midrashimelucidate the sense of the Psalms verse: Because Israel offers 75. The meaningof the verseis unclear.This seemsto be the understanding of them•ni.sh. 76. PRK28:9, p. 433. 77. In other versions of this traditionthe sacrificesatone for the sins of the nationsor propitiateGod for rainon theirbehalf.ThusbSuk55bjuxtaposesthe traditionwith a statement of R. Yohanan:"Alasfor the nationsof the world,who hada loss andknownotwhattheylost. While the Templestood the altaratonedfor them.Now whatwill atonefor them?"And see Rashiad loc. So Shirha-ShirintRabba4:1: "Justas a dove atonesfor sins, so Israelatonesfor the nations.Since all those seventy bullocksthatthey sacrificeon the Festivalcorrespondto the seventynations,for the worldwill neverbe emptyof them."On rain,see MidrashTehillint 109:4:"OnSukkotwe offer up seventybullocksfor the seventynations,andwe praythatrain will come down for them."
AN ESCHATOLOGICALDRAMA
35
sacrificeson behalfof the nations,"thereforethey oughtto love us. Not only do they not love us, but they hate us, as it says, Theyanswermy love with accusation(Ps 109:4)."78AlthoughIsraelmakesthelovinggestureof bringing sacrificesfor othernations,those nationsdespise Israel.The questionat [C] shouldperhapsbe understoodas: "Whatis the reasonIsraeloffers sacrifices for the nations,since the nationsare so ungrateful,andeven accuseIsrael?" The redactorwas evidentlyso astonishedat R. Alexandrai'ssuggestionthat he interruptedthe nimshalwith an explanation.Israelacts virtuouslydespite the ingratitudeof the nations,andconfidentlyawaitshervindicationin court. The homily profitablycan be seen againstthis background.The homilist fleshes out the "accusations"the nations bring againstIsrael to which Ps 109:4alludes.The bitter,ungratefulnationsaccuseall Israelof not observing the Torah, while those called as witnesses, such as Potiphar'swife and Laban,falsely accused individualIsraelitesof sin. Consonantwith rabbinic times, the homilist reinterpretsthe ritual Israel performson behalf of the nationsfromsacrificesto Torah.The nationsthemselvesadmitthatthe world only exists because of Torah,and thus concede that they owe their very existence to Israel'sfulfillingthe Torah(B3). Most importantly,the homily graphicallynarratesthe "judgment"which Israelconfidentlyawaits in the midrash.Justicewill prevail.Israelwill "standjudgment"andbe vindicated. The false accusations,the mistreatmentandhatredof Israelwill be exposed andthe nationswill be punished.The homilistprojectsthe privatecelebration of Israeland God, which the midrashlimits to Shemini'Aseret,to the world to come. By their own actions the nationslose theirright to participatein the "celebrationof the king"to which they wereonce invited.They not only hatedIsraelbut they destroyedthe Templein which "their"sacrificeswere They fail to celebrateSukkotbothin thisworldandin theeschaton. brought.79 Firstthey abusedIsraeland the Temple,precludingthe sacrificesbroughton theirbehalf,andthenthey rejectanotherSukkotcommandment, the "simple" preceptof the sukka.In the worldto come, IsraelandGod rejoicealone.
78. Tanhumna,Pinhas ?17, 603; Tanhumna,Pinhas ?14, ed. Buber, 4:35; Banzidbar Rabba 21:24; Midrash Tehillint 109:4; YalqutShimnoni,Num ?782. 79. See bSuk 55a, cited in n. 77.
L. RUBENSTEIN JEFFREY
36
Conclusions
These motifs-the trial involving the nationsand Israel,the two sides pressingchargesin court,the eschatologicalrewardandpunishment,and of course the sukka-are consistentwith motifs attachedto Sukkotby other sources,and suggest thatthe homily shouldbe understoodwithinthis wider context. Because of this thematicoverlap,laterJewish traditionconnected the homily to Sukkot.As noted above, in the Safed manuscriptof Pesiqta de-Rav Kahana, this homily begins the "alternativeportion,"apparently intendedas a homily for the second day of Sukkotin the diaspora.80 So too a late medieval midrashentitled"A Homily for Sukkot"containsour the homilyin their homily.81Liturgicalpoets from Qalironwardparaphrase piyyutimfor Sukkot,82and medievaljurists make the connectionas well.83 Jewish traditionunderstoodthe liturgicaldesignationfor Sukkot,"thetime of our rejoicing,"which echoes the Deuteronomicpromise"you shall have nothingbutjoy" (Deut 16:15)in eschatologicalterms.Thefestivalof Sukkot celebratedthe future triumphin judgment,victory over the nations, and eternalrewardof "rejoicing"in the worldto come. In additionto these thematicconnections,to understandSukkotas the context for the homily brings its moralizingand humorouscharacterinto sharperrelief. The messageof the importanceof punctiliouslyobservingthe commandmentto dwell in the sukkacouldhardlybe missedby the audience. Although the homilist focuses on the nations' failure ratherthan Israel's observance,the implicationsareclear.Eternalrewardin the worldto come is 80. PRK452; see the notes there. 81. Bet Ha-Midrash,ed. A. Jellinek(Leipzig,1853-77), 6:50.Jellinekcalls thetext "Neue Pesikta,"apparentlya laterreworkingof the Pesiqtamaterials. 82. See Qalir's siluq, Ki 'eqqah mo'ed, in Mahzor le-Sukkot,edited by Daniel Goldschmidt;
compiled by Jonah Frankel(Jerusalem,1980), pp. 126-135. The beginningof the piyyut presupposesthe homily.Those who believe Qalirdid not know the BabylonianTalmudwill claim thathe knew the midrashfound in the Talmudfromanothersource.We have seen that the amoraimto whomthe Talmudattributesthe midrasharePalestinian.Forreferencesin other piyyutim,see the aforementioned Mahzor,p. 22 1. 19, p. 25 1. 16, p. 34 11.14-15, p. 54 11.36 ff., p. 248 11.17 ff. 83. See Abrahamben Nathanof Lunel, Sefer Ha-Manhig,ed. Y. Raphael(Jerusalem: MossadHaravKook, 1978), 2:408, ?46; Simhahben Samuel,MahzorVitry,ed. S. Hurwitz (Berlin:H. Itzkowski,1893), 2:443, ?381; Elazarb. Judahof Worms,SeferRoqeahHa-Gadol (Warsaw,1880), pp. 48b.
DRAMA AN ESCHATOLOGICAL
37
no small incentive.If the goal was to promotedwellingin the sukkawithin the community,the homily seems an effectivemeans. Yet the homilist artfullybalancesthe eschatologicalpromisewith thisworldly realism. Dwelling in the sukka was not always the most pleasant experience.If autumnin Palestinecan be delightfullyrefreshing,it can also be rainy,windy,andcold or oppressivelyhot. Sometimesit is uncomfortable to sit in the sukka.No one likes to eat the festivalmeal with teethchattering or pouringsweat. Sensitive to these possibilities,the Mishnaexempts one fromremainingin the sukkaif it begins to rain,and othertraditionsprovide dispensationfor similar discomforts.A baraitain the PalestinianTalmud rules: "Justas they clear out the sukkaon accountof rain, so too because of extremeheat or mosquitoes."84 The discomfortof the nationsin the hot sun was an experiencefamiliarto Jews. They knew well that the "simple commandment"was not so simple afterall. The audienceprobablyrecalled timeswhenthey hadwishedto kick theirsukkotin disgustandretreatto more comfortablesurroundings.We might expect a sympatheticchuckle,a smile of understanding as they musedat the predicamentof the unfortunate nations. God laughswith triumphalmocking,but thosewho annuallyexperiencedthe ups and downs of sukkalife, and mightbe returningto theirsukkotafterthe homily,probablylaughedmoregently at the tongue-in-cheekhumor. The humorouselementshouldnot obscurethe overallmessageof reward for Israeland dismissalof the nations.Therelingersan air of triumphalism, of particularism,and of superiority.Sukkotfollows soon afterRoshHashana andYomKippur,the Day of Judgmentandthe Day of Atonement,whenGod seals the fate of humanbeings for the coming year.Besides the individual judgmentbased on personalmeritand sin, these traditionspoint to a larger judgment,that of entire peoples, of Israel and the nations.Pesiqta de-Rav Kahana27:2 explicitlylinks Sukkotto thejudgmentof RoshHashana,andit seems thatour homily shouldbe understoodin this light as well. The sukka, metonymicallyrepresentingobservanceof Torah,separatesIsraelfrom the nations.In the finalreckoning,all pleas will be futile:only thosewho observe the Torahwill have a sharein the worldto come. New York University
New York,N.Y.
84. ySuk 2:10, 53c. RecallthatJonahfelt so uncomfortably hot in his sukkathathe longed for death(Jon4:8).
The Use of Midrash in Maimonides' "Guide of the Perplexed": Decoding the Duality of the Text Author(s): James A. Diamond Source: AJS Review, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1996), pp. 39-60 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Association for Jewish Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1486653 . Accessed: 11/07/2011 16:15 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup. . Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact
[email protected].
Cambridge University Press and Association for Jewish Studies are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to AJS Review.
http://www.jstor.org
THE USE OF MIDRASH IN MAIMONIDES' GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED: DECODING THE DUALITY OF THE TEXT by JAMESA. DIAMOND Introduction
In the introductionto his philosophicalmagnumopus, the Guideof the Perplexed,Maimonidesprovidesus with a rationalefor the compositionof this work as well as instructionsfor the targetedreaderon how to decipher its elusive and enigmatic style. Such devices as contradiction,diffuse and seemingly discordanttreatmentof subjectmatter,and deliberateruses are employed to accommodateboth halakhic legal constraintson the overt teachingof physics andmetaphysicsandthe wide intellectualdisparityof his potentialreaders.The sensitivenatureof the topicsto be exploreddemandsan unorthodoxpedagogythatbothilluminatesandconceals,allowingentranceto the qualifiedfew while excludingthosewho cannotcope withthe intellectual rigorsinvolved. Rabbinicstrictureprohibitsrevealinganythingmore of the Account of the Chariot(metaphysics)thanchapterheadings,and therefore Maimonidescautions,"my purposeis that the truthsbe glimpsedand then again be concealed so as not to oppose that divine purpose which has concealedfrom the vulgar among the people those truthsrequisitefor His apprehension."' Maimonides' treatise is addressedto readerswho find themselves in an existential quandarywhose only resolutionappearsto be an either/or 1. Daldlat al-hd'irrn, trans. by Shlomo Pines, The Guide of the Perplexed (Chicago, 1963),
introduction,p. 7. All referencesto this workwill be cited hereafteras Guide.
AJSReview21/1 (1996):39-60
39
40
JAMES A. DIAMOND
choicebetweenreligionandintellect.Thosewho haveachievedphilosophical sophistication"musthavefelt distressedby theexternalsof theLaw"plunging them into a "stateof perplexityand confusionas to whether[one] should follow his intellect,renouncewhathe knew concerningthe termsin question andconsequentlyconsiderthathe has renouncedthe foundationsof the Law or he shouldhold fast to his understanding of thosetermsandnot let himself be drawnon togetherwith his intellect . . . perceivingthathe had brought loss to himself and harmto his religion."2Maimonides'remedy,offeredin the Guide,is to expose the heterogeneousnatureof Scripture,whoseexternal layer is but a veil for deepertruthswhich, when discovered,will allow the faithfulrationalistto remaintrueto both his intellectandreligioustradition. Maimonidesrelatesthathe hadonce triedto composea commentarythat would"explainall the difficultpassagesin the midrashimwherethe external sense manifestlycontradictsthe truthanddepartsfromthe intelligible,"3 but had abortedthis undertakingbecausehe had concludedthatif "we should adhereto parablesand to concealmentof what ought to be concealedwe would not be deviatingfrom the primarypurpose.We would, as it were, have replacedone individualby anotherof the samespecies."4Realizingthat his endeavorwould promotefurtherconfusionratherthanthe clarityhe had hoped for, Maimonidesabandonedthe project,later to be replacedby the style andcontentof the presenttreatise,the Guide. In this paper I shall confine myself to Maimonides'use of midrash in the Guide and demonstratethat his expositions of many topics and issues in the Guide are implicitlyrootedin complex,multilayeredreadings of midrash.Upon the failure of his earlier attemptat a straightforward commentaryon midrash,Maimonidesoptedfor an approachthatwouldleave the simple understandingof the masses undisturbed,while accommodating the sensibilitiesof the philosophicallyinclined.It will be seen thatmidrash is subtly woven into the text of the Guideby way of directquotationand indirectreferenceso as to performthis deliberatebalancingact.
2. Ibid., pp. 5-6. 3. Ibid., p. 9. 4. Ibid., see also Maimonides' introduction to the tenth chapterof TractateSanhedrin(Perek Heleq) in his Commentary to the Mishnah, where he announces his intention to embark upon such a work, Mishnah im Perush Moshe ben Mainzon, trans. Heb. J. Kafih (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1964), vol. 4, p. 109.
MIDRASH IN GUIDE OF THEPERPLEXED
41
In his list of the seven causes of contradiction found in literary compositions,5 Maimonides designates contradictions in haggadah and midrash as sixth and seventh. The sixth results when an authorfails to detect a contradiction between two basic propositions which, after many premises, may lead to "contradictory or contrary" conclusions. More relevant to our study, however, is the seventh, which is not due to confused and sloppy writing but rather is a consciously planned literary device of concealment designed to exclude unsophisticated readers and prevent them from discovering its use in the text. The seventhcause. In speakingaboutvery obscuremattersit is necessaryto conceal some partsand to disclose others.Sometimesin the case of certain dictathis necessityrequiresthatthe discussionproceedon thebasisof a certain premise,whereasin anotherplacenecessityrequiresthatthediscussionproceed on the basis of anotherpremisecontradictingthe firstone. In such cases the the authoraccordingly vulgar must in no way be awareof the contradiction; uses some device to conceal it by all means. Midrash is the only genre that shares the seventh cause with the Guide. The only other works that might contain contradictions of the same type are the books of the prophets, but this possibility is left as a "matter for speculative study and investigation."6 Maimonides therefore considers several midrashic sources to be esoteric texts whose meaning suggests itself to the few but remains obscure to most. Since he adopts the same ploy in his own work, it would be reasonable to assume that those midrashim which are similarily crafted are of a more sophisticated type and address only the most attentive of readers. In addition, as the declared subject matter of the Guide is Ma'aseh Bre 'shit and Merkavah-domains which stretch the Jewish tradition's outermost limits of obscurity and mystery-midrashim quoted in the context of such discussions should themselves be intentionally obscure in the sense that they deal with or are related to the same sublime material. Those parts of the Guide which utilize midrash to further an argument or strengthen a proposition can only be understood when several layers of camouflage are stripped away so as to reveal the ultimate core of meaning. The combination of the text, deliberately adopting a method of contradiction, with a midrash, also texturized by contradiction, compels members of the 5. Guide, pp. 17-20. 6. Ibid., pp. 18-19.
JAMES A. DIAMOND
42
intelligentsia to devise a reading which provides access to the book's true meaning. At the same time, this complex strategy impedes access to the book by the masses. In what follows I shall demonstrate this thesis by analyzing three extracts from the Guide, each of which is constructed around a midrashic axis. All of these passages, when subjected to a detailed examination, will appear slightly skewed as a result of some incongruence which arises from the manner in which the midrash is incorporated into the text. This unorthodox use of midrash is meant only for the philosophically trained eye, obliquely guiding it to reexamine the midrash both in its own context and in the context of the Guide as a whole. The outcome is an increasingly profound reading which Maimonides deems, for one reason or another, would be detrimental to the simple piety of the masses. The thematic link between these passages is that each midrash is taken from Midrash Rabbah and forms the crux of a self-reflexive discourse about the nature and purpose of midrash itself. Shir Hashirim Rabbah 1:8 and the Parabolic Method Maimonides informs us at the start that the Jewish religion is practiced on various levels of the realm of intellect and thought in response to the equivocality of Scripture, "so that the multitude might comprehend them in accord with the capacity of their understanding and the weakness of their representationwhereas the perfect man ... will comprehendthem otherwise."7 The impossibility of an unequivocal narrativewhen discussing such obscure topics as the Account of the Beginning and the Account of the Chariot is illustrated by Solomon's maxim "That which was is far off and exceeding deep; who can find it out?" (Eccles. 7:24). Further on in the introduction, Maimonides quotes a midrash from Shir Hashirim Rabbah (1:8)8 that can be regarded as a direct response to the query in this verse, "who can find it out?" Solomon is portrayed as the inventor of the parabolic method, wherein the use of parables for the understanding of Scripture is likened to the joining of cords and ropes in order to draw up water from an exceedingly cold and deep well. Thus Solomon is credited with pioneering a method by which "the meaning of the words of the Torah would be understood."The image of 7. Ibid.,p. 9. 8. Midrash Rabbah Shir Hashirim, ed. S. Dunsk (Jerusalem, 1980).
MIDRASH IN GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED
43
drawing water (= knowledge) from a deep well soothes the Solomonic cry of despair at the prospect of unfathomable depths expressed in Ecclesiastes.9 Maimonides elaborates on this idea by citing another midrash in Shir Hashirim Rabbah which compares understandingTorah by means of parable to using light provided by worthless material to find a valuable lost article in a dark house. Just as the material that provides the light is worthless, "so the parable in itself is worth nothing but by means of it you can understand the words of the Torah." At first glance both midrashim seem to convey the basic proposition that a true understanding of Torah can only be achieved upon the realization that its structure is composed of an external layer of parable which conceals an internal essential truth. On closer scrutiny a number of "divergences"'1arise between the two which present us with the Guide's first instance of midrashic duality. A parallel deconstruction of the two midrashic texts reveals a study in contrasts rather than harmony. Well Parable 1. Discovery of meaning and attaining what was once unattainable (stringing cord together = Solomon's mashal methodology). 2. Constructionof method to decipher biblical text.
2. Deconstruction(lighting of material = dissipation of mashal to arrive at
3. Extolling virtue of mashal. 4. Watermetaphorsignifies message of biblical text. 5. Understandingconveyed by act of drinking.
meaning) 3. Worthlessnessof mashal. 4. Fire eliminatesouterlayer,unveiling inner meaningof Scripture. 5. Lighting of lamp is act of comprehension.
Pearl Parable 1. Recovery of what was once within grasp and lost (loss of pearl in house).
While the well parable vindicates the mashal as a vehicle ultimately leading to a comprehensive assimilation of meaning ("drinkingwater"), the 9. See the furtherinterpretation of Eccles. 7:24 in Guide1:34. 10. For a most insightfultheorythatwhatmanyscholarshave viewedas contradictions in the Guide are really "divergences"and not logical contradictions,see MarvinFox, "A New View of Maimonides'Methodof Contradictions," Annualof Bar-llanUniversity22-23, Moshe
Schwarcz Memorial Volume (1987).
44
JAMES A. DIAMOND
pearlparabledenigratesit as an aid thatmustbe dispensedwith in orderto gain clarity.Thatclarity,signifiedby distinguishinga pearlat a distancefrom amongsthouseholdobjects,would seem to indicatean apprehensioninferior to the one symbolizedby the actualingestingof fluid. Thejuxtapositionof these two midrashimreflectsa variegatedreadership demarcatedby differentapproachesto Scripture.The firstmidrashis directed at those who are philosophicallyadept enough to realize that a literal readingof Scripturecan only lead to such absurditiesas anthropomorphic images of the deity, and thereforeneed a justificationof the parableas a necessaryinstrumentof truth.The natureof the subjectmatter-an ultimately unknowabledeity-mandates thatScripturetakeliterarylicense of this kind in orderto convey its meaning. On the otherhand,the simple fundamentalist belief of the massesvalues the literal above all else, and thus the anthropomorphic God is exactly the one prescribedby Scripture.ForMaimonides,of course,this is tantamount to idolatry,"andwidely held beliefs of thiskindcanonly be dispelledby way of extremecorrectivemeasures.The antidoteis providedby the secondmidrash, with its radicalcall to discardthe parable/literalaltogetherand regardthe mashalas so muchdrossto be siftedout so thatthe truemeaningcanemerge. Althoughparablesarea valuablemediumof truth,as is madeclearby the firstmidrash,they have, in fact, led the multitudeinto gross error,whichthe secondmidrashattemptsto reversewith its derisivetone. Justas the golden mean,in the realmof ethics, can sometimesonly be achievedby resortingto the habituationof an extremetrait,"so the acquisitionof correctopinions,in the realmof thought,demandsparallelremedialaction. Theknowledgeobtainedwhentheparaboliccover(seeingfroma distance) is obliteratedis inferiorto thatarisingwhenit is preserved(ingesting)in that the multitudecan only aspireto a semblanceof the truth.This modicumof truthleaves them with certainindispensablenotionsof God (incorporeality, nonaffectation)describedas "mattersthatoughtto be inculcated,madeclear andexplainedto everyoneaccordingto his capacityandoughtto be inculcated in virtueof traditionalauthorityuponchilden,women,stupidones andthose of defectivenaturaldispositionjust as they adoptthe notionthatGod is one, 11. See Guide, p. 81, where the belief in corporealityis equatedwith the belief "in the non-existenceof the deity,in the associationof othergods with Himor in the worshipof other thanHe." 12. See MishnehTorah,HilkhotDe'ot 2:3-5.
MIDRASH IN GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED
45
thatHe is eternaland thatnone but He shouldbe worshipped."'3 Scripture's is the sole meansof communicatingGod's penchantfor anthropomorphisms existenceto the multitudewithoutrevealinganythingaboutHis essenceor the truerealityof His substance.Theassociationof theprivilegedfew withthefirst midrashis furthersubstantiatedby the next passagein which the water/well transforms imagerysurfaces,Guide1:30.A clever wordplayin the Targum'4 the verse "Withjoy shall ye drawwaterout of the wells of salvation"(Isa. 12:3) to "Withjoy shall you receive a new teachingfromthe chosenof the righteous."Wateris equatedwith knowledge,while the Hebrewterm for "wells,"ma'yene,is transformedto be "theequivalentof me'eyneha'edah: I mean therebythe notableswho are the men of knowledge.""The pairing of water/knowledgewith well/notablesin the contextof the lexicographical analysisof the term"eating"in 1:30reflectson the metaphoricusage of the very same imagesin our firstmidrashas alludingto the processof "notables" acquiring"knowledge." The final prooftextin this passage, "A word fitly spokenis like apples of gold in settingsof silver"(Prov.25:11), providesa synthesisfor the ideas expressedin the two precedingmidrashimby way of an expansiveimage of Scripture'sheterogeneousmeaning."Silver"correspondsto the external meaning,which is "usefulin many respects,amongwhich is the welfareof humansocieties,"while "gold,"the internalmeaning,"containswisdomthat is useful for beliefs concernedwiththe truthas it is."'6 The externalrepresentsthe moraland politicalfoundationsupon which societal welfare depends,whereas the internalconveys the purelyabstract and theoreticalgroundworknecessary for intellectualwelfare. These two meaningsare posited in additionto the starklyliteraland vulgarreading,17 and thereforethe second midrashcan be seen as proddingthe masses to 13. Guide I:35, p. 81.
14. The Aramaictranslation-cum-commentary of Isaiah. 15. Guide, p. 64.
16. Ibid.,p. 6. 17. Fora well-arguedthesiscallingfortheapplicationof thisanalysisto thecommandments as well as the narrative,see Josef Stern,"Maimonideson the Covenantof Circumcisionand the Unity of God,"in TheMidrashicImagination,ed. M. Fishbane(Albany:StateUniversity of New York Press, 1993), pp. 131-154, where Maimonides'explanationof circumcision thathe employsnot only for the "exemplifiesa mode of allegoricalor parabolicinterpretation narrativeportionsof Scripturebutalso the commandments" (p. 132;andsee esp. the discussion at pp. 146-150).
46
JAMESA. DIAMOND
bypass the face value altogetherin orderto arriveat the "silver,"the bread andbutterof interpersonalandintersocietalrelations.The intellectual,on the otherhand,is urgedto strivefor the "gold." Whereasthe masses can only achievethe silverby discardingthe vulgar meaning,the externalgold layeris attainablesolely by assimilatingthe silver, as "its externalmeaningalso ought to containin it somethingthatindicates to someone consideringit what is to be found in its internalmeaning."" The tension inherent in the first two midrashimis resolved by Proverbs 25:11, which sets up two observers,one whose view froma distanceleaves him with an illusion (althougha useful one), and one who can traversethe distanceanddiscernreality(thoughalwaysobscuredby the illusorydeviceof filligreework,indicatingthata clearknowledgeof God'sessenceis ultimately 19 unattainable). When the three introductoryverses of this passage (Hos. 12:11;Ezek. 17:2, 21:5) are subjectedto closer scrutiny,the choice of prooftextsfor the use of paraboliclanguageby the prophetsdoes not appearto be random.It is insteada carefullyconstructedendorsementof thetrivalentnatureof Scripture which has emergedthus far. When unraveled,the commonthreadbinding these three verses is that the truthsof Scriptureradiateout to respective audiences,satiatingtheir diverse intellectualcapacitieson one of the two levels of meaningbeyondthe bareliteral. The middleverse(Ezek. 17:2)signifiestheparadigmof parabolicexegesis in thatit introducesa chapterwhoseprophecyis markedby a dualitythroughout. It embodies a poetic fable which is subjectedto a dual interpretation, firston an earthlyplane and then on a divine one. As MosheGreenberghas pointedout, theprophecy: fableandinterpretation, twoeagles,twoplants, Dualitypervades two planesof agency(earthlyanddivine)doom two modesof punishment, and consolation.Withthis dualityagreesthe doublecommandwith whichthe
18. Guide,p. 12. 19. For an importantand controversialstudy on what can ultimatelybe known in the Maimonideansystem, see S. Pines, "The Limitationsof HumanKnowledgeAccordingto Al-Farabi,ibn Baja and Maimonides,"in Studiesin MedievalJewishHistoryand Literature, ed. I. Twersky(Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1979),pp. 82-109.
MIDRASH IN GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED
47
oracle opens: "pose a riddle(hidah)and tell a fable (mashal)"-an indication
thatmoreis herethanmeetstheeye.20
The schemataof this chapterin Ezekiel precisely complementsMaimonides'exegeticalhierarchyas follows: 1. Verses 1-10 = eagle parable= vulgarliteral,whichin itself has no useful purposeand is purepoetry.21 2. Verses 11-18 = firstlevel of interpretation, referringto politicalevents of the day involving earthlyentities Babylonand Egypt and consequences of breachingtreaties= silver/externalmeaning,concerning"welfareof humansocieties." sets up firstinterpretation 3. Verses19-21 = secondlevel of interpretation, of as a to realm of events itself ultimate truth-the earthly parablealluding divine, i.e., consequences of violating divine covenant= internal/gold which is wisdom "usefulfor beliefs concernedwith the truthas it is." The greatmedievalexegete David Kimhi'sdistinctionbetweenthe terms hidah and mashal is enlightening,in that it accountsfor why I thinkMaimonideschose this particularverse here:"A hidahis an obscuresayingfrom which somethingelse is to be understood,while a mashalis a likeningof one matterto another-so the mashal in which the king is likened to an eagle is at the same time a hidah, since none but the discerning(maskilim)can understand it."22 The leap from the vulgar to the first level, where moral and
politicallessons arederived,canandmustbe achievedby most.Advancement to the second stage of theoreticalspeculationregardingthe divine sphereis barredto all but the few (maskilim). If Ezekiel 17:2 is emblematicof the structureof paraboliclanguage,then the two otherverses relay the difficultywith whichthatlanguageis rendered comprehensible.Hosea 12:11, "Andby the ministryof the prophetshave I used similitudes,"portraysGod, in one sense, as bestowingthe allegorical methodupon the prophetsas a mode of communication.The ambiguityof 20. Moshe Greenberg,Ezekiel1-20, AnchorBible (GardenCity,N.Y.:Doubleday,1983), p. 317. 21. For Maimonides'opinion of those who view Scriptureas poetryor history,see his scolding of the "learnedman"who propoundeda challengeto the logic of the Eden story; Guide1:2,p. 24. 22. Kimhi, Commentary,on Ezekiel 17:2.
48
JAMESA. DIAMOND
the Hebrewtermfor "haveI used similitudes"('adamneh) allows for another sense which the midrash23 and some medievalexegetes taketo mean"I have assumedlikenesses."24 This wordplay and midrashicgloss would most certainlyhave been familiar to Maimonides and may explain his preferencefor the Hosea passage in this context. The elasticity of the phraseconjuresup an image of two very distinctdomains-one, privateand self-contained,playingitself out wholly within the confines of the mind ("likenesses")of the prophet and the other,public andaccessible,revealed (i.e., philosopher/intellectual), in the prophet'spopularpronouncements("similitudes"). The "similitudes" are the means whereby the theoreticalformulationsconceived within the prophet'smind ("likenesses")are relayed to the public, albeit in a very distilledfashion.25 Hosea 12:11 thus establishestwo poles of humanitywhose only hope of is by way of the parable.Ezekiel 17:2 affordsus a typology rapprochement of this literarydevice as a model for studyingit. The thirdverse, "They say of me: Is he not a makerof parables?"(Ezek. 21:5), when examined contextually,reveals the failings of the parabolicdevice in actualpractice and how they can be overcomein orderto salvagethe originalintentof the parable. The sequence of the narrativesurroundingthe verse commenceswith a propheticvision to Ezekiel consisting of a parablein which a fire is ignited,consumingan entireforest;both fresh and dry trees are destroyed, and the fire is inextinguishable.The prophetprotestsin 21:5 thatthe people will not acknowledgethis as an authenticpropheticvision forewarningan impendinghistoricaldisasterand will simply accusehim of being a spinner of riddles and fables. God respondsby renderingthe prophecyas explicit as possible with regardto the imminentdestructionof IsraelandJerusalem, whose consequenceswill be indiscriminatelywreakedon bothrighteousand wicked. Ezekiel21:5, therefore,is the instrumental versewithina dramaticdevelopmentthat Maimonidesutilizedas a metaphorfor whathad unfortunately 23. See Pesikta Rabbati, trans. W. G. Braude (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 33:11. 24. See the commentaries of Rashi and Rabbi Joseph Kara to this verse. 25. For the precise intellectual machinations involved in the prophetic process, see Guide 1I:36-38, where the "true reality and quiddity of prophecy" is detailed, pp. 369-378.
MIDRASH IN GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED
49
become the popularattitudetowardallegory.The prophetrealizes that the people will not see past the poetry-past the vulgar and literal-and this ultimatelyundermineshis authorityas a messengerof God. The parable is to be dispensedwith altogetherand the people must be confrontedwith the unmediatedpolitical and social ramifications,which we have marked as the external/silvermeaningof the originalparable.Only then will they understand. This verse, which portraysthe people as unable and/orunwilling to transcendthe face value of the allegoricalsymbolism,providesthe rationale for what we have demonstratedto be the moralof the second midrash,in which the mashal is deemedto be worthless.The devaluationof the mashal is a drasticmeasureto allay the fear expressedin the prophet'sfrustrated plea thatthe people will only view him as a "makerof parables"andnot as a harbingerof the practicaland theoreticaltruthsimplicitin his visions. In summary,our analysis thus far has revealed this passage in the Guide to be a carefully craftedargument,constructedby manipulationof scripturalverse andmidrash.The argumentproposesa hierarchyof scriptural interpretationwhich parallelsa pyramid-shapedmodel of humanintellect. Ultimatemeaninglies within the exclusive domainof the superiorintellect. Inferioryet necessarytruthsare aimedat those less capable.For the former all planes of interpretation(poetic,practical-ethical, theoretical)coexist in a of truth that if would one complexgrid collapse any componentwas lacking. For the latterthe grid must be disassembledso thatonly whatMaimonides calls the externalmeaningsurvives,while the literalis sacrificedaltogether and the theoreticalremainsout of reach. When the subtleinterplayof midrashandverseis noted,a passagein the Guidewhichat firstsightadvancesthe simplepropositionthatScripturerelies heavilyon parablesas its parlanceis rendereda morecomplexargumentabout suchthingsas thenatureof parabolicparlance,authorialintentandmotivation, andcompositereadership.The stimulusfor this readingis the incongruityof the two midrashimregardingthe role of parablein recovery/discovery of the which then recasts the and verses scripturalmessage, preceding subsequent from simple prooftextsinto a "genericpattern(causing)the verses to speak with each other and a kind of axiological code by which we can read the
50
JAMESA. DIAMOND
The readerto whomMaimonidesis reachingoutwill discern juxtaposition."26 of Scripture-"hermeneutic the patternleadingto a trueunderstanding keys to the unlockingof the hermeticTorah"27-whileotherswill be obliviousto it, gainingonly very restrictedaccess to Scripture'struths. GenesisRabbah9 and Flash Technique Anotherreason that compels Maimonidesto adopt this writing style, particularlyrelated to his use of midrash,is implicit in the natureof the subjectmatter(Ma'aseh Bre'shitandMa'asehMerkavah),whichobliges all who have gained any knowledge of it to transmitit to othersby way of "flashes":"every man endowed with knowledgewho has come to possess of somethingpertainingto those secrets,eitherthroughhis an understanding own speculationor throughbeing conductedtowardthis by a guide must indubitablysay something.It is, however,forbiddento be explicit aboutit. He mustaccordinglymakethe secretappearin flashes."28 Maimonides'preferencefor the types of midrashwhich he employs in the compositionof his treatiseis expressedin termsof flashes:"Manysuch flashes,indications,andpointersoccurin the sayingsof the Sages, maytheir memorybe blessed,butthese sayingsaremixedup withthe sayingsof others and with sayings of anotherkind. For this reason you will find that with regardto these mysteries,I always mentionthe single saying on which the matteris based,while I leave the restto thosewhomit befitsthattheseshould be left to them."29 Only midrashimwhich conform with the stricturesagainstdisclosing such sensitive materialby theirusage of "flashes,indicationsand pointers" in place of clearexpositionwill be incorporated intoMaimonides'treatiseon these matters.Therefore,as we have alreadyseen, a referenceto a midrashin the Guideshouldalmostalways piqueour attentionto a cautiousreadingof a text thatis purposefullyrestrainedandambiguousregardingits message. 26. See David Boyarin, Intertextuality and the Reading of Midrash (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 32, and especially the chapter on Song of Songs, pp. 105-116, where he discusses Shir Hashirint Rabbah 1:8. 27. Ibid., p. 107. 28. Guide 11:29, p. 347. 29. Ibid.
MIDRASH IN GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED
51
Indeed,the very midrashwhich provokedthe discussionin 11:29is itself a case study in flash pedagogy.GenesisRabbah9 is adducedas supportfor the prohibitionagainstthese esotericmatters:"As fromthe beginningof the book up to here, the glory of God requiresto concealthe thing."'"Here the midrashrelates a verse from Proverbs25:2 calling for concealmentto the scripturalaccountof the firstdays of creation.At firstglance,thisis simplya rabbinicendorsementof the confidentialnatureof esoterictopics. However, if we importmeaningsthat Maimonidesspecificallyassignedelsewhereto the term"gloryof God"(kavod),the midrashthenflashessignalsthathave a differentconnotation. Kavodcan equivocallysignify eitherGod's"essenceandtruereality"or "thehonouringof Him by all men.""HonoringGod, Maimonidescontinues, is directlyproportionalto the extentto whichone apprehends Him,and"Man in particularhonoursHim by speechesso thathe indicatestherebythatwhich he has apprehendedby his intellectandcommunicatesit to others.""' Beings incapableof apprehensionhonor God only indirectly,simply by inspiring passively "him who considers them to honour God either by means of articulateutteranceor withoutit if speechis not permitted."" Thereappears to be an inconsistencyin this line of thought.HonoringGod is synonymous with apprehendingHis essence and communicatingit to others.Surelysuch apprehensionfalls underthe rubricof metaphysics,whichis prohibitedfrom being revealed.Ultimatelyapprehensionmustlead to silence, whichfails to Honorcannot qualify for the "honor"as definedhere of "communication." materializeout of muteness. The resolution of this inconsistencymay very well lie in the dualvoicedness of Genesis Rabbah 9. Proverbs25:2 is not only a directive regulatingfutureattemptsto convey thismaterialbutis also descriptiveof the Genesiscreationnarrative.The narrativein Genesisis itself a "concealment" in consonancewith the glory of God, i.e., thereis a type of languagewhich conforms with the prohibitionagainst direct instruction,and that is the languageof parable. Maimonidesmay have had two reasonsfor not being overly explicit on this issue. First,by posing Scriptureas a modelfor all futurecommunications 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 1:64, pp. 156-157.
32. Ibid. 33. Ibid.
52
JAMES A. DIAMOND
regardingphysics and metaphysics,the implicationfollows that the Torah intentionallyconceals truthsfrom the masses (which was left moot in the Second, the definitionof kavod, when combinedwith this introduction).34 midrash,allows for very little hope thatthe vast majorityof peoplecan ever aspireto honorGod. They cannotapprehendGod;they cannotbe taughtby scholars;and the book to which they turnfor guidanceon all aspectsof their lives intentionallywithholdsthe truthfromthem. This extremelycynical and pessimisticstanceis somewhatmodifiedby the use of a midrashthatcan be viewed univocallyas simplyinstructivefor thefutureor,upondeeperreflectionandfamiliaritywiththe Guideas a whole, as a self-glossing discourseon the natureof Scriptureitself. Only the few shouldbe privy to Scripture's who have the prerequisiterigoroustraining35 hiddenagenda. Anotherof Maimonides'evasive techniquesis the art of omission. As with the passagein 11:29,ambiguityor inconsistencyshouldalarmthe reader to crosscheckany midrashicor scripturalquotationwith its originalsource. The omissionof partof the relevantreferenceor its contextoftenprovidesa key to Maimonides'trueintent.In 11:29,only the firsthalfof Proverbs25:2 is quoted,whereasthe entireverse is reproducedin GenesisRabbahandreads thus:"It is the glory of God to conceal a thing,but the glory of kings is to searchout a matter"In the originalmidrash,each half of the versebecomes a referentfor differentportionsof the Genesiscreationaccount. The first half characterizesthe creationnarrativeup to Genesis 1:31, concludingwith the creationof man,an accountwhich mustbe shroudedin obscurity.The secondhalf informsthenarrativethatfollows,callingfor study andclarity.This omissionaffordsa liberalreadingof the verseas coloredby the midrashbut outsidethe strictconfinesof its originalexegesis. ForMaimonides,the opposingpartsof the versereflectthe dichotomyof scripturallanguageandhumanintellect.Bothpartsreferto the samecreation account,requiringconcealmentandrevelationat the sametime.The essence ("glory")and truerealityof God are ultimatelyconcealed,but it is the duty of those who are capable("kings")36to investigatethis matterinsofaras it is 34. Ibid., p. 19-"whether contradictions due to the seventh cause are to be found in the books of the prophets is a matter for speculative study and investigation." 35. For a description of a worthy disciple, see ibid., p. 3-the Epistle Dedicatory to Joseph. 36. See Gersonides' comment on this verse, which symbolizes the intellectual faculty as "king," and also Maimonides in his Mishneh Torah, Laws of Repentance 8:4, where "crowns on heads" are equated with "knowledge" in the imagery of the "world to come."
MIDRASH IN GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED
53
intellectuallypossible. Scripture'sparabolicAccountof the Creationdeters most from its mysteriesbut encouragesthe few to searchon for its inner truth. Genesis 1:31, the lead verse of Genesis Rabbah9:1, is instrumentalin the sifting out of Maimonides'message. For Maimonides,the words "And God saw everythingthatHe made,andbehold,it was very good"definethe goodnessthatwas revealedto Moses in responseto his pleafor knowledgeof God's ways andglory.Moses' requestto be shownGod'sglorywas rebuffed as unattainableby any humanbeing. InsteadGod'sgoodnesswas revealedas the apex of humanintellectualcapacity,which"alludesto the displayto him of all existing thingsof which it is said, 'AndGod saw everything... it was very good.' By theirdisplay,I meanthathe will apprehendtheirnatureand the way they are mutuallyconnectedso thathe will know how He governs them in generaland in detail."37 The terms "glory"and "goodness"in this context are contrastingintellectualgoals, the formerunachieveable,the latterto be strivenfor. This juxtapositionmustbe importedintoananalysisof GenesisRabbah9 as quoted in 11:29,andperfectsits readingfor the few as formulatedby Maimonides.38 Following our analysis, the mechanismfor decoding the meaningof this passagecan be tracedas follows: 1. Contextuallydissonantuse of midrash(GenesisRabbah9:1) motivates the searchfor hiddenmeaning. 2. Discoveryof partialomissionof operativeversequotedby midrash(Prov. 25:2) and variantformulationof midrashby Maimonides. 3. Lead verse (Gen. 1:31) assumes significationsassigned to it in other chaptersof Guide. 4. Derivationof meaningby intendedaudienceregardingpossibleandimpossible formsof knowledge("goodness"and"glory");languageof Scripture (concealment);mediumof instruction(concealment/parable). 5. Intermeshingof midrashwith discourseon natureof midrash("flashes") resultsin intratextualillustrationof "flash"technique. 37. Guide1:54,p. 124; see also p. 453. 38. See also ibid. 11:30,pp. 353-354, wherethe expression"it was good"pronouncedby God in the creationnarrativehas an associationwith externalutilitarianmeaningand inner hiddenmeaning.
JAMES A. DIAMOND
54
GenesisRabbah27 and PropheticRadicalism Anotherinstanceof the interplaybetweenmidrashandtextualdissertation regardingsome aspect of the natureof midrashitself occursin Guide1:46, wherethe midrash'spreferencefor anthropomorphisms is rationalized.This is attributedto its mimickingof propheticterminology,"Forthis reasonyou will find thatin the whole of the Talmudandin all the Midrashimthey keep The sages felt secure to the externalsense of the dicta of the prophets."39 that their adoptionof this style could not possibly lead to error,since it is so obviously self-evidentthat it is not be takenliterally,"becauseof their knowledgethatthe matteris safe fromconfusionandwithregardto it no error is to be fearedin any respect:all the dictahave to be consideredas parables and as a guidanceconductingthe mind towardone being."40 A midrashis quoted in supportof this thesis: "Greatis the power of the prophets;for they liken a form to its creator;for it is said: 'And uponthe likenessof the thronewas the likeness as the appearanceof man' (Ezek. 1:26)."41The sheer audacityinvolvedin describingGod corporeallyis sufficientproof"thatthey were innocentof the belief in the corporealityof God;and furthermore that all the shapesand figuresthatare seen in the vision of prophecyare created things." To corroborateMaimonides'understandingof the phrase"greatis the power"(gadolkohan),a passagefromtheTalmudis quotedwhereina similar figureof speech constitutesa commenton the seeminglyshockingactionof a rabbiwho performedthe act of halisah (takingoff a shoe to avoid levirate marriage)with a slipperand at night.42"Anotherrabbisaid thereupon:How greatis his strengthto have done it alone.""Howgreatis his strengthmeans how great is his power" Upon closer examinationof the originaltalmudicsource,a startlingdiscrepancyemergesbetweenthe phrase'scontextualmeaningandthe meaning which Maimonidesis purportedlysubstantiating.Regardlessof any textual variantsor emendations,43 the logical progressionof this talmudicpericope can only lead to the conclusionthat the phraseis sarcasticallymeantto be 39. Ibid., p. 102. 40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.,p. 103. 42. T.B., Yebamot 104a. 43. See Pines's note 50 on this point.
MIDRASH IN GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED
55
a declarationof disapprovalof the actions at hand.44An expressionwhich Maimonidesarguesis one of praiseand appreciationis curiouslyverifiedby one conveying denigrationand mockery.Once again the cautiousreaderis alertedto an alternativeapproachto the midrashby an incongruitywhich could not have escapedMaimonides'attention. The solution to this conundrumlies in the multiprongedstrategyof the Guidedemonstratedthusfar.Successin addressingthe multitudeis measured in terms of the extent to which they can be jolted out of their traditional acceptanceof propheticandrabbinicteachingsat face value,therebyrejecting corporealismsand gaining closer proximityto a monotheisticbelief. This is accomplishedby a reductioad absurdumargumentimplicitin the "greatis the power"midrash. The perfect man, however, realizes that any particularsection of the Guidecan only be graspedin termsof the totalityof the treatise,"connecting its chaptersone with another. . . and also to graspeach word thatoccurs in it in the course of the speech even if that word does not belong to the intentionof the chapter.Forthe dictionof thisTreatisehas notbeenchosenat Forhim,each haphazardbutwith greatexactnessandexceedingprecision."45 wordof the quotedmidrashand its talmudiccounterpart gains a significance its context and attracts a network of allusions,definitions, .beyond specific andexpositionsthatare scatteredthroughoutthe treatise. Those who have "philosophizedand have knowledge of the true sciences"46are aware that it is philosophicallyunacceptableto describe God in positive terms, as the prophets and rabbis have done. On the other hand, the alternativeof utter silence and mutenessregardingdivine science would leave both the masses and the elite in a void bereft of the guidanceandinstructionrequiredin regardto suchfundamentalmatters.The intellectuallysophisticatedreader,therefore,will be promptedto anotherlevel of understandingthe "greatis the power"midrashvia the hiddenmessageof its talmudicprooftext.The referenceto leviratemarriageandhalisahconjures up Maimonides'theoreticalformulationselsewherein the Guide,suggesting thatthe formof the Torah'snarrativeandlegal componentsis, in a sense, the lesser of two evils necessitatedby the unpalatablealternativeof silence. 44. See Rashi's commentary on this expression, n. 40. 45. Guide, p. 15.
46. Ibid.,p. 10.
56
JAMES A. DIAMOND
1:26 is the operative chapterdeliberatingon the anthropomorphically chargednarrativesegmentsof the Torah,whichare governedby the maxim, "TheTorahspeakethin the languageof men."Corporealattributesconvey the basic notionsof existence and perfectionto a generalpublicwhose only frame of referenceis the physical world, "as the multitudecannotat first conceive of any existence save that of a body alone,"and "everythingthat the multitudeconsidera perfectionis predicatedof Him even if it is only a perfectionof relationto ourselves."47 111:32is the complementaryanalogueto the 1:26 argumentwith regard to the Torah'slegislative component.The rationaleit offers for much of the legislative content is divine recognitionof humannature'sweakness and generalresistanceto suddenand radicalchange.The law is motivated by primaryand secondaryintentions,the latteraimed at mutualabolition of wrongdoingand correctnessof beliefs, and the former at intellectual apprehensionof God. Thus we are presentedwith a tripartitestructure of scripturallaw which exactly parallelswhat we have seen of scriptural narrative. = formalaspectof law. 1. Literal/superficial 2. External= correctbeliefs and moral-ethicalguidance. 3. Internal= trueapprehensionof the deity. The externalformalaspectof the law, at its moststarkandobviouslevel, means nothing. It is simply a concession to humanfrailty,"for a sudden transitionfrom one oppositeto anotheris impossible .... therefore,He may be exalted,sufferedthe above mentionedkindsof worshipto remain[animal sacrifice]but transferredthem from createdor imaginaryand unrealthings to His own name."48Maimonidesdescribesthe outerform of the law as a "divineruse"designed to establishGod's oneness and existence,"whileat the same time the souls had no feeling of repugnanceand were not repelled becauseof the abolitionof modesof worshipto whichtheywereaccustomed andthanwhich no othermode of worshipwas knownat thattime."49 Justas therewas no otherlanguagewith whichGod could be discussed, as pointed out in 1:26, so there was no other legal modalitywhose praxis 47. Ibid.,p. 56. 48. Ibid., p. 526. 49. Ibid., p. 527.
MIDRASH IN GUIDE OF THEPERPLEXED
57
could lead to the same refinednotionsof God. "Inanticipationof what the soul is naturallyincapableof receiving,[God]prescribe[d]the laws thatwe have mentionedso that the first intentionshould be achieved,namely the apprehensionof Him."soThoughmuchof this discussioncenterson animal sacrifice,it can be read as an overallprefaceto the sectiondealingwith the rationalefor the commandmentsandinformsthatentirediscussion.Its thesis is applicableto the categoryof rituallaw in general. Criticalfor our purposesis the concludingparagraphof 111:32,where Maimonidesfortifieshis previousdiscussionwith a midrashreportingthatat the watersof Marah,just afterthe exodus fromEgypt,therewas a revelation of a "firstlegislation,"' i.e., "TheSabbathandthe civil laws wereprescribed at Marah."52 Maimonidesclassifies this revelationas one of "firstintentionconcerned solely with correctopinionsas witnessedby the Sabbath(creationof world in time) and the civil laws (abolitionof mutualwrongdoing)"; "Accordingly it is alreadyclear to you that in the firstlegislationtherewas nothingat all concerningburntofferings and sacrificesfor as we have mentioned,these belong to second intentions."53 Obviously, the perfect law is one which confinesitself to firstintentionsandis not dilutedby inferiorsecondaryones. For Maimonides,then,the legislationpromulgatedat Marahis paradigmatic of this superlativelaw untaintedby formalritualconformingto a defective humancharacteristic. The contrastof first and second legislationsis indeedradicalwhen one considersthatMarahprecededthe Sinaitictheophany.The trulyutopianlaw, it indicates,is not the one emergingfromSinaiandpresentlyextantbutrather a pre-Sinaiticideal whichneverfully materializeddueto the reasonsoutlined above. If not for the exigencies of humannature,the finaldraft,as it were,of the Torah,as presentedat Sinai,wouldhavebeensuperfluous.1:26and111:32 forma sustainedargumentthatthe legacyof Sinaiis, in effect,a compromise. As a result, the religious intellectualis faced with an ongoingchallengeto recoverits originalpristineintentionsaimedat the apprehension of the deity. In the passage under consideration,the inconsistencyof the talmudic prooftexton leviratemarriageprecipitatesa revisedreadingof the "greatis 50. 51. 52. 53.
Ibid. Ibid.,pp. 530-531. B.T., Shabbath87b. See above, n. 49.
JAMESA. DIAMOND
58
the power"midrashin which the aggregateof theseideasplantedthroughout the treatiseconverge.The authenticstudentof Maimonidesis directedto the rationalefor leviratemarriagefoundin 111:49,54which is uniqueamongthe variousreasonsfor othercommandmentsin thatit validatesa customwhich antedatesSinai; "As for the reason for the levirateit is literallystated [in Scripture]thatthis was an ancientcustomthatobtainedbeforethe giving of the Torahand thatwas perpetuatedby the Law." The escape routefor avoidingleviratemarriageis halisah;accordingto Maimonides,this is a demeaningprocessprovidingan incentiveto perform the levirate.The reasonprovidedfor this commandment disruptsthe pattern of the section dealing with the rationalizationof the commandments.No actualreasonis offeredfor its utilityas eitherpromotinga moralqualityor rightopinion or combatingan idolatrouspractice."Instead,thereis simply an appealto some long-standingtraditionof the Torahwhich is considered sufficientfor its beingadoptedby andenshrinedin the Law.A comprehensive analysis of this commandmentwould requirea separatestudy,but what is importantfor our purposesis the significationit wouldbringto the mindof an attentivereadersearchingfor a key to a difficultpassagewithinwhich a referenceis made. seeminglyinappropriate For Maimonides'true disciples, armedwith the hints and clues interspersedthroughoutthe Guide,the midrashat handwouldemergein a subtly nuancedform.In one sense, the expression"greatis the power"trulypraises the prophetsfor their ability to createa languagewherelanguageis sorely inadequate.In quiteanothersense, the very sameexpressionis criticalof the propheticchoice of languagewhen cast in light of the commentselsewhere aboutleviratemarriage.The latterreferentprovidesthe intersectingpointfor the conclusionwhichmustbe drawnfromsuchdisparatechaptersas 1:26and 111:32meldingtogetherin our passagein 1:46. This critiqueis bolsteredby what we have seen to be the connotations raisedby the levirateas emblematicof the law lookingbackto andembracing its antecedents.The "likeningof a form to its creator"is not the ideal and is reallya utilitariansubmissionto the weaknessof the humanintellect.The intellectualwill be compelledto aspireto somepristinelevel of understanding beyondthelanguageof theprophets.Thatlevel is one whichpropheticspeech, as embodiedin the corpusof Scripture,cannotcapture(possiblythe realm 54. Guide,p. 603. 55. Ibid. 111:35.
MIDRASH IN GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED
59
of pureabstractspeculation).The demandsof religiousobservancefor most and of philosophicaltruthfor the few dictatethat propheticdiscoursewill attractboth praiseand criticism.The astutereadercan detectbothnotionsin this midrash,while those not philosophicallyinclinedwill remainwith the former.The notion that the Torahis not the ideal in the sense demonstrated would be too radicalfor the masses to absorband yet continueto remain faithfulto its content. MarvinFox's solutionto the "contradiction" of maintainingboththe duty to pray and the denial of divine attributeswithin the same Maimonidean system is most apropos our problem as it deals with identical opposing demands.The doctrine of divine attributesis at odds with the traditional notion of prayer.Maimonidesdid not wish to explicitlyrejectthe latterin favorof the former,for fear thatunphilosophicalbutpiousreaderswouldnot be able to cope. Instead,he synthesizedthe alternativesinto a systemwhich enunciates theidealof a formof worshipthatmakesnouseof language, buthe alsorecognizesthatthispresentsanimpossible demandnotonlyforcommon His solutionis to retainboththelanguage people,butevenfor philosophers. of worshipandthetruthaboutdivineattributes withina singlesystem.These elementsof the systemlive in dialectical tension,andit is a greatartto keep themin balance.56 The same "balancingact" must be performedby the religiousphilosopher who appreciatesboth the skillfulnessof propheticimageryandthe natureof its sublimesubtext. Conclusion We have seen thatMaimonidesadoptsa creativestrategywithrespectto the use of midrashand the mannerin whichhe incorporatesit into his work. The questionas to how Maimonidescould feel comfortableabouttreating reveredand esteemedrabbinicutteranceswith so muchinterpretivelatitude canbe answeredby reflectingon whattypeof literaturehe consideredmidrash to be. In responseto thosewho holdthatmidrashcapturesthetruemeaningof biblical texts or is equal in statusto traditionallegal decisions,Maimonides 56. Fox, "New View of Maimonides' Method of Contradictions,"p. 76.
60
JAMESA. DIAMOND
declaresthatit has "thecharacterof poeticalconceitswhose meaningis not At thattime this method obscurefor someoneendowedwith understanding. was generallyknown and used by everybodyjust as the poets use poetical expression.""'Midrashis poetry, a genre that by definitionstretchesthe bounds of conventionallanguageto embracethe poet's personalthoughts. Accordingto Maimonides,this artwas at one time generallyrecognizedfor whatit was, and he is simply reintroducingits authenticrootsto his readers. The rabbisthemselvesset the stage for Maimonides'methodologywith their "poeticalconceits," which were never intendedto be static authoritative texts that manifestedthe correct meaningof scripturaltexts. Midrash,as "witty"poetry,has a malleabilitynot availablewithdoctrinaireteachingslike halakhah.For this reasonit is a suitablecandidatefor the kindof liberaland ambiguoususage Maimonidesemploys in the labyrinthineundertakingthat constitutesthe Guideof the Perplexed. Ont. Toronto,
57. Guide,p. 573.
Between Metaphysical and Liberal Pluralism: A Reappraisal of Rabbi A. I. Kook's Espousal of Toleration Author(s): Tamar Ross Source: AJS Review, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1996), pp. 61-110 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Association for Jewish Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1486654 . Accessed: 11/07/2011 16:16 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup. . Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact
[email protected].
Cambridge University Press and Association for Jewish Studies are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to AJS Review.
http://www.jstor.org
BETWEENMETAPHYSICAL AND LIBERALPLURALISM: A REAPPRAISALOF RABBI A. I. KOOK'S ESPOUSALOF TOLERATION by TAMARROSS Much has been said and written about the unique position regarding tolerationthat was adoptedby RabbiAbrahamIsaac Kook.'Its uniqueness within Jewish traditionis not open to doubt.The questionI would like to explore here is the extent to which his version of tolerationis compatible with the tolerationthat has become partof the modernsecularoutlook.In orderto accomplishthis task, I begin by settingup a typologyof two basic varietiesof toleration,relatingone to the skepticismof the relativistwho espousesliberalpluralism,and the otherto religioussystemswith absolutist claims for truth.In the second partof the article,a sketchof the historyof tolerationin Judaism,this typologyis confirmed.The thirdpartof the article is a review of R. Kook'snotionof toleration,whichseems at firstto conform to the type of tolerationgenerally associated with liberalism,but, when translatedinto practicalpolicy, displays some significantaberrations.The 1. Binyamin'Ish-Shalom,"Toleranceand Its TheoreticalBasis in the Teachingof Rabbi Kook"(Hebrew),Daat 20 (Winter1988): 151-168; BinyaminEfrati,Sanegoriya(Seeingthe GoodSide) in the Teachingof R. Kook(Hebrew)(Jerusalem:MosadHaravKook, 1959);Zvi Yaron,ThePhilosophyof R. Kook(Hebrew)(Jerusalem:JewishAgency TorahDept., 1974), pp. 323-373; EliezerSchweid,Judaismand the SolitaryJew (Hebrew) chap. 12: "Toleration," (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1975), chap. 3: "Secularismfrom a ReligiousPerspective-R. Kook's Teaching,"pp. 178-192.
AJS Review 21/1 (1996): 61-110
61
62
TAMARROSS
fourthpartsuggeststhatthese aberrationsarenot evidenceof inconsistencies or anomalies,but ratheran indicationof the fact thatno attitudeof toleration, even that of the most liberal pluralist,can completelyevade the necessity for intoleranceat some point; and that differentviews regardingthe point wheretolerationshouldbe limitedreflectdifferentepistemologicalpositions, each of which is associatedwith a differentsocietal ideal which serves as the criterionfor limiting toleration.The fifth part is an expositionof the peculiarlyreligious version of epistemologicalrelativismthat sustainsR. Kook's position. The sixth part discusses the criteriafor practicalpolicy thatfollow from this epistemologicalview, when compoundedby R. Kook's views of nationalismand the natureof religiousbelief in the messianicage, and demonstratesthe resultantdivergencefrom more radicalversions of individualistpluralism.The seventhand final partcontendsthatR. Kook's version of tolerationtends more towarda communitarian ideal of society but that even this compatibilityis limited. The discussionconcludeswith an assessmentof what neverthelessdoes constitutean originalattemptat with the phenomenonof modernsecularpluralism. rapprochement 1. Typologyof Toleration PrudentialTolerationandIdeologicalToleration The virtueof tolerationhas become one of the centraltenetsof modem Westernsociety. Disputingits value has come to be regardedas tantamount to opposing mother'smilk and apple pie. But "toleration"often serves as a catch-alltitle for a wide varietyof positions.In orderto understandthe precise natureof each of these, and the extent to which they are related, it would be worthwhileto first take a hardlook at the notionof toleration in general, and its relationshipto pluralism,paternalism,and relativismin These termsareoftenusedinterchangeably, thusstringingtogether particular. a clusterof relatedbut disparateideas. Introducinga few initialobservations and distinctionswould make it possible to avoid some of the conceptual confusionsand ambiguitiesreflectedin the everydayusage of these terms, andpreventmuddinesswhen drawingcomparisons.2 2. I owe specialthanksto Avi Sagie, who at the eleventhhourof my writingkindlyshared with me the manuscriptof his forthcomingarticle,"TheJewishReligion:Tolerationand the
ANDLIBERALPLURALISM BETWEEN METAPHYSICAL
63
The firstpointto be noted3is thatanynotionof toleration necessarily involvesbotha positiveanda negativeresponseto its object.Thepositive elementconsistsof a willingnessto endure,or putupwith,thatobject.The in some negativeelementis thefactthatthiswillingnessmustbe half-hearted an wish that were different. and sense, by underlying things accompanied One method But thereare varyingdegreesof acceptanceor disapproval. is to establishthe of distinguishing betweendifferentvarietiesof toleration is involved.Toleration relativeweightof thepositiveandnegativeattitudes exhibitedin its purestsensewhenthetworesponsesareequallystrong,thus thelevelof tensionbetweenthematits mostintense. rendering in In ordinarydiscourse,however,tolerationis sometimesunderstood a very mild sense, when the tensionis muchweaker.This weaknessis exhibitedwheneitherthe positiveor the negativeresponseis appreciably Thisis whatoccurs,for example,on one endof the scale, moredominant. whenwhatpassesfor tolerationis reallylackof option,i.e., a positionof situationor to preventor completepowerlessnessto alteran undesirable Attheotherendof hindersomethinghated,whichperforcemustbe endured. wouldclaimit to be merely thescaleis lackof objection(whoseopponents to thefactthat a coverformoralweakness);4 i.e., an attitudeof indifference in of think act a and The former variety conflictingways. people position is closerto intolerancethanto toleration,becausethe positiveelementof acceptancewoulddisappearthe momentthatthis was possible.The latter positionhardlyqualifiesas tolerationat all, becausethe negativeelement, or practical to the extentit exists, stemssimplyfromany inconvenience for in or matters of thatdiffer entailed taste difficulty makingspace lifestyles for fromour own, thusshadinginto the positionof the radicalanarchist, whomall opinionsareequallyvalid. of the powerless(whichwe Situatedbetweenthe grudgingendurance shall label Position1) and the neutralityor indifference of the anarchist levels,both (whichwe shalllabelPosition4) lie at leasttwo intermediate Possibilityof Pluralism."His elegantly drawnapparatushelped me to sharpenand amplify upon some of my own distinctions,which are similarto his, but allow for greateroverlap betweenpluralismand toleration. 3. As has been done by Jay Newman, "The Idea of Religious Tolerance,"American PhilosophicalQuarterly15, no. 3 (July 1978): 187, and by P. F. Strawson,Freedomand Resentment(London:Methuen,1974), chap.4: "TheLimitsof Toleration," p. 43. 4. See Newman,"Ideaof ReligiousTolerance,"p. 194.
64
TAMARROSS
of which qualify more accuratelyas bona fide varietiesof toleration.In the contextof politicaldiscussions,these levels have been loosely characterized as "maximalist"and "minimalist"varietiesof liberalism.5The criteriafor distinguishingbetween these two positions relate to the relativedegree in which they embrace pluralism(i.e., the promotionof a wide variety of alternatives-ideas, values,or lifestyles)as an intrinsicvalue.Thisdifference exhibitsitself eitherin the motivefor toleration,theobjectof toleration,or the extent of self-restraintmandated(or, conversely,the degreeof interference condoned). Motive.The differentmotives of Positions2 and 3 can be characterized as prudentialor ideological.6 Position2 is moved by prudentialconsiderationsthat are eithertactical or realistic.The tactical toleratordoes not view pluralismas a necessary, valuable, or permanentfeature of life. His tolerationfor rival options is sustainedonly by the recognitionthatthe lack of pluralitybornof coercion sometimesboomerangsandgeneratesoppositionratherthanagreement.He is thereforemovedto hopethata nonrepressiveatmosphere,ratherthanattitudes of total rejection,will prove more effective pragmaticallyas a strategyof persuasiontowardthe single desired view. Very often this hope slips into a mode of paternalismthat does not qualify as tolerationat all, becauseit refusesto view dissidentpositionsas a genuinedifferenceof opinion,thereby eliminatingthe tensionbetweenpositiveand negativeelementsof response. 5. For a more elaborateexplicationof these two modelsof tolerationand the respective philosophicaland political difficultiesthey engenderwhen formingthe basis for practical policy, see HerbertMarcuse,"RepressiveTolerance,"in A Critiqueof Pure Tolerance,ed. R. P. Wolff, B. Moore Jr., and H. Marcuse(Boston:Beacon Press, 1969), pp. 81-123; W. Kendall,"The'OpenSociety' andIts Fallacies,"AmericanPoliticalScienceReview54 (1960): AustralasianJournalof Philosophy67 (1989): 972-979; DavidLewis, "MillandMilquetoast," in On Toleration,ed. S. 152-171; Karl Popper,"Tolerationand IntellectualResponsibility," Mendus and D. Edwards(Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1987), pp. 17-34; David Hed, "Two Conceptsof Liberalism,"in In theLabyrinthof Democracy,ed. YuvalLurieandHayimMaranz (Ben-GurionUniversity,1990),pp. 169-184. Thetwo versionsof maximalismandminimalism havealternativelybeendescribedas thickor thin,rightistor leftist,individualistic orpluralistic, when appliednot only to tolerationas such, but also to the broaderconceptof liberalismas a formof government. 6. Althoughthese motivesareseparateanddistinctjustificationsfortoleration,theyarenot alwaysmutuallyexclusive.On the contrary,theymayreinforceeachother.See SusanMendus's introductionto MendusandEdwards,On Toleration,pp. 3-4. Mendustermsthe threemotives and"morality." "prudence," "rationality,"
BETWEENMETAPHYSICALAND LIBERALPLURALISM
65
Such fudging of differencesis effected either by interpretingthe tolerated opinion or value as essentially similarto one's own (or at any rate, not a contradictionof it), or by excusingits existencewith the argumentthatit was or truefreedomof choice. assumedout of lack of understanding The realistictoleratoracceptsthe need to makepeace with the existence of pluralismas a phenomenonthatis hereto stay.He is movedto tolerationby therecognitionthatif we arenotpreparedto putup withwhatis objectionable to us, thereis little chancethatotherswill reciprocatein kind,andnotattempt to curtailour own freedomto behaveas we wish. Position 3 is based on ideological considerationsthat are eitherphilosophicalor altruistic. The philosophical toleratoris moved by a regardfor truth,out of the conviction that the philosophicalinterestsof truthare best fosteredin an atmosphereof freedomof thought,which includesthe rightof all people to express theirown views-even when in our eyes these mightbe mistaken. Since humanbeings are fallible, it is only when we have the opportunityto engage in constantdialogue,contrastingand debatingour views with those of others,thatwe can hope to refineandcorrectourown views. The altruistictoleratoris moved by the convictionthat trueregardfor one'sfellow-manis bestexpressedby protectinghis inalienablerightto decide autonomously.Everypersonis firstandforemostan independentagent,born with a naturalrightto personalliberty.Everyfreelymadechoice has its own value, alongside that of others,either as an expressionof individualismor becausepluralityof optionsis a necessaryconditionfor humanautonomy. Object of toleration. A second test and determinantof the variety of tolerationinvolved is on the level of practicalpolicy: what should we be tolerantof? Should tolerationapply only to the bearerof the opinion and perhapsto his rightto hold it, or shouldit extendeven to the opinionitself? Extentof self-restraintmandated(or degree of interferencecondoned). A thirdcriterionfor classificationbelongs even more blatantlyto the level of action. What reaction is strong enough to qualify as intolerant?Does the restraintfrom interventionthat tolerationentails stop only at physical coercion,or does it avoidall formsof legal or socialsanction,includingpublic declarationsof censure,and attemptsto battleeven unspokenpsychological attitudesof derision and contempt?May we engage in gentle or indirect persuasion,or must we refrainfrompressurethatinterfereseven subtlywith freedom of choice? Must we ensure the right to a hearingof rival views,
66
TAMARROSS
theirpublic expression,the proselytizingand incitingof othersto act upon them,even by positiveandexplicitinstitutionalprovision?Ordo we promote the "meltingpot" phenomenonby encouragingthe formationof as broad a consensus as possible, whitewashingthe individualdifferencesbetween minoritygroups? Tolerationof the Position2 varietyfor the bearerof an untenableopinion, and perhapseven for his rightto hold it in private,could be basedon considerationsof personalrespect,or at the very least on tacticalconsiderations (such as the assessmentthatlack of overtinterferenceis sometimesfar more effectiveas a tacticof persuasionthanoutrightopposition).At the sametime, advocatesof this position may still feel duty-boundto attemptto limit the right to express dissidentviews in public,to the extentthatsuch resistance is possible and does not clash with the dictatesof prudence.7They would haveno compunctionsin principleregardingthe exerciseof indirectpressure (warningothers,preventingharmfulinfluences,publicizingdeclarationsof disapproval),as it is precisely prudentialistcalculationsthatwould move a personin this campto considersuch measures. On the otherhand,exponentsof Position3, in the interestof preserving pluralism,will exercise greaterself-restraint.Accordingto the ideological tolerator,the only theoreticallylegitimatejustificationfor interferingwith the expressionof opinionsis the one originallyformulatedby J. S. Mill, i.e., to preventharmto othersor to protectoneself. Becausehe welcomespluralism as an intrinsicgood, he will findit possibleto adoptan acceptingattitudenot only towardthe bearerof the dissidentopinion,and its expression,buteven towardthe opinionitself, despitethe fact thathe does not shareit. Relativism The differentattitudestowardpluralismof the two versionsof toleration areclosely relatedto the degreeof absolutenessor certitudethateachattaches to its own truthsor values.Position1, like Position2, is predicatedon a belief in objectivetruthsandabsolutevalues.Position3, on the otherhand,assumes someformof relativism.In its milderform,thephilosophictolerator'sinterest 7. It is worthnotingin this connection,however,thatthe distinctionbetweenholdingand expressingan opinion is easily erodedif a personis not preparedto lie in responseto direct questioningor to performacts thatare inconsistentwithhis privateconvictions.See Strawson, "Limitsof Toleration,"p. 46.
BETWEEN METAPHYSICALAND LIBERALPLURALISM
67
in pluralismis based on skepticismregardingthe abilityof humanbeings to ever be certainof achievingabsolutetruth,even thoughit may exist. Here pluralismfunctionsas a necessarymeansfor comingcloser to the truth,and not as an end in itself. In its strongerform, the second variantof Position 3, the willingness of the altruistictoleratorto place freedom of choice above truthis best understoodagainstthe backgroundof an even less conclusiveview of truth, which speaksonly in termsof variousidealformsof life ratherthanmutually exclusive truths.Althougheven this varietyof tolerationmay still be based on the assumptionof humanfallibilism,8it is often skepticalnot only about the ability of humanbeings to ever be certainof havingachievedtruth,but even aboutthe very existence of truth,thus shadinginto the indifferenceof Position4. Greatertentativenessof truthclaims may be whatlends credence to the altruist'sstancethatif someonesincerelybelieves something,thereis no compellingreasonto preventhim fromactinguponit. Despite the relationshipbetweenthe two varietiesof tolerationand their respectivedegrees of truthcertitude,two furtherpoints are worth noting. First, neitherprudentialnor ideological motives are absolutelycompelling indicationsfor toleration,for the very same considerationscan be used in order to reach the opposite conclusions.The prudentiallyintolerantcould considerthe very existenceof a pluralityof views as endangeringthe security of his own. The philosophicallyintolerantcouldbe concernedfor truthfor its own sake,becausethe existenceof falsityis so unbearable.9 The altruistically intolerantcould be motivatedby a paternalisticconcernfor the well-being of misguidedfellow-beings. But it is the ideologicalvarietyof toleration, which bases its acceptanceof pluralismon regardfor truth,that rests on particularlyprecariousfoundations,since it couldbe arguedthatthis concept of tolerationcan neverbe legitimatelyappliedto anypositionwhichclaimsto be absolutelyestablished;as one philosopherhas commented:"Ifone shares
8. Contraryto what is usually assumed,it is this versionof intellectualskepticismthat supportsJ. S. Mill's liberalism.Mill opposesthe idea of publictruthnot becausesocietymust have freedomof speech, butfor the same reason that it must have freedomof speech, i.e., an assaulton one definitivetruth.For Mill, skepticismand toleranceare integrallyconnected. He thinks our choice is either never to silence or to declare ourselves infallible. See Kendall, "Open Society," pp. 975-976; Strawson, "Limits of Toleration,"p. 50. 9. Newman, "Idea of Religious Tolerance," pp. 190-191.
68
TAMARROSS
the position,it makesno sense to speakof toleratingit, andif one disagrees with it, then one is committedto its repudiation."'" The precedingreservationis quitegermaneto the discussionof religious beliefs, especially of the variety to be found in the acceptedmonotheistic religions, since these notoriouslyclaim to be the absolute truth.Surely, tolerationof opinion here would make no sense. In all of the monotheistic belief systems,thebelieveris movedby theconvictionthathis religionspeaks in the nameof an absolutetruthalreadyrevealedby God.Thereappearsto be no way thatan adherentof one religioncan "accept"or "endure"the errorsof a rivalreligion(or anti-religion)."For this reason,it is temptingto conclude thatideologicaltolerationof opinions,particularlyof the theologicalvariety, can only flourishin the liberalenvironmentof secularism,which speaksin the nameof relativism(i.e., thatall beliefs are relativeto a particularculture or time, andno one of themis to be preferredabsolutelyto any other).It can only make sense in an atmospherewhere "opinions"are understoodto be somethingweakerthanstatementsof absolutetruth.'"If this is so, thenthose 10. Strawson,"Limitsof Toleration,"p. 47. 11. For those who accept the Kantiancriterionof universalizability, with the implied universalityand absolutenessof moralprinciples,the impossibilityof tolerancewould apply heretoo. It has, however,been arguedthatone cannotdrawa distinctionbetweenthe moraland the nonmoralby contendingthatone is basedon reasonandtheotheron feeling.Moralityitself is based on strongfeelings, and the conceptof moralitywouldwitheraway andbecome lost in the conceptof expediencyif strongfeelingsor sentimentwerenot involvedin thejudgment thatsomethingis morallyrightor wrong.The conclusionis thereforedrawnthatno sharpline canbe drawnbetweenwhatI dislikeandwhatI disapproveof. See BaronessWarnock'sarticle, "TheLimits of Toleration,"chap. 7 in On Toleration,p. 126. However,Warnockalso argues thatthereis no necessity to identifyrelativism(the belief thatnothingis ultimatelybetteror worse thananythingelse) with the belief thatmoralityis basedas muchon feeling as reason, for some feelings may be betteror moreimportant(culturally,historically)thanothers. 12. Accordingto R. M. Hare in Freedomand Reason(Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1963), p. 177, "whatdistinguishesthe liberalis thathe respectsthe ideals of othersas he does his own. This does not meanhe agreeswith them-that wouldbe logicallyimpossibleif they are differentfrom his." But if his and others'conflict,"he will-in arbitrating betweenpeople's interestsand ideals, give as much weight to each person'sas to any other's;he will not give his own ideals and interestspreferencebecausethey are his own. It is only when somebody else's pursuitinterfereswith others' that this arbitrationbecomesnecessary."But Harethen continues:"He does not claim finalityfor his own ideal, thoughhe may be surethatit is the best thathe has discoveredso far.... He may even thinkthata diversityof idealsis in itselfa good thing,not only becausepeoplearedifferentandwhattheyarelikelyto achieveis different ... but also, becauseit takesall sortsto makea world"(p. 180).
BETWEENMETAPHYSICALAND LIBERALPLURALISM
69
who speak unequivocallyof tolerationas a virtuemustbe referringonly to some belief or doctrinewhich they regardas basicallya matterof personal opinion,prejudice,feeling, inclination,or taste.'3 A legitimate counterargumentthat has been offered, however, is that most of the beliefs that we consider importantare actually beliefs that involve practicalapplication.14As Strawsonputs it, "Opinionsdo not arrive in the world ownerlessand unparented.They come only attachedto people, and are, moreover,seldom divorced from actions."' As such, they have repercussionsthat cannotbe ignored.It is only at the most superficiallevel that religious belief can be taken as an abstractand metaphysicalissue, without consequencesin the real world. From the standpointof religious believers(and disbelievers),it is not enoughthattheirsincerelyheld beliefs should be permitteda hearing or that they should not be penalized for holdingthem;they must also be able to live by the preceptsand customsof theirreligionor irreligion.Moralbeliefs are also action-guidingratherthan abstract,and politicalbeliefs quite clearlycover a broadspectrumof action ratherthanopinion.Evenin the searchfor scientifictruth,theexpressionof an opinioncannotbe separatedfromaction."Factsare not dumbclutterstrewn meaninglesslyabout the attic of the world. In their selection, discussion, and bringinginto focus, they are inevitablyacted upon. They are used as stepping-stonesto anotherlevel of inquiryand are inextricablyintermeshed with action."'6 Thus,"thereis ... a validityattachedto the notionof tolerationof opinion as a social phenomenon,attachedto a personand issuing in action,thatis missingfromthe notionof abstractopinionalone,starkandunembodiedin a socialcontext.""Even one who holdsreligiousopinionswithabsoluteclaims to truthmight still be able to make a distinctionbetweenthe truthvalue of an opinionin its unembodiedform and the value of the same opinionin its social application,and to be tolerantof opinionsin the lattersense. Because 13. Thus, as Newman points out ("Idea of Religious Tolerance," p. 188), when toleration is applied to moral positions or to rational argument, the concept need not necessarily represent a normative ideal. A person may criticize himself or others for merely tolerating what calls for stronger approval or respect, or for even tolerating something that calls for stronger measures of disapproval and denunciation. 14. Newman, loc. cit.; Strawson, "Limits of Toleration," pp. 43-55. 15. Strawson, "Limits of Toleration," p. 47.
16. Ibid.,p. 49. 17. Ibid.,p. 47.
TAMARROSS
70
most talkof tolerationof opinionsrefersnot to theirrelationshipto truthbut to action,the dividingline betweenabsolutistandrelativistcan neverbe all thatclear-cut,andboth will be involvedin tolerationto some degree. 2. Toleration in Jewish Sources Before Rabbi Kook
Pluralismof Views But Rejectionof Heresy In the light of all this, we are in a positionto undertakean assessment of R. Kook's views regardingthe room for tolerationwithin a religious worldview.Firstit shouldbe acknowledgedthatbeforeR. Kooktherealready existed a long series of authoritativeJewish sourcesthataffirmedthe basic dignityof man in general,irrespectiveof race or religion,simplyby virtue of the fact that all men were createdin the image of God."8Therewas also ample recognitionof the legitimacyof pluralismin the realmof opinions, includingthe right to hold and express diverseviews, as epitomizedin the classic principle"Boththese andthese arethe wordsof the living God"('Elu ve-'elu divrei 'Elokim Hayim).'9 18. See 'Avot 3:18. For furtheramplificationof this theme,see AaronLichtenstein,"The 5 (May 1993): 8-16; Menahem'Elon, Dignity of CreatedBeings" (Hebrew),Mahanayinm "Freedomof Expressionand the Controlof MinorityRightsin JewishLaw,"ibid.,pp. 28-30, pars.5-6. See also TB Kritot6b: "Everyfast-dayin whichthesinnersof Israeldo notparticipate is not a truefast-day,as we see fromthe case of the helbena(galbanum),whichhas a badsmell butis includedby Scripture(Exodus30:34)amongthe ingredientsto be includedin the incense to be offeredin the serviceof the sanctuary"; the themeis elaborateduponin DerashotHa-ran (Nissimb. Reuvenof Gerondi),editedby L. A. Feldman(Jerusalem,1973),firstderasha,pp. 3 ff. 19. For furtheramplificationandsources,see 'Elon,"Freedomof Expression,"pp. 25-26. A spiritof pluralismbased on such sourcessurelyanimatesthe tolerationof diversityin the realmof halakhicpracticeexemplifiedin such contemporary rulingsas R. MosheFeinstein's permittingthe sale, during the year of shmita (the sabbaticalyear), of 'etrogint(citrons) (the possibilityof "selling"the landof producedin the frameworkof belief in heternmekhirah Israelin orderto obviate its lying fallow) even to those who do not acceptthis heter,since thereis no violationof "placinga stumblingblockbeforethe blind"regardinganythingthatis done in accordancewith the decisionof a sage untila Sanhedrinactuallyrulesagainstit (Igrot Moshe, OrahHayim, vol. 1, sec. 186). That is, it is recognizedhere that the fragmentation of religiousauthorityallows for manyopinions.Comparethe ResponsaMishnatYosefpt. 1, in his ResponsaTzitz sec. 100. Anotherleadingcontemporarydecisor,R. EliezerWaldenberg, Eliezer 12, pt. 16, sec. 3, forbidspracticinga humra(stringentmeasure)which will shame
BETWEENMETAPHYSICALAND LIBERALPLURALISM
71
All this appliesonly to opinionsthatcould be construedas fallingwithin the realm of normativeJewish belief and practice,or at any rate as not directlyin conflictwith it.20 It is certainlynot applicablein the case of heresy, where the entire theoreticalstructureof halakhahis based on the principle of theocraticrule and the interventionistnotionthatevery Jew is responsible for every other (Kol Yisrael'arevimzeh la-zeh).As for infidelsin general,21 and Jewish ones in particular,it would be safe to say thatthe generalthrust of halakhahappearsto be one of extremeintolerancetowardtheirbeliefs and opinions,as well towardtheiriight to hold dissidentviews andlive by them. The usual rationale for regardingJewish heretics, both socially and religiously, not as people with legitimateopinions worthyof respect,but as offenders and criminals who have absolutelyno right to their views, was the inverselyaltruisticpaternalisticassumptionthateveryJew naturally wants to observe mitzvot and refrainfrom transgressions.If he lapses, this is only becausehis evil inclinationhas succeededin temptinghim to behave otherwise.The coercion and intolerance,therefore,come to help rid him of the shacklesof temptation,so thatwhenhe finallyasserts"Iwish this"(rotzeh 'ani), it certainlyreflectshis genuine will.22Freedomis the abilityto act in accordancewith one's truedesire,withoutany outsideobstacles,andsociety someone else who does not keep the same stringency.He wrote this in responseto a query regardingthe practiceof the saintlyHafetzHayim,who behavedin this mannerregardingthe eating of nzatzahsheruyah(moistenedunleavenedbread)on Passover;the questionerasked whetherhe was obligatedto performa hataratnedarinz(remissionof vows) in thisconnection. 20. E.g., see R. Moshe Feinstein'srulingin his IgrotMoshe,OrahHayim,vol. 1, sec. 46, thatalthoughthe Israeliflag is a symbolof the stateof the wickedhereticswho deny Jewish tradition,there is no ban on it, for there is nothingagainstplacing a secularobject in the synagogue.Therefore,it is not worthcreatinga disputeover somethingwhichis not actually forbidden.In this case, the imprudenceof divisivenessoverridesthe distastefor the dissident. One source that might be construedas extendingthe tolerationprincipleeven furtheris TB Menahot27a, whichcomparesthe obligationto bindtogetherthe 'arba'minim(fourspeciesof plantsblessed on Sukkot)to the obligationto bind togetherall typesof Jews, which includes even the wickedamongthem.But the intentis mostlikelydirectedto toleranceof theirpersons, not of theirwickednessper se. 21. E.g., see Maimonides'opinionin his Guideof the Perplexed,III, chap.51, regarding the secondclass of people surroundingthe palacein searchof the king.Since theyhold wrong opinions, sometimesthey must be slain and all memoryof theiropinionsdestroyed,so that they will not misleadothers. 22. Rambam,HilkhotGerushin2:2. See also Yaron,Philosophyof R. Kook,p. 327, and especiallyn. 13.
72
TAMARROSS
musthelp all Jews to do so. On the face of it, intolerancein theextremeis the normnot only with regardto the sinner'sopinionsor his rightto hold them, but even regardingthe sinnerhimself. An instructiveexamplecan be found in the Talmud,where it is establishedas permissibleto hate the perpetual sinner(the rasha'), andthatdoing so is even a mitzvah.23 Categoriesof Heretics The halakhahregardingheresy identifies several categoriesof transgressors and lays down differentdegrees of qualificationas to the duty of exhibitinglove or even tolerationtowardthem, in accordancewith the severity of their waywardness.The more noteworthycategories,for our purposes,includethe mumarle-te'avon(transgressormotivatedby the wish to gratifyhis desires),the mumarle-hakh'is(transgressormotivatedby the wish to annoythe community),the 'epiqoros(heretic),the mehalelshabbat be-farhesiyah(desecratorof the Sabbathin public), and the poresh min ha-tzibbur(transgressorwho departsfromthe community). It is oftenregardednotonly as permissible,butevenas a mitzvah(positive injunction),to hate most of these types of sinners.Accordingto at least one hatredof the mumarle-te'avonreferssimplyto reservations interpretation, abouthis behaviorand does not obviatethe injunctionof loving the person holdsthatthe mitzvahof love himself,24butthe moreprevalentunderstanding does not applyeven to thisless severeclassof sinner.Thus,one is notonly not obliged to love the mumarle-te'avon,but is even permittedto excludehim fromthe usualformsof welfarepreservedfor one's fellow-Jews,i.e., charity, returnof lost articlesand redemptionfrom captivity,refrainingfromtaking intereston loans to him, and providinghim with tokhehah(chastisement). The last measureof restraintservesas an indication,not of the consideration invokedby toleration,but of the lack of regardinvokedby indifference. As for the personwho continuesto transgresseven aftertokhehah,it is forbiddento mournhim or to participatein his burial.Andas forthe 'epiqoros andthe mumarle-hakh'is,one is obligatednot only to hate such sinnersand 23. 23. TB Pesahim113b;Shulhan'Arukh,HoshenMishpat272:11. 24. Tanya',pt. 1, chap. 32. For discussionof furtherreferenceswhich mitigatethe level of hatredone is obligatedto harborfor the transgressor, see Yehudah'Amital,"Regardingthe Status of the Secular Jew in Our Days" (Hebrew), 'Alon Shvut le-Bogrei YeshivatHar Etzyon,
no. 6 (Elul 1988), pp. 11-12; MordecaiGafni,"TheHalakhicApproachTowardSecularists" (Hebrew),Mahanayinz, pp. 189-190, May, 1993.
ANDLIBERALPLURALISM BETWEEN METAPHYSICAL
73
to deprivethemof the usualformsof welfare,butalso to activelycausethem harmand even death.If one does not have the opportunityto activelycause theirdeath,one is permittedto do so passively.2 All this rings very harshlyto modem ears. Even in halakhicterms,the obligationto kill sinnersappearsespeciallyproblematicwhencontrastedwith thegeneralinjunctionagainstmurder,whetherof Jewornon-Jew.Theseverity of the law may be mitigatedby the observationthatwide gapsbetweentheory in halakhicliterature.A and practicalimplementationare not unprecedented case in point is the death penaltyprescribedfor certaintransgressionsthat are really quite common, such as violationsof Sabbathlaws or sexual sins. When it comes to the applicationof these penalties,the Mishnahrecordsa debate between tanna'imas to whethera Sanhedrinthat pronouncessuch a penaltyonce a week, once in seventy years, or even once ever, is to be regardedas murderous.A questionof this kind would seem to indicatethat the intentof the penaltyprescribedis not practicalbut didactic:to establish at least in theorythe utterseverityof certaintransgressions, as if to say that sucha sinnerhas in principleforfeitedhis trueclaimto God'sgift of life. One might conclude that the same applies to the harshattitudetowardheretics prescribedin Jewish law. Even if thereare practicaldifficultiespreventing the actualapplicationof the halakhicpenalties,these prescriptionscome to drive home to us thatinfidelityis a greatspiritualtravesty,and thatthe very presenceof the hereticwithin a society of God-fearersposes a threatto the community'sfoundations.26 Transitionto a SecularAge Even if the tendencyto regardthe moreseverehalakhicstricturesagainst Jewish infidels as having an intent more pedagogicthanpracticalis taken into account,the dramaticrise of secularismin the last 200 yearshas madeit increasinglydifficultfor observantJews to bearwiththe halakhah'sgenerally intolerantattitude.Faced with the rapidlydwindlingratio of believers to rebels againsttraditionalnormsand belief, and confrontedby the sweeping changesin the makeupof Jewish society at large,moreand moreobservant 25. Rambam,HilkhotRotzeah,end of chap.4. 26. This disparitybetweenhalakhiclegislationand its executionhas been likenedto the differencein style of fatherlyand motherlyupbringing.See 'Amital,"Regardingthe Statusof theSecularJew,"pp. 9-10, andGafni,"HalakhicApproachTowardsSecularists," pp.200-201.
74
TAMARROSS
Jews began asking whetherit was possible, or even desirable,to write off vast numbersof fellow-Jews as dissentersby continuingto define them as rebelliousexceptionsto the rule. Two Waysof Relatingto Secularism Inbroadgeneralterms,two reactionsto thisdifficultydevelopedwithinthe halakhiccommunity:entrenchmentin the traditionalpositionof intolerance, and erosionof the intoleranceto a lesser or greaterdegree. The groupadoptingthe firstapproachwas aidedby the generalmistrust of modem espousalsof tolerationamongabsolutistreligions.The historical links between an ideology of tolerationand religiousskepticismwere too obvious to be ignored.No one could deny thatthe most severe threatto all the greatmonotheisticreligionswas posed by the criticalattitudeof modern freethinkerstowardany system of thoughtthat made pretentiousclaims to exclusive possession of the keys to truthand personalsalvation.Since the very same critiqueis what lay behind the new embracingof toleration,it certainlycould not be condoned.Recognizingthatit was hardto avoid the pitfallof indifferencewhen toleratingdifference,some observantJews came to thepracticalconclusionof favoringthe formationof independent,separatist religiouscommunities. By the beginningof the nineteenthcentury,attemptswere alreadybeing made to distancethe Maskilim(supportersof "enlightenment" and secular and the advocates of reform from the rest the comof education) religious these efforts were not the Hatam Sofer (R. Moses munity; supported only by an avowed even the but Maharatz Sofer,1762-1839), separatist, by Hayot(R. Zvi HirschHayes, 1805-1855), a rabbinicleadergenerallyregardedas having some degree of openness towardthe outside world.27Separatismwas also the policy adoptedby the Neo-Orthodoxcommunityof Frankfurt-am-Main at the instigationof R. SamsonRaphaelHirsch(1808-1888). A smallerand moreselective society thatstill correspondedto the traditionalconceptionof communitywould be able to bypassthe need for tolerationand remaintrue to the old normsand definitions. 27. This separatismwas expressedin prescribingthe avoidanceof social contactwith such dissidentJews, not mourningor eulogizing them, banningthem as kosherwitnesses, with them.See the collectedwritingsof MaharatzHayot,vol. 2, andforbiddingintermarriage Iggeret Kannaut, p. 908 and on.
AND LIBERALPLURALISM BETWEEN METAPHYSICAL
75
Traditionalistsadoptingthe second approachresistedcutting ties with what quickly became the majorityof secularand nonobservingJews in the emancipatedcommunitiesof WesternEurope.In the growingYishuvin the land of Israel during the early years of the twentiethcentury,it became increasinglydifficultto ignorethe Jewishrelevanceof the largersurrounding communityand relateto its memberswith totalanimosityand reserve.Such difficultiesforced the Orthodoxinto a growing tension betweena realistic recognitionof the new secularrealityandthe codifiedreligiouscategoriesof the past. Sometimesthis tension was excusedby a simpleacknowledgment that the halakhicallyfaithful had no choice; i.e., being in the minority, they simply lacked the political power to enforce stricturesbased on the old standards,and thereforehad to make grudgingpeace with a workable coexistencewhich would at least protecttheirown rightto live in accordance withtraditionalideasandideals.In accordancewiththedefinitionsestablished above,this of coursewouldhardlyqualifyas a genuinepositionof toleration. ErosionStrategies A moresubtleor covertversionof this tensiongraduallymanifesteditself in an increasinglyingenious exploitationof whateverhalakhicloopholes could be found in supportof a more positively tolerantattitudeat least towardfreethinkers.Threefacts were takeninto consideration.The firstwas the secularist'sown understandingof his behavior(i.e., he did not view his transgressionsas sinful at all andthereforecouldnotbe regardedas a mumar le-hakh'is).28 Second was the fact that the secularist'stransgressionshad now come to be so widespreadand commonplacethathe could not even be 28. R. Ya'aqovEttlinger(1798-1891), in ResponsaBinyanZionha-Hadashot10, sec. 23, rules that since many Sabbathtransgressorseven make Kiddushon Shabbatand pray,they cannotbe regardedas deliberateSabbathtransgressors. Thereforeone can be lenientregarding use of theirwine, even thoughmorestringentbehavioris to be preferred.Precedentfor taking into accountthe sinner'sown view of his behaviorcan be foundin the stanceof the Radvaz (RabbiDavid ben Zimrah,1479-1573) at the time of the Spanishexpulsion,in a responsum regardinga certainmaggid who propoundedviews in the synagoguethatconfoundedsimple faith.The Radvazruledthatthe maggidwas absolvedof guilt, since he hadnot arrivedat his heresy willfully,but only throughfaultyreasoning.See Yesh'ayahuLeibowitz'streatmentof thisresponsumin "TwoConceptionsof Tolerationin Judaism"(Hebrew),in Emunah,Historiah ve-'Arahim(Jerusalem:Aqademon,1982), p. 18. A similarline of reasoningcan be foundin a responsumof R. AqivaEiger,the rabbiof Posenat the end of the eighteenthcentury,who was asked whethersomeone who shavedwith a razorcould be regardedas a kosherwitness.The answer:since this practicehas becomeso widespread-for all ourmanysins-among so many
76
TAMARROSS
regardedas a poreshminha-tzibbur.29Andthird,the spiritof the new age was so seductivethatthe secularistcouldwell be definedas a tinoqshenishbah(a Jewishchild broughtup in captivityby non-Jews)who is merelycontinuing in his parents'footstepsand does not know any better3" (andthereforedoes not even qualify as mumarle-te'avon). All these considerationsserved to justify a more charitableview of religioustransgressors,based at the very least on paternalisticpreconceptions. Anotherexpedientsupportingtolerationconsistedof the delegitimization of the mitzvah of tokhehahin the present day and age, in view of the ineffectualor even counterproductive effect it would have on contemporary But even the here, professedmotivationfor rejectingcoercion secularists.3 or public sanctionremainedentirelytacticaland pragmatic,and appliedto the holdersof the opinions,but not to the opinionsthemselves.The idea of applyingnew halakhiccategoriesor theologicalassessmentsregardingthe Jews, many do not regardit as forbidden.Here too thereis a recognitionthatif manyJews do not observea certainmitzvah,this affectsits religious-halakhic status,or at least promotes a morelenientevaluationof its transgression; i.e., an admissionthata religious-socialchange stemmingfromthefactthatmanyJewsarenotkeepinga certainmitzvahhasthepowerto evoke a new attituderegardingthose Jews whichdoes not regardthemas religioustransgressors. But this responsumstill relatesto people who are in principleobservantJews, and have merely lapsedin regardto the observanceof a particularmitzvah.Both responsaassumethatJewish society at largeshouldbe governedby halakhahin principle,andthateven a massivenumber of transgressors muststill be regardedas exceptionsto the halakhicrulewhichgovernssociety as a whole. 29. R. David Zvi Hoffman (in ResponsaMelanmed Leho'il 1, 29) establishesthat the cannot even as The definitionof farhesiya Sabbath desecrators. public transgressors qualify ("public")has changed,since it is now the majoritythatdo not observeShabbat.On the basis of this observation,he permitsincludingthemin a minyan,even thoughit is preferableto pray in anothercongregationif this can be done withcreatingoffense. 30. A rulingby Maimonidesthatalthoughit is a mitzvahto kill epiqorsimandnmumarin? who denythe divinityof the Torah,the childrenof suchdissentersareto be regardedas tinoqot shenishbuwho had no choice, serves as the basis for posqinm in recentgenerationsto regard currentsecularistsleniently.The lack of choice stemsfroma recognitionof the possibilityof intellectualseduction.E.g., see R. Meir SimhaHa-cohenof Dvinsk (1843-1928) in Meshekh Hokhma,Shemot3, 19, or R. TzadoqHa-cohenin Tzidqatha-Tzaddiq,sec. 43. An even more ingeniousandradicalrationalefor relatingto modemhereticsbe-'avototahavah("lovingly") ratherthan with tokhehah("chastisement"), and not applyingthe law of kofrinm to them, is suggestedby the Hazon 'Ish (YorehDe'ah, HilkhotShehitah2, end of n. 16):i.e., the fact that Divine Providenceis not evidentin ourday. 31. Hazon'Ish's commentaryon MishnehTorah,HilkhotDe'ot 6:3.
ANDLIBERALPLURALISM BETWEEN METAPHYSICAL
77
legitimacyof dissidentopinionsper se or theirexpression,in conformance with the ideological tolerationof modernsecularliberalism,was nowhere entertained. 3. RabbiKook's"Liberalism" New Strategies From various passages in R. Kook's writings, it is obvious that he disagreedvehemently with the separatistresponseto the phenomenonof secularismin Jewish society.32Other passages indicatehis affinity to the second approach.He most definitelywas interestedin exploitingwhatever halakhicavenuesalreadyexistedto supporta positiveattitudeof optimismand love towardpresent-daysinners,out of a convictionthatsuch an approach, combinedwith betterpublicrelationsfor the religiousview, wouldbe vastly moreeffective thanintolerancein returningthe waywardto the fold.33Much of the charm of R. Kook's position emerges in the personalrelationship he developed with the secularists,insistingon attributingreligiouslyvalid motivesto theirbehavioreven whenit blatantlycontravenedhalakhicnorms. (Some, of course, were quick to express resentmentat his presumptuous of theirviews.34 But, as has been pointedout elsewhere,35the appropriation rhetoricof paternalismsometimes masks a strongerversion of toleration thatis not free to express itself more openly becauseof halakhicor similar compunctions.) Regardingthe halakhic definitionof present-daysecularists,R. Kook exploitedall the usual tactics mentionedabove in orderto arriveat a more charitableview of theirstatusvis-a-vis the law. He also addeda few new but similarstrategiesof his own. One of themwas a romanticbelief (obviously groundedon kabbalisticsourcespertainingto the uniquenatureof the Jewish soul) which amplified upon the basic halakhiccontentionthat the Jew's hiddenwill is always to observemitzvot. 32. 'Orot(Jerusalem:MossadHaravKook,), pp. 73-74. [au. year of pub.?] 33. IgrotR'ayahI (Jerusalem,1962),pp. 58, 160-161. 34. Forseveralexamplesof suchcriticism,see AviezerRavitzky,Messianism,Zionismand JewishReligiousRadicalism(Hebrew)(TelAviv:Am Oved,Tel Aviv, 1993),p. 160. 35. See YosefAhitov,"TheAttitudeTowardsSecularists"(Hebrew),in Be-HevleiMassoret u-Temura(Rehovot,1990), pp. 35-50.
78
TAMARROSS
incapable Accordingto thisview, theJew,by definition,is constitutionally of being a kofer (heretic),for kfira (heresy)entails an absoluteconviction of God's nonexistence,whereasthe Jew, if he is honest with himself, can claim at most to be an agnosticdoubter.The rareJewish"heretic,"therefore, who claims thathe is absolutelycertainof his position,mustbe regardedas a rashabecauseof his hypocrisyanddeceit,but not-presumably-because of his heresy.36 As for the more run-of-the-millsecularists,who are simply indifferent to religion, sometimesthey arriveat theirpositionout of moralweakness, althoughfrequentlythis is not the case, as evidenced by the impressive idealism regardingsocial issues that some of them display,often at great personalcost, and even to the pointof willingnessto give up theirvery lives for the sakeof the nation.Forthis reason,they maybe likenedto the talmudic exampleof the birdthatprotectsitself fromthehunterby perchingon a statue of the king.37Despite their heresy they cannotbe condemned,due to their attachmentto the Jewishnation.The nationalistor cosmopolitanaspirations of the Jewish secularistsalso precludethe possibilityof definingthem as cuttingthemselvesoff fromthe communityat large(porshimminiha-tzibbur) or as willful transgressors(mumarimle-te'avon).38Moreoften thannot, the secularistposition is an expressionof the intellectualconfusionthat stems from the currentculturalclimate.39R. Kook, like othersbeforehim, viewed the secularclimate as so powerfuland persuasivethatit was to be likened to the more physical varietyof seduction,which, accordingto at least one discussionin the Talmud,excuses the sexual transgressorto the extent that he is not regardedas unfitto bearwitnessin court.40 As for the mitzvahof tokhehah,R. Kookruledthatthisobligationapplies only to those who know how. For this reason,it reallyis only a hypothetical 36. Igrot R'ayah I, pp. 20-21. Further development of this idea appears in R. Kook's letter to the Ridbaz (Igrot R'ayah II, pp. 184-198). In this letter R. Kook also employs another metaphysical concept to justify his refusal to distance himself from the secular Zionists, i.e., the midrashic understanding of the 'erev rav ("mixed multitude") as those who were destined to produce superior offspring in the generations that follow. The use of this notion relates to a kabbalistic dispute about whether the final redemption will be the result of a separation of the holy and the profane, or the sanctification of the profane and its elevation. 37. Igrot R'ayah II, 170-171. 38. Ibid. I, pp. 170-171, 368-370; "'Al Bamoteinu Halalim," Ma'amarei R'ayah I (Jerusalem, 1980), pp. 90-91. 39. Igrot R'ayah I, pp. 100-101. 40. Ibid., pp. 170-171, 100-101.
BETWEENMETAPHYSICALAND LIBERALPLURALISM
79
mitzvah, similar to the status of ben sorer u-moreh(rebelliousson); it comes to teach zealousnessand discouragewishy-washyaccommodationto unacceptablepropositions,but was neverintendedfor practicalapplication.41 Moreover,he held, therewas no currentpoint to tokhehah,because"in our days it is a thing thatis not heeded."Thereforeit was betterto leave sinners to continuein unwittingtransgression,andrelateto themonly with love.42 The halakhiccontortionsthat R. Kook felt forced to adoptin orderto supporta liberalattitudetowardtheJewishsecularistsof his dayareevidenced most poignantlyin his eulogy for the ten shomrim(membersof a prestate securityorganization)who fell while defendingan outpostin the Galilee.43 In this eulogy he expressedhis painover the fact thatthe instinctiveimpulse to mournand glorify the memory of these young nationalheroes of pure motivationwas necessarilytemperedby the usual constraintsthathalakhah places on mourningand participatingin the burialof repeatedtransgressors. After exploring some of the loopholes mentionedabove and findingthem wanting,he describeswith bitterirony the "tragicbliss"of coming up with the finalrock-bottomdregsof a solutionto his dilemma.R. Kookis enabled to indulge his naturaland spontaneoussorrowon this occasionby the fact thatthe Rema' quotes an opinion(of the 'Asheri)thatdeems any Jew killed by non-Jews to be exempt from the normalrestrictionagainst eulogizing religiouswrongdoers.44 From all that has been said until now, it is obvious that R. Kook was stretchingthe halakhic possibilities of tolerationfor heretics to the maximum.The questionthat remainsto be addressed,however,is whether his protestationsof love for the secularhalutzimn of his day stemmedmerely fromthe considerationsof his halakhicpredecessors.Washis attitudesimply a particularlygracefulform of resignationto the fact thatthe religiouswere left with no choice underthe circumstances?Was it meantto serve only as a temporarystopgap,undeservingof the title of tolerationat all, or at most tolerationof the prudentialvariety?Ordidhis halakhicrulingsindicatea more profounddeviationfrom traditionaltheologicalcategories,andan affinityto 41. Ibid.,p. 305. 42. For an expression of this view, see the letter R. Kook wrote to his parents in Igrot R'ayah I, pp. 352-353, regarding the policy of those who opposed his approach to the secularists. (In this letter he displays great nobility and personal tolerance regarding his adversaries on this issue.) 43. "'Al Bamoteinu Halalim," pp. 89-93. 44. Yoreh De'ah 340:5.
TAMARROSS
80
more modem and secularideologicalconsiderationsof the philosophicalor even the altruisticvariety? Satisfactionat Inabilityto Censure A questionsimilarto this one was actuallyputto R. Kookby his beloved disciple, Dr. Moshe Zeidel, in an extremelyinterestingexchangeof letters regardingthe issue of toleration.The initialstimulusto thisdiscussionwas R. Kook's negativereactionto some commentsmadeby EliezerBen-Yehudah, the editorof the periodicalHa-hashkafa,in the wakeof the Uganda-Palestine debate.45In response to those Zionists who based their oppositionto the proposalto createa Jewishhomelandin Ugandaon the traditionalconnection of the Jewishpeople to the landof Israel,Ben-Yehudah assertedthatthe very essence of Zionismwas a rebellionagainstJewishtraditionand all it stood for, and thereforethatthe Ugandaproposalwas worthyof consideration. R. Kook viewed Ben-Yehudah'sdisparagingremarksaboutthe relationship of the modernZionistmovementto the Jewishpastandits traditionas a peculiarlyperverseformof self-hatred.However,he added,"Withall my love for learningandteachingthe principlesof ourbelief,I am farfromdemanding the impositionof these opinionson anyoneelse, as [suchimposition]is not heededin ourday."It was this addendumthatpromptedZeidel'squery:46was R. Kook'srefrainingfrom censurein this case a positiontakenout necessity (i.e., lack of choice, and therefore,in view of our earlierremarks,not really tolerationat all), or because such restraint(or toleration)was prescribedby the law of the Torah,i.e., bearssome intrinsicreligiousjustification? Unmentioned,of course, was a thirdbut hiddenpossibility,i.e., thatR. Kookwas promptedby totallysecularconsiderationsandvaluesto "discover" such a normwithinhalakhah.Zeidelassumed,andwe mayassumewithhim, thata poseq of the statureof R. Kook would not deliberatelyallow personal views or ideological considerationsthatreflectedthe currentculturalmilieu to figurein his halakhicreasoning.But it couldbe arguedthatthe questionof toleration,by its very nature,cannotbe divorcedfrom such considerations. Moreover,the discomfitureof R. Kook and his generationregardingthis questionmay have been so great that he was unconsciouslyforced in this instanceto allow the two domainsto intermingle. 45. Igrot R'alyah I, p. 18. 46. Ibid., p. 19.
BETWEENMETAPHYSICALAND LIBERALPLURALISM
81
R. Kookrespondedto Zeidel'squeryin one of his mostseminaldiscussions On the one hand,he writes,if conditionsin our of the issue of toleration.47 day allowed for it, we would definitelybe obliged by halakhahto publicly condemn wrongdoers;even now, when such sanctioningis not feasible, thereis no room for unlimitedtoleration.But afterdefiningthe restrictions on tolerationthat still apply, and explainingwhy the antiliberalstance is impracticablefrom a halakhicpoint of view, he adds a considerationthat raisesjust the whiff of a suspicionthatthepolicyof tolerationhe is promoting may not stem entirelyfrom negativeconsiderations(i.e., lack of choice and the necessityto comply with an undesirablesituation). R. Kook's argumentruns as follows: Althoughthe naturalinstinct of the national spirit is to assert its authoritywhenever signs of spiritual disintegrationbecome apparent,such authoritycan be effectively imposed only when the nation'spowersareat the heightof theirperfection.Therefore, Divine Providence sees to it that, despite the naturalimpulse for public censure, objective obstacles to the implementationof sanctionsappearin direct proportionto the weakness of the nationalpower. Sometimesthese obstaclestakethe formof external,practicalimpediments,suchas the fearof foreignrulers.Sometimesthey areinternalandspiritual,suchas the halakhic whencensurewill not be heeded.So injunctionto refrainfromreprimanding far R. Kook's statementseems quite innocuous,but this does not hold for his concludingcomment;here he says thatwhen a social situationarisesin which the mitzvahof tokhehahis inapplicable,we shouldfeel satisfactionat the situation,out of a recognitionthatit expressesthe divinewill. IntrinsicValueof NoncoercedBelief At this point we may feel promptedto ask whetherthe satisfactionthat R. Kook encouragesus to feel is merely gratificationat the fact that God limits our ability to censurewhen the nation'spowersare not in full force, andcorrespondinglyunwillingto acceptreactionsof zealotry,or is it perhaps an intrinsicvaluationof a faith thatis not acquiredby coercivemeans,and in a social system totallyfree of externallyimposedconstraints. A closer look at several other passages in R. Kook's writings lends some credenceto the second possibility.48 In one passagehe contendsthat 47. Ibid., pp. 19-21.
48. This is in contradictionto the view of somethatR. Kook'stolerancenevergoes beyond the statusof post-factum(bedi'avad).E.g., see YosefAhitov,"ReflectionsRegardingtheFuture
82
TAMARROSS
when mankindwas in the more primitivestage of its development,there was a religious interestin restrictingopportunitiesfor free inquiryand in subjugatingthe will. But now thathumancivilizationhasdevelopedandsome portionsof the will and mindnaturallytendtowardthe good, liberalismand anarchyare necessaryconcomitants.AlthoughR. Kook hastensto add that the dangerfromwhateverunpurifiedbarbaricelementsremainin such a state is even greaterthan before, he also believes thatthe returnof religionand traditionto their formerrepressivetactics undersuch circumstanceswould constitutea grave error.49 In anotherpassage,he views the increasedinterest in democraticrule ratherthanexternallyimposedstandardsas comparableto the increasedwillingnessto applymoralstandardsof behaviorto animalsas well as to humans;bothareparallelmanifestationsof the heightenedspiritual awarenessthathumancivilizationis destinedto graduallyattain.50 OpenDialogueFurthersTruth In additionto these obliquereferencesto the superiorvalueof a political climate which protects the right to autonomousdecision, when the level of intellectualand moral maturityof a given society warrantsit, thereare innumerableexpressions in R. Kook's writingsof vehementresistanceto the stultificationof man's creativeand inquiringspirit.5'One of the reasons given for thisis certainlyreminiscentof thephilosophicvarietyof ideological motivationin Position3: i.e., thattheopendialecticof opposingideasfurthers the flourishingof truth. With uncharacteristicsarcasm,the usually gentle and benign R. Kook sharplycriticizesthe provincialismof those small-mindedpeoplewho think that"whateverexists outsidethe cavity of theirskull is nothingbutone long chaos," and that all of life and the world is no greaterthan what can be foundin theirlittle sphere.52His mockeryhere supportsan impassionedplea for recognitionof the pluralismin Jewish thought,which shouldwork for of Relationswith the Secularists"(Hebrew),in Be-HevleiMassoretu-Tentura, ed. Menahem Kahanah(Rehovot:Kivvunim,1990), pp. 37-38. 49. 'Orot ha-'Enunah (Jerusalem, 1985), pp. 66-67. 50. "Talelei 'Orot," Ma'anmareiR'ayah I, p. 26, sec. 8. 51. 'Orot ha-Qodesh I (Jerusalem, 1963), pp. 176-177; 'Orot ha-'Enunah, pp. 67-68; 'Arpelei Tohar (Jerusalem, 1983), p. 62. 52. 'Eder ha-Yaqar (Jerusalem, 1963), p. 14.
BETWEENMETAPHYSICALAND LIBERAL PLURALISM
83
its enrichment, successfullyin the realmof just as has beenaccomplished halakhah.53 of thought,he says,leadsonlyto superficiality Narrowness anda diminthe greatestflawin pietyappearswhen ishingof man'sspiritualcapacity;54 Thelengthsof toleration fearof sin is replacedby fearof thought.55 thatR. to assumein supportof thisfreedomarequiteastounding: Kookis prepared the morevulgaran idea,the greaterits provocativeness, andthereforethe greaterits capacityfor servingas a catalystthatstimulatesthoughtand bearsa constructiveinfluence.56 Evenheresyhas a placein the worldof ideas,as a stimulusto intellectualferment.5It is obviousthatR. Kookis supremelyconfidentof the abilityof religiousbeliefto emergeintactfrom anyintellectual struggle. Whatemergesso far,then,is thaton the level of abstractopinion,R. Kook'stoleration is as lackingin reserveas thatof themostskepticalliberal whoreducesallconflictsof opinionto matters of taste.Butasidefromthetest of motivationon the level of opinion,we havealsociteda secondtestand of ideologicaltoleration, determinant At relatingto its practical applicability. thislevelR. Kookappearsto exhibitseveralinconsistencies oranomalies. Inconsistencies Alongsidethepassageswhichexpressextremeliberalism by theoretically valuein all opinions,evenwhentheseappearto wildlyconflict, recognizing otherpassagesseem to gravelylimitandencroachuponpublicexpression of this expansivenessof spirit.Thus,for example,in the aforementioned parableof thebirdescapingthehunter'sarrowbecauseit is perchedon the iconof theking,"5 R. Kookassertsthattoleration forsecularists dueto their nationalloyaltymustdistinguish betweentheirpersonsandtheirbeliefs.One butmustnottaketheirsinfulopinionsinto maypraywiththetransgressors, or appointthemas leaders,andinsteadmusttryto win them consideration overto thereligiouspositionby meansof persuasion andexplanation. 53. Ibid., pp. 14-15. See also "Ma'amar Meyuhad," in Ma'anmareiR'ayah I, p. 105; Igrot R'ayah, pp. 192-193. 54. 'Orot ha-Qodesh I, 22; 'Orot ha-Emunah, pp. 67-68. 55. 'Orot ha-Qodesh III (Jerusalem, 1964), introduction, p. 26. 56. 'Orot ha-Emnunah,p. 21; 'Orot ha-Qodesh III, introduction, p. 44. 57. 'Orot, pp. 73-74. 58. Igrot R'ayah, pp. 171-172.
84
TAMARROSS
Then again, in a passage in which R. Kook speaks out vehemently againstthe tendencyto silence freedomof thoughtin the nameof faith,59he neverthelesscontendsin the followingparagraph thata kernelof truthcanbe found even in intolerance.Whatis it? The cautionnot to rely overmuchon humanwisdom, and this is the basis for respectof Heaven.So thereseems to be room for some intolerancein a basicallytolerantstancewheneverit promotesreligiousbelief in practice. Not only does R. Kook circumscribethe expressionof opinions.Sometimes his reservationsextend even to the holdersof these opinions, after the fashion of traditionalhalakhahin the presecularage.6?Thus, alongside passages that express great appreciationfor secularistspersonally,other Some of these passagescall for extremeintolerancetowardthe transgressors. were writtenbefore his confrontationin the flesh with secularhalutzimin Palestine, after which he found it more difficultto dismiss the notion of toleratingtheir persons despite disapprovingof their actions. But in the very same letter to Moshe Zeidel cited above (writtenafter R. Kook was alreadywell establishedin Palestine)in whichhe expressedhis oppositionto publiccensurein our times, he claims in the same breath,regardingEliezer Ben-Yehudah,that he who threatensany element at the basis of national existence, not only in action but even in thought,is to be regardedas a nationalcriminal,and not to be tolerated. Despitethese equivocations,we shouldnot too hastilydistanceR. Kook's versionof tolerationfromthe ideologicalvariety.Forthesedifficultiesmerely reflectthe generalproblemof the limits of toleration,which even the most enthusiasticadvocateof pluralismmustconfront. 4. TheLimitsof Toleration ThereMust Be a Limit The truthis that however much the ideologicaltoleratorwould like to see unlimitedfreedomof expression,this idealpresentspracticaldifficulties. 59. 'Orotha-Emunah,pp. 67-68. 60. E.g., see Ginzei R'ayah 6 (Jerusalem, 1990), p. 151, where love of the rasha' is perceived as problematic because it could lead to a blurring of the distinction between the bearer of the wickedness and the wickedness itself.
BETWEENMETAPHYSICALAND LIBERALPLURALISM
85
Justas the absolutist(Position2) may be willing to sufferopinionsotherthan his own at least in termsof theirpracticalimplications,the skepticalpluralist (Position 3) may be moved to recognize that interferencewith freedomof expression sometimes has a role. In order to maintainan atmosphereof toleration,he may not only have to disqualifypositionsthat are intolerant, but sometimeswill even be forced,out of purelypracticalconsiderations,to impose restraintsupon variousdemandsthat if uncurbed,would be totally incompatible. Even when we do not seek interactionor cooperation,the very fact that several conflicting ideals may requirethe same social context in orderto be realized,inevitablyforces us into a situationwhere thereis a reciprocal acknowledgmentof rights and duties. For this reasonissues of social and legal sanction, institutionalarrangements,punishmentand control,cannot be avoided; even the most liberal conceptionof governmentis invariably temperedby the fact that however legitimatethe claim to a multiplicityof truthsor values, somethingapproachingconsistencyis necessarilycalledfor in their practicalapplication.So it is not the questionof limits per se that distinguishesbetween one position of tolerationand another,but exactly whereand how the limits are drawn. In some of the passagescited above,we see R. Kookexplicitlyexpressing a keen sensitivityto the social repercussionsof opinions,andanawarenessfor this reasonof the importanceof distinguishingbetweenan open, accepting attitude to purely theoreticalopinions and tolerationof opinions which influencepeople and bear practicalimplications.Thus, one of the grounds offeredfor limitingfreedomof thoughtis the recognitionthatfor all practical purposesit is virtually impossible to totally divorce thoughtfrom action, as actions tend to stem from ideas.61For this reason,refrainingfrompublic expression even of ideas that are true in and of themselves is justified when such freedomof expressionmightexerta perniciousmoralinfluence.62 Elsewhere, this qualificationis expressed in even more sweeping terms. Even when he admits that freedomof thoughthas value when the interest is theoretical,R. Kook adds that since the masses are generallyinfluenced by every passing whim, there is virtuallyno meaningin grantinga liberty thatis incapableof being realizedin practice.The necessityfor guaranteeing freedomof thoughtvia the adoptionof a positive initialbias serves as one 61. Igrot R'ayah I, 19-20. 62. 'Orot ha-Qodesh III, 282.
86
TAMARROSS
of R. Kook'srationalesfor thejustice of submittingto the Torah'srestrictive prescriptions. In general,then,neutralityof thoughtis a fallacy.63 Continuingin thisvein, anotherpassageassertsthatthe superiorclass of tzaddiqimarecharacterized by the abilityto relateabstractlyandbenignlyto deviantbeliefs, presumably becausetheyarecapableof takingthelong view,andof recognizinghow these aberrationsaremerelytemporaryin theirpartiality,butdestinedto contribute to the eventualformulationof a greaterand moreinclusiveformulaof truth. But this favorable attitudeto deviance is by no means allowed concrete expressionin practice.64 WhereDo We Draw the Line? In a religious system which emphasizesthe importanceof action far more than dogma, R. Kook was clearlynot the firsthalakhistto have made the distinctionbetween abstractopinions and those which have practical implications.65 A crucial question,however,both for the halakhistand for any propagatorof toleration,is: What is the criterionfor drawingthe line betweenopinionsthatare harmlessin theirpracticalor societalimpact,or at any ratecan still be endured,and those thatcannotbe sufferedbecausetheir consequencesin the real world are pernicious?Maimonideswould certainly have drawnthe line at heresy,which he regardedas a practicaltransgression not to be suffered. As we have alreadynoted,R. Kook seems to be equivocalon this point, or at any ratedoes not provideus with any clearindicationas to whenheresy is to be sufferedand when not. In a letter to the Ridbaz(R. Jacob David ben Zeev Willowski, 1845-1918),66 who objected to his positive attitude to the Zionist secularists,R. Kook introducesthe twin conceptsof segulah (uniqueness)and behirah (chosenness)as two separatefactors relatingto the unique holiness of the Jewish people. Segulah is an intrinsicquality embeddedin the natureof the Jewishsoul by God'swill, and comprisesits 63. 'Arpelei Tohai; p. 18. 64. Ibid., p. 27. 65. Maimonides, for example, often differentiates 'eniunot davar bilvad (theoretical opinions) and entunot ha-nmevi'otliyedei nma'aseh(opinions that lead to action). E.g., see Ma'aniar Tehiyat ha-Metini, sec. 4; Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Sotah, chap. 3. 66. Igrot R'ayah II, pp. 184-198.
BETWEENMETAPHYSICALAND LIBERALPLURALISM
87
nationalaspect.Behirahis dependentuponthe Jew'sgood deeds andtalmud torah,and is the religiousaspectof the Jewishsoul. R. Kook arguesthatthe relationshipbetweenthesetwo forcesis not fixed and static,but undergoeschangesat variousperiodsof history.In the time of "thefootstepsof the Messiah"-the dawnof the messianicage-the segulah aspect becomes dominant.Accordingly,R. Kook claims, he does not apply but only to those his attitudeof tolerationto all secularistsindiscriminately, in whose internalnaturehe discernsa greatmeasureof segulah.As for those who have completelylost theirinternalsegulah,he reassertsthe obligationto hatethem.But thenhe crypticallyaddsthat"therearemanyways to ascertain whetherit is so" (i.e., whethertheir segulah force is intact),and these are learnedthroughstudyof Kabbalah.67 So it would seem thatin his own mind, at any rate, he was following a consistentprinciplein drawingthe line of toleration,but we have as yet to spell it out. EpistemologicalBases for Drawingthe Line We have alreadyestablishedthat the differentvarietiesof tolerationare WhatI wouldlike to groundedupondifferentepistemologicalunderpinnings. the now is that different views the regarding limitingof tolerationare suggest in like to the same manner, epistemologicalpositions.Thepure loosely allied, who is no believes there relativist absolutetruth,andeven theepistemological skepticwho doubtswhetherwe caneverbe certainof reachingit (i.e., Position 4 and some versions of Position 3), concludethatsince thereis no rational way to solve arguments,we mustsimplyagreeto differ,andperhapseven take positive delight in the colorfulnessof our differences.Not only the bearers of various opinions, but even the opinions themselves,must be accorded equal weight and respect.Freedomof expressionbecomesthe chief value if we wish to live togetherin peace, and the institutionalstructureof society must be so arrangedas to provideit to the maximumextentpossible.Only intolerantviews and absolutistopinions that interferewith the freedomof othersare to be excluded. A slightly more stringentapproachfollows from the first variantof Position 3, which is often termed"criticalcognitivism."Accordingto this view, "while truthas a metaphysicalabstractionor unqualifiedand ultimate categorymay be a disputableconcept,the fact is thatopinionsmaybe closer 67. Ibid.,p. 188.
TAMARROSS
88
to or furtherfromthe truth,as well as ethicallybetteror worse,andlogically Theprotagonistsof thisview will neversilence moreor less soundlybased."68 falsehood,reasoningthatif we arenotpreparedto tolerateits expression,then we are assumingour own infallibility.But they also asserttheirown rightto denouncewhateveris falsehoodin theireyes, andto hope for the creationof an ever-increasingareaof commonagreement.This view will also encourage pluralismof opinions,freedomof expression,andthe exchangeof ideas,not becausevarietyis an ideal in andof itself, butbecauseit is a meansto further the processwherebymorefalsehoodswill becomemanifest. Despite these differences,both purerelativists(or epistemologicalskeptics) and criticalcognitivistswill combatany "meltingpot"attempton the partof utopianiststo "improve"societyin termsof a singleideal.As opposed to the absolutist,theywill tendto be the "enemyof thosewhosesingleiitense of the vision of the ends of life drives themto try to makethe requirements ideal coextensive with those of a commonsocial morality."69Theirview of In the end, its value is subservientto society itself is totally instrumentalist. the interestsof the individualswho composeit. Suchvalueexists only to the extentthatit servesto providean operativeframeworkfor the pursuitof truth or the expressionof morepersonalideals whichdemanda broaderandmore complexcontextfor theirfulfillment. 5. TheDialectic Natureof Truth R. Kook's MetaphysicalView As with other varietiesof toleration,the key to R. Kook's decisions in regardto practicalpolicy lies in a precisedefinitionof his motivationandthe Just as purerelativism specific natureof its epistemologicalunderpinnings. tends to lead the altruisticallytolerantto regardpluralismand freedomof choice as the ultimatevalue to be protected,andcriticalcognitivismleadsthe philosophicallytolerantto see this value in guardingfreedomof expression, so the pluralistscheme that R. Kook subscribesto tends him to a specific formulaof tolerationwithits own criteriafor settinglimitationsuponfreedom on the level of embodiedbeliefs andopinions. 68. Strawson,"Limitsof Toleration," p. 53. 69. Strawson,"SocialMoralityandIndividualIdeal,"p. 44.
BETWEENMETAPHYSICALAND LIBERAL PLURALISM
89
As has already been demonstratedby 'Ish-Shalom,the truth is that, despite the affinity of R. Kook's thought to the ideological tolerationof modem secular liberalism,the tolerationthat he expressesreally rests on entirelydifferentpremises:a uniquelyreligiousworldview,predicatedon the mysticalnotionof an infiniteGod who is absoluteexistence.70 FromGod'spointof view, thisinfiniteandabsoluterealityis a monolithic undefinedunity,with no distinctionbetweendisparateentities.Pluralityand diversityare merelythe functionof man'slimitedperceptions.Nevertheless, of the Oneis whatgives the factthathis perceptionsarepartialmanifestations them theirvalidity.The task of finitemindsis to try to reconstructa perfect facsimileof the ultimateunitythatis God's,in the formof a compositeunity thatcontinuallyincorporateswithinitselfall newlydiscovereddiversity.From the limited standpointof createdminds,this facsimileappearseven greater thanthe originalinfiniteunity which is God's, becauseit has the additional powerof growth. R. Kook's view here is very similar to that of many mystics, and is strikinglyclose to the neo-Hegelianmysticismof the EnglishphilosopherF. H. Bradley(1864-1924), an oldercontemporary(R. Kookwas bornin 1865 and died in 1935), whose works he probablydid not know. Bradley,like Kook, was a metaphysicalmonist, believing,in line with the Parmenidean, Neoplatonictradition,that only the One was real, leaving no room for the existenceof separateentities,not even individualselves.7'Bradleyregarded self-conscious individualselves and the disparateobjects of the world as we know it as ultimatelymere appearance,producedby the emergenceof Thoughtto disruptthe unityof ImmediateExperience.And he also supposed that the task of finite minds or selves, in the process of Thought,was to attemptto recreateby disjunctivereasoninga coherentpictureof reality which would come as close as possibleto the originalunity.In this attempt, Thoughtwould act, throughits finite centersin minds,to replicatethe lost unityby takingup moreandmoreaspectsof the realintothe netof discursive reasoninguntilfinallynothingwouldbe left out, andthe originalunitywould be regained,in enhancedform, by the copy and originaluniting in what Bradleycalled the "AbsoluteExperience."
70. 'Ish-Shalom, "'Toleranceand Its Theoretical Basis," p. 153. 71. See particularly his Appearance and Realit,, 2nd ed. (London, 1897) and Essays on Truthand Reality (Oxford, 1914).
TAMARROSS
90
This metaphysicalscheme may be regardedas a sort of parallelto the Lurianiccosmic process of the tzimtzumand the "breakingof the vessels," which created the unredeemedworld as we know it, and its tiqqun,the mending of the lost unity. R. Kook's interpretationof this process as an enhancement,in which the static monistic unity is rejoinedby a dynamic element, is the counterpartof Bradley'snotion of the dialecticprocess in whichImmediateExperienceis disruptedby Thoughtin orderto be enhanced when the synthesis between Thought and Experienceis regainedin the AbsoluteExperience. As opposed to the critical cognitivists,who understandthe process of coming closer to the truthas the gradualeliminationof error,we shall see that R. Kook, like Bradley,sees this process as achievedby takingup the truthin each partialview. PureRelativism There is a point of similaritybetween R. Kook's epistemologicalfallibilism (i.e., the idea thattruth,from man'spointof view, is neverabsolute) and the intellectual and moral skepticism that fosters pluralisticnotions of modem secular relativism.The impressionof similarityis especially strengthenedby R. Kook's ability not only to toleratethe heretic'sright to doubt, but even to attributeelements of truthor value to the heretical postureitself.72Nevertheless,it would be inaccurateto equatethis position with the pure relativist'snegationof the very existence of absolutetruth, or with the epistemologicalskeptic'sdespairof ever achievingit-as 'Ish Shalommay (mistakenly,I believe) be takento mean when he assertsthat R. Kook adopts a relativisticstance towardall metaphysicalsystems and The fact thatthis equation attributesto themonly the statusof hypotheses.73 follows immediatelyupon the heels of 'Ish-Shalom'spreviousand correct observationof the unique metaphysicalbasis for R. Kook's expressionsof of alleging that he was tolerationserves to highlightthe inappropriateness an indiscriminateor unqualifiedrelativist.Failureto attendto some of the finersubtletiesunderlyingR. Kook'sposition,anddemarcateit clearlyfrom thatof the truerelativist,could easily stem fromtoo loose a use of the term 72. 'Orot ha-Emunah, pp. 23-24 (a parallel passage appears in 'Arpelei Tohar,p. 45). 73. Ibid., pp. 153-154.
BETWEENMETAPHYSICALAND LIBERAL PLURALISM
91
"relativism,"whichoften servesas an umbrellafor two or threequiteseparate claims.74 At first blush, the epistemological approachassumed by R. Kook's positionmay appearcloser to the moremutedversionof relativismsupported by the "gettingcloser to the truth"approachof Position3. For on the one hand,R. Kook states that realityis so all-encompassingand rich thatit can This sounds like the never be containedin any one formulationof truth.7" of Position variant the second of 3, or the even epistemologicalskepticism he also statesthatthe on the other hand, purerrelativismof Position4. But This statementis more clash betweenrival ideas furthersthe cause of truth.76 moderateand seems to reflecta criticalcognitivistposition-that of the first variantof Position3. R. Kook here advocatespluralismnot becausehe does not believe in the existence of absolutetruth,but on the contrary,out of his conviction that the very pluralityof options will lead us closer to it. The clash between rival opinions spursus on to refineour ideas andcontinually improveupon our formulations,therebycomingcloserto the truth.77 However,as 'Ish-Shalomhimself andothershave pointedout,78R. Kook assertsmore thanthis. Any particularformulation,he maintains,necessarily containssomethingof the infiniterealitythat truthis tryingto grasp.79The tension between opposing truthsis valuablenot only becauseit challenges us to refine our own views against the foil of othersor encouragesus to discardthemcompletelyif they seem to be false. A successfulconfrontation, accordingto R. Kook, never entailsthe diminishingof rivalviewpoints.On the contrary,to the extent that rival ideas each have their own element of truth,the confrontationbetweenthemspursus to seek anoverarchingformula thatcontainsthe truthin all. When we see differencesthatappearabsolute, we must search for a method of harmonizingthem and achieving a new synthesis. The test of the synthesisis its capacityto absorbandvitalizedifferences, and connect them to a common source. Apparentlyconflictingpicturesare 74. The danger is intensified by the fact that R. Kook himself (Igrot R'ayah I, p. 47) describes the Jewish understanding of all human perceptions as "subjective and relative," without adding any further distinctions. 75. 'Orot ha-Qodesh II, p. 403; ibid. III, p. 327. 76. "Ne'edar ba-Qodesh," Ma'amnareiR'ayah II, p. 400. 77. Igrot R'ayah I, p. 164. 78. See Schweid, Judaism and the Solitary Jew, pp. 180-181, for a similar account. 79. 'Orot ha-Qodesh I, pp. 17-18.
TAMARROSS
92
reallydifferentparts,or aspects,of a single picturemomentarilycominginto misleadingprominence,and this composite totalityis the ideal image we striveto reach.In this image, every truthis given its properdue, andconflict is avoidedby carefularrangementand propersubordinationof partto part. What emerges is a harmoniouscomplexity,gloriously rich in its infinity. For this reason the value of tolerationrests, not in its power to obliterate differencesanddebates,but in its abilityto sustainthemin orderto highlight a new reality.Just as two negatives,in the physicalsciences,do not cancel each other out but rathercreate a new positive, so too in the world of the spirit.80 While every formulationhas an element that is essential and true, it also has an element that is false. Conflicts and contradictionsbetween formulationsstem, not from whateach asserts,but fromwhatthey deny.81It is the pretentiousclaim to exclusiveness,and the inabilityto recognizethe legitimateaspects of rival points of view, that createsthe false impression and of incompatibility.Alternatively,the recognitionof complementariness, the willingnessto be augmentedby the other,furtherthe cause of truth.All this leads to a definitehierarchyof value. The relativeweight of each part dependson its place in the total context and the degreeof its abilityto be inclusive; the more comprehensiveor inclusive the formulation,the more valid.82 Thusthe finalformulationis not merelythearithmetical sumof its various parts;this would contributenothingto the eliminationof the clash between them.The identityandsignificanceof eachelementis necessarilytransformed when supplementedby its rivals within the largercontextuality,while still maintainingthe uniquenessof its own individuality. One conclusion that emerges from R. Kook's metaphysicalconception of truthis that even when what is concernedis on the level of unembodied opinion, with no obvious practicalapplication,the positive elementin his tolerationis not as robustas it first appears.On the one hand,it is fair to say thatfor all its paternalism,R. Kook'sattitudeof acceptanceexceeds the simple blindness to differencewhich generallycharacterizesthat position. The toleratedview is welcomednot merelybecausethe misreadingof its true natureis temporaryand the entireconflictwill eventuallyemergeas illusory 80. 'Ederha-Yaqar,p. 14. 81. 'Orotha-QodeshIII,p. 327; see also 'Orotha-QodeshII, p. 484. 82. 'Orot,pp. 130-131.
BETWEENMETAPHYSICALAND LIBERALPLURALISM
93
in retrospect,and thus be eradicated.It is also welcomed for what it can genuinelydo to revise andimprovethe moreinclusivepointof view. But, by the same token,the positiveelementin his tolerationcannotbe regardedas a willingnessto coexist with any idea as it stands,butonly for whatit too might becomewhen envelopedby a largercontext.Morespecifically,his notorious appreciationfor secularismdoes not rest on the termsin which secularism perceives itself (namely,as somethingrespectableon its own merits),but on what it becomes when incorporatedin a religiouscontextwhich totally transformsits significance.Seen this way, secularismis a passing heresy whose values are eventuallysuckedup andbecomesomethingnew. 6. TheLimitsof Toleration The Limitsto Toleration R. Kook's divergencefrom the policies of secularrelativisttoleration becomes even more clear in his criteriafor setting practicallimits to the enduringof opinionswhich have practicalimport. Admittedly,some of R. Kook's statementsof the rationalefor limiting tolerationcould be takenas faintechoes of those ascribedaboveto the pure relativistor epistemologicalskepticof Position3. Forexample,in the letter to Dr.Zeidel, he lists the two reasonsfor limitingfreedomas the fact thatno virtueis good in the extremeand the dangerof nihilism.83 If the reasonfor R. Kook's objectionto extremismin any virtueis thatit preventsthe expressionof others,then both of the precedingconsiderations mightstillbe conceivedas notexceedingtheself-imposedboundsof neutrality of the ideological toleratorcommittedto maximalpluralism.However,R. Kook continueshis discussionof the necessityto limit tolerationby offering severalcriteriafor rankingconflictingviews thatare not merelyprocedural and formal,but involve an appeal to a substantivescale of values. And if we attemptto reconstructthe commonthreadunderlyingthis rankingfor the purposeof practicalpolicy,it is easily seen thatthe limitsto tolerationthathe imposes are a directresultof his harmonisticvision of truth,and the unique view of society stemmingfromit. Accordingto this view, the ultimatevalue to be protectedby intoleranceis not freedomof choice, as in the second 83. Igrot R'ayah I, pp. 19-21.
94
TAMARROSS
variantof Position3, or truth,as in the firstvariantof Position3, butthatof social cohesion. Along with the philosophictoleratorof Position3's firstvariant,R. Kook would agree that a centralfunctionof communityis to guaranteeand foster the searchfor truth.ButbecauseR. Kook'svisionof truthis of theharmonistic variety,social cohesion in his scheme is not merelyan instrumentalvalue, i.e., a tool which providesthe necessarycontextfor workingout individual ideas and ideals. It is ratherthe concreteaffirmationand projectionof his harmonisticview of truthon the politicalplane.Therefore,althoughfreedom is a positive value, society cannot exist withoutthe impositionof certain limitationsdesigned to guaranteeeach elementof truthits rightfulposition in the total context. The objection to total anarchyis not merely pragmatic.To the extent that opinions and beliefs are not unembodiedentities, the coexistence of variouselements in one communitysignify for R. Kook proof of his ideal truth'sexistence..Indeed,his idealof truthcan onlybe realizedwithina social R. Kookadoptstheclassicalview in whichsocietyis seen collectivecontext.84 as a unityof a numberof "natural" institutions-family,socioeconomicclass, tribe,nation,extendingto humanityat large,and finallyto all of creation.85 Each collective unit contributes,in its distinctiveway, to the intellectual, moral, social, and spiritualdevelopmentof the humanbeing, who derives his statusfrom his place in society.86Society has a formalstructure,divided into groupswith differentfunctions;and within each of these groupseach memberhas a distinctiverole which representshis or her contributionto the totalwhole. Thus, for R. Kook social cohesionis not an incidentalmeansto individualself-expression.It is a value unto itself, to which the individual contributesandonly therebyfindshis own worth.In thisversionof pluralism, society itself has a sort of moralstanding,the productof a sense of actively sharedidentity,which reflectsthe all-inclusiveunityof God.
84. 'Ikvei ha-Tzon, pp. 147-148. 85. 'Orot, pp. 42-44, 'Orot ha-'Enmunah,p. 105. 86. E.g., see R. Kook's remarks on the status of the Jewish woman. The fact that Jewish society is composed of households and families, rather than individuals, as the basic unit guarantees the Jewish woman her unique position within her home, and spares her the need to resort to the indignities of political hustling (Igrot R'ayah III, pp. 50-51).
BETWEENMETAPHYSICALAND LIBERALPLURALISM
95
ProtectingSociety's Interests How is this harmonisticview of truthandsocietytranslatedintopractice? What criteriafor limiting tolerationdoes it engender?As a harmonistic pluralist,R. Kook is inclinedto definethe limitsof tolerationin termsof the commonmoralitywhich delineateseach societyat large,andto be intolerant of any elementthreateningthis principleof cohesion. The logic of cohesion dictates the theoreticalprinciplethat the more comprehensivean idea, the more it demandszealousness(althoughthe very its zealousnature).87 qualityof comprehensiveness'belies A moreexplicit expressionof R. Kook'ssocial policy of comprehensiveness appearsin his communitarianextensionof J. S. Mill's harmprinciple. Insteadof the criterionof individualself-preservation overridingthe concern for liberty,R. Kook assertsthatany idea thatposes a threatto the existence and moralfiberof the society thatadoptsit oughtto be curtailed.If a society were to toleratea potentialthreatto its distinctivequality,this would be no morethancommunalflabbinessand tantamountto collectivesuicide.88 Implicitin this view of tolerationis the idea that society's entiremoral climate must reflect some collective image of humansolidaritythat is the productof an actively shared identity.However, R. Kook adds, it is not easy to establishjust whatingredientis necessaryfor the preservationof any particularsociety, since moralityis relative,and differentsocieties require differentstandards.In orderto understandhis specific prescriptionfor the of preservationof Jewish society, we must firstestablishhis understanding the natureof nationalismin general,andof Jewishnationalismin particular. Nationalism R. Kook's view of society and its relationshipto the individualled him to adopta view of nationalismthatwas especiallypopularin the nineteenth century.He begins with an assumptionthat prevailedin several forms in ancient and medieval times (and was most naturalin ancienttimes, when "nation"referredto an ethnicgroup,ratherthanthe modernsituation,where it pertainsmore to a political unit): each nationrepresentsa metaphysical entity or personality,a living organism,a moraland collectivebody, and is 87. 'Orot, pp. 130-131.
88. IgrotR'ayahI, pp. 19-20.
TAMARROSS
96
not merely a productof law and historicalcircumstance.While all national groupingsare concernedto protecttheirphysicalwelfare,whatdistinguishes the characterof one nationfromanotheris theuniqueset of virtuesandtalents which God has distributedto each particularnationalgroup.89 These virtues and talentsbestow an aestheticdimensionuponthe concernfor the nation's physical welfare9 that defines and constitutesthe nationalpersonality,is reflectedin its laws, traditions,andcustoms,andformsits socialclimate.The continuingpresenceof this dimensionin the nationallife servesas the basis for its organizedactivityand as the sign andguaranteeof its unity. JewishNationalism WhatdistinguishesR. Kook'stheoryof nationalismfromthemoregeneral nineteenth-century conceptionis the view of Jewishnationalismthathe grafts to it. Central this view is the notion that the distinctcontributionof upon the Jewishpeople to the communityof nationsis not some uniquecognitive ability,emotionalinclination,or talent,butthe urgeto concentrateandreflect the variousdivine powers distributedand scatteredamongthe othernations in a comprehensiveunifiedform. The raisond'etreof the Jewishpeople is to gatherall the special qualitiesthat serve to definethe respectivenational charactersof the othernationsandweld themtogetheras varyingexpressions of a common moral urge.91R. Kook equatesthis moralurge with religious The uniquetask of the Jewishpeople faith, or the strivingfor perfection.92 is to harmonizeand readjustthe mass of expressionsof this cosmic urge, and form them into a cohesive unity,by establishingand enforcingmutual reciprocation,and providing a general spiritualcontext for a pluralityof 89. 'Orot,p. 152, sec. 2. This themewas also stressedby Mazzini,in delineatingthe nature of modemnationalism. 90. Ibid. 64, sec. 10; "Talelei'Orot,"Ma'anmarei ha-'Ideiot R'ayal I, p. 21; "Le-mahalah be-Yisrael,"'Orot,p. 120. 91. 'Orot,pp. 129-130, 138; 'Olat R'ayah I, pp. 376-377. R. Kook's view of knesset yisrael as the concentrateof all humanityis rootedin the specialstatusthatthisconcepthas in qabbalisticsymbolism,whereknessetyisrael is equatedwith malhut,the lowest sefira,which servesas a finalreceptaclefor the bountyof all the highersefirotthatflow intoit. Thissefirais characterized by the fact thatit has no specialcharacterof its own. Its lack of a distinguishing qualityis just whatallows it to best serve as a spongefor collectingall the others,for its own characterposes no barrier. 92. 'Arpelei Tohan;pp. 3, 105-106; 'Orot ha-Teshuvah, chap. 5, sec. 2; 'Orot ha-Qodesh
III,pp. 65-66; 'Orot,p. 138, sec. 3.
ANDLIBERAL BETWEEN METAPHYSICAL PLURALISM
97
diverseunits.93Reflectingthe divine unity in this manner,the Jewishpeople serve as the special instrumentof divine revelation.It is in the Jewish people's way of life and creativitythat the process of revelationfinds its fullest expression.94 Acknowledging that the religious element is not always experienced consciouslyas suchby everymemberof theJewishnation,R. Kookcontends thatlatentlyit is always thereand readyto be activated.95 He does not wish to imply thatnon-Jewsare totallydevoid of moralandreligiousvalues.The urge to reflectthe divine pervadesall men, and indeedall creation.But this yearningnormallyexhibitsitself via the individualas such, who deriveshis divine essence directly from a cosmic urge best describedas the universal soul, ratherthanbeing determinedby the nationalunit. It is only amongthe Jewishpeople thatthe developmentand expressionof this urgeis translated into the very fabricor specialcontentof nationallife,96so thatthe individual Jew deriveshis religiousstrivingfromthe nationalsoul. Because the quality of Jewish nationalismhas a specific religious and moral value, it is different in kind from all other forms of nationalism. Indeed,the applicationof the term "nation"to the Jews is justifiedonly in the sense that all humancollectives are describedas such, but shouldreally be understoodas a mere figureof speech.97In all otherformsof nationalism, the individualderives his status from his place in society, but the national unity,in turn,is subservientto the interestsof humanityat large.As a result, in some instancesit is permissiblefor the individualto disregardthe national interestwhen it works against the interestsof the universalcommunityof mankind.9" The purposeof any collective is to furthermoralflourishing,and if any to this end, the statehas expressionof the nationalwill is counterproductive no right to that interference.But becausethe essence of Jewishnationalism is the strivingfor unity, the desire to hold togethera complexhierarchyof groups,the Jewishpeople does not competeas a nationamongothernations, 93. 'OlatR'ayahI, pp. 386-387. 94. 'ArpeleiTohar,pp. 56-57, 64; 'Orot,p. 138. 95. 'Ikveiha-Tzon(Jerusalem,1963),pp. 124-125; 'Orot,pp.63-64, sec. 9; IggerotR'ayah II, pp. 186-187. 96. 'Ikveiha-Tzon,pp. 147-148; 'Orotha-QodeshIII, pp. 117-118; 'OlatR'ayahII, pp. 43-44; 'Orotha-QodeshII, pp. 561-562. 97. 'IgrotRayahII, pp. 65-66; 'Orot,p. 144, sec. 3. 98. Ibid.
98
TAMARROSS
but insteadrepresentsa type of meta-nationalism, a view of nationalismfrom a higherplane. Jewish nationalismdoes not standin conflict with universalism,and is A Judaism particularistonly in the sense thatuniversalismis particularist.99 that is intolerantof universalurges has no legitimacy.'"Judaismis ideally Itspurpose incapableof chauvinism,for its essentialnatureis cosmopolitan.'10 is to providea model of harmonizationon a nationalscale (the widest scale capable of recognizablybearingthe joint experiencenecessaryto found a commonlife) thatwill eventuallybe adoptedby humanityat largeandobviate 102The worldis not yet readyto adoptthis the needfor nationalismaltogether. model when is it cosmopolitan representedby individuals,becausein their national tend to take over the world and overrunthe presentform, groups with theircollectivecompetitiveness. individuals harmonyrepresentedby R. In Kook'sview, theTorahservesas anidealframeworkor startingpoint for Jewish nationalism,because it providesthe most liberalbias possible, providing a model for the accommodationof all views in their rightful relationshipsand proportions.R. Kook would regardthe thin patriotism view of statehoodas incapableof engenderedby the secularinstrumentalist of the Jewish for very long. In fact, he takesa dim sustaining unity society view of nationalismin general(i.e., secularnationalism)whenit is takentoo 99. This paradoxparallelsthe paradoxcommonlyattributedto liberalism:the liberalmust be intolerantof the anti-liberalin the nameof liberalism. 100. 'ArpeleiTohar,pp. 56-57; 'Orotha-QodeshIII,pp. 349-350; 'Ikveiha-Tzon,p. 123. 101. Accordingto R. Kook,the Jewishpeople'suniquecomprehensivequalityof concentratingall powersand meshingthem into one coherentwhole gives rise to concomitantother qualities,just as one is not surprisedthatthe brainandheartof the individualorganismexhibit manifestationsof life thatare not foundin the restof the body ('Orot,p. 138, sec. 2). Because they containall tendencies,the Jewishpeople are moreproneto innerconflict.For the same reason,they are more self-sufficient.(ibid., p. 169). Anotherdifferenceis the creativepower of the historyand cultureof the Jewishpeople. The nationalculturesof othernationsmerely rearrangewhat alreadyexists in variousformsandconstellations;they describeandpreserve. But Jewish creativityis ex nihilo, true innovation('Orotha-QodeshIII, pp. 67-69). This is similarto the view of R. YehudahHalevi, who also held thatIsrael'suniquenessdid consist in its comprisingan organismseparatefrom the rest of humanity,but ratherin its servingas the heartof the generaluniversalorganism.Thereis no roomfor questionsof equalitywithin an organism,becauseall partsof the hierarchyworktogetherfor the commongood. It is only whenthe variouselementsareviewed in partial,individualtermsthatthereis roomfor talkof inequity. 102. 'Orot,p. 156, sec. 11.
BETWEENMETAPHYSICALAND LIBERALPLURALISM
99
seriously,for it thenbecomesa divisivefactor,ratherthanone thatcontributes to cohesion and synthesis. R. Kook's appeal to seculariststo adopt religiouspracticeis based on a sharedconcern for social cohesion. He assumes that for Jewish secular nationalists,social cohesion alone is an intrinsicvalue, and tolerationof religiousobservancemerelytheefficientmeansforobtainingthatend,once its pastrecordconvincesthemthatit is anessentialmeansof ensuringthenational existence.'"0For the religious, however, the secularists'concernfor social cohesionis in itself proofof theirrelevanceto the religiousidealof pluralistic harmony,and sufficientgroundsfor sufferingtheirpragmatismand lack of trueconviction.Thuseachcampassumesa hierarchyof valuesthatoverarches the values of the otherwithoutcancelingthem out, effectivelytransforming whateverdissonancesit is confrontedwith into a value compatiblewith its own point of view.'1" The appealfor tolerationon the partof the religiousderivesadditional supportfrom the faith that the beneficialinfluenceof a Torahway of life will eventuallywin out and be internalizedby the secularists.Nevertheless, what this strategyparadoxicallyachieves is that only the tolerationof the religious is based on regardfor pluralism(albeit of a limited, harmonistic sort)as an intrinsicvalue, whereassecularisttolerationfor religiouspractice is motivatedby merely prudentialconsiderations.1"' R. Kook does not take into account the possibility that secularism,on ideologicalgrounds,might be committedto a more radicalversionof pluralismthanhis, as an intrinsic value. R. Kook's uniqueview of the Jewishnation'sfunctionservesto explain some of the apparentinconsistenciesin his tolerationpolicieson the practical level. Tolerationof secularistshas its place so long as secularismmaintains some attachmentto the body of the nation as a whole.'" Secularistslike Eliezer Ben-Yehudah,who explicitly renouncedhis connectionwith the Jewish past, forfeit the right to tolerationnot only of their opinions, but even of their persons, because they introducean element of divisiveness 103. 'IgrotR'ayahI, pp. 100-101. 104. 'Orot, pp. 73-74; 'Iggerot R'ayah I, pp. 48-49.
105. For a modifiedversionof the moreusualsuggestionof a nmodus vivendibetweenthe religiousand secularcamps, which worksin reverse(appealingto the religiouson prudential grounds,in the interestof social cohesion, and to the secularistsin termsof theirideological commitmentto pluralism),see Hed, "TwoConceptsof Liberalism,"pp. 183-184. 106. 'IgrotR'ayahI, p. 311.
100
TAMARROSS
into Jewish life. R. Kook most likely viewed Ben-Yehudah'swillingnessto entertainthe Ugandaoptionanddivorcehimselffromthe benigninfluenceof of the futility living in the traditionalJewishhomelandas a finalconfirmation of encompassinghis views withinthe pluralistictotalityof Jewishcohesion. ReligiousCoercion Can tolerance of this kind be called liberal?If we restrictourselves to the level of unembodiedopinion, R. Kook's dialecticconcept of truth and unrestrainedespousal of pluralismmay afford some defense against the standardobjectionto absolutistreligion broughtby the pure relativist and the more moderateskeptic. His openness to rival notions of truthis obviouslymorecongenialto themthanthe standardreligiousview. But it just as obviously cannotsucceed in capturingthe full impactof modernsecular notions of toleration,once we consider R. Kook's reservationsregarding embodiedopinions which, in their concreteapplications,threatenhis ideal imageof social solidarity.Herewe mustask whetherit is practicallypossible to view any society as a whole, and Jewishsociety in particular,as a single moralentity,given the pervasivepluralismof modernliberalsocieties.In the absenceof a generalrecognitionof society as a moralentity,any attemptto establishsuch a status would seem to standin vulnerabletensionwith the ideal of modem secularliberalism. The modern secular liberal generally views society as the voluntary product of an arbitraryconvergence of individualinterests.In his eyes, society's value extendsjust so far as it serves and accordswith the private interestsof its individualmembers,whicharedeterminedby theirpreviously established,autonomouschoices. But wheneverthereis a definiteidealimage of society based on humansolidarity,and especiallywhen this is connected to religiousdevotion,we have a much greaterdemandfor a comprehensive common morality,and an insistenceon the need to make the whole moral climateof an existing nationalstate reflectthis ideal. In view of the natural diversityof humanideals, one would expect the membersof such a state to be subjectto at least some coercion.And the modem liberaloutlookfinds such coercionobjectionable. But even thoughR. Kook'scriterionfor limitingtoleration(a well-defined pictureof social cohesion)is morerestrictivethanthatof theusualideological tolerator(whose only bottomline is the undefinedpursuitof truthor freedom of expression),it is precisely our thirdand final determinantof toleration
BETWEENMETAPHYSICALAND LIBERALPLURALISM
101
(extent of self-restraintmandated,or degree of interventioncondoned)that is perhapsthe most crucial.Once we have establishedjust how far R. Kook will go in toleratingthe objectionablebefore intervening(threatto social cohesion),we mustask whatformof interventionhis oppositionentails.Will gentlepersuasionsuffice,or will he strivefor externallyimposedcoercionas well? At this point, our secular modernliberal may be mollifiedby another unexpectedtwist in R. Kook's tolerationpolicy. This is illustratedin an interestingexchangeof opinionswhich took place in the year 1920 between R. Kook and RabbiDr. BernardDrakhman,one of the leadersof religious In this exchange,R. Kook took issue with Zionism in the United States.10" Drachman'scall for a rapprochementbetween the secularZionist leaders and the religious Yishuv in the form of legislationenforcinghalakhahthat would leave the individualfree to retainhis own beliefs in private.Although thereis no doubtthat R. Kook agreedwith Drachman'sargumentsin favor of legislationof this kind (e.g., religion and nationalismare inseparablein Judaism,religionis the factorthatpreservesthe unityof the Jewishpeople), he opposedDrachman'sconclusion. The most significantfeatureof R. Kook'soppositionwas its rationale.The usual traditionalistjustificationfor delegitimizingpublic enforcementof halakhah,as we have noted above, rests on the tacticalconsiderationthat since in ourday andage societydisapprovesof coercion,one mayassumethat coercionwill not produceretroactivegratitude.But R. Kook'sargumentwas for religiousobservancewas a different;he held thatlegislatinga requirement policy of treatingsymptomssuperficiallythattypifiedthe Galutmentality.In the eraof Redemption,superficialobservanceof the mitzvotdoes not suffice. We need a religiouslife thatwill attractsecularistson its own merits,not out of a pragmaticmodus vivendi. Choices made from innerconvictionrather thanin obedienceto authorityarequalitativelysuperior,becauseautonomous decisionstrulyindicateand deepenresolve.108 107. For a discussion of this exchange, see Rivka Shatz, "R. Kook's Stand Regarding the Question of Religious Legislation in 1920" (Hebrew), Kivvunim 33 (1986): 101-104. 108. If the son's behavior is any measure of the father's policy, it is worth noting that R. Zvi Yehudah objected to nonobservant visitors donning a head covering merely out of deference to him when such practice was unaccompanied by inner conviction. He was also a card-carrying member of the League Against Religious Coercion until he became convinced that his unlikely colleagues had no comparable objection to the coercion of secular practices. See Yaron, Philosophy of R. Kook, p. 337, n. 40.
102
TAMARROSS
In tendering this argumentfor noncoercion,R. Kook introducedan additionalversion of toleration,sometimesknown as voluntarism,which standsbetweenthe prudentialistandideologicalvarieties.'09 Onthe one hand, this motivationneed not entail any compromisewith the certaintyof one objectivetruth.On the otherhand,it acceptspluralismnot merelyout of a realisticresignationto the brutefacts of life, butbecausea varietyof options is necessaryfor the exercise of truechoice andthe best meansfor verifying commitment.Thisjustificationfor tolerationis particularly suitedto religious systems,or to any moralsystem thatrequiresbehaviorbasedon decisionsof conscience,or genuineacceptance. Admittedly,the historyof halakhahindicatesthattherehas neverbeen a totalconsensusin Judaismregardingthisissue." At most,deliberateintention was consideredrequisiteto the fulfillmentof certainspecificmitzvot,without denyingthe value of routineor externallymotivatedobservancein general. Perhapsit is no mereaccidentof historythatone of the firstJewishversionsof the voluntaristargumentcan be foundin the writingsof MosesMendelssohn, who differentiatedbetween social deeds, whose value lies in the act itself, and religious deeds, which requireinnerconvictionin orderto bear merit. The special emphasisof both Mendelssohnand R. Kook on the importance of voluntarismcan be viewed as evidence of the same wish to explorethe possibilityof a new type of affinitybetweenthe politicaltemperfosteredby the ideal image of man in a religiousframework,andthe social idealsof the modem secularliberal. In termsof the thirdcriterionwe establishedfor distinguishingbetween prudentialand ideologicaltoleration(restraintfromintervention),R. Kook's convictionthatwe are on the brinkof messianictimes fortifieshis tendency to a policy of noninterventionthat extends beyond contingentpragmatic considerationsand approachesthe altruisticprincipleof total freedomof expression.His ability to see the modernappreciationof autonomyas the supremevalue as an indicationof the higherlevel of spirituality(worship out of love, or devequt)that he associateswith the messianicage could be viewed as a form of rapprochement with modernliberalism.
of this argument,see Locke'sEpistola 109. Forone of the earliestsystematicpresentations de Tolerantia,publishedin 1688. This most likely servedas the subsequentbasis for viewing autonomousdecisionas a necessaryprerequisiteof moralityin Kantianethics. 110. For sources,see Sagie, "JewishReligion."
BETWEENMETAPHYSICALAND LIBERAL PLURALISM
103
However, in view of R. Kook's vehementoutcriesagainst all manner of public desecrationof the Torahin the new Yishuv,it would be fair to andthat-unlike assumethateven herethe societalprincipleis notredundant, Mendelssohn-R. Kook would not have been preparedto supporta Jewish state which separatedchurchand state as a matterof principle."'Although he would have agreed with the altruistictoleratorthat one of the central functionsof communityis to guaranteeand foster liberty,he would most likely still have assertedthatto be free is not to be able to do whateverone chooses, but rather,the libertyto self-realizationthroughthe communalwill, or commonmorality. In this sense, even a more restrictiveview of society can have as its goal the developmentof individualsand the promotionof theirinterests,to the extent that true libertyis ultimatelyfound only withinthe largerwhole. Maimonides'defense of religiouscoercionwas correctin his time,"2because the professedwill of the nationwas to observemitzvot,and this definedthe individual'struewill as well, even when he was temporarilyovercomeby a conflictingpassion. One may assume that if the Sanhedrinhad been reinstatedby majority consent (a possibility that R. Kook actively sought to realize), R. Kook would have deemed all its coercive measuresas once again legitimate, because this very reinstatementwould have served as confirmationof the higher level of identitybetween the communalwill and the privatewill of its individualmembersenvisioned in the messianic age. Until such time, restraintfrom interferencein the form of religious legislation is called for only as long as, and to the extent that, society in general opposes such measures.But this certainlydoes not eliminatethe duty and right to persuasionby educationand all other democraticallyapprovedmeasures. If society opposes demonstrations,public agitation,or any other form of persuasion,the individualmust acquiescebecauseof his respectfor society, but not becausethese methodsare intrinsicallyinvalid."3 111. As proposed by Yesh'ayahu Leibowitz in his writings. See also Joseph Agassi, Religion and Nationality: Toward an Israeli National Identity,(Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Papyrus, 1984). 112. See n. 22. 113. Naphtali Berlin makes the same conjecture regarding R. Zvi Yehudah's position in "Why Did R. Zvi Yehudah Join the League Against Religious Coercion?" (Hebrew), Mahshevet ha-Dor, no. 1 (Jerusalem: Hamahon le-Limmud ve-'Iyyun be-Mishnat ha-R'ayah Kook Zatzal, 1991), pp. 21-23.
104
TAMAR ROSS
Summary In sum, R. Kook's position on tolerationis unusuallycomplex.It defies classificationby meansof the usualstereotypicaldivisionbetweenprudential (absolutist,religious)and ideological (relativist,secular)versionsof toleration. Its atypicalnaturestemsfrom the fact thatit restson a uniqueamalgam of disparatefactors,some tremendouslyliberating,and otherspointingjust as stronglytowardintolerantconstraint. R. Kook's undogmaticmetaphysicof truth,andthe fact thatit mandates a constantstruggleto refine particulartruth-assertions, tends to an attitude towardabstractopinionwhichis so liberalthatit hardlyqualifiesas toleration at all, becauseit is not in the least grudging. However, even on the level of unembodiedtruths,the harmonizing characterof thepluralismthatR. Kookfavorsservesas a restraining factor,for in the attemptto synthesizedifferencesin the contextof an overarchingtruth, theiroriginal significancecan be totally distorted.This intoleranttendency is furtheredthe momentR. Kook allows himself to overstepthe boundsof nonpaternalisticneutralityin the realm of practicalpolicy and specifically define in advance the natureof the overarchingtruthto be achieved, as he does when defining the specific characterof Jewish nationalismas a comprehensivereligiousurge. On the other hand, when R. Kook's messianicviews are coupledwith his definitionof Jewish nationalism,he is moved to delay coercivepolicies until they are assumed voluntarilyby the collective will of the nation,as befitsthe messianicage. But the fact thathe makesno principledobjectionto coercivepolitics, anddoes not shy awayfromagitatingfor the dominationof a collective will by democraticmeans,leads him back to a morerestrictive tolerationpolicy thatconsiderablylimits the parametersof pluralism. 7. Society and the Individual
Communitarianism In some respectsR. Kook'snotionof tolerationis stronglyreminiscentof the currentcritiqueof modem secularliberalismthathas come to be known claim that as communitarianism.114In the spiritof R. Kook,communitarians 114. For a more extensive account of communitarianism and its critique of liberalism, see Charles Taylor, "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-CommunitarianDebate," in Liberalism and the
BETWEENMETAPHYSICALAND LIBERALPLURALISM
105
liberalismcan manage to totally disregardthe notion of the generalgood only because it paintsa distortedpictureof man,ignoringwhat real people are like, denyingtheirbasic need for mutualrelationsand the fact thattheir individualnaturesareinevitablydeterminedwithinthe contextof community and tradition.Society, say the communitarians,is not merely a voluntary associationor a cooperativeventurefor mutualadvantage,whereeachperson participatesonly so faras it accordswithhis or herprivateinterests,andwhere the associationitself lasts only so long as it achievesa limited,agreed-upon aim. By providingthe ultimatedeterminingcontextwithinwhichindividual choices are recognizedand defined, society is essential to the individual's awarenessof his own individuality.The individualcannotexpresshimself fully except in relationto the broadercommunity.The broadercontext of it gives societyenablesthe individualto becomeconsciousof his particularity; him the backgroundthat enables him to abstracthimself from the whole. It is throughsociety that a person'splace in the communityis definitively recognizedandthathe comes to see whathe has it in himselfto be. The ideal relationbetween society and the individualis a dynamicone, accordingto which mutualadjustmentoccursbetweensociety andthe variousindividuals thatcompose it. Freedom, according to this conception,means more than merely the absenceof coercion.It also involvesa willingidentification witha community. Societiesbondedby thisfeelingof identification a require level of togetherness thatis dialogic ratherthanaggregate,a matterof whatwe sharein the sense of "for us," ratherthan a mere convergenceof interest.Sharingis itself a noninstrumental value in the contextof such a society,extendingbeyondthe merely convergentinterestsof a collection of individuals.The laws of that society have to be seen as reflectingextensionsof its collectiveself. Some Reservations is muchmore Clearly,the preferredpoliticalcultureof communitarianism of than that the liberal with extreme traditional compatible religiousvalues, in calling upon humanbeings to becomecovenantkeepers,and in tying the Moral Life, ed. Nancy L. Rosenblum (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989); Allen E. Buchanan, "Assessing the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism," Ethics 99 (July 1989): 852-882.
106
TAMAR ROSS
right to maximize their potentialfor happinessto theirresponsibilityfor a covenantedpartnershipwith otherhumanbeings.However,even the modem wouldmostlikelytakeissue withR. Kook'stoleration secularcommunitarian positionon severalaccounts. To begin with, he would say thatthereis simplyno workinganalogyof a nationalcommunityas R. Kook describesit. Firstof all, R. Kook'saccount of the natureand role of the nationunrealisticallyequivocatesbetweenthe mythic or metaphysicaland the empirical.Even on a purelymetaphysical level, theconceptof a collectivenationalqualityis problematic.Howdoes this metaphysicalqualityrelateto the individual,whose qualitiesare genetically determined?And on an empiric level, a nation is neithera "will" nor a personality.Nor can the nationalunit be properlycomparedto an organism. Nationalcommunitiesareproductsof law andof historicalaccident,whereas the analysis given by R. Kook is ahistorical.It ignoresthe role of real life andthe actualimpactof practicalpolitics. Secondly,R. Kook's view of nationalismfails to distinguishbetweenthe ethnicconceptof nationandthe modernpoliticalnotionof state,whichoften includesoverlappingboundariesor competingloyaltiesbothwithinthe state and without,e.g., between churchand state, or betweenminoritychurches and the official one. It specificallyoverlooksthe possibilityof a situation wherethe nationis composedof variousethnicandreligiousgroupsthatare not all Jewish,andthe only possiblecommonmoralityremainingmaybe the physicalprotectionof its citizens. If religiouspaternalismis to be condoned at all in such a state, then it mustevidenceequalconcernfor the observance of all religions. The same criticism can be leveled against R. Kook's account of the specific nature of the Jewish people. Can we identify the characteristic quality of Jewish peoplehoodthat he posits in the actual,concretenation of Israel?Does the Jewish nation really exhibit the yearningto reflectthe Ultimatein empiric,this-worldlyterms?(It is thismixingof the metaphysical and the historicalthat brings R. Kook to speak of a latentuniquenessthat does not always manifestitself overtly,thus transforminghis theoryof the uniquenessof the Jewishpeopleinto a statementthatcan neverbe falsified."5 When the facts deny it, we can say that it still lies burieddeep within the 115. Eliezer Goldman, "The Structuringof Rabbi Kook's Thought (1906-1909)" (Hebrew), Bar Ilan Annual 22-23 (1987): 115-116.
BETWEEN METAPHYSICALAND LIBERALPLURALISM
107
Jewish soul, and will emerge with the properconditions.No time limit is spelled out.) Although the secular communitarianmay sympathizewith R. Kook's societal extension of the Millian principle,he will neverthelessobject to violationof the rule of neutralitybeyondthe value of social cohesion.In his view, R. Kook's appeal for tolerationon the partof the secularistsmerely masqueradesas neutralby assuminga utilitariangarb, but is nevertheless un-Millianand partisanin actualfact, for the Milliandefenderof toleration would make his case withouttakingsides in the dispute.He may argue,of course, from certainpremises,but not from those premisesthat are partof the very disputebetweenthe contendingfactions.In the eyes of the secular communitarian,the doctrineof sharedinterestsin social cohesion may be construedas simply a gimmick on the partof the religiouswherebypublic expressionof the secularist'sembodiedvalues can be declaredoff-limitsas far as the state is concerned,while subtleargumentsare discoveredto show thatthe same values, in theirunembodiedform,are not reallysecularat all, but trulyreligiousstrivingsin disguise. The strengthof R. Kook's attemptto base the argumentfor interim tolerationon an appeal to a common interestin social cohesion lies in the fact thatit temporarilyallows each camp to be tolerantfor reasonswhich it recognizesas importantto itself. Butin actualfact the suggestedarrangement is very fragile, for the religious camp is basically maintainingthe status quo out of a secret hope that the secularistswill eventuallycome round to share their opinions, whereasall that has really been establishedin the secularcamp is a public policy that has not been internalized.In the long run,this policy requiresa moreconsiderablecommonmoralityin orderto be sustained.Failing this, one side or the othercould at any pointlose patience anddecide thatthe sacrificeis not worthit. If too muchtime elapseswithout any dramaticconversions,the religious may come to questionR. Kook's messianicconviction that nationalunity will eventuallycause the religious ideal to prevail.The secularist,on his part,may be promptedto ask: How much can reasonablybe expected of us? How long can we be expectedto alterourentirelifestyle simplyto accommodatethe needsof a minority,even when the minorityregardsits needs as mattersof principle? Given the peculiar,heterogeneouscharacterof the modernnation-state, and the fragilityof R. Kook's solutionin the face of persistentsecularism, the modern communitarianmay understandablyconclude that R. Kook's
108
TAMARROSS
formulafor an abidingsense of communityon the nationallevel cannotbe effective. Insteadof heavily ideologicalpretensions,perhapsa much more moderateconceptionof communityis called for,basedon a startingpremise of prudentialtolerationand the bareminimumof values whichall members of the nationcan honestlyshare.As one politicalphilosopherhas suggested: "In a liberalpluralistsociety we can at best have near-universalconsensus concerningbasic beliefs aboutjustice and toleration.Any strongersense of communitywould have to be found in varioussubnationalgroups,be they religious,ethnic,political,etc. Moreover,the libertiesthatare protectedin a liberalsociety shouldmakeit possiblefor peopleto freelyenterthesegroups and to form strongbonds within them. Thus, it may not be communityin some overarchingsense, but only a pluralityof communitiesthat can be possiblein liberalsociety.""6 Under such a regime, the religious Jew may still continue to retain somethingof R. Kook's ideologicalappreciationfor toleration.But the basis for this appreciationwill not be his metaphysicalassumptionsregarding the natureof society in general and the Jew in particular,but ratherthe understanding,shared by modem secularists,that belief of any sort, and particularlyreligiousbelief, requiresa certaindegreeof noncoercivenessin orderto avoid the dangerof hypocrisy,especially in the modernage. His tolerationmay be bolsteredby R. Kook'sdivergencefrom the stridenttruth claims of absolutist religion, but will truly avoid paternalismonly if his tentativelyassumedversion of truthdoes not presumeto includeall others, but only to be refinedby the dialoguewith them.The religiousJew need not give up the traditionalbelief that eventuallyall Jews, and all of mankind, will come roundto acceptanceof Torah.But this belief can be maintained indefinitelyalongside secularismonly if it is neutralizedinto a possibility whichis deferredto the invisiblydistantfuture,divorcedfromthe urgencyof immediatemessianicexpectations.R. Kook'soptimisticbelief thatideas do not come to the worldby chance,but only whenDivineProvidenceconsiders mankindto be ready for them, need not be translatedinto more explicit practicalconclusions. Existing secular societies do not tend to remakethemselveseither in the totally open image of the radicalpluralist'sdreamor in the traditional religionist'sparadigmof the closed society. The questionis always which 116. DavidD. Duquette,"LiberalPurposesandCommunity" (Paperpresentedat the Ninth AnnualSocial PhilosophyConference,DavidsonCollege,NorthCarolina,August1992).
BETWEEN METAPHYSICALAND LIBERALPLURALISM
109
of the two we accept as the ideal towardwhich we try to move. Thatis the real issue at stake between the proponentsof modernliberalpluralismand its critics,and it expressesitself in the tendencyto maximalistor minimalist notionsof liberty.R. Kook's tolerationtheorymay be viewed as an original and valiant,but necessarilyimperfect,attemptto straddlethe two options. As a postscriptI would like to addjust one more comment.It mightbe argued"'that the ability of the religiousbelieverto accommodatepluralism as an intrinsicvalue, as in the second variantof Position3, and not merely as an importantmeansfor discoveringtruth,as in the firstvariantof Position 3, reallymandatesa total revolutionregardingthe meaningof religioustruth statements-viewing these not as literallyinformativepropositionsaboutthe world, God, and historythat can be simply verifiedor falsifiedempirically, butas tools for establishingor expressinga set of valuesuncommittedto any hard-and-fastmetaphysicalor ontologicalassumptions. One of the least noted and appreciatedaspectsof R. Kook'sthoughtis the originalityand modernityof his approachin preciselythis area.We have alreadynoted R. Kook's view of truthformulationsas propositionsthatare liableto continualrefinementad infinitum.EventhoughtheymaynotshareR. Kook'sharmonisticview of truthas a hierarchyof validopinionsthatrelatein varyingdegreesto a commonroot,this view is similarin its epistemological modestyto thatof the criticalcognitivistspromotingthe firstformof Position 3. But thereis anotheraspect of R. Kook's view of truth,extendingbeyond the fallibilism of the critical cognitivists and approximatingmore recent approachesto the philosophy of science and to epistemology,that fosters the second form of Position 3. This consists of R. Kook'sawarenessof the limitationsimplicitin any finiteformulationof reality,andhis understanding of the searchfor truthmore as a matterof paradigmsacceptedand rejected in terms of their suitabilityto the currentspiritualand moralneeds of the specificcommunityconcerned,thanof certainty,proof,andeven irreversible disproof. R. Kook, however, never understoodthis view of truthas groundsfor pure relativism,or reductionof religiouscommitment.All thatit meantfor him was that instead of facticity being the ultimatetest of "truth"in the religious sense, the real measureof such statementsis pragmatic;i.e., the extent to which they lend significanceto the values they strive to embody andcontributeto theirflourishing. 117. See Sagie, "Jewish Religion."
110
TAMAR ROSS
Moreover,R. Kookdid not developtheseideasin theformof a rigorously articulatedand full-blownphilosophy;its kernelscan only be gatheredfrom various significantinstances where he implementedthis view in practice in order to assess the relative validity of rival truthclaims. But it is this aspect of R. Kook's thought,if it ever were to be absorbedfully into the mainstreamthinkingof traditionalJudaism,thatmightprovidetheunexpected impetusfor a new climateof discourse,andthe explorationof freshmodesof accommodationby the religiouscampto the modemsecularliberaloutlook, on groundsthatlie beyondthe prudential. On the otherhand,perhapsthe good healthof popularreligionrequires thatthis possibilitytoo remaina messianicdreamthatis best deferredto the invisibly distantfuture.At any rate, all this is alreadymaterialfor another topic and anotherpaper. TamarRoss BarIlanUniversity Dept.of Philosophy
Review: The Sheffield Dictionary of Classical Hebrew Author(s): Gary A. Rendsburg Source: AJS Review, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1996), pp. 111-118 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Association for Jewish Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1486655 . Accessed: 11/07/2011 16:16 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup. . Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact
[email protected].
Cambridge University Press and Association for Jewish Studies are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to AJS Review.
http://www.jstor.org
REVIEW ESSAY THE SHEFFIELD DICTIONARY OF CLASSICAL HEBREW by GARYA. RENDSBURG David J. A. Clines, ed. The Dictionary of Classical Hebrew. Vol. 1: Aleph.
Sheffield:SheffieldAcademicPress, 1993. 475 pp. It is not difficultto see the massive amountof excellentwork thatwent into the productionof this new dictionaryof ancientHebrew.Unfortunately, it is equallyeasy to see its faultsand failings. Firstlet us set the book underreview in the contextof otherdictionaries of ancient Hebrew.The two standardworks of Biblical Hebrewcurrently in use are BDB (Brown-Driver-Briggs, Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament, 1907) and HALAT (Koehler-Baumgartner,Hebrdiisches und Aramiiisches Lexikon zum Alten Testament, 1967-90, this work has now
begun to appearin English translation).Both of these are based on older works, the formergoing ultimatelyback to Gesenius(1815) and the latter basedon an earlierworkby the same authors(1953). Mostimportantly, both works rely heavily on etymologies, and both are limited solely to Biblical Hebrew(with additionalsectionson BiblicalAramaic). By contrast,the presentproject,headedby D. J. A. Clines, calls itself The Dictionary of Classical Hebrew (hereafter DCH), by which is meant all
sourcesof the Hebrewlanguageup to 200 C.E.Accordingly,this worklists all words occurringin the Bible, inscriptions,Ben Sira,Qumran,NahalHever, WadiMurabba'at,etc. The nonbiblicalmaterialscompriseabout 15 percent of the corpus. Because of the expandedcorpus and because of the larger amountof informationit includes,this new dictionarywill, uponcompletion, AJS Review 21/1 (1996): 111-118
111
112
GARYA. RENDSBURG
be more than double the size of HALATand nearlyfour times the size of BDB. The projectplan calls for eight volumeswith an estimated3,835 total pages. DCH departsfromits predecessorsin listingno etymologies.The editors believe that (I use thepluralformto referto Clinesandhis staffof researchers) the presenceof cognatematerialin otherdictionaries"is highlyproblematic, and it is difficult to see what purposeit serves,"and that "dataabout the meaningof cognatewordsin AkkadianandArabic,for example,arestrictly irrelevantto the Hebrewlanguage"(p. 17). Thus, instead of emphasizingthe meaningsof words with attentionto etymology,DCH emphasizesthe uses of words.Orin the editors'words:"we subscribeto the dictumthatthe meaningof a wordis its use in the language. The focus here, then, is not so much on the meanings,or the translation equivalents,of individualwordsas on the patternsandcombinationsin which wordsareused;andattentionis paidprimarilynot to the unusualanddifficult words but to the common words" (pp. 14-15). With this in mind, DCH displays "in exhaustivedetail, all the subjectsand objects that are attested for every verb, and for nouns, all the verbs and all the other nouns with whichthey are connected"(p. 15). (As we.shallsee withourexamplebelow, the informationpresentedis in fact even more complete.)This featureis undoubtedlythe most importantcontributionof this dictionary.' To take an example, let us look at the common noun 'xT.The entry is divided into four sections, based on the differentuses of the word: "humanity,people," "individual,""the man"(with article),and "son of a person,individual"(in the specificexpressiontr7?1:). Underthe firstof these definitionsthe entry presentsthe following information:the approximately T'51,a~n, mD, pTyp forty verbs predicatedof nxNas subject p , Kt, (r'n,, and nominal clauses such as "m so n?v, on); ?mt, n', ?ttn, wS,, ~t, ino, of as verbs which vix serves the object D•T(Ps 144:3); approximatelythirty (nri, wi, 5, at, nsr,;'a, ~ nn, , etc.); dozens of constructphraseswith v uN[1QS 0tt serving as both nomen regens and nomenrectum(e.g., nai 11:9], •'N :a [Gen 8:21], etc.); appositionalusages (in this case there is but one: 'tV T'r t [Isa 22:6]); adjectivesattachedto nu8 (e.g., Yi in Ps 140:2);prepositionsused with the word (most of the standardones [-:, -5, V), etc.). Also, -=, p7, etc.]); and finally various collocations(with anumn, 1. The fourth and final volume of HALAT moved in this direction, though not with the completeness of DCH; see my review in AJS Review 18 (1993): 95-102.
THE SHEFFIELDDICTIONARYOF CLASSICAL HEBREW
113
scatteredthroughoutthe entry are indicationsof various words found in parallelismwithotM(e.g., u'•, ynx, etc.). And all of this appearsonly in the firstsection of the entry,under"humanity,people."For the following three sections correspondingto the otheruses of t1u, the same wealthof detailed informationis found. It is the totalityof these datathatI had in mind when I opened this review by referringto "themassiveamountof excellentwork that went into the productionof this new dictionary."This approachto the Hebrewvocabularyrepresentsa majordeparturefromall previouseffortsin the field of Hebrewlexicography. But I also referredat the outset to the faults andfailingsof DCH, and it is to these thatI now turnmy attention. First,one mustquestionvery seriouslythe decisionnot to includecognate material.I includehere severalsamplesof errorswhich can arisefrom such omissions.The hapax legomenonD't? in Isa 19:3 is listed as a pluralnoun (in bracketsto indicatethatthe form meaning"ghosts"underthe entry is not attested)with the note "sg.'i.p perh.Og or Og" (p. 202). Attentionto etymology, however, reveals that the word is a borrowingfrom Akkadian e.temmu"spiritof the dead."'While it is true that native Hebrewspeakers may have understoodm'tr as a pluralnoun, therecertainlyis no absolute proof of this. Since in origin the mem is partof the word,listing the entry under and suggestingthe above singularformsarebothinappropriate. 'p. in Deut 33:2 is to be DCH assumesthatthe famouscrux Similarly, mrl,•t understoodas comprisingthe vocables "fire"andnT"law,"thoughat least the partialdisclaimer"appar."is addedI,,(p. 401). But a glance at etymology reveals, as any Hebraistknows, that nT is a Persianloanwordin Hebrew. Do the editors of DCH assume that Deuteronomy33 was authoredin the Persianperiod?Clearlythe poem is muchearlier,andobviouslynirv means somethingelse.3 As these two examplesplainly indicate,lexicographicalresearchcannot proceed as if the language in questionexisted in a vacuum.If the editors wish to eschew cognates,fine,butat the veryleastloanwordsdemandspecial attention.The user of the dictionaryis entitledto know, for example,that the hapaxlegomenonp•t "linen"in Prov7:16 is a loanwordfromEgyptian, 2. Cf. H. R. [C.] Cohen, Biblical Hapax Legonzena in the Light of Akkadian and Ugaritic (Missoula, Mont., 1978), p. 42.
3. For a survey of opinions, see G. A. Rendsburg,"HebrewT'dtand Ugariticidymn," Journal of Northwest Semitic Languages 8 (1980): 81-84.
114
GARYA. RENDSBURG
especially since this word occurs in the constructphrase ,'1t T1u in its only attestation(as DCH notes [p. 202]). Similarly,the readerwould be enlightenedto learn that the hapax legomenonI'niM'tM"hertowers"in Jer 50:15 (listed under in,•v in brackets[p. 413]) is a loanwordfromAkkadian as tu,4 an importantpoint in light of the fact thatthe sole occurrenceof this wordappearsin the prophet'soracleto Babylonas an exampleof whatI call addressee-switching.And, of course,a varietyof Persianloanwordsattested only in books of the exilic periodshouldbe so indicated. The editorsmay respondto my criticismwith theiraforecitedstatement that"attentionis paid primarilynot to the unusualand difficultwordsbut to the commonwords."But this disclaimeris no compensationfor the kindof omissions (and, in some cases, errors)thatI am pointingout regardingrare words. even Furthermore, cognateevidencesometimesaffectsourunderstanding of commonwords.DCH continuesthe time-honoredtraditionof translating as "fireoffering"(p. 411). But Ugariticinstructsus thatwe are dealing ;nW.differentroots, for in this language"fire"is ist, and the rarerword with shouldbe disassociatedfrom ttxrand itt means "gift, offering."5Thus, .W with no connectionto fire. insteadshouldbe rendered"gift,offering" I turnnow to anotherissue. The editorsdecidedto close theircorpusat 200 C.E.The reasonfor thisis clear:to haveadjustedit by anotherfew decades would have entailedincorporatinga vast amountof additionalmaterialfrom the Mishnah and the Tosefta (perhapsalso various tannaiticmidrashim, dependingon one's view as to the dateof the Mekhiltaandothertexts).One why certainlycan empathizewith the dilemma,andone can fully understand these materialswere not includedin the corpus.To have includedtannaitic sourceswould have madethe projectall the moremassive,andI can imagine thatmany more years would have passedbeforethis firstvolumeappeared. And yet if the editorswere fully to be faithfulto theirgoal of producinga dictionarythat "differsfrom traditionalHebrewlexica in thatit designates anddefinesa phaseof the languageas ClassicalHebrew"(p. 14), they would have included tannaitictexts as well. The phase of the languageknown alternativelyas MishnaicHebrewor moreproperlyTannaiticHebrewis part andparcelof ClassicalHebrew.Some may argueotherwise;but everyone,I 4. See Cohen, Biblical Hapax Legomena, pp. 46-47. 5. See most recently J. C. Greenfield, "Etymological Semantics," Zeitschriftfiir Althebraistik 6 (1993): 26-37, in particular pp. 33-34.
THE SHEFFIELDDICTIONARYOF CLASSICAL HEBREW
115
think,would agreethatif a dictionarywere to includeNahalHeverandWadi Murabba'attexts, then certainlytannaitictexts should be includedtoo. To illustratethis point,in its entryfor ',nxR "guarantor" (p. 195),DCH listsjust one attestation,Murabba'at30 2:24. But this wordoccursseveraladditional times in the Mishnahand Tosefta,and the user of DCH would benefitfrom this knowledge.Again, I understandhow muchmoreworkwouldhave been involved by extendingDCH's corpusto the Mishnahand relatedtexts; but on the other hand the databasealreadyexists in microficheform in The HistoricalDictionaryof the HebrewLanguage:Materialsfor theDictionary, Series I: 200 BCE-300 CE (Jerusalem,1988), producedby the Academyof the HebrewLanguage.In fact, the editorsstatethattheyutilizedthis valuable resourcefor most of the Dead Sea Scrollsvocabulary(p. 31). AnothercriticismI shallraiseconcernsemendations.The editorsof DCH decided "as a rule to include all emendationsthat are adopted"in BDB, KB/HALAT,and BHS (p. 17). "But we never say whetherwe agree with an emendationor not; . . . our policy has been to avoid makingjudgments on such issues" (ibid.). I am in full agreementwith this position,but one mustquestionwhy list proposedemendationsat all. The editorsstateclearly that "unlikeprevious dictionaries[DCH] has a theoreticalbase in modem linguistics"(p. 14). I know of no linguistic approachwhich would waste time andspace dealingwith proposedemendations.Avi Hurvitzis absolutely correctwhen he states that "a linguistic study whose centralpurposeis to seek facts and avoid conjectures,shouldbase itself on actualtexts--difficult texts."6And while thoughthey may be-rather thandependon reconstructed I do not accuseDCH of basingitself on emendations,the very mentioningof themin the entriesof individualwordswill lead usersof the dictionaryaway fromthe work's statedgoal. Thereare some very useful featuresin this work.Eachentrybegins with the numberof occurrencesin each of the subcorpora.Forexample,we learn thatp•) occurs 790.55.228.3 times, referring,respectively,to the Bible, Ben Sira,the Dead Sea Scrolls,andinscriptions.In additionthereis an exhaustive table listing "WordsBeginning with Aleph in Orderof Frequency"(pp. 67-88), taking us from the ubiquitousnr with 11,826 occurrencesto the severalhundredinstancesof wordswhichoccuronly once (mostof theseare propernames). 6. A LinguisticStudy,of the RelationshipBetweenthe Priestly Sourceand the Book of Ezekiel (Paris, 1982), p. 19.
116
GARY A. RENDSBURG
As just indicatedin the parentheticremark,DCH includes all proper names, both personal names and toponyms.The former appearin large numbersnot only in the Bible, butalso in inscriptions,especiallyseals.It is a majoradvanceof this dictionaryto includeall such data.Whenwe combine this exhaustivenesswith the distributiongiven, we learn at an instantthat a name such as 0.0.0.3 times, appearsonly in inscriptions. "1rn, occurring The entrythenlists the specificoccurrences,one of whichis in Aradostracon 21 and two of which are on seals (p. 290). Toponymsare includedwith specific geographicinformationwhere available.Thus, for example, since little or nothingis known aboutaDn,the entrystatessimply"secondstation of exodus"(p. 461); in contrastto the entryfor Mum, which states"townin JordanValley,appar.ident. with Adamah,T. ed-Damye,S of confluenceof JabbokandJordan"(p. 129). The volume closes with a reverseEnglish-Hebrewindex.It appearsthat only wordsrepresentingprimaryglosses are included.Thus,for example,to cite some of the words discussedbelow, neither"lamb"nor "army"is listed in this index. I appendhere commentson selectedentries,recognizingfully thatsome of my remarksdevolve from attentionto cognate usage (I have omitted referencesto secondaryliterature): 1u/wS:This Ketiv/Qereoccurs in Prov 31:4, but means neither"or"(p. is "any"(relatedto the 147) nor "where?"(p. 202). The best interpretation ') as and the Ugariticcognateay negative particle "not") both the context demonstrate. 1at(p. 151): The gloss given is "bodyor perh.belly";but given the use of this wordin Ugaritic,specificallyin Krt88, 178, whereit refersto a large army,the meaning"body"is assuredand"belly"can be dismissed. 1•m(p. 164): DCH errs in continuingthe identificationof Ur of the Chaldees with the famous Ur "in southernBabylon, on right bank of Euphrates,mod. T. el-Muqayyar."There simply is no evidence for this identification.Instead,Abraham'sUr shouldbe identifiedwith modem Urfa in southernTurkey(nearHarran),which not only accordswith local Jewish and Muslim tradition,but truly is "beyondthe River,"to use the biblical expression. p~t"weigh"(p. 170): Somewherethe readershouldbe apprisedthatthe Semitic root of "weigh"is wzn, not to be confusedwith the wordfor "ear,
OFCLASSICAL HEBREW THESHEFFIELD DICTIONARY
117
hear,"whose root is 'dn. Note that these two words have only one root consonantin common. ?:?t "eat" (pp. 240-245): Somewherein this long entry should be a referenceto the sexual usage of this verbalroot, seen most clearlyin Prov 30:20, but also in Gen 39:6 andperhapsin Exod 2:20. z'iM (pp. 277-286, especially p. 286): The word appears2,848 times in the corpus. Accordingto DCH it always means "God,god, gods, etc.," except in 1 Sam 28:13 r1"• I, jp Y vwl', t'Lt, whereDCH uses the gloss "ghost,"thoughit rendersthe phrase"agod (Samuel)I haveseen risingfrom the ground."This is an admittedlydifficultphrase,but the usage is clear.In Egypt and elsewhere in antiquity,and no doubtin popularbelief in ancient Israel, the dead were considereddivine. These words in the mouthof the mediumof Endorindicatethat she consideredthe deceasedto be gods, and needs to be a pluralsubject.I in any case the pluralverb shows that et,,rM suggest"gods (i.e., the deifieddead) I have seen risingfromthe ground." (p. 300): This word is a hapaxappearingin Prov30:31. The gloss afterwhich appearseveralsuggestionsbased reads tlap, "God,i.e. var.of at on emendations. aI,,.," Only the end of the entrydoes DCH note "the mainly In as a army" possibility. my estimation,this is the only meaningthatmakes in the context,though"thekinsfolk"or "thetribe"wouldbe more sense any precise.This understandingis based on Arabic,where the phraseal-qawm means"thekinsfolk"or "thetribe."Note thatProv30:1-31:9 are the words of Massaitekings of the SyrianDesert, whose languagein antiquitywould have hadmuch in commonwith bothAramaicandArabic,as a quickglance at these chaptersdemonstrates.This factorexplainsthe presenceof a pure Arabismin the Bible. ?E: This phraseoccurs in Gen 49:21 and has elicited much dis"i 'nnx cussion. DCH assumes it means "words of beauty"(p. 326) or through of beauty"(p. 314), andonly tertiarilysuggests emendation"branches/antlers "lambsof beauty."I find this last interpretation the most convincingby far, andthe worddeservesits own entry(on p. 326 under thereaderis directed .nN wordfor "lamb," elsewhere).The word is cognateto the commonAramaic andit is no surpriseto see this lexeme in the wordsaboutNaphtali,one of the northernmost tribes.It stands,therefore,as an exemplarof IsraelianHebrew. "hero"(p. 365) and "altarhearth"(p. 377): Somewherethe reader occurs ?'I?. in MeshaStele, line 12, whichhas been *,xshouldlearnthat 5tv"t interpretedas eitherof these rarewords.
GARY A. RENDSBURG
118
I am quite sure thatthe scholarsresponsiblefor this dictionarywill read my review and claim thatI have misunderstoodtheirgoals of concentrating on uses of wordsinsteadof meanings,andof devotingmostof theireffortsto thesepoints;I commendthe the commonwordsin the language.I understand researchersinvolved in this projectfor the majorstridestakento achieving theirstatedgoals; and I recognizethe majorcontributionsthatthis important referencework makes. My negativecommentsare a reactionmainlyto the claim that cognates "are strictly irrelevantto the Hebrewlanguage,"as I hope to have demonstratedin this essay. AdmittedlyI have concentratedmy -effortsin thisreviewon the rarewordsin thelanguage,somethingwhichDCH professesnot to have done.But thenone mightask,why botherincludingrare wordsat all, especiallythe hundredsof propernames?If thedictionarywished to deal mainly with the uses of a word, and not its meanings,presumably a criticalmass of data is necessaryby which to ascertainsuch information. The point is that DCH chose to be exhaustive,and to includeall words in the language(as opposedto dealingonly with wordswhichoccur,let us say, at least ten times in the corpus).Havingmadethatchoice, I believe thatthe projectneeds to devote additionalenergies to these rarerlexemes, and of courseit is specificallythese items whichrequirean eye to cognateusages. In sum, one is temptedto recall H. L. Ginsberg'sdictum concerning Ugariticstudiesand apply it to Clines and his staff:the only ones who have not made errorsin writingdictionariesare those who have not attemptedto do so. Clines himself anticipatedsome of the criticismsof this essay with the following words:"Criticscan easily thinkof manythingswe mighthave done, and blame us for these omissions.They have alreadystartedto make suchcriticisms,and most of theircriticismsarevalid.In the end, though,we have to say that we preferour way of writinga Hebrewdictionaryto their way of not writing a Hebrewdictionary"(p. 10). Yet, at the same time, I cannothelp but feel thatjust a little moreworkin selectedareaswouldhave increasedthe value of this projectimmensely. CornellUniversity Ithaca,N.Y.
Review: Judah halevi's "The Kuzari" in French Author(s): Seymour Feldman Source: AJS Review, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1996), pp. 119-123 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Association for Jewish Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1486656 . Accessed: 11/07/2011 16:16 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup. . Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact
[email protected].
Cambridge University Press and Association for Jewish Studies are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to AJS Review.
http://www.jstor.org
REVIEW ESSAY JUDAH HALEVI'S THE KUZARI IN FRENCH by SEYMOURFELDMAN CharlesTouati,trans.Le Kuzari:Apologiede la religionmdprisee.Louvain: Peeters,1994. xvi, 252 pp. A year before his death in 1141, the great Hebrewpoet of medieval SephardicJewryJudahHalevi wrote a prose work in which he took up his pen on behalf of Judaism.Writtenduringthe Second Crusade,the Kuzari reflects not only the conflict between Christianityand Islam, but also the currentprecariousposition of Jewry,especially at the time of the Spanish Reconquista.Unlike most Jewish polemicalworks,the Kuzariis writtenin the formof a dialogue.In this respectit resemblesPeterAbelard'sDialogue Betweena Philosopher,Jew and Christian,writtenaboutthe sametime. Whatmakes the Kuzariespecially interesting,and perhapsunique,as a polemicalworkis thatit is rootedin historicalfact:therewas a Khazarnation located in southernRussia whose ruling class had convertedto Judaism during the eighth century.Over time a traditionhad developed that the conversionwas the result of a debate amongstrepresentativesof Judaism, Christianity,and Islam. Halevi used this piece of historicalfact and legend as the stage-settingfor his apologiafor Judaism.But he madeone significant change: he added a philosopherto the debate. Indeed, as one reads the treatise, one sees quite clearly that Halevi was more worriedabout the threatof philosophy to Judaismthan he was about the challengesposed by Christianityand Islam. After all, the latteradmittedthat in some sense Judaismwas true;philosophy,as Haleviunderstoodit, deniedor was skeptical AJSReview21/1 (1996):119-123
119
120
FELDMAN SEYMOUR
aboutthe truthof any revealedreligion.Thatthe philosopherspeaksfirstin the debateand soon leaves is misleading:his presenceis felt throughoutthe treatise;indeed,thereis more discussionof philosophyin books 4 and 5 of the workthanin books 1-3. Halevi's anxiety about philosophyparallelsthe Muslim Al-Ghazzali's concern a half-centuryearlier; in fact, several scholars have argued for the influence of Al-Ghazzaliupon Halevi. Be that as it may, it is certain that Halevi wants to draw a sharpdistinctionbetweenprophetictruthand philosophicalspeculation,which, he claims, is really irrelevantto religion even when true. Accordingly,Halevi is a medievalthinkerwhom modems of a certainpersuasionshould welcome, especially those who are fond of Kierkegaard,Buber,or Wittgenstein. Writtenin a beautifulclassical Arabic, the Kuzariwas translatedinto Hebrew shortly after its initial appearanceby the "fatherof translators," Judahibn Tibbon.However,it was not too popular,since it appearedat the high point of Jewish Aristotelianism.For a morepositivereceptionit had to wait until the Renaissance,especiallyin Italy,wherein a Platonist-humanist environmentit fared better,receiving its most detailedcommentaryat the hands of the Mantuanrabbi JudahMoscato (fl. latterhalf of 15th cent.). Since then the Kuzarihas become a classic of medievalHebrewliterature andJewishreligiousthought. Yet the contemporaryreaderwho has no Arabic or Hebrewhas been frustrated.Forin spiteof the Kuzari'sestablishedpositionin Jewishliterature, it did not fare well in the handsof its translatorsor editors.The Kuzariwas translatedinto Latin (1660) and Spanish (1663); in the latterhalf of the nineteenthcentury David Cassel renderedit into German.But all these translationswere made from the Hebrewtranslationof ibn Tibbon,which itself had not yet received a critical edition. In 1887 HartwigHirschfeld publishedthe firstcriticaleditionof the Arabictext alongwith a revisedtext of the ibn Tibbontranslation.In 1905 he publishedan Englishtranslation, which has been reissued recently by Schocken. Partialtranslationshave appearedin Frenchby M. Ventura(1932) and in Englishby I. Heinemann (1947); but only the latter is availablein print. So for one who reads no Arabicor Hebrewthe only optionshavebeenHirschfeld'sEnglishtranslation or Heinemann'sselections;or one could tryto get Cassel'sGermanrendition at a good universitylibrary.(Thelate LawrenceBermanbegana new English
THEKUZARIIN FRENCH
121
translation,but it was unfinishedat the time of his untimelydeath;it is now being completedby BarryKogan.) Thingschangedradicallytwentyyearsago when DavidBaneth'scritical editionof the Arabictext was publishedposthumouslyin Jerusalem(1976). Althoughhe madeuse of Hirschfeld'sedition,Banethutilizedthe corrigenda suggestedby several scholarswho had closely examinedHirschfeld'stext shortly after it appeared.An excellent Arabist and medievalist,Baneth supplementedthese correctionswith his own emendationsand supplieda new criticalapparatus.His editionis trulythe criticaleditionof the Kuzari. Fouryearsearlier,however,a new Hebrewtranslationhadbeenpublished in Tel Aviv by Judah ibn Shmuel. This Hebrewversion was based upon the earliercorrectionsof Hirschfeldas well as the unpublishedArabictext of Baneth and the critical editing of the ibn Tibbon translationby such scholarsas A. Zifroni.This new Hebrewedition,whichis availableboth in hardcoverand paperback,has several virtues:an informativeintroduction, usefulnotes,andvaluableglossariesandindices.Nevertheless,the translation itself has some vices, particularlyits reorderingof paragraphsand frequent paraphrasing. For all these reasons Charles Touati's new French translationof the Kuzariis most welcome. Based upon Baneth'sArabicedition as well as a comparativeanalysis of the ibn Tibbon translation,it satisfies the two essential criteriathat a good translationought to satisfy:(1) fidelityto the originallanguageand thoughtof the text;and (2) readabilityin the language of the translation.Its accuracyis clearly superiorto all existing versions. Touati'sFrenchreadssmoothlyandfelicitously.Quitevaluablearehis notes, which frequentlyclarify difficult textual problemsin the Arabic and ibn Tibbontexts. He has also provideda brief introductiondescribingthe main themes in Halevi's conceptionof Judaism.Touatiis presentlypreparinga comprehensivestudyof Halevi'sreligiousthought. The best way to see the significanceof this translationis to juxtapose severalpassagesfrom the FrenchandEnglishtranslations. 1. Since one of the main bones of contentionbetweenphilosophyand revealedreligionis the very possibilityof revelation,it is crucialto have all those passages in the Kuzarithat deal with this issue accuratelytranslated. Let us look at 1.6: If anyoneis to be guidedin mattersdivine,andto be convinced Hirschfeld: thatGodspeaksto man,whilsthe considersit to be improbable, he mustbe
122
SEYMOURFELDMAN
convincedof it by himselfby meansof generallyknownfacts,whichallow no refutation,and particularlyimbuehim with the belief that God has spokento man. Touati:"Si l'on d6sire dirigerquelqu'undans la parolede Dieu et lui faire admettrecommevraique Dieu parle l'homme,ce qu'il tientpourimprobable, on doit lui presenterdes preuves manifesteset irrefutables;et encore se laissera-t-ildifficilementpersuaderque Dieu a parlda un mortel. The Arabic term wa-bil-'hray which introduces the italicized phrase in the translations above is not properly renderedin Hirschfeld nor in any of the ibn Tibbon versions. This term implies a reservation. Thus, the phrase is to be rendered as: "nevertheless, he will allow himself to be persuaded only with difficulty that God speaks to a mortal" (my translation of Touati's French). This important qualification is lost in the English translation. 2. In 1:15 the Rabbi responds to the King's criticism that his opening speech lacks universal theological content and unduly focuses upon particular historical facts as follows: Hirschfeld:Surely, the beginningof my speech was just the proof, and so evidentthatit requiresno otherargument. Heinemann:But the beginning of my speech was the very proof, yea the evidence ... Touati:Mais c'est justementmon pr6amblequi constituema d6monstration: je me fondaissur l'exp6riencesensibleque se passede preuveset de demonstration. The two English translations, as well as ibn Shmuel's Hebrew version, fail to bring out Halevi's important point that for the Jew historical facts directly experienced, and not theological arguments,are the proof of Judaism.Touati's French accurately and nicely expresses the original Arabic, which I render as follows: "The beginning of my speech is the proof; indeed, it is the sensible experience, which dispenses with inference and demonstration. 3. 4:3 is one of the most important passages in the entire treatise. There Halevi presents his view of prophetic cognition. He wants to stress the fact that the prophet is capable of having a direct, immediate "acquaintance"with God, whereas the philosopher can only know God by abstractreasoning and description. The passage is translatedas follows: Hirschfeld:It [the divine]can be designatedby propheticor visionarymeans.
IN FRENCH THEKUZARI
123
Heinemann:No, God can be designatedby Propheticvision and throughthe
spirit. et le regardint6rieur. Touati:Eh bien, il ist vis6 parle vision proph6tique
Although Heinemann's"throughthe spirit"takes a stab at the original, Hirschfeldmisses the markaltogether.The Arabicbastrarefersto a mental insight or intuition, which Touati's"regardint6rieur"approximatesmore closely. 4. At the end of 4:3 Halevi discusses the significanceof the Tetragrammaton,which Israelitespronounceas "Adonai."The truepronunciation were knownonly by the prophetsand and meaningof the Tetragrammaton the high priest. Halevi uses this point to again differentiateprophecyfrom philosophy. whichstandsat suchan immeaAdonai... pointsto something Hirschfeld: surablealtitudethat a real designationis impossible.Indicationis possiblein
onedirectiononly.
Touati:Le nom Adonay... est commela vis6e d'unecertaineentit6concrete,
bienque,en soi, Dieusoit trop61ev6pour8trevis6 commeunetreconcret; touteperception duconcret,eneffet,n'appr6hende qu'unaspectparmid'autres (bi-jihatindunajiha).
Here Halevi is pointing to the extreme difficultyof speakingaboutGod, especially when we do not know His propername.At best we can referto Godby a namethatis a kindof aliasenablingus to knowGodin someway or another.For example,as Adonaiwe know God to be merciful;as Elohimwe referto God as just. This importantpointis correctlybroughtout in Touati's translationbut is utterlylost or garbledin the Englishof Hirschfeld.(Nor is it correctlyrenderedby ibn Shmuel.) Thesepassagesclearlyshow the virtuesof Touati'stranslation.At present it is the most reliableandreadableversionof the Kuzari.Indeed,it is a model for all futuretranslationsof worksof this genre.Weowe him a greatdebt. RutgersUniversity New Brunswick,N.J.
Review: [untitled] Author(s): Jerome A. Lund Source: AJS Review, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1996), pp. 125-127 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Association for Jewish Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1486657 . Accessed: 11/07/2011 16:16 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup. . Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact
[email protected].
Cambridge University Press and Association for Jewish Studies are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to AJS Review.
http://www.jstor.org
BOOK REVIEWS Isaac Rabinowitz. A WitnessForever: Ancient Israel's Perception of Literature and the Resultant Hebrew Bible. Occasional Publications of the Departmentof
NearEasternStudiesandthe Programof JewishStudies,CornellUniversity. Bethesda,Md.: CDL Press, 1993. xvii, 148 pp. This posthumousvolume serves both as a tributeto the scholarlycareer of Isaac Rabinowitzand as a fitting inauguralvolume for the Occasional Publicationsseries of the Departmentof Near Eastern Studies and the Programof Jewish Studies at CornellUniversity.The volume containsan index combiningsubjectmatter,Hebrewterms,and biblicalcitations,and a bibliographyof the author.In addition,David I. Owen and Ross Brann,in theirafterwords,contributeappropriateremarksaboutthe author,giving us insightinto his personalityandcareer. Rabinowitzfocuses on the questionof how ancientIsraelperceivedits own literatureand proceedsto demonstratethe relevanceof this perception to the understandingof the natureand functionof the HebrewBible. He developshis monographin six chapters. Chapter1 concerns ancient Israel's assumptionsabout the natureand power of words. Accordingto Rabinowitz,the ancientIsraelitesdid not see wordsmerelyas linguisticsymbolsof referents,as we do today,butas identical with the referents,possessingextraordinary attributesandpowers.Wordand were Words were taken to be concentratedessences or reality inseparable. innercharactersof their respectivereal referents.The degreeof powerof a worddependeduponthe "soul"whichutteredit. Readersinfluencedby James Barrwill find Rabinowitz'sassumptionaboutthe "soulishness"of words,a la JohannesPedersen,objectionable.Because "holy words"were the most powerfulof all words,the editorsof the HebrewBible employedeuphemisms in pejorativestatementsaboutGod andthe king:"Bless[actually:curse]God and die" (Job 2:9) and "Davidspurnedthe enemies of the Lord"-actually David spurnedthe Lord(2 Sam. 12:14). Inchapter2, RabinowitzdiscussesancientIsrael's