Ancient Scepticism
Ancient Philosophies T h i s s e r i e s p r o v i d e s fresh a n d e n g a g i n g n e w i n t r...
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Ancient Scepticism
Ancient Philosophies T h i s s e r i e s p r o v i d e s fresh a n d e n g a g i n g n e w i n t r o d u c t i o n s to the m a j o r s c h o o l s o f p h i l o s o p h y of antiquity. D e s i g n e d for s t u d e n t s o f p h i l o s o p h y a n d c l a s s i c s , the b o o k s offer c l e a r a n d r i g o r o u s p r e s e n t a tion o f core ideas a n d lay the i o u n d a t i o n for a t h o r o u g h u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f their subjects. P r i m a r y texts are h a n d l e d i n t r a n s l a t i o n a n d the readers are p r o v i d e d w i t h u s e f u l g l o s s a r i e s , c h r o n o l o g i e s a n d g u i d e s to the p r i m a r y s o u r c e m a t e r i a l .
Published Ancient Scepticism
Presocratics
Hartilti
fames
Thorsrud
Cynics
Warren
Stoicism
William
Desmond
lohn
Seilars
Neoplatonisni Pnuliina
Rentes
Forthcoming The Ancient Commentators
Epicureanism
o n Plato a n d A r i s t o t l e
Tim
Miira
Tuominen
Aristotle Vasilis
Politis
Classical Islamic Philosophy Deborah
Black
Confucianism Ptini
Goldin
O'Keefe
Plato Andrew
Mason
Socrates Mark McPherran
Ancient Scepticism Harald lhorsrud
ACUMEN
© Harald I h o r s r u d , 2009 This book is copyright under the Berne Convention. No reproduction without permission. A l l rights reserved. First published in 2009 by A c u m e n A c u m e n Publishing Limited Stocksfield Hall Stocks field NE43 7 T N www.acumenpublishing.co.uk I S B N : 978-1-84465-130-6 (hardcover) I S B N : 978-1-84465-131-3
(paperback)
British Library Cataloguing-m-Publication
Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Typeset in M i n i o n . Printed and bound by Biddies Ltd., K i n g s Lynn.
F o r her p a t i e n c e , u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d love, this b o o k is d e d i c a t e d to L a u r a : amicus
certus
in re incerta
cernitur.
Contents
Preface Sources
ix and abbreviations
x.i xv
Chronology 1
Introduction
2
P y r r h o a n d T i m o n ; the o r i g i n of P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c i s m
17
I
3
A r c e s i l a u s ; the o r i g i n of A c a d e m i c S c e p t i c i s m
36
4
Carneades
59
5
C i c e r o : the e n d o i the s c e p t i c a l A c a d e m y
84
6
A e i i e s i d e m u s : the P y r r h o n i a n r e v i v a l
7
S e x t u s E m p i r i c u s : the c o n s i s t e n c y of P y r r h o n i a n Scepticism
102 123
8
Pyrrhonian arguments
147
9
T h e ( o r d i n a r y ) life o f a P y r r h o n i s t
173
Nates
201
Guide
to further
reading
215
References
231
Index
239
Index
of passages
245
vii
Preface
W h e n I w a s a g r a d u a t e s t u d e n t a slogan w a s p r o p o s e d for a d e p a r t m e n t T - s h i r t : " P h i l o s o p h y . W e V e d o n e less i n 2 , 5 0 0 years t h a n m o s t people d o i n a single d a y " T h e s l o g a n w a s rejected. But it reflects a s e r i o u s s c e p t i c a l s e n t i m e n t . W h e n w e c o n s i d e r the r e m a r k a b l e progress m a d e b y s c i e n c e in the past 400 years, p h i l o s o p h y a p p e a r s i n a n u n f a v o u r a b l e light. A t a m i n i m u m , w e w o u l d like to k n o w w h y there is s o little a g r e e m e n t a m o n g p r o f e s s i o n a l a c a d e m i c s r e g a r d i n g the s o l u t i o n s to p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o b l e m s , their p r o p e r a r t i c u l a t i o n , a n d e v e n the m e t h o d s suitable to r e s o l v i n g t h e m , M y d e s i r e to f i n d a satisfactory e x p l a n a t i o n of p e r v a s i v e d i s a g r e e m e n t has s u s t a i n e d m y interest i n the a n c i e n t S c e p t i c s , F r o m their a r g u m e n t s a n d strategies, w e c a n c o n s t r u c t v a r i o u s e x p l a n a t i o n s l o r w h y p h i l o s o p h e r s have not a n d p e r h a p s w i l l not r e a c h c o n s e n s u s . T h e r e are, o f c o u r s e , p l e n t y ot n o n - s c e p t i c a l s o l u t i o n s as w e l l , a n d I a m not c o n v i n c e d that I h a v e a satisfactory e x p l a n a t i o n yet. But reflecting o n the a r g u m e n t s o i the a n c i e n t S c e p t i c s has p r o v e d to be i m m e n s e l y v a l u a b l e i n getting to grips w i t h the b r o a d i s s u e of the l i m i t s of r e a s o n . T h e S c e p t i c s a l s o h a v e s o m e f a s c i n a t i n g t h i n g s to say a b o u t the p r o p e r r e s p o n s e to o u r r a t i o n a l l i m i t a t i o n s . T h e s e r e s p o n s e s are m e a n t to s h o w h o w S c e p t i c i s m is a v i a b l e p o s i t i o n a n d not m e r e l y a set of a r g u m e n t s c o n f i n e d to the s t u d y o r the c l a s s r o o m . W h i l e I
ix
A NCtENT
SCEPTICISM
c a n n o t say that I h a v e t r i e d to live w i t h o u t beliefs, as the S c e p t i c s suggest w e s h o u l d , their p r o p o s a l s have i n s p i r e d me to t h i n k m o r e clearly about f u n d a m e n t a l p r o b l e m s r e g a r d i n g the nature o f r a t i o n a l belief a n d a p p e a r a n c e s , a n d the roles they play i n a c t i o n . It is m y h o p e that this b o o k w i l l e n c o u r a g e readers interested i n these a n d related issues to f u r t h e r their o w n e n q u i r i e s . I have t r i e d not to p r e s u p p o s e familiarity w i t h earlier G r e e k p h i l o s o p h e r s or w i t h the S c e p t i c s ' c o n t e m p o r a r i e s , i n s t e a d s u p p l y i n g the d e t a i l s w h e r e n e c e s s a r y . I h a v e a i m e d at p r o d u c i n g a c o h e r e n t h i s t o r i c a l n a r r a t i v e i n w h i c h to situate the d e v e l o p m e n t a n d t r a n s m i s s i o n o f a n c i e n t s c e p t i c a l a r g u m e n t s a n d strategies. N e a r l y e v e r y p o r t i o n of t h i s a c c o u n t , h o w e v e r , is c o n t r o v e r s i a l . T h i s is w h y I have t r i e d to be t h o r o u g h in p r o v i d i n g references to b o t h p r i m a r y a n d secondary- sources. T h e references c a n always be ignored, but they w i l l b e h e l p f u l for those interested i n p u r s u i n g a p a r t i c u l a r i d e a , e s p e c i a l l y given the v a r i e t y ot plausible i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s that are often a v a i l a b l e . S i m i l a r l y , the g u i d e to f u r t h e r r e a d i n g is p r o b a b l y tar m o r e extensive t h a n m a n y r e a d e r s w i l l r e q u i r e . B u t as it is a r r a n g e d i n s e c t i o n s c o r r e s p o n d i n g to the m a j o r figures a n d p e r i o d s o f a n c i e n t S c e p t i c i s m , I h o p e it w i l l p r o v e u s e f u l for f u r t h e r study. I h a d the g o o d f o r t u n e to be i n t r o d u c e d to the a n c i e n t S c e p t i c s by Jim H a n k i n s o n a n d P a u l W o o d r u f f , a n d to H e l l e n i s t i c p h i l o s o p h y m o r e generally b y Stephen W h i t e . T h e y w e r e excellent g u i d e s , as well as m o d e l s , a n d h a v e g i v e n m e a great d e a l of e n c o u r a g e m e n t . I a m v e r y grateful to the p u b l i s h e r s a n o n y m o u s readers w h o p r o v i d e d m a n y detailed a n d i n s i g h t f u l c o m m e n t s , as well as to T i m O ' K e e f e , W i l h e l m N i g h t i n g a l e a n d R a l p h A n s k e , all of w h o m r e a d a n d c o m m e n t e d o n the m a n u s c r i p t . A l s o , m y students i n a s e m i n a r at A g n e s Scott C o l l e g e g e n e r o u s l y offered h e l p f u l c o m m e n t s o n e a r l y drafts of the c h a p t e r s . A l t h o u g h it is likely that s o m e e r r o r s or o v e r s i g h t s r e m a i n , this b o o k is far better for the r e v i s i o n s I h a v e b e e n able to m a k e i n r e s p o n s e to this c r i t i c a l a t t e n t i o n . M y t h a n k s to K a t e W i l l i a m s for e x p e r t c o p y - e d i t i n g a n d to S t e v e n G e r r a r d at A c u m e n for s e e i n g t h i s project t h r o u g h a n d for l o c a t i n g the s p e c t a c u l a r p a i n t i n g of C a r n e a d e s o n the cover.
Sources and abbreviations
Anonymous In Tht. = In Tiieaetetum (Commentary
on Plato's Theaetetus)
Aristotle iYE = j\if omachean Ethics Met. = Metaphysics Rh. = Rhetoric Augustine Contra Ac. - Contra Académicos (Against the
Academicians)
Aulus Gellius NA = Nodes Attkae (Attic Nights) Cicero Ac. = Académica (Academic Amic. = De Amicitia (On
Books)
Friendship)
Ait = Epistularwn ad Attiam
(Letters to Attic us)
De Or. = De Oraiore (On the Orator) Div. = De Divinatione (On
Divination)
Fin. = De Finibus Bonorum et Malarwm (On Moral Ends) Fat, = De Fato (On Fate) Inv. = Delnventione
(On [Rhetorical]
Leg. = De Legibus (On the
Invention)
hws)
JVD = De Natura Deorum (On the Nature of the Gods} Off. = De Ojficiis (On Duties) x:
ANCIENT
SCEPTICISM
Orat. = Orator Rep. = De Republics (On the Republic) Top. = Topic a Tusc. = Tusculanae Disputationes (Tuscutan Disputations) Diogenes Laertius DL = Lives anil Opinions of Eminent Philosophers in Ten Books Eusebius Praep. Ev. = Praeparatio Evangelica (Preparation for the Gospels) Lactam ius Div. Inst. = Divinae Institutions
(Divine Institutes)
Philo of Alexandria De Ebr. = De Ebrietate (On
Drunkenness)
Philodemus Index Ac. = Index Academicorum (History of the Academy) Photius Bib. = Bibliotheca (Library) Plato Ap. = Apology Gorg = Gorjias Prof. = Protagoras Rep. = Republic Tiit. = Vieaetetus Plutarch Adv. Col. = Adversus Colotem (Against Colotes) Coin. Not. = De Communibus Notitiis (Against the Stoics on Common Conceptions) Prof. Virt. = De Profectibus in Vtrtute (On Moral Progress) St. Rep. = De Stoicorum Repugnantus (On Stoic Self-Coniradsctions) Vit. Alex. = Vitae Parallelae, Alexander (Parallel Lives, Alexander) Vit, Cat. Mai = Vitae Parallelae, Cato Maior (Parallel Lhvs, Life ofCato the Elder) Sextus Empiric us M = Pros Mathematikous (Latin: Adversus Mathematicos; Against the Professors)
SOURCES
AND
ABBREVIATIONS
PH = Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes (Outlines of Pyrrhonism) Many of the passages from these and other relevant sources are excerpted and translated in: IG = B. hiwood & L. P Gerson (eds), Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings, 2nd edn (Indianapolis, I N : Hackett, 1997). LS = A, A. Long & D. N. Sedley (eds), Vie HeBemstic Philosophers, 2 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
>:ii:
Chronology
Many of the dates below are approximate (see the Oxford Classical Dictionary and Dorandi 1999). The dating of events in the Academy in the first century ucr. is particularly controversial, as are the dates for the later Pyrrhonists. BCE 399
Death of Socrates
3*7
Plato opens the Academy
347
Death of Plato, Speusippus becomes head of the Academy
334-324
Anaxarchus and Pyrrho travel through Asia with Alexander the Great
335
Aristotle opens the Lyceum
300
Zeno opens the Stoa; Timoji becomes a student of Pyrrho
298
Arcesilaus comes to Athens, eventually studies at the Academy
275
Death of Pyrrho Arcesilaus becomes head of the Academy, initiating its sceptical phase
241
Death of Arcesilaus
230
Death of Timon
156/5
Cameades goes to Rome as part of an Athenian embassy, having earlier become head of the Academy
ANCIENT
SCEPTICISM
L3T :i<
Canieades retires Death of Canieades, Clitomachus becomes head of the Academy
L10 90 89/3 early-mid 1st
Philo of Larissa becomes head of the Academy Antiochus secedes from Philo s Academy Philo llees to Rome from political instability in Athens Aenesidemus revives Pyrrhonism
century (?) 84
Death of Philo
68
Death of Antiochus
46-44 43
Cicero writes most of his philosophical dialogues Death of Cicero Anonymous commentator on Plato's Theaeteaa
1st century
Philodemus Philo of Alexandria
30-45 C E u lst-2nd century (?)
Agrippa (some time between Aenesidenius and Sevtus)
46-125 125-180 2nd century
Plutarch Aulus Gellius Numenius Aristocles (although he may be as early as the first century B C E )
2nd-3rd century 3rd century
Diogenes Laertius
240-320
Lactam ius
260-339
Eusebius
354-430
Augustine
9th century-
xvi
Sevtus Empiric us
Photius
ONE
Introduction
T h e G r e e k w o r d skepsis m e a n s e n q u i r y o r investigation. B u t a s c e p t i c is not m e r e l y o n e w h o investigates; a l m o s t e v e r y o n e d o e s that. S c e p tical i n v e s t i g a t i o n is d i s t i n c t i v e l y s h a p e d b y the p o s s i b i l i t y o f d e c e p t i o n a n d e r r o r ; a n d it is an i m p o r t a n t c o r r e c t i v e to o u r c r e d u l o u s a n d s o m e t i m e s g u l l i b l e i n c l i n a t i o n s . I n this b o o k w e shall e x a m i n e the two p h i l o s o p h i c a l m o v e m e n t s - P y r r h o n i a n a n d A c a d e m i c - that stretch f r o m a p p r o x i m a t e l y the t h i r d c e n t u r y BCE to t h e s e c o n d c e n t u r y CE a n d together constitute a n c i e n t S c e p t i c i s m , Both A c a d e m i c and Pyrrhonian Scepticism develop in c o m p l i cated w a y s in r e s p o n s e to e a c h o t h e r a n d in r e s p o n s e to t h e i r c o m m o n d o g m a t i c o p p o n e n t s . I n o r d e r to trace t h e s e lines o f h i s t o r i c a l i n f l u e n c e a n d d e v e l o p m e n t , I p r e s e n t the S c e p t i c s in t h e f o l l o w i n g c h a p t e r s i n c h r o n o l o g i c a l o r d e r ( w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n of C h a p t e r s 5 a n d 6 ) . W h i l e it w o u l d be m i s l e a d i n g to d e s c r i b e the w h o l e of a n c i e n t S c e p t i c i s m as a u n i f i e d p h i l o s o p h i c a l m o v e m e n t , t h e a n c i e n t S c e p tics d o s h a r e s o m e f a m i l y r e s e m b l a n c e s , A s a g e n e r a l i n t r o d u c t i o n , I offer a b r i e f c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o i c o m m o n a r g u m e n t a t i v e strategies a n d c o n c e r n s f o l l o w e d by a s k e t c h of the h i s t o r i c a l n a r r a t i v e to be d e v e l o p e d a n d s o m e r e m a r k s about t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n A c a demics and Pyrrhonists.
1
A NCtENT
SCEPTICISM
Suspension of judgement B y the t i m e the S c e p t i c s a r r i v e d o n the s c e n e there w e r e m a n y c o m p e t i n g a n d i n c o m p a t i b l e p h i l o s o p h i c a l theories available. O n e o i the centra] p r e o c c u p a t i o n s o f G r e e k p h i l o s o p h y i r o m the P r e s o c r a t ics o n w a r d w a s to a c c o u n t for the v a r i a b i l i t y a n d d e c e p t i v e n e s s o f a p p e a r a n c e s , a n d m o r e g e n e r a l l y to e x p l a i n h o w a n d w h y t h i n g s c h a n g e . T h i s led to a great d e a l of s p e c u l a t i o n a n d p h i l o s o p h i c a l a r g u m e n t r e g a r d i n g the relation o f a p p e a r a n c e to reality. B u t o n this i m p o r t a n t i s s u e , a s o n v i r t u a l l y e v e r y t h i n g else, p h i l o s o p h e r s d i s a gree. T h i s fact a d d s c o n s i d e r a b l y to the sceptic's i m p r e s s i o n that we are n o t u p to the task o f e x p l a i n i n g the v a r i a b i l i t y a n d d e c e p t i v e n e s s of a p p e a r a n c e s . P h i l o s o p h e r s as well as o r d i n a r y people disagree w i t h e a c h other about v i r t u a l l y e v e r y t h i n g ; at t i m e s we e v e n disagree with ourselves, T h e s o l u t i o n , it s e e m s , m u s t be e p i s t e m i c : w e n e e d s o m e n o n a r b i t r a r y a n d p r i n c i p l e d w a y to resolve these d i s a g r e e m e n t s . B u t even w i t h regard to the p r o p e r m e t h o d tor r e s o l v i n g d i s a g r e e m e n t s , p h i l o s o p h e r s disagree. A l l of this is grist for the s c e p t i c a l m i l l . But a n c i e n t S c e p t i c i s m does not d e v e l o p m e r e l y as a r e j e c t i o n o f the a s p i r a t i o n s a n d v i e w s of earlier p h i l o s o p h e r s ; it a l s o d r a w s o n t h e m i n a positive way. P e r h a p s the m o s t v a l u a b l e s k i l l the G r e e k S o p h i s t s (fifth a n d f o u r t h c e n t u r i e s B C E ) offered to t e a c h is the ability to a r g u e p e r s u a sively for or against a n y p r o p o s i t i o n . Protagoras, for e x a m p l e , c l a i m s that o n e v e r y issue there are t w o o p p o s e d a c c o u n t s ( D L 9.51, see a l s o 3 . 3 7 ) , a n d that m a s t e r i n g h i s r h e t o r i c a l t e c h n i q u e s w i l l l e a d to s o u n d , p r a c t i c a l j u d g e m e n t (Prot. 3 1 9 a ) . T h e h i s t o r i a n T h u c y d i d e s , w h o is s t r o n g l y i n f l u e n c e d by the S o p h i s t s , o p p o s e s o n e a c c o u n t o i e v e n t s to a n o t h e r in o r d e r to d o j u s t i c e to the c o m p l e x i t y of h u m a n affairs a n d to a r r i v e at a p r o p e r l y c a u t i o u s , a n d i n f o r m e d , j u d g e m e n t (History
of the Peiopotmesian
War 1 . 2 2 - 2 3 ) . T h e S o p h i s t A n t i p h o n
teaches h i s students h o w to o p p o s e a r g u m e n t s for the s a k e o f l e a r n i n g to be a n effective legal a d v o c a t e . F o r h i s part, A r i s t o t l e c o u n t e r s P l a t o s w o r r y about the u n s c r u p u l o u s use of r h e t o r i c a l p o w e r by c l a i m i n g that a r g u i n g tor a n d against a n i s s u e , a n d d e r i v i n g o p p o s e d
2
INTRODUCTION
c o n c l u s i o n s f r o m the s a m e p r e m i s e s , h e l p s u s to d i s c e r n w h e r e the t r u t h lies (Rh.
L i s Topics 1 . 1 - 2 , e s p e c i a l l y 1 0 1 a 3 4 - 3 6 ) ,
I n genera], the p r a c t i c e o f o p p o s i n g a r g u m e n t s w a s d e v e l o p e d as a v a l u a b l e m e a n s o f a r r i v i n g at p h i l o s o p h i c a l j u d g e m e n t s a b o u t the t r u t h , d e l i b e r a t i v e d e c i s i o n s about the best c o u r s e o f a c t i o n a n d forensic j u d g e m e n t s about i n n o c e n c e a n d guilt. I n m a n y of the S c e p tical a p p r o p r i a t i o n s of this m e t h o d , h o w e v e r , the o u t c o m e is s u s p e n s i o n ot j u d g e m e n t [epoche],
e v e n if the g o a l is initially the d i s c o v e r y
o f t r u t h . ( H o w e v e r , C i c e r o s later A c a d e m i c v e r s i o n of t h i s m e t h o d m a r k s a r e v e r s i o n to its o r i g i n a l l y positive e m p l o y m e n t ; see C h a p t e r 5, a n d f u r t h e r b e l o w . ) I n so far as the a n c i e n t S c e p t i c s p r o m o t e the s u s p e n s i o n o f j u d g e m e n t , they are quite u n l i k e o t h e r s c h o o l s or m o v e m e n t s . N o r m a l l y w e s e e k to u n d e r s t a n d a p h i l o s o p h e r i n t e r m s of h i s d o c t r i n e s , a n d the a r g u m e n t s h e offers i n s u p p o r t . F o r e x a m p l e , a Stoic believes v i r t u e is sufficient l o r a g o o d life, a n A r i s t o t e l i a n b e l i e v e s w e n e e d s o m e e x t e r n a l g o o d s in a d d i t i o n to v i r t u e to live w e l l , a n d a n E p i c u r e a n believes n o t h i n g is w o r t h w h i l e i n the a b s e n c e of p l e a s u r e . W h e n s t u d y i n g s u c h p h i l o s o p h e r s w e t r y to d e t e r m i n e w h a t their d o c t r i n e s a m o u n t to a n d w h y they b e l i e v e t h e m to be true. W e e m p l o y the s a m e f o c u s w h e t h e r the d o c t r i n e s in q u e s t i o n are p o s i t i v e or negative. A n atheist, for e x a m p l e , a r g u e s that G o d d o e s not exist, o r that w e c a n n o t k n o w w h e t h e r G o d exists. A n d a n antirealist a r g u e s that there are n o m i n d - i n d e p e n d e n t s t r u c t u r e s in the w o r l d , o r that w e c a n n o t k n o w s u c h s t r u c t u r e s exist. E v e n t h o u g h w e s o m e t i m e s refer to s u c h v i e w s as s c e p t i c a l , we m u s t note that the c o g n i t i v e attitude e x p r e s s e d is n o t u n c e r t a i n t y or i n d e c i s i o n , but r a t h e r a k i n d of belief: to d i s b e l i e v e p is to believe that n o t - p . F r o m the a g n o s t i c s s t a n d p o i n t , b o t h the theist a n d the atheist are m i s t a k e n . A n d g e n e r a l l y s p e a k i n g , f r o m the s t a n d p o i n t of o n e w h o has s u s p e n d e d j u d g e m e n t , t h o s e w h o c o n f i d e n t l y d e n y are j u s t as d o g m a t i c as t h o s e w h o c o n f i d e n t l y a f f i r m . F o r this reason the f o r m e r are often r e f e r r e d to as negative d o g m a t i s t s . It is c o n t r o v e r s i a l w h e t h e r a n y ancient Sceptics w e r e negative d o g m a t i s t s . W h e t h e r or not t h e y w e r e ( w h i c h w i l l b e e x p l o r e d case by case in the f o l l o w i n g c h a p t e r s ) it i s e a s y to see h o w they m i g h t have
3
ANCIENT
SCEPTICISM
a p p e a r e d to be. A s tar as the sceptic is c o n c e r n e d , n o one, so far, has m a n a g e d to establish a n o n - a r b i t r a r y , p r i n c i p l e d w a y of r e s o l v i n g the u b i q u i t o u s disputes. E v e r y a r g u m e n t has so far b e e n (or at least c o u l d be) r e f u t e d o r m e t w i t h a n e q u a l l y c o m p e l l i n g c o u n t e r - a r g u m e n t . II the S c e p t i c s w e r e so s u c c e s s f u l in r e f u t i n g all a r g u m e n t s , it is h a r d to see h o w they c o u l d resist the negatively d o g m a t i c c o n c l u s i o n that k n o w l e d g e is i m p o s s i b l e . A t the v e r y least it s e e m s t h e y m u s t have b e l i e v e d s o m e t h i n g about o u r c o g n i t i v e l i m i t a t i o n s , or a b o u t w h a t we s h o u l d d o i n light o f these l i m i t a t i o n s .
Inconsistency T h i s s u s p i c i o n is e v i d e n t i n the frequently r a i s e d o b j e c t i o n that it is i n c o n s i s t e n t to c l a i m to k n o w that k n o w l e d g e is i m p o s s i b l e or e v e n to b e l i e v e that we s h o u l d h a v e n o beliefs. M o r e generally, the project of r a t i o n a l l y e s t a b l i s h i n g that n o t h i n g c a n be r a t i o n a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d s e e m s to be a non-starter. E i t h e r the s c e p t i c w i l l p r o v i d e r e a s o n s for t h i s c o n c l u s i o n or he w i l l not. B u t he w o u l d not p r o v i d e r e a s o n s if he thought it w e r e futile to d o so. So he h a s to a s s u m e that we can r a t i o n a l l y e s t a b l i s h s o m e t h i n g if he is g o i n g to try to r a t i o n a l l y establish that w e cannot.
O n the o t h e r h a n d , if the s c e p t i c offers n o
r e a s o n s , t h e n it s e e m s w e c a n j u s t ignore h i m . W e m a y restate this p r o b l e m b y c o n s i d e r i n g the status o f the premises i n sceptical arguments,
E i t h e r the s c e p t i c h a s
adequate
j u s t i f i c a t i o n for h i s p r e m i s e s or he d o e s not. I n e i t h e r case he is i n trouble. I f he has a d e q u a t e j u s t i f i c a t i o n , s c e p t i c i s m is refuted. I f he d o e s n o t , t h e n w e m a y d e m a n d to be p e r s u a d e d that h i s p r e m i s e s are t r u e . T h e o n l y w a y he c a n d o this is to s h o w that h i s p r e m i s e s are adequately j u s t i f i e d , w h i c h a g a i n u n d e r m i n e s h i s s c e p t i c a l c o n c l u s i o n . ( F o r m o r e o n this a r g u m e n t see C h a p t e r 7.) But the s c e p t i c d o e s n o t n e e d to e m p l o y a n y p e r s o n a l c o n v i c t i o n s i n h i s a r g u m e n t s . I n s t e a d , h e m a y d r a w all that he needs f r o m h i s i n t e r l o c u t o r . Plato often portrays S o c r a t e s a r g u i n g i n this m a n n e r . I n h i s c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h E u t h y p h r o , for e x a m p l e , S o c r a t e s d r a w s out the i m p l i c a t i o n s o f a d e f i n i t i o n o f piety that he p r o b a b l y does
•J
INTRODUCTION
not accept h i m s e l f . I f w e say that piety is w h a t is dear to the gods, a n d we b e l i e v e that the s a m e t h i n g is d e a r to H e r a but d i s p l e a s i n g to H e p h a e s t u s , we w i l l have to c o n c l u d e that the s a m e t h i n g is a n d is not p i o u s (Euthyphro
7 a - 8 a ) . W h e t h e r or not Socrates accepts a n y of
these p r o p o s i t i o n s is b e s i d e the p o i n t s i n c e he is p r i m a r i l y interested i n testing E u t h y p h r o . T h i s is w h y Socrates e l s e w h e r e c o m p a r e s h i m selt to a b a r r e n m i d w i f e w h o gives b i r t h to n o p h i l o s o p h i c a l theses but m e r e l y d r a w s t h e m out o f o t h e r s (Tht.
I43e-l49a).
T h i s style o i a r g u m e n t is c a l l e d "ad hominem",
not i n the p e j o r a -
tive sense o f a n irrelevant attack o n someone's character, but b e c a u s e it relies solely o n the p r o p o n e n t s o w n v i e w s . It is also c a l l e d " d i a l e c t i c a l " s i n c e the a r g u m e n t is essentially part of a d i a l o g u e in w h i c h o n e p e r s o n d e f e n d s h i s p o s i t i o n against the o t h e r s attack. F r o m the s c e p t i c s p e r s p e c t i v e , the c r u c i a l point is that the q u e s t i o n e r n e e d not e n d o r s e e i t h e r the p r e m i s e s or the c o n c l u s i o n of the a r g u m e n t . H e m a y e v e n r e m a i n a g n o s t i c about the s t a n d a r d of j u s t i f i c a t i o n that he h o l d s h i s i n t e r l o c u t o r to, T h e dialectical style of argument
is a c o m m o n s c e p t i c a l strat-
egy, but it is b y n o m e a n s a n e c e s s a r y feature o f a n c i e n t S c e p t i c i s m . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h i s strategy s h o w s us o n e of the w a y s o f r e s p o n d i n g to the i n c o n s i s t e n c y charge. II the s c e p t i c is able to engage In his c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a r g u m e n t a t i v e activity w i t h o u t c o m m i t t i n g h i m s e l f to a n y beliefs about the efficacy of r e a s o n , the d e s i r a b i l i t y of t r u t h or s o m e o t h e r related matter, t h e n he w i l l not be v u l n e r a b l e to the charge o f i n c o n s i s t e n c y . S i n c e the s c e p t i c n e e d not b e l i e v e a n y t h i n g he is a s s e r t i n g , he c a n n o t be c h a r g e d w i t h i n c o n s i s t e n t l y b e l i e v i n g those t h i n g s . But the p e r s i s t e n c e w i t h w h i c h the c h a r g e of i n c o n s i s t e n c y is l e v elled suggests e i t h e r a persistent m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g or that at least s o m e S c e p t i c s d i d i n fact h o l d s o m e s e c o n d - o r d e r beliefs a b o u t the status of f i r s t - o r d e r beliefs; i n o t h e r w o r d s , p e r h a p s s o m e o f t h e m d i d believe they k n e w that k n o w l e d g e is i m p o s s i b l e or that we s h o u l d h o l d n o beliefs. It is, after a l l , a s h o r t step f r o m the o b s e r v a t i o n that so l a r n o b e l i e ! h a s b e e n adequately j u s t i f i e d to the d o g m a t i c c o n c l u s i o n that n o b e l i e f c a n be j u s t i f i e d . A c a d e m i c S c e p t i c s , i n p a r t i c u l a r , have b e e n thought to be negatively d o g m a t i c i n t h i s way. I n C h a p t e r s
ANCIENT
SCEPTICISM
3 a n d 4 w e s h a l l see w h y this c l a i m is so often repeated a n d w h y it is m i s t a k e n .
Impracticality W h i l e the c h a r g e of i n c o n s i s t e n c y p r e s u p p o s e s that the sceptic has s o m e beliefs, a n o t h e r persistent o b j e c t i o n p r e s u p p o s e s that the s c e p tic h a s n o beliefs. M a n y critics a r g u e that a life w i t h o u t beliefs is i m p r a c t i c a l , c l a i m i n g that one m u s t have beliefs either i n o r d e r to act, or, at least, i n o r d e r to act w e l l a n d live a g o o d , m o r a l life (see S t r i k e r 1 9 8 0 ) . T h i s type o i o b j e c t i o n is aptly d e s c r i b e d b y the G r e e k t e r m apraxia
(inaction).
I n r e s p o n d i n g to apraxia
o b j e c t i o n s the S c e p t i c s d e s c r i b e v a r i -
o u s positive attitudes o n e m a y take t o w a r d s a p p e a r a n c e s w i t h o u t c o m p r o m i s i n g the s u s p e n s i o n of j u d g e m e n t . ( W e s h o u l d note that i n these d i s c u s s i o n s , i n t e l l e c t u a l s e e m i n g s are c o u n t e d as a p p e a r a n c e s a l o n g w i t h o r d i n a r y p e r c e p t u a l s e e m i n g s - so it m a y a p p e a r that the b o o k is g r e e n , a n d it m a y a p p e a r that t w o a r g u m e n t s are equally c o m p e l l i n g . ) T h e r e is n o s t a n d a r d s c e p t i c a l a c c o u n t of h o w life w i t h out belief is possible. T h i s is d u e i n part to differences about the s c o p e of epoche ( h o w m u c h we are to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t a b o u t ) as w e l l as the p r o p e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the s c e p t i c a l l y a c c e p t a b l e attitudes that g u i d e the Sceptics' a c t i o n s . D e s p i t e these differences, the fact that m o s t S c e p t i c s w e r e so k e e n to r e s p o n d to apraxia
o b j e c t i o n s i n d i c a t e s h o w i m p o r t a n t the
p r a c t i c a l i t y o f s c e p t i c i s m is to t h e m . U n l i k e m o s t m o d e m a n d c o n t e m p o r a r y varieties, the a n c i e n t S c e p t i c s offered their s c e p t i c i s m as a w a y of life. T h i s is in k e e p i n g w i t h the g e n e r a l H e l l e n i s t i c e m p h a sis o n p h i l o s o p h y as a set of p r a c t i c e s o r s p i r i t u a l exercises ( H a d o t 1995, 2 0 0 2 ) . A s we s h a l l s e e i n C h a p t e r 2, the earliest official a n c i e n t S c e p t i c , P y r r h o , m a k e s the r e v o l u t i o n a r y m o v e of s u b s t i t u t i n g the question " W h a t must I k n o w to live w e l l ? " w i t h the sceptical q u e s t i o n " H o w c a n 1 still live w e l l in the a b s e n c e o f k n o w l e d g e ? " T h e i n s i s t e n c e o n the v i a b i l i t y of s c e p t i c i s m is in s t a r k c o n t r a s t w i t h the w a y m o d e r n a n d c o n t e m p o r a r y p h i l o s o p h e r s often insulate
INTRODUCTION
(heir d a i l y life f r o m their s c e p t i c a l doubts. F o r e x a m p l e , after p r o p o s i n g to take s e r i o u s l y the p o s s i b i l i t y that t h e r e is a n a l l - p o w e r f u l evil d e m o n s y s t e m a t i c a l l y d e c e i v i n g h i m , D e s c a r t e s c a l m s the fears that m i g h t a r i s e f r o m h i s r a d i c a l h y p o t h e s i s : " I k n o w that n o d a n g e r or e r r o r w i l l result f r o m m y p l a n , a n d that I c a n n o t p o s s i b l y go too far i n m y d i s t r u s t f u l attitude. T h i s is b e c a u s e the task n o w in h a n d does not i n v o l v e a c t i o n b u t m e r e l y the a c q u i s i t i o n o f k n o w l e d g e " ( C o t t i n g h a m 1936: 15). T h e p o i n t o f D e s c a r t e s ' s c e p t i c a l j o u r n e y is to e s t a b l i s h the reliability o f h i s c o g n i t i v e e q u i p m e n t , t h e r e b y p r o v i d i n g a f i r m a n d lasting f o u n d a t i o n for the s c i e n c e s . A n d w h i l e he is c o n v i n c e d that s c i e n t i f i c p r o g r e s s w i l l i m p r o v e the h u m a n c o n d i t i o n , h i s attempt to e s t a b l i s h its p h i l o s o p h i c a l f o u n d a t i o n is a p u r e l y theoretical matter. H i s s c e p t i c i s m is a thought e x p e r i m e n t . H e has no i n t e n t i o n o l a l l o w i n g s u c h s p e c u l a t i o n to i n f l u e n c e h i s a c t i o n s , a n d he w o u l d be utterly u n i m p r e s s e d b y the apraxia
objection.
N o n e of the a n c i e n t S c e p t i c s start o u t w i t h the v i e w that s c e p t i c i s m is a n a w f u l , it rarefied, c o n d i t i o n that m u s t be
overcome.
A n c i e n t S c e p t i c i s m is not so m u c h a p r o b l e m o r set o f o b j e c t i o n s as a n a r g u m e n t a t i v e practice situated in a p h i l o s o p h i c a l w a y of life. A n d , at least for P y r r h o n i a n Sceptics, epoche is a n a c c o m p l i s h m e n t a n d the m e a n s to t r a n q u i l i t y .
1
The distinction between Academics a n d Pyrrhonists A l t h o u g h it is easy e n o u g h to c l a s s i f y the S c e p t i c s a s A c a d e m i c or P y r r h o n i s t (see F i g u r e 1), this sheds little light o n a n y s u b s t a n t i v e differences b e t w e e n i n d i v i d u a l S c e p t i c s or b e t w e e n the two c a m p s m o r e generally. I n the s e c o n d c e n t u r y C E , the R o m a n a u t h o r A u l u s G e l l i u s refers to the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n A c a d e m i c s a n d P y r r h o n i s t s as a n o l d question treated b y m a n y G r e e k w r i t e r s (NA 11.5.6; see S t r i k e r 1981 J. G e l l i u s uses the f o l l o w i n g t e r m s to d e s c r i b e b o t h A c a d e m i c s a n d P y r r h o n i s t s : skeptikoi
( t h o s e w h o investigate), epfiektikoi
s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t ) , a n d tiporetikoi
(those w h o
( t h o s e w h o are p u z z l e d ) . A s to 2
the difference, he reports it in this w a y :
7
ANCIENT
SCEPTICISM
t h e A c a d e m i c s a p p r e h e n d I ( i n s o m e s e n s e ) the v e r y iact 3
that n o t h i n g c a n be a p p r e h e n d e d , a n d they d e t e r m i n e ( i n s o m e s e n s e ) that n o t h i n g c a n be d e t e r m i n e d , w h e r e a s the P y r r h o n i s t s assert that n o t e v e n that s e e m s to be t r u e , s i n c e n o t h i n g s e e m s to be true.
(NA 11.5.8)
Pyrrhonists
Academics
/** ArcesUaus ^ " " " ^
Pyrrho
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V^_^365-275BC^
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320-230 B C L
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2L4-12SBCE Clitomachus 1JS7-1 LU B C S
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Vhilo of L a r i s s a ^ \ 159—84 n e t ^ /
f*^ V
A ntiochus
Aenesidemus
130-68 B C I J~ — _ — C L o c r o
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first c t n l u r y C E
106-43 B C E ^ y
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\ J a l e second c t n l u r y C E X
Figure 1, Academics and Pyrrhonists.
INTRODUCTION
T h e P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c Sextus E m p i r i c u s offers r o u g h l y the s a m e d i s t i n c t i o n in h i s p r e l i m i n a r y d i v i s i o n of k i n d s o f p h i l o s o p h y : T h o s e w h o are c a l l e d D o g m a t i s t s . . . t h i n k they h a v e d i s c o v e r e d the truth . . . T h e s c h o o l s of C l i t o m a c h u s a n d C a r n e a d e s , a n d o t h e r A c a d e m i c s , h a v e a s s e r t e d that t h i n g s c a n n o t be a p p r e h e n d e d . A n d the S c e p t i c s are still investigating. H e n c e the m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l k i n d s of p h i l o s o p h y are r e a s o n a b l y t h o u g h t to b e three: the D o g m a t i c , the A c a d e m i c , a n d the Sceptical.
(PW 1.3-4)*
It is c r u c i a l to note that he singles o u t C l i t o m a c h u s a n d C a r n e a d e s as negatively d o g m a t i c A c a d e m i c s , s i n c e we f i n d later that he d o e s not t h i n k that all A c a d e m i c s fit this m o u l d . T h e r e have b e e n , so m o s t people say, t h r e e A c a d e m i e s ; one - the oldest - w a s Plato's, a s e c o n d w a s the M i d d l e A c a d e m y o f A r c e s i l a u s . . . a n d the t h i r d w a s the N e w A c a d e m y of C a r n e a d e s a n d C l i t o m a c h u s . S o m e a d d a f o u r t h , the A c a d e m y of P h i l o . . . a n d s o m e r e c k o n as a fifth the A c a d e m y of Antiochus.
(PH
1.220)
Sextus goes o n to s h o w h o w h i s P y r r h o n i s m differs f r o m e a c h of these A c a d e m i c p o s i t i o n s . A t the b e g i n n i n g of the A c a d e m y , Plato is c l e a r l y d o g m a t i c i n so far as h e m a k e s a s s e r t i o n s about F o r m s , or p r o v i d e n c e , o r the v i r t u o u s lite. A n d at the e n d o f the A c a d e m y , P h i l o a n d A n t i o c h u s are d o g m a t i c i n a l l o w i n g for s o m e f o r m of a p p r e h e n s i o n (see C h a p t e r 5 ) . It is o n l y the i n t e r v e n i n g p o s i t i o n s of A r c e s i l a u s a n d C a r n e a d e s that m i g h t p l a u s i b l y be t h o u g h t to b e the s a m e as P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c i s m . But a c c o r d i n g to S e x t u s , C a r n e a d e s m a k e s c o n f i d e n t a f f i r m a t i o n s about t h i n g s b e i n g i n a p p r e h e n s i b l e , w h i l e the P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c s d o not. F u r t h e r m o r e , C a r n e a d e s relies o n , o r goes a l o n g w i t h , the way t h i n g s s e e m w h e n he has d e t e r m i n e d they are p l a u s i b l e . P y r r h o n i s t s , b y c o n t r a s t , d o not m a k e s u c h d i s t i n c t i o n s a m o n g a p p e a r a n c e s to w h i c h they y i e l d i n a m o r e p a s s i v e s e n s e . ( W e s h a l l e x p l o r e
4
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C a r n e a d e s ' p l a u s i b l e a p p e a r a n c e s i n C h a p t e r 4 , a n d Sextus' reliance on appearances i n C h a p t e r 9 ) . T h e p r o p e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f these d i s t i n c t i o n s is h i g h l y c o n troversial. I n p a r t i c u l a r it is u n c l e a r w h e t h e r it is fair to d e s c r i b e C a r n e a d e s as negatively d o g m a t i c , a n d p e r m a n e n t l y c l o s e d to the possibility o l discovering the truth. A l t h o u g h C a r n e a d e s does confidently argue a n d affirm that t h i n g s are not a p p r e h e n s i b l e , i n C i c e r o ' s a c c o u n t he d o e s not c l a i m to h a v e a p p r e h e n d e d this {Ac.
2.110).
F u r t h e r m o r e , h i s a f f i r m a t i o n s m a y have b e e n part o f a d i a l e c t i c a l strategy, i n w h i c h c a s e t h e y w o u l d n o t have b e e n a f f i r m e d i n h i s o w n voice. So it is possible to reject C a r n e a d e s ' negative d o g m a t i s m w h i l e p r e s e r v i n g w h a t Sextus says about h i s r e l i a n c e o n a p p e a r a n c e s ; this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w i l l be d e v e l o p e d i n C h a p t e r 4, Sextus sees a n e v e n s m a l l e r difference b e t w e e n t h e P y r r h o n i s t a n d A r c e s i l a u s . I n fact he d e s c r i b e s t h e m as " v i r t u a l l y the s a m e " i n so lar as they m a k e n o a s s e r t i o n s about reality, prefer n o a p p e a r a n c e s o n the basis o f greater plausibility, a n d s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t about e v e r y t h i n g (PH
1.232). T h e o n l y s e r i o u s p o i n t of d i s t i n c t i o n is that A r c e s i l a u s
t h i n k s s u s p e n s i o n o f j u d g e m e n t is a g o o d t h i n g a n d assent a b a d t h i n g , w h e r e a s the P y r r h o n i s t w i l l o n l y a c k n o w l e d g e that they a p p e a r so. S o S e x t u s t h i n k s A r c e s i l a u s does after all m a k e s o m e a s s e r t i o n s about reality. (I e x p l a i n A r c e s i l a u s ' c o m m i t m e n t to the real v a l u e o l epoche a s a c o n s e q u e n c e o f h i s S o c r a t i c i n h e r i t a n c e i n C h a p t e r 3.) T h e charge o f negative d o g m a t i s m p r o b a b l y o r i g i n a t e s i n the earliest a c c o u n t of t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n A c a d e m i c s a n d P y r r h o n ists. S o m e t i m e i n the first c e n t u r y B C E , a m e m b e r of t h e A c a d e m y , A e n e s i d e m u s , g r e w dissatisfied w i t h the i n c r e a s i n g l y d o g m a t i c t e n d e n c i e s of the s c h o o l a n d set o u t to r e v i v e a m o r e r a d i c a l f o r m o l s c e p t i c i s m , i n s p i r e d by t h e e a r l y S c e p t i c P y r r h o (see C h a p t e r 6 for the r e v i v a l , C h a p t e r 2 for t h e o r i g i n a t i o n ) . I n the first b o o k o f h i s Pyrrhoniais
Discourses,
he c l a i m s that A c a d e m i c s c o n f i d e n t l y affirm
s o m e t h i n g s a n d reject others, w h i l e t h e P y r r h o n i s t s c o n s i s t e n t l y doubt e v e r y t h i n g , a n d d e t e r m i n e n o t h i n g ; they d o not e v e n determ i n e that they d e t e r m i n e n o t h i n g . A e n e s i d e m u s is right about the i n c r e a s i n g l y d o g m a t i c t e n d e n c i e s i n the A c a d e m y o f the first c e n t u r y B C E . B u t it is u n l i k e l y that he
INTRODUCTION
i n t e n d s to label as negatively d o g m a t i c the entire s c e p t i c a l A c a d e m y i n all of its p h a s e s . A t o n e p o i n t he says the A c a d e m i c s ,
especially
the ones now, a p p e a r to b e j u s t Stoics f i g h t i n g against Stoics ( P h o tius, Bib.
170al5-l6j.
It is p o s s i b l e that A e n e s i d e m u s i n t e n d s his
c h a r g e of negative d o g m a t i s m to a p p l y only, or at least mostly, to his c o n t e m p o r a r i e s . H e p r o b a b l y s a w the h i s t o r y o f the A c a d e m y as a g r a d u a l d e c l i n e f r o m the r i g o r o u s s c e p t i c i s m of A r c e s i l a u s to the exhausted dogmatic c o m p r o m i s e s of Philo a n d A n t i o c h u s . O n this v i e w , as the A c a d e m i c s c a r r i e d o n their intense d i a l e c t i c a l struggles, e s p e c i a l l y w i t h the Stoics, they w e r e d r i v e n to m a k e m o r e a n d m o r e c o n c e s s i o n s , Specifically in r e s p o n s e to charges o l i n c o n s i s t e n c y a n d i m p r a c t i c a l i t y they e x p a n d e d the n o t i o n o f s c e p t i c a l l y
acceptable
assent, a n d c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y r e d u c e d the s c o p e of epochs.
I n the e n d ,
P h i l o is left r e j e c t i n g o n l y the Stoics' c l a i m s to certainty, a n d A n t i o c h u s b e c o m e s a Stoic i n all but n a m e . I n o p p o s i t i o n to this n a r r a t i v e o f d e c l i n e , we m a y a l s o see the o u t c o m e of the A c a d e m y ' s 200 years' w o r t h of d i a l e c t i c a l e n g a g e m e n t w i t h t h e i r o p p o n e n t s i n a p o s i t i v e light. I n that case, the A c a d e m i c s w o u l d h a v e b e e n right to m o d i f y the o r i g i n a l l y r a d i c a l s c e p t i c i s m of A r c e s i l a u s . C i c e r o , w h o c o u n t s h i m s e l f a lifelong A c a d e m i c , s t a n d s at the e n d o f this history. A l t h o u g h h i s v i e w of A c a d e m i c p h i l o s o p h y is c o l o u r e d b y h i s o w n i n c l i n a t i o n s a n d by h i s goal of d i s s e m i n a t i n g G r e e k p h i l o s o p h y a m o n g the R o m a n elite, he is o u r m o s t
exten-
s i v e a n d s y m p a t h e t i c s o u r c e . A n d h i s v i e w is u n c o m p l i c a t e d b y a n y a w a r e n e s s of a P y r r h o n i a n r e v i v a l in the first c e n t u r y B C E . S o his r e m a r k s are p r o b a b l y free of p o l e m i c a l interests w i t h r e g a r d to the distinction between Academics and Pyrrhonists. C i c e r o p r o v i d e s s o m e v e r y i n f o r m a t i v e a c c o u n t s of the h i s t o r y of the s c e p t i c a l A c a d e m y . I n the Acaciemica,
for e x a m p l e , he e n d o r s e s
a n a c c o u n t that p r o b a b l y reflects A r c e s i l a u s ' o w n v i e w o f the A c a d e m y ' s h i s t o r i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t . H e asserts that it is the o b s c u r i t y of t h i n g s that led S o c r a t e s to h i s c o n f e s s i o n o f i g n o r a n c e ; a s even before h i m , it h a d l e d D e m o c r i t u s ,
Anaxagoras,
E m p e d o c l e s , a n d v i r t u a l l y all the e a r l y p h i l o s o p h e r s to say that n o t h i n g c o u l d be c o g n i z e d , a p p r e h e n d e d , or k n o w n ,
11
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SCEPTICISM
b e c a u s e the senses w e r e l i m i t e d , o u r m i n d s w e a k , a n d the course o f o u r lives brief, w h i l e the truth h a d b e e n s u b m e r g e d i n a n a b y s s (as D e m o c r i t u s s a i d ) , e v e r y t h i n g w a s s u b j e c t to o p i n i o n a n d c u s t o m , n o r o o m w a s left for t r u t h , a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y e v e r y t h i n g w a s s h r o u d e d i n d a r k n e s s . That's w h y A r c e s i l a u s u s e d to d e n y that a n y t h i n g c o u l d be k n o w n , not even the r e s i d u a l c l a i m that Socrates h a d a l l o w e d h i m s e l f , i.e. the k n o w l e d g e that h e didn't k n o w a n y t h i n g . (Ac, 1 . 4 4 - 4 5 )
5
C i c e r o d o e s not e x p l a i n f u r t h e r w h a t he m e a n s by the " o b s c u r i t y of t h i n g s " or h o w h i s f a m o u s p r e d e c e s s o r s a r r i v e d at it. W h a t e v e r the case m a y be, A r c e s i l a u s e n d s u p s u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t about e v e r y t h i n g ; a n d b y a r g u i n g against all c o m e r s , l i k e S o c r a t e s , he is s u p p o s e d to h a v e c o n v i n c e d m o s t people to d o the s a m e , C i c e r o d o e s not c l a i m i n t h i s passage (or i n the p a r a l l e l passage at A c . 2 . 7 2 - 7 4 ) that the P r e s o c r a t i c s w e r e fully s c e p t i c a l . H e cites t h e m , as p r e s u m a b l y A r c e s i l a u s d i d , a s n o t e w o r t h y
predecessors
w h o rightly despaired o f acquiring empirical knowledge (Brittain & P a l m e r 2 0 0 1 ) . F o r D e m o c r i t u s , s i n c e o u r p e r c e p t i o n s n e v e r reveal the a t o m i c s t r u c t u r e o f t h i n g s , they c a n n e v e r reveal the t r u t h . A n d i n so far as P a r m e n i d e s d e n i e s the reality of c h a n g e , there is n o k n o w l e d g e to be h a d about n a t u r a l , p h y s i c a l p r o c e s s e s . B u t the A c a d e m i c s refuse to go a l o n g w i t h the negatively d o g m a t i c d e n i a l of the existence or accessibility of t r u t h ; they m e r e l y d e n y that a n y t h i n g is graspable i n the m a n n e r d e f e n d e d by the Stoics (Ac.
2.73).
A r c e s i l a u s a l s o c o u n t s S o c r a t e s a n d Plato a s g e n u i n e S c e p t i c s s i n c e Socrates t h o u g h t that n o t h i n g c a n be k n o w n ( w i t h the one i m p o r t a n t e x c e p t i o n of h i s o w n i g n o r a n c e ) a n d Plato argues o n b o t h sides o f e v e r y issue, a n d affirms n o t h i n g i n h i s b o o k s (Ac. 2 . 7 4 , 1 . 4 6 ; see C h a p t e r 3). C i c e r o e x t e n d s this h i s t o r i c a l a c c o u n t , e m p h a s i z i n g , or p e r h a p s c o n s t r u c t i n g , a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l c o n t i n u i t y . Socrates first p r a c t i s e d the A c a d e m i c m e t h o d of a r g u i n g against e v e r y t h i n g a n d o p e n l y j u d g i n g n o t h i n g . It w a s t h e n r e v i v e d by A r c e s i l a u s , c o n f i r m e d or s t r e n g t h e n e d by C a r n e a d e s , a n d f r o m there it c o n t i n u e d to f l o u r i s h
12
INTRODUCTION
right d o w n to h i s o w n age (ND
1.11). C i c e r o c l e a r l y u n d e r s t a n d s
this m e t h o d to c o n s i s t of three c o m p o n e n t s : r e l i e v i n g o t h e r s f r o m d e c e p t i o n s , c o n c e a l i n g o n e s o w n v i e w s a n d s e a r c h i n g for the m o s t p r o b a b l e s o l u t i o n o n e v e r y d i s p u t e d i s s u e (Twsc. 5.11; see C h a p t e r 5). R e l i e v i n g o t h e r s f r o m d e c e p t i o n is c o m p a t i b l e w i t h A r c e s i l a u s ' i n s i s t e n c e o n epochs.
B u t c o n c e a l i n g one's v i e w c l e a r l y i m p l i e s one
has s o m e t h i n g to c o n c e a l , o n w h i c h he apparently has not s u s p e n d e d j u d g e m e n t . A n d s e e k i n g the m o s t p r o b a b l e v i e w l e a d s C i c e r o to e n d o r s e c e r t a i n p o s i t i o n s as m o r e l i k e l y to be t r u e t h a n o t h e r s . I n C i c e r o s p h i l o s o p h i c a l f a l l i b i l i s m , the s c o p e o f epochs
has d r a m a t i -
cally c o n t r a c t e d ; o n e m a y n o w believe all s o r t s of t h i n g s as l o n g as o n e stops s h o r t of c l a i m i n g to k n o w a n y t h i n g , C i c e r o c o n s i d e r s this m e t h o d to be a m o n g the greatest gifts that G r e e k p h i l o s o p h y has to offer. S o he m u s t have t h o u g h t that w h a t ever alterations w e r e n e c e s s a r y to p r o d u c e it w e r e i m p o r t a n t steps f o r w a r d . H i s g l o s s i n g o v e r the differences b e t w e e n h i s f a l l i b i l i s m a n d the s c e p t i c i s m o f e a r l i e r A c a d e m i c s c a n be e x p l a i n e d by h i s interest i n e s t a b l i s h i n g a n authoritative genealogy a n d p e r h a p s n o t w a n t i n g to a p p e a r to be a p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n n o v a t o r , to w h a t e v e r extent he w a s . It w a s not i n the least bit n e c e s s a r y that the r a d i c a l s c e p t i c i s m of A r c e s i l a u s s h o u l d g r o w into f a l l i b i l i s m . B u t that it d i d d e v e l o p this way, a n d that C i c e r o w e l c o m e d the g r o w t h , are integral p a r t s o f the o v e r a l l n a r r a t i v e I shall d e v e l o p i n this b o o k . O n a n a r r o w e r v i e w , C i c e r o d o e s not b e l o n g a m o n g the G r e e k S c e p t i c s : he is a R o m a n ; he is m o s t f a m o u s for b e i n g a s t a t e s m a n a n d orator rather t h a n a p h i l o s o p h e r ; a n d he e n d o r s e s a m e t h o d that leads to the a c q u i s i t i o n of fallible, p h i l o s o p h i c a l b e l i e f s . But s i n c e he 0
s t a n d s at the e n d of the h i s t o r i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t o f A c a d e m i c S c e p t i c i s m , a n d s i n c e he is o u r m o s t extensive s o u r c e for that history, we m u s t take a c c o u n t o l h i s v i e w o f t h i n g s . T h i s is w h y I h a v e i n c l u d e d s u c h a n e x t e n s i v e d i s c u s s i o n of C i c e r o in C h a p t e r 5.
I also believe
his tallibilist v i e w is w o r t h c o n s i d e r i n g o n its o w n m e r i t s . It c e r t a i n l y exerts a great d e a l o l i n f l u e n c e i n the s u b s e q u e n t h i s t o r y of ideas, s p u r r i n g o n s u c h figures as A u g u s t i n e , P e t r a r c h , E r a s m u s a n d H u m e , to n a m e o n l y a few (see 5 " T h e l e g a c y of a n c i e n t S c e p t i c i s m " i n the G u i d e to F u r t h e r R e a d i n g for a select b i b l i o g r a p h y ) .
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W h e t h e r w e opt for the p o s i t i v e o r negative a s s e s s m e n t of the A c a d e m y ' s slide i n t o f a l l i b i l i s m , a n d the d o g m a t i c v i e w s ot P h i l o a n d A n t i o c h u s , it is w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d that s u c h a slide o c c u r s . T h i s d e v e l o p m e n t i n s p i r e d A e n e s i d e m u s ' r e v i v a l ot P y r r h o n i s m . A f t e r A e n e s i d e m u s a n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t S c e p t i c A g r i p p a , w h o m we k n o w p r a c t i c a l l y n o t h i n g about, d e v e l o p e d a n e v e n m o r e f o r m i d a b l e set o f s c e p t i c a l a r g u m e n t s ( C h a p t e r 8J. T h e s e a r g u m e n t s w e r e t h e n a p p r o p r i a t e d by S e x t u s E m p i r i c u s a l o n g w i t h m a t e r i a l t r o m A e n e s i d e m u s , o t h e r P y r r h o n i s t s n o w lost to us a n d a g o o d deal of a r g u m e n t a t i o n t r o m the S c e p t i c a l A c a d e m i c s v i a the w r i t i n g s o f C l i t o m a c h u s a n d others. S o P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c i s m , i n its m a t u r e f o r m u l a t i o n , d r a w s on m a n y s t r a n d s of the e a r l i e r S c e p t i c a l t r a d i t i o n , P y r r h o n i a n a n d Academic' G i v e n these facts, the p r o s p e c t of d r a w i n g c l e a r l i n e s b e t w e e n P y r r h o n i s t s a n d A c a d e m i c s as s u c h is s l i m . T h e o n l y u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l point w e c a n m a k e o n this topic is that w h i l e t h e y are all c o n c e r n e d to s h o w that the s c e p t i c a l life is viable, the A c a d e m i c s never p r o m i s e that it w i l l b e t r a n q u i l , w h e r e a s the P y r r h o n i s t s d o . A m o r e p r o m i s i n g a p p r o a c h is to differentiate e a c h o f the a n c i e n t S c e p t i c s o n t h e i r o w n t e r m s . T h e f a m i l y r e s e m b l a n c e s we have e x p l o r e d m o t i v a t e the f o l l o w i n g q u e s t i o n s :
« H o w d o e s the s c e p t i c a r r i v e at *
s c o p e of * *
epochei
H o w m u c h d o e s he s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t about - w h a t is the epochei
H o w d o e s he r e s p o n d to c h a r g e s o f i n c o n s i s t e n c y ? H o w does he r e s p o n d to apmxiti
o b j e c t i o n s ? D o e s he a l l o w
h i m s e l f s o m e beliefs or not? A n d m o r e generally, w h a t k i n d o l life w o u l d s u c h a s c e p t i c live? Before t u r n i n g to these q u e s t i o n s a n d the detailed e x a m i n a t i o n of the v a r i o u s S c e p t i c s , w e m u s t first c o n s i d e r s o m e p r o b l e m s i n i n t e r p r e t i n g the f r a g m e n t a r y e v i d e n c e .
i;
INTRODUCTION
Some problems of interpretation It is i r o n i c a l l y fitting that there s h o u l d be so m u c h d i s p u t e a b o u t the a n c i e n t S c e p t i c s . T h i s is d u e , o n o n e h a n d , to the m e a g r e a n d f r a g m e n t a r y state of o u r e v i d e n c e , w h i c h m a k e s it difficult to j u d g e the h i s t o r i c a l a c c u r a c y o f v i e w s a n d m e t h o d s attributed to t h e m . T h e r e are m a n y c h a l l e n g e s in s o r t i n g t h r o u g h the e v i d e n c e , w h i c h is often at o n e or two r e m o v e s f r o m the o r i g i n a l S c e p t i c . I n a d d i t i o n to p r o b l e m s of t r a n s l a t i o n f r o m G r e e k a n d L a t i n , there are p o s s i b l e d i s tortions to a c c o u n t for, o w i n g p e r h a p s to the r e p o r t e r s o w n a g e n d a , a lack of c o n c e r n w i t h h i s t o r i c a l a c c u r a c y or p l a i n o l d m i s u n d e r s t a n d ing. T h e g e n r e of the s o u r c e s m u s t also be factored i n , as they range f r o m p o l e m i c a l treatises, s a t i r i c a l verse a n d p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i a l o g u e s to b i o g r a p h y a n d d o x o g r a p h y , w h i c h is a c a t c h - a l l d e s c r i p t i o n for a k i n d of r e p o r t i n g a n d a r r a n g i n g o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l d o c t r i n e s or
(doxai
dogmatti}? O n the o t h e r h a n d , d i s p u t e s about a n c i e n t S c e p t i c i s m are also
fuelled b y p u r e l y p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s a g r e e m e n t s a s w e l l . S o m e t i m e s the e v i d e n c e c a n be r e a d in logically i n c o m p a t i b l e w a y s , at w h i c h p o i n t c o m m e n t a t o r s t u r n for g u i d a n c e to p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n s i d e r a tions a n d s o m e v e r s i o n of the p r i n c i p l e o f charity, w h i c h i n its m o s t g e n e r a l f o r m u l a t i o n c o m m a n d s us to o p t for the m o s t c o h e r e n t a n d plausible c o n s t r u a l we c a n
find.
I n w h a t f o l l o w s , I h a v e t r i e d as m u c h as p o s s i b l e to let the S c e p t i c s s p e a k for themselves. T h a t is, I h a v e s o u g h t first a n d foremost to p r o v i d e h i s t o r i c a l l y a c c u r a t e a c c o u n t s of the d e v e l o p m e n t o f A c a d e m i c a n d P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c i s m . T h i s a p p r o a c h has the v i r t u e of l e a v i n g o p e n the q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r we s h o u l d take their p o s i t i o n s s e r i o u s l y as live p h i l o s o p h i c a l o p t i o n s . T h a t s o r t o f q u e s t i o n , I believe, s h o u l d be a n s w e r e d o n l y after w e have articulated as c l e a r l y a s p o s sible the h i s t o r i c a l p o s i t i o n i n q u e s t i o n . T o a s s u m e i n a d v a n c e that the a n c i e n t S c e p t i c s p r o v i d e us w i t h viable alternatives to o u r c u r rent c h o i c e s o l p h i l o s o p h i c a l m e t h o d s a n d p o s i t i o n s r u n s the r i s k of i m p o v e r i s h i n g the past by i m p o s i n g o u r c u r r e n t c o n c e p t i o n s of w h a t is i m p o r t a n t , i n t e r e s t i n g a n d viable. T o see o u r p r e d e c e s s o r s ' v i e w s too n a r r o w l y i n t e r m s of o u r o w n a l s o u l t i m a t e l y l i m i t s o u r
L?
ANCIENT
SCEPTICISM
c u r r e n t array o f c h o i c e s . S t u d y i n g the h i s t o r y of ideas m a y l e a d u s to d i s c o v e r (or r e d i s c o v e r ) a n e x c i t i n g p h i l o s o p h i c a l a p p r o a c h that is not c u r r e n t l y b e i n g d i s c u s s e d o r practised. O f c o u r s e , it m a y also lead to the c o n c l u s i o n that s o m e p a r t i c u l a r idea is i r r e t r i e v a b l y foreign to u s , a p r o d u c t of r a d i c a l l y different r i m e s . But this s h o u l d be as w e l c o m e a c o n c l u s i o n as a failed h y p o t h e s i s i n the n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s : siiould
be, despite the fact that it g e n e r a l l y is not. It w o u l d be v e r y
strange it the s t a n d a r d o p e n i n g of so m a n y h i s t o r i c a l s t u d i e s - "so and so has b e e n u n j u s t l y n e g l e c t e d " - w e r e a l w a y s t r u e . N o n e t h e l e s s , I t h i n k it is t r u e that until about t h i r t y y e a r s ago, the a n c i e n t S c e p t i c s h a d b e e n u n j u s t l y neglected. T h e s i t u a t i o n is quite different today. T h i s b o o k w o u l d not have b e e n p o s s i b l e if it w e r e n o t for the fact that so m u c h excellent s c h o l a r s h i p h a s b e e n p r o d u c e d , i l l u m i n a t i n g b o t h the h i s t o r i c a l a n d p h i l o s o p h i c a l aspects of a n c i e n t S c e p t i c i s m ; the g u i d e to f u r t h e r r e a d i n g testifies to this. I h a v e d r a w n extensively I r o m the s e c o n d a r y literature i n a r r i v i n g at m y o w n v i e w s . B u t it is c r u c i a l to note, i n c o n c l u d i n g this i n t r o d u c t i o n , that o n v i r t u a l l y e v e r y s u b s t a n t i a l p o i n t o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n there are plausible alternatives to those 1 present. I believe the n a r r a t i v e I d e v e l o p in this b o o k m a k e s the best s e n s e o l the e v i d e n c e , h i s t o r i cally a n d p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y , but it s h o u l d be a c c e p t e d , i f it is a c c e p t e d , w i t h the s a m e c a u t i o n w i t h w h i c h it is offered.
16
TWO
Pyrrho and Timon: the origin of Pyrrhonian Scepticism
T h e h i s t o r y o f a n c i e n t S c e p t i c i s m officially b e g i n s w i t h t h e e n i g m a t i c character, P y r r h o of E l i s ( c . 3 6 5 - 2 7 5 B C E ) . P y r r h o wrote n o t h i n g h i m s e l f , s o w h a t little e v i d e n c e w e have r e g a r d i n g h i m c o m e s m o s t l y f r o m the w r i t i n g s o f h i s p u p i l T i m o n a n d a b o o k by a n e a r l y c o n t e m p o r a r y biographer, A n t i g o n u s o f C a r y s t u s . O n l y f r a g m e n t s o f these w o r k s s u r v i v e i n t h e a c c o u n t s o f other, later w r i t e r s . D i o g e n e s L a e r t i u s , for e x a m p l e , d r a w s f r o m b o t h i n h i s b i o g r a p h y o f P y r r h o ( D L 9 . 6 1 - 1 0 8 ) . T h e s e later a c c o u n t s l o o k at P y r r h o t h r o u g h t h e lens of w h a t P y r r h o n i s m h a d b e c o m e h u n d r e d s of years later, s o they m u s t be u s e d w i t h c a u t i o n .
1
N e v e r t h e l e s s , i n s e e k i n g to u n d e r s t a n d the h i s t o r y o f G r e e k S c e p t i c i s m it is n e c e s s a r y to r e c o n s t r u c t Pyrrho's p o s i t i o n . T h i s is s o l o r two r e a s o n s . First, the f o u n d e r o f A c a d e m i c S c e p t i c i s m , A r c e s i laus, w a s i n f l u e n c e d b y P y r r h o . A n d secondly, the f o u n d e r o l n e o P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c i s m , A e n e s i d e m u s ( C h a p t e r 6) l o o k e d to P y r r h o as a n i n s p i r a t i o n a l m o d e l o f the s c e p t i c a l life. C l e a r l y w e n e e d s o m e a c c o u n t o l P y r r h o s v i e w s a n d h i s c h a r a c t e r to m a k e sense o f t h i s historical influence. T w o r e c u r r e n t t h e m e s i n the e v i d e n c e are P y r r h o s r e m a r k a b l y t r a n q u i l liie, a n d h i s r e f u s a l to m a k e a n y f i r m d e t e r m i n a t i o n s about things. T h e r e is n o t h i n g u n u s u a l about a G r e e k p h i l o s o p h e r p r o m o t i n g t r a n q u i l l i t y as the p r o p e r goal. A n d there is n o t h i n g u n u s u a l
L7
ANCIENT
SCEPTICISM
about the g e n e r a l l y s c e p t i c a l t h r u s t o l h i s view. A n u m b e r ot p h i l o s o p h e r s h a d h e l d , for v a r i o u s r e a s o n s , that c e r t a i n k i n d s o f k n o w l edge are b e y o n d o u r r e a c h , o r that w e s h o u l d r e m a i n indifferent and i m p a s s i v e to fortune. Pyrrho's n o v e l c o n t r i b u t i o n , a n d the j u s tification for h i s status a s father of G r e e k S c e p t i c i s m , is the w a y he c o m b i n e s these: he p r o p o s e s that t r a n q u i l l i t y is w o n b y m e a n s of a f i r m l y u n o p i n i o n a t e d a n d indifferent attitude. N o o n e before h i m h a d suggested that the r e c o g n i t i o n of o u r c o g n i t i v e l i m i t a t i o n s w o u l d l e a d to s u c h a h a p p y e n d i n g . O n the c o n t r a r y , it w a s w i d e l y a c c e p t e d that k n o w l e d g e plays a n integral role in attaining w h a t e v e r is c l a i m e d to be the p r o p e r goal of life. A r i s t o t l e ( 3 8 4 - 3 2 2 B C E ) , for e x a m p l e , h o l d s that h u m a n c o g n i t i v e a n d s e n s o r y e q u i p m e n t is s u f f i c i e n t l y m a t c h e d w i t h the s t r u c t u r e o f reality to e n a b l e us to satisfy o u r n a t u r a l desire tor u n d e r s t a n d i n g . N a t u r e s i m p l y d o e s not e n d o w its c r e a t u r e s w i t h n a t u r a l d e s i r e s that c a n n o t , i n p r i n c i p l e , be satisfied. S o a c q u i r i n g k n o w l e d g e is part o f the p r o p e r f u l f i l m e n t of o u r n a t u r e s . K n o w l e d g e is thus a n e s s e n t i a l c o m p o n e n t i n a f l o u r i s h i n g lite; it is b o t h i n t r i n s i c a l l y v a l u a b l e as the s a t i s f a c t i o n o f a n a t u r a l d e s i r e a n d i n s t r u n i e n t a l l y v a l u a b l e i n e s t a b l i s h i n g the appropriate ends of a c t i o n . T h i s A r i s t o t e l i a n p o s i tion is p a r t i c u l a r l y i m p o r t a n t b e c a u s e it p r o v i d e s the c o n t e x t for o u r m o s t i n f o r m a t i v e piece of e v i d e n c e r e g a r d i n g P y r r h o .
E u s e b i u s ' report of Aristocles' report of T i m o n s account of P y r r h o S o m e t i m e a r o u n d the s e c o n d c e n t u r y C E , a n A r i s t o t e l i a n p h i l o s o pher, A r i s t o c l e s , wrote a b o o k e n t i t l e d On Philosophy
( C h i e s a r a 2001:
x v i i - x v i i i ) . W e w o u l d k n o w n o t h i n g o f t h i s b o o k if it w e r e n o t f o r E u s e b i u s ( r . 2 6 0 - 3 3 9 ) , a C h r i s t i a n b i s h o p , w h o quotes d i r e c t l y f r o m it i n h i s o w n w o r k , Preparation
for the Gospel. G i v e n that Pyrrho's v i e w s
are r e p o r t e d o r i g i n a l l y by T i m o n , w h o is t h e n q u o t e d b y A r i s t o c l e s , w h o is t h e n q u o t e d b y E u s e b i u s , one m i g h t t h i n k the text is o f q u e s t i o n a b l e h i s t o r i c a l v a l u e . F o r t u n a t e l y , it s e e m s that b o t h A r i s t o c l e s and E u s e b i u s have i n lact p r e s e r v e d the actual w o r d s of T i m o n .
IS
PYRRHO
AND
TIMON
U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the passage still c o n t a i n s a c r u c i a l a m b i g u i t y . O n o n e t r a n s l a t i o n , T i m o n m e a n s t o say that P y r r h o t h i n k s t h i n g s are indeterminate-,
o n the other, that they are indeterminable.
I have
i n s e r t e d alternative t r a n s l a t i o n s of the a m b i g u o u s sentence below. O n the first, l a b e l l e d [ M ] for m e t a p h y s i c a l , P y r r h o is m a k i n g a c l a i m p r i m a r i l y r e g a r d i n g the nature of t h i n g s ( t h e y are i n d e t e r m i n a t e ) . O n the s e c o n d , l a b e l l e d [E] for e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l , P y r r h o is m a k i n g a c l a i m p r i m a r i l y r e g a r d i n g o u r k n o w l e d g e ( w e are u n a b l e to m a k e a c c u r a t e d e t e r m i n a t i o n s a b o u t t h i n g s ) . H e r e is the passage: It is s u p r e m e l y n e c e s s a r y to investigate o u r o w n c a p a c i t y for k n o w l e d g e . F o r if we are so c o n s t i t u t e d that w e k n o w n o t h ing, t h e r e is n o n e e d to c o n t i n u e i n q u i r y into o t h e r t h i n g s . A m o n g the a n c i e n t s too there h a v e b e e n p e o p l e w h o m a d e this p r o n o u n c e m e n t , a n d A r i s t o t l e has a r g u e d against t h e m . P y r r h o of E l i s was a l s o a p o w e r f u l advocate o l s u c h a p o s i t i o n . H e h i m s e l f h a s left n o t h i n g i n w r i t i n g , but h i s d i s c i p l e T i m o n s a y s that w h o e v e r w a n t s to be h a p p y m u s t c o n s i d e r these three q u e s t i o n s : first, h o w are t h i n g s by n a t u r e ? S e c o n d l y , w h a t attitude s h o u l d w e adopt t o w a r d s t h e m ? T h i r d l y , w h a t w i l l be the o u t c o m e for t h o s e w h o h a v e this attitude? A c c o r d i n g to T i m o n , [ M ] P y r r h o d e c l a r e d that t h i n g s are e q u a l l y ated and
unstable
and
indeterminate;
undifferenti-
for this
reason
n e i t h e r o u r s e n s a t i o n s n o r o u r o p i n i o n s tell LIS truths or falsehoods. [E]
P y r r h o d e c l a r e d that t h i n g s are e q u a l l y and immeasurable
and undecidable,
[since]
s e n s a t i o n s n o r o u r o p i n i o n s [consistently! or falsehoods.
indifferentiabie neither our tell us truths
21
Therefore, for t h i s r e a s o n w e s h o u l d not p u t o u r trust i n t h e m o n e bit, but w e s h o u l d b e u n o p i n i o n a t e d , u n c o m mitted and unwavering, saying concerning each individual t h i n g that it n o m o r e is t h a n is not, o r it b o t h is a n d is not, or it n e i t h e r is n o r is n o t . T h e o u t c o m e for those w h o a c t u a l l y
19
ANCIENT
SCEPTICISM
adopt t h i s attitude, says T i m o n , w i l l be first s p e e c h l e s s n e s s , and then freedom I r o m disturbance.., {Praep.
Ev. 1 4 . 1 8 . 1 - 4 [ L S I F ] )
T h e c o r e o f P y r r h o s t e a c h i n g e m e r g e s i n r e s p o n s e to the three related q u e s t i o n s : h o w are t h i n g s b y nature, w h a t attitude s h o u l d w e adopt t o w a r d s t h e m a n d w h a t w i l l b e the o u t c o m e of a d o p t i n g s u c h a n attitude? T i m o n offers these a s p r o b l e m s that m u s t b e r e s o l v e d b y those w h o w i s h to be happy, A n d the s e c o n d q u e s t i o n c l e a r l y a s k s for, a n d is given, a n o r m a t i v e r e s p o n s e : w e should
trust n e i t h e r s e n s a t i o n s
n o r o p i n i o n s . H i e e t h i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e o f this a c c o u n t i s c o n f i r m e d b y A r i s t o c l e s ' c o m p l a i n t that i f T i m o n h a d i n t e n d e d h i s w r i t i n g to h a v e s o m e beneficial effect, t h e n it w o u l d have to b e by m e a n s o f c o n v i n c i n g us o f the t r u t h of P y r r h o s s t a t e m e n t s (Praep.
Ev. 1 4 . 1 8 . 1 6 ) .
H i at is, h e a s s u m e s that t e a c h i n g c a n o n l y i m p r o v e the s t u d e n t b y i m p a r t i n g k n o w l e d g e , o r at least true beliefs, H o w , t h e n , c a n P y r r h o s s c e p t i c a l t e a c h i n g benefit us? W e shall r e t u r n to this issue after d i s c u s s i n g t h e first q u e s t i o n .
Things are indeterminate T h e fact that t h e first q u e s t i o n a d d r e s s e s the nature of t h i n g s m i g h t i n c l i n e us t o w a r d s t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . O n t h i s v i e w , t h i n g s are u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d , u n s t a b l e a n d i n d e t e r m i n a t e . T o s a y that t h i n g s are u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d a p p e a r s to m e a n that there are n o real, i n t r i n s i c d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n a n y t w o things, S i m i l a r l y , t h e y are i n d e t e r m i n a t e : n o m o r e o n e w a y t h a n a n o t h e r . A n a t o j i i ist w o u l d a c c e p t a r e s t r i c t e d v e r s i o n o f this: there are n o real d i f ferences b e t w e e n t h i n g s w i t h respect to s e c o n d a r y qualities s u c h as c o l o u r s i n c e the a t o m i c c o m p o n e n t s o f t h i n g s are c o l o u r l e s s . A s D e m o c r i t u s f a m o u s l y asserts: " B y c o n v e n t i o n , sweet; b y c o n v e n t i o n , bitter; by c o n v e n t i o n , hot; by c o n v e n t i o n , c o l d ; b y c o n v e n t i o n , c o l o r ; but i n reality, a t o m s a n d v o i d " (Af 7.135; see D L 9 . 7 2 ) . S i n c e a t o m s really d o h a v e s i z e a n d shape, h o w e v e r , t h i n g s are differentiated a n d
20
PYRRHO
AND
TIMON
d e t e r m i n a t e w i t h respect to these p r o p e r t i e s . B u t for P y r r h o , o n the m e t a p h y s i c a l interpretation not e v e n s i z e a n d s h a p e differentiate one thing from another. T h i s m a y s e e m w i l d l y i m p l a u s i b l e o n the g r o u n d s that the regularity o í o u r e x p e r i e n c e o l the w o r l d strongly suggests s o m e u n d e r l y i n g s t r u c t u r e . I f t h i n g s are really n o m o r e o n e w a y t h a n a n o t h e r , it b e c o m e s difficult to u n d e r s t a n d w h y the s u n a l w a y s s e e m s w a r m i n g a n d a n i c y lake a l w a y s s e e m s c o o l i n g , o r w h y h e a v y objects a l w a y s s e e m to tail to e a r t h a n d v e r y light o n e s s e e m to rise a n d float. W e d o not k n o w w h e t h e r P y r r h o felt c o m p e l l e d to e x p l a i n the a p p a r ent regularity of o u r e x p e r i e n c e . B u t g i v e n h i s r e j e c t i o n of scientific e x p l a n a t i o n s ( D L 9 . 6 5 ) , it is likely that he w o u l d have d i s m i s s e d s u c h attempts as " e m p t y t h e o r i z i n g " A n d i n d e e d , i f t h i n g s w e r e i n t r i n s i cally i n d e t e r m i n a t e , it w o u l d be futile to t h i n k we c o u l d e x p l a i n any p e r c e i v e d regularities b y r e v e a l i n g s o m e u n d e r l y i n g s t r u c t u r e . It w o u l d j u s t b e a brute, i n e x p l i c a b l e tact that m e t a p h y s i c a l i n d e t e r m i n a c y is c o m p a t i b l e w i t h p e r c e i v e d regularities. F o r sceptical p u r p o s e s , it is m o r e p r o d u c t i v e to focus o n p e r c e i v e d i r r e g u l a r i t i e s , for e x a m p l e , that the s a m e t h i n g a p p e a r s r a d i c a l l y d i f ferent i n different c i r c u m s t a n c e s : the w i n d feels w a r m to y o u a n d c o o l to m e . T h e v a r i a b i l i t y o f p h e n o m e n a a l o n g w i t h s e e m i n g l y e n d less d i s a g r e e m e n t is a staple o f a n c i e n t S c e p t i c i s m . A l t h o u g h there is n o c l e a r e v i d e n c e that P y r r h o d e f e n d s m e t a p h y s i c a l i n d e t e r m i n a c y o n the basis o f variability, this is at least a p l a u s i b l e route ( D L 9.106; see Bett 2 0 0 0 ) . E v e n so, it r e q u i r e s a c r u c i a l p r e m i s e l i n k i n g v a r i ability to i n d e t e r m i n a c y : if A is by nature F(=
d e t e r m i n a t e d F), t h e n
x is i n v a r i a b l y F . T h i s p r i n c i p l e m a y b e i n t e r p r e t e d i n a v a r i e t y of w a y s , d e p e n d i n g o n h o w w e u n d e r s t a n d the key q u a l i f i e r s " i n v a r i a b l y " a n d "by nature". N e v e r t h e l e s s , s o m e t h i n g like it is n e c e s s a r y to get us f r o m the v a r i a b i l i t y o f the w a y t h i n g s s e e m to the c o n c l u s i o n that they are not b y nature a n y m o r e o n e w a y t h a n a n o t h e r
(see
C h a p t e r 6 tor A e n e s i d e m u s ' later p o l e m i c a l use o f i n v a r i a b i l i t y as a condition on truth). R e g a r d l e s s of h o w he a r r i v e d at it, w e c a n f u r t h e r c l a r i f y P y r r h o s v i e w by i n t e r p r e t i n g h i s s e c o n d a d j e c t i v e : w h a t does he m e a n by s a y i n g that t h i n g s are u n s t a b l e ? O n e attractive o p t i o n is that P y r r h o
21
ANCIENT
SCEPTICISM
d e f e n d s the v i e w Plato attributes to the H e r a c l i t e a n s i n the etctus
Thea-
( 1 5 2 d - e ) ; n a m e l y , that e v e r y t h i n g is c o n s t a n t l y c h a n g i n g i n
e v e r y respect (Bett 2 0 0 0 : 1 3 2 - 4 0 ; Powers 2 0 0 1 ) . T h e rate of change is irrelevant. T h e i m p o r t a n t point is that a t h i n g never h a s p r e c i s e l y the s a m e p r o p e r t i e s I r o m o n e m o m e n t to the next. W e s h o u l d not t h i n k that w e h a v e s t o p p e d the p r o c e s s by t a k i n g a p h o t o g r a p h , s i n c e this f r o z e n m o m e n t d o e s not c o r r e s p o n d to the real n a t u r e of the t h i n g . I n fact, it is not really fitting to call it o n e t h i n g i n the first place. I f all of its p r o p e r t i e s are i n flux, it w i l l not be the s a m e t h i n g o v e r t i m e ; constant c h a n g e w i l l c o n s u m e w h a t e v e r m o m e n t a r y identity w e m a y i m p o s e . I n r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h i s i n s i g h t , we s h o u l d replace the v e r b "to b e " w i t h " b e c o m e s " . It is n e v e r c o r r e c t to say that x is F , but o n l y that x b e c o m e s F. A n d e v e n t h e n , A d o e s n o t r e m a i n F ; n o r does it e v e n -
r e m a i n itself. S o it is e v e n m i s l e a d i n g to talk about all of a thing's p r o p e r t i e s c h a n g i n g i n so far as that p r e s u p p o s e s s o m e u n d e r l y i n g s u b s t r a t u m that m i g h t e n d u r e . B e c a u s e o f this i n d e t e r m i n a c y , P y r r h o c o n c l u d e s that
neither
o u r s e n s a t i o n s n o r o p i n i o n s tell the t r u t h or f a l s e h o o d s . It is clear e n o u g h w h y h e w o u l d t h i n k that t h e y fail to r e p o r t the t r u t h . I n o r d e r for o u r s e n s a t i o n s or o p i n i o n s to report a n y t h i n g it s e e m s t h e y m u s t assert s o m e definite, or d e t e r m i n a t e , p r o p o s i t i o n . A n d i n o r d e r for a n a s s e r t i o n to be t r u e it m u s t c o r r e c t l y report the relevant state o f affairs. I f t h i n g s are i n h e r e n t l y i n d e t e r m i n a t e , n o a s s e r t i o n c a n c o r r e c t l y r e p o r t h o w t h i n g s are. S o m e t a p h y s i c a l i n d e t e r m i n a c y e l i m i n a t e s the p o s s i b i l i t y that a n y s e n s a t i o n o r o p i n i o n c o u l d be true. But w h y d o e s P y r r h o also say that i n d e t e r m i n a c y e l i m i n a t e s the p o s s i b i l i t y that a n y s e n s a t i o n or o p i n i o n c o u l d be false? T h e m o r e n a t u r a l c o n s e q u e n c e to d r a w , it s e e m s , w o u l d be that all p r o p o s i t i o n s are false b e c a u s e they attempt to assert s o m e t h i n g d e t e r m i n a t e about t h i n g s that are i n d e t e r m i n a t e . P e r h a p s P y r r h o t h i n k s that i n o r d e r for the p r o p o s i t i o n "JC is V
to be false, s o m e d e t e r m i n a t e state
of affairs represented by "x is n o t - F ' m u s t be true. I n other w o r d s , p e r h a p s h e t h i n k s the p o s s i b i l i t y o f e r r o r o n l y m a k e s s e n s e i n a w o r l d of d e t e r m i n a t e o b j e c t s . I n that case, i n d e t e r m i n a c y w o u l d e l i m i n a t e the p o s s i b i l i t y of a n y t h i n g b e i n g t r u e or false,
22
PYRRHO AND TIMON
P y r r h o m i g h t have a d o p t e d s u c h a n a r r o w c o n c e p t i o n of w h a t is r e q u i r e d for a statement to be false. B u t there is n o e v i d e n c e that ho c i d .
Things are undecidable T h e m o s t c o n v i n c i n g o b j e c t i o n to the m e t a p h y s i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is the d e c i d e d l y e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l focus o f A r i s t o c l e s On Philosophy. 1
One
of h i s m a i n tasks in this b o o k is to d e f e n d Aristotle's v i e w that b o t h s e n s a t i o n a n d r e a s o n , p r o p e r l y e m p l o y e d , are reliable g u i d e s i n s e e k ing k n o w l e d g e . T o this e n d , h e argues against c o m p e t i n g a c c o u n t s . P a r m e n i d e s a n d h i s f o l l o w e r s reject the e v i d e n c e of the s e n s e s a n d trust o n l y r e a s o n . P r o t a g o r a s a n d M e t r o d o r u s reject r e a s o n a n d trust o n l y s e n s a t i o n . C y r e n a i c s reject b o t h s e n s a t i o n a n d r e a s o n a n d accept o n l y t h e i r o w n affections or feelings. A n d , finally, P y r r h o a n d his followers reject all a c c o u n t s o f k n o w l e d g e a n d m a i n t a i n that it is o u r nature to k n o w n o t h i n g ( B r e n n a n 1998; C h i e s a r a 2 0 0 1 ) , A r i s t o c l e s c l e a r l y c o u n t s P y r r h o a m o n g those w h o p r o c l a i m that "we are s o c o n s t i t u t e d that w e k n o w n o t h i n g " {Praep.
Ev. 1 4 , 1 8 , 1 - 2 ) .
T h i s is a s t a t e m e n t not a b o u t t h i n g s t h e m s e l v e s , but rather o u r o w n c o g n i t i v e a n d s e n s o r y c a p a c i t i e s . S i m i l a r l y , he identifies the s u b j e c t to be investigated as o u r c a p a c i t y for k n o w l e d g e . II the m e t a p h y s i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w e r e c o r r e c t , o u r i n a b i l i t y to a c q u i r e k n o w l e d g e w o u l d be due to the nature ot t h i n g s a n d not, a s A r i s t o c l e s s a y s , due to a n y facts about u s . I n d e e d , if t h i n g s are i n d e t e r m i n a t e not e v e n G o d c a n have a n y k n o w l e d g e of t h e m . S o , if t h i n g s are i n d e t e r m i n a t e , it d o e s not m a t t e r h o w we are c o n s t i t u t e d , a n d P y r r h o s r e m a r k about o u r c o n s t i t u t i o n w o u l d be idle. But if the e p i s t e m o l ó g i c a I v i e w is right, h o w c a n we e x p l a i n the first q u e s t i o n a b o u t the nature o f things?
W h e n we refer to t h i n g s
it is s o m e t i m e s u n c l e a r w h e t h e r we m e a n to talk about the t h i n g s t h e m s e l v e s or t h e i r effect o n us, or both, It I a m a s k e d a b o u t h o n e y , I c o u l d r e s p o n d either by t a l k i n g about its c h e m i c a l c o m p o s i t i o n or about the w a y it tastes. S i m i l a r l y , P y r r h o c a n r e a s o n a b l y be u n d e r s t o o d as s a y i n g ;
23
ANCIENT
[E]
SCEPTICISM
t h i n g s are e q u a l l y i n d i f f è r e n t i a b l e a n d
immeasurable
and undecidable. In that case, his answe r tells us o n l y about h o w we are affected b y things, that is, it i n f o r m s u s o n l y about o u r c o n s t i t u t i o n a n d c a p a c i t i e s . T h e e p i s t e m o l ó g i c a ! interpretation a l l o w s u s , a n d p e r h a p s e v e n requires us, to r e m a i n a g n o s t i c about the n a t u r e of t h i n g s t h e m s e l v e s . O n this v i e w , w h a t leads P y r r h o to c o n c l u d e that w e are s o c o n stituted as to k n o w n o t h i n g is that " n e i t h e r s e n s a t i o n s n o r o p i n i o n s [consistently] tell us t r u t h s or f a l s e h o o d s " (Pmep,
Ev. 1 4 1 8 . 4 ) . T h e
point is not that s e n s a t i o n s a n d o p i n i o n s h a v e n o t r u t h - v a l u e , but that we are not able to d e t e r m i n e w h a t t r u t h - v a l u e they have. T h e y are not reliable guides; h e n c e the q u a l i f i c a t i o n that they d o not consistently tell the t r u t h or lie. A g a i n , s o m e sort of v a r i a b i l i t y i n the w a y t h i n g s a p p e a r w i l l motivate this p o s i t i o n . A n d a g a i n we w i l l n e e d to s u p p l y a c r u c i a l p r e m i s e , this time l i n k i n g the v a r i a b i l i t y of appearances to o u r i n a b i l ity to d e c i d e a m o n g t h e m . W h e r e the m e t a p h y s i c a l v i e w n e e d s a r e q u i r e m e n t o n t r u t h , the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l v i e w n e e d s a r e q u i r e m e n t on j u s t i f i c a t i o n . W e start w i t h the o b s e r v a t i o n that the s a m e t h i n g a p p e a r s i n v a r i o u s , a n d i n c o m p a t i b l e , w a y s : b o t h F a n d n o t - F . It we are u n a b l e to r a t i o n a l l y prefer o n e o f these appearances t h e n w e m u s t s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t about w h a t A really is, by nature. -
T h e later S c e p t i c A e n e s i d e m u s h o l d s s u c h a v i e w o l P y r r h o . H e c l a i m s that P y r r h o d e t e r m i n e s n o t h i n g d o g m a t i c a l l y b e c a u s e of c o n t r a d i c t i o n ( D L 9 , 1 0 6 ) a n d that h e p h i l o s o p h i z e d a c c o r d i n g to the p r i n c i p l e of s u s p e n s i o n ot j u d g e m e n t ( D L 9.62), B u t a g a i n , we m u s t bear i n m i n d the p o s s i b i l i t y that he is p r o j e c t i n g h i s o w n v i e w b a c k i n t i m e (Beit 2 0 0 0 : 4 8 - 5 7 ) . It is p o s s i b l e that e v e n T i m o n projects h i s o w n e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l s c e p t i c i s m o n to P y r r h o . I n that case, T i m o n , a n d not P y r r h o , w o u l d be the first P y r r h o n i s t ( B r u n s c h w i g 1 9 9 4 ) . T h e later t r a d i t i o n , b e g i n n i n g w i t h T i m o n , m i g h t have d r a w n o n l y f r o m the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l c o n s e q u e n c e s o f P y r r h o s m e t a p h y s i c a l indeterminism. I a m not c o n f i d e n t that the i s s u e c a n be resolved o n the basis of the e v i d e n c e we have. B u t it P y r r h o is p r i m a r i l y c o n c e r n e d to s h o w that
2i
PYRRHO
AND
TIMON
r e c o g n i z i n g o u r c o g n i t i v e l i m i t a t i o n s is not a c a u s e for d e s p a i r but rather a route to t r a n q u i l l i t y , either the m e t a p h y s i c a l o r e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l v i e w w i l l d o . S i n c e I find the m o r e m o d e s t , e p i s t e m o l ó g i c a 1 variety slightly m o r e p l a u s i b l e , a n d s i n c e it w i n s the d a y historically, I shall d e v e l o p t h i s a c c o u n t i n w h a t f o l l o w s ; i n effect, I shall p r o c e e d as if T i m o n got P y r r h o right. Before m o v i n g o n to the s e c o n d a n d t h i r d q u e s t i o n s , w e s h a l l n e e d to c o n s i d e r w h a t P y r r h o m e a n s to i n c l u d e i n h i s c l a i m about the nature of t h i n g s .
T h e scope o f " t h i n g s " a n d Pyrrho's m o r a l c o n v e n t i o n a l i s m F o r P y r r h o , the m o s t i m p o r t a n t matters that call for m e a s u r e m e n t or d e c i s i o n are e v a l u a t i o n s of w h a t is g o o d a n d b a d . So, we s h o u l d f o c u s o n the c l a i m that t h i n g s are e q u a l l y indifferentiable, u n m e a s u r a b l e a n d u n d e c i d a b l e w i t h respect to their v a l u e a n d c h o i c e w o r t h i n e s s . T h i s r e a l i z a t i o n s h o u l d m a k e u s appreciate that v a l u e j u d g e m e n t s are c o n t i n g e n t a n d g r o u n d l e s s ; w e are u n a b l e to j u s t i f y a n y c o n v i c tion that s o m e t h i n g is not j u s t a p p a r e n t l y g o o d , but really g o o d . A c c o r d i n g l y , P y r r h o p r o c l a i m s that " c o n v e n t i o n a n d habit are the basis o f e v e r y t h i n g that m e n d o " ( D L 9.61 ), a n d " a p p e a r a n c e s p r e v a i l e v e r y w h e r e " ( D L 9 . 1 0 5 ) . S i m i l a r l y , "there is n o t h i n g g o o d or b a d by nature, but 'these t h i n g s are d e t e r m i n e d b y m e n i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h c o n v e n t i o n a c c o r d i n g to T i m o n " (M I L 1 4 0 ) . A l t h o u g h this r e m a r k suggests the negatively d o g m a t i c , m e t a p h y s i c a l v i e w that v a l u e s d o not exist i n nature, w e s h o u l d note that o n l y the latter h a l f is attributed to T i m o n . S o h i s p o i n t m a y still b e that s i n c e w e are u n a b l e to e s t a b l i s h w h a t is g o o d o r b a d b y nature, we m u s t p r e s c r i b e v a l u e s conventionally. T h u s we m a y take Pyrrho's m o r a l c o n v e n t i o n a l i s m as a n i m m e d i ate c o n s e q u e n c e of h i s v i e w about o u r cognitive l i m i t s . W e are not s o c o n s t i t u t e d as to k n o w w h a t is b y nature g o o d a n d b a d . T h e s e v i e w s m a y have b e e n i n s p i r e d b y h i s c o m p a t r i o t A n a x a r c h u s , w h o c o m p a r e s t h i n g s to the p a i n t e d s c e n e s that we see at the
theatre.
W e w o u l d t h i n k s o m e o n e m a d tor t a k i n g s u c h facades for reality.
25
ANCIENT
SCEPTICISM
S i m i l a r l y , w e b e h a v e l i k e m a d m e n or d r e a m e r s if we s u p p o s e o u r s e n s a t i o n s are reliable i n d i c a t o r s
of the
true
natures ol
things
( M 7.87-88). A p p l y i n g this to evaluative p r o p e r t i e s , w e w i l l b e h a v e l i k e d r e a m ers a n d m a d m e n if w e take a p p a r e n t l y g o o d t h i n g s for g e n u i n e l y good ones.
J
I n o n e r e v e a l i n g a n e c d o t e w e f i n d t h i s idea a p p l i e d to
justice a n d morality in general. A n a x a r c h u s , along with Pyrrho, a c c o m p a n i e d A l e x a n d e r the G r e a t o n s o m e e x p e d i t i o n s a n d s e e m s to have b e e n b y turns flattering a n d d i s d a i n f u l . After a d r u n k e n q u a r rel, A l e x a n d e r kills h i s f r i e n d C l e i t u s , a n d t h e n i m m e d i a t e l y feels great r e m o r s e . I n h i s d i s d a i n f u l m o o d , A n a x a r c h u s scoffs at h i m for b e h a v i n g like a slave, t e a r i n g the l a w a n d d i s a p p r o v a l o f m e n , w h e n he s h o u l d r e a l i z e that he, l i k e Z e u s , is the l a w ( P l u t a r c h , Vit
Alex.
5 0 - 5 2 ) . A l e x a n d e r s m i s e r y is the result of m i s t a k e n l y t h i n k i n g that h i s a c t i o n w a s i n reality u n j u s t , s h a m e f u l a n d w o r t h y of p u n i s h m e n t . B u t just as the w r i t e r o f the play d e t e r m i n e s the plot, the k i n g decides what justice is. It is difficult to a c c e p t the n o t i o n that w e c a n n o t differentiate g o o d f r o m b a d a c t i o n s e v e n in e x t r e m e c a s e s ; to t h i n k , for e x a m p l e , that A l e x a n d e r s c r i m e is really n o better or w o r s e t h a n the g o o d d e e d s he p e r f o r m e d . B u t P y r r h o n e i t h e r a d v o c a t e s a life o f c r i m e n o r a life of v i r t u e , a s c o n c e i v e d b y h i s c o n t e m p o r a r i e s . H i s a i m is to relieve us o f p o o r l y f o u n d e d c o n f i d e n c e a n d the d i s t u r b i n g d e s i r e s that it produces. T h e m o r e c o m m o n v i e w a m o n g G r e e k p h i l o s o p h e r s is that the p r o b l e m is desire for t h i n g s that t u r n o u t to b e b a d . O n t h i s v i e w , h a p p i n e s s requires c h o o s i n g , if n o t a c q u i r i n g , w h a t is g e n u i n e l y a n d not m e r e l y a p p a r e n t l y g o o d . W e e s t a b l i s h o u r goals in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h w h a t we d e s i r e , a n d we desire w h a t appears good. O n e m i g h t start out in p u r s u i t of m o n e y , b e l i e v i n g that it w o u l d be g e n u i n e l y g o o d to be r i c h , a n d t h e n later decide that t h i s is o n l y a n apparent g o o d s i n c e s o m e w e a l t h y people s e e m to be m i s e r a b l e . S u c h e x p e r i e n c e s m a y c o n v i n c e us that there is a n i m p o r t a n t d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n m e r e l y a p p a r e n t g o o d s a n d g e n u i n e ones. A r m e d w i t h this d i s t i n c t i o n , o n e w o u l d never desire s o m e t h i n g as o n l y a n apparent
good.
T h u s we q u i c k l y arrive at the v i e w that we m u s t first d e t e r m i n e w h a t
2(5
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is g e n u i n e l y g o o d i n o r d e r to e s t a b l i s h the p r o p e r goals in the larger pursuit ol happiness. I f w e m u s t j u s t i f y o u r e n d s as g e n u i n e l y g o o d i n o r d e r to be happy, s c e p t i c i s m about evaluative matters w i l l e l i m i n a t e the p o s s i b i l i t y of h a p p i n e s s . B u t P y r r h o d o e s n o t take h i s s c e p t i c i s m to b e s u c h a w e t blanket, S o it s e e m s h e w o u l d have us replace the m o r e f a m i l i a r q u e s t i o n o f w h a t o n e needs to k n o w to live w e l l , w i t h the q u e s t i o n of h o w o n e m a y live w e l l i n the a b s e n c e of k n o w l e d g e . I n r e s p o n s e to A r i s t o c l e s c o m p l a i n t a b o u t the p o s s i b i l i t y of a n y benefit c o m 1
i n g to t h o s e w h o r e a d T i m o n s b o o k s , w e s h o u l d say that i m p a r t i n g k n o w l e d g e is not the o n l y w a y to benefit o n e s students; i n tact, it is not e v e n a possible way. T h e negative c l a i m , t h e n , is that w e are i n c a p a b l e of a c q u i r i n g evaluative k n o w l e d g e , a n d the positive c l a i m is that s u c h k n o w l e d g e is n o t n e c e s s a r y for t r a n q u i l l i t y or h a p p i n e s s . T i m o n asserts b o t h of these, a p p a r e n t l y o n b e h a l f of P y r r h o , in the f o l l o w i n g couplet: " H a v i n g a c o r r e c t y a r d s t i c k of t r u t h , I w i l l relate a f i c t i o n , as it e v i d e n t l y is to m e , / that the nature of the d i v i n e a n d g o o d [exists] forever a n d f r o m these life b e c o m e s m o s t equable for m a n " ( M 11.20; S v a v a r s s o n 2004; cf. B u r n y e a t 1980). T h e r e are a c t u a l l y t w o f i c t i o n s here: first, that the nature of the d i v i n e a n d g o o d exists forever; a n d s e c o n d l y , that these are the s o u r c e of a t r a n q u i l , equable life. T o say that they exist forever m a y be t a k e n to m e a n that t h e y are stable m e a s u r e s of w h a t is good, a n d not m e r e l y c o n v e n t i o n a l o r contingent. B u t a c c o r d i n g to P y r r h o , e v e n if s u c h s t a n d a r d s w e r e real, they are b e y o n d o u r c o g n i t i v e r e a c h . S o they c a n n o t s e r v e as s t a n d a r d s or m e a s u r e s for us to a c t u a l l y use, a n d t h u s they c a n n o t be r e l i e d o n i n a t t a i n i n g a t r a n q u i l life. H e is able to c o n f i d e n t l y assert that these are fictions s i n c e this is a n a p p l i c a t i o n of h i s m o r e g e n e r a l c l a i m that t h i n g s are indifferentiable, i m m e a s u r a b l e a n d u n d e c i d a b l e . C i c e r o focuses o n the p r a c t i c a l c o n s e q u e n c e s o f t h i s lack of e v a l u ative d i s t i n c t i o n s in h i s r e m a r k s a b o u t P y r r h o (Ac. 2.130; Fin.
3,11¬
12, 4.43, 4.49, 4.60; Off. 1,6). H e attributes to P y r r h o the v i e w that all t h i n g s are equal, that is, that t h e y are all e q u a l l y w o r t h y of c h o i c e o r of a v o i d a n c e . B u t C i c e r o m a k e s it c l e a r that t h i s is part of P y r r h o s c o n c e p t i o n o f v i r t u e as the o n l y g o o d ; e v e r y t h i n g else is i n d i f f e r e n t .
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T h e r e are n o rational g r o u n d s for p r e f e r r i n g o n e t h i n g to a n o t h e r for we are i n c a p a b l e o f d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r a n y t h i n g la m o r e valuable or c h o i c e w o r t h y t h a n a n y t h i n g else. W e m a y feel a p h y s i o l o g i c a l c o m p u l s i o n o n e w a y or another, b u t t h i s is n o i n d i c a t i o n of h a v i n g a r r i v e d at a c o r r e c t a s s e s s m e n t o l a t h i n g s w o r t h . T h e fact that we are n a t u r a l l y i n c l i n e d to s e e k f o o d a n d shelter does not e n t a i l that we s h o u l d , o r that these t h i n g s are by n a t u r e good, I n o r d e r to m a k e s e n s e o l w h a t we m a y c a l l P y r r h o s c o n c e p t i o n o f v i r t u e we s h a l l n e e d to e x p l o r e h i s a n s w e r to T i m o n s s e c o n d q u e s t i o n : w h a t attitude s h o u l d we a d o p t t o w a r d s t h i n g s ?
P y r r h o ' s p r e s c r i p t i o n : the sceptical attitude I n A r i s t o c l e s ' report ( q u o t e d a b o v e ) , P y r r h o a d v i s e s that " w e s h o u l d not put o u r trust i n [sensations a n d o p i n i o n s ] o n e bit, but w e s h o u l d be u n o p i n i o n a t e d , u n c o m m i t t e d a n d u n w a v e r i n g , s a y i n g c o n c e r n i n g e a c h i n d i v i d u a l t h i n g that it n o m o r e is t h a n is not, or it b o t h is a n d is not, or it n e i t h e r is n o r is not". T h e s u g g e s t i o n that we s h o u l d be u n w a v e r i n g and u n c o m m i t t e d raises the p r o b l e m of c o n s i s t e n c y . Is P y r r h o a d v i s i n g us to f i r m l y c o m m i t o u r s e l v e s to the o p i n i o n that we s h o u l d be u n o p i n i o n a t e d a n d u n c o m m i t t e d ? W e s h a l l r e t u r n to the p r o b l e m o f c o n s i s t e n c y i n the next s e c t i o n . F o r n o w we shall c o n c e n t r a t e o n w h a t P y r r h o a d v i s e s us to say, a n d t h u s p r e s u m a b l y to t h i n k . W h a t , for e x a m p l e , w o u l d P y r r h o h a v e us say a n d t h i n k about d e a t h ? A n u n t i m e l y d e a t h is g e n e r a l l y t h o u g h t to be u n q u e s t i o n a b l y b a d . B u t a c c o r d i n g to o n e a n e c d o t e , P y r r h o c a l m l y l a c e d h i s o w n i m m i n e n t death o n b o a r d a s h i p i n a s t o r m . U n l i k e the o t h e r s , he d i s p l a y e d n o i n c l i n a t i o n to p a n i c a n d llee. I n s t e a d , the s t o r y goes, he p o i n t e d to a c o n t e n t e d pig h a p p i l y e a t i n g i n the m i d s t of the s t o r m and r e m a r k e d that this is h o w w e o u g h t to be as w e l l ( D L 9.68). T h e pig h a d n o beliefs about w h e t h e r h i s s i t u a t i o n w a s really b a d , a n d i n d i f f e r e n t l y c a r r i e d o n eating, P y r r h o s attitude i n this s i t u a t i o n is c a p t u r e d by the e x p r e s s i o n that d e a t h is n o m o r e b a d t h a n g o o d , o r b o t h b a d a n d g o o d , or
28
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n e i t h e r b a d n o r g o o d . T h i s c o m p l i c a t e d utterance m a y be interpreted i n t w o w a y s . F i r s t , it m i g h t be t a k e n as o n e ( o r all) of three d i s t i n c t c l a i m s : we m a y say e i t h e r that (a) d e a t h is n o m o r e b a d t h a n g o o d , or (b) death i s b o t h b a d a n d g o o d , o r ( c ) death is n e i t h e r b a d n o r g o o d . S e c o n d l y , it m i g h t be t a k e n as o n l y o n e , f o u r - p a r t r e m a r k ; d e a t h is n o m o r e ( i ) b a d t h a n it is (ii) g o o d , or (iii) b o t h b a d a n d g o o d , or (iv) n e i t h e r b a d n o r g o o d . T h i s s e c o n d alternative really d o e s not a l l o w us to say a n y t h i n g positive about d e a t h at all. W h a t we are a l l o w e d to say, roughly, is that death is n o m o r e this w a y t h a n that way, or n e i t h e r w a y (see A u l u s G e l l i u s , NA 11.5.4; D e L a c y 1958). A n d t h i s is w h a t w e w o u l d e x p e c t if P y r r h o w e r e c o m m i t t e d to the n o t i o n that we c a n n o t ever k n o w a n y t h i n g a b o u t the n a t u r e of death. F u r t h e r m o r e , the s e c o n d a n d t h i r d c l a i m s o f the first alternative - (b) a n d (c) - are p r o b l e m a t i c . It w o u l d m a k e s e n s e for D e m o c r i t u s to say, l o r e x a m p l e , that a p a t c h o f s n o w is n o m o r e w h i t e t h a n notw h i t e b e c a u s e i n its real, a t o m i c n a t u r e it h a s n o c o l o u r . B u t P y r r h o w o u l d not accept s u c h a definite a c c o u n t of the nature of t h i n g s . H e w o u l d not, in p a r t i c u l a r , accept the v i e w that it is the nature of t h i n g s to l a c k all c o l o u r . T h i s is f u n d a m e n t a l l y different f r o m his b r o a d e r c l a i m that it is the n a t u r e o f t h i n g s to b e u n k n o w a b l e . S o P y r r h o s h o u l d not e n c o u r a g e us to say that ( c ) d e a t h is n e i t h e r g o o d n o r b a d i n so far a s that m e a n s he k n o w s , o r is e v e n c o n f i d e n t , that death l a c k s any p a r t i c u l a r v a l u e . W i t h regard to the s e c o n d c l a i m ( b ) , it w o u l d m a k e sense for P r o t a g o r a s to say, tor e x a m p l e , that a patch of s n o w is b o t h w h i t e a n d n o t - w h i t e b e c a u s e a t h i n g is what it a p p e a r s to b e , a n d if it a p p e a r s w h i t e to y o u a n d n o t - w h i t e to m e , t h e n it is w h i t e for y o u a n d notw h i t e for m e . A g a i n , P y r r h o s h o u l d not be w i l l i n g to e n d o r s e s u c h a p o s i t i v e v i e w about the n a t u r e o l t h i n g s , F a r f r o m c l a i m i n g that a p p e a r a n c e s reveal the t r u e ( e v e n it s e e m i n g l y c o n t r a d i c t o r y ) nature of t h i n g s , he absolutely d e n i e s that a p p e a r a n c e s c a n i n d i c a t e the n a t u r e o f reality. P y r r h o w o u l d not e n c o u r a g e us to say, o n the basis J
o f c o n f l i c t i n g a p p e a r a n c e s , that it is b o t h g o o d a n d b a d . I n s u p p o r t o f the s e c o n d alternative, we s h o u l d c o n s i d e r T i m o n ' s r e m a r k that "the e x p r e s s i o n ['no more'] m e a n s ' d e t e r m i n i n g n o t h i n g , a n d s u s p e n d i n g j u d g m e n t ' " ( D L 9,76). I f P y r r h o w e r e to say that
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death is n o m o r e this t h a n that, we m a y take h i m to m e a n that we c a n d e t e r m i n e n o t h i n g about death a n d so m u s t s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t . W e m u s t r e m a i n u n o p i n i o n a t e d a n d u n c o m m i t t e d , a n d w h e n faced w i t h death w e m u s t be u n w a v e r i n g a n d f i r m i n o u r r e f u s a l to take a position. W h e t h e r o r not P y r r h o w o u l d have c a l l e d this d i s p o s i t i o n v i r t u e , he d i d c l a i m that those w h o develop it a c h i e v e t r a n q u i l l i t y . C i c e r o reports that the followers of P y r r h o h o l d m o r a l i t y ( o r v i r t u e ) to be the o n l y g o o d (Fin.
3 . 1 2 ) . But if n o t h i n g is k n o w n to be g o o d or
b a d by nature, t h e n it follows that P y r r h o does not k n o w w h e t h e r it is t r u l y g o o d to be f i r m l y u n c o m m i t t e d a n d u n o p i n i o n a t e d ; n o r c o u l d he c l a i m that t r a n q u i l l i t y is g o o d by nature. I n that case, the s c e p t i c a l d i s p o s i t i o n is o n l y c o n v e n t i o n a l l y g o o d , it it is g o o d at a l l , and we c o u l d d i s m i s s h i s a d v i c e as b e i n g out of step w i t h o u r c u r rent c o n v e n t i o n s .
P y r r h o ' s f i r m l a c k o f c o m m i t m e n t a n d the p r o b l e m o f consistency P y r r h o ' s p o s i t i o n appears i n c o n s i s t e n t . It we are so c o n s t i t u t e d as to k n o w n o t h i n g , it s e e m s we c a n never k n o w that we are s o constituted; n o r c a n we k n o w that t r a n q u i l l i t y is g o o d a n d w o r t h s t r i v i n g for. A n d h o w are w e to b e c o m e f i r m l y u n c o m m i t t e d a n d u n o p i n i o n ated if n o t b y a c q u i r i n g firm c o n v i c t i o n s a n d o p i n i o n s ? G e n e r a l l y , we t h i n k a f i r m , stable d i s p o s i t i o n to be a s i g n of d e e p c o m m i t m e n t a n d , o n the o t h e r h a n d , we suspect that the u n c o m m i t t e d are p r o n e to vacillate. O u r e v i d e n c e r e g a r d i n g P y r r h o does not reveal that he even c o n s i d e r e d these sorts of o b j e c t i o n s , m u c h less w h a t h i s r e s p o n s e m a y h a v e b e e n . N e v e r t h e l e s s , there are s e v e r a l different r e s p o n s e s a v a i l able. T h e s e are w o r t h c o n s i d e r i n g as they f o r e s h a d o w later d e v e l o p m e n t s i n both A c a d e m i c a n d P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c i s m . O n e w a y to a v o i d s u c h i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s is to a l l o w l o r e x c e p t i o n s to P y r r h o ' s g e n e r a l c l a i m s . P e r h a p s all we c a n k n o w is that we are so c o n s t i t u t e d as to k n o w n o t h i n g , a n d that t r a n q u i l l i t y is the o n l y
PYRRHO
AND
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g e n u i n e g o o d . T h e s e c o n v i c t i o n s w i l l e n a b l e us to r e m a i n f i r m l y u n c o m m i t t e d r e g a r d i n g e v e r y t h i n g else. T h a t is, w e s h o u l d a v o i d all o t h e r o p i n i o n s a n d c o n v i c t i o n s about k n o w l e d g e a n d the good. II P y r r h o c o u l d p r o v i d e s o m e p r i n c i p l e d r e a s o n for m a k i n g s u c h e x c e p t i o n s we w o u l d h a v e a c o n v i n c i n g r e s p o n s e to the p r o b l e m . H o w e v e r , there is n o e v i d e n c e that he m a d e s u c h a m o v e . A n o t h e r s o l u t i o n is to c l a i m that P y r r h o h a d habituated h i m s e l f to r e m a i n u n c o m m i t t e d a n d u n o p i n i o n a t e d . I n that case, h i s t r a n q u i l lity w o u l d not be the p r o d u c t of k n o w l e d g e , or e v e n belief, but rather the p r o d u c t of a d e e p l y r o o t e d h a b i t u a l w a y of s e e i n g t h i n g s . I n s u p port of this s o l u t i o n we m a y appeal to the m a n y reports f o c u s i n g o n h i s r e m a r k a b l e d i s p o s i t i o n . T i m o n is s a i d to h a v e c l e a r l y revealed this d i s p o s i t i o n i n h i s b o o k , Pytho
(.which is n o l o n g e r extant; D L
9.67). T i m o n also c o n s i s t e n t l y p r a i s e s h i m in o t h e r w o r k s for his d i s p a s s i o n a t e tranquillity, h i g h l i g h t i n g h i s Lack o f d i s t u r b i n g beliefs or d o c t r i n e s : P y r r h o is not w e i g h e d d o w n w i t h p a s s i o n , o p i n i o n a n d futile legislation (Praep.
Ev. 14.18.19); he has e s c a p e d f r o m s e r v i t u d e
to the o p i n i o n s a n d e m p t y t h e o r i z i n g o f S o p h i s t s ( D L 9,64). A n o t h e r follower o f P y r r h o , N a u s i p h a n e s asserts that we s h o u l d b e c o m e like P y r r h o i n d i s p o s i t i o n , but that we s h o u l d adopt h i s [ N a u s i p h a n e s ' ] o w n d o c t r i n e s ( D L 9.64). S o m e b i o g r a p h i c a l details p r o v i d e a s k e t c h of h o w P y r r h o m i g h t have a r r i v e d at h i s r e m a r k a b l e d i s p o s i t i o n . W h i l e i n I n d i a w i t h A l e x ander, P y r r h o s teacher, A n a x a r c h u s , w a s c r i t i c i z e d for a t t e n d i n g k i n g s in their courts, S u c h b e h a v i o u r , the I n d i a n critic m a i n t a i n e d , w o u l d m a k e h i m u n a b l e to teach others w h a t is g o o d . W h i l e this probably d i d not trouble A n a x a r c h u s , it d i d have a n effect o n P y r r h o , w h o h a d c o l l e c t e d t h o u s a n d s o f pieces of gold f r o m A l e x a n d e r for a p o e m he h a d w r i t t e n ( M 1.282). P y r r h o w i t h d r e w into s o l i t u d e ( D L 9 . 6 2 ) . H e w a s p e r h a p s c o n c e r n e d to a v o i d the a p p e a r a n c e
of
b e l i e v i n g that k i n g s w i e l d real p o w e r o r that p o l i t i c a l i n v o l v e m e n t is b e n e f i c i a l . I n k e e p i n g w i t h h i s d i s d a i n for w o r l d l y power, P y r r h o w a s f o n d of q u o t i n g a line f r o m the Iliad in w h i c h H o m e r calls into q u e s t i o n the p r e m i u m the w a r r i o r c u l t u r e p l a c e d o n f a m e or g l o r y : the g e n e r a tions of m e n c o m e a n d go like leaves o n a tree (Iliad 6 . 1 4 6 ) . F r o m this
31
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lofty p e r s p e c t i v e it s e e m s silly to give oneself airs for h a v i n g f a m o u s ancestors or for d o i n g w h a t m a y a p p e a r to be g l o r i o u s deeds. P y r r h o frequently cited other passages i n H o m e r d i s p l a y i n g the i n c o n s i s t ency, futility a n d c h i l d i s h n e s s o f h u m a n i t y ( D L 9 , 6 7 ) . P y r r h o was e v e n fonder of quoting i r o m D e m o c r i t u s , w h o s i m i larly r a i l e d against the d e s t r u c t i v e a n d d i s t u r b i n g effects o f excessive a m b i t i o n a n d d e s i r e . D e m o c r i t u s h e l d that the p r o p e r goal i n life is a persistently c h e e r f u l , tearless, c a l m a n d t r a n q u i l state of m i n d ( D L 9.54). T o a c h i e v e this he a d v i s e d that we m u s t attend to w h a t is p o s sible a n d b e satisfied w i t h w h a t w e have r a t h e r t h a n a l l o w o u r s e l v e s to be c o n s u m e d b y e n v y a n d desire. T h e practice a n d p r e a c h i n g o f s u c h d e t a c h m e n t is not u n u s u a l i n G r e e k p h i l o s o p h y p r i o r to P y r r h o : i n a d d i t i o n to D e m o c r i t u s , D i o g e n e s the C y n i c p r o m o t e d a s i m i l a r d i s p o s i t i o n . B u t o n their v i e w s , d e t a c h m e n t is s u p p o s e d to a r i s e f r o m a c o r r e c t e v a l u a t i o n o f the g o o d s o f fortune, w h e r e a s i n P y r r h o ' s v i e w it arises f r o m a refusal to evaluate s u c h g o o d s i n the first place. I n a n y case, s u c h d e t a c h m e n t
is a h a r d - w o n
accomplishment.
P y r r h o a c k n o w l e d g e s this in the f o l l o w i n g report: " W h e n h e was terrified b y a d o g that h a d r u s h e d at h i m , he a n s w e r e d h i s c r i t i c that it is difficult to e n t i r e l y s t r i p off one's h u m a n i t y , but that one s h o u l d struggle against t h i n g s first by d e e d s a n d t h e n , if that doesn't w o r k , by r e a s o n " ( D L 9.66; see Praep.
Ev. 14.18.26). It p r o b a b l y s e e m e d
to P y r r h o that o u r m o s t i m p o r t a n t struggle is to resist the v e r y h u m a n t e n d e n c y to evaluate t h i n g s as g e n u i n e l y g o o d o r b a d . T h i s t e n d e n c y is m o s t likely to s u r f a c e w h e n d a n g e r l o o m s . W e all tend to see i m m i n e n t h a r m a n d a n u n t i m e l y d e a t h as g e n u i n e l y b a d . B u t P y r r h o a d v i s e s that we l e a r n to see t h e m as n e i t h e r g o o d n o r b a d ; that i s , he p r o m o t e s the d e v e l o p m e n t o f a d i s p o s i t i o n not to evaluate things, a n d m o r e g e n e r a l l y not to s u p p o s e that a n y t h i n g is really, by nature, F . It is u n l i k e l y that one c o u l d s u c c e e d i n s t r i p p i n g away one's n a t u r a l h u m a n t e n d e n c y to c o n s i d e r p a i n a n d d e a t h g e n u i n e l y b a d w i t h o u t s o m e v e r y c o m p e l l i n g r e a s o n s . I n o t h e r w o r d s , o n e w o u l d probably not u n d e r t a k e a r i g o r o u s p r o g r a m m e
of c o n d i t i o n i n g unless o n e
c a m e to b e l i e v e that the p r o m i s e d t r a n q u i l l i t y w o u l d be w o r t h it.
PYRRHO
AND
TIMDN
P l u t a r c h attributes to P y r r h o the v i e w that " f r e e d o m f r o m s u f f e r i n g (apatheta)
h a s to be g a i n e d t h r o u g h r e a s o n a n d p h i l o s o p h y "
(Pro).
Virt. 8 2 F ) . A n d this leads us a g a i n to c o n f r o n t the p r o b l e m o f c o n sistency. W h y is the f i r m l y u n c o m m i t t e d P y r r h o not still left w i t h positive c o n v i c t i o n s a b o u t the v a l u e of t r a n q u i l l i t y a n d o u r cognitive limitations? I n a passage p r o b a b l y f r o m T i m o n s Pytho,
we f i n d a
metaphor
that plays a c e n t r a l role i n later P y r r h o n i s m ; the s c e p t i c applies his c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y s c e p t i c a l utterances to t h e m s e l v e s , w h i c h s h o w s h o w the utterances are l i k e purgatives i n d r i v i n g out the offensive s u b s t a n c e before e l i m i n a t i n g t h e m s e l v e s ( D L 9 . 7 6 ) . T h u s the e x p r e s s i o n " n o m o r e this t h a n that" applies to itself a n d d i s c h a r g e s the a p p e a r a n c e that the sceptic has a s s e r t e d s o m e t h i n g definite. W h e n he says that he d e t e r m i n e s n o t h i n g , he s h o u l d not be t a k e n as h a v i n g d e t e r m i n e d e v e n that he d e t e r m i n e s n o t h i n g . P y r r h o s d i s p o s i t i o n is w h a t is left after the s c e p t i c a l purgatives p e r f o r m t h e i r f u n c t i o n . ( W e shall c o n s i d e r the p u r g a t i v e m e t a p h o r i n greater detail i n Chapter 9.}
5
The outcome: Pyrrho's prudent tranquillity W e t u r n finally to the t h i r d q u e s t i o n . H a v i n g b e c o m e firmly u n c o m m i t t e d r e g a r d i n g the natures o l t h i n g s , o n e is i n i t i a l l y s p e e c h l e s s . It is not c l e a r w h e t h e r this s h o u l d be t a k e n literally, o r rather as a w i t h h o l d i n g of a n y p o s i t i v e a s s e r t i o n about t h i n g s . E v e n if the initial o u t c o m e is a n a m a z e d s i l e n c e , we h a v e to a s s u m e that the s c e p t i c e v e n t u a l l y a d o p t s s o m e f o r m of s p e e c h to a c c o u n t for P y r r h o s w i l l i n g n e s s to h o l d f o r t h . Sextus d e s c r i b e s a v e r y plausible c a n d i d a t e for s c e p t i c a l l y a c c e p t able s p e e c h as a k i n d o l n o n - a s s e r t i o n i n w h i c h we refuse to assert ( o r d e n y j a n y t h i n g a b o u t the w a y the w o r l d is (PH 1 . 1 9 2 - 3 , a l t h o u g h h e does not attribute t h i s to P y r r h o ) . I n this case w e s h a l l o n l y r e p o r t h o w things seem without any further c o m m i t m e n t . I f one succeeds i n a d o p t i n g the s c e p t i c a l attitude a n d o n l y says o f t h i n g s that they are n o m o r e this w a y t h a n that o r neither, t h e n he w o u l d , o b v i o u s l y ,
33
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n o longer be a s s e r t i n g a n y t h i n g positive about t h e nature o f t h i n g s w h e n he s p o k e . F o l l o w i n g s p e e c h l e s s n e s s , or n o n - a s s e r t i o n , is t r a n q u i l l i t y . T h e sceptic is n o longer i n c l i n e d o n e w a y o r a n o t h e r ; a s T i m o n s a y s , he w i l l n e i t h e r c h o o s e n o r d e c l i n e ( A f 1 1 . 1 6 4 ) . A s a result he is c o m pletely u n d i s t u r b e d b y w h a t e v e r c o u r s e t h i n g s take. T h e c r u c i a l a s s u m p t i o n at w o r k here is that it is the f r u s t r a t i o n o f o u r beliefs a n d d e s i r e s that is r e s p o n s i b l e for w h a t e v e r d i s t u r b a n c e s w e suffer. ( W e s h a l l e x a m i n e this d i a g n o s i s f u r t h e r i n C h a p t e r 7.) B u t i f P y r r h o c a m e to see p a i n a n d death as n o t g e n u i n e l y b a d , he w o u l d not see t h e m a s t h i n g s to be a v o i d e d " either. A c c o r d i n g Il
to A n t i g o n u s , P y r r h o w a s r e c k l e s s , " a v o i d i n g n o t h i n g a n d t a k i n g n o p r e c a u t i o n s , f a c i n g e v e r y t h i n g a s it c a m e , w a g o n s , p r e c i p i c e s , dogs, a n d e n t r u s t i n g n o t h i n g w h a t s o e v e r to h i s s e n s a t i o n s " ( D L 9 . 6 2 ) . O n this v i e w P y r r h o w a s kept a l i v e b y h i s d e v o t e d students, w h o steered h i m a w a y f r o m s p e e d i n g w a g o n s a n d d a n g e r o u s cliffs. B u t a c c o r d i n g to A e n e s i d e m u s , P y r r h o s s u s p e n s i o n of j u d g e m e n t d i d not c a u s e h i m to act carelessly i n h i s d a i l y life ( D L 9,62). A n d T i m o n c l a i m s that P y r r h o d i d not depart f r o m n o r m a l , h a b i t u a l o r c u s t o m a r y p r a c t i c e (sunetheia;
D L 9.105),
T h e s e latter r e m a r k s m a y s e e m to c o n f l i c t w i t h the a n e c d o t e s reporting P y r r h o s thoroughly unconventional behaviour. But p r u d e n c e d o e s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y r e q u i r e s o c i a l c o n f o r m i t y . T h e tales o f P y r r h o s r e c k l e s s n e s s a p p e a r to be s e n s a t i o n a l f a b r i c a t i o n s , p r o b ably d e v i s e d to illustrate the s u p p o s e d l y terrible p r a c t i c a l
conse-
q u e n c e s o f s c e p t i c i s m . A l t h o u g h there is n o c o n c l u s i v e textual basis for c h o o s i n g the p r u d e n t over the reckless P y r r h o , I d e f e r o n c e again to h i s s t u d e n t T i m o n , w h o a n n o u n c e s i n a n o t h e r lost w o r k , On the Senses:
" T h a t h o n e y is sweet 1 d o not assert, but I agree that it s e e m s
to b e " ( D L 9 . 1 0 5 ) . A e n e s i d e m u s takes s u c h r e m a r k s to indicate that P y r r h o g u i d e s h i m s e l f by the a p p e a r a n c e s ( D L 9.106), H o n e y s apparent s w e e t n e s s is sufficient to m a k e m e w a n t to eat it; in this w a y a p p e a r a n c e s p r e v a i l over theories o r a r g u m e n t s p u r p o r t i n g to reveal s o m e t h i n g about the h i d d e n nature o l h o n e y (see D L 9 . 1 0 5 ) . I f A e n e s i d e m u s is right, w e m a y say that P y r r h o h a s n o o p i n i o n s about the nature o f s p e e d i n g c h a r i o t s b e y o n d w h a t h i s senses report, B u t it
J4
PYRRHO
AND
TIMON
o n e a p p e a r s to b e r u s h i n g t o w a r d s h i m he w i l l m o v e out ot the way, just a s o r d i n a r y people d o .
Conclusion W h i l e I believe this a c c o u n t of P y r r h o m a k e s the best sense of the f r a g m e n t a r y a n d s o m e t i m e s c o n f l i c t i n g e v i d e n c e , it is v u l n e r a b l e to the o b j e c t i o n that it is the p r o d u c t o f later S c e p t i c s p r o j e c t i n g their o w n v i e w s a n d p r a c t i c e s b a c k i n time. G i v e n the s c a r c i t y of e v i d e n c e , h o w e v e r , we c a n n o t be too c o n f i d e n t about the extent to w h i c h the later t r a d i t i o n d e p a r t s f r o m or d e v e l o p s P y r r h o s s c e p t i c a l p o s i t i o n (but see Bett 2 0 0 0 ) . A n d given the fact that P y r r h o never wrote a n y t h i n g , we are largely d e p e n d e n t o n T i m o n , w h o m Sextus d e s c r i b e s as P y r r h o s p r o p h e t ( M 1.53). B u t if P y r r h o is so o r a c u l a r as to n e e d a p r o p h e t , I b e l i e v e w e are r i g h t to a c c e p t the p r o p h e t s interpretation. F u r t h e r m o r e , the a c c o u n t I h a v e p r o v i d e d a l l o w s us to see the h i s t o r y of P y r r h o n i s m as the d e v e l o p m e n t o f s c e p t i c a l t h e m e s that e m e r g e f r o m the liie o f P y r r h o . F i r s t a n d f o r e m o s t is h i s s c e p t i c a l d i s p o s i t i o n , w h i c h i n c l i n e s h i m a w a y f r o m a r r i v i n g at any evaluative j u d g e m e n t s . L a t e r P y r r h o n i s t s t u r n their attention e s p e c i a l l y to the d e v e l o p m e n t of a r g u m e n t a t i v e strategies, the a p p l i c a t i o n o f w h i c h leads t h e m to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t a n d u l t i m a t e l y to a c q u i r e s o m e t h i n g like P y r r h o s celebrated d i s p o s i t i o n . I n a n y case, P y r r h o s m o s t i m p o r t a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n to the h i s t o r y of S c e p t i c i s m is to p r e s e n t o u r c o g n i t i v e l i m i t a t i o n s i n a p o s i t i v e light as the route to a g o o d , t r a n q u i l liie.
3?
THREE
Arcesilaus: the origin of Academic Scepticism
S o m e t i m e a r o u n d 387 B C E , Plato b e g a n m e e t i n g w i t h h i s students i n a grove, o r p u b l i c p a r k , j u s t o u t s i d e the city w a l l o f A t h e n s , w h e r e he h a d s t u d i e d p h i l o s o p h y as a y o u n g m a n before b e c o m i n g a p u p i l of Socrates ( D L 3.5), T h i s p a r t i c u l a r g r o w w a s n a m e d after a G r e e k h e r o , H e k a d e m o s . T h u s w a s b o r n Plato's A c a d e m y . ' Plato a l s o b o u g h t ( o r was g i v e n ) a private r e s i d e n c e n e a r b y w h e r e he a n d h i s s t u d e n t s ate their m e a l s a n d h a d the o c c a s i o n a l d r i n k i n g party (symposium).
T h e m a i n philosophical business was conducted
b o t h w i t h i n the private h o u s e a n d i n the o p e n s p a c e of the p a r k . W i t h the e x c e p t i o n of a few a n e c d o t e s r e c o r d e d l o n g after the fact, we have n o explicit a c c o u n t o f the m e t h o d s a n d c u r r i c u l a o l the original Academy, H o w e v e r , g i v e n the p r o m i n e n t role p l a y e d b y the t h e o r y
(or
t h e o r i e s ) o f the F o r m s in Plato's d i a l o g u e s , a n d Aristotle's e x t e n sive c r i t i q u e i n On Ideas
( a n d Met.
1.9), it is l i k e l y that they w e r e
m u c h d i s c u s s e d i n the A c a d e m y a s w e l l . Plato's first two s u c c e s s o r s , S p e u s i p p u s , followed b y X e n o c r a t e s , b o t h d e v e l o p e d elaborate a n d d i s t i n c t m e t a p h y s i c a l t h e o r i e s a p p a r e n t l y d e s i g n e d , l i k e the F o r m s , to e x p l a i n the intelligible o r d e r i n the w o r l d ( a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s ) . S i n c e S p e u s i p p u s a n d X e n o c r a t e s w e r e b o t h m e m b e r s o f the A c a d e m y p r i o r to Plato's death, the o r i g i n of their m e t a p h y s i c a l t h e o r i e s is p r o b a b l y to b e f o u n d i n their t r a i n i n g w i t h Plato.
ARCESILAUS
T h e s a m e m a y be s a i d for A r i s t o t l e , w h o w a s a s t u d e n t i n the A c a d e m y l o r twenty years before s e t t i n g off to start h i s o w n s c h o o l . H i s m e t a p h y s i c a l v i e w , w h i c h is a p p a r e n t l y d e v e l o p e d in r e a c t i o n to the F o r m s , differs m a r k e d l y f r o m those of h i s A c a d e m i c c o l l e a g u e s . A r i s t o t l e r e m a r k s that e v e n t h o u g h the F o r m s h a d b e e n i n t r o d u c e d by h i s f r i e n d s , he is b o u n d to h o n o u r the t r u t h m o r e h i g h l y (JV£ 1,6,
I 0 ° 6 a l 2 - 1 7 ) . I n d e e d , w e m a y even say that one d i s h o n o u r s
o n e s f r i e n d b y not p o i n t i n g out the flaws i n h i s r e a s o n i n g . A n d we m i g h t , s o m e w h a t o p t i m i s t i c a l l y , h o p e that Aristotle's f r i e n d s i n the A c a d e m y s a w it that w a y as w e l l , A f t e r a l l , Plato h i m s e l f p r o v i d e s s o m e d e v a s t a t i n g o b j e c t i o n s to the t h e o r y of the F o r m s i n h i s o w n
Parmenides. T h e fact that d i s a g r e e m e n t w a s tolerated if not e n c o u r a g e d , a n d the fact that s u c h a v a r i e t y o f p o s i t i o n s e m e r g e d f r o m the A c a d e m y , suggest that Plato w a s not interested i n forcing a n o r t h o d o x interpretation o f the F o r m s o n h i s s t u d e n t s . I n k e e p i n g w i t h the d i a l e c t i c a l spirit o f h i s d i a l o g u e s Plato p r o b a b l y sought to i n s p i r e h i s students to t h i n k for t h e m s e l v e s . A S o c r a t i c t h e m e that e m e r g e s t i m e a n d 1
again In the d i a l o g u e s is that w e m u s t a r r i v e at the t r u t h for o u r s e l v e s if we are to a r r i v e at a l l . T e a c h i n g is not a m a t t e r of p o u r i n g the a n s w e r s i n , but rather l e a d i n g , e n t i c i n g o r aggravating the s t u d e n t to d i s c o v e r the t r u t h for h i m s e l f , I n short, l e a r n i n g c a n n e v e r be forced (see for e x a m p l e Rep. 5 3 6 e - f ) . A n d in so far as the d e v e l o p m e n t a n d p r o m o t i o n o f an official a c c o u n t o f P l a t o n i s m i n v o l v e d s u c h force, it w o u l d not h a v e b e e n p a r t of P l a t o s p l a n tor the A c a d e m y a n d his students. A n o t h e r t h e m e I r o m the d i a l o g u e s that Plato's s u c c e s s o r s f o c u s e d o n is that v i r t u e is sufficient (or n e a r l y s u f f i c i e n t ) for h a p p i n e s s . I n m a k i n g h i s case for the i n t r i n s i c v a l u e o f v i r t u e In the Republic,
for
e x a m p l e , Plato argues that it s h o u l d be u n d e r s t o o d a s a k i n d of health of the s o u l a n d f u l f i l m e n t of o u r r a t i o n a l , h u m a n nature. Properlyu n d e r s t o o d , virtue is w o r t h w h i l e regardless of its c o n s e q u e n c e s , a l t h o u g h it is v a l u a b l e for its c o n s e q u e n c e s a s w e l l . T h e intellectual pleasures that are available o n l y to the v i r t u o u s are far s u p e r i o r to anyother. W i t h o u t the k n o w l e d g e of the F o r m o f the G o o d that is n e c e s s a r y tor v i r t u e , e v e n the fullest possible k n o w l e d g e of o t h e r t h i n g s is
37
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SCEPTICISM
of n o benefit to u s , a n y m o r e t h a n if w e a c q u i r e a n y t h i n g w i t h o u t the g o o d o f it {Rep. 5 0 5 a - b ) . A s l o n g a s w e l a c k v i r t u e , n o n e o f w h a t we typically t h i n k o l a s g o o d - tor e x a m p l e , h e a l t h , w e a l t h , b e a u t y - is n e c e s s a r i l y g o o d o r b e n e f i c i a l for us, I f I a m i n a v i c i o u s state, these apparent g o o d s are i n fact h a r m f u l i n so far as t h e y m a k e m e better able to a c h i e v e m y v i c i o u s goals. A s l o n g as I d o not k n o w w h a t is g o o d for m e , I a m better oft n o t b e i n g able to a c h i e v e m y e n d s . S p e u s i p p u s a n d X e n o c r a t e s w e r e p r o b a b l y t h i n k i n g a l o n g these lines w h e n they a s s e r t e d that the best life tor h u m a n b e i n g s is o n e i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h n a t u r e ( D i l l o n 2 0 0 3 : 77, 142ff.). B u t it is a l s o likely that they d i s a g r e e d a b o u t the details of h o w the p h r a s e " i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h n a t u r e " w a s to be i n t e r p r e t e d . T h e t h i r d s u c c e s s o r , P o l e m o , l e d the A c a d e m y for n e a r l y forty years f r o m 314 B C E u n t i l h i s d e a t h i n c.276 B C E . H e does not s e e m to h a v e d i v e r g e d significantly t r o m h i s predecessor, X e n o c r a t e s . Instead, he e m p h a s i z e d the i m p o r t a n c e of e n g a g i n g i n p r a c t i c a l affairs. T h i s is not to say that he i g n o r e d or a v o i d e d theoretical p u r s u i t s , b u t that he c a u t i o n e d h i s s t u d e n t s not to b e c o m e so e n g r o s s e d w i t h t h e m as to lose sight o f their a p p l i c a t i o n s , We s h o u l d not, h e says, b e a d m i r e d for o u r skill w i t h w o r d s , a n d yet be at w a r w i t h o u r s e l v e s i n the o r d e r i n g o f o u r lives ( D L 4 . 1 8 ) . T h e c o n f l i c t he refers to is p r o b a b l y a m a t t e r o f h a v i n g o n e s beliefs a n d d i s p o s i t i o n s at o d d s w i t h one a n o t h e r : b e l i e v i n g c o n t r a d i c t o r y t h i n g s a n d not l i v i n g in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the dictates o f r e a s o n , a n d o u r c o m m o n h u m a n nature, but i n s t e a d l e a r n i n g h o w to talk a g o o d game, T h i s is also a t h e m e that Plato frequently d e v e l o p s in h i s d i a logues; p l a y i n g w i t h w o r d s s h o u l d n e v e r be m i s t a k e n for g e n u i n e p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s c u s s i o n . T h e f o r m e r a i m s o n l y at v i c t o r y w h i l e the latter a i m s at u n c o v e r i n g the t r u t h . M a n y of S o c r a t e s
1
interlocutors
suffer, at least i n h i s e y e s , f r o m the m i s a p p r e h e n s i o n that the point of p h i l o s o p h i c a l debate is to w i n a n d be t h o u g h t s u p e r i o r to one's o p p o n e n t . N o t all of the G r e e k S o p h i s t s w e r e u n s c r u p u l o u s ; Plato presents b o t h G o r g i a s a n d P r o t a g o r a s a s at least w e l l - m e a n i n g , a n d there is g o o d r e a s o n to believe that he is n o t e s p e c i a l l y fair i n h i s g e n e r a l p o r t r a y a l of the S o p h i s t s (see W o o d r u f f 1999).
Neverthe-
less, o n e of the S o p h i s t s m o s t h i g h l y p r i z e d s k i l l s was the ability to 1
38
ARCESILAUS
argue o n both sides ot a n y i s s u e . T h i s is e s p e c i a l l y v a l u a b l e w h e n p o l i t i c a l b u s i n e s s is c o n d u c t e d by w a y o f p u b l i c s p e e c h . It is also c r u c i a l l y i m p o r t a n t w h e n d e f e n d i n g o n e s e l l f r o m unjust a c c u s a t i o n s , a l t h o u g h o f c o u r s e it w o u l d w o r k e q u a l l y w e l l against j u s t ones (see Aristophanes'
Clouds).
I n h i s d i a l o g u e s , Plato expresses the w o r r y that the m a s t e r y of s u c h a skill too easily d i s t r a c t s us f r o m the difficult w o r k of e x a m i n i n g o u r o w n lives. T h o s e w h o seek to w i n by a n y m e a n s a n d w h o change their p o s i t i o n solely to a v o i d b e i n g refuted are like patients w h o lie to their doctors.* T h i s a n a l o g y a s s u m e s that one's interlocutor is q u a l i f i e d to d i a g n o s e intellectual c o n d i t i o n s a n d that the p u r s u i t o f t r u t h c a n in fact l e a d to a h a r m o n i o u s life. B u t P o l e m o is o n s o l i d P l a t o n i c g r o u n d i n i n s i s t i n g that b e i n g a clever s p e a k e r is w o r t h l e s s if not h a r m f u l i n the a b s e n c e of a w e l l - o r d e r e d , v i r t u o u s life. N o d o u b t this p o i n t was not lost o n P o l e m o s s t u d e n t A r c e s i l a u s , w h o w a s a n e x c e p t i o n a l l y clever speaker. A f t e r s t u d y i n g a s t r o n o m y a n d g e o m e t r y i n h i s h o m e t o w n of P i t a n e , he c a m e to A t h e n s as a y o u n g m a n ot about eighteen y e a r s o l d ( c . 2 9 8 B C E ) , r o u g h l y the t i m e i n w h i c h P y r r h o ( c . 3 6 5 - 2 7 5 ) , Z e n o (the f o u n d e r of S t o i c i s m , c . 3 3 5 2 6 2 ) a n d E p i c u r u s ( c . 3 4 l - 2 7 1 ) w e r e all f l o u r i s h i n g . H i s older b r o t h e r w a n t e d h i m to b e c o m e a n orator, w h i c h is p e r h a p s w h y he s t u d i e d w i t h Aristotle's s u c c e s s o r , T h e o p h r a s t u s . A r i s t o t l e h a d i n c l u d e d r h e t o r i c a s a legitimate s c i e n c e , w o r t h y o f p h i l o s o p h e r s ' attention, a n d T h e o p h r a s t u s i n c l u d e d it i n h i s c u r r i c u l u m . B u t despite h i s r h e t o r i c a l p r o w e s s , A r c e s i l a u s w a s d e v o t e d to p h i l o s o p h y a n d , m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , to one of the l e a d i n g A c a d e m i c s , G r a n t o r . Altogether, A r c e s i l a u s s p e n t about twenty years i n Plato's s c h o o l before b e c o m i n g h e a d h i m s e l f , a p p a r e n t l y w i t h the a p p r o v a l o f his c o l l e a g u e s ( D L 4 . 3 2 ) . T h e a u t h o r ot the Academic
Index
remarks,
"At first he d e f e n d e d the p o s i t i o n a d o p t e d by the S c h o o l f r o m Plato a n d S p e u s i p p u s u p to P o l e m o " (Index.
A c , c o l . 18). If o u r e v i d e n c e
c o n c e r n i n g Arcesilaus' predecessors
is a c c u r a t e ,
t h e n n o single,
o r t h o d o x P l a t o n i s m w a s s h a r e d a m o n g t h e m a l l . S o the p o s i t i o n (thesis) that he i n i t i a l l y a d o p t e d s h o u l d be u n d e r s t o o d as m o r e of a g e n e r a l s t a n c e o r r e s e a r c h a g e n d a t h a n a set of s p e c i f i c c o n c l u s i o n s . I n that sense ( a n d w i t h s o m e s i m p l i f i c a t i o n ) , the p o s i t i o n , or
39
ANCIENT
SCEPTICISM
a g e n d a , o f Plato's A c a d e m y p r i o r to A r c e s i l a u s ' t a k i n g over p r o m i n e n t l y teatured the p r o p e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the F o r m s , i n c l u d i n g h o w or w h e t h e r they m a k e k n o w l e d g e of the p h y s i c a l w o r l d p o s sible, a n d the p r o p e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the e t h i c a l ideal o f l i v i n g i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h nature.
S c e p t i c i s m i n the A c a d e m y : the P l a t o n i c a n d S o c r a t i c i n s p i r a t i o n A r c e s i l a u s t u r n e d the A c a d e m y a w a y f r o m these p r o j e c t s
and
t o w a r d s s c e p t i c i s m . I n at least o n e i m p o r t a n t respect this m o v e was not r e v o l u t i o n a r y . A s we have s e e n , there h a d a l w a y s b e e n a n i n t e l l e c t u a l f r e e d o m in the A c a d e m y that kept it f r o m b e c o m i n g a m e r e s t o r e h o u s e of d o g m a . B u t the m o v e to s c e p t i c i s m d i d m a r k a n e w a n d d i s t i n c t p h a s e of the A c a d e m y . By the t i m e A r c e s i l a u s b e c a m e h e a d of the s c h o o l , t h e r e w e r e p r o b a b l y n o A c a d e m i c s alive w h o h a d p e r s o n a l l y k n o w n Plato. T h i s m a d e Plato's b o o k s all the m o r e i m p o r t a n t . D e s p i t e h a v i n g a c c e s s to t h e s e b o o k s , A r c e s i l a u s a c q u i r e d h i s o w n c o p i e s ( D L 4 . 3 2 ) , f r o m w h i c h he d e r i v e d h i s s c e p t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . A s C i c e r o puts it: J
[ A r c e s i l a u s w a s ] the first to adopt f r o m the v a r i e d b o o k s ol Plato a n d f r o m Socrates
1
d i a l o g u e s , e s p e c i a l l y the i d e a
that there is n o c e r t a i n t y that c a n be g r a s p e d e i t h e r by the senses or the m i n d . I n this c o m p l e t e rejection of the m i n d a n d s e n s e s as i n s t r u m e n t s of j u d g m e n t , he is s a i d to have e m p l o y e d an e x c e p t i o n a l l y c h a r m i n g m a n n e r of s p e a k i n g , a n d also to h a v e b e e n the first to establish the practice - a l t h o u g h t h i s w a s v e r y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of S o c r a t e s - o f not r e v e a l i n g h i s o w n v i e w , but o f a l w a y s a r g u i n g against a n y v i e w that a n y o n e else w o u l d assert, {De Or. 3.67 [ M a y & W i s s e 2 0 0 1 ] ; see P l u t a r c h , Adv. Col. 112 l e - 1 1 2 2a) T h a t A r c e s i l a u s d e r i v e d h i s s c e p t i c i s m f r o m Plato's d i a l o g u e s w i l l go s o m e w a y i n e x p l a i n i n g w h y there is n o r e c o r d o l a n y protest or
40
AfcCESILAUS
upheaval following his innovation. Given his powerful rhetorical skill, he m i g h t have sold his colleagues o n the idea that he w a s r e t u r n i n g the i n s t i t u t i o n to its real roots: Plato, a n d S o c r a t e s before h i m , had been sceptics. Earlier A c a d e m i c s , i n c l u d i n g Arcesilaus himself, 5
h a d m i s u n d e r s t o o d the s p i r i t o f P l a t o n i c p h i l o s o p h y b y s e e k i n g to articulate, d e v e l o p a n d d e f e n d positive d o c t r i n e s . T h u s he set out to r e i n v i g o r a t e the A c a d e m y w i t h the s c e p t i c a l spirit of its f o u n d e r , h i P l a t o s d i a l o g u e s , C i c e r o c l a i m s , " n o t h i n g is a f f i r m e d , there are m a n y a r g u m e n t s o n e i t h e r s i d e , e v e r y t h i n g is u n d e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n , a n d n o t h i n g is c l a i m e d to be c e r t a i n " ( A c . 1.46).
A r g u i n g against all comers T h e fact that Plato wrote d i a l o g u e s p r o v i d e s s o m e s u p p o r t for the c l a i m that he never a f f i r m e d a n y t h i n g in h i s o w n voice. I n Berkeley's a n d H u m e ' s p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i a l o g u e s , by c o n t r a s t , it is g e n e r a l l y clear w h o s p e a k s tor the author, a n d w h a t p o s i t i o n s are b e i n g p r o m o t e d . But i n Plato's d i a l o g u e s it is not c l e a r w h o , if a n y o n e , s p e a k s for the author. It c o n t i n u e s to be e x t r e m e l y difficult to d i s c e r n w h a t Plato t h i n k s , a n d g i v e n the s c h o l a r l y t r a c k r e c o r d there is little h o p e of ever a r r i v i n g at a c o n s e n s u s , let a l o n e a n e n d u r i n g one, r e g a r d i n g an o r t h o d o x P l a t o n i s m that is true to Plato's i n t e n t i o n s , That the d i a l o g u e s c o n t a i n a r g u m e n t s against w h a t e v e r a n y o n e asserts is a l s o p l a u s i b l e e n o u g h , Socrates is c o n s t a n t l y t r o l l i n g l o r n e w a n s w e r s to h i s q u e s t i o n s a n d for n e w i n t e r l o c u t o r s w h o w i l l finally reveal the truth to h i m , C i c e r o s p e c i f i c a l l y tells us that A r c e s i laus r e v i v e d this S o c r a t i c p r a c t i c e of e l i c i t i n g h i s i n t e r l o c u t o r s ' v i e w s i n o r d e r to a r g u e against t h e m (Fin.
2.2; ND 1.11; Fat. 4; Ac.
that is, to see w h e t h e r their r e a s o n s really j u s t i f y t h e i r b e l i e f s . Socrates e x p l a i n s this practice i n the Apology
1,16), 6
a s part o f h i s s t r u g -
gle to u n d e r s t a n d the p u z z l i n g p r o n o u n c e m e n t of the D e l p h i c o r a cle; n a m e l y , that n o o n e i s w i s e r t h a n Socrates ( A p . 2 0 e - 2 2 e ) , H e c o u l d not, at first, i m a g i n e h o w this statement c o u l d be t r u e s i n c e he d i s c e r n e d n o w i s d o m i n h i m s e l f , b u t he h a d n o d o u b t that it w a s true, for the g o d w o u l d not lie. S e e k i n g to resolve the oracle's r i d d l e ,
U
ANCIENT
SCEPTICISM
he e x a m i n e d those w h o h a d a r e p u t a t i o n for w i s d o m , p e r h a p s to better u n d e r s t a n d w h a t he w a s s u p p o s e d to have h i m s e l f . B u t after a l i f e t i m e spent s e a r c h i n g for s o m e o n e w i t h e x p e r t , that is, i r r e f u t a ble, k n o w l e d g e o f v i r t u e , Socrates g r a d u a l l y c a m e to the c o n c l u s i o n that w h a t the o r a c l e m e a n t w a s that he is wisest b e c a u s e he d o e s not believe he k n o w s w h a t in fact he does n o t . So he is slightly better off t h a n all the rest w h o m i s t a k e n l y t h i n k they k n o w what they do not. ( N o t e this is a far c r y f r o m the t r a n q u i l c o n t e n t m e n t that P y r r h o discovers f r o m his ignorance.) I n p u r s u i n g t h i s project, S o c r a t e s m a k e s three i m p o r t a n t a s s u m p tions about k n o w l e d g e a n d virtue. F i r s t , he i m p l i c i t l y identifies k n o w l e d g e w i t h virtue. I n r e a c t i o n to the o r a c l e s a s s e r t i o n that n o one is a s w i s e a s Socrates, he reflects o n the fact that he is not a w a r e of k n o w i n g a n y t h i n g w o r t h w h i l e ( A p . 20c, 21 b ) . I n o t h e r w o r d s , he a s s u m e s that if he w e r e w i s e he w o u l d have the relevant sort o f k n o w l e d g e . A c c o r d i n g l y , he investigates the o r a c l e b y l o o k i n g for s o m e o n e w h o h a s the sort of k n o w l e d g e that he l a c k s . S e c o n d l y , i f s o m e o n e h a s this k n o w l e d g e , t h e n he c a n n o t be refuted. T o k n o w p is to k n o w w h y p is t r u e i n s u c h a w a y that n o a r g u m e n t c a n u n d e r m i n e y o u r g r a s p o f that t r u t h (see Gorg.
4 7 3 b ; Merta
85c).
This
a s s u m p t i o n is evident i n the w a y S o c r a t e s goes a b o u t testing the oracle; n a m e l y , b y s e e i n g w h e t h e r a n y o n e c a n c o n s i s t e n t l y d e f e n d h i s v i e w s o n v i r t u e . W h e n Socrates s h o w s h i s i n t e r l o c u t o r is u n w i t t i n g l y c o m m i t t e d to c o n t r a d i c t o r y beliefs about p , we are s u p p o s e d to c o n c l u d e the i n t e r l o c u t o r d o e s not k n o w p. T h e t h i r d a s s u m p t i o n is the i d e a that k n o w l e d g e of v i r t u e is n e c e s s a r y ( a n d p o s s i b l y e v e n sufficient) for p e r f o r m i n g g o o d m o r a l a c t i o n s a n d u l t i m a t e l y for l i v i n g a g o o d life. T h i s is r o o t e d i n a n o t h e r f a m o u s S o c r a t i c p a r adox: n o o n e k n o w i n g l y d o e s w r o n g (e.g. Prot
351b-358d),
T h e u p s h o t is that as l o n g as w e l a c k this c r u c i a l k n o w l e d g e , the o n l y t h i n g really w o r t h d o i n g is to earnestly p u r s u e it. A n d , given the s e c o n d a s s u m p t i o n - if y o u have k n o w l e d g e , y o u c a n n o t be refuted - we m u s t not rest c o n t e n t w i t h e v e n the m o s t t h o r o u g h l y d e f e n d e d p o s i t i o n a s l o n g as it is p o s s i b l e that it m i g h t be refuted. A s l o n g as that p o s s i b i l i t y r e m a i n s , w e c a n n o t j u s t i f i a b l y c l a i m to have the k n o w l e d g e that i s n e c e s s a r y for o u r f l o u r i s h i n g .
42
ARCESILAUS
A c c o r d i n g l y , A r c e s i l a u s m o v e s the A c a d e m y away t r o m a b s t r u s e theoretical s p e c u l a t i o n r e g a r d i n g the F o r m s o r o t h e r m e t a p h y s i c a l first p r i n c i p l e s by e m p h a s i z i n g the negative c h a r a c t e r of Socrates' project. U n d e r h i s l e a d e r s h i p , the o u t c o m e of p h i l o s o p h i c a l e n q u i r y is the e l i m i n a t i o n o f p o o r l y f o u n d e d beliefs. T h i s is a c c o m p l i s h e d by a r g u i n g against a n y t h i n g that a n y o n e is w i l l i n g to d e f e n d .
Nothing can be k n o w n with certainty G i v e n the nature o f S o c r a t e s ' p r o j e c t , it w o u l d not be s u r p r i s i n g if he c a m e to the c o n c l u s i o n that n o t h i n g c a n b e k n o w n w i t h certainty, at least r e g a r d i n g v i r t u e . S u c h a c o n c l u s i o n w o u l d b e h a r d to a v o i d after reflecting o n h i s repeated failure to f i n d s o m e o n e w i t h expert, (i.e. irrefutable, c e r t a i n ) k n o w l e d g e . W h e n e v e r he d i s c o v e r s a p r o m i s i n g c a n d i d a t e , Socrates e v e n t u a l l y f i n d s h i m l a c k i n g . W h e t h e r or not he a r t i c u l a t e d the i m p l i c i t p r e m i s e s , the suggestion o f a n i n d u c t i v e a r g u m e n t is u n m i s t a k a b l e . I n t e r l o c u t o r s A to Y have failed to c o n sistently d e f e n d their v i e w s a n d therefore t h e i r ( i m p l i c i t or explicit) c l a i m s to c e r t a i n k n o w l e d g e are false. O n the basis of this e x p e r i e n c e o n e m i g h t r e a s o n a b l y expect that i n t e r l o c u t o r Z w i l l a l s o tail. A n d o n the basis o f that e m i m e r a t i v e i n d u c t i o n o n e m i g h t r e a s o n a b l y infer that e v e r y o n e w i l l fail. F i n a l l y , i n o r d e r to e x p l a i n these failures, one m i g h t r e a s o n a b l y c o n c l u d e that n o t h i n g (at least r e g a r d i n g v i r t u e ) c a n be k n o w n w i t h certainty. F o r i f k n o w l e d g e of s u c h a n i m p o r t a n t m a t t e r w e r e p o s s i b l e , s u r e l y s o m e o n e w o u l d have a c q u i r e d it. T h i s c o n c l u s i o n is n e c e s s a r i l y tentative. T h e fact that n o one passes S o c r a t e s ' tests does not entail that n o t h i n g c a n be k n o w n . W e m a y just as well c o n c l u d e that Socrates has not c h o s e n his i n t e r l o c u t o r s w e l l e n o u g h or that t h e r e is s o m e t h i n g w r o n g w i t h the tests. I n p a r t i c u l a r , the s e c o n d a s s u m p t i o n m e n t i o n e d above, n a m e l y that k n o w l e d g e requires irrefutability, s e e m s too d e m a n d i n g . I n k e e p i n g w i t h o u r o r d i n a r y w a y s of s p e a k i n g , we m i g h t w i s h to say we k n o w all s o r t s o l t h i n g s despite b e i n g u n a b l e to p r o v i d e irrefutable j u s t i fication. O n the o t h e r h a n d , w e m i g h t also i n s i s t that the d e g r e e of j u s t i f i c a t i o n m u s t be p r o p o r t i o n a l to the i m p o r t a n c e of the m a t t e r
13
ANCIENT
SCEPTICISM
i n q u e s t i o n . It, as Socrates m a i n t a i n s , beliefs about the p r o p e r w a y to live are the m o s t i m p o r t a n t , t h e n we m i g h t r e a s o n a b l y h o l d t h e m to s u c h stringent r e q u i r e m e n t s . B e that a s it may, it A r c e s i l a u s p u r s u e d a s i m i l a r l y S o c r a t i c m i s s i o n , a n d given h i s r h e t o r i c a l power, he p r o b a b l y w o u l d h a v e e x p e r i e n c e d the s a m e s t r i n g of d i s a p p o i n t m e n t s , T h u s he w o u l d have a r r i v e d at the c o n c l u s i o n that n o t h i n g c a n be k n o w n w i t h c e r t a i n t y by m e a n s of the s a m e sort ot i n d u c t i v e r e a s o n i n g . C i c e r o a l s o p r o v i d e s a n alternative e x p l a n a t i o n . H e tells u s that A r c e s i l a u s , again f o l l o w i n g i n Socrates* footsteps, a r r i v e d at h i s c o n fession o f i g n o r a n c e f r o m reflecting o n the l i m i t a t i o n s of o u r m i n d s a n d senses a n d the s h o r t n e s s o f life ( A c . 1 . 4 5 ) .
3
I f i n d e e d h e ever
f o r m u l a t e d this as a n a r g u m e n t , it n e e d not e x c l u d e the i n d u c t i v e r e a s o n i n g . O n the c o n t r a r y , s u c h l i m i t a t i o n s w o u l d in fact h e l p to e x p l a i n the s t r i n g o f d i s a p p o i n t m e n t s that figure in the i n d u c t i v e a r g u m e n t . T h e c r u c i a l p o i n t is that A r c e s i l a u s s e e m s to have r e a s o n e d h i s w a y to the c o n c l u s i o n that n o t h i n g c a n b e k n o w n .
The influence of P y r r h o S o A r c e s i l a u s c o u l d h a v e agreed w i t h P y r r h o that w e are not s o c o n stituted as to g a i n c e r t a i n k n o w l e d g e of the w o r l d . M o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , A r c e s i l a u s s e e m s to b e f o l l o w i n g P y r r h o s l e a d w h e n he insists that w i s d o m r e q u i r e s the s u s p e n s i o n of j u d g e m e n t . T h i s is a n i d e a that we d e f i n i t e l y d o not find i n Platos dialogues.B o t h S e x t u s E m p i r i c u s (PH
1 . 2 3 2 - 4 ) a n d N u m e n i u s (Pmcp.
Ev.
1 4 . 6 . 4 - 6 ) c l a i m that A r c e s i l a u s is like a P y r r h o n i s t i n so far as he refuses to assert a n y t h i n g about the w a y the w o r l d really is."-' L i k e P y r r h o , he refuses to accept the v e r d i c t o f the senses or of r e a s o n as b e i n g true o r e v e n likely to be true. Sextus f u r t h e r c l a i m s that A r c esilaus differs f r o m the P y r r h o n i s t o n l y in e n d o r s i n g the s u s p e n s i o n of j u d g e m e n t as g o o d . It is l i k e l y that A r c e s i l a u s , like so m a n y o t h e r s , a d m i r e d P y r r h o s l e g e n d a r y t r a n q u i l l i t y . H e m a y a l s o have b e e n i m p r e s s e d by P y r r h o s i n s i s t e n c e that we must s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t in light o f o u r i g n o r a n c e .
•It
ARCESILAUS
But there is n o e v i d e n c e to suggest that A r c e s i l a u s t h o u g h t t r a n q u i l lity is the proper goal in life. S o w h i l e Pyrrho's i n f l u e n c e is significant, it d o e s not s h a p e t h e c o n t o u r s o f A r c e s i l a u s ' s c e p t i c i s m n e a r l y as m u c h as the i n f l u e n c e of Plato a n d S o c r a t e s . It is o n l y b y p o i n t i n g to the figure o f Socrates that w e c a n u n d e r s t a n d w h y A r c e s i l a u s m i g h t have t h o u g h t s u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t is good (PH 1.233). I f h e accepts the S o c r a t i c p r e s u p p o s i t i o n that v i r t u e , a s a f o r m of k n o w l e d g e , is n e c e s s a r y for a g o o d life, t h e n we a r e right to resist a n y t e m p t a t i o n to settle for beliefs that a r e not k n o w n w i t h certainty. T o settle for s u c h beliefs w i l l put the s e a r c h for t r u t h to a p r e m a t u r e e n d a n d so c a n n o t be g o o d . O n the c o n t r a r y , s u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t is g o o d , but o n l y w i t h respect to o u r c o m m i t m e n t to d i s c o v e r t h e t r u t h .
Z e n o a n d the Stoic i n s p i r a t i o n A r o u n d the t i m e A r c e s i l a u s a r r i v e d i n A t h e n s a s a y o u n g m a n (c.298 B C E ) , Z e n o , w h o also s t u d i e d w i t h P o l e m o i n Plato's A c a d emy, h a d established a n e w philosophical school. Since h e typically m e t w i t h h i s d i s c i p l e s at o n e of the c o v e r e d c o l o n n a d e s ( o r Stoa), c l o s e to t h e A g o r a , they e v e n t u a l l y c a m e to b e c a l l e d Stoics, W h e n A r c e s i l a u s t o o k over as h e a d o f the A c a d e m y in c.268, S t o i c i s m w a s well established a n d flourishing. O n e of the d e f i n i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f the e a r l y S t o a is a n e m p i r i c a l l y b a s e d e p i s t e m o l o g y that is s u p p o s e d to s h o w h o w the w i s d o m that Socrates s o u g h t w a s p o s s i b l e ( L o n g 1988; F r e d e 1999). T h e e s s e n t i a l i n g r e d i e n t is a type o f i m p r e s s i o n that "arises f r o m w h a t is, a n d is s t a m p e d a n d i m p r e s s e d exactly in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h w h a t is, o f s u c h a k i n d as c o u l d n o t arise f r o m w h a t is n o t " (Af 7 . 2 4 8 ) . T h e Stoics d e s c r i b e d s u c h i m p r e s s i o n s as kataJeptike,
graspable or g r a s p i n g ;
I s h a l l leave it transliterated as "kataleptic". K a t a l e p t i c i m p r e s s i o n s a c c u r a t e l y c o n v e y all the relevant details o f t h e o b j e c t o r state o f affairs f r o m w h i c h they a r i s e . T h e y s o m e h o w guarantee the t r u t h o f the p r o p o s i t i o n s that articulate t h e i r content, Kataleptic impressions provide a crucial path from foolishness to w i s d o m tor t h e Stoics. B y l e a r n i n g to d i s t i n g u i s h kataleptic
ANCIENT
SCEPTICISM
i m p r e s s i o n s f r o m n o n - k a t a l e p t i c o n e s , w e m a y give o u r assent o n l y to w h a t is true. T h e kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n is a n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e , so to speak, that is s h a r e d a m o n g sage a n d f o o l i s h alike. W h e n o n e is i n a n o r m a l a n d healthy c o n d i t i o n , the i m p r e s s i o n s o n e receives are, for the m o s t part, k a t a l e p t i c . But w h e n w e assent to kataleptic i m p r e s sions, we d o not d o so f r o m the s a m e f i r m a n d u n w a v e r i n g d i s p o s i t i o n that the sage does, n o r d o we g r a s p the c o m p l e x , m u t u a l l y r e i n f o r c i n g i n t e r r e l a t i o n s a m o n g these i m p r e s s i o n s . U n l i k e the sages assent, ours is c o n t i n g e n t o n c i r c u m s t a n c e s a n d is not r o o t e d i n a c o m p l e t e , systematic g r a s p of reality. S o e v e n i f w e assent to a kataleptic i m p r e s sion (or, m o r e precisely, to the p r o p o s i t i o n i m p l i c i t in the i m p r e s s i o n ) we m a y still quite easily be c o n v i n c e d to a b a n d o n this t r u t h b y s o m e a r g u m e n t o r s o m e o t h e r i m p r e s s i o n . T h e Stoic sage, by c o n t r a s t , is i r r e f u t a b l e a n d u n s h a k e a b l e i n h i s k n o w l e d g e (e.g. D L 7-121, 162, 201; M 7 . 1 5 7 ) . H e r e at last is s o m e o n e , or at least a p o s s i b l e s o m e o n e , w h o c o u l d s t a n d u p to Socrates' relentless q u e s t i o n i n g . I n the a b s e n c e of a real sage to c r o s s - e x a m i n e , A r c e s i l a u s t u r n s his sights o n those w h o w o u l d d e f e n d this i d e a l l y w i s e h u m a n b e i n g . T h e r e are t w o d i s t i n c t a c c o u n t s of h i s m o t i v a t i o n for d o i n g so. A c c o r d i n g to o n e , he w i s h e d to s c o r e p o i n t s b y t a k i n g d o w n a w i d e l y r e s p e c t e d p h i l o s o p h y a n d p e r h a p s a l s o to b o o s t the f a m e of h i s o w n s c h o o l i n the p r o c e s s (Praep.
Ev. 14.4.8; A c . 2 . 1 5 - 1 6 ) .
A c c o r d i n g to the other, he s i m p l y w a n t e d to d i s c o v e r the t r u t h , a n d especially w h e t h e r Z e n o k n e w his optimistic epistemological v i e w to be true ( A c . 2.76). T h e s e t w o a c c o u n t s are c o m p a t i b l e . T h e r e m a y w e l l h a v e b e e n s o m e petty p r o f e s s i o n a l r i v a l r y at w o r k i n a d d i t i o n to the m o r e noble a s p i r a t i o n s . C i c e r o r e c o n s t r u c t s the debate this w a y ; N o n e o f Zeno's predecessors h a d ever explicitly formulated, or e v e n suggested, the v i e w that a p e r s o n c o u l d h o l d n o o p i n i o n s - a n d not j u s t that they c o u l d , but that d o i n g so was n e c e s s a r y for the w i s e p e r s o n . A r c e s i l a u s thought that this v i e w w a s b o t h t r u e a n d h o n o r a b l e , as w e l l a s right for the w i s e p e r s o n . So he a s k e d Z e n o , we m a y s u p p o s e , w h a t w o u l d h a p p e n it the w i s e p e r s o n couldn't a p p r e h e n d a n y t h i n g , but
4G
ARCESILAUS
it w a s a m a r k o f w i s d o m not to h o l d o p i n i o n s . Z e n o r e p l i e d , n o d o u b t , that the w i s e p e r s o n w o u l d n ' t h o l d a n y o p i n i o n s b e c a u s e there w a s s o m e t h i n g a p p r e h e n s i b l e [kataleptic]. S o what w a s that? A n i m p r e s s i o n , 1 s u p p o s e . W e l l , w h a t k i n d of i m p r e s s i o n ? T h e n Z e n o d e f i n e d it thus: a n i m p r e s s i o n f r o m w h a t is, s t a m p e d , i m p r e s s e d , a n d m o l d e d just as it is. After that, A r c e s i l a u s w e n t o n to a s k w h a t w o u l d h a p p e n if a true i m p r e s s i o n w a s j u s t like a false o n e . A t t h i s p o i n t , Z e n o w a s s h a r p e n o u g h to see that n o i m p r e s s i o n w o u l d be a p p r e h e n s i b l e if o n e that c a m e f r o m what is w a s s u c h that there c o u l d be o n e j u s t like it f r o m w h a t is n o t . A r c e s i l a u s agreed that t h i s w a s a g o o d a d d i t i o n to the d e f i n i t i o n , s i n c e n e i t h e r a false i m p r e s s i o n , n o r a t r u e i m p r e s s i o n j u s t l i k e a false o n e , w a s a p p r e h e n s i b l e . So t h e n he set to w o r k w i t h h i s a r g u m e n t s to s h o w that t h e r e is n o i m p r e s s i o n f r o m s o m e t h i n g true s u c h that there c o u l d not be o n e j u s t like it f r o m s o m e t h i n g false.
(Ac- 2.77)
B o t h A r c e s i l a u s a n d Z e n o agree that the sage h o l d s n o m e r e o p i n ions; that he is infallible ( A c . 2 . 6 6 - 6 7 ) . T h e m o s t p l a u s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n for this a g r e e m e n t is their c o m m o n S o c r a t i c i n h e r i t a n c e . T h e r e is n o t h i n g s h o r t of infallibility that w i l l satisfy the S o c r a t i c r e q u i r e m e n t s o n w i s d o m . A s l o n g as it r e m a i n s p o s s i b l e that o n e m i g h t be refuted, he c a n n o t rest c o n t e n t w i t h m e r e beliefs or e v e n w i t h isolated bits o f k n o w l e d g e . I n s o far as o u r h a p p i n e s s a n d w e l l - b e i n g rest f i r m l y o n s u c h beliefs, o n e m u s t c o n t i n u e to p u t t h e m to the test u n t i l they are absolutely s e c u r e d . T h i s i n t u r n requires g r a s p i n g all of the s y s t e m a t i c e n t a i l m e n t s that s u p p o r t the t r u t h of e a c h of the sages beliefs. F o r e x a m p l e , in o r d e r to infallibly g r a s p the t r u t h of Stoic ethical p r i n c i p l e s , o n e m u s t see h o w they are logically related to the p r i n c i p l e s of p h y s i c s a n d theology. " 1
B u t if there w e r e n o t h i n g that w e c a n be absolutely c e r t a i n of, then it s e e m s w e c a n o n l y attain the infallibility of the sage by refusi n g to believe a n y t h i n g at a l l . B e l i e v i n g n o t h i n g is the o n l y w a y to assure that we w i l l never be m i s t a k e n . Z e n o agrees that the sage w i l l w i t h h o l d belief w h e n e v e r he is u n c e r t a i n . A l t h o u g h s u c h c a u t i o n is
17
ANCIENT
SCEPTICISM
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f the sage, h i s w i s d o m is c o n s t i t u t e d b y irrefutable k n o w l e d g e . T o get to t h i s c o m p r e h e n s i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , w e have to rely o n isolated bits o f certainty. T h e s e are d e l i v e r e d to u s b y m e a n s o f i m p r e s s i o n s that originate i n w h a t t h e y represent, a n d that c o r r e c t l y report the details o f w h a t they represent. A r c e s i l a u s raised the o b v i o u s w o r r y that a n i m p r e s s i o n m i g h t appear to satisfy these c o n d i t i o n s a n d yet fail to. Z e n o t h e n a d d e d the c r u c i a l c l a i m that i n o r d e r for a n i m p r e s s i o n to b e kataleptic, there c a n n o t exist a talse i m p r e s s i o n that is i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m it; or, i n S e x t u s a c c o u n t , a kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n is o f s u c h a k i n d 1
as c o u l d not arise t r o m w h a t is not (AÍ 7.252). W e m a y take this r e q u i r e m e n t as m e r e l y a c l a r i f i c a t i o n o r a s u b s t a n t i v e a d d i t i o n . A s a c l a r i f i c a t i o n , w e c a n see Z e n o a p p e a l i n g to the p r i n c i p l e of identity of i n d i s c e r n i b l e s in a r g u i n g that s i n c e n o t w o t h i n g s are e v e r exactly alike, their i m p r e s s i o n s w i l l n e v e r be exactly alike, or i n d i s t i n g u i s h able, either. B u t that s e e m s to m i s s the point of A r c e s i l a u s ' c o n c e r n ; n a m e l y , that t w o i m p r e s s i o n s m i g h t appear
indistinguishable. For
that r e a s o n , it s e e m s preferable to r e a d Z e n o ' s a d d i t i o n as m a r k i n g a first step t o w a r d s a n e x t e r n a l i s t v i e w , a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h the s u b j e c t does not n e e d to b e a w a r e that the i m p r e s s i o n h e assents to is k a t a leptic i n o r d e r for h i m to g r a s p it as k a t a l e p t i c , ' O n t h i s v i e w , Z e n o 2
begins to b r i n g in c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of h o w kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n s are f o r m e d - their c a u s a l h i s t o r i e s - as a w a y of g u a r a n t e e i n g they arise t r o m w h a t is, a n d that they are s t a m p e d a n d m o u l d e d p r e c i s e l y i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h this. D e s p i t e this m o v e , A r c e s i l a u s went to w o r k c o n s t r u e ting e x a m p l e s of talse i m p r e s s i o n s that are i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m t r u e ones. C i c e r o reports two k i n d s . O n e type illustrates cases o f m i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n : for e x a m p l e , identical t w i n s , eggs, statues or i m p r i n t s i n w a x m a d e by the s a m e r i n g ( A c . 2 . 8 4 - 8 7 ) . A n o t h e r type i n v o l v e s cases o f i l l u s i o n , d r e a m s a n d m a d n e s s (Ac. 2 . 8 8 - 9 1 ) . A l l o f these e x a m p l e s illustrate A r c e s i l a u s ' g e n e r a l point that for e v e r y true i m p r e s s i o n there m a y exist a false o n e that is q u a l i t a t i v e l y i d e n t i c a l to it, a n d thus i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m the t r u e o n e . T h e i s s u e , as A r c e s i l a u s c h o s e to u n d e r s t a n d it, is w h e t h e r w e are e v e r actually i n a p o s i t i o n to identify an i m p r e s s i o n as k a t a l e p t i c , regardless o f its c a u s a l h i s t o r y .
48
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T h e r e is a g o o d r e a s o n to agree w i t h A r c e s i l a u s ' a s s e s s m e n t h e r e . I n the S o c r a t i c spirit, t h e p u r p o s e o i Z e n o s a c c o u n t o f k n o w l e d g e is p r a c t i c a l . H e is not p r i m a r i l y i n t e r e s t e d in s h o w i n g us that i n s o m e abstract, t h e o r e t i c a l s e n s e w i s d o m is a l o g i c a l possibility, or that there is n o t h i n g c o n c e p t u a l l y i n c o h e r e n t about it. R a t h e r , w h a t he w a n t s to e s t a b l i s h is that w i t h t h e p r o p e r t r a i n i n g a n d use of o u r c o g n i t i v e r e s o u r c e s , w i s d o m is a n a t t a i n a b l e i d e a l . T h e r e is n o t h i n g about o u r h u m a n n a t u r e or about the w o r l d that prevents us f r o m a t t a i n i n g w i s d o m ; folly is d u e e x c l u s i v e l y to the c o r r u p t i o n of o u r n a t u r e . S o Z e n o n e e d s to s h o w that s o m e o n e c o u l d a c t u a l l y d e v e l o p his s k i l l s o f d i s c e r n m e n t to s u c h a level that he w o u l d n e v e r m i s t a k e a f a l s e h o o d for a t r u t h - a n d s o the " a r m s r a c e " b e g i n s . I n r e s p o n s e to e a c h of the s c e p t i c a l s c e n a r i o s he w i l l be forced to h y p o t h e s i z e an e v e n greater level o f e x p e r t i s e . E v e n i f the s c e p t i c grants
that
n o t w o i m p r e s s i o n s are in fact q u a l i t a t i v e l y i d e n t i c a l , he c a n a l w a y s i m a g i n e that they are s o i n f i n i t e s i m a l l y close that n o actual p e r s o n s skill c o u l d differentiate t h e m . H i e p o s s i b i l i t y of e r r o r a p p e a r s to be inescapable. If w e accept
this l i n e of t h i n k i n g , a n d i f w e accept t h e i n i t i a l
a s s u m p t i o n that w i s d o m is i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h e r r o r , w e have n o t h i n g left to d o b u t s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t .
A r c e s i l a u s is c r e d i t e d w i t h
d o i n g j u s t that:
F o r these r e a s o n s [i.e. r e a s o n s that e s t a b l i s h t h e i m p o s sibility o f S t o i c k n o w l e d g e ] , he [ A r c e s i l a u s ] t h o u g h t
that
we s h o u l d n ' t assert o r a f f i r m a n y t h i n g , or a p p r o v e it w i t h assent: w e s h o u l d a l w a y s c u r b o u r r a s h n e s s a n d r e s t r a i n o u r selves f r o m a n y slip. B u t he c o n s i d e r e d it p a r t i c u l a r l y r a s h to approve s o m e t h i n g false o r u n k n o w n , b e c a u s e n o t h i n g was m o r e s h a m e f u l t h a n for one's a s s e n t o r a p p r o v a l to outr u n k n o w l e d g e or a p p r e h e n s i o n . H i s practice w a s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h this theory, s o that b y a r g u i n g against everyone's v i e w s he led m o s t o l t h e m a w a y f r o m t h e i r o w n : w h e n a r g u m e n t s of e q u a l weight w e r e f o u n d l o r the o p p o s i t e sides of the s a m e s u b j e c t , it w a s e a s i e r to w i t h h o l d a s s e n t h o r n either side.
( A c . 1,45; see D L 4 . 2 8 , 32)
ANCIENT
SCEPTICISM
H e r e we have a picture of a m a n w h o never believes he k n o w s what he d o e s not. N o r d o e s h e even believe w h a t m a y be false. It appears that h e believes n o t h i n g . B u t w o u l d h e have c o n s i d e r e d m u n d a n e e m p i r i c a l beliefs r e g a r d i n g tables a n d c h a i r s to be r a s h a n d s h a m e ful also? It is u n l i k e l y that a n y o n e w o u l d p r i d e h i m s e l f o n k n o w i n g that, l o r e x a m p l e , G r a n t o r is w a l k i n g i n t h e A c a d e m y . I f A r c e s i l a u s had not n e e d e d to argue against s u c h a c l a i m , p e r h a p s h e w o u l d not object to b e l i e v i n g it. T a k e n this way, s u s p e n s i o n of j u d g e m e n t w o u l d be l i m i t e d to those matters that have b e e n tested a n d refuted, that i s , s h o w n to be u n j u s t i f i e d . A l t h o u g h t h i s s e e m s to be the m o r e c h a r i t a b l e r e a d i n g , A r c e s i l a u s i n fact t h o u g h t w e m u s t s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t about e v e r y t h i n g (PH 1.232; D L 4 . 3 2 ; Adv. Col. 1 1 2 0 C ) . T o a t t a i n w i s d o m w e m u s t d e v e l o p the u n w a v e r i n g d i s p o s i t i o n to assent o n l y to kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n s , regardless o f w h a t they are i m p r e s s i o n s o l . M o r e generally, a n d w i t h out p r e s u p p o s i n g S t o i c epistemology, w e m a y say that A r c e s i l a u s a i m e d to d e v e l o p the d i s p o s i t i o n to assent o n l y to p r o p o s i t i o n s sufficiently justified as to e n a b l e o n e to w i t h s t a n d S o c r a t i c e x a m i n a t i o n . I n e i t h e r case, w e m u s t w i t h h o l d assent not j u s t to c o n t r o v e r s i a l a n d d i s p u t e d i m p r e s s i o n s about j u s t i c e a n d v i r t u e , b u t also to i m p r e s s i o n s about tables, c h a i r s a n d people a s w e l l ( A i 7 . 1 5 5 - 7 ) .
T h e apraxia
objection, I : s u s p e n d i n g judgement renders us
inactive T h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n m a k e s the best sense o l the apraxia
o b j e c t i o n : to
s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t about e v e r y t h i n g m a k e s lite u n l i v e a b l e . If A r c esilaus h a d a l l o w e d h i m s e l f beliefs about t h e m e d i u m - s i z e d objects we a l l e n c o u n t e r d a y to day, t h e o b j e c t i o n w o u l d lose its p u n c h . P l u t a r c h r e c o r d s o n e v e r s i o n o f this o b j e c t i o n , a i m e d s p e c i f i c a l l y at A r c e s i l a u s : " h o w is it that s o m e o n e w h o s u s p e n d s j u d g m e n t does not r u s h a w a y to a m o u n t a i n i n s t e a d of to the bath, o r s t a n d s u p a n d w a l k s to t h e d o o r rather than t h e w a l l w h e n h e w a n t s to go out to the m a r k e t - p l a c e ?
11
( Adv. Col. 1 1 2 2 E [ L S 6 9 A ] ; see a l s o Ac. 2 . 3 7 - 3 8 ) .
T h e i d e a is that b e l i e f is a n e c e s s a r y part o f a n y i n t e n t i o n a l a c t i o n . I n
50
ARCESILAUS
t e r m s of Stoic p s y c h o l o g y , o n e m u s t first p e r c e i v e the b a t h as s o m e t h i n g d e s i r a b l e a n d t h e n assent to the related p r o p o s i t i o n " I s h o u l d step t o w a r d s the bath". O n l y t h e n d o e s the e x p e c t e d a c t i o n o c c u r , I f h e w e r e to w i t h h o l d assent f r o m h i s i m p r e s s i o n (or a g a i n , the p r o p o s i t i o n associated w i t h the i m p r e s s i o n ] , then h e w o u l d not m o v e t o w a r d s the bath; he m i g h t just as w e l l m o v e t o w a r d s the m o u n t a i n , or s t a n d c o m p l e t e l y still. I m a g i n e s e e i n g a b o w l of fruit o n a table. Y o u are h u n g r y , so y o u p e r c e i v e the fruit as s o m e t h i n g to be t a k e n a n d eaten. A c c o r d i n g to A r c e s i l a u s , we c a n n e v e r be c e r t a i n about this i m p r e s s i o n - for e x a m p l e , the fruit m a y be w a x - so we m u s t not assent to it. B u t a c c o r d i n g to the S t o i c s , w i t h h o l d i n g o u r assent w i l l keep us t r o m a c t i n g . O n their view, if we r e a c h out tor the fruit t h e n we h a v e a s s e n t e d to the p r o p o s i t i o n that the fruit s h o u l d be t a k e n .
1 3
T o e l i m i n a t e assent i s to e l i m i n a t e a c t i o n . H e r e is A r c e s i l a u s ' reply, as r e p o r t e d by P l u t a r c h : T h e m o v e m e n t of i m p r e s s i o n we c o u l d not r e m o v e , e v e n if w e w a n t e d to; rather, as s o o n as we e n c o u n t e r t h i n g s , we get a n i m p r e s s i o n a n d are affected b y t h e m . T h e m o v e m e n t o f i m p u l s e , w h e n a r o u s e d by that ot i m p r e s s i o n , m o v e s a p e r s o n actively t o w a r d s appropriate objects, s i n c e a k i n d of t u r n ot the s c a l e a n d i n c l i n a t i o n o c c u r . . . S o t h o s e w h o s u s p e n d j u d g m e n t a b o u t e v e r y t h i n g d o not r e m o v e this m o v e m e n t either, but m a k e use o f the i m p u l s e w h i c h leads t h e m n a t u r a l l y t o w a r d s w h a t a p p e a r s a p p r o p r i a t e . W h a t , t h e n , is the o n l y t h i n g t h e y a v o i d ? T h a t o n l y i n w h i c h f a l s e h o o d a n d d e c e p t i o n are e n g e n d e r e d - o p i n i n g a n d precipitately a s s e n t i n g . , . F o r a c t i o n requires t w o things: a n i m p r e s s i o n of s o m e t h i n g a p p r o p r i a t e , a n d a n i m p u l s e t o w a r d s the a p p r o priate o b j e c t that has a p p e a r e d ; n e i t h e r o f these is in conflict with suspension of judgment, (Adv. Col
1 1 2 2 B - D [LS 69A])
R e f l e c t i n g o n o u r a c t i o n s will m a k e this a c c o u n t s e e m p l a u s i b l e . M o s t o f the t i m e , w h e n w e c h o o s e to d o s o m e t h i n g we d o n o t lay out a list ot all the pros a n d c o n s , carefully w e i g h the o p t i o n s a n d
ANCIENT
SCEPTICISM
t h e n f i n a l l y a r r i v e at a c o n s c i o u s j u d g e m e n t or a s s e n t . I n o r d i n a r y , e v e r y d a y sorts o f a c t i o n s we s i m p l y r e s p o n d to s t i m u l i w i t h o u t b e i n g a w a r e that w e have a s s e n t e d . T h i s d o e s not m e a n that we h a v e not i n fact assented. B u t the w a y we u s u a l l y use the t e r m " a s s e n t " is to d e s c r i b e a c o n s c i o u s , deliberate a p p r o v a l o l s o m e i m p r e s s i o n or c o u r s e o l a c t i o n . S o in the e v e r y d a y s e n s e of the t e r m , A r c e s i l a u s is right to say that assent is not n e c e s s a r y tor a c t i o n . But the Stoic a c c o u n t of assent is i n fact m o r e subtle a n d p l a u s i ble t h a n this. T h e i d e a that i m p r e s s i o n s m i g h t l e a d i m m e d i a t e l y to a c t i o n c o u l d be c h a l l e n g e d o n the g r o u n d s that it d o e s not e x p l a i n the i n t e n t i o n a l nature of a c t i o n . T o m e r e l y r e s p o n d is n o t to act i n a sense that m e r i t s p r a i s e or b l a m e , n o r does it e x p r e s s a n y t h i n g about the a g e n t s character. I f w e w i s h to e x p l a i n these a s p e c t s o f a c t i o n , we will need more than a crude stimulus-response m o d e l .
u
N e v e r t h e l e s s , A r c e s i l a u s s e e m s to have the b e t t e r o f this exchange. S o m e sort of a c t i o n is c l e a r l y p o s s i b l e w i t h o u t assent. W e shall next c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r l i m i t i n g o u r s e l v e s to t h i s type o f a c t i o n w o u l d be worthwhile.
The aprax'ta objection, I I : suspending judgement makes virtue and happiness impossible A n o t h e r v e r s i o n of the apraxia
o b j e c t i o n c l a i m s that v i r t u e a n d h a p -
p i n e s s w i l l be i m p o s s i b l e to a c h i e v e ii we s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t about e v e r y t h i n g ( M 7 . 1 5 8 ; Ac. 2 . 2 3 - 2 5 , 2.39), T h i s o b j e c t i o n p r e s u p p o s e s s o m e t h i n g like the Stoic v i e w that v i r t u e r e q u i r e s f i r m c o n v i c t i o n s about w h a t is m o r a l l y right a n d g o o d , a n d that it is b o t h n e c e s s a r y a n d sufficient for h a p p i n e s s . G i v e n this p r e s u p p o s i t i o n , A r c e s i l a u s ' p r o p o s a l to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t about e v e r y t h i n g effectively e l i m i nates a n y p o s s i b i l i t y of a t t a i n i n g virtue, a n d t h u s a h a p p y life ( i n so far as w e t a k e v i r t u e to be n e c e s s a r y for h a p p i n e s s ) . A c c o r d i n g to S e x t u s , A r c e s i l a u s felt c o m p e l l e d to r e s p o n d to this o b j e c t i o n . F o r the c h a m p i o n o f the " t r u e " S o c r a t i c t r a d i t i o n , s u c h a charge w o u l d be d e v a s t a t i n g . Socrates' p r i m e m o t i v a t i o n w a s not s i m p l y to a v o i d e r r o r or r a s h n e s s , but r a t h e r to l e a r n h o w to Lead the
52
ARCESILAUS
best p o s s i b l e life. I f it t u r n s out that A r c e s i l a u s ' m e t h o d is i n c o m p a t ible w i t h that e n d , he w o u l d be h a r d p r e s s e d to j u s t i f y h i s c l a i m to the S o c r a t i c m a n t l e . S e x t u s a s s e r t s that s i n c e ;
it w a s n e c e s s a r y to investigate the c o n d u c t o f life too, w h i c h is not of a nature to be e x p l a i n e d w i t h o u t a c r i t e r i o n , o n w h i c h h a p p i n e s s too, i,e, the e n d of life, has its trust d e p e n d ent, A r c e s i l a u s says that o n e w h o s u s p e n d s j u d g m e n t about e v e r y t h i n g w i l l regulate c h o i c e a n d a v o i d a n c e a n d a c t i o n s i n g e n e r a l b y "the r e a s o n a b l e " [to culogon];
a n d that b y p r o -
c e e d i n g i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h this c r i t e r i o n he w i l l act r i g h t l y ; for h a p p i n e s s is a c q u i r e d t h r o u g h p r u d e n c e , a n d p r u d e n c e resides i n r i g h t a c t i o n s , a n d r i g h t a c t i o n is whatever, o n c e it h a s b e e n d o n e , h a s a r e a s o n a b l e j u s t i f i c a t i o n ; therefore, o n e w h o attends to the r e a s o n a b l e w i l l act r i g h t l y a n d be happy.
( M 7-158
[LS69B])
U n f o r t u n a t e l y this is the o n l y piece o f e v i d e n c e for A r c e s i l a u s s c e p 1
tical c r i t e r i o n of c h o i c e a n d a v o i d a n c e . S o w e c a n o n l y c a u t i o u s l y speculate about t h e details a n d h o w it is s u p p o s e d to y i e l d h a p p i n e s s . But first w e m u s t c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r A r c e s i l a u s e n d o r s e s this c r i t e r i o n h i m s e l f o r not.
The dialectical interpretation O n t h e d i a l e c t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , A r c e s i l a u s n e v e r asserts h i s o w n v i e w s ; i n d e e d , in so far as he h e e d s h i s o w n a d v i c e to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t , he has n o v i e w s to assert in the first place. I n s t e a d , he elicits h i s o p p o n e n t s ' v i e w s In o r d e r to s h o w t h e m that t h e y are c o m m i t t e d to i n c o n s i s t e n t beliefs a n d therefore that they d o not k n o w w h a t they t h i n k they k n o w . H i s m i s s i o n , l i k e Socrates', is to deflate the c o n f i d e n t d o g m a t i s t s a n d e n c o u r a g e a n o p e n - e n d e d p u r s u i t o f the t r u t h . W e c a n easily see h o w t h i s w o u l d w o r k w i t h A r c e s i l a u s ' a r g u m e n t s against the kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n . It is the Stoics w h o insist o n u n s a t isfiable c o n d i t i o n s ; A r c e s i l a u s m e r e l y d r a w s out the i m p l i c a t i o n s
53
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w i t h o u t a d d i n g a n y t h i n g o f h i s o w n . G i v e n the f u r t h e r Stoic v i e w that the sage n e v e r assents to w h a t has not b e e n g r a s p e d w i t h certainty, it f o l l o w s , again o n Stoic g r o u n d s , that o n e m u s t s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t . A r c e s i l a u s n e e d not c o n t r i b u t e a n y t h i n g o f h i s o w n , W e m a y see h i s r e m a r k s about the eulogon
i n this d i a l e c t i c a l light
r a t h e r t h a n as e x p r e s s i n g h i s o w n v i e w s i n the f o l l o w i n g way. T h e Stoic sage regulates h i s c h o i c e a n d a v o i d a n c e in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h his unwavering, systematic knowledge. By proceeding in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h w h a t he k n o w s to be t r u l y g o o d , he a c t s rightly. T h i s they u n d e r s t o o d to be p r u d e n c e (phronesis),
w h i c h guarantees a h a p p y
lite. H a v i n g u n d e r m i n e d the Stoic a c c o u n t o f k n o w l e d g e , A r c e s i l a u s t h e n p r o c e e d s to s h o w the Stoics that they have a m p l e theoretical r e s o u r c e s to a n s w e r their o w n o b j e c t i o n s about s u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t , e v e n t h o u g h the k i n d o f p r u d e n c e that r e m a i n s p o s s i b l e is a m u c h m o r e m o d e s t s o r t . I n effect, he v a n d a l i z e s the Stoic s y s t e m b y r e p l a c i n g the sages a c t i o n b a s e d o n c e r t a i n t y w i t h the m o r e d o w n to earth a n d r e a d i l y attainable a c t i o n i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the reasonable. T h e greatest strength of the d i a l e c t i c a l interpretation is that it saves A r c e s i l a u s f r o m a v a r i e t y of potential i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s . F o r e x a m p l e , it he p e r s o n a l l y believes we s h o u l d s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t , t h e n it s e e m s he s h o u l d not a l s o a d v i s e u s to regulate o u r l i v e s in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the reasonable, i n so far as that c o n f l i c t s w i t h s u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t . N o r s h o u l d he e n d o r s e the three S o c r a t i c p r i n c i p l e s : (i) v i r t u e is a k i n d o l k n o w l e d g e ; ( i i j the p e r s o n w i t h k n o w l e d g e is irrefutable; a n d (iii) v i r t u e is n e c e s s a r y if not a l s o sufficient for a g o o d lite. B u t if he believes n o n e o l these t h i n g s , he c a n n o t be a c c u s e d o l i n c o n s i s t e n c y . F u r t h e r s u p p o r t for the d i a l e c t i c a l interpretation c o m e s f r o m the fact that all of the v i e w s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h A r c e s i l a u s c a n p l a u s i b l y be s e e n as c o n s e q u e n c e s o f S t o i c c o m m i t m e n t s that w o u l d be p a r t i c u l a r l y u n w e l c o m e to the Stoics.
ARCESILAUS
A n o b j e c t i o n to t h e d i a l e c t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n A l t h o u g h the d i a l e c t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is attractive, it is v u l n e r a b l e to at least o n e p o w e r f u l o b j e c t i o n . It is o d d for A r c e s i l a u s to have b o t h e r e d r e s p o n d i n g to the iipmxia
o b j e c t i o n s i l he w e r e o n l y d r a w -
i n g c o n s e q u e n c e s f r o m the Stoic p o s i t i o n . I f it is o n l y the Stoics w h o are u n w i t t i n g l y c o m m i t t e d to the v i e w that w e s h o u l d s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t , then the charge that this m a k e s life u n l i v e a b l e a n d v i r t u e i m p o s s i b l e is all the m o r e d a m n i n g for t h e m , I n that case it w o u l d m a k e m o r e sense for A r c e s i l a u s to a p p l a u d the apraxia
objections
than to r e s p o n d to t h e m . H e w o u l d have m o r e effectively deflated his o p p o n e n t s if he left t h e m w i t h t h e i r o w n i n c o h e r e n t view. S o his r e s p o n s e suggests that he is d e f e n d i n g h i s o w n v i e w : A r c e s i l a u s h i m s e l f t h i n k s that we s h o u l d s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t . S i m i l a r l y , if he w e r e o n l y c o n c e r n e d to s h o w the Stoics the i n a d e q u a c y o f t h e i r v i e w , it m a k e s n o s e n s e for h i m to p r o v i d e a n a l t e r n a tive c r i t e r i o n of a c t i o n . B u t let us s u p p o s e for the s a k e o f a r g u m e n t that he g e n e r o u s l y offers the Stoics a viable alternative, I f the d i a l e c t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is right, A r c e s i l a u s m u s t have e m p l o y e d the Stoic u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f to eulogon,
for if he p r o v i d e d h i s o w n u n d e r s t a n d -
ing he w o u l d n o longer b e a r g u i n g dialectically. T h e Stoics d e f i n e d the reasonable (to eulogon)
as a p r o p o s i t i o n that has m o r e c h a n c e s
o f b e i n g t r u e t h a n false ( D L 7-76). T h i s is m o r e or less the sense i n w h i c h w e t y p i c a l l y use the t e r m a l s o . A r e a s o n a b l e p r o p o s i t i o n is c r e d i b l e ; it is w o r t h a c c e p t i n g as true e v e n t h o u g h we d o not take the e v i d e n c e o r a r g u m e n t s to be c o n c l u s i v e . It that is c o r r e c t , t h e n A r c e s i l a u s has not i n fact s h o w n the Stoics that m o r a l l y right a c t i o n a n d h a p p i n e s s are p o s s i b l e for t h o s e w h o s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t . T h e o n e w h o regulates h i s a c t i o n in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h to eulogon,
a s the Stoics u n d e r s t a n d that t e r m , w i l l have all sorts
o f beliefs about w h a t o n e s h o u l d or s h o u l d not d o . S u c h a p e r s o n w i l l not h a v e s u s p e n d e d j u d g e m e n t . I n o r d e r for A r c e s i l a u s to a r r i v e at the d e s i r e d c o n c l u s i o n , he w i l l have to p r o v i d e s o m e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f to eulogon
s u c h that a c t i n g i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h it is c o n s i s t e n t
w i t h s u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t . T h i s suggests, c o n t r a r y to the d i a l e c t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , that h i s goal is to s h o w the Stoics that the s c e p t i c is
55
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able to live a n d f l o u r i s h w i t h o u t the Stoic c r i t e r i o n ; this s e e m s to be A r c e s i l a u s ' o w n v i e w of" the matter (see H a n k i n s o n l 9 ° 8 a ; 8 5 - 9 1 ) .
C o n s i s t e n c y a n d Arcesilaus' Socratic habits A s w e have a l r e a d y seen, it a p p e a r s i n c o n s i s t e n t to b e l i e v e that v i r tue is a k i n d of irrefutable k n o w l e d g e and that one s h o u l d s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t about e v e r y t h i n g . I f we s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t w e s h o u l d not also h o l d beliefs about k n o w l e d g e a n d v i r t u e ; o n o n e a c c o u n t A r c e s i l a u s m a d e a p o i n t e v e n of s u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t w i t h regard to w h e t h e r he w a s i n fact i g n o r a n t (Ac.
1.45). O n the o t h e r h a n d ,
A r c e s i l a u s is frequently a s s o c i a t e d w i t h v i e w s about w h a t k n o w l e d g e r e q u i r e s a n d w i t h the a d v i c e that w e s h o u l d s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t . H o w then are we to resolve t h i s apparent i n c o n s i s t e n c y ? T h e rise of S t o i c i s m , e s p e c i a l l y u n d e r the guise of a positive d e v e l o p m e n t of S o c r a t i c p h i l o s o p h y , w o u l d have i n c i t e d A r c e s i l a u s to b r i n g the critical or s c e p t i c a l elements o f Socrates to light. I n r e v i v i n g this s c e p t i c a l practice, he p r o b a b l y a c c e p t e d S o c r a t e s ' m e t h o d o l o g i cal a s s u m p t i o n s as w e l l . T h e p o i n t o f a r g u i n g against e v e r y o n e is to p r o m o t e the S o c r a t i c s e a r c h for t r u t h . It w o u l d be u n a c c e p t a b l y d o g m a t i c , however, if he h a d never t u r n e d his s c e p t i c a l sights o n h i s o w n assumptions.
1 5
O n e s h o u l d not u n c r i t i c a l l y believe a n y t h i n g . O n c e
he h a d d o n e so, he m u s t h a v e f o u n d p o w e r f u l a r g u m e n t s o p p o s i n g Socrates' a s s u m p t i o n s . I n o r d e r for A r c e s i l a u s to be a c o n s i s t e n t s c e p t i c he w o u l d n e e d to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t r e g a r d i n g these m o t i v a t i n g a s s u m p t i o n s . It w o u l d follow that he d i d not believe v i r t u e is a n irrefutable k i n d of k n o w l e d g e o r that it is essentia] for a f l o u r i s h i n g life. W h y t h e n d i d he c a r r y o n w i t h h i s s c e p t i c a l practice, b e h a v i n g as if he b e l i e v e d these t h i n g s ? I believe the m o s t plausible s p e c u l a t i o n is to c h a r a c t e r i z e commitments
the
that u n d e r l i e A r c e s i l a u s ' b e h a v i o u r as a - r a t i o n a l :
they are n e i t h e r i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h , n o r v i o l a t i o n s of, a n y r a t i o n a l s t a n d a r d s . W h a t e v e r attitude A r c e s i l a u s c o n t i n u e d to take t o w a r d s his initially m o t i v a t i n g a s s u m p t i o n s , he c a n n o t h a v e t h o u g h t that
56
ARCESILAUS
r e a s o n r e q u i r e s us to engage i n this S o c r a t i c project. T h e dictates of r e a s o n , tor A r c e s i l a u s , are i n c o n c l u s i v e . T h e i r o n y is that this attitude a r i s e s f r o m a d e e p c o m m i t m e n t to f o l l o w r e a s o n w h e r e v e r it leads. It a p p e a r s that that c o m m i t m e n t c a n n o t itself b e r a t i o n a l , e v e n if A r c e s i l a u s t h o u g h t that initially he h a d g o o d r e a s o n s for a d o p t i n g it. A s a h a b i t u a l activity, A r c e s i l a u s n e e d not feel c o m p e l l e d to d e f e n d it. E v e n after a c k n o w l e d g i n g that there are n o c o n c l u s i v e a r g u m e n t s i n s u p p o r t of the n o t i o n that it is g o o d o r b e n e f i c i a l to b e h a v e this way, he m e r e l y finds h i m s e l l i n c l i n e d to c o n t i n u e . S i m i l a r l y , A r c e s i l a u s ' a c c e p t a n c e o f the n o t i o n that k n o w l e d g e is i m p o s s i b l e m a y be h a b i t u a l , a n d not r a t i o n a l . H i s a r g u m e n t against the Stoic c r i t e r i o n of k n o w l e d g e is c l e a r l y d i a l e c t i c a l , s o h e n e e d not accept the c o n c l u s i o n that n o t h i n g c a n be k n o w n ( i n the Stoic s e n s e ) . B u t c o n s i d e r i n g h i s s u c c e s s i n refuting all c o m e r s , it m u s t have s e e m e d that k n o w l e d g e is o u t of o u r reach. H e r e a g a i n we m a y a p p e a l to S o c r a t e s for i l l u s t r a t i o n . A f t e r a lifetime of r e f u t i n g t h o s e w h o thought they h a d k n o w l e d g e , S o c r a tes c o n t i n u e d to e n t e r t a i n the p o s s i b i l i t y that he m i g h t yet d i s c o v e r s o m e o n e w h o c o u l d s u c c e s s f u l l y d e f e n d h i m s e l f . T h i s m u s t have s e e m e d a v e r y s l i m possibility. A f t e r years o f s u c c e s s f u l l y refuting h i s c o n t e m p o r a r i e s , A r c e s i l a u s w o u l d be i n c l i n e d to expect that the next i n t e r l o c u t o r w o u l d also fall. T h e idea that k n o w l e d g e is i m p o s s i b l e w o u l d take h o l d as m o r e o f a h a b i t u a l e x p e c t a t i o n t h a n a r a t i o n a l , p h i l o s o p h i c a l j u d g e m e n t or belief that he w o u l d be w i l l i n g to d e f e n d ( C o o p e r 2 0 0 4 ) . A t n o p o i n t does A r c e s i l a u s c o n c l u d e , a n d h e n c e b e l i e v e , that k n o w l e d g e is i m p o s s i b l e , e v e n t h o u g h it m u s t
have
s e e m e d ( i n s o m e s e n s e ) to be the case. ( W e s h a l l r e t u r n to this c r u c i a l c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n a p p e a r a n c e s a n d j u d g e m e n t s or beliefs later; see e s p e c i a l l y C h a p t e r 9.) F i n a l l y , w h a t are we to m a k e of l i v i n g in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the r e a s o n a b l e ? A r c e s i l a u s m a i n t a i n s that just as p u r p o s e f u l a c t i o n is possible w i t h o u t assent or belief, s o too is reasonable action. S o m e t h i n g s w i l l s e e m r e a s o n a b l e j u s t a s h i e w i l l s e e m hot; i n b o t h cases s o m e a c t i o n w i l l ensue, regardless o f w h e t h e r I assent to the i m p r e s s i o n . A l l that A r c e s i l a u s a s k s u s to d o is p r o v i d e a n e x p l a n a t i o n of w h y it a p p e a r e d reasonable after the fact. G i v e n the s o c i a l i m p o r t a n c e of
57
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e x p l a i n i n g o u r a c t i o n s , it is likely that the " r e a s o n a b l e j u s t i f i c a t i o n " is a i m e d at c o n v i n c i n g o t h e r s that o n e s a c t i o n w a s a p p r o p r i a t e . I I m y a c t i o n or c h o i c e has s o m e a d v e r s e effect a n d I fail to c o n v i n c e others that it w a s r e a s o n a b l e , I w i l l p r o b a b l y suffer u n d e s i r a b l e c o n s e q u e n c e s . E v e n if m y a c t i o n s have a positive effect, m y c o n v i n c i n g e x p l a n a t i o n w i l l h e l p m e to get the credit 1 d e s e r v e . B y d e v e l o p i n g a d i s p o s i t i o n to p r o v i d e c o n v i n c i n g a c c o u n t s of w h y I t o o k m y a c t i o n to be r e a s o n a b l e , I w i l l for the m o s t part act rightly a n d p r u d e n t l y and
w i l l be happy. A s s e n t i n g to these i m p r e s s i o n s a n d f o r m i n g
beliefs a b o u t w h a t is right a n d w r o n g c o n t r i b u t e s i n n o w a y to m y s u c c e s s ; in fact, g i v e n A r c e s i l a u s m i s t r u s t o f r a t i o n a l l y s u p p o r t e d 1
c o n c l u s i o n s , w e are better off not a s s e n t i n g .
Conclusion T h e k i n d s o f p r u d e n c e a n d h a p p i n e s s that o n e m i g h t e x p e c t f r o m s u c h a life are far m o r e m o d e s t t h a n the Stoic varieties. I n fact, l i v i n g i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the reasonable s e e m s e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y easy. B u t we m u s t recall that u n i v e r s a l s u s p e n s i o n o f j u d g e m e n t is a n e s s e n tial part of t h i s life, a n d we s h o u l d not a s s u m e that this is a s i m p l e matter. F r o m A r c e s i l a u s S o c r a t i c p e r s p e c t i v e , w e all suffer f r o m a 1
p r o n o u n c e d d i s p o s i t i o n to p r e m a t u r e l y put a n e n d to e n q u i r y a n d affirm o u r v i e w s w i t h too m u c h c o n f i d e n c e . W i t h o u t the i r r i t a t i n g benefit of a Socrates w h o relentlessly puts u s to the test, w e are p r o n e to settle c o m f o r t a b l y into o u r c o n v i c t i o n s w i t h o u t e v e n b e i n g a w a r e of h a v i n g d o n e so.
58
FOUR
Carneades
N o n e of A r c e s i l a u s ' first three s u c c e s s o r s ( L a c y d e s , E v a n d r u s a n d H e g e s i n u s ) are c r e d i t e d w i t h a n y n o t e w o r t h y a c h i e v e m e n t s :
they
merely continue Arcesilaus' practice. C a r n e a d e s , by contrast, surpasses e v e n A r c e s i l a u s i n h i s r h e t o r i c a l a n d p h i l o s o p h i c a l b r i l l i a n c e . A c c o r d i n g l y , he invites a n even greater m e a s u r e o l c r i t i c i s m : this m a n a l s o w o u l d b r i n g f o r w a r d a n d take b a c k , a n d g a t h e r to the battle c o n t r a d i c t i o n s a n d subtle t w i s t s i n v a r i o u s w a y s , a n d be full b o t h o l d e n i a l s a n d a f f i r m a t i o n s , a n d c o n t r a d i c t i o n s o n b o t h sides: a n d il e v e r there w a s n e e d of m a r v e l o u s statements, he w o u l d rise u p as violent as a r i v e r i n f l o o d , o v e r f l o w i n g w i t h r a p i d s t r e a m e v e r y t h i n g o n this s i d e a n d o n that, a n d w o u l d fall u p o n h i s h e a r e r s a n d d r a g t h e m a l o n g w i t h h i m in a t u m u l t . . , T h e evil results therefore w e r e the m o r e n u m e r o u s ( t h a n A r c e s i l a u s ' ] . A n d n e v e r t h e less C a r n e a d e s f a s c i n a t e d a n d e n s l a v e d m e n s s o u l s . . . I n fact e v e r y o p i n i o n o f C a r n e a d e s w a s v i c t o r i o u s , a n d never a n y other, s i n c e t h o s e w i t h w h o m he w a s at w a r w e r e less p o w e r f u l as s p e a k e r s .
(Praep.
Ev. 14.8.2, 9—10)
C a r n e a d e s ' p e r s u a s i v e n e s s o n l y s e r v e s to a c c o m p l i s h greater e v i l if w e a s s u m e that he leads people a w a y f r o m true, o r at least b e n e f i c i a l ,
59
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SCEPTICISM
beliefs. T h e p r e s s i n g q u e s t i o n i s : w h a t d i d he h o p e to a c h i e v e ? It is u n c h a r i t a b l e to a s s u m e that h e w a s m a l i c i o u s . B u t it is easy to see h o w he m i g h t have a p p e a r e d so. B o t h Socrates (Ap. 2 3 c ) a n d A r c e s i l a u s ( D L 4,37) h a d attracted a large f o l l o w i n g b y p u b l i c l y deflating the intellectual p r e t e n s i o n s o f p r o m i n e n t people. A n d they e a r n e d s c o r n a l o n g w i t h a d m i r a t i o n : they w e r e b o t h a c c u s e d o f c o r r u p t i n g the y o u t h (Ap. 2 3 d ; D L 4 . 4 0 ) . By u n d e r m i n i n g c o n v i c t i o n they a p p e a r to be l e a d i n g p e o p l e astray. T h e y take a w a y the m o r a l c o m p a s s a n d replace it w i t h n o t h i n g . I n 156/5 B C E , C a r n e a d e s , a l o n g w i t h t w o o t h e r p h i l o s o p h e r s , w a s sent by A t h e n s as an a m b a s s a d o r to R o m e (Tusc. 13.21; Div. Inst.
Alt.
4 . 5 ; De Or. 2.155;
5 . 1 5 . 3 - 5 ) . W h i l e there h e p u b l i c l y a r g u e d at
length i n d e f e n c e of c e r t a i n P l a t o n i c a n d A r i s t o t e l i a n c o n c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e o n o n e d a y a n d t h e n refuted h i s o w n a r g u m e n t s the next. H e d i d this, "not b e c a u s e he thought j u s t i c e o u g h t to be d i s p a r aged, but to s h o w that its d e f e n d e r s h a d n o c e r t a i n or f i r m a r g u m e n t s about
it" ( L a c t a n t i u s , Epitome
55.8
[LS 6 8 M ] ) . Cato was
s c a n d a l i z e d by this d i s p l a y a n d d e v i s e d a c l e v e r p l a n to p u r g e the city of C a r n e a d e s a n d h i s fellow p h i l o s o p h e r s as q u i c k l y as p o s sible. H e c r i t i c i z e d the Senate for d e t a i n i n g m e n w h o w e r e able to get a n y t h i n g t h e y m i g h t w i s h b y m e a n s o f their p e r s u a s i v e p o w e r s , and
suggested they vote i m m e d i a t e l y o n the embassy's p r o p o s a l
a n d s e n d t h e m h o m e to A t h e n s ( P l u t a r c h , Vit. Cat. Mai.
2 2 - 3 ) . It
p r o b a b l y a p p e a r e d to C a t o , a n d o t h e r R o m a n s , that C a r n e a d e s w a s i n d e e d d i s p a r a g i n g j u s t i c e , e v e n il that w a s not h i s intent. U n d e r m i n i n g conviction, even poorly founded conviction, can be a d a n gerous b u s i n e s s . I n o r d e r to d e t e r m i n e m o r e p r e c i s e l y w h a t C a r n e a d e s s o u g h t to a c h i e v e by m e a n s ot h i s r h e t o r i c a l b r i l l i a n c e a n d h o w he differs f r o m A r c e s i l a u s , w e shall e x a m i n e a s e l e c t i o n of h i s a r g u m e n t s .
T h e o l o g i c a l arguments, I: against G o d ' s eternity A s w i t h h i s a r g u m e n t s a b o u t j u s t i c e , C a r n e a d e s s o u g h t to u n d e r m i n e p o o r l y f o u n d e d c o n v i c t i o n s about the gods. H e r e a g a i n he
ixl
CARNEADES
d i d n o t w i s h to p r o m o t e a t h e i s m , n o r d i s p a r a g e the g o d s ,
but
rather to s h o w the Stoics that they h a d e s t a b l i s h e d n o t h i n g in their t h e o l o g y {ND
3 , 4 3 - 4 4 ; M 9 . 1 8 2 - 4 ) . A l t h o u g h these a r g u m e n t s are
a i m e d s p e c i f i c a l l y at the Stoics, they a p p l y j u s t as w e l l to a n y t h e o l o g i c a l v i e w that u n d e r s t a n d s G o d as a l i v i n g b e i n g , b o t h e t e r n a l and benevolent. If, as the Stoics m a i n t a i n , G o d is alive ( a n d is n o t a p l a n t ) t h e n he is c a p a b l e of s e n s a t i o n . B u t s e n s a t i o n , a c c o r d i n g to the Stoics, is a k i n d ot alteration: " I f G o d is a l t e r e d , he is receptive o f a l t e r a t i o n a n d c h a n g e ; a n d b e i n g receptive o f c h a n g e , he w i l l c e r t a i n l y be receptive o f change for the w o r s e . A n d il so, h e is also p e r i s h able" ( A i 9 . 1 4 6 - 7 ) . S e n s a t i o n r e q u i r e s that the agent be the passive r e c i p i e n t of s o m e t h i n g that effects a c h a n g e i n h i m . W h e t h e r that alteration is tor the better or w o r s e is o u t s i d e h i s c o n t r o l s i n c e he p a s s i v e l y receives it. W e d o not c h o o s e to feel heat or c o l d w h e n we do. A l t h o u g h we m a y try to a v o i d e x p o s i n g o u r s e l v e s to e x t r e m e c o n d i t i o n s , f r e e z i n g to death is u l t i m a t e l y o u t ot o u r c o n t r o l (see ND
3.34). I f o n e is s t r a n d e d o n a s n o w y m o u n t a i n , w h e t h e r or not
o n e c h o o s e s to freeze is beside the p o i n t . S o e v e n t h o u g h n o one c o u l d s t r a n d G o d o n a s n o w y m o u n t a i n , he is, i n p r i n c i p l e , r e c e p tive o f h a r m f u l or d e s t r u c t i v e alterations i n s o far a s he is a s e n t i e n t b e i n g . T o be sentient is to b e v u l n e r a b l e to d e s t r u c t i o n , so G o d cannot be both sentient a n d eternal. T h e easiest w a y out o f this p r o b l e m is to grant that G o d is not eternal. T h e p r o b l e m w i t h this is that a n integral s t a r t i n g - p o i n t for Stoic t h e o l o g y is the c o m m o n l y a c c e p t e d n o t i o n that w h a t is d i v i n e is e t e r n a l a n d i m p e r i s h a b l e . T h u s C a r n e a d e s m a y h a v e p r e s s e d the f o l l o w i n g d i l e m m a . E i t h e r G o d is i m p e r i s h a b l e o r h e is not. It he is, then it a p p e a r s he c a n n o t be sentient, s i n c e all s e n t i e n t t h i n g s are p e r i s h a b l e . A n d it he is not, t h e n we are n o l o n g e r w o r k i n g w i t h the c o m m o n c o n c e p t i o n of G o d , c o n t r a r y to the Stoics' c l a i m . A r g u i n g b o t h l o r a n d against the i m p e r i s h a b i l i t y o l G o d is s u p p o s e d to leave u s w i t h n o r a t i o n a l b a s i s to prefer e i t h e r v i e w (see L o n g 1990).
ill
ANCIENT
SCEPTICISM
Theological arguments, I I : against G o d ' s benevolence G o d ' s b e n e v o l e n c e is part o f h i s c o m p l e t e l y v i r t u o u s nature a c c o r d i n g to the Stoics. B u t it G o d has a l l the d i s p o s i t i o n s that w e h u m a n beings c o n s i d e r v i r t u o u s , t h e n he m u s t be subject to at least s o m e of the s a m e c o n d i t i o n s that m a k e v i r t u e p o s s i b l e a n d d e s i r a b l e for us. T h i s led C a r n e a d e s to a r g u e as f o l l o w s :
if a b e i n g does not a n d c a n n o t p a r t a k e of e v i l , w h a t n e e d has he to m a k e a c h o i c e b e t w e e n g o o d t h i n g s a n d e v i l t h i n g s , a n d w h a t n e e d h a s he o f reason a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g ?
We
a p p l y these faculties to a d v a n c e f r o m w h a t is revealed to w h a t is h i d d e n , but n o t h i n g c a n be h i d d e n f r o m G o d , A s for j u s t i c e , w h i c h a p p o r t i o n s to e a c h its o w n , it has n o relevance to the gods, for as y o u Stoics p u t it, it w a s b o r n w h e n m e n b a n d e d together i n c o m m u n i t y . T e m p e r a n c e c o n s i s t s in forg o i n g p h y s i c a l p l e a s u r e s ; i f t h i s v i r t u e has a role i n h e a v e n , there m u s t also be s c o p e for p h y s i c a l p l e a s u r e s there. A s for the i d e a of G o d m a n i f e s t i n g c o u r a g e , h o w c a n w e envisage that, s e e i n g that p a i n or grief or d a n g e r d o e s not i m p i n g e o n G o d ? Yet c a n we p o s s i b l y v i s u a l i z e a G o d w h o d o e s not use r e a s o n , a n d w h o is e n d o w e d w i t h n o virtue? (NB
3.38 [ W a l s h 1997); cf. Atf 9 . 1 3 2 - 7 7 )
T h i s is e v i d e n t l y the i n s p i r a t i o n l o r the s c e p t i c a l d i l e m m a that H u m e a d v a n c e s ( i n Part V o f h i s Dialogues
Concerning
Natural
Religion;
see P r i c e 1964). O n one h a n d , the m o r e w e m a k e G o d like us the m o r e he is v u l n e r a b l e , i m p e r f e c t a n d s u b j e c t to h u m a n f a i l i n g s . O n the o t h e r h a n d , the less we m a k e G o d like us the less c o m p r e h e n s i ble he Is. S o we m a y either o p t for a distant, i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e G o d w h o satisfies o u r e x p e c t a t i o n s of d i v i n e p e r f e c t i o n or a closer, m o r e c o m p r e h e n s i b l e G o d w h o suffers f r o m o u r h u m a n failings a n d is, to that extent, less w o r t h y ot the title.
62
CARNEADES
Theological a r g u m e n t s . III: sorites T h e Stoics believe b o t h that the w o r l d itself is a d i v i n e b e i n g , a n d that it is p o s s i b l e to a c c o u n t l o r p o p u l a r G r e e k , p o l y t h e i s t i c religious v i e w s as well. T h e y a r g u e that elements o r aspects o f t h e d i v i n e b e i n g are t h e m s e l v e s d i v i n e . B u t c e r t a i n l y n o t e v e r y t h i n g in t h e w o r l d is a god. So it is n e c e s s a r y to s h o w h o w w e m a y d r a w a c l e a r line b e t w e e n w h a t is d i v i n e a n d therefore w o r t h y of w o r s h i p a n d w h a t is not. C a r n e a d e s e m p l o y s a sorites a r g u m e n t i n o r d e r to s h o w that n o s u c h p r i n c i p l e d l i n e c a n be d r a w n ( B u r n y e a t 1982b), T h e t e r m sorites c o m e s f r o m the G r e e k w o r d for heap, soros.
If
I place o n e g r a i n of w h e a t o n the table a n d a s k y o u w h e t h e r it is a h e a p , y o u w i l l say n o , If I a d d a n o t h e r g r a i n to t h e first y o u w i l l still say it is not a h e a p . B u t if I c o n t i n u e to a d d m o r e a n d m o r e , at s o m e p o i n t it c l e a r l y b e c o m e s a h e a p . Yet, as a g e n e r a l r u l e , the a d d i t i o n o f o n e g r a i n d o e s not t r a n s f o r m a n o n - h e a p i n t o a h e a p . S o it s e e m s that there c a n be n o h e a p s or, m o r e plausibly, it s e e m s that o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of " h e a p " is too f u z z y to a l l o w us to d r a w clear lines b e t w e e n h e a p s a n d n o n - h e a p s , T h i s f o r m o f r e a s o n i n g exploits the l u z z i n e s s of c o n c e p t s : by m i n u t e a d d i t i o n s ( o r s u b t r a c t i o n s ) of s o m e p r o p e r t y w e f i n d it i m p o s s i b l e to d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r the c o n c e p t c o n t i n u e s to apply. I m a g i n e s o m e o n e w h o is v e r y p o o r . A d d i n g a p e n n y to h i s b a n k a c c o u n t w i l l not m a k e h i m wealthy, yet if w e c o n t i n u e to a d d p e n n i e s , e v e n t u a l l y he w i l l b e c o m e w e a l t h y ; it is j u s t not clear w h e n w e r e a c h that p o i n t , i f i n d e e d there is a p o i n t at w h i c h p o v e r t y is t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o w e a l t h , It does not follow that n o o n e is w e a l t h y . W h a t follows is that w e d o not k n o w t h e precise l i m i t s o f this predicate.
1
W e c a n r u n t h i s a r g u m e n t o n c o u n t l e s s o t h e r adjectives -
for
e x a m p l e , tall, b a l d , t r i e n d l y - as well as m a n y o f the c o n c e p t s that we use o n a d a i l y b a s i s . M o s t w o u l d agree that football is a s p o r t . But is golf a s p o r t ? H o w a b o u t F r i s b e e golf? H o w about v i d e o golf? O u r i n a b i l i t y to c o n c l u s i v e l y d e t e r m i n e w h a t c o u n t s a s a s p o r t or w h o c o u n t s a s b a l d m a y not s e e m t o o t h r e a t e n i n g , but t h e d a n g e r s b e c o m e m o r e a p p a r e n t w h e n w e c o n s i d e r the predicate " i s a person". D e c i d i n g w h o o r w h a t is a p e r s o n has i m p o r t a n t m o r a l a n d legal
63
ANCIENT
SCEPTICISM
i m p l i c a t i o n s , b o t h for b e g i n n i n g - o f - l i f e a n d e n d - o f - l i f e i s s u e s . T h e m i c r o s c o p i c c l u s t e r o f cells o f a n e w l y f e r t i l i z e d e g g is pretty c l e a r l y not a p e r s o n . B u t a d d i n g a m i l l i s e c o n d s w o r t h o f d e v e l o p m e n t does not s e e m t o be s i g n i f i c a n t e n o u g h t o m a k e the d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n a p e r s o n a n d a n o n - p e r s o n . A n d yet as d e v e l o p m e n t c o n t i n u e s after b i r t h w e get to w h a t o b v i o u s l y is a p e r s o n . I n these cases there is a greater u r g e n c y a n d necessity i n c o n f r o n t i n g the sorites p a r a d o x b e c a u s e s i g n i f i c a n t a c t i o n m a y well be r e q u i r e d . C a r n e a d e s a p p l i e d t h e sorites to the p r e d i c a t e " i s a g o d " In the following way: I f Z e u s is a g o d . . . P o s e i d o n too, b e i n g h i s brother, w i l l be a god. B u t i f P o s e i d o n is a g o d , t h e [ r i v e r ] A c h e l o u s t o o w i l l be a g o d . A n d i f t h e A c h e l o u s i s , s o is t h e N i l e . I f t h e N i l e is, s o are all r i v e r s . It all l i v e r s a r e , s t r e a m s too w o u l d be g o d s . If s t r e a m s w e r e , t o r r e n t s w o u l d be. B u t s t r e a m s are not. T h e r e f o r e Z e u s is not a g o d either. B u t if there are gods, Z e u s too w o u l d be a g o d . T h e r e f o r e there are n o g o d s . ( M 9 . 1 8 2 - 4 [ L S 7 0 E ] ; see a l s o W D 3 . 4 3 - 4 ) T h i s is a creative u s e o f t h e sorites s i n c e it does not p r o c e e d b y the s i m p l e a d d i t i o n o f s o m e property. I n s t e a d , as i n t h e s p o r t e x a m p l e above, C a r n e a d e s proceeds b y d r a w i n g analogies. B o t h P o s e i d o n a n d A c h e l o u s are large b o d i e s o l water; i f it is t r u e that o n e is a g o d , t h e n the o t h e r m u s t be a g o d also. B u t if the r i v e r A c h e l o u s is a god, t h e n so too is e v e r y o t h e r river. W e m a y c o n t i n u e this line o f r e a s o n i n g u n t i l w e a r r i v e at a p u d d l e in the street: there is n o p r i n c i p l e d place to d r a w the l i n e .
1
I f o n e is i n c l i n e d to w o r s h i p the gods it s e e m s o n e w i l l have to d e t e r m i n e w h o o r w h a t is w o r t h y of s u c h respect. W h a t C a r n e a d e s seeks t o s h o w w i t h h i s a r g u m e n t s is n o t that n o t h i n g is a g o d , but that the Stoics have p r o v i d e d n o c o n v i n c i n g a c c o u n t o f h o w w e m a y m a i n t a i n the c o m m o n G r e e k c o n c e p t i o n of m u l t i p l e gods w i t h o u t a c k n o w l e d g i n g t h e d i v i n i t y o f e v e r y t h i n g . A n d i f r e a s o n c a n tell us n o t h i n g definitive about the nature o r e x i s t e n c e o f G o d , o r t h e gods, we m u s t s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t .
I>4
CARNEADES
T h i s is p r o b a b l y w h a t A r c e s i l a u s w o u l d have us do. H o w e v e r , it is not as c l e a r i n the case o l C a r n e a d e s , w h o i s s a i d to h a v e d e p a r t e d f r o m h i s great p r e d e c e s s o r by c l a i m i n g that we c a n n o t , a n d n e e d not, s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t about e v e r y t h i n g (Praep. 2.59;
Ev. 14.7; see Ac.
PH 1 . 2 2 7 - 3 0 ) . W h a t attitude, t h e n , w o u l d C a r n e a d e s have us
take t o w a r d s o u r i n c o n c l u s i v e e n q u i r y i n t o the nature of the gods? W e s h a l l r e t u r n to t h i s q u e s t i o n later.
Ethical arguments: Carneades divisions 1
C a r n e a d e s e t h i c a l a r g u m e n t s e x h i b i t the s a m e p a t t e r n . H e is not 1
interested i n d i s p a r a g i n g v i r t u e or i n c o n v i n c i n g us to
become
v i c i o u s . O n c e a g a i n he is b e n t o n u n d e r m i n i n g the p o o r l y p l a c e d c o n f i d e n c e o f the d o g m a t i s t s . U n l i k e A r c e s i l a u s , w h o a r g u e d against w h a t e v e r h i s i n t e r l o c u t o r s actually b e l i e v e d (or w e r e t e m p t e d to b e l i e v e ) , C a r n e a d e s b r o a d e n e d the s c e p t i c a l attack i n s e e k i n g to refute e v e r y p o s s i b l e e t h i c a l t h e o r y {Fin.
5.16), M o r e precisely, he set out i n a " d i v i s i o n " e v e r y e t h i c a l
t h e o r y that h a d b e e n c o n s t r u c t e d o r c o u l d b e c o n s t r u c t e d i n a c c o r d ance with certain naturalistic assumptions. Since those assumptions w e r e s h a r e d a m o n g h i s c o n t e m p o r a r i e s , he e m p l o y e d h i s d i v i s i o n to u n d e r m i n e the v e r y project o f H e l l e n i s t i c e t h i c a l p h i l o s o p h y ( A l g r a 1997; A n n a s 2001, 2 0 0 7 ) . A c c o r d i n g to the naturalistic a s s u m p t i o n s , a n e t h i c a l t h e o r y m u s t e x p l a i n w h a t s o r t s of g o o d s we n a t u r a l l y desire, a n d w h y , or l o r what e n d , w e desire them. E t h i c a l development is, in one important respect, n o different f r o m the n a t u r a l , p h y s i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t of a n infant i n t o a n adult; the final stage of d e v e l o p m e n t i s , i n s o m e s e n s e , i n h e r e n t in the p e r s o n s initial c o n d i t i o n . S o o u r c o m m o n h u m a n n a t u r e i n c l i n e s us t o w a r d s c e r t a i n t h i n g s a n d a w a y f r o m o t h e r s , a n d it is o n l y f r o m those n a t u r a l d i s p o s i t i o n s that we are able to c o n s t r u c t a f l o u r i s h i n g h u m a n life. It o u r i n i t i a l c o n d i t i o n is n u r t u r e d appropriately, we fulfil o u r teios: o u r n a t u r a l e n d or f u n c t i o n . But there are m a n y w a y s in w h i c h that d e v e l o p m e n t m a y go w r o n g . Just as a l a c k of g o o d n u t r i t i o n w i l l
65
ANCIENT
SCEPTICISM
prevent o n e f r o m a c h i e v i n g the n a t u r a l , p h y s i o l o g i c a l e n d , a l a c k o l u n d e r s t a n d i n g about the p r o p e r goals i n life w i l l p r e v e n t o n e f r o m a c h i e v i n g the n a t u r a l , e t h i c a l e n d . T h u s a c r u c i a l task for e t h i c a l t h e o r y is to teach us w h a t the p r o p e r goals are. By contrast, a c c o r d i n g to s o m e n o n - n a t u r a l i s t i c e t h i c a l v i e w s , o u r p r o p e r goal is to t r a n s c e n d the l i m i t a t i o n s o f h u m a n nature. I n s o m e of P l a t o s d i a l o g u e s , we are e n c o u r a g e d to e s c a p e t h i s life as q u i c k l y as p o s s i b l e by b e c o m i n g like G o d ( A n n a s 1 9 9 9 ) . L a t e r C h r i s t i a n t h i n k e r s d e v e l o p e d t h i s further, c l a i m i n g that h u m a n nature c a n n o t be perfected b y m e r e l y n a t u r a l m e a n s , but r e q u i r e s s u p e r n a t u r a l intervention. C a r n e a d e s offers three c a n d i d a t e s
for the objects o u r
nature
i n c l i n e s us t o w a r d s : p l e a s u r e , a b s e n c e of p a i n a n d p r i m a r y n a t u r a l t h i n g s (i.e. g o o d s o f the b o d y a n d m i n d s u c h as h e a l t h , beauty or i n t e l l i g e n c e ) . T h e s e s e e m to be the o n l y p l a u s i b l e c a n d i d a t e s , a s we c a n see b y t r y i n g to f i n d o t h e r n a t u r a l i s t i c ( n o n - t h e o l o g i c a l ) g o o d s that d o not fit into o n e o f these categories. T h i s i m m e d i a t e l y gives us three possible a c c o u n t s of w h a t we s h o u l d o r g a n i z e o u r lives a r o u n d . W e m a y say the best lite for h u m a n b e i n g s is: ( I ) to o b t a i n pleasure; ( 2 ) to o b t a i n the a b s e n c e o f p a i n ; o r (3) to o b t a i n the p r i m a r y n a t u r a l g o o d s . T h e s e are the s i m p l e s t t h e o r i e s b e c a u s e they h o l d that nature i m p l a n t s i n us a desire for the t h i n g s we m u s t o b t a i n to live w e l l . But p e r h a p s we s h o u l d i n s i s t that it is not e n o u g h m e r e l y to get these t h i n g s , but that we m u s t d o so in the right way, that is, v i r t u ously. S o they w i l l o n l y be c o m p o n e n t s ot a g o o d life w h e n a c c o m p a n i e d w i t h v i r t u e . T h i s w i l l give us three m o r e o p t i o n s . T h e best lite for h u m a n b e i n g s is; (4) v i r t u e plus p l e a s u r e ; ( 5 ) v i r t u e p l u s the a b s e n c e of p a i n ; or (6) virtue p l u s the p r i m a r y n a t u r a l g o o d s . T h e s e theories w i l l h a v e to e x p l a i n w h y it matters h o w w e get the t h i n g s we n e e d to f l o u r i s h . T h e n a g a i n , p e r h a p s w e s h o u l d o n l y t h i n k o l these as targets to be a i m e d at. I n that case, w e get three m o r e p o s s i b i l i t i e s . T h e best life tor h u m a n b e i n g s i s : (7) to strive for p l e a s u r e ; ( 8 ) to strive for the a b s e n c e o f p a i n ; o r ( 9 ) to strive for the p r i m a r y n a t u r a l g o o d s . T h e difficult}" here is to e x p l a i n w h y nature i m p l a n t s desires i n u s that we do not n e e d to satisfy in o r d e r to f l o u r i s h (see F i g u r e 2).
CARNEADES
Ethical ends: objects that human nature inclines us towards
Pleasure
Absence of pain
Primary nature things (mental and physical goods: health, wealth, intelligence)
Corresponding accounts of the good life in accordance with human nature
(l) Obtaining pleasure (EPICUREANS)
(4) Obtaining pleasure in a morally good life
(2) Obtaining the absence of pain
(5) Obtaining the absence of pain in a morally good life
(3) Obtaining (and enjoying) the primary natural things
(6) Obtaining and enjoying the primary natural things in a morally good life (ARISTOTELIANS)
(7) Striving for pleasure
(S) Striving for the absence of pain
(9) Striving for the primary natural things (STOICS)
Figure i. C a m r a d t s ' ethical divisions {Fin. 5.15-23, Turn. 5.64-35: Ac. 2.128-31 ).
T h e s e t h e o r i e s are all s u p p o s e d to give u s a c t u a l , p r a c t i c a l g u i d a n c e i n p l a n n i n g o u t o u r lives. A l t h o u g h they all p l a c e a s i g n i f i cant e m p h a s i s o n g r a s p i n g w h a t the p r o p e r targets are, they are not intellectualist: t h e y d o not m a i n t a i n that b e c o m i n g e t h i c a l l y g o o d is s i m p l y a m a t t e r of a c q u i r i n g the r i g h t s o r t of k n o w l e d g e ; or if it is, t h e n a c q u i r i n g k n o w l e d g e w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e s o m e c h a n g e i n o u r d i s p o s i t i o n s a n d d e s i r e s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , they all m a i n t a i n that k n o w l e d g e is a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n for v i r t u e : i f w e d o not k n o w w h i c h targets are t h e right o n e s to a i m at, w e will o n l y hit t h e m h a p h a z a r d l y a n d b y a c c i d e n t . T o c o n s i s t e n t l y a n d reliably hit t h e
right
targets w e m u s t k n o w w h a t w e are to a i m at (see Fuse, 5.15; J V £ 1.2, l 0 9 4 a 2 3 - 2 5 a n d 1.3, I 0 9 5 a 9 - 1 2 ) , T h e comparisons between ethical views implicit in C a r n e a d e s ' d i v i s i o n s h o w s that they c a n n o t all be true. T o d e f e n d one is to attack
&7
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the o t h e r s . B u t rather t h a n t a k i n g the p e r s p e c t i v e of a p a r t i c i p a n t i n these e t h i c a l debates, C a r n e a d e s places h i m s e l f o u t s i d e , s u r v e y i n g the w h o l e Held. T h i s f r e e d o m I r o m d o c t r i n a l c o m m i t m e n t gives h i m a n o n - p a r t i s a n a p p r e c i a t i o n of the s t r e n g t h s a n d w e a k n e s s e s o f the v a r i o u s p o s i t i o n s , a n d it gives h t m a c o n v e n i e n t f r a m e for h i s s c e p t i c a l attacks. S u c h is C i c e r o ' s a p p r o a c h i n De Fin/bus
w h e n he argues for a n d
against the three m o s t plausible a n d forcefully d e f e n d e d p o s i t i o n s : the E p i c u r e a n ( 1 ) , the A r i s t o t e l i a n (6J a n d the Stoic ( 9 ) . T h e s c e p t i cal a r g u m e n t s that C i c e r o reports against these v i e w s are n o t a l w a y s e x p l i c i t l y attributed t o C a r n e a d e s , but the context m a k e s it r e a s o n able to s u p p o s e that they are h i s , or at least w e r e i n s p i r e d by h i m ,
I n c o n s i s t e n c i e s i n E p i c u r e a n a n d Stoic ethics O n e o f C i c e r o ' s central c o m p l a i n t s about the E p i c u r e a n v i e w is that it is i n c o n s i s t e n t . E p i c u r u s , in fact, w a v e r s b e t w e e n (1) a n d ( 2 ) , s i n c e he s o m e t i m e s c o n c e i v e s of p l e a s u r e a s a n active s t i m u l a t i o n of the senses a n d o t h e r t i m e s as the t r a n q u i l a b s e n c e of p a i n / It is clear that m a x i m i z i n g o n e type o f p l e a s u r e d o e s not a l w a y s m a x i m i z e the other. S e e k i n g the a b s e n c e of p a i n w i l l l e a d m e a w a y f r o m m a n y p l e a s u r e s I m i g h t o t h e r w i s e enjoy. A n d s e e k i n g t h o s e active p l e a s u r e s w i l l p r o b a b l y l e a d to s o m e u n w a n t e d p a i n s . W e are b o r n w i t h a n a t u r a l d e s i r e for pleasure. B u t a c c o r d i n g to E p i c u r u s it is the a b s e n c e ot p a i n that c o m p l e t e s or fulfils o u r n a t u r e . I f this is c o r r e c t , n a t u r e s e e m s g u i l t y of m i s l e a d i n g u s . It w o u l d m a k e m u c h m o r e sense to give us a desire l o r the a b s e n c e of p a i n if that is w h a t w e n e e d to f l o u r i s h . E p i c u r u s m u s t e x p l a i n w h y nature s h o u l d i m p l a n t in us a desire for pleasure w h e n the satisfaction ot that desire d o e s not g u a r a n t e e a g o o d life. T h e r e are p o w e r f u l r e s p o n s e s available to the E p i c u r e a n , s o m e o l w h i c h c a n be f o u n d i n C i c e r o ' s defence ( F i n . 1; see also D L 10.121¬ 3 5 ) . H o w e v e r , the s c e p t i c d o e s not n e e d to p r o v i d e irrefutable, c o n c l u s i v e e v i d e n c e that the p o s i t i o n i n q u e s t i o n is false. S c e p t i cal refutation a i m s at s h o w i n g that the d o g m a t i s t s d o not have a n
SB
CARNEADES
adequate d e t e n t e , u s u a l l y b y p o i n t i n g out i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s w i t h i n their t h e o r i e s . It is often p o s s i b l e to p a t c h up the i n c o n s i s t e n c y by m o d i f y i n g the theory, but that i n t u r n w i l l p r o v i d e a n e w target for s c e p t i c a l refutation. T h e b u r d e n o f p r o o f a l w a y s lies w i t h those w h o are p r o m o t i n g a p o s i t i v e v i e w . C i c e r o ' s m a i n o b j e c t i o n to the Stoic a c c o u n t o f t h e e t h i c a l e n d also points to a n i n c o n s i s t e n c y . T h e Stoics c l a i m that the p r i m a r y n a t u r a l g o o d s are v a l u a b l e , a n d t h u s c h o i c e w o r t h y , but a l s o indifferent w i t h respect to o u r h a p p i n e s s . It is s u p p o s e d l y a m a t t e r o f s t r i v i n g in the right way that c o u n t s ; w h e t h e r or n o t w e s u c c e e d is i r r e l e v a n t . T h e Stoic sage w i l l m a k e e v e r y r e a s o n a b l e effort to m a i n t a i n h i s h e a l t h , for e x a m p l e , b u t this is c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s f a l l i n g 01 H i s w i s d o m is not m a n i f e s t e d i n o u t c o m e s o v e r w h i c h he has n o ultimate c o n t r o l , but r a t h e r i n a q u a l i t a t i v e state o f m i n d that d i r e c t s h i m to a c t a l w a y s i n the right way. O n c e h e has a c h i e v e d w i s d o m , h i s h a p p i n e s s c a n not be affected b y the p r e s e n c e or a b s e n c e of health or other s u c h so c a l l e d " p r e f e r r e d indifférents''. T h e qualitative state o l v i r t u e a l l o w s tor n e i t h e r i n c r e a s e n o r d e c r e a s e : a c h r o n i c a l l y ill sage w i l l be no less h a p p y t h a n o n e i n great h e a l t h . I n effect, the Stoics a p p e a r to be s a y i n g that s u c h t h i n g s as h e a l t h , strength a n d b e a u t y are w o r t h c h o o s i n g b e c a u s e t h e y are w o r t h h a v i n g , but a l s o that it does not really m a t t e r w h e t h e r y o u have t h e m . C i c e r o presents the Stoics w i t h a d i l e m m a : e i t h e r t h e y m u s t say that the p r i m a r y n a t u r a l g o o d s are really g o o d , o r that they are really n e u t r a l , neither good n o r b a d . I f they go w i t h the f o r m e r o p t i o n , their p o s i t i o n collapses into the Peripatetic v i e w that h a p p i n e s s c o m e s o n l y t h r o u g h a v i r t u o u s a c q u i s i t i o n , use a n d e n j o y m e n t of g o o d t h i n g s . I n o t h e r w o r d s , we w i l l see that the Stoics d o not really believe that s t r i v i n g is all w e n e e d for h a p p i n e s s . I f they go w i t h the latter o p t i o n , their p o s i t i o n c a n n o longer offer any p r a c t i c a l g u i d a n c e ; it w i l l no longer matter w h e t h e r I t r y to p r e s e r v e m y h e a l t h s i n c e it c a n n e i t h e r a d d to n o r s u b t r a c t f r o m m y h a p p i n e s s , So it w i l l not m a t t e r w h e t h e r I try to p r e s e r v e m y h e a l t h or not. I n general, s u c h a t h e o r y w i l l give us n o basis o n w h i c h to c h o o s e o n e t h i n g a n d reject another. C a m e a d e s u s e d to get quite w o r k e d u p by the Stoic c l a i m that virtue is sufficient for h a p p i n e s s (Tusc. 5.83J. O n e o f t h e w a y s he
69
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sought to u n d e r m i n e this c o n v i c t i o n w a s to argue i n s u p p o r t of the first h o r n o f the d i l e m m a , that is, to s h o w that their t h e o r y actually c o m m i t s t h e m to the Peripatetic p o s i t i o n . C a r n e a d e s u s e d to j u d g e the c o n t r o v e r s y [between Peripatetics a n d Stoics] a s a respected arbitrator. S i n c e the s a m e things w h i c h the Peripatetics d e e m e d g o o d s , the Stoics r e g a r d e d as advantages, a n d s i n c e the Peripatetics d i d not c o n t e r m o r e value t h a n the Stoics o n w e a l t h , g o o d health, a n d other things of the s a m e k i n d , he s a i d that w h e n the i s s u e is w e i g h e d w i t h respect to the facts, not w o r d s , there w a s n o c a u s e for dispute.
(Tusc.
5.120; see also Fr>t. 3.41 )
C a r n e a d e s is c l e a r l y out to u n d e r m i n e a c e n t r a l c o m p o n e n t in Stoic e t h i c s : the d o c t r i n e of the p r e f e r r e d indifférents. H o w e v e r , he is not t r y i n g to s h o w that Stoic a n d A r i s t o t e l i a n e t h i c s converge in o r d e r to d e f e n d it. I n d e e d , t h i s is o n l y o n e h o r n o l the d i l e m m a . U n d e r l y i n g the a r g u m e n t , at least i n C i c e r o ' s p r e s e n t a t i o n , is the n o t i o n that w h a t really matters is the life o n e leads, the c h o i c e s one m a k e s , the w a y o n e r e s p o n d s to g o o d f o r t u n e a n d adversity, not the w o r d s o n e u s e s to d e s c r i b e t h e m , or the t h e o r y one appeals to i n o r d e r to e x p l a i n oneself. I f the lives o f m o r a l l y u p r i g h t Stoics are i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m the lives o f Peripatetics, t h e n the d o c t r i n a l differe n c e s a r e i n s i g n i f i c a n t . T h i s p r a g m a t i c attitude is not offered as a n alternative to p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n . C a r n e a d e s is not s a y i n g that r a t i o n a l e n q u i r y is futile, but r a t h e r that d o g m a t i c
commitment
to p h i l o s o p h i c a l theories is futile. S o it w o u l d be s u r p r i s i n g if the participants h a d invited h i m to sit as j u d g e . It he thought they w e r e all equally w r o n g , there is n o t h i n g for h i m to judge. B u t C i c e r o says that the c o n t r o v e r s y u s e d to be d e c i d e d by C a r n e a d e s [controversiam
sotebat iudica re]. S i n c e it is c l e a r l y a p h i l -
o s o p h i c a l dispute, what needs to be d e c i d e d is w h i c h s i d e presents the m o s t r a t i o n a l l y c o m p e l l i n g case. I f C a r n e a d e s j u d g e d that o n e p o s i tion is m o r e plausibly d e f e n d e d t h a n the o t h e r s , it is h a r d to see w h y he w o u l d not a p p r o v e of that side h i m s e l f . W h a t attitude t h e n w o u l d C a r n e a d e s have us take t o w a r d s t h e s e i n c o n c l u s i v e ethical theories?
70
CARNEADES
W e shall p o s t p o n e this q u e s t i o n o n e last t i m e u n t i l w e have c o n s i d e r e d h i s a r g u m e n t s against Stoic epistemology.
Epistemological arguments A s w i t h h i s s c e p t i c a l attacks o n t h e o l o g y a n d e t h i c s , C a r n e a d e s d i d not a i m to s h o w that n o b e l i e l is true, b u t rather that n o n e o f the available e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l theories h a d e s t a b l i s h e d a n y t h i n g about knowledge. O n c e again, C a r n e a d e s was more ambitious than A r c esilaus:
[ H e ] p o s i t i o n e d h i m s e l f o n the c r i t e r i o n not o n l y against the Stoics b u t also against e v e r y o n e before h i m . I n fact h i s first a r g u m e n t , w h i c h is d i r e c t e d against all o l t h e m together, is o n e a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h he e s t a b l i s h e s that n o t h i n g is w i t h o u t q u a l i f i c a t i o n a c r i t e r i o n ot t r u t h - not r e a s o n , not s e n s e p e r c e p t i o n , not a p p e a r a n c e , n o t a n y t h i n g else that there is; for all of these a s a group d e c e i v e us,
( M 7.159)
4
D e s p i t e d i s a g r e e m e n t s r e g a r d i n g p r o p o s e d c r i t e r i a , it w a s agreed a m o n g H e l l e n i s t i c p h i l o s o p h e r s that the s u c c e s s f u l c a n d i d a t e m u s t play s o m e role i n d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g the t r u e i r o m the false ( S t r i k e r 1 9 7 4 ) . So C a r n e a d e s a t t e m p t s to s h o w that n o t h i n g c a n fill this role, that is, that we have n o reliable w a y to differentiate the t r u e f r o m the false. A s d e s c r i b e d by the Stoics, the c r i t e r i o n is m o r e t h a n j u s t a theoretical a c c o u n t ; it is s u p p o s e d to be the tool that e n a b l e s us to progress f r o m folly to w i s d o m . W e s a w i n C h a p t e r 3 that b e c o m i n g w i s e , for the Stoics, is a m a t t e r of l e a r n i n g to assent o n l y to kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n s . T h e p o i n t of e x p l a i n i n g the nature of s u c h i m p r e s s i o n s is not s i m p l y to a s s u r e us that s o m e t h i n g is t r u e , but r a t h e r to s h o w h o w w e c a n assent o n l y to w h a t is true, E x t e n d i n g A r c e s i l a u s ' attack,
Carneades makes a distinction
b e t w e e n t w o a s p e c t s ot a n i m p r e s s i o n : o n e i n relation to w h a t it is a n i m p r e s s i o n ot, a n d the o t h e r i n relation to the agent h a v i n g the
"1
ANCIENT
SCEPTICISM
i m p r e s s i o n . T h e first relation d e t e r m i n e s w h e t h e r it is true o r false, a n d the s e c o n d w h e t h e r it is c o n v i n c i n g or not. S e p a r a t i n g these aspects m a k e s A r c e s i l a u s ' o b j e c t i o n m o r e v i v i d , a n d it forces
the
Stoics to be m o r e explicit about their p o s i t i o n : a n i m p r e s s i o n w i l l be true or false d e p e n d i n g o n w h e t h e r it agrees w i t h its o b j e c t ( s ) , but this w i l l not d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r o r not the agent finds the i m p r e s s i o n c o n v i n c i n g ( A i 7.168), O n the other h a n d , the fact that the agent finds the i m p r e s s i o n c o n v i n c i n g n e e d not tell us a n y t h i n g about w h e t h e r it is true o r false. The
Stoic c r i t e r i o n ,
the kataleptic
impression, includes
both
aspects in s u c h a w a y that its p e r s u a s i v e n e s s is s u p p o s e d to indicate its t r u t h , B u t , as A r c e s i l a u s h a d a r g u e d , for a n y i r r e s i s t i b l y p e r s u a sive a n d t r u e i m p r e s s i o n we c a n i m a g i n e a false o n e that is i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e . C a r n e a d e s e m p l o y s a sorites a r g u m e n t to f u r t h e r this o b j e c t i o n , A d v a n c i n g b y m i n u t e degrees we c a n i m a g i n e t r a n s f o r m i n g a kataleptic into a n o n - k a t a l e p t i c i m p r e s s i o n , or vice versa, O n e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of the a r g u m e n t goes t h i s way.
[ 1]
3
I f G o d c a n present a s l e e p e r w i t h a pe rsuasive i m p r e s s i o n [of w h a t doesn't e x i s t ] , t h e n H e c a n present the sleeper w i t h a n i m p r e s s i o n that is e x t r e m e l y t r u t h - l i k e , i.e. o n e w h i c h a p p r o x i m a t e s the t r u t h v e r y closely,
[2]
I f . . . one that is e x t r e m e l y t r u t h - l i k e , then . . . o n e that's difficult to d i s c r i m i n a t e I r o m a true i m p r e s s i o n .
[3]
I f . . , o n e that is difficult to d i s c r i m i n a t e , t h e n . . . one that can't be d i s c r i m i n a t e d ,
[4]
I f . . . o n e that can't be d i s c r i m i n a t e d , t h e n . . . one that doesn't differ at a l l ,
(Ac. 2.47-49)
T h e i m p r e s s i o n retains its p e r s u a s i v e n e s s t h r o u g h o u t
the steps; it
does not b e c o m e m o r e p e r s u a s i v e as we p r o c e e d . W h a t c h a n g e s is the degree of difference b e t w e e n t h i s v a c u o u s i m p r e s s i o n a n d a true one. T h e i m p r e s s i o n s t h e m s e l v e s g r a d u a l l y b e c o m e m o r e a n d m o r e s i m i l a r u n t i l we a r r i v e at i d e n t i c a l , that is, i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e , p e r c e p tual contents. I n the e n d , t w o e q u a l l y p e r s u a s i v e i m p r e s s i o n s , one v a c u o u s a n d o n e t r u e , differ in n o t h i n g but n u m b e r .
72
CARNEADES
C h r y s i p p u s c u s t o m a r y w a y of d e a l i n g w i t h the sorites is to stop 1
a n s w e r i n g before o n e c o m e s to u n c l e a r cases: " i n the case of a p p e a r a n c e s w h e r e the difference b e t w e e n t h e m is so s m a l l , the w i s e pers o n w i l l h o l d fast a n d k e e p quiet, w h e r e a s i n cases w h e r e a greater difference s t r i k e s h i m , he w i l l assent to o n e of t h e m as t r u e " { A i 7-416; see A c . 2 , 9 1 - 2 ) . S o if the d i f f e r e n c e s are m i n u t e , say b e t w e e n two i m p r i n t s f r o m the s a m e r i n g , the sage w i l l w i t h h o l d assent. R u t i n cases w h e r e there is a great d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n a kataleptic a n d n o n - k a t a l e p t i c i m p r e s s i o n , the sage w i l l not hesitate to assent to the former. T h e p r o b l e m w i t h this r e s p o n s e is that it a s s u m e s one c a n a c t u ally d e c i d e w h i c h s i t u a t i o n o n e is i n . S u p p o s e that "fifty is f e w " is the content of a kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n , a n d that "ten t h o u s a n d is f e w " is the c o n t e n t o l a n o n - k a t a l e p t i c a n d false i m p r e s s i o n . C l e a r l y , fifty-one is a b o u t as far f r o m ten t h o u s a n d as fifty is. S o the sage w i l l assent to the p r o p o s i t i o n that "fifty-one is f e w " a l s o ( A i 7 - 4 1 6 - 2 1 ) . I f there is a great d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n the e v i d e n t t r u t h of s u c h c l a i m s a n d the falsity of "ten t h o u s a n d is few", there s h o u l d a l s o be a great d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n " f i f t y - t w o is f e w " a n d "ten t h o u s a n d is few". B u t o n c e he starts d o w n that r o a d , there s e e m s to be n o p r i n c i p l e d place to stop a n s w e r i n g . E v e n i f w e s u p p o s e that s o m e w h e r e a l o n g this r o a d the sage w o u l d e v e n t u a l l y receive the kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n that o n e h u n d r e d (or w h a t e v e r the n u m b e r m a y b e ) is not tew, he m u s t be a b l e to r e c o g n i z e it a s s u c h . T h i s i m p r e s s i o n m u s t be q u i t e d i s t i n c t f r o m the i m p r e s s i o n that n i n e t y - n i n e is few. But this w o u l d be a r e m a r k a b l e feat of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s i n c e in e v e r y o t h e r case the a d d i t i o n o f one u n i t is not e n o u g h to t r a n s f o r m tew i n t o m a n y . S o e v e n it the sage receives the kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n r e g a r d i n g w h a t is few a n d m a n y , the sorites o b j e c t i o n s h o u l d u n d e r m i n e h i s c o n f i d e n c e i n b e i n g able to c o r r e c t l y i d e n t i f y it as s u c h . Similarly, o n e
might be prevented from finding a
kataleptic
i m p r e s s i o n c o n v i n c i n g d u e to e x t e r n a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s . F o r e x a m p l e , w h e n H e r a c l e s s t o o d by A d m e t u s , h a v i n g b r o u g h t A l c e s t i s u p f r o m b e l o w the e a r t h , A d m e t u s d i d
"3
ANCIENT
SCEPTICISM
catch a kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n f r o m A l c e s t i s , yet d i d not trust I t . . . . F o r A d met us f i g u r e d that A l c e s t i s w a s d e a d a n d that a d e a d p e r s o n d o e s not rise u p .
(Ai 7.254-56)
T h e i m p r e s s i o n o f A l c e s t i s s e e m s to meet the r e q u i r e m e n t s for b e i n g k a t a l e p t i c : it is f r o m a real t h i n g , a n d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h p r e c i s e l y that t h i n g , a n d a c c u r a t e l y depicts all the relevant details. T o deal w i t h s u c h e v e n t u a l i t i e s , s o m e later Stoics argue that the kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n c a n o n l y s e r v e as the c r i t e r i o n o l truth il it has no obstacle ( M 7 . 2 5 3 - 5 7 , 7 . 4 2 4 ) . A s the A d m e t u s e x a m p l e illustrates, the s o r t s o f o b s t a c l e s i n q u e s t i o n are beliefs or m e n t a l states. I f I a m i n a n a n x i o u s or f e a r f u l state of m i n d , 1 m i g h t v e r y w e l l receive a kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n a n d yet refuse to assent to it. S i m i l a r l y , if I a m f i r m l y c o n v i n c e d o l s o m e false belief, I m i g h t a l s o be r e l u c t a n t to assent to s o m e o t h e r truth. I f t h e r e are n o s u c h o b s t a c l e s , a s s e n t i n g to a kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n is like the s i n k i n g o f a s c a l e s b a l a n c e w h e n weight is p u t o n it. T h e m i n d n e c e s s a r i l y y i e l d s a n d c a n n o t r e t r a i n t r o m g i v i n g its a p p r o v a l to what is p e r s p i c u o u s ( A c . 2 . 3 8 ) . W h e n the kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n l a c k s a n y o b s t a c l e s it p r a c t i c a l l y lays h o l d o f us b y the h a i r a n d d r a g s us to assent ( A i 7.257). W h a t these passages suggest is s o m e sort o f n a t u r a l fit b e t w e e n kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n s a n d o u r r a t i o n a l faculty s u c h that
these
i m p r e s s i o n s are, at least potentially, c o m p e l l i n g i n a w a y that false ones c a n n o t be. A c c o r d i n g to this v i e w , kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n s affect the p r o p e r l y t r a i n e d m i n d i n a w a y that is quite different f r o m the w a y talse i m p r e s s i o n s affect the s a m e m i n d . T h e sage is the o n e w h o has h a b i t u a t e d h i m s e l f not to b e t e m p t e d to assent to false beliefs. T h e fit b e t w e e n h i s r a t i o n a l nature a n d the truth e x p l a i n s h o w this h a b i t u a t i o n is p o s s i b l e . So p e r h a p s it is possible to a c q u i r e the n e c e s s a r y level o f d i s c e r n m e n t , it w e c a n still c a l l it that. T a k e n this way, the Stoic c r i t e r i o n is s i m p l y a guarantee that o n e m i g h t d e v e l o p one's cognitive a n d p e r c e p t u a l e q u i p m e n t in s u c h a w a y that o n e o n l y finds kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n s persuasive. ' 1
S u c h a g u a r a n t e e is still c o l d c o m f o r t to the S c e p t i c . C a r n e a d e s follows A r c e s i l a u s in f o r c i n g the Stoics to live u p to the m o r e a m b i tious p r o m i s e of their e p i s t e m o l o g y : s h o w u s i j o w o n e m i g h t b e c o m e
7t
CARNEADES
a sage. T h i s is e s p e c i a l l y urgent given their v i e w that n o t h i n g but w i s d o m is really w o r t h w h i l e . W h i l e w e all l a n g u i s h in o u r v i c e a n d folly, it is of little use to b e t o l d that w i s d o m is p o s s i b l e . C a r n e a d e s ' s c e p t i c a l attack e m p h a s i z e s that the relation of a n i m p r e s s i o n to the agent, its p e r s u a s i v e n e s s o r credibility, is p r i m a r y i n o u r
struggle
tor w i s d o m ,
Epoche
and
apmxia
W e c o m e finally to the q u e s t i o n o f what cognitive attitude C a r n e a d e s w o u l d have us take t o w a r d s all this i n c o n c l u s i v e n e s s . T h e s i m p l e a n s w e r is that we s h o u l d w i t h h o l d a s s e n t . B u t d e t e r m i n i n g p r e c i s e l y w h a t he m e a n s b y this is c o m p l i c a t e d by the fact that he m a k e s a d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t w o k i n d s o f assent, o n l y o n e o f w h i c h we are s u p p o s e d to w i t h h o l d . T h e o t h e r is s c e p t i c a l l y a c c e p t a b l e (Ac. C i c e r o reports
2.104).
C a r n e a d e s ' distinction as a key move
i n his
response to the s t a n d a r d objection that s u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t m a k e s life i m p o s s i b l e (iipraxia).
T h e Stoics c o m p l a i n e d that if there are no
kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n s , a s C a r n e a d e s argues, t h e n e v e r y t h i n g w o u l d be u n c l e a r (Ac. 2 . 3 2 ) . C a r n e a d e s ' s c e p t i c a l a t t a c k calls into q u e s t i o n the fit b e t w e e n h u m a n c o g n i t i o n a n d the w o r l d . I n o t h e r w o r d s , it suggests that e v e n if we u s e o u r c o g n i t i v e e q u i p m e n t to the best of o u r ability we m i g h t not m a k e a n y progress t o w a r d s s e c u r i n g i n f a l lible j u s t i f i c a t i o n for o u r beliefs. We m a y d e v e l o p this o b j e c t i o n f u r t h e r i n t e r m s of the two aspects of a n i m p r e s s i o n . B y m a k i n g t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n C a r n e a d e s d r a w s o u r attention to the lact that the subjective p l a u s i b i l i t y ot a n i m p r e s s i o n is n o necessary i n d i c a t o r o f truth a n d v i c e v e r s a . T h a t is all he needs to assert for the s a k e of h i s o b j e c t i o n to Stoic epistemology. B u t this leaves o p e n the q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r the subjective p l a u sibility of a n i m p r e s s i o n is e v e n a fallible i n d i c a t o r o f t r u t h , that is, w h e t h e r there is any c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n p l a u s i b i l i t y a n d t r u t h . It not, s o m e t h i n g s e e m i n g p l a u s i b l e h a s n o greater l i k e l i h o o d of b e i n g true t h a n s o m e t h i n g s e e m i n g w i l d l y i m p l a u s i b l e . T h e c o n v i n c i n g a n d f a m i l i a r sight o f a f r i e n d is j u s t as l i k e l y to be true as the
ANCIENT
SCEPTICISM
d r e a m - l i k e , h a z y i m p r e s s i o n o f a c e n t a u r . A s far as w e k n o w , the w a y the w o r l d a p p e a r s is not i n a n y w a y a n i n d i c a t o r o f the w a y the w o r l d is, I f that is w h a t C a r n e a d e s m e a n s , it is easy to see w h y the Stoics w o u l d assert that he is o v e r t u r n i n g life itself a n d d e p r i v i n g us of o u r m i n d s (Ac. 2 . 3 1 ) . I n c o u n t e r i n g the apraxia
o b j e c t i o n , C a r n e a d e s m a i n t a i n s that
there is a n i m p o r t a n t difference b e t w e e n a n i m p r e s s i o n b e i n g m e r e l y u n c l e a r a n d it's b e i n g i n a p p r e h e n s i b l e (Ac. 2.32; Prncp.
Ev. 14.7).
E v e r y t h i n g is e q u a l l y i n a p p r e h e n s i b l e : n o i m p r e s s i o n c a n be g r a s p e d or a p p r e h e n d e d i n s u c h a w a y that w e c o u l d not i n p r i n c i p l e be m i s t a k e n about it. But that d o e s not m e a n that e v e r y t h i n g is equally u n c l e a r . C a r n e a d e s o n l y a i m s to d o a w a y w i t h w h a t n e v e r existed, the Stoic f i c t i o n o f kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n s . B u t h e leaves us w h a t w e h a v e h a d all a l o n g , p e r s u a s i v e o r c o n v i n c i n g i m p r e s s i o n s , as o u r g u i d e i n p r a c t i c a l matters, R a t h e r than give us a d v i c e about h o w w e s h o u l d act i n the a b s e n c e of c e r t a i n k n o w l e d g e , C a r n e a d e s m e r e l y d e s c r i b e s h o w w e d o act: . . . j u s t a s i n o r d i n a r y life, w h e n w e are i n v e s t i g a t i n g a s m a l l m a t t e r w e q u e s t i o n o n e w i t n e s s , w h e n it is a greater m a t ter, s e v e r a l w i t n e s s e s , a n d w h e n it is a n e v e n m o r e e s s e n t i a l m a t t e r w e e x a m i n e e a c h of the w i t n e s s e s o n t h e basis o f the m u t u a l a g r e e m e n t a m o n g the o t h e r s . . .
(Af 7.184)
I n the first level o f s c r u t i n y w e a p p l y the p e r s u a s i v e i m p r e s s i o n o n its o w n as t h e c r i t e r i o n . I f I receive a n i m p r e s s i o n that is, at first sight, a p p a r e n t l y true, I assent to it a n d act a c c o r d i n g l y ; w e shall c o n s i d e r w h a t is i n v o l v e d i n s u c h assent below. T h e fact that w h a t is a p p a r ently t r u e is s o m e t i m e s false d o e s not b o t h e r u s , a n d n o r s h o u l d it. C a r n e a d e s asserts that:
o n e s h o u l d not, b e c a u s e the rare o c c u r r e n c e o f this [the a p p a r e n t l y true i m p r e s s i o n b e i n g l a l s e ] , d i s t r u s t the o n e that for the m o s t part tells the t r u t h . F o r b o t h o u r j u d g m e n t s a n d o u r a c t i o n s are, as a matter ot fact, regulated b y w h a t applies for the m o s t part.
76
(Af 7,175)
CARNEADES
T h e c l a i m that s u c h i m p r e s s i o n s "tell the t r u t h " for the m o s t part is s i m p l y a w a y o f s a y i n g that they are reliable or trustworthy. I f he h a d meant s o m e t h i n g m o r e , he w o u l d be suggesting a d o g m a t i c alternative to the Stoic a c c o u n t o f t r u t h . H e does not ( a n d s h o u l d not) offer a n y s p e c u l a t i o n as to w h y s u c h i m p r e s s i o n s are l o r the m o s t part reliable. But
i n p r e s e n t i n g the p e r s u a s i v e i m p r e s s i o n a s a n
alternative
a c c o u n t o f the c r i t e r i o n , he is m a k i n g a s i g n i f i c a n t d e p a r t u r e f r o m the s t a n d a r d use of the t e r m " c r i t e r i o n " O n the s t a n d a r d use, if s o m e t h i n g satisfies the c r i t e r i o n of t r u t h t h e n it is true. B u t a c o n v i n c i n g i m p r e s s i o n m a y be t r u e o r false. At the s e c o n d level of s c r u t i n y , w h e r e the stakes are a bit higher, we e x a m i n e the i m p r e s s i o n s that a p p e a r a l o n g w i t h the o n e i n q u e s t i o n . C a r n e a d e s ' m a k e s the o b v i o u s , but i m p o r t a n t , o b s e r v a t i o n that we t y p i c a l l y d o not receive isolated, i n d i v i d u a l i m p r e s s i o n s ; rather, they c o m e i n g r o u p s . W h e n I e n c o u n t e r m y f r i e n d , I receive i m p r e s s i o n s of h e r clothes, her hair, h e r s h o e s a n d the s o u n d of h e r v o i c e , a l o n g w i t h the objects she m a y be h o l d i n g a n d o t h e r t h i n g s i n the i m m e d i a t e vicinity, a n d e v e n the q u a l i t y ot the light. W h e n the c l u s ter of s u c h i m p r e s s i o n s all a p p e a r t r u e a n d m u t u a l l y s u p p o r t i v e , o u r trust is greater. B u t if one o f these i m p r e s s i o n s a p p e a r s false, if m y f r i e n d s v o i c e s o u n d s c o m p l e t e l y u n f a m i l i a r , t h e n I s h o u l d reject the i m p r e s s i o n that this is m y f r i e n d . C a r n e a d e s d e s c r i b e s t h i s w i t h the a d d i t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t that the c o n v i n c i n g i m p r e s s i o n n o t be " t u r n e d away", that is, t u r n e d a w a y b y a n a p p a r e n t l y false i m p r e s s i o n a c c o m p a n y i n g it. At the t h i r d level of s c r u t i n y , i n matters o f the h i g h e s t i m p o r tance, we t u r n o u r attention to e a c h o f the a s s o c i a t e d i m p r e s s i o n s t h e m s e l v e s a n d a c t i v e l y s e e k to d i s c r e d i t o n e o n the basis of the others. C a r n e a d e s c l a i m s that this is the sort of t h i n g we d o w h e n s c r u t i n i z i n g c a n d i d a t e s for p u b l i c office. It is n o t sufficient that the c a n d i d a t e c o n v i n c i n g l y a p p e a r s to be q u a l i f i e d . C o m m e n s u r a t e w i t h the i m p o r t a n c e o f the p o s i t i o n , we w i l l e x a m i n e h i s c r e d e n t i a l s a n d references. E a c h of these in t u r n w i l l b e put to s i m i l a r tests. I n the end,
the m o s t w e c a n a c h i e v e is c o h e r e n c e a m o n g the e x a m i n e d
i m p r e s s i o n s , but at t h i s highest level o l s c r u t i n y , we w i l l not settle for the c o h e r e n c e ot the i n i t i a l cluster of i m p r e s s i o n s . T h u s w e get
"7
ANCIENT
SCEPTICISM
the f i n a l r e q u i r e m e n t that the c o n v i n c i n g i m p r e s s i o n that h a s not b e e n t u r n e d a w a y h a s a l s o b e e n gone o v e r i n detail. D e s p i t e the fact that the h i g h e s t level of s c r u t i n y still fails to g u a r antee the t r u t h o l the i m p r e s s i o n , we c o n t i n u e to r e l y o n i t If we d o not, that is, i f w e find n o i m p r e s s i o n s c o n v i n c i n g , C a r n e a d e s grants that life w o u l d be o v e r t u r n e d (Ac. 239,
103.
105).
C a r n e a d e s ' p r a c t i c a l c r i t e r i o n a n d the t w o t y p e s o f a s s e n t W h a t exactly are we d o i n g w h e n w e rely o n s u c h i m p r e s s i o n s ? W e m a y n o w u n d e r s t a n d the type of assent C a r n e a d e s a l l o w s a n d the type he w o u l d have us w i t h h o l d . F o r c o n v e n i e n c e we s h a l l refer to these as s c e p t i c a l a n d d o g m a t i c assent, respectively. S c e p t i c a l assent is given to p e r s u a s i v e i m p r e s s i o n s that h a v e r e c e i v e d the appropriate level of scrutiny. ( M o r e strictly s p e a k i n g , assent is g i v e n to a p r o p o s i t i o n a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the i m p r e s s i o n . I f we d o not f o r m u l a t e s u c h a p r o p o s i t i o n b y i n t e r p r e t i n g the i m p r e s s i o n s s i g n i f i c a n c e , then it is n o t " s a y i n g " a n y t h i n g w i t h w h i c h w e m i g h t agree.) The
distinction between dogmatic
a n d s c e p t i c a l assent
may
be i n t e r p r e t e d in two w a y s . O n e is that C a r n e a d e s w o u l d h a v e us w i t h h o l d assent i n the m a n n e r that w o u l d c h a r a c t e r i z e assent to a kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n if we w e r e a b l e to i d e n t i f y it as s u c h . I n o t h e r w o r d s , s i n c e we c a n n o t k n o w w h e t h e r a n y i m p r e s s i o n we assent to is kataleptic, we s h o u l d n e v e r assent w i t h absolute c o n f i d e n c e . O n this probabilist
view, a l l that C a r n e a d e s w o u l d have us a v o i d
is the r a s h n e s s of t a k i n g o u r s e l v e s to know w h a t w e d o not; he does not o b j e c t to c a u t i o u s l y b e l i e v i n g that s o m e i m p r e s s i o n is p r o b a b l y true. If this is c o r r e c t , C a r n e a d e s d o e s not c o m p l e t e l y sever the c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n p e r s u a s i v e i m p r e s s i o n s a n d the t r u t h . H e m e r e l y p o i n t s out that p e r s u a s i v e i m p r e s s i o n s are fallible a n d that a s far as we k n o w they are all we have. A c c o r d i n g l y , s c e p t i c a l assent w o u l d y i e l d fallible beliefs h e l d w i t h the a p p r o p r i a t e l y m o d e s t a w a r e n e s s that they m a y be false. The
o t h e r alternative is that C a r n e a d e s w o u l d h a v e us w i t h -
h o l d assent to the t r u t h o f a n y p r o p o s i t i o n , O n this sceptical
78
view,
CARNEADES
d o g m a t i c assent is s i m p l y a m a t t e r o f t a k i n g s o m e t h i n g to be true, w h e t h e r i n a m o d e s t or c o n f i d e n t m a n n e r . W i t h h o l d i n g this type of assent w o u l d rule out b e l i e v i n g a n y t h i n g , as w e c o m m o n l y use the w o r d belief. T h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g type of s c e p t i c a l assent w o u l d be a m a t t e r of g o i n g a l o n g w i t h s o m e i m p r e s s i o n w i t h o u t t a k i n g it to be true, o r e v e n p r o b a b l y true, T h i s i s s u e c o n t i n u e s to be c o n t r o v e r s i a l . A l t h o u g h a n u m b e r of s c h o l a r s i n recent y e a r s have s u p p o r t e d the s e c o n d alternative, I believe the first is the c o r r e c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f C a r n e a d e s , at least w i t h respect to o r d i n a r y , n o n - p h i l o s o p h i c a l b e l i e f s .
7
A s w e saw in C h a p t e r 3, A r c e s i l a u s offers a v e r s i o n of the s c e p t i c a l r e s p o n s e . A c t i o n does not r e q u i r e assent, all we n e e d is a n i m p r e s s i o n a n d a n i m p u l s e , n e i t h e r o f w h i c h n e e d to be, or e v e n c a n be, w i t h h e l d . W h a t m a k e s c o m p e l l i n g A r c e s i l a u s ' use o f t h i s r e s p o n s e is the n o t i o n that w e often act w i t h o u t c o n s c i o u s l y o r deliberately reflecting o n o u r s i t u a t i o n , C a r n e a d e s i n c o r p o r a t e s s u c h cases in h i s first level o f s c r u t i n y : " i n cases w h e r e the s i t u a t i o n does not give us a n o p p o r t u n i t y for e x a c t c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the m a t t e r " ( M 7 . 1 8 5 ) . W h e n b e i n g p u r s u e d by e n e m i e s , o n e d o e s not h a v e t i m e to c o n s c i o u s l y deliberate about the e v i d e n c e of one's s e n s e s ; o n e m u s t act o n the b a s i s o f h o w e v e r t h i n g s s t r i k e one at that m o m e n t . But as we r a m p u p the level of s c r u t i n y , this a c c o u n t n o l o n g e r m a k e s sense. Suppose I have carefully a n d thoroughly e x a m i n e d an a p p l e . I h a v e e v e n l e d a bit to m y pet h a m s t e r , w h i c h a p p e a r s fine a f t e r w a r d s . A l l ot m y i m p r e s s i o n s c o n f i r m that it is a g o o d a p p l e s o I take a bite. T h e m o s t p l a u s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n is that I have c o m e to b e l i e v e the a p p l e is p r o b a b l y o k a y to eat. T h e s c e p t i c a l v i e w w o u l d r e q u i r e m e to say that a l t h o u g h the apple a p p e a r s g o o d after m y c a r e f u l e x a m i n a t i o n , I have n o o p i n i o n a s to w h e t h e r it " r e a l l y " is o r not. But
C a r n e a d e s offers h i s p e r s u a s i v e i m p r e s s i o n s as part o f a
d e s c r i p t i o n about h o w we in fact get a l o n g i n the w o r l d . M o s t p e o ple take the e v i d e n c e of their s e n s e s as g o o d , a l t h o u g h fallible, i n d i cators of the w a y the w o r l d is. T h i s is not to say that they a c c e p t s o m e s o p h i s t i c a t e d m e t a p h y s i c a l t h e o r y a b o u t reality, or e v e n s o m e
~9
ANCIENT
SCEPTICISM
e x p l a n a t i o n a s to w h y the senses are generally reliable. W h e n w e raise the level of s c r u t i n y , we e x p e c t to i n c r e a s e o u r c h a n c e s of getting t h i n g s right. W e d o not e x p e c t to m e r e l y feel m o r e c o n v i n c e d . The
m a i n p r o b l e m w i t h the s c e p t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is that it
requires the C a r n e a d e a n to f i n d s o m e t h i n g c o n v i n c i n g w i t h o u t thereby finding it likely to b e t r u e . Yet these n o t i o n s are s o c l o s e l y l i n k e d that p u l l i n g t h e m apart a p p e a r s to m a k e t h e m b o t h u n i n telligible. T h i s is e s p e c i a l l y clear w h e n w e rely o n i m p r e s s i o n s to d e t e r m i n e the best c o u r s e ot a c t i o n . It is quite i m p l a u s i b l e to t h i n k that a n i m p r e s s i o n leads i m m e d i a t e l y to i m p u l s e w h e n w e are s l o w l y and methodically considering possible courses of action along with the relevant e v i d e n c e . S u c h deliberate j u d g e m e n t calls for s o m e k i n d of a s s e n t T h i s is w h e r e C a r n e a d e s persuasive i m p r e s s i o n s a n d h i s variety o l 1
sceptical assent c o m e i n . I n differentiating t w o k i n d s of assent, a n d i n d e s c r i b i n g the levels of s c r u t i n y w e t y p i c a l l y e m p l o y , he s h o w s h o w d e l i b e r a t i o n , a n d not iust a c t i o n , is p o s s i b l e tor the sceptic. W h i l e this m o v e strengthens the s c e p t i c s r e s p o n s e to the apraxia it c o m e s at the p r i c e of l o o s e n i n g u p o n A s a r e s p o n s e to the apraxia
objection,
cpache.
objection, C a r n e a d e s practical crite1
r i o n is o n l y m e a n t to s h o w h o w we m a n a g e i n o r d i n a r y life w i t h o u t kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n s . W i t h o n e i m p o r t a n t e x c e p t i o n , e x a m p l e s o l C a r n e a d e s s c e p t i c a l assent a l w a y s o c c u r i n the c o n t e x t o f m a k i n g 1
o r d i n a r y , e v e r y d a y j u d g e m e n t s : for e x a m p l e , w h e t h e r this is Socrates (AJ 7 . 1 7 6 - 7 8 ) , w h e t h e r to flee (Af 7,186), w h e t h e r a c o i l e d object is a r o p e or a s n a k e (AJ 7 . 1 8 7 ) , w h e t h e r to go o n a voyage, get m a r r i e d , s o w c r o p s a n d so o n ( A c . 2.100, 109), T h e p o s s i b l e e x c e p t i o n o c c u r s i n r e s p o n s e to the i n c o n s i s t e n c y o b j e c t i o n . C a r n e a d e s w o u l d not n e e d to assert that he k n o w s k n o w l edge is i m p o s s i b l e ; i n s t e a d he m a y say this is a p e r s u a s i v e intellectual i m p r e s s i o n to w h i c h he assents w i t h the p r o p e r m e a s u r e of c a u t i o n (Ac, 2 . 1 1 0 ) . C i c e r o d o e s not e x p l i c i t l y a s s i g n this j u d g e m e n t to h i m , but it w o u l d h a v e b e e n a n o b v i o u s m o v e to m a k e . E x c l u d i n g this case, C a r n e a d e s is n e v e r r e p o r t e d to h a v e s i n c e r e l y a p p r o v e d of a n y of the p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n s he d e b a t e d . S o m e t i m e s he d e f e n d e d a v i e w s o v i g o r o u s l y he w a s t h o u g h t to a c t u a l l y e n d o r s e it ( A c . 2.139;
CARNEADES
see 2 . 1 3 1 ; Fin. 5 . 2 0 ) . B u t C i c e r o m a k e s it clear that he o n l y a r g u e d for these p o s i t i o n s dialectically. E v e n h i s close f r i e n d a n d c o m p a n i o n C l i t o m a c h u s c o u l d never figure out w h i c h p h i l o s o p h i c a l v i e w s C a r n e a d e s a c c e p t e d {Ac. 2 . 1 3 9 ) . T h e m o s t p l a u s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n for this is that he d i d not a c c e p t a n y ot t h e m , but c o n t i n u e d , i n g o o d S o c r a t i c f a s h i o n , to seek the t r u t h . I n the m e a n t i m e , he a l l o w s for the o r d i n a r y p r o c e s s o l d e l i b e r a t i o n a n d a s c e p t i c a l l y a p p r o p r i a t e assent to p e r s u a s i v e i m p r e s s i o n s r e g a r d i n g the d a y - t o - d a y m a i n t e n a n c e of o u r lives.
The dialectical interpretation A s w i t h A r c e s i l a u s , it r e m a i n s a d i s t i n c t p o s s i b i l i t y that C a r n e a d e s d o e s not e n d o r s e a n y o f h i s a p p a r e n t l y p o s i t i v e c l a i m s , but i n s t e a d d e v e l o p s t h e m all o n the b a s i s o f h i s o p p o n e n t s ' v i e w s . O n a p u r e l y d i a l e c t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , C a r n e a d e s s h o w s o n l y that e v e r y positive, d o g m a t i c v i e w is r a t i o n a l l y i n d e f e n s i b l e i n t e r m s o f its p r o p o n e n t s own
standards.
But if C a r n e a d e s is s h o w i n g the Stoics w h e r e their p o s i t i o n leads, then o n c e a g a i n the apraxia
o b j e c t i o n w o u l d b e their p r o b l e m , not
his. C a r n e a d e s s h o u l d not r e s p o n d to s u c h o b j e c t i o n s b u t
rather
accept t h e m as f u r t h e r c o n f i r m a t i o n of the u n t e n a b l e p o s i t i o n o c c u pied by dogmatists. H o w e v e r , C a r n e a d e s ' d i a l e c t i c a l strategy m i g h t b e m o r e i n d i r e c t . H e m i g h t h a v e s o u g h t to s h o w the Stoics that their p o s i t i o n is not the best available. It he c a n s h o w that Stoic e p i s t e m o l o g y is less r a t i o n ally d e f e n s i b l e t h a n s o m e o t h e r a c c o u n t , he w i l l h a v e e s t a b l i s h e d his goal. H e w i l l h a v e s h o w n that the Stoics' c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e i r e p i s t e m o l o g y is p o o r l y f o u n d e d . T h e elaborate a c c o u n t of p e r s u a s i v e i m p r e s s i o n s m a y be the c e n t r e p i e c e of t h i s i n d i r e c t strategy. T h i s w o u l d also e x p l a i n w h y the a c c o u n t of p e r s u a s i v e i m p r e s s i o n s is not d e r i v e d strictly o n the basis of Stoic c o m m i t m e n t s . C a r n e a d e s w o u l d not be t r y i n g to s h o w what the Stoics are u n w i t t i n g l y c o m m i t t e d to, but rather that there is a better e x p l a n a t i o n available. S i n c e s u c h a m o d e s t , probabilist alternative w o u l d not be a p p e a l i n g to Stoics, w h o
SI
ANCIENT
SCEPTICISM
b e l i e v e d that w i s d o m requires irrefutable k n o w l e d g e , i n the e n d they w o u l d be left w i t h n o e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n ; that i s , they w o u l d be l e d to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t ( A l l e n 1994J. But if this w e r e C a r n e a d e s ' strategy it is u n c l e a r w h y he w o u l d not accept this alternative h i m s e l f H e is n o t c o m m i t t e d i n a d v a n c e to epochs,
n o r is he a t t r i b u t e d a n y u n e q u i v o c a l v i e w a b o u t w h a t w i s -
d o m r e q u i r e s . F u r t h e r m o r e , if h i s d e s c r i p t i o n o l s c e p t i c a l l y a p p r o priate assent i s a n a c c o u n t o f h o w p e o p l e d o i n fact deliberate, t h e n he too w i l l deliberate i n this way. H i s a d m i s s i o n that life w o u l d be o v e r t u r n e d w i t h o u t c o n v i n c i n g i m p r e s s i o n s to g u i d e the w a y s e e m s s i n c e r e . I I so, C a r n e a d e s w i l l rely o n c o n v i n c i n g i m p r e s s i o n s j u s t as e v e r y o n e does, T h e d i a l e c t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a l s o r e q u i r e s that w e e x p l a i n a w a y the e v i d e n c e r e p o r t i n g C a r n e a d e s ' d e p a r t u r e f r o m A r c e s i l a u s ' p o s i t i o n . Sextus m a r k s t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , as w e h a v e s e e n , i n t e r m s o f A r c esilaus' M i d d l e A c a d e m y a n d C a r n e a d e s ' N e w A c a d e m y . C a r n e a d e s deviates f r o m A r c e s i l a u s ' m o r e r a d i c a l l y s c e p t i c a l p o s i t i o n by d e l i b erately c h o o s i n g to y i e l d to s o m e i m p r e s s i o n s rather t h a n f o l l o w i n g a l o n g w i t h o u t a n y s t r o n g i n c l i n a t i o n o r a d h e r e n c e [PH 1 . 2 3 0 ) .
3
A p p a r e n t l y h i s p o i n t is that C a r n e a d e s violates the s c e p t i c a l s p i r i t o f epoche by b e i n g t o o actively i n v o l v e d o r interested i n getting t h i n g s right, a n d in p r e f e r r i n g o n e i m p r e s s i o n to a n o t h e r o n the b a s i s o f h o w c o n v i n c i n g they are. H i s y i e l d i n g to c o n v i n c i n g i m p r e s s i o n s a c c o m p a n i e s a s t r o n g i n c l i n a t i o n t o w a r d s t h i n g s b e i n g a s they s e e m . I n o t h e r w o r d s , he a c c e p t s that c o n v i n c i n g i m p r e s s i o n s h a v e s o m e e v i d e n t i a l v a l u e , that they are fallible i n d i c a t o r s o f t r u t h . A n d like e v e r y o n e else, he relies o n t h e m i n the c o u n t l e s s o r d i n a r y j u d g e m e n t s w e m a k e everyday.
Conclusion Carneades w a s both more ambitious and more modest than Arcesilaus. H e w a s m o r e a m b i t i o u s i n e x t e n d i n g h i s s c e p t i c a l a r g u m e n t s r e g a r d i n g e p i s t e m o l o g y a n d e t h i c s to c o v e r e v e r y p o s s i b l e t h e o r y that m i g h t be p r o p o u n d e d , A n d he w a s m o r e m o d e s t i n a l l o w i n g
82
CARNEADES
for a k i n d of p o s i t i v e m e n t a l attitude that w e take t o w a r d s t h i n g s we d o n o t k n o w , at least w i t h r e g a r d to p r a c t i c a l i s s u e s . C a r n e a d e s ' v i e w o f s c e p t i c a l assent m a k e s for a m o r e c o n v i n c i n g r e s p o n s e to the apraxia
o b j e c t i o n s i n c e it leaves in place all the o r d i -
n a r y m e a s u r e s of d e l i b e r a t i o n that p e o p l e i n fact employ. A r c e s i l a u s , as I have i n t e r p r e t e d h i m in C h a p t e r 3, is o n l y able to s h o w h o w a v e r y reactive f o r m of a c t i o n is p o s s i b l e . H i s c r i t e r i o n o f a c t i o n d o e s not e x p l a i n h o w the s c e p t i c m a y a d j u d i c a t e a m o n g h i s i m p r e s s i o n s after h a v i n g reflected o n t h e m . C a r n e a d e s ' v i e w a l s o p r e s e r v e s the sceptic's c o n s i s t e n c y in a l l o w i n g h i m to say that it a p p e a r s c o n v i n c ing, but not c e r t a i n , that k n o w l e d g e is i m p o s s i b l e {Ac. 2 . 1 1 0 ) .
S3
FIVE
Cicero: the end of the sceptical Academy
T h e r e are two n a r r a t i v e s w e c a n tell r e g a r d i n g the e n d ot the s c e p t i cal A c a d e m y . A c c o r d i n g to the first, the fallibilist interpretation o l C a r n e a d e s is h i s t o r i c a l l y w r o n g , a n d p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y ill a d v i s e d . It w a s a m i s t a k e to p o s i t i v e l y e n d o r s e the c l a i m s that earlier A c a d e m ics a d v a n c e d dialectically. C o m p a r e d to the o r i g i n a l l y r a d i c a l a n d p u r e s c e p t i c i s m o f A r c e s i l a u s , the later p r o d u c t is a n e x h a u s t e d a n d degenerate c o m p r o m i s e . A r c e s i l a u s w a s right to insist o n the u n i v e r s a l s u s p e n s i o n of j u d g e m e n t ; to c o m p r o m i s e o n this p o i n t is to a b a n d o n w h a t is best about A c a d e m i c S c e p t i c i s m . T h i s is the line p u r s u e d by the r e n e g a d e A c a d e m i c A e n e s i d e m u s , w h o m w e shall m e e t i n C h a p t e r 6. A c c o r d i n g to the s e c o n d n a r r a t i v e , o n e v e r s i o n of w h i c h we shall d e v e l o p i n t h i s chapter, A r c e s i l a u s ' s u c c e s s o r s w e r e right to m o d i f y a n d mitigate h i s o r i g i n a l l y r a d i c a l s c e p t i c i s m . I n p a r t i c u l a r they w e r e right to l i m i t the s c o p e of w h a t we m u s t s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t
about,
a n d to enlarge the s c o p e o f s c e p t i c a l l y a p p r o p r i a t e assent. V i e w e d i n this way, their c o n c e s s i o n s constitute progress; the c u l m i n a t i o n of m a n y years of p h i l o s o p h i c a l debate w i t h the Stoics, A t the h e a r t o f t h i s dispute is the issue o f w h e t h e r it is e v e r w i s e to a c c e p t a p r o p o s i t i o n that is not k n o w n to be true. I n o t h e r w o r d s , 1
w h a t w i l l the sage d o in the a b s e n c e of c e r t a i n t y ? A r c e s i l a u s a n d C a r n e a d e s agree that he w i l l s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t . But by m o d i f y -
Sí
CICERO
i n g w h a t it m e a n s to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t , C a r n e a d e s a l s o a l l o w s l o r p r a c t i c a l d e l i b e r a t i o n l e a d i n g to fallible beliefs i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h c o n v i n c i n g i m p r e s s i o n s . F o r e x a m p l e , it s e e m s that the weather is fine a n d the c r e w reliable, so it s e e m s likely that the voyage w i l l be safe. B u t t h i s c o n v i n c i n g i m p r e s s i o n is n o t the p r o d u c t of a r g u i n g p r o a n d c o n ; it is s i m p l y a m a t t e r of e x a m i n i n g the c o n d i t i o n s a n d c h e c k i n g o n e i m p r e s s i o n against a n o t h e r . C a r n e a d e s f a l l i b i l i s m 1
s e e m s o n l y to e x t e n d to p r a c t i c a l matters a n d is not related to his d i a l e c t i c a l method.-
2
T h e s c e p t i c a l A c a d e m y ' s final c o n c e s s i o n is to a c c e p t that d i a lectical a r g u m e n t p r o a n d c o n c a n p r o v i d e fallible j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n s u p p o r t of o n e s i d e o f the d i s p u t e . T h e o u t c o m e is n o longer the p u r e l y negative o n e of u n d e r m i n i n g c o n v i c t i o n . T h i s final step is the d e v e l o p m e n t o l p h i l o s o p h i c a l f a l l i b i l i s m a s a k i n d ot m i t i g a t e d s c e p t i c i s m . O n this view, the A c a d e m i c s c o n t i n u e to reject the Stoic a c c o u n t o l k n o w l e d g e , but they e x p a n d e v e n f u r t h e r the r a n g e of s c e p t i c a l l y appropriate assent.
T h e A c a d e m y after the d e a t h o f C a r n e a d e s A f t e r C a r n e a d e s ' death i n c. 128 B C E , his l o n g - t i m e f r i e n d a n d a s s o c i ate C l i t o m a c h u s b e c a m e h e a d ot the A c a d e m y . C l i t o m a c h u s wrote over 4 0 0 b o o k s , m a n y (it n o t a l l ) of w h i c h c o n t a i n e d a r g u m e n t s he h a d h e a r d f r o m h i s m u c h - a d m i r e d f r i e n d ( D L 4 . 6 7 ) . C a r n e a d e s p r a i s e d h i m , s a r d o n i c a l l y , for s a y i n g the s a m e t h i n g s [as C a r n e a d e s h a d ] , in c o n t r a s t to a n o t h e r student, C h a r m a d a s , w h o s a i d t h e m i n the s a m e w a y (Omt.
5 1 ) . T h i s m a y s i m p l y be a m a t t e r of C l i t o m a -
c h u s ' l a c k i n g the o r a t o r i c a l s k i l l s of h i s teacher. B u t it so, it suggests that C l i t o m a c h u s w o u l d not h a v e b e e n as effective at u n d e r m i n i n g h i s o p p o n e n t ' s d o g m a t i c c o n f i d e n c e . It is w o r t h r e m e m b e r i n g that b o t h A r c e s i l a u s a n d C a r n e a d e s c a r r i e d o n their p h i l o s o p h i c a l w o r k p r i m a r i l y , if not exclusively, t h r o u g h c o n v e r s a t i o n rather t h a n writing. A f t e r C l i t o m a c h u s death in c . l 10 B C E , P h i l o of L a r i s s a b e c a m e 1
h e a d o f the A c a d e m y . H e h a d b e e n C l i t o m a c h u s s t u d e n t for a b o u t 1
S5
ANCIENT
SCEPTICISM
fourteen y e a r s , a n d w a s o v e r j o y e d at h i s p r o m o t i o n , r e t u r n i n g the favour b y p r e s e r v i n g a n d a u g m e n t i n g the d o c t r i n e s of h i s teacher. So at least i n i t i a l l y he h e l d to the C l i t o m a c h e a n o r t h o d o x y . I n C h a p t e r 4 I h a v e t r i e d to a r t i c u l a t e w h a t that o r t h o d o x y w a s ; a l t h o u g h this c o n t i n u e s to be c o n t r o v e r s i a l , we s h a l l take this p o s i t i o n as the one P h i l o starts w i t h . I n a d d i t i o n to the c o n t i n u e d o p p o s i t i o n to the Stoic a c c o u n t of kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n s , the c r u c i a l e l e m e n t of t h i s p o s i t i o n , or p r a c t i c e , is that the o u t c o m e o f d i a l e c t i c a l a r g u m e n t is a l w a y s negative: e i t h e r the sceptic o r h i s i n t e r l o c u t o r s u s p e n d s j u d g e m e n t , h a v i n g c o m e to see that r e a s o n p r o v i d e s n o m o r e s u p p o r t for one side of the d i s p u t e t h a n the other. Eventually Philo became disenchanted with Clitomachus
1
(i.e.
C a r n e a d e s ) p r o m o t i o n of epoche b e c a u s e of the c l a r i t y a n d agree1
m e n t o f h i s s e n s a t i o n s {Praep.
Ev. 1 4 . 9 . 1 - 2 ) . P r e c i s e l y w h y P h i l o
b e c a m e d i s e n c h a n t e d w i t h epoche a n d c h a n g e d h i s m i n d is as c o n troversial as w h a t h e c h a n g e d h i s m i n d to. Sextus e x p l a i n s w h a t is d i s t i n c t i v e about P h i l o s n e w p o s i t i o n , w h i c h he Labels the F o u r t h A c a d e m y , i n this w a y ( P f f 1.220; see Praep.
Ev. 14.4): " P h i l o a n d
h i s followers say that as far as the Stoic s t a n d a r d (i.e. a p p r e h e n s i v e [kataleptic] a p p e a r a n c e ) is c o n c e r n e d objects are i n a p p r e h e n s i b l e , but a s far as the nature ot the o b j e c t s t h e m s e l v e s is c o n c e r n e d they are a p p r e h e n s i b l e " ( P H 1.235; see PH 1.220; Praep. Ev. 14.4). I n o t h e r w o r d s , t h i n g s c a n n o t be k n o w n i n the m a n n e r the Stoics c l a i m , but they c a n still be k n o w n i n s o m e less d e m a n d i n g way. T h i s v i e w w a s set out in d e t a i l i n Philo's R o m a n b o o k s , so c a l l e d b e c a u s e he wrote t h e m s h o r t l y after c o m i n g to R o m e i n 89/8 B C E . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , we h a v e o n l y a few r e f e r e n c e s to these b o o k s i n o u r s o u r c e s , n o n e ot w h i c h elaborate the nature ot P h i l o s n o v e l p o s i t i o n . A c c o r d i n g to o n e p l a u s i b l e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , P h i l o s i n n o v a t i o n is to d r o p the i n t e r n a l i s t r e q u i r e m e n t that c a u s e d s o m u c h trouble for earlier d e f e n d e r s o f Stoic e p i s t e m o l o g y ( H a n k i n s o n 1 9 9 8 a : 1 1 6 - 2 0 ) . I n o t h e r w o r d s , for P h i l o it is n o longer n e c e s s a r y to k n o w that one k n o w s of a n y p a r t i c u l a r i m p r e s s i o n that it a c c u r a t e l y c o n v e y s the relevant details. I n effect, P h i l o a l l o w s that c e r t a i n i m p r e s s i o n s reveal the nature o f their object but not the tact that they are so r e v e l a tory. N o i m p r e s s i o n is s e l f - c e r t i f y i n g In the w a y r e q u i r e d by ( s o m e
CICERO
a c c o u n t s o f ) S t o i c e p i s t e m o l o g y , but o n Philo's n e w a c c o u n t s u c h selt-certification is n o t n e c e s s a r y for k n o w l e d g e .
3
W h a t e v e r h i s R o m a n v i e w m a y h a v e b e e n , Philo's f o r m e r s t u d e n t A n t i o c h u s w a s o u t r a g e d by it. H e h a d a l r e a d y a b a n d o n e d the s c e p t i c i s m o f the T h i r d A c a d e m y for a f o r m o f S t o i c i s m . A n t i o c h u s c a m e to believe that the Stoic c r i t e r i o n is the o n l y p o s s i b l e , or at least r e a s o n able, a c c o u n t o f k n o w l e d g e (Ac. 2 . 1 8 - 3 1 ) . T h i s is p r o b a b l y w h y he w a s s o put out b y Philo's n e w , n o n - S t o i c a c c o u n t of k n o w l e d g e , H e w a s even m o v e d to p u b l i s h h i s o w n extensive a r g u m e n t s i n o p p o s i tion (Ac. 2 . 1 1 - 1 2 ) . D e s p i t e h i s e n d o r s e m e n t of S t o i c i s m , A n t i o c h u s c o n t i n u e d to consider h i m s e l f a n A c a d e m i c because he believed his view w a s a r e t u r n to the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n of Plato a n d h i s i m m e d i a t e s u c c e s sors ( A c . 1 . 1 7 - 1 8 ) . A n t i o c h u s f u r t h e r a r g u e d that the Stoic v i e w e m e r g e d as a d e v e l o p m e n t o l this o r i g i n a l A c a d e m i c p o s i t i o n ( A c . 2,43). S o i n d e f e n d i n g Stoic epistemology, A n t i o c h u s took h i m s e l f to be c o r r e c t i n g the e r r o r s initiated b y A r c e s i l a u s ' s c e p t i c a l t u r n i n the A c a d e m y , A l t h o u g h Sextus associates A n t i o c h u s w i t h the F i f t h A c a d e m y , it is not clear w h e t h e r he s u c c e e d e d P h i l o i n a n y officially r e c o g n i z e d capacity. S h o r t l y after P h i l o a n d o t h e r p r o m i n e n t A c a d e m i c s fled f r o m A t h e n s to R o m e , Plato's A c a d e m y c e a s e d to exist as a n i n s t i t u t i o n . B u t e v e n if it h a d c o n t i n u e d to exist, n e i t h e r of the p o s i t i o n s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the F o u r t h a n d F i f t h A c a d e m i e s w o u l d q u a l i f y as s c e p t i c a l i n so far as both a l l o w l o r s o m e k i n d of k n o w l e d g e . T h e s c e p t i c a l A c a d e m y c o m e s to a n e n d i n either case.
Cicero's mitigated scepticism T h i s e n d , h o w e v e r , is not a full stop. B e t w e e n 46 a n d 4 4 B C E C i c e r o , w h o h a d s t u d i e d w i t h both P h i l o a n d A n t i o c h u s , a s well as o t h e r p r o m i n e n t Stoic a n d E p i c u r e a n p h i l o s o p h e r s , w r o t e a series of d i a logues d e f e n d i n g a n d d i s p l a y i n g the p r a c t i c e of A c a d e m i c p h i l o s o phy as he s a w i t . I n r e s p o n s e to h i s c r i t i c s , he insists that he h a s not J
c o m e f o r w a r d as c h a m p i o n ot a lost c a u s e : " W h e n m e n d i e , their
87
ANCIENT
SCEPTICISM
d o c t r i n e s d o not p e r i s h w i t h t h e m , t h o u g h p e r h a p s they surfer f r o m the loss o i a n authoritative e x p o n e n t " (iYD 1.11), S o m e forty years after the A c a d e m y c l o s e d its d o o r s , C i c e r o presents h i m s e l f as j u s t s u c h a n authoritative v o i c e . T h e p r o b l e m is that C i c e r o ' s m i t i g a t e d s c e p t i c i s m is a s i g n i f i c a n t d e p a r t u r e f r o m h i s A c a d e m i c predecessors. H e accepts n e i t h e r the Stoic e p i s t e m o l o g y o l A n t i o c h u s ' F i f t h A c a d e m y n o r the less d e m a n d i n g a c c o u n t o f k n o w l edge that c h a r a c t e r i z e s Philo's R o m a n b o o k s . N o r d o e s he a c c e p t the severe v i e w o f epocke c h a m p i o n e d by A r c e s i l a u s a n d C a r n e a d e s / A s w e h a v e seen, for A r c e s i l a u s a n d C a r n e a d e s , s u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t o n p h i l o s o p h i c a l matters is c o m p l e t e l y u n r e l a t e d to the issue of apraxia.
T h e i r s c e p t i c a l c r i t e r i a s h o w o n l y h o w we are able to
act i n p r a c t i c a l matters. T h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f these c r i t e r i a h a s n o t h i n g to d o w i t h the d i a l e c t i c a l s k i l l s of a r g u m e n t p r o a n d c o n . F o r e x a m p l e , i n v e s t i g a t i n g s o m e a p p e a r a n c e i n the m a n n e r
proposed
b y C a r n e a d e s is not a matter o f a r t i c u l a t i n g r a t i o n a l a r g u m e n t s for and against it. W h a t e v e r c o u r s e o f a c t i o n o n e c h o o s e s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h these p r a c t i c a l c r i t e r i a is not the p r o d u c t of a p h i l o s o p h i c a l e n q u i r y . A s far as w e k n o w , A r c e s i l a u s never d e s c r i b e s the c o n c l u s i o n o l a n a r g u m e n t as eulogon,
a n d C a r n e a d e s n e v e r d e s c r i b e s the
c o n c l u s i o n of a n a r g u m e n t a s pithanon
(with one possible exception
to be d i s c u s s e d b e l o w ) , C i c e r o , h o w e v e r , translates C a r n e a d e s ' pithanon probabile
w i t h the L a t i n
(i.e. p r o b a b l e or p l a u s i b l e ) a n d s o m e t i m e s veri simile
(i.e.
t r u t h - l i k e ) , a n d m a i n t a i n s that the s o l e p u r p o s e of the A c a d e m i c a r g u m e n t p r o a n d c o n is to " d r a w out o r l o r m u l a t e the t r u t h or its closest p o s s i b l e a p p r o x i m a t i o n " ( A c . 2.7; s e e A c . 2 , 6 0 , 2 . 6 6 ; ND Fin,
1.13; Tusc.
1.11;
1,8, 2.9; G l u c k e r 1995), R a t h e r t h a n m e r e l y r e v e a l -
i n g larger p o r t i o n s o f o u r i g n o r a n c e , C i c e r o t h i n k s the A c a d e m i c m e t h o d a l l o w s for p r o g r e s s t o w a r d s the t r u t h * A n d these j u d g e m e n t s w i l l clearly h a v e a m a j o r i m p a c t o n the c h o i c e s o n e m a k e s a n d the k i n d of life o n e lives. S o C i c e r o uses the A c a d e m i c d i a l e c t i c a l m e t h o d to a c c o m p l i s h b o t h p o s i t i v e a n d negative e n d s : b y r e v e a l i n g the strength o f the o p p o s e d a r g u m e n t s it e l i m i n a t e s u n w a r r a n t e d c o n f i d e n c e w h i l e e s t a b l i s h i n g the degree to w h i c h o n e v i e w is m o r e p r o b a b l e t h a n another.
88
CICERO
D e s p i t e the a p p a r e n t n o v e l t y o f h i s v i e w o f the A c a d e m i c m e t h o d , C i c e r o c l a i m s that it h a d a l w a y s b e e n the p r a c t i c e o l the s c e p t i c a l A c a d e m y : the m e t h o d o f a r g u i n g against e v e r y t h i n g a n d
openly
j u d g i n g n o t h i n g o r i g i n a t e d w i t h Socrates, w a s r e v i v e d b y A r c e s i l a u s , s t r e n g t h e n e d by C a r n e a d e s a n d f l o u r i s h e d right d o w n to h i s o w n t i m e . T h i s a p p r o a c h r e q u i r e s t h e A c a d e m i c to m a s t e r all the s c h o o l s of p h i l o s o p h y i n o r d e r to m a k e a w e l l - i n f o r m e d j u d g e m e n t w h e r e the truth p r o b a b l y lies (ND
about
1 . 1 1 - 1 2 ) . S i m i l a r l y , he c l a i m s
that of all the c o m p e t i n g p h i l o s o p h i c a l sects that arose f r o m S o c rates, as i m m o r t a l i z e d i n Plato's d i a l o g u e s , he f o l l o w s the o n e that he t h i n k s S o c r a t e s h i m s e l f u s e d ; ' l o c o n c e a l o n e s o w n o p i n i o n , to relieve o t h e r s of error, a n d i n e v e r y d i s c u s s i o n to l o o k for w h a t w a s most probable" (Tusc. 5.11). It is p o s s i b l e that C i c e r o s i n c e r e l y t h o u g h t
he w a s p r e s e n t i n g
a n a c c u r a t e a c c o u n t of t h e h i s t o r y of the A c a d e m y . B u t e v e n if he w a s a w a r e o f the extent to w h i c h h i s a c c o u n t w a s r e v i s i o n i s t , it is not s u r p r i s i n g that he d i d not present it a s s u c h . I n t h e H e l l e n i s tic p e r i o d , t h e r e w a s n o p r e m i u m o n o r i g i n a l i t y or novelty. A n d C i c e r o w o u l d p r o b a b l y have s h i e d a w a y f r o m p r e s e n t i n g h i m s e l f as a p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n n o v a t o r as he w a s a l r e a d y c o n f r o n t i n g
the
p r o b l e m o f c o n v i n c i n g the r u l i n g c l a s s o f the v a l u e o f R o m a n i z i n g G r e e k p h i l o s o p h y . G i v e n t h e i r s u s p i c i o n s o f G r e e k p h i l o s o p h y , it w o u l d have b e e n p a r t i c u l a r l y u n s u i t a b l e for a s t a t e s m a n o f C i c e r o ' s s t a n d i n g to put h i m s e l f f o r w a r d as a n i n n o v a t o r . T h u s w e f i n d h i m u n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y m o d e s t i n this regard, d e s c r i b i n g h i m s e l f as a m e r e t r a n s c r i b e r , p r o v i d i n g o n l y the w o r d s w i t h w h i c h to express the b o r r o w e d ideas (Alt.
12.52).
F u r t h e r m o r e , C i c e r o m a y well h a v e felt j u s t i f i e d s i n c e other p r o m i n e n t A c a d e m i c s h a d p r o v i d e d t h e i r o w n r e v i s i o n i s t a c c o u n t s of the h i s t o r y of the A c a d e m y . A r c e s i l a u s got the b a l l r o l l i n g b y c l a i m i n g to have r e t u r n e d to t h e o r i g i n a l , s c e p t i c a l v i e w s o f P l a t o a n d S o c rates; P h i l o a n d A n t i o c h u s later offered quite different a c c o u n t s of the h i s t o r y of the A c a d e m y , e a c h in s u p p o r t of h i s o w n i n n o v a t i o n ( B r i t t a i n 2001:
169-219).
I n a d d i t i o n to t h e i l l u s t r i o u s h i s t o r i c a l o r i g i n s o f this v i e w , C i c e r o defends h i s A c a d e m i c allegiance b y a r g u i n g t h a t it is the o n l y p r u d e n t
89
ANCIENT
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p o s i t i o n to take tor t h o s e starting out o n p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n v e s t i g a tions: [ W e A c a d e m i c s ] are m o r e
free a n d u n b i a s e d s i n c e
our
p o w e r o l j u d g m e n t is i m p a r t i a l s o w e are not c o m p e l l e d by a n y n e c e s s i t y to d e f e n d all those t h i n g s p r e s c r i b e d a n d , as it w e r e , d i c t a t e d b y s o m e authority. F o r . , . [the d o g m a t i s t s ] pass j u d g m e n t about matters w h i c h they h a v e not c o m p r e h e n d e d either y i e l d i n g to s o m e f r i e n d o r captivated by s o m e single [ p h i l o s o p h e r ] w h o m t h e y first h e a r d . A n d t h e y are d r i v e n , a s i f b y a s t o r m , to that v i e w w h i c h they c l i n g to like a r o c k . . . A l t h o u g h I don't k n o w w h y , m o s t p e o p l e prefer to go w r o n g a n d to d e f e n d p u g n a c i o u s l y that v i e w w h i c h they h a v e l e a r n e d to love rather t h a n to seek w i t h o u t b e i n g s t u b b o r n for the v i e w w h i c h c a n be m a i n t a i n e d m o s t c o n sistently.
(Ac. 2.8-9}
B e c o m i n g i r r a t i o n a l l y attached to a p h i l o s o p h i c a l s y s t e m is a trem e n d o u s i r o n y s i n c e p h i l o s o p h e r s p r i d e t h e m s e l v e s o n the r a t i o n ality o f t h e i r c o n v i c t i o n s . B u t p h i l o s o p h e r s are like e v e r y o n e else w h e n it c o m e s to f i n d i n g c o m f o r t i n w h a t is familiar. A d h e r i n g to a p h i l o s o p h i c a l s y s t e m c a n p r o v i d e the c o m f o r t of m a k i n g sense out of t h i n g s : or at least the i m p r e s s i o n that o n e h a s m a d e sense out of t h i n g s . C i c e r o ' s p o i n t is that the s a t i s f a c t i o n this p r o v i d e s m a y e n c o u r a g e us to d i s c o u n t or i g n o r e o b j e c t i o n s to o u r p o s i t i o n . S u c h s t u b b o r n n e s s is i n n o w a y necessitated b y allegiance to a p h i l o s o p h i c a l s y s t e m . B u t to a l i g n o u r s e l v e s , say to E p i c u r e a n i s m , w o u l d r e q u i r e us to j u d g e that E p i c u r u s h a d b e e n a w i s e m a n . A n d yet, " d e c i d i n g w h o is w i s e s e e m s to be a p a r t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n of p e o ple w h o are a l r e a d y w i s e " ( A c . 2.9). S i n c e n o o n e starts out w i t h the k n o w l e d g e a n d w i s d o m he d e s i r e s , w e s h o u l d all b e g i n w i t h the A c a d e m i c m e t h o d , a n d c a r e f u l l y e x a m i n e the r a t i o n a l m e r i t s ot e a c h competing account belore m a k i n g any judgements. ' 1
E v e n so, w h y s h o u l d we m a k e a tiy j u d g e m e n t s as a result of o u r e n q u i r y ? T h i s is a n e s p e c i a l l y p r e s s i n g q u e s t i o n il w e grant, as C i c ero d o e s , that f i n d i n g o n e v i e w to b e m o r e p r o b a b l e t h a n a n o t h e r
CICERO
p r o v i d e s o n l y a fallible j u s t i f i c a t i o n ; f u r t h e r e n q u i r y m a y w e l l s h o w that a different p o s i t i o n is m o r e p r o b a b l e , s o p e r h a p s it w o u l d be m o r e p r u d e n t to w i t h h o l d j u d g e m e n t
until we c a n c o n c l u s i v e l y
settle the matter. C l o s e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h this c o n c e r n is a s e c o n d q u e s t i o n : w h y s h o u l d we t h i n k that f o l l o w i n g this m e t h o d w i l l e n a ble us to progress t o w a r d s the t r u t h r a t h e r t h a n m e r e l y e x c h a n g i n g o n e v i e w for a n o t h e r ? W e s h a l l take these q u e s t i o n s i n t u r n .
W h y s h o u l d w e accept any p h i l o s o p h i c a l beliefs? O n s o m e o c c a s i o n s , C i c e r o s e e m s to e n d o r s e the v i e w that it is never w i s e to b e l i e v e w h a t we d o not k n o w for c e r t a i n (e.g. Ac. 2.66).
In
context, we s h o u l d u n d e r s t a n d t h i s as part o l the earlier A c a d e m i c s ' dialectical strategy. C a r n e a d e s u s e d to e m p l o y two related a r g u m e n t s against the Stoics (Ac, 2.59, (A)
67,
78):
If the sage assents (to s o m e t h i n g u n k n o w n ) he w i l l h o l d an o p i n i o n , T h e sage w i l l n e v e r h o l d a n o p i n i o n ( h e is infallible), T h e r e f o r e , the sage w i l l n e v e r assent to a n y t h i n g ( s i n c e there is n o t h i n g w o r t h y o f h i s a s s e n t ) .
A n d he s o m e t i m e s a r g u e d t h i s way, (B)
If the sage assents (to s o m e t h i n g u n k n o w n ) he w i l l h o l d an o p i n i o n , T h e sage assents (to s o m e t h i n g u n k n o w n ) . T h e r e f o r e , the sage h o l d s o p i n i o n s ( a n d is fallible).
N e i t h e r of these options is acceptable to the Stoics, Since they thought that assent is n e c e s s a r y for a c t i o n , ( A ) w o u l d r e n d e r the sage i m p a s sive. A n d since they t h o u g h t a s s e n t i n g to w h a t is u n k n o w n is a m o r a l as well as a n e p i s t e m i c failing (M 7 . 1 5 7 ) , ( B ) w o u l d r e n d e r the sage foolish. W i t h i n the c o n t e x t of this d i a l e c t i c a l strategy, it m a k e s s e n s e for C i c e r o to a f f i r m that the sage is infallible. B u t it w o u l d be v e r y
01
ANCIENT
SCEPTICISM
s u r p r i s i n g it he b e l i e v e d this h i m s e l f s i n c e the A c a d e m i c m e t h o d o n l y yields fallible j u s t i f i c a t i o n . II w i s d o m r e q u i r e s infallibility, C i c ero w o u l d h a v e to c o n c l u d e that h i s favoured m e t h o d is i n c a p a b l e o l p r o d u c i n g w i s d o m . Similarly, s i n c e he believes that h u m a n c o g n i t i o n is i n e s c a p a b l y fallible, he w o u l d h a v e to c o n c l u d e that w i s d o m is u n a t t a i n a b l e . I n tact, he m a i n t a i n s that Stoic w i s d o m is u n a t t a i n able, o r at least s o lar u n a t t a i n e d . D e s p i t e h i s a d m i r a t i o n tor this lofty i d e a l , he often p o i n t s out that there have n e v e r b e e n a n y real lite Stoic sages - it h a p p e n s m o r e often that a m u l e gives b i r t h (Div. 2.61). E v e n the Stoics w e r e reluctant to a c k n o w l e d g e a n y a c t u a l sages (see B r o u w e r 2 0 0 2 ) . U n l i k e the Stoics, C i c e r o a l l o w s for a m o r e m o d e s t c o n c e p t i o n o f w i s d o m , one that is attainable by real, i m p e r f e c t h u m a n beings: T h o s e w h o act a n d live in s u c h a w a y as to p r o v e their loyalty, integrity, l a i r n e s s a n d generosity, in w h o there is n o e x c e s sive desire, l i c e n t i o u s n e s s a n d i n s o l e n c e , a n d w h o have great strength of c h a r a c t e r . . . let us c o n s i d e r g o o d , as they w e r e a c c o u n t e d g o o d In life , . ,
(Amic.
19)
A l t h o u g h C i c e r o d o e s not e x p l a i n w h a t c o g n i t i v e state s u c h real life v i r t u e a r i s e s f r o m , it is clear that the c o n s t a n c y of those d e s c r i b e d i n this passage is not the p r o d u c t o f Stoic w i s d o m . S i m i l a r l y , w h e n he refers to the c o u r a g e or j u s t i c e o f real R o m a n h e r o e s , he d o e s not m e a n for us to u n d e r s t a n d these as perfect m o d e l s o l v i r t u e . T h e y a c h i e v e d o n l y a s e m b l a n c e a n d l i k e n e s s to (Stoic) w i s d o m (Off.
3.16).
But it is virtue n o n e t h e l e s s . I n g e n e r a l , w h a t C i c e r o f i n d s a d m i r a b l e about real people is their ability to b a l a n c e p r i n c i p l e d , r a t i o n a l c o n v i c t i o n w i t h the gentleness a n d m e r c y that a r i s e s f r o m a n a p p r e c i a t i o n o f h u m a n fallibility. T h e A c a d e m i c m e t h o d , as C i c e r o c o n c e i v e s it, is ideally s u i t e d to p r o m o t e this b a l a n c e . S i n c e there is n o c o n c l u s i v e e n d to e n q u i r y , one m u s t c o n t i n u e to put h i s fallible c o n v i c t i o n s to the test. T h e o p e n - e n d e d nature o f e n q u i r y is s u p p o s e d to prevent us f r o m b e c o m i n g i r r a t i o n ally attached to o u r v i e w s ; it keeps the v i r t u e o f p e r s e v e r a n c e f r o m d e g e n e r a t i n g into the v i c e of obstinacy,*
92
CICERO
But w e have yet to see w h y w e s h o u l d p e r s e v e r e i n the first place. W h y s h o u l d we believe a n y t h i n g as a result o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l e n q u i r y ? T h e a n s w e r is i m p l i c i t i n C i c e r o ' s p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i a l o g u e s : the m o s t r a t i o n a l l y defensible v i e w is the m o s t likely to be true a n d the m o s t beneficial. S u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t m a y guarantee that o n e a v o i d s error, but it a l s o guarantees that p h i l o s o p h i c a l e n q u i r y w i l l y i e l d n o positive benefits. T h i s is u n a c c e p t a b l e for C i c e r o , w h o sees the a i m s of the p h i l o s o p h i c a l art of t h i n k i n g a n d the r h e t o r i c a l art o l s p e a k i n g as intimately c o n n e c t e d : w i s d o m a n d e l o q u e n c e s h o u l d not be s o u g h t i n i s o l a t i o n f r o m one another, for " w i s d o m w i t h o u t e l o q u e n c e does too little for the g o o d of states, b u t . . . e l o q u e n c e w i t h o u t w i s d o m is generally h i g h l y d i s a d v a n t a g e o u s " (Inv. 1.1; see a l s o L o n g 1 9 9 5 ) . T h e s e p a r a t i o n of these arts yields either a n i n a r t i c u l a t e w i s d o m or a b a b b l i n g s t u p i d i t y (De Or. 3 . 1 4 2 ) . I f we r e m a i n u n c o n v i n c e d b y w h a t is true, or at least likely to be true, it does u s n o g o o d O n the o t h e r h a n d , a foolish e l o q u e n c e is like a w e a p o n in the h a n d s o f a m a d m a n . It the natural e n d of p h i l o s o p h y is to not m e r e l y a i m at but to b r i n g about the i m p r o v e m e n t of h u m a n lite, the p h i l o s o p h e r m u s t m a s t e r the art of p e r s u a s i o n . B u t he m u s t also d i s c o v e r what is truly b e n e f i c i a l b y m e a n s of rational e n q u iry. O t h e r w i s e , he w i l l be guilty o f a babbli ng stupidity. S i n c e nature has not e q u i p p e d us w i t h the m e a n s ot a c q u i r i n g certainty, w e c a n a r r i v e o n l y at p r o b a b l e beliefs r e g a r d i n g w h a t is b e n e f i c i a l . H e n c e if p h i l o s o p h y is to a c c o m p l i s h its n a t u r a l e n d , i u c h beliefs m u s t be sufficient to i m p r o v e the h u m a n c o n d i t i o n . But w h y s h o u l d we a c c e p t this p r a g m a t i c c o n c e p t i o n ot p h i l o s o phy i n the first place? If, c o n t r a r y to C i c e r o ' s v i e w , p h i l o s o p h y arose s i m p l y as a n e x p r e s s i o n ot o u r natural curiosity, there w o u l d be n o t h i n g o b j e c t i o n a b l e about treating it a s a c o l l e c t i o n o f i n t r i g u i n g p u z zles. I n d e e d , it w o u l d be o b j e c t i o n a b l e to p r e t e n d that p h i l o s o p h y c a n d o m o r e t h a n satisfy, or at least stimulate, o u r c u r i o s i t y a n d s t r e n g t h e n o u r r e a s o n i n g skills. O n this view, p h i l o s o p h y h a s no i n h e r e n t s o c i a l or p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n s . C i c e r o ' s a r g u m e n t d e p e n d s o n the Stoic v i e w that w e a l l h a v e a n a t u r a l s y m p a t h y tor m e m b e r s o f o u r s p e c i e s , despite the tact that this s y m p a t h y is often t h o r o u g h l y c o r r u p t e d (Fin. 3 . 6 2 - 6 8 ; see
Rep.
1.39; Leg. 1.16, 28, 32). It i s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h o u r nature to v a l u e
03
ANCIENT
SCEPTICISM
a n d p r o m o t e the p u b l i c g o o d , B u t this r e q u i r e s s o m e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of w h a t is g e n u i n e l y b e n e f i c i a l . A n d this r e q u i r e s p h i l o s o p h y , broadly u n d e r s t o o d as the art ot t h i n k i n g . O n c e w e a c k n o w l e d g e o u r n a t u ral s y m p a t h y a n d the c o r r e s p o n d i n g obligation to d i s c o v e r w h a t is g e n u i n e l y b e n e f i c i a l , w e w i l l a l s o be obliged to d e v e l o p a n d p r a c t i s e the art of p e r s u a s i o n . A c q u i r i n g , d e f e n d i n g a n d p r o m o t i n g fallible beliefs about the p u b l i c g o o d is t h u s a n e c e s s a r y part o f d i s c h a r g i n g the s o c i a l a n d p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n of p h i l o s o p h y , A n o t h e r n a t u r a l e n d ot p h i l o s o p h y is to s e c u r e , a s far as p o s s i b l e , a t r a n q u i l , h a p p y a n d v i r t u o u s life. F o r C i c e r o , t r a n q u i l l i t y d o e s not c o m e f r o m s u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t a s P y r r h o p r o m i s e s , but rather t r o m e m b r a c i n g the v i e w that v i r t u e is sufficient for h a p p i n e s s , W h a t is m o s t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f C i c e r o ' s real life sage is the c o n v i c t i o n that all h u m a n p o s s e s s i o n s are i n f e r i o r to w i s d o m . W i t h this c o n v i c t i o n , one is able to w e a t h e r a n y s t o r m a n d a v o i d d i s t u r b i n g e m o t i o n s s u c h as tear a n d distress: . . . i f t h e r e is s o m e o n e w h o regards as e n d u r a b l e the p o w e r of F o r t u n e a n d all the h u m a n lot, w h a t e v e r c a n befall, s o that n e i t h e r fear n o r a n x i e t y affects h i m , i f he lusts after n o t h i n g , is c a r r i e d away b y n o m e a n i n g l e s s m e n t a l p l e a s u r e , o n w h a t g r o u n d s is he not h a p p y ? A n d if t h i s is brought about b y v i r t u e , o n w h a t g r o u n d s does v i r t u e of itself a l o n e not m a k e people h a p p y ?
(Tusc.
5.17}
T l i i s is the m o s t a u d a c i o u s a n d i m p o r t a n t p r o m i s e m a d e by p h i l o s o phy, A c c o r d i n g l y , C i c e r o repeatedly s u b j e c t s it to c a r e f u l s c r u t i n y , a r g u i n g b o t h for a n d against it in Tusculanac De Fiisibus
Botiorum
et Maloruin
Disputationes
5 and
3 - 5 . B u t the s u f f i c i e n c y ot v i r t u e
r e m a i n s o n l y a p r o m i s e a n d a p o s s i b i l i t y i n s o tar a s we have failed to g r a s p the t r u t h of this c l a i m w i t h certainty. A l t h o u g h the m o s t effective d e f e n c e against the v i c i s s i t u d e s o f lite w o u l d be the firm c o n v i c t i o n that v i r t u e is sufficient tor h a p p i ness, we c a n n o t d i s c o u n t the o p p o s e d a r g u m e n t s . A g a i n , the Stoic v i e w a p p e a r s to be t o o d e m a n d i n g , r e q u i r i n g not m e r e l y a n u n a t tainable e p i s t e m i c ideal, but a d e g r e e o f s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y that s e e m s
94
CICERO
i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h o u r tragility. O n the o t h e r h a n d , a c k n o w l e d g i n g o u r v u l n e r a b i l i t y m a y e n c o u r a g e us to set o u r sights t o o l o w a n d treat o u r w e a k n e s s e s as inevitable. I n the e n d , the extent to w h i c h a real p e r s o n c a n p r e s e r v e h i s t r a n q u i l l i t y i n the race o f s u f f e r i n g is an e m p i r i c a l q u e s t i o n . But the m o s t effective defence, a n d the m o s t r a t i o n a l l y defensible view, is to believe either that v i r t u e is sufficient tor h a p p i n e s s , or at least n e a r l y sufficient (Off.
3.31; see a l s o Fuse.
5,3-4; A c . 2.134).
verisimilitude a n d philosophical expertise H o w e v e r , it s e e m s that u n j u s t i f i e d , a n d e v e n false, beliefs m a y be j u s t as c o m f o r t i n g a n d beneficial as j u s t i f i e d , p r o b a b l e o r t r u e beliefs. S o w e s h o u l d not t h i n k that the benefits ot a d o p t i n g s o m e b e l i e l p r o v i d e a g o o d r e a s o n for t h i n k i n g it is t r u e . T h e f u n d a m e n t a l c l a i m of m i t i gated s c e p t i c i s m is that w e s h o u l d adopt the m o s t rationally c o n v i n c ing, p r o b a b l e v i e w b e c a u s e it is m o s t l i k e l y to b e t r u e , a n d b e c a u s e it is w o r t h r i s k i n g e r r o r i n o r d e r to believe w h a t is t r u e . W i t h o u t this c o n d i t i o n , it w i l l still be r e a s o n a b l e to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t as long as c o n c l u s i v e j u s t i f i c a t i o n is l a c k i n g . S o a s s u m i n g that w e s h o u l d b e l i e v e the t r u t h , a n d that we are better oft w i t h p r o b a b l e beliefs, it w i l l follow that we s h o u l d b e l i e v e the m o s t p r o b a b l e view. B u t o n e m i g h t object that a n y attempt to e s t a b l i s h that we s h o u l d a d o p t the m o s t r a t i o n a l l y d e f e n s i b l e v i e w begs the q u e s t i o n . M o r e generally, a t t e m p t i n g to r a t i o n a l l y establish the reliability o f r e a s o n s e e m s to p r e s u p p o s e the reliability o f r e a s o n . F o r e x a m p l e , C i c e r o s d e f e n c e o f the v i e w that p h i l o s o p h y a i m s at the i m p r o v e m e n t of the h u m a n c o n d i t i o n relies o n the p r e m i s e that we have a n a t u r a l s y m p a t h y for m e m b e r s of o u r species. B u t w h y s h o u l d we b e l i e v e that, e s p e c i a l l y given the a d m i s s i o n that j u s t i f i c a t i o n a l w a y s fails ( o r at least has tailed so far) to be c o n c l u s i v e ? N o m a t t e r h o w extensively C i c e r o d e f e n d s h i s p r e m i s e s , w e w i l l be left w i t h this b a s i c q u e s t i o n : w h y s h o u l d I adopt a belief o n the basis o f a fallible j u s t i f i c a t i o n ? Fortunately, we m a y appeal to the existence o f p r a c t i c a l expertise as a n i n d i c a t i o n that the p r o p e r use o f r e a s o n leads us c l o s e r to the
95
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t r u t h . I n s h o w i n g h o w e x p e r t i s e is p o s s i b l e , we m a y c l a i m that it is a matter o l l e a r n i n g to d i s c e r n w h a t is p r o b a b l e (Ac. 2.146"). T h e best e x p l a n a t i o n for the fact that e x p e r t s are m o r e often s u c c e s s f u l t h a n n o n - e x p e r t s is that w h a t they f i n d p r o b a b l e is in fact true. I f e x p e r t i s e a r i s e s f r o m l e a r n i n g to see w h a t is p r o b a b l e , or l i k e the t r u t h , t h e n t r u t h m u s t exist. C i c e r o a c k n o w l e d g e s t h i s a s s u m p t i o n in h i s d e f e n c e ot the A c a d e m i c m e t h o d . A n t i o c h u s h a d o b j e c t e d that the A c a d e m i c s * w o r s t m i s t a k e ; is to take these two r a d i c a l l y i n c o n s i s t e n t p r e m i s e s to be c o n s i s t e n t , first, [ l ] t h e r e are s o m e false i m p r e s s i o n s ( f r o m w h i c h it f o l l o w s that s o m e are t r u e ) ; a n d t h e n a g a i n , [2] there is n o difference at all b e t w e e n t r u e a n d false i m p r e s s i o n s . B u t t h e y a s s u m e d the first p r e m i s e as i l t h e r e w e r e a difference - h e n c e the f o r m e r is u n d e r m i n e d by the latter, a n d the latter by the f o r m e r .
( A c . 2.44)
I n o t h e r w o r d s , the A c a d e m i c s i n c o n s i s t e n t l y m a i n t a i n b o t h that there is a n d that there is not a d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n true a n d false i m p r e s s i o n s . L u c u l l u s c o n s i d e r s this to be the greatest p o s s i b l e r e f u tation o f the A c a d e m i c m e t h o d . C i c e r o c o n c e d e s that this o b j e c t i o n w o u l d be r i g h t , " i l we A c a d e m i c s d i d a w a y w i t h t r u t h altogether. Yet w e don't, s i n c e w e d i s c e r n as m a n y t r u e as false t h i n g s . B u t o u r d i s c e r n i n g is a k i n d o f a p p r o v a l : we don't find a n y s i g n o l a p p r e h e n s i o n " ( A c . 2 . 1 1 1 ) . T h i s is a n o d d r e s p o n s e if we take it as m e r e l y r e a f f i r m i n g the first p r e m i s e [ l ] , that is, there is a difference b e t w e e n t r u e a n d false i m p r e s s i o n s . I f 1 a m a c c u s e d o l i n c o n s i s t e n t l y m a i n t a i n i n g p a n d ~ p , it w i l l n o t d o tor m e to c o n f i d e n t l y reply that this w o u l d be r i g h t except for the fact that I h o l d p. I n o r d e r for this to be a r e s p o n s e to A n t i o c h u s ' o b j e c t i o n , C i c e r o needs to d i s a m b i g u a t e the k i n d of difference i n v o l v e d in e a c h ot the allegedly I n c o n s i s t e n t c l a i m s . I n the s e c o n d p r e m i s e [2], the differe n c e b e t w e e n a t r u e a n d false i m p r e s s i o n is a matter o f w h a t a c t u a l people are able to d i s c e r n . S o the p o i n t is s i m p l y that there is n o difference that o n e c a n d i s c e r n i n practice. I n the first p r e m i s e [ l ] ,
%
CICERO
the difference b e t w e e n a t r u e a n d i a l s e i m p r e s s i o n is a c a u s a l one. C i c e r o agrees w i t h the Stoics that t r u e i m p r e s s i o n s c o m e f r o m w h a t is the case a n d accurately c o n v e y the relevant details of their object, w h e r e a s false i m p r e s s i o n s do not; he d o e s not d e n y that t r u t h exists. So despite the e v e r - p r e s e n t
p o s s i b i l i t y ot a n i m p e n e t r a b l e
decep-
t i o n , C i c e r o c a n m a i n t a i n that s o m e i m p r e s s i o n s are true a n d s o m e false. So C i c e r o i s not m e r e l y r e a f f i r m i n g the first p r e m i s e
[l|. He
e x p l a i n s w h y A c a d e m i c s d o not do away w i t h t r u t h by s a y i n g that he d i s c e r n s as m a n y true as false t h i n g s . It is likely that s o m e o f the i m p r e s s i o n s he receives are t r u e , e v e n t h o u g h h e is not i n a p o s i t i o n to say w i t h c e r t a i n t y w h i c h t h e s e are. W h e n l i m i t e d to p r a c t i c a l m a t t e r s , t h i s m u c h is c o n s i s t e n t w i t h C a r n e a d e s ' s c e p t i c i s m . B u t C i c e r o believes we c a n d i s c e r n w h a t is p r o b a b l e e v e n i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l , a n d e s p e c i a l l y e t h i c a l , matters. T h e A c a d e m i c sage w i l l guide h i s c o n d u c t , w h e t h e r i n o r d i n a r y , e v e r y d a y matters o r w h e n d e c i d i n g w h a t is m o r a l l y appropriate, b y f o l l o w i n g what appears probable (Ac. 2.110), I n o r d e r to e x t e n d the p r o b a b l e i n this way, w e m u s t a s s u m e t h e r e is a k i n d of p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n d e t h i c a l expertise, a n a l o g o u s to the m o r e t e c h n i c a l varieties, T h e Stoics c e r t a i n l y c o n c e i v e d o l p h i l o s o p h y t h i s way. T h e y m a i n tain that dialectic w a s i n v e n t e d t o e n a b l e us to d i s t i n g u i s h truth f r o m f a l s e h o o d ( A c . 2.91; see D L 7 . 4 6 ) . B u t , C i c e r o a s k s , i n w h a t s u b j e c t is the s k i l l e d d i a l e c t i c i a n able to m a k e s u c h j u d g e m e n t s ? O n e m u s t k n o w m o r e t h a n the p r i n c i p l e s o l d i a l e c t i c to d i s t i n g u i s h t r u t h f r o m f a l s e h o o d . C i c e r o a l l o w s that the d i a l e c t i c i a n m a y judge w h i c h infere n c e s are acceptable, w h i c h p r o p o s i t i o n s are a m b i g u o u s a n d w h i c h conclusions genuinely follow from w h i c h premises, But this makes dialectic a far m o r e m o d e s t e n t e r p r i s e t h a n the Stoic variety, w h i c h p r o m i s e s , a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s , the d i s c o v e r y of s u b s t a n t i v e t r u t h s . O n the m o r e m o d e s t a c c o u n t , d i a l e c t i c is a m a t t e r o f r e a s o n j u d g i n g about itseli: the p r o p e r a n d i m p r o p e r use o f l o g i c a l inference. O n this v i e w , it is clear that p h i l o s o p h i c a l expertise w i l l have to rely o n s o m e t h i n g m o r e t h a n d i a l e c t i c i n l e a d i n g us to t r u t h . E v e n if the p h i l o s o p h e r is able to reveal that s o m e justification is i n a d e q u a t e , it w i l l not follow that the v i e w in q u e s t i o n is false. It w i l l a l w a y s be
07
ANCIENT
SCEPTICISM
p o s s i b l e to c o n s t r u c t a m o r e c o n s i s t e n t a n d m o r e c o n v i n c i n g j u s tification o f that s a m e view. B u t i f w e c a n n o t c o n c l u s i v e l y rule any p o s i t i o n out, we s h o u l d h a v e little c o n f i d e n c e in t h o s e v i e w s that h a v e not yet b e e n refuted a n d c o n t i n u e to a p p e a r probable. T h e i r s u r v i v a l m a y s i m p l y be a m a t t e r of not h a v i n g s u b j e c t e d t h e m to sufficient s c r u t i n y . I I so, the p r o b a b l e n o longer s e e m s to p r o v i d e g o o d g r o u n d s for e v e n tentative a p p r o v a l . The
mitigated sceptics prospects
are p a r t i c u l a r l y bleak w h e n
a t t e m p t i n g to a d j u d i c a t e a m o n g c o m p e t i n g p o s i t i o n s that are intern a l l y c o n s i s t e n t . D e t e r m i n i n g w h o h a s the m o s t r a t i o n a l l y d e f e n sible v i e w i n s u c h a debate m a y reveal m o r e about the o b s e r v e r s ' p r e c o n c e p t i o n s t h a n the p o s i t i o n s t h e m s e l v e s . T h i s s e e m s to be the case w i t h C i c e r o ' s o w n alleged refutation o l E p i c u r e a n ethics i n De Finibus
Bonorum
et Malorum
2. It is e s p e c i a l l y s t r i k i n g that C i c e r o
h i m s e l f p r o v i d e s the m a t e r i a l , v i a h i s c h a r a c t e r T o r q u a t u s i n B o o k 1 to meet many, if not a l l , o f the o b j e c t i o n s he levels in B o o k 2. So one m i g h t o b j e c t that C i c e r o ' s fallibilist p u r s u i t of truth is really n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n the p u r s u i t of p e r s u a s i o n ( I n w o o d 1990), I n s u p p o r t of this o b j e c t i o n , o n e m i g h t a l s o c l a i m that the a n a l ogy b e t w e e n the p l a u s i b i l i t y o f s e n s e - i m p r e s s i o n s a n d the p l a u s i b i l ity o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n s b r e a k s d o w n w i t h regard to the c r u c i a l factor of p r e d i c t i o n . S c i e n c e a n d t e c h n i c a l expertise rely h e a v i l y o n p r e d i c t i v e failure a s a m e a n s of d i s c o n t i n u a t i o n ; t h e a s s u m p t i o n is that the s t r u c t u r e of the p h y s i c a l w o r l d p r o v i d e s a n objective c o n s t r a i n t . I I the engineer's d e s i g n is not c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the l a w s of nature, the bridge w i l l collapse. B u t there is a r g u a b l y n o s u c h c o n s t r a i n t available for the p h i l o s o p h i c a l v e r s i o n o f this m e t h o d . O n e c a n s t u b b o r n l y m a i n t a i n one's e t h i c a l o r m e t a p h y s i c a l v i e w s , w h e t h e r they t u r n out to be t r u e or false, w i t h o u t suffering a n y a n a l ogous c o l l a p s e ,
Socrates and epistemic optimism W h a t i n i t i a l l y a p p e a r s to be o n l y a m i n i m a l c o m m i t m e n t to a p h i l o s o p h i c a l m e t h o d t u r n s out to r e q u i r e s o m e o p t i m i s t i c v i e w s about
98
CICERO
h u m a n nature a n d r e a s o n . I n o r d e r for C i c e r o to be c o n f i d e n t that the p r o p e r a p p l i c a t i o n of the A c a d e m i c m e t h o d w i l l lead us c l o s e r to the t r u t h , he m u s t s u p p o s e that there are s u c h t r u t h s to b e d i s c o v e r e d i n the first place. H e m u s t a l s o s u p p o s e that h u m a n nature p r o v i d e s the k i n d o f objective c o n s t r a i n t o n ethical t h e o r y that p h y s i c a l nature p r o v i d e s tor s c i e n t i f i c theory. S o m e o n e l i v i n g in a c c o r d a n c e
with
talse e t h i c a l v i e w s w i l l not i n fact be happy, despite w h a t he m a y say or t h i n k . It is s i m p l y not p o s s i b l e to live w e l l if o n e h a s false beliefs about w h a t is i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h o u r nature, a n d w h a t is g e n u i n e l y w o r t h p u r s u i n g a n d w h a t is w o r t h a v o i d i n g . I n general, C i c e r o needs the e p i s t e m i c a l l y o p t i m i s t i c v i e w that t h r o u g h s t u d y a n d p r a c t i c e we c a n c o m e to see w h a t is intelligible i n itself a s p e r s u a s i v e (see Rh. 1.1, 1 3 5 5 a ) . T h i s is n e c e s s a r y i n o r d e r for us to trust that c o n t i n u e d e n q u i r y a n d a r g u m e n t p r o a n d c o n i n the a b s e n c e of a c r i t e r i o n of t r u t h is not a c o l o s s a l w a s t e of t i m e . T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t e x p r e s s i o n o f this o p t i m i s m is the n o t i o n that the t r u t h c a n n o t be retuted, a n d h e n c e that w h a t has not yet b e e n refuted, despite s e r i o u s efforts to d o so, is likely to be t r u e . S u c h o p t i m i s m is a l s o n e c e s s a r y to m a i n t a i n the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n p e r s e v e r a n c e a n d o b s t i n a c y . If nature p r o v i d e s n o c o n straints o n p h i l o s o p h i c a l e n q u i r y , that is, if nature n e v e r gives us reliable i n d i c a t o r s about h o w w e l l we are d o i n g , t h e n all p e r s e v e r a n c e is e q u a l l y f o o l i s h ( o r e q u a l l y w i s e ) . T h e o p t i m i s t i c v i e w that there are s u c h c o n s t r a i n t s , h o w e v e r , i n d i c a t e s that if o n e is p r o p e r l y o p e n - m i n d e d a n d d e d i c a t e d to e n q u i r y , if o n e has really a c q u i r e d p h i l o s o p h i c a l e x p e r t i s e , t h e n w h a t o n e finds p e r s u a s i v e w i l l m o r e likely be true t h a n w h a t o t h e r s find p e r s u a s i v e . S h o r t o l c o m m i t t i n g o u r s e l v e s to s o m e c r i t e r i o n o f t r u t h , this fallible, i n d u c t i v e c o n f i r m a t i o n is the best w e c a n a c h i e v e . T h e r e c a n be n o guarantee that the A c a d e m i c m e t h o d l e a d s to t r u t h ; this is w h a t w e s h o u l d expect f r o m a sceptically cautious philosophy. But even w i t h o u t a n y s u c h guarantees, it is n o n e t h e l e s s reasonable to p u r s u e t r u t h w h i l e l a c k i n g a c r i t e r i o n in the full sense. E v e n ii the A c a d e m i c never a d v a n c e s b e y o n d v e r i s i m i l i t u d e , a n d even if he m a k e s n o m e a s urable progress t o w a r d s t r u t h , we m a y still p r e i e r h i s m e t h o d o n the g r o u n d s that it offers a r e a s o n a b l e c o m p r o m i s e b e t w e e n r a d i c a l
:jv,
ANCIENT
SCEPTICISM
s c e p t i c i s m a n d d o g m a t i s m . It is a n attempt to b a l a n c e the d e m a n d that we d i s c o v e r a n d b e l i e v e the truth w i t h the a w a r e n e s s o f o u r cognitive l i m i t a t i o n s a n d i m p e r f e c t i o n s . K a r l P o p p e r identifies this as the m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l q u e s t i o n o f e p i s t e m o l o g y : " H o w c a n w e a d m i t that o u r k n o w l e d g e is a h u m a n - a n all t o o h u m a n - affair, w i t h o u t at the s a m e t i m e i m p l y i n g that it is all i n d i v i d u a l w h i m a n d a r b i t r a r i n e s s ? " ( P o p p e r 1963: 16). A n d he attributes the o r i g i n a l d i s c o v e r y of h i s tallibilist s o l u t i o n to Plato's Socrates. C i c e r o s e e m s to have d r a w n a s i m i l a r l e s s o n f r o m Socrates. D e s p i t e s i n c e r e l y b e l i e v i n g that he failed to k n o w the things he m o s t w i s h e d to k n o w , S o c r a t e s r e m a i n s f i r m in h i s r e a s o n e d c o n v i c t i o n s . E v e n w h e n o n trial tor h i s life, he r e f u s e d to p a n d e r to the j u d g e s or c o m p r o m i s e h i s p r i n c i p l e s . H e c o n t i n u e d to investigate t h e m o s t p r e s s i n g p h i l o s o p h i c a l matters to the v e r y e n d ( T u s c 1.71; see Plato Phaedo
107a).
Socrates' w i l l i n g n e s s to abide b y the c o n c l u s i o n s o f h i s a r g u m e n t s is n o w h e r e m o r e a p p a r e n t t h a n w h e n C r i t o tries to c o n v i n c e h i m that h e is b e i n g u n r e a s o n a b l e b y s t a y i n g in p r i s o n a n d forfeiting h i s life. S o c r a t e s replies