Palgrave Studies in Pragmatics, Language and Cognition
Series Advisors: Kent Bach, Anne Bezuidenhout, Noël Burton-Robe...
31 downloads
1070 Views
1MB Size
Report
This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form
Palgrave Studies in Pragmatics, Language and Cognition
Series Advisors: Kent Bach, Anne Bezuidenhout, Noël Burton-Roberts, Robyn Carston, Sam Glucksberg, Francesca Happé, François Recanati, Deirdre Wilson Palgrave Studies in Pragmatics, Language and Cognition is a series of high quality research monographs and edited collections of essays focusing on the human pragmatic capacity and its interaction with natural language semantics and other faculties of mind. A central interest is the interface of pragmatics with the linguistic system(s), with the ‘theory of mind’ capacity and with other mental reasoning and general problem-solving capacities. Work of a social or cultural anthropological kind is included if firmly embedded in a cognitive framework. Given the interdisciplinarity of the focal issues, relevant research will come from linguistics, philosophy of language, theoretical and experimental pragmatics, psychology and child development. The series aims to reflect all kinds of research in the relevant fields – conceptual, analytical and experimental. Titles include: Anton Benz, Gerhard Jäger and Robert van Rooij (editors) GAME THEORY AND PRAGMATICS Reinhard Blutner and Henk Zeevat (editors) OPTIMALITY THEORY AND PRAGMATICS María J. Frápolli (editor) SAYING, MEANING AND REFERRING Essays on François Recanati’s Philosophy of Language Corinne Iten LINGUISTIC MEANING, TRUTH CONDITIONS AND RELEVANCE The Case of Concessives Mark Jary ASSERTION Ira Noveck and Dan Sperber (editors) EXPERIMENTAL PRAGMATICS Klaus Petrus MEANING AND ANALYSIS New Essays on Grice George Powell (editor) LANGUAGE, THOUGHT AND REFERENCE Uli Sauerland and Penka Stateva (editors) PRESUPPOSITION AND IMPLICATURE IN COMPOSITIONAL SEMANTICS
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Series Editors: Richard Breheny and Uli Sauerland
Uli Sauerland and Kazuko Yatsushiro (editors) SEMANTICS AND PRAGMATICS From Experiment to Theory
Christoph Unger GENRE, RELEVANCE AND GLOBAL COHERENCE The Pragmatics of Discourse Type
Palgrave Studies in Pragmatics, Language and Cognition Series Series Standing Order ISBN 978–0–333–99010–0 Hardback 978–0–333–98584–7 Paperback (outside North America only) You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and the ISBN quoted above. Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Hans-Christian Schmitz ACCENTUATION AND INTERPRETATION
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Assertion
Mark Jary
Roehampton University, London, UK
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
© Mark Jary 2010
No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6-10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2010 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–0–230–57399–4 hardback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Jary, Mark, 1964– Assertion / Mark Jary. p. cm. — (Palgrave studies in pragmatics, language, and cognition) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978–0–230–57399–4 1. Grammar, Comparative and general—Mood. I. Title. P281.J37 2010 415 .6—dc22 2010002698 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission.
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Dedicated to the memory of Greta Hutchings
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
This page intentionally left blank
List of Figures and Tables
ix
Acknowledgements
x
1 Introduction
1
2 Assertion in Speech-act Theory 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Two types of speech-act theorist 2.3 Speech-act fundamentalists and assertion 2.4 Conclusion
6 6 6 16 30
3 Assertion, Belief and Knowledge 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Assertion and belief: what is the correct order of explanation? 3.3 Assertion and belief attribution 3.4 Assertion and knowledge 3.5 Conclusion
32 32
4 A Sign of Assertion 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Frege’s assertion sign 4.3 Assertion: illocution and inference 4.4 A natural-language assertion sign? 4.5 Conclusion
52 52 53 56 59 82
33 38 46 50
5 Assertion and Common Ground 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Sense, force and representation in Stalnaker’s account 5.3 Assertion and presupposition 5.4 Comparison with Relevance Theory 5.5 Conclusion
84 84 85 92 99 103
6 Assertion and Mood 6.1 Introduction 6.2 Mood in formal semantics
105 105 105 vii
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Contents
Contents
6.3 Speech-act approaches to mood 6.4 Conclusion
120 128
7 Assertion and Main Point 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Non-asserted main point 7.3 Assertion, presupposition and conventional implicature 7.4 Ordered entailments 7.5 Conclusion
129 129 130
8 Assertion and Relevance 8.1 Introduction 8.2 Relevance in a context vs. relevance to an individual 8.3 Context types 8.4 Mood and force 8.5 Assertion and main point 8.6 Relevance maximising vs. relevance optimising 8.7 Comparison with other frameworks 8.8 Conclusion
150 150 151 152 155 173 177 192 194
9 Conclusion
196
Notes
199
References
211
Index
219
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
134 138 148
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
viii
Figures 6.1 Fulfilment conditions 7.1 Ordered entailments 8.1 Types of assumption
110 139 154
Tables 4.1 Modes of commitment 8.1 Assertion and main point compared 8.2 Summary of relationship between interpretation strategies and metarepresentational requirements
ix
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
70 173 186
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
List of Figures and Tables
This book is the result of many years’ work, and many people have helped along the way. Foremost amongst those is Robyn Carston, from whose generous and rigorous supervision I benefited from greatly whilst studying at UCL. Another member of the UCL Linguistics Department faculty who has been a great source of support and intellectual stimulation is Deirdre Wilson, whose work with Dan Sperber provides the theoretical framework in which the ideas developed in the final chapters of the book are grounded. I have also benefited greatly from the support and encouragement of Rob Stainton, who generously read the manuscript and made many useful objections and suggestions. At UCL, I had the pleasure of interacting with a number of fellow students and members of the faculty. Those whose words and thoughts have certainly influenced my thinking include Nicholas Allot, Richard Breheny, Alison Hall, Corrine Iten, Milena Nuti, George Powell, Paula Rubio Fernandez, Neil Smith and Tim Wharton. Beyond UCL, I have also benefitted from discussions and email exchanges with Kent Bach, Stephen Barker, Coralie Chevallier, Manuel García-Carpintero, Mitch Green, Mikhail Kissine (who also read the manuscript and made very useful comments) and Agustín Vicente. Much of this book was written during a six-month period of study leave awarded by the School of Arts at Roehampton University, for which I am grateful. I also want to thank my friend Silvia Vidaurreta for the loan of her flat in Spain, where I worked on the final chapters of the book. The series editors Richard Breheny and Uli Sauerland have also helped with useful comments and encouragement. At home, my wife Helen and our children, George and Rachel, are a constant source of love and support, without which I would do very little, let alone write a book.
x
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Acknowledgements
1
This book has two main aims. One is to bring together and discuss in a systematic way a range of perspectives on assertion: philosophical, linguistic and psychological. As far as I know, this has never been done before.1 The other is to present a view of the pragmatics of assertion, with particular emphasis on the contribution of the declarative mood to the process of utterance interpretation. I hope that in laying the ground for the achievement of the second aim, I fulfil the first. As with so many topics relating to linguistic meaning, the study of assertion starts with Frege. Before Frege, the distinction between the conceptual content conveyed by a statement – what Frege referred to as ‘a thought’, but today would be called a proposition – and the act of putting forward and openly committing oneself to that content was not adequately appreciated. Frege rectified this, and gave assertion a key role both in his philosophy of language and in his logical symbolism. Reactions to Frege’s insight have differed. It has been taken by some to provide the grounds for a use-based theory meaning. Brandom, for example, seeks to explain meaning in terms of the consequences of assertion, understood in terms of the practical and inferential commitments and entitlements taken on by asserters. Others, however, have chosen to play down the significance that Frege gave assertion. Indeed, in most analytical philosophy of language since Frege, the tendency has been to factor out the act and focus on the content. On this view, propositions, not assertions, are the fundamental bearers of truth conditions. When force is discussed in this framework, it is generally seen as something that can be bolted on to truth-conditional content, rather than something that is integral to that content. Chapter 2 of this book looks at assertion from both these perspectives. It starts by looking at the approach to assertion in what I term 1
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Introduction
Assertion
‘traditional speech-act theory’, as typified by the work of Searle and Bach and Harnish. On this view, assertoric force is just one force among many that can be attached to propositional content, and is awarded no higher theoretical status than, say, directive force. This contrasts with the approach I call ‘speech-act fundamentalism’. One key characteristic of this view, championed by Brandom, is that assertion is the basic unit of analysis in the study of linguistic meaning. Other illocutionary forces are explained in terms of assertoric force, as, indeed, is conceptual content, though I do not go into that aspect of Brandom’s work. Rather, I compare his framework with that of Barker, who also takes a fundamentalist approach to speech-acts and gives assertion a central role in the analysis of other forces. Assertion is closely related to the notion of belief: assertions express beliefs. That is a platitude, but there is much more that can be said about the precise nature of the assertion-belief relationship, and this is far from platitudinous. First, there is the question of conceptual priority. Modern views on the pragmatics of linguistic communication might lead one to see belief as conceptually prior to assertions, for, due primarily to its Gricean legacy, modern pragmatics tends to view the interpretation of assertions as a matter of belief attribution. Add to this the widely-held view that linguistically encoded meaning radically underdetermines the content of our assertions, and one is easily led to the conclusion that assertions derive their content from the beliefs they express. However, if the question is considered from a perspective unburdened by consideration of the processes of utterance interpretation, the converse order of conceptual priority is possible. According to this view, as propounded by Dummett, assertion is conceptually prior to belief. Dummett’s arguments to this effect are discussed in Chapter 3, where it is argued that this position is compatible with the linguistic-pragmatic view that assertoric utterances ultimately derive their content from the beliefs they express. Despite Grice’s influence, not everyone accepts that the interpretation of assertoric utterances is essentially a matter of belief attribution. While it is widely agreed that assertions express beliefs, there is less consensus about whether hearers, when interpreting utterances, necessarily treat assertions as expressions of belief. There are those who argue that assertions are first and foremost treated as sources of information about the world, and constitute a form of perception-by-proxy. Holders of this view, such as Dummett, Millikan and McDowell thus stand in opposition to Grice and his followers, such as Sperber and Wilson and Bach and Harnish, for whom utterance interpretation is belief attribution. These
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
2
3
positions and their motivations are also discussed in Chapter 3, where an ecumenical stance is advocated. Views on the relationship between assertion and belief have a bearing on views of the force-form relationship. For those who assign assertion a fundamental explanatory role in their theory of linguistic meaning, the notion of a format specified for assertion is crucial. This is because, for those taking this position, there must be a type of behaviour whose tokening counts as asserting, no appeal to a more basic meaningful entity, such as belief, being possible. For these authors, the sign of assertion is the declarative mood, and the production of this sign under the right conditions is constitutive of assertion. Those who see assertion as case of belief attribution, by contrast, are able to posit a much looser link between mood and force, and even to deny that there is any special relationship between the declarative and assertion. In Chapter 4, I look at arguments that have been made to this effect, and show that cases of non-assertoric use of the declarative are actually straightforwardly explained by the assumption that the declarative is indeed specified for the performance of assertions. This Chapter focuses heavily on Dummett’s claims concerning the assertion-declarative relationship, highlighting the crucial distinction he draws between the question of whether the positing of an assertion sign is necessary to explain what assertion is, and the question of whether an assertion sign is required in order that hearers can recognise the speaker’s assertoric intentions. Up to and including Chapter 4, the book examines assertion from a primarily philosophical perspective. However, as stated above, a key aim of the book is to provide an account of the mechanics of the interpretation of assertions, with particular emphasis on the role of the declarative mood in this process. From a philosophical point of view, it is sufficient to say that the declarative is a sign of assertion. From a linguistic perspective – especially one concerned with the pragmatics of utterance interpretation, this is not enough. Rather, one needs to identify the features of the declarative that make it apt for the making of assertions. This can only be done within a theoretical framework, the features assigned to the declarative being part of the vocabulary of that framework. Chapter 5 provides a bridge from the philosophical to the linguistic. It deals with Stalnaker’s common-ground view of assertion, a philosophical account that has provided the basis of a number of linguistic accounts of the declarative mood. These accounts, and others, are discussed in detail in Chapter 6, where formal-semantic accounts of mood are contrasted with varieties of speech-act accounts.
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Introduction
Assertion
Within linguistics, assertion is thought of not only in terms of truthcommitment, but also in terms of information structure. It is common to find asserted information identified as that which is the main point of the utterance. This aspect of assertion is discussed in Chapter 7, where it is shown that main-point status and assertion do not always coincide: main points need not be asserted by the speaker and what is asserted need not have main-point status. This Chapter also discusses the relationship between assertion and presupposition, a topic raised in Chapter 5 on Stalnaker. Following Stalnaker, presuppositions are commonly regarded as propositions treated as having common-ground status. I defend an alternative approach, on which presuppostional characteristics are indicative not necessarily of common-ground status, but of a particular functional role in the interpretation process. This view of presuppositional phenomena is found in the work of Sperber and Wilson, and it is their Relevance Theory framework which is employed both in this chapter and Chapter 8. Chapter 8 presents a novel account of the role of the declarative mood in the interpretation of assertions, and also puts forward an account of its non-assertoric uses. Because it is grounded in the notion of relevance, this account has the advantage of providing an explanation of why we attend to assertions: they come with the presumption that they will be relevant to us. However, this assumption is conveyed by all utterances, so what sets assertions apart? The claim I make is that assertions, unlike directives and questions, present the proposition expressed by the utterance as relevant in its own right. The role of the declarative is to mark the proposition expressed as potentially relevant in this manner. Nonassertoric uses of the declarative are explained in two ways: either the proposition is presented as relevant in its own right, but in an embedded context that represents, say, the content of a fiction or supposition; or it is relevant in its own right in a basic context that represents the actual world, but witnessing the performance of the act is sufficient grounds for accepting that proposition. If witnessing the act is sufficient grounds for acceptance, then the utterance does not count as an assertion for, as is explained in Chapter 8, assertion is characterised by certain cognitive and social safeguards that come into play when there is a possibility of the hearer being misled or deceived. Analysing assertion in terms of relevance has the further advantage of shedding light on the relationship between assertoric force and mainpoint status. On the account presented in Chapter 8, an assertion is a case of a proposition being presented as relevant in its own right to an individual. For a proposition to be relevant to an individual, in
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
4
5
the technical sense employed in Chapter 8, it needs to be true. Thus the truth requirement on assertions follows from their special claim of relevance. Main-point status is also analysable in terms of relevance: the proposition communicated by an utterance that makes the greatest contribution to the overall relevance of the utterance is its main point. On this view, assertions often have main-point status because their point is to present the proposition expressed by the utterance as relevant to the individual. Under certain conditions, however, assertion and main-point status diverge. This is explained in Chapter 8. Chapter 8 also returns to issues raised in Chapter 3 concerning the relationship between assertion and belief. In Chapter 3, I argue that the interpretation of assertions need not necessarily involve belief attribution. In Chapter 8, I show that, of a range of possible relevance-driven utterance interpretation strategies, only the more sophisticated require belief attribution. This observation has a number of implications. One is that the case made by Sperber and Wilson for a pragmatics module is greatly weakened. Another is that, pace Sperber and Wilson, utterance interpretation is often a relevance-maximising, rather than relevance-optimising, procedure. The book ends with a short concluding chapter. Before starting on the book proper, both a note on terminology and an apology for a glaring omission are in order. In the literature on mood, the form associated with assertion is sometimes referred to as ‘the indicative mood’, and sometimes as ‘the declarative mood’. The former is most common among philosophers, but linguists are prone to object that the indicative is, strictly speaking, a verbal inflection rather than a clause type. I have used the term ‘declarative’ pretty much throughout this book, to refer to both embedded and unembedded instances of the form standardly associated with assertions – as opposed to commands and questions – in traditional grammars. The glaring omission is the almost complete absence of any discussion of the importance of intonation in relation to assertion. This is particularly important in languages, such as Spanish and Italian, where interrogative sentences are not marked syntactically or morphologically and are hence syntactically identical to declaratives. Clearly, when I make claims about the function of the declarative in relation to assertion, I mean when it is uttered with the appropriate intonation contour.
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Introduction
2
2.1 Introduction Although, as we will see later in this book, the notion of assertoric character is employed, tacitly or otherwise, in the study of inference and representation, assertion is first and foremost an action. Accordingly, we do well to start with an overview of assertion as it has been viewed in speech-act theory. This will serve a number of purposes. First, it will highlight issues relating to assertion to be discussed in later chapters, such as the relationship between assertion, truth and belief. Second, it will allow discussion of certain fundamental issues in some depth. One of these concerns which features of assertion – informativeness, truthcommitment, belief expression, explicitness – are central to its analysis. Another is whether assertion should be analysed as a sister of other illocutionary acts, or whether it is more fundamental, and therefore correctly seen as a superordinate species of act. The chapter begins by distinguishing two types of speech-act theorist. Their two approaches are then discussed, and the work of major players in each camp compared and contrasted in some detail. I end the chapter by highlighting the points raised in this chapter that will be important in the remainder of the book.
2.2 Two types of speech-act theorist Meaning theorists with an interest in speech acts tend to fall into two camps. For one, speech-act theory is a component of a theory of linguistic meaning, one that is designed to work in conjunction with a truth-conditional account of some notion of ‘core meaning’. As we will 6
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Assertion in Speech-act Theory
see, such approaches tend to treat the proposition as this core element of meaning, viewing assertion as being just one of the many things that speakers can do with it. For these theorists, the key question concerning assertion tends to be how this act is to be distinguished from others such as ordering, promising and questioning. Probably the best known member of this group is Searle, who is justly considered one of the founders of speech-act theory, so we’ll call this camp the ‘traditional speech-act theorists’. But of course, while a founder, Searle is not the father of speech-act theory. That mantle rests with Austin (1962/1975), who, like Wittgenstein (1958), argued that philosophers of language had placed too much emphasis on the descriptive – or propositional – element of declarative sentences, with the result that they ignored the uses to which sentences of all types were put and hence failed to take into account a crucial social element of linguistic meaning. For those in the second camp, this social element of meaning is not merely crucial, but central: rather than viewing speech act-theory as a bolt-on to truth-conditional accounts, they argue that linguistic meaning should be explained in terms of the uses to which linguistic forms are put. Detailed and well articulated theories of this type have been proposed by Brandom, Alston and Barker. Because they see speech acts as fundamental to linguistic meaning, we’ll call them ‘speech-act fundamentalists’.1 They are of particular interest here because, unlike the traditionalists, they tend to give special status to assertion, claiming (in the case of Brandom and Barker, though not Alston) that other sentential illocutionary acts must be understood in terms of assertion. We begin by looking at the traditionalists. 2.2.1 Speech-act traditionalists and assertion 2.2.1.1 Individuating assertion: truth, belief and informativeness The view of assertion as a sister, rather than the mother, of other illocutionary acts has its roots in Austin’s rejection of the distinction he introduced, at the start of How to Do Things with Words, between constative and performative utterances. Austin first suggested that utterances might usefully be divided into two types, depending on whether they can be aptly judged true or false. Those that can, he termed ‘constatives’. Those that cannot, he suggested, have their meaning in the acts that they can be used to perform, hence the term ‘performative’. Examples of these included explicit performatives such as (1) and (2), which share with constatives declarative word order, and acts performed using
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Assertion in Speech-act Theory 7
8
Assertion
(1) (2) (3) (4)
I warn you not to come any closer. I promise to be good. Stand at ease. What’s your name?
Rather than being true or false, utterances such as these were said by Austin to be felicitous or infelicitous according to whether certain conditions were in place. Thus one reason an order would be infelicitous, for example, is that the act ordered had already been carried out. Austin’s eventual rejection of the constatives/performative distinction was the result of two observations (Lecture XI). First, he noted that to state2 – the prototypical constative – is as much to do something as is to promise or to warn, as evidenced by the coherence of discourse such as (5): (5) When I said that the house was old, I wasn’t warning you against buying it, I was just stating a fact This suggests that merely being amenable to judgments of truth and falsity does not preclude an utterance from being also a case of doing something with words. Austin’s second observation was that statements were subject to the same sort of infelicities as performatives: for example, just as a promise can be insincere if the speaker has no intention of carrying out the act described, so a statement can be insincere if the speaker does not believe the content of her assertion. These considerations led Austin to conclude that ‘Stating, describing etc. are just two names among a very great many others for illocutionary acts; they have no unique position’ (Austin 1962/1975: 148–9, original emphasis). In seeking to develop Austin’s ideas, Searle (1969) set out to establish clear criteria for distinguishing illocutionary acts. Using a detailed analysis of promising as his starting point, he put forward four dimensions along which illocutionary acts can vary. The first is in terms of the propositional content that is acceptable for each act: whereas assertions and yes/no-questions can take any propositional content, some other acts are more restricted: for example, promises, according to Searle, can only express propositions denoting future acts performed by the speaker, while requests must concern future acts performed by the hearer.3 The second dimension relates to the conditions that must be in place for an act to be performed felicitously: for Searle, an assertion that P is
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
other sentence-types, such as orders given using imperatives (3), and questions asked using interrogatives (4):
infelicitous if the speaker does not have evidence for the truth of P, or if it is clear to both speaker and hearer that the hearer already knows that P. Along the same dimension, a request is infelicitous if the speaker believes that the hearer is not able to perform the act requested. Illocutionary acts also differ in terms of the psychological states they are related to: assertion with belief, requests with desire, for example. Searle’s final dimension concerns what an utterance must count as if it is to be regarded as being of a particular type. Searle calls this its ‘essential condition’. The essential condition for assertion, according to Searle, is that it count as ‘an undertaking to the effect that P represents an actual state of affairs’, while requests, for example, must count as an attempt by the speaker to perform the act described by the utterance (1969: 66). Searle’s characterisation of assertion raises a number of issues. For him, the essence of assertion lies in an undertaking by the speaker that the proposition expressed by the utterance represents an actual state of affairs. However, the nature of this undertaking is not elaborated on. We will return to this issue, which is highlighted by Brandom (1994: 173), when we consider speech-act fundamentalist views of assertion in section 2.3.1. Another issue that will have to wait until later is the relationship between belief and assertion, which will be given a chapter of its own (Chapter 3). A point that can be considered now, though, is the fact that, for Searle, the intention to communicate the proposition expressed by the utterance is not essential to the notion of assertion. On Searle’s account, an assertion that P will be unhappy if it is made under circumstances in which it is obvious to both the speaker and the hearer that the hearer already knows that P, but it will still be an assertion, for it will still count as an undertaking that P is true.4 This is not the view taken by Bach and Harnish. Following Grice, these authors see linguistic communication as involving primarily the expression and recognition of speaker attitudes. On this view, assertion differs from other illocutionary acts primarily in terms of the attitude it expresses: belief, as opposed to desire, intention, gratitude, sorrow, etc. For Bach and Harnish, an utterance expressing P counts as an assertion only if the speaker intends the hearer to take her utterance as reason to believe both that she believes that P and that she intends the hearer to believe that P (1979: 16).5 Only the recognition of the intention is crucial: its fulfilment – so that the hearer actually believed that the speaker believed that P and/or came to believe P himself – would be a perlocutionary consequence of the act and hence not a requisite for its successful performance. Among the traditionalists, then, there is disagreement about the importance of communication to the analysis of assertion.
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Assertion in Speech-act Theory 9
Assertion
That there is disagreement is not surprising, for there are good reasons both for wanting and for not wanting an informative element in a definition of assertion. We want to establish a set of criteria by which to identify an illocutionary act as an assertion. Such an endeavour will be successful to the extent which it classifies acts correctly. However, because there are cases of assertion in which the speaker does not intend to inform the hearer – perhaps because she does not expect the hearer to accept the assertion, because the hearer already accepts what is being asserted, or because there is no addressee – an account for which the presence of informative intentions is a defining feature of assertions will fail to classify some acts correctly. This is the problem faced by Bach and Harnish’s definition: it does not class as assertions those cases where the speaker has no intention of having his audience believe the content of his statement. Imagine someone accused of heresy being tortured so that she recant her heretical views. But she does not; rather she reaffirms them. In such a case, she cannot be said to intend to have her hearers believe the content of her utterance, but she surely makes an assertion. Or consider cases where the speaker is already sure that the hearer believes the proposition expressed (and that he does not need reminding of it), such as when a teacher asks a pupil ‘What’s the capital of France?’ In responding ‘Paris is the capital of France’, the pupil asserts that Paris is the capital of France, even though he can have no intention that the teacher should come to believe this.6 But attempting to come up with criteria for correctly classifying acts as assertions is not the only aim a theorist might have in developing a characterisation of assertion. It is equally legitimate – and necessary – to ask why the practice of assertion exists, and an adequate answer to this question must surely give informativeness centre stage. Assertions exist, and we are disposed to attend to them, because they are a source of information about the world beyond our perceptual capacities. This much seems obvious, and the burden of proof is surely on anyone who would deny it. Consequently, a complete understanding of assertion cannot be arrived at without considering its informative function. We appear, then, to be in a dilemma. On the one hand, we want an account of assertion that does not exclude non-informative assertions; on the other hand, we want that account to reflect the fact that the importance of assertion as a social activity lies in its function as a means of in information transfer. Fortunately, Millikan’s notion of proper function offers us a way out. According to Millikan (1984; 1993), a proper function of a behaviour is defined in terms of its history: ‘What caused that behaviour to be repeated?’ is the question that must be asked in
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
10
determining a function. It is surely uncontroversial to say that what caused the practice of assertion to be repeated is its potential for conveying information about how the world is beyond the perceptual reach of the hearer.7 On this understanding of ‘function’, assertion has an informative function even if many cases of assertion are neither informative, nor intended to be so, in much the same way that sex has a reproductive function even if many human sexual acts neither result in reproduction nor are intended to do so. Thus, while Bach and Harnish’s definition fails as a means of correctly classifying all acts of assertion, it is correct in seeking to include informativeness as a necessary element of a complete understanding of assertion. Searle’s definition of assertion as being essentially an undertaking to the truth of the proposition expressed might capture all cases of assertion and certainly identifies a feature central to the analysis of this act, it does not get at its function. Rather, Searle’s account reduces its central function to a subsidiary consideration. In sum, in order to arrive at a characterisation of assertion that acknowledges its informative function, in Millikan’s sense of ‘function’, whilst allowing that not all cases of assertion seek to inform, some qualification is needed. We would do well, then, to follow Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995: 181) and call an assertion that P which is intended to inform the hearer that P an ‘ordinary assertion’. This allows for the existence of unordinary assertions where there is no intention to inform the speaker of the proposition expressed, whilst also recognising that the informativeness is essential to an adequate characterisation of assertion.
2.2.2 The assertive family and direction of fit As well as being an act in its own right, assertion has also been viewed by speech-act theorists as prototypical of a group of illocutionary acts. It is clear that asserting is not distinct from, say, informing, reminding and complaining in the way that it is distinct from promising and ordering, and this observation underlies attempts within speech-act theory to taxomonise illocutionary acts. This practice was started by Austin (1962/1975: Lecture XII), and various alternative systems have since been proposed by, among others, Searle (1975/1979), Bach and Harnish (1979) and Alston (2000). Those who put forward such taxonomies generally take whatever feature they see as central to assertion as a necessary condition for being a member of the group for which it serves as a prototype. Thus, to be
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Assertion in Speech-act Theory 11
Assertion
member of Searle’s group of assertives, an illocutionary act must count as an undertaking to the truth of the proposition expressed by the utterance (1975/1979: 12), while to be a member of Bach and Harnish’s class of constatives, an act must express both a belief and an intention that the hearer ‘form (or continue to hold) a like belief’ (1979: 42). Members of the group then vary in a variety of ways, such as according to the strength of speaker commitment (e.g. guessing vs. insisting) or whether the speaker is responding to a query. Searle (1975/1979: 2–8) lists twelve criteria according to which speech acts might be classified, but considers three of these to be the most important. These are differences in the point or purpose of the act, in the psychological state expressed, and in the direction of fit between the words and the world. Direction of fit concerns whether the aim of the utterance is to get the words to fit the world or to make the world fit the words. An assertion is true if the proposition it expresses obtains in the actual world, and hence has word-to-world fit; a command, for example, is fulfilled if the world is changed such that the proposition expressed obtains, and hence has world-to-word direction of fit. Searle suggested that it would be elegant if the whole of his taxonomy could be built around this distinction, but found himself unable to do so, largely because certain expressive speech acts, such as greetings and congratulating (i.e. members of Searle’s class of expressives), have no direction of fit.8 However, Recanati (1987) has suggested that a taxonomy of speech acts can indeed be developed on the basis of direction of fit, as long as this is restricted to what he terms ‘content-conveying acts’, a restriction that excludes expressives. By ‘content-conveying’, Recanati does not mean informative, but refers rather to acts that have a central aim of describing either how the world is, or how it is to be as a result of the utterance. Reviving Austin’s terminology (though not the basis of his distinction), he calls the former ‘constative’ and the latter ‘performative’. Performatives, on Recanati’s account, are content-conveying utterances with world-to-word direction of fit, while constatives, of which assertion is prototypical, are individuated by word-to-world fit. Recanati does not deny that assertions have a special relationship with belief and truth, though he does not take a position on the precise nature of that relationship as he does not rely on it to distinguish the class of acts that assertion belongs to from other acts (1987: 137–8). As we have seen, this is in contrast to Searle and Bach and Harnish, who, respectively, see truth-commitment and belief expression as central.
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
12
Assertion in Speech-act Theory 13
The notion of direction of fit, though, is a problematic one, especially when applied to future-tense utterances. Take an utterance of (6), for example:
This could be either an assertion of future intent or a promise. In the case that the speaker turns up at the party, the assertion is judged true or the promise deemed to have been kept. In both cases the speaker has brought about the state of affairs described, though the direction of fit is said to be different in each case: word-to-world in the assertion case, world-to-word in the promise case. It is hard to see what motivates this claim, though, other than the stipulation that promises have the latter fit and assertions the former. To be sure, the promise can count as a reason for the speaker to be at the party in a way that the assertion cannot (Watson 2004), but it is not clear how the notion of directionof-fit captures this. As we will see in Chapter 4 the differences between assertions and promises are best understood in terms of the grounds the utterance provides for accepting the proposition expressed, rather than in the nature of the relationship between the proposition expressed and the world. Here we just need to note that the supposed direction-of-fit distinction is hard to maintain. Another problem is that direction of fit suggests symmetry where there is none. To have word-to-world direction of fit is, essentially, to be truth apt. To have world-to-word direction of fit is to be compliance or fulfilment apt. But these latter terms cannot be explicated except in terms of truth. World-to-word and word-to-world directions of fit are not equals, then. Rather, the latter is superordinate to the former. Direction of fit has also been applied to the analysis of belief and desire. Roughly speaking, the idea is while a belief that P should be cancelled in the case that not-P, a desire that P endures under such circumstances. However, as Sobel and Copp (2001) have shown, close application of this criterion proves difficult. As these authors suggest, then, direction of fit is best treated as a useful metaphor. Applied to speech acts, it has intuitive appeal but should not, I think, be used as a basis for distinguishing assertion (or assertives) from other acts (or classes of acts). 2.2.3 The explicit nature of assertions The final means of individuating assertion and other assertive acts that we will consider in this subsection is that proposed by Alston (2000).
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
(6) I’ll be at the party
Assertion
To a certain extent, Alston straddles the two camps identified at the beginning of this chapter: with the traditionalists, he sees assertion as being a sister to acts such as ordering and promising, but, like the fundamentalists, he avoids affording propositions the role of bearers of core-meaning. Alston’s analysis of illocutionary acts is markedly different from those discussed so far. He takes as his starting point Austin and Searle’s observation that the successful and felicitous performance of an illocutionary act relies on certain conditions being fulfilled. For example, a request that someone open the door is defective if (among other things) the speaker does not want the door to be opened, believes that it cannot be opened, or if the door is already open. Alston’s suggestion is that in performing an illocutionary act, a speaker takes responsibility for the holding of those conditions that must be in place if the act is not to go awry. The notion of responsibility that Alston intends is not that the speaker must be the cause of the conditions – in the sense that it is the speaker who has brought them into existence – but that the speaker is open to rebuke if these conditions are not met (Alston 2000: 54). The reason that the speaker is open to rebuke, Alston argues, is that illocutionary acts are norm governed, the conditions for their felicitous and successful performance being rules which govern their use (2000: 58–63). Having established this notion of taking responsibility, Alston then distinguishes classes of illocutionary acts according to the types of responsibility taken. In issuing an order, for example, the speaker takes responsibility for it being possible for the hearer to do the act described, for the speaker having the authority to place on the hearer an obligation to do the act, and for placing that obligation on the hearer by uttering the sentence (Alston 2000: 102). Thus the speaker is open to rebuke if it is not possible for the hearer do the act or if, for example, the speaker does not have the requisite authority to require the hearer to perform the act. The possibility of the speaker performing any given illocutionary act is dependent in part on what Alston terms ‘conceptually necessary conditions’ (Alston 2000: 93, fn. 8). Thus, if the order is that the hearer open the door, then it is conceptually necessary that there exists a uniquely identifiable door, and that this door is closed. So, according to Alston, in uttering, (7), the speaker takes responsibility for it being the case that (8) and (9) obtain. (7) Open the door. (8) There is uniquely identifiable doorx . (9) Doorx is closed.
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
14
In issuing an order by uttering an imperative sentence, then, the speaker takes responsibility, on Alston’s account, for it being the case that the world is a certain way (and places the hearer under an obligation to change it). It is even possible that the hearer is informed, by the utterance of (7), that the doorx is closed. However, the speaker has not asserted that the doorx is closed, on Alston’s account, for the simple reason that the utterance does not explicitly express the proposition that the door is closed. Thus, for Alston, what is distinctive about the assertive class of illocutionary acts is that the speaker takes responsibility for the obtaining of the proposition explicitly expressed by the utterance. Assertions thus make explicit a proposition the obtaining of which the speaker takes responsibility for, and it is this, on Alston’s account, that is their defining characteristic (2000: 116–20). The explicitness criterion for distinguishing assertions has a number of advantages. It acknowledges that a speaker generally expresses belief in (and undertakes a commitment to the truth of) a number of propositions regardless of the illocutionary act she is performing. For example, utterances of (7), (10) and (11) would each commit the speaker to truth of (and indicate that she believes) (8) and (9). (10) Thank you for opening the door. (11) I promise to open the door. Alston’s characterisation of assertion also acknowledges that speakers, when making assertions, commit themselves to propositions other than that which is explicitly expressed. Thus, an assertion of (12) commits the speaker not only to the proposition expressed by that utterance, but also to (8), (9), (13) and (14). (12) My brother will close the door. (13) The speaker has a brother. (14) The speaker’s brother will do something. As noted by Barker (2002), the explicit nature of assertions is rarely commented upon in the literature. Indeed, some authors deny that what is asserted need be explicitly expressed. For example, Russell seems to have thought that all the elements of the logical form of a definite description are asserted by the speaker who asserts a sentence containing that definite description: ‘Thus when we say “x was the father of Charles II.’ we not only assert that x had a certain relation to Charles II., but also that nothing else had this relation.” (Russell 1905: 481–2) Geach (1965), on the other hand, has it that subordinate clauses introduced by ‘the fact
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Assertion in Speech-act Theory 15
16
Assertion
(15) Peter is aware of the fact that his wife has arranged a surprise party for him (16) Peter pointed out that Chomsky is an American citizen Geach also claims that such a double-barrelled assertion takes place with ‘under the illusion that’, as in (17): (17) Peter is under the illusion that he is the son of God In this case, the ‘embedded assertion’ is the negation of the embedded clause (i.e. that Peter is not the son of God), so, for both Geach and Russell, it appears that commitment to truth is all that is required for a proposition to count as asserted. Explicitness, for these authors, is not a criterion. The problem with this position, as Alston points out, is that it fails to distinguish asserted propositions from those for which responsibility is taken in the performance of non-assertive illocutionary acts. As we saw above, the speaker of (7) takes responsibility for the truth of (8) and (9). The utterance (7), though, is not an assertion. Do we want to say that when issuing directives containing, say, a definite description we assert all the propositions associated with the use of that description? This would make assertion a potential element of every illocutionary act. Alston’s explicitness criterion avoids this consequence.9
2.3 Speech-act fundamentalists and assertion In order to spell out what is distinctive about the proposals of Barker and Brandom, we first need to look briefly at the relationship between traditional speech-act theory and truth conditional semantics. Speech-act traditionalists, as was noted at the start of this chapter, see speech-act theory as a complement to truth-conditional accounts of meaning. Their explanatory strategy is to divide utterance meaning into two components: a propositional element and a force element. The force/content distinction was, of course, introduced by Frege
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
that’ are asserted by the speaker, as are those introduced by factive verbs such as ‘point out’. In cases such as (15) and (16) the speaker is said by Geach to have performed a ‘double-barrelled assertion’, with one assertion committing the speaker to the proposition expressed by the main clause, and the other to that expressed by the subordinate clause.
(1918–19/1997), a variant of it being adopted by Searle (1969: 31), who uses F(P) notation to distinguish the force and propositional content of an utterance. Employing this notation, (18) stands for an assertion that P, (19) a question whether P, (20) a command to P, and (21) a promise that P.10 The notation can be extended to cover all sentential illocutionary acts by introducing a symbol for each act. (18) (19) (20) (21)
(P) ?(P) !(P) Pr(P)
One role played by propositions in traditional speech-act theories, then, is to explain a putative core element of meaning common to a set of utterances such as (22) to (24): what these have in common, on this view, is that they express the same proposition, which we can show as (25): (22) (23) (24) (25)
Peter will come. Will Peter come? Come, Peter.
On the truth-conditional account of meaning generally assumed by traditional speech-act theories, propositions play the role of ultimate bearer of truth. As that account sees truth-conditions as the means by which linguistic meaning is to be explained, it follows that, in these theories, propositions play the role of the ultimate explanans in linguistic semantics. However, assigning this role to propositions qua truth-bearers raises the problem of how to explain those aspects of sentential linguistic meaning which are not amenable to analysis in terms of truth and falsity, notably the non-assertive illocutionary acts and the non-declarative sentence-types associated with them. Faced with the problem that only assertions can be aptly judged true or false, theorists generally take one of two paths: either they exclude non-declarative sentences and/or non-assertive utterances from their analysis, or they introduce a superordinate term that places being true on a level with being complied with, in the case of orders, and being answered, in the case of questions. Thus truth conditions are seen as a type of satisfaction condition, on a par with compliance conditions and answerhood conditions.11
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Assertion in Speech-act Theory 17
Assertion
The first approach is clearly inadequate if one wants a complete account of linguistic meaning. The second has the disadvantage of reducing truth, which is supposed by truth conditionalists to be the bedrock on which the theory of meaning rests, to a type of satisfaction. But satisfaction, in this sense, cannot be defined except in terms of truth. To see this, consider under what conditions an order is said to be satisfied. An order is satisfied, on this account, if it is complied with. But under what conditions is it complied with? The answer must be that that it is complied with if the proposition it expresses is made true (by the addressee). But being true, on this account, is another form of satisfaction. So the term we are attempting to define gets re-introduced in the definitions. This is not a feature of acceptable definitions. It might be responded that having compliance explained in terms of truth is to be desired, as it shows that the fundamental notion of truth can be applied to the analysis of non-assertive illocutionary acts and linguistic forms associated with these. Thus it might be suggested that the superordinate notion of satisfaction be dropped, and that the notion of compliance be analysed in terms of making true, thus saving the truthconditional approach. But this is to accept that propositionhood alone is insufficient to qualify an object for the status of truth bearer, and that assertives – being the only class of illocutionary acts aptly described as true or false – have a special relation to truth, and thus a special role to play in both in a truth-based theory of meaning and in the analysis of illocutionary acts. It is, in effect, to reject the view that propositions are the ultimate bearers of truth and the fundamental explanans in a theory of linguistic meaning.12 The authors whose work we will look at in this section do indeed give special status to assertions in the theories of meanings that they propose. Assertions differ from propositions in that the former are acts, while the latter – whatever they are – are certainly not.13 The emphasis that Brandom and Barker place on acts in their analyses of meaning is reflected in their conception of truth. Whereas truth-conditionalists see truth as a property that propositions either do or do not have, Brandom and Barker see truth primarily in terms of judgement. To understand truth, they argue, we should not ask which objects can have the property of being true, but rather what class of phenomena can aptly be judged true. Judging, like asserting, is an act; and judging an assertion as true expresses an attitude of acceptance towards that assertion. Barker and Brandom, therefore, are expressivists about truth, for they see the attitude of acceptance that judgments of truth express, and the consequences of
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
18
Assertion in Speech-act Theory 19
such expressions, as key to its understanding. We now look at each of their frameworks in turn.
Like Searle, Brandom sees assertion as essentially an undertaking of commitment. For Brandom, though, ascertaining the precise nature of this commitment is crucial, not just in order to understand assertion, but as the basis for a theory of linguistic meaning. Brandom’s view of assertion has its roots in Dummett’s characterisation of competence in this speech act as being a matter of grasping both of the conditions under which it is correct to make an assertion, and the consequences of doing so: Learning to use a statement of a given form involves [. . .] learning two things: the conditions under which one is justified in making the statement; and what constitutes acceptance of it, i.e. the consequences of accepting it. Here ‘consequences’ must be taken to include both the inferential powers of the statement and anything that counts as acting on the truth of the statement. (Dummett 1981: 453). The conditions under which you are justified in making an assertion are those which make the assertion true. The consequences are both practical and inferential. For example, if you assert that the beer is in the fridge, then you are committed to going to get the beer from the fridge if properly ordered to fetch it. This is a practical consequence of your assertion. If you assert that the dress the actress wore was red (all over), then you are committed also to the claim that the dress was not white. This is an inferential commitment. The commitments that any one speaker undertakes depend upon her prior commitments. Thus if she asserts both that the dress the actress wore was red and that red is the colour of blood, then she is committed to the claim that the actress wore a dress that was the colour of blood. Dummett distinguishes two types of assertion: those that have verifiable truth-conditions and those which do not. The latter group includes ethical statements and ascriptions of responsibility. The category that comprises of both type of assertion he calls ‘quasi assertion’. What unites utterances in this group is the following: all can be used to deceive, all employ declarative syntax, all are open to demands for justification, and all constrain the speaker’s subsequent verbal and/or non-verbal action (Dummett 1981: 356–7). The last two of these features are the consequences of assertion, and it is these that are at the heart of Brandom’s account.
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
2.3.1 Brandom: assertion as discursive commitment
Assertion
Brandom divides Dummett’s consequences into two types: commitments and entitlements (1994: 168). In the example just used, the claim that the dress was red prohibits you from asserting (i.e. commits you to not asserting) that it was white (or green, or blue . . .), but it entitles you to assert that the dress was scarlet, or vermillion. As we will see below, it is through these notions of commitments and entitlements that Brandom seeks to explain semantic relationships. In making an assertion, on Brandom’s account, speakers both assume authority and undertake a responsibility: the authority they assume is the right to pass on the entitlements and commitments of their assertion to their listeners; the responsibility is to justify their assertions if challenged.14 Assertions can be justified in three ways: by deferring to a previous asserter (who assumed the authority to pass on the commitment undertaken by the current asserter), by reporting reliable perceptual experience, or by giving reasons in the form of further assertions (1994: 172–4). The last of these is most pertinent to present concerns. In relation to reasons and reason-giving, Brandom draws an important distinction between perception, the act of assertion in particular and action in general. Actions, in general, can require the giving of reasons (‘Why did you shoot him?’) and perception can be employed in reason giving (‘I shot him because I saw him reach for his gun.’), but only assertions are capable both of being a reason and of justifying calls for reasons. You might assert that rain is likely to give a reason for carrying an umbrella, but that assertion also justifies your hearer in requiring that you give a reason for it. This reason might be a further assertion (‘It often rains in London in April’), which would again have the role of both standing as a reason and creating the responsibility to give additional reasons. Having the dual characteristics of both being able to serve as reason and ‘reason-requirer’ is, for Brandom, sufficient condition for being an assertion (1994: 167).15 The notion of giving and requiring reasons makes sense only in a social context. In giving a reason, on Brandom’s account, a speaker takes on the responsibility of giving further reason, if so required, and, in doing so, she implicitly endorses inferential relationships between the reasons she gives. For an audience to accept her reasons is to grant that she is entitled to them, to take on those entitlements themselves and thereby endorse that inference. Brandom sees assertions, then, as speech acts that can serve as premises and conclusions, and accepting an assertion that P as a reason for an assertion that Q is to accept the inference from P to Q. Thus assertions, for Brandom, are fundamentally ‘fodder
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
20
for inferences’ (1994: 168), and a key function of assertion is to make explicit inferential relations implicit in the commitment undertaken by interlocutors.16 Brandom explains force in terms of the different commitments and entitlements undertaken by interlocutors. In this respect, his account is similar to Alston’s, discussed above. Thus promises commit speakers to act; orders commit hearers to act, and so on.17 The role played by the common propositional core in traditional speech-act theories is here played by assertions. For Brandom, other illocutionary-act types make sense only in relation to a prior notion of assertion. This is because promises and orders, for example, rely for their explication on the notion of a described state of affairs being made true, and Brandom, as we will see below, views truth primarily in terms of judgements of assertions. Assertion, for Brandom, ‘is the fundamental speech act, defining the specific difference between linguistic practice and social practices more generally’ (1994: 173). The traditional semantic relationships of entailment, compatibility and contradiction are explained by Brandom in terms of compatibility and incompatibility of commitments and entitlements. P entails Q iff asserting that P prohibits one from asserting not-Q. P is compatible with Q iff asserting that P entitles one to assert that Q. P contradicts Q iff asserting that P removes entitlement to assert that Q (1994: 160). The propositional content of an assertion, then, consists in the commitments and entitlements that are concomitant with that act of assertion, and bestowed upon those who accept it. Propositional content is thus explained in terms of commitments and entitlements rather than in terms of truth conditions. One can say, according to Brandom, of anything which has propositional content that it has truth conditions, but to do so is just to ‘pay a harmless compliment’ to things whose contents can be expressed in declarative sentences or by the corresponding ‘that clauses’ (1994: 329). Thus Brandom allows the possibility of expressing semantic content in truth-conditional terms, but denies the possibility of explaining semantic content truthconditionally (loc. cit.). In this respect, Brandom differs from Dummett, who places greater emphasis on truth conditions. As we saw above, Dummett has it that assertions proper are those whose truth can be verified. Indeed, he (1993) sees truth-conditional accounts of meaning such as Davidson’s as potential components of a theory of meaning in that they provide, according to him, a theory of sense. One finds little mention, however, of the sense/force distinction in Brandom’s work.18
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Assertion in Speech-act Theory 21
Assertion
For Brandom, truth is to be explained in terms of the commitments and entitlements that result from truth-judgements. Judging an assertion true entails taking on commitments and entitlements, and an understanding of this is all there is to an understanding of the notion of truth, according to Brandom. Hence he is a deflationist about truth, in that he thinks the notion can be explained in terms of prior notions of judgement, commitment and entitlement (1994: ch. 5).19 This is not to say, though, that he is a relativist about truth: there is, for Brandom, an objective fact of the matter. Essentially, his view is that our ability to challenge the commitments undertaken by others is restricted by how the world is. These commitments are the result of a combination of perception, inference and action, and two of these – perception and action – are cases of non-linguistically mediated interaction with the world. Consequently, ‘empirical and practical constraints get built into what commitments (including inferential commitments) one can sustain entitlement to’ (1994: 333). Before concluding this subsection, it is necessary to consider Brandom’s aim in developing his theory, so that it can be compared with the aim of the present project. The aim of Chapter 8 is to present an account of assertion from the perspective of a cognitive theory of utterance interpretation. Brandom’s aim is quite different. He wants an explanation of what it is to be a language user such that one could recognise this ability however it were manifested, a theory, that is, that applies to human verbal communication but would also enable us to say whether a newly discovered extraterrestrial gaseous life-form had language. As he himself puts it: The primary explanatory target is what it is to grasp a propositional content and to have and to attribute to others states and performances with such contents – in the sense of explaining what doing the trick consists in, what would count as doing it, rather than show how it is done by creatures wired up as we are (1994: 155). The aim of the project towards which the ideas developed in Chapter 8 seek to contribute is precisely to explain how linguistic communication is achieved by ‘creatures wired up like we are’. This project is complementary to – rather than in competition with – the type undertaken by Brandom. The standards by which they will be judged differ greatly. Brandom’s is a philosophical account and will be assessed in terms of its coherence, elegance and ontological economy. The cognitive account put forward in Chapter 8 will ultimately be judged in terms of the
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
22
predictions it makes and whether these are novel, interesting and confirmed. Elegance and ontological economy are considerations, but are not primary: it might turn out that we creatures are wired up pretty messily. However, to offer a cognitive account of assertion is to suppose that assertions can be distinguished from other acts and are there for the explaining. Brandom’s definition of assertion as an act which can both serve as a reason and require the giving of reasons is both original and useful in this respect as it makes no reference to the notion of belief. As we will see in the next chapter, introducing belief into a philosophical analysis of assertion is a problematic move as it assumes that belief can be explained independently of assertion, and – as will also be seen – it is far from obvious that this is the case.
2.3.2 Barker: a speech-act theoretic approach to meaning Like Brandom, Barker (2004) seeks to ground an account of linguistic meaning in speech acts. Unlike Brandom, however, he seeks to do so in overtly psychologistic terms. Psychology enters his story in two ways: on the one hand, he analyses linguistic forms as indicators of characteristic associated intentions, and the interpretation of speaker meaning as relying on the hearer deciding whether the speaker actually has the intentions indicated (2004: 7, 45–62); on the other, the expressive powers of natural language are argued by Barker to be grounded in a more rudimentary representational system of cognitive ‘tracking states’ (2004: 19–20, ch. 7). Barker develops a view on which language derives its meaning not from a mapping relationship with the world – as would be the case on a standard truth-conditional account expressed in model-theoretic terms – but from a linkage between linguistic forms and intentions. Linguistic types are associated by Barker with act types. Declarative sentences, for example, are associated with the act of asserting, while NPs are indicators of an intention to denote (where ‘denote’ is to be understood as ‘to have stand for’ (2004: 5)). According to Barker, by using a given linguistic form, a speaker advertises (i.e. presents herself as having) the intention associated with that form. It does not follow, though, that she in fact has that intention, nor that she intends the hearer to believe that she has it. Whether she has the intentions she advertises is something the hearer must either infer, or determine from the linguistic environment of the intention-indicator: if a declarative sentence, for example, is embedded in the antecedent of a conditional, this
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Assertion in Speech-act Theory 23
Assertion
indicates that the speaker does not have the assertoric intention advertised. Linguistic forms are thus ‘proto-acts’, in Barker’s terminology: they are characteristic of speakers intending to perform certain acts, but their production does not, on its own, constitute performance of those acts (2004: 45–51). Barker rejects the sense/force distinction that is assumed by traditional speech-act theorists. In this, and in his psychologism, Barker is resolutely anti-Fregean in his approach. Indeed, his stated aim is to overthrow Frege’s semantic paradigm (2004: vii). For Barker, assertions – not propositions – are the primary bearers of truth. Assertions, Barker claims, are associated with intentions to express commitment states and have these states accepted, confirmed or rejected by hearers. For a hearer to judge an assertion true is for him to express the same commitment state in his own case.20 Barker analyses assertion as follows. In uttering a declarative sentence, the speaker advertises the intention to assert. This is itself formed of two intentions, one representational and one communicative. The representational intention is to represent a state of affairs;21 the communicative intention is an intention to defend a commitment. A speaker defends a commitment, in Barker’s terms, if the hearer believes that the speaker has that commitment, and either accepts, confirms or rejects that commitment in his own case (2004: 8). But to what exactly does the speaker defend a commitment? The answer Barker gives to this question depends on a distinction he draws between reportive and expressive assertions. A reportive assertion is, in essence, characterised by the speaker’s intention to defend a commitment that the state of affairs described by her utterance obtains, that it is an accurate reflection of how the world is. However, because, according to Barker, logical complexity is not a feature of the world (2007: 4–5), logically complex assertions, such as those containing negation and modal operators, cannot be analysed as involving intentions to represent how the world is. In these cases, Barker claims, speakers do not intend to defend a commitment to a state of affairs obtaining, but to being in a particular commitment state, one that it is correct to be in for a creature whose cognitive system is aimed at accurately representing the world. Thus, in asserting the logically complex (26), the speaker has the following intentions: (26) There is probably life on Mars
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
24
Assertion in Speech-act Theory 25
(27) I believe that there is life on Mars For Barker, two assertions may have the same representational element but be judged true under different circumstances. For example, on his analysis, assertions of both (26) and (27) represent the world as being such that the speaker believes that there is life on Mars. However, because the communicative intention is different in each case, they will be judged true under different circumstances: (27) is a reportive assertion, and will be judged true just in case the hearer agrees that the speaker is in the state described; (26), by contrast, will be judged true if the hearer accepts that the state that the speaker represents herself as being in is a correct one to be in, thereby undertaking commitment to that state in his own case. (2004: 8–13) Thus truth-judgments are not, for Barker, judgements of correspondence, but are to be understood in terms of the attitudes they express, as in Brandom’s framework. To judge an assertion as true is to accept it. What one is accepting, on Barker’s view, depends on the speaker’s communicative intention: in the reportive case, one is accepting that the world is as described by the speaker; in the expressive case, one is agreeing that the state that the speaker is in a correct state to be in, given how the world is. This is not to say that Barker posits two forms of acceptance, though. Claiming that the world is a particular way by performing a reportive assertion is, in effect, on his account, to present oneself as being in a particular commitment state. What distinguishes the commitment states associated with reportive assertion from those associated with expressive assertions is that, in the former case, the state that the speaker is in maps directly to the world, while in the latter it does not. As noted above, Barker grounds his theory of meaning in a notion of basic cognitive states that he calls ‘tracking states’. These are states that represent – or reflect – how the world is (or, in the case of intentional tracking states, how the holder wants the world to be). For expository purposes (though Barker does not speak of them in these terms), we can think of them as logically simple sentences of mentalese with empirical content (i.e.
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Representative intention: to represent a state of affairs in which she believes that there is life on Mars Communicative intention: (a) that her hearer believe that the speaker is in this state and (b) that he accept, confirm or rejects being in that state himself.
Assertion
expressing thoughts like ‘Rain is wet’ rather than ‘Justice is good’).22 They are not beliefs, because beliefs can be logically complex (one can believe that it is not raining, for example), but are a more basic species of thought. Logically complex beliefs are available only to linguistic animals, on Barker’s story. The basic ‘tracking states’ that we are thinking of as simple sentences of mentalese, by contrast, are common to humans and some non-linguistic animals (2004: 190). So, when performing a reportive assertion, the speaker in effect expresses a cognitive state of the basic tracking kind. In accepting this, the hearer is in only a derivative sense accepting that it accurately represents the world. At a more basic level, she is accepting that the state expressed is an appropriate one to be in given how the world is, and hence the acceptance is of the same type that one finds, according to Barker, with expressive assertions. Those, such as Barker, who deny propositions an explanatory role in semantics must find another means of explaining what is common to a group of sentences such as (28) to (30), such that (30) might be uttered to ask whether (28) had been complied with, and (29) uttered to assert that it had: (28) Peter, stand up! (29) Peter is standing up (30) Is Peter standing up?’ Barker explains the meaning common to these three sentences in terms of assertion. An order given using an imperative sentence is analysed as a case of a speaker advertising intentions to: a) represent a state of affairs in which she desires that the hearer sees to it that a certain assertion is correct (in the sense that it is correctly asserted by anyone with perfect information); b) have the hearer believe she has this desire. If the speaker has the advertised intention b), then her utterance is an order (2004: 82) Thus in uttering (28), the speaker is, according to Barker, advertising an intention to represent a desire she has that Peter make the world such that (29) can be correctly asserted. Note that in an order, on Barker’s account, there is no intention advertised to defend commitment to the state represented. This is what distinguishes (31) from (28): although both represent, on his account, the same state of affairs, only (31) advertises the intention that the hearer should accept or reject that representation. In his words, assertions are democratic; orders are not (2004: 44).23
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
26
Assertion in Speech-act Theory 27
(31) I want you to make it the case that Peter stands up
a) to represent a state of affairs in which the speaker desires that the hearer affirm or deny a certain assertion; b) to have the hearer believe that the speaker has this desire. Thus in uttering (30) the speaker advertises an intention to represent a desire she has that the hearer affirm or deny (29). If she has the intention advertised, then she asks a question. The assertion that the speaker wishes to see made correct, in the case of orders, or affirmed or denied, in the case of questions, is identified by the hearer as the assertion that would be performed by the use of a proto-assertion constructed from the lexical elements of the imperative or interrogative sentence. Thus it is not necessary, according to Barker, to assume that there is a common propositional core that (28) to (30) share in order to explain the sense in which they are about the same state of affairs. Assertion is basic, and orders and questions express desires about assertions. Barker is adamant that the assertion (29) is not a component of either (28) or (30): it cannot be, he says, because the imperative and interrogative mood of the sentences uttered means that the speaker ‘does not engage in the behaviour characteristic of someone with an assertive communicative purpose’ (2004: 83). Such behaviour is, for Barker, the uttering of a declarative sentence. Thus, Barker insists, although assertions are required in order to explain the other main illocutionary acts, they do not fulfil this role in the same way that propositions do in traditional speech-act accounts: they are not constituents of these acts. Barker uses the bipartite nature of his analysis of assertion (the distinction between representative and communicative intentions) to distinguish between those propositions that are asserted by a speaker and those to which she is committed, but does not assert. One example he gives are so-called ‘conventional implicatures’ (Grice 1989: 25–6) such as the implication (32) arising from the use of ‘therefore’ in Grice’s famous example (33): (32) Being English entails being brave (33) He’s English. Therefore, he’s brave Barker’s analysis of this case would go as follows: the speaker’s use of ‘therefore’ in (33) advertises her intention to represent herself as being
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
In the case of questions asked using interrogative form, the intentions advertised are as follows:
Assertion
in the state of believing (32) and expresses her intention that the hearer should appeal to his own possession of this state in processing (33). Thus, for Barker, putative conventional implicatures such as those associated with ‘therefore’ and ‘even’ are unlike assertions both in that they have common-ground status and in that, although they advertise the speaker as being in a particular state, they are not associated with any intention to defend that state. In other words, while they share with assertions a representational intention, they lack a communicative intention (2004: 42–4). While both Barker and Brandom are fundamentalists about speech acts, there are important differences between them. At the root of these lie their attitudes to psychologism. As was noted in the previous subsection, Brandom has no interest in explaining the cognitive underpinnings of human linguistic communication: how creatures ‘wired up like us’ come to be competent asserters. Barker, however, does not appear to recognise Brandom’s distinction between theory of assertion and a theory of the human cognitive capacity to engage in that practice. Rather, he makes direct appeal to human ‘wiring’ in his explanations of assertion. Their respective positions on psychologism are reflected in how they ground their theories. Because Brandom seeks to explain semantic relations such as entailment in terms of commitment, the basic requirement, on his account, for becoming an asserter is to be a member of a community, for commitment can only be made sense of in terms of one person having a commitment to another. Brandom’s is therefore a social theory of meaning, one grounded in the idea of a community of language users. Barker, by contrast, grounds his theory in intentions, but to have an intention is, at very least, to have a representation of how one wants the world to be, which in turn entails having a representation of how the world currently is. An intentional account therefore presupposes a level of representation at which intentions are formed. The most basic level of representation, for Barker, is the level of logically simple tracking states discussed above. So, grounding his analysis of assertion in intentions means that Barker must appeal to cognitive science to explain the representational states and computational processes that intention-having presupposes (2004: 74–5). However, as we will now see, this reliance threatens to undermine his anti-Fregean stance. Barker’s problem is that he is ultimately reliant on the very force/sense distinction that he seeks to reject, even though this now operates, for him, at the level of thought. This is because the level of tracking
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
28
states that Barker posits as the medium in which basic intentions are formed contains both doxastic and intentional tracking states (2004: 193). These might be distinguished by saying that the former, as they are correct if they match the world, are truth-apt, while the latter are not. This move is not open to Barker, though, as, for him, to be truthapt is to be associated with an intention to defend being in the state represented: what make assertions truth-apt, on Barker’s account, is that they come with an intention to defend a commitment state. Doxastic tracking properties, though, are the medium in which the commitment states represented by assertions are grounded, so they cannot be seen as intentions to defend those states: they are the objects of defence, not bearers of the defensive stance. Consequently, an alternative criterion to truth-aptness is required in order to distinguish doxastic from intentional tracking states. Barker’s solution is direction of fit: doxastic states are said to have word-to-world direction of fit, intentional states world-to-word (2004: 193). But, as was noted above, direction of fit is a metaphor that needs to be cashed out. Barker’s cashes it out (not in Renewing Meaning, but in a later publication) by saying that to have word-to-world direction of fit is to be a state or act which has a defensive component, and that to have a defensive component is to be truth-apt (Barker 2007: 200). But Barker is adamant that tracking states are not truth-apt, precisely because they lack such a defensive component. It follows, therefore, that they do not – on his definition of the notion – have direction of fit. Without direction of fit, however, Barker has no way of distinguishing doxastic from intentional tracking states, even though such a distinction is required by his theory. Barker’s problems in this respect stem from his desire to undermine the Fregean concept of semantics – especially the sense/force distinction – while at the same time appealing to cognitive science. Traditional cognitive science seeks to explain thought and behaviour in terms of computations over representations. This requires that there be at least two types of representation available to any cognitive system: one that represents how the world is and one that represents goals. Call the first type B-Reps and the second type G-Reps. Goal achievement is recorded by the system when its behaviour results in it tokening a B-Rep that matches a G-Rep. How does it match? It matches when the G-Rep and the B-Rep have the same content, or sense. Thus at the cognitive level, no matter how sub-personal you go, a means of distinguishing goal representations from state-of the world representations is needed, and so is a means of matching them up. This is precisely what the force/sense distinction does. Cognitive science is inherently
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Assertion in Speech-act Theory 29
Assertion
Fregean, and it cannot be appealed to in order to bring down the Fregean project.24 In more recent work, Barker (2007) no longer relies on appeals to traditional cognitive science. To outline these developments would take us too far afield here, but the lesson from the previous discussion is important for the present project. The proposals developed in Chapter 8 are couched in a cognitive theory of communication that assumes that thought can be usefully modelled in terms of computations over representations (essentially the position defended by Fodor 1981; 1998; 2008). We can now see that any such project cannot do without the sense/force distinction, and hence a position will have to be taken on the nature of propositions. This is given below in section 3.
2.4 Conclusion Of the topics that have been discussed in this chapter, three require special attention. First, there is the issue of propositionhood. Is there a core meaning over which illocutionary force operates, as the traditionalists have it, or is assertion basic, as the fundamentalists insist? The position taken in this book will be that assertion is fundamental, primarily for the reasons given in section 3.3: in a truth-based theory of meaning, the ultimate explanans must be truth bearers; propositionhood alone is insufficient for truth aptness; consequently, propositions are not truth-bearers. However, it is convenient to be able to talk of assertions expressing propositions, and of an assertion sharing a propositional core with other illocutionary acts, such as an order or question. Fortunately, we can continue to make use of this idiom by making the following stipulations: 1. To say that an assertion A expresses a proposition P is to say that there is a set of possible worlds in which A would be correctly judged true. We can then, inspired by Stalnaker (1978/1999) identify, P with that set of worlds. 2. To say that A, an order O and a question Q express the same proposition P is to say that, in order to identify the set of worlds in which O is complied with or Q correctly affirmed, we must derive a declarative sentence from the lexical elements of O or Q (respecting contextual parameters). An assertion of this declarative sentence will pick out the set of worlds P in which A is true, O is complied with or Q correctly affirmed.25
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
30
On this view, then, each non-assertive sentential utterance is related, by virtue of its lexical elements, to a derivable assertive utterance. The satisfaction (e.g. compliance) conditions of the non-assertive utterance are the truth conditions of the derived assertive. Talk of propositions is a convenient abstraction from this relationship. The second point relates to giving due credit to the importance of the consequences of assertion to its analysis. This point, made initially by Dummett and later developed by Brandom, will be shown in Chapter 4 to shed light on the nature of the relationship between assertoric force and declarative mood. In particular, it will be shown how viewing assertion in these terms allows one to hold the view that the declarative is an indicator of assertoric force, while also making available straightforward analyses of non-assertoric uses of this form. The third point is related to the second. The expressivist approach to truth advocated by the fundamentalists offers an alternative perspective on truth judgements in linguistic theorising. On this view, to judge an assertion as true is to accept the consequences of that assertion. Acceptance is only an issue, however, when rejection is also possible. In cases where rejection is not possible, acceptance, and hence truth judgements, should no longer be an issue. In Chapter 4, it will be argued that in cases where witnessing a non-assertoric utterance of a declarative sentence that expresses P results in the same commitments that follow from accepting an assertion that P, then rejection is not an issue and truth judgements do not apply. This analysis is applied to promises, certain commands, and explicit performatives. So far, then, most of the implications for the remainder of this book come from the fundamentalists. What of the traditionalists? The traditionalists’ emphasis on assertion as an expression of belief certainly needs attention. Indeed, so much so that this is the topic of the next chapter.
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Assertion in Speech-act Theory 31
3
3.1 Introduction Perhaps the most natural way to think about the relationship between assertion and belief is to see former as the expression – or exteriorisation – of the latter. This is certainly how Frege saw it. For him, belief is the result of judging a thought true, and assertion is the manifestation of that judgement (1918–19/1997: 329). Viewed this way, assertion can only be analysed given a prior notion of belief. This order of priority is found throughout linguistics and philosophy of language. Bach and Harnish (1979), as we saw in Chapter 2, analyse assertion as involving the expression of belief and the intention to cause belief formation in others. In this, they take their cue from Grice, who saw the speaker’s intention that ‘the hearer should think that the speaker believes something’ (1989: 123, original emphasis) as key to the correct analysis of assertion. Furthermore, it is now widely agreed in linguistic pragmatics that the linguistically encoded meaning of an assertion dramatically underdetermines the proposition to which the speaker undertakes a commitment (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995; Bach 1994; Carston 2002; Recanati 2004). On this view, assertions derive their full meaning from the beliefs they express, and hence this ‘underdeterminacy thesis’, as it is commonly called, appears to require that belief must be seen as more fundamental than assertion. It might be thought, then, that there is universal consensus on this issue. However, there are those, such as Dummett, who dissent, arguing that placing belief before assertion gets the order of explanation wrong: it is belief, they say, that should be analysed in terms of assertion, not vice versa. We will see in section 3.2 that Dummett’s arguments to this effect are strong, but we will also see that whether, and in what 32
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Assertion, Belief and Knowledge
sense, assertion is correctly said to be prior to belief depends very much on what project one is engaged in: the philosophical undertaking of explaining what the practice of assertion and the notion of belief consist in, or the scientific task of explaining the cognitive mechanisms underlying the human capacity for assertion. In section 3.3, we will take as given that, from the point of view of the cognitive project to which the proposals developed in Chapter 8 seek to contribute, belief is prior to assertion and that assertions are expressions of belief. The question to be considered in that section is whether we should then see the interpretation of assertions as necessarily involving belief attribution on the part of the hearer. It is not obvious that this is the case. It is possible that assertions are caused by and express beliefs, but that belief attribution is not required for their interpretation. It is certainly the case that some forms of animal communication have these characteristics. For example, the vervet monkey’s alarm call (Seyfarth et al. 1980) is caused by the animal’s belief that a snake is present and can hence be seen as an expression of that belief, but it does not follow that interpreting the call requires that the monkey’s conspecifics attribute to it these beliefs.1 As we will see, a number of authors have argued that all that is needed for the practice of assertion to function in a large proportion of cases is that hearers take asserters to be sources of information – or knowledge – rather than expressers of belief, still others have argued that assertion should be analysed primarily in terms of its relationship to knowledge, rather than to belief. This knowledge account of assertion is discussed in section 3.4.
3.2 Assertion and belief: what is the correct order of explanation? This section is devoted to a discussion of Dummett’s view that belief should be explained in terms of assertion, and not vice versa. The consequences of this claim for cognitive science are discussed, as is some evidence that, from an empirical point of view, investigating Dummett’s claims might prove fruitful in terms of an understanding of how children develop the notion of representation that underlies their eventual grasp of belief. The argument put forward by Dummett (1981; 1993) for the priority of assertion over belief can be summarised as follows: 1. The notion of belief is reliant on a notion of truth. 2. Truth must be explained, in part, in terms of treating as true.
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Assertion, Belief and Knowledge 33
Assertion
3. Treating as true is a practice. 4. Given 2 and 3, it follows that truth cannot be explained without reference to a practice that exemplifies treating as true. 5. Assertion is the practice that best exemplifies treating as true. 6. Given 4 and 5, it follows that assertion cannot be explained in terms of belief, for the notion of belief is reliant on the notion of truth, which must itself be explained in terms of the practice that best exemplifies treating as true: assertion. Let’s look at each of these steps. Step 1 claims that belief cannot be explicated without recourse to the notion of truth. This is uncontroversial: belief is standardly characterised as an attitude to a proposition, that attitude being one of holding that its propositional object is true. Though Dummett (1993: 217) speaks of belief as holding a sentence – rather than a proposition – to be true, nothing hinges on this for present purposes. In discussing his argument, too will use the term ‘sentence’ where I would normally be more inclined to say ‘proposition’. Step 2 is to claim that truth must be explained, in part, in terms of treating as true (Dummett 1993: 221). This in opposition to the view that the notion of truth can be given an analysis solely in terms of the conditions that make a sentence, statement, belief or proposition (choose your favourite fundamental truth-bearer) true. Dummett does not deny, however, that the notion of truth-conditions has a role to play in explicating truth. His claim is, rather, that merely being able to divide a set of sentences into those whose truth conditions obtain, and those whose do not, shows only a partial grasp of the notion of truth, for it fails to demonstrate an appreciation of the point of truth judgements. To show that one has a grasp of the point of such judgements, Dummett argues, one must demonstrate a grasp of the consequences, both practical and inferential, of judging a sentence true (Dummett 1981: 453). It follows from this that a complete account of truth requires an explanation of what it is to treat as true a sentence so judged. To digress slightly, it is this claim that lies at the root of Dummett’s disagreement with Davidson over the adequacy of a disquotational theory of meaning (Dummett 1989/1993; 1993). To say, as Davidson (1967/2001) does, that the meaning of a sentence such as (1) can be captured by the T-sentence (2) is, according to Dummett, only partly correct. (1) Snow is white. (2) ‘Snow is white’ is true iff snow is white. (3) ‘Snow is white’ is labelled ‘true’ iff snow is white.
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
34
What a disquotational theory of meaning captures is the competent speaker’s ability to divide sentences into those which are correctly called ‘false’ and those which are correctly called ‘true’. But competent language users know more than this, Dummett argues: they know that judging a sentence true carries with it certain consequences, and it is only when one grasps this, he claims, that one can be said to be a fully competent language user. Dummett’s point here can be illustrated by saying that, according to him, the T-sentence (2) should be rewritten with ‘true’ in quotation, as in (3), for what a T-sentence captures is the ability to label a sentence correctly. It says nothing about the language user’s grasp of the point of such labelling, but it is precisely this, for Dummett, that is the key to understanding the significance of the label applied. In sum, the ability to decide correctly whether or not a sentence is true is insufficient to indicate a grasp of truth, according to Dummett. To show this, he argues, one must show that one understands what it is to treat a sentence as true. This requires competence in a practice that exemplifies treating as true. The preceding discussion has brought us to step 4 of Dummett’s argument for the priority of belief over assertion. We must now ask which practice best exemplifies treating as true. As we have just seen, to treat a sentence as true is, on Dummett’s account, to grasp its practical and inferential consequences. What behaviour would count as evidence of grasping these? While other forms of behaviour might demonstrate a grasp of some of the practical consequences of treating a sentence as true, many, perhaps most, of its inferential consequences can only be demonstrated by asserting (or assenting to assertions of) those consequences and denying those statements which are not consequences. It is fair to say, then, that treating as true is best exemplified by competence in the practice of assertion.2 This is step 5 of the argument. From this and step 4, step 6 follows: assertion cannot be explained in terms of belief, for assertion is required to explain the notion of truth, which is in turn needed to explain belief. This is a strong argument for the priority of assertion over belief, one that I am inclined to accept. What is particularly attractive about it is that the tight relationship it posits between notions of truth and assertion affords an understanding of falsity that alternative accounts do not provide. For example, the notion of truth employed in model-theoretic accounts of meaning reduces falsity to a failure to map to the model. But this does not distinguish acts which are not truth apt, such as directives performed by uttering imperatives, from false assertions. Both fail to map to a model of the world, but only the latter are correctly described as false. Dummett’s account suggests the following explanation: to be
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Assertion, Belief and Knowledge 35
Assertion
aptly described as false, a propositional form must be the sort of thing that can be treated as true. To treat a propositional form as true, though, is not merely to tick a box indicating that it maps to a model: it is to express a judgement that has consequences, these consequences being dependent both on what other propositions the individual has judged true, and on her intentions and desires. To accept a false assertion, on this view, is to undertake commitment to the consequences of that assertion even though the appropriate conditions for making it do not obtain. The absence of the conditions for assertion is part of what falsity amounts to, but it is not the whole story. However, despite my acceptance of Dummett’s argument for the priority of assertion over belief, I am intending to put forward in Chapter 8 a cognitive account of assertion which sees assertions as deriving their meaning from the beliefs they communicate. Such a view gives explanatory priority to beliefs over assertions. It is possible, however, to maintain the position that, from a philosophical point of view, assertion is prior to belief, while in the terms of cognitive science, belief is fundamental to assertion in an important sense. The order of explanation with which Dummett is concerned is an issue of conceptual priority. On this view, if we want to give an analysis of the notion of belief, we cannot do so without reference to assertion. It does not follow from this, though, that the empirical order of explanation will be the same. It may well be that, armed with the concepts of belief and assertion, we can devise an accurate model of communication according to which assertions derive their meaning from beliefs that they express. Thus, as long as philosophical questions of conceptual priority are kept apart from empirical questions about the cognitive processes involved in utterance interpretation, there is no conflict between the view that the notion of assertion is conceptually prior to the notion of belief, and the view that assertoric utterances derive their content from the beliefs they express. This is not to say that issues of conceptual priority necessarily have no bearing on empirical matters. Indeed, the assertion-first view proposed by Dummett does suggest the empirical hypothesis that competence in assertion is the means by which one comes to understand the notions of truth and falsity that underlie a full-fledged conception of belief. On this reading, the assertion-first view predicts that the grasp of truth and falsity required by the notion of belief will only be available to competent asserters. In other words, pre-linguistic humans (and non-linguistic animals) should not be able to demonstrate a grasp of the concept of belief. We will briefly consider whether this prediction is borne out.
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
36
To have a full-fledged conception of the notion of belief is, minimally, to understand that action is guided not by how the world is but by how it is represented as being, such that when there is a mismatch between how the world is and how it is represented, the agent will act in accordance with how he represents the world rather than how it actually is. Underlying this is the recognition that falsity is about more than a failure of a representation to map reality. As we have seen, to grasp falsity, one must comprehend the distinction between the conditions for correctly judging true and the consequences of doing so, and appreciate that the consequences of a truth judgement follow even if the conditions that would make such a judgement correct do not obtain. The acid test for a grasp of the causal powers of false belief is the ability to pass one of the battery of false-belief tests that have been developed by experimental psychologists. The most well known is probably the Sally-Ann test (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985), in which a child is asked to predict where an agent will look for an object about whose location the agent has a false belief. To pass the test the subject must indicate that the agent will look for the object where she believes it to be, rather than where the subject knows it to be. Applied empirically, Dummett’s assertion-first account of belief predicts that passing this test will be possible only for competent asserters, as it is through competence in this practice that the required understanding of falsity is said to develop. There is some evidence that this is the case. It is now widely accepted that a certain degree of linguistic competence is required to pass the standard false-belief tests (Astington and Jenkins 1999; de Villiers and de Villiers 2000; Ruffman et al. 2003). Moreover, there is also evidence that it is competence in the use of the syntax of ‘say’-complements (i.e. embedded declarative syntax) that is the single best linguistic predictor of success in these tasks (de Villiers and Pyers 2002; Hale and TagerFlusberg 2003; Lohmann and Tomasello 2003). ‘Say’-sentences are used to report assertions, and are found in discourse that aims to explain behaviour in terms of the commitments undertaken by those engaged in making and responding to assertions (e.g. ‘Johnny looked in the cupboard for the biscuits because that’s where Billy said that the biscuits were’). Competence in the production and reception of complex sentences with embedded declarative syntax is an indication that a child can identify assertions as a class of acts and that she is able to participate in discourse in which the commitments undertaken by asserters are discussed. Indeed, there is evidence that it is engagement in this discourse – rather than mere syntactic competence – that is the key
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Assertion, Belief and Knowledge 37
Assertion
to developing the ability to predict behaviour based on false belief (Slaughter et al. 2007). These speculations are expanded on in detail in Jary (2010), and to go into them now would take us too far afield.3 The crucial point for present purposes is that the philosophical view of assertion as prior to belief, as defended by Dummett, is not incompatible with an approach to the science of utterance interpretation that seeks to explain assertion in terms of the communication of belief, treating belief as prior. The first is a conceptual claim, the second an empirical one. The position taken is this book, then, will be that assertion is conceptually prior to belief: if we want to say what assertion is without reference to the cognitive capacities that allow us to engage in this practice, then we cannot do so by reference to belief expression. This is because, as Dummett argues, the concept of belief is reliant on the notion of truth; the notion of truth requires for its explication reference to the consequences of a truth judgement; and these consequences can be explained only by recourse to the practice of assertion. However, from the point of view of explaining how beings ‘wired up like us’ (to borrow Brandom’s characterisation of the cognitive-science enterprise) engage in assertion, the order is best reversed: assertion is most profitably analysed as the expression and communication of belief.4
3.3 Assertion and belief attribution The view that there is a correct order of explanation between belief and assertion grants that there is relationship between the two notions, and that there is such a relationship is not seriously disputed by anyone, as far as I know. It is generally accepted that a sincere assertion expresses a belief of the speaker’s and, when accepted, results in the adoption of that belief by the hearer – what debate there is concerns how kernel this is to the correct analysis of assertion. It is also widely accepted, though, that assertions are a source of information about how the world is beyond the internal life of the speaker. Much – perhaps most – of the knowledge we have of the world comes from testimony, i.e. what we have been told rather than from what we have observed.5 Where theorists differ is on the question of which of these two observations is the key to the correct analysis of assertion. For some, most notably Grice, assertion is to be analysed as being characterised by the intention that the hearer should come to think that the speaker believes that P, there often being an ulterior intention to the effect that the hearer should also come to believe that P himself (1989: 123). This view is accepted by Strawson (1971) and,
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
38
as we saw in Chapter 2, by Bach and Harnish (1979), although the latter see the intention that the hearer believe that P as a primary, not ulterior, assertoric intention. Those who object to this view include Dummett (1989/1993), McDowell (1980/1998) and Millikan (2004: ch. 9; 2005: ch. 10). For these authors, assertions are primarily sources of information about how the world is, not how it is represented by the speaker. Assertions, on this view, are a form of perception by proxy, and only derivatively do they serve as indications of the speaker’s doxastic state. In this section, I will look at these views more closely before presenting a hybrid position. This sees assertion as primarily a phenomenon of information transfer that is underpinned by a special type of intention, the full recognition of which involves attributing the belief that P to the speaker. However, it will be claimed that this communicative intention does not necessarily play a direct role in the process of interpreting an assertion. Rather, it is there to be called upon when needed. The view of assertion as being first and foremost about the communication of speaker attitudes has its roots in Grice’s notion of non-natural meaning, of which utterance meaning is an instance. Gricean nonnatural meaning is characterised by its association with special type of intention: the intention to induce a certain belief in the audience via the recognition of that intention (1989: 218–19). On this view, identifying utterance-meaning necessarily involves attributing intentions, and the intentions that need to be ascribed concern propositional attitudes of the speaker. In the case of an assertion that P, the attitude that needs to be attributed to the speaker, according to Grice (1989: 123), is the intention that the hearer should think that the speaker believes that P. As just noted, Grice saw the intention that the speaker believe that P as a possible ulterior motive, one that is present in only a subset of assertions. Where present, though, this ulterior intention is parasitic, according to Grice, on the speaker’s prior intention to exhibit her belief that P. So, on the Gricean view, interpreting an assertion is a special type of belief attribution. For those who oppose this position, analysing assertions as cases of invited belief attribution gets things the wrong way round. Assertions, say critics of the Gricean view, are primarily a means of information transfer, and the fact that they can serve as indicators of the speaker’s belief state is a by-product of that function. The following quotation from Dummett is a forthright expression of this position: It is essential to our most basic acquisition of the practice of using a language that we learn to act on what others tell us; only as a more
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Assertion, Belief and Knowledge 39
Assertion
sophisticated by-product do we learn to use their utterances as revealing their beliefs, and even then, their intention is typically to inform us that what they say is so rather than to allow us a glimpse of their private convictions. Were it otherwise, it would be, as it were, an afterthought that we could, by making an unintended use of them, gain information from the assertions of others; and we should accept those assertions as true only on occasions on which we had particular reason to trust the speaker’s veracity, rather than, as now, whenever we have no particular reason to doubt it (1989/1993: 171, original emphasis). Further doubt is cast on the Gricean picture by the developmental evidence. The view that interpreting an assertion requires the attribution of a belief to the asserter assumes that belief attribution is within the capacities of all who respond appropriately to assertions. However, young children who cannot demonstrate (by passing one of the false-belief tests mentioned in section 3.2) a conception of belief appear to be able to make, and respond appropriately to, assertions (Breheny 2006). This suggests that the ability to attribute belief is not a prerequisite for at least novice-level competence in the practice of assertion. The alternative to the Gricean view of assertion we can dub the ‘perception-by-proxy view.’6 According to this picture, assertion is first and foremost a means of information transfer and a direct cause of belief formation, the beliefs formed having the same propositional content as the assertion. Dummett says that ‘we learn to react to the statements of others in the same way that we react to various observed features in the environment’ (1981: 355); while Millikan says: ‘Forming a belief about where Johnny is on the basis of being told where he is, is just as direct a process (and just as indirect) as forming a belief about where Johnny is on the basis of seeing him there’ (2004: 125). In addition to not requiring that young children be competent belief attributors, the perception-by-proxy view has the advantage of being phenomenologically compelling: it doesn’t feel, in most cases, as if we go through the process of attributing beliefs in the interpretation of quotidian assertions. When a friend tells us of her weekend, it does not seem as if we treat what she says as primarily an expression of her beliefs about what she did: rather, we treat it as information about what she did. That said, though, the perception-by-proxy view is not without its problems, and it is to these that we now turn. The first problem is that the perception-by-proxy view does not recognise a distinction between understanding an assertion and accepting it.
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
40
While it is certainly the case that we unreflectively accept many of the assertions directed at us, it is also undoubtedly true that there are many assertions directed at us which we do not accept; yet we still understand these. Comprehension and acceptance, then, are different things, and what a theory of assertion qua speech act should do (especially if it wants to respect the illocutionary/perlocutionary distinction), is to explain the former, not the latter. The perception-by-proxy view, at least in its simplest form, misses this point. The second problem is that utterance interpretation just does seem to need recognition of a special kind of intention. What distinguishes an assertion from a case of recital, for example, is speaker intention, and hearers need to be sensitive to this. But once this point is conceded, then the question of what type of intention the hearer must recognise once again raises its head. An off-the-shelf answer is that an intention broadly of the Gricean type is needed, and this requires attributing an intention to cause the hearer to form a belief about the speaker’s belief. Belief attribution is then back in the picture and the comprehension/acceptance distinction comes for free: comprehension just is, on this story, attributing the correct intention about a belief, but this does not entail acceptance of the belief on the hearer’s part. If the perception-by-proxy view is to be saved, then, it must find a way of distinguishing communicative acts of language production from noncommunicative acts, and this can only be done by accepting that this requires that intention attribution plays a role in the interpretation of assertions. We might ask, though, whether the required intention attribution necessarily involves belief attribution: could it not be the case that the intention that is attributed is an intention to impart information? This would give us a perception-by-proxy account that is Gricean in the stress it places on the role of intention attribution, but without Grice’s insistence that the intentions in question concern belief attributions. Let’s spell this proposal out in more detail before considering objections. The idea is this: assertion comes with an overt intention to let the hearer know that P, where P is the proposition explicitly expressed by the utterance, (where ‘know’ is understood as having information rather than having a justified true belief). Correctly identifying the production of a declarative sentence as an assertion and not, say, a case of recital, requires attributing to the speaker the overt intention to let the hearer know that P. This solves the problem of the need to distinguish assertions from the non-illocutionary production of assertoric forms, but it does not solve the comprehension/acceptance problem: on this
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Assertion, Belief and Knowledge 41
Assertion
story, once the intention has been recognised, P has been accepted by the hearer. This is because ‘know’ is a factive verb, and assigning an intention let the hearer know that P is to accept thereby that P. Before we consider this problem, note first that the comprehension/acceptance distinction is only an issue for assertive speech acts: in the interpretation of, for example, orders, questions and promises, interpretation and acceptance of the thought that the speaker wishes to communicate coincide. Correctly interpreting these speech acts requires the hearer forming, respectively, beliefs of the following type: (4) The speaker wants me to make it the case that P (5) The speaker wants to know whether P (6) The speaker promises that P Unless the hearer forms belief of these types, as a result of interpreting the utterance, he has not comprehended the utterance. In these cases, then, comprehension is acceptance (cf. McDowell 1980/1998: 42). What distinguishes assertion is that acceptance involves more than the hearer correctly describing the goal of some observed behaviour. Acceptance of an assertion requires the hearer not only forming a belief of the form (7) but also of the form (8), when (in straightforward cases) he has no perceptual evidence that P beyond the assertion. What the non-assertive cases show, though, is that it is not a feature of linguistic communication in general that comprehension and acceptance must be kept apart. Rather, it is a feature specific to assertion. (7) The speaker as asserted that P (8) P But it is one thing to say that assertion allows for the possibility of acceptance without comprehension, and another to say that in, the process of interpreting an assertion, comprehension necessarily precedes and is distinct from acceptance. It is open to a holder of the perception-byproxy view to maintain that although assertion doesn’t necessarily result in acceptance, this is in some sense the normal or primary procedure, the bifurcation of interpretation and acceptance being a secondary phenomenon. The challenge is to cash out the ‘in some sense’ and say just how information transfer is primary, while also allowing for the comprehension/acceptance distinction to be maintained where necessary. In the remainder of this section, I will outline a view that meets these criteria, building on suggestions made by McDowell (1980/1998).
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
42
McDowell argues that a knowledge transfer account of assertion can be seen as prior in both phylogenetic and ontogenetic terms. He suggests that protolinguistic communication in humans was of the instinctive sort typified by the vervet monkey’s alarm call, as mentioned above in section 3.1. This sort of communicative behaviour does not rely on intention recognition or belief attribution. Rather, ‘When the communicative process functions properly, sensory confrontation with a piece of communicative behaviour has the same impact on the state of a perceiver as sensory confrontation with the states of affairs that the behaviour, as we may say, represents; elements of the communicative repertoire serve as epistemic surrogates for the represented states of affairs’ (McDowell 1980/1998: 45). Communication of this type, then, has the same impact on the cognitive disposition of the receiver as direct perception of the state of affairs represented. It is plausible, he claims, that ‘the assertoric core of linguistic behaviour is a descendent, now under intentional control, of the sort of instinctive communicative repertoire [typified by vervet monkeys]’ (loc. cit).7 Such a story, he goes on to suggest, can be told at the ontogenetic level too: ‘The acquisition of linguistic competence by a contemporary human being may be expected to recapitulate, in some salient respect, the evolution of language from instinctive communicative behaviours’ (1980/1998: 47). What McDowell suggests, then, is that the child’s early competence in communciation involves treating this type of utterance as a source of information about the world, rather than a source of information about the speaker’s beliefs. The ability to see assertions as indicators of the speaker’s epistemic state is a later development, dependent on a grasp of the representational capacities of assertion: ‘It is not that their [i.e. assertions’] capacity for use as expressive of belief breathes into them the life that enables them to represent reality, but rather that their antecedent capacity to represent reality is what makes them capable of expressing beliefs’ (McDowell 1980/1998: 48). If it is accepted that, as far as pre-belief-attributing children go, utterance interpretation is a form of perception-by-proxy, in which interpretation and acceptance are one and the same process, the question that follows is this: what happens when these children do acquire the ability to attribute beliefs? Two possible answers present themselves. One is that the interpretation process undergoes a radical overhaul, such that children now react to assertions primarily as expressions of belief and only as sources of knowledge if the speaker is judged to be reliable, and what she says is plausible. The other is that interpretation proceeds
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Assertion, Belief and Knowledge 43
Assertion
as before, but that belief attribution can be brought in to assist when necessary. This could be for a number of reasons: it might be that the speaker is judged unreliable or untrustworthy; that what she asserts is implausible; that the significance of her utterance cannot be ascertained without taking into account her belief state; or that the nature of the interaction means that it is common ground that the speaker’s aim is to persuade, rather than to inform, as in academic discourse. Of the two possible answers, the second seems the most likely. It would be odd for a cognitive system to completely abandon procedures that have taken a significant amount of time and energy to develop. It is much more likely that the system would be augmented with new procedures, these being brought into play when things go awry. On this view, the hearer treats assertions as a direct source of knowledge that the state of affairs represented obtains unless he has reason not to. The idea, then, is that a complex intention of the type that Grice saw as constitutive of speaker meaning is attributable by the hearer to the speaker, but not necessarily made use of in every case of interpretation. Sperber and Wilson’s notion of manifestness is useful here. An assumption is manifest to an individual iff he is capable of representing it mentally and judging it as true or probably true (1986/1995: 39).8 Importantly, an assumption does not have to be mentally represented by an individual to be manifest to that individual: it must merely be capable of being made so. Equally important is that only assumptions that are mentally represented can play a causal role in the interpretation process. The fact that an assumption is made manifest to the hearer by a speech act does not therefore entail that it plays a causal role in the interpretation of that utterance. This notion of manifestness is useful in reconciling Gricean (in the sense that they involve belief attribution) and perception-by-proxy accounts of assertion, for it suggests a means by which a special type of intention can be characteristic of assertion without necessarily playing a role in the interpretation of every assertion. We can say that a complex intention about the belief states of the speaker and hearer, underlies assertion, and that acts of assertion make that intention manifest, without it following that a representation of that intention necessarily plays a role in the interpretation of every assertion. In other words, assertions necessarily make manifest, to a hearer capable of belief attribution, this sort of complex intention about beliefs, but this intention need not be taken into account in the interpretive process. Looked at this way, Grice-style intentions are a sort of meta-communicative insight that we employ in order to help us interpret cases in which basic
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
44
interpretive processes either won’t work, or would be likely to lead to us acquiring false beliefs (cf. Millikan 1984: 69). The hybrid view I propose, then, is this: novice competence in assertion, of the sort developed by young children is indeed a form of perception by proxy in which comprehension and acceptance coincide. The onset of the ability to attribute beliefs allows the child to conceptualise assertions as expressions of belief, and as attempts to cause beliefs. This is the ability to attribute Gricean-style intentions to communicators. However, this new insight does not result in the wholesale rejection of the interpretative procedures that have served the child well up to that point. Rather, these are augmented by the child’s new capacities, and these are brought to bear on the interpretive process only when needed, such as when the speaker is judged to be incompetent, unreliable or untrustworthy, or when, for example, the nature of the interaction makes it obvious that the speaker is not intending to inform, but to persuade, as in academic discourse. This position does require that the ability to recognise the intention to communicate by the use of language (rather than to recite, say) is not equated with the ability to attribute Gricean intentions. But that is not a problematic requirement. Sperber and Wilson characterise overt communicative behaviour as ‘ostensive’. In communication of this type, the communicator produces a stimulus (linguistic or otherwise) that makes mutually manifest to communicator and audience that the communicator intends, by means of that stimulus, to make manifest a set of assumptions (1986/1995: 63). As theorists, we might gloss ‘make manifest’ as ‘cause to believe’ (though in doing so we would lose some of the attractive features of the notion of manifestness). From the perspective of the child who has no conception of belief, though, we can gloss it as ‘make known’. To recognise ostension, then, is just to recognise behaviour as being directed at providing information: we only need to think of it as aimed at expressing – and possibly instilling – belief if, whether as theorists or as sophisticated communicators, we adopt a meta-communicative stance. In sum, then: assertion is primarily a means of knowledge transfer in the sense that this is what the practice has evolved to achieve, and this is how it is treated by novice asserters. Moreover, even sophisticated communicators may treat it as such unless they have reason not to. When a hearer approaches assertion in this way, comprehension and acceptance coincide. Looked at from the outside, however, this knowledge-transfer process functions by means of belief expression. To view assertion this way is to take a meta-communicative stance towards it. Such a stance
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Assertion, Belief and Knowledge 45
Assertion
is available both to the theorist and to the sophisticated communicator, both of whom have the notion of belief in their conceptual repertoires. When the sophisticated communicator adopts this stance, comprehension and acceptance come apart. Sophisticated communicative interactions, such as academic discourse, rely on both speaker and hearer adopting this meta-communicative perspective. That said, questions of truth and falsity – and hence of acceptance and rejection – can be entertained only when the meta-communicative stance is taken. And as assertion is bound up with truth, full-fledged competence in assertion results only when such a stance can be taken. This is the point acknowledged by Dummett when he says, ‘we might say that the child cannot assert anything until he can lie. It is this insight which underlies Grice’s account of meaning’ (1981: 453).
3.4 Assertion and knowledge If proto-assertion were, as the McDowell view suggests, primarily perception by proxy, then it would not be surprising to find that some means of ensuring the reliability of this source of information were to develop. One possibility is that a cost because associated with passing on misinformation, such that an individual who did so became liable to receive some form of social sanction. This would explain how, in full-fledged assertion, speakers come to take responsibility for what they assert, such that they can be rebuked if what they say is false. For Williamson (1996), assertion is essentially an activity in which asserters take responsibility for the quality of the information that they pass on, this responsibility being such that speakers should only assert what they are certain of, i.e. what they know. In developing his position, Williamson seeks a constitutive rule for assertion that will distinguish it form other speech acts. A constitutive rule is, as the name suggests, a means of isolating the essence of an activity, and whatever rule is constitutive of assertion, Williamson argues, can be expressed in the form given in (9):9 (9) One must ((assert that P) only if certain conditions pertain) Formulating the constitutive rule for assertion requires specifying what the ‘certain conditions’ are. Williamson argues that the condition cannot simply be that P be true, for this would fail to individuate assertion, there being other speech acts, such as conjecturing and swearing, which are also subject to the rule that they should only be performed if the
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
46
speaker believes them to be true, or likely to be so. One might want to argue that swearing that P is merely a strong form of asserting that P, but this, Williamson argues, would not undermine his case: for him, the key point is that assertion lies on a cline between conjecturing and swearing, each point on the cline having different standards of warranting evidence. Someone wanting to maintain that truth individuated assertion would have to argue that the standard of evidence required for assertion was ‘more intimately related to truth’ (1996: 497) than other truth-aiming speech acts. For Williamson, what distinguishes assertion from other truth-aiming speech acts is that the standard of evidence it requires is different from that required by the others: the evidence required for assertion, Williamson argues, is knowledge. On this view, the rule constitutive of assertion is: (10) One must ((assert that P) only if one knows that P) It is important to note that the claim is not that people only assert what they know, rather that they are open to rebuke if it turns out that they do not know what they assert. As García-Carpintero puts it: It is of course no objection to such an account that there are assertions whose producers lack knowledge of the contents they assert. The claim is not that knowledge by the asserter [. . .] of the asserted proposition is essential; the claim is rather that being subject to blame if knowledge [. . . is] missing is essential (2004: 145). In his attempt to show that knowledge is what warrants assertion, Williamson (1996) imagines a lottery in which the chances of winning are very low, say 14 million to 1, and in which there can only be one winner. A friend of yours has only one ticket and you say to him, after the draw has taken place but without either of you being aware of the outcome (but both aware of the odds): (11) Your ticket didn’t win The crucial point about (11) is that one can be very sure that it is true (the odds on it not being true are 14 million to 1), but it is still faulty in the circumstances described. If assertion were warranted by truth, though, then (11) should be OK, for it is highly likely to be true. The fact that (11) is not acceptable leads Williamson to conclude that
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Assertion, Belief and Knowledge 47
48
Assertion
what warrants assertion is not the very probable truth of P, but that the speaker knows that P (as opposed to her justifiably believing that P).
Moreover, Williamson argues that there is a difference in effect between (11) and (12) which would not exist if assertion were warranted by truth. (11) would be warranted, according to a defender of the truth-theory of assertion, by its almost certain truth. One should therefore expect, on this view, that (12) (which explicitly expresses the almost-certainty of the proposition expressed by (11)) would have the same effect and therefore be faulty in the same way. However, while (11) could be responded to, in the circumstances under consideration, by asking ‘How do you know?, (12) could be responded to by saying ‘I know’ (1996: 499–500). Or, to make the point another way, while (11) would be felt deceitful in the situation described, (12) would merely be uninformative. Indeed, the fact that one can respond ‘How do you know?’ to an assertion, Williamson argues, indicates that assertion presupposes knowledge. Moreover, ‘Do you know that?’ is an aggressive response to assertion, and the aggressiveness can be explained by the fact that it calls into question the speaker’s warrant to assert (1996: 505–6). The fact that speakers often assert when they do not have knowledge, Williamson goes on to argue, is not a problem for his account, as breaking a constitutive rule (a norm) does not mean that the activity it constitutes does not take place. There are different standards of rules for different occasions (the offside rule is not generally observed in informal games of football). Thus, in gossip, although one may assert without knowledge, it is not that the knowledge rule is not in force, but that breaking it is of little consequence (1996: 511). As noted above, the reason there exists a speech-act that is warranted by knowledge rather than (highly probable, belief-warranting) truth, Williamson suggests, is that, when one asserts, one takes responsibility for the truth of what one says, a responsibility one discharges by epistemically ensuring the truth of the content. It is because humans have a use for relations of responsibility, then, that the act of assertion exists, according to Williamson (1996: 521–2). Williamson’s claim that assertion is primarily a means of taking responsibility is supported by the variety of means a speaker has available to avoid taking epistemic responsibility for the information she seeks to communicate, even when she is inclined to take it to treat it as true. Evidential particles are the obvious example, but the epistemic use of ‘must’ and ‘can’t’ are
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
(12) Your ticket is almost certain not to have won
notable as means of presenting information as certain without claiming knowledge. While generally very sympathetic to Williamson’s account of assertion, García-Carpintero (2004) argues that it fails to reflect the social function of assertion as a means of transferring knowledge: someone performing soliloquies in the absence of an audience could be complying with the knowledge rule, even though she would not be communicating anything to anybody. And surely, if one wants to explain assertion in terms of responsibility for information garnered via communication, then it must be viewed as primarily a communicative act. Moreover, from this perspective, Williamson’s knowledge rule can be argued not to individuate assertion, as someone who claims that knowledge is a prerequisite for assertion is also likely to view it as a prerequisite for presupposition: the grounds for one’s presuppositions must be the same as those that warrant one’s assertions. García-Carpintero (2004: 159) therefore proposes that the knowledge rule be replaced by the transfer of knowledge rule (13): (13) One must ((assert P) only if one’s audience comes thereby to be in a position to know P) It should be noted that Williamson is not the only author who sees assertions as knowledge claims. Brandom, whose work we considered in some detail in Chapter 2, argues that this view of assertion follows from his notion of discursive commitment. According to Brandom, to accept an assertion is to do three things: it is to ascribe to the asserter certain commitments; it is to judge that she is entitled to those commitments, and it is to acknowledge that those commitments apply in one’s own case. Each of these corresponds to one element of the standard view of knowledge as justified true belief: to ascribe practical and inferential commitments is to ascribe belief ; to grant entitlements is to view the belief as justified; and to undertake those commitments oneself is to assign the assertion the status of truth. It follows from this that an assertion, on Brandom’s account, is knowledge claim (Brandom 1994: 201–4; 2000: 168–9). For Brandom, then, assertions are knowledge claims because they are claims of justified true belief. Williamson (1995) does not accept the thesis that knowledge is analysable as justified true belief, so would not agree with Brandom’s reasoning. Where both authors concur, though, is on the importance of the notion of responsibility in understanding
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Assertion, Belief and Knowledge 49
Assertion
assertion. We have already seen in Chapter 2 that Brandom sees assertion as essentially involving undertaking the responsibility to provide reasons for the claims one makes, and we have seen in this chapter that Williamson also views the existence of the practice of assertion as explainable in terms of our use for notions of responsibility. Some have suggested that Williamson’s account offers nothing that could not be derived from a belief expression account of assertion. For example, Bach (forthcoming: n. 22) and Hindriks (2007) argue that the relationship between knowledge and assertion can be explained by viewing knowledge as the norm for belief. Looked at this way, they claim, assertion can be explained in terms of belief expression without having to posit a special relationship with knowledge. My own view is that the knowledge account is useful in the importance it places on epistemic responsibility. Belief-expression models of assertion can lose sight of the fact that an assertion is fundamentally faulty if it is false – regardless of of whether it expresses a sincerely held belief – and that the asserter can be rebuked for having made a false no matter how sincerely she holds the belief it expresses. If the effect of the knowledge account is to encourage proponents of belief-expression accounts to emphasise the importance of the beliefs expressed by assertions being justified and true, then it is to be welcomed. In order to establish whether Williamson’s knowledge account of assertion has anything to offer other than already made available by belief-expression accounts, we would have to ask whether he is right in denying that knowledge really is justified true belief, but that question would take us far beyond the scope of this book.10
3.5 Conclusion In this chapter, we have been concerned with the relationship between assertions and the mental states that this act expresses. We have seen that, from the perspective of conceptual priority, there is a good case to be made for putting assertion before belief. We also noted, though, that accepting this does not preclude us from reversing the order when adopting a scientific approach to the study of human communication. From the scientific perspective, we may see assertion as primarily about the communication of beliefs, but, again, perspectives must not be confused. From the claim that assertion is primarily about belief communication, it does not follow that interpreting assertions is necessarily about belief attribution. Belief attribution will certainly have a role to play in explaining sophisticated assertive behaviour, but it need not
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
50
be brought in to explain every instance of successful interpretation. Rather, assumptions about the speaker’s complex intentions concerning the interlocutors’ belief states can be thought of as merely manifest to the sophisticated hearer, there to be drawn upon if needed, but not necessarily playing a causal role in interpretation. We also looked at Williamson’s knowledge account of assertion, noting that the extent that it could be said to be an alternative to a belief expression account depended ultimately on whether knowledge is explainable in terms of justified true belief, an issue that is beyond the scope of this book. In all of our discussion so far, however, we have not yet paused to ask why hearers might be interested in the beliefs (or, for that matter, knowledge) of others. The fact that someone expresses a belief, even a justified true one, is not in itself reason to attend to it. We are disposed to attend to assertions, surely, because we expect to derive cognitive benefit from them. It might be thought, then, that assertions are primarily relevance claims. This is the position that will be defended in Chapter 8, where it will be shown that their status as truth-claims follows from this, given the notion of relevance employed there. Before this position can be elaborated on, however, there is still substantial ground to be covered. In particular, we need to investigate the linguistic forms employed in the making of assertions. We begin looking at this topic in the next chapter, though it will be an issue that dominates the remainder off the book.
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Assertion, Belief and Knowledge 51
4
4.1 Introduction This chapter considers the place of assertoric forms in the analysis of assertion. It is often claimed that such forms are redundant: the sign that Frege employs in his logical symbolism to mark an assertion has been argued to be logically superfluous, and a number of authors have claimed that the declarative mood in natural language has no special relationship with assertion. The general thrust of this chapter will be that such views are misguided. In defence of Frege’s assertion sign, it will be argued that if one wants to use a logical system to build up a representation of how the world is, then such a sign is required on pain of infinite regress. Regarding the declarative mood, we will see how Dummett’s arguments (presented in the previous chapter) concerning the relationship between assertion, truth and belief require that a form specified for the performance of that act be posited. We will also see how a conception of assertion that stresses the commitments undertaken by those who make and assent to assertions leads to a straightforward analysis of non-assertoric uses of the declarative mood, uses which have been put forward as counterexamples to the view that the declarative is a marker of assertoric force. The chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 discusses Frege’s assertion sign and, in doing so, introduces the notion of assertion as a move in inference rather than, as we have been considering it so far, an illocutionary act. Consequently, in section 4.3, the differences between the two conceptions of assertion are considered. Finally, in section 4.4, I give considerable attention to the claim made by Dummett that the declarative mood is a natural-language equivalent of Frege’s assertion sign. 52
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
A Sign of Assertion
A Sign of Assertion 53
4.2 Frege’s assertion sign Early in his presentation of his logical symbolism in the Begriffsschrift, Frege introduces a symbol ‘’, which, when prefixed to a string of symbols, indicates that that string expresses a content which has been judged true. The symbol itself is in fact a combination of two elements: the horizontal line indicates that the symbols that follow are bound together as the content of a potential assertion, the addition of the vertical line indicates that that content is asserted. Frege named the horizontal line ‘the content stroke’ and the vertical line ‘the judgement stroke’. Russell and Whitehead, in the Principia Mathematica, call the combined symbol ‘’ ‘the assertion sign’. In introducing this sign, Frege recognises that the same proposition – ‘thought’, in his terminology – can occur, in discourse and in logic, both with and without assertoric force.1 Geach (1965: 449) dubs this ‘the Frege point’, and points out that it is enlightening as to the nature of modus ponens. Expressed as in (1), one might ask why P is not redundant in the second line of the argument, for it is already to be found in the first premise. The Frege point is that, although present in both premises, P is only judged true by the introduction of the second premise. Frege’s assertion sign serves to make this explicit, as in (2): (1)
(2)
P→Q P Q (P → Q) P Q
But if all Frege’s judgement stroke offers is greater perspicuity, then it has no defence against the criticism that it is logically superfluous, nothing more than a punctuation mark. This is the complaint made by Wittgenstein, who says that ‘Frege’s assertion sign marks the beginning of the sentence. Thus its function is like that of a full-stop’ (1958: §22, original emphasis). Another criticism is that the judgement that lies behind assertion is a psychological phenomenon, and, as such, should have no place in logic (see, e.g. Anscombe 1959/1996: ch. 8). Indeed,
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
I show that the arguments levelled against this position can be resisted as long as the rendering one gives it is no stronger than that intended by Dummett.
Assertion
Frege himself was adamant that psychology should play no part in logic (1897/1997: 243–50), so it is not immediately clear why he included in his symbolism a sign that signifies the psychological act of judging true. To see why he did so, we need to consider his motivation for developing his system of logical notation. Despite Frege’s immense influence on modern logic, his assertion sign is not commonplace today (the symbol ‘’ standardly means ‘is a theorem’ these days). The reason for this is that what follows logically from a set of premises is not determined by the attitudes towards those propositions: you and I may agree that an argument is valid, while disagreeing that it is sound; I may accept premises that you reject, for example. If logic is conceived of the study of valid arguments, then, the assertion sign is indeed redundant. However, logic has not always been conceived of in this way. Green points out that Frege was part of a tradition that saw the refinement of logical systems as having as one of its goals the development of a language that would, among other things, ‘serve as an organon for the discovery of new truths or for the systematization of what is already known’ (Green 2002: 207). This point, Green argues, is key to an appreciation of Frege’s reasons for employing his assertion sign, in spite of his staunch anti-psychologist stance. Both Green (2002) and Smith (2000) argue that Frege draws a distinction between inference and pseudo-inference, and that appreciating this point is the key to understanding the central role he gave to the assertion sign. Inference, for Frege, is a process governed by the laws of logic that is aimed at increasing a stock of knowledge. The application and study of the rules of logic for purposes other than the confirmation and extension of knowledge is, for Frege, mere pseudo-inference. When engaging in pseudo-inference the truth or falsity of the premises is indeed immaterial. When engaging in inference proper, however, the truth-status of the premises employed is of great consequence. Green puts it like this: if we wish to indicate which thoughts are known to be true and thus capable of funding further discovery or reconstruction, a device for marking these thoughts will reflect a distinction relevant to inference and thereby redound to the logical adequacy of a notation (Green 2002: 214). Frege, then, employs the assertion sign in his logical symbolism because he envisages its eventual use as a tool for the perspicuous expression and subsequent extension of knowledge: it is to be employed ultimately
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
54
in developing an accurate representation of the world, not merely as an object of study for logicians. That said, Wittgenstein is right that the assertion sign does not add to the expressive power of the symbolism. There is no proposition that can be expressed using this sign that cannot be expressed without it. Rather, the assertion sign is best thought of as providing a format for the expression of propositions judged true. The alternative to specifying such a format is to build into the conceptual repertoire of the system a predicate, such as ‘. . . is true’, that takes propositions as its subject. This would be applied to all propositions judged true, so that if one judged P true, then ‘That P is true’ would be added to one’s stock of knowledge, but then so would ‘That P is true is true’, and so on, ad infinitum. The use of an assertion sign avoids this problem. As Frege (1918–19/1997: 330) puts it: ‘We express acknowledgement of truth in the form of an assertoric sentence. We do not need the word ‘true’ for this.’ The point I take from this is that if one wants to use an inferential system as a means of world representation, then one needs to specify a propositional format whose use counts as acceptance of the truth of the proposition expressed. Failure to do so will result in regress. We can say that such forms, while not specified for the performance of a speech act, nevertheless have ‘assertoric character’. The term comes from Geach, who observes that ‘The assertoric force of a sentence is [. . .] shown by its not being enclosed in the context of a longer sentence’ and then goes on to speculate that: Possibly there is something corresponding to this in the realm of thoughts; possibly a thought is assertoric in character unless it loses this character by occurring only as an element in a more complicated thought [. . .] This would be a neat solution to how thought is related to judgment (Geach 1960: 456–7). What representations with assertoric character have in common with assertions qua speech acts is that their employment results in commitment. One who entertains a thought in a format which has assertoric character can neither reject its inferential consequences nor fail to act upon it. In a parallel fashion, one who makes an assertion is committed to the inferential consequences of that assertion and to acting on it. Thus if a representation has assertoric character, then its use results in assertoric commitment. As we will see in more detail in Chapter 8, the framework employed there – Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory – posits a
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
A Sign of Assertion 55
Assertion
representational format at the level of thought which has assertoric character in Geach’s sense. Sperber and Wilson call a thought expressed in this representational format a ‘factual assumption’. To stipulate such a format in a model of cognition, they note, is to posit that ‘a fundamental propositional attitude of belief or assumption is pre-wired into the very architecture of the mind. As a result, a representation can be entertained as an assumption without the fact that it is an assumption being explicitly expressed’ (1986/1995: 74). Because both Frege and Sperber and Wilson – despite the great differences in the overall goals of their projects – have in common the aim of developing an inferential system of world-representation, both are compelled to stipulate a format whose employment in the expression of a proposition counts as acceptance of that proposition. Is there an equivalent format in natural language? And if so, what is it? One possibility is that there is a convention (where in Frege and Sperber and Wilson’s systems there is a stipulation) such that uttering a declarative sentence that explicitly expresses the proposition that P is to assert that P. But, as we will see in section 4.4, it has been objected that such convention could never hold sway in human linguistic communication, for it would be always open to abuse. Before considering this issue, though, we need to dwell a little on the move we have made from treating, in the previous two chapters, assertion as an illocutionary act to considering it, in this section, a move in inference. This raises the issue of the relationship between assertions qua speech acts and assertions qua premises and conclusions. This issue is discussed in the next section.
4.3 Assertion: illocution and inference As noted in Chapter 2, Brandom says that assertions are ‘fodder for inferences’ (1994: 168). But what exactly does that mean? There is one sense in which not only assertions, but all illocutionary acts are fodder for inference, for linguistic communication relies on inference and thus all speech acts provide, in that sense, input to an inferential process. Brandom’s point, though, is that assertions are a source of premises that can be used in inference beyond the identification of the speaker’s meaning. He means that assertions are a source of premises that enable one to enlarge, through inference, one’s stock of knowledge. But it is one thing to say that assertions qua speech acts are sources of premises and another to say that they can serve as premises in inference. To be sure, when we present inferences using natural language, we use
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
56
A Sign of Assertion 57
(3) If Peter does not study, he will fail the exam Peter does not study Peter will fail the exam But an ‘inference’ such as (3) is very informal. It relies heavily on human cognitive dispositions. For example, we are disposed to assume that the individual denoted by ‘Peter’ is the same in both the initial and second premise, and that ‘he’ in the consequent of the conditional is co-extensive with ‘Peter’ in the antecedent. It also relies on acceptance of modus ponens as a valid rule of inference. A formal inference system must make explicit all of these assumptions if it is not to be reliant itself on the inferential abilities of its users. Thus pragmatic inference plays a significant role in the interpretation of ‘inferences’ such as (3). That is to say, we are inclined to say that the argument in (3) is valid because we bring to bear on it processes we employ in utterance interpretation. We are disposed to treat (3) as a stretch of discourse, and in finding it valid we are in fact judging that the discourse is coherent. In Brandom’s terms, we are saying that one who asserts both ‘premises’ in (3) is entitled also to assert the conclusion. That we can represent an inference as in (3) does not show that natural-language assertions can serve as premises. Rather, it shows that declarative sentences can be used to represent and communicate the premises and conclusions of an inference (cf. Stainton 2006: 183–5). There is a difference between what is required of a form used to represent a premise that plays a role in an inference and what is required of a form that is employed as a vehicle of inference.2 To serve as a vehicle of inference, a propositional form must meet two criteria. First, it must encode determinate truth conditions. That is to say, it must encode the proposition it expresses, for otherwise inference will itself be required in order to determine that proposition, and we will have a problem of regress. Second, a propositional form must be expressed in a format recognised by an inferential system as being of a type that can serve as a premise in that system. This second point is emphasised by Millikan, who illustrates it thus: suppose that the first premise of a would-be inference is stored in a Venn diagram and the second in a circuit diagram, or on a map, or
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
declarative sentences (i.e. assertoric forms) to represent premises and conclusions:
58
Assertion
Natural language assertions fail to meet both of the criteria for serving as a vehicle of inference: the sentences that they employ underdetermine the truth conditions of the propositions asserted; and they are not designed to serve as premises in a formal inference system, but as stimuli in a process of inferential communication. The sense in which an illocutionary assertion is fodder for inference, then, is that it expresses a proposition and provides a warrant to introduce that proposition as a premise in inference. Because such an assertion does not, though, encode a proposition in a format apt for inference, it is important to distinguish between assertions qua premises in inference and assertions qua speech acts. What the two have in common is that they express propositions and carry with them a commitment to consequences of acceptance (or judgment). How they differ is that the latter do not encode the propositions that they express and cannot therefore serve as vehicles of inference. Because illocutionary assertions have a special relationship with inference in that they represent premises and provide warrant for their introduction, one way we can show that an utterance is an assertion is to show that it can be used with others as a representation of an inference, such as in (3). Pagin calls this the ‘inferential integration test’ and he uses it in an attempt to show that in uttering an explicit performative of the form ‘I hereby assert that P’, the speaker does not assert that P (2004: 855):3 (4) If 73 is a prime number, we cannot share the stones equally. I hereby assert that 73 is a prime number. So, we cannot share the stones equally. However, as we will now see, care is needed when applying this test. The claim that Pagin makes is that the explicit performative does not introduce the premise that 73 is a prime number. This, the claim goes, shows that in uttering ‘I hereby assert that 73 is a prime number, one does not assert that 73 is a prime number. But while (4) is certainly odd, it can easily be made into a coherent stretch of discourse by presenting it as a conversation, and having the addressee of the explicit performative explicitly accept the assertion that 73 is a prime number:
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
in the notation of Principia Mathematica. No rule of inference could combine these premises directly, without some kind of translation (2004: 217).
A Sign of Assertion 59
The problem with the rendering of the inference in (3) arises because, when evaluating such inferences, we tend to treat the premises and conclusions as a soliloquy. In a soliloquy, assertions are not directed at an audience and hence there is no need for acceptance to be signalled: instead, assertion and acceptance coincide. In a dialogue, by contrast, acceptance of an assertion must be signalled by the hearer (though perhaps only by the absence of an objection) before the asserted proposition can become part of the conversational record. Introducing explicit performatives into an ‘inference’ such as (4) makes it difficult to interpret as a soliloquy, for such utterances are intrinsically audience-directed acts, whether they are considered declarations (Recanati 1987; Searle 1989) or acts of showing (Jary 2007).4 This is the source of the oddness of (4). By providing a context in which the explicit performative is clearly directed at an audience, the dialogue in (5) rectifies this oddness and demonstrates that the inferential integration test cannot be used to show that by uttering ‘I hereby assert that P’ one cannot thereby assert that P.5 To sum up this section, assertions qua speech acts and assertions qua premises both have assertoric character. But while both express a proposition and commit the user to the truth of that proposition, they are not identical: a premise must encode the proposition it expresses, so that it can be a vehicle of inference, whereas an assertion qua speech act is not subject to this requirement. Assertions qua speech acts express a proposition and grant warrant for the introduction of that proposition as a premise. Before it can be used as premise, though, the proposition must be encoded in a format recognised by an inferential system. The inferential integration test, while a useful tool for identifying assertions (or, at least, truth-apt speech acts), needs to be applied with care: the fact that it relies on our pragmatic intuitions regarding discourse coherence needs to be borne in mind in order to ensure that any apparent failure to pass the test is not in fact a result of pragmatic infelicity.
4.4 A natural-language assertion sign? As noted earlier, when constructing a formal inference system such as the Begriffsschrift, it can be stipulated that writing a proposition P in a specified format imbues P with assertoric character. We need now to
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
(5) Mary: If 73 is a prime number, we cannot share the stones equally. Peter: I hereby assert that 73 is a prime number. Mary: I agree. So, we cannot share the stones equally.
Assertion
ask whether the declarative mood is a natural-language equivalent of Frege’s assertion sign. That is to say, does its use result in a commitment to treat the proposition expressed as true? Dummett has argued that unembedded declarative syntax has just this function.6 But where Frege stipulates, Dummett relies on convention: for him, assertion is to be explained in terms of the conventions associated with the use of assertoric forms (1981: 311), declarative mood being ‘ordinarily’ a sign of assertoric force (i.e. an assertoric form) (1981: 357; 1993: 208). In this section, we will consider this position in some detail, paying particular attention to objections that have been levelled against it. Because Dummett sees assertion in terms of conventions associated with the use of the declarative mood, his position can be stated either from the perspective of mood, or from the perspective of force. From the former perspective, we can say that Dummett holds the Declarative Thesis: The Declarative Thesis: The declarative mood is a conventional sign of assertoric force. From the perspective of force, we can say that he holds the Assertion Thesis: The Assertion Thesis: Assertion is to be explained in terms of conventions associated with the use of declarative sentences. It is important to stress that, as far as Dummett is concerned, the notion of assertion is to be explained wholly in terms of convention. Thus, in saying that the declarative mood is a conventional sign of assertoric force, he does not mean that it is merely a reliable indicator of that force, but that due to the conventions associated with it, its use under appropriate conditions constitutes assertion. It is, for Dummett, a fully fledged Fregean assertion sign. As we will soon see, though, this does not commit him to the view that all assertions must be performed using the declarative mood, nor to the view that only the declarative can be used to make assertions. This section is organised around the challenges that might be levelled at the two theses. The Declarative Thesis has been objected to by pointing out cases where this mood is used to perform acts other than assertives. Such objections and the responses that are open to Dummett (some of which he himself makes) are discussed in 4.4.1. The Assertion Thesis has been objected to by pointing to cases in which forms other
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
60
A Sign of Assertion 61
4.4.1 Challenges to the Declarative Thesis We begin this section by looking in detail at Davidson’s claim that, due to the fact that linguistic conventions do not constrain the use to which linguistic forms can be put, there could be no such thing as a naturallanguage equivalent of Frege’s assertion sign. We then go on to look at the use of the declarative to perform acts other than assertion. We will see that detailed consideration of these cases actually strengthens, rather than weakens, the claim that the declarative is a marker of assertion, as long as due emphasis is given to the consequences of assertion in the analysis of this act, as Dummett and those who follow him, such as Brandom, suggest. 4.4.1.1 ‘The autonomy of linguistic meaning’ and the declarative as assertion sign Arguing against the view that the declarative mood is a conventional sign of assertion, Davidson makes the strong claim that the nature of language is such that conventions of meaning can never fully constrain use, and that consequently there could never be a natural-language equivalent of Frege’s assertion sign. A fundamental feature of language, according to Davidson, is what he calls ‘the autonomy of linguistic meaning’: Once a feature of language has been given conventional expression, it can be used to serve many extra-linguistic ends; symbolic representation necessarily breaks any close tie with extra-linguistic purpose. Applied to the present case, this means that there cannot be a form of speech which, solely by dint of its conventional meaning, can be used only for a given purpose, such as making an assertion or asking a question (1979/2001: 113–14). Davidson’s point here is that a conventional relationship between a linguistic form and a meaning cannot guarantee that, on every occasion of use, that form is used in accordance with that convention. In terms of the relationship between mood and force, Davidson’s thesis has the consequence of ruling out the possibility of a natural-language equivalent of Frege’s assertion sign: in other words, if this thesis is correct, no
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
than the declarative are used to perform assertions. Dummett’s response to this type of objection is discussed in section 4.4.2. The section concludes by returning to the issue of whether, in the light of the data discussed, assertion can be explained purely in terms of convention.
Assertion
propositional form in a language such as English could possibly have assertoric character. Hare (1989) objects, arguing that for any law, there could be a convention to the same effect. And, he says, there is no a priori reason that there could not be a law such that whoever uttered a certain propositional form was thereby committed to the proposition she expressed. Such a law, he points out, certainly governs the giving of testimony under oath, and one can imagine a possible world in which the same law applied to all utterances of declarative sentences, so that speakers were subject to rebuke if they uttered a falsehood under any conditions. As Hare notes, such a law would make acting and storytelling impossible (or at least, we might add, a risky business – there is a law against murder, but that does not prevent it from happening), but there is nothing conceptually incoherent about such a world. Nevertheless, the world we are in does have actors and storytellers, and they do manage to employ declarative sentences without fear of rebuke, so the fact that a world in which the declarative is a failsafe sign of assertion is a conceptual possibility is of little help in helping us to understand the role of declarative syntax in the practice of assertion in our world. Green takes a different tack. He notes that common counterexamples to the proposal that use of the declarative is a guarantee of assertoric force, such as fiction and acting, have in common the feature that the speakers are not performing illocutionary acts at all (1997: 222). However, one can allow that there is no form such that its production guarantees that the speaker is performing a particular illocutionary act without also giving up the possibility of there being a form that, granted that the speaker is engaged in one illocutionary act or another, indicates which act she is performing. Green calls such an illocutionary force indicator a ‘weak IFID’, a strong IFID being one that guarantees that the speaker is performing the associated act without the need to first ascertain that she is performing an illocutionary act of one type or another. We might agree that the use of the declarative mood does not commit a speaker to the truth of the proposition expressed regardless of the activity in which she is engaged, but still allow that it indicates which illocutionary act she is performing if it is first granted that she is performing one or another such act. This would make the declarative a weak IFID, in Green’s terms. There is one sense in which declarative mood clearly is not a weak IFID: it does not convey assertoric force if it is embedded in the antecedent of a conditional. But Dummett maintains that illocutionaryforce indication is a feature of sentences as a whole, not of clauses that serve as constituents of sentences (1981: 304), so this observation
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
62
cannot serve as an objection to his claim that the declarative is an assertoric-force indicator. However, as Green points out, there are cases where syntactically unembedded declarative sentences are uttered in the performance of an illocutionary act, yet do not carry assertoric force. This is the case, for example, in a discourse such as the following (1997: 227): (6) Let us suppose the next sentence for the sake of argument. Snow is white. By this light, then, a declarative sentence is not even a weak indicator of assertoric force, for it can be used in a speech act without thereby committing the speaker to the truth of the proposition expressed. However, we should note that, while not linguistically embedded, the utterance of ‘Snow is white’ is ‘cordoned off’ by the previous utterance. If ‘Snow is white’ were uttered, unembedded, in the performance of a speech act and in the absence of an introductory edict such as we find in (6), then the speaker would be taken to have asserted that snow is white, and this would be as a result of her choice of linguistic mood. Had she chosen to utter, under the same circumstances (and non-rhetorically), ‘Is snow white?’, for example, she would not have been taken to have made an assertion.7 In other words, cases such as (6) do not rule out the view that assertion is the default interpretation for utterances of declarative sentences, in that the utterance of a syntactically unembedded declarative sentence counts as an assertion unless there are contextual indications to the contrary. I think this is the correct way to view the relationship between the declarative and assertion. It is also a fairer rendering of Dummett’s view than the one attributed to him by those, such as Davidson, who object to the Declarative Thesis on the grounds that there are non-assertoric use of declarative sentences. In saying that the declarative is a sign of assertoric force, Dummett does not rule out the possibility of it being used, even unembedded, without the speaker thereby asserting. Indeed, he allows that if declarative syntax is used by an actor engaged in dramatic representation (a case that is commonly put forward as evidence against the view that the declarative is a conventional force marker), then it conveys something other than assertoric force. He does not accept, though, that when a declarative used in such a way it is completely devoid of assertoric force. Rather, he holds that what happens in such a case cannot be understood without recourse to the notion of assertion. In such a case, he says, the actor does more than assert: she
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
A Sign of Assertion 63
Assertion
asserts in a context that limits the force of her utterance. But one cannot characterise her behaviour without reference to the notion of assertoric force, for in order to understand what the actor is doing, Dummett argues, we need to treat her utterance as an assertion made under special circumstances. In other words, it is not the case that the actor is not, in any sense, asserting: it is that she is doing more than asserting. Were we to employ symbols to indicate what she is doing, rather than omit the assertion sign altogether, we would use the assertion sign prefixed by another sign that indicated ‘dramatic force’ (1981: 311; 1993:212). It is worth spending some time considering this point and the objections that have been made against it, for it has considerable bearing, as we will see, on the correct analysis of declarative mood. If it can be shown that non-assertoric uses of the declarative require, for their correct analysis, recourse to what we might term ‘modified’ or ‘restricted’ assertoric effects, as Dummett claims is the case with stage assertions, then it becomes more reasonable to claim that the declarative has a special relationship with assertion, rather than being, as some have maintained (Davidson 1979/2001; Recanati 1987), force-neutral. We will therefore now give some consideration to an objection to Dummett’s analysis of stage assertions made by Recanati (1987). Recanati claims that Dummett’s analysis of stage assertions fails to recognise a distinction between the force indicated by a form and the presence of that force in fact. Recanati’s objection relies on an observation made by Hare (1970/1971: 89–93; 1989) that the Fregean assertion sign, rather than signalling merely completeness and judgement, actually contains three elements. Hare shows that the assertion sign functions, in the work of Frege and Russell and Whitehead, also as a mood marker (a ‘tropic’ in Hare’s terminology). That is to say, it specifies that the descriptive content it prefixes (Hare’s ‘phrastic’) is expressed in a format that renders it assertable, i.e. in an assertoric format. For it to be asserted, though, another element is needed to signal judgement (Hare calls this a ‘neustic’). Thus what distinguishes the antecedent of a conditional premise and the minor premise in a case of modus ponens is, in Hare’s terms, that the latter contains a neustic which is absent in the former. This is why, for Hare, uttering a conditional sentence does not commit the speaker to the truth of the proposition expressed by the antecedent. The need to distinguish between neustic and tropic (the logical correlates of mood and force) is obscured in the work of Frege, and that of Russell and Whitehead, because they are concerned with inferences involving only assertoric forms. If one wants to develop an inference system that guides action, however, then a means of representing states
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
64
of affairs that are goals, rather than actual, is needed. This requires that two distinctions be marked. On the one hand, a distinction is needed between those propositional forms which are assertoric in potential and are in fact asserted, and those which have assertoric potential but are not asserted. On the other hand, a distinction must be marked between those forms that have assertoric potential and those (such as imperative syntax in natural language) which do not. Such a distinction is an issue for Hare, who is concerned with ethics, and for Grice (2001) in his work on practical reasoning. According to Dummett, if one actor says to another (whose character is named ‘Jim’, let’s say) ‘You are an imbecile’, we can represent her utterance as (7), where ‘’ is a marker of dramatic force, ‘’ is the assertion sign (both neustic and tropic) and angle-brackets contain the propositional content:8 (7) Recanati, however, argues, contra Dummett, that in this case, ‘’ is not functioning as a marker of assertoric force, but merely as an indicator of assertoric potential, i.e. as a mood marker (i.e. merely a tropic). However, Recanati (1987: 263) also uses the distinction between indicated force and actual force (i.e. between neustic and tropic) to explain the difference between A’s utterance and B’s utterance in (8): (8) A: You are an imbecile B: Oh, I am an imbecile! Thank you very much. According to Recantati, the force in A’s utterance is both indicated and actual (i.e. A is asserting that B is an imbecile), while in B’s it is merely indicated. The problem for Recantati is that a dialogue such as (8) could easily arise in a play. Some means must therefore be found of explaining the difference between the two utterances in such a context. Dummett’s claim (that A is asserting the proposition he expresses while at the same time doing so only within the conventions of dramatic representation) explains how the audience recognises the difference between A’s utterance and B’s. Recanati, though, is committed to the view that both A’s and B’s utterances, if they occur in dramatic representation, only indicate force, and that in neither utterance is the potential force realised. He therefore has no account of how the difference between the two. This point can be illustrated as follows. First, we separate tropic and neustic: let ‘’ be unambiguously a sign of a propositional form’s
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
A Sign of Assertion 65
66
Assertion
(9) A: P B: P According to Recanati, in order to represent the dialogue as spoken by actors, we must remove the neustic. But this gives us (10), and we are no longer able to distinguish the two utterances. (10) A: P B: P The conclusion we must draw is that the speech of actors engaged in dramatic representation cannot be explained in terms of their merely indicating linguistically the force potential that their utterances have. Rather, as Dummett advises, we have to view a stage assertion as an assertion made under special circumstances. These circumstances have the effect of restricting the consequences of the assertion, so that the commitment undertaken is limited to the confines of the dramatic representation. Our understanding of that representation, however, relies on us treating the actor as one who has asserted, rather than one who has simply indicated that she has asserted by her use of a form with assertoric potential. Pace Recanati, there is more to stage assertions than the mere indication of force potential: there is also force of a kind. How does this relate to current concerns? It was suggested earlier that the declarative is a default maker of assertoric force, so that it counts as an instance of assertion unless there are overriding contextual conditions. What the discussion of the acting case indicates, though, is that even when overriding contextual conditions pertain the resulting act is one whose assertoric force is modified in some way, rather than completely nullified. In Hare’s terms, the neustic is not absent – as is the case when the declarative is found in the antecedent of a conditional – but prefixed by another sign that limits the consequences of its application. It is a mistake, then, to view non-assertoric uses of the declarative as being on a par with its use in the antecedent of a conditional. In the latter case, the neustic is indeed missing (and Dummett agrees with this). A neustic of some sort, however, must be present in those cases in which an actor is acting an assertion, otherwise we would have no grounds for attributing to the character whom the actor portrays the
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
assertoric potential (Hare’s ‘tropic’) and ‘’ be a sign that the proposition is uttered with its indicated force (Hare’s ‘neustic’). We can now represent the dialogue in (8) as (9):
commitments that she thereby undertakes within the confines of the dramatic representation in which she is engaged. Thus the correct analysis of stage assertions requires recourse to the consequences argued by Dummett to be associated with the use of the declarative mood by virtue of its function as a marker of assertoric force. This supports the view that the declarative is indeed an assertion sign (or, at least, shows that these cases cannot be used as objections to this view). However, the existence of stage assertions is not the only objection that has been made against this position. In the remainder of this section, we will consider other cases that are commonly put forward as instances of the non-assertoric use of an unembedded declarative in order to see whether these can also be explained in terms of the assertoric consequences associated, on Dummett’s view, with this form. In the following subsections, then, we will look at the use of the declarative in cases of supposition and fiction, in the performance of directives and commissives, and, finally, in the performance of explicit performatives and declarations. We will see that in each case a straightforward analysis is afforded by the assumption that the declarative is marker of assertion. 4.4.1.2 Discourse embedding and fiction What I am calling ‘discourse embedding’ occurs when an utterance of a syntactically unembedded sentence is governed by previous discourse that precludes an assertoric interpretation. My reasons for discussing it under the same heading as fiction-creation will become clear as we progress. One example of discourse embedding already given is (6); another is (11). In these cases, the speaker undertakes a non-assertoric mode of commitment to the proposition expressed. The speaker of (6) is committed to the proposition that snow is white as a supposition for the sake of argument, while the speaker of (11) is committed to it as a conjecture. In Dummettian terms, these commitments are the inferential consequences of supposition and conjecture. (6) Let us suppose the next sentence for the sake of argument. Snow is white. (11) I therefore put forward the following conjecture: snow is white The modes of commitment associated with assertion, conjecture and supposition differ in terms of their relationship to truth and evidence (or warrant). As we saw in our discussion of the work of Brandom and Williamson in previous chapters, a speaker who undertakes assertoric
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
A Sign of Assertion 67
Assertion
commitment to P thereby undertakes responsibility, if challenged by being asked, for example, ‘How do you know?’, to provide evidence that establishes that P (perhaps by citing a source from whose prior assertion she has received warrant to assert that P). Commitment under the mode of conjecture, however, does not involve undertaking this degree of responsibility. A speaker who conjectures that P is merely obliged to show, if challenged, that P is compatible with the set of propositions to which she is assertorically committed. What both modes of commitment have in common is that the speaker is required to reject P if it is shown that P is false. This does not hold for supposition: a speaker may legitimately suppose a false proposition (Green 1999). But while they differ greatly in their relationship to truth and in the grounds on which they can be challenged, assertion, conjecture and supposition have in common a commitment to consistency. Although one is entitled to suppose a falsehood, one cannot simultaneously suppose two contradictory propositions: for example, one cannot simultaneously suppose for the sake of argument that fairies exist and that fairies don’t exist. Importantly, this commitment to consistency does not hold for all propositional attitudes: I can both want not to damage the environment and want to take a long-haul flight. In wanting both these things, I am not being inconsistent, even though the desires are incompatible. There is a difference, then, between contradiction and incompatibility. P and Q are incompatible if both cannot be true simultaneously. A contradiction results, however, only if P and Q are objects of a propositional attitude that requires consistency. One way of thinking about the distinction is this: if P and Q are incompatible propositions, they are precluded (under ideal conditions) from inclusion in your belief box, but can be included in your desire box, for only the former has a consistency requirement. When one has incompatible desires, the result is a dilemma, not a contradiction. It is obvious why consistency is a requirement of belief: belief aims at truth and consistency is a means of preserving truth. As assertion also aims at truth, the mode of commitment undertaken by asserters also entails commitment to consistency, and the same goes for conjecture, which is also truth-aiming. But not all consistency-aiming endeavours aim at truth. As noted above, a speaker cannot be criticised for supposing a falsehood. She can, however, be rebuked if she supposes an inconsistent set of propositions. Similarly, although fiction is not truth aiming, it does create expectations of consistency (cf. Chierchia and McConnellGinet 2000: 216–17): if a character dies early in the narrative and then
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
68
reappears later, we are entitled to demand an explanation, to require that reason be given.9 Recanati (2000: 49–62) analyses supposition and fiction as a form of simulation. In supposing for the sake of argument or in recounting a story we engage, he says, in simulation. What we are simulating is assertion. On this view, then supposition and fiction are pretend assertions. In pretending to assert, as when we suppose, conjecture or create fiction, we undertake a mode of commitment to the consequences that would follow from actually making an assertion. Thus what unites these modes of commitment is that they all involve treating as true without claiming truth. Stalnaker’s term for this, which I will adopt henceforth, is ‘acceptance’: ‘To accept a proposition is to treat it as a true proposition one way or another’ (Stalnaker 1984: 79). Acceptance thus defined applies both to assertion and to the forms of simulated assertion we are considering here. What assertions and simulated assertion have in common, then, is acceptance of the inferential consequences of asserting that P. Acceptance involves a commitment to consistency: one cannot accept incompatible propositions for to do so would be a failure to treat them as true. How assertions and simulated assertions differ, is, in part, explicable in terms of how they relate to the conditions for asserting that P. While asserting that P is an undertaking that the conditions for asserting that P obtain (or, in the case of past tense and future tense assertions, did or will obtain,), conjecture, supposition and fiction involve no such undertaking. Conjecture, however, differs from supposition and fiction in that, while it does not involve a claim that the conditions for asserting that P obtain, demonstration they do not obtain obliges the speaker to withdraw her conjecture; no such requirement holds for supposition and fiction. The similarities and differences between these modes of commitment are summarised in Table 4.1.10 Thus discourse embedded and fictional uses of the declarative have in common an undertaking of commitment to the inferential consequences of acceptance of their propositional content. They are better analysed, therefore, as cases of simulated assertion, rather than as cases where the assertoric potential of the form employed is indicated but not fulfilled, i.e. where the assertoric tropic is present but the neustic is absent. The problem with viewing these as neustic-less uses of an assertoric form is that this fails to explain the commitments taken on by speakers. The neustic is certainly completely absent when an assertoric form is embedded in the antecedent of a conditional, for no commitment to the consequences of asserting that proposition is undertaken.
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
A Sign of Assertion 69
70
Assertion
Assertion
Conjecture
Supposition
Fiction
Is a claim that the conditions for asserting that P obtain
Yes
No
No
No
Must be withdrawn if it is shown that these conditions do not obtain
Yes
Yes
No
No
Is an undertaking of commitment (of some kind) to the inferential consequences of asserting that P
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
But discourse-embedded and fiction-creating uses of the declarative do involve taking on commitments and hence have little in common with its use as the antecedent of a conditional. They have much more in common with declaratives used as a means of undertaking assertoric commitment and therefore support, rather than undermine, Dummett’s claim that assertion is an act that is to be explained in terms of the use of the conventions associated with the use of the declarative. For some, but not all, of the conventional significance of the assertoric use of declarative syntax carries over to these non-assertoric uses. How discourse-embedded and fiction-creating uses of the declarative differ from assertion is in terms of their relationship to the conditions for assertion: only assertion is a claim about the obtaining of truth conditions.11 4.4.1.3 Directives and commissives Another observation that is often put forward as evidence against the claim that the declarative is an assertion sign is that it can be used to perform acts other than assertives. One example that has been given is the use of future-tense declaratives to issue directives, such as (12), which is adapted from Recanati (1987: 138): (12) You will clean the latrines. For Recanati, the existence of directives, such as (12), that employ declarative syntax is evidence that the declarative is force-neutral
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Table 4.1 Modes of commitment
(1987: 163–9). However, it is possible to provide an account of these directives that treats the declarative as primarily an indicator of assertoric force. Moreover, this can be done without the need to treat (12) as an indirect speech act, in the sense of Searle (1975/1979). First, note that future-tense declaratives are only acceptable as directives in a situation in which the speaker has authority over the hearer, and when the act predicated of the hearer is within the boundaries of what it is permissible for the speaker to require of him. Thus a beggar cannot issue a plea (another type of directive) by uttering (13). The use of future-tense declarative syntax is thus more limited than the imperative in terms of its potential for the performance of directives: both (12) and (13) could be performed using the imperative mood, as (14) and (15) show: (13) You will spare me some change (14) Clean the latrines (15) Spare me some change This point established, we can then ask what would be the effect of an utterance made using assertoric syntax that predicated a future act of an addressee over whom the speaker had authority. Future-tense use of assertoric syntax that expresses the proposition that P, on Dummett’s view, involves the speaker undertaking a commitment to the truth of P, and the putting forward of P for acceptance or rejection by the hearer. In the absence of a countermanding directive from a higher authority, the hearer will have no choice but to accept that P (unless he is prepared to accept the consequences of insubordination), for, as far as he is concerned, the speaker’s decisions about the hearer’s future actions determine those actions. He will have no grounds, therefore, for rejecting P, given that the speaker had expressed, by means of that utterance, her decision concerning his future behaviour. And, for the speaker to accept that P is in a case such as (12), in effect, for him to undertake to perform the act predicated of him. In practical terms, then, the use of assertoric syntax in such a case functions to convey directive force. However, the directive force of the utterance results from the potential of the form employed to commit the speaker to the proposition expressed and to put that proposition forward for acceptance or rejection by the hearer. In other words, it results from the form’s assertoric potential. Consequently, (12) does not count as an example against the view that declarative syntax is, under less narrow conditions, a marker of assertoric force. Rather, it is just this assumption that underlies this explanation of how an utterance such as (12) comes to have the force of directive.
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
A Sign of Assertion 71
Assertion
Note that this account does not treat (12) as an indirect speech act: for a speech act to be performed indirectly, two acts must be performed, the indirect one by means of a direct act. In the case just discussed, though, the hearer does not assign assertoric force to the utterance, find this interpretation unsatisfactory, and then go on to infer that the speaker’s intentions are in fact directive. Rather, the conventions associated with utterance of declarative syntax (i.e. that the speaker undertakes a commitment to the truth of P and puts P forward for acceptance) result – given the relationship between the interlocutors and the nature of the future act predicated of the hearer – in directive force. The strong content and context constraints that such an interpretation relies on, however, do not apply to the interpretation of the utterance of an imperative sentence as directive, thus allowing the imperative form to be used for a wider class of directive acts.12 A similar explanation can be put forward for the use of future-tense declaratives used to make promises. Like future-tense declaratives with directive force, promises have been seen to pose a problem for accounts, such as Dummett’s, which treat the declarative as a conventional marker of assertoric force. Recanati (1987: 167), for example, is worried that such a view leads to the position that an utterance such as (16) is an indirect promise. The problem with this position, he says, is that it implies that promising is never direct, for there is no commissive mood. (16) I’ll be there But, if indicating assertoric force is understood as consisting in undertaking commitment to the truth of the proposition expressed, we can treat (16) as a direct promise without abandoning the claim that declarative syntax is a marker of assertoric force. Promises and future tense assertions (such as (16) spoken as a statement about the speaker’s intentions) have much in common: both commit the speaker to the truth of the proposition expressed and both present themselves as grounds for the hearer to believe that the state of affairs described will obtain. How they differ is in the type of grounds they provide for this belief. An assertion requires that the speaker, if required to do so by the hearer, give justification beyond the utterance itself. In the case of (16) spoken as an assertion, the speaker might offer as justification the claim that she has decided to go there, (16) being in that case a report of that decision. A promise differs in that the utterance itself is presented as sufficient reason for the hearer to accept that the state of affairs described by the
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
72
utterance will obtain: no further reason for acceptance of the proposition expressed can be required. Indeed, the question of acceptance does not arise in the case of a promise. To be sure, we might judge that the speaker is unlikely to keep her promise. But this is quite distinct from rejecting an assertion: an assertion is put forward for acceptance or rejection; a promise is not. The possibility of rejection has an important role to play in the analysis of the activity of assertion, but none to play in the analysis of promising, for how hearers respond to a promise has no bearing on the success of that promise. The reason that the declarative is apt for promising is that it is a form whose use commits the speaker to the truth of the proposition expressed. When that proposition is future tense and relates to a state of affairs over which the speaker has influence, then the question arises of what the speaker is doing: is she undertaking to bring about that state of affairs, or is she, say, predicting that a certain state of affairs will hold? What the hearer needs to determine, in order to resolve the ambiguity, is the justificatory status of the utterance: is it presented as sufficient reason in itself to believe that P or can further reason be demanded? In the former case, the utterance counts as a promise; in the latter case, it is an assertive speech-act. To grant that the declarative is force ambiguous, though, is not to accept that it is not a conventional marker of assertoric force. Indeed, it is the potential of the form to commit the speaker to the proposition expressed that marks it for use in promising.13 Moreover, as is the case with directives, the use of the declarative to make promises is limited to certain contents: the utterance must describe a future situation the bringing about of which the speaker can reasonably be expected to see to. In both the directive and the commissive cases, then, the function of the declarative as a conventional marker of assertoric force can be exploited to explain these other – content- and context-constrained – uses. In both cases, the reason that assertoric force does not result, despite the use of the declarative, is that rejection of the proposition expressed is not presented as an option for the hearer. In the directive case, the speaker’s authority precludes this; in the commissive case, having witnessed the utterance is presented as sufficient grounds for the hearer to adopt the proposition expressed as a belief. 4.4.1.4 Explicit performatives and declarations Whether you regard explicit performatives as a counterexample to the claim that declarative syntax is a conventional marker of assertoric force will depend on whether you view them as assertions. The view that
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
A Sign of Assertion 73
74
Assertion
(17) I (hereby) accept your apology (18) I (hereby) promise to be there Others, however, reject this view and claim that explicit performatives are not assertions, primarily on the grounds that they cannot be true or false (Austin 1962/1975; Recanati 1987; Searle 1989). I side with this second camp (Jary 2007). Dummett’s position is not entirely clear: he opposes explicit performatives to ‘ordinary assertions’, the former being characterised by their ‘not stat[ing] something as being the case independently of the act of uttering it’ (1981: 334). This suggests that he does see them as a non-ordinary sub-species of assertion. However, explicit performatives fail to meet one of his conditions for assertionhood: they do not require justification. Moreover, they are not put forward for acceptance or rejection by the audience. A felicitous explicit performative such as (17) or (18) results in the proposition expressed becoming a belief of the hearer’s by virtue of his having witnessed it: he can no more reject the proposition that the speaker accepted his apology or promised to be there than he can reject the proposition that the speaker has spoken (Jary 2007: 210–17). Explicit performatives, then, are not assertions by Dummett’s criteria. It does not follow, though, that they undermine his claim that unembedded declarative syntax is a sign of assertoric force. An analysis parallel to that given above for promises is available. Whether uttered as a performative or as an assertion, an explicit performative sentence commits the speaker to the truth of the proposition expressed. However, only if an assertion is made is the option of rejecting that proposition open to the hearer. An explicit-performative utterance of a declarative sentence precludes rejection, for, in her utterance, the speaker gives the hearer perceptual evidence that the state of affairs described by her utterance obtains. As there is no option for rejection in the performative case, no assertion is made. That said, the very fact that we can talk about the utterance describing a state of affairs stems from the assertoric potential of the linguistic form employed. The special circumstances of use (to describe a state of affairs constituted by the utterance itself), precludes that utterance from having assertoric force, but if the form did not have
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
utterances such as (17) and (18) are in fact assertions is held by, among others, Bach and Harnish (1979; 1992) and Ginet (1979). On this view, these utterances present no threat to Dummett’s view of the conventional significance of the declarative mood as a marker of assertoric force.
A Sign of Assertion 75
It is essential to the notion of a performative [. . .] that related forms of words, with a different tense, a different subject, or perhaps even with only a different inflection of the verb, should be capable of being used as assertions of the ordinary kind [. . .] The reason [. . .] is that otherwise the phrase ‘what it signifies’ would be without content. Any significant utterance of a sentence is used to effect something, to perform some (conventional) act; but we can without triviality specify what it is that it effects by saying that it is ‘what it signifies’ only if there are other uses of it which are used to signify the performance of the act in the sense of stating that it is performed (Dummett 1981: 334 original emphasis) Thus Dummett’s position on explicit performatives is that cases such as (17) and (18) can be said to serve to effect the state of affairs described only because of the existence of minimally different, non-performative sentences, such as (19) and (20), that can be used to assert that that state of affairs obtains. I think, however, that what is required is not such minimally distinct sentences but an alternative use of the very sentence that is used in performative utterances, such as when a priest, explaining the marriage procedure prior to the ceremony, explains to the couple ‘. . . and then I pronounce you husband and wife’. In this case, all formal features and contextual parameters are the same as in the performative case, except that the utterance does not refer to itself (i.e. there is no implicit ‘hereby’). (19) She accepts your apology. (20) He promises to be there. On this analysis, although explicit performative utterances are not assertions, they do rely on the assertoric potential of declarative syntax for their success: if the same form of words could not be used merely to describe that state of affairs, then it could not be said that they bring about the state of affairs that they describe. Declarations such as (21) also rely on the assertoric potential of the declarative form employed, but, once more, there is no option for rejection. This is because the speaker has the authority to bring about the state of affairs described by the utterance. However, as in the
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
assertoric potential, then an explicit performative interpretation would not be possible. This is the point made by Dummett in the following quotation:
76
Assertion
(21) This meeting is now closed This analysis of explicit performatives and declarations is strengthened by the fact that the inferences that are licensed by a felicitous declaration or explicit performative utterance are those that are licensed by an assertion with the same propositional content. Thus you are entitled to draw the same conclusions from an assertion of (19) as you are from witnessing the utterance of (17), for example. So, as in the previous cases that we have looked at in this section, the use of the declarative for explicit performatives and declarations can be analysed in terms of the consequences associated with the assertoric use of that form. The difference lies in your grounds for drawing those conclusions: in the case of declarations and explicit performatives, the grounds are that you have witnesses the act; in the case of an assertion, the grounds are that the speaker has provided you, by means of the conventions associated with the use of declarative sentences, with warrant to employ in inference the proposition expressed. Moreover, it is only in the latter case that is it open to you to deny that the state of affairs described obtains, or to require of the speaker further reason to accept the content of her utterance. 4.4.1.5 Conclusion to section 4.4.1 What unites the non-assertoric uses of the declarative discussed in sections 4.4.1.3 and 4.4.1.4 is that the successful performance of each act has the same inferential and practical consequences for its audience that an acceptance of an assertion expressing the same proposition would have. This explains the aptness of the declarative for the performance of these acts. The reason that they do not count as assertions is that they are not put forward for acceptance or rejection by the hearer. The directive cases exploit the authority the speaker has over the hearer such that rejection is not an option for him. Promises present the act itself as sufficient grounds for acceptance. Similarly, explicit performatives and declarations rely on the act in question being witnessed for their effect. Because hearer acceptance is not an issue in any of these cases, they
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
performative case, it only makes sense to talk of declarations bringing about the state of affairs they describe if there is another, descriptive use of the same sentence. Thus the analysis of declarations requires that the forms used have assertoric potential, even though declarations themselves are not assertions.
are not the sort of thing that can be judged true or false, because the function of such judgements is to signal acceptance. The discourse-embedding and fiction cases discussed in section 4.4.1.2, by contrast, do put themselves forward for acceptance. It is this they have in common with assertion and it is this which motivates the use of the declarative in such cases. To be acceptance-apt is to be treatable as true. To treat as true is to accept, under a certain mode of commitment, the consequences of assertion. It should be no surprise, then, that acceptance apt-speech acts employ the declarative if this is the mood that is specified for the making of assertions. Thus Dummett’s Declarative Thesis is not undermined by the alleged counterexamples that we have discussed in this section. It is possible to hold that the declarative sentence-type is an indicator of assertoric force and still allow that it has other uses which to do not result in an utterance being classified as an assertion. These other uses, moreover, can be analysed in terms of the consequences that result from the assertoric use of the declarative. Their existence therefore strengthens, rather than weakens, the claim that the declarative a default marker of assertoric force.
4.4.2 Challenges to the Assertion Thesis The cases that we will discuss in this section are those in which assertions are made by means other than the unembedded use of declarative sentences. These cases do not threaten the Declarative Thesis: the claim that there is a conventional means of doing something does not exclude the possibility of it being done by unconventional means. On one reading of it, though, the Assertion Thesis – which states that assertion is to be explained in terms of conventions associated with the use of declarative sentences – is threatened by some of these cases. However, as we will see in this section, this is not the reading intended by Dummett. There are two main types of case that threaten the Assertion Thesis: sub-sentential assertions and alleged cases of assertions performed using non-declarative sentences. The first class have been discussed extensively by Stainton (1993; 1997; 2005; 2006), who gives a number of examples of phrases used in isolation to make assertions. An indicative list, taken from Stainton (1997: 61), is given below:
(22) (Two people are talking at a party. One points to a man near the door and says) John’s father.
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
A Sign of Assertion 77
78
Assertion
The crucial point about these cases is that the speaker may lie or mislead using these phrases, indicating both that assertoric commitment is being undertaken by the speaker and that a proposition is being put forward for acceptance by the hearer. It is seems clear, then, that an assertion is being made in each of these cases. Examples of the second class come from Davidson (1979/2001: 110), who says that utterances such as (26) and (27) may be used to assert that Joan is wearing her purple hat again: (26) Did you notice that Joan is wearing her purple hat again? (27) Notice that Joan is wearing her purple hat again. Dummett has two responses to these cases. The first relies on a distinction he makes between the force of the utterance and the speaker’s point in making the utterance, and is itself enough to deal with Davidson’s alleged counterexamples. This distinction, though, will not deal with the sub-sentential cases, as Stainton notes (1997: 61). In order to deal with these, we have to invoke Dummett’s deeper claim that the point of positing a conventional relationship between declarative syntax and assertion is required not to determine whether a given utterance counts as an assertion, but to make sense of the notion of assertion in the first place. We deal with each response in the next two sections. 4.4.2.1 The tactical role of mood and force In response to Davidson’s cases, Dummett grants that the point of these utterances might well be to alert the hearer to the fact that Joan is wearing her purple hat again, but says that to accept this is not to accept that (26), say, is not a question but an assertion. That (26) is a question, he notes, is clear from the fact that it calls for answer. Viewing (26) as an assertion, he says, conflates force and speaker’s point. Force is best seen as a tactical notion: a means by which speaker’s achieve their strategic aims. It relates not to the speaker’s long-term aim, ‘but to the form of linguistic or non-linguistic response, if any, which is called for, and the commitment, if any, undertaken by the speaker’ (Dummett 1993: 223). On this view of force, Davidson’s cases are not counterexamples to the
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
(23) (A student is receiving instruction in painting. The teacher looks at the current canvas and says) Nice work. (24) (A boat speeds by. A spectator says) Very fast. (25) (A letter arrives. The recipient looks at the envelope and says) From Spain.
A Sign of Assertion 79
view that assertion is to be analysed in terms of conventions associated with declarative and the Assertion Thesis survives.
Dummett does not consider in any great detail sub-sentential assertions of the type identified by Stainton. He makes the brief comment that an utterance of ‘the highest mountain in the world’ uttered out of the blue, has sense and reference but no force: the speaker cannot be said to have done anything right or wrong. Spoken in response to a question such as ‘What is Mount Everest?’, though, the utterance has a force and can be counted as an assertion, he says (Dummett 1981: 297–8). Stainton’s claim, though, is that even without prior discourse to indicate its force, a sub-sentential utterance can serve as an assertion. The examples he gives, listed above, are designed to show how non-linguistic context alone is enough to imbue an utterance of a sentence fragment with assertoric force. These cases, then, might look to be counterexamples to Dummett’s Assertion Thesis, i.e. that assertion must be explained in terms of conventions associated with the use of declarative sentences. What I want to argue, though, is that this conclusion is based on a flawed interpretation of the Assertion Thesis. The mistake is to view this thesis entailing what we can call ‘Not-Dummett’:14 Not-Dummett: In the absence of a discourse context (such as a question-answer pair) that makes assertoric force otherwise apparent, assertoric force must always be signalled by the use of declarative syntax. Not only does the Assertion Thesis not entail Not-Dummett, Dummett does not hold Not-Dummett, as he makes very clear in Mood, force and convention. In that paper, Dummett (1993: 202) poses two questions about force. I have rephrased them below as questions specifically about assertion. Question 1: What is it to attach assertoric force to an utterance? Question 2: Under what conditions is it correct to say that someone has made an utterance with assertoric force? Question 1 asks what it is to make an assertion. It requires an explanation of what assertion consists in. Question 2 asks how one is to recognise an utterance as conveying assertoric force. Now, in order to take Stainton’s examples as evidence against Dummett’s position on the
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
4.4.2.2 The role of convention in understanding assertion
Assertion
relationship between assertion and the conventional use of declarative syntax, we must read Dummett as proposing this relationship as a means of answering Question 2. That is, we must take him as meaning that it is correct to say that someone has asserted only if they have uttered a declarative sentence. This would indeed commit him to Not-Dummett. However, this is not what Dummett means. Rather, the conventional relationship between mood and force that he proposes is aimed at answering Question 1: his view is not that utterances cannot be assertoric unless they involve the unembedded use of declarative syntax, but that unless we posit a conventional relationship between assertion and declarative syntax, we have no means of explicating assertion. In other words, his Assertion Thesis is not intended as an answer to Question 2, but to Question 1: The conventions to which I intended to allude are not those which determine whether, for example, an utterance is to be taken as an assertion, but those without which there would be no such thing as the assertoric use of sentences, those by reference to which an account is to be given of what it is to make an assertion (Dummett 1993: 221). On this view, we need to posit a conventional relationship between declarative syntax and assertion in order to say what assertion is, but once we have this notion, we can identify assertions as acts performed with the intention to assert, regardless of whether this intention is signalled with declarative syntax. To show that Dummett is wrong, then, it is not enough to point to assertions such as (22) to (25): one must also show that it is not necessary to posit a conventional relationship between assertion and declarative syntax in order to explain what assertion is. To do this, one might argue, à la Grice, that assertion is best explained in terms of the expression of belief. But Dummett, as we saw in Chapter 3, holds the view that assertion is conceptually prior to belief, and has strong arguments to this effect. Consequently, to argue against him, it would be necessary to show that his views concerning this order of explanation are wrong. Another route suggests itself. One might want to characterise assertion in terms of its relationship to truth, rather than belief, but without positing a conventional link between a particular linguistic form and truth. One might want to claim, for example, that to assert is to speak with the intention of saying something true. This though, requires that truth be explicated. As we saw in Chapter 3, for Dummett, truth is to be
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
80
explicated in terms of treating true. We must then ask what practice best exemplifies treating as true, assertion being, for Dummett, the answer to that question. Circularity results: in attempting explain assertion, we make use of the notion of truth which in turn, for its explication, requires recourse to the notion of assertion. Again, Dummett forces any prospective opponent to tackle him on the nature of truth, rather than on the seemingly firmer ground of the mood/force relationship. None of the above should be taken to imply, however, that Dummett rules out intention attribution playing a role in the identification of assertoric force on a particular occasion of utterance. His claim is, rather, that having an intention to assert presupposes a notion of assertion, and it is this prior notion that must be explained in terms of convention, not intention. He draws a parallel with the use of ambiguous words such as ‘slip’: it may be necessary to take into account speaker intentions in order to determine whether, in uttering ‘I didn’t notice the slip’, the speaker meant an error or a garment, he says, but the possible meanings of the ambiguous word are determined by convention, not by intention (Dummett 1993: 215). In short, then, the existence of sub-sentential assertions does not undermine Dummett’s Assertion Thesis. Dummett’s point about the relationship between assertion and declarative mood is a deep one concerning the role of treating as true in explicating truth. To challenge it, this deep point must be targeted. Alleged counterexamples of the type considered in this section will not do the job.
4.4.3 Conclusion to section 4.4 In this section, I have considered, on the one hand, whether the declarative should be thought of as a marker of declarative force, and, on the other, whether an affirmative answer to this question means that assertions must always be performed using the declarative form. The answer has been that the declarative should be thought of as a sign of assertion, but that this does not entail the view that assertion cannot be performed by other means. It might still be asked, though, whether, given the cases discussed in sub-section 4.4.1, assertion can be fully explained in terms of the conventions associated with the use of the declarative mood, as Dummett holds. The objection would centre on the fact that where there is ambiguity in the use of the declarative, as in the cases discussed in that sub-section, this ambiguity is resolved by considering speaker intentions: what determines, for example, whether an utterance of ‘I promise never to drink again’ counts as a promise or as
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
A Sign of Assertion 81
Assertion
a statement concerning the speaker’s habitual response to a hangover is the speaker’s intention, not a convention. This would be taken to show that there is an essential intentional ingredient to assertion, and that convention cannot be the whole story. I think, though, that the cases discussed in sub-section 4.4.1 do not undermine the conventionalist analysis. It is open to the conventionalist to respond, I think, that those cases are marked by particular context and/or content factors. For example, on the context side, we noted how the use of the declarative in directive speech acts required the speaker to have authority over the hearer; on the content side, explicit performatives are characterised by the fact that they are about an illocutionary act. Thus, it is only under certain conditions, the conventionalist can argue, that speaker intentions come into consideration. Moreover, the issue of speaker intentions only arises, it can be claimed, due to the conventional significance of the form employed as a marker of assertoric force. On this issue, perhaps the parallel with lexical ambiguity (as in Dummett’s ‘slip’ example) is misleading: whereas ‘slip’ has (at least) two conventional meanings, the declarative is a conventional marker only of assertoric force. The potential that it has, under certain conditions, to convey other forces results not from conventions relating the declarative to these forces, but from its conventional role as a means of conveying assertoric force and further context and content considerations. Furthermore, against the intentionalist analysis, it could be argued that one can assert without intending to. Imagine, for example, a speaker who makes a sexist statement with ironic intentions, but whose audience has little appreciation of – or sensitivity to – irony. She would be taken by her audience to have asserted, and might even agree herself that she had unwittingly asserted the offensive proposition. Overall, then, I think that the view that the concept of assertion can ultimately be analysed in terms of the conventions associated with the utterance of declarative sentences can be maintained, though some nuance must be introduced in order to handle the cases discussed section 4.4.1.
4.5 Conclusion A number of significant points can be drawn from the preceding discussion. First, if an inferential system is intended as a means of representing the world, then a sign or format that imbues a propositional form with assertoric character must be specified. Failure to do so will result in infinite regress. Second, from the fact that assertions qua speech acts can present propositions as suitable for use as premises in inference, it
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
82
does not follow that assertions qua speech acts can serve as premises. Moreover, there is good reason to think that they cannot: assertions qua premises in inference must encode their truth conditions, something that assertion qua illocutionary acts rarely do. Third, we have seen that non-assertoric uses of the declarative that have been put forward as evidence that this form is not a marker of assertoric force can be straightforwardly explained on the assumption that this is indeed its role, even while allowing that assertions can be performed by other means. Generally, the proposed counter-examples can be explained in terms of their relationship to an assertion made using the same form: in some cases, witnessing the act performed has the same consequences as accepting an assertion employing the same form would have; in others, the consequences of the act are an acceptance, albeit in a restricted domain, of the inferential consequences of the associated assertion. In Chapter 6, we will look more closely at the role of mood in assertion, considering first just what the declarative encodes that makes it so suitable for the making of assertions. Before that, though, we need to consider one final perspective on assertion: Stalnaker’s common ground view. We look at this now because it has been very influential on some of the linguistic accounts of the declarative that we will consider in Chapter 6.
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
A Sign of Assertion 83
5
5.1 Introduction Linguistic communication generally takes place against a background of assumptions held in common by those participating in the conversation. Call this the common ground. These assumptions represent the state of the world as it is taken to be by those participants. Depending on the interlocutors and the topic of discussion, these common assumptions might range from facts concerning who is participating in the conversation to shared beliefs about quantum physics. Assertion can be viewed as a means of adding to that stock of shared assumptions: when one asserts that P, one puts P forward for inclusion in the common ground, and P will acquire common-ground status unless it is rejected by the other participants in the conversation. On this view of assertion, what one is entitled to assert is constrained by the common ground: one should normally only assert a proposition that is compatible with, but not entailed by, the common ground. To do otherwise would either be contradictory (in the case that the proposition asserted were incompatible with the common ground, i.e. with propositions accepted as true by the speaker), or uninformative. A much-discussed model of assertion along these lines has been developed by Robert Stalnaker (1975/1999 inter alia). As noted in the introduction, this is the philosophical analysis of assertion that has most influence on formal-semantic approaches to mood. It is thus discussed here with a view to the subsequent discussion of these analyses of mood, and serves, to some degree, as a bridge from the philosophical concerns of the previous chapters to the linguistic and cognitive topics that will dominate during the remainder of the book. 84
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Assertion and Common Ground
For Stalnaker, a proposition is a function from possible worlds into truth values. The set of propositions that make up the common ground will thus pick out a set of possible worlds consisting of all those worlds in which all the propositions in the common ground return a positive truth value. These possible worlds will be the live options for how the world might actually be. Stalnaker calls this set of worlds ‘the context set’. An assertion, if accepted by the addressee, adds the proposition expressed to the common ground. This proposition will return a positive truth value in some, but not all, of the possible worlds in the context set. Those worlds in which it returns a negative truth value will be removed from the context set, and so some of the candidate worlds for the actual world will have been eliminated. On this view, a central aim of conversation is to reduce uncertainty about the way the world is. Reducing the context set by means of assertion achieves this aim, and it is in these terms that Stalnaker seeks to capture the informative nature of assertion.1 A major concern of Stalnaker’s in developing this view of assertion is to provide a pragmatic account of presupposition phenomena. In linguistics, it is this aspect of his work that has had the most impact, particularly among formal semanticists. Stalnaker’s account of presupposition is discussed in section 5.3 of this chapter. From a speech-act theoretic perspective, Stalnaker’s account has received considerably less attention. However, as we will see in the section 5.2, his account does reflect the traditional speech-act distinction between sense and force in the dual way it employs the notion of truth: both to capture the content of assertions and the consequences of making them. Another feature of Stalnaker’s account that has received little attention is the features it shares with Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory. Although they are perhaps not immediately obvious, we will see in section 5.4 that there are significant points of contact. I will argue there that some of the challenges faced by Stalnaker’s account, particularly the problem of logical omniscience that results from his possible-worlds framework, can be addressed by adopting elements of Sperber and Wilson’s framework.
5.2 Sense, force and representation in Stalnaker’s account In this section, we consider Stalnaker’s account from the perspective of speech-act theory. We will see that assertoric force is explained, on the common-ground account, in terms of a consistency requirement
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Assertion and Common Ground 85
Assertion
on the basic context set. Other speech acts can be distinguished from assertion both in terms of the type of context set they seek to modify and whether they are best analysed as attempts to reduce a context set, basic or otherwise. This discussion brings to light two conceptions of truth at play in Stalnaker’s account, and this is in turn related to two conceptions of representation.
5.2.1 Consistency and assertoric force As we noted in the previous chapter, to make an assertion is to undertake a commitment to consistency. This is captured in Stalnaker’s account by characterising the context set as the set of worlds in which all the propositions in the common ground are true in each world in that set. It is important to stress that this consistency requirement does not follow automatically from the fact that an assertion expresses a proposition. A set of propositions, thought of as functions from possible worlds to truth values, will also pick out the set of possible worlds consisting in all those worlds in which at least one proposition in that set is true. This, though, will not be a consistent set, for propositions true in some worlds in the set will be false in others. In characterising the context set as the set of worlds in which all propositions in the common ground are true in all members of that set, Stalnaker requires that this set be consistent and thereby reflects the fact that assertion is a truth-aiming activity. Notice, though, that truth plays two very different roles here. On the one hand, we have truth employed as a means of characterising propositions. A proposition is thought of as means of partitioning sets of possible worlds according to whether or not the proposition is true in each of the worlds in that set. On the other hand, we have truth as an aim of assertion. This is truth thought of in terms of treating as true. The assertions we can make are constrained, on Stalnaker’s account, by their compatibility with the propositions already in the common ground, and if an assertion is accepted, it will constrain what further assertions can be accepted. This latter – pragmatic – conception of truth draws on the significance of the everyday notion of truth employed in human affairs. By contrast, the conception of truth employed in characterising propositions is highly abstract and not open to analysis in terms of the consequences of making a truth judgement. The distinction between truth as applied to propositions and truth as applied to assertions calls to mind Dummett’s criticisms of Davidson’s disquotational theory of meaning, discussed in Chapter 3 section 3.2. Dummett’s point, recall, is that what an approach such as Davidson’s
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
86
describes is the ability of a language user to distinguish sentences that should be called ‘true’. Such accounts take for granted, he argues, the point, or the consequences, of such a distinction. Stalnaker’s account seeks to capture the point of this distinction – that is, the point of truthjudgements – in terms of how they reduce uncertainty about the nature of the world by limiting the range of permissible assertions. This is why the context set must be one in which all propositions in the common ground are true in all the possible worlds in that set, for only through the requirement of consistency can the informative nature of assertions (and hence their point) be captured. The two conceptions of truth at play in Stalnaker’s account also relate to the traditional speech-act distinction between sense and force (as reflected in the F(P) notation discussed in Chapter 2). One could just as easily use the notion partitioning possible worlds – and thus the propositional notion of truth – in an analysis of what it is to understand an utterance of an imperative: you understand an utterance of an imperative sentence if you can distinguish all the worlds in which that utterance is complied with from all those in which it is not. Utterances of different imperative sentences will partition possible worlds in different ways. If the worlds selected as the compliance worlds of an imperative are the same as those worlds for which an utterance of declarative sentence selects returns the value ‘true’, then it is surely fair to say that the two utterances express the same proposition, that they have the same sense. But, as Dummett counsels, we must say more if we are to capture the difference between utterances of imperative and declarative sentences. We need to say what their point is – what they are used for. This, of course, is where force comes in, and the effect of reducing – while maintaining the consistency of – the context set is Stalnaker’s means of adding assertoric force to the propositional element of assertions. The point of an utterance of an imperative is surely not to remove all non-compliance worlds from the common ground. Imperatives are not informative in this sense. Imperatival – or ‘directive’ – force will have to be explained by other means.2 So while it might be correctly said that propositional content, and therefore sense, determines a sentence’s truth value at any given possible world, it is force that determines aptness for truth-judgement. Any sentential utterance can be said to express a proposition, but only assertives (and perhaps some rhetorical questions, see Barker 2004: 37; Pagin 2004: 851) are truth apt. As we saw in Chapter 2, the significance of the consequence of truth judgements for semantic theory is a major fault line amongst theorists. Those who think the analysis of meaning
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Assertion and Common Ground 87
Assertion
boils down to the analysis of truth conditions will be content with the abstract notion of truth as a value of propositions. Taking this stance does postpone having to consider questions of use and force, but it also, according to Dummett (1993), limits such theories to accounting only for sense, rather than for linguistic meaning in its totality. Employing a notion of truth that gives credence to the significance of truth judgements, however, requires giving explanatory priority to assertions, à la Brandom and Barker, for it is assertions which are the primary objects of truth judgements. In certain respects, through his dual use of possible worlds, Stalnaker straddles the two camps. On the one hand, he employs possible worlds to characterise the content of assertions. On the other, he employs possible worlds to characterise the information state of the participants in the conversation. The latter move enables him to say something about the informative purpose of assertion in terms of removing possible worlds that are candidates for the actual world from the context set. What enables him to do this, though, is the consistency requirement on the context set. Without this requirement, adding propositions to the common ground would extend, rather than reduce, the context set. 5.2.2 The problem of representation The two ways in which the notion of truth is employed in Stalnaker’s account also manifests itself in a dual use of the notion of representation. Discussing the relationship between propositions and representation, Stalnaker says that: A proposition – the content of an assertion or a belief – is a representation of the world as being a certain way. But for any given representation of the world as being a certain way, there will be a set of all the possible states of the world which accord with the representation – which are that way. So any proposition determines a set of possible worlds. And, for any given set of possible worlds, to locate the actual world in that set is to represent the world as being a certain way (1978/1999: 79 original emphasis). Discussing accounts, such as Stalnaker’s, which analyse assertions and beliefs as expressions of propositions, in turn understood as sets of possible worlds, Brandom comments: The question that then arises is what expressing a proposition has to do with representing anything (1994: 665, fn. 32 original emphasis).
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
88
Brandom’s complaint against possible-world accounts of representation centres on the alleged inability of such theories to explain the significance of such representation in human affairs (echoes again of Dummett’s complaint against Davidson). This significance is, for him, the key to understanding the nature of linguistic representation. In this sub-section, we look at Brandom’s complaint and ask whether Stalnaker has any response available to him. Implicit in the above quote from Stalnaker is the view that (a) the content of an assertion or belief can be abstracted away from other elements of this act or state; and (b) such abstraction delivers up the representational core of that assertion or belief. This is evident in the fact that Stalnaker says that it is the proposition expressed by the assertion or belief, rather than the assertion or belief itself, which is ‘a representation of the world as being a certain way’. Note, though, that in the above quotation, the notion of representation is employed twice: first, a proposition is characterised as a representation of the world as being a certain way; then, locating the actual world in a set of propositions is described as a means of representing the world as being a certain way. Locating the actual world in a set of possible worlds is what one does, on Stalnaker’s account, when one asserts. So, just as we found two notions of truth at play in Stalnaker’s model, here we find two notions of representation. On the one hand, propositions represent the world as being a certain way; on the other, speakers represent the world as being a certain way when they assert. Moreover, these two notions are closely related to those two conceptions of truth: a proposition represents the world as being a certain way by dividing a set of possible worlds into those in which it is true and those in which it is not; a speaker and hearer coincide in representing the world as being a certain way if she makes an assertion and it becomes mutually accepted that he judges it true. The abstract notion of truth employed in the analysis of propositions is thus related to the notion of representation at play when isolating the contents of assertions and beliefs, while the practical notion of a truth judgement employed in Stalnaker’s analysis of assertions is related to acts of representing the actual world as being a particular way by locating the world in a set of propositions. Just as the two notions of truth at play in Stalnaker’s account correspond to the distinction between sense and force, so do the two notions of representation. A proposition simpliciter is the sense of a representation, but representation of the world as being a particular way – in the sense of locating the actual world in a set of possible worlds – is achieved only when a representation is employed with assertoric force.3
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Assertion and Common Ground 89
Assertion
Brandom’s objection to Stalnaker’s characterisation of the representational capacity of assertions and beliefs is aimed at the first of these notions of representation, i.e. the idea that a proposition, conceived of as a set of possible worlds, can capture the representational nature of these acts and states. For Brandom, an adequate analysis of representation must make reference to the use to which representations are put and what counts as making proper use of them. That is, representation only makes sense in relation to an individual or system whose behaviour will be guided by the ‘consumption’ of those representations (Brandom 1994: 72–4). This is not a view that is unique to Brandom: essentially the same position is held by a number of authors who have worked on representation. For example, Sperber says that ‘[a] representation involves a relationship between three terms: an object is representation of something, for some information-processing device’ (1996: 61, original emphasis), while Dennett (whom Brandom cites) says that ‘nothing is intrinsically a representation of anything; something is a representation only for or to someone’ (1981: 122). On this view of representation, abstracting representations such as assertions and beliefs to sets of possible worlds removes elements from these acts and states that make them representational in the first place. This, I think, is the crux of Brandom’s complaint: if we analyse representation in terms of sets of possible worlds, then we lose our hold on its significance in human activity. But this significance, Brandom would argue, is just what gives our assertions and beliefs representational content. It is only because they constrain and guide our behaviour (i.e. they are representations for us) that we have grounds to call them representations. However, the notion of representation that is employed in the latter part of the above quote from Stalnaker, whereby we represent the world as being a certain way by locating it in a set of possible worlds, is not open to this criticism. To locate, by means of assertion, the actual world in a set of possible worlds is to undertake a commitment to consistency, so that neither the speaker nor those who accept her assertion can go on to make another assertion that is incompatible with what has been asserted. As we noted in section 5.2.1, this commitment does constrain behaviour, so representation thus construed does meet Brandom’s requirement that representation be explained in terms of uptake, of ‘taking, treating or using it in practice as a representation’ (Brandom 1994: 74, original emphasis). Brandom is right, then, to worry that viewing propositions as sets of possible worlds raises the question of how they ever come to represent
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
90
anything. But Stalnaker’s use of the possible worlds framework in analysing assertion also offers a means by which to explain how assertions manage to constrain our behaviour and hence of how they come to represent the world. Assertions, on his account, come with a commitment to consistency and this commitment constrains the behaviour of those who make, and accept, assertions. That said, a commitment to consistency alone will not explain why assertions are representations of the actual world. As was noted in the discussion of fiction and supposition in Chapter 4, not all consistency-aiming endeavours aim at representing the actual world. Other means are needed, then, in order to distinguish assertion as a species of representation. How this might be done is the topic of the next sub-section.
5.2.3 Distinguishing assertions from other acts aimed at reducing a context set Stalnaker stresses that in characterising assertion in terms of an attempt to reduce the context set, he does not mean to give a definition of assertion, but only to make ‘a claim about one effect which assertions have, and are intended to have – an effect that should be a component, or a consequence, of an adequate definition’ (1978/1999: 87). One of his reasons for not claiming that putting forward for context-set reduction is a sufficient condition for an act to count as an assertion is that there are, he says, other acts that have an are intended to have the same effect (loc. cit.). The act he mentions in this light in Assertion is the making of a supposition. However, it is likely that he had in mind a whole range of acts that are related to acceptance-apt attitudes. As noted in the last chapter, Stalnaker defines acceptance as treating a proposition as true in one way or another – as ignoring, perhaps only temporarily, the possibility that it is false (1984: 79). As well as supposing, he mentions presupposing, presuming, postulating, and assuming. We will leave presupposing until the next section as it is distinct from the others in that it cannot be used in an explicit performative (i.e. one cannot say ‘I hereby presuppose that P’ and thereby presuppose that P), suggesting that, unlike the others, it is not an illocutionary act. What we will see is that the remaining acceptance-apt acts can in fact be distinguished from assertion in terms of the type of context set that they act upon. In his work on belief attribution and conditionals, Stalnaker (1975/1999; 1988/1999) distinguishes between a basic context and a derived context. A derived, or embedded, context is one at which an
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Assertion and Common Ground 91
Assertion
embedded sentence such as we find in a belief report should be interpreted. The set of possible worlds that make up the basic context may be distinct from those that make up the embedded context: the set of worlds that speaker believes to be the live options for the actual world may be distinct from those that she takes the subject of the belief report to be treating as candidate worlds. Similarly, subjunctive (i.e. counterfactual) conditionals create a context which is usually disjoint from the basic context in which the conversation is taking place, hence the implication that follows from a subjunctive conditional that the negation of the antecedent is true. A fundamental difference between basic and derived contexts is that in the former, but not in the latter, it must be true that the participants of the speech event exist and that the speech act in question takes place. This need not be the case in derived contexts. One can say, for example, ‘Let’s suppose we weren’t here’ (Stalnaker 1988/1999: 156–9). This is not to say, though, that all derived contexts must be disjoint from the basic context. Presuming is an attitude that involves accepting a proposition as true while also accepting that one does not have knowledge of its truth. It differs from supposition in that one cannot presume what one knows to be false. The set of worlds (i.e. derived context set) picked out by acceptance of a presumption, then, will be all those worlds in the basic context set less those in which the proposition presumed is also true. Thus while, on the Stalnakerian account, assertion cannot be distinguished from other acceptance-apt acts in terms of the type of effect it has on a context set, it can be distinguished in terms of the type of context set it aims at affecting. Assertions are aimed at modifying the basic context; other acceptance-apt acts are aimed at modifying a derived context that is embedded within the basic context. This derived context set may be, but need not be, disjoint from the basic context set. Stalnaker’s conception of a derived context set therefore offers a means of distinguishing – within his general framework – assertion from other acceptance-apt speech acts, and belief from other acceptance-apt propositional attitudes. This distinction between basic and embedded contexts will be central to the analysis of assertion put forward in Chapter 8.
5.3 Assertion and presupposition As noted earlier, Stalnaker’s interest in assertion is motivated to a large extent by a desire to put forward a pragmatic account of what are generally termed presuppositional phenomena. Indeed, in his earliest
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
92
writing on this topic, what he would later term ‘the context set’ is called ‘the presupposition set’ (Stalnaker 1973: 450). In this section, we will look closely at the assertion/presupposition contrast in Stalnaker’s account, concentrating in particular on the issue of presupposition accommodation. We will see that, while Stalnaker draws a useful distinction between those propositions that can be inferred from the fact that an assertion has been made and the proposition that the assertion has the overt goal of communicating, the identification of presuppositions as common-ground propositions is highly problematic. 5.3.1 Presupposition: the Stalnakerian view It has long been felt, among linguists and philosophers of language, that there is a class of implications that follow from certain statements which behaves differently to straightforward entailments. For example, (1)a entails both (1)c and (1)d. However, there appears to be a difference in the way the two entailments respond to the negation of (1)a. If we negate (1)a we get (1)b. A speaker who uttered (1)b, however, would not, it is widely held, generally be committed to (1)c, though she would normally be committed to (1)d. (1) a. b. c. d.
John gave his wife roses John didn’t give his wife roses John gave his wife flowers John has a wife
This illustrates, of course, the widely-drawn distinction between entailment and presupposition: (1)a entails (1)c but is said to presuppose (1)d. Generally, a statement S is said to presuppose P if P can usually be inferred both from S and its negation. Other examples of presuppositions are given in the pairs below. In each case, the b-member of the pair is an example of what is commonly considered a presupposition of the a-member.4 (2) a. b. (3) a. b. (4) a. b.
Peter hasn’t quit smoking Peter smokes Perhaps John realises that the exam will be difficult The exam will be difficult Peter wasn’t sad to see her leave She left
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Assertion and Common Ground 93
Assertion
(5) a. b. (6) a. b.
Bill might not know that the bar is shut The bar is shut It was Bill who wrote the book Someone wrote the book
As the name suggests, there is a widespread feeling that presuppositions should normally be part of the common ground of the conversation in which an utterance takes place. Stalnaker seeks to exploit this in an attempt to subvert the prevalent view that presuppositions, like entailments, are part of what is encoded by a sentence.5 Taking his cue from Grice’s conversational analyses of the apparent ambiguities of natural language conjunctions such as ‘or’, Stalnaker attempts to explain presuppositions in terms of expectations that hearers and speakers could reasonably have about each others behaviour, granted their rationality and common goals. Presupposition, in Stalnaker’s framework, is a propositional attitude of speakers: to treat a proposition as common ground is to presuppose it. Certain linguistic structures, on his account, should be used only if certain propositions are already part of the common ground. For example, a definite description should only be used if it is common ground that the referent exists, thus explaining why both (1)a and b presuppose (1)d. Change of state verbs such as ‘quit’ are to be used only if the state of affairs that is described as undergoing change obtains. Similarly, the Stalnakerian view would have it that factive predicates such as ‘know’, ‘realize’ and ‘be sad that’ should normally be used only if it is common ground that the proposition expressed by the complement clause is true, and cleft sentences such as (6)a only if it is common ground that the event described by (6)b has taken place. The justification for these stipulations is rational conversational efficiency. Take the factive verb ‘know’ as an example. As we have seen, Stalnaker claims that, generally, when one asserts that someone knows that P, one treats it as common ground that P. This can be explained, he says, by considering what would happen if one were to assert someone knows that P against a conversational background in which P were in doubt or dispute. In such a case, one would be making a statement that could be challenged in two ways: either by denying that the individual in question knows that P or by denying that P. Consequently, the point of the assertion would be obscured. In the same situation, to assert that someone does not know that P would be gratuitously weak. For in the case that not-P, someone’s knowing that P is already ruled out (Stalnaker 1974/1999: 55).
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
94
On this account, then, assertion is an attempt to have the proposition expressed added to the presuppositions of the participants in a conversation. The presuppositions associated with utterances of declarative sentences are distinguished from the proposition expressed by those sentences in terms of their relationship with the common ground: the former are, under ideal conditions, already part of the common ground while the latter are not. However, there is a fly in the ointment. As Stalnaker has always been aware, linguistic forms are often not used in the way that his account, on a simple reading, predicts. For example, (1)a could be uttered quite felicitously in conversation in which (1)d was not common ground. However, if (1)a were accepted (and possibly even if it were not) then (1)d would also be common ground as a result of the utterance. It would appear that a definite description can be used – without giving rise to intuitions of infelicity or inappropriateness – to communicate that the referent exists. This creates a problem for Stalnaker, as his basis for distinguishing between assertion and presupposition appears to be undermined by such cases: both presuppostions and assertions can serve to extend the common ground. As just noted, Stalnaker was aware of this problem from early on (see Stalnaker 1974/1999: 51–53, especially fn. 2). He attempts to deal with it by appealing to Lewis’s (1979) notion of accommodation. The idea is this: when a linguistic form that is generally only appropriately used if P is common ground is employed in a conversation in which P is not common ground, then the participants of the conversation tend to accommodate that use by quietly adding P to the common ground. This will happen if the proposition is uncontroversial and it is common ground that the speaker is in position to know that P. Stalnaker implements this idea in an ingenious manner by distinguishing two the ways an assertion can modify the common ground. On the one hand, as we have seen, an assertion, if accepted, will modify the common ground by having its content added to that set of propositions, thereby reducing the context set. This Stalnaker calls ‘the essential effect’ of assertion. It is essential not because an act must have this effect if it is to count as an assertion, but because it grants an insight into the nature of assertion, in that this effect should be, according to Stalnaker, a consequence of any satisfactory definition of that act. However, an assertion will also affect the common ground in manner not essential to assertion but common to all speech acts: the fact that the speech act has taken place will become common ground. Thus if somebody asserts, promises or commands that P, the fact that she has asserted, promised or commanded that P will become common ground. In the case of assertion,
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Assertion and Common Ground 95
Assertion
this effect on the common ground differs from its essential effect in that it is automatic and unavoidable: it is not dependent on acceptance by the addressee.6 This is because the production of the speech act is ‘a manifest event’ (Stalnaker 2002: 708), one which has been mutually witnessed by all participants and hence cannot be rejected. Stalnaker introduces this distinction between the essential and nonessential effects of assertion in Assertion (1978/1999: 86), but it is in two later papers (1988/1999; 2002) that he details how, he claims, it can be used to account for presupposition accommodation while still maintaining the distinction he wishes to draw between assertion and presupposition in terms of the latter’s alleged common-ground status. What he says is that the distinction between the two effects makes it possible to idealise a moment between comprehension and acceptance. At that point, it will be common ground that the speaker has asserted that P, but P will not yet have been accepted into the common ground. Given that the speaker has asserted that P, it will be possible for the hearer to infer that the speaker assumes that certain propositions are common ground from the fact that the she has used linguistic forms – such as definite descriptions and factive verbs – which, according to Stalnaker, considerations of communicative efficiency decree should only be used if a certain proposition is common ground. The hearer can then add to the common ground any propositions that are not in fact presupposed before accepting (or rejecting) the asserted proposition. It is the common ground at this stage of the interaction – once the utterance has been comprehended and any presuppositions made by the speaker that were not already common ground have been incorporated into the common ground – that an assertion has the essential effect of updating. As the quote below shows, although elaborated on in later papers, this aspect of his model was present from quite early on. However, although ingenious, it is open to criticism, as we will see in the next sub-section. [T]he context on which an assertion has its essential effect is not defined by what is presupposed before the speaker begins to speak, but will include any information which the speaker assumes his audience can infer from the performance of the speech act (Stalnaker 1978/1999: 86). 5.3.2 Criticising the Stalnakerian view of presupposition accommodation One criticism that can be levelled against the Stalnakerian notion of presupposition accommodation is that, as Abbott (2000) and Simons (2007)
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
96
have shown, the putative phenomenon of presupposition accommodation is too widespread to be seriously considered an exploitation of a norm such that certain constructions should only be used if the proposition whose acceptance is signalled by that use is part of the common ground. We will not go into this objection here, because the data will be discussed in Chapter 7 at some length. The problem that we will consider here lies in Stalnaker’s grounds for claiming that presuppostions are best explained as common-ground assumptions. His reasons for adopting this position are, recall, that he believes it would go against norms of rational communicative efficiency to put forward more than one proposition per utterance for inclusion in the common ground. For to do so, he says, would leave the audience in doubt about the speaker’s main point, ‘thus leaving unclear what direction he wanted or expected the conversation to take’ (1974/1999: 55). This assumes, though, that there are no means available to simultaneously both put a set of propositions forward for inclusion in the common ground and indicate which of these is the speaker’s main point. In other words, Stalnaker assumes that to utter, say, ‘x knows that P’ against a common ground which does not include P is equivalent to asserting ‘P and x knows that P’. Such a conjoined assertion might indeed leave the audience perplexed about the speaker’s intentions concerning the direction of the conversation. However, this analysis ignores the possibility that a function of main-clause declarative syntax is to endow the proposition expressed with main-point status. If that is indeed a function of this form, then there is no need to claim that it is only rational to assert ‘x knows that P’ in a context in which P is common ground, for the confusion that Stalnaker claims would result if P were not common ground is avoided by other means, viz. by not giving P main-point status through one’s choice of the means by which one expresses P (cf. Abbott 2000). A Stalnakerian might want to respond, of course, that it is just this main-point effect that the view of presuppositions as being associated with common-ground status seeks to explain. Common ground assumptions, the response would go, are by their nature, in the background, hence the non-main-point status of non-asserted propositions. However, by its insistence that conversations can proceed efficiently only if presupposed propositions are common ground, the Stalnakerian position opens itself to accusations of being self-contradictory: on the one hand, it identifies a presupposition as a proposition P associated with a linguistic form whose use is only acceptable, on grounds of rational communicative efficiency, if P is common ground; on the other hand, it
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Assertion and Common Ground 97
98
Assertion
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
S’s utterance contains L It is communicatively efficient to utter L only if P is common ground P is not common ground S is not behaving in a communicatively efficient manner If the hearer accommodates P, S will be behaving in a communicatively efficient manner 6. P is not controversial and S is in a position to know that P 7. Accommodate P! The problem with this inference is that accepting the premise at line 5 requires rejecting the premise at line 2: accepting that is communicatively efficient to accommodate presupposition P is tantamount to denying that it is communicatively efficient to utter the linguistic form associated with P only if it is common ground that P. In other words, as long as the alleged common-ground status of presuppositions is derived from considerations of rational communicative efficiency, the phenomenon of presupposition accommodation is incompatible with their having that status. The Stalnakerian view of presuppositions is thus undermined by cases in which it is communicatively efficient to use a form associated with a presupposition even if that presupposition is not common ground. The mechanism of accommodation cannot rescue this conception of presupposition because the same considerations that are claimed to underlie the alleged common-ground status are employed to explain those cases in which this status is absent.7 Modifying the common-ground requirement so that a presupposed proposition must have common-ground status only at an idealised point between comprehension and acceptance/rejection simply removes the intuitive appeal of the original conception. What we are left with is a distinction not between what is asserted and what is common ground, but between propositions whose addition to the common ground is the raison d’être of the speech act, and propositions which can be justifiably added to the common ground given that the speech act has been performed. This, I think, is a very useful and theoretically important distinction which has considerable explanatory potential: it might explain, for example, why ‘the family of utterances’ (to use the felicitous phrase coined by Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 2000: 28–32) related to an utterance U (i.e. its negation, modal form etc.)
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
argues that is sometimes acceptable, presumably on the same grounds, to use that form if the P is not common ground. Thus the reasoning process that is claimed to underlie presupposition accommodation goes as follows:
share presuppositions. Because the speaker, in each case, is talking about the same objects and situations, we can draw similar conclusions from each of the utterances (such as the existence of the objects referred to). Our ability to draw such inferences can be exploited be speakers.8 The tough question then becomes explaining why it is acceptable to communicate a certain proposition without asserting it. The general intuition is that this has to do both with considerations of main-pointhood and controversy. What is needed is a framework that can give flesh to these intuitive bones. In Chapter 7, an account is proposed that seeks to do just this. This, though, makes use of a conception of common ground that better reflects the realities of linguistic interaction and the limitations of human cognition: Sperber and Wilson’s notion of mutual manifestness. This is compared with Stalnaker’s notion of common ground in the next section of this chapter.
5.4 Comparison with Relevance Theory The analysis put forward in Chapter 8 employs Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory as a means of bringing together disparate perspectives on assertion. In order that the view developed there can be related to the Stanakerian picture, it will be useful here to compare the two frameworks. We will see that both models allow for a range of propositions to be a communicated by an assertion, and that both see the enlarging of a set of mutual beliefs as central aim of linguistic communication. I will argue, however, that from the perspective of a theory of utterance interpretation, the Relevance Theory notion of mutual manifestness offers a solution to certain problems raised by Stalnaker’s conception of common ground. One similarity between the two frameworks lies in the distinction that Stalnaker makes between the essential and non-essential effects of assertion. The essential effect of assertion, recall, is the reduction of the context set by the addition of the proposition explicitly expressed by the assertion to the common ground. This type of effect can be avoided if the assertion is rejected. Non-essential effects are reductions to the context set that result from the fact that the assertion has been made. These effects are not dependent on acceptance. One non-essential effect of an assertion will be to add (7) to the common ground, another, assuming the speaker is judged sincere, will be to add (8): (7) The speaker has asserted that P (8) The speaker believes that P
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Assertion and Common Ground 99
Assertion
This distinction is captured in Relevance Theory by the distinction between basic and higher-level explicatures. An explicature is a communicated assumption that is derived by developing the encoded meaning (logical form) of the utterance (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995: 182). Higher-order explicatures are derived by embedding, under a propositional-attitude or speech-act description, the proposition derived by developing the encoded meaning of the sentence. In RelevanceTheory terms, then, (7) and (8) are higher-level explicatures of an assertion that P. Another similarity is an emphasis on the role of linguistic communication in co-ordinating behaviour. Whereas Stalnaker sees assertion as an act aimed at reducing the context set by adding the proposition expressed to the common ground, Sperber and Wilson see a central aim of linguistic communication as being to expand the mutual cognitive environment of the participants in a conversation (1986/1995: 64). A mutual cognitive environment is a set of shared assumptions whose shared nature is manifest to both the speaker and hearer. As noted briefly in Chapter 3, an assumption is said to be manifest to an individual to some degree if she is capable or representing it mentally and judging it as true or probably true (1986/1995: 39). As assumptions are propositional entities, they will pick out the set of possible worlds in which they are true. Moreover, because the aim of a cognitive environment is to provide an accurate representation of the world (i.e. it is consistency aiming), the set of worlds it picks out can be identified as those in which all mutually manifest assumptions are true in all possible worlds in that set. As in Stalnaker’s model, this is an idealisation, but it is a reasonable one in that consistency is what cognitive environments aim at, even if they never achieve it. The set of worlds picked out by the mutual cognitive environment is thus equivalent to Stalnaker’s context set, and extending the mutual cognitive environment entails reducing the context set. However, Sperber and Wilson’s notion of manifestness has the advantage of accounting for a phenomenon that poses a challenge for a possible-worlds account of mental representation such as Stalnaker’s. This is the problem of logical omniscience (Stalnaker 1991/1999). Analysing beliefs as sets of possible worlds, as Stalnaker does, assumes that the beliefs of an individual are deductively closed: i.e. that the holder of a set of beliefs believes all that that set of beliefs implies. This is also an idealisation: we are clearly ignorant of the consequences of many of our beliefs. Moreover, working out these consequences is often a difficult reflective process. These facts, though, are hard to explain at
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
100
the level of abstraction at which Stalnaker’s account operates: there is no obvious reason, on the version of the possible-worlds account of propositions defended by Stalnaker, why the consequences of an individual’s beliefs should not be available to her. The Relevance Theory notion of manifestness, by contrast, reflects this fact about beliefs. As noted briefly in Chapter 3, Sperber and Wilson draw a distinction between those assumptions – to use their terminology – that are mentally represented by (or entertained) by an individual and those that he is capable of entertaining as a result of inference or perception. The former – those which are entertained and can therefore play a causal role in cognition – they refer to as the assumptions of an individual; the latter they call assumptions which are manifest to an individual (1986/1995: 40). This terminology is confusing, however, in that entertained assumptions are also manifest to the individual (one is clearly capable of representing assumptions that one has in fact represented). Consequently, I will from now on refer to the former as ‘mentally represented assumptions’ and the latter as ‘merely manifest assumptions’. By distinguishing between mentally represented assumptions and merely manifest assumptions, Sperber and Wilson avoid the problems of logical omniscience that Stalnaker encounters. Belief, on Stalnaker’s account, is a disposition to act a certain way, given certain desires (1984: 15). On this view of belief, the problem of logical omniscience reveals itself when (a) we observe that a certain belief B is entailed by a set of beliefs which, by virtue of his behaviour, we feel justified in attributing to an individual, but (b) the individual does not demonstrate a disposition to act on B to fulfil his desires. On Sperber and Wilson’s account, by contrast, this observation can be explained: the individual does not act on B because it is a merely manifest assumption, and hence has no cognitive powers of causation. Of course, buying this solution to the problem of logical omniscience requires accepting that for a belief to have causal powers it must be physically instantiated in some manner in the mind/brain of an agent. Sperber and Wilson follow Fodor (1975; 1998) in viewing such mentally represented assumptions as syntactic objects, or sentences of the language of thought. On this view, it is by virtue of their formal properties that beliefs have causal powers, so merely manifest beliefs will play no causal role in cognition. Now, Stalnaker has argued against what he calls the linguistic picture of mental representation, on which beliefs are viewed as mental sentences with formal properties (1984: chs 1 and 2). However, his objection is that, according to him, such an account cannot serve as a theory of content, of what is represented by thought.
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Assertion and Common Ground 101
Assertion
When it comes to the issue of how content is mentally represented, he is less vehemently opposed to the idea that thoughts may have form and structure akin to that we find in the sentences speaker’s use to express them. The difference between his pragmatic view – on which content is to be explained in terms of dispositions to act – and what he calls the linguistic view is that the pragmatic view sees the form in which beliefs are represented as inessential to their content. The views he seeks to reject, by contrast, attempt to explain content in terms of a causal relationship between objects and states of affairs in the world and formal objects in the mind/brain. However, as Stalnaker acknowledges, the pragmatic picture that he propounds does not preclude positing such formal mental objects in an explanation of how representation is achieved (1984: 23) Thus it is open to Stalnaker to adopt the distinction between mentally represented assumptions and merely manifest assumptions as long as his theory of content does not rely on this distinction. Indeed, Stalnaker (1991/1999) himself argues that the solution to the problem of logical omniscience lies in an understanding of accessibility (as opposed to implicitness). And accessibility is a notion open to analysis in terms of manifestness. A further advantage of adopting the notion of mutual manifestness is that it affords a more nuanced picture of the relationship between assertion and the mutual information state of the interlocutors than the more abstract Stalnakerian common ground. Rather than a proposition either being common ground or not, as is the case on Stalnaker’s model, we have degrees of manifestness, and a mutually manifest assumption may be more manifest to the hearer than to the speaker. An assertion may thus serve to make more manifest to the hearer what, in Stalnaker’s framework, is already a common-ground assumption in that it is true in all possible worlds in the context set. More generally, such a conception of the mutual background of beliefs against which linguistic communication takes place predicts that there should exist means by which speakers not only add to this background, but also modify the degree to which the propositions that constitute it are accessible. As we will see in Chapter 7, a number of putative presuppositional phenomena – particularly those associated with grammatical and phonological form – can be analysed as means by which to achieve this effect. On occasions, Stalnaker does appeal to functions other than informativeness that an assertion might have. In particular, he notes that they have the effect of influencing the direction that a conversation may take. One example is in his discussion, mentioned above, of the
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
102
Assertion and Common Ground 103
There may be other constraints on appropriate assertion – other considerations that count in favour of stating that φ rather than informing the addressee that φ by manifestly presupposing it. A successful assertion may change the context in other ways than by simply adding its content to the context, for example by influencing the direction of the subsequent conversation (2002: 710, original emphasis). Stalnaker’s conception of common ground, though, does not allow for these other effects of assertion to be modelled. From the point of view of a theory of utterance interpretation, this is major shortcoming. It is likely that Stalnaker would respond that, for his purposes, his highly abstract notion of common ground is sufficient. For some of his concerns, such as the analysis of conditionals, belief reports and certain problems of reference, that may well be the case. For a thorough analysis of assertion, however, a framework that better reflects the constraints of human cognition is to be preferred.
5.5 Conclusion One of Stalnaker’s basic claims is that presuppositions are common ground assumptions. This view, however, cannot be maintained, at least not if it is motivated by considerations of rational communicative efficiency. Nevertheless, Stalnaker’s model offers important insights that will inform the account put forward in Chapter 8. First, it draws an important distinction between those propositions whose communication is the raison d’etre of assertion and those whose which can be inferred from the fact that this act takes place. Second, it shows how world representation can be modelled using the possible-worlds framework. A proposition, considered in isolation, is a representation of a world as being a certain way. However, it cannot yet serve as a representation of a particular world, for many worlds will be as represented by that proposition. To represent a particular world, we need a consistent set of propositions, so that alternative candidate worlds can be successively eliminated and we can move closer to an accurate representation
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
rationale for not asserting ‘x knows that P’ in a context in which P is in doubt or dispute. It would be communicatively inefficient to do so, he says, because it would ‘leave unclear what direction he intended or expected the conversation to take’ (1974/1999: 55). Elsewhere, he says that:
Assertion
of the target world. For the target world to be the actual world, however, some form of stipulation is needed. What Stalnaker does is treat the basic context set as having the function of representing the actual world. In Chapter 8, I argue that Sperber and Wilson’s notion of a factual assumptions can serve as the representational format for those propositions that pick out the basic context set. Before doing so, however, more needs to be said about the relationship between assertion and linguistic form. This is the topic of the next two chapters.
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
104
6
6.1 Introduction Taken together, the conclusions drawn from the discussion in Chapter 3 of the relationship between assertion and belief and Chapter 4’s consideration of the role of an assertion sign in the analysis of assertion lead naturally to the view that declarative syntax has a special relationship with assertion. In this chapter, we begin to consider more closely the nature of that relationship. Our main concern will be how the declarative is to be distinguished from the other major moods, such that its assertoric role is explained. The approach taken will be to critically survey a range of proposals that have been made concerning the semantics of the major moods. First, we consider approaches to mood that take a formal semantic perspective, before going on to look at speech-act approaches.
6.2 Mood in formal semantics Within formal semantics, two general approaches to mood can be discerned. On the one hand, there have been attempts to integrate mood into a Davidsonian account of linguistic semantics by searching for the equivalent of T-sentences for non-declaratives; on the other, efforts have been made to account for mood distinction in terms of possible worlds, often employing Stalnaker’s common-ground framework. In this section, we look at each in turn. 6.2.1 Davidsonian accounts What I am calling Davidsonian accounts offer an analysis of nondeclarative moods that parallels the T-sentence analysis of declaratives 105
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Assertion and Mood
Assertion
championed by Davidson. Such theories have been put forward by, among others, McGinn (1977), Segal (1991) and Boisvert and Ludwig (2006). Davidson himself, though, favoured a different approach to mood, so we will briefly consider his own account before looking at the attempts made by others to incorporate mood into his general semantic programme. Davidson’s paratactic account of mood divides the non-declarative moods into a declarative core and a mood-setter. Thus, according to him, an imperative such as (1) encodes the information in (2), and an utterance of (2) is composed of two speech acts corresponding to the two sentential elements of (1) (1979/2001: 119): (1) Put the kettle on. (2) My next utterance is imperatival in force. You will put the kettle on. Davidson treats the declarative as force-neutral and thus the declarative core element of non-declaratives carries no indication of associated force. This is important, because analysing assertion as an act performed by uttering a form specified for that purpose, as Dummett seeks to (see Chapter 4), would create a problem of infinite regress for Davidson. This is because Davidson has it that when a non-declarative is used with its specified force, this is achieved by the speaker truthfully asserting the content of the mood-setter. But if assertion were analysed by him in terms of a form-force relationship, then a mood-setter would be needed for each assertion, and, as each mood-setter must be asserted if the sentence is to be uttered with its specified force, then a mood-setter will be needed for each mood-setter, ad infinitum. Thus a simple assertion such as (3) would have to be analysed as (4), and (1) as (5) (see Dummett 1993: 206): (3) The Earth is flat (4) . . . My next utterance is assertoric in force. My next utterance is assertoric in force. My next utterance is assertoric in force. The Earth is flat (5) . . . My next utterance is assertoric in force. My next utterance is assertoric in force. My next utterance is assertoric in force. My next utterance is imperatival in force. You will put the kettle on By claiming that the declarative is force-neutral, Davidson avoids these problems. However, this commits him to the view that the declarative offers no indication of force whatsoever. We might ask, with Dummett,
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
106
Assertion and Mood 107
To make out that the indicative mood was really a non-mood, one would have to show that its use gave no indication whatever of the force attached to the utterance. This is impossible to do: at the very least, the use of the indicative mood is a prima-facie indication that the speaker is attaching to what he says a force distinct from any of those which the interrogative, imperative, and optative moods are typically used to convey (Dummett 1993: 207). Dummett also points out that Davidson’s paratactic account misanalyses his own data. Arguing against the view that the declarative is a marker of assertoric force, Davidson (1979/2001: 110) offers (6) and (7) as examples of non-declarative assertions: (6) Did you notice that Joan is wearing her purple hat again? (7) Notice that Joan is wearing her purple hat again (8) a. My next utterance is interrogative. You noticed that Joan is wearing her purple hat again b. My next utterance is assertive. You noticed that Joan is wearing her purple hat again (9) a. My next utterance is imperative. You notice that Joan is wearing her purple hat again b. My next utterance is assertive. You notice that Joan is wearing her purple hat again In these cases, Davidson would have it that the mood indicates a double utterance so that (6) and (7) would be interpreted, initially at least, as having the truth conditions in (8)a and (9)a respectively. However, as these are presented by Davidson as examples of an interrogative and an imperative being used to make assertions, the mood-setter would be judged false and the utterances reinterpreted as in (8)a and (8)b. But this is wrong: if these are indeed assertions, then what the speaker is asserting is the content of the embedded declarative sentence (that Joan is wearing her purple hat again), not the content of the whole sentence (that the hearer noticed that Joan is wearing her purple hat again). But this means that Davidson must provide an explanation of how the content of the embedded declarative is picked out as the content of the
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
how reasonable a claim this is: the fact that the declarative stands in opposition to other forms that Davidson accepts as force indicators surely means that its use must give some indication of the force attached to the utterance:
Assertion
assertion, and, because he claims that the declarative is not a force indicator, he must do this without any appeal to a relationship between declarative mood and assertoric force (Dummett 1993: 208–9). Davidson’s account has also been criticised on other grounds (Hornsby 1986; Hare 1989; Segal 1991; Harnish 1994; Boisvert and Ludwig 2006), but we will not go into these criticisms here as they do not relate directly to the relationship between declarative mood and assertoric force. Rather, we will consider other approaches to mood that have been put forward within his semantic framework. Of attempts to integrate mood into the Davidsonian programme, the most developed and thorough is Boisvert and Ludwig (2006), so it is that work on which we will concentrate here. While they do not deny a link between illocutionary force and mood, Boisvert and Ludwig reject the view that mood is a conventional indicator of force. Their main reason for doing so is that, according to them, such an account fails to explain the contribution of mood to mixed-mood sentences such as (10) to (22) (their (7) to (11)): (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
If the war goes badly, the President’s approval rating will drop If you’re going to the store, buy some milk If you’ll be in later, would you like to have lunch? Don’t cheat or you’ll get a failing grade for the course Is it a secret or can you tell me who it is?
Regarding (10), they point out that while this contains two declarative sentences, neither is used assert to the proposition expressed. The obvious response for an adherent of the force-indicator approach is to say that only main-clause mood indicates force and that what is being asserted is the proposition expressed by the conditional sentence as a whole. Boisvert and Ludwig accept this objection as far as (10) goes, but claim that it does not explain examples (11) and (12). These sentences, they say, are not, respectively, in the imperative and interrogative moods because they do not issue a simple directive nor ask a simple question; rather, these sentences issue a conditional directive and ask a conditional question. Unfortunately, Boisvert and Ludwig do not consider the obvious response to this counterargument: conditional directives and conditional questions are still directives and questions, and how we identify (11) and (12) as such can be straightforwardly explained if we assume that main-clause mood indicates force.1 As regards (13) and (14), Boisvert and Ludwig rely heavily on punctuation in order to pass these off as evidence against the force indicating role of mood. The lack of a
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
108
comma or semi-colon between the disjuncts might give the impression that we are dealing with single utterances here, but if read aloud, these examples require what is often termed ‘comma intonation’, indicating that each example actually consists of two illocutionary acts (a directive and an assertion/warning in the case of (13), two questions in the case of (14)). Thus analysed, (13) and (14) do not provide evidence against the force-indicating view of mood. This is not to say, though, that there is no evidence against the forceindicating view. The strongest case is put forward by Pendlebury (1986) who notes that mood is not semantically inert when embedded, but can contribute towards the sense of the sentences in which it occurs. He gives the following examples (his (5) and (6)): (15) Rick thinks he knows that Sam will play it again (16) Rick thinks he knows whether Sam will play it again The difference between the grammatical moods of the embedded sentences in these cases has truth-conditional consequences for the sentences as a whole. It is not only with ‘know’ that this occurs: note how the mood of the embedded clause leads to a truth conditional difference between the following examples: (17) Peter insists that they are here (18) Peter insists that they be here Because they deny that mood is a force indicator, accounts such as Boisvert and Ludwig’s might be better equipped to deal with this data. Therefore, despite the failures of Boisvert and Ludwig’s objection to the force-indicating approach to mood, their positive proposals still merit consideration.2 Davidsonian accounts such as Boisvert and Ludwig’s seek to account for mood as a feature of sentence types that can make a contribution to the compositionally derived meaning of a sentence type in which it occurs. The Davidsonian approach to linguistic meaning gives an extensional account of the meaning of declarative sentence types by specifying, compositionally, their truth conditions. Non-declaratives do not have truth conditions, however, so it is not immediately obvious that this account can be extended to account for the full range of sentence types. The solution proposed by Boisvert and Ludwig (following McGinn (1977) and Segal (1991)) is to generalise the notion of truth to a notion of fulfilment. They then identify two main types of fulfilment
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Assertion and Mood 109
110
Assertion
Compliance conditions
Truth conditions
Obedience conditions
Response conditions
Figure 6.1 Fulfilment conditions
conditions: truth conditions and compliance conditions, subdividing the latter into obedience and response conditions. This is illustrated in Figure 6.1 (Boisvert and Ludwig’s Figure 34.1): However, despite the impression that Figure 6.1 might give, Boisvert and Ludwig do not claim that the notions of obedience and response conditions can be explicated without recourse to the notion of truth. An utterance of an imperative, on their account, is obeyed iff the audience makes it the case that the declarative core of the imperative is true (and does so with the intention of obeying that utterance). This highlights an important feature of Davidsonian treatments of mood that distinguishes them from force-indicating accounts: whereas the latter see the force indicator as operating over a proposition, or sentence radical, the former see imperative and interrogative sentences as being derived from a genuinely declarative core. In this respect, then, Davidsonians are closer to the speech-act fundamentalists discussed in Chapter 2 than the speechact traditionalists: recall that the traditionalists treat assertion as just one mood among many and treat propositions as the basic bearers of truth conditions; Davidsonians, by contrast, treat declarative sentencetypes as basic and analyse the other moods in terms of these, paralleling the speech-act fundamentalist strategy of analysing the other major illocutionary forces in terms of assertion. But speech-act fundamentalists explain the link between mood and force by defining the sentence typically used to perform an illocutionary act in terms of that act. So, for Brandom the declarative is whatever form is typically associated with the making of assertions (claims) within a language, and while Barker identifies declarative sentences as protodeclaratives. Davidsonian accounts of mood, by contrast, deny such a direct link between form and force. How, then, do they explain
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Fulfilment conditions
the systematic relationship that is commonly observed? The move that is made, both by Segal and by Boisvert and Ludwig is to claim that what relates a form with a force is a common type of fulfilment condition: according the these authors, declaratives and assertions both have truth conditions; imperatives and directives both have obedience conditions, interrogatives and questions both have response/answerhood conditions. Given this parallel, a pragmatic principle can be posited such that when someone utters a token of a sentence type that has a certain kind of fulfilment condition, they can thereby be taken to be performing an act which has the same class of fulfilment condition, unless there is some indication to the contrary (Segal 1991: 177 posits such a principle). This view has it that the declarative – our current concern – is apt for assertion because it has truth conditions, and assertions aim at truth. We might justifiably ask at this point why it should be the case that a sentence type should exist that has the same type of fulfilment conditions as speech-act type even though its function is not to indicate that an utterance of that speech act is intended. However, it is not the case that these authors see the supposed existence of sentence types and illocutionary-act types with matching fulfilment conditions as merely a fortunate coincidence. Indeed, Boisvert and Ludwig (2006: 878) speak of imperatives and interrogative as being ‘designed to help us perform’ certain speech acts. Rather, the aim is, on the one hand, to account for mood in a compositional theory of the semantics of natural language, and on the other to have a suitably weak link between form and force such that the commonly made observation that the moods are often used without their associated force can be explained. Accounting for the fact that mood is a defeasible determinant of force is a challenge that any theory of mood must meet. However, it is not certain that this requires abandoning the views that the function of mood is to indicate force, as Boisvert and Ludwig counsel. As we will see, there are other accounts that view mood as a force-indicating form but do not require that mood always determines force. Boisvert and Ludwig’s proposal must therefore be assessed in terms of how it meets its other aim of accounting for mood within a compositional semantic theory. Here, though, we have a problem. The sort of data that they seek to account for is not the truth-conditional consequences of mood alternation that we find in the Pendlebury type examples above ((15) to (18)), but the ‘mixed mood’ sentences exemplified by (10) to (14). But, as we have seen, these data can be handled quite straightforwardly by a force-indicating account.
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Assertion and Mood 111
112
Assertion
(23) (24) (25) (26)
Rick thinks he knows that Sam will play it again Rick thinks he knows whether Sam will play it again Peter insists that they are here Peter insists that they be here
Pendlebury discusses this problem and argues that it is uneconomical, as it would also require treating each of ‘knows when/why/how/how often/what/who’ as a compound verb. Greater parsimony is achieved by treating ‘whether’ as a mood-marker than as a verb modifier, Pendlebury claims (1986: 364). Pendlebury could also point to cases such as (17) and (18): here the complementiser is the same and the difference in truth conditions must be explained in terms of the syntax of the subordinate clause rather than positing that the complementiser modifies the verb.4 Moreover, it is not clear how Boisvert and Ludwig’s account could explain this difference: the fulfilment of (18) does not depend on anyone’s compliance with the subordinate clause, but on whether Peter actually issues a directive with that content. Of course, Boisvert and Ludwig could deny that an account of imperatives should also account for apparent ‘embedded imperatives’. But if, as I have argued, their account has no advantages over force-indicating accounts in explaining the ‘mixed mood’ cases, and cannot explain the apparent contribution of mood to the Pendlebury-type cases, then it is fast running out of unique selling points and we are left with few reasons to buy it. One notable reason Boisvert andLudwig’s account will find it difficult to account for the Pendlebury cases is that it seeks to explain the non-declarative moods in terms of the perlocutionary consequences of the associated illocutionary forces: i.e. the hearer’s compliance with the speaker’ directive. It is hard to see how this could be extended to cover embedded clauses such as those we find in (15) to (18), for subordinate clauses of this type are generally associated neither with an illocutionary nor a perlocutionary point independent of that associated with an utterance of the main clause, and the truth of these sentences certainly does not depend on the fulfilment of any perlocutionary goals associated with the subordinate clause. Moreover, there is room for concern
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Discussing the Pendlebury-type cases, Boisvert and Ludwig (2006: 883) raise the issue of whether these would not be better analysed by treating ‘knows that’ and ‘knows whether’ as distinct compound verbs.3 If this is the case, then the complements of (15) and (16) have the same mood.
about the whole strategy of generalising the notion of truth conditions to a broader category of fulfilment conditions: this puts being true on a par with being complied with, but it is odd to say that an assertion is fulfilled if it is true, and being true is certainly not a perlocutionary goal of assertion. There is more that could be said about Boisvert and Ludwig’s approach to mood, but to do so would take us too far away from our current concern, which is the declarative and how it is to be distinguished from the other moods. As far as that question is concerned, the discussion in this subsection has shown that to attempt to do so in terms of distinct types of fulfilment conditions is, at the least, highly problematic.
6.2.2 Possible-world accounts of mood As noted at the beginning of this section, the alternative approach to mood that is favoured in formal semantics is to employ a possibleworlds framework. One of the earliest proposals to deal with mood in this way was put forward by Huntley (1984) in his analysis of the English imperative. Huntley argues that what distinguishes the declarative from the imperative is that the former, but not the latter, involves deictic linking to a particular possible world. Thus, he claims, declaratives are apt for assertions because they specify the world at which they are to be evaluated as true or false, while imperatives do not. The world to which declaratives typically establish a deictic link is, he argues, the actual world, and it is in these cases that assertoric force is conveyed. A similar claim is made by Farkas (1992). According to her, the declarative requires anchoring the proposition expressed to a particular possible world. A main-clause declarative is said to be anchored to ‘the world that models reality for the purposes of a conversation’ (p. 85), whereas embedded declaratives are claimed to anchor the proposition expressed to a world that represents the way reality is taken to be by the subject of the matrix verb, so that a belief report anchors the proposition expressed by the complement to a world that represents reality for that individual to whom the belief is attributed. The (Romance) subjunctive is chosen, on her account, when the anchoring relationship is to a set of worlds, rather to than to a particular world. This is intended to explain the use, for example, of the subjunctive as the complement of desire attributions such as (19): the proposition expressed by the complement of a desire report is not claimed by the speaker to be true in anyone’s representation of reality.
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Assertion and Mood 113
114
Assertion
In section 5.2.2, it was noted that possible worlds are used in two different ways in Stalnaker’s common-ground model of assertion: both as the content of the assertion and as the object of representation. An assertion picks out a set of possible worlds, and that is its content, but an assertion is a representation of a particular possible world, and that world is the object of representation. Huntley’s (1984) and Farkas’s (1992) accounts use possible worlds in this second way, as the object of representation: the anchoring relationship in Farkas’s account and the deictic reference in Huntley’s identify which possible world is being represented by the proposition expressed by the declarative. But, while this approach to mood is intuitively appealing, it is open to objection on the grounds that it mis-describes the phenomenon of belief attribution. It is fair to say that, in making an assertion, I am describing the actual world as being a particular way. However, it is misleading to extend this to the analysis of belief reports, and say that when I attribute a belief to another individual (using an embedded declarative sentence) I am describing another world as being a certain way. Rather, I am describing the actual world as being a certain way according to someone else. It is wrong to talk of the world represented by an individual’s beliefs, if what is meant is some world other than the actual world. The world represented by the individual’s beliefs is the actual world: it is that in the case of a false belief, the actual world is mis-represented. What an individual’s beliefs pick out, though, it not a particular world but a set of worlds: beliefs, even when consistent, are not comprehensive enough to pick out unique possible worlds. Hence the standard Hintikka (1962) semantics for belief reports has it that a belief ascription is true iff the proposition expressed by the embedded clause is true, not in a particular possible world, but in all worlds picked out by the attribuee’s belief set. But, if this is accepted, then the view that declaratives anchor a proposition to a particular world in which the proposition expressed is to be evaluated as true or false cannot be maintained. The embedded use of declaratives in belief reports cannot be said to anchor the proposition expressed to the particular world taken to model reality according to the individual to whom the belief is attributed, for no such world can be identified; and they cannot be said to be anchored to the actual world (i.e. the world represented, albeit indirectly, by the object of a belief report), because the truth of a belief report does not depend on the truth of the embedded proposition in the world in which the report is made.
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
(19) Silvia quiere que Juan se vaya ‘Silvia wants Juan to go-SUBJ’
In later work, Farkas (2003) modifies her position and suggests that what distinguishes declaratives as used in belief reports from (Romance) subjunctives as found in desire reports is the type of context-change potential (‘CCP’, see Heim 1983/2002) associated with each. The declarative complements of belief reports have, according to Farkas, assertive CCP in that the proposition expressed is to be added to a derived context set (see section 5.2.3) that constitutes the content of the attribuee’s representation of the world. The subjunctive complements of desire verbs, by contrast, change the context set not by removing possible worlds but by ordering them, ranking those in which the proposition expressed by the complement clause is true higher than those in which it is not (as suggested by the analysis of desire predicates in Heim 1992).5 Although Farkas herself doesn’t make this point, it is worth noting that her later approach to mood manages to explain, without positing an anchoring relationship, the observation that declaratives are apt for representing particular worlds. We saw in Chapter 5 that the reason that assertions can be said, on the Stalnakerian picture, to represent the actual world is because they come with a commitment to consistency. Because declaratives, on Farkas’s (2003) account, have assertive CCP and hence involve a commitment to consistency, they can be used to represent particular worlds. However, we need not say that the object of a belief report represents the particular possible world anchored to the subject of a belief report. Rather, it represents the actual world for that individual according to the speaker. By contrast, because re-ordering a context set does not require removing worlds, consistency plays no role in this process and the forms related with it cannot be employed as a means of representing a particular world. Taking a slightly different approach, though still within the Stalnakerian framework, Schlenker (2005) argues that the declarative encodes the constraint that it can only be used if the world denoted by the proposition expressed is present in (i.e. the proposition is not ruled out by) the context set. This is not the same, however, as saying that the declarative encodes assertive CCP. Having assertive CCP requires that: a) the proposition expressed by the utterance is not already part of the common ground (i.e. is not true in all possible worlds in the context set); b) the proposition expressed by the utterance is not ruled out by the common ground (i.e. is true in some possible worlds in the context set);
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Assertion and Mood 115
116
Assertion
Requirements a) and b) ensure, respectively, that adding the proposition expressed to the common ground will reduce the context set but not eliminate it altogether. Requirement c) ensures that the context set can be reduced in a determinate way: if a proposition cannot be given a truth-value at a possible world in the context set, it will be unclear whether it should be removed or not and the audience will be confused about the speaker’s intentions (on these first three requirements, see Stalnaker 1978/1999: 88–90). Requirement d), I argue, is needed to distinguish assertions from other speech acts that share the first three requirements but do not have the function of reducing the context set. For example, a command such as (20) requires that the proposition expressed is not part of the common ground ((20) would be odd if it were common ground that the hearer had finished his meal) and that the proposition expressed is not ruled out by the common ground ((20) would be infelicitous if the meal were so huge that it could never be finished by the addressee).6 Moreover, it is likely that the proposition expressed by (20) will enter the common ground if (20) is compiled with. What distinguishes (21) from (20) is that acceptance of (21) will allow the participants of the conversation to treat it as common ground that Peter will eat his dinner up (whether he eventually does or not), while the only means by which (20) will get the proposition expressed into the common ground is if Peter complies with the order and his compliance becomes common ground. Thus it is context change that results from acceptance which is the hallmark of assertive CCP. (20) Eat your dinner up, Peter! (21) Peter will eat his dinner up As, on the Stalnakerian model, presuppositions are common-ground assumptions and hence true in all possible worlds in the context set, and as directives with content P generally share presuppositions with assertions of P, a command cannot be distinguished from an assertion in terms of requirement c). Consequently, if assertions are to be distinguished from commands, it must be by some other means. Requirement d) does this: issuing a command is not an attempt to modify the common ground by getting P accepted into the common ground.
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
c) the utterance expresses a proposition in each of the possible worlds in the context set; d) the proposition expressed can be added to the common ground as a result of the acceptance of the utterance.
According to Schlenker, the declarative encodes simply requirement b) (that the proposition expressed by the utterance is not ruled out by the common ground). This requirement, though, is also fulfilled by presuppositions: a presupposition, on the Stalnakerian model is by definition true in all possible worlds in the context set. Consequently, Schlenker’s account predicts that clausal presuppositions should be expressed by declarative clauses. In French (the language he considers), though, there are counterexamples: ‘be happy that’, which presupposes the proposition expressed by the embedded clause, takes the subjunctive. (22) Jean est heureux qu’il pleuve/∗ pleut ‘Jean is happy that it rains- SUBJ/∗ IND’ Schlenker attempts to deal with this case by first noting that so-called ‘factive emotive’ predicates such as this are best analysed as causal statements: that it is raining is presented as the cause of Jean’s happiness. This position is taken by a number of authors (Bosque 1990; Heim 1992; Giorgi and Pianesi 1997; Quer 1998; Jary 2009). Schlenker also argues, though, that causal statements require counterfactual reasoning, on the grounds that, according to him, they require recourse to a counterfactual statement to explicate their meaning (roughly, ‘Jean would be less happy if it were not raining’). As we have seen, on a Stalnakerian account of conditionals (Stalnaker 1975/1999), counterfactuals require recourse to worlds outside the context set. This removes the presupposition that the context set contains a world in which the proposition expressed by the subjunctive clause is true, and consequently, on Schlenker’s account, warrants the use of the subjunctive. While this is a neat manoeuvre (a similar one is made by Quer 2001), it is an expensive one: it requires buying a whole theory of causality (i.e. Lewis’s 1973) and thereby attempts to resolve semantic issues by appeal to metaphysics. Moreover, even if causality is correctly analysed in terms of counterfactuality, it is still a rather desperate move to say, when faced with a sentence that threatens an analysis, that we should instead consider a different sentence (a counterfactual, in this case) which would confirm that analysis. Given these concerns, we should reject the claim that the declarative is unique in requiring that the proposition expressed by the utterance not be ruled out by the common ground, for this is also a feature of any embedded non-declarative that expresses a presupposition.
10.1057/9780230274617 - Assertion, Mark Jary
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromso - PalgraveConnect - 2011-04-20
Assertion and Mood 117
Assertion
Perhaps the most fundamentally Stalnakerian account of mood is that put forward by Portner (2005; 2007), who attempts to give an account of mood in the terms of Stalnaker’s (1984) broader philosophical aim of explaining semantic content in terms of rational action. On this account, the content of desires is to be explained in terms dispositions to act given certain beliefs, and the content of beliefs in terms of dispositions to act given certain desires. Rational action is explained in terms of choosing between possibilities, and so meaning is characterised in terms of possible worlds. Portner seeks to mirror this view of meaning in an account of mood by positing that, in addition to Stalnaker’s common ground, there is associated with each participant in the conversation a ‘To-Do List’. The role of the To-Do List is to rank worlds in the common ground as more preferable than others, actions being rational if they tend to remove lowly ranked possible worlds from the context set.7 Portner defines a To-Do List not as a set of propositions, but as a set of properties. He then claims that what distinguishes imperatives from declaratives is that the former denote properties (derived by abstrac