Bordering Biomedicine
At the Interface
Series Editors Dr Robert Fisher Dr Margaret Sönser Breen
Advisory Board Prof...
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Bordering Biomedicine
At the Interface
Series Editors Dr Robert Fisher Dr Margaret Sönser Breen
Advisory Board Professor Margaret Chatterjee Professor Michael Goodman Dr Jones Irwin Professor Asa Kasher Dr Owen Kelly Revd Stephen Morris
Professor John Parry Dr David Seth Preston Professor Peter L. Twohig Professor S Ram Vemuri Professor Bernie Warren Revd Dr Kenneth Wilson, O.B.E Volume 29
A volume in the Probing the Boundaries project ‘Making Sense of: Health, Illness and Disease’
Probing the Bounderies
Bordering Biomedicine
Edited by
Vera Kalitzkus and Peter L. Twohig
Amsterdam - New York, NY 2006
The paper on which this book is printed meets the requirements of “ISO 9706:1994, Information and documentation - Paper for documents Requirements for permanence”. ISBN: 90-420-1999-9 ©Editions Rodopi B.V., Amsterdam - New York, NY 2006 Printed in the Netherlands
Contents Introduction Vera Kalitzkus and Peter L. Twohig
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Part 1 Humanist, Social Science and Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Health, Illness and Disease The Musician, the Diarist and the Construction Worker: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Health, Illness and Disease Peter L. Twohig
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Stanislaw Wyspiański (1869-1907): The Last Self-Portrait of the Syphilitic Artist Tomasz Śpiewak
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Part 2 The Epistemology of Biomedicine The Anthropology of Aetiology James Davies
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The Social Construction of Disease: Why Homosexuality isn't Like Cancer Matthew McGrattan
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Green Fingers or Pink Viagra? Female Sexual Dysfunction and Medicalisation in Contemporary Medical Discourse Katherine Angel
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The Communication of Diagnostic Information by Doctors to Patients in the Consultation Peter J. Schulz
103
Contents
Part 3 Biomedicine in a Socio-Cultural Context Subaltern Theories of Health and Illness: An Ethnographic Study of Mexican Women With HIV Disease Betania Allen When the Diagnosed Talk: Ethnographic Narratives of Mental Illness Bindhulakshmi Critical Excess: Sex, Drugs, Intervention Aaron Goodfellow 'Normal Gone Bad': Health Discourses, Schools and the Female Body Emma Rich, Hannele Harjunen and John Evans
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141
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Part 4 Beyond Biomedicine: Ethics, Experience, Voice Midwifery, Consumerism and the Ethics of Informed Choice 197 Philippa Spoel Towards a Concept of Hope: A Functional Reconceptualization Stephen Michael Neff Embodied Practices and Subjectivity in Psychopathology Ian Tucker
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233
Getting By: The Lived Experience of Patients with Cystic Fibrosis and their Carers of Waiting for Lung Transplant Kath MacDonald
249
Speaking About the Unspeakable: Cervical Screening in New Zealand Judith Macdonald
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Welcome to a Probing the Boundaries Project Bordering Biomedicine appears within the Making Sense of: Health, Illness and Disease project series of publications. These projects conduct inter- and multi-disciplinary research aiming to explore the processes by which we attempt to create meaning in health, illness and disease. The projects examine the models we use to understand our experiences of health and illness (looking particularly at perceptions of the body), and evaluate the diversity of ways in which we creatively struggle to make sense of such experiences and express ourselves across a range of media. Among the themes these projects explore are: • •
• •
•
•
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the ‘significance' of health, illness and disease for individuals and communities the concept of the ‘well' person; the preoccupation with health; the attitudes of the ‘well' to the ‘ill'; perceptions of ‘impairment' and disability; the challenges posed when confronted by illness and disease; the notion of being ‘cured' how we perceive of and conduct ourselves through the experiences of health and illness ‘models' of the body; the body in pain; biological and medical views of illness; the ambiguous relationship with ‘alternative' medicine and therapies; the doctor-patient relationship; the ‘clinical gaze' the impact of health, illness and disease on biology, economics, government, medicine, politics, social sciences; the potential influences of gender, ethnicity, and class; health care, service providers, and public policy the nature and role of ‘metaphors' in expressing the experiences of health, illness and disease - for example, illness as ‘another country'; the role of narrative and narrative interpretation in making sense of the ‘journey' from health through illness, diagnosis, and treatment; the importance of story telling; dealing with chronic and terminal illness the relationship between creative work and illness and disease: the work of artists, musicians, poets, writers. Illness and the literary imagination - studies of writers and literature which take health, disability, illness and disease as a central theme Dr Robert Fisher Inter-Disciplinary.Net http://www.inter-disciplinary.net
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Introduction Vera Kalitzkus and Peter L. Twohig Biomedicine, the dominant organizing framework of modern medicine, is built upon the foundational concept that disease is located in the body and that disease is linked to some injury to the body, usually in the form of a pathological lesion. Biomedicine is a relatively recent framework, emerging only in the late eighteenth century and articulated and expanded with increasing rapidity since those first steps. David Armstrong has described biomedicine as the “most successful theory of health and illness.”1 Clinical practice within the biomedical model has as its objective the identification of the lesion and its treatment or management. Within the biomedical paradigm, there was, initially, little space for the perspectives of social science or the humanities. While the metropolis of biomedicine was consolidating its authority, other perspectives were pushed to the borders. According to Armstrong, “the first contribution of social science to medicine … lay in offering complementary and supportive explanatory models for biomedicine.”2 Or, as Aaron Goodfellow notes in his contribution in this volume, “[c]ulture is pictured as something crucial to the treatment of disease only in the sense that it must be worked through if medical science is to operate to its maximal effect.”3 Many scholarly disciplines border biomedicine and can make a contribution to social theorizing about health, illness and disease. Recent discussions take many forms. Critical medical anthropologists, for example, insist that biomedicine is a cultural system and therefore never neutral nor objective. Political economy demands that we situate our analyses within struggles over wealth, inequity and a range of other issues that unfold on local, national or international levels. Humanists have consistently and insistently argued that the best physicians were those able to consider patient values, beliefs and a range of other factors alongside decisions based on biomedical models. The acclaimed Canadian physician William Osler, using an appropriate biomedical metaphor, argued in 1920 that the ‘humanities are the hormones’ to suggest their central role in clinical decision-making and their important place within the biomedical body.4 If we are to rebalance research efforts in our contemporary analyses of health, illness and disease, we need some form of social theorizing. The moral and ethical implications of new medical technologies, such as the new ‘race-based’ pharmaceuticals targeted for particular communities, are only the most obvious examples of areas of biomedicine that are ripe for social theorizing. Reproductive technologies,
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Introduction
organ transplantation or the use of stem cells and genetic engineering offer further, dramatic examples where social scientists and humanists (SSH) have much to offer the perspectives of biomedicine. The aim of this volume is continue to engage with the biomedical paradigm, a process that has yielded two previous volumes.5 As David Armstrong has noted the relationship between biomedicine and other ways of knowing takes many forms. Firstly, SSH perspectives can be deployed to provide contextual information and conceptual support for biomedical interpretations. Secondly, SSH can define its own areas of analysis but still work within a largely biomedical paradigm. Thirdly, SSH can take biomedicine as its subject area, analyzing professional power or the increasing ‘medicalization’ of aspects of social life. Fourthly, there are those analyses that seek to situate biomedicine in its historical and cultural place, highlighting that it is only one interpretive framework and that others have existed and continue to exist. The papers in this volume take a variety of approaches and have different relationships with the biomedical paradigm. Taken together, all of the authors are attempting to find ways to add SSH perspectives to biomedical understandings or even force us to rethink the fundamental precepts of biomedicine. Many of the authors also share an interest in finding ways through which SSH perspectives could be implemented into the various fields of clinical practice. This is, then, part of a project that seeks to make incursions into the territory of biomedicine and, in some cases, to claim that territory as a contested geography, in which biomedicine and SSH perspectives are equally legitimate. In the opening essay, Peter Twohig offers a brief summary of the Making Sense of Health Illness and Disease conference project and draws from the disease experiences of Jacqueline du Pré, Kathleen Chesto and an informant he calls Charles to reveal the insights that are contained in individual’s stories of illness. In the second essay of the first section, Tomas Śpiewak examines the last self-portrait of the great Polish artist Stanislaw Wyspiański’s to critically examine the myths and metaphors of syphilis. The papers in the second part of this volume use the main characteristics and underlying assumptions of biomedicine as their starting point. Some authors understand biomedicine as a cultural system, showing a specific cultural basis and being determined by its surrounding cultural context. Biomedicine is the dominant organizational framework of western medicine and, as such, is rooted in a specific view of health, illness and disease that is deeply entrenched by social values and morals, as also the authors in part three aptly demonstrate. These authors show how this affects perspectives on individuals and their bodies, definitions of health, illness and disease categories, and treatment options. Not surprisingly, such considerations also shape the relationship between health care providers and patients, and the authors in part four are specifically concerned with these relationships. These authors also explore the ethical and outcome concerns of client-professional relationship.
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In his essay on aetiology, James Davies highlights the on-going importance of ‘first causes’ in many aspects of biomedicine and why this reductionism serves the interests of certain forms of practice. He pays close attention to the way in which scientific credibility shape respectability of particular healing traditions and how, in the absence of such credibility, other devices are deployed to fill these gaps. Matthew McGrattan’s essay critically examines the broad literature on the ‘social construction’ of disease. While he does not reject the utility of such a theoretical model, he uses a careful philosophical analysis to question the far reaching claims of social constructivists, as they move from particular cases to general conclusions. Katherine Angel’s exploration of female sexual dysfunction and its medicalisation in contemporary clinical medicine builds on the insights of the first two papers in this section. Angel illustrates how biomedicine can reduce complex interconnections to monocausal explanatory models. Furthermore, she draws attention to the especially harmful connection of biomedicine with economic interests in the context of the “creation” of new diseases. New illnesses are on the way – illnesses deeply rooted in and affected by the cultural values of western modern societies. They point to problems, shortcomings and conflicts in western modern society and should make us ponder how some conditions come to be defined and subsequently pathologised. In the last paper of this section, Peter J. Schulz deals with the communication of diagnostic information by doctors to patients in the consultation, through his use of speech act theories in his analysis of doctor-patient-consultations. Despite recent efforts to see the patient as partner – and to reflect that endeavour in the communication style between medical professional and patient – there still is (and will be) a hierarchical imbalance between the two due to the professional’s medical knowledge and a state of limited self autonomy (caused by the state of being sick) by the patient. Schulz raises important questions that arise from new communication strategies and how they have the potential to transform the doctor-patient relationship. In spite of its common roots, intercultural comparative studies show that biomedicine is not a monolithic system, but instead features cultural variants in its diverse local settings. More specifically, one should refer to the cultures of biomedicine instead of just biomedicine per se. Looking at the regional practices of biomedicine and exploring their theoretical and historical roots contests the biomedical claim of objectivity and “universal truth.” Instead, such analyses reveal the cultural determination of biomedicine, of medical practice and – intimately connected with that – of conceptions of the body, life, health and illness and ultimately death. All medical systems have an empirical base and focus their action on the physiological, material body – despite the fact that non-western medical systems make a larger space for spiritual aspects of healing. Yet, in these cases, too, the starting point is still quite often a problem with the material body. To focus on the cultural dimension of
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Introduction
medicine, medical anthropologist Byron Good states, is not to deny its effects on the biophysiological plain. Rather, it shows that multiple realms – including the biological, the social and the cultural – interact.1 Acknowledging the interdependence between culture and the physiological realm is not an easy endeavour, as David B. Morris emphasizes: An understanding of the interrelations between culture and biology will require a tolerance for ambiguities far greater than any medical school today is likely to test for and certify in its graduates. It also demands an awareness of unusual patterns where traditional observers see mere randomness or a confusion of unconnected data.2 Some of these issues are address in the essays in the third part of the volume. Betania Allen focuses on the nosological system and symbolic efficacy. She shows the various ways of making sense of a disease and explores the element of choice in a socio-cultural context that offers various and also contradictory modes of explanation. Allen’s case study of Mexico demonstrates that it is important examine options of choice and making sense, if we are to better understand issues of “compliance.” In her essay drawn from research in Kerala, India, Bindulakshmi examines how the diagnosis of mental illness can be used as a means of social resistance and to shape social space. At the same time, these diagnoses can be used as a means to discipline behaviours that are not sanctioned (and are therefore defined as “deviant”) and therefore serve to regulate the lives and bodies of women. Bindulakshmi’s essay helps us to understand the experience of women and the role of professionals in Kerala. Aaron Goodfellow’s essay “Critical Excess: Sex, Drugs, Intervention” analyzes the narratives of participants in a drug treatment centre in the United States. The compelling narratives of Stacy, Reanna and Moses reveal the narrow scope of interventions predicated on the belief that addictions reside within individual bodies, without a full consideration of the ways in which lived experience interact both with institutions (such as a rehabilitation program) and multiple ethical discourse. Bringing together the findings of two research projects from two different countries Rich, Harjunen and Evans point to the danger the discourse of “healthism” entails for young women and further social implications the ideal body involved. Their analysis of school-based health education programs draws attention to the role of schools as “transmitters of social inequality through the construction of ‘health.’” The authors show how these programs actually generate pressure for the young women to conform to idealized versions of the body.
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The success of biomedicine, Horacio Fabrega states, plays an important role in changing the wishes and expectations of individuals about this aspect of health care.3 Growing worries and fears concerning ones health lead to a more frequent demand for biomedical services and therapies and also to an attitude of expectation for cure and treatment. At the same time, the development of biomedicine also resulted in a loss of subjectivity and meaning in illness. With the rise of positivistic-oriented medicine, the focus shifted from the subjective description of illnesses by the suffering individual to the search for objective medical facts. Through this transition, the patient’s body was transformed into a passive object for medical inquiry. The subjective view of the patient has become more and more subordinate to the dominant biomedical view. In medical diagnosis, the patient’s illness narrative is translated by the doctor into a series of objective salient facts, which become signs of a pathological process. Medical anthropologist Arthur Kleinman explains that, for this translation to occur, illness as experience has to be decoded into the disease as biological pathology.4 There is no room for questions about the meaning of the illness for the individual. To counterbalance this process, sociocultural factors need to be taken further into consideration: both to make medicine effective in various cultural settings and to address ethical difficulties resulting from a clash of differing cultural norms. One strategy would be to give room and voice to the patient’s point of view and the subjective side of illness and disease. In the words of Morris: The social, cultural, and personal dimensions of illness must be understood through other means, and one neglected but useful resource is narrative. Narrative, we might say, constitutes a mode of understanding appropriate for situations too variable and too untidy for laboratory analysis. Narrative, we might say, constitutes a mode of understanding appropriate for situations too variable and too untidy for laboratory analysis.4 The final section of this book further contributes to this task. In her essay, Phillipa Spoel provides a case study of ‘informed choice’ in contemporary midwifery practice in Canada. Her analysis of the tensions inherent in the idea of informed choice, revealed through an explication of the underlying frameworks of choice, including consumerist notions, ideas of expertise or expert opinion, and the very notion of “value-neutral biomedical information.” Her careful arguments raise the question of whether ‘informed choice’ should be a guiding principle for midwifery and, by implication, other areas of clinical care. Stephen Neff reviews a series of empirical studies on hope in his essay “Towards a Concept of Hope: A Functional Reconceptualization.” He argues that hope, while subjective, is best understood as a relational concept. This insight transcends the perceived idiosyncratic nature of hope and demands some
6
Introduction
consideration of the prior experience of individuals, the relationships embedded in those experiences, and ideas about the future. In his essay, Ian Tucker builds upon the large literature that explores ideas of embodiment. Tucker explores the everyday management strategies of persons diagnosed as ‘schizophrenic,’ including individual practices, levels of activity and their use of social space. The explicit focus of his analysis concerns medication use and the embodied practices that govern their use. Tucker provides insight into the relationship between the experiences of the individual and the biomedical framework of contemporary pharmacotherapy, using what he calls “user-centred research.” Kath McDonald provides an empirical study of persons with cystic fibrosis who are waiting for lung transplants. Participants in her research included individuals who had experienced transplants, those who were still waiting, as well as the perspectives of caregivers. The themes generated through her analysis included notions of displacement, disorder, of living ‘life in limbo’ and of readjustment to wellness. Her conclusion is that a focus on the ‘lived experience’ of persons with cystic fibrosis provides health care providers with greater awareness and, perhaps, form a kind of research scaffolding from which more ‘sensitive and supportive’ programs can be constructed. Such is the hope of researchers of all kinds. The final essay in this volume examines two ‘medical disasters’ in New Zealand concerning cervical screening. Judith Macdonald combines an analysis of textual sources with qualitative interviews. Her analysis of different voices, including those of health professionals, women, and different cultural groups, cogently illustrate the ways in which gender, power and voice intersect to generate both meaning and silence. Cumulatively, the essays in this volume extend the earlier efforts of an interdisciplinary conference project that began in 2002. The Making Sense of Health, Illness and Disease conference has brought together hundreds of scholars from around the world. It aspires to generate new conversations and to promote interdisciplinary dialogue. The selections in this volume are representative of the wide array of papers presented at the conference. All of the papers herein were selected for inclusion by the editors, in consultation with the delegates and with an international steering committee. We hope that they convey something of the flavour of the conference at which they were first presented but, more importantly, that they will become a resource for other researchers interested in exploring health, illness and disease.
Notes 1
David Armstrong, “Social Theorizing About Health and Illness,” in Gary L. Albrecht, Ray Fitzpatrick and Susan C. Scrimshaw, Handbook of Social Studies in Health and Medicine, Thousand Oaks, Sage, 2003, 24.
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2
Ibid., 25. Aaron Goodfellow, “Critical Excess: Sex, Drugs, Intervention,” pp. 161178 in this volume. 4 William Osler, The Old Humanities and the New Science (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1920), 26. 5 Peter L. Twohig and Vera Kalitzkus, eds. Making Sense of Health, Illness and Disease (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004) and Twohig and Kalitzkus, eds., Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Health, Illness and Disease (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004). 6 Armstrong, “Social Theorizing About Health and Illness.” 1 Byron Good, Medicine, Rationality and Experience: An Anthropological Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 53). 2 David B. Morris, Illness and Culture in the Postmodern Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000 [1998]), 18. 3 Horacio Fabrega, “Medical Validity in Eastern and Western Traditions,” in Perspectives in Biology and Medicine (Vol. 45, 3 (Summer 2002), 407. 4 Arthur Kleinman, Writing at the Margin. Discourse Between Anthropology and Medicine (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995. 5 Morris, 1998: 89. 3
Bibliography Armstrong, David. “Social Theorizing About Health and Illness,” in Gary L. Albrecht, Ray Fitzpatrick and Susan C. Scrimshaw, Handbook of Social Studies in Health and Medicine, Thousand Oaks, Sage, 2003: 24-35. Fabrega, Horacio. “Medical Validity in Eastern and Western Traditions.” Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, Vol. 45, 3, (Summer 2002): 295415. Good, Byron. Medicine, Rationality and Experience: An Anthropological Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Kleinman, Arthur. Writing at the Margin: Discourse Between Anthropology and Medicine. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995. Morris, David B. Illness and Culture in the Postmodern Age. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000 [1998].
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Acknowledgments The editors would like to thank everyone who contributed to this volume in various ways. We would especially like to thank the authors for their cooperation and patience, and the conference participants who make this conference a success each year. We acknowledge with gratitude the inspiration of Rob Fisher, who initiated this conference in 2002. It has been such a fruitful arena for discussion and the co-editors, authors and participants have all profited enormously.
Part 1
Humanist, Social Science and Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Health, Illness and Disease
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The Musician, the Diarist and the Construction Worker: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Health, Illness and Disease Peter L. Twohig 1.
Introduction
This is the third Making Sense of Health, Illness and Disease conference and it is clear that the discussions have been highly productive, with new, international collaborations emerging from earlier conferences (including both publications and new research projects1), interdisciplinary dialogue and, hopefully, new insights. This conference is intended to initiate and renew conversations about health, illness and disease, analyses of the relationships between patients and health care providers, and the interaction between ideas of treatment and those of healing. Fundamentally, this conference has attempted to bridge the worldviews that prevail within the social sciences and humanities (SSH) and those of biomedicine and clinical practice. In 2004, we returned to St. Catherine’s College, Oxford University, the site of the first conference in 2002. As the opening address for the conference, I thought it would be useful to highlight why health is well-suited to the multiple perspectives that have characterized this conference project. I hope to achieve this through presenting a few brief vignettes, including an example drawn from my current research on diabetes and hypertension. Finally, I want to conclude with some words about interdisciplinary perspectives on health, illness and disease. 2.
The Musician
In 2003, “Making Sense of Health Illness and Disease” convened at St Hilda’s College and, more specifically, in the Jacqueline du Pré building. Du Pré was the brilliant cellist whose career was cut short because of her own encounter with multiple sclerosis. Her story is quite well known and it need not be fully recounted here. For a long time, her illness was imperceptible to everyone except her. As Carol Easton tells it, du Pré looked well and felt well much of the time but her energy would suddenly dissipate. She would have occasional symptoms, including tingling in her extremities and non-specific aches and pains, which eventually affected her ability to perform.2 Her sister Hilary recounted that in January 1973, just before du Pré turned 28, she performed in Toronto, Ontario, to warm but not enthusiastic reviews. She performed in New York on 25 January and, according to her sister’s account, the “critics complained of her self-indulgent playing, her rasping tone, and that she
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The Musician, the Diarist and the Construction Worker
often missed notes.” Du Pré sought the advice of physicians and, according to Hilary, they were “anything but helpful. She was told that she was suffering from ‘adolescent trauma’ (at twenty-eight!), which was a cruel diagnosis as she was made to think she was making a fuss about nothing.”3 And then there were the rumours. As her health deteriorated, Jacqueline du Pré was forced to take a sabbatical from performing and recording. Such interludes are not typical for internationally acclaimed artists, who have a short half-life, and her pause prompted cruel speculation. Du Pré was said to be neurotic or perhaps she was having a nervous breakdown. Others suggested that her marriage to Daniel Barenboim was failing or that she had a drinking problem. As Easton notes, “Because she looked well, it was easy to interpret her weakness and fatigue as laziness or depression.”4 Du Pré’s experience was different only because of her enormous public profile, which she ultimately used to good effect. Du Pré never wrote about her illness but she did publicly speak about it. She made her first public appearance in a wheelchair in October 1975, with acclaimed dancer Margot Fonteyn helping her into the Royal Opera House. She followed this inaugural, dramatic appearance with the launch of Crack, a young people’s section within the Multiple Sclerosis Society, at the Royal Festival Hall in London in February 1976. On that august stage, the site of many stirring musical performances, du Pré delivered a speech in which she argued that “life can start from a wheelchair” and told the audience of her new devotion to teaching and her desire to rethink her life. Du Pré used her illness encounter to highlight the need for personal growth, understanding and the need for research into multiple sclerosis in the UK.5 For most of us, our engagement with health, illness and disease is a more personal and private encounter. Chronic diseases such as multiple sclerosis present an opportunity to explore in detail an individual’s encounter with illness. Narrative research, such as that conducted by Ian Robinson, provides one lens through which to understand multiple sclerosis.6 Another lens into the world of the encounter with illness is through autobiographical accounts (or pathographies). These offer insight into suffering and social isolation, to be sure, but may also disrupt our easy assumptions and reveal how people who have chronic illness find positive experiences or renewed perspectives on life. The British Conservative writer and reactionary G.K. Chesterton wrote in the early twentieth century that we see great things from the valley, but only small things from the peak.7 Perhaps illness leads us to a valley but there we can encounter many acts of kindness, friendship, love, even healing. A privileged few can even see great things from the valley of illness. Certainly, this was the case for the young poet Mattie Stepanek who, I noted on my journey here, died at Children’s National Medical Center in Washington, D.C., on 22 June 2004. He was 13. Stepanek had a
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rare form of muscular dystrophy called dysautonomic mitochondrial myopathy, which basically meant that the bodily functions many of us take for granted (body temperature, heart rate, digestion and breathing) did not always work for Mattie. He was predeceased by two brothers and a sister who had the same disease and his mother had the adult form. There is certainly sadness in this tale of young children enduring such a devastating illness. But, his obituary noted, “Mattie was upbeat, saying he didn’t fear death. His work was full of life, a quest for peace, hope and the inner voice he called a heartsong.” In fact, at the age of 13, Stepanek had published five books, all of them having “heartsong” in the title. The publisher of his first book printed 200 copies but it eventually sold more than 500,000 copies.8 Stepanek, I would submit, saw great things from the valley of his illness. 3.
The Diarist
But we must guard against romanticizing suffering and the encounter with illness. Kathleen Chesto entitled her published journal Risking Hope: Fragile Faith in the Healing Process.9 Risk and fragility are strong themes in her journal, which she began writing from her first night in intensive care at the Yale-New Haven Hospital in April 1986. Her book is arranged in four sections – crisis, denial, depression and letting go. In the introduction, Chesto suggests that hers “is a story of healing. Oh not the spectacular kind of healing for which we usually reserve the title miracle … but it is healing, nonetheless.”10 She describes the “nonchalance”11 of the physician in the face of her increasing paralysis, which squares with Jacqueline du Pré’s experience. This is a text filled with both humour and pathos. One of the first entries in the diary (20 April 1986) reads: “It is not losing my legs or arms that fills me with fear so intangible that I can taste it. Tonight, in the ICU twilight, I am afraid of losing myself.”12 Fear of losing one’s self to one’s disease is a strong theme in the texts of illness. In Chesto’s case, it is manifested it an encounter with her friend Ellie. In an entry tellingly entitled “Woman?” (7 June), she notes how she and Ellie went to have her colours done and how they laughed like teenagers. “Is it possible to feel like a woman again, despite the canes and the chair?” she asks.13 Jacqueline du Pré was even more stark. Her sister recalled that “As Jackie became more incapacitated she took an even greater delight in shocking people. Many a male visitor would be alarmed by the greeting, ‘Fuck me.’ Some were able to deal with it and turn it into a joke, while others were frightened away. Maybe it was Jackie’s way of saying she was still a woman and had not lost her sexuality.”14 The illness experience, it is clear, is deeply gendered. Then there are the demands of adjustment. Chesto’s entry for 18 May 1986 reads: “They say I have adjusted well to the canes, the mobility
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The Musician, the Diarist and the Construction Worker
device, the occasional catheters. They say I have accepted the disease and its limitations beautifully. If I have adjusted so well and accepted so much, then tell me, why am I sitting on the ground among the crocus stumps, crying?”15 Another entry “Please Help Me”, written a month later (10 June), begins “My other friends have all deserted me. No one calls or visits or even drops a card. Their lives have moved on while mine has come to a grinding halt. I think I make them uncomfortable … I know my illness is difficult for you, but it’s not a picnic for me either. I can’t do it alone.”16 The social isolation captured in these descriptions is apparent. Illness reshapes the encounter with the other. Chesto recounts how a saleswoman “droned on in that tone I have heard far too often since being confined to a wheelchair. … Beside me, nine-year-old Liz [her daughter] was growing increasingly more fidgety. She suddenly planted her small body firmly between the saleswoman and me. Hands on her hips, a mounting fury in her voice, she said loudly: “My Mom’s not stupid! She’s just crippled!”17 Patronizing salespeople are one matter but an entry for 5 May 1987, entitled “Advice,” offers another lens into the changing social relationships of MS sufferers. It is worth noting that this entry is in the Denial section of the book. It reads: “why are there so many people within my immediate acquaintance who are absolutely certain that they know the cause, the cure, or both? I have been badgered with books and tapes, diets and therapies, and a score of armchair psychiatrists who feel perfectly free to analyze every word that comes out of my mouth. … there is something about illness, or depression, or both, that makes us terribly vulnerable. Family and friends feel it is not only their right, but their duty, to tell us how to live.” She describes the pseudo-psychiatrists as the “worst” and the dieters as “the most intrusive.”18 She then declares that if she had followed the unwelcome advice of the many, her tombstone would have to be engraved with the following epitaph: “Of Kathy, let these words suffice: Lived with MS, died from advice.”19 A slightly different account of this is developed by Miriam Ottenberg, in The Pursuit of Hope.20 She won the Pulitzer Prize in 1960 for exposing used-car frauds. She writes: “Victims fall regularly for what one friend calls the “peanut butter syndrome.” ‘If somebody eats peanut butter and it coincides with an upcycle in his disease, he’s going to say peanut butter is a cure for MS.’”21 The illness sufferer is inundated with advice, prescriptions for living, and various explanations for their disease and for living well. Their world is, in a sense, a public space, in which many people participate, though this participation is not always welcomed. The link between individual’s conceptualizations of their life and illness, the advice of family, friends, or even strangers, and their encounters with health care providers (formal or informal), remains a
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matter for exploration and research. There is now a growing body of research that suggests that educational efforts that fit with people's "lay epidemiology" and beliefs about their disease experience are more likely to lead to behaviour change.22 For example, Airhihenbuwa et al. have noted the limitations of health education approaches that attempt to identify and address knowledge "deficiencies" in efforts to prevent HIV/AIDS, without regard to the beliefs of the intended audience.23 Others argue that approaches that consider patient knowledge and belief are likely to be more successful than the "tyranny of health promotion" described by Becker.24 This is what underpins a research project that I am currently engaged in on diabetes and hypertension, and to which I now wish to turn. 4.
Diabetes and Hypertension
A. The Clinical Issue Type 2 diabetes is a large and growing health issue for Canada and for other countries. People with diabetes have a greater incidence of renal disease, eye disease (retinopathy), cardiovascular disease, and cerebrovascular disease than the general population and epidemiological evidence suggests that relative hyperglycaemia accounts for only part of this risk.25 For some time it has been known that elevated blood pressure, recognized as a major risk factor for stroke and myocardial infarction, is also more common among people with type 2 diabetes than in the general population.26 The risk of myocardial infarction, for example, is two to six times higher among persons with type 2 diabetes than among the general population.27 The UK Prospective Diabetes Study (UKPDS) found a high prevalence of hypertension (39%), and began to explore the question of "tight" blood pressure control in 1987, concluding a decade later that tight blood pressure control (<150/<85 mmHG) was not only clinically beneficial but also cost-effective.28 Recent Canadian and American guidelines and further research from UKPDS recommend even lower targets.29 Other research has demonstrated that improved blood pressure control among persons with diabetes reduces the risk of cardiovascular complication30 and nephropathy,31 while even more recent studies suggest the importance of early assessment of blood pressure among persons with diabetes.32 Adherence to recommendations, including those for blood pressure control, is considered to be essential to prevent disease complications such as cardiovascular, cerebrovascular, ocular or renal disease. Nevertheless, in the early 1990s more than half of people with diabetes33 and a similar proportion of those with hypertension34 did not adhere to such recommendations. Another study found that 40-50% of patients with hypertension withdrew from treatment programs before one
16
The Musician, the Diarist and the Construction Worker
year passed, and of those who remained, only 20-30% adhered to the prescribed regimens.35 More recent work by Joffres, et al. concludes that "we have not made any progress on the control of hypertension, and that we might indeed be losing some ground."36 Data from Nova Scotia37 and elsewhere suggest that gaps remain.38 While responsibility for nonadherence is traditionally assigned to patients, health care providers now recognize the complexity of treatment decisions. For people with diabetes, following the recommendations of health care providers is a complex process. Elliot, et al. (2000) identified six broad categories of factors that influence patient adherence, including practical and logistical issues, patient knowledge, perception of health benefits, social support, communication with health care providers, and the complexity of the treatment regimen.39 One recent study found that people with both diabetes and hypertension were "bombarded" with warnings about future health complications. Patients heard messages from health care providers, friends and family or detected "internal" warnings based on subjective assessments of their own health.40 Messages about evidence and risk are weighed against the subjective disease experience, willingness to change lifestyle behaviours, or myriad other factors. It is into this complex web that I wanted to step, specifically to understand how people with diabetes and high blood pressure made decisions about risks, about changes to their diet, and a range of other topics. B. Charles Charles is a 51 year old man, who lives in a small town in Nova Scotia, Canada. He has both diabetes and hypertension. When I interviewed him, he had lost twenty pounds in about six weeks through a combination of diet and exercise. He only recently discovered that he had diabetes – about six months before I interviewed him – and he was told that he was on the “borderline” and that, if he was diligent, he would be able to achieve good glycaemic control through diet and exercise. Charles takes his diabetes and his high blood pressure seriously, even though both are well controlled. Early in our interview, he said “I don’t know why I’m so conscious but I am now … I have no idea why and what happened.” When I asked Charles how he prioritized these issues, he said he was more concerned with his blood pressure, “Cause it’s a silent killer.” He developed his assessment a little further: But uh I’m scared it’s going to go up and … something is going to let go somewhere in my body or heart or but the diabetes I know of it, I don’t really fully understand the whole thing about it but I know through people [who] had it [that they] lost legs, limbs, and toes and eyesight and I… it doesn’t
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scare me like [so] that I’m really worried about it. But [because] I’m on the pressure and then so okay I’ll eat all the good stuff hopefully and with the diabetes it’s gonna come down and I’m hoping it is … Friends of mine who had [diabetes] young, died with it, lost legs, like I said toes and that’s not ever gonna happen to me … Charles was highly motivated to make changes in his life although at several points through the interview, he lit cigarettes. He did indicate that he would quit smoking after he lost weight and had previously stopped smoking for two months. As he put it “it’s get rid of my weight and then I’ll feel good about myself and yeah, the cigarettes are gonna be gone.” Here we gain some insight into body image for this participant, an element that he developed more fully later in the interview, together with some insight into the important role of social support, in this case the participant’s partner. Well, when I seen that I start putting clothes on and start going from a 38 [waist size, measured in inches] to a 40 then a 42 forty-two … and then going to Dominican [on vacation] and last year and my wife said your face looks like its a blowfish – I started laughing go away I don’t feel big I don’t look big so I was standing there in the airport I was the only one there sweating soaking with sweat not doing nothing just waiting in a line and I said oh God I feel like I feel like I’m guilty or something I’m just sweating here bad and I said this is not going to happen again …I’ll never do this again. I’ve got to do something when I get home but I didn’t so come January, my birthday was the 18th, coming off January so she said why don’t we start walking and I started and I said okay so I got into walking and she said why don’t you eat cereal …” Charles was, at age 51, still young. He was unable to work due to an injury he suffered in June 2000, four years before I interviewed him. I wanted to understand why he was willing to make some changes. At first, he was not able to offer a clear explanation but it became apparent as the interview developed. I started working when I was 17 in construction and I worked two years before that, I started at 15, I started working and then I said that’s all I know is
18
The Musician, the Diarist and the Construction Worker construction well what am I going to do. What are they going to do for me? I said Charles, then okay then there’s nothing you can do then, there’s nothing you can do … I had a lot stress over that way and only for Dr. R. helping me and he was very good to me and we’ll get through it he said Charles, just keep doing what you have to do and finally it will all come together. And once that came together, and it only came together about six month’s now after the initial feedback from [Worker’s Compensation] and the news that I did get my wages lost, you did have permanent medical injuries on both shoulders and far as they are concerned you are not going back to construction …
For this person, settling his compensation claim and the financial security this offered, was a key component in initiating change. Suddenly, he could see a future for himself. He continued: it was like the waiting game is over, I know where I stand and what I have to work with the rest of my life, my wife and I, and I said well okay then I’m only 51 and he kinda give me a little lecture about my weight and what’s going on and he said C. do you want to be around awhile and I said yeah and start showing me he said look all this is wrong with ya if you continue doing what you’re doing you’re gonna have to do something so I said well okay that’s one part got over with the financial which I know I’m alright and health wise I said well it is a good time to get over this … Although his broad financial picture was secured through the settling of his compensation claim, this was a person who still had some significant issues around money. Late in the interview, I asked Charles specifically about the issue of cost. By this point, we had shared a few laughs and there was a good rapport between us. So I asked about the cost of medications. PT: … is that an issue for you? C: Yes, I gotta pay for everything – I have no medical PT: You have no medical so that’s an issue for right now and it could be an issue that grows?
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C: It could be yeah very bad. You’re talking hundreds of dollars for medication for me and my wife she’s on medications and that’s sometimes it hurts. (long, emotional pause). There is no other way around it, I can’t get a medical, once I am out of my union they cut it off and when my job’s over, I lose medical, I lose everything PT: So are high blood pressure medications, the one’s that you are on … are they expensive? … C: They are! Dr. R. gives me some [free] samples to hold me over for a little while to see if we could get it controlled and if they don’t work then we’ll try some other thing and that works and then we will try to get you something that’s going to be affordable and I know my wife’s are four hundred and some dollars for a month … I said I can’t afford that kind of money but he said we’ll try something and I said okay just try it but I know if I lose the weight and everything else, the pressure is going down, I know it’s gonna go down it has to … I’m praying that’s gonna save me that way as far as medical wise … This example illustrates that there are no borders between the world of health and the material reality of patients. For health care providers dealing with diabetes, the cost of drugs or of supplies such as testing strips is frequently considered. But the description provided by Charles goes well beyond this. For this person, his entire future was bound up with financial uncertainty and it was not until this uncertainty was removed that he began to make significant changes in his life. Individuals do not compartmentalize their life, instead taking a broad view – a view that lends itself to interdisciplinary inquiry and for the social theorizing provided by social science and humanities perspectives discussed in the introduction to this volume. For Charles, several elements were at work. Firstly, there was the fairly recent diagnosis of diabetes, though this was a minor element in his own description. After all, he did not place much stock in the experience of his friends who were experiencing many of the complications of diabetes. He was more concerned that he would have an event because of his high blood pressure but this was never really developed by the participant. For this individual, newly diagnosed with diabetes, the major issues were those of finances. It is clear from a close reading of this text that the major element was settling his worker’s compensation claim and the future that that indicated. And, specifically related to his clinical conditions, the cost of medications was a large concern for this individual.
20 5.
The Musician, the Diarist and the Construction Worker Conclusion: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Health, Illness and Disease
So far, I have developed a few vignettes in the hope that they reveal something about the varying nature of responses to illness, to diagnosis, to prognosis. Jacqueline du Pré, the musician, never wrote about her own illness but used her social status and network to initiate positive changes for those with multiple sclerosis in the UK and beyond. Kathleen Chesto, the diarist, offers us a rich and highly personal account of her illness, which is filled with equal parts of humour, triumph, tragedy and outrage. To these two well-known and public figures, I would like to add Charles. A man who worked in construction and earned an honest living for thirty years. His story offers us other kinds of insights. He indicates the complex matrix that guides decisions to change one’s life and the worries of the future. The stories of the musician, the diarist and the construction worker open up new paths to understanding. And this takes me to my final point; the need for interdisciplinary perspectives on health, illness and disease. The famous Canadian author Robertson Davies, in the Gillman Lecture delivered to Johns Hopkins Medical School on 18 November 1984, made the distinction between knowledge and wisdom.41 He used the image of the caduceus, familiar to most of us as the symbol of medicine, with two serpents entwined on the staff. Some will recall that the mythological story of the caduceus is that the serpents were fighting and were pacified only when Hermes placed the staff between them. Davies used this image as a metaphor for knowledge and wisdom. Though not necessarily opponents, they do need to be reconciled and brought into some kind of relationship with one another. Such is the task of interdisciplinarity. Knowledge is earned through education and study and, as such. Knowledge provides the capacity to help through building particular skills, often described as “competencies” by health care professions. For example, physicians need to know the current evidence, to provide a basis for appropriate clinical decision making. Wisdom is different, according to Davies. It comes from within and offers the health care provider a link with the world of the patient. Commenting on Wisdom, Davies wrote: it is what makes [the physician] look not at the disease, but at the bearer of the disease. It is what creates the link that unites the healer with [the] patient, and the exercise of which makes … a true healer, a true child of Hermes. It is Wisdom that tells the physician how to make the patient a partner in his own cure. Instead of calling them
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Knowledge and Wisdom, let us call them Science and Humanism. The connection between knowledge and wisdom, or science and humanism, remind us that the world of the patient and that of the provider are not really separate spheres but are inextricably linked. One is not bound up in rational science, while the remains rooted in emotions or values. Such a perspective – embedded in social science and humanities (SSH) perspectives on health, illness and disease – helps us to bridge the world of the patient and the health care provider. In a famous essay, C.P. Snow distinguished between the two cultures of the academy, the culture of science (and here I would include medicine) and the culture of the humanities.42 Traditionally, science and medicine have enjoyed legitimacy, status, funding and power within the modern university. While there is greater room for SSH perspectives on biomedicine, we would do well to remember the relationships delineated by David Armstrong and recounted in the introduction. It is reasonable to ask what proportion of the seemingly plentiful resources now devoted to SSH perspectives on health, illness and disease are devoted to the foundational research of exploring biomedicine as one system of knowledge among many (and one that can be located in historically and culturally specific terms). To borrow a familiar motif, it is not simply enough to ‘add SSH perspectives to biomedicine and stir.’ Interdisciplinary perspectives take many forms. It is possible, for example, to construct interdisciplinary research or clinical teams and still operate only within the biomedical paradigm. In the end, we must engage with the questions: What kind of interdisciplinarity are we discussing and what are we hoping to achieve through this interdisciplinarity? Such questions are always worth considering – we should never simply assume that an interdisciplinary research project will yield fresher insights or new perspectives but, instead, always be critically engaged with our own project. But to my mind, the answer is that clinical decisions must also consider patient and societal values, if they are to be useful. Complex decisions, such as when to seek care or to initiate a new medication must be guided by a broad and deep understanding of patient values. These values are shaped by culture, media, religion, history, and a range of other factors. And, finally, if clinical practice is to achieve its highest professional form, it must engage with these broader issues. I would argue that interdisciplinary perspectives – from within biomedicine and outside its borders – are best able to expand the debate and introduce some of these values and material realties to clinical decision making. After all, many decisions cannot be based solely on treatment protocols, algorithms, or understandings basic anatomy, physiology or pharmacology. Instead,
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The Musician, the Diarist and the Construction Worker
decisions about health, illness, disease and treatment are fundamentally about human values. This brings me to my last point. I have already suggested that if clinical practice is to achieve its highest professional form, it must do so through an engagement with the broader issues and values of patients. I also believe that if interdisciplinarity is to achieve its highest professional form, it is not enough to merely include other disciplines at the borderlands, to expand the scope of inquiry without fundamentally allowing this to change the assumptions and practices of clinical care. It is both comfortable and easy to add new perspectives to a project or a program, without permitting those new perspectives to change the research project or professional practice, respectively. Collectively, we need to aspire to be both discomfiting and subversive. International dialogue, such as that which occurs at the Making Sense of Health, Illness and Disease conference, is one element of this. When researchers from different countries and different intellectual traditions come together, the assumptions that prevail within a discipline or within a particular setting are revealed. The very process of bringing together researchers from different disciplines decentres some of the assumptions of a discipline, causes individuals to reflect on their own assumptions (and those of their discipline) and in this way enriches and invigorates scholarship. International dialogue also reveals that there is nothing ‘natural’ about the ways in which health services are organized or delivered. Working with researchers from many disciplines and different countries forces one to reconsider assumptions that underpin our research, even if we are unaware of those assumptions. I think that this, too, invigorates research and provides fresh insights on new and old questions alike. To achieve the full potential of the interdisciplinary project – our full potential – other perspectives must be incorporated at the metropolis, not simply added in at the borderlands. Only in this way can day-to-day practice be truly transformed and research by truly transformative.
Notes 1
Emma Rich and Hannele Harjunen encountered one another’s work at the second Making Sense of Health Illness and Disease conference and their research paper in this volume, coauthored with John Evans, is a result of that exchange. Bernie Warren and I met at the first Making Sense conference and, following that, worked together to develop a research proposal that was funded by Canada’s Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. In addition to this volume, some of the papers that have been presented at previous conferences have been published in two edited collections Making Sense of Health, Illness and Disease (Rodopi 2004)
Peter L. Twohig
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and Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Health, Illness and Disease (Rodopi 2004). 2 Carol Easton, Jacqueline duPré: A Biography. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1989, 159. 3 Hilary du Pré and Piers du Pré, A Genius in the Family : An Intimate Memoir of Jacqueliné du Pré. London : Vintage, 1998, 284. 4 Easton, 162-3. 5 du Pré and du Pré, 316-7. 6 Ian Robinson, “Personal Narratives, Social Careers and Medical Courses: Analysing Life Trajectories in Autobiographies of People with Multiple Sclerosis,” Social Science and Medicine 30, 11 (1990): 1173-1186 7 Chesterton (1874-1936) was English critic, essayist, novelist and poet and the quote appears in the Father Borwn story, “Hammer of God.” See Collins Concise Dictionary of Quotations (London: Collins, 1998). I would like to thank Dale Ahlquist, President of the American Chesterton Society for his help. 8 Globe and Mail (Toronto, Ontario, Canada), 4 June 2004. 9 Kathleen Chesto, Risking Hope: Fragile Faith in the Healing Process Kansas City: Sheed & Ward, 1990. 10 Chesto, v. 11 Chesto, vi. 12 Chesto, 5. 13 Chesto, 17. 14 du Pré and du Pré, 343. 15 Chesto, 12. 16 Chesto, 18. 17 Chesto, 29. 18 Chesto, 41-2. 19 Chesto, 43. 20 Miriam Ottenberg, The Pursuit of Hope. New York: Rawson, Wade Publishers, Inc., 1978. 21 Ottenberg, 21. 22 Trish Greenlagh, C Helman and AM Chowdhury, “Health beliefs and folk models of diabetes in British Bangladeshis: A qualitative study,” British Medical Journal, 316 (1998): 978-83. 23 C.O. Airhihenbuwa, R.J. DiClemente, G.M. Wingwood, A. Lowe, “HIV/AIDS education and prevention among African-Americans: A focus on culture,” AIDS Educ Prev,4 (1992): 267-76. 24 M.H. Becker, “The tyranny of health promotion,” Public Health Review, 14 (1986): 15-25. 25 See, for example, A.I. Adler, et al. “Association of systolic blood pressure with macrovascular and microvascular complications of type 2 diabetes (UKPDS): prospective observational study,” British Medical Journal, 321 (2000): 412-19; I.M. Stratton, et al. “Epidemiological association of glycaemia with macrovascular and microvascular
24
The Musician, the Diarist and the Construction Worker
complications of type 2 diabetes (UKPDS 25),” British Medical Journal, 321 (2000): 405-12; M. Hanefield, et al., “Risk factors for myocardial infarction and death in newly detected NIDDM: The diabetes intervention study, 11-year follow-up,” Diabetelogia, 39 (1996): 1577-83 and W.J. Elliot, et al., “Hypertension in patients with diabetes: Overcoming barriers to effective control,” Postgraduate medicine 107 (2000); 29-38. 26 W. Kannel and D. McGee, “Diabetes and cardiovascular disease. The Framingham study,” Journal of the American Medical Association, 241 (1979): 2035-38; J.A.E. Manson, et al. “A prospective study of maturityonset diabetes mellitus and risk of coronary heart disease and stroke in women,” Archives of Internal Medicine, 151 (1991): 1141-47. 27 C.D. Byrne and S.H. Wild, “Diabetes care needs evidence based interventions to reduce risk of vascular disease,” British Medical Journal, 320 (2000): 1554-55. 28 Adler, et al., “Association of systolic blood pressure,” 412-19; Stratton, et al., “Epidemiological association of glycaemia with macrovascular and micro-vascular complications,” 405-12; Hanefield, et al. “Risk factors for myocardial infarction and death,” 1577-83; Elliot, et al., “Hypertension in patients with diabetes,” 29-38; Kannel and McGee, “Diabetes and cardiovascular disease,” 2035-38; Manson, et al”. A prospective study of maturity-onset diabetes mellitus and risk of coronary heart disease and stroke in women,” 1141-47; Byrne and Wild, “Diabetes care needs evidence based interventions to reduce risk of vascular disease,” 1554-55; UK Prospective Diabetes Study Group, “Cost effectiveness analysis of improved blood pressure control in hypertensive patients with type 2 diabetes: UKPDS 40,” British Medical Journal, 317 (1998):.720-26. 29 S. Meltzer, et al., “1998 clinical practice guidelines for the management of diabetes in Canada,” Canadian Medical Association Journal, 159, 8 Suppl (1998): S1-S29; American Diabetes Association, “Treatment of Hypertension in Adults With Diabetes,” Diabetes Care, 25, Suppl 1 (2002): S71-S73. 30 L. Hansson, et al. “Effect of intensive blood-pressure lowering and lowdose aspirin in patients with hypertension: principal results of the hypertension optimal treatment (HOT) randomised trial,” Lancet, 351 (1998): 1755-62; J. Tuomilehto, et al. “Effect of calcium-channel blockade in older patients with diabetes and systolic hypertension,” New England Journal of Medicine, 320 (1999): 677-84; J.D. Curb, et al., “Effect of diuretic-based antihypertensive treatment on cardiovascular disease risk in older diabetic patients with isolated systolic hypertension,” Journal of the American Medical Association, 276 (1996): 1886-92. 31 E.J. Lewis, et al. “The effect of angiotensin-converting-enzyme inhibition on diabetic nephropathy,” New England Journal of Medicine, 329 (1993): 1456-62. 32 Adler, et al. “Association of systolic blood pressure,” 412-19.
Peter L. Twohig
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33
Karam JH. Diabetes mellitus, hypoglycemia, and lipoprotein disorders. In SA Schroeder, et al. (Eds). Current medical diagnosis and treatment (Norwalk: Appleton and Lange, 1999), pp. 900-945. 34 B.M. Massie and M. Sokolow, “Cardiovascular disease”. In SA Schroeder, et al. (Eds). Current medical diagnosis and treatment (Norwalk: Appleton and Lange, 1999), pp. 257-356. 35 P. Miller, R. Wikoff, and A. Hiatt, “Fishbein's model of reasoned action and compliance behaviour of hypertensive patients,” Nursing Research, 41 (1992): 104-109. 36 M.R. Joffres, et al., “Distribution of blood pressure and hypertension in Canada and the United States,” American Journal of Hypertension, 14 (2001): 1099-1105. 37 H.K. Wolf, et al., “Trends in the prevalence and treatment of hypertension in Halifax County from 1985 to 1995,” Canadian Medical Association Journal, 161 (1999): 699-704. 38 M.R. Joffres et. al., “Awareness, treatment and control of hypertension in Canada,” American Journal of Hypertension, 10 (1997): 1097-1102. 39 W.J. Elliot, et al., “Hypertension in patients with diabetes: Overcoming barriers to effective control,” Postgraduate medicine, 107 (2000): 29-38. 40 J. Weiss and S.A. Hutchinson, “Warnings about vulnerability in clients with diabetes and hypertension,” Qualitative Health Research, 10 (2000): 521-537. 41 This essay was published under the title “Can a Doctor be a Humanist?” in Robertson Davies, The Merry Heart: Selections 1980-1995 (Toronto: Douglas Gibson, 1996. 42 This essay was first presented at Cambridge University in May 1959. It was subsequently published under the title The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959). An expanded version, responding to some of the debate his lecture prompted, was published as The Two Cultures: A Second Look (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964).
Bibliography Adler A.I., I.M. Stratton, H.A.W. Neil, J.S. Yudkin D.R. Matthews, C.A. Cull, et al. “Association of systolic blood pressure with macrovascular and microvascular complications of type 2 diabetes (UKPDS): prospective observational study.” British Medical Journal, 321 (2000): 412-19. Airhihenbuwa CO, DiClemente RJ, Wingwood GM, Lowe A. “HIV/AIDS education and prevention among African-Americans: A focus on culture.” AIDS Educ Prev 4 (1992): 267-76.
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American Diabetes Association. “Treatment of Hypertension in Adults With Diabetes.” Diabetes Care, 25 (2002): S71-S73. Becker, MH. The tyranny of health promotion. Public Health Review, 14 (1986): 15-25. Byrne C.D. and S.H. Wild. “Diabetes care needs evidence based interventions to reduce risk of vascular disease.” British Medical Journal, 320 (2000): 1554-55. Chesto, Kathleen. Risking Hope: Fragile Faith in the Healing Process Kansas City: Sheed & Ward, 1990. Curb, J.D., S.L. Pressel, J.A. Cutler, P. Savage, W.B. Applegate, H. Black, et al. “Effect of diuretic-based antihypertensive treatment on cardiovascular disease risk in older diabetic patients with isolated systolic hypertension.” Journal of the American Medical Association, 276 (1996): 1886-92. Davies, Robertson. The Merry Heart: Selections 1980-1995. Toronto: Douglas Gibson, 1996. du Pré, Hilary and Piers du Pré, A Genius in the Family : An Intimate Memoir of Jacqueliné du Pré. London : Vintage, 1998, 284. Easton, Carol. Jacqueline duPré: A Biography. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1989. Elliot W.J., R. Maddy R, R. Toto, G. Bakris. “Hypertension in patients with diabetes: Overcoming barriers to effective control.” Postgraduate medicine, 107 (2000): 29-38. Elliot W.J., R. Maddy, R. Toto, and G. Bakris. “Hypertension in patients with diabetes: Overcoming barriers to effective control.” Postgraduate medicine, 107 (2000): 29-38. Greenlagh, Trish, C Helman and AM Chowdhury, “Health beliefs and folk models of diabetes in British Bangladeshis: A qualitative study,” British Medical Journal, 316 (1998): 978-83. Hanefield M., S. Fisher, U. Julius, J. Schulze, U. Schwanebeck, et al. “Risk factors for myocardial infarction and death in newly detected NIDDM: The diabetes intervention study, 11-year follow-up.” Diabetelogia, 39 (1996): 1577-83.
Peter L. Twohig
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Hansson, L, A. Zanchetti, S.G. Carruthers, B. Dahlöf, D. Elmfeldt, et al. “Effect of intensive blood-pressure lowering and low-dose aspirin in patients with hypertension: principal results of the hypertension optimal treatment (HOT) randomised trial.” Lancet, 351 (1998): 1755-62. Joffres M.R., P. Ghadirian, J.G. Fodor, A. Petrasovits, A. Chockalingham, P. Hamet. “Awareness, treatment and control of hypertension in Canada.” American Journal of Hypertension, 10 (1997): 1097-1102. Joffres, M.R., P. Hamet, D.R. MacLean, G. L'italien, and G. Fodor. “Distribution of blood pressure and hypertension in Canada and the United States.” American Journal of Hypertension, 14 (2001): 1099-1105. Kannel W. and D. McGee. “Diabetes and cardiovascular disease. The Framingham study.” Journal of the American Medical Association, 241 (1979): 2035-38. Karam JH. “Diabetes mellitus, hypoglycemia, and lipoprotein disorders.” In SA Schroeder, et al. (Eds). Current medical diagnosis and treatment. Norwalk: Appleton and Lange, pp. 900-945. Lewis E.J., L.G. Hunsicker, R.P. Bain, R.D. Rohde. “The effect of angiotensin-converting-enzyme inhibition on diabetic nephropathy.” New England Journal of Medicine, 329 (1993): 1456-62. Manson, J.A.E., G.A. Colditz, M.J. Stampfer, W.C. Willett, A.S. Krolewski, et al. “A prospective study of maturity-onset diabetes mellitus and risk of coronary heart disease and stroke in women.” Archives of Internal Medicine, 151 (1991): 1141-47. Massie, B.M. and M. Sokolow. “Cardiovascular disease.” In SA Schroeder, et al. (Eds). Current medical diagnosis and treatment. Norwalk: Appleton and Lange, pp. 257-356. Meltzer, S, L. Leiter, D. Daneman, H.C. Gerstein, D. Lau, et al. “1998 clinical practice guidelines for the management of diabetes in Canada.” Canadian Medical Association Journal, 159, 8 Suppl. (1998): S1-S29. Miller P., R. Wikoff and A. Hiatt. “Fishbein's model of reasoned action and compliance behaviour of hypertensive patients.” Nursing Research, 41 (1992): 104-109. Ottenberg, Miriam The Pursuit of Hope. New York: Rawson, Wade Publishers, Inc., 1978.
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Robinson, Ian. “Personal Narratives, Social Careers and Medical Courses: Analysing Life Trajectories in Autobiographies of People with Multiple Sclerosis.” Social Science and Medicine 30, 11 (1990): 1173-1186. Snow, C.P. The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959. A Snow, C.P. The Two Cultures: A Second Look. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964. Stratton, I.M., A.I. Adler, H.A.W. Neil, D.R. Matthews, S.E. Manley, C.A. Cull, et al. “Epidemiological association of glycaemia with macrovascular and micro-vascular complications of type 2 diabetes (UKPDS 25).” British Medical Journal, 321 (2000): 405-12 Tuomilehto J., D. Rastenyte, W.H. Birkenhäger, L. Thijs, R. Antikainen, et al. “Effect of calcium-channel blockade in older patients with diabetes and systolic hypertension.” New England Journal of Medicine, 320 (1999): 677-84. Twohig, Peter L and Vera Kalitzkus, eds. Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Health, Illness and Disease Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004. Twohig, Peter L and Vera Kalitzkus, eds. Making Sense of Health, Illness and Disease. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004. UK Prospective Diabetes Study Group. “Cost effectiveness analysis of improved blood pressure control in hypertensive patients with type 2 diabetes: UKPDS 40.” British Medical Journal, 317 (1998): 720-26. Weiss J., and S.A. Hutchinson. “Warnings about vulnerability in clients with diabetes and hypertension.” Qualitative Health Research, 10 (2000): 521-537. Wolf, H.K., P. Andreou, I.R. Bata, D.G. Comeau, R.D. Gregor, et al. “Trends in the prevalence and treatment of hypertension in Halifax County from 1985 to 1995.” Canadian Medical Association Journal, 161 (1999): 699-704.
Acknowledgments Portions of this paper were presented at a panel entitled “Health, the Humanities, and the Public Good” organized by Chris MacDonald,
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Department of Philosophy, Saint Mary’s University and the Atlantic Centre for Ethics. I would like to thank my co-panelists, Dr MacDonald and Dr Charles Weijer, for the opportunity to share some of this research. Other ideas were first presented at the School of Dramatic Arts, University of Windsor and Dr Bernie Warren and his students were most gracious. Research funding for this paper was provided by the Nova Scotia Health Research Foundation and by the Canada Research Chairs program.
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Stanisław Wyspiański (1869 – 1907): The Last Self-Portrait of the “Syphilitic Artist” Tomasz Śpiewak Abstract During the last years of his life, Stanislaw Wyspiański, one of the most important personas of the Young Poland movement (playwright, poet, painter, book designer), suffered from syphilis: a symbolic and paradigmatic disease of the fin de siècle culture. Despite the extensive research conducted on his creative output throughout the 20th century, this discourse almost completely neglects the textual and visual manifestations of syphilis that surface when examining the array of possible links between Wyspianski’s biography and the experience of his long-term illness. In this respect, one of the most important personas of Polish culture has remained its great, unrecognized “ailing Other.” By examining Wyspiański’s last self-portrait (1907) which presents the extreme distortion of the face, the paper attempts to situate and discuss this representation of the syphilitic body in the wider context of European depictions of this disease in the 19th century. Furthermore, I illuminate the misogynistic and excluding discourses, mythology and metaphors surrounding the disfiguring disease which have left their traces on Wyspiański’s work. It can be claimed only to some degree that the selfportrait follows the canonical patterns of representation of a syphilitic face: Hence, the underlying question of my text will concern the relation between the identity of the artist and the experience of the disease, i.e. the identification (or lack thereof) with the image of his own ailing body. Since painting became the primary area in which Wyspianski confronted his ailing condition – there are only scant traces of similar introspections in his written works – the paper also seeks to address the issue of artistic medium as it relates to illness. Keywords: syphilis and European culture at the turn of the 19th century; disease and the representation of the male body; disease and alienation; artistic expression; melancholy and depression 1.
Introduction
Stanislaw Wyspiański, one of the most interesting and versatile personas of the Young Poland movement and the father figure of Polish 20th century theatre, suffered for approximately ten years from syphilis, which he contracted from a prostitute while studying in Paris in 1894.
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Stanislaw Wyspiański (1869-1907)
Painter, pastellist, decorative artist, illustrator, writer, and theatre director, Wyspiański long experienced a sense of impending mortality though only marginally touching upon this subject in his artistic work. That sense was compounded around 1905 when the state of his health rapidly deteriorated, bringing a wave of fears not only of his approaching death but also of madness – a characteristic of the third and final stage in the development of syphilis. During his artistic career, apart from being the creator of the magnificent stained-glass windows of Wawel Cathedral and the Franciscan Church in Krakow, Wyspiański established his position primarily as the creator of numerous pastel portraits of his family, acquaintances, as well as self-portraits. In 1907, already on his deathbed, the artist executed his last intriguing self-image. In a 25 x 16 centimetre charcoal sketch, Wyspiański repeats his most common composition, self-portrait en face; that is, a portrait in which the face is only minimally turned to the left with a reduced or absent background. This time, though, a rapid, nervous line delineates the contours of the skull and draws attention to the dirty, sticky hair, while in an unusually strong way marking the left temple and the long arch of the very peculiarly joined eyebrows. What immediately attracts attention is the strong deformation of the face, most visible in the mouth area: the right side of the moustache is blunted by a vague blot, as if partially erased. Wyspiański renders the emaciation of the face as never before: the head, in comparison to previous self-portraits, seems to be much smaller, bony, and fragile. Intriguing as this self-portrait is as the very last and personal statement by an outstanding artist facing the experience of death, it can, however, be scrutinized within one more interpretative context: the representation of syphilis in fin-de-siècle culture. To some extent, as will be discussed later, it can also be seen as a moment of fiercely interrupted speechlessness in the experience of illness. The frankness, even cruelty of the artistic depiction of the artist’s own visage, as transformed by disease, provokes as well a separate question regarding the very function of artistic style in dealing with illness. 2.
Wyspiański – An Ailing Artist.
Wyspiański’s disease has never been questioned, and so there is no need for a “retrospective diagnosis,” which, as Deborah Hayden has demonstrated, is often a case in studies on syphilis, art, and literature. 1 However, Polish literary studies and art history have devoted only minimal attention to analysis of this last image, not to mention analysis of more subtle relations between Wyspiański’s biography, the experience of suffering from syphilis, and his oeuvre. Certainly one of the main reasons for this oversight stems from a puzzling reluctance by the artist himself to speak directly about his ailing condition. Hence Kazimierz Wyka, one of
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the foremost experts on Wyspiański, perceived him as an artist studiously avoiding any kind of personal and confessional lyricism, noting that “He saw, in his time, too much of a similar tendency, very often false and forced, for it to have ever seduced his proud, ironic, rough, and demanding nature.” 2 Only occasionally would the self-imposed silence break and reveal the other Wyspiański. Wyka points to such a few rare moments in Wyspianski’s oeuvre, finding the subject both fascinating and demanding of a more thorough essay or even a new, “existential biography” of the artist. Although Wyka’s seminal observations were pronounced in the 1960s, to date no one has responded to his call. What might be the reasons for this particular silence surrounding Wyspiański as an ailing artist? One cannot resist the temptation to claim that apart from the complexities of the subject, there has been an ideological image of syphilis as disease ultimately linked to promiscuity and prostitution, various and contradictory discourses surrounding syphilis since its first visual depictions (the strongest articulation of which came to the fore in the late 19th century), and Wyspiański’s lofty position in Polish culture, all of which has prevented any kind of deeper and methodologically rethought discourse about ‘Wyspiański as an artist who suffered from syphilis.’ Thus, such hazy phrases as ‘the artist, who died in his youth’ of ‘this terrible disease’ still remain the only references to him as an ailing artist. It must be noted that the project of reading into the signature of illness in Wyspiański’s work, attempting to extricate it from the subtext of both text and image, compels us to change our common approach towards what it means to represent illness. A number of scholars working on the issue have heralded syphilis as the most literary disease of the 19th century, the great successor of tuberculosis, which had primarily been construed as a romantic disease. However, case studies discussed by those scholars were clearly determined by a very narrowly understood thematization of disease, mainly as a topic or literary motif, or as a direct statement. As a result, there were few doubts about the ways syphilis might enter literature and art. 3 However, especially in cases of artists whose artistic responses to their suffering for complex reasons were removed from a direct fixation on an easily recognizable literal or visual motif, such an understanding of thematization and visualization of illness turns out to be very reductive. In order to offer a new view on Wyspiański as an ailing artist, in order to create a context for the questions posed through this paper, a radically different approach needs to be adopted: one that does away with such a narrowly understood motif or literary image and investigates into deeper layers of the work, into the unconscious of the text/image itself. Obviously, such an operation involves a detailed scrutiny of the individual style of the artist as well as his creative process, both of which must be understood in relation to Julia Kristeva’s concepts of melancholy and self-healing through engaging in artistic activity.
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Stanislaw Wyspiański (1869-1907)
Such an approach has a lot to do with the status of syphilis as the symbolic disease of fin-de-siècle culture where, despite its prevalence in public discourse at that time, it was nevertheless relegated into the sphere of the subtext. As Hayden writes: Syphilis was life’s dark secret. The word was taboo, with the terrifying diagnosis at most whispered to an intimate friend, and then only with assurances of utmost secrecy. It was too shameful to record by name in a diary and was alluded to in correspondence only in code. How much, I wondered, was syphilis an unacknowledged subtext in nineteenth-century biography? 4 Following Hayden, we can ask, then, how much of the syphilitic subtext is buried underneath Wyspiański’s intriguing last self-portrait? 3.
The Alienation of the Male Body
No pictures of Wyspiański depicting his face in the final stage of his life have survived and it is very likely that none were ever taken. We cannot be fully sure how his face looked at the time when he produced his last self-portrait. 5 Nevertheless, a certain image of his body has been preserved. It is known that during the last months of his life Wyspiański avoided leaving the secure space of his household and gave up regular trips to Krakow that he previously enjoyed so much, precisely because by that time his face had already been dramatically changed. According to a note from a doctor’s examination discovered in 1980, Wyspiański’s nose bone was removed in 1905, two years before he executed his last selfimage. 6 Accounts from the artist’s friends and acquaintances who paid him final visits reveal a certain ambiguity in the image of the artist’s body and, as I argue, they even develop a certain “strategy” for dealing with the shock of syphilis. While these accounts are not able to entirely omit any reference to Wyspiański’s devastated body, many of these accounts seem to be permeated with a peculiar desire to counter the horror of syphilis. They do so by demonstrating the moral dignity of the dying and his strong, unbreakable will. As one of these accounts, written by a leading Polish writer, Stefan Żeromski, notes, “[T]ill his very last moments, in his eyes, in his iris, in his physically destroyed fingers he kept the past and future of his humiliated nation.” 7 “The virtuous only become more so as they slide toward death,” wrote Susan Sontag in her seminal essay on disease. 8 “Fatal illness has always been viewed as a test of moral character, but in the nineteenth century there is a great reluctance to let anybody flunk the test.” 9 Sontag’s sentence brilliantly describes the attitude and expectations of those who came to pay their last visits to Wyspiański, yet at the same
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time it can be applied to a broader set of texts. This literary portrait of the dying artist, including a certain narration about the ailing body embedded in it, is of great significance, since it serves as a pattern for interpretation of Wyspiański’s more direct, lyrical, and self reflexive pieces of writing and art. No matter how strong the effort was to counterbalance it, the horror of the syphilitic body was nevertheless recorded in these accounts. According to a few of them, Wyspiański continued to work on his last texts and pictures even at a point when his body was in a state of advanced deterioration: his hands were oozing with pus, yet he persevered and continued to write and draw with the help of wooden splints attached to his hands with bandages. Of course, this image is transmitted only by means of written accounts, not visual depictions. What is known, however, is the extent to which the ravaging effects of syphilis were wrought on the body at the end of the 19th century; and these – predating and exclusive of written accounts – are documented by a vast and powerful medical and popular iconography that syphilis had managed to establish by the end of the century. “Today everyone has syphilis” has been an oft-quoted laconic sentence by Flaubert referring to the size of the syphilis epidemic in the 19th century. 10 Indeed, at some point twenty percent of the male population in Paris suffered from the disease. Only a few, however, as Elaine Showalter points out, were able to preserve their identities as “ailing persons.” Except for a few cases involving artists, “(s)yphilis had a face but no voice; while profligates and prostitutes were seen as its risk groups, they did not come forward to speak of the disease.” 11 They were written about and often visually represented, but themselves remained silent. It was mainly the discourses of Victorian morality and medicine that controlled the ailing syphilitic body. As Deborah Hayden points out, “It was this silent disease that perplexed and fascinated the medical community in the nineteenth century when scientific research dedicated itself to understanding, treating and seeking a cure for it. Syphilology became a respectable, challenging branch of medicine.” 12 Although widely represented, the syphilitic face was marked by gender which, in turn, organized and controlled depictions of the disease. As Sander Gilman argues, the beginning of the 19th century brought with it a newly-formed binary model of representation that focused on the ailing face of the prostitute and the genitals of the syphilitic male. 13 It is only through this binary model, which from the beginning of the century started to undergo the process of cultural codification, that two representations could exist and – what is more important – create meaning. In this manner, the binary structure of representation began to organize the field of the male viewer, through illustrating who he should avoid and, if he ignored these warnings, what kind of ravages might be infringed on his male body. An ideological message behind this construction is clear: “The infected male is
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Stanislaw Wyspiański (1869-1907)
anonymous, faceless, for he is the incidental victim of the female’s infection.” 14 At the turn of the century, however, the dubious balance of this iconographic configuration undergoes a dramatic change. According to Showalter, now these are women to become doubly silenced by the new system of representation of syphilis. As before they are still denied voice, now they no longer have a body either. In her text on the cultural image of syphilis in the fin de siècle, Showalter claims: The iconography of syphilis was primarily masculine. With its dramatic inscription on the male body, the hideous ravages of syphilis … made the disease a powerful deterrent in theological and moral reform campaigns to control male sexuality, seen as one of the main causes of degeneration. 15 In this context, D. H. Lawrence’s rumination on syphilis seems to be particularly meaningful: The great shock of syphilis created a rupture in human consciousness. In the nineteenth century, from having been a “pox,” a comic, manly disease, syphilis became a secret horror which alienated men from their physical selves. 16 The ravages of the disease were no less horrifyingly wrought on female bodies than male ones. However, it has been males who have felt alienated by the disease, and it has been the male consciousness, rather than, as D.H. Lawrence puts it, the generally “human” consciousness, in which the great shock of syphilis took place. In this respect, the shock of male syphilis was caused not so much by the disease itself but rather by its representation. Being a male and having syphilis meant an inevitable confrontation with the powerful, abundant, and hateful iconography of syphilitic the male body. How might the 19th century male syphilitics have introjected the social hatred toward their own bodies? What is the status of a self-portrait by a male, syphilitic artist? 4.
Artist of Death
Wyspiański, puzzlingly reluctant to speak about his illness, was recognized as one of Poland’s greatest artists of death in the 20th century. Parallels between his art and theatre and that of Tadeusz Kantor are not surprising, given Kantor’s strong fascination with Wyspiański, which was often overtly expressed. Stanisław Brzozowski, a contemporary and
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influential critic, was probably the first one who recognized Wyspiański as an artist whose true realm of creation was death. He argued: Between the world of the living – whose life is more rotten than the rottenness of death – and the shadows of the dead, stands the poet; he turns back from the ghosts and enters the realm of death in order to worship life with the dead. The rhythm of Wyspiański’s creation proceeds in such a vicious circle of resurrecting the past only in order to give it up, to liberate oneself from it. The past arises before the poet’s eyes, its empty eye sockets gaze at him and say, “You, alive, what do you wish from us? We already were – now the moment is yours – be. 17 Without any doubt it can be claimed, as Janusz Wałek claims, that Wyspiański’s oeuvre circulating around death is “shaped by the deeply personal perspective of the quickly developing and incurable illness that the artist was fully aware of.” 18 According to Wałek, Wyspiański’s poems, or rather semi-private personal poetic notes, are also rife with reflections about his death and illness. The sense of impending danger probably gave birth to one of the most intriguing poems, which Wałek notes “is marked by an almost hysterical irritation” 19 : How will I calm myself down full of fear are my eyes, full of terror are my thoughts, full of dread is my heart, full of trembling are my breasts – how will I calm myself down 20 Wałek is extremely careful not to ultimately pin down the meaning of the poem by binding it to illness, and thus he adds that “certainly, this poem may as well have other, more general references.” 21 This move is extremely significant since, according to a common though yet uncodified tradition, the poem (which has been dated to around 1897, roughly the time when Wyspiański was diagnosed) was not only the first artistic recognition of the artist’s own condition but also the way in which Wyspiański communicated the dreadful news to his aunt, Joanna Stankiewicz. Not being able to confront his aunt in a direct manner, he instead passed her a little sheet of paper containing the poem-confession. Even if the context of creation was not pressured by family, however, the poem can certainly be related to the experience of illness. Furthermore, having been written approximately ten years before Wyspiański’s death and before the last self-image is executed, it can be related to his very early experience of disease, perhaps even marking the very moment when
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Stanislaw Wyspiański (1869-1907)
syphilis begins to change Wyspiański’s existence forever. If such a hypothesis is true, it contradicts a common conception of Wyspiański as a very discreet artist, and the history of his disease turns out to be framed by two very personal and very direct artistic enunciations: the poem and the last self-image. Yet these two enunciations differ greatly in their depictions of the artist’s condition as expressed through different media. While the poem constructs an image of the body divided into different, clearly symbolic parts which nevertheless become reunited in fear and torment, the last self-image, to some degree continuing and repeating Wyspiański’s style of self-portraiture, focuses only on representation of the face (the hateful male syphilitic face of the end of the 19th century?), cutting it off from the rest of the ailing body. 5.
On the Verge of Melancholia
Is it a real-life deformation that lurks behind Wyspiański’s selfportrait? Is it, in this sense, a realistic portrait? Wyspiański, a brilliant drawer, was not a realist artist in the proper sense of the term. However, one can easily imagine his expressive and tense line, even with all of its high selectiveness, as able to depict any kind of facial deformation. But if we assume that the “canonical” images of syphilis from the fin de siècle might be of help here in identification of the image of a syphilitic person, then the answer to these questions would have to be no. Wyspiański’s last self-portrait does not resemble any of the canonical depictions. The distortion visible in the image, because it is too far from being “strictly syphilitic,” does not allow us to claim that it sends the viewer directly to the representation of syphilis. Common aspects of the canonical representtation such as maculae, papules, tubercles, pustules, blebs, tumours, lesions, scales, crusts, chancres, gammas, fissures, and scars do not appear in the image at all. A narrowly interpreted motif or image would then exclude Wyspiański from the gallery of other 19th century syphilitic artists. However, an interpretation can also be carried on in another direction. Although the deterioration of Wyspiański’s face and body was beyond doubt real (his nose bone having been removed two years earlier), his last depiction, despite the vague deformation it presents, leans in the direction of a phantasmal distortion, rather than a real one. A set of questions arises immediately. Does the visible deformation in the image have little to do with Wyspiański’s real body at this stage of his life, and, thus, is what the self-portrait presents an image of his inner self, a portrait of his tormented consciousness? Or, since the representation of the syphilitic body in the 19th century had been both alienating as well as ideologically invested, could the self-portrait be Wyspiański’s attempt to create a new (and contradictory) language to speak about the illness, or is it perhaps a sign of an already well-formed language, operating with a complicated metaphoric and symbolic system, born from a close encounter
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with transgressive sexuality and death? 22 If this is the case, Wyspiański’s last self-portrait would testify to a project of positive, life-affirming artistic creation, despite its being rooted in the despair and horror he apparently was confronting at the brink of illness and death. Finally, we must consider whether it is the crude facture of the image (a charcoal sketch) that determines its final form. If this is the case, it is of value to compare it with Wyspiański’s two other self-portraits in pencil done seventeen years earlier in 1890. The earliest depicts a sleek, milky, childlike face with delicate contours and shading. The second, portrait en face, a quite uncommon approach to self-portraits in Wyspiański’s oeuvre, only exacerbates the general impression this second image evokes: that of a manly, confident face and a sharp, authoritative gaze. There is a continuity between these images: both of them insist on the face as the site of totality in form and completeness, and this very trait becomes even more discernible when viewed next to the last self-portrait. I want to argue that, seen in this light, two early images open a series of depictions of Wyspiański’s face where a certain modus of the understanding of one’s own image is worked out; only through this modus, the face becomes not only visible but also comprehensible and recognizable by the artist as well as by the viewer. Nothing from this project remains in the last depiction of Wyspiański. Here, a curvy, elegant line, one of the recognizable characteristics of Wyspiański’s modernism, reaches its total opposite: it becomes the locus of the tension in the image, operating on the contrast between sharply edged skull, blurred hair, mouth, and moustache. It can hardly be said whether the purpose of the line is to draw and thus cut the contour of the face out of the background, or instead to blur it, thereby destroying the possibility of his own image coming into pictorial existence at all. This tension organizes itself unequally by focusing on certain points. The sharply articulated line of the skull in the upper right-hand corner of the image seems to fade away to a point of total vagueness and ambiguity as our gaze moves downward. The bow-shaped eyebrows and the forehead seem to create the last stem for what lies below them and this part of the portrait undergoes a gradually greater deformation: eyebrows, protruding and black-ringed eyes, the uncanny crimped and unstable line of the nose; a large and strongly deforming blotch around the mouth, blurring the whole lower right part of the face and rendering the mouth itself almost invisible; the expansive moustache, which, at the right side of the image, sticks out beyond the contour of the face and sags. The left contour of the face in the cheek area is multiplied by many lines drawn side by side, as if Wyspiański was looking for this contour but unable to find it or, on the contrary, as if he tried to lose it within its multiplication. Certainly, this final image was produced at a time when Wyspiański’s body was in a state of very advanced deterioration and his hands were wrapped in bandages. Nonetheless, the image is not devoid of fine details
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Stanislaw Wyspiański (1869-1907)
such as a sharply and precisely marked left iris, itself a contrast to the generally overwhelming destruction and proof of the yet uncompromised technical accuracy of the artist. This striking detail of the representation immediately draws any viewer’s attention. Wyspiański’s self-portraits, according to the tradition of interpretation best represented by Kazimierz Wyka, can be regarded as a series dominated by the artist’s increasing introspection, clearly related to his own painful recognition of his condition, as well as his shattered expectations concerning his family life and art. Within this interpretative tradition, special attention is granted to the following pieces of work: a famous blue pastel self-portrait from 1894, a self-portrait from 1902, and a self-portrait with his wife. There is, of course, an aesthetic side to the introspection. A number of Wyspiański’s self-portraits along with portraits of his family (mainly children) and acquaintances have been described within a paradigm of melancholic art: the construction of the painting with the focus always on the face and on a gaze lost in the distance, in search of an imprecise, intangible object. The best example here is certainly the self-portrait from 1902, and although Kazimierz Wyka surprisingly omits this in his text of Wyspiański’s introspections, others have included it. The whole composition, with brightened, polished pastels in the face whose gentle bluish shadow contrasts with a dark-brown and only roughly depicted coat, strongly intensifies the impression of not only stability and calmness, but also of a peculiar frozenness, as if illustrating the state of “the coldness and emotional paralysis of the melancholic person” as evoked by Julia Kristeva in her essay on Holbein’s Dead Christ. 23 In these alternative interpretations of the last self-portrait, we can track down the moment in which the strategy and pattern of depicting Wyspiański’s ailing body, employed by his acquaintances who saw him on the deathbed, begins to permeate interpretations of his works. Janusz Wałek wrote: Wyspiański’s last self-portrait, done in charcoal and already a death-image, depicts a sparkle of this penetrating iris; though the trace of death is clearly visible in it, it is transformed into a desire for life: the troubling, angry gaze, posing a challenge beyond the strength of one singular life. 24 Such accounts attempted to persuade the reader that Wyspiański was even greater when he was dying because his devastated body becomes the site of his unbreakable will’s triumph over the constraints of nature, life, and death. Here we have an example of what Sontag recognizes as a universal pattern in the depiction of suffering from illness. All of the above accounts focus a special delight on Wyspiański’s steel-blue eyes as the locus of his great spirit. Regarded in this way, not sōma, not even a face, but eyes
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alone become Wyspiański’s true image. The last portrait, then, is nothing but a portrait of consciousness trapped within a deteriorating body. It is undeniably true that in the self-portrait the eyes are the detail that immediately attracts attention. Protruding from their orbits, with sharply marked irises, full of wrath or simply terrified, the eyes crave attention, and capture the viewer. Comparison with the 1903 self-portrait reinforces this impression. Here, melancholic search for the lost object renders the eyes neither sad nor desperate. Wyspiański, the artist, peacefully contemplates his own visage and lets the viewer do exactly the same thing. The last self-portrait, however, cannot simply be regarded as a powerful appendix to the introspective chain, while still remaining within the melancholic paradigm. As an appendix it would remain as proof of a yet unabased zeal for creating a new language of introspection, a new language to speak about one’s own condition and illness. Furthermore, it would also constitute an attempt to sustain (or maybe to re-establish) a melancholic and thus stable relation between the space of the body and the field of the image since it is an artistic style that, in Kristeva’s terms, embodies a particular potential to rule over the chaos of one’s melancholy: Very much like personal behaviour, artistic style imposes itself as a means of countervailing the loss of the other and of meaning: a means more powerful than any other because more autonomous (no matter who his patron is, isn’t the artist master of his work?) but, in fact and fundamentally, analogous with or complementary to behaviour, for it fills the same psychic need to confront separation, emptiness, death. 25 According to Kristeva, a melancholic moment sediments in a piece of work that then bears it only as a trace of the past hiatus. Kristeva’s project is then positive: an artistic activity wins over the melancholic moment, which in return can bring into the system of representation new and thus far unknown dimensions. The bonds that tie the subject to the body and meaning are recovered and secured again. There are peculiar bonds that link together melancholy, realism, and mimetic art. Melancholy, despite the break and the loss of meaning, requires a strong will to sustain and preserve the body and the image of it, thereby placing itself at the site of re-presentation and reference. A melancholic moment may indeed signify a crisis, the total collapse of the symbolic system and meaning. However, the representation that preserves melancholic hiatus as a trace, finds itself on the other side, as the positive project of the secured artistic style, imagination, and body whose saved and finally safe image now becomes apparent. In Wyspiański’s oeuvre, the best example of this secured, frozen image of the face is the self-portrait
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Stanislaw Wyspiański (1869-1907)
from 1902 with its attempt to close the face in elegant lines, brightened colours, and delicate shading – the execution of the face that shows Wyspiański’s melancholic disenchantment is now transformed into the beauty of his own visage. 6.
When the Bonds with the Body Are Severed
As previously argued, it could be relatively easy to advance a hypothesis that would treat the last self-image as the sign of a new language that, on one hand, is born out of the loss and horror of the ailing body and, on the other, preserves the signs of despair by transforming it into distortions within the visual field and tensions between various areas of the face, all the while remaining within the ambit of the melancholic canon. Extolling one’s wound while mastering the loss imposed by it exemplifies Kristeva’s notion of the role of an artistic style in the process of (self) healing. But at the same time we have to remember that it is an artistic activity (anti-melancholic in its essence), with the accent put on decisive counter-action to the loss, that allows the subject to transcend his or her melancholia. Although there are strong links between the melancholic and syphilitic portraits in the period, and despite the fact that the works delivered by Wyspiański before 1907 do indeed bear distinctive features of melancholia, my claim is that the last self-portrait is, on the contrary, the site of the break with the melancholic paradigm. This is true even though I consider this portrait the moment where the syphilitic body, earlier only sediment in the subtext, now approaches the surface of the painting. To again quote Kristeva: Is it still possible to paint when the bonds that tie us to the body and meaning are severed? Is it still possible to paint when desire, which is a bond, disintegrates? Is it still possible to paint when one identifies not with desire but with severance, which is the truth of human psychic life, a severance that is represented by death in the imagination and that melancholia conveys as symptom? 26 According to this notion, melancholia, as a symptom of the identification with severance, is capable of giving birth to melancholic aesthetics. However, what if the severance is too great and too overwhelming to produce a piece of work that would still remain in the framework of any aesthetic project? Those who witnessed Wyspiański during his last days and felt compelled to relate their stories took pains to create and sustain the image of the artist whose moral dignity, even in his last moments, remained untouched by “this horrible disease” and who, although struck down with
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illness, “kept the entire nation in his ailing fingers.” Wyspiański was a strong personality. However, it is reasonable to be suspicious about the ideological slant those accounts take. What might be true about the man who executes the melancholic self-portraits does not necessarily have to be true about the man who, in 1907, executes his last image. Had a potent artistic activity, strong enough to overcome loss (according to Kristeva’s notion), perhaps been confronted with the horror of a body too horrendous to be capable of saving meaning this time? Wyspiański’s oozing fingers were not able to hold anything, be it a pen, pencil, or an entire nation. Wyspiański’s last self-portrait, though only a charcoal sketch, does not bear the signs of an uncompleted piece of work. While not repeating any patterns of the representation of syphilis, or the self-created patterns of depiction of his own image, the centre of the facial deformation (a vague blot around the mouth), as if partially erased, seems to preserve rather a moment of incapability of the artistic style of countervailing the loss of meaning; the moment of the final exhaustion of the melancholic paradigm. The breakdown of the symbolic system (in Kristeva’s terms) is translated here into a total dishevelling of the lines of the face and the disturbance of the canon of representation of his own image. Provided it had been this canon through which the face had been visible, comprehensible and recognizable, a new self-image now becomes the site of a symbolic non-sense. The deformation of the artist’s face, although real, is not represented. There is only a lack of totality, a partial erasure; the site between the not-depicted facial distortion and the undepicted totality of the image. An other face.
Notes 1
Deborah Hayden POX: Genius, Madness, and the Mysteries of Syphilis (New York: Basic Books 2003), 60-68. 2 Kazimierz Wyka, Wyznania uduszonego (Kraków: Universtitas, 1995), 116 (my translation). 3 For example: Jean Goens, De la syphilis au sida: cinq siècles des mémoires littéraires de Vénus (Bruxelles: Presses interuniversitaires européennes, 1995), Patrick Wald Lasowski, Syphilis: essai sur la littérature française du XIXe siècle (Paris: Gallimard, 1982). 4 Hayden, xv. 5 There is in fact a photograph depicting Wyspiański’s corpse on the deathbed. However, the poor quality of the photograph as well as the fact that it was taken from a very low right angle (thus concealing the left side of the face, the one that in the last self-portrait bears deformation) make the face almost invisible.
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This note was discovered by Wyspianski’s biographer, Krystyna Zbijewska and mentioned in her book about the artist Orzeł w kurniku. Z życia Stanisława Wyspiańskiego (Warszawa: Panstwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1980). 7 Wyspiański w oczach wspolczesnych, ed. Leon Płoszewski (Krakow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1971), 471 (my translation). 8 Susan Sontag, Illness as Metaphor and AIDS and Its Metaphors (New York: Picador, 1990), 41. 9 Ibid. 10 “Plus ou moins, tout le monde en est affecté” in Goens, 97. 11 Elaine Showalter, Sexual Anarchy: Gender and Culture at the “Fin de Siècle” (London: Bloomsbury, 1991), 191. 12 Hayden, 29. 13 Sander Gilman, Sexuality. An Illustrated History. Representing the Sexual in Medicine and Culture from the Middle Ages to the Age of AIDS (New York: Wiley, 1989), 238. 14 Ibid., 238. 15 Showalter, 192-193; my emphasis. 16 Ibid., 199. 17 Stanisław Brzozowski, Współczesna powieść i krytyka (KrakówWrocław: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1984), 335 (my translation) 18 Wałek, Stanisława Wyspiańskiego instynkt śmierci, in Stanisław Wyspianski. Studium artysty: materialy z sesji naukowej na Uniwersytecie Jagiellońskim 7-9 czerwca 1995, ed. Ewa Miodońska-Brookes (Kraków : TAiWPN Universitas, 1996), 41. 19 Wałek, 45. 20 My translation. 21 Wałek, 45. 22 Transgressive sexuality not necessarily in the sense of Wyspiański’s own sexuality but rather as one regarded as transgressive in the syphilitic discourse of the fin de siècle as linked to illicit sexual practices (prostitution, homosexuality). 23 Julia Kristeva, The Black Sun. Depression and Melancholia. Translated by Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 107138. 24 Wałek, 47. 25 Kristeva, 129; my emphasis. 26 Ibid., 136-137; my emphasis.
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Bibliography Brzozowski, Stanisław, Współczesna powieść i krytyka. KrakówWrocław: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1984. Gilman, Sander L., Sexuality. An Illustrated History. Representing the Sexual in Medicine and Culture from the Middle Ages to the Age of AIDS. New York: Wiley, 1989. Goens, Jean, De la syphilis au sida : cinq siècles des mémoires littéraires de Vénus. Bruxelles : Presses interuniversitaires européennes, 1995. Hayden, Deborah, POX. Genius, Madness, and the Mysteries of Syphilis. New York: Basic Books 2003. Kristeva, Julia, The Black Sun. Depression and Melancholia. Translated by Leon S. Roudiez. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989. Showalter, Elaine, Sexual Anarchy: Gender and Culture at the “Fin de Siècle.” London: Bloomsbury, 1991. Sontag, Illness as Metaphor and AIDS and Its Metaphors. New York: Picador, 1990. Wałek, Janusz. Stanisława Wyspiańskiego instynkt śmerci in Stanisław Wyspianski. Studium artysty: materialy z sesji naukowej na Uniwersytecie Jagiellońskim 7-9 czerwca 1995, ed. Ewa Miodońska-Brookes (Kraków : TAiWPN Universitas, 1996) Wyka, K. Wyznania uduszonego. Kraków: Universtitas, 1995. Wyspiański w oczach współczesnych, ed. Leon Płoszewski. Krakow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1971
Note on Contributor Tomasz Spiewak is a doctoral student in the IPP program Performance and Media Studies in the Institute of Theatre Studies at the University of Mainz, Germany. In 2002 he graduated from the Institute of Polish Literature at Jagiellonian University in Krakow, Poland. Since then he has
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been working on his doctoral dissertation in comparative literature and theatre, devoted to representation of body and illness at the turns of the 19th and 20th centuries. Currently he is a visiting scholar in the Department of English and Comparative Literature at Columbia University in New York .
Part 2
The Epistemology of Biomedicine
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The Anthropology of Aetiology James Davies Abstract Despite overt claims of thinking in complex ways about aetiology, a proclivity to think reductively when making diagnoses still widely exists in many clinical traditions (thinking in terms of ‘first causes’ rather than ‘primary causes’). Even for practitioners within mono-causal systems (e.g. biomedicine and psychoanalysis) who acknowledge the intricate nature of causality, we can still infer from their practices a reluctance to jettison ideas of ‘first causes’. We stress that this is particularly the case in certain psychotherapeutic traditions where reductionism has a historical legacy. Rather than accounting for this reluctance by looking to the psychological characteristics of the practitioners involved, or to the power dynamics between medicine and state, we look to the competitive social context in which curative systems are obliged to vie for resources and status. We thus partly locate this reluctance to relinquish reductive thinking in the authority reductionism confers; an authority which if believed by a sufficient body of practitioners, policy makers, and users, helps secure the tradition’s position in the market place. From this standpoint, we identify one important factor among others that accounts for reductionist practice in curative traditions, suggesting that reductionism lives on since it serves the interests of the curative tradition itself with its ongoing struggle for explanatory authority, status, and survival amid a contending sea of possibilities. Key Words: Aetiology; Reductionism; Diagnosis; CBT. In this paper I shall argue that thinking reductively about aetiology cannot be accounted for by psychological and socio-political explanations alone. Rather I argue that the tendency to think in terms of ‘first causes,’ which can be observed in certain psychotherapeutic and biomedical traditions, has its origins partly in the authority reductionism confers. In addition, this authority is ever more needed in a heterogeneous society comprising many disparate healing traditions all of which are contending to explain and treat the one symptom configuration. Thus holding onto reductionism can be interpreted in the light of the interests of the curative tradition itself with its ongoing struggle for explanatory authority, status, and survival amid a contending sea of systems. By means of drawing some crucial distinctions between mono- and multi-causal systems, and ‘first’ and ‘primary’ causes, I will show that where a given curative tradition locates the source of a particular complaint constitutes more than
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just a medical act; it is, in addition, a socio/cultural act that has survival implications for the given curative tradition of which this act is a part. The first essential step in framing this argument is to draw a broad distinction between two types of intervention used in different curative traditions: mono-causal and multi-causal intervention. We can characterise mono-causal curative systems as those that tend to direct their alleviative action at one phenomenological domain or another, such as at the body, at the mind, or at the wider social or meta-social environment. Examples of mono-causal practice are readily found in many Western curative traditions. In the biomedical tradition, for instance, the cause of a particular illness is mainly sought for in the individual’s body. This view of clinical reality assumes that biologic concerns are the more basic or ‘real’ concerns so far as it is biological rather than sociocultural or psychological causes of distress to which curative action is levelled. An example of the type of thinking that may underpin monocausal practice is powerfully illustrated by Margaret Lock and Nancy Scheper-Hughes’ description of a rounds presentation at medical school. They write: We are reminded of a grand rounds presentation before a class of first-year medical students that concerned the case of a middle aged woman suffering from chronic and debilitating headaches. In halting sentences the patient explained before the class of two hundred that her husband was an alcoholic who occasionally beat her, that she had been virtually housebound for the past five years looking after her senile and incontinent mother-in-law, and that she worries constantly about her teenage son who is flunking out of high school. Although the woman’s story elicited considerable sympathy from the students, many grew restless with the line of clinical questioning, and one finally interrupted the professor to demand “but what is the real cause of the headaches”? 1 It may be less the case that these students are oblivious to the sociocultural influences on this patient’s distress, than that they feel this consideration as simply irrelevant to their practice. To them the sociological distress has coalesced in the body. It is this coalescence that is perceived as the real cause of distress. To locate the cause of a disorder in any region other than the physical body would be to render the doctor’s remedial intervention less directly curing and, at best, palliative or alleviative. The mono-causal practice of the medical doctor differs only in external particularities from that of the psychoanalyst, since structurally
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they are the same. As this paper dwells more specifically on the practice of psychoanalysis it is important that I first justify why this system should be classified as mono-causal. Psychoanalysts are prone to think in monocausal terms when they regard the real cause of a complaint as residing in the psyche. As one psychoanalyst tells us, ‘the wish for further insight in order to discover the unconscious meaning of unsatisfactory life situations or incomprehensible symptoms implies acceptance of the fact that ultimately the cause of psychological symptoms lies within oneself.’ 2 At this point a certain objection might be raised that this quotation does not capture an attitude that is representative in the psychoanalytic community, since, it could be argued, psychoanalysis as a discourse has always acknowledged the influence of formative environments on individual psychology. This objection would indeed be powerful only if the following points were overlooked; firstly, that the term ‘environment’ means for the psychoanalyst something quite different from what it means to either the anthropologist or the sociologist; and secondly, that the consequence of any interaction between environment and psyche always coalesces in psyche in the form of a primary cause. Both these points warrant closer attention. Firstly, to clarify the different meanings the term environment holds for anthropological and psychoanalytic discourses, we may turn to the work of the mid 20th century sociologist C.W. Mill. His distinction between ‘the personal troubles of the milieu’ and ‘the public issues of social structure’ appears to clarify this matter so far as it separates those disorders which have their origins within the character of the individual and his/her immediate family milieu (i.e. within the immediate environment), from those transcending the immediate range of nuclear relations and the range of the person’s inner life (i.e. having their origins in the wider social world). Illustrating this differentiation Mills writes: consider unemployment. When, in a city of 100,000 only one man is unemployed, that is his personal trouble, and for its relief we properly look to the character of the man, his skills, and his immediate opportunities. But when in a nation of 50 million employees, 15 million men are unemployed, that is an issue, and we may not hope to find its solution within the range of opportunities open to any one individual. … Consider marriage, inside a marriage a man and a woman may experience personal troubles, but when the divorce rate during the first four years of marriage is 350 out of every 1,000 attempts, this is an indication of a structural issue having to do with the institutions of marriage and the family and other institutions that bear upon them. 3
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Mill’s work is useful here as his concept of issues refers to problems whose causes are located in ‘environment’ as the term is generally understood by the psychoanalyst, while his concept of troubles pertains to problems which find their origin in an ‘environment’ that is sociologically defined. When psychoanalysts speak of environment, then, they do so in a qualified sense from the sociologist’s standpoint. For the psychoanalyst ‘environment’ refers to original formative environment of both the parents and the immediate milieu and not, as Mills would regard it, to the wider structural world in which this nuclear nexus is embedded. 4 If I have clarified to some degree the different meanings the term environment carries for each discourse, the second point referring to the ‘coalesce of disease’ still needs to be addressed. As I mentioned earlier the method of identifying where any curative discourse locates the source of suffering is to notice where the given discourse directs its alleviative action. So far as the techniques of psychoanalysis are aimed at individual psychic life, the patterns of dreams, fantasies, and emotional happenings that daily assail the patient, analysts are directing their cure at the psyche. For the analyst the consequences of the early dynamics of the nuclear triad (mother, father, and child) coalesce in psychology in the form of developmental impediments. It is this coalescence that is considered the main cause, as it is this coalescence that is treated in analysis. This is not to say that other influencing causal factors along the chain are ignored and that all analysts fail to understand the complexity of causality; rather it is simply to note that in terms of treating the patient, these other causal factors are not considered relevant. 5 The psychoanalyst is equipped to treat ‘psychological disorders’ alone, and thus the social world and its impact on the person is given less attention. 6 Analysing the origins of the mono-causal nature of psychoanalysis would take us beyond the purview of this paper but one such influence may be profitable to explore, if only perfunctorily, before moving to my description of multi-causal systems – namely, Freud’s relationship with his social world. Freud, in many respects, was a man of his day, a man typical of middle-class bourgeois Vienna, a conventional man who plainly accepted the social reality with which he was presented. At face value this representation of Freud’s relationship with his environment seems to contradict the common belief of a man highly at variance with social convention. But if we probe deeper we find that apart form his objection to the overly strong social taboo on sex, he accepted most of his society’s dominant values. We can infer this acquiescence from both his practice and his writing. His positivism, his views on patriarchal dominance, his dichotomising of the rational/irrational (and his championing of the former), his acceptance of economic values of the middle classes, are all attitudes that lie implicit in this writing, attitudes which characterise the conventional thinking of his day. Erich Fromm has eloquently explored all these factors
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in his book Sigmund Freud’s Mission that constitutes a psychosocial investigation of Freud’s character. 7 Freud’s general orientation had an impact on his interpretation of psychological distress. He did not regard modern Vienna as a reprehensible social system, and therefore located the cause of distress not in that society but rather in a disordered psyche. Thus root causes were sought more in the patient’s ill adaptation to an acceptable social world than in the very foundation of society itself. Therapy involved bringing the patient back into healthy relationship with his or her social surroundings, not empowering individuals to oppose and seek alteration of a situation outside of themselves. If society is without blame then the origin of illness resides elsewhere – within the psyche of the individual. Freud’s complicity with his social world not only influenced his theory and practice, but also all subsequent developments within the field of psychoanalysis itself. This crude representation of Freud’s attitude to his social world could be greatly embellished, but for now we offer it as footnote concerning one key factor as to why psychoanalysis has traditionally opposed a socio-centric vision of aetiology. Indeed, the focus on the individual psyche is diametrically opposed to the socio-centric vision that is ascendant among the social sciences today. If we wish to look for the foundations of psychodynamic thought then we must look to the personality of its founding father, his attitudes, intellectual bias, his culturally coloured assumptions, all things constituting the foundations of most psychodynamic thinking. If the above discussion shows that both biomedical and psychoanalytic systems are examples of mono-causal traditions that, by necessity, direct their curative action at one phenomenological domain alone, then let us now turn to discussing the nature of multi-causal systems. These systems, instead of directing curative action at one domain, say at psyche or body, will level curative action at a number of domains simultaneously and thus are more holistic in approach, postulating several causes acting together. The West African diviner is a perfect example of a doctor who casts about him for the many causes of distress. The doctor looks to the patient’s diet, to physiology, to current relationships, to the patient’s rapport with the ancestors or community spirits, he looks to the cosmos, to the patterning of the stars, to inter-communal tensions; he looks to all these different domains to ascertain the possible source or sources of distress. It is only after having conducted this comprehensive surveillance that he gathers up the facts and infers from them where curative action is to be targeted, often deciding to direct such action to many domains at once. 8 Multi-causal practice will proceed in a manner quite unlike that found in mono-causal systems. In a sense these two systems reside at opposite ends of a working spectrum. The term ‘spectrum’ is one used advisedly since it leaves open the possibility that other kinds of practice
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dwell between these two polar ends. Indeed, it is certainly the case that there are systems that are neither mono- or multi-causal but rather what we might regard as dyadic or triadic in orientation. An example of a dyadic system might be psychiatry, insofar as it is equipped to level curative action at two domains simultaneously: at body via pharmacology, and at psyche via psychotherapy. Psychiatry also on occasion enters the triadic realm so far as it involves manipulation of the environment for curative ends. Certain modern psychiatric day-centres, for instance, as well providing prescriptions and psychotherapy, also work to provide a physical space conducive to the patient’s well-being. 9 Art rooms, games rooms, comfortably furnished common-rooms will comprise the physical make-up of the centre, a corporeal space judiciously manoeuvred to support the patient’s recovery. The acknowledgement that practice other than mono- or multicausal exists does not sabotage the central point that I emphasise – namely, that the curative action of those holding to mono-causal systems (such as the psychoanalyst) appears quite different from the curative actions performed by those who practice multi-causality. Mono-causal practice directs curative action at one domain, while multi-causal practice potentially directs action at many different domains. Another important feature distinguishing mono-causal from multi-causal systems, is that monocausal systems often imply the notion that there is a first cause sitting at the root of any given complaint. They oblige the practitioner to practice as though there were things such as first causes, as though there were some foundation of illness that could be unearthed or, as the medical student introduced at the beginning of the paper phrased it, as though there were some ‘real’ cause to be treated. However, if we were to ask the practitioner whether any other influences might have precipitated the first or ‘real’ cause, we would be met invariably with a positive response. We might be told that a first cause, such as a patient receiving insufficient mothering as a child, might have had its roots in social determinants that inhibited the care-giver’s ability to sufficiently support the child. The psychoanalyst might also readily admit that these determinants might be bound to wider economic and socio-political factors. Similarly, with the medical doctor we might be told that a first cause such as carcinogens in the diet, might have its roots in a number of non-biological factors, from the patient’s being ill-informed about correct diet, to his inability to procure satisfactory nutrition and so on. Thus, although a practitioner such as a medical doctor or a psychoanalyst may practice as though first causes exist, he or she if pressed will often admit to thinking in more complex ways about aetiology, a fact which highlights a very real discrepancy between thought and practice. 10 So far, then, as the idea of ‘first cause’ or ‘real cause’ connotes a reality inconsistent with much practitioner thinking, an idea that is more tacitly held then explicitly, just as it is more inadvertently taught than
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overtly. A reasonable question to ask, then, is why hold to this idea of ‘first causes’ at all? Why not cast it overboard as an item to be someday gathered up by future historians of science, an artefact that is largely irrelevant to our practices today so far as it peddles a fallacy about aetiology. Before I answer this question let me first ask whether or not there might be a preferable idiom in which to cast our understanding of aetiology. Or in other words, let me ask whether there is another conception of causality that better suits what we intuit to be the case – namely, that we are never dealing with definitive or first causes when treating illness. I think it must be clear that there are indeed an abundance of preferable conceptions and we need only to search for them. One such conception might be to think in terms of primary causes. This phrase, while connoting none of the finality inherent in the phrase first cause (a finality that conjures up images of a causal foundation from which all subsequent troubles stem), has the added merit of capturing the idea that by and large all mono-causal systems direct their alleviate action at one causal domain alone and that by implication such systems do not treat (nor of course should we expect them to treat) the whole configuration of causes that may have contributed to the given complaint. This phrase sits well, then, with an image of aetiology that more resembles a casual chain than a causal bedrock; a chain along which are strung the many contributing factors to the particular distress. This image implies that different mono-causal systems direct their alleviative action primarily at one notch on this chain’s continuum. Inculcating mono-causal practitioners with the idea that they are never treating first-causes, but rather treating what we have termed ‘primary’ causes that dwell on a chain of influence, sensitises such practitioners to the fact that mono-causal systems are limited. The medical doctor cannot be expected to cure the social deprivation that may have prompted the depression which weakened the immune system that in turn permitted the flu. Physicians can only treat the flu and perhaps the immune system leaving others to effect change in other causal domains. Likewise, psychoanalysts who always think in terms of primary causes will be more open to recognising the limitations of their discourse and to acknowledging to the patient, to speak figuratively, when a doctor dealing with a different causal domain should be called in. Such an analyst would practice in accordance with an attitude contrasting that engendered by a belief in first causes and all that this implies: that there is a foundation to mental disturbance, an irreducible happening or collection of happenings to which we can confidently point as the origin of distress. This ‘reductive’ attitude does not allow for ambiguity or uncertainty, nor does it encourage the natural humility we must by necessity entertain when acknowledging the thorough complexity at the heart of all causal questions.
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Now that I have made clear the distinctions between mono- and multi-causality and primary and first causes and clarified that many practitioners, although practicing as though first causes exist, readily admit that there is no such first cause that is itself beyond influence, it falls to me to take up the final concern of this paper and ask why then this resistance to conceiving illness aetiology in terms other than first or real cause? Or in other words, why this reluctance to expose tacitly held ideas of first causes and replace them with an explicit and humbling adherence to a conceptualisation that rather emphasises the primacy of all intervention? I shall start by noting a few answers, some obvious some not so, that can be given to this question. Firstly, we must recognise that the particular explanatory perspective we assume when answering this question will influence any answer given. A psychologist, for instance, might answer that thinking in terms of first causes endows the practitioner with a sense of certainty, with the belief that they have found a foundation to the problem. It is this certainty that allows them to act in what are often quite stressful and uncertain situations. Without such certainty there might be hesitancy of action, which can only bode ill for a patient who is in an emergency state. Joan Cassell noticed the necessity of certainty in the practice of surgeons, where uncertainty is not an alternative they can afford. 11 Viewed from this perspective, a practitioner might be reluctant to let go of the idea of first causes due to the uncertainty that could arise. Alternatively a biomedical purist who reduces distress to biochemistry or else to a genetic explanation might readily say that the physiological basis to distress is not an ‘assumption’ but an axiom – we speak of first causes, he might say, because to locate the first cause of malady in the body is to approximate ‘truth’ most closely since there is in reality a causal bedrock from which all ensuing socio/psychological/biological dis-ease stems. This attitude assumes a materialist reductionism that accords no significance to any social-psychological factors that may have preceded or acted in conjunction with the biological cause. It follows, then, that if we ourselves wish to avoid the pitfalls of such reductionism we are obliged to say that if they contain a certain ‘truth,’ they do not contain the whole truth. Whatever might be the case, I believe they are neglecting an important factor that might be unearthed by the sociological or, as I would call it, the anthropological perspective. In the last part of this paper I wish to articulate an answer to this question from this anthropological perspective. The following reflections have been derived from research I have been conducting among psychotherapeutic communities in London and Oxford, mainly psychoanalytic and psychiatric. The first thing to remember is that multi-causal systems such as the divination system I mentioned earlier, are usually found in small-scale, homogenous societies where a variety of curative discourses do not exist to treat different illness domains (e.g. a psychology for the mind or
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biomedicine for the body). 12 This contrasts with the fact that most monocausal systems are found in large-scale heterogeneous societies where a number of curative systems exist side by side often in competing relation. Unlike the multi-causal systems, then, mono-causal discourses rarely appear in isolation but always amid a sea of neighbouring discourses that contend for explanatory authority. This jostling for explanatory authority is very real and clearly evinced in the recent struggles between two different camps within psychiatry, especially in the United States. On the one hand, there are those practitioners who are more biomedically inclined while, on the other, there is a group primarily interested in psychodynamics. 13 Both camps are dealing with a configuration of facts whose aetiology can be interpreted from different perspectives, including the biomedical and the psychotherapeutic. We must also remember that when we speak of ‘psychotherapy’ we are not dealing with a neatly circumscribed system of knowledge and practice. Within the field itself there are many competing therapeutic schools and alternatives from cognitive behavioural to humanistic, to psychodynamic psychotherapy. Outside the domain of psychotherapy and indeed psychiatry itself, there also dwell other interpretive schemes stemming from religious, charismatic, or spiritual perspectives, as well as from ‘alternative’ perspectives found in more holistic practices such as homeopathy. 14 Finally, there are also the growing challenges from medical anthropology and sociology that emphasise the social origins of distress. Given these contending interpretations is it always possible that the explanatory authority can shift from one interpretive system to another. Such a shift occurred in American psychiatry during the 1980s and 90s, a period in which explanatory authority moved from psychodynamics to biology, privileging pharmacological over psychoanalytic intervention. The fact that explanatory authority is prone to shift can be more clearly seen if we assume a wider historical perspective and regard how the phenomenon of madness has been variously interpreted though time and space. 15 In Greco-Roman Europe a mythic-religious interpretive system held sway, in the middle ages this was superseded by a strictly religious interpretive scheme, whereas today our understanding of ‘madness’ has been entirely medicalised leaving no room for the demons and daemons of old. 16 At the present time, the apparent arbitrator between all these contending explanatory systems, as Arthur Kleinman (1991) has called them, is empirical investigation. It is the scientific credibility of any given system that decides its respectability. All manner of quantitative and qualitative methods are recruited to decide the issue of which curative system is most effective. Naturally, this arbitrator is not full-proof, as can be seen in the area of psychiatry; a discipline that is often asked to charter phenomena that cannot, at present be accurately captured in scientific formula.
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Thus, the empirical method has its confines as there will always exist beyond its bounds whole areas that do not lend themselves to being accurately measured and definitively explained. Where empiricism fails to conclusively confirm a given practice, as has been largely the case with psychoanalysis, other less certain means of confirmation are recruited to endow a given tradition with authority – that is, to provide authoritative supports where science has failed to do so. As many medical anthropologists have shown, all manner of symbols may be appropriated like tropes, dress codes, pseudo-scientific empiricism and jargon, styles of speech; all kinds of rhetoric devices are employed to fill the gaps. 17 Naturally in this paper I have no time to discuss all of these devices, but before I close I would like to touch upon one that has yet to be defined as such – namely, the device of reductionism. Reductionism, the act of reducing a chain of events to a ‘first’ cause, constitutes a rhetorical device that acts as a prop. To locate the cause in a given area is to work with a hypothesis, to act on an assumption, not an irrevocably demonstrated empirical fact. Of course this assumption is expedient if, as in the case of biomedicine, it underpins a curative tradition that often works effectively. But expedient or not, if taken as more than an assumption and held aloft as an axiom, we reify a phenomenon that exists only in abstraction. An example of how the ‘axiomising’ of an assumption can be used as a ‘rhetorical prop’ can be seen in the recent struggles within British psychiatry between two kinds of psychotherapy: psychodynamic and cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT). It appears that, at the present time at least, CBT is the preferred option. One reason in particular for this can be inferred from the manner in which CBT advertises itself to National Health Service (NHS) policy makers. To illustrate I turn to the words of one senior member of the mental health services in the NHS: What it so appealing about CBT to the managers, to the public and to the politicians is that CBT people can say that we have a treatment for depression that is as effective as taking a pill…if you take 6 pills in 6 sessions you can expect this kind of result and if you take another 10 pills then you can have another kind off result. It is all very neat, it is really about the way it presents itself. It speaks in medical terms about ‘causes’ and ‘cures’ and this pleases the NHS officials and politicians. It offers treatment for ‘discrete’ conditions – depression, anxiety stemming form discrete causes. But of course in clinical practice very often people rarely present with neat depression it is not an analogous to a broken leg or a headache or whatever – the reality tends to be much more complicated. The case with physical
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medicine I am sure physicians say it not as neat as it appears. But speaking in the medical model, ignoring these complexities, reducing symptoms to clear causes [faulty cognitive patterning] CBT manages to say what people want to here. During my fieldwork I found these complaints to be echoed by a range of mental health practitioners within the NHS. Surprisingly, similar reservations were also voiced by certain CBT practitioners. As one such informant commented to me: it does seem that CBT increasingly markets itself in ways not entirely congruent with the facts. If we enjoy higher success rates than other therapies this might be because it is easier to study cognitive therapy than the psychodynamic options. These studies are taken to suppose that the CBT model of the mind is correct – things are presented as more simple than they actually are, and while this keeps CBT on the wards the oversimplification some-times makes me feel uneasy. Cognitive behavioural therapy sells its efficacy by many devices, some rhetorical some not. A non-rhetorical device would be the act of making research-based claims that CBT enjoys better outcome rates for certain mental disturbances than do psychodynamic or drug therapies. A strictly rhetorical device, on the other hand, would be an act such as making either implied or overt claims about the causal origin of any given complaint, claims that have no such empirical backing. Such implied reductionism can be inferred from CBT’s concept of the person, and the manner in which CBT advertises this concept. For instance, CBT speaks of persons as being ‘hard-wired’ to behave in particular ways, while underplaying that such wiring is itself an epiphenomenon. That is, rather than stressing that such wiring constitutes a ‘primary’ cause that is not beyond influence such causes are often rhetorically allowed to appear as first or ‘real’ causes of distress. This attitude can be observed in certain textbooks of CBT that tend to ‘axiomise’ what are essentially assumptions, making the focal point at which alleviative action is directed appear more like a ‘first’ than ‘primary’ cause. If CBT’s representation of aetiology fails to capture the complexity at the heart of the matter, it nevertheless captures the attention of policy makers within the NHS. As many informants claimed, the models of mental illness most preferred by NHS officials are those that speak of definite causes engendering definite symptoms that, in turn, can be successfully and unequivocally treated. Such clear curative projects are what officials like to institute as they appeal, as another informant
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claimed, to a ‘traditional view of illness particular to the biomedical model … and traditional models are what politicians will pay for.’ Thus to cast one’s system in traditional aetiological terms confers an authority which, if supported by relatively high success rates, is sure to give it a competitive edge over systems less comfortable with the reductionist rhetoric. To turn now from this illustration, if we agree that any study of the matter of aetiology must be regarded in this wider social context of competing curative discourses, it is possible to suggest that the reluctance of certain curative traditions (e.g. psychoanalysis) to jettison often tacitly held ideas of ‘real’ or ‘first’ causes is, in part, due to a reluctance to remove an important prop. Such props, if believed by practitioners, policy makers, or a sufficient body of users, endows a given tradition with considerable authority. From this perspective, we identify one important factor among many that may account for reductionist tendencies in curative traditions. This perspective looks not to the psychological characteristics of the practitioners involved, nor the power dynamics between medicine and state, but to the competitive social forces at play that threaten the legitimacy of the curative system. Thus holding onto reductionism can be interpreted in terms of the interests of the curative tradition itself with its ongoing struggle for explanatory authority, status, and survival amid a contending sea of possibilities. In sum, although most practitioners within mono-causal systems think in terms of what I have called primary causes, from their practice we infer a reluctance to jettison ideas of first causes. I have stressed this to be particularly the case in certain psychotherapeutic discourses. This reluctance to relinquish the rhetorical device of reductionism, in part, has its origins in the authority reductionism confers. In addition, this authority is evermore needed in a society comprising many disparate traditions all of which are contending to explain and treat the one symptom configuration.
Notes 1
Margaret Lock and Nancy Scheper-Hughes, “A Critical-Interpretive Approach in Medical Anthropology: Rituals and Routines of Discipline and Dissent.” In Handbook of Medical Anthropology, edited by Carolyn F. Sargent and Thomas M. Johnson (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1996), p. 46. 2 Joyce McDougall, Theatres of the Mind (London: Free Association Books, 1996), p. 7. 3 C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 9. 4 An immediate objection here would be that our formulation ignores the fact that Freud accounted for wider social influence by means of his idea
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of superego. See, for example, Charles Rycroft, A Critical Dictionary of Psychoanalysis (London: Penguin, 1968). This objection can be easily met by noting that this concept was restricted in its acknowledgement of social forces: while it might have recognised social mores and how they impacted on psychological dynamics, it did not acknowledge the impact of wider social institutions (economic, political, wider kinship, legal, religious etc.) on psychopathology of individual life. Thus the notion of the superego treated the relevance of social influence only in a limited sense (in the sense that is contains one’s internalised social conscience), not in the sense that it acknowledged the wider influence of social institutions. 5 This comment does not apply to those belonging to what is known as the cultural school. Theorists such as Erich Fromm (1942), Karen Horney (1950), and Harry Stack Sullivan (1953), all tried to integrate into their thinking the sociological perspective – that is, to account for mental distress both in psychological and sociological terms. Jean Miller (1976) is another such theorist who primarily locates the source of in this case women’s distress in an oppressive society – her therapy is about enlightening patients to the social origins of their discontent. 6 As to whether this ignoring is helpful to patients is a matter of some contention, however it might be noted in passing that if internal causality is assumed when external causality is the case, the patient will erroneously assume responsibility for things over which he or she has little control, which in turn might entail effects less curative than harmful. 7 Erich Fromm, Freud’s Mission (New York: Grove Press, 1959). 8 For an example of multi-causality at play I direct the reader to Victor Turner’s (1967) study The Forest of Symbols. This work emphasises in particular the social origins of distress. 9 I am thinking particularly of the psychiatric day-centre at the Warneford Hospital, Oxford, England, where I carried out an observer placement during 2004. 10 These reflections have their basis in the fieldwork I have been conducting among psychotherapeutic and psychiatric communities in London. The data is derived from over 30 informal interviews I conducted between Oct 2003 and Oct 2004. 11 See the extended discussion in Jone Cassell, ‘On Control, Certitude, and the “Paranoia” of Surgeons’, in Culture, Medicine, and Psychiatry. 11(1987): 229-249. 12 It could be objected that with the rise of global industrialisation and modernisation no such ‘homogenous communities’ today exist. I believe such thinking might be overstating the case, for although it is certain that more communities than ever before have access to a selection of different curative options, it is also true that ease of access is not universally shared to the same extent. Middle class individuals living in North London or
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upper Manhattan, will undoubtedly have more curative options open to them than current day members of the Yanamamo of Brazil or the Sambia of Papa New Guinea. However this is not to say members of such groups have no such option, rather we speak of degrees of accessibility. Thus when we speak of homogenous and heterogeneous societies we must admit of referring to ideal types. 13 Tanya Luhrmann, Of Two Minds: The Growing Disorder in American Psychiatry (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000). 14 Thomas Csordas (1990). 15 Writers who has commented on this area are Roy Porter, Madness: a Brief History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) and Edward Shorter, A History of Psychiatry. From the Era of the Asylum to the Age of Prozac (New York: Wiley, 1997). 16 Roy Porter, Madness: A Brief History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 17 The authors I refer to here, and the papers in which their comments can be found are: Thomas Csordas, “Somatic Modes of Attention,” in Cultural Anthropology, 8(2) (1993): 135-156; Arthur Kleinman, Rethinking Psychiatry (New York: Free Press, 1996); Marianne Roseman, Healing Sounds from the Malaysian Rainforest: Temiar Music and Medicine (California: University of California Press, 1991); and, finally, Victor Turner, The Forest of Symbols (London: Cornell University Press, 1967).
Bibliography Cassell, Jone. ‘On Control, Certitude, and the “Paranoia” of Surgeons’, in Culture, Medicine, and Psychiatry. 11(1987): 229-249. Csordas, Thomas. ‘Somatic Modes Anthropology, 8(2) (1993): 135-156.
of
Attention’,
in
Cultural
Dow, James. “Universal aspects of symbolic healing: a theoretical synthesis.” American Anthropologist. 88 (1986) 56-69. Fromm, Erich. The Fear of Freedom. London: Routledge, 1952. Fromm, Erich. Sigmund Freud’s Mission. New York: Grove Press, 1959. Helman, Cecil. Culture, Health, and Illness. London: ButterworthHienman, 1996.
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Horney, Karen. Neurosis and Human Growth: A Struggle Toward SelfNeurosis. New York: Norton, 1955. Kleinman, Auther. Rethinking Psychiatry. New York: Free Press, 1991. Lock, Margaret and Nancy Scheper-Hughes. “The Mindful Body: A Prolegonmenon to Future Work in Medical Anthropology.” Medical Anthropology Quarterly, 1, 1 (1987): 6-41. Lock, Margaret and Nancy Scheper-Hughes, “A Critical-Interpretive Approach in Medical Anthropology: Rituals and Routines of Discipline and Dissent.” In Handbook of Medical Anthropology, edited by Carolyn F. Sargent and Thomas M. Johnson. Westport, Greenwood Press, 1996. Luhrmann, T.M. Of Two Minds: The Growing Disorder in American Psychiatry. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000. McDougall, Joyce. Theatres of the Body. London: Free Association Books, 1996. Miller, Jean Baker. Toward a New Psychology of Women. London: Penguin, 1976. Porter, Roy. Madness: a Brief History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Roseman, Marianne. Healing Sounds from the Malaysian Rainforest: Temiar Music and Medicine. California: University of California Press, 1991. Rycroft, Charles. A Critical Dictionary of Psychoanalysis. London: Penguin, 1968. Shorter, Edward. A History of Psychiatry: From the Era of the Asylum to the Age of Prozac. New York: Wiley, 1997. Sullivan, Harry Stack. The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry. London: Tavistock, 1955. Turner, Victor. The Forest of Symbols. London: Cornell University Press, 1967.
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Note on Contributor James Davies earned his doctorate in social anthropology from the Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology, University of Oxford. He is also a practicing psychotherapist within the NHS in Britain.
The Social Construction of Disease: Why Homosexuality isn’t Like Cancer Matthew McGrattan Abstract In this paper I shall be concerned with what I shall call epistemic constructivism about disease, that is, the view that the belief that a condition is a disease reflects the socially and culturally relative values of a particular society rather than any objective underlying facts. I shall argue that, while arguments proceeding from specific case studies often appear weak, convincing arguments can be made for this constructivist position if understood as a form of inference to the best explanation. However, despite the success of arguments of this type with respect to specific individual conditions such as homosexuality or drapetomania no general conclusions follow. Any such move would need to argue inductively from specific cases to general conclusions about all diseases but would fail as the features which justify the initial inference to best explanation in such cases are absent in the majority of cases. Such features include the presence of socio-historical variation in belief, absence of alternative naturalistic explanations for such variation, lack of consensus about the etiology or pathology of the condition, and so on. I shall conclude that arguments based on case studies fail to support any more general form of constructivism with respect to disease. Keywords: Social construction, disease, induction, inference to the best explanation. 1.
Introduction
There are several major schools of thought concerning normative questions in medicine and psychiatry; concerning the distinction between normality and health on the one hand and abnormality and disease on the other. These schools can be grouped under two main headings which we might label ‘naturalism,’ the view that there are objective natural facts about health norms, and ‘constructivism,’ the view that the norms of health are products of contingent human value judgements. This paper is concerned with one particular form argument, based on case studies, which is invoked in support of the constructivist position. I shall argue that this argument fails as, when the argument is analysed in detail, it rests on certain untenable claims about the degree to which the putative disease conditions described in these cases studies resemble other diseases. I shall
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argue that these case studies only support the view that the particular conditions described, rather than all diseases, are socially constructed. A. Naturalism Naturalists hold that disease states can be defined in objective natural terms that can be specified independently of the value judgements individuals or societies make with respect to a putative disease condition. A number of different naturalist models for disease exist, for example: 1. Patho-morphological: disease can be defined in terms of identifiable changes in body morphology. Xavier Bichat (1777 1802), for example, associated disease with changes in tissue pathology; Rudolf Virchow (1821 - 1902), similarly, associated disease with particular changes in cellular morphology. 2. Teleo-functional: body parts have specific functions determined by the selective history of the lineage of which the organism is part. The evolutionary history of a species determines what counts as, for example, a well-functioning heart or liver and disease can be identified with malfunction. 3. Statistical: diseased individuals are those who deviate from statistically determined population norms. These views are associated with the work of biologically-minded philosophers of science and with the broader biomedical model developed by the “Western” medical sciences since at least the Renaissance. However, by far the largest recent body of literature concerned with the disease-question – i.e. with our understanding of the norms of human function, health and disease – springs neither from philosophy or medicine. Instead, there is a large corpus of work in this area that has been produced by social scientists primarily sociologists and medical anthropologists but also including medical historians and critics of psychiatric medicine influenced by social science perspectives and methodologies. B. Value-centred Approaches This body of literature rejects the view that there are straightforward, objective, historically and culturally universal norms of human functioning. Instead, they claim, the norms of health are socially constructed. According to this view, what counts as disease and what counts as health are historically and culturally relative, subjective and entirely contingent products of social and cultural factors. There are no objective natural facts about disease. Rather disease occurs when some putative condition is identified as being negatively valued either by individuals or by socio-cultural groups. While naturalist approaches are generally more common among medical professionals and philosophers working in the field the value-driven approach is widespread and may
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even be the orthodox position among sociologists and anthropologists working on medicine and psychiatry. Social constructivists adopt a particular value-centred approach arguing that “the physician creates illness just as the lawmaker creates crime ... illness is not biological but social, stemming from current social conceptions of what disease is.”1 A crude way of characterising the constructivist approach would be to say that the values embodied in the beliefs and practices of a particular socio-cultural group are manifested in the distinctions they make between normal and abnormal states. Furthermore, these distinctions in some sense make it the case – through a process of labelling or definition – that a particular state of affairs is normal or abnormal. The social constructivist argues that the boundaries between health and disease, as understood in both medicine and psychiatry are, in some non-trivial sense, created rather than discovered. My concern here will not be to show that constructivism about disease is false, but that one particular widely advanced, empirically driven, argument for constructivism, what we might call the Argument from Case Studies, fails. 2.
Social Constructivism
Ian Hacking has listed over sixty different types of “fact” that have been presented as socially constructed, including “emotions, facts, gender, homosexual culture, illness, literacy, nature, quarks, reality, urban schooling, Zulu Nationalism, deafness, serial homicide, [etc.]”2 This is an extremely heterogeneous list! In what respect can all of these things be said to be socially constructed? Hacking himself identifies several key claims, one theoretical and two “motivational” rather than substantive, which commonly appear in the social constructivist literature. If we consider some hypothetical domain of facts X, the constructivist, according to Hacking, says of X that: 1. X need not have existed or need to be at all as it is. X, or X as it is at present, is not determined by the nature of things, it is not inevitable. 2. X is quite bad as it is, [and] 3. We would be much better off if X were done away with, or at least, radically transformed. It is the first of these claims, the non-inevitability claim, which is central to social constructivism as a theoretical position about the nature of normative distinctions in medicine. Claims about non-inevitability can be read in various ways. If all we have in mind is that X-facts are contingent, rather than necessary, then social constructivism about many phenomena seems trivially true. If, for example, the first proto-humans had all been wiped out by a massive asteroid impact approximately 400,000 years ago
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then it would indeed be true that Zulu Nationalism would not have existed. The existence or otherwise of Zulu Nationalism (and a great many other items on Hacking’s list) is a contingent fact – there are not Zulu Nationalists in all possible worlds. The social constructivist model, however, is not intended merely to point out that certain facts are only contingently true. Rather, the constructivist presents an account of how a particular phenomenon came to be the way it is – or came to be believed to be the way it is – which explains its non-inevitability. According to this view: what we regard as “truth” (which of course varies historically and cross-culturally), i.e. our current accepted ways of understanding the world, is a product not of objective observation of the world, but of the social processes and interactions in which people are constantly engaged with each 4 other. There are a number of levels on which the investigation of scientific, or other apparently factual, areas of discourse can take place. These include, but are not limited to, the following broad categories: 1. Ontological/Metaphysical. What sorts of things exist in the world? What is the nature of their existence? 2. Epistemology and the Sociology of Knowledge. What can we know about the world? To what extent are the truths known (or knowable) in any given society influenced (or determined) by social, economic, political, cultural, and ideological factors? Similar questions hold for any false statements erroneously believed to be true. 3. Individual and social ethics. What ought we to do? What types of treatment should a doctor, for example, provide, or what types of scientific research ought, or ought not, to be carried out? An individual advocating a constructivist position can argue that constructivism is true at any or all of these levels. Constructivism at level three, for example, would amount to an advocacy of some form of moral relativism. Similarly, at level two, it would amount to epistemic relativism, the view that the canons of rationality and of good scientific methodology are not universal. Instead, such canons are viewed as culturally, socially and historically contingent; one possible epistemology among many, and further, that there is no fact of the matter as to which account of warranted belief is the best, or the correct one. A realist about any of these would claim on the one hand that there were genuine (and presumably epistemically accessible) objective
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moral facts and on the other that there were universally applicable common standards of rational warrant and genuine facts about whether a particular belief was known (as well as merely believed) and facts about the appropriate canons of rationality and standards of scientific methodology. It is primarily with constructivism at the first and second level, what we might call metaphysical constructivism and epistemic constructivism, with which this paper is concerned and which we might spell out in more detail as epistemic constructivism and metaphysical constructivism. Epistemic constructivism is the view that the beliefs (or some sub-class of beliefs) prevalent in a society are primarily, or even solely, to be accounted for by referring to social, economic, cultural and ideological factors. Some degree of epistemic constructivism is clearly true. Any explanation of why, for example, communism was much more prevalent in 1950s Leningrad than it was in 1950s Los Angeles will clearly appeal to social and cultural factors rather than, say, to the possibility that each and every member of these social and cultural groups independently assessed – perhaps via a close reading of the works of Marx, Engels and Adam Smith followed by a detailed consideration of moral and pragmatic considerations – the viability of capitalism versus Marxist-Leninism and, by some miraculous coincidence, it simply turned out that all of the communists were located in one place and the capitalists in another. Metaphysical constructivism is the view that facts themselves (or some sub-class of facts) are socially constructed. This is prima facie plausible in some cases. Gender, for example, is one widely cited example of a phenomenon that has been claimed to be a social construction. If, for example, the concept of masculinity in a particular society involves strength, stoicism, relative imperviousness to physical pain, aggression, physical competence, and a relative lack of concern for physical appearance, then it is easy to see how the wide acceptance of this concept might lead us to bring up male children to embody some or all of these virtues. The very fact that the social group within which the child is raised, the child’s parents and the child himself all share the belief that maleness involves all of these features makes it true that the child (and most other male children) comes to be male in this particular historically and culturally specific sense of maleness. It is not just that there is a widespread belief that men are a certain way; it is that the very prevalence of the belief makes the belief true. Constructivism, in this sense, makes a substantive metaphysical as well as epistemological point; it is not just that we seek a socio-cultural explanation for the etiology of beliefs, we seek a socio-cultural explanation for the nature of reality. Both of these senses of social construction can come in local and global forms. The local constructivist perspective might maintain that some particular area of discourse or another is epistemically or metaphysically constructed but also accept that there may be other areas of discourse for which, say, a non-social explanation for the nature of belief
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or for the nature of reality itself, may be appropriate. The global constructivist perspective, on the other hand, is committed to universal constructivism. Every kind of putative fact and every belief about such facts is subject to the same kind of constructivist explanation. Here, I am primarily concerned with local constructivism with respect to standards of disease and health rather than global constructivism (although there are advocates of constructivism with respect to disease who would also advocate a similar global view). 3.
The Social Construction of Disease
Constructivists with respect to disease typically hold that both epistemic and metaphysical constructivism are true of disease and health. Although among those who advocate such a view there is no single, universally accepted model for the social construction of disease and/or illness which commands consensus throughout the literature. Nor is it even the case that all of the literature stems from a single disciplinary tradition. Groups working in this area include sociologists interested in social problems and ‘deviance’, post-modernist or post-structuralist theorists influenced by Foucault, and those working in the field of sociology of scientific knowledge (loosely, in the tradition of the Edinburgh ‘strong programme’). In addition there is also a general antipathy towards naturalist/objectivist accounts of disease (and sympathy towards some type of social construction) in the work of the critics of psychiatric medicine sometimes lumped together as ‘anti-psychiatrists,’ who deny that there are unproblematic, objective mental illnesses in the sense that mainstream psychiatric medicine accepts. While there is no single such model or a single disciplinary tradition, there is a widespread use of case studies to support the constructivist claim. Typically advocates of constructivism about disease argue from epistemic constructivism about disease5 to metaphysical constructivism,6 although it is not always made clear in the literature that there is such a distinction and there can be some equivocation between the two. My concern here is to show that the types of empirically driven arguments given by constructivists for epistemic constructivism about disease (in general) fail. I will not be concerned with demonstrating that constructivism in general is false with respect to disease. Partly because, as will become apparent, I think that some (local) form of epistemic constructivism is true with respect to some specific conditions. Social constructivism about disease is often rapidly dismissed in the more naturalistically inclined literature, not least because at worst the arguments can appear extremely weak – arguing, for example, from the mere presence of variation to the conclusion that the facts are social constructions. Arguments for constructivism typically invoke a contrast with naturalism: if naturalism is false, by extension, constructivism is true. Peter Sedgwick, for example, says:
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Concepts of illness were in use among people for centuries before the advent of any reliable knowledge of the human body, and are still employed today within societies which favour a non-physiological (magical or religious) account of the nature of human maladies … Sickness and disease may be conceptualised, in different cultures, as originating within bodily states, or within perturbations of the spirit, or as a mixture of both.7 And similarly, Vivien Burr draws attention to the fact that: The cultural and historical specificity of biomedicine is also clear ... the biomedical model is one that is not universal ... This [and the rise of alternative medicine in the West] should caution us against the view that our own predominant biomedical view of disease is the right one and all others false. 8 Sedgwick’s point is that the fact that the concept of illness exists in cultures with radically different medical models is supposed to show that it cannot be true, as a matter of conceptual analysis, that illness can be defined as a narrow physiological state as (allegedly) described by Western biomedicine. Similarly, Burr wants to caution against simply accepting the Western biomedical model as correct – it is not the only model out there (and by implication it is no more correct than any other). However, in both cases – prior use and synchronic/diachronic variation – there is confusion here between two completely different phenomena. On the one hand, there is a question about the norms of health and disease and, on the other, there is an entirely different question about how a society explains the etiology and/or pathophysiology of a condition antecedently defined as a disease. It is certainly true that with respect to etiology and nosology there is a wide degree of variation across history and across cultures. For example, Western medicine followed, in some form or another, the Galenic humoral model until the 17th century but no longer does. This model still exists in modified form: as Yunani medicine (which is in part derived from classic medieval Arabic works such as Ibn Sina’s Al-Quanum fi’l-tibb), in the ‘folk’ medical traditions of Pakistan and other Islamic countries, and in the folk medicine of Spanish-speaking Latin America. Elements of the humoral tradition also exist , to a certain extent, in the ‘folk’ concepts of the West – old-fashioned medical advice such as ‘feed a cold, starve a fever’ or the wide-spread, yet false, belief that one catches the common cold from being cold (by venturing outside on a cold day with damp hair, etc.).9 Traditional Chinese medicine still follows a broadly humoral approach, with health consisting in the balance of internal ‘forces’ with each other and with the external environment. Traditional
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Tibetan medicine, driven by a Buddhist conception of the mind-body relationship, tends to interpret physical symptoms as signs of underlying mental conflict (rendering almost all illnesses psycho-somatic), and so reverses the mind-body priorities found in Western medicine, and so on. One could continue on, citing cultures in which illness is caused by gods angered at the transgression of a deeply held tribal taboo, those in which illness is the result of malevolent spells being cast by jealous neighbours, and so on, more or less ad infinitum. Medical anthropology throws up almost as many models of disease and illness as there are cultures. Nevertheless, the constructivist is wrong to suggest that the existence of such varying models for the etiology of illness show that illness cannot be some type of bodily state specifiable in terms of morphology. It is certainly true that such an identification cannot be analytical and if proponents of a morphological model of disease were claiming that such a model was a priori true, as a matter of conceptual analysis, then they would be wrong, and the historical and anthropological data would support the view that they would be wrong. However, the identification of illness with some morphology or other is precisely not a conceptual claim, but rather an a posteriori empirical claim much like the claim that water is H2O. It is normally accepted as uncontroversial that water is in fact H2O even though there was a time when we did not know this was the case. It is still possible to have the concept of water and yet fail to have the concept of H2O and fail to appreciate the truth of the identity claim linking the two. Similarly, advocates of the ‘disease-asmorphology’ view need not worry that there are people who have the concepts of disease and/or illness without sharing the further belief that some identity claim connecting disease or illness with a type of pathophysiological state is true. 4.
Standard Case Studies
Despite these doubts, there does seem to be some substance to the constructivist appeal to the case study. Typically, a slight idealized case study arguing for the social construction of disease proceeds as follows: 1.
A demand for explanation: Attention is drawn to the fact that there is some putative disease condition about which lay and medical opinion varies either synchronically across cultures and/or diachronically across history. Perhaps there has been a sudden increase or decrease in the incidence of a particular diagnosis – think here, for example, of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), which has seen a massive increase in diagnosis over the past forty years. Or perhaps a putative condition's disease-status has altered over time. In this context, a particularly commonly cited example is that of homosexuality which became classified as a disease (rather
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than a ‘moral failing’) during the mid-to-late 19th century and which ceased to be classified as a disease by the American Psychiatric Association in the early 1970s. It is variation of this type that requires explanation. A denial that a factual explanation can be given: It is claimed that there is no available non-social explanation that can be given to explain the synchronic and/or diachronic variation identified above. Often the argument for this point appeals to the apparent invariance (over the time period or cultures in question) of any relevant objective ‘underlying’ facts that might be used to provide such an explanation. In the case of homosexuality, for example, one might argue that little changed about homosexuals or homosexual behaviour over the period from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s in which the definition of homosexuality as a disorder changed. In the case of ADHD, one might argue that there is little evidence that children (and particularly male children) changed physically over the period in which diagnoses of ADHD multiplied exponentially (despite of the fact that it is often claimed that ADHD has a biochemical or neurological etiology). Provision of an alternative social explanation: The social constructivist then advances an alternative social explanation that accounts for the synchronic and diachronic variation described above. Typically such explanations appeal to the way that changing social values are reflected in social definitions of deviance. Such models present deviance as being the outcome of social processes – for example, as arising from the interactions of competing interest groups – and then describe the ways in which certain types of deviance become medicalized. Where medicalization is the general term used in the sociological literature for the process by which a social problem – some condition claimed to be ‘deviant’ by some individual or interest group – becomes defined as a specifically medical problem and adopted as a diagnosis by the medical establishment.
A. ‘Inference to the Best Explanation’ These case studies can best be used to support the claim that disease is a social construction if we understand their structure as presenting an implicit argument in the form of an abductive claim or instance of ‘inference to the best explanation.’ On such an interpretation, the constructivist is arguing that the best available explanation for the patterns of changing diagnostic classification with respect to a condition is that the classificatory beliefs of the medical establishment are not tracking any changes in objective facts, rather they track changing social values
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(because they are in a sense products of them). Such abductive arguments have the following general pattern: A1:
A2: A3: AC:
If the classification of condition C as a disease was the result of socio-culturally relative values then we ought to expect that: a. The disease status (or incidence) of C will vary either over time or across cultures (or both). b. The variation at [a] will appear to track changes in social values. c. No straightforward natural explanation of the variation at [a] will exist. Condition C does in fact exhibit features [a], [b] and [c]. The best explanation for A2 is that the classification of C as a disease is a social construction, therefore: (Probably) C is a social construction.
B. Homosexuality The structure of this argument is rarely if ever made explicit in the literature. Instead, a detailed history is usually provided showing how: 1. the classification of homosexuality as a disease is a culturally and historically local phenomenon specific to Western culture in the period between the late 19th and 20th centuries; 2. that considerable historical variation in the treatment of homosexuality exists both across the world and over time; 3. that the original classification of homosexuality as a disease reflected the increasing tendency in the late 19th century of the medical profession to annex previously difficult moral problems as diseases coinciding with the rise of the biomedical establishment and the replacement of priests in many areas of social life with doctors; 4. that the declassification of homosexuality as a disease in the early 1970s reflected increasing gay-rights activism, growing social tolerance and a decline of traditional religious values, and so on; 5. that no ‘scientific’ non-social explanation can be given for the changes in classification. From such data it is usually concluded that homosexuality was not objectively a disease but rather that the classification of homosexuality as
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a disease is best explained as a socially constructed reflection of social values. 5.
Arguments Against the Constructivist Perspective
Case studies like this can be used to support the view that diagnostic beliefs are socially determined with respect to a specific condition. However, the further claim is then usually made that such case studies support the general epistemic constructivist claim. In order for this general claim to be convincing, some kind of inductive argument would need to hold true: I1
I2 IC
It is the case that the empirical facts with respect to some putative disease support the view that the beliefs of medical professionals and lay people alike reflect changing social values rather than any objective, value-free and/or natural facts and therefore the classification of the alleged disorder as a disease is a social construction. And, that all other diseases are sufficiently similar to these particular individual case studies that we also ought to view these diseases as social constructions.
However, both the facts of the case studies and the inferences drawn from them can be questioned. A. Social Causation and the Role of Environment Individuals do not manifest as diseased independently of the environment in which they live. The incidence of a disorder can be affected by a changing social environment without being constituted by the value-judgements made by the society. Disorders can be socially caused and/or the result of the relationship between an individual and the environment (social, or otherwise) that they are within. The metabolic disorder phenylketonuria (PKU), for example, in the days before routine post-natal testing of newborns, inevitably led to mental retardation, seizures and abnormal growth patterns among other symptoms. This is because people with PKU lack an enzyme which enables them to process the essential amino acid phenylalanine and the ‘hyperphenylalaninemia’ that results has toxic effects. It is the combination of the lack of the enzyme hydroxylase (which breaks down phenylalanine) and the presence of phenylalanine in the dietary environment of the infant that leads to the symptoms. As a result, infants
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who test positive for PKU are treated by dietary management. This has led to an almost total disappearance of the symptoms of PKU from Western societies. But this change does not reflect a decrease in the numbers of phenylketonuric babies being born or in the disease-status of PKU. Rather, controlled changes in the children’s environment prevent the symptoms of the disease manifesting.10 Similarly, some explanations for the rise of ADHD have appealed to the change in social environment within which children exist, including different class-room environments, changes in teaching style and teaching materials. Supporters of ADHD as a diagnosis have claimed that the change in social environment has led to children predisposed to ADHD manifesting symptoms that they would not otherwise have manifested. The constructivist is correct that children have not changed but is incorrect that nothing else has changed. Their environment is different. ADHD, on this account, may be socially caused but its status qua disease is not socially constructed.11 The relationship between social factors and disease incidence can be extremely complex and the constructivist needs to be wary of inferring from the covariance of disease incidence with social factors to the claim that the disease itself is a social construction. As well as straightforward cases of social causation, there can be much more subtle interactions between social phenomena and disease. Men in Western societies, for example, are overwhelmingly more likely to suffer from a number of conditions, including heart disease and cancer but also including accidents and a wide range of other chronic conditions. Some explanations of why this is appeal to the nature of socially constructed gender roles and the connection between the nature of masculinity and the tendency to indulge in high-risk lifestyle behaviour and to make less use of health-care services. In such a case, there is a relationship between a social factor widely agreed to be socially constructed, gender identity, and poor health.12 In a parallel case, some authors have drawn attention to the radically different way that men in Madras understand gender identity and the incidence and treatment of HIV and AIDS. The standard Western model of homosexuality – men who identify as homosexual and who exclusively or primarily have sex with men – does not apply in Madras. Instead among Madras men there are groups who regularly have sex with men (known as ‘panthi’ in the local slang) but who do not identify as homosexual in anything like the Western sense and whose patterns of sexual interaction do not fit comfortably with the Western model, including their use or non-use of contraception, the sexual practices in which they engage, the people with whom they have sex, the likelihood of them contracting HIV and of spreading the virus to women. This has a direct impact on HIV infection rates and on treatment and prevention models since the (socially constructed) gender identity of these men leads them to exhibit very different patterns of sexual behaviour from that
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prevalent in the West (and it is the Western model which has dominated approaches to HIV treatment among men likely to acquire the virus through male-male sexual contact).13 In such cases there is a set of factors widely agreed to be socially constructed (even by many generally sceptical about constructivism in other areas) and where these social factors affect the etiology and prevalence of the diseases under discussion and yet where we would not say that the condition itself was a social construction. B. Alternative Non-social Explanations Even in some of the widely cited constructivist cases, the ‘facts’ are by no means unquestioned. Some members of the APA, and in its own literature, the APA itself, explain the history of the transition from the view that homosexuality is a disease to the removal of homosexuality from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual in terms of the arguments presented to the APA and in the medical literature which appeal to straightforwardly ‘objective’ factual claims. The arguments included evidence produced by the Kinsey Report in the late 1940s and by the National Institute of Mental Health Task Force on Homosexuality in 1969 suggesting that homosexuality is not correlated with diminished well-being or life expectancy, i.e. with increased mortality or morbidity, and that on standard, independently developed, measures of mental health homosexuals are as well-adjusted and content as heterosexuals. Such ‘factual’ claims were marshalled to support the conclusion that homosexuality ought to be declassified.14 Of course the fact that the decision to remove homosexuality from the DSM was taken on a postal ballot of APA members does suggest that something atypical was going on in this case. It is not normally the case that scientific decisions are explicitly taken on a majority vote. Such considerations suggest that the constructivist interpretation of such case studies is not straightforwardly true or universally accepted. The initial premise in the constructivists ‘inductive’ argument is far from established. 6.
Other Problems
The number of diseases which have been examined in this type of investigation is relatively small. The same cases – ADHD, post-traumatic stress disorder, drapetomania, homosexuality, masturbation, menopause, Soviet psychiatric diagnosis of dissidents, schizophrenia in general, and so on – crop up again and again. An inductive argument from a relatively small number of cases to general conclusions covering a vast and highly heterogeneous range of disorders is hardly convincing unless the constructivist can show that in important respects the wider group of disorders are similar to the model constructivist cases.
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A. Behaviour versus Somatic conditions However, such model cases are by no means typical of the vast majority of disorders and consist almost entirely of psychiatric diagnoses and a very small number of disorders associated with ‘life events’ such as menopause, menstruation, or puberty. The definitions of such disorders are almost entirely concerned with behaviour. Furthermore, in almost all of these cases no undisputed etiological or pathological model exists. In almost none of the cases discussed is there widespread agreement with respect to the cause of the disorder. For example, we can contrast ADHD where, as already mentioned, a vast number of competing models exist, with tuberculosis or malaria where the etiology or pathology of the disorder is not disputed. The same problem applies equally to many of the other cases cited; schizophrenia is another disorder where a wide range of competing models exist in the constructivist literature. B. Lack of variation The number of physical (rather than psychiatric or behavioural) conditions where even the presence of variation in the constructivist model holds true is astonishingly small. The Papago Indians of Arizona have historically suffered from high levels of obesity and it has been reported that the Papago norm was such that anyone not verging on clinical obesity was seen as undernourished. Similarly, at least one South American tribe are so widely infected with dyschromic spirochetosis (which causes coloured spots on the skin) that individuals without the characteristic spots are seen as disordered.15 However, with the exception of these two examples (both of which concern relatively mild disorders and where the primary distinction drawn is aesthetic rather than medical) it is extremely difficult to find any other example in the literature where any mildly serious (or worse) physical disorder is classed as a disease by one culture but is not classed as such by another. The classic diseases of the Western biomedical model such as malaria, tuberculosis, ischaemic heart disease, and lung cancer are physical disorders with a widely understood pathophysiology and etiology. Their status as diseases is almost universally undisputed and these examples are rarely addressed in the constructivist literature. C. Reliability and Validity Equally seriously, for the advocate of social construction, many of the disorders on the constructivist list of exemplars are often subject to ‘internal’ criticisms from within the medical sciences. Far from being uncontroversial examples of standard medical practice they are often accused of failing to live up to the internal standards that medicine sets for
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itself. For example, it is a standard expectation that diagnoses ought to be both reliable and valid. Reliability: concerns the consistency with which diagnoses are employed by different clinicians or on different occasions. If two psychiatrists met the same patient, we would expect both to make the same diagnosis. Similarly we would expect a patient to be assigned the same diagnosis on two different occasions... 16 Validity suggests that the diagnostic category is a distinct entity with clearly defined boundaries and that diagnosis should coincide with a stable prognosis and make useful predictions about treatment and outcome. However, in many of the cases used by constructivists, this is not the case. Within the same state in the USA rate of diagnosis of ADHD, for example, can vary by as much as a factor of ten from county to county and between countries diagnosis can vary from as little as 0.5% of children in one country to as much as 17% in another. Similarly the same patients will be diagnosed differently depending on which doctors are carrying out the diagnosis. Criteria for diagnosis can vary across cultures and different medical groups will place different emphasis on particular symptoms, stressing hyperkinesis in one case or stressing inattention or social disruption in another. Comorbidity, the overlapping presence of two or more diagnostic categories, and the possibility that there is no distinct disease entity being measured is also a continual problem with ADHD overlapping with (and possibly not being distinct from) conduct disorder, anxiety disorder and major depression among others. Similarly Bentall’s book-length17 study of psychiatric medicine offers a sustained, comprehensive, and, if accurate, potentially devastating critique of the whole of post-Kraepelinian psychiatric diagnostic classification. The book argues that schizophrenia and major depression fail on both reliability and validity and that the history of psychiatric research on both conditions is riddled with methodological errors and inconsistencies. Bentall is particularly critical of cross-cultural studies that purport to show the ‘universality’ of schizophrenia and the reliability of the diagnosis arguing that in fact the studies are fatally flawed and show nothing of the kind. 7.
Conclusion
The success of the inductive argument from case studies to the general conclusion that diagnostic classification in medicine is socially constructed, relies on both the success of the individual case studies and the similarity between the disorders studied in these cases and disease in general. However, it is by no means clear that facts in all of the case studies are how they are represented in the constructivist literature nor is it the case that, even if we grant the basic facts, that the constructivist
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conclusion follows. The best explanation in some cases is simply not that the beliefs of the medical profession about the disorder in question were determined purely by social values. Even if we grant (and I am prepared to do so in some cases) that the constructivist is correct and that some diseases are social constructions the general case does not follow. The constructivist cases are highly atypical. First, they concern primarily psychiatric and behavioural disorders which do not resemble the bulk of the disorders with which medicine is concerned. Secondly, there is little evidence that the kind of story told in the case studies with respect to the process of medicalization has been mirrored in the history or anthropology of physical illness. With the exception of a tiny number of non-serious disorders – dyschromic spirechetosis, for example – it is simply not the case that any widespread variation exists with respect to the disease status of such conditions. Nor is it the case that there is any evidence that physical diseases have gone through the same social process – identification of deviance, the interaction of competing interest groups, consolidation and entrenchment, and so on – identified in the sociology of medicalization. Finally, the cases studied are not even agreed to be examples of good medical practice by the medical establishment, because they fail, regularly, to live up to minimal standards of reliability, validity and so on. It simply does not follow from an examination of a small number of atypical, methodologically suspect, ‘conflictual’ diagnoses where, contrary to the medicalization model, the diagnoses are in fact rarely settled and where continuing controversy exists with respect to almost all of them – that the conclusions drawn apply to a much larger number of entirely different conditions. Of course, most of what I have argued does not touch on the metaphysical claim – that there are no disease norms and all norms of health and disease are social constructions – except to suggest that much of the evidence adduced in support of this view does not provide the support claimed. The onus now is on the proponent of social constructivism with respect to disease to provide us with an explicit argument for metaphysical social constructivism that does not appeal to precisely the type of inductive generalisation from case studies which, as I have argued above, must fail. With respect to the role case studies can play in the understanding of our concept of disease, homosexuality is just not like cancer.
Notes 1. Eliot Freidson, Profession of Medicine: A study of the sociology of applied knowledge, (New York: Dodd Mead, 1970) 2 Hacking’s list is drawn from a quick survey of papers or books with the titles “The Social Construction of X” or “Constructing X”.
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3. Ian Hacking, The Social Construction of What?, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999) 4. Vivien Burr, An Introduction to Social Constructionism, (London: Routledge, 1995). 5. The view that the judgements made by medical professionals and laypeople that some putative condition is a disease are the product of contingent, socio-culturally and historical relative, values. 6. The view that disease itself – rather than just beliefs about disease – is the product of the same contingent, socio-culturally and historical relative, values. 7. Peter Sedgwick, Psycho Politics, (London: Pluto, 1982) 8. Burr, An Introduction to Social Constructionism. 9. As opposed to catching the cold from infection by any one a vast number of viruses including rhinoviruses, coronaviruses and adenoviruses. 10. Susanne Schweitzer-Krantz and Peter Burgard, “Survey of national guidelines for the treatment of phenylketonuria,” European Journal of Pediatrics 39 (2000): S70 - S73. 11. I should note that in citing this particular explanation of the massive increase in ADHD I am not endorsing it. Timmimi, in his book on ADHD, lists literally dozens of alternate competing explanations for the changing incidence and status of ADHD of which this is only one. Timmimi, Pathological child psychiatry and the medicalization of childhood, (Hove: Brunner-Routledge, 2002). 12. William H. Courtenay, “Constructions of masculinity and their influence on men's well-being: a theory of gender and health,” Social Science and Medicine, 50 (2000): 1385-1401. 13. Sheena Asthana and Robert Oostvogels, “The social construction of male ‘homosexuality’ in India: implications for HIV transmission and prevention,” Social Science and Medicine, 52 (2001): 707-721. 14. See, for example, The American Psychological Association, Fact Sheet, Answers to Your Questions About Sexual Orientation and Homosexuality, (Washington, D.C.: APA Office of Public Affairs, 1998), Ken Hausman, “Pioneering Psychiatrist, Psychoanalyst Judd Marmor Dies at Age 93”, Psychiatric News 39 (2004): 2, and Lynne Lamberg, “Gay Is Okay With APA--Forum Honors Landmark 1973 Events,” Journal of the American Medical Association, 280 (1998):497 – 499. 15. Both of these cases cited in Peter Conrad and Joseph Schneider, Deviance and Medicalization: From Badness to Sickness, (St. Louis: Mosby, 1980). 16. Richard Bentall, Madness Explained: Psychosis and Human Nature, (London: Allen Lane, 2003). 17. Ibid.
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Bibliography American Psychological Association. Answers to Your Questions About Sexual Orientation and Homosexuality. Washington, D.C.: APA Office of Public Affairs, 1998. Asthana, Sheena and Oostvogels, Robert. “The social construction of male ‘homosexuality’ in India: implications for HIV transmission and prevention.” Social Science and Medicine, 52 (2001): 707-721. Bentall, Richard. Madness Explained: Psychosis and Human Nature. Allen Lane: London, 2003. Burr, Vivien. An Introduction to Social Constructionism. Routledge: London, 1995. Conrad, Peter and Schneider, Joseph. Deviance and Medicalization: From Badness to Sickness. St. Louis: Mosby, 1980. Courtenay, William H. “Constructions of Masculinity and their Influence on Men’s Well-being: a Theory of Gender and Health.” Social Science and Medicine, 50 (2000): 1385 – 1401 Freidson, Eliot. Profession of Medicine: A Study of the Sociology of Applied Knowledge. New York: Dodd Mead, 1970. Hausman, Ken. “Pioneering Psychiatrist, Psychoanalyst Judd Marmor Dies at Age 93.” Psychiatric News 39 (2004): 2 Hacking, Ian. The Social Construction of What?. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999. Lamberg, Lynne. “Gay Is Okay With APA – Forum Honors Landmark 1973 Events.” Journal of the American Medical Association 280 (1998): 497-499. Schweitzer-Krantz, Susanne and Burgard, Peter. “Survey of national guidelines for the treatment of phenylketonuria.” European Journal of Pediatrics 39 (2000): S70 - S73. Sedgwick, Peter. Psycho Politics. London: Pluto, 1982. Timimi, Sam. Pathological child psychiatry and the medicalization of childhood, Hove: Brunner-Routledge, 2002.
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Note on Contributor Matthew McGrattan completed his undergraduate M.A.(Hons) in Philosophy at Glasgow University in 1996 and the B.Phil in Philosophy at Oxford University in 2000. He currently works for the Museum for the History of Science in Oxford and is completing a D.Phil in the Philosophy of Science writing on ‘The Concepts of Disease and Health.’
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Green Fingers or Pink Viagra? Female Sexual Dysfunction and Medicalisation in Contemporary Medical Discourse Katherine Angel Abstract Recent attempts to reclassify female sexual problems have generated considerable media interest, an interest entangled with the success of Viagra for male sexual problems. The medical and public debate about Female Sexual Dysfunction (FSD) opens a window onto cultural anxieties about appropriate causal frameworks for understanding sexual problems, specifically about the ontological status of conditions potentially stemming from psychological and social causes. A 1998 report on FSD sees the manoeuvring of a coalition of disciplines emphasising biological psychiatry’s affinity with scientific medicine, and distancing current work on sexual dysfunctions from psychodynamic psychiatry. The report reveals discomfort with the troubling relationship between the medical, psychiatric, psychological and social; and this negotiation of disciplinary affiliations mirrors anxieties about the ontology these various disciplines endorse. I suggest that the generation and sustaining of theoretical frameworks for medicine, common to the discipline and its cultural context, can be usefully studied in the case of contemporary controversy over the causation of sexual dysfunctions. The history of medicine’s emphasis on the production of medical knowledge and practice needs to incorporate scrutiny of the discursive production of causal frameworks both within medicine and the culture of which it is born. Keywords: Female Sexual Dysfunction, DSM, medicalisation, Viagra, medical ontology, biological psychiatry. 1.
Introduction
In January 2003, Ray Moynihan wrote an article in the British Medical Journal called “The making of a disease: female sexual dysfunction.” He claimed that “a cohort of researchers with close ties to drug companies,” encouraged by the success of Viagra, was working with colleagues in the pharmaceutical industry to develop and define a new category of human illness at meetings heavily sponsored by companies racing to develop new drugs.
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In conversation with Irwin Goldstein, a professor of urology and gynaecology at Boston University School of Medicine, and a prominent figure in recent efforts to reclassify female sexual problems, Moynihan asked about criticisms that sexual problems may not be best dealt with by doctors. Goldstein replied: “Who’s best equipped to deal with [them]? The horticulturists?” And when asked whether marketing campaigns can privilege certain views of sexual difficulties and promote some therapies over others, Goldstein said “I’m an academic clinical doctor. That’s a question for some philosopher.” 1 Who is equipped to deal with sexual dysfunctions is a core question in the debate about female sexual dysfunction (FSD) 2 ; pills, surgical interventions, talking therapies, and even a particularly intimate horticulture – Masters and Johnson’s sex therapy – have all been invoked in their treatment. What counts as an appropriate intervention, however, hinges on views of what sort of things sexual dysfunctions are and what sorts of things cause them. And the debate about FSD reveals an interesting node of anxieties about the kinds of causes that can be part of a scientific medicine – anxieties that I shall discuss here. 2.
Viagra
Sildenafil citrate, approved in 1998 and sold by Pfizer as Viagra, was the first non-invasive, non-surgical, oral medical treatment for impotence, or erectile dysfunction as it is now more commonly called (I shall henceforth refer to it as ED). 3 It soon became the most commercially successful clinical drug on record, with, according to Pfizer, about sixteen million men around the world receiving it, and nine tablets dispensed every second worldwide. 4 The advent of Viagra led to praise for the destigmatisation of a widespread problem, concern about its effects on both the male and female sexual script 5 , and debate about its economic ramifications. The UK government in 1999 advised the restriction of NHS prescriptions to men with ED arising from one of a range of specified physical causes (including prostate cancer, spinal cord injury, and Multiple Sclerosis). Men with ED “of psychological origin” would be excluded, although exception might be made for those “who are caused severe distress by impotence”, and private prescriptions would be possible, though expensive. 6 The question of the causation of ED thus became acutely relevant to treatment availability, and any stigma already attached to “psychogenic” impotence may well have been exacerbated. 3.
The Consensus Report
The location of sexual problems within psychiatric jurisdiction stems partly from the psychoanalytic influence on 20th century American
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psychiatry, but, more deeply, from the mutually entangled development of psychiatry, sexology and criminology in the last quarter of the 19th century. 7 The current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM IV) categorises sexual problems into problems with sexual desire (hypoactive sexual desire disorder and sexual aversion disorder), sexual arousal (female sexual arousal disorder and male erectile disorder), orgasm (female orgasmic disorder, male orgasmic disorder, premature ejaculation) and problems of sexual pain (dyspareunia, vaginismus) as well as sexual dysfunction due to a general medical condition, and substance-induced sexual dysfunction. 8 Recent efforts to revise these categories, however, have attracted considerable media attention. Alongside the development of research into ED, increased attention turned in the 1990s to female sexual problems, and the potential effects of Viagra on them. 9 The first International Consensus Development Conference on Female Sexual Dysfunction, convened by the Sexual Function Health Council of the American Foundation for Urologic Disease and the International Society of Impotence Research, was held in October 1998, its report published in the Journal of Urology in March 2000. 10 The Basson report, as I shall now refer to it (Rosemary Basson was the first and corresponding author) was written by nineteen authors from departments of urology, biostatistics, psychiatry, obstetrics and gynaecology, marital and sexual health, and psychology – though with practitioners in psychiatry and urology dominating. It claims that a “major barrier to the development of clinical research and practice has been the absence of a well-defined, broadly accepted diagnostic framework and classification for female sexual dysfunction;” the conference thus sought to outline a framework for female sexual dysfunction “that would include psychogenic and organically based disorders” and be applicable in medical and mental health settings, given that the DSM was not “intended to be used for classification of organic causes of female sexual dysfunctions.” 11 And yet, while it makes some significant and interesting changes to the classifications – hypoactive sexual desire was broadened to include a lack of receptivity to sexual activity; sexual arousal disorder was expanded to incorporate non-genital and subjective definitions of arousal; a new category of non-coital sexual pain disorder was added; and a personal distress criterion was included for all categories – the Basson report preserves the basic structure of the DSM classification. The high prevalence of FSD is heavily emphasised by the Basson report; it cites a rate of 43%, a figure derived from a study by Laumann et al. 12 This article – which involved a reanalysis of a slice of data from the National Health and Social Life Survey conducted in 1992 and published in 1994 13 – emphasises considerable contextual, psychological and social associations with sexual problems. 14 The authors emphasise the “salience of emotional distress on sexual dysfunction” and the ways in which
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“psychosocial disturbances affect sexual functioning,” 15 phenomena which are, however, rarely mentioned alongside the ubiquitous citation of the 43% statistic both in the medical and the lay media. 16 Moreover, despite the fact that Laumann et al. caution that their findings are “not equivalent to clinical diagnosis,” 17 invocations of the 43% statistic are rarely qualified; the Basson report concedes that the study “did not include a detailed clinical evaluation” but nonetheless repeats the statistic, without qualification, several times. 18 It also makes claims about specific forms of dysfunction on the basis of the Laumann article and the National Health and Social Life Survey from which the article is derived. Whether Laumann et al.’s claims are accurate, and whatever the motivations for the reanalysed data, 19 the effect of these repeated omissions and emphases is that a network of citations is built up in the literature, reinforcing the 43% claim, which conveys a misleading impression of consensus and factualness about prevalence. They also fail to communicate the variety of kinds of sexual problems experienced. Furthermore, they reveal a reluctance to think about psychological and social factors as correlates, or perhaps even causes, of sexual problems, thus entrenching a prior emphasis on narrow physiological causes. These potential factors are successfully obscured by a reemphasis on mechanical causes modelling itself on the rhetoric on ED: an oft-repeated mantra about ED emphasised that while cases were, until recently, attributed to emotional problems, “experts” now agree that the vast majority “have a physical basis.” 20 There are important issues here regarding the male sexual script especially, with the enthusiasm for organic explanations of ED possibly related to an assumption of personal and gender failure in cases of psychosexual difficulties. But it is also related to concerns with the troubling ontological status of illnesses stemming from psychological causes, concerns which we shall explore further below. 4.
Medicalisation and Anti-Medicalisation
The critique of medicalisation has a complex history, as well as a remarkable contemporary currency. 21 Zola provided a classic description of medicalisation as a process “whereby more and more of everyday life has come under medical dominion, influence and supervision.” 22 A multiplicity of concerns – with social control, diminishing individual autonomy, industry interests, and the need for, and safety of, technological treatments – are subsumed under the medicalisation critique. But the core concept of medicalisation is expressed by Kawachi and Conrad’s definition of it as a process “by which non-medical problems become defined and treated as medical problems, usually in terms of illnesses and disorders.” 23 Thus problems that are a normal and inevitable part of life, including those of a personal, social, political, or economic nature, or
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problems which are essentially risks, are being inappropriately transformed into medical problems or diseases requiring intensive medical scrutiny and technological intervention. 24 While the transformation claim arguably depends on an understanding of the distinction between disease and non-disease, and thus on an adequate definition of disease, notoriously hard to come by, 25 my concern here is to look at the wider ontological anxieties revealed by the medicalisation critique. 5.
Female Sexual Dysfunction and Medicalisation
Moynihan’s article with which I opened this paper problematises the category of “female sexual dysfunction.” It suggests that there may be more at work, causally, than recent classifications of FSD allow; that psychological and social experiences can affect our physical functioning; and that we should scrutinise the cultural, social, and economic influences on, and ramifications of, categorising problems as diseases. Thus many critics of the medicalisation of FSD question the identification of problems in sexual lives as dysfunctions, disorders, or diseases, especially when such problems are often associated with relationship difficulties, fatigue, stress, and socioeconomic problems rendering lack of sexual interest or response understandable and even adaptive. 26 The response to Moynihan’s article, both in the BMJ and in the wider medical and lay press, was heated. 27 A nurse therapist wrote that FSD is not a “new, pharmaceutically manufactured condition” and objected to the charge that practitioners are “only treating ‘social disorders.’” 28 A private consultant wrote that Moynihan’s article “trivializes the real suffering experienced by millions of women.” 29 And a patient wrote that women are “effectively silenced by the constant response that it is psychological (i.e. that [they are] imagining it).” 30 And yet nothing Moynihan claimed entails the view that the symptoms experienced by patients are not real, not physical, not important, not distressing, and not in need of treatment. These responses to the medicalisation critique reveal some interesting assumptions about the kind of entities admissible in an adequately scientific medicine. One assumption is that psychological factors can have no causal agency; another is that to emphasise psychological and social influences on our functioning, and indeed on medical classification, is to deny the physical reality of a condition. This excursion into the “non-physical” is thought to constitute an excursion into the non-real, since a condition’s reality is thought to be guaranteed only by the existence of a physical cause. Another assumption is that if a technological treatment of an illness exists, this treatment vindicates the “reality” and physical causation of the condition. That medical treatment and complex, psychosocial causation are seen as mutually exclusive is
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indicated in Richard Taylor Segraves’s statement that “the recent interest in biological treatment for female sexual dysfunction has emphasised the need for a system to classify organogenic sexual disorders.” 31 One could, by means of an explanation for these assumptions, invoke the historical fragility of the scientific status of sex research, wherein the emphasis on mechanical physiology provides a means to bring sexology into the scientific fold. The fragility of fields such as sexology and psychiatry, that is, might produce this emphasis on the exclusively ‘physical’. But this too is an aspect of a wider anxiety about preserving medicine’s hard-won status as a scientific endeavour, potentially endangered by the introduction of causal entities whose physical presence and agency is seen as dubious. What is more, these troubles besiege less “fragile” disciplines, surfacing in disputes regarding the immune system, peptic ulcers, and cancer, for example. The desire to limit causal explanations to ones involving physical causes (understood as excluding the psychological, the social, the contextual or relational) manifests itself in various sites of the FSD debate. One is the rhetoric employed about sex, represented as wholly separate from the context, relations, and lives in which it is embedded. The phenomena of diagnostic overlap in female sexual problems, and the complexity of female sexuality, are thus presented as puzzles leading to a methodological impasse. 32 Another is the discourse regarding the position of scientific medicine with respect to psychiatry, to which I now turn. 6.
Lack of Medicalisation
Feelings about the relation between medicine and psychiatry can be gleaned from statements in the medical literature about the medicalisation of sexual problems. The Basson report states that “[l]ess attention has been paid to the sexual problems of women.” 33 And John Bancroft claims that the “medicalization of sexuality has been largely restricted to the male.” 34 I shall not go into the substantial evidence against such claims here, save to note that they overlook a ubiquity of discourses in which proper sexual functioning is seen as key to individual as well as social health and order. 35 I shall point out, though, that one might be tempted to make these claims because much of the discourse about female sexuality has occurred within psychiatry and psychology, and within the psychoanalytic and psychodynamic disciplines that flowered between the 1920s and 1960s especially. But brushing aside swathes of sexuality study on these grounds assumes, both with respect to contemporary medicine and historically, that anything that is psychological or psychiatric is thereby not medical. And the question of the relationship between medicine and psychiatry is precisely the question which the debate about FSD reveals to be so problematic.
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That the Basson report can take this stance on medicalisation reveals the extent to which it forms an assertion of a particular etiological, therapeutic and disciplinary ownership of sexual problems – namely that of scientific medicine – to be contrasted with psychiatry and the murky world of sex therapy. The report can be read as an attempt to relocate female sexual problems within the field of medicine “proper” and not the troubled lands of psychiatry, represented as problematic, marginal and unclear. One psychiatrist, for example, writes that the new classification removes female sexual problems “from the realm of primarily psychiatric disorders … thereby bringing it into the mainstream of research and treatment.” 36 7.
The DSM and Sexual Problems
The Basson report queries the location of sexual problems in a psychiatric manual; it claims that the DSM-IV was developed “to provide nomenclature for mental conditions” and is “limited to consideration of psychiatric disorders”; a “diagnostic system that is applicable in medical and mental health settings is needed.” 37 Likewise, Sandra Leiblum writes that the definitions of sexual dysfunction in DSM-IV tend to be more useful to mental health practitioners than medical practitioners, since disorders [in the DSM] are viewed as psychosomatic in etiology – those due exclusively to a medical condition are relegated to a separate diagnostic entity, namely ‘sexual dysfunction due to a general medical condition.’ 38 These claims about the DSM are, however, belied by the revision of the DSM for its third edition in 1980. Its architects, and especially the very influential Robert Spitzer, aimed to distance psychiatry from psychodynamism; to redress psychiatry’s increasingly dubious status in the eyes of the medical profession and the wider culture; to reposition the discipline as biological psychiatry; and to rehabilitate a Kraepelinian model of psychiatry. 39 Spitzer saw the manual as representing an advance “toward the fulfilment of the scientific aspirations of the professions,” indicating an emergent professional consensus over procedures that “would eliminate the disarray that has characterized psychiatric diagnoses.” 40 The prime movers in these efforts quite explicitly committed themselves to the view that there is a clear boundary between the normal and the sick; that there are discrete mental illnesses; and that the focus “of psychiatric physicians should be particularly on the biological aspects of mental illness.” 41 What is more, representatives of a psychodynamic perspective were marginalised and alienated in the consensus processes. 42
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The DSM-III, in its aim to produce a “medical nomenclature” that would be common to all clinicians and researchers regardless of theoretical orientation, committed itself to etiological neutrality, invoking its methodological innovations, such as the multiaxial system, as proof of its all-embracing biopsychosocial perspective. 43 But this etiological neutrality dealt a blow to one of the central tenets of American psychiatry before 1980 – that the discipline was to identify and treat causes, not merely symptoms. And it is thoroughly amenable not only to the media (typically wary of complex, multifactorial disease narratives) but also to institutions with vested interests in marginalising the psychological, social, and contextual factors in disease. Pharmaceutical companies found no resistance in the DSM-III, and will have found even less in the Basson report, which states, for instance, that it may be useful “to develop a classification system for female sexual dysfunction that would parallel the clinical and basic science developments for men,” which have emphasised “organic causes and physical determinants for erectile dysfunction.” 44 The Basson report’s casting of the DSM as psychodynamic must therefore be seen as serving a particular rhetorical function. That the report stakes a proprietary claim to female sexual dysfunction, but on condition of its representation as a strictly medical disorder, undermines the efforts of DSM-III to represent psychiatry as unproblematically part of scientific medicine. This assertion of a physiological and pharmacological framework for sexual problems is not only an index of disciplinary expansionism (and by this I do not mean the expansion of a particular discipline such as urology, for instance, but rather of a range of disciplines all seeking shelter under the banner of a respectable, scientific biomedicine); it connotes an ongoing confusion about the relationship between the medical, the psychiatric, the psychological and the social, as well as illustrating the different connotations of these terms in different mouths. As Goldstein says, “I love psychologists, but they don’t deal with evidence.” 45
8.
Conclusion
Various tools are relevant in thinking about the ontological preferences and anxieties in representations of sexual problems – for instance, the role of the media in shaping discourse about medical causes; the impact of professional and disciplinary organisation on theoretical thinking in medicine; and the ramifications of academic-industrial collaboration. Important work on the impact of increasing privatisation and commercialisation of biomedical research, and the moral economies of academic scientists and pharmaceutical companies, is also crucial. 46 And yet I want to suggest that in the case of female sexual dysfunction at the very least, there is a need for a focus on the production of causal
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frameworks by medical discourse, and on a culture’s theoretical thinking about medicine. The disciplinary and productive power of medical discourse not only produces bodies, individuals and desires but also produces objects, such as appropriately scientific causes, available for theorising and experience by participants in a medical culture. We need, therefore, to scrutinise the voicing of epistemological and ontological commitments in medicine, a voicing which, reflecting wider cultural assumptions about medical objects, serves to produce and reinforce individual and cultural scripts about them. An arena where such an analysis would be fruitful is that relating to the workings of associations between ideals of specific causes, specific conditions and specific drugs. FSD is cast, by its new advocates, as a unitary, monolithic disorder with, hopefully, a common pathophysiology upon which a specific drug can act. This tendency is arguably related to the greater ease in marketing a drug for a condition understood as unitary, rather than one seen as fragmented into complex parts. Subtypes of a condition may involve different causal processes which do not necessarily all respond to the same drug. There may, then, be considerable motivations for blurring all (physical) causal factors into one unitary pathophysiological process. Drugs not working on a universal causal process might not work on every instance of FSD, and may even work on non-cases of FSD. Their medical cachet would then be undermined, since specificity of action has become the hallmark of a medical drug. Interestingly, in the FSD debate and elsewhere, a treatment acting on a particular cause tends to be seen as revealing the cause of the condition in question, an inference that betrays the preference for single causes. It also serves to distance the unpalatable prospect of “lifestyle drugs.” Just as Ritalin’s success in enhancing focus and concentration in individuals not diagnosed with ADHD, and its desirability on the black market, provoked consternation, so the use of Viagra by men without sexual problems, as an enhancer of normal function, and as another pill to pop in nightclubs, has raised troubling questions. The fear is that these drugs slide towards being non-medical promises of well-being sold in kooky health shops, and indeed become akin to recreational and illegal drugs. Moreover, while Ritalin threatens to become the legal cocaine of overworked adults and underachieving kids, Viagra presents an exacerbating problem in threatening to reveal itself as a sex toy, a sex aid, or an aphrodisiac. The marketing of drugs for sexual problems sits within a tradition of representing sexual technologies, at risk of a dubious status, as medical technologies unlikely to threaten traditional moral and behavioural norms. 47 The threat that sexual technologies pose to the ideal of a medical magic bullet also emanates from the discourse of self-
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fulfilment that tends to recur in the domain of sexuality; 48 and the popular rhetoric about sex as the expression of the inner core of ourselves, whose repression can lead to physical, mental and social disorder, has a long history. 49 These discourses of self-fulfilment in relation to sex threaten to cast drugs as enhancement technologies, through which individual pleasures triumph over the social and familial containment of sexuality. These are merely preliminary observations regarding the cultural contexts in which ontological assumptions about medicine operate. I hope, however, to have given a sense of the potential rewards to be had in scrutinising the etiological assumptions circulated between various stakeholders in medical culture. The individual and cultural scripts about appropriate ontologies in medicine reinforce and shape one another even through the cacophony of controversy, and are both expressed and moulded by the pharmaceutical pursuit of magic bullets – revealing and contextualising, in the case of FSD, a tendency to represent physiological ills and pharmacological solutions as natural bed-fellows, and to emphasise the virtue of little blue pills over that of green fingers in the realm of sexual problems.
Notes 1
Ray Moynihan, “The Making of a Disease: Female Sexual Dysfunction,” British Medical Journal 326 (2003): 45-47. 2 I use the term “FSD” for convenience, not to indicate a position on the question of the category’s validity. 3 Before the introduction of Viagra, penile implants, vacuum pumps, and urethral suppositories were used to treat ED; these are still used if Viagra is unsuccessful. Three other Viagra-like drugs – which increase blood flow to the penis – are now on the market, with a fourth drug, apomorphine (a dopamine agonist) acting centrally. 4 http://www.viagra.com/consumer/aboutViagra/index.asp (accessed 12 October 2004). 5 On sexual scripts, see John Gagnon, Human Sexualities (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1977). 6 Gavin Yamey, “End Restrictions on Prescribing Viagra, Urges Coalition,” British Medical Journal 322 (2001): 385; UK Department of Health Press Release, “Impotence Consultation – Dobson Announces Final Decision,” 7 May 1999. 7 See Lucy Bland and Laura L. Doan (eds.), Sexology Uncensored: the Documents of Sexual Science (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998). For the relationship between the nineteenth century’s “avalanche of numbers” and its “invention of normalcy” see Ian Hacking, The Taming of Chance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
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American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.) (Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association, 1994). 9 Pfizer in fact announced in February 2004 that it was abandoning trials on Viagra as a means to improve female sexual problems, turning instead to drugs affecting brain chemistry. See Gardiner Harris, “Pfizer Gives Up Testing Viagra on Women,” New York Times, 28 February 2004. 10 Rosemary Basson et al., “Report of the International Consensus Development Conference on Female Sexual Dysfunction: Definitions and Classifications,” Journal of Urology 163 (2000): 888-893, reprinted in Journal of Sex and Marital Therapy 27 (2001): 83-94. The page numbers henceforth refer to the latter publication. 11 Basson et al., 84-85. 12 Edward O. Laumann et al., “Sexual Dysfunction in the United States: Prevalence and Predictors,” Journal of the American Medical Association 281 (1999): 538-544. 13 Edward O. Laumann et al., The Social Organization of Sexuality: Sexual Practices in the United States (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1994). 14 Amongst others, between educational attainment, stress and forced sexual contact on the one hand, and various kinds of sexual dysfunction on the other; Laumann et al., 1994, 540-544. 15 Laumann et al., 1999, 543. 16 See for example Jennifer Berman et al., “Female Sexual Dysfunction: Incidence, Pathophysiology, Evaluation, and Treatment Options,” Urology 54 (1999): 385-391; Jennifer Berman et al., “Effect of Sildenafil on Subjective and Physiological Parameters of the Female Sexual Response in Women with Sexual Arousal Disorder,” Journal of Sex and Marital Therapy 27 (2001): 411-420; R. Cooke, “There’s gold in them thar pills,” Observer, 27 October 2002. 17 Laumann et al., 1999, 541. 18 Basson et al., 83-90. 19 It became clear that Laumann et al. worked for Pfizer and other pharmaceutical companies – circumstances originally omitted in publication; though this is unremarkable in itself, it is possible that there were marketing incentives, post-Viagra, to republicise the original data, given the potential for invocation of its statistics. 20 For example J. Brody, “Personal Health,” New York Times, 12 August 1988, sec. B, p. 4, quoted in Leonore Tiefer, Sex Is Not a Natural Act and Other Essays (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995), 162. 21 Some classic formulations of the orthodox critique include Thomas Szasz, The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct (London: Secker & Warburg, 1962); Ivan Illich, Medical Nemesis: The Expropriation of Health (London: Calder and Boyars, 1975); Peter Conrad and Joseph W. Schneider, Deviance and
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Medicalization: From Badness to Sickness (St Louis: Mosby, 1980). For the Foucauldian critique, see Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (New York: Pantheon, 1965); idem, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception (London: Tavistock, 1973); Alan Petersen and Robin Bunton (eds.), Foucault: Health and Medicine (London: Routledge, 1997); David Armstrong, Political Anatomy of the Body: Medical Knowledge in Britain in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). For the contemporary discussion, witness the profusion of media discourse regarding Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, Gulf War Syndrome, Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, and the increasingly controversial SSRIs. See also the BMJ’s themed edition: “Too Much Medicine?” British Medical Journal 324 (13 April 2002): 859-526. 22 Irving Kenneth Zola, Socio-medical Inquiries: Recollections, Reflections, and Reconsiderations (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983), 295. 23 I. Kawachi and Peter Conrad, “Medicalisation and the Pharmacological Treatment of Blood Pressure,” in Contested Ground: Public Purpose and Private Interests in the Regulation of Prescription Drugs, ed. Peter Davis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 26-41. 24 Examples include social anxiety disorder, menopause, pre-menstrual dysphoric disorder, post-war and post-trauma syndromes, ADHD, obesity, osteoporosis, and high blood pressure. See Richard J. DeGrandpre, Ritalin Nation: Rapid-Fire Culture and the Transformation of Human Consciousness (New York: Norton, 1999); Margaret Lock, Encounters with Aging: Mythologies of Menopause in Japan and North America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Lynn Payer, Diseasemongers: How Doctors, Drug Companies, and Insurers are Making You Feel Sick (New York: Wiley, 1992). 25 See James M. Humber and Robert F. Almeder (eds.), What Is Disease? (Totowa, NJ: Humana Press, 1997), and Ron Amundson, “Against Normal Function,” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 31 (2000): 33-53. 26 John Bancroft et al. “Conceptualizing Women’s Sexual Problems,” Journal of Sex and Marital Therapy 27 (2001): 95-103; John Bancroft, “The Medicalization of Female Sexual Dysfunction: the Need for Caution,” Archives of Sexual Behavior 31 (2002): 451-455. 27 See for instance CBC News, “Article suggests ‘female sexual dysfunction’ created to sell drugs,” 3 January 2003, (13 October 2004), http://www.cbc.ca/stories/2003/01/03/Consumers/qfemale_sex030103; BBC News Online, “Myth of female impotence ‘created,’” 3 January 2003, (13 October 2004), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/2621705.stm. 28 Edna M. Astbury-Ward, “Re: Enhancing Relationships is a Joke,” bmj.com 2003
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http://bmj/bmjjournals.com/cgi/eletters/326/7379/45#28401 (20 January 2004). 29 David M. Ferguson, “Trivialization of a Disease,” bmj.com 2003 http://bmj.bmjjournals.com/cgi/eletters/326/7379/45#28521 (20 January 2004). 30 Pauline Lewis, “Conspiracy of Silence Hinders Understanding,” bmj.com 2003 http://bmj.bmjjournals.com/cgi/eletters/326/7379/45#28412 (20 January 2004). 31 Richard Taylor Segraves, “Editor’s comments,” Journal of Sex and Marital Therapy 27 (2001): 81. 32 See Basson et al., 88; Sandra R. Leiblum, “Critical Overview of the New Consensus-based Definitions and Classification of Female Sexual Dysfunction,” Journal of Sex and Marital Therapy, 27 (2001): 159-168, 161; Bancroft et al., 2001, 99; Rosemary Basson, “Are the complexities of Women’s Sexual Function Reflected in the New Consensus Definitions of Dysfunction?” Journal of Sex and Marital Therapy 27 (2001): 105-112. 33 Basson et al., 83. 34 Bancroft, 2002. 35 See Allan Brandt, No Magic Bullet: A Social History of Venereal Disease in the United States since 1880 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Jeffrey Weeks, Sex, Politics, and Society: the Regulation of Sexuality since 1800 (London: Longman, 1981); Rachel Maines, The Technology of Orgasm: ‘Hysteria’, the Vibrator, and Women’s Sexual Satisfaction (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998). 36 Renate Rosenthal, “Female Sexuality Comes Out Of the Psychiatric Closet,” Journal of Sex and Marital Therapy 27 (2001): 203-204, 203. (Italics added.) 37 Basson et al., 84, 92. 38 Sandra.R. Leiblum, 2001, 161. 39 Stuart A. Kirk and Herb Kutchins, The Selling of DSM: The Rhetoric of Science in Psychiatry (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1992). 40 Ronald Bayer and Robert L. Spitzer, “Neurosis, Psychodynamics, and DSM-III: a History of the Controversy,” Archives of General Psychiatry, 42 (1985): 187-195, 187. On the twentieth century history of psychiatry’s problematic status, see Katherine Angel, “Defining Psychiatry: Aubrey Lewis’s 1938 Report and the Rockefeller Foundation,” in European Psychiatry on the Eve of War: Aubrey Lewis, the Maudsley Hospital and the Rockefeller Foundation in the 1930s, ed. Katherine Angel, Edgar Jones, and Michael Neve (London: Wellcome Trust Centre for the History of Medicine at UCL, 2003) 39-56. 41 Gerald L. Klerman, “The Evolution of a Scientific Nosology,” in Schizophrenia: Science and Practice, ed. John C. Shershow (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978). 42 Kirk and Kutchins, 1992.
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43
APA, 1994, xviii. Italics added. Basson et al., 85. 45 Moynihan, 47. 46 See Jennifer R. Fishman, “Manufacturing Desire: The Commodification of Female Sexual Dysfunction,” Social Studies of Science 34 (2004): 187218, and David Healy, “Shaping the Intimate: Influences on the Experience of Everyday Nerves,” Social Studies of Science 34 (2004): 219-245. 47 See Jennifer R. Fishman and Laura Mamo, “What’s in a Disorder: a Cultural Analysis of Medical and Pharmaceutical Constructions of Male and Female Sexual Dysfunction,” in A New View of Women’s Sexual Problems, ed. Ellyn Kaschak and Leonore Tiefer (New York: Haworth Press), 179-195); Maines, 1998. 48 The website for a clitoral stimulator called Vielle states that “Everybody is entitled to a satisfying, healthy sex life.” What is more, the occurrence of sexual problems is not “natural or inevitable.” http://www.vielle.info/Home/Index.cfm (15 October 2004). 49 See Angus McLaren, Twentieth Century Sexuality: a History (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999); Weeks, 1981; and Deborah Lupton, Medicine as Culture: Illness, Disease and the Body in Western Societies (London: Sage, 1994); Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction (London: Allen Lane, 1976). 44
Bibliography American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.). Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association, 1994. Amundson, Ron. “Against Normal Function.” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 31 (2000): 33-53. Angel, Katherine. “Defining Psychiatry: Aubrey Lewis’s 1938 Report and the Rockefeller Foundation.” In European Psychiatry on the Eve of War: Aubrey Lewis, the Maudsley Hospital and the Rockefeller Foundation in the 1930s, edited by Katherine Angel, Edgar Jones, and Michael Neve, 3956. London: Wellcome Trust Centre for the History of Medicine at UCL, 2003. Armstrong, David. Political Anatomy of the Body: Medical Knowledge in Britain in the Twentieth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
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Bancroft, John “The Medicalization of Female Sexual Dysfunction: the Need for Caution.” Archives of Sexual Behavior 31 (2002): 451-455. Bancroft, John, Cynthia A. Graham, and Carol McCord. “Conceptualizing Women’s Sexual Problems.” Journal of Sex and Marital Therapy 27 (2001): 95-103. Basson, Rosemary. “Are the Complexities of Women’s Sexual Function Reflected in the New Consensus Definitions of Dysfunction?” Journal of Sex and Marital Therapy 27 (2001): 105-112. Basson, Rosemary, Jennifer Berman, Arthur L. Burnett, Leonard Derogatis, David Ferguson, et al. “Report of the International Consensus Development Conference on Female Sexual Dysfunction: Definitions and Classifications.” Journal of Urology 163 (2000): 888-893; reprinted in Journal of Sex and Marital Therapy 27 (2001): 83-94. Bayer, Ronald and Robert L. Spitzer. “Neurosis, Psychodynamics, and DSM-III: a History of the Controversy.” Archives of General Psychiatry 42 (1985): 187-195. Berman, Jennifer, Laura Berman, and Irwin Goldstein. “Female Sexual Dysfunction: Incidence, Pathophysiology, Evaluation, and Treatment Options.” Urology 54 (1999): 385-391. Berman, Jennifer, Laura Berman, H. Lin, E. Flaherty, N. Lahey, Irwin Goldstein. “Effect of Sildenafil on Subjective and Physiological Parameters of the Female Sexual response in Women with Sexual Arousal Disorder.” Journal of Sex and Marital Therapy 27 (2001): 411-420. Bland, Lucy and Laura L. Doan. (eds.) Sexology Uncensored: the Documents of Sexual Science. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998. Brandt, Allan. No Magic Bullet: A Social History of Venereal Disease in the United States since 1880. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. British Medical Journal (themed edition). “Too Much Medicine?” British Medical Journal 324 (2002): 859-926. Conrad, Peter and Joseph W. Schneider. Deviance and Medicalization: From Badness to Sickness. St Louis: Mosby, 1980. DeGrandpre, Richard J. Ritalin Nation: Rapid-Fire Culture and the Transformation of Human Consciousness. New York: Norton, 1999.
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Fishman, Jennifer R. “Manufacturing Desire: The Commodification of Female Sexual Dysfunction.” Social Studies of Science 34 (2004): 187218. Fishman, Jennifer R. and Laura Mamo. “What’s in a Disorder: a Cultural Analysis of Medical and Pharmaceutical Constructions of Male and Female Sexual Dysfunction.” In A New View of Women’s Sexual Problems, edited by Ellyn Kaschak and Leonore Tiefer, 179-195. New York: Haworth Press, 2001. Foucault, Michel. Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason. New York: Pantheon, 1965. Foucault, Michel. The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception. London: Tavistock, 1973. Foucault, Michel. The History of Sexuality: An Introduction (Volume 1). London: Allen Lane, 1976. Gagnon, John. Human Sexualities Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1977. Hacking, Ian. The Taming of Chance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Healy, David. “Shaping the Intimate: Influences on the Experience of Everyday Nerves.” Social Studies of Science 34 (2004): 219-245. Humber, James M. and Robert F. Almeder (eds.). What Is Disease? Totowa, NJ: Humana Press, 1997. Illich, Ivan. Medical Nemesis: The Expropriation of Health. London: Calder and Boyars, 1975. Kawachi, I. and Peter Conrad. “Medicalisation and the Pharmacological Treatment of Blood Pressure.” In Contested Ground: Public Purpose and Private Interests in the Regulation of Prescription Drugs, edited by Peter Davis, 26-41. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. Kirk, Stuart A. and Herb Kutchins. The Selling of DSM: The Rhetoric of Science in Psychiatry. New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1992. Klerman, Gerald L. “The Evolution of a Scientific Nosology.” In Schizophrenia: Science and Practice, edited by J.C. Shershow, 99-121. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978.
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Laumann, Edward O., John H. Gagnon, Robert T. Michael, and Stuart Michaels. The Social Organization of Sexuality: Sexual Practices in the United States. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1994. Laumann, Edward O., Anthony Paik and Raymond C. Rosen. “Sexual Dysfunction in the United States: Prevalence and Predictors.” Journal of the American Medical Association 281 (1999): 538-544. Leiblum, Sandra R. “Critical Overview of the New Consensus-based Definitions and Classification of Female Sexual Dysfunction.” Journal of Sex and Marital Therapy 27 (2001):159-168. Lock, Margaret. Encounters with Aging: Mythologies of Menopause in Japan and North America. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993. Lupton, Deborah. Medicine as Culture: Illness, Disease and the Body in Western Societies. London: Sage, 1994. Maines, Rachel. The Technology of Orgasm: ‘Hysteria’, the Vibrator, and Women’s Sexual Satisfaction. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998. McLaren, Angus. Twentieth Century Sexuality: A History. Oxford: Blackwell, 1999. Moynihan, Ray. “The Making of a Disease: Female Sexual Dysfunction.” British Medical Journal 326 (2003): 45-47. Payer, Lynn. Disease-mongers: How Doctors, Drug Companies, and Insurers are Making You Feel Sick. New York: Wiley, 1992. Petersen, Alan and Robin Bunton (eds.). Foucault: Health and Medicine. London: Routledge, 1997. Rosenthal, Renate. “Female Sexuality Comes Out Of the Psychiatric Closet.” Journal of Sex and Marital Therapy 27 (2001): 203-204. Segraves, Richard Taylor. “Editor’s comments.” Journal of Sex and Marital Therapy 27 (2001), 81. Szasz, Thomas. The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct. London: Secker & Warburg, 1962.
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Tiefer, Leonore. Sex Is Not a Natural Act and Other Essays. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995. UK Government Department of Health Press Release. “Impotence Consultation – Dobson Announces Final Decision.” 7 May 1999. Weeks, Jeffrey. Sex, Politics, and Society: the Regulation of Sexuality since 1800. London: Longman, 1981. Zola, Irving Kenneth. Socio-medical Inquiries: Recollections, Reflections, and Reconsiderations. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983.
Note on Contributor Katherine Angel is currently writing a PhD on the lingering preference for single cause models in contemporary medical discourse. Her two case studies are Female Sexual Dysfunction and debates about the effects of stress on the immune system. She has completed two research jobs, one at the Wellcome Trust Centre for the History of Medicine at University College London, which led to a Medical History supplement with Edgar Jones and Michael Neve entitled European Psychiatry on the Eve of War: Aubrey Lewis, the Maudsley Hospital and the Rockefeller Foundation in the 1930s, and one in the Department of History and Philosophy of Science at Cambridge on Disease, Trust and Risk: Philosophy in Healthcare Technology. Department of the History and Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University, United Kingdom.
The Communication of Diagnostic Information by Doctors to Patients in the Consultation Peter J. Schulz Abstract In recent years research on communication in the medical field has increasingly developed. In particular the interaction between patient and doctor, as it develops during a consultation, has become a very interesting field of analysis. The approach to diseases and to patients has changed throughout the years and recently the trend is to consider the patient as a partner, as someone who cooperates in his own well-being. The cooperation between patient and doctor can be made easier through a more effective communication, above all during the crucial moment of the medical consultation. Two main moments in this interaction are diagnosis and prognosis. This paper will analyze them more precisely as speech acts of a particular kind. Searle’s taxonomy of speech acts will be used to classify them and also to understand ways in which they are peculiar. With regard to diagnosis, it will be shown how the performance of this speech act triggers a causal chain that, through the suggestion of a specific treatment, brings about changes in reality which could involve institutions at different levels and degrees of commitment. Moreover, the paper will hint at various perlocutionary effects entailed by the prognosis, which may strongly influence the patients’ behaviours. Keywords: health communication; speech acts; diagnosis, prognosis; 1.
Introduction
In recent years there have been an increasing number of studies in interpersonal communication in the doctor-patient consultation.1 Descriptive and experimental research has tried to shed light on the communication process during medical consultations. One explanation for the increasing interest in this area is that doctor-patient interaction has to be considered as one of the most complex interpersonal interactions because it deals with individuals in non-equal positions, considers the tension between the lay person and professional expertise, concerns issues of vital significance and requires close cooperation. Moreover, the asymmetrical communication between doctors and patients has changed to a remarkable extent over the past thirty years due to the enhanced role that patients play in making decisions about their treatment. As several authors
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have argued, until recently a paternalistic model of the doctor-patient relationship was dominant.2 According to this model, doctors exercise expertise in determining the nature of a patient’s condition and its proper management; meanwhile patients assume the passive sick role, whereby they are obligated to seek competent medical help and cooperate with the therapeutic agent.3 Changes in the health care delivery systems have shifted more responsibility to patients and the paternalistic model has elevated patient responsibility to both seek treatment and consider alternatives. Nevertheless, doctor-patient consultation is still based upon a communication gap between the medical competence on one side, and patients’ inability to help him or herself on the other side. Previous research4 has argued forcefully that the relative absence of diagnostic information provided by doctors in different types of medical interaction stems from the maintenance of authority by the practitioner over the patient. On the other side, it is increasingly recognized by the profession itself, that the relative absence of diagnostic information provided by doctors to patients has an impact on patients’ compliance with treatment programs. This paper proposes that an assessment of the two main concepts underlying doctor-patient communication, diagnosis and prognosis, might shed light on the asymmetrical relationship between patients and doctors. In order to gain a proper understanding of how medical assessment is delivered to the patient, I will first consider the role that diagnosis and prognosis play within doctor-patient communication. A closer look at the logic of diagnosis shows that it should not to be misunderstood as a merely theoretical proposition. The diagnosis also entails some strong communicative as well as institutional aspects that we briefly are going to describe. How diagnosis is related to communicative aspects becomes even more evident when taking into consideration the proximate concept of prognosis or prognostic knowledge. Within the concept of prognostic knowledge we can consider and emphasize the special situation of the patient. Whereas the diagnostic goal for the practitioner is to match the patient’s disease to the corresponding system of diseases, the patient is mostly interested in what he or she can expect now and in the future. This is where the concept of prognosis comes in. Reconsidering prognosis for the analysis of doctor-patient communication will highlight why the concept of disease should not be reduced to its functional aspects and will emphasize the patient’s perception as well as the goal-oriented behaviour of medical doctors. 2.
The Pivotal Position of Diagnosis
The concept of diagnosis has not always had such an important role in medicine as Lord Horder had attributed to it: His dictum “that the most important thing in medicine is diagnosis, the second most important
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thing is diagnosis and the third most important thing is diagnosis”5 was probably misleading for the first practitioners in the Western world. The most important concept for Hippocrates’ medical science, at least for the so-called school of Kos, was the idea of prognosis. Indeed, the reputation of the practitioner depended on whether he was able to carry out an appropriate prognosis. Whether or not he should act, the prognosis was taken as the basis for such a decision. The diagnosis, on the other hand, followed such a decision. That the reputation of Hippocrates was based on his prognostic rather than his diagnostic skill stemmed from the very nature of medical treatment, whose aim is primarily not to correctly recognize the disease but to cure it. Hippocrates’ own method was developed by means of conjectures: As far as I am concerned, I will not make any general predictions, but write down characters (semeia), by means of which one can make conjectures concerning the patients: which of them will heal and which will die; which will heal within a short time or sooner or later will die. (Corpus Hippocraticum, Chap. 1) Now, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, diagnosis means “The process of determining the nature of a disease” and “the identification of a disease from a patient’s symptoms.” It might, however, also refer to a “formal statement of this inquiry.” As to the latter, diagnosis forms a pivotal position within the doctor-patient consultation insofar as it denotes the completion of the practitioner’s inquiry into the patient’s complaint. Usually the diagnosis, in the sense of a formal statement in consultations is combined with an utterance in which the practitioner addresses the management of the patient’s condition. As to the former meaning, diagnosis might also be characterized as a process or inquiry into the patient’s health condition (sometimes it is also referred to as “diagnostics” 6 ). In other words, in working up a patient, doctors are blending at least two activities: one is the gathering of information and the other is the attempt to see a pattern or a constellation in those data.7 It is the patternseeing that might more technically be called the diagnosis. The doctor wants to put the patient in a classification because the doctor’s knowledge of causes, treatments, and prognoses is organized that way. In trying to arrive at a classification – that is, a disease or illness label – the process of data gathering and diagnosis are in no set sequence. The heart of any diagnostic reasoning is the relationship between signs, symptoms, laboratory tests, and so on, and the disease of which they are manifestations. What can the presence of the one tell the doctor about the possible presence of the other? That is, given the one, what is the probability of the other’s being there? Given the presence of a disease, what is the probability of having a specific symptom? What the doctor
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usually wants to know in diagnosis is the probability of the patient’s having this or that disease, given the symptoms he or she is manifesting. This is just the converse of what we might find out from records or the literature, namely, given the disease, what is the incidence of the symptom. In the diagnostic context, the physician is given the symptom, and is trying to figure out the probability of this or that disease in his patient, given the symptom. Impressionistically, then, if there is a high prior probability (a high incidence of the disease in the population) and if most people with the disease have the symptom in question, then the probability of this particular patient’s having the disease seems quite high. What we have done so far is to give a simplified description of the diagnostic process and also of the logic of diagnosis. A medical diagnostic process is a form of categorization, where the doctor tries to find an answer to the question “To which disease-category does one attribute this patient with these complaints, symptoms, and signs, or is there no disease (as a category) present here, or does the symptom ambiguously refer to more diseases?”8 The following example might shed light on this meaning: A particular patient, Beatrice, consults her doctor complaining of a feeling of pain, burning, tingling; she has a red rash with fluid-filled blisters on her back, fever and headache. After performing a routine examination, the doctor comes to the conclusion that Beatrice has shingles. Beatrice’s complaints, symptoms, and signs can be transformed by the medical practitioner into a patient data set consisting of several statements where each statement is describing a complaint, a symptom, or a sign. At any instant of the diagnostic process the doctor holds a set of judgments on what might be wrong with the patient. This set of judgments underlies the diagnosis. Accordingly, the diagnosis might be symbolized by D = {s1, …, sn} where each si is a statement on the patient at a particular instant of time. Within this formal description of medical diagnosis, one might distinguish particular forms of diagnosis. For instance, as Sadegh-Zadeh9 suggests, one might further distinguish between categorical and conjectural diagnosis, where the former refers to a statement on the patient that the diagnostician considers as true and the latter to a statement about the patient which the diagnostician does not yet consider to be true, but only a ‘hypothesis.’ Syntactically spoken, the conjecture might be formulated as a disjunction (‘Beatrice has shingles or she has an allergy’), it may be a modal statement (‘maybe Beatrice has shingles’) or it might come up as a quantitative-probabilistic diagnosis (‘the probability that Beatrice has shingles is about 0.6’).10
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Diagnosis as a Case of Speech Act
A medical diagnosis, as it has been described so far, identifies the disease from which the patient suffers. In one sense, diagnosis marks the completion of the doctor’s inquiries into the patients’ complaint and forms the foundation to manage the condition. But in another sense, as a formal statement of this inquiry combined with an utterance, diagnosis forms a pivotal position within the general practice consultation. At first glance, the doctors’ utterance to Beatrice ‘You have shingles’ belongs, according to the taxonomy of Speech Act Theory,11 to the class of assertive sentences such as ‘the door is open.’ Such sentences are usually viewed as statements of fact. Doctors will consider their diagnosis as a statement which they believe to report facts. However, beside the fact that delivering the diagnostic information within a distinct utterance presupposes asserting facts, the act of delivering also generates facts. By the use of the utterance ‘You have shingles,’ the doctor tries to bring about some institutional state of affairs, some changes in the patient’s world. From that point of view, delivering diagnostic information amounts to a case of declarative sentences: The patient might follow the doctor’s suggestion how to manage his/her health condition. Furthermore, the doctor’s diagnosis brings about other material changes in the real world, e.g. health insurance will pay for what the treatment of this disease will cost. This applies also for cases where doctors do not deliver the diagnosis to their patients, as often happens.12 Obviously, the more the diagnosis refers to a serious illness, the more it provokes a profound change in the world of the patient. As Searle noted,13 speech acts themselves are to be considered as institutional facts because they respond to constitutive rules. If we consider the diagnosis as a speech act, it will be interesting to investigate the constitutive rules to which it responds. In other words, we could describe diagnosis from the point of view of its necessary conditions and consequences. The necessary conditions for a diagnosis are: a disease, the professional qualification of GPs, a place meant for medical examinations14 and the analysis of the symptoms or data in general. The main consequence of a diagnosis expressed during a medical consultation is usually the suggestion of a certain therapy which may include the assumption of medicines, a period of rest, a prophylaxis treatment (in the case of infectious diseases found on others), hospitalisation, or intensive therapies. This means that when GPs examine a patient in their surgery, what they say will have quite a different meaning from what is said, for example, at a dinner with colleagues or during evening talks with their spouse. It is precisely through the formulation of the therapeutic suggestion that the diagnosis triggers a causal chain which often brings about important effects at institutional level or in the patient’s lifestyle.
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Examples of effects at the institutional level include the case in which health insurance has to pay for a certain therapy, but also other effects such as facilitating time off work or arranging specific therapies, depending on how the disease is considered at an institutional level. The patient’s lifestyle could also undergo major changes depending on the treatment regimen. From what we have said, it could also follow that the diagnosis has the illocutionary force in the sense that it commits the doctor to the truth of what he is saying. A medical diagnosis put forward by a doctor such as ‘I diagnose you having shingles’ (i.e. ‘You have shingles’ or ‘Beatrice has shingles’) may be construed as an illocutionary act that brings about the complex, co-operative process of viewing and treating a human being as a patient with shingles. In this respect the verb ‘to diagnose’ turns out to be a performative verb like ‘to bet,’ ‘to promise,’ ‘to swear’ or ‘to invite.’ In accordance with the taxonomic criteria proposed by Searle15 five basic classes of speech acts can be distinguished: assertives, directives, commissives, expressives and declaratives. We can now examine the speech act of diagnosis through each of these five classes. a) Assertives: The illocutionary goal of assertive speech acts can be defined in terms of the speaker’s intention of getting the hearer to accept the propositional content of the utterance as the expression of a true state of affairs.16 For present purposes, it is important to emphasize that whatever the type of assertive act may be, the doctor’s intention is to express a qualifying judgment. After seeing the patient, the doctor asserts the diagnosis by saying ‘you have bronchitis.’ Even if a mistake is always possible, what is said by the physician reflects what he or she thinks is the truth. b) Directives: The illocutionary goal of directives speech act is to attempt to get the hearer to do something. Paradigmatic cases are ‘to request,’ ‘to question,’ ‘to order,’ and ‘to advise.’ An example would be ‘The symptoms reveal that you might have SARS.’ The entities of the illness together with the institutional role of the physician mean that the utterance is understood as an obligation to be quarantined. Other diagnoses – such as ‘You have shingles’ – have an illocutionary force less powerful and are most likely to be perceived from the audience as advice. c) Comissives: The illocutionary goal of commissive speech acts is the speaker’s undertaking of the obligation to perform the action described by the propositional content of the utterance. Commissives are centred upon an action to be performed by the speaker (not by the hearer); moreover, it is the hearer (not the speaker), who is primarily supposed to benefit from the result of the action (basic categories are promises and offers). Their manifestation in diagnosis is realized by the expression of the doctor’s ability that the proposed therapy will be the right one in order for the patient to be cured. For example, the utterance ‘You have
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pneumonia’ implies the intention, the commitment taken by the physician towards a therapy’s proposal. Insofar as the doctor takes an obligation towards the adequate cure of the patient, the diagnosis could be considered as a commissive. d) Expressives: The illocutionary goal of expressive speech acts can be defined as the expression of a psychological state of the speaker which is brought about by the state of affairs indicated by the propositional content (paradigmatic cases are ‘to thank,’ ‘to congratulate’ or ‘to condole’). It seems to be evident that a diagnosis does not count as an expressive. Certainly, in a given situation the doctor might express his or her personal regret or sentiment, as in the example: “I’m sorry to have to tell you that …”. This, however, is not to be considered as a part of the diagnosis itself. e) Declaratives: Through the use of utterances, the speaker tries to bring about some institutional state of affairs or some change in the world. Paradigmatic cases are ‘to declare,’ ‘to marry,’ and ‘to fire.’ Certainly, the simple diagnosis could not be counted as a declarative; however, declaratives might play an important role under specific circumstances. Let us imagine that there is an outbreak of an epidemic like SARS and the government declares a public emergency. Subsequent to this declarative, the diagnosis ‘You have SARS’ would imply a directive such as ‘You have to be quarantined.’ It turns out that among the different taxonomic classes proposed by Searle, diagnosis fits quite well into the class of assertives, and cannot be directly considered to be another class. However, what makes this more interesting is that a diagnosis entails several institutional implications and the diagnosis initiates different institutional actions. It is through a diagnosis (written on a paper) and its accompanying prescription that the pharmacist is going to provide the medicament to the patient. It is by means of the diagnosis that the health insurer is going to pay for the medication as well as for the medical assessment. Of course, further investigations should be done, analyzing the diagnosis and intertwined institutional aspects. It follows, however, from the previous remarks that speech act theory, with its focus on the rules and conditions through which a sentence is understood as a particular kind of action, seems a promising approach and arguably central to the analysis of forms of interaction that takes place between doctor and patient.
4.
The Concept of Prognosis
In a manner analogous to that of diagnosis, prognosis is also at the core of doctors’ behaviour. But while diagnosis of a patient refers to a present instant of time, the prognosis is considered to be a statement that refers to the likely outcome of a patient’s disease.17 This analogy,
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however, has its own limits. A statement about the future entails a greater degree of uncertainty than a statement about the present and any diagnosis refers to an actual state of health. Prognosis refers necessarily to something in process in time that might still be subject to change. With any form of decision to act, the prognosis will be diversified. So, while the diagnosis is not the only basis for any prognosis, it is certainly the most important. For example, the order of the conceptions could not be reversed: it would be practically and logically incorrect if the prognosis influenced the medical assessment. Due to these differences, doctors will usually prioritize the diagnosis. The paradigm of classical mechanics allows us to see how closely the prognosis is related to the diagnosis. One is able to predict the status of any self-contained system at any moment in the future, in any instance where one knows the status, the ‘diagnosis,’ of the system in some determined moment. But although it is true that nowadays one might reach a high degree of probability for the diagnosis by means of modern medical technology, the ideal of precision remains far away. This is particularly true for prognosis, which is an assertion of probability par excellence. It might be this low degree of certainty which explains why the modern practitioner prefers generally to make a diagnosis instead of, as Hippocrates did, a prognosis. Medical knowledge in both diagnosis and prognosis is based on observations of occurrences in single persons. Multiple observations of patients can assist in discovering common features of these occurrences and in inducing rules from them, i.e. as statistical knowledge. But the extrapolation of these rules or statistical data to single persons remains a matter of probability factors. For this reason, statistical knowledge cannot really be related to a single case with any certainty. Usually, in spite of the temporal logic of diagnosis and prognosis that we have noted, every diagnosis includes also some prognostic valency. This is because every syndrome that might be diagnosed has its own typical course, always under the condition of probability (including such factors as duration of the condition, severity of the condition, and so forth). From the patient’s point of view, the prognostic valency is to the forward even as the doctor makes a diagnosis; at the same time, though, the doctor may be compelled to give priority to the demands that stem from the particular situation of the patient to the doctor’s action. The fact that prognosis plays such an important role for the patient is only understandable, then, if we consider its vital significance for the patient’s situation: it is about one’s own future, or, more emphatically, one’s own identity is at stake. Consequently, communicating a well-founded prognosis to the patient does not simply mean to transfer information; it means, even more importantly, to change a situation. But prognosis is not opposed to diagnosis in all respects. Both have a very practical basis – they are both action-oriented. This applies not
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only to the specific functions of diagnosis and prognosis but also to physician behaviour, since it enables decision-making as well as warranting it. A closer look at both diagnosis and prognosis shows that these concepts should not be misunderstood as merely theoretical propositions. Neither aims to generate a theoretical knowledge but rather a practical knowledge. A wrong diagnosis cannot be simply revised, as one might do with a pure theoretical statement, because the error refers to an action that cannot be easily cancelled. In contrast to hypotheses that derive from the natural sciences and are considered as universal statements, diagnosis and prognosis are singular statements on a particular patient at a particular instant of time. A medical assessment that stems from a pure theoretical interest and does not consider at all any kind of preventive or therapeutic regime should not be considered as a diagnosis or a prognosis, but as a human-biological enquiry. Such an isolated, ‘objective’ inquiry would necessarily disregard the fact that the concept of disease includes necessarily an assessment on the patient’s side about his or her subjective state. If we take into account that the concept of disease does indeed include such an assessment through the patient, it becomes evident that the concept of disease entails several individual, social and cultural factors. Reconfigured in this way, the concept of disease is thus characterised by a specific lack of conceptual clarity: Disease in this framework becomes, so to say, an interpretandum with underlying premises that are only partly an object of a scientific inquiry. Yet, this concept of disease is very productive in practical terms: we must conclude that some of a disease’s underlying premises might be ascertained only considering the specific socio-cultural circumstances where the doctor is consulting his patients.18
5.
Using the Concept of Prognosis in Order to Making Sense of Disease
As has already been mentioned before, the different degree of certainty between diagnosis and prognosis helps to explain why doctors are more oriented towards the diagnosis than to the prognosis. However, this entails, to some degree, the risk of repressing the extent to which disease is a disturbance of the functionality of the human organism. Certainly, the medical assessment of a disease embraces empirically describable and fixable parameters such as blood pressure, cholesterol level, number of leukocytes, to mention only a few. But disease should not be understood to consist merely of simple empirical diagnostic findings. From the point of view of patients, the most important question concerns their own future and what kind of physical disturbances they may have to take into account. And it is due to some initial disturbance of their wellbeing that the patient is usually consulting a doctor in order to gain some respite. Therefore, besides its functional disturbance, the concept of a
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disease refers to a state of a missing well-being and, as such, to a subjective state of being. Now, within the concept of prognostic knowledge we have the opportunity to consider and emphasize the special situation of the patient. Whereas the diagnostic goal for the practitioner is to match the patient’s disease to the corresponding system of diseases, patients are mostly interested in what they can expect for themselves and their future h