BRITAIN AND THE REVOLT IN CYPRUS, 1954-1959
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BRITAIN AND THE REVOLT IN CYPRUS, 1954-1959
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Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus 1954-1959
ROBERT HOLLAND
CLARENDON PRESS
OXFORD
This book has been printed digitally and produced in a standard specification in order to ensure its continuing availability
OXPORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Bangkok Buenos Aires Cape Town Chennai Dar es Salaam Delhi Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kolkata Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi Sao Paulo Shanghai Singapore Taipei Tokyo Toronto with an associated company in Berlin Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York © Robert Holland 1998 The moral rights of the author have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) Reprinted 2002 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer ISBN 0-19-820538-4
Jacket illustration: A detail from 'Harding's Nightmare", painted in Cyprus by George Pol. Georghiou, 1957
For Jack
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author of a book as long as this one inevitably contracts many debts of gratitude along the way. I have received much assistance from librarians and archivists, notably in the Public Record Office of the United Kingdom at Kew, the Public Record Office of the Republic of Cyprus (whose Keeper, Mrs Effie Parparinou, gave me advice on her collection, and much else besides), the National Archives of the United States in Washington, the extremely hospitable Eisenhower Presidential Library at Abilene, Kansas (especially Mr Dwight D. Strandberg), Rhodes House Library in Oxford, whose then Librarian, Mr Alan Bell, afforded me advance access to the Cyprus Papers of Lord Caradon, the Library of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies in London, and the Library of the Archbishop Makarios III Foundation, which allowed me to use their newspaper collection in that cool and lovely archiepiscopal corner of Nicosia. I am indebted to the Academic Affairs Division of NATO which awarded me a Research Fellowship in 1991-2, allowing me to carry out extensive work in the United States and Cyprus during a sabbatical. The Central Research Fund of the University of London provided a small travel subsidy in 1993. The inclusion in this book of a set of fine photographs has only been possible through the generosity of Mr Constantine Leventis. I was immensely fortunate from almost my first day researching this topic in Nicosia to find a real 'home from home' in the Cyprus American Archaeological Research Institute (CAARI). To Stuart and Lena Swiny go thanks for introducing me, and for making CAARI what it is; thanks also go to Vathoulla Moutoukki for helping to keep it that way and for always finding a space for me even at short notice. The best thing about the writing of this book has been the genuine friendships which have lightened its burdens. Here I will only mention four people. Dr George Georghallides, the most accomplished historian of Cyprus in the period of British rule, gave me the benefits of his deep knowledge, but more than that he extended his vivid and forceful camaraderie; his wife, Joan, welcomed me constantly and warmly into her home. Diana and Sophocles Markides were from the first unstinting in their hospitality. From the former I obtained many insights into the peculiarities of Cypriot politics; from the latter I learned much about the nature and spirit of Hellenism; from them both I got much fun, and fresh air walking in the Troodos mountains. Tony Morris and Anna Illingworth of Oxford University Press were the ideal editors—supportive, patient, and always prompt with advice. Lastly, to Hillia, my wife, goes not only gratitude for that most up-to-date marital aid, 'computer support', but thanks for tolerating one of the less satisfactory human conditions: partnership with a writer whose mind was usually elsewhere, and who often was elsewhere. I hope this book will be some return not only to her, but to all those who have helped me in writing it. R.F.H. Wimbledon June 7997
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CONTENTS
List of Illustrations and Map 1 The Pattern of Colonial Cyprus, 1878-1950
xi i
2 A Crisis of Trust, i February 1950-1 April 1955
20
3 'Terror Island', 2 April-3 October 1955
55
4 The Struggle for Mastery, 4 October 1955-9 March 1956
83
5 A Light in the Tunnel, 10 March-26 July 1956
120
6 The Sands of Goodwill, 27 July 1956-5 April 1957
144
7 Matters of Honour, 6 April-4 October 1957
182
8 A Time of Gestures, 5 October 1957-13 February 1958
213
9 A Choice of Evils, 14 February~3O June 1958
236
10 The Metaphysics of Partition, i July-4 December 1958
263
11 A Promised Land?, 5 December 1958-19 March 1959
295
12 Afterthoughts and Aftermaths
330
List of Sources
337
Bibliography
339
Index
341
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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS (Plates between pp. ir6andii?)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Sir John Harding meets Archbishop Makarios A British soldier stands guard during a house search A priest being frisked during a security operation Cypriots being taken away for interrogation Archbishop Makarios addresses a huge crowd in Athens Makarios arriving in Athens after his detention Sir Hugh Foot walking through Nicosia Scene in Nicosia street after the shooting of two British policemen The British Army guards the Greek and Turkish quarters in Nicosia Greek-Cypriots await the Archbishop's speech during his homecoming A Greek-Cypriot youth organization celebrates Makarios' return Colonel Grivas goes back to Athens
NB: All plates from Hulton Getty, except Plate 7 which is from Associated Press
MAP Map showing the deployment of the Security Forces in Cyprus on the declaration of a State of Emergency, 26 November 199 5. UK Public Record Office. Crown copywright material in the Public Record Office is reproduced by permission of Her Majesty's Stationery Office.
102-3
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i
The Pattern of Colonial Cyprus, 1878-1950 Nicosia, 21 October 1931 At first the Greek crowd which gathered in the late afternoon around the tawdry premises of the Commercial Club was measured in a few hundreds.1 But as the news spread through the town that the Greek members of the Colony's Legislative Council had resigned in the wake of a row about the island's tiny budget, and the speeches became fiercer and more vivid, the numbers swelled to over three thousand. With people crammed inside the Club, leaning out of the balconies, and spilling over the veranda into the street, speaker after speaker railed against the injustices of British rule, and hailed the day when the English would depart and the Union (or Enosis) of Cyprus with the Mother Kingdom of Greece would be consummated. As the passions of the meeting rose to a climax, a priest mounted the makeshift platform and declared a revolution to be under way. Suddenly, somebody thrust a Greek flag— many were being held aloft, or draped over the jutting buttresses of the Club—into his hands, on which he proceeded to plant a dramatic kiss. Amidst renewed cheers some voices in the crowd shouted out that on the following day the Governor, Sir Ronald Storrs, was due to leave for England, and that he should be sent on his way with the demands of the island's population ringing in his ears. To repeated cries of 'To Government House, To Government House', the mass of protesters set out on the road towards the rather unprepossessing building which served as the symbol of British rule in Cyprus. As the dense procession wound its way towards its destination about a mile and a half distant, kicking up a pall of dust along Nicosia's barely made-up roads, its size increased still further as more of the capital's 22,000 inhabitants tacked themselves on to the column. The atmosphere was redolent of the Orthodox Christian festivals so characteristic of Greek life on the island, an impression heightened by the presence of many clerics, lifting their black skirts as they tried to keep up with the pace. But there was also a more threatening strain. Passing the Government timber-yard, the demonstrators helped themselves to sticks of various sizes, and uprooted the wooden tree-guards along the roadside. Armed in this rough-and-ready fashion, and with a motley apparatus of bicycles, lanterns, electric torches, huge banners, and blue-and-white flags of Greece, the concourse finally arrived at the entrance to the drive of Government House, its watered parkland a rare sight in such an arid town, shortly before 8 p.m. The following account is based on Governor Storrs' official dispatch on the riots, printed as Cmd. 4045, Disturbances in Cyprus in October igji (London, HMSO, 1932). The definitive secondary treatment is G. S. Georghallides, Cyprus and the Governorship of Sir Ronald Storrs: The Causes of the igji Crisis (Nicosia, 1985).
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The Cyprus Police soon learned that trouble was brewing, and a patrol was hurriedly dispatched to monitor what was happening. By the time the crowd appeared at the entrance to Government House eight foot-police carrying batons barred its progress, with five mounted officers drawn up behind the first of several gates. The advance portions of the intruders ground to a halt at this obstruction, but as the rearguard piled up those at the front were propelled against the thin police line. Sticks and stones began to be thrown and batons wielded, a feverish mood set in, and as the frightened horses stampeded, the demonstrators finally broke forward and poured up the drive. Their momentum carried them to within thirty yards of the house, where police reinforcements had regrouped, restraining what had now become a heated mob from invading the large circular terrace in front of the main building. For twenty minutes, with much milling about, this uneasy equilibrium was held, whilst a nervous colonial official ineffectually called on the citizens to disperse. But then, with an electric impulse, the ranks surged forward once more. With cries of 'Enosii rising above the general rumpus, and raucous demands that the Governor himself appear before them immediately, the advance guard scrambled across the terrace and right up to the doors of the residence. There they found themselves confronted by the nervous triumvirate of the District Commissioner of Nicosia, the Cyprus Colonial Secretary and the Chief Inspector of Police. Cooped up in his office within the long, warren-like arrangement of his residence, Governor Storrs urgently conferred with the Chief Commandant as to the use of troops to quell the outbreak. Eventually he sent a message that if the crowd withdrew to a 'respectful distance' he would invite one or two of its leaders in to see him, but given the fracas, Storrs' invitation—passed on through the District Commissioner—could only be heard by those standing on, or very close, to the porch itself. In the intervening hiatus some of the petitioners angrily denounced the Governor's failure to appear. Up to this point the mood had not altogether lost its air of carnival. Now an uglier edge made itself felt. Some bricks began to fly; the first windows were broken; soon somebody scrambled on to the roof of Government House and—triumph of triumphs—unfurled the Greek national colours. According to Storrs' later account forwarded to an aghast Colonial Office in London, the more moderate elements in the crowd, including those local notables who had initially put themselves at its head, drifted off as they began to fear the climax. Certainly, the proceedings had reached a point where the participants had either shamefacedly to turn on their heels, or press on regardless. As this collective decision was digested and resolved, those who remained split off into groups, threatening to disintegrate into noisy disarray, jeering and heaving rocks at the police vehicles which sped frantically up and down the single highway. Meanwhile, some forty armed police under a senior commander had been brought into Government House at 9 p.m. through a rear entrance. Soon afterwards the stone-throwing intensified; almost all the windows on the frontage were smashed, and the telephone equipment wrecked. A fresh police detachment arrived from an outlying station, but could only gain the safety of Government House by hurrying from their vehicles
Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959
3
under a barrage of debris. Although the doors of the residence were propped up by its defenders with bulky furniture, its besiegers—again helped by the proximity of the timber-yard—staved them in with logs roped together as a battering ram. A spluttering, lurid light was thrown on this scene by the torching of the Colonial Secretary's motor-car, along with a number of other abandoned Police vehicles. A Turkish Chief Inspector of Police requested permission to order his men to fire a single warning volley. At first the Commissioner, in operational control, refused, since in the poor light the only clearly visible targets were the youths whose boisterousness had led them to cluster in and around the porch; the bulk of the crowd, including the ringleaders doing most of the damage, kept to the shadows of the trees dotted about the terrace, from which occasional but determined sallies were being made. Shortly after 10 p.m. the incendiarism, however, spread from the gutted motor-vehicles to the house itself. The police had sought to protect the frontage, but had been driven back by missiles. Blazing wooden stakes were tossed through the shattered windows. After the failure of a last desperate attempt to disperse the crowd with a baton charge (quaintly described by Storrs as having been conducted 'according to King's Regulations'), the Commissioner yielded to the pressure of the police. A bugle was sounded; the Riot Act was hurriedly read out in English as a formality, and then its general sense shouted in Greek; the bugle sounded again; and finally a police rifle-party of twelve discharged a single round of shots. Seven men were wounded, and two collapsed to the ground (of whom one, a youth of eighteen years, later died). With confusion reigning, the police baton-charged again, this time to better effect. The crowd, stunned by the crack of the rifles, quickly broke up, scattering towards the town. Yet this success came too late to save Storrs' mansion. Almost simultaneously with the Police cannonade, the flames from the curtains on the west corner of the building spread to the roof; within seconds the conflagration had taken hold of the entire timbered structure; five minutes later—it was now not far off midnight—there was nothing left but a smouldering shell. There was in this spectacular outcome no diminution of the island's architectural heritage. When Lady Storrs had first approached Government House on her arrival with her husband in 1926, she mistook it for the stables.2 More personally distressing was the destruction of the collection of antiquities and objetsd'art which the Storrs had accumulated over thirty years in the Near Eastern world. During the days after 21 October the Governor, nevertheless, had little opportunity to worry about such a loss. The permanent military garrison in the Crown Colony of Cyprus consisted of only three officers and 123 men, for the most part stationed in the Troodos mountains to the west. If the outbreak in Nicosia spread to the other large towns, anarchy beckoned. Having escaped from the burning hulk of Government House to the Colonial Secretary's near-by Lodge, and after ordering the troops in Troodos to leave for the capital immediately, Storrs' first priority had been to telegraph the General Officer Commanding the British troops in Egypt for additional army units to be sent by air, and 2
Ronald Storrs, Orientations (London, 1937), p. 534.
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then to request the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet to provide an aircraft carrier or cruiser. By daylight on the 22nd the walls of Nicosia had been plastered with large notices in Greek announcing a curfew, and prohibiting assemblies of more than five persons. This did not prevent excited gatherings from forming inside the old walled town, but as troops arrived the exits from the city were effectively controlled and Government property (such as the vulnerable Secretariat) adequately protected. By noon on the 22nd it was possible for the harassed colonial authorities to turn some of their attention to the progress of disturbances outside Nicosia. At Larnaca, Famagusta, Kyrenia, Limassol (where the District Commissioner's residence was also burned down), and Paphos, trouble rumbled on into the early days of November; all British women and children were evacuated in a Khedivial steamship to Egypt. Perhaps most troubling of all for the Cyprus Government was the appearance of agents from the towns who toured the villages informing the populace that 'this is the end of the English period—this is the day of revolution and hurrah for Enosii. Yet for Storrs and his advisers it was not all bad news. The goodwill of the Muslim community, and that of the other minorities, such as the Armenians and Maronites, had not wavered during the disturbance. Above all, reinforcements from outside Cyprus gradually built up. HMS London appeared off Larnaca on the 23rd, and the Rear Admiral Commanding promptly landed marines at various points on the coast. Two days later HMS Colombo anchored off Famagusta, and put ashore further reinforcements. With air detachments arriving in penny packets from Egypt, and a flight of RAF day-bombers now on the scene to over-fly the villages, law and order was messily but in the end successfully restored. Restoring order was one thing, renewing battered prestige was quite another. The latter required something sterner. The Governor therefore decided to deport not only the alleged lay ringleaders of the outbreak, including two prominent Communists, but more significantly the Bishops of Kition and Kyrenia, although the evidence linking the latter at least with the immediate troubles was threadbare.' These prelates were arrested in their palaces by British troops—the Bishop of Kyrenia being hauled from his own bedroom at i a.m.—and bundled out of Cyprus in a steamer to begin their exile in Malta. Thereafter they were allowed to roam freely, but not to return to their homeland. By 5 November the situation had quietened down sufficiently so that the naval landing parties were withdrawn. Altogether during the episode thirty people had been wounded, and six Greeks killed; over 2,000 demonstrators were convicted and sentenced to various periods of incarceration, and a Reparation Impost Law levied fines of £34,315 on towns and villages held to be collectively responsible for seditious actions. Cyprus was not again to experience widespread disorders until the bombs announcing a new rebellion exploded in Nicosia twenty-four years later. Yet the Cyprus rebellion of 1931, and the burning down of Government House, was the most humiliating blow sustained by the British in any •' For the deportations of 1931 see Georghallides, 'The Cyprus Revolt and the British Deportation Policy, October 1931-December \^z\ Journaloj'the Society oJCypriot Studies (Nicosia, 1995), pp. 37-114.
Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959
5
of their Crown Colonies in the years between the two world wars, and in a profound sense their position in the island never entirely recovered from the blow. In the years which followed the British administration in Cyprus built a new Government House: this time a more imposing affair of brick and concrete with a view to permanence. Yet the outbreak of October 1931 became part of the political folklore on the island. Why, then, had it happened? And why in its aftermath did the Cyprus authorities fall back on a programme of unusually firm, even Draconian, repression, including the suspension of constitutional government in the colony which, uniquely in British decolonization, was not to be restored until the birth of an independent Republic of Cyprus? The answer to the first of these questions lies in the long-standing impetus behind the movement for Enosis. According to Enosis tradition, as General Wolseley stepped ashore at Larnaca on 22 July 1878 to proclaim formally the end of Turkish administration and the beginning of British occupation he was welcomed by the then Bishop of Kitium with a plea that the new conquerors should shortly hand Cyprus over to Greece. Whilst there is some evidence that this much-quoted episode was somewhat elaborated in the telling,4 from early on in the new dispensation there was undoubtedly a hope that Cyprus would shortly find a more congenial resting place in the bosom of greater Hellas. Nor was this expectation lacking foundation; it was based on a belief in the beneficence of that English liberal civilization which in the 18205 and 18305 had lent a helping hand to the emergence of the independent Greek state, and in 1868 led Prime Minister Gladstone's Liberal Government to acquiesce in the union of the British Ionian Protectorate with the infant Hellenic Kingdom. Subsequently, events in the wider world—the gradual crumbling of the Ottoman Empire and further consolidations of the Greek-speaking irredenta in the region—served to stimulate this hopefulness, and a sense of expectancy against all the odds, often verging on naivety, was ever afterwards to play a significant part in shaping Greek-Cypriot politics and psychology. The Enosis movement remained for some years after 1878 patchy and incidental in its extent, but compared with anti-colonial phenomena elsewhere in the British Empire it exhibited a relatively high degree of continuity and fixity of purpose. At the heart of the belief in Cypriot Enosis lay a consciousness of belonging to Greek culture and civilization. Here the Ottoman legacy carried with it ambivalent effects. On the one hand, the Turkish power had never hesitated to crush signs of Greek political pretensions to the control of Cyprus, as it had done in 1821 when it appeared that the Greek revolt on the mainland might spread to the island, leading to the execution of the Orthodox Archbishop, along with much of the intelligentsia. On the other hand, in conformity with the principles of the millet system whereby Ottoman administration was mediated through more or less autonomous racial and religious communities within the empire, the Turks not only left the Greeks of 4 Rolandos Katsiaounis, Labour, Society and Politics in Cyprus during the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century (Nicosia, 1996), pp. 27-8.
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Q'prus to get on with running their own affairs, but encouraged the Orthodox Church to assume the secular as well as ecclesiastical leadership of their community. The position of the Archbishop of Cyprus as ethnarch of his people was in no small part, therefore, an Ottoman creation, and there were a number of occasions on which the Greek Church and the Turkish authorities, as well as large landowners or chiftliksfrom both the Orthodox and Muslim communities, closed ranks against the violent protests apt to boil up from the impoverished depths of rural life, marked as it was by a pattern of small peasant proprietors subject to the constant division of estates through inheritance and foreclosures by debtors. Sociologically, then, the roots ofEnosis may be explained by the elaboration over a long period of high Greek culture within the milieu of Orthodox society in Cyprus. Ethnic, linguistic, literary, and religious conventions were shaped around a Hellenistic consciousness to preserve a customary order from hostile pressures within and without. The ancient church of Cyprus was both the symbol and functional core of this process, but it spanned out through schoolteachers, the professions, the merchant classes, and came to embrace a more affluent peasant cadre as agrarian change slowly brought about social differentiation in the countryside. Here also was the key to why Enosis enthusiasm, linked as it was to what outsiders often considered a deeply anachronistic religious establishment, nevertheless flourished in the face of 'modernity'. An explicit and highly formalized Greekness was the chief means through which an existing order maintained its cohesion in a changing world—including, after 1878, a changing colonial world. In so far as the British colonialists brushed aside the old Ottoman immobilism, and brought modernization in their wake, it was also quite logical that the new rulers, though at first less disliked perhaps than their predecessors, gradually found themselves faced with an overt and persistent demand for Enosis on the part of many of their Greek subjects. The Orthodox Church in Cyprus was to play such a prominent part in the struggle of the 19505 that a thumb-nail sketch of its history is required. 5 In the words of a leading sociologist of Mediterranean mores, 'a Greek is a Greek to the extent that he is Orthodox'." If this is generally true of Greek metropolitan mentality, it applied with particular force in Cyprus. The survival of the Church and that of a Hellenic 'nation' on the island was indissolubly connected in the same way as the Catholic faith and the Gael of Ireland. The Cypriot Church was very old, having been founded by St Barnabus when he converted the Roman Governor, Sergius Paulus, in AD 45. In AD 488 the Emperor Zeno accorded it the much-prized honour of autocephalous status, meaning that it obtained an independent spiritual and temporal jurisdiction, and its archbishop the right to carry the golden staff and sign his edicts in red ink alongside the patriarchs of Constantinople and Jerusalem. 'The autocephalous character of the Church was important' the distinguished French historian, Francois Crouzet, has summed up this aspect 5 For the Greek Church in Cyprus see Sir George Hill, A History of Cyprus, vol. iv, The Ottoman Province and the British Colony, 157]-1948 (Cambridge, 1952), pp. 305-91, 569-606. '' W. Peristiany, Honour anil Shame. The lvalues of Mediterranean Society (Chicago, 1966), pp. 175-6.
Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959
7
because it cemented the religious sympathies of Cypriot Greeks with their ethnic identity; lay society came to be perfectly adapted to religious organization. As a result, the Orthodox Church became something more than simply the forum of Christian devotional life. It emerged as the most distinctive expression of an often besieged community.7
In independent Greece such confessional primacy was before long attenuated by the structures of a nation-state which proceeded to displace ecclesiastical leadership and nationalize Church lands. But in Cyprus, where Turkish rule simply gave way to new foreign masters, the Church retained a leading—if still often ambivalent—position as the repository of the national idea. It was the resulting tendency in Greek-Cypriot life to mix up the temporal and spiritual spheres which the British occupiers were always to find deeply aggravating. 'If few Eastern politicians are religious men', one British historian of the Greek people once cryptically wrote, 'nearly all Eastern Churchmen are politicians',8 and this trait was one which invariably got Eastern Orthodoxy a bad press in Britain, with its very different assumptions about Church and State. In Cyprus the additional link with an unfulfilled national aspiration put Orthodox leadership at odds with the characteristic secularism of British colonial practice, with all its pedestrian efficiency. The Church even lost some privileges accorded by the Ottomans: Bishops no longer received a berat from the government to authorize the collection of dues from the populace, and became subject to various land and personal taxes.9 As the two leading but competitive institutions in the island, the Greek Church and the British colonial state ran more foul of each other as time went on. It was therefore with a tone of approval that a Government survey in 1928 concluded that the usually uneducated village priest 'remains today the patcher of quarrels and a general counsellor but his influence tends rather to diminish'.10 Like the Roman Catholic Church in Britain's other Mediterranean island of Malta, Orthodoxy in Cyprus was to devote itself in the following decades to resisting this process of attrition. The 'unique value' ofEnosis, as Ronald Storrs once expressed it, in Greek-Cypriot life was provided with an outlet after 1882 in the form of a Legislative Assembly. That forum witnessed during the closing years of the nineteenth century a more assertive and secular form ofEnosis consciousness, encouraged by such wider events as the Greco-Turkish war of 1896 and the reverberations of the Cretan Question. A more pronounced national strain fed into the internecine struggle between rival factions over the vacant Archbishopric after 1900 which dominated Cypriot public affairs, and accentuated the grievance surrounding the continued extraction of the Cyprus Tribute, once paid to the Ottoman Porte, but now siphoned off to pay British bondholders of a Turkish loan dating back to the Crimean War. A contemporary 7
Francois Crouzet, Le Conflitde Chypre, /946-7959, 2 vols. (Brussels, 1973), i. 100-1. W. Miller, History of the Greek People (London, 1924), p. 281. 9 Katsiaounis, Labour, Politics and Society in Cyprus, 72-8 describes the fiscal impact of British rule on the ecclesiastical domain. This phenomenon was nothing new-—the ancient Orthodox Church in the East had found the rule of the Arabs more congenial to its interests than that of the grasping Byzantines. See Stephen Runciman, A History of the Crusades, 3 vols. (London, 1994; ist edn., 1951), i. 17. 10 R. J. Surridge, A Survey of Rural Life in Cyprus (Nicosia, 1930), p. 22. 8
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British observer in Cyprus felt that it was the Tribute which more than anything else undermined Anglo-Greek understanding within the island." For a long time the indeterminate status of the British presence, and its uncertain prolongation, moderated these frictions. As in Egypt, however, it was the spirit of permanence which gradually came to pervade British occupation in the years prior to the First World War which heightened local discontent. In Cyprus this opposition found a readymade vent in the Enosis demand. On the declaration of war between Britain and Turkey in early November 1914, the Liberal Government annexed Cyprus, liquidating the fiction of Ottoman overlordship. To champions of Enosis, this meant that the island was now at last Britain's to give away according to the proper canons of justice. Indeed, the Coalition Government of Herbert Asquith very nearly did give it away, making such an offer to Greece in April 1915 in return for the latter's entry into war on the Allied side; and had the dominant pro-German faction in Athens not refused, much later turmoil might have been avoided. After the war a Greek-Cypriot delegation joined that exotic but largely powerless fringe at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919—including colonial Africans, Bedouin Arabs, Egyptian pashas, Congress nationalists from India, amongst others—intent on making their often frail voices heard from sidelines. Like other parts of the ex-Ottoman world, the fate of Cyprus was not confirmed until the Treaty of Lausanne in October 1923.12 Under these terms the Turkish Republic, headed by its great architect, Kemal Ataturk, recognized the abrogation of its sovereignty over the island, which Britain duly declared to be a Crown Colony. Later on the interpretation of the Lausanne Treaty became part of the complicated legal woof of the Cyprus dispute. As Crouzet astutely remarks, whereas for some other parts of the Near East the Treaty of Lausanne definitively resolved long-standing controversies over borders and status, the 'Cyprus Question', once a fragment of the old Eastern Question in European and Asiatic diplomacy, was now merely refrigerated within the framework of formal British colonialism." The 'thaw' of decolonization—scarcely in view at that time—was bound eventually to spill out into antagonisms that were more Balkan than colonial in nature, with all the intensity that this description implied. Enosis politics inside Cyprus became much more vocal in the wake of the Lausanne settlement. Its most public expression was the regular passage of resolutions calling for union with Greece and general obstructiveness in the Legislative Assembly. To secure a majority for necessary laws, the British administration found itself reliant on Turkish votes. This helped to foster competition between the Orthodox and Muslim communities (respectively 80 per cent and 18 per cent of the population), and soon led to what one official in the British Colonial Office called a 'regime of apprehension', in which the population had lost its sense of the limits and rules of colonial 1
' C. W. Orr, Cyprus under Hnlisli Rule (London, 1918). '- This period of British rule in Cyprus is fully treated in Gcorghallides, A Political and Administrative History of Cyprus, 1918-1926 (Nicosia, 1979). '•' Crou/ct, Con/lit dc Chyprc, i. 47.
Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, ig$4-1959
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governance. There were two possible ways of meeting this rising challenge. One was represented by Governor Storrs' preference for what he termed an 'oriental method of administrative tactics'. This was a kind of English liberalism in the East, involving the abolition of the Tribute in 1928, making the most of new imperial legislation for Welfare and Development, and most importantly recognizing fully the Greekness of the Greeks—a man, Storrs afterwards wrote, is of the race that he feels himself to be, so that the Greek-Cypriot was 'Greek-speaking, Greek-thinking, Greek-feeling, Greek, just as much as the French-Canadian is French-speaking, French-thinking, French-feeling and French'.14 By the same token, Storrs accepted the Turkishness of the Turks, and his 'administrative tactics' led him to flit from a Greek social gathering, where he liked to display his considerable classical learning, to some Turkish reception where a sprig of green would be worn in his white lapel. This duality easily seemed fabricated and disingenuous. When a visitor to the island in the wake of the 1931 troubles asked a local English official why, despite his earnest efforts, Storrs had been hated, the explanation given was because 'they [the Greeks] felt he was laughing at them'.15 This was unfair. Storrs was not laughing, only being clever in the traditions of British oriental statecraft which he had himself played a distinguished part in evolving. But sensitivity at being 'laughed at', or simply being taken for granted, was nevertheless to loom large in Greek-Cypriot mentality thereafter. The second method of resolving the apprehensions of British supremacy was much simpler: coercion. The temptation to fall back on the use of force, or what one contemporary analyst of the British Empire referred to as 'the medicine of the body politick',16 was particularly felt in the 'British' Mediterranean between the two world wars, as that region emerged as a principal locus of the United Kingdom's overseas power. In Cyprus from 1925 onwards the British administration in the island and the Colonial Office in London became increasingly impatient with the unstable operation of the old legislative system, and a keen desire emerged to do away with it altogether. The riots of October 1931 provided the pretext to seize back the initiative which had been slipping from British hands for many years. Furthermore, after Storrs had been moved to the backwater of Northern Rhodesia, his two successors as Governor, Sir Reginald Stubbs (1932-3) and General Sir Richmond Palmer (1933-9), presided over policies designed to consolidate this advantage and, in Palmer's words, to effect the 'substitution of a British for a Greek atmosphere' in the colony.17 The ensuing 'era of illiberal laws', as it came to be designated by the GreekCypriot intelligentsia, left a deep imprint on the local colonial pattern. Many of these laws were directed against the Orthodox Church.18 There were regulations 14
15 Storrs, Orientations, 550. Georghallides, Storrs, 700. W. K. Hancock, 'The Medicine of the Body Politic', Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, vol. i, Problems of Nationality, 1918-36 (Oxford, 1936), pp. 393-485. 17 James A. McHenry, The Uneasy Partnership on Cyprus, 79/9-39; The Political and Diplomatic Interaction between Great Britain, Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot Community (New York, 1987), p. 85. 18 See Georghallides, 'Church and State in Cyprus, October 1931 to November 1932: "A Systematic Humiliation of the Autocephalous Church of Cyprus"?', Epeteris (Nicosia), 19 (1992), 361-448. 16
io
i8j8-igso
concerning the ringing of Church bells, which had been used to summon demonstrators together in October 1931. Another statute passed in 1937 tried to give the colonial government some control over future elections to the archiepiscopacy, though after Cyril Ill's death in 1935 the Holy Synod steadfastly refused to elect a successor whilst the Bishops of Kitium and Kyrenia remained in exile. Under Stubbs and Palmer, too, the Cyprus authorities sought to wrest control of secondary education from Greek-Cypriot, particularly ecclesiastical, hands. Education, indeed, testified to the ability and determination of Greek society in Cyprus to live in its own world, almost as if British sovereignty did not exist; especially galling to British officials were the school maps marking Cyprus blue for Greece, not red for the British Empire. Palmer's introduction of supervisory Boards of Education to curb these 'abuses' stimulated allegations of the Government's dehellenizing intentions which struck deep roots in the Greek-Cypriot mind. Although the ecclesiastical hierarchy had too keen a sense of its own interests to clash head-on with the British during the 19308, a certain iron entered the Cypriot Orthodox soul, and must have been on display at many common meal-tables when the future Archbishop Makarios III was a novice at Kykko monastery, imbibing the thoughts of his venerable seniors. Above all, after 1931 the British and the Greeks in Cyprus retreated into their respective social and mental compartments, meeting only at the official interface as ruler and ruled. Social contact even at the highest levels became constrained and increasingly rare. 'If I might suggest, Sir, no more mixed tea parties', an officer commanding one of the emergency detachments sent from Egypt had advised Storrs,19 and after Storrs left Nicosia these uncomfortable occasions became largely a thing of the past. Of course, this disengagement could not be complete on a small island; for one thing, the administration, Police, and the bureaucracy of the courts would have collapsed without Greek personnel; whilst Britons and Greeks had always been bound up together in urban commerce. The very advancement of Greek society in the island, nevertheless, meant that it could not be co-opted as a junior, collaborating class in the classic colonial style, and as such both sides increasingly tended to keep each other at a distance. Where the British fell back on their political superiority, and a belief apparently confirmed by practice that Greek-Cypriots 'at the first sign of firmness . . . behave like lambs', the majority of educated Greeks rebounded into an exclusive concentration on Orthodoxy, on Enosis and cultural insularity as a counterpoint to colonial subordination. This cult of Enosis was perfervid and prone to excess emotion; a dream-world where Greek myth and feeling easily slid from reality, 'a hypnotization of a living self by a dead self, as Arnold Toynbee once defined a certain variety of nationalism. But locked into this confined space, it was natural that the Greek mind in Cyprus took the forms it did. Of the obsession of GreekCypriots with Enosis the same observation applies that was once made with regard to the appeal of Orangism in Protestant Ulster—that nobody could understand the extent and vigour of the feeling except those who shared it.2(} 19 211
Storrs, Orientations, 700. R. M. Henry, The Evolution of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1920), p. 137.
Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959
11
There was, nevertheless, a new element in Greek-Cypriot politics prior to the Second World War which, if it was not opposed to Enosis, existed in contradistinction to it. This was Communism, which in marxisant forms took root in Cypriot towns, especially rumbustious Limassol, from the early 19205. Its roots in the impact of urbanization and proletarianization on a still deeply rural society, as well as its secularism and clandestine character, made it a tough proposition for the British, who during the 19305 came to see the Left—not least through its close links with the burgeoning trade unions—as potentially their most dangerous enemy. The effects of this Communist intrusion on the Greek-Cypriot Right were complex. The latter, possessing no comparable set of ideas to compete with those of the Left, or even with the developmental rhetoric of British colonialism, rallied defensively to the Enosis ideal, whilst the Communists, although carefully avoiding the stigma of being 'antinational', were increasingly repelled by the reactionary and clerical penumbra surrounding Enosis. Consequently there arose the beginnings of a venomous rivalry between Left and Right which was integrated, along with the British presence, into a highly complex tri-cornered battle for the leadership of Cyprus. For the colonial administration, the emergence of Cypriot Communism had the initial benefit of driving a potential wedge into Greek society. But this bonus was more than cancelled out in the long term by the effect in stirring up and radicalizing the Right's devotion to the cause of Enosis as almost its sole motivating ideal. One of the facets of Cypriot Communism which made it so dangerous to competitors was that it harboured a capacity to span the communal divide between Greeks and Turks. Turkish Cyprus will come to feature prominently in our account. In fact the Turks were the only major social grouping which did not at this earlier stage hanker after some form of hegemony. Having lost power, they did not expect to regain it. They were also a relatively declining community in terms of demography and wealth. 'This significant change in the natural order of things', a British official commentary later remarked with regard to the shift in land-ownership, 'has been the inevitable outcome of the natural thrust of the Greek-Cypriot community and the failure of the Turkish-Cypriot community to keep pace with them in a competitive world where they [the Turks] are no longer the ruling class.'21 To keep up with the pace of Greek-Cypriot modernization, or at least to prevent themselves being trampled over in the process, the local Turkish leaders came to rely on a mild British favouritism. The nuances of this incipient Anglo-Turkish tie in Cyprus were neatly encapsulated in the experience of the Acting Governor, Harry Luke, whose job it was in November 1914 to go and inform the Turkish notables that due to annexation they had become British citizens rather than subjects of the Caliph. He expected a rough response, but found their attitude to be one of'dignified resignation'.22 Over the following years the Evcaf, or Muslim religious foundation, fell largely under British guidance, as did the shariah courts: this old-fashioned, tolerant, and religiously 21
Government of Cyprus to British Embassy, Ankara, 19 Feb. 1954,00926/183. Sir Harry Luke, Cities and Men. An Autobiography, vol. ii, Aegean, Cyprus, Turkey, Transcaspia and Palestine (^14-24) (London, 1951), p. i. 22
12
iSjS-rgso
latitudinarian community became so dependent on the secular government that after 1930 they did not even bother to appoint their own mufti. This picture of social atrophy should not be overdrawn. Although many of the most progressive elements in the Muslim community were drawn towards the brighter lights of the new Republic in Turkey, Kemalist inspiration still managed to export itself to Muslim Cyprus. The result was a 'Turkification' of the chief Cypriot minority which, whilst it did not lead to the abandonment of the fez or the adoption of the Latin alphabet at the same rate as on the mainland, did gradually modify the status quo. Greek and Turkish Cyprus were both caught up, then, in the same forces of change, but in a highly differentiated manner. The quality of Greek and Turkish coexistence in Cyprus was always a matter for contention. Spatially the two groups intermingled a good deal. There was no part of the island where the Turks had bunched themselves into a majority; equally there were few areas—the Troodos mountains, later one of the heartlands of GreekCypriot rebelliousness against British rule, being an exception—where a Muslim presence was almost wholly absent. In the villages Greeks and Turks frequented their own coffee-shops, but apart from talking about the same perennial topics of rural life, they often used the same language and as individuals indulged in the full range of intercourse; mixed marriages were very rare, but what evidence there is suggests that sexual liaison was by no means uncommon. In some areas this admixture of Greek and Turkish life extended even to certain syncretic tendencies in religion; it was not unknown for individuals from the two communities to venerate at the shrines of the other, and a number of Turkish communities existed in the vicinity of Orthodox monasteries without friction. Similarly, in the towns the two groups had their own quarters, but they were not by any means rigidly demarcated, and urban markets operated in a way which took little account of racial difference. Significantly, it was more or less impossible to tell Greeks or Turks apart by appearance or dress. In the language of socio-psychiatry, the sense of'otherness' experienced by the great majority of Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots in relation to each other was very limited. Yet if the two main Cypriot communities lived alongside each other, they only lived with each other in qualified wrays; and whilst colonial Cyprus was characterized by a Greco-Turkish pax of a sort, old differences were not reconciled out of existence. Localized shocks were apt to produce open conflict, as when communal riots in Limassol in 1912 led to seven fatalities. Basically, Turkish Cyprus was accommodating, even complacent, towards the economic and social dominance of the majority; but being in the curious position of a minority who had once formed part of the ruling power, it evinced an instinctive hostility to anything which smacked of Greek political supremacy. For this reason Cypriot Turks were highly suspicious ofEnosis, reacted critically to the riots of 1931, and approved the repressive laws—aimed against Greeks, not themselves—which had ensued. Before long communal tensions relapsed into the general inertia induced by what Greeks called the 'Palmcrist dictatorship', assisted by the sustained rapprochement between Greece and Turkey after the disasters in the region during the early 19205. Yet it was, perhaps, always likely
Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959
J
3
that this somnolence would only last so long as indigenous politics in its modern form continued to be suppressed within the island. The Second World War interrupted the somewhat stagnant calm in Cyprus and brought political effervescence in its wake, as it did in much of Britain's overseas empire. Unlike some other large Mediterranean islands—Crete, Malta, Sicily—it was not the scene of battles, but it was deeply affected by events around it.23 The Italian attack on Greece in October 1940 and its heroic repulse, British intervention in the Peloponnese in early 1941, and German invasion and occupation with all its rigours and deprivations, gave a new meaning to embattled Hellenism. Cyprus could not be insulated against these tremors. Nor, in the circumstances, was it in Britain's interest to do so. In defying Fascism, Britain (and her Empire) was alone for a time except for poor, weak, but heroic Greece. The Byronic idyll of Anglo-Hellenic comradeship was fashioned anew. Pressed to fulfil its recruiting targets, the Cyprus authorities even used the slogan 'For Greece and Freedom'. Volunteers flocked to the Cyprus Regiment, though not necessarily because of the slogan, since of the 37,000 Cypriots who volunteered for the Cyprus Regiment, roughly one-third was Turkish. The war years prompted a new colonial credo in British policy embracing partnership, development, and the promise to extend self-government. In the Colonial Office this meant that the complete absence of any local representation in Cypriot administration made a striking anomaly. The wartime Governor, Sir Charles Woolley, was therefore pressed into reintroducing a modest degree of constitutional representation. This did not mean a restoration of the defunct Legislative Assembly, but in 1943 municipal elections were held for the first time since the 19205. These were notable for the first incursion into politics of AKEL (the Progressive Party of Workers), as the Communists had recently regrouped themselves, winning office in Famagusta and Limassol. Immediately afterwards the newly elected mayors of both Left and Right, however, despatched a joint memorial to London demanding Enosis. While the war, therefore, witnessed a new rhetoric of Anglo-Greek comradeship, it was a rhetoric which the various sides in Cyprus sought to turn to their own advantage. As, too, in some other imperial relationships during the war, cynicism gradually triumphed over unity against a common menace. Governor Woolley expressed what became a common expatriate view when he remarked of Cypriots, for example, that 'there is no genuine willingness to contribute to the war effort, except in so far as it pays to do so'.24 When a British journalist passed on a message of support from the acting Archbishop, the Governor merely raised a dubious eyebrow and muttered, 'He said that, did he?'25 Such brittle guardedness now epitomized the dominant British attitude to the Greek ecclesiastical and civil elite. Simultaneously, Greeks 23
Anglo-Greek relations on Cyprus during the Second World War are nicely evoked in Percy Arnold, Cyprus Challenge: A Colonial Island and its Aspirations (London, 1956). 24 G. H. Kelling, Countdown to Rebellion: British Policy in Cyprus, igsg-55 (New York, 1990), p. 58. 25 Arnold, Cyprus Challenge, 45.
14
1878-1950
came widely to discount British claims to be fighting in the name of Freedom and Democracy. The rejection which entered wartime relations is illustrated by the contrast that when Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, visited Cyprus in the spring of 1941, he had been met by cheerful and curious crowds; but by the time a senior Colonial Office official spent a few days on the island in July 1944, charged to report on the situation whilst ostensibly opening a number of development projects, his itinerary was marred by demonstrations, and he had to be kept under police protection outside the towns to prevent further disorders.26 All in all, by the end of the Second World War the situation in Cyprus could not be said to have been revolutionary. Public order was not seriously in jeopardy. Yet the atmosphere was deeply unsettled, and the sentiment of Greek nationalism as lively as it had ever been now that the lid of repression had been hesitantly lifted. After the war, the British in Cyprus were to find themselves sucked back into all the old uncertainties which had plagued them before the apotheosis of 1931. A liberal instinct in colonial and imperial policy was one of the features of the Labour Government of Clement Attlee after July 1945. This did not extend, however, to any contemplation of granting Enosis to Cyprus, although there was a continuing strand of philhellenism in the Foreign Office which led one of its most senior figures, Sir William Strang, to express the purely personal opinion that in the end union with Greece would prove both the most just and expedient solution to the Cyprus problem.27 The policy which the Secretary of State for Colonies, Arthur Creech-Jones, unveiled in the House of Commons on 23 October 1946, nevertheless, included the repeal of the old 'Palmcrist' Law on archiepiscopal elections, an amnesty for the exiles of 1931, and accelerated economic development.28 Most significantly, a Consultative Assembly was provisionally announced to consider more thoroughgoing constitutional reforms. Creech-Jones' desire to turn over a new leaf in Cypriot administration also entered into his selection of Woolley's successor as Governor. Instead of appointing yet another official from an African colony, a practice which Cypriot nationalists always resented as a slight to themselves, the Colonial Secretary chose Lord Winster, a retired Labour politician with no previous experience of administration overseas. 1947/8 was a watershed in the affairs of much of the European colonial world. A pattern was discernible in which some territories found themselves on a conveyor-belt transporting them, albeit at varying speeds, towards political independence, whilst others lost their place in the queue (the latter invariably with deleterious results for all concerned). In the case of Cyprus it was sometimes argued that if Lord Winster had arrived quickly in the colony, instead of delaying his appearance till March 1947, and been able to implement a fresh policy with the sort of aplomb which Lord Mountbatten exhibited in India, then the whole Cypriot scene might have been transformed. But in this context the Indian analogy—apart from the obvious matter of physical 26 27 2S
Arnold, Cyprus Challenge, 45. W. Strang, minute, 17 Dec. 1950, F O t f i / H j i $ , RGio8i/io. Parliamentary Debates: (Conimom), 1945-6, vol. 427, 23 Oct. 1946, cols. 396-8.
Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, ig54~i959 scale—was
15
misleading. Mountbatten's panache and freedom to manoeuvre derived precisely from an implicit British willingness to leave India. Not only was the Labour Government not prepared to leave Cyprus, but the fact that the British strategic stakes in both Egypt and Palestine were simultaneously under pressure meant that the imperial value of the island was rising rather than falling. The slippery relationship between strategic utility and political policy which took root in the framework of post-war instability in the eastern Mediterranean was profoundly to shape the evolution of the Cyprus issue. When Winster went to Cyprus, therefore, he carried with him little by way of political gifts, and that little was not gratefully received. Arriving in Nicosia, he found the town decked out in Hellenic colours, and no leading members of the main community to meet him; the local press offered him the sole advice to go home and inform the British Cabinet of the immutability of their demand for Enosis. Before long Winster was caught up in the psychological barbed wire which had for some while come to divide the Cyprus Government from the bulk of the population. But not everything remained exactly as it was in Cyprus. The later 19405 were a crucible for changing Cypriot politics. An election to the Archbishopric could be relied on to stir feelings amongst Greeks. As it happened, there were two in quick succession. The first of these led to the elevation of the acting Ethnarch, Leontius, who lived long enough to coin the slogan'Enosis and only Enosis' before succumbing to typhus on 26 July 1947. In the second election, victory went to the Bishop of Kyrenia, now returned from his long exile, who was installed as Makarios II (not to be confused with his own successor, Makarios III, with whom we shall be principally concerned). Amidst the ecclesiastical and popular hubbub the Church leadership adopted a more aggressively nationalist tone and threw off some of the restraints which expediency had dictated after 1931. But the conflict between the Greek Church and colonial government remained highly stylized. By contrast, what emerged into the open in 1947/8 was a bitter struggle between the ecclesiastical Right and the secular Left for dominance within the Greek community. The superimposition of Left-Right competition upon the classical pattern of dissatisfaction with British rule was deeply to mark the saga of the Consultative Assembly which opened on i November 1947. That Winster got this off the ground was an achievement in itself. It is doubtful that any 'career' Governor could have done it. His biggest success was to persuade AKEL to participate, providing eight of the ten Greek representatives; the other two had to be nominated by the Governor, since the Right boycotted the whole exercise (there were also seven Turks, and one Maronite, presided over by a British chairman, the Chief Justice in the colony, Sir Edward Jackson). After protracted discussions, Governor Winster went back to London in April 1948—as his successors during the Emergency were often to do—in the hope of obtaining authority to make the sort of offer, based on Jackson's draft liberal constitution, which could clinch agreement and trigger a process of reconciliation. Perhaps a year earlier he might have got what he wanted. But the Labour Government was already past its prime, and harried by the Conservative Opposition; Palestine, in particular, was racked by rebellion. Although Attlee had provisionally given his
16
1878-1 g$o
blessing to the Jackson document, the Cabinet—prompted by Foreign Secretary Bevin, who was determined to reinforce Britain's remaining bastions in and around the Middle East—turned it down. When Winster returned to Nicosia he took with him instead a very modest proposition which fell markedly short of the degree of selfgovernment recently acquired, for example, by Malta. Almost immediately the Left—mercilessly flayed by the Right as 'anti-national' for its cooperation with the British—cut its losses and retreated from the Assembly, which swiftly collapsed. Thereafter AKEL sedulously fostered the image of being more Enosist than the Enosists in an attempt to wipe the blot of 1947/8 from its escutcheon. British officialdom, for its part, fell back, mostly with relief, on the old certitudes of benevolent but stern autocracy. Of course, there were different interpretations as to who was to blame for the failure. The liberal Manchester Guardian in Britain argued that the Greek-Cypriots had shown their inveterate irresponsibility by rejecting a perfectly sensible proposal.29 Greeks almost universally believed that the British and Cyprus Governments had been insincere in setting up the Assembly in the first place. All the various protagonists returned to their mental fortresses. The crisis of trust which impregnated the final years of British rule on the island started at this point. Lord Winster, acutely disappointed, announced his resignation in November 1948, though he did not leave till the following February, his last public function in Lefkara marred by much jostling and heckling. For his successor, the Labour Government went back to basics and selected Sir Andrew Wright, presently Governor of the Gambia. He was recommended by the assumed advantage of being an old Cyprus hand; as Major Wright, and Storrs' right-hand man, it was petrol from his wrecked motor-car which had been used by rioters to touch off the conflagration of Government House on 21 October 1931. His instructions from the Labour Government in returning to Cyprus included a cautious reminder not to miss an opportunity to get constitutional life going again in the island; but there was never much chance that a man, described within the Colonial Office as 'a fine Victorian type now almost extinct in the British Colonial Service','" and who 'looked upon the Cypriots somewhat as children who needed a firm hand [and] . . . an occasional spanking', would do any such thing. The clash between the continuing vitality of a strict colonial orthodoxy on the part of the local British authorities, and the widespread sense amongst GreekCypriots of being caught in a time-warp, of being passed by in a brave new post-war world, underlay the looming confrontation during the years ahead. For the moment, however, the focus of Cypriot affairs remained on the internecine struggle between the Nationalists and AKEL. The bitterness displayed was a reflection of the savageries of the civil war then coming to a bloody climax in Greece. Thus the purge within AKEL of those associated with the 'deviation' of participation in the Consultative Assembly was ordered directly from the 29
Manchester Guardian (i$ Aug. 1948). '" Margaret Tibbetts (United States Embassy, London) to Department of State, 28 Nov. 1950, Box 2403, RG-,9, State Department Reeords, Archives of the United States of America, Washington (henceforth USNA).
Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959
17
headquarters of KKE, the Communist Party of Greece. Simultaneously, the Church and the Right resounded to cries of'Down with the Constitution!' and 'Away from the Polls!'. In the municipal elections of early 1949, the previous advances of AKEL were reversed. Amidst this heightened political and social conflict, which also involved bitter disputes on the Cyprus copper mines, the Orthodox hierarchy was edged, at first very nervously, towards a fateful decision. For centuries the Church had been able to exercise its primacy within Greek society from its elevated social and institutional position. Invaders had come and gone; but inside the island, clerical leadership had not been fundamentally challenged. Now it was threatened both by the British with their putative constitutionalism, and from the Left with its secular ideology and parallel institutions. Against this background, the Church felt driven to 'go down amongst the people', to soil its hands in a grubby and also dangerous political struggle, if its religious and temporal position was to be preserved. Faced with the appointment to the vacant see of Kitium in April 1949, the Church's seniors broke with their gerontocratic conventions by choosing a young and dynamic Deacon then on a World Council of Churches Scholarship in the United States. The youthful Bishop Makarios, on his return, was immediately put in charge of the Ethnarchy bureau, and hence with oversight of the Enosis campaign.31 From the start he showed himself to be an astute and determined political operator. The shadowy presence in Cyprus during the summer of 1949 of agents of the fanatically anti-Communist Khi organization in Greece, whose leader was Colonel George Grivas, himself a Cypriot by birth, was a further sign that tensions on the island were coming to a head. The public offer of the Left in October to join a 'national embassy' to demand Enosis at the United Nations triggered events which were profoundly to alter the political landscape of Cyprus. Not only did this nascent 'internationalization' of the Enosis claim have consequences which nobody could have anticipated at the time, but more immediately it amounted to an attempt to impose joint leadership on the national struggle itself. The pressure this brought to bear on the Church and the Right to throw caution to the winds, and to strike a blow against both the Communists and the British, epitomized the internal dynamics of colonial politics in Cyprus. On i December 1949 the Holy Synod announced that a plebiscite on Enosis would be held the following month; the Cyprus Government would be asked to conduct this vote; and if it refused, the Church would assume the sacred duty itself. This was a direct challenge to all who opposed the Church's claims not only to primacy within the Enosis movement, but to a wider supremacy within Cypriot society. Just as the Church was being forced into defending its established prestige and privileges, so, too, were the colonial authorities. The Archbishop's letter to Governor Wright on 4 December 1949 requesting that his administration assume responsibility for the plebiscite got a predictably dusty answer. Wright told him that the issue of sovereignty over the island was completely and permanently closed. On 13 January 1950, 31 For the election of the young Makarios to episcopal office, see Stanley Mayes, Makarios. A Biography ("London, 1981), pp. 27-8.
18
1878-1950
two days before the vote was due to take place on Church premises throughout the island, the Governor sent a dispatch to the Colonial Office requesting the grant of special powers to curb the press, prosecute sedition, and, through a change to the Deportation (British Subjects) Law, to act decisively against troublemakers." As a distillation of the wisdom of what Wright habitually called the 'British Ascendancy' in Cyprus this analysis merits attention. He assured Creech-Jones at the outset that the purpose of the desired legislation was to create the stable conditions necessary for the eventual reintroduction of constitutional government. But more important than this, he insisted, was the adoption of a firm and unambiguous policy which would allow the administration to be conducted in future without perpetual interruption from political crises, and with as much assistance as possible from 'the very large body of the public on whose tacit support the administration rests'. Wright further summarized the rhythms of the movement and the necessary responses it evoked: 'The strength of Enosis is not consistent but ebbs and flows in accordance with external conditions . . . and with the ability of the Administration to control abuse of the Enosis influence... under such powers as may be allowed.'" It flowed from this principle that while it was up to Her Majesty's Government in London to see that the sources of external support for Enosis were cut off, above all from Greece, it was essential that the Cyprus administration be armed with the authority to defeat its protagonists on home ground. Meanwhile, the Governor impressed on the Colonial Secretary, the plebiscite being run by the Church had made conditions even less appropriate for constitutional government, let alone the exercise of self-determination, than had been the case before 1931. Wright's dispatch to London was, in many ways, the true harbinger of the Emergency state in Cyprus during 1955-9, J ust as tne calling of the plebiscite marked a new and more active stage in the Enosis movement. Nevertheless, the Governor knew that there was nothing he could do to prevent the plebiscite itself taking place. An injunction could hardly be made preventing the Orthodox faithful entering the Churches and appending their signatures to bound volumes propped up before the altar-piece. The authorities restricted themselves to reminding all Government employees that they must refrain from any political activity. This was the beginning of a prolonged crisis of loyalties for all Grcek-Cypriots in public service. The voting took place between 15 and 22 January 1950 amidst complete calm and with no incidents. All those aged over 18, of both sexes, were eligible to sign the registers. Bells called the believers to their duty; whilst the more pious were said to have bowed before the Enosis document as if it were an icon. From the sidelines the Muslim minority watched proceedings with mingled uninterest and apprehension. The more florid and romantic accounts of this occasion from the Greek side may be discounted. But at least one British observer with many years experience of living in the Near East was deeply impressed by what he estimated to be a dignified and orderly expression of national will.14 To Wright and his Government it was a blatant display 12
Wright to Arthur Creech-Jones, 13 Jan. 1950, CO537/6228. " A. M. Dickson toj. S. Bennett, 25 June 1950, (10926/175.
" Ibid.
Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 7954-7959
19
of ecclesiastical blackmail; and undeniably the nature of the proceedings involved considerable moral pressure. Whether voting in secret would have markedly reduced the plurality of 96.5 per cent of the votes cast in favour of Enosis is, however, doubtful. Political mobilization, as embodied in the Church plebiscite on the one side, and the temptation of special powers for the colonial government on the other, were mirror images of the hostile forces set in motion. Violence was not yet part of this picture. British autocracy retained a certain benevolence, couched in terms of sound government and developmental goals—1950 was the year when the scourge of malaria was finally lifted from the island, perhaps the greatest legacy of British rule. At the same time the rhetoric of Enosis still kept its dream-like, almost theoretical, quality. Everything remained too provisional, or merely aspirational, to generate physical conflict. Yet there had come again into being by the end of January 1950 a regime of anxiety and mistrust of a peculiarly intense variety; to this extent at least Wright's analysis was not at all misplaced. Later on the Emergency was to take many novel forms, and helped to create a new Cyprus divided in many ways; but the lineaments of the older colonial pattern were always to be discernible.
2
A Crisis of Trust, i February 1950-1 April 1955 Sir Andrew Wright's demands for repressive powers—described by a legal adviser in the Colonial Office as 'far and away the most extreme demand put up by any [colonial] territory so far as my experience . . . extends'—triggered a debate in British circles which ran up to, and beyond, the outbreak of violence on the island. To John Bennett, a senior official with wide experience in the region, it was reminiscent of 'the familiar talk of harassed colonial governors everywhere in the last half century', convinced that the sole solution to their problems lay in the power to lock up a few agitators; the result had usually only been to stoke up further protest.' Hitherto, Bennett went on, Cyprus had not fallen into this pattern, because it was too small either to rebel or to become a major international issue, but he warned against any assumption that this would continue to be so in the 19508. This critique found an echo with Labour ministers, and especially with Jim Griffiths, who succeeded Creech-Jones as Colonial Secretary in February 1950. Griffiths was an old-fashioned trade union radical with a strong distaste for colonial reaction. But it was not an easy thing to turn down a governor's advice regarding his own colony. Wright was asked, therefore, to be patient whilst an assessment was sought from the Chiefs of Staff as to the strategic value of Cyprus to Britain. On this judgement would hinge the price—including the price of repression—that might be paid to keep the island under exclusive British control. We must say something at this point concerning the background to these crucial strategic rationalizations. In fact grave doubts as to the usefulness of possessing Cyprus had been expressed in the run-up to the original occupation in 1878. 'A glance at the map', commented the then British Ambassador in Constantinople, Sir Henry Layard, was enough to indicate the island's shortcomings as a location from which to exercize power and influence in the wider Middle East.2 The absence of large-scale port facilities, and the difficulty of constructing them, was widely remarked upon in Parliament at the time. The distinguished historian of British foreign policy, Harold Temperley, concluded that Disraeli's decision to acquire Cyprus had been hasty and based on imperfect information. Whatever practical military significance Cyprus may have had for the United Kingdom was shortly afterwards made redundant by the occupation of Egypt in 1882. It was thereafter that country— principally through the base at Suez—which became the linchpin of British strategy in the Orient, and eventually played such a large part in two world wars; in the 1 J. Bennett, minute, 21 Jan. 1950, CO537/6228. - H. Temperley, 'Further Evidence on Disraeli and Cyprus', English Historical Review (January 1930, PP. 458-9-
Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959
21
conflict of 1939-45 Cairo was virtually Britain's overseas capital. By contrast, Cyprus remained a backwater. It was this happy experience of military obscurity, unlike some other parts of the region, which allowed the protagonists of Enosis to argue after 1945 that British claims involving the island's strategic indispensability were a smokescreen for a purely political, and therefore wholly self-interested, requirement. This suspicion had some truth, but only up to a point. Just as in 1878 the putative possession of Batoum or Mohammerah were recognized as clearly preferable to Cyprus as footholds for British expansion in the Near East, so after 1945 continued access to Palestine and Egypt was acknowledged as more directly relevant to the defence of Britain's stake. But in Palestine the Mandatory administration was faced with, and soon defeated by, a Jewish rebellion, whilst in the Egyptian Canal Zone Britain was under mounting pressure which in the end assumed the form of terrorist attacks. It was against this backcloth that in late 1948 it was concluded by the Air Ministry in London that 'the strategic importance of Cyprus has grown enormously since the Second World War'.3 The precise reasoning behind this growth, however, had an essentially political and constitutional twist which was to feed powerfully into later events. A key lesson which British policy-makers and strategists derived from painful Middle Eastern lessons in the later 19405 was that to depend on leaseback arrangements and political 'understandings' to guarantee key military facilities was to live above a trap-door which might swing open at any time. Only sovereignty— pure and undiluted—could ensure that British forces did not have to live the same hand-to-mouth existence which they had endured since the end of the war in so many other places.4 In other words, it was the very status of Cyprus as a Crown Colony which, imperfect as it was in many strategical and physical aspects, made its retention specially important as providing a nodal point of Britain's residual strength in the region. This was the essential thought coming to the surface when, in early 1950, the Chiefs of Staff were asked to make their definitive assessment. The manner in which that assessment was made is highly significant. An initial submission to the Chiefs of Staff drawn up in the Colonial Office sought to balance military factors against 'the political reactions to our present position and policy in Cyprus on Commonwealth policy and ideals, on our position in the United Nations . . . [and] our general claim to represent Western democracy . . . in fact [on] our ideological position in the Cold War'.5 When this paper went to the Foreign Office, however, it disappeared from view for six weeks, during which it became the monopoly of the Middle Eastern 'experts' in that department. The outcome was described as a 'fervent essay setting out the reasons . . . for keeping Cyprus'. What followed was, in John Bennett's opinion, a 'superfluous and rather silly' process in 1
Director of Planning, Air Staff minute, 7 Sept. 1948, Air 20/7028. British strategic planning in the eastern Mediterranean in this period is fully documented in John Kent (ed.), Egypt and the Defence of the Middle East. British Documents on the End of Empire, Ser. B. vol. iv (London, 1998). 5 Bennett, minute, 21 Jan. 1950,0)537/6228. 4
22
/ February-1 April 7955
which, while posing questions to the Chiefs of Staff, the answers were also provided without their complexities being addressed in a serious or rigorous way.6 The main components of the appreciation which emerged in April were that Cyprus had 'a positive and increasing strategic role as an air base and a garrison'; and that only access to the whole of the island under conditions of sovereignty could serve the resulting British needs.7 By no means everybody in the Colonial Office shared Bennett's scepticism. Sir John Martin, the Assistant Under-Secretary, whose general influence on policy derived in part from having been Churchill's chief personal aide in the Second World War, welcomed the conclusion as 'a solid foundation for the future'. 8 What is notable here is the highly skewed manner in which the fundamentals of the British position in Cyprus was drawn up. 'This is the starting point', it was concluded in the Colonial Office as a plain matter of fact. 'We must resign ourselves to the position of being primarily an occupying Power.'9 Whilst this conclusion was being thrashed out, Sir Andrew Wright returned to Cyprus and set about dealing as best he could with his opponents (indeed, one of the reasons used by Griffiths to deny him the special powers he had recently requested was that the Cyprus Government already had enough authority at its disposal to act rigorously against sedition). When the nationalist-dominated municipal council in Limassol changed the name of 'Churchill Street' to 'October 28th Street', thus newly commemorating the day when Greece went to war with Italy in 1940, Wright imprisoned the offending members, and replaced them with his own nominees. Such action seemed overblown in London, and Griffiths resented having to defend it at the Dispatch Box. When he complained to the Governor, however, Wright simply replied that there would soon be a 'Down with England Street' in every Cypriot town unless prompt action was taken to stop the rot."1 This difference of perspective between London and Nicosia was to be a constant factor in events, although the forms of its expression were to prove by no means consistent. That Sir Andrew Wright was an antediluvian figure was obvious enough to the Colonial Office—and even more so to most Cypriots. There was both about him and his administration a degree of 'out-of-touchness' which was unusual even by the standards of most contemporary colonial regimes where social change, often closely related to the war, had moved ahead of political evolution. 'During our conversation', the United States Consul, William Porter, reported to the State Department in Washington on an interview he had with Wright at the Governor's country retreat in the Cypriot mountains, in which the latter stressed the need to bring to an end what he called the era of British laxness in the colony, '. . . I could not help reflecting that it is one thing to sit, high and remote, on the slopes of [Mount] Olympos and '' Bennett, minute, 20 Apr. 1950,0.0537/6244. 7 Chiefs of Staff Paper, 'The Strategic Importance of Retaining Full Sovereignty in Cyprus', June 1950, CO537/6244. 8 Sir J. Martin, minute, 24 Apr. 1950,03537/6244. '' M. Fisher, minute, 8 June 1950, CO537/6228. 111 Wright to Griffiths, 12 June 1950,0)537/6229.
Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-7959
23
figure out how to bring the Cypriots to heel, and quite another matter to do it effectively.'11 One ingredient in the air of unreality was the fact that this insular regime had over a long period of time escaped from close metropolitan surveillance. When the minutes of the Cyprus Executive Council were examined for the first time in the Colonial Office, it was remarked, for example, that they afforded 'an interesting window through which to peep at an administration of which we [in London] know so little'.12 Wright and his colleagues lived in this enclosed official world, and many of their characteristics, viewed from outside, amounted to caricature. Yet their assumptions were not wholly untested or lacking in a logic of their own. Cypriot experience did appear to bear out Governor Wright's basic principle that 'if you wave sticks at Cypriots you do not have to call out the garrison'.13 Appearances, in short, were everything, and underpinned a very Mediterranean ambience of theatrical make-believe. Richard Grossman, the Labour parliamentarian and journalist, caught this Cypriot flavour very well when he wrote following a visit to the island that: nothing is very serious, since no one on either side means what he says or does what he means. The Government issues one terrifying edict after another forbidding Enosis propaganda, but makes no effort to enforce them when they are flagrantly disobeyed. The Greeks chant 'Enosis or Death' in impressive chorus, but are genuinely horrified when you ask them what they propose to do about it. Cyprus is the only amiable police state I have ever visited.14
For a long time it was not to be clear in Cyprus where the comedy of colonial manners ended, and high tragedy began. Meanwhile, during the summer of 1950 the impasse between Griffiths and Wright over the request for special powers continued. 'Once embarked on a policy of repression' the minister argued 'we could not stop half-way, we must see it through',15 adding that he could not authorize 'emergency powers without any emergency' in the island. Wright at least succeeded in keeping his demands on the agenda for future discussion. Furthermore, he was in no doubt himself that an emergency did already exist on the island and would have eventually to be resolved. More proof of this had been afforded by the decision of the Ethnarchy Council to send representatives to Athens bearing the impressive leather-bound volumes of the plebiscite's signatures. Wright insisted that the British Government see to it that these delegates were not welcomed in the Greek capital. In doing so he pointed out that the speedy suppression of the Enosis rising in 1931 had not least been due to the fact that Prime Minister Venizelos in Athens had told his own countrymen that so long as British supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean survived intact, Greece could not put at risk 'the traditional framework of Anglo-Hellenic friendship'. But times had changed during the interval. In early 1947 a straitened Labour Government in Britain had announced its intention to withdraw its troops from Greece, despite the civil war then raging; and although a United Kingdom Police 11 William J. Porter, 'Politics in Cyprus. A Conversation with the Governor', 16 Sept. 1950, Box 2602, RGsQ, State Department Records, USNA. 12 I1 Martin, minute, 15 Jan. 1953,0)926/42. Fisher, minute, 20 Mar. 1950,0)537/6231. 14 Richard Grossman, 'A Visit to Cyprus', Scotsman and Nation (29 Jan. 1955). 15 Note of meeting with the Secretary of State, 31 Aug. 1950,0)537/6228.
24
/ February ~i April 1955
Mission remained till mid-igso, the British presence was rapidly displaced by American influence and personnel under the aegis of the Truman Doctrine. In addition, the British had left Palestine, and were experiencing acute difficulties in their precarious Egyptian base; the preconditions of the United Kingdom's dominance in the eastern Mediterranean no longer existed. This altered seascape, though it went beyond the purely localized imagination of the British administration in Cyprus, profoundly influenced the latter's fate. One sign of the change was that British badgering of the Greek premier, M. Plastiras, to cold-shoulder the Cypriot delegation met with an ambivalent response. Even King Paul, who owed the restoration of his throne to Churchill, protested that he could not afford to ignore Greek public opinion on the matter completely. The slow evaporation of British support for the Greek monarchy began at this point. Meanwhile, the Cypriot delegates did not come, declaim, and rapidly depart like previous Enosis missions; led by the Bishop of Kyrenia—after Bishop Makarios of Kitium had declined to do so—they stomped the main Greek cities, culminating in a meeting in Athens' Olympic stadium on 21 July 1950. As the British Ambassador told Herbert Morrison, Foreign Secretary in the Labour Government, the effect of this barnstorming was to make 'all Greeks Cyprus-conscious', adding that the 'daily rubbing-in of Greek expectations, and the identification of every kind of national and local organization . . . with these hopes [of Enosis] is a fact'.16 Symbolic of this was the handing-over of the plebiscitary volumes by the Bishop of Kyrenia to the Speaker of the Greek Parliament amidst scenes of Hellenic fervour. Afterwards the Delegation left to take their message to the United Nations. Their mission had not succeeded as yet in its fundamental aim of persuading the Greek Government to sponsor the Enosis cause on the international stage; but they had made headway towards injecting Cypriot aspirations into the mainstream of Greek metropolitan politics. In that setting, indeed, the Cyprus question subsumed a wider meaning; the spirit of Hellenic solidarity it engendered contributed to the knitting-together of a society so recently torn apart in a fratricidal bloodletting. During the prolonged absence of the Enosis delegates from Cyprus an event of even greater influence on the future of the island took place: the election of a new Archbishop following the death of the incumbent on 28 June. There were two candidates: the Bishops of Kyrenia and Kitium. The latter was undoubtedly assisted in the manoeuvres following the Archbishop's death by the absence of his chief rival on the propaganda mission abroad, though this was surely fortuitous rather than indicating, as some alleged, a precocious political talent. Nonetheless, the youthful prelate was duly elevated as Archbishop Makarios III.17 Makarios' personality and beliefs, so difficult to define in such an enigmatic figure, will be left for events gradually to reveal, but the basic facts of his life are as follows. He was born Michael Christodoulou Mouskos, of peasant stock, in the Paphian village of Panayia, close to the ancient "' C. Norton to A. Rumhold, i6June 1950,1^0371/87720, RGio8i/i35. 17 For a concise treatment in English see Stanley Mayes, Makarins. A Biography (London, 1981).
Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959
25
monastery of Chrysorroyiatissa, on 13 August 1913. For young boys of modest background the Church offered one of the few career openings available, and in 1926 he had entered Kykko monastery, remotely situated in the Troodos mountains, as a novice. Aged 20, he enrolled at the Pancyprian Gymnasium in Nicosia, long a centre ofEnosis sentiment and learning, to complete his school studies. In 1939 the young priest was ordained a deacon and took up a scholarship at the University of Athens, in which city he remained during the harsh war years; it was at this stage that he assumed the name of Makarios in connection with his pastoral work. It was in wartime Athens, too, that Makarios first came into contact with extreme right-wing figures who were significantly to influence his career—and whose successors, many years later, and after the terminus of this account, were to destroy so much of his life's work. When peace came he obtained support from the World Council of Churches to pursue further theological training at a Methodist seminary in Boston before, as we noted earlier, being called home to the episcopacy, and finally ascending the throne of St Barnabus at the age of 39. There are several elements in a brief profile of Makarios which should be highlighted. One was his youthfulness and energy. This easily seems a cliche, but was in fact highly significant. Although the Cyprus Government was used to the opposition of the Orthodox clergy, it was an opposition mitigated by a cautious and venerable, not to say geriatric, leadership. Makarios' evident vim and vigour signified that the ancient and highly stylized Cyprus Church was now being driven along by new and unpredictable forces. Secondly, there was the Archbishop-elect's cosmopolitan experience. Of course, it was only cosmopolitan by the yardstick of a small, enclosed island society. Yet it was enough to make him special—representative of a Cyprus coming alive to the outside world, sharply elevating its horizon above the jaded, crushing confines of colonial existence. The third element to be noted was also superficially pedestrian, but of some importance: his gift for finely calculated rhetoric. This attribute is not unusual in an Orthodox primate. But Makarios could outshine almost all his peers; and in a colony where sedition was habitually clothed in rhetoric and satire, this aspect of his abilities stood out.18 It meant that the British were never to be quite clear where Makarios' religion ended and his politics began. This confusion was evident, indeed, even at his enthronement in the Metropolitan Church of St John in Nicosia in October 1950, when one report of the Cyprus Government forwarded to London on the Archbishop's address made it out to be a demagogic exhibition of rhetorical Enosis, whilst another stated that it was a very low-key performance in which politics intruded only obliquely and at the end of His Beatitude's solemn words.19 The contradictions surrounding British assessments of Makarios' character and ambitions 18 There was also another dimension to the Archbishop's magnetism—his voice. 'The appearance of Makarios,' the English poet James Fenton wrote much later, 'the robes, the head-dress, the beard, the smile, assured him of world-wide fame; he might hardly have needed a voice to add to his accomplishments. Yet the voice alone would have made him a hero. It was distinctive enough in English . . . In Greek it was music of the most heady kind.' 'The Death of Makarios', New Statesman (5 Aug. 1977). 19 Political Situation Report, Oct. 1950,00537/6235.
26
/ February-1 April i g$s
will be central to our account, but it may be underlined that a confusion was detectable from his elevation to the primacy. The election of Archbishop Makarios and the edge this undoubtedly gave to the campaign for Enosis provided Governor Wright with the pretext he needed in early 1951 to scotch any possibility of granting Cyprus a new constitution. In explaining to Griffiths why this was so, he confessed that British experience in the island proved 'that as a political idea there is nothing we can offer which can hold a candle to Enosis locally in sentimental appeal. If thus we talk about political idealism, in relation to concrete proposals or practical life, we play straight into the hands ofEnosis'.20 The only alternative this left was to fall back on the reinforcement of the existing order. Insofar as this advice clashed with the instructions which Wright had been given at the time of his appointment, it was an invitation to the home government to dismiss him. That a change of personnel was not enforced at this point was very important. One argument adduced for inaction in Whitehall was that a radical change of course in Cyprus required not just getting rid of the Governor, but 'a clean sweep of most of the other officials'—a clear impossibility.21 Another road taken—or not taken— came in May 1951 when the Greek Government made a highly confidential approach to London, offering in return for Cypriot Enosis to grant the United Kingdom whatever bases she needed either on the island or the Greek mainland. Yet the very weakness of the Labour Government, constantly attacked by the Conservatives for retreating from one British bastion overseas after another, meant there was no serious chance of the offer being taken up. This rejection was critically to affect the development of Greek policy; it was also to sap Labour's ability to attack later Conservative Governments head-on over Cyprus, since the latter could always threaten to publish documents showing what their predecessors had themselves turned down. Meanwhile, the attention ofministers and officials turned instead to the possibilities of executing a kind of counter-coup in Cyprus. In this regard it was argued in the Colonial Office that the current deployment of Enosis forces in both Cyprus and Greece might hold 'tactical possibilities'. If these forces were allowed to approach a peak of excitement, it was pointed out, it might be possible 'with a mixture of care and boldness . . . to cut them all off at once'; the corresponding deflation would be all the greater for having been preceded by so much pent-up expectation.22 It was in this supple (perhaps too-supple) vein that the idea of a pre-emptive strike against Makarios and his supporters took shape. After the British general election in October 1951, Sir Winston Churchill formed a new Conservative Government. Any hope entertained by the Cyprus authorities, however, that this would open up the prospect of the special powers which Wright had continued to press for through the previous summer and autumn, were disappointed. Although the Governor had been promised by officials that his demands would be the very first item brought up with a new Secretary of State for Colonies, 20 21
Wright to Griffiths, igjan. 1951, €0537/7453. Fisher, minute, 19 Sept. 1950, €0537/6229.
n
Fisher, 24 Apr. 1951, €0537/7453.
Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959
27
Griffiths' successor, Oliver Lyttelton, decided that with acute colonial difficulties elsewhere—the British High Commissioner in Malaya, for example, had just been assassinated by Communist insurgents—Cyprus should 'be left undisturbed as long as possible';" Sir Thomas Lloyd, a friend of Wright's, was dispatched to Nicosia to break this unwelcome news. Nor did the Governor obtain much more satisfaction when he returned to London in the spring of 1952. His pleas that Cyprus had now become 'full of seditious talk' which could not any longer be allowed to go unpunished were met by Lyttelton's advice not 'to drive the disease [of Enosis] inward by suppressing the symptoms'.24 But, unlike Griffiths, the new Colonial Secretary did feel that something had to be done to help the Governor in his undoubted predicament. It was in this context that the attraction of a decisive parliamentary statement, which would make plain beyond equivocation Britain's determination to retain full sovereignty over Cyprus, began to take shape. The Governor was even allowed whilst in London to draft the early versions of such a pronouncement—the result was predictably fierce. But a parliamentary manoeuvre on these lines required the cooperation of the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, since it was integral to the scheme that the statement should come at the end of a wider debate on the Middle East, so giving it gravitas and implicitly stressing the strategic imperatives. Eden was not yet convinced that such a manreuvre was necessary, and he refused.25 To the Foreign Office the plan smacked of an attempt both by the Colonial Office and Cyprus administration to evade their responsibility to keep Cyprus quiet. Still, although the concept of a decisive parliamentary declaration, like the possibility of outright repression inside the island, went temporarily into limbo, it did not disappear. Wright was not exaggerating unduly when he tried to impress on Whitehall that things were getting worse in his colony. The election of a Conservative Government in Britain coincided with a further intensification of the Enosis campaign in the island. This phase was inaugurated by Archbishop Makarios' 'Call to Youth' delivered at Phanomerani Church on 13 January 1952 (the second anniversary of the plebiscite). Not long afterwards there occurred the first juvenile disturbances in Paphos and Nicosia, and the early stages of what became known as the 'Battle of the Paint-Pots', in which walls and streets in Cypriot towns were daubed with Enosis slogans; the letter 'A' for 'Anti-stasis', or 'resistance', ran through this graffiti, and such translations as 'Greeks, liberty is won with blood—Enosis, A.A.A.' soon caught the eye of the Colonial Office.26 As the months went by, buildings in the island were to be so covered in this way that there was hardly any clear space left on them—except in the Turkish quarters, and the few high-rise commercial offices that were beginning to be put up, most notably by British banks. Yet it was what could not be seen so graphically that was more important. Under the Archbishop's aegis, the Enosis campaign had grafted on to it an institutional apparatus which it had never previously 23 24 25 26
Thomas Lloyd to Lennox-Boyd, 13 Feb. 1952, €0926/12. Note of meeting at the Colonial Office, 2 Apr. 1952,00926/12. Anthony Eden to Oliver Lyttelton, 29 Apr. 1952, €0926/12. Political Situation Report, May 1952,0)926/19.
28
i February-1 April i g$$
possessed. This encompassed the schools (principally through PEON, the Pancyprian National Youth Organization, which was Makarios' personal creation), the farmers (through PEK, the Pan-agrarian Union of Cyprus), and the Free Trade Unions. For many years, Emms had been a high Greek aspiration, mediated through an ecclesiastical and professional elite, but whose popular roots had been mostly sporadic in their expression. By early 1952 Enosis was on its way to becoming, within the constraints of a small island society, a mass movement with an autonomous institutional life of its own. This was something new—and much more dangerous to colonial authority. Just as important as Makarios' work inside Cyprus was his tireless campaigning beyond its shores. During May 1952 he visited Egypt, the Lebanon, and Syria, partly ministering to Orthodox communities, but more particularly scouting out a government to sponsor Enosis at the United Nations—the real purpose here being to humiliate Greece into doing so herself. Makarios' visit to an Arab world still smarting from the disastrous war with Israel in 1948/9 afforded him his first glimpse of unbridled anti-westernism, and provided the kernel for the 'non-aligned' philosophy which was powerfully to influence him in future years (there was also concern in Whitehall that his entourage might make contact with the arms-dealers now doing a brisk trade in the region). From the Levant he transferred in early June 1952 to Athens. This visit proved a turning-point in his career. For reasons which had little to do with Cyprus, the atmosphere in Athens was tense. The Greek capital was undergoing a rapid and ramshackle growth, sucking in population from the countryside. Many of the tensions generated came to be refracted through Cypriot affairs, as if the blockage of aspirations in one sector of Greek life was a metaphor for grievances in another. Some at least of this feeling was apt to be directed against the British. When Lord Halifax preceded Makarios in Athens by a few weeks to preside over the unveiling of a war memorial, he noticed a distinct strain of Anglophobia.27 Working in harness with the Archbishop of Athens, Spyridon, Makarios worked on these feelings, and began to appeal over the heads of the Government. He also made contact with the main figure in the opposition, and hero of the 1940 Greek resistance, FieldMarshal Papagos. Under intense pressure, Prime Minister Sophocles Venizelos (son of the great Eleutherios) promised Makarios that he would study the possibility of taking the Cyprus question to the United Nations, but added the qualification that any decision would have to take account of the wider necessities of Greek policy.28 If there were signs here that Athens might shortly be set at odds with Great Britain over Cyprus, there were also the seeds of a bitter rivalry between Makarios and Greek conservatism extending well beyond Cypriot independence. Above all, however, Makarios had put his growing personal prestige behind the principle that 'Where Cyprus goes, Greece follows'. The Archbishop's stay in Athens was notable for another event, rumours of which 27 28
Note by I.ord Halifax on Visit to Greece, 9 May 1952, FO371 /101807, WG1051/1. Sir Charles Peakc to Eden, 30 July 1952, FOjy 1/101812, WGioSi/so.
Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959
29
soon appeared in Greek-Cypriot newspapers: a meeting between Makarios and Colonel George Grivas on 2 July, and their communion, along with several associates, in a 'Holy Sacred Oath' binding them to the cause of Enosis.29 In the wake of this oath Grivas established EOKA, the National Organization of Greek-Cypriot Fighters—destined to become one of the classic 'terrorist' movements in the era of decolonization. Grivas' usually fleeting shadow will loom over this account, so that the basic facts of his life must be recounted.30 He had been born in the village of Trikomo, close to the Cypriot town of Famagusta, in 1898. Like Makarios, he had studied at the Pancyprian gymnasium, before joining the Greek Army and fighting in various Balkan conflicts before and during the Great War of 1914-18. Later he served during the disastrous campaign in Asia Minor during 1921-2, and on the bitterly contested Albanian front in 1940. During the latter operations he was promoted to lieutenant-colonel. This was no mean experience, though one which was, apart from a brief stint at a French academy in the 19305 during which he was first introduced to the doctrine of guerre revolutionnaire, largely conventional in nature. It was during, and particularly after, the Second World War that Grivas' career became murky. He first became a national figure towards the end of the short-lived resistance to the German invasion of Greece in the spring of 1941. Instead of lying low in Athens, like some other senior military figures, he took to the hills. Whether while 'on the run' he undertook any hostile actions against German forces or installations remains problematical. There were allegations that he took money from the occupying authorities (if so, he was hardly alone); it was also alleged that his chief role throughout enemy occupation was that of an extreme right-wing activist dedicated to the return of the monarchy. Certainly during the civil war which got under way in Greece after September 1944, Grivas formed a para-royalist body, Khi, which hunted down Communists in the most brutal fashion. Although Grivas' actions at this time are no clearer than they were later to be in Cyprus, it appears that he built up a resentment against the British for not providing him with the support he expected. As early as 1946, one entry in his diary was said to record 'When the British hear of me again, they will not easily ignore me.'31 Afterwards he lost control ofKhi, and his attempt to enter the mainstream of Greek politics after the end of the civil war was a flop. This was the juncture at which he linked himself with Cypriot Enosis, and during the summer of 1951, now on the Army retirement list, he visited his home island to reconnoitre the possibility of guerrilla action; a year later, alongside Archbishop Makarios, another outsider in the internecine world of Greek party politics, Grivas took the Holy Sacred Oath we have referred to. 'Grivas is not one of those fascinating characters that bear much investigation as a person' a wellinformed British journalist in Greece wrote a few years later when asked to write a 29
Political Situation Report, July 1952, €0926/19. There is no full-scale biography of Grivas available in English. For a good general analysis of his position see Doros Alastos, Cyprus Guerrilla: Grivas, Makarios and the British (London, 1960). 31 See profile on Grivas in Leslie Finer to Michael Davis, 9 Jan. 1958, Legum Papers, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London. 30
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biographical sketch. 'He is a dull, competent, obstinate and somewhat courageous professional soldier.'32 This was close to the mark. Grivas had no ideas beyond a hatred of Communism, a love of Greece and a sincere and highly romanticized belief in Enosis. Unlike many leaders of armed terrorist movements, he lacked to a peculiar degree the capacity to transform himself into a practising politician. Yet his very simplicity, or obduracy, combined with utter single-mindedness, was to make him a formidable opponent of colonial rule in his original homeland. The relationship between Makarios and Grivas, the priest-politician and the man of violence, was ambiguous from the start. It eludes precise analysis the more easily since the determining factor became not so much the relationship itself, as what others made of it. In the discussion following the secret oath, the Archbishop apparently told Grivas that he would not find fifty Cypriots to follow him in an armed rebellion; one of their accomplices retorted 'No-one is born brave; he becomes brave, given the right leadership.'" Just what was the right kind of leadership in the prevailing circumstances became the chief divide in internal Greek-Cypriot politics. But if Makarios distrusted violence, he could not ignore its potential value in proving to the British that the Enosis demand was serious. From Athens the Archbishop went on to New York, where he stayed for some months, making what contacts he could to ease the path for a reference of Enosis to the United Nations. He was especially impressed by the resolution in the General Assembly on 16 December 1952 reaffirming the sanctity of the principle of self-determination, since this suggested a more 'saleable' case for Cypriot freedom in the international market-place—including freedom to leave one state and join another—than a crude, unvarnished demand for Enosis. Simultaneously, Grivas was again in Cyprus, where he resided for five months after October 1952, choosing personnel, identifying suitable locations for 'hides' and arms-caches, and selecting a stretch of beach at Khlorakas, near Paphos on the western coast of Cyprus, as a place for landing consignments of weapons and ammunition from Greece. By the end of 1952 force was being added to the options of rhetorical and organizational Enosis, though whether these various methods would ever converge was uncertain. Although Enosis sentiment in Cyprus persisted quite independently of encouragement from metropolitan Greece, effective subversion required at least the complaisance of the Greek Government. To this extent there was more than a vestige of truth to the later conviction of British officialdom that Athens lay behind the terrorism of EOKA. But it did not require ministers in that capital to take any actions themselves to make things awkward for the British; it was only necessary for them to cease putting restraints on certain factions in their midst. The distinction was an important one. At first, in fact, the decisive victory of Field-Marshal Papagos and his 'Rally' party at the general election in Greece during November 1952 appeared propitious from the vantage-point of Britain and the Cyprus Government. Papagos was a 'strong man' who, it was thought, would soon stuff the dangerous genie of Enosis back into its bottle. This anticipation was heightened when, in his first meeting with the British 12
Legum Papers, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London. •" Quoted in Mayes, Makarios, 49.
Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959
31
Ambassador in Athens, Sir Charles Peake, Papagos spoke of the Cypriot question being 'infected with demagogy'.34 But Papagos also spoke of the need to settle the matter quickly; and as successive approaches on his part were rebuffed—'neither now nor in any foreseeable future could my Government contemplate any change of sovereignty', Peake told him bluntly35—Papagos became disillusioned. This disillusionment was mutual after Papagos refrained from curbing Makarios' activities in Athens whilst the latter was on his way back from New York in early March 1953 (at this stage the Archbishop met again with Grivas, who had himself just got back from Cyprus, and approved the import into the island of sabotage equipment, though not any pistols or rifles). Especially annoying to Her Majesty's Government was the rising antiBritish invective of Athens Radio, overlapping on the airwaves as it did with its even more hostile counterpart in Cairo. In fact, some evidence exists that Papagos did contemplate having Grivas arrested at this stage.36 To have done so, however, would have been politically very dangerous. Meanwhile, Peake impressed on the Foreign Office that it was simply not possible for the Field-Marshal to suppress the Enosis campaign which to Greeks was the quintessence of patriotism. But to British Conservative ministers this would not wash. They knew that Papagos had a record of putting down leftist dissent at home with a draconian hand, and they expected him to do the same with the Enosists. Neither Eden nor Lyttelton, as the most interested members of the British Cabinet, saw any excuse for not doing in the one case what the FieldMarshal had been notably effective at in the other. As in his relations with President Nasser of Egypt, so with Papagos, Eden's growing temperamentalism, compounded by illness, entered the reckoning. The Foreign Secretary had been due to visit Athens en route to Turkey in the spring of 1953, but this had been cancelled because of ill health. During the following summer, however, after surgery on his liver in the United States, the Greek Government offered its hospitality to the recuperating British statesman. He cruised amongst the Greek islands in a yacht loaned by Aristotle Onassis, before spending a few days in Athens. It was arranged during this interlude that Papagos would pay Eden a visit at the flat which had been made available to him. The 'Eden-Papagos Incident' which followed merits barely a footnote in British diplomatic history, but in Greek political folklore it looms large. Eden had, in fact, made it perfectly clear well beforehand that he was prepared for a tour d'horizon with the premier of Greece on foreign policy, but that he would flatly not discuss Cyprus.37 This determination can only have been reinforced by the recent episode in Paphos, when the local celebrations of Queen Elizabeth IPs coronation had been marred by 800 Greek schoolboys going on the rampage, pulling down all the Union flags in the main athletics stadium. According to the record of Eden's conversation with Papagos in Athens,38 however, it was in fact 34
35 PeaketoEden,28Nov. 1952,FO37i/ioi8o8,WGio52/9. Ibid. See material in FO37I/130085, RGCio319/89. 37 G. Harrison, 31 Mar., FO371 /107498, WG1051 / 5. 38 Record of conversation between the Secretary of State and Field-Marshal Papagos, 22 Sept. 1953, FO37I/I07499, WGio52/3. 36
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the Englishman who at least indirectly raised the forbidden topic when he began by saying that 'he [Eden] had greatly enjoyed his tour, adding with a smile that he had had a very friendly reception ashore, and [that] he had been asked no questions about Cyprus'. Papagos ignored this reference, speaking at length about the Trieste problem, on which Greece had supported Britain, before tentatively suggesting that a discreet Anglo-Greek demarche should be made concerning the future of Cyprus. Eden immediately snapped back that 'The question [of Cyprus] is closed for us,' adding for good measure that 'after all, there was a considerable Greek population in Alexandria and New York, but he did not suppose that the Greek Government was demanding Enosis for them'.19 Eden was not really saying anything new in this, but the way he said it hurt, and Papagos did not stay long. It was the beginning of the end of'the traditional framework of Anglo-Hellenic friendship'. Cyprus was to provide a cameo alongside the larger Egyptian canvas of Eden's stormy future both as Foreign Secretary and subsequently as Prime Minister. In both cases, however, it is too easy to load culpability for events exclusively on to his jolted nerves and failing judgement. His brusqueness with Papagos was not the first time that he had 'roasted' a representative of Greece over Cyprus. He had done the same to a rising politician, Evangelos Averoff, who will feature prominently in subsequent events, at a meeting in Rome some months before.4" The pattern of these outbursts suggests that Eden tried his best to throw out an unmistakable signal in private that Greece should not embark on a course which could only end in disaster for her relations with the United Kingdom—and perhaps with the West as a whole. Speaking roughly to Averoff, however, was one thing, and to the great FieldMarshal, who had his own vanities, quite another. Two weeks after the EdenPapagos encounter in Athens, Ambassador Peake received an aide-memoire from the Greek Foreign Office affirming that, failing the holding of bilateral talks on Cyprus, Greece would regain her 'freedom of manoeuvre' in the matter. This was, as Peake put it, 'the first hint of a threat',41 and he responded by telling Papagos that Eden had 'meant every word he said' in their talk. Papagos made one last effort to halt the drift, calling Peake to his home and insisting on a promise that 'sooner or later' there must be an Anglo-Greek understanding. 'The Cyprus issue was not static' he pleaded. 'It was festering and would get worse and worse unless we could think of some prudent way to scotch it.'42 By the end of 1953 the threads of Anglo-Greek intimacy were visibly unravelling. At first there were minor tokens of this process, such as the cancellation of an exhibition on British Philhellenes and the Greek War of Independence due to be opened in Athens by the Duchess of Kent. Then on 23 February 1954 the Greek Government confirmed to London that unless talks on Cyprus took place beforehand, its delegates at the United Nations would raise the item during the autumn session. At the same juncture Papagos' indirect pressure on w 40 41 42
Record of conversation between the Secretary of State and Field-Marshal Papagos. Eden to Foreign Office, 30 Nov. 1951, FO37I/95I28, RGro23/g. Peake to Eden, i6Oct. 1953, FO37I/IO7502, WGio8i/50. Peake to Eden, 14 Nov. 1953, FC^" 1/107502, WG1081/63.
Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959
33
Grivas, and just as importantly on his financial backers and agents, to desist from plans to establish some kind of militant organization in Cyprus, began to wane. These vibrations were closely calibrated with developments inside Cyprus. A Greek writer based in London, Doros Alastos, who soon after the Cyprus Emergency ended conducted extensive interviews in the island, remarked that by the beginning of 1954 the fact that an uprising was on the way 'was known to everybody [in Cyprus], including the Police'.43 Yet whereas in virtually all other British colonies the authorities would have been able to identify at least some suspects, in Cyprus they had almost no idea where to look—except, that is, in the direction of Archbishop Makarios (Grivas' presence in the island, we shall see, was not known to the British till much later). The reason for this lay in the deficiency of information which was to be one of the critical weaknesses of the British during the Emergency—a deficiency which was itself only the by-product of the gulf between British and Greek society on the island. There was probably some substance, too, in another factor which Doros Alastos felt underlay the failure to act effectively against incipient subversion: the feeling that the Cyprus Government 'might even welcome a showdown in order to strike at the extremists on both sides' in Cypriot politics (that is, against the Right and the Left). As a showdown became more and more likely, any such 'welcome' was to be overtaken by nervousness on the part of a colonial government acutely conscious of its own limited capacity for force. Yet, as before 1931, the prospect of trouble also carried with it a sense of catharsis, of being able to assume longsoughtafter powers, and the chance for a beleaguered government to deal a potentially crushing blow to the purveyors of sedition. On the eve of all rebellions force is the great temptation on both sides of the divide. It was the unfortunate fate of Sir Robert Armitage, at that time Chief Secretary in the Gold Coast Colony, to be appointed to succeed Wright as Governor of Cyprus at such a difficult juncture. Armitage was to become almost the archetype of the 'failed Governor' in the era of decolonization—a tag confirmed by his later governorship in Nyasaland, which was also marked by disorders and alleged incompetence. He was, in fact, a man of limited ability, modest imagination, and of sincere and wellmeaning convictions: the churlish might say the classic colonial administrator. Occasionally in the Colonial Office the possibility had been discussed of succeeding Wright with somebody who had what one official called 'the Mountbatten touch',44 that is, the panache and iconoclasm to break old taboos and get on the wavelength of potential new allies. The idea had not found much favour. Instead, Armitage, a man whose whole career had been spent in African administration, had risen to the top of the list. Just as striking was the judgement in the Colonial Office that it was not necessary to provide the new Governor with any firm instructions before leaving for his assignment, since there was no 'seething discontent, chronically threatening internal order', and when the Enosis movement, though congenitally vocal, 'in 41
Alastos, Cyprus Guerrilla, 47.
44
Bennett, minute, i Feb. 1951,00537/453.
34
-i February-1 April 1955
practice accepts so lamely Administration on the spot'45—a version of the argument much used amongst expatriate officials in Cyprus that the very absence of violence was testimony to the natural passiveness of Cypriots and the artificiality of the Enosis demand. There were plenty of neutral observers who pointed out that this was extremely dangerous since it amounted to an invitation to take up arms; but the belief was part of the ingrained dialectic in the island. When Armitage arrived in Nicosia at the end of January 1954, therefore, he carried with him no political programme to offset his own natural indecision—even the advice given to Wright in 1949 to be on the look-out for an opportunity to reintroduce constitutional government was at first omitted. In the stressful times ahead, Armitage was often to appear bereft and clueless, and to be derided back in London on these grounds. The truth was that this immobility merely reflected the rationale which had underlain his own appointment. This is not to say that Armitage had no ideas of his own when he took up his post in Cyprus. These preconceptions, however, were understandably the product entirely of his African, especially his Gold Coast, experience. Sir Robert was said to have kept on his desk in Nicosia a picture of Kwame Nkrumah, the erstwhile radical nationalist politician in the Gold Coast who had come to cooperate with the Government in maintaining law and order, and to promote peaceful constitutional development. In the Gold Coast this formula for tacit collaboration between colonial authority and nationalism in the age of decolonization worked relatively smoothly. Armitage's vision of performing the same feat in Cyprus was neither unintelligent nor lacking in good faith. Yet in truth the analogy had little bearing on Cypriot affairs. Nkrumah was a 'new man' in his own country, with only a fragile constituency, who needed the British as much as, and probably more than, they needed him. In Cyprus neither Enosis nor the Church was new, and most certainly they never depended on the British. It is doubtful that Armitage expected that Archbishop Makarios could possibly prove to be 'his' Nkrumah; if he harboured any such illusion, more experienced local officials would have quickly disabused him. Much more likely is that he hoped that after a due exhibition of the strength of the Government's 'will', a moderate alternative might be identified and afforded the kind of patronage which had been the key to success in Accra. Before long, hard Cypriot experience was to prove to Armitage just how impossible this was; but by then his advice had already helped to compromise Her Majesty's Government, and damaged his own reputation. Meanwhile, the crisis of confidence which was beginning to surround the Cyprus Government in the spring and summer of 1954 derived a fresh surge from the new deadline set by the Greek Government on 20 April: if Britain did not agree to bilateral talks before 20 August 1954, the Greek Ambassador informed the Foreign Office, his government would launch an appeal at the United Nations the following September. Cypriot Enosis had long conducted a lone struggle, receiving strangulated support from 'Mother Greece'. The spurt of expectation surrounding Enosis 45
'Cyprus: Political and Constitutional Considerations', Oct. 1953, 00926/91.
Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 7954-7959
35
linked to the real prospect of Greek sponsorship at the United Nations transformed this situation. It was also mirrored, however, in the dissolution of the hesitation which Eden and other senior figures in the Foreign Office had previously entertained about intervening to reassert the status quo. The major review of the Cyprus issue in the Foreign Office on 29 June 1954, chaired by the Minister of State, Selwyn Lloyd, and for which Ambassador Peake was brought home from Athens, was crucial in this respect (Eden himself was much taken up at this time with the Geneva Conference on Indo-China, of which he was co-chairman). Amongst the key principles established in this meeting was that 'any British statement of policy for Cyprus should declare self-government and not self-determination to be the ultimate goal. Cyprus should remain a Commonwealth fortress.'46 When Peak pointed out that the effect of this would be to throw added strain on Anglo-Greek relations, it was agreed that 'bad relations with Greece was the inevitable price we must pay if we were to keep Cyprus'.47 It was also explicitly recognized that by permanently ruling out selfdetermination, Britain would have to make do without reliable American support for her position. We shall see that at many of the important junctures in the troubles ahead, the responses of the United States were to be very significant, if not decisive. At this point, however, the decision to announce the principle of a new, if still limited, constitution for the island, was taken primarily to deflect outright American opposition to British policy. Long after the memory of this meeting had faded, the tactics of heaping the costs of the Cyprus dispute on to Greece, and of constructing successive constitutional offers with a view to winning sympathy outside the island, not least in the United States, rather than cooperation inside it, characterized the blend of assertion and defeatism in the evolution of British policy. Selwyn Lloyd's ringing endorsement of Cyprus as a 'Commonwealth fortress' came just ahead of the important announcement in early July that the British Middle Headquarters for Land and Air Forces in the Middle East would be moving from the Suez Base in Egypt to the colony. Subsequently the Sunday Times reported that 'scores of Army and Royal Air Force officers and their families [from Egypt] are dividing their time between relaxing on golden beaches and anxious surveys of available private accommodation in Cyprus'.48 Indeed, it quickly became clear that, contrary to the original conception of a 'planning' headquarters with only limited infrastructure, the aim of the British military was to reconstruct in Cyprus as much of the Suez set-up as they could. Churchill's Private Secretary gave the Prime Minister an early warning that the Headquarters bore a strong likeness to the 'absurdly exaggerated' base established by Lord Mountbatten in Ceylon during the War.49 Churchill immediately instituted an enquiry, but once such a project was under way, it was not easy to stop. Selwyn Lloyd's reference to a 'Commonwealth fortress' indicated another weak spot, since a fortress defined simply in British imperial terms was 46
Notes of meeting held by the Minister of State, 29 June 1954, FO37I/112848, WGio8i/i66. 48 Ibid. Sunday Times (4 July 1954). Anthony Montague-Brown, Long Sunset: Memoirs of Winston Churchill's Last Private Secretary (London, 1995), p. 183. 47
49
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not one whose strategic role was likely to win easily the automatic approbation of other people, or even of friends. Once it became clear that the Greek Government was going to raise Cyprus at the United Nations, for example, the British Embassy in Washington was told to try to extract some helpful statement from the Pentagon as to why the continuance of British sovereignty in Cyprus was vital. Unfortunately, the only statement offered by the American Joint Chiefs was that, while access to Cypriot facilities in wartime was an interest of the United States, the question of 'which friendly flag flew over the island is not a military concern'.50 Such a formula was not only unhelpful, it was potentially damaging in its implications regarding sovereignty, and any idea of making use of it was abandoned. It was in such ways that consideration in Whitehall of the Cyprus situation became conditioned, more than anything else, by a preoccupation with public relations. Reasons of publicity also demanded that in framing the intended parliamentarystatement to 'warn off Greece from pursuing the Cyprus issue at the United Nations, the British Government should include a gesture about the constitutional evolution of Cyprus. For this to be credible, however, it was necessary that a sufficient body of Cypriots should emerge willing to cooperate in the modest experiment. The question was: how far down the road to self-government was it necessary to go in order to discover the sleeping beauty of Cypriot 'moderation'? It was to help answer this crucial question that Governor Armitage was hurriedly called home to London. Whilst there he 'weighed in heavily' against the grant of any constitution which detracted from the arbitrary powers of the existing administration, and specifically advised against any offer which went as far as that previously made by Lord Winster.51 Significantly, Armitage assured the Colonial Office that, even on the basis of a very modest provision for self-government, he would be able to rally enough Cypriots to get a new constitution going in the course of 1955. In making this recommendation, which did not reflect unanimity within the always-divided Cyprus Executive Council, Armitage made his own position hostage to the shifting fortunes of local politics. There was another matter, meanwhile, at the top of Armitage's agenda whilst he was in Whitehall. From the vantage-point of the Cyprus Government there was no point making a stern declaration in Westminster unless it was linked to moves against sedition in the colony itself. 'Some arrests will be necessary' Armitage told the Colonial Office, adding that his advisers 'did not foresee any widespread trouble' as a result.52 This raised some eyebrows. Locking people up—above all, locking up Makarios, which Armitage also raised as a possibility for the first time—was one thing guaranteed to embarrass the British position should Cyprus indeed be debated at the United Nations. Perhaps if British ministers had subjected Armitage's proposal to closer scrutiny they would have turned it down. But in July 1954 the Conservative Government was distracted by many other, seemingly larger, worries. 511
Memorandum of conversation, 25 June 1954, Box 3602, RG59, State Department Records, USNA. G. Harrison, 18 Mar. 1954. FO37I/112848, WGio8i/io2. " Young, minute, 5July 1954, £'0371/112848, WGio8i/i83.
51
Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959
37
Furthermore, the Governor told officials categorically that Makarios and the Church, once challenged, would retire into their shell, as the latter institution had always done in the past when put to the test. On 23 July the British Cabinet, therefore, approved both the terms of a parliamentary statement on the future of Cyprus, and the principle of an 'anti-sedition warning' to be made simultaneously in Nicosia, so crushing Enosis from both ends at once. By then Armitage was back in the Cypriot capital, where feverish speculation had mounted about the intentions of the Government, and two days later he nervously telegraphed the Colonial Secretary, Lyttelton, that if Makarios did flout the warning that was about to be made by the authorities, '[the] Cyprus Government could not (repeat not) ignore it, and would be forced into a prosecution'.53 This was the first sign in London that things might not proceed quite as simply as had been indicated. Nevertheless, in order to take the Cypriots by surprise and bounce them into submission, the Governor urgently pressed that both statements—the one in Parliament, and the one in Nicosia—should now go ahead speedily before Westminster went into recess in August, after which the blistering hot Cypriot summer would ensure that the response to the British moves would be languid and short-lived. Although there was some resentment in the Foreign Office at having 'a pistol put at our heads',54 the Cabinet agreed that the subject of Cyprus should be tacked on to the end of the controversial statement due to be made by Eden on the afternoon of 28 July concerning the progress of his negotiations with President Nasser on the future status of the Suez Base. For the Conservative Government, and especially for Eden, now deeply unpopular with the right wing of the party, the uttering of tough words on Cyprus offered the attraction of drawing the sting from the Egyptian issue. That an impression was likely to be created in Cypriot minds that their own future was being unfairly mortgaged to circumstances elsewhere did not constitute a consideration which in the circumstances weighed heavily in the Westminster scales. This background to the exchanges in Parliament on 28 July has been sketched in detail because what happened then was often held directly responsible for the later bloodshed in the island. Indeed, no other intervention at the Dispatch Box in the House of Commons in recent decades has had such a load of responsibility thrown on to the precise words which were adopted. This alleged responsibility was not Eden's, who had just sat down after speaking on Egypt to angry murmurs of'scuttle' welling up behind him, but of the junior Colonial Office minister, Henry Hopkinson, whose job it was to divert attention to Cyprus. The very rushed nature of the exercise had meant, according to an 'inside' account reaching the Americans from the Colonial Office,55 that almost no preparation had been made for the eventuality that the Opposition, having listened to the minister's opening bald statement that the British Government 'cannot contemplate a change of sovereignty in Cyprus', coupled with 53
Armitage to Lyttelton, 25 July 1954, FO37I/112849, WGio8i/204. Harrison,minute,20July 1954,FO37I/II2849,WGio8i/2o8. 'British Difficulties over Cyprus', Embassy (London) to State Department, 25 Aug. 1954, Box 3602, RGs9, State Department Records, USNA. 54 55
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a vague reference to a future constitution, should press home an attack. As a result, when Griffiths, as Labour's colonial affairs spokesman, promptly asked supplementary questions, Hopkinson apparently 'went completely off his prepared brief'. 56 In particular, responding to Griffith's probings as to what sort of constitution was envisaged, he spoke as follows: It has always been understood and agreed that there are certain territories in the Commonwealth which, owing to their particular circumstances, can never expect to be fully independent [Hon. Members: 'Oh!']. I think the Right Honourable Gentlemen will agree that there are some territories which cannot expect that. 1 am not going as far as that this afternoon, but I have said that the question of the abrogation of British sovereignty cannot arise—that British sovereignty will remain. 57
There was in this, it is true, a certain ambiguity. Hopkinson always contended that the word 'never' was not explicitly used in relation to Cyprus. Nevertheless, he was widely understood to have done so, and nowhere more so than in the colony concerned. At the time, however, not only was the dismay on the Opposition benches partially simulated—for Hopkinson was quite right that it was commonly appreciated that the 'particular cirumstances' of some colonies did at that time make full independence hard to imagine—but the junior minister's words were overshadowed by the attempt made to relieve the situation by his departmental chief. Oliver Lyttelton, who was in the Colonial Office tidying his papers on the day of his retirement from politics, received a telephone call to say that Hopkinson was floundering badly in the House.58 He rushed to the chamber and with a farewell brio deflected discussion from the sensitive matter of Cypriot self-determination by making a frontal assault on Greece, which he referred to as a 'friendly but unstable ally'. 59 In the Foreign Office at least this was reckoned to be a graver error than Hopkinson's,60 since it was quite gratuitous in the offence it was bound to cause in Athens. Nevertheless, it was Hopkinson's seemingly adamantine 'never' which was always remembered against him, even though he was only saying in public what was being said all over Westminster and Whitehall in private. In Cyprus Hopkinson's 'never' and Lyttelton's reference to an 'unstable' Greece were immediately compounded by the storm set off by the local administration's declaration that henceforth sedition in the island would be prosecuted. Anxious as to how wide Armitage might try to 'spread his net', London had exerted pressure at the last minute to tone this declaration down.61 But when the intervention emerged in the form of a stiff announcement by the Cyprus Attorney-General, it was widely interpreted as calling off the uneasy 'truce' between the Government and the Enosis movement. Afterwards everybody waited on tenterhooks to see if the Archbishop 514
'British Difficulties over Cyprus', Embassy (London) to State Department. Parliamentary Debates (Commons), f 95.7-4, vol. 531,28 July 1954, cols. 504-7. '" Oliver Lyttclton, The Memoirs of Lord Chandos (London, 1962), p. 72. •"' Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 1953-4, vol. 531, 28 July 1954, col. 552. fl " F. Roberts, 4 Aug. 1954, F()37i/i 12850, WGio8i/233. 61 D. Muirhead, minute, 29july 1954, FO37I/112849, WGio8i/204. 57
Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, /954-7959
39
would take any notice when he next preached at a small village outside Nicosia on the morning of Sunday, 8 August. On that occasion, after disposing of religion, Makarios warmed to the matter of the moment. 'These new illiberal laws can only be found in fascist countries, and terrorist measures cannot last for ever' he told his congregation. 'No imprisonment, no exile, no fine will prevent us carrying on the struggle. Long live Union with Greece. Down with the Constitution.' Makarios' references to the fascism and terrorism of the Government made officials in London distinctly sceptical when the Governor claimed immediately afterwards that the Archbishop had backed down, so that 'for the first time in seventy-six years, the Cyprus Government has the initiative in a bloodless struggle with the forces of sedition'.62 The truth was that the Cyprus Government itself drew back from a head-on confrontation with the Archbishop, but Armitage's words nonetheless reflected the hubris of his administration now pitted more or less directly against the forces of Enosis. Allegations of fascism in the administration of Cyprus were naturally exaggerated, but there was somebody on the British side who saw the point: Prime Minister Churchill himself. His anger throws a poignant light on the man in his political twilight. What offended him about the Cyprus Attorney-General's remarks was the 'rigid system of mental restriction' they appeared to envisage;63 at one point the AttorneyGeneral had even implied that the publication in Cypriot newspapers of extracts from Hansard including favourable references to Enosis would be liable to prosecution—so making Westminster itself a source of sedition in a British colony. All Greek-Cypriot newspapers closed down whilst this matter remained in doubt. Churchill impressed on Lyttelton's successor, Alan Lennox-Boyd, that 'a mistake has been made',64 and insisted on the Attorney-General issuing a prompt clarification, after which Greeklanguage newspapers gingerly returned to the streets. There is a sense in this episode of Churchill, at this mostly sad finale to his career, clinging to the remnants of a liberal belief which had first taken him into politics. Most Greek-Cypriots had learned at school that on the only occasion Churchill had ever visited the island, in 1907, he had spoken warmly of the Enosis ideal.65 This was the sort of thing Churchill, a sentimentalist at heart, never forgot. Once the controversy over Cyprus in July and August 1954 had blown over, his mind wandered from the topic, and it was noted that when Governor Armitage spoke in October to a large body of parliamentarians in London, his administration met with no strong criticisms. But in the mean time Lennox-Boyd, prompted by his chief, had warned Armitage that 'In the last resort... your authority and policy in Cyprus depend on the body of public opinion [in Britain]. We have regrettably failed to secure this on the Sedition question.'66 We shall see that the unsure relationship between the Cabinet's policies towards Cyprus and British opinion was to remain a major source of instability and anxiety as events proceeded. 62 63 64 65 66
Armitage to Lennox-Boyd, 9 Aug. 1954, FO37I/112850, WGio8i/255. Sir Winston Churchill to Lennox-Boyd, 11 Aug. 1954, PREM11/605. Churchill to Lennox-Boyd, 13 Aug., ibid. See G. S. Georghallides, 'Cyprus and Winston Churchill's 1907 Visit', Thetis, 2-3 (1995), 177-94. Lennox-Boyd to Armitage, i6Aug. 1954,03926/499.
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As this reconstruction shows, critics who traced the subsequent breakdown on the island to Hopkinson's undoubtedly clumsy performance in the House of Commons on 28 July 1954 simplified a much more complicated set of events.67 Labour spokesmen came increasingly to latch on to his 'never' as a convenient way of screening off their own previous responsibility for Cypriot affairs. On the other hand, the summer of 1954 marked a genuine watershed in the unfolding of the struggle over the island. A major reason for this was the crisis now surrounding Anglo-Greek relations. The Athenian newspaper Vima pointed out to its readers that one striking feature of the debate on 28 July was that sustained criticism of the British Government had been limited to the cluster of socialist radicals around Aneurin Bevan. When the Greek Ambassador called on Selvvyn Lloyd at the Foreign Office on 4 August to complain about the language which had been used in Parliament, the British minister said he could hold out no hope that 'the word "never" used in the debate... meant anything other than "never" '; conversely, when Selwyn Lloyd tried to soften this blow with lugubrious tributes to Greek valour in the Second World War, the Ambassador cut him short with the advice that 'it was unwise to lay it on too much. It would . . . do more harm with Greek opinion than good."1'1* There was a coldness in this which entered the bones of the Cyprus conflict, so that the intimate political tie between the two countries, with its Byronic and Gladstonian legacies, and which had flowered again in the recent war, was to be progressively liquidated. Just as important as this diplomatic severance, however, was the colonial reality that inside the island the lines of conflict had been soldered into place. Many observers were puzzled at the contradiction that the Cyprus administration should have invoked anti-sedition decrees just when it was supposedly seeking the support of moderate Cypriots. This was to mistake the very different analysis which prevailed in the British official mind as to the link in Cyprus between coercion and moderation. The Cyprus Government had given up any residual belief in the will-o'-the-wisp of'middle-of-the-roaders' in the Greek community—as Armitage explained shortly afterwards to Lennox-Boyd, the so-called moderates possessed 'no organization, no party, no funds, no agents, and they will win nothing'.69 Yet the tactics of the Cyprus Government, instead of shocking the mass of Greek-Cypriots back into the passivity on which the authority of the colonial administration had always rested, now had the opposite effect of crystallizing a united nationalist front between otherwise disparate factions. A key illustration of this was that AKEL now moved into Makarios' column, so that when the Archbishop preached to one of the biggest Enosis demonstrations ever held at Phaneromani Church on 13 August, there was a strong Communist presence. These events had implications for the personal relationship between the colonial regime and Archbishop Makarios. 'In effect the ( '~ For a fuller reconstruction see R. F. Holland, 'Never, Never Land: British Colonial Policy and the Roots of Violence in Cyprus, 1950-54', Jotmtal of Imperial and Commomvea Ith History, 21/3 (Sept. 1993). ''" Selvvyn Lloyd, minute, 4 Aug. 1954, FO37I/112850, WGio8i/23o. ''" Armitage to Thomas Lloyd, 13 Sept. 1954,01)926/500.
Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, ig54~i959
41
[Cyprus] Government's statement about the enforcement of the anti-sedition law is a challenge to the Archbishop,' a Foreign Office official summed up the situation. 'If he takes up the challenge and chooses to act provocatively, the Governor will sooner or later have to lock him up. They must take the consequences of adopting a strong line, and the political martyrdom of the Archbishop is one of the consequences.'70 From this point on British willingness to face up to the 'political martyrdom' of Makarios was a critical test of its determination to assert its mastery over the island. It was in these increasingly fragile conditions that the Greek Government's appeal to the United Nations was to unfold. The United Nations was to become part of the warp and woof of the Cyprus conflict, but it was never to hold the stage quite as it did between September and December 1954. The intricacies of this part of the story have been fully detailed elsewhere, and will not be repeated at length in this account. The sensitivity of British diplomacy in New York concerning Cyprus, however, needs to be underlined. Up until the early 19505 the United Kingdom's position in the United Nations had been a relatively comfortable one. She was a signatory of the original San Francisco Charter, and a member of the Security Council; and whilst in the General Assembly and other committees colonial powers were beginning to feel the heat of criticism, it had been first the Dutch over the East Indies, and then France over Indo-China and North Africa, who had been most affected. All the British delegates had to do to escape uncomfortable attention was avoid being tarred with the brush of these errant powers by presenting the United Kingdom's policies in the colonial sphere as relatively liberal. It was Cyprus, and especially Makarios' repeated lobbying on the margins of the United Nations, which first edged Britain into a more exposed position in the international arena alongside France; the very strong feelings which were to surround the figure of the Archbishop were to be rooted in this situation. The Greek Government's decision to appeal formally on the Cypriots' behalf to the General Assembly, basing their argument not on Enosis, but on self-determination, therefore touched an increasingly raw British nerve in a world where anti-colonialism was beginning to make the running. This refinement of Greek tactics was not easy to counter. The argument of the British (and the French) at the United Nations over colonial questions was that they were explicitly excluded from the purview of that body under the 'domestic jurisdiction' clause in the Charter—in other words, the domestic affairs of members, including matters pertaining to overseas dependencies, was none of the United Nations' business. This defence had worn thin by 1954. The only alternative was the distinctly undignified action of walking out of the Assembly when any disputed item was raised. To avoid this, on the eve of the session the British Embassy tried to get the Eisenhower Administration to throw its weight against the inscription of Cyprus on the Manhattan agenda. A British representative saw the Secretary of State, 70
Wilding,minute,7Aug. 1954,FOsyi/i 12850, WGio8i/238.
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/ February-1 April 7955
John Foster Dulles, and argued with him that any discussion of Cyprus in New York would have very damaging effects on NATO, Greco-Turkish relations and the United Nations itself. The Cyprus agitation, this envoy said, was 'an unholy alliance between the Orthodox Church and the Communists', adding for good measure that 'the Cypriots were not Greeks at all, although they spoke the same language and had the same religion'.71 Dulles was unsympathetic; indeed, so irritated had he been by Britain's lack of support for the recent American intervention in Guatamala that, according to one British diplomat in Washington, anybody raising Cyprus with him risked 'being thrown out of the room'.72 This indignity was avoided, but the British certainly felt badly let down when the session opened with what the Observer in London described on 26 September as a 'heavy defeat' for the United Kingdom over the inscription of the Cyprus item. The Americans, Selwyn Lloyd complained bitterly to Eden as head of the British Delegation, 'have not lifted a finger to help us'.73 The situation was one, then, which became enmeshed in all the complex psychological and policy differences which set the patrician cynicism of contemporary British diplomacy so much at odds with Eisenhower's prickly and dogmatically Presbyterian Secretary of State. But it was not only the Americans who were held to be at fault. From the start British diplomats found it difficult to muster general international support over Cyprus. Occasionally there was a palpable sense of betrayal, as when the British, having backed the Dutch claim to West Irian, sat and watched the Netherlands vote at the United Nations go to Greece over Cyprus. Even the Commonwealth connection was not reliable—Canada abstained, whilst although the Australians rather grudgingly helped out, they privately told Selwyn Lloyd that the British failure to make any credible constitutional progress in Cyprus made things very difficult. 74 Only France stood firm, though in colonial matters backing from that quarter was not entirely advantageous—as if a hitherto sober citizen was suddenly seen consorting with a notorious alcoholic. Reduced to scraping around for assistance from minor, and not always savoury, governments, many of them Latin American, British officials began to evince a cynical view of the position that they were left to uphold; as one put it after a lobbying exercise, 'if the Ethiopians understood the issue, they probably would not support us'.75 Indeed, the United Kingdom Delegation's dilemma over Cyprus could serve in miniature as a portrayal of the increasing travails of British diplomacy as it discovered that mobilizing friends on its behalf in the post-war world had suddenly become much more difficult. This fragility at the United Nations was to be a perennial nightmare of British policy as the Cyprus question proceeded. Her Majesty's Government could not hope to get by in New York on this matter 71
Memorandum of Conversation, 25 Aug. 1954, Box 3602, RG59, State Department Records, USNA. 72 B. Salt to Young, 9 Sept. 1954,1^0371/112848, WGio8i/i8.s. " Selwyn Lloyd to Eden, 30 Sept. 1954, FC^yt/i 12867, WGio8i/728. 74 Muirhead, minute, ii Oct. 1954, FO37I/U2868, WGio8i/782. 75 Buxton, minute, 24 Sept. 1954, FOi 12862, WGioSi/sSg.
Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959
43
without effective support from at least one other interested party. A temptation to exploit Turkish susceptibilities about Cyprus had arisen as soon as the Church plebiscite had taken place back in January 1950. 'The Turkish card is a tricky one' the British Ambassador in Athens stated soon afterwards 'but useful in the pass to which we have come'.76 For some while the scope for playing this card remained limited. The Democratic Party regime led by Adnan Menderes, which defeated the Kemalist Republican People's Party at the Turkish general election in May 1950, remained committed to the historic reconciliation with Greece. Both countries shared a common aspiration to join NATO, a goal achieved in 1952 under American auspices, despite British opposition. In February 1953 Greece and Turkey signed a 'treaty of peace and friendship', and jointly initialled the Balkan Pact with Yugoslavia at Bled in August 1954. This was the high watermark of Greco-Turkish amity in the postwar period. Any British actions tending to undermine this development were liable to criticism in NATO circles. Even when the British did start to press the Cyprus button with the Turks, the effect was not at first to trigger the instantaneous reactions that were hoped for: 'curiously vacillating' and 'curiously equivocal' were remarks typical of the puzzlement felt on this score in London.77 Although one of the anticipated advantages of the 'Never' statement in Parliament on 28 July 1954 had been to warm up Turkish feeling over Cyprus, the outcome had only been what the British Foreign Office complained was a 'watery reaction' in Ankara.78 In truth, this did not mean that Turkey was uninterested in the fate of Cyprus, any more than the Muslim community in Cyprus was unconcerned about the prospect ofEnosis. The key to Turkish policy at this stage was to ensure that it was the British who paid the price of bad relations with Greece in blocking Enosis, rather than themselves; it was, after all, Britain's colony. It remains, nevertheless, a notable fact that it was the British who in the first instance had to screw the Turks up to a pitch of excitement about Cyprus, not the other way round. Without reliable help from elsewhere, and reluctant to stage a walk-out from the General Assembly, turning Turkish water into fire at the United Nations after September 1954 became not only desirable for Britain, but imperative. This was done in various ways. 'Discreet patronage' was afforded a Turkish-Cypriot mission to New York, extending to 'touching up' their propaganda, and taking its members around foreign Delegations—the whole purpose being to catch up some of the ground lost to Makarios in recent years.79 Above all, as the session proceeded, Turkish objections to any change of sovereignty in Cyprus were increasingly highlighted in British arguments, until it displaced the 'domestic jurisdiction' thesis. This changing balance was evident in Selwyn Lloyd's only set-piece address to the General Assembly on the 76
Norton, 19Jan. 1950^0371/87719^01081/104. N.Cheetham,minute,3i Mar. 1954,FC>37i/i 12844, WGio8i/6z; alsoR. Wilding,minute,6July 1954, FO37I/112848, WGio8i/i69. 78 British Embassy, Ankara (Circular) to Foreign Office, 6 Aug. 1954, FO371 /112850, WG10817247. 79 'Cyprus Turkish Delegation', United Kingdom Delegation (New York) to Foreign Office, 5 Oct. 1954, FO37i/i 12868, WGio8i/772. 77
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Cyprus item. Afterwards the minister reported to Eden how, despite his delegation's efforts, even Peru, Colombia and the Scandinavians had deserted the British standard, adding with unconscious pathos 'perhaps the nicest thing said about my speech came from the Turk, who described it as the age-old wisdom of a never-ageing Empire'.80 By early October Selwyn-Lloyd and his colleagues could take some comfort from the fact that Turkey showed signs of being able to be 'left to make the running' on Cyprus.81 For the British there was a danger in all this, as one official prophetically remarked, of ending up being caught 'between two fires' — Greek and Turkish — in a violent Cypriot blaze.82 But at the United Nations in 1954 this seemed a distant risk to balance against the necessities of the moment. Bringing the Turks on board meanwhile brought benefits. Although the Americans had supported Greece over inscription, they had never intended that the United Nations should be drawn further into a potentially damaging dispute, and it was Cabot Lodge's lobbying which ensured the success of a New Zealand motion putting off any further Cyprus debate 'for the present'. This was not an ideal outcome for Her Majesty's Government, but at least it constituted a 'strong first inning lead' in Whitehall's favourite metaphor.8' Overall, the deadlock in New York prefigured the bind in which Cyprus was to be caught in that forum: Greece could muster enough votes to get Cypriot self-determination on to the agenda, but the Anglo-Turkish combination were always able to rustle up enough support to frustrate the two-thirds plurality required for any definitive recommendation. Given how7 anodyne the United Nations often appeared to a later generation, it is not easy to grasp why the Cyprus debates in the autumn of 1954 marked the beginning of what Governor Armitage described as 'the slide to violence and bloodshed' in Cyprus (Colonel Grivas arrived in the island to take up command of EOKA on 10 November).84 A link between discussion at the United Nations and a move towards violence, paradoxical though it might seem, was not unique to Cyprus. Both phenomena were forms of advertisement, and impregnated with heady expectation; it was the proximity of a United Nations debate which also helped to trigger the sanguinary 'Battle of Algiers', for example, in November 1957. Greek opinion had genuinely— if perhaps naively— believed that once Cyprus got lodged in the United Nations' machinery, self-determination, and, therefore, Enosis, would surely follow. The sudden crushing of these hopes created a highly charged atmosphere. On 1 2 December Ambassador Peake warned Eden of this from Athens, pointing out that far from attachment to Enosis crumbling before the blows it had sustained, it had 'come to stay', and that if the Greek Government was made to lose face they would merely 'set themselves to consider by what steps they could regain it'.85 The obvious s
" Sehvyn Lloyd to Eden, 30 Sept. 1954, FOtfi/i 12867, WG1081/728. Muirhead, minute, iSOct. 1954, FO^-ji/112869, WGioSi/Sjf). " Wilding, minute, 23 Nov. 1954, FO^i/i 12875, WGio8i/ioi2. 81 W.Pink, minute, 23 Dec. 1954, FO37I/112885, WGio8i/i296. 84 Armitage to Thomas Lloyd, 26 May 1955, FOjyi/t 17630, RGio8i/27o. 85 PeaketoEden, to Dec. 1954, FO37J/112880, WGio8i/i 172. M
Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959
45
steps included adding guns and explosives to the money which was already known to have gone from Greece to Enosis organizations in the colony. 'If blood shall flow in Cyprus', Peake concluded grimly, 'I do not for a moment think that the Greeks would pause to consider who was at fault. They would argue that their Cypriot brethren were shedding their blood in the cause of freedom.' Peake was giving a clear warning as to what might be about to happen. But even this extremity was not without some recourse. From early December 1954 a major intelligence operation was under way around the coast of Cyprus in the hope of catching Greek gun-runners 'red-handed', and the incriminating evidence used to push Athens, and thereby the Cypriots, back from the brink.86 None was more conscious of the risks being run than Armitage and his administration. The sudden sag in their confidence was undoubtedly related to what one leading District official observed as 'the recent unpredictable swing of the rural population to the Enosis idea';87 it even became potentially dangerous for British officials to tour areas which hitherto had been solidly 'loyal' in disposition. The overlap of this phenomenon with the proceedings in the United Nations was not accidental, and the Governor pleaded with Lennox-Boyd that the opportunity be exploited by the British Government to crush Enosis in that forum whilst they had the chance, even if it meant walking out. If this was not done, the Governor finally warned, 'there will be no ... prospect whatever of introducing a constitution in I955'.88 This confession, effectively withdrawing the advice on which London had based its decisions back in the summer, and which had held out the prospect of some relief on an increasingly acute question, was a turning-point in his governorship. 'Why?', Eden irascibly wrote on a copy of the telegram.89 Ivone Kirkpatrick, as Permanent Head of the Foreign Office, advised that as soon as possible a 'tough, realistic and energetic Cyprus policy' should be drafted; otherwise, he warned, 'we should drift from one setback to another—like the French'.90 These were exactly Eden's sentiments, and a minute to this effect was composed and issued through the Private Secretary at 10 Downing Street 'without it appearing that the Secretary of State and the Foreign Office were responsible' (an indication of the confusions in British policy-making as Churchill's incapacity dogged the final phases of his premiership).91 This was a highly important passage not only in bringing Cyprus definitively within Eden's personal domain, but because the principle of a 'tough, realistic and energetic Cyprus policy' carried the seeds of the later Emergency state in the island. Simultaneously, the decision was taken to call Armitage home for 'consultations'—a sure sign that the Governor was in trouble. From this interrogation Armitage was, paradoxically, saved by the riots which 86
Young, minute, 21 Dec. 1954^0371/112885, WGio8i/i276. J. Weston (Commissioner, Famagusta) to John Fletcher-Cook (Colonial Secretary, Cyprus) 15 Oct. 1954,0)926/79. 88 Armitage to Lennox-Boyd, 2 Dec. 1954, FOjyi/i 12881, WGio8i/i 198. 89 90 Ibid. Kirkpatrick, minute, 9 Dec. 1954, ibid. " Rumbold, minute, 15 Dec. 1954, ibid. 87
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occurred both in Greece and in Cyprus over the weekend of 19/20 December 1954, following the termination of the United Nations session. A Governor could hardly go home when his colony was in such an uproar. That uproar began to emanate most loudly from the schools. On 19 December a large body of pupils from the PanCyprian Gymnasium in Nicosia broke their lessons. They set off for the American Consulate, shouting Enosis slogans, waving Greek flags, and pulling down Union flags along the way, before arriving at their destination, where volleys of debris were unleashed (it was to be a curious aspect of the dispute that Greeks often held the Americans primarily responsible for what they saw as incorrigible British delinquencies—an early lesson in the costs of superpowerdom). The Police rushed to the scene, and for two and a half hours a street-battle raged on the main road skirting the old walled city, with its great Venetian ramparts, the constabulary advancing, according to an eye-witness, against a shower of stones from the retreating youths, only to withdraw under a fresh barrage from demonstrators appearing on their flanks from the adjacent side-streets.'" The quelling of disorder had to await the arrival of a tear-gas squad. Here was a pattern, with schoolgirls exhorting their male peers to greater exertions, the security forces in awkward pursuit of children, the unfurling of some flags and the desecration of others, the gutting of property (on this occasion the popular Blackpool Fish and Chip Shop went up in flames), which was to be repeated time and again over the next few years. In Limassol, a town more prone to rowdiness than staid, ecclesiastical Nicosia, youths rampaged through the central streets, causing the Army to intervene on behalf of the civil power. The panicky troops opened fire, wounding three people. The distance, both mental and moral, between Whitehall and Cyprus was caught in the response of one official when photographs arrived in the Foreign Office of these demonstrations—the taut faces of angry adolescents, the airborne lumps of rock, the Cyprus Police in their motley riot-gear, the palpable sense of ugly confrontation—'entertaining . . . the demonstrators were evidently enjoying themselves'.91 The truth, of course, was that they were not enjoying themselves; nor, indeed, was the Cyprus Government defeatist in the merely pusillanimous sense conveyed by its growing band of Foreign Office critics. A remark which got closer to the truth of a wobbly colonial regime with wholly inadequate force at its disposal was the description in the Times of Cyprus to the effect that the Cyprus Government was 'like a lobster, hard outside, soft inside'—hence the swings which were to become more erratic as the pressure mounted.94 What above all worried the administration at this stage was that the Archbishop's return to Nicosia after his stay in New York might be the trigger for a breakdown. It was certainly a noisy occasion when Makarios arrived home on 10 January 1955. A crowd of 2,000 supporters met him at the airport with cries of'Hurrah for Enosis\ 'Down with the Constitution', and 'Let the English go away'. A still larger throng awaited him at the rambling archiepiscopal Palace in the 92 94
Cyprus Mail (20 Dec. 1954). Times of Cyprus (28 Dec. 1954).
w
Wilding, 24 Dec. 1954, FO37I/112884, WGio8i/i274.
Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959
47
old walled town. A Te Deum was sung in the nearby Metropolitan Church of St John, climaxing in the conventional florid oratory. The Bishop of Kyrenia kicked off with a fierce denunciation of British rule. When Makarios followed he did so, according to Armitage's description, in 'a more outspoken and violent... tone than on any previous occasion'.95 Expressing disappointment with the United Nations, he took comfort that Cyprus had now become an international issue. 'He then went on to stress', Armitage informed Lennox-Boyd, the Colonial Secretary, 'that although Mother Greece is standing by their side, Cypriots should not expect everything from Greece, but should intensify their struggle, sacrifice themselves for it, and stopping at nothing.' This emphasis on the Cypriots' own efforts highlighted a new strain in Makarios' thinking. Nevertheless, Armitage's account of this occasion differs significantly from that of a Conservative (and Greek-speaking) member of the British House of Commons who was present throughout. Patrick Maitland afterwards wrote privately to Eden that Makarios' return had presented 'a fascinating study of personalities'.96 The hubbub had steadily risen from the airport to the cathedral, and when the Bishop of Kyrenia spoke he sought to whip up the congregation to still greater excitements. Yet, Maitland detected a different vein in Makarios, who had shown signs of wishing to moderate the boisterousness of proceedings. He spoke briefly, avoided politics, and 'sought to play the crowd down'.97 When an interjector put aside all ecclesiastical decorum and yelled out Torni Anglia' (Prostitute England), the Archbishop 'froze him into the ground' with a reproving glare. Two such different accounts exemplify the problem the British always had in establishing the 'real' Makarios. But then the Archbishop was a man of intensely divided impulses. Of all the criticisms to which he was to become subject, one of the most telling is that he was indecisive and fearful when confronting issues of great moment. Already under pressure from Grivas to agree to the commencement of a campaign of violence, Makarios' instincts as a man of caution, and no doubt his innate suspicion of Grivas himself, clashed with his self-image as a man of destiny. His stern rebuke to the cry of'Porni Anglia' indicated his desire not to burn his boats with the British administration. Above all, Makarios, like many of his own supporters, was caught up in a 'crisis of trust' which, Maitland observed, had come to engulf the island, and was undergoing a 'last examination of conscience' before coming to fateful decisions about a possible use of violence.98 This touched the heart of the matter. Maitland advised Eden that in these circumstances to propose a constitution less liberal than that put forward at the Constituent Assembly in 1948 would be 'an idiotic offer'. The deduction he made from this, however, was that it would be better to offer nothing at all. It was thus that British and Greek logic, even when it agreed on the underlying political facts, spun off at right angles to each other. Whitehall, too, however, was not wholly exempt from the 'last examination of conscience' under way in Cyprus. In this case the role of chief examiner was played by 95 96 97
Armitage to Lennox-Boyd, 11 Jan. i955,FO37i/ii762i,RGio8i/34. Patrick Maitland to Eden, 'Notes on Cyprus', 3 Feb. 1955, FO37I/117624, RGioSi/Sg. 98 Ibid. Ibid.
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Anthony Nutting, Minister of State in the Foreign Office (Nutting was later to resign over Suez—another line of fissure within British policy linking Cyprus and Egypt). Nutting was no 'defeatist'. He had joined in criticizing Armitage when the latter drew back at the last minute from imposing Government control on the schools, on the grounds that it would be a greater provocation even than arresting Makarios. Yet he did not share Eden's depreciation of the role played by the United States—'I wouldn't worry about the Americans', Eden had previously instructed his officials over Cyprus"—and he was now swayed by the advice of the United Kingdom's Ambassador in Washington, Sir Roger Makins, that although the Eisenhower Administration was happy to see the continuance of British sovereignty in the colony, they might change their minds if trouble ever broke out.1()l) Cypriots, Nutting argued, had to be offered at least the recognition of 'ultimate self-determination', since 'although we have not said that Cyprus will never be allowed self-determination, we have never said that it will'. In sum, the minister recommended what he called 'a policy of firmness in the present combined with reasonableness and open-mindedness in the future'. The only alternative, he said grimly, would be 'to fight it out with the Greeks'.101 Nutting was the first senior British figure to enunciate the argument that if only transparent and credible concessions were made to Greek-Cypriots about the future of the island, they would simmer down and accept something more modest in the mean time. But was it the case by early 1955, let alone later, that the arousal of Greek passions which had crystallized around the Enosis demand could be regulated and deflected by benign talk about the future? Eden regarded this as completely unrealistic. His political conscience had been shaped by the experience of Munich—that to be forced into concession through fear of an adversary was to invite certain oblivion. The images and rhetorical conceits grounded in the disrepute of pre-war Appeasement in Europe permeated British discussions about Cyprus, as they did of some other parts of the Middle East. Scribbling in considerable irritation over Nutting's memorandum, the Foreign Secretary's retort to the argument that the only alternative would be to fight it out with the Greeks was that Greece would not resist for long since 'the country is unstable'; to the proposition that a reference to 'ultimate selfdetermination' in Cyprus would assist Britain's international position, he struck back acidly 'not with the Turks or FYanco'; and to the thesis that a slight shift of position would give Papagos and his ministers the pretext to withdraw from the vicarious position they had taken up, he expostulated 'They would give a shout of triumph'. It was a shout of triumph that neither British diplomacy in the eastern Mediterranean, nor Eden himself at a time when the jockeying to succeed Churchill was at its height, could afford in the winter of 1955. If recognition of'ultimate self-determination' was still out of the question, so was any substantial movement on a new constitution for the colony. This was despite Governor Armitage's self-pitying confession in a long dispatch on i February 1955 vv Eden, minute, 24 Mar. 1955, FO37I/112841, WGio8i/4Q. ""' Sir Roger Makins to Eden, i2jan. 1955, FO37i/ii762i, RGio8i/43. "" Nutting, memorandum, 8 Feb. 1955, FO3yi/117625, RGioSi/107.
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that 'no one will come forward to talk to us [the Cyprus Government]' on the basis of the current policy, and which stressed the critical need to 'avoid creating conditions which may lead to disturbances, especially the type of disorders which the Police cannot quell through riot squads'—that is, the sort which required Army intervention.102 In a long analysis which admitted the acute divisions among his own advisers—and, characteristically, not without a long list of qualifications—Armitage finally came down on the side of reintroducing as soon as possible a Legislative Assembly with an elected Greek majority, albeit one which, as before 1931, would leave the casting vote with the Turkish representatives. This represented a considerable departure from the instructions which he had taken with him to Nicosia just over a year before. 'I am bewildered by the Governor's rapid changes of front,' was Kirkpatrick's angry response.103 Eden was equally dismayed. 'We have recently announced a constitution [on 28 July 1954]. Not enough people want to work it, so we rush around and look for another,' he summed up the situation. 'We never allow our medicine to work. We should . . . let no glimmer of weakness emerge on our side... strengthen [the] Police in Cyprus, improve our broadcasting etc, I had hoped we should have done this long ago. Nothing ever seems to be done in Cyprus.'104 Eden's mounting frustration that the situation in Cyprus was being allowed to slip beyond control by weakness and incompetence had been boosted considerably by a dramatic development a few days before Armitage's dispatch on a new constitution was received. In the early hours of 25 January HMS Comet, a surveillance vessel equipped with special radar facilities, and playing its part in a carefully planned operation under the codename 'Pursenet', picked up the trail of a Greek fishing boat, the Aghios Georghios, heading for Khlorakas.105 The Aghios Georghios—whose movements had been tipped off by British intelligence sources in Athens—was suspected to be carrying a consignment of arms and explosives. Two months before a similar interception had failed at the last moment when the crew in the nick of time dumped their cargo in the open sea and turned successfully on their tracks. This time the Comet's commander waited until the Greek boat got close to shore, and then pounced. The crew had only consigned a part of their load of weapons to the water before being arrested. Meanwhile, on shore the Cyprus Police rounded up the waiting reception committee, including a senior aide to Grivas, Socrates Loizides, who was also known to Archbishop Makarios, along with twenty-seven cases of explosives which had already been ferried ashore by dinghy. The apprehension of the Aghios Georghios was a blow to Grivas' skeletal organization. This was not principally because of the lost armoury. What worried Grivas most was its psychological effect on his Cypriot helpers, and above all the precedent of betrayal it provided. His first priority was to insist that the leak had come from 102
Armitage to Lloyd, i Feb. 1955, FO37I/117625, RGio8i//io6. I. Kirkpatrick, i4Feb. 1955^0371/117625,1101081/108. Eden,minute,9Feb. 1955,FO37I/117625,RGioSi/io?. 103 For background to the Aghios Georghios episode see Nancy Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece (London, 1978), pp. 104-10. 101
104
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i February-i April ig$$
Athens, not within EOKA itself. 'Silence. Keep your mouths shut. British agents are everywhere,' ran one of EOKA's cyclostyled pamphlets,106 and henceforth Grivas was to eliminate individuals at the slightest suggestion of their unreliability. No attempt was made to assert any innocence on the part of theAghios Georghios'' complement; indeed, they did not even defend themselves, or, despite prompting, show any concern about the implications for their dependants at home (which suggested to the British that considerable financial help was on hand from some quarter). 'We played head and tails. We lost, you won,' one of them briskly told his interrogators. The conduct of these interviews was revealing. The key objective—personally monitored by Eden in London—was to gather information on a possible link between gun-running and the Greek Government, so that the focus of questions was on the official treatment of theAghios Georghios as it had left Piraeus, and its revictualling in Rhodes.107 Divers were kept at work under dangerous winter conditions whilst the resulting prosecutions were in progress, attempting to recover jettisoned cargo and especially incriminating material. Although four cases including a Bren gun and small-arms were brought up, any link with Athens remained wholly conjectural. The other possibility was to draw Archbishop Makarios into the web. Eden's preoccupation at this point with implicating the Archbishop struck one of his aides as symptomatic of an obsession for detail to the detriment of any real vision of national policy.108 But whatever Eden's wider failings may have been, the detail was not just incidental. Here, too, the end result was nonetheless threadbare. The proposition that the Archbishop knew Socrates Loizides, Loizides was a gun-runner, ergo the Archbishop was a man of violence, was not one which could be entered into a court of law; and although the Archbishop did not condemn the gun-running, there was not a shred of evidence to connect him directly with it.109 In this regard it is very significant that theAghios Georghios incident—predating the actual outbreak of violence—remained the only one in which the British and Cyprus Governments were ever able to get anywhere close to establishing a tangible, if still very wobbly, connection between Makarios and instruments of violence inside the island. The interrogations arising from the Aghios Georghios, however, did prove one thing for certain: there was a 'terrorist' organization in place and ready to act. This inevitably concentrated the minds of those responsible for law and order in the colony, including the Colonial Secretary in London. Lennox-Boyd was a deep-dyed colonial conservative. But as the Minister responsible to the Crown, he saw Eden on 15 February and told him bluntly that they were all at a 'dead end' in Cyprus and that it was simply not possible any longer to govern the island simply by executive fiat.110 The Foreign Secretary could not brush Lennox-Boyd aside as he had Nutting or Armitage. He agreed in principle that a new 'offer' should be made to the Cypriots, 106
Enclosure in FO37I/117630,1101081/270. Lennox-Boyd to Armitage, i Feb. 1955, FO37i/i 17688, RGi 192/8. David Dutton, Eden (London, 1996), p. 375. m R. Thompson, minute, 15 June 1955, FO37I/117637. "" J. Ward, 15 Feb. 1955, FO37i/i 17625, RGio8i/m.
107
108
Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959
5T
but with one crucial proviso: that it should be approved beforehand by the Turkish Government.111 This was the first occasion that a Turkish 'condition' was integrated into British policy on Cyprus. For the moment officials in Whitehall set about rejigging a formula to present to Ankara. Playing with words, however, took time, and time was something that the Cyprus Government had very little of. In particular, the administration feared that the celebrations on 25 March (Greek Independence Day) would prove the next flashpoint. In a state of acute anxiety, Armitage fell back on a last resort of his own: a personal meeting between himself and Archbishop Makarios which would break the mutual embargo which had long existed on direct contact between the Cyprus Government and the Orthodox Church at the highest levels. This was not the first time Armitage had thought of such a meeting. When Makarios had been in Athens in December 1954, the Governor had, with Ambassador Peake's help, sent a junior emissary to see him at his hotel to suggest an encounter. Asked what the agenda of such a meeting might be, Makarios had, however, simply been told 'the maintenance of law and order', which offered little in return for his cooperation; the Archbishop had retreated into one of his enigmatic poses.112 But by February 1955 Makarios was as keen to meet with Armitage as Armitage was to see him. When the Archbishop's chief aide, Nikos Kranidiotis, met with Lawrence Durrell, the author who, as a fluent Greek speaker, had been brought in to upgrade the Cyprus Broadcasting Service, on 22 February, Kranidiotis stressed Makarios' fear of 'the drift towards local violence as a possible next step'113—the same fear as Armitage. The intermediaries sketched out a plan for a secret meeting at night in the remote monastery of Kykko between the two leaders, after which an agreed communique might help to get everybody over the 'hump' of 25 March. But just as Makarios had to 'deliver' Grivas to any such accommodation, so Armitage could not make a move of such importance without the permission of Her Majesty's Government. Perhaps left to himself, and with the weight of responsibility on him, Lennox-Boyd might have authorized the Governor to go ahead. But the real power lay elsewhere. Eden gave short shrift to what he and his officials saw as the proposition that the Governor should go 'cap in hand' into Makarios' territory (Kykko), effectively suing for help in governing his own colony.114 Reluctantly explaining to Armitage why this was not possible, Lennox-Boyd told him on 25 February that it would 'suggest a readiness and even anxiety on your part to seek an accommodation on self-determination'.115 Armitage's anxiety was, in fact, purely and simply to keep the peace; that this could not be disentangled from constitutional issues had become the nub of the problem. When he made a second attempt, pointedly arguing that any such meeting would be a triumph in breaking down the 'boycott imposed by the Church [on the administration] for the last twenty years',116 he 111 113 114 115 116
Ibid. "2 British Embassy, Athens to Foreign Office, FO37I/117620, RGioSi/y. Armitage, telegram to Lennox-Boyd, 24 Feb. 1955, FO37I/117625, RGio8i/i34. Nutting, minute, 28 Feb. 1955^6371/117626^61081/137. Lennox-Boyd to Armitage, 25 Feb. 1955^0371/117625^61081/134. Armitage, telegram to Lennox-Boyd, 26 Feb. 1955, FO37I/117626, RGio8i/i38.
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was refused again; and when he compounded his error by sending out a further distress signal, asking that the British Government seek Papagos' help to restrain the extremists in Cyprus,117 he was swiftly and this time irreversibly called home. His experience in Whitehall must have been fairly bruising; the word used by one observer to describe what happened to him when he tried to explain his difficulties to a high-level meeting of ministers and officials was 'demolished'."8 After Armitage arrived back in Nicosia on 23 March he found that the atmosphere ahead of Greek Independence Day was worse than when he had left. Amidst this tension Makarios remained locked in his own ambivalence. His rhetoric was undimmed, and even turned up a notch. 'We demand selfdetermination and nothing less,' he pronounced in a sermon. 'How shall we get this? By persistent and firm continuation of our struggle in all directions. By the weapon of our right. The wind of freedom is blowing everywhere, tearing down the colonial regimes.' Such language did not bode well. But on 25 March the Archbishop played a leading part in calming down the celebrations, and at one point even dispersed a crowd which gathered in front of his Palace. Quite what security advice Armitage received at this time we do not know. But a good deal can be deduced from his urgent appeal two days later that a new Cyprus statement had to be made in Parliament before it went into recess on 7 August. 119 'Not a chance. We must give Turkey a fair crack of the whip,' was how this was shot down when the Colonial Office diffidently raised the matter.120 Shortly after i a.m. on the morning of i April—April Fool's Day, as contemporaries could hardly fail to notice—a series of explosions rocked Government buildings in Nicosia, Limassol, and Larnaca. None had been guarded (this was to provide another rod in London with which to beat the Cyprus authorities). As their main target, the bombers made a selection well judged to grate with Anthony Eden, for whom propaganda had become the measure of a tough and energetic policy in the colony: the transmitters of the newly refurbished Cyprus Broadcasting Service were all destroyed. Pamphlets issued in the name, mysteriously, of'Dighenis', a Greek god of legend, and of EOKA (a name hitherto unknown to the British), were left littering the vicinity of the various attacks, calling on the people to rise up to achieve Enosis; as something of an afterthought, other leaflets were scattered in TurkishCypriot neighbourhoods in Nicosia informing their inhabitants that no harm was intended to them, but advising that Muslims should refrain from lining up in the struggle beside the British colonialists. Some hours after the first detonations, a Police check on the Famagusta-Larnaca road stopped a car, and found nine handgrenades, two sticks of dynamite, and three packets of explosive. The car's owner, Gregoris Axfentiou, was absent; as Grivas' chief lieutenant, Axfentiou was soon to be the second most hunted man on the island, and ultimately the principal martyr of the 117
Ward, minute, 19 Mar. 1955, RGio8i/i82, FO37t/i 17627. Note of meeting at the Foreign Office, 18 Mar. 1955, €0926/257. "'' Armitage, telegram toLennox-Boyd, 27 Mar. 1955, FO37I/117627, RGio8i/i97. 12(1 Nutting, minute, 28 Mar. 1955, ibid. 118
Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959
53
rebellion. The only fatality in this initial flurry of depredations was a nineteen-yearold youth whose body was found by an electric pylon near Famagusta (he had been trying to shear through the wires). In reporting these events to London, Armitage tried to find at least some small solace to pacify his superiors: a small transmitter, he related, had been borrowed to re-establish a broadcasting service around Nicosia and Larnaca. 'The programme' the Governor assured Lennox-Boyd, and through him the Cabinet, somewhat lamely 'will consist of mainly gramophone records and talks.'121 The complex origins of a rebellion are crucial to any understanding of its future course, which is why they have been traced in some detail here. Why, then, in some kind of nutshell, had unrest in Cyprus finally boiled over into violence, and what was the true nature of the organization of EOKA? Fra^ois Crouzet finds the distinguishing characteristic of the latter in its lack of spontaneity, the deliberateness and centralized nature of its creation, a phenomenon orchestrated from above rather than one which welled up from below.122 In this sense EOKA bore much greater resemblance to the calculated terrorism of such groups as Stern and Irgun in Palestine during the 19405, than it did to the more haphazard, and roughly contemporary, eruptions of Chinese insurgency in Malaya or the Mau Mau revolt in Kenya. It was a conflict, in short, which was not suddenly triggered by rural depression and unfocused political aspirations, but which flowed from a much more long-standing and even institutionalized confrontation between British administration and GreekCypriot society. To this extent at least British allegations of complicity in the use of force to resolve the issue—above all, the complicity of Makarios and the Church— were not to be wholly misplaced, even if they were never able to find the proofs required to turn this conviction (or prejudice) to their political advantage. Yet it remains the case that the outbreak of physical Greek resistance to British rule on the island in April 1955 was by no means inevitable, and was the product of a sharp psychological polarization between the British and the bulk of the Cypriots amidst the changing post-war world. For British policy-makers, and to a large section of metropolitan opinion, it became axiomatic that there should not be in Cyprus the same sorry story repeated so often elsewhere in the Middle East after 1945. Cyprus, as a sovereign British Colony, was to be different. This difference was made increasingly plain to the Cypriots themselves, and it was above all a sense of being singled out for special and discriminatory treatment, of being left behind when other, less advanced colonial peoples were being permitted to move forward politically and constitutionally, which fuelled and popularized a deep-seated sense of grievance amongst the majority. 'It seems inconceivable', a British visitor to the island remarked in the course of 1954, 'that the Cypriots could become vicious like the Egyptians."23 But that they could be like Egyptians if they chose was part and parcel of the more extreme Enosis rhetoric; and EOKA could not have arisen, and above all 121 122 121
Armitage to Lennox-Boyd, i Apr. 1955, FO37I/117628, RGioSi 7214. Fran9ois Crouzet, Le Conftit de Chypre, 1946-1959, 2 vols. (Brussels, 1973), ii. 486-7. The visitor was the Conservative MP Richard Brooman-White.
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could not have survived, if the possibility of such emulation, and even a certain pride in it, had not touched a chord amongst the great mass of Greek-Cypriots who detested violence for its own sake. What accident and events brought into head-on collision in Cyprus, therefore, were two different but equally tenacious ideas about the exceptional circumstances of the island—a Greek-Cypriot belief that they were exceptionally qualified to determine their own future, and a British belief that the island must be exempted in some way from the process of imperial retraction. In politics, as in most things, there are dangers in being different, and those dangers were soon to affect all those concerned in the Cyprus story. 'The enchanted island', to use the cliche which so many British travellers down the years had adopted to describe the special Levantine blend of people and scenes which they found there, was through this indirect and often obscure route to be transmuted into a more contemporary stereotype—an 'island of terror'.
3 'Terror Island', 2 April-3 October 1955 The meaning of the explosions of i April was not clear at first to the Cyprus Government. Even the nomenclature was confusing. Some pamphlets appeared signed EOKA, others bore the equally confusing mark of 'EMAK'. It was not known whether 'Dighenis' was a man or a committee. The discovery of a big arms store at Limassol on 3 April containing 300 Ib. of gelignite, 24 smoke grenades, detonators, and ammunition for a light-machine gun, was less equivocal. But doubt remained whether the organizers of this outbreak were able or intended to sustain their actions, and Armitage's security advisers told him to expect a lull until the Greek Easter; only if violence continued after that, they said, could it be assumed that a serious challenge to the Government's authority was unfolding.1 The Greek reaction in the island to the event was inscrutable. In the press and the cafes there was no ready approval of the saboteurs, but neither was there much criticism.2 The Turks kept their own counsel. Everybody watched everybody else, to see what would happen next. As was usual in such circumstances, Her Majesty's Government immediately promised the Governor whatever reinforcements were needed to ensure law and order. But the Governor was also expected to explain why things seemed to be getting out of control. The omission to guard Government buildings, despite the recent tension, was a source of embarrassment and criticism. Armitage's explanation, that although it was known that guns and explosives had been smuggled into Cyprus 'there was no indication from any source that they were about to be used', did not go down very well.3 In fact, the local authorities had expected trouble to emerge—as it had in 1931—more or less spontaneously during the course of a demonstration or the anniversary celebrations which figured so largely in the Greek calendar. They had not anticipated cool, premeditated terrorism of the sort previously associated with Jewish extremists in Palestine. After i April Armitage had no choice but to request the Commander-in-Chief at Middle East Headquarters, with whom his own relations had hitherto been distant and rather formal, to provide static guards for Government installations, whilst the desperately under-strength Police were diverted to mobile patrols. But his priority was, as he explained to Lennox-Boyd, 'not to create the impression that these [subversive] activities have disrupted the normal life of the Government and people of Cyprus',4 and to go ahead with his public engagements as usual. This was understandable and even wise, but was capable of being represented as 1
For a security evaluation see Armitage to Lennox-Boyd, 20 May 1955, FO37I/117632, RGio8i/339. 2 Armitage to Lennox-Boyd, 19 May 1955, FO37I/117637, RGio8i/477. 3 4 ArmitagetoLennox-Boyd,5 Apr. i955,FO37i/ii7o29,RGio8i/2oo. Ibid.
5^
2 April-3 October 1955
complaisant. In both Kenya and Malaya local civilian authorities had recently been accused of idly standing by whilst subversion had taken root around them. 5 This accusation now began to be made about the Cyprus administration. Almost as soon as news of the explosions arrived in London, it was arranged that General Sir Gerald Templer, who had so successfully combated Communist insurgents in Malaya,6 should visit Cyprus to see what was needed to 'ginger u p . . . what is patently an inadequate security force'.7 Whilst there he was inevitably influenced by the widespread irritation felt in military circles towards the 'business as usual' tendencies of civilian officials, and especially an alleged lack of'grip' on the part of the Governor. Templer recommended that the numbers and morale of the Cyprus Police be urgently improved, and in particular that the glaring omission of a Special Branch should be rectified. Complaints about the efficiency of the intelligence set-up in the colony was to run right through the Emergency, although the most profound roots of this problem in the recent colonial history of the island largely escaped analysis. Templer's adverse comments when he got back to London on what he had found, nevertheless, compounded Eden's exasperation that the local Government was still not doing enough to help itself, and it seems likely—though there is no proof—that it was at this point that the option of replacing the Governor first began to enter the reckoning. If security was necessarily the first preoccupation after i April, there was also the problem of what to do on the constitutional front. The advent of subversion deepened this dilemma in various ways. One aspect of Athens Radio propaganda which had especially worried the Cyprus authorities for some time was the singling out of individual Greek-Cypriots known to have dealings with the British as 'traitors'. If a new constitutional offer was made, any citizen who spoke favourably of it might well be at risk of assassination; failure to protect such persons would destroy the credibility of British rule. This was a key factor in the discussions of the Executive Council. Despite the risks, Armitage came down once again on the side of making some move, though not without the usual haverings and doubts.8 On 5 April 1955, however, Eden succeeded Churchill as Prime Minister (the last official document handled by Churchill in Downing Street was the report of the enquiry he had earlier instituted into the size of the Middle East Headquarters in Cyprus—too late to act on).9 Eden needed his own mandate if his authority to govern was not to be impaired, and a 5 High Commissioner Henry Gurney in Malaya and Governor Sir Philip Mitchell in Kenya, for example, provide contemporary analogues to Armitage's career in Cyprus, not least in their often abrasive relations with London. See David Throup, The Economic ami Social Origins of Man Man (London, 1988) and Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency, 1948-60 (Singapore, 1989). '' For an account of Templer's success in repressing the Communist insurgency in Malaya, which was to provide such a desirable, if elusive, parallel for Cyprus, see Richard Cloake, Templer. Lion of Malaya (London, 1993). 7 Nutting to Eden, i Apr. 1955, FO37I/117629, RGio8i/242. * Armitage, telegram to Colonial Office, 12 Apr. 1055^0926/258. '' Anthony Montague-Brown, Long Sunset: Memoirs of Winston Churchill's Last Private Secretary (London, 1995), p. 183.
Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-*959
57
general election was duly called. As a Foreign Office official told Peake in Athens, this made any hint of giving in to the demands of terrorists impossible to contemplate, and the Cyprus proposals promptly disappeared into 'cold storage'.10 There they were to remain frozen for some time. The pattern in which British domestic politics habitually ran athwart Cypriot affairs was to become engraved in the basic structure of the conflict. The new Foreign Secretary in the Eden ministry was Harold Macmillan, and to some people at least this provided a chance to lance the Cypriot boil. As wartime 'Viceroy' in the Mediterranean, Macmillan had worked closely with leading Greek figures. The retired elder statesman Lord Halifax, writing to congratulate him on his promotion, reminded Macmillan of these past friendships they had shared.11 He also took the opportunity to say that a number of eminent Greeks had told him that the Cyprus matter could easily be solved 'if we only show understanding of Greek feelings and not slam doors etc.'; all the British Government had done in recent years, Halifax complained, was 'to barricade ourselves in and dig trenches deeper and slam all the doors tighter'. The Foreign Secretary replied that 'we [the British Government] cannot afford to give any impression that we are on the run in Cyprus' lest it weaken the British position elsewhere in the Middle East.12 In the months ahead, making clear that Britain was not on the run in the Middle East was the dominant motif of the Eden government; and just as Harold Macmillan was to prove plus royaliste que k rot over the Egyptian question,13 so he was to do so over what was, in this context, its Cypriot appendage. Events were to be profoundly shaped as a consequence. Nevertheless, in writing to Halifax, the Foreign Secretary did feel able to offer the optimistic gloss that there was a chance of progress 'if we could get a moratorium on violence'. The question was, how might such a moratorium be brought about? What would be its price, and who might pay it? Nobody wanted or needed a moratorium more than the Cyprus Government, and on 29 May Armitage sent a cri de cceur to the Permanent Head of the Colonial Office in which the frayed nerves of his administration were evident. In a reference to the barrier seemingly raised in London against any foreseeable prospect of political progress inside the colony, he bluntly told Sir Thomas Lloyd If we have no rallying point [in Cyprus] we can't go on as we are defending a negative... Will we be able to maintain internal security [in Cyprus] if sabotage, riots and attacks on individuals are intensified? If we cannot maintain order through police and civil means, it will require troops. Can we contemplate... another Palestine or Canal Zone? Some say that things can never be as bad as that in Cyprus. But if desperate people decided that they are to [be], how can they be prevented? Who will be on our side—some terrified Turks and Armenians?14 10 11 12 13 14
Ward to Peake, 23 Apr. 1955, FO37i/ii763i,RGio8i/3O4. Lord Halifax to Macmillan, 18 Apr. 1955^0371/117630^01081/297. Macmillan to Halifax, 26 Apr. 1955, ibid. Keith Kyle, The Suez Crisis (London, 1991), p. 228. Armitage to Thomas Lloyd, 26 May 1955, FOi 17/637, RGioSi /46s.
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2April-3 October 1955
This was the authentic plea of a colonial administration facing what it feared might become an uncontrollable situation. Armitage's nightmare vision was not to be far from the mark. But if the Governor was desperate for a rally of the local forces of moderation and non-violence, the Conservative Government needed a rallying-point amongst its own parliamentary supporters at home, just as British diplomacy needed to mobilize its psychological and material weight against Middle Eastern nationalism—indeed, these last two imperatives were more than ever closely connected. These rival imperatives did not match up with each other, and in key respects were in contradistinction. What might 'rally' disaffected Cypriots—if only through renewed quiesence—behind British rule was just as likely to divide opinion in the imperial metropole, and convey a fatal message of weakness to the watching world. In the Foreign Office Armitage's plea was therefore written off as 'a form of Danegeld'— Danegeld which Eden, always vulnerable to barbs from sterner members of his own party, could not afford to pay." Nor was Armitage's analogy between the undeniably uncomfortable situation in Cyprus and the grave dilemmas which had led to the British departure from Palestine, and which still assailed them in Egypt, accepted as valid. First, both in Palestine and Egypt the United Kingdom had lacked allies in the local population to allow them to fight back effectively. Secondly, in these other places Britain had not enjoyed external support—rather the opposite. It was at least possible to view Cyprus in a contrasting light, so that where Armitage saw only 'a few terrified Turks and Armenians', ministers and many officials in London identified the key to a more pugnacious defence of the British stake. There was to be an internal dimension to this strategy, but it was the foreign policy aspect—what was described as 'bringing Turkey into the centre of the picture' of discussions about Cyprus16— which was central to Foreign Office calculations. This might not stop riots, sabotage, or attacks on individuals in the island. But then coping with such things was not the Foreign Office's job. What it might conceivably achieve was to set the status quo in a kind of international aspic, if only by the sheer political venom of the animosities aroused. Such stabilization, however necessarily brittle in the circumstances, was all that the essential interests of Her Majesty's Government required. Bringing the Turks into the centre of the picture meant something more than merely relying, as hitherto, on their support in New York, or using them as a convenient excuse for inaction. The fact that such an internationalization of the dispute came to the fore under Macmillan's aegis as Foreign Secretary was not just fortuitous. In fact, he was always to seek to 'solve' the Cyprus problem through complicated international means, rather than by engaging with the details of internal Cypriot politics—details which he looked upon with disdain. In this regard the remark made by a recent biographer that Macmillan—in striking contrast, for example, to Eden—was never very interested in the British Empire, or immersed in its distinctive problems, is relevant.17 Where Eden's 'medicine' for the ills of Cyprus 15 17
lfl Thompson, minute, 4 June 1955, ibid. Ibid. John Turner, Macmillan (London, 1996), pp. 178-9.
Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959
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was an energetic and straightforward repression, Macmillan's cure lay in bringing international leverage to bear. This tactic was at once potentially more powerful and less direct—both of which appealed to his way of conducting political business. It was also more dangerous. During the summer of 1955 Cyprus became a kind of laboratory for his preferred modus operandi. This approach crystallized around the idea of calling a three-power international conference of Britain, Greece, and Turkey, ostensibly to deal with strategic issues in the eastern Mediterranean as a whole. In practice the conference would be used to spring on Greece the solution of a tri-dominion over Cyprus whereby the United Kingdom retained sovereignty, but in which Turkey as well as Greece would play a role in the administration of the island, much to the detriment of the Greek position. By pulling the rabbit of a de facto settlement out of his conference hat, Macmillan would consolidate his position as Eden's own heir apparent—a consideration which vitally influenced his actions over Cyprus, as they did even more significantly over Egypt. A notable aspect of this scheme as it began to be thrashed out after May 1955 was that there were to be no Cypriot representatives at the envisaged conference. Their absence would be the key to its success, because only by excluding them could the internal complexion of the island be subordinated to the international and regional factors which Macmillan was bent on exploiting. Such a coup de theatre had its appeal—except for those on the British side facing the backwash that was bound to be caused in and around the colony itself. Armitage was quick to object that the manipulation of a conference in the manner proposed would be widely seen as nothing more than a ruse 'to prevent the possibility of [the] emergence of a Cypriot nation and a Cypriot government';18 the only effect, the Governor said, would be to precipitate more, not less, violence inside the island by heightening the misunderstanding which already existed. These doubts were shared in the Colonial Office, never slow to recognize hare-brained Foreign Office schemes for tackling colonial problems. For the moment, however, the Governor was above all preoccupied with keeping up the appearances of normality around him. In this regard he faced a symbolic decision at the beginning of June—whether to repeat the practice followed ever since the start of British occupation and remove the seat of administration during the scorching summer from Nicosia to the relative cool of the hill-station at Troodos. His intention to stick with tradition played into the hands of Armitage's growing band of critics at home, and the Colonial Secretary reluctantly ordered him to stay at his post in the Cypriot capital.19 It was probably as well since on 19 June the real slide to violence began. The key battle-ground at this stage of the incipient rebellion was the Police. After General Templer's visit in mid-April, the Cyprus Government had set about strengthening that cadre, which in the first instance meant increasing its numbers. When very few Greeks responded to the call, the Government resorted to pressuring 18 19
Armitage to Lennox-Boyd, 8 June 1955,00926/259. Lyttelton, minute, 19June 1955,00926/141.
6o
2 April-3 October 1955
some of its own public servants to join the part-time constabulary, though not to much avail. This was the first sign of a crack within the heart of the administration. For Grivas it was of the utmost importance to drive a wedge between the Police and the bulk of the population; it was also necessary to attack Police stations in order to loot their weapons—the more guns obtained inside the island, the less dependent EOKA would become on the erratic supply from Greece. Both these motives entered into EOKA's actions from 19 June onwards. On that day there were several explosions at Police installations in Nicosia and Kyrenia. On 21 June the front of the Divisional Police Headquarters in Ataturk Square was blown in, injuring five persons and killing one; this brought EOKA violence into the Turkish quarter of the city for the first time. Far more perturbing to the authorities was the attack on Amiandos Police Station the following day by men armed with machine guns, who singled out for assassination a Greek Police Sergeant active in the newly established Special Branch. The obvious deduction was that the terrorist organization was obtaining inside information on key targets. The Cyprus Government had always been something of a sieve—the Greek press was full of speculation, often accurate, about confidential Government business. Here were the roots of the situation whereby the British Army in Cyprus and EOKA relied on the same Police force for the information on which their respective operations came to be based,20 which was one reason why the military story of the Emergency, not unlike its political counterpart, simply went round in circles. This porousness within the Police became in the summer of 1955 a matter of life and death for individuals. Over the next weeks intimidation of Greek-Cypriot personnel in the Police continued. The murder on 13 August of a Special Constable, Nicki Stavros, well known as a local football star, made a major impact; his brother's grieving letter in the press excoriating the murderers for creating in Cyprus 'a hell of terrorism for liberty' 21 might be taken as marking the beginning—in a way the explosions of i April had not—of a nightmare within local Greek society. But it was also a serious defeat for the Cyprus Government. 'The Police Are Out Of The Fight' EOKA graffiti in Nicosia declared afterwards. Certainly a large proportion of Greek Police became useless so far as combating EOKA was concerned. To fill the gap in the security machine the Cyprus Government announced during August the formation of an Auxiliary Police Force, and this proved from the outset to be composed almost exclusively of Turks.22 Armitage's prophecy that British rule might end up reliant on 'a few terrified Turks and Armenians', was under way. What Armitage could not have anticipated was the degree to which the Turks would exploit their advantage, and the lengths to which the British and Cyprus Governments might eventually go—or be pushed—to offset their weakness by manipulating the wider balance of power between the main 211
Doras Alastos, Cyprus Guerrilla: Grivas, Makarios and the British (London, 1960), p. 125. Times of Cyprus (IT, Aug. 1955). 22 For background, see David Anderson, 'Policing and Communal Conflict: The Cyprus Emergency, 1954-60' in R. F. Holland (cd.), Emergencies and Disorder in the European Empires after 1945 (London, 1994). 21
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indigenous communities. The communalization of the Cyprus Police was to unfold as a critical index of this phenomenon. EOKA's actions after 19/20 June confirmed and intensified the physical struggle between the Government and the 'men of violence' in Cyprus, and put the political contest on to a new plane. 'Step by step', the United States Consul in Nicosia, Raymond Courtney, who had himself just narrowly escaped a bomb blast, reported to Washington at the end of that month, 'the Enosists have tested it [the Cyprus Government] out, and... proved that they can get away with open and even violent defiance.'23 Certainly, any attempt to sustain the appearance of normality ceased to be credible. Once this Rubicon was crossed, Armitage and his advisers lurched towards the declaration of an Emergency and the additional powers which went with it. Plans existed for extensive arrests once such an announcement was made, and several key suspects had already been taken into custody. One of Armitage's principal concerns in wishing to inaugurate such a formal change was that otherwise these men would soon have to be released.24 This proposal met with a blank refusal in London. On 30 June Macmillan had formally announced the British intention to hold an Eastern Mediterranean Conference, and invitations were issued to Greece and Turkey. Everything hinged on the Greek Government being prepared to attend this meeting; whilst any announcement of an Emergency in Cyprus was bound to make the Athenian horse bolt prematurely. Armitage's subsequent plea that the 'lives of men of extreme importance in the Police are at risk' was therefore met only to the extent that he was allowed to continue planning in secret for a crack-down.25 Nor was Armitage's additional argument—not so much in contradiction to further arrests as might be superficially supposed—that self-determination had become 'the one real, vital, allabsorbing point', and that any White Paper published in connection with the projected Tripartite Conference which omitted dealing with this point would be 'so much waste paper',26 likely to meet with more sympathy. When the Cabinet met on 7 July these requests were swept aside.27 There was one matter, however, on which it was possible to give the beleaguered Governor some modest satisfaction. For several weeks Armitage had pressed hard for a visit by the Colonial Secretary to see Cypriot conditions for himself, and hopefully appreciate his problems more vividly. It was this request which the Cabinet—once assured by the Governor that he could provide cast-iron security for Lennox-Boyd, whose assassination would obviously have been a major disaster for the Government28—duly approved. 23 R. Courtney to State Department, 30 June 1955, Box 3273, RGsg, State Department Records, USNA. 24 Thompson,minute,24June i955,FO37i/ii7639,RGio8i/5O9. 25 Armitage, telegram to Lennox-Boyd, 30 June 1955, €0926/259. 26 Armitage to Martin, 26 June 1955, €0926/265. 27 Conclusions of meeting held at 10 Downing Street, 7 July 1955, CM (55) 21 CABi28/29. 28 See brief for Cabinet (7 July) on 'Internal Security of Cyprus' in FO37i/n642, RGio8i/625. Ministers would have had very much in mind as precedents Gurney's assassination in Malaya in 1951, and perhaps even more appositely in this case, that of Lord Moyne, British Resident Minister in the Middle East, in Cairo during 1944.
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When Lennox-Boyd, wasting no time, arrived in Nicosia on the morning of Saturday, 9 July, accompanied by a very senior official, Sir John Martin, he was the first Secretary of State for Colonies ever to visit Cyprus. It was a visit, obviously, of some delicacy. One of its subsidiary purposes was for the British Government to be able to say at the forthcoming conference that a genuine consultation with Cypriot opinion had taken place as part of the preparations. At the same time ministers were concerned that Lennox-Boyd's presence in the island should not build up unvrarrarited expectations—not only amongst Cypriots. To dispel any illusions the Colonial Office had made it perfectly clear to Armitage beforehand that whilst Lennox-Boyd would be prepared to discuss a new 'liberal' constitution in Cyprus, he could not discuss selfdetermination. Going straight from the airport to a meeting with the Governor and his Executive Council, Lennox-Boyd reiterated that he had come chiefly as a token of support for the Government and its supporters—nothing more.29 Armitage tried hard to focus the meeting on the offer of a constitution which, he said, 'would give the people of Cyprus something to work for', and warned the minister that '[a] policy of laissezfaire . . . was likely to have very serious consequences'.10 Lennox-Boyd was careful, however, not to be drawn beyond what he knew to be the Cabinet position. If LennoxBoyd was reticent with Armitage, he was naturally even more so during his subsequent encounters with various Cypriot delegations the following day. He learned more from them than they did from him. The farming representatives told him that 'on the political side the rural people were all agreed'—only self-determination would satisfy their aspirations." The left-wing Mayors told him the same. He assured the latter that Cypriot views would be borne in mind during the coming conference, although his attempts to steer the conversation on to social and economic improvement fell flat. With the right-wing mayors Lennox-Boyd did not bother even to do that, and simply grinned and bore the Nationalists' denunciations of the impending conference. 'The over-riding desire of the whole Greek population of Cyprus was for Enosis\ the Mayor of Nicosia, Dr Dervis, declared, 'and in this sense EOKA and the Greek people of Cyprus are the same.'12 This was verging on blatant sedition, though as the Times of Cyprus remarked, Dervis could hardly be prosecuted for saying to Lennox-Boyd what he could have from the lips of every Greek taxi-driver in the city." Even the TurkishCypriot representatives—whom he saw last of all—did not give Lennox-Boyd an easy time, taxing him with the alleged oppressions and discriminations suffered by their community at the hands of the British administration—complaints which LennoxBoyd sought repeatedly to deflect by underlining throughout Her Majesty's Government's 'appreciation of the sturdy loyalty of the Turkish community'.14 2
* Minutes of an Extraordinary Meeting of the Cyprus Executive Council, Saturday, 9 July 1955, 01)926/190. " Ibid. 1 Minutes of meeting at Government House, Nicosia with representatives of rural interests, 10 July 1955, CO926/190. 1 Minutes of meeting with right-wing mayors, 10 July 1955, ibid. 1 r/m«»/C)'/>««(3Julyi955). 4 Minutes of meeting with Turkish Representatives, 10 July 1955, CO926/I9O.
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The most important meeting that Lennox-Boyd had in Cyprus, however, was that with Archbishop Makarios on the afternoon of his arrival. It marked the beginning of the Archbishop's personal dealings with British authority. If the worsening violence at this time constituted a crisis for the Cyprus Government, so it did for Makarios— arguably more so. Rumours had already begun that the initiative was slipping into the hands of extremists on the Greek side, and, ominously, that Turkish-Cypriots were gathering arms of their own to combat Enosis (this incipient organization was said to be called 'Volkan'). A first indication that Makarios' position was not wholly intransigent came when he had seen the local Anglican Archdeacon a few days before and told him that he fully appreciated how sterile the slogan ''Enosis and only Enosis' had become, and that 'he was sure the right answer to all these questions could easily be found if only the British Government would move away from the "No Change" position and allow him some room for negotiation'.35 In explaining his difficulties Makarios also told Archdeacon Goldie something else: that he could not openly denounce the violence of EOKA without putting his own life at risk.36 He was on various occasions in the future to refer to this constraint in his conversations with British interlocutors; almost invariably it was rebuffed as a mark of his indecisiveness as a politician, or—since few pejoratives were to be spared in the Archbishop's case—as a sign of personal cowardice. It was a variation on the complex contradictions of the British view of Makarios that he was seen as both the veiled leader of EOKA, and a potential victim of it (the only attempt to assassinate Makarios, indeed, was to be by a Greek hand). For the present, the Archbishop was already signalling in advance of the Colonial Secretary's arrival that he was more moderate than his own rhetoric might suggest. The meeting of the Colonial Secretary and the Archbishop, with the Governor in attendance, took place, appropriately enough, in the card-room of the Ledra Palace Hotel, amidst security described by one experienced British correspondent as 'the toughest I have ever seen, even in wartime'.37 An aide of Makarios did the translating—although Makarios spoke English accurately, if slowly, the precise meaning of words was always to be a potential pitfall in his interchanges with the British. The Archbishop began by criticizing the 'crooked approach' of using an international conference to make Cyprus into an explosive and deadlocked issue, before asking Lennox-Boyd what he meant when he referred to the possibility of constitutional development in the island.38 The minister maintained a discreet silence about the conference—about which he had, in fact, his own doubts—but explained that full internal self-government had to be successfully experimented with before further moves might be made. Their discussion moved on to the subject of violence, in the course of which Makarios explained that he could not put himself at odds with his own people by an open denunciation of EOKA. To this Lennox-Boyd replied firmly 35 Conversation between Archbishop Makarios and Archdeacon Goldie, 27 June 1955, FO37I/117641, RGio8i/595. 36 Ibid. " Times of Cyprus (10 July 1955). 38 Meeting at Ledra Palace Hotel, 9 July 1955^0371/117641^01081/595.
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that 'he [Makarios] knew his own influence, and it was up to him to use it'.39 Finally, and most revealingly, the exchanges bumped up against the ultimate difference of self-determination. Makarios and Lennox-Boyd fenced on this topic, before Armitage intervened—it was the only occasion he spoke—to ask Makarios directly if the offer of a constitution incorporating self-determination after afixed'periodfmight be acceptable. Makarios replied that 'such an offer would provide ground for discussion. He [Makarios] would agree to a meeting on that basis'.40 In theory at least, this suggestion, and the Archbishop's response to it, opened up an area for possible negotiation. Shortly afterwards the meeting broke up with that courteous but somewhat frigid formality which always characterized Anglo-Greek discourse in the colony. The future course of Makarios' dealings with the British was foreshadowed in this first encounter. There were three great imponderables, of which the question of an interim self-governing ('liberal') constitution was the most complicated, violence was the most emotional, and self-determination the most decisive. But, however these might appear to be separated out, it was the way they tended to fuse together which made understanding so difficult. This was symbolized by the bombs which exploded inside the main Secretariat building in Nicosia during the Colonial Secretary's stay (that EOKA could penetrate the inner sanctum of Government was a blow to confidence). The triggering of devices by the terrorists at crucial moments of contact between British officialdom and the Archbishop became part of a recurrent pattern, though who was intimidating whom was perhaps more convoluted than the British assumed. Nevertheless, these explosions helped to sour Lennox-Boyd's last few hours in the colony. Nor was his departure assisted when it turned out that his return flight to London via Rome with British European Airways was to be shared by a Nationalist delegation on its way to lobby European capitals. Crowds ofEnosis supporters surrounded the tarmac—Nicosia was a small, intimate airport—and the Secretary of State mounted the aeroplane amidst a flurry of Greek flag-waving. In Cyprus, as so often, a certain unintended but amiable irony could yet serve as a counter-point to high political emotions. When the Colonial Secretary got home, planning for the Tripartite Conference to be held in London was in full swing within the Foreign Office. The Turkish Government had accepted the invitation on 2 July, and on 8 July the Greek Government followed suit. In securing these acceptances, explicit assurances were given to both Athens and Ankara that the British Government would not attempt a fait accompli by 'bouncing' the conference with a Cyprus plan of its own. This was exactly what Macmillan intended to do. Although the plan he began to evolve came to be referred to amongst the civil servants as a tridominium, the term was not really appropriate, since Greece and Turkey were merely to be invited to appoint 'Assessors' to advise the Governor and his Executive Council on certain matters. Because the Foreign Secretary's main purpose was to 'bury' self-determination, it was, he argued, tactically necessary to be 'really bold' with regard to self-government, in order to 'set Left and •w Meeting at Ledra Palace Hotel.
*' Ibid.
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Right in Cyprus fighting one another and forgetting Enosii (this was where 'liberalism' came in).41 A vital element in the conference scheme concerned the date. This had been left out of the original invitations. By delaying its occurrence till the end of August, the Greek Government might be lulled into optimism about an outcome favourable to their hopes, and not have the time, once this was confounded, to go through all the procedures involved in inscribing Cyprus again on the agenda of the forthcoming United Nations session. Averting further discussion in New York was the underlying objective of the whole exercise. This scenario did not, of course, bode well for relations with Greece. Ambassador Peake, for example, warned that the moment the British suggested that Turkey regain a role in the administration of Cyprus after the long interval since 1878, the Greeks would walk out of the conference. What Peake did not grasp was that this was far from being seen as disadvantageous in Whitehall. 'This is an excellent point,' a Foreign Office official noted approvingly. 'On this showing the [Tripartite] talks are bound to break down—and possibly explode.'42 The high-risk nature of this gambit, and its not entirely respectable character, generated tensions. The United States Embassy in London sensed this when their usual Whitehall contacts appeared 'more and more jumpy' whenever Cyprus was mentioned, and finally clammed up altogether.43 Relations between departments in Whitehall assumed a fractious tone. Colonial Office officials were instinctively opposed to subjecting a complicated problem in their own sphere of responsibility to all the distortions of international politics. Whatever may have been true earlier, most saw the advantages in steering the Cyprus problem if possible back into the more conventional channels of internal colonial political development which were working well enough elsewhere in the remaining British Empire. Hostility to the Macmillan plan was forcefully expressed by the Assistant Under-Secretary, H. T. Bourdillon, who caustically remarked that the scheme was in truth not one for 'tridominium', but for 'Pan-demonium', and that the real purpose seemed to be to kill 'any chance of the Cypriots making up their own minds about their future in conditions of orderly progress'.44 'I am disturbed . . . that we are aiming for a deadlock,' Bourdillon remarked in terms Makarios himself might have approved, adding acidly, 'with great respect I do urge that we ... pursue our proposal for selfdetermination with the real object of bringing it about, regarding it as I think we do as the only means of achieving a permanent solution.' Nevertheless, the ball had effectively been taken out of the Colonial Office court. Nor is there much sign that Alan Lennox-Boyd—always caught between the pragmatism of his department and his close alignment with the 'colonial' right-wing within his own party—pressed with any vigour on his senior colleagues the compromise of self-determination after a fixed interval which Armitage had floated with Archbishop Makarios in Nicosia. 41
W. Morris, minute, 17 Aug. 1955,00926/259. R. Selby, minute, 23 July 1955, FO37I/117645, RGio8i/7o6. 43 E. Wilson (London) to F. Wood (State Department), 4 Aug. 1955, Box 3273, RG59, State Department Records, USNA. 44 H. Bourdillon to Martin, 23 July 1955,00926/259. 42
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On 7 August the Cabinet confirmed that at the Tripartite Conference any mention of self-determination should be excluded. 'It would now seem to be impossible', a minute in the Colonial Office recorded, 'to find a formula which would be acceptable to both the Cabinet and the Cypriots.'45 This careful formulation of the essential struggle was itself very telling. The Cabinet decision of 7 August in effect handed the initiative in British policy, temporarily, to Macmillan. Everything now hinged on the management of the conference—and of the explosion, or more properly the threat of an explosion, which was part and parcel of the strategy of bringing Greece to heel over Cyprus. But why had the Greek Government accepted an invitation which many people pointed out might be used for a hostile purpose? For one thing, the Americans pressed them to accept, and in doing so gave assurances that the conference was a genuine attempt on Britain's part to forge a compromise. Whilst some parts of Greek opinion reacted strongly against the matching invitation to Turkey, Greek ministers had never denied that Ankara had a legitimate interest in the Muslim minority in the island. What they did not accept was that Turkey had an equivalent interest in Cyprus to that of Greece. No hint of this had been given in the invitation precisely to avoid scaring them off. Entry to a conference on Eastern Mediterranean affairs in London afforded a recognition of Greece's integration into the West, the yearning for which was still close to the sensitive surface of Athenian political psychology. While, therefore, Archbishop Makarios rushed to Athens on 11 July and pressed on politicians his suspicions of British tactics, he could not sway them. In accepting the conference invitation, the Greek Foreign Minister, Stephanoupoulos, told Macmillan in Strasbourg that he hoped it would mark the 'renewal of the traditional friendship between Greece and the United Kingdom', though he added the rider that the 'centre of gravity' of the Greek position over Cyprus remained self-determination.46 Makarios had, however, gained one compensation: it was simultaneously announced in Athens that if the Tripartite meeting proved abortive, Greece remained committed to raising Cyprus at the United Nations thereafter. This episode served, nonetheless, to intensify the rivalry between the Archbishop and the 'Rally' ministry, the latter made weaker by Papagos' illness (he was dying of cancer, and from the late summer was never seen again in public). When Makarios preached at Trooditissa monastery on 15 August, he strikingly emphasized not the theme of Enosis, but that of 'liberty', stressing in his address that Cypriots 'could manage their own fate and future'. The potential of Cyprus for dividing British officialdom always paled besides its capacity to set Greeks against each other. Yet the most ominous possibility was not that of setting Greek against Greek, or Left against Right, but rather that of setting Greek against Turk and vice versatriggering, that is, ethnic rivalry, with all its capacity for a more extended violence than that currently blighting the island's life. We must at this point go back 45
Bennett, minute, 3 Aug. 1955, 00926/259. ' Macmillan, telegram to Foreign Office, 6July 1955, FO37I/117641, RGio8i/594.
4r
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somewhat on our chronology to focus more sharply on developments within the Turkish-Cypriot community, and its relations with both the Cyprus and Turkish Governments, since so much was eventually to hinge on these factors. The volatility of Greek-Cypriot politics during the early 19505 had been echoed on the Turkish side where a new, essentially opportunist grouping, the Federation of Turkish Associations, sought to monopolize minority politics, just as the Enosists strove to dominate majority politics. What the Federation wanted, however, was not merely guarantees against any future Greek domination, but distinct privileges within the existing order—privileges which, it was calculated, the hard-pressed Cyprus Government might be badgered into giving them. Furthermore, in trying to extract such advantages—including Federation control over the Evkaf, with its money and patronage, over a revived Muftiship, as well as special rights in education—TurkishCypriot politicians set out to secure the sponsorship of Ankara. That it was the Turkish-Cypriots who in the first instance embroiled a reluctant 'Motherland' on their own behalf, not the other way round, is noteworthy, since it was a fact later obscured by the degree to which the Cypriot Muslims became purely and simply the pawns of Ankara's diplomacy, in stark contrast to the more complex and fractious relations always subsisting between Greek-Cypriots and Athens. The classic approach of the Cyprus authorities to its Muslim subjects, and intercommunal relations generally, was laid out by Governor Sir Andrew Wright when he had visited the Turkish capital in December 1953—the visit itself, indeed, was a sign of heightened concern with Turkish-Cypriot political activity in the colony. On that occasion Wright stated his Government's aim that 'the Turks in Cyprus should develop from their past history as good Turks, just as the Greeks should develop as good Greeks. It was not their policy to attempt to turn either Turks or Greeks into Englishmen.'47 Wright went on to warn the British Ambassador to Turkey, Sir James Bbwker, that 'it would not be either wise or helpful' to enlist the influence of the Turkish Government to counter the Greek movement in Cyprus; and he concluded with the stern declaration that the Government in Nicosia 'must be master in its own house'. Mastery in its colonial house, insofar as communal matters were concerned, meant preserving a stable equilibrium in which British authority could not be credibly impeached as favouring one community over the other. During the Emergency, and ever afterwards, much Greek-Cypriot opinion came to believe that the British power in the island had sought to 'divide and rule' ever since their arrival in 1878. The truth was that as late as the beginning of 1954 the beau ideal of British rule in Cyprus was not to be soiled and compromised by involvement in communal politics, but rather to be suspended above it, mitigated only by encouragement to the Turkish underdog to 'keep its end up' within Cypriot society and commerce. The trouble was that circumstances made such impartiality—at once benevolent and self-interested—increasingly hard to sustain. Initially the guidelines shifted almost imperceptibly. After Wright's visit, the British Embassy in Ankara, backed 47
'Sir Andrew Wright's Visit to Turkey', i Dec. 1953,03926/183.
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by the Foreign Office in London, maintained its pressure for some 'discreet differentiation' to be shown to Turkish-Cypriots over their Greek compatriots.48 Whereas Wright, for all his passionate contempt ofEnosis, was in fact more interested in Greek than Turkish affairs—his wife, for what it is worth, was a Greek-speaker—Armitage began his Governorship when conditions were forcibly edging the administration towards meeting at least some Turkish desiderata. Discreet differentiation shortly began to assume a more overtly political form. Something of this atmosphere is conveyed by the report of the two British counsellors from the Ankara Embassy who visited the colony in June 1954, and whose report recorded that the local authorities had taken 'considerable trouble for us to meet the majority of the responsible and reliable Turks on the island'. Although, the account added, this category amounted to no more than ten individuals, it was noted that things seemed about to improve since 'a number of younger men were coming on'.4" 'Coming on' meant tacit grooming under British patronage; one of these rising stars in the small Turkish-Cypriot world was Rauf Denktash, just then beginning a legal and political career in which his relationships with the British were to turn full circle not once, but several times over. As we noted previously, it was the need to lubricate this gradually tightening Anglo-Turkish tie within the island which was one factor shaping the fateful 'Never' statement of 28 July 1954. Meanwhile, the everyday realities of communal coexistence in Cyprus remained, if not impervious, then resistant to fundamental change. There were no communal incidents during the United Nations debates in the autumn of 1954. The outbreak of violence on the island on i April 1955 inevitably had an impact on communal affairs, as the banding together of various Muslim bodies (including the Federation) into the 'Cyprus is Turkish Party' suggested. Yet for some time there was no direct conflict between the two main ethnic groups. EOKA violence was initially directed against British installations, and then against Greek 'traitors'; Grivas, indeed, explicitly forbade any victimizing of Turks. In this he was quite practical—EOKA could not fight everybody at once. Rather the process of ethnic polarization at first worked indirectly by differentiating Greek and Turkish relationships with the colonial power. Whilst the Greek community, therefore, distanced itself from the British administration, local Turks seized the opportunity to press their own distinctive claims and grievances on the Cyprus Government with a new stridency—an attitude described by Armitage, whose patience quickly wore thin, as 'aping the oppressed minority'.1" Through the summer of 1955 events pushed the Turks and the British into closer harness, as the formation of the Auxiliary Police illustrated. Relations between Greeks and Turks in the colony began to change for the worse, therefore, not as a result of mutual violence or even innate hostility, but by dint of the shift in the connection each had with the local administration, and especially the security machine. The Times of Cyprus, for example, referred to the 'picture of contrasting life' between 4S +1;
N. Chectham to Pearson, 6 Jan. 1954, ibid. 'Report of a Visit to Cyprus', 3 June 1954, FOsyr/i 12848, WGio8i/i89. 5 " Armitage to Thomas Lloyd, 26 May 1955, FO37I/117637, RGio8i/465.
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the two main communities as they reacted differently to events, or were variously affected by the actions of the Army and Police. In this way Greek and Turkish Cyprus were progressively sealed off from each other, allowing suspicion and even hatred to fester. This still had a long way to go on the eve of the Tripartite conference, but the possibilities were visible enough for those—on all sides—with an interest in exploiting racial and religious feeling. The same complex distortions began to obtrude at the international level. The mainland Turkish press had responded to the initial news of i April, not by outright attacks on the Greeks, but by criticizing the Cyprus Government for failing to prevent the outrage. Although the Ankara regime distanced itself from the more extreme of these outbursts, so that Prime Minister Menderes refused an audience to the Turkish-Cypriot delegation which immediately rushed to Ankara, it was not long before signs emerged that the Turkish Government was 'raising its price' for supporting the United Kingdom.52 For the British, it was vital that as much of the price of Turkish help as possible was paid by people other than themselves. In this connection considerable interest was taken in the Foreign Office when it appeared that a campaign was under way in Turkey to implicate in the dispute the Orthodox Patriarchate of Istanbul, with its penumbra of Greek civilization and commerce. This was described in London as having 'interesting possibilities';53 there was also a recrudescence of the sentiment, expressed at a slightly earlier point, that 'a few riots in Ankara would do us nicely',54 the implication being that such disturbances would provide a useful background to events by obscuring all traces of Turkish 'equivocations' over the Cyprus issue. In this context riots in Ankara (where there was no exposed Greek community) was one thing, and in Istanbul quite another. Nevertheless, Greek concern about the safety of their own compatriots in Turkish cities, and above all the preservation of the great religious and cultural legacy of Constantinople, was to emerge as a consistent thread running through the Cypriot power-struggle. Doubts and hesitations in Whitehall about the ramifications of the projected Eastern Mediterranean conference went beyond the confines of the Colonial Office. Even some individuals in the Foreign Office felt uneasy. When, however, it emerged that the Greek Government had made a preliminary overture of its own to Turkey, the Foreign Secretary instructed his officials to put aside all 'scruples' in what everybody recognized was to be a diplomatic sleight of hand.55 'The stronger the position the Turks take at the outset [of the conference] the better it will be for us and for them' was how Macmillan stated the position on 16 July.56 Sir James Bowker was set to work to get this message across to his hosts in Ankara. It was not a very difficult task 51 52 51 54 55 56
Times of Cyprus (i Aug. 1955). Wilding, minute, 15 May 1955,RGio8i/326,FOi 17631. Note on Bowker telegram to Foreign Office, i6July 1955^0371/117/643^61081/664. Wilding, minute, 14 Sept. 1954^0371/112859,^61081/500. Macmillan, telegram (Geneva) to Foreign Office, i6July 1955^0371/117642^61081/668. Macmillan (Strasbourg), telegram to Foreign Office, 17 July 1955, FO37I/117643, RGio8i/668.
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for an accomplished diplomat. The consequences of setting things up in this way were to be such that it is important to be clear as to Macmillan's real purposes. He did not set out to generate violence beyond the conference chamber, though it may well be deduced that incidental violence in certain places was an acceptable risk. Nor was it his intention that the meeting itself should break up in public acrimony, though this, too, would not necessarily be bad from the British vantage-point, so long as the Greeks could be portrayed as the culprits. What Macmillan aimed at was an outcome in which the Greeks should be confronted head-on with a 'negative' Turkey, so creating a gap into which he could successfully insert himself as an arbitrator and man of peace. The problem was that it did not take much knowledge of history to realize that holding a conference between Greece and Turkey on such a basis was like standing close to a pile of explosive material with a burning brand. When Prime Minister Menderes saw the Turkish delegation off to the Tripartite Conference at the end of July he spoke emotively in his address of the 'day of massacre' which Enosis would bring to the Turks of Cyprus, and recalled the glorious triumphs of the infant Turkish Republic against Greece in 1922. When the American Embassy in Ankara, smelling danger, dispatched an official to the Turkish Foreign Office to complain at such provocative use of language, the only answer he got was that 'It had to be done'." In Cyprus the tension had risen progressively once the London conference was formally announced. One consequence was that the civil power became more and more reliant on the Army to keep control. The earlier visitation to the colony by General Templer was followed in mid-July by one from an even more august figure, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field-Marshal Sir John Harding, who was on his way from an official trip to Turkey. Once back in the United Kingdom, the FieldMarshal drew up recommendations which went beyond Templer's earlier calls for the stiffening of the Police and the establishment of a Special Branch, advising the concentration of responsibility for all security operations in the hands of a supremo.58 The Governor, however, was quick to reject the analogy which Harding made with anti-insurgency campaigns in other colonies. 'All security measures in Malaya and Kenya', Armitage pointed out in his sometimes strangulated prose, 'with none of the advantages of remoteness in distance and size and [sic] of dealing with black and yellow races, will have to be used in this cradle of civilization,' including the suppression of a Christian Church.59 The Governor's point had some force. One of the themes of our account shall be that it did not prove possible to sustain in Cyprus, so close to Europe, and so easily converged upon by the world's press, methods which could often be got away with elsewhere. But such warnings were overshadowed by the necessities of the moment. Armitage had already warned that if the conference failed, a large-scale outbreak of terrorism would follow. Since the conference was 57 Warren (Ankara) to State Department, 26 Aug. 1955, Box 3273, RG59, State Department Records, USNA. 5(1 'Report on Visit to Cyprus and Turkey, 4-11 July 1955', in FO37I/I77322, RGii97/7. 5 " Armitage to Lcnnox-Boyd, 23 Aug. 1955, CQi)z6/2$i).
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more or less bound to fail in the sense which Armitage intended—that is, in appeasing Greek feelings—a further deterioration inside the island was sure. It was doubts as to Armitage's ability to get to grips with such a situation which now put his own position in jeopardy. 'I am really worried about Cyprus,' Macmillan wrote to Eden on 16 August, forewarning him that the trouble was bound to intensify when the conference was finished. 'The real trouble is at the top. Could we not have a new Governor?'60 Whilst the suggestion of a new Governor took root in London, one immediate priority was clear: making sure that during the London Conference conditions in Cyprus were kept as calm as possible. To a rise in Police pay which helped to raise depressed morale, and the deployment of the new Auxiliary constabulary, was added a tightening of military control of road traffic, more mobile patrols in the countryside, and a fresh batch of Army reinforcements from Egypt and Malta (2,000 extra Royal Marines had arrived by early September). One innovation was of particular note: the curfew. As in Malaya, the purpose of this technique was to 'teach the villages a lesson', and to make the ordinary population fear the Government more than the men of violence. It was by way of such a pilot exercise that a small settlement at Agros, suitably high up in the Troodos mountains, was selected. A shot had been fired at a Greek policeman, and although there was no evidence that a villager had been responsible, one hundred troops and extra Police descended upon the settlement on 16 August. The inhabitants were housebound from 7 p.m. to 7 a.m., electricity was cut off, and the village swept by searchlights throughout the night. Sixty inhabitants were eventually arrested.61 One of the few British reporters who managed to get there whilst this was going on happened to have witnessed the longest, toughest curfew Templer had imposed on a Malayan village: that at Tanjong Malim.62 He found the method very similar, but there was one major contrast: the sullen Chinese villagers of Tanjong Malim bore little resemblance to the cheerful Greeks of Agros, who seemed to enjoy the break from the hard routine of minding their flocks, and in daytime were often found to be chatting to British troops over their tea. Even the local Police appeared to think that the whole thing was 'a lot of fuss about nothing'. Predictably, nobody was ever arrested for firing the original shot. But it was, the same English reporter remarked rather dramatically, transparently intended as 'a symbol, a warning, an example for the whole island'. The curfew at Agros was lifted on 21 August to assist an air of normalcy in the island when the Tripartite Conference began. Meanwhile, Special Branch enquiries had investigated the claims being made in Ankara that Greek terrorists in Cyprus were planning widespread attacks on the Muslim minority, and found them to be baseless.63 Nevertheless, detailed plans existed for clamping down rapidly on the 60
Macmillan to Eden, i6Aug. 1955, PREMi 1/834. For details of the Agros curfew see John Peck (British Middle East Organization) to Ward, 13 Aug. 1955, FO37I/117650, RGio8i/837. 62 Times of Cyprus (21 Aug. 1955). 61 Acting Governor to Colonial Office, 25 Aug. 1955, FO3717117652, RGio8i/i833. 61
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towns in case demonstrations took place. With this assurance Governor Armitage left for London himself on the 24th. But he did so under something of a cloud, since it was widely rumoured that at the first sign of renewed difficulties the Army's patience would run out and that the military commanders would demand full control over the conduct of security. Everything hinged on the outcome of the conference. 'A complete turndown ofEnosis, a repetition of Hopkinson's "never",' an editorial in the now increasingly anti-Government Times of Cyprus predicted, 'can be expected to usher in a period of strife and martial law. The cards are down.'64 The killing of another Greek policeman, Constable Poullis, on 29 August, the opening day of the London gathering, in the old town of Nicosia, along with the extensive arrest of'suspects' found to be in the area, helped to ensure that the Cypriot capital remained tense during the course of the following days. The story of the London conference will not be related in great detail here.65 Macmillan presided over the proceedings, since the Colonial Secretary was away in Africa, and only turned up for the closing stages—an index of the degree to which the Colonial Office had been sidelined in Whitehall over Cyprus policy. The Foreign Secretary kicked off the opening session with a self-confessedly 'dull and pompous' oration—a tactic which helped to lift the British Government above the fray. W) He outlined the list of British achievements in Cyprus and denied claims that British troops were engaged in a 'reign of terror' in the island/'7 Yet there was also a vein of threat when, in descrying the evils of EOKA, he sought to widen the obloquy by stating that if a 'heavy burden rests with those who commit these outrages . . . a still greater responsibility lies on those who have encouraged the perpetrators to believe that their acts of barbarism are noble and heroic' (just in case the Greek delegates did not let this pass, the Foreign Secretary had with him a prepared brief on Greek complicity in gun-running, based, inevitably loosely, on theAghios Georghioscase). After adopting this subtly threatening tone, Macmillan quickly assumed his other pose, that of conciliator and man of reason, stressing that the introduction of selfgovernment in Cyprus 'must be the first aim', though he was careful not to say precisely what he had in mind—not least since the Turkish Foreign Minister, Fatin Zorlu, had warned him personally the previous day of his Government's hostility to any new constitution for Cyprus. The British minister wound up his presentation by saying how much he looked forward to the opening statements of the Greek and Turkish Governments to be made the following day 'not only to prevent differences [over Cyprus] but to establish a still closer cooperation with our two NATO allies in the Eastern Mediterranean'. The intended effect of the Greek and Turkish responses to Macmillan's carefully 64
Times of Cyprus (24 hug. 1955)For a fuller narrative see Francois Crouzet, Le Conflit de Chypre, ii. 7946-7959, 2 vols. (Brussels, 6 i973), 9i-7°8' Ml Young, minute, 5 Aug. 1955, FO37I/117647, RGio8r/792. 67 For the published proceedings of the conference see The Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterannean, August 2g-September 7 7955, Cmd. 9594 (London, HMSO, 1955). H
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chosen words was not, of course, to prevent differences over Cyprus, but to highlight their utter irreconcilability. Over the next two days Greco-Turkish divisions over Cyprus were laid bare for all the world to see. The responsibility for this did not lie with the Greek delegation, if only because, closeted with people more powerful than they were, it was in their interest to keep matters as cool and restrained as possible. Stephanoupoulos, Foreign Minister of Greece, therefore spoke with moderation, whilst not giving away any part of his country's position. By contrast, Zorlu proceeded to put the Turkish case in its most extreme form, as he had been encouraged to do. It need have surprised nobody that, rhetorically, he went the whole hog. His argument that any alteration of the status quo in Cyprus would automatically throw into question the legal basis of the settlement arrived at in the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 was grist to this mill. Turning from law to geography, Zorlu pointed out that not only was Cyprus closer to Anatolia than to Greece, it was part of Anatolia, having been linked to it by land within recent geological eras, so that 'when we take into account the state of the population in Cyprus, it is not sufficient to say ... that 100,000 Turks live there. One should rather say that 24,000,000 Turks live there.' Zorlu went on to make the claim that if self-determination were ever to be applied in Cyprus, 'the guiding principle shall not be the consideration of majorities and minorities, but rather the granting of full equality to the two [ethnic] groups'—that is, the wishes of the 18 per cent of the population comprised of Turks was to be put on a par with the 80 per cent comprised of Greeks. To make the point in the most practical way, a group of Turkish-Cypriots turned up at the Colonial Office asking to be directed to sources in London where they could obtain guns.68 A brazen quality was henceforth to attach itself to Turkish dealings over Cyprus; it was their way of doing business. The Turks, Macmillan had assured Eden in advance, would be 'rigid in substance'.69 Zorlu now left no doubt how rigid the substance might be. After these preliminary exchanges, both the Greek and Turkish delegations saw no point in continuing with a conference in which there was clearly no chance of any agreement. For the British Foreign Secretary, however, one of his key objectives— getting a British plan 'on the table', so that it could be claimed afterwards at the United Nations that a new generous 'offer' had been made—had not yet been achieved. It took a good deal of cajoling by Macmillan, and the use of his position as chairman, to keep the conference going by insisting on an adjournment until 6 September. He used the interim to introduce into his private talks with Stephanoupoulos and Zorlu the tridominium proposal which up till this point had been kept under wraps. The Greeks were promised 'a real, genuine advance' in the political life of Cyprus (though one which did not prejudice British control of foreign policy, defence, and internal security). The Turks were offered participation in a 'partnership at the centre' including an advisory role in the administration of Cyprus under continuing British sovereignty. On self-determination itself, Macmillan was careful 68 69
On this visitation see CO926/183. Macmillan to Eden, 31 Aug. 1955^0371/117653^01081/927.
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to emphasize, the interested parties should continue to 'agree to differ'. In that difference lay, according to Macmillan's scenario, the United Kingdom's best guarantee of its continued mastery over the island. That the Greek Government would reject such a 'partnership' as just a way of smothering self-determination was certain. What mattered much more for Macmillan was that it should be accepted by Turkey. Any mention of a 'real, genuine advance' in Cypriot self-government, however, was to Zorlu and his colleagues a danger sign that the British, having marched the Turks up to the top of the Cypriot hill, would send them marching down again if it suited them. They were convinced that any constitution in the island would prove to be a slippery slope to Enosis. Their fear of such an outcome reflected the sense of vulnerability which was the obverse of the public, bullying face which ultimately was to make Zorlu anathema in Whitehall. When the latter saw Macmillan alone on 7 September he told him that the Turkish Cabinet had stayed up all night discussing the new British plan formally unveiled the day before, and that they rejected it categorically.70 The Foreign Secretary pleaded with him about the 'deplorable impression' which would be created if at the end of the conference the Greeks ended up seeming more reasonable than the Turks.71 The price the Turkish minister demanded, and received, for going along with Macmillan's scheme was that at the final plenary session he should be allowed to put carefully framed questions meeting the Turkish desiderata, and that he should receive certain prescribed answers. The conclusion of the 'Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean' was therefore just as stage-managed, and perhaps even more phoney, than the beginning. Stephanoupoulos began on Greece's behalf by stating that he would submit Macmillan's ideas to the Cabinet in Athens, but held out little hope of agreement to anything which so blatantly sought to deny self-determination to the Cypriots. Immediately afterwards Zorlu posed his crucial questions.72 The first was: 'Does the British Government intend to maintain in the present and in the future the right of sovereignty on the island of Cyprus, devolved upon Great Britain by the Treaty of Lausanne?' In the course of an intentionally prolix answer, the Foreign Secretary stated, 'I am bound to say that there is no prospect of any change in the foreseeable future.' More definitive still was Zorlu's second question: 'If the British Government is determined to maintain sovereignty on the Island, does it, for the present or the future, accept any principle which might ultimately lead to the independence of the Island or its accession to another country?' To this Macmillan's unequivocal reply was, 'We do not accept the principle of self-determination, as one of universal application. We think that exceptions must be made in view of geographical, traditional, historical, 70 Record of Conversation between the Secretary of State and the Turkish Foreign Minister at Lancaster House, 7 Sept. 1955, FO37I/117656, RG1081/984. 71 Ibid. 72 Verbatim reports of the Tripartite Conference are in 00926/183. For Greek and American reactions to 'the Zorlu questions' see memorandum of conversation, 12 Sept. 1955, Box 3273, RG59, State Department Records, USNA.
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strategical and other considerations.' This was, in effect, just another, more complicated way of falling back on Hopkinson's 'Never' statement of 28 July 1954. That assertion, nonetheless, had at least been a unilateral British formulation, and as such retractable should Her Majesty's Government's views undergo a transformation. What had now been done was to inaugurate a process of making British policy on Cyprus hostage to Turkish interests, which was quite another matter. Armitage had already warned that the consequence of any repetition of the Hopkinson principle would be further violence in Cyprus. Fresh violence was already under way, though not in the manner, or the place, the Governor had predicted. On the afternoon of 6 September anti-Greek riots erupted in Istanbul and continued for nearly twenty-four hours. News of what happened filtered out only very gradually over the next few days. A full account was subsequently cobbled together by the British Consul-General, Michael Stewart (later Foreign Secretary in a Labour Government).73 The riots had allegedly been sparked by rumours of a bomb planted at Ataturk's birthplace, currently the Turkish Consulate in Salonica. In fact, rumours of an assault on this establishment were a ritualized signal for any Turkish action of an anti-Greek kind, and Stewart's enquiries soon discounted the spontaneity of the demonstrations. Zorlu's uncompromising statements in London had worked on the emotions of the Turkish mob in Istanbul, which proceeded 'to display in a peculiarly brutal and useless way their hatred of the Greeks'. From its original epicentre in Taksim Square, the trouble rippled out during the evening through the old suburb of Pera, the smashing and looting of Greek commercial property being executed, Stewart reported, 'with a method and determination which would have done credit to any thorough-going barbarian'. The Turkish Police were not only largely passive towards this destruction, but discriminated in the protection which they afforded to western embassies. Guards were stationed around some European legations even before the violence got under way. Only a single policeman, however, appeared in front of the British residence, who shortly drifted off. Army troops remained, meanwhile, in the side streets, and when they did enter the main avenues, did nothing to restrain the looters. The brunt of the damage was sustained by Greek business premises and residential areas in old Istanbul, but also extended to Greek centres along the Bosphorus. Greek Churches were especially singled out, the Panayia, one of the oldest Byzantine structures, being gutted.74 At least one Orthodox priest died as his Church was incinerated. There were also, allegedly, a number of rapes of Greek women. Similar, though rather less uncontrolled, disturbances occurred elsewhere in Turkey where there was a Greek presence, especially at Izmir, where the families of Greek officers serving at NATO Regional Headquarters were evacuated. In fact, what was universally recognized to be a highly reprehensible outburst in retrospect constituted something more profound. It marked, 73
Michael Stewart to Macmillan, 22 Sept. 1955, FO37I/117711, RGio344/so. According to an estimate from Lambeth Palace, 72 out of 83 Orthodox churches in the city were damaged. The historic Phaner, however, was closely protected by Turkish troops throughout. 74
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as one historian has noted, 'the beginning of the end of the historic Greek community in Turkey'.75 Who was responsible? The very simultaneity with which the trouble had erupted in various places, both in European and Asiatic Turkey, indicated a degree of planning. The Turkish Government blamed the Communists, though few if any others found this convincing. The 'Cyprus is Turkish Party', led by the fanatical Hikmet Bil, had been a visible presence in the streets, but in Stewart's opinion it was not capable of the 'methodical destruction' involved. He blamed extreme nationalists in league with hooligan elements. As the dust settled, officials in the British Foreign Office entertained no doubt that Menderes and Zorlu 'knew all about the business' from the start, even if the riots had gone beyond what was originally intended.76 Their political purpose was to demonstrate unequivocally the seriousness of the Turkish claims over Cyprus. In this vein the actions were directed principally against Greece, but they were a vivid reminder, as well, to the British (and also to the Americans, presently unpopular in Turkey following a cut in aid payments, whose Embassy was also afforded scant protection). In these ways the riots in Istanbul and Izmir were a necessary coda to the London conference. British responses were mixed from the start. Some in Whitehall shared Stewart's disgust. Others welcomed the fact that the Greeks were being given 'a taste of their o\vn medicine'—the phrase was in vogue—whilst one even greeted the burning down of the ancient Panayia as the welcome liquidation of a 'major eyesore'.77 The most telling reaction was that of Macmillan himself, who, when advised by his own officials, as well as Ambassador Bowker in Ankara, that the United Kingdom should 'court a sharp rebuff by admonishing Turkey, omitted to do so.78 Instead, a note of distinctly mild disapproval was dispatched to Menderes. There was no doubt that the Turkish outburst had been an embarrassment, not least with the United Nations in view; but it had its uses, as Macmillan was not too fastidious to grasp. In this connection, note must also be taken, however, of the allegation made in Greek quarters that the British were directly compromised in these events. There are at least a few wisps of evidence which might lead to this apparently wild charge not being rejected totally out of hand. When Zorlu was on trial for his life in Turkey after the 1960 revolution in that country, some of the charges related to the disturbances of September 1955, and it emerged from state records that the Foreign Minister had telephoned Istanbul from London to say that 'a little activity will be useful';79 the similarity to language being used in the British Foreign Office ('a few riots... will do us nicely') is transparent. One imponderable here is the growing involvement in Cyprus matters of Ml5, who, it appears from the memoirs of one agent, were 75
Alexis Alexandris, The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations, 1918-74 (Athens, 1983), p. 270. '"' Ward,minute,8Oct. i9SS,FO37i/ii7iii/5o. 77 J. Grant, minute, 17 Oct. 1955, FO37i/ii7ii4, RGio344/43. 78 Selby, minute, 13 Sept. 1955, FOi 17657, RGioSi/ioig. 79 Stephen Xydis, Cyprus, Conflict and Conciliation, 1950-54 (Columbus, Ohio, 1967), p. 51.
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presently bugging the Greek Embassy in London.80 The Americans did not feel able to reject outrightly Greek allegations of British complicity; he 'could not read the British mind' was all a senior State Department official felt able to say privately on the matter.81 A balanced judgement is that whilst there was no direct complicity of the sort alleged, it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that someone, somewhere on the British side exhibited a calculated complaisance when 'a little activity' was broached by the Turks (with whom extensive talks were going on outside the conference throughout). Whatever the truth may have been, the effect in Athens could only be very damaging. 'I think that for the first time I have been here', one of Ambassador Peake's staff summed it up grimly, 'we face the prospect of having the whole country against us.'82 What was more important than the largely lost cause of Anglo-Greek relations were the repercussions for the integrity of NATO. In Washington it was admitted that, given the provocation offered, the Greek Government acted throughout the crisis with 'exemplary coolness'.83 The withdrawal of the Greek contingent from NATO Regional Headquarters in this light was an understandable sop thrown by the Athenian authorities to their own public opinion. One American action at this time, nevertheless, grated badly in Greece, and began a slow but inexorable slide not only in Greek-American relations, but in Greece's relations with the Western Alliance as a whole.84 In the wake of the disturbances, President Eisenhower sent identical notes to Prime Ministers Menderes and Constantine Karamanlis (the latter a relatively young politician who, with the backing of the Americans and King Paul, had succeeded to the Greek premiership on Papagos' death85) deploring antagonism between the two nations and calling for calm. This failure to make any distinction between perpetrator and victim sent a shock-wave through highly-strung Greek feelings. Over the following weeks American diplomacy played the leading role in trying to limit the damage to NATO and to coax the Greek contingent back to Regional Headquarters, so plugging a hole on the south-eastern flank of the alliance. The United States succeeded when at the end of October, in a piquant ceremony, the Greek flag was raised again in Izmir in the presence of Greek and Turkish troops, as well as a minister from Ankara. Despite this, for the first time since the civil war neutralist forces received a boost in Greek politics, with long-term effects not only for Cyprus, but for the future of Greek democracy. It was the riots in Istanbul and their aftermath, flowing in no small part from the conference in London, which 80
Peter Wright, Spycatcher: The Candid Autobiography of a Secret Agent (New York, 1987), p. 113. Memorandum of conversation, 13 Sept., Box 3273, RGsg, State Department Records, USNA. Lambert to Ward, 15 Sept. 1955, FO37I/117659. 81 UK Delegation (New York) to Foreign Office, i3Sept. 1955,00926/181. 84 For a broad survey of Greek-American relations covering Cyprus see Theodore A. Couloumbis, Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO Influences (New Haven, Conn., 1966). 85 Because Papagos had not been seen for some time in public, and, unusually in the Orthodox rite, the lid of his coffin was not lifted during his funeral, the rumour circulated in Athens that the Field-Marshal had, in fact, been deadfor some time, and the announcement delayed to allow the Palace and its American backers to fix the succession of their protege. That Karamanlis' leadership began under this cloud of suspicion had some significance for his delicate position over the Cyprus issue thereafter. 81 82
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first made plain what in Washington was described as 'the most dangerous smell' of the Cyprus quarrel.86 Nowhere, of course, \vas this ugly smell more pungent than in Cyprus, where the local administration had to do what it could to keep the situation from disintegrating. It was in the wake of the Istanbul disturbances, Lawrence Durrell related in his memoir, Bitter Lemons, that there was a sharp change of atmosphere in his village of Bellapaix, and that the local mtikhtar advised him to leave (what was known as the old 'Kyrenia colony', ever-popular with expatriate painters and writers, soon became depleted).87 For the administration, the presence of the Archbishop was always the eye of the storm. This was illustrated when it fell to be considered what would happen if the Archbishop got stopped at a road block. Armitage's conclusion was that whilst Makarios should not himself be subjected to a search—he would, the Governor remarked, hardly be hiding a machine gun under his cassock—those travelling with him should be.88 Any such searches had, it was felt, to be carried out speedily, to forestall the possibility of a crowd gathering, leading to a disturbance which might quickly get beyond the control of the Police. On 8 September Makarios' car was stopped at a check in Famagusta. As luck would have it, the British soldiers concerned did not recognize the Archbishop, or the golden rod by his side. There was a commotion until a Greek Police Sergeant came along and identified the Primate. By then there was a crowd of over 2,000 people milling angrily about. After hurried requests for instructions to Police Headquarters, Makarios was allowed to proceed (though his companions were frisked). This incident was reported on the BBC lunchtime news in Britain, and Lennox-Boyd found himself lobbied by some Conservative MPs as to why the Archbishop had been left alone. The minister promptly complained to Armitage that Makarios should either have not been stopped at all, or, if he were stopped, the search operation should have been 'rigorously carried through', including the person of His Beatitude.89 The episode was relatively petty, but it showed not only the practical difficulties of keeping order in Nicosia, but also how the 'realities'—and the logic arising from those realities—facing the British and Cyprus Governments were by no means always the same. The Cyprus authorities, in fact, had decided that it could not make further progress in stemming disorder unless it took decisive action to restore its battered prestige. An address by the Archbishop at Kykko monastery on 10 September in which he declared that he 'would fight to the end for self-determination', and EOKA pamphlets circulating on the same occasion affirming that after recent events 'the real conflict will now begin',90 gave Armitage the excuse he needed, and he promptly 8(1
Selwyn Lloyd to Foreign Office, 15 Sept. 1955, 00926/181. See chapter entitled 'The Feast of Unreason' in Lawrence Durrell, Bitter Lemons of Cyprus (London, 1957) which captures the change of mood at this time. 88 Armitage to Lennox-Boyd, 20 Sept. 1955, PREMi 1/1248. 8<) Lennox-Boyd, telegram to Armitage, 19 Sept. 1955, PRE?4i 1/1248. 90 Acting Governor to Lennox-Boyd, 8 Sept. 1955,01)926/270. 87
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asked Lennox-Boyd for powers to deport 'certain senior Cypriot ecclesiastics' at his own discretion. The mind of the Cabinet had been moving in a similar direction, especially after a major discussion of the security situation in the colony held at 10 Downing Street a few days before, in which Sir John Harding, as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, had also participated. It was a measure of ministerial nervousness that, in turning towards such a dramatic initiative, it was not Makarios, but the extremist Bishop of Kyrenia, whom they first had in their sights. There was also another imponderable: the Cabinet had come to the provisional conclusion that if emergency powers, including those of exile, were to be applied in Cyprus, Armitage was not the man to do it. The Governor's request, in other words, had the ironic effect of putting his own fate in the balance. On 15 September ministers put off a final decision on the next move till the 24th, when it would be known for sure whether a vote on the inscription of Cyprus would take place at the United Nations. In the mean time all those nagging doubts which always clustered around the deportation of Orthodox dignitaries in Cyprus came to the surface. As in 1931, concerns of legality were to the fore.91 Then there were the practicalities—seemingly minor, but actually crucial. Where would Kyrenia (or Makarios, or perhaps both) be sent? By no means everybody was happy with the suggestion of St Helena, due to its Napoleonic associations (the ex-Emperor, had, after all, died there).92 It was in discussing this aspect that the Seychelles was first raised as an alternative. Again, if the deportee(s) were to go by boat through the Suez Canal, the nightmare instantly came to mind that the wily Egyptians might stop the vessel and rescue them—the image of the Archbishop alongside President Nasser in Cairo under such triumphant circumstances caused a tremor of panic. The extent of this anxiety is conveyed by the official minute of Harold Caccia, one of the most experienced advisers within the Foreign Office, that a plain statement should be put on record of the fact that any action of the kind now being contemplated would involve lasting and grievous damage, not only to Anglo-Greek relations, but 'to our standing as a civilized power' in the world at large.93 It was whilst these vibrations were at work that a fresh incident occurred in Cyprus which resolved the future of Armitage, if not of the Archbishop. This was the burning of the British Institute in Nicosia, and the extensive breakdown of law and order which accompanied it. On the evening of 17 September a British Army jeep was hijacked by a group of riotous Greek youths as it patrolled Metaxas Square in central Nicosia, overturned, and set alight. A disturbance followed lasting three hours, during which the heart of the city was said to be given over to 'mob rule'.94 So unaccountably slow was the response of the Security Forces that it was said that a Constable on a bicycle had to go round waking up reserve policemen from their sleep. Afterwards there was what was described as 'intense mutual recriminations' between 91 92 93 94
D. Holland, minute, 13 Sept. i9S5,FO37i/U76s8,RGio8i/io48. Thompson, minute, 19 Sept. 1955^0371/117659^01081/1094. H. Caccia, minute, 20 Sept. 1955^0371/117661. For the Police report on this incident see enclosure in €0926/420.
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the Police and Army as to what had gone wrong.95 The Police said that the soldiers had not reacted to urgent calls for help—a claim backed up by the fact that all senior commanders were at a social function to commemorate the Battle of Britain. The Army claimed that the Police had delayed till far too late in calling for their help. There may well have been some truth in this, insofar as the Police hitherto had exhibited a preference—doubtless wise, but which carried risks—for letting clashes fizzle out of their own accord. Alas, in this case, the riot did not fizzle out, and the result was that the British Institute—shades of Government House in 1931—went up in flames, and with it one of the finest British libraries in the Middle East. This was a major blow to the reputation of the Cyprus Government. The astringent Times of Cyprus had a field-day, fulminating that the Government had 'brought humiliation on itself, on its hard-pressed and loyal police force, on the British Army and on the name of Britain'.96 In London the Daily Mail, sensing the direction of the wind, started a campaign for the Governor's dismissal. These tensions were brought to a head by the question of whether a public enquiry was required to 'clear the air', which Armitage now advised was necessary. Washing their Cypriot laundry in public was something Her Majesty's Government could do without, and this provided the immediate background to the decision, taken by the Cabinet at its resumed discussion on 24 September, to dismiss the hapless Governor. On the following day at 11.30 a.m. he received a special cipher to that effect. He was to be replaced by Field-Marshal Sir John Harding, who in a very unusual move was to step down from his elevated post to become a colonial governor. At the time it was generally assumed that it was the Metaxas Square riot which had delivered the coup de grace to Armitage. There was some truth to this, though he had actually been on borrowed time in Cyprus for several months at least. The fate of the British Institute only precipitated what was probably inevitable before very long. A measure of how low confidence in Armitage had fallen in Whitehall was afforded when the Governor, despite his imminent departure, continued to press for discretionary powers—these, it was concluded in the Colonial Office, could not be entrusted to 'so emotional a man as Sir Robert'.97 Armitage was emotional, and also prone to a crippling uncertainty which led him to hedge every judgement about with qualifications. His capacity to alter his advice from day to day was indeed frustrating. Nevertheless, it was the situation, even more than the man, which explained his wavering views, as the career of his more illustrious successor in the island was to suggest. Her Majesty's Government was at least equally prone to evasion and indecision, and in this case the dismissal of Armitage was an alternative to a policy of deportation from which ministers yet shrank, hoping that a military governor might find other ways of going about things. Armitage did not spend long in the humiliating position he now found himself in. He departed on 3 October in a manner which was unfortu95 % 1)7
Armitage to Martin, 23 Sept. 1955,0)926/420. Times of Cyprus (t& Sept. 1955). Ward, minute, 26 Sept. 1955, FO37i/ii7662/ii58.
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nate, but somehow appropriate. A crowd of Cypriots gathered at the Customs House at Larnaca to witness his embarkation. They were hustled away to a point where they could see nothing. Booing started, and continued, as Armitage, looking 'sad and tired', arrived in a limousine, got out and disappeared unaccompanied up the gangplank of his boat. A seventeen-gun salute was fired as the vessel pulled away in a forlorn piece of ceremonial. 'It is of no interest to us' was Archbishop Makarios' dismissive response when he was asked for his reaction by a British journalist to the change of governor." This was disingenuous. Makarios appreciated very well that the shift from a civilian 'career' official like Armitage to a distinguished soldier at the head of the Cyprus Government was very significant for everybody. The assertion, however, conjured up the divided compartments of a small but intense colonial world which Armitage had never really been equipped to straddle from the start. To convey the general situation in the island at the time of Armitage's departure we may turn to a description sent to Washington by the United States Consul in Nicosia, Raymond Courtney. Privy to discussions within the Cyprus Government, and yet also in contact with Enosis leaders, he was perhaps uniquely positioned to put his finger on the island's pulse. Courtney told Dulles he had visited Armitage to say farewell. The latter, with understandable bitterness, had repeated his belief that peace and cooperation could not come to the colony without full recognition of selfdetermination. 'He felt that Her Majesty's Government had refused to recognize the reality existing in Cyprus,' Courtney explained, 'that it had not adopted a policy capable of resolving the problem here and that Macmillan's public virtual reiteration of Hopkinson's "never" was wrong and unfortunate."00 Consul Courtney's dispatch went on to paint a depressing picture of the state of the colony, in which the Police— '1500 now badly frightened men, inexperienced and untrained for the task confronting them'—became daily more reliant on back-up from the Army. Although the image of'Terror Island' promoted in the lurid London press was overdrawn, he wrote, there was 'a grimness and tension... which is difficult to describe but strongly felt' by everybody. Security Forces went around in vehicles with cages on the outside for protection; police stations were screened by barbed wire; troops surrounded villages at dawn and subjected them to searches which rarely yielded any information to assist the fight against EOKA, but which inevitably alienated the inhabitants; and those Greeks accused of being 'traitors' lived in daily dread of assassination. Despite this dismal scene, Courtney did not despair that a compromise based on selfgovernment might be struck if only the Security Forces could get a grip on the situation (a big 'if'). But, like Armitage, he was convinced that 'in the end further account will have to be taken of the nationalist feelings and aspirations of the majority of the Cypriot people'.101 98
C. Foley, Island in Revolt (London, 1963), pp. 37-9. The Times (26 Sept. 1955). 10(1 Consular dispatch, 'Deadlock in Cyprus', 29 Sept. 1955, Box 3273, RG.S9, State Department Records, USNA. 101 Ibid. 99
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Such was the condition of Cyprus at the beginning of October 1955. In dismissing Armitage so peremptorily, there was a danger for Her Majesty's Government, of course, that he might be tempted to express his own version of events in public—not the last time, we shall see, that this fear arose with regard to an outgoing Governor of Cyprus. This possibility was averted by Armitage's appointment to the vacant governorship of Nyasaland within days of his return to the United Kingdom (ironically, in that colony his relations with Whitehall were to go through very much the same cycle, ending in disillusionment and recrimination, as they had in the eastern Mediterranean).102 But if Armitage had failed in Cyprus, so had everyone else. At different times the task of finding a solution to the problem had oscillated—like a game of 'pass the parcel'—between the administration in Nicosia, the Colonial Office, the Foreign Office, the British Embassy in Athens, and 10 Downing Street. Now the politicians in Westminster took the easy way out: they turned to the military to apply a simple solution to a problem whose complexities otherwise eluded them. Armitage's irritating talk of 'rallying points' was disposed of—for a time at least. Instead, there was a natural recoil towards the philosophy of Sir Andrew Wright: that 'if you waved sticks at the Cypriots, you might not have to call out the garrison'. Nobody could wave a stick with more chance of attaining this essentially psychological purpose than a British Field-Marshal. As a Foreign Office source admitted to an American diplomat in London on 4 October, the day of Harding's arrival in Cyprus, 'everything depends on what the Field-Marshal can achieve'.103 102 For the tensions between British ministers and Armitage as Governor of Nyasaland see Robert Shepherd, Iain Macleoii (London, 1994), pp. 192-3. m Memorandum on Cyprus, 4 Oct. 1955, US Embassy (London), Box 3274, RG59, State Department Records, USNA.
4 The Struggle for Mastery, 4 October 1955-9 March 1956 Field-Marshal Sir John Harding arrived in Nicosia to take up his new labours the day after Armitage's departure.1 He had been on the verge of retirement, and looking forward to settling down on the family farm in Dorset; Harold Macmillan echoed a common view in saying that it was 'self-sacrificing and patriotic of Harding to take the job' in Cyprus.2 Only Eden's personal plea, coupled with the promise that in doing so he would have a personal line of communication to 10 Downing Street, persuaded him to do so. The appointment of a soldier to govern the island was an implicit criticism of both the Colonial Office and the local authorities for having presided over a breakdown requiring such remedial attention. Yet in Whitehall generally there was a widespread sense of relief in handing the problem over to the military. British opinion as represented by the press reflected something of the same relief, if with predictable nuances. 'Good luck, Sir John,' the Daily Express hailed a new soldier-proconsul dispatched on a daunting mission.3 'A military appointment is not incompatible with a politically liberal policy', the progressive Manchester Guardian remarked more soberly, but went on to warn that if the Conservative Government was 'still set on its "Never, Never" attitude to self-determination, the strong hand of Governor Harding may in the end be no more successful than the gentler one of Sir Robert Armitage in containing the explosions which shake the island'.4 The tension and ultimately crippling contradictions between political conciliation and security imperatives were to bedevil Harding's highly controversial governorship. The resulting complexities will underlie much of our narrative. His many critics, not a few of whom were to emerge back in Whitehall, held the view that he had a naive trust in military methods and little grasp of politics. Harding, as Commanderin-Chief, Far East Land Forces, had once been considered for the Malayan High Commissionership during the Communist insurgency in that territory, but had been rejected because he had shown little interest in the political factors involved (the job had gone to Templer, with excellent results).5 Significantly, political considerations did not enter the reckoning in choosing a successor to Armitage. It was precisely because security considerations so markedly overshadowed politics in the case of the 1 There is no major biography of Harding. See Michael Carver, Harding ofPethertori: Field-Marshal (London, 1978). 2 Evelyn Shuckburgh, Descent to Suez: Diaries, 1951-6 (London, 1986), p. 282. 3 4 Daily Express (28 Sept. 1955). Manchester Guardian (28 Sept. 1955). 5 A. J. Stock well, British Documents on the End of Empire. Malaya. Part 2: The Communist Insurrection, 1948-53 (London, 1996), p. 306.
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Cyprus job that this bias in the Field-Marshal's make-up did not weigh heavily. Harding, too, as we have seen, had contributed to the critique of the performance hitherto of Armitage and the Cyprus Government, and in doing so had marked himself out as a possible replacement. The basic point was that Her Majesty's Government appointed a soldier as Governor, and a soldier was what they got, even when ministers and officials later on sometimes tried to move the goalposts which they had themselves put in place. Harding, however, was by no means naive. He consistently inspired an unusual degree of respect and affection amongst his own staff. Nor did he lack intelligence, though there were definite limits to his capacity for imaginative sympathy, a fact which shall loom large in this account. Harding was well aware that although he went as a Field-Marshal to Nicosia, he remained in theory at least a civilian governor. When asked at a press conference in London shortly before leaving for his response to a statement by the Greek Foreign Minister that in selecting him the British Government had 'gone to war' over Cyprus, he responded, 'There is no suggestion of war. The sooner people settle down together peacefully and quietly the sooner we can find an answer.'6 Yet on the same plane that took him to Cyprus there travelled a lawyer to advise him on the framing of Emergency powers.7 This ambivalence between conciliation and retribution, the carrot and the stick, was never to be resolved during his time in Cyprus. Harding, as we have seen, was sent to wave sticks at the Cypriocs in the belief that if a real Field-Marshal did so, the population would swiftly revert to its natural passivity. The trouble was that in rushing the new Governor out to Nicosia, there was no consensus—no discussion even—of what the implications might be if the bulk of Cypriots defied previous experience, and the garrison had to be called out on a scale never previously contemplated. This lack of clarity was evident in the two main guidelines given to Field-Marshal Harding by Prime Minister Eden. The first was 'to have a look around first' before declaring an Emergency.8 Evident in this was a keen reluctance to take an action which was bound to be interpreted by on-lookers as a distress signal. The second instruction was to 'get moving on the road to self-government if possible'.9 This was not much more of a political directive than Armitage had been given in early 1954. To Harding 'having a look round' meant getting to grips with what was widely regarded as an incompetent civil administration, while simultaneously revamping the security machine—an urgent necessity, as the embarrassing EOKA raid on Amiandos Police Station, and the looting of its weaponry, the day after Harding's arrival all too plainly showed. To these matters we shall turn later. But, since Harding was the quintessence of a no-nonsense Army man, having a look around also meant sizing his chief opponent up by looking him straight in the eye. On this matter Harding lost no time at all, and agreed to meet Archbishop Makarios in the Ledra Palace Hotel on the evening of 4 October. It was the beginning of what became known as the fl
7 Times of Cyprus (28 Sept. 1955). Ibid. (4 Oct. 1955). * Lennox-Boyd, minute, 24 Sept. 1955, PREMi 1/834. " Ward, minute, 5 Oct. 1955, FOjyi/117663, RGio8i/ii86.
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'Harding-Makarios negotiations'—one of the most protracted and complex exchanges in the history of British decolonization after the Second World War. The meeting, which took place in a 'frank and cordial atmosphere',10 foreshadowed a great deal in the future relations between the Field-Marshal and the Primate. Makarios began by emphasizing that the recognition of self-determination by Britain was the crux of the matter. Harding replied by a clipped review of the factors—strategic requirements, NATO cooperation, the uncertain situation in the Middle East, and, thrown in for present company, the defence of Christian freedom— which made such a proposition so difficult to contemplate. 'This was my main theme throughout the discussion', Harding informed Lennox-Boyd afterwards, and, since he had been forewarned about Makarios' incorrigible stubbornness, he was struck by the fact that the Archbishop did not reject his case categorically.11 Makarios accepted, for example, that Middle Eastern affairs were a legitimate consideration with regard to the future of Cyprus, but he refuted the emphasis which Harding had placed on 'Turkish anxieties'—indeed, it soon became apparent to the Governor that one of the Archbishop's key aims was to chisel away at the Turkish obstacle which Macmillan had recently put in the path of Cyprus's political evolution. 'Throughout the whole of our discussion', Harding's account went on, 'he [Makarios] used words such as "in principle" and "theoretical" when referring to the right of self-determination . . . It is in an agreement on some face-saving formula on what he claimed to be the inherent human right of self-determination that I detected some faint prospect of a solution.'12 The Field-Marshal's impression that Makarios' cooperation could be bought with a 'face-saving' device suggested at the outset a flaw in his understanding of the phenomenon he was confronting. Yet he did not miss—and quite transparently the Archbishop chose words which made it impossible for him to miss—Makarios' essential desire for an agreement. The mood stiffened somewhat at the end when Harding told Makarios that if a settlement was not arrived at soon the only alternative would be an 'open conflict in which I could count on all the resources of the British Government... [and] which would be a very unhappy and unpleasant experience for everyone'. Nevertheless, when the two dignitaries finally separated in the foyer of the hotel towards their respective vehicles, waiting journalists noted the pronounced friendliness of their mutual gesticulations. Each knew the other had at least a part of his own fate in their hands. Eden and other interested ministers immediately took alarm when it appeared from this report that the Archbishop had succeeded in edging the discussion towards self-determination. The Field-Marshal, of course, was a military man, not a constitutional lawyer, and did not intuitively grasp the difference between selfgovernment and self-determination in colonial circumstances—nor, perhaps, the very different meanings each had in Conservative political discourse at home. Nobody in Whitehall, furthermore, had explained these nice distinctions to him 10 11
Harding, telegram to Lennox-Boyd, 5 Oct. 1955, FO37I/U7664, RGio8i/i259. Ibid. ' 2 Ibid.
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before he left London. Harding, therefore, was authorized to carry on the contact he had begun with the Archbishop, but he was now made clearly to understand that what was 'on the table' for the Cypriots was not self-determination, either now or in the future, but self-government on the lines Macmillan had outlined on 6 September in the Tripartite Conference." At the same time, in case even at this very early stage the new Governor began to feel boxed in, he was reassured of full and unqualified Cabinet support if matters came to a 'clean break' between himself and the Archbishop. A process was, therefore, begun in which limits to Harding's freedom to negotiate a political solution in Cyprus had always to be counterbalanced by a reluctant willingness in London to back up the repressive actions which the Field-Marshal, as a commonsensical soldier, firmly believed represented the only logical alternative. When the second Harding-Makarios meeting took place on 7 October, the Governor stuck rigidly to his brief. As a result, the two men went over Macmillan's statement of 6 September 'up hill and down dale', as the Governor expressed it,14 Harding treating Macmillan's original text as if it possessed the admirable clarity of an Army field manual, and the Archbishop approaching it like some dubious production of an early schismatic requiring careful and highly sceptical exegesis. In a metaphor which was to recur endlessly in debates over Cyprus, Harding told his interlocutor that Macmillan's words 'left the door to the future open . . . and that the path to and through that door would be fully safeguarded if he and his followers would accept the proposals for the development of self-government put forward by Her Majesty's Government', whilst again impressing upon him the very grave consequences 'if he deliberately shut that door'.15 This formulation, however, did not throw any light on what actually lay beyond the door for the inhabitants of Cyprus, if and when it should be opened to them—they were invited merely to have confidence that it led somewhere other than where they were at present. Makarios agreed to put the proposal once again to his own Ethnarchy Council, but he did so dispiritedly, and making clear that it stood no chance of acceptance. When the delegations broke up, the sparkle of a few days before had already disappeared.1-' In the wake of this discussion Harding, nonetheless, told Lennox-Boyd that he still reckoned he could 'carry the Archbishop with me' provided that the British Government would commit itself to a discussion of self-determination once a freely elected local authority of some kind was in being, but forlornly added, 'I suppose that would be out of the question'.17 The Field-Marshal had barely been in the island one week before he had begun to grasp that the situation was rather more intractable than might be supposed from outside. In telling Harding 'to have a look round', however, Eden had not intended the new Governor suddenly to become a convert to Cypriot self-determination, even as a long-term goal. Lennox-Boyd reiterated that Harding's proposal went beyond what the Cabinet could contemplate, so that when the " Lennox-Boyd to Harding, 6 Oct. 1955, FC)37i/i 17664, RGioSi 71259. " Harding, telegram to Lennox-Boyd, 7 Oct. 1955, ibid. " Ibid. "' Times of Cyprus (8 Oct. 1955). 17 Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 7 Oct. 1955, F()37i/i 17664, RGio8i/i259.
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Governor and the Archbishop met again on 11 October they swiftly arrived at the same deadlock. As they set about composing a communique, Makarios, fully aware of what the consequences of a final breakdown would be, suddenly interjected, 'I am very unhappy'. 'I replied that so indeed was I,' Harding told Lennox-Boyd, 'but the tone and timing of his [Makarios'] remark led me to think that left to himself he might have taken a more conciliatory attitude.'18 What is, indeed, quite clear is that if both men had been left to themselves they would have stood a good chance of coming to an understanding. In many ways, constitutional theory apart, the matters they discussed were intrinsically simple; the complexity was invariably imposed on them by others. Unhappy though both Harding and Makarios were, there was clearly no point in meeting again unless the parameters of their discussion changed. Meanwhile, the Governor was determined to prepare the ground for the implementation of those threats which were always an essential element in his exchanges with the Archbishop. On the evening of 11 October he made use of direct telegraphic communication with 10 Downing Street to demand, first, the authority to declare a full Emergency entirely at his discretion, and, secondly, power to deport any senior cleric suspected of sedition.19 Clothing the Governor with this authority would transfer a good deal of control over the development of events from London to Nicosia. The Foreign Office once again got cold feet at this prospect—after all, if the FieldMarshal was not a constitutional lawyer, neither was he a diplomatist, and he cared little for the wider political ramifications which had made ministers and officials pull back from this very brink at the end of September. Nor was Macmillan entirely comforted when Eden suggested a trade-off in which the Governor could act against the Bishop of Kyrenia as and when he liked, but that he would only be authorized to target Makarios following prior consultations with the Prime Minister. 'I hope you will not give [Harding] the blank cheque for Bishops', Macmillan remarked in his feline way, 'but put Bishops on an equality with Archbishops.'20 The Prime Minister, however, could hardly go back altogether on the commitment that had already been made to the Governor. In the 'transaction' which was therefore struck, Harding was guaranteed a military aeroplane at twenty-four hours' notice to deport any cleric of his choice, and received authority to declare a State of Emergency if it seemed to him 'imperatively necessary', with the proviso that any action concerning the Archbishop had to have explicit approval from London.21 It was, indeed, Eden who now fixed the Seychelles as a probable location of exile—the chief advantage of the latter, apart from its condition as a sleepy British colony, being that it was not St Helena, and had a history of being used as dumping-ground for the 'undesirables' of the old British India.22 It was in this muddled and even nervous way that 'Operation Apollo'—the deportation of Makarios—acquired firmer shape. 18 19 20 21
Harding, telegram to Lennox-Boyd, n Oct. 1955, FO37I/117664, RGio8i/i277. Harding, telegram to Lennox-Boyd, i2Oct. 1955, FO37i/ii7666, RGio8i/i302. Macmillan to Eden, 12Oct. 1955, FO37i/ii7664, RGio8i/i274. Ward, minute, 13 Oct. 1955, ibid. " Nutting to Eden, 13 Oct. 1955, ibid.
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4 October 1955-9 March 1956
This 'transaction' between London and Nicosia lit a slow-burning fuse under British policy. Eden fully understood the risks, and it helped to concentrate the mind. Furthermore, he remained tantalized by the thought that 'what divides the Governor and the Archbishop might be quite small1, and began to canvas his Cabinet colleagues that Harding be allowed 'to have another go' with Makarios, the aim being to split the Nationalist forces in the island. 2 ' Here was evidence of that divided personality which ran through Eden's premiership—on the one hand, the craving to be perceived as a man of firmness and implacable will, on the other the instincts of the supple tactician drawn towards a bargain if he could get one. It was this proclivity which was derided in some quarters as 'trying to make peace all over the place'.24 Certainly, there were several members of his own Cabinet who were not willing to pay any price for peace and quiet in Cyprus. Lord Salisbury, Lord President of the Council and doyen of right-wing Toryism, told Eden that 'there was no basis on which to negotiate with the Archbishop. The gap was too wide.'25 Whether the gap was really too wide, however, could only be determined by the Governor and his advisers. Harding squarely put it to the Prime Minister that there were two basic courses of action open. One was to go ahead without any reference to the Archbishop, and take whatever actions were necessary to impose a purely British solution. The second option was less sure, perhaps, but also less costly and fraught with 'unpleasantness'-—to come up with a formula on self-determination which might meet the needs of Her Majesty's Government, and not cause the Turkish Government to bolt, whilst splitting Makarios and his supporters from the extremists and men of violence,26 Only then, he explained, could the Cyprus Government effectively set about pushing the Church back into its proper place in the life of the island—a prerequisite which he saw for the successful reintroduction of constitutionalism. What Harding was not prepared to do was to proceed with the pointless exercise of seeing Makarios again 'until 1 have some enticement to offer him to move in the direction of compromise'. On 19 October the Cabinet's Colonial Policy Committee authorized civil servants to see if they could discover some 'golden words' on self-determination which might serve Harding's purposes.27 This marked the beginning of the end of the 'Never' policy enunciated in July 1954, and which had never been clearly recanted. But measured against Cypriot realities, the shift remained purely hypothetical. Playing with words, as always, took time, which the Cyprus Government had less of than ever before. The Governor and his advisers were keenly conscious that with every day that passed EOKA was gaining sway over the population and acquiring weapons. Simultaneously, speculation amongst the Cypriot public mounted feverishly about an impending solution—characteristically, discussion went beyond anything that 21 24 25 26 27
Eden to Selwyn Lloyd, 13 Oct. 1955, FO37I/117664, RGio8i/i2ij4. Shuckburgh, Descent to Suez, 282. 'Cyprus: Note of a Meeting', i4Oct. 1955, FO37I/117664, RGio8i/i294. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, i6Oct. 1955^0371/117666^01081/1304. Ward to Caccia, 19 Oct. 1955, FOjyt/i 17666, RGio8i/i3O2.
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was at all likely to be attained. In Greek newspapers, for example, Dominion Status, as it was enjoyed by such members of the British Empire-Commonwealth as Australia and Canada, began to be floated as the obvious basis for a compromise. When Harding took this possibility up with London, he received a prompt reminder from Lennox-Boyd that Dominion Status was simply 'self-determination in another guise'.28 If Harding came early on to feel confused as to what British policy was actually meant to be, it was a confusion widely shared in the island. Robert Stephens, an experienced journalist, captured this in an article entitled, according to the dominant metaphor, 'The door not closed, but is it really open?'29 It was to find out whether the door was open, and also to leave the British Cabinet in no doubt as to what the consequences would be if it was closed, that the Governor prepared to make a visit to Britain. Before leaving, however, he called to Government House a prominent Cypriot lawyer, and ex-Attorney General, Stelios Pavlides, and told him 'to let the Archbishop know that on my return [from London] I may have something to say to h i m . . . and that I hoped he may have something to say to me'.30 Much clearly depended on whether the two men had something to say to each other when they both got back to Nicosia (Makarios left for Athens immediately after Harding's own departure on 31 October). But the stuttering negotiations between them did not take place in a vacuum. On 28 October a new EOKA offensive began with a spectacular success—a cargo of arms and ammunition being transferred from the Suez Base was seized in a terrorist raid in Famagusta. This cast a pall over the Governor's initial prediction that law and order would be returned to Cyprus within six months, and his response was to bring the internal security campaign under his own direct supervision. Meanwhile, order in Greek-Cypriot schools deteriorated sharply. 'No single factor in the Cyprus situation did more to prepare the ground for violence and rebellion', Harding's Chief of Staff, Brigadier Baker, later remarked, 'than the failure... to take control of secondary education in the Island.'31 Armitage's failure to act on this front had been widely deprecated. During the early weeks of Harding's governorship, however, disaffection in the classroom spread like wildfire. There were several reasons for this. On 24 September the Greek Government had announced that it would not seek to inscribe Cyprus on the agenda of the United Nations. There is no doubt that this decision was based on strong hints to them from London that they would be rewarded for their conciliation.32 The reward they seemingly got was the appointment of a Field-Marshal to govern Cyprus. Harding had 28
Lennox-Boyd to Harding, 28 Oct. 1955^0371/117667^61081/1337. Times of Cyprus (23 Oct. 1955). 30 Harding, telegram to Lennox-Boyd, 27 Oct. 1955, FO37I//H7667, RGio8i/i35o. Stelios Pavlides, who had recently resigned from the Executive Council in Cyprus, was the 'Third Man' widely referred to at the time as a secret intermediary in the Harding-Makarios exchanges. 31 Brigadier G. H. Baker, 'The Cyprus Emergency: A review of the More Important Problems that Arose and the Measures Taken to Deal with Them', unpub. paper, Library of the Imperial War Museum, London, p. 5. 12 Note on Harding memorandum 'Cyprus Policy October igss-October 1957', Dec. 1957, 0)926/859. 29
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nothing to do with this petty deception, but it got his tenure off to a bad start with Greek opinion and fed through to the pupils. More than anything else, however, the trouble in the schools by late October 1955 came to be connected with the prosecution of a twenty-two-year-old Greek-Cypriot, Michael Karaolis, for the murder of Constable Poullis in Nicosia on 29 August. Since the fate of Michael Karaolis was to influence events profoundly, the background to his prosecution for murder must be sketched. He came from a modestly affluent family and certainly was not representative of the 'raffish' fringe which later came to surround EOKA. A graduate of the English School in Nicosia, he had been a prefect, and participated in the sporting activities associated with Queen Elizabeth IPs Coronation in 1953. Afterwards he had worked as a clerk in the Inland Revenue, and although in May 1955 a bomb had gone off in the building where he worked, there was nothing to connect him with the incident. In other words, he was a bright young man with sound credentials, who was in many respects ideally suited for a career in the middle echelons of the Cyprus administration. Karaolis' implication in the killing of Poullis came about as follows. 1 ' The policeman had been felled by revolver fire in Ledra Street, just inside the old walled city. The assassin was seen to escape on a bicycle. A passer-by dragged him off, but the perpetrator had disappeared into the maze of surrounding streets and alleyways. The bike left behind by the murderer became the vital clue, and ownership of it was traced to Karaolis, who had gone missing from his work. Four days later he was arrested whilst avoiding a road check near Famagusta, carrying a letter in his pocket which read: 'Zodro. I send you the bearer of this note, he is a good boy and a patriot to the point of self-sacrifice. You can trust him. Nobody must learn his identity. [Signed) Averoff.' Zodro was identified by security experts as Gregoris Axfentiou, Grivas' chief lieutenant. The trial of Karaolis—the 'good boy', as the Greek press labelled him—began on 24 October. It was presided over by the Chief Justice, Sir Eric Hallinan, in what was described in the Times of Cyprus as the 'small and intimate British courtroom' of the Nicosia Assize.u The prosecuting counsel was an increasingly prominent TurkishCypriot lawyer, Rauf Denktash. The Times vivid reporting captured the tension between the little kindnesses of the judicial process and the collective sense of'being inextricably caught up in the terrible machinery of the law'. The outcome hinged, inevitably, on the identification of the rider of Karaolis' bike at the time of the crime. Karaolis denied under oath that it had been him. He claimed that on 29 August he had been at a coffee-shop, and had there lent his bicycle to his brother-in-law. Afterwards he had gone to the house of his uncle and aunt, and spent the afternoon playing drafts. Whilst thus engaged news had come of the shooting, and before long his brother-in-law arrived to warn that the murderer had grabbed Karaolis' bike as he sought to flee. Karaolis panicked—he feared, he said, that the police would make a false link with the still unsolved explosion at his workplace—and had gone into " For details of Karaolis' implication in the murder of Constable Poullis see material in FO37I/117670, RGio8i/(495. •14 Times of Cyprus (25 Oct. 1955).
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hiding at a friend's house. On 4 September the friend had driven him to the outskirts of Famagusta, and handed him the letter found on his person when arrested. Karaolis denied all knowledge of 'Zodro', of having any involvement in the murder of Poullis, or, indeed, of being a 'patriot to the point of self-sacrifice'. The case for the prosecution was based on the identification of Karaolis as the rider of the bike by three Turkish witnesses (the Greek witness who had dragged the assailant to the pavement demurred), and on Denktash's attempts to establish that the atrocity conformed to the general pattern of EOKA assassinations. The defence focused on Karaolis' alibi and the failure of the Police at the time properly to record corroborating statements, as well as on what was alleged to have been a too-hasty assumption of Karaolis' guilt arising from 'the atmosphere of suspicion and prejudice in which the prisoner was caught'.35 By 28 October, when the trial came to a climax, the courtroom had, according to the Times correspondent, become virtually an armed redoubt, with even the Chief Justice being thoroughly searched before entering the chamber. 'The strain is becoming unbearable,' a court official complained, and it was true that the proceedings became a theatre in which was played out the long-pent-up contest of sedition and anti-sedition in the colony. In the end it was the stumbling, contradictory evidence of Karaolis' brother-in-law which made the difference; he could not remember even basic details about the game of drafts supposedly played with the defendant. 'It is difficult to test the veracity of an alibi of this kind,' the Chief Justice stated in his summing-up. 'But sometimes a small matter may reveal the weakness of it.'36 Small or not, Karaolis was duly found guilty, and was sentenced by the Chief Justice to death by hanging. It was the first such sentence connected with an EOKA offence. There remained the recourse of appeals to the Cyprus Supreme Court and to the Privy Council in London, and finally the hope of the Queen's clemency through her Governor. But given the powerful feelings amongst the Security Forces that terrorism had to meet its just reward, the odds were always stacked against any such remission. That terrorism deserved no mercy was not just an assumption of Harding's, it was one of his deepest feelings. Yet he understood that once the stage was reached of carrying out capital sentences, the possibilities of political agreement would be very gravely compromised. This added to the urgency for a clarification of Cyprus's future whilst a chance of agreement still existed. In meeting with the Cabinet on i November he did not mince his words with ministers whom he already suspected of being unwilling to confront awkward decisions. He told the Cabinet even more starkly than he had previously done by telegram that one of two courses had to be decided upon. Either there must be offered some prospect of ultimate self-determination, though subject to requirements of the strategic situation and to progress in self-government, or a regime of military government must be established and the country run indefinitely as a police state. No middle course was any longer open.37 35 17
Ibid. (29 Oct. 1955).
'6 Ibid.
Caccia toMacmillan, i Nov. 1955, FO37I/117668, RGio8i/i39i.
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He strongly recommended the former approach. By way of making plain, furthermore, what the full implications of a police state would be, Harding set about pressing on the Colonial Office his requirements for the power to levy collective fines and impose curfews 'on at least as extensive a scale as General Templer in Malaya'; ™ a mandatory death penalty—-also drawn from Malayan experience—for terrorist crimes; the regulation of the ringing of Church bells as had been practised after 1931; and a whipping law to allow the punishment of delinquent youth. Eden—always acutely sensitive to public relations—-felt most unhappy about the last request.19 The image of British soldiers wielding the lash against Greek schoolchildren was not a pretty one. But then Harding meant it to be disturbing—not only to seditious youths and their parents in Cyprus, but to British ministers tempted by some illusory middle way which merely shifted the responsibility for coping with the deadlock on to other people. Not surprisingly, it was during the Governor's visit to London that rumours of a serious rift between himself and the British Government began to circulate. Alongside talks with the Cabinet and the Colonial Office, Harding had several meetings with the Chiefs of Staff. He fully accepted, as a soldier-governor, that political development in Cyprus had to be in accordance with the 'requirements of the strategic situation'. Whenever journalists pressed him to explain what the nature of those requirement were, he always responded, tartly, 'Look at the map.' By no means everybody found such an airy generalization convincing. Harding, however, never did tell journalists very much—he despised them only slightly less than he did the terrorists. This did not mean that in private he failed to grasp that in Cyprus the relationship between strategic requirements and constitutional policy needed to be more carefully separated out than had yet been done. He probably realized it better than most representatives of the press. In fact, he was beginning to play with the idea that involving NATO in conciliation might be a way of legitimizing a continuing British defence interest and 'getting on to a winner with the Archbishop' (his use of political language was always prone to crudity). Nevertheless, his discussions with the Chiefs of Staff in early November 1955 were principally taken up with more immediate concerns. During the early autumn there had been a marked rise in tension in the iMiddle East, focusing on fears of a preventive war by Israel against her Arab neighbours, and the possibility that Britain might have to meet its treaty obligation to intervene on behalf of Jordan. The leading question that the Chiefs of Staff consequently asked Harding was whether, in the event of troops being moved from Cyprus to Jordan, he could hold the situation in the island for eight days before reinforcements arrived from Britain. Harding answered in the negative.40 It was this external constraint—that is, to help ensure that the island stayed as quiet as possible at a time of considerable regional uncertainty—which underpinned the Cabinet's decision to grant the Governor the 'enticement' he said was necessary to lead •'" I larding to Lennox-Boyd, 19 Nov. 1955, FO37i/ii767i,RGio8i/i470. •"' N. Cairncross toj. Stacpoole, 19 Nov. 1955, PREMi 1/834. •"' Chiefs of Staff (1955) Qist meeting, i Nov. 1955, DEKE/i.
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Makarios towards a compromise. Asked by journalists at London Airport when departing on 11 November what were the prospects for peace in Cyprus, Harding was able to reply with discreetly veiled optimism 'I have some ideas'. He was eager to share these ideas with Makarios, and irritated to learn on his arrival back in Nicosia that the Archbishop was still in Athens, where the latter had rushed to try to ensure that the new Greek Government formed after the death of Papagos on 5 October, and led by Constantine Karamanlis, widely regarded as an American protege, did not slide out of a commitment to support the Enosis campaign. While Harding waited for Makarios to come home, however, the security situation in the colony worsened markedly. On 12 November there were riots in both Cyprus and Greece when the Supreme Court in Nicosia rejected Michael Karaolis' appeal (his case was shortly transferred to the higher jurisdiction of the Privy Council). Students were again in the forefront of these renewed disturbances. Since fining parents for the misdemeanours of their children had been shown to be useless, and even the efforts of Greek headmasters proved abortive, Harding resorted at this point to locking-out pupils.41 The first establishment to be closed was the Samuel School in Nicosia on 15 November; Larnaca's Commercial Gymnasium soon followed. On Friday, 18 November an EOKA bomb offensive began—Grivas later claimed to have set off fifty devices in the first wave. A British NCO was killed in one explosion at Kykko camp; two others and a private suffered fatal injuries over the next few days. This offensive coincided with Makarios' reappearance, as those in Government House did not fail to note. When Harding immediately sent a message to the Archbishop that a meeting between them was urgent, Makarios replied that he had to write a sermon for the Sunday, and could not possibly grant the Governor an interview until after the weekend. By the time Harding finally got into Makarios' presence on the morning of November 21—they met in the house of the Archbishop's aide, Nikos Kranidiotis—he was highly impatient, suspicious, and in no mood for what he saw as prevarication. According to Kranidiotis' account, as soon as the Governor entered the room where the Archbishop was sitting, he took out a document from his breast pocket and passed it to Makarios with the remark, 'Your Beatitude, I have very good news for you.'42 This document contained an 'enticement' in the form of a new attempt by the British Government to define its position on the central issue of the application of self-determination in Cyprus. 'It is not the position of Her Majesty's Government', this read, 'that the principle of self-determination can never be applicable to Cyprus. It is their position that it is not now a practical proposition both on account of the present strategical situation and on account of the consequences of the relations between North Atlantic Treaty Organization Powers in the Eastern Mediterranean.' In the mean time, this definition continued, the United Kingdom was prepared to consider a 'wide measure of self-government', provided that the Cypriot population 41 42
p. 60.
Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 15 Nov. 1955, CO926/i66. Quoted in Evangelos Averoff, Lost Opportunities. The Cyprus Question, 1950-63 (New York, 1986),
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cooperated freely in its implementation. Once such an experiment was successfully under way, and Cypriots had given proof of their political maturity, the British Government would be prepared to invite representatives of the main communities to discuss the ultimate future of the island 'within the framework of [HMG's] treaties and alliances' (the last qualification had been a precondition of approval by the Foreign Office). This formulation was known thereafter as 'the double negative', since it proceeded by stating what the intentions of the British Government were not, rather than by clearly describing what they were. It did at least formally dispose of the pure negativism of July 1954; but that the search for 'golden words' had ended in such guardedness spoke volumes about the cast of mind behind British policy-making. Still, the phraseology afforded the Field-Marshal just the sort of face-saver he thought was required to get Makarios 'in the bag'. When Makarios had subjected the paper to a close reading, however, he observed that 'when analysed there was a difference between the substance of the proposals and the phraseology'.4' After that the two men jousted over the meaning of the document. Makarios pointed out that it left the United Kingdom as the arbiter of the fate of Cyprus; the Governor said that whatever decisions a British Government took in future would inevitably have to allow for Cypriot and world opinion. Makarios objected that the 'strategical situation' would always provide an excuse to Britain for denying freedom to Cyprus; Harding told him that modern weapon development, or, say, a new Middle Eastern defence organization, might lift this constraint on Cypriot political development at any time. Getting closer to the core of the problem, the Archbishop complained that the reference to 'treaties and alliances' would allow Turkey to block progress in the island permanently. Harding assured him that no country would possess a veto (this assurance the Governor was to have cause to remember later on). In short, they went round in circles, as the British and the Greeks had always done in Cyprus. 'Throughout our discussion', Harding told Lennox-Boyd, 'the Archbishop criticized our formula as vague and the negation of self-determination.'44 Towards the end Harding adopted a sterner pose, telling Makarios that 'there was no question of bargaining, that HMG had given fullest consideration to all his [Makarios'] arguments within the limits of their responsibilities, and the decision he was making was fraught with the most far-reaching consequences for the people of Cyprus'. With a gloomy expression, Makarios agreed to put the declaration before the Ethnarchy Council, but he held out little hope of agreement. A few days later it was indeed turned down. This meeting was arguably the most crucial of all the watersheds in the FieldMarshal's personal relations with the Archbishop. He experienced a palpable sense of political failure. 'I feel you'll put it off with your Archbishop,' General Templer, his successor as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, had written to him from London soon after he went to Nicosia. 'And the people are so nice . . . no hatred really.'45 Not 41
44 Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 22 Nov. 1955^0371/117672^01081/1514. Ibid. Templer to Harding, n Oct. 1955, 8908-144, 6-44, Harding Papers, National Army Museum, London. 45
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only had Harding failed to pull it off, but any optimism was exploded. Bitter feelings, if not quite yet of hatred, set in. Harding felt he had gone more than his fair share of the way towards meeting Makarios. He had accepted him as the prime spokesman of the Cypriot population (though he was always careful to maintain a discreet and parallel liaison with the Muslim leaders). When he had discovered that the stumblingblock was indeed self-determination, the Field-Marshal had gone to London and put his prestige on the line in moving Eden and other ministers from their entrenched position. In return Makarios had treated a perfectly reasonable offer with lofty disdain, and far from 'having something to say' on returning from Athens, he had nothing worth while seemingly to say at all. Perhaps most damning was the pattern of violence interlaced with the various phases of negotiation which was repeated sufficiently often, in Harding's eyes, as to appear coldly calculated. This sense of being blackmailed was something which triggered a strong reaction in Harding—his own threats to Makarios, which anyway so far had been essentially verbal, he did not see as at all comparable. After 21 November he entertained towards the Archbishop a strong personal distaste which he was never able to master properly. So significant was this rupture that it requires special reflection. Harding was an unvarnished military professional whose virtues did not lie in dealing with the unfamiliar and baffling. The Primate of an ancient Eastern church was very unfamiliar to him indeed, and partly, but not only, for this reason he did not conceal that the process of negotiation was one in which he felt intensely uncomfortable. Makarios' theological habit of chiselling away little gains by protracted argument created in Harding an impression of insatiability which made him uneasy and increasingly impatient. Arguably, most fundamental in this context was the observation made in the Colonial Office much later that the determining factor in Harding's governorship had been his lack of any previous experience of self-government in a British colony.46 As a result he had no conception of the ways in which nationalist politicians operated; whilst the fact of Makarios' priesthood doubled the offence in his eyes of all the little subterfuges and tricks which leaders of'underdog' nationalities habitually employ, if only because of their weakness. 'To make a sound assessment of the Archbishop's position at any one time', Harding once explained in acute frustration to LennoxBoyd, 'it is essential to recognize that he [Makarios] is determined to be master of events. If he enters into an agreement, it is because he believes that it will serve his aims to do so. For him it will not mark the end of the conflict, but the beginning of another phase.'47 This comment was as revealing about Harding as it was about Makarios. That the Archbishop could hardly be expected to enter into an agreement that did not serve his aims, and that in political relationships one phase of bargaining always does follow another, did not penetrate his consciousness. Regarding the trouble in Cyprus as a kind of mutiny in the ranks, he expected, once enough face had been saved all round, that everything could go back to normal; and when it did not he 46 Note on Harding memorandum 'Cyprus Policy October igss-October 1957', Dec. 1957, €0926/859. 47 Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 15 December 1955, FO37I/117678.
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felt cheated and betrayed. These assumptions led him to believe that any agreement with Makarios was suspect, because sooner or later it would be turned against the British (a supposition that did not by any means lack veracity). The 'HardingMakarios' negotiations had quite a long way to go after 21 November 1955, and attitudes on both sides were not to be consistent throughout. Nevertheless, given the psychological impulses we have described, the chances of a successful outcome were never high. Meanwhile, what of the Archbishop's own position and perspective? Curiously, whereas Harding came deeply to distrust Makarios, Makarios never distrusted Harding, or regarded him as anything other than a man of straightforward integrity. His distrust centred not on the Field-Marshal, and not so much on the Cyprus administration, but on the British Government. It was said, for example, that the Archbishop noticed how his exchanges with Harding would often be going very well, until the latter said he had to telephone London for instructions, and when he returned the British position had invariably stiffened. This impression was well founded; as we have seen, in the Colonial Office itself the struggle was defined as one quintessentially between the Greek-Cypriots and British Conservative ministers. Makarios was too percipient to miss such a fundamental point. When on 21 November the Archbishop subjected the document handed to him by Harding to such sceptical scrutiny, it was not the Governor's word he was doubting, but the sincerity of an imperial government whose good faith he was expected to take on absolute trust. Both the Field-Marshal and the Governor were imprisoned within their own suspicions and prejudices—traits which were, at bottom, an emanation of the colonial history of the island. Nevertheless, was it not a fatal error on Makarios' part to turn down a British offer which, even if it did not point unequivocally towards the eventual exercise of selfdetermination, would surely have done so sooner rather than later? In the light of recent Cypriot history, this question has a sadly tantalizing quality. In fact, assertions that the Archbishop was gravely at fault in not closing with Harding's offer has come from a variety of quarters—Greek as well as British. Evangelos Averoff, soon to loom large in this story as a Greek Foreign Minister, contends in his memoirs that the moment Makarios read Harding's 'piece of paper' he realized that an acceptable solution was within his grasp, but that he let the opportunity slip away under pressure from the group of extremists around the Bishop of Kyrenia.4!) In this regard, Averoff notes that, for all Makarios' considerable gifts, he suffered from what in the circumstances was the weakness that the criticism of his fellow Greek-Cypriots was 'the only kind of opposition he [Makarios] minded'. 49 This is an astute observation, but then nationalist leaders necessarily place the highest premium on solidarity within their own ranks; in Makarios' case the priority of internal cohesion was compounded by the strong sense of 'brotherhood' within Greek-Cypriot society. It showed in his growing reiteration of the need for the Greeks of Cyprus to look to 4
* Averoff, Lost Opportunities, 60.
49
Ibid. 62.
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themselves, and to nobody else—not even to the sometimes wavering support of Athens. Moreover, Averoff's assertion that the Archbishop knew when reading the British statement that he was on the verge of a decisive breakthrough is itself problematical. More reliable is the judgement made at the time by Consul Courtney, close to the negotiations throughout, who told Washington that there was nothing feigned about Makarios' distrust of the offer made to him, and that he saw nothing concrete in it which might counter widespread Greek-Cypriot disbelief in British good faith.50 There can be in all this no definitive judgement, other than the simple one, that a crisis of trust had brought about the violence in the first place, and that it would take more than 'golden words', or guarded negatives, to make it go away. But words and negations were often all there seemed to be. Even though Makarios and the Ethnarchy Council had not accepted the offer of 21 November, there remained a possibility that they might yet do so if only they could be made to see that otherwise they faced complete isolation. When Ambassador Peake had shown a draft of the intended statement to the Foreign Minister in the Karamanlis Government, M. Theotokis, the latter said that it would be an 'act of bad faith' if Makarios turned it down.51 Eden latched on to this as providing a possible way to 'disillusion' the Archbishop that he could count on the recently formed Greek Government to support him in future. When Peake saw Theotokis in Athens hours after the Harding-Makarios interview on the 2ist, therefore, he implored him that 'the situation [in Cyprus] was now critical and if we were to get through it called for a desperate remedy'—the remedy being for Athens to intervene with the Archbishop.52 Theotokis, however, was evasive. Shortly afterwards, Eden made a personal plea to Karamanlis—an action which suggests more of a willingness to eat humble pie, despite his undoubtedly nervous condition, than most of his biographers allow for. But this initiative, too, failed. Theotokis explained to Peake on 23 November that the ministry would have 'signed its own death warrant' if it broke with Makarios, leading inexorably to a Popular Front regime and the reversal of all the gains of the civil war.53 As for the new British formula, to Karamanlis it had been 'rendered almost unrecognizable' by the qualifications which seemed to have been added at the last minute. These qualifications—including the reference to 'treaties and alliances', which the Greeks suspected gave Turkey a tacit veto on future developments—indeed reflected the bargaining which had gone on within Cabinet circles in London. Following the disappointment of these approaches, Peake's advice to London was that, if there was to be a settlement over Cyprus, it could not be one arrived at through Greece, where no Government could afford to distance itself from the Archbishop. This remained his assessment so long as he remained in Athens. It was axiomatic in Harding's strategy that any break in the negotiation with the 50 Courtney, telegram to State Department, 19 Dec. 1955, Box 3274, RG59, State Department, USNA. 51 Peake to Foreign Office, 21 Nov. 1955^0371/117670^61081/1462. 52 Peake to Foreign Office, 22 Nov. 1955^0371/117671^61081/1248. 53 Peake to Foreign Office, 28 Nov. 1955^0371/117672^61081/1517.
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4 October 1955-9 March 1956
Archbishop had to be followed by tangible signs of the retribution which he had always warned would follow from failure to agree. Not to take such action would fatally undermine his own credibility. By 23 November any hope that such a break might be averted had been extinguished. The announcement on the same day of a general strike by the Cypriot trade unions for the coming weekend provided the Governor with the opportunity he needed. Two days later he formally requested that Her Majesty's Government authorize him to declare an Emergency in the colony. Eden and the Cabinet could not refuse, but they did qualify their assent. Principal among these rather telling limitations was an instruction not to rule out any possibility of renewing the talks with Makarios (effectively maintaining a block on deportation), to avoid 'wholesale whipping', to go easy on collective punishment because it had an 'ugly ring' in the outside world, and not (as Harding had specifically asked) to inaugurate a political offensive against sedition with the proscription of AKEL.54 It is doubtful whether Harding would have tarried long in using the freedom he was thus granted. Any final hesitations evaporated when a British Army Sergeant, arriving at his home in a Nicosia suburb for lunch on 24 November, was shot dead in the road by a young Cypriot who had ridden up on his bike and opened fire—a classic form of urban assassination by EOKA. After some hurried hours spent with lawyers and security advisers, on Saturday, 26 November, at 17.00 GMT, Governor Harding gave a short but sharp public broadcast in which he announced that a State of Emergency now existed on the island. A few hours after speaking on the radio, the Governor was due to attend one of the social highlights of the expatriate year—the Caledonian Society Ball in the Ledra Palace Hotel. Minutes before he was due to make his appearance, however, a bomb exploded causing 'a chaos of sudden darkness, explosive fumes and shattered glass'.55 It was a primitive device—EOKA's bomb-making skills at this point were not what they later became—and there were no serious injuries, though the Police Commissioner's wife had cuts and bruises along with several other victims. Still, feelings ran understandably high, and journalists, including some from overseas, converging on the scene were roughly treated by the Security Forces. When the Archbishop preached the following day in the Cathedral, however, he passed over the episode, and certainly did not condemn it; his sole remark outside religion was that only selfdetermination could lift the pall from people's minds. All the hopes associated with the Harding-Makarios negotiations had apparently disappeared into thin air. 'So Cyprus is back where she was at the time of Sir John's arrival', the Times of Cyprus concluded gloomily on 28 November, 'with this difference: that a spirit of violence undreamed of hitherto on this Island faces a paramilitary dictatorship which nobody on any side expects in itself to bring a solution.' Cyprus in November 1955 was in fact by no means a paramilitary dictatorship—in many ways it was never to become so, though many aspects were to belie this. But 54 55
Colonial Office to Harding, 25 Nov. 1955,00926/562. Times of Cyprus (27 Nov. 1955).
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before proceeding further with the course of the Emergency, we must say something about Harding's priorities after becoming Governor with respect to the administration and the revamping of the security machine. It was inevitable that the Cyprus administration, after all the criticisms that had been made, should be held responsible for what Harding's Chief of Staff, Brigadier Baker, called an 'inadequate reaction' to the symptoms of rebelliousness.56 A number of long-standing officials were pensioned off. Those in the technical departments—agriculture and irrigation, for example—who had tried to carry on as normal were sharply cautioned. A new Deputy Governor, George Sinclair, was appointed to pull the threads together on the civilian side (though the fact that he came from Togoland aroused sarcasm in the Greek press). On the grounds that the central administration had become isolated from the districts, and had consistently been taken unawares by events, Harding gave more influence to the District Commissioners, and linked the various levels through the District Security Committees, which afterwards formed a core element in military reorganization. He ordered all senior personnel to start learning Greek, on the grounds that their omission to do so before explained why the Government had found itself bereft of vital information. How many rose to this challenge is unknown. There was one Greek-speaking British official, however, John Reddaway, whose linguistic facility was a factor in his meteoric rise from what had hitherto been a relatively slow-moving career within the local hierarchy. Reddaway had not previously impressed Consul Courtney as a man of great imagination or ability.57 He was, in fact, more complex than this suggests. It was his ability at crafting political memoranda which recommended him to a Governor who did not himself take naturally to composition, but who badly needed a draftsman whose views meshed with his own. Reddaway's emotional personality arguably made him ill-fitted to be the 'listening post to the Greek community', as well as the author of political testaments, which Harding made him into. Meanwhile, the Governor's new broom briskly swept clean the allegedly Augean stables of the Cyprus Government. Harding's prime concern was, of course, the overhaul of the Security Forces and the working out of a plan of campaign to defeat terrorism. Greek commentators were to argue in retrospect that in conducting prolonged talks with Makarios, the FieldMarshal had simply been 'buying time' in which to gear-up his military machine for an offensive. This is a simplification of what, for Harding, was the very nice judgement that had to be made as to the balance to be struck between coercion and conciliation. Nevertheless, he quickly came to the conclusion that the right conditions for a political settlement could not be created 'until and unless terrorism and intimidation had been stamped out'.58 After late November this became an unshakeable assumption. In appreciating Harding's situation it must be remembered, therefore, that the security problem posed by EOKA remained his central concern. At the end of his governorship, indeed, Harding was to claim that the reason why he had gone 56 57 58
Baker, 'The Cyprus Emergency', 9. Courtney Dispatch, 30 July 1955, Box 3273, RG59, State Department Records, USNA. Baker, 'The Cyprus Emergency', 13.
i oo
4 October 1955-9 March 1956
out to Cyprus was to prove 'that terrorism can be mastered in the physical sense', and that no British Government had a valid excuse for being held to ransom by violence.59 Embedded in this fierce determination was the aim of reversing the dismal precedent set by Palestine in the later 19408. The defeat of British arms by Jewish terrorists in that territory had bitten deep into the post-war psychology of the Army high command, who resolved never again to have their hands tied behind their backs by the politicians when fighting a ruthless and evil enemy/'0 A Palestinian shadow was to lie over a good deal of Harding's behaviour whilst he was in Cyprus. We shall not be primarily concerned with military events, but some of Harding's priorities in this area must be identified. The most important requirement for the restoration of normalcy was to get the Police back 'into the fight'. Armitage had made progress on this, but not enough. Pay was boosted again to improve morale. Numbers also had to be raised. Although Armitage had introduced a Police Auxiliary arm, he had limited its recruitment for fear of tilting the force in the direction of an overwhelming Turkish preponderance. Not only did Harding remove this restraint, but the expansion—including a new arm, the Police Mobile Reserves—involved the recruitment of individuals who, according to one long-standing British official in the island, came from 'the lowest stratum of Turkish-Cypriot society and are known not to have been beyond criminal activities in the past'.61 To provide leadership for this rapidly improvised cadre, plans were made to import constables from the United Kingdom, especially from the Metropolitan Police. This, however, took time—the Home Office were to show themselves uneasy at British police being exposed to the sorts of practices followed in Cyprus before returning to their duties in Britain. Not until May 1956 was Harding able to restore 'normal' policing in Cyprus, and thereby release troops for offensives against EOKA. In the interim the Army continued to act 'in support of the civil power', and at various points during his negotiations with Makarios, the Governor demanded, and was given, more troops for this purpose: in mid-October 1955 over 500 men of the First Battalion Gordon Highlanders were flown in, and shortly afterwards the First Battalion of the Royal Norfolk Regiment, bringing the total Army garrison to over 12,000. One use to which many of these troops were put was supervising an intensive 'clean-up' campaign ridding the island of EOKA graffiti and posters, the universality of which, even on Government buildings, had shocked the Field-Marshal on assuming his post—and given him a first inkling of the scale of the task he confronted. Apart from the need for more troops and policemen, as soon as Harding arrived in Cyprus he began to bombard London with a stream of requests related to the *'' Address by His Excellency to District Security Committees, 21 Oct. 1957, CO926/1055. As one of Harding's predecessors as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field-Marshal Montgomerv, wrote of this experience, 'There is much to be learnt from a study of how the problem [of Palestine] was handled by the Labour Government of the day—chiefly how not to handle such matters.' See Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery, Memoirs (London, 1958), pp. 427-36. Harding was always to be on the look-out for any sign that the Conservative Government which gave him the job of pacifying Cyprus was falling into the same errors. M John Wcston to Reddaway, 2 July 1956, 0^)926/209. M
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security effort. One of his key concerns was to ensure that no arms got into the colony from outside, and to this end he pestered the Admiralty for more naval patrol boats with anti-submarine facilities. In an episode which brought out something of the Governor's style, the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet had protested when Harding unilaterally announced a shoot-on-sight policy to be used against any Greek Navy vessel appearing off the coast of Cyprus—that is, on the vessel of a fellow NATO ally.62 Sealing off the island remained a central component in the Cyprus Government's aims, as important for its psychological effects on Cypriots as for its utility in denying supplies to EOKA. The compactness of Cyprus was also a feature which impressed itself on Harding. As more manpower became available, and with improved telecommunications, a strategy of flexible response was evolved, blanketing hotbeds of trouble such as the notorious Famagusta 'triangle', clamping down on the towns, and gradually building up the capacity to strike at EOKA in the rural areas. The most important task, however, was to construct what Brigadier Baker termed 'an efficient machine for producing prompt and detailed information'.63 In this connection one of the scarcest resources were Greek-speaking Army intelligence officers, and finding such personnel was one of the prime tasks of the Colonial Office official whose hectic job it was to deal with Harding's accumulating desiderata. The individuals selected—at first often veterans of the Greek civil war—were not always good quality. There were dangers in this, and the security campaign had always to be improvised as it went along. Nor did it take long to be realized that the mountainous terrain of Cyprus was perfect guerrilla country. Overall, when one of Whitehall's top security specialists was sent out to make an assessment only three weeks after Harding's arrival, his conclusion was that the outcome would be 'a near-run thing, but he is pretty sure that the Field-Marshal will manage it', provided that the terrorist organization could be penetrated. This qualification was to be crucial. In the immediate wake of the declaration of the Emergency, Field-Marshal Harding was not in a position to launch a decisive military blow against Grivas. On the other hand, he was eager to do something which could deliver a sharp psychological check to his opponents. In his eyes, this could only mean deporting the Archbishop, since Makarios' very presence continued to function as a rallying-point for disloyalty and sedition. In the weeks after 21 November Eden's reluctance to authorize such an action began to chafe on Harding's patience. He was also highly perturbed when Her Majesty's Government was drawn into a further series of'elucidations' of its position over self-determination, the most public of which was given in the House of Commons on 5 December, affirming that self-determination would be applicable in 62 The First Sea Lord expressed the hope to the Prime Minister that 'the Royal Navy would not be asked to depth charge our Greek allies'. See Admiralty telegram to C.-in-C. Mediterranean Fleet, 25 Dec. 1955, FO37I/117690, RGi 192/82. Given the controversy which had never entirely died down about the Royal Navy's sinking of its French ally at Mers-el-Kebir in 1940, Harding had touched a sensitive Admiralty spot. 63 Baker,'The Cyprus Emergency', 13.
ote-- Each district has a joint military/Police operations centre, which is Commanded direct from H Q CYPRUS OPS by HE The GOVERNOR through a Chief of Staff.
Deployment of the Security Forces in Cyprus on the declaration of a State of Emergency, 26 November 1955. Source: UK Public Record Office (PREM 117834)
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Cyprus 'sometime and in certain conditions' (though what the conditions might be was not specified).64 Harding, as we have seen, had himself pressed for an 'enticement', but since it had failed he greatly disliked the seeping out of obscure little concessions which did nothing but give an impression of weakness and which harmed his own prestige. Nor did the modifications of the formula—the result in part of American pressure on London—seem to have any effect in Athens, leading to the suspicion that Karamanlis and Makarios had struck a deal of their own to spin the whole process out till the Greek general election, scheduled to take place in February, should be over. Being 'spun out' was just what Harding feared most of all. It led directly to the 'middle way' which helped the politicians off their various hooks, but which made the problem itself far more intractable, and also cost lives. Virtually every day brought evidence that time was working against the British in the island. At the beginning of December the Greek merchant vessel Aeloia was searched by Cyprus customs after a tip-off, and a consignment of 'books' was found to contain machine guns, hand-grenades, limpet mines, and pistols. On 5 December a Cypriot policeman, a Greek civilian, and a Royal Marine were murdered in an ambush at Amiandos. The Governor's feelings began to boil over. 'I cannot continue', he wrote to Lennox-Boyd, hinting at resignation for the first time, 'to accept responsibility for the Government of Cyprus and for the morale and discipline of the Security Forces . . . unless I am allowed to take effective measures to deal with all cases of flagrant sedition and other breaches of the law.' 65 In this the Governor was referring principally to action against the Archbishop. But although Makarios remained as yet beyond his reach, the Cabinet in London could not afford to deny Harding some further scope for action. A Rubicon was crossed on 8 December when the first shot was fired across the bows of the Church. In the early hours of the morning British troops, accompanied by Army chaplains, entered twenty-four carefully selected monasteries in the island in search of the arms that they were widely rumoured to harbour. Many an old hunting rifle was handed over by bleary monks whose feelings towards the Army padres were not presumably very ecumenical; but beyond these, as well as two pistols at Kykko, and a few sticks of dynamite and some EOKA pamphlets at Kantara monastery, nothing was found to justify the extravagant allegations which had been made (the non sequitur in Harding's report, 'harmless pieces of military equipment', was telling).66 This initiative had caused some perturbation in London, at least amongst civil servants. The observation in the Colonial Office that during the Second World War not even the Germans had searched the Vatican conveys the embarrassment which was felt/'7 Nevertheless, the possibility of finding some means of'getting at' the Cyprus Church (usually interpreted as getting at its money, as its most sensitive point) was not to be discounted on the British side until virtually the M 65 66 67
Parliamentary Debate;: (Commons), /"955-6, vol. 547, 5 Dec. 1955, cols. 32-4. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 8 Dec. 1955, FO37I/117675, RG1081/1604. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 8 Dec. 1955, FO37I/117676/1617. H, Caccia, minute,9July 1955, FO37I/117691, RGCi 196/6.
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very end of the Emergency. For the moment, only Makarios himself was able to provide a potential surrogate for this wider action. Still more important was the other sop given to the Governor: permission to proscribe AKEL. On 14 December 132 Communists were duly arrested. It is ironic that the detention camps, destined to be such a feature of Cypriot life, were first filled up with men who were deeply opposed to EOKA. From i April 1955 onwards, for example, in those areas where AKEL was dominant, there had been markedly fewer security incidents than elsewhere. In pressing for authorization the Governor was inspired, nonetheless, by the traditional Cyprus Government belief that the liquidation of AKEL was a prerequisite for any safe experiment in Cypriot selfgovernment, since otherwise the Communists would sweep the board. The problem was that, as at the time of the Constituent Assembly in 1948, AKEL was also the only credible counterweight to clerical Nationalism in the colony. Its suppression was a measure of the contradictions emerging from the mixing up of an older colonial orthodoxy in Emergency policy. In practice, AKEL continued to operate underground after December 1955, including the printing and distribution of its newspapers. For the duration of British rule the Communists had little choice but to line up behind Archbishop Makarios, partly for defence against the British, and ultimately most of all for protection against the right-wing excesses of EOKA. The centrality of Makarios to British dilemmas was highlighted anew by the furore which surrounded the funeral of his young cousin, Charalambous Mouskos, who was killed on 15 December in an EOKA attack on an Army vehicle travelling along the Lefkos-Troodos mountain road. At the outset of the ambush, led by Markos Drakos, a senior lieutenant of Grivas, the British corporal driving the jeep was killed instantly. His passenger, Major Coombes of the Royal Engineers, fought back, and although Drakos escaped, two of the band were captured. Mouskos died from his wounds. The authorities gave permission for the latter to be buried in Phanomerani Church in Nicosia, but with clergy and relatives only present. When the funeral took place on 17 December, however, a large crowd gathered along the route of the hearse all the way to interment. The Police intervened and, amidst much confusion, tear-gas enveloped both mourners and coffin. To Makarios this indignity was a 'black stigma in the history of the British Occupation of Cyprus'; to Harding the incident was yet one more proof that the Archbishop never stuck by his word. But there was another special meaning attached to the Mouskos funeral. Young Greeks were said to have knelt as the coffin passed by.68 It was the beginning of the 'cult of heroes' which was to shape the political culture of Greek Cyprus. Conversely, amongst the British community in Cyprus the killing of a terrorist in open fire—especially one related by blood to the Archbishop—was greeted as a triumph. Coombes told a press conference a few days after the incident that it had been nothing more than his duty to shoot a 'pathetic, frightened' young Cypriot, and called for 'no jubilation, no exulting'.69 But jubilation there was, of the sort which heightened misunderstanding and contempt all round. 68
Times of Cyprus (18 Dec. 1955).
69
Ibid. (24 Dec. 1955).
io6
4 October 1955-9 March 1956
Aware that circumstances were becoming more brittle by the day, in the run-up to Christmas the Americans increased their efforts to secure a renewal of direct negotiations in the island. For some weeks after the Istanbul riots in September they had concentrated on patching up the Greco-Turkish spat. Then they had applied pressure on London. Finally, feeling they 'had pushed the British considerably',70 in mid-December they shifted round to the Greeks, so that Consul Courtney had several pressing interviews with Makarios, while Ambassador Cannon in Athens lobbied the Greek Government. The wounding of three Americans by a bomb in Nicosia on 18 December gave a fillip to this process—it was a measure of the concern this incident generated that a plan was drawn up for a wholesale evacuation of all American nationals if law and order broke down on a widespread basis. On 23 December Dulles sent a message to Prime Minister Karamanlis that 'this may be the high tide for Greece on the Cyprus problem and if the Greek Government does not try to ride into harbour now, it may find no such favourable opportunity for years to come'/1 Where Eden failed with the Greeks, Dulles could at least partially succeed, and it was to ride into a Cypriot harbour, or at least to be seen looking for such a refuge, that on Christmas Eve Karamanlis dispatched an envoy, Alexis Liaitis, to Nicosia to press Makarios into another meeting with the Governor. It was the beginning of the second and final phase of the 'Harding-Makarios negotiations'. Liaitis spent four days in Cyprus, during which he saw the Archbishop several times, and Harding once. The latter encounter was a rather stilted affair, especially once the Greek diplomat expressed such unwelcome opinions as that the condemned Karaolis was a 'national hero', and that it would be 'political suicide' for the Greek Government to press Makarios to accept the British formula. 72 Liaitis had no crushing influence to bring to bear on anyone, but what he could do was offer an excuse for the two main parties in the island to come together again if they wished. Makarios certainly wanted to renew contact with the Field-Marshal. There were already signs that the Turkish Government, somewhat under a cloud since the September disturbances, was recovering its nerve. As such, the Archbishop could not but be aware that the 'high tide' for Greece in this matter might be his high tide as well. Simultaneously, Governor Harding was also drawn towards another attempt at accommodation. During the last few weeks of 1955 any idea that the British were merely up against a few hotheads had evaporated. Not only was EOKA by the turn of the year recognized to be 'a proper organization', but through East European sources it had been learned that 'Dighenis' was none other than Colonel George Grivas, thus confirming long-held British suspicions that 'fanatical' Greek Army figures were at the back of the trouble.71 Furthermore, Harding was all too conscious, as he told 70
Baxter to Allen, 21 Dec. 1956, Box 3273, RG59, State Department Records, USNA. Dulles to Cannon (Athens Embassy), 23 Dec. 1955, Box 3274, RG59, State Department Records, USNA. 12 Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 27 Dec. 1955, FO371 /117678/1735. 73 Ward, minute, 4 Nov. 1955,00926/455. 71
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Lennox-Boyd on 21 December, that popular support for EOKA was still growing; and although he remained extremely doubtful that any agreement with the Archbishop 'will do more than change the scene and postpone the date of the final showdown' (an expression which gives the key to his fears and suspicions in the following weeks),74 his growing appreciation of the difficulties facing him led to a revived interest in a political agreement, provided it did not prejudice fundamental British interests. Neither Harding's undiminished distaste for Makarios, nor the Archbishop's distrust of Her Majesty's Government, therefore, prevented the two men coming together again for successive meetings on 9 and 13 December. Early on in these exchanges a significant shift of focus became apparent on Makarios' part. When the Governor—after consultation with London—added yet one more gloss on self-determination which, as Ambassador Bowker in Ankara was assured, did not 'give anything away of real value',75 it was not immediately spurned by the Archbishop. At the same time the latter indicated that he was prepared to leave aside the issue of self-determination which had hitherto preoccupied everybody's attention, and concentrated instead on the transitional constitution under which an internal Cypriot government would be set up. For Harding this brought very close the moment of decision he had anticipated for some time. He very much wanted an agreement if he could get one. But he also suspected this was just another manoeuvre by the Archbishop, who, having pocketed one set of concessions, would merely set out to pocket another. Meanwhile, precious time was being lost—time which helped the terrorists more than the government. What Harding required before proceeding further, then, was some pledge or guarantee that the Archbishop had undergone a genuine change of heart. His solution was to seek from his opponent an explicit condemnation of violence. Above all, he wanted this quickly. 'I am asking whether His Beatitude is prepared to send me a letter', the Governor demanded towards the end of their meeting on the i3th, 'by which it is made clear that he accepts . . . cooperation and to stress that he denounces violence. The answer I am waiting for is yes or no.'76 The Archbishop's enigmatic response to Harding's black-and-white summary of where matters stood—'I would agree, but not in the way you put it' —conveyed the clash of culture, subtlety, and method which lay between them. Harding's impatience to bring things to a head arose directly from the sharp turn for the worse in the conditions prevailing within Cyprus in the New Year of 1956. On 1 1 January occurred the first killing by EOKA of a Turkish policeman. His funeral in Ataturk Square was very emotional, and was followed by Muslim demonstrations.77 But for the moment this communal tension was overshadowed by the breakdown in the Greek schools. So far Harding had refrained from imposing state control and dismissing all mainland Greek teachers, as he wished, having been warned by the Colonial Office's own Chief Educational Adviser that without the teachers from Greece 74 75 76 77
Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 2i Dec. i955,FO37i/ii7678/i7io. Foreign Office to Ankara Embassy, lojan. 1956^0371/123864, RGio8i/8g. 'Verbatim Report of 6th Meeting between Harding and Makarios', FC>37i/i 17865, RGio8i/67. Times of Cyprus (12 Jan. 1956).
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4 October 1955-9 March 1956
the whole secondary system would grind to a halt.78 Yet the policy of closing down 'troublesome' schools soon threatened to have the same effect, since as they closed, more pupils were released to cause trouble on the streets and to lobby those schools which remained open. Even the primary sector began to be affected. Parents, headmasters, and the great majority of teachers struggled to maintain discipline in institutions which were the pride and joy of the majority community. Asked afterwards why these efforts failed, one teacher simply replied 'they [the children] were making history'.79 They were certainly making trouble for the British Army, as soldiers tried to smother the surge of Greek flag-waving and general mayhem which gathered momentum in the first two weeks of January. Pursuing a campaign, not so much of crushing EOKA, but of chasing schoolkids around classrooms, was something that the British Security Forces found humiliating. Nobody could feel this particular indignity more than a Field-Marshal, and an impatience to 'take off the gloves' fed directly into Harding's approach to the exchanges with the Archbishop. In signalling that he was prepared to move on and discuss an interim form of government, the Archbishop had ditched the long-standing position of the Enosis movement evoked by such traditional slogans as 'Away from the Polls' and 'Down with the Constitution'. Yet in many ways the nature of whatever constitution might eventually be conceded would determine the future of the British presence on the island even more irreversibly than mere verbal glosses on the principle of selfdetermination. It was vital, therefore, from Harding's point of view, to clarify the assumptions governing any further talks with Makarios. During the interval after 13 December Harding, in tandem with Reddaway, drew up a sweeping analysis. 'The development of a [provisional] constitution for Cyprus is not merely a political exercise,' this tour d'horizon portentously began. 'It is a critical phase in the history of British Middle Eastern policy.'80 The paper proceeded to set out the preconditions for securing what the Cyprus Government took to be the essential aim—that is, to ensure that 'when self-determination is applied, the outcome will be a [Cypriot] decision to remain within the [British] Commonwealth and with Enosis finally rejected'. These preconditions included 'a metamorphosis in Greek Cypriot mentality and emotions', the crushing of EOKA 'beyond all hope of recovery', the neutralization of the political power of the Church, and the imposition of state control on education, amongst other requirements.81 Clearly, in this scenario wide areas of public life would have to remain firmly under British control for a considerable period. Implicit in the paper was not only the obvious gulf between Harding and Makarios, but the more subtle divide between the Governor and key British ministers. The latter suffered no illusions that Greek Cyprus would ever 'reject' Enosis for Commonwealth membership. In harbouring such baseless hopes, it began to be suspected—as 78 C. Cox, minute, 25 May 1955, 01)926/55. For an important summary on this aspect of the Emergency see 'Chronological Record of the Part Played by Students of Cypriot Schools in Disturbances, i August 1954-31 January 1956', in 0)926/166. 79 Doros Alastos, Cyprus Guerrilla: Grivas. Makarios and the British (London, 1960), pp. 64-5. 811 'The Constitutional Problem in Cyprus: Note by the Governor', 18 Jan. 1956, 03926/548. n Ibid.
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the Times of Cyprus was already inveighing in public—that the Governor was too much under the sway of Reddaway. But meanwhile it was potentially fatal to Conservative party unity for the Cabinet even to be seen considering the possibility of self-determination for Cyprus. Whatever these underlying differences, the real significance of the memorandum was not its precise contents, but the use to which it was put, since Harding arrived in London on 20 January 1956 armed with his analysis to make sure that Her Majesty's Government fully understood the full extent of the necessities if Cyprus was indeed to be a British rather than a Greek island. The Field-Marshal's visit took place amidst great secrecy. 'I wouldn't be able to tell you where he is staying even if I knew,' a Colonial Office spokesman laconically told enquiring journalists.82 Rumours circulated in the newspapers that a 'terrific row' blew up between Eden and Harding, and that the Governor was on the verge of resignation. Harding repulsed such suggestions as 'quite untrue' and 'monstrous' when he was quizzed on the BBC's 'Panorama' television programme on the evening of 23 January.83 The truth was somewhere in between. The British Cabinet's mind was by no means made up on its wider Middle Eastern policy; one consequence of this was that it still did not know what it really wanted in Cyprus. Eden and his colleagues therefore looked to Harding to go on 'holding the fort' in the colony until the shape of the future became clearer. The Field-Marshal was not prepared to do this unless his hands were freed from political constraints, and there is no doubt that he made this clear in the plainest terms. The outcome was that ministers authorized an absolutely 'final edition' of the formula on self-determination about which Harding and Makarios had haggled over for so long, but which left in place its essentially negative construction, including the reference to 'treaties and alliances'. What was new was the draft of a statement to be signed and issued by Makarios denouncing violence. It was also to be made clear that no definitive discussions could take place on a 'transitory regime' until others besides the Archbishop became party to them—a reference to Turkish-Cypriot leaders, with whom the Governor's private contacts had become more frequent as the main negotiations proceeded. On 27 January Harding returned to Nicosia determined to put the Archbishop 'up against a wall'.84 If he refused to jump the obstacle, as he had refused to accept the 'enticement' of 21 November, negotiations would end, the Archbishop would at last be deported, and a trial offeree inaugurated in which there could only be one winner. Harding forwarded to the Archbishop the 'final edition' of the British Government's formula, and the draft denunciation of violence awaiting his signature, as soon as he got back to Nicosia. A decisive moment in the struggle was obviously close. The Archbishop called a 'national consultation' over the weekend of 30 January/ i February. This had to be preceded, however, by an even more delicate consultation. On the night of 28 January Makarios attended the ordination of a young priest at Kykko monastery; but his real purpose was to meet Grivas, who had recently 82 83 84
Times of 'Cyprus (20 Jan. 1956). 'Panorama'transcript,23Jan. 1956,FO37i/i23i69,RGio8i/234. Ward, minute, 2 Feb. i9s6,FO37i/i23i 7 8,RGio8i/i78.
no
4 October 1955-9 March 1956
arrived in the area on foot (British troops were simultaneously scouring the foothills and forested margins of the Troodos mountains to intercept him).85 The Archbishop argued his case with EOKA's leader for coming to a settlement with the British Government based on an acceptance of the amended formula on self-determination, but which would require specific guarantees as to the 'wide measure of self-government' promised for the transitory period. The principal guarantee Makarios required as a test of British good faith—the counterpart, in its way, of Harding's demand for a denunciation of violence—was an explicit acceptance that in a restored Legislative Assembly there would be a Greek elected majority. Grivas agreed reluctantly to this basis, and ordered a two-week lull in the activities of his organization to give fresh talks a chance. But he also added a significant condition of his own: that there should be an amnesty for all those implicated in EOKA actions since i April. The 'national consultation' which followed this assignation was a stormy affair, especially as that weekend Harding had ordered the closure of the Pan-Cyprian Gymnasium amidst scenes of pandemonium (leaving another 2,000 highly charged teenagers to roam the streets of Nicosia). During the various sessions Makarios' position was assailed by the extreme Kyrenia faction. The dangerous \vord of'traitor' was bandied around.8'' When the Archbishop finally wrote to the Governor, as he promised, on 2 February, he was nevertheless able to accept provisionally the 'final edition' on selfdetermination and to agree to enter into talks on an interim constitution, but he asked for satisfaction on the Greek elected majority, on the nature of transitional powers, and on the potentially thorny matter of an amnesty. Whether negotiations could proceed any further depended on the nature of Harding's response. In fact we have already seen that the Governor's idea of a transitory regime was a long way from anything which could satisfy even moderate GreekCypriot opinion. But Eden had always impressed on the Governor his anxiety that if a breakdown were to come about, it was most important that it should not do so through a 'misunderstanding'. All kinds of factors—including uses of language, and Harding's political inexperience—made this danger a very real one. As it happened, there turned up on the island at this point a Labour MP, Francis Noel-Baker, with a deep interest in Greek affairs. The son of a Labour ex-Cabinet Minister, Noel-Baker was a fluent Greek-speaker—-indeed his family still owned large estates on the island of Euboea. It was at Karamanlis' urging that at this delicate juncture he offered his services as mediator; nor was Eden unhappy for him to make the attempt. NoelBaker therefore for some days bustled between Government House and the Archbishopric carrying messages and glosses, sometimes translating as he went. When the Governor finally responded to Makarios on 14 February, his main concession to the Archbishop's request for guarantees was to agree that the transfer of powers to a Cypriot administration, including the crucial area of public security, would be part of a 'suitably phased process', though how long these phases might be remained "s Grivas, Memoirs (London, 1964), 62-3. S(l Courtney, telegram to State Department, 4 Feb. 1956, Box 3274, RG^g, State Department Records, USNA.
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vague. Any recognition, however, of a Greek-elected majority could not, Harding stated, be given pending the enlargement of the talks to include other Cypriot representatives. His letter made no mention of the sensitive matter of an amnesty. Still, if the substance did not meet Makarios' points, the tone was conciliatory, and NoelBaker returned to London with the feeling that some progress had been made.87 In reality, Harding's patience was worn almost through. Later on he considered the employment of Noel-Baker's services to have been one of the few mistakes of his governorship,88 presumably because it helped to postpone a confrontation for a few more vital weeks. But at the time there remained one consideration which made any immediate breaking off with Makarios impossible. The Greek general election was scheduled for 19 February, and Dulles had told the Foreign Office that it was vital that no events take place in Cyprus before then jeopardizing Karamanlis—'they [the Americans] would blame us if there is a breakdown' it was noted.89 With Eden and Macmillan's recent replacement as Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, about to go to Washington for talks, it was particularly important to avert a quarrel on this score. The problem was, however, that the longer the Cyprus negotiations went on, the more factors were injected into them which made agreement even more difficult, and perhaps impossible. Thus Makarios' aide, Kranidiotis, raised with Reddaway the commutation of the death-sentences on Karaolis (whose appeal was still in process pending a Privy Council hearing) and on another young Greek-Cypriot, Andreou Demetriou, who had recently been convicted under the mandatory death penalty introduced on 26 November. These were matters—involving acts of violence (or intended violence, since Demetriou had done no actual bodily harm) against members of the Security Forces—about which Harding harboured extremely powerful feelings. He told the Colonial Secretary that 'he could not continue to expose troops and police to ruthless attempts by dastardly terrorists who knew sooner or later they would escape for their crimes'.90 In this way the atmosphere of the exchanges took on an even sharper edge. On 19 February Karamanlis was duly re-elected. It was this which finally lifted the barrier to bringing things to a head. '[O]ur next move', the Governor telegraphed on the same day to Lennox-Boyd, 'should be to make it quite clear that all bets are off unless and until the Archbishop makes a public declaration against violence and disorder.'91 Makarios' awareness that the negotiation was teetering on the brink is shown by his telephone call to London urging Noel-Baker to rush to Nicosia to help. With the reserved encouragement of the Colonial Office,92 the Labour MP concurred. He arrived back in Cyprus on 21 February, and through him Harding conveyed the simple message to Makarios 'that [he]... can either have cooperation with me or the 87 88 89 90 91 92
Francois Crouzet, Le Conflitde Chypre, 7946-7959,2 vols. (Brussels, 1973), ii. 767. Harding, memorandum, 'Cyprus Policy October igss-October 1957', in 00926/859. Thompson, 30Jan. 1956^01081/162^0371/123867. Harding, telegram to Lennox-Boyd, 19 Feb. 1956,00926/261. Harding, telegram to Lennox-Boyd, 21 Feb. 1956, €0926/261. Ward, minute, i6Feb. 1956^0371/123870,^1081/273.
H2
4 October 1955-9 March 1956 9
support of EOKA'. ' Here was the nub of Harding's philosophy—as applicable to the Archbishop as it was to Her Majesty's Government—that there was 'no middle way' in such an affair. The brutal truth by February 1956, however, was that for the Archbishop to reject EOKA in the public and categoric terms required of him was virtually impossible. When Noel-Baker brought the two men together again, on 24 February, it was a failure. On the interim constitution, Harding promised that the guiding principle would be that of 'normal, liberal constitutional doctrine', but he refused to be drawn as to what this meant in terms of the complexion of the legislature; while on the amnesty he stood firmly by his conviction that those convicted of crimes involving violence against the person had to accept the full consequences of their actions. Almost as soon as Harding got back to Government House he telegraphed a request to London that the Colonial Secretary come immediately to Cyprus. He explained his request by saying that the negotiations with Makarios had reached a point where the various issues had become so complex that the problem could no longer be adequately conveyed in telegrams. This reflected how Harding himself had come to feel confused by the various aspects involved. But the Governor had another motive which was at least equally important, embedded in his further rationale that Lennox-Boyd's presence was needed to ensure that his own views, and those of Her Majesty's Government, were in accord 'before we embark on the next and most critical phase of this business'/'4 In short, if there was to be a breakdown, as now seemed inevitable, the Governor was determined that the authorities at home should be involved in the most unequivocal way possible—that is, by the physical presence of the responsible minister. There could then be no escape for Her Majesty's Government later on from accepting the full consequences which sprang, more than anything else, from its own policy towards the island. As Lennox-Boyd told Eden, this was for him 'a difficult and embarrassing' request to turn down.95 Yet there was a danger that once Lennox-Boyd got to Nicosia he might be drawn alongside Harding into a last-minute attempt to pull off a deal. Such a prospect was all the more delicate since in the previous few weeks Eden's leadership had been sniped at with increasing force in his own party for lacking decisiveness and direction. In agreeing, with evident reluctance, therefore, that Lennox-Boyd might go to Cyprus, the Prime Minister laid strong emphasis on the fact that 'we have gone as far in concession to Makarios as it is possible to expect'—it was his instinct, he said, to show the world what had been offered 'and see how the medicine works'.% After arriving in the Cypriot capital on 26 November the Colonial Secretary took considerable care to keep Eden closely informed. Yet he could not fail to be swayed by the acute tension within the colony, and the grim reality as to the consequences of a breakdown. Although he therefore assured Eden that he appreciated the necessity 'to stay within the limits of the authority you have given me', he also entered a plea that 'a little sugar '" I larding, telegram to Lennox-Boyd, 23 Feb. 1956, RG1091/306, FC>371/23871. 1)4 Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 24 Feb. 11)56, F()371/123871, RG1081 ^383. 1)5 Lennox-Boyd to Eden, 24 Feb. 1956, FO37I/123872, RGP'io8i/347. '"' Eden to Lennox-Boyd, 25 Feb. 1956, F()37i/i2387i, RGio8i/323.
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coating' might be required to pull Makarios round. Both Noel-Baker and Consul Courtney, who were continuing their separate good offices, told Government House that the necessary 'sugar coating' was a clear recognition of a Greek-elected majority. On the evening of 28 February Lennox-Boyd telegraphed Eden that he and the Governor intended to see Makarios the next day and tell him once and for all 'exactly where we stand'; but in doing so they sought permission to tell the Archbishop that one further 'elucidation' would shortly be made in Parliament incorporating an assurance that the majority in the Legislative Assembly would reflect the ethnic balance of the population. 'In the event of a breakdown', Lennox-Boyd sought to convince the Prime Minister of the wisdom of this point, 'I would much rather be able to point later to the amnesty and public security [than to the legislature] as the real cause.'98 Since the cause of the final breakdown of the Harding-Makarios negotiations was inevitably to be a matter of dispute, in which each side tried to gain the propaganda advantage, this was a revealing statement. Of course, if a settlement foundered on what, in other colonies, would have been considered a most straightforward point of constitutional development, British policy would necessarily appear in a critical light. Conversely, if the breakdown occurred, or seemed to occur, over anything to do with violence, then the assumed culpability shifted by osmosis from the British to Makarios. Eden refused, nevertheless, to grant Lennox-Boyd's request. The reasons for his refusal, he stated frankly, were 'by no means wholly based on the Turkish reaction'.99 This was despite some feeling amongst official advisers that LennoxBoyd's, and Harding's, need for a 'sweetener' should be met on the straightforward grounds that 'at some stage we must tell the Turks that 18 per cent of the [Cypriot] population cannot have an unqualified veto on the remaining 82 per cent'.100 That the reaction Eden feared was principally, though not exclusively, among circles within his own party at home, then, rather than the Turks, is fairly transparent. To this extent the allegations afterwards made in Opposition circles that the British Government let the chance of a settlement slip away for domestic political reasons has some foundation—though how long such a settlement might itself have lasted is another matter. The gloom which surrounded the meeting of Sir John Harding, Lennox-Boyd, and Archbishop Makarios on the evening of 29 February was accentuated by the sentences of death just confirmed on two men, Andreas Zakos and Charilaos Michael, for EOKA-related crimes. During the preceding hours several bombs had gone off in Nicosia—a number of detonations were actually heard by the Governor and Colonial Secretary on their way to the meeting-place. As on previous occasions, this was something for which Harding held the Archbishop personally responsible—though in truth Grivas intended such explosions to serve as a 'reminder' to Makarios as much as a means of intimidating Harding. The meeting between the principals on 97 98 99 100
Lennox-Boyd, telegram to Eden, 27 Feb. 1956^0371/123871, RGio8i/323Lennox-Boyd, telegram to Eden, 28 Feb. 1956, FO37I /123871, RGioSi7327. Eden to Lennox-Boyd, 29 Feb. 1956^0371/123873^01081/378. Ward, minute, 28 Feb. 1956^0371/123871^01081/327.
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4 October 1955-9 March 1956
29 February ran what was probably an inevitable course. Lennox-Boyd asked the Archbishop if he had any response to the documents setting out the final British position which had been forwarded to Makarios' Palace a few hours before.101 The Archbishop began by paying tribute to the Governor's perseverance over the five months of their talks, and remarked that with goodwill some of the remaining problems could be surmounted, but that 'others were matters of fact and not of confidence'. In this regard he specified the amnesty, control over public security, and recognition of a Greek-elected majority. On the amnesty, whilst Makarios recognized that violence against the person could not be included, he could not agree to the implementation of capital punishments for those found to be carrying explosive substances, which he said 'raised questions of considerable juridical and forensic complexity'. Since several such cases were in process, the matter was not academic. Lennox-Boyd stated in reply that the British Government could not 'draw a distinction between violence which succeeded in its purposes and those [sic] which did not'. The climax of the exchanges came over the matter of the interim constitution. After the Colonial Secretary had repeated his assurance of 'normal, liberal constitutional doctrine', but could not go further, Makarios retorted that this 'did not really meet the point'. 'It was clear', Lennox-Boyd quickly intervened, 'that we had disagreed not over any one point but over a number of important questions... I feared that in a few months' time his [Makarios'] fellow-countrymen would be asking why he had not accepted the Lennox-Boyd proposals which had been put to him tonight.'1'12 According to a Greek account, the minister's departing words to the Archbishop—'God save your people'—were still more stark.m Makarios, as was his wont, retreated into enigmatic politeness. Their parting had a grim, if somewhat staged, solemnity about it. Although the lives of Harding and Makarios were to remain intertwined for some time, they were, in fact, never to meet each other again. Over the years, if not months, some of Makarios' compatriots did, as LennoxBoyd had prophesied, come to regret this division of the ways. But, like most human emotions, regret is a two-edged sword. When Noel-Baker, staying briefly in Athens on his way home, told Ambassador Peake that Her Majesty's Government would shortly come to wish that they had gone the little bit further required to get an agreement, Peake had 'ruefully agreed'."14 In doing so Sir Charles was probably prompted by an intuition of the high personal cost that would now be incurred in running his own Embassy. Any such symmetry between the regretfulness of the British and the Greek-Cypriots, however, may also be seen in retrospect as entirely appropriate, since whoever was eventually to win the struggle about to enter a more intensive phase, it was not to be either of the original contestants. They were to succeed only in inflicting mutual hurt on themselves. 101
t(]2 Harding to Lennox-Boyd, i Mar. 1956, €0926/426. Ibid. Quoted in Diana Markidcs, 'Britain's "New Look" Policy for Cyprus and the Harding-Makarios Talks, Jan. 1955-Mar. u)$&, Journal oflmperial and Commonwealth History, 23/3 (Sept. 1995), 497. 1114 Cannon (Athens) to State Department, 3 Mar. 1956, Box 3275, RGs9, State Department Records, USNA. 1111
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Such observations apart, why had the fateful break occurred? In a wide-ranging analysis, Consul Courtney gave it as his belief that it was the matter of the legislature which had been the chief stumbling-block.105 This was confirmed by the admission of the Colonial Office shortly afterwards that with the aid of a Greek-elected majority an agreement with Makarios could have been secured.106 An extra twist is given by the fact recorded on the British side that during the negotiations Makarios had showed himself just as keen as the British to get 'the visitors from overseas in the hills' (that is, Grivas) out of Cyprus as soon as possible.107 Courtney, in his report to Washington on the eventual outcome, expressed puzzlement as to why, having come such a long way over self-determination since the infamous 'Never' of July 1954, the British had jibbed at a crucial moment over what seemed to him the lesser matter. He detected, he said, 'a lack of logic or conviction' in the British contention that they could not swallow the Greek-elected majority, when they had swallowed so much else. Makarios did not escape Courtney's criticism for not having shown greater foresight and courage in building up a moderate party pledged to peaceful cooperation, but he regretted even more the painfully slow evolutions of the British formula which as every day had passed allowed the atmosphere to blacken and disorder to spread. 'However that may be,' Courtney summed up matters from the American Consulate, 'the mutual mistrust which hampered the negotiations throughout (and despite our own best efforts) certainly did not abate in the later stages, rather, if anything, it became harder and sharper."08 In this assessment the Consul perhaps failed to grasp why—in the modalities of British decolonization—control over the transition to self-rule was so vital, whilst preserving the dignity of the outgoing power; under Cypriot conditions, a Greek-elected majority would indeed have made this virtually impossible. But whatever the immediate causes of the breakdown may have been, Fransois Crouzet is surely right that the individual points of contention always paled besides more enduring polarities,109 or what Harding himself called 'the struggle for mastery over the destiny of Cyprus'.110 The immediate consequences of the ending of negotiation will not detain us very long. Harding had to wait a couple of days to allow Lennox-Boyd to get home before telegraphing his recommendations. Amidst this hiatus, however, on i March Britain's position in the Middle East suffered a major blow when King Hussein of Jordan dismissed General Glubb from his post at the head of the Arab Legion (Glubb went first to Cyprus for several days, before returning to the United Kingdom). 'Chaos in the Foreign Office', a senior official wrote in his diary as the news of Glubb's eviction sank in, with Eden ringing up every five minutes for news.111 1(15
Courtney Dispatch, 'Breakdown of Negotiations on Cyprus Issue', 14 Mar. 1956, Box 3275, RG59, State Department Records, USNA. 106 Seep. 126. 107 U)8 Courtney Dispatch, 'Breakdown of Negotiations on Cyprus Issue'. Ibid. m Fran9ois Crouzet, Le Conflit de Chypre, 7946-7959,2 vols. (Brussels, 1973), ii. 777-8. 110 Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 31 Jan. 1956^0371/123867^61081/156. 1 '' Shuckburgh, Descent to Suez, 340-1.
116
4 October 1955-9 March 1956
Meanwhile, on 3 March, Harding's request for the immediate deportation of Archbishop Makarios was received in the Colonial Office. The manner in which this demand was couched was striking. He warned the Colonial Secretary that the effects of the deportation would include 'immediate and violent reactions' amounting to a general insurrection. After a phase of containment on the part of the Police and Army, this unrest would subside, he predicted, into continuing demonstrations and arson, growing hostility to all British personnel, 'mobs of villagers' making trouble wherever they could, and widespread non-cooperation with the aim of a 'breakdown of the administration and essential services'. 'Against this background', Harding instructed the Minister with an undertow of sarcasm, 'I would be grateful if you could arrange for the Hastings [aircraft] to be here by next Tuesday."u Harding's portrayal did nothing to soothe nerves in Whitehall about deporting a Christian leader in what one commentator in the Colonial Office referred to scathingly as 'a manner reminiscent of Henry VIII'.'" The legal position, for one thing, was by no means watertight, so that special legislation had to be passed in Cyprus, in Aden (where Makarios' aeroplane was to be refuelled), in Kenya (where he was to be entrusted to the charge of the Royal Navy for onward conveyance), and in the Seychelles as his final destination. There were worrying logistical niggles. How, for example, was the Archbishop to be got from his Palace and on to an aeroplane without undue and potentially embarrassing force? But the biggest problem arose from the fact that, after arrival in the Seychelles, he was, at Harding's insistence, not to be set free— as the Cypriot exiles of 1931 had been left to roam at will—but kept under lock and key without benefit of trial. There was in all this a certain impression of underhandedness, even duplicity, which was the cause of anxiety for both ministers and officials in London, and was always to be the Achilles' heel of the action against Makarios. When the Cabinet, still distracted by the crisis in Jordan, met on the morning of 6 March, therefore, it is not surprising that second thoughts quickly rose to the surface. After some heart-searching, Lennox-Boyd was deputed to go away and make one last attempt to get the Field-Marshal to change his mind. 'Please don't think this is going to be an order, counter-order, disorder telegram,' the Colonial Secretary began by trying to disarm Harding. 'There is no question of withdrawing full authority to remove the prelate as soon as you wish." 14 Nonetheless, Lennox-Boyd went on to ask whether it would not be more advisable just to deport Makarios, and let him go freely to Athens, or anywhere else, but not imprison him. This was the sort of shillyshallying which Harding despised. He told Lennox-Boyd bluntly that if he was to 'neutralize' Makarios, it was absolutely essential that he be held 'incommunicado' until such time as Cyprus was pacified (the stress on 'incommunicado' explains why later no communications—not even Christmas greetings—were allo\ved to reach the Archbishop from correspondents at home). To help allay the doubts of British ministers, the Governor assured Lennox-Boyd that the Cyprus Government had 112 111 114
Harding, telegram to Lennox-Boyd, 3 Mar. 1956, PREMn/f248. D. Smith, minute, 15 Mar. 1956, COioj5/6. T,cnno\-Boyd, telegram to Harding, 6 Mar. 1956, PREMi 1/48.
PLATE 1. Sir John Harding meets Archbishop Makarios in secret, November 1955 (John Reddaway, with moustache, in background)
PLATE 2. A British soldier stands guard as Turkish-Cypriot policemen search a house in Nicosia following the murder of two members of the Security Forces, February 1956
PLATE 3. A priest being frisked in the village of Lefkonicos as Security Forces move in following a terrorist incident, December 1955
PLATE 4. Cypriots being taken away by truck for interrogation in Nicosia following the shooting of two people in the vicinity, August 1956
Archbishop Makarios arrives in Athens on 17 April 1957 after his release from the Seychelles
PLATES. The Archbishop addresses a huge crowd from a balcony of the Hotel Grande Bretagne in Constitution Square
^f r Hi" re/Um!,ng CXileS 3re driven int° the centre of *e ci
PLATE 7. Sir Hugh Foot (foreground, hands behind back), with the local Commissioner for Police by his side, walks through Nicosia without armed protection, December 1957
PLATES. Scene immediately after the shooting of two British policemen in a Nicosia street, October 1957
PLATE 9. The British Army guards the dividing line between the Greek and Turkish quarters in Nicosia shortly after the curfew had been lifted, June 1958
Archbishop Makarios goes home to Cyprus, 1 March 1959
PLATE 10 (above). Greek-Cypriots, many with flags of Greece capped with Orthodox crosses, gather in front of the Archbishop's palace to await his speech PLATE 11 (left). A Greek-Cypriot youth organization takes part in the celebrations
PLATE 12. Colonel Grivas declaims to an adoring crowd on his return to Athens, 19 March 1959
Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959
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acquired 'conclusive evidence' not only that Makarios had a close connection with EOKA, and had encouraged the smuggling into the island of ammunition and explosives, but that there was 'even some reason to believe that he [Makarios] had taken a leading part in guiding and inspiring the terrorist movement'.115 When this 'conclusive evidence' turned up a few days later in the Colonial Office, it was found to be extremely tendentious, depending wholly on unnamed sources, and relating mainly to the period before the outbreak of violence on i April IQ55.116 By then, however, the Cabinet had agreed to let Harding go ahead. Later it was alleged by critics in Britain that this decision arose directly from the Jordan crisis—that, after being made to seem weak over the dismissal of Glubb, Eden tried to make himself appear strong by the exiling of Makarios. There is no evidence that such a direct connection was made117—the deportation was sufficiently rooted in the logic of the Cypriot conflict not to need extraneous interpretations, whilst the necessary delay in the deportation after 29 February had, as the Cabinet Secretary minuted, nothing to do with developments elsewhere. The most which may be said in this connection is that the overlapping crisis in the Levant made it psychologically more difficult for the Cabinet to resist being pressured into a decision which it knew, in its heart of hearts, was a mistake, but which the force of circumstances made it impossible to avoid. Following the Cabinet decision, a Hastings Mark II transporter duly arrived at Nicosia airfield on Wednesday, 7 March, to play its part in events. The last-minute planning of what was now relabelled 'Operation Airborne' hinged on the Archbishop's announcement that on the following Friday he would be departing for Athens.118 This provided a fortuitous solution to the problem of getting Makarios from the Archbishopric to the airport without manhandling by the Security Forces. Once at the airport the Archbishop would, as Harding explained to London, simply be 'diverted' to a different destination.119 Neither the Governor nor Whitehall officials stopped to think about what might happen in Athens when the aeroplane supposedly carrying the Archbishop to the Greek capital arrived without him, and news spread that he had been abducted. When Ambassador Peake told the Foreign Office on the afternoon of 8 March that Makarios' Athenian supporters were already being bussed in from the suburbs to meet their hero, and that his disappearance might lead to riots prejudicing the very survival of the regime,120 all that was done to limit the damage was the sending of an instruction to British European Airways to keep its flights clear of all Greek air space from 5 p.m. the following afternoon to prevent any reprisals. Paying the 'price' of Greek resentment over Cyprus became an endless, self-perpetuating process. 115
Minutes of Cabinet discussion, 6 Mar., ibid. Harding, telegram to Lennox-Boyd, 13 Mar. 1956, ibid. Brooke to Eden, 12 Mar. 1956, PREMi 1/1248. 118 Makarios later stated to a confidante that it had been his intention, on his projected return from Athens, to attempt to resume talks with the Governor (private information). There is no reason to doubt this, since it would certainly have been in his interest to do so. 119 Harding, telegram to Lennox-Boyd, 6 Mar. 1956, FO3717123873, RGio8i/38i. 120 Peake, telegram to Foreign Office, 7 Mar. 1956, RGio8i/387, FO37I/123873. 116 117
118
4 October 1955 9 March 1956
Did Makarios have any suspicions of what was afoot when he set out for Nicosia Airport at 3 p.m. on that Friday? Rumours that he would be arrested by the British had been circulating in Greek newspapers ever since the end of the talks. At the Archbishop's residence too, eyebrows must surely have been raised when a junior Secretariat official called to advise that the Primate travel to the airport alone with his driver, and when asked why, had merely muttered something about 'security'. Alerted or not by this deception, it was said that the Archbishop packed some extra clothing just in case he ended up staying somewhere other than he intended.121 Once on the tarmac at the airport, Makarios was surrounded by British soldiers with Brigadier Baker at their head. He was led to a screened-off corner of the strip and escorted into the Hastings, where he found the Bishop of Kyrenia, the latter's dour Secretary, and Father Papastavros, a well-known Enosis enthusiast ('in for a penny, in for a pound' was Harding's breezy rationale as to why, in the matter of deportation, the Bishop was to be made equal to the Archbishop).122 The aircraft finally took off and headed southwards at 4.15 p.m. Timed exactly to coincide with this 'diversion', British troops entered the Archbishopric and proceeded to search minutely the offices and Makarios' private rooms, looking for material to justify the deportation. Army jeeps conveyed large quantities of ecclesiastical correspondence to the Secretariat.12' In the private rooms no evidence was found either of political activity or (since this was a period when propaganda was beginning to take many forms) of possible sexual inclination. All they did find were lots of filled ashtrays. Makarios, whilst almost certainly chaste, was a chain-smoker, and the pressure on him was always greater than his cool exterior suggested. Makarios' journey proceeded along the legal tramlines we noted previously. Since there was concern about a hostile reaction on the part of the large Greek community in East Africa at the presence of the Archbishop under arrest in their midst—guarded by black policemen—he was moved very quickly by military convoy from Nairobi to Mombasa, and thence on board HMS Loch Fada. The Archbishop loved travel and none of this was probably uncongenial to him. He also had the consolation of knowing that whatever failings the British had, he was in no physical danger from them (in fact, he was probably safer than he had been in Nicosia). As a man of some humour, the Archbishop would surely, too, have been amused had he known of a final twist to the story of his deportation. One of the matters which ministers in London had necessarily turned their attention to on 6 October was the exact location in the Seychelles of the Archbishop's detention. It was hardly feasible for him to be kept in the local gaol along with the petty delinquents of Seychellois society. Instead, the Colonial Secretary had selected the Governor's own country residence ('Sans Souci') for the duration. When photographs of this rambling and pleasing villa surrounded by fruit trees were handed round the Cabinet table, several ministers enviously remarked that they 'would have liked the opportunity themselves'. Sans Souci was therefore designated as the tem121 122 121
Stanley Mayes, Makarios. A Biography (London, 1981), p. 84. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 6 Mar. 1956, FOj?!7123873, RGioSi7381. Times of Cyl>rus(io Mar. 1956).
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porary lodgement of the Archbishop and his companions. However, Lennox-Boyd too easily assumed that the Governor of the Seychelles, Sir William Addis, would readily acquiesce in the requisitioning of his rustic property, and another residential arrangement was made locally. At first Lennox-Boyd was not informed of this, with good reason, since the name of this less salubrious home was—and had long been— 'La Bastille'. When this alteration of the plan appeared in a telegram, the Colonial Secretary swiftly told Governor Addis of the 'shock of dismay' which the news had caused the entire Cabinet, and instructed him to adhere to what had been originally decreed.124 'It must sound very silly at your end', Lennox-Boyd explained to Addis, 'but it's clearly in all our interests not to present Parliament and Press with such obvious jokes.' Sir William reluctantly concurred, though he got his revenge by inflicting some execrable but topical Anglo-French verse on the minister: Well in Sans Souci let it be Thus denying Opposition opportunity Of stating Archbishop Ne Peut rester tranquille In a house called La Bastille.125
What, then, was the real meaning behind the deportation of Makarios? The immediate official gloss put on the action—for example, in Harding's radio address to the people of Cyprus a few days after the Archbishop's disappearance—was that a way had been opened for a body of 'moderate' Greek-Cypriot politicians to make their presence felt at last. Moderation was certainly the missing 'ghost in the machine' of colonial politics in the island. At the end of his Governorship, Harding was to hold the Greek-Cypriots collectively responsible for the fact that the vacuum left by the deportation was not, in fact, filled in this way.126 The evidence, however, does not suggest that such a fine political calculation lay behind the decision. Consul Courtney was closer to the muddled truth when he told Dulles that the British had despaired of getting an acceptable agreement, and decided to take a gamble in getting rid of their chief opponent. For some while, indeed, Harding had come to fear an agreement more than a breakdown, since the latter had the advantage of clearing the way for sterner measures, whereas the former would merely signal another phase of the political uncertainty gradually sapping British prestige. This bias outweighed the consideration that, as the Spectator commented, deportation was bound to give Makarios 'all the advantages of political martyrdom, without the salient disadvantage of being dead'.127 For a while after 9 March 1956 a load of responsibility fell from the Archbishop's shoulders. The position of the Field-Marshal was considerably more taxing, since he had now to see through to the bitter end his belief that in Cyprus there could be 'no middle way'. 124 125 126
127
Lennox-Boyd, telegram to Addis, 7 Mar. 1956, PREMi 1/1248. Addis to Lennox-Boyd, 8 Mar. 1956, ibid. See p. 208.
Spectator (17 Mar. 1956).
5 A Light in the Tunnel, ioMarch-26July 1956 The sudden disappearance of Archbishop Makarios had a stunning effect on most Greek-Cypriots. When the news of what had happened went round on that late Friday afternoon, shop proprietors pulled down their shutters and small groups formed to discuss the development. 'There was an ominous quiet everywhere,' the Times of Cyprus reported,1 accentuated in Nicosia by the British invasion of the Archbishopric and the heightened level of activity by Security Forces. Anybody who tried to get a different slant on things from the Government station by tuning in to Athens Radio received only an irritating crackle; it was the first time that any British Government had resorted to jamming (German radio had not been jammed after September 1939). A three-day general strike was declared in the majority community. The only Greek representative left on the Executive Council, John derides, duly resigned, announcing that the deportation was 'like throwing oil on a fire'. Far from making cooperation with the British authorities by Greeks more likely, it became more dangerous for any who might be found to attempt it. The immediate concern of Her Majesty's Government was not the reaction of Greeks, but the possible outcry in Britain. In this regard Parliament was especially uppermost in ministers' minds. The position of the Labour Party over Cyprus since leaving office in 1951 needs to be briefly elaborated here. Jim Griffiths was elevated to the Deputy Leadership of the Party in mid-itjss, and so ceased to be spokesman on colonial matters. His place was taken by Aneurin Bevan. The latter had really wanted the 'shadow' job for foreign affairs, and although, as a biographer has pointed out, he 'increasingly looked to the world stage to raise his horizons, developing a taste for foreign travel which . . . accorded with his conviction that the real problems of modern politics were global problems',2 he made little effort to acquaint himself with the actual details of colonial issues. Griffiths had been an effective critic over Cypriot affairs because he was welt informed and could spot the weak points in the Government's armour. The blur of Sevan's rhetoric often led him to fail to identify these chinks altogether. But there was a still more fundamental reason why Labour became a less effective Opposition with regard to colonial policy in general, and Cyprus in particular, after Bevan took over. 'The greatest difference', John Campbell has written as to how this phase of Labour politics differed from the preceding period, 'was that the longer the 1955 Parliament lasted—at least up until 1958—the more confident Labour felt of winning next time, much more confident than it had been in the 1 2
Times of Cyprus ( T o Mar. 1955). John Campbell, Nye Herein and I he Mirage of British Socialism (London, 1987), p. 284.
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disturbed years of 1952-55.' It followed that the Party became nervous about striking any postures which might be characterized by its opponents as irresponsible and insufficiently patriotic, for fear of prejudicing its bright prospects at the next election. The eruption of violence in Cyprus naturally accentuated this caution. In consequence, the Opposition was beguiled into cooperating with the Government's desire to keep debates about the island in the House of Commons to a minimum. What emerged was not a bipartisan policy as such, but a tacit understanding that it was best to say as little as possible about a matter which had the capacity to embarrass everybody, albeit for different reasons. This parliamentary 'blind eye' continued through most of the Harding-Makarios negotiations, when ministers' arguments that the talks were far too delicate to be subjected to the Commons bear-garden prevailed. As conditions in Cyprus worsened, however, and the talks between the Field-Marshal and the Archbishop had approached a climax, pressure had mounted on the Opposition to state its own views. It was to fend off what, in the circumstances, would have been a highly inconvenient debate for the Government that on 5 March—just one day before the decision was taken to deport Makarios—the Colonial Secretary stated at the dispatch box that the most substantive difficulties over self-determination had been 'cleared out of the way', and with this assurance gained a respite until Wednesday, 14 March, when a full-dress debate was promised.4 Afterwards, Opposition critics felt that the Colonial Secretary had deliberately misled the House in order to spring the fait accompli of the deportation not only on Makarios and the Greek-Cypriots, but also on the Government's opponents at home. In fact, as we have seen, on 5 March the British Cabinet was still hoping not to have to resort to Makarios' imprisonment, and to this extent at least Lennox-Boyd had not been disingenuous. Yet the incident was another example of the parliamentary obfuscation, or calculated inexactitudes, which some ministers, and especially Lennox-Boyd, fell back on as their Cyprus policy got into one tangle after another. Once the dramatic news of the deportation came through, the Labour leadership had to decide whether to rephrase in a more critical vein their draft Commons motion which regretted the Government's failure to reach a settlement in Cyprus 'and, in particular, their action in discontinuing negotiations after the major issue had been resolved'—a wording which begged the highly dubious assertion already made by Lennox-Boyd that the key problem of self-determination had been cleared away. Significantly, in the Jordan debate on 7 March, the Labour Front Bench struck a posture of attacking the Government, in Richard Grossman's words, 'more in sorrow than in anger',5 and in much the same spirit Gaitskell and Bevan chose to pull their Cypriot punches too. The mildly censorious motion was not revised. Furthermore, when Bevan finally opened the debate for the Opposition on the I4th he quickly 3 4 5
Ibid. 311. Parliamentary Debates (Commons), / 955-6, vol. 540, 5 Mar. 1955, cols. 1716-23. Janet Morgan (ed.), The Backbench Diaries of Richard Grossman (London, 1981), p. 464.
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disappeared down the blind alley of making parallels with the deportations of 1931, before turning the situation into one for some rumbustious Tory-baiting. The response of the Government backbenches to the deportation on 9 March, Bevan observed, was as if'we had heard news of a new Battle of Trafalgar'/ 1 This may have been a well-turned blow in purely partisan terms, but it diverted attention from the substance of the Cyprus problem on which ministers might have been pinned down. One observer in the Public Gallery felt that Bevan's performance conveyed 'the uneasy feeling that he didn't know much about colonial affairs'; 7 more damning for the Party as a whole was the general impression also gained that 'no one on the Labour side seemed scixed with the situation or passionately concerned with the Cypriots'.8 Such an observation was not quite accurate or fair. Jim Griffiths, who always remained interested in Cyprus, and Labour representatives of north London constituencies with large Cypriot communities, were quick to seize critically on the Government's tactic of seeking to convey that since the issue of self-determination had been cleared up, the real reason for the breakdown could only lie in Makarios' sinister motives. Griffiths pointed out that the whole tone of ministerial statements in fact 'was a denial of the acceptance of a settlement upon the major issues', and indeed hard-line Tory backbenchers made it clear during the same debate that, for their part, Cypriot self-determination remained unacceptable. 'It was very interesting to the House', Griffiths commented acidly, '. . . to find that the people who chivvied him [Eden] over Egypt were his major supporters over the Cyprus issue.' Another Labour speaker, and future Attorney-General, Elwyn-Jones, tried to explore the legal basis of the action taken against iMakarios, a matter on which the Government was privately nervous, although the force of his enquiries lost something when he mistook the ocean in which the Seychelles was situated. The Colonial Secretary was assisted in fending off these assaults by a forceful speaking style which—allied to his considerable physical bulk—always made him an effective, if not graceful, parliamentary performer on awkward occasions. He reiterated that the proprieties of colonial legislation had been observed, and diverted attention to evidence of Makarios' guilt which would at some point, the minister deftly claimed, be laid before the House—though he chose not to subject to parliamentary scrutiny the material he had recently received on this matter from Nicosia. Lennox-Boyd also adopted a tactic he was frequently to employ on future occasions: he took cover behind the figure of Field-Marshal Harding himself, whom he described as a 'brave, generous, patient, liberal soldier and statesman', so that any impugning of the Government automatically appeared to be an attack on the distinguished Governor. He also laid a good deal of stress on Turkish fears ofEnosis. Altogether this constituted a formidable ring of defensive positions and the Opposition did not sacrificially impale itself on them. In his summing-up Lennox-Boyd was able to conclude that he did not h 7
Parliamentary Debates, (Commons,), 7955-6, vol. 550, 14 Mar. 1956, cols. 393-510. Morgan, Grossman, 478. * Ibid.
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remember 'for very many years if at all, a Motion of Censure with so little fire in it', and the debate fizzled out with a big Government plurality. It is paradoxical that the Conservative Government, which had caused such a parliamentary storm over Cyprus in July 1954, suffered nothing like the same embarrassment in March 1956 over what was a far more controversial action. Curiously, more of the real difficulty over Cyprus came out in the parallel debate which took place in the upper chamber.9 The ecclesiastical element in the latter could not but express concern when a fellow Christian leader was the subject of harassment. Dr Fisher, the Archbishop of Canterbury, spoke of the 'shock and uneasiness which Christians in many parts are feeling' following the deportation, and pointed out how to Orthodox believers everywhere it was 'an act of sacrilege, persecution and barbarism'. These were strong words. But closer to the Government's political bone was the Archbishop's gloss that there was bound to be a doubt 'in any English mind' when a political leader was arrested and detained without trial by British authority. Fisher was careful not to attack the Conservative Government outright. He admitted that it had 'an absolute duty to restore civil order' in a disaffected colony, but the whole thrust of his address was about reconciliation, which he suggested might be assisted by the dispatch of a Commissioner to Cyprus to advise on a new constitution, and to assist in the renewal of the negotiations which had been so brusquely interrupted. That this touched a raw nerve was shown by the sharp reproof of the Government Leader in the House of Lords, Viscount de L'Isle, to the effect that he 'deeply regretted' that the Archbishop of Canterbury had signally failed to condemn murders which had taken place with the connivance of his Cypriot counterpart. When Fisher responded that of course he dissociated himself'utterly and entirely' from terrorism and murder, the Tory peer hit back that 'It is not enough to dissociate oneself. Surely it falls to the most reverend Primate utterly to condemn it?' Not even Canterbury himself, it seemed, was to be free of the ministerial tactic of tarring with the brush of Makarios anybody who criticized Government actions over Cyprus. The Spectator caught this neatly in a cartoon which showed Fisher's clerical baggage turning up on the quay in the Seychelles alongside that of Makarios. Yet the incident—which foreshadowed Archbishop Fisher's later assault over the invasion of Egypt,10 and suggested a distancing of Church and State which was ultimately to intrude into social and internal affairs, but which interestingly first took shape on overseas issues— indicated an important facet of ministerial responses on the Cyprus issue. In general, ministers were confident of dealing with the narrowly partisan assaults of the Opposition, which could be deflected by charges of irresponsibility, or of not supporting British troops in the field. What the Conservative Government did fear, however, was losing touch with the liberally inclined, middling, and undoubtedly patriotic portion of society, many of them Tory voters, who nevertheless were 9 10
Parliamentary Debates (Lara's), 7955-6, vol. 196,17 Mar. 1956, cols. 501-75. Keith Kyle, The Suez Crisis (London, 1991), pp. 390-1.
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coming in the post-war era to be instinctively opposed when the maintenance of British rule over other people required the use of force. It was true that the phenomenon of'terrorism' in Cyprus triggered responses of a traditional colonial morality which ministers could exploit very powerfully. Yet Fisher's words in the House of Lords pointed towards a counter-morality in which Britain's own actions were capable of casting doubt on her motives. We shall see that the clash of these valuesystems, and the atmosphere of a gathering ethical concern, were increasingly to affect the context in which policy towards Cyprus was determined." Any criticisms of the deportation of Makarios voiced in Britain naturally paled besides the hostility aroused in Greece. The government in Athens deeply resented the lack of any forewarning regarding an action bound to jeopardize its own position. Ambassador Peake reported that it was only the huge thunderstorm which fortuitously broke over Athens on the weekend of 10-11 March which averted an immediate outburst of mass feeling. 12 Peake's American counterpart, Cavendish Cannon, advised Washington, with some hyperbole perhaps given that a civil war had come in-between, that the deportation had sparked in Greece 'popular passions unknown since the Italian invasion of 1940'." The Greek capital was certainly awash with rumours surrounding the big Eiwsis demonstration called for 12 March—rumours that the Communists would use it as a cover for a coup, that the Army and Police would fail to keep control, that British intelligence agents would try to compromise the safety of American personnel in order to swing United States opinion against Greece (the last of these was typical of the morass of allegation and counterallegation which now surrounded the whole question). Only a public plea by King Paul for calm coupled with Ambassador Cannon's widely publicised expression of 'the sympathetic concern of the United States Government for recent events in Cyprus' was credited with saving the Government from worse trouble. Meanwhile, even the most responsible Athenian newspapers, according to Peake, concluded that Britain 'has deliberately cut the last tie which remained with Greece and had ensured a lasting hostility between the two countries'.14 The sacking of the British Consulate in the Cretan capital of Heraklion on 13 March appeared to bear this out. In a way Anglo-Greek relations never did recover from the deportation of Archbishop Makarios, though many later actions, not all of them to do with Cyprus, were to add to the effect. Anglo-American relations could not remain unaffected by what had happened. The first Washington heard about the deportation was from the news-tapes, though the Foreign Office, true to form, blamed this on a blunder in the Colonial Office.15 " For some penetrating remarks on British public opinion and the moral dynamics of decolonization which are borne out by Cypriot experience see John Darwin, The End of the British Empire: The Historical Debate (London, 1991), pp. 19-21. 12 Peake to Lloyd, 22 Mar. 1956, FOj? 1/123880, RG1081/636. " Cannon to State Department, 12 Mar. 1956, Box 3275, RGs9, State Department Records, USNA. " Peake, telegram to Foreign Office, 13 Mar. 1956, FO37I/I23875, RGioSi/.^. 15 'Cyprus: Information to the United States about the Deportation of Archbishop Makarios', 14 Alar. 1956, FO37i/i23877,RGio8i/532.
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The perceived slight to Britain's prime ally was only partially mitigated by the fact that Harding's first action once 'Operation Airborne' was under way had been to call Courtney to Government House and provide him with an explanation. In Athens the United States Embassy, in addition to Cannon's expression of sympathy with Greek anger, temporarily broke off all social contact with their British counterparts, if only as a form of self-protection.16 In the American media there was, according to British diplomats, an attempt to blow up the episode into a major Anglo-American rift, with the newspapers larded with sarcastic analogies to the colonial policy of George III. 'There is no word of support for any part of our position', one official in Whitehall complained,17 and feelings were further bruised when the correspondence purloined from the offices of the archbishopric in Nicosia brought to light evidence that American officials had been in friendly discourse with the Ethnarchy throughout the recent negotiations—a painful lesson that reading other people's mail is not often good for the ego.18 After an initial response in which the Americans signalled a clear distance from British actions, Washington's more considered reaction was to call for the renewal of negotiations as soon as possible, whilst refraining from specifying who should be included in such talks. This was the context in which the NATO Council first came to the fore as a potential medium for settling, or at least ameliorating, the quarrel. In fact the failure of NATO so far to take any effective action in a question which set some of its own members so much at odds had not redounded to its credit. That it had been so reticent was partly due to Dulles' fears that bringing in NATO would only 'sharpen already divisive tendencies' amongst the countries concerned.19 On 14 March, however, the Greek Permanent Representative at NATO's Paris Headquarters formally raised the Cyprus matter, and a few days later the Secretary-General (the ex-British Conservative minister, Lord Ismay, who was predictably open to the criticism of inactivity because of his affiliations) finally floated the possibility of NATO arbitration. Suggestions along these lines were to prove very controversial in Britain, and in particular to become a red rag to right-wing bulls. Ministers were very conscious of the resulting need to tread very carefully. When the United Kingdom's delegate to NATO said in Paris that 'speaking personally' he thought that mediation by the alliance might have a beneficial role to play, Eden scrawled on the telegram 'he cannot do that', and the official was suitably corrected when he came back to London for a briefing.20 On 3 May, however, Dulles told Selwyn Lloyd at a Council Meeting in Bonn that unless Her Majesty's Government took an initiative of its own to improve the Cyprus situation, NATO was bound before long to take a hand. An impending event in the colony to which we shall soon turn gave particular force to 16
Lambert to Young, 21 Mar. 1956, FO37I/I23879, RGio8i/6i6. Thompson, minute, 13 Mar. 1956, FO37I/I23875, RGio8i/432. 18 See material in FO37J / J 23879, RG1081 / 581. 19 Dulles to United States Ambassadors in Athens and Ankara, 4 Apr. 1956, State Department Records, RGsg, Box 3275, USNA. 20 Neil Cairncross toj. Graham, 29 May 1956, FO37I/I23887, RGio8i/882. 17
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this advice. Dulles, in fact, was always to shrink from lumbering NATO with any exclusive responsibility for solving so intractable a problem as Cyprus. After the deportation of Makarios, nevertheless, the NATO stick provided one means by which the Eisenhower Administration could coax the British into a more conciliatory frame of mind. Different shades of opinion in Britain naturally reflected contrasts to be found amongst expatriate officialdom in Cyprus itself. Two prognoses may be referred to not only as illustrations, but for the way that they highlighted conditions in the colony. In a letter written to the Colonial Office by Leslie Glass, who had succeeded Lawrence Durrell in the luckless position as Director of Publicity in the Cyprus Government, the author gloomily stated that as things were going the British position in Cyprus would 'end up like Palestine and Ireland'.21 Ideas of deflecting Greeks away from loyalty to the Enosis ideal and towards a rejuvenated attachment to Britain were, in his opinion, nothing more than a pipe-dream. 'In my opinion', Glass commented on the crucial security dimension, 'it will be a close race whether we can penetrate the hard core of EOKA . . . before the measures we take drive the population into open and general sympathy with the terrorists. If the latter comes first, we have lost the battle.' In this connection he considered the argument that the Security Forces should show themselves to be more determined and, if necessary, more intimidatory than EOKA, to be fatally misplaced. Instead he called for a 'reasonable political offer', which he identified as agreement to recognize the validity of a Greekelected majority in a new constitution. The conclusion of Glass' analysis may be quoted at length: I realise that I know little of the Greek-Cypriot mentality, but I have had considerable experience of the forces of nationalism in South East Asia and in the Middle East generally, and I have profound doubt as to the practicability of any policy except that of coming to terms with nationalist feeling once it is really aflame. In the course of my work, I spend many hours talking to foreign correspondents some of whom are men of a good deal of experience and wisdom with a very wide and first-hand knowledge of world affairs—men who have sat through the Palestine troubles, watched the riots in Trieste, had bombs hurled at them in Algeria and Indo-China, and so on. There is hardly one of these more reasonable correspondents who is not extremely uneasy at what the future may hold unless we can come to an early political agreement here. I realise, too, that the situation in Cyprus is not necessarily the same as anywhere else in the world—but to many of these correspondents the pattern seems strangely familiar. 22
Glass's cri de coeur was dismissed in the Foreign Office as 'staggering' and 'valueless' because it ignored Turkey, and also because it would lead many people to ask 'why we broke off the talks with Makarios, since we could almost certainly have had an agreement with him if we were prepared to concede the Greek elected majority'. 21 This was a frank admission. The thesis, however, that there was no alternative to an 21
Glass, memorandum, 'The Future of Cyprus', ¥0371/12388$, RGioSi/Soy. " Ibid. " Galsworthy, minute, 2 May 1956, ibid.
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ordered retreat before the onset of nationalism was precisely what many involved in British overseas policy were still far from accepting, especially with regard to the Middle East. Like Britain's Representative at NATO, therefore, Glass had a sharp 'talking to' when he next came back to London.24 The assessment of Cypriot necessities provided by John Shattock, Head of the Political Office for British Middle East Forces at the Episkopi Headquarters, was very different. He shared the widespread belief that it was due to the laxity of the local authorities that the Greek-Cypriots had come to fear EOKA more than they feared the Government. Only when this situation was reversed, Shattock argued, drawing on his own experience of combating seditious outrages in Bengal during the 19305, could terrorism be isolated and eradicated.25 He estimated this would take eighteen months of 'steady pressure' on Cypriots to bring about, but harboured no doubts that it could be achieved if enough will was shown. In the interim a constitutional plan for Cyprus should be drawn up, not to appease Greek aspirations, which would be counter-productive, but solely with a view to minimizing international criticism of the British Government. Although the head of the Southern European department in the Foreign Office, Jack Ward, was disappointed at the eighteen months' time-limit put on the process of pacification, he welcomed the Bengal analogy that could be set off against more disturbing Irish parallels. The real difference between Ireland in the 19205 and Cyprus in the 19508, Ward stated in replying, was that on the former occasion Britain had been able to use the 'Black and Tans and executed murderers and did all sorts of things which are inconceivable in the soft and apologetic mood of today', and he went on to ask pointedly 'why the authorities in Cyprus have never pressed for military courts to render speedy justice on terrorists? Can we expect the terrorists to take us seriously when not one murderer has swung against seventy-five [EOKA] assassinations?'26 The aspect to which Ward referred was highly topical. Military courts had not been set up in Cyprus in order to avoid the embarrassments of martial law. Instead a system of Special Courts had been instituted in November 1955, staffed with judges on short-term contracts from Britain. Despite this innovation, feelings in the Security Forces often ran high against a judiciary often pictured as failing to prosecute terrorism with sufficient rigour. At the time of Ward's letter, sentiments on these matters were closely tied up with the fate of the two Greek-Cypriots already condemned to death for terrorist offences, Karaolis and Demetriou, whose cases were at last reaching their climax. There were distinctive aspects to both these cases. The individuals concerned were young (Karaolis 23, Demetriou 21). Another twist was that very recently a bill to abolish capital punishment in the name of a Private Member, Mr Sydney Silverman, had been passed in the British House of Commons, only to be rejected in the Lords. In some minds there was a doubt that it was defensible to carry out an execution in a British colony whilst legislation on this matter was caught up in the 24 25 26
Nutting, minute, 30 May 1956, ibid. J. Shattock to Ward, 9 Apr. 1956^0371/123882^01081/723. Ward to Shattock, 5 May 1956, FO37i/i2388a, RGio8i/724.
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Westminster process. Demetriou had not killed anybody; he had fired a shot at an Englishman in Famagusta on 23 November, just two days after the Emergency Regulation specifying a mandatory death penalty for carrying arms came into operation. Karaolis had been convicted of a murder under the ordinary criminal code, but Greek opinion was conscious that the clinching witnesses had been Turks. The combination of Turkish evidence, a Turkish prosecutor in the person of Rauf Denktash, and a British court was repeated when Karaolis' appeal came before the Privy Council on ii April 1956. It was dismissed on the i4th. From that moment a grim timetable was in operation whereby within a matter of days the Privy Council was bound to issue an Order confirming its decision, after which the decision to grant clemency would pass to Governor Harding. As one official in Whitehall remarked, Karaolis1 case would not have reached the point it had without having been considered 'at the highest level',27 and the execution looked certain to take place in earlyMay (clearly also, if both Demetriou and Karaolis were to hang, it should be at the same time, if only not to have to repeat the necessary security precautions). 'None of this is known in Athens,' it was recorded in the Foreign Office,28 whose concern with the Karaolis case had consistently been on its likely repercussions beyond the confines of the colony. Greek newspapers had been following Karaolis' plight closely for months, and the Privy Council decision was the trigger for a surge of feeling aimed in particular against the Greek Foreign Minister, M. Theotokis, for his weakness in bringing pressure to bear on the British Government. It was obvious that the Opposition were stalking Theotokis as a surrogate for Prime Minister Karamanlis' alleged backsliding on Enosis. Simultaneously, Peake in Athens and Britain's Consul-General in Salonica received death-threats if the executions went ahead. Already suffering intense nervous strain from heading such a beleaguered Embassy, the Ambassador was in a very invidious position. On 19 April he telegraphed Selwyn Lloyd that he felt reluctant to proffer any recommendation 'which might seem even unconsciously to be biased by a desire to preserve my own skin'.29 Yet the Ambassador could not refrain from advising that if the executions were carried out the effects would be even more damaging than the deportation of Archbishop Makarios. He assured the Foreign Secretary that he would carry out whatever duty was laid upon him, but the inescapable reality was that the hanging of the two Greek-Cypriots would 'set us back a long way for a long time'.10 For the British Government the possible assassination of one of its most experienced diplomatic representatives (and one with whom Eden had a long-standing friendship) was transparently a most anxious concern, and consideration was given to the suggestion of calling the Greek Charge d'Affaires— the Ambassador of Greece having been withdrawn immediately after Makarios' arrest—to the Foreign Office, and warning him outright that 'if a hair of Her II 2S w
III
Thompson, minute, 17 Apr. 1956^371/123884/789. The Karaolis Case', Thompson memorandum, 17 Apr. 1956, FO371/123884, RG1081/782. Peake, telegram to Selwyn Lloyd, 19 Apr. 1956, F()371 /123884, RG1081 /774-
Ibid.
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Majesty's Ambassador is touched the Greek Government will get into a great deal of trouble'.31 The difficulty, it was found, lay in spelling out what this 'trouble' might be. Even so, it seems highly likely that some means was found of conveying such a message. Otherwise the response of the British Government to the many appeals they received for clemency on behalf of the condemned men was that the matter was one entirely for the jurisdiction of the Cyprus authorities. This was the reply which Selwyn Lloyd made to Dulles when the latter raised the matter with him—along with the possibility of NATO intervention — in Bonn at the beginning of May. For Harding, the question of implementing capital sentences for terrorist crimes was one of the most burdensome aspects of his Governorship. He was a lifelong supporter of the principle of capital punishment (later, as a member of the House of Lords, he was to be a fierce opponent of Silverman's abolitionist legislation). His arguments were always couched in a powerfully felt but unvarnished evocation of 'an eye for an eye'. That the black-and-white quality of the Field-Marshal's world-view did not fit Cypriot conditions was beginning to be voiced in some influential British circles by the spring of 1956. The experienced Diplomatic Correspondent of the London Times, A. M. Rendel, told contacts in the United States Embassy after returning from a visit to Cyprus that 'he was not impressed with Governor Harding who . . . is a conscientious, sincere, diligent soldier lacking the imagination or political experience to deal with the present situation'.32 But things often looked differently from the vantage-point of those actually charged with restoring law and order in a disturbed colony. It was axiomatic in senior Army circles that one reason why the Zionist revolt had not been defeated in Palestine during the 19405 was because capital sentences for acts of terrorism had been commuted except in a bare minimum of cases—in contrast, for example, to the Arab disturbances just a few years before, when over one hundred young Arabs had been hanged under Emergency legislation.33 According to this logic, it was obvious why one lot of Palestinian terrorists had been defeated, and the other had triumphed. Harding was very conscious of these parallels. Above all, he was convinced that the effective conduct of the military campaign depended on the morale of the Security Forces. The killing on 1 6 April of one of the few 'crack' Greek officers left in the Cyprus Police, while he was visiting his pregnant wife in a Nicosia hospital, by an EOKA gunman, was not only 'a serious blow to the [Police] force as a whole', according to one leading British security official,34 it helped to stack the odds further against any reprieve for Karaolis and Demetriou. Even so, it is doubtful that any great difference was made. On 8 May— giving time for the NATO meeting in Bonn to disperse—the Executive Council of the Cyprus Government met and confirmed the implementation of the sentences. 11
Logan, minute, 23 Apr. 1956, FO37I/I23836, RGioSi/Sas. Rutter (London) dispatch to State Department, 25 Apr. 1956, Box 3275, RG5Q, State Department Records, USNA. " For some comments on the capital sentencing of Jewish terrorists during the 19405 see Nicholas Bethell, The Palestine Triangle: The Struggle between the Jews, the Arabs and the British, ^36-48 (London, 1983), PP. 38-59. '4 Shattock to Ward, isMay i956,FO37i/i23894,RGio8i/io9. 32
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Last-minute appeals on Karaolis' and Demetriou's behalf followed. Foreign Minister Theotokis telephoned Peake 'excited and incoherent', speaking in such a way, Peake reported, as 'to make my flesh creep','5 while the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean was immediately put on stand-by for an emergency evacuation of British nationals from Greece. The Greek Government harboured no illusions that appeals directed to the British were likely to be effective, and concentrated their attentions on the Americans instead. But although Ambassador Cannon told a delegation at his embassy that he was 'doing all he could' to obtain commutations, '6 when the Greek Ambassador in Washington went to plead at the State Department the reply he received from a senior official was that 'we [the United States] had nothing to do with it'." The truth was that Dulles had already learned from Selwyn Lloyd that there were not likely to be any reprieves. It was the nub of the emerging American dilemma over Cyprus, however, that whether they liked it or not, they were increasingly compromised by British actions, and the United States Consulate in Salonica was duly burned down by demonstrators. An even vaster concourse gathered in Athens which spilled over into violence, leading to nine deaths. Meanwhile, in Cyprus a military clamp-down began as soon as the Executive Council decision not to grant clemency was taken. The Times of Cyprus described the colony as 'an armed camp' with field artillery being brought into the capital for psychological effect.38 Patrolling was constant, bans were put on vehicle traffic, and telephone links cut off. Expatriates were told to keep their children away from school for several days. On the morning of 9 May a Greek crowd gathered in front of Nicosia Central Prison in a vigil. Rumours at various times circulated that the executions had taken place. Finally, at 9.30 a.m. on 10 May it was announced on the radio that Karaolis and Demetriou had died in the early hours. Very shortly afterwards EOKA announced that the two British Army hostages they were holding, Corporals Shilton and Hill, both of the Royal Leicestershire Regiment, had also had their 'sentences' implemented.' 9 The murder by EOKA of the corporals was, in fact, a mimicry of the killing of two abducted British soldiers in similar circumstances by Zionist terrorists in Palestine during July 1947—an incident which had deeply stirred public opinion in the United Kingdom, and was widely thought to have played a part in breaking the British will to maintain the Mandate. As it happened, on this occasion there was a strong reaction of moral revulsion amongst Greek-Cypriots themselves, and with a single, unconsummated exception, Grivas never dared to use the tactic again.40 Though it was •'5 Peake, telegram to Foreign Office, 8 May 1956, 1^0371/123887, RGio8i/892. At the same time Peake recorded that the Greek Police in Athens were proving 'very good' in the protection of both himself and his Embassy. See Peake to Ward, 9 June 1956, ibid. •"' Sec Reuters report on Ambassador Cannon's remarks to plea from Pan-Hellenic Committee for Union with Cyprus in FO37I/I2388Q. 17 Memorandum of conversation, 9 May 1956, Box 3276, RG59, State Department Records, USNA. 1S -Times ofCyprus(ioMa\ 1956). •w Corporal Gordon Hill had been held by EOKA since November 1955, and Corporal Ronnie Shilton since Apr. 1956. 411 Doros Alastos, Cyprus Guerrilla: Grivas, Makarios and the British (London, 1960), pp. 118-119.
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necessarily obscure to most British observers, circumstances, indeed, forced Greek Cyprus into its own moral debate, or a continuing 'examination of conscience'—for if the British were not natural repressers, the Greeks were not natural terrorists. Meanwhile, the effect of the hangings of Karaolis and Demetriou was not to produce widespread disorders in the colony. Consul Courtney described a dour but strangely passive reaction in the island (though not in the Turkish quarters, where the Bayram celebrations continued unabated).41 He attributed this to the extent of the security operation and the degree to which the executions had signalled the unwavering will of the British to continue to rule the island. Yet it was also possible that the passivity which Courtney noted was a token of something else: a further indelible branding of the iron of ill-usage into Greek minds, and the consolidation of a cult of martyrdom begun with the funeral of Charalambous Mouskos. When Lawrence Durrell visited his old village of Bellapaix on the day of the executions, he found it wrapped in an ominous silence, the cafes deserted and nobody at work.42 Today, indeed, the square in which the old British Secretariat stands is named after Michael Karaolis, whose modest statue—for he was not an EOKA 'fighter' like Gregoris Axfentiou, whose memorial is much larger—stands opposite the entrance. After the deaths of Karaolis and Demetriou, 'Harding the Murderer' became a recurrent slogan in EOKA propaganda. Yet behind the public image of implacability which the Governor cultivated, there was another Harding whose more pliable tendencies were less visible. Alongside the tougher security measures—more curfews, house searches, collective punishments—in the wake of Makarios' deportation he began to consider what political means might be found to ease the tension. Already, at the beginning of April, he drafted a paper designed for the British Cabinet ('Future Policy in Cyprus') which stated the impossibility of remaining 'politically immobile' and recommended 'some placation of Greek-Cypriot nationalism' beyond a purely theoretical recognition of self-determination.43 Harding's suggestion was that self-determination should be guaranteed after a fixed interval, which he put at ten years. This was not a new idea. Not only had Armitage once raised it in the presence of Lennox-Boyd and the Archbishop,44 it had since been floated at several points by the Americans—indeed, the overlap between the views of the Governor and those prevalent in American diplomatic circles was to grow with time. The purpose of the provision for a fixed interval was to get over the fundamental problem of Greek mistrust by making a precise and irrevocable commitment on the central issue. Once this was done, the controversy over self-determination, with all its capacity for divisiveness, might be temporarily 'frozen', and minds allowed to focus on 41 Consular dispatch, 'Reactions in Cyprus to Executions of Karaolis and Demetriou', 18 May 1956, Box 3276, RG59, State Department Records, USNA. 42 Lawrence Durrell, Bitter Lemons of Cyprus (London, 1957), pp. 227-8. 43 Harding, memorandum, 'The Future of British Policy in Cyprus', 4 Apr. 1956, FO37i/i2388i, RGio8i/690. 44 See p. 64.
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more practical problems of immediate cooperation. This remained at the heart of Harding's political recommendations whilst he remained in his post. But was it really credible to talk about the political 'placation' of Greek-Cypriots one minute while putting many of them under curfew the next? Was it, anyway, possible that the demand for self-determination could be 'frozen', any more than one could freeze the wider Enosis movement—a naivety which Lennox-Boyd also once had cause to point out to Harding? 'Not a runner,' was Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick's reaction to Harding's suggestion;45 a post-dated cheque of the kind Harding had in mind, one of Kirkpatrick's subordinates added, would be 'a fatal thing to toss into Greek polities', since far from draining the pressure from the dispute, it would simply pump more in. lf> But perhaps the main criticism put forward was that 'we should . . . find it difficult not to be drawn into a negotiation' once such a concession was made.47 In the wake of the breakdown with Archbishop Makarios, Her Majesty's Government could not afford to be seen entering into new talks, least of all talks in which self-determination was part of the agenda. The domestic weakness of Eden's ministry-—currently suffering a run of by-election reverses—underpinned this necessity. On 17 April the Prime Minister announced in the House of Commons that there could be no possibility of talks on Cyprus' future until after violence ceased.48 The Colonial Secretary repeated this assurance two days later; and although on the latter occasion it was also announced that Lord Radcliffe, the distinguished jurist, had accepted a commission to draft a constitution for Cyprus, just what his terms of reference were, and what the timing of his commission might be, remained undefined. Although Harding had intended to travel to London to press the argument for 'placation', the negative response to his memorandum in early April led him to cancel the visit. But on a number of fronts the need for some appeasement of Greek feelings became more pronounced in the following weeks. The grim progress of the Karaolis and Demetriou cases had a lot to do with this, but their effect was reinforced in other ways. In the wake of the escalation in security measures, there had emerged a series of allegations concerning brutality by a small number of members of the Security Forces in the course of their duties. In early April these gained some credence when two British officers, Captain O'Driscoll of the Intelligence Corps and Lieutenant Linzee of the Gordon Highlanders, were court-martialled and convicted for causing bodily harm during an interrogation. Senior officers spoke on their behalf. What could not be said in court was that the two men had, in fact, succeeded in eliciting the most significant information yet obtained on EOKA's organization— indicating the moral tightrope on which the security campaign, at least in its intelligence dimension, was coming to be placed. O'Driscoll and Linzee were dismissed the service, though for reduced terms. During the immediate run-up to the executions on 10 May, Greek-Cypriot claims of ill-treatment hung fire. Afterwards a fresh 4S 4fl 47 4)1
Kirkpatrick, minute, 31 May 1856, FO37I/I23894, RGio8i/iio. Galsworthy, minute, 4 May 1956, FO371 /123838/918. 'The Governor's Proposals on the Future of Cyprus', to Apr. 1956, FC^yi/123894, RGio8i/i to. Parliamentary Dehates (Commons), igss 6, vol. 551, 17 Apr. 1956, cols. 846-7.
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wave of allegations followed, and the Greek Government announced that they were taking the issue to the European Court of Human Justice. That Court duly set up an investigating sub-committee, though its remit was restricted to the administrative practices of the Emergency in Cyprus, not alleged derelictions by individuals. This was the beginning of a saga which was to constitute a vital sub-plot in the Emergency drama, and to cause acute heartache to Harding, who despised nothing more than what he regarded as gross smears of British officers doing their patriotic duty under provocative conditions. In the late spring of 1956, nevertheless, the more toxic element in Anglo-Greek relations within Cyprus associated with the allegations we have referred to accentuated still further the Governor's belief that British policy could not for much longer stay fixed in a state of political immobility. Another aspect of the deteriorating conditions within Cyprus was heightened inter-communal tension. We have stressed that hitherto such friction had been almost an incidental by-product of the Emergency. The manner in which Makarios' deportation brought life in the Greek community to a shuddering and dejected halt, whilst reassuring and even enthusing Turks, provides an example of the process. Thereafter, however, confrontation became more direct, in which the 'defeat' of one community—such as the executions of 10 May—were transfigured into the 'victory' of the other. The killing of a Turkish constable on 23 May in Nicosia led to serious rioting and damage to Greek property in several towns, whilst clashes at Aphania, near the capital, four days later led to a number of fatalities. Foley in the Times of Cyprus wrote that ethnic violence had emerged 'as a real rather than possible factor in the Cyprus political tangle'.49 There was no more sombre indication of this than the inauguration by the Security Forces of the 'Green Line' between the Greek and Turkish quarters. At first this was just a mesh of barbed wire rolled up to allow ingress and egress, ready to be closed at any sign of trouble; over time it was to become a more formidable obstacle. As with all such demarcations, however, it had a dual function both as a physical reassurance to ordinary and sometimes frightened citizens, and as a psychological, if at first mostly unintended, invitation to retreat into ethnic compartments and rival identities. This ambiguous but potentially deadly combination was almost invisibly coming together. The other, and always crucial, factor shaping Harding's assessments was the progress of the security campaign. Here the record of success was mixed. In this connection one of the most picturesque episodes in the Emergency cannot be omitted. At the beginning of April a Greek employee on the staff of Government House planted a bomb on the underside of the Governor's bed, and duly fled. Harding slept blissfully unaware of his danger that night, and in the morning—when the disappearance of a member of staff was noted—the bomb was discovered (it had not gone off, apparently, because the room temperature had failed to fall to the level set for the device).50 All Greek-Cypriot employees in the residence—some of them 40 50
Times of Cyprus (2$ May 1956). Harding to Colonial Office, 21 Mar. i9s6,FO37i/i23879,RGio8i/6o4.
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long-serving—were sacked. These dismissals did not make good publicity. They carried further a process in which Greeks were to be ejected from all positions, however menial, which had a bearing on security. Most symbolically, however, the curious episode captured very pictorially the distrust which extended through every nook and cranny in the colony. Meanwhile, the wider campaign against EOKA was hard pounding. In mid-April Colonial Office sources informed the United States Embassy in London that the Security Forces 'have not met with appreciable success' despite the recent build-up, and although the same officials anticipated that a breakthrough would soon be made, it seemed to their American confidantes that they were speaking 'more out of a sense of duty than personal conviction'.51 Above all, the campaign of pacification had run up against one crucial constraint: a deficiency of reliable intelligence. '[V]ery little information is coming from outside,' one insider summed up the situation. 'Almost everything is dependent on interrogation.'" Such a dependence on interrogation constituted a danger in both moral and security terms. During May the lives of five more British soldiers were claimed by EOKA, with several more injured. There were, nevertheless, good reasons why both in London and Nicosia British officials thought that the tide might be about to be turned against EOKA. The Army garrison was now over 20,000 troops. EOKA's active cadre at any one time never rose above 200. An important turning-point came in mid-May when the Police, recently stiffened by new recruits from the United Kingdom, at last resumed their normal responsibilities for law and order, allowing the Army to concentrate on carrying the fight to the enemy. Two squadrons of reconnaissance helicopters, which Harding had long demanded, finally arrived 'on station' and—less mechanical, but possibly as useful—a pack of tracker-dogs, trained at sniffing-out terrorists from their hiding places, came from Kenya. Although intelligence about the whereabouts of leading terrorists was hard to come by, at least the British had come to possess a much better idea how the organization worked, including an appreciation of its cellular structure—something which made guessing, of which the Security Forces had to do a great deal, rather easier. In short, considerably later than he had initially anticipated, Harding was ready at last to launch an offensive. During the third week of May 'Operation Pepperpot' homed-in on the Kyrenia mountains in the north of the island, and some important captures were made. But this was only the first prong of a larger plan, the main fork of which was 'Operation Lucky Alphonse', designed to corner in the Troodos massif EOKA groups on the rebound from elsewhere. 'Lucky Alphonse' involved the concentration in a relatively small area of over 5,000 troops spearheaded by two parachute battalions, as well as the 40th and 45th Royal Marine Commandos, and was due to be unleashed on 7 June. By then, however, Governor 51 Ruttcr, memorandum, 'Security Situation in Cyprus', 12 Apr. 1956, Box 3275, RGgQ, State Department Records, USNA. 52 Shattock to Ward, 15 June 1956, FO37I /12380.4^61081/109. 'Outside'in this connection meant information volunteered, or—much more likely—bought. £5,000 was the going rate for intelligence leading to a 'kill'.
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Harding was not in Cyprus. Instead, having cancelled his earlier trip in April, he had finally departed for London determined to press on the British Cabinet the need for a political initiative alongside the impending, and hopefully decisive, military push, since to Harding the two offensives ran naturally alongside each other. We come here to matters of vital significance in assessing Harding's controversial governorship. The chief criticism of the Field-Marshal as Governor was that he lacked political imagination in a situation requiring considerable resources of sympathetic insight. Harding's own public persona, calculated to exude toughness and a 'will to win', played into this one-dimensional image. He even relished doing so. In many ways he relished it too much for the good of his own reputation, but the habit was not as gratuitous as it seemed—rather, there was reflected in the habit the fact that the Cyprus struggle was essentially a contest of psychology, not one measured in crude casualty statistics. But Harding was also acutely aware that it was no good winning the fight against the terrorists only to lose the battle for the 'hearts and minds' of the great majority of Cypriots. 'I feel strongly', he telegraphed LennoxBoyd on 27 May, a few days before leaving for London, 'that we cannot hope to hold our present position much longer without making some positive move towards reconciliation.'53 A new flurry of rumours began that there was a serious difference between Harding and the British Government. A glimmer of what this difference was emerged when the Governor, interviewed by the Economist in Nicosia, said off the record that 'he was in complete agreement with the [British] Government, but that he continued to look for a way out of the impasse'.54 He was franker about his dissatisfaction with the lack of movement in talking to Consul Courtney. The result was that when the Governor finally left for London on i June, Washington was fully informed that he carried with him ideas to 'sell to the [British] Cabinet'.55 These ideas hinged on the guarantee of self-determination after a set interval. On this basis the Governor felt that the Labour and Liberal Parties in Britain might be got 'on board', destroying any expectation amongst supporters of Enosis that they merely had to hang on for a change of government in London to get what they wanted. The eventual exercise of self-determination was to be subject to NATO supervision. In forewarning Lennox-Boyd of his views, the Governor was also careful to underline that it would be essential with regard to Turkey to 'exercise . . . such pressure as it is considered judicious to exert', though the very delicacy of the phraseology indicated Harding's awareness that he was cutting very close to the ministerial bone. Unfortunately, the timing of Harding's decision to seek to prise open the log-jam over Cyprus clashed with the state of British Conservative politics. On 13 June the last British troops were due to leave the Suez base. In the weeks prior to this a spasm of ultra sentiment passed through a wide section of Conservative parliamentarians and activists. An influential segment of the latter began to take an even keener 51
Harding, telegram to Lennox-Boyd, 27 May 1956, FO37i/i238g2, RGio8i/io4i. Rutter (London Embassy) to State Department, 4 June 1956, Box 3276, RG59, State Department Records, USNA. 55 C. Elbrick to Rountree, 28 May 1956, ibid. 54
1 36
10 March -26 July rg$6
interest in Cyprus as the place where the spreading defeatism of national policy, as they saw it, had to be kept at bay. It was no accident that on i June— the day of Harding's arrival — the Prime Minister gave a speech in Norwich in the course of which the British case over Cyprus was stated in its crudest form: that if the island was lost, the Middle East was lost, and that if the Middle East and its oil was lost, the British people would surely starve. Only the most credulous could believe this —oil, after all, was traded on world markets for money, not prestige, even supposing that Cyprus, which had no oil of its own, had any bearing on the commodity at all —but the sweeping assertion was, in truth, simply meant as a signal of Eden's determination not to give way. In the diplomatic realm, the same unyielding message was sent out when the United States Ambassador called at the Foreign Office with a message from Dulles urging that the United Kingdom do something shortly to alleviate the Cyprus danger. His host, Kirkpatrick, let fly emotionally that 'the Americans seemed to think it right that the Greek Government should murder any Cypriot \vho had the moral courage' to stand up to EOKA. 5fl Ambassador Aldrych was left to retreat through the door saying half-apologetically that he had 'only come to give [the] message' from Washington. When Eden —who at this point was receiving extra police protection following rumours that an EOKA squad was operating in London — spoke to a Conservative audience at the Albert Hall on 12 June, the loudest cheer he received was when he announced the immediate deportation from Britain of Father Macheriotis, a Greek priest active in Orthodox charities, who had been accused in the press of diverting money to the Enosis movement.17 In this fevered atmosphere calls for 'placation' were not popular. What made political pressures at home concerning Cyprus all the more formidable was the way that they overlapped with increasingly blunt threats from the Turkish Government. When Bow ker heard of the Harding plan, he warned that any fixing of a date for Cypriot self-determination would lead to 'a serious deterioration in Anglo-Turkish relations', adding that the Turks might start by trying to 'take it out on the Greeks of Istanbul'." Much more worrying was that, in taking it out on Greeks, Turkey might also start taking it on the British. Fearing that the latter were about to shift their position, Menderes and Zorlu now resorted to plain blackmail in the form of a threat to invade Cyprus if an attempt was made to transfer sovereignty to Greece. This was the first intimation of Turkish military intervention. Since the wrenching away of a British colony by some foreign power was the worst of all decolonization scenarios,59 assessments of this threat were very important. After collating various sources, the Foreign Office conclusion was that the Turkish Army was 3fl
Kirkpatrick, minute, 7 June 1956, FC^i/u.-jSgs, RGio8i/i 128. Aldrich, telegram to State Department, 14 June 1956, Box 3276, RGsg, State Department Records, USNA. 5(1 Bovvkcr to Selwyn Lloyd, 2 June 1956, F"()37i 7123843, RGio8i/io66. 59 The scenario referred to here is underplayed in most accounts of the British 'end of Empire', but in certain contexts was a matter of considerable anxiety. In this period the claim of Francoist Spain to Gibraltar, for example, caused much concern. Years later the Argentinian invasion of the Falklands and the reactions to it illustrated how explosively the scenario might work out in practice. 57
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unlikely to descend on Cyprus, even if some form ofEnosis was being implemented, so long as British troops remained on the island;60 and that meanwhile it was much more likely that Turkey would seek to frighten Greece by 'rattling her sabre' on the Thracian border or in the Aegean. This judgement needs to be carefully noted, since it rebuts the blanket assertion which came to be built into British diplomatic rationales over Cyprus: that whatever the merits ofEnosis as a solution for the island's future, it could never be implemented since Turkey would intervene automatically. Nevertheless, the spectre of Turkish military action could not be taken lightly from the summer of 1956 onwards, and one effect was to rivet into place the 'Turkishpolitical factor' which, rather than any material need for a strategic base, came to dominate British calculations.61 Against this concern, however, had to be set Harding's forceful arguments in the Cabinet talks that it was not possible simply to do nothing in Cyprus, whilst things went from bad to worse. Nor, despite Kirkpatrick's antics in the Foreign Office, was the Prime Minister insensitive to the danger that if the British continued to stonewall over Cyprus, the Americans would start to intervene, using NATO as a cover. Eden naturally wanted an end to violence in Cyprus if only it could be secured without costs in other directions. Hemmed in from a bewildering variety of directions, the temptation was to give with one hand, and to take away with the other. The agreed plan which emerged from intensive Cabinet talks, therefore, did not guarantee Cypriot self-determination, but stated that it would come 'under consideration' by NATO after ten years.62 This would be subject, however, to full safeguards for minorities, and to a defence treaty in which both the United Kingdom and Turkey would be full partners alongside Greece. Lord Radcliffe, as Constitutional Commissioner, would go immediately to the island to begin a process of consultation with all parties concerning an interim self-governing constitution—though, as the Foreign Office privately observed, this 'did not prejudge the question of the Greek elected majority'.63 As a last minute 'tweak' by ministers, the Turkish Government was given a secret promise that in the event of self-determination the United Kingdom would retain permanent and sovereign enclaves, within which Turkey would be allowed to station troops of her own—so hinting for the first time at the concession to Turkey of a physical stake in the island which she had effectively lost in 1878.64 This plan, Selwyn Lloyd told Dulles on 19 June when conveying its broad outline but by no means all its details, 'represents the absolute limit to which we are prepared to go', but one which might just be made acceptable to both Greece and Turkey 'if we are given enough support by our friends'.65 That the Eisenhower Administration so frequently called on Britain to be 60 61 62 H 64 65
'Turkish Military Action in Connection with the Cyprus Question', 26 June 1956, FC>37i /123906. Shattock to Ward, 5 May 1956, FC>37i/i23882/724. For the record of Cabinet discussions at this time see CABi30/io9. Galsworthy,minute, 11 June 1956,FO37I/I23898,RGio8i//i24i. Foreign Office to Ankara Embassy, 19 June 1956, FO37I/I23899/I242. Foreign Office to British Embassy, Washington, igjune 1956, ^0371/123899^01081/1239.
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conciliatory in negotiation on issues which mattered a great deal to her, but at all the crucial moments drew back from doing what she could to assist the United Kingdom gain her basic desiderata, was the nub of the resentment felt in London with regard to Middle Eastern matters during the period, including Egypt. This was what was meant by recurring references to Dulles' alleged 'dishonesty'. The American response to such a critique was that they could not share in being responsible for schemes which had not been put to them whilst they were being hammered out in London. But the British knew that when it came to shared policy-making, the Americans would always preponderate; and for this essentially psychological reason they often fell back on the temptation of presenting Washington with/a/ft accompli in the expectation that the Americans would comply, even whilst holding their highly moral noses. The 'June Plan' for Cyprus got caught up in this Anglo-American dialectic. Chance events also played a part in undercutting the sort of help Selwyn Lloyd hoped for. Two days before his discussion with Dulles, the United States Vice-Consul in Nicosia, William Boteler, had been killed when a bomb was thrown into a Nicosia restaurant, 'Little Soho1, where he was dining. Courtney's assessment was that this probably did not presage an EOKA murder campaign against American personnel in the colony.6" There were, however, rumours in the press that the Eisenhower Administration was considering a complaint to the British Government concerning the provision of security for its nationals.67 Although no complaint was made, the Boteler assassination reinforced Dulles' prejudice against jeopardizing American goodwill in the region on behalf of a plan which, in his opinion and that of his advisers, had no chance of satisfying anybody. When Roger Makins, the British Ambassador, pressed its merits on the State Department, he was told that it was 'tantamount to giving Turkey a built-in veto... for all time', and that the Greeks would see it as 'just another manoeuvre to perpetuate British sovereignty over Cyprus'/'8 The following day Dulles told Makins in person that the effect would be 'to create an insoluble problem in the future', adding in the sort of aside which grated on British nerves, 'Was that the intention?'6'' Although the letters exchanged between Eden and Eisenhower had no such brittle undertones,70 it was clear that as things stood Her Majesty's Government could not count on much help from its 'friend', the United States. Meanwhile, speculation in the Greek capital was intense. Sir Charles Peake had continued 'living under great strain' whilst he awaited instructions to submit the scheme to Karamanlis and his new Foreign Minister, Evangelos Averoff (Theotokis having at last been forced to resign).71 Bottled up in his Embassy, the Ambassador's nerves by this time were close to being shattered, and Lady Peake, in evident distress, rang the Foreign Office, not only to warn officials of her husband's condition, but to '* Courtney to State Department, 19 June 1956, Box 3276, RG59, State Department Records, USNA. 67 The Times report in FO.^y i /12389971240. 68 R. Makins to Foreign Office, 21 June 1956, ^'0371/123900,1101081/1284. M Makins to Foreign Office, 22 June 1956, ibid. 711 Sec exchange in FO371 /123901, RG1081 /1345. 71 Ward, minute, 11 May 1956, FO37I/123889, RG 1081/954.
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complain bitterly of the way he was being treated by his own masters, as well as by the Greeks; she could, she said, 'get no sense' out of him about the uselessness of carrying on, and threatened to take her grievance personally to ministers.72 The truth was that just as the Greek Government had been cut out of the circuit of British diplomacy over Cyprus, so was the British Embassy in Athens. Peake was merely the victim of a process which his own advice had not infrequently fostered. It was a sad end for somebody who loved both Greece and the Greeks, whatever he thought their political failings to be. Although back in the Foreign Office it was remarked that a 'weak and nervy' Ambassador was hardly an advantage, it was not in Athens that the real game was being played out. Peake was consequently left in a state of mental collapse whilst the Turks got a first look at the plan. When Bowker showed the details to Zorlu on 20 June, however, they were firmly rejected. 'The plan', Bowker told Selwyn Lloyd, 'has brought back with a rush all the suppressed doubts and misgivings which they [the Turks] felt during the negotiations with Makarios and the feeling that they will have to go it alone [over Cyprus].'73 It was because Harding had foreseen such a point that his original dispatch had called for 'judicious pressure' to be brought to bear on Ankara at the crucial moment. That such judiciousness was severely limited by the special operations of the 'Turkishpolitical factor' was suggested by the meeting of fifty members of the Tory 'Suez Group' who met in London on 27 June to discuss their reactions should the British Government make any move involving Cypriot self-determination.74 Whilst not in any sense directly coordinated with Turkish pressure, there is little doubt that a link existed between these phenomena—at least some of the MPs concerned, for example, were frequent visitors to the Turkish Embassy throughout this period. In his preparations for a Commons statement on Cyprus scheduled for 12 July, Eden, closely attuned to these undercurrents, duly sent back the first draft supplied by the Colonial Office because it 'implied too much eagerness for self-determination'.75 When the premier did speak at the Dispatch Box, eagerness of any sort was absent. Eden referred to the tireless efforts of his Government on behalf of a settlement, but said that it had proved impossible to define an approach which did not 'raise far wider issues for our Turkish allies'.76 In these circumstances, he said, there was no alternative but to press on with the more modest goal of developing internal self-government. He also informed the House that Lord Radcliffe would be leaving the very next day for Cyprus to begin his investigations as Constitutional Commissioner. In a subsequent debate it was stressed, however, that the purpose of Radcliffe's visit was not to talk to anybody in particular, but merely 'to get the atmosphere of the island'.77 'He will certainly get that,' guffawed one member of the Opposition. 72 73 74 75 76 77
Ward,minute,22June 1956,FO37i/i23905,RGio8i/i462. Bowker to Ward, 20 June 1956, FO371 /123901 /1368. Fransois Crouzet, Le Conflit de Chypre, 7946-7959,2 vols. (Brussels, 1973), ii. 833-4. Philip de Zuleta to Logan, 12 July 1956,00926/592. Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 1955-6, vol. 556,12 July 1956, cols. 596-8. Ibid. 19 July 1956,00!. 1443.
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The result, then, of the abortive 'June Plan' was to do nothing to ease Harding's dilemmas as Governor of Cyprus. His feelings at this abortive outcome may be deduced from his comment, tinged with bitterness, on a draft of Eden's Commons statement that 'it calls into question the sincerity of everything we have said on the subject of self-determination and would be a god-send to our detractors'.78 The fact was that the configuration of pressures in London and Nicosia underpinned very different priorities in shaping an acceptable initiative. The most which Eden could afford to contemplate was a very limited exercise in constitution-making explicitly divorced from any question of self-determination. Yet as Harding had sought to impress on Lennox-Boyd after returning to Cyprus on 23 June, any constitutional move which did not at the same time deal firmly and precisely with self-determination would be worse than useless from his point of view, because it would merely reinforce mistrust of what the British were trying to do79—one could almost hear the Cypriot ghost of Sir Robert Armitage extolling self-determination to ministers as the one real, vital, all-absorbing point. Even if it was impossible for the moment to push ahead without Turkish agreement, Harding argued despairingly, it was essential that Her Majesty's Government publish the contents of the present plan so that 'we shall have fixed a visible light at the end of the tunnel for the Greek-Cypriot people, which is a pre-requisite to their cooperation in restoring law and order, and in framing a constitution'.*10 This proposition, too, however, was rejected, and the details of the June proposals were, in fact, never to see the light of day. Something of the fracture in British policy-making showed through in an article which appeared in the London Evening Standard on 17 July by Randolph Churchill, never the most emollient of authors. This lambasted British ministers who in effect abdicated their own responsibility for determining the future of a British colony to a foreign Government, and in the mean time left it up to a distinguished soldier to cope with the ensuing mess. 'This', Churchill fits observed, with characteristic bile, 'is what passes for statesmanship in the Eden era.'81 Though not the sort of indiscreet language Harding would have employed, it is fairly certain that these words reflected an element in his feelings, and may even have been directly inspired by them. The Field-Marshal's sense of being let down was all the sharper because of disappointment on the security front in Cyprus. Whilst he had been closeted with the Cabinet in London, 'Operation Lucky Alphonse' had been unfolding. Harding closely scanned the ensuing flood of military telegrams, since a 'spectacular' breakthrough against EOKA might have allowed Her Majesty's Government some crucial freedom to manoeuvre, as well as enhancing the Governor's own leverage in his relations with the Cabinet. 'Spectacular' in this context had already come to mean something very specific: the elimination of Grivas. Indeed, it had become an assumption of the campaign that, deprived of Grivas' leadership, EOKA would collapse. 7S Harding, telegram to Lennox-Boyd, 5 July COQ26/592. ''' Harding, telegram to Lennox-Boyd, 25 June 1956, CO926/CO926/55I. sl Evening Standard (17 ]u\y 1956).
s
" Ibid.
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The most prized information recently obtained by intelligence operatives—including O'Driscoll and Linzee, the court-martialled officers—was that 'Dighenis' was on the run in the Kykko area. 'Lucky Alphonse' therefore meant getting lucky in the search to pin down one man. It was Grivas, however, who enjoyed the good fortune. On the morning of 7 June he was alerted by the barking of an Army dog, and with five others moved quickly south to avoid capture in the direction of the Paphos Forest. Although at one point this group ran headlong into a unit of paratroopers, and had to scatter in a hail of machine-gun fire, Grivas, with a single companion, managed to reach the vicinity of Trooditissa monastery on the i3th.82 From here he was able to pass in safe stages to the suburbs of Limassol, where he was to remain—concealed in a private residence—for many months. One commentator has contended that thereafter his role was greatly reduced, and that the machinery of terrorism he had created was left to 'freewheel under the force of its own momentum'.83 This underestimates Grivas' continuing ability to determine the overall level of EOKA activity through a primitive but effective communications system,84 as well as the degree to which British failure to catch him sapped their own credibility as the de facto rulers of the island. 'Lucky Alphonse' had succeeded in disorganizing the EOKA mountaingangs, and led to a number of deaths and captures, but it did not deliver a knock-out blow. In such a summary, mention must also be made of the forest fire in the Troodos foothills on 17 June, which killed twenty-one British soldiers and injured many more, making it the biggest single loss incurred by the British Army during the Emergency. In these troubled years, personal tragedy was to assume many forms.85 Harding's earnest hopes, then, of simultaneously crushing the terrorists and 'placating' Greek-Cypriot aspirations had been dashed. After Eden spoke in the House of Commons on 12 July, the only surviving fragment of the recent proposals was the Radcliffe constitutional mission. It was not much to be getting on with. The Commissioner arrived in Cyprus—travelling via Beirut, to avoid Athens—on 15 July, and 'got the atmosphere' of the colony by being taken everywhere under armed escort. No leading Greek-Cypriot representative agreed to see him. The sole press photograph showed Radcliffe sipping tea in a Turkish club in Famagusta; he also had several meetings with Kucuk and other Muslim representatives, who forcibly impressed on him their grievances. Yet the important thing was not for the Commissioner to talk to Cypriots, Greek or Turkish, but to confer with Harding. The 82
G. Grivas, Memoirs (London, 1964), pp. 66-7. N. Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece (London, 1978), p. 248. 84 Grivas' messages to members of EOKA were restricted almost exclusively to group leaders or 'area commanders', and carried only by the most trusted agents using code names. His channel with the Greek Government lay through the Greek Consulate in Nicosia—delivery, however, being at a suitable distance from that building. Although the British knew of this circuit, they refrained from the precedent of seizing a diplomatic bag, or entering the Consulate, as they had previously occupied the Archbishopric. See Evangelos Averoff, Lost Opportunities. The Cyprus Qiiestion, /950-63 (New York, 1986), 161-2. 83 Mobile patrols along the treacherous mountain roads of Cyprus were highly dangerous, especially at night, and more British military personnel were killed in driving accidents during the Emergency than through the actions of EOKA. 83
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influence of the Governor, and the patent realities of the local situation, were discernible in the report which Radcliffe drew up for Lennox-Boyd after his return on 2 August (he had stayed in the island shorter than expected for a stark reason we shall see in the next chapter). Radcliffe began the analysis in this document by likening the contemporary Greek-Cypriot to the nineteenth-century Irishman: that is, to somebody who had fallen over a long period into an infantile delusion—in this case, Enosis—and who had built up a deep distrust of those who ruled over him.'% To exorcise this mistrust required, Radcliffe argued, a constitution which not only laid down very clearly what powers were exercised by whom, but which should above all things be generous in spirit. Radcliffe concluded: In short, my own limited observation leads me to confirm the view that the 'pacification' of Cyprus does absolutely depend upon the making of a elear and public decision about selfdetermination—until that is clone, pacification will not begin in any serious sense, and until then the offer . . . of any constitution will be seen only as one more in the game which is played around the question of self-determination. 87
The Commissioner was repeating here the pure milk of Harding's own evolving doctrine. The emphasis on the link between a generous recognition of the application of self-determination and the process of restoring law and order in the island reflected the priorities of the military man, with all its limitations of analysis and feeling. It did not look much beyond the actual restoration of normalcy. Nothing more could be expected of a Field-Marshal. Nevertheless, if only by dint of the very responsibilities he carried, Harding had come to understand the relationship between constitutional questions and the roots of violence more profoundly than during his frustrating negotiations with the Archbishop some months before. But although Radcliffe, as Constitutional Commissioner for Cyprus, had grasped the point of this experience whilst cooped up at the height of sweltering summer in the Governor's office in Nicosia, it was to be another matter maintaining the logic when dealing with ministers whose priorities were shaped in very different ways. Viewed from London, and above all the Cabinet room, any 'game' being played out in Cyprus was, indeed, only one round in a much more complicated contest of survival linking the Middle East with the factional and ideological tensions within British Conservatism. That competition could not be shut off quite as easily as the Governor often seemed to think. Whilst hoping desperately for some lucky break against EOKA, Eden and his colleagues therefore came to depend on Harding simply to keep a lid on the island's troubles, unmoved, and sometimes exasperated, by his pleas for action to break out of the local spiral of intimidation and counterintimidation. As it happened, however, another event took place whilst Radcliffe was in Cyprus which \vas bound to have radical consequences throughout the eastern Mediterranean. On a hot, sultry night in Cairo on 26 July, President Gamal Abdul 8(1
'Note by Lord Radcliffe on his return from Visit to Cyprus 14 July to 8 August 1956', €0926/244. "7 Ibid.
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Nasser suddenly broke off the predictable and rhetorical flow of a speech to a large crowd of his supporters to make the very practical announcement—staggering to the ears of his delirious audience, as it was to be to the outside world—that the Egyptian Government had nationalized the Suez Canal Company. Cypriot events had always been in some degree hostage to the bufferings of Anglo-Egyptian rivalry. Never was this to be more so than in the succeeding months. There could be no flickering light in the Cypriot tunnel until this larger, if not necessarily more intense, blaze had consumed itself.
6 The Sands of Goodwill, 27 July 1956-5 April 1957 The 'Suez Crisis' of 1956 occupies a central place in British history during the twentieth century. As such, it is usually thought of as an episode of foreign policy set against the backdrop of Middle Eastern affairs. It was also, however, a specifically Mediterranean crisis which formed part of a larger pattern of nationalist turbulence in that region from 1945 through to the early 19608. In this regard the post-war traumas in Palestine, Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, and French North Africa formed a continuum; even little Malta had a noisy and not bloodless Emergency during its own prelude to independence. Never were the threads of this regional phenomenon to be pulled more tightly together than in the summer and autumn of 1956, when Nasserism and its allies appeared to mount a direct challenge to the old colonial powers from Algeria to the Levant. Greece could scarcely remain unaffected by events so relatively nearby. Furthermore, although she had not been a signatory to the 1880 Suez Canal Convention, the high percentage of traffic traversing the Canal that was Greek registered, and the prominent role of Greek nationals amongst the pilots of the Company, meant that the United Kingdom could not exclude Greece from an invitation to attend the London Maritime Conference which Prime Minister Eden called together in September. According to Peake's deputy in Athens, Charles Lambert (who ran the Embassy when Peake took sick leave), the situation posed in acute form the question 'of where Greece stands today in the contemporary world'.1 Hitherto Greek officialdom had tried to conduct its Cyprus policy in a way which did not burn any bridges behind it. It was Suez, Lambert went on, which revealed the 'cracks in the facade', and brought about a local political climate which, like the physical climate, was 'not quite Europe, nor Asia, nor Africa'. In this profound sense, Greece was not unlike Egypt, suspended between different worlds, and harbouring elements from contrasting but adjacent cultures. Nevertheless, it seemed inevitable, Lambert thought, that as a result of the escalating pressures Greece would be forced to slide down one side or the other—and even, perhaps, to recede behind the Iron Curtain as it nearly had done only a few years before. That the Greek Government refused Eden's invitation to the Maritime Conference reflected a desire above all to avoid choosing sides, and in so doing to prevent the substantial Greek community in Egypt from being subsumed in the anti-British and anti-western currents in that country. 2 The British Embassy in Greece was eager to 1
Lambert to Lloyd, 29 Sept. 1956, FOjy 1/123850. The Greek community in Egypt had been closely integrated into the 'capitulatory' framework established by the leading European powers in the nineteenth century, and it was probably inevitable that 2
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dissuade the British Government from imposing any penalty for this abstention. Lambert counselled that a political assault, far from 'bringing her to her senses', would have the opposite effect on Greek opinion, basing his advice on the premiss 'that we do not wish to destroy Greece altogether'. That there was a temptation to 'destroy' Greece, just as there was a wish to destroy Egypt, indicated the complexity of the psychological setting in which political decisions were being made—though what 'destroy' meant in such contexts was indefinable. The conference in London failed anyway to arrive at worthwhile conclusions. Eden's heart was not in it. The next stage of the British Prime Minister's increasingly covert strategy required that Egypt's ability to run the Canal on her own be clearly demonstrated, and it was in order to achieve this that 'Operation Mayhem' was undertaken, in which British and French pilots were ordered by their home governments to leave the Company's employment, while a record volume of merchant ships was directed to the waterway. The fact that this ruse failed in no small part because the Greek pilots continued to ply their skills even after their British and French colleagues left did nothing to salvage Anglo-Greek relations. One index of this polarization was the deluge of pro-Enosis and anti-British pamphlets suddenly appearing in English and Greek versions at Athens airport. A number of British travellers passing through were so appalled that they got into some unseemly arguments, including one overwrought member of the United Kingdom's Olympic squad on his way to the Melbourne Games. To Harding, the situation at the Hellenikon terminal testified to the British Government's failure to counter effectively aggressive Greek publicity about Cyprus, and he insisted that the Foreign Office in London ensure that the offending material be withdrawn. In that department the assumption that to achieve this they merely had to speak firmly enough to Karamanlis was exasperating. To satisfy the Governor, officials nonetheless went through all sorts of possible courses of action, but to no avail. When a boycott of the Athens route by British European Airways was considered, it turned out to be the British airline's most profitable 'hub', so that going elsewhere would be selfdefeating.3 This illustrated the depressing truth that the United Kingdom's ability to impose her will on minor powers was in rapid decline. It was, indeed, the fact that Britain could not impose herself even on such subordinate countries as Egypt and Greece, not so much that she was undergoing relegation vis-d-vis the superpowers of the United States and the Soviet Union, which fuelled a sense of national diminution so prevalent in parts of British society as 1956 progressed. The emergent Suez crisis also cut across Anglo-Turkish relations. The value of Turkish support to the Eden government increased since that country was the only absolutely reliable Middle Eastern power beyond the arm of Nasserism (even any hope that the Nasser regime would treat them sympathetically was eventually disappointed. For the migration of 'Egyptian' Greeks back to Greece see Vassilis Panaytopoulos, 'Les Grecs d'Egypte a Athenes', in J. L. Miege and Collette Dubois, L 'Europe retrouve: les migrations de la decolonisation (Paris, 1994). ' Ward, minute, 25July 1956, FO37i/i 17865, RGio8i/67.
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Nuri-es-Said's pro-British regime in Iraq was not cast-iron in this sense). The point was underlined as some of Britain's old Commonwealth partners appeared less than staunch over the Canal question. Meanwhile, the reliability of Britain in Turkish eyes came under closer scrutiny as the crisis unfolded. Radical Arab nationalism was a threat to the interests of both countries—and ultimately more to Turkey than Britain, as growing frictions over the Turkish-Syrian border illustrated. Consequently, Ankara looked to the British Government to deal decisively with Nasser, as it had somewhat belatedly done with Makarios. For Menderes and Zorlu the two 'tests' ran together. At bottom, Turkey was not likely to turn against Britain so long as the latter did not let her down. But if Britain appeared to falter in the face of difficulty, as she had done so often before in the post-war Middle East, assumptions in the Turkish leadership were liable to change rapidly. Cyprus was the place where instability in this vital relationship was bound to make itself felt. The most obvious link between the Suez crisis and Cyprus, however, lay in the part ascribed to the island in 'Operation Musketeer' (the invasion of Egypt). It had always underlain British strategic thinking that the real value of Cyprus related to the scenario of a unilateral (that is, non-NATO) expedition to defend British national interests in the Levant. For some while it had been assumed that such an intervention would take place in Jordan with the limited aim of dissuading Israel from an attempt to extend its frontiers beyond those established by the Arab-Jewish war of 1948-9. An invasion of Egypt was a riskier exercise altogether, even in harness, as it turned out, with France. It entailed the concentration of a significant land force, the bulk of which would have to be transported by sea, and one of the most crucial planning decisions in 'Musketeer' was the relegation of Cyprus to the platform from which the initial wave of airborne assaults was to be launched. The great harbour of Valletta in Malta—also, of course, a British colony—was instead selected as the maritime staging-post for the invasion. Later on Field-Marshal Harding, amongst others, was to consider that the eventual debacle was due in large part to the greater length of time required for the troop-ships to get to Egypt from Malta than would have been the case from Limassol, the use of which, he contended, was logistically feasible for the purpose.4 This mistake he attributed primarily to political interference. That there was a rebellion going on in Cyprus, but not in Malta, must surely have been a factor in the making of these arrangements, though whether the outcome would have been any different goes beyond the realm of this book, other than to say that Grivas would have taken great pride in thinking of himself, however indirectly, as the arbiter of the battle over Suez. In a more limited and practical sense, 'Musketeer' put to the test those often rather wobbly arguments about the military significance of the island—-including its lack of a real port—which had been current from the original conception of British occupation in 1878, and on which Her Majesty's Government's determination to maintain its sovereignty continued to hinge. Events in Cyprus, meanwhile, did not wait on what was happening elsewhere. 4
Note on 'Eden Memoirs' in Harding Papers, National Army Museum.
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One reason why Lord Radcliffe had returned to London ahead of schedule on 2 August was that the Governor had impressed on him the urgency of conveying to the British Government the preliminary conclusions which they had discussed so closely together. But another, perhaps even more compelling, reason was to avoid being present when three more men condemned for terrorist offences—Andreas Zakos (aged 25), Harilaos Michael (aged 22), and lakovos Patsatsos (also 22)—were executed; the effect, otherwise, would have been fatally to compromise Radcliffe's mission before it even got off the ground.5 Pleas on behalf of the trio stressed that a reprieve would help to create the 'right atmosphere' for the Commissioner's work.6 The grim situation was made more dramatic by EOKA's abduction of a retired British official, Mr Cremer, and the threat to kill him if Zakos, Michael, and Patsatsos were hanged. On 4 August Zakos appealed from prison for Cremer's release, and the Englishman was within hours dumped, alive, on a deserted road near Karavas. Harding remained unmoved, and on 7 August the Governor and his Executive Council decided against commutation of the sentences.7 As in early May, security in Nicosia was stepped up during the days and hours prior to the executions. This time the streets around the prison were cordoned off with barbed wire to prevent crowds getting near. Of particular concern were conditions within the Prison, which Harding had recently told the Colonial Office was in an 'explosive state' due to overcrowding, shortage of warders (all Greeks had resigned), and the unruly behaviour of the inmates. Afterwards the Governor described to Lennox-Boyd as 'exaggerated' reports that on the night of 8/9 August the Central Prison had been in 'complete pandemonium', but his own highly coloured account sent to the Colonial Office lends credence to the Times of Cyprus'1 evocation of the eerie atmosphere of the occasion, with the sound of baleful singing from the other prisoners, the banging of whatever heavy objects came to hand, and the fact that the din could be heard even inside the saloon bar of the Ledra Palace Hotel.8 After a slight delay for the usual arrangements to be made, the three men were executed in the early hours of 9 August. Whether Zakos' last request was to listen to a recording of Bach, as Enosis propaganda claimed, is beside the point; it was the after-touches of this sort which refined the cult of martyrdom in the GreekCypriot mind. A three-day general strike ensued which brought the island to a standstill, whilst requiem services were held in all Orthodox churches. One Greek-Cypriot historian, by no means an admirer of EOKA, has remarked in relation to the executions of convicted terrorists that Governor Harding was 'heavyhanded and lacked those flickers of humanity necessary to make the man come alive'.9 It is easy to sympathize with this criticism, though it should be added that 5 A Turkish-Cypriot had received £5,000 for information leading to the arrest of Patsatsos. For this case see FO37i /123919, RG1081 /1884. 6 For the appeals see 00926/570. 7 Francois Crouzet, Le Conflit de Chypre, 1946-1959,2 vols. (Brussels, 1973), ii. 559. 8 Times of Cyprus (8 Aug. 1956). For the Governor's account see Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 9 Aug. i956,PREMn/i75i. 9 Doros Alastos, Cyprus Guerrilla: Grivas, Makarios and the British (London, 1960), p. 7.
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Harding commuted a significant number of mandatory capital sentences where no actual bodily harm had occurred. In early August EOKA had unleashed a series of urban assassinations in which twenty-one Greek 'traitors' had been killed—the victims often sought out in cafes to accentuate the public ritual of the horror. It was hardly surprising that Radcliffe had no Greek visitors during his stay. Harding could not understand why some on his own side did not see that any show of sympathy in these conditions was fatally misplaced. When the distinguished British Ambassador in Rome, Sir Ashley Clarke, for example, entered such a plea, with an eye on 'liberal' opinion in western Europe, the Governor pronounced himself'speechless with rage and amazement' that a senior British representative could fail to recognize the necessities which sprang from the burdens which he was being asked to discharge.10 In reality, the truth was not that Harding lacked feeling or humanity, but rather perhaps that he allowed his own sense of outage to enter too powerfully into the making of political and moral judgements. The occasion for a very important political judgement supervened when on 16 August, quite out of the blue, Grivas announced a ceasefire. In leaflets which circulated that afternoon he stated his readiness to facilitate the renewal of discussions between the British Government and Archbishop Makarios by offering a full-scale truce. 'EOKA declares', this announcement ran, 'that it will stand on its guard, ready for new sacrifices, knowing that it has all the moral and material backing necessary, [signed] EOKA, the Leader, Dighenis."1 Grivas' move was widely said to be a response to an interview given the day before to the Times of Cyprus by Harding. In this the Governor had defended the recent executions vigorously, but he had also struck another note. On the crucial matter of Makarios' role he noted there was no question of a draft constitution being sent to him for approval, but added 'I daresay that he [Makarios] will have an opportunity of expressing his views about it like everybody else' (indeed, Harding and Radcliffe had already touched in their talks on the need, sooner or later, to bring the Archbishop 'back into the picture'). 'If there is to be a stopping of violence and its consequences in this island,' Harding had told Foley's newspaper, 'I can only say, "Let the murderers make the first move"."2 Grivas did not keep him waiting long. Whether Harding's words had been the cause, rather than just the occasion, of Grivas1 initiative is problematical. The latter had for some weeks been under pressure from Karamanlis and Averoff to stop the spate of violence. The Greek Government had recently appointed as its Consul-General in Nicosia an official, Angelos Vlachos, who was known to be critical of perfervid Enosis feeling and the risks it entailed for other parts of the Greek world. Allegedly it was Vlachos who composed the ceasefire proclamation, giving it a clipped, businesslike style very different from the florid character of most EOKA literature." It was also probably true that Grivas 111
Harding, telegram to Lennox-Koyd, 9 Aug. 11)56, F()37i 7123917, RGioS 1/1812. " George Grivas, Memoirs (London, 1964), p. 87. 12
Times of Cyprus (i(> Aug. 1956).
" Evangelos Averoff, Lost Opportunities, The Cyprus Qtiestion, /950-6j (New York, 1986), p. 91.
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could not stand for long against the expression of Athenian views when they were insistent enough. He also understood that he could not go on ordering the killing of Greek-Cypriots, 'traitors' or otherwise, without eventually reaping a whirlwind of his own. Such assassination campaigns were always carried out in spurts, and then halted. It so happened, then, that Harding's interview coincided with the peaking of a short but sharp period of EOKA activity. That Grivas' announcement was read out over the Cyprus Broadcasting Service gave it a certain status. Several minor Emergency Regulations were relaxed at once. 'Goodwill glows miraculous,' the Times of Cyprus reported14—it was a feature throughout the Emergency that it only required a sudden ray of hope to produce a wave of public relief and optimism. But was the 'goodwill' in the Grivas offer real? Would not any positive response to it by the British be dancing to the terrorist tune? Rumours abounded that the Cyprus administration was divided as to what to do. These divisions were hinted at in Harding's message to Lennox-Boyd that the local authorities intended 'to respond by a carefully thought out policy of [a] progressive relaxation of Emergency measures', adding, however, that it would be necessary 'to hold the balance between giving EOKA an excuse for starting up [violence] again with a large measure of public support. . . and running after them on the other'.15 What the Governor wanted while this balance was being struck was for Her Majesty's Government to press on as quickly as possible with the Radcliffe exercise, and to bypass EOKA by pursuing an international agreement on Cyprus. In other words, he wanted the Cabinet to develop its own constructive initiative, and not be dragged along in the wake of Grivas, losing the propaganda war as it went. There was strong evidence that the Greek Government was ready to take part in a Cyprus deal. It is relevant to note at this point the Turkish claim that it was Averoff who was the first tentatively to float the possibility of a compromise involving partition in the summer of 1956, and although this was always to be hotly denied by the minister concerned, there is some evidence to back the assertion up.16 Both Karamanlis and Averoff apprehended that the crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean was gradually edging Greece towards a precipice, and they sought ways—even potentially controversial ways—to avoid it. The British Embassy in Athens informed London three days after Grivas' announcement that the Greek authorities were desperate 'to get shot of it [the Cyprus problem] and the opportunity may now have come'.17 Leaflets demanding Enosis suddenly disappeared from Athens airport. But the Greeks could not get shot of Cyprus without British cooperation. The very intensity of the crisis in August 1956, however, made it impossible for Eden to send out the kind of friendly signals which might be interpreted as allowing a 'shout of triumph' to the United Kingdom's opponents without risking his wider diplomacy and 14
Times of Cyprus (19 Aug. 1956). Harding, telegram to Lennox-Boyd, 29 Sept. 1956,00926/552. lfl See material in FO37i/i23926,RGio8i/203i.AlsoOwen T.Jones to L. Berry, 18 Aug. 1956, Box 3277, RGsg, State Department Records, USNA. 17 Lambert, telegram to Foreign Office, 19 Aug. 1956, FO37i/i239i8, RGio8i/i825. 15
1 50
27 July 1 956-5 April 1 957
perhaps his premiership. An instruction against making 'nice noises' about Cyprus to Athens was therefore issued from i o Downing Street.18 Any chance of conciliatory action being taken up at the international level consequently slipped by. As a result, Harding was left to make up his own mind on a purely local response to Grivas' move. From the outset his security advisers were against any positive reaction to the EOKA announcement. Their immediate assessment was that Grivas' action was dictated by the losses which the organization had recently suffered —as was certainly the case in some degree. Army commanders did not therefore regard the proffered truce as, in Brigadier Baker's expression, 'a truce in the proper sense of the word', but only a temporary and calculated suspension of EOKA activities in order to enjoy a 'breather' whilst preparing a fresh onslaught.1" The crude threat remaining in Grivas' statement whilst shorn of the more 'flowery' Enosis sentiments, gave some credence to such an interpretation. The crystallization of an 'antitruce' logic within senior British echelons in Cyprus at this juncture was important, and for the rest of the Emergency the Security Forces were to resist having their operations turned 'on' and 'off for purely political purposes. Against this background, for Harding to have overruled his military advisers he would have needed to have reinvented himself, wrhich was not something he was ever tempted, or had the suppleness of personality, to do whilst he was in Cyprus. The Cyprus Government's reply to Grivas' offer was communicated on 22 August by radio, and by thousands of leaflets distributed throughout the island; in the remote mountains it was broadcast with the aid of loudspeakers from low-flying aircraft. This reply laid out terms of surrender to be accepted or rejected within the next three weeks. These included a limited amnesty whereby EOKA fighters were given the choice of either going to Greece, or of staying in the island, in which case only those accused of crimes against the person would be prosecuted. No commitment was made about the ending of the Emergency or talking to Makarios. Harding admitted to Lennox-Boyd that this 'offer' was not likely to lead to the surrender of many hard-core EOKA operatives. 'The main reason for putting out surrender terms', he said, 'are political. It will regain for us the initiative which for the moment EOKA has seized by its dramatic gesture.'20 At the same time, he explained, they would provide 'full justification for continuing our operations against the terrorists'. Grivas' retort was brisk: either Harding withdrew his insulting terms, or EOKA would regain its 'freedom of action' on 27 August. Echoing the ancient cry of Thermopylae, he added 'Heroes do not surrender: come and get us.' Less banal was the action of an EOKA group which strapped a bundle of wooden rifles around a donkey's rump and dispatched the forlorn creature down a village street with a sign around its neck declaring, 'I surrender, my Field Marshal.' The resulting photograph was reproduced in certain sections of the international press. It so happened that a chance for the British to regain the propaganda initiative had 1S
P. Dean, minute, 21 Aug. 1956, FO37i/i23g22, RGioSi/igr?. '" Brigadier G. H. Baker, 'The Cyprus Emergency', unpub. paper, Imperial War Museum, p. 57. Harding, telegram to I,cnnox-Boyd, 21 Aug. 1956, (^0926/427.
20
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by then already arisen in a most fortuitous manner. On 21 August a further batch of Grivas' guerrilla diaries was found buried in a number of glass jars close to Lyssi village, adding to the fragments which had fallen into British hands when EOKA's leader had so nearly been captured on 7 June. This new manuscript was substantial, amounting to some 250,000 words (of which only 10,000 were ever published). It gave details, amongst other things, of Grivas' relations with Archbishop Makarios up to, but not beyond, i April 1955. At first officials in London were not convinced of the authenticity of this document, suspecting that it might be a stunt organized from within the Cyprus Government; a graphologist was sent out to check.21 Once any doubts of Grivas' authorship were dispelled, even amongst Greeks, the question in British circles was how to exploit this literary bonanza. The striking thing about what followed is that the diaries were not used primarily to discredit Grivas himself. Indeed, as time went on, Grivas escaped intense opprobrium amongst the British. 'In the eyes of many of them', wrote Doros Alastos, recalling attitudes amongst the British Army in Cyprus,' "Dighenis" gradually became an object of respect, even of fascination.'22 A kind of exculpatory fascination with terrorists is not a unique phenomenon. With Grivas, both the Security Forces in the island, and Her Majesty's Government in London, knew where they were. He could be pursued, and, if found alive, probably killed on the spot, since it was always assumed that he would never allow himself to be taken; but whatever his eventual fate, he posed no grave political dilemma, no acutely embarrassing questions.23 This provides the key to why it was Makarios, the man of politics, not Grivas, the man of violence, who invariably aroused the deepest British emotions, and why it was the Archbishop whom the British sought to compromise with the help of the discovered material. Once the bulk of the diaries were flown to London, therefore, the translators were set to work abstracting potentially incriminating material on Makarios. On 25 August Kirkpatrick triumphantly called the United States Ambassador to the Foreign Office and gave him the 'full works' purporting to show that 'Makarios [is] effective Commander [of] terrorist forces, Dighenis entirely in character [of] Chief of Staff, and the Greek Government fully implicated as [the] directing power'.24 The Ambassador ignored this simple formulation of what were, in reality, highly complex and by no means harmonious relationships, and instead impressed on his host the urgency of doing nothing to make conciliation more difficult. When Aldrich stressed the same point on a second visit soon afterwards, Kirkpatrick spoke to him so roughly that he soon departed, though not before the Head of the Foreign Office expostulated that 'we [the British Government] were not going to negotiate with Archbishop Makarios', and that, speaking personally, he would 'sooner negotiate with the 21
For checks on the authenticity of the diaries, sec FO371 /123921, RG1081 /1901. Alastos, Cyprus Guerrilla, 14. An extreme form of this tendency was the idea current in certain intelligence circles, and put to Macmillan by the right-wing Conservative MP Julian Amery, that Grivas be converted into a stalkinghorse for British interests as 'Dictator' of Greece. In the Foreign Office cooler minds dismissed any idea that Grivas might eventually prove to be 'just another Papagos'. See FO371/130071, RGCioi8/i8. 24 Aldrich, telegram to Dulles, 24 Aug. 1956, Box 3277, RG,S9, State Department Records, USNA. 22
23
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terrorist Grivas'. 25 On 26 August Lennox-Boyd took the unusual step of holding a press conference on a Sunday—the choice of the Sabbath being made to rub home a religious point—to unveil the diaries and distribute selected passages. Shortly afterwards in Parliament the minister focused his analysis on what the diaries revealed about Makarios' share 'in the foundations of EOKA, in its operational planning, in the starting of violence, in the discussion of the choice of victims, and in many other ways'.2'1 Although many people—including Conservative MPs—were afterwards to press for the full and unexpurgated publication of the diaries, this request was never to be met. As the Crown's own legal officers had often to repeat thereafter, there was, in fact, nothing in them relating to Makarios which could stand up in a court of law. 'A successful trial of such a high ecclesiastic', an official advised, 'is virtually impossible for a democracy under rule of law';27 and although the temptation to act against the Cyprus Church was to continue almost to the very end of our story, this profound restraint was always to remain in place. By the end of all these convolutions there was not much left for anybody in Cyprus to do except hold their breath and wait for violence to start up again. Harding's concern was that when it did, public support for EOKA should not be forthcoming, and it was in a desperate attempt to prevent this that in drafting his radio broadcast for 30 August he sought to strike what he called 'a more helpful and constructive note' by including a sympathetic reference to the concession of a Greek-elected majority in an eventual constitution, 28 thereby returning to the critical issue which more than any other had brought about the collapse of the Anglo-Cypriot talks back in late February. Lennox-Boyd insisted, however, that such a reference be omitted 'in view of the fact that nothing positive can be said about its solution'. 29 Grivas' deadline passed without an>- such note being struck. On i September a major incident took place when a prominent EOKA prisoner, Polycarpos Georgkat/is, feigned illness, and was taken to a local hospital, where he was rescued by attackers who killed a British policeman and a Greek medical orderly (two terrorists also died in the shoot-out). Shortly after a bomb exploded in the main British Secretariat building in the capital—proof again of EOKA's ability to penetrate the heart of government. Over the month as a whole eight more Greeks were murdered by EOKA, and ten members of the Security Forces. The reference to a Greek-elected majority had not been the only one which Lennox-Boyd judiciously excised from the Governor's draft speech as Grivas' deadline expired. Harding had at one point also defended his own role by likening it to that of a 'surgeon who has to use his knife to restore the health of his patient', an analogy which alarmed the Colonial Secretary as bound to provide la gift to Low or Vicky' (the most celebrated, and sometimes merciless, political cartoonists of their ' Kirkpatrick, minute, 27 Aug. 1956, FO37I/123921, RG 1081/11)03. Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 7955 6, vol. 558, 14 Sept. 1956, col. 383. - Ward, minute, 5 Sept. 1956, F()37i7123926, 1*01081/1932. 2 Harding, telegram to Lennox-Boyd, 28 Aug. 1956, (^0926/254. 2 Lennox-Boyd to I larding, 29 Aug. 1956, ibid.
2
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day).30 That the British Cabinet continued to oppose a move to lighten the political atmosphere, whilst also denying the Governor an opportunity to explain in his own way why his actions took the stern form they did, fuelled Harding's impatience. That he wished to explain himself to the disaffected populace had a lot to do with the imminence of a new set of capital cases under Emergency laws. In mid-September the Executive Council confirmed the death sentences on three more Greeks condemned for EOKA-related crimes—Mavromatis, Koutsoftas, and Panayides. When these men's lawyers had an interview with the Governor on the 20th, they argued strenuously that it would be morally indefensible for the executions to be carried out after the previous month's 'surrender offer'. 'Once His Excellency had invoked the spirit of clemency and forgiveness', they stated, 'it seemed unfair to let the men die because the amnesty had not had the effect which had been expected'; if the sentences were nonetheless carried out, they continued, 'it would be clear that the purpose of the executions was to serve as a deterrent for others rather than as a punishment on these men'.31 Harding was seemingly unmoved. '[I]t was', he told the pleaders, 'the existing conditions and circumstances to which he had to have regard and not the hypothetical situation which might have arisen if events had followed a different and happier path.'32 This was always the nub of his argument against those who spoke in mitigation of 'terrorism', just as it was when dealing with the British Cabinet; so long as violence lasted, there could be no 'middle way' in the rigorous implementation of the law. The three men were duly hanged during the early hours of 22 September. The fact that the mandatory death penalty was conceived as primarily a collective punishment—or collective deterrent—was also bound up with the blurring of guilt and innocence which so vitally affected the moral history of the Cyprus Emergency. A similar dynamic was involved in the practice of curfews, which also became widespread during the late summer of 1956. One week after the three hangings, two British Police Sergeants were shot dead in Nicosia's Ledra Street—the 'Murder Mile' of the sensationalist Fleet Street press—and the Greek quarter of the capital was subjected to the toughest curfew yet. This time hardly any warning was given, so few families were able to stock up with essentials. Access to the municipal market was barred even during the short intervals allowed for individuals to emerge from the airless interiors of houses and apartments to fetch water and other necessaries. This went on for eight days. The whole point of the ceaseless patrolling by Security Forces, the close regulation of movement (so that even to appear on a balcony was hazardous), and the interrogation of household heads in screened-off compounds, was not to catch the murderers, who had quite obviously got clean away, but to induce in the people at large a sense of guilt, of complicity in terror, and hence a radical 'change of heart'. Harding had always warned Makarios that life would be very 10 11
Ibid.
Record of an interview granted by Governor to the lawyers of Mavromatis, Koutsoftas, and Panayides, 20 Sept. 1956, SAi 71325,1956, Public Record Office of Cyprus, Nicosia. 32 Ibid.
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unpleasant if the troubles continued, and unpleasant it certainly became. Nor was it Harding's fault that there was no apparent way out. Yet, to an English correspondent in the Times of Cyprus, 'no finer pressure cooker' for EOKA could be devised than the strict curfewing which became such a feature of Cypriot experience.31 The build-up of tension in Cyprus reflected also the rising crescendo over Suez. British planning for military action against Egypt had alternating effects on the security situation in the colony. Initially Harding had troops taken away from his command, as units returned to Britain for training in airborne landing (that the training could not take place in Cyprus was itself a comment on conditions). From midSeptember, however, significant reinforcements arrived. With Anglo-French collusion central to 'Operation Musketeer', 15,000 of these men were from France— or rather, from Algeria, since the Government of Guy Mollct in Paris diverted paratroopers in their famous leopard-skin uniforms from North Africa. They were met off the ships not only by British officers, but also by EOKA leaflets which warned them to do nothing to help the British Security Forces whilst they were there. In fact the French had little intention of doing so, and relations between the two allied armies in Cyprus were politely cool on the way out to Egypt, and (not surprisingly, given what happened in between) more fractious on the return leg, when fights in Nicosia's less salubrious bars became not uncommon—French soldiers, it was said, paraded up and down Ledra Street adopting the most gallic of poses as a form of immunity from anti-English feeling. Future complications were to be caused by the fact that in this interval an indeterminate quantity of guns found their way from French hands into those of EOKA.S4 The general build-up, nevertheless allowed the Governor to launch a fresh offensive in the Kyrenia mountains—'Operation Sparrowhawk'— which inflicted considerable damage on the terrorists. As October 1956 progressed, the Security Forces went flat out to break Grivas' organization before the unleashing of'Musketeer' inevitably drained British troops from the island once more. The very congestion on the island, with the British Army now numbering over 30,000, however, provided EOKA with easier targets. Whereas the latter's 'kill rate' had been ten per month prior to the truce, it shot up to twenty-six for several months afterwards, with the focus of these attacks shifting back to British military personnel. Particularly horrifying was the atrocity at Lefkonico on 23 October. Hitherto, EOKA's bomb devices had been very crude and often ineffective, but the terrorists' skills were improving. On this occasion a water-tap, regularly used by soldiers of the Highland Light Brigade after rugby, was wired up to a 'control' in the adjacent olive grove. Two soldiers were disembowelled and four badly injured in the resulting explosion. Horror was compounded by the fact that the fatal signal had been given by two Greek girls waving their handkerchiefs. To Grivas in his memoirs, the incident represented the glorious devotion of Greek-Cypriot youth to 'the cause'.'" The British widely took it as testimony to their evil delinquency, and it was true that the violence, and even more the cult of violence, now began to weave a vicious legacy. " Times of Cyprus (12 Oct. 1956).
" See p. 324.
-'5 Grivns, Memoirs, 96.
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Another disturbing aspect of the Lefkonico affair, however, was that when Security Forces got to the scene in strength, they 'did not conceal their anger'.36 This was a euphemism for Army reprisals on locals who happened to be in the vicinity at the time, and although only bumps and bruises were involved at this stage, it was a notable precedent. Consul Courtney, usually sympathetic to British dilemmas when it came to combating EOKA, if not on wider political matters, informed Washington that in the 'extensive and sustained drive' under way against the terrorists more and more ordinary Cypriots were 'getting rougher handling by [the] police and military'.37 As both a practitioner and theorist of insurgency, Grivas was to prove ruthlessly adept at manipulating this spiral of terror and counter-terror. In the often one-dimensional portrayal of Field-Marshal Harding, both at the time and since, critics alleged that he was blind to the process of alienation which his actions unleashed. It would be false to dispute this altogether, but it was true only up to a point, and it became less true as his governorship proceeded. Lord Radcliffe gave it as his impression following a second brief visit to Cyprus in early October 1956 that the Governor was 'inexperienced politically, had no senior political adviser, and felt politically isolated'.38 The isolation explains his growing, and some thought illjudged, reliance on John Reddaway to chart a path through the local labyrinth. His understanding always remained that of the soldier, and it was his greatest weakness in his new career that he could not alter his metier. Yet this did not mean that his insights were lacking in intelligence, or were necessarily illiberal. After all, soldiers had not infrequently acted as agents of reform in the history of British expansion and contraction overseas, if only by dint of their professional realism.39 There was a hint of such a desire in the tour d'horizon addressed by the Governor to the British Government on 5 October in which he began by reasserting that if given enough troops 'the Grivas organization can be put out of business as a major political factor in a matter of months'.40 Yet, sidelining EOKA politically was not the same thing as its eradication, and for the first time Harding added the vital proviso that even when the terrorists had been 'beaten', there could be no guarantee that they would not start up their activities after a brief interval. 'If that should happen', he added, 'the only way of suppressing it would be by methods similar to those I am now using. I cannot see any but the most determined [British] Government standing for that.' Consciousness that such methods could not, in fact, be kept up for very much longer, and that if the medicine had to be sharp, it had also to be short, started to loom large in Harding's mind. It made the need for political action all the more urgent. It also made him •'6 Nancy Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece (London, 1978), p. 202. 37 Courtney, telegram 23 Oct. 1956, Box 3277, RGsg, State Department Records, USNA. 18 Kirkpatrick, minute, iSOct. 1956, FO3717123933. 19 In this context the clearest parallel to the pattern of Harding's experience in Cyprus, including his relations with the Government at home, is that of Lord Allenby as High Commissioner in Egypt during the disturbed period in Egypt after 1919. See Lord Wavell, Allenby in Egypt (London, 1943). 40 Harding, telegram to Colonial Office, 5 Oct. 1956,01)926/552.
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for the first time impatient with the absolute priority attached to avoiding trouble with Turkey. When Radcliffe should complete his report on a constitution for Cyprus, the Governor told Lennox-Boyd, it would be vital 'to bring all our guns to bear [on Ankara], i.e. to put heavy and sustained pressure on them which, as I now see it, we frightened ourselves out of doing in June'. In sum, Harding now felt ministers were being 'too soft on the Turks'. 41 Bringing a metaphorical gun to bear on Turkey, however, was one of the last things Eden and his Cabinet were likely to contemplate in October 1956 in the light of the wider Middle Eastern situation, and they acted quickly to dispel the Governor's apparent illusions. Alerted by Radcliffe to the degree to which Harding felt 'out on a limb', they first dispatched a junior Colonial Office minister, John Hare, to explain the formidable difficulties posed by the Governor's own proposals. At some point in Hare's discussion with Harding he evidently raised the possibility of partition as perhaps the only way to apply self-determination with any hope of Turkish consent, since the Governor immediately warned the Colonial Office that his administration 'shall never come to regard it [partition] as anything other than a counsel of despair'.42 In Hare's wake came Ambassador Bowker, whose task was also to give the Governor 'a clearer idea of the Turkish Government's obduracy'. The FieldMarshal was more likely to be impressed by a senior diplomat than a rising young politician. But if Bowker succeeded in drumming home to Harding that no liberties could be taken with Turkish susceptibilities, so Harding forcefully outlined his own underlying reality that there could be no genuine pacification in the island unless the question of Cypriot self-determination was resolved.43 It was in trying to reconcile these necessities that the two men picked up again on the partition theme. Significantly, in doing so Harding did not shift from his view that partition would be disastrous for Cyprus 'from the practical point of view'—that is, if it was ever implemented. But he did become enamoured of the possibility that such a bait might give the Turks 'a possible inducement... to play on a constitution', and in so doing open the way for an experiment based on Radcliffe's imminent recommendations.44 The Field-Marshal's willingness to move gingerly down a path which he recognized to be a 'counsel of despair' in the hope that it might clear away the prime obstacle to the 'placation' of Greek-Cypriot aspirations was a measure of his eagerness for a solution, but also an example of his tendency to contradiction. By October 1956 partition was emerging, still rather obscurely, and by a very contorted logic, as the point of intersection between the Turkish imperatives of British Middle Eastern policy and the sine qua iwn of self-determination for the pacification of Cyprus. Such future contingencies apart, on the eve of'Operation Musketeer' British policymaking about Cyprus went into yet another phase of complete limbo. Lennox-Boyd told Harding that there was no chance of Radcliffe's report, which was now in 41 42 41 44
Young to Stewart, 19 Oct. 1936, FO371 /123931, RG1081 /2226. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, r6Oct. 1956, PREMi 1/1756. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 30 Oct. 1956, €0926/552. Bowker to Foreign Office, 6 Nov. 1956, FOj7i /123934, RGi 081 ^346.
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Her Majesty's Government's possession, being published for at least a month. This led the Governor to describe himself as 'disappointed and somewhat dismayed'.45 In mid- and late October British ministers were also having to fend off pressure for movement over Cyprus from another quarter. Extremely concerned about the rising tension throughout much of the Mediterranean region, the Administration in Washington had overcome its hesitations, and decided to take action on its own behalf. Julius Holmes, President Eisenhower's Special Assistant on NATO Affairs—an official with considerable Mediterranean experience going back to the Second World War, and who had for some time been arguing that Cyprus provided a fortuitous opportunity for NATO to develop its powers as an arbitrator—was sent to explore the outlines of a deal in the various capitals. Arriving first in London, Holmes got little joy. Eden pronounced himself as 'bewildered' by American interference, and refused to see the President's envoy.46 Instead he was granted an interview with Lennox-Boyd and Selwyn Lloyd. The door of 10 Downing Street was still closed to him when, having gone in the interval to Athens, he returned and tried again. Nor did he have much more luck when he went to Ankara on 27 October. Holmes was kept waiting for several days—mostly spent playing golf on the arid and bumpy fairways of the Turkish capital—before Menderes finally agreed to see him.47 By then news was arriving that British and French troops, with Turkish approval, were descending on Egypt. This abortive initiative proved, in fact, the only direct and unilateral intervention in Cypriot affairs by the United States during the Emergency. The picture of President Eisenhower's chief NATO aide being kept at such arm's length by supposed allies adds a fresh sidelight on why it was, with regard to the larger matter of the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt, that the reaction in the White House was even more acerbic than in other sections of the Washington establishment. The first inkling in Washington that a major British military operation in the eastern Mediterranean was under way came from Pentagon intelligence of the build-up of activity around Cyprus. On the night of 31 October Canberra and Valiant bombers left southward in waves from Nicosia and Akrotiri airfields to drop their bombs on the ground establishments of the Egyptian Air Force. Since the planners of 'Musketeer' feared that if some of Egypt's Russian-piloted MiGs got airborne, their first target would be British installations in Cyprus,48 it was probably as well for many Cypriots, irrespective of their political sympathies, that these strikes succeeded. The constant droning of the aircraft overhead kept virtually everybody in southern Cyprus awake that night—Grivas himself, hidden away near Limassol, cannot have been oblivious to the noise. Consul Courtney remarked that the display of aerial power made a 'forcible impression' on the general public.49 It was precisely on such 45 46 47 48 49
Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 25 Oct. 1956,00926/344. Nutting, minute, 18 Oct. 1956^0371/123937^61081/2409. Bowker to D. P. Reilly, 6Nov. i9s6,FO37i/i23935,RGio8i/2349. Keith Kyle, The Suez Crisis (London, 1991), p. 169. Courtney, telegram to Dulles, 2 Nov. 1956, Box 3278, RG59, State Department Records, USNA.
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27 July 1956-5 April 1957
impressions that the British Government pinned many of its hopes, since the chief psychological purpose of the Suez campaign was to assert the British determination to maintain its stake in the region. The details of the ensuing foul-ups—military and, even more, political—which brought the Suez expedition shuddering to a halt will not be repeated here. On 6 November the British Government ordered a stop to the advance of its troops down the Canal, and, reluctantly, the French followed suit. By 9 November the First Paratroop Battalion was already back in Cyprus, and Harding was able to renew the offensive in the western part of the island which had been called off on the eve of the invasion. But this was small compensation for the much larger set-back which had been suffered elsewhere. In fact it was several months before the British garrison in Cyprus was restored to anything near its pre-Suez size. Meanwhile, the Egyptian debacle was the sign for Grivas to step up EOKA's efforts; nor was there much evidence at this stage of Athenian pressure to make him hold his hand. During the first three weeks of November EOKA killed thirty-three people—the highest casualty rate of the Emergency. In a particularly bloody forty-eight hours on 14/15 November, five fatalities occurred, including two British servicemen. Douglas Williamson, the Assistant Commissioner at Platres, blown up by a parcel bomb, was the most senior Cyprus Government official to be assassinated by EOKA during the conflict. The targeting of British civilian residents—a retired expatriate was shot dead whilst repairing his car in a quiet Nicosia suburb—was a fresh development, and led to protests that insufficient protection was being afforded by the Security Forces. Some of the resulting criticism was directed at the Governor for giving a low priority to the protection of civilians. A particularly poignant casualty was Angus MacDonald, the first journalist to die in the troubles. MacDonald was a young man who had been assisting Randolph Churchill in London on his biography of Lord Derby when, like his employer, in August 1956 he moved to the scene of the gathering crisis in the Levant. Foley recruited him for the Times of Cyprus. On 16 November MacDonald went out of the office in the old part of the town for a breather, and was gunned down in an adjoining alley-way. The half-finished article left on the victim's desk appeared in the newspaper several days later. 'Those who advised the Governor in August', it ran at the interrupted point, 'to put an end to the truce by demanding surrender terms because . . . EOKA was broken, bear some responsibility for the men who have died since.'M1 Harding accepted no such responsibility. That lay exclusively with the killers. To believe anything else, in his eyes, was madness, and he detested those, like Foley, who appeared to suggest that the guilt should be shared out (though it should also be said that for Foley, the killing of MacDonald was an occasion for considerable personal heart-searching on these issues). The Governor's response to Grivas' postSuez offensive was, characteristically, to tighten the Emergency regime still further. He came to London in mid-November in part to set out his case for an extended s
" Foley, Island in Revolt (London, 1971), p. 154.
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mandatory death penalty to deter the spate of urban assassinations, a law for the immunity of public servants to counter the fresh wave of allegations of brutality by members of the Security Forces, extra curbs on the press, and a 'mass deportation' of EOKA detainees so as to lessen the mounting pressure in the overcrowded camps.51 In Whitehall these demands raised eyebrows, and led the less discreet to point out the illogicality in calling for the 'placation' of Greek-Cypriot feelings one minute, and the next propagating Draconian and arguably counter-productive methods. In particular, his assumption that civil servants simply had to read the Riot Act to a few journalists in order to get a better press led to scathing comment. Yet, his advice on these matters could not easily be passed over. The British Government refused to contemplate dumping Cypriot 'terrorists' on to Her Majesty's Prison Service (though several dozen high-security EOKA suspects had already been transferred to Wormwood Scrubs). Nevertheless, additional laws were approved which broadened the mandatory death penalty to include consorting with those in possession of arms, gave the Governor power to act against newspapers publishing material prejudicial to the security campaign, and made it not only very difficult to institute a private prosecution against a public servant, but potentially costly, since those instigating such a process were to be liable to prosecution themselves if the original charges were not sustained. In the subtly changed moral perspective brought about by the roller-coaster of the Suez crisis, however, metropolitan opinion started to react more critically to repressive colonial legislation of this sort. Suddenly it jarred in a new way. Harding's action in using the new press law to prosecute Foley was undoubtedly an error, because Fleet Street—where Foley had many friends, having, ironically, once been Foreign News Editor of the arch-imperialist Daily Express—immediately rallied to the cause of press freedom. In the event Foley was acquitted, but not before The Times in London published an article on 29 November entitled 'The Heavy Hand' in which it was remarked that the tougher regulations in Cyprus 'were not to be excused as a reply to the ruthlessness of EOKA'. Matters were not helped by the appearances which Harding made on radio and television while in Britain. Interviewed on the BBC, he said in a reply to a question as to whether he had yet found any Cypriots willing to talk to him, 'I am not really looking for anyone to negotiate with in present circumstances.' Whereas before this might have passed unnoticed, now it hit a wrong note. More ill advised was the Field-Marshal's defence of the revamped mandatory death penalty on the BBC's 'Home and Abroad' current affairs programme. This exchange went as follows: QUESTION. Do you mean that a youth of 17 who is carrying arms should be treated in the same way as a man who has used arms? ANSWER. Who is to stop a youth of 17 from carrying arms? His mother. And what better support for his mother in stopping him than to make the penalty for this wretched business as severe as it can be. 51
See material on the problems of the detention camps in 01)926/343.
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Harding was, in a way, the victim of his own forthright honesty in refusing to dissimulate the blunt reasoning behind his own security policies. Nevertheless, the deep water into which Her Majesty's Government was being drawn was illustrated when the Cyprus regulations were debated in the House of Lords on 6 December, where legal peers were bound to cast a keenly critical eye on them.52 On this occasion the Government spokesman, Lord Lloyd, found himself confronted with the considerable forensic expertise of Earl Jowitt who, as Attorney-General in Attlee's Labour Government, had strongly opposed the execution of Jewish terrorists in Palestine. His remarks on this occasion were all the more cutting for having been prefaced by the observation that he knew absolutely nothing about Cyprus, and would never have dreamed about intervening on the subject, had he not listened to Harding on the radio a few days before. He took issue with the 'utterly fallacious' proposition put forward by the Governor that the more severely certain crimes were punished, the less likely they were to occur. This was an argument, he said, which invariably led to the last state being worse than the first. The peer acknowledged that Harding was doing a difficult job, and that he should have all the powers he reasonably required; but he confessed that the fact that the Governor had asked for, and been granted, powers which were 'the most Draconian I ever recall', filled him with grave anxiety. So long as attacks on Government policy remained at this level of generality their rhetorical effects were rarely lasting. What hurt was when they began to nail down the details. Jowitt now proceeded to do this with regard to the provision for mandatory capital sentencing which, he icily observed, 'bears this stamped upon its face: that the Executive has lost faith in its judges'. His most caustic words, however, concerned the looseness of the wording, which appeared to bring within the scope of the legislation even persons who happened to be found in the company of a poacher. In truth, the law had been drafted in Nicosia, and the Colonial Office had refrained from insisting on amendment for fear of antagonizing the already sensitive Governor. Whatever the reason may have been, in answering Jowitt's points Lloyd was ill at ease and even maladroit. He repeatedly fell back lamely on the argument that in any legal document there was always a vital difference between the drafting and the intention. He admitted that he was 'not going to pretend' that the drafting of the clauses in this case was perfect, and gave an assurance that he and his colleagues would 'have a look at them', but rested his argument on the necessity to lift from the shoulders of the judiciary an agonizing decision relating to crimes 'which, in our view, amounted in the present circumstances to murder or attempted murder'. 'All I would say', Lloyd added before sitting down, 'is that anyone who is carrying a bomb in Cyprus at the moment is not doing so for fun.' Not only did Lloyd's jejune treatment strike an inappropriate chord, but the fact that on a matter involving life and death, legislation had been approved on such an unsatisfactory basis, created an impression of policy being dangerously improvised as ministers went along. The debate itself, like all " Sec Parliamentary Debates (Lords.), / 956-7, vol. 200,6 Dec. 1956, cols. 813-39.
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those on Cyprus, came and went without any practical consequences, but it conveyed a new ethical and political sensitivity as British politics entered a post-Suez world in which many of the older certainties and benchmarks had foundered. Earl Jowitt's observation during the Lords debate described above that, in the FieldMarshal's public statements, the emphasis usually seemed to be that of 'the commander carrying on a campaign, not of a Governor trying to bring peace to his disturbed island' drew political blood.5' Yet it was only half—the public half—of the truth. The more private Harding was increasingly impatient for a political breakthrough to lighten his task. The only hope for this lay in the success of the Radcliffe mission, and one additional reason for the Governor's visit to London was to insist that Radcliffe's recommendations be published and acted upon without further delay. Before appearing in London, furthermore, he afforded the British cabinet a trenchant analysis of the Cypriot situation. The publication of the Commissioner's report, might, Harding stated, prove a turning-point away from fear and tyranny in the colony; but equally it might be just one more fruitless effort.54 The outcome hinged on whether publication of its contents was tied to a comprehensive statement about the long-term future 'in terms which leave no room for misunderstanding, misinterpretation or suspicion'. Yet even such a crystal-clear statement on these lines was not enough. The complexities of the problem also meant that such variables as the 'contingency' of partition, the views of Greece and Turkey, some means of involving Archbishop Makarios in a settlement and the terms of his release, and an amnesty for EOKA, had all to be simultaneously brought into the equation. If action over Radcliffe was taken in isolation from all these factors, he warned, the effect would be to make things worse, not better, since the very failure to resolve uncertainty would intensify rivalry not only between the British and the Greeks, but between the Greeks and the Turks. If the opportunity provided by Radcliffe was allowed to slip by, Harding powerfully concluded: it would be unwise to assume that it will be possible to [resume conciliation] at some later date . . . The sands of goodwill and cooperation between the Government and people of Cyprus are running out. Already the younger generation of Greek-Cypriots are poisoned and embittered. It can only be a question of time before the readiness of the older people to acquiesce in the continuation of the British connection is permanently impaired. The longer the present troubles continue, the greater is the risk of our reaching a point of no return in our relations with the Greek-Cypriot people as a whole.55
We should at this point review some of the details of the Radcliffe Report which was lying uneasily on ministerial desks in Whitehall, and which represented the only slender hope of halting the evaporation of goodwill to which Harding referred.56 The 53
Ibid. col. 826. 'Cyprus Policy: Note by the Governor', 23 Nov. 1956, 00926/553. " Ibid. 56 Constitutional Proposals for Cyprus: Report Submitted to the Secretary of State for Colonies, Cmd. 42, HMSO, 1956. 54
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apparently disarming introduction was, in fact, crucial. Radcliffe emphasized that his task as Commissioner had not been to invent some formula capable of bringing peace to a disaffected colony. His brief had been simply to propose the bases of constitutional development in Cyprus after law and order had been restored, and on the basis of continuing British sovereignty. This implicitly reflected the conviction which Harding had himself impressed on Radcliffe in Nicosia that without the 'missing factor' of self-determination, no constitutional initiative in the island could hope to succeed. In other words—though any 'lay' reader would not easily have seen the point—the report itself confessed to a gaping hole in the middle which would eventually have to be filled in one way or another. Beyond this there were two main practical themes in the body of Radcliffe's recommendations. The first concerned the distribution of powers between the British administration as represented by the Governor, and a restored Legislative Assembly. To solve this conundrum the Commissioner resorted to the old imperial device of dyarchy—that is, splitting the exercise of powers into two parts, one to be retained by the colonial power, the other to be devolved into local hands. Since the assumption of the report was continuing British sovereignty, however, the form of dyarchy which was recommended was one which would allow the British executive to function regardless of the opposition of elected representatives. As Crou/et stresses in his account, the design was not that of a democratic polity, or even a genuine form of autonomy, but a colonial constitution of a distinctively old-fashioned kind." 'Not fit for Zulus' afterwards became a tag in Greek-Cypriot circles, and it was at least true that there were already several constitutions in British Africa of a more advanced kind than this. The other thread running through the report was the protection of minority rights. Radcliffe explicitly rejected the claim of the Muslim community for coequality with the Greek majority, just as he was said to be hostile to a partition of Cyprus (Radcliffe, also as a special Commissioner, had been responsible for delimiting the partitioned borders of the Punjab and Bengal in 1947, during the course of which much bloodshed had occurred, so he appreciated very well why partition was a 'counsel of despair'). Nevertheless, the extensive powers and status which were provisionally held out by Radcliffe to the Cypriot Muslims presaged a separate Turkish sphere cut out from the overarching Greek pattern. In the Legislative Assembly Turkish votes and those of the Governor's nominated representatives were to enjoy a plurality over Greeks. To anyone who knew anything of recent Cypriot history, this was not to look forward, but back to the period prior to 1931. Overall, it is hard to disagree with Crouzet that if colonial rule had not already been challenged, if violence had not been in full flow, and if ethnic tension had not already been aroused, these proposals might have provided a basis for a solution; what they could not do on their own—and what Radcliffe implicitly admitted they could not do—was effect a compromise in the triangular battle between imperial, national, and racial passions which by the autumn of 1956 had Cyprus in their grip.'8 57
Crou/ct, Conjlil tie Cltypn; ii. 881-2.
5S
Ibid. 883.
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Despite these limitations, even the publication, let alone the acceptance of Radcliffe's proposals, held risks for the beleaguered Conservative Government. As soon as rumours circulated that the report had been completed, demands that it be suppressed started to come in from Ankara, where Radcliffe was feared as the start of a slippery slope to Enosis; and, as the Foreign Office noted, it was 'a safe assumption... that our dependence on Turkish goodwill and cooperation will have increased rather than diminished as a result of the Suez imbroglio'. In the powerful and confused backwash of Suez, whipped up as it was by emotions of humiliation, failure, and betrayal, any suggestion of adding yet a further British climbdown was bound to be highly controversial at home. On the other hand, as Lennox-Boyd admitted, any straight suppression of the report was 'impracticable, if only because Lord Radcliffe would himself refuse to agree to it' (that the Colonial Secretary would have liked to suppress it was transparent).59 On 13 November Lennox-Boyd made a 'holding' statement in the House of Commons that the report would be published 'in due course'.60 This did not sound at all urgent, and the United States Ambassador visited the Foreign Office the same day to renew his Government's complaint that the British Cabinet 'had not put its mind to the Cyprus problem'.61 Kirkpatrick was, after recent events, in no position to upbraid Ambassador Aldrych as he had done in the past, and instead assured him that 'they [the Cabinet] meant to do so without delay'. The disappearance of Eden for recuperation in Jamaica on 23 November, leaving behind him a swirl of rumours that he would never return in an official capacity, helped in some degree to make this possible. When the United Kingdom's Permanent Representative returned to London at the beginning of December, he formed the impression that ministers, under the temporary leadership of R. A. Butler pending a leadership contest, were 'longing for a proper way out of this [Cypriot] mess'.62 It was in order to find a 'proper way' through this maze of dilemmas that LennoxBoyd (whose own associations with the right-wing of his party came close to the surface at this stage) latched on to the theme of partition. He did so, however, not as a 'contingency' to coax Turkey into an acceptance of constitutional progress as Harding wished, but as a threat to force the Greeks and Greek-Cypriots 'to reconsider the merits of the status quo'.63 This difference was obviously fundamental. When Lennox-Boyd put his ideas in draft form to the Cabinet's Colonial Policy Committee on 3 December, one ministerial colleague, indeed, retorted that from a GreekCypriot vantage-point the wording proposed by Lennox-Boyd was 'even worse . . . than Her Majesty's Government's previous announcements, because it hints at partition without stating anything definite about self-determination' (almost the exact 59
Young, minute, 7 Nov. 1956, FO37I/123935^01081/2362. Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 1956-7, vol. 560,13 Nov. 1956, cols. 754-5. 61 Aldrich, telegram to Dulles, 13 Nov. 1956, Box 3278, RGs9, State Department Records, USNA. 62 Steel to Hood, 4 Jan. i957,FO37i/i3oi37,RGCi072/2. 63 'Cyprus: Memorandum by Mr Lennox-Boyd for Cyprus Policy Committee', CAB 129/821, CA(56)33. 60
l6
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opposite of what the Governor had in mind)/'4 Furthermore, it was pointed out, playing with partition in this way risked 'a serious deterioration in Anglo-Greek or Anglo-Turkish relations or hoth'—that is, falling out badly with both communities, and ending up in that most nightmarish of decolonizations, one in which the British were attacked from all sides, as had happened in Palestine only a few years before. When the issue was raised again in Cabinet on 11 December, the same doubts were raised that 'the Island might eventually be partitioned against the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants'/' 5 In the interval, however, the pressure from both Washington and NATO to make some move over Cyprus had been stepped up, and the Foreign Office entered the fray to stress that a parliamentary statement had to be made before the Christmas recess intervened/' 6 Not for the first time the tactical necessities of a parliamentary timetable led to the rushing of a crucial statement on the future of Cyprus. In fact this served the purposes of Lennox-Boyd, who offered to leave immediately for talks in Athens and Ankara, promising that in these exchanges he would make no definite commitments on partition but 'represent the policy set out in the proposed statement as merely the lines on which the [British] were at present thinking'/' 7 On this rather fragile basis the Colonial Secretary went away to prepare for his travels, with a view to making a new announcement in the House of Commons on Wednesday, 19 December. In leaving for Athens on 13 December, Lennox-Boyd harboured no illusions that the Greek Government would unreservedly accept the Radcliffe formula. After arrival he did not even ask them to do so, merely pressing on Karamanlis at their meeting that he avoid any rigid position on the subject. Radcliffe's report, he said, was as liberal a document as the British Government could put forward in the circumstances/'8 As for JVIakarios, a topic which could hardly be ignored, the Colonial Secretary assured the Greek leader and Foreign Minister Averoff that a Colonial Office official and an interpreter were already on their way to the Seychelles, and that the Archbishop would at the appropriate moment be shown a copy of the report and given an opportunity to express his views on it. At the same time Lennox-Boyd made it clear that there was no possibility of any negotiation being involved in this 'consultation', and he ended threateningly (in an echo of the Harding-Makarios exchanges of old) by saying that the present was the 'last chance' to settle the Cyprus problem amicably. Prime Minister Karamanlis, in replying, passed over Radcliffe more or less entirely. \Vhat he wanted to know was if these constitutional recommendations were the whole story of the impending statement in Parliament, or whether (as the Greeks M
Minutes of Cyprus Policy Committee, 4 Jan. 1957,1^0371/123940,1101072/2476. '" Cyprus: Cabinet Conclusions on Plan for a Constitutional Settlement, u Dec. 1956, CAB 128/30/2, CM99(s6)i. '''' 'Cyprus: Cabinet Conclusions on Plan for a Constitutional Settlement, 12 Dec. 1956, CAB 128/30/2, CM99(5f>)2. f7 ' Ibid. '"s Record of Conversation between the Greek Prime Minister and Colonial Secretary in Athens, 14 Dec. 1956, CO(_)26/353.
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suspected) there was some other ingredient to be added to the recipe. Only then did Lennox-Boyd give him the full gist of the proposed declaration 'which, he said, would put it [Radcliffe] in its political framework', including partition as an option in the event of the application of self-determination. For Greek ministers, whatever possibilities might have crossed Averoff's mind during his early days in office, partition now could only mean political extinction. In bringing these talks to an acrimonious end, therefore, the British and the Greeks did what they always did when tempers frayed—they argued about Makarios. After Lennox-Boyd claimed yet again to have 'irrefutable proof that the Archbishop was involved in EOKA's violence, Karamanlis acidly commented that he was 'doubtful whether the Archbishop had any connection with terrorism'. 'It appeared from the discussion that on the questions of Archbishop Makarios and of self-determination', Karamanlis concluded, 'the views of HMG were far removed from those . . . of the Greek Government,' leaving the British minister to depart with the prediction that the alternative was 'very grim and grave. It could only be the maintenance of military government.'69 In the midst of these exchanges, relations were not helped when LennoxBoyd—seeking to exploit every possible leverage—tried to get access to King Paul in order to persuade him to exert influence over his Prime Minister, only to find that Karamanlis vetoed any royal audience being given to the visiting statesman. As the British Embassy observed, this episode marked a further erosion of the monarchy's capacity to act as a 'power for stabilization' in Greek politics.70 In the Foreign Office the Greek approach during this sequence was immediately afterwards castigated as 'ungracious and ungenerous and very stupid'.71 The British side sincerely felt that they had made substantial concessions to the Greek case. Lennox-Boyd had not pressed for an unqualified expression of approval for the British statement. A liberal, self-governing constitution, of a sort, was foreshadowed. Even Makarios was to be brought back into a corner of the picture. The Greek perception, however, was very different. Their full agreement was not asked for, they felt, because the British did not greatly care whether they had it or not. The Radcliffe recommendations begged all the vital constitutional and political questions. As a close British observer of Greek politics observed, this first official contact between the two Governments over Cyprus since Makarios' deportation symbolized the mental gulf between them, with the British proffering gifts they expected to be gratefully received, and the Greeks revolting at being taken for granted one moment and bullied the next.72 For Lennox-Boyd and his delegation, which included a bevy of Foreign and Colonial Office officials, the stopover in Athens was merely a prelude to the main business in Ankara. The latter constituted what was summed up afterwards as 'an important chapter in the Cyprus Question'.73 The Colonial Secretary assured Menderes when 69 71 72 73
70 Ibid. J.Mackenzie to T.Lloyd, 28 Dec. 1956^0371/123942^01081/2571. Young to Roberts, 17 Dec. 1956, FO37i/i2394i, 1161081/2509. Leslie Finer, Times of Cyprus (31 Dec. 1956). Galsworthy, 4Jan. 1957^0371/123942^01081/2571.
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they met on 16 December that Britain 'had no intention of betraying' the Muslims in the colony. In presenting the Radcliffe report, he did so in minimalist ways—stressing that it involved no change of sovereignty, and that at every turn it was qualified byreservations and safeguards. Like Karamanlis, however, what the Turkish leader really wanted to know about was the wider 'political framework' to be unveiled in the British parliament in three days' time. In expatiating on this, Lcnnox-Boyd stated that he would 'bear in mind any comments made by the Turkish Government, between now and Wednesday [the igth], or in the period between the statement on Wednesday and the preparation of the legal safeguards [in the constitution]'.74 This came very close to asking Menderes to name his own price for cooperation, and went beyond the assurance the Colonial Secretary had given his more doubtful ministerial colleagues before leaving London. Indeed, Lennox-Boyd said he was quite prepared to go back to London and ask the Cabinet that 'it [partition] should be put in a more positive way, and he fully understood the [Turkish ] Prime Minister's wish that this should be so'.75 When Menderes responded by demanding that the British Government abandon the 'academic exercise' of the Radcliffe constitution and move straight to partition, the Colonial Secretary said that Radcliffe could not be thrown over in London 'at this stage'—a striking qualification. 76 Although Menderes for a while persisted in his preference for a quick-fix partition—'we have done this sort of thing before', he told Lennox-Boyd, 'and you will see that it is not as bad as all that'— he eventually came round to the alternative of a more positive wording on partition in the hypothetical contingency of self-determination. With this the Colonial Secretary returned to London in the unlikely role of a Turkish messenger. On his arrival, Sir Norman Brook, the Cabinet Secretary, was immediately set to work on a new phraseology on partition. The result was a declaration 'that the exercise of self-determination in such a mixed community [as Cyprus] must include partition among the eventual options'. Whilst not quite as 'positive' as Menderes had indicated, it was felt in Whitehall that this embodied 'the essence of what the Turks want'—the guarantee of a physical stake in the island should the status quo ever be altered. In presenting this to the full Cabinet on 17 December, Lennox-Boyd pointed out that it would meet not only the Turkish desiderata but that it was 'also likely to be acceptable to the Government's supporters in the House of Commons'.77 In some ministerial quarters anxiety about this approach continued to be felt. Lennox-Boyd had gone to Ankara saying he would not tie British hands over partition, and had returned clearly compromised to some degree. Several colleagues felt that the impression created that Cypriot self-determination was to be entirely a matter of British convenience would be highly damaging, while the view was also aired that pushing partition forward in this way would reduce the incentive of local • 4 Record of Conversation between the Turkish Prime Minister and the Colonial Secretary in Ankara, 16 Dec. 1956, COQ26/353. 75 Ibid. ~" Lcnnox-Boyd to Selwyn Lloyd, 17 Dec. 1956, 0^0926/254. " Cyprus: Cabinet Conclusions on a Plan for Constitutional Settlement, CAB 128/30/2, CM 102(56) i.
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Cypriot communities to work together. But Lennox-Boyd's trump card against these hesitations was the sheer necessity to get up in the House of Commons on Wednesday afternoon and say something about Cyprus. Brook's suggested wording was the only one guaranteed not to be rejected in Ankara, or to cause unhappiness on the Government's own benches. This was, therefore, with a bit of tinkering, what was said by the Colonial Secretary in the House of Commons on the afternoon of 19 December.78 In this way the genie of partition was finally eased out of its Cypriot bottle. Subsidiary to this crucial development, but revealing in its own way, was the episode in which Archbishop Makarios was simultaneously apprised of—if not really consulted about—the Radcliffe recommendations. Before relating this, however, we must pause to glimpse something of Archbishop Makarios' life in his Indian Ocean detention. The very colonial English couple who had been put in charge of the Cypriot 'guests' in the residence of Sans Souci, Captain and Mrs Le Geyt, have left a memoir of their experience.79 Although at first taken aback at the 'ancient and oriental appearance' of the Orthodox ecclesiastics, Makarios' courtesy and cheerfulness made an immediate impact on them. Life in the residence was frugal but adequate. A certain pettiness showed in the treatment of Makarios and his companions, though not by the Le Geyts. One of the few, scarcely insupportable, privations of the Greek inmates other than the loss of their freedom was the absence of olive oil in the diet. A request that this commodity might be supplied from Cyprus was nonetheless refused.80 When the Captain asked for the provision of croquet equipment to provide much needed exercise for his charges, especially the overweight Bishop of Kyrenia, this, too, was denied. Such small-mindedness came as much from official nervousness as from any spite. It was the same nervousness which at first meant that the perimeter of Sans Souci was patrolled by guards with machine guns and the ubiquitous tracker-dogs from Kenya.81 Such apprehensions were explained by the great embarrassment already caused by the escapes of leading EOKA suspects from custody in Cyprus, and concern that an attempt to rescue the Archbishop might be launched from within the Greek community in East Africa; officials in Athens could not resist some fun at British expense by occasionally spreading rumours that such an event was in the offing.82 But there was no real possibility that the Primate of a great eastern Church was going to leap the walls of his verdant prison, and before long the atmosphere surrounding Sans Souci became less 78
Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 1955-6, vol. 562,19 Dec. 1956, cols. 1268-78. Captain Le Geyt, Makarios in Exile (Nicosia, 1961). The Official Secrets Act was employed to block the publication of this memoir, which gave a relatively favourable view of its subject, in the United Kingdom. See the material in CO926/1109. 80 Harding, telegram to Lennox-Boyd, 25 Apr. 1956, FO37I/I23886, RGio8i/830. Harding's explanation was that the provision of food packages from Cyprus would require 'careful scrutiny' when the resources of the Security Forces were already fully stretched. 81 A stock of 30 brens, 15,000 rounds of ammunition, and 30 rockets were stored at Mombasa to be drawn upon at request by the Seychelles Police Force. See material in WO276/2I (War Office files). 82 For British fears about such a potential escapade see FO371 /123891, RG1081 /1oio and /1o11. 79
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strained. The 'guests' were allowed to go for walks outside the grounds, and local clergy, usually the Anglican Archdeacon and the local Roman Catholic Bishop, were let in to have tea, where the discussion was inevitably theological—matters on which hair-splitting Orthodoxy invariably prevailed over Anglican pedestrianism, if not over Roman obstinacy. The Archbishop received English lessons, and although they vvere interrupted when the hired teacher, aghast at the revelations of Grivas' diaries, felt he could go on no longer, Mrs Le Geyt filled the gap. All these innocent activities made a strange contrast with the darkness of a distant terrorism, and Captain Le Geyt captured this when he recalled his difficulty in understanding 'why a man | Archbishop Makarios j with such a sporting nature has not condemned the unsporting tactics of the EOKA terrorists'.83 Whatever the true answer to the Captain's psychological puzzle, as Makarios' sojourn in Sans Souci went on, he was not totally carefree. At times he seemed pale; he was examined for an ulcer, although nothing was found; increasingly he preferred his own company.84 Mis anxieties can only be guessed at, since, unlike Grivas, he did not attempt to keep a diary. At first, exile, though hardly desirable in itself, undoubtedly had some compensations for Makarios. It put the onus on other people, and provided space for reflection. He could be heartened as it became obvious that, far from destroying his reputation with his own countrymen, exile only served to confirm his status as the leader of the Greek-Cypriot people. At the same time, his biographer, Stanley Mayes, points out that he must have been very conscious that one of his predecessors as Bishop of Kitium, exiled in 1931, had died before being allowed to go home. Above all, the longer time went on, the more violence took hold in Cyprus, and the more rudderless the Greek community became, the more difficult it was bound to be for him at some future point to pick up the pieces. Above all, he could see how, step by step, Turkey was being drawn into 'the centre of the picture'. Yet profoundly though the Archbishop wished to be released from detention, he could not afford to be let out on British terms. In any departure, he must go—and be seen to go— entirely as his own man. Greek 'face' and British 'prestige' were, as always, pitted against each other in this mental struggle. During his statement to the House of Commons on ig December 1956, the Colonial Secretary announced that an official, Derek Pearson, accompanied by a Greek interpreter, had just arrived in the Seychelles to make contact with the Archbishop (they had travelled to their destination incognito on a cruise liner, though in a sequence sardonically likened by the Times of Cyprus to a 'film thriller', their 'cover' was blown when they insisted on reading their briefing documents on the leisure deck of the vessel).83 As the representatives from London finally entered the dining-room of Sans Souci on 20 December and bent to receive the formal benediction of the Archbishop, the occasion must have exuded a subtle irony. The observation made in the Foreign Office that Pearson and his companion, S1 s;;
Quoted in Stanley Mayes, Makarios. A Biography (London, 1981), p. 88. Times of Cyprus (22 Dec. n)56).
S4
Ibid.
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Criton Tornaritis (a former Attorney-General of Cyprus) 'were not given a very easy hand to play' whilst in the Seychelles, whereas Makarios' was 'full of trumps',86 typified the British sense of fragility whenever they tried to deal directly with the Archbishop. The analysis was accurate in so far as the hands of the two visitors were almost completely tied by their strict instructions not to enter into any negotiations with Makarios (Lennox-Boyd had emphasized this limitation in speaking to the House of Commons). The two visitors, therefore, had nothing in effect to give the Archbishop, whereas the Archbishop did have something—an encouraging word about Radcliffe, if not an outright denunciation of violence—that they wanted from him. Two days before Christmas, Makarios let drop to Pearson that he was 'willing to bargain some sort of pacifying action against the promise of a change of venue', but retreated into his shell once he saw that the emissary was not empowered to make a commitment of any sort. On 9 January Pearson and Tornaritis received instructions from the British Cabinet to leave 'by the next boat'.87 In essence, their mission had been just as 'academic' as Lord Radcliffe's more wide-ranging constitutional endeavours. By the time the next boat arrived five days later, the Radcliffe initiative had become irretrievably bogged down—rejected in Athens, damned with the faintest of praises in Ankara, and with 'scarcely perceptible support' emanating from Washington. This reconstruction of events in the final days and weeks of 1956, fateful as they were for the subsequent history of Cyprus, throw light on the political process at work on the British side. Harding had once more pressed for a political move by Her Majesty's Government to assist the pacification of Cyprus. Events had finally forced the Cabinet's hand, but the shape this initiative took was a very long way from Harding's seminal call for a statement 'which leaves no room for misunderstanding, misinterpretation or suspicion'. As some ministers had warned, the airing of partition, even in contingent form, increased the scope for misunderstanding all round. Rising Turkish disenchantment was linked to Ankara's belief in the wake of the 19 December statement that they had been deceived. Zorlu's claim that Lennox-Boyd had given him a personal promise that partition was 'round the corner', indeed, distinctly embarrassed the Colonial Secretary among his colleagues, and he regretted having allowed their talks to be conducted entirely in English, without the precise clarification afforded by an interpreter. It is impossible to be sure where the truth lies in this. It was part of the Turkish technique over Cyprus to assert that cast-iron guarantees had been made to them, only to be subsequently reneged upon. At the same time, the record of the talks in Ankara suggest that the Colonial Secretary went a long way to ingratiate himself with his hosts. What is sure is that by early 1957 the British were in danger of falling into the trap some had forecast—that of alienating the Turks whilst still fighting with the Greeks. Nor had the abortive climax of the Radcliffe exercise resulted in any improvement 86 8/
W. Hayter, minute, 6 Feb. 1956, FO3717130070, RGiois/3i. Young, minute, 9Jan. 1957^0371/130070^01015/17.
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of Anglo-American understanding over Cyprus. The furthest the Eisenhower Administration would go in welcoming the report was to express a 'sympathetic interest', coded language which Whitehall felt fatally prejudiced the enterprise. Meanwhile, American anxieties about the rebarbative effects of British policy were sharpened by the advent of the partition option. If the British official mind, wizened by hard imperial experience, regarded partition as a resort which, whatever its imperfections, was quite legitimately open to powers burdened with the responsibility of governing plural and divided societies, American officialdom looked askance at decisions which were likely to create a legacy of regional instability open to exploitation by the enemies of the West. In this vein the prominent British role in the partitioning of Indo-China during 1954, which yielded the north of that country to the Communist regime led by Ho Chi Minh, had angered Dulles. Such suspicions and impatience were reflected in the comment ('Good grief) scribbled on the telegram which first disclosed that the British seemed to be thinking of partitioning Cyprus.88 By late 1956 one of the priorities of the Eisenhower Administration was to ensure that America's allies settled their differences in accordance with broad alliance interests, and a Resolution was passed at the NATO Council in Paris on T6 December to this effect. Not only did the appearance of partition threaten this goal, but with another United Nations session looming there seemed to be every prospect of further diplomatic hostilities breaking out over Cyprus—the Greek Government was threatening to go 'all out' in New York to exploit their moral advantage after Suez, the British countered with the threat to publish information proving Athenian complicity in Cypriot terrorism, whilst Turkish diplomats issued chilling threats of a possible 'massacre' of Greeks in Istanbul.89 Bent on screening off NATO from such disruptions, the Eisenhower Administration pressured the Greeks, but also made no secret of their willingness to 'speak boldly to the British' if something did not happen pretty soon to clap a lid back on the Cypriot cauldron.'"1 In speaking to the British in the future, the Americans were no longer to be dealing with Eden, who on 10 January was succeeded as Prime Minister by Harold Macmillan, the latter having convincingly defeated R. A. Butler in the contest for the leadership of the Conservative Party. It was said that this outcome was affected by the belief in parts of the party that Butler had been a 'weak sister' over Suez,91 and as we have seen the latter had, albeit in his usual veiled manner, shown similar hesitations over Cyprus. When President Eisenhower heard the news of this choice, his comment was that Macmillan and Eden were, in fact, 'somewhat alike in the fact that both could not bear to see the dying of Britain as a colonial power'.92 Nevertheless, the new Prime Minister later told his official biographer that on gaining the leaderm
Aldrich, telegram to Dulles, 24 Aug. 1956, Box 3277, RG.59, State Department Records, USNA. Peake to Hayter, 13 Jan. 1957, FO37i/i30i62, RGCio72/i78i. '"' L. Dale to N. Parsons, 16 Jan. 1956, Box 3278, RGsg, State Department Records, USNA. 91 For Butler and the Sue/, crisis see A. Howard, RAB: The Life of R. A. Butler (London, 1987), PP-n330-42. Eisenhower Diary, 10 Jan. 1957, Box 8, ACW File, Papers of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. SM
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ship he 'intended to run it [the Government]... as a centre party . . . I was not prepared to run it on an extreme right-wing basis'.93 He was keenly aware from the start that to be swept along by Suez-type forces would almost certainly mean suffering the same kind of shipwreck as his predecessor. For this reason alone he was disposed to look for some way of excising the Cypriot canker facing his inevitably fragile ministry. 'It would be of immense advantage to this country', he wrote to Selwyn Lloyd, whom he retained as Foreign Secretary, 'if we could get the Cyprus question settled during the lifetime of this Parliament.'94 The principle of this time-frame for the settlement of the problem was deeply to influence events, though not necessarily in a straightforward manner. In the art of politics, however, immediate necessities are not the same thing as medium- or long-term goals, nor do they always point in the same direction. 'If you want to get upstream, you start by rowing downstream,' was a favourite maxim of Macmillan's, and one which may be said to have had a special application to certain colonial problems in the era of decolonization (the classic exponent being General de Gaulle, who first rode the wave ofAlgerie Franfaise to get back into power in France during 1958, only to sacrifice the interests of the settlers when finally ordering French withdrawal from that country). For the moment, the situation in Cyprus, and the complexion of Conservative domestic politics, remained too much in flux for any decisive or controversial decisions to be taken in early 1957. When the Archbishop of Canterbury wrote to the new Prime Minister calling on him to take a grip on Cypriot affairs, and appoint a new Governor who might prove 'a skilful and sympathetic healer of divisions',95 Macmillan sent only an evasive response. 'Pathetically naive and misguided,' a Colonial Office official remarked on Dr Fisher's plea, expressing the supercharged emotions still running through sections of British opinion in the wake of Suez. Macmillan had no intention of striking out in one direction or another until, and unless, it became transparent which of the competing currents was the more compelling. Yet if the substance of policy was as yet unchanged, there was mounting pressure to adjust its style and tone. There were two sensitive aspects of the Emergency which came to the fore in early 1957 and highlighted the pitfalls in front of the British Government. The first was the continuing Greek-Cypriot campaign to publicize and seek redress for alleged misdemeanours by members of the Security Forces. In the absence of any independent enquiry, the Nicosia Bar Council—till now the only Greek-dominated institution in Cyprus maintaining a dialogue with the colonial authorities—set up in late 1956 its own Human Rights Commission. This led to a surge of publicity, though the Commission was careful to stress that its charges concerned not the generality of the Security Forces, but a small and identifiable number of special interrogators. When the Colonial Office—increasingly of the opinion that 'there was no smoke without fire' in this area—pressed the Governor to take action 93 94 95
Alistair Home, Macmillan, 1957-1986 (London, 1989), ii. 37. Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary, 4 Feb. 1957, PREMii/iysyA. Archbishop Fisher to Prime Minister, 4 Feb. 1957, €0926/632.
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to counter the anxieties, he merely restated the existing procedure that 'if. . . complaints were made in detail, were signed by complainants and properly presented, they were carefully investigated and the members of the Security Forces were either cleared or their actions were brought home to them What he would not do was to act on general allegations or anonymous claims."'6 The problem was that complainants were quite obviously ill-placed to present their material in the shipshape manner required. Meanwhile, the well-respected Manchester Guardian reported that you only had to spend a day in a Nicosia barrister's office, observing the comings and goings of relatives with no idea where a loved one had been taken, except for rumours that so-and-so had been seen at a police station looking daxed and unhappy, to realize that something was going amiss somewhere.97 Harding believed that the allegations were smears, as many surely were. Nevertheless, the unwillingness to allow any independent investigation became increasingly embarrassing in terms of international opinion. The other controversial Emergency practice which raised acute moral and practical questions was the mandatory death penalty. This legislation had one concrete disadvantage—the condemned cells were filling up, with the grim prospect of a succession of hangings through the rest of the year (over two dozen individuals were involved). Ministers in London did not relish taking responsibility for these executions, and badgered Harding for a convincing rationale for the law which they could at least use in Parliament and other public forums to deflect criticism. 'One youth,' the Governor responded to such a request, 'aware that he was liable to the deathpenalty, declared his intention of implicating others as well, and proceeded to make a 26-page statement admitting his complicity in earlier murders and giving material which led to the arrest of many terrorists in the area. The same occurred to a lesser degree in Famagusta."'8 Yet, as Harding surely realized, this was exactly the sort of explanation which could not be used in Parliament, amounting as it did to a species of extracted confession. The fact was that if ministers in London often seemed unwilling to make Harding's task easier in the realm of political policy, Harding was not at all disposed to help them get off the hook as to its presentation. More than any other branch of Emergency policy, the implementation of capital sentences involving actual bodily harm embodied the Governor's philosophy of'no middle way', and functioned in his mind as a litmus-test of the British Government's willingness to live up to the underlying challenge to prove that it was possible physically to master the scourge of terrorism. As such, it came to mark a principal fault-line in British policy-making. This volatility was underlined by the fact that one convicted Greek, Tsaldaris, was due to be hanged on the eve of the United Nations session. Appeals poured in as usual, both inside and outside the island—including the long, ancient-looking scrolls addressed to the Governor from Cypriot villages, with their straggly peasant '"' Sinclair to Melville, 5 Jan. 1957, €0926/879. "7 Manchester Guardian (iqVeb. 1957). ''" Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 21 Dec. 1956, €0926/561.
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signatures and marks of identification. In previous capital cases during the Emergency, the authorities in London had not intervened on behalf of clemency. That such an intervention now occurred arose almost certainly because of the Government's heightened vulnerability to international criticism. Even so, great care was needed in selecting the reasons to be put to the Governor, since any mention of the United Nations was likely to meet with acute irritation. Lennox-Boyd pointed out to the Governor the 'one point of legal doubt which had previously been expressed by our counsel [in London]',99 whilst the minister promised to take personal responsibility if the commutation was followed by a rash of further killings. Tsaldaris did not hang, and this decision played a part in helping the Americans to persuade the Greek Government not to press their case in New York, and instead to accept another anodyne resolution. Nevertheless, Harding resented having his elbow jogged, and in yielding he made it plain that he did not regard it as a precedent. Since there was a queue of condemned men, it was inevitable that there was only a brief space before another capital case moved into the foreground. This concerned Evagoras Pallikarides, whose appeal against sentence of death had been dismissed at the end of February. His situation attracted a great deal of international attention since, aged 18 years, he was the youngest so far to face the gallows. Pallikarides had been apprehended in December 1955 when an Army patrol in the Troodos mountains came upon an armed EOKA group on its way to winter quarters; whereas his companions had successfully made off, Pallikarides had surrendered without resistance. After the Supreme Court decision, the usual procedures were gone through. In this instance, however, there was a further twist, since the matter got mixed up with the British Loan Agreement (part of the post-Suez reconstruction) then subject to Congressional hearings in the United States. Two prominent Democrats, Senator Javits and Representative Fulton, took up Pallikarides' plight as precisely the kind of action which habitually made the task of Britain's friends in Washington more difficult. Fulton telephoned Harding personally, and although the Governor denied using the words which Fulton repeated on the floor of Congress ('Don't let any sentiment enter into this sort of thing'), that he said something like it would have been completely in character.100 With the execution due in a few hours, a senior State Department official got through to Macmillan on the telephone late on the afternoon of the i3th. 'The Prime Minister was not at all encouraging,' it was noted. 'He said he would communicate with the officials there [in London], but that the extent to which they could interfere with the actions of the local authorities was very limited."01 Ministers knew that to intervene with the Governor again so quickly might risk triggering his resignation. The United Nations, crucially, was not in session. In the early hours of the i4th the execution took place amidst the usual din in Nicosia Central Prison.102 Later that day 99
D. Smith, minute, 11 Feb. 1957, €10926/1090. Representative Fulton to S. Elbrick (State Department), 18 Mar. 1957, Box 3279, RG$<), State Department Records, USNA. 101 Barbour (London Embassy) to State Department, 13 Mar. 1957, ibid. m Times of 'Cyprus (14 Mar. 1957). 100
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the United States Ambassador in Athens, attending a black tie luncheon in honour of the demise of a member of Greek royalty, remarked in the course of his speech that 'everybody's thoughts turn to another death of the past twenty-four hours which also inspires respect'. 'Altogether unpardonable,' spat one minute in the Foreign Office. '"•' 'We are losing friends in the United States,' another rather contrastingly observed. These two responses traced the razor's edge between emotion and pragmatism on which British policy-making was poised. Gradually, nevertheless, a consensus was forming that the British position over Cyprus had somehow to be moved on to less exposed ground—though how, and with what long-term purpose, this was to be done remained highly contentious. Harding's pleas to London for the 'placation' of Greek-Cypriot feelings had previously overlapped with the carrying out of capital sentences, and this juncture was no exception. It might even be said that the Field-Marshal fell into a 'middle way' of his own, still committed to the administration of the 'medicine1 which Eden had once prescribed, but now eager to take away its bitter taste for ordinary Cypriots. From early February 1957 Harding began a spate of calls to London for a 'dramatic gesture' to seize the initiative back from Grivas.104 In doing so, he was influenced by the fact that E1OKA had recently incurred heavy losses, since it was his firm belief that progress 'in the field' would allow the British to move forward politically from strength, rather than from dreaded weakness. In late January Markos Drakos, a leading figure in EOKA, was shot dead in the Troodos, and a terrorist 'ring' was broken up in the notorious village of Omodhos. Then on 3 March, in the most famous of all the shoot-outs during the Emergency, Grivas' deputy, Gregoris Axfentiou, had died virtually under the walls of Makheras monastery. He had held at bay a unit of the Duke of Wellington's regiment for over ten hours, at the end of which his hideout was incinerated with burning oil; a British soldier was also killed during the incident.1"5 These successes were the result of a better flow of information, and fuelled a belief that EOKA might be 'about to be put out of extended action'. Whereas in Harding's circle these security successes were seen as opening up a window of opportunity for constructive action, in London the effect was often the opposite one of reinforcing the temptation to sit back and wait for outright 'victory' to fall like ripe fruit into Her Majesty's Government's lap, with all the credit this would bring. When the Prime Minister met with Secretary-General Ismay, now more vigorously canvassing the idea of NATO arbitration, he told him that the Security Forces in Cyprus were on the verge of stamping out terrorism, and that it would be 'a pity if the appointment of a [NATO] conciliator was merely to hold terrorism in suspense'.106 Macmillan's hesitancy was reinforced by the belief that the only 'dramatic gesture' likely to make any impact on Cypriot opinion was the release of the Archbishop. In the end it was Grivas who got his gesture in first yet again. On the "" Galsworthy, 5 Apr. 1957, FC)37i/.t30101, RGCio345/3<). 104 Young, minute, 8 Mar. 1957, FO371/130138, RGCio72/28. IIIS For Axt'entious' death see Crawshaw, Cyprus Rero/1,232-3. "'" Minutes of Meeting in Paris Kmbassy, TO Mar. 1957, CO()26/626.
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afternoon of 14 March, within hours of Pallikarides' execution, EOKA leaflets circulated in the Cypriot capital announcing a truce in order to provide the conditions in which Makarios might be freed and negotiations resumed. The next day Lord Ismay formally proposed that the interested parties make use of his personal 'good offices' in order to find a way out of the impasse. The British Government had been much criticized for not seizing the opportunities presented by Grivas' first truce offer in August 1956. To make no response whatever on this new occasion posed real difficulties, especially given the parallel moves within NATO. Yet, Macmillan was barely in the saddle as Prime Minister, and the vibrations in much of his party remained unpredictable. According to his official biographer, Macmillan's first instinct was to do nothing in response to Grivas' move. His Cabinet colleagues were no clearer in their minds. 'No one seemed to know what to do about the Archbishop,' Macmillan recorded of the discussion which took place in 10 Downing Street on the morning of 16 March.107 The various and conflicting elements in the decision may be glimpsed from the exchange which occurred when Lennox-Boyd left the Cabinet to confer urgently with Harding by teleprinter. The Colonial Secretary first asked the Governor how close they were to 'gathering the fruits of victory'.108 Harding replied in his bluntest style that victory would come in the end, but that it would involve 'continuing many unpleasant things including executions to achieve'. The Governor proceeded to make a suggestion of his own. This consisted of'a short-cut [to peace] by bargaining Makarios' release for Grivas' departure' from Cyprus. But it was precisely such 'bargaining with terror' which the Cabinet was afraid of being drawn into. The Colonial Secretary sheered off, pointing out that what the Cabinet had in mind was to win credit with world opinion by 'linking the reply to EOKA and the reply to... Lord Ismay'. This was not a short-cut to peace, but a means of deflecting the pressures working on the British Government. When the Governor and the Colonial Secretary resumed their discussion in the afternoon, the former pressed again for an attempt at a 'direct swap' between the Archbishop and Grivas, significantly reminding Lennox-Boyd that when they had together negotiated with Makarios before his deportation 'he [Makarios] had always expessed himself as worried [as we were] about how to get rid of the visitors from overseas in the hills'—a reference to the hard-core terrorists.109 This put the Archbishop in a subtly different light. It made no difference to the outcome. To release the Archbishop under the sort of auspices envisaged by Harding would make it almost impossible to avoid the resumption in some form of the talks which had been broken off at the end of February 1956. This remained too radical a change of course for the British Government to contemplate. It is evident from these exchanges that what mattered in British domestic politics as much as the release of the Archbishop was how he was to have his freedom restored to him. Indeed, it was widely recognized on the British side that the detention of 107 108
Home, Macmillan, ii. 36. Record of teleprinter conversation, 16 Mar. 1957, €0926/1042.
l09
Ibid.
i ?6
27 July 1956-5 April 1957
Makarios was 'more and more a liability', even if nobody could risk admitting that it had been a serious mistake in the first place. Yet, against this had to be set the fact that Cyprus remained an issue on which the self-consciously 'imperial' wing of the Conservative party claimed a leverage beyond its parliamentary numbers. On 19 March the heralded announcement of the British Government's response to EOKA's suspension of violence had to be cancelled at the last minute. The Times of Cyprus attributed this to Harding's influence, 110 who arrived in London on that day for consultations prior to Macmillan's departure to Bermuda for the first meeting of the British and American leaderships since Suez. In fact, the real barrier lay in and around the Cabinet itself, not least in the person of Lord Salisbury as Lord Chancellor, who described himself as 'dismayed' by the suggestion that Makarios should be allowed to go free, and called on the Prime Minister 'to proceed with the task of hunting down the Terrorists'.1" But perhaps the most cautionary influence on the premier was the Chief Whip, Edward Heath, who acted as spokesman for the right-wing in telling his chief that the Party had not 'accustomed itself to the thought that Makarios should be free to return at will outside Cyprus'. 'What disturbs me most', Heath went on, 'is that the Party will feel that we are weakening and putting a most valuable card in the hands of our bitterest opponents just at the moment when after so much blood and tears, we are on the point of victory."1- Such were the sentiments which had to be weighed against 'the continuous American pleading' to let Makarios go as Macmillan prepared for his crucial encounter with President Eisenhower. That the deadlock was still in place when Macmillan left for Bermuda on 20 March was probably not unwelcome to him. It w:as not wholly accidental that some of the most difficult decisions of his premiership were taken whilst he was abroad, conveniently leaving some of the dust to settle before his return. This feature blended with the evanescence of his personality. It was also true that he had more room for manoeuvre over Makarios whilst he was in Bermuda, and away from the heat which Cypriot affairs Were apt to create when under consideration at home. Naturally, the island occupied a marginal place in the planning for the AngloAmerican conference, which got under way on 21 March. What Macmillan wanted most from Eisenhower was an agreement to sell Thor missiles to Britain. 1u This was the most powerful 'victory' which the Prime Minister could offer his party and the country back home. Yet if the President was to arm the British with this technology, it followed that the hitter's NATO credentials had to be in order. Eisenhower, in fact, raised Cyprus early on by referring to the various messages he had received—especially one from the King of Greece—calling for Makarios' release. Macmillan's reply was striking. He assured Eisenhower that Cyprus had 'no great intrinsic interest' left for the United Kingdom, but that if self-determination was applied 'there was the ''" Times nf Cyprus (23 Mar. 1957). 111 Salisbury to Macmillan, 19 Mar. 1957, PRl'-Mi 1/1757/1. 112 Edward Heath to Macmillan, 19 Mar. 1957, ibid. "' For the role of nuclear issues at the Bermuda conference see J. Baylis, Anglo-American Defence Relations, igjy-tfj (London, 1981), pp. 103-6.
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possibility of a civil war which might well spead to a general Turco-Greek conflict'.114 This was to throw a great deal of strategic baggage overboard in one go, whilst shifting the focus to ethnic and regional conflict, which provided a more flexible and less vulnerable set of reasons underpinning the imperatives of British control. There were strong echoes here of Macmillan's tactics at the Tripartite Conference in 1955—as well as pointers to the future. Eisenhower, whose knowledge of Cyprus— or Cypress, as he sometimes called it—was understandably scant, passed over this prognosis, simply observing that he 'didn't believe that they [the British] were gaining much by keeping him [Makarios] prisoner'. The best thing, the President advised, was to 'turn him loose upon the world', since this 'would prove... that they [the British Government] were trying to reach a solution to the problem'.115 For Eisenhower, as for Macmillan, the appearance of moving towards a solution was more important than its problematical achievement. Cyprus was not mentioned again between the two leaders in Bermuda, nor did it need to be. Instead, Macmillan emerged from sessions devoted to money and missiles to find anxious messages from London about the fate of Makarios. On 23 March Lennox-Boyd and Harding, fearful that Macmillan might be about to duck the issue, sent a communication pressing the case for release. 'The Governor and I', LennoxBoyd stated, 'have been from the very start of his [Makarios'] exile conscious of the difficulty of how we were eventually going to bring him back into circulation . . . As [the] Governor says, "you do not deal yourself an ace of spades to keep it permanently in your hand".'116 'This may very well be the last opportunity', Lennox-Boyd continued, 'to play this card to our best advantage.' What the Colonial Secretary meant by 'best advantage', he stressed, was to prevent the Archbishop re-emerging as 'sole [Cypriot] participant' in any negotiation, and above all to deny him any status in the crucial international aspects of a settlement. On the heels of this message came a contrary plea from Lord Salisbury that to free Makarios 'would be regarded by large sections of our Party as abject surrender'."7 These conflicting prognoses illustrated the battle for the soul of British Conservatism during the process of decolonization—on the one hand a kind of reluctant but yielding pragmatism conscious of a need to move with, and sometimes ahead, of the game, and on the other a deeply fundamentalist conviction that to make concessions under pressure would be to lose prestige, and with it the credibility to direct events according to the national interest. Macmillan's dilemma over whether or not to let Makarios go would have been considerably simplified if the Archbishop could have been persuaded at long last to make a public renunciation of EOKA's violence. A fresh attempt was made on these lines using the Governor of the Seychelles as intermediary, but on 23 March Sir William Addis informed London that his 'lodger'—the conventional euphemism for Makarios—remained 'charming but adamant', and had 'kept repeating that were he 114 115 116 117
Policy on Cyprus. Bermuda: Item 3 at Plenary Session, 21 Mar. FO37i/i3oi 12, RGCiosi/23. ICW File, International Meetings Series, Bermuda Conference 1957, Eisenhower Papers, Box 10. Lennox-Boyd to Macmillan, 23 Mar. 1957, PREMi i / I757A. Salisbury to Macmillan, 23 Mar. 1957, ibid.
iy8
27 July 7956-5 April igsj
in Cyprus he could do so much more to restore early peace'.118 Allowing the Archbishop back into the colony, however, was not at all in ministerial minds, and certainly not in Harding's. As a result, the decision facing the Prime Minister was whether the Archbishop should nonetheless be released unilaterally, or, as he put it, 'an act of grace, or rather contempt'' by Her Majesty's Government.119 The Prime Minister's manner of resolving this matter throws a penetrating light on his modus operandi as a politician. In coming down in favour of release, he stressed that there was to be no connection with any bargaining, or relaxation of Emergency measures in Cyprus. Above all, it was vital, Macmillan stated, 'not to accept any commitment to so-called "negotiations" ', and to put the emphasis in any policy statement on international talks about Cyprus from which the Archbishop was to be rigidly excluded. As a final touch, Macmillan laid down that Makarios should leave the Seychelles by boat, since this would provide time for the British Government to arrange its dispositions for the future. 'In a word', the premier summarized what he had in mind, 'I would try to separate out all these actions and give the impression that the Archbishop had played with characteristic twistiness." 20 This was very different from Harding's formula which sought to link the range of Cypriot issues together in a way which fostered the basic conditions for the restoration of peace. But by separating things out Macmillan defused a decision which might otherwise have exploded around him in the most dangerous manner. The Archbishop, in short, was to be 'let loose upon the world', but in a manner which did not weaken Macmillan's grip on power, and which by the same token did little or nothing to mitigate the struggle between Makarios and the Greek-Cypriots on the one hand, and the British Cabinet on the other. By the time Macmillan returned to London on 27 March the chief concern over the decision was its presentation to parliament, which had been given so man)- assurances that the Archbishop would not be released until he had explicitly renounced violence. This awkward explanation fell to Lennox-Boyd the next day, who informed the House that the Archbishop would be taken away 'by the first available boat' to call at the Seychelles. IM Grivas was to be offered a safe conduct out of Cyprus (though the chances of EOKA's leader availing himself of an offer which was not part and parcel of a wider settlement was nil). The main emphasis of Lennox-Boyd's statement was on the international talks which were a necessary prelude, he said, to any solution of the Cyprus problem. 'The Right Honourable Gentleman', cryptically observed the Liberal leader, Clement Da vies, in reply, 'has drawn the distinction between what is happening internally and internationally, but it is internally that the trouble [in Cyprus] is."22 Harding himself could not have put it plainer. But to this and similar complaints that Cyprus proper did not appear very prominently in llfi
Addis to Colonial Office, 23 Mar. 1957, (.01)26/949. 12 "'' Macmillan to Salisbury, 24 Mar. 1957, FO37t/i3oii2, RGCiosi/i T. " Ibid. m For the Colonial Secretary's statement sec Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 19.^-7, vol. 567, 28 Mar. 1957, cols. 1355-58. 122 Tbid. col. 1364."
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anything the minister had to say, Lennox-Boyd merely retorted that the Government's priority was to 'press on with the NATO exercise' and only after that to 'see where we are going' with regard to developments inside the island. Even this finessing of Makarios' release was not enough to keep Salisbury in the Government. He resigned on the day of the announcement—the only resignation from the British Cabinet on a colonial issue during the 'end of empire'. The isolated loss of Salisbury was not a serious blow to the Prime Minister. For the latter it was better that a minister known to be generally disgruntled should go over the Cyprus hurdle than the looming 'water jump' of the final agreement with Nasser resolving claims regarding the Suez Canal.123 When Salisbury expatiated on the reasons for his departure in the House of Commons, the Prime Minister had little difficulty in turning the episode aside by following it with an address which ignored Cyprus entirely and highlighted instead the success in persuading the Americans to let Britain have the Thor missiles. By this means Macmillan 'separated out' Salisbury's discontent from wider politics, and allotted to him some of the contempt reserved for Archbishop Makarios. The day after the news of his forthcoming release, the Archbishop—with his improved but still very deliberate English—gave a press conference in the Seychelles. To the inevitable question 'Do you regret the violence in Cyprus?', he parried 'Nobody would be pleased with suffering caused by an anomalous situation,' and he went on to express the hope that after his release Her Majesty's Government 'will take further steps towards pacification'.124 Less ambiguous was Makarios' behaviour before his departure. Various receptions were held at his expense, including one for all the local officials and clergy he had met during his stay, and another to inaugurate two educational scholarships in the colony. Most enjoyable, apparently, was the party held in the garden of Sans Souci on the last night for the domestic staff, many of whom were to be sacked once the 'guests' were no longer resident. Makarios shook hands with them all as he walked along the assembled line. Mrs Le Geyt remembered him 'rushing to and fro with trays of food, fetching extra chairs, serving drinks, and listening with a beaming smile to the music and singing, till 11 p.m. 'He bore no grudges,' his English biographer relates,125 and it was true that, whatever faults he had, harbouring resentment or feeling contempt towards others were not among them. The story of Makarios' exile in the Indian Ocean, given its many ironies, would not be complete if it had not had a final twist. Lennox-Boyd, we saw, had promised that the Archbishop would leave the Seychelles by the first available boat. Unfortunately, no British-registered vessel was in the vicinity, and a booking had to be made on a Greek-owned craft. It was with consternation that the Colonial Office discovered that the name of this ship was World Harmony. It was naturally a matter of concern that Makarios, whom the British had sought so assiduously to depict as a murderer and a hypocrite, should re-enter the limelight under such auspices.126 An 123 m l25 Home, Macmillan, ii. 38. Mayes, Makarios, 101. Ibid. 102. 126 por tne arrangements of Makarios' departure see material in 01)926/1035.
2
180
7.fa!}' 1956-5 April 1957
arrangement was therefore made with another Greek liner carrying the slightly less invidious name of Olympic Thunderer, and it was this vessel which steamed into Port Victoria at midnight on 5 April, and a few hours later departed westwards with the Archbishop aboard. Makarios was at last free to 'roam at will', and Sir William Addis was able to reclaim for himself the rustic comforts of Sans Souci. At least in the Seychelles normal life could be very easily and speedily restored. Meanwhile it had been the manifestation of a light at the end of a tunnel which lent a special glow to the rejoicings in Cyprus which erupted when the news of Makarios' release had first been announced. Church bells rang across the island. Crowds gathered in Metaxas Square and surrounded the Archbishopric in Nicosia, with cries of 'Enosis, Enosis\ 'Long Live Makarios', and the Greek National Anthem. The capital, except for the Turkish quarters, was festooned with blue-and-white flags. In a sudden bursting of tension, British soldiers to their amazement found themselves feted by passing Greeks. Some Army personnel joined in the fun, and even waved the Greek colours put into their unsuspecting hands. 127 Indeed, it is notable that purely human relations between the great bulk of British servicemen and the general population had never lost the basic decencies. The Times of Cyprus not infrequently carried the photograph of some smiling British soldier with his newly conquered Greek bride, surrounded by quizzical in-laws from the village; one can only guess who pacified whom in the end. It was, by contrast, always the politics of the Emergency which got in the way of natural affinities. But the moment of mutual reconciliation at first promised by the Archbishop's freedom lasted all too briefly. As Lennox-Boyd's statement in the Commons was digested, with its vague emphasis on talks within NATO, and rejection of any negotiation with Cypriot representatives, optimism sagged. When Governor Harding arrived at Nicosia airport on 30 March he spoke briefly but sternly of his determination to press home the campaign against EOKA. 'Some [Greeks | conversed half-heartedly in the Archbishop's square', Foley's newspaper captured the pricking of this bubble of hopefulness, 'but there was little enthusiasm. They finally straggled away."28 British troops descended on Metaxas Square, and sealed it off; road checks were tightened up, Greek flags started being taken down again, and photographs of Makarios confiscated. Before long the celebrations had ceased altogether. The suddenness with which the chill descended communicated itself to the distant Colonial Office. 'For whatever reason,' Sir John Martin remarked, 'and at this distance it is difficult to criticize the action of the authorities in checking the exuberance of the Greek-Cypriot demonstrators, we seem to have lost some of the ground gained towards the restoration of normal conditions in the first fine careless rapture which followed the Archbishop's release.'12<) What might appear in London as harmless and wholly understandable 'rapture' amongst Greek-Cypriots, however, was interpreted rather differently by those who had to deal with the phenomenon on the ground. Reddaway, for example, described 127 lw
12S Times of Cyprus (2<)Mar. 1957). Ibid. (30 Mar. 1957). Martin, minute, 4 Apr. 1957, (^0926/1082.
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the Greek-Cypriot crowds as 'extremely provocative and offensive', and their demonstration of joy as 'the work of EOKA'.130 The speed with which the Cyprus Government moved to cut short the 'air of hope' sweeping the island aroused considerable criticism from neutral observers. Yet in extenuation it may be said that what the authorities in Nicosia feared more than anything else was the encouragement of'false hope, since it was they who would have the job of coping with the bitter resentments which were bound to ensue when people realized that, in fact, nothing had really changed at all. In this sense Reddaway's deprecation of Greek-Cypriot celebrations, and Harding's stern injunctions, were simply the natural counterpart of the 'contempt' shown by Macmillan in his handling of the decision to release Makarios. Yet, in truth, the release of the Archbishop and the declaration of EOKA's truce did mean that the very nature of the Emergency was changing. Above all, and despite the fact that much of the worst violence was still to come, the Emergency as a classic military insurgency was soon to give way to a more intensely political phenomenon. This did not mean, however, that it thereby became less vicious or pregnant with foreboding for the future of Cyprus. Up till this point the 'struggle for mastery' had been one primarily between the British and the Greeks. It had been, that is, a colonial contest, with all its pettiness and misunderstandings, but nonetheless one which stuck to fairly narrow grooves. The more politicized Emergency about to take shape was, in contrast, to be defined in communal as well as colonial terms, so that Anglo-Greek rivalry had superimposed upon it a polarization between Greeks and Turks with far greater potential for bringing the island to the edge of chaos. The sands of goodwill now began to run out, not in one direction, but in many. "n Reddaway to Martin, 4 Apr. 1957,00926/894.
7 Matters of Honour, 6 April-4 October 1957 Even after Makarios' departure from the Seychelles Governor Harding still hoped that a way might be found to link this development with Grivas' exit from Cyprus. This remained, he stressed to the Colonial Office, 'the most important factor in leading to the cessation of hostilities'.1 When the American Embassy in London passed on proof that there was a chance that EOK A's leader might still be persuaded to go to Greece, Harding confirmed from his own sources that both the Greek Government and influential Greek-Cypriots were eager for Grivas to leave Cyprus 'but that they wish him to do so on his own terms and with his flags flying'. 2 Everything that was known about Grivas' personality suggested that the only other way he was prepared to leave the colony was in a coffin. Rumours abounded that the British were now close to discovering his whereabouts, and in Washington there was anxiety that if Grivas was killed, his organization might fall under Communist sway. Although this fear had little real basis in Cypriot politics, it was natural enough given the Soviet attempt to break into Middle Eastern politics which was to cause much tension during the summer of 1957. More than ever keen to gain American goodwill, Harding modified the security offensive under way in the Paphos area, minimizing the chances that Grivas might slip away unnoticed, whilst ensuring that he would be able to make safe contact with British troops 'even if they were surrounding his hide-out'.' Special care was taken that Grivas was not unaware—perhaps because of a breakdown in his radio communications—of the safe conduct offer recently made to him by the British Government. Royal Air Force aeroplanes flew low over the Cypriot mountains 'sky-shouting' these terms, infringing the customary peace of the shepherds and moufflon who were the main frequenters of their more remote parts. There was little chance of Grivas leaving Cyprus entirely of his own volition. It was inherent in the cultivation of his own 'legend' that he must be seen to go, if at all, only under extreme duress. Nevertheless, the Governor urged London to permit the Greek Government to send their own envoy to establish what Grivas' terms for laying down his arms might be. He was even willing to furnish an Army escort for this emissary provided the exercise took place in complete secrecy. Yet, as LennoxBoyd explained on 12 April, the Greeks would almost certainly leak the story as testimony to British dependence on their help. There were, the Colonial Secretary stated, 'too many uncertainties' about the whole thing, 4 and although he went on to identify 'the present state of Turkish opinion' as one reason why British Army troops could not be ordered to stand guard whilst Grivas enjoyed a conference with his Athenian sympathizers, he was quite as much preoccupied with the repercussions of 1 !
Harding, telegram to Colonial Oftiee, 5 Apr. £957, ("0926/1042. Ibid. ' Lennox-Boyd to Harding, 12 Apr. 1957, ibid.
2
Ibid.
Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959
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any such revelation in and around Westminster. Neither was it likely that the Greek Government would apply any independent pressure on Grivas. When Foreign Minister Averoff raised the possibility with Karamanlis, the Greek premier 'hit the ceiling'.5 Archbishop Makarios was left to appeal himself to Grivas to maintain the 'truce' for as long as possible, whilst carefully adding that the preservation of the Colonel's prestige was a major consideration. Replying on 27 April, the Colonel slammed the door on any immediate prospect that he might give up the armed struggle.6 Ironically, for all the gulf which had come to lie between them, the Governor and the Archbishop shared a common desire to cut the Emergency short by coaxing Grivas and his gunmen out of Cyprus. That this did not happen was due to Grivas' obstinacy and to Makarios' innate caution, but also because any attempt to force the issue posed too many risks to the survival of British and Greek ministers in their very different political worlds. This evasion of 'the problem of Grivas' helps to explain why the Archbishop's release was simply the prelude to the deadlock over Cyprus assuming new and arguably more intractable forms. If this was not Makarios' fault, any more than it was Harding's, there is no doubt that his own journey from the time he left the Seychelles on 6 April to his eventual arrival in Athens got things off to a bad start. The attitudes expressed by the Archbishop at this stage smacked to British officialdom of 'triumphant arrogance'. That Makarios would have been best advised to keep his own counsel en route is true. He was so advised by his old English interlocuteur, Francis Noel-Baker, who rushed to Tananarive in Madagascar, where the Olympic Thunderer docked on 9 April. Such advice, however, was not easy to take. Makarios had been exiled by the British in an attempt to drive a wedge between himself and the Greek-Cypriot people. They had failed, and finally been constrained into letting him go, as the Archbishop had always expected. It was a triumph, and it is not a Greek trait to hide their victories under bushels. To this temptation was allied a more subtle necessity. It had often been bruited that Makarios might make a bargain to regain his freedom. Although Macmillan had finally decided to release him without any quid pro quo in the form of a public denunciation of violence which had been so repeatedly sought, Makarios had enough enemies on every side prepared to spread gossip that he had entered into a secret understanding of some sort. The Archbishop was under a good deal of pressure to make it plain that this was untrue. Although in his first press conference in Tananarive he acknowledged that the 'liberal sentiments' of the British people had contributed to his freedom, his comments in relation to Her Majesty's Government were therefore cold and even scathing. So the worm continued to turn in his relations with those who ruled in London. On past form, Makarios' transit from the Seychelles was fated not to go smoothly. From Madagascar he flew to Nairobi. The colonial authorities in the colony were no 5 Allen, telegram to State Department, 4 Apr. 1957, Box 3280, RGsQ, State Department Records, USNA. fi Fran9ois Crouzet, Le Conflit de Chypre, 7946-7959,2 vols. (Brussels, 1973), ii. 942.
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more pleased at having to entertain the 'terrorist-Archbishop' on his way back from exile than they had been on his way out, especially when Makarios booked into the Norfolk Hotel, the social heart of expatriate life in the capital. On the grounds that he constituted a 'grave security risk' a clampdown was ordered in the city with the intended effect of keeping him insulated in the Hotel.7 'Round the clock' CID surveillance, however, could not stop him meeting prominent African nationalist politicians, including Oginga Odinga and Tom Mboya, though Makarios' rough analogue in the story of Kenyan decolonization, Jomo Kenyatta, was not available, being then detained in the northern wastes of Turkana province under less comfortable circumstances than the Archbishop had experienced in Sans Souci. The attempt to isolate Makarios during his brief sojourn was scuppered by the coincidence that his stay overlapped with Palm Sunday, providing the occasion for the Archbishop's first public celebration of Orthodox communion since March 1956. The substantial Greek community in the colony gathered in large numbers for the service, at which the} were treated to the splendid sight of Makarios in full regalia, and to a rhetoric which mixed the eternal themes of earthly and heavenly struggle. 'We arc like soldiers in a Church army', the Archbishop declared, 'fighting our best for our freedom.'8 After this he was hurried out of the colony almost as brusquely as he had first arrived. Lennox-Boyd afterwards apologized to the Governor of Kenya, Sir Evelyn Baring, for the trouble he had been caused by the Archbishop's various comings and goings, and the Colonial Office turned a blind eye to the extortionate expenses which the Nairobi Secretariat afterwards demanded, including ^800 for the loan of two 'sniffer' dogs which had faithfully prowled the perimeter of Sans Souci.'' The brutal logic of the Cyprus conflict was often redeemed in small ways by such harmless trivia. The picture of the Archbishop in Kenya, furthermore, provides a nice sidelight on how the trajectories of small colonial worlds sometimes crossed each other in the age of decolonization. Makarios, indeed, left a minor but enduring imprint on Kenyan life, since that country is the only one outside the Greek-speaking world where there are today roads bearing the sonorous title 'Archbishop Makarios Avenue'. The Archbishop at last arrived in Athens on 17 April. A noisy concourse met him on a grey, windy day at Hellenikon airport, including Averoff and several other ministers. Makarios and the Bishop of Kyrenia, to whose company he was still unhappily yoked, were driven into the city in a pure white Cadillac, against which their flowing black robes made a striking image; the two prelates stood in the pit of the automobile according to that American electioneering style which had become widely imitated. As the cavalcade proceeded there were numerous stops where mayors and local celebrities could make speeches, and so appropriate a little slice of glory. The centrepiece of the occasion came when the Archbishop appeared on the balcony of his suite in the Hotel Grande Bretagne overlooking a vast throng—as large as Churchill had 7
For Makarios 1 stay in Nairobi sec material in Hox 3280, RG^t), State Department Records, USNA. Times<>/Cyprus(\bApr. 1957). " 'Kenya Government Account \\ith the Cyprus Government: Operation Apollo' in CX)g26/io4i. Ironically, the Greek-Cypriot, rather than the Uritish taxpayer, footed the bill for Makarios' detention. s
185
Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959
addressed on the same spot in December 1944—waving a sea of banners sporting such messages as 'The Seychelles are the graveyard of colonialism' and, more simply and ominously, 'EOKA'. According to one report the Archbishop was overcome with emotion, and threw away his prepared script.10 Yet Makarios was too self-possessed, and the moment too important, for him not to have weighed his words very carefully indeed beforehand. He began by thanking all elements in Greek-Cypriot life for their steadfastness during his absence. This implicitly gave EOKA its due, but only as a fragment of a much wider and more permanent movement. Throughout his address Makarios made no direct mention of Enosis, and said nothing which might cause gratuitous offence to Turkish ears—the sort of offence which might trigger the threats which had continued to come from Turkish sources that the Greeks of Istanbul might prove to be the ultimate victims of the Cyprus conflict. But he did say that he would 'continue the struggle for self-determination . . . I am firmly convinced the Cyprus cause will reach a final stage. This is guaranteed by the Cypriots' immoveable decision to shake off the British yoke and live free.' Here Makarios the anti-colonialist was in full flow, including denunciations of'concentration camps' and 'the tortures of the oppressor'.11 The reference to a 'final stage', nevertheless, went beyond merely getting the British oppressor out—it could only mean eventual Enosis, albeit in some vague, dreamlike future. Although Makarios might distance himself from the Enosis demand as a practical and immediate proposition, as Ethnarch of his people he could not yet screen it out entirely. Even this increasingly residual role accorded to aspirational Enosis, however, was enough to entrench existing enmities now that he was free again to exercise his supreme but often disruptive oratorical skills. The scene of Makarios' Athenian homecoming—for it was a kind of homecoming—merits highlighting because in many ways it marked the apogee of his entire career. He was on the crest of a moving wave. His later return to Cyprus, dramatic though it was to be, and even later his role as President of an independent Republic, were to be surrounded by more divisive and sometimes vicious forces than yet existed in April 1957. Already there were significant traces of this vulnerability. Prime Minister Karamanlis did not personally welcome Makarios to Athens. He was not allowed to lay a wreath on the tomb of the Unknown Warrior, as was customary for distinguished visitors. These omissions in part flowed from the dour warning from Ankara as to what might happen if the Archbishop's welcome proved to be 'too formal'.12 But beyond this both Karamanlis and Averoff were all too aware that Makarios' presence in Athens directly threatened themselves, since it was bound to be exploited by the Opposition. The Greek Government had every reason to play down as gently as they dared the Archbishop's apparent victory. But whatever political clouds lowered over this moment, for Makarios it was one of profound—in British eyes 'arrogant'—triumph; the most unalloyed of its kind that this son of a Cypriot goat-herdsman was ever to savour. 10
Times of Cyprus (30 Apr. 1957).
" Crouzet, Con flit de Chypre, ii. 938.
l2
Ibid. 950.
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6 April-4 October 1957
The underlying difficulties of Makarios' situation soon asserted themselves. The United States Ambassador in Athens had alerted Washington that so long as the Archbishop stayed in the Greek capital he was sure to be surrounded by destructive and intransigent elements. It was vital, he advised, that Makarios be allowed back into Cyprus, and so brought into contact with a wider and more moderate spectrum of opinion, oral least that he be invited to London. Neither of these was likely. Prime Minister Macmillan might have taken President Eisenhower's advice to 'throw him [Makarios] back into the sea', but the whole intention was that he should be left to drift off into the murky channels of Greek politics, where he would eventually disappear from view. Macmillan was therefore utterly unmoved when Noel-Baker, still conducting his personal crusade for conciliation, sought a personal interview to plead that Makarios was not 'the super-Rasputin of the popular press', and that he w r ould be open to any sensible offer made to him. 1 ' The Archbishop, for his part, could hardly risk his dignity by going to London to knock uninvited on the door of the Colonial Office, though just in case he did show up it was decided that he should only be seen by a senior official, not by a minister. The outcome of all this was that, his exile over, Makarios was to endure another, in many ways more trying, form of incarceration in the Hotel Grande Bretagne and the offices which the Greek Government made available in the diplomatic quarter of Athens. In these circumstances the Archbishop's life settled clown into a 'deadly routine',' 4 in which he had numerous interviews every day, but could never speak fully and frankly for fear of closing off his own options. His personal prestige was under more of an insidious threat now he was free than it had been during his imprisonment. When Charles Foley interviewed him at the end of April he found that an 'air of strain' was unmistakable in Makarios' manner. 15 The stagnancy of the Archbishop's situation was, in fact, simply one expression of the high political deadlock which now prevailed. As always, however, such immobilism did not preclude dynamic and mostly destructive movements at the lower levels of the conflict. The position of the Cyprus Government was hardly much better than that of the Archbishop. Makarios' release inaugurated what John Reddaway called 'a very tricky phase' in which it was vital to display 'determination and fixity of purpose both here and in London' to discourage Greek-Cypriots from the belief 'that the Enosis extremists have the British on the run again'."' The Archbishop's words and actions since leaving the Seychelles had dispelled any hopes that he might prove to be a more chastened personality. One result was to convince the Cyprus authorities that a purely internal solution was never likely to come about without some form of " Francis Noel-Baker to Macmillan, i6July 1957,03926/636. 14 Note on Interview with Archbishop Makarios, 3 Mar. 1958, File 'Cyprus 1958-1)', Lcgum Papers. 'His [Makarios'| policy is to see everybody,' Lepurn, the Observer's colonial affairs correspondent, remarked in this unpublished portrait. 'He has no social life. He keeps normal office hours commuting . . . between his suite in the Hotel Grande Brctagnc and the Kthnarchy Office.' 15 Times nj'Cy/irtis (30 Apr. 1957). "' Reddaway to Morris, 4 Apr. 1957,0)926/894.
Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959
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external force majeure. In these quarters an important shift of thinking therefore occurred towards the concept of an international agreement between the three main outside powers and over the heads of the local population. Such an international approach was not conceived of as a mere tactical ploy to alleviate the United Kingdom's position at the United Nations or elsewhere. Rather it was to be another kind of'short cut' to peace. One measure of the seriousness of this proposition in Nicosia was the prominent role envisaged for the United States and NATO in banging the necessary heads together. Whilst this idea was taking shape, however, the Governor pressed London for permission to launch a counter-offensive to 'reduce and destroy his [Makarios'] political power',17 the main purpose being to ensure that when an international conference should be held, the Archbishop's position alongside what Harding significantly called 'other representatives of the Cypriot people' should bear no comparison to the near co-equality with the Government itself which Makarios had enjoyed in the prolonged peace talks of late 1955 and early 1956. In these ways the Cyprus Government's responses evolved into a frequently contradictory mixture of blind reaction, obsession with its own tottering 'prestige', and a preparedness to go down any path which promised to lead the way out from the nightmare which surrounded them. The Cyprus Government was so isolated, however, that what Harding called a 'political counter-offensive' could only really mean a desperate bidding up of the propaganda stakes. At the end of 1956 that Government had produced an official publication called The Church and Terrorism in Cyprus with a picture of Makarios poised above the photograph of a Greek-Cypriot 'traitor' gunned down by EOKA during a religious service, the corpse shockingly splayed-out amongst the pews.18 Even this was a version, modified at London's insistence, of a still more punchy publication called The Flaming Cassock in which Makarios' image had been superimposed over the murder scene, with obvious implications. In returning with renewed zeal to the propaganda front after April 1957, the Governor requested that Whitehall publish more of the Archbishop's stolen correspondence, only to be told once again that whatever the seditious tone of these papers, they did not prove Harding's repeated contention that the Church had been 'clearly revealed as the cover organization of the whole terrorist conspiracy'.19 Nor did Lennox-Boyd authorize the draft legislation soon afterwards forwarded from Nicosia which sought to impose State control over the finances of the Orthodox Church, gently telling Harding that he 'felt bound to say ... that the opportunity for legislation of this kind may have passed'.20 But if the time had passed for such a law, had not the time also passed for the Emergency in its current form? And what was the point of having a Field-Marshal as Governor, his prestige draining away, invisibly but nonetheless irreversibly, day by day? 17
Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 30 May 1957, FO37i/i3oi6s,RGi782/7i. The Church and Terrorism in Cyprus: A Record of the Complicity of the Church of Cyprus in Political Violence (Government Printing Office, Nicosia, 1957). 19 Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 16 Apr. 1957,0)926/962. 20 Lennox-Boyd to Harding, 29 May 1957, FO3717130163, RGCi782/35. 18
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Harding increasingly asked himself this question as spring turned into summer. Meanwhile, the colonial administration had largely to content itself with increasingly covert ways of denigrating Makarios by word of mouth through the island. 21 These indirect and rather underhanded methods were not Harding's style, and they represent a less-than-distinguished episode in his career. Meanwhile, there was at least some truth in the impression of James Cameron, the distinguished overseas reporter of the News Chronicle, that 'more and more . . . is the situation [in Cyprus] dominated by personal factors in the Governor's mind— his personal feud with Archbishop Makarios, his personal stake in the capture of Grivas, his personal necessity to prove the unproveable, that Cyprus can be held by force'." That the security campaign at this time became more than ever focused on the single point of tracking down Grivas, however, was not just a measure of an obsessiveness which anybody charged with Harding's responsibilities must surely have felt. It arose from his conviction that EOKA's leader remained the basic key to the cessation of hostilities. Eliminating him from the situation was the logical counterpart to destroying Makarios' political power as a prelude to the internationally orchestrated settlement which the Cyprus Government saw as the only hope for salvaging the battered Cypriot polity. Hunting for Grivas, however, also gave the Security Forces something to do when EOKA had otherwise 'gone to ground' — in the eyes of Army commanders, an important consideration for troops otherwise cooped up in cramped, often unhygienic camps, with nothing to do with their offduty hours. 2 ' There was thus a pronounced build-up in Army 'sweeps' through the rural areas, and especially in the Troodos foothills, where intelligence had again (if quite wrongly) divined that Grivas had moved his hideout. One episode above all stood out in these continued military operations: the curfew of the village of Milikouri, very near the spot where Grivas had so narrowly escaped his pursuers in June igsG. 24 At fifty-four days beginning on 24 March, this turned out to be the longest of all the curfews of the Emergency. It was not thought that Grivas was actually in, or necessarily even around, Milikouri, but rather that the village contained vital clues as to where he might be located.2" The inhabitants were allowed to go about their daily labours, but between 7 p.m. and 7 a.m. everybody was confined to their homes. The village was completely cut off from the outside world, and all dwellings, other buildings, and vehicles of all descriptions were minutely searched. What this meant in practice may be glimpsed from a letter written home by one British National Serviceman on 'search and cordon' duty, though the example is drawn not from Milikouri itself, but from an incident in the village of Xeros. The soldier recorded: 21
'Political Counter-Offensive against Archbishop Makarios', I'0371/130165, RGCtj8z/jj. Nen>$ Chronicle (13 June 1957). 21 The Imperial War Museum Library has a number of unpublished memoirs evoking the experience of National Servicemen in Cyprus. For examples sec the Papers of A. R. Ashton and R. S. Bra/icr. 24 Seep. 141. 25 There may well also be some truth in the assertion that Milikouri was singled out for punishment because of its close connections with nearby Kykko monastery, which dominated the economic life of the 11
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One can stop any car any time and search it i.e. take off the mudguards, tyres, dashboard, everything. The commandos stopped a lorry full of sand and having torn [it]... to pieces, they told the driver to empty all the sand out to see if there was anything in it. There wasn't so they told him to shove it all on again. He refused, left the sand and drove off with an empty lorry.2fl
Such petty occurrences, multiplied many times over, inevitably had deeply alienating effects. The sum of that alienation was perhaps greater that its parts. Intense illfeeling was created by the searching of homes—the pulling down of compartments which might conceal an individual, or grubby fingers rummaging through the family trunk stuffed with items treasured more often than not for their sentimental than material value. Some of the soldiers did this work with discretion and sensitivity— clothing, for example, neatly folded exactly as it was found. Others were not so fastidious. Matters were made worse by the exaggerated rumours which flourished because of the ban on journalists entering Milikouri till near the end of the curfew. The resentment of the latter naturally fed into their reporting of the situation. When it ended, Brigadier Baker assured the press who had flooded on to the scene that 'this curfew wasn't punitive. It just happened that Milikouri was unlucky enough to be in the centre of operations.'27 Nobody, certainly had died; the Royal Engineers strove to put back up whatever had been taken down; and the village children cannot have been wholly unseduced by the generous supplies of chocolate distributed through Army largesse as the centre of operations moved on.28 The experience of Milikouri, nonetheless, added its mite to the Anglo-Cypriot divide, and the further allegations of mistreatment it had generated were later to enter into the reinforcement of the Greek Government's case at the United Nations. The unstable foundations of the Emergency, furthermore, became encapulated through the summer of 1957 in two classic themes. First, there was the question of the detention camps. It had been the prospect of the reuniting of families which afforded a special edge to that 'rapture' which seized the Greek community on the news of Makarios' release. Harding would have loved to have emptied the camps as soon as possible. They were a major security headache. But he remained adamant that the gates could only be opened as and when a genuine settlement was arrived at. Intent in the interim on ignoring the Greek chorus within the island and that of'liberal' opinion in Britain, the Governor shared the frustration of his colleagues that there seemed to be a tendency elsewhere to view the detainees as analogous to those interned in the United Kingdom during the Second World War. In truth, he stressed to London, they were men who were 'undoubtedly guilty of murder, attempted murder, incitement or conspiracy to murder', but who had not been able to be village. For the later role of the Milikouri curfew at the United Nations, see Stephen Xydis, Cyprus. Conflict and Conciliation, 1954-58 (Columbus, Ohio, 1967), pp. 318-19. 26 Lieutenant D. B. McHugh to 'Mum and Dad', 26 Apr. 1957, McHugh Papers, Imperial War Museum. 21 Times of Cyprus (10 May 1957). 28 N. Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece (London, 1978), pp. 240-1.
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convicted 'for the deplorable reason that witnesses had been intimidated by the terrorists into refusing to give evidence'.29 Such a characterization, however, had lost much of its credibility to outsiders. One sceptic in Whitehall rather tartly observed that the alleged tendency to murderous deliquency did not square with his own experience at having to read the mail of those high-security detainees who had been moved to Wormwood Scrubs in England, since God figured in virtually all their letters 'home.311 Most discreetly damning in this respect was the recognition in the Colonial Office that should the Governor allow the press into 'Pyroi' and 'K' camps in Cyprus, it would be transparent that the occupants were 'man-in-the-street-ish' rather than hardened killers.11 Against this had to be set the fact, as one official sympathetic to the Governor put it, that his rigidity on this matter was 'an important expression of the Governor's views' which could only be relaxed as part and parcel of a political agreement. '2 This remained the nub of the matter. As it was, Harding reluctantly agreed to a slow trickle of releases, though whether these fortunate few made much of the rehabilitation classes they received to inculcate 'a less violent attitude to life', combined with an appreciation of why Cyprus was important to Britain's Middle Eastern diplomacy," can only be guessed at. Even in going this far Harding left Lennox-Boyd in no doubt that he remained adamantly opposed to 'easy and swift releases of large numbers' of detainees.'4 Yet the longer EOKA's truce went on, the more awkward such a position was to sustain. The second, by no means new, theme was that of alleged misconduct by members of the Security Forces. It was inherent in the 'very tricky phase' under way that propaganda came to the fore on both sides. Renewed Greek-Cypriot concentration on promoting such allegations was the natural counterpart to the Cyprus administration's denigration of the Archbishop. As ever, the Governor expressed his 'unshakeable intention' to support the Security Forces against the new tide of'smears'.35 Yet, the campaign in which respectable Greek lawyers figured prominently undeniably began to make headway. One compelling reason why it did so was because Government prosecutions started to go embarrassingly wrong in the courts. Specifically, judges subjected the use of confessions to close scrutiny and occasionally declared them to be 'inadmissable' owing to the circumstances surrounding their origin. This contributed to a sharp rise in the tensions which had always existed between the judges imported from the United Kingdom to staff the Special Courts and the Security Forces. One British journalist touched on an aspect of this in observing that the 'confidence of the Cypriots in the judiciary is in sharp contrast to their distrust of the Administration'. 36 This difference was in its way a tribute to British juristic 2
Harding to Lennox-Hovel, 9 Apr. 1957, 03926/871. ' A. Robertson, minute, 19 Apr. 1957. ibid. ' H. White, minute, 29 Apr. 1957, €,0926/81. " Neale, minute, i May 1957, ibid. 1 M Harding to Colonial Office, i June 1957, €0926/871. Ibid. •' I larding to Colonial Office, 7 May 1957, €0926/882. ' Nancy Crawshaw, 'Justice in Cyprus. II—The Special Courts', Manchester Guardian (2 July 1957).
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traditions under intense stress. Nevertheless, once Government prosecutions began to fail in the courts on grounds which appeared to give some credence to GreekCypriot suspicions, the whole foundation of British policy was weakened both practically and in a moral sense. A central figure here was Mr Justice Shaw, who early on in the Emergency had been severely wounded by a terrorist. The police subsequently came to believe that Shaw bent over backwards in his judgments to show that he bore no grudges." Be this as it may, it was Shaw who presided over the controversial case of Nikos Sampson, who had been arrested in late January for the murder of an English policeman. Seized in a house in Dhali, he had been taken to Nicosia Police Station, where he signed a confession. Afterwards he claimed to have been tortured, including a knive being inserted under his fingernails. What emerged during his trial was that in being transported from Dhali to Nicosia, Sampson had been forced to lie face downwards in an open truck during driving rain and only partially clothed (the movement of suspects in conditions of discomfort appears to have been a common practice during the Emergency). Although on 23 May Shaw dismissed the allegation of torture, he rejected the confession on the grounds of the 'unconscionable treatment' accorded to Sampson during his arrest—in a damaging summary the justice remarked that the handling of the accused 'was something that he had never met in his 47 years of [ judicial] experience'.38 One may reflect that had Shaw been practising in the special courts of French Algeria at that very time, the 'roughing up' of Sampson might have appeared to be small beer indeed. But he was in Cyprus, not Algeria, and upholding the scales of British colonial justice. He acquitted Sampson, who was, however, soon afterwards rearrested and this time sentenced to death for possession of a gun. Sampson was certainly no innocent at large.39 His restless and violent personality were many years later to cost Greek Cyprus dear.40 In the summer of 1957, however, his case helped foul the atmosphere in the island just as that of the more hapless Michael Karaolis had done in the fateful autumn of 1954. On no other matter, in the mean while, were relations between Whitehall and the Nicosia authorities so brittle than how to handle the Greek-Cypriot propaganda campaign. In the Colonial Office it was felt that 'it was all very well for the Governor to say that it is surely possible by assiduous briefing to prevent hostile . . . press comment', but in cases where serious allegations received some corroboration by statements from the Bench itself then 'the Governor's contention . . . just does not stand up'.41 Indeed, Harding's obstinacy in this matter was described by one official charged with Cypriot responsibilities as characteristic of his 'fantastic 37 For Shaw, see Crouzet, Conflit de Chypre, ii. 553 n, 596 n, 617, and Crawshaw, Cyprus Revolt, 188,247. 38 For a summary of the Sampson case see the Observer (24 May 1957). •w For Sampson's career as an EOKA gunman at this time see Charles Foley and W. Scobie, The Stmggle for Cyprus (Stanford, Calif., 1975), pp. 105-7,115-17. 40 Sampson was one of the organizers of the coup against President Makarios in 1974 which fatally precipitated the Turkish invasion of the island in July of that year. 41 Melville, minute, 29 May 1957,0)926/880.
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misunderstanding of the facts of life of press relations'.42 What concerned the Colonial Office most was that even well-disposed journalists who were under no illusions as to the realities of dealing with terrorism started to display uneasiness, as when Eldon Griffiths of Newsweek (later a Conservative MP) expressed anxiety that Shaw's judgment over Sampson did actually imply that mistreatment had gone beyond what had been substantiated during the trial. He was assured otherwise, but as the Colonial Office official who handled this business remarked, if'friends' now required such comforting, 'it will be seen that hostile critics could have a field day'.43 In a minute which revealed how cryptic matters were becoming, the same official concluded that given the available information 'any newspaper man in his right mind would think that the Governor had a fairly good idea that something was wrong somewhere but had not found a face-saving way of putting right what was wrong'. 44 One possible way to put things right was to allow an independent enquiry to visit Cyprus, either a British Parliamentary delegation or from an agency such as the Human Rights Sub-Commission of the European Court. This was considered by the Cyprus Policy Committee of the British Cabinet, but rejected. One reason for doing so was that it could not be discounted that some of the allegations might be found to be true. 4 ' The clinching factor, however, was almost certainly the Governor's insistence on regarding any intrusion by outsiders as 'calling into question his own administration, and even touching his own personal honour'. 46 This entry into the foreground of the matter of 'honour' suggested an acutely heightened sensitivity. Unable to announce an enquiry to disarm the Opposition in Westminster, and soften worries even on his own side of the House, Lcnnox-Boyd was left to cope as best he could at the Dispatch Box, sometimes helped by the occasional slips of Labour parliamentarians, as when a north London MP with many Cypriot constituents, Lena Jaeger, muddled the identities of Greek detainees whose complaints she was seeking to air. Where such grave matters were involved, the minister reprovingly stated, it was necessary to maintain the most scrupulous accuracy. 4 ' In early June the Cyprus Government, with Whitehall's approval, published a W'hite Paper entitled Allegations of Brutality hi Cyprus, an official denial which struck many as having been drawn up, not to meet the worries of the Greek-Cypriot public, but merely to stifle suspicions in the outside world.48 Such improvisations might be of some immediate use, but could not break up the cloud which had formed over the Emergency in Cyprus— a cloud which Archbishop Makarios sought to blacken further when on 19 July he held a press conference in Athens at which he presented 317 detailed statements by Greek-Cypriots of the ill-treatment they claimed to have received. On balance, the 42
Noakcs to Carstairs, 28 May 1957, ibid. " Noakcs, memorandum, 30 May 1957, ibid. 4l Ibid. Lennox-Hoyd to Lord Chancellor, 25 June IQ.S7, ibid. 4(1 D. Kirkham, minute, 19 June 1957, ibid. 47 For an illustration of the difficulties facing Opposition members in the House of Commons seeking to raise issues of ill-treatment see Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 1956-7, vol. 573, 15 July 1957, cols. 773-896. 48 'The White Paper: For the Overseas Market Only', Times of Cyprus (14 June 1957). 41
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Greeks were winning the propaganda fight on points against the British. Whether they were winning the wider political war over the future of Cyprus—just then entering a. new period of turbulence—was another matter. In announcing the Archbishop's release to Parliament, Lennox-Boyd had emphasized the prospect of future discussions unfolding gradually within NATO. This was one way of marginalizing Makarios. Harding was all in favour of that. But, for the Governor, talking about NATO was not just a means of getting over a parliamentary hurdle. On 3 April he told the American Consul, Courtney, that NATO was 'the only present hope' he saw for progress,49 most probably through the setting up of an independent Cypriot state under international guarantee—the guarantee being designed to meet Turkish fears that independence would lead straight to Enosis. Unless something along these lines was done quickly, Harding admitted, partition might well 'prove to be the result to which they were finally driven'.50 In the same vein, he shortly afterwards pleaded with the British Government 'to get it [NATO conciliation] started'.51 Otherwise, as he pointed out to ministers, EOKA would restart its military operations, possibly on a bigger scale than before the truce. It was the fear of such renewal which came to determine much of the Governor's thinking in the months ahead. The surfacing of the concept of an independent, self-standing Cyprus—one, that is, whose sovereignty was separate from Britain, Greece or Turkey, and guaranteed against future immersion into any one of them—was highly significant. First mooted by the Indian delegate at the United Nations, Krishna Menon, in February, it came to be seen as Dulles' brainchild, which was not least why Harding now latched on to it. Nevertheless, the pattern in which the Governor's calls on Her Majesty's Government for urgent action were recurrently brushed aside now repeated itself. The most obvious reason for this concerned Turkey. In releasing Makarios, the British Cabinet had presumed on Turkish tolerance, but simultaneously provided assurances to Menderes and Zorlu that it did not prejudice the understanding over partition that had been reached with Lennox-Boyd back in December.52 At first all seemed to be well. Ankara restricted itself, as we saw, to warning Karamanlis to tone down Makarios' welcome in Athens.53 Before long, however, Ambassador Bowker reported from Ankara 'a minor crisis in Anglo—Turkish relations' generated by Turkish fears that recent events had put the Greeks 'firmly back on the path of Enosis\54 Having read Governor Harding's recommendation to push on quickly with peacemaking through NATO, Bowker advised that no further liberties be taken with Turkish feelings. In the Foreign Office this was taken as decisive in the matter, so that it was concluded 'there is ... no further need to go into the other 49 50 52 51 14
Courtney, telegram to Dulles, Box 3280, RGgg, State Department Records, USNA. 51 Ibid. Harding, telegram to Colonial Office, 5 Apr. 1957, FO37i/i35i38,RGio72/36. Bowker, telegram to Selwyn Lloyd, 10 Apr. 1957, FO37I/I30095, RGCi0344/4o. Crouzet, Conflit de Chypre, ii. 950. Bowker to Selwyn Lloyd, 12 Apr. 1957, FO37I/I30095, RGCio344/43.
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obstacles to any scheme for [Cypriot] independence, though these are clearly formidable'. 55 This 'minor crisis' in Anglo-Turkish relations was, in fact, the harbinger of something more serious. For months the Turkish leadership had been exhorting the British to go straight to partition. The freeing of Makarios not only convinced Ankara that time was now working against them, but that if they were going to make the most of their opportunity before it finally slipped away, they might have to act unilaterally. From early May the partitionist campaign in Turkey sharply intensified, and took on an anti-British as well as an anti-Greek colouring. For Menderes and Zorlu this had the advantage of acting as a safety-valve for the deterioration in the internal stability of their country, with inflation rising, living-standards falling, and growing discontent in the Army. But what made these circumstances even more complicated was their overlap with the emergence of Syria as a Soviet proxy, and the threat this posed on the one hand to Turkey's borders, and on the other to Western interests. The Syrian crisis was to simmer in the Middle East throughout the summer, and whilst it lasted the priority attached to keeping the Turks loyal to the Baghdad Pact became more pressing than ever in London and (what was new and perhaps even more important) in Washington. It was logical in these circumstances that it was the problem of Turkey which figured more largely than ever in the Foreign Office mind. But even in that department it was recognized that there were, indeed, other formidable obstacles which meant the Cabinet could not act as Harding wished it to. These difficulties were evoked in an analysis of the implications of any international negotiation based on the premiss of an independent Cypriot state. At a very early stage in such a scenario, it was argued, it would be seen that Britain had 'largely... lost control over the future of the island'.56 Most fundamentally of all, independence was defined as tantamount to 'handing Cyprus over to Makarios',57 since there could be no doubt who wrould be the elected leader of such a polity. The critical conclusion drawn from this was that Cypriot independence was the worst of all possible outcomes for Britain—wane even than Enosis—since at least in the latter case the United Kingdom would retain some residual influence over Athens, whereas Makarios would presumably remain an enemy. This British prejudice against an independence solution was to be a major complication in the most climactic phases of the Cyprus conflict. But it was already making itself felt in the summer of 1957, when any indication that Cyprus might be handed over to Makarios under NATO's guidance threatened to set off precisely those intra-Tory detonations which Macmillan knew to be the biggest danger to his leadership. For all these reasons Ambassador Bowker's advice that the time had arrived 'to cut the Gordian knot and reach a decision now for partition' became once again a great temptation in London.58 Macmillan records in his memoirs that on becoming " Young, minule, 12 May 1957, FO^yi/i^or^S, RGCio7i/3(>. 'fl Thompson, minute, 7 Aug. 1957, FO371/130084, RGCiojiy/^a. 5S Bowkcr to Foreign Office, 9 Apr. 1957, F(>371/130138, RGCio72/38.
*' Ibid.
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premier he soon grasped that 'perhaps partition was the only way out' in Cyprus, and that he instructed the Cyprus Government to speed up the existing investigation into the modalities of such an operation.59 Yet there was another factor which underpinned the salience of partition in British thinking. This was the strategic dimension—that old Cypriot bugbear. Ever since the dimly remembered Chiefs of Staff obiter dicta of June I950,60 British policy had been predicated on the assumption that her national interests required Cyprus as a base, not a base on Cyprus. But was this still true? Harding was impatient that the British Government should indeed make up its mind as to whether this restriction held. Macmillan had his own doubts as to whether Britain's requirements in the island presently went beyond an aerodrome, or what he called 'a sort of Gibraltar';61 and he set up a committee of officials under the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Norman Brook, to investigate, on this assumption, the nature and extent of the bases in Cyprus that would be required.62 Such questioning, however, was only one fragment of a much wider review of the configuration of British defence policy touched off by the events of Suez. The Defence White Paper published on 4 April was, in Macmillan's words, 'the biggest change in military policy in normal times'.63 In fact, implementing that change—which included an upgrading of nuclear weaponry, and a downgrading of conventional commitments overseas—was to be a highly contested and partial process. Nevertheless, this burgeoning revision of Britain's requirements, including Cyprus, opened the way to partition as a practical option. When the Minister of Defence, Duncan Sandys, visited Cyprus between 25 and 28 April, it was common knowledge that, apart from discussing with Harding the timing of the medium-term rundown in the Cyprus garrison in line with the White Paper's prognostications, he was scouting out the possibilities for a quick partition involving the retention of British base areas.64 Whilst he was in the island, however, any enthusiasm Sandys had for partition was temporarily cooled by the opposition of the local British political and military establishment, though the motivations of the latter were by no means uniform. Whereas defence planners in London might be drawn to the idea that the time had come to reduce Britain's strategic stake in Cyprus, at Middle Eastern Headquarters such a view was understandably anathema. This opposition fed through to the Chiefs of Staff in London,65 and proved sufficiently resilient that the underlying strategic issues were not, in fact, to be resolved so long as the Emergency lasted. This was testimony to blockages in metropolitan decision-making on a much wider plane. Resistance to partition inside the civilian branches of the Cyprus Government, however, was rooted in other preoccupations. It remained the Government o/Cyprus, and as such was committed, according to its own lights, to all who lived there. Its reactions were also shaped by the conclusions of the accelerated study of the implementation 59
M Harold Macmilhn, Riding the Storm, 7956-7 959 (London, 1971)^.225. Seepp.2o-22. hl Crouzet,ConflitdeChypre, 11.924. Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 657. 63 w Ibid. 263. Times of Cyprus (26 Apr. 1957). 65 Robert Stephens, Cyprus, a Place of Arms: Power Politics and Ethnic Conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean (London, 1966), p. 137. 61
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of partition, to the effect that partition could only be effected bloodlessly if it was implemented gradually over a period often to fifteen years. A short, sharp partition, by contrast, could only be imposed by 'fire and sword'/'6 In drawing up, after Sandys left, a 'forces analysis' required for the various scenarios confronting British decision-makers, one of the Governor's prime purposes was therefore to disillusion ministers in London that partition constituted an easy or desirable way out of their dilemmas. It was, in fact, 'the big one', needing three Infantry Brigades plus armoured units even if it was to be conducted as part of a 'phased process'/'7 Nevertheless, the kernel of the decision which Sandys had conveyed to Harding—that within two years the British Army garrison would have to be reduced to preEmergency levels—was of the utmost significance in setting the parameters within which a solution had henceforth to be found. It had, in short, a concentrating effect, though in which direction remained open to dispute. Harding presented his military appraisal to London for guidance on the eve of the NATO Council which met in Bonn, 2-5 May. The recent handover of the SecretaryGeneralship of that organization from Lord Ismay to the experienced Belgian statesman M. Paul Henri Spaak signified not only a shift in its broad goals, but also had specific implications for NATO's handling of Cypriot matters/* Hitherto, essentially concerned with an external military threat, the organixational focus turned to the consolidation of NATO's internal cohesion, so recently threatened over Suez, and thus to political 'problem-solving' generally. Here Cyprus was the obvious current test case. Spaak's own nationality was also pertinent, since it made him sympathetic to small countries ('underdogs'), and thus to Greece rather than Turkey. Significantly, it also predisposed him to a particular solution, since, as Spaak pointed out to the United Kingdom's representative at NATO Headquarters, although the Walloons had a long history of wishing to attach themselves to France, after 1830 they had settled down to a stable life within an independent Belgian state/'*' The use of parochial Belgian history as a guide for Cypriot solutions aroused only sarcasm in London. Nevertheless, concern as to where Spaak might be heading was not eased when he informed Selwyn Lloyd over dinner in Bonn that he intended to explore a solution directly with the three interested governments, and that he wished at some point to see Archbishop Makarios. '1 told him to be extremely careful about that,' the Foreign Secretary assured Macmillan, 70 but there was no doubt that Spaak's arrival constituted a new imponderable from the vantage-point of the British Government. Had Spaak been purely a lone agent in putting forward what became his 'good offices' mission over Cyprus, he could easily have been pushed to one side by the M
' 'Cyprus Government Report on the Methods, Costs and Consequences of Partition' in 03926/1042. '" Harding, telegram to Lennox-Boyd, r May 1956, CO926/io~8. rs ' For Spaak's rather lightweight memoirs see his Coin/nits itttiflicrcs: dc l\rcenir aux deception (Paris, 1969). ''" Roberts to Havter, 27 May 1957, FO.^i 7130139, RGCioyi/sy. 711 'Record of Conversation between Secretary of State and M. Spaak in Bonn, 3 May 1957', FO37I/I30138, RGCio72/48.
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British. What was most worrying, however, for London was the suspicion that he had been 'successfully nobbled by the Americans'.71 There were certainly influential elements in the Eisenhower Administration who were disappointed that the British Government had not built upon the opportunity presented by the release of Makarios. Such views were played upon even more by the rumours of a possible partition (or 'forcible vivisection', as it was pejoratively described in the State Department72) which might get the British out of a hole, but at the cost of triggering instability in the region, and possibly a Greco-Turkish war. It was fears along these lines which—for the first time since the abortive 'Holmes mission' cut short by Suez—led to a feeling in Washington that it was necessary to 'use our influence to steer this problem towards a reasonable solution'.73 Whilst Spaak was never simply the instrument of the Americans, he would certainly not have taken up his 'good offices' after the Bonn meeting had he not been fully aware that he had the support of NATO's leading power. On 2 June he dispatched to the main interested governments an official note putting forward the proposal for a statute of independence for Cyprus, citing as a precedent not only the Belgian model, but the much more recent and perhaps more apposite analogy by which an independent Austria was guaranteed by Treaty against a new Anschluss with Germany. 'Shoot this proposal down as soon as possible' was the panicky instruction from London to Ambassador Roberts at NATO Headquarters.74 The British Government's dilemmas with respect to international conciliation, and NATO intervention in particular, was indeed very acute. It was becoming clearer all the time that some such help would probably be needed to force through a solution on the various competing sides. Yet Britain's ability to control the forms which NATO (and American) action might take was also in decline. NATO meddling in the United Kingdom's colonial business, furthermore, remained highly sensitive within the Conservative parliamentary party; indeed, where Cyprus was concerned, it became more sensitive after the eating of humble Egyptian pie finally came to an end with the high tension of the Commons debate on the Suez Agreement on 15-16 May, about which Macmillan was intensely nervous.75 In its wake the rightwing '1957 Group'—the true successor to the Suez Group—emerged as the keeper of the flame of a British Cyprus, with Spaak as one of its favourite targets. Although the Turkish Government shot down the Secretary-General's memorandum by refusing to invite Spaak to Ankara even to discuss it, the latter's 'good offices' were clearly not ended. With partition still a forbidden or unattainable fruit, and independence, 'guaranteed' or otherwise, unacceptable in both Ankara and London, it remained safer for Macmillan and his ministerial colleagues for the moment to hide behind the fact of the Cypriot impasse than to do anything to break it open. Harding's hopes for a breakthrough to relieve the growing internal stresses of the 71 72 71 75
Foreign Office to United Kingdom, telegram, 15 June 1957, FC>37i/i3oi39, RGCio72/i59. Wood to T. Jones, 13 Apr. 1957, Box 3280, RG.S9, State Department Records, USNA. 74 Ibid. Hoyer-Miller, minute, i4june 1957, FO37i/i3oi39,RGCi07i/59. Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 235.
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Emergency therefore seemed once more hemmed in on every side. When Consul Courtney retired from his post in Nicosia and was 'debriefed' in Washington, he described the present condition of the island in mid-June as 'quiet but apprehensive', adding that even those Cypriots who abhorred terrorism 'would prefer EOKA violence to continued British rule'. 76 The Governor would not have accepted this, but he was acutely conscious of the brink on which Cyprus stood. Indeed, he had already told Courtney's successor, William Belcher, that Cyprus' problems were 'again being pushed aside' by the Macmillan Government.77 What made this so dangerous, in Harding's view, was that sooner or later Grivas' restless personality made a renewed EOKA onslaught certain unless a political initiative intervened. 78 There was another development, however, which made the situation more desperate than any faced in the past. This stemmed from the heightened communal feeling in the colony. It was true that in some 'mixed1 (i.e. Greek-Turkish) villages, with a long memory of cohabitation, Makarios' release had led to a slightly better atmosphere. But for the most part the opposite was true, with some local politicians ruthlessly exploiting ethnic feelings. This tendency seemed close to getting out of control on the Turkish side, where Dr Kucuk, as Harding complained to the Turkish Ambassador in London on a visit, sought to 'out-Makarios the Archbishop';79 in mid-June Turkish councillors resigned en masse from all Cypriot municipalities, opening up a new front of ethnic competition with pregnant consequences for the future. For the first time inside the Cyprus Government the fear took shape of just how dire the British position would become if, when EOKA resumed violence, the Cypriot Turks decided to 'take the law into their own hands'.8" At that point the same sort of humiliating denouement which had befallen the British in Palestine—assaulted on all sides, with no option but to cut their losses and get out quick, with their tail between the legs—would finally beckon in Cyprus. Driven by these concerns, Harding, apart from seeing to it that the 'Green Line' dividing the Greek and Turkish parts of Nicosia was more closely policed, sought to combat what he saw as the Macmillan Government's fatal complaisance by demanding once more a 'dramatic initiative' to stave off the disintegration he most dreaded. The changing balance in his own views was conveyed by the goal he now defined for British policy: 'to disengage with honour'.<S1 But where did honour lie for the British in Cyprus? Harding was convinced it could not lie in partition, against which, as one official recorded in Whitehall, he proceeded to 'come down like a ton of bricks'.82
711 Memorandum of Conversation, 17 June 1957, Box 3280, RG59, State Department Records, USNA. 77 Belcher, telegram to Dulles, lojune 1957, ibid. 78 Harding, telegram to Lennox-Boyd, lojune 1957, 00926/1095. '" Note by Governor: Interview with the Turkish Ambassador, 27 July 1957, 00926/615. s " Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 7 June 1957,00926/1095. 81 Harding to Lennox-Boyd, i July 1957, ibid. 82 Notes on Sir John Harding's Proposals for an 'International' Solution for Cyprus, 5 July 1957, 00926/1095.
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After being forwarded a recent set of Cabinet minutes, he telegrammed to LennoxBoyd on i July as follows: I must confess that I cannot help feeling that [the Cyprus Policy Committee] papers reflect a conclusion that partition is [the] only possible solution; that the end product of any plan must inevitably [be] partition and soon; and that the only problem to be solved is how to make partition respectable to save our face . . . it does look to me as if the fundamental difference between us is that the Cyprus Policy Committee [of the Cabinet] has accepted partition as inevitable whereas I do not'.83
These words defined, indeed, the chief political and to some extent moral difference between the two British governments in London and Nicosia. It was essentially the difference between a metropolitan government concerned, in this instance, almost exclusively with the 'high polities' revolving around Cyprus, including its Westminster ramifications, and a local administration whose priority above all were conditions within the island. 'With great respect,' the Governor concluded his message with that arch formality which always indicated that he was in great earnest, 'I suggest . . . that the next step might be for H[er] M[ajesty's] Government] to put their cards on the table with the Americans and M. Spaak and tell them [their]... objectives and the lengths to which [they]... are now prepared to go in search of a settlement.'84 These lengths included the United Kingdom's preparedness, at long last, to yield her sole sovereignty over most of the island. But there was another 'length' which, Harding felt, the British Cabinet had 'frightened itself out of taking a year earlier in the search for peace:85 a willingness to exert the necessary level of pressure on Turkey as well as Greece. On that occasion Eden's nerve had failed in the run-up to the invasion of Egypt. When Field-Marshal Harding arrived in London on 6 July 1957 for talks with the Cabinet it was unclear whether the nerve of the new occupant of 10 Downing Street would prove any firmer under pressure. In the preceding weeks the Prime Minister had himself become convinced that the British Government could not afford to go through the summer without doing something about Cyprus. On 7 July Macmillan, Butler, Selwyn Lloyd, Sandys, the Marshal of the Royal Air Force, the Permanent Head of the Foreign Office, and Governor Harding discussed the problem for four hours after 4 p.m., dined, and (after a break for the Prime Minister to deliver a television broadcast on industrial problems at home) resumed into the night hours. 'We hammered out a new plan', Macmillan wrote in his diary,'. . . which seemed quite good at the time, but it will probably not look good in the morning.'86 Quite how the Prime Minister felt about it that morning we do not know, but the plan involved the concept of a 'triple sovereignty' over the island, involving Britain, Greece, and Turkey, married to the development of internal self-government, and the retention of bases by the United Kingdom. Later on the United States Embassy in London was to tell Washington 83 84
Harding, telegram to Lennox-Boyd, i July 1957, €0926/1095. 85 8f> Ibid. See p. 139. Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 660.
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that it was internal Tory politics which explained why a tridominium 'shot to the top of the list' at this stage.87 There was some truth to this, but the Governor's unwillingness to play the partition game also entered the reckoning; even the Foreign Office was now prepared to admit that partition would be 'not quite the idyllic process envisaged by the Turks'.™ The plan was not altogether brand new since it bore resemblances to that which Macmillan, as Foreign Secretary, had prepared in advance of the 1955 Tripartite Conference. But there were also key differences. The provision for British bases had not featured earlier. On that occasion Greece and Turkey were only to be 'associated' with Britain's continuing rule; now sovereignty was to be vested—at least in theory—equally between the three powers. Finally, the nationality of the Governor was to be that of a 'neutral' country, the logic being that otherwise sooner or later it would be necessary to contemplate a Greek appointee. By implication, this was to be a tridominium in which some parts of the triangle were to be more equal than others. Discussions about Cyprus continued in the full Cabinet on 10-11 July. Macmillan was conscious that the Government was approaching what he called 'the last—often the most dangerous—weeks of the | parliamentary] session'.84 'I have tried the party pretty hard over Sue/,' the Prime Minister recorded after Cabinet on the nth. 'I did not want a panic about "selling out in Cyprus".""1 Ministerial deliberations were renewed against this worrisome domestic backcloth on the i6th. The remaining problems over Cyprus, Macmillan noted, were not so much to do with the policy, but its method and presentation.'" Yet the methods concealed a range of motives and priorities. Lennox-Boyd and I larding were both taken aback when they saw the Foreign Office note drawn up after the meeting on the i6th, which made no provision for bringing in the Americans and Spaak, and envisaged a conference at which the British would leave it to the Turks to do all the running, mostly against Greece, until they intervened with their own proposals at the last minute. In complaining to Selvvyn Lloyd, the Colonial Secretary pointedly stated that this continued reliance on the Turks was a point on which Sir John Harding felt especially strongly.92 What seemed to be emerging, indeed, was strikingly reminiscent of the approach so disastrously followed in September 1955. A repetition of that exercise, the Field-Marshal stated in a memorandum for ministers, would be a fatal affront to the Greeks, and prejudice whatever chance there was of bringing them round to cooperation. The result would be to revive suspicions . . . that HMG arc simply trying to confront the Greeks (and this time the Americans and M. Spaak too) with a show of intransigence by the Turks instigated by HMG themselves. It may well never get started at all because the Greeks would not come. If it does get started, it will certainly break down in dissension and recrimination . . . In such circumstances the concept of tridominium, far from being welcomed as a t/ctis ex machina, would be S7
Whitney, memorandum, 27 Sept. 1957, Box 3281, RGsg, State Department Records, USNA. Hayter, minute, ifi.May 1957,I'O.}?!/130095, RGCio344/74. '' Macmillan, Riding the .9/»nw, 66t. '"' Ibid. '" Ibid. ''- Lennox-Boyd to Sehvyn Lloyd, 18 July 10.57, (.0926/1095. ss
s
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dismissed as a mere rabbit out of a hat. In many quarters the performance will only serve to confirm the belief that HMG are already 'sold' on partition and that they are trying to put the best face on it they can.91
Harding's use of language was, as so often, calculatingly provocative. He was interested in getting a solution, not in a 'performance' merely for public consumption. Continued evasion would only further distort an already viciously complicated problem. But there was another matter which separated the Cyprus and British Governments. Harding and his advisers looked to international pressure to bring Makarios and his supporters—doubtless kicking and screaming—into an agreement. But it was absolutely vital that the proposed system of internal selfgovernment, so vital to the overall balance of the plan, be such as to carry credibility with the bulk of ordinary Cypriots. The Governor had long since appreciated that the Radcliffe 'offer' could not do this, and that any unvarnished repetition of it would provide exactly the excuse required to reject the whole scheme. Nonetheless, the Prime Minister did not feel he could go further. 'As in the past', Reddaway summed up the Governor's basic reactions on 26 July, 'we shall have handed over the initiative to Makarios and the Greek-Cypriots . . . Unless the deadlock is broken soon, there will... be a serious risk of terrorism breaking out again. We shall then be back to square one, and no progress will be possible . . . until terrorism has again been fought to a standstill.'94 When on the same day the Foreign Office, under Macmillan's supervision, drew up the invitations to Greece and Turkey for the proposed conference, these differences both of method and substance had not been resolved. The crucial matter was whether the Greek Government would accept an invitation which was liable to be full of pitfalls for them. Peake's successor as British Ambassador in Athens, Sir Roger Allen, thought that the Karamanlis ministry, at its weakest point since September 1955, just mightbe persuaded to do so. He described to Selwyn Lloyd how the Greek Government was 'beginning to play on two levels',95 on the one hand striking stern poses as when on 12 July it confirmed its intention to inscribe Cyprus again at the United Nations, including this time a controversial subitem on the allegations of brutality, whilst on the other feeling out 'the best terms they could get'. In fact, the mainland Greeks had always played on two (if not more) levels. But it was the case that a newly heightened consciousness of their vulnerability had accentuated these layered tactics. There were fresh rumours of Turkish gunrunning into Cyprus, with Turkish Army officers infiltrating in the guise of teachers in Muslim schools;96 and although American intelligence agents were sent to reconnoitre the southern coast of Anatolia, and found no evidence of arms consignments being sent, in Washington this was not taken as conclusive proof that something of the kind was not going on.97 There was even talk of a possible coup in Athens. For M 94 95 96 97
'Cyprus: Memorandum by the Governor' in 00926/1095. Reddaway, minute, 26July 1957, €0926/1055. Allen to Young, 19 July 1957, FO37i/i3oo8s, RGCio3i9/8i. Allen to Young, 31 July 1957, FO37i/i30o85,RGCio3i9/9i. Warren, telegram to State Department, Box 3281, RGsg, State Department Records, USNA.
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heleaguered Greek ministers, an international conference might at least 'buy time' and help to siphon off some of these pressures. But to inveigle the Greeks to another London conference there had to be a castiron assurance both that this was not to be September 1955 all over again, and that partition was not one of the projected outcomes. This had become, and remained, the nub of the matter. It was also relevant to the role to be assumed by the Americans. Macmillan was prepared to meet at least one of Harding's criticisms by trying to involve the United States more closely. On 31 July Selwyn Lloyd personally promised Secretary of State Dulles that the British Government would not enter the proposed conference with any prior understanding with Turkey (or what the Greeks called an 'Anglo-Turkish conspiracy'). But what Dulles wanted to find out before agreeing to engage American influence on behalf of a conference was whether the 'partition pledge' made by the Colonial Secretary in Parliament on 19 December 1956 still held. This was the tell-tale sign of British intentions over Cyprus. Having explored the matter, the United States Embassy in London advised Washington that the British Government still, in fact, regarded that statement as applying to any new plan for determining Cyprus' future.1'8 Bent on having as little as possible to do with what they suspected might turn out to be simply a front for the 'vivisection' of the island, therefore, the Eisenhower Administration quickly retired once more into the background. The intense diplomacy which followed over the month of August we need only briefly summarize. On the 3rd, Sir Roger Allen formally presented the British invitation to Averoff in Athens. He told the Greek minister that the United Kingdom would approach the intended conference with a genuinely 'open mind'. A couple of days later Allen was also able to tell Averoff that the British Government would agree to Spaak sitting at the conference table. But he could not meet the essential Greek fears, and on the gth Karamanlis turned down the invitation. 'We decided not to take no for an answer,' Macmillan wrote," and London continued to press Athens to alter its decision. Governor Harding did what little he could to nudge things along, easing some Emergency Regulations, and even commuting the death sentence of a convicted terrorist, Andreas Sophocleous. Throughout this time, however, Bowker advised from Ankara that the Turks were sure to reject anything which the Greeks accepted. In short, the conference, like that of 1955, was bound to crash, and with perhaps even more catastrophic effects than its predecessor. On 27 August the Greek Government, who above all feared the fall-out from a failed conference marked by acrimony, decisively rejected the renewed invitation, and although some desultory attempts continued to keep the conference proposal alive—dogged by leaks in Whitehall which suggested to Ambassador Allen that 'some source in a confidential position' might be betraying his or her confidence100—it was, in fact, doomed. 1)S 'United Kingdom Commitments and Proposed Conference', Embassy Dispatch to State Department, Box 3281, RGgo., State Department Records, USNA. '''' Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 672. '"" Allen to Addis, 12 Oct. 1957, FC)37i/130143, RGCi6o2/4.
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Instead, a new round of polemical debates about Cyprus loomed at the United Nations; and, as everybody knew, such debates had usually been the signal for further violence in the island. Violence, indeed, looked set to break out on all sides in the colony. On 31 August four Turks—members of'Volkan'—were killed by an explosion in a house in a suburb of Nicosia; police investigations revealed it to be a bomb factory. Harding's brusque reply to the call from Dr Dervis, Mayor of Nicosia, that the Security Forces should crack down on the dangerous new factor of Turkish terrorism helped to encourage the growth of Greek perceptions of British complicity in Turkish depredations.101 That Harding would have looked benignly on terrorism from any quarter was to mistake the man. Nevertheless, the incident was important for leaving the initial traces of a tendency within the Cyprus Government and Security Forces to turn a blind eye to the 'men of violence' in the Turkish community. In the light of later events, the decision not to nip Turkish aggression in the bud just as it emerged into the open may have been fatal to the Greeks, but it was also to prove highly damaging to the British. There was, however, another significant form of violence just then getting under way. This consisted of EOKA attacks on the Communists—themselves mostly, if not exclusively, Greeks. Since Makarios' release AKEL had shown signs of independent activity. With speculation rife about a possible end to the Emergency triggered by Makarios' release, it was natural that the Left should seek to position itself for the future. British intelligence reported that AKEL had now recovered at the grass-roots and had 'a ready supply of juveniles' for its demonstrations102—a sign that the position in Cypriot politics of EOKA and the Right was not impregnable. There were also grounds for believing that the Cyprus Government, having once proscribed AKEL, was seeking to give it a discreet boost. The party's old leader, Andreas Ziartides, was allowed to re-enter the island from Greece in May, making an obvious contrast with the treatment of Makarios. Of the average trickle of twentyfive persons a month that were let out of the detention camps through the summer, a disproportionate number were AKEL members. It seems likely that when Harding envisioned a conference at which Makarios would be flanked by 'other Cypriot representatives', he calculated that a reactivated AKEL would be among them. Nonetheless, Left-Right rivalry in Cyprus was far too deeply embedded to hinge on external manipulation. AKEL's modest revival, indeed, ignited all of Grivas' old Khi-ite neuroses.103 From mid-August a series of beatings of Leftists began. Some of the most sickening atrocities perpetrated by EOKA were later to be against AKEL, which lacked the capacity to protect its own rank and file possessed by both the British and the Turks. For the present, this intra-Greek violence heightened the gathering sense that the dam of the wider Cypriot 'truce'—a truce the British themselves espoused not to recognize—might be about to break. 101 102 103
Crouzet, Conflitde Chypre, ii. 959. Belcher, telegram to Dulles, 13 Aug. 1957, Box 3281, RG59, State Department Records, USNA. See p. 29.
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The continuance of the round of Cyprus diplomacy into September reflected a general desire to head off a breakdown of the fragile equilibrium in the island. Much of this revolved around the United Nations. The British Government at first hoped to prevent the inscription of the issue on to the agenda in New York, and it was to secure American cooperation—or as John Profumo, the junior Colonial Office minister, put it, to ensure that 'the Americans should not go cold on us at this critical stage"04—that they agreed to the first wide-ranging Anglo-American talks on Cyprus which took place in Washington between 11 and 14 September, just ahead of the new session. These, however, did not amount to the 'laying of cards on the table' which Harding had previously called for. The Americans were only given glimpses of the tridominium plan, and although they agreed to go away and consider what they had been told, it was evident that they did not think much of the British suggestions—as one of them tactfully put it to the British team, the doubts harboured inside the Administration were 'not based solely upon the views of the United States Ambassador in Athens but represented serious doubts . . . in the State Department'.10'' 'Clearly the Americans are trying to disengage' was how such remarks were interpreted in London,1116 and on 20 September the United States delegation did not oppose the Greek Government's sponsorship of the Cyprus item for discussion, which duly won a majority. Nobody expected the following debate to lead anywhere other than to more verbal confrontation—and perhaps worse. Averoff suffered no illusion that this inscription was anything but a pyrrhic victory for Greece. In New York he had the albatross of the brutality allegations slung around his neck which, embarrassing as they were for Britain, were also regarded as gratuitously provocative by most other delegations. When Archbishop Makarios arrived in New York to listen to the debates, for the first time he found access to senior American officials barred. This was only an outward ripple of something more fundamental: the attenuation of American sympathy for, and patience with, Greece's tactics over Cyprus. During the summer Karamanlis and A veroff had felt bound to respond to their domestic opponents' calls to exert more leverage over their NATO partners. Between 17 and 21 August they had visited Cairo for talks with President Nasser. This may have been essentially play-acting. The Greek leadership consistently refused to contemplate any substantive reorientation away from the West. But with the crisis over Soviet penetration into Syria just coming to a climax, this was not a good time for the Greeks even to appear to exploit American susceptibilities. As the British had found out over Suez, the Eisenhower White House expected from their junior allies an impeccable loyalty, and they expected this of Greece even more readily than from the United Kingdom. It was in an attempt to row back from the exposed Greek position that A veroff quickly latched on to the proposal for an independence solution for Cyprus which Dulles himself had first seriously propounded. He even persuaded Archbishop Makarios to agree in private that "" Profumo, minute, 17 Aug. 1957, FO37i/t.}oii7,RGCiO5i/i39. 1113 Roberts, telegram to Foreign Office, 2 Oct. 1957, FO3717130139, RGCio72/68. '"" Caccia, minute, xoOct. 1957, FO3717130139, RGCio72//i.
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this might prove an acceptable compromise—an important moment in the evolution of the latter's views.107 When the United Nations session finally opened, not only did Averoff refrain from actively pursuing the issue of alleged ill-treatment by British Security Forces in Cyprus, he told Selwyn Lloyd in a meeting that his Government was now willing to consider an independent Cyprus within the British Commonwealth of Nations.108 This was a very long way indeed from the Enosis ideals which had flourished for so many decades in both Greek and Cypriot politics. In making his approach to Selwyn Lloyd, Averoff knew very well from his own sources how short the time was for peace to be secured in Cyprus. It was not in Grivas' nature to let major international discussions take place about the future of the island without signalling his own stake in the matter. This renewed brittleness lay behind the analysis sent to London by Sir Roger Allen in Athens on 14 October. He advised that Her Majesty's Government had to move very quickly to make the most of Averoff's opening for a solution. Otherwise—conscious of the statement made by the prominent British Labour leader Barbara Castle at the Party conference in Brighton on 4 October, in which she referred to the 'freedom operation' which the next Socialist Government would carry out over Cyprus—there would be no chance whatsoever of obtaining Greek cooperation, since it would be obvious that all they had to do was hang on for the next British election to bring Labour into office. The sole alternative he saw to a rapid push towards conciliation, in harness with the Americans, was 'to allow things to drag on as they are indefinitely', with all its growing risks.109 The tridominium plan he dismissed as a 'waste of time' for the simple reason that it was equally unacceptable to the two sides—the Turks because it was not partition, the Greeks because it might lead to partition. Allen concluded with that nervous bashfulness which British officials often adopted when making suggestions about Cyprus which they knew to clash with powerful political elements on their own side: Obviously I am looking at it only from the Greek point of view. I know I am being rash in even suggesting that there is a chance that we could tie the Greek Government down . .. But timing in these things is imperative. Six months ago there did not seem to be any possible compromise in sight; three months hence I believe that any possible compromise will have receded over the horizon. If we want to settle the Cyprus problem, I think we must take our decision now.110
But did ministers want—or rather could they take the contingent risks—in rushing to settle the Cyprus problem in the time-frame available? Allen did not include such an imponderable lightly. Yet, time was working against such a hope even more irrevocably than he supposed. On the day he wrote his dispatch, the widely respected Mukhtar of Dhali was murdered by EOKA whilst going about his business in the village. This act was widely taken to presage the end of the truce on the island. For a considerable period Governor Harding had been warning that only the intercession 107 109
m Crouzet, ConflitdeChypre,\\.^. Ibid.970. AllentoHayter, i4Oct. i957,FO37i/i3oo8s,RGCio3i9/ii9.
"" Ibid.
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of a credible political solution could prevent the recurrence of violence. At the time of the Mukhtar's murder, no such solution was in sight. On 18 October—curiously echoing the very beginning of the violence on the island—the Cyprus BroadcastingService was bombed off the air. A few days later Harding resigned from his onerous and unforgiving post. Harding's resignation was, of course, a major watershed in the history of the Emergency in Cyprus. Why did he do it? For one thing, he had become convinced that the days had passed when the full rigour of the Emergency could be sustained. He had always understood that there was a limit to the period over which a rigorous extirpation of terrorism from the wider Cypriot community could be kept up. That point appeared to have been passed at some indistinct juncture since the freeing of Makarios. For Harding this was confirmed by the Sampson case—itself a kind of 'test of will' of both the Cyprus and British Governments. With the date of his execution imminent, Archbishop Makarios sent a message through American channels that the carrying out of Sampson's sentence would 'destroy all the bridges between the Cypriots and the British'.''' I larding reprieved Sampson on the eve of the United Nations session, just as Tsardellis had been reprieved in February, but although there is no evidence that this decision was actually imposed on the Governor from London, it aroused deep reluctance on his part, and led to strong feelings within the Security Forces. This decision, enforced as it was by political necessity, smacked of the middle way which Harding detested but which now seemed on the verge of becoming ineluctable. Sampson's escape from the gallows did not determine Harding's subsequent decision to go, but it inclined him further in that direction. There is no doubt, too, that the Castle statement at the Labour conference appearing to commit a future Socialist government to a radical change of course was a heavy blow to Harding. He had for some while banked on encouraging a bipartisan approach to Cyprus in Westminster as the natural counterpart to winning the cooperation of the United States and NATO—all part of a strategy to box in the GreekCypriots, and above all the Archbishop. It was rather typical of the Cyprus Government that this perfectly logical aim had got mixed up with questionable tactics. Reddaway had circulated 'semi-official' material on the eve of the Labour Party conference to the effect that Socialist Governments never did in office what they promised beforehand. A British colonial official slandering the integrity of Her Majesty's Opposition was unusual, leading the Colonial Office to comment feelingly that 'the desirability of transferring Mr Reddaway [from Cyprus] is as present in our hearts as Calais was in Queen Mary's'." 2 Harding, however, stood by his chief political adviser, who otherwise would probably have soon been on his way elsewhere. This episode evokes why the Castle intervention touched such a sensitive local chord. Nor could attempts by other Labour politicians to cover Castle's tracks do '" Hadscll (United States Embassy, London) to Foreign Office, 26 July 1957, (^026/883. Pcake, minute, 3 Oct. 1957, CO()26/Q53. Such frustration arose, in part, from the fact that Rcddaway was suspected of feeding the Cyprus Broadcasting Service with material 'designed to infuriate Greeks'. See the Spectator (28 Sept. 1957). 112
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much to alleviate the effect, although Desmond Donnelly, a visiting Socialist MP, went on Cyprus radio to assert that 'in a [party] conference words can have a different meaning back in England to what they have here'. There were even some on the Greek side who were made 'profoundly gloomy' by it,113 since it was bound to cut the ground from under the feet of any attempt at 'moderation'; it was therefore understandable that Harding's despondency rose to a peak. International deadlock, paralysis and lack of consensus in London, communal tension, Grivas and EOKA set for what military intelligence predicted might be a 'big bang',114 and, to cap it all, the prospect of reductions in the garrison—that the Field-Marshal chose to get away from this gridlock whilst some semblance of quiet still existed need surprise nobody. The first report that he had decided to go appeared in the Daily Telegraph on 9 October, and it was indeed on or about that date that Harding confirmed to Lennox-Boyd an intention which he had first raised as a possibility a few weeks earlier. The interruption of EOKA's truce which soon followed was closely related to the resulting public speculation surrounding the Governor's position, since Grivas was absolutely determined that what looked set to be Harding's final days on the island should be marked by violence as a token of his failure. Equally, Harding was determined to ensure that his claims to have mastered terrorism should not be confounded, and to this effect Emergency Regulations were actually tightened up a notch. All this was part of the embittered choreography of the conflict, in which the appearances of right and wrong, defeat and victory, became everything, and the realities wholly obscured. Although Harding had told Lennox-Boyd that he wished to be out of Cyprus by the end of the month, the necessary arrangements took time. Many of these were delicate, such as ensuring that the Greek Government toned down any note of'jubilation' when the public announcement was made. Averoff promised to do what he could. Assurances had also to be conveyed to Ankara that the replacement of Harding did not signify a change of policy, or that Makarios would be allowed back into the island. It was in ways such as this that the coming transition carried a political mortgage from the first. The most sensitive arrangement of all, naturally, was the succession to the Field-Marshal. Rumours on this abounded—it was even suggested that Sir Anthony Eden, presently in retirement in Jamaica, might re-enter public life in this role.11' It was a leak in the leading Jamaican newspaper The Gleaner which led to a hurried confirmation on 22 October both of Harding's imminent departure and of his replacement, though the latter was not to be Eden, but the incumbent Governor in Kingston, Sir Hugh Foot; the announcement underlined, however, that the change at the top was 'an administrative and not a political one', and that it did not mean that Cyprus was regarded as of any less strategic significance.116 By this point it was already too late for the Field-Marshal to depart by the end of the month, which '" Stewart to Addis, 11 Oct. 1957, ¥0371/130085, RGCiO3i9/ii5. Memorandum of Conversation at US Consulate, 26 Sept., Box 3281, RGsg, State Department Records, USNA. 115 Times of Cyprus (16 Oct. 1957). "fl The Times (22 Oct. 1957). 114
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meant having to be at his post during the 'Oxi Day' celebrations of the Greek community on the 3oth. Despite certain modest relaxations regarding the holding of Church services and the display of flags, this triggered the first general bout of mayhem since the EOKA truce began. It was noticed that considerable licence was given to the Turkish Mobile Reserves in dealing with demonstrators." 7 Overall, the management of the final phase of Harding's Governorship was not happy. 'The whole operation', one official in Whitehall commented, 'has gone awry from the start." ls For the most revealing insight into the feelings which surrounded Harding's departure we may turn to his farewell address delivered to the assembled District Security Committees on 21 October, just before the news of the resignation was about to be broken to the press. The Governor began by saying that on matters of policy 'there was no shred of difference between me and the Secretary of State and the [British] Government'. That such a difference lay behind his decision was widely believed, and it was very important for this suspicion to be scotched. Nor was the disavowal insincere, since both the British and Cyprus Governments remained committed to the defeat of EOKA. The Field-Marshal's chief theme to his audience, indeed, was that they had together achieved the goal which they had set out to attain two years before: it had, Harding now claimed, been 'proved quite clearly that terrorism can be mastered in the physical sense', and that Britain still had the willpower and resources to stand firm against the blackmail of violence. Despite this, however, one thing still remained to be done—to 'release the people of Cyprus from the grip of fear and intimidation'. Harding continued 'I am frequently charged with the belief that this problem can be solved by military measures, but I think you know better than that. This . . . is an example of" something that never can or will be done by security or military measures. It can only be done on the political side and with the participation and help . . . of the general public. They can free themselves, but you, the security organizations, cannot release them. You have created conditions in which they could, if they wished, have released themselves, and that is a great achievement.""
The bitter truth, however, was that they had not 'wished'—or so Harding saw it. Gradually, after the deportation of Archbishop Makarios, the terrorists had been, if not eliminated within six months as Harding had hoped, then at least forced back into the shadows of Cypriot life. But instead of Greek-Cypriots taking the opportunity to free themselves from the evil incubus of terrorism, they had continued to hold aloof from Government, and as much by this fatal omission, as by commission, had allowed EOKA's influence to survive the onslaught of the Security Forces. The personal distaste which Harding came early on to entertain towards Makarios ended up, therefore, being transferred to Greek Cyprus as a whole; and it was this distaste which more than anything else shaped the atmosphere of Harding's exit. More specifically, 117
Times oJ'Cyprus^i Oct. 1957). "•s Galsworthy, minute, 21 Oct. 1957, F()37i/i3oi22, RGCi055/3. "'' Address by His Excellency the Governor to District Security Committees, 21 Oct. 1957, COcj26/io74.
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Harding was absolutely clear about the most urgent requirement for British policy in the island: to keep up the relentless pressure against EOKA and prevent that organization regaining the initiative, in the belief that sooner or later it would disintegrate. He therefore advised the District Security Committees to 'keep your basic security organization intact, well oiled and ready to go into full gear at short notice'—it was, he said, the 'Ace of Spades' in any renewed conflict. In short, Harding left, as he had arrived, a soldier first, and a politician second. Replying on an occasion tinged with considerable emotion, the new Director of Operations, General Kendrew, remarked that all those present accepted his decision to leave with complete loyalty. 'You can rest assured', Kendrew told the departing chief, 'that we are going to see this thing through."20 There was a presage here of the frictions which were always to dog relations between military and civil officials bent on keeping the Harding flame alight, and a new Governor noted for his liberal, and even radical, convictions. Yet if Harding's principal sentiment concerned the lack of'participation and help' from Greek-Cypriots in forging a political solution, he also felt that such assistance had not been forthcoming from Her Majesty's Government. Speaking privately for the last time to Consul Belcher, Harding was quite open in his criticism of Macmillan and his colleagues for having recently treated Cyprus 'like a sparetime matter'.121 In the same conversation he spoke of the urgent need to 'bang heads together', and went so far as to say that it was 'worth the United States President's time and attention' to intervene on the matter. This probably unique instance in the era of decolonization of a British colonial governor calling for American interference in the affairs of his own territory was a measure of his frustration with London, and a recognition of the growing power realities in the eastern Mediterranean. Ministers and officials in Whitehall were quite aware that Harding entertained feelings of having been left in the lurch, and it was for this reason that his resignation—and the prospect of his returning home 'unmuzzled'—was perturbing. It was feared that he might give public vent to his grievances when he landed at London airport, since the press would be on hand in great numbers to pick up any outburst. We may recall that similar vibrations had surrounded Sir Robert Armitage's dismissal. Armitage, however, had needed a new job, and was quickly found one; the Field-Marshal—whose experience had been so much worse than his predecessor's—would be constrained by no such consideration. Reports of Harding's final tour round the Army cantonments in Cyprus in which he made pointed remarks about the island's affairs 'having been put into the laps of politicians and statesmen in the last few months' were not reassuring. There were contradictions in such complaints, since it was also his view—privately expressed to Belcher-—that the politicians had not actually done enough to drive through a solution. Like most soldiers facing similarly complicated circumstances, Harding tried to have it both ways, and used his prestige to get it. Realizing how thin the ice was on which everybody was standing, the Colonial Office indicated to the 120 121
Speech by Director of Operations in Reply to Farewell Address of Governor, ibid. Belcher, telegram to Dulles, 2 Nov. 1957, Box 3282, RG59, State Department Records, USNA.
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Governor as delicately as it could that the less public comment made on his return the better it would be for everybody. Sir John and Lady Harding eventually left Cyprus on 4 November, and, avoiding Athens, travelled to London via Rome. Emerging through the VIP terminal at London airport, Lady Harding still carrying the rather battered bouquet given to her in Nicosia, the pair were met by a scrum of journalists, and a relatively new phenomenon, the burning arc lights of television news cameras. Afterwards it was thought that it was the heat and stuffiness which made the Field-Marshal appear pale and nervy. He had recently felt considerable strain, as the remark he allegedly made as he bustled through the concourse of the press—'Thank God I am now quiet'—suggested.'22 In fact Harding's personality was characterized by too dignified a reserve to launch into intemperate indiscretions off the cuff, though just in case the Colonial Office ensured that his first public engagement was not for six weeks, at the very unpolitical venue of the first Provincial Cyprus Wine-Tasting Buffet in Norwich. Despite this, the Field-Marshal's dispatch in early December of a i,20o-page apologia of his Governorship to Lennox-I3oyd, which officials noticed did not afford them a single compliment, made it clear that Harding intended to keep a watching brief over developments. m During the rest of the Emergency the Macmillan government always had to take into consideration Harding's views as they were expressed both in the House of Lords—to which he was shortly elevated—and in the newspapers. Those views always remained in line with his 'last will and testament' revealed to the District Security Committees, with the notable qualification that freedom from responsibility gave a decidedly freer rein to those prejudices which had taken a powerful grip on his mind. Later on in the Emergency saga, when Grivas himself eventually went home to Athens and addressed a tumultuous and adoring crowd, he began his speech by saying that a statue should be raised in that city to Field-Marshal Harding, since he had done more than anybody else to keep alive the spirit of Hellenic resistance in Cyprus.124 He was being uncharacteristically ironic, but the remark indicated the extent to which Harding himself came to shape Greek perceptions of the Emergency, just as the image of Makarios dominated British minds. In many ways it still does. Inevitably, on the British side more diversified assessments at first prevailed. To the editorialist in the Daily fa-press, writing as the Field-Marshal came home, his service to the Empire ranked alongside those of Hastings, Milner, and Cur/on—arguably it was even greater than theirs, since it was Harding's fate to be a proconsul when the British faith in themselves as an imperial people had dwindled. 12 "" Such hyperbole already rang hollow in the changing Britain of late 1957. Its purpose was largely to blunt the critical commentaries emanating from progressive and left-wing organs. Even these, however, tended not to attack Harding directly, but rather saw him as '•" Conslanlinides to Rcddaway, 14 Nov. 1957, (^'926/807. That this remark had been uttered was quickly denied. '" Memorandum by Sir John Harding. 'Cyprus Policy, Oct. igss-Oct. 1957', ('0926/859. 124 IJS Crnuzct, Con/lit i/c Cliyprc, ii. 625. Daily Express (i Nov. 1957).
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having been tragically diminished through serving as the instrumentality for bankrupt and destructive policies. 'The courageous and honourable aspect of his [Harding's] character', James Cameron summed up the governorship with his usual astuteness, 'could no longer be seen behind the barbed wire.'126 In the course of time, paradoxically, it was Grivas' stereotype of Harding as a cold, heartless figure hopelessly out of touch with his times which eventually came to shape even the British 'memory' of the events we have described. Harding felt this deeply—for example, when a 1981 Granada Television programme on the 'end of empire' in Cyprus took this simplistic line. Harding was, indeed, 'out of touch' with the times, but then the essence of the Cypriot tragedy was that it existed at a tangent to norms prevailing elsewhere. The Field-Marshal was not more out of touch, for example, than Grivas himself, with his essentially nineteenth-century version of Greek nationalism and irredentism. To a not inconsiderable extent, Harding did achieve what Prime Minister Eden had originally sent him to do in the colony—that is, 'to let the medicine work'. He had stemmed the collapsing morale of the British presence as it had come to exist by the late summer of 1955. His achievement in this respect is conveyed by a senior British official soon after Harding's departure who recalled the 'quite extraordinary measure of personal loyalty and affection he won from the civil police and military officials. I never remember the like of it during twenty years in India in often quite similar circumstances.'127 It was true that Harding did not reach out to ordinary Cypriots, and that his few contacts with them were stilted. When, a few days before his departure, he went under heavy escort through the Greek portion of 'old' Nicosia, it was only the second time he had been there during his stay. But then it was physically impossible to break out of the thick protection which inevitably surrounded a military governor in his position; whilst to have done so with any frequency or panache would have mixed up the psychological messages which he felt it vitally necessary to get across. On what, for Harding, was the most important matter of all—that of security— there is no doubt that a substantial improvement was made in key areas. Before Harding's arrival, the Police had been demoralized and taken out of the fight. 'Today', one intelligence appreciation summed up the difference he had made, 'the Army are much more in the background, and it is the Police who really do police the island."28 This did not mean that EOKA no longer had the capacity to inflict damage; whilst Grivas himself remained at large. What it did mean was that, in hurting others in the future, EOKA was also bound to hurt itself, perhaps to an even greater extent—a situation which was deeply to influence later events. The methods which had effected this turnaround, however, made the Security Forces dependent on the cooperation of one fragment of the Cypriot population—the Turks—in a way which was drastically to compromise their own position. This was the somewhat deformed kind of'normality' which Harding had succeeded in creating within Cyprus. 12(1 127
James Cameron, News Chronicle (21 Oct. 1957). ShattocktoDeane,7Nov. i957,FO37i/i30ii7,RGCio5i/i77.
l28
Ibid.
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Our final summary of Harding's turbulent Governorship may appropriately bring us to a comparison with General (later Field-Marshal) Sir Gerald Templer, his own successor as Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Today few pay much attention to their attainments in that senior military post; rather their reputations in posterity have been largely fixed by different records in combating late colonial revolts. Where Templer ('the Lion of Malaya1) successfully defeated Communist rebels in Britain's premier possession in south-east Asia, Harding's achievement was clearly more ambiguous. In Malaya, however, Templer was able from the start to promise all Malayans—who were quite as ethnically mixed as Cypriots—that, once law and order was restored, they could move swiftly forward to self-determination; by so doing British good faith was not in question despite the sternness of Templer's subsequent repression. Although the intractability of the security problems he faced led Harding to appreciate why such a promise was necessary, he was never permitted to do the same. Templer understood that successful counter-insurgency consisted, as he put it, of'90 per cent talking and 10 per cent shooting', and was able to translate this principle into action; Harding grasped this important truth only partially, and to the extent that he did so, he found it impossible to put into practice under Cypriot conditions. In so far as Harding failed, where Templer succeeded, therefore, he was undone by the undoubted limitations of his own insights and sympathies, by the fatal interaction with parliamentary and ministerial Conservatism at home, and by the accumulated detritus of the recent colonial history of the island. Archbishop Fisher of Lambeth had once called on Macmillan to send as Governor to Cyprus a 'sympathetic healer of divisions'. In selecting Sir Hugh Foot to replace Harding, the Prime Minister had at last belatedly followed that advice. 'Wheel on the idealist,' Macmillan was habitually to quip, in his best sardonic manner, whenever Foot came to London to discuss what were to become more terrible burdens than ever. Whether 'idealism' could succeed where Sir John Harding's honest but doomed integrity had failed was to be put to a very severe test.
8 A Time of Gestures, 5 October 1957-13 February 1958 When Sir John Harding, after a suitable interval following his retirement, delivered an address about Cyprus to the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, the only dissonant note came from a peer who remarked that 'the Politicians had failed in the first place and had handed the matter to the Military who in turn had failed and the "buck" was now back with the Politicians'.1 In truth this was as neat an encapsulation of the recent history of British policy as could be compressed into a single sentence. The appointment of a 'career' colonial administrator to replace a Field-Marshal brought things full circle. Sir Hugh Foot, h owever, was no ordinary Governor. He came from a distinguished Corni