Contemporary Music Theoretical and Philosophical Perspectives
Edited by Max Paddison and Irène Deliège
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Contemporary Music Theoretical and Philosophical Perspectives
Edited by Max Paddison and Irène Deliège
Contemporary Music
This book is dedicated to the memory of CÉLESTIN DELIÈGE, musicologist and music theorist, born 29 October 1922, died 18 April 2010
Contemporary Music
Theoretical and Philosophical Perspectives
Edited by Max Paddison University of Durham, UK and Irène Deliège University of Liège, Belgium
© Max Paddison, Irène Deliège and contributors 2010 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Max Paddison and Irène Deliège have asserted their right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the editors of this work. Published by Ashgate Publishing Limited Ashgate Publishing Company Wey Court East Suite 420 Union Road 101 Cherry Street Farnham Burlington Surrey, GU9 7PT VT 05401-4405 England USA www.ashgate.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Contemporary music: theoretical and philosophical perspectives. 1. Music – 21st century – Philosophy and aesthetics. 2. Avant-garde (Music) I. Paddison, Max. II. Deliège, Irène. 780.9’05–dc22 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Contemporary music: theoretical and philosophical perspectives / [edited by] Max Paddison and Irène Deliège. p. cm. Includes index. ISBN 978-0-7546-0497-6 (hardcover: alk. paper) – ISBN 978-1-4094-0416-3 (ebook) 1. Music – 20th century – History and criticism. 2. Music – 20th century – Philosophy and aesthetics. 3. Music – 21st century – History and criticism. 4. Music – 21st century – Philosophy and aesthetics. I. Paddison, Max. II. Deliège, Irène. ML197.C75126 2009 780.9’04–dc22 2009050043 This is a revised and expanded English edition of Musique contemporaine: perspectives théoriques et philosophiques, edited by Irène Deliège and Max Paddison (Sprimont: Pierre Mardaga éditeur, 2001). Translators involved in this project were Mark Berry, Anne Giannini, Christopher Johns, Sebastiaan Kokelaar, Matthew Lavy, Dave Meredith, and Max Paddison. Translations editor: Max Paddison. This book has been published with the support of the Wernaers Foundation and under the auspices of ESCOM, the European Society for the Cognitive Sciences of Music. ISBN 9780754604976 (hbk) ISBN 9781409404163 (ebk) III Bach musicological font developed by © Yo Tomita.
Contents List of Music Examples List of Figures and Tables Contributors
ix xi xiii
Preface Irène Deliège and Max Paddison
xix
Introduction Contemporary Music: Theory, Aesthetics, Critical Theory Max Paddison
1
PART I: Theoretical Perspectives and Retrospectives 1 The Principles of Music and the Rationalization of Theory Hugues Dufourt
19
2
Atonal Harmony: From Set to Scale Célestin Deliège
51
3
In Search of Lost Harmony Rudolf Frisius
77
4 Against a Theory of Musical (New) Complexity Richard Toop
89
5
Heterogeneity: Or, On the Choice of Being Omnivorous Pascal Decroupet
99
6
Varèse, Serialism and the Acoustic Metaphor Pascal Decroupet
117
7
‘I Open and Close’? Richard Toop
133
8 A Period of Confrontation: The Post-Webern Years Célestin Deliège
143
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PART II: Philosophical Critiques and Speculations After Adorno 9 A Philosophy of Totality Herman Sabbe
175
10
183
Possibilities for a Work-Immanent Contemporary Musical Logic François Nicolas
11 Postmodernism and the Survival of the Avant-garde Max Paddison
205
12 Material Constraints: Adorno, Benjamin, Arendt Anne Boissière
229
13
249
Towards an Aesthetics of Risk Marc Jimenez
14 Music and Social Relations: Towards a Theory of Mediation Max Paddison
259
PART III: Creative Orientations 15 Music, Ambiguity, Buddhism: A Composer’s Perspective Jonathan Harvey 16 Artistic Orientations, Aesthetic Concepts, and the Limits of Explanation: An Interview with Pierre Boulez David Walters 17
279
305
Failed Time, Successful Time, Shadowtime: An Interview with Brian Ferneyhough Lois Fitch and John Hails
319
Sound Structures, Transformations, and Broken Magic: An Interview with Helmut Lachenmann Abigail Heathcote
331
19
Hunting and Forms: An Interview with Wolfgang Rihm Richard McGregor
18
349
Contents
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Postlude: Helmut Lachenmann, Wolfgang Rihm and the Austro-German Tradition Alastair Williams
361
Index of Names
371
Index of Subjects
379
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List of Music Examples 2.1. Metric series founded on harmonics 1 to 6 2.2. Harmonics 1 to 32, divided according to octaves 2.3. Reading of the 4th 2.4. Atonal type triad 2.5. Linked triads within twelve-tone aggregate 2.6. Schoenberg, Klavierstück op. 33a, harmonic matrix 2.7. Webern, Concerto op. 24: (a) harmonic matrix; (b) reading conforming to the present hypothesis 2.8. Boulez, Répons: (a) harmonic matrix; (b) chords in fundamental position; (c) figuring of chords 2.9. Berio, serial mode of La Vera Storia: (a) figuring of the fundamentals; (b) (Fêtes), figuring of fundamentals and chords 2.10. Stockhausen, Klavierstück III: (a) notation of basic pentachord (following Harvey); (b) basic chords in fundamental position 0 2.11. Stockhausen, Klavierstück III (after the original edition, Universal UE 12251) 6.1. Boulez, Structure 1a: graphs (a) and (b) 6.2. Varèse, Octandre: graphs (a), (b) and (c) 6.3. Webern, Cantata No. 2 op. 31: graphs (a) and (b) 6.4. Varèse, Hyperprism: graph 6.5. Varèse, Intégrales: graph 6.6. Varèse, Déserts: graphs (a) and (b) 15.1. Beethoven Piano Sonata op. 2, no. 2 15.2. Harvey, Wheel of Emptiness (opening) 15.3. Harvey, Wheel of Emptiness (p. 27) 15.4. Harvey, String Quartet No. 4 15.5. Harvey, One Evening, movement 1 (opening) 15.6. Harvey, One Evening, movement 2 15.7. Harvey, One Evening, movement 4: rhythm 15.8. Harvey, One Evening, movement 4 (pp. 134–5)
55 57 59 63 63 66 67 69 70 71 73 121 123 124 127 128 130 284 291 292 295 297 298 299 301
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List of Figures and Tables Figures 10.1. Penrose tiling 14.1. Work-immanent mediation of music 14.2. Social mediation of music 14.3. Historical mediation of musical material
193 268 271 272
Tables 2.1. Scale of harmonics conceived as a mode 2.2. Harmonic intervals: model ratios 2.3. Chromatic scale of frequencies: comparison between systems 2.4. Figuring of the chromatic scale, band 16…32 2.5. Transcription of pitch classes in relation to the scale of harmonics 10.1. Three logical principles: classical/dialectical 10.2. Three dialectical categories (Kierkegaard) 10.3. The 3 (1+2) dimensions of logic in music
59 60 60 61 62 196 199 203
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Contributors Anne Boissière is Professor of Philosophy and Aesthetics, Centre d’Étude des Arts Contemporains at the University of Lille 3. She has written extensively on Adorno and critical theory, and is the author of Adorno, la vérité de la musique moderne (Villeneuve d’Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 1999) and La pensée musicale de T.W. Adorno: l’épique et le temps (Paris: Beauchesne, 2010). Pierre Boulez is one of the most important and influential French composers of our time. He is also equally renowned as a conductor, having worked with all the great orchestras of the world, and was founder and first director of IRCAM (Institut de Recherche et Coordination Acoustique/Musique) in Paris. He has won many honours and awards, and received the Ernst von Siemens Prize in 1979. From 1976 to 1995 he held the Chair of Invention, Technique et Langage en Musique at the Collège de France, and his writings on the theory and aesthetics of contemporary music remain an important contribution to the debates on music today. His publications include Relevés d’apprenti (Paris: Gallimard, 1966), Par volonté et par hasard: Entretiens avec Célestin Deliège (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1975), Penser la musique aujourd’hui (Paris: Gallimard, 1987), and Points de repère I, II and III (3 vols) (Paris: Bourgois, 1995 and 2005). Pascal Decroupet is Professor of Musicology at the Sophia Antipolis University of Nice. He has written extensively on twentieth-century and contemporary music, and in particular on Stockhausen, Boulez and Pousseur. He has selected and edited a range of Pousseur’s writings in Écrits théoriques 1954–1967 (Sprimont: Mardaga, 2004), and Série et harmonie généralisées: Écrits (1968–1998) (Sprimont: Mardaga, 2009). Célestin Deliège was Professor of Music Analysis at the Liège Conservatoire. He is regarded as one of the most significant and perceptive writers on music today, and is credited with introducing Schenkerian analytical theory to the francophone world in his book Les fondements de la musique tonale (Paris: Éditions JC Lattès, 1984). His reflections on modernism and the predicament of contemporary music since 1945 have produced many important publications, culminating in his monumental and definitive study of the period, Cinquante ans de modernité musicale: de Darmstadt à l’IRCAM (Sprimont: Mardaga, 2003). He died in April 2010 as this book was going to press. Irène Deliège is founding Director of the European Society for the Cognitive Study of Music (ESCOM), Liège, and founding editor of the journal Musicae
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Scientiae. Her research is on the cognitive psychology of music, and she has published widely in this field, including The Perception and Cognition of Music, jointly edited with J. Sloboda (London: Taylor & Francis, 1997). Hugues Dufourt is a distinguished French composer associated with Spectralism (a term he coined in 1979 to describe his own music and that of Tristan Murail and Gérard Grisey). He is also Professor of Philosophy and Director of Research at CNRS Université Paris I (Panthéon-Sorbonne), was a founding member of the Ensemble Itinéraire, the Collectif de Recherche Instrumentale et de Synthèse Sonore (CRISS), and the Centre d’Information et de Documentation / Recherche Musicale (CID-RM). As well his prolific compositional output – which includes large-scale works often inspired by painting, such as La maison du sourd and Le déluge d’après Poussin – he has also written widely on issues in contemporary music. His main writings have been published under the title Musique, pouvoir, écriture (Paris: Bourgois, 1991). Brian Ferneyhough is a highly influential and internationally acclaimed British composer, strongly associated with the European avant-garde and with the ‘New Complexity’. Currently Professor of Music at Stanford University, he has regularly taught at the Darmstädter Ferienkursen für Neue Musik, and was for many years Professor of Composition at the Staatliche Hochschule für Musik in Freiburg. His works range from the early Cassandra’s Dream Song, through the Études transcendantales from the 1980s to his largest work yet, the opera Shadowtime (1999–2004). He was awarded the Ernst von Siemens Prize in 2007. He has written extensively on his own and other composers’ music, and most of his earlier articles, essays and interviews are included in his Collected Writings, ed. Richard Toop and James Boros (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1995). Lois Fitch is Senior Lecturer in Music at the Royal Northern College of Music, Manchester. Her doctoral dissertation at the University of Durham was on the music of Brian Ferneyhough. Rudolf Frisius was Professor of Musicology at the Pädagogische Hochschule, Karlsruhe. He has published and broadcast extensively on issues in contemporary music, and has written on Cage, Pousseur, Schaeffer, Stockhausen, Rihm and many other important post-war composers. Since 1998 he has been President of the Institut für Neue Musik und Musikerziehung in Darmstadt. John Hails lectures in Music at Napier University, Edinburgh, and has a particular interest in the music of Ferneyhough. He is also a composer (he did his doctorate at the University of Durham) and is a winner of the Royal Philharmonic Society Prize for Composition.
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Jonathan Harvey is a distinguished British composer of international importance. His music is sensuous and contemplative, and for some time has been influenced by his experience of Buddhism, notably in works such as One Evening and Wheel of Emptiness. He was for many years Professor of Music at Sussex University, where he remains an Honorary Professor, and he is also Visiting Professor at Oxford. In the early 1980s he was invited by Boulez to work at IRCAM. He is author of The Music of Stockhausen: An Introduction (London: Faber, 1975), and his subsequent writings include Music and Inspiration (London: Faber, 1999), and In Quest of Spirit: Thoughts on Music (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). Abigail Heathcote is doing research on Jean-François Lyotard at the University of Paris VIII. Her research at the University of Durham was on the music and writings of Helmut Lachenmann. Marc Jimenez is a philosopher and translator, and is Professor of Aesthetics and Art History at the University of Paris I (Panthéon-Sorbonne) and Director of the Centre de Recherche en Esthétique. He is the author of many books on Adorno, aesthetics and history of art, including Adorno: art, idéologie et théorie de l’art (Paris: Union Générale d’Éditions, 1973); Adorno et la modernité: vers une esthétique négative (Paris: Éditions Klincksieck, 1983); La critique: Crise de l’art ou consensus culturel? (Paris: Klincksieck, 1995); and Qu’est-ce que l’esthétique? (Paris: Gallimard, 1997). He is also the translator into French of Adorno’s Ästhetische Theorie. Helmut Lachenmann is a distinguished and highly original German composer whose distinctive approach to composition he has himself described as musique concrète instrumentale. Some of his most celebrated works are Schwankungen am Rand, Tanzsuite mit Deutschlandlied, Staub and the music-theatre piece Das Mädchen mit den Schwefelhölzern. He is a regular teacher at the Darmstädter Ferienkursen für Neue Musik, and was formerly Professor of Composition at the Stuttgart Hochschule für Musik. He was awarded the Ernst von Siemens Prize in 1997, and is currently Fromm Visiting Professor at Harvard University. He has written many articles and essays, published in Musik als existentielle Erfahrung (Wiesbaden: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1996). Richard McGregor is Professor of Music at the University of Cumbria. He has published on the music of Peter Maxwell Davies, James MacMillan and Wolfgang Rihm, and is editor of Perspectives on Peter Maxwell Davies (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000). François Nicolas is a composer and writer on music. He is Associate Professor at the École Normale Supérieure in Paris, and joint founder of the journal Entretemps. He has published numerous books and articles on twentieth-century
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and contemporary music, and has edited the IRCAM dossier La singularité Schoenberg (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1997). Max Paddison is Professor of Music Aesthetics and Associate Director of the Centre for Contemporary Performing Arts (CCPA) at the University of Durham. He has published extensively on Adorno, aesthetics, critical theory, and the concept of modernism, and is author of Adorno’s Aesthetics of Music (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), and Adorno, Modernism and Mass Culture (London: Kahn & Averill, 1996). Wolfgang Rihm is one of the most impressive German composers of the postwar generation. His music, which was initially regarded as representative of the ‘New Simplicity’ and ‘New Romanticism’, is anti-systematic and open to many stylistic influences. Rihm is extremely prolific, and has written important works in all genres, as well as many that defy categorization; he regards pieces as ‘works in progress’, like Jagden und Formen, and often continues to produce different versions over long periods. He was awarded the Ernst von Siemens Prize in 2003, and is Professor of Composition at the Staatliche Hochschule für Musik in Karlsruhe. He has published several volumes of his writings, including Ausgesprochen. Schriften und Gespräche, ed. Ulrich Mosch, 2 vols (Zurich: Amadeus, 1997), and Offene Enden (Munich and Vienna: Hauser, 2002). Herman Sabbe is Emeritus Professor of Music at the University of Ghent, and was also Professor of Musicology at the Free University of Brussels. He has written widely on all aspects of twentieth-century and contemporary music, and is author or co-author of over 20 books, including György Ligeti: Studien zur kompositorischen Phänomenologie (Munich: Text + Kritik, 1987), and All that Music! Een Antropologie van de Westerse Muziekcultuur (Leuven: Acco, 1996). Richard Toop is Reader in Music and Chair of the Musicology Unit at the Sydney Conservatorium, University of Sydney. He has written extensively on contemporary music and the post-war avant-garde, especially Stockhausen. Ligeti and Ferneyhough. He is author of György Ligeti (London: Phaidon Press, 1999), and is joint editor (with James Boros) of Brian Ferneyhough, Collected Writings (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1995). David Walters teaches Musicology at Marmara University of Istanbul. His doctoral dissertation at the University of Durham was on Boulez’s aesthetics of music. Alastair Williams is Reader in Music at Keele University. He writes widely on issues in contemporary music, and is currently working on new music in Germany since 1968, and especially Lachenmann and Rihm. He is the author of New Music
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and the Claims of Modernity (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997), and Constructing Musicology (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001).
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Preface Irène Deliège and Max Paddison
Theories and philosophies of contemporary music: why bring them together in a colloquium of which the present work is the result? Composers such as Pierre Boulez and Luciano Berio have been of the opinion that in our day the idea came first and then led directly to style. The idea has been, in the first instance, the fruit of prescriptive theories; in engendering style it has also been the starting point for aesthetic developments. However, after the initial shock of creation, the judgement of the observer intervenes and creates a space of confrontation and collaboration in which other theoreticians and philosophers encounter each other; their work exercises its influence a posteriori. They too, in their turn, bear witness to this level. Amongst the philosophers, the figure of Theodor Adorno stands out. He has set in motion a train of thought that is still alive and seems far from being exhausted. His critical aesthetic theory permeates the philosophical contents of this book, whereas the theoretical sections tend more towards logical positivism. Together they constitute a thought-provoking ensemble put forward by ESCOM, the European Society for the Cognitive Sciences of Music, at the turning point between two centuries. The project on which the book is based went through several distinct stages. The original colloquium, entitled Musique contemporaine: théories et philosophie, was organized by ESCOM and led by Irène Deliège, and took place in Brussels at La Monnaie, The Royal Opera, on 18 and 19 March 2000 in connection with the Ars Musica Festival of that year and with the collaboration of the Centre de Recherches Musicales de Wallonie. There were invited papers from Célestin Deliège, Hugues Dufourt, Richard Toop, Rudolf Frisius, Pascal Decroupet, Herman Sabbe, François Nicolas, Anne Boissière, Marc Jimenez and Max Paddison, and each of the two days’ contributions were framed by commentary from Jean Molino and Jean-Jacques Nattiez, who also chaired sessions. From the start the participants had been asked to take part in the colloquium with the intention that their papers would later be expanded and developed to become essays in a substantial book. As a stage in this process, a small French/English volume of ‘Working Papers’ (textes d’étude) was also published to coincide with the colloquium, containing short versions of the papers to be delivered. Following the success of the colloquium itself, the contributors were accordingly asked to Irène Deliège (ed.), Contemporary Music: Theories and Philosophy. Working Papers / Musique contemporaine: théories et philosophie. Textes d’Étude (Liège: ESCOM Publications, 2000).
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revise and develop their papers into full-length essays, and also in some cases to provide a second related essay for the volume if they wished. The resulting book of fourteen essays and an Introduction, edited by Irène Deliège and Max Paddison, was published in French in 2001 (a publication not to be confused with the French/English ‘Working Papers’ volume mentioned above, which shares a very similar title). Work then began on an English version of the book, involving much translation and in some cases further revision of the original conception. What also became apparent during this process was the need to embrace a wider range of music and to give more voice to composers themselves. In view of this, we have added a third part to this edition in the form of five theoretical and philosophical perspectives of a different kind from those which dominate the essays in Parts I and II. These are statements from five contemporary composers who have each made highly significant and very different contributions to debates around music today, both through their compositions and through their writings on music: Pierre Boulez, Brian Ferneyhough, Jonathan Harvey, Helmut Lachenmann and Wolfgang Rihm. Finally, Alastair Williams was invited to contribute a Postlude to the book, drawing strands together and giving an important emphasis to Lachenmann and Rihm lacking in the original French edition. The editors are indebted to the French publisher Pierre Mardaga and the Director of the Collection Musique et Musicologie, Malou Haine, for their permission to publish translations of material that had originally appeared in French. They would also like to thank all the original contributors to this volume for their help and support, and in particular for their great patience in view of the time it has taken to get their work to press in English. Gratitude is also due to the composers in Part III, who have granted permission for the interviews with them to be included here – Pierre Boulez, Brian Ferneyhough, Helmut Lachenmann and Wolfgang Rihm – and also to those who interviewed them – David Walters, Lois Fitch, John Hails, Abigail Heathcote and Richard McGregor – as well as to Jonathan Harvey for his essay and to Alastair Williams for his concluding chapter. We are also very appreciative of the work done by Joris De Henau in resetting the music examples and tables for this edition, Kelcey Swain for his computer enhancements, and for a grant from the Faculty of Arts and Humanities Research Committee of the University of Durham to pay for this work. Finally, we are grateful for the initial draft translation work done on this project by Mark Berry, Anne Giannini, Christopher Johns, Sebastiaan Kokelaar, Matthew Lavy and Dave Meredith. Further extensive and detailed translation work, both of a technical and of a stylistic nature, was essential to the final shape of the project, and Max Paddison has acted as overall translator as well as translations editor.
Irène Deliège and Max Paddison (eds), Musique contemporaine: Perspectives théoriques et philosophiques (Sprimont: Mardaga, 2001).
Introduction
Contemporary Music: Theory, Aesthetics, Critical Theory Max Paddison
‘Very frequently no one knows that contemporary music is or could be art. He simply thinks it is irritating. Irritating one way or another, that is to say keeping us from ossifying …’ (John Cage, Silence)
I You might reasonably say that contemporary music is simply what is going on now, music that reflects its time, where multiplicity rules and music fits in, one way or another. Or you could argue that contemporary music also has a history of being ‘contemporary’, where in many respects it has never really fitted in, and has become self-reflexive and critical in ways that relate not only to its own time but also to its own history. If you take this view – which, broadly speaking, is the view of the chapters in this book – then the contemporary music in question becomes that of the avant-garde and the experimental, particularly since 1945, with all the difficulties to which this has always given rise. If such music continues to have irritation value, in John Cage’s sense of ‘keeping us from ossifying’, then the discourses that surround it are also likely to prove provocative. The idea of a music that is truly contemporary, in the sense of relating to its time, is one which has always had its problems. To discuss contemporary music today – at least, in the way in which it is intended here – could even be regarded as to be out of step with what appears as current, relevant and widely accepted, particularly if it is assumed that the essential debates have already happened and that the matter is now closed. We argue here that the case very much remains open, and that the debates continue, if for no other reason than that what could be called ‘advanced’ contemporary music itself continues to change and to go into unexpected and unforeseen places. The end of history has not happened – at least not in music. In fact, especially in music, the need for discussion has never been
John Cage, Silence (London: Marion Boyars, 1968), p. 44. Ibid., p. 44. Taking his cue from Hegel’s philosophy of history, where the motor of history is driven by conflict and contradictions, Francis Fukuyama had famously argued that perhaps
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greater, with the general demise of heroic modernism, the decline of the New, the turn away from experimentation, and the celebration of diversity, all of which were features at one stage seen as marking the shift to the postmodern – a concept which itself now shows distinct signs of ageing. Indeed, this has been the case ever since the concept was employed to identify stylistic changes in contemporary architecture by Charles Jencks and more fundamental social, technological and epistemological changes by Jean-François Lyotard in the 1970s and 1980s. It was also partly the result of the critique of postmodernism by Jürgen Habermas and others on the grounds of the (neo)conservative implications of the critique of subjectivity and of rationality to be encountered in the writings of Foucault, Lyotard, Deleuze and Guattari. At the same time, the social situation of art music in general and of advanced music in particular remains distinctly contradictory, stark in its contrasts, and confused in the face of conflicting demands. The kind of cultural democracy created to a large extent since the 1980s by new and accessible technology is matched by the increasing bureaucratization and managerial control of culture by the new politics which also emerged in Europe in the 1980s, with its insistence on accountability, participation, value for money, and entertainment. (You could see this as a market updating of what in the late 1970s had been known somewhat confusingly by the Arts Council in the UK as the ‘democratization of culture’ under its slogan at that time, ‘Arts for All’, amid accusations of levelling the end of history had occurred in 1989, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the triumph of Western capitalism and the emergence of the United States as the world’s only super-power (see Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’, The National Interest 16 (Summer 1989), pp. 3–18). The falseness of Fukuyama’s argument was evident at the time, and has certainly been revealed to be so by subsequent world events. Nevertheless, 1989 was a significant date, but more so as the beginning of a new age of uncertainty. Alastair Williams argues for the importance of 1989 as a turning point in contemporary music in Germany (see Alastair Williams, ‘Helmut Lachenmann, Wolfgang Rihm and the Austro-German tradition’, this volume). Contemporary music in the rest of Europe and in North America appears to have been slower in its response (see Max Paddison, Adorno, Modernism and Mass Culture, London: Kahn & Averill, 2004, pp. 132–3). In his What is Post-Modernism? (London/New York: Academy Editions/St Martin’s Press, 1986), p. 3, Charles Jencks traces the term ‘postmodern’ back to the Spanish writer Federico De Onis in his Antologia de la poesía española e hispanoamericana of 1934 and to Arnold Toynbee’s A Study of History of 1938. What I’m referring to here is the emergence of the term ‘postmodernism’ as a widely employed label both for a style and for a historical period dating from the late 1960s / early 1970s up to the early twenty-first century, with the 1980s as the most intensive period in the modernism/postmodernism debate, especially that between Habermas and Lyotard. See Richard Rorty, ‘Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity’, in Richard J. Bernstein (ed.), Habermas and Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985), pp. 161–75. See also Jürgen Habermas, Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne: Zwölf Vorlesungen (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1985). Trans. as: The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987).
Introduction
down on the one side and elitism on the other.) Situated in a vortex of impossible demands, contemporary music cannot be identified as one thing, consistent and recognized by all. Artists tend to do what they do, in spite of political and social pressures to make art ‘useful’ or ‘relevant’ in some way, in order to justify supporting it with public funding. Instead, you could say that the real situation faced by contemporary music is that all we have are widely differing and often sharply contrasting responses to a common dilemma within a cultural context characterized by fragmentation, a situation which compels advanced music towards reflexion. Put crudely, the role of a theory of music today is to identify and explicate those responses, and the role of a philosophy of music is to problematize them in relation to the common dilemma in a fragmented world of special-interest groups and niche marketing. This collection of essays places itself precisely there, taking stock, seeking new patterns in the already-familiar, and casting a critical eye over the assumptions that surround the idea of an advanced music today. The emphasis is largely music-theoretical in the first part of the book, philosophical in the second, with a combination of the two in relation to the composers in the third part. Strict lines of demarcation cannot easily be sustained between theory, philosophy and creative practice, however, and the fact that they inevitably and most profitably interact is evident throughout. But how are we to understand such a tired term as ‘contemporary music’, given its capacity to refer to all and everything and nothing in particular? Strictly speaking, ‘contemporary’ should mean ‘now’, right up to date, the music of our contemporaries in the twenty-first century. The problem, however, is that ‘contemporary music’ has become a label just like those it has tried to replace in a fast-moving culture – labels like ‘modern’ (from modo, meaning ‘now’, but displaced interestingly by ‘postmodern’), the ‘New’ (so often recycled, so many old ‘New Musics’), and the ‘avant-garde’ (which originally had a more specialized meaning to do with pushing boundaries, but is now regarded in some circles as distinctly old fashioned). In view of such difficulties regarding the question ‘what is contemporary?’, and recognizing my already evident bias towards the idea of an ‘advanced’ music, we can only be pragmatic, and say that in the context of these essays the term can be seen in two ways. The first, and relatively simple answer is that the use of terms such as ‘contemporary’ and ‘advanced’ refers here An interesting perspective on this now largely forgotten debate between the proponents of ‘cultural democracy’ and those of the ‘democratization of culture’ is that of community arts in the late 1970s and early 1980s in Britain, in particular as seen in the exchange between the community artist Owen Kelly and the then Secretary-General of the Arts Council, Sir Roy Shaw. See especially Owen Kelly, Community, Art and the State: Storming the Citadels (London: Comedia, 1984). The French version of this debate concerned animation socioculturelle versus mainstream gallery, museum and concert hall culture, and was taken up in Germany as soziokulturelle Animation. It is probably safe to say that both community arts and animation socioculturelle have now become thoroughly institutionalized.
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also to the legacy of very different but radical musics which can be traced back at least to the beginning of the twentieth century. This is a legacy which persists, in spite of all, and through it we continue to engage with problems of musical material, form and structure in ways that can best be described as critical and self-reflexive, in musical terms at least. (It has to be said that, while the politics of music strongly underpins the debates represented in this book, especially in Parts II and III, the question of directly politically engaged contemporary music is not a focus.) The obvious examples of a ‘legacy’ that spring to mind are best seen as taking their orientation from the music of composers such as Schoenberg, Webern, Berg, Stravinsky, Varèse, Cage and Carter, through Feldman, Boulez, Stockhausen, Nono, Berio, Pousseur, Kagel, Xenakis and Ligeti to Birtwistle, Ferneyhough, Finnissy, Lachenmann and Rihm, to name but a few. (Debussy, for example, remains a strong influence on many composers of the later twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, including the Spectralists, as well as the French-orientated English composer Jonathan Harvey, and the German neoromantic composer Wolfgang Rihm, and therefore must also be acknowledged as a continuing presence). But the problem with such lists is that the attempt to trace a legacy or a characteristic line of historical development quickly begins to look like the construction of a tradition, and even a canon, and would therefore appear to come into conflict with the idea of a critical and self-reflexive music, of resistance and the search for the new and the unknown. The second, and more difficult, answer to the question ‘what is contemporary music?’ involves complex issues around the different forms taken by such musical self-reflexion, the relation to rapid developments in technology and to the dominant commodity culture, and the tension between what is often seen as the most extreme autonomy and consistency of such music and the heterogeneity and diversity of society at large, given the power of the culture industry and the mass media. Aspects of rock music are also discussed, at times in abrupt juxtapositions around issues of heterogeneity and reflexivity. Frank Zappa therefore also features, not because he wrote some ‘art music’ that happened to be taken up by Boulez and IRCAM in Paris, but particularly because his rock music appears as radically critical today as it did in 1966 and because it cuts across such boundaries. By way of introduction I offer a thematic overview of the book before going on to take up some of the issues raised. First of all, however, there are some important theoretical issues that need to be addressed. II It is hardly surprising that a common point of reference in many of these essays is critical theory, and in particular that of Theodor Adorno. In the 1920s and 1930s Adorno was already engaged on a critique of the music of the period and its social
Introduction
situation. By the late 1940s, with Philosophy of New Music (1949) Adorno could be said to have intervened directly in the course of what was then contemporary music, in effect hastening the decline of neo-classicism and the emergence of postWebernian serialism. Further interventions were his critique of total serialism at Darmstadt in 1954, and then his call for une musique informelle in 1960. In his essay ‘Vers une musique informelle’ Adorno put forward the idea of a music which resists the impulse towards total rationalization and presents to us again something of the exploration of the unknown and the unforeseen which goes back to decisive moments of pre- and early modernism: the spirit of Baudelaire’s seminal writings from the 1840s and 1850s, the French Symbolism of the 1880s and 1890s, and the freedom of the Second Viennese School Expressionism of the years 1908–1914. Indeed, the concept of musique informelle has turned out to be an intriguing, enigmatic and influential ideal, and, as it is often invoked in the essays and interviews in this volume, it is worth spending a moment to consider its implications in a little more detail here.10 The origins of Adorno’s use of the term musique informelle are currently of considerable interest and a range of unlikely theories is being put forward to explain where Adorno got it from. To attempt to put the matter straight, I would suggest that it is quite clear that Adorno took the concept from existing usage in painting, as anyone with a knowledge of the art informel movement in Europe following the Second World War and the influence of American Abstract Expressionism from which it in part derived will immediately recognize – indeed, Gianmario Borio has traced many of these connections in detail in his book Musikalische Avantgarde um 1960.11 Adorno was certainly aware of the use of the concept of the informel in painting in Germany
Theodor W. Adorno, Philosophie der neuen Musik (1949). Gesammelte Schriften Vol. 12, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1975). A new translation, as Philosophy of New Music, trans., ed. and with and introduction by Robert Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), supersedes the earlier Philosophy of Modern Music, trans. Anne G. Mitchell and Wesley V. Blomster (London: Sheed & Ward, 1973). Originally given as a paper in 1954, ‘Das Altern der neuen Musik’ was published in Der Monat in May 1955, an expanded version appearing the following year in the collection of essays on music, Dissonanzen (1956), Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 14, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1973, 1980), pp. 143–67. Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Vers une musique informelle’ (1960), Quasi una Fantasia (1963). Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 16, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1978), pp. 493–540. Trans. Rodney Livingstone, ‘Vers une musique informelle’, Quasi una Fantasia: Essays on Modern Music (London: Verso, 1992), pp. 269–322. 10 I am grateful to Joris De Henau for providing me with the occasion to revisit Adorno’s concept of musique informelle. Our discussions encouraged me to elaborate my thinking on the subject. 11 Gianmario Borio, Musikalische Avantgarde um 1960: Entwurf einer Theorie der informellen Musik (Laaber: Laaber Verlag, 1993).
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in the 1950s as informelle Kunst, or informelle Malerei,12 represented by action painting and also by Tachist artists such as the German painter Wols (Alfred Otto Wolfgang Schulze) and, in particular perhaps, the painter of informelle Bilder with a confusingly similar name, Bernhard Schultze.13 In its turn this German usage derives from a French use of the term, as art informel (‘art with no form’) from the School of Paris in the immediate post-war years of the 1940s and early 1950s, a use further legitimated by an exhibition under the title ‘Signifiants de l’Informel’ put on in Paris in 1952 by Michel Tapié.14 Given this developing history, Adorno needed only to take it over into music as musique informelle to designate a kind of new music that did not yet exist, but which would be in ‘no form’, in that it would refuse to accept pre-given solutions, including those emerging from Darmstadt (informelle Kunst does not, of course, mean ‘formless art’, given that, in order to exist at all, everything has a ‘form’, even if it goes directly against all previously known and familiar forms). All this, I think, is pretty convincing, and in demonstrating clearly that the notion of the informel had already been a motivating factor in the visual arts for fifteen years prior to Adorno appropriating it, it also shows the extent to which Adorno was attempting to drag the attention of an increasingly self-obsessed and insular musical avant-garde towards larger horizons already being explored in the visual arts. At the same time it demonstrates Adorno’s firm conviction that it is the task of a critical theory to attempt the impossible, and to prompt practice to move from where it is and yet again to move on in order ‘to find something new’.15 What Adorno focuses so acutely in his theoretical and philosophical writings, and what makes them so relevant to the situation today, is the dilemma of theory (both philosophical and musical) and its relation to art itself. That is to say, there 12
See Theodor W. Adorno, Ästhetische Theorie. Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 7 ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970), p. 329, where Adorno uses the term ‘informal painting’ (informelle Malerei) in conjunction with action painting and aleatoric music. 13 The brief mention in passing of the contemporary painter of ‘informelle Bilder’ [Bernhard] Schultze in ‘Vers une musique informelle’ (Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 16, p. 526) shows that Adorno was familiar with the idea of informelle Malerei, introduced by Schultze, K.O. Götz and Wols to Germany in the very early 1950s. Gianmario Borio cites evidence where Schultze himself reports that Adorno was present at an exhibition of Schultze’s work in Düsseldorf in 1957; Borio also suggests that Adorno had visited the Quadriga Exhibition of ‘informal painting’ in Frankfurt in 1952. He is also firmly of the view that Adorno derived his concept of ‘informelle Kunst’ from painting: see Borio, Musikalische Avantgarde um 1960, p. 90, note 45. The fact that Adorno uses the French form of the term, however, suggests that he was also aware of its origins in Paris in the mid1940s, and that the German painters had got it from there. 14 Gianmario Borio also shows much evidence for this link, as well as for connections with Italian artists of the period: see Borio, Musikalische Avantgarde um 1960, p. 129. 15 Adorno often quoted the final line from Baudelaire’s poem ‘Le Voyage’ from Les fleurs du mal, ‘Au fond de l’Inconnu pour trouver du nouveau!’.
Introduction
is the imperative, on the one hand, for theory to describe, explain and interpret, while, on the other hand, there is the need for theory to recognize its failure to explain that which in the work of art resists interpretation – what Pierre Boulez has insisted, citing André Breton, is an ‘indestructible kernel of darkness’16 at the heart of the creative process. And this tension within theory and philosophy as resistance to interpretation is present, of course, both within the creative process and within the work of art itself. The shared premise of all these essays, discussions and interviews is that musical works are themselves highly structured and thus constitute a mode of cognition, albeit – and importantly, in case we mistake music for language or philosophy in any literal sense – non-conceptual.17 However apparently unorthodox they might at first appear, musical works are systematic in their structure and constitute relationships between parts and whole which have a coherence and logic of their own and which can be analysed, theorized and philosophically interpreted. Indeed, it could be said, taking up Adorno’s important insight, that the experience of art works, and musical works in particular, demands continuation in thought. This is not least of all because the systematicity of art is frequently troubling and provocative, turning out to be antisystematic in relation to prevailing systems outside art – Adorno’s suggestion (following Karl Kraus) that ‘in society as a whole it is art that should introduce chaos into order rather than the reverse’.18 At the same time, musical structures, however necessarily autonomous they appear, share their materials, their elements and even their systematicity with society as a whole, especially when attempting to shake themselves free from it. An important task of both theory and philosophy of music is to identify these points of intersection, but without succumbing to the delusion that everything is thereby explained. Other important theoretical and philosophical strands in these essays have very different trajectories: analytic philosophy, cognitive psychology, and positivism. That points of contact are made between Adorno and these traditions is clearly 16 ‘… un “noyau infracassable de nuit”’, André Breton, cited in Pierre Boulez, ‘Nécessité d’une orientation esthétique’, Points de repère I: Imagine (Paris: Christian Bourgois, 1985), p. 552. Trans. as: ‘Putting the Phantoms to Flight’, Orientations, trans. Martin Cooper (London: Faber & Faber, 1986), p. 83. 17 In Aesthetic Theory Adorno talks of art in general (and music in particular) as a form of begriffslose Erkenntnis (‘conceptless cognition’); he also talks of music as having a ‘language-character’ (Sprachcharakter), arguing that it is ‘language like’ but is not a language. See my essay ‘The Language-Character of Music: Some Motifs in Adorno’, in Richard Klein and Claus-Steffen Mahnkopf (eds), Mit den Ohren denken. Adornos Philosophie der Musik (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1998), pp. 71–91, where I consider this position in detail. 18 Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor (London: Athlone Press, 1997), p. 93. See original German: ‘Mehrfach ist, zuerst wohl von Karl Kraus, ausgesprochen worden, daß, in der totalen Gesellschaft, Kunst eher Chaos in die Ordnung zu bringen habe als das Gegenteil.’ Ästhetische Theorie. Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 7, p. 144.
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evident in a number of contributions, even where the emphases are quite distinct and critical. At the same time there is no sense that Adorno has in some way become an orthodoxy for the areas of contemporary music discussed here – far from it, as the criticisms from the composers represented in Part III clearly signify: Jonathan Harvey, for instance, finds Adorno’s interpretation of Wagner through the concepts of phantasmagoria and commodity fetishism runs counter to his own understanding of the composer, and is disturbed by Adorno’s essentially Marxian analysis. Even Adorno’s idea of une musique informelle, increasingly speculated upon by theorists and composers alike, and described by Lachenmann as ‘a beautiful idea’, is not a prescription for composers to try to put into practice (that would be ‘dead on arrival!’, says Ferneyhough), but is really what I would call a ‘prismatic concept’ – that is to say, a multi-faceted concept that enables us to see things from different and unusual angles and in a new and unfamiliar light. In other words, it alienates or estranges our thinking about form. Even though Adorno had undoubtedly diagnosed something, and had tried to reveal different facets of it, making an effort to think beyond the immediate problem and to provide new perspectives, he could not jump over his own shadow, his Austro-German legacy from the nineteenth century, nor could he predict how things would actually turn out in the future. Lachenmann’s observation in his interview in this volume is telling, if two-edged: ‘I have a great deal of respect for Adorno, but … he was [a] fossil from the nineteenth century.’ But he then goes on: ‘From that perspective he had a very precise diagnostic eye for what happens today.’ Adorno undoubtedly stood somewhat apart from the avant-garde of his time, but his perception was probably all the more acute for that, and the problems he saw were real ones. Solutions, however, were for composers to find. Critical reactions and responses to Darmstadt orthodoxies of multiple serialism led, as it turned out, to remarkably creative solutions – one thinks of Kagel, Ligeti, Nono and, later, Lachenmann, Rihm, Birtwistle, Ferneyhough, Murail and Grisey – and even if Adorno could not have predicted them, they could also, in very different respects, be seen to display facets of a possible musique informelle. III While different, and sometimes conflicting, theoretical or philosophical perspectives characterize the chapters in this book, what is also striking is the extent to which certain concerns are seen as central. One of these is the acknowledgement of the significance of the new musical developments that took place in the period from the late 1940s up to the early 1960s, and which particularly involved innovations from Messiaen and Cage taken up by, among others, Boulez and Stockhausen. Célestin Deliège, chronicler of the avant-garde, music analyst and author of one of the first books in French on Schenker, puts forward an uncompromising case for the enduring historical significance of these developments, centred largely on Darmstadt, in his essay ‘A period of
Introduction
confrontation: the post-Webern years’; at the same time, however, his critical assessment of the successes and also the failures of these years is equally uncompromising. Another important concern has to do with the way in which the technical development of music is closely tied to the technological development of society itself. This is the central theme of Hugues Dufourt’s chapter ‘The principles of music and the rationalization of theory’ – an exhaustive historical survey of the relation of music to technology, with a view to situating the importance of French Spectralism in contemporary composition (as well as being a philosopher, Hugues Dufourt is also himself a composer and a founding member of the original group of French Spectralists, together with Tristan Murail and Gérard Grisey). Underlying Dufourt’s theme is the explanatory power of the sociologist Max Weber’s concept of rationalization, particularly as he himself had applied it to music in his pioneering study Die rationalen und soziologischen Grundlagen der Musik (1921) (The Rational and Social Foundations of Music).19 A further theme is the discussion of musical material. A range of emphases is evident. The concern with the systematicity and logicality of musical structures, and the need to relate to handed-down materials, is fundamental both to Célestin Deliège on the rationalization of atonal harmony and François Nicolas on musical logic. In his chapter, ‘Atonal harmony: from set to scale’, Célestin Deliège puts forward here a completely original alternative to set theory for the analysis of atonal harmony which takes account of fundamental tones, resonance and timbre, and through this is able to make a meaningful connection with the Spectralist composers. François Nicolas, in contrast, from his research work at IRCAM, carries out a philosophical analysis of the necessary conditions of a musical logic, focusing in turn on notation and consistency, the dialectical relationship to other works, and the possibility of an autonomous, strategic musical logic, not determined by external factors. The focus in both these contributions is therefore decisively on the autonomy of musical structures and their immanent consistency, something which throws into relief the repressed social ‘other’ of autonomous musical structures. This can be seen in different ways in Pascal Decroupet’s contribution ‘Heterogeneity: or, on the choice of being omnivorous’, and Rudolf Frisius’s ‘In search of lost harmony’. Indeed, Frisius suggests that Ives and Cage have shown us ‘that music may also renew itself harmonically when the composer opens the windows to let the exterior world penetrate into his work’. Decroupet ostensibly focuses on ‘ways in which stylistically diverse materials are incorporated in a range of different types of music’. He explores the crossing of boundaries, quotation, montage, attempted syntheses, and cross-over, discussing a range of musics including Cage, Schaeffer, Pousseur, musique concrète, Zimmermann, rock music, jazz and ‘world music’, in relation to emerging technologies, sampling and scratching. The contributions 19
Max Weber, Die rationalen und soziologischen Grundlagen der Musik, with an Introduction by Theodor Kroyer (Munich: Drei Masken Verlag, 1921). Trans. as: The Rational and Social Foundations of Music, trans. and ed. Don Martindale, Johannes Riedel and Gertrude Neuwirth (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1958).
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of both Frisius and Decroupet throw into relief yet again the issue of musical material. And any discussion of musical material, whatever its origins, is clearly also a discussion of form, of the interaction of material and structure, of history, historical movement, musical ‘meaning’, and of social mediation. This is the substance of Anne Boissière’s ‘Material constraints: Adorno, Benjamin, Arendt’, where she discusses the pre-formation of material in relation to the notion of ‘inner necessity’ and interrogates directly the status of the concept of form that grants the material its poetic value, as well as seeking to counter the accusation sometimes levelled at Adorno, that he was an ‘anti-avant-gardist’. Boissière’s approach is an original one, drawing on Walter Benjamin’s concept of storytelling and Hannah Arendt’s dual concept of work as both process and as object to emphasize the idea of historical transmission of materials as a living tradition. The focus of my own chapter on the mediation of music and society, ‘Music and social relations: towards a theory of mediation’, offers a discussion of the concept of musical material in Adorno in relation to dialectical levels or modalities of music’s mediation. But the historical process of increasing control over material, according to Adorno, leads not only to the crisis of total rationalization – Max Weber’s ‘iron cage of rationality’ – but also to a crisis of material itself. The idea of a coherent and ‘appropriate’ musical material falls into fragments and collapses as the actual available material, however apparently diverse in its origins, becomes ever more homogeneous and standardized through its appropriation by the music industry in an age of mass culture. The tendency of art to take extreme rationalization into the inner world of its form, to become what Valéry had called ‘a closed world’, creating its own individual context of meaning with each new work, had long been noticed as a characteristic of the avant-garde. One result of this has been complexity taken to its extreme, as seen, for example, in Brian Ferneyhough’s music, where the work itself sets up, quite literally, a resistance to interpretation, discussed by Richard Toop in his essay ‘Against a theory of musical (new) complexity’. The other extreme, already suggested by both Frisius and Decroupet, and touched on by Herman Sabbe in ‘A philosophy of totality’, is the omnivorous acceptance of everything as material, as seen in the case of John Cage. I take this further in my own essay ‘Postmodernism and the survival of the avant-garde’ through contrasting the omnivorous example of Frank Zappa with the complexity and selfreferentiality of Brian Ferneyhough, relating both to a concept of the absurd. The double focus of these essays – theoretical and philosophical perspectives – means, on the one hand, a focus on the details of musical syntax and material and on details of particular compositional issues (Decroupet’s discussion of Varèse, Toop on Ferneyhough, Deliège on post-Webernian music, in particular Stockhausen and Boulez). On the other hand, it also means an emphasis on critique – in effect a metacritique of theory itself. The debates that arose over the last three decades of the twentieth century concerning the legitimacy of modernist art and of the avantgarde with the ascendancy of the ‘condition of postmodernity’ led to a crisis within theory itself as well (and by this I don’t mean theory simply in the specialized sense of ‘music theory’, but theoretical discourse in the larger sense, including
Introduction
11
philosophy). Indeed, Marc Jimenez goes so far as to suggest that there may be a correlation between two crises: ‘one of an institutionalized, complaisant and promotional criticism, which thus is no longer functional, and one of a confused art, victim of a loss of legitimacy’. To that extent, he argues, theory – in this case aesthetics – must be prepared to take risks. IV But creativity involves living with risk, uncertainty and ambiguity, and developing strategies to encompass and articulate these through giving them form – however informel that might actually turn out to be. The composers represented in Part III of this book have themselves also all written extensively about music in both theoretical and aesthetic terms, and here speak directly of their ideas and concerns. Indeed, the big issues are those that have increasingly come to occupy composers for well over a century now – how to deal with the essential arbitrariness of musical materials in the absence of any overarching and generally accepted system for organizing them, and the evident need with each new work to build a new structural context within which such initially arbitrary and, in a sense, meaningless materials, in spite of their shared ‘commonality’ and handed-down historical meanings, can be organized and become again meaningful in a new context. Inseparable from these concerns in music, oscillating constantly between intuition and the urge to systematize, are questions of freedom in relation to control, chance in relation to determinacy, and time and temporality in relation to space and spatialization – time as structure, time as experience, and time as things in perpetual transition, a sense of the transitoriness of things, of objects in space. In view of such all-pervading instability and uncertainty it might seem all the more remarkable that composers should be concerned at all with ideas of ‘truth’ in relation to their music; in fact some kind of ‘truth concept’ emerges directly or indirectly as an issue in most of the composers represented in Part III, alongside the ever-present problem of meaning. For Jonathan Harvey, in his chapter ‘Music, Ambiguity, Buddhism’, truth in music – ‘axioms that are true for all music’, as he puts it – is what he calls ‘a kind of … Uncertainty Principle’, and there is a sense in which he has recourse to Buddhism as a way of framing and structuring the potentially disturbing ambiguity and transitoriness of the world, a world which, as a composer, he articulates through music. The transcendent and mystical character of Harvey’s form of Spectralism also points, perhaps inevitably, beyond music itself in a search for meaning, using music as a model for understanding the relationship between illusion and reality. Faced likewise with the dilemmas of choice and the unforeseen in his work, Pierre Boulez is a Cartesian, casting all into doubt in the pursuit of immanent-musical truth, and starting again from basic principles. As he puts it in his interview with David Walters, ‘You have to put what you want to decide into doubt – that is already in the writings of Descartes – doubt is fundamental; ‘… as long as you don’t doubt, you cannot find the truth, or the temporary truth.’ The life’s work of
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the artist is the necessity of ‘building an instrument’ – that is to say, ‘an instrument that is totally adapted to his own thinking … “Original,” as in the sense that it goes to the origin of himself.’ Here, the instrument is the music – or, perhaps more accurately, the unique and systematic instrument which becomes a new ‘second nature’ through which the music emerges. While it’s difficult to imagine a composer more different to Pierre Boulez than Helmut Lachenmann, there is a striking convergence on the need to create a unique context of meaning through the act of composing. While with Lachenmann it is Cage rather than Mallarmé who is the dominant influence, in his interview with Abigail Heathcote he says: ‘In my music there’s no such thing as chance. … That’s what I mean when I sometimes say, “composing means building an instrument”. Composing means discovering and revealing a new, invented imaginary instrument. In my case the problem is that such an imaginary instrument doesn’t exist before I develop it by composing the piece. So my composing is full of helpful “mistakes”.’ There is a fundamental sense in which this applies to all art today – the context itself must also be built, as a special world within which each gesture can become meaningful, where the arbitrary is eliminated and chance is embraced by the total context of the work, and a kind of consistency is achieved as ‘truth’ to the dominating idea of the work, its ‘scheme’. When, at one point in his interview with Lois Fitch and John Hails, Brian Ferneyhough states: ‘If music is not true, it can’t be beautiful’, he perhaps had something along these lines in mind – that the dominating idea that animates a work permeates every detail at every level, and the beauty of the work is this consistency of idea and work, in a very Schoenbergian sense. Indeed, it’s also precisely this thought that Boulez derives from Mallarmé, that ‘the Idea is reflected in everything’. In Ferneyhough’s opera Shadowtime, which arises out of a longstanding engagement with the work of Walter Benjamin, it is the concept of time itself that is central – or rather, several different concepts of time, as life time, historical time, dramatic time, and what he calls ‘failed time’ – and which systematically structures the work. On the other hand, fundamental to Wolfgang Rihm’s approach to composition is a rejection of any overt systematization, and what comes through clearly in his conversation with Richard McGregor is the value he lays on intuition and his admiration for those composers who most strongly exemplify the sense of freedom of the music of the period around 1910 – Debussy, Mahler and the pre-serial Schoenberg, and in this respect, although this is not raised as such in the interview, Rihm could be understood as having much in common with Adorno’s notion of une musique informelle, to return once again to that seminal ideal. Speaking of his early experience of taking part in a performance of Debussy’s Le Martyre de Saint-Sébastien Rihm says: ‘There was a music which only consists of itself, self-sufficient. The music was not something a teacher talks about with words … the music was a living creature, and singing within this living creature opened me.’
Introduction
13
V The importance of Rihm and Lachenmann in contemporary music in Germany as figures who have emerged since 1968, and therefore after the first wave of the post-1945 avant-garde, cannot be overemphasized. The original French edition of this book in 2001 had little to say on either composer, and it gives cause for some satisfaction that this omission has now been addressed. As a postlude to this English edition of the book Alastair Williams was invited to provide a commentary on the significance of these two very different composers who could be said to encompass the extremes of contemporary music in Germany today. His chapter, ‘Helmut Lachenmann, Wolfgang Rihm and the Austro-German tradition’, brings together a number of important strands also highlighted elsewhere in the book and links developments in contemporary music in Germany to a larger European and American context.20 As Williams argues, we probably need to rethink the significance of what has happened in advanced music since the mid-twentieth century. The pivotal date may no longer be 1945, but 1968, with the recognition at last that the revolution of the late 1960s was significant after all, together with the enormous political and cultural significance of 1989 and the fall of the Berlin Wall. What is more, the key role played by Germany in contemporary music may need to be revisited and recognized for a second time. It is not only German composers as such – although the importance of Stockhausen, Henze, Huber, Lachenmann and Rihm is now probably clear enough – but also developments in contemporary music in Germany, of composers from elsewhere – such as Nono, Kagel, Ligeti, Ferneyhough – who had chosen to work in the country either permanently or for extended periods of their lives, as well as the opposite: German composers who have chosen to live outside Germany, like Henze in Italy. As Alastair Williams suggests, all this challenges us to rethink the musical historiography of the later twentieth and the early twenty-first centuries, and compels us to experience again the relationship of subjectivity to objectivity and of modernity to tradition. In their very different ways Lachenmann and Rihm in particular have developed new critical musical ‘languages’ which, in Williams’s words, ‘contribute to the larger cultural project of bringing the more abstract procedures of modernity into contact with heightened, self-reflexive forms of perception’. Finally, it needs to be re-emphasized that this book does not claim in any way to be all-inclusive, nor does it set out to offer a historical survey of current and past tendencies in the whole range of music available today or, for that matter, since the mid-twentieth century,21 although the historical context of ideas is certainly important. It is the theoretical and philosophical questions arising 20
See also Alastair Williams, ‘Ageing of the New: The Museum of Musical Modernism’, in Nicholas Cook and Anthony Pople (eds), The Cambridge History of Twentieth-Century Music (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 506–38. 21 For a book that does precisely that, see Célestin Deliège, Cinquante ans de modernité musicale: De Darmstadt à l’IRCAM (Sprimont: Pierre Mardaga, 2003).
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from the situation of particular areas of advanced contemporary music seen also in the context of key developments in earlier twentieth-century music that the contributions seek to address – difficulties, problems and dilemmas at the turn of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. In many respects the book is likely to prove provocative, as much by what it includes as by what it leaves out, and by the kinds of theoretical and philosophical approaches taken. All this is completely in line with a publication that has its origins in a symposium of invited theorists, philosophers and composers22 – that is to say, it is speculative, sometimes difficult, often contentious, and hopefully thought-provoking. As Carl Dahlhaus said at another symposium on contemporary music held at Darmstadt in 1966, and which included Adorno, Ligeti, Kagel, Haubenstock-Ramati and Earle Brown: ‘But difficulties are provocations, or at least they should be.’23 Bibliography Adorno, T.W., Philosophie der neuen Musik (1949). Gesammelte Schriften Vol. 12, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1975). Trans. as: Philosophy of New Music, trans., ed. and with and introduction by Robert Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2006) ——, ‘Das Altern der Neuen Musik’ (1956 version), Dissonanzen (1956), Gesammelte Schriften Vol. 14, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1973, 1980), pp. 143–67 ——, ‘Vers une musique informelle’ (1960), Quasi una Fantasia (1963) Gesammelte Schriften Vol. 16, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1978), pp. 493–540. Trans. Rodney Livingstone, ‘Vers une musique informelle’, Quasi una Fantasia: Essays on Modern Music (London: Verso, 1992), pp. 269–322 ——, Ästhetische Theorie. Gesammelte Schriften Vol. 7 ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970). Trans. as: Aesthetic Theory, trans. with introduction by Robert Hullot-Kentor (London: Athlone Press, 1997) 22
The original colloquium of invited papers at La Monnaie, Brussels, in 2000, and the original French edition of the resulting book – Irène Deliège and Max Paddison (eds), Musique contemporaine: Perspectives théoriques et philosophiques (Sprimont: Mardaga, 2001) – have been greatly expanded for the present English edition. See Preface for details. 23 ‘Schwierigkeiten aber sind Provokationen oder sollten es sein.’ Carl Dahlhaus, Form in der Neuen Musik: Darmstädter Beiträge zur Neuen Musik X, ed. Ernst Thomas (Mainz: B. Schott’s Söhne, 1966), p. 49 (my trans.). For an English version of Dahlhaus’s introductory paper to this symposium, see the chapter ‘Form’ (trans. Stephen Hinton), in Carl Dahlhaus, Schoenberg and the New Music, trans. Derrick Puffett and Alfred Clayton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 248–64.
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Borio, Gianmario, Musikalische Avantgarde um 1960: Entwurf einer Theorie der informellen Musik (Laaber: Laaber Verlag, 1993) Boulez, Pierre, ‘Nécessité d’une orientation esthétique’, Points de repère I: Imagine (Paris: Christian Bourgois, 1985). Trans. as ‘Putting the Phantoms to Flight’, Orientations, trans. Martin Cooper (London: Faber & Faber, 1986), pp. 63–83 Cage, John, Silence (London: Marion Boyars, 1968; 1980) Dahlhaus, Carl, Form in der Neuen Musik: Darmstädter Beiträge zur Neuen Musik X, ed. Ernst Thomas (Mainz: B. Schott’s Söhne, 1966) ——, Schoenberg and the New Music, trans. Derrick Puffett and Alfred Clayton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) Deliège, Célestin, Cinquante ans de modernité musicale: De Darmstadt à l’IRCAM (Sprimont: Pierre Mardaga, 2003) Fukuyama, Francis, ‘The End of History?’, The National Interest 16 (Summer 1989), pp. 3–18 Habermas, Jürgen, Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne: Zwölf Vorlesungen (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1985). Trans. as: The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987) Jencks, Charles, What is Post-Modernism? (London/New York: Academy Editions/ St Martin’s Press, 1986) Kelly, Owen, Community, Art and the State: Storming the Citadels (London: Comedia, 1984) Lyotard, Jean-François, La condition postmoderne: rapport sur le savoir (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1979). Trans. as: The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. G. Bennington and B. Massumi, Foreword by Fredric Jameson (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986) Paddison, Max, ‘The Language-Character of Music: Some Motifs in Adorno’, in Richard Klein and Claus-Steffen Mahnkopf (eds), Mit den Ohren denken. Adornos Philosophie der Musik (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1998), pp. 71–91 ——, Adorno, Modernism and Mass Culture: Essays on Critical Theory and Music (London: Kahn & Averill, 1996, 2004) Rorty, Richard, ‘Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity’, in Richard J. Bernstein (ed.), Habermas and Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985), pp. 161–75 Weber, Max, Die rationalen und soziologischen Grundlagen der Musik, with an Introduction by Theodor Kroyer (Munich: Drei Masken Verlag, 1921). Trans. as: The Rational and Social Foundations of Music, trans. and ed. Don Martindale, Johannes Riedel and Gertrude Neuwirth (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1958) Williams, Alastair, ‘Ageing of the New: The Museum of Musical Modernism’, in Nicholas Cook and Anthony Pople (eds), The Cambridge History of TwentiethCentury Music (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 506–38
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PART I Theoretical Perspectives and Retrospectives
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Chapter 1
The Principles of Music and the Rationalization of Theory
Hugues Dufourt
Introduction In this chapter I set out to formulate the conditions for a possible theory of music today, while in the process providing a historical sketch of categories of music theory (with specific focus on the study of acoustics) since the seventeenth century. My approach draws on recent studies in the history and philosophy of the science of music and also on present research into computer music and the cognitive psychology of music. After the pioneering studies of Crombie, Walker, Palisca and Drake, researchers such as H.F. Cohen, Paolo Gozza and Antonio Serravezza have made important contributions to the history of the science of music. The aims of this field of research are now clearly defined and its problems have been identified and categorized. Its historiographical models may be seen as a counterpart to research into computer music and the cognitive psychology of music. What I seek to do here is to join these two approaches. In the first section, ‘Clock, ruler and balance’, I argue that the principles of music change when they become a part of the physics of inertia. In the seventeenth century music ceased to belong to the field of cosmology and became a part of the study of mechanics. The revolution in this field led to a new way of using concepts and to new ways of thinking about music. The mechanistic theory of music reached its high point in the nineteenth century with Helmholtz. The first part of this chapter is therefore devoted to a necessarily brief historical account of the mechanistic In the French edition of this book this essay is entitled ‘Les principes de la musique’. In that version the first part is considerably longer. For the English edition it was felt that much of the earlier historical material on the development of the science of acoustics was already available elsewhere for English-speaking readers in relatively popular sources, notably J. Jeans, Science and Music (New York: Dover Publications, 1968, originally published by Cambridge University Press in 1937), and H. Lowery, A Guide to Musical Acoustics (New York: Dover Publications, 1966; originally published by Dennis Dobson in 1956). What has been emphasized in this English version of the essay are the connections between the two parts, most notably in terms of Max Weber’s concept of the historical and social process of rationalization in relation to music theory and the acoustics of music [trans. ed. MP].
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principles of music, which is also at the same time a history of the process of musical rationalization, in the sense in which Max Weber used the term in his pioneering sociological study The Rational and Social Foundations of Music. In the second part, entitled ‘The fundamentals of spectral music’, I discuss what I see as the logical conflict upon which the new science of sound was constructed in the twentieth century. The technology of the production and control of sound and of electroacoustics and digital processing mean the establishment of new standards for understanding our sound world. Because our musical culture – which is both scientific and artistic – devises perceptual stratagems and then uses them as its basis, its defining characteristic could now be said to be the search for sonic illusion. Clock, ruler and balance As with all forms of technical activity, music today is part of industrial society. Whether popular or art music, it is the expression of a form of civilization which has given pride of place to automation and speed within the hierarchy that governs its life-style and aesthetic values. A civilization based on quick reflexes copies the structures of automation in all decisions of everyday life and rejects the slow reactions of traditional society. I would call a society industrial when it offers a general explanation of all psychic functions on the basis of reflexes – that is, when it tends to apply automation to relations in all aspects of life. The theory of music which developed during the twentieth century is characterized by a high level of analytical abstraction. It substitutes sensory receptors for receptor endings. To our physiological organs it adds tools, then machines that can transform movement, machines that create and control movement, and, finally, machines that process information. Music, nowadays, is neither created nor played without machines, computers, and systems for analysis and measurement. Solutions to historical problems concerning the origins and limitations of physiological functions, particularly those affecting sensory-motor coordination, are sought through laboratory experimentation. The theory of music was born in the seventeenth century and founded on the doctrines of mechanistic reflexology. As a result it has retained certain basic determining factors from its original context. Musical instruments, musical notation, and, specifically, thinking about music are regarded merely as technical devices. Music is a construction made by machines that can change movement into something sensorial. The manufacture of musical instruments, particularly after Vaucanson, eliminated the difference between organization and manufacture. Making music always comes down to constructing an automaton; that is to say,
See Max Weber, Die rationalen und soziologischen Grundlagen der Musik (Munich: Drei-Masken-Verlag, 1921). Translated into English as: The Rational and Social Foundations of Music, trans. and ed. Don Martindale, Johannes Riedel and Gertrude Neuwirth (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1958).
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something that provides intelligible and functional substitutes for activities which formerly, in the musical traditions since Aristotle, were the domain of instrument manufacture and of physiological techniques developed by performers. In their very design, their use and their function, musical instruments in traditional civilizations required an implicit reference to some similarity between nature and art, between life and technical means. The musical instrument in industrial society is a reductionistic object that merely simulates functions and establishes well-tempered relations between structures. While traditional instruments were the result of a compromise between mechanics and human physiology, modern instruments aim at modes of compatibility and forms of coexistence between patterns of representation, operational models and structural laws. The traditional instrument was a regulatory device based on the model of an organism. The internal organization of its mechanical system revealed the integration of parts and whole and reproduced their internal and reciprocal relations. In brief, it implied the use of technology to copy life. Thus the traditional instrument mimicked physiological behaviour and incorporated its functional activities. The contemporary musical instrument is very different. It is a theoretical and experimental construct that requires a thorough analysis of the conditions in which sound is produced as well as a strict determination of the conditions of its variation. The musical instrument of our time is the result of purely rational invention for which adaptation and regulatory criteria have become problems to solve. We know, for instance, that regulatory devices were added to the model of the clock after Descartes’ death. Christian Huygens (1639–1695) used the pendulum with isochronal oscillations (1657) for clocks, as well as the coil spring for watches (1675). By applying the principle of inertia to the representation of circular uniform movement, Huygens was able, in 1659, to express centrifugal force quantitatively. As Pierre Costabel has argued, Huygens was the first scientist who imagined the relations between mathematical theory and experimentation as being interdependent and as forming a whole. Huygens was the first to study the oscillations of the composite pendulum, which he considered to be formed of a large number of simple pendulums, each one of which corresponding to a small part of the mass of the composite pendulum. Huygens’s theory defines the value of the moment of inertia of a solid in relation to an axis; this makes it possible to establish the identity of the average of durations relative to all simple pendulums, and the duration of one oscillation. With the invention of the coiled pendulum oscillator, the balance (le fléau; that is, the beam of the weighing scales) was given an alternating movement that has its own period. The spiral spring embodies the idea of the isochronicity of the oscillations of a mechanical system, the structure of which is maintained by a S. Bachelard, ‘L’influence de Huygens aux XVIIIe et XIXe siècles’, in Huygens et la France (Paris: Vrin, 1982), pp. 243–50. Pierre Costabel, ‘Huygens et la mécanique’, in Huygens et la France (Paris: Vrin, 1982), pp. 139–52.
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continuous use of energy. The use of the spiral pendulum oscillator for watches turns a complex mechanism of wheels, cams and levers into a theorem of rational mechanics. The first clock to work with a pendulum was built in 1657 by Salomon Coster according to Christian Huygens’s instructions. It can be considered as the prototype of future musical instruments. The new instrument, whether electromagnetic, electroacoustic or computer, is in fact the result of a combination of theoretical and experimental – and therefore artificial – procedures. The musical instrument no longer belongs to the realm of conventional instrument building (that is, organology), but rather to that of technology. Mechanical invention is no longer a part of the universal organization of matter by life. It has become one of the applications of knowledge which tends to simplify its models, to make its organizational standards homogeneous and the design of its parts uniform, and to unify its metrical and qualitative characteristics, so as to ensure the greatest precision in the manufacture and standardization of the product. Modern mechanics, which based the science of movement on inertia, has introduced indifference and disequilibrium into the regulatory system of traditional musical instruments. The construction of servo-mechanisms or electronic automata must compensate today for the loss of the kind of functional standards that applied before to the musical instrument as a part of the world of general organology. The technological phase seems to have changed the very organization of musical instruments; the technical standards of regularity and predictability in their construction cannot be equated with mere technique. The musical instrument of today is an automaton that receives, transmits, computes, interprets or synthesizes information. Sensors, transducers and analysers have replaced the physiological functions of our own sensory receptors. To produce a synthetic sound is to manufacture the components of an excitory mechanism; physicists and psychoacousticians can digitize the characteristic multiplicity of its vibrations. In the Renaissance, and above all in the seventeenth century, instrument making became a real science. Physicists, musicians and instrument makers all worked together. Sebastian Virdung in 1511, Martin Agricola in 1528, Michael Praetorius in 1614 and 1620, and Marin Mersenne in 1636 and 1637 laid the foundations of musical-instrument technology. Technique and technology – the revelation of the rules of an art – became in the eighteenth century the description of the arts themselves and their practitioners. The concept is due to Leibniz, who defined its main aspects at the end of the Nouveaus Essais (1705). This science of art and its products is in fact a science of the labours of the human hand. It is linked to another aspect of technology: the science of the concrete application of an abstract principle. It is one thing to explain and develop the theory of an art – that is, to consider the purely theoretical side of knowledge implicitly contained in applied work. It is another thing to infer all the potential for invention from the resources of applied science, which is no longer fundamental science and is not yet technical application. Huygens, Boyle and Hooke belong to the cohort of new inventors who were to base instrument making on a body of theoretical physics and on exact
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knowledge. When, in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, music theorists (who were also musicians and acousticians) such as Zarlino, Mersenne, Werckmeister, Sauveur, Rameau or Tartini, wrote their treatises, instrument making had already benefited from the progress that had taken place in mechanics, making it much more accurate. But the modern technology of musical instruments really progressed thanks to the first dynamic study of elasticity, a study of string vibration. At the same time, progress in the understanding of acoustics, elasticity and friction improved the precision of scientific measuring devices and industrial manufacturing methods. The development of instrument making and instrumental practice in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was based on the first scientific revolution that took place in the seventeenth century and made the development of mechanical construction models possible. A resonator with a given periodicity was considered to be a simple pendulum, and its isochronal oscillations led to the generalization of the concept of resonance in the nineteenth century. Resonance is, of course, at the very foundation of all sound reproduction devices such as the record player or the telephone. Two other basic properties of sound production – interference and the Doppler effect – as well as the study of the visible spectrum also played an essential part in the development of electroacoustics in the nineteenth century. If we accept, as Bacon and Leibniz did, that the work of technicians and mechanical engineers can lead to new theories, we can also consider that research and the knowledge of theoretical principles can lead to a rational change in modes of production. Up to the nineteenth century, mechanics, as a universal science, held sway over most of the other sciences. The nineteenth century, with the production of energy and the development of the new means of communication that ensued, discovered new theoretical orientations. Ampère’s electromagnetism and Faraday’s induction led to the understanding of the common characteristics of electromagnetic induction and light. The musical instrument of the twentieth century, based on sound synthesis, is a distant continuation of the knowledge which appeared at the end of the nineteenth century, with the study of the mutual relationship of mechanical, light and electromagnetic phenomena. The development of musical instruments therefore belongs to different domains. It shows that scientific explanations can be sanctioned by practice, as in the case of temperament. And, contrariwise, it shows that industry can be guided by theory, by the application of rules that stem from general principles, as in the case of synthesis techniques. Paolo Rossi writes: Mersenne and Gassendi both rejected as dogmatic Descartes’ effort to base physics on universal principles; they were much more aware than he was of the fact that ‘real physics’ is closely tied to the gentilles inventions of engineers and technicians. For Mersenne, the descriptive knowledge of the phenomena and
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Until recently, the theory of music owed its development to that of mathematical and physical acoustics. From the very start, which traditionally goes back to Pythagoras, the theory of music was born of the refusal to search for the secret of experience in the study of its data alone. The theory of music is a speculative effort to understand, explain, organize and unify the complex multiplicity of phenomena. This emphasis on the ordering of phenomena places music at the very roots of the natural sciences. Music cannot be contemplated in a totally random world, nor in one where each particular element remains fixed in its essence. The Eleatic philosophers’ critique of Becoming (devenir) and of movement, which resists all efforts to organize Being (l’Être) and to include within it differentiation and multiplicity, raises from the very beginning a fundamental question of music theory. To regard space and time as absolutes, and to include movement within this, risks depriving movement of all rational justification and could plunge the sensory world into a phantasmagoric unreality. Thus, one could say that the question raised by the existence of music is intrinsically linked to the very possibility of the world’s existence. Man can only conceive of one world and not the pure multiplicity of chaos. The existence of music in the world is, as is the world itself, both the multiplicity and the One of Platonism. It is a unified multiplicity where the presence of the One explains order as well as the architectonic and hierarchical nature of the multiplicity, with its determining factors and its structure: an organization of parts that form a whole. In its origins the theory of music was a method of analysing the world and its phenomena. It is at the same time also a theory of mind that invents the science of the phenomenal world. Any theory of music is both speculation on the world and the world reflecting the mind. In Ancient Greece it provides simultaneously the first outline of a positive science and the first elaborated representation of our interior world. The theory of music is part of the tradition of numbers and forms which, applied to the mathematics of heavenly bodies and of sound, brought together the science of astronomy and the science of harmony. This ‘science of reason’, which harks back to the school of Pythagoras in the fifth century BC, will remain almost unchanged from Plato and Aristotle all the way to Kepler, Mersenne and Descartes. Thomas S. Kuhn writes: Kepler, Mersenne, and Descartes, all wrote on harmonics; Galileo, Huyghens, and Newton displayed interest in it; Euler’s Tentamen novae theoriae musicae is in a longstanding tradition. After its publication in 1739, harmonics ceased to figure for its own sake in the research of major scientists, but an initially related field had already taken its place: the study, both theoretical and experimental, of Paolo Rossi, Les philosophes et les machines 1400–1700, trans. Patrick Vighetti (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1996; original Italian ed. 1962), p. 114.
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vibrating strings, oscillating air columns, and acoustics in general. The career of Joseph Sauveur (1653–1716) clearly illustrates the transition from harmonics as music to harmonics as acoustics.
When Joseph Fourier considered all waves as additions of sine waves, he was fulfilling the spirit and logic of Descartes’s Regulae; he dealt with physics as a continuation of mathematics. The logical process, hierarchy of calculation, the theory governing the use of symbols, all is mathematically determined in music. Today, a parameter, an acoustic index, a salient event for perception, indicate the velocity of variation of a variable. Fourier, along with Leonhard Euler and Daniel Bernoulli, defined the mathematical concept of harmonicity. Through harmonic analysis, a periodic function can be divided into an infinite number of harmonic functions. Fourier included all the elements of harmonicity in a single functional complex, expressed mathematically. The essential characteristics of the modern idea of harmony are based on the commensurability of harmonic functions. If two straight sine waves have periods that are linked by an inconsistent ratio, sounds will be said to be inharmonic. If the two waves have periods such that they are part of a same harmonic series, the ratio between the two is commensurate. Sounds are then said to be harmonic. Periodic but non-sinusoidal vibrations of most musical instruments can thus be represented by the sum of sinusoidal vibrations that form a harmonic series. If all periodic phenomena are expressed by a sinusoidal function, the musical phenomenon can be considered as one entity and its general theory can be formulated. Thus, thanks to Fourier, musical theory can attain a fully functional and formal status, since it can represent sound and music by a ratio of time, space and number. Descartes, who based the theory of music on the model of the science of motion, made it possible, later on, for Fourier, then Helmholtz, to approach gradually the physics of sound waves, the mathematics of continuous functions, and music based on the spectrum. The new concepts that transformed acoustics and the theory of music were developed through phases that can be considered as turning points in history. Among them we have frequency, beats, resonance, elasticity and distortion. The nineteenth century added other concepts, such as torsional oscillation, the Doppler effect, interference and diffraction. Until 1880, theory reverted to physical mathematics. The development of acoustics from Galileo to Fourier or Simon Ohm ran parallel with the progress towards mathematical mechanics that reached its peak with the work of Helmholtz. Around 1880 the opposite idea was broached: to restore mechanics to the field of electrodynamics. The mechanics of malleable bodies could yield no more paradigms to science, so these had to be found in the theory of electrical and magnetic phenomena. Mechanics – the synthesis of physics that only Thomas S. Kuhn, ‘Mathematical versus Experimental Traditions in the Development of Physical Science’, in The Essential Tension, Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1977), p. 40 n.
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uses the concepts of substance and extension, of figure and of movement – found its accomplishment in acoustics and in Helmholtz’s theory of music. Heir to the theories of the eighteenth century, he was still striving to construct a mechanical image of the magnetic field, particularly by his theory of cycles. Around 1900 it was felt that it was impossible to include electrodynamics in mechanics. A new era then began for acoustics. The discoveries of the science of mechanics had led to the idea that all natural phenomena could be described in terms of simple forces exercising pressure on solids. Today, the fact that we no longer think in these terms makes it difficult, once again, to understand the history of the beginnings of acoustics. Helmholtz’s work seems central: it sums up and assembles, in terms of mechanical thought, the acoustic knowledge built up since the seventeenth century. His mechanistic philosophy, explicitly connected to the tradition of Galileo, was challenged at the end of the nineteenth century by analyses of magnetism, electricity and light. But the history of music is not simply the substitution of one paradigm for another. Furthermore, the mathematical physics of the seventeenth century was ahead of its time. It put forward the idea of the rational synchronicity of law and causal determination. This cannot be validated by an idea of knowledge that projects the forms of human language on to the formulae of science. On the contrary, the history of acoustics and of the theory of music show a gradual mathematization of mechanics upon which no logical, linguistic and even less philosophical formalism can shed light. The fundamentals of spectral music In the age of industry art music renewed both its concept and its aesthetics. Combining the logic of technology with economic interests, it has now become a new kind of cultural reality: a combination of science and art serving to create the basic conditions for music itself. Taking a broad view of progressive music since the 1950s, one sees a totality with all its parts interconnected. Signal processing, the cognitive psychology of music, computer-aided composition, and room acoustics are now the factors that organize the production of music. Music gets its procedures, its allure, its experimental style and its unifying objectives from science. From science it takes the language of precision. The ultra-miniaturization of switching procedures, scale gains in computing speed, the ever-increasing storage capacity for data, these all provide the practice of music with new standards and norms of representation, new structural requirements and new criteria of accuracy. The technology of sound production replaces instrument making, logical machines guide thought, and programming seems to be the dominating concept of musical composition. The science and technology that are associated with it have given the music of the second half of the century its cultural flavour. It is considered to be a form of knowledge where symbolic algorithms determine, from the very start, a logical configuration and a network of technical connections. Music is developing today as science does, and is threatening to explode under pressure of continuously
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changing knowledge, something which constantly threatens its equilibrium. Like science, music is swept on by developments in other fields such as technology and the communication needs of society. Musical research adjusts to the structure of the subject matter it studies. It adopts the programmatic function of the concepts and languages with which it defines its objectives. Art music during this period owes its particular character to the progress of technology within the overall forces of production. Economic interests, technical activities, the legal and institutional framework of society, all define an operational mode that is far from autonomous. All these conditions taken together can be reduced to what was called by Adorno in 1949 ‘the historical tendency of musical material’. Since the 1950s, music has acquired an ‘experimental’ form. It is considered to be an artificial experiment undertaken in the new environment of the laboratory. Even its own logic is developed on the model of a particular number of intellectual operations governed by the rigorous control of conditions. Musical creation has become a kind of spontaneous experiment, different from musical research only in its freedom to choose its ends. Art music in the second half of the twentieth century developed in a world of abstract calculations and the artifice of the mass media. It situated itself at the intersection of multiple disciplines, and this led to boundary conflicts. Since there was relative incompatibility between norms belonging to different fields, musical production in recent decades has experimented with partial synthesis. Its new theoretical status derives, therefore, from a problem that is not its own: that of scientific objectivity in its relation to the historicity of knowledge. Musical research bears that name because it is halfway between logic and experience. Abandoning all claims of totality, musical rationality henceforth pursues its aims towards systematization in the rethinking of formal schemas, in the resolution of formal conflicts and the constraints of notation and transcription. These are different aspects of the definition of the subject-matter which connect, overlap, supplement each other, and thus reciprocally define each other. Music lives in a world of adjacent and related forms that do not achieve the level of ideality of logic or pure mathematics. Its structures are simultaneously coded procedures, tools and models. Physical acoustics, musical acoustics, room acoustics, psycho-acoustics and cognitive psychology use the techniques of coded information and its computerized processing. These scientific disciplines converge and progessively divide their subject-matter into the domains defined by their interconnections. Traditional music theory is replaced by a general epistemology, the unity of which is characterized by an interdisciplinary criss-crossing without any common core or historical precedent. However, this addition of disciplines is
See T.W. Adorno, Philosophie der Neuen Musik, Gesammelte Schriften Vol. 12, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1975; original ed. 1949), especially pp. 38–42. See also the English translation: Philosophy of New Music, trans., ed. and with an introduction by Robert Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), pp. 31–4.
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no mere juxtaposition. The refurbishment of these theories is largely due to the need to overcome their pluralism. They do not simply add one on top of the other, but rather they overlap. The digital science of sound has solved the problems raised by mechanical acoustics by changing the scale of the fields studied and the methods of approaching sound. Just as chemistry became a science of non-existent bodies, as Auguste Laurent said in 1854, electroacoustics has now become a science and a technique of non-existent sounds. In 1860 Marcellin Berthelot said that chemistry created its own object. A century later, a sound synthesis program, such as Max Matthews’s Music V, computerizes sound production by defining its algorithm. An algorithm for synthesis is a program that has production capacity. To look at sounds objectively, define them, modify them and actually create them are one and the same thing in synthesized music. It differs from ‘instrumental’ music because it is not dependent on human gesture. It is also different in its precision, reproducibility and stability. To instrumental music, electronic music adds machinery – computers, and detection and measurement devices – as well as experimental techniques. After Max Matthews, Jean-Claude Risset developed a new experimental technique at the end of the 1960s: analysis by synthesis. Computer music requires complete specification of the physical structure of sound, and this will only be relevant if all details are included. A program for synthesis needs a thorough analytical study of sounds. A program of this kind is not an electroacoustical stereotype. Pierre Schaeffer’s experimental empiricism is very different from the experimental rationalism of Matthews, Pierce and Risset. Observations and experiments are of the order of the millisecond. The capture of the infinitesimal components of sound requires a new way of looking at sound. When you change the level of observation, you also change the level of objectivity of the phenomena that you observe. Finding new techniques to examine and study, and refining them, led to entirely different acoustical studies. Traditional acoustics was replaced by micro-acoustics, which includes timbre synthesis in the production of definite pitch and duration. For synthesis acoustics, musical sound is defined not only by its pitch and dynamics, but also by its timbre. Timbre, as part of the definition of a sound, is the most important theoretical development in the use of computers. To produce or reproduce a sound, it is not enough to convert a series of numbers that represent simple waves into sound. Matthews and Risset showed that the frequency spectrum cannot alone explain the specific shape of the constituents of timbre. Timbre depends on the evolution of the frequency spectrum, on attack and decay, and on the respective and mutual development of the different harmonics or partials of the sound. The method of analysis by synthesis developed by Risset has triggered great progress in the understanding of musical timbre by including numerous details for the envelope of each component of a frequency. Computers were used to reconstruct instrumental sound, to create entirely new sounds, to study auditory illusions and paradoxes and to process sound digitally. According to Risset, a study of the structural stability and functional constants of a sound cannot alone suffice
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to capture, understand or characterize the properties of musical sound. Dynamic considerations are also necessary. Computerized sound synthesis has shown that a purely technological approach to music is inadequate. From analogue electroacoustics to computer music there is all the difference between technology – even if it is revolutionary – and theory. Theory is born of the failures of technology. And the theory of sound synthesis has defined and formulated the valid conditions in which a sound is deemed to be musical. On one hand, perception does not hear vibrations or their numerical characteristics; on the other hand, the subjects of observation and experimentation in psycho-acoustics use the scale of a phenomenon that classical acoustics could not measure, observe nor even imagine. Thus the history of music in the second half of the twentieth century is influenced much more by the structure of acoustical theory than one generally thinks. In this period, the historicity of musical structures has been dependent on the conditions of their objectivity. These conditions are defined by science, and not by technology. However, they are both theoretical and experimental. Today, the theory of music has become a program. It has the progressive and problematic nature of a program. Theory is only valid if it is worded in technical terms that can adequately characterize relationships between observable objects. These terms must also be capable of relating fields of objects even if their components cannot be observed. Theory has become a standard for the organization of experiments, and attenuates their discrepancies. It creates relations within comprehensive operational systems for which it ensures formal consistency from the very start. The theory of music becomes consistent thanks to the conformity of formalized structures, operational models and symbolic connections. Music theory today can no longer be content with a speculative system of explanation. It cannot be restricted to a unified view of its interpretation. Such a unity would merely ensure comprehension, and theory must also be able to create new objects. It must create structures. It is a form of organization that must allow for different applications. The theory of music is the power of form. Its power of formulation makes it akin to the functions of language. Its organization can be compared to technical specifications. Its ability to create and differentiate objects, and to structure experience gives it the symbolic and operational status of positive knowledge. Instructions combine determinations, not qualities. A theory is only worthy of that name if it can find new forms of intellectual speculation and not just forms of rational connections. A theory does not simply suggest ways of operating. It is not just an updating of an organized set of operations. It reveals a new framework for classification. Computerized sound synthesis has made it possible to identify and understand the properties of musical sound which had never been clarified nor even sensed. Without method, observation and research lead nowhere. Digital sound synthesis has led to new criteria for discrimination in the search for the constituent relations of sound. Its main contribution is the discovery of new ways of defining sound. It creates real links between different phenomena. A program for synthesis is in itself the production of sound, an applied theorem and a machine
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for demonstrating. One program can do all this at the same time. It is at once a quantitative prescription, a technical determinism, a conceptual model and a method of research. In computer music, the validity of a symbolic algorithm means accuracy of pattern, efficiency of a rule of generation, and intrinsic transparency of a set of relationships. To become an explanatory principle, a theory of music must comply with three conditions that are interconnected. First of all, it must achieve the status of explicit formulation. Theory is actually analysis, because it looks for the reasons why a given property can be expressed in an overall and intrinsic fashion. Formulating a question therefore means separating and connecting the elements of a situation, identifying those relations that can form a consistent whole, selecting and organizing directions and methods of research. The explanatory value of a theory hinges largely on its ability to turn the phenomenon it is studying into a system of simultaneous determinations. To explain is thus to express the interdependence of factors and to specify the laws of the connection and alternation of the premisses. A second condition is that a theory must propose an operational technique. Derivation becomes both a divided and cohesive activity. The logic of operations must therefore be redefined at all times. A theory reorganizes its principles and arranges them within an axiomatic system. It reorganizes the operational chain of causal links and rearranges the order of conditions. It verifies and enlarges the use of its operational models. For theory, to define conditions means to use a subterfuge, an intermediary. Defining conditions means to consider the aim that is sought and the functional idea of the mechanism. It is a series of acts, a composition of consequences. It is more and more specialized. A synthesis algorithm today is the rational equivalent of the technical organization of action. The operational rule leads to a chain of different states. It means to discriminate and control the field of possibilities. In so far as it organizes a new way of thinking, theory defines the invariants of transformation and determines univocal procedures. Its method of construction is also the expression of functional necessity. Finally, a theory must create links of objective validity. It must specify its object, define the particulars of its schemes and turn these into models. By giving its objects a specific identity, theory has therefore the ability to differentiate between them. The value of a theory resides in its ability to articulate its aims, identify the pertinent indices, and bring out individual characteristics in their reciprocal relations. The music of the second half of the twentieth century is said to be experimental when it is considered capable of creating its own control system. It is said to be formal when it seeks a general mode of operation. In both cases, musical creation is above all linked to a theoretical function of extrapolation, of well thoughtout extension. Whether you emphasize the artificial nature of technique or the autonomous development of a functional law, in both cases the general properties of a system are used to define and understand the precise way in which a work of art operates. Chance, combinatorics, statistics, entropy, code, all these terms being used more or less loosely and metaphorically, convey the will to compare a work of art to the universal nature of theoretical mediation. The music of the last
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half-century is defined as a structuring process, inspired by a logico-mechanistic myth and expressly based on the technological model of automation. Basically, it is seen as the generalization of digital synthesis. According to its exponents, twentieth-century music is both theory and realization. To revisit a distinction already identified, it could be called ‘experimental’ when it searches for its principles, or formal when its operations are deduced from a law of series. ‘Formal’ music explains what is concrete and can be perceived through abstract relations, forecasting or computing, or again through the operation of hidden mechanisms. Whatever its type or modality, it is always a question of configuration, assembly, devices. Twentieth-century music strives to differentiate its structures while thematizing operational generalities. A difficult problem of aesthetics arises here – and, indeed, of the history of civilization. The twentieth century is characterized by a way of considering the relation of a totality and its parts that starts from the parts and proceeds to work its way to the totality. The analytical method and the possibility of conceiving of discontinuity seem to be the starting point. The music of the twentieth century is linked to structures that are constantly branching out and that express a theoretical ambivalence regarding global and analytical processes. Thus the greater part of musical production in the second half of the twentieth century seems to be the illustration of a philosophical theory of music. It is no longer really a work of art, but the result of an operation, a strategem. The liberal ideology, the prestige of science, technological philosophy – all these can be called on to explain the spirit of anti-physics that has reigned in music since 1945, just so long as we add the caveat, however, that this ‘mechanistic’ view of music is still aimed at combatting the concepts of the anti-mechanistic and counter-revolutionary biology of the Nazis, which it has always rejected. Ironically, the development of musical research has, in the long run, jeopardized the position of modern music. Research requires of creation a kind of novelty that has no longer anything in common with art. Considered as a rational ploy, modern music is reduced to a kind of formal experiment and must submit to the imperialism of knowledge. If technology and modelling can give musical creation a chance for renewed confrontation, they also demand that music accept the fits and starts, as well as the frenzy, of perpetual urgency – something which does not readily accommodate the requirements of a well thought-out concept. The music of our time is thus obliged to readjust ideas and procedures constantly, because the latest fashions in technique keep unadjusting them. Musical creation linked to research then appears to be doomed to production conditions as sterile as they are contrived. In this extraneous situation, modern music is reduced to the condition of an experiment in knowledge. The revolution in the science of musical sound is irreversible. The theoretical distinction between information mechanisms and energy mechanisms creates a clear split in the second half of the twentieth century between electronic technology and synthesis acoustics. Shannon led the way. Matthews defined aims and a method. Risset founded the discipline, not just by using Shepard’s
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first discoveries, but above all by adding the mathematics of quality, alteration and change to the digital representation of sound. In his presentation of analysis through synthesis, Risset was clearly aware of the fact that he was suggesting a new method and thus a new experience of the world of sound. This new type of experiment brings about a revolution in ideas because it shows that the way in which the world of sound was approached in the past is inadequate. New views are therefore formulated, and this requires a change in perspective, a new approach. The fact that sound is considered to be a program for synthesis is also a revolution in thought. The infinitesimal scale on which sound is created is not just the result of a change in proportions or an exercise in mental microscopy. The need to describe and theorize the structure of sound on a microscopic level leads to a complete revision of methods of examination and to new questions. Separating energy from information results in the fact that sound is no longer seen as the pure space-time continuity of energy. Of course, Risset accepts that the life of a sound depends on coordination, energy and relations. But he notes that the representation of a sinusoidal sound by sinusoidal pressure leaves out an essential aspect of the sound phenomenon. On the contrary, information theory, born of the study of the productivity of information channels, requires that we understand what governs the amount of information contained within a given structure. The answer cannot be found in a mechanical or even energetic application of the laws governing inert matter. This alone could not explain the existence of musical sound to which Fourier’s analysis only gives an idealistic answer. Analysis by synthesis as propounded by Risset implies a theory based on the need for organization and on the analytical study of the order of integration on an observation scale. According to this method, organization expresses the quality of a given physical quantity as well as the fact that this quality can be measured by the amount of information contained in that structure. The human ear is not a universal receiver. It interacts, as a hunter does with his prey. Sound is made to facilitate survival and has a very elaborate and specific level of complexity. The nervous impulses sent by the ear to the brain reproduce the form of the modulations that the ear received. Information travels through the chain of receivers, the relays. The code – that is the correspondence between the message received and the message emitted – the mathematics of quality, alteration and change depends entirely upon the structure and organization of these relays. Risset’s basic idea is that the human ear is extremely selective. It can capture certain aspects of sound with the greatest precision, but must be content with acceptable approximations of others. The quality of sound at the highest level of organization is relatively autonomous in its form of organization. A balance of matter and energy – required by the law of conservation of both matter and energy – cannot alone explain the organization that is characteristic of musical sound. Risset’s guiding thought is that those structures that give acoustical energy their real configuration can only be grasped as a function of real time. Time is no longer a geometrical dimension, but a real variable that suggests succession, evolution and direction. The organization of sounds is partly considered independently from
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their physical support. With organized sound it is therefore necessary to draw a distinction between the flow of energy and matter, the permanent structures through which the impulses pass, and the dynamic characteristics that affect these structures. The life of a sound is due to the variations in its architecture. The boundary conditions maintain a structure’s identity. But the ear disregards the conditions of this identity. The useful information is precisely contained in the evanescent elements, in the slightest alterations, in the disruptions or the neutralization of variations. The concept of information, which can be represented quantitatively, does not only measure the level of structural organization, but also the ability of these structures to create ever more organization or, on the contrary, to lose more and more of it. Sound is self-regulation, always threatened, always at risk, always reconstructed. It is a distribution of matter and energy in time and space. But the structures thus formed are not stable; they move from a greater or lesser degree of organization. Equilibrium requires effort. Self-regulation does not only mean a balance of corrected discrepancies. It also ensures a state of equilibrium between different tendencies. Thus sounds can be classified according to the respective positions of their components. A sound will be deemed to belong to a single category when its parts are related by a continuous curve; it will be said to change categories when there is discontinuity, or a hiatus, in its elements. Sound is a dynamic and unstable system, and the physics of macroscopic objects cannot suffice to explain it. Thus the qualitative determinations that are characteristic of musical timbre are not just the products of stable components that are connected in a state of equilibrium. Quality is the expression of certain quantitative relations where each phenomenon is a function of the others. Musical sound should be seen as a multiplicity of series that are coordinated in time. Before computers were used, electroacoustic music was controlled by voltage switches, which were generally oscillators that only had very few waveforms. Voltage was used as a control signal, and the way of changing it was usually the same as the one used for audio-frequency signals. Control voltage is produced, recorded and changed by oscillators, amplifiers and filters. The analogue synthesizer is based on transducer technology, in other words on the transformation of one form of energy into another. Analogue synthesis produces an electric signal similar to the one that is characteristic of the variations of sound in atmospheric pressure. This is possible because of modulation that makes the characteristic magnitude of oscillations vary in proportion to the characteristic magnitudes of the modulating signal. In transduction, the information transfer is not divorced from the mechanism that generates energy. Analogue electronic technology creates an artificial unity of harmonic frequencies that are separate at the start. The electric oscillations reconstruct the mechanical phenomenon of resonance. If a Fourier analysis can divide a complex signal mathematically into a sum of sine waves of different amplitude and phase, electronic oscillators can only produce periodic signals of determined amplitude and frequency. Therefore, electronic technology must artificially restore the unity of the interdependent elements of the different
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frequencies that are characteristic of a spectrum by mathematical and experimental methods. Fourier’s analysis was conceived at the start as a way of solving problems of heat conduction. It also applies to the study of sound waves and is theoretically important for understanding all undulatory phenomena such as sound, the surface waves of a liquid, and electromagnetic oscillations. In physics, the idea of the division of a periodic oscillation into sinusoidal oscillations is extremely fruitful. The representation of functions as series or integers of circular functions can help with the understanding of complex mechanical vibrations. Wave trains can be superimposed, can penetrate each other, can combine and yet can ignore each other. Contrary to traditional mechanical instruments, the generators of electrical oscillations do not produce harmonic complexes. Timbre synthesis, which is easy with electroacoustic techniques, is carried out by emitting simultaneously a certain number of simple harmonic sounds that are all electrically sustained and that each have given dynamics. The modular toolbox of analogue music is a mere extension of the principle of an electroacoustic generator with adjustable timbre. It combines oscillators, filters, envelope generators, white noise generators, ring modulators, sequencers, harmonizers and systems for reverberation, delay or echo. Fundamentals, partials or frequency bands can thus be added, subtracted or emphasized according to needs. The first general-purpose software for the synthesis of musical sound developed by Max Matthews in 1958 made the computer calculate the values of every point of a sound wave. The resulting numbers, called samples, are changed into electric impulses by a digital to analogue converter. The discrete electric impulses that the converter produces by modifying the samples are then smoothed by a filter to make a continuous wave. The electrical signal is then amplified and broadcast over a system of loudspeakers. The computer is essential for the study of musical timbre. It makes it possible to work separately but jointly with the different elements of the sound; that is, the fundamental frequency, the distribution of partials and of energy throughout the spectrum, and the time envelopes as well as the micro-variations in amplitude and frequency, whether random or regular modulations. Smith observes that: ‘Historically, additive synthesis produces a spectrum that is a series of discrete sine waves.’ He goes on to point out that the earliest example of analytical additive synthesis in music was the analysis and resynthesis of a trumpet sound achieved by Jean-Claude Risset in 1964, using Music V. It was also Risset who carried out what has now become the classic experiment, the first reduction of the amplitude envelopes of harmonics to linear segments. As Risset argued: The ear follows the evolution of a sound. Therefore additive synthesis must include a time factor. For instance this can be done by adding sine waves with
J.O. Smith, ‘La synthèse sonore’, Les cahiers de l’Ircam 2 (1993), p. 88. Ibid.
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amplitude and frequency modulation by using ‘envelopes’ that are a function of time and can be specified in great detail.10
Additive synthesis, according to Risset, is a method similar to a ‘progressive Fourier analysis’.11 It is probably the greatest contribution to our ideas concerning the world of sound. Risset looked for – and found – a more general and abstract representation of acoustical phenomena than that of Helmholtz, who had remained attached to a mechanistic view of nature. Risset’s work is a distant continuation of electrotechnical studies. These were an essential technical novelty in the nineteenth century, for electrotechnology is not one of the old crafts; it brought about a terrifying change in the use of the forces of nature. At the turn of the nineteenth century, as knowledge of acoustics, hydraulics, elasticity and friction developed – and all these fields were a part of mechanics – a new world of sound transmission appeared, using electrical waves. Risset’s references and standards are no longer mainly a part of rational mechanics but rather of studies on the relations between matter, light, electricity and magnetism. For instance, spectroscopic methods based on a Doppler–Fizeau effect create a bridge between theoretical optics and acoustics. They employ tools and experiments on interference which apply measurement and numbers to the study of waves. Resonance phenomena are the basis of many instruments used for the measurement of oscillation frequency. Risset writes: Computerized sound synthesis releases you from instrumental causality. When you calculate a sound it does not necessarily behave like a mechanical phenomenon. The computer has neither mass, connections, knocks, friction nor breath. To specify a timbre, it is no longer enough to identify its source; a single computer, just as a single loud-speaker, can produce sounds of very different nature.12
The words ‘progressive Fourier analysis’ show this radical change in perspective and illustrate the conflict in physics between the sciences of mechanics and energy. Risset helped to develop a science that has progressed so far as to change the geometrical and mechanical bases of the representation of acoustical phenomena. This new science shows that the analysis of the conditions of the observation of waveforms has not progressed enough yet, and that concepts of timbre born of Helmholtz’s resonators are only valid for experimental approximation. The conventional study of the spectrum of a waveform produces, in a way, a synoptic instantaneous intuition of the vibrations of the different rays of a spectrum. With its 10 Risset, Jean-Claude, ‘Synthèse et matériau musical’, Les cahiers de l’Ircam 2 (1993), p. 49. 11 Risset, Jean-Claude, ‘Musique, calcul secret?’, Revue critique 359 (1977), p. 424. 12 Risset, Jean-Claude, ‘Acoustique et musique: mutation vers le son numérique’, Encyclopedia universalis (Paris: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1990).
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limited means, electronic technology cannot reproduce the inharmonic complexes of brass or percussion. The precision of voltage oscillators cannot measure the acoustic properties of instrumental timbre and thus is not sufficient. Musical timbre has no explanatory elements. The precise knowledge of a musical timbre deals with combinations of relations. The understanding of functional relationships that are characteristic of a musical timbre is only possible on the microscopic level. Electronic technology alone cannot analyse musical sound on a rational basis. To explain the relations between the characteristic variables of musical timbre, be they simultaneous or successive, you need extremely precise and complex electronic devices that can perform a detailed observation, make appropriate conjectures and explain an acoustic phenomenon in mathematical terms. Only the computer can supply the procedures and methods that are needed to approach the inner structure of what is perceived. Digital synthesis was the only possible experimental method for sound. The computer made acoustics really mathematical. It played an essential role in establishing, interpreting, measuring and producing acoustic properties. It makes it possible to enter the very texture of sound, the details of its inner structure. With its limits, electronic technology was not accurate enough to identify the variables that make up the spectrum. To reconstitute a complex electric signal, which truly expresses pseudo-periodic phenomena, as are most orchestral sounds, the study of the problem of quantification has to start from scratch and must consider it in a general framework. With digital synthesis, software can be used to simulate an oscillator. Digital synthesis is the artificial production of a waveform in time, using a computing algorithm that gives the different values of amplitude at close intervals. Music IV (1963) and Music V (1968), developed by Matthews, are based on the principle of modular organization whereby a series of spectral determinations are assembled in a single waveform. Additive synthesis thus controls the amplitude and frequency of a number of sinusoidal oscillators that are added so as to produce an output signal. The spectral analysis of sound, carried out by dividing the periodic phenomenon into its pure sine components, makes synthesis possible. Signal processing, which has become a field of science in its own right, describes the physical basis of data on representations of frequency through time that make a developing spectral analysis meaningful. Contrary to the case of stationary waves, where a Fourier transform is the normal tool, there was no specific system to describe most of the non-stationary signals that you find in practice. The study of the internal changes in sound signals necessitates a way of representing a signal and making it discrete with the twofold function of time and frequency. Sampling a signal and its spectrum will therefore depend on the nature of the variable used. If it is time, the description of the signal will be temporal. If the variable is frequency, the signal description will be frequential. The loudness of a signal, its energy and self-correlation are represented in the time domain, just as any characteristic that develops in time. But the study of sound signals in the spectral field – ray distribution, dynamic spectrum, distortion – is carried out in the frequency domain. The separation between time and frequency domains in
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the analysis of discrete sound signals is partly founded on psycho-acoustics and thus has a natural basis. But a time and frequency analysis takes into account a kind of two-dimensional aspect that can be compared to the duality of waveform and corpuscle. To use a simple analogy, the analysis of the time and frequency development of a sound signal sometimes suggests, because of its ambiguity, an electron spin for which a new mathematical concept is needed. It is not really a vector, since its intensity is directed along several axes and does not increase by continuous variations. Jean-Claude Risset introduced the method of analysis– synthesis and approached the crucial problem of time–frequency representation by assessing the spectral characteristics of musical sound and analysing its evolution. Time–frequency methods take account, explicitly, of non-stationary and stationary signals. They have to deal with the intermediate characteristics in the case of musical sound. Instead of considering the stationary situation where spectral analysis can represent the instantaneous properties of regularity, additive synthesis strives to describe the development of magnitudes with time, as this can yield useful information on the complexity of musical sound. Digital additive synthesis leads us to consider the antinomy between frequency and time in the identification of the characteristic structures of musical timbre. Risset’s analysis–synthesis method stems from the relative failure of the methods born of harmonic analysis. These cannot devise discriminating criteria for the real variables of musical signals. Nevertheless, additive synthesis is far from neglecting harmonic analyses: it is used to devise procedures that can highlight acoustical indices of musical sound and identify them. Musical sound is a specific signal and the organization of the information concerning it requires several levels of abstraction, particularly if the aim is to understand the sound as a whole as well as its details. The organization of acoustic information is akin to mathematical microscopy, where processes must be considered in the framework of duration. Risset’s ‘analysis through synthesis’, carried out for the first time on a trumpet sound to reconstruct it through additive synthesis, shows that the louder the sound, the more high frequencies appear in its spectrum. The ‘analysis through synthesis’ of a violin sound by Matthews also shows that a conventional view of instrumental timbre is not satisfactory because it is restricted to the spectral characteristics. The words ‘spectral music’ describe the antinomy of the mind that is unable to imagine time and frequency simultaneously and must therefore constantly make the analysis of the one by the other more complex and comprehensive. A model with a constant spectrum is not up to the task of accounting for the identity of a musical timbre. Risset writes: We need to take into account the variations of parameters in time, their random variations but, above all, their systematic variations according to register, characteristic modulations, ‘accidents’ or idiosyncrasies of the production of sound, that help to identify its mode of production … Generally speaking, timbre, which shows the differences in the origin of sound vibrations, is based
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not on the assessment of a single spectrum, but on spectral and time signatures that are more elaborate and resist distortion.13
Two contradictory and complementary representations are thus linked in signal analysis. The first belongs to what we may call a spectral method that considers the frequency and energy contents. The second, which Risset calls ‘developing’, concerns the evolution in time of the frequency contents of the signal. A signal’s energy is distributed simultaneously over time and frequency. All representations of energy in time and frequency, therefore, are organized around a basic symmetry. Frequency analysis provides an instantaneous definition of the spectrum of the waveform. It therefore belongs to the timeless history of abstraction and sees matter as being almost unaffected by time divisions. Frequency analysis considers implicitly that time is not a part of matter, and that the behaviour of matter can only be observed during a fraction of time. This is also the classical view of physical vibration that considers it to be a succession of instant configurations of matter or energy. On the contrary, time analysis includes change and transition in terms of energy and information theory. Permanence is no longer sought in changing conditions, but rather intrinsic properties, signatures. While frequency analysis tends to stabilize configuration, time analysis deals with developing situations. Time and frequency analyses are alternate modes of abstraction that can only be expressed by each other, in an oblique or refracted fashion, as they are at the same time contradictory and complementary. The representation of a vibration can only be a compromise between its time resolution and its spectral resolution. In the seventeenth century, thanks to Daniel Bernoulli and Joseph Fourier, the solution of the equation of the waves of a vibrating string led to harmonic analysis. In the twentieth century, the ‘developing Fourier analysis’, as Jean-Claude Risset termed it, studies the ingredients and the patterns obtained by extrapolation at the limit of the relaxation of acoustic energy. Time analysis, except for the typical case, studies movement beyond the finite duration of an observation and beyond typical values. It reintroduces irregularity and fluctuations in the definition of the identity of a sound. While music theory, from Pythagoras to Fourier, dealt with the development of an abstract morphology, the organization of the information that is characteristic of the spectra of waveforms led to the formation, in the twentieth century, of concrete morphology. For the philosophy of additive synthesis, the concept of instantaneous action is an illusion. The computing of the ratio of energy to frequency can only partly explain sound, which is restricted to instantaneous observation, and can only express the constraints of regularity. On the contrary, the theory of musical sound, according to computerized acoustics, underlines the connection of time and space in observation techniques as well as in the interpretation of acoustic phenomena. The measurements and the theoretical constructs of computer music are dependent 13
Ibid.
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on the limiting conditions of time. Risset considers that you cannot understand a form without studying the process of its formation. He adds to the classical study of acoustic forms considered as instantaneous modes of coordination – and in physical acoustics, as superimposed groups of waves – the search for patterns that are both form and potentiality. There is no general theory of musical sound. Aesthetics is a science of disruption, of slight differences. Additive synthesis was used to reinterpret facts already known and to forecast facts as yet unknown, such as auditory illusion and paradoxical sound. To explain the formation of a sound that moves simultaneously up and down, the concept of high and low had to be divided into two different attributes: the tonal component and the spectral component. Formal structure can generate objects. To understand the properties of musical sound, something different must be added to the systems and laws of invariance. A sound is, in principle, subordinate to the pressure that affects it, and this, according to Risset’s epistemology, means that the category of reciprocal determination is added, as with Kant, to that of causality. The links that Risset emphasizes in additive synthesis are dependent on different forms of dynamic solidarity. The categories of digital acoustics are numbers, time, relations, and continuous alteration and fluctuation. Sound is organized according to a purely qualitative typology, where the different parts overlap, interact and are included in each other. They are, so to speak, made out of ambiguity, tiny characteristics and crossed functional relations that are responsible for the birth, differentiation and structuring of the results of perception. Risset points out that the main traits, the specific features of a sound, can be studied on an overall general level as well as in the details. The pertinent indices, the physical predicates that are meaningful for perception, are found in a general transformation as well as in essential details. Thus Risset seems to be wary of – indeed averse to – the exclusively algorithmic concepts of sound. In their present form they cannot always grasp the transcendental characteristics of an organized sound structure. The geometrical habits of science are gradually being pushed into the background. A sound is not something inert; it is not contained in a structureless space and doomed to vibrations on one tone alone. The time dimension, which Risset has included in the world of sound, and space coordinates are not interchangeable. The dynamic comprehension of a form cannot be restricted to the broad structure of its phases. In sound there are abnormalities, peculiarities, aberrant moments; the rule of inference cannot explain them. After Schaeffer, Risset advocated a concrete view of sound. A concept of this kind implies a reference to time, and therefore cannot be limited to subdivisions nor to a complete process. Outside the field of mechanics, matter is no longer a passive support for quality. In 1927 Alfred North Whitehead wrote: The fashionable idea is that new physics has restricted all laws of physics to geometrical relations. This is completely ridiculous. It has done just the opposite. It has replaced the Aristotelian concept of a procession of forms by the concept
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Sound has a periodic activity, and spectral analysis can bring out the characteristics of its appearance. But the inner structure of sound is not restricted to this form of organization. Digital acoustics deals with differences, the tiny modifications that disrupt a causal sequence. It studies bends, characteristic articulations and, above all, alterations. The refusal to restrict the understanding of acoustical form to the differentiation of the details of extended form does not mean a rejection of mathematics. Sound synthesis requires that patterns of magnitudes be made objective, for they are laws of local connections and cannot become a part of a system; they are also the emerging and discontinuous aspects that make explanations incomplete and only partially systematic. But computer music is an extremely formalized field. Synthetic sound is entirely determined by purely mathematical characters. Many characteristics of sound, discovered thanks to additive synthesis, were only observed because of the precision of modern instruments for detection, recording and measurement. Even more than this, it is to the development of the kind of mathematics that is needed for computers that we owe a precise knowledge of most of a sound’s properties. The study of the mathematical laws that enable us to formulate our knowledge of the phenomenon of sound shows clearly that the formulae of the older mechanics are only approximate. Digital synthesis looks for tiny mistakes in the explanations of simple laws. A sound is a transformation process, not a finished form. If Fourier’s harmonic analysis can only yield a first approximation of the phenomenon of sound, this does not invalidate it. Digital technology adds infinitesimal corrections to the explanation given by mechanical models. It also supplies the experimental means that can translate and verify the properties ascribed to microscopic elements or functions. The concepts that synthesis acoustics have added to our knowledge of sound were built up little by little on the ruins of classical mechanical acoustics. Nothing remains of the old concepts of dynamics, pitch or timbre; this is why no theory of music in the traditional sense has appeared during the twentieth century. The only theoretical problems that are worth considering today are the lack of a theory of music in our times and the recessive nature of the history of musical theory. This theoretical silence could lead us to doubt the need for work in this field. But it only makes musical production – which seems to have withdrawn into itself – even more opaque. There are many obstacles to real, demanding theoretical work: interdependent and more and more closely coordinated techniques; musical thought engrossed in the problems of adapting its operations to quality; and finally, the certainty – not so new but more and more widely shared – that art is nothing but culture and that it is up to the social reformers to lay down its rules. 14 A.N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1926).
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Since the 1990s, particularly in France, the ideology of the market on the right and the ideology of the libertarians on the left have together created a kind of logical and political monster. Its only watchword is that the end justifies the means. If discredit has been visited on all that is theoretical, it is because of this smug view of music as a battlefield where rivalry reigns, an arena where violent statements are made, outlandish exhibitions of incompatible views which must of necessity engage in battle and eliminate each other. ‘Leave it alone – nature will manage!’ seems to be the motto of the culture crowd. For them, the principle of free competition and some Malthusian left-overs of the theory of evolution seem to suffice to give a secure, firm and lasting basis to their doctrine. The trademark ‘in music, anything goes’ puts culture on the stock market, puts beauty up for elections, sets art critics to checking labels, and banishes aesthetics to a free-forall striptease. The media, as a latter-day Minotaur, demand their fill of young composers every evening. The Ogre is insatiable and commands the artist to feed the public with that ‘dangerous little something’ that is supposed to satisfy its narcissism. Doomed to be inscrutable, art is only allowed a few allusions within the carefully weighed synthesis of the intimate and the global. The hordes of deranged researchers are politely requested to crank out their daily batch of cogitation while concert organizers fight over the first half of the month (the press doesn’t cover the second half). The philosophical debate on music has greatly helped to disgrace all theoretical efforts by making them seem unfounded. Since it was always a discourse on legitimacy, its results had to be deconstructed, its theses subverted, its premisses negated. This allowed certain philosophers to indulge in eclectic prognostications that posed as efforts to destabilize all signifiers. The most important theoretical initiative came from the musicians themselves, particularly those of the Darmstadt School. However, their methods were inevitably inadequate, considering the extent of the problems. If total serialism was a real stylistic breakthrough at the middle of the twentieth century, the largely metaphorical use of mathematical, physical or psycho-acoustic terminology led to a lack of precision is its theoretical constructions that could make it seem to be vague in its principles. Under the influence of mathematical logic the serial composers tried once and for all to systematize the technical aspects of music, to propose a form of logic, and to organize their thinking by analysing concepts. Giving a deductive form to creative activities, musicians – just as logicians – drew a distinction between analysis and inference. This has perhaps not been thoroughly understood. It is precisely the distinction between inference and conceptualization that allows for the use of research in music – something which, up to now, has not succeeded in defining its theoretical status. The precise exposition of a problem requires that clear concepts be defined, and that practical intentions be converted into cognitive intentions. It is, of course, difficult to define the contemporary theoretical work of the neo-serialists. It would be tempting simply to state that systematic work on very different problems is enough to stimulate the ideas that this work leads to. But neo-serialism seems,
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fundamentally, to seek its inspiration elsewhere. Its basic idea is that organization modifies the standards of musical thought even more than it clarifies it. The doctrinal link that neo-serialism asserts between necessity and generality is, for these composers, the driving force of their intellectual work and the hallmark of their way of thinking. The clarification of the distinction between all aspects of musical composition is linked, for serialism, to the use of codes that apply to the very technique of composition. The change in structural organization must, of necessity, go hand in hand with a revision of the categories used to think it through. This dichotomy between concept and method leads to an indispensable tension that marks an all-embracing method of creation and gives it its characteristic image. From the very start the Western musical tradition gave a high priority to pitch relations and neglected the other parameters of sound: duration, timbre and dynamics. This led to a hierarchy in constraints that first applies to pitches, then to rhythm, metre and orchestration. But intrinsic to all hierarchies is subordination. Hierarchical thinking is very far from combinatorial thinking. By proclaiming the equality of the parameters of musical discourse, serialism has done away with hierarchy and replaced it by parametrical complexes. The decisive change is due to Messiaen. In Mode de valeurs et d’intensités, his now famous piano piece from 1949, he gives equal importance to the parameters of pitch, duration and dynamics. By applying the series to all aspects of sound, neo-serialism was striving to generalize a compositional technique. This does not just concern direct application. Serial tables and figures give every piece characteristic relationships that create specific links between the different components of music. Serial organization becomes a stylistic principle and also a method of generation. It is supposed to subject the whole work as well as its details to the imperative of structure and to the principle of discursive precision. The qualitative relations between the whole and the parts comprise a formal system that makes it possible to deal with them in a methodologically systematic fashion, copied from mathematics. One wonders, however, whether it is really possible to ensure congruence between the rules of construction and images born of intuition. Neo-serialism, as a general theory of music, strives precisely to fill the gap that keeps cropping up between the pattern and the corresponding image. Though musical theory and practice have common structural requirements, these are not necessarily identical nor are they in agreement. Is musical theory just a comment on musical practice, or can it have an influence – and if so, how much? Neo-serialism has claimed a novel theoretical approach, but it has never accepted to be reduced to a mere collection of tricks. It considers that the recognition of the need for organization is, in itself, a basis for theory. This is a genuine conceptual revolution. Quality was based on hierarchy in the music of the past. Now, quality is found in organization. The basic aspects of structure are pitch, duration, timbre, attack, register and dynamics. These concepts define the properties of music. These properties link together levels of expression that are different, and have their own individuality. Nevertheless, the constituents of serial
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music are not unrelated. A further constituent, in fact, is the way in which relations of coexistence are organized. For instance, the profile of an attack and that of the decay of a sound are fundamental parameters of timbre. This finding of musical acoustics also applies to orchestration. The connection between pitch and sound envelope plays an essential part in the relation between harmony and timbre. Serial composition is on the borderline between these two fields and explores the conditions in which stabilization is possible or impossible. This intermediate area, the threshold between timbre and harmony, is texture. Texture defines the inner constitution of a compound sound at the moment when it prepares to decompose and divide into a harmonic relation of pitches. Texture indicates the conditions of continuity and discontinuity that occur when two systems compete. Traditional music separates pitch from timbre, thus making them incompatible. In serial music, they are competitors. Half way between two stabilized regimes of sound, texture is a combination. The understanding of this kind of intermediary situation makes it possible to join the two fields of harmony and timbre, separate in the past but connected today, by specific forms of interaction. Before systematically organizing this field, thanks to musical acoustics born of the computer, serial music and theory controlled the separate evolution of amplitude and frequency. Thus orchestral timbre was determined by the profiles of attack and decay transients of orchestral sound rather that by the relative amplitude of stable pitch. Structure, the smallest significant unit of morphology for serial theory, is based on systems of interference between the properties of sound. Neo-serialism, which is today the laboratory of music, dismantled the so-called ‘natural’ givens of art and organized them on the basis of more general and fundamental operative concepts. Boulez, Stockhausen and Ligeti were then able to interpolate different orchestral timbres by controlling their gradual metamorphosis. Just as chemists do, serial musicians look at structure as an expanded formula. Structure is involved with the elements that it includes in a set of relations, and with that set of relations itself. Pitch, timbre, dynamics and attack are mutually determined, and they combine in specific ways. The law of coexistence and agreement between the different parameters makes it possible to manipulate sound. Musical material is no longer fragmented. Multiplicity is not just multiplicity; it is unity. Thus the different aspects of music – harmony, polyphony, rhythm, metre, general tempo and orchestration – are mutually organized, their multiplicity unified as if they were the multiple parts of one orchestral totality. The theory of the generalized series includes pitch, dynamics, register, duration and timbre in one initial group: the sound figure. It is intuitively validated, for it has relations of similarity and difference between diverse determinants. For instance, it creates relations between the rhythms of accent, dynamics, duration and pitch. All these components are controlled by one same chain of proportions that distributes them along a discontinuous path. The way in which pitch and profile of attack, duration and timbre, register and dynamics are articulated is based on new categories and defines new objects. The concept of harmony is replaced by that of blocks of sound with variable density. Metre is replaced by organized
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streams of rhythmic blocks, or by their combination. Dynamics and timbre have their own logic which, because of recurrence, avoids the clichés of orchestration. Polyphony breaks free from the constraints of linearity and from the inertia of preestablished horizontal structures. On the other hand, each sound figure has its own characteristics of instrumentation that make it relatively stable. The serial system deals with modes of coexistence of the different parameters and constructs its objects like organized totalities, complexes that are determined by the reciprocal location of their characteristics. To produce diversity is to determine the type of relation between the parts and the whole. But the concept of totality is no longer realistically cogent. Totality is defined as the organization of quality and as the mutual relationship of interdependent variables. The grouping of a sound figure justifies the systematic processing of its structure, according to the theoretician of serial music. It allows for the formal development of its organizational properties, as it is based on the formation of an operative representation, if not on the choice of an algorithm. Harmony, counterpoint and figuration are replaced by representational sets that control the vertical, horizontal and diagonal dimensions of music according to the categories of series, classification and magnitude. So the serial system restores the point, the line and volume as axes that generate the structure. Thus functional homogeneity is ensured. Irrational rhythms liberate polyphony from tonal hegemony by avoiding the attraction of the material. Serialism invalidates musical idioms because it dissolves the standards of their creation into the immanence of a rational project. Expressive elements – in a sense precompositional – are rejected out of hand, as they refer to a typology, to an ontology of organizational types. The morphological constituents of serialism must therefore lose their identity and become absorbed into their function. Musical composition then becomes a gradual complication of structures, then of families of structures with functions that become more specialized and differentiated as they become more coordinated. And it is here that serialism encounters the question of aesthetics. Its theory of creation is a theory of levels of complexity and their specific properties. Serialism accepts that creation is always, to some degree, a synthetic activity and that it refers to a causality that is not circular, an organization that is not a closed loop. It introduces a functional principle at all levels of musical composition and considers that the mutual genesis of forms suffices to explain the production of diversity. Musical composition is not an assembly, a ‘putting together’. The composer is not an arranger. Musical composition is authentically a synthesis. In a synthesis, the parts are mutually interdependent without calling for the necessity to invoke the finality of the whole. Musical creation is not the result of the combination of parts, but a product that unites the parts. The creation process can therefore be explained from a strictly functional point of view. The basic elements of the organization are the same, but the networks of interaction differ. Quality is the result of integration. So musical composition is not the technology of a certain class of operations, but a technique of the mind, a technique for thinking, a form of cognition. The science of music is the science of a class of structures, not of a class of objects.
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The functional theory of art proposed by serialism is underpinned by a cognitivist theory of the function of art. If creation means awareness of the conditions under which musical thought operates in order to achieve new levels of organization, then it consists in making the different registers of representation cooperate with ever-increasing effectiveness. The theory of art as theory of functional integrity is correlated with a theory of the function of art as a conquest of degrees of freedom. Serial aesthetics is the aesthetics of the mobilization of cognition and the celebration of functionality. It is an immanent theory and rejects all consideration of ‘meaning’ other than that which derives from the intensification of the material. Functional aesthetics is connected with a philosophy of history that derives from Max Weber rather than Adorno. Its starting point is the idea that in the West music is a counterpart of mechanics. Seen from this point of view, the function of Western music is to restore a qualitatively dynamic experience that mechanics represses in favour of quantitative considerations. From the very end of the Middle Ages, reality has been grasped musically through series of intervals and formal laws of iteration. The development of instrument making, the progress of music notation and the spread of polyphony reveal a cultural construct modelled on the process of social mechanization. Engaged in a process of subjective rationalization as an effect of capitalism, mankind provides itself with the means of subjective expression as part of the process of its own alienation. The expressive power of music is due to its ability to present non-objective themes endowed with implicit energy. Over and above processes of growth and evolution, Western music is capable of expressing and activating release, motivation, goal-direction, recollection and anticipation. The only intellectual schema it has available to account for sensormotor dynamics and cognitive integration is developing variation. Movement and arrest, tension and release, ascent and descent are not thematized but transcribed in musical notation in the form of equilibrium disrupted then restored between consonance and dissonance, between the fertility of rhythmic accentuation and the strictness of metrical divisions. Rather than disappear, the Greek theory of proportions – of continuous fractions – is generalized, so as to give Medieval and Renaissance musics their operational and intellectual basis. The functional theory of music thus finds its origins in a distant past from which it reproduces the general design and from which it retains in its structure the memory of its intellectual schemata. The main work to reflect on the nature, meaning and scope of music theory is Max Weber’s essay on the sociology of music published in 1921 (it actually dates from 1911). His title, ‘The Rational and Social Foundations of Music’, clearly indicates its main thrust. Max Weber asks whether the history of music is really history. For him, the history of music is the history of the systems that define eras of knowledge and modes of production. Every period of musical production is enclosed in specific modes of thought, with their specific technology, tools
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and categories.15 Each cultural construct is sufficient unto itself because of its inner consistency. This is true of the spread of Pythagoras’s thought in ancient Europe and of the development of technology and machines in the Middle Ages, manifested in the invention of staff notation, of polyphony, and the progress of instrument making. A new scientific movement appeared in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries which laid the grounds for the process of rationalization of sound in the seventeenth century, even though the two periods cannot be linked by an uninterrupted continuity in historical development. A harmonic conception of intervals was established in the seventeenth century and conditioned the further elaboration of the system of staff notation, the experiments with systems of tuning which led to the establishment of equal temperament, and the sudden appearance and spread of the generalized monophonic style in the eighteenth century. Because of this rationalization, the psycho-physiological elements of the art of music became detached from its physical and numerical elements, and acquired a specific form. They became part of a new type, a new genre of knowledge. The philosophy of serial music, supported by long historical experience, sees the musical situation as a dialectic of the determining conditions of music. This means that music as art can only conceive of one order, one mode of organization. The contribution of serialism to musical thought is due just as much to a radical change in perspective as to a reversal of terms. The theory of serial music emphasizes, in effect, the recurrent character of musical organization. A structure is a clear and articulated totality that has systems of relations that can be unfolded. It is also a formal entity that can adjust to the conditions and implications of discursive thought. As a rational product, a musical composition goes beyond the stage of mere prototype or concrete exemplar to become part of the plot of formal reason. The new philosophical idea contributed by serialism is that the ‘making’ of art, the act of creation, is born of reason. Musical creation, according to serialism, can only accomplish its specific way of working by means of the kinds of thematic integration, differentiation and determination of invariants that underlie each one of its operative chains. This is not formalism. Boulez, Stockhausen, Xenakis, Berio, Nono, Carter all state, on the basis of very different ways of thinking, that music is created through a constant compromise between aspects that are partly irreconcilable, and that concern musical perception, cognition, technique and logic, to the extent that every new decision implies both a change in organizational patterns and a corresponding change in outlook. The foremost idea of serialism is that the very use of rules changes their meaning. If musical composition can be compared with a series of experiments, then the work owes its form to the broadening and in-depth improvement of these experiments, in the specific conditions of its establishment as art. Its substance – its content – becomes more specific at each phase of its accomplishment, 15 See Don Martindale and Johannes Riedel, Introduction: ‘Max Weber’s Sociology of Music’ to the English translation, The Rational and Social Foundations of Music, pp. ix–lii, for a helpful account of Weber’s concept of rationalization in relation to music.
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and thus acquires new meaning. Serialism has developed through the perpetual confrontation between formalism and abstraction. Abstraction means to discover the law that combines interdependent relations. It requires clarification of ideas at each step; in other words, it requires an analysis of concepts. Serialism is unthinkable without an analysis of this kind. Furthermore, it can only claim to be a radical reform of musical theory because it considers that it has understood the fruitfulness of the semantics of formalized theories for music. Music, as an original and creative form of activity, can be seen as an art of pure transposition and transformation. A theory of music, in order to succeed, has therefore no choice but to take the form of a critique of transformation. For after identifying the invariants used for transformation, musical thought must then renew them. This means that it always escapes the rule of congruence to arrive at the operational properties of symmetrical relations. Musical thought is active in its own sphere, the domain of correspondences and proportions. It converts the static equivalence of congruence into the dynamics of intervallic organization. Musical logic is based on the power of differentiation, dependent on the acceptance of asymmetry in the establishment of structural formulae: orientation, polarization, pressure and corrosion. Musical thought has a strong power of distortion and reproduces the human experience of movement that Kant, in his Opus posthumum considered to be the only possible forms, which is to say attraction and repulsion.16 Science of music has renewed itself under the impulse of cognitive psychology. It uses its problems, methods, categories and, more generally, its forms of reflexion. But this appropriation of tools, concepts and models does not substantially modify the ‘intellectualistic’ premises that dominated the musical aesthetics of the twentieth century and shaped its theory of art. Even when it includes practice, the cognitive aesthetics of music (the implicit aesthetics of the theory of the serial system as well as the practice of computer music) assigns the most fundamental properties of signifying forms to the determination of categories that are themselves susceptible to being converted into a formalism of representation, and to which they themselves can also be reduced. From this point of view, artistic forms can do little other than exhibit the qualities of a purely theoretical construction. The advanced music of the second half of the twentieth century has always claimed an elective affinity with the higher forms of intelligence, and considered itself as the stylized manifestation of the power of discursive integration. By claiming to be the mere symbolization of the power of differentiation and of accommodation to categories, artistic creation became a sublimated version of the psycho-technical synthesis of high-level software. If you call intellectualism the doctrine that includes all mental functions in the definition of intelligence, you can claim that the doctrine of music – of musicians – which dominated in the twentieth century is an intellectualistic 16 See Immanuel Kant, ‘Towards the elementary system of the moving forces of matter’, Opus posthumum (1790–1801), trans. Eckhart Förster and Michael Rosen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 23.
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doctrine. Despite the efforts of cognitivism, which aims at the irreducibility of art to science, musical thought proper insists in passing itself off as a science and, as a form of research, claims the theoretical and institutional status of a science. The music of our time has not left its cognitive frame of reference. Its philosophy remains one of representation. In this respect it can therefore be considered as an ideology. Information theory as applied to music, which is based today on the cognitive psychology of music, touches up the décor rather than changing it. We must accept, however, that by applying itself to the dimensions of timbre and dynamics information theory and computer music have not just explored a domain that is traditionally neglected. They have brought it to the fore by changing its position. Professional musicians have lost their traditional field of competence. This is now within the domain of theory. Important as it might be, the essential tension resulting from the annexation by theory of a domain traditionally devolved to the professional musician cannot alone account for all those aspects of music for which a study of the symbolization of its impulses has yet to be carried out. A new theory of music, if it were to be established, would need to look at the situation of music in its essential negativity and, for a musician, this remains something largely inconceivable. If it were done, the history of the categories of musical thought would need to be articulated as a dialectic which would no longer limit itself to a purely cognitive examination of its determining conditions, but would need to recognize that it is itself formed by the convergence of the historical conditions themselves. In his Preface to the Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel states that ‘form is itself the intrinsic becoming of concrete contents’.17 Thus, a real theory of music cannot be satisfied with understanding the relations between concept and reality, or between concept and phenomenon. Musical production must be considered in its entirety, as a process of self-creation that does not solely depend on what knowledge can give in isolation. The cognitive project of a theory of music must, under these conditions, be included in a thematization of praxis: in other words, the theory of music must also incorporate a social history of music. Bibliography Adorno, T.W., Philosophie der Neuen Musik, Gesammelte Schriften Vol. 12, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1975; original ed. 1949). English translation: Philosophy of New Music, trans., ed. and with and introduction by Robert Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2006) Alain, O., L’harmonie, series Que-sais-je? (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1965) 17 G.W.F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), p. 55 (‘… weil die Form das einheimische Werden des konkreten Inhalts selbst ist’).
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Bachelard, S., ‘L’influence de Huygens aux XVIIIe et XIXe siècles’, in Huygens et la France (Paris: Vrin, 1982), pp. 240–58 Barbereau, A., Études sur l’origine du système musical (Paris: Bachelier, 1852) Blay, M., Les raisons de l’infini: Du monde clos à l’univers mathématique (Paris: Gallimard, 1993) ——, La naissance de la science classique au XVIIe siècle (Paris: Nathan, 1999) Bouligand, G. and Desbats, J., La mathématique et son unité. Introduction aux éléments de l’analyse et à la philosophie des sciences déductives (Paris: Payot, 1947) Brunschvig, L., Les étapes de la philosophie mathématique (1912), new edition with Preface by Jean-Toussaint Desanti (Paris: Blanchard, 1993) Clavelin, M., La philosophie naturelle de Galilée (Paris: A. Colin, 1968) Costabel, P., ‘Huygens et la mécanique’, in Huygens et la France (Paris: Vrin, 1982), pp. 139–52 Crombie, A.C., Augustine to Galileo, the History of Science AD 400–1650 (London: The Falcon Press, 1952; second ed. London: Heinemann, 1957) Descartes, R., Règles utiles et claires pour la direction de l’esprit en la recherche de la vérité, trans. with conceptual annotation by Jean-Luc Marion with mathematical examples by Pierre Costabel (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977) Durutte, C., Technie, ou lois générales du système harmonique (Paris: MalletBachelier, 1855) Einstein, A. and Infeld, L., The Evolution of Physics: The Growth of Ideas from Early Concepts to Relativity and Quanta (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1938) Galileo Galilei, Discorsi e dimostrazioni mathematiche intorno a due nuove scienze, Opere Galileo Galilei in 20 vols (Florence: A. Favaro, 1890– 1909/1970) Hegel, G.W.F., Phänomenologie des Geistes (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1970) Kant, I., ‘Towards the elementary system of the moving forces of matter’, Opus postumum (1790–1801), trans. Eckhart Förster and Michael Rosen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) Kuhn, Thomas S., ‘Mathematical versus Experimental Traditions in the Development of Physical Science’, in The Essential Tension, Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 31–65 Mach, Ernst, Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung historisch-kritisch dargestellt (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1883) Orcalli, A., Stanze inesplorate dell’ armonia: Sull’ estetica musicale di Camille Durutte (Milan: Angelo Guarini e Ass., 1996) Risset, Jean-Claude, ‘Musique, calcul secret?’, Revue critique 359 (1977), pp. 414–29
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——, Entry: ‘Acoustique et musique: mutation vers le son numérique’, Encyclopedia universalis (Paris: Supplément 1990 et nouvelle édition, 1990), pp. 522–34 ——, ‘Synthèse et matériau musical’, Les cahiers de l’Ircam 2 (1993), pp. 43– 65 Rossi, P. Les philosophes et les machines 1400–1700, trans. Patrick Vighetti (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1996; original Italian ed. 1962) Smith, J.O., ‘La synthèse sonore’, Les cahiers de l’Ircam No.2 (1993), pp. 83–96 Stewart, I., Does God Play Dice? The New Mathematics of Chaos (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1989; 2nd rev. ed. 2002) Weber, Max, Die rationalen und soziologischen Grundlagen der Musik (Munich: Drei-Masken-Verlag, 1921). English translation: The Rational and Social Foundations of Music (1911), trans. and ed. Don Martindale, Johannes Riedel and Gertrude Neuwirth (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1958) Whitehead, A.N., Science and the Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1926) Wronski, H., Messianisme, ou réforme absolue du savoir humain, nommément: réforme des mathématiques comme prototype de l’accomplissement final des sciences et réforme de la philosophie comme base de l’accomplissement final de la religion (Paris: Firmin-Didot frères, 1847), 3 vols.
Chapter 2
Atonal Harmony: From Set to Scale Célestin Deliège
Introduction 1. ‘It would be a mistake to believe that rules of composition can be derived from such phenomena as the harmonic series’, Carl Dahlhaus has argued. He was undoubtedly correct in objecting to Hindemith’s theory of harmony, as put forward in Unterweisung im Tonsatz, a theory which is anyway probably objectively impossible. However, the fact that rules of grammar are prior to rules of composition, and that these are intrinsic to language, seems to me to remove the obstacle. Acoustic resonance is probably the most authentic universal principle utilized by music, whatever its mode of existence. Even someone who is completely unaware of this fact cannot avoid it. 2. The series was created to establish an atonal order. From the very beginning it was considered, quite explicitly, to be a unifying principle, leading to a synthesis which gives each pitch equal status and, as it was said at the time, it abolishes concepts of consonance and dissonance. This very quickly led to a situation where no form of hierarchy prevailed any longer, and harmony was, as Webern had suggested, in a state of non-gravity. 3. When composers wish to restore some kind of hierarchy, they must now of necessity create it through their own procedures. A great deal has been said about composers creating their own material. This has led to very thorough analyses of the genesis of works (see Piencikowski, Kobliakov, Decroupet) of a kind which usually requires a careful study of composers’ sketches. 4. Could one therefore not say that what is true of tonality is also true of atonality, and that its fate could well be the one assigned by Riemann to tonal harmony? The sound spectrum may seem to suggest today that, instead of abolishing consonance and dissonance, tonal harmony may embrace them both. This is what Pousseur thought in the 1970s – but then, he was aiming at a prospective and retrospective inclusion of his own work in the history of harmony. That is not my aim. What I am proposing here is a theory Carl Dahlhaus, ‘Plaidoyer pour une théorie actuelle de la musique’, in Tod Machover (ed.), Quoi? Quand? Comment? La recherche musicale (Paris: Bourgois-Ircam, 1985), p. 76.
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to ‘riemannize’ chromatic atonal harmony – in other words, to bestow a fundamental on any aggregate in atonal music, and thus to propose a figured harmony, just as was done for the basso continuo in the past. Riemann’s theory of harmony was a new dawn in relation to that of Schenker. May the one put forward in this chapter likewise one day turn out to be a new dawn! Basic outline I. Some historical givens 1. First hypothesis (a) Tonality derives from the logic behind medieval modality. (b) Atonality is a logical step in the evolution of polyphony, based on extreme tonal chromaticism. (c) Observation of many recent compositional techniques (such as those of Boulez, Berio, Ligeti, Lindberg, Saariaho, Dufourt and Harvey, among others) suggests that atonal harmony may be rationalized in a way that implies a new type of modality. This new modality restores the hierarchy of intervals that had been temporarily overshadowed by the (somewhat arbitrary) pitch series. The atonal modal scale will turn out to be none other than that of the acoustic spectrum. 2. The aim of this chapter is to show that atonal and serial structures contain this hierarchy, and that it is possible to demonstrate as much while retaining all the power of atonal harmony. I argue that it is necessary to restore the inherent fundamentals for this type of harmony just as is (or can be) done in – and for – every other historical period. This can give us a perspective on composition if the composer wishes to create polarized processes while maintaining harmonic structure in an atonal chromaticism. The tendency to do so has been in evidence since the end of the 1970s, or indeed earlier in certain specific cases. In essence, my proposal amounts to creating a chromatic modality that allows modulations or, perhaps better put, ‘mutations’. 3. In the classical period chords were treated as an aspect of counterpoint. Contemporary treatises show that harmony was calculated with respect to the interval; this is particularly clear in the work of Kirnberger. Rameau, of course, demonstrated the acoustic basis of chords; but, whether his work was accepted or not, it had no effect whatsoever on composition. It was not until Riemann and the applications of his work by d’Indy, Schenker and J.P. Kirnberger, Die Kunst des reinen Satzes in der Musik (1771–1776), trans. David Beach and Jürgen Thym (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1982).
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Schoenberg (a diverse group indeed) that a rational analysis of the tonal system was achieved, with a figuring of fundamentals which even today receives only partial recognition. 4. When dodecaphony and serialism were first posited, the great diversity they afforded was a cause of much delight: it was calculated that it was possible to construct some 479,001,600 permutations within the scale of twelve notes. The system, then, was far from defunct, and the initiator’s prophecy of an era of practical possibilities seemed true. However, Milton Babbitt’s hexachordal theory showed that, by dividing the series into complementary groups, Schoenberg himself had from the outset reduced the supposed huge diversity available into certain combinatorial ‘orders’. These orders anticipated the models of Webern, which have been readily attributed to the asceticism of his style. Nevertheless, speculation on certain transpositions and permutations continued, although barely survived the general lack of interest. When Forte’s table of pitch class sets finally appeared, it became clear that the large numbers that had initially caused such joy could be reduced to 208 items in groups of three to nine notes; these items could be multiplied by two at most, according to whether one read them from left to right, or reversed them and read from right to left. 5. And what about Spectralism? Up until now this has also been striking for its display of plurality, but it is patently obvious that it lacks a grand theory. It is always possible to speculate on non-harmonic intervals and on the fusion of harmony and timbre, but the number of potential solutions would be enormous. Thus, without going back to a medieval modal pluralism (itself sometimes reducible to just three hexachords), we can now recognize three main grammatical techniques since Bach. Of these, two date from the twentieth century. As a result, we may now limit ourselves to those pitch theories that have finally become the most influential in the West. This development has been one single historical process, with its beginnings in the empirical pluralism of practice and subsequently reduced to a theoretical rationalization inspired by recourse to logical principles. George Perle, Twelve-tone Tonality (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1977), p. 5. M. Babbitt, ‘Some Aspects of Twelve Tone Composition’, The Score XII (1955), 53–61; ‘Set Structure as a Compositional Determinate’, Journal of Music Theory 5/1 (1961), pp. 72–94, reprinted in B. Boretz and E. Cone (eds), Perspectives in Contemporary Music (New York: Norton, 1972), pp. 129–14; Words about Music, ef. S. Dembski and J. Straus (Madison: Wisconsin University Press, 1987). Alan Forte, Structure of Atonal Music (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 179–81.
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However, we don’t need to limit our attention to these established facts. After all, just as we include under the heading ‘tonal’ the whole corpus of music from Bach to Wagner (indeed, one can argue that tonality is already to be found in Monteverdi), so also it may be conjectured that future generations could be tempted to include the contribution of the twentieth-century Second Viennese School and its derivatives under the single heading of ‘atonal music’. In this event, these well-informed successors of ours might also be tempted to include other musico-historical adventurers, seeing continuity where we see only splits and ruptures. II. Principles and premisses 1. In summary, the course of history runs through the grammatical developments mentioned above and leads, at each period of composition, from empirical pluralism, which is itself able to bear on such theories a priori, to rational unity, something which emerges a posteriori by a process of progressive reductions. It also turns out that this historical process works much as a demystification process – and this despite the inaccuracies that have inevitably been handed down to the theoretical systems themselves. This process could help us reevaluate the procedural practices that arose through the creation of musical works, but which an essentially neutral level analysis (as Nattiez and Molino would call it) might treat as superfluous. Such procedures have not been lacking in the twentieth century. Indeed each composer, whether a direct or indirect heir of Second Viennese School dodecaphony, proposed his own. The examination of sketches has become for more unrelenting musicologists a sort of detective work which seeks to unravel the secrets buried deep in the works of these composers. Since I am focusing more on finding common traits than on individual aspects of composition (at least as far as grammars are concerned), I recently decided that the time had come to find the rationale behind atonal harmony, or at least to attempt to find it by considering it in the field of acoustics, even though rumour has it that Schoenberg instituted a system that cannot be considered this way. Tonal music is built on the opposition between consonance and dissonance; but dodecaphonism and serialism apparently did away with them both. This has long perplexed me, and I have finally classified it as an accepted but inapplicable fantasy. Certainly we may lay waste to nature, but we cannot escape it. 2. Eminent predecessors have opened up the path: Paul Hindemith, Karlheinz Stockhausen, Godfried Michael Koenig, Claude Ballif, Henri Pousseur, George Perle, set theory, Spectralism.
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2.1. Hindemith worked on tonal chromaticism. The scope of his own examination was limited by his use of a theory of acoustic resonance that bears on two series of exploited harmonics: the first (which is the more interesting, acting like a gravitational system) reaches the 16th harmonic; the second (which is more analytical) is limited to the 6th harmonic. I myself have discussed and given a critique of this theory. I would add that I regret Hindemith had neither the charisma of Schoenberg nor the means to develop his theory by extending it towards a generalized chromaticism. A more perspicacious Hindemith could maybe have prevented some of the setbacks suffered by music in this century. 2.2. Stockhausen also developed his famous theory of time by means of the acoustic spectrum, linking pitch and duration together: a lesson in taperecording (une leçon du magnétophone), as François-Bernard Mâche called it. His criticism may be valid, but the theory allowed new meaning to be given to serial theory, with a conception of a spectral system of hierarchized groups based on fundamental durations. This system gave a referential frame to Stockhausen’s invention. Godfried Michael Koenig drew directly on this theory in his 1960 article ‘Musik und Zahl’, and is notable for proposing metric durations which he develops as far as the 6th harmonic, and which allow a rational diversification of the metric groups according to these proportions.10 It is my conviction that, by modulating the fundamental duration infinitesimally, this theory can be taken up and extended to the entire spectrum of sound. However, this is not my present subject of concern; I shall limit myself to giving a very simple example drawn from Koenig’s proposition (Example 2.1). Example 2.1. Metric series founded on harmonics 1 to 6
Paul Hindemith, Unterweisung im Tonsatz (Mainz: Schott, 1937); The Craft of Musical Composition (London: Schott, 1945). Célestin Deliège, ‘Nature <--> Culture : choix de parcours, de la théorie de Hindemith aux fondements présumés de l’harmonie atonale’, Ostinato-Rigore 6–7 (1996), pp. 59–99. Karlheinz Stockhausen, ‘… wie die Zeit vergeht …’, Die Reihe 3 (1957), in Texte 1 (Cologne: DuMont Schauberg, 1963), pp. 99–139. François-Bernard Mâche, Musique, mythe, nature ou les dauphins d’Arion (Paris: Klincksieck, 1983). 10 Gottfried-Michael Koenig, ‘Musik und Zahl’ (1960), Musik Konzept 66 (1989), pp. 13–24.
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2.3. Without referring to scientific precepts, Claude Ballif11 presented a theory that he called ‘metatonal’, which clearly expresses the necessity of polarizing atonal harmony. He proposed a modulation system that made use of the tritone, working on a chromatic scale with 11 notes. It was regarded as utopian. We may agree. But what was the motivation that inspired this utopia, and what were its origins? 2.4. Last but not least, Henri Pousseur,12 paying homage to Rameau, formed the basis of his ‘network’ theory (théorie des réseaux) by restoring the consonant and dissonant values of chromatic harmony. Similarly George Perle13 proposed a combinatorial system which was close to that of Pousseur but influenced by Babbitt. It may be added that when he practised consonance, he did not greatly distinguish it from dissonance. Set theories had the merit of reducing the size of the large numbers, but confined us within the abstract logic of the set. It was serialism that led set theories in this direction, but sonority – and hence real pitch – has no place here. It seems to me that, without abandoning these theories (which retain an epistemological interest inasmuch as serialism has, from the time of Schoenberg, been related to the set rather than the scale), it must be possible to perfect them by considering atonality through using the same logic as for the scale; it was this logic which originally allowed the development of polyphony. 3. In this era of the search for universals, acoustics provides us with the most indisputable universal – that of spectral resonance. This return to the physical world allows us to recover the harmony of an atonal universe rationally. This is exactly what generations of so-called ‘spectral’ composers have realized. But in their works we see these composers themselves dealing with a pluralism provoked by recourse to enharmonics through synthesized sound and frequency modulation, fields which the present theory does not does not aim to cover. That said, nothing need prevent us from referring to these when we have recourse to concepts such as the micro-interval. Nor should we lose sight of the fact that, since the octave of the sound-band 16…32 is founded on a scale of harmonics, a series is thereby introduced.
11
C. Ballif, Introduction à la métatonalité (Paris: Masse, 1956). Henri Pousseur, ‘L’Apothéose de Rameau’, Revue d’esthétique, musique nouvelle (1968), pp. 105–117. 13 Perle, Twelve-tone Tonality. 12
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III. Atonal hemitonic chromaticism 1. General 1.1. Postulate: Atonal harmony is the descendant of all previous Western polyphony. Its harmonic morphology, then, responds to the universal laws of resonance controlled by acoustics. 1.2. This postulate implies that each note can be labelled according to the position it occupies in the aggregate and in the register. As a result of this we may abandon the theory of sets used by dodecaphony, serialism and set theory, and turn instead to the chromatic scale. 1.3. If we consider A 27.5 Hz (diapason 440 Hz) as note 1 then A 3520 Hz is note 128. This will be the territory examined by means of our hypothesis. 1.4. Each fundamental of an aggregate is assigned as a harmonic of one of the octaves 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, according to the register which it occupies on the general scale (see Example 2.2, harmonics 1 to 32). Example 2.2. Harmonics 1 to 32, divided according to octaves
1.5. The first aim of this theory is to provide each aggregate with a fundamental. By doing this, we will be in a position to control, firstly, the degree of chromaticism or diatonicism of the linear sequence of fundamentals as well as the atonal density of each aggregate; secondly, the internal hierarchy of each aggregate; and, thirdly, a figuring which gives the equivalent of continuo figured bass. 1.6. Five octaves (1…32) are needed to generate the useful harmonics of the hemitonic chromatic scale. Octave 1…2 is empty. Octave 2…4 contains the ratios 3:2 and 4:3 (a fifth and a fourth), a subdivision which we will need to remember when calculating the ratios of intervals in the subsequent octaves if we wish to
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avoid the appearance of unwanted secondary fundamentals. The third octave 4…8 is the first octave for us to work with. 2. Identification of the fundamental 2.1. In principle, the attribution of a fundamental to an aggregate is independent of the musical context. However, it cannot be assigned arbitrarily: so the context can be important. At least three notes are needed to identify a fundamental. Without particular occurrences in context, for example the presence of an ordered spectrum, it is difficult to attribute a fundamental to an aggregate of twelve notes; otherwise what transpires is merely ‘noise’. 2.2. The very structure of the spectrum justifies the attribution of a fundamental, since it is ordered in relation to the modalities of application to the aggregate. The fifth (2:3), or the cycle of fifths, is the first point of reference. In the rare cases where the fifth is absent, the preferred interval is the major third (4:5) or, failing that, the major second (8:9). The nature of certain morphologies may lead to ambiguities in interpretation. In these instances, there are two possible options, which is to the advantage of the user. But care is needed when subdividing the octave (3:2, 4:3). The fifth which is ‘furthest to the left’ of a cycle is the fundamental. In all instances, the implications of context must prevail. 2.3. An ordered spectrum is read in the order of the harmonics present in the aggregate. The figuring of the aggregate must conform to the mobility of the registers. 2.4. Whenever it is possible to fix a linear order for the sequence of fundamentals in a given process, we suggest that it may be helpful to label these from 0 to 11 in order to be consistent with pitch classes as in set theory. In the examples given in the present work, 0 is arbitrarily assigned to A. 2.5. Unless implied by context, the 21st harmonic should not appear in the aggregate. It gives the fourth of the fundamental, and therefore this note automatically becomes fundamental to a low fifth (as already noted by Helmholtz). The inverse of a higher fourth gives a lower fifth. Let us take a structure with three notes 16:20:21 (C–E–F); in this same register, the 16th harmonic must substitute for the 21st and the structure in question becomes 12:15:16. The placing of the notes remains the same but their control has changed (Example 2.3). For this reason it is only possible to order a spectrum of 12 notes arbitrarily. 2.6. When considering the scale of harmonics as a mode, we must bear in mind its configuration and content in consecutive intervals (Table 2.1).
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Example 2.3. Reading of the 4th
Table 2.1. Scale of harmonics conceived as a mode Space 1…2 2…4 4…7 7–8…11 11…16…20
Intervals octave fifth–fourth major third–two minor thirds 4 major seconds 9 minor seconds
Relations 2:1 (2) 3:2 (1.5)–4:3 (1.33) 5:4 (1.25)–6:5 (1.2)–7:6 (1.16) From 8:7 (1.14) to 11:10 (1.1) From 12:11 (1.09) to 20:19 (1.052)
Above 20, the series of micro-intervals begins
3. Establishing the figuring 3.1. Like our predecessors, we dislike the harmonics which bear the prime numbers 7, 11, 13, 19 and so on; they have a beautiful sonority when correctly restored (for example Stockhausen, Stimmung), but they are noticeably different from the tempered scale. This incompatibility can be partially overcome by conforming to the model ratio of each interval; that is, by keeping constant ratios for any given class of intervals, whatever its position within the scale (fictive theory). These model ratios are given by those harmonics that are not represented by a prime number. There are necessary exceptions, for the minor second and the tritone. Atonal harmony must often substitute the semitone 17:16 for the minor second 16:15. The tritone evokes the ratios 7:5 or 24:17. The best tritone is the one whose square gives the number closest to two (the octave). It goes without saying that these prescriptions are the consequence of the compromise with equal temperament (or with well temperament). They are automatically unnecessary when applied to synthesized instruments if the temperament does not need to be preserved (see the list of model ratios, Table 2.2). The use of model ratios necessitates the use of decimal numbers. 3.2. The present theory uses either pure harmonics or the model interval according to the domain of application, in order to stabilize the figuring of the aggregate. Equal temperament can only produce a stable figuring that may be transposed chromatically. A figuring based on harmonics alone may be sufficient for any theoretical work; but compromise is necessary in figuring for any application to a tempered work. This latter solution, which is more useful although more laborious to produce, is necessary if we wish to remain as close as possible to a tempered
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application. It means that certain model ratios must be changed (see the entries Table 2.3 comparing: (i) the frequencies given by equal temperament in the band of frequencies 440–880; (ii) the 16th…30th harmonics in the same register; and (iii) the model ratios). Table 2.2. minor second major second minor third major third fourth tritone with prime numbers
Table 2.3.
Harmonic intervals: model ratios 16:15=1.066… 17:16=1.0625 major seventh 9:8=1.125 10:9=1.11… minor seventh 6:5=1.2 major sixth 5:4=1.25 minor sixth 4:3=1.33 fifth 7:5=1.4 17:12=1.416
15:8=1.875 16:9=1.77… 9:5=1.8 5:3=1.66… 8:5=1.6 3:2=1.5
Chromatic scale of frequencies: comparison between systems
Equal temperament A 440 B 466.16 B 493.88 C 523.25 C 554.37 D 587.33 D 622.75
Harmonics 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
440 467.5 495 522.5 550 577.5 605
E F F G
659.26 698.46 739.99 783.99
24 26 27 28
660 715 742 770
G
830.61
30
835
Model ratios 16 17 18 19.2 20 21.33… 22.4=7:5 22.6=17:12 24 25.6 26.66… 28.44=16:9 28.8=9:5 30
440 467.5 495 528 550 586.66 616 623.33… 660 704 733.33 782.22 792 835
3.3. Resorting to the model interval, therefore, does not completely resolve the question of compromise. When we use the ratios in the band 16…32, we notate them by substituting the decimal numbers 19.2–21.3–22.6–25.6–26.6–28.4 for the real harmonics. This keeps the original whole numbers for the harmonics in place. Inasmuch as this theory uses harmonics to answer the rational objectives of modalization and polarization, rather than being purely academic, is it not preferable to disregard the numerical discrepancies which cannot be totally corrected by the use of decimal numbers anyway? For example, the ratio 20:19.2 is a very short minor second, 1.041. It is possible to be flexible on this matter. I fully understand, therefore, the opinion of anyone who refuses to use decimal
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numbers and holds exclusively with pure harmonics; for this person will obtain a figuring that is totally valid but is also simpler, and which therefore has the advantage that it is more easily memorized by any performer playing continuo. Nevertheless, a happy medium has been sought by examining the 13th harmonic, which is found between the minor and major sixths of harmonic 8 (which bears the fundamental). One practical solution would be to attribute the 13th harmonic to the minor sixth and to transfer the major sixth to the 27th harmonic; another would be to attribute it to the major sixth, in which case the minor sixth would be transferred to the 25th harmonic. The use of model ratios simplifies this problem: a minor sixth = 8 times 8:5 = 12.8, and a minor sixth = 8 times 5:3 = 13.3. For those who dislike decimals, we may even suggest the figuring 13− for the minor sixth and 13+ for the major sixth. At any rate, establishing the figuring by reference to register will in the end require decimals. Due to these considerations and those of Table 2.3, I shall use the whole numbers properly belonging to the harmonics, with ‘−’ and ‘+’ for the 13th harmonic, in the tables in this study. In the musical examples, I shall use a figuring of the chromatic scale that preserves the whole numbers of the harmonics, while at the same time adjusting them with decimals towards equal temperament. The numbers appearing in octave 16…32 will be divided or multiplied by 2, 4 or 8, according to the register occupied by the pitch that needs figuring (see Table 2.4: only the minor sixth has been reduced from 25.6 to 25.4 to bring it closer to equal temperament). Table 2.4. 0 16
1 17
Figuring of the chromatic scale, band 16…32 2 18
3 19
4 20
5 21.3
6 22.6
7 24
8 25.4
9 27
10 28.4
11 30
Upper row: pitch classes Bottom row: compromise figuring with equal temperament
Before we look at any examples, we give a table demonstrating the progressive generation of harmonics and of pitch classes. The two systems are ordered. This table does not take into account the compromise towards equal temperament that is taken up in the figuring of the examples. Thus, the major and minor sixths generated by the 8th harmonic are grouped under the figuring 13. The most noticeable absence is the 21st harmonic (a blurred cell, blotting out the figure 5). If it were replaced this would immediately cause the cycle of lower fifths to be reconstituted, as already mentioned in section 2.5.
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Table 2.5. Transcription of pitch classes in relation to the scale of harmonics Ordered pitch classes
Ordered spectrum
0
7
23 235
0
4
7
0
4
7
10
2357
0
4
7
10
23579
0
4
6
7
10
2 3 5 7 9 11
0
4
6
7
8
9
10
2 3 5 7 9 11 13
0
4
6
7
8
9
10
11
2 3 5 7 9 11 13 15
4
6
7
8
9
10
11
2 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17
4
6
7
8
9
10
11
2 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19
0
1
2
0
1
2
3
IV. Applications 1. Abstract models When applying this model, it is necessary to establish a clear relation between the transcription of pitch classes and sonic transcription. This is because of the initial division of the octave into two regions, 3:2 and 4:3. Thus, no aggregate defined by the interval of the fourth can be transcribed by the pitch classes 0…5 (which would determine a transposition, as we have seen, 5 substituting for 0), but rather by 7…0 or, if one prefers, 7…12 (0 = 12 modulo 12). To start with, we need to go back to the scale type of the harmonic spectrum of sounds from 1 to 32 over 5 octaves, 27.5 to 880 Hz (see Example 2.2). For the moment, let us work on the structures of each of the three types of generation independently of register, while remembering that cases (b) and (c) are rare in structures of medium density or else are the result of a specific decision following from the context. If we use the traditional (but unfortunate) terminology, we may say that these cases generate defective scales: (a) generation 2:3 (fifth); (b) generation 4:5 (major third, when the aggregate had neither fourth nor fifth); and (c) generation 8:9 (major second, when there is neither major third, fourth nor fifth). (a) Type 1 generation (2:3), Fifth The following selected examples illustrate this type: 1. The atonal triad. Maybe this should be called the atonal ‘perfect chord’. Its pitch classes are notated {0,1,7}, and its acoustic translation in compacted position: 8:12:17 (Example 2.4). When extended four times, this triad gives
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the twelve tones, and since the twelfth note is in the place of the 21st harmonic, the cycle can be infinitely rotated (Example 2.5). This example also serves to familiarise the reader with figuring by register. Example 2.4. Atonal type triad
Example 2.5. Linked triads within twelve-tone aggregate
2. The chromatic hexachord. If it is agreed that each fundamental carries pitch class 0, and since we know that class 5, virtually carrier of the 21st harmonic, cannot appear (see Table 2.5), the chromatic hexachord cannot be written {0,1,2,3,4,5}; rather, it belongs to the second region of the octave and is thus written {7,8,9,10,11,0}. It may legitimately be given the following sonic translation:14 12 13 – 13 + 7 8 9 octave 8…16
14 10
15 11
16 0
That said, in the framework of this theory where each note is figured according to its register, this would imply that the hexachord belongs to the band 330 to 440 Hz. We need a more general notation that will preserve the spectral order. Thus the following transcription is used, conforming to the ordered spectrum: 2 3 5 7 0 7 10 fundamental position
9
11
13 – 8
13 + 9
15 11
17
19
All hexachords are of Type 1 generation, with the exception of the wholetone scale which does not impose any polarization other than its tonic. 14
In all diagrams, harmonics are noted in italics.
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3. Aggregates giving an option for fundamentals. Many hexachords – and a fortiori the denser aggregates – offer a choice of fundamentals. This allows the composer more than one way of polarising a single aggregate. For example: {0,1,2,3,6,7}; {0,1,2,3,7,8} 2 3 5 7 9 11 13 13 15 0 7 2 6 6 1 0 2 3 mutation of fundamentals between classes 0 and 6
17 1 7
19 3
2 3 5 7 9 11 13 13 15 0 7 2 8 1 8 3 7 0 2 mutation of fundamentals between classes 0 and 1
17 1
19 3
The fundamentals in these two examples were displaced towards 6 and 1 in order to demonstrate the derivation in relation to the original structure. These aggregates should not be seen as an inversion since they reproduce an ordered spectrum. This is thus an internal mutation. A simple transposition would have reproduced the spectral succession of the first line. In this example {0,1,2,3,6,7}, pitch classes 0 and 6 may be alternately or simultaneously exploited as fundamentals. Lines 2 and 3 of the diagram, under the harmonics (line 1), demonstrate the generation of the same pitch classes, which occupy different places in the spectral scale. Although classes 7 and 2 also form the interval of a fifth (modulo 12), 7 cannot generate the same series without making the 21st harmonic appear on pitch class 0. These internal mutations clearly demonstrate that the ordered spectrum can be worked with like a mode in atonal harmony. (b) Type 2 generation (4:5), major third and no fifth This is most usually found with aggregates stemming from the whole-tone scale, complete or fragmentary. However, we also find the hexachord {0,2,3,4,6} which only escapes the tone scale by chromaticization of one degree. We have here an aggregate that can combine two fundamentals; the second combination may perhaps seem preferable since it is more compact: 4 5 7 9 11 13 13 15 17 0 4 2 6 2 6 0 4 3 mutation of fundamentals between classes 0 and 2
19 3
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(c) Type 3 generation (8:9), major second, no major third or fifth In principle, these only affect the trichord {0,1,2} or the tetrachord {0,1,2,3}: 8 0 0
9 2 2
17 1 1
19 3
A mutation of the tetrachord could be suggested between 0 and 1, but this would be unsatisfying because it would not express the limit of the minor third of the aggregate. For the classes {1,3,0,2}, the succession of harmonics 8:9:15:17 would be structurally inadequate. In every case where the mutation of a fundamental is possible, the first condition for the composer is to make it perceptible; if not, there would be ambiguity, or the aggregate would be perceived as an inversion or in a state of suspension. 2. Examples I shall now give some concrete examples. Nevertheless, the methodological character of the theory must be borne in mind; it is more a suggestion for the composer than an analytical method as such. The analyses which will be proposed below are given for contexts which were not written with this method in mind. It will certainly not be difficult to give the aggregates the appropriate figuring, but the linear relations between fundamentals have not been deliberately conceived as such. A high degree of chromaticism is nevertheless to be observed in these sequences.15 I propose to illustrate the above discussion by examining five harmonic matrices: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Schoenberg, Klavierstück op. 33a; Webern, Concerto op. 24; Boulez, Répons; Berio, La Vera Storia; and Stockhausen, Klavierstück III.
1. Schoenberg: harmonic matrix of Klavierstück op. 33a Six chords of four notes are found, as in Example 2.6a. Of these, the latter three are the transposed and inverted retrograde of the former three. In Example 2.6b, they are notated in fundamental position. The roman numerals underneath are arbitrarily established on the basis 0=A. This then follows: I–IX–X–II–III–IV 15 In the following examples, the figuring demonstrates the proposed compromise with equal temperament.
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Example 2.6. Schoenberg, Klavierstück op. 33a, harmonic matrix
or, in other words, two disjunct intervals and three semitones, in consecutive relations. This structure, reduced to its harmonic spectrum, would be notated thus in pitch classes: {7,8,11,0,1,2} that is, the ordered spectrum: 2 0
3 7
9 2
13 – 8
15 11
17 1
harmonics pitch classes
Thus we have a sequence with strong chromatic density comprising three minor seconds and two tritones; in other circumstances, this scale could be said to constitute the basic mode for the work. In Example 2.6c, the figuring of the chords conforms to the position of the notes in each register. In principle, a pianist who only has the designated notes as fundamentals should be able to play the written notes on the basis of this figuring. This is why one can speak of a new model for figured bass; this is purely hypothetical here, but convincing and well defined in the frame of the present theory. It should not be very difficult to memorize the fixed numbers corresponding to the different harmonics, which need only be multiplied or divided. 2. Webern: harmonic matrix of Concerto op. 24 This example was chosen because it demonstrates the absolute priority of context. It is to some extent a counter-example to our hypothesis. Here, the use of the 21st
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Example 2.7. Webern, Concerto op. 24: (a) harmonic matrix; (b) reading conforming to the present hypothesis (a)
(b)
harmonic is justified. The reason for this is that the serial harmony is based on the chromatic superposition of two whole-tone scales (Example 2.7a). In the lower range, we see four trichords making up the series. The pitch classes which give the harmonic perspective emerge in two groups: the first and third give {0,4,1}, the second and fourth give {0,4,3}. These are the original trichord and its inversion. When these trichords are regrouped as two hexachords we notice that exchanging one note in each trichord with that of its neighbour produces a superposition of two augmented fifth chords (the harmonic type characteristic of the whole-tone scale), and that if one reads these horizontal hexachords diagonally they produce the scale in question. The pitch classes of the hexachords, parallel at the distance of a tritone, allow us to reduce what follows to {0,1,4,5,8,9} where the presence of the interval of a fourth {0,5} immediately designates the 21st harmonic. The sequence of fundamentals, arbitrarily figured as in the previous example and linked to the spectral content independent of register, demonstrates very clearly the high atonal density that we see in Webern’s work. In fundamental position, we can notate them as follows:
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I–VII VI–0 I–VII
(8:10:17) (8:10:19) (8:10:13:17:21:27)
or, linearly, the tritones are crossed between fundamentals in trichords and where the relation between hexachords is also a tritone. As for the harmonics, each triad bears a chromatic relation of a major seventh or minor ninth, and the hexachord bears three minor ninths. This last result of our analysis can by confirmed by other methods of observation; the aim here is not to corroborate these. It needs to be reiterated that this example was chosen to demonstrate the priority of context over any other theoretical hypothesis. However, the more correct figuring of the hexachords as found in Example 2.7b should be borne in mind. But if this satisfies the theoretical requirements, how can it be made perceptible? This problem is common in spectral composition, where the bass and the fundamental are often confused as far as perception is concerned. This is exactly why the hypothesis presented here is aimed more at the composer and the improviser than at the analyst. Polarizing atonal harmony means that fundamentals may be perceived, and this can be achieved almost entirely through metre, which must be slow enough, and timbre, which must be sufficiently clear and dense. 3. Boulez: harmonic matrix of Répons The chordal block (Example 2.8a) which is played for two seconds at the beginning of the work particularly struck me because of the importance of the consequences to which it gives rise in the score. I had discussed this with musicology students at Montreal University as early as 1982, and I returned to the idea in the form of an imaginary genetic analysis in Inharmonique 4,16 always with the same idea of a prolific deduction and of an expanding universe – ideas dear to the composer – proposing that one cell of the matrix in question was an original element of a ‘big bang’. Today, I am in a position to produce an objective analysis that is totally separate from any poietic or genetic project, thanks to the theoretical hypothesis proposed here, and which is based purely on the harmonic spectrum. The five aggregates of seven notes (Example 2.8a) can be reduced to three aggregates of eight notes. (The third is called ‘virtual’ because the fundamental E – a note belonging to the series but absent from the matrix – is not found: Example 2.8b). Aggregates 1 and 2, 3 and 4 give similar pairs. For aggregates 1 and 2, there is an exchange between the A and the G, which does not give any change in fundamental. On the other hand, for aggregates 3 and 4 there is an exchange between the A and the F; this deprives chord 3 of its fundamental A, and it becomes E (Example 2.8c). It is only possible to figure what is written when this 16 Celestin Deliège, ‘Moment de Pierre Boulez, sur l’introduction orchestrale de Répons’, Inharmoniques 4 (1988), pp. 181–202.
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Example 2.8. Boulez, Répons: (a) harmonic matrix; (b) chords in fundamental position; (c) figuring of chords (a)
(b)
(c)
figuring arises from the register. In the same way, aggregate 5 could not be figured on the basis of the virtual aggregate in Example 2.8b. Examination of the harmonic matrix of Répons, where all the intervals are equal (unlike in Webernian harmony), nevertheless demonstrates a true atonal composition; the sequence of the three fundamentals is I–0–VI (where the virtual fundamental is taken into account) or I–0–I (in the other case). These are true chromatic sequences. 4. Berio: harmonic matrix of La Vera Storia We refer here to an analysis of the harmonic bases of Luciano Berio’s opera La Vera Storia as discussed by David Osmond-Smith.17 Osmond-Smith observes that the composer uses what he calls a ‘code’ expressed from the first bar of the work. This is based on the following harmonic matrix, based on F4: C–C–E–F–G–A–B–B David Osmond-Smith, Berio (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 103–5. 17
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From the point of view of our hypothesis, we are looking at the position of a serial mode based on its possible secondary fundamental (III). The fundamental mode (0) which groups the largest cycle of fifths (and thus contains the best acoustic properties) is established on A (Example 2.9a). Example 2.9. Berio, serial mode of La Vera Storia: (a) figuring of the fundamentals; (b) (Fêtes), figuring of fundamentals and chords (a)
(b)
The roman numerals give the fundamentals as eventually determined, independently of whether or not they can occur. They may be analysed as follows: A 0 C III B II E VII F IX G X B I C IV
tonic of the mode; reference fundamental secondary fundamental can only appear where there is no E can only appear where there is no A can only appear where there is no B can only appear where there is no C no possible occurrences no possible occurrences
Let us now set down the acoustic configuration of the mode by placing the pitch classes in relation to the harmonics: 2 0
3 7
5 4
7 10
9 2
13+ 9
17 1
19 3
harmonics pitch classes
Osmond-Smith next demonstrates how Berio uses this group, which we have called a mode, both melodically and harmonically. Here is the harmonic matrix
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as used in the two scenes of Fêtes. The labelling of the fundamentals and the figuring of the chords with four notes are, of course, our own (Example 2.9b). The first point of note is that we have not made any arbitrary decisions here. The composer himself, through Osmond-Smith, has given us the basis for our work. Naturally, it could not be said that Berio was thinking of the fundamentals we have identified, nor even that he had a spectral perspective on his harmonics. But whether he intended it or not, this harmonic matrix is derived from a fixed group of eight notes which may be identified as a modal chromatic scale comprising, as Osmond-Smith remarks, two well-distinguished parts: a compact chromatic group of a major third A–C and a second, more open, disjunct group of a fifth C–G (the C and the C are found in both groups). This example confirms how much Berio had moved since the 1970s towards the polarization of chromatic harmony – the present case is an important example, due to the duration of the spread of the aggregates. Analysis of the harmonic field comes down to four fundamentals grouped in two chromatic pairs, separated by a major third (IX–X, II–III) or by a tritone (II–III, IX–X), depending on your perspective. As in the previous examples, the chromatic density prevails over the diatonic (which indicates atonality). The two former chords are of Type 2 generation (4:5), and the others have the fifth. The individual figuring of the chords also confirms this. 5. Stockhausen: harmonic matrix of Klavierstück III I shall now examine David Lewin’s analysis of Stockhausen’s Klavierstück III,18 a most elegant piece of work which makes use of set theory. It should be remarked that this analysis is one of very few that attempts to use this method on any work later than the Second Viennese School. Jonathan Harvey indicated that this piece is built on a pentachord, for which he gave a prototype (Example 2.10a: this is a standard notation for the first pentachord of the score).19 Example 2.10.
Stockhausen, Klavierstück III: (a) notation of basic pentachord (following Harvey); (b) basic chords in fundamental position 0
(a) (b)
18 David Lewin, Musical Form and Transformation: Four Analytical Essays (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1993), pp. 16–67. 19 Jonathan Harvey, The Music of Stockhausen: An Introduction (London: Faber, 1975), p. 24.
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Strengthened by this information, Lewin took up the pursuit of these pentachords throughout the piece, and found them from the first to the last note. His discovery might have surprised Stockhausen, who had carefully disguised them. Lewin used a retrospective method. In other words, by constantly going back to areas he had already covered, he could re-discover omitted possibilities. It is possible that this level analysis, which makes great use of the ‘poietic’ level (to use Jean-Jacques Nattiez’s term), strictly speaking coincides with the genesis of the work; certainly reconstruction does seem highly plausible. Table 2.6. Reading of pentachords. Reading of harmony.
Bars 1 2 f to 3 a 3 a to 5 b 5 e to 7 a 5 b to 7 f 8 f to 10 e 8 f to 10 b 9 e to 11 a
Initial ‘P’ harmonics in close fundamental position 4 – 6 – 11 – 13− – 13+ Rank 1 2 3 4 5 Nomenclature Notation of the C=0, B=11 inversions from low to high 9B28A 1–2–3–4–5 53248 4–3–5–1–2 7654A 2–5–1–3–4 42358 3–2–4–5–1 A2B98 2–5–1–4–3 5674A 5–4–1–3–2 5678B 4–2–3–5–1 3BA09 5–1–3–2–4
Beginning of 9 to 11 e AB014 4–1–5–3–2 11 g to 12 g 7856B 2–5–3–4–1 13 a to 15 g A8197 4–2–3–5–1 Inverted ‘I’ harmonics in close fundamental position 4 – 6 – 11 – 13 – 13+ Rank 1 2 3 4 5 1 b to2 f A98B5 5–2–1–4–3 2 from b B5324 1–2–3–5–4 2 d to 5 f 27865 3–1–2–5–4 5 e to 7 f 423B5 2–3–4–1–5 5 b to7 AB985 4–5–1–2–3 8 and 9 14567 5–3–1–4–2 11 accd to 12 f 41756 3–1–2–4–5 11 f to 12 e 536B4 1–5–4–3–2 12 e to 13 432A1 1–5–4–2–3 13 a to16 A170B 1–3–2–5–4
Fundamental notes V XI I XI V I II VI VII II IV
I VII X VII I IX IX VII VI III
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Table 2.6 follows Lewin’s divisions20 in the two left-hand columns. The first column allows us to find our place easily in the score reproduced above; the second translates the notes into pitch classes in the order of their succession. The third column gives the rank interversions in the spectral scale, and the fourth indicates the fundamentals on the base A = 0. We will return to this shortly. Example 2.11. Stockhausen, Klavierstück III (after the original edition, Universal UE 12251)
The basic pentachord is the same as that noted by Harvey, and is accompanied by its inversion. We notate the two ordered sets, reduced to 0, as follows: {0,1,2,3,6} {3,2,1,0,9} The numbers in bold characters indicate the axis of symmetry used by Lewin to decide on the parallelism between the two structures. His position is correct, but it is contested by some who see instead the two structures in relation to a minor third or major sixth. Addition of each of the terms in the two sets = 3. Their alternative reading is to see the non-transposed parallelism as follows:21 20
Lewin, Musical Form and Transformation, p. 19. Due to the constraints of spacing, class 10 is replaced by the letter A and class 11 by the letter B, in both text and Table 2.6. 21
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{0,1,2,3,6} {0,B,A,9,6} Adding each of the terms here gives = 0. The acoustic perspective which concerns us here is not decisive on this issue. The only way of writing the pitch classes is as follows: 1. set in its original P form 2 3 11 13− 13+ 0 7 6 8 9 2. inverted set form i 2 3 7 15 17 0 7 10 11 1
harmonics pitch classes harmonics pitch classes
The main difference between this transcription and that of the set theorists is that it is not significant with regard to transposition. It is the translation of an ordered acoustic spectrum transcribed into pitch classes, no more and no less. In other words, set theory can grasp the essentially logical facts of music, but not that which is their strictly musical essence. A simpler example may help us to understand this: set theory notates the major triad 0,4,7 and its inversion 7,3,0, giving the minor triad. Yet, from a strictly musical point of view, it is out of the question to consider a minor triad as the inversion of the major triad, while from a strictly logical point of view this comparison is perfectly valid. Following the ordered spectral scale, we now transcribe the two basic pentachords of Klavierstück III in musical notation, on the basis of the fundamental 0 = A (Example 2.10b), even though this fundamental is absent from the piece. We can now move on to examine the third and fourth columns of Table 2.6 with reference to the score. The third column gives the inversion of the aggregates. We could say that those for which rank 1 is furthest to the left are in fundamental position, just as in tonal music; similarly, when one of the other ranks (2 to 5) is further to the left this is the result of a possible inversion from first to fourth. This nomenclature is not in the least problematic if it is only in atonal harmony that the most significant is given by the interversions. It must be reiterated that the hierarchy can only be pertinent if the composer wishes to establish his harmony on a scalar basis. This certainly was not the case with Stockhausen in 1952. The fourth column – giving the linear perspective of the fundamentals – is the most interesting: we see here an agreement in the intervals between the notation of the fundamentals and Lewin’s figuring of the transpositions. Only the numbers themselves differ, since they are not used for the same purpose. The division of the piece into two sections is also different, since Lewin places the break at the end of bar 7, which is certainly pertinent for section P of the table, but for section i it is preferable to place the break at the rests at the end of bar 8. These fundamentals
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translate a split at these central points where the symmetries are broken. In section i, it seems that the repetition of the fundamental IX demands that its first occurrence has to be isolated. Let us compare these fundamentals while eliminating the reiterations. Bars 1 to 7 Position P
V–XI–I–XI–V
Position i
I–VII–X–VII–I
Position P
I–II–VI–VII–II–IV
Position i
(IX) –IX–VII–VI–III
symmetry of the outer tritones and of circularity central dissymmetry: major second, minor third Bars 8 to 16 intersecting symmetry: central for the minor seconds, exterior for the major seconds, contingent for the major thirds II–VI, III–VII, outer tritone ratios
The difficulties we have encountered in these examples demonstrate that the works in question were conceived without referral to our suggested method. They obviously do not break away from acoustic resonance, but they certainly do not contribute to it. Indeed, they were often conceived without the least reference to the pitch spectrum. We have examined what are predominantly recent examples. So-called ‘spectralist’ composers, and the move from the analogue to the digital, have introduced new representations which restore to harmony the status which it was about to lose. The propositions put forward here have no other purpose than to demonstrate, through a return to a scalar perspective, the value of completing the logical principles established by set theory. By themselves, these principles are unable to address the living substance of music itself: sound. Bibliography Babbitt, M., ‘Some Aspects of Twelve Tone Composition’, The Score 12 (1955), pp. 53–61 ——, ‘Set Structure as a Compositional Determinate’, Journal of Music Theory 5/1 (1961), pp. 72–94, reprinted in B. Boretz and E. Cone (eds), Perspectives in Contemporary Music (New York: Norton, 1972), pp. 129–47 ——, Words about Music, ed. S. Dembski and J. Straus (Madison: Wisconsin University Press, 1987) Ballif, C., Introduction à la métatonalité (Paris: Masse, 1956)
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Dahlhaus, Carl, ‘Plaidoyer pour une théorie actuelle de la musique’, in Tod Machover (ed.), Quoi? Quand? Comment? La recherche musicale (Paris: Bourgois-Ircam, 1985), pp. 73–86 Deliège, Célestin, ‘Moment de Pierre Boulez, sur l’introduction orchestrale de Répons’, Inharmoniques 4 (1988), pp. 181–202 ——, ‘Nature <--> Culture: choix de parcours, de la théorie de Hindemith aux fondements présumés de l’harmonie atonal’, Ostinato-Rigore 6–7 (1996), pp. 59–99 Forte, Alan, The Structure of Atonal Music (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973) Harvey, Jonathan, The Music of Stockhausen: An Introduction (London: Faber, 1975) Hindemith, Paul, Unterweisung im Tonsatz (Mainz: Schott, 1937) ——, The Craft of Musical Composition (London: Schott, 1945) Kirnberger, J.P., Die Kunst des reinen Satzes in der Musik (1771–1776), trans. David Beach and Jürgen Thym (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1982) Koenig, G.-M., ‘Musik und Zahl’ (1960), Musik Konzept 66 (1989), pp. 13–24 Lewin, David, ‘Making and Using PC Set Network in Stockhausen Klavierstück III’ in Musical Form and Transformation: Four Analytical Essays (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1993), pp. 16–67 Mâche, F.-B., Musique, mythe, nature ou les dauphins d’Arion (Paris: Klincksieck, 1983) Osmond-Smith, David, Berio (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) Perle, George, Twelve-tone Tonality (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1977) Pousseur, Henri, ‘L’apothéose de Rameau’, Revue d’esthétique, musique nouvelle (1968), pp. 105–117 Stockhausen, Karlheinz, ‘… wie die Zeit vergeht …’, Die Reihe 3 (1957), in Texte zur elektronischen und instrumentalen Musik, Vol. 1 (Cologne: DuMont Schauberg, 1963), pp. 99–139
Chapter 3
In Search of Lost Harmony
Rudolf Frisius
I The twentieth century was characterized by the search for alternatives to tonality, and by a specific conception of harmony. New harmonic functions and structures were developed, new systems of pitch organization, new possibilities for integration between pitch structures and timbral structures. The generalization of traditional harmonic thinking (that is to say, imagined in terms of determined pitches) had consequences both at the macroscopic level of sonic material (for example, the integration of noise) and at the detailed microscopic level of the individual sound (with a view to the integration of the microscopic and the macroscopic). Far-reaching changes in the development of twentieth-century music and musical thought are nowhere more apparent than in the realm of harmony. This encompasses the development of new chord functions, chord structures and chord transformations within a given tonal system; the development of new systems and corresponding new harmonic structures; and the development of new possibilities of integration between chord structure and timbre. It also includes the generalization of traditional harmonic thinking tied to a fixed, unequivocal pitch. This can be understood both in a vertical sense (relating to the sound material) through the integration of complex pitch determinations (for example, the emancipation of noise), and in a horizontal sense (relating to form or the formal development of sounds) through the integration of variable determinations (for example, generalized vibrato, or the micro- and macroscopic integration of the smallest formal units through to larger formal contexts). It is harmony understood in this larger context that provides the focus for this chapter. II In music, the word harmony, in its proper sense and in a broader (historical and systematic) sense, refers to the theory of ordered relationships between pitches. The development of polyphony in the West, and in particular the modern development of major/minor tonality, have led to a narrow concept of harmony which is based This is an abridged translation of the essay which appeared in the original French edition of this book.
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on simultaneous (or at least representable as simultaneous) ordered relationships between pitches. In the development of music in the twentieth century this limitation has been questioned because the complementarity, or heterogeneity, of successive and simultaneous relationships between pitches developed in previous centuries, and with it the previously valid distinction between harmony and melody (that is to say, successive ordered relationships between pitches), have also become subject to doubt. Furthermore this has also extended to the determination of rhythm and the temporal order in relation to melody and harmony. In the context of the development of music in the twentieth century, the concept of harmony, if it is to retain its universal validity (for the twenty-first century, as well as outside the context of Western music), needs to be generalized beyond the realm of unequivocally determined pitch: that is to say, as vertical development (concerned with momentary pitch determination at a given point in time, which is to include mixed tones and noise); or as horizontal development (concerned with the determination of pitch during any given segment of time). In these larger contexts we can determine whether and to what extent the conceptual framework and methods of description of the traditional theory of harmony can be retained or developed. This is particularly relevant in the case of the chord sequence, which describes chords as ordered sonorities, the structure of which can be described on the one hand as a codified system of fundamental chords, and on the other hand as codified systems for constructing derivational chords. Inasmuch as this ordering of pitches relates to a fixed, unequivocal pitch, the relationships between pitches in the traditional theory of harmony are derived: 1. from the sound structure of a number of given intervals (generally the series of natural tones); 2. from the interval structure of an ordered progression of intervals (for example, progressions of thirds); or 3. from a sequence of given pitches (a scale). These different principles of the construction of fundamental chords were as a rule not isolated, but were used in combinations. In the development of music in the twentieth century the problems inherent in these deductive procedures, which were already of limited use in the description of traditional harmonic orderings (whether in isolation or in combinations), have now become clearly apparent. I shall briefly expand on each of the above three categories. Sound structure Reference to the harmonic series alone does not suffice to distinguish, for example, the sound structure of music based on a major/minor tonality, or the sound structure of spectral music, while – as has already been shown in physics by Helmholtz and in the development towards atonality by Schoenberg – in the continuum of harmonics there are no boundaries that allow for an unequivocal
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demarcation of consonances and dissonances, so that such oppositions may be historically relativized. Intervallic structure Reference to a hierarchy of intervals proves to be problematic when it comes up against certain fundamental principles. On the one hand, there is the intervallic structural principle of the equivalence of octaves (of particular importance to the rules of harmonic derivation), according to which no more than twelve notes may be superimposed in intervals of a third and aggregates of thirds consisting of fewer notes are not to be regarded as autonomous chords, starting with chords of three major or four minor thirds. On the other hand, there is the intervallic structural limitation of fundamental chords which include a perfect 5th (that is, in major or minor chords; in traditional harmonic theory diminished or augmented chords are not recognized as fundamental chords, although, for example, in the case of a diminished chord the harmonic proportion of 5:6:7 has sometimes been retained, which includes the harmonic at the seventh traditionally avoided in the tonal system, and although, in the tempered system at least, the augmented chord consists exclusively of consonances). Scales Reference to scales is limited in traditional theory by the fact that their general use resolves the difference between melodic and harmonic structure, which is fundamental to music based on a major/minor tonality. This limitation does not exist in non-tonal music. III The concept of harmony refers to ‘that which goes together’, to parts of a whole that relate to one another in a ‘fitting’ way within a particular context. What is meant by ‘fitting’ and ‘harmonic’ can be described by means of concepts such as ‘perfect order’, ‘proportion’, ‘coincidence’ and ‘harmonic coexistence’. These parts, arranged into a whole that provides the general context, have been defined in different ways according to the context in which the notion of ‘harmony’ appeared. In mythological constellations based on integration, ‘harmony’ signifies something quite different to the subtle differentiations used in art (which includes aesthetic reflection) and science (mathematical structuring in particular and the description of natural phenomena based upon it, as, for example, in astronomy). In the realm of music the general aspects of the concept of harmony come into play when it is considered from the larger perspective of aesthetics; in this respect the music and music theory of the twentieth century does not differ from those of preceding centuries. The musical and extra-musical aspects of harmony combine
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in an evolution which is rooted in Greek antiquity and can be followed through to the twentieth century. Here one thinks, for example, of the architectural and musical conceptions of Le Corbusier and Xenakis, or the attempts, in practice or in theory, to integrate sound and colour, as in the works of Arnold Schoenberg and Olivier Messiaen. In the context of the evolution of music and its theory, the concept of harmony is habitually defined in a more precise way, and refers not only to articulated oppositions within sound events but, even more accurately, to contrasts within a certain structural level: between oppositions of articulated pitch or pitch relations. This way of narrowing down the idea of harmony to that of pitch caused problems in the twentieth century: modern developments and attempts at theoretical synthesis have undermined the efforts to limit harmony exclusively to pitch relations. This is because even in the context of fixed pitch relations, the harmonic criteria of the preceding centuries had to a large extent broken down. Current musical evolution throws a new light on problems that already in the past posed difficulties for the concept of harmony. Today, as much as in the past, it is difficult to define precisely the harmonic relations between sounds: which intervals or constellations of intervals can be defined as ‘harmonic’ and which cannot. And how is one to conceive of them in a concrete way: as an abstract reservoir of sounds, or in the context of a temporal configuration of sounds (simultaneous or successive) that are more precisely discernable? The oldest attempt to establish a theoretical definition of harmonic relations consisted in measuring the proportions of intervals. To link the concrete perception of intervals to numerical proportions generally goes hand in hand with the attempt to postulate a hierarchy of intervals, based on a hierarchy of proportions which correspond to them (the theories of antiquity measure these by means of strings, and in modern times, according to the harmonic theory of acoustics, by means of frequencies; this latter approach has in the twentieth century produced entirely synthesized and qualified frequency structures, an example of which is Stockhausen’s Studie I of 1953). In the harmonic theory based on the opposition between major and minor, this hierarchy is presupposed, so that in serial music, for example, it has to be justified every time (for example, Studie I distinguished itself by means of its intervallic proportions from Webern’s Concerto op. 24, which functions as a model for the construction of intervals), and appears to be the result of a structuring by means of notation. (In Stockhausen’s vocal sextet Stimmung, written in 1968, the radical nature of a serial project aiming to derive all structure from a compositional idea which has been determined a priori is limited by the fact that this structuring is applied to an extract from the natural harmonic series; thus the link to nature is not replaced by the serial principle, but is expressly accepted, and its consequences are followed through.) Within the context of conceptions which refer to the traditional harmonic systems of antiquity, the hierarchy of harmonic intervals is at first represented in an extra-temporal abstraction – that is to say, independently of its concrete sonic realization (for example, as either successive or simultaneous intervals). This harmonic conception based on structures outside
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time is as important in ancient as it is in more recent theory; the general idea which underlies it (for example, the idea that the formation of sonic systems and scales is not a condition to be determined externally, but one that has to be integrated into a conception of harmony grounded in theory) is found in Greek antiquity as well as in the work of Xenakis and his mathematical theory of scales, based on the theory of ‘screens’ (which Xenakis, taking the degree of abstraction of ancient theories even further, bases on principles which allow the derivation not only of pitch structures, but also of durations, thus resolving in a dialectical manner the opposition between the temporal and the extra-temporal, between the successive and the simultaneous.) In the course of the evolution of musical theory this structuring of pitch relations ‘outside time’ has been justified in different ways, depending on whether, for example, it constitutes a point of departure or the goal aimed for. The first approach, the significance of which was without doubt fundamental to ancient and medieval theory and was still influential in the twentieth century, concentrates on the construction of hierarchies of numerical proportions, and consequently stresses the importance of the mathematical foundation over the concrete appearance. This pre-eminence of abstraction appears together with the integration of that which the ear perceives into structures which doubtlessly also operate in other realms of sense experience (in particular the realm of visual experience), but which, even within the realm of music, are considered to be further removed from sense experience (by reducing complex sonic events to fixed constellations of pitch), without producing for example an exact differentiation between the horizontal and the vertical. The second approach is not the result of a presupposed abstraction, but of an evolution the ramifications of which have subtly spread into separate realms over the centuries. Here abstraction offers the possibility of integrating apparently irreconcilable aspects (for example by attempting to enlarge the conceptions of serial music or music formalized beyond the realm of what can be perceived by the ear). The question of delimitation of that which is harmonic – of that which goes together, of that which stands in a relationship – is not only problematic when one compares music to other realms of sense experience, but is also problematic within music itself. This is particularly evident where a musical theory has been developed not a priori but on the basis of concrete experiences of sound and with reference to a specific state of musical evolution. A particularly telling indication of abstraction in a theory based on rational interval proportions is the fact that it proceeds from the harmonic relationship, from the interval, not from the individual pitch that is combined with one or more other pitches. When one relates this approach to the reality of the music one hears, one realizes that this starting point corresponds to an act of listening not orientated according to isolated pitches (as is the case with people who have absolute pitch), but to sonic relationships. A musical ear formed by this theory orientates itself, not only in the case of isolated pitches but also in the case of combinations of pitches, not by means of their real register, but by means of global or relative
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determinations. This way of abstracting the exact delimitation of the register may also be described as follows: one posits a principle of neutral transposition, according to which groups of pitches essentially do not change their character if one transposes them to another level. If this hypothesis is exact, it has to be supposed that melodic or harmonic intervals, successions or aggregates of sounds can be transposed to any interval without being modified. This hypothesis is posed particularly in a theory that concentrates on the relationships between pitches and says nothing precise about sounds themselves. It becomes obvious that this is not entirely convincing when one examines its ultimate consequences. The principle of transposition is on the evidence limited by the sonic space itself and the modified conditions of the act of listening in the extremely high and extremely low registers. It appears to be problematic to presuppose, in the case of a transposition in the extreme of a succession of sounds or a chord, that they are not affected, and that which is evident in the case of the transposition of large intervals also applies, when one listens attentively, to the smaller ones. Musical thought that follows the traditional paths abstracts all of this by considering isolated notes to be indifferently transposable and the transposed position of part of a scale or a chord to be entirely equivalent to its point of origin. This kind of approach has come increasingly unstuck in the light of certain crucial aspects of the evolution of music in the twentieth century. (In traditional classical music, these aspects only appeared very rarely, such as in the rules for the notation of small intervals –thirds, for example – in the lower registers, or in the music of Berlioz, where different timpani sounds are superimposed, producing in the lower register and in narrow intervals a complex sonic picture which the notes written down in the score and their traditional harmonic classification fails to reflect.) In the twentieth century, the limits of musical thought of this nature became apparent in musical practices that adopted its procedures. Thus, the difficulty of transposing sonic gestures into other registers without losing their identity is felt above all when pitch is not clearly definable; in other words, when it concerns noise. Luigi Russolo tried to overcome this difficulty in his noise music by constructing instruments which allowed for the transposition of noise (on a scale of quarter tones). He based this on the questionable principle that even within complex noises a predominant pitch remains discernable, and that it was possible to make it out even after transposition. However, this conception was not able to meet the demands of the new noise compositions (in that it remained attached to the fiction of a noise keyboard, and therefore to traditional musical thought, even though it was able to prefigure more modern technical variants, such as tape recorders with variable play-back speed or samplers). These futurist attempts at composition with noise, developed in the second decade of the century, furnished, from the moment of their conception, the material for many controversies. Even composers engaged in coherent research were forced to find other approaches, occupying themselves less with instrumental
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innovation than with attempts effectively and profoundly to modify compositional thought, at the price of holding on to traditional instruments. Edgard Varèse, whose experimental works were inspired by the theories of Ferruccio Busoni, most often (with the exception of Ionisation) stuck to the instruments of the traditional orchestra, and, in spite of a number of significant contributions to the emancipation of noise, never renounced fixed pitch. Nevertheless, he came up with important solutions to the development of continuous music (for example by writing down glissandi of sirens or heavily differentiated spectra for sounds and sustained noises), by freeing himself from established scales; these propositions were further developed by Xenakis in his structures of glissandi produced technically or instrumentally. This music demands (even when it still works with clearly fixed pitch, as in the string glissandi in Metastasis, and, even more clearly, the complex electronic glissandi of Diamorphoses) a generalization of harmonic thought, which is able to depart from structures of scales and fixed intervals (even in micro-intervals), or which presupposes fixed vertical structures only in limited instances, for example in very short temporal sections, at the start, at the end or at turning points in a continuous evolution. One encounters efforts of this kind to shed classical thinking on pitch in the 1930s and 1940s in the compositions and theoretical reflections of John Cage and Pierre Schaeffer. Cage radicalized that which was already featured in the works of Varèse (for example in Ionisation), namely a kind of composition with sounds which do not have a fixed pitch. For percussion instruments or sources of experimental sounds (including electroacoustics) the compositional determination of sound material comes down to the indication of the source of the sound, to which eventually are added more precise indications of modes of performance, dynamics or degrees of intensity (sometimes with a more or less vague indication of register); the indication of the unfolding of sound, of duration and, if necessary, of dynamics (of the sound spectrum). This leads to the conception of a work which is characterized above all by a precise temporal organization, but with sonorities which are indeterminate to a greater or lesser degree. This was developed first of all in the instrumental realm, then later by means of technical sources used in live performance (Imaginary Landscape No. 1, Credo in Us, Imaginary Landscape No. 4), and was finally transferred to tape (Imaginary Landscape No. 5, Williams Mix). This musical evolution brings out the need for a theory of harmony based on indeterminate degrees and relationships; a theory which questions traditional thought even more radically than the ‘anarchic harmony’ developed by Cage in his later works, in which, as far as the unfolding of sound is concerned, variability and indeterminacy are essentially confined to the temporal structure (by means of ‘time brackets’); as far as sound material is concerned, he falls back on traditional categories, by creating an antithesis between fixed and indeterminate pitch (the first category is fixed exactly, by means of systems which hark back to serial music or its microtonal derivatives, whereas the second category is only given an approximate value).
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The output for prepared piano is a special case in the musical thought of John Cage. It is above all this link with a traditional instrument, dependent entirely on fixed pitch, which shows the doubt cast on the relationship between notation and spatial realization inherited from the tradition – and, at the same time, the possibility of a standardized theoretical description, particularly of the structure of intervals, of melody and of harmony. In this kind of score, written in the traditional way, only the rhythmic values can still be deciphered by reference to a traditional representation of sounds; the notes written down are entirely or to a large extent fictional, as the corresponding strings have been masked by noise as a result of the preparation; the structure of the keyboard thus no longer guarantees an ordered scale of determined notes. When several keys are struck at the same time, the resulting complex sounds can be of such a different character that they are no longer perceived as different degrees of the same scale, but as individual and heterogeneous sound objects, The invention, sonic realization and musical act of listening are thus placed in a new framework, which plays an important role in live music, and particularly in electroacoustic music produced in the studio. As early as 1948, the year which saw the birth of the musique concrète invented by him, Pierre Schaeffer remarked that the majority of sounds produced artificially do not fit into scales, according to traditional compositional and theoretical classifications, and that it is impossible to transpose them at will, or transform their timbre, without losing their sonic identity. Together with Pierre Henry, he opted for a solution to the problem of indeterminate sounds (according to classical categories) which differed from that of Cage: it is not by means of a score, which allows a margin with regard to sounds in live performances, but by means of studio productions that the composer himself, without the intervention of an interpreter, can determine all the details of the sound (including the spectral definition, the dynamics and the spatial diffusion). This perspective allows a light to be thrown on new aspects, resulting not from the relationship between composition and interpretation, which preserves the traditional division of labour between composer and interpreter (and listener), but from a confrontation with the phenomenology of perceived sounds, which have been captured and transformed by technology. This approach brings to the fore another crucial problem of a generalized theory of harmony, namely the question of harmonic objects or sonic objects which are harmonically linked. Here one has recourse, in order to generalize the traditional distinction between a successive and a simultaneous relationship of sounds, to the opposition between cutting (Schnitt) and pasting (Montage). This generalizes the traditional transformation techniques, for example of motives or chords and their groupings, by attempting to systematize electroacoustic techniques of transformation. To replace the constraints of pre-established rules with individual relationships, resulting on each occasion from the compositional context (which plays an equally important role in twentieth-century experiments with fixed pitch and with pitch constructions obtained by means of generalization), is to take this
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even further in a radical spirit: music of traditional sounds is transformed into autonomous sound art. The evolution of musical thought, of invention and sonic realization in the twentieth century may be described by means of a polarization between, on the one hand, the radicalization of thought within abstract structures (be it by reference to natural harmonics, or tempered harmonics, or both), which generalizes an abstract conception of pitch in order to arrive at a way of thinking about parameters which is abstract and multidimensional, and, on the other hand, a focus on concrete sound, understood as real. This gesture of abstracting real sound, particularly in the realm of harmony, for the first time becomes discernable in the Baroque period, where composers figure the bass by abstracting the register and the intervallic structure of a chord, and, in the case of the doubling of the octave, the number of sounds which it contains, its vertical density, in order to offer the interpreter a degree of freedom, close to improvisation, in the final realization. Once this conception of music based on the figured bass had been abandoned, the details of the realization of a chord (from intervallic structure to instrumentation) came to be controlled with a greater degree of precision, and as a consequence the freedom left to the interpreter was greatly reduced. A theory of music which takes into account this evolution would have to have taken a closer interest in the construction of chords (and perhaps even in the way they are linked together) and would have to have concerned itself with the concrete harmonic characteristics which are perceived. Instead of this, however, an evolution in the exact opposite direction took place, towards the end of the nineteenth century, with Gottfried Weber’s theory of degrees and Hugo Riemann’s theory of functions: an abstraction is made of the sounds and sonic relationships which are genuinely perceived and these are reduced to simple schemes of chords based on the principle of the equivalence of octaves, thus neglecting the individual and concrete particularities in favour of rudimentary harmonic constructions. With this theory, perceptible aggregates are explained either by reference to fundamental chords and variants derived from them (variants in terms of register, actual intervallic structure, doublings and omitted notes), or as derivational chords, which can only be understood in a larger formal context. These two explanations become problematic as soon as one begins to question the traditional harmonic hierarchy, either as a result of the dissolution of conventional linking schemes, or as a result of the emancipation of dissonant chords. Composition as the original realization of pre-existing linking schemes is replaced by composition conceived of as individual invention of sound, which establishes complex and autonomous harmonic polarities. The listener will only perceive them perfectly when they are translated clearly, not just within an abstract harmonic scheme, but also by means of the concrete construction of intervals and instrumentation. This condition is fulfilled when one uses, with a greater degree of precaution, the traditional procedures for a realization in different octaves, thus succeeding in drawing a clear picture for the ear itself of the new harmonic aggregates (there are illustrative examples of this in the works of Ives, Schoenberg, Berg and Webern).
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When this does not happen, a considerable gap opens between the harmonic structure and the coherence of harmonic laws postulated (rightly or wrongly) by traditional theory – for example, when a harmony is conceived of primarily as an aggregate of sounds deriving from several classes of pitch, or as a group of abstract sounds which one cannot really locate in time (not only those in vertical succession, but also their permutations), such as isolated segments (or segments obtained by a process of multiplication) of a series, as found in the works of Pierre Boulez. This radicalization of instrumental thought (which was inherited from the principle of figured bass, but survived into microtonal music) arrives at its limits when one conceives of it as music produced by technical means, which does not allow for the adequate technical realization of the procedures of classical composition on staves. This explains why, even in music which has been constructed a priori, such as electroacoustic serial music (and even ‘new’ instrumental music inspired by it), one may discern a new interest in real sound which has not been alienated by abstract schemes. In the works of Stockhausen, for example, we find this in the mixtures of sound in the first two electroacoustic studies, and later in the perfectly articulated sonic polarities – instrumental, vocal or electronic – the modern equivalents of the fundamental chords of the past, which can be combined, horizontally as well as vertically, with added events, outside function, such as variations of glissando, modifications of pitch or dynamics, and the addition of noise. All this makes it possible, for example in Hymnen, to integrate in a new way known (or possibly reworked) and unknown sounds. A later example of this is found in the polyphonic layers of the Licht cycle, where these sonorities are established within continuous formal processes, for example as glissandi of the different notes in the series. The musical evolution of Stockhausen has always been characterized by new conceptions and the parallel integration of known theoretical elements; it possibly also illustrates the attempt to arrive at a kind of harmony to the second degree, which allows for an equilibrium not just between different and on the face of it incompatible musical materials, but even between different schools of musical thought. The search for lost harmony, which started in the music of the twentieth century when traditional tonality was dissolved, consisted in an attempt to develop antitheses opposed to the tradition, an attempt to extend and integrate, and sometimes (in repetitive or spectral music) to generalize a single aspect. In the realm of harmony one is confronted with a great number of new points of departure, situated between the extremes of an extension (or of a reduction) of traditional tonality and a new universal sound art, which offers alternatives to ancient theoretical conceptions which were quasi-grammatical or -syntactical in nature. The search for lost harmony can in this context perhaps be compared to other phenomena that allow for a re-evaluation of elements which appear to belong to the past. Ives and, after him, John Cage, have shown that music can also renew itself harmonically when the composer opens the windows to let the outside world
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penetrate into his work – for example, by including ragtime at the same time as atonal chords in the strings (as in Central Park in the Dark). But there are other ways, opened up by the unfettered inventiveness of the composer – attempts to find sounds and sound structures which are completely new and which emancipate themselves from what is already there. Bibliography Albersmeier, F.-J. (ed.), Texte zur Theorie des Films (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1979) Boulez, Pierre, Penser la musique aujourd’hui (Geneva: Gonthier, 1963) ——, Points de repère (Paris: Bourgois, 1985) Busoni, Feruccio, Entwurf einer neuen Ästhetik der Tonkunst (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1974) Frisius, Rudolf, Untersuchungen über den Akkordbegriff (Göttingen: doctoral dissertation, 1970) ——, ‘Aufgeklärte Musik: Über Theorie und Praxis der seriellen und konkreten Musik’, in Rudolf Stephan (ed.), Musik und Theorie (Mainz: Schott, 1987) ——, Entries: ‘musique concrète’, ‘Radiokunst’, ‘Serielle Musik’, in Musik in Gesellschaft und Gegenwart 2, vols 6 and 8 (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1996, 1998) —— and de la Motte-Haber, Helga (eds), Musik und Technik (Mainz: Schott, 1996) Hába, Alois, Neue Harmonielehre des diatonischen, chromatischen, Viertel-, Drittel-,Sechstel-, und Zwölftel-Tonsystems (1927), Preface by Rudolf Frisius (Vienna: Universal, 1978) Helmholtz, H. von, Die Lehre von den Tonempfindungen (Braunschweig: Viehweg & Sohn, 1913) Kostelanetz, Richard, John Cage (New York: Praeger, 1970) Russolo, Luigi, L’art des bruits (Lausanne: L’Âge d’Homme, 1975) Schaeffer, Pierre, À la recherche d’une musique concrète (Paris: Seuil, 1952) ——, Traité des objets musicaux (Paris: Seuil, 1952) Schenker, Heinrich, Harmonielehre (Vienna: Universal Edition, 1906) Stockhausen, Karlheinz, Texte zur elektronischen und instrumentalen Musik, Vol. 1 (Cologne: DuMont Schauberg, 1963)
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Chapter 4
Against a Theory of Musical (New) Complexity
Richard Toop
For most of its history, Western art music has fostered notions of complexity, in one form or another – the extravagant alleluias of plainchant and thirteenthcentury Parisian organum offer two early examples. Though it seems reasonable to suggest that any musical work which repeatedly fascinates listeners is, in one way or another, ‘complex’, there have been certain periods (such as the so-called ‘ars subtilior’ of the fourteenth century) where there has been a conscious pursuit of intricacy, particularly in relation to rhythm. Moreover, the various spectacular historical ‘retreats’ from complexity, whether by the Florentine Camerata or by exponents of the style galante, have always led to a gradual restoration of complexity in other guises. The twentieth century has had no shortage of investigations which aimed radically to expand the technical resources available to composers; in terms of rhythm one can cite Ives, Stravinsky and Nancarrow (noting also the role of mechanical instruments), and in terms of pitch not only the Second Viennese School but equally the microtonal explorations of Alois Hába. It follows from this that the emergence since the late 1980s of a group of composers particularly associated, even if only at a journalistic level, with the notion of ‘new complexity’ is, of itself, unremarkable. The term ‘new complexity’ seems to have been coined around 1980 by the English composer Nigel Osborne, in introducing a concert of works by James Dillon and Chris Dench. Presumably, the term was intended ironically, as a counterpoint to the already prevalent catchcry of ‘new simplicity’. Slowly, it caught on, and, whatever its limitations, I would defend it on the same basis that Adorno defended ‘isms’. It didn’t define anything precise, but perhaps it was helpful in locating a certain way of thinking which conceived itself not only in terms of creative strategies, but also as resistance. To this extent, it seems problematic for one to formulate a ‘theory’ which accounts for this music in the same sort of way as the serial music that preceded it. Some attention will be given here to considering why this might be the case.
For Claudine P. and Jules F. Verbal communication from James Dillon. T.W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor (London: Athlone Press, 1997), pp.24ff.
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One can make the following distinction: serialism can be defined primarily in terms of its technical compositional processes – at any rate, that’s how it was presented in the 1950s, and that remains the case for Stockhausen today. To that extent, one draws on technical criteria to decide whether or not a work can be described meaningfully as ‘serial’. In contrast, ‘complexity’ (including ‘new complexity’) is more profitably assessed in terms of the musical outcome – whether auditive or notational – though a composer’s verbal statements of intent may also provide pointers. The two approaches are not, of themselves, mutually exclusive: many of the algorithms used by ‘complex’ composers have their roots in serialism, and in some instances (such as some aspects of Ferneyhough’s pitch structures) are indistinguishable from them. And there can be covert homages too; although, in terms of aesthetic models, Ferneyhough refers more readily to Schoenberg’s String Quartet No.2 than to any of the twelve-tone works, the series of Moses und Aron does operate as a ‘hidden filter’ in parts of the Carceri d’Invenzione cycle. Nevertheless, to the extent that musical ‘complexity’, new or not, is more a matter of conception and perception than of algorithms that might potentially be fitted into one big system, it might be that any meaningful theory of musical complexity would have an aesthetic or perceptual orientation, rather than a technical one. Pursuing this a little further, serialism implies both a theoretical underlay and an ideology of unification. Back in the 1920s there were already ‘theories of twelvetone music’. Just after the Second World War, René Leibowitz could write a book entitled La musique de douze sons, whose very title assumed, however informally, that all the works he described and analysed revealed aspects of a latently disclosable whole. The theoretical writings of Milton Babbitt, from the mid-1950s onwards, sought to give this ‘whole’ a concrete presence by emphasizing parallels with mathematical theory (primarily that of groups, taking composition as an application of modulo 12 arithmetic). Each new combinatorial or permutational discovery, as revealed and expounded in subsequent decades of articles in journals such as the Journal of Music Theory, was presented as an addition to existing ‘knowledge’. Nothing was recanted or superseded (a consideration which, if one applies Popper’s falsifiability criterion, leads to doubts as to whether such a theory could be regarded as ‘scientific’, in the sense claimed by some of its adherents). In comparison, the theories expounded by Stockhausen in articles such as ‘… wie die Zeit vergeht …’ or ‘Die Einheit der musikalischen Zeit‘ are informal, and undisguisedly speculative. Instead of building on previous statements, they criticise or refute them. Nevertheless, they clearly have an integrative ideology, even though it arises as much from practice as theory. But there was an early point at
Brian Ferneyhough’s Collected Writings, ed. J. Boros and R. Toop (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1995) include seven references to the Second Quartet, and not more than two to any serial work. Karlheinz Stockhausen, Texte zur elektronischen und instrumentalen Musik, Vol. 1 (Cologne: DuMont Schauberg, 1963), pp. 99–139. Ibid., pp. 211–21.
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which these too came to an end. With Stockhausen’s ‘Erfindung und Entdeckung’ of 1961, the emphasis has already moved towards practice: instead of charts and tables, and there are excerpts from scores. In fact, from this period onwards, there are no theoretical or even analytical articles for a couple of decades – that is, until Stockhausen became immersed in the Licht cycle, and was convinced, like Schoenberg before him, that his ‘formula’ procedures represented a potentially ‘universal’ method of composition. As far as the ‘new complexity’ is concerned, there are no equivalents, and, almost by definition, there cannot be. I would say that complexity does not accumulate, it proliferates. There are articles by Ferneyhough which say, in effect, ‘this is how I composed such-and-such a work’. There are others, such as ‘The Tactility of Time’, which certainly embrace theoretical perspectives, in the sense that they conceive and debate material in abstract terms, and often indicate potentially fruitful paths of further investigation. There are yet others – perhaps the most important ones – which one could place in the domain of aesthetic theory. But none of them say, or even dream of saying ‘this is the method, the technique of composition one should use in order to compose properly’; nor do the articles by any other composers whom one might be inclined to link with the notion of ‘complexity’. In any case, the historical context of this ‘new complexity’ is different. It has no missionary zeal: it does not seek to ‘ensure the supremacy of German [or any other] music for the next hundred years’ (Schoenberg), or to effect a tabula rasa, to return musical writing to a degree zero (Boulez). In many respects, it is historically rooted: the early works of Ferneyhough have their origins in early Boulez, and to some degree early Stockhausen. That is, they are conceived as the continuation and even resuscitation of an intransigent, purist ‘tradition’ which, though recent, is already being displaced by 1960s pluralism. Going further back, Finnissy and Dench cite Ives as a primary influence, but as practice (and to some degree aesthetics), not as theory. Rather than the utopian optimism of post-war serialism, one senses in the New Complexity an ethos of containable crisis: there are no easy solutions, and the ‘blood, sweat and tears’ are nakedly, perhaps even narcissistically exposed. One can, perhaps, detect a certain fatalistic tendency in this conception of complexity. In terms of both performance and perception, it is well aware that its voyages begin at the limits of possibility, and that its hope of transcendence is fragile. ‘Das Unzulängliche, hier wird’s Ereignis’: well, we’ll see – at least, one has to try.10 ‘Das Unbeschreibliche, hier wird es getan’: same thing.11 Here, Goethe’s lines represent
Ibid., pp. 222–58. Brian Ferneyhough, Collected Writings, pp. 42–50. See Richard Toop, ‘Four Facets of “The New Complexity”’, in Contact 32 (1988), pp. 5ff. 10 ‘The insufficient is here made to happen’. Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Faust, Part 2, Act V, closing lines of the ‘Chorus mysticus’. 11 ‘The indescribable is here accomplished’. Ibid.
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not so much an aspiration as a wall that one bangs one’s head against until, as one has anticipated, one has to draw back, a little concussed, and start planning the next assault. No wonder that Ferneyhough invokes Walter Benjamin,12 and Barrett uses quotations from Beckett, Celan and Cioran in his scores. The ‘praise of failure’ which was such a prominent feature of early exegeses13 may have receded somewhat during the 1990s, but it remains implicit. In Ferneyhough’s works, one finds reflections of this at every technical level from microscopic detail to the large form, but also in the metaphysical conceptions underlying individual works. The phrase ‘mise-en-abîme’ occurs more than once in his writings:14 a typical formal strategy is to begin with a proposition that seems reasonable, and then to force it into situations of ‘impossibility’, where coherence is not lost, but constantly walks a tightrope over the abyss (the notion of the salto mortale15 is also dear to Ferneyhough). One example of this is the frequent conflict between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ materials: in the first part of Carceri d’Invenzione I, for instance, the tutti interventions threaten to overwhelm the linear cycles which form the ‘principal discourse’. And in the much more recent String Trio, four different types of ‘intervention’ (now labelled as such in the score), which at first appear to be mere punctuations, finish by occupying the formal foreground. It is reasonable to enquire to what extent, and at what stage, if ever, composers associated with ‘new complexity’ were conscious of complexity as an intended facet of their creative work, and whether they attached particular significance to it. With Ferneyhough, certainly, evidence of a consciousness not only of complexity, but also of a ‘complexity ethic’, can already be found in relatively early essays. In 1978, he writes: ‘it seems to me that one of the characteristics of an authentic work consists exactly in this: to recognize the endless continuum of complexity uniting all things.’16 But even earlier evidence is to be found in the prefaces to the scores. In Cassandra’s Dream Song (1970), for example, we find: ‘The choice of notation in this instance was primarily dictated by a desire to define the quality of the final sound by relating it consciously to the degree of complexity present in the score.’ But what holds good for Ferneyhough – whom I am inclined to regard as sui generis, rather than symptomatic of anything – does not necessarily hold for other composers. And it may well be that their view of the concept, or at least of the word, was modified, in a frankly defensive manner, once the phrase ‘new complexity’ became a pervasive journalistic label in the mid-1980s. For example, Finnissy, in 1986, said: ‘It horrifies me that people say [my] music is complex. It isn’t, except in a very superficial detailed kind of way. It’s complex if you accept 12
See Brian Ferneyhough, Collected Writings, p. 246. See ibid., pp. 266ff. (in relation to Lemma-Icon-Epigram). 14 See ibid., p. 296. 15 Ibid., p. 290. 16 Ibid., p. 2. 13
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that human beings are complex, and that all art is complex.’17 And around the same time, Dench said ‘Funnily enough, the notion of complexity came about through much older pieces that were much more skin-deep – pieces that had the flashy surface and nothing underneath’.18 The notational factor can’t be ignored here: if one looks at scores such as those of Ferneyhough, Dench, Dillon and others, it is not surprising if the word ‘complex’ comes to mind. But the score is indeed only a surface, and not a sounding one. Any composer who, gazing proudly at pages swarming with several levels of irrational rhythms, labyrinths of microtonal pitches, and timbre inflections changing each millisecond, prides himself on being ‘where it’s at’, and on ensuring his ‘complexity’, is kidding himself. This doesn’t mean, however, that the outcome of naïve emulation (whose exploration would be a fascinating topic in itself) is always disastrous. I don’t share the view of Heinz-Klaus Metzger, who says that if he were to teach composition, he would make his students spend two years contemplating the commandment: ‘Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of anything that is heaven above, or that is on the earth beneath’ (Exodus 20:4).19 It’s a nice concetto, but it bears no relation to how musical creativity actually works. The strategy of a transcendental aesthetic is essentially threefold: first one emulates, then one outdoes, and then one tries to outdo oneself. But if the first of these may also involve notation, the second and third involve substance. One notes the reluctance of most of those composers associated with this notion of ‘complexity’ to engage with ‘pure’ forms of electroacoustic music, either avoiding the field altogether, or restricting its use to live processing of instrumental sounds. At first sight this might seem curious, since computer music offers such complete control in the temporal domain, which is perhaps the most obviously problematic aspect of their instrumental scores. But this, perhaps, is to misunderstand an essential aspect of much of their work, namely its physicality. Naturally, there is often an abstractly conceived scheme that determines or at least influences the precise points in time at which events occur or are initiated. But the score does not exist to convey the outcome of the system, as might be the case with some serialist schools, but rather to initiate what Rudolf Frisius refers to as ‘real sound’.20 And it is their conviction, at this point in time, that not only instruments, but above all instrumentalists, are crucial to the production of this real sound. This is not just the product of a sentimental humanitarian creed, expressing horror at mechanization, or of accommodation to current practice. It reflects real experience. The scores prescribe physical actions that often interact with, contradict, rub against one another, and this, just as much as any schematics, is the source of perceived complexity. It is, if you like, the Heroclitean element: both the 17
Richard Toop, ‘Four Facets of “The New Complexity”’, p. 5. Ibid. 19 Heinz-Klaus Metzger, ‘Cologne Manifesto 1991’, Eonta 2/2 (1994), p. 22. 20 Rudolf Frisius, ‘In Search of Lost Harmony’, this volume. 18
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compositional ‘force-fields’ (to use Ferneyhough’s phrase) and the sound itself are in constant flux. It would be hard to think of any other group of composers – even the Spectralists – for whom the complexity of sound itself, and the production of sound, was a more central issue The fact that ‘complexity’ has been the source of so much discussion in recent years in fields other than music, notably in economic modelling, but also in various scientific domains, invites one to enquire about possible connections. At this stage, I think the conclusions to be drawn are limited. It is clear that nearly all of these composers have a wide-ranging intellectual curiosity that extends way beyond the arts. It is also clear that many of them use computers not just for notation (Barrett rightly prefers his own exquisite calligraphy) or sound synthesis, but for the modelling of compositional processes. Moreover, to the extent that they seek to develop or extend these resources rather than just using what is available, one could say, at least in an informal sense, that they are involved in the development of complex systems. Let’s take the following fairly standard definition of complex systems as ‘any system which involves a number of elements, arranged in structure(s) which can exist on many scales. These go through processes of change that are not describable by a single rule nor are reducible to only one level of explanation; their levels often include features whose emergence cannot be predicted from their current specifications’. I certainly wouldn’t have any difficulty in applying this definition fairly literally to Ferneyhough’s composition process, and not just in the recent pieces produced at IRCAM using Patchwork, but in the handwritten sketches for pieces written in the late 1980s, long before ‘complexity’ had become a buzzword. However, for all that Ferneyhough sometimes refers to ‘random funneling’,21 scientific and mathematical models do not seem to play any significant role in the public discourse of these composers as they did with the serialists, and do even today with composers such as Ligeti and did, albeit with increasing reticence, in the case of Xenakis. I don’t hear them habitually talking (as some composers do) about chaos theory, fractals and cellular automata. They may well see parallels with their own practice, but they don’t seek to make this into a form of legitimation. For them, those elements which one might be inclined to ascribe to ‘science’, loosely defined, are a matter of pragmatics, not thematics. I’m reminded here of a comment that Mallarmé is supposed to have made to a fellow poet who complained that he couldn’t find the ideas to complete his sonnet. Mallarmé’s unsympathetic reply was (and I paraphrase): ‘Sonnets are made with words, not ideas’. The computer programs, the software development: these are not the goals of the compositions, but tools – perhaps artificially intelligent ones. If one looks at the avowed extra-musical influences on the works of these composers, which are in fact considerable, one finds not only that they come mainly from the other arts, but from many different eras: roughly, from Lucretius to the present day, but without the indifference to almost everything in between that one notes in Xenakis. Though visual artists play a role – Dürer, Brueghel and Piranesi Brian Ferneyhough, Collected Writings, p. 407.
21
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for Ferneyhough, and Matta for both Ferneyhough and Barrett – philosophy and above all literature form a principal focus: Hölderlin and Rilke for Dillon, Beckett and more recently Celan for Barrett. With Ferneyhough, perhaps predictably, the range is wider, but also somewhat different in character. In no case are we talking about ‘illustration’, unless one takes the whirling clarinet solo at the beginning of Ferneyhough’s Chute d’Icare as a gently ironic depiction of the would-be astronaut’s untimely descent. But whereas with Dillon and Barrett one assumes a close identification with the writers’ Weltanschauung, and an empathic search for epiphanies (a notion which may be the key word in dealing with these composers), with Ferneyhough, outwardly at least, the point at issue is investigation rather than inspiration. This is most evident in the Time and Motion Study series from the 1970s, but is also invoked explicitly elsewhere, whether in relation to alchemy (in Transit), to the emblema of Alciati (in Lemma-Icon-Epigram), or certain geological metaphors for creativity in a poem by A.R. Ammons (Terrain). But the composer’s external, objective statements of intent, while real, also suggest the Cartesian notion of ‘advancing masked’. And behind the mask, perhaps, is not so much the supposed ‘rationality’ of Descartes as the introspective anguish of Walter Benjamin, who may only surface as the explicit reference point for one work by Ferneyhough (Kurze Schatten II), but who seems to me to be the ghost stalking through the whole of what I would call a subterranean epiphany-machine. It may be observed, of course, that virtually all the influences cited above are also, in their own way, complex, whether this is a matter of language, of structure, of multiple points of reference, or of sheer diversity of elements. Perhaps the essential factor to grasp in establishing at least an aesthetics of complexity, if not a theory, would be the relationship between organicity and diversity. The technical basis of this is not, of itself, important: it could be an outgrowth of serial thinking, or of stochastics à la Xenakis, or Ives, or something quite different, such as models from the natural sciences. What is important is the composer’s relationship to musical material, and to notions of process that are evolutionary and dialectical rather than juxtapositional. The case I have sought to make here, however briefly, is that musical complexity is, perhaps, resistant to meaningful theoretical formulation, at least in terms of a global theory of musical materials, and that this may be no bad thing. It follows logically from this to enquire whether the same might not apply to all attempts to establish more or less systematic, inclusive theories in relation to musical procedures which are still a part of current artistic practice. I have no definitive answer to give here, but I incline to a negative view, on pragmatic grounds. That is, I look in vain for twentieth-century instances where such theories seem to indicate anything more than procedural ossification. It seems to me that Unterweisung im Tonsatz was a disaster for Hindemith’s development as a composer. It could be argued, of course, that the disaster had already occurred, and that Unterweisung im Tonsatz simply documents it. But, either way, I would be inclined to postulate a consistent decline in melodic and harmonic invention from the mid-1930s onwards which can be persuasively linked to the restrictive criteria proposed in the book.
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It’s the same thing with Boulez’s Penser la musique aujourd’hui, or, rather, with the largely unstated theoretical considerations that lie beneath the opaque surface. And it’s the same thing, overwhelmingly, with Peter Schat’s ‘tone-clock’, which in my opinion produced one nice piece – Canto general – and then, nothing of more than parochial interest. One could argue a more favourable case for Messiaen’s Technique de mon langage musical; but is that in any real sense a theory, rather than an account of current practice and future possibilities? And is it any coincidence that the aspect that Messiaen covers most systematically, namely pitch modes, is precisely the one that Messiaen was to regard as exhausted just a few years later? This does not imply an aversion on my part to all theoretical utterances concerning music! But it seems to me that, in comparison to scientific theories, contemporary musical theories incline towards closure. For that reason, they seem to me most valuable as a guide to the principles underlying composition in former eras, and would be even more so if they could also highlight what constitutes ‘best practice’. For me, one of the disappointments of most theories relating to older music is that they take ‘best practice’ for granted, relying on examples drawn from the works of ‘masters’. But apart from identifying banal apprentice errors, they don’t distinguish between competence and excellence, except through the relative prestige implicitly conferred by inclusion or omission. In fact, one of the broad problems of music theories is that, on account of their aspirations to universality, they have to be seen to confer legitimacy on methods of composition which mainly produce bad results. (At least, I think this would be true in relation to music produced from the seventeenth century onwards; and even sixty years after Jeppesen’s Palestrina model, there are very few attempts to produce theories of pre-Baroque composition – it’s a great pity.) One has to ask: how plausible is a theory that can only demonstrate that Haydn and Beethoven are superior to Wagenseil and Lanner by absolutely refusing to discuss the latter? Returning to a more contemporary situation: Gottfried Michael Koenig’s dictum, ‘Given the rules, find the music’22 seems appropriate enough to the experimental context in which he uttered it, but I would be reluctant to see it generalized to all compositional practice. Here I would like to pick up on a comment that Célestin Deliège makes.23 He notes that the early serial composers greatly exaggerated the real diversity of materials afforded by the 12 possible 12note series, and I agree with him entirely. But as Morton Feldman once said, where would we be without our illusions?24 When Stockhausen, as a young man, learned from Herbert Eimert about the existence of all-interval series, only a handful of them had been found. So Stockhausen, so he told me, would sit up night after night, trying to find more, just by trial and error. It was very difficult! In fact, 22 G. Koenig, ‘Composition Processes’, cited from J. Tabor (ed.), Otto Laske: Navigating New Musical Horizons (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), p. 25. 23 Célestin Deliège, ‘Atonal Harmony: From Set to Scale’, this volume. 24 ‘Morton Feldman, Earle Brown and Heinz-Klaus Metzger in Discussion’, Music before Revolution, 4 LPs (EMI Electrola, IC 16528954/957).
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though he desperately wanted to find such a series for the Nr. 4 Klavierstücke – the sketches clearly document this search – he didn’t manage it, so he had to resort to an all-interval hexachord for the first pieces. Eventually he found one, and it became the basis for Gruppen (as well as a reconceived Klavierstück VII). It is in this light, I think, that one should understand ‘… wie die Zeit vergeht …’: not really as theory, for all its attempts at a theoretical edifice, but a reflection of the excitement, the speculation, and the practice following a discovery. Perhaps the real death-blow to serialism in its narrow, 12-tone definition, was the systematic exposition of its total resources. Suddenly, everything was there;25 you could no longer discover, only select. The late Franco Evangelisti once described notation as ‘the gravestone of the musical thoughts themselves’.26 I would be inclined to describe theory as the gravestone of musical invention, and since I don’t want to see the music I love, complex or not, buried prematurely, I would invite its creators to beware of theory. But I don’t think I really need to say this to them: they know it already. Bibliography Adorno, T.W., Philosophie der neuen Musik (1949). Gesammelte Schriften Vol. 12, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1975). Trans. as: Philosophy of New Music, trans., ed. and with and introduction by Robert Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2006) ——, Ästhetische Theorie (1970). Gesammelte Schriften Vol. 7, ed. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970). Trans. as: Aesthetic Theory, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor (London: Athlone Press, 1997) Cage, John and Knowles, Alison (eds), Notations (New York: Something Else Press, 1969) Eimert, Herbert, Grundlagen der musikalischen Reihentechnik (Vienna: Universal Edition, 1964) Ferneyhough, Brian, Collected Writings, ed. James Boros and Richard Toop (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1998) Metzger, Heinz-Klaus, ‘Cologne Manifesto’, Eonta 2/2 (1994) Stockhausen, Karlheinz, Texte zur elektronischen und instrumentalen Musik, Vol. 1 (Cologne: DuMont Schauberg, 1963) Tabor, Jerry (ed.), Otto Laske: Navigating New Musical Horizons (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999) Toop, Richard, ‘Four Facets of “The New Complexity”’, Contact 32 (Spring 1988), pp. 4–8 25 See, for example, the tables of all-interval series in Herbert Eimert, Grundlagen der musikalischen Reihentechnik (Vienna: Universal Edition, 1964) pp. 72ff. 26 In John Cage and Alison Knowles (eds), Notations (New York: Something Else Press, 1969), unpaginated.
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Chapter 5
Heterogeneity: Or, On the Choice of Being Omnivorous Pascal Decroupet
Heterogeneity in music has many aspects. My focus here is on ways in which stylistically diverse materials are incorporated in a range of different types of music. The span of composers and genres discussed here is wide, and includes The Beatles, John Cage, Pierre Henry, Henri Pousseur, Pierre Schaeffer, Karlheinz Stockhausen, Bernd Alois Zimmerman, progressive rock and ‘world music’. The chapter ends with a consideration of the concept of sampling by comparing Schaeffer’s approach to more recent developments. It is evident that heterogeneity in music has very diverse aspects, the entirety of which cannot be contained in too narrow a framework. Thus it is possible to understand the concept in such a broad way that all significant differences between materials can lead to an analysis of their heterogeneity. Such a view is based on an organicist model which has in fact been of considerable importance for the development of Classical and Romantic music up to the Second Viennese School and the first ventures into serial music. Nevertheless, there is no reason to consider such a model as absolute and immutable, given that other eras and other cultures have developed differing conceptions, where the position of unity is not as preponderant as in what Carl Dahlhaus called – not without irony – ‘proper music’. For, if one sets up this organicist model as a prime example, even a work such as Le Marteau sans maître, with its multiple systems of derivation, each leading to a clearly distinct acoustic result, would have doubt cast upon its suitability, doubt which would fit into the line of development of Berg’s Lulu, where the fundamental power of the basic series dissolves in its different derivations. The same is true for other pieces by Boulez, a composer whom I cite here in recognition of a certain deductive rigour in his recourse to materials previously prepared and already exploited in other works (all these relationships have been recorded in the catalogue of the Boulez archive which Robert Piencikowski has established at the Paul Sacher Foundation in Basel). Indeed, the collage (let’s not shy away from the term) of material of different origins in the Improvisations sur Mallarmé, for example, is clear testimony to the change of perspective which took place at the end of the 1950s: a series of deductions is, after all, no longer sufficient authorization for a simple correspondence between the structure of the material and the formal structure of the work as a whole. The concept of unity is severely biased, despite the surface not revealing clues of this to the listener. Moreover, in extending
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Boulez’s reflections on noise, as recorded in Penser la musique aujourd’hui, would it not be necessary to enquire about the matter of whether the integration of certain noises within the context of musical instruments (whether by means of percussion instruments or of technological tools of some description) does not also constitute a rupture of the homogeneity of the universe of sound, largely dominated by the organization of pitches, a common denominator which noises do not share? If all these perspectives serve to lead to interesting observations, then the point of view adopted here can be seen less as merely novel, and instead as being rooted in the tradition of reflection on the stylistic heterogeneity at the very heart of original composition itself. I Even if musical reference and musical reverence have always existed side by side, an appreciable change nevertheless occurred from the beginning of the nineteenth century with what Walter Benjamin called the ‘reproducibility of the work of art’, something which also extended to the domain of sound. Perspectives were enhanced, and with them the possibilities for opening musical language to new materials, indeed to new influences, and consequently for devising original musical forms which are more a function of the new means of production than of the sacrosanct tradition. For a long time different keywords had been attached to the notion of heterogeneity, notably the terms ‘quotation’, ‘montage’ and ‘collage’. The form in which music is quoted, when one quotes in music (Adorno’s concept of ‘music about music’ could not be more explicit), self-evident as it may at first seem, is perhaps no less false (or at least not necessarily true) if we attempt to adapt it in the current context of musical production – namely, its more or less synthetic realization in a studio. If, then, in a repertoire piece such as Berio’s Sinfonia, that which is quoted necessarily belongs to the restricted domain of music, it is other musical trends, as much in the experimental sphere as in popular music in the broader sense, which have taken leave of the norms of sound which for most still govern musical perception.
Pierre Boulez, Penser la musique aujourd’hui (Geneva: Gonthier, 1964), pp. 44–5. Walter Benjamin, ‘Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit’, Gesammelte Schriften, Werkausgabe 2 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1980), pp. 707–739. See for example Elmar Budde, ‘Zitat, Collage, Montage’, Die Musik der sechziger Jahre (Mainz: Schott, 1972), pp. 26–38; or also Clemens Kühn, Das Zitat in der Musik der Gegemwart – mit Ausblicken auf bildende Kunst und Literatur (Hamburg: K.D. Wagner, 1972), pp. 10–20. Theodor W. Adorno, Philosophie der neuen Musik, Gesammelte Schriften Vol. 12, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1976), pp. 166–9.
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Let us briefly return to some differentiating elements at the heart of ‘sound’ in its most general sense such as proposed by Henri Pousseur a number of decades ago, which have not lost their pertinence, particularly if it is a question of offering a nuanced perception of the boundary between ‘sound’ and ‘noise’. If the respective acoustic definitions distinguish unequivocally between sound and noise according to the degree of periodicity contained in the vibratory wave of the phenomenon in question, the qualitative difference has been subject to a process of historical evolution. Thus, until the beginning of the twentieth century, percussion instruments – with the exception of pitched instruments or those which suggested a specific local colour – were largely excluded from the symphony orchestra. It was with Stravinsky and Varèse that these ‘noise generators’ entered the musical scene in force, thus experiencing a shift from noise (the non-musical) to sound (that which is musically exploitable). With the advent of radiotelephony and equipment suitable for recording and reproducing music, background sound, generally considered to be a disturbance or even acoustic pollution, could suddenly be subjected to creative manipulation, and be integrated into a composition: the sound of a train rumbling became a sound with which the composer could work as with any other recorded sound, vocal or instrumental. Is it necessary to insist upon the differences in what is considered musical between people, and more particularly between social classes and generations? The accordion waltz, ethnic music, contemporary music, techno, and so on – to the listener all these domains are either accepted as music or rejected, and those which are rejected are disqualified as noise. Pousseur thus distinguishes a double intention in every sound phenomenon, combining the action at its source and the strictly sonorous intention of this action. ‘Music’, from this perspective, is the result of a double intention: of the productive action and of the sonorous intention. Mechanical phenomena, for their part, combine an intentional action (for example, moving) and a sound production, which makes greater use of the makeshift (footsteps, motors, etc.). Natural phenomena, finally, are the consequence of a non-intentional action and the sonorous result. (In a combinatory system of these two intentions, it remains to envisage a fourth case, certainly a little paradoxical from the traditional perspective, as it consists of the voluntary production of sound, which, at that moment when the sound is perceptible, depends nonetheless on an involuntary action, thus of the order of a natural phenomenon. The artistic form which matches this constellation is that of sculptures and sound installations in an at least apparently natural situation, the sonorous intention being articulated at the time of the construction of the object, whereas the production of the sound itself actually depends on the intervention of natural phenomena such as wind and rain.)
Henri Pousseur, Musique, sémantique, société (Tournai: Castermann, 1972), pp. 8–9. Jean-Jacques Nattiez, Musicologie générale et sémiologie (Paris: Bourgois, 1987), pp. 71–5. English trans.: Music and Discourse: Towards a Semiology of Music (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 48–54.
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Changes in the domain of sound in the course of the second half of the twentieth century shattered the criteria of what constitutes music to such a great extent, and so much more than in all previous periods, that only recourse to a distinction between sound phenomena based on their intentions will suffice as a tool to guide our reflections. If Janequin used voices to evoke the noises of battle and Beethoven instruments for a pastoral atmosphere, a qualitative leap occurs in the twentieth century, for example, between the symphonic poem Pacific 231 by Arthur Honegger and the Étude aux chemins de fer by Pierre Schaeffer: sound simulation on the one hand, integration of concrete, recorded sounds on the other. And for all that concrete music, like electronic music shortly afterwards, was largely decried at its outset, fifty years on we are forced to acknowledge that what Schaeffer initiated (and independently of the aesthetic quarrels which were soon to divide Paris and Cologne) is today alive and kicking, a ‘third era’ of music alongside the vocal and the instrumental according to Hans Heinz Stuckenschmidt’s formulation. To treat the question of heterogeneity for the second half of the twentieth century in an original way, whilst learning the lessons of the work of Jean-Paul Olive on the beginning of the century but without following the path opened by Béatrice Ramaut-Chevassus, a degree of focus is necessary that may appear excessive. It is, however, the result of a greater concentration on electronic music as the most legitimate axis of musical invention in the second half of the twentieth century, justified as much by the topicality of the means of production as by that of the contents conveyed. In order to structure my treatment of heterogeneity I should like to distinguish between two levels: on the one hand, there are the means of integrating materials of diverse origins; on the other hand, there is the nature of the elements being integrated. In spite of the use of recording by composers from the end of the 1920s, such as Weill (the radio in Lindbergflug or indeed Angèle’s tango played on a gramophone in Der Zar läßt sich photographieren), Hindemith (compositions presented on record at the festival of contemporary music in Berlin in 1930) or Honegger (Roi David), it is more the instrumental palette that provokes a certain extra-territoriality: the sirens in Varèse, the revolver and the typewriter in Parade by Satie, the black music evoked by means of the percussion ensemble in the Ballet mécanique by Antheil, or the kitchen utensils, newspapers and other domestic implements needed to realize a very elaborate rhythmic part in Cage’s Living Room Music. This extension is most certainly linked to the interest, from the end of the nineteenth century, in oriental music, presented at various world
Hans Heinz Stuckenschmidt, ‘Die dritte Epoche. Bemerkungen zur Ästhetik der Elektronenmusik’, Die Reihe 1 (1955), pp. 17–19. Jean-Paul Olive, Musique et montage. Essai sur le matériau musical au début du XXe siècle (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1998). Béatrice Ramaut-Chevassus, Musique et postmodernité (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1998).
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fairs at the turn of the century,10 as well as the infatuation with all sorts of different percussion instruments which ensued. Recording serves first of all as a means of documentation, and, from this point of view, appreciably modifies musical consciousness and memory, for, by detaching the production and perception of sound both temporally and spatially, it makes the music move into an ‘imaginary museum’ (Malraux),11 in the sense that the physical presence at a given moment in a given place is no longer a prerequisite for the perception of a piece of music, at least at the level of the sound. It was only with the invention of musique concrète by Schaeffer, the first music to make use, at the level of production, of technical and aesthetic tools already proven in the cinema industry, that a real reversal occurred. This move to a productive use of means of recording constitutes one of the most important changes of paradigm in the evolution of twentieth-century music, if not the most important, for it permits interpretative readings of this evolution beyond aesthetic limitations. Moving on to the nature of the elements being integrated, it is this that renders the musical classifications inherited from the nineteenth century most fragile. The kind of musical reverence practised for centuries aims to integrate, generally speaking, older pieces of music of the same genre as the piece of music into which they are being integrated: in Tombeaus and Hommages, pieces written in an old style or reworkings of older texts by composers professing to be members of a ‘neo’ movement, even in most of the musical collages of the 1960s, the stylistic break is above all a historical break, or, more precisely, a break recognized by the listeners’ educated historical awareness. The situation changes fundamentally as soon as the sounds being integrated come from a domain which did not previously fall under the narrow definition of music. Here again we must be careful to make distinctions: while recourse to certain exotic or ‘extra-symphonic’ instruments may serve the purpose of illustration (gongs to sound oriental, the ‘Almglocken’ in Mahler’s symphonies, the typewriter in Parade mentioned above, etc.), no such intention may be found in Cage’s use of variable-speed turntables playing recordings at changing speeds in Imaginary Landscape No. 1, or indeed of other electrical sounds in the following pieces in the cycle, including the gramophone playing pre-existing pieces of music in Credo in us, or in Schaeffer collecting everyday sounds for the purpose of his noise concerts. The source of the sound in its own right is of lesser importance than the sound considered in its different acoustic dimensions, and it is even Schaeffer’s intention that the associations attached to recorded sounds should be forgotten. In his first production, the Étude aux chemins de fer, the origin of the sounds can be easily determined; to break the immediate association, and thereby pass from the sonorous to the musical, Schaeffer uses the technique of looping. If the repetitions thus generated appear to correspond to 10 Jonathan Bellman (ed.), The Exotic in Western Music (Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press, 1998). 11 See André Malraux, La psychologie de l’art, Vol. 1, La musée imaginaire (Paris: Albert Skira, 1947–50).
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certain phenomena of a moving train (the wheels on the track produce a regular and repetitive rhythm), these are essentially unrelated to the other sounds chosen, like a door being closed by a gust of wind. Between the mechanical phenomenon and the natural ‘agent’ there develops by means of the same principle of looping a dialectic which makes evident the distance separating the artist’s hand from the sound phenomenon captured in its raw form. If the broadening of what is considered musical by means of percussion instruments and recordings is testimony to a certain musical searching, then the integration of jazz and rock into contemporary music, as well as the reverse situation (i.e. the symphonic side of jazz, and collaboration between rock groups and symphony orchestras or ethnic musicians or jazz improvisers), is synonymous with the transgression of established genres, perhaps creating a new one, which has been given the fashionable name of ‘cross-over’. II At the end of the 1950s, Bernd Alois Zimmermann based his idea of musical pluralism – which at the surface level is manifested in a stylistic plurality of materials – on a new concept of musical reality.12 The predominant aspect of the latter is, more precisely, a new reality of musical perception, disconnected from the time and place of the sound performance. In the same way as the radio (then still the central medium) superimposes different fluxes of reality on its different waves, the listener, by his action towards the radio set, makes the diversity of these realities merge into one single unit: the receiver becomes, in the fullest sense of the term, the instrument of the receiver. The particularity of this model experience of the new reality of music rests in juxtaposition; even just a small amount of radio interference superimposed on the whole suggests a continuity, indeed a reality at several levels. When Zimmermann passes from the observation about the social conditions of musical perception to its own creation, the art of music – the art of writing in its polyphonic aspect – comes into its own again: it thus combines the stylistic diversity of the radiophonic experience with the superimposition of the different narrative threads in James Joyce’s ‘stream of consciousness’.13 Thus, with the exception of the Musique pour les soupers du roi Ubu – where it is precisely the abrupt conjunction of the quoted fragments, and therefore the sudden cuts that give rise to the force of the discourse – borrowing from other compositions or musical styles generally takes place against a background which prolongs the situation stated just previously in the course of the work, indeed by the simultaneous accumulation of quotations, in such a way that the incursion of 12 Bernd Alois Zimmermann, ‘Vom Handwerk des Komponisten’, Intervall und Zeit (Mainz: Schott, 1974), p. 35. 13 Bernd Alois Zimmermann, ‘J.M.R. Lenz und neue Aspekte der Oper: Libretto, Vorwand oder Anlass’, Theater und Zeit 8 (1961), p. 153.
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connoted realities does not result in a black hole of musical energy (the innocuous pleasure of recognition suspending momentarily our attention directed towards the treatment). Zimmermann does not attempt to establish a univocal message to the listener; on the contrary, he endeavours to create, by means of disturbances in perception (symbolized by the superimposition of different situations), a situation that gives rise to active and interrogative perception. One of the most significant examples in this respect is the second scene of act II of the opera Die Soldaten, composed in different stages between 1958 and 1964. This scene, which dates from the first large stage of the composition of the work, interrupted by the cancellation of the performance planned for 1960, is the first of many ‘simultaneous scenes’ (Simultanszenen), the dramatic form which also characterizes the two big scenes in act IV. The simultaneous presence on stage of many fragments of the story leads, in the momentary perception, to a certain vagueness of time on stage, a vagueness which is more the result of overdetermination (several scenes with precise timings combine in the perception of the listener) than of any lack of importance of these scenes to the discursive logic. In the above-mentioned scene in act II, Zimmermann has scene iii, act II played at the same time as scene ii, act III of Lenz’s original piece, of which it is the logical consequence, and which therefore follows it chronologically (the letter written in the first scene in Lille is received and read at Armentières in the second); moreover, it anticipates (independently of the suppression of the end of the main action, in which Marie, the female protagonist, and Desportes, the officer trying to seduce her, are joined by other characters) the unique intervention of Marie’s grandmother, who, in Lenz’s version concludes act II with a little threeverse song. Zimmermann therefore accentuates the causal links between the threads of the story, and notably the relationship between the present scene, and two different points in the future, these being the reading of the letter and the sight of the grandmother against the background of the amorous banter; the latter was preceded by the writing of the letter (which has therefore not yet been sent), and it also signifies – a connection explicit in the text sung by the grandmother – the beginning of Marie’s fall. The force of logical cohesion causes any discomfort at the rupturing of the temporal unit to disappear. Zimmermann clarifies the interpretation of the situation in terms of temporal relationships by the superimposition of dodecaphonic language, which has characterized the work until this point, and a Bach chorale harmonization, prepared by a number of melodic turns inducing the tonality. And the poem sung by the grandmother becomes more and more removed from the spatio-temporal reality of the action, as it slides towards the domain of eternal truths, such as contained in fables and tales. And when the future fall of Marie and the tears which from now on will roll down her cheeks are in question, Zimmermann signifies the perpetual return of such situations by quoting the choral Ich bins, ich sollte büßen from the St Matthew Passion. The function of heterogeneity in this case is therefore twofold: on the one hand, at the level of content, the quotation functions as a parable, by referring via another
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story of suffering (the Passion of Christ) to a more general grief (use of this chorale in funeral services); on the other hand, by removing the grandmother from the here and now of the seduction scene, the quotation clarifies the different temporal levels in play: two levels of experienced reality, but superimposed because of the primacy of the causal relations over the chronological development, the third an atemporal reality in the sense of a presence without limits – the eternity to which the music quoted also alludes, the religious connotations of which are evident even to the listener unable to identify the harmonization or the original text. At the beginning of the 1960s, Henri Pousseur undertook, together with Michel Butor, the conception and realization of the ‘variable fantasia in operatic style’, Votre Faust, the production of which has up until now been attempted three times, none of them very convincing (Milan 1969; Gelsenkirchen 1982; Bonn 1999). Responding to the appeal made by Butor in his article ‘La musique, l’art realiste’,14 Pousseur let his conception of the series develop towards a ‘universal matrix’ (Herman Sabbe),15 able to accommodate the most diverse of musical languages by linking them with more or less systematic principles of transformation. Without Pousseur ever having explicitly stated this relationship, there is a surprising parallel with technology developed at the Siemens studio in Munich at the beginning of the 1960s, where Pousseur worked for an extended period of time, by means of which a certain series of commands recorded on perforated tape could drive different combinations of electronic musical instruments or identical ensembles differently parametrized by another command sent by the perforated tape reader.16 It was Pousseur’s ambition to bring together idioms hitherto considered to be irreconcilable: it was clearly a case of breaking with the taboos practised during the formative years of serial music by the very generation to which Pousseur himself belonged, and of which he had been one of the foremost figures. The result was a multitude of alternative references to existing languages or works, this diversity being distributed throughout the work according to criteria which were both serial and dramatic, the variable fantasia being well and truly intended for the stage. If, in the ‘Prologue dans le ciel’, the elements of cross-reference are somehow concealed (on two levels, in fact, both for the constructed, nonmotivic, dodecaphonic series and for a longer-term content, on to which harmonic transformations resulting in an interaction between dissonance and consonance
14
Reprinted in Michel Butor, Répertoire II (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1964), pp. 27–41. See, for example, Herman Sabbe, ‘A logic of coherence and an aesthetic of contingency: European versus American “open structure” music’, Journal of New Music Research 16/3 (1987), pp. 177–86. 16 Helmut Klein, ‘Einrichtungen des Siemens-Studios für elektronische Musik’, Bayerischer Rundfunk. Konzerte mit Neuer Musik 13/50 (1962), pp. 26–45; abridged in Siemens Kultur Programm (ed.), Siemens-Studio für elektronsiche Musik (Munich: Siemens, 1994), pp. 19–25. 15
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are grafted and come into play),17 the fairground scenes, with their different stalls, have recourse to recognizable fragments of existing music. This chosen solution is distinctive in the puppet shows in the second act, where whole (or abridged) scenes from operas provide the musical basis – dramatically it is the musical accompaniment to the show being watched by the protagonists at one of the stalls. Since Votre Faust was conceived from the perspective of a work in mobile form, the trajectory of the protagonists in the course of the first act can lead them towards four different shows:18 two backgrounds of ‘real’ opera, Mozart’s Don Giovanni and Gluck’s Orpheus, and two more artificial backgrounds, of which the first is a ‘fantastic cavalcade’ through German Romantic music from Mozart to dodecaphony, and the second an English cantata, alternating with a version à la Weill (in a similar way to that in which Brecht’s references to John Gay’s Beggars’ Opera give rise to musical echoes in the score of The Threepenny Opera). However, the journey of the protagonists does not determine only the choice of scene, but also the interpretation of the background music, namely whether this is transmitted through loudspeakers (the orchestration respecting the symphonic orchestration of the originals) or played in ‘ruined’ versions (en ruine) by some of the on-stage musicians. This difference of medium is crucial, for the sound and the action are appropriate to each other: the audience either sees a handful of largely inactive musicians while listening to symphonic music, and can easily imagine that it is a recording, or thinks that the richness of the symphonic texture has been reduced in order to be performable by this ‘salon orchestra’. In addition to this understanding of the adaptation of the body of sound present on the stage there is the understanding that this ‘corrosion’ of the text goes beyond the mere reduction of the instrumental texture, leading to an alteration of the quoted motives, without these ever losing their referential power. Thus the relationship between the original text and the mode of presentation reveals simultaneously the dramatic function and the heterogeneity of the sound material employed. Indeed, the punctuation of the stages of the Passion of Christ which are superimposed on to each puppet show (Faust can only ever be a descent into hell) are always performed on instruments usually absent from classical opera, namely percussion instruments and piano (in the role of keyboard percussion). This separation of media thus reinforces a certain individuality of the components of the mosaic. In the case of Stockhausen, such a clarification of levels marks the development from Prozession to Kurzwellen. Whereas, in the former, the existing music upon 17 Henri Pousseur, ‘L’apothéose de Rameau. Essai sur la question harmonique’, Musiques Nouvelles. Revue d’esthétique 21 (1968), p. 140; Pascal Decroupet, ‘A la recherche de l’harmonie perdue. Regards analytiques sur le “Prologue dans le ciel” de Votre Faust de Henri Pousseur’, Revue belge de musicologie 43 (1989), pp. 87–100. 18 In the reduced version that Pousseur had recorded on vinyl in 1970, the choice is limited to two shows, and it is to be expected among the tragic consequences that this reduction, initially the result of the number of 33rpm sides available, led to a ‘revision’ of the staged work, and that today the author knows only of this truncated version.
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which the artists are called to work by means of systematic transformations are all works by Stockhausen, of which one might recognize some specific trait or other without ever really knowing whether what one is hearing is a quoted fragment or a more or less elaborate transformation, in Kurzwellen, the ‘real’ elements are heard coming from a short-wave receiver, and the transformations are the result of the activity of the instrumentalists present on stage. To bring these two worlds closer together, the interventions of the musicians are amplified and transformed by filters. In Telemusik, a recorded work produced in 1966 while Stockhausen was staying in Japan, such an illumination is not possible, because everything comes from loudspeakers. Nevertheless the metaphor of the short-wave receiver is evident at the sound level, being itself a metaphor of an imaginary journey around the planet with different landings or approaches, which cause musical fragments, identifiable as different from the environment in which they evolve, to emerge from the background of sound (a high-pitched crackling at around 12,000 Hz), even if, because of the different ‘musical culture’ to which they appeal, they are not ‘recognizable’ in the same way as the opera themes in Votre Faust. Stockhausen’s selection, as far as the original pieces with which he chooses to work are concerned, is not an illustration of all the different kinds of music in this world, even if a ‘music of the world’ slant is evident, because the music most strongly implied, such as the classical and romantic repertoire, jazz and commercial pop music, is not included. In Hymnen, this choice is again biased: both the familiarity of the objects present and the opposition between the original sources (often symphonies or chorales) and the electronic work are enhanced. III At the beginning of the 1980s, Pousseur revised Votre Faust in order to derive a supplementary satellite work: La Passion selon Guignol (The Passion according to Punch), based on one of the puppet-show scenes lost in the ‘revision’ of the score. Shortly before, with the Seconde apothéose de Rameau, he had returned to his research of the 1960s by giving his original theoretical formulation, which gave rise to Votre Faust and Couleurs croisées, precisely the ‘Apothéose de Rameau’, a musical counterpart. Whereas, in this Seconde apothéose, the Parnassus of composers quoted is very clearly orientated towards ‘serious’ music, the Passion selon Guignol extends a path opened by the Iles déchaînées, realized in 1980 in collaboration with his son Denis, in which the marriage of conflict between a symphony orchestra, a jazz group and an experimental music ensemble (using, notably, commercial synthesizers) is taken as the theme. The Passion draws on the tradition of the English Punch and Judy puppet show, Elizabethan song and church anthems, and their ruination à la Threepenny Opera; in its composition Pousseur collaborated with the young Brazilian composer Paulo Chagas. To structure the show, Pousseur accentuates the kaleidoscopic side by brief appearances of the beginnings of the other puppet shows; on the one hand, this division demonstrates, albeit in just a few
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fragments, the complementary nature of the four shows in the original score; on the other hand, it sets up more pronounced fissures through which new material can come to be integrated. The direction of these additions extends the axis traced by the two versions of the original show, namely the rereading of Baroque or Classical material through an ‘ethnic’ perspective, while this is also, at the second degree, more of the type of Weill’s forays into jazz, recalling more the models popularized by dance orchestras of the kind that are found in metropolitan bars rather than authentic Afro-American practice. The very principle of the expansion of a musical world by increasingly large concentric circles is the explicit basis of the development of Pousseur’s work from the beginning of the 1960s.19 Thus – and in this respect the collaboration with Chagas is certainly not without importance – the colours of funk and reggae become ever more precise, and culminate in the repetition of a quotation from a song by Bob Marley. Technical processes intervene in a relatively discreet fashion in this composition, even if the vocal quartet, apart from the indispensable amplification, is at times clearly modulated, and if certain instruments characteristic of rock groups are present. The separation of these spheres is achieved by the distribution of the forces on stage, the orchestra, arranged in a horseshoe shape, surrounding the instrumentalists of the rock group, who form a homogeneous whole situated immediately in front of the conductor. What sense can be made of this broadening of perspective? One answer comes from more general considerations regarding an era in which attempts were made to bring the domains of ‘classical’ and ‘popular’ closer together. This happened at the same time that jazz, after an experimental period of emancipation with regard to its roots, rejuvenated itself by means of new dialogues with ethnic musicians, dialogues between cultures in which musicians from the electronic sphere also participated. Fraternization, reconciliation across the generation barrier, an attempt to make different sorts of music accessible to new audiences? With the benefit of hindsight it must be concluded that this was a failure: a failure which nevertheless had an interesting parallel, but in the opposite direction, so to speak.20 The desire to reduce the gulf between creators and audience led a number of artists to incorporate a compartmentalization of musical practices into their artistic endeavours. This was 19
Pousseur, ‘L’apothéose de Rameau’, pp. 144–5. I shall not dwell here on the recurrent phenomenon of classical music ‘adapted for the general public’ (in recent years notably by the tenor Helmut Lotti or the ‘king of the waltz’, André Rieu) or the numerous concerts bringing together stars from the classical stage, singers, indeed whole ensembles with currently popular soloists or groups – to name but a few: Pavarotti and Bono (U2) in Miss Sarajevo, the Scorpions and the Berlin Philharmonic for the opening of the EXPO in Hanover, or indeed Metallica’s last album, S&M, remarkably watered down by virtue of the group’s association with a symphony orchestra. The formula is common in film music, which is, according to Michel Chion, the privileged intermediary between the general public and the symphony orchestra (Musiques, Médias, Technologies (Paris: Flammarion, 1994), pp. 55–7), or indeed in the productions for the Eurovision Song Contest. 20
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not only the case with so-called serious musicians, but was also true in the same period of rock musicians, who, driven by their concern to break down the frontiers between the music that their middle-class parents listened to and that which they themselves listened to with their friends, attempted to forge links and to fuse different musical genres.21 This earned them almost immediate isolation in the rock world, their music being judged ‘head-music’, whereas the popular tradition of the genre demanded a greater connection to a restrictive conception of ‘dance music’. At the same time, however, certain serious composers were finding reasons to sympathize with this qualified movement within progressive rock, of which one of the paths, called symphonic rock, had classical musicians (ranging from a few instruments to a whole symphony orchestra) perform in rock numbers. One of the origins of this concern to bring the genres of high and low music (French: élevé vs. vulgaire; German: E- vs. U-Musik) closer together dates back to the albums produced by the Beatles after their touring period. With Yellow Submarine and Sergeant Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band – their first real studio productions, in the sense that they significantly took advantage of the new possibilities of multi-track recording – musically the Beatles went beyond what was, with the means available at the time, possible in real time; that is to say, in a live concert. Suddenly there appeared a panoply of unusual sounds in the framework of rock and pop, ranging from a quartet of classical Indian instruments (sitar and tablas in ‘Within You, Without You’, by George Harrison, who had been working with Ravi Shankar, whose first records were inundating the Western market at the time), to the hunted animals’ cries at the end of Good Morning.22 It was not long before a tidal wave of rock music appeared systematically looking for new sounds, often in association with classical or jazz musicians. Pink Floyd in their albums of the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s, such as Atom Heart Mother, were resolutely committed to this course. The first adaptations of pieces of classical music by rock groups were also born, such as Mussorgsky’s Pictures at an Exhibition by Emerson, Lake and Palmer. At Woodstock Jimi Hendrix reinterpreted the American national anthem by making it ‘suffer’ a distortion which can hold its own against the cutting-up of the German national anthem by Stockhausen. Soft Machine built bridges towards jazz, a tradition to which a certain John Zorn was also to belong, and the list just goes on getting longer.23 In return, the London Symphony Orchestra launched the series ‘Classic Rock’, in which, as a reversal of the situation described above, it was the masterpieces of the rock repertoire which were presented in a classicoromantic transmutation, with distinct touches of Hollywood. 21
Edward Macam, Rocking the Classics. English Progressive Rock and the Counterculture (London: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 13. 22 The genesis of this album has been illustrated with the help of the original volumes in the documentary made by Alan Benson, In My Life (Buena Vista International, Inc., 1998). 23 See also the impressive documentation of Patrick Landolt and Ruedi Wyss (eds), Die lachenden Außenseiter. Musiker und Musikerinnen zwischen Jazz, Rock und neuer Musik. Die 80er und 90er Jahre (Zurich: Rotpunktverlag, 1993).
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Serious composers, for their part, tried to cross boundaries by soaking up jazz – a tendency that extended, for example, an older interest in ragtime and LatinAmerican dance music. While it was the Beatles’ decision to have Stockhausen on the sleeve of the Sergeant Pepper album, Zimmermann has an extract from ‘Hey Jude’ alongside passages of jazz played live by one of the groups of free-jazz musicians then active in Cologne in his Requiem für einen jungen Dichter, the whole being mixed with a symphony orchestra (with lower strings only), electronic sounds recorded on tape, and a multitude of vocal material ranging from readings of the constitution to recordings of demonstrations or public declarations. In Zimmermann’s work of the 1960s, elements of jazz became a kind of signature in his music: from Dialogue (where jazz percussion runs alongside quotations from Mozart and Debussy) to Stille und Umkehr and Ekklesiastische Aktion ‘Ich wandte mich um und sah alles Unrecht, das geschah unter der Sonne’, Zimmermann sought to guarantee the authenticity of the sonorous result by explicitly indicating the individual jazz musicians who were to play the passages in question. More generally, it must nevertheless be noted that this was a case of what turned out to be a temporary rapprochement of two movements both marginal in the same way, something which can hardly be said to have entailed a massive shift of audience either way between the classical and the popular. IV In ‘world music’, sampling existing recordings has replaced meetings between musicians of different origins simultaneously present in the flesh on stage or in the studio. As everywhere else, the best and the worse also rubbed shoulders here. Indeed, some were more preoccupied with quasi-ethnomusicological concerns than they were with the musical production of the people they were recording. On the other hand, certain producers or groups practised sampling with a purely commercial aim, genuinely exploiting ethnic musicians under the pretence of universal fraternization. If, in the 1960s, the call for peoples to come together could be interpreted against the background of a nascent euphoria of global awareness, current globalization, with its political and economic intrigues, makes decidedly less romantic reading. Symbolic of this fraternization are the omnipresent slogans inviting universal participation in ‘one world’ – part of the motto of both the EXPO in Hanover and of the Love Parade in Berlin, Mecca of the adherents of the techno world. The relationship between sample and heterogeneity poses a fundamental question: that of the ‘recognizability’ of the sample – or, in other words, what it is that makes a quotation a quotation.24 Length is an essential factor for 24 In her theory of quotation in music, Sofia Lissa insisted, from the 1960s onwards, upon the fact that that which is identifiable as foreign cannot function as a quotation (‘Ästhetische Funktionen des musikalischen Zitats’, Die Musikforschung 4 (1966), pp. 364–78).
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determining whether a sample functions as an atomistic irreducible unit (and is thus by definition not recognizable, as it does not refer to its source) or as a genuine quotation. Just as the distinction between noise and sound can, outside the domain of acoustics, change its definition with time, the idea of the sample necessitates historical precision. Let us return to the heroic age of the first works of Schaeffer. The overwhelming verdict pronounced at the time was based on the problem of the anecdote (i.e. the immediate reference to the source of production). Now, when one rereads the pages – practical and theoretical – of the musique concrète log which Schaeffer kept when he was first getting going at the beginning of the year 1948, his fear of anecdote is omnipresent.25 Whether it be the first experiments with noise waves or listening to recordings made at the Gare des Batignolles, where different locomotives served as the sound source, Schaeffer’s conclusion is the same: a way of extracting sounds from reality is urgently needed, in order to annihilate the anecdotal through the purely musical processing carried out on the recorded sounds. The anecdote, according to Schaeffer, is anti-musical, and any incapacity to reduce it renders the whole concrete project absurd. This risk, given particular attention at the time of the preliminary experiments, led Schaeffer to formulate the two fundamental laws of his approach. Firstly, it is through his intervention in the recorded sound, and notably through the choice of a sample, that the composer makes his mark on the sound object, which becomes a musical object more by virtue of the treatment it undergoes than by the choice, aesthetically orientated, of the sound production. Secondly, however, since even a sample (considered in its temporal dimensions in the era of records and closed grooves and not in terms of frequencies of sampling in the digital environment) is not a completely virgin representation of its source, Schaeffer emphasizes identical repetition, something never used by nature, and, what is more, repetition according to an ordered series: the joining of the succession of samples lends the work an autonomous sense beyond the realistic evocation of the recorded sounds. Thus, the Étude aux chemins de fer becomes a study in rhythm, this being heard both at the microscopic level of the articulation internal to a sample, and at the macroscopic level of the grouping of the samples at different levels: the groups of samples, the groups of groups (for example, in the Étude aux chemins de fer, the different perspectives of the train’s interior, presented in a predetermined order, with specific repetition factors), the signals at the level of the overall form, and so on. The position adopted by Schaeffer at the end of the 1940s has many times been re-evaluated at the very heart of the Groupe de Recherches Musicales. Thus, when Schaeffer wrote his études at the end of the 1950s, the abstraction is appreciably more advanced than it had been ten years previously. The orientation towards more traditional instrumental sources (even if they were primarily 25 Pierre Schaeffer, A la recherche d’une musique concrète (Paris: Seuil, 1952), pp. 11–28.
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percussion sounds) puts the composer in a different context, and removes the temptation, indeed the danger, of curiosity on the part of the listener concerning the original source of the sound. The concentration at the level of articulation that Schaeffer had already tried to bring to the fore in 1948 was instantly more successful. A decade later, in a much reviewed aesthetic and political context, Luc Ferrari developed his concept of ‘anecdotal music’, where the recognition of the source is part of the essence of the approach. This antagonism is has led to a certain terminological confusion concerning that which has, since the 1970s, increasingly been called acousmatic music. In the two serial études Pierre Henry composed in 1951–1952, we find, alongside variable palettes of recorded sounds, a completely remarkable use of certain flaws and particularities inherent in the technique of production itself; he continually oscillates between abstraction and accentuation of the sound source, as even the titles indicate. However, the exceptional route that he chose in 1951–1952 when faced with the kind of realizations that sought to be technically ever more perfect, is a persistent feature of his work. Flaws in performance are like the fingerprint of the performer, the artist’s signature, if one will, and it is not just a matter of chance, for one consistent facet of Henry’s work is the level of continual variation of his pieces in the concert situation. Far removed from the mania of Boulezian revision, Henry in this way incorporates a certain open perspective of form in his work, which is integrally based on the support of the acoustic fixation of the sound. Some of the later versions, which have been preserved on gramophone record (without this in any way implying a definitive performance), therefore breathe the air of different eras. Thus it goes from the integration of beat-boxes and basses to explicit connotations of techno in the newly cut version of the Tenth Symphony. In Psyché Rock, Henry first juxtaposes and then superimposes the electronic world of the end of the 1960s and a rock rhythm section, augmented by interjections from the brass. Whereas in Schaeffer’s Bilude for piano and tape it is the rhythmic dimension that assumes the role of common denominator between a Bach prelude and the different recorded sounds (from prepared piano, to scissors, to liquid being poured into a glass) which come to replace the parts of the original text, in Psyché Rock the electronic sonorities only rarely conform to the rhythmic framework imposed by the rock section. Since a lack of technical ability in the performance can be excluded, a different explanation becomes evident, namely that common to all contemporary music: the lack of relationship between one structure and another, not only with regard to the order of their succession (a problem made topical by research into vagueness in Europe from the mid-1950s) but also with regard to their superimposition. These structures as well as the perception of sound relations became open to unprecedented and unforeseen combinations, and therefore became partly unnecessary, in the sense that other combinations would be equally valid, both from the point of view of the theory of underlying forms and from that of the resultant sound. It is certain that the acceptance of this new and irrefutable fact was partly facilitated by the position adopted by Cage at the beginning of the 1950s: to be precise, at the point at which he opted for a form of
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spatial notation to record the rhythm of his instrumental compositions, reflecting the nascent practice in the work of editing magnetic tape, where the note-values are determined by the length of the tape (in Music of Changes in centimetres/ inches on the stave). Thus polyphony was reconstrued with a different meaning and this original function was found at the antipodes of one of the main points of its previous definition, namely the ability to monitor simultaneously the horizontal and the vertical. At present, polyphony consists of structures simultaneously participating in independent processes of evolution, linked (or not) at a higher level of organization which orders the structures into a hierarchy (which can just as easily be rejected at a fundamental level). The existence at an absolute level of such oppositions of process does not, however, mean in return that anything is possible at any time: the universe in which a composition or a musical practice evolves is always the consequence of a choice, whatever the detailed nature of the criteria presiding over it. Since the beginning of the 1980s an analogous approach has characterized DJs who have abandoned the subordinate role of record-plugger to become genuine composers in real time. Thus we witness – first of all in clubs, thereafter by means of commercial support – the superimposition of, on the one hand, pulsations coming from a beat box and guaranteeing the appearance of dance music, and, on the other hand, everything from ambient tracks of greater or lesser length and a huge variety of recordings documenting non-Western musical practices, to samples directly lifted by scratching, so that sounds from all these sources could undergo transformations by filtering, movement in space, and any other modifications technically available to the mixer. As heterogeneity of material is the basis of this process, it is not surprising that the notion of fusion has become central to any discussion of this music. Two attitudes confront each other in this domain, being distinguished more at the level of their proponents than, generally speaking, that of the resultant sound: on the one hand, musicians of diverse origins living in the West incorporate within their musical practice the traditions linking them to their origins; on the other hand, in parallel with the massive development of tourism, exoticism must be continually varied in order to avoid the rapid erosion of its attractions. And the problem of exoticism is chasing world music in the same way that the reproach of the anecdotal and the associative for a long time closed our ears when faced with the profound innovations of musique concrète. Escaping exoticism nevertheless means that the borrowings not only refer to the sound substrate, but also to a whole complex reality in which music is integrated within its original context. It is this that has been described as a quasi-ethnological approach, and it is precisely an attitude of this kind that prevailed at all the initial world music enterprises in the mid-1980s. Nevertheless, it was not long afterwards that, once this first wave of world music had forced its way through the various currents of pop and underground, the disappearance of signification in world music was celebrated in one of the most influential magazines in the field, Melody
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Maker, as major progress in the new tendency towards fusion.26 This analysis strongly resembles the verdict of ‘head music’ passed on certain progressive rock bands that had moved in the direction of ‘concert music’ in the 1970s, while at the same time the first punk bands were making their presence felt in the clubs. The concept of fusion, insofar as the ‘synthesis’ is considered to have succeeded, still implies the disappearance of the strong identities of the primary material, and is therefore a long way from the initial preoccupations of world music. But playing with these materials without a sufficiently precise definition of its identity causes the ‘other’ to decompose into a diffuse mass of exotic touches. In return, globalization brings with it an ever greater fragmentation of the world. Whereas in the 1960s, where the general consciousness was distinguished by a fundamental anti-imperialism, the heterogeneity of the materials included in a given composition served to enhance the respective contributions – peaceful coexistence and so many meetings accentuating the richness of a developing universal consciousness – today the impression of bathing in an ocean of sounds where all sonorities are valid and can be interchanged without causing surprise or disapprobation precludes even the possibility of creating such an enhancement. Letting oneself be carried along by the current is never anything other than a question of choice, just as resistance is also a choice. If there has to be a choice, therefore, it is as well to opt for an existence rich in diverse experiences and to seek actively to prevent the world of ‘anything goes’ levelling our perceptions for lack of critical reflection. In this way one could hope to save the heterogeneity of one of the elements essential to its very definition: difference. Bibliography Adorno, Theodor W., Philosophie der neuen Musik, Gesammelte Schriften Vol. 12, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1976) Bellman, Jonathan (ed.), The Exotic in Western Music (Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press, 1998) Benjamin, Walter, ‘Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit’, Gesammelte Schriften, Werkausgabe 2 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1980), pp. 707–39 Boulez, Pierre, Penser la musique aujourd’hui (Geneva: Gonthier, 1964) Budde, Elmar, ‘Zitat, Collage, Montage’, in Die Musik der sechsziger Jahre (Mainz: Schott, 1972), pp. 26–38 Butor, Michel, Répertoire II (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1964) Chion, Michel, Musiques, Médias, Technologies (Paris: Flammarion, 1994) 26
After David Hesmondhalgh, ‘International Times: Fusions, Exoticism, and Antiracism in Electronic Dance Music’, in Georgina Born and David Hesmondhalgh (eds), Western Music and its Others. Difference, Representation and Appropriation in Music (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000), p. 284.
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Decroupet, Pascal, ‘A la recherche de l’harmonie perdue. Regards analytiques sur le “Prologue dans le ciel” de Votre Faust de Henri Pousseur’, Revue Belge de Musicologie 43 (1989), pp. 87–100 Hesmondhalgh, David, ‘International Times: Fusions, Exoticism, and Antiracism in Electronic Dance Music’, in Georgina Born and David Hesmondhalgh (eds), Western Music and its Others: Difference, Representation and Appropriation in Music (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000) Klein, Helmut, ‘Einrichtungen des Siemens-Studios für elektronische Musik’, Bayerischer Rundfunk. Konzerte mit Neuer Musik 13/50 (1962), pp. 26–45; abridged in Siemens Kultur Programm (ed.), Siemens-Studio für elektronsiche Musik (Munich: Siemens, 1994), pp. 19–25 Kühn, Clemens, Das Zitat in der Musik der Gegenwart – mit Ausblicken auf bildende Kunst und Literatur (Hamburg: K.D. Wagner, 1972) Landolt, Patrick, and Wyss, Ruedi (eds), Die lachenden Außenseiter. Musiker und Musikerinnen zwischen Jazz, Rock und neuer Musik. Die 80er und 90er Jahre (Zurich: Rotpunktverlag, 1993) Lissa, Sofia, ‘Ästhetische Funktionen des musikalischen Zitats’, Die Musikforschung 4 (1966), pp. 364–78 Macam, Edward, Rocking the Classics. English Progressive Rock and the Counterculture (London: Oxford University Press, 1997) Malraux, André, La psychologie de l’art, Vol. 1, La musée imaginaire (Paris: Albert Skira, 1947–50) Nattiez, Jean-Jacques, Musicologie générale et semiology (Paris: Bourgois, 1987). Trans. as: Music and Discourse: Towards a Semiology of Music (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990) Olive, Jean-Paul, Musique et montage. Essai sur le matériau musical au début du XXe siècle (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1998) Pousseur, Henri, ‘L’apothéose de Rameau. Essai sur la question harmonique’, Musiques Nouvelles. Revue d’esthétique 21 (1968), pp. 105–72. ——, Musique, sémantique, société (Tournai: Castermann, 1972) Ramaut-Chevassus, Béatrice, Musique et postmodernité (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1998) Sabbe, Herman, ‘A logic of coherence and an aesthetic of contingency: European versus American “open structure” music’, Journal of New Music Research 16/3 (1987), pp. 177–86 Schaeffer, Pierre, A la recherche d’une musique concrète (Paris: Seuil, 1952) Stuckenschmidt, Hans Heinz, ‘Die dritte Epoche. Bemerkungen zur Ästhetik der Elektronenmusik’, Die Reihe 1 (1955), pp. 17–19 Zimmermann, Bernd Alois, ‘J.M.R. Lenz und neue Aspekte der Oper: Libretto, Vorwand oder Anlass’, Theater und Zeit 8 (1961), pp. 152–5 ——, ‘Vom Handwerk des Komponisten’, in Intervall und Zeit (Mainz: Schott, 1974)
Chapter 6
Varèse, Serialism and the Acoustic Metaphor Pascal Decroupet
The following analysis of certain aspects of the music of Varèse draws on a number approaches, principal among them the notion of ‘sonic evidence’ (évidence sonore) developed by Boulez at the time when he was formulating the bases of his serial language, and a comparison of certain acoustic observations made by Helmholtz, together with various ideas taken from Varèse’s own writings. The notion of ‘sonic evidence’ is illustrated by examples taken from Webern’s opp. 21 and 31 and then applied to passages from Octandre, Intégrales and Déserts; the transcriptions of acoustic phenomena in the instrumental music of Varèse by selective consideration of parts of Hyperprism, Intégrales and Ecuatorial. Just as Varèse works by means of a constant superimposition of several systems, so my responses to his music will be simultaneously partial and multiple. I For decades now it has been good practice for a young composer to claim to draw his inspiration from Varèse, notably because his music repeatedly provides practical proof that at the heart of a sound complex, acoustic dimensions are inseparable. It shows the consequences for the global phenomenon of modifications effected at the level of an isolated component. At the end of the 1940s in Europe, at a time when composers were becoming aware of the different dimensions – or parameters – of the sound phenomenon as distinct variables to be subjected to serial organization, their artificial separation was, conversely, the precondition for a form of composition aiming to attain a new, vectorial resultant of these liberated factors. Comparing the approach to the parameter of pitch in pieces like Cage’s Music of Changes and Boulez’s Structures I, conclusions can be drawn from two distinct aspects of the understanding of the notion of sonority: Cage is at first more interested in the sound object – complex, one, and indivisible – whereas Boulez tends towards structured sonorities, spread out in time, resulting from an arrangement of pitches and rhythmic organization, each independent of the other. As far as composed sonority is concerned, the exposition of Webern’s Symphony op. 21 is a textbook example: the fixed registration enables a virtuosic polyphonic
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treatment (double canon in contrary motion), and guarantees homogeneity in a centrifugal sound universe. The only note to appear in two different registers is the E: it is the outcome of an initial chain of fourths of low to medium range, and the starting point, an octave lower, of a new chain of fourths which then symmetrically textures the material for the medium-high register (Example 6.1a). The respective occurrences of these Es are emphasized by the simultaneous appearance of A3 – first note of the composition, axis of symmetry of the composite sonority, and the only note not to have been generated by the chains of fourths (unless it could be regarded as being ‘reflected back’ to the centre of the sonority in its capacity as a second common factor of the two chains, of which it is the seventh element respectively). Whereas the simultaneous attacks of several sounds are generally characterized by a difference of timbre or mode of articulation (e.g. in the case where instruments of the same family play), the pairs A3–E4 and E3–A3 are characterized by a homogeneous timbre (the harp). In the rhythmic plan, the progression of the motives is closely linked to the definition of musical space: • •
•
•
•
bar 1: sigh – minim on the horn – sigh; bar 2: minim on the first beat in the horn – minim on the second beat in the harp – crotchet on the fourth beat in the horn; resultant rhythm: short–long– short (this motive is repeated constantly until bar 10, precisely the place where the harp finishes playing its second block of E–A); bars 3–6: pairs of semibreves on the same instrument superimpose themselves on this basic motive, underlining the two-bar divisions; the first horn replies symmetrically in mid-register to the second horn in the lower register; the pairs of notes are G–A and B–B; bars 7–10: the bass clarinet replies to the clarinet (homogeneity of instrumental colour, but reversal of register and grouping of sounds in relation to the horns); since the semibreves are already familiar, there is room for a new event: simultaneous notes on the harp, also stated in a symmetrical, rhythmic fashion, and in an additional dimension – the sound space (l’espace sonore); from bar 11, a first development at the very heart of the exposition appeals to a new resultant rhythmic motive: short–short–long; the combination of the two ‘composite’ motives gives rise to the densest motive of this exposition, namely a sonic event per beat.
This arrangement of phrases moreover corroborates the dodecaphonic organization: the first note of bar 11 is – by virtue of being the common cell – the first note of the second serial form in the first voice of the canon, and therefore the beginning of a new section. René Leibowitz, Introduction à la musique de douze sons (Paris: L’Arche, 1949), p. 234; Schoenberg and his School (New York: Da Capo Press, orig. 1949; reprint 1979), p. 212. Pierre Boulez, Relevés d’apprenti (Paris: Seuil, 1966), p. 223.
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In subsequent works, Boulez takes over the concept of sonic object, underlining in his writing more the role played in this line of thought by Cage than that played by Schaeffer, for whom the idea also occupied a central position from the very first attempts to theorize the research he carried out in 1948. Cage, for his part, also includes sonorities spreading out over time. The initial difference between the two points of view is nevertheless made clear through the divergent ways in which these two composers interpret Varèse’s Ionisation. With his concern for ‘liberating sound’, Cage takes his place among the direct descendants of Varèse, whereas Boulez, in 1948, in search of an analogous treatment of pitch-structures and rhythmic-structures, sees in Ionisation only a testimony to Varèse’s weakness, since he ‘evades the problem by evading the whole problem of the technique [l’écriture] itself [read: the organization of pitch] only to devote himself to the rhythm. It is a solution of convenience that solves nothing’. As part of the enterprise of liberating the most diverse range of sounds, and with the aim of appreciably broadening the repertoire of musically useable sounds, the role of pieces for percussion ensemble written in the United States in the 1930s was crucial. This remains the case even if Cage later came to interpret them as being transitional works between music primarily conceived for the piano (signifying a hegemony of pitch determined by equal temperament), and moving towards a music of the future which would accommodate all possible and imaginable sonorities. This broadening of the concept of ‘music’ had repercussions on the respective sound worlds of Varèse and Cage, to be seen in the expressions ‘son organisé’ and ‘organisation of sound’. In the works that followed these compositions for percussion ensemble, Cage turned sometimes to prepared piano, sometimes to electronic instruments – firstly the record-player and radio-receiver, later the tape recorder. Cage devotes himself to pushing to its limit the Varèsian idea of integrating all sounds in a musical composition. Under the impetus of his philosophical convictions, he concludes that mediation between the generalized availability of sound phenomena and their integration in a particular musical composition is impossible: this leads to his renunciation of any concept of combination or ordering of these materials, in other words, of any kind of musical syntax. The sounds he creates with Music of Changes in mind (several reproductions of sketches accompany Schädler’s article of 1990) belong to three distinct families. As Cage puts it: ‘The sounds themselves are single, aggregates (cf. the accord sometimes obtained on a prepared piano when only one key is depressed), or complex situations (constellations) in time (cf. the Chinese characters made with
Ibid., p. 74. John Cage, Silence (London: Marion Boyars, 1989), p. 5. Edgard Varèse, Écrits, ed. Louise Hirbour (Paris: Bourgois, 1983), p. 108. Cage, Silence, p. 3. Stefan Schädler, ‘Transformationen des Zeitbegriffs in John Cage’s Music of Changes’, Musik-Konzepte Sonderband John Cage II (Munich: Text + Kritik, 1990), pp. 213–36.
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several strokes)’. According to Cage, these sonorities – he also calls them ‘dense sounds’ – bear no relation to harmony, and are not endowed with directionality of any kind: each entry in the preparatory charts is therefore a piece of musical data without any implication. Despite the similarity of work ‘on the chessboard’, the difference between the tables for Music of Changes and those for Structures I is manifest; later, Cage was to say that Boulez’s concern could be summarized as ‘putting numbers in charts’.10 The most appropriate reading today of Structure Ia, to which Cage alludes here, is that initiated by Robert Piencikowski (1985), moving the emphasis from considerations limited strictly to polyphony towards an interpretation of the harmony resulting from serial operations. Such a perspective extends the explanation given by Boulez of the construction of his serial tables: the ordering of serial forms according to the hierarchy contained in the series itself, rather than the chromatic transpositions used by Schoenberg and which Boulez rejects as mechanical.11 Thus, the end-point of Boulez’s research is likewise sound, understood not as isolated phenomenon but as a polyphonic resultant, which, moreover, reveals certain characteristics of the initial series: ‘under current perspectives, in which the discovery of the series has been the object of attention, the most general object available to a composer’s imagination, the sound figure, transcends the traditional opposition of the notions of vertical and horizontal’.12 On the first page of Structure Ia, only two intervals break through the chromatic veil: towards the beginning of the sequence, a fifth, and at its very end the tritone concluding the series. Now, it is precisely on these two interval classes that Boulez focuses his harmonic attention, in two particular sequences of the movement. Piencikowski has provided the key to such an interpretation on the basis of the first sequence of the second part of the movement (bars 65–72): the characteristics of the series and the organization of the serial forms lead to the tritone on E4 (a ‘polar’ pitch, which appears in the mid-range at the end of the first part – bar 64) becoming evident through the meeting of two rhythmic voices in each of the two pianos on the fifth durational value respectively; thereafter the tritone appears melodically in interrelationships crossing between the two pianos. The fourths in bars 8–10 accumulate around the same E4, and Boulez reveals this harmonic property of the serial givens at the surface in his choice of the number of simultaneous serial forms and their registration in the zone of intersection around E4 (Example 6.1b).
Cage Silence, p. 58. See John Cage in Richard Kostelanetz, John Cage im Gespräch. Zu Musik, Kunst und geistigen Fragen unserer Zeit (Cologne: DuMont, 1989) p. 61. 10 Ibid., 61; cf. Joan Peyser Boulez: Composer, Conductor, Enigma (New York: Schirmer, 1976), p. 70. 11 See Pierre Boulez, ‘Eventuellement …’, in Relevés d’apprenti (Paris: Seuil, 1966), pp. 153–4. 12 Ibid., p. 154.
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Example 6.1. Boulez, Structure 1a: graphs (a) and (b) (a)
(b)
With the years, and parallel to his own development, Boulez’s stance on Varèse has changed, and, in 1959, Varèse acceded to the Boulezian Parnassus in a commentary accompanying the recordings of Hyperprism, Octandre and Intégrales in the series of records edited under the label of the Domaine musical. This new stage is seen in the adoption into this framework of a vocabulary that Boulez had in the course of the 1950s reserved for the most innovative aspects of Webern and Debussy: thus it was a matter of ‘projection of complexes of timbres and registers’, ‘differentiation and immediate ordering into a hierarchy of relations [in aggregates of two to four pitches]: acoustic EVIDENCE’ and ‘“thinking form”, according to the lesson of the late Debussy’.13 The ‘acoustic evidence’ (évidence acoustique) that Boulez finds in Varèse corresponds to what he had called ‘sonic evidence’ (évidence sonore) around 1951–1952 in his description of the works of Webern and of his own poetics: the ‘generation of the structure on the basis of the material’,14 or an instrumentation that is not accidental but essential – in other words, something that reveals at the surface the underlying structure.15 In ‘Tendances de la musique récente’ (written in 1953, published in 1957), Boulez revisits this second meaning, and concludes by linking it directly to the problem of serial function: ‘orchestration no longer has a solely decorative function, but is itself part of the structure; it is a particularly efficient medium of relationship between and synthesis of pitches, note-values, and volume.’16 Such a comment 13
Pierre Boulez, Points de repère (Paris: Bourgois, 1985), p. 380. Pierre Boulez, ‘Schoenberg est mort’, in Relevés d’apprenti (Paris: Seuil, 1966), p. 271. 15 Boulez, ‘Eventuellement … ’, p. 173. 16 Boulez, Relevés d’apprenti, p. 228. 14
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refers explicitly to those places where, in the works of Varèse, sound objects with different instrumentations and registers are juxtaposed in an abrupt fashion: for these sound objects, which he also calls ‘compact blocks’, Boulez underlines (in contrast to Cage’s objects) the harmonic use, implying ‘conflicts’ by virtue of ‘the use of the relationships in the chromatic scale with the most tension’.17 In bars 19–24 of the first movement of Octandre two elements confront each other: the first consists of a repeated brass chord with an interpolated chord in which the woodwinds predominate; the second is composed of two largely identical sound blocks (only the flute adds two notes, at the minor ninth of the two horn notes respectively), which are testimony to an internal mobility surrounding a fixed chord, on which a melodic motive on the trumpet is superposed. A reduction of this passage to the mere pitch classes (Example 6.2a) shows, on the one hand, differentiation through recourse to register change and, on the other hand, the chromatic composition of the complexes. The acoustic evidence in the case of Varèse shows through in the identical register of the notes A–B–B in bar 20 and in the second aggregate of bar 22: this acoustic identity of the notes common to both blocks – real in the resultant sound – is the sign of an identical function, namely that of a chord in second position at the heart of a structure functioning by means of the balance between two distinct objects. The immobile sound of bar 23 is distinct not only because of rhythmic differences, but also in its instrumentation. It is precisely the two instruments that Varèse leaves out in bar 22 which play an essential role here: the trumpet with its melodic motive, and the trombone with a C4 around which the whole sound is articulated in a symmetrical manner. This symmetry is perfect only if the sound is reduced to pitch classes (Example 6.2b); on the other hand, if we take register into account – that is, the absolute values of the components of the sonority (Example 6.2c), one of the segments contains a permutation which warps the symmetry, without however affecting the general symmetrical framework, given by the extremities of the sound. The other notes of the trumpet part (G5 and F5), on the one hand broaden the chromatic segment in terms of pitch classes, and, on the other hand, return in the following bar (which is the counterpart of the first mobile sonority) in the form of sustained notes. For bars 49–64 of the second movement of Octandre (Example 6.2b), a similar course of reasoning can be followed, with one additional particularity. On the one hand, the two sonorities share four notes (of which three form a chromatic segment) in identical registers. On the other hand, the arrangement of the components reflects this idea of the permutation of notes at two distinct levels: firstly, a division into groups according to the values 6–(3)–1–(2) for sonority A and (1)–3–(2)–6 for sonority B; and, secondly, an articulation of the chromatic segment of six pitches from the first sonority according to the notes common to the second, leading to partial blocks also of 1, 3 and 2 sounds respectively, blocks which are treated separately, in a homogeneous manner, by means of registration. Boulez, Points de repère, p. 380.
17
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Example 6.2. Varèse, Octandre: graphs (a), (b) and (c) (a)
(b)
(c)
Such a clarification of the chromatic structure by means of register can be coupled with evidence in the realm of timbre, either by treatment in homogeneous strata, as in Intégrales (bar 78), or according to rhythmic groupings, as in Hyperprism (bars 45–48). The notion of permutation has acquired particular significance in the work of Stockhausen since 1953, when he spoke of Klangpermutation, the origin of his conception of an integral and therefore electronic serial work, namely Studie I. His general aesthetic intention is to show an unchanging universe in an ever-changing light.18 It is from this a priori starting point that he analyses the Concerto op. 24 by Webern;19 and when, at the end of 1954, he turned to Debussy, he emphasized, by way of a bridge towards Webern, the importance of sound blocks in the first movement of the Second Cantata op. 31 (this essential passage contained in the radio version was omitted from the printed version).20 There Webern limits the 18 Karlheinz Stockhausen, ‘Gruppenkomposition: Klavierstück I’, in Texte zur elektronischen und instrumentalen Musik, Vol. 1 (Cologne: DuMont Schauberg, 1963), p. 70. 19 Stockhausen, Texte zur elektronischen und instrumentalen Musik, pp. 24–31. 20 See also Boulez, Relevés d’apprenti, p. 197.
Example 6.3. Webern, Cantata No. 2 op. 31: graphs (a) and (b) (a)
(b)
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choice of serial forms to a series and its inversion, beginning with the same starting note; these two forms can further be read backwards in the melodic parts; in the orchestral parts, with few exceptions, only the six-note chords are heard, derived respectively from the four half-forms, pairs of which differ only by a single note: thus, the exchange in one sonority of the notes B and C implies a change of serial form (Example 6.3). At the formal level, the symmetrical distribution of the serial forms in the melodic part is unsettled by a counter-movement in several waves at the level of the spatial projection of the sonorities: the major strategies can be identified as (a) similarity of register between the blocks taken from different halfforms; (b) change of register by chromatic complementarity; and (c) progressively overstepping the range of the blocks. It is by these means that Webern concretely illustrates, on the sound plane, the last phrase sung by the bass soloist: ‘tritt das Bewegende im Klang hervor’ (‘the internal movement is revealed in the sound’). II The techniques of the articulation of sound described above correspond for the greater part to the common strategies of the first half of the twentieth century: concern for complementarity, chromatic harmony, symmetrical distribution and structural instrumentation. What distinguishes Varèse most clearly from his contemporaries is his interest in acoustics and in new instruments. Varèse’s expectations concerning new instruments were as much visions based, explicitly or otherwise, on his reading of the major work of Helmholtz, Die Lehre von den Tonempfindungen. Thus, for example, he wrote in his article ‘Nouveaux instruments et nouvelle musique’: the new musical device that I envisage will be capable of producing sounds at any frequency, and will extend the limits of both the highest and the lowest registers, which in turn will give rise to new organizations of vertical resultants: chords, their construction, their voicing – in other words their oxygenation. Not only will the harmonic possibilities be revealed in all their splendour, but the use of certain interferences created by the partials will be a considerable contribution. We can expect to be able to use the radical imaginings of lower resultants and differential and additional sounds. An entirely new extravaganza of sounds!21
These ideas correspond closely to points touched upon by Helmholtz in the second part of his treatise: there, under the title ‘Störungen des Zusammenklangs’ (‘Interferences in consonance’), he groups certain phenomena which would have attracted Varèse’s interest, for these are precisely combination sounds, interferences, or even low sounds or the lowest sounds of all. Varèse knew that, in order to exploit such enrichments of timbre, he would need specific equipment, Varèse, Écrits, p. 92.
21
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just as Helmholtz would have had to construct himself an ad hoc instrument, combining different polyphonic sirens, in order to see his research through. This was, for Varèse, the first obstacle – one of a purely material order. The second obstacle, of a more aesthetic order, lay in the very nature of the phenomena described by Helmholtz. Thus, for differential sounds, for example, he comes to the conclusion that: ‘The series [of differential sounds] are interrupted as soon as the last order fails to produce any new notes. As a general rule, this leads to the generation of the complete harmonic series 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, etc. right down to the generating fundamentals.’22 If one attempts to make these phenomena audible by means of instrumental writing, nothing but an increase in the density of the same chord in the bass register would be obtained. Varèse, a composer fascinated by older composers such as Debussy, Busoni and Richard Strauss, and at a time when the latter was considered, even more than Schoenberg, to be the modern composer par excellence, probably saw no gain in such a thickening of triadic structures. It must therefore be asked whether Varèse’s knowledge of Helmholtz served to provide a screen on to which he projected a somewhat negative image. Would he not rather, in pursuing his aim of writing resolutely modern, and therefore atonal, music, have attempted to apply certain fundamental ideas of Helmholtz to a foreign context? The absence of the indispensable means of production led him to imagine a form of concrete metaphoric composition; namely, an instrumental transcription of acoustic phenomena, considered in a rigorous, stylistic light. The principles of distortion which follow open up a network of stylistic conditions and compositional choices. At the beginning of Hyperprism (Example 6.4), the tenor trombone and the horns alternate with a repeated C4, varied by dynamic changes, glissandi or flutter-tonguing. Beyond the great variety of percussion instruments, only one other phenomenon appears: a D2 in the bass trombone shortly after the first glissando F4–C4 in the tenor trombone. The first order differential note of the interval F4–C4, considered as a natural major third, is a C2: the stylistic intervention thus consists of a chromatic alteration of the differential note with respect to the generating interval, as well as in its relatively independent rhythmic treatment. If, however, we take the notation chosen by Varèse strictly at face value – and if, therefore, F4–C4 is not an enharmonic major third, but simply an interval of four semitones in equal temperament – the differential sound changes, coming significantly closer to the D2 written by Varèse (in Hertz: 349.23 – 277.18 = 72.05, which is closest to the value 72.36 which corresponds to an eighth of a tone below D2, which has a frequency of 73.42). Any doubt is from this point onwards permitted! But whatever the right solution may be, there has been, in one way or another, creative intervention on the scientific information given by Helmholtz: the first leaves the acoustic foundation intact, but leads the composer to correct the result with a view to making his musical language stylistically appropriate; the second alters the very foundations of the acoustic theory, while adopting its 22 Hermann von Helmholtz, Die Lehre von den Tonempfindungen (Braunschweig: Vieweg & Sohn, 1913, 6th edition), p. 257 [trans. MP].
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principles of deduction, which are nonetheless a function of the resonance, and therefore of the natural harmonic series. In the transition to the following passage, in bar 12, a C6 is heard in the flute (with a doubling by means of a transitory low attack – C4 in the trombone) alongside the C transposed up an octave and played by the trumpet (i.e. C5). This C6 sounds for the first time after an ascending motive A3–C4, which can be identified without difficulty as the inversion of the figure F4–C4. Because of the logarithmic nature of our perception of the scale of pitches, such an inversion does not lead, in terms of combination sounds, to a symmetrical counterpart. The musical space created by the three sounds D2–C4–C6 seems to indicate that Varèse was more keen to take advantage of symmetrical distribution than to remain captive to a single acoustic metaphor. There is, however, another explanation for the C6, precisely in terms of combination sounds: the additional sound that A3 and C4 generate is a B4 too low by a quarter tone; since Varèse, with the exception of a D2 a quarter tone lower in the penultimate section of the work (bars 68–74), maintains a notation tempered by semitone, we assimilate this additional sound to a B4, which, in combination with the C5 in the trumpet, gives as a final additional sound, the C6 in the flute. This C6 is like a belated consequence of the other trombone glissando (bar 3: B3–C4), chronologically first in relation to the F4–C4, with which it subsequently regularly alternates. When it first occurred, the glissando B3–C4 immediately set off the siren; in the following occurrences, the siren is either delayed or absent, but keeps its rendezvous for the attack of the C6 in bar 12. Example 6.4. Varèse, Hyperprism: graph
At the beginning of Intégrales (Example 6.5), the calculation of the combination sounds on the basis of the complex formed by the three notes played by the clarinet (D5–A5 in short notes, a long note on B5) indicates, as much for the ‘differential’ sounds as for the ‘additional’ ones, the respective registers of the two sound blocks, in the woodwinds and trombones respectively. A double calculation of this kind, of both the sums and the differences, corresponds to the result provided by a ring-modulator in the electronic medium. It is true that certain adjustments are necessary to make the musical text fit the acoustic idea; since, however, all these ‘corrections’ result in a web of complex yet coherent relations, it is difficult to reject the principle itself as pure speculation. In the lower register, the range A2–F4 is shrunk symmetrically to C3–C4, whereas, in the high register, F6–A6 is extended to E6–B6. The A5, which is not taken into account here,
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assumes essentially a function of chromatic friction in the sonority with respect to the held note in the clarinet (B5); on the other hand, the woodwinds’ block is a transposition up a semitone of the ensemble of the initial figure, the chromatic complementarity of the passage as a whole (the nine notes of the segment A–E) assure it additional coherence of another order. These tranformations generate a vertical chain of minor ninths, linking the two sound objects and the initial figure: C3–C4–D5–E6. The significance of such relations of minor ninths is, at the end of this section, in bars 25–28, underlined in the extremes of register, in the flutes and trombones respectively. Moreover, the highest note in the piccolo, G7, is in a chromatically ascending relationship with the lowest sound in the double bass trombone, A1. The extreme registers thus form a metaphorical continuum (a transfer of the idea of chromatic modulus to real sound space), an idea close to that which Wyschnegradsky called the ‘cyclicity’ of sound space.23 Example 6.5. Varèse, Intégrales: graph
The second acoustic phenomenon in which Varèse shows deep interest is that of interferences and beats. In Helmholtz we read: ‘As soon as the relationships defined by consonance are no longer respected, beats occur, that is to say that entire sonorities, or isolated components, or indeed combination sounds of these sonorities either mutually reinforce each other, or cancel each other out. The sonorities do not, therefore, continue simultaneously without interference in the perception, but rather check their respective regular development.’24 Thus, the beats give rise to dynamic variations at the heart of a sonority, and their origin can be found in less than perfect intonation. In the orchestral introduction to Ecuatorial, Varèse gives this phenomenon two different readings: in bars 28–29, the ondes martenot oscillates sound F7 against F7, two notes whose dynamic evolution is completely independent; in bars 15–18, one component (metaphorically speaking, a partial) of a four-note chord played by the trumpets and ondes Martenot, and whose dynamic evolution is a decrescendo, comes out of this global envelope by means of a new increase in intensity, before the whole sonority disappears into silence. The composition of this sonority in terms of pitch classes provides an explanation of this state of affairs: of the notes A–B–B–F, 23 Ivan Wyschnegradsky, ‘Ultrachromatisme et espaces non octaviants’, La revue musicale (1972), p. 101. 24 Helmholtz, Die Lehre von den Tonempfindungen, p. 335 [trans. MP].
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it is precisely the last that does not belong to the chromatic set: this ‘foreign body’ is recognizable by its autonomous dynamic. Another acoustic metaphor facilitates an interpretation of the role of the resonant percussion at the beginning of Intégrales. The high-pitched instruments reinforce the last three entries of the block of woodwinds; the gong twice reinforces the block of brass; the tam-tam and chinese cymbal reinforce the entries of the trumpet when it takes up the solo part; tam-tam and gong prepare for the low-pitched complexes. The complex sounds of the percussion instruments are therefore assimilated to the sound complexes in the instrumental groups, a similar procedure to that which Boulez25 – from whom this terminology is borrowed – hoped for in 1953, by constructing, in his article ‘Tendances de la musique récente’, the historical lineage ‘percussion instruments – prepared piano – frequency multiplication (multiplication sonore)’ (i.e. Varèse–Cage–Boulez), and of which he gave a sonic illustration of stunning clarity on the final page of Le Marteau sans maître. In bars 174–190 of the final movement, Boulez alternates – in terms of the serial organization – cells taken from the basic series grouped according to variable densities, and blocks obtained by frequency multiplication. The boundaries between these different kinds of structures are indicated by changes of pedal point at the fermatas above bar-lines (the last over a silence). Now, Boulez had devised frequency multiplication in order to create the material for sound complexes: their assimilation to complex sounds is revealed by the presence of tam-tams and low gongs in the bars where the flute spells out, according to the different characteristic variants of the cycle ‘L’artisanat furieux’, such sound blocks. The flute, and later the resonant percussion, interrupt, once each, the course of the finale; on the occasions after that when they return, before the concluding page, the percussion accompanies the arabesques in the flute without interruption. At the end of the work, they ‘analyse’ the serial structure, in the same way as the sound complexes analyse metaphorically the complex sounds. Let us conclude by observing some ‘composed’ sonorities in the work of Varèse: their progressive ‘temporal’ constitution allows us to look inside their ‘extra-temporal’ structure. The most obvious examples are to be found in Déserts, where the graphic presentation, particularly of bars 41–45 and 85–93, with their subdivision into quavers, has certainly contributed to their popularity with the exegetes; moreover, the dynamics there are uncommonly differentiated. If we reduce these respective passages to their ‘composed’ sonorities, the parts of which are successively revealed at the surface, we obtain two dodecaphonic chords of symmetrical structure. In bars 41–45, the chord is made up of two vertical chains of minor ninths a tritone apart; one of the extreme notes of each such chain is reflected symmetrically within the range C2–C7 (Example 6.6a). If the same passage is then approached according to the order of appearance of the components 25 Pierre Boulez and John Cage, Correspondance, ed. Jean-Jacques Nattiez (Paris: Bourgois, 1991), p. 47; Eng. trans.: The Boulez–Cage Correspondence, ed. Jean-Jacques Nattiez, trans. and ed. Robert Samuels (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 30.
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of the sonority, whilst taking the two predominant harmonic factors into account – minor ninth and tritone – the beginning is surprising: although the framework interval of the triads in the extremes of the high and low registers is a minor ninth, the first interval to sound in each register is the fourth resulting from the reflection of the notes outside the tessitura. Thus, the only interval outside the framework is exposed in a particular manner by negative acoustic clarification. In bars 85–93, two sonorities of four notes each successively appear (bars 85–91 and 91–93). These sonorities are the result of a symmetrical projection with respect to the axis drawn in bars 41–45, namely F4–G4. Their instrumentation is different, accentuated, for the second sonority, by retreating attacks on the piano. In the mid-range, these sonorities are linked by a chain of major sevenths, variants of the minor ninths more common in Varèsian harmony (Example 6.6b). Example 6.6. Varèse, Déserts: graphs (a) and (b) (a)
(b)
Since Ecuatorial, minor ninths and the tritone have been given meaning as alterations of the octave and the fifth. It is on the basis of this tension that the non-octave structures in Varèse’s sonorities must be understood: at the entry of the choir in Ecuatorial, the open fifths repeated octave after octave even make one understand this negative reality which is the basis of the most radical of Varèse’s explorations into the new universe of sound, namely the metaphorical liquidation of dodecaphonic temperament and the octave as an identifying factor. Bibliography Boulez, Pierre, Relevés d’apprenti (Paris: Seuil, 1966) ——, Points de repère (Paris: Bourgois, 1985) —— and Cage, John, Correspondance, ed. Jean-Jacques Nattiez (Paris: Bourgois, 1991); Eng. trans.: The Boulez–Cage Correspondence, ed. Jean-Jacques
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Nattiez, trans. and ed. Robert Samuels (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) Cage, John, Silence (London: Marion Boyars, 1989) Helmholtz, Hermann von, Die Lehre von den Tonempfindungen (Braunschweig: Vieweg & Sohn, 1913, 6th edition) Kostelanetz, Richard, John Cage (Cologne: DuMont, 1973) ——, John Cage im Gespräch. Zu Musik, Kunst und geistigen Fragen unserer Zeit (Cologne: DuMont, 1989) Leibowitz, René, Introduction à la musique de douze sons (Paris: L’Arche, 1949) ——, Schoenberg and his School (New York: Da Capo Press, reprint 1979; orig. 1949) Peyser, Joan, Boulez: Composer, Conductor, Enigma (New York: Schirmer, 1976) Piencikowski, Robert, ‘Nature morte avec guitare’, in Josef Häusler (ed.), Pierre Boulez. Eine Festschrift zum 60. Geburtstag am 26. März 1985 (Vienna: Universal Edition, 1985), pp. 82–98 Schädler, Stefan, ‘Transformationen des Zeitbegriffs in John Cage’s Music of Changes’, Musik-Konzepte Sonderband John Cage II (Munich: Text + Kritik, 1990), pp. 185–236 Stockhausen, Karlheinz, Texte zur elektronischen und instrumentalen Musik, Vol. 1 (Cologne: DuMont Schauberg, 1963) Varèse, Edgard, Écrits, ed. Louise Hirbour (Paris: Bourgois, 1983) Wyschnegradsky, Ivan, ‘Ultrachromatisme et espaces non octaviants’, La revue musicale 290–291 (1972), pp. 71–141
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Chapter 7
‘I Open and Close’?
Richard Toop
It is clear that, for many composers in the second half of the twentieth century, the nature and function of beginnings and endings became a great deal less selfevident than was formerly the case, and nowhere more so than in the works of Brian Ferneyhough. In his music, increasingly, the standard strategies for setting a work in motion are not so much revoked as problematized and expanded: the very idea of beginning a work (as every composer must) is placed under particular, idiosyncratic scrutiny, and potentially becomes an intentionality-related ‘theme’ in its own right. Similarly, though perhaps to a lesser degree, the nature, function and even possibility of ‘endings’ is put in question. To begin with beginnings, and to summarize conventional wisdom: an opening may be tentative (exploratory), hortatory, expository, or it may suddenly open the door on a process already in full flow. However fleetingly, it defines a territory, which might be durable (as witness the Baroque principle of affects), or relative – a thesis in search of (or at least implying) an antithesis, as in much Romantic practice. In the course of the twentieth century, and particularly in the second half of the century where notions of a possible ‘lingua franca’ become increasingly illusory and ultimately absurd, the territory defined by an opening also becomes an emphatic assertion of aesthetic choice: a wilful decision to pursue a particular stylistic path in preference to a multiplicity of other available options. Yet in the mid-1960s, at the time Ferneyhough began his career as a composer, much attention was being given by leading members of the European avant-garde to ‘open’ or ‘variable’ forms, many of which reduced the whole notion of ‘openings’ and ‘endings’ to a near-arbitrary matter of choice. This is a notion to which Ferneyhough never subscribed – or at least, not in such an overtly gratuitous manner. While some works from 1970–1974 included aleatory elements, openings and endings were always ‘protected species’, immune from any significant variation. In Ferneyhough’s earlier pieces there are already various speculations at work which naturally affect the way that works open, but not necessarily in a sense that invites or obliges the listener to perceive them in a special light. In part, they simply reflect a young composer working inexorably but slowly towards a personal vision, via models from previous generations. Thus the Sonatas for String Quartet open with evocations of the Webern Bagatelles of nearly 50 years earlier, even if The title is that of a text by Samuel Beckett, Cascando, and a string quartet by Richard Barrett; only the question-mark is mine.
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such allusions are ultimately contradicted (or rather, problematized) by an overall duration that greatly exceeds Webern’s entire output for this genre. Similarly, while the athematicism that inaugurates the wind sextet Prometheus, and the compositional process that underlies it, may in fact reflect the young Ferneyhough’s fascination with such Heraclitean dicta as ‘One never steps twice in the same river’, at a more prosaic, purely aural level it might be sufficient to conclude that he had been impressed by Stockhausen’s Zeitmaße (as was also the case). These earlier works tend either to ‘drift into existence’ (as with Epicycle or Transit), or begin with dramatic/rhetorical assertions, as does Firecycle Beta – logically enough, in terms of its cosmological subject matter – or, at a more modest level, Sieben Sterne (1971) and Cassandra’s Dreamsong (1970). The opening of Transit is a classic exemplar of ‘becoming’: the neutral, ‘stateless’ initial chord for the six vocalists is gradually given ‘form’ by their own implementation of rhythmic models, and the still somewhat inchoate outcome is given further profile (one might say legitimation) by the more structured interpolations of three spatially distant timpani players. In concert, where the ensemble is laid out in concentric rings (by analogy with the pseudo-Renaissance alchemical woodcut which is one of the work’s inspirations), one is aware of a paradox here: the perceived (and increasing) coherence of the nearby voices seems to arise as a quasi-arbitrary byproduct of the action of remote forces. In the course of the 1970s, the status of the ‘opening’ becomes a more obvious subject of introspection in parallel with a more obviously ‘investigative’ approach to composition embodied in the Time and Motion Study series. The ‘problematic’ edge given to the opening of Transit by the spatial layout of forces is intensified in some respects in Time and Motion Study II for solo cello and electronics (1976). Here the soloist is not only placed in the midst of the electronic equipment, but is connected to it, almost as a laboratory subject of an experiment which is already under way before his first utterance (the two tape recorders which will gather some of these on loops having been started ten seconds earlier). Not unnaturally, the start of his part is marked: ‘extremely nervous’. The composer writes: ‘The opening section is composed of a lengthy passage in which interlocking fragments of the main and secondary material categories are “analyzed‑out” by recourse to two tape loop delay systems.’ Two things follow from this. The first is that, unlike many post-war modernists, Ferneyhough is very much attached to the traditional dualities of ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ materials (in his case, typically more a matter of ‘texture types’ than of motives per se). The second, more directly relevant to the subject of this essay, is that in the context of a piece which Ferneyhough describes as dealing ‘with the manner in which memory sieves, colors and re‑orders while processing information’, the initial material is already the object of compositional analysis, albeit, for a Brian Ferneyhough, Collected Writings, ed. James Boros and Richard Toop (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1995), p. 109. Ibid., p. 107.
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few seconds, inaudibly so (since the tape playback only becomes audible after 9 or 14 seconds). Resorting reluctantly to overused jargon, one might describe it as ‘double-coded’: it operates both as ‘utterance’ and as data for processing, and while one might argue that this latently true of any opening, its presentation as such here is disconcertingly overt. An extreme example of the expectations invested in even a single sonic event is provided by Ferneyhough’s comments on the opening of Unity Capsule: The first interval is a microtonal glissando, which thus immediately pinpoints the largely non‑tempered pitch material of the piece (the A ¾‑flat is, at one and the same time, part of a glissando which, by implication, sweeps through all microtonal intervals within the specified step, and a gesture produced by embouchure modification precluding exactly tempered pitch definition). This initial figure is, therefore, paradigmatic for the articulative ambitus of the whole.
In addition, considerable symbolic importance is attached (as with Time and Motion Study II) to a preparatory event that precedes the sounding piece itself: ‘A further consideration immediately underlining the complex relationship conjoining pitch, noise and action is the opening, highly demonstrative de‑tuning of the instrument which takes place before a sound is heard, so that the written pitches at that point in no rationally determinable way correspond to those encountered later, and which were, in fact, generated by the same system.’ One might doubt whether single visual or acoustic gestures, however arresting, can bear quite the weight of intention imposed on them here; at least, not from anyone’s view except the composer’s. However, in subsequent works, perhaps beginning with the String Quartet No. 2 (1980), Ferneyhough is at particular pains to arrive at opening ‘statements’ which both open up a distinctive acoustic field, and immediately suggest movements within it. One can see a move towards this aspiration in the second ‘version’ of Funérailles (1977–1980) for seven strings and harp. Here, however, there are particular complications to consider. Funérailles consists of two parts, the first of which is a 1977 completion of material dating back to 1970 (and thus to ‘early Ferneyhough’); the second part is a radically elaborated rereading of the first. In calling the two parts ‘versions’, the composer’s clear intention is to problematize the whole notion of the ‘work’. These two versions, he writes in the preface to the score, ‘can neither be considered as two movements of the same work, nor as two distinct works’. Neither may be played without the other, but nor may they be played directly after one another. This has little impact on one’s perception of the opening of Funérailles I, which one assumes would always be played first, not because the composer insists on it (the score is not entirely specific on this point),
Ibid., pp. 104ff (emphasis added). Ibid.
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but because it seems aesthetically unproductive to do otherwise. Funérailles II, on the other hand, is heard not so much as a ‘variation’ (or, in Renaissance terms, a ‘parody’) as an enormously enriched ‘other’, allied to its predecessor through the memory that Funérailles I began with a simple held note and crescendo, which in Funérailles II acquires an extraordinary intensity and subtlety that redefines (rightly) one’s expectations of the music to follow. In the case of the String Quartet No. 2, the genre itself appears to have played a decisive role: ‘In contrast to many works of the last decade, in which I undertook an “aesthetic investigation” of several areas of musico‑cultural interaction, the medium of the string quartet has imposed its own rules of play, forcing me to reorientate myself entirely within the boundaries of what might (platitudinously) be termed the “purely musical”.’ The ‘rules’ of the quartet genre are, in part, discursive, and this discourse rests, traditionally, on ‘figures’. Around 1980, Ferneyhough comes to adopts a very particular view of the musical ‘figure’, not as theme or motive (though that possibility is not ruled out), but as ‘a gesture whose component defining features – timbre, pitch contour, dynamic level etc. – display a tendency towards escaping from that specific context in order to become independently signifying radicals, free to recombine, to “solidify” into further gestural forms’. At one level, Ferneyhough is giving a more precise orientation to his old obsession with Heraclitean flux; at another, he is defining a space for musical ‘transformations’. The opening bars of the String Quartet No. 2 not only exemplify this approach, but also embody what becomes a characteristically ‘dialectical’ opening strategy, in which paradox plays no small role. Initially only the first violin is involved, alternating sharply etched ‘figures’ (and subsequently a more mellifluous ‘secondary material’) with bars of ‘silence’. The silence, however, is relative; the figures themselves are so intense that one needs the pause to absorb them, and perhaps imagine their continuation – to that extent the sound projects on into the silence. And while, at the outset, this is not a ‘quartet’, it rapidly and purposefully becomes one, through a process of ‘cell division’: a new instrument enters imperceptibly, momentarily turning its predecessor into a ‘super-instrument’ with eight strings, then detaches bit by bit to gain a separate identity. A comparably equivocal opening is that of the solo piano piece Lemma-IconEpigram (1981). It opens with what might call an ‘Urmotiv’: a four-note motive which, despite its extreme speed of emission, is so ‘generic’ (it belongs to what one might call an expanded family of B–A–C–H motives) that it immediately chisels itself into the listener’s memory. Curiously, Ferneyhough’s attitude to this prima materia is almost dismissive: ‘The piece has to start with some material, but it could have started with others; I simply wrote down a set of notes without thinking about them at all, and said, I will work with these’. I have to say that I
Ibid, pp. 117ff. Ibid. Ibid.
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rather take issue with that statement – the sketches (and the intervallic structure of the motive) don’t suggest that the selection of pitches was at all arbitrary. But in this context, that is a secondary issue. The motive is followed by a rapid sequence of equally brief transformations, each of which takes the motive in a different direction, and the cumulative effect of these (it should be borne in mind that one is only talking here about the first 30 seconds or so of the work), is intentionally dizzying: ‘the whole thing is in a whirlwind of dissolution even before it has been created’. So the opening figure has to operate as the template not so much for a conventional development, in which derived figures constantly reinforce one’s memory of the starting point, as for what Ferneyhough calls ‘a sort of non‑discursive argumentation’. It has to leave an almost ineradicable trace, such that, however radical the subsequent departures may be, it is still invoked in its absence: ‘we are already showing possible parametric expansional techniques, but at the same time, we are demonstrating the actual construction of the original. So at the same time as freeing itself from this space, it is reminding us what the original space was.’ 10 Nevertheless, Ferneyhough’s view of his initial material (if one can take his comments at face value) is still more concerned with its functionality than its innate ‘presence’. If so, this too changes. In 1983 he commented: ‘it is important that the initial sounds of a piece will give the listener that sense of aura, that sense of magnetism, that sense of presence, indefinable in another way, which only a particular sort of aural sensation can achieve. And therefore the beginnings of most of my works have that … or I try to make them have a very clear image.’11 This approach is exemplified in the first two parts of the Carceri d’Invenzione cycle (1981–1986): Superscriptio (1981) for solo piccolo, and Carceri d’Invenzione I (1982) for 16 players. Clearly, the idea of beginning a 100-minute cycle involving about 40 performers with a 4½-minute piccolo solo requires some special pleading. In the influential article Form-Figure-Style (1982), Ferneyhough ends by advocating ‘a species of expressive vitality which, like the architectural fantasies of Piranesi,12 does not content itself with remaining industriously imprisoned within the limits of the individual work.’13 The reference here, naturally, is to the series of engravings that gives the Carceri cycle its name (though with a double meaning: as ‘imaginary dungeons’, but also as ‘dungeons of invention’), and elsewhere, Ferneyhough expresses his admiration for ‘their quality of being capable of throwing their perspectival trajectories across the edge of the page into the world outside’.14 It is this aspect that conditions the opening of Superscriptio
Ibid., p. 264. Ibid., p. 288. 11 Ibid., p. 273. 12 Piranesi’s Carceri d’Invenzione engravings were shortly to provide the inspiration for a major cycle of works; cf. Ferneyhough, Collected Writings, pp. 186, 408. 13 Ibid., p. 28. 14 Ibid., p. 243. 10
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and, by implication, the series as a whole. In his preface to the score, Ferneyhough comments that ‘the sound of any extremely high or low instrument tends, at least for me, to evoke associations with borders, boundaries and with whatever lies beyond’.15 Here, the piece begins with the innately high instrument already in its highest range, but urging insistently upwards – constantly banging its head against an uncrossable barrier, an ‘unbreakable’ ceiling, seeking to sketch, however transitorily, ‘a trace with no dimensions, representing some ultimate “inside of the outside”, itself never to be captured in sound’.16 As for the opening of Carceri d’Invenzione I, it has to function in one of two ways: either as the commencement of an autonomous piece, or as the second part of the Carceri cycle, following on immediately from Superscriptio. Either way, it delineates extremes in much the same way as the opening of the piccolo piece does, but with at least two important distinctions. First, it charts the lower extremes (bass trombone) as well as the higher ones (piccolo), both being supplemented by the outermost registers of the piano. Second, the occupation of these boundaries is comparatively static; there is no attempt to break outside them. On the contrary, one might easily have the impression that the instruments have just forced an entry from ‘outside’, and are making (thwarted) attempts to break into the enormous ‘middle’ space that lies between them, and that will be spectacularly occupied by the remaining wind and brass a few moments later. ‘If I were just doing it as a dramatic gesture’, says Ferneyhough, ‘I believe that these forces would seem very implausible as entities, whereas by simultaneously figurally interpreting certain gestural units on several levels, through temporal and perceptual space, into the future, I believe I authenticate and validate these particular dramatic gestural devices as – what shall we say? – coherent definitions of lines of force’.17 All this, of course, operates well enough without reference to Superscriptio. But in the context of the whole cycle, additional factors come into play. By the end of the piccolo piece, the full (albeit limited) range of the instrument has been brought into play, even if the final note is, once again, at the very top of the instrument. So the opening of Carceri d’Invenzione I picks up from that last note, while also, by insisting on extremes, ‘wiping out’ the upper middle octaves that Superscriptio had gradually acquired, and thus referring back to the very beginning of the piece, so as to pursue a different course from almost the same point of departure. At the same time, after the initial bars for just three instruments, it finally ‘releases’ the ensemble that has been sitting mute onstage for the previous five minutes, rather like a genie corked up in a bottle. Clearly it would be tedious to examine every Ferneyhough opening since the Carceri d’Invenzione cycle, and to some degree superfluous, since the same basic principles apply. However, it may be instructive briefly to investigate the opening strategies of a later sequence of works for solo instrument and ensemble – La 15
Ibid., p. 134. Ibid. 17 Ibid. 16
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chute d’Icare (1988), Terrain (1992), Allgebrah (1990–1996), and Incipits (1996) – since here the openings are also reflections on the idea of a ‘soloist’, and his or her possible relations to an instrumental collective. Here again, certain extra-musical factors come into play, but only, I think, as a reinforcement of Ferneyhough’s own ‘innate ideas’. Thus, while the whirling solo clarinet part at the beginning of La chute d’Icare may indeed suggest the luckless aviator’s frantic and ignominious descent, one needs to remember that work’s title is taken from a painting by Brueghel in which, notoriously, one has to look hard to find any trace of Icarus, beyond a few ripples, and which the impact of this ‘mythical’ event is, on the face of it, negligible. And so it is (or seems to be) with Ferneyhough’s opening: the clarinet’s virtuosity is barely registered in the placid conduct of the other instruments. Yet in fact it is playing a vital role in shaping the overall harmonic structure, which evolves slowly and belatedly from its flurry of pitches. So what seems incidental is fact fundamental – what is portrayed as non-communication is, in effect, quite the reverse. Ferneyhough has referred to the clarinet in La chute d’Icare as an ‘obbligato’ part, and this reflects the fact that, timbrally, the clarinet is a natural part of the overall ensemble of three winds, piano, percussion and three strings. In Terrain, on the contrary, the solo violin is an emphatic outsider, set in opposition to the octet instrumentation of Varèse’s Octandre, whose only string component is a double-bass. Far from seeking to play down this opposition, the composer pushes it to extremes: the work opens with an extended violin solo, and it is almost two minutes (out of 14) before the rest of the ensemble starts to enter. As if to compensate for this, the single instrument engages in dialogue with itself, not just in terms of consecutive materials, but also, for much of the time, in the projection of two simultaneous layers (perhaps, rather than ‘dialogue’, one should call this stratified monologue). The beginning of Allgebrah for oboe and nine strings again provides a quite different scenario: a commencement in media res whose initial tutti bars are so frantically interwoven (particularly in the parts for oboe and the four violins) that only strategies for at least provisional disentanglement can follow. One might be inclined to ally this to the frantic creative activities of the schizophrenic artist Adolf Wölfli, from whom the work’s title derives, though Ferneyhough portrays it simply as the exposition of three layers of varying degrees of complexity whose shifting relationships will be central to the formal development of the work. As for Incipits, for solo viola, obbligato percussion and six strings, the title itself implies that the idea of beginning(s) is to be placed under the microscope. On the face of it, the situation at the outset is comparable to that of Terrain: the soloist plays for about one and a half minutes before the ensemble starts to enter. But whereas the violin in Terrain momentarily became a ‘pseudo-duo’, here the duo is real: the obbligato percussionist is also present from the start. Whether, or to what degree, this represents ‘dialogue’ is another matter. The two forces involved are flagrantly incommensurate: on the one hand, the viola with all its possibilities of nuance in pitch (extending to eighth-tones!), dynamics and timbre, and on the other, three
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woodblocks of indeterminate pitch, with no means of sustaining duration except tremolos – reviving Lévi-Strauss’s distinction, one might talk of an extreme confrontation of ‘the raw and the cooked’. Turning much more briefly to endings, some summary of general assumptions is again called for. Here, in conventional terms, obvious distinctions might be made between: • • •
palpable ‘closing strategies’ (codas), which might be triumphalist (rare today outside the minimalist repertoire), valedictory, ironic, or something else; what happens in the closing moments, which might be seen as the arbitrary end of a mechanistic process, the logical end of a teleological one, an unexpected last-minute swerve, and so on; and what the listener senses when the activity of the musicians has just come to an end (the ending after the ending).
For Ferneyhough, it seems, works themselves do not ‘finish’ in quite the conventional sense, though clearly there is a point at which the composer ‘finishes’ them, by stopping work on them (and consequently, at which the musicians stop playing). This does not mean that the works are necessarily ‘open-ended’, though in a limited sense this too is the case. For instance, in relation to a relatively early work like Transit, he writes: ‘The work does not set out to recommend any of the world views it reflects upon; as with other works, the ending really rather leaves things coolly open’.18 Yet such an opinion is likely to startle the listener who has just experienced the final, apocalyptic moments of the work (tam-tam and all the rest), and what the composer himself describes as ‘the final, chaotic cycling of the brass and percussion’.19 Similarly, concerning Time and Motion Study II, Ferneyhough comments that ‘As with the other components of the cycle, no definitive conclusions are drawn: the future remains open’.20 But this at least partly reflects the ‘investigative’ agendas underlying many works of the 1970s, and the Time and Motion Study cycle in particular: given a sufficiently rich field of investigation, there are no definitive conclusions, only points at which it seems sensible to call a temporary halt, and reflect before deciding whether or not to proceed further. This seems to imply that, for the listener too, even the most emphatic of conclusions is to be understood in a broader perspective, and that at least two levels of reflection should follow the final sounds. One might compare this to a judicial process where, at the end of evidence being given, one makes an initial assessment per se of the last statements heard, but then assesses them in relation to everything that preceded them. 18
Ibid., p. 326. Ibid. 20 Ibid., p. 114. 19
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If this idea of some kind of auditory double-take by the listener immediately after a performance seems unduly fanciful, it gains considerable support from Ferneyhough’s comments on the final part of Lemma-Icon-Epigram. These directly address not only the listener’s possible response to its process of collapse and dissolution – almost capitulation – but also (and in this context, more significantly) the reflective feedback process that might follow in its wake: In Lemma-Icon-Epigram, for instance, you will find a final section which is peculiarly out of proportion, somehow `weak’ when approached from preceding passages. One sort of frame has been suggested, for which this ending is clearly inappropriate, something of a let-down. Whether it is an actual failure, of course, depends almost exclusively on what evidence one has been able to assemble as to the overall focus and ambience of the work up until that point. An aware listener will presumably feel frustrated by the collapse at the end, the inefficient dissipation of accumulated energies: at that time (at the latest immediately after the conclusion of the performance) this frustration will, ideally, feed back into and animate the reflexive phase of aesthetic reception. For that, those remaining energies can still come in useful.21
One might wonder, however, whether such refection is to be left entirely to the listener, or whether the composer might not feel inclined to implant a last-minute (or last-moment) signpost, and indeed there are some such. Admittedly, it is doubtful whether the natural harmonic B at the end of the guitar piece Kurze Schatten II, which the composer describes as ‘a Pyrrhic victory, perhaps, for the defamiliarization principle over the ineluctable encroachment, from panel to panel, of “normal” guitar sonority’22 would ever have much more than symbolic value, and then only for those ‘in the know’. But the quizzical little figure that ends Lemma-Icon-Epigram does indeed seem to say ‘Well, there it is – make up your own mind!’. Innate in such an ending is the perception of fragmentation, and there is no doubt that for Ferneyhough this fragmentation has acquired a significance that is very different to its valedictory aura in Webern, or its iconclastic status (the isolated shards left after the tabula rasa) for the 1950s avant-garde. It is, in fact, a precondition for his own very particular conception of ‘open-endedness’. He writes: ‘I believe very much that fragmentation … can only have a musical expressive significance to the extent that we can postulate at least possible alternative ideal completions that never were’.23 And elsewhere, invoking a much broader perspective: ‘if you can create enough energies in a musical (or any sort 21
Ibid., p. 451. Ibid., p. 152. The piece begins with substantial scordatura. By the end of the piece, all strings except the one on which this final note is played have been restored to the normal tuning. 23 Ibid., p. 267. 22
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of artistic) language, you’re capable (or the language is capable) of doing a salto mortale over the edge of the picture, or over the end – the final double bar line – of a composition, in such a way as to be able actually to modify, to change, to show in a different light the world outside the object itself. And that would be a sort of idealistic answer to the question of what does a work of art mean, and what is it for, what does it do, how does it express?’.24 Bibliography Ferneyhough, Brian, Collected Writings, ed. James Boros and Richard Toop (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1995)
24
Ibid., p. 290.
Chapter 8
A Period of Confrontation: The Post-Webern Years
Célestin Deliège
Art can express its radical potential only as art, in its own language and image, which invalidate the ordinary language, the ‘prose du monde’. (Herbert Marcuse, Counterrevolution and Revolt) And let us not forget that rarely has a generation of composers had so many lucky opportunities and been born at so favourable a time as the present period: the ‘cities have been razed’ and we can start again from the ground up, without regard for the ruins or relics of a time ‘without taste’. (Karlheinz Stockhausen, Texte)
Introduction My intention here is not to adopt a militant approach. It’s more a question of taking a fresh look at an era remarkable for its musical creativity, and to do so as objectively as possible in the context of a debate that has not yet reached its conclusion, while at the same time attempting to raise critique to a more dialectical level. We need to ask straight away who it is and what it is we are talking about. Who? We are referring to those who have made history since the death of Webern. Of this there can be no doubt. It’s only for the historian that history involves discontinuity; for society it is perfectly continuous, since it cannot accept a void. Yet if we manage to agree on a definition of creativity and the creative act – let’s say that of Rimbaud or Schoenberg, as the production of an event appearing for the first time, where the process is attached to some indispensable innovation – friend and foe alike will know exactly who is being referred to. Approval or suspicion
This essay was originally written in 1987 and was first published in the French version of this volume in 2001. Herbert Marcuse, Counterrevolution and Revolt (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1972), p. 103 (italics in original). Karlheinz Stockhausen, ‘Zur Situation des Metiers (Klangkomposition)’ (1953), Texte zur elektronischen und instrumentalen Musik, Vol. 1 (Cologne: DuMont Schauberg, 1963), p. 48 [trans. MP].
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only begin when the question is raised as to what the substance of the innovation might be. The history of which we speak should not therefore need re-evaluation. This latter proposition will not, however, be recognized as true by opponents of the historical rupture represented by the 1950s and 1960s. It could well be said that, for them, the outcome is already signed and sealed; if they are not obsessively determined to reduce the problem to something planned beforehand then they can only approach it, of course, via the kind of unsupported claims that apparently require no explanation. How has it come about that they find such meagre resources on which to devote the pursuit of reason? If I begin my contribution in this way, rather than arguing from the outset by invoking Stockhausen and Boulez, who are my principal subjects, it is because, at the very moment I began to write, an old issue of Music & Letters (July 1987) fell into my hands. It contained a critical review of Boulez’s Orientations (the English translation of Points de repère) in which the reviewer was content to see historically ‘a sense of nostalgia for lost causes’. Were these critical comments to prove justified, then 20 years or so of musical creativity, of discoveries and invention, would have to be considered null and void. How, consequently, is one to understand the way in which musical history, having produced a vacuum, has been able to manifest itself more recently, and this being the case, from which source has it been able to derive its nourishment? God alone creates out of nothing, or from chaos! The reviewer’s criticism provides no response whatsoever to this crucial question; it sends us away instead to look at the concert programmes ‘the big London orchestras offer now’ compared to those of the Domaine Musical in the 1950s and 1960s. The observation lacks precision. But were our man to be able, even inside his head, to cite some examples of works to demonstrate what he means, this would still remain an opinion of no consequence. It is difficult to see how the significant musical works that came out of the 1970s or 1980s, just as with the music of other preceding periods, could be unable to offer any immediate points of reference to its antecedents. Of course, from the perspective of empirical, or even romantic, criticism, such a question can no have no meaning at all; 20 years of collapse in music history represent but a brief moment of distraction or delirium, and if there must be a transition with an historical antecedent, it will be discovered in other values, in works from the first half of the century, for example, even if this should entail forgetting that they might have a place of their own in the historical continuum. But whatever might be the case for such an ill-considered attitude, I do not wish
See Douglas Jarman, Review: ‘Orientations: Collected Writings by Pierre Boulez, ed. Jean-Jacques Nattiez; and Pierre Boulez: a Symposium, ed. William Glock’, Music & Letters, 68/3 (July 1987), pp. 282–3. Ibid., p. 283. Ibid. Douglas Jarman writes: ‘How sad, and how salutary, it is to read the manifestos and the programmes of the Domaine Musical concerts and compare them with the sort of programmes the big London orchestras offer now!’
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to argue here, in the name of the perpetual return of things remembered, that once again ill fate during the creation of works ensures that they be recognized today as important. History probably does not recognize literal repetition, but what is at issue in the present problematic has gone beyond the framework of whether a work should be considered as good or bad, interesting or tedious. Instead, it is a question of evaluating an entire project, the aim of which was nothing less than how to unblock the history of Western music, which, by the early decades of the twentieth century, had reached the critical stage, first of all, of no longer being able to assume the existence of a traditional lingua franca given that a ruptured musical language was the only prospect in view; and, second, of the necessary recognition that Webern had provided the exemplary and incontrovertible model for what an atonal harmonic language could be, by means of serial organization and the chromatic scale. It cannot be stated too strongly to those for whom music is more than just a pleasant décor, and who did not live through the immediate postWebern period, what a time this was for those who wished to compose; the sum of anxiety was oppressive in the presence of the necessity to invent, but how much this was compensated by the enthusiasm provoked when every new discovery seemed to open up new paths and break down walls. The manner in which the efforts of the 1950s are currently naïvely discussed – something we have just seen blithely displayed in the review referred to above – signals a difficult and delicate necessity to employ tools of argument rather different from the traditional material of art criticism: this is, all told, nothing less than the problem of the future of musical civilization, as it was accepted by some musicians at that time when confronted by detractors who had nothing to propose by way of counter-argument. And even today it is difficult to see how 30-year-old composers could devote themselves to models other than those of their immediate predecessors, something that cannot be avoided without recourse to regressive practices or contributions from outside Western music. The fundamental debate is as wide open as that. It could, however, be summarized simply by the mere listing of titles: Stockhausen’s Gruppen, Carré, Kontakte and Hymnen; Berio’s Epiphanie and Chemins I–IV; Boulez’s Pli selon pli and cummings ist der dichter – to cite but a few virtually irrefutable examples produced during the incriminating years. Do they truly represent lost causes? However, I shall not choose this easy path, although it ought to suffice to legitimate that which is at stake, when we must, without further ado, put paid to the poor standard of such a pronunciamento. What the hostile critique of modernism defends is the traditional notion of the masterpiece, a notion that is more a matter of taste than of conceptual thinking. It is not under this heading that I make my challenge and choose my terrain – that is to say, by opposing to it other masterpieces whose quality could be attributed to our own taste. To escape from the circularity of such a commodified debate, we must therefore go further, and defend modernism in the name of what it is, by recognizing as much its aporias as its consistency.
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I shall draw on a text by Valéry, aimed originally at secondary school pupils in 1932, with the object of proposing a particular critical conception of history. The perspicacity of this little article, occasional and deliberately simple in character, is worthy enough to have inspired Paul Ricoeur, and I intend to use it here in order to structure my own ‘plot setting’. Using Valéry’s argument in the present circumstances, I must first of all apologize for the crudity of the scheme I attribute to him, and which does not really allow appreciation of its finer points. Its basis lies in the implacable opposition between the existence of a fact and the evaluation of its importance by the historian. This results in such differences between those whose burden it is to observe the event that the only agreements it is possible to reach are upon objective propositions of the kind: ‘Louis XIV died in 1715.’ Each of the various extensions given to the event ‘express the nature and character of their authors and this always results in an obvious fact, which is the impossibility of separating the observer and that which he has observed, the history and the historian’. The significance accorded to historical facts is therefore dependent upon testimony and leads to a choice of conventions. Since history, as a discipline, has not been able to establish itself as an exact science, the relative point of view to which it gives rise implies that the interpretation of the past is translated for us by a multiplicity of possible consequences. And, as if we had followed the Augustinian path relative to the conception of the modalities of the present, Valéry writes: ‘At each instant, you suppose another instant other than that which follows: in each imaginary present in which you place yourself, you conceive of another future other than that which comes to pass.’10 Thus appears the celebrated ‘IF’ of conjectures, the little conjunction, which ‘grants to history the power of novels and stories.’11 From this ‘suspension’ arises the idea of ‘fate’: ‘the following moment will be that of coronation or the scaffold, that of the artist who will unveil his marble statue …’12 It is here that reality always appears likely to lend itself to a multitude of interpretations: ‘This is why a De Maistre or a Michelet are equally possible’, and why, for us, ‘the eternal present is like a fluttering between symmetrical hypotheses, the one supposing the past, the other suggesting to us a future.’13 Having reached this point of reflection, Valéry tries to be pragmatic. The investigative method he proposes for ‘reading’ history ‘and making use of it’ is for everyone to rely upon the subjectivity of his personal experience by approaching the past from the present. He thereby proposes to his young audience an evaluation Paul Valéry, ‘Discours de l’histoire’ (1932), Essais quasi politiques, In Variétés, Oeuvres, Vol.1 (Paris: Gallimard, 1957), pp. 1128–37. Ibid., p. 1130. Ibid. 10 Ibid., p. 1132. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid., p. 1133. 13 Ibid.
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of the 45 years separating the time of his talk from his own time as a student of rhetoric at school.14 Valéry’s conclusion, after a brief examination of the two periods, is the absolute impossibility of all prediction. ‘In 1887 could even the most knowledgeable man, the most profound philosopher, the most calculating politician have dreamed of that which we see today, after forty-five miserable years?’, asks the writer. His response, which he takes great care to underline, is that ‘we walk backwards into the future’.15 We leave Valéry’s discourse, knowing – as we could hardly fail to acknowledge – that the recommended method risks turning out to be insecure, trusting a past situated in the perspective of the longue durée and which no longer encompasses the memory of present witnesses; but the proposal appears convincing to us if we put the decades separating us from events belonging to history to good use in order to rediscover them from the perspective of intimate experience; and, furthermore, if we think of Carl Dahlhaus’s observation16 that, a fortiori, the understanding of art accrues suggestive possibilities over time, which is something that distinguishes it historically from other past events, in that the existence of art works is perpetuated even though the period of their creation has passed. Positioning ourselves in the Augustinian triple present and trusting in the wise philosophy of Valéry, we therefore attempt to penetrate history backwards and, taking our leave from an outcome unknowable in 1950, to re-evaluate this recent past by working towards an outcome that is actualized or dissolved before our very eyes. We can perhaps – but without seeking to foretell – try to conceive the potentialities concealed within that which is actually available to us, although this final point will not constitute the essential object of our consideration. It is anticipated that we shall encounter on the way the ‘little conjunction’, the IF of all imaginary history. We shall have to ascribe this type of encounter to the adversary of modernism (which believes in lost causes and nostalgia), who thereby involves his own – that which has not taken place. But other ‘ifs’, in forms more subtle, or more durable and critical, have insinuated a heavy conditionality into the present of this past, questioning it on its future. We shall also have to encounter these ‘ifs’, which are born of the uncertainties of a history brought back to zero. It will be understood that my favoured terrain will be the initiatives taken by Stockhausen and Boulez, as opposed to their works looked at individually. The substance of my argument in a earlier study was that at this period we did not so much ask: ‘What is Boulez composing? What is Stockhausen composing?’17 The question that preoccupied us instead was: ‘At what stage is Boulez now? At what stage is Stockhausen now?’ In that present, now passed, we thus knew that these two composers were making the musical history that we were living through 14 In 1887 Valéry was a pupil at the lycée in Montpellier. He then went on to study law at the University of Montpellier, graduating in 1892 [note MP]. 15 Ibid., p. 1135 (emphasis in original). 16 Carl Dahlhaus, Grundlagen der Musikgeschichte (Cologne: Gerig, 1967), Chapter 1. 17 See Célestin Deliège, Invention musicale et idéologies (Paris: Bourgois, 1986).
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and would go on living. And this judgement was not wrong, for whatever one might think of their activities today, what other historical juncture could have led towards a different field of creativity? This history has certainly been a troubled one, even from within the inner sanctum, but whether it is to be read in exaltation or disillusionment, it has been accomplished without any counterpart, without any alternative. The period of convergence The second great reflection upon the organization of post-tonal language during the course of the twentieth century – the first having been that of Schoenberg, 30 years earlier – was due to Olivier Messiaen, perhaps the least controversial composer of our time, thanks to the aura of legitimacy with which he succeeded in surrounding his art. How could a society, even one saturated by the values of materialistic exchange, deny a high credit to an art emphasizing the most traditional spiritual values, values that, perhaps above all else, no longer hold, and thereby tend to become rarefied in the bosom of a lay collectivity, which therefore feels all the more obliged to respect them? Moreover, Messiaen’s craft, always accomplished in broad daylight, yet without ostentation, never ceased to refer to traditions of education and training that had great social credibility. As a composer, however, Messiaen’s mode of behaviour was never conventional or academic; he thus revealed himself often to be audacious, but always remained very wary in crossing the threshold of adventure. He liked, even during the 1940s, to define himself as a rhythmician; and his extensive research into the syntax of durations – concerned with the design of new rhythmical figures or their redistribution in a flexible, supple metre, sometimes in a ‘drawn-out’ tempo, sometimes more precipitous – has always rested upon an unquestionable efficacy. It was Messiaen, nonetheless, who, aiming at a complementary extension of his rhythmic system, in 1949 became carried away by a relationship of interdependence between different parameters of sound which up to then had always been treated compositionally as independent categories. I only return to this celebrated event here in order to underline its historical importance. To come back to Valéry’s distinction, I should say that the term ‘importance’ has here nothing of the excessive about it; it can hardly be doubted that the objective existence of the Mode de valeurs et d’intensités, from the Quatres études de rythme (1949–1950) for piano coincided, for the young musicians of the time, with its importance: an importance far more concerned with – and this was also the view of its composer – the consequences of the step taken than with the intrinsic value of the piece in itself. The somewhat banal fact, to which it is nevertheless worth drawing attention here, is that this is a case of a theoretical proposition formulated as a work which then not only passed beyond the work in question, but also became an authentic theme of research in its own right, and in its turn was drawn upon to create works which would in due course themselves soon be demanding to be revised and
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superseded. The objective fact – in the sense in which an event, to use Valéry’s example, is dated – is the work and the theoretical proposition that it implies, and the importance of the proposition is the result of an historical situation. If Messiaen, from a personal point of view, prioritized research into rhythm, he was not alien to the ways of thinking thrown up by the phenomenon of serialism: it is no accident that the modes of pitch in Mode de valeurs et d’intensités are based upon scales of twelve notes. And it is no less true that it is by virtue of their reflection upon Webernian serialism that Boulez and, two years later, Stockhausen discovered in Messiaen’s proposition the source of an extended conception of serial technique. Boulez immediately translated the theory into Structures I (1952) for two pianos, and the relationship to Messiaen is explicitly attested by his decision to transfer one of Messiaen’s modes of pitch for use as the pitch series of Structure Ia and to incorporate into the series, as Messiaen had done, a scale of durations organized in arithmetical progression, a series of attacks and a group of intensities. With Stockhausen, the same position is confirmed even more explicitly, if that is possible, by the reference to Messiaen and to his fellow student, Karel Goeyvaerts, who was at that time working in the same direction, in combining this research with an analysis of Webern’s Concerto op. 24, in which he discovers, in the mirror games that characterize that piece, a marked tendency towards systematization of the relations between variables.18 Although, to my knowledge, there is no documentary evidence concerning the meetings and conversations between Boulez and Stockhausen during the latter’s spell in Messiaen’s class in Paris, it is nevertheless absolutely certain historically that the meetings were frequent and that the observable correlations in the research of the two composers is in no sense something that can be accounted for exclusively from their reading of Messiaen and Webern, but that it arose from an authentic dialogue. The Parisian period of Stockhausen’s youth is, moreover, the single moment permitting us to speak of a Boulez–Stockhausen conjunction. This conjunction, which manifested itself concretely in Boulez’s Structures I and Polyphonie X (1950–1951) on one hand, and, on the other, Stockhausen’s Kreuzspiel (1951), Klavierstücke I–IV (1952–1953), and Kontrapunkte (1953), could not last. The composers’ paths would progressively diverge – although it didn’t get to the point of their no longer being able to shake hands until about 1963 – but whatever the degree of cordiality such gestures might suggest today, the observer can no longer imagine, from their works and options, what might have been the content of that which in politico-diplomatic jargon is called a ‘summit conference’. To tell the truth, from the perspective of a ‘conjunction’ there was no more produced by the Boulez–Stockhausen relationship than could be said to be the case for any other group of artists in the course of the twentieth century, whatever 18 Karlheinz Stockhausen, ‘Weberns Konzert für 9 Instrumente op. 24. Analyse des ersten Satzes’ (1953), Texte zur elektronischen und instrumentalen Musik, Vol. 1 (Cologne: DuMont Schauberg, 1963), pp. 24–31.
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their disciplines; and allusion is only made here to the distancing between two composers who had taken part for two years in common research – virtually nothing on a larger historical scale – so as not to puzzle the reader who might be expecting on my part the intention of uniting their different points of view. That question is not on the agenda of this chapter. Returning to the works from the period of convergence, what strikes us most from examining them is the parallelism of serial conception: the desire to affirm the equivalence of the horizontal and vertical projection of the material, involving a type of combination in which the diagonal dimension will generate or take advantage of unisons. One can hardly give a better example of this conscious desire than works such as Kreuzspiel and Polyphonie X, in which the visual intersections of the notation generate the aural architecture. Such intersections rest – whether totally or otherwise – upon the group of properties belonging to the sound, thus creating a strictly probabilistic combination. The composers had the merit of immediately realizing the excess of riches resulting from their discovery, and we know that they were not slow to draw their conclusions, each according to his fashion. But it would be wrong, in spite of serious self-critique, to deny that a very profound trace of the research undertaken at that point of convergence has marked both their subsequent paths. Boulez expressed in 1954, with considerable fury,19 what could appear to be a partial disavowal of what he had written in 1952 in his article ‘Eventuellement’;20 but it would still be erroneous only to see criticism or self-criticism in these humorous remarks, however scathing. Boulez’s writings convey above all else the refusal to allow a proposition, even one coming from him, to take a dogmatic turn, and this refusal is always added to new propositions. These theoretical essays must be read, above all, as the expression of a poetic art: it is in this sense that they are interesting, and that they need to be studied one day by placing their polemical aspect, which so far has been regarded as their most striking feature, to one side if we wish to attempt to grasp their central concepts. This is also why I detect in Boulez a type of approach that is essentially Popperian, as I have also noted elsewhere.21 Stockhausen’s refutation of the excesses of complexity has likewise been most rapidly denoted by his practice as composer, although he would never withdraw a work from his catalogue, as Boulez did with Polyphonie X and other works afterwards, no more than he would return to works already completed. For him, it is always the next work that ‘corrects’ its predecessor, if need be. But Stockhausen displays a far more shrewd – albeit perhaps unconscious – form of re-evaluation: he categorizes his works according to subsequent stages of his evolution, even at the risk of somewhat mistaking their status. He has acted in this way in arranging 19
Pierre Boulez, Relevés d’apprenti (Paris: Seuil, 1966), pp. 27–32. Ibid., pp. 147–82. 21 Célestin Deliège, ‘La fin du romantisme’, Entretemps 4 (1987), pp. 40–41. 20
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his first piano pieces into relevant categories of ‘group’ technique.22 This form of retrospective anticipation has been noted by one of the best commentators upon his work, Jonathan Harvey.23 It would, however, be unjust to see in this attitude some form of malice on Stockhausen’s part. The evidence shows that the composer’s experience of discovery was that of an unimaginable state of exaltation. Stockhausen’s sense of the present is combined with paroxysm: the danger it threatens, from this standpoint, would be that discovery and invention should be experienced for their own sake. This mode of behaviour favours the appearance of provisional works. By this I mean those works, such as Mikrophonie I (1964), which display more their origin and underlying character as research than their actual aesthetic outcome; but, in such a case, another work – in this particular case, Momente (1962) – reveals the aesthetic solution which could have been drawn from the initial vision. The critique developed by Stockhausen and Boulez simultaneously with their so-called ‘pointillist’ works (using the term to characterize forms made up of a constellation of points) leads us towards Valéry’s ‘little conjunction’: the enigmatic if which ‘makes us participate in this suspension in the face of uncertainty, wherein consists the sensation of great lives’, at the point when ‘the artist reveals his marble or gives the order for the removal of the arches and props still supporting his edifice’. This kind of self-questioning described by Valéry is that of the person in charge. That quality of the if pertains in the immediate present or in a present projected into the immediate future, but which seals the destiny of the work of art. This is an if which can be that of Cézanne’s celebrated doubt in the face of the work to be made, or that of the decision, already taken, to change direction. The critique put forward by Boulez and Stockhausen, each according to their distinctive modalities, belongs to this category of turning back upon itself. But alternative ways of introducing the ‘little conjunction’ were being expressed at that time and are still being expressed: the if of true nostalgia for that which is completed, and therefore posed in the past tense; the hostile if, of the kind that we discovered at the beginning of this essay, in which the implied question is ‘and what if events had been different?’ This if is always objectively masked by irony and pity because it discharges itself only in vain conjectures or in silence. In parallel with total serialism (irrespective of whether its advent is interpreted as terrifying or salutary from the perspective of any future history) this question has so far received no answer: all things considered, there was no alternative imaginable at that time to Stockhausen’s conception of serialism, save perhaps for the case of Xenakis; but it is unlikely that the nostalgic if would ever have been convinced by this. The same state of mind can find no refuge with Messiaen, who was undisputedly responsible for making the initial effort with total serialism, any more than with Stravinsky, who defended these new compositional developments. 22 Karlheinz Stockhausen, ‘Erfindung und Entdeckung. Ein Beitrag zur Form-Genese’ (1961), Texte zur elektronischen und instrumentalen Musik, Vol. 1, p. 232. 23 Jonathan Harvey, The Music of Stockhausen (London: Faber, 1975), p. 23.
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When Claude Samuel asked Messiaen about the consequences of his research into rhythm amongst the composers of the next generation, the master’s response was completely unambiguous: ‘Pierre Boulez is the one most influenced by my rhythmic research; even so, his approach is different from mine and, above all, he had the intelligence to associate it with the serial procedures of Webern and the system of irrational note-values that, beginning with Chopin, were pursued by Debussy and found one of their best outlets in Varèse and Jolivet.’ And Messiaen continues: ‘I’ll cite next the research into irrational values carried to its extreme by Karlheinz Stockhausen; in his Klavierstücke and his Zeitmaße, irrational values of extreme complexity have made rhythmic headway’.24 It will no doubt be objected that Messiaen’s argument is an argument about technical competence and that it belongs to the kind of militant discourse that justifies all forms of invention in the name of internal artistic necessity. Therein appears a crucial problem, which the composer himself skirts and for which cultural sociologists have often reproached him, but which critical philosophy, as in the case of Adorno, takes into account in defending the creator’s standpoint. As we shall see later, Stockhausen did not totally ignore this aspect, while Boulez seems to have passed over it in silence. I shall return to this point, but without claiming to be able to go beyond it. For the moment, however, there is little choice but for us to underline the powerlessness of the nostalgic if, which accuses composers of pursuing lost causes, but which can only win its own cause by withdrawing from that on which it claims to stake everything. Its complaints hit an impasse – the pipedream of an illusory reversibility of what is towards what was. In other words, it cannot itself reflect its own complaint; its criticism is incapable of exerting itself in reality, owing to the fact that the argument it develops against the composer– creator follows from a criticism passed over in silence, and which it refuses or neglects to address to society. Cage: an interpellation Another call to attention, which was not really formulated as such but nevertheless involved the if in the form of the conditional faced with the most immediate present, goes something like this: If, instead of composing works bending under the weight of information excess, you were to substitute by means of chance processes a total absence of relations between the sounds you put into your work, would this be any the less satisfying? This question merits even more consideration, given that it came from a brother and not an enemy. Cage, who posed it implicitly, had the prestige of the family elder, and his experience was unimpeachable. He admired Satie, but also Webern. The traces of a poor art (art pauvre, or arte povera) to 24 Olivier Messiaen, Music and Color: Conversations with Claude Samuel, trans. E. Thomas Glasow (Portland, OR: Amadeus Press, 1994), p. 82. Original French edition: Claude Samuel, Entretiens avec Olivier Messiaen (Paris: Belfond, 1967), p. 89.
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be found in his Quartet did not leave one to suppose that that which attracted him most in Satie was the musique d’ameublement. Furthermore, he was quite clear that it was the relative isolation of sounds and the importance of silence that struck him most in Webern. During the 1940s he seemed to have tried to pursue the programme begun by Varèse, paying particular attention to percussion and to noise. His first works for piano, the attention he paid to serial technique, and above all, his invention of the prepared piano, won him the sympathy of the young Europeans. Boulez, most notably, considered him in 1950 to be a confidant, and kept up a sustained correspondence with him, over which musicologists in the twenty-first century will have plenty to quarrel about when they write the history of our time. In the meantime, ‘Le système mis à nu’ (‘The system stripped bare’),25 a significant extract from this correspondence which appeared in Points de repère, shows the extent of the exchange of ideas between the two men on questions of compositional craft and current projects. In this text, Boulez expounds at length to his friend on the latest stages of his research into serial technique which, at that time, he envisaged basing on quarter tones. He speaks of works in progress, among which are Un coup de dés, a composition which unfortunately has remained in the archives. This correspondence was suddenly brought to a halt by Boulez, says Cage: ‘But he rejected outright any acceptance of the idea of chance. That wasn’t a part of his views.’26 From the moment when Cage began to devote his compositions to chance processes and to a completely passive acceptance of the outcome, he had all but lost his interlocutor. Cage’s proposition reveals itself to be singularly ambiguous; it was difficult to attack to the extent to which it claimed to express a religious philosophy, Zen Buddhism, and also because Cage most certainly did not aim to extend his method beyond his own work and his circle of friends, who, besides, did not apply his approach with an equivalent radicalism. In spite of his submission to the outcome of chance, Cage debated the question a great deal, above all when, in his conversations with Daniel Charles, he was pressed on the matter. In terms of his own behaviour, it must be acknowledged that, faithful to his basic philosophy, he abstained from all pejorative judgement upon the work of his European colleagues; and, from the standpoint of composition, one of his most pertinent observations is the distinction that he established between chance and indeterminacy, when he 25
Pierre Boulez, ‘Le système mis à nu’, Points de repère (Paris: Bourgois-Seuil, 1981), pp. 127–40. See Boulez, ‘The System Exposed’, Orientations, ed. Jean-Jacques Nattiez, trans. Martin Cooper (London: Faber & Faber, 1986), pp. 129–42. Boulez’s title in French of this section – originally, of course, a letter to John Cage – refers obliquely to the title of Marcel Duchamp’s famous painting also known as ‘The Large Glass’, The bride stripped bare by her bachelors, even (1915–1923), a connection not retained in the English translation by Martin Cooper [note MP]. 26 John Cage, For the Birds: John Cage in Conversation with Daniel Charles (London: Marion Boyars, 1981), p. 180. See original French edition: Pour les oiseaux (Paris: Éditions Pierre Belfond, 1976), p. 181.
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speaks of aleatoricism, specifying that his conception of the aleatory in his work is definitely that of chance.27 Henceforth, despite an often sustained and intelligent line of argument, it was difficult to find points of entry for objection. I cannot here treat this subject on the scale that it really requires, but, while promising to return to it at another time, I consider that Cage’s defence is vulnerable when he proposes a form of libertarianism which pleads the composer’s non-responsibility, when in fact part of this is offloaded onto the performer, perforce obliged to convey the outcome. Placed in the presence of various notations and graphs, he is compelled to decipher them, to interpret them in both senses of the word, by making choices – that famous word used by composers of our time as an argument of seduction, before truly asking themselves indispensable questions about the meaning and the opportunity such minor choices can assume in the eyes of the executant, and about their qualitative worth in the setting of available alternatives – which in Cage’s case must not, as a matter of principle, be regarded as of any importance, since no structuring intentionality is postulated. By the same token, why did Cage desire a particular intensity of sound?28 Is that not also, however weak, the appearance of a search for a result which can be explained as a compensatory effect in the absence of a qualitative outcome? Cage insists, moreover, on his lack of interest in quality; only quantity concerns him. Heinz-Klaus Metzger has rightly remarked upon the lack of a connection in Cageian propositions between the meticulous score and the acoustic result, but he does not draw the consequences from this remark, any more than from another, no less judicious, in which he hesitates to grasp the significance of the social anticipation that accompanies the Cageian path in a world which only accepts it as something to laugh at.29 John Cage, who has never proclaimed that he is not a composer, has however declared that he has invented ‘music, (not composition)’.30 The music he has invented is intended to be devoid of internal relations: ‘What makes sounds ‘abstract’ is, instead of listening to them for themselves, being content with listening to their relationships. It would be just as valid, as I once said, to express musical ideas with lights … Or with apples!’31 And he adds even more insistently: I know perfectly well that things interpenetrate. But I think they interpenetrate more richly and with more complexity when I myself do not establish any connection. That is when they meet and form the number one. But, at the same time, they form no obstruction. They are themselves. They are. And since each one is itself, there is a plurality in the number one.32 27
Ibid., p. 79 (see original French edition, p. 74). Ibid., pp. 95–6 (see original French edition, p. 90). 29 Heinz-Klaus Metzger, ‘Musique laissée en liberté’, in John Cage, cahier 2 (Nevers: Maison de la Culture de Nevers et de la Nièvre, 1972), p. 24. 30 John Cage, For the Birds, p. 15 (see original French edition, p. 9). 31 Ibid., p. 78 (see original French edition, pp. 72–3). 32 Ibid., p. 78 (see original French edition, p. 73). 28
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And he says emphatically: ‘I hear not only the number two, but also the plurality of the number one’.33 It is from such considerations, but even more so from the acoustic characteristics of the music – am I anticipating too much? – and my frustration at the reception of works by various composers whose aesthetic outcome appeared dubious to me, that I tend to think that Cage has primarily invented a musical principle of falsification. By the time the correspondence between him and Boulez had broken off, Cage had in fact demonstrated that chance operations could be substituted for the excess of information contained in the combinatorial series. Admittedly the demonstration was not entirely convincing, but it was not without value. The combinatorial series lives essentially on the firm support it receives from a multiplicity of relationships, but it is true that a superabundance of these relations may allow the infiltration of aleatory elements without prejudice. Hence, in thinking that unconnected sounds, distributed by chance, constituted an effective control, there was only one step one could take: to introduce non-structure into structure. The test allows one to see – and above all to hear – whether the structure has been interfered with. If it proves able to absorb, without damage, the inoculation of aleatory sound, there is a strong likelihood that the work subjected to the test is extremely weak. On the other hand, strong works will violently reject this addition of disruptive chance. The subject of this essay does not involve any account of the conditions of the experiment, which requires infinite care and cannot be carried out in the same way as with tonal or modal systems. Unless I should prove to be gravely mistaken, Cage’s invention would have led him involuntarily to produce a system of falsification par excellence, whose function would reveal its pertinence in the fact that it cannot falsify itself. It is thus not surprising that Cage felt himself to be close to Dada: this type of subversive marginality, strongly coloured by the avant-garde and prisoner of the same social contingencies as the adversary it vituperated, could never have proposed such a rivalry with its intended object of attack. In their most aggressive intentions, seeking to attain social domination through the most reified of cultural values, the culturally subversive margins have committed the error of making use of the materials with which they were most directly in contact without taking into account the fact that, in fighting the social productions of culture, they were attacking at the same time that which was most authentic and artistically profound; tackling the opposition in reverse, they were unable to recognize that they were deriding the only objects which still allowed the citizen to claim, without too much embarrassment, his social and civilizational membership. Manifestly and paradoxically – despite a total absence of irritation which suggests the realization of his humanity in a most genial and good-natured manner – Cage has conveyed the same sort of error, but not without contradiction. He has delivered an apologia for Indian music, whose very strict code, it would seem, Zen has never tried to crush; he has destructured the music before seriously having asked himself about its possible status as a musical language, and without retreating in the face 33
Ibid., p. 78 (see original French edition, p. 72).
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of evidence of the setback that a treatment of spoken language of the kind he reserves for music would inflict upon communication. There are, of course, many other potential developments with regard to the Cage phenomenon that could be pursued, but I have only dealt with one here in order to underline the significance of his questioning during the 1950s, and to take into account his impact on certain European bourgeois milieus whose contemporary musical style has sometimes been identified with Cage’s influence. Let us not forget that certain aspects of academic music education from the late 1980s, to the extent that it attempted to develop a creative plan, appealed to a pedagogy which articulated its methods on the discredited cast-offs abandoned to the nostalgia of chance-produced musique concrète sound-effects. Nevertheless, there was to be a partial convergence between Cage and Stockhausen, especially during the 1960s, but it was not to be a true interplay of influences. Perhaps it resulted from Stockhausen’s avowed ‘voracity’, whereby he frequently incorporated into his own experience characteristics discovered in the failures of others, and which one finds revealed mostly in the works he characterized as intuitive, and which display traces of residual American influences. But whatever the truth of this, the distance between them remained considerable and resulted principally from the fact that there was never any abdication of the will in Stockhausen. Cage himself had signalled the absence of any correlation between his own willingness to submit to the outcome of his chance processes and the determination with which Stockhausen submitted everything to the imperative of his plan of activity. One of his favourite theses is that contemporary European music preserves a dramatic content that the American music of his milieu does not contain. In this connection, comparing the styles of Stockhausen and Wolff, he notes: ‘But in Stockhausen, on the level of conflict, everything is willed. It’s even more than drama, it’s tragedy as there must be determinacy or indeterminacy, one or the other. While in Wolff’s music, there is freedom’.34 Whether the conditionality of the ‘if’ emanates from nostalgia for the past, which would have liked to divert the course of history without even being able to give concrete expression to its desire, or whether refusal of serialism was a way of gaining admittance to the present, Stockhausen and Boulez only experienced the conviction – something that was historically quite exceptional – that the destiny of a self-aware music lay with them. Let us not speak only of those, who, like Berio, Pousseur, Ligeti or Donatoni, more or less at the same time, accepted the consequences of total serialism, but let us take an example that might perhaps appear more unexpected: I suggest, in spite of violent disagreement with my view from some quarters, that Xenakis will be seen ultimately not to have changed the course of the language of music towards areas open to a totally divergent path. Xenakis’s activity has remained centred upon the properties of sound; his language has remained strictly non-tonal, and if he has had recourse to the contribution of aleatoricism, this has certainly been a case of randomicity rather than chance. 34
Ibid., p. 199 (see original French edition, pp. 199–200).
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Yet with every one of the leading composers of the 1950s there was, beyond any friendships and rivalries, a common background, which, it seems to me, was impossible for them to renounce. Although compositional research became progressively more collective, Stockhausen and Boulez would remain the initiators. We have seen the two composers react very quickly to the danger to which serial ‘pointillist technique’ exposed their work. This reaction, at the very least in its tangible aspect, was a little slower on Stockhausen’s part; once rendered concrete, his technique immediately proved to be marked by statistical organization, whilst for Boulez, it was an editorial problem which prevailed, not in any exclusively linear sense, but which nonetheless verged upon issues of phraseology and sequentiality. The anchor point of both these two composers’ ways of thinking is to be found in their use of material. Boulez, in Le Marteau sans maître (1955), integrates it into a combinatorial series limited by the primary implications of the compositional texture, as had been the case in Le soleil des eaux (1948), but taking another approach to instrumental writing. Stockhausen, put in contact with the manipulation of sound through working in the studio and confronted by the resistance of the acoustic properties of sound, would be greatly preoccupied with problems of timbre, and would quickly distance himself from the serial conception of his first important works by constructing series founded upon the relations of the harmonic series. Electroacoustic work served swiftly to reveal his requirements, which led him to take new compositional steps so influential that it is not an exaggeration to say that, over a period of about 15 years, each new work he produced confronted the observer with totally new musical ideas. Has the term creativity, in Rimbaud’s sense of ‘creation’, ever been so charged with meaning? It is this sequence of creative steps we should now like to consider retrospectively by plunging immediately into critical discussion, with the intention also of preserving an epistemological interest in his work. The period of expansion Work in the studio, linked to the acoustic studies Stockhausen was undertaking in Bonn, put him in direct contact with a knowledge of physics which, while already long established, had not yet been encountered by composers. It was through its relation to practice that theory revealed to him that the interdependence of the properties of sound upon which the serial composers of his generation were reflecting existed in fact in Nature. When a sine wave is emitted, its frequency is related to its duration; in order for it to be ‘coloured’, it has to be superimposed upon other waves related to it in terms of harmonic or inharmonic partials. Research into colour/timbre is involved additionally with the modulation of the attack, the sustain, and the decay of the sound by variables of amplitude. A description, even at this elementary level, already involves the set of all variables accompanying the emission of sound, and shows how Stockhausen could not avoid essentially
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considering and operating on these relations. Following this line of reasoning, it would be very appealing to regard him as a twentieth-century Rameau, whilst Boulez would be a Bach, introducing the set of variables in grand combination. This reasoning would be all the more tempting in its reversal of nationalities: Rameau coming to Germany, and Bach to France. But all seduction is possessed of its snare, and, without regarding an historical representation of this kind to be completely false, we shall see that it is really nothing more than a pleasant allusion. History does not allow itself to be so readily transposed. Whereas Rameau outlined the bases of a grammar by means of an explanatory theory, thus communicating a posteriori the results of a long-term collective experiment, Stockhausen had to write down given knowledge a priori: knowledge in relation to a practical experiment totally new to musical composition. And besides, the equivalence of the projection of serial variables is as much the affair of both these composers – Stockhausen and Boulez – whereas Rameau and Bach are separated precisely through their respective conceptions of composition. It is probably this type of composition, elaborating the work through relating each parameter to all the others, which is the essential source of Stockhausen’s discoveries. Without abandoning the relationship pitch ↔ timbre, itself tied to duration, as he had shown in his most famous essay ‘… wie die Zeit vergeht …’ (‘… how time passes …’) (1957),35 an overall statistical perspective imposed itself, in the process creating relations of density within and between structures. It is these relations, organized into a hierarchy with the aid of the voice in Gesang der Jünglinge (1955–1956), which produce the differentiating of degrees of sonic density, and which spatialize the work structurally, just as much as it does via the mode of projection from speakers and the diffusion of sound. One can therefore appreciate just what a pivotal moment Gesang der Jünglinge represents in Stockhausen’s evolution, simultaneously with the discovery of a conception of serialism released from its dodecaphonic origins and the realization of the first accomplished model of electroacoustic composition – this latter, even when it had recourse to musique concrète methods such as the incorporation of the voice or of national anthems, has always been distinguished from manufactured music by the accumulation of musical objects – the concrete manifestation of ‘group technique’ as a formal support, and, principally, a field for exploiting density relations involving the spatialization of form. It is certainly as a result of the exploration of serialism as a point of departure leading to the interplay of density relations in electroacoustic composition that the first gap appears between the paths of Stockhausen and Boulez. In fact, Boulez had already felt strongly the necessity of organizing form through the exploitation of important variations in density, but this he reached not via the acoustic image by which he was often confronted, but by serial work leading to harmonic organization. This is one of the most likely reasons explaining why spatialization has been more 35 Karlheinz Stockhausen, ‘… wie die Zeit vergeht …’, Texte zur elektronischen und instrumentalen Musik, Vol. 1, pp. 99–139.
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belatedly, and in particular more indirectly, involved in his work. One has to wait until Domaines (1968), in which six instrumental groups are distributed in the limited space of the podium around which a soloist moves, expressing more a perspective de scenario than a representation of structure, and then, a little later, … explosante-fixe … (1971), in which this time a structural vision is imposed via spatial movements, to see Boulez seriously preoccupied with the spatial projection of music. In Répons (which exists in three versions: 1981, 1982, 1984) the problem is posed in a different, more novel fashion: but can one really believe, even in this case, and being cautious to avoid a judgement, that space is the indispensable category of the musical event? Nevertheless, a contradiction remained that was apparently difficult to resolve. In his essay ‘Musik im Raum’ (‘Music in Space’) (1958), Stockhausen declared his wish to articulate temporal phases that were longer than others with a predominance of particular sonic properties. However, it does not seem that group technique, even if practised in this way, permits an easy auditory distinction to be made in the case of complex polyphonic structures if one does not separate the sources of sound emission very clearly from one another, whether electronic or instrumental.36 Where was the origin of this contradiction to be found – a contradiction which composers were already attempting to correct, but which nonetheless resisted them? First of all, perhaps, it had not been properly recognized, at least explicitly, that it was more marked in instrumental than in electronic works. Why? Probably because the latter, associating simple sound waves with some concrete sounds, as is the case in Gesang and even in Kontakte (1958–1960), tend to eliminate the resistance offered by pitch perception, which, whatever system might incorporate it into the work, remains, in the Western tradition, by far the most important. Besides, how could it be otherwise, when music, whether tonal or serial, or simply non-tonal, continues to be produced by traditional instruments? Consequently, even if well configured in small, clearly defined entities, with the acoustic variables involved in a narrow interdependence, they cannot form a real hierarchy: the only possibility to create the predominance of certain variables over others requires that they have conferred upon them a longer duration, notably by pitches repeated or held; and yet the modalities of prolongation of an event can never represent the equivalent of a polarization, because that implies, in the first place, a domain bound by relations. Thus is posed the celebrated objection raised in 1964 by the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss, who declared that serialism succumbed to ‘the utopia of the century’ in founding itself only upon a single level of articulation.37 If it were only a matter of a ‘utopia’, it is not impossible to think that composers were hardly finding it pleasurable: their direction, their passion, their enthusiasm, and their
36 Karlheinz Stockhausen, ‘Musik im Raum’ (1958), Texte zur elektronischen und instrumentalen Musik, Vol. 1, pp. 154–5. 37 Claude Lévi-Strauss, Mythologiques 1, Le cru et le cuit (Paris: Plon, 1964), pp. 26–34.
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judgement put them in a position of triumph; but the problematic they had to confront belonged to the category of aporia. Lévi-Strauss: an interpellation Much has been said about Lévi-Strauss’s comments, yet composers, with the exception of Pousseur, have hardly shown any reaction to them. Boulez, directly affected by the quotation of an argument referring to anthropology, kept his silence rather than engaging in polemics. One can ask why, and although today any response would still be a matter for him, I do not believe that it would be very difficult to hazard a guess as to its nature. He was probably well aware of the fact that Lévi-Strauss had addressed the problem with considerable penetration, but it is likely that the argument, which developed around the preliminary philosophy of the opposition between nature and culture, was one that would naturally have aroused his scepticism. Moreover, he was not unaware of the precariousness of serialism as code, as system, but he knew that no code fell from the sky to replace irremediably lost tonality, and that the fate of music remained in the composer’s hands, as Lévi-Strauss openly declared. One could doubtless understand up to a certain point the mode of reasoning used, but it had to be admitted that what LéviStrauss named a first level of articulation of language, in the sense in which he understood it, was that the system, having effectively disappeared into itself, had inevitably to be reconstituted by action on the composer’s part. As for Pousseur’s response,38 it was undeniably courageous, but it could not be convincing to an ethnologist because it resorted to militant discourse without being able to demonstrate that the basic system he demanded was present in some way. Pousseur’s argument was based on four points: 1. the unimpeachability of Webernian systemization – but on this point the ethnologist saw only the hand of man, and therefore saw it as a reinforcement of his thesis; 2. the importance of the chromatic interval – and perhaps here Pousseur had some advantage over the Lévi-Straussian point of view, which was ultimately rather essentialist; 3. the nature/culture dichotomy – and here he caught his interlocutor in flagrante delicto methodologically, in opposing painting and music. It will be recalled indeed that Lévi-Strauss saw in colours a natural facet which furnished painting with a first level of articulation, and thus the elements of a system, and yet music’s location of these elements in the constitution of its scales was an element of cultural origin. Pousseur did not fail to remind him of the natural origin of the system of sound in vibration, equivalent, 38 Henri Pousseur, Fragments théoriques 1, sur la musique expérimentale (Brussels: Institut de Sociologie, ULB, 1970), pp. 20–27.
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from his point of view, to the system of colours. But of course his opponent could not be unaware of this; it was necessary rather to abide with the issue that his philosophy defended not the physical origin of the elements, but their physiological character. On this point, Pousseur’s reminder remained indispensable, to the extent to which his potential adversary only experienced the nature/culture opposition at a level of perception that was philosophical and not truly scientific; and finally 4. the level of defence to which Pousseur resorted, which is always both the most pertinent and the most fragile: the incontestable success of works, such as the most important electroacoustic realizations of Stockhausen. If, in his case for the defence, Pousseur clearly seized upon some of the difficulties in the case put forward by Lévi-Strauss, he nevertheless brought no action against the central point of his argument, the demand to identify a first level of articulation, absent in serial theory, represented by a system preformed and fixed in its hierarchy. But what route could have been taken to demonstrate the possible irrelevance of such a demand? For my part, I had, during the period following the publication of The Raw and the Cooked (1964), attempted a discussion of sorts,39 but I realize today how much the comments remained the prisoner of militant justification. Without doubt, we were wrong to refuse to let ourselves be involved in the LéviStraussian philosophical project. But beyond this project, largely biased in the name of the celebrated nature/culture opposition by the implicit distinction between physical phenomena and the physiologically given – something which permitted a very fragile opposition between painting and music – there was cause to take very seriously the warning relating to a menace threatening music. Today, one would be tempted to think that the intellectual and artistic world never accorded enough attention to the objections of a serious critic. Thinking that is too positive has always tended towards justification rather than the sharing of reflection, even to the extent of risking putting itself in danger. But, in any case, it is necessary to recognize that in art neither proof nor disproof has the pertinence accorded to it by science. The work of art establishes its legitimacy by its accreditation within social groups, whose importance cannot be evaluated a priori, whilst Adorno’s observation that art works ‘are hardly universally pleasing, and yet they cannot thereby be objectively disqualified as art’40 remains undeniable. Must we therefore resign ourselves to accepting the fact that judgement fails in the face of art and that it is rejected on account of its contingency? In spite of his scepticism, Adorno seems to have refused to allow this. 39
Célestin Deliège, ‘Sur quelques motifs de l’ouverture aux mythologiques’, L’Arc 26 (1965), pp. 69–76. 40 Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor (London: Athlone Press, 1997), p. 165. Cf. Ästhetische Theorie (1970), Gesammelte Schriften Vol. 7, ed. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970; 2nd ed. 1972), p. 248.
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Is it therefore the judgement of taste that triumphs anew? It can never be avoided on the receiving end: when, some years later during an interview with Lévi-Strauss, Jean-Jacques Nattiez tried to return to his position regarding the problem of serialism, Lévi-Strauss replied that serial music bored him, but he also admitted to feeling little attraction to the ethnic music to which one would have expected his work would have rendered him responsive.41 Be that as it may, LéviStrauss was right, in The Raw and the Cooked, to try to grant his taste some kind of rational explanation; this is the only level at which the composer can follow him. It is only today, however, that this dialogue could be revisited with the necessary calm, but at the expense of changing the perspective. It seems very much the case that serialism could never acknowledge to itself an important presence of the ‘natural’, as, for example, the exploitation of the natural ‘resonance’ of harmonics – something never forbidden. To seek to apply the resources of a natural language to it can therefore be most fruitful. Experiments such as Stockhausen’s Kreuzspiel and Boulez’s Structure Ia, which apply an elementary logarithm, are an index of the resemblance of serial technique to artificial languages, something well confirmed by subsequent practice. To speak of serialism and its derived techniques requires that one treat and appreciate its givens from the perspective of techniques of information. That is certainly the reason for our ability to understand that, since Schoenberg, the composer has been obliged to create his own material, and also equally to understand the origin of the connection established since Stockhausen’s Elektronische Studie II (1954) between electroacoustics and serialism. Boulez was not mistaken in making those statements that indicated the absence of preconceived scales in serial music, and which alerted the attention of Lévi-Strauss. It is definitely true that serialism, whatever the ‘manufacturing process’ to which it has recourse, natural or synthetic, can be read and interpreted only in terms of programming. Would serial music thus have given way to the utopia of the century? This question remains to be answered: but it should be emphasized that what is clearly delineated is the view of the prevailing aporias themselves. Claude Lévi-Strauss’s underlying conditional if was no doubt expressed against the background of nostalgia, but it had the merit of acting as a warning to the present of the musical future; it is utterly distinct from questions asked by a vulgar attachment to the past: the anthropologist issued a warning, but he did not formally condemn. ‘This school has chosen to lay a wager upon its destiny and that of music’,42 he writes in the conclusions to his text. He did not suspect that he would soon be unwillingly engaged in this wager: less than four years after the publication of The Raw and the Cooked, its author learned that Luciano Berio, one of the most liberal representatives of serialist thought, had chosen to give concrete expression to the structural association of music and the bororo myth – the work’s theme in the proper sense – by using the ode in his Sinfonia (1968–1969). 41 Jean-Jacques Nattiez, ‘Rencontre avec Lévi-Strauss: le plaisir et la structure’, Musique en Jeu 12, Autour de Lévi-Strauss (1973), p. 6. 42 Claude Lévi-Strauss, Mythologiques 1, p. 34.
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The period of equivocation In the article ‘Musik im Raum’, it will be recalled, Stockhausen mentions the necessity of separating sound sources in space in order to render the perception of the groups as distinct as possible. He even adds, in the French translation, that music conceived in this way no longer lends itself to radiophonic diffusion, apart from as some kind of documentary record: ‘Is it not better to see reproductions of works in the plastic arts rather than to see nothing at all?’ asks the composer, treating the question by analogy.43 This is most notably implied by the complexity that results from note durations and the superimposition of different tempi; but another reason is to be seen in the impossibility of organizing pitches into a hierarchy, more so perhaps in instrumental music than in electroacoustic music, where work on densities is more immediately audible. One solution lies in making sharp distinctions between timbres, as in Carré (1960) – in my opinion the best controlled among those of Stockhausen’s works that resort to space and group techniques through vocal and orchestral means. The fact remains that the general problem posed by the necessity of applying the principle of group segregation to the spatial dissemination of sound reveals a lacuna at the level of the theory’s intrinsic structure – even if this mode of dissemination proves successful to the extent that Stockhausen provides it with an adequate, indeed specific, form of notation. The serialists acted unanimously with respect to this lacuna, rather than defending themselves against it. The absence of intra-group hierarchies allows the practice of numerous permutations and interversions, without any noticeable result as far as perception is concerned. Working, as Stockhausen put it, on the basis of an ‘equality of rights’ (Gleichberechtigung)44 between the various parameters of sound (primarily pitch and duration), the composer endeavoured, of course, to create distinctive reference points for the listening experience. But within such a system of probabilities it is only with difficulty that the individual efforts of the composer can triumph over the principle of equality. In many of the works written between 1956 and 1958 aural, inter-group perception of the variants of intra-group distribution became an often hazardous operation whose profitability, qualitatively speaking, was doubtful. The difficulties were further compounded by the fact that composers relied upon statistically derived results to open up their formal structures to indeterminacy. In this respect it became impossible, philosophically speaking, not to recognize in it the kind of imagery current in the physics of the second quarter of the twentieth century. But it was precisely such imagery, in suggesting the confirmation of possible correspondences in the work of composers such as Stockhausen and Pousseur 43 Karlheinz Stockhausen, ‘Musique dans l’espace’, Revue Belge de Musicologie 13, (1959), p. 82. 44 Karlheinz Stockhausen, ‘Erfindung und Entdeckung. Ein Beitrag zur Form-Genese’, Texte zur elektronischen und instrumentalen Musik, Vol. 1, p. 232.
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(and also Xenakis, of course, although in a totally different sense) that predicted the non-differentiation inevitably contained within the indeterminacy of such structures. An order of importance open to plausible evaluation can nevertheless be established between objects that cannot be compared quantitatively by dimension. The following quotation cited by Bachelard from an article by Chester Townsend Ruddick written in 1932 suggests the kind of parallelism evoked here. Speaking of the objects of a statistical law, Bachelard notes: Their only distinctive characteristic can be their membership of a certain group; they can be hydrogen atoms or men, but not this hydrogen atom or that man. They are distinguished as objects only outside their group, but not as objects within their group. The law is established on the assumption that a member of the group is thus likely, no matter what, to satisfy certain conditions. All individual characteristics are erased by the introduction of the individual into the group.45
However, the open work, or mobile, is erected on this aporia – that is to say, the difficulty of individualizing the elements that make up membership of a group submerged in the non-differentiation of an absence of hierarchy – as the variable ordering of sections according to a terminology that serves to define more or less the range of variability offered. This was the outcome of impeccable logic, where the non-differentiated (which itself resulted from what might be called the ‘hyperdifferentiation’ of elements) profited from its inability to engender any kind of diversity apart from that of multiple equivalence. In the short term the problem of musical perception did not become an issue to the same extent as was the case with the problem of the emancipation of the performer, who henceforth was no longer condemned to the passive role of qualified musical reproduction but now had the possibility of confronting his responsibility towards the combination of ‘choices’ offered to him by the score. Once again, the enthusiasm with which the innovation was presented contributed to closing the door against the multitude of questions it raised. Furthermore, the concept of ‘openness’ varied considerably from one composer to another, making any appreciation of the phenomenon as a whole almost as impossible today as it ever was. We know that literary models had been very important for Boulez’s work since the beginning of the 1950s, when he had conceived the project of a compositional approach derived from Un coup de dés, and then later when the published fragments of Mallarmé’s Livre struck him all the more forcefully on their publication in 1957 while the writing of the Third Piano Sonata (1955–1957) was already very much under way. Here the performer’s responsibility remains principally what it had been throughout the long history of polyphony: to transmit 45 Gaston Bachelard, Le nouvel esprit scientifique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1934), p. 127. See also Chester Townsend Ruddick, ‘On the Confirmation of Natural Law’, The Monist 42/3 (July 1932), pp. 330–84.
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as well as possible the content of the score. A supplementary interest was that the performer was able to decide on his particular version by conforming to a limited number of possibilities. However, Boulez has never offered any rational arguments in justification of his project; his motivations appear to have been more of a poetic order, rather than to do with a wish to provide any openings for the performer. In Berio’s case the use of mobile or ‘open’ forms more generally consisted in providing possibilities for the use of insertions or games involving interversions of the ordering of major sections of a structure. Pousseur, it seems to me, brought a very ludic sense to the use of mobile forms, while it was Stockhausen who, in the second half of the 1950s, aimed furthest of all in this respect, with the possible exception of American composers. Through playing with the oppositions between ordered and disordered structures, and between determinate and indeterminate materials in his Klavierstück X (1954–1961), Stockhausen opened the door wide to what could be understood in this context as entropy. It requires very serious and attentive listening to this piece to know whether it is actually the oppositional relationships that are being perceived or whether, on the contrary, it is the totality of the elements that make up the structure overall that are heard as homogenous. Any research into such questions of perception would probably immediately come up against factual difficulties pertaining to the sound/silence opposition which is very much in evidence in this piece. Given they were so conscious of practising an experimental art, one wonders why composers did not do any research into such perceptual issues. Would it not have been preferable to attempt to establish such experimental conditions concerning perceptibility rather than confining experimentation only to the completed works themselves? This question arises particularly with respect to Stockhausen, to the extent that his breakthrough was the most divergent from the norm. It is always possible to reply by drawing attention to the uncertainty of such tests and their fallibility in the face of an evolving culture and the susceptibility of perception to adaptation under such circumstances. In the end, however, after more than quarter of a century, it might be interesting today to look once again at the possibilities for an appropriate randomized statistical method for testing those areas in which group technique still seems to cause problems, particularly in cases where composers may well have distanced themselves subsequently from their earlier innovations. Klavierstück XI (1956) had a period of great fame. The piece posed major problems. Its performance was susceptible to a multiplicity of combinations which today could be calculated by a computer to produce results which would be in the order of large numbers. However, for reasons to do with what can actually be produced by means of probability techniques applied to music, it cannot be guaranteed that a genuine diversity would result. In addition, random probability can here coincide with chance probability, at least if the performer has the audacity and the expertise for playing the game; that is to say, in not preparing his version beforehand – something which the composer, however, has never encouraged. But does the interpreter benefit from this promised freedom? If he perfects one or more
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versions does he not place himself in the position of the traditional performer, aiming to exhibit the results of his work? It will naturally be claimed that he is responsible for his version, even if he has initially placed his faith in chance through simply glancing at the score without any intention of preparing the parameters of the next structural fragment his eye alights upon in the piece, however furnished with prescriptions it might be from the one he has just left. This much can be admitted, but nevertheless such reasoning also courts the risk of circularity: the performer, in fact, can retain nothing of the quality of his independent choices other than that which his virtuosity permits or suggests that he master. As for the listeners – for them, the open work, however it has been made, remains always closed; they hear the actual, not the potential. It would be incorrect, of course, to read these reservations as having relevance for a critique of traditional art, just as it would be utterly misleading to see in it an attempt to undermine the credibility of the musicians who have created the music history of the period since 1945. Personalities are not called into question; they have experienced more profoundly than the witnesses themselves the objective contradictions of the material explored. Perhaps one might regret that, in certain cases, all the consequences of the precariousness of the situation have not been drawn, not so much in the works themselves but in the presentation of suggestions and plans. Architecture, for example, has left us just such research testimonies, as in the case of Walter Gropius. It is probable in this instance that the full weight of artistic tradition was brought to bear in order to conserve the priority of the art object. But, at the same time, by turning the distance separating us from this period of exploration to our advantage, it is impossible not to consider what it could be that has prevented certain works from winning undisputed legitimacy. The way composers experienced the profoundly problematic character of the music of the 1950s manifested itself at the beginning of the following decade in a vision which served to reveal just how explosive the unresolved contradictions of the preceding decade were. By recourse to what he would come to call Momentform, Stockhausen restored difference; that is to say, individual structure. Even if the distribution of characteristics inside the group remained barely discernible, their succession was clarified considerably by the presence of a dominant variable characterizing each group – or group of groups – in passing from one group to the other. The combined effect of vocal and instrumental forces on the one hand and the dramatic situation on the other at times worked extremely well together towards the restoration of clarity. This new conception is particularly well illustrated in Momente, although Carré had already done much more than merely launch it, while, in the mixed-media domain (electroacoustic and instrumental), Kontakte also exhibited a form that was clearly perceptible. A little later, Mixtur (1964) was to build a new correlation between source (the orchestra and sine waves) and diffusion. For Boulez, a desire to reduce complexity appeared in the Improvisations sur Mallarmé (1957), but the true meaning of that which is efficaciously ‘mobile’ only appeared in Éclat (1965), where mobility is provided in the flexibility of the form:
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a lesson given by the conductor to the composer, and one he has subsequently not neglected to pass on to others. As for Berio, he deserves credit for only rarely ever deviating – Tempi Concertati (1958–1959) is an exception – from the fertility of ‘practical reason’. The use of his sense of freedom had always protected him from all the excesses of orthodoxy without ever tempting him to declare a schism. In 1960 he could be inventive by amalgamating all available discoveries to date. Épiphanies (1959–1965, 1991) brought about a fertile synthesis of concepts which had, for a moment, threatened the legitimacy of musical modernism, whereas Différences (1959) resonated with an objective irony which helped to explode the dullness of the undifferentiated by means other than the differentiation of sound sources. For Stockhausen, the period of experimentation still had another ten years to go. In his extension of the famous Klavierstück XI it was the performer who remained the object of focus. If the most frequently asked question at the time had been: how can the performer be granted new freedoms? it would be tempting with hindsight to change this now to: how can the performer’s productive capacity be further exploited? What kind of dialectical feat would be required in order to resolve the contradiction that never ceased to re-appear, and which led the performer to ask himself whether these recent freedoms were offered gratis or granted as favours that demanded much in return, and whether they brought with them the possibility either of creative elevation or of reduction to a position of enslavement? An unequivocal answer could hardly have been expected at the time, and still cannot be today. Perhaps one day we shall come to recognize that the history of contemporary music was played out just as much in relation to this problem as it was in relation to the journey from the tonal universe to the atonal universe, or in relation to the introduction of serialism. Liberation or coercion? – all the evidence points to the coexistence of these two antinomial tendencies. Once revealed, however, coercion produces good results for no one – neither for the composer nor for the performer. Could it be that one of the consequences of a political order that had experienced dictatorship was that, under cover of democracy and the abandonment of the authoritarian prerogative, authority in the form of the composer’s leadership might reinforce its control over the performer via the intermediary of the musical mode of production? I do not intend here to raise these issues further in the context of Stockhausen’s Aus den sieben Tagen (1968) and Kurzwellen (1969), or of Globokar’s Concerto grosso (1969– 1970). I think that in the case of these ‘works’ the composers have considerably reduced their prerogatives, while at the same time placing the performer in an unprecedented position of subordination, obliging him to change the use not only of his freedom but also of his competence. A similar remark might be made concerning Cage’s infamous Concert for Piano and Orchestra (1958), but there is in this ‘object’ – ‘cette chose’ as Duchamp might have said – an implied level of plaisanterie which reduces the authoritarian tendency somewhat. Referring the
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interested reader to my previous observations on these questions,46 I would prefer by way of conclusion to consider for a moment the – if perhaps not liberating then at least fruitful – contribution made by Stockhausen in the form of what he called intuitive music. Conjectures and conclusions Works such as Plus-Minus (1963), Stop (1965), Prozession (1967) and Spiral (1968), to cite only some of the most sophisticated projects, have brought opportune perspectives to musical practice at a time when music is no longer regarded as a fine art in the sense previously understood by classical humanism. During the course of this essay I have drawn attention to evidence of the aporias facing composers during the post-Webernian period, the consequences of which have meant, for the listener, a calling into question of the legitimacy of musical works and their conceptual world. The extent to which serial music and its related concepts are really accepted culturally in our society (and statistical surveys are, in the end, of only limited value in this respect) is something we cannot know with any certainty, at least to the same extent that contemporary visual and plastic arts in the West have always been able to attract large audiences. What would be valuable would be to ascertain individual – for which read family – usage of ‘new music’ at home: listening to recordings, radio broadcasts, and so on. We already possess interesting data on the professed motivations of Parisian concert-goers in relation to the Ensemble Intercontemporain,47 through which we learn that a desire for information is given the highest priority; but what does not appear at all in the results of the survey is any form of research into aesthetic pleasure. In addition, we learn that an important segment of the audience plays, or has played, a musical instrument. As a result we possess an illuminating piece of information regarding potential future contact with music at the level of reception. In other words, could not the legitimacy that has been lost, possibly due to the aporias that compositional systems have not completely succeeded in overcoming, be compensated by a new practical approach to music that has the means of rendering acceptable, and even attractive, those things which a single hearing can no longer guarantee with any certainty? Were this conjecture able to be verified sociologically, it would have to be admitted that one of the transformations accomplished by musical modernism would be precisely this. Otherwise the traditional forms of contemplation associated with the Kantian concept of beauty would have to be revoked, or at very least would be weakened by substituting an active relationship to the music whereby listeners would be raised to a level of musical practice. In this, however, 46 Deliège, Invention musicale et idéologies, pp. 334–42; ‘La fin du romantisme’, Entretemps 4 (1987), pp. 37–40. 47 Pierre-Michel Menger, ‘L’oreille spéculative, consommation et perception de la musique contemporaine’, Revue française de sociologie 27/3 (July–September 1986), pp. 445–78.
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they would not be restricted to the arduous task of the reproduction of the score itself (which, before the development of techniques of mechanical reproduction, would have had to be done fluently), but they would instead be encouraged to see themselves as agents capable of managing the ‘programme’ put forward by the composer, thanks to their newly acquired knowledge of compositional technique. Were this to come about, it would be necessary to agree that there should be no qualitative regression in the comprehension of music, but, on the contrary, access to musical language in return for a mode of response far less equivocal than that of the past. It is in this regard that those works – I prefer the term ‘programs’ – of Stockhausen just cited reveal their significance, and can be understood in the sense of what he suggests should be seen as an enlargement of the field of perception of musical parameters in maintaining the level achieved.48 Stockhausen’s programmes preserve the statistical links with serialism. The levels of elaboration in Plus-Minus and Stop appear as prototypes of a pedagogical practice now accepted by composers, and one can imagine that such programmes could be further refined. After this initial foray, however, Stockhausen did not continue in exactly the same direction, reverting instead to musical practices that were more individual than collective, more specialized than generalized in relation to the musically active community. One might imagine that, in envisaging such a future, I’m re-subscribing to the utopian vision of an art produced by all, an idea that elsewhere I’ve always fought against. Such is not the case, however. That which is utopian in the notion of an art produced by all is the claim to transform everyone into the creator of a work of art. But in art it is mistaken, first of all, to believe that everyone can ever draw near to such an ideal: indeed, it is probably not even desirable. One can wish of every person that they should live their life aesthetically, but this is something which need not imply the presence of art. Second, this can only be a question concerning the matter of a desirable approach to performance practice, which, rather than decoding a score for the listener, decodes a ‘program’ for his personal use and edification and into which his initiative can be incorporated. It is a safe bet, moreover, that such a practice would provide the shock needed, and perhaps the only one possible, to stimulate a return to the idea of great works, but with an abandonment of the compromise by means of which the concert has served to edify music since the nineteenth century. If this new way of relating to music exists, for the time being at least, the fact remains that there has been no abandoning of traditional habits anything like as radical as that proposed by Adorno, to cite just one example. Great works have continued to make their mark on the history of recent years. If their dissemination often postulates the need for new architectural thinking for concert halls or the configuration of the auditorium, they have not downgraded the idea of the concert itself. Nevertheless, they do not appear to be numerous, while speculation 48 Jonathan Cott, Stockhausen: Conversations with the Composer (London: Robson Books, 1974), pp. 88–9.
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about this in writing and in action has not, unfortunately, disappeared. Yet in the meantime we can rejoice at signs of a tendency manifesting itself in changes in the vocabulary we use to relate to the 1950s. Thus, rather than speaking of pitches, durations and other parameters which electroacoustics had rendered inevitable, we once again hear talk of harmony, melody, rhythm and metre. Without doubt such concepts will never disappear, but nevertheless the language of the advanced musical community has tended to play them down. As for Boulez, he gives greatest priority to writing (l’écriture); in so doing he puts back into play a dialectical relationship language/writing (langage/écriture) which calls for a synthesis. The synthesis he suggests is one that restricts writing to taking on the hierarchies that present themselves in the marking of configurations and polarizations. Writing thus substitutes itself for the deficiency of the system. The overriding question is whether musical composition will be able to perpetuate itself in the long term on the basis of such a vision, or whether it is only a question of getting rid of the myth of a system to which we had too unconditionally linked classical thought and its Cartesian demands, and towards which the spoken language and its associated studies are once again leading us. Current philosophical thought has got no further in surmounting the confrontation being played out between Adorno’s negative dialectics and analytic philosophy – an adversary otherwise as objectively redoubtable for Adorno as the Heideggerian ontology against which he exhausted himself, and which is for philosophy no more and no less a track equivalent to that exhibited by art through the multifarious facets of its retrospectivist attitudes. At the heart of this confrontation lies the very same problem: analytic philosophy aims towards a system, but without the multiplicity of theories that can recreate unity, whereas negative dialectics turns its back upon system and concept, placing its confidence in the writing of a kind of thinking that is always ready to re-define itself. Stockhausen had come to believe in a universal music. Through pleasure, in his view, there is a total escape from the one-dimensionality deplored by Marcuse.49 The composer appeared to assume the pessimism of Adorno in the face of the culture industry, and after a period of time he came to believe in art only as an underground activity.50 The great discoveries of science never ceased to fascinate him, and in them he found again that miraculous aspect which, through his own experience, had driven him from acoustic micro-organisms to the universality of macro-form. He did not, however, give the upper hand to rational imagery; paradoxically, the composer who has been most concerned among the musicians of his generation with the scientific foundations of his art is also the composer who has returned to the illuminism of the Romantics. But his mysticism and imagination led him far beyond everything conceived by Christian or syncretic 49 See Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man: The Ideology of Industrial Society (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964). 50 Karlheinz Stockhausen, ‘Arbeitsbericht 1952/53: Orientierung’ (1958), Texte zur elektronischen und instrumentalen Musik, Vol. 1, p. 33.
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Romanticism towards regions of Surrealism bursting with explosions of excess. From this perspective, the present essay has not dealt with Stockhausen according to Stockhausen, and the tone might well appear heretical. For the charismatic task cannot be the tentative one of understanding history and confronting it by endeavouring to catch sight of it as if it were already old. It remains true that the later evolution of the composer, after the hieratic positions of Alphabet für Liège (1972) and Inori’s acts of prayer (1973–1974), already prepared by the magical words of Stimmung (1968), implies that Stockhausen could be spoken about in an entirely different, wholly ‘other’ manner. But it behoves the upstart stranger, standing at the portals of a temple in which a ceremony whose ritual eludes him is taking place, not to force an entry. Bibliography Adorno, T.W., Ästhetische Theorie (1970), Gesammelte Schriften Vol. 7, ed. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970; 2nd ed. 1972). Trans. as: Aesthetic Theory, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor (London: Athlone Press, 1997) Bachelard, Gaston, Le nouvel esprit scientifique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1934) Boulez, Pierre, Relevés d’apprenti (Paris: Seuil, 1966) ——, Points de repère (Paris: Bourgois-Seuil, 1981) Cage, John, For the Birds: John Cage in Conversation with Daniel Charles (London: Marion Boyars, 1981). Original French edition: Pour Les Oiseaux (Paris: Éditions Pierre Belfond, 1976) Cott, Jonathan, Stockhausen: Conversations with the Composer (London: Robson Books, 1974) Dahlhaus, Carl, Grundlagen der Musikgeschichte (Cologne: Gerig, 1967). Trans. as: Foundations of Music History, trans. J.B. Robinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) Deliège, Célestin, ‘Sur quelques motifs de l’ouverture aux mythologiques’, L’Arc 26 (1965), pp. 69–76 ——, Invention musicale et ideologies (Paris: Bourgois, 1986) ——, ‘La fin du romantisme’, Entretemps 4 (1987), pp. 27–48 Harvey, Jonathan, The Music of Stockhausen (London: Faber, 1975) Lévi-Strauss, Claude, Mythologiques 1, Le cru et le cuit (Paris: Plon, 1964) Marcuse, Herbert, One Dimensional Man: The Ideology of Industrial Society (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964) ——, Counterrevolution and Revolt (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1972) Menger, Pierre-Michel, ‘L’oreille spéculative, consommation et perception de la musique contemporaine’, Revue française de sociologie 27/3 (July–September 1986), pp. 445–78
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Messiaen, Olivier, Music and Color: Conversations with Claude Samuel, trans. E. Thomas Glasow (Portland, OR: Amadeus Press, 1994). For the French edition, see under Claude Samuel, below. Metzger, Heinz-Klaus, ‘Musique laissée en liberté’, in John Cage, Cahier 2 (Nevers: Maison de la Culture de Nevers et de la Nièvre, 1972), pp. 15–29 Nattiez, Jean-Jacques, ‘Rencontre avec Lévi-Strauss: le plaisir et la structure’, Musique en Jeu 12, Autour de Lévi-Strauss (1973), pp. 3–10 Pousseur, Henri, Fragments théoriques 1, sur la musique expérimentale (Brussels: Institut de Sociologie, ULB, 1970) Ruddick, Chester Townsend, ‘On the Confirmation of Natural Law’, The Monist 42/3 (July 1932), pp. 330–84 Samuel, Claude, Entretiens avec Olivier Messiaen (Paris: Belfond, 1967). For the English edition, see under Messiaen, above. Stockhausen, Karlheinz, ‘Musique dans l’espace’, Revue belge de musicologie, Vol. 13 (1959), 1–4 (Brussels), pp. 76–82 ——, Texte zur elektronischen und instrumentalen Musik, Vol. 1 (Cologne: DuMont Schauberg, 1963) ——, ‘Musique universelle’, Musique en jeu 15, Forum de musique contemporaine 1 (1974), pp. 30–34 Valéry, Paul, ‘Discours de l’histoire’, Essais quasi politiques, In Variétés, Oeuvres, Vol. 1 (Paris: Gallimard, 1957), pp. 1128–37
PART II Philosophical Critiques and Speculations After Adorno
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Chapter 9
A Philosophy of Totality Herman Sabbe
My aim in this chapter is to identify a common denominator within the cultural philosophies which underpin the ‘New Music’ of the twentieth century. As a candidate I propose, in its various guises, the aspiration towards inclusiveness: the permanent integration of all elements and their total determination in the case of multiple serialism; total indeterminacy in the case of chance music; and the availability of all musics in ‘quotation’ techniques. My intention is to propose and develop concepts pertinent to the New Music: that is to say, concepts that encapsulate all that determines novelty in such music. Furthermore, I shall also develop concepts that have some application for general history. By this I mean that, even if a general history cannot concern itself with the particularity of music, it can include music within its general propositions, provided that it can deal adequately with concepts that are sufficiently general, so as to allow the integration of music within a general history of culture and society. I should add that my point of view here (as much as possible) will be that of the detached observer. The nineteenth century was notable above all for expansion: the expansion of sound level (in music as in the environment); the expansion of instruments (notably of orchestral instruments, from the orchestra of Haydn to that of Mahler); the expansion of the duration of works; the expansion of sonic space, both high and low (for example the full range of the keyboard); the expansion of harmonic space, in terms of the density of chords; and, above all, the ever expanding journey through the circle of keys – that is to say stretching further and further away from any sense of tonal stability. Through this last point, we also touch another aspect of the idea of evolution that marked the nineteenth century: what could be called the accumulation of expressive drift. Under the pressure of the demands for original, subjective expressivity, the romantic century could not refrain from pushing back the limits of the admissible, and had difficulty remaining within the musical system generally in force, namely, the system of ‘common practice’ tonality. (This thesis finds easy justification in the light of the functional evolution of the dominant seventh: dissonant to the ears of Haydn and his contemporaries, since Wagner it has become a chord of resolution.) Thus, through expansion and through accumulation, the musical nineteenth century was taken to the very limits. In his works of the period 1906 to 1909, Schoenberg took a position visà-vis these limits. This position constituted a total about-turn in relation to the
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expansiveness that had preceded it; it was a position characterized by compression. In the Chamber Symphony of 1906, Schoenberg reduced the orchestra to 15 solo instruments, but while still keeping to the challenge of maintaining the generic character of ‘symphony’ through the complexity of thematic elaboration. (Historically, extremes touch each other here: 1906 was also the year of Mahler’s Eighth Symphony, the so-called ‘Symphony of a Thousand’, at which stage Schoenberg himself had not yet finished the orchestration of his monumental Gurrelieder). The First Chamber Symphony, moreover, is remarkable in many other respects, by virtue of which it constitutes an important point of departure for the New Music, even before the transition to atonality (which was to be achieved only two years later, in 1908). Schoenberg’s Kammersymphonie, albeit still in a very timid way, begins the process of what could be called the generalization of equivalence – a process to be encountered throughout the history of the ‘New Music’ in the twentieth century. At issue here, and in parallel with what was happening or was about to happen with other composers like Debussy and Scriabin – is the equivalence of intervals other than thirds as the basis of a harmonic system (i.e. fourths and whole tones as well as semitones). The ‘scales’ with fourths or with whole tones determined successive order (the horizontal: melody) as much as simultaneous order (the vertical: harmony). This is the idea of the magic square. But more importantly, because of a more general order, is the notion (not yet explicit) of field, a harmonic field: a set of relations that regulates in a given period of time all that unfolds. Concepts of dissonance–consonance find their status altered here to the point of losing all meaning: these are now also equivalents. ‘Dissonance’ is no longer dependent upon a ‘consonance’ to which it must ‘resolve’ (it is this notion that Schoenberg described as ‘the emancipation of the dissonance’). One of the consequences of this (certainly not foreseen by Schoenberg himself) is the neutralization of harmonic space (neither the one nor the other; alternatively, both the one and the other). Each chord, whether one calls it such or whether one prefers the term ‘aggregate’, constitutes an entity in itself, a ‘harmonic colour’, and all these harmonic colours are equivalent in the same way that all the different instrumental colours (the 15 timbres used in his instrumental ensemble) and their combinations also are. Considered in terms of the relation to limits which arose through what I have called ‘the accumulation of expressive drift’, the position taken by Schoenberg had been in the spirit of a continuity which had radical consequences. As the departure from the tonal centre became more and more important and the centralist pull became less so, one of the possible consequences was to abandon it altogether, and to think of each tonal element as a potential tonal centre, facing a pluri-polar or even omni-polar reality. All the semitones of the tempered chromatic scale – later to be designated the twelve ‘pitch classes’ – would be equivalent, tonal relations arising henceforth in
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an ad hoc manner, organizing themselves according to contexts from which they in turn derive their ultimate significance. The musical form, therefore, is emergent. With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that it was his stand on continuity that led Schoenberg to transgress boundaries, and at the same time to create something that seemed to be a point of rupture, a discontinuity: through Schoenberg, the tonal system had reached its point of ‘catastrophe’. Musical historiography registered the new situation under the category of ‘atonality’ – a term that belongs exclusively in the domain of music theory and has not been the subject of much interpretation that transcends the limits of this domain. I shall attempt, therefore, to identify certain characteristics of the atonal situation that will allow us to position it as framed in a moment of culture: • •
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The abandoning of the centralist representation of the world (which departs from a central tone in order to return to it, each tonal phenomenon being interpreted in relation to this single centre). The replacing of a perspective of depth with a dispersion of space – or, still more generally, with the opening of a space of n dimensions (these first two points are comparable to the abandonment of Albertian perspective in painting, something which took place at exactly the same moment in history). Configurations are interchangeable: no single direction imposes itself (we will see that this directional freedom necessarily affects temporal unfolding, as rhythm: that is, uncertainties in the organization of time and duration). Further, through this suppression of imposed direction (both harmonic and metric), there results a feeling of ‘weightlessness’ (remember that Schoenberg cast off the shackles of all things tonal at the very moment he put into music the poetry of Stefan George speaking of ‘luft von anderem planeten’: floating through interstellar space!). No pre-established signs: place therefore for ‘existence’ as opposed to ‘essence’ (I am here offering an interpretation of Schoenberg such as that proposed by Leibowitz). A new epistemological situation: musical meaning is no longer a given – neither to its creator nor to its listener.
The atonality practised by Schoenberg and his disciples from 1908 to 1923 has been described as ‘free’. Free it certainly was: free from all deductive logic, of all linear causality – that which follows is not at any moment or in any way determined by what precedes it, nor, in principle, by any prior given. It is this indeterminacy that constitutes the primary difficulty of this music, for its listener as for its composer. The anarchy that it cultivates engages the selective responsibility of the creator at every instant, from note to note. Schoenberg would soon announce his ‘rappel à l’ordre’ – the institution of dodecaphony (accompanied furthermore by a return to pre-established forms). Here, by contrast, every configuration would be reducible
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to a single nucleus, a single given, a pre-condition: the initial series (the ‘row’). Is it already the case at this point that ‘Schoenberg is dead’? The installation of the authority of the series (‘sets’) – completely exterior to the ‘inner voice’, the one thing that Schoenberg until then had claimed to want to follow – as an absolute foundation (therefore as a form of fundamentalism) constituted an important historical moment for reasons other than the purely technical and formal. This was the moment when the constructive and the expressive faced one another, when began the story of two opposing autonomies, the autonomy of compositional methodology, and the autonomy of the subject. Or, it is the story of the two forces that now stand facing each other: the power of subjective expression and the power of constructivist law. This, then, was the conflict, the dilemma, even the aporia with which Schoenberg found himself confronted. Let us then pursue the concept of ‘equivalence’ further along this track. If a concept as abstract as serialism is to be thinkable in these terms, it could be defined as a generalization of equivalence: arrangements of pitches (12, as far as the dodecaphonic series is concerned), distributions of durational values, degrees of intensity, of timbre and so forth, as well as all their possible combinations, all can be considered as logical equivalents. The composer’s work consists, then, of (pre)selecting the material elements, defining the number of their possible combinations, then of undertaking the transformations of admissible combinations (transformations of temporal order, transformation in the pitch space, parametric intermodulations …); at each level of organization the composer can make a new selection, suggest different levels of perception (notably by modifying the speed of unfolding), provided that he keeps watch at each level over the equidistribution of possibilities. (Transposed to a physical, acoustic level, this can be compared to white noise – the sum total of possibilities – filtered to varying degrees.) If ‘Schoenberg’ signifies the equivalence of all the pitches in the panchromatic scale, and also of all the intervals between them, another decisive step was taken with Cage, who promulgated the equivalence of all sonic phenomena (tones, sounds, noises …, no matter the category labels). And one other step, more decisive still, was the equivalence of sound and silence (non-sound). In this manner, Cage puts between parentheses – without challenging it, so he remains able to quote it at will – the entire past musical world. Thus, in a manner even more overt than that of Schoenberg, he privileges ‘existence’ (in the philosophical sense) against ‘essence’. And here begins the story of transgressions, another mark of the New Music. • •
Cage’s intentional(!), willed silence is the introduction of the ‘Not’ in the positivity of art; this runs entirely contrary to all narrative convention: an art that is silent cannot be accounted for. In the world of sound up until that point categories were sharply defined: there were the sonic phenomena that constituted the category ‘music’;
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there were those that could – by right – make up ‘speech’ (those that were admissible, civilized); finally, there were … the rest: the sonic detritus, to remain absolutely distanced from the purity of vocal enunciation just as from music. (In a sense it is a sign of the radicality of the New Music that side by side with a kind of music that welcomed ‘sonic detritus’ was a kind that occupied itself with the elimination of all ‘impure’ elements: Webern would be the exemplar of the latter.) This transgressivity also relates to time: the lack of temporal limits. Certain music (LaMonte Young, to cite only one example) no longer fits social time; the time of listening, then, no longer submits to any control. As for vocality, we can take the example Ligeti’s Aventures (1962). Aventures makes us listen to the body, in all its states, its exclamations and questionings, its intrigues and absurdities. The music here is visceral, the language of guts and mucous. Aventures delivers, with all the sophistication of modernity, the sound world raw, as it were: all that through which sound is rendered menacing, chaotic; all that through which sound threatens the order of the world (the cosmos, logos) with chaos; all that is unsettling in sound: explosions, whistles, hissing, …; all that concerns vocal communication that one never learns in a formal manner, but learns instead through mimicry – inflections, intonations; all that which, like a spontaneous apprenticeship, is inscribed as much on our intimate physical body as on the social body. Aventures sets out to give us an inventory of types of oral behaviour independent of the lexicon: babbling, chattering, cackling, breathing, choking, muttering, mumbling, murmuring, breathing, groaning, coughing, laughing: all this cultural residue that normally remains repressed, inhibited, censored, is here laid bare, becomes primordial, making evident in the most direct manner the fundamental immemorial constants of human relations: conflict, hatred, games of love, the thirst for power and possession. Another mark of the twofold radicality of Ligeti’s work is that he wrote Aventures and Lux Aeterna (1966) side by side: the most corporeal with the most spiritual – the pre-verbal and the trans-verbal, Caliban and Ariel, the animal face of man alongside his (potentially) angelic face. Ligeti is not, to be sure, the only one to have opened the world of high art music to an unrestricted and unrestrained vocality. Without wishing to be exhaustive, we should at least add here the name of Dieter Schnebel. Seen from another perspective, these transgressions correspond to an escape from divisions. The 1960s saw the triumph of openings up, of breaking down boundaries between media and between artistic disciplines.
Dodecaphonic composition was historically the first in a line of types of what I would call totalization–summation that would come to be characteristic of the New Music for the rest of the twentieth century. Every individual form of seriation comprised all 12 pitch-classes, through which they staked a claim to universality, a claim that is pushed even further if the particular arrangement of a series constitutes
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the symbol of a perfectly closed world. The self-complementing hexachord imagined by Schoenberg as early as 1915 for Jacob’s Ladder, the ‘miracle series’ or ‘magic series’ (die Wunderreihe), so called because self-reproducing, for his Modern Psalm No. 1 in 1950 (which was the last of the works planned out by Schoenberg), Webern’s endlessly self-referential trichords, the ‘all-combinatorial pitch-class set’ theoretically established by Babbitt, the ‘universal formula’ (Weltformel) devised by Stockhausen for his heptalogy Licht – there are more than enough claims here to embrace the entire world, even if in all cases in the end it always comes down to the world of the dodecatonic division of the octave. Because, as we have already noted, in the pitch domain atonality does not imply the determination of temporal divisions, as had been the case with tonality (and continues to be in popular or more conventional music) through its rhythmic cadential formulae, Cage had either to impose an arbitrary time-frame (the delimitation and division of musical time imposed ‘as though from the outside’), or arbitrarily to abandon all temporal determination (durations then appeared to organize themselves ‘spontaneously’, in a non-predetermined manner, as if ‘from the inside’, from the contingent presence of sounds), before serialsm could arrive at a solution for a total differentiation of durational values. If dodecaphonic composition signified the sum total of pitch elements – the pitch-class set – ‘total’ serialism (the adjective is heavy with implications) attempted to realize the continuous presence of all sets: pitch-class sets, durational sets, sets of dynamics, of registers, of timbres – in short, the set of sets. And if serialism explains a tendency towards total composition, then ‘chance music’, on the contrary, is integral non-composition. The Philosophy of Totality manifests itself in absence as in presence, in emptiness as in plenitude, in Nothingness as in Totality – Nothingness being the rejection of all rejections, which is to say, the acceptance of all and everything. It is the ultimate transgression, that which negates – a philosophy of All which is also a philosophy of Nothing, which refuses all divisions: the ‘musikè’ that opens itself to everything audible in the world. To close this paragraph, I would add that a particular serialism (the most rigorous, that recommended by Karel Goeyvaerts – see the correspondence with Stockhausen, 1951–53) constitutes the beginning of ‘algorithmicization’ and (avant la lettre) ‘cloning’: an automatizable process for reproducing sameness. Repetitive-minimalist music, because strongly undifferentiated, has often been regarded as being an antidote to the differentiations pursued by serialism. Before acquiescing to this proposition we should note that the long sounds and long
Herman, Sabbe, ‘Die Einheit der Stockhausen-Zeit …: Neue Erkenntnismöglichkeiten der seriellen Engwicklung anhand des frühen Wirkens von Stockhausen und Goeyvaerts. Dargestellt aufgrund der Briefe Stockhausens an Goevaerts’, in Heinz-Klaus Metzger and Rainer Riehn (eds), Musik-Konzepte 19: Karlheinz Stockhausen: … wie die Zeit verging … (Munich: Edition Text + Kritik, 1981) pp. 5–96.
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repetitious stretches of minimalist music teach us that identity in music is never complete; it always includes difference. But the differentiation practised to excess by serialism ended up by leading to indifference: a kind of ‘all-always’ – that is to say, all elements always equally present, equally distributed, equivalent, and in equilibrium. There is nothing to choose between any of the serially constituted entities, each constitutes a whole in itself: this is logical indifference. Also, every arrangement of such serial entities must likewise be equally valued, logically. Their sequence, therefore, is also irrelevant: this is chronological indifference. This manifests itself in an exemplary manner in so-called ‘open’ or ‘mobile’ forms which, regarded in this way, form the logical ‘trans-serial’ sequence of serialism. Another kind of indifference, arrived at through successive accumulation of pre-existent material (and to which Stravinsky, for his part, had already greatly contributed) is the historical indifference of quotations, by dint of citation: Machaut, Monteverdi, Mozart, Messiaen – or, better, in disorder: Mozart, Monteverdi, Messiaen, Machaut – constitute a single ‘reservoir’: another form of totalization through actualization and simultaneization of all pasts by way of their citation. (Does ‘postmodernism’ thus manifest itself as following on naturally from a triumphant modernist attitude? At least a certain postmodernism?) As a further step in its generalization the principle of equivalence seems, in postmodernity, to transcend the separate domains of social–cultural genres: with John Zorn and other American composers one hears, juxtaposed, ‘classic classic’, avant-garde in the classical tradition, jazz, country, the list goes on. Do we have here, then, one of the ways in which a new multimedia society is in the process of finding itself? Finally, with Cage, who welcomes without discrimination any, all, and no matter what sounds in the world, are we confronted with the ultimate indifference of nature (in the