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ontemporary CPragmatism
Contemporary Pragmatism Editors
Mitchell Aboulafia, The Juilliard School, USA John R. Shook, Center for Inquiry, USA
Assistant Editor
Tibor Solymosi, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale
Editorial Board Susana de Castro Amaral, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Brazil Randall Auxier, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, USA Richard Bernstein, New School University, USA James Bohman, Saint Louis University, USA Randall Dipert, University at Buffalo, USA Pascal Engel, Université Paris IV–Sorbonne, France Jose Miguel Esteban, Universidad Autonoma del Estado de Morelos, Mexico Nancy Frankenberry, Dartmouth College, USA Nancy Fraser, New School University, USA Jim Garrison, Virginia Tech University, USA Paulo Ghiraldelli, Jr., Centro de Estudos em Filosofia Americana, Brazil Eddie Glaude, Princeton University, USA Russell Goodman, University of New Mexico, USA Judith Green, Fordham University, USA Susan Haack, University of Miami, USA Jürgen Habermas, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University of Frankfurt, Germany Leoni Henning, Universidade Estadual de Londrina, Brazil Hans Joas, University of Erfurt, Germany; University of Chicago, USA Robert Kane, University of Texas, USA Paul Kurtz, Center for Inquiry, USA John Lachs, Vanderbilt University, USA Alvaro Marquez-Fernandez, Universidad del Zulia, Venezuela Joseph Margolis, Temple University, USA James Marshall, University of Auckland, New Zealand Glenn McGee, Albany Medical Center, New York, USA Floyd Merrell, Purdue University, USA Cheryl Misak, University of Toronto, Canada Lucius Outlaw, Jr., Vanderbilt University, USA Michael Peters, University of Auckland, Austr.; University of Glasgow, Scotland Huw Price, University of Sydney, Australia Hilary Putnam, Harvard University, USA Bjørn Ramberg, University of Oslo, Norway Mike Sandbothe, Aalborg University, Denmark Dmitri Shalin, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, USA Jeffrey Stout, Princeton University, USA Claudine Tiercelin, L’Université de Paris-XII, France Celal Türer, Erciyes University, Turkey Bas van Fraassen, Princeton University, USA Marcus Vinícius da Cunha, Universidade de São Paulo, Ribeirão Preto, Brazil Cornel West, Princeton University, USA
Contemporary Pragmatism is affiliated with the International Pragmatism Society. See information for subscribers and contributors on the last page.
ontemporary CPragmatism Edited by
Mitchell Aboulafia & John R. Shook Volume 6 Number 1 June 2009
AMSTERDAM - NEW YORK, NY 2009
The paper on which this book is printed meets the requirements of “ISO 9706:1994, Information and documentation - Paper for documents Requirements for permanence”. ISSN: 1572-3429 ISBN: 978-90-420-2656-8 E-Book ISBN: 978-90-420-2657-5 ©Editions Rodopi B.V., Amsterdam - New York, NY 2009 Printed in The Netherlands
Contemporary Pragmatism Volume 6 Number 1
June 2009
Contents Articles Sami Pihlström Pragmatism and Naturalized Transcendental Subjectivity
1
Carl Sachs Natural Agents: A Transcendental Argument for Pragmatic Naturalism
15
Charles A. Hobbs Naturalism, Death, and Functional Immortality
39
Andrew Wells Garnar Must a Pragmatist Be a Historical Materialist?
67
Tina Sikka A Pragmatist Critique of Derridian Politics
87
Phillip Deen A Call for Inclusion in the Pragmatic Justification of Democracy
131
Naoko Saito and Paul Standish What’s the Problem with Problem-Solving? Language, Skepticism, and Pragmatism
153
Discussion John Lachs Rescher’s Cognitive Pragmatism
169
Nicholas Rescher Epistemic Pragmatism (A Reply)
179
Review Essay Joseph Margolis A “Pragmatist” among Disputed Pragmatists: Robert Brandom’s Between Saying and Doing: Towards an Analytic Pragmatism
183
Contemporary Pragmatism Vol. 6, No. 1 (June 2009), 1–13
Editions Rodopi © 2009
Pragmatism and Naturalized Transcendental Subjectivity Sami Pihlström
Pragmatism is an emergentist version of non-reductive naturalism: subjectivity arises as a natural development of certain kinds of organisms and their interactions with their environment. Subjectivity must be understood dynamically, in relation to (habits of) action; therefore, pragmatism is a philosophical anthropology, not just a philosophy of mind. Pragmatic naturalism not only avoids scientistic reductions of subjectivity but is compatible with a reconceptualized transcendental perspective on subjectivity; however, the problem of (transcendental) solipsism must not be ignored. Pragmatist philosophy of mind and subjectivity must engage with metaphysical questions about the way(s) the world is for us, in a manner ultimately connected with ethics.
Pragmatist thinkers, with the possible exception of influential neopragmatists like Richard Rorty and Robert Brandom, are rarely cited in mainstream contemporary analytic philosophy of mind.1 Nor are pragmatists’ works among standard references in phenomenologically oriented explorations of the mind and subjectivity, even though there is some interesting historical scholarship available on, for example, the connections between William James’s radical empiricism (focusing on the notion of “pure experience”) and Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology.2 In order to bring pragmatism – classical and modern – better into the focus of contemporary debates on subjectivity, this paper briefly argues for the following seven points (most of which I have discussed in more detail in previous publications of mine): 1.
Pragmatism may be regarded as an emergentist version of non-reductive naturalism: subjectivity arises from nature as a natural development of certain kinds of organisms and their interaction with their natural environment.
2.
Subjectivity must, in pragmatism, be understood dynamically, that is, in relation to (habits of) action. Therefore, pragmatism is essentially a philosophical anthropology, not just a philosophy of mind.
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3.
Not all pragmatists are emergentists, however; some have been, for instance, panpsychists. This is an interesting tension in pragmatist philosophy of mind.
4.
Pragmatic, non-reductive naturalism not only avoids scientistic reductions of subjectivity but is even compatible with a transcendental (Kantian-like) perspective on subjectivity, if the latter is reconceptualized from a pragmatist standpoint.
5.
No transcendental philosophy of subjectivity, even a pragmatic one, can ignore the problem of (transcendental) solipsism.
6.
Pragmatist philosophy of mind and subjectivity cannot be thoroughly nonmetaphysical (or “post-ontological”) but must engage with metaphysical questions about the way(s) the world is for us.
7.
Pragmatist metaphysics, both in general and in its particular applications in the philosophy of mind and subjectivity, must be intimately reconnected with ethics.
I will briefly consider these points in turn. My discussion will not constitute a deductive chain of argument; that would be a much more ambitious task. Rather, I will offer a kind of narrative, with one idea more or less naturally leading to another. Thus, I hope to be able to take up key pragmatist themes that may help to rearticulate some aspects of a plausible pragmatist approach to subjectivity. I cannot even attempt to interpret any of the classical or recent pragmatists whose views can be found as the main sources of my reflections. I will just summarize (and to some extent defend) a pragmatist philosophy of subjectivity, with my own, perhaps somewhat idiosyncratic emphases. Nevertheless, I do believe that it is to some extent justified to ascribe at least some of the ideas to be articulated below to some of the leading pragmatist thinkers. Note also that I am not merely describing pragmatist views in positive terms; I also try to identify tensions, challenges, and open issues. I am obviously aware of the fact that several pragmatists will immediately deny one or more of my allegedly pragmatist “theses.” That, however, is precisely as it should be: pragmatism is not a final set of closed, completed doctrines; it is a living philosophical orientation,3 and creative pragmatic work on subjectivity can be fruitfully continued if – and perhaps only if – philosophers disagree on how exactly pragmatists should view this exciting phenomenon. By no means am I claiming, then, that the seven pragmatist perspectives on subjectivity to be discussed form a coherent whole without internal tensions. The tensions they embody should be a source of genuine pragmatist insights. Pragmatism, as I see it, is inherently pluralistic; its tolerant methodology for examining subjectivity – or any other philosophically interesting phenomenon – need not be seen as a rival to, but may
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be seen as critically transforming and to some extent accommodating, some other methods, such as the transcendental one. 1. Emergence and non-reductive naturalism The pragmatist approach to subjectivity, as I see it, starts from non-reductive naturalism. This starting point can be made more precise by employing the concept of emergence. Subjectivity is something that “emerges from” the natural world, and is thus itself something fully natural, even though it is possible only in complex systems that are in some sense “more than the sum of their parts.” Nature, for pragmatists, is multiply layered, and its “higher” levels, including subjectivity, freedom, culture, and values, cannot be completely reduced – either conceptually, ontologically, or explanatorily – to its “lower” ones. This emergent naturalism is especially clear in John Dewey’s and George Herbert Mead’s pragmatism,4 although there was surprisingly little exchange between American pragmatism and British empiricism (which flourished in the 1920–30s, hence partly simultaneously with pragmatism).5 In The Quest for Certainty, Dewey writes: “The intellectual activity of man is not something brought to bear upon nature from without; it is nature realizing its own potentialities in behalf of a fuller and richer issue of events.”6 What gradually emerges out of the originally inanimate world in Dewey’s system is life, mind, freedom, culture, and value. For Dewey, such emergent structures and properties are “real features of ... complex systems which cannot be accounted for in terms that would be adequate if the same constituents were organized in a less complex way.”7 Although Dewey was a naturalist, he rejected metaphysical realists’ dream of representing nature as it is in itself from an absolute perspective. For him, any ontological structure of reality is a humanly established structure, itself emerging in the course of human experience and inquiry – and thereby, arguably, a structure to some extent presupposing subjective experiential perspectives or continuously getting “structured” through such perspectives of ours. In this sense his realism about emergent properties – if we may call it that – is thoroughly pragmatic. In the evolutionary flow of experience, both subjectivity and the objects constituted through inquiry and our practice-laden perspectives continuously emerge. Dewey was not entirely happy with the term ‘emergence’, however. Late in his life, jointly with Arthur Bentley, he argued that the “natural man” who talks, thinks, and knows should not, “even in his latest and most complex activities,” be surveyed “as magically ‘emergent’ into something new and strange.”8 He contrasted his transactional view of emergence to previous views (including, presumably, the British empiricists’ ideas) as follows: At a stage at which an inquirer wants to keep “life,” let us say, within “nature,” at the same time not “degrading” it to what he fears some other workers may think of “nature” – or perhaps similarly, if he wants to treat
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SAMI PIHLSTRÖM “mind” within organic life – he may say that life or mind “emerges,” calling it thereby “natural” in origin, yet still holding that it is all that it was held to be in its earlier “non-natural” envisionment. The transactional view of emergence, in contrast, will not expect merely to report the advent out of the womb of nature of something that still retains an old non-natural independence and isolation. It will be positively interested in fresh direct study in the new form. It will seek enriched descriptions of primary life processes in their environments and of the more complex behavioral processes in theirs.9
Accordingly, while being careful with the word “emergence,” Dewey did not reject the idea but only what he saw as its magical overtones. He simply required scientific, experimental research on the emergence of life and mind. Subjectivity cannot be studied purely philosophically, from an arm-chair, but our philosophical examinations of subjectivity must be empirically anchored, continuous with, not separated from, the advancing sciences. Among neopragmatists, Hilary Putnam may be the one whose views come closest to an emergentist philosophy of the mind and subjectivity. He has, after all, been one of the leading critics of reductive accounts of the mind for decades. However, he says that emergence is a “bad metaphor,”10 especially because its advocates tend to construe the mind as a mysterious entity whose existence calls for a (scientific-like) explanation. We should, rather, view the mind pragmatically as a world-involving set of capacities. Instead of maintaining the largely Cartesian framework within which mentality and subjectivity are mysterious, we should, according to Putnam, dissolve this mystery. From Putnam’s point of view, it may seem that emergentist philosophers of mind just keep up the mystery by talking about the somewhat magic leap of emergent novelty. However, if we, in a Deweyan and/or Meadian fashion regard mental properties as naturally emerging, I do not think that any mysterious emergentist assumptions are needed. The problem need not be thoroughly dissolved in a Wittgensteinian way, even if both dualistic and reductively scientistic approaches to it are abandoned. 2. Agency and philosophical anthropology Pragmatic subjectivity, in its natural emergence, is crucially connected with human (habits of) action, hence with the notion of agency. This conviction seems to be shared by those pragmatists who are fruitfully (re)interpretable as emergentists (including Dewey) and those who would rather abandon the entire issue of emergence (including Putnam). The emergence of subjectivity is not the emergence of peculiar immaterial entities, properties, or states (e.g., qualia understood as some kind of internal mental objects), but the emergence of certain capacities and habitualities, of ways of “being in the world” (if a Heideggerian expression is appropriate in this context).
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This, along with the pragmatists’ general naturalism, is a further step toward a total rejection of Cartesian assumptions that pragmatists have developed since Charles Peirce’s anti-Cartesian articles of the 1860s.11 The mind is “in the world,” not “in the head” of subjects or minded beings; subjectivity is inevitably connected with intersubjectivity, when it is understood in terms of subjects’ worldly (including social) actions.12 Pragmatism, then, can never remain merely a philosophy of mind; rather, it is a much more comprehensive orientation in philosophical anthropology, seeking to understand not just the mind (mentality, subjectivity) but the entire human being in her/his worldly (including social) surroundings, that is, in James’s words, “the whole man in us.”13 As such a general philosophical project, pragmatism must not only investigate the nature of the mind and its contents – as analytic philosophy of mind primarily does – but the ways in which “minded” creatures like us live in the world, amidst their different projects and habitualities. After all, the concept of a habit, or habitual action, has been central to the pragmatist tradition since its very start.14 This is why the recent analytic debates in the philosophy of mind have only limited relevance to pragmatist explorations of the mind and subjectivity. Nor do phenomenological investigations fare much better in this regard, however. Phenomenologists usually seek to examine mental and experiential phenomena from an allegedly “presuppositionless” standpoint, focusing on the way the world appears to us in experience and bracketing all naturalistic presuppositions (such as the very existence of a material world). One reason why we need to insist on both the natural emergence and the habitual embeddedness of subjectivity in pragmatism is the need to avoid the remnants of such “first philosophy.” Despite some highly interesting developments in phenomenology that seem to bring it in many ways close to pragmatism,15 it seems to me that the worldly – natural and practical – embeddedness of subjectivity is not sufficiently emphasized in phenomenological studies of experience. The same may, after all, be true about James’s radical empiricism, which, as an apparently first-philosophical metaphysical theory of the general structure of reality, may in the end be hard to reconcile with his pragmatism. 3. Emergence or panpsychism? For a pragmatist philosophical anthropologist, it may seem natural to think of subjectivity as a naturally emergent product of forces that are originally devoid of subjectivity. Our evolutionary history has produced complex organisms, world-directed agents, with genuinely “novel” subjective perspectives irreducible to what is objectively going on in their worldly surroundings. There is, however, an important tension in pragmatism between emergentist and nonemergentist views. It is, as already implicitly acknowledged, to some extent a mystery how anything subjective can, or ever could, “emerge” from something in which there is no subjectivity (or mentality, or experience, etc.) at all.
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Some pragmatists (and non-pragmatists) have, therefore, been inclined toward panpsychism instead of emergentism; arguably, there are elements of panpsychism in all the major classical pragmatists (Peirce, James, Dewey, and F.C.S. Schiller).16 James, in particular, is an interesting figure in this regard. Around the middle of the first decade of the twentieth century, he struggled with both radical empiricism and what he labeled “pluralistic panpsychism.”17 Panpsychism, though certainly a non-standard alternative, is increasingly drawing attention in the philosophy of mind today; pragmatist perspectives could significantly enrich this discussion, too (just as the discussion of emergence). It would be an especially significant pragmatist contribution to analyze in detail the usually metaphysically realistic background assumptions at work in the emergence vs. panpsychism controversy. The main novelty of pragmatist philosophy of subjectivity might be, indeed, that this dialogue cannot be based upon prior metaphysically realist presuppositions, according to which there either just is, or is not, emergent subjectivity (e.g., qualia, or related “mysterious” entities) “out there” in the world independently of us, conceived “absolutely,” or from an imagined “God’s-Eye View” (as Putnam would presumably put it). Rather, a pragmatic perspective on subjectivity should take seriously the idea that the world, insofar as it is an object of human conceptualizing, theorizing, and understanding (even including its mental, subjective, and perspectival aspects), is to some extent a “human construction,” structured and categorized by us into what it is or can ever be for us. Subjectivity, then, is also something that we ourselves (in a Kantian-like way) “impose on” or “contribute to” the world we live in. Whether this is ultimately emergentistically or panpsychistically elaborated is a further matter deserving continuous attention by pragmatist thinkers.18 Panpsychism may, if pragmatically articulated, be connected with, or even based on, Peirce’s synechism: the doctrine of continuity, according to which both being as such and specific modes of being, such as mentality, spontaneity, or (presumably) subjectivity, are matters of degree, instead of being sharply separable from their opposites. Nor is there any ontological gap between reality or being, on the one hand, and appearances or phenomena, on the other. For Peirce, synechism is “the tendency to regard everything as continuous,” in a way that includes “the whole domain of experience in every element of it.”19 Synechism, for Peirce, was both metaphysical and methodological. For a pragmatist philosopher working on the notion of subjectivity, it might be understood as the requirement to avoid postulating Cartesian gaps between the subjective mind and the objective (natural, material) world. The pragmatic embeddedness of subjectivity in our habits of action might be either emergentistically or synechistically conceptualized. This is to some extent an unresolved tension in pragmatist metaphysics and philosophy of mind. For a pluralistically oriented pragmatist, it would be ideal to get both – emergent novelty with continuity – but this may be difficult to achieve.
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4. The return of the transcendental subject While the naturalized picture of subjectivity here associated with pragmatism – whether it is, in the end, better understood in terms of emergence (and nonreductive naturalism with a “layered” reality) or in terms of panpsychism (sacrificing some, though not all, central assumptions taken to characterize naturalism in favor of at least some kind of metaphysical idealism) – may seem to be strictly opposed to any form of transcendental subjectivity, such as the “transcendental ego” invoked by classical transcendental thinkers like Kant and Husserl, there is an important transcendental strain in pragmatist philosophy of subjectivity (and intersubjectivity). According to James, in particular, “we” organize or structure the reality we are able to experience;20 this worldstructuring “we” plays a (quasi-)transcendental role, although in many signifycant respects pragmatism departs from Kantian transcendental philosophy. A similar “humanist” picture of pragmatism is provided in Schiller’s somewhat neglected writings.21 There is, in addition to undeniable differences, a lot of common ground between the Kantian transcendental tradition and the pragmatist tradition, to the extent that pragmatism may even be regarded as a relatively late twist in the former tradition. The pragmatist perspective on subjectivity, as outlined above, may even be seen as a way of articulating the “paradox of subjectivity” – our problematic role as both world-constituting beings and beings existing in a fully natural world, that is, beings whose subjective experiences, including the worldconstituting perspectives themselves, emerge within that world – that the transcendental tradition has always taken seriously.22 The challenge for pragmatists in this regard is to make naturalism and transcendental inquiry better compatible with each other as philosophical methods. This paper cannot examine that issue in general terms; I can merely programmatically suggest that such a reconciliation might be achieved by arguing that the world-engaging, dynamic, practice-embedded subjectivity the pragmatists emphasize itself “constitutes,” or even “constructs,” reality (objectivity) in a way analogous to the constitution of reality and its objects in transcendental philosophy. Just like the phenomenological notion of Gegenstandskonstitution, the pragmatist conception of world-structuring through human practices would be thoroughly misunderstood if this conception were taken to be committed to the claim that we humans “construct” or “create” reality in a factual, causal, or empirical sense; clearly, much of reality is independent of us, and we should be pragmatic realists about it. However, there is a clearly identifiable (JamesianDeweyan) sense in which reality does depend on us. The objects of our thought and inquiry are inevitably the result of selective interests, of what is important for us, of what we find significant in the world surrounding us, a world in which we must continuously act and orientate. Such selective interests and valuational activities – arising out of our human agency and habits of action, which themselves are crucial to any pragmatist philosophy of subjectivity, as suggested
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above – then to a crucial extent determine what the world, for us, is like. This is rather obviously analogous to the way in which the human cognitive faculty at a transcendental level constructs the empirical world in Kant’s First Critique. The transcendental subjectivity involved must, however, be carefully reconceptualized in terms of natural (presumably, emergently real) practices taking place in the world, which again is constituted, transcendentally, from subjective perspectives. There is, admittedly, a circular structure here, indicating, however, reflexivity instead of any vicious circularity or questionbegging. Transcendental subjectivity is not any kind of other-worldly (transcendent) ghost; it is our own subjectivity in this very world we live in and which is given to us as an object of cognition, that is, our own subjectivity viewed as the subject of world-constitution rather than simply as one object among others in the (constituted) world.23 We must, therefore, be able to view ourselves, slightly paradoxically, both as subjects and objects. Pragmatism, as much as Kantian transcendental philosophy, may offer us philosophical resources to defend this double-aspect view of ourselves. 5. The problem of solipsism Insofar as pragmatism “goes transcendental” along the lines suggested in the above reinterpretation of James, in particular, it will be a real issue whether the pragmatist conception of subjectivity in the end collapses into some form of solipsism. (Perhaps this is not a major problem for Peircean or Deweyan pragmatists, but for Jamesian or Schillerian more subjectivist pragmatists it certainly is.) Ultimately, it is my future experiences that count in determining the pragmatic significance of any (metaphysical) “formula of the world.” My selective interests guide the transcendental world-constituting that enables the objects of experience and inquiry to emerge. Moreover, it is not clear that my subjectivity is genuinely connected intersubjectively with other experiential points of view. Solipsism is, in Jamesian pragmatism, in the end overcome only ethically, through a pragmatic (moral) decision to take seriously other experiential perspectives on the world.24 It would, however, be impossible to argue for this interpretation of James, and for the relevance of the problem of solipsism in his thought, in this paper. I am certainly not claiming that James, or any pragmatist (or perhaps anyone else), is or ever has been a solipsist. Even so, the problem of solipsism does have a role to play in a serious philosophical examination of the problem of subjectivity. It certainly plays a role in transcendental philosophy, especially transcendental phenomenology, and it is hence natural to see it as playing such a role in Kantian reinterpretations of pragmatism, too. The way in which I am (as I really believe I am) connected, intersubjectively, with other human subjects within genuinely shareable practices and habits of action must be pragmatically explored; it cannot be just taken for granted.
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Note, however, that the problem of solipsism as it is understood here is not just the skeptical, epistemological problem that, for all we know, the external world might not exist or everything might just be my dream. It is, rather, the conceptual problem of how we are so much as able to view our own subjectivity as one among many, and to view the world as empirically speaking independent of us, even though it is – if the reflections above are on the right track – transcendentally speaking constituted by our practices. The social and intersubjective emphasis of pragmatism is certainly to its merit, but these valuable insights of pragmatism should not blind us to the philosophical significance of this conceptual problem (even if the epistemological version of the solipsism issue is a relatively uninteresting remnant of the Cartesian paradigm that pragmatists have, with good reason, set aside). 6. Pragmatism and metaphysics As a follow-up to the proposal not only to (non-reductively) naturalize subjectivity but to “re-transcendentalize” pragmatism and pragmatic naturalism, a metaphilosophical point on pragmatist philosophy of subjectivity needs to be raised. It might seem that pragmatism approaches the mind and subjectivity in non-metaphysical and non-ontological terms, purely epistemologically and experientially – or, in contemporary pragmatism inspired by Rorty’s antirepresentationalism, purely linguistically, examining not the “real” phenomenon of subjectivity at all – whether or not we may usefully say that there “really” is such a phenomenon in the world – but just the vocabularies or discourses (or “language-games”) we use to talk about subjectivity. Bjørn Ramberg, in particular, has aptly spoken about “post-ontological philosophy of mind” in this Rortyan context.25 This is indeed the perspective taken by several neopragmatists of the Rortyan stripe; however, for classical pragmatists, as has been argued by Dewey scholars and James scholars alike, the notion of experience is much more central than the notion of language.26 I am not claiming that the neopragmatists’ insistence on language is mistaken; on the contrary, pragmatists need to (re)connect their views with (late-) Wittgensteinian philosophy of language, for instance. Therefore, a sharp opposition between experience-oriented classical pragmatism (e.g., Dewey) and language-oriented neopragmatism (e.g., Rorty) is misleading and may hinder our pragmatist explorations of the dimensions of our subjectivity that are clearly both experiential and linguistically articulable. However, it would be a mistake to conclude that there is no place for ontology or metaphysics in pragmatism at all (either generally or in the special field of subjectivity research). By examining the ways in which subjectivity is experienced, or linguistically structured (spoken about), by us, pragmatists may examine what subjectivity, for us, is – or what its role or place in the natural empirical world transcendentally structured by us (by that very subjectivity) is. They will then examine the
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philosophical-anthropological phenomenon we categorize as subjectivity from within the perspectives of our lives already colored by that phenomenon. This, I am tempted to say, will be an ontological inquiry into subjectivity, albeit in a heavily reinterpreted form. It is “metaphysics of subjectivity” in a Kantian shape, examining not the way the world is absolutely independently of us but the ways in which we may (have to) take the world to be in terms of our experiential and linguistic practices. Pragmatists should not give up metaphysics but reinterpret the very notion of metaphysics pragmatically. In the case of subjectivity, what this means is that, once again, we should not be concerned with the subject conceived (or imagined) as a Cartesian-like substantial entity – any knowledge about which Kant persuasively argued is impossible27 – but, truly transcendentally, with the ways in which our subjectivity construes, for us, the world we live in as the (always reinterpretable) condition for the possibility of being able to experience any objects “out there.”28 7. Metaphysics, ethics, and subjectivity A successful rehabilitation of metaphysics – in relation to subjectivity or more generally – can eventually only take place in pragmatism if we are prepared to reconnect metaphysics with ethics. Ultimately, our metaphysical perspectives on subjectivity, when subjected to pragmatic evaluation in terms of the “pragmatic method” (especially in its Jamesian form), will have to be grounded in ethical considerations. This is how we should read James’s reflections on “some metaphysical problems pragmatically considered” in the third lecture of Pragmatism. It is, in the end, the ethical significance of various metaphysical conceptions of subjectivity that will determine their pragmatic “cash value.” James does not explicitly discuss subjectivity in this context, but he does examine free will, for instance, and his approach can be readily applied to the problems we are now considering.29 Here, the acknowledgment of the other subject, another human person and experiential point of view independent of ourselves, is a decisive test case, a criterion for any adequate pragmatist metaphysics of subjectivity. This will be a genuinely metaphysical endeavor grounded in ethics. Our pragmatist philosophy of subjectivity cannot first settle the metaphysical question of what subjectivity is, or whether there is any, in order to turn to ethical issues afterwards, but must approach this topic ethically from the very start. There is no non-ethical, or morally neutral, way of understanding, at a purely theoretical level, our practical world-embeddedness and the (quasi-)transcendental world-constitutivity itself reflexively embedded in that embeddedness. Thus, the special case of subjectivity, pragmatically investigated and rearticulated, enables us to draw a general metaphilosophical moral about the need to reconsider the relations between two central philosophical sub-disciplines, ethics and metaphysics. For a pragmatist, it is not the case – either here or elsewhere – that metaphysical issues are to be solved first and ethical ones only
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thereafter; on the contrary, the two are intimately entangled, because there is no way to examine metaphysically the way the world is absolutely, and any investigation of the world as structured from the perspectives of our selective (subjective) interests will inevitably be colored by ethical considerations.30
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I am grateful to Bjørn Ramberg who invited me to present this paper in the “Pragmatism and Subjectivity” symposium at the APA Pacific Division Conference in Vancouver, BC (8–12 April 2009), as well as to all those who commented on the presentation. This paper is part of my research project, “The Ethical Grounds of Metaphysics,” funded by the Academy of Finland (2008–11).
NOTES 1. Another notable exception is Bjørn Ramberg, whose work in the philosophy of mind largely starts from Rortyan and Davidsonian ideas. See Ramberg, “Pragmatism and Post-Ontological Philosophy of Mind,” in Rorty and His Critics, ed. Robert B. Brandom (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2000). Furthermore, Hilary Putnam’s work is of course classical in the philosophy of mind, but during his functionalist period in the 1960–70s, when he significantly contributed to the emergence of the main paradigms of contemporary philosophy of mind, he was not yet a pragmatist – not, at least, in the sense of being connected with the pragmatist tradition. For a pragmatist reconsideration of the problems of functionalism, see Putnam, Words and Life, ed. James Conant (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994); and Putnam, The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and World (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). Furthermore, while John Dewey is generally acknowledged as a classic of naturalism, which in turn is generally seen as the main paradigm of modern philosophy of mind, Dewey’s pragmatism plays hardly any role in this acknowledgment. 2. See Lynn Bridgers, Contemporary Varieties of Religious Experience (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005). 3. See Robert B. Talisse and Scott F. Aikin, Pragmatism: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: Continuum, 2008). 4. See, in particular, Dewey’s classical works, Experience and Nature (1925, 2nd edn. 1929) (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1986); and The Quest for Certainty: A Study on the Relation between Knowledge and Action (1929) (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1960). Among Mead’s works, see especially The Philosophy of the Present (1932), ed. A. E. Murphy (La Salle, Ill.:: Open Court). 5. Sami Pihlström, “The Re-Emergence of the Emergence Debate,” Principia 6.1 (2002): 133–181; Charbel Niño El-Hani and Sami Pihlström, “Emergence Theories and Pragmatic Realism,” Essays in Philosophy 3.2 (2002), at www.humboldt.edu/~essays. 6. Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, pp. 214–215. 7. J. E. Tiles, Dewey (London and New York: Routledge, 1988), p. 148. 8. John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley, Knowing and the Known (1949), in John Dewey: The Later Works, 1925–1953, vol. 16, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1989), p. 45. 9. Ibid., p. 121.
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10. See Putnam, The Threefold Cord, p. 174. 11. These are collected in Charles S. Peirce, The Essential Peirce vol. 1, eds. Nathan Houser et al., (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992). 12. See again Putnam, The Threefold Cord, on emergence as a misleading metaphor, encouraging us to conceive of the mind as a kind of “thing” rather than a world-directed activity. As indicated above, I am not entirely convinced that this pessimism about the potential role played by the concept of emergence is justified. Even Putnam himself has appealed to an intuitive concept of emergence in defending his nonreductive account of the mind. 13. Sami Pihlström, Pragmatism and Philosophical Anthropology: Understanding Our Human Life in a Human World (New York: Peter Lang, 1998); “On the Concept of Philosophical Anthropology,” Journal of Philosophical Research 28 (2003), pp. 259–285. 14. See Charles S. Peirce, “The Fixation of Belief” (1877), reprinted in The Essential Peirce, for the famous “doubt-belief theory of inquiry” and the related conception of beliefs as “habits of action.” For the importance of “habitual rationality” in pragmatism, see Erkki Kilpinen, The Enormous Fly-Wheel of Society: Pragmatism’s Conception of Habitual Rationality and Social Theory (Helsinki: University of Helsinki, Department of Sociology, 2000). 15. I am convinced that pragmatists have a lot to learn from, say, David Carr, The Paradox of Subjectivity: The Self in the Transcendental Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), which starts from Kant and Husserl, or from Dan Zahavi, Husserl’s Phenomenology (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 2003). 16. This is what David Skrbina argues in his book, Panpsychism in the West (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005). 17. For interesting discussions of James’s panpsychist (or “panexperientialist”) reflections, see T. L. S. Sprigge, James and Bradley: American Truth and British Reality (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1993). 18. Sami Pihlström, “Panpsychism – a Neglected Jamesian Alternative?” Journal of Philosophical Research 32 (2007): 319–347, reprinted in Pihlström, “The Trail of the Human Serpent Is over Everything”: Jamesian Perspectives on Mind, World, and Religion (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 2008), chap. 7. 19. Charles S. Peirce, “Immortality in the Light of Synechism” (1893) in The Essential Peirce, vol. 2, ed. The Peirce Edition Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), pp. 1–2. 20. See especially William James, Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking (1907), eds. Frederick H. Burkhardt, Fredson Bowers, and Ignas K. Skrupskelis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), chap. 7. 21. F. C. S. Schiller, Pragmatism and Humanism: Selected Writings 1891–1938, eds. John R. Shook and Hugh P. MacDonald (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2008). 22. See again Carr, The Paradox of Subjectivity. 23. Sami Pihlström, Naturalizing the Transcendental: A Pragmatic View (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2003), especially “Introduction”; Pihlström, “The Problem of Mind and Other Minds in William James’s Pragmatism,” in Psychology and Philosophy, ed. Sara Heinämaa and Martina Reuter (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009), reprinted (in an expanded form) in Pihlström, “The Trail of the Human Serpent Is over Everything,” chap. 5.
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24. Sami Pihlström, Solipsism: History, Critique, and Relevance (Tampere, Finland: Tampere University Press, 2004), chap. 5; Pihlström, “The Problem of Mind and Other Minds in William James’s Pragmatism.” 25. Ramberg, “Pragmatism and Post-Ontological Philosophy of Mind,” cited above. 26. See for example David L. Hildebrand, Beyond Realism and Antirealism: Dewey and the Neopragmatists (Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 2003). 27. See the section on the “Paralogisms of Pure Reason” (“Paralogismen der reinen Vernunft”) in Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781/1787), ed. Raymund Schmidt (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1990). 28. Sami Pihlström, “The Metaphysics and Ethics of the Self: Personal Identity Pragmatically Reconsidered,” forthcoming in Identity and Social Transformation: Proceedings of the 5th Central European Pragmatist Forum, ed. John Ryder and Radim Šip (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2009); Pihlström, Pragmatist Metaphysics: An Essay on the Ethical Grounds of Ontology (London: Continuum, 2009). 29. See James, Pragmatism, chap. 3. I have examined the metaphysical and ethical significance of the pragmatic method more closely in Pihlström, Pragmatist Metaphysics. 30. For more thoroughgoing elaborations of this view, see Pihlström, “The Trail of the Human Serpent Is over Everything,” especially chap. 5; and Pragmatist Metaphysics, passim.
Sami Pihlström Professor of Practical Philosophy Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy University of Jyväskylä P.O. Box 35 FI-40014 Finland
Contemporary Pragmatism Vol. 6, No. 1 (June 2009), 15–37
Editions Rodopi © 2009
Natural Agents: A Transcendental Argument for Pragmatic Naturalism Carl Sachs
I distinguish between two phases of Rorty’s naturalism: “nonreductive physicalism” (NRP) and “pragmatic naturalism” (PN). NRP holds that the vocabulary of mental states is irreducible that of physical states, but this irreducibility does not distinguish the mental from other irreducible vocabularies. PN differs by explicitly accepting a naturalistic argument for the transcendental status of the vocabulary of agency. Though I present some reasons for preferring PN over NRP, PN depends on whether ‘normativity’ can be ‘naturalized’.
1. Introduction A substantial portion of 20th and 21st century Anglophone philosophy concerns the problem of naturalism. By this I mean the philosophical motivations for adopting naturalism, the status and varieties of naturalism, and the debates between naturalists and their critics. The resulting philosophical situation has been described as “the real battle going on today, between reductive naturalism and normatively oriented accounts of rational practice” (Moyar 2008, 141). A resolution of this “battle” requires an inquiry into the prospects for a stable and attractive via media between these extremes. Let us say, then, that a candidate for a via media between reductive naturalism and norm-focused account of the social practices of rational agents is a candidate for “non-reductive naturalism.” On the face of it, non-reductive naturalism promises us to eat our cake and have it afterwards. Since it is non-reductionist, it could avoid the problems that accompany reductive or eliminative naturalism.1 Yet as a version of naturalism, it avoids the dogmatic temptations of a first philosophy which stands apart from science, justifies science, and prescribes its cultural vocation.2 “Nonreductive naturalism” is used here as an umbrella term for a variety of positions that attempt to preserve metaphilosophical naturalism without giving in to reductionism or scientism. My aim here is to examine the strengths and weaknesses of a particular strategy for arriving at non-reductive naturalism – what might be called “the Davidson-Rorty strategy.”
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Rorty, as is well appreciated, enthusiastically endorses historicism with respect to philosophical problems and theories. His historicist emphasis on the invention of increasingly more sophisticated forms of self-understanding is supposed to work in tandem with a naturalist emphasis on human beings as slightly more complicated animals. The question arises therefore as to how we are supposed to understand the relation between naturalism and historicism. In what follows I will reconstruct Rorty’s naturalism through his engagement with Donald Davidson.3 This engagement falls into two stages: “non-reductive physicalism” and “pragmatic naturalism.”4 Pragmatic naturalism differs by accepting the importance of transcendental argument for understanding our ascriptions of intentional states, or by what Ramberg (2004) calls “the vocabulary of agency.” I begin with a reconstruction of “non-reductive physicalism” (section 2), with emphasis on how Rorty uses anomalous monism in order to deny (pace Davidson) that the vocabulary of intentional states has any privileged status over other descriptions of natural events, objects, and relations. I then turn to more recent work by Davidson and by Bjørn Ramberg to show how the distinctive status of the vocabulary of agency can be secured through transcendental argument, provided that the argument is understood as naturalistic and antifoundational (section 3). I argue that Rorty should be willing to endorse transcendental arguments as formulated in this way because they do not function as descriptive vocabularies. Rather, they are normative; they reveal basic structures of our self-understanding as agents. I argue that PN, understood this way, has distinct advantages over NRP. I conclude that Rortyian pragmatic naturalism is a type of naturalism insofar as it begins with the basically Wittgensteinian point that there is a plurality of discursive practices within the form of life of a certain kind of animal (section 4). Pragmatic naturalism, so understood, naturalizes the manifest image without reducing it to, or translating it into, the scientific image. We thus acknowledge the centrality to our self-understanding of ourselves as a certain kind of animal rather than as a system of particles (or whatever the ultimate constituents of reality turn out to be, if quantum mechanics is replaced by some other theory). 2. Non-reductive Physicalism What Rorty calls “non-reductive physicalism” (or “antireductionist naturalism”) goes through slightly different formulations throughout the 1990s. This position is comprised of two distinct claims. The first claim is that there are no radical discontinuities between humans and the rest of nature. Rorty presents this claim in a number of different ways, but it emerges clearly through the following examples:
Natural Agents: A Transcendental Argument for Pragmatic Naturalism 17 1.
“To be a naturalist, in this sense, is to be the kind of antiessentialist who, like Dewey, sees no breaks in the hierarchy of increasingly complex adjustments to novel stimulation – the hierarchy which has amoebae adjusting themselves to changed water temperature at the bottom, bees dancing and chess players check-mating in the middle, and people fomenting scientific, artistic, and political revolutions at the top.” (Rorty 1991a, 109)
2.
“every event can be described in micro-structural terms, a description which mentions only elementary particles, and can be explained by reference to other events so described. This applies, e.g. to the events which are Mozart composing a melody or Euclid seeing how to prove a theorem.” (Rorty 1991b, 114)5
3.
“I define naturalism as the claim that (a) there is no occupant of space-time that is not linked in a single web of causal relations to all other occupants and (b) that any explanation of the behavior of any such spatiotemporal object must consist in placing that object within that single web.” (Rorty 1998b, 94)
4.
“I shall define ‘naturalism’ as the view that anything might have been otherwise, that there can be no conditionless conditions. Naturalists believe that all explanation is causal explanation of the actual, and that there is no such thing as a noncausal condition of possibility.” (Rorty 1991d, 55)
Or, as Rorty puts it in an especially pithy statement, “as good Darwinians, we want to introduce as few discontinuities as possible into the story of how we got from the apes to the Enlightenment” (Rorty 1998a, 40). Let us call this the continuity thesis, as comprised of the following claims: a)
for any entity, it stands in relation to other entities in terms that can be described using notions of spatio-temporal location and causal interaction.
b) all differences between spatio-temporal, causally related (i.e. “natural”) entities are differences of degree rather than of kind and, as a corollary. c)
all differences between human beings and other natural entities are differences of degree rather than of kind.
d) Thus human beings are properly seen as slightly more complicated than other animals, but nonetheless not something other than animal; we are not something animal plus something else that is non-animal or non-natural. The justification for the continuity thesis lies in Rorty’s debt to Quine, for whom there is no a priori vocation for philosophy; philosophy takes place within the
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natural world as the sciences present it. In its Quinean version, the continuity thesis is first and foremost a methodological assumption: philosophy is continuous with science, and only concerned with the objects of scientific inquiry. Consequently there are no entities that are exempt from the causal order. Rorty shares Quine’s rejection of any first philosophy that attempts to justify the sciences themselves. The continuity thesis is also, for Rorty, expression of sensitivity to the Darwinian and Deweyan understanding that human existence is continuous with the forms of life of other animals. The picture of humans as animals is underwritten by the results of the natural sciences. The second claim is presented as “anti-reductionism” or “non-reductive,” where reduction (and so irreducibility) is a semantic notion. Thus, in recasting Davidson, Rorty writes: to say that Davidson is an anti-reductionist physicalist is to say that he combines this claim [i.e. (2) above] with the doctrine that ‘reduction’ is relation merely between linguistic items, not among ontological categories. To reduce the language of X’s to the language of Y’s one must show either (a) that if you can talk about Ys you do not need to talk about X’s, or (b) that any given description in terms of X’s applies to all and only the things to which a given description in terms of Y’s applies. (Rorty 1991b, 114–115) Alternatively, following directly on (3) above, “I define reductionism as the insistence that there is not only a single web but a single privileged description of all entities caught in that web” (Rorty 1998b, 94). Let us call this the irreducibility thesis: there is no single privileged descriptive vocabulary to which all others can either be reduced (or eliminated if they cannot be reduced). Since Rorty stipulates that reduction is a semantic relation, the irreducibility thesis can be defined as the impossibility (or perhaps, more precisely, the uselessness) of that semantic relation among different “vocabularies.”6 If reduction is a semantic notion, then so too is irreducibility. Rorty thus argues that non-reductive physicalism rests on a conceptual or semantic irreducibility.7 Irreducibility is simply to say that talk of X’s – e.g. beliefs, desires, and reasons – cannot be replaced with talks of Y’s – e.g. patterns of neuronal activity or of fundamental particles – without altering the distribution of truth-values across sentences (or theories). To say that I believe that democracy is the worst form of government except for all the others is irreplaceable, salva vertiate, by saying anything about the behavior of large groups of neurons in my brain. Thus construed as a semantic relation, irreducibility is ontologically inert.8 It asserts only that talking about beliefs cannot be replaced by talking about brain-states; more generally, there is no single descriptive vocabulary into which all others can be translated salva veritate.
Natural Agents: A Transcendental Argument for Pragmatic Naturalism 19 Irreducibility therefore neither licenses an inference to metaphysical supernaturalism nor blocks a commitment to metaphysical naturalism; irreducibility is “no impediment to a materialist outlook” (Rorty 1991b, 114). Nevertheless, it is not entirely clear how the dual commitment to continuity and irreducibility is supposed to work, or whether Rorty is even entitled to hold both theses. Since Davidson’s anomalous monism is also a type of non-reductive naturalism, and Davidson’s dialogue with Rorty has been important for both of them, it is helpful here to take a closer look at Davidson. Sinclair (2002) argues that Davidson ought to be interpreted as a naturalist because Davidson, like Rorty, accepts Quine’s emphasis on the continuity between philosophy and science. Yet Davidson is a non-reductive naturalist because he rejects the view that there must be a single level of description which satisfies all of our explanatory interests.9 Instead, Davidson holds that there can be both “heteronomic” and “homonomic” generalizations in the construction of theories (Davidson 1980). For some empirical theory, generalization to some additional body of evidence is homonomic if it further refines and extends those constitutive concepts already at work in the theory prior to taking the new body of evidence into account. A generalization is heteronomic if it departs from the prior set of concepts. On these grounds, Davidson claims that generalizations about psychophysical relations must be heteronomic because of the distinctive character of the concepts used in describing psychological states: when we use the concepts of belief, desire, and the rest, we must stand prepared, as the evidence accumulates, to adjust our theory in the light of considerations of overall cogency: the constitutive ideal of rationality partly controls each phase in the evolution of what must be an evolving theory.... We must conclude, I think, that nomological slack between the mental and the physical is essential as long as we conceive of man as a rational animal. (Davidson 1980, 223) The “evolving theory” here is the theory of the behavior of the creature construed as an intentional being, i.e. an agent. The norm of rationality makes it possible to take behavior as actions expressive of beliefs and desires, and this norm is heteronomic with respect to the concepts employed in physical theory. This does not preclude us from saying that every particular mental event is identical with some physical event. We can have both “causal dependence and nomological independence” of the mental and the physical (Davidson 1980, 224). Anomalous monism thus allows two different types of explanation – the psychological and the physical – to be regarded as conceptually (i.e. semantically) irreducible without warranting any claims about the distinct ontological status of the mental. By adopting this strategy from Davidson for his own purposes, Rorty accepts the conceptual difference between the mental and
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the physical but renders it ontologically innocuous. As he puts it, “the difference between mind and body – between reasons and causes – is thus no more mysterious than, e.g. the relation between a macro-structural and microstructural description of a table” (Rorty 1991b, 114). Rorty’s creative appropriation of Davidson should not blind us to a subtle but critically important distinction between their versions of non-reductive naturalism. Consider their respective attitudes towards Brentano’s thesis that the intentional is irreducible to the non-intentional. Davidson situates himself with respect to Quine’s attitude towards Brentano: After accepting Brentano’s claim that intentional idioms (those we use to report propositional attitudes) are not reducible to non-intentional concepts, Quine remarks, “One may accept the Brentano thesis either as showing the indispensability of intentional idioms and the importance of an autonomous science of intention, or as showing the baselessness of intentional idioms and the emptiness of a science of intention. My attitude, unlike Brentano’s, is the second.” (Davidson 2004a, 153)10 Though Davidson does not take Brentano’s thesis without reservation, he does argue that the vocabulary in which we employ intentional idioms has a special status with respect to the vocabularies of the natural sciences. By contrast, Rorty insists that the irreducibility of the intentional to the non-intentional is no different from any other kind of irreducibility. This irreducibility no different from, nor or any more significant, than the irreducibility of the biological or the geological. Deepening the contrast between Davidson and Rorty here is crucial for appreciating the superiority of Rorty’s later position. Rorty further develops this line of thought in a critical response to McDowell (1996). Rorty expresses skepticism about whether we could show “that there is a bigger gap between rationality and elementary particles and avian monogamy and those particles” (1998d, 393). Rorty happily accepts the Davidsonian thesis that the norms of rationality we employ in attributing psychological states to certain organisms on the basis of their behavior is heteronomic with respect to, and so irreducible to, the concepts of physics. Yet, he argues, it is conceptually irreducible only in the same way that any two forms of explanation may be irreducible to each other. That provides no reason, Rorty argues, for thinking that we need a new conception of the natural in order to accommodate the exercise of conceptual capacities, i.e. “naturalized platonism” (McDowell 1996, 95). The irreducibility of the mental to the physical does not indicate anything special about the mental; all vocabularies may be irreducible to one another. Though this flies in the face of Davidsonian doctrine, Rorty’s point ought to be well taken for two reasons. Firstly, Davidson’s original argument for the irreducibility of the mental suggests that all non-intentional vocabularies are in principle reducible to that of physics. But the irreducibility at stake here is a
Natural Agents: A Transcendental Argument for Pragmatic Naturalism 21 conceptual one. The question therefore is whether the concepts that are constitutive of the vocabulary of geology or ecology are in principle semantically reducible to those of physics in a way that agency is not. Anyone who is inclined to think that conceptual irreducibility is a legitimate strategy to begin with should feel nervous about asserting that talking about beliefs is in principle irreducible to talking about particles, but talking about anticlines is not.11 Insisting on a difference between the sorts of irreducibility (psychophysical and geophysical) can easily become, if one is not exceedingly careful, a refuge for exiled and homeless intuitions about the ontological divide between humanity and nature. Rorty rightly questions Davidson’s contention that all nonintentional vocabularies can be in principle semantically reduced to that of physics.12 Secondly, Rorty argues for conceptual irreducibility, as Davidson does, in light of the diversity of human needs and interests. Sinclair clearly brings out this aspect of Davidson’s argument for non-reductive naturalism; we need different vocabularies, such as the vocabulary of the mental and the physical, because different vocabularies are governed by different explanatory interests we have as the sort of creatures we are (Sinclair 2002, 178ff). Some of our explanatory interests require intentional attributions, and thus presuppose norms of rationality. But then we ought to notice that we have explanatory interests not only in attributing psychological states; we have geological interests, ecological interests, paleontological interests, and so forth. Thus the considerations that Davidson brings to bear for refusing to reduce the psychological to the microphysical ought to hold for refusing to endorse the reduction of any interest-satisfying vocabulary to that of another. There is no reason, Rorty concludes, to think that the vocabulary of psychological states is sui generis with respect to all other vocabularies. Rorty concludes against McDowell that there is no need to fight off “bald naturalism” with “naturalized Platonism,” because bald naturalism is compatible with pluralism of vocabularies and so utterly innocuous. Recently, however, Rorty (2000) has conceded to Ramberg (2000) that Davidson had a deeper point that Rorty previously acknowledged. To use Ramberg’s terminology, the vocabulary of agency has priority over all vocabularies of empirical generalization. The next step is to determine what it is in Davidson’s account that Rorty has come to accept, and how accepting this points to a stronger version of non-reductive naturalism. 3. The Transcendental Priority of Agency To understand the significance of Rorty’s acceptance of Ramberg’s criticisms, we need to see how Ramberg is not only building on Davidson’s argument for the conceptual irreducibility of the mental, but also how Davidson’s argument is best seen as a transcendental argument of a peculiar sort. The transcendental character of Davidson’s arguments has been acknowledged elsewhere (Maker
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1991; Carpenter 2002; Bridges 2006). Here I want to appropriate Bridge’s term “transcendental externalism” in order to develop further Carpenter’s claim that “Davidson’s externalism, and especially its central model of triangulation, represents the heart of his transcendental argumentation” (220). More specifically, I want to describe three features of Davidson’s account of agency: that the irreducibility of the mental depends on the interrelation between physical and social externalism; that it is developed and defended through transcendental argument; and that it is a naturalized and anti-foundational transcendental argument, which Davidson calls “triangulation.” The triangulation argument can be difficult to specify precisely, in part because of the peculiarities of Davidson’s style of philosophizing. However, the importance of triangulation is clearly brought out in Davidson’s “Three Varieties of Knowledge” (2001d). Here, Davidson takes it as a basic fact that there are three domains of empirical knowledge: the subjective, the objective, and the intersubjective. Davidson regards modern epistemology as a series of various attempts to reduce one or two forms of knowledge to some third, and claims that all such attempts have failed. Hence he takes it as a starting point that “none of the three forms of knowledge is reducible to one or both of the others” (206). No ultimate priority can be assigned to knowledge of one’s own mental states, knowledge of the mental states of others, or knowledge of physical objects and events. At the same time, we need to understand how all three are both interconnected with and irreducible to one another. In “Three Varieties” Davidson argues that the indispensability of triangulation shows why all three types of empirical knowledge are inseparable. One cannot make sense of subjectivity without objectivity, because one cannot be a holder of beliefs at all without also understanding that one’s beliefs could be wrong. In that way beliefs require the concept of error, which in turn presupposes a grasp of objectivity.13 Yet objectivity depends upon the intersubjective community of creatures with whom one communicates: “it is only when an observer consciously correlates the responses of another creature with objects and events of the observer’s world that there is any basis for saying the creature is responding to these or to those objects and events” (212). Intersubjective communication consists of the on-going coordination of one’s responses to changes in the environment with the responses of others. To be a subject, then, is to regard oneself implicitly as standing at one corner of a triangle; at one of the other corners is another subject, and at the third corner is the world of objects.14 Consequently, “knowledge of other minds and knowledge of the world are mutually dependent; neither is possible without the other” and “knowledge of our own minds and knowledge of the minds of others are thus mutually dependent” (213). The “triangulation” of the subjective, intersubjective, and objective demonstrates why none can be grounded in the other; “[t]he three sorts of knowledge form a tripod: if any leg were lost, no part would stand” (220).
Natural Agents: A Transcendental Argument for Pragmatic Naturalism 23 Davidson’s version of semantic externalism is a “novel hybrid of perceptual and social externalism” (Carpenter 2002, 221), since we cannot have social and perceptual externalism depend on each other. Without social relations, one cannot determine the content-determining cause of propositional attitudes. But without causal relations with objects, one cannot ascribe propositional attitudes to those with whom one coordinates one’s behavior. And without both, one cannot even understand oneself as having beliefs and desires. As Carpenter helpfully puts it, the meaning of our thoughts and our utterances are fixed neither by the micro-structure of our physical environment nor by the practices of our linguistic communities. Rather, Davidson’s triangulation theory of externalism asserts that content is fixed (at least in part) by systematic patterns of causal interactions between ourselves, other people with whom we interact linguistically, and objects and events we perceive in the world. (228) In other words, the dynamic and evolving pattern of interaction between language users (social externalism) and the world (perceptual externalism) determines both “the objectivity of thought and the empirical content of thoughts about the external world” (Davidson 2001b, 129). In this sense the triangulation argument should be regarded as a transcendental argument, since it specifies a necessary condition of there being any rational cognition, and thus agency, at all. In “The Emergence of Thought” (Davidson 2001b) Davidson presents triangulation as a necessary condition for the emergence of thought itself. The emergence of thought is difficult to conceive precisely because the vocabulary of intentional ascriptions is irreducible to that of physical systems.15 Since it is irreducible (i.e. no homonomic psychophysical generalizations), we face a difficulty, to which I turn to quote Davidson at length: In both the evolution of thought in the history of mankind, and the evolution of thought in an individual, there is a stage at which there is no thought followed by a subsequent stage at which there is thought. To describe the emergence of thought would be to describe the process which leads from the first to the second of these stages. What we lack is a satisfactory vocabulary for describing the intermediate steps.... It is not that we have a clear idea what sort of language we would use to describe half-formed mind; there may be a very deep conceptual difficulty or impossibility involved. That means that there is a perhaps insuperable problem in giving a full description of the emergence of thought.... [but] There is a prelinguistic, precognitive situation which seems to me to constitute a necessary condition for thought and language, a condition that can exist independent of thought, and can therefore precede it.... The
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Anomalous monism holds that there is no serviceable vocabulary for bridging descriptions of objects and events in terms of physical (or chemical, biological, etc.) laws to vocabularies which ascribe beliefs, desires, and intentions to rational agents. Yet the vocabulary of intentional ascriptions is indispensable, for reasons familiar to us from Strawson and Austin as well as Davidson. Davidson’s triangulation argument shows us how to specify exactly which complex patterns of animal behavior are necessary conditions for the application of the vocabulary of agency. It thus allows us to regard ourselves both as parts of the natural world and as agents. Yet it is only as agents that we can see ourselves as distinguishing between those theories which are governed by norms of rationality (the mental) and those theories which are not so governed (the physical). In that respect the vocabulary of agency has a transcendental status with respect to empirical theories of both mental and physical phenomena. On this interpretation, the vocabulary of agency is both transcendental and naturalistic. The task now is to see how it can fulfill both conditions. This problem is resolved by noticing that the triangulation argument is explicitly and emphatically non-foundational. Though non-foundational, it counts as a transcendental argument because triangulation specifies a necessary condition for there being any rational thought at all. Pihlström (2004) proposes that an argument is transcendental if it satisfies two conditions: (i) it demonstrates “concern for the necessary conditions for the possibility of something (such as experience or meaning)”; (ii) “an examination of the conditions for the possibility of some given actuality must proceed ‘from within’ the sphere (of experience, of meaning) constrained and limited by those conditions” (293).16 The first condition is by now familiar from the work of Strawson and Stroud. The second condition prevents empirical discovery of actual conditions (e.g. of cognition or language) from counting as transcendental. In these terms, Davidson demonstrates that anything that we must describe by using the vocabulary of agency, including empirical content governed by shared norms (objective, intersubjective, and subjective), has as a necessary condition the triangulation between at least two creatures and a shared world. Yet it is only from within the sphere of agency, having been initiated into it through triangulation, that we are in an epistemic position to appreciate the force of the demonstration. Triangulation is a necessary condition for us to be the sorts of beings that we can recognize as agents at all. Like arguments in the transcendental tradition from Kant to Heidegger and Wittgenstein, Davidson’s triangulation argument culminates in a moment of insight into the necessary conditions of those basic features of ourselves without which we would find ourselves utterly unintelligible, unrecognizable.
Natural Agents: A Transcendental Argument for Pragmatic Naturalism 25 That the triangulation argument is non-foundational, and thus compatible with naturalism in a way that foundational transcendental arguments are not, has not been appreciated. For example, in his important comparison of Kant and Davidson, Maker distinguishes between “confrontational arguments” and “transcendental arguments” (Maker 1991). Confrontational arguments posit an antecedently given subject and an antecedently given object and ask how subjectivity and objectivity, thus construed, could confront each other. By contrast, transcendental arguments demonstrate that no confrontation is necessary; subjectivity and objectivity are only intelligible insofar as they are mutually dependent. The mutual dependence is established by showing it to be a necessary condition for the possibility of any knowledge-claim at all. What a transcendental thinker such as Kant or Davidson “wants to show is that objectivity is other than subjectivity without being something radically other as to be thoroughly beyond and completely inaccessible to it” (Maker 1991, 351). While I concur with Maker to that extent, he does not sufficiently appreciate that triangulation is not a foundational transcendental argument. Though triangulation is a necessary condition for the possibility of empirical content, it does not provide a foundation for all knowledge and experience as a whole. Rather, it illustrates the interdependence of irreducibly different kinds of rational cognition. More importantly, by bringing into consideration the role of inter-subjectivity through the existence of another sentient creature who occupies a distinct spatio-temporal location and who has her own pattern of responses to stimuli, Davidson shows that objectivity cannot be given a foundation in subjectivity. In order for triangulation to work, the other must be truly irreducible to any sameness of self and other – for only then can the otherness of the other’s perspective count as a frame of reference according to which my own beliefs can be seen as true or false. I can only triangulate if the otherness of the other subject is irreducible to my own subjectivity. If it is not irreducible, then genuine inter-subjectivity is lost, and both objectivity and subjectivity along with it. Taken this way, triangulation should be regarded as a transcendental argument against “the constitutive power of transcendental subjectivity,” contra Pihlström (2004).17 Triangulation is a transcendental argument which shows, pace Kant and Husserl, that subjectivity cannot be foundational for knowledge. Triangulation allows Davidson to show how the irreducibility of psychological language to bio-chemical language is different in kind from the irreducibility of the latter to descriptions couched in terms of the behavior of elementary particles. The process of communication embedded in the relation of triangulation is, as Davidson puts it, “a community of minds is the basis of knowledge; it provides the measure of all things. It makes no sense to question the adequacy of this measure, or to seek a more ultimate standard” (Davidson 2001d, 218). Further developing this line of thought, Ramberg (2000) suggests that “the distinctiveness of agency lies ... in the fact that the predicates thus applied
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take their point from a normativity we invoke when we try to explain to ourselves what it is that makes communication possible” (Ramberg 2000, 360). Viewed in these terms, the basis of knowledge invoked by Davidson is construed as “a plurality of creatures engaged in the project of describing their world and interpreting each other’s descriptions of it” (ibid., 362). There is no question of our even being able to derive the vocabulary of agency from the vocabulary of empirical generalization; the former is a condition of possibility for the latter, with the crucial proviso that the former is conceptualized as having a naturalized transcendental condition: the triangulation between a plurality of animals and their world. It has often seemed that there is a conflict between transcendental interpretations of Davidson and naturalistic interpretations of Davidson. Yet only if the triangulation argument is both transcendental and naturalistic will we be able to appreciate the change in Rorty’s later position. 4. Pragmatic Naturalism Rorty’s shift from “non-reductive physicalism” to “pragmatic naturalism” can be seen in a number of articles from the first few years of the current century. In “Naturalism and quietism” (2007), Rorty clearly distinguishes between his own views and naturalistically-oriented analytic metaphysics and epistemology. Rorty identifies this difference through what Price (2004) calls “subject naturalism” and “object naturalism.” Object naturalism consists of an ontological doctrine – “the view that in some important sense, all there is is the world studied by science” – and an epistemological doctrine – “the view that all genuine knowledge is scientific knowledge” (73). But object naturalism is not the only kind of naturalism there is: I want to distinguish object naturalism from a second view of the relevance to science to philosophy. According to this second view, philosophy needs to begin with what science tells us about ourselves. Science tells us that we humans are natural creatures, and if the claims and ambitions of philosophy conflict with this view, then philosophy needs to give way. This is naturalism in the sense of Hume, then, and arguably Nietzsche. I’ll call it subject naturalism. (73) While object naturalists “worry about the place of non-particles in a world of particles,” (Rorty 2007, 151) subject naturalists view such “placement problems” (i.e. the place of values, mental states, numbers, secondary qualities, etc.) as no more than “problems about human linguistic behavior (or perhaps about human thought)” (Price 2004, 76). Thus, whereas object naturalists want to show how values, consciousness, secondary qualities, and logical and mathematical principles are consistent with our best contemporary physics, subject naturalists begin with a picture of human beings as a peculiar sort of animal – an animal that engages in an odd behavior called language.
Natural Agents: A Transcendental Argument for Pragmatic Naturalism 27 Subject naturalism is consistent with the continuity thesis because it holds that humans are slightly more complicated animals. Yet it also embraces the irreducibility thesis because human beings are regarded as animals that engage in a variety of discursive practices, none of which satisfies all needs and interests. Thus there is no single privileged descriptive vocabulary to which all others can be reduced. Price further argues that subject naturalism undermines object (i.e. reductive) naturalism because it abstains from commitment to any substantive word-world relations. If one thinks that the terms employed by linguistic animals are representations of entities and properties, then there could be a privileged descriptive vocabulary. But the move from subject naturalism to object naturalism depends on having a substantive view of word-world relations from which subject naturalism can simply abstain. Subject naturalists “think that once we have explained the uses of the relevant terms, there is no further problem about the relation of those uses to the world” (Rorty 2007, 151). More interestingly, however, Rorty explicitly identifies Price’s subject naturalism with Ramberg’s (2004) own version of “pragmatic naturalism.” Ramberg’s account of pragmatic naturalism requires a distinction between reduction and naturalization; the importance of this distinction makes it worthwhile to cite Ramberg at length: Reduction ... is a meta-tool of science; a way of systematically extending the domain of a set of tools for handling the explanatory tasks that scientists confront. Naturalization, by contrast, is a goal of philosophy: the elimination of metaphysical gaps between the characteristic features by which we deal with agents and thinkers, on the one side, and the characteristic features by reference to which we empirically generalize over the causal relations between objects and events, on the other. It is only in the context of a certain metaphysics that the scientific tool becomes a philosophical one, an instrument of legislative ontology. This is the metaphysics of scientism.... The pragmatic naturalist, by contrast, treats the gap itself, that which transforms reduction into a philosophical project, as a symptom of dysfunction in our philosophical vocabulary. Pragmatic naturalism does not aim at conceptual reduction, but at a transformation of those conceptual structures we rely on to sustain our sense of a metaphysical gap between those items we catch in our vocabulary of thought and agency, and those items we describe in our vocabularies of causal regularities. (Ramberg 2004, 43) Pragmatic naturalism, in Ramberg’s sense, holds that while reduction can be a legitimate strategy for organizing vocabularies of causal regularities, reduction is not necessary to alleviate metaphysical gaps, which is the goal of naturalization.18 Ramberg regards the distinction between “our vocabulary of agency” and “our vocabularies of causal regularities” as the Davidsonian distinction between the theories we form about ourselves as self- and other-interpreting
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agents (theories that are governed by norms of rationality) and the theories we form about the objective world (which are not so governed). That distinction, in turn, is secured through anti-foundational, naturalistic transcendental argument: without that distinction, we would be unable to regard ourselves as agents at all, but triangulation allows us to see agency as natural. The priority of the vocabulary of agency permits a powerful criticism of Rorty’s (1998c) argument against McDowell (and Davidson). Against Rorty, Ramberg argues that the inescapability of agency shows that not every vocabulary can be regarded as on a par with the kinds of empirical generalization used in scientific explanation: “we should see an interesting difference between the sort of conceptual features that may distinguish the biological or the geological from each other or from the chemical or the physical, and the sorts of conceptual freedom that make the psychological distinct from all of these” (Ramberg 2004, 46). Triangulation guarantees that the vocabulary of agency is irreducible to the vocabulary of empirical generalizations, for it makes all such generalizations possible in the first place. It follows that the irreducibility of the mental to the physical cannot be held on a par with the irreducibility of the vital to the physical. Not only does Rorty concede the point, but Rorty’s (2000) response to Ramberg (2000) is remarkable for the extent of the concession.19 Rorty now accepts that the vocabulary of agency is privileged, in a distinctive way: “there is a vocabulary which is privileged, not by irreducibility, but by inescapability. It is not, however, the descriptive vocabulary of intentionality but the prescriptive vocabulary of normativity.... The two are not the same” (Rorty 2000, 373). By distinguishing between the descriptive and the prescriptive, Rorty endorses the transcendental presupposition of agency without rejecting the claim that there is no single privileged descriptive vocabulary. This point is central for a post-ontological philosophy, if the point of ontology – whether classical, “fundamental,” or scientific – is to assign ultimate privilege to some descriptive vocabulary.20 But the inescapability of normativity, as construed by Davidson, Ramberg, and now Rorty, does not threaten to smuggle ontology in through the back door after having been kicked out the front. To summarize, Rortyian pragmatic naturalism holds that: (a) the vocabulary of agency is distinctive from the vocabularies of empirical generalizations; (b) its distinctiveness lies in the role that normativity plays in this vocabulary; (c) the distinctiveness of the vocabulary of agency can be brought out through naturalistic transcendental argument. As a naturalistic transcendental argument, however, pragmatic naturalism is still a conceptual position, and so not grounded in any strong ontological claims for or against physicalism, reductionism, etc.21 An immediate advantage of PN over NRP can be seen in how it distinguishes between different positions that Rorty had previously conflated. Recall that NRP held that the irreducibility of the mental to the physical is no different from the irreducibility of the biological to the physical. It is clear that
Natural Agents: A Transcendental Argument for Pragmatic Naturalism 29 part of this thought can be accommodated in terms of the “disunity of science” thesis advanced by Dupré (2004). If we consider how scientists actually work, we will see both a plurality of methods of inquiry and a plurality of scientific theories. Taking such diversity into account, there may be very good reasons for rejecting the reduction of the biological to the physical.22 Consequently we can reject what Dupré calls “the myth of the unity of science.” It is just this myth which Rorty also criticizes – remember that Rorty is skeptical of the viability of the reduction of the biological (“avian monogamy”) to the physical (“particles”). But NRP holds that once the myth of the unity of science is rejected, we will have done all that needs to be done to satisfy Davidson’s and McDowell’s desire to safeguard the distinctiveness of the mental. By contrast, PN allows us to correctly emphasize the difference between Dupré’s thesis and Ramberg’s. Dupré argues against a single privileged descriptive vocabulary among empirical generalizations; Ramberg argues for a distinctive status of the prescriptive vocabulary of agency as distinct from descriptive vocabularies of empirical generalization. Though pragmatic naturalism can happily accept both of these points, the difference was obscured in Rorty’s earlier position, and it is a virtue of PN that it makes the difference clear. Still, it might be asked: if we accept both the transcendental priority of the vocabulary of agency and the disunity of sciences – is there still anything left worth calling naturalism at all? The answer I propose is a tentative “yes,” because both within science (the Rorty-Dupré thesis) and among discursive practices generally (the Ramberg-Price thesis) we discover a basic plurality in the form of life of a certain kind of animal. Pragmatic naturalism understood in this way takes its cue from Wittgenstein’s remark: “Commanding, questioning, storytelling, chatting, are as much a part of our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing” (Wittgenstein 2001, §25). Though pragmatic naturalism is fully consistent with insights from the natural sciences (e.g. paleontology, neuroscience, comparative psychology, molecular genetics, particle physics, etc.), its content and validity are independent of them. (One might say that pragmatic naturalism allows us to naturalize the manifest image without reducing it to the scientific image or combining them within a synoptic view.23) The “yes” is tentative because obstacles to a full-blooded embrace of PN must not be ignored. The most serious problem is this: in order to accommodate the vocabulary of agency within naturalism, we must be able to see how normativity can be natural. Hence the pragmatic naturalist must surmount a dual burden: the tradition of how the normative has traditionally been conceived, and the tradition of how the natural has traditionally been conceived.24 On the one hand, among twentieth-century philosophers, normativity has paradigmatically been attached to linguistic performances expressive of conceptual mastery. On the other hand, within the modern tradition, nature has been construed as ‘disenchanted’, i.e. nomologically governed and so not describable in terms of norms.
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At this point we face a potentially serious problem with the DavidsonRorty strategy for constructing pragmatic naturalism. The problem is that both Davidson and Rorty appear to accept the very “disenchanted” concept of nature which renders it difficult, if not impossible, to see how normativity could be naturalized. For example, Davidson has been criticized for his rejection of our conception of animal life, which ought be to central to a successful pragmatic naturalism. In his criticism of the triangulation argument, Bridges (2006) contends that Davidson’s worries about “the ambiguity of the concept of cause” (Davidson 2001b, 129) in our explanations of animal behavior, and our inability to attribute propositional attitudes to them, arise because Davidson refuses to help himself to what Bridges calls “our ordinary conception of animal life” (Bridges 2006, 310). On the one hand, I concur with Bridges that our ordinary conception of animal life, grounded as it is in the form of life that we as animals share with the others, allows us to avoid having “to choose between Davidson’s bare vision of an animal driven to and fro by undifferentiated causal sequences passing through its body, and the sentimental pet owner’s view of an animal as a fullfledged thinker and agent who just happens to be unusually taciturn” (311). Put slightly differently, Davidson’s conception of nature, including animal life, is that of a disenchanted concept of nature. On the other hand, the theorists who offer alternatives to this dilemma – Bridges considers McDowell and Hurley – still must take up the burden of explaining how the normative emerged from the non-normative without reducing the normative to the non-normative, which is exactly the problem to which triangulation is a response.25 The disenchanted concept of nature is clearly present in NRP, where the commitment to naturalism is expressed through the claim that the ultimate constituents of nature are microphysical states. While PN does indicate a turn away from an emphasis on microphysics towards a picture of human beings as animals, where animal life is understood in terms that Rorty inherits from Dewey and Darwin, it is not yet clear to me that PN goes far enough in distancing itself from the disenchanted concept of nature that dominates both Davidson’s remarks on animals and NRP. The resolution of this problem requires that Rortyian pragmatic naturalism be further developed by taking much more seriously the thought that human beings are a more properly regarded as a certain kind of animal than as a system of particles.26 (This is also the crux of the difference between Price’s subject naturalism and object naturalism.) PN, as I have presented here, ought to be responsive to these worries due to its conception of (1) the vocabulary of agency as having patterns of complex animal behavior for its necessary conditions of application and (2) pluralism with respect to science which allows for a conception of animal life irreducible to the movements of particles. Yet without denying that much more work is required, PN offers a promising via media between “reductive naturalism” and “normatively oriented accounts of social practice” (Moyar 2008, p 141). It can
Natural Agents: A Transcendental Argument for Pragmatic Naturalism 31 do so because the incorporation of the vocabulary of agency into naturalism makes possible a much richer and more sophisticated picture of ourselves as “natural agents”: animals who are inescapably committed to the process of triangulating between the subjective, objective, and intersubjective aspects of knowledge and experience, and in that process engendering, as Rorty has done more than most to emphasize, ever more interesting and exciting forms of science, philosophy, and poetry.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I wish to thank Steven Levine, Cheryl Misak, and Sami Pihlström for their comments on previous drafts of this paper, and Maureen Eckert for helpful remarks that led to note 8. The initial version of this paper was written as part of a NEH 2007 Summer Seminar organized at the University of New Mexico by Russell Goodman; the author thanks the NEH for its support, as well as the generous collegiality of the seminar participants and organizers.
NOTES 1. I have in mind here what Price (2004) calls “placement problems”: if the natural is all there is, then what should be said about values or about secondary qualities? For a now-classical presentation of placement problems for naturalism, see Stroud, “The Charm of Naturalism,” Pacific APA Presidential Address, 1996, reprinted in De Caro and Macarthur (2004). 2. In doing so, non-reductive naturalism also avoids flying in the face of the dominant metaphilosophical attitude of our times. Nor should it be ignored that a metaphilosophical commitment to naturalism is very likely regarded, among professional philosophers, as part of a broader commitment to secularism in the public sphere generally. 3. Since this paper emphasizes Rorty’s appropriation of Davidson, I shall ignore the early stage of Rorty’s naturalism, the “epistemological behaviorism” of Rorty (1979), where Davidson plays a less central role than in Rorty’s subsequent work. 4. The term “pragmatic naturalism” has a long genealogy independent of Rorty and his interlocutors; it was originally applied to Dewey’s position. Though Rorty has sometimes laid claim to the mantle of Dewey’s heir, much to the consternation of Dewey scholars, it is outside the purview of this paper to consider whether Rorty’s pragmatic naturalism is that of Dewey. 5. The careful reader will note that Rorty presents this as a definition of physicalism, not of naturalism. However, the notion that does the heavy lifting for Rorty here and throughout his corpus is that of a non-reductive physicalism. The idea of a “nonreductive physicalism” is also mentioned in a footnote to the citation in note 3 above. 6. For an extended discussion of the status of a “vocabulary” in Rorty’s philosophy, see Brandom (2000). 7. Only on the view of concepts that Davidson and Rorty accept – in which to grasp a concept is to know how to use a word in a sentence – is the identification of
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conceptual claims with semantic ones permissible. Since it is the views of Davidson and Rorty that are at issue here, I will use “semantic” and “conceptual” interchangeably. 8. Consequently, arguments against non-reductive naturalism – that is, arguments in favor of physicalism (“or something near enough”) – must turn on refutations of the semantic and epistemic views at work in Davidson and in Rorty, as can be seen in the criticisms of Davidson advanced by Kim and by Fodor. The disagreement in how to approach problems in philosophy of mind is driven by a much deeper set of striking contrasts. 9. Sinclair argues that Fodor’s reductive naturalism is driven by an a priori metaphysical commitment to “essentialism,” which he takes to mean “the ontological doctrine that posits a world consisting of a fixed totality of mind-independent entities admitting of only one true and complete description” (Sinclair 2002, 166). Only with this commitment in place does the continuity thesis shared by Davidson, Rorty, and Fodor generate the demand that (a) only phenomena that are reducible to physical phenomena count as real and (b) philosophical theories about necessary and possible conditions must be rejected if they conflict with empirical results about actual conditions. 10. This version of “Could There Be a Science of Rationality?” contains an “Afterword” not included in the original 1995 version of this essay, as reprinted in Problems of Rationality (2004). 11. In fact, Davidson does assert just this – that the vocabulary of geology is not in principle irreducible to that of physics, even if not in fact, whereas the vocabulary of psychology is irreducible in principle (Davidson 2004b, 112). 12. And, for that matter, which physics? I suspect that the privileged status of physics in Davidson – as in Quine and Sellars – derives its cachet from transferring to some imagined future physics – whatever physics might someday, somehow succeed in unifying (or overturning) general relativity and quantum field theory – the privileged status which Newtonian physics had for the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It is to Rorty’s credit that he is more sensitive to this point than are most contemporary naturalists, whether reductive or non-reductive. (A little historicism can go a long way.) 13. For elaboration of this claim within Davidson’s project, see “The Myth of the Subjective” (Davidson 2001a). However, it is important to notice that this constraint only pertains to conceptions of subjectivity as characterizable in terms of propositional attitudes. In the absence of mastery of a language, Davidson argues, the conditions for individuating propositional attitudes cannot be satisfied. However, Davidson does not deny that triangulation is possible in the absence of language. Davidson addresses the need for an account of non-linguistic triangulation, or “primitive triangulation” (Davidson 2005). For why Davidson requires a more fully developed account of primitive or non-linguistic triangulation, see Nulty (2006). 14. I take these to be “the familiar objects whose antics make our sentences and opinions true or false” (Davidson 2001c). 15. Sinclair (2005) does an excellent job of showing how the account of triangulation is motivated by the metaphilosophical commitment to non-reductive naturalism, and that seeing it in the proper context allows the Davidsonian naturalist to side-step certain objections. Where I disagree with Sinclair (2002; 2005) is in his reluctance to regard Davidson’s argument as a transcendental one. Davidson can hold transcendental claims of a weaker, naturalistic sort, to be specified. 16. Pihlström does not regard these conditions as necessary and sufficient conditions for transcendental argument: “Am I now claiming that any piece of philosophy if and only if it investigates the necessary conditions for the possibility of some given X
Natural Agents: A Transcendental Argument for Pragmatic Naturalism 33 from within the sphere constrained by those conditions? Yes, but both X and the kinds of investigation that satisfy this criterion can be so variable that this ‘single criterion’ – while being a verbal formula that indeed captures all transcendental philosophies – itself has a family-resemblance character” (293). 17. It would take a different sort of paper to consider the similarities and differences between the transcendental argument of Davidson and that of Wittgenstein. For a nuanced explication of the sort of transcendental interpretation of Wittgenstein which could profitably be brought into conversation with the interpretation of Davidson defended here, see Lear (1998). 18. Notice, however, that by identifying reduction as concerned with “the explanatory tasks that scientists confront,” Ramberg regards reduction as an epistemic notion, and so not, as Rorty initially did, as a semantic one. 19. “In the case of Bjørn Ramberg’s paper, I find myself not only agreeing with what he says, but very much enlightened by it. So I shall be trying to restate Ramberg’s arguments rather than to rebut them – trying to strengthen rather than weaken them” (Rorty 2000, 370). 20. Whether it is possible or desirable to construct an ontology that is not an attempt to provide an ultimate or final descriptive vocabulary is not an issue that Rorty or Ramberg take seriously. 21. Ramberg (2000) argues our most basic reason for accepting the transcendental priority of agency, and thereby rejecting “scientism,” are not ontological but political. Rorty highlights the importance of this move by stressing the terminological shift from “intentionality” (a descriptive term) to “normativity” (a prescriptive term). We can thereby rescue the basically Kantian motivations of Davidson’s interest in anomalous monism by drawing out the point through Hegel rather than through Brentano. The next step would be to show how one can uphold the demand to resist and eliminate various form of dehumanization without ascribing a non-natural ontological status to human beings. 22. For recent attempts to explicate the nature of biological phenomena without reducing them to physico-chemical ones, yet but without thereby re-introducing vitalism or supernaturalism see Kauffman (1995; 2000) and Thompson (2007). 23. The hallmark of the “naturalized manifest image” is that it does not require any ontological commitments over and above those of the natural sciences. It thereby ought to be distinguished from the tradition of “perennial philosophy” which articulated the manifest image through an explicit anti-naturalism or supernaturalism in a tradition that runs from Plato through Paul and Augustine down to Descartes and Kant. 24. Aiken (2006) remarks, following Margolis, that if normativity is conceived of along Fregean lines, as it is by “Fregean Pragmatists” (322) such as Sellars, Brandom and McDowell – as well as Davidson and Rorty – there is a deep conflict with the commitment to continuity so important to the Deweyan strain within pragmatic naturalism. As long as normativity is construed along those lines, we will be tempted to give far too quick a response when asked why cooperative hunting among chimpanzees or dolphins should not count as normative. Rorty is aware, so far as I can tell, of the tension between the Fregean and Darwinian strands in his thought; he simply thinks that the urge to overcome that tension is the same as the demand to combine the manifest and scientific images within a synoptic view, and that urge therefore ought to be resisted, not satisfied. 25. In a similar vein, Finkelstein (2007) argues that Davidson is unable to avail himself our ordinary conception of animal life because of his commitment to what a properly philosophical theory is.
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26. Further development of this line of thought will require a conversation between pragmatic naturalists and critics of the disenchantment of nature (e.g. Theodor Adorno, Hans Jonas, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, John McDowell) and their contemporary exponents.
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Natural Agents: A Transcendental Argument for Pragmatic Naturalism 35 Finkelstein, David. 2007. “Holism and Animal Minds,” in Wittgenstein and the Moral Life: Essays in Honor of Cora Diamond, ed. Alice Crary (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), pp. 251–278. Kauffman, Stuart. 1995. At Home in the Universe: The Search for Laws of SelfOrganization and Complexity. New York: Oxford University Press. Kauffman, Stuart. 2000. Investigations. New York: Oxford University Press. Lear, Jonathan. 1998. “The Disappearing ‘We’,” in Open Minded: Working Out the Logic of the Soul (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), pp. 282–300. Maker, William. 1991. “Davidson’s Transcendental Argument,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51: 345–360. McDowell, John. 1996. Mind and World. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Moyar, Dean. 2008. “Review of Hegel, Idealism, and Analytic Philosophy by Tom Rockmore,” European Journal of Philosophy 16: 138–141. Nulty, Tim. 2006. “Davidsonian Triangulation and Heideggerian Comportment,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14: 443–453. Pihlström, Sami. 2004. “Recent Reinterpretations of the Transcendental,” Inquiry 47.3: 289–314. Price, Huw. 2004. “Naturalism without Representationalism,” in Naturalism in Question, ed. Mario De Caro and David Macarthur (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 71–88. Ramberg, Bjorn. 2000. “Post-ontological Philosophy of Mind: Davidson vs. Rorty,” in Rorty and His Critics, ed. Robert Brandom (Malden, MA: Blackwell), pp. 351–370. Ramberg, Bjorn. 2004. “Naturalizing Idealizations: Pragmatism and the Interpretive Strategy,” Contemporary Pragmatism 1.2: 1–66. Rorty, Richard. 1979. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Rorty, Richard. 1991a. “Inquiry as Recontextualization: An Anti-dualist Account of Interpretation,” in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, ed. Richard Rorty (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), pp. 93–110. Rorty, Richard. 1991b. “Non-reductive Physicalism,” in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, Philosophical Papers Volume One (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), pp. 113–125.
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Rorty, Richard. 1991c. “Pragmatism, Davidson, and Truth,” Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers Volume One, ed. Richard Rorty (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), pp. 126–150. Rorty, Richard. 1991d. “Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and the Reification of Language,” in Essays on Heidegger and Others, Philosophical Papers Volume Two (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), pp. 50–65. Rorty, Richard. 1998a. “Is Truth a Goal of Inquiry? Donald Davidson versus Crispin Wright,” in Truth and Progress, Philosophical Papers Volume Three (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), pp. 19–42. Rorty, Richard. 1998b. “Charles Taylor on Truth,” in Truth and Progress, Philosophical Papers Volume Three (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), pp. 84–97. Rorty, Richard. 1998c. “The Very Idea of Answerability to the World,” in Truth and Progress, Philosophical Papers Volume Three (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), pp. 138–152. Rorty, Richard. 1998d. “McDowell, Davidson, and Spontaneity,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58: 389–394. Rorty, Richard. 2000. “Response to Ramberg,” in Rorty and His Critics, ed. Robert Brandom (Malden, MA: Blackwell), pp. 370–377. Rorty, Richard. 2006. “Naturalism and Quietism,” in Philosophy as Cultural Politics, Philosophical Papers Volume Four (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), pp. 147–159. Sinclair, Robert. 2002. “What is Radical Interpretation? Davidson, Fodor, and the Naturalization of Philosophy,” Inquiry 45: 161–184. Sinclair, Robert. 2005. “The Philosophical Significance of Triangulation: Locating Davidson’s Non-Reductive Naturalism,” Metaphilosophy 36: 708–728. Stroud, Barry. 2004. “The Charm of Naturalism,” in Naturalism in Question, ed. Mario De Caro and David Macarthur (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), pp. 21– 35. Thompson, Evan. 2007. Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 2001. Philosophical Investigations, 3rd edn, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Natural Agents: A Transcendental Argument for Pragmatic Naturalism 37 Carl Sachs Lecturer Department of Philosophy and Religion Studies University of North Texas 1155 Union Circle #310920 Denton, Texas 76203–5017 United States
Contemporary Pragmatism Vol. 6, No. 1 (June 2009), 39–65
Editions Rodopi © 2009
Naturalism, Death, and Functional Immortality Charles A. Hobbs
I consider a naturalistic approach to death, seeking a naturalistic or “functional” version of immortality. Making use of John Dewey and some other classical American philosophers, I first articulate the naturalism of this project. I then discuss what such naturalism means for understanding the self and its survival. Finally, I consider the existential question about to what extent such a view of immortality is satisfying.
1. Introduction Everyone dies. Now given this fact of our existence, I hold that the meaning of living, that is, of our experience, is never a completely separate issue from the meaning of our deaths and dying.1 It is from this context that I wish to articulate another approach to the meaning of death, which is simultaneously an approach to the meaning of our living.2 My approach is a naturalistic one. I shall articulate a kind of immortality in this world that is not to be conceived in a traditional Western sense of eternal, immutable, or otherwise ongoing existence of one’s individual personality beyond the death of his or her earthly lived body. I wish, instead, to articulate what I shall term a naturalistic or functional immortality.3 Concerning this view, there is in the final analysis a significant question regarding to what extent one can live as a naturalist and with that alone, that is, an existential question about the extent to which such a naturalistic view of death is satisfying, and in this I shall later turn to some of the essays of John J. McDermott on the matter. This approach is in the spirit of understanding philosophy’s proper role as one of being relevant to life, or, as James Campbell has said recently said with reference to pragmatism: “Philosophy’s job is to address our problems of living – whether the metaphysical ones that tormented James, or the scientific ones that challenged Peirce, or the social ones that invigorated Dewey – and to be ever vigilant in challenging the purely intellectual solutions to which philosophers too often acquiesce.”4 As for the job at hand here, it is one of addressing our mortality by way of the issue of immortality, with the problem being one of whether or not we can live satisfactory lives without any certain knowledge of or even belief in personal survival after death and without much likelihood of
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our even being remembered as individuals for very long beyond our current existence. The concern here is thus not one simply of abstractions, for it is about our living with this fact. Now let us proceed from here by addressing a matter of terminology, especially the word immortality. The term appears employed quite often to refer to a survival, or continued existence, of the individual human personality. This is what is often meant when immortality is characterized as eternal life. Such immortality typically means, in short, the perpetuation of “personal” or “subjective” consciousness beyond one’s death. Kai Nielsen characterizes the position well: In speaking of immortality we are speaking of the endless existence of a person after what we call her ‘death’ or at least the death of her body. What is agreed on all sides, and what is an inconvertible fact, is that after a time for all of us our bodies cease to be energized and left alone they will simply rot, and no matter how they are manipulated, when they are thoroughly in that state there is no evidence of their ever being reenergised. (In that respect we are not like batteries.) Believers in immortality believe that, all this to the contrary notwithstanding, we, as human beings, persons, selves, somehow do not really die but have instead an endless existence after such a de-energisation and disintegration of our bodies or (if you will) our ‘earthly bodies’.5 As Nielsen clearly and forcefully puts the matter, immortality is most often understood, again, as the unending existence of the person beyond death. This, however ultimately incoherent or unlikely, is the major component of what believers in immortality typically mean by the term. I should be clear from the start that the view under consideration here, that of functional immortality or what George Santayana called “ideal immortality,” is of a very different species from the more conventional species described above.6 According to the functional view of immortality, there is no necessary postulation of eternal life as it is most often understood. Rather, there is, according to this view, an end of one’s personal experience beyond which he or she does not go, at least not as first-person endeavor. In other words, given the naturalism this position entails, which we shall address shortly, there is no ultimate personal survival of the body’s demise, or at least not as we can know consistent with naturalism. Yet while there may be no such ultimate personal or subjective survival, death does not necessarily mean an absolute end of the self simultaneous with one’s biological demise, particularly if the self has an irreducible social aspect. We will return to this notion of the self, but let us move now to first briefly consider at least a preliminary formulation of the view of immortality under consideration by turning to some of the remarks of Charles S. Peirce.
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While not at great length, Peirce provides an expression of the view under consideration. In his brief 1893 article “Immortality in the Light of Synechism,” we find a comment that is fairly representative of Peirce’s scattered remarks on the subject. Referring to his doctrine of continuity (synechism), he writes, ... synechism recognizes that the carnal consciousness is but a small part of the man. There is, in the second place, the social consciousness, by which a man’s spirit is embodied in others, and which continues to live and breathe and have its being very much longer than superficial observers think.7 That is, we can speak of a “survival” of the self through what Peirce is here calling the “social consciousness” by virtue of which one’s spirit lives on. Elsewhere, tying this notion of immortality to the purported words of Jesus, Peirce discusses this further: “Do you believe in a future life?” Some kind of a future life there can be no doubt of. A man of character leaves an influence living after him. It is living: it is personal. In my opinion, it is quite proper to call that a future life. Jesus so spoke of it when he said he would always be with us.8 Now we can readily recognize that there are those who would dismiss such an understanding of immortality as being, in Martin Gardner’s words, among “... those shabby pseudoimmortalities that atheists and pantheists are forever proffering as substitutes for the real thing.”9 This is not surprising, for a continued existence in the sense, as Peirce has said, of spirit as embodied in others, might well be thought of as simply amounting to a kind of mere residue. Indeed, this seems to be the case with regard to a former personal consciousness, and this is in large part, I think, why such a form of immortality, that is, immortality as embodiment in others, has for many people fairly dubious importance. It is here that one well may recall Woody Allen’s remark that he does not want immortality by virtue of his work, but, rather, that “I want to achieve immortality by not dying.”10 That is, immortality, if there is such a thing, is most often conceived of as a subjective affair, and, accordingly, a functional or social immortality, by itself, may not appear as amounting to very much at all. Yet such consideration should not necessarily preclude us from considering more closely a view of death according to which there is an alternative model of immortality to some ongoing personal consciousness. I also respond that the view of death articulated here will probably only strike one as “thin” or, as Gardner has put it, as being among “shabby pseudoimmortalities,” if one conceives of the self in Cartesian fashion as wholly atomistic or individuated, that is, non-contextual and non-relational. In any case, let us first turn more explicitly to the meaning of philosophical naturalism and its relevance for
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the current project. We can then return to the issue of the self, doing so from a naturalistic viewpoint we shall have articulated. Then, as I have indicated, let us provide a more explicit account of the meaning of functional immortality and the consequences of believing it and it alone with regard to death, which is to say that we shall further discuss death in terms of how we deal with it as a significant part of the meaning of our living. In this regard, it will be important to indicate that functional immortality is not ultimate immortality but rather involves a sense of one’s continued existence that suffices for some by temperament to make life sufficiently meaningful to get through another day. 2. Naturalism and Its American Sources “Functional immortality” requires some account of naturalism, and, in providing it, I shall here deal especially with naturalism as expressed by some classical American philosophers, including John Dewey. As part of this, I will discuss the issue of materialism in relation to naturalism, which is a significant issue regarding the extent to which materialism sometimes entails scientism. An important reason for this has to do with what such naturalism is not. Presently, “naturalism” is often associated with reductive physicalism.11 Yet unlike such scientistic naturalism, classical American naturalism (and Kai Nielsen’s as well) is not a form of reductionism. Thus it can quite readily admit meanings and values, aspects of the world not normally considered as wholly material, as real and not somehow simply or merely phenomenal or epiphenomenal. A beginning difficulty that any opening discussion of naturalism faces is that there is not a great deal of agreement about the “nature” of naturalism. That is, there are and have been a number of understandings of philosophical naturalism; there are indeed varieties of it. There is ethical naturalism, there is metaphysical naturalism, there is methodological naturalism, and there is, again, scientistic naturalism, to name a few.12 Central to naturalism, whatever its particular form or manifestation, is an insistence that every hypothesis and phenomenon is to be examined by the same basic methods of inquiry. Another way of putting this is simply to say that what is and is knowable is fundamentally natural as opposed to “super”-natural. All forms of naturalism deny that any such thing as the supernatural applies to intelligible descriptions of the various phenomena, causes, and processes within our natural world. This is the philosophical attitude expressed by Santayana in his 1905 The Life of Reason: “Men and gods are not conceivable otherwise than as inhabitants of nature.”13 Still, what exactly constitutes the naturalism of the current project and where did it come from? There is, again, also the issue of exactly what kind of naturalism we are endorsing and employing in the present project. Assumptions and ideas of philosophical naturalism can be seen within the work of the first Western philosophers, that is, within the pre-Socratic, Ionian philosophers such as Thales, reportedly the first to provide explanations of natural phenomenon with no appeal to supernatural causes, and Jonathan
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Barnes, for example, has characterized these philosophers as holding empirical principles of inquiry that are at least anticipatory of naturalism in its more modern forms.14 Later on, it is Aristotle who can unmistakably be understood as a naturalist. As Dewey points out, Aristotle is the first real historical instance of naturalism, into which only later on a dogmatic supernaturalism is injected, such that the dominant trend in philosophy later became very much anti-naturalistic, that is, until relatively recently in history.15 Ancient Greek and Roman thought was, on the whole, quite naturalistic in spirit, and Roy Wood Sellars expresses this point well with regard to the Epicurean philosophers, who constitute the most striking example of naturalism after Aristotle, and who were indeed committed to ethics as first-philosophy. Sellars characterizes the Epicurean as a “... naturalist who took pride in the fact that he had conquered ignominious fears and ungrounded hopes...”16 and Epicureanism, as Sellars (himself a naturalist) approvingly reminds us, was the only thoroughly naturalistic school of its time, according to which “Wise conduct needed no cosmic sanctions.”17 Now in addition to such ancient pre-Socratic, Aristotelian, and Epicurean roots, naturalism also has more recent historical roots in America, with Dewey, among others, playing a significant role. It seems here relevant to mention Jaegwon Kim, not in his capacity as philosopher of mind or metaphysician, but rather with regard to his recent article on the nature of naturalism and its proximate origins in several mid-twentiethcentury American philosophers.18 As part of a rather helpful tracing of some of these sources of contemporary naturalism, Kim, in his 2003 article “The American Origins of Philosophical Naturalism,” first considers the issue of whether naturalism contains particular subject matter or whether it is a method or set of methods only. That is, he considers the question of “whether naturalism is, or includes, a set of substantive philosophical theses concerning a specific subject matter, or is, merely or principally, a set of methodological precepts concerning the proper way of conducting our intellectual inquiries.”19 Kim notes that, of course, both could be the case.20 As a part of this, he asks, “If naturalism is a methodological precept, does it concern philosophy alone (all of it?), or is it intended to apply to all areas of cognitive endeavor?”21 On the other hand, if we consider philosophical naturalism as including substantive claims, then what exactly are they? There are a variety of doctrines with which naturalism tends to be associated, including “empiricism, materialism, physicalism, reductionism, scientific realism, moral realism, epistemological externalism, and nominalism.”22 As Kim notes, a relevant question here is one of ascertaining the commonality of these and related positions such that they tend to be associated with naturalism.23 With such considerations in mind, by the term naturalism, I hereafter refer to philosophical positions, quite often rooted in the classical American tradition, according to which, broadly speaking, nature is understood as what is given or provided in experience. That is, nature is understood as continuous with experience. In his Epilogue (“The Nature of Naturalism”) to the classic 1944
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expression of mid-twentieth-century American naturalism, Naturalism and the Human Spirit, John Herman Randall, Jr. says that naturalism “is not so much a system or a body of doctrine as an attitude and temper: it is essentially a philosophic method and a program...” and it is further characterized as follows: ... naturalism, refusing to admit impassable gulfs and dualisms, either ontological or methodological, holds that everything encountered by men has some natural status in Nature, this does not mean that naturalism can absorb all the philosophic theories of what man encounters and in that sense cease to be a distinctive position. It is indeed fundamentally opposed to all those theories and interpretations which assert dualisms and gulfs....24 Randall adds with explicit reference to Dewey’s “Antinaturalism in Extremis” (the first essay of the same 1944 volume) that naturalism is the active antagonist of such dualisms and gulfs “so long as they are flourishing.”25 Moreover, according to Randall, there exists “no room for any Supernatural in naturalism – no supernatural or transcendental God and no personal survival after death.”26 For naturalists such as Dewey and Randall, there are to be no appeals to transcendental entities, and this view receives lively expression more recently, for example, by Nielsen, who says, “There are ... no purely mental substances and there are no supernatural realities transcendent to the world or at least we have no sound grounds for believing that there are such realities or perhaps even for believing that there could be such realities.”27 Dewey, in “Antinaturalism in Extremis” (a rather aggressive article attacking Kant and German idealism, Thomists, and others), characterizes naturalism as follows: The fact of the case is that naturalism finds the values in question, the worth and dignity of men and women, founded in human nature itself, in the connections, actual and potential, of human beings with one another in their natural social relationships. Not only that, but it is ready at any time to maintain the thesis that a foundation within man and nature is a much sounder one than is one alleged to exist outside the constitution of man and nature.28 The naturalist looks to the human realm itself in order to understand any form of value. That is, human experience, of whatever kind, is understandable in natural terms. In seeking to account for or understand that which is problematic or difficult in experience, American naturalism asserts that there is not any need for appeal to that which is not accessible to experience. John McDermott has provided a fine Deweyan summation of the understanding of experience that is here at work, describing experience as “nothing less than what we do and what
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is done to us, as well as the ‘way’ in which these transactions proceed....”29 Thus, for example, the naturalist does not have to deny spirituality or “mystical” experiences. He or she would rather be interested in what kind of human experiences these spiritual experiences are and how they proceed, as Dewey is, for example, in his 1934 A Common Faith, a work in which he defends the association of naturalism with a religious aspect of experience. As Dewey recognizes, the religious, which is a dimension of experience (along with the aesthetic), need not necessarily be associated with anything supernatural in order to still be quite meaningful as experience, although not as knowledge.30 The point is that such experience, as natural, is perfectly open to inquiry and in no way some closed domain or something simply rejected out of hand. This general position of not going beyond the natural in order to account for the natural is American naturalism’s adequacy thesis. With respect to it Larry Hickman writes that attempts to do otherwise, that is, attempts to search outside of human experience for absolutes, norms, or standards, inevitably “end in appeals to authority, a priorism, or the dead weight of tradition.”31 Committing to such an adequacy thesis does not, of course, mean that we must embrace some crude materialism or physicalism (with which, again, naturalism is now often identified), but, rather, simply that there are not adequate grounds for trying to comprehend that which is natural in non- or super-natural terms. We might say, simply, that what is natural is enough. Although naturalism need not entail a reductive materialism (or “physicalism”), there have nevertheless been some critics, such as W. H. Sheldon (in his 1945 “Critique of Naturalism”32), who charge naturalism with crass philosophical materialism, that is, with being definitionally limited to “physical nature.”33 Sheldon levels the following accusation (his term) against the naturalism expressed by Dewey and his Columbia associates such as Sidney Hook: Their naturalism is just materialism over again under a softer name. They claim to have superseded that perennial type of metaphysic; I believe they slip back into the same old rut. True, they are careful to define materialism in such a way as not to be accused of it; but to all intents and purposes they stand for the same sort of thing that materialists have always stood for. Thus they do not, as they claim to do, settle the old conflict between idealism and materialism (or for that matter, between scholasticism and process-metaphysic); they perpetuate the conflict by taking sides.34 So the naturalists, it seems, are not what they say they are, and, as such, they promise more than they deliver. Sheldon later continues: ... when I accuse the naturalists of materialism, I mean a working materialism, a philosophy that goes beyond pure theory to set up a way of
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Such naturalism, in short, says Sheldon, is limited to the physicality of nature. Dewey and his former Columbia students Hook and Ernest Nagel in the 1945 article “Are Naturalists Materialists?” are explicit in responding to Sheldon’s charge: When the consequences of this view (frequently given the label “reductive materialism”) are strictly drawn, statements such as “I am in pain” must be regarded as logically entailing statements of the form “My body is in such and such a physico-chemico-physiological state.” Whether any competent thinker has ever held such a view in the specific form here outlined is doubtful, though Democritus, Hobbes, and some contemporary behaviorists are often interpreted to assert something not very dissimilar to it. Those who do hold it maintain often that the obvious differences between a color and an electro-magnetic vibration, or between a felt pain and a physiological condition of an organism, are “illusory” and not “real,” since only physical processes and events (i.e., those describable exclusively with the help of physical terms) have the dignity of reality. But whatever may be said for reductive materialism – and very little can be said in its favor – it can be categorically asserted that it is not a view which is professed, either tacitly or explicitly, by the naturalists whom Mr. Sheldon is criticizing. If “materialism” means reductive materialism, then those naturalists are not materialists.36 Sheldon criticizes naturalism for being a form of reductive materialism in disguise, that is, a form of materialism that ignores the environment and context in which things happen, but this is not in fact the general position of these naturalists, who are in fact here explicitly distancing themselves from crass versions of materialism (versions, it is noted, often associated with the likes of Democritus and Hobbes). As Lewis S. Feuer puts it, these Columbia naturalists (Dewey, Nagel, Hook) were not holding “that mental states, emotions, joys, apprehensions of meaning, were subsumable under the heading of physical entities or events....”37 They were instead maintaining the more nuanced and defensible position (again in the words of Feuer) “that these mental occurrences were adjectival to physical ones and were in this sense analogous to such properties as temperature and solubility, which were not themselves physical entities, inasmuch as for instance, they had neither volume nor shape...” and
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simply that such mental occurrences have physical causes, which is to say that “they depended on certain organizations of physical things, without, however, being themselves additional physical entities.”38 In responding to Sheldon’s concern, Dewey and company are explaining, in short, that naturalists need not mind being called materialists so long as this does not mean reductive materialism.39 Also instructive on this issue is Ernest Nagel’s 1954 presidential address (“Naturalism Reconsidered”) to the American Philosophical Association.40 Nagel says that Naturalism does not maintain that only what is material exists, since many things noted in experience, for example, modes of action, relations of meaning, dreams, joys, plans, aspirations, are not as such material bodies or organizations of material bodies. What naturalism does assert as a truth about nature is that through forms of behavior or functions of material systems are indefeasibly parts of nature, forms and functions are not themselves agents in their own realization or in the realization of anything else. In the conception of nature’s processes which naturalism affirms, there is no place for the operation of disembodied forces, no place for an immaterial spirit directing the course of events, no place for the survival of personality after the corruption of the body which exhibits it.41 Naturalism disavows any transcendental or disembodied entities or forces, but as Nagel is pointing out, this view does not at all mean some reductive materialism, although it does mean that the naturalist cannot be sure of any personal immortality beyond death. Also, the rejection of any kind of reductionism follows from the basic pluralism of such naturalism. According to this commitment, not only materialistic reductionism would be rejected, but also any and all other forms of it, such as absolute idealism or metaphysical monism. That is, there is a commitment to irreducible variety or plurality of things within the world, that is, a plurality that is never ultimately reducible to anything else more basic. Let us look again to Nagel, who says that a ... major contention of naturalism is that the manifest plurality and variety of things, of their qualities and their functions, are an irreducible feature of the cosmos, not a deceptive appearance cloaking some more homogeneous ‘ultimate reality’ or transempirical substance, and that the sequential orders in which events occur or the manifold relations of dependence in which things exist are contingent connections, not the embodiments of a fixed and unified pattern of logically necessary links.42
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Thus any strict determinism is rejected. There are, as fundamental features of reality, plurality and variety. In any case, whether naturalism is of the materialistic variety or of a more pluralistic variety, nature is understood as adaptable or malleable in the sense that while there is indeed determination within nature or natural processes, such processes are also open in a significant respect. As Peirce well recognized (in for example his 1892 “The Doctrine of Necessity Examined” and his 1898 “The Logic of Continuity”), nature is describable both by law and chance. In other words, the universe is tychistic, that is, has the habit of chance such that not all events are causally determined to occur in the manner in which they do by the antecedent happenings.43 Accordingly, so-called laws of nature are hence understood as modifiable habits, rather than immutable, and so chance here means, as Douglas Anderson has said, that “nature has a habit of breaking habits.”44 Naturalists, it should not be surprising, reject strict dualisms, and, in particular, they reject Cartesian dualism. To do this is a significant part of affirming continuity between the human and nature with regard to the totality of the realms of experience. Accordingly, of great significance for naturalists are issues regarding the implications or consequences of experience for understanding nature. Such is the fundamental importance experience plays for naturalism and which suggests its association or link with empiricism as opposed to rationalism, although, to be sure, naturalism’s link here is to a radical or immediate form of empiricism, one congruent with our lived experience. It is such an empiricism that enables one perhaps to circumvent or sidestep the problem/question of whether the naturalism with which we are concerned must or must not be identified as a form of materialism. Dewey is here instructive in his seminal 1905 article “The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism,” saying that “Immediate empiricism postulates that things – anything, everything, in the ordinary or non-technical use of term ‘thing’ – are what they are experienced as.”45 From this perspective, we can understand nature as experience, that is, as what presents itself to us, as Heidegger, for example, interprets the classical Greek notion of phusis or nature.46 As Dewey puts it, “if one wishes to describe anything truly, his task is to tell what it is experienced as being” and that “things are what they are experienced to be...”47 Indeed, experience is Dewey’s most significant concept, the most significant statement of which is his 1925 Experience and Nature. For Dewey, it is imperative that whatever claims philosophers may raise be always traced back to experience itself, and that general philosophical conclusions have to be made consistent with experience, consistent, that is, with the experienced doings and undergoings of life. As a part of this, it seems worth emphasizing that Dewey’s understanding of experience refers not simply to the experience of an isolated individual, but rather to something much broader. As commentator S. Morris Eames puts it, for Dewey, experience is inclusive of
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... the experiences and reports of experiences of other men, living and dead, mature and immature, normal and abnormal. Experience is thus taken in a broad and full sense; it covers anything and everything that can be denoted. Experience includes feelings, sensations, concepts, psychical events, physical things, relations, actualities, potentialities, the harmonies and disharmonies of life. Experience includes our memories and imaginations, our pasts and projected futures, our present awareness, our illusions and hallucinations; it includes truths and falsehoods, objects of beauty and ugliness, goods and evils; it includes language and events, and “death, war, and taxes” (EN, LW 1: ch. 1). Experience includes all that is, has been, and has potentiality of becoming. For Dewey, experience is ultimate reality, if one chooses to use an old metaphysical term.48 Such a rich naturalist account of experience serves to expose inconsistencies of traditional accounts of nature, and Dewey’s effort, indeed, is one of overcoming the merely apparent separation between humans and nature. The strategy for this is one of articulating a philosophical method that shows both humans as a part of nature as well as nature as being for us cognitively accessible, and, as scholars such as Eames have emphasized, this is the main goal and point of the first chapter of Experience and Nature (“Experience and Philosophic Method”), where Dewey writes that “experience is of as well as in nature.”49 As a part of this, Dewey’s account, like that of his naturalist contemporary Santayana, rejects the Kantian view that reason or reflection is any sort of transcendental activity. That is, it has a natural as opposed to a transcendental status. In any case, naturalism can be understood as a doctrine denying breaks or strict divisions within experience, and this, of course, is a part of naturalism’s strong tendency of anti-dualism. Now contrary to this, an influential and widespread traditional postulation has been that there is a gap or separation between experience and nature. Eames has pointed out that, when such dualism has been perpetrated, experience has been understood as subjective and nature as objective.50 Descartes himself, of course, is the obvious exemplar of such a philosophical bifurcation or dichotomy. Naturalism flatly and wholeheartedly rejects such a separation. Instead, there is, according to the naturalist, an interrelation of nature and the human organism. There is a unity of organic interaction between these two aspects, and hence humans are constitutors of nature. In sum, naturalism, at least according to the present project, is understood as an anti-reductionist, anti-supernaturalist, contextualist, historicist, non-dualist and non-scientistic endeavor. This does not, however, mean that we must endorse or be led to relativism, nihilism, or subjectivism. There is good reason, in any case, to avoid reductionism, and the primary reason for this is one of respecting the primacy of experience, as opposed to founding a philosophical project, primarily, on some epistemology or ontology, rather than upon experience itself. Such an attitude is consistent with classical American
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naturalism, and also quite consistent with the more recent naturalism of Nielsen, whom I mentioned earlier, and so it remains in some quarters alive and well. With this, let us now turn in the following section to a naturalistic conception of the self. 3. The Naturalistic Self The functional immortality view of death also requires some such account of the self in naturalistic terms, and so I shall here take this up. First, it is fair to say that naturalists are in large part responding to Descartes and, more specifically, to Descartes’ starting point for philosophy, namely the cogito. Now when Descartes articulated his formulation of the cogito, that is, the I that is thinking, he was doing much more than simply declaring the foundation for a metaphysical/epistemological dualism. He was also articulating what would come to be an extremely influential view of the self, namely the self as a mental substance, distinguished from extended, material substance. Modern rationalists, of course, are not alone in this understanding of the self, for it is also found within modern classical empiricism (e.g. Locke, Hume), according to which the basis for knowledge is experience in the sense of individually private perception, which is understood as the sensory effects of those “primary” qualities that cause them in determinate or lawful ways. Thus, naturalism is largely a response to classical modern philosophy in general, as well as its twentieth-century empiricist heirs, such as the philosophers of logical positivism. In any case, the functional immortality view of death follows from an understanding of the self as relational, as social, as opposed to being confined only to this or “my” body. That is, this understanding of death presupposes an organic self extending well beyond my personal body, experience, and/or thoughts. Functional immortality assumes what Eugene Fontinell has called “a Field Model of the Self,” according to which “a self is composed of submicroscopic, microscopic, macroscopic, and ultramacroscopic fields...,” a view also found earlier in the idealism of William Earnest Hocking.51 As Fontinell, among others, points out, James’s position is quite consistent with this, insofar as he rejects any notion of an encapsulated self, that is, any notion according to which the self is contained inside the boundary of one’s skin or simply within some mind or ego.52 Instead, such a pragmatist notion of self can be well understood as a kind of non-dualistic, outward radiation and overlapping with other fields. In Fontinell’s metaphorical phrase, it is fields within fields.53 Similarly, in the words of John McDermott, one “is neither a container nor a box in a world of boxes.”54 As Randall exclaimed in his 1958 Nature and Historical Experience, “It is indeed amazing that students of man should ever have convinced themselves that the mechanisms of human behavior are located exclusively within the skin of the organism, or within a private and subjective ‘mind’, in view of the obvious fact, that everything that distinguishes man from other
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animals is a common and social possession.”55 In any case, Fontinell provides a helpful set of eight principles with which such a rich naturalist view of the self should adhere. According to him, our understanding of the self should do as follows: 1.
preserve individuality without falling into atomistic individualism or egocentric isolationism;
2.
account for change, growth, and development;
3.
account for a range and diversity of relations;
4.
account for continuity, identity, sameness, and difference;
5.
account for a variety of structures or dynamic systems such as the psychological, personal, historical, cultural, social, and religious;
6.
indicate how individuals both make and are made by language, history, art, science, religion, and other institutions;
7.
allow for creative participation in wider processes or fields;
8.
allow for radical transformation without obliteration or absorption into another reality or process.56
Again, Fontinell describes such a self as fields within fields.57 He explicitly references and allies himself with James, who, as Fontinell points out, talked of the self as “all shades and no boundaries.”58 Such a notion of the self eschews atomism, dualisms, and reductive materialism, to name a few of its foes. More positively, it emphasizes context, function, and relationality. It is on the basis of such a naturalistic view of the self that I identify the aforementioned functional immortality view of death, according to which the self lives past or through death not in the sense of a continued personal or subjective experience of one’s own (although, as far as we know, this cannot be absolutely ruled out, a point Fontinell for his part emphasizes), but rather in the sense of living on through, for example, one’s children, one’s ideas, and the various relationships cultivated in life that do not and presumably cannot simply end simultaneously with one’s biological demise. Accordingly, while death is a significant limitation on the activities of the self in the sense that its former center is no longer making a contribution, the self nevertheless goes on in its exerting of influence upon and within the world, albeit in a sort of restructured way. Put simply, meanings are real and live beyond my own person, affecting other people in a personal way. In his 1931 Immortality and the Present Mood, Julius Bixler expresses this position well:
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CHARLES A. HOBBS My friend’s ideals do not die when he dies. Indeed, as many have testified, his death may make possible for me a more perfect loyalty to his ideals. A life which has been is not a non-existent thing. An achieved possibility is a part of the nature of the real. The world is a very different place because of those who have left their mark upon us.59
Such a conception of immortality, of course, may appear to many people as insubstantial or thin, but this is precisely because they have a thin conception of the self, a conception that is part of the Cartesian legacy according to which the self is understood as individualized and atomistic as opposed to being understood as a significant part of something bigger. That is, it may well not satisfy those who thus desire to be preserved eternally as their unique individualized selves, since this would seem to require another world than this one; such immortality of one’s individuality does not appear to be the case with regard to this world. The functionalist version of immortality, of course, does not assume any other world than this one, and, I should add, such a version of immortality is itself nothing new. We can find instantiations of it at least as far back as ancient Greece. To name but one example, we find Socrates, at about the middle of Plato’s Symposium, saying that he concurs with Diotima’s claim that love is a desire for immortality understood as the reproduction of the self in this world, and so is a preservation through, for example, one’s children and/or one’s teaching.60 It is in this way that Socrates refers to the “children” of Homer, namely the Iliad and Odyssey, and also to all more literal (biological) children, as the essence of immortality. In any case, to return to classical American naturalism, we can see, for example, in Dewey’s Experience and Nature, a sense of the self that is quite consistent and required for the sort of immortality at issue here. The living person or self is transactionally constituted by events and interactions inclusive of that which lies beyond our skin. In this regard Dewey writes, “The thing essential to bear in mind is that living as an empirical affair is not something which goes on below the skin-surface of an organism....”61 Rather, he says “it is always an inclusive affair involving connection, interaction of what is within the organic body and what lies outside in space and time, and with higher organisms far outside.”62 Experience and, indeed, meaning and our embodiment within the world are never something simply somehow merely internal to one’s person. Rather, in Darwinian fashion, Dewey describes the self, or, in his term, the organism, as fundamentally interactive with its environment. As such, the skin demarcates the boundary of self and world, as organism and environment, in what is ultimately an unimportant way. Rather, experience goes beyond the skin and is transactional, and the self is not independent of its context, and this means the cultural, historical, societal contexts. In chapter 4 (“The Act of Expression”) of his 1934 Art as Experience, Dewey elaborates on this theme:
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The epidermis is only in the most superficial way an indication of where an organism ends and its environment begins. There are things inside the body that are foreign to it, and there are things outside of it that belong to it de jure, if not de facto; that must, that is, be taken possession of if life is to continue. On the lower scale, air and food materials are such things; on the higher, tools, whether the pen of the writer or the anvil of the blacksmith, utensils and furnishings, property, friends and institutions – all the supports and sustenances without which a civilized life cannot be. The need that is manifest in the urgent impulsions that demand completion through what the environment – and it alone – can supply, is a dynamic acknowledgment of this dependence of the self for wholeness upon its surroundings.63 The self, in this way, is dependent on its environment, on a context. It is contextual or relational. Now the final point here is one of inquiring into what the consequences are of the functional immortality view for living. We should of course remember here that the functional immortality view is of a different sort than most other prominent beliefs or views about death, not only in the senses that this view affirms an immortality that is not personal or subjective and that it affirms a naturalism that is not wholly reducible to materialism, but also in the sense that this view of death is, quite simply, an empirical fact. Regarding the commitment here to a naturalism that is not merely materialism, Dewey is helpful, as we have seen. For Dewey, it is experience that is the center from which meaning develops and grows. Materiality is of course required, but without being wholly dependent upon or reducible to it. That is, in classical American fashion, I assume a naturalism that affirms the human spirit.64 In any case, let us now turn again to the issue of practical consequences and, as part of this, to the existential issue of whether such an understanding provides equanimity in the face of death. This final consideration arises from the question of whether one can live with the naturalistic meaning of our living and dying alone. 4. Practical Consequences: the Existential Question One’s biological demise, while a significant coming-to-be, does not and cannot erase that one did exist in this world and, by virtue of it, that one presumably continues, in some degree, to exert an influence on and within the world. One continues, after one’s biological demise, to exist functionally within this world insofar as existence is constituted by such influence, and so I would here point out that the naturalistic or functional immortality of which I speak is not a mere sentimentalism to the effect that one shall live on within the thoughts of family and friends, although it does include the significance of such memories insofar as this is the mode through which such influence is transmitted, at least in the more immediate future beyond one’s death. In any case, the functional
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immortality account of death does not constitute a belief that is mutually exclusive of more speculative beliefs concerning death, such as those of personal immortality and of reincarnation, the Epicurean view that death is nothing to us, or Thomas Nagel’s deprivation view of death. From a pragmatist point of view, these other categories of beliefs are to be considered meaningful only if they in fact make some difference in our conduct, certainly as James says about metaphysical positions generally in Lecture II of his Pragmatism. Yet all must accept the functional immortality view of death as an empirical fact, regardless of whether it is supplemented by any of the other more speculative beliefs about the meaning or nature of death, for this means simply continuing to exert some influence (and, of course, hopefully for the better). While not taking part in the same discussion I am, the contemporary British philosopher Derek Parfit has nevertheless made some observations lending support to the view of immortality suggested here. In his 1984 Reasons and Persons, Parfit writes that There will later be some memories about my life. And there may later be thoughts that are influenced by mine, or things done as the result of my advice. My death will break the more direct relations between my present experiences and future experiences, but it will not break various other relations. This is all there is to the fact that there will be no one living who will be me. Now that I have seen this, my death seems to me less bad.65 Parfit examines and then criticizes the notion that death is best characterized as mainly the loss of one’s identity, that is, in the Enlightenment sense of the term, such that it is understood as that experience which becomes conscious. One’s cognitive and bodily experiences are not best likened to lightening flashes which quickly come and go. We instead have the ability to make connections between such experiences so as to establish a kind of comprehensive framework which we consider to be our identity. From this perspective, at death, since the brain ceases functioning and the body in general decays, what happens is simply that one loses the ability to establish and maintain such an identity. Now Parfit’s criticism here is that this modern Enlightenment emphasis upon identity, which has resulted in a view of death as simply the termination of everything making up one’s personality, disregards or ignores significant aspects of the person that remain after his or her death, for example, memories about the person or perhaps articles, books, or other things we have written or produced. The modernist sense of the self, dependent on a clear distinction between identity and non-identity, leads to a sense of death according to which such things are not indicative of a continued existence beyond our death. Now, to be sure, my death is of significance in that it ruptures those more immediate relations between one’s future and present experience. Yet with a more expansive sense of the self, we can see how death does not necessarily rupture
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all relations. Contrary to many of the so-called postmodern thinkers, this does not of course mean that the notion of identity must simply be abandoned completely. A significant amount of that which constitutes the self is indeed identity. However, the important supplement to this is that not all that makes up the self can or has to be understood as wholly constituted through such identity, such as, for example, the continuation of one’s words and actions within the lives of other people. One’s personality is made up of a number of elements. Yet not every one of them presupposes the control of some reflective self. That is, personality (understood as a complex of mental, physical, and social elements) is not in all respects dependent on a cogito, that is, upon an “I” that is selfaware. In any case, the question in the end is not one of whether or not such a notion of immortality is intelligible, but rather one of whether, as unsupplemented by any of the other views of death, a naturalistic or functional view gives us what we need. This brings to mind Albert Camus’ declaration, in The Myth of Sisyphus (which John McDermott is fond of citing), that “I want to know whether I can live with what I know and with that alone.”66 To reformulate this question, and to make it more specific, we can ask, with regard to death: can one go about living with only the knowledge that one’s existence exerts an influence, makes a difference, upon at least some future affairs, that is, without any supplementary knowledge to the effect that death involves or means anything more than this? In other words, to what extent, on its own, does the functional immortality view of death provide satisfaction? Can one live without faith in anything more? Are the practical effects of this efficacious for coping with our living in the world? In McDermott’s words, the question is one of whether we can “live with this secular liturgy, stunningly apart from a meaning transcendent of our everyday affairs...,”67 or, as he asks elsewhere, “can we experience ourselves as terminal and yet live creative, probing, building lives which, nonetheless, ask for no guarantees and for no ultimate significance to be attributed to our endeavor?”68 That is, we must ask, as McDermott has, about whether or not one can have equanimity in the face of death, that is, in the face of one’s own death. I respond that there are those of us who wish to exist as unconstrained by illusions as we can, and this would seem to entail an honest acceptance, however troubling it might be, of the ultimate disaster that shall come to pass for us as individuals. In any case, the comfort, if there can here be comfort, is in the empirical reality not only of a continued, albeit limited, existence through memory and influence, but also through being a part of that which is larger than any individualized self. This latter consideration is advocated by James as part of the conclusion he states in the Postscript of his 1902 The Varieties of Religious Experience. James writes:
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CHARLES A. HOBBS ... we can experience union with something larger than ourselves and in that union find our greatest peace ... the practical needs and experiences of religion seem to me sufficiently met by the belief that beyond each man and in a fashion continuous with him there exists a larger power which is friendly to him and to his ideals. All that the facts require is that the power should be both other and larger than our conscious selves. Anything larger will do, if only it be large enough to trust for the next step. It need not be infinite, it need not be solitary. It might conceivably even be only a larger and more godlike self, of which the present self would then be but the mutilated expression, and the universe might conceivably be a collection of such selves, of different degrees of inclusiveness, with no absolute unity realized in it at all.69
To sum up here, it was James’ belief that, with regard to immortality, there can be comfort through being part of that which is greater or larger than our individual selves, and that, as he says, pretty much anything larger will do. It need not necessarily be some bigger heavenly ego or anything infinite, but rather something simply larger than one’s own self as individual, and this seems an important aspect of the term functional immortality, in that it is not ultimate but it does the job of getting at least some of us through another day. As for Dewey, that which is larger than our individual selves is of course society, which, as he says near the beginning of his 1916 Democracy and Education, has its existence “through a process of transmission quite as much as biological life,” with the transmission occurring “by means of communication of habits of doing, thinking, and feeling from the older to the younger.”70 What Dewey is describing I would call, broadly, pedagogical, with the role here of pedagogy as one of itself constituting through activity and tradition, over the long-haul, the functional immortality of which I speak. We might thus just as well call the functional view of immortality a social immortality in which we are “immortal” not through our living on forever as individuals, but through the continuity between the individual and the greater trans-temporal process of society. I do not take issue with Dewey’s characterization of society, but it is worth recognizing that we are not guaranteed any sustainable equanimity in the face of our death, for, so much more likely than not, it is only a matter of time before we, or at least most of us, as individuals, are completely and utterly annihilated and forgotten. This is why, despite the Deweyan social answer I have mentioned, it may well be the case that a thorough-going naturalist position on death inevitably entails an element of bitterness or sadness, or, as Santayana says, “A note of failure and melancholy must always dominate in the struggle against natural death.”71 This is despite any Jamesian speculation about that which may be larger than and friendly to us.
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Speaking of James, there is here another relevant passage from The Varieties of Religious Experience (from Lectures VI and VII on “The Sick Soul”): The fact that we can die, that we can be ill at all, is what perplexes us; the fact that we now for a moment live and are well is irrelevant to that perplexity. We need a life not correlated with death, a health not liable to illness, a kind of good that will not perish, a good in fact that flies beyond the Goods of nature. It all depends on how sensitive the soul may become to discords. “The trouble with me is that I believe too much in common happiness and goodness,” said a friend of mine whose consciousness was of this sort, “and nothing can console me for their transiency. I am appalled and disconcerted at its being possible.” And so with most of us: a little cooling down of animal excitability and instinct, a little loss of animal toughness, a little irritable weakness and descent of the pain-threshold, will bring the worm at the core of all our usual springs of delight into full view, and turn us into melancholy metaphysicians. The pride of life and glory of the world will shrivel. It is after all but the standing quarrel of hot youth and hoary eld. Old age has the last word: the purely naturalistic look at life, however enthusiastically it may begin, is sure to end in sadness. This sadness lies at the heart of every merely positivistic, agnostic, or naturalistic scheme of philosophy.72 It is with this sentiment that I would like to return to John McDermott, for we would do well to consider now his position on death in conjunction with the present project. In existentialist fashion, McDermott believes that the meaning of death, and, indeed, that of life, is most rich and striking when understood according to completely natural terms. Eugene Fontinell has in fact already performed a careful articulation and assessment of McDermott’s position in a recent essay.73 Fontinell says the following: If there is one need claimed, explicitly and implicitly, by all the traditional religions, it is the need to know that we are not alone. McDermott, on the other hand, repeatedly, explicitly and implicitly, argues that we must learn to accept the fact that we are alone – starkly and chillingly alone. There is no one, “nothing,” other than ourselves and other members of the human community who can help us to render life meaningful, who can participate with us in the struggle to achieve “salvation.”74
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As such, the nature of the human person, as we have seen with Dewey, lies mainly in his or her interaction with others. Indeed, as Fontinell himself notes, McDermott says that “The quality of the other and how we transact with the other constitutes our very being as human.”75 Simply put, McDermott is in the company of Nietzsche, among others, in rejecting any “God” or, more broadly, in rejecting any transcendent meaning. In any case, McDermott also holds that, in an important sense, each of us is radically alone. There can be for McDermott no salvation at all apart from temporal salvation, that is, if there can even be any such salvation at all. Thus the question, again, is one of whether we can live with the affairs of time only, that is, apart from any transcendent meaning.76 McDermott’s own answer is yes, and, moreover, that “it is only in this way that we live a distinctively human life.”77 With regard to the proper response to living in the face of our death, he further elaborates “that we should experience our own lives in the context of being permanently afflicted, that is, of being terminal,” and that “This is not to propose a morbid personal style, but rather to ask that this attitude ride as an abiding presence in the active recesses of our conscious life.”78 Now while the answer may well be that it is possible to live in this way, it also seems worth adding that such living is by no means necessarily easy. As Fontinell rightly notes, McDermott makes “terminality an energizing rather than a de-energizing phenomenon/belief.”79 Referencing Norman O. Brown’s work, McDermott declares that “The message is clear and twofold: avoid the temptation to invest in meaning which transcends our own experience of the life-cycle; and affirm the imminence of death as the gateway to an unrepressed life in which the moment sings its own song, in its own way, once and once only.”80 To accept one’s mortality is, in short, to live a more abundant life. McDermott recognizes, of course, that far from all of us respond to our terminality in this way. He says that while in one way or another everyone is aware of the fact of our mortality, we tend to respond to this in a variety of ways, with fear being one way and forgetting it being another common response. More destructively, denial of the fact that we shall die is also a common response. One might well respond, of course, by asking how indeed we can deny such a basic and fundamental fact of existence, but still, examples of such denial are widespread. McDermott is emphatic that such denial of the trauma of death quite often takes the form of “belief in some form of salvation or immortality.”81 In his view, there is a serious problem with this, and it is not only that such belief seeks to negate what death is, namely complete and utter annihilation, but also that it involves a serious misunderstanding of what constitutes the proper importance and value of human life. That is, what properly defines being human, and thus gives human life its unique flavor, is our being aware of our mortality. The authentic response to this, then, is to own up to the brutal fact that we shall die, as opposed to engaging in whatever strategies of belief in immortality as a means of pretending otherwise.
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Now to return to the topic of a functional immortality, the question may arise as to what extent it is problematic from McDermott’s standpoint. Now for McDermott, to repeat, the belief in immortality constitutes an illegitimate denial of death. There exists nothing but ourselves and other individuals of the human community that can aid in rendering life meaningful, and this would be the one and only form of “salvation,” if there is to be any. Let us, however, be clear about what McDermott refers to by the term “immortality.” He writes as follows: The history of culture has presented many varieties of immortality. Perhaps the most ingenious, although the least plausible, is that of traditional Roman Catholicism, wherein each of us, bodily, is resurrected glorious and immortal or damned and immortal. The attraction here is that our eternal life will be affectively continuous with our mortal life. Other versions of the doctrine of immortality involve claims of reincarnation, metempsychosis, immersion, or absorption, each attempting to perpetuate the me which is me, in one form or another.82 This is a fairly wide ranging list. Yet it is clear who McDermott takes the main culprit to be, and it is also clear that he would concur with Nielsen who says that “none of the faces of immortality provide live options.”83 In any case, McDermott’s brief taxonomy here does not include the “immortality” of which I speak, but nor should it, for, as I suggest, the acceptance of a functional immortality is not a denial or shunning of death, but is rather simply a naturalizing of a doctrine that is otherwise supra-natural. Functional immortality does not even constitute a belief in the typical sense of the word, for what it denotes is simply an empirical fact. That we exist and how we exist, and that we constitute an influence in and upon the world, however great or small, is empirically undeniable. In this sense, McDermott can be said to accept a functional immortality, as indicated, for example, by his response to Rainer Maria Rilke’s poem “The Ninth Elegy.”84 In responding to Rilke’s question, “having been once on Earth–can it ever be cancelled?,” McDermott is emphatic: “I think not. Celebrate!”85 We are, of course, still left with the existential question, as earlier recognized, of to what extent functional immortality is satisfactory for the individual, as un-supplemented by extra metaphysical baggage or speculation. As far as communal inquiry goes, it is with this question that we may be stranded, especially in light of the irreducible nature of temperament, as described by James. I mean here that the question is one whose answer can never be completely generalized and is always precarious, and particularly given that the answer to such a question can indeed change for the individual over time. So while there can be equanimity in the face of death, this does not mean that any and everyone shall experience such an acceptance or calmness. In Jamesian fashion, I suggest, again, that it is a personal question whose answer,
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in the end, can only be given by the individual person, and varies according to temperament, need, and context.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS For his many comments, questions, and suggestions on work leading to this, I give special thanks to Ken Stikkers. I also thank Tom Alexander, Larry Hickman, Doug Anderson, John McDermott, Bryan Wiebe, and Ann Clark.
NOTES 1. And vice versa. That is, the meaning of death is inseparable from the meaning of living. There is not any confrontation of death that is wholly distinct from a confrontation of life, and there is not any contemplation of death that escapes reflection upon that in and about life which we value, that is, whatever it is that makes our lives worthwhile when they are in fact worthwhile, and the kinds of relationships we choose to engage in with other people. Thus reflection upon death constitutes an inescapable aspect of our quest to lead examined lives. I agree here with Richard W. Momeyer’s discussion in his Confronting Death (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988); see especially p. xiv. 2. I here say “the meaning of our living” as opposed to “the meaning of life” because I hold with pragmatists generally that life is an abstraction compared to our living that occurs only in the present as opposed to some other time. John McDermott expresses this point well in his 1991 essay “Why Bother: Is Life Worth Living?” McDermott says the following: “The term ‘life’ can only be used retrospectively as in my life, or, if you knew of my life, or, what a life I have had, or, I have no life, or, plaintively, this is a life? The term ‘living’, on the other hand, is a process word, a present participle, a happening, and a witness to the ‘specious present.’ Following John Dewey, we live only at this time and at no other time and so life is an abstraction, perched above our living as a desperate effort to identify ourselves, to become existentially instantiated. Yet, the only part of our past, which exists, is the past that is present to us. And the future is but a ‘gossamer wing,’ vapid, elusive, and most always, by far, doomed to be different from the futured intentions of our present. Our living is not out of something or in something. Nor is it about something, or on behalf of something. Rather, our living is constitutive of our person. Who we are at any moment is precisely our living.” Journal of Philosophy 88 (1991): 678–679. McDermott’s essay is reprinted with additions in Philosophy and the Reconstruction of Culture, ed. John J. Stuhr (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), and also in McDermott’s The Drama of Possibility: Experience as Philosophy of Culture, ed. Douglas R. Anderson (New York: Fordham University Press, 2007). 3. Thanks to Larry Hickman for the phrase “functional immortality” (from personal discussion at Center for Dewey Studies). 4. James Campbell, “One Hundred Years of Pragmatism,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 43 (2007): 5. 5. Kai Nielsen, “The Faces of Immortality,” in Death and Afterlife, ed. Stephen T. Davis (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), p. 2. As Nielsen goes on to point out, there are two different versions of Western immortality. He explains as follows:
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“Jewish, Christian and Islamic defenders of immortality take two fundamentally different positions in their characterization of the afterlife. The first position ... is probably the more religiously orthodox position and the second position, until rather recently, would more likely appeal to philosophers and perhaps even to common sense since the time of Descartes, and in certain strata of society extending down to our own time.... The two views are, respectively, bodily resurrection by God to eternal life, and Cartesian dualism with its belief in an indestructible, immaterial individual self distinct from the body in which this self is said to be housed. This self is also thought to be capable of, without any body in which it must be housed, to exist as a disembodied individual who is also a person.” Ibid. Reprinted in Nielsen’s Naturalism and Religion (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2001). 6. See Chapter 14 (“Ideal Immortality”) of Part III (“Reason in Religion”) in The Life of Reason (New York: Scribners, 1955). 7. Peirce, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur Burks (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), vol. 7, p. 356. 8. Peirce, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vol. 6, p. 354. 9. Martin Gardner, The Whys of a Philosophical Scrivener (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1983), p. 280. 10. I thank Andrew Youpa for alerting me to this quotation; I cannot locate a print citation for this, but a “google” search turns up numerous attributions (without print citation) of this to Allen. 11. I note this as a dominant trend. There are certainly exceptions such as, e.g., the work of Canadian philosopher Kai Nielsen, whose naturalism very much resembles some varieties of classical American naturalism, particularly Dewey’s naturalism. See, e.g., Nielsen’s Naturalism and Religion (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2001), Naturalism Without Foundations (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1996), and On Transforming Philosophy: A Metaphilosophical Inquiry (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1995). See also Robert Sinclair’s “Nielsen’s Conception of Philosophy: Its Essential Tension and Deweyan Resolution” and Nielsen’s reply, both in Reason & Emancipation: Essays on the Philosophy of Kai Nielsen, ed. Michel Seymour and Matthias Fritsch (Amherst, N.Y.: Humanity Books, 2007), pp. 161–171, 173–180. In any case, as with any –ism, we do well to define what we mean by it. Other names associated with related forms of non-reductive “naturalism,” in no particular order of importance, include John Lachs, Joseph Margolis, Nicholas Rescher, John Ryder, Charlene Haddock Seigfried, John E. Smith, and John J. Stuhr, to name just a few. There is also of course the compelling naturalistic (and existentialist) view of John J. McDermott, which I discuss in the last section of this paper. 12. Nielsen provides a helpful typology of naturalisms. He distinguishes cosmological (worldview) naturalism, methodological naturalism, ethical naturalism, and scientistic naturalism. See Naturalism and Religion, p. 136. 13. The Life of Reason, p. 17. 14. Early Greek Philosophy, ed. and trans. Jonathan Barnes (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), p. 49. 15. Dewey, “Anti-Naturalism in Extremis,” in The Later Works of John Dewey, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1989), vol. 15, p. 46. Originally published in the Partisan Review 10 (January-February 1943): 24–39. 16. Roy Wood Sellars, “The Emergence of Naturalism,” International Journal of Ethics 34 (1924): 320.
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17. “The Emergence of Naturalism,” ibid. 18. Jaegwon Kim, “The American Origins of Philosophical Naturalism” in Philosophy in America at the Turn of the Century (Charlottesville, Virg.: Philosophy Documentation Center, 2003) Of course, the origins of American naturalism can be said to ultimately go back much further than this, not only back to C. S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, but also further back to include philosophers such as Henry David Thoreau and Ralph Waldo Emerson. 19. “The American Origins of Philosophical Naturalism,” p. 85. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid. 22. Ibid, p. 86. 23. Ibid. 24. Naturalism and the Human Spirit, ed. Yervant H. Krikorian (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944), p. 374, 358. 25. Ibid, p. 358. 26. Ibid. It should be noted, however, that Randall immediately adds that “There is room for religion, to be sure, since that is an encountered fact of human experience.” (ibid) This is, to be sure, Dewey’s position on religious experience (or the “mystical”) as well, as evidenced by his 1934 A Common Faith, in which Dewey says the following: “There is no reason for denying the existence of experiences that are called mystical. On the contrary, there is every reason to suppose that, in some degree of intensity, they occur so frequently that they may be regarded as normal manifestations that take place at certain rhythmic points in the movement of experience. The assumption that denial of a particular interpretation of their objective content proves that those who make the denial do not have the experience in question, so that if they had it they would be equally persuaded of its objective source in the presence of God, has no foundation in fact. As with every empirical phenomenon, the occurrence of the state called mystical is simply an occasion for inquiry into its mode of causation. There is no more reason for converting the experience itself into an immediate knowledge of its cause than in the case of an experience of lightning or any other natural occurrence.” The Later Works of John Dewey, vol. 9, p. 26. 27. Naturalism and Religion, p. 29. 28. Dewey, The Later Works of John Dewey, vol. 15, p. 54. Also in the 1944 Naturalism and the Human Spirit volume, pp. 1–16. 29. See the Preface of McDermott’s The Culture of Experience: Philosophical Essays in the American Grain (Prospect Heights, Ill.: Waveland Press, 1976), p. ix. It is significant that McDermott also notes here “that only in the American philosophical tradition is this [conception of experience] the primary concern” (ibid). 30. Paul Kurtz is helpful on this point, saying as follows: “The naturalists do not deny that aesthetic and religious experiences are central to human life; in a sense they provide content to a rich and full life. The real issue for the naturalists however is how you interpret these experiences. Dewey constantly talks about the immediate experiences that we have, undergo, suffer, enjoy; but he denies that the term ‘knowledge’ should be applied to this range of awareness in any special way. For it is one thing to have a raw, brute, and unrefined immediate experience, it is another thing to interpret, relate, organize, or deduce from this experience ‘concepts,’ to claim that they apply to the world, and to act upon them.” See Kurtz’s “Naturalism in American Philosophy” in Philosophy and the Civilizing Arts: Essays Presented to Herbert W.
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Schneider, ed. Craig Walton and John P. Anton (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1974), p. 207. 31. Larry A. Hickman, “Theism and Naturalism in American Philosophy: An Overview” Journal of Korean Religion 7 (2005): 220 (and see p. 221 for the phrase “‘adequacy’ thesis of American naturalism”). 32. W.H. Sheldon, Journal of Philosophy 42 (1945): 253–270. Sheldon’s article is largely a critique of Naturalism and the Human Spirit. 33. Dewey, “Are Naturalists Materialists?” The Later Works of John Dewey, vol. 15, p. 109. Originally published in Journal of Philosophy 42 (1945): 515–530; also reprinted in American Philosophic Naturalism in the Twentieth Century, ed. John Ryder (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1994), pp. 102–120. 34. “Critique of Naturalism,” p. 254. 35. Ibid, p. 256. 36. Dewey, The Later Works of John Dewey, vol. 15, pp. 113–114. To be fair (according to Lewis S. Feuer), it was Ernest Nagel who was mainly responsible for the composition of this article, with Dewey himself actually writing very little (probably not much beyond the first paragraph). Ibid, p. xvi. 37. Introduction to The Later Works of John Dewey, vol. 15, p. xvi. 38. Ibid. 39. See also Chapter 7 (“Nature, Life and Body-Mind”) of Dewey’s Experience and Nature, in which Dewey writes as follows: “‘Matter’, or the physical, is a character of events when they occur at a certain level of interaction. It is not itself an event or existence; the notion that while ‘mind’ denotes essence, ‘matter’ denotes existence is superstition ... the dependence of life, sentiency and mind upon ‘matter’ is ... practical or instrumental.” The Later Works of John Dewey, vol. 1, pp. 200, 201. 40. To the Eastern Division APA meeting in Baltimore, and originally published in Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 28 (1954–55): 5–17. Reprinted in American Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, ed. Paul Kurtz (New York: Macmillan, 1966), and in Presidential Addresses of the American Philosophical Association: 1951–1960, ed. Richard T. Hull (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2006), pp. 265–275. 41. American Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, p. 547. 42. Ibid, p. 547. 43. Peirce writes in “The Logic of Continuity” that tychism is the doctrine that absolute chance is a factor of the universe. This is from his Cambridge Lectures on “Reasoning and the Logic of Things” (Lecture Eight). See Reasoning and the Logic of Things: The Cambridge Conferences Lectures of 1898, ed. Kenneth Laine Ketner (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), pp. 242–268. I offer further discussion of Peirce’s tychism in my “Peirce’s Tychism and the Epicurean Swerve,” forthcoming in Southwest Philosophical Studies. 44. From personal discussion with Anderson. 45. Dewey, The Middle Works of John Dewey, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977), vol. 13, p. 158. 46. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1959). 47. Dewey, The Middle Works of John Dewey, vol. 3, p. 159. We also find such a naturalism, whereby nature is experience, in James’ radical empiricism, which is, indeed, more or less what Dewey means by immediate empiricism.
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48. “Experience and Philosophical Method in John Dewey” in Experience and Value: Essays on John Dewey and Pragmatic Naturalism, ed. Elizabeth R. Eames and Richard W. Field (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2003), p. 15. Originally published in the Midwestern Journal of Philosophy 4.1 (Spring 1976): 15–29. 49. Dewey, The Later Works of John Dewey, vol. 1, p. 12. 50. Experience and Value: Essays on John Dewey and Pragmatic Naturalism, p. 14. 51. Eugene Fontinell, Self, God, and Immortality: A Jamesian Investigation (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), p. 46. Regarding Hocking (who himself writes of the self as a Field of Fields), see, for example, his “Fact, Field, and Destiny: Inductive Elements of Metaphysics” in Review of Metaphysics 11 (1958): 542. Reprinted in A William Ernest Hocking Reader, with Commentary, ed. John Lachs and D. Micah Hester (Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 2004). Thanks to Douglas Anderson for calling my attention to the Hocking article. 52. Self, God, and Immortality: A Jamesian Investigation, p. 47. 53. Ibid, p. 46. 54. John J. McDermott, Streams of Experience: Reflections on the History and Philosophy of American Culture (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1986), p. 196. 55. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 173. 56. Self, God, and Immortality, p. 46. 57. Ibid. 58. Ibid, p. 47. 59. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 36. 60. Symposium 207a–212c. 61. Dewey, The Later Works of John Dewey, vol. 1, p. 215. 62. Ibid. 63. Dewey, The Later Works of John Dewey, vol. 10, pp. 64–65. 64. Again, I recognize that there are of course other varieties of naturalism, and certainly including the scientistic kind that does reduce all things to matter, a charge that, as Dewey notes in “Anti-Naturalism in Extremis,” is often leveled by antinaturalists at naturalism is general. (The Later Works of John Dewey, vol. 15, p. 56). Such would be a vulgar naturalism necessarily excluding from its concerns or recognition issues of human meaning and spirit. 65. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984, p. 281. 66. Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, and Other Essays, trans. Justin O’Brien (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), p. 51. 67. Streams of Experience: Reflections on the History and Philosophy of American Culture, p. 90. 68. Ibid, p. 164. 69. James, The Works of William James (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 413. 70. Dewey, The Middle Works of John Dewey, vol. 9, p. 109. Dewey adds the following: “Without this communication of ideals, hopes, expectations, standards, opinions, from those members of society who are passing out of the group life to those who are coming into it, social life could not survive. If the members who compose a society lived on continuously, they might educate the new-born members, but it would be a task directed by personal interest rather than social need. Now it is a work of necessity.” Ibid
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71. The Life of Reason, p. 290. 72. James, The Works of William James (1985), p. 119. 73. Experience as Philosophy: On the Work of John J. McDermott, ed. James Campbell and Richard E. Hart (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006), pp. 116– 139. 74. Experience as Philosophy, p. 127. 75. Streams of Experience, p. 197; Experience as Philosophy, p. 127. 76. Streams of Experience, p. 90. 77. Ibid, p. 164. “The Inevitability of Our Own Death” was originally published in the Texas Humanist (April 1981), and, since Streams of Experience, it has also been reprinted in American Philosophic Naturalism in the Twentieth Century (1994) and in The Drama of Possibility: Experience as Philosophy of Culture (2007). 78. Streams of Experience, p. 164. 79. Experience as Philosophy, p. 136. 80. Streams of Experience, p. 163. 81. Ibid, p. 162. McDermott adds the following: “I do not refer here to a hope that somehow, somewhere, somewhen, all will go well for all of us who are, have been, or will be. Certainly, such a hope is a legitimate and understandable human aspiration. But to convert this hope into a commitment, a knowledge, a settled conviction, is to participate in an illegitimate move from possibility to actuality. It is understandable that we wish to escape from peril, but it is unacceptable to translate that desire into an assured belief that we have so escaped.” Ibid. 82. Streams of Experience, p. 162. McDermott adds the following: “Obviously, I have no final knowledge of these claims nor do I know of anyone who has. Evidence on their behalf is scanty, scattered, tentative, highly personal, and empirically dubious. Yet many of us cling to one or more of these solutions, as a redoubt, a trump card, or a lastminute reprieve from the overwhelming evidence that we are terminal.” Ibid. 83. Nielsen, “The Faces of Immortality,” Death and Afterlife, p. 28. 84. Duino Elegies (New York: W.W. Norton, 1939), p. 73 (as cited by McDermott in Streams of Experience, p. 257). 85. Streams of Experience, p. 168.
Charles A. Hobbs Visiting Assistant Professor Department of Philosophy 77 Spes Unica Hall Saint Mary’s College Notre Dame, IN 46556 United States
Contemporary Pragmatism Vol. 6, No. 1 (June 2009), 67–86
Editions Rodopi © 2009
Must a Pragmatist Be a Historical Materialist? Andrew Wells Garnar
There has only been sporadic engagement between the pragmatist and Marxist philosophical traditions. This is unfortunate because each has a great deal to learn from the other. This article seeks to form a bridge between the two traditions by reconstructing an argument from Marx and Engels for historical materialism in the light of both traditions’ shared emphasis on the centrality of action. There is much in the Marxist tradition that pragmatists can and should integrate into their own work, particularly given their interest in cultivating richer democracies.
The history of the relationship of pragmatism and Marxism might be generally characterized as one of mutual misunderstanding, with the exceptions of Sidney Hook and Cornel West, in particular West’s books The Ethical Dimensions of Marxist Thought and Keeping Faith. Both sides are guilty of misunderstanding. For example, Dewey’s remarks on Marxist theory and practice are not particularly sympathetic.1 This misunderstanding might be explained by the fact that what some present-day academics see as the rather rigorous nature of Marxist analysis only gradually came into existence. For example, Marx’s 1844 Manuscripts and The German Ideology were not published until 1932, while Lukács’ History and Class Consciousness was published in 1922 but did not get translated into English until 1971. Some of the staples of contemporary academic Marxism were largely unavailable to a pragmatist like Dewey until late in his life. From the Marxist side the case of the Frankfurt School’s history in the United States is instructive in this regard, since Columbia University took in some of that group during the time John Dewey was there. Given the geographic proximity, the interpretation of pragmatism put forward by Max Horkheimer in The Eclipse of Reason is eye-catching.2 While one can see where Horkheimer gets his reading from, it can be said that he does to Dewey what Dewey might be accused of doing to earlier Marxists: engaging in serious misinterpretation. This is not to say that there are serious disagreements between Horkheimer and Dewey. Horkheimer rejected capitalism in toto; Dewey and other pragmatists
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were critical of capitalism but took a much more melioratist position about how to deal with its excesses. For such reasons, the little conversation between the two philosophies is understandable. This situation was then compounded by the difficulties they each faced within the academy after World War II. For pragmatism, its difficulties followed from diminishing significance for several decades in the wake of analytic philosophy and a subsequent resurgence in which pragmatists have sought to justify their own identity and differences from dominant strands of English-speaking philosophy. Marxism has had to deal first with eras of anticommunist paranoia and then the rise of post-Marxist French philosophy (Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, Lacan, etc.) which takes a very critical stance towards more traditional Marxisms. It is against this backdrop that I raise the question: “Must a pragmatist be a historical materialist?” It is important to raise this question. Although I take this in a different spirit than was intended, Derrida puts the present situation correctly: “no future without Marx.” (Derrida 1994, 13) Why? I take it is obvious that economics plays an important, if not decisive, role in the lives of Americans. With this is in mind, it is worth observing that Thomas Friedman’s The World Is Flat remained on the New York Times best sellers list for over two years and was republished in an updated and expanded hardback edition within a year or so of its initial publication (and revised a little more for the paperback edition). This is a nontechnical book about globalization, particularly the economic dimensions of globalization. Part of the popularity of Friedman’s book is that it gives tools for people in the United States for understanding how globalization impacts their lives.3 This points towards an awareness, perhaps only tacit, that there are deep interconnections between the way people live their lives and the economic sphere. Neither this awareness nor this interconnection is new and Marxism has always provided a way to rigorously understand such interconnections. This presents the first reason for both laypeople and academic pragmatists to think about historical materialism seriously. Furthermore, from Charles Peirce to Cornel West, there has been a concern within pragmatism about cultivating democracy, be it liberal democracy or something more radical. Pragmatists, and I have Dewey in mind here, have had a difficult time implementing their democratic ideas into society in as thorough-going a manner as they would like. Dewey’s experience with education reform and other democratic projects generally is telling in this respect. While public education has retained much of Dewey’s rhetoric, its substance owes much more to the technocratic theory of Walter Lippmann, a theory that is effectively bent towards producing laborers for capitalist production. The trouble is that pragmatists have traditionally lacked the resources for explaining such failures. A specific example, more conventionally philosophical, occurs with Dewey’s brief discussion of the relationship between ethics and economics at
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the conclusion of chapter 10 of The Quest for Certainty. There, Dewey offers a brief reconstruction of how, through a denigration of economic theory by other sciences and philosophy, the economic sphere comes to dominate human existence. The trouble arises from modernity’s move to make ends into ideals, hence ethereal and subjective, while economics developed into a very rigid structure for providing means. Like many of the arguments in The Quest for Certainty, Dewey locates the trouble in a naïve separation of theory from practice. The result: That the economic life, thus exiled from the pale of higher values, takes revenge by declaring that it is the only social reality, and by means of the doctrine of materialistic determination of institutions and conduct in all fields, denies to deliberate morals and politics any share of causal regulation, is not surprising. (Dewey 1988, 255) While Dewey’s reconstruction of this history deserves to be taken quite seriously, it is also lacking. What is missing here is a systematic account of what happens in individuals’ concrete lives that allowed this to occur. To ask Dewey to do the requisite history on this front would be too much, but as I argue below, there is need for consideration of the structure, specifically the social structure, that produced this situation. It is this larger social structure, and its entanglement with questions of power and domination, which pragmatists need into take account if they wish to fully realize the prospect of democracy, that is, to achieve the ethical and political significance that pragmatism rightfully promises. The interpretation of Marxist historical materialism developed here aims to provide a start for pragmatists to do just this. To this end, I begin by briefly exploring the shared methodical starting point for both the classical pragmatists and Marx. From here, I reconstruct at some length the decisive moves in an early argument by Marx and Engels for historical materialism. By beginning with the common strand between these two traditions, I attempt to show a pragmatist is committed to a sort of historical materialism. I then conclude this article by addressing several concerns that could be raised by both sides about such a dialogue. We can begin by noting that common to both the classical pragmatists (Peirce, James, Dewey, and Mead) and Marx and Engels is the centrality of action. Both traditions begin, methodologically speaking, by analyzing people doing things. Although this might at first appear like a trivial move, it has profound consequences and marks a revolutionary break with the history of Western metaphysics. Instead of understanding the subject as existing outside the world and, in some sense, beyond the temporal order, the subject is now shown to be an active participant in the world. The subject constructs her or his world, and not simply in some Kantian sense, but very much literally.
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Against Western metaphysics, both traditions do not denigrate this making, but instead use it as the starting point for understanding the subject’s world. Through the study of human action, we come to understand how the subject is an active part of the world, as is all of the subject’s products, be they houses, governments or concepts. I will refer to this conception of the subject as “acting-in-the-world,” largely to distinguish it from more traditional philosophies of “acting-on-the-world,” where the latter amounts to the Spectator Theory that Dewey relentlessly criticizes. A way into the pragmatic version of “acting-in-the-world” is to go back to Peirce’s formulation of the pragmatic maxim: Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object. (CP 5.402) What we find here is the object that the subject considers is nothing more than the effects that have “practical bearings,” consequences. All the object amounts to is what the object can do, have done to it, do with it, etc. There is nothing else, because all there is are consequences. In the Popular Science Monthly essay where Peirce introduces what we will later be known as the maxim, he analyzes concepts from physics like force. In Pragmatism, James applies the maxim to a whole range of concepts and objects. What is needed is a way to explain these diverse applications in a common space in which the subject, the subject’s conceptions, the objects, and actions all take place in. I call this, for lack of a better term, “the world.” On this reading, the classical pragmatists concerned themselves with articulating the implications of acting-in-the-world, as well as trying to find an adequate way of talking about it. For instance, both of these themes can be seen in Peirce’s semiotics and the idealism he adopts in his later writings, James’ radical empiricism, and Dewey’s discussions about “transactions.” Regardless of its expression, the idea that sets the agenda for many of the classical pragmatists is that the subject actively participates in a world that it always already belongs to. Although the context is rather different, a similar methodological trajectory can be found in Marx and Engels. The “Theses on Feuerbach” sketch out the leitmotifs of Marx’s vision of acting-in-the-world. Consider the Second Thesis: The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, that is, the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is
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isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question. (Marx 1978a, 144, emphasis in original) Here we see similar motifs. For Marx, humanity proves truth through practice, actions. Through doing things in the world, subjects show that an idea or whathave-you is true. Again, we see how it is that the subject is wholly conceived of as part of the world. The other theses make this point as well, also emphasizing the subject’s active role. The most famous of the Theses makes this point beautifully: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.” (Marx 1978a, 145, emphasis in original) Marx can assert this largely because of what he has outlined in the previous Theses: that the subject can only be understood as playing an active role in a world. Philosophy and every other human endeavor is grounded in the world and results from practices contained within the world. What Marx finds frustrating about much of the philosophy of his day was that it did not seek to engage the world that it was a part of. Further still, and this is part of his objection to Feuerbach, is that the philosophical tradition makes it very difficult to see how any philosophy might engage the world except as misguided ideology. This is what Marx and Engels overturned. While differences will emerge between these two ways to explicate acting-in-the-world, the concern with acting subjects, acting individuals, engaging the world is common to both traditions. Marxists and pragmatists have taken acting-in-the-world in different directions. Pragmatists have been concerned a wide spectrum of philosophical issues including ontology, ethics, science, and politics. Many Marxists have addressed these matters themselves, but approached in a different way. They have started from questions about the production and reproduction of human life and proceeded from there to engage these more traditionally philosophical questions. There are two interrelated reasons for this, which I hope to show that pragmatists must think through. First, when Marx began writing, capitalism was already the dominant mode of the production and reproduction of life, most clearly in Europe and America but elsewhere as well through colonialism. Consequently, the bourgeoisie were in the midst of totally transforming the world. From the perspective of the proletariat, many of these changes were detrimental to their existence. The centrality of capitalism to life one hundred and fifty years ago, as well as today, led Marx to put a great deal of emphasis on matters of these modes of production, particularly economics. Second, consideration of the mode of production and the ways it determines the rest of human existence, as well matters about ruling classes, brought to the fore questions surrounding the nature and function of power. What lurks in the background with this claim and throughout this paper is a
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worry that pragmatists have been unwilling to engage matters of power, conceived of as domination and oppression, in a thorough-going manner, which has caused many of them to disregard most of the Marxist tradition. I will return to this point below. Despite these different trajectories, it is this fundamental agreement on acting-in-the-world that allows for a pragmatic reconstruction of Marx’s historical materialism. Because of the shared trajectory of acting-in-the-world, pragmatists are effectively committed to some interpretation of historical materialism. Why? To demonstrate this, I will engage in a reconstruction of Marx and Engels historical materialism as they present it in The German Ideology (GI). Early in that work they state: “The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals.” (GI 37) What is decisive in this claim is their sense of “living.” History must be concerned with human individuals doing things in the world. “They are real individuals, their activity and the material conditions of their life, both those which they find already existing and those produced by their activity.” (GI 36–37) In order to understand humanity, one must look to human activity and the material conditions of that activity. Of course, there is a case to be made that this is true of any living organism.4 The thing that distinguishes humans from other animals is that humans began to “produce their means of subsistence...” (GI 37, emphasis in original). Two obvious examples of such activities are the development of agriculture and the domestication of animals. In each case, elements are taken out of the environment and transformed to produce things for satiating human needs. This is the beginning of what they will refer to as “the mode of production.” At this point, Marx and Engels make a key move: “By producing their means of subsistence men [sic] are indirectly producing their material life.”5 (GI 37) This statement is powerful, yet ambiguous. Ambiguous because on first read, it might appear that the means of subsistence (food, water, clothing, housing) would seem to exhaust “material life.” Since this seems too simple, something else might have been intended. On my interpretation, what they are getting at here is life as lived through material: be it artifacts, relationships with the environment (what they call “nature”), as well as self and other. The last two must be included here as well since self and other are both material existences, i.e., bodies. Though trouble with writing of “material life” is that “material” carries a somewhat static undercurrent, but this is clearly not what Marx and Engels have in mind given the emphasis on activity. To see the full power of the claim that the mode of production simultaneously produces humanity’s material life, several other points must be brought in. First, the mode of the production of human subsistence presupposes what Marx and Engels’ refer to as a certain “physical organization.” This phrase is productively overdetermined. In the course of one page (GI 37), it can be read as meaning: (a) the physical organization of the human body; (b) the physical organization of the environment humans interact with; (c) most importantly, the
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physical, i.e., material, organization of humans within the mode of production. The first two senses will establish certain limits on the last. Yet, for my purposes, it is the last that is most significant because through the physical, material, relationships that humans take with respect to another, different sorts of social structures emerge. This claim at this point in the argument is rather abstract. It can be made more concrete by considering discussions about the division of labor. Different humans do different activities with respect to the production of the means of subsistence. Because of these different roles, they will form different sorts of relations with one another and themselves. What they require from each other will be different, e.g., what the hunter requires from the farmer is not the same as the farmer from the hunter. It is at this point, in particular when we consider what they call the “tribal” mode of production, we can see why Marx and Engels claim that: As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce. Hence individuals depend on the material conditions of their production. (GI 37, emphasis in original) Working with this methodology, there is nothing more to individuals than what they do. But, given certain qualifications relating back to the division of labor, much of what individuals do is produce and reproduce their means of subsistence. For this reason, Marx and Engels can claim that: (1) individuals are bound up with the mode of production in at least two different senses (the “what” and the “how” they produce); and (2) that individuals are “determined,” in a sense to be explained below, by their relationship to the mode of production. We can now see why Marx and Engels focus so much on the mode of production: the mode of production is what sustains human individuals, while at the same time structuring the lives of those individuals. One consequence of this position is that different modes of production will “determine” different sorts of social and cultural arrangements. The point about social arrangements should be clear enough. Because different ways of producing the material conditions of life entail different sorts of relations between individuals, social arrangements will depend on the mode of production. Marx and Engels discuss precisely this point with respect to the transitions from “tribal” to “ancient” and then to “feudal” modes of production and property. For example, within the developments of the ancient mode of production, by which they mean Greece and Rome, one sees the division of town and country, each place involving different sorts of labor. Also, with the growth of desires on the part of the ruling class, there is an expansion in the numbers of slaves and other laborers in order to fulfill these desires. Modes of
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governance then emerge to perpetuate this sort of society, as well as regimes of property. They extend out this line of reasoning to show how the feudal system arose out of the problems of the ancient, and the same can be said of capitalism as well. The outlines for a case about culture can be seen here as well, inasmuch as culture can be understood as an extension of society. Yet, there is another argument that Marx and Engels pursue that proves to be more significant for a pragmatist because it draws together the mode of production, culture, and consciousness. What must be kept in mind here is the developmental story that they are telling. To begin with: “The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men – the language of real life.” (GI 42) Since they begin by looking at definite individuals performing definite activities, it is reasonable to say that “culture,” broadly speaking, will be interwoven into these activities. These activities of production drive human existence because they are essential to human survival. Early on in human history, everything is related back to practicality, specifically: questions about survival. Marx and Engels emphasize that this is particularly true of language since “language is practical...” (GI 49, emphasis in original) Language first arises because of the need for individuals to communicate, have “intercourse,” relationships, with one another. This is the primary reason why language is fundamentally practical. It emerged in order to facilitate individuals in the production of the means of subsistence. What is important here is that language does not develop for me as individual qua individual, but instead as a way of relating me to other individuals. The need to have more complex relationships with others produces language. It is at this point that we can turn to matter of consciousness. For Marx and Engels, consciousness is always shaped by society, which itself is a deeply pragmatic claim. It can only be produced within the context of social relations. Though before showing why this falls out of what has been argued thus far, a bit is needed on what they mean by the term. First off, consciousness is never “pure.” Consciousness is utterly unlike the Cartesian cogito. Instead, “The ‘mind’ is from the outset afflicted with the curse of being ‘burdened’ with matter...” (GI 49) Whenever one is discussing the mind or consciousness, it always must be remembered that consciousness is embodied, grounded in the matter of the body. Marx and Engels take this point in the most logical direction in a sentence crossed-out in the manuscript, but that is of some importance: “My relation to my surroundings is my consciousness.” (GI 49n2) Unlike traditional accounts of consciousness, their conception is nothing located exclusively in the head of the individual. Instead, it is relation between the individual and his or her sensuous environment: things, animals, other individuals, in short, the world. It is clear in Marx and Engel’s discussions of consciousness that it is also developmental. Tribal consciousness is very close to the consciousness of
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animals, except that “with him consciousness takes the place of instinct or that his instinct is a conscious one.” (GI 50) The basics of what we will later recognize as self-consciousness begin to emerge here, but they are not very developed. For a robust self-awareness to develop a more complex mode of production is required, but that is getting ahead of the story. In order to fully understand why consciousness is social, we need to examine two moments in Marx and Engel’s argument. The first has to do with the interconnections between consciousness and language. They note: “Language is as old as consciousness” (GI 49) While not reading this statement as prefiguring 20th century work on language and mind, there is a strong connection here between these two. Given the practicality of language and the embodiedness of consciousness, the two must be bound up together: each realizes the other. Language makes possible the cognizing of relations with the world, while these relations that constitute consciousness, especially with other individuals, produce language. Yet, given the thoroughly social character of language, this entails that consciousness is thoroughly social as well. Consciousness arises out of relations with other individuals and the rest of the world. Language is the tool individuals use to facilitate such relations. What is important to note here is that for as much as language and consciousness are reciprocally related, they are not the same, reducible to each other. Each plays a different role in the account of the individual that Marx and Engels formulate. The second moment comes once humanity begins to transition from the tribal to the ancient mode of production. Part of what drives this process is the further division of labor. The division of labor begins with “the division of labor in the sexual act.” (GI 50) From here, as the population grows, which is made possible in part by the expansion of the means of production and further drives those means, labor is further divided. These divisions will occur along the lines of physical ability (e.g., strength), accident, talent, need, accident, and so on. The decisive moment comes when material labor is separated from mental labor. This produces a profound schism among social relations, which Marx illuminates in a marginal note: “The first form of ideologists, priests, is coincident.” (GI, 50n3, emphasis in original) The image of the priest, with his or her power of the masses, illustrates just how distinctive this new sort of labor is and its presumed superiority. Marx and Engels go so far as to say that this separation of manual and mental labor is when “Division of labor only truly becomes such...” (GI 50) To put the point perhaps too strongly, it is with this separation that we see the beginnings of the sort of class conflict that concerns the Manifesto. The connection that Marx and Engels make between this chiefest of divisions of labor and consciousness is quite fascinating. The separation of mental labor from material allows consciousness to misunderstand itself. “From this moment onwards consciousness can flatter itself that it is something other than consciousness of existence practice, that it really represents something
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without representing something real...” (GI 50, emphasis in original) Arising out of making mental labor something distinct from material labor, in the form of the priest and probably the emerging ruling class as well, consciousness is taken for something that it is not: outside the world. To use Marx and Engels’ language, consciousness assumes that it represents itself as distinct from the world. This is directly opposed to how they construe consciousness, as a relation between an individual and her or his surroundings. In the latter understanding of consciousness, if representation is even an applicable term, it represents something real: the relation between the active individual and the world. Through rigidly separating mental labor from material labor, consciousness becomes thought of as something else entirely, something religious, philosophical, metaphysical. We see two things here. First, the dominant discourses on consciousness or its correlates within the Western tradition have been based on a radical misunderstanding of consciousness and its connection to modes of production. Second, that consciousness is social, though from a different, yet related angle. How the relations that constitute consciousness are formed depend on the division of labor. Given that an individual’s world is “determined” by the existent mode of production, which structures the division of labor, any relation to the world will also be shaped by the mode of production, as well as language. At this point, it becomes clear how culture, better put: “cultural production,” is “determined” by the mode of production. Culture, both in the broad anthropological sense as well as in the more limited, “high cultural” sense, is the product of humans acting in the world through a particular mode of production. Culture reflects the activity of a particular sort of conscious individual, especially in the limited, “high cultural” sense. Particular ways of producing and reproducing the means of subsistence make possible certain sorts of consciousnesses. These different sorts of conscious beings, individuals, make their way through the world in various ways, which is dependent on their position within the division of labor. These differences will be manifested in the different sorts of cultural products created.6 Regardless, any cultural production will be “determined” by the mode of production, in the sense of “determined” in which a definite set of limited, though perhaps large, possibilities are established. The linchpin that makes this claim possible is the argument developed above that consciousness depends on the mode of production. Through this point, we find that all any cultural activity will be structured for similar reasons. What gives “high culture,” and at this point philosophy must be included here, the illusion of autonomy is a misunderstanding similar to the one discussed above with respect to consciousness. When the division is made between material and mental labor, conscious beings, at least of a particular class, believe that consciousness is something independent of the world of material relations; it is something “in itself.” The cultural productions of individuals whose being is
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based on this misunderstanding reflect this misunderstanding as well. As Marx and Engels put the matter: from now on consciousness is in a position to emancipate itself from the world and to proceed to the formation of “pure” theory, theology, philosophy, morality, etc.. But even if this theory, theology, philosophy, morality, etc., come into contradiction with the existing relations, this can only occur because existing social relations have come into contradiction with existing productive forces... (GI 50–51) First, the supposed abstraction of consciousness from the world allows these certain individuals to pursue their particular cultural activities as if they are “pure,” not dependent on the mode of production, hence objective or true. Yet, given the argument reconstructed above, this rests upon a mistake, that consciousness is “pure,” which is then recapitulated at the level of cultural production. This “pure” culture does not represent the true, but only the activity of particular individuals, usually who occupy an advantageous position within the division of labor. Second, the contradictions that sometimes arise between these productions and “existing relations” do not illustrate the production’s autonomy. Just the opposite: it reinforces that such cultural productions are always bound up with the mode of production. What such “dissonant cases” show is that the forces of production have changed, which leads social relations to come into contradiction with those forces. From this, we can now begin to build out towards the larger concerns about economics and society, especially as Marx and Engels describe them elsewhere. This is one reconstruction of Marx and Engels’ historical materialism. The starting point is the proposition that of living human individuals, which entails that these are human individuals living, acting, in the world. Humans transform the world in order to sustain themselves. Yet, such transformations also change the individuals involved. This is because of two interrelated points: (1) human individuals live within a society of other individuals and only come to be recognized as human individuals in the context of that society; and (2) all of this occurs within a mode of producing the materials for sustaining those individuals. As society changes, which occurs because of transformations in the mode of production, relations between members of the society change.7 As Marx and Engels make clear, new forms of consciousness are produced as the mode of production is transformed. The relationship between the individual and the mode of production, via the division of labor, “determine” the sort of consciousness the individual has. This is then reflected both in social relations and cultural productions.
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Why then is a pragmatist committed to something like historical materialism? The answer revolves around what one is committed to when one endorses acting-in-the-world. From Peirce on, pragmatism has largely focused on how the socially constituted individual navigates the world based upon consequences. The individual is wholly contained within and has very dynamic relations with the world, a world which one might describe as “precarious and stable.” The classical pragmatists like Peirce, James, Dewey, and Mead all took this concern in somewhat different directions. Yet, by the time Dewey writes Experience and Nature and The Quest for Certainty, he is exploring matters that cover much the same terrain as Marx and Engels in the passages discussed above; matters like: how early humanity engaged the world such that they could sustain themselves in it and what repercussions this had for society and culture.8 I have attempted to show that Marx and Engels and a pragmatist can, and largely do, begin from roughly the same starting point. What explains the apparent differences between them might be best called “a matter of structure and individuals.” Effectively, what Marx and Engels seek to describe is the structure through which individuals relate to one another, themselves and their environment. Their discussions of these structures are somewhat abstract in parts of The German Ideology under consideration here, but elsewhere in Part I of that work, and more so in The Manifesto and Capital, its then-contemporary form is articulated in grisly detail. Pragmatists have traditionally assumed a certain sort of structurality to human life, but have not dealt with such structure as thoroughly, made clear its rigorousness and oftentimes oppressiveness, as Marx and Engels. Marxists have emphasized, though not exclusively, matters of structure, while pragmatists have been concerned more with the individual, albeit an individual realized only through belonging to a community. Yet, based on my reconstruction of historical materialism, I hope to have shown that in fact the two concepts are bound up together and must both be addressed simultaneously. When this question of structurality is worked through “then Pragmatism assumes its proper stature as revolutionary step in Western philosophy.” (Sellars 1991, 340) If contemporary pragmatists wish to realize the full promise of their philosophy, such an engagement with this structure, especially the economic dimensions, is imperative. Without this, and without reflections upon the brutality of these structures, pragmatism cannot fulfill its promise. We can now return to Dewey’s discussion of economic life introduced at the start of this paper. There, Dewey notes the way in which the downplaying of economics results in a brutal separation of ends and means that is common to both industrial and post-industrial life. The value of historical materialism as articulated here is that it provides depth to Dewey’s reconstruction. No doubt, capitalism in its various forms relies on precisely this separation. What Marx
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and Engels bring to the fore is a demonstration of how this emerged early on within human development with the division of manual and intellectual labor. Taking the first premise of human history in conjunction with the whole of the Marxist tradition’s writing on labor and one discovers what might be called the “existential guts” that lies below many of Dewey’s dissections of the history of philosophy. In these writings, like the Manifesto and Capital up to present day Marxists, there are many vivid portraits of how the separation of means and ends and theory and practice plays out in the lives of people. Particularly when one digs into the early phases of the Industrial Revolution in Europe and America, as well as outside the Economic North in the present, we find that these lives are sometimes quite brutal. As discussed above, Dewey was aware of this, as were Peirce and James to different extents, yet what was lost in the classical pragmatists was a way of addressing the systematicity of this oppression, alienation and exploitation. Historical materialism as reconstructed here provides a way to do just this while remaining within the trajectory of pragmatism. This reconstruction, particularly taken in light of the discussion below, retains a space for human agency that is central to much of pragmatism, while also marking the rather serious limits to that agency. Giving all this, I imagine that some pragmatists will rightly raise a number of concerns. I will address two that strike me as particularly pressing. The first problem can be stated as: “You have argued above that the production and reproduction of the means of subsistence ‘determines’ consciousness, social, cultural life. There are several problems with such a claim like explaining the wide variety of socio-cultural forms and the reduction of human life to the economic. Yet, for a pragmatist, perhaps the most damning thing is the determinism implied in your claim. In any number of senses, the future is undetermined, yet your position seems to deny this.”9 No doubt this is a serious objection, one that is generated by Marx and Engels’ own pronouncements, especially in the Manifesto and in certain passages of The German Ideology, never mind Marx’s discussions of the “Laws of Capitalism” in Capital. There has also been a tendency among both defenders and opponents of Marxism to read Marx and Engels in this manner. Yet, this is not the only interpretation of historical materialism. Cornel West makes clear the “openness” of Marx, curiously contra Engels, and Raymond Williams has argued persuasively against more hard-line determinist interpretations of Marxism.10 Instead of directly exploring either Williams or West, I will focus on a set of letters written by Engels to Joseph Bloch in the 1890s where he clarified his and Marx’s position on historical materialism. Engels writes: According to the materialist conception of history, the ultimately determining element in history is the production and reproduction of real
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Clearly, Engels here is mainly making a negative point about what he and Marx never intended to mean. Yet, he begins to draw what will be a crucial distinction a few lines later. This distinction is between “determining elements” and “ultimately determining elements.” The “economic” element, that element concerned with the mode of production, plays a decisive role in history. But it is not the only factor in human history. Far from it, as Engels explains: The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure: political forms of the class struggle and its results, to wit: constitutions established by the victorious class after a successful battle, etc., juridical forms, and then even the reflexes of all these actual struggles in the brains of the participants, political, juridical, philosophical theories, religious views and their further development into systems of dogmas, also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggles and in many cases preponderate in determining their form. (Engels 1978, 760, emphasis in original) Engels makes it obvious here that the economic element does play the most important part in establishing the limits of human existence, but this is not to say that the economic is the only factor. The economic shapes the “superstructure,” yet the “superstructure” influences the form of struggle, which will impact the production of real life. Elements of the “superstructure” like political and juridical organizations, religion and philosophy, being in some sense the most ideologically accessible expressions of the mode of production, help to structure the shape of human struggles. At least on some occasions, the materials used to articulate such struggles are derived from these socio-culture formations.11 What Engels does not address here, though it is consistent with his argument, is that such struggles will feed back into the “base” because they are struggles over real life. These struggles might be fought at the level of “superstructure,” but they will reverberate at the “economic.” In this way, there is a feedback loop between the economic and the other elements of society.12 I shall now clarify my use of the word “determination.” Determination is not meant in the supposedly scientific sense of determination in which Y always follows from X like hitting together billiard balls. Instead, determination means the establishing of limits of possible actions and channeling of human actions through the limits. The economic element, along with others, establishes the space of human activities. In such a space, some practices are possible, while others are impossible. For instance, individuals cannot choose in advance what
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language they speak or the sociality that structures their consciousness. Yet, there is freedom to do many definite things with consciousness and language, even given the limits that have been set up. It is in this context we see the full impact of Engels’ claim that: “We make our own history ourselves, but, in the first place, under definite assumptions and conditions. Among these the economic ones are ultimately decisive.” (Engels 1978, 761) Humanity, either as individuals or collectives, produces history and produce history as the result of their activities. Yet, the history that humanity produces is constrained, that is to say determined, by the elements discussed above. And Engels is correct in pointing out that the economic is decisive, because the economic in this context means the production and reproduction of real life, how individuals make and remake the materiality that comprises the world. Given the centrality of this sort of production and reproduction to the lives of individuals, the economic will be “decisive” because they are basic to human existence. Despite the claim of a particular consciousness, i.e., bourgeois, that “superstructural” forms are more important, these material concerns are the basis of human existence. Their production and reproduction play the pivotal role in understanding the human condition. This is not to discount the “superstructure,” because there are multiple feedback loops between all these elements, but to say that if one wants to understand and take action about human struggles and history, one must look to the variety of ways in which the field of possible actions is determined. The next objection that might be raised against the position developed here is: “You talk at great length about action which is good, yet you seem to give not just priority but objective superiority to labor. You do not address play at all, give its creative its due, or even appear to have sufficient resources to do so. At best, what you have done is addressed the creativity of labor, but not the creativity of action in all its moments.” For a pragmatist, especially one schooled in the works of Dewey, this is not a trivial concern. Both work and play are central concepts throughout Dewey and many pragmatic philosophers of education. The case is not made easier with works like that of Teresa Ebert’s Ludic Feminism and After, whose argument against post-structuralist, particular feminist post-structuralist, uses of the concept of play can be brutally summarized: by foregrounding “play” these postmodernists reify the consciousness of a particular class of privileged scholars and make critique of the capitalist mode of production impossible. There is no need to address the subtleties of Ebert’s critique of post-structuralism now, except to note that she is not wrong in terms of the broad outline. In which case, the issue at hand is showing how it is that a pragmatist’s conception of work and play escapes the accusation of being painfully bourgeois.
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To adequately address this challenge would require a full-scale analysis of the creativity of action, which is beyond the scope of this paper.13 Instead, I will make two points that might give a way out of the apparent impasse. First, at least the Deweyian conception of “play” is not overtly political. It can, and perhaps should, be at certain moments, but this is not the primary meaning for Dewey. Play is a moment in action where the ends are not firmly fixed: an individual reconstructs the means at hand, but without a particular goal in mind.14 Play is a style of action that cannot be neatly cut off from other moments in action. This is opposed to certain “ludic” postmodernists like JeanFrancois Lyotard, Judith Butler, and Jacques Derrida who, according to Ebert, thoroughly politicize “play.” The Lyotard of The Postmodern Condition ends up with an understanding of the contemporary world in which resistance to domination can largely be accomplished through what he terms “parology,” an aimless use of language that does not conform to the logic of performativity.15 Such a sense of play can be called creative in a very broad sense, but I doubt in the sense that many pragmatists or Marxists will use. The point of this comparison is two-fold. First, for Dewey, play is a moment in action, but not the only moment, nor the most important depending on the context. Second, because of this, there is a space to consider both work/labor and play as important and creative, again hinging on the context. The pragmatic up-shot is that while in some situations, work does trump play, this is not always the case which one should be sensitive to. The second point amounts to a Marxist rejoinder to the first. The interpretation I have offered of historical materialism is consistent with this discussion of play, assuming one is properly cautious. Both work and play have roles in the production and reproduction of real life and should be understood as playing those roles. Yet, such agreement must be qualified based on my interpretation, mostly arising out of my discussion of the division of labor. After a certain age, play’s role in life tends to be either downplayed or carefully controlled. Those people who pursue labor based on play either turn it into a materially, class-based, privileged life, a position quite distinct from that of the proletariat, or run the risk of being the starving artist. This can be further seen in the role that play has in different sorts of labor. Factory work involves little play, or creativity in a standard sense, on the part of the laborer, a point that is not farremoved from Marx’s criticisms of alienation. On the other hand, many “whitecollar” laborers are occasionally required to engage in critical thinking, “thinking outside the box,” which is one species of “carefully controlled” play. In this way, Ebert is on to something when she claims that play, in certain senses, is bound up with class privilege. This is a point that pragmatists should be attentive to if they are not already. In conclusion, I have sought to show that the historical materialism of Marx and Engels is at least consonant with the trajectory of classical pragmatism. Furthermore, I hope to have demonstrated the necessity of pragmatists
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engaging with the Marxist tradition because such an engagement provides the pragmatist a ways of thinking about the structure of society in a manner that allows to the pragmatist to better understand the obstacles to the pragmatic conceptions of democracy. Historical materialism seeks to make plain the ways in which concrete practices, specifically economic practices, affect the rest of society, establishing constraints on ways of acting and living. While, if Marxism is correct, such determinations have always been the case throughout human history, its significance in the present under capitalism is vital to conceptualize. As mentioned above, the classic pragmatists were aware of the deleterious effects of industrial capitalism to human possibilities, but they appear to have lacked an adequate way to work through these difficulties. Clearly, there are potential pitfalls for pragmatists who elect to embrace historical materialism, though as I sought to argue above many of the philosophical concerns arise from overheated rhetoric on the part of Marxists. Given what I argued here, there is the space for a productive interchange between pragmatists and Marxists, one that at least pragmatists should learn a great deal from. For these reasons, the pragmatist should seriously consider being a historical materialist as well.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I thank Jim Garrison for his very helpful criticisms on an early draft of this paper.
NOTES 1. For example, the few discussions of Marxism in Human Nature and Conduct show that Dewey read Marxism as very a very rigid, mechanistic, doctrine. On the other hand, it is better in some respects than psychoanalysis. 2. See Horkheimer (2004, 28–38) for the core of his critique of pragmatism. There he notes that Dewey’s theory “is consistent, but abolishes philosophical thought while it still is philosophical thought.” (Horkheimer 2004, 33–34, emphasis in original) See also Larry Hickman’s brief but useful analysis of Horkheimer’s reading of Dewey (1992, 64–68; 200–201). 3. While not the most sophisticated way to illustrate the point, the numerous reader reviews of Freidman’s The World is Flat on websites like Amazon.com sound the recurring theme that Freidman helps to make sense of both the positive and negative effects of globalization for people living in the United States. 4. Dewey makes this point clearly in his contributions to A Cyclopedia of Education, specifically the entry on “Organism and Environment” (Dewey 1978, 437– 438). 5. An issue that I will not address in this paper directly, but is worth noting, is the ways in which Marx and Engels deal the roles of women and men throughout The
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German Ideology. This passage foregrounds part of the trouble, since clearly men and women would have producing the means of subsistence. Such concerns will reappear when they begin to discuss the origins of division of labor. 6. For example, simply consider the differences between folk music in both Europe and America when compared to “classical music” (particularly that of the Baroque and Classical periods). In the interest of full disclosure, this discussion was written while listening to the works of Anton Webern. 7. The qualification regarding the mode of production is deliberately ambiguous. On the one hand, there are changes in the mode itself. On the other, there are social changes which reconstitute the mode and feedback into society. 8. With respect to Dewey, two clear examples of such discussions are the first two chapters of The Quest for Certainty, though these themes resonate throughout, and virtually every chapter in Experience and Nature. 9. On this pragmatic criticism, I am thinking most specifically of James’s discussions of pluralism and religion in Pragmatism. Dewey relies on a similar position, at least in the later works like The Quest for Certainty and Experience and Nature, though it is much more “existentially grounded” than James, particularly on the matter of meliorism. 10. See West (1991) and Williams (1977, 83–89; 1980, 31–49). Although I do not explicitly invoke Williams here, this analysis of determination owes much to his work. This discussion also echoes Foucault’s analytics of power and its affinities with pragmatism. For more on this, see Garnar (2006). 11. For one example of this, see the speech Marx gave in Amsterdam in 1872 where he addresses the possibility of non-violent revolution (Marx 1978b). 12. It is beyond the scope of this paper to address how best to describe these different elements of society (writing in terms of “base/superstructure,” “totality,” or perhaps something else). As Williams argues (1980, 31–40), there are risks associated with both of the traditional approaches which must be weighed. 13. The starting point for such an analysis must be Hans Joas (1996). 14. A classic example of a simple example of play in this sense is children doing things with blocks, Legos, or Play-Doh. Garrison (1997, 70–78) develops this sort of example in such a way that raises serious questions about ludic use of play by demonstrating how children deploy metaphysics and meanings even in this sort of event. 15. It should be noted that elsewhere Lyotard does develop a more robust ethical system, specifically in The Differend. While Ebert is also critical of this later work, it does escape some of the challenges leveled against The Postmodern Condition.
REFERENCES Derrida, Jacques. 1994. Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International, trans. Peggy Kamuf. New York: Routledge. Dewey, John. 1958. Experience and Nature. New York: Dover. Dewey, John. 1978. “Contributions to A Cyclopedia of Education: Volume 1 and 2,” in The Middle Works, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press), vol. 6, pp. 358–467.
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Dewey, John. 1979. “Contributions to A Cyclopedia of Education: Volume 3, 4, and 5,” in The Middle Works, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press), vol. 7, pp. 209–365. Dewey, John. 1988. The Quest for Certainty, The Later Works, vol. 4, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press). Dewey, John. 2002. Human Nature and Conduct. Mineola, N.Y.: Dover. Ebert, Teresa. 1996. Ludic Feminism and After: Postmodernism, Desire, and Labor in Late Capitalism. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Engels, Friedrich. 1978. “Letters on Historical Materialism” in The Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd edn, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: Norton), pp. 760-768. Garnar, Andrew. 2006. “Power, Action, Signs: Between Foucault and Peirce,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 42:347–366. Garrison, Jim. 1997. Dewey and Eros: Wisdom and Desire in the Art of Teaching. New York: Teachers College Press. Hickman, Larry. 1992. John Dewey’s Pragmatic Technology. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Horkheimer, Max. 1947. Eclipse of Reason. New York: Continuum. James, William. 1907. Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, repr. in Writings, 1902-1910, ed. Bruce Kuklick (New York: Library of America, 1987). Joas, Hans. 1996. The Creativity of Action, trans. J. Gaines and P. Keast. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Lyotard, Jean-François. 1979. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Lyotard, Jean-François. 1988. The Differend: Phrases in Dispute, trans. Georges Van Den Abbeel. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Marx, Karl. 1977. Capital: Volume One, trans. Ben Fowkes. New York: Vintage Books. Marx, Karl. 1978a. “Theses on Feuerbach” in The Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd edn, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: Norton), pp. 143–154. Marx, Karl. 1978b. “The Possibility of Non-Violent Revolution (The Amsterdam speech)” in The Marx-Engels Reader, Second Edition, 2nd edn, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: Norton), pp. 520–524.
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Marx, Karl. 1988. Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, trans. Martin Milligan. Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books. Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. 1998. The German Ideology. Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books. (Abbreviated: GI) Peirce, Charles Sanders. 1934. Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, in 6 volumes, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). (Abbreviated: CP:Volume.Paragraph) Sellars, Wilfrid. 1991. Science, Perception and Reality. Atascadero, Cal.: Ridgeview Publishing Company. West, Cornel. 1991. The Ethical Dimensions of Marxist Thought. New York: Monthly Review Press. West, Cornel. 1993. Keeping Faith: Philosophy and Race in America. New York: Routledge. Williams, Raymond. 1977. Marxism and Literature. New York: Oxford University Press. Williams, Raymond. 1980. Culture and Materialism. New York: Verso.
Andrew Wells Garnar Lecturer Department of Philosophy and Religion (0528) Clemson University Clemson, SC 29634 United States
Contemporary Pragmatism Vol. 6, No. 1 (June 2009), 87–129
Editions Rodopi © 2009
A Pragmatist Critique of Derridian Politics Tina Sikka
I draw on Security Council Resolution 1674 to demonstrate that the political assumptions Jacques Derrida holds in his politically-oriented texts are inconsistent with the assumptions of his linguistic texts, and that Jürgen Habermas’s political theory is consistent with the political implications of his approach to language. Habermasian pragmatism offers a critical theory of society and discourse of modernity that touches on the same themes of politics and meaning as Derrida and other deconstructionists, but is more coherent, consistent, and explanatorily persuasive.
In recent years there has been a rise in the amount of critical scholarship dedicated to unpacking the relationship between the late French philosopher Jacques Derrida and the German social theorist Jürgen Habermas. Although these two thinkers were born only a few years apart, their experiences of the world and the specific historical forces that shaped their intellectual upbringing could not be more different. Habermas was born and grew up in Germany and was 15 years old when WW II ended. Much of his work, it has been said, is a response to the devastation wrought by Nazism and the attendant need for Germany to found a new constitutional order. Derrida was a Sephardic Jew born in Algeria and educated in France. It has been argued that the trajectory of his work is shaped by the sense of being doubly displaced and, consequently, feeling estranged from both Algerian and French society. This lack of grounding is reflected in his philosophy which is shaped by an ongoing suspicion of “discourses of identity,” (Thomassen, 2006, 1). Perhaps as a partial result of these differences, the theoretical assumptions that underpin Habermas and Derrida’s manifold books and articles on the nature of language, meaning, subjectivity, and truth are equally contradictory. Despite these seemingly insurmountable differences I, as well as other contributors to this area of research such as Lasse Thomassen, Richard Rorty, Richard J. Bernstein, Simon Critchley, and Martin Morris, have come to believe that there are points of convergence and divergence between Habermas and Derrida worth unpacking – particularly in relation to their strikingly analogous
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approaches to international politics.1 As Lasse Thomassen argues, what merits further study of their approaches in relation to one another is [t]heir simultaneous differences and shared concerns. They are often taken as representatives of, respectively, modernity, postmodernism, universalism and particularism, and reason and the critique of reason. There are indeed important differences between them over the role of philosophy and reason. Nonetheless, they share in a critique of nationalism and xenophobia, and a concern for further European integration and the rule of law in international relations (Thomassen, 2006, 2). While I concur that the similarities between Derrida and Habermas’ political philosophies are striking, over the past few years I have turned my attention away from examining their similar political philosophies to unpacking the aporetic relationship that exists between Derrida’s early attempts to destabilize the conceptual grounds of metaphysical philosophy, and his later political texts which tend to embrace these very normative principles. My objective in this article is to concretely demonstrate this inconsistency. I first discerned the lack of entailment between Derrida’s linguistic and political work through my contemporaneous readings of Derrida and Habermas and the consequent development of a growing belief, on my part, that pragmatist philosophy in general, and Habermasian pragmatism in particular, offers a critical theory of society and discourse of modernity. This theory touches on the same themes as Derrida and other deconstructionists (i.e. politics and meaning), but does so in a manner that is coherent, consistent, and explanatorily persuasive. My objective here is not to belabor the theoretical intricacies of this argument but rather to demonstrate concretely that this is in fact the case. This article reveals the inconsistencies that exist between Derrida’s early and later work and shows that the opposite is the case with respect to Habermas’ early and later work. I employ a Habermasian pragmatist critique of Derrida’s deconstructionist philosophy from the perspective of entailment. The case study chosen for making this argument is a political text, Security Council Resolution 1674 on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). I subject this text to a double reading: first, through the precepts of Habermas’ linguistic work in order to unearth the political norms that result, which I then compare to the politico-moral framework he actually articulates in his later work; and second, through the assumptions of Derrida’s linguistic texts in order to show that the politics that result are not consistent with the political themes he expresses in his political texts.2 I chose this particular political text as the central case study because it makes claims to universality, justice, and human rights which fit well into Habermas and Derrida’s political theory but, when analyzed using Derrida’s linguistic philosophy, reveals itself as untenable.
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Before I begin this examination, I must address several possible points of contention, or even disagreement, that readers may have in relation to this rather novel and untested thesis. I discuss these potential arguments in the following several paragraphs. The first significant point of contention that may be raised in relation to this project is the choice of case study. It could be argued that Security Council Resolution 1674, which I use to redeem or validate my central claim that Derrida’s deconstructionist philosophy is inconsistent while Habermas’ pragmatist position is not, is problematic because it does not represent an authentic instance of free, open, and democratic discourse – despite the fact that it makes claims to all three. Put another way, it could be argued that this political text constitutes an instance of strategic action masking itself as communicative action. Although UN Security Council resolutions are often portrayed by the UN, the media, and individual governments as emerging out of a fair and impartial discussion modeled after Habermasian discourse ethics, it is often the case that the narrow national self-interests of states trump the norms of justice, equality, fairness, etc. Nevertheless, I still chose this particular case study because it represents a textually-based example of what can emerge out of insistent discourse and deliberation. Despite the fact that the principle of R2P was not adopted by the UN Security Council without strenuous discussion, and was often clouded by the interests of self-seeking actors, it was still adopted.3 Moreover, it is difficult, if not impossible, to find a political text that has developed out of an instance, or instances, of public argumentation that meet all of the criteria outlined in Habermas’ theory of communicative action and discourse ethics. Moreover, I firmly believe that the interlocutors that participated in the discourse over R2P still relied on the basic precepts of communicative action as an idealized form of discourse. Remember that for Habermas, ideal or idealized does not refer to ideal in the traditional sense (i.e. perfect). Rather, drawing on Weber, Habermas’ conception of the ideal is more analogous to that of an ideal type. Weber defines an ideal type as typological term that does not refer to the perfect actualization of a given phenomenon but, instead, emphasizes certain elements common to most cases of this phenomenon. For example, democracy, as a political system, is an ideal type that is realized in many different ways but which tends to have a multiparty system, fair and free elections, etc. In Between Fact and Norms Habermas makes this argument clear. He states that such idealizations ensure that certain procedures should be the “core structure in a separate, constitutionally organized political system, but not [serve] as a model for all social institutions” (Habermas, 1998, 305). Similarly, in communicative action actors tend to speak, debate, and question one another expecting or acting as if all of the criteria of public argumentation/discourse ethics have been or could be met (remember that these presuppositions include that no relevant argument is excluded, only the better argument can exert a persuasive force, no validity claim is exempt from argu-
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mentation, everyone is entitled to participate, etc). As such, I argue that Security Council Resolution 1674 is a perfectly acceptable textual medium through which to substantiate the argument(s) that Derrida’s political philosophy is not entailed by his approach to language and meaning, and the political implications of Habermas’ theory of language are consistent with the political philosophy he espouses. Another potential point of disagreement might occur over whether or not it is possible to pragmatically critique deconstructionist philosophy. That is, it has been argued that because Derrida’s philosophical framework is explicitly opposed to the values of consistency, entailment, and coherence, a pragmatic critique would violate its basic principles. There are two responses to the critique worth considering that not only justifies but necessitates a pragmatic critique of deconstruction. This first is simply that because Derrida is consistently supportive of oppositional readings and interpretations, he can hardly exclude a pragmatist reading of his work since to do so would violate the precepts of difference and dissemination. The second response is little more complex and involves an explanation of the performative contradiction. The performative contradiction is a term Habermas borrows from Karl-Otto Apel and refers to the lack of fit between the content and performance of a speech act. For example, Habermas argues that in uttering statements about truth, meaning, and the logos, even though he is critical of these precepts, Derrida takes up a communicative stance which, by corollary, unintentionally presupposes the existence of that which he seeks to transgress. The same argument can be made in relation to the skepticism some scholars might have about the ability to articulate a pragmatist critique of Derrida. By drawing on the performative contradiction, one could argue that Derrida, in critiquing the normative valuation of consistency, coherence, and entailment, actually presupposes that which he seeks to bring into question. Thus Derrida cannot “possibly avoid appealing to ... [what he means] to repudiate” (McCarthy, 1990, xv). This internal contradiction, therefore, opens the door for a pragmatist critique of deconstruction. A final possible contention that might emerge is over the implicit assumptions I make about philosophy and philosophizing. In questioning the limits of a pragmatist critique, from the perspective of entailment, one could argue that I make a set of epistemic value commitments that I have failed to discuss. Specifically, it could be argued that in critiquing deconstructionist philosophy as inconsistent, I have committed myself to and elevated the values of consistency, coherence, and entailment without an adequate inquiry into my choices. Such a misleading “category mistake” could thus be said to distort rather than persuasively critique the assumptions of Derridian deconstruction. However, as a self-identified pragmatist, my response to such lines questioning is, first, yes I do hold that the values of consistency and entailment carry universal normative significance, and second, no this epistemological commitment does not constitute a category mistake.
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I, like Clinton Golding and others, contend that if “no criterion-based judgments are made about some ideas being better than others, we may be swapping some opinions, but we aren’t doing philosophy” (Golding, 2007, 5). And as Kant himself argues, “Consistency is the supreme obligation of a philosophy and yet the most rarely found” (Kant, 1949, 217). Moreover, the capacity to problematize an opponent’s view through the lens of philosophical criticism requires that one examine their opponent’s perspective from several different positions. This might include, in addition to logical consistency, an examination of their system as a whole, a study of its sources, and an assessment of its consequences. To argue that deconstruction is immune from such a critique is to endow it with a kind of intellectual freedom that shields it from any accountability. Thus, turning to the substance of this article, I have chosen to draw on several of the strategies of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), as articulated by such theorists as Ruth Wodak, Norman Fairclough, and Teun A. van Dijk, which I use to subject the text of Security Council Resolution 1674 to a Habermasian linguistic perspective and followed by a Derridian one. Briefly, CDA is a qualitative methodology that proposes “a study of the relations between discourse, power, dominance, social inequality and the position of the discourse analyst in such social relationships” (van Dijk, 1993a, 249). Its purpose is to focus on the “role of discourse in the (re)production and challenge of dominance” (van Dijk, 1993a, 249).4 CDA’s normative approach, according to Norman Fairclough, requires that opaque relationships be examined – including those between: “(a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes” (Fairclough, 1993, 135). An example of CDA in practice is van Dijk’s (van Dijk, 1993b) examination of the debate surrounding ethnic affairs in Western parliaments which illustrates how political elites play a role in the reproduction of racism and racist discourse. van Dijk does this by locating and presenting those statements and assertions, taken from parliamentary records, that resonate and are consistent with negative assumptions and stereotypes about minority groups, which are most often based on nationalist rhetoric. Because CDA is oriented primarily to unearthing the ideological biases of texts through an examination of the relationship between discourse or language and culture, its use, for my particular purposes, requires that some adjustments be made to its objectives and basic methodology. In order to use CDA to examine R2P’s articles and principles through Habermas and Derrida’s theories of language, it must be adapted to identify the basic epistemological and ontological assumptions that Habermas and Derrida hold in their respective linguistic philosophies, and then to use those assumptions to study R2P and hypothesize what their response to its basic tenets might be. Following this, I compare these conclusions to the political philosophies Habermas and Derrida actually espouse and show that the political assumptions Derrida actually holds in his later work is not consistent with the assumptions he makes in his linguistic
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texts, and that Habermas’ political theory is consistent with the political implications extrapolated from his approach to language. I contend that the concepts, theories, and suppositions which accurately encompass Habermas’ primary assumptions include: discourse, consensus, understanding, intersubjectivity, communication, justification, modernity, Enlightenment, argumentation, reason, post-traditionality, and postmetaphysicality. Conversely, Derrida’s approach to language can be characterized by the following terms and infrastructures: deconstruction, différance, displacement, dissemination, non-presence or absence, complexity, metaphysics, logocentrism, misunderstanding, miscommunication, and grammatology. With these primary assumptions in mind, I now examine the articles of R2P using both Habermas and Derrida’s philosophies of language. 1. Habermas and the Responsibility to Protect In the following sections I draw on eight central principles and stipulations of R2P and subject them to a reading through Habermas’ approach to language in order to affirm my argument that his political philosophy is directly entailed by his theory of language and meaning and, consequently, that his pragmatism is superior to Derrida’s deconstructive approach. To this end, I not only describe what I believe Habermas’ response to these articles might be, were his linguistic theory to stand alone, but I also discuss what his political philosophy does say and, as such, hold both perspectives up to one another to illustrate his consistency concretely. The same mode of analysis is performed vis à vis Derrida further on. 1: Article 2 Emphasizes the importance of preventing armed conflict and its recurrence, and stresses in this context the need for a comprehensive approach through promoting economic growth, poverty eradication, sustainable development, national reconciliation, good governance, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for, and protection of, human rights, and in this regard, urges the cooperation of Member States and underlines the importance of a coherent, comprehensive and coordinated approach by the principal organs of the United Nations, cooperating with one another and within their respective mandates; The basic political assumptions of this particular article, much like the ones that follow, are ontologically coherent with Habermas’ approach to language and politics. In particular, this article’s emphasis on cooperation and respect for the Other are suppositions that he focuses on heavily in his linguistic and political work. For instance, in Habermas’ texts on language, cooperation between individuals (or Member States as this article stipulates) is argued to occur intersubjectively. He argues that the intersubjective relation, which presupposes
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a “structure of mutual recognition” (Habermas, 2003, 191), is constituted by the relation “that speaking and acting subjects take up when they come to an understanding with one another about something” by using the medium of natural language to “draw upon culturally transmitted interpretations, and relate simultaneously to something in the one objective world, something in their common social world, and something in each’s own subjective world” (Habermas, 1981, 392). This particular interpretation of cooperation by Habermas, which arises several more times in this resolution, is also in harmony with his political theory in which he again emphasizes that intersubjectivity is the primary relation between citizens. In Between Fact and Norms, Habermas states that intersubjectivity is the “process of reaching understanding that takes place through democratic procedures or in the communicative network of public spheres” (Habermas, 1998b, 299). He argues that this process of reaching understanding must occur with other social actors since it is only with Others that a procedural and deliberative democratic system can be strengthened. The latter assumption, respect for the Other, is consistent with Habermas’ adaptation of Mead’s theory of the ‘generalized other’ which, in his linguistic work, is constituted by a contextualized and performative familiarity of “being with the other”... [and] by a “close and symmetric interpersonal relation, where each reaches an awareness of himself [or herself] by being with, in, and for the other” (Habermas, 2003, 192). Similarly, in the context of law, democracy, and rights, Habermas applies this ethos of the “generalized other” to argue that the ability to recognize the Other as a subject who has certain rights and duties is what generates the capacity to recognize one’s own possession of said rights and duties (since the Other also recognizes them in you). Habermas maintains that the “elements of the legal order ... presuppose collaboration among subjects who recognize one another, in their reciprocally related rights and duties, as free and equal citizens” (Habermas, 1998b, 88). This consistency on the subjects of intersubjectivity and the generalized Other, as I have stated, is indicative of the coherence between Habermas’ early linguistic and later political work. 2: Article 7 Reaffirms that ending impunity is essential if a society in conflict or recovering from conflict is to come to terms with past abuses committed against civilians affected by armed conflict and to prevent future such abuses, draws attention to the full range of justice and reconciliation mechanisms to be considered, including national, international and “mixed” criminal courts and tribunals and truth and reconciliation commissions, and notes that such mechanisms can promote not only individual responsibility for serious crimes, but also peace, truth, reconciliation and the rights of the victims;
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This article, if read through Habermas’ linguistic philosophy, looks favorably upon its privileging of truth and reconciliation as well as the stipulation that the full range of mechanisms to achieve justice must be considered. Remember that truth, for Habermas, is approached postmetaphysically and is considered to be discursively achieved, universal, and counterfactual (or conditional). As such, truth, or what is accepted as true, can only be adjusted through a process whereby lifeworld certainties that have been problematized are subsequently thematized and subjected to rational discussion and debate. Habermas argues that truth is established only through the knowledge and acceptance of truth conditions that rationally justify why a truth claim should be accepted as true. This process of justification establishes an “internal relation between a proposition’s truth conditions and the kinds of reasons that might justify a corresponding truth claim” (Habermas, 2003, 71). Moreover, Habermas claims that “Argumentation remains the only available medium of ascertaining truth since truth claims that have been problematized cannot be tested in any other way” (Habermas, 2003, 38). It should be noted, however, that Habermas also argues that moral claims are truth-analogous given that their rightness is established analogously through procedures of rational argumentation – yet he also states that, in relation to moral claims, a connection to reality is unnecessary. This means that “the meaning of “rightness” consists entirely in ideal warranted acceptability” (Habermas, 2003, 248) achieved procedurally. Moreover, moral claims, because they lack a justification-transcendent relation to the objective world, are “replaced by the regulative idea of the mutual inclusion of the other in an inclusive – and to that extent universal – world of well-ordered interpersonal relationships” (Habermas, 2003, 248). Similarly, in this article of R2P, truth is defined procedurally and is discussed in the context of commissions oriented to revealing the ‘truths’ (inclusive of moral truths) of the victims of conflict and, by inference, emphasizes reaching accord, agreement, and reconciliation through rational discourse, in which the opinions, views, and stories of the Other are respected. It is significant that this process of reconciliation is also approached procedurally as it is consistent with Habermas’ method. That is, Habermas also emphasizes that consensus and agreement, and therefore reconciliation, can only be achieved through the use of universal procedures and the following idealizing presuppositions: (1) support of public debate and the complete inclusion of all those affected; (2) the equal distribution of the right to participate; (3) a nonviolent context in which only the unforced force of the better argument holds sway; and (4) an assurance of the sincerity of all who express themselves (Habermas, 2003, 37). In the realm of political theory, Habermas’ approach to truth undergoes little, if any, substantive alteration. In The Inclusion of the Other, he reiterates that truth must be thought of as both pragmatic and fallible: “when we assert ‘p’ and thereby claim truth for ‘p’ we accept the obligation to defend ‘p’ in
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argumentation [in accordance with the procedures of argumentation] – in full awareness of its fallibility – against all future objections” (Habermas, 2001, 37). However, it should be noted that this particular conception of truth, which extends into Habermas’ political theory, is somewhat different from how he approaches truth in his early work on ideology, knowledge, and interests. For example, Habermas, in Truth and Justification, acknowledges that in his early work he had claimed that truth was indistinguishable from ideal assertibility which, in turn, had left him open to the charge that assertibility, under ‘ideal’ conditions, is insufficiently fallible and that, consequently, the regulative ideals that arise out of truth conceived of in this way cannot be approximated. Thus, Habermas argues that These objections have prompted me to revise the discursive conception of rational acceptability by relating it to a pragmatically conceived, nonepistemic concept of truth but without thereby assimilating “truth” to “ideal assertibility” (Habermas, 2003, 38). This change, however, does not radically alter Habermas’ basic assumptions about the role of discourse and the importance of the intersubjective relation to truth. Both interpretations of truth are cognizant of and respect the role justification plays in the truth predicate but have divergent ideas about how strong the idealizations of argumentation are (that is, a non-epistemic theory of truth orients itself to achieving a kind of truth that is capable of being “justified in every context” (Habermas, 2001, 37)). In relation to this article’s principle that all mechanisms to achieve justice and reconciliation must be considered, what is significant, in the context of Habermas’ theoretical framework (in both his early and later texts), is that he explicitly and consistently defends the belief that communication between individuals is by nature oriented to the achievement of reconciliation, agreement, and consensus against any and all objections. Habermas maintains that this orientation is both a function of language itself and an attitudinal characteristic of participants in communication: Reaching understanding is the inherent telos of human language ... the concepts of speaking and reaching understanding reciprocally interpret one another. For this reason, we can analyze the formal-pragmatic features of this attitude oriented toward reaching understanding in connection with the model of the attitude of participants in communication, one of whom – in the simplest case – carries out a speech act, to which the other takes a “yes” or “no” position. (Habermas, 1998a, 120–121). Similarly, in his texts on politics using the same basic framework, Habermas states that in order for an authentic and postnational democratic ethos to take hold, what is required is the universalization of the tenet that communication
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between individuals is invariably oriented to coordination and understanding in the distinct sense of communicative action. Thus, he states that only through the “inclusive procedure of will-formation marked by discussion and publicity” (Habermas 2006, 122), can the cosmopolitan condition be realized. He does not, however, explicitly discuss the concept or issue of justice, as a political term, until his later work on postnational politics, law, and democracy. Habermas, in these latter texts, defines justice as the process or procedure whereby one is able to justify legitimate legal norms in a rational manner. He states that justice is intimately connected to democracy wherein democratic genesis, rather than a priori principles, is what provides a statute with its just-ness. That is, “the justice of law is guaranteed by the particular procedure by which it comes about” (Habermas, 2006, 189). This procedure, again (and consistent with his linguistic philosophy), consists of intersubjective and discursive communicative action in which all are able to participate and raise issues and questions in a fair environment. Overall, it is clear that Habermas’ epistemological and ontological assumptions, specifically in relation to the subjects of truth, reconciliation, and justice, are, one, consistent with the assumptions of this particular article, and, two, applies to both his linguistic and political texts. 3: Article 8 Emphasizes in this context the responsibility of States to comply with their relevant obligations to end impunity and to prosecute those responsible for war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and serious violations of international humanitarian law, while recognizing, for States in or recovering from armed conflict, the need to restore or build independent national judicial systems and institutions; In regards to Habermas’ approach to language and meaning, what stands out in this particular article are the terms compliance, obligation, violations of law, and the need for independent judicial institutions. In this section, I focus on the need to comply with legal obligations and to support the autonomy of judicial institutions. The requirement that states must comply with their obligations (under national law) and prosecute those who violate humanitarian norms is consistent with the linguistic philosophy Habermas articulates in his early work as well as the approach to the political he takes in his later texts. Although he does not explicitly discuss compliance with law in his texts on language and meaning, he does emphasize the need for individuals to abide by the norms that cons