James S. Fish kin
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James S. Fish kin
Yale
University
Press New
Haven
and
London
loittenfs •
l l l l I l t l l l l t R B R S I I B f l a i i a i l l l l i a i l l M I I
Copyright © 1992 by Yale University. All rights reserved. This book may not
List of i l l u s t r a t i o n s v i i
be reproduced, in whole or in part, including illustrations, in any form (beyond
Acknowledgments
that copying permitted by Sections 107 and 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law and
ix
except by reviewers for the public press), without written permission from the publishers.
Part
Designed by Nancy Ovedovit/. and set in Sabon type by Tseng Information
H i e l i m i t s of Systematic Justice
One
Systems. Printed in the United States of America by BookCrafters, Chelsea, Michigan. Library of Congress Catalogmg-in-l'ublication Data Fishkin, James S.
1. 1
Introduction
1.2
The
P r o b l e m of Value
1.3
The
Problem of Value C o n t i n u e d : Future
Generations
The dialogue of justice : toward a seif-reflective society / James S. Fishkin. p.
cm.
includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN
0-300-05161-1
1. Justice. JC578.F56
2. Liberalism,
_L Social justice.
1992
3 2 0 ' . 0 U 1 — dc20
5
9
L4
S t r u c t u r e : Problems of Progress
1.5
Assignment: C o n f l i c t i n g Visions of Equal
1.6
D e m o c r a c y and Progress
Opportunity
I . Title.
1
19
29 35
92-15494 <;ii>
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. The
Part
Two
S t r a t e g i e s of Reconstruction
paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council on Library Resources.
2. I
C r i t e r i a for an Acceptable Theory
2.2
Beyond l n t u i t i o n i s m
2.3
Political T h o u g h t Experiments
45 50
41
2.4
Category i : The Quest for Consent
.53
2.5
Category 2: Realistic Hypotheticais
67
2.6
Category 3: I m p a r t i a l Decision Procedures
2.7
79
Hustrations
M o r e on Category 3: Preference, U t i l i t y , and the G o o d
101
Part Three The I d e a l of a Seif-Refletth/e Society
3.1
T o w a r d Reconstruction
3.2
T h e Legitimacy Problem
3.3
Legitimacy and O b l i g a t i o n
129
3.4
L i b e r t y of Poiiticai C u l t u r e
144
3.5
The Conditions of A c t i v i s t L i b e r t y
3.6
Representation Vouchers and Deliberative O p i n i o n Polls
3.7
197
Conclusion
Notes
205
Index
233
201
115 117
165
Tables
1.
The Pure Problem of Justice
21
2.
T h e T r i l e m m a of Equal O p p o r t u n i t y
33
Figures
1.
T h e Forms of Democracy
37
2.
Decision Procedures
51
3.
O p t i o n s i n Category I
54
4.
N o z i e k ' s Scenario
75
5.
O p t i o n s for H y p o t h e t i c a l - C h o i c e Theories
83
6.
M a x i m i n w i t h a Guaranteed M i n i m u m
88
7.
U t i l i t a r i a n i s m w i t h a Guaranteed M i n i m u m
89
8.
E q u a l i t y w i t h a Guaranteed M i n i m u m
90
IIIIIIIIII
The beginnings of this book were supported by the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation d u r i n g a research leave I spent at the I n s t i t u t i o n for Social and Policy Studies at Yale U n i versity i n 1 9 8 4 - 8 5 , The book was revised and expanded as part of my research d u r i n g a year spent as a fellow at the Center for A d vanced Study i n the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford in .1987-88. 1 completed the book after my return to the University of Texas at A u s t i n w i t h support f r o m the Darrcll K. Royal Regents Chair in Ethics and A m e r i c a n Society. A l l of this assistance is gratefully acknowledged. I w o u l d especially like to thank the f o l l o w i n g people for their help over the p e r i o d 1 have w o r k e d on theories of justice: Bruce A c k e n n a n , R i c h a r d Arneson, Brian Barry, D a v i d Braybrooke, Robert D a h l , Bill Gaiston, Peter Lasiett, Sandy Levinson, Ed L i n d b l o m , Claus O f f e , D o u g Rae, G i o v a n n i Sartori, T o m Sermg, M i c h a e l W a l d , and Bernard W i l l i a m s . 1 w o u l d also like to thank T i m Terrell f o r organizing a three-day s y m p o s i u m about this b o o k at the Emory University L a w School O c t o b e r 23—25,1988. I am very grateful to all of the participants in that dialogue, w h i c h has greatly improved the final result. A r rangements are being made for the proceedings of the symposium to be published separately.
•art One •
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••aal
The Limits of Systematic Justice
LI
Introduction
As once-repressive regimes crumble around the globe, we see them a t t e m p t i n g to embrace liberal-democratic values. A t the same t i m e , Americans express e x t r a o r d i n a r y malaise w i t h their apparently t r i u m p h a n t political ideals. This unprecedented situa1
tion gives new urgency to the central question of contemporary political t h e o r y : Can we arrive at defensible and coherent ideals that o u g h t to guide liberal-democratic aspirations? T h i s simple question has been the focus of almost three decades o f intense w o r k in contemporary political theory. Yet this 2
e x t r a o r d i n a r y level of activity, concentrated on philosophies of the ideal or just society, has yielded inconclusive results at best. I propose, first, to offer a diagnosis of the difficulties afflicting the c o n t e m p o r a r y dialogue about the just society, and, second, to offer a proposal that avoids those difficulties, a proposal based ultimately o n the c l a i m that justice requires a certain k i n d of dialogue. We w i l l begin w i t h the dialogue about justice and move to the c l a i m that justice comes f r o m
dialogue i n w h a t i w i l l call
a "self-reflective society." The v i a b i l i t y of liberal democracy as a public philosophy has been held hostage by three false dilemmas. These overly con-
2
Sntradustion
The l i m i t s o f S y s t e m a t i c Justice
as:
to such systematic theories, I n the first t w o parts of this book 1 w i l l
and sys-
examine those impediments, arguing that theories w h i c h ignore
Leo Strauss and his popular
them fail to d o justice to the true complexity and controversiality
disciple A l l a n B l o o m w o u l d have us believe that w i t h o u t the certi-
of the subject. Part I w i l l focus on substantive impediments, part 2
tude of rationally undeniable " n a t u r a l r i g h t s , " we can have n o t h -
on m e t h o d o l o g i c a l ones.
stricted views of our possible options can be summarized absolutism tematic
versus relativism,
theory
versus
religion
intuitionistn.
versus amoralism,
ing but " r e l a t i v i s m , " where the m o r a l judgments central to West-
1
Pact 3 w i l l show h o w much can be done without
systematic
ern c i v i l i z a t i o n and democracy must be on the same f o o t i n g as
theorv. It w i l l offer a constructive argument for the first principles
those o f cultures w h i c h practice cannibalism. Others w o u l d have
of a defensible liberal society—an argument that, w i t h i n a more
us believe that unless religion is b r o u g h t back explicitly into our
l i m i t e d d o m a i n , avoids all of the difficulties discussed i n parts 1
public spaces, we w i l l have "a naked public square" in w h i c h out-
and 2.
1
society can profess to believe i n n o t h i n g at all.* A n d w i t h i n the
W h a t do 1 mean by a systematic theory? First, one that gives
camp of liberalism itself, those w h o w o u l d reconstruct a public
us a coherent picture of an ideal in clear focus, an ideal defined
1
philosophy aspire to systematic solutions, believing that a n y t h i n g less complete and determinate w o u l d amount to an " i n t u i t i o n t s m " where, i n effect, we each appeal to our personal tastes. W h e n the new versions of liberalism fall short of such grand expectations, they w r o n g l y appear to amount to n o t h i n g at a l l .
by full realization of one or more first principles that hold out exception,
Rawls calls the " p r i o r i t y defines moral
with-
one or more first principles that solve w h a t John progress
problem."
6
Second, a systematic theory
for us because we can measure h o w just
a society we have by h o w close we are to the ideal. Even if we
This b o o k w i l l chart a t h i r d way, to free the hostage f r o m these
could never fully actualize such an ideal, our progress should be
false dilemmas. It proposes foundations for liberalism that f a l l
measured, asymptotically, by h o w closely we approach i t . T h i r d ,
i n t o neither absolutism nor relativism, that are based on neither
a systematic theory should provide solutions that h o l d as a mat-
religion nor a m o r a l i s m , and that amount, in the end, to something
ter of general theory regardless of social context. They should
less than systematic theory and to something more than i n t u i t i o n -
offer the same prescriptions regardless of the d i f f e r i n g beliefs or
ism. This t h i r d way, the ideal of a self-reflective society, combines
practices i n d i v i d u a l s or groups may b r i n g to the issue of justice.
the o b j e c t i v i t y of morals asserted by the absolutists w i t h the sen-
They s h o u l d , i n other w o r d s , be context-independent
sitivity to social context asserted by the relativists; it combines
context-dependent.
the value of neutrality on religion asserted by the secularists w i t h
ditions such as resources and technology (and the lack of outside
the value of having values i n public spaces asserted by the new
interference), the principles of justice offered by systematic theo-
religious r i g h t ; and i t combines the sensitivity to social justice as-
ries do not vary in their basic substantive implications f r o m one
serted by the reconstructors of liberalism w i t h the awareness o f
society to another. In particular, they do not vary w i t h the be-
the c o n t r o v e r s i a l l y and incompleteness of those solutions asserted by i n f l a t i o n i s t s .
rather than
Given the availability of certain objective con-
liefs and practices accepted by the people w h o live in the societies being evaluated.
Let us begin w i t h the debate inside liberalism itself. Over the
I w i l l argue that there are crucial impediments, both substan-
last t w o decades, those a t t e m p t i n g to reconstruct liberalism have
tive and m e t h o d o l o g i c a l , to this k i n d of systematic theory, and
aspired to present us w i t h a systematic
theory of the first p r i n -
that the most plausible model for understanding the true com-
ciples of the just society. However, there are serious impediments
plexity of p o l i t i c a l m o r a l i t y is not the systematic liberalism gen-
4
U t e l i m i t s of S y s t e m a t i c Justice
The P r o b l e m o f V a l u e
erally aspired to, but a different model that I w i l l call " l i m i t e d
o f f e r i n g definite conclusions—prescriptions
l i b e r a l i s m . " O n this construction, three main points should be
specific guidance than w o u l d sheer i n t u i t i o n i s m .
made about the status of liberal political philosophy. First, we
S
that give far more
Briefly, I w i l l propose a solution to the p r o b l e m of p o l i t i c a l
have c o m p e t i n g first principles, "['here are fundamental moral con-
legitimacy by arguing that a self-reflective society produces o b l i -
flicts a m o n g competing ultimate principles even under the best
gations on the p a r t of all its members, instead of basing o b l i g a t i o n
conditions to w h i c h we m i g h t realistically aspire. I n other w o r d s ,
on legitimacy, I w i l l propose that we base legitimacy on obliga-
the pieces of our ideal solution d o n ' t neatly fit together even under
t i o n . T h e resulting n o t i o n of political legitimacy purports to solve
the best conditions we m i g h t realistically imagine. We have c o m -
the core issues c o n f r o n t i n g the liberal state w i t h o u t the neces-
peting "ideals w i t h o u t an i d e a l " rather than a solution to the
sity for a systematic
p r i o r i t y p r o b l e m that resolves all conflict among first principles.
social justice. W i t h i n a more limited d o m a i n , this strategy sup-
Second, we have fundamental moral conflicts in our identification
ports first principles f o r an ideal theory of the liberal state. Instead
of m o r a l progress. U is possible, in other w o r d s , for each preferred
of a systematic theory of justice, it offers a more limited theory of
state of affairs to be more just than the last but for us to end up in a
legitimate p o l i t i c a l institutions. Instead of one overall judgment
cycle where we started, v i o l a t i n g transitivity (or acyclicity). T h i r d ,
of social justice, it decomposes justice i n t o many morally appro-
instead of systematic solutions that are context-independent,
theory resolving all the substantive issues of
we
priate decisions by many people i n distinct roles in the requisite
have l i m i t e d solutions that are context-dependent. By this 1 mean
legitimate p o l i t i c a l institutions. Its distinctive prescriptions w i l l
that w h a t is m o r a l l y appropriate may vary significantly, depending
focus, not on the substance of social justice, but on the conditions
on the social practices that are widely accepted in a given society.
w h i c h must be satisfied by the institutions that must make the
W i t h i n l i m i t e d liberalism, we w i l l not aspire to resolve a l l
decisions, i n that way, my proposal w i l l avoid the full force of the
m o r a l conflicts. We w i l l not presume to settle the p r i o r i t y p r o b -
conundrums of systematic justice to w h i c h we n o w t u r n .
lem a m o n g c o m p e t i n g substantive principles. Indeterminacies and fundamental tensions a m o n g first principles are inevitable. To pre-
1.2 The Problem
sume otherwise is not to d o justice to the true c o m p l e x i t y of p o l i t i c a l m o r a l i t y . But then h o w are trade-offs among c o m p e t i n g principles to be arrived at? Can we get definite results w h e n p r i n ciples conflict and w h e n theory does not seem to define systematicpriorities? Part 3 w i l l propose a strategy that embraces these complexities, w h i l e at the same time o f f e r i n g a basis for definite prescriptions. Since Rawls, the crucial options for liberal theory have seemed to b o i l d o w n to either systematic theory or " i n t u i t t o n i s m . " I n t u i t i o n ism has been treated, essentially, as the absence of a systematic t h e o r y — a tack that seems to leave us all to trade off conflicts
of
Value
D i s t r i b u t i v e justice can be thought of as a c o n j u n c t i o n of three separate issues: (a) T h e p r o b l e m of value, or what is being d i s t r i b u t e d (b) T h e p r o b l e m of structure,
or how
that value is d i s t r i b -
u t e d — t h a t is, its shape, impersonally considered (c) T h e p r o b l e m of assignment,
or to whom
positions i n the
structure are granted, or how those positions are rationed o r given out These three issues, together, define justice within
a given soci-
a m o n g principles as we see fit. I n part 3, we w i l l see that there are
ety. I n a d d i t i o n , there are, of course, issues about justice or injus-
other o p t i o n s . It is possible to abandon systematic theory w h i l e
tice i n the relations among societies. However, we shall see that
fbs
The fmhhm
l i m i t s ef Systematic Assise
©S ¥ s b e
7
the task is d a u n t i n g enough, w i t h o u t the further complexities o f
if we depart systematically f r o m actual preferences, we face an
international relations.
alternative source of difficulty that is equally d a u n t i n g .
My
1
focus in part t w i l l be on the true complexities of the
Beginning w i t h theories that rely o n preference
satisfaction,
substantive issues posed by the three problems. Part 2 w i l l t u r n
we can dramatize the problem by considering some e m p i r i c a l
to the variety of possible decision procedures for resolving these
w o r k of F.. i„ T h o r n d i k e , a psychologist w h o used dollars as place
substantive issues, i n the end, I w i l l argue for a particular cate-
holders for u t i l i t y in studies of C o l u m b i a University students in
g o r y of decision procedure that can deal w i t h these substantive
the 1930s. T h o r n d i k e tells us that for the sums of money specified,
issues to the degree necessary for l i m i t e d liberalism. T h i s decision
the C o l u m b i a students w o u l d — o n average—agree to:
procedure w i l l contrast sharply w i t h the hypothetical thought experiments that have f o r m e d the basis for all recent attempts at systematic liberal theory. W h i l e the substantive and m e t h o d o l o g i cal impediments to systematic theory are indeed very great, m y theme i n part 3 w i l l be that a version of unsystematic theory can be developed that satisfies criteria for an acceptable theory that [ w i l l propose. By the problem
of value, I mean the problem of defining w h a t
we are d i s t r i b u t i n g . Is it money, utility, or w h a t Rawis calls p r i mary goods? Is it prestige or self-esteem? Is it w h a t Bruce Ackerman
calls m a n n a ?
2
For there to be an issue about the structure
Have one upper f r o n t t o o t h
S 5,0 00
pulled out Have one little finger of one
$75,000
hand cut off Eat a dead beetle one inch long
$5,000 $10,000
C h o k e a stray cat to death ( w i t h bare hands) Have to live all the rest of your
$1,000,000
life on a farm in Kansas, ten miles f r o m any t o w n
of d i s t r i b u t i o n , there has to be something that is being d i s t r i b -
These d o l l a r amounts were offered as the students' o w n precise
u t e d — s o m e t h i n g whose d i s t r i b u t i o n has a m o r a l l y relevant effect
assessments of their interests at stake in these possible events.' The i m p l i c a t i o n is that if one of the C o l u m b i a students were stranded
on human interests. In other w o r d s , to resolve the problem of value, we must have
on a f a r m i n Kansas for the rest of his life, i t w o u l d amount to
a t h e o r y for assessing human interests. I w i l l pursue these issues
a d e p r i v a t i o n equivalent to the mental suffering his peers w o u l d
in greater detail i n sections 2.6 and 2.7, but it is w o r t h paus-
experience if they had to eat t w o hundred dead beetles, each an
ing here to identify the basic issues. I w i l l treat the p r o b l e m of
inch l o n g . As i n the later development of cost-benefit
value i n terms of t w o dilemmas, one that arises immediately and
dollars are treated as place holders for utility.' Such conclusions
another that arises w h e n time is considered. W e ' l l t u r n to the
seem s t a r t l i n g t o us today because they are entirely innocent of the
second d i l e m m a i n the next section.
difficulties t h a t apply to interpersonal comparisons of the inten-
T h e immediate difficulty in assessing human interests is that If we use ivant-regarding
c r i t e r i a — t h a t is, if we rely o n criteria
that identify interests w i t h satisfaction of at least some actual
analysts,
1
sity of preference satisfaction, difficulties emphasized by Pareto, Lionel R o b b i n s , and others.' O n the other hand, if we use criteria for evaluating interests
preferences—we face various w e l l - k n o w n difficulties about inter-
that are not w a n t - r e g a r d i n g , we can interpret a change as serving
personal comparisons of want satisfaction.
someone's interests even if none of that person's o w n preferences
1
O n the other h a n d .
F u t a r e ©erse restions
The L i m i t s of S y s t e m a t i c Justice
9
agree w i t h the assessment. Such criteria face a different f u n d a -
orities of the liberal state. The institutions that have l e g i t i m a c y —
mental challenge. They must justify paternalistic inferences that,
in w h a t I w i l l cal! a self-reflective political c u l t u r e — w i l l specify
somehow, the theorist is a better judge of person X s
interests
procedures more determinate than sheer i n t u i t i o n i s m for dealing
than X is. W h i l e we m i g h t all agree that paternalism may be justi-
w i t h the inevitable fundamental m o r a l conflicts. I n d o i n g so, they
fied in dealing w i t h children (and in some other isolated cases), to
w i l l wrestle, i n particular contexts, w i t h the d a u n t i n g problems of
b u i l d paternalism into a general answer to the p r o b l e m of value
value, structure, and assignment.
w o u l d be to treat an entire adult p o p u l a t i o n as if it were composed of c h i l d r e n — a s i f the theorist (or the state f o l l o w i n g such theories)
1.3 The Problem
c o u l d routinely judge their interests better than they could.*
Vuture
T h i s d i l e m m a appears to enmesh any substantively ambitious
of Value
Continued:
Generations
assessment of human interests in one intractable controversy or
The challenge for systematic justice becomes much more dif-
another. Later, we w i l l see that the real force of this dilemma de-
ficult once time is i n t r o d u c e d . O u r notions of i n d i v i d u a l human
pends u p o n considering interests in a context-independent man-
interests have not been refined to deal w i t h problems i n v o l v i n g
ner. It depends o n the expectation that we should be able to assess
possible future people. However difficult the p r o b l e m of value
the interests of any i n d i v i d u a l simply by k n o w i n g h o w she ranked
mav be w h e n applied to the interests of the l i v i n g , once the inter-
on an index of p r i m a r y goods, or on a utilitometer, or in her
ests of future generations are taken i n t o account, new sources o f
shares of manna. For this k i n d of systematic theory of justice,
intractable conflict emerge. If we consistently tie our conception
there is no need to k n o w the social practices for dealing w i t h
of interests to personal identity, we face one sort of c o n u n d r u m ;
these matters that are generally accepted in a particular society.
if we consistently untie our conception of interests f r o m personal
My
p o s i t i o n w i l t be that if those social practices satisfy certain
identity, we face another, l b give up either conception consistently
d e m a n d i n g conditions, then they are legitimate and, for purposes
w o u l d open us to bizarre and compelling counterexamples. But
of the relevant social choices by the relevant institutions, p r o v i d e
we cannot rely on both simultaneously w i t h o u t tolerating funda-
a basis for appropriate judgment.''
mental m o r a l conflict and fundamental p l u r a l i s m . A n d we cannot
O f course, there are also severe limitations to relying on w h a t
ignore this set of issues, because no defensible theory of justice
is generally believed. Some of the worst injustices in history have
can neglect the facts that people are b o r n and die and that our
been largely accepted in their respective societies, even by their
actions may have serious effects on the interests of those yet to
victims. "
be b o r n .
1
H o w e v e r , by specifying criteria for the development of shared
The t w o conceptions of interests at issue are radically incom-
understandings, we can distinguish forms of consensus that arc
mensurable; they do not fit together i n t o a coherent image of the
suspect f r o m those that have legitimacy. When victims of injus-
interests of possible future people.' Once more, we get a k i n d of
tice accept the ideologies that rationalize their positions, it w i l l
broken image rather than a unified vision in clear focus/
be obvious that the conditions under w h i c h they came to develop
We w o u l d o r d i n a r i l y assume that person X can be harmed if
those notions fall far short of our requirements. I w i l l propose a
and o n l y if X is made worse off than X otherwise w o u l d have
context-dependent strategy that is sufficiently demanding about
been. For o r d i n a r y cases, this assumption w o r k s well enough, if
l i b e r t y of political culture that it plausibly clarifies the first p r i -
1 punch you in the nose, you are worse off a f t e r w a r d than be-
10
fufare Generations
The L i m i t s o f S y s t e m a t i c j u s t i c e
11
fore (your nose is bleeding); that is w h a t we mean w h e n we say
a large scale. Let us call this the laissez-faire
you were harmed. If, somehow, it could be s h o w n that your nose
simplify matters, we m i g h t imagine an alternative o p t i o n — l e t us
w o u l d spontaneously have begun to bleed at exactly that m o m e n t ,
call it restriction-—
regardless of whether you had been punched, most, if not a l l , of
over several generations. W i t h o u t specifying h o w this m i g h t be
the case for your having been harmed (by my punch) w o u l d evapo-
accomplished, let us imagine that our demographers and econo-
rate. Let us call this the identity-specific
mists tell us that great prosperity w o u l d likely be achieved after
notion
of harm:
X must
be made worse off than X otherwise w o u l d have been for X to have been h a r m e d .
policy o p t i o n . To
that w o u l d sharply curtail p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h
several generations of restriction. It is w o r t h n o t i n g that the p o p u l a t i o n that would
exist after
A l t h o u g h the identity-specific n o t i o n of h a r m is b o t h c o m m o n -
several generations of p o p u l a t i o n restriction is not merely a sub-
sensical and a central part of many legal notions (particularly i n
set of the p o p u l a t i o n that w o u l d exist after several generations of
t o r t law),' it is inadequate for the evaluation of the interests of
laissez-faire. I n fact, after several generations, the overlap q u i c k l y
5
possible future people.
fades to v i r t u a l l y n i l . Consider all the contingencies involved in
Consider t w o simple cases, one at the level of i n d i v i d u a l choice,
d e t e r m i n i n g the identity of a particular generation ( w h o marries
the other at the level of social choice. First, a w o m a n has a dis-
w h o m , the t i m i n g of c h i l d r e n , w h o m the c h i l d r e n marry, and so
ease or is under medication for a given p e r i o d such that, if she
on). M y i d e n t i t y or yours w o u l d be different if any of these fac-
were to conceive a child d u r i n g that p e r i o d , it w o u l d have seri-
tors had been different (so that I could no longer speak of " m y "
ous disabilities (perhaps, for instance, she has German measles
identity i n the same sense). I w i l l accept Thomas Schwartz's cal-
and the c h i l d w o u l d be deaf). Llowever, if she were to w a i t u n t i l
culations o n this issue and conclude that after several generations,
after that p e r i o d , she could reliably expect to conceive a n o r m a l
the overlap v i r t u a l l y disappears.
c h i l d . M a n y of us w o u l d say that she should w a i t in the interests
in the same p o s i t i o n t r y i n g to condemn the policy of laissez-faire
of the c h i l d . H o w e v e r , we cannot say so w i t h i n the confines o f
as we were in a t t e m p t i n g to condemn the decision of the w o m a n
6
If this is the case, then we are
the identity-specific n o t i o n of h a r m . The child w h o is b o r n w i t h
to conceive d u r i n g the risky p e r i o d (leading to a child w i t h seri-
serious disabilities is not worse off than it otherwise w o u l d have
ous disabilities). We cannot say of all those w h o w o u l d experience
been, because i f the mother had w a i t e d , it w o u l d not have
been;
suffering and mass misery due to o v e r p o p u l a t i o n that they are
another c h i l d w o u l d have been conceived instead, as differentiable
worse off than they otherwise w o u l d have been, because were it
f r o m the first as one sibling f r o m another. W i t h i n the confines of
not for the laissez-faire p o p u l a t i o n policy, they would
the identity-specific n o t i o n , the other child is not harmed by the
been,
m o t h e r ' s decision to conceive d u r i n g the risky p e r i o d . O r , if it is
people w o u l d have existed instead. Over several generations, the
h a r m e d , we cannot formulate the h a r m w i t h the identity-specific
results of the t w o p o p u l a t i o n policies—mass misery f r o m laissez-
conception.
faire versus prosperity f r o m r e s t r i c t i o n — w o u l d be visited upon
4
5
not
have
i f the other policy had been chosen, completely different
Consider this social choice parallel: Let us imagine a t h i r d
people w i t h entirely different identities. Hence, whatever benefits
w o r l d c o u n t r y facing massive p o p u l a t i o n problems. Suppose that
or harms may be involved cannot be conceptualized w i t h i n the
demographers and economists together establish that if n o t h i n g
confines of the identity-specific n o t i o n of h a r m .
is done about o v e r p o p u l a t i o n , after several generations the c o u n -
T h i s issue is not a mere philosopher's q u i r k , i t is w o r t h n o t i n g
try w i l l face disaster—mass misery, m a l n u t r i t i o n , starvation o n
that a f l o o d of l i t i g a t i o n has bedeviled the courts on exactly this
12
The l i m i t s o f S y s t e m a t i c Justice
Future G e n e r a t i o n s
13
p r o b l e m . M a n y " w r o n g f u l l i f e " lawsuits have been b r o u g h t o n
Rawlsian p r i m a r y goods or of some other metric for benefits and
behalf of children whose prenatal defects should have been d i a g -
harms that d i d not make essential reference to preference satisfac-
nosed by a doctor or a laboratory.' Typically, the contestants c l a i m
t i o n . We can call such theories, u t i l i t a r i a n i s m included,
that the fetus should have been a b o r t e d — i f the doctor or labora-
independent
t o r y had only been sufficiently competent to i n f o r m the prospec-
is the most p r o m i n e n t theorist w h o has argued for some v a r i -
tive parents ot the child's probable disability. The difficulty faced
ant of u t i l i t a r i a n i s m precisely on the grounds that it is identity-
by the courts has been very much the same as the one mentioned
independent, that it avoids the counterexamples to w h a t I have
here. T h e o r d i n a r y way to conceptualize damages w i t h i n t o r t l a w
been c a l l i n g the identity-specific view.''
identity-
theories (for the assessment of interests). Derek Par fit
is to imagine r e t u r n i n g the injured party to the position he w o u l d
The p r o b l e m w i t h identity-independent theories is replace-
have been in had the injury not occurred. But in this case, t h a t
ability. T h i s p o i n t can be made most dramatically w i t h a sci-
p o s i t i o n is nonexistence. Nonexistence is, of course, not the same
ence fiction scenario. Suppose that I could painlessly and instan-
as death. Never to have existed is very different f r o m having a life
taneously replace
that is interrupted.
wilt appreciate it more. Furthermore, as a general matter, the new
all the readers of this book w i t h others w h o
G i v e n some of the bizarre implications of the identity-specific
readers—let us call them replacements—-will get more out of life.
v i e w o f h a r m , one clear alternative takes on new attractiveness.
O n whatever identity-independent dimension of value we are talk-
Why
not compare states of affairs by l o o k i n g at the benefits and
harms disconnected
ing about, they w i l l achieve higher scores. To s i m p l i f y matters, if
f r o m any considerations having to do w i t h the
we assume that the dimension of value is u t i l i t a r i a n i s m , then the
identities of the individuals? One theory has, of course, been par-
point is that they w i l l add more utiles to life each day than d i d
t i c u l a r l y n o t e w o r t h y for d o i n g this: u t i l i t a r i a n i s m . Setting aside
their predecessors.
problems of interpersonal comparisons,
let us suppose that we
Note that I have not specified anything about how
this tran-
had a utilitometer, or that we could make at least rough inter-
sition takes place. Perhaps, as in the movie Invasion
personal comparisons of the intensity of preference satisfaction.^
Snatchers,
T h i s w o u l d p e r m i t us to compare the disutility experienced by the
on your appearances and incorporating your roles and memories.
of the
Body
it occurs t h r o u g h creatures f r o m outer space taking
seriously disabled c h i l d w i t h the u t i l i t y experienced by the nor-
Perhaps 1 have a machine that simply fabricates new copies. O r
ma! one, or to compare the disutility experienced by all those w h o
perhaps a new, m i n i a t u r e technology is contained w i t h i n the book
suffer f r o m mass misery due to overpopulation w i t h the u t i l i t y
you are reading, a technology that w i l l go into effect as soon as
of those w h o experience prosperity f r o m p o p u l a t i o n restriction.
you reach a certain page. I n any case, the reason for posing the
U t i l i t a r i a n i s m has the property that it permits us to look at any
issue in a science f i c t i o n scenario is that it clarifies the v u l n e r a b i l i t y
t w o states of affairs and compare the benefits and harms w i t h o u t
of identity-independent views to replaceability arguments w i t h o u t
having to k n o w anything about h o w the identities of the people
raising e m p i r i c a l complications about the fear and disutility ex-
in one state compare to the identities of the people i n the other. It
perienced by those w h o are eventually replaced. (For this reason,
is w o r t h n o t i n g that w h i l e u t i l i t a r i a n i s m is the most notable ex-
you w i l l have to consider my example hypothetical or assume that
ample of this property, it is not the only possible one. Suppose w e
you have already passed the crucial page.)
compared the t w o states in terms of an i m p a r t i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n o f
O f course, replaceability arguments are not l i m i t e d to science
14
f u t u r e geaeritHaras
The l i m i t s o f S y s t e m a t i c Justice
IS
f i c t i o n . Consider this dialogue about the collectivization of Soviet
d u c t i o n of the d e f o r m e d child or to the miseries of o v e r p o p u l a t i o n
agriculture f r o m A r t h u r Koestler's novel Darkness
w i t h o u t w o r r y i n g about whether the better-off people envisioned
at Noon
(Com-
under the alternative choice are the same people. But the same
missar ivanov is addressing the prisoner Rubashov): "Yes, we l i q u i d a t e d the parasitic part of the peasantry and let it d i e of s t a r v a t i o n , i t was a surgical o p e r a t i o n w h i c h had to be done once and
for a l l ; but i n the g o o d o l d days before the R e v o l u t i o n just as
m a n y d i e d in any d r y y e a r — o n l y senselessly and pointlessly. T h e v i c t i m s of the Y e l l o w River floods i n C h i n a amount sometimes to h u n -
anonymous consideration of interests leads these theories to neglect the question of whether the people under the replacement scenario are the same as the people in the o r i g i n a l p o p u l a t i o n . The general d i l e m m a is that if we tie interests consistently to personal identity, we face the identity-specific counterexamples, but
dreds o f thousands. N a t u r e is generous in her senseless e x p e r i m e n t s
if we untie them consistently f r o m persona! identity, we face the
o n m a n k i n d . W h y s h o u l d m a n k i n d not have the rights to e x p e r i m e n t
replaceability scenario.
on
It may be w o r t h pausing to consider t w o creative efforts to
itself?" H e paused: Rubashov d i d n o t answer. H e went o n : " H a v e you ever
avoid one h o r n or another of this d i l e m m a . The first, f o r m u l a t e d
read brochures of an a n d - v i v i s e c t i o n i s t society? They are s h a t t e r i n g
by Peter Singer, aspires to avoid replaceability. I w i l l argue that
and h e a r t b r e a k i n g ; w h e n one reads h o w some p o o r cur w h i c h has h a d
it does not. T h e second, formulated by Jonathan Bennet, seems
its liver cut o u t , whines a n d licks his t o r m e n t o r ' s hands, one is just as nauseated as y o u were t o n i g h t . But i f these people had their say, we w o u l d have n o serums against cholera, t y p h o i d , or d i p h t h e r i a . "
1 0
to avoid the identity-specific counterexamples, i w i l l argue that it does not. Singer distinguishes his "preference" u t i l i t a r i a n i s m f r o m the
The general p r o b l e m is that for any identity-independent con-
sensate classical version: " T h i s other version of u t i l i t a r i a n i s m
c e p t i o n of interests, so long as the abstract structure of d i s t r i b u -
judges actions, not by their tendency to m a x i m i z e pleasure or
t i o n , the payoffs to positions, is at least as g o o d under the re-
avoid p a i n , but by the extent to w h i c h they accord w i t h the
placement scenario, there are no grounds for objecting w i t h i n the
preferences of any beings affected by the action or its conse-
confines of this k i n d of theory. In fact, if we are utilitarians and the
quences." F r o m this property of preference u t i l i t a r i a n i s m , Singer
replacement scenario w o u l d increase utility, we can be obligated
concludes: " K i l l i n g a person w h o prefers to continue l i v i n g is
to k i l l everyone and replace them w i t h a new p o p u l a t i o n of better
therefore w r o n g , other things being equal. T h a t the v i c t i m s are
u t i l i t y - m a x i r n i z e r s . O n the identity-independent view, people are
not a r o u n d to lament the fact that their preferences have been
simply vessels for h o l d i n g so much u t i l i t y (or whatever else is o u r
disregarded is i r r e l e v a n t . " ' 1
m e t r i c of value), i t is the u t i l i t y that matters, not the vessels. If a
Singer's n o t i o n is that some beings, such as animals, fetuses,
vessel breaks, it has no importance p r o v i d e d another vessel can
and infants, experience u t i l i t y only i n the p r i m i t i v e sensate sense.
be f o u n d or be created that w i l l h o l d as much or more.
Singer believes that replaceability arguments still apply i n their
i t is the very m e r i t of the identity-independent principles i n
case, and he explores the implications of this fact for the eating
dealing w i t h the earlier counterexamples to the identity-specific
of meat and the permissibility of a b o r t i o n and even infanticide.
the assessment of interests
However, he believes that the applicability of u t i l i t y to more de-
f r o m the identities of the people a f f e c t e d — w h i c h renders t h e m
veloped c h i l d r e n and adults i n this second-higher sense of pref-
vulnerable to this repiaceabitity scenario. Because the interests are
erence u t i l i t a r i a n i s m w o u l d block replaceability scenarios f r o m
v i e w e d anonymously, such theories w i l l permit us to object to p r o -
being applied to such persons, i t is in this way that his d i s t i n c t i o n
view-—-namely, that they disconnect
16
The L i m i t s of S y s t e m a t i c Justice
Future Generations
17
between preference and sensate u t i l i t a r i a n i s m m i g h t be taken to
personal identities, i t avoids the counterexamples w i t h w h i c h we
get us out of our dilemma (when applied, at least, to older c h i l d r e n
started, but only by creating a vulnerability to replaceability argu-
and adults).
ments.
I believe that Singer's escape is illusory. Preference u t i l i t a r i -
Consider a second strategy for avoiding our d i l e m m a . It has
anism is, at b o t t o m , identity-independent and thus vulnerable to
sometimes been argued that we should only count the utilities of
some versions of the replaceability scenario. This becomes ap-
those w h o w o u l d exist were an action not taken. Bennett has de-
parent if one thinks carefully about w h a t the "other things being
veloped one variant of this approach: " T h e question o f whether
e q u a l " clause might mean in Singer's s o l u t i o n . Recall that i n o u r
action A is m o r a l l y o b l i g a t o r y depends only u p o n the utilities of
various scenarios, the replacements can also be imagined to have
people w h o w o u l d exist if A were not p e r f o r m e d . "
preferences i n a self-conscious and reflective sense. Satisfaction o f
posal helps w i t h the particular examples we directed against the
those preferences may easily t u r n out to balance the f r u s t r a t i o n o f
identity-specific view. For example, if the p o p u l a t i o n planner com-
the life plans of the previously existing p o p u l a t i o n .
u
T h i s pro-
pares the benefits of the restrictive policy w i t h the misery experi-
M o r e specifically, if we imagine, as Singer seems to, a special
enced by those persons w h o w o u l d exist were that alternative not
d i s u t i l i t y in an o n g o i n g life being interrupted (whether or not the
taken, then there is a clear case for the restrictive policy. Simi-
person is around to regret the i n t e r r u p t i o n ) , we m i g h t , s y m m e t r i -
larly, i f the prospective mother compares the benefits of having a
cally, imagine a special u t i l i t y experienced by each r e p l a c e m e n t —
n o r m a l c h i l d w i t h the disutility of the child w h o w o u l d exist if
for example, u t i l i t y f r o m the miracle of his or her being b r o u g h t
that alternative were not chosen, then there is a clear case for her
i n t o existence. The new person may well experience an "existence
waiting.
b o n u s " that counterbalances the disutility f r o m the previous per-
T h i s strategy does n o t , however, offer a genuine way out of
son's existence i n t e r r u p t i o n . A n y reader of Walt W h i t m a n ' s Song
our d i l e m m a . W h i l e i t handles our t w o particular examples, it is
w i l l have a v i v i d sense of such an existence bonus. There
still vulnerable to the same basic difficulty we encountered w i t h
of Myself
is no reason, in principle, why one of these must be greater t h a n
identity-specific positions: on these views, it cannot be counted as
another. The theoretical v u l n e r a b i l i t y to replaceability arguments
a harm that someone is created to endure a miserable existence.
remains.
Bennet's strategy is vulnerable whenever the others
who would
T h e v u l n e r a b i l i t y is built i n t o the foundations of u t i l i t a r i a n i s m .
exist anyway are benefited by the misery of the newly produced
It is unavoidably identity-independent because it is w h a t m i g h t be
person. For example, imagine a p o p u l a t i o n considering whether
called a purely structural p r i n c i p l e . It defines the sufficient c o n d i -
to breed a race of test-tube-produced slaves. The persons w h o
tions f o r a p p r o v i n g a change based entirely on i n f o r m a t i o n avail-
w o u l d exist were this policy not adopted are the present popula-
able f r o m a listing of payoffs to positions under one alternative as
t i o n . They w o u l d benefit overwhelmingly f r o m having a race of
compared to another. ' If the total (or average, for some versions)
slaves. T h e only ones w h o w o u l d suffer are precisely the ones w h o
is higher under one alternative, then i t must be chosen. There is
cannot be considered in this strategy—the ones w h o w o u l d not
no reason for u t i l i t a r i a n i s m (or any other purely structural p r i n -
exist were the policy not adopted. They are the ones harmed by
ciple) to be concerned w i t h the issue o f whether the identities o f
the policy, yet their misery could not be counted by this proposal.
1
the replacements are different f r o m the identities of the o r i g i n a l s .
The t w o horns of our dilemma are constructed out of partial
Because u t i l i t a r i a n i s m completely unties human interests f r o m
pictures of the interests of possible future people. Each of the
18
Structure
The L i m i t s o f S y s t e m a t i c Justice
19
approaches has something to he said for i t . But relying o n one
mode, we w o u l d be led to other bizarre results. O u r procreational
consistently to the exclusion of the other w o u l d lead to disastrous
liberties, i n the negative-liberty sense of unconstrained personal
or bizarre results.
choice, w o u l d be encroached upon by a host of new obligations examples
and restrictions. Suppose we were consistent classical utilitarians
are required to make the p o i n t : procreational liberty. Procrea-
and applied that position to the question of p r o d u c i n g or not p r o -
t i o n a l l i b e r t y defines a sphere of choice of undeniable i m p o r -
ducing a d d i t i o n a l c h i l d r e n . So long as the a d d i t i o n a l c h i l d w o u l d
tance where single-minded reliance on either identity-specific or
add (or was reasonably likely to add) more u t i l i t y than disutility
identity-independent notions of human interest w o u l d lead to
(including whatever utility/disutility was caused by the c h i l d but
bizarre and d i s t u r b i n g results.
was experienced by siblings, friends, and others), then w e w o u l d
Consider a more mundane area where no exotic
Identity-specific theories, if relied o n consistently, give procrea-
be obligated
or m o r a l l y required to produce that c h i l d . I t w o u l d
t i o n a l l i b e r t y t o o broad a mandate, w h i l e identity-independent
no longer be a matter of discretion or of persona! choice. Once
theories, if relied o n consistently, give i t an overly restrictive one.
such issues are put in the category of m o r a l requirement, they are
Identity-specific theories open up too broad an area of procrea-
no longer w i t h i n the realm of procreational liberty.
t i o n a l l i b e r t y because they do not count as harms actions w h i c h ,
longer i n the area of life where we are permissibly free to do as we
They are no
o n other theories for the assessment of interests, m i g h t plausibly
please so long as we do not h a r m or violate the rights of others.
be counted as harms.
They are moved i n t o the category of duty or requirement, where
I am assuming that we are placing procreational liberty w i t h i n some variant of the h a r m p r i n c i p l e , namely, that people acting i n d i v i d u a l l y or together, consensually, can do as they please so long as they do not h a r m (or invade the rights of) others. '
1 1
failing to p e r f o r m the action i n question is m o r a l l y b l a m e w o r t h y and l i v i n g up to the requirement is an o b l i g a t i o n . Consistently relying o n the identity-specific view of h a r m overly demoralizes and broadens procreational liberty. Consistently rely-
Suppose families go ahead and produce seriously disabled or
ing o n the identity-independent view overly moralizes and nar-
d e f o r m e d children w h e n they k n o w perfectly well that after a
rows procreational liberty. Each of these familiar and coherent
w a i t i n g p e r i o d they could produce n o r m a l ones (or be reliably
approaches, approaches that w o r k well enough in o r d i n a r y life,
likely to d o so). Is that not sufficiently irresponsible
yields bizarre and unacceptable
that it raises
results for the interests of pos-
basic questions about the appropriate breadth of procreational
sible future people. We are left w i t h conflicting, incommensurable
liberty? I am raising this p r i m a r i l y as a m o r a l question, w i t h o u t
images—images w h i c h d o not fit together i n t o a unified con-
getting i n t o the complicated issue of legal remedies or restrictions.
ception but w h i c h serve, at best, to identify c o n f l i c t i n g m o r a l
I merely w a n t to make the p o i n t that there is something objection-
considerations that can be balanced out in particular cases.
able about p r o d u c i n g a c h i l d under such (avoidable) conditions, and that w h a t makes that action objectionable is some considera t i o n of the interests of the c h i l d — o n c e those interests are conceived i n some way different f r o m the manner permitted by the identity-specific n o t i o n .
f A Structure:
Problems
of
Progress
Let us t u r n to the second basic problem of justice, the issue of structure.' Suppose w e were to have perfect solutions to the issue
O n the other hand, i f we were consistently to conceive the inter-
of h o w to measure people's interests (at least so far as these are at
ests of possible children i n the alternative, identity-independent
stake in questions of d i s t r i b u t i v e justice), and suppose we were to
20
2i
Sfruîture
The l i m i t s of S y s t e m a t i c Justice
have perfect solutions to the issue of h o w people ought to be as-
Table i . T h e Pure P r o b l e m of Justice
signed positions i n the structure according to some viable theory oi: equal o p p o r t u n i t y .
2
Even w i t h perfect solutions to the problems of value ( w h a t
A
B
Position Payoffs
Position Payoffs
is d i s t r i b u t e d ) and of assignment (how people get and m a i n t a i n positions in the structure), the fundamental p r o b l e m of structure
P,
S.
S,
i\
w o u l d remain to be considered in its o w n right before we c o u l d
p"
s"
s"
p"
arrive at a systematic, substantive theory of justice. Given a listing of payoffs (in our chosen value) to positions (n-tiles of the p o p u l a t i o n defined by their shares of the chosen value), w h a t can w e say about the justice or injustice of any t w o alternative situations this stock example, w h i c h I w i l l b o r r o w f r o m G i l b e r t H a r m a n ,
A and B? (See table i . ) M e r e l y f r o m the i n f o r m a t i o n in t w o such listings of payoffs to
J u d i t h T h o m s o n , and others/'
positions, we can tell whether A or B has a higher total or a higher
Imagine a doctor i n a battlefield or other emergency situation
m i n i m u m , or is more equal or w o u l d benefit or disadvantage more
w h o has to choose between saving five lives and saving one. The
strata of society. M a n y of the central issues of distributive jus-
one life w i l l take all of his time and resources. But if he neglects the
tice can be stated w i t h i n the confines of this pure p r o b l e m . I n an
one, he can save five others. We w o u l d not blame h i m for neglect-
i m p o r t a n t article, Douglas Rae dubs this pure p r o b l e m " s i m p l e
ing the one. indeed, five lives saved at the cost of one lost, seems,
j u s t i c e . ' W h i l e i t is " s i m p l e " because many of the crucial c o m -
on its face, a reasonable calculation. But now consider a second
plexities have been relegated to the problems of value and struc-
version. O u r doctor, n o w a convinced u t i l i t a r i a n , has returned to
ture, it is, i n its o w n r i g h t , even more difficult than has previously
the hospital, where he has five patients, each needing emergency
been realized, i n fact, I w i l l argue, no solution that passes certain
d o n a t i o n of some vital organ. There are, unfortunately, n o v o l u n -
m i n i m u m tests is possible. I w i l l use these conclusions to raise-
tary organ donors. But a patient in r o o m 306 has checked in for a
some general issues about the kinds of answers we should expect
routine physical exam. H e is a healthy specimen and, by himself,
1
3
could supply all the organs necessary to save the other five. O u r
f r o m theories of justice. U n t i l relatively recently, there was a widespread consensus
doctor cuts up the patient and redistributes the organs so as to
about the p r o b l e m of structure, and indeed about answers to the
save five lives. If the calculation (that five lives saved are w o r t h
entire issue of d i s t r i b u t i v e justice. As H . L . A . H a r t noted, there
more than the cost of one lost) was correct in the first case, w h y
was "a once widely accepted o l d faith that some f o r m of u t i l i t a r i -
is it not also correct i n the second?
a n i s m , i f only we could discover the right f o r m , must capture the essence of p o l i t i c a l m o r a l i t y . "
O f course, some complexities must be accounted for i n any u t i l i t a r i a n calculation applied to this case, i f it is u t i l i t y that is
4
W h y has utilitarianism fallen into disfavor? The most p o w e r f u l
ultimately being m a x i m i z e d , we must assume that i n d i v i d u a l lives
arguments against it focus on the fact that it does n o t , i n some
are place holders for future streams of u t i l i t y . I n this way, we can
sense, take seriously the "separateness of persons." M o s t notably,
reach the conclusion that five lives are likely to yield m o r e long-
it does not offer sufficient protections f r o m the kinds of sacrifices
term u t i l i t y than w o u l d one life. W h i l e the case m i g h t be m o d i f i e d
that the greater social g o o d can place on individuals. Consider
so as to b r i n g this assumption into question, it is n o t , on its face,
5
22
Tfie limits
an unreasonable assumption. Second, there are problems
about
the effect of such an intervention on social practices that do p r o duce great long-term u t i l i t y so long as people continue to rely o n t h e m — s o c i a l practices such as the routine physical exam.
23
Stnjsture
o f S y s t e m a t i c Justice
How-
ever, utilitarians have always had a response for such objections.
3. E q u a l i t y 4. The m i n i m u m share (or the m a x i m i n principle} W h e n we t h i n k of the general welfare, we t h i n k of the t w o separate dimensions in considerations
I and 2, "the greatest g o o d
I hey can lie or deceive or just keep things secret if it w i l l produce
of the greatest n u m b e r , " as i n Bentham's slogan (even t h o u g h ,
greater social u t i l i t y . W i t h o u t g o i n g into whether this strategy i n
operationally, only the first clause really mattered for Bentham).*
itself constitutes further grounds for objecting to u t i l i t a r i a n i s m ,
Alternatively, d i s t r i b u t i o n raises t w o fundamental and separable
we can see that it should be possible to preserve the inference that
issues: equality, w h i c h can be thought of as the relative standing of
aggregate u t i l i t y is served.
the less w e l l off strata, and m a x i m i n , w h i c h can be t h o u g h t of as
bor our purposes, t w o m a i n conclusions are w o r t h d r a w i n g f r o m this example. First, aggregate utility, even w h e n supplemented by the fact that most people are made better off, hardly constitutes an adequate solution to the problem of structure. We must also deal w i t h distributive objections focused o n l i m i t i n g the sacrifices that may be demanded in the name of overall social
the absolute
standing of the least well off stratum. In the examples
that f o l l o w , I w i l l measure equality simply by t a k i n g the mean of the differences f r o m the mean; A m a r t y a Sen has demonstrated some subtle and i m p o r t a n t differences in measures of equality, but these do not affect the basic argument developed here. ' 1
Each of these four basic criteria has its proponents. 'The first
u t i l i t y . Second, criteria for structure cannot be applied in isolation
point 1 w a n t to develop is that the inadequacy of each can
f r o m criteria f o r assignment—criteria
be
for w h o gets w h a t p o s i t i o n
dramatized by the fact that it w i l l support choices w h i c h v i o -
in the structure. There must be some fair process for d e t e r m i n i n g
late all three of the other basic criteria. Despite the enthusiasm
w h o suffers and w h o benefits. The arbitrariness of p i c k i n g out the
of Rawlsians, o n the one hand, and of utilitarians, o n the other,
patient in r o o m 306 violates our i m p l i c i t assumptions about fair
single-minded reliance on any one of these basic criteria, even for
assignment. We w i l l return to the assignment problem below, but
the pure p r o b l e m of justice, leads to disaster.
m the meantime, it should be emphasized that any solution to the
The more basic difficulty is that any complete principle w h i c h
structure problem can, at most, be necessary and not sufficient for
attempted to avoid these disasters w o u l d violate t r a n s i t i v i t y . A n -
an adequate s o l u t i o n , because criteria for fair assignment w o u l d
other way of saying this is that any principle w h i c h always sides
be required as w e l l .
w i t h three of these basic criteria w i l l take public policy i n a cycle
In dealing w i t h the structure p r o b l e m , we must c o n f r o n t t w o distinct families of consideration. One focuses on the general w e l fare, the other o n d i s t r i b u t i o n . F o l l o w i n g Brian Barry, I w i l l say that one m i g h t be called "aggregative" and the other " d i s t r i b u t i v e . " ' F r o m each of these t w o families, I w i l l take t w o basic considerations, to yield the f o l l o w i n g four: 1. The total welfare 2. The numbers
affected
(under some possible c o n d i t i o n s ) — a result that raises basic questions about the k i n d of connection commonly assumed between ideal theory and public policy. Let me demonstrate the first difficulty w i t h a series of simple numerical illustrations. I am assuming that all of the issues about what wc are. d i s t r i b u t i n g and -about h o w we measure it have already been resolved. Suppose we solved these issues to a degree beyond anyone's wildest o p t i m i s m . We have an index for, say, Rawlsian p r i m a r y goods or Ackermanian manna that we can rep-
The l i m i t s ®l S y s t e m a t i c Justice
24
Strwture
25
resent, for these purposes, w i t h cardinal, interpersonal shares to
tive objection to u t i l i t a r i a n i s m that has become a commonplace of
ranked positions. " Even w i t h such a s o l u t i o n , the pure p r o b l e m
recent theories of justice emphasizing the separateness of persons
of justice Is far more difficult than has been imagined.
and the great sacrifices w h i c h m a x i m i z i n g the total can sometimes
1
T h e p o i n t can be made as a sequence of abstract h o r r o r stories.
require. I n this case, most people are made worse off, equality is
Each h o r r o r story can be thought of as a m i n i m u m test for an ade-
decreased, and the m i n i m u m is devastated:
quate theory of justice. W h e n three of our basic criteria prefer one A
alternative, it is the one that should be chosen. Each h o r r o r story consists i n siding w i t h one of the four against the other three. I w i l l later show, however, that these four m i n i m u m tests, i n c o m b i n a t i o n , violate transitivity. Hence, any principle that satisfied all f o u r w o u l d not define a unified and coherent direction for public policy, i n that sense, we have to choose between m o r a l l y adequate choices in particular cases (avoiding the four h o r r o r stories) and coherent progress in our sequence of policy choices over time. In either case, the n o t i o n that we can gradually realize an ideal w i t h m o r a l l y adequate principles is undermined. The true c o m p l e x i t y of justice does n o t , by itself, i m p l y relativism or subjectivism,
10
I
20
1
30
I
40
I
50
i
60
1
70
1,000 3: M a x i m i n violates equality, the t o t a l , and the n u m -
Scenario
bers c r i t e r i o n . T h i s case is an extension of Douglas Rae's critique
11
b u t it does disappoint c o m m o n expectations about the k i n d of
B
i
s o l u t i o n our principles ought to provide.
of m a x i m i n . Rae showed h o w m a x i m i n can distribute less i n t o t a l , less equally.'" Particularly i n cases where the m i d d l e classes are
I: Equality violates m a x i m i n , numbers, and the t o t a l .
?
devastated, the welfare state may, nevertheless, i m p r o v e the lot
T h i s scenario is just an extension of Rawls's argument against
;
of those at the b o t t o m w h i l e the rich continue to get richer, i n
equality. The leveling approach to equality can be ruinous to a l l —
*
that case, the t o t a l may decrease w h i l e inequality increases along
l o w e r i n g the total in a way that makes most people worse off,
\
w i t h the m i n i m u m share. The example is not f a n c i f u l . Some may
i n c l u d i n g those at the b o t t o m . This possibility is illustrated by the
i
regard it as a g o o d description of the " B r i t i s h disease," a syn-
choice between A and B below:
\
d r o m e that has, at times, been thought to affect many of the aging
Scenario
A
B
10
2
20
2
30
2
40
2
50
2
60
2
70
2
welfare states of the West, i n this scenario, I have simply added a f a c t o r — t h e numbers affected. If d i s t r i b u t i n g less in t o t a l , less equally was a serious objection to m a x i m i n , an even more serious o b j e c t i o n is d i s t r i b u t i n g less in t o t a l , less equally, w h i l e at the same t i m e m a k i n g most people (or most strata) worse off. Here is an example: A
B
10
11
2; The total welfare violates m a x i m i n , equality, and
20
15
the numbers c r i t e r i o n . This case simply expands o n the d i s t r i b u -
30
15
Scenario
The l i m i t s o f S y s t e m a t i c Justice
Strusture
27
40
20
so clearly served along w i t h a central element of d i s t r i b u t i o n , or
50
30
when d i s t r i b u t i v e interests are so clearly served along w i t h a cen-
60
30
tral element of the general welfare, the result is very d i f f i c u l t to
70
LOO
argue against. Let us label these four tests in the order of our four
i n the move f r o m A to B, the total is lowered f r o m 2 8 0 to 2 2 1 , five out of seven strata are worsened, and inequality is i n creased. O n l y a fanatical advocate of m a x i m i n w o u l d s u p p o r t such changes because of the small increase of the m i n i m u m share ( f r o m 10 to 11). 4: The numbers c r i t e r i o n violates the total, m a x i m i n ,
Scenario
and equality. Serving the m a j o r i t y here distributes less in t o t a l , less equally, to the d e t r i m e n t of the least favored. T h i s case maybe t h o u g h t of as a tyranny of the m a j o r i t y that violates b o t h u t i l i tarian and distributive justice considerations at the same t i m e : A
B
10
0
20
5
scenarios; Test I: Prefer alternatives prescribed simultaneously by m a x i m i n , the t o t a l , and the numbers c r i t e r i o n . In other w o r d s , prefer more in total when it helps most people, including the least well off. Test 2: Prefer alternatives prescribed simultaneously by maxi m i n , equality, and the numbers c r i t e r i o n . I n other w o r d s , prefer equality w h e n it is to most people's advantage, including the least favored. 'lest 3: Prefer alternatives prescribed simultaneously by the total, equality, and the numbers criterion. In other w o r d s , prefer alternatives that distribute more in total, more equally to the advantage of most people (or strata). Prefer alternatives prescribed simultaneously by the
Test 4:
t o t a l , m a x i m i n , and equality. I n other w o r d s , prefer alternatives
30
5
40
45
that distribute more i n t o t a l , more equally, when it is to the ad-
50
55
vantage of the least favored.
60
65
W h e n viewed i n i s o l a t i o n , each of these tests seems o v e r w h e l m -
95
ingly c o m p e l l i n g . H o w e v e r , if they are taken together as consti-
70
t u t i n g necessary c o n d i t i o n s for an adequate principle of d i s t r i b u -
I he move to B serves the most advantaged four strata, but i n a
tive justice, then no adequate principle of distributive justice can
way that increases inequality (the mean of the differences f r o m the
avoid v i o l a t i n g transitivity. A simple illustration demonstrates this
mean increases f r o m 17.14 to about 3 0 ) , lowers the total ( f r o m
result. I n the table on the f o l l o w i n g page, test 1 w o u l d force us
2 8 0 to 2 7 0 ) , and devastates the m i n i m u m ( f r o m 10 to 0).
to choose B over A , test 2 w o u l d force us to choose C over B,
Each of these four scenarios can be thought of as a m i n i m u m
test 3 w o u l d force tis to choose L) over C, test 4 w o u l d force us to
test w h i c h the other criteria, taken in isolation, fail. If 1 am cor-
choose
rect that these basic criteria should be f o l l o w e d when three agree,
back to A .
over D , but then test I w o u l d lead us f r o m E i n a cycle
then we have four separate m i n i m u m tests for any principle of dis-
The move f r o m A to B is required by test 1 , because the t o t a l is
t r i b u t i v e justice. The power of each test is that it combines b o t h
increased f r o m 250 to 2 7 0 , the m i n i m u m is increased f r o m 10 to
of the members of either the aggregative or distributive family
1 1, and three of the five strata are better off. The move f r o m B to C
w i t h a member of the rival family. W h e n aggregative interests are
is required by test 2 because the m i n i m u m is increased f r o m 11
r i
j
Use U S J H S ©I S y s t e a a s f k Jasiise
M
A
B
C
D
F.
10 30 50
1 I
12
9
30 50 80 100
31
S 42
70 90
51 52 53
52
54 55
picture of the relations between idea! theory and public p o l i c y . It 1:
undermines the n o t i o n of a unidirectional approach to the ideal, where it is b o t h possible and desirable for each state of affairs to
50 50
be " m o r e j u s t " than the last. Such a ranking may no longer be possible because " m o r e j u s t " is no longer a transitive r e l a t i o n . This
51
new picture is the one i have termed "ideals w i t h o u t an i d e a l " con-
52
flicting principles, without
——
II
29
Assignment
a single unified vision to be gradually
approached.'' Each element of mora! conflict, if taken seriously,
to 12, equality is increased (the mean o i the differences f r o m the
w o u l d lead public policy in a quite different d i r e c t i o n . T h i s may
mean is lowered f r o m 28.24 to 14.64), and three of the five strata
force an i n t u i t i o n i s t i c balancing of particular cases to take policy,
are better off. The move f r o m C to D is required by test 3 because
over time, in a cycle. Because progress in one d i r e c t i o n may force
the total increases f r o m 199 to 2 1 1 , equality increases (the mean
us to retrace our steps along another valued dimension, patterns
of the differences f r o m the mean decreases f r o m 14.64 to 13.7),
of m o r a l conflict can eventually take us back to where we started.
and four of the five strata are made better off. The move f r o m D
[f we do justice to the true complexities of the p u r e - d i s t r i b u t i o n
to K is required by test 4 because the total increases f r o m 2 1 1 to
p r o b l e m , we must take account of all four of the basic criteria I
2 1 2 , the m i n i m u m increases f r o m 8 to 9, and equality increases
have proposed. But once we take this step, it seems difficult not to
(the mean of the differences f r o m the mean decreases f r o m
accept the four m i n i m u m tests. Either one or more of these tests
13.7
must be abandoned, or the n o t i o n that " m o r e j u s t " is necessarily
to 13.36). T h e cycle is completed w i t h the move f r o m E back to A . T h i s
a transitive relation must be. O n substantive grounds, the former
w o u l d be required by test 1 because the m i n i m u m increases f r o m 9
o p t i o n seems clearly indefensible, for it w o u l d expose us to con-
to 10, the total increases f r o m 212 to 250, and three of the five
d o n i n g one or more of o u r four h o r r o r stories as an e m b o d i m e n t
strata are clearly made better off. Hence, if an adequate p r i n c i p l e
oi justice. T h e alternative, w h i c h I accept, is that there are crucial
of d i s t r i b u t i v e justice must pass our four tests, such a p r i n c i p l e ,
impediments to any systematic theorv of justice,
however it is f o r m u l a t e d , must violate t r a n s i t i v i t y . ' 1
W h y should this be disturbing? Recent theories of justice have given us a picture of ideal theory whose task is to offer a systematic s o l u t i o n that holds w i t h o u t exception ( w h i c h solves the p r i o r i t y p r o b l e m in Rawls's language), and w h i c h we are to attempt,
Conflicting
of Equal
Opportunity
Visions
Regardless of h o w we handle the problem of structure, we face
perhaps o n l y asymptotically, to approach so far as circumstances
a separate set of issues in the problem of assignment: who
p e r m i t . We are given a unified and coherent picture of an ideal
what position
s o l u t i o n , i n w h i c h all the elements of m o r a l conflict have been p u t
be affected as decisively by assignment as by structure. N o viable
gets
in the structure. The life histories of individuals can
in their appropriate p r i o r i t y relations. The task of public policy is
theory of d i s t r i b u t i v e justice could a f f o r d to ignore the issue of
to get us as close as possible, even if the best we can possibly d o
assignment. Imagine one that d i d so. Then imagine that it ranked
is an a p p r o x i m a t i o n .
some sequence of situations A, B, C, D as successive improvements
T h e v i o l a t i o n of transitivity, however, supports a quite different
I
1.5 Assignment;
in terms of structure (as judged, for example, by the percentage of
30
the stated value held by each tenth of the society), i t no criteria are offered for assignment, but only for structure, then the sequence A , B, C, D c o u l d , in theory, be compatible w i t h any objectionable set o f l i m i t a t i o n s in terms of assignment. We m i g h t , for example, imagine the i n t r o d u c t i o n of a caste system, or of an underclass, or of an apartheid system of racial segregation. In principle, n o t h i n g prevents objectionable forms of assignment f r o m coexisting w i t h an i m p r o v e d structure—say, greater equality in income d i s t r i b u t i o n , greater totals, or whatever your favorite structural principle may be.
1
Suppose we are c o m m i t t e d to the proposition that the sequence of situations A , B, C, D represents consistent improvement o n s t r u c t u r a l grounds. T h e n let us imagine that we also have a sequence of structurally identical situations A ' , B', C , D ' that i n volve the i n t r o d u c t i o n of a caste system. The second g r o u p of situations is structurally
identical in that the payoffs to positions
under A ' , B', C , D ' are precisely the same as under A , B, C, D . If we have no criteria for assignment, then the structural criteria that w o u l d c o m m i t us to the p r o p o s i t i o n that A, B, C, D is an i m p r o v e m e n t w o u l d equally c o m m i t us to the proposition that A ' , IV, C , D ' must be an improvement. But w i t h i n liberal theory, it is h a r d to imagine that, whatever the structural improvements, they w o u l d insulate the overall result i n the second sequence f r o m decisive objections. The point of such examples is that no defensible, substantive theory of justice can afford to ignore the assignment p r o b l e m . Otherwise, such theories are vulnerable to representing as justice the i n t r o d u c t i o n of apartheid, the creation of a caste system, or the creation of a permanent underclass. In order to deal w i t h the assignment p r o b l e m , we need a viable theory of equal o p p o r t u n i t y . We need some fair system for 2
31
Assignment
The L i m i t s csi S y s t e m a t i c Justice
ration-
ing the chance to be unequal whenever there are going to be inequalities. O f course, if we had perfect equality of outcomes, then there w o u l d be little need to develop a theory of assignment. B u t there are substantial inequalities i n every m o d e m developed society, capitalist or socialist. Furthermore, if a theory were to be
systematic, it w o u l d have to rank outcomes as they
approached
whatever ideal was posited. Even advocates of perfect equality of outcomes w o u l d have to evaluate many d i f f e r i n g degrees
of i n -
equality (in a d d i t i o n to the many other difficulties such advocates w o u l d face). However, the difficulty i n developing a viable theory of assignment is that the values that are implicated by the equal o p p o r t u nity p r o b l e m do not fit together into a unified picture of an ideal s o l u t i o n — e v e n under the best conditions that m i g h t realistically be imagined for a m o d e r n , large-scale society. The issue can be posed as a " t r i l e m m a , " a k i n d of dilemma w i t h three corners. A first principle at issue i n the trilcmrna is merit:
1
that is, that
there should be widespread procedural fairness i n the evaluation of qualifications for positions. By "qualifications," 1 mean criteria that are job-related i n that they fairly can be interpreted as i n d i cators of competence or m o t i v a t i o n for performance. Whether we are t a l k i n g about scholastic aptitude tests, civil service exams, or the evaluation of publications for academic tenure decisions, we are all f a m i l i a r w i t h the culture of meritocracy. It is deeply embedded i n the rationales and practices of most of our institutions. But m e r i t , by itself, is not enough. Arguments for this conclusion are dramatized by an example that I w i l l b o r r o w f r o m Bernard W i l l i a m s . Imagine a society dominated by a w a r r i o r class/ F r o m generation to generation, the children of the present 1
w a r r i o r s become the new w a r r i o r class and rule in t u r n . A t some p o i n t , critics achieve a major r e f o r m . " F r o m n o w o n , " they announce, "there shall be equal o p p o r t u n i t y , because we shall select the best w a r r i o r s t h r o u g h a suitable c o m p e t i t i o n . " They then design an elaborate w a r r i o r - O l y m p i c s that selects the most competent w a r r i o r s . The c o m p e t i t i o n is held, but it makes v i r t u a l l y no difference to the outcome. The competition is w o n , o v e r w h e l m ingly or perhaps entirely, by the children of the present w a r r i o r s . A t first, to make it simple, let us imagine that the causal mechanism is quite obvious. T h e children of the present w a r r i o r class are both w e l l trained and well nourished. The rest of the p o p u l a t i o n ,
3§
The
UmiH o f
Sysfemssfis JusHs©
33
Assignment
wc m i g h t imagine, is on the verge of starvation. This fact turns the
Table 2. T h e T r i i e m m a of Equal O p p o r t u n i t y
equal o p p o r t u n i t y c o m p e t i t i o n into a series of wrestling and boxi n g matches between three-hundred-pound sumo wrestlers and
Option i
Option 2
Option i
n i n e t y - p o u n d weaklings. Clearly, such a c o m p e t i t i o n w o u l d not Merit
adequately realize equal o p p o r t u n i t y . N o t e , however, that its re-
4
('A[u;il life chances
sults w o u l d be supported by the principle of merit. The sumo
v
!
L i b e r t y in f a m i l y
wrestlers, we can assume, really are better w a r r i o r s than the weak-
"
'
~
;
lings. They are better warriors because they have had a lifetime of favorable conditions to develop the desired characteristics,
while
uvely w e l l in meritocratic c o m p e t i t i o n . The principle of m e r i t then
their rivals have had a lifetime of grossly unfavorable conditions
becomes a mechanism for generating unequal life chances.
to prepare for the same c o m p e t i t i o n .
It is w o r t h m e n t i o n i n g that in real life we do not fully realize
Real equal o p p o r t u n i t y , i t m i g h t be argued, must get at those
any of these principles. But we attempt to approach each of them
c o n d i t i o n s , for they determine the real terms of c o m p e t i t i o n . T h e
and, to one degree or another, we are successful (even t h o u g h
d i f f i c u l t y , of course, is that those conditions are protected by the
each p r i n c i p l e m i g h t take public policy i n a different d i r e c t i o n ) .
l i b e r t y to confer benefits w i t h i n the private sphere of family rela-
The p o i n t is that these criteria do not combine to make a uni-
tions.
fied and coherent scenario for the appropriate relations between
A more ambitious account of equal o p p o r t u n i t y w o u l d add to
liberty and equality, even under the best conditions that m i g h t
m e r i t the second requirement that there should be equality of life chances.
realistically be imagined. Consider the three options p i c t u r e d in
By this 1 mean that we should not be able to predict the
table 2. O p t i o n I is exemplified clearly by the w a r r i o r society. L i b -
eventual places in society of new-born infants about w h o m we
erty w i t h i n the family (the liberty to confer benefits) protects the
k n o w certain a r b i t r a r y native characteristics such as family back-
process whereby advantaged families differentially benefit then-
g r o u n d , race, sex, religion, and ethnicity. This c r i t e r i o n captures
children i n the developmental competition so that, as a statistical
w h a t was objectionable about the w a r r i o r society.' We could (but
matter, those c h i l d r e n w i l l achieve unequal life chances. Suppose
should n o t be able to) predict the winners and losers in the c o m -
we attempted to achieve b o t h m e r i t and equal life chances. I hen,
p e t i t i o n merely by k n o w i n g the class into w h i c h they were b o r n .
as p i c t u r e d in o p t i o n 2, we w o u l d have to somehow insulate chil-
O f course, this principle is widely violated in our o w n society,
dren f r o m the advantages their parents w o u l d wish to confer upon
as various sociological studies demonstrate, If we k n o w father's
t h e m . Perhaps some system of collectivized child rearing w o u l d
income o r education, we can make g o o d statistical predictions of
do the j o b . O r perhaps a school system could be designed that
the life chances among any cohort of n e w - b o r n infants/'
an^F*^mw^
w o u l d even out advantages and disadvantages f r o m class back-
I he causal mechanism operating here is, to a large extent,
g r o u n d and block the exit options of private schools, t u t o r i n g in
simply a more discreet version of w h a t was blatant in the w a r r i o r
the home, and so o n . Whatever the precise details, any such sce-
society example. Advantaged families differentially influence the
nario w o u l d require a significant sacrifice in liberty w i t h i n the
development of qualifications, talents, motivations, and so f o r t h
family. A t h i r d possibility w o u l d be to preserve l i b e r t y w i t h i n the
in their c h i l d r e n compared to less advantaged families. Those
family, but to attempt to realize equal life chances independently
favorable causal conditions prepare such children to do compara-
of the principle of m e r i t . This t h i r d o p t i o n might be termed the
7
i
m
n
n
34
3S
tJeracKracy a n d P r o g r e s s
H i e l i m i t s of S y s t e m a t i c Justice
"reverse d i s c r i m i n a t i o n " scenario because it w o u l d require that
the best conditions that m i g h t realistically be imagined. If we are
people be assigned to positions according to some pattern thai tie-
left w i t h principles in intractable conflict, even under favorable
parted systematically f r o m merit. One strategy w o u l d be simplv
conditions, then we do not have the k i n d of ideal s o l u t i o n — d e -
disadvantaged
fined w i t h o u t m o r a l c o n f l i c t — a s p i r e d to by systematic theory. We
backgrounds. A n alternative version of this scenario w o u l d assign
do not have a s o l u t i o n to the p r i o r i t y p r o b l e m . Instead, we have
all positions randomly, perhaps t h r o u g h a job lottery. Regardless
"ideals w i t h o u t an i d e a l . "
to hire less-qualified people f r o m comparatively
of the details, any version of o p t i o n 3 w o u l d require a significant sacrifice in merit {and i n the values p r o m o t e d by m e r i t o c r a c y — that is, procedural fairness and efficiency). Clearly, each of our three scenarios is a h o r r o r story. A c h i e v i n g
1.6 Democracy
and
Progress
F r o m the perspective of many theorists of justice,
democracy
any t w o of our principles precludes achieving the t h i r d — u n d e r
is a narrower topic than distributive justice, because many theo-
an}' realistic scenario of favorable conditions. i t is as if we had
ries w o u l d include the right to participate in political institutions
a three-cornered stool, but only t w o legs available to h o l d it u p .
as part of the more general d i s t r i b u t i o n of p r i m a r y goods or of
Even after we p r o p up any t w o sides, lack of the t h i r d leg is enough
fundamental rights and liberties in a just society.
8
Other theorists, however, w o u l d regard the c o n u n d r u m s of dis-
to undermine or destabilize the whole structure. One reasonable response to this pattern of conflict w o u l d be
t r i b u t i o n just discussed as p r o v i d i n g an argument for focusing o n
to trade off these three principles in particular cases, but to avoid
democratic procedures
any systematic attempt to fully realize any of them, given the cost
cannot settle substantive questions on the merits, we can at least
in c o m p e t i n g principles. Such a position w o u l d , of course, be an
determine procedures in w h i c h each person's conscientious views
example o f w h a t n o w is c o m m o n l y termed " i n t u i t i o n i s m " — t h e
get an appropriate hearing and an appropriate chance to influence
t r a d i n g o f f of competing principles in particular cases w i t h o u t any
a fair process of collective decision m a k i n g .
systematic s o l u t i o n that can be fully realized.
rather than on outcomes. Perhaps, if we
The d i f f i c u l t y is that the democratic t r a d i t i o n has
9
bequeathed
The i n t u i t i o n i s t position is unpopular and dissatisfying, in part,
to us a variety of fundamental values at stake in democratic pro-
because it is w i d e l y seen as vague in its prescriptions. H o w e v e r ,
cedures, a variety of ideal images of w h a t an appropriate collec-
such a charge is not entirely appropriate. Clearly, when there are
tive procedure m i g h t be. Because these ideal images cannot all be
strong gains to be made w i t h o u t a corresponding loss i n c o m -
simultaneously realized, they require some hard choices. 1 believe
peting p r i n c i p l e s ,
or significant losses w i t h o u t a corresponding
that figure I provides a useful way of p i c t u r i n g the dimensions
then there w i l l be a case for choice of a policy o p t i o n w i t h i n
along w h i c h this democratic debate tends to range. I have labeled
gain,
11
10
the i n t u i t i o n i s t f r a m e w o r k . There w i l l also be cases under other
the n o r t h - s o u t h dimension " M a d i s o n i a n " versus " m a j o r i t a r i a n . "
c o n d i t i o n s , but the t w o possibilities just mentioned are the most
By M a d i s o n i a n , I simply mean the degree to w h i c h the system
obvious ones.
includes impediments of one sort or another to popular m a j o r i -
W h e t h e r or not we adopt an i n t u i t i o n i s t response, the t r i l e m m a poses a significant obstacle to the ambitions of systematic t h e o r y .
12
!
ties. These impediments are usually justified, at least i n theory, by a desire to prevent t y r a n n y of the m a j o r i t y . Theoretically, the 2
Either we give up one of the pieces or we have to a d m i t that the
construction of impediments could go far beyond a n y t h i n g envi-
three components of the t r i l e m m a do not fit together, even under
sioned by M a d i s o n , so that, strictly speaking, he w o u l d not have
36
S e m m r a c y mû
The l i m i t s of S y s t e m a t i c Justice
advocated a perfectly " M a d i s o n i a n " system. T h e t e r m , however, provides a useful label for a basic m o t i v a t i o n underlying checks and balances, the t e r r i t o r i a l , federal, and bicameral character of many A m e r i c a n representative arrangements,
Progress
•itriire i - The Forms of Democracy Figu Madisonian
(Unanimous
(Avoiding tyranny^
direct democracy)
and the operation
of j u d i c i a l review and other institutions that serve as impediments to majorities. Alternatively, movement south along the same d i mension s i m p l y means that there are no effective impediments to p o p u l a r majorities, so that the tatter tend to get their way. As D a h l
-» A
Direct (participation)
noted i n a classic study, the American system is not very m a j o r i -
•B
t a r i a n . W i t h a system of " m i n o r i t i e s r u l e , " it is somewhere in the u p p e r - r i g h t - h a n d quadrant of figure I .
Indirect (competence)
1
T h e east-west dimension is familiar i n that it depicts the degree to w h i c h the system is indirect (representative) or direct (relying o n the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of members w i t h o u t the intermediary of representatives). For both the north-south and east-west dimensions,
Majoritanan
(Majoritarian
(popular control)
direct democracy)
many d i f f i c u l t judgments of degree w o u l d be required to make any precise comparisons. The main usefulness of the diagram is
absurdum. I n any case, any extreme version w o u l d fit the lower-
that i t captures a w i d e range of debate and a variety of c o n f l i c t i n g
left-hand corner of the diagram.
images w i t h i n a single space, so as to clarify h o w gains i n one
By contrast, R o b e r t Paul W o l f f ' s proposal for unanimous direct democracy fits the extreme upper-left position.' The u n a n i m i t y
value can be expected to require costs i n another.
1
T h e A m e r i c a n system w o u l d fit somewhere in the u p p e r - r i g h t -
rule gives everyone a veto, p r o v i d i n g the greatest possible protec-
hand q u a d r a n t of figure l . T o v a r y i n g degrees, most parliamentary
tion against tyranny of the m a j o r i t y f r o m new policies. I t w o u l d
systems w o u l d fit somewhere to the south of the American system.
not provide protection f r o m omissions, but that is not an issue we
D e p e n d i n g on the impediments they offered to popular m a j o r i -
need to pursue here. T h e placement of unanimous direct democ-
ties, they m i g h t fit i n the lower p o r t i o n of the northeast quadrant
racy in the upper-left corner and the placement of m a j o r i t a r i a n
or the upper p o r t i o n of the southeast one.
direct democracy in the lower-left corner illustrate h o w extreme
T h e western positions i n figure i are most usefully exemplified by certain extreme ideal images. Suppose, for example, t h a t
5
direct systems (both implementable through a t w o - w a y cable system) can be crucially different on our north-south d i m e n s i o n .
the W a r n e r - A m e x Qube system i n C a n t o n , O h i o , were used f o r
In a p p l y i n g the l i m i t e d liberalism model to my discussion of
actual government policy m a k i n g . Each resident could respond
justice, I argued that there were not only fundamental conflicts
immediately o n any question posed o n the t w o - w a y cable tele-
in our ideal images, but also fundamental conflicts in our notions
vision system. Constant referendums w o u l d thus be feasible o n
of moral progress intended to realize those ideal Images. We can
all public questions. Some w o u l d regard instantaneous,
majori-
get the same cycles i n a p p l y i n g democratic principles that we en-
tarian direct democracy as the perfect embodiment of a certain
countered in a p p l y i n g principles of justice. I do not have i n m i n d
i n f l u e n t i a l , ideal image. Others w o u l d regard i t as a reductio ad
here the cycles familiar to students of the classic v o t i n g paradox.
as
The l i m i t s of S y s t e m a t i c Justice
Cycles i n applying
particular democratic arrangements {say, ma-
popular c o n t r o l , movement west on participation as a value i n
j o r i t y rule} to policy or candidate choice can be distinguished f r o m
itself, movement n o r t h on the prevention of tyranny of the ma-
cycles i n the design of the democratic arrangement itself. H o w a
j o r i t y , and movement east o n the greater competence of repre-
cycle of democratic reforms m i g h t arise can be charted in figure I .
sentatives. D e p e n d i n g on w h i c h of these partial images is given
Imagine an American-style status quo somewhere in the upper-
greater emphasis, one can go r o u n d and r o u n d . Each d i r e c t i o n
r i g h t - h a n d quadrant, at p o i n t A . W i t h i n the family of arguments
for r e f o r m has plausibility because of its emphasis on a distinc-
Democracy a n d P r o g r e s s
39
loosely counted as democratic, a variety of reforms m i g h t be sup-
tive value. Elowever, the end result is the same kind of cycle t h a t
p o r t e d that w o u l d increase m a j o r i t y c o n t r o l over policy outcomes
we encountered w i t h d i s t r i b u t i v e justice. C o n f l i c t i n g values in the
( p r o p o r t i o n a l representation, r e f o r m of the electoral college, a less
identification of the ideal yield c o n f l i c t i n g directions for m o r a l
activist or independent judiciary, p o l i t i c a l control over the Fed-
progress—directions
eral Reserve, and so on). 1 am not advocating these reforms, but
where we started.
only p o i n t i n g out that were they to come about they could move the entire system south, f r o m A to B in the diagram.
w h i c h , step by step, can take us back to
Focusing on democracy rather than on the full range of issues in the theory of justice does not provide a basis for a v o i d i n g either
F r o m B we could imagine a second line of r e f o r m based on the
of the t w o basic problems we encountered earlier w i t h systematic
argument that real democracy requires far greater direct participa-
theory. We get neither a unified and coherent picture of the ideal
t i o n . Even w i t h i n the confines of a generally representative system,
nor an unambiguous route to m o r a l progress. Rather than a sys-
a number of reforms could be designed to move the system west-
tematic s o l u t i o n , the l i m i t e d liberalism model is a more plausible
w a r d to a p o i n t such as C. Referendum and recall provisions and
interpretation of the m o r a l complexities at stake in democratic
p r o l i f e r a t i o n of direct primaries, t o w n meetings, and other direct-
theory, just as it is in the theory of justice.
g o v e r n i n g arrangements w i t h i n specific jurisdictions are some of
Despite these l i m i t a t i o n s , the move to proceduralism as a re-
the reforms that could be employed to move the system in this
sponse to substantive difficulties has merit, as we w i l l see in part 3.
direction."
However, m o r e is required than a f o r m a l proceduralism based
F r o m p o i n t C, the greater power in the hands of an aroused
merely o n the character of democratic institutions. C o n s i d e r a t i o n
populace m i g h t well produce calls for p r o t e c t i o n against t y r a n n y
of procedures in the context of all the background conditions f o r
of the m a j o r i t y . Reinvigoration of the separation of powers, checks
l i b e r t y of p o l i t i c a l culture w i l l provide the basis for more a m b i -
and balances, and an activist judiciary determined to protect v a r i -
tious conclusions.
ous c o n s t i t u t i o n a l rights could move the system f r o m C to a p o i n t such as D , directly n o r t h . H o w e v e r , f r o m p o i n t D arguments about the greater c o m petence of representatives could be employed to undermine the earlier p r o l i f e r a t i o n of referendums, primaries, t o w n meetings, and other direct institutions, so as to return the system to our o r i g i n a l status q u o , point A . Each step in this scenario relies o n values that are deeply rooted w i t h i n the general family of democratic arguments/ M o v e m e n t south depends on the emphasis of
2.1 Criteria
for an Acceptable
Theory
If I am correct about the impediments to systematic versions of liberalism, where does that leave efforts to reconstruct
lib-
eral theory? Perhaps the aspirations of systematic theory demand too m u c h . It may be possible to define criteria for an acceptable theory, criteria w h i c h it is possible for some versions of liberal theory to f u l f i l l , but w h i c h are, nevertheless, far less ambitious than the requirements for systematic theory. I propose that we consider four criteria for an acceptable theory of the first principles of a liberal state. Such a theory, at the least, should provide e x p l i c i t grounds for satisfying these c r i t e r i a : 1. It should differentiate
among alternatives: i t should p r o -
vide an e x p l i c i t basis for d e t e r m i n i n g , if only incompletely, w h i c h states are better than other states, selecting preferred
one
or a few
most
states f r o m a plausible construction of the feasible set.
There are t w o crucial ways in w h i c h the theories considered here fail this c r i t e r i o n . They can be distinguished as: (a) vacuousness:
a theory can tail to differentiate by legitimat-
i n g all (or v i r t u a l l y all) the realistic possibilities; (b) blind alleys:
a theory can fail to differentiate by r u l i n g out
all the realistic possibilities.
S t r a t e g i e s ©f ^@fonsS7ticH@n
Criteria for o n a s s e m b l e Theory
Vacuous theories legitimate too m u c h ; blind-alley theories leg i t i m a t e too little. We w i l l find that some forms of consent theory
43
that the e x p l a n a t i o n for that obligation should apply to all those who
must c o m p l y w i t h the o b l i g a t i o n . Since part of the very
t u r n out to be vacuous. A n d if we assume, as 1 d o , that we live
notion of having a state is that the state apply its a u t h o r i t y univer-
in a w o r l d of states, one obvious way a theory couid produce
sal lv w i t h i n a given t e r r i t o r y , the individually b i n d i n g character
b l i n d alleys is t h r o u g h philosophical anarchism ( r u l i n g out all the
of its obligations must apply universally t h r o u g h o u t its t e r r i t o r y .
realistic possibilities).
The last p a r t of c r i t e r i o n 2, the particularity requirement, is
These are not the only possible ways of failing c r i t e r i o n 1 . A theory m i g h t , for example, offer no prescriptions
based on the n o t i o n that states have a claim on the loyalty of their
whatsoever.
citizens—a c l a i m that is not equally satisfied for those citizens by
H o w e v e r , these are the t w o ways that w i l l piay a roie in our argu-
any number of other states w i t h similar characteristics. O f course,
ment, so they are w o r t h distinguishing. Political philosophy fails to be prescriptive
those other states, if they are legitimate, may make similar claims if it telis us either
on their citizens. Just as I have obligations to my mother that 1 d o
that all the possibilities are absolutely unacceptable or that they
not have to total strangers, no matter h o w similar to my mother
are a l l equally acceptable. In failing either c r i t e r i o n 1(a) or 1(b),
those strangers may be, I have obligations to m y state, if it is a
p o l i t i c a l philosophy basically w o u l d be telling us that there was
legitimate state, that I do not have to any number of other states,
n o t h i n g to choose f r o m among the alternatives. Theories failing
no matter h o w similar to my state those states may be. If I am a
these criteria w o u l d h o l d that, even as a matter of aspiration, no
citizen of state X , i t is my state in the sense that 1 owe special o b l i -
distinctions need to be made and no guidance needs to be offered
gations to i t . I am assuming that if a theory of the first principles
about the most basic differences among p o l i t i c a l systems. If these
of a liberal state p u r p o r t s to explain the obligations of citizens to
m i n i m a l criteria cannot be satisfied, then i n an i m p o r t a n t sense
support i t , then the special character of those political obligations
the subject w o u l d have n o t h i n g to offer. I am assuming that an
needs to be accounted for.
adequate theory must, at the least, make some distinctions a m o n g states a n d , in that sense, be prescriptive. 2. A n acceptable theory should be individually
3. A n acceptable theory should solve or deal successfully w i t h the jurisdiction
binding.
For
problem.
By this I mean that the fundamental
basis a theory offers for its prescriptions should not p r o v i d e rival
each person subject to its a u t h o r i t y , the state should have an ex-
theories (offering rival prescriptions) w i t h grounds for c l a i m i n g
p l a n a t i o n for w h y that person is obligated to u p h o l d the regime.
jurisdiction over the result—grounds for c l a i m i n g that their pre-
' I his c r i t e r i o n can be b r o k e n d o w n into t w o parts:
scriptions have the same justification. Such j u r i s d i c t i o n problems
(a) T h e scope of the individually b i n d i n g requirement must be universal
for those subject to its a u t h o r i t y .
(b) T h e manner must be particular or satisfy the p a r t i c u l a r i t y requirement; that is, the citizen must not be equally o b l i gated to u p h o l d regimes other than his o w n as part of his political obligation.
1
Legitimate states h o l d that individuals are obligated to u p h o l d and obey their authority. The basic idea of c r i t e r i o n 2 is merely
undermine the sense i n w h i c h a theory can be taken to solve anyt h i n g . If, for example, rival courts claim j u r i s d i c t i o n over the same issue, the mere fact that each m i g h t give us a k i n d of i m p a r t i a l decision does not help us to resolve the issue until we find some way to resolve, in t u r n , the jurisdictional conflicts among the courts' claims to decide. We w i l l see that the rivalries among theoretical "decision procedures" pose a similar p r o b l e m , leaving us w i t h no court or decision procedure for choosing among them. 4. A n acceptable theory should satisfy criteria 1—3
without
44
S t r a t e g i e s ©}
f a l l i n g i n t o indoctrination
45
feionstresfiim
problems.
The manner of establishing
o b l i g a t i o n s and their acceptance should not be subject to a de-
poses a constructive strategy that does p u r p o r t to satisfy all of these criteria.
l e g i t i m a t i n g charge that people were brainwashed or coercively m o l d e d so as to support the regime in the required way. We need, of course, a more detailed, constructive account of w h a t w o u l d constitute n o t being brainwashed or coercively m o l d e d . This p r o b lem w i l l detain us later at some length. These are criteria w h i c h a libera! theory of the state must satisfy i f it is to offer authoritative prescriptions—at the levels of b o t h social and i n d i v i d u a l choice. The key social-choice question is: W h i c h states are better than others? The key individual-choice question is: W h y are individuals w i t h i n a state bound to supp o r t the answer to the social-choice question? To deal w i t h the social-choice question, an acceptable theory should differentiate a m o n g alternatives so as to satisfy c r i t e r i o n 1. To deal w i t h the i n d i v i d u a l - c h o i c e question, members should be bound to u p h o l d the social-choice response so as to satisfy c r i t e r i o n 2. To deal adequately w i t h both of these questions, a theory must also conf r o n t c r i t e r i o n 3 : i f a theory's implications are to be authoritative, they must avoid j u r i s d i c t i o n problems; that is, they must avoid p r o v i d i n g a fundamental basis for rival theories to provide i n c o m patible prescriptions. Theories bedeviled by j u r i s d i c t i o n problems u n d e r m i n e their o w n authority. Finally, i n d o c t r i n a t i o n problems must also be avoided i f the theory's prescriptions are to be aut h o r i t a t i v e ; if their apparent authoritativeness rests on collective b r a i n w a s h i n g , then they are subject to obvious, delegitimating arguments. Hence, a theory needs to satisfy all four of our criteria i f it is to provide an authoritative basis f o r choice at b o t h the social- and individual-choice levels. M o s t of part 2 w i l l juxtapose these criteria w i t h a scheme for classifying the basic strategies available to liberal theory tor establishing its first principles. I w i l l argue that all but one of the strategies can be expected to fail one or more of the criteria just proposed. T h i s argument w i l l set the stage for part 3, w h i c h p r o -
2.2 Beyond
Intuitionism
Our first c r i t e r i o n challenges us to decide whether a theory can distinguish a m o n g the range of relevant alternatives, i t requires that an acceptable version of liberal theory provide an e x p l i c i t basis for d i s t i n g u i s h i n g the morally preferred p o l i t i c a l arrangement (or a l i m i t e d class of such arrangements) f r o m most of its serious rivals. By "serious r i v a l s " I mean p o l i t i c a l alternatives w i t h i n some plausible construction of the feasible set, and for w h i c h significant philosophical claims have been advanced. O f course, w h a t is meant by " l i b e r a l i s m " or " l i b e r a l t h e o r y " is itself a matter of considerable dispute. We can generally distinguish t w o approaches to this problem. One approach w o u l d classify normative theories or ideologies as " l i b e r a l " in terms of what they prescribe, w h i l e another approach w o u l d classify them in terms of how
they prescribe i t . The first approach relies o n
the substantive prescriptions resulting f r o m a theory, w h i l e the second relies on the kinds of arguments employed by a theory to support its substantive prescriptions, The first strategy is exemplified by M a u r i c e Cranston's q u i p : " A liberal, i suppose one could say, is a person w h o believes in liberty, as a nudist is a person w h o believes in n u d i t y . " As liberals 1
are those w h o believe in liberty, liberal theories, o n this view, are those w h i c h offer systematic justification or support for liberty. By contrast, the second strategy w o u l d identify as " l i b e r a l " those theories w h i c h employ a certain mode of argument. A n example is Ronald D w o r k i n ' s claim that "a certain conception of equality, w h i c h I shall call the liberal conception of equality, is the nerve of l i b e r a l i s m . " ' D w o r k i n means by equality a certain l i m i t a t i o n o n the arguments w h i c h it is appropriate for the state to employ in justifying its policies. Whatever their other differences, 5
Rawls's
46
Strategies s i g e í s n s t r u s f í r a
g-eyoriet I n t u i t i o n i s m
47
t h e o r y of justice, Aekerman's n o t i o n of " n e u t r a l d i a l o g u e , " and
for the trade-offs between fundamental principles such as l i b e r t y
the recent attempts to reconstruct utilitarianism all rely o n a f o u n -
and equality. If the trade-offs between all competing principles
d a t i o n a l conception of i m p a r t i a l i t y or equal consideration as a
can be fully captured by a series of clearly ranked indifference
strategy for d e r i v i n g the first principles of a liberal state;
curves, let us call the p o s i t i o n that results systematic i n t u i t i o n i s m .
1
6
We need not decide the question here whether liberalism is best
This position does not represent the absence of a theory p r o v i d -
defined in terms of its substantive conclusions or in terms of its
ing p r i o r i t y rules. Rather, it embodies a complex statement of a
modes of argument for those conclusions. The position 1 w i l l de-
single clear p r i o r i t y rule: Prefer alternatives o n the most highly-
velop can plausibly be classified as " l i b e r a l " on either account. O n
ranked indifference curve achievable.
the one hand, its centerpiece w i l l be an attempt to justify the p o l i t i -
moral considerations are adequately captured by the indifference-
cal liberties of t h o u g h t , belief, and association—prescriptions that
curve analysis, there is no indeterminacy about h o w to evaluate
have long been at the core of whatever substantive consensus l i b -
any alternatives that may present themselves. Systematic i n t u i t i o n -
Provided that all of the
eralism has achieved. O n the other hand, my argument for liberty-
ism of this k i n d is not really i n t u i t i o n i s m , precisely because it is
w i l l depend o n recognizably liberal methodological assumptions.
systematic. I t is simply the use of a distinctive device for stating a
It w i l l , in fact, be based on a claim about the conditions under
complex principle that is supposed to have clear p r i o r i t y over all
w h i c h certain forms of m o r a l evaluation w o u l d be possible i n a
competing considerations.
liberal state.
It is the unsystematic variety of i n t u i t i o n i s m — w h e r e the m o r a l
W h y do our criteria require an " e x p l i c i t " basis? By this I mean
c o m p l e x i t y of possible trade-offs has not been reduced to a series
that criteria must be offered spelling out the proposed p r i o r i t i e s .
of ranked indifference curves—that represents a basic challenge
Relying solely on " i n t u i t i o n i s m " is not enough. The intuitionist is
to the theoretical aspirations of liberal political philosophy. U n -
c o m m i t t e d to a plurality of principles w i t h o u t any clear weights
systematic i n t u i t i o n i s m leaves us w i t h o u t guidance. We are stuck
or p r i o r i t y rules and w i t h o u t any m e t h o d for resolving conflicts
w i t h incommensurable, c o n f l i c t i n g factors whose relations to one
a m o n g t h e m . The label " i n t u i t i o n i s t " indicates that a person has
another are regarded as a matter of unsettlable dispute. A t most
no further e x p l i c a t i o n of the trade-offs to w h i c h he is c o m m i t t e d
we may k n o w w h i c h factors to weigh. However, even the meta-
in p a r t i c u l a r cases. I n t u i t i o n i s m is, i n an i m p o r t a n t sense, the
phor of " w e i g h i n g , " standard though it is, is misleading. T h e
absence of a theory.
absence of any c o m m o n metric for comparing incommensurable
5
H o w e v e r , suppose there were a very decisive i n t u i t i o n i s t w h o
considerations is itself a central part of the p r o b l e m . ' I t is the
c o u l d always select his preferred alternative f r o m a list w i t h i n the
mysteriousness of i n t u i t i o n i s m , leaving each of us to c o n f r o n t con-
feasible set. W o u l d this ability to determine preferred alternatives
flicting ultimate principles w i t h o u t further guidance, that violates
satisfy o u r criteria? I t w o u l d still fall short because the basis f o r
the " e x p l i c i t n e s s " requirement of our criteria.
s e l e c t i o n — i f i t were t r u l y i n t u i t i o n i s t — w o u l d defy further ex-
Yet the m a i n thrust of m y argument thus far has been that
p l a n a t i o n . I n this connection, we should distinguish w h a t m i g h t
unsystematic i n t u i t i o n i s m is unavoidable. Liberal theory, i n par-
be called systematic
variety
ticular, must inevitably assign a p r i m a r y role to i n t u i t i o n i s m ; it is
that falls c r i t e r i o n 1 (see section 2.1 above). Some w r i t e r s , most
beyond any reasonable construction of its capacities to produce
n o t a b l y B r i a n Barry, have experimented w i t h indifference curves
a full-fledged systematic alternative.* Such a conclusion w i l l not
intuitionism
f r o m the unsystematic
48
S t r a t e g i e s tá
Beyorid InfytHsnism
Resmastrsstiwî
only be d i s a p p o i n t i n g to many, but it w i l l also appear to foreclose completely the prospects that any construction of liberalism w i l l satisfy our criteria for an acceptable theory. However, this pessimistic conclusion is mistaken. As we w i l l see in part .3, other strategies h o l d promise for satisfying our criteria despite all the negative and l i m i t i n g conclusions developed here. W h y should we be concerned w i t h these criteria? Why, for example, should we require an explicit basis for selecting a m o r a l l y preferred state f r o m the feasible set (criterion 1)? W i t h o u t passing even this m i n i m a l test, liberal theory seems to be n o t h i n g more than a bundle of conflicting principles o f f e r i n g us no definite d i r e c t i o n , even for our aspirations. As Bruce Ackerman has argued, a successful case for the morally preferred state w o u l d dispatch, at a stroke, the charge that liberalism, philosophically", is n o t h i n g more than "a p i t i f u l blob of s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t i o n . " " It is for this reason that his theory, along w i t h the other main attempts to revive liberal theory, adopts a version of this c r i t e r i o n as its m a i n order of business. If a theory's prescriptions are so easy to f u l f i l l that most states already satisfy t h e m , then it fails our first c r i t e r i o n because it is vacuous. O n the other hand, if its prescriptions are impossibly d i f f i c u l t to f u l f i l l , so that all the serious possibilities are ruled o u t , then it fails our first c r i t e r i o n by landing us in a b l i n d a l l e v — by l i m i t i n g its prescriptions to possibilities that fall outside the feasible set. W h a t we require is some basis for distinguishing the m o r a l l y preferred state f r o m most or all of the rival alternatives that deserve to be taken seriously. O f course, we can only consider the range of alternatives i n f o r m a l l y . There are always new possibilities to be imagined or invented, new objections to be weighed, new implications of f a m i l iar principles in new situations. Given these complexities, it seems q u i x o t i c to expect to narrow the range of possibilities to one preferred alternative. F u r t h e r m o r e , the alternatives for w h i c h serious philosophical
49
claims have been advanced w i l l vary f r o m one p e r i o d to another. There w i l l be similar v a r i a t i o n in our understanding of the range of feasible alternatives and of the probable collective and i n d i v i d u a l responses to various empirical conditions, I need to assume o n l y that the state of debate is robust:
that a w i d e variety of alterna-
tives is advanced w i t h sophistication f r o m a wide variety of m o r a l and ideological perspectives. These criteria are really a s h o r t - h a n d device for assessing w h a t one proposal or another contributes to the current state of theoretical debate.' They are merely a w a y 0
of f o r m u l a t i n g the p r o b l e m : W h a t does any given proposal contribute to the state of debate about the fundamental alternatives available to libera! theory? Our
question is: Can liberalism produce any definite conclu-
sions about its m o r a l p r i o r i t i e s , at least when favorable conditions are assumed? If these definite conclusions do not n a r r o w the alternatives to one, they should eliminate everything but a l i m i t e d subclass whose members are essentially equal in their realization of significant prescribed values. We should be able to characterize w h y and h o w the members of this subclass are equivalent and how they are, together, distinctive compared to the f u l l range of rival possibilities. W h a t are the g r o u n d rules for determining the feasible set of alternatives? I w i l l f o l l o w Rawls and assume the favorable conditions of w h a t he calls "ideal theory."
M
I w i l l assume g o o d - f a i t h
efforts at strict compliance w i t h the principles proposed, b o t h i n the present and i n the relevant recent past.
12
Furthermore, I w i l l
assume only "moderate scarcity" and not the extreme
scarcity
of resources that blights many countries today in the t h i r d (and fourth) w o r l d .
1 3
The first task for liberal theory is to prescribe a preferred solution under an o p t i m i s t i c scenario of conditions. Unresolvable dilemmas or t r o u b l i n g indeterminacies w o u l d not be surprising under situations of tragic conflict or of extreme scarcity. But acceptable versions of liberal theory should be able to differentiate
50
51
ï»elrHîd Thought gxjMmmests
the most preferred alternative (or a subclass of equivalents) under
Figure 2. Decision Procedures
favorable conditions w h e n they are insulated f r o m these c o m p l i -
2 3 Political
Thought
Situations
Motivations
cations..
Experiments
Actual
Hypotht
Brute
1
2
Refined
4
3
Recent liberal theory has been distinctive for its thought experiments: t r a n s p o r t i n g us to an imaginary situation or t r a n s f o r m i n g our m o t i v a t i o n so that we choose p o l i t i c a l principles under con-
Category 2 transforms the situation for choice but not the m o t i -
d i t i o n s i n w h i c h only the m o r a l l y relevant factors bear on the
v a t i o n . The state of nature i n Robert N o z i c k ' s Anarchy,
decision. T w o kinds of imaginary devices have been e m p l o y e d —
Utopia
changes i n the s i t u a t i o n of choice and changes in the m o t i v a t i o n
there should be a state at all to the "best anarchic s i t u a t i o n one
( w i t h i n w h i c h I include filtering requirements by w h i c h only cer-
reasonably c o u l d hope f o r . ' " The motivations of people i n this
tain m o t i v a t i o n s are selected, w h i l e the rest are prevented f r o m
state of nature are not altered; they must be given a realistic
bearing o n the decision). W h e n the m o t i v a t i o n for choosing p r i n -
construction. We are to assume that some w o u l d j o i n
1
State
and
is a g o o d example. We are to take the question whether 1
protec-
ciples has been altered or filtered i n the interests of i m p a r t i a l i t y , (
t i o n associations v o l u n t a r i l y ; others w o u l d choose to be indepen-
w i l l classify i t as " r e f i n e d " ; when people choose, or are imagined
dent. As we w i l t see later, a major problem facing N o z i c k ' s argu-
to choose, w i t h unaltered m o t i v a t i o n (as, realistically, we w o u l d
ment is whether his scenario for the m i n i m a l state is compatible
expect t h e m to do i n actual life), 1 w i l l classify those m o t i v a t i o n s
w i t h a realistic construction of people's preferences—whether,
as " b r u t e . " W h e n the situation for choosing principles is the one
particular, independents w o u l d be fully "compensated" i n being
in w h i c h those w h o must abide by the principles live together
forced to j o i n the state.
in
5
as an o n g o i n g enterprise, i w i l l classify it as an " a c t u a l - " choice
Category 3 transforms not only the situation, as i n category 2,
s i t u a t i o n . W h e n the situation for choice is an imaginary one, held
but also the m o t i v a t i o n s for choice in that situation. For example,
to be m o r a l l y relevant, but not the situation in w h i c h those w h o
in Rawls's o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n , agents are to choose principles of
must abide by the principles must live together as an o n g o i n g
justice so as to m a x i m i z e their shares of p r i m a r y goods w i t h o u t
enterprise, 1 w i l l term it " h y p o t h e t i c a l . " These distinctions are
k n o w i n g w h o i n particular they w i l l t u r n out to be once the veil
represented i n figure 2.
of ignorance is l i f t e d . They are endowed w i t h an abstract prefer-
2
A n example of category i is offered by actual-consent theory.
ence for p r i m a r y goods regardless of the details of their actual life
A c c o r d i n g to this approach, if people consent in real life, they are
plans; they w i l l k n o w the latter only after the principles o f justice
obligated to u p h o l d the state; if enough (whatever that means)
have been chosen. I n Ackerman's spaceship dialogues, entrants
do actually consent, then the state is held to be legitimate and,
to a new w o r l d argue over the d i s t r i b u t i o n of " m a n n a " t h r o u g h a
somehow, everyone is obligated. M o t i v a t i o n and situation are as 3
filtering device for relevant arguments (the " n e u t r a l i t y " assump-
we find t h e m . N e i t h e r Is subjected to some t r a n s f o r m a t i o n in the
t i o n ) . The perfectly sympathetic spectator of the classical u t i l i -
name of i m p a r t i a l i t y or moral relevance.
tarians has b o t h an imaginary vantage p o i n t (omniscience) and a
6
52
S3
The Q u e s t f o r Consent
Strategies of ^e^onstructioii
postulated m o t i v a t i o n (he reproduces in himself every pain and
2.4 and 2.5. The difficulties in category 3, the main focus of recent
pleasure in the w o r l d and, hence, w i l l prefer states of the w o r l d
theoretical activity in liberalism, w i l l be our subject in sections
that m a x i m i z e the net balance o f pleasure over pain).
2.6 and 2.7. Last, the o p p o r t u n i t y represented by category 4 w i l l
O f the possibilities presented in figure 2, the basic difficulty
be our subject i n part 3.
w i t h the t o p - r o w categories ( I and 2) is that they are subject to i n d o c t r i n a t i o n problems, while the basic difficulty w i t h the right-
2.4 Category
c o l u m n categories (2 and 3) is that they are subject to j u r i s d i c t i o n
1: The Quest for
Consent
problems. The only possibility offering a prospect for avoiding
In the simplest of our four categories (box I i n figure 2), we are
b o t h is category 4 (the l e f t - b o t t o m quadrant). M y proposal is an
dealing w i t h brute preferences and an actual, rather than a hypo-
instance of that approach.
thetical, s i t u a t i o n . M y basic c l a i m about the " b r u t e " categories
A similar p o i n t can be made about our other criteria. Consider
(whether actual as in box 1 or hypothetical as in box 2) w i l l be that
the varieties of actual-consent theory that fit in category 1, T h e
they are rendered vulnerable to i n d o c t r i n a t i o n problems by their
p r o b l e m w i t h universal express-consent w i l l t u r n out to be that
lack of a refinement mechanism for purging motivations of bias.
it violates c r i t e r i o n 1(b) in section 2 . 1 . As W o l f f shows, to re-
Their v u l n e r a b i l i t y takes the f o r m of a dilemma: n o t h i n g in the
q u i r e that everyone expressly agree to the state is to require the
strategy rules out extreme efforts at i n d o c t r i n a t i o n , but w i t h o u t
b l i n d alley of philosophical anarchism. Alternatively, the p r o b l e m
such i n d o c t r i n a t i o n , the strategy cannot plausibly be interpreted
w i t h universal tacit consent w i l l t u r n out to be that it violates
as leading to determinate results that satisfy our other criteria, in
c r i t e r i o n 1(a). In order to get everyone committed to support-
particular, criteria I and 2 — t h e requirements that our theory be
ing the state, the criteria for consent are loosened to the p o i n t
nonvacuous, that it avoid b l i n d alleys, and that it produce obliga-
that v i r t u a l l y any state can c l a i m universal consent. Such an ap-
tions that are i n d i v i d u a l l y b i n d i n g . Together, these criteria require
proach produces vacuous results by legitimating v i r t u a l l y every-
some differentiated solutions and bind us to them.
t h i n g . F u r t h e r m o r e , the problem w i t h nonuniversal tacit consent
The basic p r o b l e m w i t h category 1 is that it is vulnerable,
w i l l t u r n out to be that it violates c r i t e r i o n 2(a). W i t h i n the con-
genericaliy, to i n d o c t r i n a t i o n problems. Furthermore, each ver-
fines of actual-consent theory, those w h o d o n ' t consent have no
sion of category i w i l l fail one aspect or another of our first t w o
reason to believe themselves obligated to uphold the law. T h e
criteria.
i n d i v i d u a l l y - b i n d i n g criterion is not satisfied because the obligat i o n is not universal. By contrast, the p r o b l e m w i t h
hypothetical
Recall that all four categories concern decision situations (real or imagined) for j u s t i f y i n g a state, either by choosing the state (or
contract theories w i l l t u r n out to be that w h i l e they may satisfy c r i -
its basic character) e x p l i c i t l y or by choosing the principles that
teria I and 2, they violate criterion 3. They are inherently subject
justify i t . For theories i n each of our four categories, it is i m p o r -
to j u r i s d i c t i o n a l challenge.
tant to ask whether the choice i n question must be unanimous,
But i n h i n t i n g at h o w some main strategies violate one or another o f our criteria, we are j u m p i n g ahead of ourselves.
Let
us t u r n to each category in greater detail, The rest of this b o o k
and w h a t k i n d of agreement or consent is required of each participant (whether or not the n o t i o n of agreement is interpreted strictly, an issue I w i l l attempt to refine further b e l o w ) .
is largely organized around the possibilities presented in figure 2.
W i t h these distinctions i n m i n d , my basic point about cate-
1! he difficulties in categories I and 2 w i l l be our subject in sections
gory 1 theories w i l l be that they are, as a general matter, subject
54
S t r a t e g i e s ©f K e t s n s f i m t i M
Figure 3. Options in Category I
all issues of public decision: "Since by the rule of u n a n i m i t y a
CATEGORY 1 THKORIES (subject to indoctrination problems violating criterion 4)
Normnamnious (violates criterion 2)
55
The Quest f o r Consent
single negative vote defeats any m o t i o n , the slightest disagreement over significant questions w i l l b r i n g the operations of the society
A
to a halt. It w i l l cease to f u n c t i o n as a political c o m m u n i t y and fall
Unanimous J \ Loose (violates Strict (violates criterion 1 fa|) criterion l [ b j )
legitimacy; a de facto government may of course emerge and take
into a c o n d i t i o n of anarchy (or at least into a c o n d i t i o n of n o n control)."
2
Given a realistic construction of the variety of preferences i n a m o d e r n large-scale society, it is implausible to suppose that unanimous voluntary agreement w i l l maintain itself. Once it breaks
to i n d o c t r i n a t i o n problems. I n a d d i t i o n , they are vulnerable to
d o w n , the prescription that results—namely,
v i o l a t i o n s o f one or another of our other criteria, as shown i n
relevant co our p r o b l e m of differentiating among states. For this
figure
J.
anarchism—is
ir-
reason, the requirement for unanimous consent i n the strict sense
I heories fitting category 1 either require unanimous agreement or s u p p o r t , or they do not. If they do not, then they are vulner-
can be taken as a v i o l a t i o n of criterion 1(b), the no-blind-alleys requirement.
able to c r i t e r i o n 2 because they lose their individually b i n d i n g
O f course, we m i g h t imagine a coercive system of collective
character. If they do require unanimous agreement, then if that
brainwashing that produced near-perfect homogeneity of prefer-
agreement is loose, m y claim w i l l be that i t leads to violations
ences, perhaps o n the order approaching w h a t w o u l d be required
of c r i t e r i o n 1(a), by p r o d u c i n g vacuous results. It legitimates t o o m u c h to differentiate among states. O n the other hand, i f the n o t i o n of agreement required is strict, then i t leads to violations of c r i t e r i o n 1(b) by, i n effect, r u l i n g o u t all the possibilities and creating a b l i n d alley.
to support c o n t i n u i n g u n a n i m i t y in the large-scale nation-state. But such a system, even if it were successful, w o u l d not produce unanimous v o l u n t a r y agreement. It could realistically be m a i n tained only t h r o u g h systematic m a n i p u l a t i o n and coercion, issues to w h i c h we w i l l r e t u r n i n part 3. In any case, a choice situation
i w i l l attempt to illustrate these difficulties by briefly exam-
that requires coercive collective thought c o n t r o l to s u p p o r t its
i n i n g some particular theories e x e m p l i f y i n g each alternative. A
conclusions exemplifies the other h o r n of our d i l e m m a : its results
g o o d example of a theory r e q u i r i n g actual unanimous agreement
are delegitimated because they rest on i n d o c t r i n a t i o n , thereby-
in the strict sense is Robert Paul W o l f f ' s argument for a system
violating c r i t e r i o n 4.
o f " u n a n i m o u s direct democracy" where "every member of the society w i l l s freely every law w h i c h is actually passed." The resultis that "he is only confronted as a citizen w i t h laws to w h i c h he has consented."
1
H o w e v e r , as W o l f f rightly admits, this solution "requires the
Suppose, however, that the no-agreement p o i n t were interpreted not as the b r e a k d o w n or cessation of the legitimate state (as in the passage quoted above), but simply as the c o n t i n u a t i o n of the status quo combined w i t h nonpassage of whatever policy produced disagreement. This possibility brings into relief some
i m p o s i t i o n of impossibly restrictive conditions w h i c h make it ap-
i m p o r t a n t differences between
plicable only to a rather bizarre variety of actual situations." The
situations. We can plausibly interpret an appropriately designed
reason is that we must imagine c o n t i n u i n g perfect agreement o n
hypothetical situation as a one-time-only event w i t h m o r a l rele-
hypothetical- and actual-choice
56
57
The Quest foF Consent
Strategies of R e i o r s s t r y s f i e n
vancc f o r whatever p o p u l a t i o n the situation is invoked. AH of
earlier decisions, and the consequences of policy omissions
those w h o are b o r n or enter the society at whatever time can par-
not consequences to w h i c h they have consented.' T h e b r e a k d o w n
ticipate i n the very same thought experiment: they can all imagine
of unanimous consent confronts such a theory w i t h violations of
themselves in Rawis's original p o s i t i o n , or in Ackerman's neu-
criterion 2. If I have not actually consented to such a law, h o w ,
are
tral dialogues, or they can all delegate the choice of principles to
w i t h i n the confines of this k i n d of actual consent theory, am 1
the same imaginary u t i l i t a r i a n spectator, There is no problem of
supposed to be b o u n d to u p h o l d it? W o l f f abandons this o p t i o n
past actual p a r t i c i p a t i o n not a p p l y i n g to new members ( i n c l u d -
because it is not t r u l y compatible w i t h i n d i v i d u a l autonomy. Be-
ing n e w l y b o r n ones) as compared to o l d ones; no one actually
cause his assumptions lead h i m to take strict unanimous choice
p a r t i c i p a t e d i n any of these imaginary scenarios, in any case.
seriously, he is led to anarchism and, hence, in our scheme, to
By contrast, actual-choice theories face the p r o b l e m that new
violations of c r i t e r i o n 1(b) (the blind-alley c r i t e r i o n ) .
members are b o r n , o l d ones die; new members arrive, o l d ones
The basic p o i n t is that if we interpret the u n a n i m i t y rule strictly,
leave. W h a t has unanimous support at one time may not have it
for an actual, o n g o i n g society rather than for a one-time-only
at another. Even if, somehow, the laws on the books were passed
hypothetical s i t u a t i o n , i t does not provide the basis for differen-
unanimously, there is no guarantee, as time goes o n , that each per-
tiating choices among nation-states.
son w i l l be " o n l y confronted as a citizen w i t h laws to w h i c h he has
conclude that the rule, w h e n taken seriously, implies anarchism.
consented." W h a t relevance does the unanimous consent of past
Alternatively, if unanimous agreement is given a looser interpre-
generations have to him? Ele is "subject to the w i l l of a n o t h e r "
tation, it is possible to escape anarchism and provide a basis for
just as m u c h as if he were an outvoted m i n o r i t y in a decision taken
morally acceptable states. The difficulty is that to get c o n t i n u -
in the present."'
ing unanimous agreement under realistic conditions, agreement
Rather, W o l f f is correct to
A related p o i n t is that policy omissions (failures to adopt new
or consent has to be defined so loosely that it provides no basis for
policies) can be just as salient and burdensome as policy commis-
differentiating conclusions. Rather, agreement defined so loosely
sions (the a d o p t i o n of new policies). There may be
unexpected
w o u l d legitimate a host of states indiscriminately. Relying on loose
emergencies, new issues, new requirements for action. The most
unanimous agreement w i l l lead, if taken seriously, to violations of
i m p o r t a n t issues of the moment may never have been previously
criterion '1(a), the nonvacuousness requirement.
decided, or even formulated as matters for public debate. The una-
The difficulties that lie d o w n this road are suggested by Locke's
n i m i t y rule, by g i v i n g everyone a veto, holds each of us hostage to
loosening of w h a t we have been calling strict agreement i n the
the w i l l of any other person w h o m i g h t block the required action.'
definition of tacit consent, as eventually developed i n the
1
As W o l f f makes clear, the special attraction of the u n a n i m i t y rule is that i t defines a system where "every member . . . w i l l s freely every law w h i c h is actually passed." As a result, he has " c o n s e n t e d " to every law w i t h w h i c h he is " c o n f r o n t e d . " H o w ever, once b o t h new issues and new members are taken into account, i t becomes implausible to claim that c o n t i n u i n g whatever policies were previously passed preserves unanimous s u p p o r t , at least for those policies. N e w generations were not party to those
Second
Treatise: The difficulty is, what ought to be look'ci upon as a tacit Consent. . . . And to this I say that every Man that hath any Possession or Enjoyment of any part of the Dominions of any Government doth thereby give his tacit Consent, and is as far forth obliged to Obedience to the laws of that Government, during such Enjoyment, as any one under it; whether this his Possession be of Land to him and his Heirs for ever, or a Lodging only for a Week; or whether it be barely travelling freely
m
S t r a t e g i e s of
Seconstrtístien
59
H i e Q » e s î for Consent
on the Highway; and, in Effect, it reaches as far as the very beans?; of anyone within the Territories of that Government/ 1
u n a n i m i t y i n a sense loose enough to legitimate some m o d e r n nation-states w o u l d legitimate too many to be useful for our purposes. W i t h i n the confines of unanimous-actual-choice theory, we
Once tacit consent is defined so broadly that receiving any bene-
are faced w i t h v i o l a t i n g either criterion 1(a) or c r i t e r i o n
fit—simply
using the king's highways, or even "the very being
in effect, the choice of l e g i t i m a t i n g too m u c h or of l e g i t i m a t i n g
of anyone w i t h i n the Territories of that Government"—-counts as
too little. One alternative, of course, w o u l d be to abandon the
consent, i t does become plausible to claim that the conditions for
u n a n i m i t y requirement entirely.
unanimous tacit consent can be continually fulfilled under real-
Eiowever, nonunanimous
1(b)—
versions of category 1 only seem to
istic conditions in a modern large-scale nation-state. So long as
encounter a d d i t i o n a l difficulties. Unanimous agreements, at least
someone has not explicitly rejected the state's l e g i t i m a c y — a n d
when undertaken v o l u n t a r i l y , appear to b i n d everyone w h o is
attempted to leave the country so as to relieve himself of all obliga-
party to them and, in that sense, provide a certain i m m u n i t y f r o m
tions to it—-he can be counted w i t h i n the f r a m e w o r k of tacit con-
further controversy. If acts of consent produce obligations in the
sent defined so loosely. As H a n n a Pitkin concludes in her critique
way that promises d o , then if everyone has consented, everyone is
of this d o c t r i n e of tacit consent, few states w o u l d be ruled out
obligated. We have at least some grounds for c o m m i t t i n g everyone
by this strategy: "Being w i t h i n the t e r r i t o r y of the w o r s t tyranny
to whatever policies and/or system was consented to—-regardless
in the w o r l d seems to constitute tacit consent to it and create an
of whatever else they m i g h t advocate.*
o b l i g a t i o n to obey i t . O n l y physical w i t h d r a w a l - — e m i g r a t i o n —
This basis for countering rival prescriptions seems to vanish
and the abandoning of all p r o p e r t y frees you f r o m that o b l i g a t i o n ;
once u n a n i m i t y breaks d o w n (or if it is never achieved). W h y
there is no such t h i n g as tacit dissent"
should / be obligated because you
The
(emphasis in o r i g i n a l ) .
7
consented, any more than I
basic difficulty is that w h e n agreement is interpreted
w o u l d be obligated because you promised? Even i f my v i e w is a
loosely, i t is plausible to include everyone in the state i n the
m i n o r i t y one, u n t i l we get some justification for s u b m i t t i n g the
agreement, but v i r t u a l l y no state is ruled o u t ; by contrast, w h e n
matter to m a j o r i t y rule (or to some other nonunanimous decision
agreement is interpreted strictly, it becomes implausible to include
rule), m y v i e w cannot be dispatched by c i t i n g the greater numbers
everyone i n the agreement, so v i r t u a l l y every state is ruled out (by
w h o support a rival view.'' The numerically predominant v i e w has
the requirement for u n a n i m i t y ) . Unanimous actual agreement is
often been m o r a l l y suspect and may well be in the f u t u r e .
far t o o d e m a n d i n g a c o n d i t i o n to provide the basis for conclusions
10
Consider w h a t happens to actual-consent theory once the i n -
among m o d e r n nation-states under realistic c o n d i -
evitability of nonconsent on the part of many is acknowledged
tions. A t the very least, realistic conditions w i l l require that there
—once, i n other w o r d s , the quest for u n a n i m i t y is abandoned.
be numerous complex questions affecting large numbers of people
Joseph Tussman's p o s i t i o n offers a good i l l u s t r a t i o n . He argues
w h o have c o n f l i c t i n g interests at stake, and c o n f l i c t i n g conscien-
that obligations to the state must derive f r o m the model of a
differentiating
tious o p i n i o n s about the result. Under such conditions, we cannot
" v o l u n t a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n " ; his argument builds o n the v i e w " t h a t
expect perfect u n a n i m i t y to m a i n t a i n itself v o l u n t a r i l y over time,
obligations are, or even must be, voluntarily assumed." H o w e v e r ,
inevitably, disagreements w i l l arise, b o t h about w h a t decisions
he is forced to c o n f r o n t the fact that
o u g h t to be made and about h o w people ought to make t h e m . To require c o n t i n u i n g u n a n i m i t y in the strict sense w o u l d effec-
any d e s c r i p t i o n o f a b o d y p o l i t i c , like the U n i t e d States, w o u l d have to
tively rule out the modern nation-state; to require c o n t i n u i n g
recognize that there are some, o r many, " c i t i z e n s " w h o c o u l d n o t be
60
S t r a t e g i e s of
l&eiotistrustion
?He Q u e s t f o r Consent
described as h a v i n g consented. There is no p o i n t to r e s o r t i n g to f i c t i o n
[engc i n c r i t e r i o n 2. If only some people consent, then it seems
to conceal this fact. It makes m o r e sense to speak o f the social c o m -
exceedingly problematical that those w h o do not consent w o u l d
pact as an ideal w h i c h is never completely realized. N o n - c o n s e n t i n g
be i n d i v i d u a l l y b o u n d to u p h o l d the result.
a d u l t citizens are, i n effect, like m i n o r s w h o are governed w i t h o u t t h e i r o w n consent. T h e p e r i o d o f tutelage and dependence is u n d u l y p r o l o n g e d . A n d this . . . is a failure o f p o l i t i c a l e d u c a t i o n .
!i
Tussman has simply attempted to w o r k t h r o u g h the i m p l i c a tions of the primacy that "consent of the g o v e r n e d "
It is arguable that actual-consent theory encounters these difficulties
because it is being employed to solve too m u c h . C o n -
sent is deeply r o o t e d in Western, especially A m e r i c a n , p o l i t i c a l ideology, i n the Declaration of Independence we are told about
(conceived
"Governments . . . d e r i v i n g their just powers f r o m the consent of
as actual, v o l u n t a r y agreement) has i n American p o l i t i c a l culture.
the governed." By being employed to solve " t o o m u c h , " I mean
B u t the result is an incoherent theory of political o b l i g a t i o n be-
that consent theory is being employed to address t w o separate
cause of w h a t he calls the " s h r i n k a g e " of the body p o l i t i c to a
questions simultaneously. W h i c h states are more legitimate or
subgroup of the politically self- conscious. Their agreement cannot
morally appropriate than others? and W h y am 1 (or any other
obligate the others any more than my promise could obligate y o u .
member) obligated to obey or u p h o l d the authority of my state?
If there were some magic percentage beyond w h i c h support
In other w o r d s , consent theory is c o m m o n l y applied (a) to the
was w i d e l y , and justifiably, acknowledged to be b i n d i n g on every-
social-choice p r o b l e m of evaluating and c o m p a r i n g states and
one, then the shrinkage problem w o u l d not undermine nonunani-
(b) to the individual-choice problem of establishing one's linkage
mous actual agreements as a fundamental basis for p o l i t i c a l p r i n -
to the state t h r o u g h p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n . There is, as we w i l l see
ciples. But there Is no such magic percentage. It is certainly not
in part 3, a natural connection between these t w o questions. But
50 percent plus 1 ( m a j o r i t y rule). M a j o r i t i e s , like other w i n n i n g
actual-consent theory provides too slim a basis for resolving b o t h
coalitions, can sanction or support unjustified and drastic actions
simultaneously.
whose consequences are felt by losing coalitions. F r o m M a d i s o n ,
The difficulty is that if consent is to serve as a self -sufficient
Tocqueville, and M i l l to the present, avoiding the possibilities f o r
response to the individual-choice problem of political o b l i g a t i o n ,
t y r a n n y of the m a j o r i t y has been one of the central tasks of m o d -
it is rendered v i r t u a l l y useless as a self-sufficient response to the
ern
democratic theory. - Increasing the percentage required for
social-choice p r o b l e m of comparing states. The reason for this
a p p r o v a l does not solve the p r o b l e m ; it only makes passage of new
c o n u n d r u m is, basically, that if actual consent is to provide a
policies o r legislation more d i f f i c u l t - — w h i c h means more people
basis for everyone's p o l i t i c a l obligations to the state, then every-
may be frustrated by having to experience the consequences of an
one must have consented. Something approaching unanimous or
u n w a n t e d status q u o .
1
O f course, once a system has been estab-
universal consent is required. But if unanimous consent is given a
lished, those w h o are already bound to it for whatever reason
strict i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , then, as W o l f f illustrates, v i r t u a l l y all states
may then find that they are also bound to u p h o l d m a j o r i t a r i a n -
are ruled out. O n the other hand, if unanimous consent is given
approved results f r o m w h i c h they dissent. But we are p r o b i n g
a loose i n t e r p r e t a t i o n — l o o s e enough to apply to everyone, say,
arguments about the fundamental issue of w h a t binds them to the
w i t h i n the t e r r i t o r y (so as to get them all obligated to obey the
system i n the first place. W h a t these points amount t o , at bot-
state)-—then meaningful differentiations among states are lost (as
t o m , is that nonunanimous-actual-consent
theory, in a v o i d i n g the
we saw w i t h Locke's loosening of tacit consent), i t is always, of
problems w i t h criteria 1(a) and 1(b), faces a fundamental chai-
course, possible to abandon the u n a n i m i t y requirement, but that
u
62
63
t h e Quest for Consent
Strategies of S e i o n s t u j i t i e n
w o u l d produce an incoherent theory of political o b l i g a t i o n (one
t 0
it w h i l e , at the same time, a d m i t t i n g that not everyone had
in w h i c h 1 a m obligated because you consented). W h a t this shows
c0
is that the aspiration overreaches to employ actual-consent theory
leading to violations of c r i t e r i o n 2.
simultaneously as the basis for b o t h the social choice-problem of
n s e n t e d , an incoherent account of political o b l i g a t i o n resulted, But perhaps the basis for mora! prescriptions in a given society
evaluating states and the individual-choice problem of his p o l i t i -
is not every individual's
cal o b l i g a t i o n . Actual-consent theory certainly may have a role,
standings of the society. W h i l e every single i n d i v i d u a l has not
but if cannot be employed to provide the sufficient conditions for
consented to those understandings, they are widely acknowledged
the s o l u t i o n of b o t h problems at the same t i m e .
14
By contrast, theories of hypothetical—as opposed to actual-—
consent but the collective, shared under-
and their status as shared conventions m i g h t arguably s u p p o r t their a p p l i c a t i o n to the society in question. In this way, some
consent may be employed for b o t h problems. They can, in a sense,
variation of nonunanimous-actual-consent
apply universally to everyone w i t h i n a t e r r i t o r y , w h i l e at the same
ployed for social-choice judgments about the legitimacy of the
t i m e y i e l d i n g differentiating conclusions. Rawis's theory of justice
state w i t h o u t also being required for individual-choice judgments
is a p r i m e example. It purports to provide distinctive, significant
of p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n . I n a way, this o p t i o n can be t h o u g h t of
conclusions and it ties those conclusions to a k i n d of c o n s e n t —
as an attempt to employ nonunanimous-consent
they are the conclusions we ourselves w o u l d supposedly reach, to
evaluation of the state, w h i l e relinquishing the previous a m b i t i o n
the extent that we were rational and to the extent that we judged
to provide a theory of p o l i t i c a l obligation as well (or at least one
the p r o b l e m under ideally fair conditions.
that relies o n the analogy between acts of consent and promises).
But Rawis's theory does not affect the conclusions just reached
M i c h a e l Walzer's argument in Spheres
theory m i g h t be em-
theory for the
of Justice
exemplifies
about actual-consent theory, i n Rawis's theory, universal consent
this strategy.
w i t h i n the t e r r i t o r y is achieved only t h r o u g h a scenario that de-
this k i n d , it can usefully illustrate the difficulties i n this general
parts f r o m the l i m i t s of realism. The purely imaginary character
a p p r o a c h — b r u t e actual-choice theories that are nonunanimous
of the scenario renders it vulnerable to j u r i s d i c t i o n problems f r o m
in their requirements.
r i v a l scenarios that also p u r p o r t to tell us w h a t we w o u l d , r a t i o -
qualitatively distinct "social goods" and that " i n t e r n a l " to our
nally, choose under fair or i m p a r t i a l c o n d i t i o n s — b u t w i t h slight
"shared u n d e r s t a n d i n g " of each good are criteria for its d i s t r i -
variations i n the notions of rationality or i m p a r t i a l i t y . As we w i l l
b u t i o n w i t h i n its o w n sphere. " T y r a n n y " occurs w h e n a given
see below, any differentiating conclusions that result can easily be
good is d i s t r i b u t e d for reasons irrelevant to those c r i t e r i a , t y p i -
evaded by r i v a l constructions of the hypothetical story. W h a t we
cally t h r o u g h c o m m a n d over other goods ( f r o m another sphere)
are t e r m i n g category 3 theories such as Rawis's have the merit
w h i c h are " d o m i n a n t , " such as capital. T h u s , medieval Christians
that they may satisfy criteria 1 and 2 but they are genericalty
condemned the sin of simony, for example, because "the mean-
vulnerable to c r i t e r i o n 3, j u r i s d i c t i o n problems.
ing of a particular social g o o d , ecclesiastical office, excluded its
R e t u r n i n g to category
1 and variations o n actual-consent
15
Because i t is the most sophisticated recent effort of
sale and p u r c h a s e . "
17
16
Walzer's central c l a i m is that there are
Similar objections apply to p r o s t i t u t i o n and
theory, the nonunanimous-choice strategies ran into trouble be-
b r i b e r y ; given certain "shared understandings" about h o w sexual
cause they employed consent as the basis for p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n as
gratification and p o l i t i c a l power are supposed to be d i s t r i b u t e d ,
well as for a theory of the legitimate state. Because they proposed
the i n t r u s i o n of money is a m o r a l l y irrelevant determinant, one
that we regard everyone w i t h i n the state's territory as obligated
that perverts those shared understandings.
S t r a t e g i e s o i ResBiistruitissn
64
The Quest f o r Consent
65
Walzcr believes that a distinctive theory of justice can be devel-
nels for p o l i t i c a l expression, and how to adjudicate disputes. We
oped f r o m the mere fact of shared understandings about the ap-
lack shared understandings of a methodological k i n d about h o w
p r o p r i a t e spheres of each social g o o d , combined w i t h the require-
to interpret and choose among whatever shared understandings
ment that these spheres be respected, "justice is relative
to social
may actually exist in our culture. Except where there is complete
simply
agreement, rival notions each w i l l have a f o o t h o l d . For the theory
Obviously, everything de-
to yield any determinate content, we w o u l d require criteria for
pends on the "shared understandings" about each g o o d and its
choosing a m o n g rival accounts of otir shared m o r a l notions. W i t h -
respective sphere in a given culture. Walzer's book is organized
out such c r i t e r i a , the theory is threatened w i t h silence i n the face
m e a n i n g s " a n d , indeed, " i n matters of m o r a l i t y , argument is the appeal to common
meanings."
18
a r o u n d his list of goods: membership, security and welfare, money and c o m m o d i t i e s , office, hard w o r k , free time, education, k i n s h i p and
love, d i v i n e grace, r e c o g n i t i o n , and political power. Is this
an exhaustive list? W o u l d we all interpret our shared understandings about the spheres of justice this way? Others have proposed quite different lists of the p r i m a r y social goods whose d i s t r i b u t i o n defines the p r o b l e m of justice. For the design of i n s t i t u t i o n s , Rawls's list reduces to liberty, equal o p p o r t u n i t y , and income and wealth.
! y
H a r o l d Lassweil, in a famous analysis, proposed power,
enlightenment, w e a l t h , well-being, s k i l l , affection, rectitude, and deference. '' 2
of serious m o r a l controversy. But such criteria cannot be developed w i t h o u t abandoning the reliance on relativism, on n o t h i n g more than the sheer fact of shared understandings. Once the possibility of a manipulated or indoctrinated consensus is acknowledged, any claims that this k i n d of theory c o u l d satisfy c r i t e r i o n 2 are e x p l o d e d . U n a n i m i t y about shared understandings is unrealistic and is not claimed by the theory. But then the issue arises: w h y should those w h o disagree be b o u n d by the consensus? If there were machinery in the theory to give us c o n f i dence about h o w the consensus was arrived at, then perhaps there could be some basis for resolving this issue. But such machinery
There are t w o m a i n difficulties w i t h this general strategy of
w o u l d , by d e f i n i t i o n , take us outside the confines of category 1
appealing to shared (but not unanimously shared) understand-
(the actual-brute category) because preferences w o u l d no longer
ings. T h e first is: h o w are we to decide between rival lists and
be merely brute. There is no such machinery in Walzer's theory,
rival understandings of their appropriate spheres? For Walzer, this
nor could there be w i t h o u t some radical change in its basic charac-
issue seems relatively s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d . It comes d o w n to a p r o b -
ter. But w i t h o u t such machinery, there are no grounds for b i n d i n g
lem o f social a n t h r o p o l o g y — a n investigation and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
dissenters to a consensus that is open to delegitimating charges of
of shared understandings about social goods and their b o u n d -
m a n i p u l a t i o n . W h y should such dissenters defer to the consensus
aries in a particular culture. H e treats the whole issue of choosing
unless there are grounds for being confident in the greater r a t i o -
a m o n g rival notions in the same culture parenthetically: " ( W h e n
nality of its collective process? W i t h such grounds, we w o u l d have
people disagree about the meaning of social goods, w h e n under-
a different kmc! of t h e o r y .
standings are controversial, then justice requires that the society
basis for responding to c r i t e r i o n 2.
22
W i t h o u t such grounds, we have no
be f a i t h f u l to the disagreements, p r o v i d i n g institutional channels
W h a t Walzer's relativism does to his attack on t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m
for their expression, adjudicative mechanisms, and alternative dis-
reveals a second major difficulty w i t h the general strategy. W i t h i n
tributions.)"
this relativistic f r a m e w o r k , there can be no criteria, except shared
2 1
Yet there w i l l also be g o o d - f a i t h disagreements about h o w (if
understandings w i t h i n the culture, for the alteration and m a n i p u -
at all) to resolve disagreements i n g o o d f a i t h , h o w to design chan-
lation of that culture. It is for this reason that it is appropriate for
S t r a t e g i e s ef
Sealisîk
Mewmtmsiïm
Hyjîatîtsîksb
us to treat Walzer's theory as a p r i m e example of category .1, the
We require transcultural criteria for the alteration and permis-
reliance on brute-actual preferences ( " b r u t e " because there are no
sible m a n i p u l a t i o n of m o r a l cultures. But such criteria must do
criteria f o r p r o t e c t i n g or refining the f o r m a t i o n of preferences;
more than simply reflect whatever understandings happen to be
" a c t u a l " because it is the existing consensus w h i c h must provide
shared w i t h i n those cultures at a given t i m e . The strategy 1 w i l l
the basis for argument).
propose in part 3 is, in part, a response to this problem because
T h e central p o l i t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n of the book is supposed to be
it focuses on the conditions under w h i c h values and preferences
the c o n d e m n a t i o n of t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m . However, imagine a t o t a l i -
develop. W i t h o u t criteria directed at this latter p r o b l e m , actual-
tarian regime that happens to succeed in the task that many
choice theories are vulnerable to the basic d i l e m m a : either they
have a t t e m p t e d — b r a i n w a s h i n g its citizens into accepting a set
fail to yield determinate implications or they yield determinate
o f shared understandings about the proper sphere of its p o l i t i -
implications only by the k i n d of manufactured consensus that
cal power. Once such shared understandings are accepted, there
renders t h e m vulnerable to i n d o c t r i n a t i o n problems.
are no grounds w i t h i n the confines of relativism to condemn the regime. The expansion of political power o n t o virtually every other sphere of life (as the boundaries were previously d r a w n ) cannot n o w constitute " t y r a n n y , " by definition, once that expansion is supported by the culture's shared understandings.
2.5 Category
2: Realistic
Hypotheticals
In category 2 of figure 2, there is a m o r a l l y relevant h y p o t h e t i -
Thus,
cal story about the choice of the state or the choice of the first
once an O r w e l l i a n regime operates perfectly, once it succeeds in
principles by w h i c h the state should be evaluated. The story is
t o t a l l y m a n i p u l a t i n g its o w n political culture, its t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m
imaginary, but the people are realistic in a special sense; they are
is transmuted i n t o justice by the relativistic strategy of relying en-
as we w o u l d find them in actual life under conditions where no
25
tirety o n shared understandings. Rather than p r o v i d i n g us w i t h the u l t i m a t e grounds for c o n d e m n i n g t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m , this relativistic t h e o r y of justice has laid the g r o u n d w o r k for its defense—prov i d e d only that thought control and propaganda are sufficientlv effective.
refinement mechanisms have been employed to purge their m o t i vations of bias or i n d o c t r i n a t i o n . I n this respect, the people are no different than they were in category I . Brute preferences are combined w i t h an imaginary story w h i c h , for some reason contended by the theorist, is m o r a l l y relevant to us i n that it bears
M a n y o f the most d i s t u r b i n g cases of injustice and e x p l o i -
on our evaluation of the state. As in category 1 , my basic line of
t a t i o n involve acceptance by the victims of the ideology ratio-
argument for category 2 w i l l be that w i t h o u t i n d o c t r i n a t i o n , brute
n a l i z i n g their v i c t i m h o o d . Provided that those ideologies are ac-
preferences produce sufficient disagreements and indeterminacies
cepted w i t h i n a given culture, a consistent relativism provides no
that they lead to failures to differentiate ( v i o l a t i n g c r i t e r i o n I ) ,
grounds f o r contrary evaluation. The same argument that B a r r i n g -
but that w i t h i n d o c t r i n a t i o n , they violate c r i t e r i o n 4.
ton M o o r e applied to Untouchables, ascetics, and even some con-
I w i l t focus on interpretations of category 2 that strive for una-
centration camp victims can then be applied to entire regimes. '
n i m i t y or unanimous acceptability, at least in some sense, The
If an entire society is victimized by a t o t a l i t a r i a n r e g i m e — b u t
agreement or consent of people m i g h t well vary i n the extent to
its members have been t h o r o u g h l y brainwashed to accept these
w h i c h it is strict or loose, but m constructing hypothetical stories
abuses of power as l e g i t i m a t e — t h e n there are no grounds for
w i t h m o r a l relevance, we need some basis for t y i n g the a u t h o r i t y of
c o n d e m n a t i o n w i t h i n a consistent relativism. For such a theory,
the result to everyone. H y p o t h e t i c a l , nonunanimous-brute theo-
" t y r a n n y " w o u l d have become "justice."
ries w o u l d fail the i n d i v i d u a l l y - b i n d i n g c r i t e r i o n (2), just as d i d
2 1
68
Realistic H y p o t i i e t i s a l s
S t r a t e g i e s of R e c o n s t r u c t i o n
69
the actual-choice versions of nonunanimous-brute theory. W h e n
point i n the story when the person's actual preferences e x p l i c i t l y
unanimous acceptability is not achieved, we have the same p r o b -
and unambiguously support the result.
lem of j u s t i f y i n g the decision rule by w h i c h those w h o disagree
N o z i c k ' s theory strives for unanimity w i t h an extremely weak
can justifiably be overruled or ignored. If there is no further step
f o r m of strict agreement. If this f o r m is unavailable, given a real-
at w h i c h unanimous acceptability is achieved, or if no refinement
istic construction of brute preferences, then so w i l l more demand-
mechanism exists to establish the greater rationality or objectivity
i o forms. T h i s case w i l l help support a more general c l a i m : that
of the consensus (as compared to the m i n o r i t y view), then crite-
strict (voluntary) unanimous agreement is too demanding a re-
n
r i o n 2 must be violated. There is no reason to believe the result to
quirement, whether for actual or for hypothetical constructions
be i n d i v i d u a l l y b i n d i n g .
of brute preferences. We have already seen that loose interpreta-
1 w i l l take Robert N o z i c k ' s argument for the m i n i m a l state as
tions of agreement (such as Locke's doctrine of tacit consent) fail
o f f e r i n g a g o o d specimen of category 2, that is, of a hypothetical-
to yield d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g conclusions, because they can be invoked
choice theory e m p l o y i n g a realistic construction of unrefined or
by an enormous variety of states. If using the king's highways or
brute preferences. As we w i l l see, it aspires to unanimous accept-
finding yourself w i t h i n the territory is taken as tacit consent, then
a b i l i t y t h r o u g h a compensation argument.
m a i n t a i n i n g consent of the people i n such a loose sense does not
As i n the discussion of actual-consent theory, it is w o r t h dis-
do much to distinguish among states. Whether we are dealing w i t h
t i n g u i s h i n g between strict and loose interpretations of consent or
actual or hypothetical constructions of brute preferences, strict
agreement. By the strict interpretation of agreement, we mean
agreement rules out t o o m u c h , while loose agreement legitimates
consent or satisfaction w i t h the result that is explicit and unam-
too much to be of any use in satisfying our first c r i t e r i o n .
biguous to the agent as an account of his actual preferences at
A c c o r d i n g to N o z i c k , we are to take the question of whether
we
there should be a state at all to the "best anarchic s i t u a t i o n one
t h i n k a person w o u l d agree to if she were rational or if she really
reasonably could hope f o r . " The state of nature is offered as a
some identifiable p o i n t i n time. It is not a matter of w h a t
2
t h o u g h t about the issue; nor is it a matter of our interpreting cer-
m o r a l l y relevant hypothetical situation for d e t e r m i n i n g whether
tain a c t s — w h i c h the agent clearly thought she was p e r f o r m i n g
or not there should be a state. The test for whether we should have
for other reasons—as appropriate tokens of consent according to
a state is to imagine our not having one—under conditions that
our conventions. Rather, by strict agreement, we mean that she
are b o t h realistic and o p t i m i s t i c — a n d then we shall see whether a
actually d i d agree (or consent or indicate, i n terms of her actual
state w o u l d have to be introduced or invented. The imagined alter-
preferences, satisfaction w i t h the result) at some point and that
natives must be realistic, for otherwise they w o u l d not be alterna-
she k n e w precisely w h a t she was d o i n g when she d i d so. O f course,
tives bearing on our range of choice; they w o u l d not constitute,
this k i n d of strict agreement may play a role i n a hypothetical
even remotely, alternatives for us. The construction of the state of
scenario, i n w h i c h case, as part of the story, we must imagine that
nature must be o p t i m i s t i c because a pessimistic or Hobbesian ac-
the people involved actually do agree. We can also leave open the
count of the state of nature could justify almost any state (even a
possibility of a p p l y i n g strict agreement retroactively (as N o z i c k
Leviathan). The idea is that if we can justify the state in preference
does i n the doctrine of full compensation),
to the best nonstate alternative, then we w o u l d have convincingly
1
or of r e q u i r i n g that
the u n a n i m i t y be prospective (rather than merely retroactive). But if the agreement is retroactive, then there must actually come a
justified the state and, indeed, a particular k i n d of state. We are given a hypothetical history. The state could have arisen
ReatisHs H y p o i h e t U o l s
71
by the scenario N o z i c k describes; and, the argument goes, this
Let us explore the precise scenario by w h i c h N o z i c k proposes
scenario w o u l d have required no morally impermissible steps:
to justify the m i n i m a l state. It illustrates the difficulty of pre-
" i f one could show that the state w o u l d be superior even to this
serving unanimous acceptability w i t h brute preferences, realisti-
most favored situation of anarchy, the best that realistically can
cally construed. We can s i m p l i f y Nozick's story into the f o l l o w i n g
be hoped for, or w o u l d arise by a process i n v o l v i n g no m o r a l l y
four steps:
impermissible steps, or w o u l d be an improvement if it arose, this w o u l d p r o v i d e a rationale for the state's existence; it w o u l d j u s t i f y the s t a t e . "
1
B u t there are innumerable possible scenarios under w h i c h states far more extensive than N o z i c k ' s " m i n i m a l state" ( l i m i t e d i n its functions to protection against force, theft, fraud, and interference w i t h contracts) m i g h t also have come about w i t h o u t violating rights (in his sense). W i t h i n Nozick's strictly nonpaternaiistic p o s i t i o n , people even have the right, voluntarily, to sell themselves i n t o slavery or to arrange for their o w n murders.' i f they were to 1
d o so, no rights w o u l d be violated. A state whose subjects were mostly slaves (or whose rights were comparable only to those i n
j.
i n d i v i d u a l s ( w i t h rights) live in the state of nature.
2. T h e individuals in step 1 f o r m voluntary associations to protect themselves. 3. T h e associations i n step 2 sort themselves out t e r r i t o r i a l l y (so that each is d o m i n a n t in its o w n t e r r i t o r y ) , f o r m i n g an " u t t r a m i n i m a l state" (where those w h o join and pay get protected and those w h o do not, do not), 4. The u l t r a m i n i m a l state in step 3 compensates the independents i n its t e r r i t o r y so as to incorporate everyone and f o r m a m i n i m a l state. T h e " r i g h t s " assumed in step I are "side-constraints"
upon
m o d e r n t o t a l i t a r i a n societies) could have come about t h r o u g h no
action. It is not permissible to violate even one person's rights,
m o r a l l y impermissible steps. Clearly, if slavery could conceivably
regardless of whether the motive is to protect a greater number
come about t h r o u g h no morally impermissible steps, then so c o u l d
of others. N u m b e r s of rights violations are not to be compared
less drastic states more extensive than the m i n i m a l state, a p r i m e
or balanced; part of the appeal of the theory is the s i m p l i c i t y of
example being the m o d e r n welfare state. W h a t N o z i c k requires
the basic p o s i t i o n that one never violates rights.' Because even
to sort t h r o u g h these counterfactuals is not merely the claim that
one rights v i o l a t i o n w o u l d delegitimate the outcome, and because
the m i n i m a l state (and only the m i n i m a l state) could come about
the independents have the right to remain independent unless
t h r o u g h no morally impermissible steps, but that this h y p o t h e t i -
they v o l u n t a r i l y cede that right to the m i n i m a l state, the theory
cal scenario—and only this hypothetical scenario—is compatible
ends up r e q u i r i n g unanimous acceptability for the transition to
w i t h a plausible, realistic construction of w h a t we could reason-
the m i n i m a l state. As noted in step 4 above, N o z i c k attempts to
ably expect to happen i n the state of nature he describes. I n par-
accomplish this t h r o u g h a " c o m p e n s a t i o n " argument. However,
ticular, i t must be uniquely compatible w i t h a plausible, realistic
in order to remain compatible w i t h the theory's fundamental as-
c o n s t r u c t i o n of the preferences we can attribute to these i m a g i -
sumptions, compensation
nary people in his choice scenario. We are not impressed bv the
makes it a p r o x y for unanimous agreement or consent f r o m those
h y p o t h e t i c a l story that if evervone were to w i s h , voluntarily, to be-
w h o apparently disagree. A n d once compensation is interpreted
has to be interpreted i n a sense that
come slaves, then a t o t a l i t a r i a n society could come about t h r o u g h
in this way, it becomes impossible to get significant substantive
n o " m o r a l l y impermissible steps." The force of this h y p o t h e t i -
conclusions f r o m the theory. So long as a choice scenario is b o t h
cal is completely blunted by the i m p i a u s i b i l i t y of a t t r i b u t i n g such
realistic i n its construction of brute preferences and unanimous in
preferences to the people under any realistic construction.
its requirements, it w i l l simply not produce t h e m .
Realistic H y p o t h e t k s l s
S t r a t e g i e s of Itecortstructmn
For our purposes, \vc d o not need to dispute steps 1-3 j
n
73
satisfying our c r i t e r i o n 2—as a way of m a k i n g the obligations to
N o z i c k ' s tour-step scenario. These transformations depend on
s u
e m p i r i c a l assumptions about the market for protection services
this p r o b l e m may be special to N o z i c k , the general issue applies
(assumptions that we can grant for purposes of argument). But
u
if the scenario reached only so far as step 3, it w o u l d not have
p p o r t the state individually
binding.
Hence, w h i l e the details of
, any theory i n this category that m i g h t aspire to satisfy out-
conditions.
accomplished its purpose, since the so-called u l t r a - m i n i m a l state
Nozick's scenario has not produced the unique legitimacy of
is not a state at a l l . It does not satisfy a state's m i n i m u m defining
the m i n i m a l state. Instead, up to step 3, it has produced only a
feature: it cannot r i g h t f u l l y claim a m o n o p o l y over the legitimate
forced choice between a legitimate nonstate (anarchy) and an ille-
use of force in its territory.' The independents, those w h o have n o t 1
v o l u n t a r i l y joined the p r o t e c t i o n association, have the same right to e m p l o y legitimate force as does the association (the " u l t r a m i n i m a ! state"). The independents cannot be incorporated w i t h out losing a crucial right, the right to interpret and defend their o w n rights as they sec f i t — a right that N o z i c k calls "self-help enforcement." ^
gitimate state ( t h r o u g h forced i n c o r p o r a t i o n of the independents). The move f r o m step 3 to step 4 — a move that N o z i c k requires if there is to be any point to the argument—seems, at first glance, to be doubly objectionable. N o t only does it appear to violate the rights of the independents, by t a k i n g away their right to selfhelp enforcement, but it also appears to violate the rights of the members by f o r c i n g r e d i s t r i b u t i o n — f o r c i n g the members to pay
i f the association takes away this right w i t h o u t consent, then
for p r o t e c t i o n services to be given to the independents, after they
the resulting state is illegitimate, because even one rights v i o l a t i o n
are incorporated. ' N o z i c k believes, roughly, that these t w o (ap-
is enough to delegitimate the outcome (it is this characteristic of
parent) w r o n g s make the next step r i g h t . The idea is that forced
1
N o z i c k ' s theory that brings it w i t h i n the category of theories re-
i n c o r p o r a t i o n can be justified through compensation. O n the one
q u i r i n g unanimous acceptability). But if the independents retain
hand, the members have not had their rights violated t h r o u g h re-
this r i g h t , then no state has been produced. If the scenario reached
d i s t r i b u t i o n to the independents (giving the independents services
only this far, then the whole point of the story w o u l d have been
they have n o t paid f o r ) , because they owe compensation to the
lost. We w o u l d have imagined an alternative to the state—namely,
independents f o r t a k i n g away the right to self-help enforcement.
a n a r c h y — o n l y to see it eventually yield anarchy.
O n the other hand, the independents have not had their rights
O f course, N o z i c k m i g h t have argued that all the independents
violated t h r o u g h forced i n c o r p o r a t i o n , because they are fully com-
simply decide, voluntarily, to buy protection contracts and j o i n
pensated. A n d if one interprets compensation strictly, as N o z i c k
the state. These people are imaginary, so actual history does n o t
does, and if it is actually paid, then it becomes a p r o x y for a k i n d
l i m i t the endings that m i g h t be devised for the story. But this re-
of consent, applied ex post facto." This aspect of compensation
duces the scenario to our i m a g i n i n g that there was anarchy but
becomes e x p l i c i t f r o m his b o r r o w i n g of the "indifference c u r v e "
that somehow, miraculously, absolutely everyone agreed to f o r m
terminology f r o m economics: " F u l l compensation keeps the vic-
a state. It strains credulity to imagine u n a n i m i t y on such a ques-
t i m on as high an indifference curve as he w o u l d occupy if the
t i o n . But a n y t h i n g less than u n a n i m i t y either prevents a state f r o m
other person h a d n ' t crossed." "
8
1
resulting or violates rights so as to delegitimate the resulting state.
X's indifference curves arc a representation of X's actual prefer-
N o t e that, for our purposes, the aspiration for u n a n i m i t y s h o u l d
ences. Once he has been fully compensated in his o w n estimation,
not be viewed as a peculiarity of the theory, but rather as a way o f
there is a sense in w h i c h he has consented to the change: he re-
74
S t r a t é g i e s e í toc&ñsíradiíHi
gards the new situation ( w i t h compensation) as at least as g o o d as the o l d s i t u a t i o n ( w i t h o u t compensation). Just as voluntary consent opens the " b o r d e r " for crossing, f u l l compensation after the
r i e n r e 4. N o z i c k ' s Scenario
O P T I O N S F O R TFIF. RESOLUTION O F N O Z I C K ' S SCENARIO
A
fact legitimizes apparent border crossings t h r o u g h a k i n d of subsequent consent. I n fact, the only objection N o z i c k offers to the
A
B
extreme case of an eccentric w h o goes around breaking arms and
Independents
Independents n o t
w r i t i n g fat checks to fully compensate the victims is that not all the
incorporated
i n c o r p o r a t e d (no state and
A
victims c o u l d possibly be fully compensated—because a general climate of fear w o u l d be created t h r o u g h o u t the c o m m u n i t y .
12
H o w e v e r , once compensation is taken seriously (and N o z i c k
violates c r i t e r i o n ! [ b j )
A t
A2
Loss fully
Loss not fully
must take it perfectly seriously if he is to preserve the simple side-
compensated ( m o r e
compensated
constraint view of rights that boundary crossings are never to
than m i n i m a l state
(illegitimate state
be p e r m i t t e d w i t h o u t consent), then the options resulting f r o m
and violates
and violates c r i t e r i a
the argument reduce to those p i c t u r e d in figure 4. For our pur-
criterion l(a!)
l [ b j and 2)
poses, N o z i c k must take compensation perfectly seriously or else he loses his basis for satisfying c r i t e r i o n 2 and m a k i n g the result individually binding.
the loss of this right to self-help enforcement is fully compensated (option A l ) or i t is not ( o p t i o n A 2 ) . If the loss of the right to self-
T h e possibilities in figure 4 depict the options available after
help enforcement is not fully compensated, then the resulting state
step 3 i n the hypothetical history. Obviously, either the indepen-
is not legitimate. For N o z i c k , even one rights v i o l a t i o n is enough
dents are incorporated i n t o the state ( o p t i o n A) or they are not
to invalidate the process. Flence o p t i o n A 2 , w h i l e p r o v i d i n g a
( o p t i o n B). If they are n o t , then, by the criteria stated earlier, the
state, does n o t provide a morally acceptable one. For our purposes,
p r o t e c t i o n association does not q u a l i f y as a state. It does not have
o p t i o n A 2 can be interpreted as violating b o t h criteria 1(b) and 2.
the requisite m o n o p o l y over the legitimate use of force i n the ter-
It violates c r i t e r i o n 1(b) because we are still w i t h o u t a justification
r i t o r y because the independents retain the same right to use force
for state a u t h o r i t y . I t violates c r i t e r i o n 2 because less than full
as does the d o m i n a n t association. Since the t h o u g h t experiment
compensation cannot be considered a p r o x y for consent. Flence,
for the possibility of justifying the state w o u l d then have failed,
w i t h inadequate compensation, the case for the theory satisfying
anarchism w o u l d have w o n the argument and the theory w o u l d
the i n d i v i d u a l l y b i n d i n g c r i t e r i o n breaks d o w n . Clearly, prospects
then violate otir c r i t e r i o n 1(b).
for a successful c o m p l e t i o n to the argument t u r n on o p t i o n A l .
I f the independents are incorporated (option A in fig. 4 ) , a
W h a t does i t take to fully compensate the independents for
necessary part of that i n c o r p o r a t i o n is the loss of the right to self-
losing the r i g h t to self-help enforcement? Recall that they are i n -
help enforcement. It is precisely the right to use vigilante justice,
dependents precisely because they previously turned d o w n the
to i n t e r p r e t and enforce one's rights entirely as one sees f i t , that
o p t i o n of j o i n i n g the p r o t e c t i o n association. N o w N o z i c k p r o -
distinguishes anarchy f r o m the state. Hence, if the t r a n s i t i o n to
poses to take away the very independence they wished to preserve
a state is to be accomplished, there are t w o possibilities: either
and, in compensation, to give them merely the p r o t e c t i o n services
76
77
i e d i s t i * H y p o t h e t i c Is
S t r a t e g i e s of R e c o n s t r u c t i o n
they hat! previously refused! It strains credulity to imagine that
to be subservient to any government, objecting to their forced i n -
they feel fully compensated, in their o w n estimation by this forced
c o r p o r a t i o n into the s t a t e .
bargain.
simply ends up in the A 2 category and the state that results is
b
i n that case, however, the scenario
T o be fully compensated, they must be on as high an " i n d i f f e r -
illegitimate because rights have been seized w i t h o u t full compen-
ence c u r v e " w i t h o u t the right but w i t h the compensating services
sation. C r i t e r i o n 2 is then violated because there is no basis in
and/or goods as they were previously w i t h their rights but w i t h -
the people's o w n preferences for b i n d i n g them to the state ( f r o m
out the compensation. The case can only be made plausible if
w h i c h they w o u l d prefer to remain independent). C r i t e r i o n 1(b) is
many more services and''or goods are p r o v i d e d than w o u l d be
also violated because we end up w i t h the b l i n d alley of anarchism
compatible w i t h the meager offerings built into the d e f i n i t i o n of
once again.
the m i n i m a l state (the m i n i m a l services p r o v i d e d are w h a t make
O n the other hand, once we assume that it is possible, at least in principle, to compensate for the loss of the independents' rights,
the m i n i m a l state " m i n i m a l " ) . W h e n we begin to imagine w h a t other goods and services might-
the required goods and services clearly surpass those offered by
be p r o v i d e d in order to make the resulting compensation suffi-
the m i n i m a ! s t a t e — p r o v i d e d that full compensation must be p r o -
ciently attractive to place the independents on as high an indiffer-
vided. A n d as we saw earlier, anything less than full compensation
ence curve as they w o u l d have been on otherwise, the resulting
should be construed as a rights violation because it w o u l d not
structure of the state begins to look quite different. We m i g h t
constitute any sort of consent or permission (even if retroactive)
imagine the new state p r o v i d i n g money, f o o d , medical care, educa-
for border crossings. Once border crossings w i t h o u t permission
t i o n , and a host of other human services. In order to render p l a u -
are tolerated, the entire theory begins to disintegrate.
ü
16
sible the c l a i m that the independents are fully compensated, the
The possibilities i n figure 4 reduce t o : (A 1) legitimate but more
apparent r e d i s t r i b u t i o n w o u l d have to be substantial. I say " a p p a r -
extensive states than the m i n i m a l state; (A2) an illegitimate state;
ent r e d i s t r i b u t i o n " because, as N o z i c k rightly notes, if transfers
and (B) no state. Nozick's proposed conclusion, the unique legiti-
are paid as compensation, they should not be considered redistri-
macy of the m i n i m a l state, is not one of the possibilities. I he
b u t i o n (even t h o u g h they w i l l have this appearance because goods
argument clearlv does not produce d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g conclusions.
or services are moved f r o m one g r o u p to another). '
O p t i o n B, anarchism, rules out all the possibilities that involve
1
1
Whatever the details, the resulting state wilt be more than m i n i -
having a state. O p t i o n A l fails to differentiate a m o n g states. From
m a l i f f u l l compensation must be paid. In fact, since many of the
it, we o n l y k n o w that some indeterminate range of more extensive
independents may have failed to join earlier because they c o u l d
states may be legitimate. We cannot k n o w more f r o m the argu-
not a f f o r d t o , the particular character of the m o r e - t h a u - m i n i m a l
ment because the issue turns o n an e m p i r i c a l question about a
state that results m i g h t t u r n out to be precisely the one N o z i c k
hypothetical history: it depends on the preferences of imaginary
is most concerned to argue against, namely, that of the m o d e r n
people. W i t h i n the g r o u n d rules of realism, there is w i d e latitude
welfare state.
in how m u c h compensation m i g h t be required and in h o w much r
It is, o f course, possible that none of these offerings w i l l t u r n
these people m i g h t t u r n out to value their independence. W h a t we
o u t to be sufficient. F r o m the standpoint of the independents, per-
can conclude is that if the argument legitimates any state at a l l , it
haps no compensation w i l l be enough to make up for loss of their
legitimates an indeterminate range of states that engage i n at least
rights. We m i g h t imagine hardy individualists, w h o do not w i s h
some r e d i s t r i b u t i o n . T h a t is v i r t u a l l y the full range of states in the
I m p a r t i a l i&etistan F i m e « J » r e s
S t r a t e g i e s of U e i e r t s t r a t H o t i
m o d e r n w o r l d today. Clearly, o p t i o n A l fails criterion 'I(a), the
79
The i n d o c t r i n a t i o n example also hints at another major problem. H y p o t h e t i c a l histories have a different claim on us than do
nonvacuous requirement. construc-
real histories. Once we get into the business of creating h y p o t h e t i -
t i o n of brute preferences w i t h o u t any explicit efforts to t r a n s f o r m
cal stories, their relevance for us must rest on some other c l a i m
We reached this dead end by assuming a realistic
those preferences t h r o u g h i n d o c t r i n a t i o n . N o z i c k , like Watzer and
than that they actually happened. The indoctrinated-hypothetical
the actual-choice theorists of category I , does not provide protec-
scenario has clearly lost all moral relevance for us. This is a cru-
t i o n f r o m i n d o c t r i n a t i o n for the process of preference f o r m a t i o n .
cial objection to brute-hypothetical scenarios. However, even if
We should see w h a t happens when this assumption is relaxed.
one constructed a scenario that had a greater c l a i m of moral rele-
Suppose, f o r example, that everyone i n the t e r r i t o r y belonged to
vance, it w o u l d still face the p r o b l e m of satisfying c r i t e r i o n 3,
a religious cult w h i c h raised its children to defer entirely to the
the j u r i s d i c t i o n p r o b l e m .
j u d g m e n t of a particular leader o n all questions of public policy.
claim to m o r a ! relevance could not be matched by rival theories
Its members were indoctrinated i n the sense that no rival views
m a k i n g the same fundamental claim to constitute an appropriate
were ever discussed, even i n private, and heavy social sanctions were applied to anyone offering the merest h i n t of d o u b t or of f r e e - t h i n k i n g . In the t e r r i t o r y of this homogeneous and coercive cult fa t e r r i t o r y we m i g h t call C u l t - l a n d ) , once the leader approves j o i n i n g the m i n i m a l state, everyone unanimously and sincerely f o l l o w s . In other w o r d s , C u l t - l a n d achieves the transition to the m i n i m a l state w i t h o u t having to c o n f r o n t the compensation
17
It w o u l d still have to establish that its
basis for m o r a l choice. Because this j u r i s d i c t i o n p r o b l e m is the central issue i n category 3 theories, I w i l l put it off until the next section. It Is w o r t h n o t i n g , however, that the same issue arises for category 2 — o n l y the latter category's responses are c o m p l i cated by the a d d i t i o n a l , delegitimating hurdle of i n d o c t r i n a t i o n problems.
p r o b l e m , simply because there are no independents to be c o m pensated. It achieves the transition to the m i n i m a l state w i t h o u t having to c o n f r o n t the p r o b l e m of disagreement, simply because there is none.
2.6 Category
3: Impartial
Decision
Procedures
Theories i n category 3 of figure 2 combine a hypothetical situat i o n w i t h an e x p l i c i t e f f o r t to refine the preferences or motivations
W h i l e such a hypothetical story w o u l d lead, unanimously, to
that bear o n the choice of p r i n c i p l e s — t o refine them so as to elimi-
the m i n i m a l state, there is no reason for that story to h o l d any
nate the biases that m i g h t otherwise deflect the choice t h r o u g h
m o r a l relevance for us. It is delegitimated as a moral example for
morally irrelevant factors. Such refinement mechanisms clearly
us because i t depends on preferences and choices that are deter-
provide a response to the i n d o c t r i n a t i o n problems that bedevil
m i n e d by i n d o c t r i n a t i o n . For a merely hypothetical story to m a i n -
categories 1 and 2.
tain m o r a l relevance, the choice needs to be v o l u n t a r y ; i t needs to
Category 3 has p r o v i d e d the basis for the resuscitation of sys-
be free of coercive m a n i p u l a t i o n . W i t h o u t i n d o c t r i n a t i o n , we can
tematic liberal theory over the last t w o decades. One basic idea
see f r o m figure 4 that N o z i c k ' s scenario leads to indeterminate
is at the core of this strategy: the definition of an appropriately
results. W i t h i n d o c t r i n a t i o n , on the other hand, it leads to re-
unbiased m o r a l perspective or decision situation for the selection
sults that lack any m o r a l relevance as an example for us. W i t h o u t
of first principles that are to have p r i o r i t y i n a liberal state (at least
i n d o c t r i n a t i o n , the scenario violates either criterion l a or criteria l b or 2; w i t h i n d o c t r i n a t i o n , the scenario obviously violates c r i t e r i o n 4.
under ideal conditions). Rawls's " o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n , " Ackerman's n o t i o n of " n e u t r a l dialogue," D w o r k i n ' s "equal concern and respect," and Peter Singer's reconstruction of the perfectly sympa-
80
I m p a r i i d Sesision F r e s e d u r e s
Strategies o i Reconstruction
thetic spectator of the classical utilitarians all have this character. Each defines a perspective of impartiality
1
for the equal consider-
81
cisely s y m m e t r i c a l claims: each can derive first principles f r o m his o w n preferred account of the m o r a l point of view. The basis f o r any particular principle supported in this way is open to reason-
a t i o n of relevant claims or interests. M o r a l decision procedures such as the Golden Rule or Kant's
able disagreement precisely because the rival procedures embody
Categorical Imperative have long played a role in ethical debate.
slightly different rival conceptions of m o r a l reasonableness, each
I he obvious difficulty has been that these procedures have been
m a k i n g the same fundamental c l a i m .
specified loosely enough that it is easy for proponents of rival sub-
Fully specifying the procedure does not evade the jurisdiction
stantive conclusions to cite their preferred outcomes as the result
p r o b l e m . Rather, it dramatizes and clarifies i t . Once we specify
of the same procedure.'
a variety of these procedures, the conclusions f r o m any p a r t i c u -
By contrast, the procedures in category 3 attempt to c o n t r o l
lar version of the strategy are too easy to evade—even for liberal
the factors that may be b r o u g h t to bear o n the decision by m a k i n g
theorists c o m m i t t e d to the same general strategy of arguing f r o m
the deliberations h y p o t h e t i c a l . The opportunities for c o n t a m i n a t -
the i m p a r t i a l consideration of interests. We need some basis for
ing the argument w i t h irrelevant factors are controlled by t a k i n g
differentiating conclusions (for criteria that select a subclass of
the deliberations to a hypothetical situation i n w h i c h the factors
most-preferred alternatives) w h i c h i t w o u l d be difficult for any
at play are fully specified and sealed off f r o m real-life biases and
recognizable version of liberal theory to evade. Because even slight
contingencies. A t first glance, this strategy seems to have a great
variations i n the account of i m p a r t i a l i t y or of interests yield r a d i -
deal of m e r i t . If each step i n the procedure is specified sufficiently,
cally different p o l i t i c a l conclusions, any proposed response to c r i -
then it s h o u l d be possible to b r i n g proponents of rival principles
terion I is subject to j u r i s d i c t i o n a l challenge—when supported in
e m p l o y i n g the same procedure to the same ultimate conclusions.
this way.
Yet f r o m this general idea, we can conclude virtually n o t h i n g
A n y viable version of category 3 must specify h o w relevant
particular fully specified strategy should have su-
claims or interests are g o i n g to be considered in an i m p a r t i a l or
premacy. Even slight variations in the account of i m p a r t i a l i t y or
appropriately unbiased way in the hypothetical situation. As 1
of interests i n a fully specified m o r a l decision procedure can p r o -
noted earlier, the initial p r o b l e m w i t h hypothetical situations is
duce radically different first p r i n c i p l e s — a fact dramatized by the
that we can see that proponents of rival principles can devise rival
dispute between Rawls and Harsanyi over interpretations of the
stories designed, in t u r n , to support their respective principles.
o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n that yield principles as different as m a x i m i n and
The central question about the strategy is: Can some character-
average utility." M a n y procedural devices seem to embody a k i n d
ization of the factors in such a hypothetical situation be
of i m p a r t i a l i t y or equal consideration. " E q u a l c o u n t i n g , " the " v e i l
f r o m j u r i s d i c t i o n a l challenge by other theories advocating other
of ignorance," and " m o r a l musical c h a i r s " are a few of the recent
factors? Unless there is some such characterization, the jurisdic-
contenders.' Similarly, many r i v a l conceptions of interests m i g h t
tion p r o b l e m is inescapable for any version of this k i n d of theory.
about which
5
1
immune
be considered i m p a r t i a l l y by such a procedure. Rawlsian p r i m a r y
Fhe quest is f o r a characterization of factors in the decision
goods, A c k e r m a n i a n " m a n n a , " and u t i l i t y in one sense or another
situation that is so neutral about the controversies i n question
are the proposals most p r o m i n e n t i n recent debates.
that i t is above reasonable challenge. Can a theory achieve strict
5
The difficulty is that proponents of each procedure (specifying a n o t i o n of i m p a r t i a l i t y and a n o t i o n of interests} can make pre-
neutrality and at the same time offer substantive conclusions? To illustrate the general p r o b l e m , let tis turn to the t w o most
I m p a r t i a l P e r n Son ^ r e c e d a r e s
S t r a t e g i e s of R e c o n s t r u c t i o n
82
a m b i t i o u s versions of a category 3 theory i n recent years, Rawls's /\ Theory
of Justice
and Ackerman's Social justice
in the
Lib-
eral State. I n discussing Rawls, Thomas Nagel cogently states the strategy at the core of b o t h theories: " A theory of the g o o d is presupposed, but it is ostensibly conceptions.
neutral between divergent
particular
83
[•'i^ure 5- Options for Hypothetical-Choice Theories HYPOTHETICAL-CHOICHTHiiOKIt-S Brute (indoctrination
Refined
problems)
. . . It is a fundamental feature of Rawls's conception
of the fairness of the o r i g i n a l position that it should not p e r m i t the
Strictly neutral
Not strictly
choice of principles of justice to depend o n a particular conception
(vacuous)
neutral
of the g o o d over w h i c h the parties may d i f f e r . " ' 1
Is it possible to develop a viable but neutral theory of relevant
Want-regarding
claims o r interests that m i g h t i m m u n i z e substantive conclusions f r o m j u r i s d i c t i o n a l challenge? A neutral theory w o u l d d r a m a t i cally reduce the r o o m f o r reasonable disagreement; it holds o u t
Selective
Nonselective (interpersonal comparisons, indoctrinated preferences)
the promise of a f i r m basis for whatever principles result f r o m the i m p a r t i a l consideration of everyone's relevant claims or interests. If a theory is beyond reasonable challenge in its c l a i m to neutrality, it trumps the conclusions of r i v a l , less neutral theories. H o w e v e r , t o the extent that this promise is directed t o w a r d
Paretian (triviality)
Ideal-regarding (paternalism)
Nou-Paretian (interpersonal comparisons)
satisfying our criteria, i t is, I w i l l argue, chimerical. To situate the argument, b o t h Rawls and A c k e r m a n offer us imaginary-choice
O f course, any particular version of such an imaginary-choice
theories: the m o r a l p o i n t of view is formalized by a h y p o t h e t i c a l
theory must offer its o w n account of w h a t factors are m o r a l l y
but m o r a l l y relevant decision situation w h i c h is constructed
relevant or irrelevant and of what gets i m p a r t i a l l y considered. It
so
as to perfectly insulate its results f r o m contamination by irrele-
is in c o n f r o n t i n g the latter task that the neutrality issue arises.
vant factors.' I n constructing these imaginary situations, we are
As figure 5 shows, some versions aspire to strict neutrality i n
n o t l i m i t e d by practical constraints. It is not an argument against
their consideration of relevant claims or interests, w h i l e others do
one of these decision situations that its defining conditions w o u l d
not. M y basic line of argument w i l l be that strict neutrality, i f
be impossible to realize. The m o r a l relevance of the imaginary
taken seriously, blocks the road to any differentiating conclusions
t h o u g h t experiment ties i n the c l a i m that if we could realize those
(prescriptions that m i g h t satisfy criterion .1). But once neutrality
c o n d i t i o n s , then our conclusions w o u l d be completely u n c o n t a m i -
is loosened, then the basis for differentiating conclusions has been
nated by m o r a l l y irrelevant factors. Provided that we can coher-
lost and the controversies a p p l y i n g to either w a n t - r e g a r d i n g or
ently and plausibly w o r k t h r o u g h w h a t w o u l d be arrived at under
ideal-regarding theories of interests (or other relevant claims) p r o -
the appropriate imaginary conditions, we have a strategy f o r sup-
vide ample r o o m for reasonable disagreement and ample grounds
p o r t i n g the resulting p r i n c i p l e : i t is the one that w o u l d be chosen
for j u r i s d i c t i o n a l challenges among competing thought experi-
under the admittedly imaginary but allegedly perfect conditions
ments ( v i o l a t i n g c r i t e r i o n 3).
for m a k i n g such a choice.
Let us begin w i t h the aspiration for strict neutrality. I n Rawls's
Impartial t&amiesi Ptm®$wm
S t r a t e g i e s of i e i e s i s t r a s t i s f j
85
case, this aspiration is expressed by his use of the " t h i n theory
want regardless of whatever else he turns out to w a n t . In this way,
of the g o o d . " We are told that " t h e theory of the g o o d used i n
he may supposedly choose moral principles out of self-interest
arguing for the principles of justice is restricted to the bare essen-
while k n o w i n g n o t h i n g about himself that does not apply equally
t i a l s . " We must use the t h i n theory because we cannot do w i t h o u t
to everyone else.
a theory of the g o o d altogether: " T o establish these principles i t
N o t e that this account of a person's true interests based o n
is necessary to rely on some n o t i o n of goodness, for we need as-
his " r a t i o n a l p l a n " does not depend in the slightest o n any ten-
sumptions about the parties' motives in the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n . " *
dency of persons in real life (or in the ideal just society) to " p l a n "
But these motives cannot be influenced by the particular concep-
their lives w i t h any coherence or even i n any consciously
tions of the g o o d we happen to have acquired i n actual life. As
lated way. Rather, "a rational plan is one that w o u l d be selected
formu-
Rawls notes in a later article, " T h a t we have one conception of the
if certain conditions were fulfilled. The c r i t e r i o n of the good is
g o o d rather than another is not relevant f r o m a m o r a l standpoint.
hypothetical in a way similar to the c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e . "
In a c q u i r i n g it we are influenced by the same sort of contingencies
10
These r a t i o n a l plans are distinguished f r o m other plans of
Rawls
life, first, i n that they c o n f o r m to certain "principles of r a t i o n a l
m i g h t have added that if we were each to i m p o r t our o w n p a r t i c u -
choice," and second, in that they w o u l d be chosen by the per-
lar conceptions of the g o o d i n t o the original p o s i t i o n , the basis
son w i t h " f u l l deliberative r a t i o n a l i t y . " The principles of rational
f o r any unanimous agreement w o u l d have been lost. N o single re-
choice are neutral w i t h respect to particular substantive
sult w o u l d rest on a firm basis because conscientious
that lead us to rule out a knowledge of our sex and class."
y
aims.
proponents
They "define r a t i o n a l i t y as preferring, other things equal, the
o f rival principles could each take their case to a version of the
greater means for realizing our aims, and the development of
o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n e m p l o y i n g their o w n notions of the g o o d . Juris-
wider and more varied interests assuming that these aspirations
d i c t i o n problems w o u l d then bedevil these rival interpretations
can be carried t h r o u g h . " The concept of deliberative r a t i o n a l i t y
of the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n — e a c h challenged by other versions that
is s i m i l a r l y n o n c o m m i t t a l w i t h respect to particular substantive
e m p l o y their favorite conceptions of interests to yield different
aims. It specifies as " r a t i o n a l " whatever plan we w o u l d choose
conclusions. R a w l s , of course, does not take this route. H i s proposal is that,
" w i t h full awareness of the relevant facts and after a careful consideration of the consequences."
11
Plans are thus rational to the
regardless of our actual notions of our interests, we should all
degree that they involve an effective consideration of means for
rely o n the same " t h i n theory." But h o w can we judge the self-
realizing our aims and a choice of aims made w i t h f u l l knowledge
interest of individuals w i t h o u t k n o w i n g a n y t h i n g i n particular
of conditions and consequences.
about them—-anything that does not apply equally to everyone
It should be evident that a w i d e variety of plans r e q u i r i n g a
else? The t h i n theory leads f r o m the " d o c t r i n e of rational plans of
w i d e variety of conditions for their fulfillment m i g h t well satisfy
l i f e " to the " d o c t r i n e of p r i m a r y g o o d s " ; the latter is to guide the
these c o n d i t i o n s . A n y plan that anyone w o u l d choose for himself
choice of principles of justice.
w i t h full awareness in the " d e l i b e r a t i v e " sense and according to
Rawls argues that an agent i n the original position may f u r t h e r
these principles o f rational choice thus qualifies as rational. I n
his o w n particular rational plan of life (whatever that may t u r n
principle, there are few limits on the variety that rational plans
o u t to be once the veil of ignorance is removed) by m a x i m i z i n g
may assume. As Rawls admits, " F r o m the d e f i n i t i o n alone very
his share of " p r i m a r y g o o d s " — g o o d s that it is rational for h i m to
little can be said about the content of a rational p l a n , or the par-
I m p a r t i a l Decision P r o c e d u r e s
S t r a t e g i e s of R e c o n s t r u c t i o n
87
ticular activities that comprise i t . " Consider Rawls's example of
The c o u n t i n g principles in c o n d i t i o n 1 are purely i n s t r u m e n t a l ;
the grass-counter: " I m a g i n e someone whose only pleasure is to
c o n d i t i o n 2 is purely f o r m a l . It specifies only that the plan is the
count blades of grass in various geometrically shaped areas such
one that the person himself w o u l d choose under conditions of ftiil
as park squares and w e l l - t r i m m e d lawns. He is otherwise intel-
awareness. H o w is this thin theory supposed to support the cal-
ligent and actually possesses unusual skills, since he manages to
culations of self-interest (behind the veil of ignorance) that yield
survive by solving difficult mathematical problems for a fee. T h e
the general and special conceptions of justice?
d e f i n i t i o n of the g o o d forces us to admit that the good for this m a n
ing the issue i n great detail, the basic point is that the t h i n theory
is indeed c o u n t i n g blades of grass, or more accurately, his g o o d is
is supposed to provide " t h e qualitative structure of the possible
determined by a plan that gives an especially p r o m i n e n t place to
gains and losses i n relation to one's conception of the g o o d . "
!fi
W i t h o u t pursu-
1
Despite the dizzying variety of life plans that m i g h t
This qualitative structure is supposed to yield the "'three chief
q u a l i f y as rational once the veil of ignorance is removed, Rawls
features" that make m a x i m i n ( m a x i m i z i n g the m i n i m u m share)
believes that there is a sufficient basis for the choice of substantive
the rational choice for the general conception of justice (and for
principles in the original p o s i t i o n . Guided by self-interest
even
the d i s t r i b u t i o n of income and wealth in the special conception).
this a c t i v i t y . "
12
t h o u g h we k n o w n o t h i n g in particular about ourselves, we w o u l d
The first feature is that "the situation is one i n w h i c h a knowledge
choose, Rawls believes, to maximize the m i n i m u m share of p r i -
of likelihoods is impossible, or at best extremely insecure." The
mary goods (the " m a x i m i n " n o t i o n of the "general
argument turns o n the second and t h i r d features;
of justice}.
11
conception"
Furthermore, once we take account of the compara-
tive w o r t h of the various p r i m a r y goods, we w o u l d also specify the p r i o r i t y rankings of the "special c o n c e p t i o n " (liberty, then fair equality of o p p o r t u n i t y , and then the m a x i m i n d i s t r i b u t i o n o f income and w e a l t h ) .
|:i
The key p o i n t f o r our purposes is that Rawls cannot get such ambitious substantive conclusions f r o m the thin theory of the g o o d and at the same time maintain its " t h i n n e s s " — i t s n e u t r a l i t y
The person choosing has a conception of the good such that he cares very little, if anything, for what he might gain above the minimum stipend that he can, in fact, be sure of by following the maximin rule [second feature). It is not worthwhile for him to take a chance for the sake of a further advantage, especially when it may turn out that he loses much that is important to him. This last provision brings in the third feature, namely, that the rejected alternatives have outcomes that one can hardly accept. The situation involves grave risks.' 8
between particular, controversial " f u l l e r " theories. The thinness of the t h i n theory derives f r o m the purely procedural and i n s t r u -
These assumptions
are not sufficient to support so strong a
mental account of its component parts. The necessary and suffi-
conclusion as m a x i m i n . To illustrate the slippage, consider the
cient conditions for a rational life plan are defined in procedural
d i s t r i b u t i o n p r o b l e m for a society of t w o persons. I n figures 6—
and instrumental terms: " A person's plan of life is rational if,
8, the shares of p r i m a r y goods to persons A and B are pictured
and only if, ( i ) it is one of the plans that is consistent w i t h the
o n the vertical and h o r i z o n t a l axes, respectively. '' Let us suppose
principles of rational choice w h e n these are applied to all the rele-
that there is some amount of p r i m a r y goods that satisfies the sec-
vant features of his s i t u a t i o n , and (2) it is that plan among those
o n d and t h i r d features assumed by Rawls i n the above passage.
meeting this c o n d i t i o n w h i c h w o u l d be chosen by h i m w i t h f u l l
Let us call that amount " Z " p r i m a r y goods. A n y t h i n g less than
deliberative rationality, that is, w i t h full awareness of the relevant
7, is a disaster; and compared to the prospect of getting less than
facts and after a careful consideration of the consequences."
Z , we care " l i t t l e if a n y t h i n g " to gamble for more, Rawls's p r o -
t 5
1
impartial
Figure fi. Maximin with a Guaranteed Minimum
fedsioii
Procedures
89
Figure 7. Utilitarianism with a Guaranteed Minimum
Z
Z
A
A
Z
B posed " m a x i m i n " s o l u t i o n is represented by the series o f L-shaped indifference curves in figure 6. However, any d i s t r i b u t i o n in the
A guaranteed m i n i m u m is a far weaker and less controver-
quadrants northeast of Z in any of the three charts satisfies the
sial conclusion than a m i n i m u m that must be m a x i m i z e d . Fhe
three features fully as m u c h as does m a x i m i n . After we p r o v i d e
latter p r i n c i p l e can require great sacrifice f r o m all other strata
everyone w i t h Z p r i m a r y goods, we could m a x i m i z e the t o t a l ,
for the sake of t i n y increases at the bottom—increases that m i g h t
as i n figure 7, or we could maximize equality, as indicated by
be above an already acceptable threshold. Suppose four Rawlsian
the 45-degree line in figure 8, or we could fill out the quadrant-
p r i m a r y goods is our definition of such a threshold. Neverthe-
northeast of Z in any other conceivable way. A l l of these options
less, m a x i m i n w o u l d tell us that d i s t r i b u t i o n Y is preferable to
satisfy the three features as much as does m a x i m i n . To require
distribution X:
that the q u a d r a n t northeast of Z be filled out as in figure 6 is t o o s t r o n g a conclusion to d r a w f r o m the assumptions available i n the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n . F u r t h e r m o r e , it is a conclusion that w o u l d force us to c o n t i n u a l l y prefer increases in the m i n i m u m over other c o m p e t i n g claims—even w h e n those other competing claims were very significant and the increases in the m i n i m u m were very small indeed.
20
X
Y
4
4.01
15
4.01
20
4.01
50
4.01
So long as we give at least Z p r i m a r y goods to everyone, w e
G i v e n the meager i n f o r m a t i o n about his self-interest available
have satisfied the security level assumed i n the three features. I t is
to an agent i n the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n , w o u l d it be rational to decide
an open question w h a t we should do after that. The three features
o n m a x i m i n w h e n another choice strategy that is conservative in
i m p l y only a guaranteed m i n i m u m , not a m i n i m u m that continues
its a t t i t u d e t o w a r d r i s k — t h e guaranteed m i n i m u m — e n s u r e s all
to rise so far as possible.
that was c l a i m e d for m a x i m i n (it satisfies the second and t h i r d
S t r a t e g i e s ©}
Usmmtrutfim
H g u r e 8. E q u a l i t y w i t h a Guaranteed
i m p a r t i e ] Decision P r o c e d u r e s
then rests o n a particular controversial theory of the g o o d and
Minimum
the d o o r has been opened to other controversial theories that can z
provide an equivalent basis for rival principles. It is then open to
A I
j u r i s d i c t i o n a l challenge by the full range of rival theories because it no longer has a plausible claim of strict neutrality w i t h w h i c h to defend itself against charges of bias. The d i l e m m a , i n other w o r d s , amounts to a h a r d choice between the v i o l a t i o n of criterion 1(a) and the v i o l a t i o n of criterion 3. The m i n i m a l interpretation of the threshold maintains a c l a i m to n e u t r a l i t y (but at the cost of radical incompleteness) because it m i g h t seem reasonable, if we have no idea of our particular rational life plan to calculate that the brute "necessaries (to use ,,
A d a m Smith's phrase) required for survival and bare membership in the society c o n f o r m to the security level stated in the three features/ C o m p a r e d to the risk of falling below such a subsistence 2
m i n i m u m , we m i g h t indeed "care very little, if a n y t h i n g " for increfeatures), w i t h o u t c o m m i t t i n g itself to a host of a d d i t i o n a l and
ments above i t . W h y gamble on w i n n i n g the jackpot introduced
d i s t u r b i n g implications? After a l l , once the veil of ignorance is re-
by great inequality if the possibility of such payoffs introduced
m o v e d , we m i g h t be i n one of the higher strata decimated by the
the risk o f starvation or other comparable disasters? In this way,
choice of Y rather than X . A n d if we are at the the b o t t o m , the
Rawls's second and t h i r d features can be given a plausible inter-
tiny increment we get tinder Y counts f o r nothing, by hypothesis,
p r e t a t i o n that seems to be neutral between particular life plans
since we are already above the threshold.
and substantive aims. N o t k n o w i n g w h a t m y life plan w i l l t u r n out
Suppose we arc right i n c l a i m i n g that it is possible to get a partial
substantive conclusion out of Rawls's three features i n
the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n . Does this partial conclusion offer any hope of satisfying our criteria?
to be, I must, nevertheless, secure certain subsistence conditions necessary for pursuing any rational life plan at all. But such a m i n i m a l safety net w o u l d be endorsed by v i r t u a l l y
I believe Rawls faces the f o l l o w i n g
every developed country, capitalist or socialist. G i v i n g everyone
d i l e m m a : O n the one hand, i f the threshold defined by the three
at least subsistence leaves almost everything after that an open
features is interpreted m i n i m a l l y , a plausible case can be made f o r
question. For example, should we strive to increase equality, total
neutrality, but at the cost of such radical incompleteness that the
o u t p u t , or the m i n i m u m level after everyone has been given at least
resulting principle is nearly t r i v i a l in its implications. It is so m i n i -
subsistence? W h a t should our priorities be within
m a l i n its demands that v i r t u a l l y any modern state satisfies it (or
defined by Z i n figures 6-8?
c o u l d easily satisfy i t ) . Hence the theory, on this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,
get us into the quadrant, but they are insufficient to direct us after
w o u l d violate our nonvacuousness requirement (criterion l [ a j ) .
that. T h e d i f f i c u l t y is that this is where serious debate begins, not
O n the other hand, if the threshold is interpreted ambitiously, then its pretensions to neutrality can no longer be s u p p o r t e d .
21
It
the quadrant
Rawls's assumptions are sufficient to
where it ends. T h e basic p o i n t is that when the security level is set so l o w
Strategies of
^essmstrwitisrt
teiHirfkil
^emieii Pmedares
93
that i t plausibly corresponds to the three features, it leaves almost
ficulty arises w i t h the special conception: a neutral interpretation,
everything unsettled. M o s t i m p o r t a n t for our purposes, the re-
a really " t h i n " theory, does not support these significant substan-
q u i r e m e n t that such a m i n i m a l safety net be satisfied w o u l d be v i r -
tive results; to get the latter, a particular, controversial theory of
tually useless in satisfying c r i t e r i o n 1(a) (nonvacuousness). H o w -
the g o o d must be assumed. "
ever, it is only the m i n i m a l interpretation of Z , the security level, that can m a i n t a i n a plausible c l a i m to neutrality.
2
1
Recall that the doctrine of rational life plans could m a i n t a i n its c l a i m to n e u t r a l i t y only by being purely procedural and i n s t r u -
O n the other hand, if we were to set Z ambitiously—say, t w o
mental. M y r a t i o n a l plan of life is supposed to be the one I w o u l d
cars and a home of one's o w n — w e w o u l d be positing a c o n t r o -
choose for myself w i t h full knowledge of conditions and conse-
versial theory of the g o o d for everyone. The t h i r d feature requires
quences and in accordance w i t h the rational means/ends relations
that we regard a n y t h i n g less than the threshold as an unacceptable
determined by the various counting p r i n c i p l e s .
disaster, w h i l e the second feature requires that we not be inter-
this m u c h i n the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n , there is no basis for the strong
ested i n g a m b l i n g for a n y t h i n g m o r e — a t least relative
25
K n o w i n g only
to the risk
p r i o r i t y relations expressed by lexical order. I m i g h t be an aspiring
o f f a l l i n g below i t . " H a v i n g (at the time of this w r i t i n g ) one car but
capitalist whose life plan is not furthered i n the least by the c i v i l
not t w o , I can, personally, quite easily imagine a plan of life where
liberties to w h i c h Rawls gives first p r i o r i t y . As such a capitalist, i
I w o u l d prefer (a) the chance
of becoming a m i l l i o n a i r e i n t r o -
m i g h t prefer to give first p r i o r i t y to the income and wealth Rawls
duced by tolerating inequalities to (b) strict equality but w i t h the
places last. O r m y rational plan of life m i g h t be more directly
guarantee of a second car. The p o i n t is that an ambitious interpre-
furthered by placing fair equality of o p p o r t u n i t y first. Perhaps
t a t i o n of the threshold w i l t depend on a controversial theory of the
I am a member of a racial or sexual m i n o r i t y whose members
g o o d — o n e that conforms to some rational life plans but clearly
place highest p r i o r i t y on equal o p p o r t u n i t y - - e v e n above liberty
not to others, particularly in its attitude t o w a r d risk. For such a
of conscience and political expression (although we m i g h t value
theory of the g o o d , a n y t h i n g less than the second car (or whatever
these h i g h l y as well). M y rational plan of life, in Rawls's precise
else is demanded of the ambitious threshold) must be absolutely
sense, m i g h t be far more effectively furthered by i n v e r t i n g one or
unacceptable. A n d compared to the risk of not getting the second
another of these p r i o r i t y rankings. F r o m the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n , 1
car, the prospect of g a m b l i n g to get H o w a r d Flughes's f o r t u n e
simply cannot k n o w whether or not this is the case.
must mean n o t h i n g . Because the ambitious threshold clearly v i o -
T h e p o i n t is that the " t h i n theory of the g o o d " — i f it remains
lates neutrality, it opens the door to other controversial theories
t r u l y t h i n — p r o v i d e s no basis for d e t e r m i n i n g these rankings, one
o f the g o o d as the basis for competing principles.
way or the other. So long as we consider life plans in a purely
A s i m i l a r difficulty arises w i t h the p r i o r i t y rankings embodied
procedural and instrumental way, a plausible c l a i m to neutrality
in the special conception. Once we take account of the qualitative
can be m a i n t a i n e d , but only at the cost of leaving the comparative
differences among the various p r i m a r y goods, we are supposed to
value of the various " p r i m a r y goods" indeterminate.
value liberty, fair equality of o p p o r t u n i t y , and income and w e a l t h
O n the other hand, if we i m p o r t into the o r i g i n a l position a
in lexical order (meaning that no amount, however great, of a
more f u l l - b o d i e d conception of the g o o d — o n e that includes par-
l o w e r - r a n k e d value is w o r t h any sacrifice, however s m a l l , in a
ticular substantive a i m s — t h e n the claim to neutrality among sub-
higher-ranked value). W i t h o u t g o i n g into all the details of this
stantive aims is lost. Rawls has suggested this last possible line of
w e l l - k n o w n controversy, it is w o r t h n o t i n g that the same basic d i f -
revision in more recent articles, where he proposes that a pacticu-
94
lar " m o d e l conception o í a m o r a l p e r s o n " should be assumed i n order to o b t a i n his proposed conclusions/
95
i m p a r t i a l decision Procedures
S t r a t e g i e s of R e c o n s t r u c t i o n
6
sibility are needed to give scope to various self-governing and social capacities of the self.
A c c o r d i n g to this model conception, " w e take moral persons to
(iv) Income and w e a l t h , understood broadly as they must be,
be characterized by t w o m o r a l powers and by t w o corresponding
are all-purpose means (having an exchange value) for
highest-order interests i n realizing and exercising these p o w e r s . "
achieving directly or indirectly almost any of our ends,
T h e t w o m o r a l powers are "the capacity for an effective sense o f
whatever they happen to be.
justice" and the "capacity to f o r m , to revise, and rationally to pur-
(v) T h e social bases of self-respect are those aspects of basic
sue a conception of the g o o d . " The key p o i n t is that in the o r i g i n a l
institutions w h i c h are n o r m a l l y essential if individuals are
p o s i t i o n the agents are to assume that they have "highest-order
to have a lively sense of their o w n w o r t h as m o r a l persons
interests" i n securing the conditions necessary for the exercise o f
and to be able to realize their higher-order interests and
these t w o m o r a l powers: " C o r r e s p o n d i n g to the m o r a l powers,
advance their ends w i t h zest and self-confidence. * 2
m o r a l persons are said to be moved by t w o highest order interests to realize and exercise these powers. By calling these interests
Because o f o u r " h i g h e s t - o r d e r " interests in securing the con-
'highest o r d e r interests, I mean that, as the model-conception o f
d i t i o n s for the exercise of the t w o m o r a l powers, we are, sup-
a m o r a l person is specified, these interests are supremely regula-
posedly, to adopt the principles of the special conception. Once
tive as well as effective. This implies that, whenever circumstances
again, the same issue arises. W h y is it rational to accept these
1
are relevant to their f u l f i l l m e n t , these interests govern deliberation and c o n d u c t . " ' 2
very s t r o n g p r i o r i t y rankings? W h y are we to accept the p r i m a r y goods in the order enumerated, where the slightest sacrifice i n
W i t h these m o r a l powers and their corresponding interests i n
l i b e r t y is n o t w o r t h the greatest possible increase i n equal oppor-
m i n d , Rawls believes that we can get the p r i o r i t y relations i n
t u n i t y , and where the slightest sacrifice in equal o p p o r t u n i t y is
the special conception. H e summarizes this construction of the
not w o r t h the greatest possible increase in income and wealth?
argument as f o l l o w s :
Rawls makes clear that he still adheres to the p r i o r i t y rankings. "' 2
In any case, w i t h o u t the p r i o r i t y rankings, the theory w o u l d fall (:) The basic liberties (freedom of thought and liberty of con-
into intuitionism.
science, etc.) are the background institutions necessary f o r
T o preserve the p r i o r i t y rankings, Rawls w o u l d have us assume
the development and exercise of the capacity to decide
that o u r interest i n l i b e r t y comes first, because the highest-order
u p o n and revise, and rationally to pursue, a conception of
interests i n o u r m o r a l powers are served first by l i b e r t y ; equal
the g o o d . Similarly, these liberties a l l o w for the develop-
o p p o r t u n i t y is second because our next-highest-order interests i n
ment and exercise of the sense of right and justice under
our m o r a l powers are served by equal o p p o r t u n i t y , and so o n .
social conditions that arc free, (ii) Freedom
of movement and free choice of occupation
Clearly, the c l a i m to neutrality has been greatly weakened by the i n t r o d u c t i o n of these assumptions. We are being asked to base-
against a background of diverse opportunities are re-
principles of justice on a particular controversial theory of the
q u i r e d for the pursuit of final ends, as well as to give effect
g o o d or, if y o u w i l l , a particular model conception of a m o r a l per-
to a decision to revise and change them, if one so desires,
son, w h e n other variations w o u l d clearly lead to different p r i o r i t y
(iii) Powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of respon-
rankings and different principles. Once these moves are made,
%
S t r a t e g i e s ©f S e s f t i i s t r a i t i o s
i m p a r t i a l decision ^rased&res
97
the strictly neutral strategy for avoiding jurisdiction problems has
you are, therefore, I should get at least as m u c h . " The difficulty
been abandoned. W h e n we employ such a controversial theory of
is that neutrality, on the strict interpretation, does not p e r m i t any
the g o o d , we can get substantive results, but they can be matched
definite answer to the further question, A t least as m u c h what? A
p o i n t by p o i n t by rival t h o u g h t experiments employing rival theo-
particular, inevitably controversial theory of the g o o d is required
ries o f the g o o d whose neutrality is similarly at issue.
to answer that question; but that is precisely w h a t is barred by
f o c l a r i f y the general issue, it is w o r t h considering a second example of a theory aspiring to strict n e u t r a l i t y . N e u t r a l i t y plays 10
an even more e x p l i c i t role in Ackerman's Social Justice
in the
neutrality. The strict interpretation is clearest i n Ackerman's attempt to
Lib-
rule out u t i l i t a r i a n i s m . We are presented w i t h a dialogue between
eral State— probably the one contemporary effort to reconstruct
" M a n i c " ( w h o likes mountaineering) and "Depressive" ( w h o likes
liberal theory that rivals Rawis's in its a m b i t i o n and systematic
p h i l o s o p h i z i n g ) . The former claims he should get more " m a n n a "
character. N e u t r a l i t y is one of three assumptions that are meant,
because he w i l l derive more u t i l i t y f r o m i t :
together, to constrain l e g i t i m a t i n g conversations about d i s t r i b u tive justice. However, the other t w o assumptions, r a t i o n a l i t y and consistency, w i l l p e r m i t an enormous range of possible d i s t r i b u tions to survive e l i m i n a t i o n .
11
But once neutrality is i n t r o d u c e d ,
A c k e r m a n argues, only his o w n proposal survives. He defines it as f o l l o w s : " N e u t r a l t t y : N o reason is a g o o d reason if it requires the power/holder to assert: (a) that his conception of the g o o d is better than that asserted by any of his fellow citizens, or (b) that, regardless of his conception of the g o o d , he is intrinsically superior to one or more of his fellow c i t i z e n s . "
DEPRESSIVE:
It translates the value of philosophizing and mountaineering into a common yardstick: subjective satisfaction. D E P R E S S I V E : But surely there are other possible yardsticks. Why can't I , for example, construct a calculus that ranks all conceptions of the good in terms of the amount of philosophic wisdom they produce and instruct the computer to tell us how much of that good each of us will produce with the manna, (He does so.)
MANK;:
12
COMPUTER:
For our purposes, the difficulty w i t h this innovative and appeal-
How, then, is the utility number relevant to our discus-
sion?
Depressive scores one hundred units on the wisdom index;
Manic scores 10 units.
ing proposal is that i f it is interpreted strictly, the resulting con-
DEPRESSIVE:
clusions are emptied of substantive content. O n the other hand, if
MANIC:
Why, then, is your yardstick better than mine?
Do i have to answer that?
15
it were to be interpreted more loosely, then no particular p r i n c i p l e
M a n i c cannot answer the question w i t h o u t v i o l a t i n g neutrality
resulting f r o m it w o u l d rest on firm g r o u n d . Rival positions c o u l d
— w h e n interpreted strictly. As the Commander in Ackerman's
then invoke rival l e g i t i m a t i n g dialogues and the same p l u r a l i s m
dialogue concludes:
w o u l d result as that w h i c h f o l l o w e d when Rawls suggested weak-
We search i n v a i n for a neutral yardstick for measuring the 'real'
ening n e u t r a l i t y .
" W e are reaching a dead-end, my friends.
In our terms, the options boil d o w n to a hard
value of different conceptions of the g o o d . To justify one yardstick
choice between violations of c r i t e r i o n I (the emptiness of s t r i c t
over all the other possible ways of r a n k i n g values w i l l require
neutrality prevents any selection of a few most preferred states)
utterances that are inconsistent w i t h at least some of the ideals
and violations of c r i t e r i o n 3, the j u r i s d i c t i o n p r o b l e m .
affirmed by some of your fellow citizens." Hence the objection to
11
Let us focus on the strict interpretation of neutrality. The argu-
u t i l i t a r i a n i s m : " T h e problem w i t h u t i l i t a r i a n i s m is its teleological
ment that passes neutrality is supposed to sanction equality. *' The
character, its e f f o r t to evaluate d i s t r i b u t i o n rules by h o w much
one successful move in the dialogues is " F i n at least as g o o d as
' g o o d ' they produce. Any such effort requires a specification of
3
98
Strategies oï
the g o o d that w i l l he contested by some citizens w h o insist o n
that I a m " i n t r i n s i c a l l y superior" to my competitors. * O n l y if
measuring their g o o d by a different yardstick, one that gives t h e m
equal amounts of manna were assumed at the outset to be the ap-
more manna than their competitors."-
p r o p r i a t e c r i t e r i o n for j u d g i n g that persons are equally well-off,
16
1
W h i l e successful in r u l i n g out u t i l i t a r i a n i s m , this conception of
w o u l d it f o l l o w that d i f f e r i n g distributions y i e l d i n g equal utilities
neutrality is so strict that it can be employed, w i t h equally dev-
were a slight to some conceptions of the g o o d . Yet this w o u l d be
astating results, against the yardsticks Ackerman eventually uses
to assume, a r b i t r a r i l y , a particular and contested solution to the
himself to settle the d i s t r i b u t i o n p r o b l e m . He later permits De-
fundamental issue: w h a t allotments are to be regarded as superior
pressive to argue, supposedly consistent w i t h neutrality, ' i f I ' m
or inferior? T h e case against equal satisfaction w o u l d appear to rest on the
at least as g o o d as M a n i c , I should get at least as much of this T h i s simple argument yields the
passages q u o t e d above objecting to u t i l i t y as a yardstick. But it is
conclusion of equal i n i t i a l shares of m a n n a — a n argument that is
successful, I believe, only if interpreted so strictly that any sub-
later broadened to include b i r t h r i g h t s , education, rights to free
stantive content to a yardstick can be ruled out because it " w i l l be
exchange, and obligations to future generations.
contested by some citizens w h o insist on measuring their g o o d by
stuff that b o t h of us d e s i r e . "
17
Yet any particular yardstick for d e t e r m i n i n g "as m u c h " i n this
y >
Some citizens, in other w o r d s , can always
be expected to disagree about a yardstick for d i s t r i b u t i o n a l ques-
man levels against u t i l i t a r i a n i s m . Even for the simplified d i s t r i b u -
tions because they w i l l do better according to some other possible
t i o n p r o b l e m e m p l o y i n g the imaginary substance manna, a variety
yardstick for evaluating everyone's shares. If any yardstick con-
o f yardsticks m i g h t be devised under w h i c h some persons w o u l d
tested i n this w a y by some citizen is ruled out by neutrality, then
d o far better and others far worse, depending upon their p a r t i c u -
no yardstick w i t h substantive implications can ever be arrived
equal o p p o r t u n i t i e s (or time shares) for employing as much of the
I
a different y a r d s t i c k . "
dialogue can be subjected to the same basic critique that Acker-
lar conceptions of the g o o d . Some obvious possibilities include
1
99
i m p a r t i a l Dedsion Procedures
Keconstrusîton
a
t — c o n s i s t e n t w i t h this demanding conception of neutrality. The d o o r is opened even more widely to such
controversies
manna as one m i g h t like at a given time or equal chances at l o t -
once the debate moves beyond the simplified manna p r o b l e m to
tery tickets for r i c h payoffs, or equal life-support payments doled
the full question of d i s t r i b u t i o n under ideal conditions. Here it is
out i n increments for as long as one m i g h t live. There is no reason
not manna but income and wealth that count as material equality.
to regard identical physical chunks of manna as a yardstick i m -
F u r t h e r m o r e , the argument ranges over genetics, education, and
mune f r o m controversy, w h i l e every other possible specification
obligations to future generations. I n each of these cases, any choice
o f content for equality is regarded as nonncutral.
of a p a r t i c u l a r yardstick is open to controversy. A n y answer to
F u r t h e r m o r e , w h y should equal physical quantities of manna
the question A n equal share of what? w o u l d appear open to the
be compatible w i t h neutrality w h e n equal satisfaction is ruled out
same argument A c k e r m a n employs against u t i l i t a r i a n i s m : w h y
as a neutral solution? If I c l a i m only that 1 should be as satis-
one yardstick f o r measuring shares rather than another?'
10
fied w i t h my share as y o u are w i t h yours, it is hard to see h o w
Even the d i v i s i o n of the general d i s t r i b u t i o n p r o b l e m into a
that amounts to c l a i m i n g that m y "conception of the g o o d is
series of discrete power dimensions (genetics, education, p r o p e r t y
b e t t e r " — f o r I am proposing, i n a sense, to treat our d i f f e r i n g con-
rights, p o l i t i c a l power) is itself a step t o w a r d certain d i s t r i b u t i o n a l
ceptions equally.
Similarly, I may propose such equal treatment
metrics compared w i t h a diversity of possible alternatives. Some
without claiming "unconditional superiority," without claiming
theories m i g h t l u m p these all together and p e r m i t inequalities
100
S t r a t e g i e s o î Meztmsfmtîfan
IPrefes-eme, U t i l i t y , a n d t h e
<&m4
101
in one to compensate for inequalities in another. Other theories
onlv get a guaranteed m i n i m u m interpreted so m i n i m a l l y that it
m i g h t add different dimensions. Degrees of liberty, social esteem,
was v i r t u a l l y useless as a basis for differentiating conclusions.
interpersonal power, job satisfaction, h e a l t h — t h e list of possible elements of value in a d i s t r i b u t i o n a l theory is open-ended
A parallel difficulty emerges for A c k e r m a n . H i s b o o k has a
and
" m a n t r a " that goes: " I ' m at least as good as you are, therefore, I
c o n t r o v e r s i a l : " Since the r o o t n o t i o n of Ackcrman's strategy is
should get at least as m u c h . " But this f o r m u l a cannot be filled out
that all exercises of " p o w e r " are to be subjected to the equalizing
w i t h o u t an answer to the next question, A t least as much w h a t ? —
rule of neutral dialogue, it seems t o o much to expect that any par-
w i t h o u t an argument for one particular d i s t r i b u t i o n a l yardstick
ticular conceptualization of these power relations, any p a r t i c u l a r
compared to the competing alternatives. T h i s is precisely the move
d i s t r i b u t i o n a l yardstick, can plausibly be claimed as the uniquely
f o r b i d d e n by strict neutrality (as we saw in the dialogue r u l i n g
uncontroversial s o l u t i o n , the uniquely neutral content for equal
out u t i l i t a r i a n i s m ) . Since, as Ackerman's Commander concluded,
power relations.'
" w e search in vain for a neutral yardstick," neutrality interpreted
12
Even if the case f o r equality were granted for purposes of argument, each of these conceptualizations of power relations c o u l d be
this strictly leads to an empty formalism, W i t h o u t some p a r t i c u lar content
specified for w h a t is distributed equally, the resulting
employed to fill out a n o t i o n of equal d i s t r i b u t i o n w i t h d r a m a t i -
principle offers no hope of p r o v i d i n g the differentiating conclu-
cally different substantive i m p l i c a t i o n s .
sions r e q u i r e d f o r c r i t e r i o n 1 .
45
The dilemma should be
clear: o n the one hand, w i t h o u t a yardstick or metric, the theory is e m p t y ; but on the other hand, we cannot provide i t w i t h a
2.7 More on Category
m e t r i c or yardstick and at the same time remain neutral a m o n g
and the
substantive theories of the g o o d . Once the proposed d i f f e r e n t i -
3: Preference,
Utility,
Good
a t i n g conclusions depend o n a particular substantive theory o f
To give f u r t h e r content to the kinds of controversies that arise
the g o o d , they can be avoided by rival theorists e m p l o y i n g r i v a l
once the quest f o r strict neutrality is abandoned, let us t u r n to
theories of the g o o d i n support of their o w n preferred ultimate
the r e m a i n i n g classifications i n figure 5. We are concerned here
principles. Once neutrality Is loosened, the basis for j u r i s d i c t i o n a l
w i t h conceptions for assessing interests i n a theory that pur-
challenges arises, v i o l a t i n g our c r i t e r i o n 3.
ports to assess everyone's interests i m p a r t i a l l y . I w i l l adapt some
R e t u r n i n g to the t y p o l o g y i n figure 5, the difficulty w i t h the
t e r m i n o l o g y f r o m Brian Barry by d i v i d i n g these theories into
first o p t i o n — i n t e r p r e t i n g interests and other relevant claims w i t h
" w a n t - r e g a r d i n g " and " i d e a l - r e g a r d i n g " theories of the g o o d .
strict n e u t r a l i t y — i s that it robs the resulting principle of signifi-
The w a n t - r e g a r d i n g versions c o n f o r m to citizen sovereignty, w h i l e
cant substantive content. I n Rawls's case, when the t h i n theory o f
the ideal-regarding ones do not. I w i l l say that a principle adheres
the g o o d is interpreted neutrally, w h e n it is interpreted i n a purely
to citizen
sovereignty
1
i f i t judges a person X to be better off if,
procedural and instrumental w a y so as not to be biased t o w a r d
and o n l y i f , at least some of X's actual preferences
any particular conception of the g o o d , no support can be f o u n d
The citizen is sovereign i n the sense that it is his or her preferences
for any significant p r i o r i t y rankings among the so-called p r i m a r y
w h i c h must be satisfied if the theory is to assess that person as
goods. Similarly, w h e n we interpreted Rawls's proposed threshold
better off.
in a manner that m i g h t seem compatible w i t h neutrality, we c o u l d
are satisfied.
W a n t - r e g a r d i n g and ideal-regarding theories each introduce
Strategies sf
Reiorisirwition
distinctive sources of controversy. The regarding theories is which
103
P r e f e r e n t e , U t i l i t y , a n d t h e Good
issue for w a n t -
i n g that . . . cases that are never likely to be actually encountered
preferences of an i n d i v i d u a l ought to
first
d o n o t have to be squared w i t h the t h i n k i n g of the o r d i n a r y m a n ,
count as defining his g o o d . Recent efforts w i t h i n utilitarianism t o wrestle w i t h this p r o b l e m can be used to illustrate the difficulty. hirst, some theories do not discriminate at all a m o n g pref-
whose principles are not designed to cope w i t h such cases.'"
1
Are such cases of fanaticism as fantastic and hypothetical as H a r e claims? Perhaps he is right that it is difficult to imagine
erences; they count all of t h e m . Consider, for example, Hare's
an individual
attempt to reconstruct u t i l i t a r i a n i s m . Hare's theory, like other
the H o l o c a u s t that they o u t w e i g h , in a strict u t i l i t a r i a n calcula-
u t i l i t a r i a n theories in the t r a d i t i o n of the impartial spectator, is a
t i o n , all the misery they w o u l d require. But the p r o b l e m cannot
hypothetical-choice version of the i m p a r t i a l i t y argument: " W h a t
be dispatched so easily. For one t h i n g , it does n o t require such
the p r i n c i p l e of u t i l i t y requires of me is to do for each man affected
a horrendous i n d i v i d u a l utility monster. The desires of numer-
by m y actions w h a t I wish were done for me in the h y p o t h e t i -
ous i n d i v i d u a l s must be taken into account. If there are enough
cal circumstance that i were in precisely his s i t u a t i o n ; and, if m y
Nazis w i t h hatred of even moderate intensity, a strict u t i l i t a r i a n
actions affect more than one man (as they nearly always w i l l ) to d o w h a t I w i s h , all in a l l , to be done for me in the hypothetical circumstances that 1 occupied all their situations (not of course at the same time but, shall we say?, i n random o r d e r ) . "
2
H a r e moves f r o m this equal consideration of everyone's interests to m a x i m i z i n g aggregate
N a z i whose preferences are so intense in favor of
c a l c u l a t i o n about total preference satisfaction in the society may conceivably s u p p o r t horrendous policies directed against Jews or other m i n o r i t y groups—once the numbers and intensities on both sides are s u m m e d up t h r o u g h o u t the society/ Perhaps Flare's mistake, and that of many other utilitarians, is
u t i l i t y by conceptualizing equal
to a d m i t that satisfaction of preferences such as that of the Nazis
consideration as equal w e i g h i n g i n an overall sum, and by de-
t o w a r d the Jews ought to count as a f o r m of u t i l i t y i n the first
fining
i n d i v i d u a l interests according to the satisfaction of desire
place. A n alternative strategy, advocated by Ronald D w o r k i n , is
o r u t i l i t y — - w i t h o u t i n t r o d u c i n g any distinctions among the pref-
to count only " p e r s o n a l " preferences (about one's o w n situation)
erences whose satisfaction is to count as desire or u t i l i t y . This
and not " e x t e r n a l " or " p u b l i c - r e g a r d i n g " preferences (about the
failure to discriminate among preferences confronts h i m w i t h the
s i t u a t i o n of others). However, such a strategy w o u l d not only rule-
p r o b l e m of " f a n a t i c a l " desires whose fulfillment requires h a r m to
out nasty external preferences such as the N a z i ' s , but it w o u l d also
others: " F o r example, if the Nazi's desire not to have Jews a r o u n d
rule out noble external preferences such as a l t r u i s m and d e v o t i o n
is intense enough to o u t w e i g h all the sufferings caused to j e w s by arranging not to have them a r o u n d , then, on this version of u t i l i t a r i a n i s m , as on any theory w i t h the same f o r m a l structure, it o u g h t to be s a t i s f i e d . "
}
i n c o r p o r a t i n g such fanatical preferences thus appears to p r o duce devastating consequences. It is w o r t h pausing to consider
6
to the g o o d o f m a n k i n d . Are we to count wants that support selfishness but not those that support self-sacrifice? We end up w i t h a severely truncated v i e w of the human good if w e l i m i t it to "pers o n a l " preferences (applying only to ourselves) and rule out all " e x t e r n a l " preferences (applying to others). W h y does D w o r k i n propose to rule out consideration of "exter-
Hare's defense to such an obvious objection: " T h e p r o b l e m is to
n a l " preferences, such as the Nazi's? The difficulty is that " p o l i t i -
be overcome by, first, p o i n t i n g out that fanatics of this heroic stat-
cal preferences, like the Nazi's, are on the same l e v e l — p u r p o r t to
ure are never likely to be encountered (that no actual Nazis had
occupy the same space—as the utilitarian theory itself." A suitably
such intense desires is, I t h i n k , obvious); secondly, by remember-
" r e s t r i c t e d , " defensible utilitarianism "cannot, w i t h o u t contradic-
Preference, Utility, and the g o o d
185
r i o n , be neutral between itself and N a z i s m , i t cannot accept at
wilt come o u t . i t is a complex empirical question depending o n i n -
once a duty to defeat the false theory that some peoples prefer-
centive effects, d e c l i n i n g marginal u t i l i t y of income, the numbers
ences s h o u l d count for more than other peoples and a dtity to
affected o n each side, and the intensity w i t h w h i c h an ideology
strive as to fulfill the political preferences of those w h o passion-
of p r o p e r t y entitlements is held m the p o p u l a t i o n . Setting aside
ately accept that false theory, as energetically as it strives for any
the interpersonal-comparisons difficulties facing D w o r k i n ' s pos-
other preferences. . . .
If utilitarianism counts the fact of these
tulated " u t i l i t a r i a n computer," a utilitarian calculation w i l l some-
preferences it has denied what it cannot deny, w h i c h is that justice
times favor r e d i s t r i b u t i o n , but it w i l l also sometimes oppose i t .
requires i t to oppose t h e m . " ''
Even if strong altruistic sentiments among the prosperous ma-
1
1
s
W h i l e D w o r k i n has an easy target here—few w o u l d deny
j o r i t y favor r e d i s t r i b u t i o n , those sentiments cannot be counted i n
that justice and N a z i s m are absolutely i n c o m p a t i b l e — w c need to
d e t e r m i n i n g w h a t justice is, if we f o l l o w D w o r k i n ' s argument, be-
probe further the grounds w i t h i n liberal theory for not c o u n t i n g
cause those sentiments w o u l d be based on a theory that rivals re-
N a z i preferences equally w i t h all others. We m i g h t distinguish
stricted u t i l i t a r i a n i s m i n occupying the same theoretical "space."
the N a z i D w o r k i n i m a g i n e s — w h o argues for the persecution of
M o s t i m p o r t a n t , in some cases the u t i l i t y f r o m a l t r u i s m w o u l d
Jews on the grounds that Jewish preferences should count f o r
tip the balance t o w a r d r e d i s t r i b u t i o n , but purely selfish "per-
l e s s — f r o m the consistent u t i l i t a r i a n N a z i w h o bedeviled blare by
s o n a l " preferences w o u l d support starvation among the under-
c o u n t i n g all preferences equally. Such a consistent N a z i cannot be
class (in a calculation based on selfishness but not on malice)-
dismissed as advocating unequal counting. Rather, he just offers
D w o r k i n w o u l d have us avoid counting the altruistic sentiments
a different conception of w h a t should count e q u a l l y — b u t in an e n v i r o n m e n t in w h i c h enough people have intense, nasty preferences that unconscionable results w o u l d f o l l o w f r o m c o u n t i n g them equally.
in d e t e r m i n i n g w h a t justice is because they are based, as the N a z i preferences were, o n a rival theory of justice—a rival to restricted u t i l i t a r i a n i s m ( w h i c h counts only personal preferences). But this argument depends, crucially, o n restricted utilitarianism
F u r t h e r m o r e , note that D w o r k i n ' s explanation for w h y w c
itself being a reliable guide to distributive justice. In this case, it
should rule out the Nazi's externa! preferences—that N a z i s m and
does not appear to be. The sentiments D w o r k i n w o u l d have us
u t i l i t a r i a n i s m occupy the same theoretical "space"-—would also
discount s u p p o r t feeding the underclass, while selfish calculations
rule out preferences for more plausible theories of justice w h i c h
w i l t , at least sometimes, support the opposite conclusion.
also occupy the same space i n that they are full-fledged rivals to
We can make the p r o b l e m even worse by i m a g i n i n g a clever
u t i l i t a r i a n i s m . D w o r k i n can, of course, respond that these other
N a z i w h o has read D w o r k i n ' s theory and supports r e d i s t r i b u t i o n
full-fledged rivals are incorrect. But the difficulty is in d e t e r m i n -
of Jewish p r o p e r t y to Aryans by plugging only personal u t i l i t y
ing, i n the first place, w h i c h is the correct theory of justice.
calculations i n t o the " u t i l i t a r i a n computer." if the society has a
It is far f r o m clear that a "restricted u t i l i t a r i a n i s m " (one w h i c h
concentration o f prosperous Jews and a lot of poor Aryans w h o
counts o n l y personal preferences) w i l l consistently yield plausible
receive great u t i l i t y f r o m getting even a chance (or a lottery ticket)
results i n terms of distributive justice. Suppose a prosperous ma-
for the confiscated properties and businesses, it is quite possible
j o r i t y is faced w i t h demands for r e d i s t r i b u t i o n on behalf o f a
that u t i l i t a r i a n calculations based purely on selfishness w i l l sup-
dispossessed underclass. There w i l l be varying results as to h o w a
p o r t confiscation and persecution. Furthermore, if such a soci-
strict u t i l i t a r i a n calculation i n v o l v i n g purely personal preferences
ety also has a l o t of altruistic sentiment, it could well be the
Strategies o í
BeíOíisíruífion
Preferente, Utility, and the Good
107
case that counting externa! preferences w o u l d protect che Jews
as u t i l i t y , then it is difficult to see how a utilitarian theory can
f r o m persecution, but counting only selfish preferences w o u l d not.
exclude some preferences entirely f r o m consideration and m a i n -
D w o r k i n ' s strategy of r u l i n g out all external preferences depends
tain the basic c l a i m that all u t i l i t y and disutility experienced by-
absolutely on the p r i o r claim that u t i l i t a r i a n i s m restricted to per-
eve ryone have been counted equally. N o t counting certain prefer-
sonal u t i l i t y is a completely reliable guide to distributive justice.
ences brings i n t o question the claim to equal consideration at the
It is this crucial c l a i m w h i c h seems dubious in these examples. A different strategy is offered by John C. Harsanyi, w h o derives
foundations of any version of systematic u t i l i t a r i a n i s m . O n the other h a n d , c o u n t i n g all preferences, i n c l u d i n g " a n t i s o c i a l " ones,
average u t i l i t y f r o m a variant of Rawls's original p o s i t i o n . He at-
exposes the resulting theory to horrendous counterexamples,
tempts, in effect, to rule out N a z i external preferences but not
in Hare's N a z i p r o b l e m .
as
altruistic ones. H e proposes to exclude " a l l clearly antisocial pref-
It is w o r t h n o t i n g that Hare offers a second line of defense
erences, such as sadism, envy, resentment, and malice." H a r s a n y i
against the f a n a t i c - N a z i p r o b l e m — t h a t "cases that are never likely
bases this exclusion on a conception of the dimensions of person-
to be actually encountered do not have to be squared w i t h the
ality that are relevant to membership in w h a t he calls "a m o r a l
t h i n k i n g of the o r d i n a r y m a n . " However, once numbers are taken
c o m m u n i t y " : " U t i l i t a r i a n ethics makes all of us members of the
into account, it is not unrealistic to imagine such fanatical prefer-
same m o r a l c o m m u n i t y . A person displaying ill w i l l t o w a r d others
ences directed at m i n o r i t y groups being supported on u t i l i t a r i a n
does remain a member of this c o m m u n i t y , but not w i t h his w h o l e
grounds. C o n t i n u i n g religious and political conflicts i n Lebanon
personality. T h a t part of his personality that harbours these hos-
and N o r t h e r n Ireland, as well as a case I applied earlier to utilitar-
tile antisocial feelings must be excluded f r o m membership, and
ian t h e o r y — - I d i A m i n ' s expulsion of the Asians f r o m Uganda
has no c l a i m for a hearing w h e n it comes to defining our concept
illustrate that intense preferences of large numbers can be directed
of social u t i l i t y . "
9
If we are to pick and choose among the preferences to be satisfied, we need some justification for our selection apart f r o m the assumption that our operative theory of the good is preference
-
at the i m p o s i t i o n of severe deprivations on particular groups. T h e issue is not a purely imaginary one l i m i t e d to philosophical discussion. H a r e argues, however, that in e m p l o y i n g such
counter-exam-
satisfaction. Whatever we t h i n k of Harsanyi's n o t i o n of m o r a l
ples, we are confusing the "level 1 " t h i n k i n g of the o r d i n a r y rea-
c o m m u n i t y , it makes no pretense to being neutral among theories
soner w i t h w h a t he calls the "level 2 " t h i n k i n g of the abstract
of the g o o d . Rather, it is a particular, controversial m o r a l i d e a l —
philosopher. It is only the level 2 t h i n k i n g of the philosopher
only one among the many that could be inserted into a m o d e l
that need h o l d p r o o f against every " f a n t a s t i c " counterexample we
of i m p a r t i a l i t y . This exclusion of some preferences based on our
m i g h t imagine. Yet h o w w o u l d Hare's level 2 theory deal w i t h
m o r a l evaluation of their appropriateness represents a sharp de-
such a case? H a r e tries to avoid the problem by focusing o n the de-
parture f r o m the u t i l i t a r i a n t r a d i t i o n , w h i c h has generally avoided
sign of the appropriate level I principles to be " i m p l a n t e d " in the
specifying the substantive content of preferences."' T h a t t r a d i t i o n
p o p u l a t i o n t h r o u g h m o r a l education. Yet the goal of this moral
has been preoccupied w i t h measuring the quantity and sometimes
education is u l t i m a t e l y u t i l i t a r i a n and the p o i n t of these counter-
the q u a l i t y of preference satisfaction, but not its legitimacy or ille-
examples is to show that such an ultimate a i m is inappropriate
gitimacy. If u t i l i t y is ultimately w h a t counts for a u t i l i t a r i a n , and if
w h e n u t i l i t y is defined so as to be entirely indiscriminate about
satisfaction of certain preferences is experienced by some persons
w h i c h preferences must be satisfied.
itrai&gies of
iPrelerestsa, U t i l i t y , s a d
Mmmsfrntitm
Want-regarding theories ail involve c o m m i t m e n t to one o r another controversial theory of the g o o d . Acketman's a n t i - u t i l i tarian dialogue quoted in section 2.6 above incisively made the
109
scrutable to every other m i n d and no c o m m o n denominator of feeling is possible."
13
If we take this " i n s c r u t a b i l i t y " seriously, then want-regarding
neutral a m o n g
theories are l i m i t e d to an extremely n a r r o w range of j u d g m e n t . We
theories o f the g o o d . Rather, it is a specification of one p a r t i c u -
can, of course, f o l l o w Pareto in a p p r o v i n g of changes that make
lar theory w i t h special controversies attached to i t . Clearly, the
some people better off and no one worse off. T h a t inference re-
choice of w h i c h preferences are to be counted is a first major
quires o n l y ( o r d i n a l ) intrapersonal comparisons. But almost every
source o f controversy. A second notorious set of issues facing
p o l i t i c a l choice of any significance in the real w o r l d w i l l make at
p o i n t that preference satisfaction is, itself, not
w a n t - r e g a r d i n g theories is the interpersonal comparison of w a n t
least some people worse off, w h i l e perhaps m a k i n g others better
satisfaction. Let us briefly explore this second major controversy
off.
before t y i n g the discussion back to our basic criteria f o r an ac-
theory cannot be entirely insensitive to the question of h o w at least
ceptable theory.
some of these losses compare to at least some of the gains, the basis
14
Provided we assume that any defensible w a n t - r e g a r d i n g
Ever since L o r d Robbins's influential article in 1938 expressing
f o r significant evaluation of policy alternatives is blocked once the
skepticism about the possibility of rigorous interpersonal c o m -
" i n s c r u t a b i l i t y " claim is taken seriously. Significant policy choices
parisons,
w i l l require some m i x t u r e of gains and losses, placing them in the
12
proponents of want-regarding theories such as u t i l i t a r i -
anism have faced the dilemma that they must either confine their
realm of w h a t the economists call the "Pareto noncomparable."
judgments to strict Pareto improvements or they must face the
The n o t o r i o u s attempts at an end run a r o u n d these difficul-
q u a g m i r e of interpersonal comparisons. The former path leads to
ties (the K a l d o r - H i c k s and Scitovsky compensation tests) rest o n
t r i v i a l i t y ; the latter inevitably produces controversy and indeter-
w h a t W i l l i a m J. Baumol called "a concealed interpersonal com-
minacies. Once again, we are faced w i t h a choice between theories
parison o n a money basis."
w h i c h either do not significantly differentiate, or do so based o n a
utilities requires the assumption that a p o u n d or a dollar "yields
controversial account of the g o o d whose usage opens the theory
the same amount of satisfaction to whomever i t is given, rich or
to j u r i s d i c t i o n a l challenges by other theories using rival c o n t r o -
p o o r . " As Little concluded in his now-classic assessment of w e l -
versial accounts of the g o o d . Once again, we are faced, at b o t t o m ,
fare economics, "Presumably, most people w o u l d agree that such
w i t h a choice between vacuousness (violating c r i t e r i o n 1 [a]) and
an assumption is r i d i c u l o u s . " " O f course, the use of compensa-
j u r i s d i c t i o n problems ( v i o l a t i n g c r i t e r i o n 4).
t i o n tests to make evaluations beyond the l i m i t a t i o n s of the Pareto
l>
Using money as a place holder for
1
i n reacting to the story of an Indian Brahmin w h o regarded
p r i n c i p l e can be m o d i f i e d to take account of differences between
himself as " t e n times" as capable of satisfaction as a l o w l y U n -
groups such as d e c l i n i n g marginal u t i l i t y of income. Cost-benefit
touchable, Robbins w r o t e : " I c o u l d not escape the c o n v i c t i o n t h a t ,
analysis is often applied so as to incorporate such weights, but they
if I chose to regard men as equally capable of satisfaction and he
can only be developed i n a rough fashion and there is w i d e r o o m
to regard them as d i f f e r i n g according to a hierarchical schedule,
for reasonable disagreement about any particular a p p l i c a t i o n . ' '
the difference between us was not one w h i c h could be resolved
Hence, we can see that the basic difficulty for w a n t - r e g a r d i n g
by the same methods of demonstration as were available i n other
theories arising f r o m interpersonal comparisons is that, o n the one
fields of social j u d g m e n t . " Robbins concluded: "Every m i n d is i n -
h a n d , s t i c k i n g w i t h i n the limits of the Pareto principle avoids the
110
Strategies of Reconstruction
Preference, Utility, a n d t h e Good
111
p r o b l e m but at the cost of silence o n most issues of social i m p o r -
the fact that a value o r a i m is among those actuailv accepted by an
tance; o n the other hand, venturing beyond those limits c o m m i t s
agent gives it no special status whatsoever in the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of
the resulting theory to interpersonal comparisons of want satisfac-
that agent's g o o d . As a result, such ideal-regarding theories avoid
t i o n — i n t e r p e r s o n a l comparisons that are inevitably controversial
the c o n u n d r u m s just mentioned about interpersonal comparisons
and can only be accomplished in a rough fashion.
of w a n t satisfaction. Degrees of want satisfaction play no role in
T h e r e m a i n i n g o p t i o n in figure 5 raises difficulties of an entirely different k i n d . As we just saw, want-regarding theories must
this k i n d of theory. H o w e v e r , ideal-regarding theories avoid these t w o basic dif-
face b o t h (a) the p r o b l e m of d e t e r m i n i n g w h i c h preferences are
ficulties
relevant t o an individual's good and (b) the problem that m i g h t
strong paternalistic
be summarized as the Pareto d i l e m m a : either stick to the l i m i t e d
off even if none
at a price, '['hey are committed to w h a t m i g h t be called inferences,
such that an agent X must be better
of X's o w n preferences w o u l d s u p p o r t such a
range of judgment sanctioned by the Pareto principle o r c o m -
conclusion. T h e paternalism problem challenging ideal-regarding
m i t the theory to controversial and inevitably inconclusive claims
theories shifts the burden of p r o o f ; it demands of tis a rationale
about interpersonal comparisons of w a n t satisfaction.
for d i s c o u n t i n g X ' s o w n conceptions of his g o o d in evaluating X's
However, these difficulties can largely be avoided by the sec-
o w n g o o d . T h i s v i e w w o u l d n o t , in the least, deny that there is
o n d m a i n o p t i o n , ideal-regarding theories. These latter theories
r o o m for some paternalistic judgments; only that, when we set
depart f r o m " c i t i z e n sovereignty": they support the conclusion
aside X's o w n views, some justification is r e q u i r e d .
17
that a person is better-off regardless of whether any of his actual
Few w o u l d deny that i n at least some isolated cases, there are
preferences have been satisfied. T h e most p r o m i n e n t contempo-
g o o d grounds for paternalistic inferences. Even strongly paternal-
rary i l l u s t r a t i o n is Rawls's d o c t r i n e of p r i m a r y goods. W h i l e i t
istic inferences—where
was useful, earlier, for us to use Rawls's t h i n theory of the g o o d
even if none o f his o w n preferences support that conclusion—are
as an i l l u s t r a t i o n of the attempt to achieve strict neutrality, the
undeniably appropriate in special cases. Consider the person w h o
set of inferences the t h i n theory is supposed to s u p p o r t — t h e doc-
suffers f r o m the delusion that he w i l l fly u p w a r d if he jumps o u t
trine of p r i m a r y goods—can be used to illustrate the problems o f
the w i n d o w . " If we restrain h i m so he never gets the chance t o
ideal-regarding theory.
test his theory, o u r inferences about his welfare may, quite ap-
T h e p o i n t is that in the o r i g i n a l position we make assumptions about our interests w h i c h are supposed t o h o l d regardless
we conclude that an agent is better off
2
propriately, be strongly paternalistic. M o r e generally, B a r r i n g t o n
of w h a t
M o o r e has documented cases of injustice whose most shocking as-
our actual preferences t u r n out t o be, once the veil of ignorance
pect is the acceptance by the victims of the ideology r a t i o n a l i z i n g
is l i f t e d . For purposes of d i s t r i b u t i v e justice, we are supposed
their oppression. M o o r e ' s analysis ranges across Untouchables,
to value l i b e r t y first, equal o p p o r t u n i t y second, and income and
ascetics, and even some concentration camp v i c t i m s .
wealth t h i r d . These conclusions are based o n a conception of o u r
dramatic cases apply t o special circumstances.The problem facing
21
But these
interests, regardless of whether, in actual life, our preferences bear
ideal-regarding theories of the good is that they are n o t l i m i t e d t o
any relation to these p r i o r i t i e s . For such ideal-regarding theo-
such unusual and isolated cases. Rather, they apply generally t o
ries, there is no p r o b l e m of p i c k i n g and choosing among actual
w h o i e populations t o provide criteria to support a theory of dis-
preferences, accepting some w h i l e rejecting others. O n this view,
t r i b u t i v e justice o r a solution to our d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n c r i t e r i o n . This
!S
ifrateg iss af Resflnstruition
112
^ r e f e r e s i s e , JStiiify, cmd t h e G e s d
113
general range of application makes the burden of proof c o n f r o n t -
conclusions, v i o l a t i n g c r i t e r i o n 1, w h i l e iess-than-strictly neutral
ing a strongly paternalistic theory more difficult. We may have to
theories are subject to j u r i s d i c t i o n problems, v i o l a t i n g c r i t e r i o n 3.
neglect the actual preferences of whole populations in our evalua-
In neither case do we get a firm basis for significant
t i o n o f their o w n g o o d . W h a t is it that disqualifies their o w n views
conclusions w i t h strong enough substantive implications to satisfy
f r o m having any weight i n , or bearing u p o n , this evaluation?
our criteria for an acceptable theory.
I d o not mean to argue that this question poses an insurmountable obstacle. M y p o i n t is only that the special paternalistic burdens of ideal-regarding theories open up r o o m for controversy and reasonable disagreement that are fully comparable to the difficulties
we encountered earlier w i t h want-regarding theories. I n
b o t h cases, once the quest for a strictly neutral theory of the g o o d has been given up, no single canonical solution can dispatch its rivals w h i l e resting i m m u n e f r o m challenges by other controversial theories of the g o o d for w h i c h symmetrical claims can be made. A n y one of these non-neutral theories of the g o o d can be combined w i t h a n o t i o n of i m p a r t i a l i t y to support significant substantive conclusions.
But such support is easily matched by
rival theories that share the same basic strategy but apply it to s u p p o r t rival conclusions—by
e m p l o y i n g their o w n non-neutral
theories of the g o o d . As can be seen in figure .5, we face a choice between b u i l d i n g a firm basis for largely empty conclusions (the strictly neutral strategy) and b u i l d i n g an insecure basis for significant conclusions (the non-neutral strategies just discussed). By an insecure base, 1 mean one subject to jurisdictional challenge by rival procedures m a k i n g symmetrical claims. The strictly neut r a l strategy survives the j u r i s d i c t i o n problem only by failing to offer d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g conclusions. The non-strictly-neutral strategies w i l l sometimes offer differentiating conclusions (satisfying c r i t e r i o n I ) , only to fail the j u r i s d i c t i o n problem (criterion 3). These latter theories, by relying on some controversial theory o f the g o o d i n order to get substantive conclusions, become vulnerable t o j u r i s d i c t i o n a l challenge by rival theories d u n employ a rival controversial theory of the good to get comparably ambitious results. The basic dilemma for these hypothetical thought e x p