DERIVATIONS IN MINIMALISM
This pathbreaking study presents a new perspective on the role of derivation, the series of operations by which sentences are formed. Working within the Minimalist Program and focusing on English, the authors develop an original theory of generative syntax, providing illuminating new analyses of some central syntactic constructions. Two key questions are explored: first, can the Extended Projection Principle (EPP) be eliminated from Minimalist analysis without loss, and perhaps with a gain in empirical coverage; and second, is the construct ‘A-chain’ similarly eliminable? The authors argue that neither EPP nor the construct ‘A-chain’ is in fact a property of Universal Grammar, but rather their descriptive content can be deduced from independently motivated properties of lexical items, in accordance with overarching principles governing derivation. In investigating these questions, a range of new data is introduced, and existing data is re-analyzed, presenting a pioneering challenge to fundamental assumptions in syntactic theory. Samuel David Epstein is a Professor in the Linguistics Department at the University of Michigan. He is co-author of A Derivational Approach to Syntactic Relations (with E. Groat, R. Kawashima and H. Kitahara), and co-editor (with N. Hornstein) of Working Minimalism (1999). He is co-founder (with S. Flynn) of the journal Syntax. T. Daniel Seely is Professor of Linguistics and Chair of the Linguistics Program at Eastern Michigan University. His work in syntax has appeared in Linguistic Inquiry and Syntax. He is organizer and editor of ‘Geometric and Thematic Structure in Binding’ (1996), the first LINGUIST List online conference, and he is co-editor (with S. D. Epstein) of Derivation and Explanation in the Minimalist Program (2002).
In this series 66 67
anthony r. warner: English auxiliaries: structure and history p. h. matthews: Grammatical theory in the United States from Bloomfield to Chomsky
68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99
ljiljana progovac: Negative and positive polarity: a binding approach r. m. w. dixon: Ergativity yan huang: The syntax and pragmatics of anaphora knud lambrecht: Information structure and sentence form: topic, focus, and the mental representation of discourse referents luigi burzio: Principles of English stress john a. hawkins: A performance theory of order and constituency alice c. harris and lyle campbell: Historical syntax in crosslinguistic perspective liliane haegeman: The syntax of negation paul gorrel: Syntax and parsing guglielmo cinque: Italian syntax and universal grammar henry smith: Restrictiveness in case theory d. robert ladd: Intonational morphology andrea moro: The raising of predicates: predicative noun phrases and the theory of clause structure roger lass: Historical linguistics and language change john m. anderson: A notional theory of syntactic categories bernd heine: Possession: cognitive sources, forces and grammaticalization nomi erteschik-shir: The dynamics of focus structure john coleman: Phonological representations: their names, forms and powers christina y. bethin: Slavic prosody: language change and phonological theory barbara dancygier: Conditionals and prediction claire lefebvre: Creole genesis and the acquisition of grammar: the case of Haitian creole heinz giegerich: Lexical strata in English keren rice: Morpheme order and semantic scope april mcmahon: Lexical phonology and the history of English matthew y. chen: Tone Sandhi: patterns across Chinese dialects gregory t. stump: Inflectional morphology: a theory of paradigm structure joan bybee: Phonology and language use laurie bauer: Morphological productivity thomas ernst: The syntax of adjuncts elizabeth closs traugott and richard b. dasher: Regularity in semantic change maya hickmann: Children’s discourse: Person, space and time across languages diane blakemore: Relevance and linguistic meaning: The semantics and pragmatics of discourse markers
100
ian roberts and anna roussou: Syntactic change: a minimalist
101 102 103 104 105 106
donka minkova: Alliteration and sound change in early English mark c. baker: Lexical categories: verbs, nouns and adjectives carlota s. smith: Modes of discourse: the local structure of texts rochelle lieber: Morphology and lexical semantics holger diessel: The acquisition of complex sentences sharon inkelas and cheryl zoll: Reduplication: doubling in
approach to grammaticalization
morphology 107 108
susan edwards: Fluent aphasia barbara dancygier and eve sweetser: Mental spaces in
grammar: conditional constructions matthew baerman, dunstan brown and greville g. corbett: The syntax–morphology interface: a study of syncretism 110 marcus tomalin: Linguistics and the Formal Sciences: The origins of generative grammar 111 samuel d. epstein and t. daniel seely: Derivations in Minimalism
109
Earlier issues not listed are also available
CAMBRIDGE STUD IES IN LINGUISTICS General Editors: P. AUSTIN, J. BRESNAN, B. COMRIE, S. CRAIN, W. DRESSLER, C. J. EWEN, R. LASS, D. LIGHTFOOT, K. RICE, I. ROBERTS, S. ROMAINE, N. V. SMITH
Derivations in Minimalism
DERIVATIONS IN MINIMALISM
SAMUEL D. EPSTEIN University of Michigan and
T. DANIEL SEELY Eastern Michigan University
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521811804 © Samuel D. Epstein and T. Daniel Seely 2006 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 2006 A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library ISBN-13 978-0-521-81180-4 hardback ISBN-10 0-521-81180-5 hardback ISBN-13 978-0-521-01058-0 paperback ISBN-10 0-521-01058-6 paperback Transferred to digital printing 2006 Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
This book is dedicated to Elaine, Molly and Sylvie; and to Hannah, Piper and Charlie; and to our students: past, present and future.
Contents
Acknowledgments Preface
xiii xiv
1
Orientation and goals
1
1.1 1.2
Some methodological preliminaries Outline and rationale
1 4
2
On the elimination of A-chains
14
2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4
Chains are not syntactic objects A-chains are not specifiable under X invisibility A non-isomorphism between A-chains and successive cyclic A-movement An alternative analysis without chains
14 20 31 42
3
On the elimination of the EPP
48
3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4
Introduction The EPP There-insertion and raising: more problems created by the EPP The conjecture class of verbs
48 49 56 70
4
More challenges to the elimination of the EPP: some movement cases
113
4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5
Introduction Evidence for successive cyclic A-movement as evidence for the EPP The Boškovi´c approach Some alternative solutions Lasnik’s cases
113 114 116 130 164
5
Exploring architecture
174
5.1 5.2
Derivational architecture of C HL Some final notes on the derivational model; eliminating feature strength, and ‘obligatory’ transformational rule application
174 197
xi
xii
Contents
References Index
199 209
Acknowledgments
We thank Andrew Winnard (Senior Commissioning Editor for Language and Linguistics), Helen Barton (Editor for Language and Linguistics), and Elizabeth Davey (Production Editor for Humanities and Social Sciences) of Cambridge University Press for their interest in our research, and for their patience, consideration and kindness during the production of this book. We are also indebted to Catherine Fortin and Mary Beers for indispensable editorial and linguistic assistance. Steve Peter expertly prepared the entire manuscript and provided crucial input at all stages, which we gratefully acknowledge here. We are very grateful to Scott Atran, Pam Beddor, Chris Collins, Diana Cresti, Josh Epstein, Justin Fitzpatrick, Jon Gajewski, Sam Gutmann, Mark Hale, Norbert Hornstein, Hisatsugu Kitahara, Rick Lewis, Peter Liem, Peter Ludlow, Fred Mailhot, Jim McCloskey, David Pesetsky, Esther Torrego, Christina Tortora, and C. Jan-Wouter Zwart for valuable discussion of many of the ideas presented here. We also especially thank Jim McCloskey, Željko Boškovi´c and Roger Martin, as well as Margaret Speas and Naoki Fukui, whose research challenging the EPP has significantly influenced the work reported here. We’ve also been influenced by Howard Lasnik’s recent research supporting the EPP, which has helped to clarify the obstacles confronted in attempting to eliminate this principle. We also owe a very special thanks to our colleague Acrisio Pires, who coauthored a manuscript with us, entitled “EPP in T?” (2004), which was written and submitted for publication during the writing of this book, and is discussed in Chapter 3. We also thank Acrisio for detailed and highly insightful comments on earlier drafts of many parts of this book, which have led to notable improvements in the final version. We are extremely indebted to Noam Chomsky for his interest in our work, and for protracted discussion of many of the ideas presented here. Needless to say, all errors are ours, and nobody acknowledged here necessarily agrees with any of the hypotheses presented.
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. . . understanding always involves the notion of composition. This notion can enter in one of two ways. If the thing understood be composite, the understanding of it can be in reference to its factors, and to their ways of interweaving so as to form that total thing. This mode of comprehension makes evident why the thing is what it is. The second mode of understanding is to treat the thing as a unity, whether or not it is capable of analysis, and to obtain evidence as to its capacity for affecting its environment. The first mode may be called the internal understanding, and the second mode is the external understanding. . . . The two modes are reciprocal; either presupposes the other. The first mode conceives the thing as an outcome, the second mode conceives it as a causal factor. . . . It is true that nothing is finally understood until its reference to process has been made evident. (pp. 45–6) Process and individuality require each other. In separation all meaning evaporates. The form of process . . . derives its character from the individuals involved, and the characters of the individuals can only be understood in terms of the process in which they are implicated. (p. 97) The whole understanding of the world consists in the analysis of process in terms of the identities and diversities of the individuals involved. (p. 98) Excerpted from Alfred North Whitehead, Modes of Thought. 1
Chapters 2 and 3 of this book are based in part on a manuscript written and circulated in 1999 and presented at the 1999 LSA Summer Institute Workshop on Grammatical Functions, ‘SPEC-ifying the GF “Subject”: Eliminating A-chains and the EPP within a Derivational Model’. Chapters 1, 4 and 5 are, to a good approximation, entirely new, as are many aspects of Chapters 2 and 3. We thank Stanley Dubinsky and William Davies for inviting us to the workshop and we thank Howard Lasnik for his valuable commentary on this paper. It should be noted that in the same year a Minimalist paper with certain similarities to our Chapters 2 and 3, concerning A-chains and the EPP, was independently written and distributed: Castillo, Juan Carlos, John Drury and Kleanthes K. Grohmann, 1999, ‘Merge Over Move and the Extended Projection Principle’, in University of Maryland Working Papers in Linguistics 8:63–103. 1. 1938. New York: The Free Press (a division of MacMillan Publishing Co. Inc.).
xiv
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xv
A revised version was then published as: Grohmann, Kleanthes K., John Drury and Juan Carlos Castillo, 2000, ‘No More EPP’, in Proceedings of the 19th West Coast Conference on Formal Linguistics, 153–166. As further concerns the elimination of A-chains (‘as we know them’), another recent analysis has appeared since the completion of Epstein and Seely (1999), that of Manzini and Roussou (2000), which regrettably we do not address here. Their analysis invokes quite different mechanisms than those proposed here. Earlier still (as recently pointed out to us by Norbert Hornstein, to whom we are indebted for doing so), Pauline Jacobson (1992) advanced an analysis of raising in a quite different framework in her ‘Raising Without Movement’. More generally, there has existed for quite some time an unclarity, and we think interesting debate, both within and between frameworks, in both syntax and semantics (which we cannot comprehensively review here) concerning the proper treatment of the categorial status, internal structure and derivation of raising infinitives. In this regard, it is important to note that at the very inception of GB theory (and the postulation of A-chains and the EPP), Chomsky (1981) explicitly addressed the broad issues at hand and explicated the nature of their importance in attempting to explain aspects of human knowledge of language, and its growth in the individual. As opposed to the GB-theoretic analyses he proposes, Chomsky (1981:92) considers an alternative: Consider . . . a different theory, call it “Theory II,” which generates different s-Structures . . . lacking empty categories – traces or PRO. One might imagine other variants of Theory II in which some of the structures with gaps . . . have trace and others do not (perhaps movementto-Comp might be distinguished from NP-movement in this way, for example). Theory II is rather different in its properties from Theory I. For example, Theory II does not observe the projection principle; furthermore, it assigns e-roles to arguments that are not in e-positions by devices quite different from those that are employed to relate operators such as wh-phrases to the variables they bind . . . Furthermore, it does not relate the properties of interpreted gaps to those of overt anaphors and pronouns with disjoint reference . . . . Theor[y] 1 and [Theory] II appear, at least, to be rather different in their conceptual and empirical properties; not so much in their coverage of data – presumably either can be developed in such a way as to deal in some manner with phenomena that are at all well-understood – but in their frameworks of unifying principles and assumptions about the nature of UG.
Portions of the following material were also presented at: the meeting of the Michigan Linguistics Society held at Eastern Michigan University (2001); Wayne State
xvi
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University Department of Linguistics colloquium (2000); the LOT Summer school and the 1st Tools in Linguistic Theory Conference (TiLT), both held at the University of Utrecht (2001); and the LSA Summer Institute held at Michigan State University (2003). We thank the organizers and audiences there for their interest in and comments on our work. We also each thank our graduate students for their many valuable contributions made during the presentation of this material in various classes (including some joint Eastern Michigan University – University of Michigan courses) and syntax workshops. In particular, we specifically acknowledge the following linguistics students from Eastern Michigan University: Scott Fults, Lydia Grebenyova, Neil Salmond, and Heather Taylor; and from the University of Michigan: Christopher Becker, Gerardo Fernandez-Salgueiro, Catherine Fortin, Rose Letsholo, Michael Marlo, Hamid Ouali, Andrea Stiasny, and Annemarie Toebosch; and (formerly at Eastern, and now at the University of Michigan) Dina Kapetangianni. Abbreviations CT MI
DBP BEA
DASR
Chomsky, Noam. 1995. ‘Categories and transformations’, in The Minimalist Program, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Chomsky, Noam. 2000. ‘Minimalist inquiries: the framework’, in Roger Martin, David Michaels, and Juan Uriagereka (eds.), Step by step: essays on minimalist syntax in honor of Howard Lasnik, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Chomsky, Noam. 2001a. ‘Derivation by phase’, in Michael Kenstowicz (ed.), Ken Hale: a life in language, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Chomsky, Noam. 2001b. ‘Beyond Explanatory Adequacy’, ms., MIT. A revised version to appear in Adriana Belletti (ed.), Structures and beyond: current issues in the theory of language, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Epstein, Samuel D., Erich Groat, Ruriko Kawashima, and Hisatsugu Kitahara. 1998. A derivational approach to syntactic relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
1
Orientation and goals
1.1
Some methodological preliminaries
1.1.1
A note on empirical coverage
Before outlining the book, we want to make aspects of our overall orientation clear, and we begin with two preliminaries. Throughout, our primary goal (whether we attain it or not!) is explanation via deduction, not empirical coverage by (re-)description or stipulation (see e.g., Epstein and Seely 2002: Introduction, for further discussion). Of course, it is undeniable that empirical coverage is vitally important, but to adapt a point we believe was made by either Dirac or Thom, 1 consider the following scenario. First suppose we have some finite set of empirical findings, such as 6
5 4
3
2 1
0 0
1
2
Figure 1.1
3
4
5
6
The data
From such findings we advance the non-finite hypothesis that x=y. Now consider
1. We are indebted to Josh Epstein for pointing this argument out to us. Despite his and our concerted efforts and numerous consultations, we have thus far been unable to determine the exact attribution, in particular, whether the argument is due to Dirac and/or to Thom, or someone else. We also thank Pam Beddor for very helpful discussion of and comments regarding the argument.
1
2 Derivations in Minimalism
the following two competing theories. Theory 1 correctly predicts three of the data, namely (1,1), (3,3), and (5,5), e.g., as follows: 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 0
1
2
3
Figure 1.2
4
5
6
Theory 1
Now consider a different theory, Theory 2, which correctly predicts none of the data. 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 0
1
2
Figure 1.3
3
4
5
6
Theory 2
Clearly Theory 1 is ‘empirically preferable’ by a ‘winning score’ of 3–0. The point, as we understand it, is that Theory 2, despite getting none of the data correct, captures the data’s overall (linear) pattern, and is ‘closer to the truth’ or ‘more illuminating’ than the empirically preferable Theory 1. Hence, we believe, Theory 2 is a better working or guiding hypothesis upon which to base future research. The ‘balance’ between coverage and insight is surely a delicate and vitally important matter, but our point here is only to re-emphasize the following: the empirical coverage of a theory (to the extent that it is ever precisely determined) is not the only issue at hand, if indeed our goal is explanation. (Needless to say, this study includes wide-
Orientation and goals
3
ranging and detailed empirical analyses, and we do not explicitly seek a theory with zero empirical coverage as our goal!) There are of course other scenarios, too, in which ‘better empirical coverage’ doesn’t necessarily weigh in favor of one theory over another. Human scientific inquiry necessarily proceeds by decomposing the world into parts; for example, human knowledge of language is hypothesized to be an investigable aspect of the world, a part which has parts within it: syntax, phonology, semantics, morphology, pragmatics, etc., each with its own subparts. Thus, we hypothesize that a given fact is syntactic, and we try to cover the fact empirically. But it may well be that it is a mistake for a syntactic theory to cover a particular fact, since the fact may well be non-syntactic. Thus, covering more facts doesn’t necessarily make a theory preferable. It can make it a worse theory than an empirically narrower competitor, if the extra ‘winning facts’, covered only by the ‘winning syntactic theory’, turn out to be, in fact, non-syntactic phenomena. We include this discussion simply to identify our (undoubtedly unachieved but ultimate) goal, what Einstein (1954:282) called ‘the grand aim of all science’: 2 . . . which is to cover the greatest possible number of empirical facts by logical deduction from the smallest possible number of hypotheses or axioms.
The centrality of ‘minimalism’ – operating in concert with the goal of empirical coverage – in all scientific explanation is evident from this perspective. (For an important, detailed discussion of the pervasive role of Minimalist method in scientific inquiry, see e.g., Freidin and Vergnaud 2001.) The analyses that follow, we suspect, fall somewhere between Theories of Type 1 and 2. Of course, we certainly hope we got all of the data right, but needless to say, in any serious empirical inquiry, one never knows with certainty if they’ve truly discovered something or not. What is virtually certain is that we got at least some things wrong. Our hope is that where we are wrong, we are nonetheless ‘close’ like Theory 2, and thereby do not lead ourselves into a wildly wrong (Theory 1 type) hypothesis, that despite covering data is in fact ‘way off track’. 1.1.2
Unclarity as a ‘merely conceptual’, hence non-empirical, issue
Another related issue concerning empirical inquiry is worth noting here. Certain 2. Einstein (1954:282) Ideas and Opinions, Bonanza Books, New York.
4
Derivations in Minimalism
issues, e.g., examining the unclarity of a principle, it seems to us are sometimes viewed as a merely ‘conceptual or philosophical issue, not really empirical, not real linguistics’. In many cases this seems to us an empirically problematic perspective to adopt. To the extent that a principle is unclear, its predictive content is unspecified, hence indeterminate. Thus unclarity is an empirical issue, and empirical issues are extremely (but not uniquely) important. The same holds true for contradictions within a theory or analysis. These are not conceptual, ‘merely theoretical’ non-empirical issues; rather, all the data is at risk of being unpredicted. (For an elegant unveiling of a contradiction embedded within Epstein et al. 1998, see Gajewski 2000.)
1.2
Outline and rationale
Our analyses are couched within and critically examine certain aspects of Chomsky’s pioneering Minimalist framework (Chomsky 1991, 1995, 2000, 2001a). We develop and explore further a level-free architecture for UG, a so-called ‘derivational approach’ to syntactic relations, as initiated in Epstein (1994, 1999) and Epstein et al. (1998), and developed in Epstein and Seely (1999, 2002: Chapter 3). This eliminative derivational Minimalism seeks generative explanation (see below) through minimization, the latter, as noted, a highly characteristic, if not defining, goal of all scientific inquiry. (See Epstein and Seely 2002 for discussion, and the references cited there.) 1.2.1
Eliminating A-chains
One central ‘observation’ made here is that, under an independently motivated, contemporary and highly restrictive Minimalist hypothesis about what a syntactic object is (and is not), the postulate chain is in fact excluded by the theory. Thus, we seek to overcome the potential contradiction faced by adopting a chainexcluding restrictive definition of syntactic object, and concomitantly postulating chains, which fail to satisfy the restrictive conditions. We retain the restrictive definition, and seek to abandon the notion A-chain (see also Hornstein 1998). Chapter 2 explores only the elimination of A-chains, and focuses on the motivation for their postulation as a concept of UG, exploring some of the empirical motivation for A-chains in English, and the architectural aspects of UG that seem to have moti-
Orientation and goals
5
vated this postulate. (We leave the role of head chains and A-bar chains within a derivational framework for future research.) We argue that the empirical support for A-chains in English raising constructions is negligible, and argue in addition that postulating A-chains engenders certain thus far unnoted empirical problems as well as fundamental (predictive) unclarities which are avoided by their elimination. We propose that there is no successive cyclic A-raising in such English constructions, but rather, by hypothesis, one fell swoop movement from theta to Case position. We do not predict that successive cyclic A-movement is universally precluded, but rather, that English raising to checks no features whatsoever (although it may have semantic features, perhaps those of a modal operator). Consequently, under Chomsky’s Minimalist explanation-seeking theory of transformational rule application, whereby all rule application is purposeful, there is no movement to or through Spec of raising to. 3 In other languages or English constructions there may well be abundant evidence for purposeful successive cyclic A-movement and intermediate feature checking. We thus do not propose that ‘successive cyclic Amovement is universally excluded’, or even that it is invariably excluded in English. ‘Successive cyclic raising’ has no real theoretical status; rather only local morpholexical feature checking does, and its overall distribution can be determined only by correctly characterizing the morphological features of all relevant lexical heads and the conditions regulating individual transformational rule application and derivations. 1.2.2
Derivations
If A-chains are eliminated and if certain information that A-chains encode is indeed important, namely the set of positions occupied by a mover and the order in which they were occupied over the course of a derivation, then such information must be expressed by other means. This, we suggest, can be achieved by adopting the derivational approach to syntactic relations. Under this level-free architecture, syntactic relations are, by hypothesis, deducible from the independently motivated iterative application of the two (perhaps unifiable; see Kitahara 1997) transformational rules, Move (Attract) and Merge. The idea is to explain the fundamental construct ‘syntactic relation’, e.g., c-command, as opposed to defining relations on already built tree structures, as is necessitated by a representational, ‘rule-free’ approach, 3. For a critical discussion of a possible problem confronting the particular Internalist-Functionalism inherent in contemporary Minimalist syntactic theory and analyses, see Epstein (2003).
6
Derivations in Minimalism
such as GB theory. (In this regard see also Uriagereka’s 1999 Multiple Spell Out proposal, eliminating the disjunction in Kayne’s representationally applied 1994 LCA, by appeal to cyclic (derivational) structure building, and non-surface application of the LCA. See also Lasnik 2001 for an insightful overview of derivation and representation within the Minimalist framework.) Thus, in the rule-based Minimalist approach, iterative application of well-defined transformational rules is assumed (contra ‘Move-_ ’). Thus, it would be odd indeed to pay no attention to the form of the rules, intermediate representations, and the mode of the iterative rule application. Similarly, Chomsky’s (1995) abandonment of a virtually rule-free, hence ‘all-at-once’, theory of D-structure generation, invites, if not requires, investigation of the empirical content of the rules and their manner of application. If, contra Move-_ , there is iterative well-defined (cyclic) rule application, then within such a theory, there are by definition intermediate representations, which are generated as output of one rule application, and input to the next. If their existence is postulated, arguably the central shift from GB to Minimalism, we should maximize explanation by trying to deduce as much as possible from these independently motivated, binary-concatenation rules, and their iterative application. In the derivational model, we seek to deduce grammatical relations from the formal properties of the rules and/or their partially ordered application. In this level-free model, each transformational output is ‘evaluated’ by both PF and LF, as opposed to the GB Y-model. As Chomsky notes (BEA:3), his phase-based approach is also level-eliminating in the following sense: In this conception there is no LF: rather, the computation maps LA to
pieceby-piece cyclically. There are, therefore, no LF properties and no interpretation of LF, strictly speaking, though Y and interpret units that are part of something like LF in a non-cyclic conception.
In the derivational model developed here, not only do the rules themselves play a central explanatory role, but by virtue of feeding each transformational output to both PF and LF, each rule application is its own ‘self-contained’ Y-model (phasal) derivation. Again, the rule and the generative procedure play a central explanatory role. By contrast, in the ‘rule-free’ Principles and Parameters model, syntactic relations are necessarily defined on trees, and grammaticality is, by definition, described by filters that ‘depict’ illegitimate syntactic representations. Each mecha-
Orientation and goals
7
nism is, by definition, non-explanatory, since definitions-on-trees, like definitions in general, do not explain. We believe that syntactic filters, describing illegitimate configurations, might be replaced with more deeply explanatory postulates; specifically, a generative procedure from which the described filtering effects can be deduced, consistent with Einstein’s grand (minimizing) aim of all science, and consistent with Whitehead’s (1938:98) view that ‘ . . . nothing is understood until its reference to process has been made evident.’ Consonant with the Minimalist Program, we assume that lexical items (consisting of certain features) play a central and ineliminable role. Perhaps, if we can discover the properties of lexical items, including their individual properties (features) of attraction and repulsion, then the way they arrange themselves in groups, as trees (or ‘sentences’) will fall out and thus be explained. As Epstein and Seely (2002) discuss, this seems very similar in spirit to J. Epstein’s conception of the explanatory power of Agent-based Computational modeling in what he calls ‘Generative Social Science’ (J. Epstein 1999; see also Epstein and Axtell 1996). As J. Epstein (1999) notes: . . . the central idea is this: to the generativist, explaining the emergence . . . of macroscopic societal regularities, such as norms or price equilibria, requires that one answer the following question: ‘How could the decentralized local interactions of heterogeneous autonomous agents (i.e. individuals) generate the given regularity?’
J. Epstein (1999) assumes that one has explained the macroscopic societal regularity, to the extent that one can . . . situate an initial population of autonomous heterogeneous agents in a relevant spatial environment; allow them to interact according to simple local rules, and thereby generate – or ‘grow’ – the macroscopic regularity from the bottom up [Our emphasis, SDE/TDS]. 4
In J. Epstein’s terms, ‘if you haven’t grown it, then you haven’t explained it.’ For us, if you define relations on (or appeal in any other way directly to the macrostructure) tree representations, you have failed to explain their properties. For example, to perform an ‘end-of-the-line’ bottom-up compositional semantic interpretation, 4. See J. Epstein (1999) for interesting discussion of the historical roots of such forms of explanation, and for discussion of the usual scientific situation in which more than one initial microspecification generates the macrostructure in question (thereby requiring more tests to distinguish the competitors’ comparative empirical adequacy).
8
Derivations in Minimalism
exactly retracing the steps of the bottom-up local pairing of two categories (the syntactic derivation), seems highly suspect. Furthermore, this postponement of interpretation, until all transformations have applied and the macrostructure is complete, in turn seems to necessitate non-minimal mechanisms such as chain-based trace theory, a look-back device whereby the admittedly important aspects of the derivation are encoded in the ‘enriched’, arguably Inclusiveness-violating, derived macrostructure itself. As argued in Epstein and Seely (2002), representational theories with enriched derivation-encoding representational mechanisms, e.g., trace theory, are thus really ‘just’ a kind of derivational theory (cf. Brody 1995, 2001), but, we would suggest, the wrong kind. An important similar argument, the spirit of which we follow here, appears in Chomsky’s (1995) discussion of another kind of successive cyclic movement, namely head-movement, in which he advocates a return to rule-based, generative theories of human knowledge of syntax. (But note this account is still not entirely chain-free.) It is generally possible to formulate the desired result in terms of outputs. In the head movement case, for example [a case of raising from N-to-V followed by [V N+V], raising to Infl SDE/TDS], one can appeal to the (plausible) assumption that the trace is a copy, so the intermediate V-trace includes within it a record of the local N→V raising. But surely this is the wrong move. The relevant chains at LF are (N, tN ) and (V, tV ), and in these the locality relation satisfied by successive raising has been lost. . . . These seem to be fundamental properties of language, which should be captured, not obscured by coding tricks, which are always available. A fully derivational approach both captures them straightforwardly and suggests that they should be pervasive, as seems to be the case. (Chomsky 1995:224)
To summarize, we argue in Chapter 2 that, under independently motivated restrictions on the postulate ‘syntactic object’, there can be no ‘enriched representational objects’ such as chains, as one would expect if the derivational approach is on track. (Nonetheless, many Minimalist analyses continue to assume chains.) 1.2.3
The EPP
If there is no movement to or through the specifier of raising-to, this in turn necessitates the abandonment of standard formulations of the EPP. We explore the elimination of the EPP in Chapter 3. We suggest that it is the EPP, an unclear and (to the extent that it is clear) questionable principle, which motivates movement to Spec, to, and such movement is argued to be empirically problematic in Chapter 2.
Orientation and goals
9
Thus, in Chapter 3, we seek to eliminate the EPP as a universal principle, following those that have already challenged its efficacy in other domains, including McCloskey (1986, 1996, 1997) and within recent Minimalist assumptions, Martin (1999), and Boškovi´c (2002). One of the leading ideas of our exploration is that the EPP is redundant with numerous other independently motivated mechanisms of the grammar. While Epstein (1990) has argued that certain redundancies are empirically supported by evidence concerning varying types and degrees of grammaticality (see also Chomsky 1965), we argue here that the EPP is not independently motivated. Given its widespread redundancy with other principles, we argue for its elimination as a universal principle of grammar. Thus, in this respect we follow Chomsky’s methodological lead regarding (empirically unsubstantiated) redundancy, as reflected in e.g., the following: Repeatedly, it has been found that these [redundant principles with overlapping empirical coverage SDE/TDS] are wrongly formulated and must be replaced by non-redundant ones. The discovery has been so regular that the need to eliminate redundancy has become a working principle in inquiry. (Chomsky 1995:5)
But suppose one adopts this strategy, seeking to eliminate such redundancy. 5 How do we determine which of the overlapping principles should be targeted for modification or elimination so as to remove the redundancy? It takes at least two to be redundant. One issue is of course the nature of the empirical overlap. Here the idea we follow is that there are multiple independently motivated principles, each overlapping with, i.e. intersecting, the empirical domain of the EPP; hence, it’s the EPP that should be targeted for modification or elimination. In addition to the redundancy, the EPP remains unclear – ‘a pervasive mystery’ according to Lasnik (2002). Furthermore, on some formulations, the EPP (as a ‘macro phrase-structural’ principle) seems to exhibit precisely the formal properties prohibited by the very 5. For extremely illuminating discussion of Minimalist method, including the elimination of redundancy, see Kitahara (2003). For other important discussion of Minimalist method, see e.g., McGilvray (1999) and Smith (1999). For a highly critical perspective, see Lappin, Levine and Johnson (2000a). For important discussion of Lappin, Levine and Johnson’s perspective, see Holmberg (2000), Reuland (2000), Roberts (2000), Piattelli-Palmarini (2000), Uriagereka (2000), and Epstein and Seely (2002: introduction). See also Lappin, Levine and Johnson (2000b) for a response to some of these responses. See also Edelman and Christianson (2003) for criticism of Minimalist method, along with Phillips and Lasnik’s illuminating (2003) response.
10
Derivations in Minimalism
heart of the derivational Minimalist attempt to explain macrostructure properties by deducing them from lexical properties, a minimal theory of transformations, and by hypothesis, language-independent principles of efficient computation. The redundancy concerning the EPP (much of which has already been noted by previous researchers, as we’ll discuss in some detail) can be informally illustrated as shown in Figure 1.4.
Obligatory Case Discharge Case “Valuation” Predication Theory Null Complementizer Theory
EPP
Derivational Morphology
Figure 1.4
Movement Locality Theory
The EPP
Of course, we do not claim to have ‘demonstrably eliminated the EPP’. 6 What we hope to have done instead is to suggest that analytical reliance on the EPP is reliance on something quite unclear, hence empirically problematic in its unclarity. Moreover, where it is clear, the EPP: (i) is highly redundant in its welcome empirical effects with numerous other independently motivated mechanisms; (ii) is empirically problematic to the extent that the predictions are clear (see Chapter 2); and (iii) (as noted above, on at least some formulations) violates both the spirit and letter of ‘Minimalist law’, threatening to mislead us into believing we have a genuine explanation of human knowledge of (un)grammaticality when we say, ‘This data can be readily accounted for by the EPP.’ 6. The five postulates intersecting the EPP might (contra this diagram) also display certain intersections with each other. This issue is not investigated here, nor do we demonstrate that the combined intersections with the EPP entirely subsumes this principle.
Orientation and goals
11
The remainder of Chapter 3, as well as Chapter 4, discusses just some of the challenges to trying to eliminate appeal to the EPP. In what remains of Chapter 3, we explore two non-movement challenges. The first is ‘there-insertion’, and the general question of what forces the presence of expletives in the absence of the EPP. Here we rely on Minimalist extensions of Fukui and Speas’s (1986) observation that ‘obligatory Case discharge’ creates a redundancy with the EPP. Currently, if Case (or unvalued -) features appear on a ‘Case-assigning’ head, they are uninterpretable, hence must be discharged. We adopt the view that expletives facilitate Case discharge (following Groat 1995 and Lasnik 1995). The second challenge investigated in Chapter 3 is the purported motivation for the EPP that stems from so-called BELIEVE-type verbs (i.e., those that can select an infinitival complement, but do not assign accusative Case). These motivate the EPP, since if indeed these verbs are Caseless, we cannot rely on Case discharge to force expletives into the derivation. Thus we seem (unwillingly) compelled to appeal to the EPP to state the fact in need of explanation, namely, the required presence of the expletive. In this discussion, we conduct an in-depth analysis of the verb conjecture, since it has been argued to be the archetypal BELIEVE-class verb. We suggest that the evidence that conjecture fails to check Case is weak, and there is evidence that we provide indicating conjecture is in fact an accusative Case-assigner, but displays curious semantic constraints on the conditions under which accusative is assigned. We follow Martin (1999) in hypothesizing that perhaps there may not exist any BELIEVEclass verbs, in which case ‘they’ provide no motivation for the EPP, since obligatory Case discharge is by hypothesis adequate to cover those phenomena thought to require appeal to EPP. We also discuss limitations of the Case discharge account in light of a further challenge, namely nominal forms of conjecture (altogether lacking accusative Case) taking an infinitival complement. Here we explore alternative independently motivated hypotheses regarding: (i) the structure of infinite complements to nouns, namely, that some are CP projections (see Ormazabal 1995); and (ii) the properties of null complementizers (as pioneered in Stowell 1981 and in Pesetsky 1991) heading such CPs. Here we adopt the leading idea of Martin (1999), namely that there is a redundancy between Null Complementizer Theory and the EPP. We nonetheless reject Martin’s specific analysis of null C 0s. We adopt instead the null C 0 analysis proposed independently of the EPP in Boškovi´c and Lasnik (2003). Following Epstein, Pires and Seely (2004), we show how this analysis of
12
Derivations in Minimalism
null C 0s can be exploited to cover certain EPP effects, revealing yet another potential redundancy – this one between the EPP and morpholexical properties. Chapter 4 explores some movement-based challenges to the elimination of the EPP. The phenomena explored here all involve evidence that a DP has moved through the specifier of an infinitival on its way to its PF position. Since we’ve argued that the specifier of non-control (e.g., raising) to is not a checking position, the EPP, then, is apparently needed to describe such cases. These are what Boškovi´c (2002) refers to as ‘intermediate EPP effects’. In this chapter we examine relevant phenomena concerning Binding Theory, Reconstruction, and Quantifier Float (all-stranding). We examine an EPP-eliminating approach to these phenomena advanced in Boškovi´c (2002). Boškovi´c’s basic idea is to exploit yet another redundancy, one between the EPP and movement locality, both forcing intermediate landing sites. Although this exploitation of the redundancy is a potentially very important part of eliminating the EPP, we nonetheless note some potential problems confronting Boškovi´c’s account. We then explore some alternative solutions, in particular adapting the independently motivated analysis in Torrego (2002), in order to capture certain ‘intermediate EPP-effects’ without reliance on the EPP. This approach presumes not that there is a redundancy between EPP and movement theory, with each forcing movement through the same position, but instead incorporates the hypothesis that the movement is not actually taking place through the EPP position; hence, there is no argument for retaining the EPP based on such data. We also briefly review analyses proposed by Williams (1982, 1989, 1994) and Bobaljik (2001), which call into question the general viability of a Sportiche (1988) type analysis of Quantifier Float, instead suggesting that such quantifiers are in fact adverbs, indicating nothing regarding the EPP. Finally, important arguments for the EPP as advanced by Lasnik are examined. The final chapter, Chapter 5, returns to and explores the central point from which we began: namely, the abandonment of the (phaseless) four-level or two-level Ymodel and the postulation instead of a level-free architecture of UG. Within this derivational approach, we advance the null hypothesis assuming phases, namely that each rule application is a self-contained Y-model derivation (phase) of its own. (For one aspect of comparison with Chomsky’s ‘bigger phase’ approach, see Epstein and Seely 2002.) We suggest that each representation generated is interpreted by PF and LF. Many representations crash, but since crashing subderivations can be embedded within larger derivations, convergence can be obtained. That is, there
Orientation and goals
13
is so-called non-fatal crashing, which can be overcome by subsequent operations yielding convergence in a derivation containing a crashing subderivation (see also Epstein 2003 for discussion of a related issue concerning Chomsky’s DBP and BEA models). We explore a deep question that arises concerning how ‘grammatical’ vs. ‘ungrammatical’ can possibly be characterized in derivational approaches – what we call ‘The (Sam) Gutmann Problem’. Among issues explored here are matters concerning what it means to have the endpoint of one derivation constitute the initiation point for another, as is assumed in any derivational approach. We call this ‘derivational recursion’, as distinct from recursive rule application, and suggest that the two are intimately related; in fact, within our model, they are one and the same. Specifically, we are led to assume that, following Chomsky, agreement checking is done through Probe-Goal matching, but we argue that Case cannot be checked in situ, but requires a more local relation, what was described as ‘spec-head’, an ‘M-command’ notion barred under the derivational account of ccommand. We propose, following DASR, a way to characterize (certain) spec-head relations, but without appeal to representationally defined notions like m-command or government. In addition, we show that the derivational model provides no way to characterize the traditional notion of ‘covert movement’, since within our model, each representation generated is interpreted by PF and LF. Similarly, re-cycling, i.e. reapplying cyclic rules at different levels or within different components, is simply inexpressible. We also argue that the derivational model allows us to eliminate feature strength (see Lasnik 1999). Each representation generated in the unfolding derivation is directly inspected by PF (and LF), and features detected are either PF-illegitimate, inducing (sometimes only temporary) crashing, or legitimate; therefore, no appeal to strength, over and above interface legitimacy, is necessary. To sum up, following Epstein and Seely (2002:86), Our proposals constitute what we believe to be the specification of the null hypothesis regarding the organization of a ‘multiple splits’ derivation-based model of UG lacking levels altogether. Our analyses are far from conclusive, but, we hope, contribute to the ongoing and (we think) exciting attempts to explicitly identify and seek explanatory maximization in formulating the theory of the biologically determined aspects of human knowledge of language, as begun and continued in Chomsky’s routinely pioneering work.
2
On the elimination of A-chains
2.1
Chains are not syntactic objects
To begin, we need to clarify precisely what an A-chain is, and whether it ‘qualifies’ as a legitimate syntactic object. Arguably the clearest recent definition of ‘syntactic object’ is in Chomsky’s (1995) Categories and Transformations (henceforth CT); and the definition provided there is, to the best of our knowledge, maintained in Chomsky’s subsequent work (Minimalist Inquiries (MI), Derivation by Phase (DBP), and Beyond Explanatory Adequacy (BEA)). This definition in many respects parallels that of ‘syntactic constituent’ or ‘syntactic category’ in previous frameworks and plays a similarly fundamental role, as we’ll see. After examining the Minimalist definition of ‘syntactic object’ we will then investigate the formal properties of the copy theory of movement, and the implications of copy theory for chains. Once this is done, the unnoticed entailment that chains are not syntactic objects emerges. 2.1.1
Syntactic objects
What counts as a syntactic object is tightly constrained: such objects are limited to lexical items and objects recursively built from them. The definition plays a direct role in the central goal of ‘minimizing’ the technicalia invoked in much Government Binding analysis. In fact the definition of ‘syntactic object’ constitutes the formal embodiment of the Inclusiveness condition, and perhaps more generally characterizes the minimalist approach. The formal definition is as follows (for further discussion see MI, p. 42): (1)
14
Syntactic Objects: a. Lexical items (CT, p. 243) b. K = {g, {a, b}}, where a, b are objects and g is the label of K (CT, p. 243).
On the elimination of A-chains
c.
15
K = {g, {a, b}}, where a, b are features of syntactic objects already formed (CT, p. 262).
Syntactic objects are of fundamental significance since only they are visible to, and hence manipulable by, the computational system of human language (Chl ). 1
1. CT is arguably inconsistent regarding the criteria for syntactic accessibility. We believe the most natural interpretation of CT is that given in our text above, namely, that only syntactic objects (SO) as formally defined in (1) are accessible to syntactic operations. Thus, if X is a SO, then X is accessible to operations; and if X is not a SO, then it is inaccessible. This view has strong conceptual support; for one thing, it is not clear why a formal definition of SO is given unless it is assumed that only SOs are accessible. Moreover, the claim that only SOs are accessible is clearly appealed to in CT. Thus, CT states: ‘And WHOSE cannot raise because it is not a syntactic object at all, hence not subject to movement.’ p. 263. See also our later discussion. On the other hand, it is to be noted that a somewhat different criterion of syntactic accessibility is also arguably given in CT. CT includes the following passage (and a number of others similar in content to it): ‘We assume further that the principles of UG involve only elements that function at the interface levels; nothing else can be “seen” in the course of computation, a general idea that will be sharpened as we proceed.’ (p. 225) From this quote it seems to follow that X is syntactically accessible only if X is interpretable at the interface. (This interpretation of what is accessible to the syntax is adopted by recent research; thus Hornstein (1998) builds his argument against chains on the assumption that ‘ . . . the objects interpreted at the interface determine the units of syntactic manipulation.’) Note that both of these criteria for syntactic accessibility are problematic within CT. If we assume that only those elements that meet the definition of SO given in (1) are syntactically accessible, then it follows that lexical features are NOT accessible. Although lexical items are SOs, individual features of lexical items apparently are not. Features are not lexical items (although lexical items consist of sets of features), and hence (1a) does not entail that features are SOs. That features are SOs does not follow from (1b). [We assume that the word ‘object’ in (1b) refers to syntactic objects; for note that if the word ‘object’ in (1b) ranged over things like features, then (1c) would be entirely unnecessary.] And (1c) only implies that an object constructed out of features is a SO, but not that the features themselves are SOs. [Note that the actual SO given by (1c) is K, and K itself is the object {g, {a, b}}, and this object K is not a feature but rather it is a complex object composed of features (and the label ‘g’).] So it follows from (1) that features are not SOs. If only SOs are syntactically accessible, and if features are not SOs, then it follows that features are inaccessible to the syntax. However, the entailment that features are inaccessible to the syntax is directly contrary to the thrust of CT, as a large part of CT in fact explores the consequences of the idea that features are accessible to syntax. Indeed, in CT, features are argued to participate in the most fundamental syntactic operations; specifically, Move/Attract, Deletion, Agreement. On the other hand, if only interface interpretable elements are accessible to the syntax, then another problem emerges. It follows that if X is not interpretable, then X is not visible/accessible for computation. But it follows from this, in turn, that [−interpretable] features are not visible to the syntax since they are not interpreted at the interface. And if that is the case we seem to disallow feature checking, which is ‘a core property of Chl (i.e. the computational system of human
16
2.1.2
Derivations in Minimalism
Copy theory and chains
Under copy theory, a mover and its ‘trace’ are identical. Thus in (2), there is exactly one DP, Mary, which is said to have two occurrences, Mary 1 in subject position, and Mary 2 in direct object position (superscripts are used only for ease of exposition). (2)
Mary 1 was arrested Mary 2
Importantly, there is only one Mary in the numeration, and there is only one Mary in (2), with the result that Inclusiveness (no new features are added in the course of the derivation) is satisfied under the copy theory. In fact, one can regard copy theory, or at least the abandonment of trace theory, as necessitated by Inclusiveness. 2 If the copy trace were not a subset of the features of the mover, then features would thereby be added in the course of the derivation, and this would violate Inclusiveness. However, if the mover and its copy-traces are identical (satisfying Inclusiveness), but the chain is to be multi-membered, then a chain cannot consist of just the mover and its trace(s), for ‘they’ are actually one and only one thing. Thus, under copy theory the chain is not {Mary, t} as in standard non-copy theory. Nor can the chain be {Mary 1, Mary 2}, for this is not the intended chain: Recall Mary 1 and Mary 2 are identical (superscripts used here for exposition only), and language) . . . ’ (p. 228). CT clearly assumes that [−interpretable] features are accessible to the syntax; the work is in large part devoted to exploring exactly this assumption. A solution to the problems outlined above is to assume that only SOs are accessible, but add to the definition of SO syntactic features; thus, features, lexical items, and elements formed from them are SOs, and only they are syntactically accessible. The addition of features to the definition of SO, which is in fact done in DBP, does not affect the argumentation regarding chains presented in the text above. 2. We are indebted to Noam Chomsky (personal communication) for extensive discussion of the copy theory, and its historical development. In classical theory, a mover and its trace are distinct; they are featurally distinct and therefore are subject to different grammatical constraints. For example, with A-movement of an R-expression, as in passive, the mover is an R-expression subject to BT-C while its trace is an anaphor subject to BT-A. Note further that because they are distinct, some mechanism for referentially associating a mover and its trace is required. (For contemporary discussion of copy theory and its entailments regarding the phonetic unrealizability of ‘traces’ see Nunes 1999, 2001 and 2004.) These characteristics of the traditional view of movement are incompatible with Minimalism and the main reason involves the overarching constraint of Inclusiveness. Inclusiveness disallows mechanisms like indexing. It also disallows traces, as entities featurally distinct from their antecedents, since such a trace does not occur in the numeration, and, by Inclusiveness, it can’t be ‘created’ in the course of a derivation. Copy theory as identity, however, is consistent with Minimalist tenets. If a mover and its trace are identical, then indexing is not required and Inclusiveness is not violated.
On the elimination of A-chains
17
therefore the set {Mary 1, Mary 2} is equivalent to the unit set {Mary}. This is not the intended characterization of the chain since, whatever else the chain is hypothesized to be in (2), it is certainly an object different from (the unit set containing) just the DP Mary. Thus, under copy theory, chains are characterized in terms of the positions occupied by the different occurrences of the mover since although the occurrences are identical, the positions of those occurrences are not. The fact that identity, in turn, requires appealing to positions in the definition of chains is perhaps most clearly stated as follows: (3)
Suppose, then, that a raises to target M in S, so that the result of the operation is S , formed by replacing M in S by {N, {a, M}}, N the label. The element a now appears twice in S , in its initial position and in the raised position. We can identify the initial position of a as the pair (b the co-constituent of a in S), and the raised position as the pair (K the co-constituent of the raised term a in S ). . . . though a and its trace are identical, the two positions are distinct [our emphasis, SDE, TDS]. We can take the chain CH that is the object interpreted at LF to be the pair of positions. (CT, p. 252)
What then is the chain associated with (2)? The chain will consist of the (one and only) DP Mary and the positions of its two occurrences. The position of a category C is defined, or identified, by the (representational) sister of C; i.e. if we know the sister of C, we know the position of C. (Interestingly, notice, that representational sisters are invariably created by the minimal, binary rules Move and Merge. This fact plays a central role in the DASR attempt to deduce/explain syntactic relations and will play a central role in what follows.) Assuming the characterization of chains in (3), what this means is that the chain in (2) consists of two members, each a pair where the first element of the pair is an occurrence a of the mover, and the second element of the pair is the ‘co-constituent,’ i.e. the sister, of a. Thus the two-membered chain in (2) is: (4)
(<Mary 1, Infl >, <Mary 2, V>)
Notice that this notation is somewhat misleading. If the position of Mary 1 is to be characterized in terms of the sister of the occurrence of Mary 1, then the sister of Mary 1 is the entire I constituent [was arrested Mary 2], not just the label ‘I ’ (the label itself is not a sister to anything nor is it a syntactic object 3). Consequently, if 3. See Collins (1999, 2002) and Seely (2000) for further discussion of the syntactic ‘inertness’ of labels.
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Derivations in Minimalism
chains must be defined in terms of the ‘position of the occurrences’ of a single category, and positions are defined in terms of the sister of an occurrence, the correct (Bare Phrase Structure) characterization of the chain of (2) is as in (5), containing two members: (i) Mary 1 and its Infl sister; and (ii) Mary 2 and its verb-sister: 4 (5)
(<Mary 1, {was {was, {arrested, {arrested Mary 2}}}}>, <arrested Mary 2>)
That is, the sister of the occurrence of Mary 1 is the entire I (or T ) was arrested Mary 2. And the sister of the occurrence of Mary 2 is the verb arrested. Importantly this specification of a chain includes complex phrases (i.e. terms) and entire derived tree representations (e.g. the I was arrested Mary in (5)). So far, we have reviewed the restricted definition of ‘syntactic object’, and we have established how chains must be defined under the copy theory of movement – in terms of multiple occurrences of the positions of the mover. We will next argue that chains are not syntactic objects. 2.1.3
Why chains are not syntactic objects
The chain in (5) does not meet the restrictive definition of ‘syntactic object’ given in (1). (5) is not a lexical item (or a feature of a lexical item) and it satisfies neither condition (1b) nor (1c). Merge and Move each take two objects, join them together (as a set), and then project one or the other thereby creating a label for the object that results. But chains do not have a label at all and there is no projection of the required sort. A chain is a set of ‘discontinuous’ positions each expressed as a relation between an occurrence of a mover and the entire derived syntactic representation which is its sister. A chain thus seems to be defined in terms of grammatical functions or relations, as in (5), in which Mary 1 is Spec, IP (= subject) and Mary 2 is direct object of V. Since chains are not syntactic objects, and since the Chl has access only to syntactic objects, it follows that chains are invisible to Chl. For all intents and
4. Notice that the Spec, IP, i.e. Mary in this case, could itself be a complex term (=subtree) as in The tall woman was arrested rendering a chain-representation even more ‘complex’, or structurally detailed. Here and throughout, we will use the terminology tense/Tense phrase, vs. Infl/Infl-phrase interchangeably, unless otherwise indicated. Notice also that both <Mary 1, {was {was, {arrested, {arrested Mary 2}}}}> and <arrested Mary 2> appear in the A-chain representation (5). Thus, among other things, the chain representation is itself internally redundant.
On the elimination of A-chains
19
purposes, then, chains do not exist in the syntax. This predicts that no computational operation of any sort can refer to them. 5 2.1.4
A potential problem: substantive reference to A-chains
We have revealed that, on formal and independently motivated grounds, chains are invisible to Chl. In fact, if we are right, this follows from the most fundamental definition that the theory incorporates, that of ‘syntactic object’. Nonetheless, elsewhere in CT, and subsequent work, ‘chains’ (CH) are treated as if they are syntactic objects, visible 6 to Chl. For example, (6)
‘ . . . CH violates the uniformity condition . . . ’ (CT, p. 258) ‘Only the head of an A-chain (equivalently, the whole chain) blocks Matching under the Minimal Link Condition.’ (DBP, p. 16) c. ‘ . . . domain and minimal domain . . . are defined “once and for all” for each CH . . . ’ (CT, p. 299) d. ‘In the present framework, the natural proposal is to eliminate the chains CH 1 and CH 2, leaving only the well-formed chain CH 3.’ (CT, p. 300) e. ‘Only the head of a chain CH enters into the operation of Attract/Move.’ (CT, p. 304) f. ‘The operation Move forms the Chain CH=(a, t(a)), t(a) the trace of a. Assume further that CH meets several other conditions (c-command, Last Resort, and others) . . . ’ (CT, p. 250)
a. b.
A theory-internal inconsistency has now emerged: the above passages presuppose that chains are visible to the Chl, and yet they cannot be visible to the Chl since they are by definition not syntactic objects. As a final note, let us consider an apparently more serious problem: CT (p. 281) seeks to deduce that ‘terms cannot be erased’ (see also footnote 1). CT notes that given the syntactic object {A, {a, b}}, erasure of b would yield {A, {a}}. CT then notes that this is by definition not a syntactic object according to the formal definition of syntactic object in (1) above. CT asserts that ‘erasure of a full category cancels the derivation.’ The logic is clear: if a non-syntactic object ever appears, the derivation is cancelled. Thus, it would
5. See Hornstein (1998) for a similar conclusion based on different argumentation. 6. If chains are ‘invisible’ as we have argued above, then it precludes both operations manipulating chains and operations referring to chains (e.g. a chain can’t be part of the structural description of an operation).
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Derivations in Minimalism
seem that chains, not being syntactic objects, wouldn’t just be invisible, but would cancel the derivation. Since all convergent derivations involve chain formation in the CT framework, it would seem that all derivations are cancelled. In what follows, we will disregard this important property of CT and will assume, less problematically, that chains are (just) invisible to Chl, i.e. they do not induce derivational cancellation. (We will later return to the prohibition against term erasure, entailed by the definition of syntactic object, since it is this aspect of the theory that forces the presence of a ‘trace’ – an enduring trace present throughout the derivation – in every departure site. Following DASR, we seek to eliminate trace theory, at least in A-movement.) We turn now to further arguments against A-chains.
2.2
A-chains are not specifiable under X invisibility
This section has two goals. The first is to strengthen the argument that chains do not exist. It is suggested that chains are not only invisible to the syntax but in fact are invisible in LF representations as well; thus, they do not exist in the mapping to LF, nor in LF representations, and hence they do not exist at all. 7 Implications of this conclusion are then explored. 2.2.1
Could chains be visible, but only at LF?
One approach to the problem raised above maintains both the restrictive definition of ‘syntactic object’ and the prediction that chains are not syntactic objects and therefore are not visible to Chl. This would seem to imply, correctly we think, that chains are not objects manipulated by Chl. This may be right since a chain, as exemplified by (5), as opposed to certain parts of it, never appears to undergo syntactic operations, such as Merge or Move. (We return to this issue below.) Notice that the non-manipulability of chains, if correct, does not logically preclude the visibility of chains at the LF interface. Chl might operate only on syntactic objects but there is nothing in the theory which forces it to create only syntactic objects, i.e. only objects that are visible to itself. In a modular system it is perfectly feasible for the products produced by component A to be inaccessible to A but these products nonetheless constitute visible input to component B. Imagine a robot, for example, 7. We are assuming, following Chomsky’s recent work, that chains cannot exist at PF since chains, as we’ve detailed above, contain syntactic structure (e.g. the I in (5)) and such structure is arguably PF-uninterpretable.
On the elimination of A-chains
21
that was designed to paint cars on the assembly line but that was not designed to detect the colors in any way – it’s ‘blind’. Obviously this robot cannot ‘see’ what it produces. But imagine that there is another ‘seeing’ robot that was designed to detect colors and takes as its input the painted cars produced as output by the blind painter robot. This seeing robot could perfectly well perform operations based on color, like putting a certain kind of bumper on the blue cars or a certain kind of tinted window on the green ones. In theory, then, it is possible for the Chl to create but not see chains and then to pass those chains over to the interface, perhaps as a ‘set of instructions,’ which are interpretable/interpreted at the interface. However, we now argue that at least within the CT analysis this logical possibility is precluded. The form of the argument is this: chains are defined in a certain way given copy theory (see section 1.2); however, (we’ll show that) on the required definition, one element of a chain is invisible at LF, and therefore the entire chain is uninterpretable at LF. Recall the Passive (2) and the chain of movement (5) associated with it, both repeated (superscripts are used only for exposition): (2)
Mary 1 was arrested Mary 2
(5)
(<Mary 1, {was {was, {arrested, {arrested Mary 2}}}}>, <arrested Mary 2>)
The first member of the chain is composed of the occurrence Mary 1 and its sister, the I {was {was, {arrested, {arrested Mary 2}}}}. But note that at LF, this I is invisible since under bare relational phrase structure theory it is neither minimal nor maximal, under the following hypothesis (see also Muysken 1982, Speas 1986, Freidin 1992): (7)
X Invisibility Hypothesis (Chomsky 1995, p. 242): A category that does not project any further is a maximal projection XP, and one that is not a projection at all is a minimal projection X min; any other is an X , invisible at the interface and for computation.
This is well motivated to the extent that single-bar projections seem not to participate in operations in Chl, as CT notes. Thus single-bar projections do not assign or receive Case; they do not participate in agreement relations; they do not bind or control and are not bound or controlled; they do not move, delete, or insert,
22
Derivations in Minimalism
nor do they undergo Merge. 8 Representationally, then, it is claimed that the (entire category) I is ‘invisible at the interface.’ But this has an important consequence: if I is invisible, then the (representational) chain specification that includes it is unspecifiable at the interface; i.e. part of the chain is invisible hence uninterpretable at the interface. As a concrete illustration, recall that the position of Mary 1 in (2) is defined in terms of its sister, the simplest assumption. But the sister to Mary 1 in the LF representation is a single-bar projection, assumed to be invisible to Chl and invisible at the interface. To consider the matter in more detail, note that at the point in the derivation before attraction (movement) of Mary, the structure is {was {was, {arrested, {arrested Mary 2}}}}, or more conspicuously: I max
(8) I was
VP arrested Mary
This I projection (within a derivational, relational, bare theory of phrase structure) is maximal, at this point in the derivation, since it does not project further. However, once Mary is attracted to Spec, I, I max in (8) will project and hence will no longer be maximal. Nor will it be minimal since it dominates the I 0 was. Thus once the application of Attract is completed, (this derivational operation (rule) yielding a representation) the intermediate projection I (which is neither a maximal nor minimal projection) is created and once the I is created, it is invisible ‘at the interface and for computation.’ Thus chains, as defined, are not specifiable even as representational objects within an LF representation.
8. Notice, however, that single-bar categories do presumably undergo compositional semantic interpretation (thanks to Diana Cresti p.c. for helpful discussion of this issue). Thus if single-bar categories are indeed invisible, there would seem to be no way to perform compositional semantic interpretation at LF. A solution to this daunting problem is readily available in the Epstein et al. (1998) framework, within which the single-bar category is interpreted when it is still a maximal projection, before being demoted to a single-bar by virtue of concatenation with an element that will become its specifier. This derivational approach to interpretation would also ‘explain’ why single-bar categories are present in LF, but invisible. How can X be present in representation R but not visible in representation R? This too could come about derivationally, X -projections are fossils of what were once X max.
On the elimination of A-chains
2.2.2
23
Avoiding reference to X : motherhood instead of sisterhood?
Thus, if in fact X is invisible, and reference to it in definitions is precluded, then, indeed the X sister cannot be used to specify the positional occurrence of a category in Spec. Lasnik (2002:7) and Chomsky (2001a:39) seem to provisionally accept our argument, and so proceed to suggest that an alternative approach to chain-specification can be maintained while also maintaining X invisibility. They suggest that the X invisibility problem we note can be circumvented by exploiting the ‘motherhood’ relation, instead of the ‘sisterhood’ relation, to specify positions of occurrences. The basic idea is as follows; consider (9)
[ IP Mary 1 [ I was arrested Mary 2]]
Instead of referring to the X sister (I ) to specify the positional occurrence of Mary 1, we can instead refer to the mother, IP, that is, the head of the chain is the occurrence of Mary immediately dominated by IP. Thus no reference to the (by hypothesis) invisible X /I is made, yet the occurrences are nonetheless positionally specified. There are at least three potential problems confronting this approach as we understand it. First, what exactly does the A-chain look like, what is an A-chain, under the positional specification of occurrences employing motherhood? The head of the chain (Mary 1) is Spec, IP, i.e. it is immediately dominated by the category IP = ‘the entire tree’, not just the label ‘IP’ which is not a term. So, in order to specify the positional occurrence of Mary 1, we need to specify what the category IP is. (This parallels the fact that we similarly needed to specify the (invisible) category I under the sisterhood approach.) Thus the first member of the chain, Mary 1, might be specified as follows: (10)
{<Mary 1 , IP>}
But this is insufficient since the ‘IP’ must be specified, and the bare phrase structure specification of IP is as follows, yet crucially it includes reference to/specification of I . Thus, under the motherhood approach, the head of the chain is the occurrence of Mary immediately dominated by the category IP:
24
(11)
Derivations in Minimalism
{<Mary 1, {was { Mary 1 {was {was {arrested {arrested Mary 2}}}}}}}> underlined= the category IP
The problem is that the motherhood approach (‘Mary 1 is immediately dominated by IP’) requires specifying the entire IP (not just the label), but specifying IP in bare phrase structure requires in turn specifying I , which is by hypothesis invisible, hence unspecifiable. If we are on track then, the appeal to motherhood does not in fact circumvent the problem of referring to (invisible) X projections. 9 One might argue that the motherhood approach could be made to work by specifying the first member of the A-chain as in (11), and ignoring the invisible I set – attending only to the ‘leftmost’ was as the ‘immediate dominator’. This amounts to a label- (or node-label) based approach. 10 Within this label-based approach the specification of the positional occurrence of the A-chain head (Mary 1) would seem to be tantamount to the following, which importantly is not a syntactic object under the restrictive definition in (1) above. (12)
{ <Mary 1, {was {Mary 1}}
Informally, this specifies that there is an occurrence of Mary, namely, Mary 1, which is immediately dominated by the IP label, namely was. Another potential problem with this label-based motherhood approach is that under Collins’ (1999, 2002) label-free system, reference to ‘the immediately dominating node-label’ is precluded, since there are no labels. In fact, Seely (2000) attempts to deduce labellessness from a derivational theory of relations within which syntactic relations are just and only the relations created by the generative procedure. As Seely notes, since the label was never operated upon by transformation, it is in no (derivational) relations, and being in no relations, it is tantamount to being absent from a syntactic representation, thereby explaining Collinsian labellessness. Following Seely, a derivational 9. Our only claim here is that if X is invisible, then there remains potential unclarity regarding the implementation of the motherhood alternative. 10. As assumed in DBP (fn. 68): ‘Other apparent distinctions between X and XP dissolve – largely or completely – with more systematic reinterpretation of relations and operations in terms of labels rather than phrasal categories, as in MI and here.’ Yet DBP (fn. 2) earlier says: ‘In what follows there is no use of labels except for the new object gamma, which has the label of either alpha or beta, determined (in the best case) by algorithm. This item is similar to the locus that determines the next operation in the system developed by Collins (1999, 2002), who proposes that labels be eliminated more generally.’ Thus the status of labels within DBP is unclear to us.
On the elimination of A-chains
25
approach seems to prohibit the ‘mother-label’ (in fact any label-based) approach to specifying occurrences, driving us back to mother-category specification, which in turn confronts the X invisibility problem, just like the sisterhood approach does. A second potential problem with the motherhood approach to X invisibility is that the positional specification of the chain tail in Passives might, under certain proposals, require direct reference to X =V , the immediate dominator/mother of the direct object occurrence. That is Mary 2, the direct object occurrence of Mary, would be positionally specified as ‘the occurrence of Mary immediately dominated by V ’ if indeed there is, or can be, a Spec, VP in Passives. If there can’t ever be Spec, VP in Passives, then there is no problem specifying the chain tail occurrence since as Chomsky notes (see Chomsky 2001a:40) within the motherhood approach, the immediate dominator of a direct object occurrence in a Passive is the maximal projection ‘VP’. The third and final potential problem is that under the motherhood-based representational specification of A-chain, we confront exactly the same kind of redundancy that confronts sisterhood. As Epstein et al. (1998), Epstein (1999) note, binary Merge and Re-Merge are operations that create sisterhood and motherhood relations (two-membered sets). There is a serious redundancy (the type of which has been addressed regarding earlier theories, by e.g. Rizzi 1986, Brody 1995) within any analysis whose rules create such relations, and yet the very same relations are again stated in representational specifications of the objects (like A-chains) created. We think it’s worth exploring the elimination of such redundancies, especially if they are empirically problematic (see below), not just redundant, under the hypothesis that representational constructs like A-chains are difficult if not impossible to specify under the restricted definitions proposed. If impossible to specify, as we suggest here, then the theory has the attractive property that its restrictive definitions disallow redundant (and problematic) specification, i.e. there is no way to formally specify an A-chain, under the theoretical apparatus proposed. Disallowing the specification of that which we (provisionally) think should not be stateable is an attractive property of a (Minimalist) theory. Of course the ‘larger’ issue is to determine how much of the theory is formulated derivationally, and to what extent is such derivational specification in fact inconsistent with the concomitant postulation of representational postulates. The preceding discussion concerns the Chomsky-Lasnik motherhood approach which seeks to provide a solution to the problem we have raised regarding the
26
Derivations in Minimalism
sisterhood approach, under the assumption that X is invisible. We have argued that, contra Lasnik and Chomsky, under X invisibility, the motherhood approach might not provide an adequate solution. Of course all the problems created by X invisibility as proposed in e.g. CT (following Muysken and Freidin) concerning chain-specification disappear if the X Invisibility Hypothesis is abandoned. Of course, the matter is entirely empirical, so what is the syntactic and interpretive status of such projections? Are they targetable? Are they specifiable in definitions? The matter seems far from clear. For example, recently, Lasnik (2002) in discussing Epstein and Seely (1999), and proposing the motherhood approach, says the following regarding targeting of X : There is actually very little evidence in the literature that intermediate projections cannot be targeted by operations (mildly surprising for something so widely believed), but I have no particular reason to doubt the claim, so I will assume it is correct. (Lasnik 2002:7)
As another example, DBP seems less ‘supportive’ than CT of X invisibility’s empirical content and its conceptual underpinnings. Thus in discussing Epstein-Seely (1999), DBP writes: Take the notion of occurrence as X sister. The empirical and conceptual arguments for X invisibility are slight. The conceptual argument relies on the assumption that X is not interpreted at LF, which is questionable and in fact rejected in standard approaches.
To clarify, we have never intended that e.g. (13)
John [ I will sleep]
appears at LF as, and is thus interpreted at LF as: (14)
John
an interpretation which would be necessitated if ‘X were not visible at LF.’ We assume X s must be interpreted at LF. But how can they be if X s are ‘invisible for computation and interpretation’ (CT). The hypothesis is that, (in contrast to the GB Y model), it must not be the case that LF is reached only after all transformations have been applied, and hence after X has been projected and rendered invisible!
On the elimination of A-chains
27
That is, it must be that LF is reached ‘derivationally’ (Epstein et al. 1998, Uriagereka 1999, Chomsky MI, DBP). But if that is the case, then, X can in principle be interpreted at the derivational point at which it has no immediate dominator – i.e. at the point of creation, when it is still a full-fledged maximal projection, not yet demoted to an invisible X by subsequent projection induced by Merge/Move (see Chomsky BPS: fn. 10 and McGilvray 1999). This then is the ‘X as representational fossil’ approach to the question: ‘If X s are invisible, what are they doing in mental representations?’ Answer: ‘they were, at an earlier point of the derivation, X max, at which point they were visible, but in output representations they have been rendered invisible.’ X s (i.e. sets like {kick him}) are interpreted at LF, precisely because LF is reached multiply and at a time when the set is still a visible, hence interpretable, maximal projection. This requires online, immediate compositional interpretation (as suggested in Epstein et al. 1998). This is then our take on the view that conceptually X s cannot be invisible. As concerns the empirical issue, Chomsky (DBP, p. 40) continues: The empirical argument is that it allows incorporation of (much of) Kayne’s (1994) Linear Correspondence Axiom, within an impoverished (bare) phrase structure system [fn. 68] . But that result, if desired, could just as well be achieved by defining ‘asymmetric c-command’ to exclude (X , YP) (a stipulation, but not more so than X invisibility).
Two points regarding this: first, ‘the empirical argument’ suggests there is but one. We are not sure about this (although in theory development one often suffices). Second, within the derivational approach we develop here, c-command and asymmetric c-command (more generally, syntactic relations) cannot be defined on representations in order to achieve a specific result. Relations instead are hypothesized to be derivational, derivative constructs, so we are not sure that this result could ‘just as well be achieved by re-defining asymmetric c-command to exclude the X YP relation.’ We do agree with DBP that X Invisibility is a stipulation, but as we’ll note in a moment, it may be possible to derive it. Thus, one can view Kayne’s LCA as providing yet another argument for X invisibility. 11 Of course, as with any theo11. Informally, the LCA states that a category X precedes a category Y, iff: (i) X asymmetrically ccommands Y, or (ii) Z precedes Y, and Z dominates X. If single-bar projections were visible to such linearization, then, the wrong result would obtain, as follows. The single bar projection asymmetrically c-commands all members of the specifier. This predicts that the members of the single bar projection precede the members of the Spec. However, the Spec asymmetrically c-commands all members of the single bar projection, thus the members of the Spec should precede the members
28
Derivations in Minimalism
retical construct, we are not asserting that X invisibility is true, but provisionally assuming that it might be, as hitherto motivated, and are trying to determine the properties and predictions of one theory incorporating the construct in question. Note furthermore that we can attempt to derive X invisibility from properties of the derivational model that we develop (see the Appendix of Epstein and Seely 1999 for extensive discussion). The basic idea is that an X is invisible since it was not merged with anything at any point in the derivation. Rather, an X projection is created by the rule of Merge itself; an X is the by-product of Merge. Thus if X and Y are merged, X or Y projects. If X re-merges (moves) to the Spec of Y, then Y projects to produce Y max, thereby demoting Y to an X , i.e. an intermediate projection. But this X-bar itself was never merged with any category and hence cannot participate in any relations with respect to any category; it is rendered syntactically inert, i.e. invisible. 12 2.2.3
Chains are redundant with Merge and Move
We now hypothesize that the non-existence of chains (here we focus on A-chains) is just the right result. Consider again the chain (15)
(<Mary 1, [was arrested Mary 2]>, <Mary 2 , arrested>)
As noted, the first member of the chain, namely (<Mary 1, [was arrested Mary 2]>, where Mary 1 is the Spec of IP and [was arrested Mary 2] is an I ) specifies the entire tree (if I were visible, which it is not, given X invisibility). What information does the chain contain? Crucially, the sister relations or, under Chomsky and Lasnik’s alternative proposal, mother relations. But notice that sister and mother relations entirely restate precisely the relations established by the application of the rules Merge and Move, which create sisters and mothers, and only these relations, while nothing else in Chl does. Thus the chain, a representational construct, of the single bar projection. Thus, if single bar projections were visible, linearization by the LCA would be impossible, since the LCA would produce instructions to PF like ‘X precedes Y and Y precedes X’ – for each and every [Spec + X ] structure. Such symmetrical instructions (due to the symmetrical, mutual c-command, (sisterhood) relation between single bar and Spec) are presumably unimplementable by the PF component. Thus, the LCA is yet another mechanism requiring the invisibility of single bar projections, and this, in turn, strengthens our argument against chains based on such invisibility. 12. See Kayne 1994: sec. 3.5 for a different approach. See also the Appendix to Uriagereka (1998:506), authored by J. Nunes and E. Thompson, for a clear, succinct explication of the LCA.
On the elimination of A-chains
29
restates formal properties of the rule applications. Thus ‘the chain’ is in fact already (successfully) specified internal to the rule of Move; specifically, chains are defined within the structural description of Move. Chains are thus, in a clear formal sense, ‘inside’, or part of, the rule of Move. This is consistent with the general ‘derivational program’: to show that representational approaches are inadequate (not internally consistent) and are redundant since the theory already incorporates derivational mechanisms (which are in our view mistakenly ignored), which themselves are not only non-problematic but empirically adequate and arguably explanatory; i.e. the independently motivated simple rule X+Y → [ Z X+Y] is sufficient to specify the chain which is not even specifiable within the representational analysis (cf. Brody 2001). In summary, we have thus far presented three arguments against chains: (i) (ii)
(iii)
Chains are not Syntactic Objects and are therefore inaccessible to syntactic operations; they are invisible to the syntax. Chains ‘contain’ an invisible X , which renders them unspecifiable to the syntax and to LF. (Thus, even if chains were Syntactic Objects, they would nonetheless not ‘exist’ for the syntax.) The information encoded in chains is in fact already contained in the syntactic operations Merge and Move. (Thus, even if chains did not contain invisible X s, they can and should nonetheless be eliminated since they are redundant with independently motivated, irreducible syntactic operations.)
The question that emerges is this: If there are no chains, then how is the important information which the ‘representationalist’ sought to provide in chains to be captured? Our answer is that the information is, even in the ‘representational approach’, already present in the derivation itself. This derivational analysis, to be considered in detail below, is entirely consistent with certain perspectives expressed in CT; in particular (16)
A chain CH=(a, t(a)) formed by Move meets several conditions, which we take to be part of the definition of the operation itself [our emphasis]. One of these is the c-command condition . . . (Chomsky 1995:253).
Thus chain conditions are ‘part of the rule’ including the c-command condition
30
Derivations in Minimalism
on chains, with c-command arguably also a derivational relation expressed by the operation Move/Attract itself, as argued in Epstein et al. (1998), and Epstein (1999). Before turning to further details of chain formation, one more note concerning X invisibility and derivationality is worth stating. If X projections are indeed invisible to Chl, predicting, apparently correctly, that they play no role in Case, Agreement, Binding, Control, and Movement, there remains still the question of theta-assignment. Consider, for example, the assignment of an external theta-role to John in (17)
[ VP John + [v + [V likes + DP the cake]]]
In the Structural Description of Merge (18)
Merge the DP John and the [v + [V likes + DP the cake]]
the underlined v-projection is still maximal. In the output representation, this vprojection vP is a ‘demoted’ invisible single bar projection of v. Thus, at least in the case of theta-role assignment to Spec, if it is indeed theta-assignment by the sister of Spec, consonant with a Montagovian compositional bottom-up semantics (see Higginbotham 1985, Berwick and Epstein 1995, Epstein et al. 1998), it seems the relation can’t be defined representationally but can be expressed (or is already expressed) within the Structural Description of the rule. Once the rule applies, it is too late; the theta-assigner (sister of Spec) is now an invisible little v . This argument extends to ‘inner Specs’ in a Larsonian shell structure, too, as well as to wh-movement to Spec, CP. In fact, it pertains to all movement to Spec, the canonical checking position. 13 Notice that the independently motivated mechanics nicely preclude appeal to anything like the projection principle – applying to all levels, within a derivation. This principle type is excluded on minimalist assumptions (CT p. 220) and within many current analyses. As we see, given X invisibility, the Projection Principle is not simply superfluous or overly determined. Rather, this representational principle is incompatible with core assumptions since theta-marking relations are not represented in tree structures given X invisibility. After Merge of an argument into Spec, vP, a representationally visible thetamarking relation between sisters no longer exists. This is consonant with Boškovi´c 13. On the interpretation of Agr-less Larsonian shell structures, and their creation in the LF component, see Epstein (1998).
On the elimination of A-chains
31
and Takahashi’s (1999) hypothesis – motivated on different grounds – that theta roles are assigned features and accords with the rule by rule derivation envisioned in DASR. Crucially, in LF representation, the sister of Spec, an X projection, is invisible. Again, this would seem to ‘force’ a derivational implementation of compositional semantics. To the extent that ‘Spec-of’ X is a Grammatical Function, these would be invisible, under X invisibility, once Spec is created. Thus (some) GFs are also ‘inside’ the independently motivated rules, wherein the Grammatical Functions already ‘reside’, given Merge and Move. This seems to us very much a return to Chomsky (1965); e.g. Suppose we have a sequence of rewriting [i.e. PS] rules associated with [such] rules is each grammatical function . . . [our emphasis, SDE, TDS] (p. 70).
As Aspects (p. 71) similarly says, grammatical functions are ‘directly derivable’ from the PS rules and representing such information in trees is thus unnecessary. We hope to have provided, thus far, compelling arguments that ‘representational chains’ are, on a number of different, independently motivated grounds, unrepresentable. In fact, as noted, since chains are by definition not syntactic objects, CT (p. 281) predicts that their presence invariably cancels the derivation. We have also suggested that the information specified or represented in a chain is in fact already expressed in the Structural Description of the sister- and mother-creating transformational rules Merge and Move. This conceptually desirable reduction of chains to properties of transformational rules would seem to work only if chain formation is isomorphic to movement. The complete reduction of chains to rules is potentially threatened if there is some other chain formation algorithm since then chains or their members might not correspond exactly to the positions (departure site and landing site) of any given single movement operation. Exactly this non-correspondence appears to be the case in CT’s analysis of successive cyclic Amovement. Let us turn then to a consideration of that analysis, within which chains are not isomorphic to Move.
2.3
A non-isomorphism between A-chains and successive cyclic Amovement
CT proposes arguably one of the most detailed analyses of standard English
Derivations in Minimalism
32
Successive Cyclic A-movement phenomena. This analysis is particularly important to our present concerns as it seeks to construct an account of A-movement and chain formation consistent with minimalist explanatory goals. We first review the analysis, which postulates A-chains non-isomorphic to Move/Attract.14 A number of potential problems are revealed, ultimately leading us to our hypothesis that there is no successive cyclic A-movement, at least in the cases under consideration here, nor a universal ‘Extended Projection Principle’ (see Chapters 3 and 4). The central case examined is: (19)
we are likely [t 3 to be asked[t 2 to t 1 build airplanes]]]] (= Chomsky 1995:ex. 88)
Certain aspects of the analysis of (19) were dealt with above. Recall, for example, that the traces, unlike the traces of pre-minimalist frameworks, are identical to we; in short we, t 3, t 2, and t 1 are the same category, namely we. 15 Furthermore, the chains associated with (19) are characterized in terms of positions (sisters of the departure and landing site(s)) and problems with this have already been discussed. Of central concern for present purposes, however, is how the chains are formed, whether automatically via movement (or some other derivational method) or through a representational chain formation algorithm. We note here that CT does seem to suggest that chains are formed through, and are isomorphic to, movement. On a number of occasions, a ‘strictly derivational’ approach to computation is assumed; for example, ‘ . . . the two elements of the chain CH formed by this [i.e. the movement] operation . . . ’ (CT, p. 250) and, as noted in section 2.1.4: ‘The operation Move forms the chain CH . . . ’ (CT, p. 250). However, the matter is not clear. As we’ll see in a moment a non-isomorphic analysis is in fact proposed. Again, we are particularly interested in this non-isomorphism since it potentially challenges the argument that chains are fully redundant with Merge/Move. 2.3.1 +/− interpretability of features Under Inclusiveness, the features that make up lexical items play a central defining 14. Unless otherwise specified, the arguments presented in this subsection concern the CT analysis of successive cyclic A-movement, but our arguments, as we will note in later discussion, extend to subsequent analyses of this phenomenon. 15. We hope the reader is not confused by our notation in which the identical copies of we are indicated by ‘t’. A more conspicuous representation would thus be: (i)
we are likely we to be asked we to we build airplanes
On the elimination of A-chains
33
role in the form and function of the operations of the computational system. For example, operations like Move/Attract F scan lexical items and apply depending on the features that are detected. Features are of various types. Cut one way, there are semantic, phonological, and formal features (Chomsky 1995:230). But features are also intrinsic or optional (p. 231); weak or strong (p. 232); and plus or minus interpretable (p. 276). This explicit appeal to features (already implicit in GB analyses of Case, Thetaassignment, Agreement, etc.) requires revision of various components of the computational system. For instance, Move-_ is replaced by Move-F since the latter is claimed to better accord with minimalist tenets. 16 Furthermore, Move is subject to Last Resort, which is (initially in CT) stated as follows: (20)
Move F raises F to target K only if F enters into a checking relation with a sublabel of K (p. 280).
It is then revised in terms of attraction (attributed to Frampton in Chomsky 1995: 297, fn. 14): (21)
K attracts F only if F is the closest feature that can enter into a checking relation with a sublabel of K.
Thus, F can raise only if a checking relation is thereby created. We take a checking relation to be a structural relation between F and a sublabel of the target K (and, of course, between F and K). Next, the ‘operations of checking and deleting’ become: (22)
A checked feature is deleted when possible (i.e. rendered invisible at LF but still accessible to computation). b. A deleted feature is erased when possible (thus it is inaccessible to computation) (p. 280).
a.
The central idea is to show that by appealing to the independently motivated notion of [+/−interpretable] lexical features, stipulations within earlier formulations 16. Chomsky points out that: ‘The underlying intuitive idea is that the operation Move is driven by morphological considerations: the requirement that some feature F must be checked. The minimal operation, then, should raise just the feature F: we should restrict alpha in the operation Move Alpha to lexical features’ (p. 262). (Cf. Chomsky 2000 and Epstein et al. 1998 which reject featuremovement.)
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Derivations in Minimalism
of checking theory can be eliminated. 17 Naturally enough, a [−interpretable] feature is not a legitimate object at LF and hence must be eliminated before LF (since if it appears, the derivation crashes at LF). Features that are [+interpretable], on the other hand, may be present at LF given Full Interpretation, and they are accessible to computation (cf. footnote 1). Chomsky’s use of [+/−interpretable], and the changes in the computational operations that it requires, is conceptually and empirically motivated. Since filters on representations (like principles) are, by definition, non-explanatory (simply specifying an ill-formed representation) the elimination of filters and their reduction to arguably ineliminable lexical features, seems to us a compelling, explanatory development of Chomsky’s theory. 2.3.2
How are chains formed?
With the above preliminaries regarding features in place, we can now consider chain formation with successive cyclic A-movement. Recall our motivation: we argued above that not all the information encoded in a chain is representable, and even if it were, the information is redundant with, hence derivable from, the computational operations Move and Merge. The argument is strongest where chain formation is isomorphic to Move, in which case the two elements involved in each Move/Merge become sisters, which are then used (unnecessarily and impossibly given X invisibility) to specify the positional members of the resulting chain. Our reduction of chains to the Move/Merge operations is (potentially) threatened if chain formation is not isomorphic to Move, which as we’ll now see, is the case for at least some chains of successive cyclic A-movement. Chomsky assumes an implicit undefined chain formation algorithm that is not clear with respect to (23) (see CT pp. 300–301): (23)
we are likely [t 3 to be asked[t 2 to t 1 build airplanes]]]]
The following three movements/attractions (the standard ones, in the standard successive cyclic order) are clearly assumed to apply in the derivation:
17. In particular, the analyses of trace-deletion in Lasnik and Saito (1984, 1992), along with cases of verb-trace deletion associated with verb raising over negation violating the Head Movement Constraint. Perhaps central is the attempt to explain the Case Filter under appeal to the notion of Interpretability. Below we suggest that, contra the CT analysis, Case may in fact be a PF uninterpretable feature, i.e. not an LF uninterpretable feature (see Epstein 1990).
On the elimination of A-chains
(24)
35
1st: move we from t 1 to t 2 position 2nd: move we from t 2 to t 3 position 3rd: move we from t 3 to matrix Spec, IP
Three distinct chains are claimed to be formed: (25)
a. b. c.
CH 1 = (t 2, t 1) CH 2 = (t 3, t 1) CH 3 = (we, t 1)
Notice that each of these three chains terminates with t 1, the theta position. Keeping in mind that the chains above consist of positions occupied by a single lexical item (i.e. the four occurrences of the one and only we in (23)), the question is: How do these chains arise? It can’t be that chain formation is isomorphic to Move. In the derivation of (23) there was EPP-checking movement from the t 2 to the t 3 position, and from t 3 to we; but, under the analysis presented in CT no chain, nor chain link, corresponding to these movements is formed (even though ‘move forms the chain CH,’ CT p. 250). Moreover, there are chains where the two positions were not related by any singleapplication of Move/Attract, e.g. both CH 2 and CH 3. 18 Each contains two positions not directly related by movement. Thus, it is proposed that there is both movement without chain formation and chain formation without movement. Notice that CH 1 does indeed consist of two positions that were related by movement. That is, there was movement from the t 1 position to the t 2 position (presumably for EPP checking), and such movement forms the chain CH 1. By contrast, CH 2 consists of two positions not related by movement: there was no single movement from t 1 to t 3 position. Finally a slightly different relation to movement is expressed in CH 3. The two members of this chain are indeed such that the head we was a landing site of movement, and the tail (t 1) was a departure site of movement, but, notice that there was no single movement (Attraction operation) moving we from 18. Furthermore, while it might be possible under copy theory (i.e. under identity) to move we from t 1 to t 2; and then to move we again from t 1 but this time to t 3 (recall that t 1 is identical to we); and then to move it a final time from t 1 to we (which would yield (25), but now with chains isomorphic to Move); this is not what is proposed (see CT p. 283). The latter two movements would presumably violate the Minimal Link Condition. They also run afoul of a CT constraint (proposed a bit later in the discussion) that a trace is inaccessible to movement (thus the first movement from t 1 to t 2 would render the occurrence t 1 invisible, preventing any move from this position).
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Derivations in Minimalism
the t 1 position directly to the matrix subject position. (Note that we are leaving aside here the problems noted above, including the fact that chains are not syntactic objects; that they can’t even be formed by Move; and that they cannot appear in LF representations.) It must be that there is an implicit chain formation algorithm not isomorphic to the move operation. This is problematic since it entails that some chains are, while others are not, isomorphic to Move, yet the chain formation algorithm is not defined, nor addressed. But this is potentially problematic since chain formation in (23) must be representational (non-isomorphic to Move) whereas a ‘strictly derivational’ view of computation is assumed, stating that the chain structure in which chains and movement are (sometimes) ‘divorced’, as in successive cyclic raising, is motivated as follows: (26)
It is ‘natural, particularly if successive cyclic raising is necessary in order to remove all [−interpretable] features . . . ’ (CT p. 300).
But a question, to be addressed below, is whether we need a theory with welldefined transformational rules; e.g. Move/Attract as well as the representational construct A-chain, leaving aside how to define ‘A-chain’ and how to define chain formation so that the derivation of (23) yields (25). In a theory with chain formation isomorphic to movement, we would seem to have a case of redundancy in which one or more of the postulates Move vs. Form Chain might be reduced to the other. 19 Below, we will argue that the system with both Move and Form Chain overgenerates: the problems we raise are thus not ones of mere superfluousness or redundancy, which is not to deny the often noted and important redundancy between Move and Form Chain (Rizzi 1986, Brody 1995). We will argue that where chain formation sometimes is and sometimes is not isomorphic to movement, there is so much apparatus that the generative procedure is ‘overburdened’ and hence ‘operationally’ inadequate to the task of correctly characterizing certain aspects of human knowledge of syntax. 2.3.3
Chains and the chain condition CH 3 in (25) is assumed to be the only legitimate LF chain; CH 1 and CH 2 are each illegitimate since they violate the Chain Condition. How the Chain Condition 19. But see Poole (1996) who notes that Chomsky (1993) has both Move and Form Chain. Poole embraces the two in his attempt to allow optional movement, which he argues forms no chain, but is allowed under the assumption that derivational economy ‘counts’ only Form Chain.
On the elimination of A-chains
37
(henceforth CC) is violated, however, is not clear. Earlier versions of CC, a representational description (which Chomsky seeks to deduce, see below), state that (27)
An A-chain is headed by a unique Case position and must terminate in a unique theta-position (Chomsky 1986).
Both CH 1 and CH 2 terminate in a theta-position (t 1) in (23), here repeated: 3
(23)
2
1 CHAINS we are likely [t 3 to be asked[t 2 to t 1 build airplanes]]]] 3 2 1 MOVES
Thus we assume that this means that CH 1 and CH 2 in (25) are each illegitimate by virtue of being headed by a Case-bearer, i.e. a category whose [−interpretable] Case feature has not been erased. But herein is a potential problem. We assume that in the numeration we bears the [−interpretable] Nominative Case feature. It is Merged into the position of t 1 and then moves successive cyclically to and through the positions of t 2 and t 3 and finally lands in Spec, matrix TP. Each movement leaves behind an identical copy. Therefore all occurrences of we bear the Nominative Case feature, under identity. Now, the [−interpretable] Case feature of we in the matrix Spec, TP position is deleted and erased by virtue of its being in a proper checking relation with the matrix T. And here, we believe, lies an important part of the CT analysis, not fully discussed in CT. Notice that we and its traces t 3 and t 2 are implicitly assumed to be non-identical (see Hornstein 1998, and the references cited therein); i.e. if we are interpreting the analysis correctly, we gets its Case checked and deleted, and therefore its sole chain-mate in the representation, namely the identical copy trace t 1, also gets its Case automatically deleted – rendering the pair a legitimate LF object, namely CH 3. But notice that the copy traces t 3 and t 2 – identical to we – do not get their Case checked automatically when the Case of we is checked. They thus retain their uninterpretable Case feature and so CH 1 and CH 2 are each claimed to be illegitimate. Why, and how, is the Case retained on t 2 and on t 3 but eliminated on t 1, even though they are each supposed to be identical to we which does have its Case checked in the matrix subject position? We think it is assumed that ‘automatic’ feature deletion, for a trace which is identical to the mover, somehow, occurs only when that trace is in a chain the head of which is checked. Indeed, it is stated that ‘ . . . features of a chain are considered a unit: if one is affected by an operation, all are’ (Chomsky 1995:381, fn. 12). We think this
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must mean that feature deletion occurs only in a chain. And what this means is that even though t 2 and t 3 are identical to the Case-checked we, they act independently with respect to feature deletion by virtue of being in no chains containing the Case-checked we. This seems a questionable result, in that ‘two identical elements’ (really, there is but one) undergo differential treatment, one has its Case checked and deleted, while the identical ‘other’ does not. To summarize, Chomsky’s chain formation algorithm is not defined. We infer that it is not isomorphic to movement. Furthermore, the mechanism by which CH 1 and CH 2 somehow retain Case is potentially problematic under copy (=identity) theory. Finally, if these chains are illegitimate, then the derivation of (23), which represents a grammatical sentence, would seem to be ruled out within the analysis, crashing at LF since it contains the two illegitimate chains. We take up this latter issue in the next subsection. 2.3.4
Derivation-internal deletion of derivation-internally created copies and chains Assuming that CH 1 and CH 2 in (23) are illegitimate, how is a well-formed (convergent) LF representation of this grammatical sentence generated? A seemingly ‘natural move’ is to eliminate the offending chains. We suggest in this subsection that this is in fact problematic on a number of grounds. CT states that the offending chains (CH 1 and CH 2 in (23)) can be removed by (28)
. . . stipulating [our emphasis, SDE, TDS] that the raising of _ heading the chain CH=(_ , t) deletes the trace formed by this operation – that is, marks it invisible at LF. . . . At LF, then, all that is “seen” is the chain CH 3, which satisfies the Chain Condition. (p. 301)
Besides being a stipulation, this deletion procedure raises a number of questions. First, it would seem to delete something that needs to be retained, namely the trace t 1. Under (28), however, this trace would be deleted as a result of the first movement, from the t 1 to t 2 position. But that is not the intended result since if t 1 is deleted the chain CH 3 (= (we, t 1)) assumed to be the one legitimate LF chain, can’t exist at LF. Thus it is stipulated that this deletion applies to the moving head of a chain but only if the chain has more than one member, i.e. by stipulation, the initial move is exempted from the trace deletion stipulation in (28). Second, the deletion of the trace is tied to movement (‘ . . . the raising of _ [heading the chain CH=(_ , t)] deletes the trace formed by this operation . . . ’). But for this to work, notice that we must form chains derivationally as movement occurs; i.e. the chains CH 1,
On the elimination of A-chains
39
CH 2, and CH 3, even though some of them do not directly correspond to movement, must be formed derivationally so that t 2 and t 3 are created by moving the head of a non-singleton chain and are thus rendered invisible. To illustrate, under this analysis moving from the t 2 to t 3 position does not form an isomorphic chain containing these two positions (see (25)). In addition, the analysis must ensure that immediately after this move from t 2 to t 3 position, the chain CH 2, namely (t 3, t 1) is (somehow) formed. With this chain formed, the stipulation (28) can now apply as desired (i.e. t 3 is indeed, at this point, before the final move, a chain-head) so that move from t 3 to we constitutes movement of the head of a non-singleton chain, and as such, leaves an ‘invisible’ trace in the t 3 position. But forming these chains, which are not isomorphic to movement, simultaneously with movement is curious as some of the chains (specifically, CH 2 and CH 3) do not correspond to movement. Thus, the undefined chain formation algorithm, sometimes forming chains non-isomorphic to Move, must apply derivationally, i.e. after movement from t 2 to t 3 but before movement from t 3 to we. There are still further questions confronting the purported deletion process. We can’t just delete chains nor whole copies since to do so is to delete terms and this is expressly disallowed (to delete a term is to destroy a syntactic object and that cancels a derivation, CT, p. 281). Moreover, deletion (and erasure) is presumed to be constrained by the checking operation: (29)
a. b.
A checked feature is deleted when possible. Deleted _ is erased when possible (CT, p. 280). (Deleted means invisible at LF but accessible to Chl; erased means invisible and inaccessible.)
So what is proposed is that the chains presumed to be illegitimate, CH 1 and CH 2, can be ‘eliminated’ in the desired sense if certain features of ‘traces’ are deleted, namely formal features. The whole trace can’t delete since it is a term. Its phonological features have already been stripped away by Spell-out and thus are not available for deletion. Its semantic features by their very nature don’t enter into checking relations and hence are not subject to (29). And ‘ . . . therefore, a formal feature F of an intermediate trace of an argument may erase, and indeed must erase if possible’ (CT, p. 301). But problems emerge. First, deletion of an element ‘marks it invisible at LF.’ Presumably some notation/marking would be needed for this (unlike erasure), but such notation is disallowed by inclusiveness. Second, an apparent contradiction arises. It is stated that ‘ . . . the intermediate deleted traces do not enter into interpretation’ (CT, p. 301). But recall that it’s not
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the whole trace that deletes, just its formal features. Deletion of these formal features does not affect the semantic features; indeed, ‘ . . . semantic features remain’ (CT, p. 301) (not being subject to (29)). How semantic features can be present but not interpreted is unexplained. Moreover, the chains resulting from the deletion of the formal features of the intermediate traces can be informally thought of as ‘a single “linked chain” . . . with “defective” intermediate traces . . . ’ (CT, p. 301); but earlier, it is stated that linked chains do not fit the current framework. Indeed, any chain linking would be a process distinct from Merge/Move, and distinct from the partially redundant, and partially unspecified derivational operation, Form Chain. Yet another question is: which formal features delete? The only candidate is the [−interpretable] Case feature since all other formal features are [+interpretable]. But it is odd that this should render the trace ‘defective’ when in all other contexts it is exactly what is required for convergence. And there is something else of concern about this: the formal feature deletion operation deletes the very formal feature that would be deleted anyway on the simplest assumption that if an operation affects X then it equally affects all (identical) occurrences of X. But now the formal case feature on the intermediate traces is not eliminated by virtue of checking deletion and erasure, since neither t 3 nor t 2 is in the checking domain of a Casechecker. Thus there must be different means, in addition to checking, whereby Case is eliminated, a conceptually questionable state of affairs. In addition, eliminating an illegitimate object (one containing a [−interpretable] feature) is generally not allowed; on the contrary, such features are retained and constitute the basis of all LF crashing. It can be noted that however the details of the deletion process might be worked out, the ‘bigger picture’ seems counterintuitive. The chains are created (by an undefined chain formation algorithm) – some do correspond to movement, some don’t – only to be eliminated since they are uninterpretable/illegitimate at LF (even though we in the matrix Spec, TP did get Case-checked and is identical with the members of the offending chains). Are there, or should there be, syntactic entities (i.e. chains) that require a less restrictive definition of syntactic object than (1), which are never in the numeration, nor in the LF representation nor in the PF representation, but are nonetheless created by Chl in the course of computation and then eliminated by Chl, in subsequent computation, before the interfaces are reached? CH 1 and CH 2 are precisely such objects. We propose that the answer is negative.
On the elimination of A-chains
41
Note, finally, the trace-deletion or trace-invisibility analysis is extended to A movement of expletives. This should then yield the welcome result that, in the following, the ‘intervening’ trace of there, being invisible, does not prevent attraction by the matrix INFL of ‘the Case and phi features of “books” ’. (30)
there seem [t to be some books on the table]
Note however that ‘marking the intervening trace invisible at LF [our emphasis: SDE, TDS]’ (CT, pp. 300–1) is too late, i.e. if the trace is a problem, marking it invisible at LF means that whenever books tries to raise, the t is still there; i.e. we can’t mark t invisible at LF and then subsequently raise features of books, since that would be to apply a transformation after the LF representation is derived. (But see DASR and below for a theory in which precisely such ordering is possible.) To summarize, we saw in section 2.1 that chains are by definition not syntactic objects, nor are they visible in the LF representation. Moreover, we have shown that chains may not even be creatable, given the X Invisibility Hypothesis (section 2). In addition, chains would seem to restate independently motivated properties of simple, virtually conceptually necessary transformational rules (Merge and Move/Attract). In this section, we argued that even if chains were somehow created and were somehow visible syntactic objects, certain other serious problems concerning chains arise. The chain formation algorithm in CT is undefined, for example. But clearly some chains are isomorphic to Move and other chains are not – this is illustrated in the central example of successive cyclic A-movement that we examined. Under the analysis of (23) with the chain structure in (25), CH 1 (isomorphic to Move) and CH 2 (non-isomorphic) must somehow be formed intra-derivationally, to feed the stipulation that movement of the head of a chain with greater than one member leaves an ‘invisible’ trace. Moreover, (elements of) the chains CH 1 and CH 2, regardless of what algorithm forms them, are deleted before LF. Thus they are created by the derivation and then are deleted, having no effect on output, and allowing the possibility of somehow simply deleting illegitimate objects before LF, raising serious questions about possible over-generation of what should crash at LF by virtue of the (undeleted) presence of illegitimate objects. In the next section we will propose an alternative analysis within which the relevant chains (and even the traces) are never generated, and therefore the problems associated with eliminating them are avoided, yet the LF output of successive cyclic
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A-movement envisioned in the standard analysis is generated, in that there simply are no intermediate traces, as opposed to there being invisible ones. We have presented a variety of difficulties with the analysis of successive cyclic A-movement. Let us turn our attention to possible solutions.
2.4
An alternative analysis without chains
2.4.1
A-movement in one step
Consider again (23), repeated below: (23)
we are likely [t 3 to be asked[t 2 to t 1 build airplanes]]]]
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the only Chain appearing in the LF representation of (23) is CH 3 (i.e (we, t 1)), a two-membered chain with we the sole Casechecked chain head in a non-theta position, and the other occurrence of we (= t 1) the sole member in theta-marked ‘Caseless’ position, the archetypal A-chain. Assuming that this is the chain structure appearing in the LF representation, the question is: ‘How is this chain generated?’ This question might be answered with another: ‘What’s the simplest assumption about the derivation that produces this chain?’ We think the simplest analysis avoids all the complex problems noted above that were associated with the creation and deletion of CH 1 and CH 2, including, more specifically the creation and deletion of the intermediate traces t 3 and t 2. In the simplest world, these traces and the chains CH 1 and CH 2 would not even be created. The simplest way to obtain this result is to assume that Movement through the infinitival subject positions does not in fact occur. Thus the question of whether traces – invisible, deleted, or erased – are left in these positions does not arise, nor does the question of how to formulate the implicit chain formation algorithm assumed to construct CH 1 and CH 2. In addition, notice that if there is no movement through these intermediate infinitival subject positions, movement and chain formation would be isomorphic even in this derivation too; i.e. there would be a single movement from the theta position directly to the Case-checking position, namely the matrix finite Spec, TP position. Thus, if a chain is formed, it is isomorphic to Movement. As noted above, in fact a chain cannot be created since, by definition, chains are not syntactic objects and can’t be positionally defined in terms of sisters
On the elimination of A-chains
43
or mothers given the X Invisibility Hypothesis. This raises the distinct possibility that UG has only the elementary operation Move, and not also an isomorphic elementary operation Form Chain. If all these welcome results can be obtained by assuming that there is no successive cyclic A-movement in such cases, why is it assumed that movement is successive cyclic? There are two answers. One lies primarily with the Extended Projection Principle. Specifically, movement through these intermediate Spec (TP) positions is assumed to be required so as to check and delete a postulated uninterpretable (‘EPP’) feature in Tense/to, or to satisfy the EPP viewed as a non-checking structural requirement. Another answer is movement locality; for example, at least as early as Chomsky (1975) and most recently in Boškovi´c (2002), it is assumed that successively cyclic A-movement is necessitated by ‘locality restrictions’ on A-movement. In the following chapter we examine the EPP as the catalyst of successive cyclic A-movement, suggesting that the EPP has been a suspect ‘principle’ from its inception and remains undesirable even in its most recent incarnations. We argue that there is no EPP and hence problematic successive cyclic A-movement, as examined in this chapter, can’t be driven by the EPP. We take up the locality-based approach in Chapter 4, suggesting that it too may be problematic, leading us ultimately to the hypothesis that no principle motivates successive cyclic A-movement, at least not in English raising and ECM constructions, and hence that there is no such movement in these cases.
2.4.2
The elimination of A-traces: derivation vs. representation
It has been suggested in the literature that perhaps there are no A-traces. Given the hypothesized non-existence of the chains CH 1 and CH 2 (see (25)) in such cases as (23), along with our observation that chains are in fact uncreatable, unrepresentable non-objects, a closely related question arises: If there is indeed one fell swoop movement from the Caseless theta position to the Case-checked theta-less position, is the trace in the theta position necessary? We think the answer is negative, as proposed in DASR, which suggests a wholesale elimination of traces. Let us pause for a moment and consider what we believe is an important issue regarding the possible elimination of A-chain traces, more specifically an issue regarding ‘representationality’ and ‘derivationality’.
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Chain-based analyses are often called ‘representational’ as opposed to ‘derivational’. In fact however this is a serious misnomer leading to much confusion, we think. A-chains, including the trace(s), represent the derivational history of Amovement and thus the A-chain is (at best) not necessary since it merely encodes aspects of the now reified derivation itself given Chomsky’s rule-based minimalist approach. The idea that A-chains, including traces, notationally encode derivational histories is not new. Consider the following case: (31)
[ S 1 John INFL [ VP 1 be [believe [ S 2 t INFL have been [ VP 2 kill t]]]] ‘John is believed to have been killed’
with respect to which Chomsky (1981:45) writes: . . . John bears the GF [NP,S 1] by virtue of its actual position in [(31)], and bears the relations [NP, S 2] and [NP, VP 2] by virtue of the positions of its traces t , t respectively. Suppose we associate with each NP in S-structure a sequence (p 1, . . . ,p n) which, in an obvious sense, represents the derivational history of this NP by successive applications of Move-_ [our emphasis, SDE, TDS].
And later in the same passage, ‘function chains’ are proposed: Correspondingly, let us associate with each NP in S-structure the sequence of GFs (GF 1, . . . , GF n), where GF i is the GF of the element filling position p i in the S-structure configuration: the NP itself for i=1, a trace in each other case. If NP was base generated, then GF n is its GF at D-structure, a GF-. If NP is a non-argument inserted in the course of a syntactic derivation, then GF n is the GF associated with the position in which it was inserted, a GF-non-theta. Let us call (GF1, . . . , GFn) the ‘function chain’ of the NP filling GF1 . . . the function chain [is defined] in terms of successive applications of Move-_ . . . [our emphasis SDE, TDS].
Similarly, Chomsky (1986:95) regards ‘a chain [as] the S-structure reflection of a “history of movement”.’ Thus, in the principle-based, ‘rule-free’ GB theory adopting the standard Ymodel, structure building rules are virtually ‘propertyless’ (‘Move anything anywhere optionally’) while principles, and their (defining) application to output representations constitute the substance of the theory. Note however that such systems by definition retain a rule, namely Move-_ , and hence are unavoidably mixed, containing one rule, and principles. ‘Rule-free’ is thus a misnomer of the Principles
On the elimination of A-chains
45
and Parameters approach. Within that framework, nothing ‘should’, nor could, be deduced directly from (the accidental) properties of the amorphous rule ‘Move anything anywhere optionally’ as it blindly applies in any one of an infinite number of ways that it logically could. As a result of this approach, the idiosyncratic properties of successive rule application must be encoded so that the output representation (to which necessarily descriptive, representational constructs such as traces and principles/filters apply) ‘in an obvious sense represents the derivational history.’ Herein lies the motivation for trace theory and for representational chains. The derivation (successive rule application) is in fact recognized as vitally important, but direct appeal to the derivation is ‘forbidden’ in a ‘rule-free’ system so that the output representations must invoke technicalia to encode derivational history – since it is clearly relevant. Chain theory and trace theory are annotational look back devices encoding derivational history, tracking where categories were derivationally, and marking those locations in the output representation. With the Minimalist elimination of S-structure, perhaps even more encoding of the derivation is necessary, since, ignoring the split-off to PF, LF representation is the sole level of syntactic representation. Importantly, notice that such trace theoretic, chain theoretic, principle-based socalled ‘representational’ theories, are crucially a kind of derivational theory to the extent that traces and chains are precisely ‘look back’ notations whereby the (empirically important) derivation that produced the output representation is encoded. Thus ‘representational’ theories are in fact, just one kind of derivational theory (for related discussion see Epstein and Seely 2002). The question then is not: ‘which is preferable, derivational or representational theory?’, but rather ‘Which type of derivational theory is preferable, one which refers to the existing rules and derivation itself, or one that instead has incorporated rules and derivations, but does not appeal to them and instead encodes derivational history in output representations containing traces and chains?’ 20
20. One notable exception is the work of Brody (1995), who proposes a representational theory with (purportedly) no derivation at all. As Brody (personal communication) rightly points out, Brody’s (1995) representational approach and Epstein et al.’s (1998) derivational approach are not diametrically opposed. Rather both seek to eliminate ‘mixed theory’ incorporating constrained rules and also filters.
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The conviction that trace theory is indeed a representational ‘coding trick’ necessitated by the failure (or within principle-based theory, the inability) to recognize the importance of the constrained application of explicitly defined rules themselves (the derivation) is in fact expressed in Chomsky (1995). With respect to another kind of movement, namely successive cyclic head movement, discussed as an illustration of general properties of movement, CT writes: It is generally possible to formulate the desired results in terms of outputs. In the head movement case, for example [a case of raising from N to V followed by [ V N+V] raising to Infl] one can appeal to the plausible assumption that the trace is a copy, so the intermediate Verbtrace includes within it a record of the local N–V raising. But surely this is the wrong move. The relevant chains at LF are (N, t N) and (V, t V), and in these, the locality relation satisfied by successive raising has been lost . . . These seem to be fundamental properties of language, which should be captured, not obscured by coding tricks, which are always available. A fully derivational approach both captures them straightforwardly and suggests that they should be pervasive, as seems to be the case. (CT, p. 224)
We (largely) agree, except that we would push the derivational approach more fully, and assume that even in the LF representation the trace-tail of the chains (namely the tails t N, and t V) are absent as well, as are the chains, since each ‘in an obvious sense represents (an aspect of) derivational history.’ The matter at hand is ultimately architectural concerning the very structure of the language faculty. If interpretation is postponed, as in GB theory, until all transformations have applied, then the information must be encoded representationally via mechanisms like trace theory. If, however, unlike GB, the rules and operations are well-defined, i.e. ‘real’, then the possibility arises that the rules themselves may be sufficient to express syntactic relations. See Epstein et al. (1998) and below. Similarly, in the case of A-movement, we would assume (with Epstein et al. 1998) that there are no traces, not even the chain-tail trace. The information represented by the trace tail of the chain is already part of the derivation, e.g. for direct objects the relation is expressed by ‘Concatenate/Merge theta marker V and DP’. Traces of the DP are only ‘coding tricks’ needed in order to represent the derivation later in the sole interpreted representation, namely the LF representation generated at ‘the end of the line’, only after all transformations have applied, as in the Y-model. Recall from section 1 that A-chains are not syntactic objects (see
On the elimination of A-chains
47
(1)) and are in fact unrepresentable during computation derivationally and at LF, as argued above. But crucially, in the Minimalist framework, unlike GB there is no prohibition barring appeal to properties of the explicit existing rules (namely, Merge, Move/Attract) and there is in fact an explanatory incentive to deduce from the application of these independently motivated reified rules, as much as can be deduced. 21 21. Lasnik (1999) provides a different argument that there are no A-traces. Following Chomsky (1995), he assumes that there is no Reconstruction in A-chains. He then notes that if there are no A-traces, Reconstruction in A-chains will be blocked, given the trace-dependence of Reconstruction.
3
On the elimination of the EPP
3.1
Introduction
Suppose, as proposed above, there is no successive cyclic A-movement through spec of TP in constructions such as (1), but movement is rather one fell swoop: (1)
we are likely [ to be asked [ to __ build airplanes]]]]
If correct, then standard formulations of the EPP, which force successive cyclic movement (perhaps redundantly with movement locality, as we’ll see below), must be abandoned. We thus reject the EPP as a structural requirement and as a featurechecking requirement of raising to. In fact, we propose that to in such cases checks no features at all and hence, given that operations are purposeful, there is no movement to the intermediate spec TPs. 1 Under our analysis, Move is one fell swoop, from theta to case-checked position. The creation of intermediate traces, the deletion of these traces, the formation of chains (and whether they are linked), chain deletion, and the question of semantic features, or lack thereof, borne by intermediate traces, simply do not arise; nor do pervasive problems associated with trying to determine what in fact the EPP is. Stated in terms of Attraction, the matrix T (be/are) does in fact attract the closest potential feature checker, which in this instance is we. Neither instance of to attracts. Movement of we in one step does
1. As Esther Torrego (personal communication) points out, raising to could fail to be a checker, yet still have interpretable features, including perhaps Tense features. In this regard, note that Stowell (1991:568) claims that ‘ . . . infinitival complements in Raising Structures [are] not . . . INTERNALLY specified for Tense’ [our emphasis SDE, TDS]. This leaves open the possibility that Stowell’s observations are correctly formalized by postulating that to is a Tense, which inherits its particular Tense specification (e.g. PAST, PRESENT) from a locally c-commanding Tense, something like ‘controlled tense’. (Interestingly, Chomsky 1957 suggests that control to is ‘semantically vacuous.’) For present purposes we leave open whether to is a tense specifier and if so, how tense is specified on it. Our main point is that it does not check syntactic features.
48
On the elimination of the EPP
49
not ‘skip’ any potential intermediate checking position, there being no feature to force movement (=re-merge) to create the position. Thus, all relevant locality requirements (and specifically the feature-relativized MLC) are satisfied. 2 In precisely such instances, then, what looks like ‘long distance’ A-movement is possible (in fact forced) and this in turn allows the simplest analysis of successive cyclic A-movement: there is simply no such thing in such cases. If this is on the right track, it suggests that there is no EPP at all, a welcome result. In this chapter, we investigate some of the history, formal properties, and current perspectives regarding the EPP. We then turn to some of the consequences of eliminating the EPP as concerns non-A-movement cases, i.e. existential structures, ECM and believe-class verbs, and infinitival complements of nominals. In Chapter 4, we focus on the proposed elimination of the EPP as concerns movement cases beyond the ‘successive cyclic’ structures already examined.
3.2
The EPP
3.2.1
The mysteriousness of the EPP
It has recently been claimed that ‘The EPP has been . . . a pervasive mystery since it was first formulated by Chomsky (1981)’ (Lasnik 2002:1). We agree. Simply put, the EPP is ill-understood. There are a number of reasonable strategies one could adopt: assume the principle for now with an eye toward its future clarification. Another, which we propose here, is to try to clarify the principle now so as to clarify the predictive content and explanatory depth of the theory. (The methodological issue of when to address which unclarity is always open to debate.) One form of clarification is elimination. The EPP can be clarified to the extent that it is eliminated. Attempting to eliminate the EPP will, at best, allow us to deduce the ‘EPP’s’ properties and effects from independently motivated principles. At worst, the attempt will have the ‘therapeutic value’ (Chomsky 1995) of determining which of the EPP’s properties and effects can (and perhaps can’t) be deduced. It’s not that we are on an ‘Anti-EPP campaign’. Rather we seek to better understand the 2. Note that in standard theory subjacency would be violated, and it is this principle that forces successive cyclic movement (see Chomsky 1975, and for a recent appeal to movement locality seeking to eliminate the EPP see Boškovi´c 2002 and Chapter 4 below). Under Attract and the MLC there is no violation. See Ferguson and Groat (1993) for the reformulation of Rizzi’s (1990) Relativized Minimality, in terms of ‘Feature-Relativized Minimality’.
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organization, hence empirical content of UG through the elimination of any appeal to the ‘pervasive mystery’ referred to as ‘the EPP’. 3.2.2
The unclarity of the formulation of the EPP
Originally, the EPP was the configurational requirement that clauses have a subject (see Chomsky 1981) as expressed by a Standard Theory PS-rule, namely (2)
S → NP Infl VP
But a problem with this statement of the EPP is that it represents a form of construction specificity of just the sort that, for principled reasons, is avoided within the Principles and Parameters (and Minimalist) approach. Note further that for us there can be no syntactic macro-structure representational requirements since we seek to explain such requirements by appeal to features of heads, as locally manipulated by the generative procedure. This is consistent with Derivational Minimalist explanation. Neither problem, construction specificity nor representational stipulation, arises within the Minimalist approach of Chomsky (1995) and much subsequent work, within which the EPP shifts from a requirement on clausal structure to a morphosyntactic requirement of feature checking. The basic idea is that there is some feature, an ‘EPP feature’, which attracts a DP to Spec position. This seeks to subsume the EPP under the more general feature-checking mechanisms of Case and Agreement. The reduction of the EPP to morpholexical feature checking by a functional head is conceptually desirable. It eliminates the pure and perhaps ill-defined stipulation that ‘clauses’ must have a ‘subject’. Moreover, feature checking is a general phenomenon. Rather than being a formally unique and descriptive ‘principle’, the EPP is reduced to the (empirically and conceptually) motivated process of lexically driven checking. But there are problems: it is unclear just what this EPP feature is. CT, for example, argues that it’s a D feature, 3 whereas it is suggested in other work (Chomsky
3. Note that there is a potential contradiction within the CT analysis of the EPP-as-D feature. On the one hand, CT argues that it is only [−interpretable] features that trigger Attract or Move, consonant with the idea that syntactic operations are driven by the need to attain interface interpretability. To trigger Move, then, the D feature of T must be [−interpretable]. But, D is a categorical feature and categorical features are claimed to be [+interpretable] (see CT, p. 277). So, either we must loosen the fundamental generalization that movement is invariably driven by [−interpretable] features (arguing
On the elimination of the EPP
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2001a) that it is the person feature (or an ‘occurrence’ feature or an ‘edge feature’ Chomsky 2004). Moreover, even if the EPP-feature were specified, we have the still unanswered question of whether it is a ‘strong feature’ (as in CT p. 232) or not; and thus the question of the level of application of the EPP (is it derivationally satisfiable (Lasnik 2002); is it an Everywhere principle Chomsky (1995:123); 4 or is it (at least) a PF principle (see Boškovi´c and Lasnik 2003)? Additional unclarity in the formulation of the EPP has recently developed with the re-emergence of the EPP as ‘some kind of’ a structural requirement (see Lasnik 2001 and Chomsky 2001a, 2001b). Yet a further issue is that the EPP has been argued to be neither featural nor configurational but instead a ‘semantic’ requirement on theme-rheme or information structure (see Rothstein 1983 and Williams 1980). This leaves unclear what even the basic formulation of the EPP is. Moreover the crosslinguistic status is in question. For example, Alexiadou and Anagnostopoulou (1998) argue that it is a parameterized principle, whereas others assume it is universal. In addition, Lasnik (2001) argues that the EPP has the added property of being optionally assigned, and thus is apparently not an inherent lexical feature. Needless to say, there are also empirical problems created by the EPP (as noted in the last chapter and discussed further below). One can rightly argue that some level of unclarity confronts every principle, but it seems to us that the EPP has distinguished itself in this regard. 3.2.3
Redundancy with other principles
The EPP has in its many varying and unclear forms been deemed not only mysterious, but to the extent that it is clear, ‘highly’ redundant with other principles of Universal Grammar. 5 The redundancies include Case/Agreement, Theta theory, Locality conditions on Movement, and the theory of null complementizers. For example, Fukui and Speas (1986) and more recently Martin (1999) argue that in a finite clause like (3)
__ has [Mary left]
Mary raises to Spec, TP not only to satisfy EPP but also to check Case and that D as the EPP feature is [−interpretable]) or we may need to abandon D as the EPP feature; alternatively we could argue that D is uninterpretable in T. 4. Thanks to Hamid Ouali (personal communication) for pointing this out to us. 5. But see Boškovi´c (1995) who argues, following the form of argument presented in Epstein (1990) that the redundancy, in the case of the EPP, might well be empirically motivated.
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Agreement features. In fact, it’s been argued that in all finite clauses the EPP overlaps with Case/Agreement checking in a spec-head configuration. There is also claimed to be redundancy with aspects of semantic structure; thus, Rothstein (1983) (see also Williams 1980) argues that EPP effects follow from predication, while Chomsky (as reported in Boškovi´c 2002) ‘suggests that EPP effects are a result of a universal thematization requirement.’ Moreover, redundancies have been identified concerning the EPP and the theory of movement locality: for instance, most recently Boškovi´c (2002) argues that successive cyclic A-movement is induced not only by the EPP but also locality conditions on movement (see also Chomsky 1975). Finally, Epstein, Pires, and Seely (2004) claim that the EPP is also redundant over a thus far recalcitrant domain, assumed to require the EPP, namely infinitival complements of nominals. This domain by hypothesis is in fact covered without appeal to the EPP, as we will review below. 3.2.4
Non-redundant EPP satisfaction
There are, we think, few cases (at least in English) where there is no redundancy, i.e. where there is alleged to be pure EPP checking. One case has already been examined, successive cyclic A-movement, and we argued that such cases of ‘pure’ EPP checking are highly problematic. Other cases include ECM and raising infinitival complements to nouns, both of which will be considered later. Another case of pure EPP satisfaction occurs in the following central, and problematic case, to be examined momentarily: (4)
*there seems a man to be outside
In fact, under the analysis in DBP this problematic case is derived via two nonredundant operations satisfying the EPP: a man moves to satisfy to and there is inserted as a pure EPP checker. What we would like to suggest, given the problems noted thus far, is that even these ‘residues’ of the EPP should be analyzed not by looking for an independently motivated EPP feature – thus far undiscovered – but by eliminating the EPP. Thus, the general research strategy we adopt is: (5)
a.
In the many cases where the EPP applies redundantly, appeal to it is unnecessary.
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We also adopt the following empirical hypothesis: b.
In the few cases (in English) where the EPP applies non-redundantly, it is making the wrong predictions.
If both (5a) and (5b) are maintainable, the EPP is eliminable; i.e. it’s superfluous or false. Before turning to detailed examinations of these pure EPP checking cases, there is one other issue to consider regarding the EPP over and above its mystery, unclarity, redundancy, and ‘purity’, namely, its empirical inadequacy as argued by McCloskey (1996). As we will argue the Irish salient unaccusatives, which McCloskey claims violate the EPP, exhibit interesting parallels with English raising infinitivals. 3.2.5
Inadequacy: McCloskey’s elimination of the EPP
We are by no means the first to suggest that the EPP might not be a principle of UG. The important work of Martin (1999) was considered above, for example. In addition, Jacobson (1992) and Manzini and Roussou (2000), propose analyses inconsistent with the EPP; Castillo, Drury and Grohmann (1999) as well as Boškovi´c (2002) reject the EPP, while Chomsky (2001a) entertains the possibility of its elimination. We will not review all of these works here, instead we would like to very briefly consider the important work of McCloskey. To begin with, McCloskey (1996) notes an unclarity regarding the EPP: With the advent of the Internal Subject Hypothesis, it becomes crucially unclear what position this principle referred to. Is it properly construed so as to require that the internal subject position always be structurally realized? Or is the requirement that there be a structural subject to be construed rather as a property of functional projections, as suggested in Chomsky (1993)? If there are many inflectional projections between C and V, which one of them, if any, is privileged by the Extended Projection Principle? (p. 242)
Like McCloskey’s (1996) treatment of Modern Irish, we have attempted to eliminate the EPP as an overarching principle governing English, by appeal to presumably ineliminable (independently motivated) morphosyntactic features of (certain) lexical items. Specifically we’ve argued that raising to checks no features and hence that there is no infinitival Spec, TP in raising constructions. Interestingly, the constructions (‘salient unaccusatives’, in McCloskey’s terminology) which McCloskey
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claims violate the EPP (having no VP-external ‘subject’) seem quite closely related to the subjectless projections we claim occur in English. McCloskey’s ‘salient unaccusatives’ are exemplified by (6)
Mheadaigh ar a neart increased on his strength ‘His strength increased’ (p. 243)
We have claimed that the infinitival to selected by a Raising predicate never has a Spec position at any point in the derivation (and this of course is inconsistent with the EPP). Thus, there is no movement through Spec-to in the following (7)
John seems (to you) [ __ to be [ t happy]
McCloskey characterizes the Irish salient unaccusative verbs, the ones inconsistent with the EPP, as follows: these are verbs which s-select a single argument, which mark that argument with what is traditionally taken to be a preposition and which seem to entirely lack a structural subject. The verb itself appears in the so-called ‘analytic form’ (McCloskey and Hale 1984), the finite form of which encodes no information about person, number and gender. (p. 243)
It seems unlikely to be accidental that the verb types assumed to ‘escape the effects of the EPP’ in Irish and in English are so closely related morphologically, taking only internal arguments, and lacking person, number and gender, by hypothesis. In fact, with seem it even parallels Irish in taking an internal PP argument, e.g. the dative experiencer. What about cases without an experiencer, e.g. (8)
John is likely [ __to be happy]
(Here again we claim that the to selected by likely (a raising predicate) checks nothing in its Spec.) Here, likely seems to be selecting an internal ‘clausal’ argument which is not a PP, whereas the Irish salient unaccusatives always select an internal PP argument. Notice, however, that what is selected by likely is to, which ‘looks’ just like a preposition. Perhaps these to-projections, Merged with the Raising predicates are in fact PPs, making such constituents internal PP arguments, just like in Irish salient unaccusative constructions. Here, we follow Chomsky (1980,
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fn. 7) who notes that to appears in infinitivals, and to is also a preposition, writing ‘A deeper understanding of language may show that the properties of contemporary English, in this regard, are more than fortuitous.’ Whether the to selected by a raising predicate is a preposition is an issue we leave for further research. 6 As a final comparison between the Irish salient unaccusatives, and the to-projection Merged with a raising predicate, it should be noted that the Irish and English examples may not be identical in their Tense features. McCloskey (p. 272) claims that the Irish salient unaccusative verbs are specified for Tense (and perhaps Mood as well). Stowell (1982), however, claims that ‘the infinitival complements in Raising structures [are] not internally specified for Tense.’ We are not altogether clear about Stowell’s claims, (in particular, is the complement externally specified for Tense?) but regardless, we note that he is talking about ‘Clauses having Tense’ whereas we are concerned with the featural properties of to, so the ‘translation’ between the GB framework within which Stowell was working and the morpholexical approach of more contemporary theory is unclear. In addition, notice that Stowell seems not to be saying that the infinitival complement to the Raising predicate is tenseless, but rather that it has no inherently specified tense ‘of its own’. The general question remains, what exactly are the features of to selected by a raising predicate? We leave this issue open here. But it is interesting to note the apparent similarities between Irish salient unaccusative constructions and English infinitivals selected by a Raising predicate: two constructions in two languages, seeming to have few if any common properties at first glance, which, if McCloskey and we are on the right track, are very closely related indeed, sharing numerous features, and in turn, mitigating against the existence of an overarching principle like the EPP. This kind of analysis goes some distance toward achieving the central goal of linguistic theory: make UG restrictive enough to account for the acquisition of any given single grammar (this grammar being the only one the child can hypothesize) but make UG permissive enough to allow for the fact that the child can acquire any human grammar. If the kind of argument just provided is on track, then acquiring construction-specific aspects of English and acquiring construction-specific 6. We’ve said earlier, following Torrego (personal communication), that to maybe bears tense features. Prepositions are not usually associated with tense. However, they may be as in e.g. I went for an hour, I went on Saturday. And, if Emonds (1986) is right that subordinating conjunctions and prepositions and complementizers are conflated, then to the extent that complementizers bear tense, then ‘prepositions’ (or whatever the ultimate label is) also bear tense.
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aspects of Irish might be achieved by the same apparatus, since the two constructions, are, at a certain level of analysis (ours and the acquirer’s by hypothesis) identical. The theory therefore need not incorporate any construction-specific apparatus, or language-specific apparatus; there is just one grammar, human, the central Chomskyan hypothesis from the start. 3.3
There-insertion and raising: more problems created by the EPP
3.3.1
The central problem
A central claim of this section is that the EPP is in fact engendering a number of serious problems which in turn motivate a series of problematic solutions, all of which, we argue, can be avoided with the elimination of the EPP. Consider then the central data in (9), which has been particularly important and troublesome to current theorizing, motivating a number of unattractive, and we suggest unnecessary, postulates. (9)
*there is likely [a man to be [[a man] outside]
In a moment, we will consider the details of recent analyses. Before doing so, however, notice that under our proposal that raising to checks no features (hence, there is no EPP in the standard sense), (9) is straightforwardly excluded: if there is no successive cyclic A-movement, then there can be no ‘partial A-movement’ as in (9). Specifically, a man can’t raise to spec of to since no features would be checked as a result. Notice that analyses embracing the EPP license precisely such movement, thereby creating the central problem of the overgeneration of (9). In the framework of Chomsky (1981) these examples were excluded by the Case Filter applying at Sstructure. The S-structure representation is filtered, since a man is caseless. In the Minimalist framework of assumptions, there cannot be appeal to the Case Filter, nor to an S-structure level of representation. More broadly, it is proposed that there are no filters internal to Chl. This is proposed presumably because it is thought to be true that filters never explain why it is that certain elements are prohibited, rather, filters by definition state the prohibition. In the Minimalist framework, all constraints on representation must be stated as ‘bare output conditions’ – conditions imposed from outside Chl, by the systems that take Chl-generated interface LF (and PF) representations as their input.
On the elimination of the EPP
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In GB the Case Filter and S-structure are axiomatic; hence the question ‘Why is it that certain NPs/DPs are Case marked at S-structure?’ is not addressed. In the Minimalist framework, not only is the question posed but a compelling answer is provided. Case is by hypothesis uninterpretable, so it must be checked and erased before LF, under the entirely natural assumption that LF representations must contain only interpretable features. Thus the Case Filter is eliminated, and in a certain sense, explained. However, under the deeper minimalist mode of explanation, (9) raises an interesting problem, which is this: nothing prohibits the Movement of a man from its initial position to the position it occupies in (9) above, i.e. subject of the infinitival; in fact, it is the EPP that licenses such movement. Moreover, the movement is sufficiently local, and is, it seems, attested in grammatical ECM constructions, which seem to exhibit the same ‘pure EPP’ movement: (10)
I expect [ a man to be [ [a man] outside]
In addition to being sufficiently local, the move satisfies Enlightened Self-Interest (Lasnik 1995) adopted in CT, (p. 346) and Suicidal Greed (MI, p. 127). That is, under the assumption (which we reject) that to does check some ‘EPP’ feature in its spec, the movement does result in feature checking in the grammatical ECM cases and thus seemingly identical ‘pure EPP’ movement is licensed in the ungrammatical (9). 7 In effect, the EPP unifies ECM and raising, exactly the wrong result. Consequently, supplementary mechanisms must be postulated so as to allow (force) the pure overt EPP movement in (10) but disallow the pure EPP movement in (9); and it is these supplementary mechanisms, we argue, that are potentially unnecessary. Returning to (9), in the covert component, a man, or some features of a man can raise into the matrix clause for the purpose of agreement and Case checking (assuming for present purposes, with DBP, that there is a pure EPP checker). This covert movement/attraction too is hard to prohibit, since precisely such movement is allowed overtly, assuming (as we do not) successive cyclic A-movement as in: (11)
a man is likely [a man to be [a man outside]]
7. Notice that the adoption of Greed, whereby the Mover must have features checked, would exclude (9) the problematic case, but also the grammatical ECM case (apparently). See Boškovi´c (1997) for arguments favoring Greed over Enlightened Self-Interest.
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That is movement from the subject of the infinitival to matrix subject position must be allowed. Assuming such movement takes place covertly in (9), the derivation would seem to violate nothing, clearly the wrong prediction. In addition, even if covert movement of features and categories is prohibited, as in the probe-goal analysis of Chomsky (2001a), the problem still persists. That is, the copula is can probe the goal a man, which has moved to spec of to to check the EPP feature, thereby checking Case and agreement features. The satisfaction of the matrix EPP is achieved through the insertion of there, which is assumed to be a pure EPP checker. So again, (9) is overgenerated. This problem has been noted and solutions proposed. We now review those solutions and argue that they, like the EPP which initiates the problem, yield yet further problems. 3.3.2
Problematic solutions: a domino effect?
In the Minimalist Inquiries (MI) framework of Chomsky (2001a), and subsequent work (particularly Chomsky 2001, DBP) the problematic example (9) is excluded by a derivational economy constraint, Merge-over-Move, which is a traffic rule, favoring application of one type of operation over another at a particular derivationinternal point at which either operation ‘could’ in principle apply. The analysis of (9) is as follows. At the following stage of the derivation, (12)
__ [to be [ a man outside]]
there are two ways in which the EPP-feature of to could be checked. 8 A man could move to Spec of to/T (just as occurs in successive cyclic A-movement) or there could be inserted into Spec to/T. Thus it appears we have a case of local derivational optionality. A number of problems now arise. The first has already been noted: what prevents raising a man to Spec of to, an important case of pure EPP checking, and inserting there in the matrix Spec TP, as a pure EPP checker (Chomsky DBP) thereby overgenerating (9)? In order to prevent this, it would seem that some form of look-ahead is necessary e.g. ‘at the derivational point (12), raise a man to Spec of to but only if you subsequently raise a man to the matrix spec – yielding
8. Although it’s not critical for our overall argument, we assume the feature-strength cycle, which states that a strong feature must be checked by the operation immediately following its introduction, i.e. we are assuming here that the EPP is satisfied as soon as possible.
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a man seems to be outside’ (and not (9)). 9 But, how can we avoid such ‘computationally costly’ look-ahead (see Collins 2001) and non-Markovian optionality? The MI answer is twofold; the postulation of (i) the numeration, and (ii) the economy principle of Merge over Move. By appeal to economy conditions, insertion (Merge) of there is a simpler operation than Move (= Remerge). Thus, the principle (13)
When both Move and Merge are ‘possible’, choose the formally simpler operation MERGE (MI, p. 17).
Thus by feature-cyclicity and ‘Merge over Move’, the next operation from (12) Merges there, yielding EPP feature checking in the structure: (14)
[there to be [a man outside]
Further merging applies yielding (15)
[is likely [ there to be [ a man outside]]
Next the EPP of is/T must be checked. The EPP feature of is can now ‘see’ only there in (15), the closest EPP checker. A man is too far away to be attracted by is. Thus there raises yielding (16)
There is likely to be a man outside.
Importantly, examples like (9) are not generable: raising of a man in the embedded infinitive is blocked, since merger of there is preferred over Move a man. 10 However, a new problem now emerges: the analysis thus far proposed forces there insertion in (12). How, then, do proponents of successive cyclic A-raising generate 9. Interestingly, this is a modern form of the age old problem: once successive cyclic movement is licensed, what prevents ‘partial movement’ as in the case above? 10. It seems to us, following Epstein (1990), that examples like (9) might be correctly excluded by phonetic requirements, not by a problem with semantic interpretation, i.e. the LF illegitimacy (uninterpretability) of structural Case. That is, the example ‘sounds wrong’, but seems to ‘mean right’, as was predicted/stated by the Case Filter. In the analysis just reviewed, the example is ungenerable given Merge over Move. It is unclear whether or not this predicts that (9) is known to be anomalous by someone who ‘knows English’ due to their knowledge of phonetic (phonosyntactic) requirements, or not. We return to this important issue below.
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cases such as (11) – where Move applies over Merge? This phenomenon, in part, motivates the numeration. As a preliminary formulation, to be modified below, assume the following. Each derivation begins with an initial selection of lexical items, which in effect constitute all the lexical items that will be used in that derivation. Thus, the derivation of (12) remains as traced above. But, the problem of undergenerating (11), successive cyclic A-movement, is solved by appeal to the numeration: in fact, there is no there in the numeration of (11); and thus at the derivational point (12) Merge over Move allows Move of a man because Merge of there is not a logical possibility, i.e. (13) is inapplicable. (Note further that a man has its Case and agreement features checked in situ, the details of which do not directly effect present argumentation. Thus, a man can’t raise to to since a man is inactive, in effect it cannot raise since there is no reason to.) It should be noted now, however, that this Merge-over-Move analysis encounters at least two potential new problems, as is pointed out in MI. First, unlike the case just discussed, there are derivations in which: (i) There is in the numeration, yet (ii) Move nonetheless applies, contra Merge-over-Move. These grammatical cases have been noted in the literature but are not generable. An illustrative example is (17)
there is a possibility that [ proofs will be discovered proofs]
At the derivation-internal point shown in (18) (18)
__ [ will be discovered proofs]
there are two ways to satisfy EPP, Move proofs or Merge there, which is indeed in the Numeration. Paradoxically, in this case we need to do Move over Merge. Notice the right result could be obtained if there was not, at this point, visible in the numeration (since there would then be nothing to Merge, movement of proofs would be allowed). This is precisely the tack initiated in MI and pursued in subsequent work (DBP and BEA). It is proposed that CPs and vP (where v is the ‘light’ verb head of transitive constructions, MI, p. 15), but not TP, are phases. A derivation is generated phase-by-phase, each phase having its own separate Numeration, called a ‘lexical array’. Thus, since the embedded CP is a phase in (17), we can begin the derivation with just and only the lexical elements required to generate this CP. Thus, when we get to stage (18) of the derivation, there is not in the (embedded CP’s) lexical array. Thus Merge over Move applies, yet Move is allowed, since we have, at this
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point, no there ‘in hand’ to Merge. Thus passive is allowed in the embedded CP. Raising of a man in (9), on the other hand, is not allowed, since TP is not a phase, and no other phase category exists that has a lexical array which excludes there. In short, there is visible throughout the derivation of (9), and must be merged in the embedded infinitival, as desired. (For arguments against appeal to the numeration cf., among others, Collins 1997:4 and Frampton and Gutmann 2002.) This phase-based, numeration-dependent, Merge over Move analysis, in turn, encounters at least one potential conceptual and one potential empirical problem (see also Epstein and Seely 2002 and Epstein 2003). One potential empirical problem concerns the actual statement of the phase analysis. First, only CPs and vPs can be phases. The empirical motivation is clear enough, but is the naming of CP and vP as phases purely descriptive and ad hoc, allowing us to Move, as if there were not in the numeration? MI says that CP and vP are a natural class since the lexical arrays associated with these two category types determine a natural syntactic object SO, an object that is relatively independent in terms of interface properties. On the ‘meaning side’ perhaps the simplest and most principled choice is to take SO to be the closest syntactic counterpart to a proposition: either a verb phrase in which all theta roles are assigned or a full clause including Tense and force. [our emphasis SDE TDS] (MI, p. 20)
The difficulty here is that, returning to the problematic case (9), within the matrix VP as well as the matrix TP, all theta roles are assigned and hence this VP would therefore seem to be ‘propositional’. If it is propositional, then it is a phase (all propositions are phases). Thus the following VP is predicted to be a phase: (19)
[ VP seem [ a man to be [a man outside]]
Since this is a category with all theta roles assigned, it is a proposition, hence a phase, and as such has its own lexical array [seem, a, man, to, be, outside] crucially excluding there. Since it is a phase excluding there, raising of a man is allowed, since Merge of there is impossible (since there is not in the lexical array associated with this phase). Finally there can be inserted after this (VP) phase is complete, and (9) is overgenerated. 11 To prevent this result, MI assumes that the VP-phases are ‘limited to transitive v with phi-features and external argument’ (MI, p. 22). 11. One might argue that the matrix VP is not propositional hence not a phase, because it lacks tense. Notice, however, that vP is assumed to be a phase/propositional yet it lacks tense. If one wanted to
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This would prevent the overgeneration. Since the VP (19) does not have an external argument, it can’t be a phase, so there is visible in the NUM throughout, and must be merged in the Spec of the embedded TP. But the naturalness of phases including ‘a verb phrase in which all theta roles are assigned’ is lost (since all theta roles are assigned in (9)). Also lost is the idea that phases are ‘propositional’ (if propositional, then a phase). This is lost since the VP (19) seems propositional. But it is by the MI hypothesis not a phase. In addition, limiting phases to transitive v with an external argument seems descriptive. The naturalness of the idea that phases are propositional is also potentially called into question by vP phases that do not seem propositional in any clear sense. Consider (20)
[ vP who bought what]
This is a phase, but seems un-propositional. Note, it might be non-propositional since it’s a double-question, or it might be non-propositional since it exhibits vacuous quantification, due to the fact that neither wh-operator binds a variable. Finally there is another potential problem similar to the one noted in Epstein et al. (1998). Recall, in characterizing the lexical arrays associated with phases, MI states that a ‘Lexical Array should determine a natural syntactic object SO, an object that is relatively independent in terms of interface properties.’ The potential problem is that, in ‘the act of’ selecting an array, how can one determine that it can yield – by as yet unapplied derivational operations – a natural syntactic object, and moreover one that is ‘relatively independent in terms of interface properties’? This suggests that lexical array selection might require look-ahead which ‘envisions’ the entire derivation and can ‘see’ whether the LF and PF representations, each a set generated by the derivation, are, or are not ‘relatively independent in terms of interface properties.’ Stated another way, we can’t know whether a vP is a legitimate phase, with its own lexical array, until the derivation is over, and we are at the interface with respect to which a phase is characterized. 12 In addition, the notion ‘relatively independent in terms of interface properties’, in contrast to ‘convergent’ (the latter entertained but rejected in MI as the characterargue that propositions (hence phases) require tense, then vP would be excluded and (9) would still be overgenerated since the matrix TP (namely T + (9)) would be propositional, hence a phase. 12. One possible way to avoid such look-ahead is to freely generate, and (thus sometimes) crash. See Frampton and Gutmann (2001) and Epstein (2003) for possible problems confronting crash generation within a derivational framework.
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ization of ‘phases’), is not well-defined. To the extent that this definition is lacking, and the notion ‘propositional’ is unclear, the hypothesis that vP and CP are phases remains ad hoc – explicitly designed to render there as if invisible at derivationinternal points at which Move is required, and Merge must be postponed. Finally, another potential problem confronting Merge-over-Move is sentences involving ‘short Passive’ such as (21)
there was a proof discovered [a proof]
Recall that TP is not a phase. Moreover, crucially, a vP lacking an external theta role is also not a phase. This stipulation was incorporated so that no sub-phase (lexical array) lacking there would allow Movement of a man over Merge in the embedded clause. (22)
there seems [there to be a man outside]
Crucially [seems to be a man outside] must not be a phase. If it were, then the Lexical Array for this vP-phase would lack there. This in turn would incorrectly allow a man to move to the Spec of the infinitival to satisfy the EPP: Merge-over-Move would allow this, since there is not in the sub-array, so Merge is not a possibility, thus licensing Move. To prevent this, it is stipulated that vP lacking an external theta role is not a phase. But if this is so, it is arguably ‘construction-specific’ and short Passives (noted in MI), as in (21) are ungenerable. Consider the derivational point (23)
[discovered a proof]
To generate (21) Move of a proof is required. But since TP is never a phase, and vP lacking en external theta role is not a phase, there are no phases in (23). Thus there remains visible in the lexical array throughout. Merge-over-Move then prohibits a proof from moving, and instead requires there-merger in this position. There then raises, yielding (24)
there was [there discovered a proof]
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Although (24) is grammatical, the analysis incorrectly renders there was a proof discovered ungenerable. 3.3.3
Further issues concerning there-insertion and raising
The Merge-over-Move analysis not only requires supplementation to account for cases like (17) where there is in the numeration yet Move applies instead of Merge, but also needs to account for cases, where again, Move preempts Merge as noted in MI: (25)
JOHN expected [a proof to be discovered a proof] = MOVE applies downstairs b. *JOHN expected [JOHN to be discovered a proof] = MERGE John downstairs, then Move John upstairs, by shortest Move
a.
The problem here is that at the following stage, Merge, in particular Merge-John into Spec, TP, to satisfy the EPP is possible, yet Move is in fact preferred, in seeming violation of Merge-over-Move. (26)
[T to be discovered a proof]
In order to prevent such Merge (recall TP is never a phase, hence the Merge-able category John is present in the lexical array) and thereby force Move, MI proposes the following: (27)
Pure merge in theta position is required of (and restricted to) arguments
Let us examine the status of (27). First of all, (27) is really two principles, stating both a requirement and a restriction, which together amount to one half of the traditional theta criterion: (28)
a. b.
If X is an argument, then X must be first-merged into a theta position. If X is a non-argument, then X must not be first-Merged into a theta position.
(This too might be regarded as a vestige of (aspects of) D-structure.) What does not follow from (27) (= (28a) and (b)) is the second half of the theta criterion, namely that all theta roles must be assigned, a matter we put aside for present purposes.
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(27) is called a ‘principle’ in MI but we are not sure of its status, hence its mode of application. It seems to us that, given ‘Merge-over-Move’, we must block, at the derivation-internal stage represented by (26), the merger of John, which Mergeover-Move demands at this very stage of derivation. Thus, it seems that (27) is not a principle (i.e. not a filter on representation; in fact it can’t be, if the assumption is that there are no filters internal to Chl), nor can it be a BOC, since we are trying to prevent a particular operation (Merge-John) from applying at a derivationalinternal point, yet the operation seems required by Merge-over-Move. What is done then is to adopt (27), making Merge of John into Spec, TP an impossibility in (26), hence allowing Move. Thus (27) must constitute a constraint on the operation of the rule Merge. With this constraint in part defining Merge, the merger of John in (26) is, in fact, impossible – this simply is not Merge, as defined in (27). Since Merge, so defined, is not an option, Merge can’t apply and Move is therefore allowed by Merge-over-Move, the right result. 13 One possible problem with this theta constraint on Merge is that it excludes, but perhaps shouldn’t, cases like (29)
*John seems that Bill sleeps.
(30)
*I was in England last year [the man]
Intuitively, at least, this type of example should not be excluded by the incorporation of a constraint on rule application such as (27). Rather, this would seem to represent a class of examples each of which constitutes a good candidate for being correctly excluded by the Bare Output Conditions of the C-I system, external to Chl. Informally, there is nothing wrong with the sound, and there is nothing wrong with the linear order of the categories – replace the verb seems with the verb thinks, and it is grammatical. So, it seems to us that what is wrong with this example is the meaning, in particular this kind of co-occurrence of a non-theta marking verb, 13. Note that (27) does raise some difficulties for the Pronominal Argument Hypothesis (PAH) of Jelinek (1984) (see also Baker 1993). For the PAH certain nominals (in, for example, Mohawk) are claimed to be base-generated in an A -position and to bind a pronominal in an A-position. Similarly Left Dislocation in English seems not to be an instance of Move: John, I wonder if Mary likes him. If John is simply merged in, (27) would require that this is a theta-position. Why the pronoun must be bound would then be a question. Moreover, Boškovi´c and Takahashi (1999) argue that optional scrambling violates Greed. They postulate that the scrambled element is ‘base generated’ in the A phonetic scrambled position, and then is driven by theta-checking into the theta position – at LF.
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and an argument John. If so, the difficult question we face is: Should the interpretive anomaly of such co-occurrence be explained by a constraint on the operation of Merge, or by appeal to independently ‘necessary’ lexical semantic (theta) properties and bare output conditions (the theta criterion as a BOC) which define the interpretability/legibility of an LF representation? The answer isn’t clear to us. But our intuition accords with that of Chomsky (1986:98–9), who writes, with respect to examples like these: We might express many of these ideas by saying that there is a principle of Full Interpretation (FI) that requires that every element of PF and LF, taken to be the interface of syntax (in the broad sense) with systems of language use, must receive an appropriate interpretation – must be licensed in the sense indicated. None can simply be disregarded. We cannot have sentences of the form (88) ‘I was in England last year the man’, interpreted as ‘I was in England last year’, disregarding ‘the man’.
Later: It is, then, a mistake to construct a rule system [our emphasis SDE, TDS] that bars [such examples]. Such rules would simply restate some complex facts that follow from quite general syntactic properties of human languages. There is, then, no justification on the basis of these constructions for enriching the class of available descriptive devices to permit these facts to be stated directly in a rule system – an undesirable move in any event.
We should note that it is not entirely clear to us whether these comments from Chomsky (1986) pertain to a ‘Universalized’ Rule system such as the one currently under consideration within which Merge and Move (or certain aspects of them) are universal. Regardless, such a constraint on Pure Merge, is a stipulation. Thus, the following question is not answered: (31)
Why is it that an argument cannot be Pure merged into a non-theta position, nor a non-argument Pure merged into a theta position?
An alternative analysis, appealing to Bare Output Conditions expressing the Theta Criterion at LF, in effect following Chomsky (1986), addresses and maybe even answers the question, predicting seemingly correctly that such examples are in a very circumscribed way, in part, uninterpretable. It isn’t clear that the Merge-constraint captures this. Another potential problem with constraining the operation of ‘Pure Merge’ in
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this way is that the notion ‘Pure Merge’ must be distinguished from ‘impure’ Merge, where impure Merge is Move/Re-Merge. It is perhaps a mistake to differentiate Pure from Impure Merge in this way, since recall, Merge-over-Move is assumed to be naturally economical since Merge is a sub-operation of Move. But given the above theta-constraint on ‘PURE’ Merge, which does not apply to the landing site of Impure Merge ( =Move =Remerge), it is not clear which operation, Merge or Move, is (intuitively) simpler, hence more economical, since ‘Pure Merge’ has certain theta-constraints on its operation that do not constrain ImpureMerge =Move =Remerge, e.g. an argument can be (re-merged (moved)) to a nontheta position, whereas, pure merger of an argument into a non-theta position is barred by the proposed theta constraint (27) on Pure Merge. Thus, the first assumption of the Merge-over-Move analysis (‘Merge, being a subcase of Move, is simpler hence preferred’) is now perhaps itself unmaintainable. In sum, the EPP seems to be creating a domino effect: since Spec of to must be filled, a case of pure EPP satisfaction, the analysis incorporates a number of arguably problematic mechanisms, including: (i) postulation of the numeration, (ii) the traffic rule Merge-over-Move, (iii) phases, and (iv) the theta based constraint on Merge, i.e. (28), incorporating half of the Theta Criterion. 3.3.4 Some advantages of a derivational analysis Let us now consider under our own analysis those cases that engendered the problematic Merge-over-Move constraint, the postulation of phases and the theta-theoretic constraint on Merge which amounts to part of the traditional Theta Criterion. Under our approach, the spec of to in examples like (9), repeated below, checks no feature. Thus Greed, ESI, or Suicidal Attract (the latter proposed in MI) prohibit movement to this position. That is a welcome result since all the difficulties presented above arise because to is claimed to have some EPP feature, and hence must be checked by something: (9 )
there seems [a man to be [a man here]]
Cases like (9 ) are perhaps the central loopholes created by the ‘translation’ of the GB Case Filter at SS, to the much preferable, but ‘delayed-enforcement’ Minimalist analysis of Case as uninterpretable at LF. For us, Merge-over-Move is simply not needed for these, or related, cases. The derivation does not have to be blocked since the derivation simply does not arise. For us, the element to has no features to check and therefore a man cannot move to Spec of to since no features could be checked there. Two derivations, then, are possible: there is merged into the matrix position,
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yielding There seems to be a man here; or, a man seems to be here is derived in one fell swoop movement (how Case and agreement are checked in such instances will be taken up a bit later). 14 Since we don’t need Merge over Move to block (9 ), we do not need to incorporate postulates like numerations and phases designed to handle the cases where Merge-over-Move does not happen, but rather Move happens, even though Merge was in principle applicable, e.g. (32)
there is a possibility that [a man will be arrested a man]
Recall, finally, that the constraint Merge-over-Move, left in this simple form, runs afoul of theta theory. As is noted in MI, in (33) (33)
John expects [John [ TP to be arrested a man]]
after the spec-less infinitival TP is built, Merge-over-Move forces merger of John, perhaps overgenerating such examples, but certainly undergenerating, leaving us no way to derive: (34)
John expects [a man [ to be arrested a man]]
Since TP is never a phase, and the embedded VP is not a phase, since it has no external argument, John is visible in the lexical array throughout. In order to block John-insertion in the embedded clause, the proposal that arguments must and can merge only into a theta position is made (see (27)). We have argued, 15 by constrast, that such derivations are excluded since movement to or through spec of to is impossible under our analysis. 14. Consider the derivational stage: (i)
seems there to be a man here
derived by Merge-over-Move. If there is a pure EPP satisfier and the EPP is a purely structural principle; i.e. not feature checking, then, it is unclear how there should induce an intervention effect blocking superraising under the probe-goal analysis. 15. The idea that the elimination of the EPP (and thus not moving to spec of raising to successive cyclically through Spec-T) can solve various problems within the Merge-over-Move account in MI is independently proposed in Castillo, Drury and Grohmann (1999). We leave to future research a comparison of their approach with those aspects of our analysis directly concerning the EPP, Mergeover-Move, and successive cyclic A-movement.
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On ECM
If the ECM to checks no features, as seems to be true even under GB exceptional case assignment analyses, then Movement to the Spec of this to should be prohibited, just like it is prohibited in (9 ). However, as shown in (34), movement to this Spec-of-to position in ECM apparently does occur, a central concern in Minimalist accounts. Why is there overt movement to this position? The standard is that movement to this spec applies since T’s EPP feature must be checked. But we would like to suggest a different approach, one that parallels our claim that raising to has no features. Thus we seek to unify ECM and Raising not by assuming that both involve movement to Spec to, but rather by postulating that neither involves movement to Spec to. That is to say, in fact, the ECM subject is not moving to such a position. We would like to suggest, following in large part independently motivated analyses of Johnson (1991), Koizumi (1995), and Lasnik and Saito (1991) that ECM is an ‘optical illusion’. In fact, the ECM subject does not occupy the Spec of to at Spell-out, consistent with our assumptions that this to is not a feature checker. Suppose that the ECM DP has overtly ‘object raised/shifted upstairs’. If this overtshift analysis is correct, nothing occupies Spec of to overtly. We, unlike others, would claim in addition that nothing even moves through Spec of to. Thus, the ECM DP is shifted (object shift for Case from the ECM verb in a spec-head relation) to the left of the ECM verb, but the ECM verb also raises to the left of the shifted object DP (for reasons unclear to us) yielding the correct word order. Nothing is ever in Spec TP. This is represented in (35). (35)
I believe a man believe [ Specless-TP to be [a man] outside (Note that ‘copies’ are shown here only for purposes of derivational exposition; no actual copies or traces are present under the derivational approach that we adopt.)
Just like ‘long distance A-raising’, for us this is not successive cyclic A-movement. Rather it is one fell swoop to upstairs spec of believe, thereby answering the vexing question: if there is no ‘exceptional case marking’, but only spec-head, why does the DP move to spec of to overtly in ECM? While it can’t in Raising? Our answer is that it doesn’t move to Spec to in ECM, just as it fails to in Raising. Thus we reject two central cases of non-redundant so-called ‘pure’ EPP-checking.
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3.4
The conjecture class of verbs
3.4.1
The Problem
Another challenge to attempting to eliminate the EPP concerns the conjecture class of verbs, as discussed in Boškovi´c (1997:135, ex. 117); see also Brody (1993). There are certain ungrammatical data that appear to be excluded only by analyses which appeal to the EPP; i.e. these data, like successive cyclic A-raising and ECM, appear to display pure EPP effects. To begin, Boškovi´c (1997:80) argues that members of the conjecture class of verbs each have the following properties: (36)
Conjecture class verbs: a. Assign subject theta role b. S-select proposition (thus disallows a Control-PRO complement) c. Assign no ACC Case d. Take an infinitival complement
The relevant data presented by Boškovi´c (1997:79) are as follows (* and ? from Boškovi´c): (37)
*John has conjectured [PRO to like Mary]
(illustrates (36b))
(38)
*John has conjectured Mary to like Peter
(illustrates (36c))
(39)
?Mary has been conjectured to like Peter
(illustrates (36d))
Under Boškovi´c’s analysis, example (37) is excluded because conjecture s-selects propositions and Control infinitives cannot be interpreted as propositional. In (38) s-selection is satisfied since the complement is propositional, but since, Boškovi´c argues, conjecture fails to assign ACC Case, Mary is not Case checked and the example is correctly excluded. The marginal example (39) is argued to provide crucial evidence that conjecture does indeed take an infinitival. Mary moves to get Case, unavailable from conjecture. Boškovi´c notes that the example (39) is ‘slightly marginal’, and attributes this to the passivization of a [−ACC] Case-assigning verb, but not to a selectional violation. We are not sure of the formal status of the ban against passivizing [−ACC], proposition-selecting verbs. As evidence for this
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ban, Boškovi´c (p. 80) offers the following example, characterizing its status with a question mark: (40)
?It has been conjectured that Peter likes Mary
So, Boškovi´c is arguing that (39) and (40) have roughly the same status, due to the passive ban, while selectional violations seem far worse. (41)
*Mary wants very much that Peter will graduate
Boškovi´c conjectures that (39) is not a selectional violation; i.e. conjecture has the lexical property of allowing infinitival complements – or has no lexical property barring them. Given these properties of conjecture, the following (arguably ungrammatical case) 16 can be excluded under the standard assumption that expletive it requires Case. (42)
*John has conjectured [it to seem that Peter is ill]
However, Lasnik (2002) notes that without the EPP, the following example, which simply omits the expletive, is overgenerated. (43)
*John has conjectured [ __ to seem Peter is ill]
Without the EPP, nothing forces Spec, TP to appear, and if nothing is forced into Spec, TP, it isn’t clear why (43) is ungrammatical. It certainly isn’t excluded by a Case requirement on expletives since there is no expletive. Nor can we appeal to Case-discharge requirements on a Case assigning head, if, as we have argued, to in such cases has no feature checking properties, and as Boškovi´c argues conjecture lacks Case. Nor can we appeal to selection, if, as discussed above, conjecture does allow infinitival complementation, as suggested by the ‘mere marginality’ of the passive infinitival example (39) above, which recall, Boškovi´c argues only violates the passive ban, not selection. How then can (43) be excluded without the EPP?
16. We suggest later that (42) (or analogs thereof) are, in fact, relatively well formed.
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3.4.2
On the properties of conjecture verbs and the documented unclarity of the data 3.4.2.1 Does conjecture take an infinitival complement? Before proceeding with some possible answers, we would like to point out what we believe to be possibly serious unclarities surrounding the data used to determine properties of the conjecture class of verbs, verbs argued to motivate an independent EPP. One straightforward approach to excluding (43) above is to assume that members of the conjecture class of verbs simply do not select an infinitival complement. But, as just noted, Boškovi´c does not pursue this approach based on the status of (39) and his analysis of it as fully consistent with conjecture selecting an infinitive. The status and analysis of (39) are thus crucial to the argument that (43) motivates the EPP. However, as documented in the literature, the status of passive infinitivals like (39) is not altogether clear. For example, Martin (1999, fn. 16) differs from Boškovi´c in his judgments regarding Passive infinitivals with conjecture. Contra Boškovi´c, Martin judges the following as having the same status, which he calls ‘at best marginal’: (44)
a. b.
Mary was conjectured to like Peter Mary was remarked to like Peter
By contrast, Boškovi´c presumes they are different, as indicated by the fact that Boškovi´c (1997:78) reports that Boškovi´c (1994) had suggested that remark belongs to the BELIEVE class of verbs (i.e. those that assign subject theta role, do not check ACC Case and take an infinitival complement), writing: In Boškovi´c 1994 I suggested that remark belongs to this class of verbs. However it seems to me now that conjecture is a better candidate for most speakers [our emphasis SDE, TDS]. (pp. 78–9)
(Boškovi´c 1997:199, fn. 7 however reports that one of his informants accepts Mary has been remarked to like Peter, noting ‘for this speaker remark does belong to the BELIEVE class.’) This indicates unclarity about the status of conjecture and its relation to remark. Moreover, as Martin (1999, fn. 16) also notes, Boškovi´c’s analysis requires some kind of independent selection, distinct from s-selection, dictating whether or not infinitival complements are allowed. This is because Boškovi´c claims a distinction
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in the status of (44a) and (44b), claiming (44b) is worse, yet the two verbs are assumed to have identical s-selectional properties. Boškovi´c calls this ‘other selection’ l( =lexical)-selection, under which an X 0 selects particular lexical items and not others. As for our own judgments, we are quite unsure about these data, perhaps indicating further unclarity. In the remainder of this chapter, we examine conjecture in great detail precisely because Boškovi´c (1997), and later researchers following him, e.g. Lasnik (2002), consider it the most likely candidate for membership in the class of so-called BELIEVE verbs. As Martin (1999) further notes, the hypothesis that conjecture assigns an external theta role, but assigns no ‘internal’ Case, runs counter to part of Burzio’s Generalization. Of course Burzio could be wrong, but the inconsistency may also indicate that conjecture is misclassified (perhaps on the basis of what may be unclear data). We will return momentarily to Martin’s re-analysis of conjecture under which it is a verb consistent with Burzio’s Generalization. Before doing so, we consider what seems to us to be a factual unclarity regarding the Case-assigning properties of conjecture, to which we now turn. 3.4.2.2 Does conjecture assign Case? Recall that Boškovi´c proposes that conjecture assigns no Case. He provides the following supporting data (p. 79): (45)
*John has conjectured something/it (indicated grammaticality judgement from Boškovi´c, p. 79)
First of all, it is not clear to us that the quantificational something and deictic referential it yield identical ungrammaticality; i.e. we are not sure whether such data should be collapsed with slash notation. But, let’s assume with Boškovi´c that the examples with something and it are ungrammatical, and equally so. Boškovi´c compares such purportedly ungrammatical cases with the following grammatical cases with wager/admit. (46)
a. b.
John wagered all his money on the Bulls. Mary admitted her mistake.
wager/admit are argued to have ACC Case to assign, while conjecture does not. But notice that no two members of the last three examples constitute a minimal
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pair. That is, the indefinite complements (something/it) used to support conjecture’s purported lack of ACC-assigning powers differ from the definite complements used to support the hypothesis that wager/admit by contrast do have ACC Case to assign. Moreover, the perfective form of conjecture is used while wager/admit appear in the simple past tense. With something/it as complement, forming a true minimal pair with (47), wager too seems significantly degraded: (47)
John (has) wagered something/it
Once again, though, the data isn’t clear; we can’t determine the comparative grammaticality of (45) vs. (47). We henceforth indicate such indeterminacy with the symbol ‘±’. Our unclarity is further compounded by the following ‘discourse’ effects. If the reference of something/it is fixed, as it could be by e.g. ‘right dislocation’, the examples improve: (48)
John wagered something, namely five-hundred dollars. John wagered it, the $500 he owes you (here, a bare amount ‘500’ is less accept17 able than a definite description, presumably due to the specificity of it).
Notice also that temporal adverbials might improve the examples still further: (49)
John can’t place another bet, he has already wagered something, namely $500.
With all of this in mind, reconsider Boškovi´c’s example supporting the claim that conjecture lacks ACC Case: (45)
*John has conjectured something/it.
What if we fix the reference here? Can a DP appear, and arguably be Case checked by conjecture? (50)
a. b.
John has conjectured something, the first law. John has conjectured something, that the first law is true.
17. Further complicating the experiments, there may in fact be two wagers: I wager ( = reckon) that she likes him vs. I wager (placed a bet of) x (e.g. a monetary amount) on y (an outcome).
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(51)
a. b.
75
John has conjectured it, the first law. John has conjectured it, that the first law is true.
Again, our judgments are unclear, but it seems that the (b) examples, in which the interpretation of something/it is propositional, are better than the (a) examples, which lack this propositional interpretation. Thus we tentatively propose, contra Boškovi´c, that (52)
Conjecture class verbs: Do assign ACC Case, but only if the ACC Case recipient can receive propositional interpretation. With Boškovi´c, we assume that conjecture a. Assigns subject theta role b. S-selects proposition (thus disallows a Control-PRO complement) c. Takes an infinitival complement
With these properties of conjecture postulated, in particular that it s-selects a proposition and (contra Boškovi´c) can ACC assign to propositional-NP/DPs only, 18 consider the following cases where conjecture takes a direct object NP/DP but the context supplies the direct object with propositional interpretation: (53)
ASSERTION: John conjectured that the Bulls would win. a. That’s interesting, I conjectured that too. b. That’s interesting, I conjectured something too, namely that 2 + 2 = 4. c. That’s interesting, since he conjectured it after they played the game! d. That’s interesting, I conjectured the same outcome.
18. Returning to (46b), it is interesting to note here that Boškovi´c’s example, arguing that admit can assign ACC, has a DP object that apparently has a propositional interpretation. (i)
Mary admitted her mistake = Mary admitted [that she was mistaken]
It does not mean: Mary admitted [2 + 2 = 5], where 2 + 2 = 5 is the mistake. Recall Boškovi´c’s other example demonstrating ACC assigning powers, (46b) John wagered all his money on the Bulls. Here too there is a propositional interpretation involved; namely, John wagered all his money [that the Bulls would win]. We leave the properties of admit and wager, focusing instead on the properties of conjecture (claimed to be an archetypal example of a BELIEVE-type verb).
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e. f.
Then John conjectured something foolish ( = reduced relative, not small clause). No he didn’t. In fact John conjectured nothing.
These seem better than Boškovi´c’s example *John has conjectured something/it. With our hypothesis that conjecture can assign ACC (at least under certain circumstances) in mind, let’s return to another case argued to indicate that conjecture lacks ACC: (54)
*?John has conjectured Mary to like Peter. (cf. John has conjectured that Mary likes Peter.)
Why is this out if, as we have suggested, conjecture can assign ACC Case? Under our hypothesis Mary cannot receive Case since Mary is not propositionally interpretable. This makes at least three predictions. First, that the passive infinitival should be improved since ACC Case is not involved. That it is better accords with the judgments of some analysts (e.g. Boškovi´c) but not others (e.g. Martin), as discussed above. (44)
?Mary was conjectured to like Peter.
A second prediction is that if we put a propositionally interpretable DP in the exceptional Case marking position with conjecture (in place of Mary in (54)), this too should lead to improvement. This prediction seems right: (55)
a. *John conjectured Mary to have upset Bill. b. John conjectured Mary’s illness to have upset Bill. c. John conjectured Mary’s having an illness to have upset Bill.
It seems to us that the DP following conjecture in (55b) and (55c), when interpreted propositionally, is more acceptable than the non-propositional DP Mary in this position. Importantly, if such data is grammatical, then, conjecture does take infinitival complements and we no longer need to rely solely on the grammatical status of the infinitival passives, about which there exists disagreement in the literature. Thus, the central EPP-motivating case under discussion (namely (43) John has
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conjectured __ to seem Peter is ill) cannot be excluded simply by saying that conjecture verbs do not take infinitives. A third prediction is that the same propositionally interpretable DP in the same position, but with non-propositional interpretation, should be comparatively degraded. Judgments yet again are unclear, but the following does indeed seem worse: (56)
*?John conjectured Mary’s illness to be influenza.
Here, Mary’s illness cannot be interpreted as ‘that Mary was ill’, but rather is forced by the equative environment to bear non-propositional interpretation; thus, under the analysis considered here Mary’s illness can’t be ACC Case-checked (if Mary’s illness is interpreted non-propositionally) or, if this DP is interpreted propositionally, there is a semantic anomaly, i.e. it would be interpreted as something like John conjectured that Mary is ill is influenza. This then suggests that, contra Boškovi´c, conjecture (or the little v selecting it) can indeed value ACC Case, but differs from ECM verbs such as believe in requiring that the infinitival subject have propositional content. Given this curious property, conjecture is now importantly consistent with Burzio’s Generalization, i.e. if we are on the right track, conjecture not only assigns an external theta role, but can assign ACC Case, as shown by reconsidering the following examples. (57)
a. John has conjectured Mary’s illness to have upset Peter. b. *It was conjectured Mary’s illness to have upset Peter. c. Mary’s illness was conjectured to have upset Peter.
To summarize, recall that Lasnik (2002) argues that examples like (43) motivate the EPP. (43)
*John has conjectured [ __ to seem Peter is ill]
Specifically, following Boškovi´c (1997), the assumption is that such examples cannot be excluded by appeal to undischarged Case on conjecture since, as we noted, Boškovi´c argues that conjecture lacks Case altogether. In this section, we have called into question the data supporting and the analysis under which conjecture is assumed to lack Case. We have suggested, contra Boškovi´c, that conjecture bears
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ACC Case and thus example (43) is excluded without appeal to the EPP, on a par with *I believe __ to seem Peter is ill. More generally, with Martin (1999:9) we suggest that it might be the case that there do not exist any BELIEVE-type verbs. We stress again that the data from the literature as well as our own data presented here are unclear. But, to the extent that the data are clear, an analysis without the EPP seems feasible. We now confront at least three problems. First, we believe there may be a contrast between the following: (58)
a. ±John has conjectured Mary’s illness. b. John has conjectured Mary’s illness to have upset Fred.
Our impression is that (58a) is worse than (58b). But (58a)’s status is unclear – consider, for instance, the analogous (59)
The doctors had conjectured Mary’s illness long before she became symptomatic.
This seems better than (58a). But if (58a) is worse then (58b), we have no explanation thus far: conjecture can assign Case to Mary’s illness and Mary’s illness is a DP that can receive propositional interpretation. Our speculative hypothesis is that for some reason the DP Mary’s illness in the direct object position of conjecture can’t receive the requisite propositional interpretation; so, the reading one gets is not unlike ‘John has conjectured influenza.’ Notice that this seems to be true with believe too; i.e. the following seems to us anomalous: I believe Mary’s illness (cf. I believe that Mary is ill). One might hypothesize a general law that when in direct object position NPs of this kind 19 are unable to receive a propositional interpretation. However, this seems false in light of examples like I regretted Mary’s illness which can mean ‘I regretted that Mary is ill’ (not: ‘I regretted influenza’). Thus, it seems that some verbs resist the propositional interpretation of apparent direct objects, while others don’t. We leave the matter to further research. The second and third problems with our tentative proposal that conjecture assigns ACC Case concern our attempted elimination of the EPP. While the ACC assigning hypothesis allows us to handle (43) without appeal to the EPP, at least two other kinds of data evade this Case discharge account. Namely, nominal forms of conjecture: (60)
*[the conjecture [ __to seem that Bill left]] upset me
19. By this kind, we mean as contrasted with ‘anaphoric’ NPs of the sort that occur in (51) above.
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and passives. We turn to the nominal cases below. As for passives, consider (61)
±It was conjectured __ to seem that Bill left.
yet again the data is unclear. If such cases are ungrammatical, as this seems to be, we have no obvious way to exclude them: since it’s passive, conjecture bears no undischarged Case, nor can we appeal to the EPP; recall that for us to has no features to check, thus we do not analyze these as expletive raising. The analysis we’ve proposed thus predicts that the examples are well formed: no ACC is assigned and thus the requirement that ACC recipients be propositional is inapplicable, as is the requirement that conjecture discharges ACC. Interestingly, certain passives are, as predicted, grammatical (or at least substantially improved in our view). Consider the following, where the raising predicate, unlike bare seem, allows a sentential subject as a lexical property. We think these are much improved: (62)
It was conjectured to be likely that Bill left.
(63)
It was conjectured to be easy to finish this project.
(64)
It was conjectured to seem weird that Bill left.
Notice further, as we noted in a different context above, that perfective aspect arguably improves the examples still further: 20 (65)
It was conjectured to have been likely that Bill left.
(66)
It was conjectured to have been easy to finish this project.
Some speakers detect further improvement with modals downstairs:
20. This is an effect already documented with agentive infinitival complements to ‘standard’ ECM Verbs like believe: (i) (ii)
*I believe John to kick Bill (right now). I believe John to have kicked Bill.
See Enç (1991) and Pires (2001).
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It was conjectured to have been likely that Bill would leave (under those circumstances).
Even with seem itself, there are ways to improve grammaticality. Consider the following (68)
It was conjectured to have seemed as if Bill would leave.
(69)
It was conjectured to have seemed weird that Bill left.
Notice that the latter case, seemed weird, allows a sentential subject; see Moro (1997). Thus, passives do not seem to present clear counter evidence to our predictions. Before returning to ACC-less nominal cases, we first consider theta marking and certain additional semantic properties of conjecture. 3.4.2.3 A note on conjecture and theta Consider next theta marking. Recall that the following is predicted good (or at least improved) by our analysis. (70)
I conjectured Mary’s illness to have upset Bill.
(70) does not entail that I was the one who conjectured Mary’s illness; i.e. the following is non-contradictory: (71)
I conjectured Mary’s illness to have upset Bill, but I was not the one who conjectured that Mary was ill.
By contrast, the following examples from Pesetsky (1991), as discussed in Boškovi´c (1997:55), do seem to involve a semantic relation of some kind between declare and March and between estimate and Bill’s weight: (72)
I declared March to be National Syntax Month.
(73)
I estimated Bill’s weight to be 150 lbs.
If true, then I did declare something (of) March and I did estimate Bill’s weight. On this matter, citing Pesetsky (1991), Boškovi´c (1997:55) notes what he calls:
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. . . a rather surprising fact concerning the relation between theta-role assignment and ECM with agentive verbs noted by Pesetsky (1991). Pesetsky observes that in some cases [unlike *Peter wagered Fred to be crazy, SDE, TDS] an agentive verb can exceptionally Case mark a lexical NP, in particular when it theta marks the NP . . . Consider (13)
Congress declared March to be National Syntax Month.
Pesetsky notes that the matrix verb in (13) affects the embedded subject. The act of declaring changes the property of March. March becomes National Syntax month by virtue of the declaration. Pesetsky interprets this as indicating that the matrix verb theta marks the embedded subject across the embedded clause boundary . . .
The hypothesized generalization is that (74)
Pesetsky’s Generalization: An agentive verb can exceptionally Case-mark, i.e. across a clause boundary, only if the agentive verb theta marks the exceptionally Case marked constituent.
But if we are correct that conjecture can indeed ECM a (propositional) NP, then unlike with declare/estimate, it seems that such ECM can occur in the absence of theta assignment. That is I conjectured Mary’s illness to have upset Fred seems to us to involve no theta marking of Mary’s illness by conjecture. (Although we have indeed suggested a semantic relation between the ACC-marked DP and conjecture; namely that the DP is required to have propositional interpretation.) To summarize we conjecture the following, namely that: (75)
CONJECTURE a. s-selects a proposition b. can assign ACC to DP, and even to ECM subject that it fails to theta mark, provided the DP can be propositionally interpreted.
The next question is: what kind of Case assignment is conjecture engaged in, when it exceptionally Case marks a DP that it fails to theta mark, as in the following? (76)
John conjectured Mary’s illness to have upset Fred.
If inherent Case assignment requires theta marking, then this can’t be inherent Case; conjecture does not (by hypothesis) theta mark Mary’s illness. If structural
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is the only remaining possibility, then structural it is. This is interesting and unclear, since there does seem to be a semantic restriction on the ECM subject (it must be propositionally interpretable) but the relation between conjecture and the DP does not appear to be a theta relation. Now notice that if conjecture assigns the agent theta role to the subject, as we assume it does, 21 then these examples suggest that the generalization that Pesetsky postulated and Boškovi´c elegantly sought to explain might be descriptively incorrect (see also Pesetsky (1991) and Boškovi´c (1997:192–3, fn. 2) for discussion of other possible counterexamples). This too requires further investigation. 3.4.2.4 Conjecture and expletives Notice that the analysis tentatively outlined above would seem to predict that an expletive cannot occur in the ECM position with conjecture. This is because an expletive, being semantically vacuous, does not receive propositional interpretation. Thus, the ACC case of conjecture cannot be assigned, leading to ill-formedness. Thus we predict that all of the following are ungrammatical (due to the presence of undischarged Case on conjecture): (77)
a. John conjectured it to seem (that) Peter is ill. b. John conjectured there to be a man outside. c. John conjectured her to be crazy. d. John conjectured Peter to be crazy.
The (77a) case seems pretty good to us (see below for ways to improve it), the others seem worse – with (77b) perhaps better than (77c) and (77d), yet still worse than (77a). It is interesting to digress here for a moment and compare conjecture with Boškovi´c’s judgments regarding wager-class verbs, which are similar to conjecture in that they are agentive verbs which bear ACC. Boškovi´c claims that wager-class verbs are grammatical with an ECMed expletive or pronoun, but not an R-expression. This is similar (but not identical) to our tentative judgments regarding conjecture. Conjecture and wager pattern together in allowing an expletive and barring an R-expression. Boškovi´c provides the following examples of wager-class verbs: 21. Conjecture is agentive according to standard diagnostics. (i) (ii) (iii)
What John did was conjecture Mary’s illness to have upset Fred. What John did was conjecture that Mary was ill. *What John did was receive a summons.
On the elimination of the EPP
(78)
He acknowledged it to be impossible to square circles.
(1997:58, ex. 21c)
(79)
Mary never alleged him to be crazy.
(1997:59, ex. 21h)
(80)
*John wagered Peter to be crazy.
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(1997:52, ex. 5a)
Note, however, that Boškovi´c does not use wager itself in (78) and (79), using instead acknowledge in (78) and allege in (79). The substitution of wager in these cases seems to yield a marginal result (we think): (81)
He wagered it to be impossible to square circles.
(82)
Mary never wagered him to be crazy.
Boškovi´c argues that wager has ACC, but in (80) Peter is, by locality, unable to ‘shift’ out of the agentive recursive VP and vP shells (induced by agentivity) and is thus unable to move to an Agr O Spec, above the vP and VP; thus, structural Case requirements are unmet. However, Boškovi´c argues, with an expletive or pronoun, incorporation of such non-branching X 0s is possible, in which case the Case Filter requirement is avoided via incorporation (Baker 1988). Again, the status of such data has been documented as unclear. For example, Collins (2002:130) in his review of Boškovi´c (1997) finds the following array of data, in which wager takes various infinitival complements, ‘very unclear’: (83)
a. *Peter wagered the students to be crazy. (Boškovi´c 1997:49) b. John was wagered to be crazy. (Boškovi´c 1997:49) c. Who did Peter wager to be crazy? (Boškovi´c 1997:49) d. John wagered there to be a stranger in that haunted house. (Boškovi´c 1997:58)
Collins writes the following regarding this data: I must admit that I find this data very unclear. For example I do not find a clear difference between (a) and (c). Furthermore, (d) does not seem particularly good to me (see Rooryck 1997:9 for related discussion).
Thus, there seems to be a relation between wager and conjecture but the data isn’t clear to us. Returning to the central theme, recall that under our tentative proposals
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regarding conjecture, the following is predicted ungrammatical since it, being an expletive, cannot be interpreted propositionally. (77)
a.
John conjectured it to seem (that) Peter is ill.
Recall we have claimed that (77a) is pretty good. Interestingly, Lasnik discusses the following, related example: (84)
*John has conjectured it to seem Peter is ill.
(Lasnik 2002, ex.11)
For Lasnik, (84) is out since conjecture lacks Case, and expletives require Case. We agree (84) is ungrammatical. However, it doesn’t constitute a counterexample to our proposals here, we would argue, since its unacceptability is in part due to the absence of a complementizer introducing the finite clause. For reasons we don’t entirely understand, the complementizer seems to become obligatory in the complement of infinitive forms of raising predicates (see Epstein, Pires, and Seely 2004 for discussion). (85)
It seems John left.
(86)
It seems that John left.
(87) (88)
*I believe it to seem John left. I believe it to seem that John left.
Now, in addition to the improvement made by adding the overt complementizer, suppose, as discussed earlier, we add perfective aspect and an overt experiencer, modify the tense of the finite clause, and change that to as if. The results seem fine: (89)
John conjectured it to have seemed to the doctors as if Peter was ill (and that explains why they prescribed the medication).
Finally, let’s also change the predicate to one that, unlike bare seem, allows an overt sentential subject as a lexical property, e.g. likely. (90)
John conjectured it to have been likely that Peter was ill.
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This seems to us to be acceptable (or only slightly marginal). It seems fairly clear to us that it in (90) is better than in the following, clearly Case-less environments: (91)
It seems [it to have been likely [that John left].
(92)
(*for) [it to have been likely that John left] disturbs me.
This would indicate that it can be Case-assigned by conjecture, consistent with our proposal that conjecture is indeed a Case-assigner. But our analysis now seems to confront a problem. As an expletive, it is not interpretable propositionally, and thus our proposal that conjecture can case-check only a DP that is propositionally interpreted is apparently not fulfilled. We would seem to wrongly predict that the examples we have just argued to be good are in fact bad (or no better than John conjectured Peter to have left). This raises the long-standing issue of the relation between the expletive it and the that-clause, 22 which it is important to note here is propositional as conjecture ‘requires’. Without 22. For example, at least as early as Rosenbaum (1967) the association was postulated. For Rosenbaum, it was expressed by generating it and the that-clause together (along with a Determiner) all inside the subject NP, as in the following: (i)
[ NP DET it That John left] [ PredP is likely]
From Deep Structures like this, there were two possible derivations. In one, Extraposition of the that-clause applies yielding (ii)
it is likely that John left.
Alternatively, indefinite pronoun deletion can apply, generating sentences like: (iii)
That John left is likely.
Thus, the relation between construction types is captured in part by expressing an abstract (never surfacing as such) underlying relation between it and the that-clause, such that they are sisters (who must ultimately be ‘separated’) initially generated within the subject NP mother. But crucially, notice that seem (in contrast to likely) disallows this configuration: (iv)
*That John left seems.
Interestingly, exactly this fact leads Moro (1997) to exclude such examples by postulating precisely an underlying sisterhood relation between the that-clause and it, which we discuss momentarily. See also Chomsky (1981:215) for binding-theoretic evidence for the it-to-that-clause association formally expressed in that framework by co-superscripting (a device now barred by inclusiveness).
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going into detail, one can imagine an expletive replacement analysis, 23 whereby the propositionally interpreted that-clause endows it with the propositional content necessary for ACC Case checking. 24 Thus, the fact that the data is improved by using likely and degrades with seems may be related to their differences in ‘overt replaceability’ of, or association with, the expletive, as in (93) (94)
*That John left seems. That John left is likely.
We leave the development of this somewhat speculative hypothesis to future research. What about there-expletives with conjecture as in (95)? 23. See Boškovi´c for arguments in favor of LF it replacement, and McCloskey (1991) for arguments against. (See also den Dikken 1995 for arguments against LF there replacement.) Agreement phenomena have constituted the driving force for expletive-associate relations in existentials: (i)
There is/* are a man outside.
McCloskey (1991) (ingeniously) argues that there is no such agreement in the case of an it-expletive and its clausal associate. McCloskey’s argument is based on the following kind of data involving contradictory coordination: (ii)
That he’ll resign and that he’ll stay in office SEEM(pl.) at this point equally likely.
(iii)
*It SEEM(pl.) at this point equally likely that he’ll resign and that he’ll stay in office. (from Boškovi´c 1997:91)
McCloskey argues that the failure of plural agreement in the second case supports the hypothesis that the clausal associate (in this case a plural coordinate) does not replace the expletive it at LF. This is in contrast to the expletive replacement that by hypothesis does occur with there-constructions, which do display agreement with the associate. However Boškovi´c argues that McCloskey’s analysis does not go through. Boškovi´c notes that even there-constructions fail to display agreement with the associate, when the associate is conjoined: (iv)
There is/*are [a man and five women] in the garden.
Thus Boškovi´c (1997:91–2) argues that there and it are identical in their associations, both failing to agree with a plural coordinate associate. Boškovi´c argues that in both cases what is in fact going on is first conjunct agreement. In both (ii) and (iv) the first conjunct is singular, hence plural agreement is barred. 24. Postulating a relation between it and the CP associate is not tantamount to proposing representational chains as syntactic objects.
On the elimination of the EPP
(95)
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John conjectured there to be a stranger in that haunted house. (Adapted from Boškovi´c 1997:58, which uses wager in the position of conjecture.)
Recall, with wager, Boškovi´c judges it grammatical, yet Collins says it ‘ . . . does not seem particularly good.’ We’re not sure. Our analysis predicts it’s bad. There is not propositional nor by hypothesis is its associate (a stranger). Thus LF replacement shouldn’t ‘save’ it. Suppose we use a DP associate that is propositionally interpretable, appropriately adjusted to control for the definiteness effect: (96)
±John conjectured there to be someone’s illness documented in the file.
We’re not sure of the status of this example, nor of its interpretation, and leave the (potentially quite interesting) matter for further research. Before turning to the next topic, an alternative analysis of the expletive cases considered above, on the assumption that they are well formed, is worth speculation. Rather than saying that conjecture can assign ACC to DP . . . provided the DP can be propositionally interpreted, we say instead the following: (97)
Conjecture can assign ACC provided the DP lacks non-propositional content.
This allows in the expletive cases since the expletive does lack non-propositional content by virtue of lacking all semantic content. Alternatively, we might argue that conjecture assigns ACC Case only to non-referential DPs, but we leave the matter here. Consider finally wh-movement. We are unclear about the status of wh-movement examples such as the following: (98)
±Who did you conjecture to have upset Peter
See Boškovi´c (1997:61) for an analysis of arguably analogous cases with wager; if these are improved, then (following Kayne 1984) the right approach seems to be that Case is somehow acquired through the process of overt wh-movement, a process unavailable to a DP like Peter. Notice also that to the extent that these are good, we make the wrong prediction (we predict they are bad), since wh-elements are not interpreted propositionally (but note that wh-elements are non-referential; hence the alternative analysis briefly considered above would seem to predict that (98) is well formed).
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This brings us finally to the central example with which we began. Suppose there is no EPP and the expletive is thus omissable, and is omitted: (84)
*John conjectured [ __ to seem Peter is ill]
What rules this out? Recall, if there is no expletive, and (if, following Boškovi´c) conjecture altogether fails to assign ACC, then it is unclear how to exclude such cases. However, by appeal to the EPP, an expletive is forced, then excluded by Case requirements on it. This is one of Lasnik’s arguments for EPP. But if, as we have argued, conjecture bears ACC and ACC must be discharged, then this example is excluded, in the same manner as the following: (99)
John believes [ __ to seem that Peter is ill]
That is, Case is uninterpretable on V/v, or to put it more contemporaneously, unless v as a probe successfully locally matches and values Case on a DP, the uninterpretable phi features remain in v, where they are uninterpretable at LF, thereby inducing crash. Before turning to the nominal case where we can’t rely on Case discharge, we briefly consider an alternative approach, one which we do not pursue here, but which is, interestingly, independently motivated, and excludes Lasnik’s example without appeal to the EPP. 3.4.2.5 An alternative to the Case analysis, an unnoted consequence of Moro (1997) Suppose, for the purposes of this section, that we are wrong and that, as Boškovi´c claims, conjecture does not have ACC Case to assign. It may still be that we can exclude (84) without appeal to the EPP. The basic idea runs in this way. Under Moro’s (1997) analysis, expletive it is a type of predicate when cooccurring with seems, in for example, (100)
It seems that Bill is smart.
Thus, for Moro it is not an expletive. What we would like to note here is that this has interesting implications for the central example, (84)
*John conjectured [ __ to seem Peter is ill]
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Under our application of the Moro story, there is no predicate predicated of the finite CP that Peter is ill. This omission of it results in a violation of predication (or theta) theory. Thus appeal to the EPP, at least in this case, is unnecessary. In what follows we briefly review, and reveal the consequences regarding the EPP of relevant aspects of Moro’s 1997 analysis. To begin, Moro (1997) notes the following paradigm with seem: (101)
a. *That John left seems. b. That John left seems weird/true/to be the case. c. *John is. d. John is weird.
The ungrammatical (101a) and (101c) are each rectified by the addition of a predicate. This type of fact leads Moro to unify the copular data and the seem data, by analyzing them both as small clause complement constructions underlyingly: (102)
SEEM
[ sc that John left
WEIRD]
(103)
BE
[ sc John
WEIRD]
In each case the subject of the small clause predication undergoes raising (in our view, for Case checking). 25 As Moro notes, the ungrammaticality of (101)
a. *That John left seems.
indicates that a predicate (e.g. weird) is required. However, this now raises a problem. If it is a pure expletive, then the following should be ungrammatical, due to the lack of the required predicate: (104)
it seems that John left.
Thus we have an apparent contradiction: (105)
A predicate is required (*That John left seems).
25. Again, we assume CPs can but need not check Case.
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and (106)
(if we assume it=expletive) It is not the case that a predicate is required (it seems that John left).
Moro’s solution is to propose that in fact a predicate is required, and it is in fact a predicate (not a subject-expletive), what Moro calls a ‘propredicate placeholder’. Thus, consistent with the small clause complement analysis for seem, Moro hypothesizes that it can appear underlyingly as the small clause predicate (107)
seem [ sc that John left it]
Here then we have a formal ‘association’ between it and the finite clause; they are, we presume, Merged and the so-called ‘subject-predicate’ relation is thereby formed. Moro now faces at least 2 questions: 1. Why must it raise in this example, with the that-clause obligatorily remaining in situ, even though the that-clause can and must raise in (102) with weird? That is, what excludes (108)
*That John left seems it (cf. That John left seems weird.)
2. What exactly is meant when Moro calls it a propredicate placeholder? And what exactly is the ‘subject-predicate relation’? That is, if not the EPP, what formal principle of grammar forces the propredicate it into the structure? As concerns the first question, Moro (1997:177) notes that one possible way of requiring that it raise in this example is to assume that it requires Case, whereas a that-clause does not. Thus, if the that-clause raises, leaving it in situ, the Case on it remains unchecked. 26
26. Moro explores a second possible analysis couched in terms of Full Interpretation, under which propredicate it is likened to the raising verbs have and be, in that it is ‘semantically underspecified’. Following Chomsky’s (1993) analysis of these auxiliary verbs, Moro (1997:179) suggests that it is not visible to LF rules, and by Full Interpretation, it must be raised overtly (see Moro 1997:178 for discussion). Again, we have a redundancy, perhaps three-fold, between the EPP, Case and Full Interpretation.
On the elimination of the EPP
(109)
91
*[That John left] j seems [t j it]
Although unnoted by Moro, this predicate analysis gets us some distance toward our goal of excluding (43) without appealing to the EPP. Recall that the problem illustrated in (43) is created precisely by omitting the expletive from the derivation/numeration. (43)
John has conjectured [ __ to seem that Peter is ill]
But this example is in fact excluded, under Moro’s assumption that the it omitted from (43) is a predicate and as such is required (see below for further discussion). That is, this example is excluded for the same reason that the following is excluded (110)
*That Peter is ill seems.
The idea is that (43) is excluded not by the EPP but by a requirement on predication. Thus, underlyingly, we must satisfy the ‘predication requirement’; and one way of doing so is by merging it as the predicative sister of the finite clause: (111)
John has conjectured [ __ to seem [ sc that Peter is ill it]
Crucially under Moro’s analysis it appears in the underlying representation, and is, we presume, within contemporary implementation, First Merged with the thatclause. Then we could appeal to Case to exclude it in this position. 27 This brings us to the second question posed above: why precisely is this ‘propredicate placeholder’ forced into the predicate position? We’re not sure what formal principle within Moro’s analysis bars the omission of propredicate it. But to address the problem raised by (43) we need to explain why a predicate, such as it, is forced into the structure. As concerns it, we’d like to tentatively suggest an answer, by slightly modifying a suggestion made by Moro (1997:195). 27. If it raises to the, by our hypothesis, ACC-assigned ECM position of conjecture, the result seems to us radically improved. Recall, however, that we have claimed that the ECM ACC recipient must receive propositional interpretation and it isn’t transparently the case that ‘propredicate’ it is interpreted propositionally. Nonetheless, above we alluded to the association between it and the that clause as a possible approach to allowing such cases (104). Within Moro’s analysis the association is directly expressed (by First Merge); what remains is a fully formal account of the manner in which it is propositionally interpreted.
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As Moro notes, citing Ruwet (1982), the following are synonymous: (112)
it seems that John is sad.
(113)
It seems true that John is sad.
We suspect the following is also synonymous. (114)
That John is sad seems true.
Moro (1997:195) suggests that this is not coincidental and is a ‘syntactically codified’ phenomenon: 28 . . . the configuration with the propredicate it . . . is assigned by default the interpretation which we have in the case of the associated sentence that actually has the word ‘true’ . . . [fn. deleted]
As Moro proposes, this might well explain, by appeal only to s-selection, not cselection, why the following is ungrammatical (115)
*It seems [for John to be sad]
Under Moro’s analysis, the underlying structure is (116)
SEEMS [ sc for John to be sad IT]
In this configuration it assigns by default the true theta role to the infinitive CP. But as Moro notes, there is independent evidence that true cannot be predicated of such infinitives (which seem to receive a conditionally irrealis interpretation at least here), as evidenced by (117)
*For John to be sad is true.
This is presumably due to s-selectional properties of true barring an irrealis from receiving the theta role assigned by true. This then s-selectively accounts for the anomaly of seem with a for-infinitive complement, without appeal to c-selection. 28. See Moro (1997:195, fns. 20 and 21) for further discussion of this matter.
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Slightly modifying Moro’s analysis here in which he proposes that a configuration is assigned a default interpretation, we’d like to suggest instead that it in such cases is not a propredicate placeholder, but rather assigns a theta role, the same one that is assigned by true. Thus, as discussed, in examples like (104)
It seems that John left.
The argumental that-clause must be assigned a theta role and it is assigned a theta role by it (under Merge) and it assigns the same theta role that is assigned by true. 29 Under this analysis, it is the theta criterion that bars (43) – i.e., a predicate is required to theta-mark the finite clause. If it serves as the theta assigner, Case requirements then force it to raise. If it is omitted (*that John left seems) a theta criterion violation results, since the that-clause lacks a theta role, a hypothesis supported by the fact that the addition of a theta assigner which theta-assigns the that-clause remedies the anomaly. (101)
a. *That John left seems.
(118)
[That John left] j seems [t j WEIRD]
(119)
IT j seems [that John left t j]
Note finally that in suggesting that the ‘theta role’ true is assigned to the thatclause by it, we are not committed to the view that the speaker asserts the truth of 29. Perhaps independent evidence for our analysis of it as assigning the truth theta role, is found in the following (i)
*I consider John it.
vs. (ii)
a. I consider that analysis it. b. That analysis is it, I’m sure. c. That John left the scene of the crime is it.
Example (i) is out, meaning anomalously that John is true, but (iia) is allowed, and means something along the lines of ‘this analysis is true.’ Notice that there is a felicitous reading of (i), as in I consider John to be ‘the right one’. If it is indeed a predicate, its theta assigning properties require further research.
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the that-clause, rather only that it seems true. Thus, as predicted, the following is not self-contradictory: (120)
It seems that John left is false.
Rather under our analysis, it means (121)
Seems [that-John-left =TRUE] is false.
In summary, more research is required to explore our suggested theta theoretic extension of Moro’s independently-motivated analysis. If viable, we have a way of excluding (43) without appeal to the EPP; rather, the theta criterion is violated and we exploit a previously unnoted partial redundancy between the theta criterion (or predication within Moro’s analysis and the EPP). Note finally if there is ‘predicative’ as Moro also argues, then perhaps the following analog of (43) can also be reduced to the theta criterion as well: (122)
John has conjectured [ __ to be a man outside]
Again, under the Moro analysis, this is excluded due to the omission of a required predicate. 3.4.2.6 Some limits of Moro and some new problems Adapting Moro provides an EPP-independent analysis of (43), but there are limits to its coverage. First, under our adaptation of Moro’s analysis as traced above, there is no way to exclude the following modification of (43) in which a predicate theta-assigning the that-clause does appear, but the predicate is not it, and being adjectival doesn’t require Case. (123)
John has conjectured [ __ to seem [that Bill left WEIRD]
Here, the theta criterion is satisfied: weird theta marks the that-clause. Thus, Moro, coupled with the assumption that conjecture lacks Case, appears to drive us back to the EPP to exclude such examples. (However, if conjecture bears ACC Case, as we suggested above, then the example is excluded due to a failure of Case discharge (the inverse Case Filter).)
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Similarly, it is important to note that Moro does not analyze all so-called itexpletives as predicates. Consider the following: (124)
It is obvious that John left.
As Moro notes, in contrast to the seem case there is already an overt predicate present in this construction, namely obvious, indicating that in this case it is not predicative. Another difference between seem and obvious, as mentioned above, is the following: (125) (126)
*That John left seems. That John left is obvious.
Given these differences, Moro analyzes the latter as (127)
BE [ SC that John left
obvious]
The surface form is derived by raising the that-clause to Spec, TP. The question now is how does Moro analyze the following? (124)
It is obvious that John left.
Here, Moro (1997:180) proposes that (i) it is generated as the subject – not the predicate – of the small clause; (ii) obvious is the predicate of the small clause; (iii) the that-clause appears as a right adjunct to S; and (iv) it undergoes raising to subject position. (128)
[ S [ S It j [ VP V=BE [ SC t j obvious]]] [ S that John left]] (Moro 1997:183)
Nonetheless, the exact derivation isn’t entirely clear to us. Moro (1997:183) writes As for the position of the finite clause . . . we can simply follow the standard account and assume that it is in an adjunct position (technically ‘extraposed’) . . .
We are not sure whether Moro intends that the that-clause is base generated in adjunct position or is moved from some unspecified position (‘extraposed’) to the
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adjunct position. What is clear is that Moro intends that it is not base generated in the matrix Spec, TP position, but is instead base generated as the subject of the SC whose predicate is obvious. (For Moro (p. 183), under Full Interpretation, it must raise, otherwise FI excludes the derivation; hence, base generation in Spec, TP is precluded.) The question we now confront is: What formal principle P of the grammar (P = EPP) forces it to be generated as the subject of obvious? Thus, directly relevant to our analysis is the question: what excludes the following analog of (43) where obvious replaces seem? (129)
*John conjectured [ __to be obvious [that Peter is ill]
Here, unlike with our analysis of seem, it is difficult to reduce the presence of it to the Theta Criterion. If we were to postulate that obvious assigns a theta role to the ‘subject’ position of the small clause (as it seems to in that John left is obvious), one could perhaps argue that it is forced into the structure by the Theta Criterion; it would be needed to receive the theta role of obvious. However, this analysis might be unmaintainable as it would overgenerate any argument in this position, for example: (130)
*John is obvious that Fred left.
Therefore, without the EPP it is not clear how Moro’s analysis forces it into the structure. An intimately related question (we suspect) is this: within Moro’s analysis (128) how does the adjoined CP acquire a theta role? Ultimately, the question reduces to the enduring one (which we too have by no means fully answered): what exactly is the association between it and the finite CP, and for us, does that arguably independent association render appeal to the EPP unnecessary in this domain? As mentioned at the outset of this section, although we ultimately do not adopt the Moro analysis here, we believe it merits further research as it may provide another means of or aid to eliminating the EPP, since, as we have shown here, this independently motivated analysis induces yet more redundancy with the EPP. Notice that our proposed Case discharge 3.4.2.7 Some residue of the EPP analysis, whereby conjecture bears ACC Case, covers all of the examples that were
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problematic for the analysis considered in the last section. Thus, (129) repeated here (129)
*John conjectured [ __to be obvious [that Peter is ill]
is correctly disallowed since conjecture cannot discharge its uninterpretable ACC Case. 30 Under our proposed elimination of the EPP, however, certain cases still elude our Case discharge proposal. First, suppose that we simply remove conjecture from (130). The result is still ungrammatical, yet there is no undischarged ACC Case: (131)
[ __to be obvious [that Peter is ill]
Here we cannot appeal to undischarged ACC Case. However, this example is arguably excluded by a prohibition barring matrix infinitives. In order to satisfy this prohibition, suppose we embed the example, as follows (132)
*It is dangerous [ __ to be obvious [that Peter is ill]]
(See Martin 1999 for an analogous example.) As Martin notes, if PRO appears in the underscored Spec T position, the example can be excluded since PRO is an argument but lacks a theta role here. But, as Martin also notes, suppose we entirely omit PRO (the same EPP-motivating technique under which expletives are simply omitted). Martin (1999) would disallow this as a null Case violation, i.e. dangerous selects null Case checking to, and with no Spec of to present, this uninterpretable Case is undischarged. 30. One question confronting our analysis is why conjecture can’t discharge its ACC Case on the embedded CP in situ, under Chomsky’s Probe-Goal analysis. Recall that we suggested above (see footnote 25) that sentential subject CPs can check NOM on T. In fact, however, we’ll suggest in Chapter 4 that Case can be checked only in the spec-head configuration, and thus probe-goal checking of the ACC of conjecture with the CP in (129) is prohibited. Notice that raising the embedded CP to the ACC case position of conjecture improves the example, we think: (i)
John conjectured that Peter is ill to be obvious.
Note that if (i) is relatively well formed, then the word string in (129) is potentially grammatical under the rightward extraposition of the finite CP. We’ve assumed that (129) is ungrammatical, but on the non-extraposed analysis. Intonational factors seem relevant in distinguishing the structures associated with (129).
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We would extend the same analysis to the sentential subject analog, (133)
*[ __ to be obvious [that Peter is ill]] is dangerous
That is, we would suggest that the infinitival subject originates as a complement of dangerous, hence here too to is selected by dangerous, and contains undischarged null Case, thereby excluding this example as well. But finally, suppose we change dangerous to a raising predicate, i.e. a predicate that fails to select null Case to, as in: (134)
*[ __ to be obvious [that Peter is ill] is likely (cf. the grammatical: For it to be obvious that Peter is ill is likely. It is likely to be obvious that Peter is ill.)
Here we cannot appeal to the following to exclude the example: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Undischarged null Case, since we’ve used raising to. Undischarged ACC, since we’ve omitted an upstairs ACC-assigning verb. The ban on matrix infinitives, satisfied here. Morovian requirements on predication. (Recall the it co-occurring with obvious (and the it is omitted here) is, for Moro, an underlying small clause subject, and it is not clear to us what forces its presence for Moro, as discussed in the previous section.)
Thus here we seem to be compelled to appeal to the EPP, although we hope to have suggested that such an appeal is no solution to the problem. We would hope people would not respond as follows: ‘no further research is necessary; the example is readily explained by the EPP.’ In the following section we explore a redundancy between null complementizer theory and the EPP. Although our primary focus will be on infinitival complements to nominals, we will suggest that the problematic example above is excluded because sentential subjects require overt complementizers; hence (134) above will be argued to be analogous to (135)
*Peter is ill is likely.
We will attempt to derive this from independently motivated theories of null affixal complementizers.
On the elimination of the EPP
3.4.2.8 A note on Boškovi´c’s (2002) dual activation approach other analysis of the ungrammaticality of (84), repeated here, (84)
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There is yet an-
*John conjectured [ __ to seem Peter is ill]
(and, more generally, of the BELIEVE class of elements) that does not appeal to the EPP. Boškovi´c (2002) observes in a footnote that (84) is correctly disallowed under the following two assumptions of Chomsky’s (1999, 2000) probe-goal system: (136)
non-control to bears a proper subset of the phi features (specifically, the person feature) b. The operation Agree (X,Y) requires that both X and Y are ‘active’ (i.e. that both contain unchecked, unvalued features; let’s refer to this as the ‘dual activation’ condition)
a.
Since non-control to bears certain of the phi features, and since phi features are uninterpretable on T, it follows that to’s feature(s) must be checked. However, since non-control to is phi defective (i.e. since it does not bear the full set of phi features person, gender, and number), it follows that to itself cannot check Case. Under Chomsky’s probe-goal system, agreement feature checking can take place in situ. Thus, for example, in a typical existential structure as in (137) (137)
there T is a man outside
vs. there T are men outside
Agree applies between T and a man resulting in the checking (valuation) of T’s phi features (and resulting in the checking of man’s Case feature), but there is no movement relation (overt or otherwise) between T and a man. It is there that checks T’s EPP feature, for Chomsky. As Boškovi´c points out, (84) is excluded under Chomsky’s system: to probes down in order to find an element that can check its feature, but since the only potential candidate, namely Peter, is ‘inactive’ since all of its features, specifically, its Case feature, have been checked, it cannot participate in Agree given (136b). There is, in short, no ‘dual activation’ between to and Peter and hence Agree(to,Peter) cannot apply thereby causing crash by virtue of to having unchecked features. Note further that if this analysis is right, there is yet a further redundancy between the EPP and independently motivated mechanisms; namely between the EPP and in situ probe-goal combined with ‘dual activation’.
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However, there is an interesting, and unnoted, negative consequence of the analysis reviewed above. Consider (138) (138)
I believe [it to have been likely that Bill left]
If there is no EPP, then nothing forces it to merge into the spec of to position. Thus, it would appear to be the case that it could merge directly into the ACC position (i.e. spec of Agr O) of believe checking it’s Case feature. The problem now though is that since the only potential candidate for checking to’s person feature is Bill, then since Bill is inactive, the structure should be out since Agree(to, Bill) cannot apply. Thus, it would appear that the EPP-less probe-goal ‘dual activation’ analysis of (84), undergenerates (138). We could allow (138) if we could somehow force the expletive to ‘start’ below to and then move up to the ACC Case position. In this regard, consider the abstract representation in (139) (139)
to defective . . . DP
Suppose, as in Chomsky (2000), that non-control to bears the person feature. Then, to must find some matching element to check its person feature, but since it’s phidefective this to cannot check Case. The DP in (139) is a potential person checker for to. However, if DP has its Case checked, as in (84), then this DP is ‘inactive’ and cannot participate in Agree(to, DP). On the other hand, if the DP is active by virtue of not having its Case feature checked, it can participate in Agree with to (resulting in to’s person feature being checked), but the DP cannot get its Case feature checked by this defective to. Thus, the DP would have to get its Case feature checked by some element other than to. If it in (138) starts low, as in, say (140), (140)
I believe to have been likely it that Bill left
the ‘right’ configuration would exist: to checks its person feature with it (since it has not yet checked its Case feature and thus is still ‘active’) and then it moves up to the ACC position of believe in order to check its Case feature (and checked to would not block this believe-to-it relation). But the question is: what forces the it to start low? It’s not the EPP (we’re assuming there is no EPP). We might appeal to Moro’s analysis according to which it in
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(140) would start low given that it is a predicate that must associate with the thatclause. Interestingly, the Moro analysis would force the representation in (140). However, even for Moro, it is not forced to start low in (141) (141)
I believe it to have seemed weird that Bill left
In (141) it is weird that serves as the predicate of the that-clause and it is a nonpredicational expletive that presumably could merge directly into the ACC Case position of believe. Furthermore, Boškovi´c (2002) presents evidence that in fact expletives don’t move. Thus the problem we raised for (138) above remains. Overall, Boškovi´c notes an interesting possible account of (84) that does not appeal to the EPP. If that analysis is right, there is yet a further redundancy with the EPP. However, there is a potential problem with the approach, represented by the undergeneration of (138). We note in closing that (138) does not represent a problem for the analysis of (84) that we have developed. (84) is out since the ACC features of conjecture are not checked. (138) is in, on the other hand, since we’re assuming that to has no features at all to check, and hence the ‘dual activation’ issue does not arise. 3.4.3
A new problem: nominal conjecture
We have suggested a possible reanalysis of the verb conjecture, one in which conjecture is a Case-assigner that requires propositional interpretation of its Case recipient. Importantly, it would seem that our overall Case discharge account cannot be extended to the nominal form of conjecture. Thus to begin consider (142)
*[the conjecture [it to be possible that Fred left]] turned out to be false
The noun conjecture, bearing inherent Case if any, cannot assign inherent Case exceptionally to the infinitival subject. This example can then be excluded since it lacks Case. Similarly for the propositionally interpretable DP Mary’s illness, as in (143). (143)
*The conjecture [Mary’s illness to have upset Fred]] turned out to be false
But if there is no EPP, and nouns do not assign Case exceptionally, what rules out the following – in which a subject is simply omitted from the expletive position? (144)
*[The conjecture [ __ to be possible that Fred left]] turned out to be false
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In the case of the verb conjecture we sought in the previous section to reduce such phenomena to undischarged ACC Case on the verb, an option that does not seem available with the noun conjecture. This seems to motivate the EPP in this domain. In the remainder of the current chapter we will explore a number of different independently motivated approaches to this problem, none of which appeal to the EPP. 3.4.3.1 Failure to select non-control to One possible way to exclude examples like (144) above, without appeal to the EPP, is through the following generalization (145)
Descriptive generalization: Nouns cannot take on infinitival complements of the non-control type (see, e.g., Lasnik 2002:5).
However, Lasnik (2002) argues that if this descriptive generalization is true, then it would be preferable to explain it. With regard to the example he discusses, namely (146)
*The belief [ __ to seem [Peter is ill]
Lasnik writes: The only obvious explanation . . . must rely on the EPP; the infinitival clause lacks a subject. One might object that for some independent reason, belief (and nouns in general) simply cannot take an infinitival complement of the non-Control type.
Lasnik continues: Descriptively, it is certainly true that nouns never take such complements. But in the absence of a better account of the fact, it seems most principled to rely on the combination of the Case Filter and the EPP.
We agree entirely with Lasnik’s commitment to going beyond what may seem to be empirically adequate descriptive generalizations, and seeking to deduce them from deeper principles. If nouns don’t take non-control infinitival complements, then we, like Lasnik, would like to ask why that it is, and want to explain it. Where we disagree concerns the nature of explanation, an admittedly delicate matter. Specifically, we disagree that ‘the only obvious explanation . . . must rely on the EPP.’ We
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think it is preferable, at least for the time being, to rely on the admittedly descriptive trans-lexical generalization, which avoids all the problems associated with the EPP and has the merit of focusing future efforts on explaining why the generalization might be true. In the following sections, we explore analyses under which the descriptive generalization, or at least the parts of it relevant to the elimination of the EPP, is derived by appeal to independently motivated lexical properties. We end this section by noting that, in fact, the descriptive generalization may not be true. Consider the following examples: (147)
My preference for it to be likely that my horse will win is clear.
(148)
My desire for it to be obvious that he is smart pleased them.
These are well formed and if the for-phrase is a complement, the examples would violate the descriptive generalization. The analyses presented below allow (147) and (148), correctly so in our view. 3.4.3.2 Is inherent Case on Ns interpretable? Again, suppose we have no EPP and suppose that there is no selectional prohibition against N taking a non-control infinitival complement. Then, the question becomes what disallows (149)
*[the conjecture [ __ to be likely that Fred left]] was false
One possibility is that, likening the nominal case to the verbal case, this example too is bad because the N bears undischarged, and by hypothesis uninterpretable, Case. The difference is that the verb bears structural, while the nominal bears inherent, Case. This requires that inherent Case on the noun is uninterpretable, as is structural Case on the verb. (The fact that inherent Case is associated with theta role assignment does not necessarily entail that inherent Case is itself interpretable on the nominal head.) We leave the implementation of this idea to future research. 31
31. While the specifics of inherent case are unclear (see Chomsky 1986, see particularly p. 193, and Boškovi´c 1997), one possible implementation of this is that the nominal head bears unvalued phi features which become valued only under phi feature matching with an inherent Case bearing DP, adapting the probe-goal analysis of structural Case (Chomsky 2001a). If inherent Case must indeed be discharged from the noun, questions emerge regarding, at the very least, four types of construction: one with no apparent complement to the noun (ia); one with
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3.4.3.3 A stranded, null, affixal C (149)
Another approach to (149), repeated here,
*[the conjecture [ __ to be likely that Fred left]] was false
is based, in part, on analyses in Martin (1999) and Boškovi´c and Lasnik (2003), which in turn borrow from and extend key ideas of Pesetsky (1991) and Ormazabal (1995). Essentially, we seek to derive the descriptive generalization that such nouns do not take non-control infinitives as in (149) from the idea that these non-control infinitives are full CPs with an affixal null C head. (By contrast, the CPs in (147) and (148) are headed by the overt C 0 for.) This affixal null C requires an appropri-
an overt propositionally interpretable DP complement to the noun (as in (ib)); one with a finite CP complement ((ic)); and the ECM configuration with a noun (as already discussed). (i)
a. The conjecture upset me. b. *?The doctor’s conjecture of Mary’s illness upset me. c. The doctor’s conjecture that Mary was ill upset me.
To begin, (ia) is grammatical. However, if the inherent Case is obligatorily discharged, as our account requires, the question is: why is (ia) grammatical? A possible answer is that it’s grammatical because inherent Case is discharged onto a phonetically null recipient (for a related discussion see Martin 1999, fn. 13). Notice in this regard that indeed (ia) is interpreted consistent with the view that conjecture theta marks a null propositional argument. Of course this raises widespread and notoriously difficult issues regarding lexical, semantic, syntactic, vs. discoursal mental representations of ‘transitivity’. The correct division of labor is especially unclear within DPs and we leave the matter here, as exploring it would take us too far afield in the present context. Consider next (ib). It may be predicted good under our analysis. Suppose that the hypothesized inherent Case of the N conjecture can be discharged only on a propositionally interpreted recipient (analogous to the verb conjecture). In (ib), the DP Mary’s illness can be interpreted propositionally and hence the inherent Case of conjecture might be appropriately discharged. But (ib) seems as bad to us as the corresponding verbal case: that the doctor conjectured Mary’s illness upset me. Consider next (ic). If conjecture must discharge inherent Case, then one possible recipient is the embedded CP. Let’s suppose that the CP can check the inherent case of conjecture. But this raises a new question about how to exclude our central example, (ii)
*The conjecture [ __ to seem that Bill left] upset me
Why can’t the inherent Case of conjecture be discharged with the complement CP here, just as we speculated it is in the finite case (ic). Suppose, along the lines of Case and phi feature checking with DPs, the CP goal like a DP goal must be phi complete to effect inherent Case checking. Then the contrast between (ic) and (ii) would emerge. But again, this raises a serious problem: why not probe ‘through’ the to seem just as we argue you do with ‘successive cyclic’ A-raising: (iii)
That Bill left is likely __ to seem __ to have upset Mary
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ate host, which, by hypothesis, it cannot find in examples such as (149). Thus, such examples are excluded as ‘stranded affix’ violations, without any appeal to the EPP. Moreover, the components of this EPP-less analysis are each independently motivated. The approach is developed in Epstein, Pires, and Seely (2004); we review that analysis and extend it below. 3.4.3.4 Martin (1999) derives only a proper subset of the nominal cases We begin by noting that Martin (1999) provides an analysis, without any appeal to the EPP, of a nominal case similar to (149). Consider (150)
*The belief [ __ to seem that [Peter is ill]] upset Mary. (see Boškovi´c 1997, Martin 1999) 32
Martin (1999) suggests that (150) is excluded as it ultimately violates ‘Myers’ Generalization’ (Myers 1984). (151)
Myers’ Generalization: . . . if zero derivation is a kind of inflection, we predict that no zero-derived word could [can] appear inside a derivational suffix, i.e. no such suffix could [can] be added to a zero-derived word. (Myers 1984:62)
Martin’s basic analysis runs as follows: (i) a nominal like belief is derived (in the syntax/morphology) from its verbal root, and that root takes a full CP complement, which in this case has a null complementizer; (ii) following Pesetsky (1991), Martin assumes that this null complementizer is an affix; (iii) the affix incorporates into the verb believe; and (iv) the [believe + null affix C] element is then input to nominalizing affixation (so as to derive the N belief). However, by Myers’ Generalization, a zero-derived element (like believe + null affix C) cannot host a derivational affix
32. Boškovi´c (1997) is the first to argue for the EPP on the basis of examples like (150) and he provides a more comprehensive paradigm than the one we present here; see Boškovi´c (1997) for further discussion. Boškovi´c (2002), on the other hand, argues against the EPP but presents (150) as problematic for the elimination of the EPP. He argues that the cases, besides (150), that purportedly motivated the EPP are redundantly ruled out by independently motivated principles of the grammar and hence that the EPP ‘should’ be eliminated. Boškovi´c, in fact, points out that ‘the EPP seems to be the only formal requirement on the target that is apparently not allowed to drive movement,’ and thus that ‘it simply does not make sense.’ See also Martin (1999) for important discussion. Boškovi´c (personal communication) points out to us that (150) is disallowed under the ‘Activation Condition’ of Chomsky (2001a); the defective EPP probe to Matches with the local DP Peter but Agree cannot operate since the goal Peter has already had its Case feature checked and hence is ‘inactive’.
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(see also Allen 1978). Hence (150) is correctly disallowed by the independently motivated Myers’ Generalization, and there is no need to appeal to the EPP. Notice that Martin’s (1999) Myersian analysis of (150) derives a proper subset of the cases that support the descriptive generalization that ‘nouns never take infinitival complements of the non-control type.’ For Martin, in any case equivalent to (152), the null complementizer (assumed to be an affix) must incorporate into the verb (otherwise the ‘stranded affix constraint’ will be violated): (152)
verb [ CP null C [ TP to non-control . . . ]]
but then the verb+null C is a zero-derived word which cannot be nominalized, since the nominalizing affix is derivational and derivational affixes can’t take a zero-derived word as host, according to Myers. 33 3.4.3.5 Martin (1999) does not account for underived nominals Interestingly, Martin (1999) does not consider another possibility. Suppose that the N head taking the CP complement is not a deverbal nominal, but is instead an underived nominal: (153)
underived-noun [ CP C [ TP to non-control . . . ]]
In this case, as Boškovi´c (1997: 43) points out, there is no violation of Myers’ Generalization; rather, the null C incorporates into the non zero-derived noun, and the result is (ceteris paribus) predicted well formed. 34 In fact, however, it is not well formed. This situation is precisely what arises relative to the example that started this section, namely,
33. Ormazabal (1995:128, fn. 45) notes that Lasnik (personal communication) observes that the success of the analysis rests on rule ordering: first the null C incorporates, then subsequent derivational affixation of the nominalizing affix is blocked by Myers’ Generalization. However, the opposite ordering is not blocked. See Ormazabal 1995 for analyses blocking a derivation in which Nominalization precedes zero-affixation. 34. Ormazabal (1995:136) (citing Boškovi´c, personal communication, and Chomsky 1970) notes that underived nominals are also incompatible with the null complementizer, yet being underived they escape Myers’ Generalization, as in (i)
*Their hypothesis [∅ neural nets are not connected].
(Ormazabal 1995:ex. 108b)
Cases like (i) in which we have an infinitival raising complement, and their relevance to the EPP, are to the best of our knowledge not noted in Ormazabal (1995).
On the elimination of the EPP
(149)
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*[the conjecture [ __ to be likely that Fred left]] was false
The Martin (1999) analysis fails to exclude (149). In order to illustrate this, note to begin with that Martin (1999) argues that (154) (a verbal case not equivalent to (149)) (154)
*Bill conjectured [ __ to seem that Fred left]
is excluded since the verb conjecture is derived from the noun conjecture; thus, according to Martin (1999), in (154) the null C incorporates into the noun conjecture to yield the zero-derived word [[conjecture] N +C]; but this zero-derived element is then, by Myers, not accessible to the verbalizing derivational affix. Thus, for Martin, it is required that the verb in (154) is derived from the noun, ultimately leading to a violation of Myers’ Generalization in this case. Crucially then, Martin clearly assumes that the noun conjecture is not derived from the verb. But, unnoted in Martin (1999) is that (149) above is ungrammatical; and it is unclear why it is so. Specifically, (149) does not violate Myers’ Generalization. This is because it is the verb conjecture (as in (154)) that is zero-derived from the noun, hence we assume the noun conjecture is not zero-derived. Thus, in (149) the null C incorporates into the underived noun conjecture and there is no violation of Myers’ generalization. 35 So even with Martin’s analysis of (150), it would seem that (149) is an important remaining argument (a ‘loophole’) motivating appeal to the EPP. With the EPP (149) is out since the spec of the lower TP (spec of to) is empty. 3.4.3.6 Toward a solution: adapting Boškovi´c and Lasnik (2003) and Ormazabal (1995) We suggest here that an approach to null complementizers as affixes, as proposed by Pesetsky (1991) and adopted with modifications by Boškovi´c and Lasnik (2003), supplemented with a proposal in Ormazabal (1995), each motivated 35. Boškovi´c and Lasnik (2003) note an empirical problem for the Pesetsky (1991) null C analysis (using Myers’ Generalization) of examples like (*the belief [ __ to seem that Peter is ill] upset Mary); specifically Boškovi´c and Lasnik argue that the analysis does not extend to nonderived nominals like *the fact C Mary left. Since the noun fact is not derived, there is no possibility of violating Myers’ Generalization. Boškovi´c and Lasnik state that to account for *the fact C Mary left there would have to be appeal to the ‘complicating assumption that all nouns are derived when taking a clausal complement’ (p. 534–5). What (i) above shows, however, is that it’s more than a complicating assumption; in fact it’s impossible to derive all cases under that assumption, (149) being the case in point, since here we have a noun from which the verb is derived; hence the noun itself is by hypothesis underived, immunizing this data from a Myersian account.
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on entirely independent grounds, actually excludes (149). Thus, even this apparent ‘loophole’ can be correctly excluded without appeal to the EPP. Boškovi´c and Lasnik (2003) (henceforth B&L) propose a theory of null complementizers that assumes the principles in (155): (155)
a. b. c.
The English lexicon contains null complementizers that are (PF) affixes and require a lexical host. Affix hopping is PF merger. PF merger requires adjacency at PF.
Under these assumptions, B&L account for the ill-formedness of structures such as (156), lacking the complementizer that, as a ‘stranded affix’ violation: the null C, which in this case is by hypothesis an affix that requires a lexical (+V) host, is not adjacent to a +V category at PF. (156)
*it seemed at that time [ CP C [David had left]]
Now, consider again our central case (149), (149)
*[the conjecture [ __ to be likely that Fred left]] was false
One unnoted consequence of the B&L analysis is as follows. First, following Ormazabal (1995), suppose the infinitival complement to the noun conjecture in (149) is a CP projection, headed by a null C. Assuming that the null C in this case is an affix which requires a +V host, then (149) is out since the N conjecture can’t host the C. Indeed, in relevant respects (149) is similar (except for the [−tense] of the lower CP) to B&L’s example (157) (p. 534): (157)
*I heard about the fact C Mary did it.
(=B&L 2003:534, ex. 13)
In (157) the affixal null C is assumed by B&L to require a +V host and so can’t take the adjacent N fact as its host, and thus the null affix C is stranded. Under this approach, (149) is excluded not because we ‘need to have a subject’, but because we have +affix null C that can’t find an appropriate host. This provides an independently motivated account of the critical example (149) without appeal to the EPP.
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In fact, B&L don’t note it, but it seems their analysis can (be made to) derive the descriptive generalization that there is no N that can take a raising (non-control) infinitival as its complement. 36 In earlier work, as discussed above, Lasnik (2002) claimed that this descriptive generalization follows in part from the EPP; i.e. in (149) above, to requires a Spec, TP so (149) is out as an EPP violation (and if we fill the Spec, TP with an overt expletive there will be a Case Filter violation). But, given that the null affix C account is independently motivated (as B&L argue), and was proposed independent of EPP-related issues, then we have yet another redundancy between the EPP and independently motivated principles. One obvious path to follow, then, is to ‘eliminate’ the EPP’s utility in this loophole case as well – as we’ve shown, we can account for (149) without the EPP. Note further that regardless of the EPP, B&L need the null affixal C analysis to account for the ill-formedness of: (158)
* the conjecture [C [it seems that Fred left]] is ludicrous (cf. the conjecture [that it seems that Fred left] is ludicrous)
Presumably, what blocks (158) is the fact that the null affixal C can’t affix to the N conjecture; but our point is that the very same analysis cannot be prevented from automatically extending to (149) (if indeed there is also a CP complement here, according to Ormazabal’s proposal), rendering the EPP unnecessary to exclude even this loophole in the Martin (1999), Myers-based, analysis. 3.4.3.7 Does B&L subsume Myers? Adapting independently motivated proposals of Boškovi´c and Lasnik (2003) and Ormazabal (1995), we have suggested that we can derive the generalization that Ns do not take (subjectless) non-control
36. Recall that we have argued that the descriptive generalization might be false given such examples as my desire for it to be obvious that he is smart pleased them. What’s important for present purposes is that we derive the relevant part of the descriptive generalization, namely, that if a N takes an infinitival raising complement, the subject of that complement must be realized. Thus, we need to block not only (149) in the text, but also *my desire to be obvious that he is smart pleased them. The null C analysis presented above can do just that. What about ‘control’ complements to nouns: (i)
the desire C to win
Why is (i) good? If there is a null C here – as in (149) above – and if that null C can’t take N as its host, then (i) should be out. Note, however, there is extensive evidence (see Ormazabal 1995, Boškovi´c 1997, Pesetsky 1991) that control infinitives are bare IPs, not CPs, and thus there is in fact no C at all, hence no null C, in (i).
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infinitives and can do so without appeal to the EPP. Instead, what disallows examples such as (159)
*the conjecture [ __ to be likely that Bill left] upset us
is the fact that the null, affixal C can’t find an appropriate host. For Martin (1999) what counts as an ‘appropriate host’ is a non zero-derived element (Martin crucially relies on Myers’ Generalization as we have seen). Our extension of B&L claims that what counts as an ‘appropriate host’ in (159) is the categorial status of the potential host; specifically, that the null C of the non-control infinitival complement can’t take a +N element as host. It would seem, then, that B&L subsume Martin: specifically, with respect to nominals, we need not appeal to Myers’ Generalization. However, the matter becomes more complicated when we return to complements to verbs. Some of the relevant issues are considered in what follows. Notice first that (160) below is bad: (160)
*I conjectured Bill left
(cf. I conjectured that Bill left.)
Suppose the V conjecture is derived from the N conjecture, as Martin argues. Then, it would seem that we need Myers to disallow (160). We would assume that the finite complement of the derived verb conjecture is a CP with a null affixal C head. Then, this null C can’t affix to the derived V conjecture by Myers. However, we might exclude (160) by instead saying that the null, affix C can’t affix to the verb conjecture, not by virtue of the fact that this V is derived, but simply by virtue of the fact that it is a verb. Thus, the claim is that the null C can’t take a +V as host, essentially adopting the B&L account. If we use the B&L approach for (160), i.e., if (160) is out since the null C can’t attach to +V, then we would be claiming, in effect, that the null C can take neither V nor N as a host, which leaves open the question of whether it can take anything as its host. Presumably the null affixal C in (160) is the same null affixal C that occurs in *the conjecture Bill left (vs. the conjecture that Bill left). But, regardless of whether we adopt Myers or B&L to exclude (160), we apparently need to say that with infinitival complements to the verb conjecture, the complement is a bare IP and not a CP. If it were a CP headed by a null C that can’t take the verb conjecture
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as host, then we incorrectly exclude examples such as the following, which we have argued to be relatively good: (70)
I conjectured Mary’s illness to have upset Bill.
If the infinitival complement here is a bare IP, we correctly allow (70) above. But, we need to be sure that we don’t incorrectly also allow: (161)
I conjectured [ __ to be likely that Bill left]
Fortunately, even if this is a bare IP, we can get it out under our earlier hypothesis that conjecture has ACC Case, which goes undischarged in this example; see section 4.2. If this is on the right track, then perhaps we can avoid appeal to the EPP given our ACC Case analysis, combined with independently motivated null affixal C analyses. There is a further previously unnoted consequence of the null C analysis, as adapted above. Consider again the example in (162a), which was presented as a ‘residue of the EPP’ in section 4.2.7: (162)
a. *To be obvious that Peter is ill is likely. b. *It to be obvious that Peter is ill is likely. c. *For to be obvious that Peter is ill is likely. d. For it to be obvious that Peter is ill is likely. e. It is likely (for it) to be obvious that Peter is ill.
As we noted earlier, (162a) is not excluded by appeal to undischarged null Case, undischarged ACC Case, or the ban on matrix infinitives, nor is it clearly excluded by Moro (1997). Hence, the EPP appears to be implicated. Notice, however, that the null affixal C analysis, as explicated above, seems to directly extend to these cases. That is, if, as has been independently argued, the infinitival here is (i) a CP projection headed by the null, affixal C, and (ii) originates as the complement to likely, then the example is correctly excluded since the null C is ‘stranded’. Thus, the example is out for the same reason that a finite sentential subject lacking a complementizer is out:
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a. *Peter is ill is likely. b. That Peter is ill is likely. c. It is likely (that) Peter is ill.
Specifically, the null C can’t find an appropriate host. Note that we adopt the B&L PF merger analysis of the affix. Thus, a derivation whereby the null C affixes to likely before the CP preposes (and thereby avoids being stranded) is impossible. Note finally that control complements must (at the least) have the option of being bare IPs, as is independently argued by Boškovi´c (1997). That is, if control complements were obligatorily CPs, with a null, affixal C, we would wrongly exclude such cases as: (164)
To go now would upset Mary.
Alternatively, we need to ensure that the infinitival in (163a) does not have the option of being a bare IP, since then the null affix analysis could not be appealed to. Thus, in effect, we’ve postulated another property of non-control to, which we might state in this way: phi defective (i.e. non-control to) must be selected by C. This guarantees that non-control to will be contained within CP; and if there is a null C it is, by hypothesis, affixal.
4
More challenges to the elimination of the EPP: some movement cases
4.1
Introduction
In this chapter, we consider further challenges to our proposed elimination of Achains, the EPP, and at least some cases of successive cyclic A-movement. The data examined here all involve evidence that a DP has moved through the spec of a non-control infinitival to position. Since the spec of non-control to is not a Casechecking position, it can’t be that movement is motivated by Case. 1 The EPP, then, is implicated in such cases. We will first review, in Section 2, the basic phenomena to be dealt with. Next, we consider one recent analysis of it, that of Boškovi´c (2002). Like our own, Boškovi´c’s approach rejects the EPP. But, interestingly, Boškovi´c’s approach may not be compatible with our hypothesis that there are no A-chains, and it is not compatible with our contention that there is no movement to, or through, spec of this non-control to. After reviewing Boškovi´c, we consider potential problems with his analysis, in Section 3. In Section 4 we consider, rather speculatively, a set of alternative proposals that reject the EPP and that also reject successive cyclic Amovement, while accounting for core data with independently motivated mechanisms. Finally, in Section 5 we briefly consider some of the arguments (not dealt with in earlier discussion) for the EPP based on work by Lasnik, in a series of important recent papers.
1. Boškovi´c (2002) refers to such cases as ‘intermediate EPP’ effects.
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Evidence for successive cyclic A-movement as evidence for the EPP
We argued in Chapters 2 and 3 above that raising to has no formal checking features. Specifically, raising to has no ‘EPP’ feature, and therefore, assuming that syntactic operations are purposeful (i.e., an operation applies only if interfaceuninterpretable features are checked as a result), there is no ‘A-movement’ to or through spec of raising to in classic cases like (1). 2 (1)
Bill seems to sleep a lot.
In deriving (1), we motivated one-step movement as in (2), with nothing in the spec of to, (2)
Bill seems to Bill sleep a lot
rather than having standard EPP-driven successive cyclic A-movement, as in (3). (3)
Bill seems Bill to Bill sleep a lot
In the previous chapters, we argued for this EPP-less, non-successive cyclic Amovement approach on both ‘conceptual’ and empirical grounds. In a number of recent works, 3 problems for this type of EPP-less, one fell swoop approach have been presented. There appear to be cases providing evidence that in fact successive cyclic A-movement through spec of raising to has taken place. These include: (4)
Condition A *Bill appears to Mary 1 [ __ to seem to herself 1 to like physics]
2. For related analyses, see also Castillo, Drury, and Grohmann (1999), Chomsky (2001a), Hornstein (2001), and Manzini and Roussou (2000). 3. See, among others Boeckx (2000, 2001), Boškovi´c (2002), and Lasnik (2003).
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It is argued that Bill needs to move through spec of to (marked ‘__’) to block the binding of herself by Mary. 4 (5)
Q-float The students 1 seem [ __ 1 all] to know French
In this case, the DP the students all is argued to have moved to spec of to, as indicated by the floating quantifier all that is ‘left behind’ by subsequent movement of the students to the matrix (under the Sportiche 1988 analysis of Q-float). (6)
Reconstruction a. *His 1 mother’s 2 bread seems to her 2 __ to be known by every man 1 to be the best. b. His 1 mother’s 2 bread seems to every man 1 __ to be known by her 2 to be the best.
The DP his mother’s bread (it is argued) needs to move through the lower spec IP position, marked as ‘__’, to create the necessary structural relations to allow the indicated binding in (6b), which is not possible in (6a). In addition, Lasnik, in a series of recent papers, has argued for the EPP on the basis of optional object shift in ECM constructions, which it is argued involves movement through the lower Spec, IP position, as evidenced by a range of interesting scopal, binding, ellipsis and other phenomena. What the cases above have in common is the abstract configuration in (7), indicated informally here: (7)
DP 1 . . . [ IP t 1 to . . . DP 1 . . . ]
There is evidence that DP 1 moved through the spec of to position (indicated by the ‘trace’ t). The DP does not have any of its own features checked in this spec of to position. Since to is defective, it in fact can’t check the (only) feature of the DP that is in need of checking, namely its Case feature. Why then does the DP move through the spec of to position? One argument is that it is because of a feature of
4. It is argued that in (4), Mary c-commands herself (for reasons that we’ll consider below) and hence Mary is a potential binder of herself; Bill in spec of to then serves as the (crucial) blocker of the Mary to herself binding relation.
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to, specifically, to’s ‘EPP’ feature. Note the form of the reasoning: the evidence supports successive cyclic A-movement; i.e. movement through spec of raising to. This to does not check the Case of the mover. Thus, it must be that to has some other feature that it needs to check, which the moving DP can in fact check. The EPP is then implicated as the relevant feature of to. Alternatively, the EPP might be construed as a ‘structural requirement’, which, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 3, seems to us problematic. We have argued that there is no successive cyclic A-movement in such cases, and no EPP feature of to. Thus, (4)–(6), and Lasnik’s cases, constitute a serious challenge to our approach. Indeed, Boškovi´c (2002) suggests that such ‘intermediate EPP effects’ provide even ‘stronger evidence for the EPP’ than the BELIEVE-class of cases considered in Chapter 3 above. In the next section, we review and examine Boškovi´c’s (2002) approach to the problems represented by (4)–(6) above. As we’ll see, he also adopts the idea that the EPP ‘should be eliminated’. He does provide an extremely interesting EPP-less analysis of (4)–(6). However, unlike our proposals above, Boškovi´c does assume that there is successive cyclic A-movement; and he further assumes that there are A-chains (and thus a chain-formation operation). Thus, for Boškovi´c, in (7) there is movement through spec of to; it’s just that this movement is not motivated by the EPP. We consider Lasnik’s cases in section 5. Overall, the claim is that with successive cyclic A-movement the facts are covered, and without it, they are not. We challenge both; i.e. it may be unclear how even with successive cyclic A-movement the facts are covered, and we speculatively suggest that without successive cyclic A-movement perhaps we have not lost empirical coverage.
4.3
The Boškovi´c approach
We first briefly review the approach of Boškovi´c (2002) (subsection 4.3.1). We then consider a number of potential problems with it (subsection 4.3.2). 4.3.1
Boškovi´c: successive cyclic A-movement without the EPP
Following a number of researchers, 5 Boškovi´c argues that ‘ . . . the EPP should be
5. In particular, Boeckx (2000), Castillo, Drury, and Grohmann (1999), Epstein & Seely (1999), and Martin (1999); and earlier work by Borer (1986) and Fukui & Speas (1986).
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eliminated.’ There is assumed to be no EPP feature (e.g. the D-feature of Chomsky (1995)) that, under Attract, drives successive cyclic A-movement. Nor is the EPP a ‘structural requirement’, namely, the phrase-structure stipulation that IPs need specifiers at some level. However, contrary to what we have argued in Chapters 2 and 3, Boškovi´c does assume that successive cyclic A-movement occurs through spec of to in cases like (8), whereas we have argued that there is one step movement from the e-position directly to the Case position. (8)
Bill seems Bill to Bill sleep a lot
If there is no EPP, what motivates the movement through spec of to? For Boškovi´c (2002:183), the intermediate . . . [Spec, IP] in the constructions in question [like (8)] [is] filled as a result of the property of the movements involved. We do not need to invoke a property of the embedded . . . Infl to drive the movement . . .
More specifically, Boškovi´c assumes the Minimize Chain Links Principle (MCLP) of Chomsky and Lasnik (1993) and Takahashi (1994). The idea is that Bill moves through spec of to in (8) since only via this movement will the chain links (associated with the movement of Bill) be as short as possible, as required by the MCLP. The deeper theoretical point is that Boškovi´c treats ‘movement through intermediate [Spec, IP]s . . . on a par with movement through intermediate [Spec, CP]s’ (p. 186). In short, the successive cyclicity of wh-movement is extended to ‘NPmovement’. In neither case is the movement to the intermediate spec position driven by a feature of the head of that spec position; rather, it is driven by certain overarching locality requirements on movement (and/or on chains). Interestingly, and almost paradoxically, movement is nonetheless hypothesized to be feature-driven in the sense that the operation Move is initiated by the need of a feature to check (there is not the completely gratuitous ‘Move anything anywhere’ of GB theory