Dokdo
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Dokdo
Publications on Ocean Development Volume 67 A Series of Studies on the International, Legal, Institutional and Policy Aspects of Ocean Development
General Editors: Vaughan Lowe and Robin Churchill
Dokdo Historical Appraisal and International Justice
Edited by
Seokwoo Lee and Hee Eun Lee
LEIDEN • BOSTON 2011
This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Dokdo : historical appraisal and international justice / edited by Seokwoo Lee and Hee Eun Lee. p. cm. — (Publications on ocean development, 0924-1922 ; v. 67) Includes index. ISBN 978-90-04-19338-3 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Tok Island (Korea)—International status. 2. Korea (South)—Foreign relations—Japan. 3. Japan—Foreign relations—Korea (South) I. Yi, Sog-u, 1967– II. Lee, Hee Eun. KZ3881.T65D65 2011 341.4’2—dc22 2010045496
ISSN: 0924-1922 ISBN: 978 90 04 19338 3 Copyright 2011 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change.
To Yoon, my best friend and loving wife – Seokwoo Lee
To Grace, my best friend and loving wife, and to our two boys, Jae Deok and Jae Huel – Hee Eun Lee
Contents Preface ................................................................................................... Map ....................................................................................................... Acknowledgements .................................................................................
ix xi xiii
Chapter I. Overview – “Dokdo: Historical Appraisal and International Justice” ............................................................................................... Seokwoo Lee and Hee Eun Lee
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Chapter II. Legalism, Geopolitics, and Morality: Perspectives from Law and History on War Guilt in Relation to the Dokdo Island Controversy ........................................................................................ Harry N. Scheiber Chapter III. Addressing and Resolving the Dokdo Matter ...................... Jon M. Van Dyke Chapter IV. Territorial Disputes in East Asia, the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, and the Legacy of U.S. Security Interests in East Asia ............................................................................................. Seokwoo Lee Chapter V. A Possible Practical Solution for the Dispute over the Dokdo/ Takeshima Islands from the Perspective of the Law of the Sea ............ Atsuko Kanehara Chapter VI. Dokdo, Colonialism, and International Law: Lessons from the Decision of the ICJ in the Land and Maritime Dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria ........................................................................ Dakas C.J. Dakas
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29
41
71
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Chapter VII. Problems of Contiguity, Natural Unity, and Ancient Original Title to Islands with Special Reference to Dokdo .................. Kaiyan Homi Kaikobad
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Chapter VIII. An American Assessment of South Korea’s Policy Options Towards Its Claim to Dokdo and Its Relations with Japan ................. Larry A. Niksch
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Contents
Chapter IX. Similarities and Differences between the Korean-Japanese Dokdo Disputes and the Sino-Japanese Diaoyudao Disputes ............. Ji Guoxing
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Chapter X. The Dokdo Dispute in Perspective and Avenues for Resolution .......................................................................................... Leszek Buszynski
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Chapter XI. Politics and Economics in the Resolution/Non-Resolution of the East China Sea/Diaoyu Islands and Northern Territories Issues: Feats, Failures, and Futures ................................................................. Jean-Marc F. Blanchard Index Terms ...........................................................................................
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Preface This book is based on selected papers from two international conferences on Dokdo. Dokdo is the rocky islet in the East Sea (Sea of Japan) which is currently disputed between Korea and Japan as both claim sovereignty over Dokdo. It is 87.4 kilometers (km) from the Korean island of Ulleungdo and 157 km from the Oki Islands of Japan and located 215 km from the Korean mainland and 211 km from the Japanese main island, Honshu at N 37°14”, E 131°52”. Formed from volcanic activity, Dokdo is comprised of two large rocky masses that are referred to by Korea as Dongdo (East Island) and Seodo (West Island) which are surrounded by thirty-two smaller outcroppings having a total area of 180,902 m2. As Director of the Inha International Ocean Law Centre, Inha University (Incheon, Korea), Professor Seokwoo Lee undertook two international conferences on Dokdo. The first was held in Seoul in 2007; and a second in Seoul in 2008. The title of the 2007 conference was “Towards a Framework for the Resolution of the Territorial Dispute between Korea and Japan over Dokdo,” and the 2008 conference was entitled “Dokdo: Historical Appraisal and International Justice.” The title of this book was named after the 2008 conference. Professor Seokwoo Lee and Professor Hee Eun Lee of Handong International Law School (Pohang, Korea) co-edited this volume.
Territorial Disputes over Islands in East Asia
Acknowledgements The editors would like to express their gratitude to Clive Schofield, Director of Research and QEII Research Fellow at the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS), University of Wollongong (Australia) and Andi Arsana, Lecturer and Researcher in the Department of Geodetic Engineering, Gadjah Mada University (Indonesia) for their work in producing the map that appears in this volume. The editors would also like to thank Hyunjoeng Chun (Class of 2009) along with Euna Lee (Class of 2010) and Jaepyung Park (Class of 2010) of Handong International Law School for their valuable assistance with editing of the papers in preparation for the publication of this volume. During the editing of this volume, Professor Kaiyan Homi Kaikobad of Brunel University passed away on July 1, 2010. Professor Kaikobad, a contributor to this book, was a renowned expert on territorial and boundary disputes. He will be remembered as a dear friend and mentor who devoted his life to trying to resolve difficult international conflicts. He will be dearly missed.
Chapter I Overview – “Dokdo: Historical Appraisal and International Justice” Seokwoo Lee* and Hee Eun Lee** Since the conclusion of World War II, the legacy of Japanese militarism and colonialism in East Asia has left many unresolved conflicts, dividing parts of the region. There are currently three territorial disputes over islands in East Asia in which Japan is a disputant: against Russia, Japan continues to claim sovereignty over the Kurile Islands (Northern Territories); against China and Taiwan over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyudao); and against Korea over Dokdo (Takeshima).1 Deep-rooted historical bitterness between Japan and the other disputants impedes the resolution of these territorial disputes and still deeply influences international relations in this region. The ongoing territorial disputes in East Asia, in particular over Dokdo, involve intertwined political and legal issues. Though it is not always easy to dichotomize politics and law in specific territorial disputes, it is also not impossible to reach a conclusion as to the strength of the competing claims to disputed territories based on international legal principles and sources. As to Dokdo, Japan specifically affirmed its claim to Dokdo by officially incorporating it into Shimane Prefecture in 1905. Japan opines that Dokdo was terra nullius in 1905 and therefore subject to occupation. Korea asserts that historical documentation proves that Dokdo belonged to Korea prior to Japan’s alleged 1905 incorporation, thereby attacking Japan’s contentions that
* Professor of International Law and Director of the Inha International Ocean Law Centre, Inha University.
** Associate Dean and Associate Professor of Law, Handong International Law School. 1
The names of these territories are also subject to dispute: Russia refers to the islands as the “Kurile Islands” while Japan denotes the area as the “Northern Territories;” China and Taiwan use the terms “Diaoyudao,” “Diaoyutai,” or “Diaoyu Islands” while Japan refers to it as the “Senkaku Islands;” and finally, “Dokdo” is the Korean designation while Japan refers to it as “Takeshima”. Dokdo is also referred to by some as the “Liancourt Rocks”. The editors of this volume acknowledge that each chapter author either uses both names designated by each country or uses only one designation.
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the Liancourt Rocks were terra nullius. Korea regained its independence in the aftermath of the Second World War, and Japan specifically renounced its claims to several named islands in the East Sea (Sea of Japan) when it signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty. However, the treaty did not specifically address the status of Dokdo. Thus, for almost sixty years the two sides have exchanged unilateral declarations of sovereignty over the tiny islands. The determination of Dokdo’s ownership is, however, not the sole purpose of this book. Beyond the question of ownership of Dokdo, this book will provide a broad framework for better appreciation and resolution of the territorial disputes that bedevil the East Asian region, and the bilateral relationship between the claimants in particular. Thus, a need has long been felt among international lawyers, historians, and policymakers in Korea, Japan, and in Asia and beyond, for a resolution of the territorial dispute between Korea and Japan over Dokdo. In such circumstances, it is imperative to clarify the relevant historical facts and develop new norms to address the very nature of the Dokdo dispute. This will be critical for formulating a broader framework for the appreciation of the nature of the territorial dispute over Dokdo. For this purpose, it is well worth noting that there is no denying the undeniable fact that the legacy of the past looms large in our thinking when we look back over the history of the territorial dispute over Dokdo. A few points will illustrate these crucial factors: • From Korea’s perspective, as a past victim of Japanese aggression, the Japanese claim to a right to Dokdo can be construed as its intention to invade or to carry out a second act of aggression. • During the Russo-Japanese War, Japan incorporated Dokdo into its own territory. Indeed, it denied Dokdo to Korea with the use of its military power. • Korea has a tremendous amount of evidence that Korea had occupied and effectively controlled Dokdo historically. However, what is more important is the historical fact that Japan incorporated Dokdo into its territory for military purposes. • Considering the provocative nature of a series of acts by Japan, including homage at the Yasukuni Shrine, distortion of history textbooks and the Dokdo issue, these acts project a nationalistic tone of the Japanese government and its efforts to justify past aggression. It can also be understood from a historical perspective as a challenge to the future order of Northeast Asia. Recently, groups of scholars have proposed ideas to resolve the Dokdo issue based on their understanding of the nature of the dispute. These proposals can be categorized into the following four approaches: first, a practical approach which includes the separation of the sovereignty issue from the allocation of maritime zones and other salient issues; second, an approach which looks to
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Japanese territorial disputes involving the Kurile and Senkaku Islands to address the Dokdo issue; third, an approach which emphasizes the U.S. role for resolving the Dokdo issue; and fourth, an approach which stresses the historical background of Japanese colonialism over Korea and its linkage with the Dokdo issue. Among the abovementioned approaches, the papers presented in this book are based on the first three approaches. However, the approach that emphasizes the historical background of Japanese colonialism over Korea and its connection with the Dokdo issue is not fully reflected here. This largely comes from learned Japanese scholars who have addressed different aspects of the historical legacy of Japanese colonialization on the Dokdo dispute. Given their importance, we summarize them below. Japan’s colonial ambitions have shaped these scholars’ perspectives on how to characterize Japan’s actions regarding Dokdo in 1905. There has been a view expressed in Japan that the acquisition of Dokdo by the Meiji government as it was incorporated into Shimane Prefecture was for military reasons as a precursor to Japan’s eventual annexation of the Korean peninsula.2 After Dokdo was declared a part of Japanese territory in February of 1905, later that same year, Korea was forced by Japan to become its protectorate which was followed by annexation five years later.3 From a Korean point of view, it is quite reasonable see a chain of events beginning with Japan’s acquisition of Dokdo that led to a period of great suffering for Koreans at the hands of Japan. This view has led to an understanding in Japan that from Korea’s perspective, the taking of Dokdo was the first step towards Japanese colonialization and thus, a potent symbol of Japan’s conquest of the Korean peninsula.4 Given this perspective, these Japanese scholars have put forward calls for a more pragmatic approach on the part of the Japanese government to resolve the Dokdo dispute. They view Japan’s claims over Dokdo as an impediment for Japan in attaining a number of important foreign policy objectives related to North Korea, including resolving the issue of Japanese citizens who were abducted by North Korea in the 1970s and 1980s, North Korea’s nuclear program, and fishing rights around Dokdo.5 They see a need for cooperation with Seoul as more important than pursuing Dokdo, which only provoked South Korea to the detriment of Japanese interests. Others want both countries to
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4
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Yoshibumi Wakamiya, Who is smiling at the latest row?, The Asahi Shimbun (July 30, 2008). Yoshibumi Wakamiya, Dare we dream of ‘friendship island?, The Asahi Shimbun (April 2–3, 2005). Kentaro Serita, The Takeshima Dispute: A Radical Proposal, 34 Japan Echo 32, 36 (2007); Wakamiya, supra note 2. Id.
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engage in dialogue as opposed to taking a confrontational stance on the question of sovereignty.6 There has also been a call for Japan to withdraw its claim to Dokdo and recognize Korean sovereignty “in the spirit of repentance” for Japan’s colonial rule over Korea.7 These scholars generally accept the Korean view that Dokdo was wrongfully taken by Japan in 1905. Considering the historical evidence of Korea’s sovereignty against the official Japanese position that Dokdo was legally acquired by balancing the historical and legal arguments taken by both countries on the question of sovereignty over Dokdo, these scholars seek to shift the nature of the dispute from the existing entrenched historical and legal arguments to a simpler, present-day calculation of cost and benefit. By doing so, the conclusion reached by these scholars is that the dispute over Dokdo is not worth the cost to Japan. The insights offered by Japanese scholars on the Dokdo dispute add greatly to the other approaches taken by the authors below to understand some of complexities and challenges of this particularly vexing territorial dispute in East Asia. The second chapter is by Harry N. Scheiber of the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law who offers a moral perspective on the Dokdo issue that considers both law and the history of Japan’s unjust treatment of Korea and the Korean people during the first half of the twentieth century. He notes that this treatment began with annexation and subsequent colonial rule and includes Japan’s actions during World War II and the crimes against human rights perpetuated by Japan during the war. From this perspective, Professor Scheiber evaluates two key elements of Japan’s claim to Dokdo. The first is the context and timing of Japan’s seizure of Dokdo in 1904 and its eventual acquisition, which he concludes, cannot be valid since Japan’s conquest of Korea precluded any effective response from Korea. He then goes on to discuss the second element, which he identifies as Japan’s literalist interpretation of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty. He argues that Japan’s positions in arguing that the Treaty omitted Dokdo from among the territories it had to give up and the Japanese view that any claims of reparations from those who suffered under Japanese rule were waived by the Treaty must be understood in light of the United States government’s interest in securing an early conclusion to U.S. occupation of Japan and Allied backing of a peace treaty that would be generous to Japan along with the U.S. policies in the region spurred on by the Korean War and the Cold War. In his view, the Treaty should be viewed not as providing the highest level of immunity as Japan maintains, but setting forth the minimum set of obligations Japan owes 6
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Shinichi Arai, We Need Solutions by Dialogue, Keynote Speech at International Conference: Dokdo: Historical Appraisal and International Justice, Seoul, Korea (Nov. 18, 2008). Haruki Wada, Let’s Resolve the Dokdo Issue, Hankyoreh (March 21, 2005).
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to Korea. In his conclusion, Professor Scheiber offers a compelling scenario whereby Japan would come to terms with its past by abandoning its claim to Dokdo in connection with a formal apology and restitution to those it harmed while Korea would respond by agreeing to limit its claim to a territorial sea around Dokdo and compromise on fisheries and other resources in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In chapter III, Professor Jon M. Van Dyke of the University of Hawaii School of Law assesses Korea’s claim to Dokdo, applying the international legal standards utilized by international tribunals. He examines the issue of delimiting the maritime boundary between Korea and Japan in relation to Dokdo and offers a possible solution for Korea to resolve the dispute. He argues that Korea has a stronger claim than Japan in light of: (1) the acts of sovereignty Korea exercised over Dokdo prior to 1905; (2) the acknowledgement by the Japanese in the late 19th century that Japan did not possess Dokdo; (3) the recognition from Japan that it did not have sovereignty over Dokdo prior to 1905 as it deemed Dokdo to be “terra nullius;” and (4) Korea’s continuous occupation of Dokdo since the early 1950s. He adds that Korea’s claim is bolstered by Dokdo’s geographical proximity to the Korea’s Ulleungdo (88 km) versus its distance to Oki Island, the nearest Japanese territory (158 km). Notwithstanding the strength of Korea’s position on the issue of sovereignty over Dokdo, Professor Van Dyke explains that Dokdo should not be used as a point of reference in delimiting the maritime boundary between the two countries. Applying the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) and examples from state practice, he believes that Dokdo should be viewed as a “rock” that cannot generate an exclusive economic zone. He adds that even if Dokdo is determined to be an “island” rather than a “rock,” an international tribunal tasked to deal with the issue of delimitation would not give it much weight because of its small size and relative insignificance. A review of cases from arbitral tribunals and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) reveals that islands are not given much consideration in deciding maritime delimitation. Thus, because Dokdo is small, essentially uninhabitable, and has limited economic value, Professor Van Dyke concludes that the boundary should be established equidistant between the two countries, more specifically, at the median line between Korea’s Ulleungdo and Japan’s Oki Island which would put Dokdo on the Korean side of the boundary. Even though international law supports the position that Dokdo is Korean territory, a speedier resolution of the dispute with Japan will require Korea to present a multifaceted deal in which Japan could be viewed to have prevailed on some issues while having given in on other issues such as Dokdo’s sovereignty. In Chapter IV, Professor Seokwoo Lee of Inha University Law School provides an analysis of the effects of the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 on three current territorial disputes over islands in East Asia in which Japan is a
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disputant: against Russia, over the Kurile Islands; against China and Taiwan, over the Senkaku Islands; and against Korea, over the Liancourt Rocks/Dokdo. He observes that the Treaty failed to define the “Kurile Islands,” and further to specify the entity in whose favor Japan had renounced sovereignty over the disputed islands. Additionally, specific mention of the Senkaku Islands and the Liancourt Rocks did not appear in the territorial clauses of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. As a result, while all the interested parties marshal support for their cases from historical sources, Professor Lee points out that it cannot be denied that much of the uncertainty surrounding the territorial demarcation is a by-product of immediate post-World War II boundary decisions and territorial dispositions. He contends that the territorial dispositions established by the Treaty were in large part a reflection of the Allied Powers’ policy in the post-World War II territorial arrangements in East Asia. He explains that the Allied Powers were concerned more about their own geo-political and strategic interests than the interests of the local rival claimants in East Asia and their claims to title over specific territories: these neglected issues resulted in outcomes perpetuating the current territorial disputes in the region. Professor Lee goes on to provide a careful examination of the drafts of the Treaty that defined the Treaty’s final terms regarding these disputed islands in East Asia. In his view, the territorial clause regarding the Kurile Islands can be interpreted as follows: first, the Soviet Union is the only recipient of the Kurile Islands envisaged by the Allied Powers; second, there were no agreed definitions of the “Kurile Islands” among the Allied Powers; and third, there are strong indications that the Allied Powers preferred not to resolve the matter of the ultimate disposition of the Kurile Islands in the Treaty. Moreover, he adds that the Senkaku Islands were not included as either Chinese and Taiwanese or Japanese territory by the drafters of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and Article 3 of the Treaty did not, to the point of specificity, define the territories that were placed within the area of the United Nations trusteeship with the United States as the sole administering authority. Regarding the Liancourt Rocks/Dokdo, he posits that the territorial clause could indicate that the San Francisco Peace Treaty assigns the Liancourt Rocks to Japan. However, Professor Lee concludes that due to the contradictory nature of the various drafts of the treaty, Korea may still be free to establish that the “Korea” renounced by the Japanese in the Treaty included the Liancourt Rocks/Dokdo. Professor Atsuko Kanehara of Sophia University follows in Chapter V with a proposal to resolve the dispute over Dokdo/Takeshima taken from the perspective of the law of the sea. She points out that although the two nations have competing claims to the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands, their ability to resolve past instances of conflict arising from the dispute over the boundary of each country’s EEZ shows the potential for a practical solution utilizing UNCLOS. She points to several areas where the two sides have demonstrated cooperation
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even when they have clashed as to where marine scientific research and fishing could be conducted in overlapping sea areas claimed by each side as part of their respective EEZs. Korea and Japan have agreements in place that delimit the continental shelf and that deal with fishing rights for each side as well as have a structure for joint development of resources on the sea bed. Professor Kanehara notes that although these arrangements avoided dealing with a final settlement on the delimitation of their EEZs, they can be counted as successes in maintaining cooperative and friendly relations between the two countries. As a result, she observes that the ability of Korea and Japan to meet their objectives on important areas such as delimiting the continental shelf and access to fishery resources, while not directly addressing the issue of sovereignty over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands, reveals that insisting on ownership over Dokdo is not in the interest of the parties. If that is the case, she asks what really are the parties’ interests in claiming sovereignty over the islands? Professor Dakas C.J. Dakas of the University of Jos analyzes and critiques the ICJ’s ruling in the case that decided sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula between Cameroon and Nigeria and puts forward the implications of the decision for the Dokdo issue in Chapter VI. He observes that the Court’s reasoning justifying its award of sovereignty of the Bakasssi Peninsula to Cameroon was based in large part on the 1913 Anglo-German Agreement in which Britain purportedly ceded the Bakassi Peninsula to Germany. Cameroon argued that the initial British cession of the Bakassi Peninsula to Germany was then renounced in favor of the French from whom Cameroon maintained it inherited. However, the Court’s decision ignored the central issue in the case: the colonial responsibility of Great Britain to the people of Bakassi and Nigeria. An earlier pact was made in 1884 between Great Britain and the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar under which Great Britain undertook to extend its protection to these Kings and Chiefs, creating a protectorate that included the Bakassi Peninsula. Yet, according to Professor Dakas, the Court effectively disregarded the clear terms of this treaty and transformed what was supposed to be a protectorate that retains sovereignty over territory into that of a colony that has none. The Court’s treatment of the colonial question as it relates to the Bakassi territorial dispute shows that the legacy of colonialism continues on in the form of Eurocentric “international” law. According to Professor Dakas, a number of lessons can be drawn from the Bakassi case that are relevant for the Dokdo issue. First, he notes that the occupation of territory as a mode of European territorial acquisition in Africa, though seemingly neutral, parallels Japan’s use of occupation as a means of taking Dokdo. Second, he observes that Korea, as a colonized state, was in no position to contribute to the content of international law, much like the African states that made no contribution to the legal rules that were applied at
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that time. Third, he notes that the legal norms justifying territorial acquisition were developed during colonialism and calls on the need to rid international law of this remnant of the colonial period. Next, Professor Dakas points out that because of the International Court of Justice’s decision in the Bakassi case, states like Korea are justified in inclining to view that the Court will not hold Japan accountable for its “imperial aggression.” Lastly, he implores vigilance so that there will not be another decision like Bakassi. In Chapter VII, Professor Kaiyan Kaikobad of Brunel University presents an extensive analysis of the role that geographical contiguity and the related concepts of adjacency, proximity, and distance apply to the issue of title to Dokdo. He notes that when dealing with land territory, there is no rule of law that permits a state to make a claim to an area of land wholly on the basis of contiguity. However, with respect to maritime territory, he observes that there are four relevant rules that allow a state to make ownership claims employing contiguity and its related principles. The first such rule is that islands that form part of the state’s coastline may be entitled to recognition that the coastal state has title. The second rule is based on the theory that there is an organic unity of certain kinds of islands, namely those that have a natural archipelagic unity. Thirdly, the coastal state has title to territory over islands that are formed by the action of a body of water, tidal, or riverain. The fourth rule, which he acknowledges as controversial, is that ownership of an island should be granted to the state that is closer in terms of comparative distance or proximity provided that the arguments put forth by both disputant states are evenly matched and there are no countervailing considerations. According to Professor Kaikobad, the rules that are relevant to the issue of title to Dokdo are those that pertain to the natural unity of islands and the principle of comparative proximity. Therefore, if Korea or Japan were able to establish that Dokdo is a natural part of or appendages to either Ulleungdo, the nearest Korean island or Oki Island, the closest Japanese island, the question of who has sovereignty over Dokdo would be clearer. He then identifies two types of evidence Korea and Japan could be able to marshal in support of their claims: the former being the “surface unity of the islands” which would include linkages to Dokdo in terms of historical, political, administrative, economic, social, and family connections and intercourse while the latter would be the “sub-surface evidence,” which is the geomorphology, geology, and bathymetry with respect Dokdo and the mainland of Korea and Japan. After a review of the evidence, Professor Kaikobad is of the opinion that the principle of contiguity would favor Korea on the issue of sovereignty over Dokdo. In the next chapter, Larry Niksch, a specialist on East Asia with the Congressional Research Service, offers an assessment of Korea’s policy options in regards to its claim to Dokdo and its relationship with Japan. Although Korea has a stronger claim to Dokdo in view of the historical claims, Korea faces the prob-
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lems of fully realizing its claim given the neutral position taken by other countries, especially the United States, and the absence of any reference to Dokdo in the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Thus, Korea appears to have three policy options to promote its claim. One option is for Korea to focus on maintaining and strengthening its present physical control, anticipating that the current status quo will cause other nations to recognize Korea’s claim and force Japan to abandon its own claim. Another option is to submit the dispute for settlement by third-party adjudication, such as through the International Court of Justice. A third option is for a negotiated settlement between the two countries. In choosing a particular policy option, the author believes Korea will have to deal with significant factors that have contributed to Korea’s “Japan bashing.” He notes the views of some Koreans that the Dokdo issue is part of a broader conflict with Japan, the belief that Japan has designs to invade Korea as it has done in the past, and the emotional reaction to any Japanese action in relation to Dokdo. These important elements have impacts not only upon Japan’s approach on Dokdo and other issues related to its relationship with Korea, but also on the United States’ attitude and perspective to the Dokdo issue, as well as Korean concerns of Japanese remilitarization. The final three chapters look to the territorial disputes Japan is involved in to provide insight into resolving the dispute over Dokdo. In Chapter IX, Professor Ji Guoxing of Shanghai Jiao Tong University compares the similarities and differences between two territorial conflicts over islands Japan has with its neighbors in northeast Asia: the Diaoyudao Islands dispute with China and the conflict over Dokdo with Korea. In both instances, Japan claims that the islands were terra nullius, discovered, and effectively occupied by Japan despite the historical evidence of discovery and administration of the island by China in the case of the Diaoyudao Islands and by Korea for Dokdo. Another similarity includes that the islands were occupied by Japan through their colonialist and imperialistic actions taken during the 1895 Sino-Japanese War and the 1905 Russo-Japanese War. Where the two disputes differ can be found in the attitude of the United States government which leans in favor of Japan with respect to the Diaoyudao dispute while it has taken a neutral stance in relation to Dokdo. Another distinction is that Japan has actual control over Diaoyudao whereas Korea has control over Dokdo. The issue of sovereignty over these islands affects delimitation between Japan and China as well as Japan and Korea in the East China Sea and the East Sea (Sea of Japan) respectively. Japan argues that its EEZ has full effect for Diaoyudao and for Dokdo while China and Korea reject that claim. Professor Ji points out that Diaoyudao was first discovered by China and Dokdo first by Korea and adds that Diaoyudao is an appendage of Taiwan and that Dokdo is an appendage of Ulleungdo. Ultimately, he concludes that Japan’s allegation of prescription is legally untenable in both cases.
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Professor Leszek Buszynski of the International University of Japan, in Chapter X, discusses the classification of territorial disputes into those involving the “homeland” and disputes over the “peripheral” and the implications of this distinction for the dispute over Dokdo. “Homeland” refers to the feeling of belonging that exists between the people and their historical land. The term “peripheral” refers to territory that was not considered part of the homeland but was located in the frontier. Territorial disputes over homeland may result in war and conflict. Though disputes over peripheral territory usually can be settled through negotiation and compromise, he points out that there are some disputes that are elevated to the point of non-negotiability. The row between Russia and Japan over the Northern Islands is illustrative of this situation. Japan is unable to make concessions in the territorial disputes it has with its neighbors without affecting negotiations in other disputes, particularly in relation to the Northern Islands. Professor Buszynski contends that states under these circumstances are beleaguered and are unable to take steps to resolve territorial disputes because of the linkages among them. If Japan surrenders one claim, its position over the others would be undermined. Thus, in relation to Dokdo, if Japan conceded its claim to Korea, it would lose all hope of obtaining the return of the Northern Islands which are significantly more important as homeland territory in comparison with Dokdo which is less important to Japan. He goes on to explain that the public efforts by Korea to confront Japan on Dokdo would be ignored and may in fact have the effect of strengthening Japan’s resolve on the issue. An appreciation of the importance of the linkage between the Northern Islands and Dokdo disputes for Japan will allow Korea to formulate a regional approach in dealing with Japan that may serve to remove the blockages in the Northern Islands dispute and in turn, help to resolve the Dokdo issue. In the closing chapter, Professor Jean-Marc Blanchard of San Francisco State University examines the potential role of economic interdependence and economic incentives to promote a resolution of the Dokdo dispute using an analysis of Japan’s dispute with China over the East China Sea and the Diaoyu/ Senkaku Islands and the dispute with Russia over the Northern Territories. The economic relationship between China and Japan was and is marked by a high level of economic interdependence. Economic incentives were utilized by Japan in an attempt to achieve a resolution of the Northern Territories dispute. His research suggests that with respect to China, economic factors did not inspire the 2008 East China Sea settlement nor did it help to resolve the dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. With respect to Russia, though the Japanese offered economic incentives, Japan was unable to motivate the Russians to compromise. Though Korea and Japan enjoy an extensive economic relationship, the political factors that animate the Dokdo dispute must be understood in order to
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help facilitate a settlement of the issue. Each country should be keenly aware of the domestic and international political circumstances facing the other country and make judgments as to how to approach negotiations and what deals to propose based on the level of stateness of the ruling administration. A proper understanding of the political realities can also lead to the use of economic incentives in a manner that encourages compromise. Professor Blanchard also notes that the political circumstances might be such that a deal potentially concluded between the two countries may not resolve all issues related to Dokdo. He warns that the political leaders on each side must prepare their people or prepare for a possible backlash. Again, the editors hope that this book will provide a framework for better appreciation of how such goals can be achieved, and in particular, how bilateral relations between the claimants, Korea and Japan, can be improved.
Chapter II Legalism, Geopolitics, and Morality: Perspectives from Law and History on War Guilt in Relation to the Dokdo Island Controversy Harry N. Scheiber* I. Introduction Highly sensitive issues in East Asian diplomatic relations are raised by the troubled questions of law and policy generated by the Japanese-Korean dispute with regard to sovereignty over the islet Dokdo in the East Sea. Attention has been given by distinguished scholars to various aspects of the formal questions based in pertinent international law. Their studies consider, as required in formal legal analysis, the current interpretations of rules, the often difficult and sometimes very arcane technicalities of law, and the precedents from prior decisions in similar cases as rendered by tribunals that have dealt with islands and maritime boundary questions. In a recent article, Professor Van Dyke has presented a searching inquiry on these lines regarding the dispute between Japan and Korea regarding sovereignty over the tiny Dokdo islet territory in the East Sea/Sea of Japan setting forth a comprehensive critical review of the academic and polemical literature, together with a full analysis of the factual, legal, and doctrinal question.1 Its persuasive conclusion is that if an international tribunal were to adjudicate the dispute, Korea’s claim very likely would prevail.2
* Stefan A. Riesenfeld Chair Professor of Law and History and Co-Director of the Law of the 1
2
Sea Program, University of California, Berkeley. See Jon M. Van Dyke, Legal Issues Relating to Sovereignty over Dokdo and Its Maritime Boundary, 38 Ocean Dev. & Int’l law, 157–224 (2007). Succinct chronology of the dispute, hyperlink references to Japanese and Korean documents, and geographical/geophysical data on Dokdo, available at http://www.dokdo-takeshima.com. Id., at 195. Byung-Ryull Kim, The History of Imperial Japan’s Seizure of Dokdo (Northeast Asia History Foundation ed., 2006) (providing a collection of diplomatic documents, cartographic references, and other sources supporting the validity of Korea’s claim). The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintains a web-based home page providing the documentation on
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In the present chapter, I do not revisit the Dokdo sovereignty issue by traversing once again all the same ground as has been so comprehensively discussed. Instead, I will contend here for giving moral considerations, especially with regard to war crimes and basic human rights, an overarching priority – indeed, a priority justified by the specific historic background, even over positive law as represented by the terms of the Japan Peace Treaty signed in San Francisco in 1951. The analysis will open with attention to the two key elements of Japan’s claim to Dokdo, both of which I regard as requiring full reconsideration in light of their historic context. First of these elements is Japan’s claim based upon the timing of its initial physical occupation of Dokdo and (shortly afterward) annexation to its home islands government. The second is Japan’s literalist – that is to say, its formalist or legalistic – reading of the Japan Peace Treaty’s language regarding the territories that were specified as being ceded back to Korea. Of particular importance to this proposed approach is the contextual geopolitical setting, the essence of which is the history of the United States government’s policies with regard to the Occupation goals during 1945–52, and with regard to the peace-treaty negotiation process and the restoration of sovereignty to Japan; and, finally, the Cold War and Korean War factors that were so pervasively influential in driving a readjustment of U.S. policies and the acceleration of the Peace Treaty process. In concluding the analysis, I shall contend for a determinative moral perspective on the Dokdo debate – a perspective from law and history that takes into account the entirety of Japan’s treatment of Korea and her people throughout the first half of the twentieth century. That history embraces, at its core, Japan’s coercive annexation of Korea, its oppressive and exploitative colonial rule, its responsibility for a wider war that became World War II, and, finally, the record of crimes against human rights (and in blatant contravention of international codes of behavior in war) that so notoriously were committed by Japan during the years of war.3
3
which it relies to support its own claim, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/ takeshima/index.html. John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power In The Pacific War (1987) (considering war atrocities on both sides in the World War II combat areas and in Japan’s occupied and colonial territories); Tokiyushi Tanaka, Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes in World War II (1996) (providing a detailed documentation of shocking atrocities including forced prostitution, abuse and killing of prisoners of war, forced labor, biological and medical experimentation, and mass rapes committed by the Japanese military and with full knowledge of the command officers and ministry level offices in Tokyo). Recent scholarly studies have similarly cast new light on the horrors of specific Japanese actions and on the degree to which Emperor Hirohito was complicit in war crimes. See, e.g., Herbert Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (2001); Iris Chang, The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II (1998).
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What of future chances for bringing the Dokdo issue to a constructive closure? The view of Korea’s sovereign claim to Dokdo that I regard as compelled by the application of a moral perspective, founded upon the revisiting of the history and a fuller understanding of the relevant geopolitics, suggests the possibility of merging the war crimes and Dokdo issues for purposes of achieving a single combined settlement. My position is that there can be advantages to both sides, not only to the Korean people, if Japan’s political and intellectual leaders would courageously develop such an approach, taking responsibility for their nation’s past and including a cession of claims to Dokdo in a restitution package that is so long and tragically overdue. Before proceeding with this analysis, however, I offer a personal note – an appeal to readers that my views in what follows be taken as they are intended: viz., as a commentary on a specific set of circumstances in their legal, geopolitical, and moral context, rather than as an expression of a personal or general bias against Japan. For one thing, it must be acknowledged that instances of crimes against individuals and groups, including both war crimes and the more extreme forms of what we would today term the “cultural imperialism” associated with colonization, are found in the histories of probably every nation on the globe.4 But for our purposes in considering the Dokdo issue, it is Japan’s record as colonizing power and war combatant that we are obligated to confront squarely.5 And so, while I express in this chapter a highly critical view of Japan’s record on the war guilt and war crime issues, if my attention were to be focused on other topics on which I have written – such as the progressive reform of Japan’s legal system, or liberalization of Japanese family law – the
4
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Certainly it is true of U.S. history with regard to the record on slavery, racial and other discrimination, and the shameful past treatment of the native Indian population; in addition, there is the more contemporary scandal of prisoner torture by the U.S. military and CIA under the Bush administration in Iraq and Afghanistan. Recent disclosures concerning mass executions and murders by the Army and Korean police in the midst of the Korean War have thrown light on a dark side in the history of nation. See, e.g., J.M. Glionna, South Korean Panel Acknowledges Mass Executions in 1950, L.A. Times, Nov. 27, 2009 (reporting the Korean government’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission on the early-war-period massacre of nearly 5,000). The author has devoted extensive research effort in the last 20 years to studies of Japanese legal culture and the country’s post-World War II history, and has had the honor of numerous close collaborations with academic colleagues in Japan. See, e.g., H. Scheiber, Interallied Conflicts and Ocean Law, 1945–53 (2001); K. Mengerink, H. Scheiber, & Y. Song, Japanese Policies, Ocean Law, and the Tuna Fisheries, Conservation and Management of International Tuna Fisheries (D. Squires et al., eds., 2009); H. Scheiber, Japan, the North Atlantic Triangle, and the Pacific Fisheries: A Perspective on the Origins of Modern Ocean Law, 1930–1953, 6 San Diego Int’l L.J., 27–112 (2004); Akio Watanabe & H. Scheiber, Occupation Policy and Economic Planning in Postwar Japan, in Economic Planning in the Post1945 Period, 100–109 (E. Aerts and A. Milward, eds., 1990).
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tone and nature of to take a questions
content of my views would be very different.6 It is the compelling the moral issues that I will be considering that makes it impossible posture of detachment and indifference that would mask the vital at stake.
II. A Reconsideration of Two Conventional Legal Issues The analysis that follows will focus first on two prominent elements of Japan’s claim to Dokdo that are usually considered in the framework of the conventional legal analysis of the contending Dokdo claims. Both the elements in question are prominent pieces in the basic structural underpinning of the Japanese position. 1. Japan’s Seizure of Control in Dokdo The first of these two elements in the Japanese position requires relatively brief attention, given what I submit should be seen as its manifest weakness, whether as to its logic or its validity in the light of accepted jurisprudence: I refer to Japan’s contention that the longevity of its occupation, control, and annexation of Dokdo (from 1905 through the end of World War II) is, under received international law and precedent, a conclusive basis for Japan’s claim to sovereignty now. Japan seized the islet in 1904 and then declared unilaterally incorporation of Dokdo into its sovereign national territory. (Korean and other critics of this claim have pointed out that Japan did this without the customary notification to other nations in the global community, that is, in a manner that these critics characterize as irregular and surreptitious – and so per se invalid.)7 To accept Japan’s argument; based on unilateral annexation and the duration of subsequent control is indeed difficult, for it requires that we should set aside as irrelevant the actual historic context in which it acted – that is, that this seizure of control in Dokdo occurred at the very moment in history when Japan was coercively depriving Korea of its sovereignty, and, moreover, that this was but the first action by Japan in a progression that made the entire life and society of the Korean nation subservient to exploitative
6
7
See, e.g., Scheiber, INTRODUCTION TO, Emerging Concepts of Rights in Japanese Law (H.N. Scheiber and L. Mayali eds., 2007); see also Japanese Family in Comparative Perspective (H. Scheiber and L. Mayali eds., 2010). Conferences and publications on Japanese culture sponsored by the Sho Sato Program for Japanese and U.S. Law, in the School of Law, U.C. Berkeley, are directed by the present author, available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/1964 .html. Kim, supra note 2, at 137–155; Van Dyke, supra note 1, at 176–78.
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and often cruel Japanese rule.8 Hence, Korea was deprived of effective means of asserting its own nation-based claim in the diplomatic arena.9 And even after its liberation from Japanese rule in 1945, Korea continued to be in a weakened negotiating position on Dokdo because of the invasion from the north and the war, and also because of lack of support from the U.S. It is unthinkable that a conquest such as Japan achieved at the start of the twentieth century, a conquest that foreclosed any effective response by the people who were victimized by colonization, should be credited as the valid basis for a territorial claim. While the war raged in Korea, casting into the diplomatic background the question of Dokdo, the Allied powers had begun the process of negotiation for a peace treaty. This brings us to the second issue in the framework of conventional legal analysis: the terms of the Japan Peace Treaty. 2. The Diplomacy and Geopolitics of the Peace Treaty The exclusion of Korea from an effective role in defending its claim to Dokdo continued far into the postwar period. Korea’s effective disfranchisement was influenced profoundly by the U.S. government’s relentless determination after 1949 to bring the occupation of Japan to an early end, and to obtain Allied support for an early, non-punitive peace treaty generous in its terms to Japan.10 At a time when the war was raging on Korean soil, the Republic of Korea’s interests (beyond fighting for its survival against the Chinese and North Korean attack) could not be pursued as they might otherwise have been. In fact, high-ranking U.S. officials exerted strong efforts to keep Korean territorial claims out of the diplomatic picture – either motivated by explicit intention or else (as a more charitable interpretation) as an unwitting result of the confusions and urgencies of the wartime situation confounding information flows within the military and civilian bureaucracies.11 8
9
10
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Peter Duus, The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea (1995); C.I. Eugene Kim & Han-Kyo Kim, Korea and the Politics of Imperialism, 1876–1910 (1967). See also text, infra note 19. Van Dyke, supra note 1, at 17 (citing to Choung-Il Chee, Korean Perspectives on Ocean Law Issues for the 21st Century 6 (1999)). See, e.g., Bernard Cohen, The Political Process and Foreign Policy: the Making of the Japanese Peace Settlement (1995); Richard H. Immerman, John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism and Power in U.S. Foreign Policy (1998); Richard Rosecrance, Australian Diplomacy and Japan 194–551 (1962); Michael Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan: the Origins of the Cold War in Asia (1985); The Postwar Foreign Policy of Japan (Akio Watanabe ed., 1985). Seokwoo Lee, The 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan and the Territorial Disputes in East Asia, 11 Pac. Rim L. & Pol’y J 63 (2002) (casting light on this topic from relevant files in the State Department records, U.S. National Archives). Lee’s findings are incorporated into Van Dyke’s analysis. See Van Dyke, supra note 1, at 182–85.
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Had Korea’s Dokdo claim been brought into the complex multinational preparatory treaty negotiations being orchestrated by John Foster Dulles, it might have given Mr. Yoshida’s government serious difficulty with public opinion and with the Diet, a more general concern that worried Dulles greatly. Presumably Dulles would also have balked at introducing any issue, such as this, however small in scope, that could cause disagreement among the Allied governments and thereby interfere with America’s primary objective. That objective was to obtain agreement on the treaty terms quickly, and then to secure the strategic alignment of Japan, once sovereignty was restored, with the U.S. and its Cold War and Korean War allies against the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China.12 When the Allied representatives convened to sign the Peace Treaty in San Francisco in September 1951, the full extent of the immunities that were to be afforded to the newly sovereign Japan became clear. Two provisions proved to be extraordinary in the advantages they afforded Japan. One was the so-called “waiver” provision that specified limitations on Japan’s liability for reparations or restitution to nations and persons victimized by her actions. The other was omission of Dokdo from the list of territories that constituted the spoils of its imperial expansion and wartime conquests. As I have already indicated, this omission was certainly consistent with American intentions, and possibly was the result of U.S. officials’ misguided presentation of the facts at the time. Indeed, it is hard to explain how Dean Rusk, a high-ranking U.S. State Department officer, could have asserted, as he did – with a critical impact upon the diplomacy of territorial issues in the Treaty – that the U.S government had no knowledge of any historic Korean counter-claim to Japan’s “Takeshima” position.13 12
13
A clear expression of Mr. Dulles’s attitude is illustrated by the manner in which he insisted upon separation of the divisive issue of Japan’s future as a fisheries power from the general peace treaty question. The U.S. official who had drafted a proposed fisheries provision for the Treaty (which would later become the working draft of the International North Pacific Fisheries Convention of 1952) reported that Dulles had said to him that he was determined “that his quick negotiation of a short general Treaty of Peace would not get bogged down in fisheries squabbles that would drag out the settlement.” From Wilbert Chapman, Chief Fisheries Office in State Dep’t, to Montgomery Pfister (Jan. 6, 1951), in Wilbert McLeod Chapman Papers (on file with the University of Washington Library). See also, supra note 10. This is a problem that Professor Seokwoo Lee has discussed, based on his research in the U.S. archives. Especially problematic is a letter from Mr. Rusk to the Ambassador of Korea declaring, “the island does not appear ever before to have been claimed by Korea” and “since about 1905 has been under the jurisdiction . . . of Japan.” Letter from Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State, to Yang You Chan, Ambassador of Korea (Sept. 1951), available at http://www.mofa .go.jp/region/asia-paci/takeshima/treatment.html. Rusk’s assertion was patently inaccurate as to what others in the State Department knew and had discussed; it was in any event consistent, however, with Rusk’s position of strong advocacy, within the Department, for a benevolent
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In any event, Dokdo was not included among the Japanese occupied territories to be returned to Korea, despite the earlier declaration of the Allied leaders at Cairo in 1943 that “Japan will be . . . expelled from all other territories [in addition to islands in the Pacific area] which she has taken by violence and greed.”14 This position was later qualified significantly by the language of the Potsdam Proclamation of the four major Allied powers in July 1945, in which Japanese sovereignty was defined as “limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and to such minor islands as we determine.”15 Omission of Dokdo from the list of “minor islands” was also a feature of the final territorial settlement provision of the Peace Treaty. This omission has provided Japan for sixty years with the argument that seems to me the most plausible, among the many that it has put forward in support of its “Takashima claim” for the Dokdo islet. Nonetheless, I will contend that this argument – which can be termed Japan’s “least implausible” argument, even though it stands on a foundation of explicit treaty terms,16 – is overbalanced by moral considerations of justice and morality that should override and prevail over it. Beyond the moral dimension, objection may be raised against the Japanese position from a more narrowly legal ground, to wit, that Japan’s position is predicated upon the unsupportable view that the Peace Treaty terms are to be implemented as the maximum limit of what Japan is obliged to do by way of concessions; instead, these terms should be regarded in terms of purely legal obligation as the minimum that is required of Japan. And if moral imperatives require more than the Peace Treaty specified, there is no obstacle whatever to Japan accepting responsibility beyond what the treaty specified as its obligations.
14 15 16
Occupation policy and generous peace treaty terms for Japan. See files relevant to peace treaty negotiations (on file with Dep’t St. Records in the Nat’l Archives). Rusk’s statement was also contrary to the admitted understanding as to Dokdo/Takeshima sovereignty in the highest levels of the Japanese government itself. See Hang Ju Nah, The Essence of Dokdo Issues and Counter-Measures, in the Focus of Japanese Prime Ministerial Decree No. 24 (June 6, 1951) (on file with author). The first five drafts of the treaty, dating from 1947 preliminary meetings, mentioned Dokdo as territory belonging to Korea, available at http://www.dokdo-takeshima .com/dokdo-sf-truth.html. The Cairo Declaration (Dec. 1, 1943). The Potsdam Declaration, para. 8 (July 26, 1945). This argument is linked by Japanese commentators to Japan’s objection to the controversial Rhee Line declaration of 1952 as the instrument by which the modern ROK claim was issued to the global community. See, e.g., Nobuyoshi Sumita, Governor Shimane Prefecture, On the Occasion of Takeshima Day, available at http://www.dokdo-takeshima.com/dokdo-shimanecase.html. In this regard, it should be noted that the Occupation authority had already warned Mr. Rhee that the declaration of such a maritime jurisdiction could not be supported by the U.S. Scheiber, supra note 5, at 229–32.
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3. The Waiver on Reparations The second Peace Treaty provision that treated Japan with extraordinary generosity immunized its government explicitly from liability for reparations and significant redress. This was the famed “waiver provision” of the Treaty’s Chapter 5, Article 14, which reads: “Except as otherwise provided in the present treaty, the Allied Powers waive all reparations claims of the Allied Powers, other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of prosecution of the War.” 17 Since the signing of the Treaty in 1951, the Japanese government, together with some of the largest and wealthiest private Japanese corporations, have consistently employed the language and intent of this “waiver” as the legal anchor of their ongoing resistance to the claims advanced by various victims of their war crimes. Those victims include, among others, the civilian and military prisoners who were forced into virtual slave labor for Japan – a fate that condemned a significant proportion to the fate of death; the women from China, the Philippines, and Korea, among other conquered territories, who were forced into unspeakable exploitation; the conscripts into the Japanese Army from Korea and other conquered areas who were shipped out into combat areas to fight and die; and others who similarly became the hapless victims of Japan’s disregard of the rules of war and heinous violations of basic human rights.18 For
17 18
Treaty of Peace with Japan art. XIV, Sept. 8, 1952, 3 U.S.T. 3916, 136 U.N.T.S. 45. See Kinue Tokudome, POW Forced Labor Lawsuits against Japanese Companies, Japan Pol’y Res. Inst. Working Paper No. 82 (Nov. 2001), available at http://www.jpri.org/publications/ working papers/wp82.html. Concise discussion of the litigation issues as they were then proceeding in the California state courts. See David D. Caron, U.S. Litigation Concerning Japanese Forced Labor in World War II, Am. Soc’y of Int’l L. Insights (Oct. 2000), available at http://www.asil.org/insight 57.cfm; Michael J. Bazyler, The Holocaust Restitution Movement in Comparative Perspective, 20 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 11, 27–32 (2002). On the prosecution and defense of Nippon Mining Company’s use of prisoners of war as slave laborers, see Anita Ramasatry, Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon – An Examination of Forced Labor Cases and their Impact on the Liability of Multinational Corporations, 20 Berkeley J. Int’l L.91, 111–117 (2002) (treating the issue of corporate complicity by American and other multinationals in regard to their organizational relationships with German and Japanese firms that used forced labor). Korean claims against Japanese firms, standing on a different grounds than those of former POWs who were in the Allied armed forces, were argued in the American courts on a different formal legal basis than the American and Allied claims, in that Korea was not a signatory to the Peace Treaty; but the rulings went against them on grounds of expiration under the relevant statute of limitations, and in at least one ruling on grounds the U.S. government’s Statement of Interest (contending that it would violate a foreign relations commitment to permit compensation to be ruled upon in an American court) made the issue of restitution by Japan purely a foreign affairs matter and thus a political question exclusively under control of the Executive Branch (i.e., the President and through his authority the Department of State).
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the Korean people, moreover, these war-period crimes were committed against them after a thirty-five year period of suffering under Japanese control during the annexation era: during which hundreds of thousand of farm families had their farmland coercively taken away and were reduced to tenancy; Japanese firms had exploited the country’s coastal fisheries, forest resources, and minerals entirely without regard to Korean property rights or welfare; and the Japanese colonial authorities had structured rice exports to the exclusive advantage of Japan, at the expense of consumption levels of the Korean people. These aspects of economic exploitation – which reduced income levels and economic well-being of the Korean people while overall production was rising for Japan’s benefit – were, of course, only a part of the larger policies of sustained political and cultural repression that prevailed throughout the period of Japanese rule.19 Despite the atrocities to which American POWs, civilians in the Philippines, and other American citizens were subjected at the hands of the Japanese during the war, the U.S. government was the principal advocate and draft author of these two provisions of the Treaty. And ever since 1951, the U.S. had adhered to a position of support, that is, it has backed the Japanese government and corporations in their resistance to reparations and restitution demands, whether in political channels or in the courts (including both American and Japanese civil tribunals). The rationale expressed by American diplomats and political leaders has been the same as Japan’s, viz., that the treaty is the controlling law and is determinative, and hence sets the maximum terms that Japan is legally obliged to accept.20 (However, as evidenced by the cooperation of the U.S. government with regard to claimants’ negotiation of voluntary restitution programs from
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Choon-Ho Park, East Asia and the Law of the Sea 57–60 (1983) (commenting on Japanese fishing fleets’ relentless assault on Korean coastal fishery resources during the period of Japan’s control); Byung-Nak Song, The Rise of the Korean Economy, 38–42 (1990). Although rising Korean rice production had been directed by the Japanese regime in “soaring” levels to the export sector exclusively to Japan, there was a decline in per capital food consumption by the Korean people. Id. at 39. See also Edward S. Mason et al., The Economic and Social Modernization of the Republic of Korea (1980). Former Secretary of State George Schultz stated the basic U.S. policy on this question and hinted at the importance of Japan’s alignment with the West in the Cold War, when he commented on a move in Congress in 2001 to forbid the use of government appropriations for Justice Department lawyers’ interventions against the claimants and in favor of Japan in the several suits then in American courts. See, Tokudome, supra note 18, at 5. “[T]he bill in question,” Schultz wrote, “would have the effect of voiding the bargain made and explicitly set out in the Treaty of Peace;” the Treaty was a “bargain,” he continued, “[that] has served us well in providing the fundamental underpinning for the peace and prosperity we have seen, for the most part, in the Asia Pacific region over the past half-century.” (Quoting Schultz in 147 Cong. Rec. H4170 (daily ed. July 18, 2001)).
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Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, there was no objection from Washington against the negotiation of such settlements).21 Ironically, while insisting on a literalist reading of these provisions that were so beneficial to them, Japanese officials proved willing and eager to set the Treaty’s literal terms aside when it was to their material advantage to do so: e.g., in paying monetary compensation rather than providing the labor and services that the Treaty explicitly specified was its obligation in production, “salvaging and other work” needed in order to “repair the damage” done in occupied Allied territories. Similarly, with full U.S. cooperation, the Dutch government negotiated an agreement with Japan for compensation to a group of its citizens seeking restitution – even though in litigation since then, Japan has adhered to the literalist position, selectively as it were, insisting that the Treaty terms made no provision for restitution to individual persons or groups, only to governments in the forms of restitution that were specified.22 In light of its past willingness to depart from literalism when convenient, Japan is significantly compromised – even in the perspective of ordinary technical legal analysis – in claiming legal immunity from reparations claims by individuals. Small steps in the direction of taking responsibility can be cited, but they remain isolated instances whose more general significance is unclear as of this writing. (These include Japanese government action returning to Seoul in 2008 the remains of 101 Korean conscript soldiers who died in Japanese military service; and the recent voluntary settlement by the Nishimatsu Construction Company to establish a restitution fund of 250 million yen to compensate Chinese who were used by the company as forced laborers during the war. Nishimatsu’s decision to step forward voluntarily in this came despite the Japanese Supreme Court’s ruling in a 2007 appeal that there was no legal entitlement on the part of the Chinese plaintiffs.23) 21
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Michael Bayzler, Holocaust Justice (2003); Michael Bayzler, Japan should Follow the International Trend and Face Its History of World War II Forced Labor, Asia-Pacific J. 30–32 (2009); Steven Clemons, Recovering Japan’s Wartime Past – and Ours, N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 2001, at A27. See also, infra notes 22–23. In testimony to Congress in 2001 Professor Harold Maier of Vanderbilt University discussed his review of “at least eight treaties in which the Japanese government has extended ‘more’ favorable treatment to other nations than it did to the United States with respect to United States claims on behalf of its injured nationals.” Tokudome, supra note 18, at 4 (quoting Professor Maier’s statement to Congress). Kyodo News, Nishimatsu Settles with Chinese Forced Laborers, Japan Times, Oct. 23, 2009. An earlier, similar case involving Chinese taken to Japan to work as forced labor in a coal mine owned by Mitsui Mining Company, received wide attention when the Fukuoka High Court overturned a ruling in favor of plaintiffs by a trial court on grounds both the government and the Mitsui interests were protected by the relevant statute of limitations (which specified a 20 year limit for initiation of suits). Wu Gang, Forced Labour Case Voided in Japan, The China Daily, May 5, 2004, available at http:www.chinadailycom.cn/English/doc/2004–05.
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A final observation with regard to Japan’s invocation of the Peace Treaty terms in these matters is worth reiteration in this context: Despite its resort to a literalist interpretation of its Treaty obligations, as I have noted earlier, Japan remains perfectly free to undertake restitution for individuals who seek redress for war crimes and violations of human rights. The Treaty should be taken as the definition of minimum obligations, not of maximum immunity.
III. Conclusion In 1945 and 1952, Japan was a beleaguered nation, its society reeling from defeat and needing massive material assistance from the Allies to rebuild the country’s economy and restore stability in its social and political order. Throughout the Occupation period, Japan was propped up and defended, its interests promoted across a broad spectrum, by the U.S. This was done over strong objections of even America’s closest Allies.24 A beneficent American occupation policy, reflected in General MacArthur’s determination to protect the Japanese from Allied pressures with regard to reparations and other demands for restitution, in effect provided Japan’s leaders with an immunity against the need to come to terms with its past. In that sense, the civilian officials and political leaders of Japan led a cloistered existence during the Occupation; the curtailing and termination of the Tokyo war crimes trials reinforced this sense of immunity. Departing from his view in 1945 at the time of the surrender, when he had declared that Japan must not be relieved of “the physical and psychological burdens of defeat,”25 MacArthur shifted position on this central question of policy even as early as 1946. When the Allies voiced objections to his favoring of Japan’s interests over their own, for example in regard to food supply, MacArthur denounced the Allies’s position as “shamelessly selfish and negative,”
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For example, there were conflicts with the Allies over the beneficent Occupation policies that evoked protests that Japan was being effectively pardoned for its war crimes, and even being given priority by the U.S. with regard to food supplies and vital industrial materials, while recovery from war losses and relief of suffering in the Allied nations and their former colonies in Asia were being given lesser priority. See Scheiber, Inter-allied Conflicts and Ocean Law, supra note 5, at 101–174. On beneficence of the Occupation policies more generally, see generally John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (1999). General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Chief of Staff (Marshall), 6 Foreign Rel. of the U.S. 671 (1945). See H. Scheiber, Taking Responsibility: Moral and Historical Perspectives on the Japanese Reparations Issue, 20 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 212–49, at 240–48 (2002) (drawing directly in this paragraph from an earlier article on the human rights theme).
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portraying his own policies as “entirely just, humanitarian, and practical.”26 The theme of humanitarianism was also voiced in other contexts. For example, with regard to demands for industrial plant transfer and other reparations, Mr. Dulles declared in a widely disseminated speech delivered in 1951: “Reparations were unthinkable . . . [and would] constitute an almost inhuman burden to bear” for Japan!27 And so we see that a moral perspective, manifested in the Occupation policies and the underlying purposes of the Peace Treaty, not only in American leaders’ rhetoric, worked in those days to the enormous advantage of Japan. On this last point, it is revealing to consider the report to his government in 1951 by a distinguished British diplomat, Alvary Gasgoigne, after a long private meeting with Prime Minister Yoshida. The Occupation command, Gasgoigne wrote, had failed abjectly in getting the message across to Japanese leaders that other nations did not approve of the insulation of Japan from the view of other Allied governments and peoples that Japan bore a heavy burden of moral responsibilities for “the barbarous manner in which the [Japanese] behaved . . . during the Second World War.” He found it astonishing that Mr. Yoshida “feels hurt . . . that we are not at present actively wooing Japan to the same extent as the U.S. [is doing]”!28 Another officer in the U.K. legation in Tokyo had a similar view, reporting to his Foreign Office that “the majority of Japanese have no idea of the legacy of hatred they may have left behind them . . . and that if I, or any other British official, were to tell them of it, we should probably be thought to be lying.”29 In sum, General MacArthur erected a protective screen that effectively isolated Japan’s leaders and people from the potential costs to them of the bitterness and hatred they had created. In that process, the Occupation regime had created a mindset in the Japanese government and society that has persisted strongly through all the years since the Surrender: it is the mindset that resists the idea that Japan should accept full moral responsibility for war guilt and war crimes. The basic attitude that results from it has been evidenced in myriad ways, not least in the intransigence with which Japan has resisted restitution claims, denied outright the validity of well-documented and essentially irrefutable evidence of war crimes, countenanced visits to the Yasukuni shrine by its leaders and that brazenly honor the architects of Japan’s crimes, and manipu-
26
27
28
29
Radiogram: From MacArthur’s headquarters in Tokyo to War Department (July 5, 1947) (on file with MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library). John Foster Dulles, Address at Whittier College (Mar. 31, 1951), full text in N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1951, at 46. Conversation between His Majesty’s Ambassador and the Japanese Prime Minister: Sir A. Gascoigne to Mr. Bevin (Jan. 29, 1951) (on file with U.K. Public Records Office). George Clutton, Despatch No. 332 (Oct. 2, 1995) (on file with U.K. Pubic Records Office).
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lated the historical accounts of the Pacific War and World War II as presented in textbooks used in the public schools. To the present day, there has not been even a ritualistic apology on terms reasonably expected by those who have been victimized, let alone the material restitution that would logically accompany such a reversal in attitude and intention.30 The war-guilt and war crimes issues persist as a central problem in the conduct of Japanese foreign policy, a recurrent source of profound and enduring difficulties in East Asian international relations in Northeast Asia. Now, more than sixty years after the Occupation authority’s beneficent reconstruction of the Japanese economy and the restoration of sovereignty, it would be no great sacrifice for Japan to accept responsibility and to view its obligations in a moral perspective, and thus follow the example of German and other European restitution agreements, giving some measure of justice to those individuals whom it has harmed. It would be mistaken, I submit, to assume that application of the moral perspective implies a zero-sum diplomatic game in which Japan loses entirely as Korea prevails in its claim. An analysis in which the Dokdo dispute is linked to the ongoing war guilt and war crimes issues can produce distinctive benefits for Japan and not only for Korea. The practical advantage for Japan, one may hope, is that settlement based on a concept of justice – a concept transcending legalisms – can serve to advance the resolution of an issue that has hung on far too long, to the detriment of Japan’s reputation as an actor in international affairs. It may be a fruitful path for addressing the problem of Japan’s widely recognized persistence, for more than half a century, in refusing to come to terms with its past. In the scenario that I am proposing, Japan would yield on its claim to Dokdo, linking that gesture to a formal apology by the Emperor and a program of tangible restitution to individuals and their families who were especially harmed during the annexation period and during the war. If Japan should act as suggested here, it raises the question, of course, of whether Korea should be induced 30
With regard to restitution for the “comfort women” abused by the Japanese military, it was not until 1992 that the Japanese government finally admitted to the existence of the officially sanctioned practice by their military, doing so only after the sensational revelation of newly discovered records documenting the atrocity. Although this was followed by an apology from Prime Minister Kiishi before the National Assembly in Seoul, it did not meet the demand of the Korean victims that such an apology come directly from the Emperor; and in fact most victims of the comfort women policy who are surviving have refused money payments, tendered through a third-party front organization, on grounds the apology was not forthcoming as they required. S. Sarah Soh, Japan’s National/Asian Fund for ‘Comfort Women,’ 76 Pacific Affairs 209–233 (2003); also, private interviews by the author with Japanese sources involved in the efforts to persuade victims to give up the demand for apology and accept monetary compensation.
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to match such a dramatic Japanese move with a conciliatory concession of its own – not as a matter of obligation (legal, moral, or otherwise) but as a way of advancing the cause of normalization of Japanese-Korean relations. To be sure, this course has the same potential to prove perilous, politically, for the Korean government’s leadership as would be the decision by Japan’s leaders to give up the Dokdo claim and undertake the restitution actions proposed here. Nonetheless, it is important to speculate on the options that might become acceptable if espoused by the two governments and defended in their domestic arenas in the right spirit, impelled by an authentic determination to make a settlement work. One possibility, in such a scenario, would be a proclamation by Korea promising that the territorial sea and full sovereign claim over Dokdo’s surrounding ocean area would be limited to twelve miles, and at most twenty-four miles for a contiguous zone. As to the waters beyond, some compromise would be formulated as to the control of fisheries and other resources – for example, an assured share (with a reasonable catch limit) for Japan of fishing yields in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) that presumably would be created by Korea, with similar consideration for Korean fishing activities in the Japanese zone that would be demarcated on its side. (Creation of the EEZs in the affected area of the East Sea/Sea of Japan has been delayed until now because of the boundary dispute.) Various alternative actions toward effecting a compromise on bilateral arrangements for resource use might be suggested as options by creative lawyers, diplomats, and elective officials – arrangements that would be seen as more than empty gestures by Korea, yet preserving for Korea a substantial portion of the benefits it would enjoy from full EEZ control in the absence of the boundary dispute. The major effect of such an agreement, of course, would be that the Korean nation would obtain its objective of an unchallenged title to sovereignty over Dokdo and the small sister islets. As an additional benefit for both countries, however, the agreement would also eliminate (or at least would soften measurably) a source of destabilizing and inflammatory diplomatic conflict and domestic political agitation – a benefit of very considerable weight. Japan’s recognition of war guilt, and acceptance of responsibility for past crimes against humanity, of course would also serve to address the wounds that have been aggravated by the unconscionably delayed apology and restitution that are owed to individual Korean citizens. And not least important among benefits to be derived, if a linkage between these issues were to be achieved as the basis for an agreement – difficult as it might be for the majority of Japanese people who had no direct part in committing the past actions at issue – both countries would share in the benefits of a major step forward in normalizing cultural and diplomatic relations. These two issues that have poisoned the diplomatic waters and agitated the politics and
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political cultures of both countries would be put to rest; and such a development can only serve to advance on a much broader front the cause of peaceful relations in Northeast Asia. Removing a moral stain of such deep meaning, and creation of more harmonious relations between the two national citizenries and governments, would thus in the long run contribute to the achievement of rule of law in the region’s international affairs. Arguably, this is a utopian proposal, too optimistic by far in its presumption that Japan’s intransigence on both issues at stake can be overcome. And utopian as well if it overestimates the creativity that Korea’s leadership would consider bringing into such a negotiation in the cause of expediting agreement. One must recall, however, that it was once regarded as hopelessly unrealistic that a Japanese-Korean agreement on joint development of any part of the Continental Shelf region of the East Sea/Sea of Japan could have been achieved; yet it came to fruition, despite the doubts voiced by so many. Moreover, some of the most important steps forward in the history of progressive change in modern diplomacy had their start with ideas that were dismissed initially as being politically impossible of achievement. Even the reopening of the World War II reparations issues in Europe in the late 1990s had long been seen as utopian, if not to say scorned, as being a futile cause; and yet there has followed since then an acknowledgement of facts long hidden, and revelations of the extent of war crimes formerly covered up – followed by apologies and voluntary restitution payments agreed upon. I will close with a reference to a hard geographic reality, one that is perhaps too easily lost from view in the noise and tumult of the zealous public agitation of the Dokdo question on both sides. This hard reality is the nature of the islet cluster itself. One of the ironies of this difficult and protracted dispute – whether one stresses legalism, geopolitics, or morality and justice – is that the nugget of great wisdom that was left to us by Judge Choon-ho Park is too easily forgotten. He wrote that it was dangerous for Japan and Korea to call “the barren rocks” constituting the Dokdo islets “the sacred territory of the fatherland.” In actuality, he stated, “they are merely ‘fly specks’ on maps, so that you need a magnifying glass to find them . . .”31 Thus did Judge Park bequeath to the present generation of governing leaders a profoundly important warning: that an excessively inflamed public opinion and dangerous international tensions, triggered by contention over such a territory, is a situation fraught with the possibility of a tragic denouement. To avoid such a tragic outcome, I submit, is well worth the pursuit of what may at first seem a utopian strategy for an honorable settlement – especially so if the settlement also will bring with it, at last, the resolution of so embittering a war crimes legacy.
31
Choon-ho Park, Commentary, L. of the Sea Inst. Proc. (1979).
Chapter III Addressing and Resolving the Dokdo Matter Jon M. Van Dyke* I. Korea’s Claim to Sovereignty Over Dokdo Is Very Strong Korea’s claim to sovereignty over Dokdo is substantially stronger than the claim of Japan, based on the principles that tribunals apply to address and resolve such disputes.1 Korea has a long historical claim, going back, according to some reports, 1500 years into the Silla Kingdom period. Maps drawn by prominent Japanese cartographers in the late 1700s and early 1800s seemed to recognize that Dokdo was part of Korea. In 1877, the Japanese Dajokan instructed the Home Ministry that “our country has nothing to do with” Dokdo and Ulleungdo. On October 25, 1900, the Korean government promulgated Imperial Ordinance No. 41, which established the county of Ulleungdo and clearly included Dokdo within its boundaries. • Japan claimed sovereignty over Dokdo on January 28, 1905, stating that this territory was “terra nullius . . . there being no evidence of its being occupied by any country.” This Japanese statement that Dokdo was “terra nullius” (referring to land that is unclaimed by any country) is significant, because it serves as an acknowledgement that Japan had no meaningful claim to Dokdo based on historical activities prior to January 28, 1905. • Japan’s 1905 claim to Dokdo was made during the period when Japan was engaged in unrelenting efforts to exert increasing military and civilian control over Korea, which led to the establishment of a protectorate over Korea in November 1905 and formal annexation in 1910. On February 23, 1904, eleven months prior to Japan’s claim to Dokdo, Japan sent troops into Seoul •
* Professor of Law and Carlsmith Ball Faculty Scholar, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawai‘i at Manoa. 1 The materials on sovereignty over Dokdo in the paragraphs that follow are explained in detail in Jon M. Van Dyke, Legal Issues Related to Sovereignty over Dokdo and Its Maritime Boundary, 38 Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 157, 157–224 (2007).
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and compelled Korea to sign a protocol agreement giving Japan effective control over Korea’s governmental activities. This protocol marked the moment when Korea lost its ability to act independently on the world stage. As Han Key Lee has written: “Korea was deprived of its rights to conduct diplomacy and its sovereignty and independence by this protocol signed on February 23, 1904, not by the Protectorate Treaty concluded on November 17, 1905.” In order to gain support for its claim to Dokdo, Japan would have to overcome the almost impossible hurdle of convincing others that its annexation of the islets was not part of its expansionist military activities in Northeast Asia, which led to the subjugation of Korea and caused enormous suffering to the Korean people. As the late Judge Choon-ho Park put it, Japan stole “the whole bakery and now wants the crumbs.” The Korean government did attempt to protest Japan’s claim to Dokdo in 1906, but its independence had been swallowed up by Japan by then, and its voice was muffled. In 1946, after World War II, the Allied Powers occupying both Japan and Korea issued instructions that separated Dokdo from Japanese territory. But the 1951 Peace Treaty between Japan and the Allied Powers made no specific mention of Dokdo (perhaps because of the Korean War and the dynamics of Cold War politics). Once Korea became freed from the occupation, it quickly and vigorously reasserted its claim to Dokdo in 1952, built a guarded lighthouse on it in 1954, and has maintained a presence there ever since. In 1965, the Republic of Korea and Japan normalized their diplomatic relations in a formal treaty. Japan sought to address Dokdo during the negotiations that led to this treaty, but Korea refused. Dokdo was never listed as an official agenda item for discussion during the protracted negotiations that produced this treaty, and the issue is ignored in the treaty. Japan’s willingness to enter into the normalization treaty without pressing its claim to Dokdo might be seen as a waiver by Japan of its claim and an acceptance of (or acquiescence to) Korea’s sovereignty over Dokdo. Japan has, however, continued to assert its claim to sovereignty regularly, and has suggested that the matter be submitted to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for resolution. Japan’s willingness to submit the Dokdo matter to the Court is inconsistent with its reluctance to submit its dispute with China over the Senkaku (Diaoyudao) Islands or its dispute with Russia over the Northern Territories to the Court.
The international tribunals that have examined disputes over small islands almost always focus on acts related to sovereign governance undertaken by the claimants during the past century. Korea’s claim would thus prevail over Japan’s (1) because Korea exercised acts of sovereignty over Dokdo in the years prior to 1905, (2) because official Japanese pronouncements in the late 19th century
Addressing and Resolving the Dokdo Matter
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noted that Japan did not possess the islets, (3) because Japan’s 1905 statement that Dokdo was “terra nullius” acknowledged its own failure to establish sovereignty prior to that time, and (4) because Korea’s consistent occupation of Dokdo since the early 1950s has served to reinforce its earlier acts of sovereignty. Korea’s position is also strengthened by the geography of the situation – Dokdo is 88 kilometers from Ulleungdo and can be seen from Ulleungdo on a clear day, but is 158 kilometers from Japan’s Oki Islands and can never be seen from them.
II. Dokdo and the Maritime Delimitation of the East Sea Because of the small size of Dokdo, its essential uninhabitability, and its limited economic value, it should not be considered in delimiting the maritime boundary in the East Sea between Korea and Japan. This boundary should be drawn at the equidistance or median line between Korea’s Ulleungdo and Japan’s Oki Islands. This delimitation would put Dokdo on the Korean side of the boundary, and would reinforce the logic of Korea’s claim to the islets under the contiguity approach. The conclusion that Dokdo should not be considered when the maritime boundary of the East Sea is being delimited can be reached through two separate approaches. First, Dokdo is a “rock” that cannot sustain human habitation or an economic life of its own, and hence does not qualify under Article 121(3) of the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention2 to generate an exclusive economic zone or a continental shelf. Second, even if Dokdo were not a “rock” under Article 121, it still should not affect the boundary delimitation because of its very small size. Each of these approaches needs to be explained separately.
III. Dokdo is a “Rock” Article 121 of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention says that islands can generate 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zones (EEZs), just as continental land masses do, but explicitly states that “[r]ocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.” The reason for denying EEZs to uninhabited locations has been explained by Judge Budislav Vukas of the International Tribunal for 2
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982); The Law of the Sea: Official Text of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea with Annexes and Index, U.N. Sales No. E.83.V.5 (1983).
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the Law of the Sea in an opinion written in the Volga case in 2002.3 He wrote that the underlying purposes for giving exclusive rights over offshore resources to coastal states through the establishment of the exclusive economic zone was to protect the economic interests of the coastal communities that depended on the resources of the sea, and thus to promote their development and enable them to feed themselves. This rationale does not apply to uninhabited islands because they have no coastal fishing communities that require such assistance. Similarly, the late Professor Jonathan Charney explained in a 1999 article that “the primary purpose of Article 121(3) was to ensure that insignificant features, particularly those far from other states, could not generate broad zones of national jurisdiction in the middle of the ocean.”4 Professor Charney went on to say that: The common spaces are diminished by using such rocks as a basis for placing a maritime area under a coastal state’s jurisdiction when it would otherwise be beyond national jurisdiction. This practice would directly conflict with the objective of Article 121(3): to protect the commons from nationalization based on minor features with little significance other than being above water at high tide.5
Professor Charney has also explained that “[o]utside state support for a noneconomically viable occupation would be inconsistent with this requirement [of being able to sustain ‘economic life of their own.’]”6 Although the terms “rock,” “human habitation,” and “economic life of their own,” are not defined in the Convention, state practice is providing precedents that help develop the governing definition. Among the examples that have emerged are: Rockall. An important case study relevant to the meaning of Article 121(3) occurred in 1997 when the United Kingdom renounced any claim to an EEZ or continental shelf around its barren granite feature named Rockall which juts out of the ocean northwest of Scotland.7 Rockall is a towering granite feature measuring about 61 meters (200 feet) in circumference, and is about seventy feet 21 meters (70 feet) high. It is located some 300 kilometers (190 miles) from the British territory of St. Kilda off the Outer Hebrides of Scotland, some 380 kilo-
3 4
5 6 7
“Volga” (Russ. v. Austl.), Declaration of Judge Vukas, ITLOS Case No. 11 (Dec. 23, 2002). Jonathan I. Charney, Rocks that Cannot Sustain Human Habitation, 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 863, 866 (1999). Id. at 876. Id. at 871 n. 34. Fishery Limits Order, 1997, S.I. 1997/1750 (U.K.); see generally David H. Anderson, British Accession to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 46 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 761, 778 (1997) (citing House of Commons Hansard, vol. 298, written answers, col. 397).
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meters (240 miles) from the Irish coastal county of Donegal, some 320 miles from the Faroes, and some 400 miles from Iceland. The Senkakus/Diaoyutai Islands. Another example of state practice concerns these eight uninhabited island features in the East China Sea 170 kilometers northeast of Taiwan, which are now controlled by Japan but are also claimed by Taiwan and by the People’s Republic of China. Altogether, they have a land area of seven square kilometers; the largest (Diaoyutai/Uotsurishima) has an area of 4.3 square kilometers, with two peaks rising to about 1100 feet, but has no anchorages for any but the smallest ships to use for landings. Historically, these outcroppings have been used only as navigational aids. In 1970, after its claim to the Daioyutai/Senkakus based on an extension of its continental shelf had been protested by Japan, the Republic of China (Taiwan) issued a reservation when ratifying the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf,8 stating that in “determining the boundary of the continental shelf of the Republic of China, exposed rocks and islets shall not be taken into account.”9 One prominent scholar from the People’s Republic of China (Ji Guoxing) has reported that the current position of the People’s Republic of China is similar: “China holds that the Diaoyudao Islands are small, uninhabited, and cannot sustain economic life of their own, and that they are not entitled to have a continental shelf.”10 Okinotorishima. More recently, and more confrontationally, a series of incidents have occurred near the tiny insular structure called Okinotorishima, sometimes referred to as Douglas Reef, which was claimed by Japan in 1931. This reef system is 1,740 kilometers south of Tokyo, and is thus the southernmost Japanese possession. At high tide, only two natural structures remain some 70 centimeters above water; these features in their natural form were about the size of two king-size beds (or four-and-a-half tatami mats). But since 1987, Japan has been trying to protect these tiny pieces of real estate from being washed away by erosion and from sinking into the sea by spending many billions of yen to bring vast amounts of wave-dissipating concrete blocks and cement to the location. China has acknowledged Japan’s possession of this islet, but has strongly protested against the claim that it can generate an EEZ, con-
8
9
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Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311. See Clive Symmons, The Maritime Zones of Islands in International Law 136, 270 n. 539 (1979) (citing Donald R. Allen & Patrick H. Mitchell, The Legal Status of the Continental Shelf of the East China Sea, 51 Or. L. Rev. 789, 808 (1972)). Ji Guoxing, The Diaoyudao (Senkaku) Disputes and Prospects for Settlement, 6 Korean J. Def. Analysis 285, 306 (1994).
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tending that it is a “rock” and not an “island” under Article 121(3) of the Law of the Sea Convention.11 Maritime Delimitation Between Nicaragua and Honduras (ICJ 2007).12 This dispute involved, among other things, the sovereignty of four small cays (Bobel Cay, Savanna Cay, Port Royal Cay, and South Cay) located just north of the 15th parallel, about 30 miles offshore in the Caribbean Sea. These features were described as “small, low islands composed largely of sand,” which “remain above water at high tide.” A number of wooden buildings are found on these cays, which are used by Jamaican fishers. Despite the periodic inhabitation of these islets, both Nicaragua and Honduras informed the International Court of Justice that they had agreed not to make any claim that the cays could generate “any maritime area beyond the territorial sea.” The Court then determined that Honduras had the better claim to sovereignty over the cays, and proceeded to draw territorial sea enclaves around them, but otherwise ignored them in determining the maritime boundary between the two countries. The resolution of this dispute thus serves as another example of state practice where countries have concluded that small islets are not entitled to generate exclusive economic zones and should be ignored in delimiting a maritime boundary. Clipperton Atoll. Clipperton Atoll (Isla de La Pasion) is a semi-rectangular atoll with 1.6 square kilometers of land, located 1,120 kilometers southwest of Mexico. It was awarded to France in a 1931 arbitration.13 Although small groups have stayed on the atoll for periods of time to exploit guano, it has never been inhabited by a permanent population.14 France claims an exclusive economic zone around Clipperton, but Mexico has strongly protested the claim, and France has apparently agreed to allow Mexican vessels to fish in the waters that would constitute the EEZ, thus acquiescing to the protests. Isla Perejil (Parsley). This barren uninhabited rocky islet is 200 meters offshore from the southern coast of Morocco, but has been claimed by Spain since 1668 and seems now to have the status of a neutralized and demilitarized 11
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Japan to Protest China Survey Near Okinotori – Exclusive Economic Zone in Question, Japan Times, May 10, 2004, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20040510a3.html. Territorial and Maritime Dispute Between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicar, v. Hond.) (Judgment of Oct. 8, 2007), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/ files/120/14075.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2009). Difference Relative to the Sovereignty over Clipperton Island (Fr. v. Mex.), 2 R.I.A.A. 1105 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1931), reprinted in 26 Am. J. Int’l L. 390 (1932). See generally Jon Van Dyke & Robert A. Brooks, Uninhabited Islands and the Ocean’s Resources: The Clipperton Island Case, in Law of the Sea: State Practice in Zones of Special Jurisdiction 351 (Thomas A. Clingan Jr. ed., 1982).
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zone after a skirmish between Spain and Morocco in 2002. The commentator F.A. Ahnish has explained that “[i]t is unreasonable to argue . . . that the rock of Perejil . . . should be entitled to a full belt of territorial sea” because “it is a small, uninhabited rock and situated only 200 metres from the Coast of Morocco.”15 Ilhas Selvagens (Savage Islands). These uninhabited islands are Portuguese, located half way between Madeira (also Portuguese) and the Canary Islands (which are Spanish) in the Atlantic Ocean. Portugal has claimed an EEZ around the Ilhas Selvagens, but Spain has protested this claim, asserting that these islets are “rocks” under Article 121(3) of the Law of the Sea Convention. Pedra Branca. This tiny islet (also known as Horsburgh Light) was awarded to Singapore by the ICJ in May 2008,16 and then in July, Singapore claimed that it could draw an EEZ from it. It has a lighthouse on it but has never been inhabited. Because of its location, if it were able to generate an EEZ, such a claim would impact the EEZ of Malaysia, and Malaysia has strongly protested Singapore’s claim, arguing that Pedra Branca must be considered to be a “rock” under Article 121(3). Datuk Cheah Kong Wai, the Director-General of the Maritime Institute of Malaysia, explained in July 2008 that to generate an EEZ a feature must have “a habitable environment that allows humans to live independently based on resources available naturally. Humans should have access to basic necessities such as fresh water, without having to rely on sources from outside and also be able to carry out economic activities such as farming, fishing or livestock rearing.” He added that operating a lighthouse does not qualify as an “economic activity” because “it is an act of facilitating navigation, a requirement [imposed by the Law of the Sea Convention] on states bordering a strait.”17 These examples demonstrate that when countries make claims for EEZs around small uninhabited island features they are frequently challenged by their neighbors. Dokdo has stark physical beauty, military personnel have been stationed on it for the past several decades, and fishing families occasionally take up temporary residence on it. But its two main islets and smaller outcroppings remain essentially barren, rocky, and uninhabitable. The distinguished Korean 15
16
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Faraj Abdullah Ahnish, The International Law of Maritime Boundaries and the Practice of States in the Mediterranean Sea (1993). Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malay. v. Sing.) (Judgment of May 23, 2008), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/130/14492 .pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2009). Pedra Branca EEZ: Singapore’s Claim on Shaky Ground, New Straits Times, July 24, 2008, available at http://voiceofmalaysian.com/tag/pedra-branca-eez-singapore%E2%80%99s-claimon-shaky-ground (interview with Datuk Cheah Kong Wai, the Director-General of the Maritime Institute of Malaysia).
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scholar, Choung Il Chee, wrote in his 1999 book that Dokdo “is a rocky island and unsuitable for human inhabitation.”18 Similarly, Han Key Lee has written that “this barren group of islets [is] unfit for sustained human habitation.”19 Professor Jin-Hyun Paik of Seoul National University wrote in 1998 that “the natural conditions of the Dokdo Islands would suggest that these islands might not generate their own EEZs or continental shelves.”20 It would appear, therefore, that Dokdo should be considered to be a “rock” that cannot generate an exclusive economic zone. Some have argued otherwise by quoting from Professor Charney’s 1999 article where he speculated that economic activity in the waters surrounding an islet could arguably constitute an “economic life of their own” to allow the islet to generate an EEZ.21 This bootstrapping approach has not been accepted, however, and when it has been asserted – by, for instance, Japan with regard to Okinotorishima – it has met with strong resistance by neighboring countries, as explained above.
IV. Even If Dokdo Were Accepted as an “Island” Rather Than a “Rock,” It Would Not Play a Substantial Role with Regard to the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the East Sea Even if Dokdo were somehow to be considered to be an “island” rather than a “rock” under Article 121, it would not be given much importance by a tribunal asked to delimit the maritime boundary between Korea and Japan because of its tiny size and relative insignificance. Tribunals have repeatedly ignored or slighted islands in maritime delimitations, even ones that have substantial populations residing on them. Among the many examples that can be listed include the following: •
The North Sea Continental Shelf Case (1969),22 where the International Court of Justice stated that a boundary delimitation should “ignor[e] the presence of islets, rocks and minor coastal projections [that would have a] disproportionally distorting effect.”
18
Choung Il Chee, Korean Perspectives on Ocean Law Issues for the 21st Century (1999). Han Key Lee, Tokdo, in Han’guk ui Yongt’o [Korea’s Territory] (1969) (S. Korea), reprinted and translated in Korea’s Territorial Rights to Tokdo in History and International Law, 29 Korea Observer 1 (1998). Jin-Hyun Paik, Evolution of Maritime Boundary Delimitation Law and Its Implications on Northeast Asia Law (unpublished paper delivered at the 1st Annual Korean-US Marine Policy Forum, Seoul) (Oct. 22–23, 1998) (on file with author). Charney, supra note 4, at 867–69. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den./ Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20).
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The Anglo-French Arbitration (1977),23 where the arbitral tribunal rejected the argument made by the United Kingdom that the Channel Islands (Jersey and Guernsey) had the capacity to generate a continental shelf independent of the English and French shelves, and gave only a “half-effect” to Britain’s Scilly Islands. The Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf Case (1982),24 where the ICJ completely ignored the island of Jerba (which now has more than 100,000 inhabitants) and gave the islands of Kerkennah only a half effect, even though they then contained a population of 15,000 and cover 180 square kilometers. The Gulf of Maine Case (1984),25 where a chamber of the ICJ ruled that Seal Island, off the southwest coast of Nova Scotia in Canada, should be given only half-effect in drawing the maritime boundary, even though this island is four kilometers long and was then inhabited year round. The Libya-Malta Case (1985),26 where the ICJ ruled that tiny and uninhabited Filfla Island, located five kilometers south of Malta’s main island, should be ignored altogether in determining the boundary between the two countries (and it also adjusted the boundary line toward Malta to give Libya a larger exclusive economic zone because of Libya’s longer coastline as compared to that of Malta). The Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration,27 where the arbitral tribunal gave no effect whatsoever to the Yemenese island of Jabal al-Tayr and those in the al-Zubayr group, because their “barren and inhospitable nature and their position well out to sea . . . mean that they should not be taken into consideration in computing the boundary line.” The Qatar-Bahrain Case,28 where the ICJ ignored completely the small, uninhabited, and barren Bahraini islet of Qit’at Jaradah, situated midway between the main island of Bahrain and the Qatar Peninsula, explaining that “the Court has sometimes been led to eliminate the disproportionate effect of small islands” in drawing maritime delimitation lines. The Court also ignored completely the “sizeable maritime feature” of Fasht al Jarim, which apparently had only “a minute part” above water at high tide, because using the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic (U.K. v. Fr.) 18 R.I.A.A. 95, 18 I.L.M. 397 (1979). Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libya), 1982 I.C.J. 18 (Apr. 14). Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (U.S. v. Can.), 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12). Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13 (Mar. 21). Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Second Stage of the Proceeding (Maritime Delimitation) (Eri. v. Yemen), 119 I.L.R. 147 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1999). Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Question between Qatar and Bahrain, 2001 I.C.J. 40 (July 1).
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feature as a basepoint would “distort the boundary and have disproportionate effects.” • The Romania-Ukraine Case (2009),29 where the ICJ completely ignored Ukraine’s Serpents’ Island (Ostrov Zmeinyy), a 0.17 square kilometer feature 35 kilometers east of the Danube Delta in the Black Sea. This decision is certainly relevant to the Dokdo situation, because the features are virtually the same size (Dokdo is 0.l8 square kilometers), both are barren and have never been inhabited by any permanent population, and both are in a location that could be seen as material to the maritime boundary between neighboring countries. The ICJ allowed Serpents’ Island to have a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea, but otherwise ruled it had no bearing on the maritime boundary, because it was too small to have any effect on the length of Ukraine’s coastline and was too far from Ukraine’s coastline to be considered part of the coast. The Court found it unnecessary to determine whether it was a “rock” under Article 121(3), but noted (in paragraph 185) that “the Court may on occasion decide not to take into account of very small islands or decide not to give them their full potential entitlement to maritime zones, should such an approach have a disproportionate effect on the delimitation line under consideration,” citing Libya/Malta (1985), Qatar/Bahrain (2001), and Nicaragua/ Honduras (2007). The Court then concluded “that, in the context of the present case, Serpents’ Island should have no effect on the delimitation in this case, other than that stemming from the role of the 12-nautical-mile arc of its territorial sea.” Other decisions where islands have been given a reduced role in the delimitation of maritime boundaries include the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Case (1986),30 the Jan Mayen Case (1993),31 and the St. Pierre and Miquelon Arbitration (1992).32 Professor Charney summarized all these decisions in his 1999 article by saying that “third–party tribunals have ignored or heavily discounted small islands because of their size, even if they were not Article 121(3) features.”33 Thus, whether or not Dokdo is a “rock” under Article 121(3), it almost certainly would be given no effect or only a very limited effect in any maritime delimitation line drawn by a judicial or arbitral tribunal. 29
30
31
32
33
Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Rom. v. Ukr.) (Judgment of Feb. 3, 2009), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/132/14987.pdf (last visited Aug. 26, 2009). Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, 25 I.L.M. 252 (1986). Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. 38 (June 14). Delimitation of the Maritime Area between Canada and France (St. Pierre and Miquelon), 31 I.L.M. 1149 (1992). Charney, supra note 4, at 876.
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V. Conclusion: What Should Korea Do Now? Although it seems almost certain, based on the application of governing legal principles to the historical record, that an international tribunal would rule that Korea has sovereignty over Dokdo, it is understandable that Korea is reluctant to submit the matter to an international court, or even to acknowledge that this matter is a “dispute.” But it cannot be denied that the Dokdo matter is a festering problem that makes it difficult for Korea and Japan to work together on issues of importance, especially regarding the development of resources in the East Sea. Japan seems to be reluctant to abandon its claim to Dokdo, because it worries this action might weaken its claims to other islands and to maritime space in other areas. Japan’s claims to the Senkaku (Diaoyutai) Islands northeast of Taiwan and to the Northern Territories north of Hokkaido are probably much more important to it than its claim to Dokdo, but Japanese leaders worry that a concession on Dokdo would have ripple effects on its other claims. Japan also claims 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zones around small islands such as Okinotorishima, Minamitorishima, and Iwo Jima (Ioto) in the northwestern Pacific, and its claim to an EEZ around Okinotorishima has been vigorously challenged by China. Japan is reluctant to do anything that might undercut these claims, and Japanese political leaders believe they will effectively end their political careers if they are seen as having given up Japanese territory needlessly. Any solution to be effective and enduring must thus be seen as a “win-win” situation for both countries. Korea’s present strategy is to promote understanding of Korea’s historical links to Dokdo and thus, the validity of its sovereignty over these islets. This strategy is sound, but it is unlikely to make Japan’s claim disappear anytime soon. To bring some earlier closure, Korea might consider trying a “package deal” approach, in which the two countries would address a number of issues together, so that Japan could be seen as having prevailed on some important issues while giving way on other issues, such as its claim to sovereignty over Dokdo. The issues that could be addressed together might include the status and continuation of the joint development zone between Japan and Korea (located in the East China Sea southeast of Cheju) and the maritime delimitation of the East Sea. Korea could, for instance, agree that Dokdo should be ignored in the maritime delimitation of the East Sea, which, as explained above, would almost certainly be the approach taken by any judicial or arbitral tribunal. This agreement would lead to the conclusion that the East Sea should be divided by the median line between Ulleungdo and Japan’s Oki Islands, which would still leave Dokdo clearly on the Korean side of the line.
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Korea might also reassess its claim, based on the theory of natural prolongation, to an extended continental shelf in the East China Sea, which led to the establishment of a joint development zone there three decades ago. The natural prolongation theory has been utilized infrequently in recent maritime delimitations. Other issues related to trade, the environment, and compensation for the Korean “comfort women” might also be packaged together in these talks. A composite settlement could clear the decks on a series of controversies and establish the framework for close neighborly ties. Such an innovative “thinking-outside-the-box” approach could promote peace and prosperity in the region, allow for the rational development of the resources of the East Sea, and establish a better life for the young people in both countries.
Chapter IV Territorial Disputes in East Asia, the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, and the Legacy of U.S. Security Interests in East Asia Seokwoo Lee I. Introduction In 1895, Japan signaled its intention to join the world’s great colonial powers by embarking on an aggressive campaign of territorial expansion in East Asia.1 This campaign, though successful on its own terms, spread death and misery to millions of people living in the acquired territories. Finally, in 1945, Japan’s empire imploded. This chapter argues that while the post-war period offered the opportunity for the complete and unambiguous resolution of territorial questions regarding Japan, the lack of precision in key diplomatic documents, especially the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, allowed certain territorial disputes to arise between Japan and its neighbors. For example, Japan and Russia both claim sovereignty over the Kurile Islands, a small group of islands, currently occupied by Russia, lying to the north of Hokkaido, the northernmost of Japan’s four main islands. Additionally, Japan, China, and Taiwan all claim sovereignty over eight uninhabited islands in the East China Sea known as the Senkaku Islands. Finally, Japan and Korea both claim sovereignty over the Liancourt Rocks, a pair of rocky islets in the Sea of Japan/East Sea. The Liancourt Rocks are currently occupied by Korea.
1
The geographical definition of East Asia used in this chapter encompasses Northeast Asia, which includes the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan/East Sea. It is surrounded by the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter China), the Republic of China (hereinafter Taiwan), Japan, North Korea, South Korea (hereinafter Korea, unless otherwise specified), and Russia. The order of the reference to the disputants in this chapter is based on the current occupant country first and the counter disputants later. Regarding the name of the islands in dispute, this chapter uses internationally known names or the names used in the current occupant country.
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This chapter first examines the historical background of each dispute including the bases for the claims made by the various parties. In the case of the dispute between Russia and Japan over the Kurile Islands, treaties executed between the two countries in 1855 and 1875 are the starting point of the discussion. Questions remain as to whether the San Francisco Peace Treaty had the effect of reinstating the terms of pre-war treaties, and if so, whether the treaties themselves were precise enough to put the conflict to rest. The claimants disagree over who first discovered and effectively occupied the Senkaku Islands and whether they were terra nullius when Japan incorporated the islands in January 1895. In the same context, it is also questionable whether China ceded the Senkaku Islands along with Taiwan to Japan under the Shimonoseki Treaty after being defeated in the Sino-Japanese War in May 1895. The question also remains as to whether the islands reverted to China after Japan’s defeat in 1945, were incorporated into Taiwan in 1949, or were restored to Japan as part of Okinawa in 1972. As to the Liancourt Rocks, Japan specifically affirmed its claim to the Liancourt Rocks by officially incorporating them into Shimane Prefecture in 1905. Japan opines that the Liancourt Rocks were terra nullius in 1905, and therefore subject to occupation, while Korea asserts that historical documentation proves that the Liancourt Rocks belonged to Korea prior to Japan’s alleged 1905 incorporation, thereby refuting Japan’s contentions that the Liancourt Rocks were terra nullius. Korea regained its independence in the aftermath of the Second World War, and Japan specifically renounced its claims to several named islands in the Sea of Japan/East Sea when it signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty. However, the treaty was silent regarding the status of the Liancourt Rocks. Thus, for almost fifty years the two sides have exchanged unilateral declarations of sovereignty over the tiny islands. This chapter analyzes the diplomatic and political maneuvering that allowed these territorial questions to remain unanswered. Included in this section is a discussion of the declarations of intent issued by the Allied Powers late in the war when it was apparent that Japan would be defeated, i.e., the Cairo Declaration, the Yalta Agreement, and the Potsdam Proclamation. These resolutions provided the general framework for the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The evolution of the San Francisco Peace Treaty itself, as revealed in a series of interim drafts, is also examined. The ongoing territorial disputes in East Asia, as this research demonstrates, involve intertwined political and legal issues. In other words, these three territorial disputes have multifaceted implications for the disputants on the one hand, and for the relations between the disputants and the interested powers, notably the United States, on the other hand. The rivalry between the United States and the former Soviet Union in the period of the Cold War; the complicated stance of the United States in the cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan; and the hands-off policy of the United
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States in the territorial disputes between Korea and Japan are only partial examples of U.S. involvement in the territorial disputes in East Asia. This situation is complicated by the fact that regional stability in East Asia has been largely influenced by U.S. security interests. Finally, this chapter offers observations regarding the future course that the disputes might take.
II. The Current Positions of Each Claimant on the Territorial Disputes on Islands in East Asia The current position of each claimant on the territorial disputes on islands in East Asia vividly illustrates a deadlock situation. For example, as to the territorial dispute over the Kurile Islands, Russia has emphasized that the inviolability of Russia’s border remains “its principle,”2 and the Russian parliament also stressed that it will not ratify any agreement on the transfer of any of the Kurile Islands to Japan, and the settlement of the issue is not “a matter of today, tomorrow or even the day after tomorrow.”3 Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov further announced that Russia planned to explore mutually acceptable forms of cooperation with Japan over the disputed Kurile Islands, but that, “We intend to solve these questions without detriment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.”4 President Yeltsin of Russia once said that the problem of the four islands should be put aside for the next generation of leaders to resolve.5 Meanwhile, Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa said that “the disputed ‘Northern Islands’ [should be] returned to Japanese control,”6 and Japanese Foreign Minister, Taro Nakayama, urged Russia to make a “political decision to end the territorial dispute over the [Kurile Islands].”7 Concerning the disputed Senkaku Islands, the Director of the Treaty and Legal Affairs Department of Taiwan’s Foreign Affairs Ministry stated that “[It]
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3
4
5
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See ‘Interference’ Claims, Itar-Tass News Agency, Mar. 30, 1999, http://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/ resources/newsarchive by search term ‘Kurile’ [hereinafter IBRU News Database/Kurile]. See “Will Not Transfer” Kuril Island to Japan, Itar-Tass News Agency, May 22, 1992, IBRU News Database/Kurile. See Peace Treaty Discussions in Tokyo, Itar-Tass News Agency, Feb. 10, 2000, IBRU News Database/Kurile. See Yeltsin on Kurile Islands, Kyodo News Service, June 13, 1991, IBRU News Database/ Kurile. See Statement on Northern Islands, Kyodo News Service, Feb. 3, 1992, IBRU News Database/ Kurile. See Japan Appeals for Decision on ‘Kuriles’, Kyodo News Agency, Oct. 11, 1991, IBRU News Database/Kurile.
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is indisputable that the islands are part of the territory of [Taiwan],”8 and that “Taiwan will continue to defend its national sovereignty and fishing rights by protecting our territorial integrity and solving disputes rationally.”9 A spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry also emphasized that “[The Senkaku] Islands belong to China, this is an historical fact,”10 and further went on to say that “Beijing [is] sticking to the principle stated by Deng Xiaoping years ago that the territorial dispute should be shelved and both sides should go into joint development, [and] the islands dispute . . . would be resolved through bilateral negotiations ‘when conditions are ripe.’”11 However, the Foreign Minister of the current occupant country, Japan, stated that “[The Senkaku Islands] in question had been Japanese territory historically and legally and no territorial dispute exists . . . and therefore there was no need for talks . . . on the issue,”12 and the Japanese Prime Minister, Ryutaro Hashimoto, further stressed that the “[Senkaku Islands] were indigenous to our nation, and no territorial dispute over the islands exists.”13 The official stance on the disputed Liancourt Rocks stated by the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs is that: “[Liancourt Rocks] cannot be subject to any diplomatic negotiations or review by the International Court of Justice inasmuch as [they are] an integral part of Korean territory historically, geographically and legally . . ., and international law supports it. We have been exercising real territorial and jurisdictional rights over the islets and therefore, they are not subject to negotiations.”14 Meanwhile, Japanese Foreign Minister Ikeda maintained that “[Liancourt Rocks] are historically and in view of the international law, an integral part of Japan,”15 and further, Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto restated in the Japanese Diet that “Japan’s position over the [Liancourt Rocks] . . . had been
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9
10
11 12 13
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See Taiwan Restates Islands Claim, Central News Agency (Taipei), Apr. 19, 1996, http:// www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/resources/newsarchive by search term ‘Senkaku’ [hereinafter IBRU News Database/ Senkaku]. See Japanese Shrine Built on Diaoyu Islands, Xinhua Domestic Service, Apr. 29, 2000, IBRU News Database/Senkaku. See Senkaku Islands Dispute, Kyodo News Service, Dec. 16, 1996, IBRU News Database/ Senkaku. Id. Id. See Tokyo Restates Claim to Islands, Kyodo News Service, May 10, 1996, IBRU News Database/Senkaku. See Dispute over Tok-To/Takeshima, Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), Mar. 2, 1996, http:// www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/resources/newsarchive by search term ‘Tok-Do and Takeshima’ [hereinafter IBRU News Database/Tok-Do and Takeshima]. Id.
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consistent and that Japan will continue diplomatic efforts to resolve the dispute peacefully.”16 From analysis of these statements and counter-statements the following positions of each claimant on the territorial disputes on islands in East Asia can be drawn. First, among the stances on the respective territorial disputes held by the current occupants, slightly different nuances are recognizable. Against the respective territorial disputes, Japan (in the case of Senkaku Islands) and Korea (in the case of Liancourt Rocks) have refused to recognize the existence of the territorial disputes, and thus maintained that there is no reason to negotiate. Meanwhile, as mentioned earlier, the Russian position on the issue of the Kurile Islands can be said to be that Russia recognizes the existence of the territorial dispute between Russia and Japan, but refuses to take any action on the issue. Second, the stances taken by the counter disputants can be categorized in the following way. Japan (in the cases of the Kurile Islands and Liancourt Rocks), and China and Taiwan (in the case of Senkaku Islands) maintain that the disputed islands are, respectively, an integral part of their country. However, Japan, and China and Taiwan prefer to approach the issue by diplomatic efforts, and thus to resolve the disputes peacefully. Third, despite these territorial disputes, each claimant reaffirms its existing friendly and co-operative relations with the other counter disputant(s). Each further agrees to strive to resolve the frictions stemming from the territorial issue,17 though there has not been any substantial progress made in this connection save in respect of the Kurile Islands.18
16 17 18
See supra note 13. See supra note 14. After President Yeltsin’s visits to Japan in September 1992 and October 1993, the Tokyo Declaration was signed, which established “the clear basis for negotiations toward an early conclusion of a peace treaty through the solution of the territorial issue on the basis of historical and legal facts and based on the documents produced with the two countries’ agreement as well as on the principles of law and justice.” Thereafter, substantial progress was made between the two parties, including the Russia – Japan Summit Meeting on the occasion of the Moscow Nuclear Safety Summit in April 1996; Russia – Japan Summit Meeting on the occasion of the Denver Summit in June 1997; Russia – Japan Summit Meeting in Krasnoyarsk in November 1997; Russia – Japan Summit Meeting in Kawana in April 1998; Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi visit to Russia in November 1998 (signed the Moscow Declaration on Establishing a Creative Partnership between Japan and the Russian Federation, and Agreement on the Establishment of a Subcommittee on Border Demarcation and a Subcommittee on Joint Economic Activities within the Framework of the Russian – Japanese Joint Committee on the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty). Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gov’t of Japan, Japan’s Northern Territories (1999), http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory/index.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2009). The measures taken by the two parties to create an appropriate environment for negotiations toward solving the territorial issue are: mutual visits between Japanese citizens and the
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III. Territorial Disputes in East Asia, the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, and the Legacy of U.S. Security Interests in East Asia 1. Territorial Disputes between Russia and Japan Concerning Kurile Islands a. Drafts of the Territorial Clause of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and their Implications The territorial disposition of the Kurile Islands was addressed in the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Article 2(c) provided that “Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905.”19 Since the San Francisco Peace Treaty provides only for a renunciation of Japanese sovereignty over the Kurile Islands without mentioning by name who should own them, a clarification of the effect of the legal disposition of these territories is required. Thus, allied to the basic rules of treaty interpretation as provided for in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties20 (hereinafter Vienna Convention), each draft of the territorial clauses of the San Francisco Peace Treaty will be gone through for that purpose. The territorial clause of the San Francisco Peace Treaty on the Kurile Islands provided that “Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905,”21 can be interpreted as follows: first, various wartime resolutions, in particular the Yalta Agreement, have significant legal weight in respect of territorial dispositions of the Kurile Islands; second, the Soviet Union is the only recipient of the Kurile Islands envisaged by the Allied Powers; third, there are no agreed definitions of the “Kurile Islands” among the Allied Powers and, even, within the U.S. Department of State; four, due to the significantly contradictory nature of the various drafts of the treaty, and other relevant instruments, the question as to what exactly constituted the Kurile Islands remains unclear; and five, there are strong indications that the Allied Powers preferred not to resolve the matter of the ultimate disposition of the Kurile Islands by the
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current Russian residents of the Kurile Islands without passports or visas; visits to the graves in the Kurile Islands; and, withdrawal of Russian military troops from the Kurile Islands. Id. Treaty of Peace with Japan, art. 2(c), Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169; 136 U.N.T.S. 45, available at http://www.taiwandocuments.org/sanfrancisco01.htm [hereinafter SF Peace Treaty]. Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties, May 23, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. SF Peace Treaty art. 2(c), supra, note 19.
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Table 1. Territorial Disposition of the Kurile Islands in the Drafts of the San Francisco Peace Treaty Drafts
Territorial Disposition of the Kurile Islands
March 19, 1947
The currently disputed Kurile Islands (Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomais) were to be handed over to the Soviet Union. The currently disputed Kurile Islands were retained by Japan. This draft refrained itself from defining the Kurile Islands that Japan should cede to the Soviet Union. The currently disputed Kurile Islands were retained by Japan. The currently disputed Kurile Islands were excluded from Japanese territory, and to be ceded to the Soviet Union. The currently disputed Kurile Islands were retained by Japan. The Kurile Islands should be transferred to the Soviet Union, but the draft failed to clarify the definition of the Kurile Islands. Etorofu and Kunashiri were recognised as the Kurile Islands, thus should be transferred to the Soviet Union, while Shikotan and the Habomais were to be retained by Japan. These drafts stated Japanese acceptance of the territorial disposition over the Kurile Islands exercised by the Allied Powers, but it also failed to clarify what the reference to Kurile Islands in the provision meant. This draft manifested the cession of the Kurile Islands to the Soviet Union, but it was not clarified what was included in the definition of the Kurile Islands. This draft manifested the cession of the Kurile Islands to the Soviet Union, but it was not clarified what was included in the definition of the Kurile Islands. This draft counted Etorofu and Kunashiri as part of the Kurile Islands to be ceded to the Soviet Union, but Shikotan and the Habomais would be retained by Japan. This draft manifested the cession of the Kurile Islands to the Soviet Union, but it was not clarified what was included in the definition of the Kurile Islands. These drafts manifested a renunciation of Japanese sovereignty over the Kurile Islands without specifying who should own them. The Kurile Islands were not clearly defined.
August 5, 1947 January 8, 1948 October 13, 1949 November 2, 1949 December 8, 1949 December 19, 1949 December 29, 1949; January 3, 1950 August 7, 1950; September 11, 1950 March 12, 1951 March 17, 1951 April 7, 1951
May 3, 1951
June 14, 1951; July 3, 1951; July 20, 1951; August 13, 1951
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San Francisco Peace Treaty and, instead, left it to the future to resolve doubts through the invocation of international solutions. b. Japan’s Renunciation of Sovereignty over the Kurile Islands The status of the Kurile Islands was addressed in the San Francisco Peace Treaty. However, the Allied Powers failed to specify any particular State as the beneficiary of the Japanese renunciation, and therefore, it is unclear how the Allied Powers intended to effect the legal disposition of these territories. In treaties of peace in which the vanquished relinquish territory, such renunciation is generally made either in favour of the country to which the renounced territory is ceded, or in favour of an ultimate recipient, or in favour of the victorious power or powers designated as having the right to dispose of the sovereignty of the renounced territory. In this respect the San Francisco Peace Treaty is unusual in that Japan renounced “all right, title and claim” to the Kurile Islands, without either conveying title to any other power, or specifying any ultimate recipient, or placing the disposition of title explicitly in the hands of the victorious powers. As far as the San Francisco Peace Treaty is concerned, Japan simply renounced its rights to these territories without retaining or obtaining any legal right to the question of the subsequent disposition, seizure, or cession of these territories by any other power or powers. Thus, the salient characteristic of the situation is that Japan, by the San Francisco Peace Treaty, simply removed Japanese sovereignty from the territories in question without specifying to whom the territories were to be ceded or who had a legal right to dispose of the territories prior to definitive cession. Some Allied Powers suggested that the territorial clauses of the San Francisco Peace Treaty should not merely delimit Japanese sovereignty according to the 1945 Potsdam Proclamation, but specify precisely the ultimate disposition of the renounced Japanese territories. Since, however, it would have raised questions to which there are now no agreed answers, the San Francisco Peace Treaty did not determine the ultimate disposition of all the territories which were taken from Japan, including the Kurile Islands. In view of the lack of the Allied Powers’ unanimity on the future status of the Kurile Islands, it was agreed that, in the interests of a speedy settlement, no attempt should be made to reach a final solution of these difficult and complex questions but that the appropriate course was to have the San Francisco Peace Treaty provide only for a renunciation of Japanese sovereignty over certain agreed territories. Clearly, the course was to proceed then, so far as Japan was concerned, leaving the future to resolve doubts by invoking international solutions other than the San Francisco Peace Treaty.22
22
Dept. St. Bull. Sept. 1951, at 454–55.
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c. The Legal Effect of the Soviet Union’s Non-Signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty Russia claims that the Kurile Islands were promised to the Soviet Union by the Yalta Agreement, and that Japan accepted this decision when it accepted the Potsdam Declaration leading to Japan’s surrender in August 1945. Under the terms of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan relinquished title over the Kurile Archipelago, but the treaty did not transfer these islands to another State. Furthermore, the San Francisco Peace Treaty provided that no State that did not sign the treaty shall derive benefits from it.23 In his speech in the 2nd Plenary Session of the San Francisco Peace Conference on September 5, 1951, Andrei Gromyko, the Delegate of the Soviet Union and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated why the Soviet Union would not sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Notable among the reasons advanced were the following: questions of territorial disposition regarding the Soviet Union, including the Kurile Islands; legally non-binding status of previous international agreements, including the Yalta Agreement; lack of protective measures against Japanese re-militarism; lack of provision on the withdrawal of foreign occupation forces from Japan, notably U.S. troops; lack of clarity on the restitution of former Chinese territory, and its disposition;24 questions of reparation by Japan for the damage caused during Japanese occupation; and denial of the Soviet Union’s request for veto power over the proceedings at the San Francisco Peace Conference.25 Although, as he warned, the Soviet Union did not sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty, it is hardly conceivable to postulate any other State than the Soviet Union as the intended beneficiary of the Japanese renunciation of the Kurile Islands in the San Francisco Peace Treaty. It is indisputably supported by the history of several prior international agreements and drafting records 23 24
25
SF Peace Treaty art. 25, supra, note 19. All the countries at war with Japan, except China and Taiwan but including the Soviet Union, were invited to the San Francisco Peace Conference beginning September 4, 1951. The reason why neither China nor Taiwan was invited to the Conference was the fact that several of the Allied Powers, most notably the United Kingdom, had already recognized China and could not support Taiwan representing ‘China.’ On the other hand, it was inconceivable to invite China since it was actively engaged in warfare against the UN-sponsored allied coalition in the Korean War. Peter Berton, The Japanese-Russian Territorial Dilemma: Historical Background, Disputes, Issues, Questions, Solution Scenarios or A Thousand Scenarios for the Thousand Islands Dispute 45 (1992). Andrei Gromyko, the Delegate of the Soviet Union, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, speech at the 2nd Plenary Session of the San Francisco Peace Conference (Sept. 5, 1951), in Graham Allison et al., Beyond Cold War to Trilateral Cooperation in the AsiaPacific Region: Scenarios for New Relationships Between Japan, Russia, and the United States 126–27 (1992) for extract version of the speech [hereinafter Beyond Cold War]; see also id. at 45–46.
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during the negotiations leading to the San Francisco Peace Treaty. It can be also interpreted, at least theoretically, that Japanese renunciation of the Kurile Islands in the San Francisco Peace Treaty was tantamount to de facto recognition that these territories had been ceded to the Soviet Union which occupied them at that time.26 Nonetheless, it is also questionable whether the Soviet Union gained ownership over the Kuriles Islands in international law given its status as a nonsignatory of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Two main sources, the Vienna Convention and the San Francisco Peace Treaty itself, can be examined to clarify this matter. d. Territorial Disposition of the Kurile Islands in the San Francisco Peace Treaty Japan has a marginally better case that the currently disputed Kurile Islands have historically been Japanese, were never taken by Japan by force, and thus should in fairness be regarded as Japanese in the San Francisco peace settlement. Etorofu, Kunashiri, and Shikotan have been described in Japanese and international usage as part of the Kurile Archipelago, and it would be difficult to prove that they are not a part of the “Kurile Islands” as the term is used in the San Francisco Peace Treaty. By signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan formally renounced “all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands.” The San Francisco Peace Treaty, which conferred no rights upon the Soviet Union, because it refused to sign, did not determine the sovereignty of the territories renounced by Japan, leaving that question, as was stated by the delegates of the United States at San Francisco, to “international solvents other than this treaty.” It is the considered opinion of the United States that by virtue of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan does not have the right to determine the sovereignty over the territories renounced by it therein.27 In a strict legal sense, therefore, it is established that Japan cannot rightfully claim ownership of the Kurile Archipelago, including Etorofu, Kunashiri, and Shikotan that are clearly fitting into the terminology of either Kurile Archipelago or Kurile Islands. Japan has only rightful title to the Habomais placed outside of the currently disputed “Kurile Islands.” Most significantly, by failing to sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Russia, on the other hand, does
26
27
See Louis J. Adams, Theory, Law and Policy of Contemporary Japanese Treaties 74 (1974). There are, however, other arguable theories, such as that to the extent any residual sovereignty may remain in Japan after the renunciation, the power to perfect sovereignty in the Soviet Union rests not with Japan but with the parties to the treaty, because the renunciation ran to such parties. See Memorandum from Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Sec’y of State for Far E. Affairs, to the Sec’y of State Regarding Japan-USSR Peace Treaty Negotiations (Aug. 25, 1956) (on file with U.S. National Archives and Records Administration).
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not, and cannot, have clear legal title to the Kurile Islands (Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomais). In sum, the outcome of the territorial dispute over the Kurile Islands adjudged on the basis of the San Francisco Peace Treaty may be itemized as follows: first, there is a legal ownership vacuum on Etorofu, Kunashiri, and Shikotan, and Russia has exercised its jurisdiction over them without any international endorsement; and second, Russia should be required to return the Habomais to Japan,28 due to Japan’s rightful title to the Habomais and Russia’s legally groundless occupation of them. e. Further Observations on the Territorial Dispute over the Kurile Islands (1) The Paths to the Joint Declaration of 1956 and the Territorial Issue Talks were initiated in London in June 1955 at the Soviet Union’s initiative to normalize relations between it and Japan. From the beginning, the Soviet Union pressed for a simple declaration of the termination of the war and an exchange of envoys, with settlement of outstanding issues later, but was confronted by Japanese demands for a prior settlement of outstanding issues before resumption of relations. In negotiations extending intermittently from June 1955 to March 1956, agreement was reached on a number of clauses to a draft treaty, but an impasse developed on the territorial issue. The terms of the agreement re-establishing diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Japan, finally reached in Moscow on October 19, 1956, combined Hatoyama’s five points with most of the agreed clauses of the draft peace treaty which had been reached in the previous negotiations in London and Moscow. On the territorial issue, Shikotan and the Habomais are withheld pending the conclusion of a peace treaty, and it is not specifically provided that the status of Etorofu and Kunashiri, the heart of the previous impasse, would continue to be a subject of future negotiation.29 This situation significantly
28
29
In that context, the issue of how Russia could transfer the Habomais to Japan is another important issue to explore, since those islands were not Russia’s to start with, despite the fact that Russia regarded them as Russian territory by Allied decision and by occupation. The fact that there are no Russian civilians in the Habomais so far, however, can shed light on developing the ways to transfer the Habomais to Japan without the human factor implications. For information on the current situation of the Kurile Islands, see Oleg Bondarenko, Paper on the Contemporary Situation in the Kuril Islands, in Beyond Cold War, supra note 25, at 13. As to internal law in Russia and the resolution of the territorial issue over the Kurile Islands, it is also noted that the territory of Russia cannot be altered without an expression of the people’s will by means of a referendum according to the Declaration of State Sovereignty and the Russian Constitution. See S. Punzhin, Legal Aspects of the Resolution of the Territorial Dispute between Japan and Russia, in Beyond Cold War, supra note 25, at 34. Memorandum from Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Sec’y of State for Far E. Affairs to the Sec’y of State Regarding Normalization of Relations between Japan and the USSR (Oct. 24,
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changed, however, since the Soviet Union made an issue of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and concluded by stating that Shikotan and the Habomais would be returned to Japan only upon condition of signature of a peace treaty and departure of all foreign troops from Japan.30 (2) Influential Factors Dissuading Russia and Japan from Making Further Progress (a) Russian and Japanese Policy Factors Japanese negotiators and influential politicians, in fact, were not interested in raising the territorial issue as a priority because other questions such as entry into the United Nations and fisheries arrangements needed settling first.31 The negotiators also regarded these negotiations largely in relation to domestic Japanese political factors, including their own political futures. Therefore, their approaches to resolving the territorial issue were totally different depending on where they stood. One group, which was placed in a particularly shaky political position and had experienced a decline in political influence, was generally supporting proposals such as the following: to reach an early agreement to sign a peace treaty involving the return of only Shikotan and the Habomais; a reservation of position on Etorofu and Kunashiri by not mentioning them in the treaty; and return of all “war criminals” immediately after the signing of the treaty.32 Meanwhile, the other group, placed in the opposite position, usually had been the most outspoken advocate of hard bargaining with the Soviet Union.33 In the meantime, due to the Soviet Union’s border problems with its other neighbors, it was doubtful that it could be induced to return the disputed
30
31
32
33
1956) (on file with U.S. National Archives and Records Administration); Peace Declaration, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1956. Incoming Telegram from U.S. Embassy, Moscow, USNARA/Doc. No.: 661.94/1-2860 EMW (Jan. 28, 1960) (on file with U.S. National Archives and Records Administration). Memorandum of Conversation Regarding Japanese-Soviet Relations, USNARA/Doc. No.: 661.941/10-3056 CJC (Oct. 30, 1956) (on file with U.S. National Archives and Records Administration). Memorandum of Conversation Regarding Japanese-Soviet Negotiations in London, USNARA/ Doc. No.: 661.94/2-156 CSBM (Feb. 1, 1956) (on file with U.S. National Archives and Records Administration). Office Memorandum from Noel Hemmendinger, Acting Dir. of the Office of Ne. Asian Affairs, to Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Sec’y of State for Far E. Affairs Regarding JapanUSSR Negotiations (Sept. 16, 1955) (on file with U.S. National Archives and Records Administration); Memorandum of Conversation Regarding Soviet-Japanese Negotiations in Moscow, USNARA/Doc. No.: 661.941/8-1056 CS/K (Aug. 10, 1956) (on file with U.S. National Archives and Records Administration).
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islands under any circumstances short of war, in part because of the dangerous precedent this would set for Soviet borders in other areas.34 (b) United States Foreign Policy Factor The U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to the ratification of the San Francisco Peace Treaty with the following declarations: As part of such advice and consent the Senate states that nothing the treaty contains is deemed to diminish or prejudice, in favor of the Soviet Union, the right, title, and interest of Japan, or the Allied Powers as defined in said treaty, in and to South Sakhalin and its adjacent islands, the Kurile Islands, the Habomai Islands, the island of Shikotan, or any other territory, rights, or interests, possessed by Japan on December 7, 1941, or to confer any right, title, or benefit therein or thereto on the Soviet Union; and also that nothing in the said treaty, or the advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification thereof, implies recognition on the part of the United States of the provisions in favor of the Soviet Union contained in the so-called ‘Yalta agreement’ regarding Japan of February 11, 1945.35
34
35
State of Department Airgram Regarding Northern Territories’ Issues, State Dep’t File No. Pol 19 Kuril Is, State Dep’t Records, Record Group 59 (Nov. 25, 1970) (on file with U.S. National Archives and Records Administration); Punzhin, supra note 28. See also Telegram from U.S. Embassy, Moscow to Dep’t State, USNARA/Doc. No.: Pol 32-6 Japan-USSR (June 22, 1964) (The U.S. intelligence report observed that with Chinese help territorial problems were apparently beginning to bedevil Soviet diplomacy. In particular, it noted that in talks with Japanese socialists, China supported Japanese claims to the Kurile Islands, and that the Soviet Union took too much land on Amur and in Eastern Europe. This report also suggested that the Soviet Union might well be concerned that concession of the Kurile Islands to Japan might strengthen the Chinese position on border issues and might be beginning to fear that such concession might embolden some Eastern Europeans to challenge the Soviet Union’s World War II territorial gains). Memorandum, Kurile Islands, State Dep’t Decimal File No. 661.941/8-356, State Dep’t Records, Record Group 59 (Aug. 3, 1956) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration). See also U.S. Cong., Foreign Relations Comm., 82d Cong., 2d Session, Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations on Executives A, B, C, and D: Japanese Peace Treaty and Other Treaties Relating to Security in the Pacific. 9. Territorial Provisions . . . It is important to remember that article 2 is a renunciatory article and makes no provision for the power or powers which are to succeed Japan in the possession of and sovereignty over the ceded territory. During the negotiation of the treaty some of the Allied Powers expressed the view that article 2 of the treaty should not only relieve Japan of its sovereignty over the territories in question but should indicate specifically what disposition was to be made of each of them. The committee believes, however, that this would have been an unwise course to pursue. It might have raised differences among the Allies which would have complicated and prolonged the conclusion of the peace. Under the circumstances it seems far better to have the treaty enter into force now, leaving to the future the final disposition of such areas as . . . the Kuriles . . . .
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As is vividly expressed, the U.S. position as to the Japan-Soviet negotiations was that if Japan recognized Soviet sovereignty over the Kurile Islands, the United States would have to reserve its rights under Article 26 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty to assert sovereignty over the Ryukyus.36 This stance was repeated consistently and delivered to Japan through various channels. On the question of what the U.S. attitude would be if Japan were to agree that it had no objection to the Soviet Union obtaining sovereignty over the Kurile Islands and other territories, Mr. William J. Sebald, then Acting Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Department of State, Far Eastern Affairs, responded that Japan had renounced all rights to the Kurile Archipelago by Article 2 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and therefore, Japan was in no position to transfer sovereignty to anybody. He further emphasized that if the Japanese agreed to transfer sovereignty over the Kurile Islands to the Soviet Union, it would seem that they were giving the Soviet Union treatment more favorable than that provided in the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Therefore, then, he concluded that the United States would have to reserve its rights under Article 26 of the treaty, and such rights might be interpreted to include the Ryukyus and the other territories.37 One of the numerous internal memoranda of the U.S. Department of State on this issue crystallized its position on upholding the status quo as follows: [Any] United States action supporting Japan’s claim to the Kuriles might appear to reflect on our position under the San Francisco Treaty in the Ryukyus . . . which Japan also renounced under the treaty; encouragement of Japanese irredentism in the north might also encourage it in the south; the hostile presence of the Soviet Union on Japan’s northern border will serve as a constant irritant in their relations.38
The optimal conditions for the U.S. foreign policy in East Asia, in particular during the period of the Cold War, could thus best be achieved by dissuading Japan from purporting to recognize Soviet sovereignty over the Kurile Islands. In other words, the United States weighed its political advantages from the position that it would assert further interests over Japanese territory. This U.S. position resorted to using Article 26 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty – that is, even if Japan does accord such recognition to the Soviet Union’s claims, it appeared possible for the United States to maintain that there would be no change in the status of the territories that resulted from the 36 37
38
Memorandum, Robertson Regarding Japan-USSR Peace Treaty Negotiations, supra note 27. Memorandum of Conversation by William J. Sebald, Acting Assistant Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of State, Far E. Affairs (Aug. 13, 1956) (on file with U.S. National Archives and Records Administration). Memorandum from William J. Sebald, Deputy Assistant Sec’y of State for Far E. Affairs to Robert D. Murphy, Deputy Under Sec’y of State for Political Affairs Regarding Japan-USSR Relations (Apr. 20, 1955) (on file with U.S. National Archives and Records Administration).
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San Francisco Peace Treaty.39 This resulted in various repercussions. On the one hand, as a legal matter, whether such recognition by Japan gave the United States the right to claim sovereignty over the Ryukyus would be highly doubtful in view of the difference in treatment of these territories in Articles 2 and 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.40 Furthermore, there also appeared to be nothing significantly relevant in this respect, since Article 26 was designed mainly to grant nations making treaties with Japan after conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty the same rights as the signatories of that treaty and conversely to prevent any post-San Francisco signatories from getting advantages, particularly economic, not granted to the signatories at San Francisco.41 On the other hand, there were political implications. It was reported that some members of the Hatoyama delegation were pleased that there had been no definite mention of Etorofu and Kunashiri in the agreements which had been signed on October 19, 1956, since there would be the possibility that Russia could make a stronger connection between their possible release of Etorofu and Kunashiri and the requirement that the United States return the Ryukyus and the other territories, including Bonin Islands. In other words, the thought allegedly expressed was perhaps that Russia could force the United States to do for Japan what the Japanese had been unable to accomplish.42 U.S. involvement and influence, as mentioned earlier, emphasized the multilateral character of the territorial dispute over the Kurile Islands. However, notwithstanding Article 26 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, as previous experiences of concluding separate peace treaties between Japan and China,43 Japan and Taiwan,44 and so on, demonstrate, the greater obstacle is reaching an agreement between the claimants themselves.
39 40 41
42
43
44
Memorandum, Robertson Regarding Japan-USSR Peace Treaty Negotiations, supra note 27. Id. Memorandum from W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant for Intelligence to the Sec’y of State to William J. Sebald, Deputy Assistant Sec’y of State for Far E. Affairs Regarding Current Soviet Intentions toward Japan (Feb. 23, 1955) (on file with U.S. National Archives and Records Administration). Memorandum of Conversation Regarding Japanese-Soviet Negotiations for Establishing Diplomatic Relations, USNARA/Doc. No.: 661.941/10-2656 CS/K (Oct. 26, 1956) (on file with U.S. National Archives and Records Administration). Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People’s Republic of China, Aug. 12, 1978, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1054–55 (1978), available at http://www.taiwandocuments.org/ beijing.htm. Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan, signed at Taipei, Apr. 28, 1952, 138 U.N.T.S. 3, 38–44, available at http://www.taiwandocuments.org/taipei01.htm.
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2. Territorial Disputes among Japan, China, and Taiwan Concerning the Senkaku Islands a. Territorial Arrangements for the Senkaku Islands under the San Francisco Peace Treaty The term Senkaku Islands, or any Chinese or Western name corresponding to the name conventionally used, did not appear specifically in the territorial clauses of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Further, the Senkaku Islands were not mentioned specifically in any international agreement, and apparently were ignored internationally until the awakening of interests in oil explorations of the continental shelf in 1969. However, the drafts of the San Francisco Peace Treaty could shed some light on the issue. As to the Senkaku Islands, the territorial provisions in the San Francisco Peace Treaty can be categorized into two parts: (1) the territorial limits of Japan, and territorial disposition of Taiwan; and (2) U.N. trusteeship over the Senkaku Islands. By mentioning the specific islands Japan should cede to China, and delineating Taiwan through latitude and longitude, the drafters of the San Francisco Peace Treaty did not include the Senkaku Islands as China or Taiwan’s territory. In other words, putting aside the question of whether the drafters designated the Senkaku Islands as parts of the Ryukyu Islands, it was manifested that the Senkaku Islands were not envisaged as a part of China or Taiwan. In the successive drafts of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, provisions on the Senkaku Islands dealt more with the introduction of U.N. trusteeship over the islands rather than with their territorial disposition. The first available draft of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, dated March 19, 1947, provided that “Japan hereby renounces all rights and titles to the Ryukyu Islands forming part of Okinawa Prefecture, and to Daito and Rasa Islands.”45 By this draft, Japan also renounced the Senkaku Islands since the Senkaku Islands are part of the Ryukyu Islands, in particular Okinawa Prefecture. With regard to the Senkaku Islands defined in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the following points could be noted: first, as mentioned earlier, the term Senkaku Islands, or any Chinese or Western name corresponding to the name conventionally used, did not appear specifically in the territorial clauses of the San Francisco Peace Treaty; second, the Senkaku Islands were not included as either Chinese or Taiwanese or Japanese territory by the drafters of the San Francisco Peace Treaty; third, Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty did not, to the point of specificity, define the territories that were placed within the area of U.N. trusteeship with the United States as the sole administering authority, 45
Memorandum from Dean G. Acheson under Sec’y of State to General MacArthur Regarding Outline and Various Sections of Draft Treaty art. 7 (Mar. 20, 1947) (on file with U.S. National Archives and Records Administration).
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due to the fact that the boundaries of the Ryukyu Islands had never been previously legally defined; and further, the precise demarcation and delineation of the area of the Ryukyu Islands have also been subject to disputes between claimants and interested parties; and fourth, throughout the drafts, in particular in the earlier drafts, there are strong assumptions that Japan renounced all rights and title to the Ryukyu Islands south of 29º N. latitude, an area which includes the disputed Senkaku Islands. b. Implications of Okinawa Reversion Treaty The Okinawa Reversion Treaty signed by the United States and Japan on June 17, 1971, which included the Senkaku Islands as part of Okinawa to be returned to Japan, brought the Senkaku Islands dispute back into the limelight, with immediate challenges by both China and Taiwan. As to the status of the Senkaku Islands, the U.S. Department of State has consistently maintained the following positions: first, the term “Nansei Shoto” as used in Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty was intended to include the Senkaku Islands. Nansei Shoto, as used in the treaty, refers to all islands south of 29° N. latitude, under Japanese administration at end of World War II, that were not otherwise specifically referred to in the treaty;46 second, under the treaty, the United States administered the Senkaku Islands as part of the Ryukyu Islands, but considered that residual sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands remained with Japan;47 and third, though Japan would then have full right to her territories, the U.S. government considered that any conflicting claims to the Senkaku Islands were a matter for resolution by the parties concerned.48 Therefore, the United States assumed administration of all the islands in the area stipulated in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, including the Senkaku Islands, without reference to sovereignty questions. The general assumption that they were part of the Ryukyu Islands was not challenged by Taiwan until 1970. In sum, the United States had taken no position on sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, stated that the United States returned them to Japanese administration with the rest of the Ryukyu Islands in 1972, and reiterated that “any dispute over sovereignty should be settled by the parties themselves, or, if they wish, by third party adjudication.”49
46
47
48 49
Senkakus Dispute, USNARA/Doc. No.: Pol 32-6 Senkaku Is 051240 (Mar. 25, 1972) (on file with U.S. National Archives and Records Administration). Telegram Regarding Continental Shelf, USNARA/Doc. No.: Pol 32–6 Senkaku Is; XR Pol 33 China Sea (Aug. 11, 1970) (on file with U.S. National Archives and Records Administration). Senkakus Dispute, supra note 46. Telegram Regarding Senkakus Dispute, USNARA/Doc. No.: Pol 32–6 Senkaku Is; Taipei 2803 (June 9, 1971) (on file with U.S. National Archives and Records Administration).
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Although the United States recognized the residual sovereignty of Japan over Nansei Shoto, including the Senkaku Islands, which the United States administered pursuant to Article 3 of San Francisco Peace Treaty, it was also the U.S. position, however, that the treaty alone was not necessarily the final determinant of the sovereignty issue.50 In other words, in the event a dispute over sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands arose, neither the San Francisco Peace Treaty nor the Okinawa Reversion Treaty would be dispositive of the dispute, which would have to be resolved by the claimants or, if they choose, through third party adjudication, such as by the International Court of Justice (hereinafter ICJ).51 3. Territorial Disputes between Korea and Japan Over the Liancourt Rocks a. Drafts of the Territorial Clause of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and their Implications Based on the implications of the relevant legal instruments preceding the San Francisco Peace Treaty mentioned above, a careful interpretation of how a series of drafts defined the terms of the San Francisco Peace Treaty regarding the Liancourt Rocks will be analyzed below. The first available draft of the territorial clause on the Liancourt Rocks dated March 19, 194752 provided that “Japan hereby renounces all rights and titles to Korea and all minor offshore Korean islands, including Quelpart Island, Port Hamilton, Dagelet (Utsuryo) Island and Liancourt Rock (Takeshima). . . .”53 This inclusion of the Liancourt
50
51
52
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Telegram Regarding Senkaku Islands, USNARA/Doc. No.: Pol 32–6 Senkaku Is; XR Pol 33 China Sea (Sept. 14, 1970) (on file with U.S. National Archives and Records Administration). See also Memorandum to Henry A. Kissinger Regarding Farewell Call on the President by Ambassador Chow Shu-kai of the Republic of China and Supplementary Talking Points for Courtesy Call by Chinese Ambassador Chow Shu-kai (Apr. 10, 1971) (on file with U.S. National Archives and Records Administration). (It is the U.S. position that neither the San Francisco Peace Treaty nor the Okinawa Reversion Treaty is necessarily the final determinant of sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands). Telegram Regarding Senkaku Islands, USNARA/Doc. No.: Pol 32–6 Senkaku Is; XR Pol 19 Ryukyu Is (Aug. 19, 1970) (on file with U.S. National Archives and Records Administration); Telegram Regarding Senkaku Islands, id. (Sept. 14, 1970) (on file with U.S. National Archives and Records Administration). Memorandum from Dean G. Acheson, under Sec’y of State to General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Regarding Outline and Various Sections of Draft Treaty (Mar. 20, 1947) (on file with U.S. National Archives and Records Administration). There is the possibility that earlier drafts existed, though their contents on the territorial disposition were identical. See Memorandum by Samuel W. Boggs, Special Adviser on Geography, Office of Intelligence Research Regarding Disposition of the Kuriles in the Treaty with Japan (July, 23, 1947) (citing the treaty draft dated on Feb. 3, 1947) (on file with author). SF Peace Treaty, supra note 19, art. 4.
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Rocks as Korean territory continued throughout the drafts of August 5, 1947;54 January 8, 1948;55 October 13, 1949;56 and November 2, 1949.57 Concerning the above provisions in the previous drafts, William J. Sebald, the U.S. Political Adviser for Japan, recommended a reconsideration of the Liancourt Rocks pointing out that it was considered of high importance, because according to him, “Japan’s [claim] to these islands is old and appears valid. Security considerations might conceivably envisage weather and radar stations thereon.”58 He further commented: It is suggested that Liancourt Rocks . . . be specified in our proposed Article 3 as belonging to Japan. Japan’s [claim] to these islands is old and appears valid, and it is difficult to regard them as islands off the shore of Korea. Security considerations might also conceivably render the provision of weather and radar stations on these islands a matter of interest to the United States.59
Though the effect of this memorandum on the territorial disposition of the Liancourt Rocks was not obviously addressed in other diplomatic documents, the position of the drafters of the San Francisco Peace Treaty was reversed in subsequent drafts. In the meantime, the pattern of designating either Korea or Japan as the recipient of the Liancourt Rocks changed, and no further reference was made to the Liancourt Rocks in the subsequent drafts. This has led to self-serving interpretations by both claimants relying on different versions of earlier drafts in the absence of a definitive disposition of the Liancourt Rocks in the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The adoption of this pattern was the reflection of compromise, as shown below, between the Commonwealth Japanese Treaty Working Party and the U.S. Department of State’s new stance, including Secretary Dulles’ proposed shortened version of the draft.
54
55
56
57
58
59
Office Memorandum from Hugh Borton, Special Assistant to the Dir., Office of Far E. Affairs to Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor of the Dep’t of State Regarding Draft Treaty of Peace for Japan (Aug. 6, 1947) (on file with U.S. National Archives and Records Administration). Memorandum Regarding Background of Draft of Japanese Peace Treaty, State Dep’t Decimal File No. 740.0011 PW (PEACE)/1-3048 CS/W, State Dep’t Records, Record Group 59 (Jan. 30, 1948) (on file with U.S. National Archives and Records Administration). Office Memorandum Regarding Attached Treaty Draft, State Dep’t Decimal File No. 740.0011 PW (PEACE)/10-1449, State Dep’t Records, Record Group 59 (Oct. 14, 1949) (on file with U.S. National Archives and Records Administration). Commentary on Treaty of Peace with Japan (Nov. 2, 1949) (on file with U.S. National Archives and Records Administration). Telegram from William J. Sebald, U.S. POLAD for Japan to Secretary of State (Nov. 14, 1949) (on file with U.S. National Archives and Records Administration). Commentary on Treaty of Peace with Japan, State Dep’t Records, Record Group 59 (Nov. 2, 1949) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration).
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Among the list of general areas of agreement reached by the Commonwealth Japanese Treaty Working Party in London is an item on “Territories to be taken from Japan need not be mentioned in a Peace Treaty.”60 On other territorial issues, it was generally agreed by the Commonwealth Japanese Treaty Working Party that: first, Japanese sovereignty would be confined to the four main islands and to a number of adjacent minor islands whose precise definition would be a matter for the Peace Conference; and second, the disposition of the territories to be ceded by Japan need not be dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty itself. In the treaty Japan might merely renounce all claims to the ceded territories.61 When Japan agreed in Article 2 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty to renounce “all right, title and claim to Korea, including the islands Quelpart, Port Hamilton, and Dagelet,” the drafters of the treaty did not include the Liancourt Rocks within the area to be renounced. Japan has, and with reason, assumed that its sovereignty still extends over the Liancourt Rocks, and the Koreans have disputed this assumption.62 Therefore, as Charney pointed out, “There is even a dispute over whether by implication or, by general terms, the victors in World War II intended to return the disputed [Liancourt Rocks] to Korea.”63 During the course of drafting the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Korea’s views were solicited, in consequence of which, the Korean Ambassador requested the U.S. Secretary of State in a letter of July 19, 1951 to amend Article 2(a) of the draft treaty so as to include the Liancourt Rocks as well as Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet among those islands over which Japan would renounce right, title, and claim by virtue of recognizing Korea’s independence. In his reply to the Korean Ambassador dated August 10, 1951, Dean Rusk, the Assistant Secretary of State, stated that the United States could not concur in the proposed amendment as it applied to the Liancourt Rocks since, according to his information, the Liancourt Rocks had never been treated as a part of Korea,
60
61
62
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Memorandum by Mr. John M. Allison, U.S. Del. to the United Nations (May 25, 1950) (on file with author); Memorandum by Mr. Hamilton, U.S. Representative on the Far E. Comm’n Regarding Territorial Provisions in Peace Treaty with Japan (May 26, 1950) (on file with author). British Embassy, Washington, D.C., U.S., Commonwealth Working Party on Japanese Peace Treaty: Report of the Commonwealth Working Party at 8 (Cabinet Office, S.W.1) (May 17, 1950) (on file with U.S. National Archives and Records Administration). Foreign Service Despatch from John M. Steeves, First Secretary of U.S. Embassy in Japan, Koreans on Liancourt Rocks, State Dep’t Decimal File No. 694.9513/10-352, State Dep’t Records, Record Group 59 (Oct. 3, 1952) (on file with U.S. National Archives and Records Administration). J.I. Charney, Probable Future Outcomes of Some Island Disputes around Japan: Comments 161 (unpublished paper presented at the Annual Conference on “Maritime Boundary Issues and Islands Disputes in the East Asian Region” in Pusan, Korea) (Aug. 4, 1997).
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Table 2. Territorial Disposition of the Liancourt Rocks in the Drafts of the San Francisco Peace Treaty Drafts
Territorial Disposition Note of the Liancourt Rocks
March 19, 1947 August 5, 1947 January 8, 1948 October 13, 1949 November 2, 1949 December 8, 1949
Japanese Japanese Japanese Japanese Japanese Japanese
December 19, 1949 December 29, 1949 January 3, 1950
Korean territory Japanese territory Japanese territory
August 7, 1950 September 11, 1950 March 12, 1951 March 17, 1951 April 7, 1951 May 3, 1951 June 14, 1951 July 3, 1951 July 20, 1951 August 13, 1951
N/A N/A N/A N/A Japanese territory N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
renunciation renunciation renunciation renunciation renunciation territory
Incoming Telegram by William J. Sebald (US POLAD for Japan) to U.S. Secretary of State, November 14, 1949 The Commonwealth Japanese Treaty Working Party: “Territories to be taken from Japan need not be mentioned in a Peace Treaty;” Secretary Dulles’ proposed shortened version of the draft
and they had been under the jurisdiction of the Oki Islands Branch Office of Japan’s Shimane Prefecture since 1905 and it did not appear that they had ever before been claimed by Korea. As a result, Article 2(a) of the San Francisco Peace Treaty made no mention of the Liancourt Rocks.64 Accordingly, it appeared that the United States viewed that the San Francisco Peace Treaty constituted a determination of the “minor islands” to be left to Japan under the Potsdam Declaration, and that the treaty left the Liancourt Rocks to Japan. The United States remarked however that the U.S. view was simply that of one of the several signatories of the treaty, and that Article 22 of
64
Letter from Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Dir., Office of Ne. Asian Affairs to U.S. Embassy in Korea (Nov. 5, 1952) (on file with author).
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the San Francisco Peace Treaty, providing for reference to the ICJ, was drafted in order to settle the disputes deriving from the treaty.65 In determining what course of action should be taken in light of this development, the question arose whether the statement made in Assistant Secretary Rusk’s letter entailed the legal conclusion that the San Francisco Peace Treaty left the Liancourt Rocks to Japan. On the one hand, it may be argued that the determination of the minor islands to be left under Japanese sovereignty required by the Potsdam Proclamation has been made by the treaty, i.e., Japan retained everything not renounced under Article 2, that Korea, prior to the signing of the treaty specifically asked for a renunciation of the Liancourt Rocks by Japan and was turned down and that therefore it was the intent of the drafters of the treaty that Japan did not renounce the Liancourt Rocks, and that these islands were accordingly included in the minor islands determined to remain under Japanese sovereignty. On the other hand, it may be argued that Assistant Secretary Rusk’s letter refusing to include the Liancourt Rocks in the enumeration of islands renounced in connection with the renunciation of Korea was based on the U.S. understanding of the historical facts, providing that “Dokdo . . . was according to our information never treated as part of Korea” [emphasis in original], and that his statement left the door open to Korea to show that it had in fact treated the Liancourt Rocks as part of Korea prior to 1905, when the Japanese placed the Liancourt Rocks under the jurisdiction of Japan’s Shimane Prefecture. Under this theory Korea would still be free to establish legally, if it could, that the “Korea” renounced in the San Francisco Peace Treaty included the Liancourt Rocks.66 This is all the more so given that the reports on the Liancourt Rocks were based for the most part on Japanese language references available in the Department of State and the Library of Congress, and the studies prepared within the Department of State and by the Japanese Foreign Office on some of the islands.67 b. The United States’ Response to the Territorial Dispute over the Liancourt Rocks Despite the U.S. view that the San Francisco Peace Treaty left the Liancourt Rocks to Japan, and had so informed the Korean Ambassador in Washington,68
65
66 67
68
Conflicting Korean – Japanese Claims to Dokdo Island (Otherwise Known as Takeshima or Liancourt Rocks) (Aug. 26, 1954) (on file with author); SF Peace Treaty art. 22, supra note 19. For the full text of this article, see ch. III n. 94. Id. Division of Research for Far East, Office of Intelligence Research, State of Dep’t, DRF Information Paper Notes on Certain Islands Adjacent to or Formerly Occupied by Japan (Unedited Draft), State Dep’t Records, Record Group 59 (Apr. 19, 1950) (on file with author). Letter from Dean Rusk, Assistant Sec’y of State to You Chan Yang, Korean Ambassador in Washington, D.C., U.S. (Aug. 9, 1951) (on file with U.S. National Archives and Records Administration).
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it was also evident that the United States was aware of the fact that its status was unsettled and in dispute.69 Accordingly, it seemed highly doubtful that the United States would wish to become involved in the controversy by taking a position as to whether Korea or Japan had sovereignty over the Liancourt Rocks. Although the United States proclaimed that it would not become involved in any territorial dispute arising from the Liancourt Rocks, in view of the position already taken by SCAP, by Assistant Secretary Rusk in a note dated August 10, 1951 to the Korean Ambassador in Washington D.C.,70 and by designating these rocks as a Japanese facility by a U.S.-Japan Joint Committee,71 the United States is already “inescapably involved” in the Liancourt Rocks dispute.72 Furthermore, under certain circumstances, if and when it should appear necessary for the United States to take a position on this issue, the position of the United States was to publicize the Rusk note and disclaim any desire to intervene in this matter.73 69
70
71
72
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Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Area Authorized for Japanese Fishing and Whaling, SCAPIN (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Instruction Note) No. 1033 (June 22, 1946) (on file with U.S. National Archives and Records Administration). See also Letter from Lt. Gen. Doyle O. Hickey, Gen. Staff, Chief of Staff to E. Allan Lightner, Jr., Charge d’Affaires, ad interim in U.S. Embassy in Korea (Nov. 27, 1952) (on file with author). For the skeptical U.S. response against Korean claims, see Use of Disputed Territory (Tokto Island) as Live Bombing Area, State Dep’t Records, Record Group 59, (Oct. 15, 1952) (on file with U.S. National Archives and Records Administration). This position has never been formally communicated to the Japanese government. Memorandum Regarding Possible Methods of Resolving Liancourt Rocks Dispute between Japan and the Republic of Korea, USNARA/694.9513/7-2253 (July 22, 1953) (on file with U.S. National Archives and Records Administration) [hereinafter Memorandum Regarding Possible Methods of Resolving Liancourt Rocks Dispute]. Outgoing Telegram to U.S. Embassy, Korea, USNARA/694.9513/11-1452 (Nov. 14, 1952) (on file with U.S. National Archives and Records Administration); Note No. 187 from U.S. Embassy in Korea to R.O.K. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Dec. 4, 1952) (on file with author); Memorandum of Conversation Regarding Liancourt Rocks, USNARA/694.95B/11-1754 CSBM (Nov. 17, 1954) (on file with U.S. National Archives and Records Administration) (Minister Shigenobu Shima, Japanese Embassy in Washington, DC, noted that the U.S. military forces in Japan had listed Liancourt Rocks as a military facility granted for their use under the Administrative Agreement and had later returned this facility to Japanese control. Mr. Shima said this appeared to constitute U.S. recognition of the validity of Japan’s claim). Memorandum by William T. Turner, Charge d’Affaires, U.S. Embassy in Japan Regarding Liancourt Rocks (Takeshima Island) Controversy, (Nov. 30, 1953) (on file with author) [hereinafter Memorandum by Turner in 1953]; Memorandum by Turner (Nov. 17, 1954). (William J. Sebald, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Far Eastern Affairs, expressed the view that it was important for Japan to keep its claim alive and not to permit its rights to be prejudiced by default. He suggested that a note to Korea or other periodic formal statements would serve this purpose). Memorandum by Turner in 1953, supra note 72.
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Both Korea and Japan, the two disputants, were well aware of the United States’ hands-off policy toward the territorial dispute over the Liancourt Rocks. However, efforts to rely on the influence of the United States had continuously been attempted, especially by Japan.74 The United States itself explored, particularly at the instance of Japan, several scenarios in the event that the need arose for it to play an active role in the resolution of the dispute. These included
74
The legal implication of the U.S. position on the issue of the sovereignty of the Liancourt Rocks should be understood in conjunction with the fact that the United States, initially the U.S. Department of State, took the primary role to draft the San Francisco Peace Treaty for the purpose of designing the post-World War II territorial configurations in East Asia. This is all the more so given that U.S. political influence has dominated bilateral relations between claimants, Korea and Japan, and the United States beyond the material periods. For the drafting of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the U.S. government set up working groups within the Department of State. They regularly met to discuss specific topics, make reports according to their timetable, and submit them to the Department of State and relevant organizations for circulation and further consideration. Among them, the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East (hereinafter ‘Inter-Divisional Area Committee’) was both a product of and a contributor to the post-war planning program of the Department of State. By the autumn of 1943, general discussion of post-war policy within the Department of State had already reached an advanced stage. The Inter-Divisional Area Committee began its meeting in October 1943, and until February 1944, it held some twenty-seven sessions. In the course of these twenty-seven meetings, the Inter-Divisional Area Committee agreed on the preferred solutions to some thirty post-war problems, and postponed two questions – the future of Portuguese Timor and the Japanese mandated islands – for further discussion, see U.S. Dep’t of State, Report on the Work of the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East, Oct. 1, 1943 – Feb. 1, 1944: Division of Japanese Affairs 13 (on file with author). As far as its relationship with the other policymaking committees in the Department of State and the government was concerned, the Inter-Divisional Area Committee was the “working committee” of the Department of State. It was in this group that the basic task of obtaining agreement among the important “middle-group” of officers of the Department of State was accomplished. It was the drafting body for the preliminary papers, which meant that it considered, corrected, and reviewed the work of individual officers. It was therefore the first important step in the long process of obtaining the approval of a particular policy within the Department of State. For this reason, the work of the Committee was exceptionally important. Id. at 14–5. In the hierarchy of the committee system that developed for the formulation of the post-war policy of the U.S. government, the Inter-Divisional Area Committee occupied a position at the bottom of the pyramid. Depending upon the procedure in effect at various times during 1944–45, the papers of the Committee would generally be submitted to the Post War Programs Committee, to the Policy Committee, or to the Staff Committee. Depending upon the decision of these higher groups, the papers would then go to the President or State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee for further consideration or be held in the Department of State pending developments. There were, of course, many changes in the papers after they left the Inter-Divisional Area Committee, but these papers were given their first definite formulation in this group and hence their most extensive consideration. In this latter sense in particular, the Inter-Divisional Area Committee was the pivotal “Working Committee” in the post-war planning program of the Far East. Id. at 15.
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a request for U.S. mediation, submission to the ICJ, submission to the U.N. Security Council, and even a request for U.S. military intervention based on their security treaty. In sum, the United States maintained its position according to its preferential order as follows: first, the United States would take no action inasmuch as both governments would try to settle the dispute by direct negotiation; second, if the Japanese government requested the U.S. government to act as a mediator in this dispute, the United States would refuse, and instead suggest that the matter might appropriately be referred to the ICJ. The United States could inform the Japanese government that this procedure might be preferable to submitting it to the United Nations; and third, if the Japanese government requested the legal opinion of the U.S. government on this question, the United States would make available to the Japanese government the U.S. position on the Liancourt Rocks as stated in the Rusk note of August 10, 1951,75 and recommend adjudication by the ICJ.76
IV. Conclusion Despite the emphasis that very careful drafting of the territorial clauses of the San Francisco Peace Treaty was to be made in order to ensure that no islands would be left in disputed sovereignty, today, half a century after conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, its uncertain legacy is still evident in East Asia. This is particularly so given that historical facts did not count as a major factor in the post-World War II territorial dispositions in East Asia. Territorial dispositions by the San Francisco Peace Treaty were largely reflective of the Allied Powers’ policy in the post-World War II territorial arrangements in East Asia without serious consideration of the interests of the local rival claimants to title over specific territories. The fact that they were more concerned about their own geo-political and strategic interests resulted in outcomes perpetuating the current territorial disputes in East Asia.
75
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Memorandum Regarding Possible Methods of Resolving Liancourt Rocks Dispute, supra note 70. Outgoing Telegram by Dean Rusk, Sec’y of State to U.S. Embassies in Korea and Japan (Mar. 27, 1961) (on file with U.S. National Archives and Records Administration); see also Outgoing Telegram to U.S. Embassies in Korea and Japan by John F. Dulles, Sec’y of State (Dec. 8, 1953) (on file with U.S. National Archives and Records Administration) (“Issue seems less acute at moment so perhaps no action on our part required. However in case issue revived believe our general line should be that this issue, if it cannot be settled by Japanese and Koreans themselves, is kind of issue appropriate for presentation International Court of Justice”).
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The ongoing territorial disputes in East Asia, as this research demonstrates, involve intertwined political and legal issues. In other words, these three territorial disputes have multi-faceted implications for the disputants on the one hand, and for disputants and the interested powers, notably the United States on the other. The rivalry between the United States and the then-Soviet Union in the period of Cold War, and afterward with Russia; the U.S.’s complicated stance against the cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan; and the U.S.’s hands-off policy against the territorial disputes between Korea and Japan are only partial examples of U.S. involvements in the territorial disputes in East Asia. This is all the more so given that regional stability in East Asia has been largely influenced by U.S. security interests. Geographically and geo-politically, the East Asian region has maintained its notorious reputation for the most complexity in the field of territorial and maritime disputes among its neighboring countries. It also can be said that the legal issues of the East Asian region involve many aspects of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter UNCLOS).77 Given the exercise of maritime jurisdiction in the form of territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf to islands and, in some cases, rocks, the outcome of maritime boundary disputes often depends on ownership and the classification of such features as an island or a rock sustaining human habitation or economic life. In sum, “territorial issues determine matters of maritime delimitation. Territorial disputes have their roots in the past whereas maritime delimitation is future-oriented once the territorial issues have been settled.”78 As to the determination of the question of sovereignty by applying the general understanding of constituting a valid claim to territory from the perspective of international law, the outcome of this research indicates as follows:
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All claimants, with the exception of Taiwan (given its questionable status it does not appear to be eligible to be a party to the UNCLOS), ratified the new 1982 UNCLOS. The dates of ratification of UNCLOS by the disputants over the three islands in East Asia are as follows: China (June 7, 1996; with declaration), Japan (June 20, 1996), Korea (January 29, 1996), and Russia (March 12, 1997; with declaration) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 396, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXXI/treaty6.asp. See also A.E. Boyle, UNCLOS, ITLOS and the Settlement of Maritime Boundary Disputes between Taiwan and Japan, in International Law Conference on the Dispute over Diaoyu/ Senkaku Island (Taiwan Law Soc. & Taiwan Institute Int’l Law eds., 1997). Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), 1994 I.C.J. 112, 226 (July 1), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iqb/iqbframe. htm (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans).
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By evaluating historical records and other evidence, it is reasonable to reach the conclusion that Japan cannot rightfully claim ownership of the Kurile Archipelago, including Etorofu, Kunashiri, and Shikotan, that clearly fit the terminology of either Kurile Archipelago or Kurile Islands. Japan has only a rightful title to the Habomais placed outside of the currently disputed “Kurile Islands.” Most significantly, by failing to sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Russia, on the other hand, does not, and cannot, have clear legal title to the Kurile Islands (Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomais) thereunder. In sum, the outcome of the territorial dispute over the Kurile Islands may be itemized as follows: first, there is a legal ownership vacuum on Etorofu, Kunashiri, and Shikotan, and Russia has exercised its jurisdiction over them without any international endorsement; and second, Russia should be required to return the Habomais to Japan, due to Japan’s rightful title to the Habomais and Russia’s legally groundless occupation of them. Meanwhile, the presence of a significant Russian population on the islands for over half a century introduces an additional legal dimension of the principle of self-determination. As regards to the Senkaku Islands, the detailed evidence produced by the Chinese side coupled with the fact that the islands in question are remote, isolated, and uninhabited, place China and Taiwan in a stronger position than Japan, at least up until January 1895, when Japan incorporated the islands into Japanese territory. This is all the more so given that Japan has produced virtually no evidence of its sovereign activities over the Senkaku Islands, despite the fact that the probative value of the submitted Chinese historical evidence can also be questioned given its nature. With regard to the Senkaku Islands defined in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the Senkaku Islands were not included as either Chinese and Taiwanese or Japanese territory by the drafters of the San Francisco Peace Treaty; and, Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty did not, to the point of specificity, define the territories that were placed within the area of the U.N. trusteeship with the United States as the sole administering authority. However, China and Taiwan’s virtual inaction over the Senkaku Islands during the very recent material periods might have strong implications of abandonment. Accordingly, overall one is inclined to conclude that Japan has a stronger claim to the disputed islands. The historical evidence supporting the claimants’ respective claims to the Liancourt Rocks would indicate that Korea has probably made out a better case, despite Korea’s virtual inaction over the Liancourt Rocks during the material periods. When Japan agreed in Article 2 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty to renounce all right, title, and claim to Korea, the drafters of the treaty did not include the Liancourt Rocks within the area to be renounced. In determining what course of action should be taken in the light of this development, the question arose whether the San Francisco Peace Treaty left the Liancourt Rocks
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to either Korea or Japan. Therefore, the question which claimant has lawful territorial sovereignty or ownership over the Liancourt Rocks takes us back to the question whether the Liancourt Rocks belonged to Korea prior to Japan’s alleged 1905 incorporation. In other words, again, it is the issue of the degree of probative value of historical evidence produced by Korea, which outweighs that of Japan. To appreciate the nature of the territorial disputes over Liancourt Rocks, due consideration should be given to the historical relationship between Korea and Japan. Japanese colonization of Korea commenced in 1904, a period which predates Japan’s official incorporation of the Liancourt Rocks into Shimane Prefecture. Despite determining the abstract legal question of sovereignty over the disputed islands in East Asia, it is quite another thing to effectuate it in practice. Given the institutional void in the East Asian region insofar as the resolution of territorial disputes is concerned, and given the current political atmosphere in the region, one is skeptical of the feasibility of a regional dispute resolution mechanism any time soon.79 Be that as it may, it is imperative that the disputants approach the issues through dialogue and a spirit of compromise. An all-or-nothing approach, which obviously does not reckon with the mutual interests of the disputants, will only aggravate an already precarious situation. Therefore, it is suggested that various confidence building measures, including joint development of the disputed maritime zone for the mutual benefit of all the affected parties, should be engendered first, instead of a hasty emphasis on the question of sovereignty over the disputed territories. Finally, every effort should be made to determine the real worth of the disputed territories instead of placing undue reliance, as is presently the case, on exaggerated notions of what is at stake. All the claimants (China, Japan, Korea, Russia, and Taiwan) over the Kurile Islands, Senkaku Islands, and Liancourt Rocks, respectively, do have certain international legal obligations in accordance with the U.N. Charter principle of peaceful settlement of disputes, notably the principles enshrined in Article 2 and Article 33(1). The duty to conduct good faith negotiations in certain circumstances also finds substantial support in the recent decision by the ICJ in the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project, as the ICJ emphasized that good faith negotiations should be conducted under international law.80
79
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See M.K. Young, Regional Institutions in East Asia and The Pacific: Is the Time Ripe?, 89 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proceedings 471 (1995); G. Triggs, Confucius and Consensus: International Law in the Asian Pacific, 21 Melb. U.L. Rev. 650 (1997). Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 78–79, 83 (Sept. 25) (quoting its Judgment in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases).
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Additionally, it is submitted that the mode of resolution and the legal arguments in respect of these controversies in East Asia shed light on several ongoing disputes in other regions in Asia including, inter alia, the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands.81 Therefore, the eventual resolution of these disputes implicates the regional dynamics of territorial dispute settlements among several Asian nations.
81
For brief information on this issue, see generally Border and Territorial Disputes 469–71, 542–45 (John B. Allcock, et al. eds., 1992); Greg Austin, China’s Ocean Frontier: International Law, Military Force and National Development 98–161 (1998); Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, Sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands (2000); C.C. Joyner, The Spratly Islands Dispute: What Role for Normalizing Relations between China and Taiwan, 32 New Eng. L. Rev. 819 (1998); C. Liu, Chinese Sovereignty and Joint Development: A Pragmatic Solution to the Spratly Islands Dispute, 18 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 865 (1996); L.A. Mito, The Timor Gap Treaty as a Model for Joint Development in the Spratly Islands, 13 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 727 (1998); S. Sharma, Territorial Acquisition, Disputes and International Law 282–90 (1997); J. Shen, International Law Rules and Historical Evidences Supporting China’s Title to the South China Sea Islands, 21 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 1 (1997).
Chapter V A Possible Practical Solution for the Dispute over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands from the Perspective of the Law of the Sea Atsuko Kanehara* I. Introduction This chapter will deal with the dispute between Korea and Japan over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands from the perspective of the law of the sea and not as a typical territorial dispute as such. It will focus upon the recent incidents that have occurred between them. The reason why the author finds an undoubted significance in such an examination is that the cooperation and differences1 which the two countries acknowledged and realized in these occasions are strongly expected to be able to shed practical light upon the dispute that exists at present. For instance, in 2005 Korea and Japan narrowly in a friendly manner managed a conflict in the case in which the Japanese Coast Guard exercised hot pursuit under Article 111, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) against a Korean fishing boat. The Korean vessel was alleged to have committed illegal fishing in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Japan. After the Korean vessel escaped into the high seas, the Japan Coast Guard vessel and Korean Maritime Police vessels faced off against each other. After a two-day standoff, this incident was peacefully resolved through intensive negotiations on the spot at sea. The master of the Korean fishing boat was handed over to the Korean authority and Japan accepted a sort of bond from the Korean boat.2 * Professor of Public International Law, Faculty of Law, Sophia University. 1 The cooperation accomplished between the two countries will be touched upon later in appropriate places in relation to issues of fisheries and delimitation of the Continental Shelf existed between them. 2 Regarding the incident, see Atsuko Kanehara, Fisheries Law Enforcement by Japan in Its Exclusive Economic Zone and Hot Pursuit from the Exclusive Economic Zone onto the High Seas of a Foreign Vessel Which Failed to Obey to Heave to, 48 Japanese Ann. Int’l L. 199 (2005). The sea area
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Then in 2006, the two countries faced tense situations concerning marine scientific research planned by each country and actually conducted by the Korean side in the sea areas where claims of the two countries for the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) overlapped due to the territorial dispute over the Dokdo/ Takeshima Islands.3 Japan declared its plan for marine scientific research to be conducted in April of 2006, and in the face of harsh protests by Korea, Japan refrained from carrying out its plan. Then, Korea, in turn, made public its plan to conduct marine scientific research in July of the same year, and despite the formal protest against it by Japan, Korea exercised its marine scientific research. After intensive negotiations, both countries finally decided to conduct their marine scientific research cooperatively being accomplished in 2006. Such cooperation is expected to continue.4 In addition, they agreed to resume negotiation in respect to the issue of maritime delimitation, especially that of the EEZ including the sea areas where the claims of the two countries for the EEZ overlapped, and this was after a six-year pause since 2000. This resumption of negotiations can be regarded as a successful result through the substantial talks between the two countries. Generally speaking, islands cause many difficult problems under the law of the sea.5 In the case of the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands, however, Korea and
3
4
5
concerning which the resolution of the conflict situation was achieved was the high seas and the EEZ of Korea at the same time, depending on matters. In relation to the matters designated by Article 56 of the UNCLOS the sea areas were the Korean EEZ, and for others they are the high seas. From such a viewpoint, too, this incident provoked an interesting issue regarding to the distribution of a sovereign right and jurisdiction between a country conducting the hot pursuit country and the coastal state of the EEZ or the flag state in respect to a fishing boat flying its flag on the high seas. Id. at. 114–120. As for the incident and some analysis principally from the perspective of Article 74, Paragraph 3 of the UNCLOS, see Atsuko Kanehara, Marine Scientific Research in the Waters Where Claims of the Exclusive Economic Zones Overlap between Japan and the Republic of Korea-Incidents between the Two States in 2006, 49 Japanese Ann. Int’l L. 98, 98–122 (2006). More generally, relating to the possible questions raised by the marine scientific research on the sea areas where multiple countries make claims for the EEZ, see Atsuko Kanehara, Nikkan Kaiyo Kagaku Chosa Mondai heno Kokusaiho ni Motozuku Nihon no Taio [Japanese Positions under the Relevant International Law Rules in Respect to the Problem of the Marine Scientific Research between Republic of Korea and Japan] 1321 Jurisuto [Jurist] 59 (2006) ( Japan) [hereinafter Japanese Positions]; Atsuko Kanehara, Marine Scientific Research in the Sea Zones Where Claims of Two States for the Exclusive Economic Zone Overlap under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (unpublished paper submitted to the 7th Science Council of Asia (SCA) Conference, SCA Joint Project Workshop D, International Cooperation in Securing the Ocean in Asia, held at Okinawa Convention Centre in Japan) ( June 15, 2007). Article 121 of the UNCLOS prescribes the condition for a rock to be entitled to have their own jurisdictional sea areas and sea beds. For a thorough examination in Japanese of the various positions of countries and drafting history of the relevant provisions of both 1958 Geneva
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Japan do not have different positions as to their status as islands.6 Considering their geographical location, it might not cause such a complicated problem regarding the issues of a base point and the legal effect on maritime delimitation. Which country can include the islands in the base point is dependent on resolving the issue of which country has territorial title over the Islands. In other words, the territorial dispute over the Islands forms the very crux of the dispute over EEZ delimitation. Thus, it can be said that the territorial dispute as such over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands has an unfortunate impact upon the law of the sea issue that lie between the two countries. Taking into consideration of this fact, there is the hint of a possible practical solution to resolve the differences between the two countries in the near future from the perspective of the law of the sea. In addition, judging from the way how each side coped with these recent incidents seems to be in line with a practical tendency in their thinking. It is hoped that if their cooperative attitudes could reach a productive result on the law of the sea issues with regard to the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands, it could at the same time circumscribe their core differences. A simplification and redefinition of the current deadlocked situations will allow Korea and Japan time and opportunities for successful negotiation in order to reach a final resolution of the dispute. Looking at the situation from the other side of the coin, if the two countries do not have possibility to gain substantial benefits by securing sovereignty over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands, why do they so persistently adhere to the sovereignty over the Islands, such a small portion of land at sea?7 As sovereign states why should they spend so much time and energy in conflict with each other over this dispute to the point of risking the destruction of friendly and cooperative relations between them that have continued for a very long time?
6
7
Conventions on the Law of the Sea and the UNCLOS, see Soji Yamamoto, Shima no Kokusaiho jo no Chii [Legal Status of an Island in the Law of the Sea] (1991) ( Japan). Whether a portion of land at sea is an island or rock is an important question for the interpretation of Article 121 of the UNCLOS. However, the author clearly points out the fact that the decision as to whether a certain land at sea is an island or a rock could not give a definitive answer for the question on the law of the sea, namely whether the land at sea is entitled to have its own jurisdictional sea areas of the state that has the territorial sovereignty over the land at sea. This is due to the lack of clarity of Article 121 of the UNCLOS. Above all, it does not define a rock itself, while it gives a definition of an island. It solely sets forth the condition for a rock to be entitled to have its own jurisdictional sea areas and seabeds. In addition, Korea and Japan have not disputed the status of the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands as islands, and therefore, the author in this paper stops short at just indicating the issue. As for a significant analysis about this issue, see Jon M. Van Dyke, Legal Issues Related to Sovereignty over Dokdo and Its Maritime Boundary, 38 Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 196 (2007). The size of the islands is 0.23 km2.
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By examining the dispute from the viewpoint of the law of the sea and thoroughly considering what benefits can or cannot be acquired by claiming for and holding sovereignty over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands would undoubtedly lead both countries to a wise and cool hearted political and legal decision as sovereign states. Further, very importantly, as Asian countries, Korea and Japan can take this opportunity in demonstrating to international society a successful management of disputes contributing to international practice that can develop the law of the sea and the international law of dispute settlement. The two countries are both state parties to the UNCLOS, which is the most important international convention on the law of the sea and sometimes referred to as “the Constitution of the Law of the Sea.” If both countries succeed in resolving the Dokdo/ Takeshima Islands dispute under the law of the sea, it will undeniably present a model for states in the world that are or will be involved in the similar situations as those of Korea and Japan.8 The following incidents will be touched upon in this chapter: the marine scientific research conducted in the sea areas where the claims of the two countries for the EEZ overlap; the cooperation concerning the fisheries in the sea areas including the disputed sea areas;9 the delimitation of the continental shelf by the Agreements that contain delimitation; and also a scheme of joint development of resources on the sea bed. In section II, I will provide a succinct survey of how islands cause conflicts in the law of the sea. Then, there will be a re-definition of the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands dispute focused upon from the perspective of the law of the sea. In section III, I will explain the recent incidents occurring between Korea and Japan mentioned above so that I may derive their value as an example of international conflict management of those incidents achieved by the two countries. In section IV, I will conclude this chapter with some suggestions about a possible practical solution for the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands dispute.
8
9
Korea and Japan concluded an Agreement on Joint Development of the continental shelf resources in 1974. It set an important precedent of joint development of the continental shelf resources early in the 1970’s which will be explained later in this chapter. The People’s Republic of China and Japan are in a similar situation as that of between Korea and Japan, and they agreed in 2001 to a prior notification system regarding marine scientific research to be conducted in the sea zones where the claims of the two countries for the EEZ overlapped. This also may form a valuable practice of a provisional arrangement under Article 74, Paragraph 3 of the UNCLOS. The phrase of “the disputed sea areas” is difficult to define precisely. In this chapter, in appropriate cases and in case of no risk of misunderstanding, the phrase will be used as designating the sea areas lying between the delimitation lines that Korea and Japan asserts to each other as the delimitation line of the EEZ.
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II. Conflicts in the Law of the Sea over the Existence of Islands 1. General Survey a. Interests of Sovereign States in Holding Territorial Sovereignty over Islands Korea and Japan strongly want to ensure territorial sovereignty over the Dokdo/ Takeshima Islands. In this regard, the fundamental question is: What stakes do the two countries precisely have in the island? Countries spend extravagant expenditures and invest significant manpower to acquire and secure territorial sovereignty over an island. As sovereign states, both countries should take the fact into serious consideration in deciding their policy of how to manage the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands dispute. In this regard, the law of the sea perspective may shed a realistic and practical light on the questions that are raised here. As for the presuppositions for such an examination, a general survey is indispensable to examine the issues raised by the existence of an island under the law of the sea. b. Issues Raised under the Law of the Sea with regard to Islands Islands present complex questions for the law of the sea. Since both Korea and Japan are state parties to the UNCLOS, it is appropriate to find examples of disputes caused by the existence of an island that may occur under the UNCLOS. For instance, states may be in conflict with each other over the following issues. First, it is critical to determine whether or not “a portion of land” at sea has the status of “an island” under the UNCLOS. This is because islands can have its own jurisdictional sea areas and seabeds, and islands can give huge jurisdictional sea areas and seabeds to the state that has sovereignty over the island,10 especially when an island is located at a certain distance from its coast. Second, in comparison with the first issue, when an island is near coast lines, it is frequently argued whether or not the island forms a base point on the baseline from which the width of a territorial sea or other jurisdictional sea areas and seabeds are measured.11 Third, depending on the location of an island, the legal effect of its existence upon the maritime delimitation becomes a very difficult issue to be dealt with. In judicial and arbitration procedures as well as negotiations between the parties to a dispute, this issue frequently poses difficulties for courts, arbitral boards, and the parties. For example, one issue is whether or not it is equitable to give full effect to an island and move the delimitation line toward the direction of the other state. Or is it more equitable 10 11
UNCLOS art. 121, ¶ 2, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 396. Concerning a straight base line, Article 7, Paragraph 1 of the UNCLOS permits coastal states to use islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity as a base point.
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to give only a half effect to the island and move the delimitation line toward the other state? Why is it given half effect and not two-thirds? Without convincing reasons in many judicial and arbitration cases, islands have been given a half effect in drawing a maritime delimitation line.12 Why are these questions so serious to the states concerned? The answer almost totally depends on each case. States have multiple interests in relation to nearby sea areas and seabeds such as fishery resources, mineral deposits, security or military concerns, as well as their importance as sea-lanes for navigation, and so on. Thus, sovereign states should seriously assess, on a case by case basis, what particular benefits will be obtained and secured in determining its position concerning an island. If the most beneficial solution for both state parties to an island dispute can be derived from that consideration, then such a solution can be possibly the most practical not only from the perspective of the law of the sea but in a wider context of the dispute. Needless to say, the truism that sovereign states have a strong tendency in desiring the enlargement of their territories by claiming territorial sovereignty over islands should be set aside. This is because such a desire frequently prevents countries from judging what is most beneficial in resolving such disputes. 2. The Dokdo/Takeshima Islands Dispute to be Re-Defined from the Viewpoint of the Law of the Sea a. The Dokdo/Takeshima Islands has been becoming the Critical Point for the Delimitation of the EEZ Both Korea and Japan define Dokdo/Takeshima as islands under the UNCLOS revealing a commonality in their positions. The Dokdo/Takeshima Islands are situated between both countries and it is not precisely said to be in the imme12
In maritime delimitation cases, “the relevant circumstances” to be considered is one of the most complicated issues, and it may give a subjective nature to the decisions. Among the “relevant circumstances,” how to reflect the effect of islands on delimitation is or can be very fungible and subjective. Concerning the question, see Malcolm D. Evans, Maritime Boundary Delimitation: Where Do We Go From Here?, in The Law of the Sea-Progress and Prospects 137, 137–160 (David Freestone, Richard Barnes & David Ong eds., 2006); Malcolm D. Evans, Maritime Delimitation and Expanding Categories of Relevant Circumstances, 40 Int’l Comp. L.Q. 1, 30–33 (1991). As for the treatment by the precedents of relevant circumstances, see also Atsuko Kanehara, Tairikudana no Kyoukaikakutei ni okeru Kohei no Gensoku [Equitable Principle of Continental Shelf Delimitation], 101 Kokka Gakkai Zasshi [ J. Ass’n Pol. & Soc. Sci.] 493–559, 601–648, 766–821 (1988) ( Japan) [hereinafter Equitable Principle]; Atsuko Kanehara, Some Remarks on Developing Rules Concerning Maritime Delimitation Mainly of Continental Shelf [hereinafter Developing Rules] (unpublished paper submitted on the Occasion of Commemoration of the Golden Jubilee of Asian and African Legal Consultative Organization, Meeting of Experts on the Emerging Issues on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) (Nov. 24, 2006) (on file with author).
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diate vicinity of each state’s coastline. As to whether the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands form a base point on the baseline from which a width of the territorial sea is measured, the two countries have disputed this issue. However, that issue is solely incidental to the claims of territorial title over the islands. Each country has incorporated the Islands as a base point when they assert the delimitation line of the EEZ between them, and such attitudes of both are in line with their claims of territorial title over the Islands. Each side insists on a median line as the delimitation line for the EEZ using the Islands as a base point on the baseline from which the width of their territorial sea and their EEZ are measured. In this respect, Korea recently changed its position so as to regard the Islands as a base point. Thus, the remaining point of conflict is clearly defined as the issue as to which state has sovereignty over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands. At the same time, however, we have to acknowledge the reality that unless the dispute concerning territorial title over the Islands is settled, the delimitation of the EEZ will not be perfectly resolved. Regarding the delimitation of the continental shelf, since the two agreements concluded in 1974 between the two countries are effective, the issue will not necessarily be seriously raised at this time. Putting aside the point that sovereign states have a strong tendency to enlarge their territories, the question remains as to what benefits would Korea and Japan gain if either could secure sovereignty over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands? The conflicts and cooperation that the two countries have undergone may give some indication at least from the practical viewpoint of the law of the sea. The conflicts and cooperation between the two countries have a long history, especially in the matter of fisheries. Before the UNCLOS, and the establishment of the legal regime of the EEZ over which a coastal state holds a sovereign right relating to exploration and exploitation of living and non-living marine resources, Korea and Japan concluded an agreement in 1965 to manage fisheries in the waters lying between them.13 After both countries had become parties to the UNCLOS, and after its coming into force, they agreed to a new Fishery Agreement which was signed in 1998 and came into force in 1999.14 The new agreement incorporated into its foundation the essence of the legal regime of the EEZ under the UNCLOS.15
13
14
15
Agreement on Fisheries between Japan and the Republic of Korea, Japan-S. Korea, June 22, 1965, provided in both Korean and Japanese, available at http://www3.mofa.go.jp/mofaj /gaiko/treaty/pdf/A-S40-247_1.pdf; Minutes agreed by both parties on the Agreement, http:// www3.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/treaty/pdf/A-S40-247_2.pdf. Agreement on Fisheries between Japan and the Republic of Korea, Japan-S. Korea, Nov. 28, 1998, available at http://www3.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/treaty/pdf/A-H11-1039.pdf (provided in both Korean and Japanese). For instance, id. pmbl., arts. 1, 2.
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In 1974, two agreements were established by Korea and Japan regarding the continental shelf with one determining the delimitation line for the northern part, and the other setting up a joint development scheme on the designated seabed areas. Considering the history and the current situations between them, what are the benefits for both countries to be gained from the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands? To examine this point in the next section, a detailed explanation will be given with these agreements and the recent incidents that have occurred over the sea areas surrounding the Islands.
III. Recent Incidents Concerning the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands Dispute 1. Seabed: The Continental Shelf a. The Two Agreements Concluded in 1974 Preceding the current dispute concerning the EEZ delimitation and other issues relating thereto, the two countries succeeded in managing the continental shelf delimitation. Korea and Japan concluded two agreements in 1974 which came into force in 1978. One is for the northern part (Northern Part Agreement)16 and the other for the southern part (Southern Part Agreement).17 The Northern Part Agreement provides for the delimitation line on the basis of the median/equidistance method, and the delimitation line generally follows the median line between the two countries. It should be noted that on this median line, the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands were not included as a base point on the baseline from which the width of the territorial sea and the continental shelf are measured.18 In addition, this median line is used to designate the provisional zones where cooperative conservation and management of fishery resources are instituted and where a special legal regime is applied under the newly concluded Fishery Agreement in 1998. The Southern Part Agreement establishes a Joint Development Zone that is mainly located on the Korean side of a hypothetical median line.19 From
16
17
18
19
Agreement Concerning the Establishment of Boundary in the Northern Part of the Continental Shelf Adjacent to the Two Countries, Japan-S. Korea, Jan. 30, 1974, 1225 U.N.T.S. 103. Agreement Concerning Joint Development of the Southern Part of the Continental Shelf Adjacent to the Two Countries, Japan-S. Korea, Jan. 30, 1974, 1225 U.N.T.S. 136. Korea quite recently changed its position regarding the median line to be used for the EEZ delimitation between Korea and Japan. In that median line, the Dokdo/Takeshima islands form one of the base points. Regarding the explanation of the Joint Development under the 1974 The Southern Part Agreement, and the current situation of the Continental Shelf delimitation between China and
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the perspective of this chapter, some analysis of the Southern Part Agreement should be meaningful.20 b. Joint Development Scheme in a Context of Disputes on Maritime Delimitation From the Southern Part Agreement, the following two points can be derived that can shed light on a practical solution for maritime delimitation. First, as to the method to resolve the issue of maritime delimitation, Korea and Japan agreed to joint development in place of setting forth a maritime delimitation line. In comparison, there are cases in which a delimitation line is determined concurrently with the establishment of joint development zones.21 For instance, it is assumed that if there is a mineral deposit straddling the delimitation line, a joint development project is undoubtedly useful for the purpose of efficient exploitation of mineral resources. In that case, joint development is conducted even after a delimitation line is agreed to between the states concerned. This practice clearly indicates that joint development can be a tool not only as a final solution but also a provisional solution for maritime delimitation. As will be seen later, joint development of resources can fall under a possible provisional arrangement under Article 74, Paragraph 3 and Article 83, Paragraph 3 of the UNCLOS.22 In case of the Southern Part Agreement, Korea and Japan agreed to the joint development scheme without determining a delimitation line because there were differences in their positions relating to the international principles and rules on the continental shelf delimitation. On the one hand, Korea’s position was that the delimitation should be conducted by respecting the principle of natural prolongation which the International Court of Justice declared as the basis of a coastal state’s sovereign right over the continental shelf in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf Case,23 five years before the conclusion of the Southern Part Agreement; and, on the other hand, Japan argued that the delimitation should be conducted based upon the median/equidistance method in accordance with Article 6 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf. To overcome the differences between them, and also to practically proceed toward
20
21 22 23
Japan, see Yukiya Hamamoto, Tairikudana no Kyodo Kaihatsu, [Joint Development of the Continental Shelf ], 565 Kokursaimondai [Int’l Aff.] 30 (2007) (Japan). As for an interim arrangement pending final solution of delimitation issues, including the significance of joint development scheme, see, for instance, Rainer Lagoni, Interim Measures pending Maritime Delimitation Agreements, 78 Am. J. Int’l L. 345 (1984). Hamamoto, supra note 19, at 36–38. As for this issue, see Kanehara, Developing Rules, supra note 12. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 3, para. 43.
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exploitation of seabed resources as fast as possible, both countries chose and agreed to the joint development scheme. Joint development is a very practical tool for resolving the issue of maritime delimitation, and international practice for it both in cases where solutions were found with and without delimitation can be found. Prominent writers also acknowledge the practical significance of joint development of resources as a tool to resolve disputes on continental shelf delimitation.24 Korea and Japan achieved resolution in a relatively early period of maritime and the continental shelf delimitation in 1974. This is a leading case of a successful agreement on joint development. Second, in close relation to the first point, joint development may be the method of not only a “final resolution” for maritime delimitation problems but also provide a “provisional solution” for it. Article 83, Paragraph 3 of the UNCLOS states that: Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the States concerned, in a spirit of understanding and co-operation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement. Such arrangements shall be without prejudice to the final delimitation.
Article 74, Paragraph 3 for EEZ delimitation provides for the same rules as Article 83, Paragraph 3. A joint development scheme can fall under the ”provisional arrangement” of continental shelf delimitation of Article 83, paragraph 3, and for an EEZ under Article 74, Paragraph 3. As a provisional arrangement under Article 83, Paragraph 3 of the UNCLOS, joint development has such status and gives to the states concerned practical benefits taking into account the following considerations. In general, disputes over maritime delimitation take a protracted period of time until a final resolution is reached, and in particular, those cases involving disputes of territorial title over islands such as the dispute over the Dokdo/ Takeshima Islands. Joint development agreed to by the states concerned pending the final resolution of delimitation may avoid undesirable and inappropriate results such as the freezing of the exploitation of resources. In addition, as far as the parties to the dispute can agree on joint development, friendly relation may be maintained and the parties can move forward in their negotiation on the completion of final delimitation while concurrently carrying out a joint development scheme.25 In this regard, in addition to the adoption of a joint development scheme, inclusion of disclaimer clauses as to a future and final decision and/or prospec24 25
See Hamamoto, supra note 19; Lagoni, supra note 20. See Kanehara, Developing Rules, supra note 12; Hamamoto, supra note 19; Lagoni, supra note 20.
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tive review clauses may be useful in order to make progress toward conclusion of a final agreement. The use of that type of provision in the negotiations and agreements for maritime delimitation can bear the continuous and flexible nature of situations and the development of the knowledge about the existence of resources to be expected on the continental shelf. The parties can also consider the development of the international rules on delimitation during the pending period and can reflect and incorporate it into their final agreement. The Southern Part Agreement contains such a disclaimer clause concerning the joint development zone providing that any provision of the Agreement may not be regarded as deciding the issue of sovereign rights over the joint development zone, or influencing the positions of the both parties regarding continental shelf delimitation.26 Further, it also includes a provision for stalling disagreement regarding delimitation for as long as fifty years.27 In reflecting the object and purpose of these provisions, Korea and Japan have been still in the process of the continental shelf delimitation and revision of the Southern Part Agreement in that sense. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, it is expected that the two countries will consider and reflect on the development of the relevant international rules on continental shelf delimitation in future reviews of the 1974 Agreement. It will certainly be a good opportunity for the two Asian countries to demonstrate a leading international practice to the world. From a different point of view, however, at least until now, the joint development zone designated by the Southern Part Agreement has not experienced substantial exploitation and given commercial benefits.28 This is due to the uncertainty of whether the expected mineral deposits exist. The time for review will come in 2028, and whether or not that will become an openly contentious issue between the two countries depends on the situation of oil production and the oil market in the world. In addition, the resolution of EEZ delimitation in the near future will have an impact on the review of the Southern Part Agreement regarding the continental shelf. Considering joint development as a “provisional arrangement” for the EEZ, Article 74, Paragraph 3 is read as the same as Article 83, Paragraph 3. Accordingly, the analysis here about the significance of the joint development scheme under the Southern Part Agreement holds true, mutats mutandis, to the issue of EEZ delimitation between Korea and Japan. The next section takes a look at issues concerning EEZ delimitation between the two countries.
26
27 28
Agreement Concerning Joint Development of the Southern Part of the Continental Shelf Adjacent to the Two Countries, supra note 17, art. 28. Id. art. 31. Hamamoto, supra note 19, at 32.
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2. EEZ Delimitation and the Issues Thereto a. Fisheries (1) From the 1965 Fishery Agreement to the 1998 Fishery Agreement In 1965, setting aside their territorial dispute over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands, Korea and Japan concluded the Fishery Agreement. It established a twelve-mile Exclusive Fishery Zone for each Party,29 and also a joint control zone where the two parties should take regulative measures pending the realization of conservation and management measures for the purpose of ensuring maximum sustainable yields.30 The Joint Fishery Committee would be in charge of scientific research in order to recommend with regard to the regulative measures to be taken.31 After the UNCLOS came into force and the two countries ratified it, they renewed the Fishery Agreement in 1998. (2) The 1998 Fishery Agreement Based upon the EEZ regime under the UNCLOS, on each side of the tentative delimitation line, sea areas are regarded as the EEZ of each country.32 The tentative delimitation lines are the same as those adopted by the 1974 Northern Part Agreement on the continental shelf which does not include Dokdo/Takeshima as a base point on the baseline from which the width of the territorial sea and the continental shelf are measured. Accordingly, for the tentative delimitation line of the EEZ under the 1998 Fishery Agreement, the Dokdo/Takeshima issue was again set aside or ignored as had been in the previous 1965 Fishery Agreement. The 1998 Fishery Agreement establishes two provisional zones: the Northern Provisional Zone and the Southern Provisional Zone.33 In this regard, the new Fishery Agreement utilized the method of provisional zones in place of completing a final delimitation of the EEZ as well. The demarcation of the provisional zones, especially the Northern Provisional Zone including the sea areas where the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands are situated, raised a contentious
29
30 31
32 33
Agreement on Fisheries between Japan and the Republic of Korea 1965, supra note 13, art. 1, ¶1. Id. art. 3. Id. arts. 67. For an analysis and the introduction of the adopting processes of the 1965 and 1998 Agreements, see, e.g., Kiminobu Hukamachi, NIkkan Gyogyo Mondai [Fisheries Issue between Japan and Korea], in Gendai no Kaiyoho [The Modern Law of the Sea] 196, 196–223 (Chiyuki Mizukami ed., 2003) ( Japan). UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 7. Agreement on Fisheries between Japan and the Republic of Korea 1998, supra note 14, art. 9.
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issue during the negotiation process for the adoption of the Agreement.34 This was because in those sea areas there exits a rich fishery resource deposit referred to as “Yamato Tai” or “Yamato Deposit.” Korea insisted that the provisional zone should be set widely. This was intended to prevent Japan’s EEZ from the covering almost all of the “Yamato Tai.” Japan took the position that the Northern Provisional Zone should be confined to the sea areas which would be subject to the influence of the existence of the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands if they had been taken into consideration in drawing the delimitation line. By taking this position, Japan purported to widen its EEZ so as to include “Yamato Tai” as much as possible. In the final text of the Agreement, the eastward limit of the Northern Provisional Zone is determined by the line of 133.5 E Longitude and as the result, 45 percent of the “Yamato Tai” is included in the Northern Provisional Zone and its remaining portion comes to be located in Japan’s EEZ. The Agreement establishes the Joint Fishery Committee that has the power to recommend to the parties conservation and management measures of the fishery resources not only in the two provisional zones but also for the EEZ sea areas of each party.35 Irrespective of minor difference of terms in the relevant provisions of the Agreement, recommendations by the Joint Committee for the two provisional zones should be respected but are not be interpreted to be legally binding. Thus, it is acknowledged that the new Fishery Agreement achieved a measure of success in maintaining cooperative and friendly relation between Korea and Japan in terms of fisheries, although leaving the final delimitation of the EEZ untouched, and setting aside the existence of the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands in the tentative delimitation line as was done in the 1974 Agreements on the continental shelf. (3) Function of the Joint Fishery Committee The Committee has the power to recommend to the parties conservation and management measures of the fishery resources in relation not only to the two provisional zones but also to the EEZ sea areas of the two countries. It may lead to compatible conservation and management of fishery resources on the EEZs of the two countries. It is very similar to the concept of the compatibility principle under Article 7 of the United Nations Convention on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks.36 Needless to say, it also reflects the 34 35 36
Hukamachi, supra note 31, at 204. Agreement on Fisheries between Japan and the Republic of Korea 1998, supra note 14, art. 12. Concerning the concept of conservation and management of fishery resources under the UN Convention, see Atsuko Kanehara, A Critical Analysis of Changes and Recent Development in the Concept of Conservation of Fisheries on the High Seas, 41 Japanese Ann. Int’l L. 9 (1998).
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idea of international and regional cooperation provided by Article 63 of the UNCLOS. In this regard as well, the two Asian countries are a model for other states in the world. 2. Marine Scientific Research (MSR) in the EEZ a. The EEZ and MSR Article 56, Paragraph 1(b)(ii) of the UNCLOS confers on coastal states with EEZ jurisdiction with regard to MSR, and Article 246, Paragraph 2 provides that MSR in the EEZ and on the continental shelf shall be conducted with the consent of the coastal states.37 In 2006, there was a tense situation between Korea and Japan regarding a MSR that was planned to be conducted in the sea areas surrounding the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands over which the two countries’ EEZ claims overlapped. b. The Incidents in 2006 38 In April of 2006, Japan planned its MSR in the waters on the Japanese side from the median line which ran between Ulleungdo and the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands. The MSR planned was a hydrographic survey to study sea bottom topography in the southwest sea areas of the Sea of Japan.39 Korea was going to submit name changes for undersea features on the occasion of the meeting of the Sub-Committee on Undersea Feature Names scheduled in June of 2006. Japan tried to prevent this, and for that purpose, it intended to gather scientific information of the undersea features concerned by conducting its own MSR. As soon as this plan was made public by the Japanese government, Korea issued harsh protests and the latter made clear that every means, including even coercive measures, would be taken in order to intercept Japanese vessels conducting the MSR. On the 21st and 22nd of April, the two countries conducted negotiations. During the talks, Japan required Korea to abandon its proposal
37
38 39
In accordance with Article 246, Paragraphs 3 and 5, depending on nature or kind of the MSR a coastal state has wide discretion or limited one in granting its consent. For a general survey of the incidents in 2006, see Kanehara, supra note 3. A hydrographic survey to study the topography of the sea bottom and sea current survey that Korea planned and carried out in July may raise an issue as to the nature or kind of the MSR. This is because Article 246, Paragraphs 3 and 5 of the UNCLOS differentiate the conditions on granting of consent by coastal state. Furthermore, if the MSR is beyond the reach of the definition set by the Article, as far as it is conducted on the high seas or has the nature of being incidental to navigation as the MSR in order for ensuring safety of navigation, such a MSR can be carried out freely on the high seas as exercising the freedom of use of the high seas. Since both Korea and Japan have not raised this issue, the author here only indicates it as one to be argued under the relevant provisions of the UNCLOS. Concerning the categorization of the MSR, see, for instance, Kanehara, Japanese Positions, supra note 4.
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of changing the names of the undersea features. In return, Korea insisted that Japan give up its plan for the MSR. As a result, three points were agreed to. First, Japan would abandon its MSR plan. Second, Korea would not propose the change of names of the undersea features. Third, negotiation of EEZ delimitation would be resumed in due course which had been discontinued for six years since 2000. On the 3rd of June, Korea explained to Japan its plan for MSR which was a sea current survey to be conducted on the waters including the disputed sea areas.40 Irrespective of Japan’s protest and request of postponement or suspension of the Korea’s MSR plan, Korea commenced and carried out such a survey on the 5th of July in the waters that included the area which lay between the median line that Japan insisted and the median line that Korea asserted. Japan immediately lodged a diplomatic protest and urged Korea to stop at sea.41 On the 4th and 5th of September, another round of negotiation over EEZ delimitation was conducted. During the talks, a joint MSR plan (a survey plan of radioactive release into the sea) was discussed and agreed to which was to be carried out in October of 2006. This joint MSR plan set six points as research spots with three of them being situated in the waters between the Japan’s median line and the Korea’s median line with the remaining three points on the Japanese side of Korea’s median line. This joint MSR was solely performed on an ad hoc basis, and, therefore, it establishes neither a continuous cooperative scheme nor provisional arrangements for MSR in the disputed sea areas. While Japan consistently proposed a prior notification system of planned MSRs to be conducted in the sea areas where the EEZ claims of the two countries overlapped, it was not able to obtain consent from Korea. In contrast, a prior notification system was already agreed in 2001 between the People’s Republic of China and Japan under similar circumstances.42
40
41
42
In this context, the disputed sea areas mean those between Korea’s median line and Japan’s median line both of which will be explained in (c) of this subsection. As explained in the supra note 39, it is a difficult issue to define the MSR that is under the jurisdiction of a coastal state of the EEZ under Article 56, Paragraph 1 (b) (ii) of the UNCLOS. It is argued, for instance, military research does not fall under that MSR, and accordingly is not restricted by the prior consent regime by a coastal state of the EEZ. In addition, it is sometimes argued that a sea current survey is incidental to navigation, and thus, it can be conducted without restriction as the freedom of navigation is guaranteed on the sea areas that are EEZs of some coastal states. Concerning the MSR issue between China and Japan and Japanese positions, see Akira Takada, Marine Scientific Research in the Exclusive Economic Zone and Japan-China Agreement for Prior Notification, 44 Japanese Ann. Int’l L. 134, 147–149 (2001).
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c. The Two Countries’ Positions regarding the Delimitation of the EEZ Both are simply arguing that the delimitation line should be a median line. The dispute over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands comes to the crux of EEZ delimitation. For Japan, the median line (“Japan’s median line”) runs between Ulleungdo and the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands. Korea asserts that the median line (Kore’s median line”) should be between the Oki Islands and the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands. Previously, Korea did not regard the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands as a base point on the baseline, and the prior Korean median line was that running between Ulleungdo and the Oki Islands. Presently, it is asserting that the median line runs between the Oki Islands and the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands. Thus, the territorial dispute over the Islands really forms the core of the dispute over EEZ delimitation. d. Results of the Incidents in 2006 with regard to the MSR and EEZ Delimitation As has been reviewed, no EEZ delimitation was established, and no provisional cooperative arrangements were successful for MSR pending the final resolution of the delimitation issue. Regarding the use of possible dispute settlement procedures, on the 18th of April, Korea submitted its declaration in accordance with Article 298 of the UNCLOS, the core of which was its denial of acceptance of any of the procedures provided for in Section 2 of Part XV of the UNCLOS with respect to all the categories of disputes referred to in paragraph (a), (b), and (c) of Article 298. While Japan has accepted the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in accordance with Article 36, Paragraph 2 of the ICJ Statute, Korea has not. Thus, there is no possibility for the ICJ or the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to deal with a dispute that involves the issue of the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands. Other compulsory dispute settlement procedures under Section 2 of Part XV of the UNCLOS cannot be triggered either. Negotiation remains for the two countries to resolve the dispute. Fortunately, on the occasion of the conflict that occurred in 2006, Korea and Japan agreed to resumption of negotiations on EEZ delimitation after a six year pause. In addition, while the two countries have not made progress on the issue, they again devised a cooperative method of a joint MSR on an ad hoc basis and continuing on that basis. In general, judging from international practice concerning maritime delimitation, and in particular, in case of the dispute between Korea and Japan, a lengthy period of time is expected to be needed before the two countries are able to reach a final resolution to EEZ delimitation. Furthermore, considering the common interests of international society for the development of scientific knowledge, the significance of the MSR is not confined to the interests of the two countries. Taking this into consideration, the permanent cooperative framework of the MSR in the disputed sea areas
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is undoubtedly preferable pending a final resolution of the dispute on EEZ delimitation. While Japan has consistently proposed to Korea an agreement on a Prior Notification System similar to an agreement in 2001 between China and Japan, Korea has yet to accept it.
IV. Conclusions So far this chapter has examined the dispute over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands between Korea and Japan from the perspective of the law of the sea, taking up mainly current incidents occurred between the two countries. On the one hand, the purpose of the examination was to circumscribe the differences of the positions of both countries to its very core. It is based upon the author’s firm perception that such a simplification through redefinition of the current deadlocked situation will undoubtedly allow Korea and Japan much time and opportunities for meaningful negotiation in order to reach a final resolution of the dispute. Actually from the perspective of the law of the sea, the two countries have succeeded in managing the issues of continental shelf delimitation, fisheries, and the MSR in the sea areas surrounding the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands. They have taken advantage of joint development of resources on the seabed, provisional zones for the cooperative conservation and management of fishery resources, and the joint MSR project conducted despite being done on an ad hoc basis. Through these arrangements, both countries consistently set aside the question of sovereignty over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands. In other words, without taking up that entangling issue, they could devise a friendly and practical solution in order to proceed in the exploitation of living and non-living marine resources and gaining scientific knowledge by the MSR that would be beneficial not only for the two countries, but also for international society as well. In addition, these successful arrangements will be an exemplar for other countries that are or will be involved in similar situations as those existing between Korea and Japan. From the examination here, what real stakes the two countries have with respect to the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands are made fairly clear. The territorial dispute as such over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands has an unfortunate impact on the law of the sea issues. Nonetheless, both have tactically overcome this hurdle by firmly utilizing practical and cooperative sense. On the other hand, looking at the point from a different viewpoint, we can further derive important suggestions from the fact that without touching upon the issue of sovereignty over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands, the two countries succeeded in cooperation by realizing the joint development of resources and the joint MSR. These facts present a critical question. Namely, what are the real gains that each country wants to acquire by claiming sovereignty over the Islands, an extremely small area of land at sea.
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The acknowledgment of the following facts by the two countries as sovereign states is crucial in deciding their positions concerning the sovereignty over the Islands: that they could manage their disputes from the vantage point of the law of the sea and that their keen interests in fishery resources can and will be secured by their own means of a joint and cooperative scheme of resource exploitation. This cannot be overly emphasized in any way. Then, what interests do the two countries have by persistently insisting on sovereignty over the Islands? The truism that sovereign states eagerly want to enlarge their own territories cannot be denied. However, can adhering to such a truism lead sovereign states to wise, practical, and productive decisions? Regarding the resources on the continental shelf, substantial commercial production is not expected despite the establishment of the joint development scheme in the Southern Part Agreement. While the Northern Part Agreement delimits the seabeds beneath the sea areas close to the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands, there is merely an inconclusive prediction of the existence of significant resources. Access to fishery resources is probably the weightiest issue due to the existence of rich resources in the so-called “Yamato Tai ” or “Yamato Deposit” nearby the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands. Despite this difficult situation, the provisional zones set by the 1998 Agreement provides the two countries with a prudent way of furthering cooperation in the conservation and management of the fishery resources so that both countries can increase and even maximize the benefit from the development of these resources. In addition, appropriate and cool-headed calculation inevitably led them to, for instance: reconsideration of the range of the provisional zones; substantiation of the conservation and management standards and measures for that purpose; and fair distribution of the benefits to be acquired from the exploitation of the resources. Thus, both countries have much room to maximize their interests in fishery resources within the cooperative scheme without unnecessarily aggravating the dispute over the sovereignty of the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands. For that purpose, the role of the Joint Fishery Committee should be reconsidered. In addition to its current authority to deliver recommendations, one way to further cooperate in the conservation and management of fishery resources is to confer upon the Committee more power in respect to not only the provisional zones but also to the EEZ of the two countries. Another remaining issue is the distribution of particular enforcement jurisdiction over fishing boats conducting fishing activities in the provisional zones. Under the existing agreement, Korea and Japan takes measures solely against fishing boats that fly its own flag. A more effective way should be devised to tighten fishery regulations, set common substantive regulative rules, and exercise enforcement. With respect to MSR, the joint MSR project could satisfy both countries’ desire for conducting MSR to a significant degree without having to delimit
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the EEZ. Japan has consistently proposed a permanent scheme for a joint MSR not on an ad hoc basis but a prior notification system which should be preferable and hopefully eventually agreed to by Korea. The People’s Republic of China and Japan have already proceeded to that stage. So far, it has been shown that the issues of development of resources and MSR can be managed without touching upon the issue of the sovereignty over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands. As far as these matters are concerned, a claim of sovereignty over the Islands is not supported by the keen interests of the two countries. Then, the crucial question persistently arises: what are the real interests for each country in claiming sovereignty over the Islands? At least, both countries now have time and opportunities to seriously face and think thoroughly through this fundamental question. The analysis of the Dokdo/ Takeshima Islands dispute from the perspective of the law of the sea can confine the conflict to its core points and provide the two countries with an opportunity to actually and practically consider their national interests in claiming sovereignty over the Islands.
Chapter VI Dokdo, Colonialism, and International Law: Lessons from the Decision of the ICJ in the Land and Maritime Dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria Dakas C.J. Dakas* I. Introduction [The approach of the International Court of Justice in the Bakassi case] is clearly rooted in a Eurocentric conception of international law . . .1 . . . [E]xposing the ignominious role of international law in the colonial project is an imperative exercise that brings with it the liberating realization that to speak of colonialism and its crippling effect in the past tense is to wallow in idle fantasy; thus underscoring the imperative of vigilance.2
The October 2002 decision of the International Court of Justice in the contentious case between Cameroon and Nigeria (Equatorial Guinea intervening)3 is, on the face of it, a decision in respect of an inter-state territorial dispute. This chapter argues, however, that in the circumstances of the case, colonialism was on trial. Properly analyzed, at the heart of the case is British colonial responsibility to the people of Bakassi. As rightly noted: Without question . . . the . . . judgment is a travesty and a cunning if brutal reenactment of colonial injustices. It is a sad reminder that the case arose in the first instance as a direct consequence of the buccaneer activities of the imperial powers of Europe who, having earlier traded in African virile peoples, sought at
* Associate Professor of Law, Department of International Law & Jurisprudence, Faculty of Law, University of Jos. 1 The Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.: Eq. Guinea Intervening) 2002 I.C.J. 492 para. 5 (Oct. 10) (Al-Khasawneh, J., separate opinion), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/94/7467.pdf [hereinafter Bakassi Case]. 2 Dakas C.J. Dakas, The Role of International Law in the Colonization of Africa: A Review in Light of Recent Calls for Re-Colonization, 7 Afr. Y.B. Int’l L. 87–88 (1999). 3 Bakassi Case, supra note 1.
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Regrettably, the International Court of Justice evaded this central issue and chose, instead, to immerse itself in a spurious analysis whose end result was the consecration of colonialism. This chapter situates the discourse within the specific context of the Dokdo issue, given its colonial antecedents, and, inter alia, underscores the imperative of critical legal scholarship that interrogates the colonial enterprise, with a view to purging international law of its colonial vestiges.
II. The Colonial Dimension of the Dokdo Issue “Dokdo” is the Korean name for a territory that is the subject of competing claims between the Republic of Korea and Japan. The Japanese name is “Takeshima,” while various Western explorers and colonial writers christen it “Liancourt Rocks.”5 The discourse that follows justifies, in my respectful view, my preference for “Dokdo.” The territory in question has been described as “two rocky islets and 32 even smaller outcroppings that have a combined land area of 0.18 square kilometers in the East Sea/Sea of Japan.”6 In spite of its small size, Dokdo evokes sentiments and emotions, predicated largely on nationalistic fervor, that eclipse its physical size. My interest, however, is borne out of the fact that the Dokdo issue is rooted in colonialism and, therefore, cannot be addressed without coming to terms with the reality of Japanese colonial and imperial exploits in the Republic of Korea. The history of Japanese exploits in Korea – and Asia in general – is a chequered one. However, our point of departure is the fact that in 1905, Japan, proceeding from the premise that Dokdo was terra nullius, claimed sovereignty over it. In 1910, Japan, in further pursuit of its colonial and imperial exploits in Asia, annexed Korea as part of its territory. It is instructive that in the Cairo Declaration of November 27, 1943, Great Britain, the United States and China, decried “the aggression of Japan,” including “the enslavement of the people of Korea,” resolved to expel Japan from all the territories “which she
4 5
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Editorial of Tuesday, The Guardian (Nigeria), Oct. 22, 2002 at 22. Northeast Asian History Foundation, Dokdo: Korean Territory since the 6th Century, Ne Asian Hist. Found., 2006, at 11–12. Jon M. Van Dyke, Legal Issues Related to Sovereignty over Dokdo and its Maritime Boundary, 38 Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 157 (2007).
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ha[d] taken by violence and greed” and expressed their determination to ensure that “Korea . . . become[s] free and independent.”7 The end of World War II culminated, in part, in the defeat of Japan and the liberation of Korea.8 However, in spite of the fact that Korea has been in effective possession and control of Dokdo for over half a century now, Japan still contests Korea’s sovereignty over the territory, although Korea’s position is that the issue of its sovereignty over the territory is beyond dispute. In a painstaking and scholarly analysis of the question of sovereignty over Dokdo, Professor Van Dyke concludes that Korea’s claim is “substantially stronger than that of Japan.”9 Van Dyke predicates his conclusion on, inter alia, the historical evidence of Korea’s exercise of sovereignty during previous centuries and the recognition of Korea’s claim by Japanese cartographers and government officials during the 18th and 19th centuries; the implausibility of the Japanese assertion in 1905 that the islets were “terra nullius, the link between the 1905 incorporation of the islets and Japan’s expansionist military activities leading to the complete subjugation of Korea, and the inability of Korea to protest effectively during that time because of Japanese military domination over the Korean government; the principle of contiguity, given the proximity of the islets to Korea’s Ulleungdo than to Japan’s Oki Islands; and Korea’s actual physical control of the islets during the past half century.10 Van Dyke’s analysis and conclusion on the question of sovereignty over Dokdo are very persuasive. However, the major focus in this chapter is not the determination of which state, as between Japan and the Republic of Korea, has sovereignty over the territory. Instead, the primary focus is the imperative of constructive and productive interrogation of the interface of international law and colonialism and its implications for Dokdo. Furthermore, it is imperative to underscore the fact that Dokdo generates a unique and distinct challenge. While most territorial disputes that are rooted in colonialism, such as the Bakassi case, involve former colonies (in the Bakassi case, Cameroon and Nigeria, being former colonies of France and Great Britain, respectively), Dokdo involves a former colonizer (Japan) and a former colony (Republic of Korea). In this circumstance, this chapter addresses critical 7
8
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The Cairo Declaration, U.K.-U.S.-China, Nov. 27, 1943 (regarding Japan) available at http:// www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c03.html. For an insightful discussion of the manner in which the victorious Allied powers engendered the framework for the termination of the state of war between them and Japan, with a view to settling outstanding questions, such as the status of the minor islands, including Dokdo, that were under the sovereignty of Japan at the end of the war, see Seokwoo Lee, The 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan and the Territorial Disputes in East Asia, 11 Pac. Rim L. & Pol’y J. 63 (2002). Van Dyke, supra note 6, at 195. Id. at 195–196.
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questions, such as the following: Is Japan at liberty to invoke international law norms that predominated in the colonial era and in respect of which the Republic of Korea could not, on account of its colonial status, make any meaningful input in its formation or crystallization? Should intertemporal law be invoked in the resolution of a dispute where one or more of the parties to the dispute played no meaningful role in the development of the normative framework that is being called into play? Should intertemporal law be invoked where it would lead to an absurd and monstrous result? Should intertemporal law be invoked where the outcome would undermine a peremptory norm? Before delving into these issues, however, I shall explore the interface of international law and colonialism in the specific context of the African colonial dispensation and, thereby, set the stage for an appraisal of the colonial dimensions of the Bakassi case and its implications for Dokdo.
III. Prelude to Bakassi: The Interface of International Law and Colonialism in the Context of the African Colonial Dispensation In light of the fact that Africa’s colonial experience set the stage for the Bakassi case, it is apposite, at this juncture, to x-ray the interface of international law and colonialism in the specific context of the African colonial dispensation. Africa’s contact with the West, the motivation behind colonialism, and the rapacious plunder thereby occasioned on the continent, are the subject of extensive research by historians, political scientists, geographers, sociologists, etc.11 It is axiomatic that African history has been so distorted, especially by Eurocentric scholars, that for a long time, the conventional “wisdom” was that Africa had no history prior to its contact with the West. As Machel puts it: “[Africa was] excluded from history, forgotten in geography [and] only existed with reference to a colonial point of reference.”12 Thus, Hegel, a German philosopher, went so far as to proclaim that Africa is “no historical part of the world; it has
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See, e.g., Basil Davidson, The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State (1992); Basil Davidson, Africa in History (1991); Daniel Offiong, Imperialism and Dependency (1980); Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism (1996); Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (1981); UNESCO General History of Africa: Africa Under Colonial Domination, 1880–1935, Vol. VII (Adu A. Boahen ed., 1985); and Crawford Young, The Heritage of Colonialism, in Africa in World Politics 19 (John W. Harbeson & Donald Rothchild eds., 1991). Samora Machel, quoted in Patrick Wilmot, Ideology and National Consciousness, 189 (1980).
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no movement or development to exhibit.”13 The reality is that “Africa has, for generations now, been viewed through a web of myth so pervasive and so glib that understanding it becomes a two-fold task: the task of clarifying the myth and the separate task of examining whatever reality has been hidden behind it . . . Only if the myth is stripped away can the reality of Africa emerge.”14 Indeed, the task of reconstructing Africa’s authentic history is so monumental that it continues to engage the attention of African and non-African scholars who have undertaken the historic mission of setting the records straight. While this task continues, numerous studies so far abound which counter the stereotypic labeling of pre-colonial Africa as “uncivilized,” “savage,” “barbaric,” etc. Walter Rodney’s How Europe Underdeveloped Africa15 and the works of a host of other scholars16 are replete with evidence – including the testimonies of some of the early European explorers17 to the effect that the popular portrayals 13
Georg Hegel, The Philosophy of History, quoted in Joseph E. Harris, Africans and Their History 9 (2nd rev. ed., 1998). Harris’ text addresses critical issues such as “A tradition of Myths and Stereotypes [about Africa]” (Chapter 1), “The Evolution of Early African Societies” (Chapter 2), “Early Kingdoms and City-States” (Chapter 3), “The Scramble and Partition” (Chapter 11), “African Diplomacy, Resistance and Rebellion” (Chapter 12), and “The European Colonizers: Policies and Practices” (Chapter 13). Unfortunately, as Harris observes, “[r]ace in general, and myths and stereotypes surrounding physical features and skin color in particular, have been so pervasive and basic in black-white relations and in accounts of those interactions that in spite of a stream of scientific evidence to the contrary, the concept of black inferiority continues to thrive in many minds.” Id. On the question of race in the United States, see, e.g., Andrew Hacker, Two Nations: Black and White, Separate, Hostile, Unequal (rev. ed., 1995). 14 Paul Bohannan, Africa and the Africans 1 (1964). Questioning the myths surrounding the history of Africa, Okoye asserts: Africa has a long and enduring history behind it, longer than any historian has described it. Africa has had its own rich sweep of events which European conquest and settlement have failed to reckon with. Yet, no civilization of the world can be divorced from the continent. The depth of its antiquity, the immensity of its treasure and the resilience of its people form a fascinating study which no single intellect can comprehend, no single volume describe. Mokwogo Okoye, African Responses 389 (1964). 15 Rodney, supra note 11. 16 See generally Basil Davidson, Black Mother: Africa – The Years of Trial (1970); W.N. Huggins & J.G. Jackson, An Introduction to African Civilizations (1973); Okoye, supra note 14; Africa in Classical Antiquity (L.A. Thompson & J Ferguson eds., 1969); The African Past Speaks (Joseph C. Miller ed., 1980); The People of Africa (H.M. Schieffelin ed., 1974). 17 For instance, Blyden is reported to have remarked that an exhibition by Africans opened his eyes to “capacities and susceptibilities altogether inconsistent with the theory that dooms such a people to a state of perpetual barbarism or of essential inferiority to the more favoured races.” E.W. Blyden, Report on the Falaba Expedition 1872, quoted in Schieffelin supra note 16, at XI. After witnessing the wonders of Egypt, Volney, a French Oriental traveler, exclaimed, “To think that this black race, today enslaved by us and the object of our disdain, is the same to which we owe our arts and sciences and even our speech,” quoted in Okoye, supra note 14, at 92.
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of Africa in Europe were clearly misconceived, and that, far from enabling or facilitating the development of Africa, Europe’s contact with Africa – since the days of the ignominious slave trade – ushered in the underdevelopment of the continent. For the purpose of this chapter, we shall examine the striking manner in which “international” law, particularly in the 19th century,18 justified the colonial project. What is even more spectacular is the stupendous manner in which international legal scholars, with few exceptions, availed the colonial project of their intellectual armory. Thus, Jenks undertakes a survey of the views of “the leading writers” of the 19th century and the early years of the 20th century – Kent, Wheaton, Phillimore, Hall, Westlake, Oppenheim, Anzilloti, Fauchille, Holtzendorf, Nys, Bello, Rivier and F. de Martens – on international law and western civilization, and describes these publicists as “so outstanding a company from nine different nations that no one can dismiss their views as unrepresentative or unimportant” and submits that “their views differ only in degrees of emphasis.”19 Wheaton, for instance, remarks, “Is there a uniform law of nations? There certainly is not the same one for all the nations and states of the world. The public law, with slight exceptions, has always been, and still is, limited to the civilised and Christian people of Europe or to those of European origin.”20 The views of Westlake who, at the material time, was, inter alia, the Whewell Professor of International Law at the University of Cambridge and reputed to be “a jurist of world-wide reputation,”21 merit further scrutiny. Accordingly, the ensuing discourse essentially examines and critiques Westlake’s views, which with varying degrees of emphasis, are largely representative of the perspectives of his Western contemporaries on the questions of sovereignty and civilization 18
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The 19th century is, from a legal perspective, remarkable in several respects: the decline of natural law and the concomitant triumph of legal positivism, as well as the construction and consolidation of sovereignty and statehood as the exclusive preserve of the “civilized.” Additionally, and as a corollary of the foregoing, the 19th century has the dubious distinction of notoriety for its colonial legacy. As the specter of re-colonization haunts Africa, it would be tantamount to laboring under a delusion to ignore the question as to whether, notwithstanding the profound transformation that international law has undergone over the years, the ghost of the 19th century still hovers over us. On the legacy of the 19th century, see generally, Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40 Harv. Int’l L. J. 1 (1999) and David Kennedy, International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of an Illusion, 17 Quinnipiac. L. Rev. 99 (1997). C. Wilfred Jenks, The Common Law of Mankind 69–74 (1958). Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law 16 (William Beach Lawrence ed., 6th ed., 1855). Furthermore, Oppenheim notes that “only such territory can be the object of occupation as belongs to no State, whether it is entirely uninhabited, for instance an island, or inhabited by natives whose community is not to be considered a State.” L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, Vol. I, 555 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955). J. Fischer Williams, Memories of John Westlake 1, 7 (J. Fischer Williams ed., 1914).
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and invariably, the colonial question. Indeed Shaw singles out Westlake as the “foremost among . . . theorists” who took the view that “the organized tribes of peoples of non-European lands had no sovereign rights over their territories and thus no sovereign title by means of effective occupation.” Accordingly, the inhabitants were “factually and not legally in occupation of the territory, which could be treated as terra nullius and acquired by any State in accordance with the requirements of international law.” Shaw further points out that the views of such theorists “appeared to dominate throughout the nineteenth century when Africa was being divided amongst the competing European powers.”22 1. Pre-Colonial Africa as “Uncivilized” and Devoid of Sovereignty John Westlake, proceeding from the premise that reflection on the principles of international law “helps to determine the action of [one’s] country by swelling the volume of its opinion,”23 sets out a pyramidal legal edifice in furtherance of the colonial project. This he does principally through his conception of the nature and acquisition of territorial sovereignty. Chapter IX of his text is strikingly captioned “Territorial Sovereignty, Especially with Relation to Uncivilised Regions.” In a sub-chapter titled “The Title to Territorial Sovereignty,” Westlake ducks the question as to how “the old civilized world” acquired the title to territorial sovereignty, as according to him, the issue is not “capable of discussion apart from the several dealings, as cession or conquest, which transfer it.”24 However, he unhesitatingly delves into a consideration of the status of “uncivilised natives” in international law. Westlake submits that “[w]hen people of the European race come into contact with American or African tribes, the prime necessity is a government.”25 Such a government has to be capable of protecting the former in a manner that enables them to “carry on the complex life to which they have been accustomed in their homes” and “protect the natives in the enjoyment of a security and well-being at least not less than they enjoyed before the arrival of the strangers.”26 Questioning whether “the natives [could] furnish such a government” or look up to the Europeans, he submits that “in the answer to that question lies, for international law, the difference between civilisation and the want of it.”27 In his view, most of the populations with whom Europeans came into contact in America and Africa could not furnish the kind of government in question. Accordingly, 22 23 24 25 26 27
Malcolm Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa: International Legal Issues 32 (1986). John Westlake, Chapters on the Principles of International Law V (1894). Id. at 134. Id. Id. Id.
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international law “has to treat such natives as uncivilised” and “regulates, for the mutual benefit of civilised states, the claims which they make to sovereignty over the region, and leaves the treatment of the natives to the conscience of the state to which sovereignty is awarded.”28 In effect, the regions inhabited by such “uncivilised natives” were not, on their own, sovereign. In this circumstance, he challenges the competence of the “uncivilised natives” to effect a transfer of territory by cession: “What is the authority – chief, elders, body of fighting men – if there is one . . . empowered to make the cession?”29 Westlake, by taking this position, boxes himself into a corner. If, as he claims, “uncivilised natives” were incapable of effecting a transfer of territory through cession, what is the legal status of treaties that, to his knowledge, were entered into between various African chiefs and respective European Powers? 2. The Legal Status of Treaties with “Uncivilized Natives/Tribes” In a spirited effort to wriggle out of the dilemma occasioned by his condescending treatment of the status of the “uncivilised natives” and its implications for their treaty-making competence, in effect, he patronizes them. “[N]o men are so savage as to be incapable of coming to some understanding with other men, and wherever contact has been established between men, some understanding, however incomplete it may be, is a better basis for their mutual relations than force.” On the specific status of treaties between European Powers and “uncivilised natives,” he contends that the latter “take no rights under international law,” with the result that “no document in which such natives are made to cede the sovereignty over any territory can be exhibited as an international title.” However, “[t]o whatever point natives may have advanced,” cession by them in accordance with their customs “may confer a moral title,” and even then only with reference to “property or power as they understand while they cede it.” Therefore, “no form of cession by them can confer any title to what they do not understand.” Yet, “while the sovereignty of a European state over an uncivilised region must find its justification, as it easily will, not in treaties with natives but in the manner of the case and compliance with conditions recognised by the civilised world,” Westlake further submits, “it is possible that a right of property may be derived from treaties with natives, and this even before any European sovereignty has begun to exist over the spot.”30 This statement is, at best, ambiguous. The distinction that Westlake makes between sovereignty and “a right of property” may well be tenable, but that does not explain how the “natives,” whose sovereignty he disputes, acquired the
28 29 30
Id. Id. at 139–143. Id. at 144–145.
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competence to alienate property through treaties with European states.31 Additionally, the assertion that “no form of cession by [uncivilised natives] can confer any title to what they do not understand,” on the face of it, gives the impression that Westlake’s position is informed by concern for the interests of the “uncivilised natives.” However, this must be appreciated within the broader context of Westlake’s mission and, in particular, his assertion denying the rights of the “uncivilised natives.” This is further borne out by the manner in which he selects and contrasts two treaties with “uncivilised” chiefs.32 The first, exemplifying what a “treaty . . . with natives ought not to be,” is that concluded between the British South Africa Company and King Umtasa in 1890. Westlake decries the fact that the treaty, to use his own words, “dignifies” the latter as “king or chief of Manika;” preferring, instead, to describe him as a “savage” and “such a drunkard as to be subject to delirium tremens.” The treaty grants to the company the “sole absolute and entire perpetual right and power” to do the acts specified therein “over the whole or any portion of the territory” of the king. The company, in turn, agrees “under the King’s supervision and authority” to perform certain functions, including assisting “in the establishment and propagation of the Christian religion and the education and civilisation of the native subjects of the King” as well as “the extension and equipment of telegraphs and of regular services of postal and transport communications.”33 Westlake finds fault with this treaty not because, as he claims, the king in question was a drunkard and could not possibly comprehend what he was doing – leaving one to wonder why this issue finds expression in the text in the first place. Instead, Westlake contends that, taken alone, the stipulations in the treaty might not have been beyond the understanding of the king, “but when they were mixed with a farrago which must have been mere jargon to him, the whole must be dismissed as something which could not have received his intelligent consent.” It is apparently of no concern to Westlake that the treaty speaks of the “territory” of the king and his “supervision and authority,” thus suggesting that the company was conscious of the existence of a government in the territory in question, one capable of providing the “supervision and authority” that the treaty envisages.34
31
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Cf. Mark F. Lindley, The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in International Law: Being a Treatise on the Law and Practice Relating to Colonial Expansion 21 (1926): “[I]t is difficult to see why, if the natives are to be regarded as capable of possessing and transferring property, they should not also be considered competent to hold and transfer the sovereignty which they actually exercise.” Id. at 151–154. Id. Id.
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In contrast, Westlake “pleasant[ly]” offers as “an example to be followed,” an 1889 treaty between “Her Majesty’s acting Consul for Nyassa” and, according to him, “the chiefs of a nation [Makololo] which for intelligence and character ranks very high among those which must still be called uncivilized.” The treaty, inter alia, makes a distinction, which is important, between the “subjects of the queen of England” and “our subjects” (the subjects of the chiefs), grants the former certain rights but exercisable “according to the laws in force” in the territory of the chiefs, provides for the payment of “duties or customs” to the chiefs, and sets out a framework for dispute resolution. Additionally, there is a stipulation to the effect that the chiefs “will at no time whatever cede any of [their] territory to any other power, or enter into any agreement treaty or arrangement with any foreign government except through and with the consent of the government of Her Majesty the queen of England, &c.”35 This treaty, according to Westlake, “contains nothing beyond the comprehension of the Makololo chiefs.” However, he maintains that “there is no cession of territorial integrity by them.” Be that as it may, there is no doubt that the treaty contains an undertaking by the chiefs not to cede any part of their territory to any “other power.” Indeed, it is revealing that Westlake glosses over the obvious fact that the treaty reckons with the fact that, but for its provisions, the Makololo chiefs would have been competent to effect a cession of their territory to a power of their choice. If, contrary to the treaty provisions, the chiefs had ceded their territory or part of it to another power, one wonders whether the British would not have invoked the terms of the treaty and alleged that the chiefs were in breach of their treaty obligations. If, but for the terms of the treaty, the chiefs had ceded their territory or part of it to a power of their choice, one also wonders whether the British would have challenged the title of that other power on the ground of an alleged absence of sovereignty on the part of the chiefs.36 Furthermore, it is poignant that the treaty evidences the existence of a government in Makololo, with laws to which the British, by the terms of the treaty, were subject. My point is not that the colonizing powers acquired valid title over African lands through cession on the strength of the various treaties that were entered 35 36
Id. If they did, that would have put their own title – to the extent that it was claimed to be predicated on the treaty – in jeopardy. Accordingly, it would not have been in the interest of the British, even if they would have ordinarily preferred otherwise, to challenge the sovereignty of the African states. It is against the backdrop of this reality that Shaw’s example of how Britain deferred to Germany on the strength of an 1883 treaty between the latter and a “local chief” in respect of the “Cameroons territory,” and his assertion that “[h]ad the area been regarded as terra nullius, the mere signing of a document would not have been sufficient and there would therefore have been scope for Britain to recoup the situation,” should be appreciated. Shaw, supra note 23, at 39.
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into with African chiefs. Instead, the determination of the validity or otherwise of such treaties depends on several factors. For instance, given the languages in which the treaties were couched, did the African chiefs really appreciate their import? Obviously this has nothing to do with illiteracy. It is one thing to be liter