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RICHES FROM ATLANTIC COMMERCE
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THE ATLANTIC WORLD Europe, Africa and the Americas, 1500-1830
EDITORS
Wi Klooer (Clark University) Beai Scid (University of Washington)
VOLUME I
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RICHES FROM ATLANTIC COMMERCE Dutch Transatlantic Trade and Shipping, 1585-1817 EDITED BY
JOHANNES POSTMA ad VICTOR ENTHOVEN
BRILL LEIDEN • BOSTON 2003
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Illustration on the cover: Colored engraving by Jan Luyken. Frontispiece in De nieuwe groote lichtende zee-fakkel, vol. 5 (Amsterdam: G. H. van Keulen, ca. 1790). Courtesy of the Rijksmuseum Nederlands Scheepvaartmuseum, Amsterdam [B.0032(109)]. This book is printed on acid-free paper.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Riches from Atlantic commerce : Dutch transatlantic trade and shipping, 1585-1817 / edited by Johannes Postma and Victor Enthoven. p. cm. — (The Atlantic world ; v. 1) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 90-04-12562-0 1. West-Indische Compagnie (Netherlands)—History. 2. Netherlands —Commerce—America—History. 3. America—Commerce—Netherlands—History. 4. Netherlands—Commerce—Africa, West—History. 5. Africa, West—Commerce—Netherlands—History. I. Postma, Johannes. II. Enthoven, V. III. Series. HF3618.A45 2003 382’.09492’07—dc22 2003056282
ISSN 1570–0542 ISBN 90 04 12562 0 © Copyright 2003 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Brill provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910 Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. pried i e eerlad
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CONTENTS
List of Illustrations .................................................................... ix List of Maps, Charts, and Graphs .......................................... xi List of Tables ............................................................................ xiii List of Appendices .................................................................... xvii Foreword .................................................................................... xix Preface ........................................................................................ xxi List of Abbreviations ................................................................ xxiii List of Contributors .................................................................. xxvii
1. Introduction .......................................................................... Victor Enthoven and Johannes Postma
1
PART ONE INITIAL VENTURES INTO THE ATLANTIC AND THE DUTCH WEST INDIA COMPANY
2. Early Dutch Expansion in the Atlantic Region, 1585–1621 ............................................................................ Victor Enthoven
17
3. Dutch Trade with Brazil before the Dutch West India Company, 1587–1621 ...................................... Christopher Ebert
49
4. The Dutch West India Company, 1621–1791 .................. Henk den Heijer
77
PART TWO AFRICAN COMMERCE AND SLAVE TRADE
5. A Reassessment of the Dutch Atlantic Slave Trade ........ Johannes Postma
115
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6. The West African Trade of the Dutch West India Company, 1674–1740 ........................................................ 139 Henk den Heijer 7. The Dutch Republic and Brazil as Commercial Partners on the West African Coast during the Eighteenth Century ............................................................ 171 Stuart B. Schwartz and Johannes Postma PART THREE CARIBBEAN AND NORTH AMERICAN TRADE
8. Curaçao and the Caribbean Transit Trade ...................... 203 Wim Klooster 9. The Curaçao Slave Market: From Asiento Trade to Free Trade, 1700–1730 ................................................ 219 Han Jordaan 10. Representative Atlantic Entrepreneur: Jacob Leisler, 1640–1691 .................................................... 259 Claudia Schnurmann PART FOUR COMMERCE WITH THE GUIANA SETTLEMENT COLONIES
11. Suriname and Its Atlantic Connections, 1667–1795 ........ 287 Johannes Postma 12. The Forgotten Colonies of Essequibo and Demerara, 1700–1814 ........................................................ 323 Eric Willem van der Oest PART FIVE GENERAL TRENDS AND IMPACT OF THE DUTCH ECONOMY
13. An Overview of Dutch Trade with the Americas, 1600–1800 ............................................................................ 365 Wim Klooster
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14. An Assessment of Dutch Transatlantic Commerce, 1585–1817 ...................................................... 385 Victor Enthoven
Appendices .................................................................................. Notes on Methodology, Currencies, Measures, and the Dutch Republic ........................................................ Sources and Credits for Illustrations ........................................ Data Collections .......................................................................... Archives ...................................................................................... Published Sources ...................................................................... Index ............................................................................................
447 461 469 473 475 479 503
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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
On page 14: 1.1. Allegorical Image of Wealth and Riches from Dutch Atlantic Commerce Illustrations 2.1–7.1 can be found between the pages 14 and 15: 2.1. Pearl Fishing Canoe (Canav pour Pechers les Perles) 2.2. Profile of Amsterdam from the IJ; An Allegory on the Prosperity of Amsterdam, 1611 3.1. The Sugar-Rich Province of Pernambuco, Brazil 3.2. The Conquest of San Salvador in Bahia by Jacob Willekens, May 1624 4.1. Willem Usselincx (1567–1647) 4.2. The West India House of the Chamber Amsterdam, MidSeventeenth Century 4.3. Capture of the ‘Silverfleet’ by Piet Heyn at Matanzas, Cuba, 1628 5.1. Allegorical Image of Europe Supported by Africa and America 5.2. Receipt for a Consignment of Slaves at Ardra, 8 December 1686 5.3. List of Ships Trading with Africa, 1730–1766 5.4. Slaves Recently Arrived at Paramaribo from Africa 6.1. Two Views of the Castle São Jorge da Mina (Elmina Castle) 6.2. Europeans and Africans Trading on the Guinea Coast 6.3. European Trading Posts at Ouidah on the Slave Coast 7.1. The Castle São Jorge da Mina (Elmina Castle) Viewed from the Sea Illustrations 8.1–12.3 can be found between the pages 286 and 287: 8.1. The Island of Curaçao 8.2. A Cacao Plant 9.1. Plan of the Town Willemstad, Curaçao, 1707 9.2. Fort Amsterdam and the Entrance of the St. Anna Bay 9.3. Part of the Auction List of Sick and Macron (Manqueron) Slaves, Landed by the Nieuwe Post, 14 February 1716
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Allegorical Image of Suriname, 1784 Sugar Mill Driven by Horses Plan of a Windmill to Power a Sugar Mill Sea Captains Carousing in Suriname View of the Roadstead of Paramaribo View of Paramaribo, from Across the River Newspaper Advertisement Seeking Suriname Horses
12.1. A Ship Consignment (Cognossement), 15 February 1781 12.2. The Essequebo Sociëteit on the Flushing Roadstead, 1772 12.3. Advertisement of the Chamber Zeeland of the Dutch West India Company, 1716 Illustrations 13.1–14.4 can be found between the pages 446 and 447: 13.1. A Sugar Plantation in Dutch-held Pernambuco, Brazil 13.2. The East Coast of North America 13.3. Dutch and French Slave Ships at Anchor in the Roadstead of St. Eustatius, 1764 14.1. Dutch Ships at Anchor in the Roadstead of the Island of São Tomé 14.2. A Yacht Drying Sails 14.3. Ships of the Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie, ca. 1770s 14.4. Merchant Man Moored on the River Meuse at Rotterdam, 1795
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LIST OF MAPS, CHARTS, AND GRAPHS
Maps 2.1. 2.2. 2.3. 2.4. 2.5. 2.6. 2.7.
The Netherlands and the Dutch Revolt, ca. 1600 ...... Holland and Zeeland, ca. 1600 ...................................... Brazil .................................................................................. Caribbean Region ............................................................ Guiana Region .................................................................. New Netherland Region .................................................. West African Coastal Regions ........................................
20 22 25 28 33 37 41
6.1. West Africa ........................................................................ 146 9.1. Willemstad and Surroundings .......................................... 231 10.1. English Colonies in North America ................................ 266 11.1. Suriname and Its Commercial Lifelines ........................ 296 12.1. Essequibo and Demerara ................................................ 330 14.1. The Atlantic ...................................................................... 388 Chart 4.1. Organization Plan of the First WIC ..............................
84
Graph 12.1. Shipping to Essequibo and Demerara, 1700–1819: Five-Year Moving Averages ........................ 347
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LIST OF TABLES
3.1. Amsterdam Freight Contracts – Lisbon Trade, 1599–1608 .......................................................................... 3.2. Amsterdam Freight Contracts for the Baltic-Portuguese Trade, 1614–1619 ................................
62 69
4.1. Initial Capital Investments of the First WIC, 1623 ........ 81 4.2. Dutch Sugar Exports from Brazil: WIC and Private, 1631–1651 ............................................................ 88 4.3. WIC Gold Exports from Africa, 1635–1675 .................. 90 4.4. Ships Captured or Destroyed by the WIC, 1623–1636 .......................................................................... 92 4.5. Shipping between the Dutch Republic and New Netherland, 1620–1674 ............................................ 94 4.6. Conversion of Old Capital into New Shares, 1674 ........ 99 4.7. WIC Commodity Trade with Africa, and Gross Profits, 1741–1779 .................................................. 104 4.8. Cumulative Three-Year Profit and Loss Accounts, 1674–1791 .......................................................................... 108 5.1. Aggregate Dutch Slave Exports from Africa, 1600–1803 .......................................................................... 5.2. Revised Slave Exports from Africa by the WIC and Interlopers, 1600–1739 .............................................. 5.3. Revised Slave Exports from Africa by Dutch Free Traders, 1730–1803 .................................................. 5.4. Ships Removed from Earlier Postma Slave Trade Data Collection, 1730–1803 .............................................. 5.5. Destinations of WIC and Interloper Slave Ships, 1675–1739 .......................................................................... 5.6. Destinations of Free Trade Slave Ships, 1730–1803 ...... 5.7. Revised Aggregate Dutch Slave Exports from Africa, 1600–1803 ..........................................................................
123 123 129 132 134 134 137
6.1. Number of Ships in the African Trade, 1674–1740 ...... 144 6.2. WIC Imports into West Africa, 1700–1723 .................... 153
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6.3. WIC Exports from the Gold Coast, 1675–1731 .......... 157 6.4. Gross Profits in the Commodity and Slave Trade, 1674–1740 ........................................................................ 166 7.1. Brazilian Ships Trading on the Mina Coast, 1681–1710 ........................................................................ 7.2. Captured Brazilian Ships, 1707–1730 ............................ 7.3. Confiscated Brazilian Ships and their Cargoes, 1681–1730 ........................................................................ 7.4. Ships Paying Ten Percent Duty, 1722–1772 ................ 7.5. Ten Percent Fees Paid, 1768–1787 ................................ 7.6. Products as Ten Percent Payments, 1719–1768 .......... 7.7. Brazilian Tobacco Shipped to the Mina Coast, 1698–1765 ........................................................................ 7.8. Slaves Sold by the WIC to Brazilian-Based Vessels, 1715–1731 .......................................................... 7.9. Slaves Passing through the Bahian Customs House, 1725–1744 ............................................................ 8.1. Tonnage of Ships Sailing between Curaçao and the United Provinces, 1701–1755 .......................... 8.2. Two Invoices of Curaçao’s Inter-Caribbean Trade, 1714 and 1741 .................................................... 8.3. Selected Items Sent from Curaçao to the Netherlands, 1771–1775 .................................................. 8.4. Product Trade Curaçao-Netherlands, 1701–1755 ........ 8.5. Curaçao’s Exports to the Netherlands, 1701–1780 ...... 9.1. Prices of Slaves Sold on the Curaçao Slave Market, 1700–1730 ........................................................................ 9.2. Buyer Categories, According to Numbers of Slaves Bought 1700–1730 ................................................ 9.3. Buyers and Preferences According to Gender and Age, 1700–1730 ........................................................ 9.4. Buyers’ Preferences in Purchasing Manquerons, Sick Slaves, or Piezas de India, 1700–1730 ....................
175 177 179 181 182 189 194 195 197 208 212 215 216 217 240 244 251 252
11.1. Comparative Ship Traffic to Suriname, 1667–1795 .... 295 11.2. Horse Landings at Paramaribo, 1683–1794 .................. 302 11.3. Fiscal Values of North American Imports to Suriname, 1705–1744 ...................................................... 304
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11.4. 11.5. 11.6. 11.7. 11.8.
Fiscal Values of Suriname Exports to North America, 1705–1744 .................................................. Slave Imports to Suriname, 1668–1803 .................. Tropical Commodities Shipped from Suriname to the Dutch Republic, 1683–1794 .......................... Market Value of Suriname Commodities, 1683–1794 .................................................................. Values of Suriname Exports to the Dutch Republic, 1683–1794 ................................................
Plantations, Slaves, and Europeans in Essequibo and Demerara, 1700–1817 ...................... 12.2. Comparative Ship Traffic to Essequibo and Demerara, 1700–1819 ........................................ 12.3. Dutch Slave Imports to Essequibo and Demerara, 1700–1793 .............................................. 12.4. Average Slave Prices for Selected Transports Arriving at Essequibo and Demerara, 1700–1791 .... 12.5. Bilateral Shipping Between the Dutch Republic and Essequibo and Demerara, 1700–1819 .............. 12.6 (A). Tropical Commodities Exported from Essequibo and Demerara, 1700–1791 ...................... 12.6 (B). Tropical Commodities Exported from Essequibo and Demerara, 1700–1791 ...................... 12.7. Market Value of Essequibo and Demerara Commodities, 1700–1791 .......................................... 12.8. North American Shipping to Essequibo and Demerara, 1700–1817 ........................................
xv
305 306 315 317 319
12.1.
13.1. 13.2. 13.3. 14.1. 14.2. 14.3.
14.4.
329 334 335 336 342 350 350 351 355
The Dutch Caribbean Trade, 1701–1780 .............. 379 British American Trade with Rotterdam, 1722–1724 .................................................................. 379 American Product Trade, 1721–1760 ...................... 383 Number of Prizes Captured, 1688–1713 ................ Estimated Dutch Atlantic Shipping, ca. 1650 ........ An Overview of Ships Arriving in the Dutch Republic from the Western Hemisphere, 1700–1817 .................................................................. Shipping to and from St. Eustatius, 1744, 1762, 1766, and 1785 ..............................................
400 402
406 412
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Dutch Ships Calling at Barbados, 1700–1750 ...... American Ships Arriving at St. Eustatius, 1771–1779 ................................................................ 14.7. P. & C. Van Eeghen’s American Investments, 1793 .................................................... 14.8. Commodities from the United States for P. & C. Van Eeghen, 1801 .................................... 14.9. Annual Average Debt of the VOC, 1671–1796 ................................................................ 14.10 (A). Capital Invested in Asia and the Atlantic, ca. 1650 .................................................................... 14.10 (B). Capital Invested in Asia and the Atlantic, ca. 1750 .................................................................... 14.11. Capital Outlay in MCC Shipping, 1720–1755 .... 14.12. West Indian Interest Payments, 1797 .................... 14.13. Estimated Imports into the Dutch Republic in 1636 ...................................................................... 14.14. Atlantic Commodities: Amsterdam Imports and Exports, 1 October 1667–30 September 1668 ...... 14.15. Estimated Market Value of 42 West India Ships Arriving in Amsterdam, 1759 ................................ 14.16. Estimated Value of Dutch Atlantic Imports, ca. 1780 .................................................................... 14.17. Trade With the Plantation Colonies on the Guiana Coast, ca. 1800 .................................... 14.18. The VOC and Atlantic Trade in the Context of Dutch Foreign Trade, ca. 1780 .......... 14.19. Estimated Value of Dutch Overseas Trade, ca. 1780 ....................................................................
413 414 418 418 420 422 423 425 434 437 438 441 441 442 443 444
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LIST OF APPENDICES
9.1. Slave Arrivals at Curaçao, 1700–1730 .......................... 447 9.2. Mortality and Sale of Slaves at Curaçao, 1700–1730 ........................................................................ 448 10.1. Agreement for Chartering Merchandise, 1675 .............. 450 10.2. Leisler’s Purchase of the Susannah, 1677 ........................ 451 10.3. Notarial Deed for the Money Borrowed by Skipper William Measure of the Happy Return, 1687 .... 452 11.1. Suriname Exports and Postma Data 11.2. Suriname Exports and Postma Data
Compared in Nassy, Van de Spiegel, Collections, 1683–1794 .................... 453 Compared in Nassy, Van de Spiegel, Collections, 1701–1787 .................... 457
12.1. Slave Ships Destined for Essequibo and Demerara that Did Not Reach Their Destination and Sold Slaves Elsewhere .............................................. 458 14.1. Ships Arriving at Amsterdam from the Western Hemisphere, 1742 and 1771–1817 .................. 459
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FOREWORD
Given its importance at the time – and its continuing importance to our understanding of that time – too little attention has been paid to the Dutch role in the history of the Western Hemisphere during the early modern era. While the current scholars studying Dutch America are few in number, fortunately they are grand in their scholarship. This is especially the case with those whose work is in the volume before us, assembled under the able leadership of Johannes Postma and Victor Enthoven. Their joint investigation of the considerable Dutch presence in Atlantic commerce throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries easily surpasses anything written on the subject to date. It will go far to redress the faults of earlier writings. It will be the definitive analysis for a long time to come. In appreciating what these authors have accomplished we also gain empathy for others dissuaded from the attempt. The requisite language skills alone are daunting. The evidentiary base is elusive and difficult to interpret. The existing secondary literature offers little upon which to build – and, as Enthoven and Postma convincingly demonstrate, it all-too-often suffers from a decided easterly tilt. The authors’ references to that literature make clear that what they present here is either completely new or revises massively what has been accepted until now. Of particular note is their discovery of just how important private Dutch merchants were to a business long thought exclusively the province of the Dutch West India Company. Just as there have been too few works that treat their subject, there are fewer still that so impressively and persuasively alter our thinking, as this one does. In the future all who write about the Dutch Republic during this period will have to take this book into account. The authors demonstration of the magnitude and continuing expansion of Dutch Caribbean and Atlantic trade has repercussions well beyond the Netherlands. The pervasiveness of Dutch commercial and financial connections extended everywhere in Spanish America, Portuguese America, French America and British America and across the entirety of two centuries. The strategically located commercial colonies of New Netherland, St. Eustatius, and Curaçao – even after
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New Amsterdam was exchanged for Suriname – in the 1660s positioned the Dutch perfectly for their trade with the colonists of all four empires, despite the objections and obstructions of their respective metropolitan governments. British American ships sailed freely to all the Dutch colonies exchanging their produce for Caribbean goods. The Brazilians offered tobacco, gold and diamonds. The French West Indians sent their sugar, molasses, and rum. The Spanish Americans trumped all with their peso de ocho reales, their silver piece of eight, the trade dollar for the world. The wharves and warehouses of Oranjestad, Willemstad, and Paramaribo bulged with goods and bustled with customers, a Babel of tongues. It was only the British military conquests of the 1780s and 1790s that put the Dutch out of business in the Western Hemisphere. In February 1781 Admiral Sir George Rodney looted St. Eustatius to the tune of some two to three million pound sterling (ƒ20 to ƒ30 million), roughly equal to the total value of all commodities shipped annually from Great Britain to British North America on the eve of the American Revolutionary War. While surely swelled by war-time commerce, the worth of the goods plundered on just this occasion from just this one Dutch outpost is just as surely suggestive of the immense amounts involved in the trade of the Dutch in the New World by the end of the eighteenth century. The editors and their colleagues reveal the ongoing, developing nature of this rich story. With this book they make a magnificent contribution to our understanding of the Atlantic World during the gilded years of the United Provinces. John J. McCusker Ewing Halsell Distinguished Professor of American History Professor of Economics Trinity University San Antonio, Texas February 2003
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PREFACE
Inspiration, Concept, and Objectives The seed for the idea of this collection was sown as early as the 1986/87 academic year, when Johannes Postma, on sabbatical from his hectic teaching position at Minnesota State University, taught a seminar at the University of Leiden on the Dutch in the Atlantic slave trade. Two of the students in the seminar, Victor Enthoven and Henk den Heijer, developed a special interest in the Atlantic region. The three have kept in touch over the years and have published on various aspects of Atlantic history. A more direct catalyst of this publication was a symposium on Dutch Atlantic Shipping, 1600–1800, sponsored by the Institute of the History of European Expansion (IGEER), and held at the University of Leiden on 5 June 1996. Enthoven, an assistant at IGEER at that time, was instrumental in organizing the symposium. Postma, then a fellow at the Netherlands Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS) at Wassenaar, was a presenter, as were other major contributors to this book, Den Heijer and Wim Klooster. The discussions following the presentations demonstrated that Dutch trade and shipping in the Atlantic region had played a vital role in the Dutch economy during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and, for the editors of this volume, it became abundantly clear that this subject deserved more attention in Dutch historiography. A slow and laborious process was set in motion and, after several unsuccessful initiatives, the collection was completed. This publication is not intended to be all-inclusive, however, because the subject is far too broad to cover in one volume. Rather, the book is intended to draw attention to the subject and stimulate further research.
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Acknowledgements
The problems of multi-lingual authorship and geographical distance have been a challenge for the editors in coordinating this project. Fortunately, the modern technology of internet and email facilitated the task considerably. We thank all the contributors, especially the early ones, for their patience and perseverance. In addition to contributing two chapters, Henk den Heijer drew the numerous maps for the collection. As joint editors, Postma translated several of the chapters from Dutch into English, and Enthoven did the lion’s share of editing and coordinating the overall contents of the collection. But in the end, all contributors added to this project in their own special way. Without the encouragement and support of many persons and institutions, this publication would never have been completed. The staffs of numerous archives and libraries generously provided their services. Joelle Million edited the entire manuscript to bring it in conformity with standard United States English, and she synchronized the diverse and exhaustive documentation. Julian Deahl, Ms. Gera van Bedaf, and Ms. Marcella Mulder at Brill Academic Publishers has been very helpful in guiding us through the process of getting the manuscript ready for publication. The editors of Brill’s Atlantic World Series, Wim Klooster and Benjamin Schmidt, assisted us with their encouragement and advice. We also thank the anonymous reviewer for his positive assessment of the manuscript. Johannes Postma and Victor Enthoven
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AA AB AGI AGS AHU APB ARA BP CO C&R DAS FRG GAA GAR Hs IGEER IIAS IMAG ING JCB KIT
Archieven der Admiraliteitscolleges (Naval Archives) Archief van de Burgemeesteren (Archives of the Mayors), Amsterdam Archivo General de Indias (General Archive of the Indies), Sevilla Archivo General de Simancas (General Archive of Simancas), Simancas Arquivo Histórico Ultramariono (Historical Archive Ultramarino), Lisbon Arquivo Publico do Estado da Bahia (Public Archives of Estado da Bahia), Bahia Algemeen Rijksarchief (National Archives), The Hague Brown Papers Colonial Office Fa. Coopstad & Rochussen (Coopstad & Rochussen Company), Rotterdam Dutch Asiatic Shipping Französisch-Reformierte Gemeinde (French Reformed Community) Gemeentearchief Amsterdam (Amsterdam Municipal Archives), Amsterdam Gemeentearchief Rotterdam (Rotterdam Municipal Archives), Rotterdam Handschrift (Manuscript) Instituut voor de Geschiedenis van de Europese Expansie (Institute for the History of European Expansion), Leiden International Institute of Asian Studies, Leiden Instituut voor Moderne Aziatische Geschiedenis (Institute of Modern Asian History), Amsterdam Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis (Institute of Dutch History), The Hague John Carter Brown Library, Providence Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen (Royal Institute for the Tropics), Amsterdam
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xxiv KITLV LKAN MCC MS NA NBKG NDAR NEHA NHM NIAS NWIC OBP ONA OSA OWIC PRO PvB PvdS RAZ Res. RGP RP RvC SG StAF
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Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (Royal Institute of Languistics and Ethnology), Leiden Landeskirchliches Archiv Nürnberg (Nürnberg Church Archive), Nürnberg Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie (Middelburg Trading Company) Manuscript Notarieel Archief (Notarial Archives) Nederlandse Bezittingen ter Kuste van Guinea (Dutch Territories on the Guinea Coast) Naval Documents of the American Revolution Nederlands Economisch Historisch Archief (Dutch Economic Historical Archive), Amsterdam Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij (Dutch Trading Company) Netherlands Institute of Advanced Studies, Wassenaar Nieuwe West-Indische Compagnie, 1675–1791 (Second Dutch West India Company, 1675–1791) Overgekomen Brieven en Papieren (Dispatched Letters and Papers) Oud Notarieel Archief (Old Notarial Archives) Oud Stadsarchief (Old Municipal Archives) Oude West-Indisceh Compagnie, 1621–1674 (First Dutch West India Company, 1621–1674) Public Record Office, London/Kew Archief van Pieter van Bleiswijk (Archive of Pieter van Bleiswijk) Archief van Pieter van de Spiegel (Archive of Pieter van de Spiegel) Rijksarchief in Zeeland (Zeeland Public Record Office), Middelburg Resolutie (Resolution) Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën (National Historical Publications) Ratsprotokoll (Council Minutes) Raad van Coloniën (Colonial Council) Staten-Generaal (States General) Stadtarchiv Frankfurt am Main, Frankfurt am Main (Frankfurt am Main Municipal Archives
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StAW SvB SvH SvS SvZ VWIS VOC WIC ZA
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Stadtarchiv Weissenburg (Weisenburg Municipal Archives), Weissenburg Sociëteit van Berbice (Berbice Corporation) Staten van Holland (States of Holland) Sociëteit van Suriname (Suriname Corporation) Staten van Zeeland (States of Zeeland) Verspreide West-Indische Stukken (Miscellaneous West Indian Documents) Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (Dutch East India Company) West-Indische Compagnie (Dutch West India Company) Zeeuws Archief (Zeeland Public Record Office), Middelburg
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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
Christopher Ebert is a Ph.D candidate at Columbia University and is researching the trade in Brazilian sugar. His work in Portuguese archives has been supported by the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation. Victor Enthoven earned his Ph.D at the University of Leiden in 1996. He was affiliated for several years with the Institute for the History of European Expansion (IGEER) at the same university. He has published several articles and books on Dutch expansion and Atlantic and Asian history, as well as on maritime history and the history of public finance. At present he is Assistant Professor of Maritime History at the Royal Netherlands Naval College at Den Helder, Netherlands. Henk den Heijer earned his Ph.D at the University of Leiden in 1997, specializing in maritime history and European expansion. He has worked as a researcher at the Universities of Leiden and Amsterdam, and is the author of several articles on Atlantic history and three books, De geschiedenis van de WIC (1994), Goud, ivoor en slaven. Scheepvaart en handel van de Tweede Westindische Compagnie (1997), and Naar de koning van Dahomey (2000). He is currently engaged in research about the Dutch East India Company and the Dutch West India Company as organizations of limited liability. Han Jordaan completed his doctoral studies at the University of Leiden in 1987, and has since worked as a museum consultant at St. Eustatius and as a research assistant at the Free University of Amsterdam. He has done extensive research on the Curaçao slave society, has published several articles on the history of the Netherlands Antilles and is currently employed at the National Archives in The Hague. Wim Klooster earned his Ph.D. at the University of Leiden in 1995, has been Assistant Professor at the University of Southern Maine, 1998–2003, and is now at Clark University, Worcester, Massachusetts. He is the author of numerous articles on Atlantic
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history and three books: The Dutch in the Americas, 1600–1800 (1997), Illicit Riches: Dutch Trade in the Caribbean, 1648–1795 (1998), and The Atlantic World (2003), co-edited with Alfred Padula. Eric Willem van der Oest studied history at the University of Leiden, specializing in maritime and West Indian history. In 1991 he published, together with R. B. Prud’homme van Reine, a catalogue for an exhibition about Dutch privateering between 1500 and 1800. After working several years for the Dutch Department of Transport, he is currently a senior consultant at a lobbying firm in The Hague, Netherlands. Johannes Postma earned his Ph.D. in history at Michigan State University in 1970 and was Professor of History at Minnesota State University at Mankato from 1969 to 2001. He is the author of several articles on Atlantic history and two books, The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1600–1800 (1990), and The Atlantic Slave Trade (2003). He continues his research and writing in retirement, and is presently living in Wilbraham, Massachusetts. Claudia Schnurmann earned her Ph.D. in 1988 from the GeorgAugust-University, Goettingen, where she currently teaches early modern history. She is author of several articles on Atlantic history and four books, including Atlantische Welten: Engländer und Niederländer im amerikanisch-atlantischen Raum, 1648–1713 (1998), Europa trifft Amerika: Atlantische Wirtschaft in der Fruehen Neuzeit, 1492–1783 (1998), and Vom Inselreich zur Weltmacht. Die Entwicklung Englands zum Weltreich vom Mittelalter bis ins 20. Jahrhundert (2001). Stuart Schwarz earned his Ph.D in Latin American history at Columbia University in 1968. He taught for many years at the University of Minnesota and assumed his position as George Burton Adams Professor of History at Yale University in 1996. He has published numerous articles and several books on Latin American history, including Sugar Plantations in the Formation of Brazilian Society: Bahia, 1550–1835 (1985) and Slaves, Peasants, and Rebels: Reconsidering Brazilian Slavery (1992). He is co-author and editor of three volumes of the Cambridge History of Latin America (2000).
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INTRODUCTION
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION V E J P
Amsterdam’s large staple market imported sugar, coffee, and cacao on thirty-five ships annually, which greatly exceeded the imports of the VOC [Dutch East India Company] to the Dutch Republic at her highest peak. M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofsz, 1967.1
Objectives In her 1967 review of C. R. Boxer’s The Dutch Seaborne Empire, historian/archivist M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofsz suggested that Boxer greatly underrated the significance of the Dutch Atlantic trade. While this view contradicted conventional wisdom, it is now apparent that Meilink-Roelofsz still significantly underestimated the volume of the Atlantic trade. The aim of this publication is to present a more accurate assessment of the volume of that commerce and to demonstrate its significance for the Dutch Republic.2 The original impulse for this collection was a symposium on the subject ‘Dutch Atlantic Shipping, 1600–1800,’ held at the University of Leiden on 5 June 1996 (the 13th Studiedag), under the auspices of 1 M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofsz, review of The Dutch Seaborne Empire, 1600–1800, by C. R. Boxer, Bijdragen voor de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden 21 (1967/68): 323. See also C. R. Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne Empire, 1600–1800 (New York: Knopf, 1965). 2 Even before the Second World War, E. E. de Jong-Keesing had already noted the large volume of the Dutch West India trade. A fleet of forty-two West India ships returned to Amsterdam in 1759 with cargoes valued at ƒ7.2 million. E. E. de Jong-Keesing, De economische crisis van 1763 te Amsterdam (Amsterdam: Intern., 1939). With the same fleet, seven ships arrived in other Dutch harbors from the West Indies. Gemeentearchief Amsterdam, Archief Brants 189: Copyboek J. I. de Neufville, 15 September 1759. See also F. Oudschans Deutz, ‘De betekenis van Suriname voor Nederland en in het bijzonder voor Amsterdam in het midden van de 18de eeuw,’ Maandblad Amstelodamum 33 (1946): 26–27.
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the Institute for the History of European Expansion (IGEER). Most of the presentations at the symposium are included in this collection, and several additional articles have been added. The general consensus among symposium participants was that Atlantic shipping and commerce had routinely been under-represented in the historiography of Dutch overseas expansion. After 1621, the Dutch West India Company (WIC – West-Indische Compagnie) initially controlled Dutch Atlantic trade in the same way that the Dutch East India Company (VOC – Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie) did in the trade with Asia. But while the VOC retained its monopoly, the WIC gradually lost control of Atlantic trade, which was increasingly privatized and diversified among numerous private entrepreneurs and firms after the 1630s.3 Most historians view the gradual deterioration of the WIC as a barometer of Dutch commercial activity in the Atlantic. But archival research of several of the 1996 symposium presenters shows that the privatized Atlantic commerce flourished. Particularly during the eighteenth century, shipping links across the Atlantic appear to have experienced considerable expansion, while the VOC faced increasing losses from the 1690s onward and became a fading force after that time.4 For the editors of this volume, the 1996 symposium made it abundantly clear that the Dutch Atlantic trade demanded serious attention and deserved a higher place on the academic agenda. During the past decade, several major academic studies have demonstrated that Dutch Atlantic commerce flourished more than has been generally assumed.5 The recently published history of the
A good example of this is the Amsterdam firm Van Eeghen, which sent its ship the Curaçaose Visser to the West Indies for a cargo of sugar and coffee, valued at ƒ500,000, during the Seven Year War (1756–1763). After the ship was captured by a British privateer, it appeared that no fewer than 119 merchants and firms had an interest in the cargo. J. Rogge, Het handelshuis Van Eeghen; Proeve eener geschiedenis van een Amsterdamsch handelshuis, 2d ed. (Amsterdam: Van Ditmar, 1949), 48. 4 F. S. Gaastra, De geschiedenis van de VOC, 2d ed. (Zutphen: Walburg, 1991), 132, table 18. The intra-Asiatic trade conducted by the company also declined significantly during the eighteenth century; see E. M. Jacobs, Koopman in Azië. De handel van de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie tijdens de achttiende eeuw (Zutphen: Walburg, 2000), 230, table 1. 5 J. Postma, The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1600–1815 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); F. Souty, Trois rivières et l’histoire. Guyana Neerlandaise Occidentale (Demerary, Essequebo, Berbice) au XVIII siècle, 1700–1796 (Ph.D. diss., University of Paris, 1995); H. den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven. Scheepvaart en handel van de Tweede Westindische Compagnie op Afrika, 1674–1740 (Zutphen: Walburg, 1997); W. Klooster, 3
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Dutch West India Company by Den Heijer provides ample evidence of this.6 A number of smaller and less well-known studies have also contributed to a new appreciation of Dutch Atlantic commerce.7 Several publications not concerned with commerce and shipping have also called attention to the prevalence of Dutch activities in the Atlantic region.8 Also stimulating interest in the history of the Dutch Illicit Riches: The Dutch Trade in the Caribbean, 1648–1795, Caribbean Series, no. 18 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1998); G. M. Welling, The Prize of Neutrality: Trade Relations between Amsterdam and North America, 1771–1817, A Study in Computing History, Amsterdamse Historische Reeks, kleine ser., no. 39 (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, 1998); C. Schnurmann, Atlantische Welten. Engländer und Niederländer im amerikanisch-atlantischen Raum, 1648–1713, Wirtschafts- und Sozialhistorische Studien, no. 9 (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 1998); C. Reinders Folmer-van Prooijen, Van goederenhandel naar slavenhandel. De Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie, 1720 –1755, Werken uitgegeven door het Koninklijk Zeeuwsch Genootschap der Wetenschappen, no. 10 (Middelburg: Koninklijk Zeeuwsch Genootschap der Wetenschappen, 2000); K. Ratelband, Nederlanders in West-Afrika, 1600–1650. Angola, Kongo en São Tomé, comp. and ed. R. Baesjou (Zutphen: Walburg, 2000). 6 H. den Heijer, De geschiedenis van de WIC (Zutphen: Walburg, 1994). 7 A. van Stipriaan, ‘Debunking Debts: Image and Reality of a Colonial Crisis, Suriname at the End of the Eighteenth Century,’ Itinerario 19, no. 1 (1995): 69–84; W. Klooster, ‘Slavenvaart op Spaanse kusten. De Nederlandse slavenhandel met Spaans Amerika, 1648–1701,’ Tijdschrift voor Zeegeschiedenis 16, no. 2 (1997): 121–40; H. den Heijer, ‘Zeeuwse smokkelhandel op West-Africa, 1674–1730,’ Tijdschrift voor Zeegeschiedenis 16, no. 2 (1997): 141–59; V. Enthoven, ‘Suriname and Zeeland: Fifteen Years of Dutch Misery on the Wild Coast, 1667–1682,’ in Procedings of the International Conference on Shipping, Factories and Colonization, ed. J. Everaert and J. Parmentier (Brussels: Koninklijke Academie voor Overzeese Wetenschappen en Wetenschappelijk Comité voor Maritieme Geschiedenis, 1996), 249–60; E. van der Oest, ‘Vergeten kolonies. Handel en scheepvaart op de kolonies Essequebo en Demerary, 1700–1791’ (master’s thesis, University of Leiden, 1992); F. Souty, ‘Le Brésil néerlandais, 1624–1654; Une tentative de projection conjuncturelle de longue durée à partir de données de court terme,’ Revue d’Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine 35 (1988): 182–239. 8 These include W. S. M. Hoogbergen, De Boni-oorlogen, 1757–1860. Marronage en guerilla in Oost-Suriname, Bronnen voor de Studie van Afro-Amerikaanse Samenlevingen in de Guyanas, no. 11 (Utrecht: Centrum voor Caribische Studies, 1985; P. J. P. Whitehead and M. Boeseman, A Portrait of Dutch Seventeenth Century Brazil: Animals, Plants and People by the Artists of Johan Maurits of Nassau, Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Westenschappen, Verhandelingen afd. Natuurkunde, 2d ser., no. 87 (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1989); L. Bosman, Nieuw Amsterdam in Berbice (Guyana). De planning en bouw van een koloniale stad, 1764 –1800, Zeven Provinciën Reeks, no. 9 (Hilversum: Verloren, 1994); W. Klooster, The Dutch in the Americas, 1600–1800: A Narrative History with the Catalogue of an Exhibition of Rare Prints, Maps, and Illustrated Books from the John Carter Brown Library (Providence: John Carter Brown Library, 1997); F. L. Schalkwijk, The Reformed Church in Dutch Brazil, 1630–1654 (Zoetermeer: Boekencentrum, 1998); K. Zandvliet, Mapping for Money: Maps, Plans and Topographic Paintings and Their Role in Dutch Overseas Expansion During the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Amsterdam: Bataafsche Leeuw, 1998); J. A. Jacobs, Een zegenrijk gewest. Nieuw-Nederland in de zeventiende eeuw, Cultuurgeschiedenis van de Republiek in de zeventiende eeuw, no. 2 (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 1999); C. Medendorp,
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in the Atlantic is the current public debate concerning the Dutch involvement in slavery and the slave trade. While this chapter of Dutch history has traditionally received little scholarly attention, descendants of Dutch slaves are now demanding an acknowledgment of the Dutch role in transplanting enslaved Africans to American and West Indian colonies to grow tropical produce for the Dutch market.9 This collection demonstrates that the Dutch were deeply involved in various aspects of the Atlantic world during the ancien régime, and that trade with the Atlantic region enriched the Dutch Republic even more than the Asian trade of the VOC.
The Deceptive Nineteenth Century The Dutch memory of its once-lucrative Atlantic commerce began to fade during the nineteenth century. The reason for this was the economic expansion that occurred in the Dutch East Indies during that century, while contraction took place in the Atlantic colonies. Gerrit Schouten, 1779–1839 (Amsterdam: Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen, 1999); H. den Heijer, ed., Naar de koning van Dahomey. Het journaal van de gezantschapsreis van Jacobus Elet naar het West-Afrikaanse koninkrijk Dahomey in 1733, Werken uitgegeven door de Linschoten Vereeniging, no. 99 (Zutphen: Walburg, 2000); J. W. C. Ort, Surinaams verhaal. Vestiging van de hervormde kerk in Suriname, 1667–1800 (Zutphen: Walburg, 2000); R. van Oers, Dutch Town Planning Overseas during VOC and WIC Rule, 1600–1800 (Zutphen: Walburg, 2000); J. A. G. de Mello, Nederlanders in Brazilië, 1624–1654. De invloed van de Hollandse bezittingen op het leven en de cultuur in NoordBrazilië, ed. B. N. Teensma (Zutphen: Walburg, 2001); and B. Schmidt, Innocence Abroad: The Dutch Imagination and the New World, 1570–1670 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 9 Recent literature regarding Dutch slavery and slave trade include R. Beeldsnijder, ‘Om werk van jullie te hebben.’ Plantageslaven in Suriname, 1730–1750, Bronnen voor de studie van Afro-Suriname, no. 16 (Utrecht: CLACS, 1994); A. F. Paula, ‘Vrije’ slaven. Een sociaal-historische studie over de dualistische slavenemancipatie op Nederlands Sint Maarten, 1816–1863 (Zutphen: Walburg, 1993); A. Blakely, Blacks in the Dutch World: The Evolution of Racial Imagery in a Modern Society (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993); E. M. L. Klinkers, Op hoop van vrijheid. Van slavensamenleving naar de Creoolse gemeenschap in Suriname, 1830–1880, Bronnen voor de studie van Afro-Surinaamse Samenlevingen, no. 18 (Utrecht: University of Utrecht, 1997); E. Kolfin, Van de slavenzweep en de Muze. Twee eeuwen verbeelding van de slavernij in Suriname, Caribbean Series, no. 17 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1997); P. C. Emmer, De Nederlandse Slavenhandel, 1500 –1850 (Amsterdam: Arbeiders, 2000); R. Daalder, A. Kieskamp, and D. J. Tang, eds., Slaven en schepen. Enkele reis, bestemming onbekend (Leiden: Primavera, 2001). The debate on slavery and its legacy can be followed via the website http://www.slavernijmonument.nl.
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These changes created a dramatic shift in the mind-set of the Dutch public, and it saturated Dutch historical tradition with an overpowering fascination with the east, while interest in the Atlantic waned. Gradually, the reality of the nineteenth century was superimposed on the memory of previous centuries. The Napoleonic era resulted in significant losses for the Dutch overseas empire in both the Atlantic region and in Asia. Salvaging the Dutch East Indies provided initially high expectations, but these did not materialize until a new cultivation system, the so-called kultuurstelsel, was introduced in the 1830s. The new system included forced-production of cash crops under government-control, and brought ƒ784 million in revenue into the Dutch treasury between 1832 and 1877. When the kultuurstelsel was abandoned in the 1870s, after much national and international criticism, the Indonesian archipelago was opened to lucrative private investments.10 Britain took nearly all Dutch colonies in the Atlantic region during the Napoleonic era; only Elmina on the West African coast remained in Dutch hands. Most of the captured territories were returned after the war, but the thriving settlements in today’s Guyana – Berbice, Essequibo, and Demerara – were permanently ceded to the United Kingdom in the Peace of Paris in 1814. Suriname returned to Dutch control in 1816, but its coffee and sugar plantations experienced increasing and damaging competition from similar crops cultivated on Java, in present-day Indonesia. When slavery was abolished in 1863, Suriname’s plantation productivity deteriorated drastically and many plantations were abandoned.11 Meanwhile, Curaçao and St. Eustatius lost their unique place as commercial entrepôts. They had once supplied foreign colonies with slaves and merchandise, and had become important depots for Venezuelan and Antillean export commodities. But when the Spanish American colonies gained their independence during the first half of the nineteenth century, both islands suffered continuing economic
10
C. Fasseur, Kultuurstelsel en koloniale baten. De Nederlandse exploitatie van Java, 1840 –1860 (Leiden: University of Leiden, 1978); C. Fasseur, ‘Het kultuurstelsel opnieuw in discussie,’ in Geld en geweten. Een bundel opstellen over anderhalve eeuw Nederlands bestuur in de Indonesische archipel, ed. C. Fasseur (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1980), 1:115–30. 11 G. Oostindie, Roosenburg en Mon Bijou. Twee Surinaamse plantages, 1720 –1870, Caribbean Series, no. 11 (Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1989), 396–401; A. van Stipriaan, Surinaams contrast. Roofbouw en overleven in een Carïbische plantagekolonie, 1750–1863, Caribbean Series, no. 13 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1993), 33–37.
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crises. Curaçao’s slump lasted until oil refineries were established on the island early in the twentieth century, while St. Eustatius never recovered.12 All Dutch West Indian colonies suffered serious economic repercussions when the British abolished the slave trade in 1808. When the Kingdom of the Netherlands was created with British support in 1814, it acquiesced to British demands to stop participating in the slave trade as well, and this furthered the decline of West Indian economies.13 No longer needing trading posts on the West African coast, the Dutch turned these over to Britain as well, in 1872. In exchange, Britain ceded its claims on Sumatra, in the East Indies. Thus, in the nineteenth century, the focus of Dutch colonial policy shifted from the Atlantic to Asia,14 and as the Netherlands enjoyed the rich proceeds from the East Indies, the memory of the once lucrative commerce from transatlantic trade faded.
Academic Imbalance The shift in focus from the Atlantic to Asia is apparent in the Colonial Reports of the States General (Koloniale Verslagen) during the mid1800s, about 90 percent of which were devoted to the East Indies.15 By the end of the century, the universities at Leiden and Utrecht had established programs for educating civil servants for the East Indies.16 One of the well-known atlases about Dutch overseas colonies exhibited a similar preoccupation with Asia.17 Strong academic interest in the East Indies continued into the twentieth century with the establishment of the Colonial Institute for 12 Klooster, Illicit Riches; J. van Soest, Olie als water. De Curaçaose economie in de eerste helft van de twintigste eeuw (Zutphen: Walburg, 1977). 13 P. C. Emmer, Engeland, Nederland, Afrika en de slavenhandel in de negentiende eeuw (Leiden: Brill, 1974). 14 H. T. Colenbrander, Koloniale geschiedenis (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1925), 2:30; A. van Dantzig, Forts and Castles of Ghana (Accra: Sedco, 1980), 73. 15 Verslag van het beheer en den staat der koloniën (The Hague: n.p., 1848–1865); Verslag van het beheer en den staat der Nederlandschen bezittingen en koloniën in Oost- en West-Indië en ter kust van Guinea (Utrecht: Kemink, 1849–1854); Koloniaal verslag uit de handelingen van de Staten-Generaal (The Hague: Algemeene Landsdrukkerij, 1866–1923). 16 C. Fasseur, De indologen. Ambtenaren voor de Oost, 1825–1950 (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 1993). 17 Atlas van Tropisch Nederland (Batavia: Reproductiebedrijf van den Topografischen Dienst in Nederlandsch-Indië, 1938).
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the Tropics (KIT) at Amsterdam, and the Royal Institute of Linguistics and Ethnology (KITLV), the Institute Kern, and the Institute Van Vollenhoven, all three well known for their Asian collections, at Leiden. Leiden is currently also the headquarters of the International Institute of Asian Studies (IIAS). The University of Amsterdam houses the Institute of Modern Asian History (IMAG), and for a time, it also had three chairs for Asian specialties in art history and archeology. Although the Institute for the History of European Expansion (IGEER) at Leiden University is more comprehensive, its feature publication Itinerario, has a decidedly Asia tilt as well.18 In academic circles, the image of the VOC took on religious or mythic proportions, according to Van Stipriaan and Bal.19 Whether this is true or not, it is clear that there is little academic support for Atlantic studies in the Netherlands. One finds only a single Atlantic specialist here and there at Dutch universities, but there is no bona fide platform for cooperation and exchange of ideas for Atlantic specialists. The Center of Latin-American and Caribbean Studies at the University of Utrecht has potential to serve this function, but it is limited in scale, and the same applies for the KITLV.20 While these academic institutions reflect the economic realities of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, their preoccupation with Asia obscures and neglects seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Atlantic history. That none of the contributors to this collection is affiliated with a Dutch university, but those in other countries all have university appointments, is affirmation of imbalanced academic priorities in the Netherlands. The fact that all of the Dutch remaining overseas territories are all in the ‘west’ makes the situation ironic. The recent
18 IGEER is presently involved in an ambitious program to educate a new generation of historians from the former VOC territories. See http://www.tanap.net/. One can only hope that a similar program for the former WIC territories will be organized. 19 A. van Stipriaan and E. Bal, ‘De VOC is een geloof. Kantekeningen bij een populair Nederlands imago,’ in Rotterdammers en de VOC. Handelscompagnie, stad en burgers, 1600–1800, ed. M. van der Heijden and P. van der Laar (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2002), 213–43. 20 It is essentially the operation of a single-person, who is affiliated with the Department of Anthropology, and issues the series Bronnen voor de Studie van Afro-Surinaamse Samenlevingen, as well as OSO, Journal of Suriname Languages, Literature, Culture, and History. The KITLV also has a department of Caribbean Studies, but its primary emphasis is Asia, and it considers itself a center for VOC studies. See http://www.kitlv.nl.
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debate about the Netherlands’ historic connection with slavery proceeds largely outside of the universities, due to lack of expertise and academic interest. A few years ago, an application for a study-group on Atlantic shipping and trade at the Netherlands Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS) in Wassenaar failed, largely due to insufficient quality participation from Dutch academic circles.
Misunderstanding and Disorientation The general lack of appreciation for the Dutch Atlantic experience is particularly evident in Dutch historiography. The publications of the prestigious Linschoten Vereeniging are strongly oriented toward Asia. Of the forty volumes published during the past four decades, only three relate to the Atlantic region.21 Only one of the nine travel books published by Terra Incognita, headquartered at Amsterdam, relates to the Atlantic.22 In its one hundred year history, the national source publication of Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën (RGP, National History Publications), of the Institute of Dutch History (ING) in The Hague, has never published one volume about the Atlantic region, and its Asian emphasis is overwhelming.23 The Current Annotated Bibliography of Dutch Expansion Studies, which appeared as volume 4 of 21 H. J. de Graaf, ed., De reis van Z. M. ‘De Vlieg’, Commandant Willem Kreekel, naar Brazilië, 1807–1808, Werken uitgegeven door de Linschoten Vereeniging, nos. 76 and 77 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1975–76); J. E. Oosterling, ed., Het korvet ‘Lynx’ in Zuid-Amerika, de Filippijnen en Oost-Indië, 1823–1825. De Koninklijke Marine als instrument van het ‘politiek systhema’ van Koning Willem I, Werken uitgegeven door de Linschoten Vereeninging, no. 89 (Zutphen: Walburg, 1989); Den Heijer, Naar de koning van Dahomey. See also http://www.linschotenvereeniging.nl. 22 K. I. Muller, ed., Elisabeth van der Woude. Memorije van ’t geen bij mijn tijt is voorgevallen. Met het opzienbarende verslag van haar reis naar de Wilde Kust, 1676–1677 (Amsterdam: Terra Incognita, 2001). See also http://www.xs4all.nl/~terrainc/. 23 The ING’s bias in favor of Asia shows also in the Jubileumbundel of the first centennial celebration of the RGP, which makes the erroneous claim that secretary Pieter van Dam wrote the first Dutch history of a corporation, the VOC, in 1701. Johannes de Laet, however, wrote the corporate history of the WIC in 1644. See R. van Gelder, ‘De eerste Nederlandse bedrijfsgeschiedenis. Pieter van Dams beschrijving van de Oost-Indische Compagnie,’ in Nederland in de wereld. Opstellen bij honderd jaar Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën, ed. S. C. Derks, Horizonreeks, no. 3 (The Hague: ING en Boom, 2002): 277–92; J. de Laet, Jaerlyck verhael van de verrichtingen der geoctroyeerde West-Indische Compagnie in derthien boecken, ed. S. P. L’Honoré Naber and J. C. M. Warnsinck, Werken uitgegeven door de Linschoten Vereeniging, nos. 34, 35, 37, 40 (1644; reprint, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1931–1937). See also http:// www.inghist.nl.
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Itinerario and identified sources before 1995, listed 769 titles dealing with Asia for the 1990–1994 period, but only 338 about Africa, West India, and the Americas combined. The lack of interest in Atlantic history among Dutch scholars has resulted in the Netherlands being short-changed in international publications as well. A 1996 British series on European expansion gives the Atlantic region ample coverage, but contributions by Dutch historians and about Dutch involvement in the Atlantic are sparse. Not until volume 9 on Atlantic Commerce, does one out of thirty-three articles focus on Dutch involvement.24 Volume 13 of the series, The Organization of Inter-Oceanic Trade in European Expansion, 1450 –1609, edited by two Dutch historians, includes three articles about Dutch intercontinental commerce, but none is about the Atlantic or is written by a Dutch historian.25 Volume 15 covers the Atlantic Slave trade, but Dutch participation in the traffic is not dicussed.26 In the remaining twenty-eight volumes, running to the year 2000, there is nothing about the Dutch in Atlantic expansion.27 This poor representation is surely not due to an international bias against the Dutch, but more likely the result of limited interest within the Dutch scholarly community. The limited attention Dutch historians have given the Atlantic region reflects the belief that West Indian, American, and African possessions contributed very little to the economic prosperity of the Dutch Republic. This view has become an accepted truth repeated in standard works on Dutch economic history, and reflected in such titles as ‘The Shrinking Horizon of the Dutch Merchants: Dutch Wealth in the Caribbean.’28 According to one Dutch historian, ‘The underlying reason behind the negligence in studying their Atlantic past is the fact that the Dutch were not very important in that part
24 E. Sluiter, ‘Dutch-Spanish Rivalry in the Caribbean Area, 1594–1609,’ in The Atlantic Staple Trade: Commerce and Politics, ed. S. Socolow, An Expanding World, no. 9 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1996), 1:239–70. 25 P. C. Emmer and F. S. Gaastra, eds., The Organization of Interoceanic Trade in European Expansion, 1450–1800, An Expanding World, no. 13 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1996). 26 P. Manning, ed., Slave Trades, 1500 –1800: Globalisation of Forced Labour, An Expanding World, no. 15 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1996). 27 South Africa and the Dutch settlement at the Cape of Good Hope are not included as Atlantic topics since they were VOC territory. 28 T. P. M. de Jong, De Krimpende horizon van de Hollandse kooplieden. Hollands welvaren in het Caribisch zeegebied, 1780–1830 (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1966).
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of the world.’29 And a recent highly acclaimed publication sees ‘The 200-year history of the Dutch Atlantic economy as one of repeated cycles of hope, frustration, and failure.’30
Point of Departure There is no denying that the Iberians, the British, and the French left a much deeper cultural and political impact on the Atlantic than did the Dutch. It is also quite evident that these nations shipped more commodities from the New to the Old World. Even in the slave trade, the Dutch played a relatively insignificant role. The central argument here is that Dutch shipments from the Americas, the West Indies, and West Africa to the United Provinces were more substantial and more valuable than previously thought, and that the Atlantic region was of much greater economic importance for the Dutch Republic than previously assumed. Furthermore, it also appears that during the ancien régime, Dutch Atlantic commerce was larger and of greater economic value than the VOC trade with Asia. Through detailed recent and earlier studies, based on extensive archival research, this publication provides supporting evidence for these assertions. In doing so, it supplies a unique overview of current research on Dutch economic activities in and with the Western Hemisphere. For the first time, a group of specialists of diverse nationalities has created a sketch of two centuries of Dutch commerce in the Atlantic, including West Africa, Brazil, Guiana, the Caribbean, and the American mainland. This book is not the final word on this issue, and much research remains to be done. Several areas within the Dutch commercial reach have been omitted because of deficient current research. The omissions include Brazil during the Dutch period (1630–1654), New Nederland, and the intra-Caribbean trade.31 Especially the latter
29
P. C. Emmer, The Dutch in the Atlantic Economy, 1580–1880: Trade, Slavery and Emancipation (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), 1. 30 J. de Vries and A. van der Woude, The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure, and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500–1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 479. 31 The rather dated publication by Wätjen is still the most complete work on trade and shipping to Dutch Brazil. H. Wätjen, Das Holländische Kolonialreich in Brasilien. Ein Kapilet aus der Kolonialgeschichte des 17. Jahrhunderts (The Hague: Nijhoff,
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needs to be studied, because many accounts about the English Caribbean mention the Dutch as essential contacts with these settlements.32 The same may be said for the French Caribbean.33 Voyages of discovery, privateering ventures, trade networks, entrepreneurial behavior, and Dutch West India interests have also been ignored, except peripherally. Although Dutch whaling and Newfoundland fishing involved Atlantic crossings, they are not included in this study, because their activities were very different in nature from merchant shipping.34 Since the focus of this study is primarily on quantifying 1921). For Dutch trade with New Netherland see J. A. Jacobs, ‘De scheepvaart en handel van de Nederlandse Republiek op Nieuw-Nederland, 1609–1675’ (master’s thesis, University of Leiden, 1989). 32 J. Lorimer, English and Irish Settlement on the River Amazon, 1550–1646, Hakluyt Society, 2d ser., no. 171 (London: Hakluyt Society, 1989); R. S. Dunn, Sugar and Slaves: The Rise of the Planter Class in the English West Indies, 1624–1713 (1972; reprint, New York: Norton, 1973), 21, 53, 72–73, 79–80; D. H. Akenson, If the Irish Ran the World, Montserrat, 1630–1730 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1997), 40–41, 66–67; K. O. Kupperman, Providence Island, 1630 –1641 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 112–13, 133–34, 167, 171, 176; I. N. Hume, The Virginia Adventure, Roanoke to James Towne: An Archaeological and Historical Odyssey (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1997), 97; J. R. Pagan, ‘Dutch Maritime and Commercial Activity in Mid-Seventeenth Century Virginia,’ Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 90 (1982): 485–501; N. Canny, ed., The Origins of Empire: British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century, vol. 1 of The Oxford History of the Britsh Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 75–76; R. Brenner, Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and London’s Overseas Traders, 1550–1653 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 594; Schnurmann, Atlantische Welten, 179–91; A. Games, Migration and the Origins of the English Atlantic World, Harvard Historical Studies, no. 133 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 31–32; M. S. Wokeck, Trade in Strangers: The Beginnings of Mass Migration to North America (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), 221; C. Matson, Merchants and Empire: Trading in Colonial New York (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); R. S. Dunn and L. Yeandle, eds., The Journal of John Winthrop, 1630 –1649, abr. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1996), 69. 33 S. L. Mims, Colbert’s West India Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1912), 45–50. 34 Dutch whalers tended to be based in Northern Holland and the Frisian islands, while Atlantic merchant transports operated primarily from port towns such as Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Middelburg, and Flushing, although there were exceptions. The Noordsche Compagnie, for instance, had a monopoly of whaling in 1614–1642, and was based at Delft, Rotterdam, Hoorn, Enkhuizen, Middelburg and Veere. See C. de Jong, Geschiedenis van de oude Nederlandse walvisvaart (Pretoria: Universiteit van Suid-Afrika, 1972); L. Hacquebord and W. Vroom, Walvisvaart in de Gouden eeuw. Opgravingen op Spitsbergen (Amsterdam: Bataafsche Leeuw, 1988). Companies active in the South Atlantic Ocean, such as the Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie (MCC) and the WIC, occasionally engaged in whaling. See Reinders Folmer-van Prooijen, Van Goederenhandel naar slavenhandel, 84; J. R. Leininga, Arctische walvisvangst in de achttiende eeuw. De betekenis van Straat Davis als vangstgebied (Amsterdam: Bataafsche Leeuw, 1995), 105; Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, 101–04.
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Dutch commercial activities, comparisons with other nations involved in Atlantic trade are also largely ignored. These various omissions are an indication that the time may be ripe for the creation of an inventory of all Dutch shipping in the Atlantic during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, comparable to the compilation of Dutch Asiatic Shipping (DAS) or the inventory of all known transatlantic slave voyages.35 Because much of the Dutch Atlantic trade was privatized, this would be a difficult, but not an impossible enterprise. A rumor has been floating around that, after years of research in numerous archives in Europe and Latin America, the elusive Austrian researcher/historian Franz Binder has documented more than ten thousand Dutch Atlantic voyages for the seventeenth century alone. The chapters in this volume provide evidence for at least another fifteen thousand Atlantic voyages during the eighteenth century, the majority of which have already been recorded and computerized. The foregoing suggests that for the 1600–1800 period, between twenty and twenty-five thousand Dutch ships may have crossed the Atlantic to either Africa or the Americas. This compares with fewer than 4,700 ships from the Dutch Republic to Asia.36
Summary of Contents The first unit of this collection begins with a contribution by Victor Enthoven, explaining the hesitant start of Dutch ventures into the Atlantic at the end of the sixteenth century. Christopher Ebert discusses the Dutch trade with Brazil before the establishment of the WIC in 1621. Henk den Heijer concludes the first part with a survey of the organization and structure of the First West India Company in 1621, and of the Second West India Company in 1674. The second unit concentrates on the West African trade and the slave trade. Johannes Postma presents a re-assessment of the volume
35 J. R. Bruijn, F. S. Gaastra, and I. Schöffer, eds., Dutch-Asiatic Shipping in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën, grote ser., nos. 165–67 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1987), 1:163–65; D. Eltis, S. D. Behrendt, H. S. Klein, and D. Richardson, eds. The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade: A Database on CD ROM (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 36 DAS, 1:174, table 35.
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of the Dutch slave trade, followed by Den Heijer with a summary of the bilateral trade between the United Provinces and Africa. Stuart Schwartz and Postma jointly explain the intricacies of Brazil’s trade with the Dutch in West Africa during the eighteenth century, in which the WIC functioned as an intermediary. The third unit focuses on the Caribbean and North American regions. Wim Klooster delineates the role of Curaçao as a Dutch trading center for the Spanish mainland and the large quantities of commodities it shipped to the Dutch Republic. Han Jordaan provides a detailed description of Curaçao’s slave trade market in the transitional years 1700–1730. Claudia Schnurmann completes the unit by showing the openness of Atlantic commerce, and illustrates that openness with the trading network of the late seventeenth-century New York merchant Jacob Leisler. Unit four concentrates on trade with the Guiana settlements, starting with Postma’s analysis of the various life-lines of the slave plantation colony of Suriname. Eric van der Oest provides a detailed description of the colonies of Essequibo and Demerara during the eighteenth century, emphasizing their rapid expansion toward the end of the eighteenth century. The final unit consists of an overview by Klooster of Dutch trade with the Americas, 1600–1800, and is followed by Enthoven’s analysis of the volume Dutch Atlantic shipping and trade for the 1585–1817 period. The publication of this book will certainly not be the last word on Dutch Atlantic commercial activity. To the contrary, the editors hope it will stimulate debate as well as additional research.
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1.1. Allegorical Image of Wealth and Riches from Dutch Atlantic Commerce. Mercury, the god of trade, is interested in the West Indian and African commodities displayed in the lap of an American Indian, including sugar, gold, and ivory, and he wants to buy them. In the background, several Africans are watching. The figure with the torch alludes to the atlas Zee-fakkel (Sea Torch), in which the illustration was first printed. This image is also used on the front cover.
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PART ONE
INITIAL VENTURES INTO THE ATLANTIC AND THE DUTCH WEST INDIA COMPANY
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CHAPTER TWO
EARLY DUTCH EXPANSION IN THE ATLANTIC REGION, 1585–1621 V E
So keen are the men of Holland to take their revenge on the Spaniards in those parts [West Africa]. N. de Blocq to Viscount De Lisle, 1612.1
Introduction During the second half of the sixteenth century, maritime explorers from the Low Countries ventured across the oceans in search of uncharted lands and commercial opportunities. One of the most famous of these explorers was Jan Huygen van Linschoten, whose numerous journeys have been published and widely read.2 Another active but less well known Dutch globetrotter was Heyndrick Dirrecksen Jolink, from Zutphen.3 His far flung travels and colorful escapades give us a sense of the style of life of these early maritime adventurers. In 1584 Jolink made his first voyage to the East Indies, where he met Van Linschoten aboard the Portuguese ship São Francisco at Goa, India. Back in the Netherlands, four years later, poverty drove him to enlist as a soldier on a voyage to South America, but his ship sank in the region of Tenerife, Canary Islands. Undeterred, he joined the crew of a Dutch ship on its way to the West Indies with a cargo 1 W. A. Shaw ed., Report on the Manuscripts of Lord de L’Isle and Dudley preserved at Penshurst Place: Sidney Papers, Historical Manuscript Commission (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1925–1966), 5:4, N. de Blocq to Viscount De Lisle, 20 January 1612. 2 J. Parmentier, ‘In het kielzog van Van Linschoten. Het Itinerario en het reysgheschrift in de praktijk,’ in Souffrir pour Parvenir, ed. R. van Gelder, J. Parmentier, and V. Roeper (Haarlem: Arcadia, 1998), 152–67. 3 S. P. L’Honoré Naber, ‘De reizen van Heyndrick Dirrecksen Jolinck van Zutphen,’ Marineblad (1909/10): 463–73. The original is in Algemeen Rijksarchief (ARA), Aanwinsten 1904, .
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of wine. After a number of adventures, in 1591 he returned to Middelburg, capital of the province of Zeeland, and signed on to a ship bound for the Guinea Coast of West Africa. Plagued by bad weather and an encounter with three English privateers, the ship became so unseaworthy that it could get no further than Cádiz, Spain. Here the Dutch sailor ended up in prison, but by convincing his captors that he was from England, he regained his freedom. In 1593, Jolink continued his adventures by signing on to a ship at Middelburg, but illness forced him to interrupt his voyage at the Canary Islands. In an inn he became embroiled in a brawl with a couple of Spaniards. The fight culminated in the collapse of the entire building, and Jolink was hauled out from under the rubble seriously wounded. After his recovery he set out for Africa in the service of a Portuguese merchant, for whom he delivered a consignment of slaves to the Cape Verde Islands. Two years later he sailed to Guinea again. The following year he signed on as a helmsman on the ship Eenhoorn from the Zeeland port of Vlissingen – or Flushing, as the English called it – for another voyage to Africa. Subsequently, he also took part in the second Dutch fleet to Asia.4 The Rise of the Dutch Seaborne Empire Jolink’s adventures may well be characteristic of Dutch seamen of his time. They demonstrate that the Dutch were moving beyond the familiar waters of Western Europe, venturing far and wide across the oceans.5 Indeed, by the end of the sixteenth century, an unprece4 J. Keuning, ed., De tweede schipvaart der Nederlanders naar Oost-Indië onder Jacob van Neck en Wybrant Warwijck, 1598–1600, Werken uitgegeven door de Linschoten Vereeniging, nos. 42, 44, 46, 48, 50 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1938–1948). 5 Allegedly, the oldest record of a voyage to the Canary Islands dates from 1508, when two ships from Zeeland visited the region. During the sixteenth century, Dutch ships maintained regular contacts with these islands. For instance, Van Meteren informs us that Anthonis Mulock, skipper from Zierikzee, dropped anchor at the Cape Verde Islands in 1528, where he obtained salt and wine. E. van Meteren and S. Ruytinck, Emanuels van Meteran Historie der Neder-landsche ende haerder na-buren oorlogen ende geschiedenissen. Tot de jare 1612 . . . Is mede hier by gevoegt des autheurs leven [door Simeon Ruytinck] . . . (The Hague: H. Jacobsz., 1614), 11; J. Reygersbergh van Cortgene, De oude Chronijcke en de Historien van Zeeland (Middelburg: Z. Roman, 1634), 286–87, 256; W. S. Unger, ed., Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van Middelburg in den landsheerlijken tijd, Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën, grote ser., nos. 54, 61, 75 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1923–1931); W. S. Unger, ed. De tol van Iersekeroord. Documenten en rekeningen,
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dented expansion of Dutch shipping to Asia, the Mediterranean, and across the Atlantic was well under way, elevating the Dutch Republic to one of the major world powers.6 The emergence of the Dutch Republic during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries represents an amazing historical phenomenon. While the Dutch were involved in an eighty year revolt against the mighty king of Spain, they not only won their independence as a nation, but also established one of the world’s most lucrative overseas empires that touched every continent on the globe. During the Eighty Year War (1568–1648), Spanish armies frequently ravaged the countryside of the predominantly Protestant northern provinces of the Low Countries, and besieged and conquered several towns in an effort to maintain Spanish control in the region (see map 2.1). The war divided the Low Countries, creating an independent republic in the north: the United Provinces, also known by the English as the Dutch Republic or the Netherlands, but leaving Spain in control of the southern provinces. But while hostilities continued, the Dutch built the world’s largest merchant marine, established themselves as one of the most potent maritime powers on the oceans, captured a leading role in world commerce, and established trading stations and settlements on many distant shores.7 A decisive event in the Eighty Year War was the Spanish capture of the city of Antwerp in 1585, the most prominent port in the Schelde River estuary. In fact, it may be said that the Dutch expansion into the Atlantic had its genesis in the Schelde River estuary, a region which was to remain prominent in the trade to the West Indies and West Africa until the end of the ancien régime.8 Prior to the Dutch Revolt, the economic center of gravity had been in Flanders
1321–1572, Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën, kleine ser., no. 29 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1929). For the oldest Dutch voyage to the New World, see L. Sicking and R. Fagel, ‘In het Kielzog van Columbus. De heer van Veere en de nieuwe wereld, 1517–1527,’ Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden 114, no. 3 (1999): 313–27. 6 J. I. Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585–1740 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), 6–11. 7 J. I. Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477–1806 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); K. Davids and J. Lucassen, eds. A Miracle Mirrored: The Dutch Republic in European Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 1–4. 8 See H. den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven. Scheepvaart en handel van de Tweede Westindische Compagnie op Afrika, 1674–1740 (Zutphen: Walburg, 1997), 371.
2
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victor enthoven
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and Brabant, with Antwerp as major harbor, commercial hub, and global financial center. Many prominent citizens of the town were Protestants, who sympathized with the revolt. They fled the city after Spain regained control over Antwerp and the southern provinces in 1585, and over time assimilated with the prominent merchant class in the Dutch Republic. This infusion of leading merchants contributed to a shift in the economic center of gravity to Zeeland and Holland, noticeable in several port-towns, and especially in various towns of the southwestern province of Zeeland.9 During the past two centuries this area has become a peripheral region of marginal economic significance, but in the early years of the Dutch Republic, Zeeland played a decisive role in the expansion of Dutch exploration and trade, especially into the Atlantic region.10 In the midst of the Eighty Year War, the warring factions agreed to an armistice, the Twelve Year Truce, that lasted through the years 1609–1621. This interlude became a significant milestone in the war, marking a power shift in favor of the United Provinces. This chapter deals with the initial phase of Dutch expansion overseas, specifically in the Atlantic region. It focuses on Dutch efforts to gain control over markets and returning luxury commodities and profits to the Dutch Republic. The chapter concludes with a comparison of the newly developed Dutch trade with Asia, the Mediterranean, and the Atlantic, and a summary of the economic implications of these various branches of Dutch overseas trade.
Breaching the Iberian-Atlantic System Long before ships from the Low Countries ventured into the Atlantic, Portuguese merchants had been delivering sugar, Brazilwood (a red dye), gold, ivory, and other products from the Atlantic to the port
9
O. Gelderblom, Zuid-Nederlandse kooplieden en de opkomst van de Amsterdamse stapelmarkt, 1578–1630 (Hilversum: Verloren, 2000). 10 V. Enthoven, Zeeland en de opkomst van de Republiek. Handel en strijd in de Scheldedelta, c. 1550–1621 (Leiden: Luctor et Victor, 1996); P. Priester, Geschiedenis van de Zeeuwse landbouw, circa 1600–1919 (’t Goy-Houten: HES, 1998), 70–71; C. Lesger, Handel in Amsterdam ten tijde van de Opstand. Kooplieden, commerciële expansie en verandering in de ruimtelijke economie van de Nederlanden, ca. 1550 –ca. 1630, Amsterdamse Historische Reeks, grote ser., no. 27 (Hilversum: Verloren, 2001), 91–92.
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of Antwerp, mostly via Lisbon.11 That pattern changed drastically when Dutch sailors ventured across the oceans after the fall of Antwerp in 1585. Unlike the Dutch voyages to Asia, of which the exact beginning is clearly marked by the expedition of Cornelis de Houtman in 1595, the commencement of Dutch expansion throughout the Atlantic region cannot be pinpointed with any exactitude. The reason for this uncertainty is that voyages to North, Central, and South America, as well as to the West Indies and Africa, were so much easier than those to Asia. Each step taken in a westerly direction was a relatively small step, a natural progression from its predecessor, hardly comparable to that big leap to the distant ports of Asia (see chapter 4). On the eve of the Dutch expansion into Asia, four trading networks were already operating in the transatlantic world. The first two were those of Spain with Spanish America and of Portugal with its Brazilian colony. Despite the union of the Spanish and Portuguese Crowns in 1580, each network functioned largely as a distinct system. The Portuguese trading network along the West African coast constituted a third Atlantic commercial system. After 1550, the Portuguese slave trade from Africa to Latin America created a fourth commercial network. In contrast to that of the Spanish, Portuguese shipping to Brazil and West Africa was not bound by strict regulations. Instead, individual shipowners and merchants operated freely in these markets.12 Dutch merchants and skippers soon followed the Iberians into these areas. As early as 1527, two Zeeland ships searched for the island Cozumel near Yucatan, in the Caribbean, in order to obtain sugar.13 As the sixteenth century progressed, sugar production expanded into Brazil and soon surpassed the harvests of the Madeiras, the Canaries, and São Tomé. As early as 1566 a Dutch
11
See H. van der Wee, The Growth of the Antwerp Market and the European Economy (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963); H. Pohl, Die Portugiesen in Antwerpen, 1567–1648: zur Geschichte einer Minderheit (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1977); J. Nanninga Uitterdijk, Een Kamper Handelshuis te Lissabon (Zwolle: Erven J. J. Tijl, 1904), . 12 E. van den Boogaart, ‘Los neerlandeses en el mundo comercial atlántico de la Doble Monarquía Ibérica, 1590–1621,’ in La expansión holandesa en el atlántico, 1580–1800, ed. E. van den Boogaart et al. (Madrid: Niel-Gerond, 1992), 67, 71. 13 M. Z. van Boxhorn, Chronijck van Zeeland eertijds beschreven door d’heer Johan van Reychersbergen, nu verbetert, ende vermeerdert (Middelburg: Z. Roman, 1644), 2:377; Sicking and Fagel, ‘In het kielzog van Columbus.’
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ship sailed directly from Brazil to the island of Walcheren in Zeeland, undoubtedly carrying sugar.14
Sugar from Brazil 15 Sugar was one of the catalysts that directed Dutch expansion across the Atlantic Ocean. For this reason, access to Brazil became a primary objective for the Dutch in South America. Around 1585, in exchange for ammunition and food, Spain’s King Philip (1527–1598) gave the Dutch rebels permission to sail to Brazil and conduct business for Spanish merchants. At least three Dutch ships sailed to Brazil in 1587. Only three years later, in 1590, about fourteen ships sailed from Dutch ports to Brazil, carrying cargoes for Spanish merchants.16 The specifics concerning these initial shipments are largely unknown, but we know that skipper Pieter Jansz. carried a cargo of sugar from Brazil to the Netherlands for the merchant Jan Pietersz. in 1594.17 The following year, skipper Pauwels Gerritsz. sailed from Zeeland to Brazil on board the Sampson, and this ship had earlier journeyed to the West Indies and also made two voyages to Brazil to fetch sugar and Brazilwood.18 Hampered by the war that the king of Spain was waging against the northern provinces of the Netherlands, ships bound for Brazil often had to sail first to a neutral country and temporarily adopt a different nationality. At the beginning of the 1590s, the skipper Lambert Pietersz. went to Bremen before sailing home to Zeeland via Brazil.19 The ship Witte Hondt, which hailed from Hoorn but
14
Unger, Bronnen tot Middelburg, 3:826. See chapter 3 in this volume for a more detailed treatment of this topic. 16 R. B. Wernham, ed., List and Analysis of State Papers, Foreign Series, Preserved in the Public Record Office (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1964–1993), 2:212, no. 274. 17 Gemeentearchief Amsterdam (GAA), Notarieel Archief (NA), 8: 121, 25 July 1591. For these and the following reference to this source, I am indebted to Wim Klooster. 18 GAA, NA 73: 5, 26 November 1595. 19 The Witte Hondt never reached the Elbe River. Laden with 27,000 pounds of brazilwood and 177 chests (42,657 kilograms) of sugar, the ship was captured on its return voyage near Cape Finisterre by the English privateer, the Centurion, and taken to London. See Enthoven, Zeeland en de opkomst van de Republiek, 297–98; Resolutiën der Staten-Generaal (Resolutiën SG), Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën (RGP), grote ser., no. 55 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1923), 726, note 1, 4 December 1592. 15
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sailed under the auspices of the Middelburg merchant François van de Perre and skipper Claes Henryckz., sailed under the Dantzig flag to Lisbon. There it was chartered by the factor of the Hulscher firm, who had permission to trade with Brazil.20 By about the middle of the 1590s, the Dutch were sailing to Brazil with a certain degree of regularity.21 This is evident from the fact that by 1595 the export taxes or convoy fees on sugar were enumerated in considerable detail, listing the different sorts of sugar and stipulating how they were to be packaged.22 At least sixteen Dutch ships reached Brazil in 1598.23 Return cargoes from Brazil consisted mainly of sugar (an average of 50,000 chests annually, approximately one million kilograms), but also Brazilwood, ginger, cotton, and hides (see chapter 3).24
The West Indies: Pearls, Hides, Tobacco, and Privateering After Brazil, the West Indies were the most important destination for Dutch shipping in the Atlantic region. Like the English and the French, also newcomers to this area, the Dutch combined commerce with violence, making predatory raids and capturing enemy ships when commerce stagnated. The initial years of Dutch trade with the 20 Family members of the Hulscher merchant house, originally from Hamburg, represented the firm in Antwerp, at the Canary Islands, Vigo, and Lisbon. Evert Hulscher also had an office in Brazil. See E. Stols, De Spaanse Brabanders, of de handelsbetrekkingen der Zuidelijke Nederlanden met de Iberische wereld, 1598–1648, Verhandelingen van de Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van België, klasse der letteren, ser. 33, no. 70 (Brussels: Palais des Academien, 1971), 2:38. For the general background of Portuguese trade in Brazil, see F. Mauro, Le Portugal, Le Brésil et l’Atlantique au XVII e siècle, 1570–1670 (Paris: Calouste Gulbankian Foundation, 1983). 21 H. Ottsen, Journael van de reis naar Zuid-Amerika, 1598–1601, ed. J. W. IJzerman, Werken uitgegeven door de Linschoten Vereeniging, no. 16 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1918), 98–106, Deductie vervaetende den oorspronck ende progres van de vaert ende handel op Brasil. 22 Resolutiën SG, RGP no. 62:587, res. 234. 23 E. Sluiter, ‘Dutch-Spanish Rivalry in the Caribbean Area, 1594–1609,’ Hispanic American Historical Review 28 (1948): 170. 24 F. Mauro, ‘Political and Economic Structures of Empire, 1580–1750: Portugal and Brazil, 1580–1695,’ in Colonial Brazil, ed. L. Bethell (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987), 51; Van den Boogaart, ‘Los neerlandeses,’ 79; Israel, Dutch Primacy, 107; Resolutiën SG, RGP no. 187: res. 2511, 26 January 1622; ARA Archief van de Staten-Generaal (SG) (liassen admiraliteiten) 5486: 26 January 1622; ARA, Archief van de Staten van Holland 1358b; Zeeuws Archief (ZA), Archief van de Staten van Zeeland (SvZ) 2091: Deductie over de handel met Brazilie via Portugal, 20 February 1622; ‘Consideratien van Handelaren over het belang van de handel
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West Indies were particularly tinged with violence, as skippers were determined to make as much profit as possible without bothering to establish and utilize regular trading contacts. They were particularly interested in obtaining pearls from the Spanish, who forced slaves to dive for these precious gems in the coastal waters. In 1593, the Spanish confiscated ten Dutch ships that were raiding the coast in search of pearls. Afterwards, Dutch skippers tried to obtain pearls through barter or by kidnaping Spanish officials and demanding pearls as ransom, or money to be exchanged for pearls. It was partly because of these tactics that the Dutch involvement in the pearl trade came to a halt during the beginning of the seventeenth century.25 One example of the intiatives undertaken by the Dutch in the West Indies is the voyage of Gillis Dornhoven’s voyage in the Zwemmende Leeuw.26 In 1595 this ship lay at anchor before the harbor of Baya on the northwest coast of Hispaniola. Tradition has it that the ship was engaged in the transport of contraband goods and the purchase of hides. Joining forces with a French privateer, the Zwemmende Leeuw captured the ship of Pedro de Arana, ‘paymaster and resident of Santo Domingo in Hispaniola.’ Arana was moving with all his possessions from Havana to Santo Domingo on Hispaniola when he chanced to encounter the French privateer. Captain Dornhoven gave the Frenchmen a thousand ducats for services rendered in capturing Arana’s ship. Afterwards, the Dutch captured Arana’s second ship, which had sailed on ahead with the rest of his possessions. On the return voyage to Zeeland, Dornhoven sold his prizes at La Rochelle, France. The incident produced a bitter aftermath when Arana had Dornhoven and his fellow ship-owners, including the prominent Zeeland merchant Balthasar de Moucheron, arraigned in court in 1610.27 op de kust van Guinea,’ Kroniek van het Historisch Genootschap, ser. 6, 27, no. 2 (1871): 260–65. 25 W. Klooster, Illicit Riches: Dutch Trade in the Caribbean, 1648–1795, Caribbean Series, no. 18 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1998), 22–24; A. Pérotin-Dumon, ‘French, English and Dutch in the Lesser Antilles: From Privateering to Planting, 1550–1650,’ in New Societies: The Caribbean in the Long Sixteenth Century, ed. P. C. Emmer and G. A. Carrerra Damas, vol. 2 of General History of the Caribbean (London: UNESCO, 1999), 114–58. 26 Notulen van de Staten van Zeeland (Notulen SvZ ), 11 March 1595. 27 ARA, SG 4923: 16 June 1611; ARA, Archieven der Admiraliteitsarchieven (AA) 2576; ARA, Archief van Hugo de Groot, supplement 2: 2–9; ZA, Archief van de directe en indirecte belastingen (1610): 22 and 28 April and 1 May 1610; J. van Roey, ‘De eerste reijse van Middelborgh na de Westindijen,’ Spiegel Historiael 6 (1971): 199–207; Resolutiën SG, RGP no. 131:895, 25 June 1609; Resolutiën SG, RGP no. 135:404, 592.
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Dutch commerce with the Spanish West Indian possessions was limited to contraband trade; only Spanish ships were legally allowed to sail there. This is why De Moucheron did not have to purchase a licence for Dornhoven’s voyage in the Zwemmende Leeuw.28 It also made contraband trade both attractive and dangerous for Dutch merchants. Furthermore, officially sanctioned raiding and capture of enemy ships, known as privateering, also held promise of substantial profits. These factors may explain why in 1597 a fleet of Dutch privateers sailed to the West Indies under the command of Melchior van den Kerckhove.29 Despite privateering activities and Spanish opposition to foreign ships into their territories, Dutch trade with the Caribbean increased steadily. After the exploit of the Zwemmende Leeuw, many other ships from Zeeland and Holland sailed to the West Indies.30 In addition to pearls, hides and tobacco were important West Indian products shipped to the Netherlands. The Medemblik skipper Barent Ericksz., for instance, brought back ten thousand hides from the West Indies on a single voyage.31 Balthasar de Moucheron also traded in West Indian hides. Although hides arrived occasionally in a state of decay, they were usually in good condition and were of a higher quality than those from the Cape Verde Islands, where De Moucheron also traded.32 Around 1600, annually approximately twenty large Dutch ships were active in Caribbean commerce, with the bulk of the hides coming from Cuba and Santo Domingo.33 Even during the years of the Twelve Year Truce, Dutch ships sailed to harbors like Havana,
28
Notulen SvZ, 11 March 1595. Resolutiën SG, RGP no. 62:678–79; Sluiter, ‘Dutch-Spanish Rivalry,’ 174–75; Enthoven, Zeeland en de opkomst van de Republiek, 184, note 75. 30 Sluiter, ‘Dutch-Spanish Rivalry,’ 173; Notulen SvZ, 8 November 1595; K. R. Andrews, English Privateering Voyages to the West Indies, 1588–1595: Documents Relating to English Voyages to the West Indies from the Defeat of the Armada to the Last Voyage of Sir Francis Drake, including Spanish Documents, Hakluyt Society, 2d ser., no. 3 (London: Hakluyt Society, 1959), 384. 31 P. de Marees, Beschrijvinghe ende historisch verhael van het Gout Koninckrijck van Guinea, anders de Gout-custe de Mina genaemt, liggende in het deel van Afrika, ed. S. P. L’Honoré Naber, Werken uitgegeven door de Linschoten Vereeniging, no. 5 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1912), . 32 In 1599, Guillaume van de Put bought Cape Verdian hides from Balthasar de Moucheron. See ARA, AA 2449: 29 September 1599; J. H. de Stoppelaar, Balthasar de Moucheron; een bladzijde uit de Nederlandse handelsgeschiedenis tijdens den tachtigjarigen oorlog (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1901), 168, note 2. 33 Klooster, Illicit Riches, 22. 29
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where they delivered shipbuilding materials in return for hides and other Caribbean products.34 Tobacco was another important product procured by the Dutch in the Caribbean. At first, the Dutch obtained tobacco through barter with the Indians, but after they established their own settlements in the West Indies during the Twelve Year Truce, they began to cultivate it themselves. Soon they produced as much tobacco as the Spanish.35 In addition, a large portion of the trade in Virginia tobacco devolved into Dutch hands.36 Owing to the dominant role of the Zeelanders in the West Indian trade and also because of the presence of Englishmen in Flushing and Middelburg, trade relations with Virginia developed readily,37 with the result that at the beginning of the seventeenth century the Northern European tobacco trade was concentrated in Zeeland.38
Salt from Venezuela In the years following 1598, Dutch ships sailed regularly to the South American mainland for one specific product in particular: salt. Salt was essential for the Dutch herring industry. In the wake of the
34
ZA, SvZ 925: Jan Soggaert to SvZ, 23 April 1619, Van den Bogaart, ‘Los neerlandeses,’ 88–95; H. K. Roessingh, Inlandse tabak in de 17e en 18e eeuw, Gelderse Historische Reeks, no. 9 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1976), 45–47, 188–89, 191–92. The latter draws too negative a picture of the Dutch tobacco cultivation in the West Indies. Around 1630 this crop was a success on New Walcheren (Tobago), at least in the opinion of skipper Gelein van Stapels, ZA, Handschriftenverzameling 182: log Gelein van Stapels, 1629–1630; M. van Wallenburg, ‘Het reisverhaal van Gelein van Stapels: een Zeeuwse schipper op de Wilde Kust, 1629–1630,’ Zeeuws Tijdschrift pt. 1, 45, no. 1 (1995): 9–14. 36 J. R. Pagan, ‘Dutch Maritime and Commercial Activity in Mid-SeventeenthCentury Virginia,’ Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 90 (1982): 485–501; J. Lorimer, ‘The English Contraband Tobacco Trade in Trinidad and Guiana, 1590–1617,’ in The Westward Enterprise: English Activities in Ireland, the Atlantic, and America, 1480 –1650, ed. N. P. Canny and P. E. H. Hair (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1978). 37 The involvement of the Dutch in the colonization of Virginia is described by Van Meteren, Emanuels van Meteren Historie. The leader of the first English settlement in Virginia, Sir Thomas Gates, had established part of his business interests in Zeeland. J. Parker, Van Meteren’s Virginia, 1607–1612 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1961), 56–57. 38 Enthoven, Zeeland en de opkomst van de Republiek, 305; Roessingh, Inlandse tabak, 188–89; J. J. Herks, De geschiedenis van de Amersfoortse tabak (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1967), 18. 35
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trade embargo imposed on the United Provinces that year by Philip , king of Spain from 1598 to 1621, the Dutch had to find another source of salt, which they previously obtained primarily from Portugal.39 But when they gained access to the salt pans of Punta de Araya in Venezuela, the Dutch established a new and third important transatlantic commercial link. In a short time the salt trade grew by leaps and bounds. At times, as many as fifty Dutch ships were moored at the Punta to collect and load salt. One historian estimates that in the period 1600–1605 about 780 Dutch ships, an average of 120 a year, sailed to the Punta.40 This number dropped rapidly after 1605, when the Twelve Year Truce was being negotiated and salt could again be obtained at Setúbal in Portugal.41 One of the few documented voyages to Punta de Araya was made in 1606 by Daniël de Moucheron, a cousin of the previously mentioned Balthasar de Moucheron. The record describes an unfortunate incident in which the Dutch ships, when they were busily loading salt, were overpowered by a Spanish armada under command of admiral Don Luis de Fajardo. Daniël de Moucheron ended up swinging from the ship’s mast at the end of a rope, demonstrating Spanish determination to keep the Dutch out of their colonial domain.42
Colonial Settlements on the Wild Coast Intricately bound up with shipping to the West Indies was Dutch expansion to the Wild Coast, the northern coast of South America between Venezuela and the Amazon River delta. Whether there was a Dutch presence there as early as 1580, as H. G. Dalton claims, is uncertain.43 The earliest record of any Dutch presence in the region was 1596, when five Dutch ships sailed to Trinidad and were
39 Despite the restriction, the Dutch often circumvented the embargo. In 1599, Willem Holleram, merchant at Galway, chartered the Rode Gans to fetch salt from St. Lucar. Instead of being taken to Galway, as stated on the bill of lading, the salt ended up at the Plymouth Roads and was transshipped to another vessel and taken to Zeeland. See ZA, Gemeentearchief Veere 170: 6 July 1599. 40 C. C. Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean and on the Wild Coast, 1580–1680 (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1971), 116; Sluiter, ‘Dutch-Spanish Rivalry,’ 175. 41 Israel, The Dutch Republic, 25; De Stoppelaar, De Moucheron, 76–77. 42 Sluiter, ‘Dutch-Spanish Rivalry,’ 190; De Stoppelaar, De Moucheron, 171. 43 H. G. Dalton, The History of British Guiana (London: Longmans, 1855), 2:105.
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captured by the Spanish in the Orinoco River delta.44 After 1596, scores of skippers and merchants presented petitions to the States General requesting permission to sail to the Wild Coast.45 According to Adriaen Cabiliau, six Dutch ships visited the region. The skipper of one of these ships, the Zeeridder, bequeathed a detailed account of his voyage to the States General in 1598.46 Accordingly, they visited the Amazon delta, where the crew traded with Indians. After this, they explored the coast as far west as the Orinoco River, and then sailed back home via Trinidad. Cabiliau and his companions discovered twenty-four rivers, as well as many islands and inlets suitable for harbors, which had hitherto been unknown to the Dutch. The failure of Cabiliau to mention any Dutch settlements along this coast suggests that none existed at that time. After 1598, Dutch commercial links with the Wild Coast expanded even further. In 1600 the ships the Hase and the Catte sailed from Middelburg for Guyana,47 and in 1613 Amsterdam merchants set up a trading post in the region of Paramaribo, on the Suriname River.48 Tradition has it that even before 1600, Zeelanders founded the forts Nassau and Oranje on the Xingú River, a tributary of the Amazon,49 but J. Lorimer points out that contemporary sources do
44
Lorimer, ‘The English Contraband Tobacco Trade,’ 26, note 3. Resolutiën SG, RGP nos. 57, 62, 71, 85, 92. 46 ARA, SG (Loketkas VOC) 12562–3: Verclaringe van de onbekende ende onbesylde voiage van America, beginninde van de riviere Amasonis tot het eylant van de Trinidad toe, 3 February 1599. This document is published in De Opkomst van het Nederlandsch gezag in Oost-Indië, ed. J. K. J. de Jonge (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1862), 1:153 ff. For the permission from the States General for this voyage, see Resolutiën SG, RGP no. 71:807, 4 February 1600. 47 Resolutiën SG, RGP no. 85:343, 14 February 1600. 48 S. van Brakel, ‘Een Amsterdamsche factorij te Paramaribo in 1613,’ Bijdragen en Mededelingen van het Historisch Genootschap, 35 (1914): 83–86. 49 G. Edmundson, ‘The Dutch on the Amazon and Negro in the Seventeenth Century,’ English Historical Review 18 (1903): 642–63. Edmundson was perhaps the first to draw attention to these forts. He based his claim on the literal interpretation of J. de Laet, Nieuwe Wereldt ofte Beschrijvinghe van West-Indien wt veelderhande schriften ende aen-teeckeninghen van verscheyden natien by een versamelt (Leiden: Elzevier, 1625), 561–62, and J. de Laet, Novus orbis seu descriptionis Indiae Occidentalis libri 17 (Leiden: Elzevirios, 1633), 634. De Laet’s remarks about the settlements on the Xingu precede a description of a Dutch expedition along the lower reaches of the Pará River in 1598. This misunderstanding was difficult to eradicate. In 1750, the city of Middelburg commissioned a declaration to demonstrate that only Zeeland and its inhabitants had the right to sail to the colony Essequibo. The forts are named as justification for this. The document is published in D. Roos, Zeeuwen en de WestIndische Compagnie (Hulst: Van Geyt, 1992), 128. 45
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not mention these forts.50 The Dutch were probably not the first to establish themselves there, but Irish and English settlers may well have settled in the northern part of the Amazon delta after 1611, emigrating via Flushing. They may have chosen this roundabout way because King James of England and Ireland (1603–1625) had forbidden immigration to Spanish areas to avoid offending King Philip of Spain. Flushing was for a certain period under English control (a pawned town), which was the reason for its rather large English community.51 In assessing out-migration from this town, it is virtually impossible to distinguish between English, Irish, and Zeeland emigrants settling on the Wild Coast. The English emigrants who departed from Flushing employed Zeeland ships, and Zeeland settlements often included many English-speaking settlers in their population.52 When the English finally abandoned their control over Flushing in 1616, it caused an exodus of English-speakers to South America. Many had no wish to remain in Flushing under the changed circumstances, but they also did not want to return to their country of origin. This is why the British-Zeeland trading company CourteenDe Moor organized their departure to South America by fitting out two fleets in that very same year.53 One of the chief investors in the first fleet was Everard van Lodensteyn, burgomaster of Delft and a member of the admiralty board of Zeeland. The three ships in the first fleet were commanded by Michiel Geleynsse, member of the admiralty board of Zeeland, Pieter Lodwijkse Ita, and Jan Pietersz. Ita – father and son. The Itas were experienced travelers to the Wild Coast, having made a voyage to the Wiapoco River during the previous year at the behest of Jan de Moor, director of the firm CourteenDe Moor. Their ships had returned to Zeeland richly laden with
50 J. Lorimer, English and Irish Settlement on the River Amazon, 1550–1646, Hakluyt Society, 2d ser., no. 171 (London: Hakluyt Society, 1989), 27, 51, 253; De Jonge, Opkomst, 1:153–60. 51 Lorimer, English and Irish Settlement, 40, 51; Edmundson, ‘The Dutch on the Amazon,’ 646. In the Nonesuch Treaty of 1585, Elizabeth had promised to lend the States General financial support. As a guarantee that the loan would be repaid, the towns of Flushing, and Den Briel, and the fort Rammekens, were given to the English sovereign as cautionary towns. 52 Lorimer, English and Irish Settlement, 51–52. 53 A sketch of ‘the Courteen Brothers’ and the trading company Jan de Moor and their activies in the West Indies, especially in the post-1621 period, can be found in Enthoven, Zeeland en de opkomst van de Republiek, 262, 264.
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tobacco and dyewood.54 The three ships set out for South America with around 130 predominantly English colonists aboard. Upon their arrival in South America, they built a fort on the banks of the Amazon River, and began to plant tobacco. After only six years, when the Twelve Year Truce with Spain expired in 1621, the colony was disbanded in response to Portuguese pressure, and the seventy surviving men and women were repatriated to Europe.55 The second fleet fitted out by the company Courteen-De Moor also departed in 1616. It sailed to the Essequibo River, where Fort Kijkoveral was founded.56 This was probably not the first settlement on the Essequibo River, because a few years earlier, one Joost van der Hooge is believed to have made a settlement there.57 It would be almost impossible to verify this claim, since the earliest Dutch presence on the Wild Coast is a mixture of fact, myth, and fiction. Despite this complication, there is no doubt that there were some small Zeeland settlements in Guiana by 1621. These settlements were viable and regularly visited by ships from the mother country. When Gelein van Stapels sailed for the West in the years 1629–1630 on orders of the Zeeland chamber of the WIC, he visited Zeeland settlements on the Amazon, the Berbice, and the Demerara rivers, as well as the one on the island of Tobago (New Walcheren).58 54
C. de Lannoy and H. van der Linden, Histoire de l’Expansion Coloniale des Peuples Européens, Néerlande et Danemark, XVII e et XVIII e siècles (Paris, Lamartin, 1911), chapter 2; Lorimer, English and Irish Settlement, 158–59. 55 Lorimer, English and Irish Settlement, 53, 163–65; Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean, 1580–1680, 80–81; Edmundson, ‘The Dutch on the Amazon,’ 644, 647–48, 651; G. J. van Grol, De grondpolitiek in het West-Indische domein der Generaliteit (1934; reprint, Amsterdam: Emmering, 1980), 2:17. 56 Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean, 1580–1680, 81; P. M. Netscher, Geschiedenis van de koloniën Essequebo, Demerary en Berbice, van de vestiging der Nederlanders aldaar tot op onzen tijd (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1888), 42; G. Edmundson, ‘The Dutch in Western Guiana,’ Economic History Review 16 (1901): 651–52. 57 Netscher believed that this Van der Hooge could not have been Joost Borssele van der Hooge (1585–1666), who was six times burgomaster of Middelburg and treasurer to the States General. In 1614 Van der Hooge helped finance the Guinea Company, and in the 1620s became a mainstay of the WIC. Netscher, Geschiedenis van de koloniën, 337–38; Enthoven, Zeeland en de opkomst van de Republiek, 434, table 9.14. 58 In 1625 Gelein van Stapels was involved in the unsuccessful attempt to found a settlement on the Amazon. Two years later a more auspicious venture of his founded a settlement on the Berbice River, at which time he was employed by the trading company of Van Pere. Moreover, in his 1629/30 report he mentioned the cordial relationship maintained with the Irish settlement on the Amazon. ZA, Handschriftenverzameling 182: log Gelein van Stapels, 1629–1630; Van Wallenburg, ‘Het reisverhaal van Gelein van Stapels,’ 9–14; Van Grol, Grondpolitiek, 1:86, 2:27; Edmundson, ‘The Dutch on the Amazon,’ 658.
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The Colony of New Netherland
From the West Indies it was but a short distance to sail to the North American continent. The first contacts between the Dutch Republic and Virginia were through Middelburg, which is not surprising in light of the temporary English presence in Flushing. It is also from Zeeland that the Merchant Adventurers had already dispatched ships to the Chesapeake Bay before 1620.59 The English merchant W. Budd chartered the ship the Vliegende Vis from Flushing to transport tobacco from North America to Europe.60 Within a short time the Dutch were in control of the trade in Virginia tobacco. In 1619, an unidentified Dutch ship sold twenty slaves to the settlers at the Jamestown colony in Virginia. The previously mentioned Courteen family also traded with North America, but their efforts did not meet with much success. On 3 November 1623, the board of directors (Heren XIX) of the WIC decided to send a ship to Virginia, undoubtedly to take on tobacco but above all to halt the private trading enterprises of Pieter Courteen in North America.61 There is some uncertainty about the way in which trade relations between the Dutch Republic and the colony of New Netherland evolved. The simplest explanation is that Henry Hudson sailed to North America under the auspices of the directors of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) in 1609, discovered the Hudson River, and informed his principals of the discovery on his return. The directors did nothing with this news until the New Netherland Company was founded in 1614. There is, however, another version. Nicolaes à Wassenaer claimed that the area around the Hudson River was discovered by a certain Hendrick Christiaensz. van Cleef, who sailed there from the West Indies around 1612.62 In the light of what has just been said about Zeeland and English contacts with the West Indies, Nicolaes à Wassenaer’s report does not seem far-fetched. Whatever the truth of the matter, in 1614 the New Netherland Company
59 J. Kupp, ‘Dutch Notarial Acts Relating to the Tobacco Trade of Virginia, 1608–1633,’ William and Mary Quarterly 30 (1973): 653–55. 60 S. M. Kingsbury, ed., The Records of the Virginia Company of London, 1607–1626 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1906–1935), 3:365. 61 Van Grol, Grondpolitiek, 2:32; J. Postma, The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1600–1815 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 12. 62 N. à Wassenaer, Historische Verhael Aller Gedenkwaeerdiger Geschiedenissen (Amsterdam: Cloppenbrg, 1625), 85.
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was established. Although this company was virtually an Amsterdam affair, this did not prevent Zeeland ships from sailing to New Netherland. In the spring of 1619, the Flushing skipper Adriaen Jorisz. arrived at the Hudson River63 and discovered the ship Swarte Beer already moored there. The ship had recently been attacked by Indians and its captain Christiaensz. had been killed, so Jorisz. took command of the Swarte Beer and returned it to Zeeland.64 In 1623, the WIC took control over the New Netherland colony, and private businessmen like Pieter Courteen had to discontinue their shipping enterprises with the colony.65
Gold and Ivory from Africa Ironically, it was the search for sugar that led the Dutch to Africa. In 1590 Barent Ericksz., a skipper from Medemblik in northern Holland, was outward-bound for Brazil to take on a cargo of sugar when damage forced him to put in at the island of Principe, where the Portuguese captured his ship. Ericksz. was taken to the nearby island of São Tomé, where he was kept prisoner for two years. During his incarceration he learned from fellow prisoners, two slaves, a plethora of details about trade and shipping with the West African Gold Coast. Once he was back home, Ericksz. had no difficulty gaining the attention and interest of merchants about his discoveries, and in the spring of 1593 he set out for Africa again on the Maeght van Enkhuysen. Nine months later he returned to the Dutch Republic, his ship laden with melequeta (cayenne pepper), ivory, and gold.66 It has been said that Ericksz. was not the first Dutchman to sail a ship to Africa, and that Heyndrick Jolink had sailed there in 1591. Regardless of who was first, Jolink or Ericksz., we can conclude that the Dutch 63 Adriaen Jorisz. was a skipper in the employ of the WIC in 1625, when he sailed to New Netherland. Apparently he continued in the service of the WIC until at least 1631, when he was mentioned in connection with Brazil. F. C. Wieder, De stichting van New York in juli 1625. Reconstructies en nieuwe gegevens ontleend aan de Van Rappard documenten (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1925), 162. My gratitude to J. A. Jacobs for this information. 64 S. Hart, The Prehistory of the New Netherland Company (Amsterdam: City of Amsterdam Press, 1959). 65 O. A. Rink, Holland on the Hudson: An Economic and Social History of Dutch New York (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), 50. 66 De Marees, Beschrijvinghe ende Historisch verhael, lv–lvi.
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first arrived in Africa early in the 1590s. In 1596, Jolink and Ericksz. made a joint voyage to the Gold Coast on the ship Eenhoorn.67 Intent on stimulating shipping to Africa, the States of Holland granted an exemption to the usual convoy fee for Africa-bound ships. In 1594, this measure was also adopted in Zeeland.68 West African trade provided a stimulus to different industries in the United Provinces. Various manufactured goods such as textiles (linen, blankets, broadcloth, and serges) and metal utensils were exported to West Africa. Around 1607 it was estimated that each ship carried 200,000 ells of linen, 40,000 pounds of copper work, and about 100,000 pounds in a variety of other products.69 Commerce with Africa turned out to be very profitable in most cases. When the Schiedam skipper Anthonis Adriaensz. returned from an African voyage and anchored his ship at Walcheren roadstead in February 1597, he had to pay ƒ337 in convoy fees for his cargo of 40,000 pounds of cayenne pepper and 3,000 pounds of ivory. This voyage registered a turnover of ƒ67,833, and finished with a net profit of ƒ59,211. Each of the fifteen shareholders received ƒ3,947, ƒ2,950 of which was in ready money.70 Taking due note of these profit margins, it is not surprising that the volume of shipping to West Africa grew by leaps and bounds. Around 1600, when about twenty Dutch ships sailed to Africa each year,71 there was no reason to allow this trade any fiscal concessions. Dutch overseas shipping received protection from the navy, for which import duties were crucial as a principal source of income. In view of the perilous financial position of the navy, double convoy fees were levied on all outward and homeward-bound trade with the Guinea Coast in Africa. Not until 1611 did financial stability return 67
See note 3. ARA, AA 2448: 22 August 1594; De Jonge, Opkomst, 1:37. 69 J. K. J. de Jonge, De oorsprong van Neerland’s bezittingen op de kust van Guinea, in herinnering gebracht uit de oorspronkelijke stukken, naar aanleiding van een voorgenomen afstand dier bezittingen aan Groot-Brittannië (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1871), 10, 32. For cargo manifests, see H. E. van Gelder, ‘Scheepsrekeningen van enkele der vroegste Guineavaarten,’ in Economisch-Historisch Jaarboek 2 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1916), 239–57. See also, P. W. Klein, De Trippen in de 17e eeuw. Een studie over het ondernemersgedrag op de Hollandse stapelmarkt (Assen: Van Gocum, 1965), 137–45. 70 Anthonis Adriaensz. had brought more than ƒ49,000 worth of gold, and sold this to the master of the Middelburg mint. Van Gelder, ‘Scheepsrekeningen,’ 252–57. 71 De Jonge, Oorsprong, 13, 34; ARA, AA 2449: 16 May 1598, 1 and 28 July, 14 and 21 August, 4 October 1599, 8 April 1600; Resolutiën SG, RGP no. 71: 8 December 1598, 15 May 1599, 26 July 1601. 68
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for the navy, resulting in the abolition of this extraordinary taxation.72 By that time the Dutch had become active on the so-called Loango Coast (modern Gabon), and they had surpassed their Portuguese, English, and French rivals in Senegambia, Cabo Verde, and on the Gold Coast. These developments took place before the Dutch became extensively involved in the Atlantic slave trade.73 The Twelve Year Truce with Spain brought a temporary halt to the growth of Dutch commerce with Africa. Despite the armistice, the Portuguese continued to capture Dutch ships,74 and merchants and companies trading with Africa requested the assistance of the States General in this matter.75 One of the consequences was that plans were made to create a powerful company, like the VOC, with monopoly rights to trade with Africa.76 This initially failed to come to fruition because of opposition from Amsterdam merchants. Johan van Oldenbarnevelt (1547–1619), advocaat van den Lande, executive administrator of Holland, also deemed it unwise to aggravate Spain’s King Philip so soon after a conditional peace had been concluded with him. In spite of this, the States General decided to send five warships to West Africa to protect Dutch merchantmen and to build a fort on the African coast.77 It was not until 1612, however, that the Dutch established their first permanent settlement in Africa, Fort Nassau in the vicinity of Mori (see map 2.7).78 Completion of this fort signified a major Dutch commitment to African trade. The 72
ZA, SvZ 917: Jan Soggaert to SvZ, 10 October 1611. The adventures of Jolink show that Dutch mariners were not unfamiliar with the slave trade. When Pieter van der Haage brought 130 slaves to Middelburg, after capturing a Portuguese slave ship in 1596, it caused an unpleasant surprise that embarrassed burgomaster Adriaen ten Haeff. On 15 November, the States of Zeeland decreed that on the first Monday thereafter the Blacks ‘by the government of this city [Middelburg] in the name of their Noble Eminences [the States of Zeeland] would be restored to their natural liberty.’ But shortly afterwards the States General decreed that Ten Haeff could do whatever he wanted with the slaves. See Notulen SvZ, 15 November 1596; Resolutiën SG, RGP no. 62:333–34, 23 and 28 November 1596; De Stoppelaar, De Moucheron, 134; W. S. Unger, ‘Bijdrage tot de geschiedenis van de Nederlandse slavenhandel, 1. Beknopt overzicht van de Nederlandse slavenhandel in het algemeen,’ in Economisch-Historisch Jaarboek 26 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1956): 136. 74 De Jonge, Oorsprong, 12–13. 75 Resolutiën SG, RGP no. 135:212, 27 August 1610 76 Resolutiën SG, RGP no. 135:793, 6 December 1612. 77 Resolutiën SG, RGP no. 135: 9 July, 4 August, 27 and 28 August, and 2 October 1610, and 25 August 1611; Shaw, Report on the Manuscripts, 5:4, N. de Blocq to Viscount De Lisle, 20 January 1612. 78 A. van Danzig, Forts and Castles of Ghana (Accra: Sedco, 1980), 13; De Jonge, Opkomst, 16. 73
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Portuguese were alarmed about this intrusion into their century-long monopoly in the African trade, but they were unable to stop it. Manuel da Cunha, the Portuguese governor of West Africa between 1617 and 1623, estimated the number of Dutch ships arriving annually at the Gold Coast at thirty.79 By the final years of the Truce in 1621, the Dutch were playing a significant role in the trade with West Africa.80 The bulk of Dutch trade with Africa was generated by merchants from Zeeland, with Balthasar de Moucheron once again a major player. As early as 1593 he had already established extensive commercial contacts with the Canary Islands, which were only a short sailing distance from the West African coast. The trading firm De Moucheron was the first to get a foothold in the Senegambia region, and agents like Tobias de Beaulieu and Cornelis De Moucheron seemed to be trading everywhere along that coast.81 But these loose connections were unsatisfactory to Balthasar de Moucheron, who wanted a permanent settlement in Africa. He had his eye on the Portuguese castle São Jorge da Mina at Elmina, which was vital to commerce with the Gold Coast. In the summer of 1596, two of his ships commanded by Karel Hulscher82 and Cornelis de Moucheron attacked this fort but failed to dislodge the Portuguese.83 Balthasar de Moucheron refused to be discouraged. Now that shipping to Asia was underway, a permanent establishment on the African coast that could service and supply ships en route was even more desirable. This time the island of Principe caught his attention. The Dutch government supported his aims, and the States General financed an expedition of five ships for which De Moucheron paid the wages of the crew. Although the island was captured without much opposition, the overall venture failed when the Portuguese quickly reconquered the island.84 The final expedition mounted by Balthasar de 79
Van den Boogaart, ‘Los neerlandeses,’ 81. E. van den Boogaart, ‘The Trade between Western Africa and the Atlantic World, 1600–1690: Estimates of Trends in Composition and Value,’ Journal of African History 33, no. 3 (1992): 369. 81 De Stoppelaar, De Moucheron, 78, 134. 82 This was a brother of Evert Hulscher. See note 20. 83 De Stoppelaar, De Moucheron, 135; J. H. de Stoppelaar, ‘De Zeeuwen aan de Westkust van Afrika, 1596–1600,’ in Nieuwe Zeeuwsche Volks-Almanak over het jaar 1875 (Middelburg: Crafford, 1874). 84 De Stoppelaar, De Moucheron, 140–49; Enthoven, Zeeland en de opkomst van de Republiek, 182. 80
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Moucheron in his bid to gain permanent footing on the African continent was the 1599 expedition to the island of São Tomé. Admiral Pieter van der Does conquered the island but had to abandon it quickly when a contagious disease broke out.85 As mentioned earlier, it was not until 1612 that the Dutch established a permanent trading station at Mori on the West African coast.86 In addition to the De Moucherons, other Zeeland merchants were deeply involved in Atlantic commercial ventures. In May 1614, the Middelburg merchants Guillaume Hermans and Wouter van der Poort established the Guinea Company to trade with West Africa and the West Indies.87 Several well-known Middelburg officials participated in this venture,88 including some future directors of the Zeeland chamber of the WIC. No records of the Guinea Company have survived, and virtually nothing is known of its activities. A report composed by the Portuguese Grand Inquisitor states that around 1611 a certain Diogo Dias Querido, along with ‘other Jews and heretics,’ established a company for commerce with Elmina, where they had three ships permanently stationed, while two yachts sailed back and forth to the Netherlands.89 Thus, before the WIC was founded in 1621, the island of Walcheren served as the principal base for commercial expeditions for Dutch commerce with Africa.90 In fact, the founding of the Guinea Company in 1614 was not an isolated event. Long before it actually took concrete shape, there had been plans to establish a Dutch trading company for the Atlantic, but these plans were deferred because of peace negotiations with Spain (see chapter 4).91 As noted earlier, the 1610 attempt by the
85
V. Enthoven, ‘De nobili, sed non foelici expeditione navali. Deel 1 en 2 over de edele vlootexpeditie naar São Thomé van 1599,’ Marineblad 110, no. 2 (2000): 50–53; no. 3 (2000): 80–83. 86 Van Dantzig, Forts and Castles, 13. 87 Notulen SvZ, 7 February 1614; Israel, Dutch Primacy, 109. 88 Enthoven, Zeeland en de opkomst van de Republiek, 434, table 9.14. 89 Van den Bogaart, ‘Los neerlandeses,’ 82. 90 One of the most famous contemporary authors about Africa, Dierick Ruiters, was based in Zeeland. D. Ruiters and S. Brun, Toortse der Zee-vaert door Dierick Ruiters (1623). Samuel Brun’s Schiffarten (1624), ed. S. P. L’Honoré Naber, Werken uitgegeven door de Linschoten Vereeniging, no. 6 (The Hague, Nijhoff, 1913). See also W. S. Unger, ‘Nieuwe gegevens betreffende het begin der vaart op Guinea, 1561–1601,’ in Economisch-Historisch Jaarboek 21 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1940), 194–217; De Marees, Beschrijvinghe ende Historisch verhael. 91 A. C. Meijer, ‘“Liefhebbers des vaderlandts ende beminders van de Commercie”; De plannen tot oprichting van een generale West-Indische Compagnie gedurende
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States General to found the united Africa company was quashed by opposition from Amsterdam merchants and by Van Oldenbarnevelt. But four years later, attitudes changed decisively and several merchants advocated the establishment of a Dutch West India Company in various meetings throughout Holland and Zeeland. In Zeeland especially, several prominent men, including the merchant-burgomaster Jan de Moor, as well as Admiral Michiel Geleynsse, and captains Pieter Lodewycx and Jan Pietersen roused interest for their plan among the governmental representatives of Zeeland, but also attracted the attention of leaders in the province of Holland.92 Merchants in Holland also applied pressure on their provincial leaders, but the government was not yet inclined to support their plans.93 Interest in overseas trade was pervasive, evidenced by the fact that several private companies were founded in that same year, including the New Netherland Company, the Northern Company, and the Guinea Company.94 But government support was essential for such major initiatives, and when the WIC was finally chartered by the States General, the Holland-based New Netherland Company and the Zeeland-based Guinea Company were absorbed into the WIC.
Conclusions Within a decade, the Dutch joined the ranks of the major trading powers in the Atlantic region. This was achieved largely at the expense of the Portuguese. The Dutch took control of part of the Brazilian sugar exports and the bulk of West African gold, ivory, beeswax, resins, and pepper now found its way to the United Provinces, where it contributed to growing economic prosperity. Following the example of Irish and English practices, the Dutch also succeeded in growing tobacco in their own agricultural colonies on the Wild Coast. In addition, a large portion of the trade in Virginia tobacco devolved into Dutch hands. The fur trade with North America was also lucrative for the Dutch. Overall, Dutch Atlantic commerce was almost de jaren 1606–1609,’ Archief van het Koninklijk Zeeuwsch Genootschap der Wetenschappen (1986), 21–70. 92 Edmundson, ‘The Dutch in Western Guiana,’ 646. 93 ARA, Archief van Johan van Oldenbarnevelt 979: Petition by the Holland merchants, 8 July 1614; Rink, Holland on the Hudson, 44–45. 94 Van Brakel, De Hollansche handelscompagnieën, 25 ff.
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completely a trade in luxury items, including the two most important agricultural products, sugar and tobacco. The only estimate of the overall volume of the Dutch Atlantic trade for this early period has been published by Van den Boogaart, and the following assessment is based on his findings.95 The annual value of beaver and otter skins from New Netherland had a value of about ƒ60,000 in 1628–1629.96 The value of imports from the Caribbean, which included tobacco, dyewood, pearls, cotton, and hides, was approximately ƒ1 million, excluding the income from salt from the Punta de Araya region between 1600 and 1609. The Dutch share in the profits from Brazil fluctuated annually between ƒ3 and ƒ6 million for the years 1600–1624, according to Van den Bogaart, and the trade with West Africa, which consisted for 75 percent of gold, had a value of around ƒ1 million. This final sum is certainly not overstated when one takes into account that the trade to West Africa of De Moucheron alone was worth a ƒ0.25 million.97 A contemporary source estimated the annual value of the Guinea trade at ƒ1 to ƒ1.5 million.98 The question may be asked which of the various major trading routes was the most important for the Dutch during the early years of their expansion, the one to Asia, to the Atlantic region, or to the Mediterranean via Gibraltar. Considering only the number of ships employed on these routes, it seems that until 1620 the Asian commerce with on average ten ships departing annually, was by no means the dominant branch. Many more ships sailed to the Mediterranean, with an annual average of nineteen, sixty-six, and fifty-six during the periods 1591–1600, 1601–1610, and 1611–1620 respectively.99 The Atlantic trade also displayed far greater activity than
95
Van den Boogaart, ‘Los neerlandeses,’ 99–103. J. A. Jacobs, Een zegenrijk gewest. Nieuw-Nederland in de zeventiende eeuw, Cultuurgeschiedenis van de Republiek in de zeventiende eeuw, no. 2 (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 1999), 181. 97 De Jonge, Oorsprong, 16–17; De Stoppelaar, De Moucheron, 134. 98 ZA, SvZ 1233: Annexes to the resolutions (res.), 1618. The sum of ƒ1.5 million corresponds to the information provided by a Spanish spy, namely that commerce of the Dutch Republic with West Africa amounted to ƒ1.2 million, and that twenty ships sailed there every year. See ZA, Verzameling Verheye-Van Citters 145.1: Cort relaes daer by verclaert wert . . .; Enthoven, Zeeland en de opkomst van de Republiek, 238, note 147. 99 J. de Vries and A. van der Woude, Nederland, 1500–1815. De eerste ronde van moderne economische groei (Amsterdam: Balans, 1995), 448, table 9.2. 96
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the Asian trade. Even before 1599 no fewer than eighty Dutch ships sailed across Atlantic waters destined for Africa, Brazil, and the West Indies.100 This was still before the ‘golden age’ of the salt trade to Punta de Araya, where 120 ships sailed annually.101 The reason frequently given for the prominence of the Asian commerce is that VOC ships were much larger than those on the other routes, so their cargo capacity was much larger and more valuable. This is certainly a valid argument. At the beginning of the seventeenth century the average size of an East Indiaman, as these ships were usually called, was 480 tons (240 last).102 This means that the average annual cargo capacity in the Asia trade was about 5,000 tons. The average tonnage of a ship in the Levantine or Mediterranean trade was 250 tons. Taking tonnage as a criterion, on average more than 21,000 tons sailed annually in the direction of the Mediterranean.103 Those going to Punta de Araya for salt averaged between two and six hundred tons,104 but the ships sailing to other Atlantic destinations tended to be smaller, perhaps somewhere around two hundred tons. If an average of eighty ships plied the Atlantic waters before 1599,105 it is safe to assume that about one hundred sailed annually after 1600, when the shipping to Punta de Araya got under way. The annual average of one hundred ships must have had a total carrying capacity of approximately 20,000 tons, much more than the 5,000 tons in the Asian trade. In the final analysis, however, it should be understood that cargo capacity of ships does not explain the value of the goods transported. In 1611, the Mediterranean merchants estimated the value of their trade at ƒ4 million, which equaled that of the VOC trade with Asia.106 Before 1620, income from the Asian trade was between three
100 Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean, 1580–1680, 52; H. den Heijer, De geschiedenis van de WIC (Zutphen: Walburg, 1994), 15–21. 101 Sluiter, ‘Dutch Rivalry,’ 179. 102 J. R. Bruijn, F. S. Gaastra, and I. Schöffer eds., Dutch-Asiatic Shipping in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën, grote ser., no. 165–67 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1987), 1:174, table 35. 103 De Vries and Van der Woude, Nederland, 1500–1815, 448, table 9.2. 104 Sluiter, ‘Dutch Rivalry,’ 179. 105 For tonnage and number of ships sailing to Africa and to the West Indies, see Resolutiën SG, RGP nos. 57, 62, 71. 106 K. Heeringa, ed., Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den Levantsche handel, 1590–1660, Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën, grote ser., nos. 9–10 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1910–1917), 1:429–31.
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to four million guilders. As explained earlier, the returns of the Dutch commerce in the Atlantic region totaled between ƒ4 and ƒ7.5 million per year. This demonstrates that during the first two decades of the seventeenth century, the Dutch trade in the Atlantic was more valuable than either of the other two commercial routes. The observation by De Vries and Van der Woude, that neither the volume nor the value of the VOC trade with Asia should be exaggerated, was certainly valid for the beginning of the seventeenth century.107
107
10.5.
De Vries and Van der Woude, Nederland, 1500–1815, 514–15, 536–37, table
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CHAPTER THREE
DUTCH TRADE WITH BRAZIL BEFORE THE DUTCH WEST INDIA COMPANY, 1587–1621 C E
This has so happily succeeded for us, so that in this period of twelve years [the Twelve Year Truce, 1609–1621] we have supplanted in those waters all the Portuguese caravels that bring over the sugar through the proficiency of our vessels, and we have substituted and incorporated from one-half to twothirds of their trade under the directions of our factors in Portugal, under Portuguese names, that along with us have had a part and portion in this trade. Deductie vervaetende den oorspronck ende progres van de vaart ende handel op Brasil, 1622.1
Introduction The above claim, which appears in a recommendation to the States General in 1622, has been so often cited by historians as to achieve certainty through sheer repetition.2 The statement appeared as the Dutch West India Company (WIC) began to take shape, and various interest groups presented ideas to the public and to the States General 1 H. Ottsen, Journael van de reis naar Zuid-Amerika, 1598–1601, ed. J. W. IJzerman, Werken uitgegeven door de Linschoten Vereeniging, no. 16 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1918), 98–106, Deductie vervaetende den oorspronck ende progres van de vaert ende handel op Brasil. The original was sent to the States General and later distributed to the representatives of the provinces. Algemeen Rijksarchief (ARA), Archief van de Staten Generaal (SG) (liassen admiraliteiten) 5486: 26 January 1622; ARA, Archief van de Staten van Holland 1358b; Zeeuws Archief, Archief van de Staten van Zeeland 2091: Deductie over de handel met Brazilie via Portugal, 20 February 1622. 2 H. Wätjen, O Dominio Colonial Hollandez no Brasil (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1938), 69–70. Wätjen based his brief analysis of the early Dutch involvement in the Brazil trade on this document. C. Boxer repeats this claim in his classic study, The Dutch in Brazil, 1624–1654 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1957), 21.
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about what the role of the WIC should be (see chapter 4). Representatives of Amsterdam’s Portuguese Jewish merchant community were behind the statement, written during a time of high political passion. Under these circumstances, both those who favored continuity in friendly trade with Brazil – such as these Sephardic merchants – and those who wished to conquer Brazil to control its trade had motives to exaggerate the importance of the Brazil trade to the Dutch economy.3 The economic momentum that impelled the Dutch Republic to a leading position in world trade by the beginning of the seventeenth century was drawn to the potential for riches from trade with Brazil. This Portuguese plantation colony had achieved maturity by the latter decades of the preceding century, producing cotton, dyewood, tobacco and – above all – sugar for European markets. Brazilian sugar appeared on the list of traded commodities published by the broker’s guild in Amsterdam as early as 1586.4 Increasingly, the Dutch played a role in shipping, refining, and marketing Brazilian sugar. Nevertheless, the Dutch Brazil trade developed during a time of great political complexity stemming from its rebellion against the King of Spain, who had newly also become the Portuguese king. This conditioned the trade. Taxes on sugar fed the treasuries of the unified Portuguese and Spanish Crown, which controlled the movement of colonial products through metropolitan – i.e. Portuguese – ports. Furthermore, the crown placed embargoes on Dutch shipping for various years between 1585 and 1609, and in some years crown authorities even confiscated Dutch ships en masse in Iberian ports. After 1605, foreign merchants were forbidden either to trade directly with Brazil or to reside there. Merchants based in the Dutch Republic occasionally responded to these restrictions by seeking illicit direct trade with Brazil or through privateering and capturing Portuguese ships with Brazilian cargoes. Mostly, however, Dutch trade with Brazil was through Portugal and involved interlinked communities of Dutch and Portuguese merchants. Indirect trade was profitable 3 For a tract offering the belligerent point of view see ‘Advies tot aanbeveling van de verovering van Brazilië,’ Kroniek van het Historisch Genootschap, ser. 6, 27, no. 2 (1871): 228–56. 4 J. J. McCusker and C. Gravesteijn, The Beginnings of Commercial and Financial Journalism. NEHA ser., no. 3 (Amsterdam: Nederlandisch Economisch-Historisch Archief, 1991), 51–52. The facsimile of the prijscourant shows ‘bresille hont Fernabock’ (brazilwood from Pernambuco), as well as white and muscovado sugar from Brazil.
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and fit with pre-existing patterns of merchant networks and commodity flows. This pattern prevailed at least until the establishment of the WIC in 1621. A debate about the involvement of the Dutch in Brazil prior to the establishment of the WIC dates at least to the beginning of the last century.5 This follows two related questions about the role of the Dutch in the trade of Brazilian colonial products: 1) When and to what extent did the Dutch become involved in this trade? and 2) How did the war with Spain affect it? Historians agree that the Dutch played a significant role, although the extent of the trade has never been credibly quantified and its origins remain somewhat murky because of a lack of sources. They have disagreed more about the effects of the war between the Dutch Republic and the Iberian Crown. Some have privileged the political context of the trade, arguing that trade embargoes severely damaged the trade and drove the Dutch to expand competitively in the western Atlantic.6 Others, inspired by the methodologies of the Annales School, have seen Dutch Atlantic expansion in terms of long-term economic development, emphasizing commercial structures and downplaying the political or martial context.7 Given the complexity of the political and economic variables, no clear synthesis has emerged from this debate. However, research over the last few decades has also provided new approaches and suggested different questions to apply to the subject of Dutch-Brazilian trade. This research has focused on merchants and merchant communities, which is also the point of departure for this article. Rather than frame questions about sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century commerce using categories of ‘Dutch’ or ‘Portuguese’ trade, it has asked: Who were the merchants? How did they transact business? And how did they respond to new opportunities or changing conditions? Although personal documents such as letters or account books of merchants in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are
5
Summarized in Wätjen, O Dominio Colonial Hollandez no Brasil, 65–71. J. I. Israel, Empires and Entrepôts: The Dutch, the Spanish Monarchy, and the Jews, 1585–1713 (London, Hambledon, 1990), 200–10; J. I. Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585–1740 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), 1–11. 7 J. de Vries and A. van der Woude, The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure, and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500–1850 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 362–70. 6
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rare, recent research has plumbed surviving public documents in various European archives, including Inquisition trial transcripts, wills and testaments, and particularly notarial records. Reliable quantitative estimates about the volume of trade are still lacking, but these sources reveal much about the structure and operation of the trade. This chapter borrows from this research and also examines some published series of notarial records.
Dutch Trade with Portugal By the time Brazilian colonial products began to appear in appreciable quantities in the metropolitan entrepôts of Lisbon, Oporto, and Viana do Castelo, Portuguese trade with the Low Countries was a well-established fact. In the northern direction went products such as figs, dyestuff, oil, and wine; coming south were timber, munitions, iron, naval stores, and various kinds of cloth and manufactured goods. But the sine qua non of this trade was the exchange of Baltic grain carried by Dutch ships and exchanged for Portuguese salt from Setubal or Aveiro. Portugal’s largest cities were often not adequately provisioned by grain from the Portuguese hinterland and relied regularly on imports. Likewise, salt was an essential ingredient in the Dutch fishing trade and an extremely important trade commodity in markets in the North and Baltic Seas. This trade operated in Dutch ships. Dutch involvement in this trade dates to the end of the fifteenth century and demonstrated ever-greater success at the expense of Hansa competitors, especially by the end of the sixteenth century. The geographical position of Holland and Zeeland between the Baltic and the Iberian Peninsula offered a strong advantage, since Dutch merchants were better positioned than their counterparts at the two poles of the trading route to calculate their shipping strategies based on the most recent information about prices and supplies.8 The earliest surviving Amsterdam freight contracts show the importance of this trade to Amsterdam freighters. In 1931, J. W. IJzerman published summaries of 1,065 contracts showing Amsterdam-Iberian trade between 1591–1602. Survival of notarial records from this period is spotty. Furthermore, merchants used notarized contracts
8
Ibid., 356; Israel, Dutch Primacy, 48–52.
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infrequently, so these records cannot give any indication of the volume of trade. It would have been several times higher than the number of surviving contracts suggests. But the patterns of voyages are clear: Dutch skippers engaged in a triangular trade, visiting North or Baltic Sea ports and the Iberian Peninsula within a single sailing season.9 Of the records summarized by IJzerman, 554 (52 percent) referred to ports of call in regions north of the Netherlands, particularly the Baltic Sea.10 To the south, Portuguese harbors were mentioned most frequently, appearing in 773 (73 percent) contracts.11 Only 375 (35 percent) contracts stipulated a direct round-trip between Amsterdam and the Iberian Peninsula. Other stops included ports in England, France, Italy, and the Canary Islands. The vast majority of this trade took place in ships of 100 to 200 ton (50–100 last) and was oriented towards the exchange of the bulk commodities mentioned above. Ships such as the fluit or, as the English said: flute or flyboat – medium-sized, cheaply built, inexpensively operated, but with a relatively large carrying capacity – were a Dutch specialty.12 In this type of trade, they offered several advantages. Their low draft was ideal for trade in shallow Baltic harbors. Additionally, their freightage rates were generally low enough to allow portions of journeys to be run on ballast, offering more flexibility and faster turnover time in harbors.13 This dynamic Dutch shipping linked Mediterranean, 9 J. W. IJzerman, ed., ‘Amsterdamsche bevrachtingscontracten, 1519–1602, Deel 1, De vaart op Spanje en Portugal,’ in Economisch-Historisch Jaarboek 17 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1931), 163–291. 10 Ibid., 286–87. 11 I have counted these mentioned harbors, in both the Portuguese Atlantic islands and the region somewhat ambiguously designated ‘Condaet,’ which technically was the region between the rivers Guadiana and Guadalquivir in Andalusia, but which could also have meant the Algarve. Contracts for the southern coast of Spain and Portugal were quite often loosely prescriptive, suggesting that the skipper visit a number of ports until he got a full cargo. E. M. Koen, ed., ‘Notarial Records Relating to the Portuguese Jews in Amsterdam up to 1639,’ Studia Rosenthaliana 1, no. 2 (1967): 113. For a typical contract see IJzerman, ‘Amsterdamsche bevrachtingscontracten,’ 228. 12 Freight contracts rarely specify the type of ship to be employed on a voyage, referring instead to last, i.e. tonnage (1 last = 2 tons). However, in 1619 a merchant testified to an Amsterdam notary that the fluit type ship had plied the waters between Spain and Portugal for twenty years. Koen, ‘Notarial Records,’ Studia Rosenthaliana 14, no. 1 (1980): 82. 13 IJzerman, ‘Amsterdamsche bevrachtingscontracten,’ 290–91. A merchant would seem to want to avoid making trips on ballast, but since acquiring and loading a cargo might take a considerable time and add to his costs, a merchant might weigh the economic advantages of a quick voyage to a desired port. Israel suggested, alternatively, that Dutch ships in the Baltic trade frequently ran on ballast before 1590
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Atlantic, and Baltic economies but had a strong orientation towards trade with Portugal.
Portugal and Brazil Portuguese trade with Brazil operated in a separate sphere, which also encompassed the Portuguese Atlantic islands and Portugal’s African coastal factories. Here the role of northern European products, such as textiles, timber, and grain, was less important. Many commodities traded to Brazil, including wine, oil, and vinegar, were produced on the Portuguese mainland or islands. Similarly, a form of bilateral trade eventually developed between Brazil and the Portuguese factories on the African coast, which exchanged slaves for molasses-cured tobacco, circumventing the need for Northern European trade items in the African markets (see chapter 7). Trade between Rio de Janeiro and the Rio de la Plata region brought silver from upper Peru into the perennially specie-starved colony. To a large extent, with the exception of textiles, trade between Portugal and Brazil was satisfied with Portuguese and Atlantic island products, dominated by Portuguese shipping and tied to the metropolitan ports, ensuring that the crown would tax Brazilian products. The predominant Brazilian export was – of course – sugar, and the years before the establishment of the WIC witnessed generally rapid expansion of output. This is reflected in the growth of sugar mills in the colony, which processed the cane from its own fields as well as those from neighboring farms. The sugar mill – labor and capital-intensive complex, called engenho in Portuguese – processed cane into semi-refined sugar, which was available in three grades of purity and was packed into crates that were sold through Portuguese ports to European markets. Representing the engines of the colonial economy, the number of Brazilian sugar mills nearly doubled between 1570 and 1583, increasing from 60 to 115. By 1629, on the eve of the Dutch invasion of Pernambuco, there were an estimated 346 mills in the colony.14 Total sugar production grew apace. Stuart because they lacked trade items. See Israel, Dutch Primacy, 49. However, ships continued to run on ballast after 1590 on various legs of the triangular route, probably to maximize profits. 14 Brazil’s engenhos processed sugar into a semi-refined state (in order of purity: blanco (white), muscovado, panela), which was then reprocessed in northern European
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Schwartz has estimated the total production of Pernambuco as 378,000 arrobas (5.6 million kilograms) in 1591, and 544,072 (8 million kilograms) in 1622. The value of Brazilian sugar did not follow this ascending trajectory. Although short-term prices could fluctuate dramatically, sugar generally enjoyed high prices in Brazil in the first few decades of the seventeenth century. In Bahia, white sugar sold for about 865 réis per arroba in 1596, rose to 1$083 in 1608, and remained generally above 1$000 for about a decade.15 By 1618, prices had fallen. In the 1620s they were about half their level of the preceding two decades. Schwartz estimated the total value of the Bahian sugar crop in 1612 as 261,963$900 réis ( ƒ1,801,000). According to his calculations, its value decreased to 165,183$982 réis ( ƒ1,135,640) in 1629, despite an increase in overall Brazilian production.16 Why was there a fall in prices? Until 1618, supply and demand grew in rough equilibrium, ensuring relatively stable prices. However, with the outbreak of war in Europe in 1618, the Atlantic economy – and the European economy as a whole – suffered a depression as trade contracted and demand dwindled.17 Brazil’s export product has been estimated at 59 tons of silver in 1620, of which sugar accounted for the lion’s share. Brazil was undoubtedly, therefore, a valuable colony. However, its importance as a whole for the Iberian Crown should not be exaggerated. In 1607, income from Brazil provided a value of 5.6 tons of silver to the Habsburg Crown, perhaps 4.5 percent of its total revenue.18 Multiple ports on both sides of the Atlantic interlinked the Portuguese and Brazilian economy. The premier Brazilian ports were those of Salvador in Bahia and Recife in Pernambuco, representing the two refineries. Sugar weight was measured in arrobas (1 arroba = ca. 14.75 kilograms). In the years 1596–1618, sugar crates or cases generally contained 14 or 15 arrobas (about 214 kilograms). See S. B. Schwartz, Sugar Plantations in the Formation of Brazilian Society, Bahia, 1550–1835 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 116–25, 165. 15 Four hundred réis made a cruzado, which was roughly equivalent to a ducat. In the Dutch Republic, 40 groten was euquivalent to ƒ1. The exchange rate between a groot and a réis might fluctuate in this period from 102/400 to 119/400. The values in guilders here are based on an average exchange of 110 groten to 400 réis. See Koen, ‘Notarial Records,’ Studia Rosenthaliana 1, no. 2 (1967): 110. Also, F. Mauro, Le Portugal, le Brésil et l’Atlantique au XVII e Siécle, 1570–1670 (Paris: Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, 1983), 479–82. 16 These represent prices in Brazil. Schwartz, Sugar Plantations, 177. 17 De Vries and Van der Woude, First Modern Economy, 372. 18 F. N. de Carvalho, H. Johnson, and M. B. N. da Silva, Nova História da Expansão Portuguesa: O Império Luso-Brasileiro, 1500–1620, ed. H. Johnson and M. B. N. da Silva (Lisbon: Editorial Estampa, 1992), 296.
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richest and productive centers of cane agriculture. But other ports – including São Vicente, Espírito Santo, Ilhéus, and Rio de Janeiro – dotted the coastline and were also tied to overseas commerce. The need for multiple ports in Brazil can be explained simply by the fact that cane cultivation was spread over a vast coastline, though concentrated in the Northeast, and export was therefore not susceptible to centralization in any single port. This lack to centralization extended also to the metropolis. Through much of the sixteenth century, Lisbon’s harbor enjoyed a preeminence lent through its monopoly of the Carreira da Índia, Portugal’s Asia trade.19 However, Brazilian trade was free, at least for subjects of the Portuguese Crown, and not restricted to any single port in the metropolis. So the sugar trade spelled a resurgence of the moribund northern ports of Oporto and Viana do Castelo, as well as of smaller ports such as Vila do Conde.20 Furthermore, these cities were already well tied to established Atlantic trading networks and consequently well suited for reexport. Transportation of Brazilian products to the metropolis remained mainly in caravels, typically 80–120 tons although larger ships were also used. Around three hundred ships were likely to have been employed in this trade annually.21 Portuguese ships traveling to Brazil might stop at one or more destinations en route. In this way, the Atlantic islands were integrated into the Brazilian economy, offering wine, in particular, for sale in America. Ten surviving freight contracts executed in Lisbon and Oporto in 1609 and examined by Maria Leonor Freire Costa show the pattern. Five of these contracts provisioned a voyage from Lisbon and five from Oporto, all with the destination of either Bahia or Pernambuco. Four mention stops en route at Atlantic island ports of Terceira, Madeira, Tenerife, and Palma. Once in Brazil, eight contracts provisioned a direct return to Lisbon, Viana, or Oporto.22 19
Mauro, Le Portugal, 570. The best and most recent work on the Brazilian sugar trade and shipping is M. L. F. Costa, ‘O Transporte no Atlântico as Frotas do Açùcar, 1580–1663’ (Ph.D. diss., Universidade Técnica de Lisboa, 2001), 7, 14. This work has also been published. Two other recent studies focus on northern Portuguese ports as centers of redistribution: M. A. F. Moreira, Os Mercadores de Viana e o Comércio do Açúcar Brasileiro no Século XVII (Viana do Castelo: Câmara Munícipal, 1990), and A. Polónia, ‘Vila do Conde. Um Nortenho na Expansão Ultramarina Quinhentista’ (Ph.D. diss., Faculdade de Letras do Porto, 1999). 21 Costa, ‘O Transporte no Atlântico,’ 169, 176, 190. 22 Ibid., appendix 6, ‘Referéncias arquivísticas, Tabela dos contratos presentes em actos notariais Lisboa e Porto: ordenação por ano.’ 20
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Once sugar or brazilwood was loaded in Brazil, ships returned – in theory at least – to Portuguese ports, where customs officials carefully compared their cargoes with the bills of lading issued by their counterparts at the Brazilian port of embarkation. Crown authority was present in all of the metropolitan and colonial port towns and prepared to tax its share of colonial wealth. Tax collection in the colony and the metropolis was farmed out to merchants and organized through customs houses. Although the taxes for sugar were not consistent throughout this period, they fell into two main categories: a 10 percent tithe paid in Brazil, and a sales tax paid in Portugal. These and various other taxes could amount to about 30 percent of the value of the sugar paid in Brazil, although the tax burden was considered higher in Lisbon than in other metropolitan ports.23 The trade in brazilwood operated under a different regimen. This product was a monopoly of the crown, which farmed out its trade through contracts and licenses. In the early seventeenth century, approximately 20,000 quintais (888 tons) were harvested annually.24
Redistribution of Brazilian Products Once Brazilian colonial products reached Portugal, the Iberian– northern European trade nexus intersected that of the PortugueseBrazilian trade. The metropolitan demand for colonial products was relatively underdeveloped. Instead, northern European, and Italian, demand was pivotal. Indeed, this demand had determined the course of exploitation of Brazil in the first place. Consequently, trade relationships with northern European entrepôts were a necessary adjunct to Portugal’s colonial production. In the earliest period, Antwerp was the port par excellence to redistribute Brazil’s production. Antwerp’s Brazil trade developed out of pre-existing trade ties with Portugal. These were cemented through the existence of mutual factories in a typical medieval pattern – bodies of resident foreign merchants constituting a ‘nation’ and protected with special privileges. Flemish merchants were active in Portugal from the middle of the fifteenth
23 Mauro, Le Portugal, 540–45. See also, V. M. Godinho, Os descobrimentos e a economia mundial, (Lisboa: Editora Arcádia, 1965), 2:470–71. 24 Carvalho et al., ed., Nova História, 220–24.
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century. Since the crown permitted foreign trade and residence in Brazil during the sixteenth century, Antwerp merchants sometimes extended their activities as far as investment and/or ownership of engenhos, as was the famous case with Erasmo Schetz, a merchant active in Antwerp’s Lisbon factory who purchased a plantation in São Vicente sometime before 1550 and left it to his children.25 An even greater impetus to Antwerp’s Brazil trade was its Portuguese factory, which dated to the beginning of the sixteenth century and was confirmed officially in 1511. From a small number it grew to 85 families and 17 single persons by 1571. Antwerp’s Portuguese merchants traded through their correspondents in Portugal, whither they sent manufactured goods (mainly fabrics) in exchange for colonial produce. They arranged transport in their own ships as well as in vessels of French, Hansa, Dutch, and Italian origin, depending on political and economic circumstances.26 Thanks largely to their efforts, Antwerp became the most important northern European depot for sugar, especially marketing sugar produced on the Portuguese islands of São Tomé and Madeira. These two islands remained important suppliers for Antwerp through much of the century. Nevertheless, the first mention of Brazilian sugar in Antwerp dates to 1519, and as Brazilian production began to increase in the second half of the sixteenth century, Antwerp benefited.27 In 1570, Portuguese merchants in Antwerp imported 3,492 cases (1.5 million pound) of sugar from São Tomé and 723 from Brazil. Between 1590 and 1599, only 362 cases came from São Tomé and 16,201 (7 million pound) from Brazil.28 Antwerp maintained a near monopoly in the importation and redistribution of sugar through the 1560s and 1570s, and its trade relationship with Portugal survived the crises at the end of the sixteenth century. In fact, Antwerp’s merchants remained significant importers of Brazilian products well into the seventeenth century.29 25 E. Stols, Os Mercadores Flamengos em Portugal e no Brasil antes das Conquistas Holandesas (São Paulo: Separata dos Anais de História, 1973), 12–13, 20–27. 26 H. Pohl, Die Portugiesen in Antwerpen, 1567–1648: zur Geschichte einer Minderheit (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1977), 25–36, 64, 216–17. 27 Stols, Os Mercadores, 21. 28 Pohl, Die Portugiesen in Antwerpen, 156. 29 See E. Stols, De Spaanse Brabanders, of de Handelsbetrekkingen der Zuidelijke Nederlanden met de Iberische wereld, 1598–1648, Verhandelingen van de Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van België, klasse der letteren, ser. 33, no. 70 (Brussels: Paleis der Academiën, 1971).
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By the end of the sixteenth century, however, other northern European trading powers began to handle Brazilian sugar just as it entered a period of great expansion. The oft-told story of Zeeland and Holland, and especially Amsterdam, moving directly into a prominent trading position as a result of the crisis of Antwerp of 1585 has been challenged. Dutch towns benefited from immigration from Brabant and Flanders, but their growth corresponded with the burgeoning of various cities tied to the Atlantic economy including Cologne, Hamburg, London, Rouen, and La Rochelle.30 These cities also gained both from the vacuum left by the sharp contraction of trade in Antwerp and from the diaspora of Antwerp merchants who were skilled in Atlantic trade. The Dutch also responded early and eagerly to opportunities for trade with Brazil, and their ships appeared in Brazilian ports at least by 1587 (see chapter 2).31 Considering that Dutch ships sailed in very large numbers to Iberian ports in the last two decades of the sixteenth century, it is not surprising that they should have made trips to Brazil. There were several ways in which they might have become involved in this trade. Some trips were contracted in Amsterdam. This is the case with several voyages planned, in cooperation with Portuguese correspondents in Lisbon, by the former Antwerp-based merchant, Hans de Schot. De Schot hired at least three skippers to sail to and trade in Brazil in the 1590s.32 Other skippers probably sailed to Brazil on an ad hoc basis. Portuguese ports offered up-to-date information about trading opportunities in Brazil, and skippers were often expected to act upon current information once they arrived in a particular port. A loan made by Amsterdam merchant Jasper Quingeth to skipper Jan Jacopsen in 1603 shows how this worked. Jacopsen was to sail to Portugal for a cargo of salt, return to Amsterdam and repay his loan. However, Quingeth left open the possibility of alternative trips. Jacopsen might choose to sail either to Brazil or Livorno from Lisbon, in which case Quingeth
30 For the case of Hamburg, see H. Kellenbenz, Unternehmerkräfte im Hamburger Portugal- und Spanienhandel, 1590–1625 (Hamburg: Verlag der Hamburgischen Bücherei, 1954), 179–81. See also, O. Gelderblom, Zuid-Nederlandse kooplieden en de opkomst van de Amsterdamse stapelmarkt, 1578–1630 (Hilversum: Verloren, 2001). 31 Schwartz, Sugar Plantations, 180; E. Sluiter, ‘Dutch Maritime Power and the Colonial Status Quo,’ Pacific Historical Review 11 (1942), 31. 32 IJzerman, ‘Amsterdamsche bevrachtingscontracten,’ 210, 216, 226.
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stipulated other terms of repayment, to be collected through correspondents in either Livorno or Lisbon. Presumably, Jacopsen would base his decision on up-to-date information received by his freighter’s correspondents in Lisbon.33 In such a way, Dutch vessels made a modest entry into the Brazil trade. The volume of this trade, however, cannot have been very large. While available sources do not permit precise estimates of the number of ships, it is possible that these exchanges employed between ten and twenty Dutch ships in some years in the 1580s and 1590s.34
The Political Context The great irony of Dutch involvement in the Brazil trade is that it was nurtured in a political arena of open hostility. The beginning of significant Dutch trading in Brazil coincided with the linking of Portugal to the Spanish Habsburg Crown in 1580. This meant that trade occurred, at least until the onset of the Twelve Year Truce in 1609, in a highly complicated context. Interference was particularly acute from the side of the Hapsburg Crown, which made repeated attempts to ban the Dutch from trade with the Iberian Peninsula and its colonies. The first general embargo, under Philip , lasted from 1585 to 1590. The second marked the ascension of Philip in 1598 and was probably – at least initially – much more effective. In 1603 the embargo was modified to allow trade with payment of a 30 percent duty on all Dutch trade items. But the embargo resumed in 1604, and lasted until the declaration of the truce in 1609.35 Furthermore, in 1605 the Spanish Crown decreed Brazil off-limits to all foreign residence and shipping.36 This policy was not revoked during the truce. 33 Gemeentearchief Amsterdam (GAA), Notarieel Archief (NA) 95: 143, 15 November 1603. 34 Van den Boogaart estimates, quite reasonably, that one hundred Dutch or Dutch-German ships made trips between Portugal and Brazil between 1587 and 1599. E. van den Boogaart, ‘Los neerlandeses en el mundo comercial atlántico de la Doble Monarquía Ibérica, 1590–1621,’ in La expansión holandesa en el atlántico, 1580–1800, ed. E. van den Boogaart et al. (Madrid: Niel-Gerond, 1992), 76–77. 35 Israel, Empires and Entrepôts, 191–97. 36 Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino (AHU), Livro do Brasil, Cod. 1193: Alvará, 1605. My work in Portuguese archives was supported by the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation.
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Support for these policies among the united Iberian kingdoms was mixed. Receipts from Portuguese trade represented a relatively small percent of the receipts of the Habsburg Crown, which also enjoyed a large and steady supply of New World silver, and considerable revenues from the Castilian hinterland. Likewise, the Castilian economy as a whole was not dependent on Dutch shipping. While it suffered by banning trade that could have been beneficial to its own economy, the Spanish Crown, and Spanish merchants, could generally afford the loss.37 Portuguese merchants fared worse under these restrictions since their wealth was tied to Dutch shipping and trade to a greater extent.38 As mentioned above, northern Europe formed a vital link with the Portuguese economy, and by the end of the sixteenth century, the Dutch were very important trading partners as well, sending well over one hundred ships a year to Portugal in the 1590s.39 When the Dutch were banned, Portugal could always carry on her trade through English, French, German, or Hansa merchants. Periods of Dutch prohibition corresponded with increasing volumes of trade with cities such as Hamburg and London. Nevertheless, the banning of Dutch trade by the crown generally brought groans of protest from Portuguese officials and merchants.40 Likewise, the Dutch Republic had little to gain from prohibiting trade with the Iberian Peninsula. In fact, its very ability to wage war against the Spanish Crown was tied to income from trade, including, ironically, the lucrative trade with Spain and Portugal, whose profits were taxed.41 It is true that open hostility in the Atlantic sphere could offer advantages to those who preferred seizing wealth by arms rather than trading. In fact, privateering flourished on these seas. Dutch privateers seized twenty-eight Portuguese ships off the coast of Brazil in 1616 alone, nearly a tenth of the fleet necessary
37 J. Lynch, The Hispanic World in Crisis and Change, 1598–1700 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 478. 38 S. B. Schwartz, ‘The Voyage of the Vassals: Royal Power, Noble Obligations, and Merchant Capital before the Portuguese Restoration of Independence, 1624–1640,’ American Historical Review 96, no. 3 (1991), 760. 39 As noted above, IJzerman found over seven hundred freight contracts for trade with Portugal in Amsterdam alone in this period. It is impossible to guess with precision the total number of voyages, but three or four times that number does not seem unreasonable. 40 Costa, ‘O Transporte no Atlântico,’ 54. 41 V. Enthoven, Zeeland en de opkomst van de Republiek. Handel en strijd in de Scheldedelta, c. 1550–1621 (Leiden: Luctor et Victor, 1996), 149–50.
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to transport the yearly sugar harvest.42 Nevertheless, their activities threatened many Dutch merchants who had grown wealthy on ordinary trade networks that encompassed the Iberian Peninsula. Consequently, the idea of a bellicose Dutch West India Company to challenge the Portuguese and Spanish Atlantic empires did not gain widespread acceptance until the termination of the Twelve Year Truce (see chapter 4). If, then, free trade between the Dutch Republic and the Iberian Peninsula was desirable to both Dutch and Portuguese merchants, it is useful to ask how successful the Habsburg embargoes were. The first embargo of Dutch shipping, from 1585 to 1590, is generally considered to have been ineffective because of lax enforcement. The embargo of 1598 was a different matter. As Israel has pointed out, when the embargoes were strictly enforced, the results could be dramatic.43 An analysis of Amsterdam freight contracts reinforces this view. As IJzerman has recorded, Lisbon is mentioned as a port of call in ninety-seven freight contracts in the year 1598, a very high level of traffic.44 But in 1599 and again in 1604, Spanish authorities tried to route Dutch traffic from Lisbon and expel Dutch factors. The totals of existing Amsterdam freight contracts listing Lisbon as a port of call give some indication of how drastically this affected shipping during these years. Table 3.1. Amsterdam Freight Contracts – Lisbon Trade, 1599–1608 Year Freight Contracts
1599 1600 1601 1602 1603 1604 1605 1606 1607 1608 3
2
7
18
39
47
2
1
5
15
Source: GAA, NA card index, ‘Lissabon.’
Apparently, the two Spanish crackdowns led to dramatic drops in activity. Although the numbers crept up slowly in following years, the embargo of 1598 was a watershed that suppressed traffic for an entire decade.45
42
Costa, ‘O Transporte no Atlântico,’ 69. Israel, Dutch Primacy, 53–59. 44 IJzerman, ‘Amsterdamsche bevrachtingscontracten,’ 233–53. 45 Similar results are noted for Rotterdam. See R. Bijlsma, ‘Rotterdamsche koopvaarders op het westen in 1605,’ in Rotterdams Jaarboekje, 2d ser., no. 5 (Rotterdam: Brusse, 1917), 55–56; R. Bijlsma, ‘Rotterdams Amerika-vaart in de eerste helft der 43
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Of course, Dutch ships did not cease to visit Portugal. In 1600, according to IJzerman, forty-six Dutch merchants still planned to collect salt in the Portuguese harbors of Aveiro and Setubal. Spanish embargoes punished Lisbon disproportionately. Also, canny merchants in Holland and Zeeland may have carried on their trade with the Iberian Peninsula through foreign skippers and crews and passports received in ‘free’ ports.46 Merchants could sometimes count on the collusion of correspondents and officials in Portuguese ports, who had little to gain from observing the Hapsburg embargoes.47 And given the widespread circulation of the Dutch merchant marine in a variety of Atlantic ports, it was relatively easy for freighters to simply alter trade routes or to obtain trade items, including Brazilian colonial products, in intermediary ports. Dutch skippers Roelof Abrahamsz., Dirck Hendricksz., Pieter Mol, Jan Andriesz., and Sybrant Jansz. left Lisbon in six ships bound for Emden, Germany, in 1601, with cargoes of sugar consigned to the Portuguese Amsterdam merchants Duarte Fernandes, Miguel Lopes Homem, Manuel Lopes Homem, Duarte Saraiva, and Manuel Lopes Nunes.48 Another Amsterdam Portuguese merchant, Francisco Mendes, deposed to a notary in 1604 that he had loaded sugar in Brazil on the ship of Jan Syvertsz., which had arrived in Amsterdam via Lisbon.49 On the other hand, although embargoes did not halt trade between the Netherlands and the Iberian Peninsula, they certainly imposed additional costs on merchants, reflected in higher insurance premiums and freight rates. The general impression offered from the years 1599 to 1608 is a sharp contraction of trade between the Dutch Republic and Portugal.
zeventiende eeuw,’ Bijdragen voor Vaderlansche Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde 5, no. 3 (1916): 97–103. 46 See, for example, Koen, ‘Notarial Records,’ Studia Rosenthaliana 22, no. 1 (1988): 60, 62; ibid., 23, no. 1 (1989): 205, 207. There is little evidence for this practice before 1609 in Amsterdam’s archives, but it was so notorious following the expiration of the truce that all northern European traffic in Portugal’s ports eventually came under suspicion. See Costa, ‘O Transporte no Atlântico,’ 54–56. 47 This was claimed to be the case with officials in Viana do Castelo at the end of the truce in the ‘Deductie.’ See Ottsen, Journael, 100. 48 Koen, ‘Notarial Records,’ Studia Rosenthaliana 2, no. 2 (1968): 270. 49 Ibid., 3, no. 1 (1969): 123.
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Merchant Organization
While Dutch merchants undoubtedly suffered from the hostile political and trade environment described above, they were able to persevere. The political, economic, and geographic particulars of the Atlantic trading sphere in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries lent new forms to merchant organization. Here the challenge was to do business in a system that was characterized by constantly shifting political alliances, a decentralized port system on both sides of the Atlantic, and transportation routes that were open and invited competition. Eddy Stols has described the emergence of far-flung Atlantic merchant networks in the middle of the sixteenth century in response to these conditions. The old system of resident nations and periodic fairs, which characterized Antwerp in the sixteenth century, had given way to merchant organizations that were ‘atomistic and continuous.’50 The merchants best poised for success were those who could deal with relatives or trusted correspondents in the widest possible variety of Atlantic locations, allowing flexibility and quick response to changing circumstances. This marked a change from a preference for factors, or company employees, that characterized medieval Italian merchant practice. The company formed by Amsterdam merchant Cornelis Snellincx in 1600 for trade with Brazil illustrates new practices. Snellincx was from Antwerp, where he had taken a Portuguese wife.51 Arriving in Amsterdam sometime before 1600, he was involved in the Brazil trade, and in 1601 served as the Amsterdam factor of the Portuguese contract holders of the brazilwood monopoly. From 1600 to 1605, he operated a company that traded with Bahia. His partners included merchants from the Dutch Republic, Portugal, England, and Antwerp. Their representative in Bahia was Antwerpbased merchant Jasper Basiliers de Jonge.52 Snellincx’s partnership embraced correspondents from north Atlantic cities that formed markets for Brazilian products.
50 Stols, Os Mercadores, 30–31, 42–43; De Vries and Van der Woude, First Modern Economy, 369. 51 Gelderblom, Zuid-Nederlandse kooplieden, 170. 52 GAA, NA, 33: 390–92, 30 March 1600; Koen, ‘Notarial Records,’ Studia Rosenthaliana 2, no. 2 (1968): 259, 268.
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While few merchants’ account books survive from this period, their activities are attested in notarial documents. Paper money, i.e. bills of exchange, fueled trade and allowed for a volume of credit-based trade many times higher than the available metallic currency would support.53 Decision-making was also diffused among merchant networks. This shows in freight contracts, which are often vague about cargoes, since freighters often left the decision about what to buy in the hands of relatives or correspondents in other ports along various legs of a journey. Merchants also pooled their investments, forming companies to share risk in maritime ventures. Since early modern states did little to support contracts or credit arrangements, all of these relationships were predicated on trust. This led, naturally, to reliance upon familial connections and what Stols has described as nearly ‘feudal’ ties between correspondents.54 While many of these qualities of early modern merchant communities are well known, their relevance for trade between the Dutch Republic and the Portuguese Atlantic empire needs to be examined. Especially after1605, direct foreign involvement in the Brazilian trade became quite risky. Two Dutch merchants who had lived in Brazil for long periods testified to Amsterdam notaries in 1609 that Dutch attempts to sell illegal linens directly in Recife and Paraíba had resulted in confiscated cargoes.55 Likewise, Dutch merchants who had lived and traded in Brazil testified to an Amsterdam notary in 1609 that Portuguese ships would not trade with vessels from other nations on the open seas unless coerced.56 IJsbrant Cornelisz. traveled to Brazil as an agent for Dutch merchants in 1617, but after suffering imprisonment in Brazil he was denied future entry into Spain or Portugal, for which he sought damages from his former employers.57 Although some merchants might have been willing to risk losing
53 This was particularly the case with the Brazilian economy. See Schwartz, Sugar Plantations, 204–08. 54 Stols, Os Mercadores, 30. Along with works mentioned elsewhere in this chapter. For Portuguese merchant networks, see J. G. Salvador, Os cristãos-novos e o comércio no Atlântico meridional (São Paulo: Pioneira, 1978), and D. G. Smith, ‘The Mercantile Class of Portugal and Brazil in the Seventeenth Century: A Socio-Economic Study of the Merchants of Lisbon and Bahia, 1620–1690,’ (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas, 1975). 55 Israel, Dutch Primacy, 107. 56 The fact that the practice had come under suspicion, however, may indicate that it existed. See Koen, ‘Notarial Records,’ Studia Rosenthaliana 5, no. 1 (1971): 110. 57 Koen, ‘Notarial Records,’ Studia Rosenthaliana 16, no. 2 (1982): 211–12.
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cargoes to coast guards and port officials, most preferred to work with Portuguese partners. This cooperation was rendered practical by Portuguese immigration to the Dutch Republic, and especially Amsterdam, providing an enormous impetus for the import of Brazilian colonial products into the Netherlands without the need to resort to illegal trade, at least during the Truce. The stream of Portuguese migrants beginning around 1600 was spawned in part by Dutch tolerance of Judaism and by persecution by the Holy Office in Portugal. A majority of Portugal’s merchants were descended from Jews, and though they had undergone conversion in the sixteenth century by becoming ‘New Christians,’ their conviction was under constant suspicion. The Inquisition could severely disrupt merchant networks in Portugal, but by fostering immigration to the Dutch Republic, it had the unintended effect of strengthening trade connections between the two countries. Displaced New Christian merchants did not sever ties with their hometowns of Oporto, Viana, and Lisbon, but used their connections to prosecute a hardy trade with their relatives and correspondents at home and in the Portuguese colonies.58 Sephardic immigration to Amsterdam remained at a slow pace until 1609 but brought important businessmen such as Manuel Rodrigues Vega, who had arrived from Antwerp by 1595, and Garcia Pimentel, who arrived from Venice in 1596.59 The trade networks of these two merchants encompassed, between them, Portugal, Brazil, North Africa, Spain, England, the Atlantic islands, and the Levant.60 During the truce, immigration accelerated and brought such notable figures as Diogo Dias Querido, who maintained business links with Venice, Livorno, West Africa, and Brazil, where he had lived for
58 For example, Duarte Palacios, merchant resident in Amsterdam, had merchant brothers, Jacome and Francisco, in Hamburg and Lisbon respectively. Francisco’s international connections allowed him to accumulate much wealth between 1620 and 1630, in spite of imprisonment by the Inquisition. Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, Processo de Inquisição de Lisboa 4481. 59 Koen, ‘Notarial Records,’ Studia Rosenthaliana 1, no. 1 (1967): 109. For Sephardic immigration to the Dutch Republic, see D. M. Swetschinski, ‘The Portuguese Jewish Merchants of Seventeenth Century Amsterdam: A Social Profile’ (Ph.D. diss., Brandeis University, 1979). J. I. Israel, ‘Sephardic Immigration into the Dutch Republic, 1595–1672,’ Studia Rosenthaliana 23, no. 2 (1989): 45–53. 60 Koen, ‘Notarial Records,’ Studia Rosenthaliana 1, no. 2 (1967): 110–12, 118–22; ibid., 2, no. 1 (1968): 111–12, 114–15, 117–18, 123; Israel, ‘Sephardic Immigration,’ 49.
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many years.61 Amsterdam, however, was not the sole beneficiary of Portuguese New Christian immigration. In the early decades of the seventeenth century, Castilian, Italian, and Atlantic trading centers such as Rouen and Hamburg also received New Christian immigrants, bolstering their importance in Atlantic trade networks and diffusing markets for Brazilian products. But the strong preference for Amsterdam of New Christians emigrating from Portugal meant that their connections and expertise were available to Dutch merchants interested in Atlantic trade. Sephardic immigration was one catalyst for Dutch competitiveness in the Atlantic world.62 The role in the redistribution of Brazilian products by nonPortuguese merchants in the Dutch Republic awaits a detailed study. However, in two areas their involvement is obvious – as insurers and as mariners. Dutch merchants became frequent underwriters of maritime insurance policies for all routes involved in the Brazil trade, from Brazil to Portugal to the Netherlands. Merchants Pieter van Geel and David de l’Hommel insured the goods loaded by order of Amsterdam merchant Luis Pereira de Miranda for a trip from Rio de Janeiro to Oporto in 1618.63 In 1618, a notary verified the receipts of a Portuguese insurance broker Henrico Zacuto in Amsterdam. His list of Dutch underwriters and the Portuguese merchants requesting their services reads as a veritable ‘who’s who’ of the Holland and Zeeland merchant community during the truce.64 No doubt this business was a valuable impetus to the development of Amsterdam’s
61
Israel, ‘Sephardic Immigration,’ 51. Ibid., 50–51. 63 Koen, ‘Notarial Records,’ Studia Rosenthaliana 13, no. 1 (1979): 108. Other examples are in ibid., 10, no. 1 (1976): 97; ibid., 13, no. 1 (1979): 113; ibid., 16, no. 1 (1982): 83. 64 Insurers were Barent Sweerts, Albert Schuijt, Jorgen Timmerman, Willem Pauw, Jacob Sijmonsz. Louw, Roelant Barckman, Pieter Belten, Jan Jansen van Helmont, Daniel and Giovanni van Geel, Pieter van Geel, David de l’Hommel, Elias van Geel, Claes Andriesz., Jacob Jacobsz. Benotenos, Herman Donckelman, Hendrick Voet, Daniel van den Eijnde, Salomon Voerknecht, Thomas van Swieten, Jan van Peenen, Bartholomeus Bisschop, Wijbrant Warwijck, Lambert van Erp, Jacques van Hanswijck, Jan van der Straten, Gillis Dodeur, Pieter Beijens, Aart Spieringh, Hendrick Thibaut, Abraham de Velaer, Paulus Bisschop, François Boudewijns, Pieter Munnicx, Adriaen Andriesen, Jaspar van Diemen, Jan Smidt and Company, Jan Battista Bartolotti, Jeronimo Vitori, Rogiers and Marten van den Heuvel, Joan Stassaert and Hendrick Tonissen. Koen, ‘Notarial Records,’ Studia Rosenthaliana 12, no. 1 (1978): 175–76. 62
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insurance market.65 Another type of financial transaction common in this period was loans on bottomry conditions, which combined the functions of finance and insurance. In this system, a merchant would make a loan to a skipper on the security of his ship. The loan was then repaid with interest upon the completion of a trading trip, but the risk was to the creditor if the cargo or ship was lost. Dirck Willems Pastoor, skipper of the Roode Leeuw, received such a loan from three Amsterdam merchants, Nicolas du Gardijn, Jude Bovenhuid, and Nicolaes Balessel in 1597, who together contributed ƒ1,200 to acquire a cargo for the 240-ton ship. The ship was to sail to Lisbon, Tangier, Cádiz, the Canary Islands, or Brazil, and then return to Lisbon where the loan was due to the merchant’s correspondent, Wijnant Keyser.66 The redistribution routes of Portuguese colonial products were entirely dominated by foreign shipping. Dutch ships played a major role here, although this business decreased from 1599 to 1608, as discussed above. Portuguese freighters contracted with skippers and merchantmen from a wide variety of Dutch towns, and this business was not small, especially during the Twelve Year Truce. As mentioned above, by the latter decades of the sixteenth century the merchant marine of the Dutch Republic had begun to dominate the trade in bulk commodities between the Baltic region and the Iberian Peninsula. Although the trade was suppressed in 1599 and 1604, after the truce it expanded again vigorously. Table 3.2 shows freight contracts for Baltic trade that mention Portuguese ports of call, executed in Amsterdam between 1614 and 1619. The prominence of Setubal as a port of call in all of these years shows that the Baltic-Portuguese trade retained a strong orientation towards the exchange of Baltic grain for Setubal salt. Nevertheless, these figures demonstrate the extremely high level of Dutch shipping in Portuguese harbors. Behind these figures, undoubtedly many times higher than surviving freight contracts suggest, stood an extensive and well-developed network of merchants, credit arrangements, and commodity exchange. As the years 1618 and 1619 show, many Dutch skippers unloaded grain in Portugal without visiting Setubal to load 65 V. Barbour, ‘Marine Risks and Insurance in the Seventeenth Century,’ Journal of Economic and Business History 1 (1928): 571–76. 66 GAA, NA, 76: 208, 17 April 1597. For another example from the same year, see GAA, NA 76: 167, 28 March 1597.
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Table 3.2. Amsterdam Freight Contracts for the Baltic-Portuguese Trade, 1614–1619 Year
Total Visits Lisbon
1614 1615 1616 1617 1618 1619
58 54 67 89 85 80
12 13 5 21 56 54
Places Named in Contracts Setubal Oporto 42 44 65 87 62 38
13 4 1 7 13 20
Viana 10 2 1 2 17
Source: P. H. Winkelman, ed. Bronnen voor de Geschiedenis van de Nederlandse Oostzeehandel in de zeventiende eeuw, Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën, grote ser. nos. 133, 161, 178, 184–86 (The Hague: Nijhof, 1975), vols. 5, 6.
salt. While their return cargoes remain generally unspecified in the freight contracts, it seems safe to assume that Brazilian sugar and dyewood were among the commodities returning to harbors in Zeeland and Holland.
Did Dutch Ships Carry the Brazilian Trade? Before 1598 the Dutch were active in Atlantic shipping lanes between Portugal and Brazil, although there is no evidence to support the view that they were the primary carriers of Brazilian goods. Rather they expanded beyond their traditional routes in the Iberian Peninsula. The previously mentioned voyages to Brazil in 1596 and 1597, contracted by Hans de Schot, illustrate this development. The pattern of trade in all three cases was the same. De Schot’s Dutch skippers loaded grain in the Netherlands, sold it in North Africa, sailed to the Atlantic islands to purchase wine, traded the wine for ‘goods’ in Brazil, and then returned to Portugal. In two of these contracts, De Schot mentioned that he acted for Antonio Anselmo, a Portuguese merchant.67 De Schot’s activities encompassed elements of traditional Dutch trading in bulk commodities along with new Atlantic routes, exploited in combination with Portuguese correspondents. 67 IJzerman, ‘Amsterdamsche bevrachtingscontracten,’ 210, 216, 226. The choice of specific destinations was sometimes left vague. For example, the skipper could sail to Ceuta Massagan in Barbary (North Africa) to unload grain, load wine in Cádiz, the Canaries, or Madeira, and then sail further to Pernambuco or Bahia in Brazil.
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In other cases, the Dutch undoubtedly traded directly with Brazil, both before and after 1605, with the connivance or at least tacit consent of port officials.68 The Portuguese colonial routes were not completely sealed. The decentralized system of ports in both the colony and the metropolis made it easier to bypass the rules, for control was weaker outside the largest ports. Dutch opportunistic tendencies were amply reflected in their activity along the Wild Coast of South America and in the northern Brazilian backwaters of Paraíba and Ceará.69 Traders from other nations also benefited from this situation. Indeed, given the resources of governments of the time, it was impossible to enforce a completely closed system of trade in the Atlantic context. Nevertheless, this chapter has argued that the importance of the Dutch in the primary routes of colonial Brazilian trade has probably been exaggerated, by both contemporary observers and subsequent historians. Particularly after 1600, there is little evidence that the Dutch were trading widely in Brazilian waters. Among the notarial records summarized in the Studia Rosenthaliana are 419 freight contracts executed in Amsterdam between January 1597 and December 1627. Considering that these were contracts involving Portuguese Jews, it is not surprising that 305 (72 percent) of these mention Portuguese ports of call. None of the merchants involved contracted Dutch skippers to trade in Brazil.70 This may very well be because sugar freights were contracted in Portugal, and, in fact, only twenty-five of these freight contracts mention sugar as a return cargo. However, fifty-two other documents relating to insurance and credit make unambiguous reference to planned voyages between Brazil and Portugal. Of these documents, 47 (90 percent) refer to ships with Portuguese names and skippers. The five exceptions date to 1606 and before, around the time of the ban on foreigners in Brazil. To highlight one of these cases, when Amsterdam merchant Paulo de Pina conveyed
68 Smaller Brazilian ports might be particularly susceptible to the breaking down of crown control, as happened with the customs house in Espírito Santo in 1617. AHU, Espírito Santo, Papeis Avulsos, Caixa 1, doc. 4. 69 The classic works on this subject are C. C. Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean and on the Wild Coast, 1580–1680 (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1971), and J. Lorimer, English and Irish Settlement on the River Amazon, 1550–1646, Hakluyt Society, 2d ser., no. 171 (London: Hakluyt Society, 1989). 70 These are all the references drawn from Koen, ‘Notarial Records,’ Studia Rosenthaliana 1 (1967)–35 (2001).
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to a fellow merchant a variety of shares in business transactions in 1618 in order to satisfy a debt, he mentioned five cargoes. Three of these had traveled from Amsterdam to the Canary Islands in three Dutch ships and then on to Pernambuco in three Portuguese vessels. The other two cargoes went first from Amsterdam to Oporto in Dutch ships, and then on to Pernambuco in Portuguese caravels.71 According to these sources, most merchants in the Republic preferred to work within a legal framework. Additionally, the European population of Brazil, estimated at about 40,000 in 1600, was not large, and demand for luxury manufactures was limited.72 This is not to say that demand was non-existent. The Dutch surely found a market for northern European manufactures in Brazil, either on their occasional attempts to trade directly with Brazil or through regular indirect trade. But this market was easily saturated, leading to unfavorably low prices.73 A trade network based on the quid pro quo exchange of manufactured goods for sugar was not always economically viable, as one Dutch merchant discovered when he left Pernambuco with unsold Dutch cloth in March of 1621.74 If, however, the Dutch merchant marine did manage to penetrate the shipping lanes between Brazil and Portugal, as some have suggested, the question might be posed: What exactly is a ‘Dutch’ ship? Behind each vessel used in a trade route stood three distinct, though sometimes overlapping, legal and economic categories. A skipper and crew whose recompense was based on freight charges; the freighter, who was a merchant; and the owners of the ship, almost always considered in the plural. Ship owners were also often merchantfreighters, sometimes freighting ships they partly owned. To complicate matters, freighters often shipped on their own account or for one or more correspondents.75 The totality of the economic arrangements standing behind a single voyage could be bewildering and is
71
Koen, ‘Notarial Records,’ Studia Rosenthaliana 12, no. 1 (1978): 177. Carvalho et al., ed., Nova História, 295. 73 E. C. de Mello, Olinda Restaurada. Guerra e Açúcar no Nordeste, 1630–1654 (São Paulo: Ed. da Universidade de São Paulo, 1975), 49. 74 Koen, ‘Notarial Records,’ Studia Rosenthaliana 20, no. 1 (1986): 117–18. 75 For these so-called partenrederijen, see J. R. Bruijn, ‘Productivity, Profitability, and Costs of Private and Corporate Dutch Ship Owning in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,’ in The Rise of Merchant Empires: Long-Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350–1750, ed., J. D. Tracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 174–94. See also chapter 14 in this volume. 72
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rarely revealed in freight contracts. A ship, then, may have been built in the Dutch Republic, but the capital represented in a vessel was not necessarily Dutch no matter what the ship’s papers or flags. Both Portuguese and Dutch investors could own part of each other’s ships, and ships could be sold between merchants from different nations. The Amsterdam merchants Laurens Joosten Baeck and Lenardo de Beer sold the 180-ton ship Sampson to the Portuguese Amsterdam merchant Antonio Martins Viegas in 1618. This ship was skippered by Dutchman Meijnert Willemsen Schram, and traded between Oporto and Amsterdam. However, Viegas owned only half of the ship. The other half belonged to Oporto merchant Diogo Lopes Pinto.76 Was the Sampson, then, a Dutch ship? Implicit in the argument that the Dutch dominated Portuguese colonial trade routes are assumptions about the superiority of Dutch capital development during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. While the dynamism of Dutch capital development cannot be denied, during the period described here the Portuguese trading economy still spawned a merchant community capable of generating massive fortunes. As Boyajian has shown, a generation of Portuguese merchants active in the first decades of the seventeenth century grew sufficiently wealthy to become the top bankers to the Spanish Crown, whose credit requirements were vast.77 The wealth of these merchants rested on trade and investment in both Brazil and the East Indies. Portuguese merchants could also benefit mightily from trade with the Republic through their correspondents and factors in the north. Bento Osorio, a Portuguese Jew resident in Amsterdam, is recorded in scores of freight contracts taking grain to southern Europe and returning with Portuguese salt. In all of these contracts he employed Dutch ships and skippers. From the contracts it is clear that he had penetrated the moedernegotie, the trade in bulk commodities linking the Netherlands, the Baltic, and the Iberian Peninsula. He declared to a notary at the end of 1618 that he had freighted two hundred ships in the previous three years to bring Setubal salt to Flanders, the Netherlands, and the Baltic for the account of Andrea
76 Koen, ‘Notarial Records,’ Studia Rosenthaliana 13, no. 2 (1979): 235. For a similar case, see ibid., 17, no. 1 (1983): 77. 77 J. C. Boyajian, Portuguese Bankers at the Court of Spain, 1626–1650 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1983), 7–13.
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Lopes Pinto, a rich Lisbon merchant. Pinto held the asiento, or contract, for the sale of salt and brazilwood, a crown monopoly. Obviously, part of his wealth was invested in the trade networks that redistributed these Portuguese and Brazilian products. Although he used Dutch shippers contracted through his correspondent Osorio, Pinto must have benefited enormously from this considerable trade.78 Trade during the truce was not a zero-sum game in which one party’s success was necessarily detrimental to the other. Rather, Portuguese and Dutch merchants grew rich together on shared trade.
Conclusion Merchants and skippers of the Dutch Republic made an entry into the Portuguese Brazilian trade before the Twelve Year Truce, venturing out modestly beyond their traditional trade with Portugal. In the last decades of the sixteenth century, this trade was often direct, but the Spanish Habsburg embargoes of 1598 and 1605 made direct trade increasingly dangerous and, therefore, uncommon. This hindered but did not stop the flow of Brazilian goods, brazilwood and sugar, into the Amsterdam market. Dutch merchants were able to trade through the diversified networks that had spread around the European Atlantic following the demise of Antwerp’s monopolies of many commodities, including sugar. In particular, Portuguese Sephardic immigration put the Dutch Republic on solid footing for indirect trade for Brazilian goods through Portugal. This trade flourished after 1609. Legal trade between Portugal and the Dutch Republic gave the Portuguese control of the primary routes of colonial distribution, and the Dutch of secondary ones, making profits for merchants in both nations. However, there were strains to the system. Some Dutch merchants chose to seize Brazilian produce on the open seas rather than trade for it through prescribed channels. Privateering – by no means exclusively a Dutch preserve – was rampant in the Atlantic and drove up costs for everyone. The Holy Office in Portugal also began to wreak havoc with trade in the final years of the truce. Beginning in 1618, the Inquisition began an assault on New Christian
78
Koen, ‘Notarial Records,’ Studia Rosenthaliana 13, no. 2 (1979): 238.
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merchants that had devastating effects, especially in the city of Oporto. In September 1618, the Portuguese Jewish community in Amsterdam declared losses to the States General caused by the imprisonment of their correspondents in Portugal, whose goods were also sequestered by the Holy Office. They claimed to have lost ƒ539,071 that year, much of which was generated by the Brazil trade.79 These crises, as well as a precipitous fall in prices as Europe moved into a depression, must have caused a number of merchants to sour on sugar. At the same time, the political winds in Spain and the Dutch Republic were changing, and as the truce was due to expire, those calling for war predominated. Dutch privateers, who had never recognized Portuguese hegemony in the western Atlantic, had reason to rejoice. Usselincx’s call for a Dutch West India Company (WIC) finally succeeded in 1621. Many merchants, however, must have feared the loss of legitimate trade. At stake was not only the Brazil trade, but also the moedernegotie, for hundreds of Dutch ships continued to travel between the Baltic ports and Portugal every year through 1620. In fact, investors were ambivalent about the company, taking several years to provide the required level of capitalization. Nevertheless, the fact that the Dutch Republic’s merchant elite allowed it to take place shows that at least some must have grown disillusioned with the system that prevailed during the Truce. After 1621, prospects for indirect trade with Brazil seemed bleak. Spain resumed its embargo of Dutch shipping in Iberian ports, which this time were rigidly policed by Spanish officials working under the War Council.80 At the same time, the WIC began planning to obtain sugar directly in Brazil under the auspices of a Dutch colony. But the old system of indirect trade did not die out completely. Throughout the 1620s, Amsterdam’s merchants continued to trade in Portugal’s ports, often through the use of foreign ships and skippers or with fraudulent papers obtained in intermediary ports. Not even the failed invasion of Bahia by the WIC in 1625 stopped this trade. As late as 1627, Amsterdam’s Portuguese Jews freighted at least thirteen
79 ARA, SG (Loketkas admiraliteit) 12561.31: Declaratie van de schaden bij de Portugeesen tot Amsterdam resideerende geleeden in Portugal door hun factooren ende vrienden door de Inquisitie gevangen ofte gevlucht, ende alle de goederen hun lieden, ende de Voorgs. Portugeesen toecoomende gesequestreert. I am indebted to Victor Enthoven for pointing out this source to me. 80 Israel, Empires and Entrepôts, 204.
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ships for voyages to Portugal or the Portuguese Atlantic islands of Madeira or the Azores, some of them to obtain sugar.81 When the WIC invaded Pernambuco in 1630, and managed to stay, the Dutch Republic had a direct source for Brazilian commodities. A new trade regimen was in place.
81 See various in Koen, ‘Notarial Records’ Studia Rosenthaliana 34, no. 1 (2000); ibid., 35, no. 1 (2001).
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE DUTCH WEST INDIA COMPANY, 1621–1791 H H
The West India Company [WIC] has, with God’s blessing, brought considerable damage to the King of Spain, but good fortune to this Republic and great wealth and prosperity to its inhabitants . . . WIC directors to the States General, 1644.1
Introduction Dutch shipping and trade in the Atlantic had increased precipitously since the end of the sixteenth century, as is demonstrated in chapter 2. Even before the Twelve Year Truce (1609–1621), the Dutch had begun trading with North, Central, and South America, the Caribbean, and West Africa. In several towns in Holland and Zeeland, merchants had established small ad hoc companies for trade with West Africa and North America.2 Dozens of ships sailed annually from the West Frisian ports of Hoorn and Enkhuizen to the coasts of Venezuela and the Caribbean islands, from which large amounts of salt were shipped. Merchants in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Middelburg dispatched ships to São Tomé and Brazil, which returned with valuable sugar cargoes. As Atlantic commerce expanded, the small trading companies were vulnerable to the hostility of Spain and Portugal. A few ships belonging to Elias Trip were attacked on
1 Remonstrantie ende Consideraties Aengaende De Vereeninghe vande Oost ende West-Indische Compagnien . . . (The Hague: Lieven de Langhe, 1644), 5, [no. 5114 in W. P. C. Knuttel, Catalogus Pamfletten-verzameling berustende in de Koninklijke Bibliotheek (Utrecht: Hes Publishers, 1978)]. 2 J. I. Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585–1740 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), 61; S. Hart, The Prehistory of the New Netherland Company (Amsterdam: City of Amsterdam Press, 1959), 17–33.
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the West African coast in 1609/10, and some of their crew members were killed.3 Combining their forces might alleviate such dangers. The idea of one company for all of the Atlantic went back as far as the trade itself. Most merchants realized that only an organization with adequate ships and military power could challenge the Iberian powers in the Atlantic. The first person to advocate the establishment of a Dutch West India Company (WIC – West-Indische Compagnie) was Willem Usselincx, an Antwerp-born merchant who had moved to Middelburg in 1591.4 Usselincx maintained good contacts with influential citizens throughout the United Provinces, including François Francken, the pensionaris (executive administrator) of Gouda, and the Flemish born preacher-geographer Petrus Plancius in Amsterdam. All were devout Calvinists and enthusiastic about the West India Company, which doubled as trading firm and weapon in the battle against the king of Spain. Usselincx claimed that he had advocated organizing such a company as early as 1592, but he had to wait till 1606 before the States of Holland approved such a plan.5 Until that year there was insufficient support for a monopolistic company for the Atlantic region. Commerce with Asia, on the other hand, had created enormous conflict among interested parties and encouraged the establishment of the Dutch East India Company (VOC – Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie). This left opportunities for private merchants to trade with Africa and America, and the States of Holland and Zeeland were willing to support such initiatives. Ships trading with West Africa were exempted from taxes, and the navy provided them with needed weapons.6 Thanks to persistent encouragement from Plancius and Francken, the States of Holland established a committee to study the feasabil-
3 P. W. Klein, De Trippen in de 17e eeuw. Een studie over het ondernemersgedrag op de Hollandse stapelmarkt (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1965), 141. 4 C. Lichtenberg, Willem Usselinx (Utrecht: Oosthoek, 1915), 18–19. 5 O. van Rees, Geschiedenis der staathuishoudkunde in Nederland tot het einde der achttiende eeuw (Utrecht: Kemink, 1865–1868), 2:461. See also, A. C. Meijer, ‘“Liefhebbers des vaderlandts ende beminders van de Commercie”; De plannen tot oprichting van een generale West-Indische Compagnie gedurende de jaren 1606–1609,’ Archief van het Konininklijk Zeeuwsch Genootschap der Wetenschappen (1986), 48–59, appendices 1–3. 6 J. K. J. de Jonge, De oorsprong van Neerland’s bezittingen op de kust van Guinea, in herinnering gebracht uit de oorspronkelijke stukken, naar aanleiding van een voorgenomen afstand dier bezittingen aan Groot-Brittanië (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1871), 8; J. H. de Stoppelaar, Balthasar de Moucheron; een bladzijde uit de Nederlandsche handelsgeschiedenis tijdens den tachtigjarigen oorlog (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1901), 179.
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ity of a trading company for the Atlantic in 1606. The committee completed an advisory report by September of that year. Meanwhile, the States General had also been discussing the establishment of such a company and had sought advice from the various provinces.7 It soon became apparent that Usselincx’s plans, which advocated agrarian colonies in the New World, had little support. The States of Holland preferred an organization that was primarily geared to commerce and shipping. Such an establishment could also be used in the battle against the king of Spain and threaten Spanish-Portuguese interests in Africa and America, as the VOC did in Asia. The plan for a WIC charter seemed identical to that of the VOC. The company would have a monopoly on shipping with western Africa and American regions, and it would have extensive military and judicial control in its monopoly territory. In 1606, nothing seemed to stand in the way of the founding of the WIC except some protests from the cities of Hoorn and Enkhuizen, whose merchants wanted to keep salt shipping free from company control, and from those interested in trade with West Africa who also wanted to limit the company’s charter to the Americas.8 All these problems could be solved, however. A more serious threat to establishing the WIC was peace negotiations between Spain and the Dutch Republic that started in 1606. Both sides were tired of war and desired peace. At first the differences seemed unsolvable, but they agreed to an armistice in April 1607. During the negotiations, Johan van Oldenbarnevelt (1547–1619), advocaat van den lande (executive administrator of Holland), withdrew plans for the WIC. For the Spanish and Portuguese, this eliminated fear of Dutch expansion in the Central and South Atlantic and made a lasting armistice possible in 1609. That agreement permitted Dutch ships only in areas not under Spanish or Portuguese control and precluded any chance of establishing a Dutch West India Company. In August 1618, Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, the advocate of a lasting peace with Spain, was ousted from office by the war party led by Stadholder Maurits of Nassau (1565–1625), Prince of Orange. Maurits advocated resumption of hostilities with Spain, which improved 7 Algemeen Rijksarchief (ARA), Archief van de Staten van Holland (SvH) 2608*c; Resolutiën der Staten-Generaal (Resolutiën SG ), Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën, grote ser., no. 101 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1957), 1 July 1606. 8 Meijer, ‘Liefhebbers des vaderlandts,’ 37–40.
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the chances for creating an Atlantic company. Shortly after the ouster of Van Oldenbarnevelt, the States of Holland approved a charter concept for a West India Company, based on the States General report of 1606. Willem Usselincx also sent in a proposal, but the States of Holland quickly rejected it. Usselincx still wanted to establish agricultural settlements, which he believed would bring more prosperity and spread Calvinism in the New World, whereas trading companies would merely focus on making profits.9 But his opinions were no longer relevant. On 3 June 1621, the States General approved the charter plan of the States of Holland, and the Dutch West India Company became a political reality. The WIC charter consisted of forty-five articles specifying the company’s structure and authority.10 The charter would be valid for twenty-four years, after which the States General would have to act on its renewal. The charter also spelled out the territorial limits of the company’s shipping and trading monopoly, which included Africa south of the tropic of Cancer, all of America, and the Atlantic and Pacific islands between the two meridians drawn across the Cape of Good Hope and the eastern extremities of New Guinea.
Capital and Organization of the First West India Company Before the WIC could go to work, the necessary capital and ships had to be procured. But contrary to the experience of the VOC, which in 1602 needed only a few weeks for shareholders to invest ƒ6.4 million, the WIC found it difficult and time consuming to secure sufficient capital.11 Many potential investors were suspicious about another trading company like the VOC which, contrary to its charter, had taken twenty years to gain ample capital liquidity and had to pay dividends in the form of spices instead of cash.12 Worse yet, because the WIC was an instrument of war against the king of Spain 9
Ibid., 44; Van Rees, Geschiedenis der staathuishoudkunde, 2:424. J. de Laet, Jaerlyck verhael van de verrichtinghen der geoctroyeerde West-Indische Compagnie in derthien boecken, ed. S. P. L’Honoré Naber and J. C. M. Warnsinck, Werken uitgegeven door de Linschoten Vereeniging, nos. 34 and 40 (1644; reprint, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1931–1937), 1:23. 11 J. G. van Dillen, Het oudste aandeelhoudersregister van de Kamer Amsterdam der OostIndische Compagnie (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1958), 36. 12 F. S. Gaastra, De geschiedenis van de VOC, 2d ed. (Zutphen: Walburg, 1991), 23–25. 10
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as well as a commercial organization, potential investors feared additional risk and higher costs. Responding to those concerns, the States General promised to support the company with ships and arms. But even this failed to convince many investors. Their lack of enthusiasm was clear when the Amsterdam chamber of the WIC opened registration for shares in November 1621, and after eight months only ƒ630,000 had been raised. When the necessary capital was still lacking after a full year, the States General placed Caribbean saltshipping, which through West Frisian pressure had initially remained in private hands, also under WIC monopoly in order to make WIC investment more attractive.13 In spite of all these efforts, adequate operating capital still came in slowly. The northern province of Friesland had loudly demanded its own chamber in 1618, but they were unable to raise enough capital and did not become part of the WIC. Efforts were even made to attract foreign capital from France, Genoa, and Venice.14 At home, investors were sought from inland towns like Utrecht and Deventer, from which one would hardly expect an interest in Atlantic commerce. The investment campaign was finally concluded in November 1623, when a total of ƒ7,108,000 was committed to the company. It took a long time, but finally the WIC procured over ƒ600,000 more than the VOC had managed to attract in 1602. Table 4.1. Initial Capital Investments of the First WIC, 1623 (guilders) Chamber Amsterdam Zeeland Maze Noorderkwartier Stad en Lande States General Total
Capital 2,846,582 1,379,775 1,039,202 505,627 836,975 500,000 7,108,161
Source: Schneeloch, Aktionäre, 26.
13 ARA, Archief van de Oude West-Indische Compagnie (OWIC) 18*: Kapitaalboek van actiën kamer Amsterdam; De Laet, Jaerlyck verhael, 1:23–26. West Frisia is today the northern part of the province of Noord Holland. 14 C. R. Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, 1624–1654 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1957), 13.
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WIC investors were obligated to fund one-third of their pledge to the company within five months; the rest had to be rendered within three years. Company investors included prominent people such as Laurens Reaal, former governor-general of the VOC in Asia, but there were also craftsmen and small business people who invested between one hundred and a thousand guilders each.15 Because the company was chronically short of funds, there were four additional capital drives between 1623 and 1639, which raised the company’s shareholder indebtedness to ƒ17,090,000. The capital in stock remained at this level until the company went bankrupt in 1674.16 The organization of the WIC was a mirror image of the political makeup of the Dutch Republic in the early seventeenth century. The States General created a decentralized organization consisting of five chambers, with some pooling the interests of a number of towns. The Zeeland chamber affiliated Middelburg, Flushing, Veere, and Tholen. Noorderkwartier included Alkmaar, Edam, Enkhuizen, Hoorn, and Medemblik, and the Maze chamber combined Rotterdam, Delft, and Dordrecht. The Amsterdam chamber had twenty directors (bewindhebbers), Zeeland had twelve, and Maze, Noorderkwartier, and Stad en Lande (Groningen) had fourteen each.17 Altogether there were seventy-four directors, but this varied over time. Towns or regions without a chamber could still get representation if they invested ƒ100,000, which gave them one director in the respective chamber. These so-called buytenheeren hardly ever attended chamber meetings and therefore played no role in the management of the company. Decision-making in the WIC was only partially influenced by the amount of money invested. More important was the division of activities and capital between the chambers, which was determined by the so-called repartitiestelsel. For example, more than 40 percent of the capital invested in the Amsterdam chamber came from other Dutch towns, as well as from Denmark, Germany, and France.18 And yet, Amsterdam had a ⁴⁄⁹ share in overall WIC governance, 15
ARA, OWIC 18*: Kapitaalboek van actiën kamer Amsterdam. N. H. Schneeloch, Aktionäre der Westindischen Compagnie von 1674. Die Verschmelzung der alten Kapitalgebergruppen zu einer neuen Aktiengesellschaft (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1982), 27–29. 17 De Laet, Jaerlyck verhael, 1:11, article 11 of the charter. For directors of the chambers, see ibid., 1:32–37. 18 ARA, OWIC, 18*: Kapitaalboek van actiën kamer Amsterdam; Israel, Dutch Primacy, 159. 16
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while Zeeland had ²⁄⁹, and the remaining three chambers just ¹⁄⁹, based on the so-called key of nine (negensleutel ). This not only determined the power structure within the WIC, but it also determined the relative involvement in company activities. Local magistrates elected the directors of the chambers, from among the principal investors, which shows how closely the WIC was tied to government. The VOC exhibited a similar symbiotic relationship between politics and private affairs. Three candidates (tripelgetal ) were nominated from the circle of principal investors, from which the mayors selected one as the new director. Other towns in a chamber also had the right to appoint one or more directors.19 To qualify as a principal investor and director for the Amsterdam chamber, one needed to have invested at least ƒ6,000; the minimum amount for other chambers was four thousand. The board of directors of the WIC consisted of the Heren Negentien (Heren XIX), of whom eight represented Amsterdam. Zeeland had four delegates, each of the three smaller chambers had two, and the States General had one. The Heren XIX met two or three times per year and set general policies for the company, such as shipping assignments for each chamber and dividend disbursements. Once every six years, the Heren XIX were responsible for drafting a ‘General Account,’ extrapolated from the accounts of the various chambers. This served as a financial statement for the major investors in the company and the States General. The WIC was managed by the Amsterdam and Zeeland chambers on a rotating basis: Amsterdam six years and Zeeland two. The presiding chamber supervised and coordinated the company’s dayto-day activities. Each chamber had its own administration and bookkeeping, and sent copies of bills of export and shipping manifests to the other chambers within three months. Revenue accounts of the auctioned tropical commodities (retourgoederen) had to be submitted to other chambers as well. The chambers of Amsterdam, Zeeland, and Stad en Lande had their own wharfs, where the company’s ships were built and repaired.20 Depending on the size of the chamber, its directors had membership on one or more special committees, 19 ARA, Verspreide West-Indische Stukken (VWIS) 501: Articles on how to choose directors of the Zeeland chamber. 20 H. J. den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven. Scheepvaart en handel van de Tweede Westindische Compagnie op Afrika, 1674–1740 (Zutphen: Walburg, 1997), 90.
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such as management of company wharfs, equipping and provisioning ships, and buying and selling imported and exported goods. Taking turns, one of the directors of the presiding chamber was responsible for supervising the outfitting shipping expeditions. These directors received a 1 percent commission on all company imports and exports, and also on the booty of WIC privateers. In addition, they received 0.5 percent of the gold and silver imported from West Africa and America. But the directors had to pay their bookkeepers and cashiers from their own income.21
Commerce, Privateering, and Colonization The preamble of the charter of 1621 stated the most important objectives of the WIC as ‘shipping, trade, and commerce with the West Indies, Africa, and the Americas.’22 But this peaceful statement gives a one-sided picture of the company that does not represent its activities during the first decades. Much like the VOC in Asia, the WIC was a renowned instrument of war in the battle against the Spanish and Portuguese in the Atlantic as early as 1623. This should be no surprise, since Dutch shipping and trade could expand in that region only at the expense of the Iberians, and conflict was unavoidable. Members of the States General knew this and promised generous military assistance in case of war.23 Even before the war in the Atlantic resumed, Dutch commercial and shipping activities were, for the most part, placed under the WIC’s direction. Until November 1623, the company lacked adequate funds and was unable to fulfill its intended role. Thus, trade with West Africa, North America, and Guiana was initially left to private companies.24 But by early 1624, the WIC had taken firm control of Fort Nassau on the Gold Coast, the trading stations at Gorée Island, and at the estuary of the Congo River. On the east coast of North America, existing facilities of Amsterdam merchants were also placed under WIC control. This represented little more than a few semi-permanent trading stations at the Hudson estuary. But in January 1624, the 21 22 23 24
De Laet, Jaerlyck verhael, 1:17, articles 28–30 of the charter. Ibid., 1:7. Ibid., 1:20, article 40 of the charter. Klein, De Trippen, 148–49.
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first settlers were dispatched to New Netherland in order to prevent the English from claiming the area.25 The Amsterdam chamber was given administrative management over the settlement because merchants of that city had traded with the region till 1621. The settlements started by Zeeland on the Wild Coast (Guiana) were also placed under WIC monopoly, but the company lacked the means to start colonizing projects there. This is why the Heren XIX wondered in October 1623 if these areas should be reserved for private exploitation, as long as adequate duties were paid for such privileges. But not until 1628 did they formulate rules for private colonization projects in Guiana, Brazil, and the Caribbean islands.26 The takeover of existing property and commercial enterprises was significant for the WIC, but the chief objective was expansion of the Dutch presence in the South Atlantic region. In 1623, the Heren XIX developed strategies to damage Spanish and Portuguese interests in America and Africa and take control wherever possible.27 The defenses of the Spanish colonies were too strong to risk attack, but intensive privateering in the Caribbean was a worthwhile alternative for the WIC. However, Portuguese possessions in South America and West Africa were not well defended, and capturing Portuguese Brazil, the world’s largest producer of sugar, could be most profitable for the company. The Heren XIX assumed that the Portuguese colonists would be accommodating to the Dutch, as their tax burden had risen significantly since the Spanish-Portuguese royal union in 1580, which had turned many Portuguese against Spain. The initial goal of the Heren XIX’s ‘grand design’ was the conquest of Salvador in Bahia, the administrative capital of Portuguese Brazil and a center of sugar cultivation. After securing Bahia, part of the conquering fleet would sail to Angola and capture São Paulo de Luanda, the most important slave trade station in Africa. The Heren XIX expected that after these vital places were taken, the remaining Portuguese areas would soon surrender to the Dutch. In the final stages, the Portuguese stronghold São Jorge da Mina on the Gold Coast would have to be captured. The ‘grand design’ was 25 J. A. Jacobs, Een zegenrijk gewest. Nieuw-Nederland in de zeventiende eeuw, Cultuurgeschiedenis van de Republiek in de zeventiende eeuw, no. 2 (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 1999), 63. 26 G. J. van Grol, De grondpolitiek in het West-Indische domein der Generaliteit (1934; reprint, Amsterdam: Emmering, 1980), 1:24–25, 29. 27 H. J. den Heijer, De geschiedenis van de WIC (Zutphen: Walburg, 1994), 35.
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put into operation in December 1623 and January 1624, when a fleet consisting of twenty-six ships and various squadrons left the Dutch Republic destined for Brazil. In early May 1624, the fleet reached the All Saints Bay and started to attack Salvador. After a heavy bombardment, most of its citizens fled and the city was easily overrun. But in less than a year, an Iberian fleet under the command of Admiral Don Fadrique de Toledo y Osorio retook the city. Not until 1629, after the legendary conquest of the ‘silverfleet’ by Piet Heyn at Matanzas (Cuba), did the WIC have sufficient resources to risk a second attack on Brazil. This time the objectives were Olinda and Recife. A fleet of sixty-seven ships and more than seven thousand soldiers captured these towns early in 1630. Then followed the difficult conquest of the northBrazilian sugar provinces. Only in 1636, after the Heren XIX appointed Johan Maurits of Nassau-Siegen (1604–1679) as governor general, did New Holland begin to prosper. Johan Maurits dealt with his Portuguese subjects in Machiavellian style: those who opposed Dutch authority were firmly put in their place, but the planters who cooperated enjoyed generous benefits. Still, he could not prevent an uprising of the Portuguese subjects, which started in 1641. After Johan Maurits returned to the United Provinces in 1644, the situation quickly deteriorated and the area under Dutch control gradually shrank. Due to lack of capital and support from the States General, the WIC was forced to surrender Recife to the Portuguese in 1654, signaling the end of the Dutch adventure in Brazil.28 As a result of the long battle and eventual loss of Brazil, one tends to forget that this rich sugar-producing area was the WIC’s original objective. Under the governorship of Johan Maurits, the company did have a reasonably successful record in Brazil. He succeeded with his policy of freedom of religion and economic benefits to appease most of the Portuguese planters. Trade between the Dutch Republic and Brazil was, in this period, primarily run by private merchants, 28 The best study on this subject is still Boxer’s The Dutch in Brazil. For the impact of Johan Maurits, see the exhibition catalog of F. J. Duparc and E. Van den Boogaart, eds., Zo wijd de wereld strekt (The Hague: Stichting Johan Maurits van Nassau, 1979). See also, E. van den Boogaart et al., eds., Johan Maurits van NassauSiegen, 1604–1679: A Humanist Prince in Europe and Brazil (The Hague: Stichting Johan Maurits van Nassau, 1979); P. Herkenhoff, ed., Brazil and the Dutch, 1630–1654 (Rio de Janeiro: GMT Editors, 1999); and J. A. G. de Mello, Nederlanders in Brazilië, 1624–1654. De invloed van de Hollandse bezetting op het leven en de cultuur in Noord-Brazilië, ed. T. N. Teensma (Zutphen: Walburg, 2001).
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who paid duties to the WIC (see table 4.2). The openness of the Atlantic region and the weak financial position of the WIC made a monopolistic policy simply unworkable (see chapters 3 and 14).29 Only the trade in dyewood remained a company monopoly. According to WIC director Johannes de Laet, the company shipped ƒ7,618,498 worth of dyewood and sugar from Brazil to the Netherlands during 1637–1644, while private merchants shipped sugar valued at ƒ20,303,478 in the same period.30 Table 4.2. Dutch Sugar Exports from Brazil: WIC and Private, 1631–1651 (arroba)* Year
WIC
1631 1632 1633 1634 1635 1636 1637 1638 1639 1640 1641 1642 1643 1644 1645 1646 1647 1648 1649 1650 1651 Total
16,906 23,111
Percent
Percent
Total 16,906 23,111
28,800 77,715 55,346 3,327 60,045 130,839 46,389 94,260 90,916 33,198 23,794 32,237 55,809 72,296
844,988
Private
30%
7,637 88,861 62,641 136,051 142,249 219,399 353,300 207,998 249,087 228,332 175,473 19,781 24,525 20,998 28,071 15,823 3,545 1,936,332
70%
28,800 85,352 144,207 65,968 196,096 273,088 265,788 447,560 298,914 282,285 252,126 207,710 75,590 96,821 20,998 28,071 15,823 3,545 2,781,320
Source: Wätjen, Das holländische Kolonialreich in Brasilien, 316–23. * One arroba is approximately 14.75 kilograms.
29 Gemeentearchief Rotterdam, Oud Stadsarchief 3025: Kort vertooch en de remonstrantie bij eenige cooplieden handelende op Brazil, 5 March 1647; J. G. van Dillen, ‘De West-Indische Compagnie, het Calvinisme en de politiek,’ Tijdschrift van Geschiedenis 74, no. 1 (1961): 145–71. 30 De Laet, Jaerlyck verhael, 4:298.
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A good measure of Brazil’s economy is the number of operating sugar mills, or engenhos. These setups were often the object of guerilla actions and were, therefore, often in disrepair. In 1639, there were 166 sugar mills in Dutch territory, of which 120 were operational. This suggests that many Portuguese sugar planters had adapted to Dutch rule and were willing to cooperate. The German historian Wätjen observed in 1921 that trade with Brazil was significant for the Dutch economy.31 On average, thirty-eight ships sailed annually from Brazil to the United Provinces. Sizeable sugar shipments from Brazil in the years 1635–1645 contributed substantially to the affluence of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Middelburg, where many sugar refineries were located. The rebellion of the Portuguese planters after Johan Maurits left signaled the end of this prosperity and foreshadowed Dutch defeat in Brazil. How did the WIC fare in West Africa? After the capture of Salvador in Bahia in 1624, Piet Heyn sailed with a squadron of seven ships to Angola to take Luanda. Although a smaller detachment of three ships under Filips van Zuylen scheduled to join him failed to make the rendezvous, Heyn went ahead with the attack anyway. He soon realized that his small squadron could not capture the heavily defended town, and his nighttime sortie against moored Portuguese merchant ships also failed, forcing him to leave empty-handed.32 Even before the WIC directors knew that the attacks on Salvador and Luanda had failed, they decided to attack São Jorge da Mina (Elmina), the most formidable Portuguese castle on the Gold Coast. A fleet of sixteen ships, commanded by admirals Jan Dircksz. Lam and Andries Veron arrived on the Gold Coast in October 1625. The attack force of 1,200 men went ashore, but the forewarned Portuguese sent a detachment of African soldiers to surprise them while they were resting on the beach west of Elmina. With 441 soldiers killed, the Dutch temporarily abandoned their plans to attack Elmina.33 During the years 1625–1637, the WIC did manage to expand its trade at the Gold Coast by making treaties with small local African
31 H. Wätjen, Das holländische Kolonialreich in Brasilien. Ein Kapitel aus der Kolonialgeschichte des 17. Jahrhunderts (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1921), 331. 32 K. Ratelband, De West-Afrikaanse reis van Piet Heyn, 1624–1625, Werken uitgegeven door de Linschoten Vereeniging, no. 61 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1959), – . 33 De Laet, Jaerlyck verhael, 1:108–09.
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kingdoms. For the time being, Fort Nassau remained the company’s headquarters, and WIC ships moved from there to various coastal places to trade. Johannes de Laet, our only source on the volume of this commerce, calculated that the company shipped nearly ƒ14 million worth of African products to the Republic in the years 1623–1636. This included 40,500 mark of gold (9,185.4 kilograms), valued at ƒ12 million. Other products imported from Africa were ivory, wax, melequeta (cayenne pepper), and dyewood. The slave trade was not important to the WIC until Brazil needed slaves, and this may have been the main reason for a new military expedition against Elmina in 1637. This time the fleet was prepared by Johan Maurits, and set out from Brazil. The Elmina castle was captured by the end of August, and other Portuguese stations on the Gold Coast were taken soon thereafter.34 Table 4.3. WIC Gold Exports from Africa, 1635–1675 Period 1635–1639 1640–1644 1645–1649 1650–1654 1655–1659 1660–1664 1665–1669 1670–1674 Total
Mark* 5,541 10,122 9,800 4,101 8,782 8,119 7,165 3,902 57,532
Source: Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (KITLV), Hs 67, Retourgoederen Goudkust; F. Binder, ‘Die Goldeinfuhr von der Goldküste in die Vereinigten Provinzen, 1665–1657,’ in Precious Metals in the Age of Expansion: Papers of the xivth International Congress of the Historical Sciences, ed. H. Kellenbenz. Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsgeschichte, no. 2 (Stuttgart: Clett-Cotta, 1981), 142–43; H. Wätjen, ‘Zur Geschichte des Tauschhandels in der Goldküste um die Mitte des 17 Jahrhunderts,’ in Forschungen und Versuchen zur Geschichte des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit. Festschrift Dietrich Schäfer, zum 70 geburtstag ( Jena: Fischer, 1915), 550–51. * A mark is a standard of weight equal to eight ounces or 0.22680 kilograms of gold.
34 Ibid., 4:295–96; Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, 16. The last Portuguese fort at Axim was captured in 1642 by Director General Jacob Ruychaver.
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The increasing demand for slaves in Brazil spurred Johan Maurits in 1641 to try once more to capture Luanda. Controlling this slave depot was not only important for Brazil, but it would also force the remaining Portuguese stations to surrender. Without access to slaves, Portuguese Brazil could not survive economically. With a fleet of twenty-one ships and a military force of 2,100, admiral Cornelis Jol left Recife for Africa on 31 May 1641. In the three months from August to October, Jol captured not only Luanda but also the sugargrowing island of São Tomé.35 The WIC had reached the upper limit of its power, and Johan Maurits expected to transport 15,000 slaves annually to Brazil. In addition, Angola was expected to produce significant quantities of copper, ivory, and dyewood. But little came of these high expectations. The WIC’s failure to take full control of the conquered territories impeded exports while debts continued to pile up. In August 1648, a Portuguese fleet commanded by Salvador Correia de Sà arrived at Luanda, forcing the Dutch to a quick surrender. São Tomé was also evacuated, but the WIC remained firmly in control of its stations on the Gold Coast and the Senegambia region.36 From these positions, the company began to concentrate more and more on the slave trade to the Caribbean and Guiana during the second half of the seventeenth century. Privateering was initially one of the pillars of the WIC. Starting in 1623, the company dispatched annually several squadrons and single privateering ships to the Caribbean, Brazil, and West Africa. Spanish and Portuguese merchant ships were captured, and Spanish islands and coastal settlements in the Caribbean were looted. Not only was booty taken, but Spanish property suffered extensive damage. The WIC’s primary goal, however, was capturing one of the large and richly laden return fleets that left the colonies each year to bring precious metals and tropical produce to Spain. After a few failed attempts, Piet Heyn successfully captured one of these so-called ‘silver fleets’ at Matanzas (Cuba) in 1628.37
35 K. Ratelband, Nederlanders in West-Afrika, 1600–1650. Angola, Kongo en São Tomé, comp. and ed. R. Baesjou (Zutphen: Walburg, 2000), 109–14, 143–46. 36 C. R. Boxer, Salvador de Sà and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola, 1602–1686 (London: Athlone Press, 1952), 253–69. 37 Contrary to what is often claimed, Piet Heyn captured only a portion of the ‘New Spanish fleet.’ See Den Heijer, De geschiedenis van de WIC, 63.
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This legendary conquest produced a booty including 177,000 Amsterdam pounds of silver, 66 pounds of gold, 1,000 pearls, and large amounts of tropical produce. The value of the booty was estimated at ƒ11.5 million.38 After expenses, ƒ7 million was left, 10 percent of which was divided as a bonus to crew members, and 10 percent went to the Prince of Orange. The WIC directors received 1 percent to be divided among them, and 50 percent was disbursed as dividends to shareholders, leaving ƒ1.5 million for the company. Between 1628 and 1640, several additional fleets were equipped to capture another ‘silver fleet,’ but Piet Heyn’s feat remained a unique event. De Laet estimated that the damage the WIC inflicted on the Spanish between 1623 and 1637 amounted to ƒ118 million, and he estimated the company’s proceeds from captured ships and cargoes at ƒ81 million. A profit of ƒ36 million should have been left after subtracting the cost of the outfitting and use of ships, and wages for crew members.39 Table 4.4. Ships Captured or Destroyed by the WIC, 1623–1636 Year 1623–1624 1625 1626 1627 1628 1629 1630 1631 1632 1633 1634 1635 1636 Total
Number of Ships 69 18 29 55 49 18 45 33 22 90 66 23 30 547
Source: De Laet, Jaerlyck Verhael, 4:282–85.
38 C. C. Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean and in the Guianas, 1680–1791 (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1985), 195–96, appendix 4. Witte Cornelisz. de With, captain under Piet Heyn in 1628, valued the booty at ƒ13–14 million. 39 De Laet, Jaerlyck verhael, 4:282–95.
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After the last attempt to capture a Spanish ‘silver fleet’ failed in 1640, WIC directors called a halt to privateering expeditions, because they lacked the funds to continue. From then on, only individual privateers remained active. In fact, the WIC was unable to keep them out of the Atlantic. Some towns, such as Middelburg and Flushing, had strong interest in this activity, and they had looked the other way as privateers were equipped in their ports and departed for the West Indies. Aware that they could not stop it, WIC directors granted private companies privateering rights as long as they paid the required duties to the company.40 Initially, only small private businesses participated, but in 1646 a number of privateers combined to operate under the the name Brasilse Directie.41 This cooperative effort aimed primarily at capturing Portuguese sugar ships in Brazilian waters. Early in 1647, the Brasilse Directie sent a number of frigates and two directors to Recife to represent them in the region. In the years 1647–1648, these frigates captured at least 247 small merchant ships.42 The Brasilse Directie did not last long, however, as the Portuguese government sent warships in 1649 to convoy the sugar ships. From then on, there were only a few incidental Dutch privateers in the Atlantic. The WIC’s strong interest in privateering was aimed at intimidating the Portuguese, in order to strengthen the company’s position in Brazil. The company also benefited from the 18 percent share of the booty that privateers paid the WIC, which was a welcome supplement for its deficient financial resources. It was a heavy burden for the privateers, however, who also had to surrender 2.5 percent of their booty to the Prince of Orange, and 2 percent to the fund that supported the poor.43 After 1649, the WIC received few benefits from privateering.
40 W. J. van Hoboken, Witte de With in Brazilië, 1648–1649 (Amsterdam: NoordHollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1955), 67. 41 Zeeuws Archief (ZA), Archief van de Staten van Zeeland (SvZ) 2118: 3, Condities Brasilse Directie, 6 December 1646. 42 C. R. Boxer, ‘Padre Antonio Vieira, S. J., and the Institution of the Brazil Company in 1649,’ Hispanic American Historical Review 29 (1949): 477. Binder estimates the number of captured ships at about 220. See F. Binder, ‘Die zeeländische Kaperfahrt, 1654–1662,’ Archief van het Koninklijk Zeeuwsch Genootschap der Wetenschappen (1986), 40–92. The Portuguese prizes are listed in C. R. Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, 1624–1654 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1957), 280, appendix 3. 43 Binder, ‘Die zeeländische Kaperfahrt,’ 42. In 1652, the privateering duties payable to the WIC were reduced to 12 percent.
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In addition to commerce and privateering, the second article of the WIC charter charged the company to colonize the ‘fruitful and unpopulated quarters’ of her domain.44 It quickly became evident that the WIC directors put very little emphasis on this responsibility. During the first years, this effort was limited to the takeover of private settlements on the Wild Coast and the Hudson River. Directors of the Amsterdam chamber devoted considerable attention to New Netherland, trying their best to entice colonists to settle there in accordance with a carefully written set of regulations. The WIC appointed a governor general, who functioned as the highest authority in the colony and was assisted by a council of colonists. The council determined where settlers could reside and what they should grow. Settlers were free to trade with Indians, but the furs they bought had to be sold to the company at regulated prices.45 Table 4.5. Shipping between the Dutch Republic and New Netherland, 1620–1674 Period 1620–1624 1625–1629 1630–1634 1635–1639 1640–1644 1645–1649 1650–1654 1655–1659 1660–1664 1665–1669 1670–1674 Total
Outward Voyages WIC Private Total 3 16 8 11 13 10 3 2 3
69
4 5 6 11 13 14 37 41 12 21 164
7 16 13 17 24 23 17 39 44 12 21 233
Homeward Voyages WIC Private Total 4 14 8 9 14 9 5 2 2
63
6 3 5 13 10 8 38 41 13 23 160
10 14 11 14 27 19 13 40 43 13 23 227
Source: J. A. Jacobs, ‘De scheepvaart en handel van de Nederlandse Republiek op Nieuw-Nederland, 1609–1675’ (master’s thesis, Leiden University, 1989).
44
De Laet, Jaerlyck verhael, 1:8–9. Van Grol, De grondpolitiek, 2:31–34; O. A. Rink, Holland on the Hudson: An Economic and Social History of Dutch New York (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), 77–79. 45
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The WIC directors were unable to attract a significant number of settlers to New Netherland. For that reason, the Heren XIX decided to establish private patroonships in its charter territories.46 This enabled private individuals to obtain land from the WIC for their own use, but with the stipulation that they had to attract a sufficient number of settlers to this land within three years. The patroon was given authority over this territory, and he also enjoyed certain tax exemptions, although the company retained control over the fur trade. Several persons applied for patroonship at the Amsterdam chamber, but only Kiliaen van Rensselaer managed to colonize a territory in the region of today’s Albany, New York. By 1660, his Rensselaerswijck had about two hundred inhabitants and forty homes.47 But this was surprising, because the WIC did very little to encourage immigration to the colony during the 1630s and early 1640s. Poor government, conflicts with Indians, and loss of territory to English colonists threatened the survival of New Netherland. In 1645, the WIC directors appointed Pieter Stuyvesant as governor general of New Netherland (1647–1664), charging him to stabilize the colony. Under his leadership, the colony did indeed flourish for a while. In the early 1660s there were seven to eight thousand colonists in New Netherland.48 Amsterdam developed a flourishing trade with the colony after the Heren XIX eased the trade regulations in the 1640s. The colony’s financial resources came primarily from a poll tax and duties on imports and exports. But the colony came to a rather sudden end. In August 1664, even before the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Dutch War, an English fleet threatened to attack New Amsterdam, the administrative center at Manhattan Island. Stuyvesant realized that he had no chance against the superior English forces and surrendered without opposition. At the time the WIC came into being, there were no thriving colonies on the Guiana coast. The Dutch had a few semi-permanent trading posts in the area, established by Zeelanders shortly after 1600. They consisted of a few wooden structures, surrounded by
46 Vryheden By de Vergaderinghe van de Negenthiene vande Geoctroyeerde West-Indische Compagnie vergunt aen allen den ghenen die eenighe Colonien in Nieuw Nederlandt sullen planten. . . . (Amsterdam: Marten Iansz. Brandt, 1630 [no. 4000 in Knuttel, Catalogus]. 47 J. F. Jameson, ed. Narratives of New Netherland, 1609–1664 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1909), 207. 48 Jacobs, Een zegenrijk gewest, 396.
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earthen wall with palisades, from which they traded with local Indians. Due to shortage of funds for colonization, the WIC allowed private individuals to settle in the area in 1628, under the same conditions as in New Netherland.49 The first successful settlement was started by the Flushing merchant Abraham van Pere. Even before the official regulations were in force, he agreed with the WIC in 1627 to establish a colony along the Berbice River. Other Zeelanders established colonies at the Essequibo and Pomeroon rivers. After the fall of Recife, many refugees from there settled on the Wild Coast, where the new colonies tended to specialize in sugar cultivation.50 But not all of these settlements were successful. For example, the German Frederick Casimir of Hanau received a permit from the Amsterdam chamber in 1669 to start a settlement, but nothing came of it.51 A Dutch colony on the Cayenne River was captured by the French in 1664, and the Essequibo colony was taken by the English in 1666. During the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665–1667), the Zeeland admiral Abraham Crijnssen captured the English colony at the Suriname River in 1667. The Peace of Breda, signed that same year, left Suriname permanently in Dutch hands in exchange for New Netherland. It did not please the WIC directors that the States of Zeeland managed the newly acquired colony until 1682. Developments in Suriname are detailed in chapter 11. Finally, the WIC also colonized a few Caribbean islands that were captured from Spain. The most important of these was Curaçao, which was captured by Johannes van Walbeek in 1634 and used by the WIC as a privateering base.52 Most of the Caribbean islands were not suitable for large scale plantation agriculture, but Curaçao was conveniently located to serve as a depot for trade with the Spanish mainland colonies. Starting in the 1660s, the island was an ideal base for asentistas, merchants who were authorized by the Spanish Crown to import slaves to the Spanish colonies. Chapters 8 and 9 address this subject in greater detail.
49
See note 46. P. M. Netscher, Geschiedenis van de koloniën Essequebo, Demerary en Berbice, van de vestiging der Nederlanders aldaar tot op onzen tijd (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1888), 71–73. 51 ARA, OWIC 18: Agreement between Fredrick Casimir and chamber Amsterdam, 18 July 1669. 52 J. H. J. Hamelberg, De Nederlanders op de West-Indische eilanden (Amsterdam: Emmering, 1979), 1:21–30. 50
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From the First to the Second Dutch West India Company The ambitious ‘grand design,’ intended to undermine the power of Spain and Portugal in the Atlantic region, had gradually faded away. Brazil was retaken by Portugal after only a brief period of prosperity, and Angola and São Tomé were surrendered in 1648. The large fleets organized to capture Spanish silver fleets had cost more money than they brought in. The ambitious plans and the battles that grew out of these had required so many resources that from the 1630s on the company was under constant threat of bankruptcy. There was hardly enough money to develop the conquered territories and stimulate trade with them. When the WIC was established, the States General set the duration of the charter at twenty-four years. A renewal of the charter would have been a formality under normal conditions, but the continued effectiveness of the WIC was increasingly being questioned. Besides, opponents of the company had gradually managed to curtail its monopoly. In order to avoid further erosion or the downfall of the WIC, the Heren XIX requested a temporary extension of the charter from the States General in July 1643.53 When the request reached the States of Holland in January 1644, it suggested studying the possibility of merging the WIC with the VOC.54 The WIC directors saw this suggestion as a plan from heaven. Such a merger would not only save the company from collapse, but also protect the financial interests of WIC investors. Their VOC colleagues had no interest in the merger, fearing that the unprofitable WIC would drag the VOC down as well.55 This led to a paper war between the directors of the two companies and between the States of Holland and the States General. The latter ended the battle by demanding ƒ1.5 million from the VOC for the extension of their charter. The VOC had to pay this in five annual installments of ƒ300,000 into the federal treasury.56 In return for such payments, the merger plans
53
ARA, Archief van de Staten-Generaal (SG) 3249: res., 17 July 1643. ARA, SvH 77: res., 22 January 1644. See also, H. J. den Heijer, ‘Plannen voor samenvoeging van VOC en WIC,’ Tijdschrift voor Zeegeschiedenis 13, no. 2 (1994): 115–30. 55 Consideratie Overgelevert by de Heeren Bewinthebberen van de Oost-Indische Compagnie . . . (The Hague: Jan Fransen, 1644) [no. 5115 in Knuttel, Catalogus]. 56 J. P. de Korte, De jaarlijkse financiële verantwoording in de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, Werken uitgegeven door de Vereeniging het Nederlandsch Economisch-Historisch Archief, no. 17 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1984), 6; Van Hoboken, Witte de With, 13–14. 54
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would be withdrawn. The VOC directors agreed, and the payments were used for troops and men-of-war to support the defense of Brazil. After these arrangements, the charters of both companies were renewed for twenty-five years in July 1647.57 The financial support received by the WIC was barely enough to meet its immediate needs, as the struggle in the Atlantic had virtually ruined the company financially. In 1649, the company’s debt stood at ƒ36 million, which included the ƒ17 million from initial investments. On the other hand, the outlying Dutch provinces still owed the company ƒ6.5 million in subsidies.58 After the loss of Brazil in 1654, the company barely had the means to outfit ships for trade with West Africa, the only area that still generated profits. Issuing bonds and loaning through bottomry were the only means by which the directors could keep this commerce going, although at a high price. Bottomry, a particularly expensive type of maritime insurance, involved an advance from a lender to prepare a ship for a voyage. In case of a shipwreck, the lender lost his investment. But if the ship arrived safely, the directors had to repay the borrowed amount plus high interest, which could go as high as 50 percent in wartime (see chapter 9). While this trading practice kept the WIC in business, it also got the company ever deeper into debt. The bewindhebbers found themselves unable to pay down their debts and were forced to renegotiate them.59 One can imagine that under those circumstances, shareholders, bondholders, and creditors would put heavy pressure on the Heren XIX when debt payments were in doubt and when the company charter needed to be renewed. The second WIC charter would terminate at the end of 1671, and fearing protests, the directors sent their request for renewal to the States General as early as 1663. It was not until 1668, however, that the States of Holland took it under consideration.60 After a lengthy review they drafted a plan for a new charter, which included drastic measures to reduce the company’s indebtedness. Shares, bonds,
57
ARA, SvH 80: res., 11 January and 3 July 1647. L. van Aitzema, Saken van staet en oorlogh, in ende omtrent de Vereenighde Nederlanden, 1621–1668 (The Hague: Veely, Tongerloo, and Dahl, 1657–1668), 6:717–18. 59 ARA, OWIC 18**; ARA, SG (Loketkas WIC) 12564.42: Notulen van de bewindhebbers inzake Brazilië, 3 September 1659. 60 ARA, SG 3269: res., 15 March 1663; ARA, SvH 101: res., 29 September and 15 December 1668. 58
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and debts were to be converted into new and much lower valued shares. All shares were to drop to 15 percent off their nominal value, and all bonds to 30 percent, while other creditors were promised 2 percent interest on old debts. To avoid new debts, the company had to reduce the number of chambers and directors. Furthermore, a fund of ƒ1 million should be created to safeguard the trade with West Africa. This proposal started a long and heated discussion between shareholders, bondholders, and directors.61 When no solution could be found, the States of Holland put forth another proposal in which the old company was to be replaced with a new one with capable directors, recruited from the ranks of shareholders. As in the earlier proposal, outstanding shares and bonds were to be converted into new shares.62 Table 4.6. Conversion of Old Capital into New Shares, 1674 (guilders) Chambers
Old Shares
Amsterdam Zeeland Maze Stad en Lande Noorderkwartier Total
10,732,107 2,448,978 1,317,379 1,288,310 1,312,884 17,090,658
Chambers
Old Bonds
Amsterdam Zeeland Maze Stad en Lande Noorderkwartier Total
3,104,754 2,096,330 432,295 618,370 222,479 6,474,228
New Shares x 0.15
1,608,466 367,346 197,606 193,246 196,932 2,563,596 New Shares
x 0.3
931,426 628,899 129,688 185,511 66,743 1,942,267
Source: ARA, Archief van de Nieuwe West-Indische Compagnie (NWIC) 831: res., 19 January 1675.
61
ARA, SvH 102: res., 8 April 1669; Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, 41–45. Edele Achtbare Heeren. Omme kortelijck aen te wijsen de Grieven die de Houders van Obligatien tot laste van de West-Indische Compagnie deser Landen by het Concept van Octroy . . . (1674) [no. 11111 in Knuttel, Catalogus]. 62
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In order to provide the new company with adequate resources, old shares and debts were converted into new ones, for which a so-called bijlage or surcharge had to be paid. Shareholders could convert their shares into new shares at 15 percent of the nominal value, but only if they paid 4 percent of the old value as a supplement. Other creditors could also convert their claims into new shares. Those claims were set at 30 percent of the nominal value, for which they had to pay a surcharge of 8 percent. The conversion of old to new capital generated an operating fund of more than ƒ1.2 million for the WIC.63 The New or Second WIC inherited the properties of the old company at home and abroad. Under the new charter, the WIC kept its monopoly over West African trade and the slave trade to America. Private trade with the Guiana Coast and the Caribbean was permitted after duty payments were made. Other areas within the WIC monopoly zone were also open to private trade as long as duties of 2 to 3 percent, depending on the destination, were paid on imports and exports. The new charter looked a lot like the old one, but the organization of the company was significantly altered. The number of directors in the various chambers was nearly cut in half, and the central board was reduced from nineteen to ten members. The Heren X included four directors from the Amsterdam chamber, two from Zeeland, and one for each of the remaining three chambers. The tenth member of the board of the Heren X was appointed by the States General. The bewindhebbers received a commission of 10 percent of the dividend paid to shareholders, with a maximum of ƒ60,000 for all directors combined for each time dividends were paid. Every three years, the Heren X were required to publish an account of the company’s financial activities, and they had to prepare a balance sheet.64
63 Octroy, By de Hoogh Mogende Heeren Staten Generael, verleent aen de West-Indische Compagnie (The Hague: Jacobus Scheltus, 1674) [no. 11112 in Knuttel, Catalogus], art. 1; ARA, Archief van de Nieuwe West-Indische Compagnie (NWIC) 831: Gestorte bijlagen, January 1675. 64 ARA, SG 3290: res., 20 September 1674.
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The End of the Trade Monopoly After the rebirth of the WIC in 1674, the directors concentrated on what was left of the company monopoly: commerce with West Africa and the slave trade to American colonies. These subjects are covered in chapters 5 and 6. After the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–1713), the WIC was increasingly confronted with very damaging actions by Zeeland interlopers.65 Zeelanders had been very active in privateering in wartime, and when peace came they tried to make up for that loss by trading illegally on the West African coast. Interlopers could make reasonable profits, but they also took enormous risks. When captured, ships and cargo were confiscated by the WIC. Statistics from 1714–1725 show that twenty-seven Zeeland ships were confiscated at Elmina. The loss to interlopers was estimated at ƒ1.7 million, plus another ƒ1.3 million in unrealized profits,66 and the merchants who incurred these losses were obviously hostile to the WIC. When the WIC charter had to be renewed in 1730, most of the protests against the company’s trading monopoly came from Zeeland. Anticipating strong protests, the directors filed their request for a charter extension as early as 1727. Shortly thereafter, a group of Flushing merchants drafted a petition denouncing the renewal of the WIC charter and demanding that all the Atlantic be opened to free trade.67 A similar request was submitted by Middelburg merchants. Both proposals were presented to the States of Zeeland in November 1728, and they became the foundation of a plan for free trade with West Africa and America.68 But the plan presented to the States General in October 1729 did not advocate complete freedom of trade. It suggested instead that a trading monopoly be maintained between Axim and Keta on the Gold Coast, where several WIC trading factories were located. This proposal led to heated exchanges among the WIC, the States General, the States of Zeeland, and groups of interested Zeeland merchants. Some wanted complete free 65 H. J. den Heijer, ‘Zeeuwse smokkelhandel op West-Afrika, 1674–1730,’ Tijdschrift voor Zeegeschiedenis 16, no. 2 (1997): 141–59. 66 ARA, Collectie Radermacher 596: List of captured ships. 67 ARA, VWIS 904: Heren X to States General, 1 August 1727; ibid., 904: Kort relaas. 68 ZA, SvZ 325: res., 30 November 1728; ibid., 326: Instructie voor de gedeputeerden ter Generaliteit, 10 October 1729.
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trade, others were willing to accept the exemption of the Gold Coast, and still others wanted to keep only the slave trade under WIC monopoly.69 By the end of May 1730, the States General reached the final phase of its deliberations. After a last round of gathering opinions and proposals, all the provinces authorized their representatives to the States General to approve a new charter, and on 8 August 1730 a revised WIC charter was approved for another thirty years.70 Little was left of the once powerful WIC monopoly. In America, only the slave trade to the Guiana settlements remained under company monopoly. But the WIC was now obligated to bring at least 2,500 slaves annually to Suriname, or that privilege would also be taken away. The WIC kept a trading monopoly on a sixty-mile strip on the Gold Coast, but the rest of Africa was now open to free traders on payment of specified duties. Even after the approval of the new charter, problems remained. In January 1731, a group of Zeeland merchants complained to the States General about the WIC, claiming that the company had used improper measurements to determine duty payments (lastgeld ).71 But after a careful investigation, the States General determined that the WIC had not violated the prescribed methods.72 Even before this was decided, the States General received another protest from Zeeland. This time, the merchants demanded that the Gold Coast also be opened to free traders and that the time allowed to complete trading missions be expanded. According to the new charter, ships that took more than twelve months to complete their voyage had to pay a late fee (napremie), which, the merchants claimed, made it very difficult to make a profit in the African trade. Again, the States General appointed a committee to investigate, and this time the outcome favored the complainants. Consequently, the States General
69
Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, 306–12. C. Cau, et al., eds., Groot Placaet-Boeck, 1658–1796 (The Hague: Van Wouw, 1658–1796), 6: columns 1414–15. 71 ARA, SG 3786: res., 10 January 1731. The carrying capacity of a ship was calculated by a regulated formula, and duties for the privilege of trading with West Africa had to be paid to the WIC accordingly. 72 ARA, SG 3787: res., 21 January 1732. See also V. Enthoven, ‘Pinassen, jachten en fregatten. Schepen in de Nederlandse Atlantische slavenhandel,’ in Slaven en Schepen. Enkele reis, bestemming onbekend, ed. R. Daalder, A. Kieskamp, and D. J. Tang (Leiden: Primavera, 2001), 43–57. 70
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ordered a revision of the charter, known as the Naader Reglement, which was issued on 6 October 1734.73 Accordingly, trade with Africa was now completely open to free traders, and the validity of the passes for the African trade was raised from twelve to sixteen months, and to twenty months for triangular slave trade voyages. The exclusion on the slave trade to Suriname, Berbice and Essequibo remained in force, but only for a few more years. In 1738, the WIC voluntarily stopped its participation in the slave trade to the colonies because of huge losses recently suffered in the traffic.74
Management of Colonial Property After the gradual opening of the trade with West Africa and the voluntary surrender of the slave trade, the WIC remained primarily involved in managing the colonies and properties in the Atlantic region. Still, the opening of the trade to the private sector did not completely dismantle the trading apparatus the WIC had created. The WIC continued to operate the trading stations on the West African coast, through which slaves were bought from African merchants and sold to free traders. For these transactions, the company received a so-called poll tax (hoofdgeld ) of ƒ20 for each slave sold.75 This go-between function was financially significant. Annually, an estimated 1,500 to 2,000 slaves passed through this process, which netted the WIC between ƒ30,000 to ƒ40,000 per year.76 The company continued to perform this function until its liquidation in 1791, but one should remember that the volume of the slave trade declined drastically during and after the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780–1784). Nevertheless, the company continued trading with Africans for a variety of African products in addition to slaves.
73
ARA, SG 3786: res., 23 May 1731; ZA, Familiearchief Verheye-Van Citters 35: Memorie; ARA, SG 3789: res., 6 October 1734. 74 J. Postma, The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1600–1815 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 203–04. 75 ARA, NWIC 110: res., 20 August 1740; ibid., 57: Heren X to J. de Petersen, 25 August 1740 and 18 April 1743. 76 Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, 369–70. See also ARA, VWIS 932: Financiële stukken Guinea, 1741–1780.
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Table 4.7. WIC Commodity Trade with Africa, and Gross Profits, 1741–1779 (guilders) Period 1741–1743 1744–1746 1747–1749 1750–1752 1753–1755 1756–1758 1759–1761 1762–1764 1765–1767 1768–1770 1771–1773 1774–1776 1777–1779 Total
Purchase 105,730 86,580 233,200 101,020 70,920 79,690 72,360 179,510 100,580 112,060 153,360 56,940 141,600 1,493,550
Sale 453,980 394,080 520,820 619,280 102,090 128,220 257,480 245,380 127,240 131,920 257,450 64,980 137,530 3,440,450
Gross Profits 4.3 4.6 2.2 6.1 1.4 1.6 3.6 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.7 1.1 1.0 2.3
Source: ARA, NWIC 270, 271, 1263, and 1264.
Table 4.7 shows that the WIC sold more than ƒ3.4 million worth of African commodities in the Dutch Republic between 1741 and 1779. Duty payments by private merchants for African commerce yielded ƒ3,273,190 for the years 1730–1791, at an annual average of ƒ54,000.77 The expenses for company personnel and upkeep of forts and trading stations came primarily from duty payments and poll taxes. In order to keep costs manageable, the company gradually reduced the number of its personnel in West Africa. In 1729, it still had three hundred servants on its rolls, but by 1740 that number was reduced to about two hundred.
Survey of WIC Colonial Properties The WIC’s commercial activities in the Caribbean and Guiana in the 1730s shrank even more than on the West African Coast. When the WIC dropped out of the transatlantic slave trade, it also ended
77 ARA, NWIC 270–71: Generale driejaarlijkse rekeningen; Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, 372, table 12.3.
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its commodity trade with the Americas. Tropical produce like sugar and cacao, as well as Spanish silver pesos (pieces of eight) formerly received for slave deliveries, were now transported by private companies. Only in a few areas where the company owned plantations did it maintain limited shipping activities. The WIC’s involvement with the Caribbean and the Guiana region was now limited primarily to administrative and military matters. By managing these colonies, the company gained the right to levy taxes, such as duties on shipping, poll taxes on slaves and free residents, and a 2.5 percent duty on all exports.78 These tax privileges could vary from one colony to another. In areas with shared administration, tax privileges were limited to duties from shipping. Among the Dutch colonies on the Guiana Coast, Suriname was most important, but the WIC directors had little control over it. The WIC briefly gained control over this promising colony in 1682, but within a year it was sold to the Suriname Corporation (Sociëteit van Suriname), specifically founded for that purpose by three interested parties: the Amsterdam chamber of the WIC, the city of Amsterdam, and the well-to-do Cornelis van Aerssen van Sommelsdijck.79 Chapter 11 gives a detailed account of the trade with Suriname. To the west of Suriname, in today’s Guyana, were three Dutch plantation colonies. The first was on the River Berbice, founded by the First WIC as a patroonship under the Zeeland merchant Abraham van Pere. In 1720, the Van Pere family was no longer able to finance and manage the colony, and it was turned over to a corporate governance structure similar to that of Suriname, the Sociëteit van Berbice, which was financed by Amsterdam merchants through shares in the corporation.80 Unfortunately, the new owners and settlers lacked the money and credit to revitalized the colony in the 1720s. The real takeoff for Berbice started the next decade when the demand for tropical products rose in Europe. In 1763 the colony counted 95
78
Octroy, preface and article 10. For duty payments, see A. J. M. Kunst, Recht, commercie en kolonialisme in West-Indië vanaf de zestiende tot in de negentiende eeuw (Zutphen: Walburg, 1981), 106–07. 79 G. W. van der Meiden, Betwist bestuur. Een eeuw strijd om de macht in Suriname, 1651–1753 (Amsterdam: Bataafsche Leeuw, 1987), 11–12. 80 The Sociëteit van Berbice was one of many shareholder-supported corporations that was founded during the speculation wave in the 1720s. See Netscher, Geschiedenis van de koloniën, 152–63. See also chapter 14 of this volume.
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plantations. Still, Berbice was the smallest of the Dutch colonies on the Guiana coast. Further west, on the Essequibo and nearby Demerara rivers, were the only colonies in the region over which the WIC had complete control, although the Zeeland chamber actually managed the two settlements. The management of and trade with these two colonies is discussed in chapter 12. In addition to these settlements, the WIC directors approved the establishment of other settlements on the Wild Coast, to which a number of unsuccessful colonizing expeditions were launched from the Netherlands. In 1676, for example, a group of colonists left in six ships from Texel and settled at Oyapoc, in today’s Guyana. But they were attacked by the French from Cayenne a few months later and were forced to leave.81 In 1692, a group of colonists led by Jan Reeps left Hoorn and settled in the estuary of the Amazon, but that effort also failed.82 The Dutch-controlled Caribbean islands, however, were all managed by the WIC. The Heren X appointed the governor of Curaçao, who was also responsible for the nearby islands of Aruba and Bonaire. The Dutch leeward islands of Saba, St. Martin, and St. Eustatius were governed by WIC-appointed commanders. But as in the plantation colonies in the Guiana region, these authorities shared their responsibilities with councils of elected colonists, who always had to be consulted for important decisions.83 When they failed to do so, they were invariably confronted with opposition from the local population. The WIC also accepted the responsibility for the military protection of the islands. Expenses for this were covered by import and export duties and the payment of head fees for slaves, colonists, and other inhabitants of the islands. Until 1730, the slave trade was an important source of income for the WIC, especially at Curaçao and St. Eustatius.
81
K. I. Muller, ed. Elisabeth van der Woude, Memorije van ’t geen bij mijn tijd is voorgevallen. Met het opzienbarende verslag van haar reis naar de Wilde Kust, 1676–1677 (Amsterdam: Terra Incognita, 2001), 117–19. Not the WIC, but the States of Holland had approved the establishment of this colony. 82 G. van Alphen, Jan Reeps en zijn onbekende kolonisatiepoging in Zuid-Amerika, 1692 (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1960). 83 W. Klooster, Illicit Riches: Dutch Trade in the Caribbean, 1648–1795, Caribbean Series, no. 18 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1998), 63–64.
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The End of the WIC The early years of the Second WIC looked very promising. Its accounts, published once every three years, showed a net profit of ƒ460,000 during the years 1674–1680.84 After that, however, losses multiplied as a result of wars and increasing competition from other Europeans, private merchants, and smugglers. In the years 1713–1722, losses rose to a record of ƒ4 million. The directors had to resort to extensive borrowing, which forced the company’s debts and interest burden ever higher. Occasionally, ‘shortage of cash’ forced the directors to give the company short-term loans from their own resources, at interest rates of 3.5 to 4 percent.85 During the early 1720s, the speculation wave that swept Europe in 1719–1720 enabled the directors to raise ƒ3.8 million by issuing new shares.86 But this infusion of new capital offered only temporary relief to the company’s liquidity problem and could not solve the real problems. The directors occasionally resorted to bookkeeping measures like removing old debts, but even that provided only short-term solutions.87 Terminating the trading monopoly initially reduced the WIC’s losses, but could not stop them. After 1730, there were just two short periods in which the company registered profits. The first took place during the Seven Year War (1756–1763). As the United Kingdom and France waged war, Dutch trade in the Caribbean experienced a tremendous revival. St. Eustatius profited especially from the war and became a vital trading center for both hostile parties.88 Due to increasing shipping fees, the WIC registered profits of ƒ1.7 million during this time and could operate in the black for a while. This scenario repeated itself during the early phase of the American Revolutionary War (1776–1780). Both Curaçao and St. Eustatius became important centers of trade for British and French colonists
84
ARA, NWIC 268: Generale driejaarlijkse rekeningen, 1674–1680. Den Heijer, Geschiedenis van de WIC, 179. 86 J. Carswell, The South Sea Bubble (London: Cresset, 1960), 148; ARA, VWIS 904: Financial overview, 1675–1728; J. G. van Dillen, ‘Effectenkoersen aan de Amsterdamse Beurs, 1723–1794,’ in Economisch-Historisch Jaarboek 17 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1931), 1–46. 87 ARA, NWIC 269: Generale staat, ultimo 1722; NWIC 271: Generale staat, ultimo 1779. For financial securities, see Den Heijer, De geschiedenis van de WIC, 185. 88 Klooster, Illicit Riches, 103–04, 176. The Dutch also lost many ships to British privateers (see chapter 14 of this volume). 85
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Table 4.8. Cumulative Three-Year Profit and Loss Accounts, 1674–1791 (guilders) Period
Accounts Cumulative Accounts Cumulative Accounts per Period with Financial without Financial Redress Redress
1674–1677 1678–1680 1681–1683 1684–1686 1687–1689 1690–1692 1693–1695 1696–1698 1699–1701 1702–1704 1705–1707 1708–1710 1711–1713 1714–1716 1717–1719 1720–1722 Redress 1722 1723–1725 1726–1728 1729–1731 1732–1734 1735–1737 1738–1740 1741–1743 1744–1746 1747–1749 1750–1752 1753–1755 1756–1758 1759–1761 1762–1764 1765–1767 1768–1770 1771–1773 1774–1776 1777–1779 Redress 1779 1780–1782 1783–1785 1786–1788 1789–1791
411,512 57,842 –343,643 –49,464 –965,065 17,553 –518,374 –347,127 –491,452 –943,369 230,458 –688,892 546,230 –1,075,626 –1,626,656 –1,344,961 –174,413 –206,097 –219,308 59,954 –103,577 –271,087 –74,593 –553,706 –91,906 –41,435 –309,855 603,425 1,092,479 43,614 –172,206 –203,479 –351,073 –237,371 176,706 –346,844 –39,368 –359,964 –815,447
Source: ARA, NWIC 268–71.
411,512 469,354 125,711 76,247 –888,818 –871,265 –1,389,639 –1,736,766 –2,228,218 –3,171,587 –2,941,129 –3,630,021 –3,083,791 –4,159,417 –5,786,073 –7,131,034 360,935 186,522 –19,575 –238,883 –178,929 –282,506 –553,593 –628,186 –1,181,892 –1,273,798 –1,315,233 –1,625,088 –1,021,663 70,816 114,430 –57,776 –261,255 –612,328 –849,699 –672,993 560,804 213,960 174,592 –185,372 –1,000,819
–7,131,034 –7,305,447 –7,511,544 –7,730,852 –7,670,898 –7,774,475 –8,045,562 –8,120,155 –8,673,861 –8,765,767 –8,807,202 –9,117,057 –8,513,632 –7,421,153 –7,377,539 –7,549,745 –7,753,224 –8,104,297 –8,341,668 –8,164,962 –8,511,806 –8,551,174 –8,911,138 –9,726,585
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in the Caribbean, but also for American revolutionaries. Objections to these dealings with rebel colonies was one reason the British government declared war against the Dutch Republic. But before that, the WIC had made profits of ƒ177,000.89 In order to make the figures look even better, WIC directors removed some more old debts from the books: the redress of 1779. With a positive balance of more than half a million on the three-year account, the WIC seemed to be in fairly good shape.90 These figures concealed negative developments, however, that contributed to the fall of the company. Early in the 1770s, the Van Sommelsdijck family sold their share in the Suriname Corporation to the city of Amsterdam, which in turn sold half of it to the WIC. The directors expected this arrangement to produce healthy profits, because Europeans were paying high prices for tropical produce.91 But the WIC had to come up with ƒ354,000 to complete the transaction, which exacerbated the precarious financial position of the company. In fact, the WIC needed the approval of the States General to sell bonds for ƒ300,000, at 2.5 to 3 percent interest.92 Although this investment seemed worth the risk to the WIC directors, they soon had to admit it was not as good as they had expected. The enormous demand for tropical commodities encouraged Amsterdam creditors to invest heavily in ‘plantation loans.’93 Most of these loans were invested in the coffee sector, which had been booming since the 1760s and was almost completely mortgaged for much more than the actual value of the coffee plantations. This, in combination with the 1773 financial crisis in Amsterdam’s capital markets, quickly tightened credit availability. In the long run, the production of coffee steadily declined, although Suriname continued to produce sugar at about the same level. Slave imports to the colony, however, declined drastically as is shown in chapter 5. 89 Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean, 1680–1791, 227–30; ARA, NWIC 271: Generale driejaarlijkse rekening, 1776–1779. 90 ARA, NWIC 271: Balansoverzicht, 1779. 91 Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean, 1680–1791, 305–06. 92 Van Grol, De grondpolitiek, 2:116–17. 93 A. J. A. Quintus Bosz., Geld, credietbehoeften en negotiaties in Suriname voor 1865 (Paramaribo: Universiteit van Suriname, 1971), 7–10. For an overview of plantation mortgages, see J. P. van de Voort, De Westindische plantages van 1720 tot 1795. Financiën en handel. (Eindhoven: De Witte, 1973). The widely accepted interpretation of plantation loans and the decline of Suriname as a plantation colony is criticized by A. van Stipriaan, ‘Debunking Debts: Image and Reality of a Colonial Crisis, Suriname at the End of the Eighteenth Century,’ Intinerario 19, no. 1 (1995): 69–84.
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In 1780, the WIC was confronted with the consequences of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780–1784). The British declared war on the Dutch Republic because they were convinced that the Dutch had not remained neutral in the American Revolutionary War and had secretly supported the revolution. In the war, the Royal Navy was clearly superior to the Dutch forces, and nearly all African and West Indian possessions were taken over by the British. In the Peace of Paris in 1784, all former Dutch territories were returned, but the damage suffered to trade and ships was impossible to repair. For the WIC, this war was the beginning of the end. Immediately after the war, the bewindhebbers of the Amsterdam chamber proposed to sell the WIC’s share in the Suriname Corporation to the city of Amsterdam for ƒ800,000. This would reduce the company’s rapidly rising deficits. But the directors of the Zeeland chamber rejected the proposal because they feared it would direct all commerce with the Guiana colonies to Amsterdam.94 Meanwhile, the colonists became increasingly more critical of the WIC administration, accusing the company of claiming all the tax revenues without spending a penney on improving administration and defense of the colonies. During its final years, the WIC increasingly had to request financial subsidies from the Dutch government. Since the reorganization in 1674, the company was entitled to subsidies, namely to pay ‘two hundred soldiers’ and maintain defense installations in the colonies. But the last war caused such large budget deficits that these subsidies could not solve its problems.95 In 1788, the States General ordered a study for the improvement of administration in the West Indian colonies, but no real changes resulted.96 Laurens Pieter van de Spiegel (1737–1800), Raadpensionaris (executive administrator of Holland) did not want to use any more government money to keep the impoverished and lethargic company afloat. Instead, he proposed not to extend the WIC charter. The province of Zeeland initially rejected this proposal but in the end also went along with the dissolution. The WIC’s last charter expired at the end of 1791, and the States General took over all WIC shares at 30 percent of their
94 95 96
Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean, 1680–1791, 582. Octroy, articles 5 and 39. For the so-called Van Wijn Committee, see chapters 12 and 14 in this volume.
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nominal value.97 This was a bargain for the shareholders, because the shares were valued at only 22 percent at the Amsterdam stock market in 1791. The colonies were placed under direct control of the States General, which thereupon created a ‘Committee for Colonies and Possessions of the Guinea Coast and America,’ a forerunner of the Colonial Ministry. After 171 dramatic years, the WIC was eliminated without honor.
Conclusions The WIC initially received a trading monopoly in the Atlantic regions outside European waters, but unlike the VOC, it never developed into a thriving enterprise. The openness of the Atlantic differed too much from the Asian sphere. The company faced competition from private shipping in the larger and more accessible Atlantic region than was the case for the VOC in Asia. Private Dutch merchants with shipping interests in Africa and America always opposed the WIC’s monopoly. Historians have often pondered the question: How was it possible that this company, already considered a failure by mighty Amsterdam merchants in the seventeenth century, could last 171 years? Had not the company achieved its goals by about 1650 with its gains and losses in the battles with Spain and Portugal? After all, the company’s commercial accomplishments were hardly laudable. For the most part, the company’s founding commercial objectives failed to be met. The WIC was most successful in creating opportunities for others. Colonial development in the Atlantic occurred at a time when there was no strong central government, and it would have been impossible to accomplish through private initiatives. Even before the WIC, some special-purpose companies traded with West Africa and North America, but their competitiveness was self-destructive. The WIC, by contrast, provided protection and continuity in shipping and trade. Its presence made it possible for colonies on the coast of Guiana to be established and sustained, and islands in the Caribbean to be colonized. The WIC enabled Curaçao to become a major trading center in the second half of the seventeenth century. 97 A. J. van der Meulen, Studies over het Ministerie Van de Spiegel (Leiden: Kooyker, 1905), 420–518; F. B. Schotanus, L. B. van de Spiegel, 1737–1800, en de ondergang van de Republiek (Loenen: Schotanus, 1994), 1:400–02.
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In West Africa, the WIC was the most influential European trading organization until the end of the seventeenth century. In addition to the important trade in gold and ivory, the slave trade was essential to the development of plantation colonies on the Guiana coast. Without control over forts and factories in West Africa, the Dutch capital-intensive triangular trade could not have developed. In addition, the WIC played an important role gathering information about supply and demand in the slave trade. Even when the company withdrew from active participation in transatlantic trade during the 1730s, it continued to play the role of intermediary and protector for private Dutch trade in the Atlantic region. Many merchants, shippers, and planters complained about the WIC’s taxes, but few wanted the company to disappear. Merchants in tropical products from West India, planters from the colonies in Guiana, and owners of sugar refineries and cacao processing plants all had an interest in the continued existence of the WIC. The company was an extension of the strongly decentralized Dutch government. With its limited powers it carried out administrative and defense functions needed to keep the colonies afloat, and many private individuals benefited in the process. At the end of the eighteenth century, when the decentralized Dutch Republic – actually little more than a federation of seven sovereign states – was at the point of disintegration in 1791, the WIC also disappeared from the scene. Soon thereafter, her ‘big brother’ in Asia, the VOC, met the same fate. The properties of the two large trading companies became colonies of the Netherlands in the early nineteenth century.
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PART TWO
AFRICAN COMMERCE AND SLAVE TRADE
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CHAPTER FIVE
A REASSESSMENT OF THE DUTCH ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE J P
Inhumane custom! Godless rascality! That people are being sold like horses into slavery. Brederoo, 1617.1
Introduction The general public in the Netherlands may still be unaware of the role the Dutch played in the transatlantic slave trade during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but students of overseas expansion can hardly claim ignorance of Dutch involvement in the forced migration from Africa. Until recent decades, very little was published about this dark chapter in Dutch history, and it was not until 1990 that a comprehensive assessment of the Dutch slave trade was published by this author.2 Even then, however, I was aware that not all relevant documents had been consulted or even located and that eventually new information would fill in some of the lacunas and correct some of the speculative elements of my work. This information came sooner than I had expected. Research on the Atlantic slave trade is an ongoing affair. Recently, Cambridge University Press published a massive electronic data collection that contains information on about 26,000 transatlantic slaving voyages uncovered and analyzed by scholars from several countries.3
1
G. A. Brederoo, Moortje, act 1, lines 233–34. J. Postma, The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1600–1815 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 3 D. Eltis, S. D. Behrendt, H. S. Klein, and D. Richardson, eds., The TransAtlantic Slave Trade: A Database on CD-ROM (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 2
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The Dutch data I collected is included in this data set. Since 1990, three important research efforts (two doctoral dissertations and one master’s thesis) have brought to light a significant amount of new information that makes a reevaluation of the Dutch slave trade necessary. Adjustment is particularly needed for the volume of the traffic, the number of enslaved Africans carried to the Americas on Dutch ships. The aim of this chapter is to incorporate the newly discovered information into the data collection gathered during my own research prior to 1990, explain some of my misguided assumptions and interpretations, and revise earlier calculations in accordance with the new findings. Historiography of the Dutch Atlantic Slave Trade Publications about the Dutch involvement in the Atlantic slave trade was minimal before the middle of the twentieth century. Just a few articles and some incidental references in general works were available to the interested reader. Scholarly articles were limited to a few scattered source publications and commentaries by such specialists on the history of the Dutch overseas empire as G. W. Kernkamp, S. van Brakel, and W. R. Menkman.4 Seventeenth- and eighteenthcentury observers, writing about their experiences in the Atlantic region, also made some valuable comments about the Dutch involvement in the slave trade. Important among these observers were Willem Bosman, Pieter de Marees, and Johannes de Laet, all of whom wrote about the Dutch West India Company (WIC) activities in the Atlantic and on the African coast. Twentieth-century scholar/entrepreneur Klaas Ratelband compiled a valuable source publication about Dutch activities on the African coast, including an extensive introduction and explanatory notes. His major work on the Dutch on the African coast was posthumously completed by René Baesjou.5 4 G. W. Kernkamp, ‘Een Contract tot de Slaafhandel van 1657,’ Bijdragen en Mededelingen van het Historisch Genootschap 22 (1901): 444–59; S. van Brakel, ‘Bescheiden over den slavenhandel der West-Indische Compagnie,’ in Economisch-Historisch Jaarboek 4 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1918), 61–77; W. R. Menkman, ‘Nederlandse en vreemde Slavenvaart,’ West-Indische Gids 26 (1943): 97–98. 5 W. Bosman, A New and Accurate Description of the Coast of Guinea (1704; reprint, New York: Barnes and Noble, 1967); P. de Marees, Beschrijvinghe ende historische verhael van het Gout Koninckrijck van Guinea . . ., ed. S. P. L’Honoré Naber, Werken uitgegeven door de Linschoten Vereeniging, no. 5 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1912); K. Ratelband,
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A few foreign publications have also commented on the involvement in the slave trade, including Elisabeth Donnan’s four-volume work in the English language (1931), and Georges Scelle’s two-volume publication in French (1906).6 One short but essential English publication by I. A. Wright (1924) explained the crucial Dutch involvement in the so-called asiento, the slave trade to the Spanish American colonies during the second half of the seventeenth century.7 An early publication of the Hakluyt Society (1925) suggested to English-speaking audiences that the Dutch were early participants in the Atlantic slave trade, albeit an incidental one, by citing an obscure observation by the Virginia chronicler Captain John Smith of 1619: ‘About the last of August, came a Dutch man of Warre that sold us twenty negars.’8 This incident clearly predated the active Dutch involvement in the traffic. While the identity of the ship has not been established, and perhaps never will be, it was most likely a Dutch privateer that had obtained the slaves from a captured foreign ship.9 The first thorough scholarly publication about the early Dutch slave trade appeared in 1956 in the form of a long article by Zeeland archivist W. S. Unger.10 A few years later, Unger published a sequel which focused on the eighteenth-century slaving activities of the Zeeland-based Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie (MCC).11 ed., Vijf Dagregisters van het Kasteel São Jorga da Mina (Elmina) aan de Goudkust, Werken uitgegeven door de Linschoten Vereeniging, no. 61 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1953); J. de Laet, Jaerlyck verhael van de verrichtinghen der gheoctroyeerde West-Indische Compagnie in derthien boecken, ed. S. P. L’Honoré Naber and J. C. M. Warnsinck, Werken uitgegeven door de Linschoten Vereeniging, nos. 34, 35, 37, 40 (1644; reprint, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1931–37). See also K. Ratelband, Nederlanders in West-Afrika, 1600–1650. Angola, Kongo en São Tomé, comp. and ed. R. Baesjou (Zutphen: Walburg, 2000). 6 E. Donnan, Documents Illustrative of the Slave Trade to America, 4 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution, 1931). The first volume is especially of interest to the Dutch slave trade; G. Scelle, La traite négriere aux de Castille . . ., 2 vols. (Paris: Larose et Tenin, 1906). 7 I. A. Wright, ‘The Coymans Asiento, 1685–1689,’ Bijdragen voor de Vaderlandse Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde 6, no. 1 (1924): 23–62. 8 V. Harlow, ed., Colonizing Expeditions to the West Indies and Guiana, 1623–1667, Hakluyt Society, 2d ser., no. 56 (London: Hakluyt Society, 1925), 125. 9 See W. S. Unger, ‘Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis van de Nederlandse slavenhandel, 1. Beknopt overzicht van de Nederlandse slavenhandel in het algemeen,’ in Economisch-Historisch Jaarboek 26 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1956), 136. 10 Unger, ‘Bijdragen Nederlandse slavenhandel, 1,’ 233–266. 11 W. S. Unger, ‘Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis van de Nederlandse slavenhandel, 2. De slavenhandel der Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie, 1732–1808,’ in Economisch-Historisch Jaarboek 28 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1958–60), 3–148.
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Compiled without the aid of computers, the quantitative work of Unger is truly impressive, but it was an examination of a single eighteenth-century slaving company that operated from Middelburg, rather than a comprehensive study. The publications cited so far were scholarly in nature and drew the attention of a limited audience; the Dutch general public remained largely uninformed about this part of their history. In 1937, L. C. Vrijman published the first general survey of the Atlantic slave trade in the Dutch language,12 but it contributed very little new information about Dutch involvement because information was still scarce and relevant archives remained unexplored. In 1968, Albert van Dantzig published the first book specifically dealing with the Dutch slave trade for a general audience.13 Being based on a limited amount of archival research, it provided little new information, but it did incorporate the findings of Unger’s scholarly articles. Philip Curtin’s 1969 The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census, stimulated a flood of research activity in several countries that had participated in the traffic. The process of decolonization in Africa and the civil rights movement in the United States were powerful inducements for such ventures, and the Atlantic slave trade in general was researched extensively during the last three decades of the twentieth century. The recently published a general work on the Dutch slave trade by Pieter Emmer incorporates much of that research.14 My own interest in the Dutch slave trade started in 1967, when I added African studies to my doctoral program. With the encouragement of one of my African professors, James Hooker, I set out to find a dissertation topic that would make use of Dutch archival sources to shed new light on African history. The Coolhaas bibliography of the Dutch maritime empire drew my attention to the fact that Dutch involvement in the Atlantic slave trade was largely unexplored.15 While writing my dissertation, I saw a prepublication version of Curtin’s book, and his work became an additional incen-
12
L. C. Vrijman, Slavenhalers en slavenhandel (Amsterdam: Van Kampen, 1937). A. van Dantzig, Het Nederlandse aandeel in de slavenhandel (Bussum: Van Dishoeck, 1968). 14 P. C. Emmer, De Nederlandse slavenhandel, 1500–1850 (Amsterdam: Arbeiderspers, 2000). 15 W. P. Coolhaas, A Critical Survey of Studies on Dutch Colonial History (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1960). 13
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tive and model for my dissertation, which was completed in 1970.16 After presenting several papers and publishing a number of articles, my research finally culminated with the publication of a book on the Dutch Atlantic slave trade in 1990.17 Several other scholars have made important contributions to the historiography of the Dutch slave trade in recent decades, and I have benefited from their work. Emmer began his research on the slave trade during the seventies and produced a number of valuable publications, including one on the traffic to New Netherland (New York) prior to 1667, an analysis of the last Dutch slaving voyage in 1803, and several interpretive essays on the end of the slave trade and the role of the WIC.18 In cooperation with Ernst van den Boogaart, Emmer also authored an important essay on the early Dutch slave trade, with emphasis on the Dutch Atlantic traffic to the Dutch colony in Brazil.19 For his several publications about the history of the Dutch in the West Indies, C. C. Goslinga also collected a considerable amount of archival data on the Dutch slave trade. Most relevant among these was his article on the role of Curaçao as a slave trading center.20 Another recent contributor was L. R. Priester, who published his master’s thesis about eighteenth-century slavery and slave trade from a sociological and intellectual perspective.21 Willem Flinkenflögel published a short interpretive work about Dutch slavery and slave 16 J. Postma, ‘The Dutch Participation in the Atlantic Slave Trade: Slaving on the Guinea Coast,’ (Ph.D. diss., Michigan State University, 1970). 17 Postma, Dutch Slave Trade. 18 P. C. Emmer, ‘De slavenhandel van en naar Nieuw Nederland,’ in Economisch en Sociaal-Historisch Jaarboek 35 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1972); P. C. Emmer, ‘De laatste slavenreis van de Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie,’ in Economisch en SociaalHistorisch Jaarboek 34 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1971); P. C. Emmer, ‘The History of the Dutch Slave Trade: A Bibliographical Survey,’ Journal of Economic History 32 (1972): 728–47; P. C. Emmer, Engeland, Nederland, Afrika en de slavenhandel in de negentiende eeuw (Leiden: Brill, 1974). 19 E. van den Boogaart and P. C. Emmer, ‘The Dutch Participation in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1596–1650,’ in The Uncommon Market: Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic Slave Trade, ed. H. A. Gemery and J. S. Hogendorn (New York: Academic Press, 1979). 20 C. C. Goslinga, ‘Curaçao as a Slave Trade Center during the War of the Spanish Succession, 1702–1714,’ Nieuwe West-Indische Gids 77 (1977–1978): 21–50; C. C. Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean and on the Wild Coast, 1580–1680 (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1971); C. C. Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean and in the Guianas, 1680–1791 (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1985). 21 L. R. Priester, De Nederlandse houding ten aanzien van slavenhandel en slavernij, 1596–1863 (Middelburg: Stichting Regionale Geschiedenis, 1987).
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trade,22 and Wim Klooster has shed new light on the asiento trade via Curaçao through his rediscovery of an important published primary source regarding that commerce.23 One unheralded contributor to the knowledge about the Dutch slave trade is Franz Binder. Although he has not published yet on the slave trade, he has done a great deal of research on the traffic for the seventeenth century and has generously shared his findings with me and others.24 The Slave Trade of the Dutch West India Company As mentioned before, my 1990 book was not a definitive study on the Dutch slave trade. The voluminous Dutch archives contain more information on the subject than any person could possibly gather in a life time. Time constraints and difficulty locating certain documents occasionally obliged me to estimate and conjecture. Recent scholars have discovered new data that make a reassessment of the Dutch slave trade imperative. These studies include an unpublished master’s thesis by E. van der Oest, a doctoral dissertation by C. Reinders Folmer-van Prooijen, an article published by W. Klooster, and a doctoral dissertation by H. den Heijer.25 The first two are relevant to the Dutch free trade era after 1730 and will be discussed later in this chapter. Den Heijer’s work, which dealt with the new or Second Dutch West India Company26 and its commerce with Africa during the years 1675–1740, uncovered a large amount of new information, particularly in regards to the volume of the traffic. He found data about forty-six slave transports that had escaped my notice, most of 22
W. Flinkenflögel, Nederlandse slavenhandel, 1621–1803 (Utrecht: Kosmos, 1994). W. Klooster, ‘Slavenvaart op Spaanse kusten. De Nederlandse slavenhandel met Spaans Amerika, 1648–1701,’ Tijdschrift voor Zeegeschiedenis 16, no. 2 (1997): 121–40. 24 See Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, 32. 25 E. van der Oest, ‘Vergeten kolonies. Handel en scheepvaart op de kolonies van Essequibo en Demerary, 1700–1791,’ (master’s thesis, University of Leiden, 1994); C. Reinders Folmer-van Prooijen, Van goederenhandel naar mensenhandel. De Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie, 1720–1755, Werken uitgegeven door het Koninklijk Zeeuwsch Genootschap der Wetenschappen, no. 10 (Middelburg: Koninklijk Zeeuwsch Genootschap der Wetenschappen, 2000); Klooster, ‘Slavenvaart op Spaanse kusten,’ 121–40; H. den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven. Scheepvaart en handel van de Tweede Westindische Compagnie op Afrika, 1674–1740 (Zutphen: Walburg, 1998). 26 For the transition from First to the Second WIC, see chapter 4 in this volume. 23
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which took place during the last quarter of the seventeenth century, a period with a substantial number of hitherto unresolved problems. Counterbalancing the impact of these newly discovered slaving transports, he also found evidence that thirty-two voyages to Africa that I had counted as slaving ventures were, in fact, part of the bilateral commerce between the Dutch Republic and Africa. Having found very little information about these ships, I designated them as slave ships rather then risk undercounting the volume of the slave trade. The overall outcome of Den Heijer’s research was a net increase of fourteen additional WIC slave transports for the 1675–1739 period. Since 1990, my own research on Dutch bilateral shipping between the Netherlands and Suriname has also led to the discovery of more information on the Dutch slave trade, including a few additional slave transports. I have incorporated all these new data in a revised slave trade data collection, which now totals 365 documented slaving transports of the WIC for the 1675–1739 period. I have also removed a few interloper ships from my old data collection, plus one ship that actually sailed before 1675, and twenty-two attempted slaving ventures that for various reasons had been aborted and had failed to land any slaves in the Americas. Among the latter group were some that were terminated by shipwreck, capture by pirates or enemy ships, or ships declared unseaworthy on the African coast. Most of these ventures were aborted before slaves were taken aboard in Africa, but seven were captured after they had collectively boarded approximately 3,000 slaves. These slaves are not included in calculating the volume of the Dutch trade because they were presumably disembarked in the Americas by ships of other nations.27 In addition to new slaving ventures, Den Heijer also found more information about voyages identified in my research, including numbers of slaves boarded, size and types of ships used in the traffic, and information about crews and captains. He added considerable detail to the data collection that I had compiled, including many additional dates for shipping activities, especially for departures from and returns to the Netherlands. The enhanced data collection also provides more reliable slave boarding and/or landing statistics and
27 These failed or aborted slaving missions are significant in evaluating the overall profitability of the WIC slave trade.
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which now contains data on 70 percent (254 of 365) of WIC slave assignments during the 1675–1739 period. Estimates are still necessary for the remaining 111 consignments. Where Den Heijer had to estimate for missing data, he extrapolated these from verified data of other transports by dividing slave ships into three categories based on size and carrying capacity.28 These estimates have been most valuable in my reassessment of the volume of the traffic, although I have amended some of Den Heijer’s estimates where I had documentary evidence in hand. I have calculated such estimates individually based on qualitative data such as information about market conditions, slave cargoes on previous or subsequent missions of the same ships, observations by contemporaries, and by business or personal correspondence. Den Heijer’s estimates tend to be slightly higher than those in my book, but in the absence of evidence to the contrary, I have accepted most of his estimates. The overall result of Den Heijer’s work and my own additional research raises WIC exports from Africa to a total of approximately 285,500 slaves, about 10,000 above my earlier estimates for the same 1600–1739 period, as is illustrated by comparing the following two tables. The most significant changes in numbers of slaves shipped are in the last quarter of the seventeenth century, where most of Den Heijer’s newly discovered slave transports belong. The increase of ships and slaves is particularly significant for the 1680s, when the Dutch dominated the slave trade with Spanish America. This was the climax of the Dutch asiento trade, which was actually managed by the Dutch merchant family of Coymans for part of that decade.29 With an average of more than 5,000 slaves transported annually, the volume during this decade was nearly twice as high as during most other decades of the WIC slave trade. This was a high point of Dutch participation in the Atlantic slave trade, and they were at that time a major player in the traffic. After the loss of the asiento during the 1690s, the WIC slave trade dropped considerably. The 28 Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, 142. Den Heijer distinguishes between large, medium and small slave ships. The vast majority were large ships of 200 ton or more, the medium size were between 160 and 200 ton, and the small slave ships were less than 160 ton. The large ships had an average of 600 slaves boarded and 501 arriving at New World harbors. The averages for the other two categories were 400–334, and 200–167 respectively. 29 See Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, 41–44.
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Table 5.1. Aggregate Dutch Slave Exports from Africa, 1600–1803 (Published in 1990) Years 1600–1645 1646–1664 1665–1674 1675–1699 1700–1709 1710–1719 1720–1729 1730–1739 1740–1749 1750–1759 1760–1769 1770–1779 1780–1795 1802–1803 1600–1803
WIC Trade Free Trade Total Documented Adjustments* Documented Adjustments 30,182 11,039 43,412 66,692 28,596 20,575 38,580 24,911
263,987
3,000 2,500 500 5,500 3,500 4,500 3,000
22,500
19,169 47,574 49,362 59,501 51,095 22,544 1,206 250,451
1,416 2,912 1,706
6,034
1665–1795
Annual Average
33,182 13,539 43,912 72,192 32,096 25,075 41,580 44,080 47,574 50,778 62,413 52,801 22,544 1,206 542,972
721 713 4,391 2,888 3,210 2,508 4,158 4,408 4,757 5,078 6,241 5,280 1,409 603 2,659
495,730
3,784
Source: Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, 295. * Adjustments include 14,000 for the interloper trade.
Table 5.2. Revised Slave Exports from Africa by the WIC and Interlopers, 1600–1739 Years 1600–1645* 1646–1664 1665–1674 1675–1679 1680–1689 1690–1699 1700–1709 1710–1719 1720–1729 1730–1739 1675–1739 1600–1739
Voyages
Documented
Interlopers & Adjustments
Total
Annual Average
27 97 49 54 42 53 43 365
30,182 11,039 43,412 12,842 49,209 25,550 27,141 20,030 28,102 23,725 186,599
3,500 3,000 1,500 2,500 3,500 3,500 3,500 3,500 3,000 500 20,000
33,682 14,039 44,912 15,342 52,709 29,050 30,641 23,530 31,102 24,225 206,599
732 484 4,491 3,068 5,271 2,905 3,064 2,353 3,110 2,423 3,178
271,232
28,000
299,232
Source: Postma Slave Trade Data Collection. * This includes shipments prior to the establishment of the WIC in 1621.
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1720s saw a slight increase, due largely to increased shipments to the Dutch colony of Suriname, but the traffic was by no means as high as during the 1680s. As a result of Den Heijer’s findings, a significant revision is necessary for the decade of the 1720s. My earlier estimates for that decade were significantly higher than the new figures, primarily because they included several ships that were part of the shuttle trade between the United Provinces and Africa, and not slave ships.30 These reductions counterbalance the increases necessary for the last quarter of the seventeenth century.
Interlopers and the Slave Trade Very little new information has been uncovered about the Dutch slave trade for the years prior to 1675. Klooster has found new information about Dutch slave trade to Buenos Aires during the 1650s and 1660s, and other foreign colonies in the Caribbean, but the number of ships and slaves involved appears to be fairly small.31 Klooster also sheds new light on slave transactions between Curaçao and the Spanish American colonies, the so-called asiento trade, but this adds little information on slave landings at Curaçao. Thus, a major reassessment of those early years, including the slave trade of the old or First WIC (1621–1674), is not yet necessary. By contrast, our knowledge about the Dutch slave trade for the sixty-five years after 1675 is now clearer than for any other period. In my earlier publications I estimated that 16,500 slaves might not have been counted because of insufficient documentation, but the precision of the new data makes that adjustment unnecessary.32 However, another uncertainty arises in its place, namely the role played by Dutch interlopers in the slave trade. Since interloper activity was illegal, documentation concerning its role is difficult to find, if available at all. In my book I reasoned that the complexity of the triangular slave trade must have restricted interloper participation to
30
Compare tables 5.1 and 5.2. For Buenos Aires alone, Klooster lists eighteen shipments, of which the human cargoes of seven ships are known and totaled 820 slaves. See Klooster, ‘Slavenvaart op Spaanse kusten,’ 123. 32 See table 5.1, and calculate for the years 1675–1739. 31
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minimum levels.33 But Den Heijer has located additional information on interloper activities and concludes that these illicit activities may have amounted to as much as 10 percent of the Dutch slave trade, involving up to 30,000 slaves during the 1600–1730 period. Conjecture will have to suffice for the volume of this traffic, but I accept Den Heijer’s suggestion and have raised my estimate for the Dutch interlopers accordingly (see table 5.2).34 In my reassessment of the 1675–1739 period, I estimate the Dutch interloper share of the traffic at 15,000 slaves, and add 5,000 as an adjustment for transports that remain undetected. It should be noted, however, that interlopers may have sold their human cargoes primarily at foreign markets, so their operations may not have increased the volume at the common destinations of Dutch slave ships.
From Monopoly to Free Trade The decade of the 1730s was a transitional period in the Dutch Atlantic slave trade. The WIC had held a monopoly over Dutch participation in the traffic since it began in earnest. Although the company had gradually surrendered several monopoly privileges, it retained its monopoly over trade with Africa and the transatlantic slave trade for more than a century. These monopoly rights were also eliminated during the 1730s, when privately owned ships were allowed to obtain slaves in Africa and transport them to the Dutch West Indian colonies. The WIC charter was customarily renewed at thirtyyear intervals, and as the 1730 renewal approached, Zeeland merchants urged an end to the company’s monopoly of the bilateral trade with Africa and the transatlantic slave trade (see chapter 4). However, the new charter approved by the States General in 1730 reduced the WIC’s monopoly only slightly. It renewed the company’s monopoly of commerce on Africa’s Gold Coast, as well as delivery of slaves to the Guiana colonies of Suriname, Berbice, and Essequibo,
33
Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, 78–83. Compare tables 5.1 and 5.2. In my earlier data collection I included six interloper slave ships, for which there was only scanty information. I do not include these ships in my revised Slave Trade Data Collection, but list them separately from the WIC trade. See also Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, 276. René Baesjou is currently investigating the interloper trade. 34
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all critical markets for the slave trade, but allowed free-trade merchants to trade in other African and Caribbean regions after paying a stipulated fee (recognitie) to the WIC. Unsatisfied with these limited concessions, free-traders continued their press for additional reductions in the company monopoly. This led to additional reforms in 1734, and in 1739 the company stopped outfitting slave ships and opened all regions to free traders. Additional reforms in 1754 and 1761 reduced permit fees, eased payment schedules, and extended the validity of permits.35 During the final decade of its slave trade monopoly, the WIC remained very active in the slave trade and, ironically, intensified its efforts to increase the traffic. But by 1739, the company relinquished the last vestiges of its monopoly, although the company continued to serve in an intermediary capacity between African merchants and free traders at their trading stations on the African coast.36 The shift to free-trade slaving brought several other important changes. Because any Dutch subject could now purchase a permit to engage in the slave trade without running the risk of having ships confiscated, the interloper slave trade was now no longer a factor. Furthermore, the Dutch base of slave trade operation increasingly shifted to the province of Zeeland, tilting the geographic balance in a traffic that WIC directors had once kept more or less divided among several provinces.
Slaving Activities of Free Traders The extensive capital needed for the complex operation of the slave trade made it difficult for free traders to succeed as individual entrepreneurs, and required the organization of trading firms to be successful. Some of the slaving firms, such as the MCC and the Rotterdambased firm of Coopstad and Rochussen (C&R), were quite large, but there were also several smaller participants. As a variety of companies engaged in the traffic, the records of their activities became
35 Algemeen Rijksarchief (ARA), Archief van de Staten-Generaal (SG) 1321: res., 31 December 1761. See also Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, 201–05, and Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, 299–314. 36 See Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, 315–39, and Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, 201–05.
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widely dispersed, and it appears that only the records of the larger companies were preserved. However, since the WIC retained an indirect involvement in the slave trade by maintaining trading stations on the African coast, selling slaving permits to free traders, and selling slaves and services to free trade ships at trading stations, WIC documents remain valuable sources of information for free trade activities. Important sources of information for the African trade are various lists of ships and fees (lastgeld ) that free traders paid for the privilege of trading on the West African coast.37 One of the problems with these lists is that officials often made no distinction between fees for the bilateral trade between the Netherlands and Africa and those for the triangular slave trade. According to the WIC charter of 1730, those engaged in the bilateral trade with Africa were allowed twelve months to complete their voyages, while slave traders had sixteen months to complete their triangular ventures. These time allotments became more lenient with the so-called Regulations of 1734, which extended the length to sixteen and twenty months respectively. Monthly penalties were imposed when skippers exceeded these limitations.38 These directions, along with the fact that the bilateral trade route seemed much shorter than the triangular route involving three continents, influenced the counting of slave voyages in my 1990 study. Trying to avoid an undercount, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, I counted voyages longer than the sixteen months as slaving ventures. This produced approximately two hundred voyages that appeared to have been engaged in the slave trade, although corroborating evidence was lacking. Deciding that they must have been slave traders, I estimated average transports for them and postulated American destinations. Since slave ship arrivals were fairly well documented for most Dutch West Indian colonies, I also concluded that some of these ships landed slave cargoes at foreign ports
37 See ARA, Archief van de Nieuwe West-Indische Compagnie 1265; ARA, Aanwinsten – 1895, – 447; Zeeuws Archief, Archief van de Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie 119; ibid., 1569. In addition, a bound volume of handwritten pages, Lijst der scheepen vaarende op de Kust van Africa, 1762–1786, is available in the Algemeen Rijksarchief in The Hague, catalog no. 1.05.07 (see illustration 5.3). 38 In 1754 and 1760, further modifications were made in the fee payments and ship tonnage measurements. See ARA, SG 1321: res. 31 December 1761. See also note 35.
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while others went to Dutch colonial markets without leaving a record.39 As logical as these conclusions seemed at that time, new findings have demonstrated that they were wrong. In his recent study of the WIC trade with Africa, Den Heijer concluded that the bilateral commodity trade comprised approximately three hundred voyages during the 1675–1740 period, considerably more than I had expected.40 For the decade of the 1730s alone, he demonstrated that sixty-two ships I had assumed to be slavers were in fact commodity traders. While this decade shows the largest discrepancies, further research would undoubtedly reveal that other ships I counted as slavers were also commodity traders.41 This finding undermines the value of the WIC fee-payment lists as instruments for determining the number of slaves transported by Dutch free traders. It also confirms the need for a reassessment of the free-trade contribution to the Dutch slave trade. While much data of the smaller companies may be lost, making it impossible to duplicate the thorough assessment done for the WIC traffic, records are still available of larger companies such as the MCC, which commissioned 111 slaving voyages between 1732 and 1803, about 18 percent of all documented free trade slaving ventures. Reinders Folmer-van Prooijen’s recent examination of MCC records also reveals a miscount among free-traders involved in the slave trade. Contrary to my assumption that the triangular slave trade required longer voyages than the bilateral commodity trade, she found that the average MCC commodity trader with Africa took longer to complete an assignment than the average triangular slave trader. Comparing thirty-five MCC slave trade ventures with thirty-one MCC African commodity traders in the 1730–1760 period, she calculated that, on average, commodity traders took thirteen days longer than slave traders (514 vs. 527 days) before returning to their home ports.42 She concluded that I had mistakenly counted thirty-one MCC commodity voyages as slaving voyages, including eight from the 1730s that Den Heijer had already confirmed, and an additional twentythree for 1740–1761. This MCC mis-identification inflated my esti-
39
Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, 212–25. See chapter 6 in this volume. 41 Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, 362–363. 42 Corrie Reinders Folmer-van Prooijen was kind enough to share her findings before the publication of her dissertation. 40
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mate of slaves on Dutch ships by more than seven thousand.43 If the example of the MCC is applied to all free trade ships, 207 Africabound ships may have been erroneously identified as slave ships.44 Since neither American destinations nor slave boarding statistics in Africa have been located for these ships, it seems most likely that the majority were commodity traders. In my initial assessment of the free trade era, wanting to make certain the volume of the slave trade was not understated, I used a ‘maximalist’ approach and assumed that Dutch ships sailing to Africa were slave traders if they took longer than the allotted time and if there was the slightest indication that they might have been involved in that traffic. In this reassessment I use a ‘minimalist’ approach, including only those ships for which there is clear evidence that they carried slaves. Since much research still remains to be done for the free trade period, especially the years 1740–1780, it is quite possible that some of the not yet identified ships may be slave ships after all, and for that reason I include small estimates for such contingencies in the reassessment in table 5.3. Table 5.3. Revised Slave Exports from Africa by Dutch Free Traders, 1730–1803 Years 1730–1739 1740–1749 1750–1759 1760–1769 1770–1779 1780–1789 1790–1795 1802–1803 1730–1803
Transports Documented Adjustments Total Annual Avg. 4 99 106 184 160 50 24 6 636
1,299 31,374 35,942 50,907 47,380 11,925 8,039 1,206 188,072
1,000 1,500 2,000 1,500 1,500 1,000 500 9,000
2,299 32,874 37,942 52,407 48,880 12,925 8,539 1,206 197,072
230 3,287 3,794 5,241 4,888 1,293 1,423 603 2,941
Source: Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, 295; Postma Slave Trade Data Collection.
43 Estimates were used for the ships with uncertain assignments. Postma Slave Trade Data Collection. 44 Table 5.4 provides an overview of these misidentified ships, which are now excluded from the Postma Slave Trade Data Collection.
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Reduced Volume of the Free Trade
While significant revisions are necessary in the volume of the Dutch traffic, most of the other conclusions concerning Dutch involvement in the Atlantic slave trade contained in my 1990 book remain substantially intact. The downward revisions in the volume of the free trade totals more than 59,000, but this is partially compensated by an increase in estimates for the WIC and interlopers slave trade before 1740, which add up to about 18,000 (see tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3). By far the largest adjustment resulting from these new calculations occurs in the decade of the 1730s. Contrary to what one might expect, free traders were initially very hesitant to enter the traffic after the partial lifting of the WIC monopoly in 1730. Only four slave transports can be documented with certainty during that decade, which is perhaps less than interloper traffic before the freeing of the trade. The initial limitations – preserving the WIC monopoly over the Gold Coast in Africa and the Guiana colonies in the Americas, which had become the most important slave markets for the Dutch in the eighteenth century – did not provide much inducement for free traders to enter the traffic. But even when all of the West African coast was opened for free traders in 1734, they failed to enter the trade in large numbers. It has also been determined that all the early free trade slaving ventures incurred financial losses, and this must have added to their initial lack of enthusiasm.45 Considerable expansion of the free trade came about only when the WIC withdrew from the slave trade altogether at the end of the decade and the Guiana markets were opened to free traders. Altogether, the four documented free trade slaving ventures during the 1730s carried 1,206 slaves from Africa, far fewer than I had estimated in my early study.46 As illustrated in table 5.3, subsequent decades also show significantly smaller numbers of ships and slaves for the free trade than indicated in previous estimates, although the differences decrease with each decade. After 1770, the discrepancies drop dramatically until they become insignificant during the last two decades of the eighteenth century. Despite the corrections, the free traders still exported annually more than 6,300 slaves from Africa in the years 1762–1772, 45
See Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven. Based on the new Postma Slave Trade Data Collection. See also Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, 212–15, 284. 46
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representing approximately 8 percent of the aggregate Atlantic slave trade at that time.47 After 1772, however, the Dutch slave trade rapidly declined as several factors combined to create an economic crisis in the Dutch empire that produced serious credit problems for the Dutch plantation colonies.48 While it seems certain that all or nearly all of the 200 ships now removed from the old data collection were not involved in the slave trade, additional research is needed to clarify the precise utilization of them. The danger of the minimalist approach is that a few slave ships may still have eluded the scrutiny of researchers, and this is why I have adjusted with estimates for such likelihood in table 5.3. A tally of the ships removed from the old database appears in table 5.4, along with estimates for hypothesized slave consignments. These numbers are slightly higher than indicated in the text because newfound data added a few previously unknown slave voyages. In addition, newly discovered data on earlier documented slave transports raised the number of slaves carried by free traders by approximately 2,500. Table 5.4 specifies the number of ships now either clearly identified as commodity traders or quite likely so, and it also lists (column 4) seventeen ships included in my original data collection for which no human cargoes were ever calculated because they were thought to be commodity traders from the beginning (column 5).49 Documentation of the Dutch slave trade for the years 1770 to 1803 is more reliable than for the previous decades. Van der Oest has contributed to this through research for his master’s thesis (1994), also displayed in chapter 12 of this volume. He found a significant amount of data concerning slave imports on the Dutch plantation colonies of Essequibo and Demerara in present-day Guyana, and he generously shared his data for inclusion in my new data collection.50 Additionally, my own research on bilateral commerce between the Dutch Republic and Suriname has also clarified the importation of 47 See H. S. Klein, The Atlantic Slave Trade (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 208. 48 Postma Slave Trade Data Collection, and Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, 212–15, 284. See also chapter 11 in this volume. 49 The original list of free trade ships is published in Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, appendix 2. 50 Van der Oest, ‘Vergeten kolonies,’ 73, 118–20. The three settlements in presentday Guyana – Berbice, Essequibo, and Demerara – were established and controlled by the Dutch until 1796, when the British took possession of these colonies. Chapter 12 in this volume examines this subject in greater detail.
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Table 5.4. Ships Removed from Earlier Postma Slave Trade Data Collection, 1730–1803 1 Decades
2 Ships
3 Estimated Slaves
4 Afica Traders*
5 Estimated Zero#
1730–1739 1740–1749 1750–1759 1760–1769 1770–1779 1780–1789 1790–1795 1802–1803 Totals
62 53 39 28 12 6 5 2 207
19,230 16,576 11,755 8,410 2,985 1,365 1,050 190 61,561
9 9 7
9 1 1 1 2 3
25
17
Source: Postma Slave Trade Data Collection. * These ships have been identified as bilateral Africa traders and are included in column 2. # These were listed as probable slave ships, but no estimates were included for enslaved passengers, and they were most likely Africa traders.
slaves into that colony. Added to the large number of slave ships that landed human cargoes at Paramaribo, an additional 116 Dutch slave ships stopped briefly at Suriname and reported the size of their transports before moving on to other West Indian markets. About half of these ships landed a portion, often just a few, of their slaves at Paramaribo. This practice of stopping there and then sailing to another destination was routine, especially after 1773, when many plantations became heavily mortgaged and many planters lacked the credit to purchase slaves.51 The final decades of the Dutch slave trade are thus quite well documented, including verified destinations for virtually all voyages. The documentation is made easier by the fact that only Dutch skippers were allowed to bring slaves to Suriname and other Guiana settlements. But a new variable entered the equation during the late 1780s, when United States ships were allowed to bring slaves into Suriname and British ships to their colonies in Guyana. North
51 Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, 214–15. The Postma Suriname Data Collection contains more than 4,300 voyages in the shuttle trade between the Dutch Republic and Suriname between 1682 and 1794, including detail on these layovers.
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American ships had been heavily engaged in the commodity trade between the North American colonies and the Dutch Guiana settlements during the entire eighteenth century, making their presence commonplace. The British had a keen interest in Demerara.52 And after the Dutch merchant marine was impaired by the Fourth AngloDutch War (1780–1784) and was unable to service the Dutch colonies in the West Indies adequately, United States skippers carried commodities from the Guiana colonies to the Netherlands and they were also allowed to bring slaves to these colonies.53 In the six-year period of 1789–1994, eighty-one United States ships landed more than seven thousand enslaved Africans at Paramaribo, an average of eighty-six slaves per transport (see chapter 11).54
American Destinations In addition to modifying the overall volume of the Dutch slave trade, new data also call for a reassessment of the distribution of African slaves in the Americas. This reassessment is especially necessary for the free trade period because of the sizable downward correction in the volume of that traffic. Thus far, the slave trade has been discussed in terms the numbers of slaves boarded on the African coast, but when the distribution of slaves in the Americas is the subject, the numbers were obviously reduced by mortality during the middle passage. Here too, new-found data changed the slave mortality rates slightly: in the WIC trade the overall average death rate rose from 15.9 percent to 16.8 percent, while for the free trade it declined from 13.8 to 13.5 percent.55
52
See chapters 11 and 12 in this volume. J. Postma, ‘Breaching the Mercantile Barriers of the Dutch Colonial Empire: North American Trade with Surinam during the Eighteenth Century,’ in Merchant Organization and Maritime Trade in the North Atlantic, 1660–1815, ed. O. U. Janzen (St. Johns, Newfoundland: International Maritime Economic History Association, 1998), 107–31. 54 The information is drawn from Postma’s America-Suriname Database. Two American slave transports were inadvertently included in my old data collection. Their removal lowered the Dutch slave trade to Suriname for the years 1802–1803, and they are now included in the American imports. See table 11.5. 55 Postma Slave Trade Data Collection; Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, 250–51. Revised figures are from the revised Dutch Slave Trade Database. 53
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Table 5.5 shows the destinations of enslaved Africans on WIC vessels, and table 5.6 does the same for free trade ships. American destinations are well documented for both categories. Of the 365 WIC documented slave ships, the place of disembarkation is known for all but fifteen. Twelve ships took slaves to multiple destinations. Estimates are inserted for both of these groups in table 5.5. This table clearly illustrates that Curaçao was the most important market for the WIC slave ships, particularly before 1700 when the Dutch controlled the asiento trade to the Spanish American colonies. By the Table 5.5. Destinations of WIC and Interloper Slave Ships, 1675–1739 Curaçao
St. Suriname Essequibo Berbice Spanish Mixed Unknown Total Eustatius America Transports Destin.
154 3
21 1
130 5
17 4
7 3
9
12 1
Slaves 64,050 Mixed Consign.* 900 Unknown Dest. 1,500 Interlopers Total 66,450
11,119 300 1,500 2,000 14,919
59,108 1,500 750
3,839 800 750
2,045 600 500
4,294
4,628
61,358
5,389
3,145
4,294
Ships Mixed Consign.*
15
365
6,251 155,334 528 4,628 1,251 6,251 13,000 15,000 1,779 181,213
Source: Postma Slave Trade Data Collection. * Mixed transports for Berbice and Essequibo (a total of seven) have been divided arbitrarily.
Table 5.6. Destinations of Free Trade Slave Ships, 1730–1803 Curaçao Ships Mixed Transports* Stopped at Suriname Slaves Documented Ports Mixed Transports Unknown Destinations Undocumented Est. Stopped at Suriname# Total
St. Suriname Demerara Berbice Dest. Mixed Total Eustatius Essequibo Unknown Consign.
21 5
22 2
404 35 117
55 14
18 7
53
51 13
573
6,612 1,000 2,000
6,221 500 2,500
106,488 7,000 1,000
14,848 1,400 250
4,701 1,000 500
11,740 2,626 5,490 7,500
13,526 150,610 13,526 11,740 7,500
9,612
9,221
(2000) 114,488
16,498
6,201
27,356
183,376
Source: Postma Slave Trade Data Collection. * Mixed transports for the Guyana colonies (a total of 21) have been divided arbitrarily. # An estimated 2,000 enslaved Africans remained in Suriname from slave ships that stopped there briefly. The majority of the slaves on board were taken to other destinations.
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1720s, however, Suriname had replaced Curaçao as the primary distribution market, and that position was solidified as the free trade era progressed. Overall, identifications of destinations in the WIC trade has not changed significantly since my 1990 study, except that additional research has produced more information on imports to Suriname and to the Essequibo and Demerara settlements. In contrast to the WIC trade, American destinations for slaves carried on free trade ships require a major reassessment. Not only has more detailed information become available for Suriname and the settlements at Essequibo and Demerara, but the withdrawal of about two hundred ships from the earlier data collection required significant change in identifying distribution markets. On the other hand, the removal of a large number of mistakenly identified slave cargoes created a much clearer picture of where the free traders disembarked their slaves. Of the 621 documented free trade slaving voyages, all but thirty have documented data on the number of slaves either boarded or landed, and in many cases additional detailed data is available about these human cargoes, as well as destination and departure and arrival dates. Slave disembarkations at Paramaribo in Suriname, the most important destination during the free trade era, is now quite thoroughly documented. Import data for the twin colonies of Essequibo and Demerara are also much clearer.56 Documentation of shipping to Suriname not only sheds light on slave embarkations in that colony but also supplies information about shipments to other settlements. As the easternmost Dutch colony in the West Indies, Suriname was often the first port of call. As many as 116 slave ships anchored at Paramaribo but then took all or most of their human cargoes to other markets. Suriname officials recorded the number of slaves aboard the arriving ships, but they often also registered intended ports of destination. Thus, the record on American destinations in the Dutch free trade has become quite comprehensive. A singular destination has been verified for 520 of the 624 slaving voyages and multiple destinations for another fifty-one. Table 5.6 lists estimated slave landings for these shipments based on ports mentioned in the records. This leaves only
56 J. Postma Commerce with Suriname is a study in progress, see chapter 11 in this volume. For Essequibo and Demerara, see chapter 12.
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fifty-three slave transports, or 8.5 percent (an estimated 12,000 slaves), with an unidentified port of disembarkation. This is a major difference with my earlier conclusions, which had more than 250 slave ships with unidentified destinations. In my earlier study, I surmised that most ships with unidentified destinations had taken their slaves to foreign markets, but no evidence has been found of significant slave landings by Dutch ships in foreign markets during the eighteenth century.57 The reduction in free trade slave transports virtually eliminates the possibility of foreign markets, and I now estimate that no more than 5,000 to 10,000 slaves were taken to foreign markets by Dutch free trade slavers – a reduction from an earlier estimate of around 40,000.58 In table 5.6, I have conjectured destinations and estimated slave landings for which destinations have not been identified. Of the large number of ships removed from the earlier database, I still expect that some may have been slavers after all. For this reason, I have included 5,000 slaves in the adjustment column of table 5.3.
Conclusions As shown in table 5.7, the overall revised estimates for the Dutch Atlantic slave trade between 1675 and 1803 show a reduction of approximately 42,000 slaves, or about 7.7 percent from earlier projections. This change is due primarily to a significant decrease in estimated free trade shipping. The numbers for the WIC slave trade actually increased by about 10,000 slaves during the 1621–1739 period. No major adjustment is necessary for the volume prior to 1675, as no significant new information for this period has been discovered in recent years, except that the estimate for interloper shipments has been raised to about 10 percent of the WIC traffic.59 The crucial years between 1675 and 1803 have now been so well scrutinized that no significant new adjustments are expected for this period. Table 5.7 presents a consolidated picture of the revised volume of the Dutch slave trade.
57 58 59
Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, 225. Ibid., 300. An estimated 2,000 slaves have been added for interloper transports.
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Table 5.7. Revised Aggregate Dutch Slave Exports from Africa, 1600–1803 Years
WIC Trade Free Trade Documented Interlopers Documented Adjustments & Adjustments
1600–1645 1646–1664 1665–1674 1675–1679 1680–1689 1690–1699 1700–1709 1710–1719 1720–1729 1730–1739 1740–1749 1750–1759 1760–1769 1770–1779 1780–1789 1790–1795 1802–1803 1600–1803
30,182 11,039 43,412 12,942 50,269 26,200 28,511 21,455 28,102 23,725
5,000 3,000 1,500 1,500 3,000 3,500 4,000 4,000 3,000
275,837
28,500
Total
Annual Average
35,182 721 14,039 713 44,912 4,391 14,442 2,888
1,299 31,374 35,942 50,907 47,380 11,925 8,039 1,206 188,072
1,000 1,500 2,000 1,500 1,500 1,000 500 9,000
32,511 25,455 31,102 26,024 32,874 37,942 52,407 48,880 12,925 8,539 1,206 501,409
3,251 2,546 3,110 2,602 3,287 3,794 5,241 4,888 1,293 1,423 603 2,458
Source: Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, 295; Postma Slave Trade Data Collection.
The relative position of the Dutch in the Atlantic slave trade remains virtually unaltered as a result of this reassessment. Their overall participation is reduced from 4.7 to 4.6 percent of the Atlantic traffic, which has recently been estimated at slightly more than eleven million slaves exported from Africa across the Atlantic.60 The Dutch remain one of the minor participants along with Spain (4.7 percent) and North America (2.5 percent), and far behind Portugal and Brazil (45.9 percent), Britain (28.1 percent), and France (13.2 percent). This reassessment of the Dutch slave trade has been a humbling experience. My pioneering work of past decades contained flaws and misjudgments from which important lessons can be learned. It shows that assumptions and speculation, however reasonable they may seem, are always inferior to verifiable evidence. 60 D. Eltis, ‘The Volume and Structure of the Transatlantic Slave Trade; A Reassessment,’ William and Mary Quarterly 58, no. 1 (2001): 43. My 1990 percentage was based on a higher grand total, 11.5 million, of the transatlantic slave trade.
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Although a 7.7 percent correction is no fatal error, it confirms that historical writing is rarely definitive and is constantly in need of revision. While a historian’s work is mostly an individual effort in both research and writing, this study also shows the communal aspect of historical research through which various individuals contribute building blocks for a reconstruction of the past. This is not a new insight, but it is a reminder that while competition may be an incentive toward greater effort, cooperation among scholars is essential and can be very productive and gratifying.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE WEST AFRICAN TRADE OF THE DUTCH WEST INDIA COMPANY, 1674–17401 H H
The merchant who is traveling into the interior will be assisted by two Christian servants of the Company and some blacks who are familiar with local customs and languages. The merchant is provided with commodities which can be used as gifts to caboceers [African brokers], chiefs and kings of whom is known that they are willing to trade with the Company. Instruction for WIC-merchants, 1705.2
Introduction Ever since the Portuguese explored the West African coast in the fifteenth century, this territory was increasingly integrated in a fast growing maritime trading system that involved several countries and colonies in the world. Sweet Brazilian tobacco, for instance, became an important product in the slave trade between Africa and the European colonies in the Americas. Indirectly there also existed an exchange of products between Asiatic countries and the West African coast. The East India companies shipped huge quantities of cowrie shells from the Maldives and textiles from the Indian subcontinent to the European staple markets. There these products were sold to merchants and companies with interests in the West African trade. The little cowrie shells were used as money on the Slave Coast and
1 This is a revised version of an earlier publication under a different title by the same author. See H. J. den Heijer, ‘Dutch Shipping and Trade with West Africa, 1674–1740,’ International Journal of Maritime History 11, no. 1 (1999): 53–79. 2 Algemeen Rijksarchief (ARA), Archief van de Nieuwe West-Indische Compagnie (NWIC) 97: Instructie voor kooplieden, 1705.
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were bartered for slaves. European and Asiatic textiles were exchanged for various African commodities, including slaves, gold and ivory everywhere along the African coast. Conversely, African gold and ivory were shipped to the European staple markets and from there to several Asiatic countries. This chapter analyzes shipping and trade of the Second Dutch West India Company (WIC) with the West African coast between 1674 and 1740. After a short overview of earlier Dutch participation in the African trade, the three main shipping activities, the coasting, the bilateral, and the slave trade, are examined. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of Dutch private trade with West Africa after 1730.
The First Dutch West India Company in West Africa The Dutch were late arrivals in the sea-borne commerce with West Africa. Only on the threshold of the seventeenth century did Dutch merchants start trading on the West African coast. The first Dutch trading voyage to West Africa was made in 1593 by a skipper named Barent Ericksz. His voyage was the beginning of a fast growing trade with the Guinea Coast. Between 1599 and 1608 some two hundred Dutch ships sailed to the African coast, an average of twenty per year.3 By 1600, Dutch merchants had become dominant in the West African trade. But unfortunately, competition between merchants was stiff and profits were rapidly shrinking. In an effort to sustain the African trade, the States of Holland began negotiating with participating merchants to secure collaboration instead of competition. But commercial rivalry between the provinces of Holland and Zeeland prevented the founding of a trading company for Dutch commerce with Africa and the Americas at that time.4 During the Twelve Year Truce (1609–1621) in the Dutch Revolt against the king of Spain, new efforts led an agreement to organize the Dutch West India Company, which would coordinate Dutch shipping and trade in the Atlantic. After long debates in city coun-
3 H. E. van Gelder, ‘Scheepsrekeningen van enkele der vroegste Guinea-vaarten,’ in Economisch-Historisch Jaarboek 2 (The Hague: Nijhof, 1916), 239. 4 J. I. Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585–1740 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), 61.
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cils and in the States of Holland and Zeeland, the WIC was finally constituted by the States General in June of 1621. The newly chartered company was granted a monopoly in trade to the Americas, the Caribbean, and to Africa south of the tropic of Cancer.5 While the main objective of the WIC was to establish and defend a commercial network, in practice it spent more money on privateering and war against Spain and Portugal in the Atlantic. Notwithstanding the costly wars in Brazil and the Caribbean, the company managed to build an extensive trading network with West Africa. Trading forts and factories on the African coast were set up in two phases. Between 1625 and 1637 the WIC established several trading factories on the Gold Coast and captured the Portuguese forts at Arguin and Cabo Verde, giving the company control of commerce in the Senegambia region. The main expansion of Dutch power in West Africa, however, was achieved during the second phase, which lasted from 1637 till 1642. In the first year the Dutch captured São Jorge da Mina (Elmina), the most important stronghold of the Portuguese in Africa. During 1641, the last year of phase two, the WIC took the Portuguese colony of Angola and the sugar island of São Tomé. For the time being the company had eliminated Portuguese power in western Africa. But in 1648 the Portuguese recovered Angola and São Tomé and were repelling the Dutch in Brazil. Only the possessions on the Gold Coast remained firmly in the hands of the WIC. Despite these losses, the company was still the foremost European trading power in West Africa, although its position was weakening. The drive for colonies and long years of war against Spain and Portugal in the Atlantic had exhausted the WIC’s capital and brought it close to bankruptcy. Financial problems made it almost impossible to invest in the West African trade, and several attempts to reform the company did not succeed. The States General finally decided to dissolve the WIC in September 1674.6 The majority in the States General, however, were convinced that the interest of the Dutch Republic in the Atlantic was best served by a chartered company.
5 J. de Laet, Jaerlyck verhael van de verrichtinghen der Geoctroyeerde West-Indische Compagnie in derthien boecken, ed. S. P. L’Honoré Naber and J. C. N. Warnsinck, Werken uitgegeven door de Linschoten Vereeniging, nos. 34, 35, 37, 40 (1644; reprint; The Hague: Nijhoff, 1931), 1:7. 6 H. J. den Heijer, De geschiedenis van de WIC (Zutphen: Walburg, 1994), 107–08.
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So they decided to establish a similar company on the very day the old one dissolved.7 At first sight the transformation from the old West India Company into the new one amounted to no more than a debt-redemption with some minor adjustments in company structure. Nevertheless, there were some significant differences between the First and the Second WIC. The old company, for example, was not only a trading organization and administrator of Dutch colonies in the Atlantic, but also an instrument in the war against Spain and Portugal. The Second WIC, by contrast, was primarily a commercial organization with interests in the commodity trade with West Africa and the transatlantic slave trade. Both kinds of trade were of great significance to the economy of the United Provinces and its colonies in the Atlantic. During the meetings of the central board of directors, the so-called Heren X, the guiding policies were determined for the coming year. The directors planned the equipment of vessels to Africa, including the number and size of the slave ships. Sometimes they also determined the value of the cargoes. One of the most important subjects was the evaluation of the company’s financial condition, which determined the payment of dividends to shareholders. Since the Heren X met only once a year, the decisions were implemented by the chambers themselves.8 The directors of the presiding chamber also had to take care of the correspondence with the various agents of the company, including the director general in Elmina. They also controlled the trade by sending price guides to Elmina, which stipulated the prices for goods to be bought and sold on the African coast by company’s personnel. After the WIC was reestablished in 1674, the directors did almost everything possible to stimulate the African trade. The prospects were initially quite positive. Old debts were resolved and the company had adequate working capital to invest in shipping and trade. Thanks to the fact that the company possessed a chain of forts on the Gold Coast and trading factories elsewhere, the WIC was still the strongest
7 ARA, Archief van de Staten-Generaal (SG) 3290: Resoluties (res.), 20 September 1674. 8 Octroy, By de Hoogh Mogende Heeren Staten Generael, verleent aen de West-Indische Compagnie (The Hague: Jacobus Scheltus, 1674), art. 22, [no. 11112 in W. P. C. Knuttel, Catalogus Pamfletten-verzameling berustende in de Koninklijke Bibliotheek (Utrecht: Hes Publishers, 1978)].
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European power on the West African coast, especially on the Gold Coast where the position of the Dutch was unrivaled. In the 1670s they had nothing to fear from the Royal African Company (RAC), their most important English competitor in Guinea. Ever since the foundation of the RAC in 1672, this organization had suffered from a permanent shortage of funds and little opportunity to invest in the expansion of its trading activities. Other European trading companies were still unimportant on the Gold Coast in the 1670s. Not only the availability of a suitable infrastructure in Africa, but also the great demand for gold and ivory in Europe and slaves in the Americas offered a good opportunity for restoring the Dutch trade with West Africa. In the United Provinces there was an enormous demand for precious metals to finance the trade with the Baltic and Asia.9 It is true that the African share of exporting gold had gradually declined since the second part of the seventeenth century, but the demand for gold on the world market was still growing, and so were selling-prices in Europe. More or less the same was happening in the transatlantic slave trade. In addition to the constant need for slaves in the Spanish colonies, there was a rising demand for black laborers in the Caribbean, caused by the rapidly expanding sugar production of the islands. The Dutch colonies in the Guianas were still underdeveloped in the 1670s, but the number of sugar plantations steadily increased, as a consequence, and so did the demand for slaves. By the end of the seventeenth century, Suriname was one of the WIC’s main customers for slaves.
Overview of Dutch Shipping with West Africa In the African trade the WIC employed four different kinds of shipping activities, namely coastal or coasting trade, coast-guarding along the coast, commodity trade between the United Provinces and West Africa, and the triangular slave trade between the Dutch Republic, West Africa, and the Americas. For each activity the company used different types and sizes of vessels. Trading voyages along the coast, 9 A. Attman, Dutch Enterprise in the World Bullion Trade, 1550–1800, Acta Regiae Societatis Scientiarum et Litterarum Gothoburgensis, Humaniora, no. 23 (Uppsela: Alqvist and Wiksell, 1983), 27; J. G. van Dillen, ‘Amsterdam als wereldmarkt der edele metalen in de 17de en 18de eeuw,’ De Economist 7 (1923), 589.
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for instance, were made by small ships with light armament, while cruisers for coast guarding were usually heavily armed frigates. Ships utilized for transport of merchandise between the Dutch Republic and West Africa were of generally medium size. In the commodity trade, yachts and small frigates were the heavily favored types of ships. In the slave trade, however, the company did not use a special kind of ship but employed a variety of vessels with different kinds of measurements and capacity.
Ships in Coasting Trade Among the various trading methods employed by the WIC on the African coast, the most common practice was the so-called stationary trade. In this practice, the company’s trading forts and factories functioned as connecting links between African and Dutch merchants. Next to this static method, the company also employed a more flexible trading system based on coasting trade employing small ships. For coasting trade the director general in Elmina had four to six vessels at his disposal. They were used for communication and transport of merchandise, food, and building materials between headTable 6.1. Number of Ships in the African Trade, 1674–1740 Period 1674–1680 1681–1685 1686–1690 1691–1695 1696–1700 1701–1705 1706–1710 1711–1715 1716–1720 1721–1725 1726–1730 1731–1735 1736–1740 Total
Coast Guarding Commodity Trade 2 3 4 3 3 5 2 5 3 2 1 33
43 32 51 20 24 10 12 45 21 41 24 4 7 334
Slave Trade Total 55 36 42 24 35 31 25 18 20 34 26 28 9 383
100 68 96 48 62 44 42 65 46 78 52 33 16 750
Source: H. J. den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven. Scheepvaart en handel van de Tweede Westindische Compagnie op Afrika, 1674–1740 (Zutphen: Walburg, 1997), 96, table 5.1.
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quarters at Elmina and other trading stations elsewhere on the coast. But the main task of these vessels was coastal trade with parts of the African coast where the company did not maintain trading stations. The Ivory Coast, Grain Coast, and QuaQua Coast, which are situated northwest of the Gold Coast, were frequently visited by company vessels, while southeast of the Slave Coast, mobile trade was driven with the African kingdoms in the Niger Delta and Old Calabar. The length of trading voyages along the coast could vary from a few weeks to a maximum of eight months. Only in rare cases were ships out for a year or more. The destination of the longer voyages was always to the south of the Bight of Benin and Biafra. During these trips ships had to sail into little creeks and rivers, so it is understandable that only small and shallow-draft vessels were suitable for trading voyages along the coast. The WIC used several types of ships but preferred fishing vessels like buizen (busses), hoekers (hookers), and pinken.10 The size of the crews on these ships varied between five and fifteen sailors. Less common but occasionally also employed were small barques and yachts with a maximum crew of twenty-five. Most of the crew members were Europeans. Only on rare occasions did the company employ Africans. Generally these African sailors were pawns, African debtors of the WIC who payed their debt in labor.11 Coastal vessels were lightly armed with one or two small canon, a few muskets (snaphaunches), machetes, and swords. With these arms the crew could protect itself against Africans or European rivals in case of conflict. The captains of these ships always combined their maritime task with the role of supercargo, and he had to coordinate and administer the commercial activities very carefully. Unfortunately, the bulk of the once-massive administrative records of the coasting trade has not survived. Of the hundreds of trading voyages, the accounts of only twenty-six trips in the period 1697–1721 survive. It is therefore impossible to construct a general view of the company’s coasting trade with this limited information. Still, the documents cast an interesting light on littoral shipping. Voyages along the Grain and Ivory coasts generally lasted not longer than two or three months, while ships bound for the Niger Delta, the Cameroons, or the isle of 10 J. van Beylen, Schepen van de Nederlanden (Amsterdam: Van Kampen, 1970), 140–46. 11 ARA, NWIC 110: Monsterrol, 31 December 1733.
10
146 henk den heijer
OASI/BRIL/POST/11374/05-05-2003
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Corisco made trips of six to twelve months. During the twenty-six trading voyages for which records exist, the company purchased African products valued at ƒ281,000. After deducting the expenses, a net profit of ƒ95,000 remained. Only two trading voyages show a deficit. This means that the WIC made an average profit on these trips of 51 percent.12 The costs of personnel at the coast and trading stations, however, is not included in this calculation.
Coast-Guarding Ships The commerce of the WIC could flourish only if competition with Dutch and/or other European merchants was limited. Especially the activities of interlopers (lorrendraaiers), which generally operated from ports of the province of Zeeland, were a commercial threat for the WIC. To prevent the activities of interlopers, the directors tried to keep a well-armed cruiser stationed in African waters continuously. But the company’s financial state made it often impossible to equip ships to guard the coast. In the period 1677–1686, for instance, not a single cruiser was sent to Africa. Under normal circumstances the costs of outfitting a cruiser came to about ƒ36,000 a year.13 But in the exceptional case of the vessel the Faam, a heavily armed frigate that made its second trip to Africa in 1718, the directors invested ƒ41,700 in equipment and provisions. To stop the frequent aggressive actions of interlopers once and for all, they put 163 sailors and soldiers on the Faam at a cost of about ƒ20,000 in wages a year.14 Notwithstanding this investment, interlopers continued their illegal activities. In December 1718, the Faam was attacked and sunk by two interlopers near the coast of Angola.15 With the sinking of the Faam, the company suffered not only a big financial loss, but also a painful psychological defeat in its struggle against the interlopers. During the period 1674–1740, the WIC directors equipped thirtythree ships for coast guarding, as is shown in table 6.1. The ship type mostly used for such duties was a frigate with a length of 110 to 125 feet. As far as we know, only once was a galiot employed in 12 13 14 15
Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Ibid.,
97–101: Handelsrekeningen van kustschepen, 1697–1721. 97: J. van Sevenhuijsen to Heren X, 30 May 1701. 1299: Rekeningen van equipage en victualiëring van de Faam. 104: W. Butler to Heren X, 27 March 1719.
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that capacity, and yachts were used four times. Cruisers were armed with approximately twenty-five guns and had an average crew of a hundred sailors and soldiers. Almost all cruisers were equipped by the chamber of Amsterdam. These cruisers usually operated one and a half years in African waters before returning to the Netherlands. The directors of the WIC invested a huge amount of money in equipping ships for coast guarding duties, and they were quite successful in its struggle against smugglers. Its cruisers seized ninetyeight Dutch interlopers, mainly equipped in Zeeland, between 1674 and 1730. These vessels also captured seventy-six Brazilian slave ships. The peace treaty of 1641 between the Dutch Republic and Portugal prohibited the Portuguese from trading on the Guinea Coast.16 However, the directors allowed Brazilians to trade on the Guinea Coast if they paid the company a toll of 10 percent of their merchandise at Elmina (see chapter 7). Brazilians who refused to pay risked the confiscation of their ship and cargo. If we calculate the profits and liabilities of the coast guarding activities, the WIC made a profit of ƒ1.35 million.17 We have to realize, however, that the company forfeited incalculable profits as a result of smuggling activities in the African trade.
Ships in the Commodity trade The bilateral trade between the Dutch Republic and Africa was economically the most important shipping activity of the Second WIC. Company vessels carried huge quantities of merchandise to West Africa and returned with valuable cargoes of gold, ivory, and other African products. For the commodity trade alone, the directors equipped 334 ships in the period 1674–1740 (see table 6.1). But coast guarding cruisers were also used for the transport of merchandise between Europe and Africa, and occasionally even vessels equipped for the slave trade transported small quantities of African products via America to the Netherlands.
16 C. van de Haar, De diplomatieke betrekkingen tussen de Republiek en Portugal, 1640–1661 (Groningen: Wolters, 1961), 38–40. The peace-treaty was confirmed in 1669. 17 Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, 295.
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Usually the ships in the commodity trade were bound for Elmina. Of the 334 vessels equipped by the WIC, 296 sailed straight to Elmina. Only five made a combined voyage to Elmina and another destination in the Senegambia region or on the Loango-Angola coast, while thirty-three vessels did not sail to Elmina at all. Until 1679 the WIC regularly sent ships to the isles of Arguin and Cabo Verde. After the conquest of its forts and factories in the Senegambia region by the French in 1678 and 1679, trade and shipping to this territory was limited. Between 1674 and 1687 the directors equipped twenty-four ships to the Senegambia region. Although not documented, it is possible that a limited trade was conducted with Cabo Verde after 1687 by company ships bound for Elmina.18 In 1721 trade at Arguin was resumed for a short period, and within three years the chamber of Amsterdam sent five ships to the island for the gum trade. But again and again the French prevented WIC personnel from reconstructing a factory at Arguin, so the directors decided to cease trading there definitely in 1724.19 Only a few ships were equipped for the commodity trade with the factories south of the Guinea coast, on the isle of Corisco and the Loango-Angola coast. The factory on Corisco was established in 1679 but closed two years later. Trade with Corisco was mainly in ivory and slaves, and this turned out to be disappointing.20 The company also possessed trading stations at Mpinda, Cabinda and Majombo on the Loango-Angola coast, to which the WIC sent four vessels to purchase dyewood. In 1682, for instance, the directors of the chamber of Amsterdam chartered a small flute for the transport of 100,000 pounds of dyewood from Angola to the Dutch Republic.21 This trade lasted until 1722, when the chamber of Zeeland equipped the hooker Poelwijk to the Loango-Angola coast. Within a year the chambers of Noorderkwartier and Zeeland sent two more ships to Majombo for trading dyewood. In all cases the ships were small and the value of the cargoes was modest. But trade on the Loango-Angola coast was driven not only by the vessels mentioned above. Most trading in 18 P. Hair, ed., Barbot on Guinea: The Writings of Jean Barbot on West Africa, 1678–1712, Hakluyt Society, 2d ser., no. 176 (London: Hakluyt Society, 1992), 1:104. 19 ARA, NWIC 377: 13 October and 29 December 1722; ibid., 378: 23 March and 16 June 1723; ibid., 379: 7 July 1724. 20 Ibid., 268: Generale driejaarlijkse rekening, 1680–1683; ibid., 336: 17 March 1681. 21 Ibid., 336: 10 October 1681; ibid., 338: 20 April 1683.
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Angolan products like dyewood, copper, and ivory was conducted by slave ships that frequented the factories in Angola. The type of ships employed in the WIC commodity has been identified for nearly 50 percent. Most common were the frigates and yachts with a length of 70 to 110 feet; these could sail to the Guinea Coast within three months. As a rule, ships in the commodity trade were mounted with fifteen to twenty guns and usually manned by thirty to thirty-five sailors.
Ships in the Slave Trade Of all shipping activities, the Heren X invested most of the company’s capital in the triangular slave trade. Between 1674 and 1740 the company equipped 383 vessels for the transport of slaves.22 In principle, slaves could be bought everywhere along the African coast, but until the end of the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–1713), the Slave Coast and the Loango-Angola Coast were the main suppliers and most of the slave ships were bound for these regions. From 1715 on, however, the Gold Coast surpassed both of these regions as supplier of slaves. The WIC did not use special ships for the slave trade, nor did it ever design vessels for this purpose. However, ships were internally modified to be suitable for the transport of slaves. Before a slave ship left the Dutch Republic, carpenters constructed a so-called diep verdeck or koebrug, which was a narrow ‘tween deck’ between the lower and the upper decks. This extra deck supplied valuable additional space to house slaves since the hold of the ship was for storing cargo, victuals, and water, rather than slaves.23 The triangular trade employed different ship types. The biggest vessels in the trade were flutes, pinnaches, and frigates with a length
22 Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, 383; J. Postma, The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1600–1815 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 110, table 5.1. Postma calculated the number of slave ships in the period 1674–1740 less than 5 percent lower than Den Heijer. 23 G. C. E. Crone, Onze schepen in de Gouden Eeuw (Amsterdam: Van Kampen, 1943), 33; Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, 142; V. Enthoven, ‘Pinassen, jachten en fregatten. Schepen in de Nederlandse Atlantische slavenhandel,’ in Slaven en Schepen. Enkele reis, bestemming onbekend, ed. R. Daalder, A. Kieskamp, and D. J. Tang (Leiden: Primavera, 2001).
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of 110 to 120 feet. Ships of that size carried an average of 600 slaves. The largest number of slaves ever transported by a WIC vessel, however, was 952. In 1696 the Johannes de Doper, a ship chartered by the chamber of Amsterdam, carried this number from Angola to the Dutch Guiana colonies of Suriname and Essequibo.24 Medium-sized ships like frigates, yachts, and galiots carried an average number of 400 slaves, while small ships like barques and hookers transported about 200 slaves per voyage. Altogether, the company shipped 190,500 slaves to the New World between 1674 and 1740. About 156,700 blacks survived the voyage and their treatment in the holding barracks in the colonies.25 The size of the crew and the armament of a slave ship depended on the size of the vessel and the number of slaves expected to be carried. Big slavers were manned by forty-five to sixty sailors and mounted with fifteen to twenty guns. Mid-sized ships had thirty to forty-five sailors and a maximum of ten guns, while small vessels had twenty to thirty sailors and fewer than ten guns. The average duration of a triangular voyage was 516 days, but the difference in time required for individual voyages could be considerable.
Trade from the Dutch Republic to West Africa Information about the quantity of goods shipped to West Africa in the seventeenth century is limited because the main part of the WIC’s archives were sold by the Dutch government in 1821 and disappeared in a paper-mill. But a comparison of the remaining documents of this period with the abundant information from the beginning of the eighteenth century, reveals that the kind of merchandise shipped to Africa changed very little over a long period.26 The large variety of commodities taken to West Africa can be reduced to five categories. Textiles represent more than half of the value, while military stores, cowrie shells, alcoholic beverages, and metal wares formed the bulk of the other half.
24 ARA, SG 5773: Lijst van compagnieschepen die slaven naar Suriname hebben vervoerd. 25 Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, 151–52, tables 5.11a and 5.11b. 26 ARA, NWIC 335: 811–1262, Handelsdocumenten.
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For the period 1700–1723 the cargo lists of 138 ships which sailed to West Africa survive, and additional information is preserved for the period 1727–1730.27 These cargo lists and other documents contain useful information about the variety of trade goods, their quantities and prices. Together they represent ƒ6.8 million worth of commodities, which is approximately 22.6 percent of the total value of goods shipped between 1674 and 1740, as is shown in table 6.4. From WIC traders, West African buyers had a choice of at least a hundred different commodities. In his famous New and Accurate Description of the Coast of Guinea, the Dutch factor Willem Bosman referred to the large variety of goods required to trade successfully on the West African coast.28 While at least a hundred different commodities were necessary for trading effectively, the company had usually 150 to 200 sorts of articles in stock. In exceptional cases it could offer the African traders as many as 350 different commodities.29 As noted below, textiles represented the most important category of imports to Africa, 50.6 percent. Textiles also illustrate how the West African coast was interlinked with international trade. The huge quantities of all kinds of fabric bartered in Africa were manufactured in several countries in Europe, in Asia, and in Africa itself. Cotton cloth, for instance, was manufactured mainly on the Indian sub-continent and shipped by the East India Companies to Europe. The directors of the WIC bought these products at the Dutch staple markets and shipped them to the West African coast.30 Asiatic calicos were introduced in West Africa by the Portuguese in the sixteenth century.31 The cheapest of the Asiatic textiles were braulis and baftas, two sorts of Indian cotton cloth which were sold in West Africa between ƒ1 and ƒ2 an ell.32 A very popular but more expensive textile was chintz; a multi-colored cotton which was woven all
27 Ibid., 109: Lijst van naar Guinea verstuurde goederen, 1727–1730; ibid., 1282–1304: Ladinglijsten van schepen. 28 W. Bosman, Nauwkeurige Beschryving van de Guinese Goud- Tand- en Slave-kust, nevens alle desselfs Landen Koningryken, en Gemenebesten (Utrecht: Anthony Schouten, 1704), 89. Bosman’s work was translated into English in 1705. 29 ARA, NWIC 103: Marktbrief, 1 July 1716. 30 C. Jörg, ‘De handel van de VOC in India,’ in Sits: Oost-West relaties in textiel, ed. E. Hartkamp-Jonxis (Zwolle: Waanders, 1987), 16–17. 31 G. V. Scammel, The First Imperial Age: European Overseas Expansion ca. 1400–1715 (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 13. 32 ARA, NWIC 97–111: passim. Prices are listed on the so called ‘marktbrieven’ (fixed price rates).
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Table 6.2. WIC Imports into West Africa, 1700–1723 (guilders) Year
Textiles
Military Stores
1700 1701 1702 1703 1704 1705 1706 1707 1708 1709 1710 1711 1712 1713 1714 1715 1716 1717 1718 1719 1720 1721 1722 1723 Total
11,450 22,950 50,100 193,690 188,200 82,780 80,150 73,230 184,290 59,280 73,160 57,200 99,320 191,960 152,580 29,070 59,990 61,690 83,810 46,680 65,340 355,610 217,550 220,220 2,660,300
1,460 15,950 15,490 31,450 19,900 17,500 8,440 16,850 71,310 20,650 12,940 21,830 19,380 19,520 18,320 4,880 19,150 27,500 48,300 10,700 18,400 124,590 56,080 19,230 639,820
50.6
12.2
Percent
Cowrie Alcoholic Iron Bars Miscellaneous Shells Beverages
24,250 41,200 36,480 55,080 591,410
300 6,740 4,880 15,010 6,100 18,360 5,070 270 14,360 6,200 6,300 2,550 3,110 5,670 4,050 750 9,830 6,510 24,530 5,660 14,750 37,750 15,780 10,410 224,940
11.2
4.3
15,290 25,410 44,330 29,830 26,440 12,250 15,900 38,220 4,470 14,380 8,840 17,320 43,040 45,250 13,850 30,450 49,130
Total
5,270 10,590 100 880 118,990
16,360 6,430 24,220 70,670 46,770 36,990 42,150 30,710 56,640 24,430 43,860 22,450 37,870 61,220 49,780 11,040 55,530 28,660 33,040 9,700 29,820 140,030 81,020 63,690 1,023,080
29,570 67,360 120,740 369,660 292,280 189,280 165,810 141,720 385,610 120,650 152,660 115,800 180,460 329,900 281,690 45,740 159,130 154,810 238,810 72,740 157,830 709,770 407,010 369,510 5,258,540
2.2
19.5
100
640 14,510 1,480 7,210 17,750 4,760 20,790 5,620 2,020 2,930 3,460 8,490 11,710 780
Sources: ARA, NWIC 1282–1304. Note: The trade goods in this table represent 55.8 percent of the commodities shipped by the WIC to West Africa between 1700 and 1723. See also table 6.4.
over India. European textiles that sold well in Africa were made of linen and wool. They included perpetuana’s (serge woolens from England), saaien (serge woolens from Leiden and Haarlem in the Dutch Republic) and platthillios (Silesian linen). European textiles were much cheaper in Africa than the calicos from Asia. A curious but very popular product was the half-used linen sheet from Holland. The company bartered thousands of these sheets at the value of ƒ2:10:00 a piece. In the years 1727–1730, for example, the WIC sold 40,000 sheets
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on the Gold Coast alone.33 Finally, a small portion of the textiles was bought and sold in Africa itself. On the Gold Coast, company merchants sold waist-cloth purchased at the Ivory Coast and the kingdom of Benin. The average selling price of an African waistcloth was less than a guilder a piece.34 The second category of commodities traded by the WIC in Africa was military stores, which consisted of a variety of firearms and gunpowder. Military stores accounted for 12.2 percent of the total import of the WIC. Initially, the sale of firearms to West Africa was limited.35 The directors of the company were afraid that the spread of firearms would be a threat to the safety of its personnel in Africa. Moreover, firearms could stimulate political instability and war on the Gold Coast and seriously disturb the flow of gold from the interior. However, when private traders and rival European companies, first of all the English, started spreading firearms among the Africans in the second half of the seventeenth century, the WIC did the same. During the last decades of the seventeenth century the director general in Elmina frequently asked his superiors in the Netherlands to send him more firearms. In December 1687, for example, the company had 8,717 snaphaunces in stock at Elmina.36 In addition to these, different types of carbines and pistols were also bartered for African products and slaves. The WIC made an average profit of 100 percent on firearms. During the first decades of the eighteenth century, the import of firearms into West Africa slowly increased. Between 1700 and 1723 the company shipped 68,797 firearms to Africa, but 10,164 of the guns turned out to be inferior and were returned to the Netherlands. This means that 14.8 percent of the firearms did not reach the African market. In the years 1727–1730 the percentage of inferior weapons increased to 33.9 percent. This deterioration in the quality of firearms was frequently noted in reports from WIC merchants to 33
Ibid., 104: Lijst van naar Guinea verstuurde goederen. Ibid., 104: Handelsrekening van de factorij te Benin, 1717–1718; ibid., 104: W. Butler to Heren X, 10 December 1718. In 1718 and 1719 the WIC bought 5,906 waist cloths at Benin. 35 P. de Marees, Beschryvinghe ende historische verhael van het Gout Koninckrijck van Guinea, anders de Gout-custe de Mina genaemt, liggende in het deel van Africa, ed. S. P. L’Honoré Naber, Werken uitgegeven door de Linschoten Vereeniging, no. 5 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1912), 95–96; R. A. Kea, Settlements, Trade and Polities in the Seventeenth-Century Gold Coast (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 158. 36 ARA, NWIC 54: Heren X to N. Sweerts, 9 October 1688. 34
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the directors in the Dutch Republic. Dutch guns were simply dangerous; an African who fired a Dutch snaphaunce risked losing his hands. As a result, African merchants began to prefer British firearms.37 This was quite a contrast to the end of the seventeenth century, when Africans still considered Dutch firearms superior to others.38 Gunpowder was another important military product. The WIC shipped more than 1.5 million pounds of gunpowder to West Africa between 1700 and 1723, of which 67,300 pounds were returned to the Dutch Republic for their inferior quality. In this period about 4.5 percent of the gunpowder was not salable but, as with firearms, the percentage increased within a few years to 8.5 percent.39 So we have to assume that the quality gunpowder was also steadily decreasing. Cowrie shells, the third category of commodities shipped to Africa, were generally shipped to Europe from the Maldive Islands by the Dutch and English East India Companies. These little sea shells were used as currency on the Slave Coast.40 Between 1700 and 1723, the WIC shipped almost 900,000 pounds of cowries to the Slave Coast, accounting for 11.2 percent of the total import to that region. The fourth category of commodities, alcoholic beverages, accounted for millions of liters imported and sold along the West African coast. Strong liquors like Dutch gin (brandewijn) and French brandy were favorite among the Africans, but also beer and wines were sold in small quantities. Alcoholic beverages accounted for bout 4.3 percent of Dutch imports to Africa. A fifth category, iron bars, constituted 2.2 percent of Dutch trade goods. A large proportion of the metal imports was in the form of pans, buckets, knives, and locks. Luxuries like beads, trinkets and mirrors were also imported but on a very small scale. The cost of many commodities remained fairly stable between 1674 and 1740 because of the absence of price inflation in the Netherlands until the 1730s.41 The prices of African products also 37
Ibid., 110: J. Elet to chamber Zeeland, 18 November 1733. Public Record Office (PRO), Treasury 70/11: H. Greenhill to directors, 5 January 1684. 39 Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, 119, table 5.5, 120–21. 40 ARA, NWIC 335: 26 April 1680; M. Johnson, ‘The Cowrie Currencies of West Africa,’ Journal of African History 11, nos. 1 and 3 (1970): 17–49, 331–53; K. Polanyi, Dahomey and the Slave Trade (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1966), 81–95. 41 J. de Vries and A. van der Woude, Nederland, 1500–1815. De eerste ronde van moderne economische groei (Amsterdam: Balans, 1995), 718, graph 12.6, 719. 38
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remained fairly stable until 1740. However, the prices of slaves steadily rose after the beginning of the eighteenth century because of growing demand for slaves in the Americas, which created fierce competition between European slave traders on the West African coast.
Exports from Africa to the Dutch Republic The WIC exported several products from West Africa to the United Provinces, but the main items were gold and ivory. If we restrict ourselves to the export from the Gold Coast, from which approximately 95 percent of the company’s African products came, gold and ivory together accounted for 96.9 percent of the value of the export, as is illustrated on table 6.3. Next in importance were products like melequeta (cayenne pepper), wax, gum, and dyewood. In addition, small quantities of lime juice, cardemom, ostrich feathers, and copper were shipped to the Republic. These minor products were bought primarily in the Senegambia region and on the LoangoAngola coast. Melequeta was obtained at the Grain Coast and the Ivory Coast. A very curious export item, which is not listed in table 6.3, was the civet cat.42 The company shipped hundreds of live civet cats to the Dutch Republic, where the secretion of the anal glands of these animals was used in the perfume industry. Export lists also include tobacco, ‘Buenos Aires’ hides, and gold and silver cruzados (Portuguese silver coin), which were brought to Africa by Portuguese slave traders from Brazil. Together these products represent only a small percentage of the total value of the company’s export from West Africa. For that reason, we will concentrate on the export of gold and ivory. Gold was the most important export commodity for the Dutch until 1740, when the directors of the WIC decided to discontinue the slave trade and minimize the commodity trade with West Africa. The company exported 62,876 marks (14,260 kilograms) of gold from the Gold Coast between 1676 and 1731, valued at more than ƒ21 million.43 The price of gold in the United Provinces increased from 42 ARA, NWIC 334: 8 and 15 August 1679; ibid., 348: 21 August 1693. See also I. Prins, ‘Gegevens betreffende de oprechte Hollandsche civet,’ in EconomischHistorisch Jaarboek 20 (Amsterdam: NEHA, 1936). 43 ARA, Verspreide West-Indische Stukken (VWIS) 928: Memorie van ingehandelde retourwaren op de kust van Guinea.
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Table 6.3. WIC Exports from the Gold Coast, 1675–1731 (guilders) Product
Unit Price
Gold Ivory Crusados (gold) Cayenne pepper Wax Sugar (white) Hides Dyewood Lime Juice Gum Crusados (silver) Sugar (brown) Cardemom Copper Total Value
336:00:00 0:17:00 15:00:00 0:02:00 0:08:00 0:04:00 0:01:00 0:01:00 20:00:00 0:01:06.6 2:10:00 0:03:00 0:04:00 0:06:00
Quantity 62,876 2,955,533 14,438 1,323,548 314,597 570,020 810,290 804,146 1,700 357,981 5,102 44,113 14,177 5,330
mark pound pieces pound pound pound pound pound aam pound pieces pound pound pound
Value
Percentage
21,126,330 2,512,280 216,570 132,350 125,840 114,000 40,510 40,210 34,000 25,060 12,760 6,620 2,840 1,600 24,390,970
86.60 10.30 0.89 0.54 0.52 0.47 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.01 100.00
Sources: ARA, NWIC 1262–1263; ARA, VWIS 928. Note: The quantity of the products is given in different units. A mark is a medieval standard of weight for precious metals and is the equivalent of eight troy ounces = 0.22680 kilograms. The Amsterdam pound measured 0.49409 kilograms. An Amsterdam aam was a measure for liquids and equaled 155.22 liters.
ƒ290 per mark at the beginning of the seventeenth century to ƒ340 at the end of the century. During the period 1674–1740 the price of gold remained fairly stable, with an average selling price of ƒ336 per mark.44 The company was a small but not insignificant supplier of gold to the Dutch Republic. A portion of this gold was sold to the Dutch East India Company, which shipped it to Asia. In total, the WIC shipped ƒ36 million of African gold to the Netherlands between 1674 and 1740. Of all the company exports from Africa, gold accounted for approximately 80 percent of its total value.45
44
ARA, NWIC 1262–1263: Driejaarlijkse rekeningen kamer Zeeland; De Laet, Jaerlyck Verhael, 4:295. 45 It is true that only 86.6 percent of the export from Elmina (the Gold Coast) consisted of gold and other commodities from the Gold Coast. Products from the Ivory Coast, Slave Coast and Benin were shipped through Elmina and are not listed in table 6.3. The export of the Senegambia region and the Loango-Angola coast is fixed on 5 percent of the total African export. See Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, 128.
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The amount of gold exported annually from the Gold Coast fluctuated substantially from year to year, but still it is possible to trace a pattern over the period 1674–1740. Until 1697 the WIC exported an average of 1,700 marks of gold a year. At the end of the seventeenth century, however, there was a sudden drop in the export of gold from Africa, with the average diminishing to 770 marks a year between 1697 and 1740.46 A plausible explanation for the declining gold trade is the expansion of the Asante confederation in the interior, which brought decades of war and instability to the Gold Coast.47 But the total export of gold from the Gold Coast did not decrease as dramatically as suggested above. It is well known that from the end of the seventeenth century slave traders from Brazil frequented the Guinea Coast and bought slaves from the WIC at Elmina and on the Slave Coast. But before a Brazilian slave trader could start his trading activities on the Guinea Coast, he had to pay a 10 percent toll on the value of the cargo to the WIC authorities at Elmina.48 Most of the traders payed their toll, as well as the cost of slaves purchased from the company, with Brazilian tobacco and sugar and with gold mined in Brazil. At its factory in Ouidah (Fida) on the Slave Coast, for instance, the company sold slaves to the Brazilians for a total of 154 marks of gold between August 1721 and October 1722.49 It is evident that of the gold exported by the WIC from West Africa between 1674 and 1740, only a portion was mined at the Gold Coast. From the beginning of the eighteenth century, about half of the gold exported by the company was brought to Africa by Brazilian slave traders. So even though gold mining on the Gold Coast decreased after 1700, the WIC remained the most important European gold trader in West Africa until 1740. The RAC, the WIC’s most important rival in West Africa, exported only about one hundred marks of gold annually between 1701 and 1725, which was substantially lower than Dutch exports.50
46
ARA, VWIS 928: Memorie. ARA, NWIC 97: J. van Sevenhuijsen to Heren X, 15 April 1700 and 30 May 1701. 48 P. Verger, Flux et reflux de la traite des nègres entre le Golfe de Bénin et Bahia de Todos os Santos du XVII e au XIX e siècle (Paris: Mouton, 1968), 11, 42. See also chapter 7 in this volume. 49 ARA, NWIC 105: Handelsoverzicht van Fida, 1 August 1721–1 October 1722. 50 T. F. Garrard, Akan Weights and the Gold Trade (London: Longman, 1980), 158. 47
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159
Ivory was bartered along the African coast from the Senegambia region in the north to the Loango-Angola coast in the south. Ivory was a very important commodity for the WIC. During the period 1676–1731 it shipped nearly three million pounds of ivory from Elmina to the Dutch Republic, with a market value of ƒ2.5 million (see table 6.3). Unfortunately, we do not know the quantity of ivory that was shipped from other parts of the West African coast. But as indicated earlier by Postma, the quantity mentioned above was probably only half of the total amount of ivory that the company exported between 1674 and 1740.51 Ivory accounted for approximately 13 percent of all WIC exports from Africa to the Dutch Republic. By modern standards, the WIC export of ivory was enormous. Ten thousand tusks of varying size were shipped to the European markets. This ivory was used for the manufacture of snuff boxes, fans, cutlery, and medallions. It was also widely used as inlay for furniture. The average selling price of ivory in the Netherlands was seventeen penningen a pound.52 Over the years, the export of ivory followed a very capricious pattern. In 1678, for example, 133,867 pounds of ivory were shipped from the Gold Coast, while in 1696 the company exported only 1,952 pounds from Elmina. Ivory exports followed quite a different pattern from that of gold exports. During the last quarter of the seventeenth century the export of ivory steadily decreased, with an average annual export of 43,400 pounds. Between 1700 and 1731, however, ivory exports grew to an average of 59,800 pounds a year. But from the beginning of the 1730s the export decreased again.53 Warfare had apparently no effect on the ivory trade from the Gold Coast. The decline in WIC ivory exports after 1730 was the result of growing competition from Dutch and English free traders.
51 J. Postma, ‘West African Exports and the Dutch West India Company, 1675– 1731,’ in Economisch en Sociaal-Historisch Jaarboek 36 (The Hague: Nijhof, 1973), 61–62. 52 ARA, NWIC 1262–1263: Driejaarlijkse rekeningen kamer Zeeland. 53 H. M. Feinberg, Africans and Europeans in West Africa: Elminans and Dutchmen on the Gold Coast during the Eighteenth Century (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1989), 59.
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The Slave trade
The WIC started its active participation in the transatlantic slave trade in the 1630s after the conquest of northern Brazil.54 Unfortunately, information about the slave trade in the period before 1674 is sparse and unreliable, but the years between 1674 and 1740 are well documented. In this period, the company transported almost 190,500 slaves across the Atlantic to supply the Dutch plantation colonies on the Guiana coast and the slave markets at Curaçao and St. Eustatius. Of this number, only 156,700 survived the voyage to the Americas and their stay in the company’s slave barracks before being sold to colonists and merchants. This means that the mortality rate was about 17.7 percent (see chapter 5).55 Although slaves could be purchased everywhere along the African coast, for the WIC the main regions were the Slave Coast, the Gold Coast, and the coastal region of Loango-Angola. The latter region was the main supplier of slaves until the end of the seventeenth century. Between 1696 to 1723, the Slave Coast became the most important region in the WIC slave trade, and between 1723 and 1740 the WIC acquired the major portion of its slaves at the Gold Coast. Political turmoil between states on the Slave Coast diminished the export of slaves from this territory in the 1720s.56 On the other hand, wars on the Gold Coast, caused by the expansion of Asante in the interior, diminished the production and export of gold but increased the number of prisoners of war who were sold to the Dutch as slaves.57 In the Caribbean, the island of Curaçao was the most important entrepôt for the slave trade with the Spanish colonies. Initially the slave trade with Spanish colonists was illegal, but in 1662 the WIC became a subcontractor in the slave asiento, the slave trade contract granted to private merchants by the Spanish government (see chapter 9).58 Until the end of the War of the Spanish Succession in 1713, the WIC was the main supplier of slaves for the Spanish colonies. 54
Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, 13–14. Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, 151–52, tables 5.11a and 5.11b. 56 R. Law, The Slave Coast of West Africa, 1550–1750: The Impact of the Atlantic Slave Trade on an African Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 166–67. 57 ARA, NWIC 98: W. de la Palma to Heren X, 5 September 1705. 58 S. van Brakel, ‘Bescheiden over den slavenhandel der West-Indische Compagnie,’ in Economisch-Historisch Jaarboek 4 (The Hague: Nijhof, 1918), 49. 55
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By way of Curaçao, the company shipped almost 62,500 slaves to the Spanish-American mainland, about 39.9 percent of its total import of slaves into the Americas. When the asiento was lost to the British, the company started an open slave market at St. Eustatius.59 Between 1719 and 1727 twenty ships sailed from Africa to St. Eustatius and delivered 10,200 slaves. But the trade was financially not very successful, so the directors decided to discontinue the open slave market in 1727. While the slave trade in the West Indies could fluctuate very strongly, due to free market principles and uncertain contracts with the asentistas (merchants who held the asiento), the slave markets in the Dutch colonies in the Guianas were fairly stable. The WIC held a monopoly over the importation of slaves in the three Dutch plantation colonies of Suriname, Essequibo, and Berbice. In Suriname it was even responsible for supplying the colony with as many slaves as were needed by its colonists.60 The company supplied Suriname with 60,800 slaves between 1674 and 1740, which was 38.8 percent of the total WIC slave trade, slightly less than the percentage shipped to Curaçao. To the other colonies in the Guianas, about 6,450 slaves were shipped, which was 4.1 percent of the total slave trade of the WIC. The destination of 16,150 slaves is not clearly documented, but most of these slaves were undoubtedly shipped directly to Veracruz and Porto Belo on the Spanish-American mainland.61 The slave trade was, as pointed out by Postma, a very complicated business.62 It not only involved a wide geographic range, but also many different societies and economic systems. In the Netherlands, commodities were purchased in guilders or pound Flemish; in Africa these commodities were bartered for slaves, and in the Americas, the slaves were exchanged for tropical products like sugar and bills of exchange. This complexity makes it very difficult to analyze the profitability of the slave trade. Still, it is possible to calculate the gross profits with the data which are available, as is illustrated in table 6.4. In Africa, the WIC obtained its slaves for commodities valued 59
Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, 197–200. J. J. Hartsinck, Beschryving van Guiana of de Wilde Kust in Zuid-America . . . (1770; reprint, Amsterdam, Emmering, 1974), 2:627–28. 61 ARA, NWIC 353: 9 September 1698. The directors of the WIC and the asentistas made a contract in 1698 to deliver the slaves directly in the ports of Cartagena, Veracruz and Porto Belo in the Spanish colonies. 62 Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, 259–60. 60
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between ƒ40 and ƒ45 per slave, while the selling price of a slave in the Americas fluctuated between ƒ190 and ƒ215.63 Until 1711, during the last phase of the War of the Spanish Succession, the company made a reasonable profit in the slave trade. Slaves sold to the asentistas at Curaçao produced a net profit of between 10 and 20 percent. The slave trade to the colonies in the Guianas was less profitable. Selling prices were about 10 percent lower here than in the Caribbean so that the net profit fluctuated between 5 and 10 percent. At the end of the War of the Spanish Succession in 1713, the cost of slaves increased from ƒ40 in 1710 to ƒ90 in 1740. But at the other end, selling prices hardly increased in the Guianas, causing profits to decrease substantially. Because the expense of equipping slave vessels did not decline but actually increased slightly, the slave trade increasingly became a wasteful enterprise for the WIC.
Shipping and Trade in Private Hands In 1730 the WIC’s charter had to be renewed by the States General. Participants in the interloper trade in Zeeland now started a pressure group to prevent the renewal of the charter if the States General refused to end the company’s monopoly in the African trade.64 The group persuaded the States of Zeeland to support their endeavor,65 arguing that the WIC monopoly had ruined Dutch trade in the Atlantic. After a long political struggle in the States General, the Zeeland pressure group succeeded in liberating the West African trade. In 1730 the monopoly was partially lifted, and in 1734 it was completely terminated.66 During the 1730s, the WIC continued to compete effectively with the Dutch free traders, but by the end of the decade the company directors decided to cease the transatlantic slave trade and minimize the commodity trade with West Africa.67 After 1740, the WIC became essentially an administrator of Dutch colonies and trading posts in the Atlantic, leaving the commodity 63 Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, 159, table 5.12; Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, 406, appendix 24. 64 ARA, VWIS 904: Kort relaas. 65 Zeeuws Archief (ZA), Archief van de Staten van Zeeland 325: res., 30 November 1728. 66 ARA, SG 3789: res., 6 October 1733; C. Cau, et al., eds. Groot Placaet-Boeck, 1658–1796 (The Hague: Van Wouw, 1658–1797), 6: columns 1414–1415. 67 ARA, NWIC 57: Heren X to J. de Petersen, 25 August 1740.
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trade with West Africa and the transatlantic slave trade to private merchants (see chapter 4). In historiography there is a common view that private merchants were far better equipped than the WIC to serve the economic concerns of the Dutch Republic in the Atlantic.68 Unfortunately, information about the commodity trade of private merchants with Africa is fragmentary. But a good indicator is the remunerativeness of the Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie (MCC), the most important Dutch private company in the West African trade. During the 1740s this company generated a net profit of well over 14 percent in the commodity trade.69 However, the combination of the ever growing competition with the British free traders and the shrinking gold production in Africa, led to declining profits in the African trade. To acquire enough gold, ivory, and other commodities, Dutch ships had to stay at the African coast longer and longer, which resulted in an increase in expenses. Confronted with higher costs for equipping ships and wages of the crew, merchants saw their initial profit slowly changing to loss. For a round-trip trading voyage, for instance, the WIC paid an average wage of ƒ6,280 to its crew, while the MCC had to pay its crew ƒ7,540. Even more striking is the difference in the value of the return cargoes: a company vessel shipped ƒ134,410 worth of African commodities to the Dutch Republic, while the value of a return cargo of an MCC ship averaged ƒ76,500. Such negative results forced the directors of the MCC to abandon the commodity trade with West Africa in 1768.70 Other private companies and ship owners continued the trade in African products. Unfortunately, little is known about the financial results of their trading efforts, but it is unlikely that they were very successful. According to research by Unger and Hudig, the private slave trade produced a slight profit.71 But just like the commodity trade, private
68
See, for instance, J. de Vries and A. van der Woude, Nederland, 1500–1815, 543. ZA, Archief van de Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie (MCC) 167, 473, 493, 958, and 1023: Scheepsboeken. This margin of profit is 2 percent lower than the 16 percent presented by Reinders Folmer-van Prooijen, because the overhead of the company was not incorporated in the later ones, C. Reinders Folmer-van Prooijen, Van goederenhandel naar slavenhandel. De Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie, 1720 –1755, Werken uitgegeven door het Koninklijk Zeeuwsch Genootschap der Wetenschappen, no. 10 (Middelburg: Koninklijk Zeeuwsch Genootschap der Wetenschappen, 2000), 200–01, appendix b. 70 Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, 364–65. 71 J. Hudig Dzn., De scheepvaart op West-Afrika en West-Indië in de achttiende eeuw 69
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slave trading voyages were also longer and more expensive than those organized by the WIC. Nevertheless, private slave traders made a profit, while the WIC incurred losses during its last decades in the slaving business. However, this does not mean that private merchants were better equipped for the slave trade than the WIC had been in the past. The merchants merely profited from the economic revival of Suriname, which resulted in higher selling prices of slaves, because plantation owners had more credit available to pay for their slaves shortly after they had been delivered.72 During the slave trade monopoly, however, it was almost impossible for the WIC to collect the outstanding debts for slaves that had been sold.73 Private merchants in the West African trade did not possess trading posts on the African coast. To obtain gold, ivory, and other African products, as well as slaves, free traders had to undertake longer lasting voyages, which could seriously raise expenses. It is also remarkable how private slave trade merchants remained dependent on the WIC. To prevent long trading voyages and high death rates among the slaves on their ships, free traders frequently bought their human cargo from WIC officials, who were able to deliver the slaves immediately.74 For this privilege a private merchant had to pay the company a ƒ20 poll tax per slave.75 But the purchasers were prepared to put up with this, because a longer stay on the African coast meant higher expenses and higher mortality among the slaves.
Conclusions To cope with European competitors in West Africa the WIC had to maintain friendly relations with African states. Until the end of the seventeenth century, the Guinea Coast was divided into a large number of small kingdoms that exhibited a certain balance of power.
(Amsterdam: De Bussy, 1926); W. S. Unger, ‘Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis van de Nederlandse slavenhandel, 2. De slavenhandel der Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie, 1732–1808’ in Economisch-Historisch Jaarboek 28 (The Hague: Nijhof, 1958), 3–131. 72 Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, 407–10, appendix 25. 73 ARA, NWIC 61: Chamber Amsterdam to J. Hoevenaer, 10 January 1735; ibid., 1141: J. Hoevenaer to chamber Amsterdam, 5 July 1736. 74 ARA, VWIS 932: Financiële stukken Guinea, 1741–1780. 75 Ibid., 41: Heren X to States General, 29 November 1744.
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War and political conflict were quite common, but seldom on a large scale.76 The WIC had to reckon with the policies of the African states and their mutual relations. War, for example, could seriously disturb the flow of the trade. The company frequently tried to tighten its grip on the coastal states by making treaties with their rulers.77 Usually the director general in Elmina offered military protection in exchange for a trade monopoly. At first these agreements were quite satisfactory, but after a while, when competition increased, they became useless. The company was unable to prevent African rulers and merchants from trading with other European companies and interlopers. Still, the WIC remained the foremost European trading power in West Africa until 1700, but its position became increasingly precarious. By the close of the seventeenth century, the English had eleven forts and factories on the Gold Coast while the Brandenburgers possessed three strongholds. It is not possible to indicate a clear point at which the Dutch trade with West Africa started to decline. Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that a decisive change in trade took place about 1700. First of all, there was a major shift in the balance of power between the interior states and the coastal kingdoms. On the Gold Coast, Asante expansion caused political turmoil and war for a long period. As a result, the African gold trade gradually declined. Another reason was the liberation of the African trade by the English parliament in 1698.78 This policy led to a growing number of British free traders in the commodity trade with West Africa and in the transatlantic slave trade. The intense competition between European free traders and companies pushed up the prices of gold, ivory, and slaves. Compared with the seventeenth century gold trade, the total African gold export decreased by approximately 20 percent between 1700 and 1750. The WIC was also confronted with a shrinking export. In the first decades of the century, the proceeds of African products gradually declined as a result of the diminishing gold trade. But in the 1720s, contrary to what one would expect, the WIC’s gold export increased. This, however, had nothing to do with a growing output of African gold, but was the result of the import of Brazilian gold
76 77 78
Kea, Settlements, Trade and Polities, 130. ARA, NWIC 122: Contracten met naturellen, passim. K. G. Davies, The Royal African Company (London: Longman, 1957), 134–35.
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Table 6.4. Gross Profits (Gp) in the Commodity and Slave Trade, 1674–1740 (guilders)
Period
Commodities Purchase Sale Gp (%)
1674–1677 1,103,350 1,032,750 1678–1680 1,188,440 2,024,190 1681–1683 1,273,520 3,015,640 1684–1686 1,191,380 2,248,700 1687–1689 1,153,930 2,796,490 1690–1692 1,116,480 3,344,270 1693–1695 831,310 2,917,890 1696–1698 1,062,520 2,100,400 1699–1701 579,330 2,084,720 1702–1704 866,470 1,851,890 1705–1707 741,500 1,499,160 1708–1710 701,250 1,431,770 1711–1713 616,290 1,298,380 1714–1716 324,710 1,634,600 1717–1719 636,760 1,324,180 1720–1722 1,567,940 2,014,880 1723–1725 960,640 3,017,430 1726–1728 896,580 2,771,770 1729–1731 643,850 2,200,100 1732–1734 887,500 1,926,460 1735–1737 611,680 1,543,700 1738–1740 305,550 812,760 Total 19,260,980 44,892,130
Purchase
Slaves Sale
0.94 508,180 1,912,910 1.70 690,660 2,746,480 2.37 429,450 1,845,990 1.89 669,560 2,841,630 2.42 476,950 2,065,640 3.00 360,250 1,494,200 3.51 326,030 1,305,260 1.98 360,630 1,469,740 3.60 478,650 1,971,980 2.14 364,310 1,453,410 2.02 334,450 1,425,010 2.04 299,120 1,325,500 2.11 230,200 626,310 5.03 411,200 1,089,290 2.08 426,320 932,920 1.29 573,320 1,336,560 3.14 910,390 2,093,170 3.09 784,730 1,780,300 3.42 640,930 1,389,180 2.17 731,550 1,308,530 2.52 676,860 1,283,040 2.66 121,300 249,700 2.33 10,805,040 33,946,750
Gp (%) 3.76 3.98 4.30 4.24 4.33 4.15 4.00 4.08 4.12 3.99 4.26 4.43 2.72 2.65 2.19 2.33 2.30 2.27 2.17 1.79 1.90 2.06 3.14
Sources: ARA, NWIC 268–69; Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, 151–52, tables 5.11a and 5.11b.
into West Africa. Portuguese traders shipped gold dust to the Guinea Coast, where they bartered the precious metal for slaves. As noted earlier, however, the Portuguese were compelled to pay customs at Elmina, where they also bought slaves from the Dutch. In this way the WIC acquired a reasonable share of the Brazilian gold. Despite the fierce competition with free traders and interlopers as well as the diminishing gold production in Africa, the company was able to maintain its position in the commodity trade remarkably well. Besides, the export of African products did not decrease all along the line. The export of ivory, for instance, increased after the beginning of the eighteenth century. Also, the gross profit that the WIC earned in the commodity trade remained fairly stable, as shown in table 6.4.
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The course of the Dutch transatlantic slave trade is quite another story. With the reestablishment of the Second WIC in 1674, the most important purchasers of slaves were the asentistas at Curaçao. The asentistas, who had contracted a slave-asiento with the Spanish Crown, bought their slaves from the WIC for fixed prices and delivered them to the Spanish colonies. The slave trade to the Dutch colonies in the Guianas was less important in 1674, but increased during the last decades of the seventeenth century. All the same, the WIC was not able to market more than 3,000 slaves a year. The slave markets served by the WIC were quite stable, while the British and French plantation colonies expanded rapidly and bought increasing numbers of slaves. Until the end of the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–1713), in which the Dutch lost the asiento trade, the WIC made reasonable profits in the slave trade. It bought slaves for a low price in Africa and sold them to the asentistas for fairly high prices. At the slave markets in the Guianas, however, selling prices were considerably lower. The War of the Spanish Succession was a turning point in the WIC slave trade. After the loss of the asiento trade, the company started an open slave market on St. Eustatius. On this market, slaves were sold to plantation owners of the surrounding English and French sugar islands between 1719 and 1728. But selling prices remained very low and instead of making profits, the WIC incurred heavy losses. By 1728 the directors decided to discontinue the slave trade at St. Eustatius. In the mean time, selling prices of slaves in the Dutch Guiana colonies stagnated, while the prices of acquisition steadily rose as a result of the fierce competition in Africa. Consequently, from 1711 onwards gross profits in the slave trade declined by almost 50 percent. Because the cost of equipping slave vessels was twice as much as for ships in the commodity trade,79 the latter experienced a slight increase while the slave trade increasingly became a losing enterprise for the company. If we compare the value of the WIC commodity trade with its slave trade between 1674 and 1740, it is clear that the trade in African products was the most important one. About 56.9 percent of the revenues made in the African trade was generated by gold, ivory, and other African commodities, while 43.1 percent came from the
79
Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, 165.
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slave trade (see table 6.4). And in the eighteenth century, the commodity trade became increasingly more important for the company. In literature about slavery and economic history, however, the slave trade is still seen as the economic lynchpin of the Dutch-African trade.80 According to David Eltis, who estimated the value of the total trade between Africa and the Atlantic world in five selected decades, the value of the slave trade between 1681 and 1690 was ƒ4.5 million while the value of the commodity trade in the same period was ƒ3.7 million.81 In the decade mentioned by Eltis, the WIC dominated the slave trade to Spanish America and supplied the Dutch plantation colonies on the Guiana coast with at least a thousand slaves a year.82 But in spite of the company’s dominant role in the slave trade, the value of the trade in African products was 55.6 percent of its total trade with Africa. Given this, we have to conclude that the commodity trade between the Dutch Republic and West Africa was by far the WIC’s more important operation. It is interesting to compare the WIC with similar companies in the West African trade. First of all, the withdrawal of the company from trading activities occurred long after the downfall of its European counterparts. On the Gold Coast, the most important trading area of West Africa, only the RAC was able to challenge the Dutch power. During the last quarter of the seventeenth century, the English organization established itself in places where only the WIC had owned trading stations before. Nevertheless, in neither the commodity trade nor the transatlantic slave trade did the RAC play a significant role. After the English parliament opened the West African trade to free traders in 1698, the RAC was mainly an administrator of English forts and factories on the black continent. The French had also tried to undermine Dutch power in West Africa and had captured the WIC’s trading stations in the Senegambia region. But their economic share of the African trade remained very small. The WIC prevented the French from settling on the Gold Coast altogether. Other European companies, like the Brandenburgers, were also unable to undermine the Dutch trade seriously in the region. It was not the European
80
De Vries and Van der Woude, Nederland, 1500–1815, 542–46. D. Eltis, ‘Precolonial Western Africa and the Atlantic Economy,’ in Slavery and the Rise of the Atlantic System, ed. B. L. Solow (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 101. A pound sterling was the equivalent of about ƒ10–ƒ12. 82 Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, 186, table 8.2; 191, table 8.3; 294. 81
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chartered companies but the British free traders and the Dutch interlopers from Zeeland who were the real threat to the WIC trade with West Africa. From the beginning of the eighteenth century, free traders and interlopers expanded their trade in gold, ivory, and slaves and seriously eroded the WIC’s prominent role in the African trade.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE DUTCH REPUBLIC AND BRAZIL AS COMMERCIAL PARTNERS ON THE WEST AFRICAN COAST DURING THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY1 S B. S J P
Encourage the Brazilians to trade with you in order that you can exchange European goods for gold. WIC directors to the director general at Elmina, 1736.2
Introduction Most of the chapters in this book focus on a particular commercial link between the Dutch Republic and one or more of its overseas dependencies. But occasionally the Dutch got involved in unusual and very intricate commercial activities that varied considerably from that bilateral pattern. One of these extraordinary arrangements developed on the coast of West Africa, where agents of the Dutch West India Company (WIC) actively served as intermediaries between African merchants and Brazilian maritime traders. This chapter explains the complex commercial and diplomatic relationships that developed from these activities. It emphasizes 1) the reasons for this intricate relationship, 2) the unique features and problems that grew out of this association, 3) the primary products exchanged, and 4) the benefits that Brazil and the Netherlands gained from this affiliation.
1
This chapter is a revised version of an earlier publication under a different name by the same authors. See J. Postma and S. B. Schwartz, ‘Brazil and Holland as Commercial Partners on the West African Coast during the Eighteenth Century,’ in Le Portugal et l’Europe Atlantique, le Brésil, et l’Amérique Latine, Melanges offerts a F. Mauro, ed. G. Marinière, Arquivos do Centro Cultural Calouste Gulbenkian, no. 34 (Lisbon: Centro Cultural Calouste Gulbenkian/CNCDP, 1995), 399–427. 2 Algemeen Rijksarchief (ARA), Archief van de Nieuwe West-Indische Compagnie (NWIC) 57: 17 October 1736.
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. Diplomatic Prelude
The topic under discussion can be understood only in light of the diplomatic backdrop of a long and extensive war, which Charles Boxer calls the ‘First World War,’ a Luso-Dutch struggle in which the Portuguese and Dutch fought over the control of their overseas empires for more than half a century. The war ended essentially with a Portuguese victory in Brazil, Dutch gains in the Indian Ocean, and a standoff in Africa, the Portuguese retaking Angola but losing Elmina and other Guinea Coast trading stations.3 As early as the 1590s Dutch ships had effectively intruded into the Guinea coastal region, and they established their first trading station at Mori on the Gold Coast (Ghana) in 1612. They forced the Portuguese from their headquarters at Elmina in 1637 and completed their sweep of the African Atlantic coast during the 1640s.4 In 1641, the year after Portugal became independent from Spain, the Dutch Republic and Portugal agreed to a ten-year truce, although hostilities continued intermittently. Portugal reasserted her authority over the Angola region during the 1640s and pushed the Dutch out of northern Brazil by 1654. However, not until 1661 did the two powers agree to a peace treaty, in which the various conquests of the previous decades were ratified. In regards to Africa, the Portuguese lost the privilege of trading in the areas where the WIC had settlements, which essentially meant the Guinea Coast. Conflicting interpretations of this treaty led to new negotiations, but by 1669 the terms of the settlement of 1641 were essentially confirmed.5 An ironic diplomatic situation resulted on the African coast as far as European colonial control is concerned. On the surface, it appeared as if the Dutch had simply claimed a monopoly over the Guinea coastal region, that previously exercised by the Portuguese, but in reality the Dutch were unable to prevent the English, French, 3 C. R. Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, 1415–1825 (New York: Knopf, 1965), 106–27. 4 J. Postma, The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1600–1815 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 17–18. 5 C. van de Haar, De diplomatieke betrekkingen tussen de Republiek en Portugal, 1640–1661 (Groningen: Wolters, 1961), 162–79. See also H. J. den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven. Scheepvaart en handel van de Tweede Westindische Compagnie, 1674–1740 (Zutphen: Walburg, 1997), 193; ARA, NWIC 1275: Final doc. See also, E. C. de Mello, O Negocio Do Brasil. Portugal, Os Paises Baixos, E O Nordeste, 1641–1669, 2nd ed. (Rio de Janeiro: Brasiliense, 1998).
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Swedes, and later the Danes from establishing permanent trading stations in the region. As a result of the Dutch-Portuguese treaty of 1661, the Dutch restricted Portuguese trade in the region on threat of having their ships and cargoes confiscated.6 While authorities in Lisbon were by and large willing to abide by the treaty of 1661 and avoid trading on the Guinea Coast, their Brazilian subjects had compelling interests in reestablishing and maintaining commercial contacts with this African region.
Historical Sources Within the Portuguese Atlantic, the connections between Brazil and Africa through the Atlantic slave trade are relatively well known and have been expanded and illumined by recent research.7 But details of the important commercial contacts between Brazil and the Guinea Coast (Costa da Mina to the Portuguese) have remained largely ignored. Pierre Verger and A. F. C. Ryder have both explored the BrazilianAfrican connection, particularly from the Brazilian perspective. Both acknowledged the prominent commercial role of the Dutch and particularly the WIC in this relationship, but because much of the documentation of that association remains in Dutch archives, these earlier studies have not been able to present a full picture of the important slave trade on the Mina Coast.8 From the Dutch perspective, this topic has recently received some attention in the doctoral dissertation of Henk den Heijer.9 6 In addition to Van de Haar, see A. F. C. Ryder, ‘The Re-establishment of Portuguese Factories on the Costa da Mina to the Mid-Eighteenth Century,’ Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria 1 (1958): 157–83. 7 See for example, L. F. de Alencastro, ‘La traite négrière et l’unité nationale brésilienne,’ Revue française d’Histoire d’Outre-Mer 61 (1979): 395–418; J. C. Miller, Way of Death: Merchant Capitalism and the Angolan Slave Trade, 1730–1830 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988); H. S. Klein, The Atlantic Slave Trade (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); M. C. da Cunha, Negros, estrangeiros. Os escravos libertos e sua volta à Africa (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1985); M. C. da Cunha, De senzala ao sobrado. Arquitectura brasileira na Nigéria e na Republica popular do Benim (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1985); M. Florentino, Em Costas Negras (Rio de Janeiro: Arquivo Nacional, 1995). 8 P. Verger, Flux et reflux de la traite des nègres entre le golfe de Benin et Bahia dc Todos os Santos du XVII e au XIX e siécle (Paris: Mouton, 1968); P. Verger, Bahia and the West Coast Trade, 1549–1851 (Ibaden: Ibaden University Press, 1964); Ryder, ‘The Reestablishment of Portuguese Factories,’ 157–83. 9 Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, 283–86.
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.
The trade between Brazil and the Guinea Coast was unique in that it was intersected by Dutch hegemony in this African region. All Portuguese subjects, including Brazilians, were barred from the Guinea Coast by international agreement. However, mutual advantage prompted the Dutch and Brazilians to work out an arrangement whereby Brazilian ship captains would be allowed to trade in the region after purchasing a trading permit at the cost of 10 percent of the value of their cargo. This allowed them to trade along the Guinea Coast, except the Gold Coast, but they could only bring Brazilian merchandise such as tobacco, sugar, and alcoholic beverages; trade goods from Europe or Asia were declared contraband and could be confiscated by the Dutch. WIC officials were initially not allowed to trade with Brazilians, but that prohibition ended before the end of the seventeenth century.10 Gradually, an active commerce developed between Dutch and Brazilian-based merchants, especially those from Salvador in Bahia, and the WIC became increasingly engaged as an intermediary or middleman between African and Brazilian traders. Surviving records of these transactions, although incomplete, add significantly to an understanding of the AfricanBrazilian connection.
Brazil and the Guinea Coast Trade For several decades after their agreements in the 1660s, authorities in both Lisbon and The Hague were hesitant to disrupt the arrangements regarding the Guinea Coast. But the Portuguese subjects in colonial Brazil were eager to resume trading with this African region. Brazil needed more slaves from Africa than Angola could supply, and Brazilian tobacco was in demand in West Africa.11 Both WIC agents in Africa and Brazilian merchants were interested in developing commercial ties, but authorities in Europe initially resisted these efforts.12 In 1676, the directors of the WIC (bewindhebbers) delib10
Ibid., 193–96. Verger, Bahia, 6–7; Verger, Flux et reflux, 653. 12 ARA, NWIC 1275: Final doc. This document gives a summary of diplomatic relations between the two powers in respect to the African coast. The Dutch obtained large amounts of salt from Portugal, which also contributed a degree of goodwill through necessity between the two maritime powers. See also chapter 3 in this volume. 11
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Table 7.1. Brazilian Ships Trading on the Mina Coast, 1681–1710 Years 1680–1689 1690–1699 1700–1709 Total
Ships Total
Annual Average
Confiscations
43 109 216 368
4.3 10.9 21.6 12.3
2 ? 16 18
Source: Verger, Bahia, 11; Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, 284.
erated about exchanging slaves for Brazilian sugar and tobacco on the island of São Tomé, but no changes in policy or practice came out of these discussions. In 1678, a Bahian ship ventured into Guinea waters, and several more were reported during the 1680s.13 During this decade, a growing number of Brazilians, and especially Bahian merchants, developed commercial ties with the Mina Coast based on the exchange of Brazilian tobacco for African slaves. Table 7.1 clearly illustrates that increase. During the early years, Dutch-Brazilian commercial relations on the Guinea Coast were erratic, but by the end of the 1680s they began to stabilize. In April 1686, a WIC frigate captured two Brazilian ships that were trading on the Guinea Coast without first paying the required 10 percent duty at Elmina. This appears to have been a new phenomenon because WIC authorities at Elmina were uncertain how to deal with the situation and requested advice from their superiors back home. ‘Treat them like [Dutch] interlopers’ was the response from the WIC directors, but instead of confiscating the ships they extracted 25 percent of the cargoes on board. This in turn precipitated a Portuguese protest.14 Meanwhile, despite pressures from the bewindhebbers of the WIC, the volume of Brazilian shipping increased. Bahian merchants had sent only eleven vessels to the Guinea Coast from 1681 to 1685, but thirty-two sailed between 1686 and 1690, and over one hundred from 1696 to 1700.15 In December 1686, the bewindhebbers expressly forbade their agents in Africa to trade with the Brazilians, but the following year the same agents bought tobacco from two Brazilian
13 14 15
ARA, NWIC 29–30: June–September 1676; ibid., 831: 302, 324–26, 333. Ibid., 834: 20, 153. J. B. Nardi, O Fumo Brasileiro No Periodo Colonial (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1996), 224.
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ships in spite of the prohibition. Policies coming from the Dutch Republic and actions by WIC agents in Africa were often contradictory, and distinguishing between trading with Brazilian ships and admitting them to anchor at Elmina to pay duties adds further to the confusion. According to one source, the first Brazilian ship was officially admitted to the Guinea Coast in 1689, but three years later WIC directors reiterated their prohibition of trade with Brazilians after they received reports that such activities were condoned by officials stationed in Africa: ‘[S]uch Brazilian ships must be confiscated,’ was the dictate from the Netherlands.16 This internal conflict and uncertainty among WIC authorities continued during most of the 1690s. The repeated orders from higher authorities not to engage in trade with the Brazilians and to confiscate their ships show that WIC agents in Africa were not following the rules. In 1790, a WIC communication to Africa stated: ‘We fear that company officials are assisting the Portuguese [Brazilians].’ Determined to keep both Portuguese and Brazilians under control on the Guinea Coast, the WIC chamber of Amsterdam ordered the construction of a frigate to combat the Brazilian presence on the Guinea Coast in 1693.17 Several years later, in 1708, the WIC Council at Elmina, a group of WIC officials who assisted the director general in governing WIC affairs in Africa, decided to purchase tobacco from Brazilian traders, but it was not until 1714 that the bewindhebbers openly permitted trade with Brazilian ships.18 But afterwards, many Brazilian ships were still captured and confiscated, as is shown in table 7.2. Meanwhile, Portuguese authorities in Salvador in Bahia and in Lisbon sought to control trade with the Mina Coast. A royal order of 12 March 1698 limited the number of participating ships to twentyfour a year and allowed only the shipment of lower grade tobacco to the African coast. In 1699, the Portuguese Crown imposed an annual limit of 4,095 arrobas of tobacco for this traffic.19 But neither
16
ARA, NWIC 54: 1 July 1689, 15 November 1689, 30 November 1690, 18 May 1691; ibid., 835: 19; ARA, Verspreide West-Indische Stukken (VWIS) 37: res., 1689. 17 ARA, NWIC 54: 3 November 1790, 4 July 1692, 20 July 1693, 4 September 1694; ibid., 835: 19. 18 ARA, Nederlandse Bezittingen ter Kuste van Guinea (NBKG) 4: 22 October 1708; ibid., 5: 13 July 1716. 19 Verger, Flux et reflux, 58–59.
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Table 7.2. Captured Brazilian Ships, 1707–1730 Years
Ships
Years
Ships
1707 1708 1709 1710 1711 1712 1713 1714 1715 1716 1717 1718 1719 Total
2 1 1 0 1 3 0 2 2 2 2 3 2 21
1720 1721 1722 1723 1724 1725 1726 1727 1728 1729 1730
1 2 1 1 2 3 3 2 2 1 1
1733
2 19
Source: ARA, NWIC 56, 180, 485, 486, 487, 746, 1024; ARA, VWIS 929; ARA, NBKG 2–6. Note: In addition, two Royal Portuguese ships were captured by the WIC in 1724.
government succeeded in limiting the trade. Between 1681 and 1710, Bahian-based ships made 385 voyages to the African coast, of which 368 sailed to Mina and only seventeen to Angola.20 To complicate the situation further, the English Royal African Company (RAC), with African headquarters at Cape Coast, made a trade agreement with Brazilian merchants. This irked the Dutch a great deal but they could not prevent it.21 A significant change seems to have taken place in the Dutch attitude regarding the trade with Brazil in 1696. A WIC directive in December of that year stated: Portuguese [i.e. Brazilian] commerce on the Gold Coast has increased significantly, much to our inconvenience. Not that we did not have the power to suppress it but the WIC was in an embarrassing situation with respect to the Portuguese Crown, from which the company receives the salt duties of Setubal . . . Now we have an opportunity to negotiate a change in the situation.22 20 J. Ribeiro Jr., Colonização e monopólio no nordeste brasileiro (São Paulo: HUCITEC, 1976), 122. 21 Verger, Flux et reflux, 47. 22 ARA, NWIC 54: 21 December 1696; ARA, NBKG 25: 12 April 1696. Setubal was the source of the salt; see also note 13.
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Negotiations stretched over a period of several years, influenced by widespread warfare among various European powers. The optimistic attitude expressed in 1696 reflected a desire to placate the Portuguese and prevent them from joining the opposition in the War of the League of Augsburg (1688–1697), known as the Nine Year War in the Netherlands. Meanwhile, WIC directors continued to forbid trading with Brazilian ships, fluctuating between toughness and cautious optimism, but still ordering confiscation. They directed that good records of confiscations be kept in case compensation became a factor in the negotiations. This ambiguous situation continued for several years.23 Meanwhile, as will be explained later, a compromise arrangement was worked out whereby Brazilian ships were allowed to do business on the Mina Coast if they first visited the Dutch headquarters at Elmina and paid a 10 percent duty on the value of a ship’s cargo. Brazilian ships that did not follow these regulations remained subject to capture and retribution.
Seizure and Confiscations As shown in tables 7.1 and 7.2, many Brazilian ships that ventured into West African waters were captured by the WIC. The exact number may never be known unless Portuguese records clarify the imperfect account presented here. The fate of the captured ships, and their cargoes and crews, varied. By and large, when Brazilian ships were apprehended without having obtained a permit at Elmina, their captains surrendered without a struggle because WIC ships tended to be larger and much better armed.24 Captured crew members were generally treated well and allowed to take service on other ships. But if they were found to be hiding precious cargo such as gold, they might be treated less favorably by their Dutch captors, to whom authorities had promised 10 percent of the booty.25 During the first decades of the eighteenth century, the WIC often confiscated captured ships and their entire cargo, and reassigned the ships to company service. In 1707 such a ship was assigned to com23 ARA, NWIC 836: 95; ARA, NBKG 25: 26 September 1697, 5 October 1697, 26 September 1699; ARA, NWIC 54: 16 September 1698. 24 Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, 283–86. 25 Ibid., 287–88.
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Table 7.3. Confiscated Brazilian Ships and their Cargoes, 1681–1730 (guilders) Years 1681–1690 1691–1700 1701–1710 1711–1720 1721–1730 Total
Ships
Cargo Value
2
17,200
16 37 21 76
137,600 318,200 180,600 653,600
Source: Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, 284.
pany trade along the coast. In 1727, another confiscated Brazilian ship was renamed the Helena and was utilized as a slave ship, carrying at least two human cargoes to Curaçao.26 Sometimes, Dutch captors went for the cargo only, if it seemed worthwhile. Slaves, gold, and tobacco were the most desired bounties. But in 1730 one captured ship was simply released at sea because the cargo consisted of ‘few and bad slaves.’27 As a rule, captured Brazilian ships were taken to Elmina where their cargo was unloaded, carefully itemized, and added to the WIC commercial inventory. Recent research by Den Heijer has produced a comprehensive summary of the value of these confiscations, as shown in table 7.3. Inventories of fifty-five such consignments have been preserved, and Den Heijer made estimates for the remaining twenty-two cargoes. Confiscated goods included tobacco, cowry shells, fire arms, gun powder, and gold, with tobacco constituting 44 percent of the total value. The captured ships also had 3,513 slaves on board, that had already been purchased on the coast. Their value was estimated at ƒ175,650, which is included in the values in table 7.3.28 After 1730 the Dutch confiscated very few Brazilian ships. When they did, they directed them to Elmina, where they usually imposed a fine, levied the customary 10 percent duty, and confiscated any contraband cargo. Apprehended Brazilian captains had to appear before
26 27 28
ARA, NBKG 3: 23 November 1707; ARA, NWIC 487: 129. ARA, NBKG 6: 27 December 1730. Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, 284.
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the court or Council at Elmina. Records of several such court cases have been preserved.29
The Ten Percent Duty One of the distinctive aspects of the Dutch-Brazilian relationship on the Guinea Coast was the payment of the 10 percent duty that the Dutch charged on the cargoes of Brazilian ships. These payments, solicited in the form of tobacco, gold, hides, or other Brazilian products (preferably the first two), permitted the payees to trade with either the Dutch or Africans along the Guinea Coast, where the Dutch claimed hegemony. If the Dutch apprehended a Brazilian ship with African products on board before it had acquired a permit or pas at Elmina, such goods were declared contraband and the ship was forced to sail to Elmina with the aforementioned consequences.30 How and when this practice of the10 percent duty payment was established is not completely clear. In 1707, the WIC directors ordered that all Portuguese ships without a permit be confiscated, which seems to indicate that the permit had been required for some time already. In fact, the treaties of both 1661 and 1669 imply that the Dutch could ‘sell’ the right to trade to the Portuguese, and this is how the practice was subsequently justified.31 The Dutch-Portuguese negotiations of 1696–1698 may have normalized the 10 percent duty payment, since the previously mentioned 25 percent taken from two ships in 1686 brought vehement protest from Portuguese authorities. The number of permits issued during the first decades must have been limited, but no systematic record of these has yet been discovered. The practice of charging a 10 percent duty strengthened after 1706, when Brazilian activity on the Guinea Coast increased,32 and particularly after 1708, when the WIC negotiated an agreement with the RAC. By this agreement, reached after several years of conflict over the issue, the WIC and the RAC promised to respect each other’s right to sell permits to Brazilians and assist them afterwards
29 ARA, NBKG 12: 21 April 1768, 6 November 1769; ibid., 13: 5 January 1782, 26 July 1784, 6 April 1786, 8 August 1786. 30 A copy of such a permit, dated 1765, is located in Verger, Flux et reflux, 43. 31 See ARA, NWIC 831: 161–62. 32 Ibid., 104: 2 January 1706.
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in their commerce along the coast by placing a company employee aboard the ship.33 WIC dealings with the Brazilians increased significantly during the 1720s, when it started keeping a special account book for the slave trade with them.34 The WIC seemed to be luring the Brazilian slave trade away from the British, one report stated, who ‘had this trade first,’ and were now ‘jealous.’35 Record keeping of the Brazilian trade in general greatly improved during this decade, and starting with the year 1722 a fairly constant record of the 10 percent duty payment survives, as shown in table 7.4. Table 7.4. Ships Paying Ten Percent Duty, 1722–1772 Year
Ships
Captured
1722 1723 1724 1725 1726 1727 1728 1729 1730 1731 1732 1733 1734 1735 1736 1737 1738 1739
22 ? 21 33 ? 33 29 27 31 ? ? ? ? 15 17 17 14 17
1 1 2 3 3 2 2 1 1
18 Year Total
243
2
18
Year 1740 1741 1742 1743 1744 1745 1746 1747 1748 1749 1750 1751 1752 1753 1754 1755 1756 1757 1758 1759–1767 1768–1772 33 Year Total
Ships 17 14 15 12 15 12 14 15 19 14 16 8 15 13 14 17 22 22 24 131 63 492
Captured
1
1
2 4
Source: Table 7.2; ARA, NWIC 113, 495; ARA, VWIS 932; ARA, NBKG 238 and 240.
33 34 35
ARA, NBKG 3: 11 July 1708; ibid., 235: 18 November 1713. ARA, NWIC 56: 190. Ibid., 104: 483.
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Table 7.5. Ten Percent Fees Paid, 1768–1787 (guilders) Years
Ships
10%
Years
1768 1769 1770 1771 1772 1773 1774 1775 1776
1 1
? ? ? 19,901 23,191 16,835 16,373 15,484 4,410
1777 1778 1779 1780 1782 1784 1786 1787
1
Ships
10%
1 1 1 2 1
7,805 11,436 14,378 20,650 ? ? ? ?
Source: ARA, NWIC 495; ARA, VWIS 932.
The number of Brazilian ships paying the required 10 percent duty is quite consistent during the thirty-one years for which records have been found. An annual average of nearly nineteen ships was recorded for the early years, and a peak of thirty per year was reached during the period of 1727–1730. During the following three decades the duty-paying ships declined to an average of nearly sixteen per year. Payments for the decade of the 1760s averaged fourteen per year. The record for 1771–1780 is based on the amounts paid, the actual 10 percent, rather than the number of ships for which payments were made (see table 7.5). Records indicate that no Brazilian ships were captured after 1730, which signifies that either the Brazilians dutifully paid their fees or that the Dutch were limited in their power to enforce their monopoly claims.
Portuguese Resurgence on the Costa da Mina In 1721 the Brazilian viceroy, Vasco Fernandes César de Meneses, on the urging of Bahian merchants led by the entrepreneur-captain Joseph de Torres, an energetic if somewhat questionable figure, approved the construction of a fortified trading station on the Slave Coast, near the town of Ouidah.36 This action, favorable to the interests of the Bahia-based merchants rather than those of Lisbon, was taken with the encouragement of the king of Ouidah and the approval 36
On Joseph de Torres and his shady career see, Verger, Flux et reflux, 76–77.
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of the paramount king of Aja, sovereign of the southern region of today’s Republic of Benin. The Portuguese Crown approved this initiative after the fact, which opened a new chapter in Brazil’s relations with West Africa.37 The impetus for this breakthrough rested with the unique DutchPortuguese relationship on the Guinea Coast, from which the Brazilians wanted release, and more specifically with events in 1717–1718. Brazilian ships had been coming to the Guinea Coast in greater numbers, focusing primarily on the slave trade on the Slave Coast and failing to go to Elmina first to pay their 10 percent duties. In 1717 the Dutch cruiser Companies Welvaren captured two Brazilian ships, confiscated eight hundred slaves, and gave chase to another Brazilian slaver. The following year, the cruiser Faam captured three Brazilian slavers with 680 slaves aboard.38 With such staggering losses, the Brazilians must have felt a need to protect themselves. Their first effort came in the form of a business proposition. The Dutch also saw benefits in a negotiated settlement as they felt the keen competition of the Brazilians in the slave markets on the Slave Coast and saw their 10 percent dues decline. In fact, the WIC agent at Ouidah reported that the Brazilians were buying eight thousand slaves annually at neighboring Jakin ( Jaquim).39 While slave ships feuded with each other on the slave Coast, negotiations were held to reach an agreement whereby the Dutch would annually supply Brazilian ships with 1,500 slaves at Elmina and 1,500 on the Slave Coast. According to the draft proposal, prices were set at ƒ90 for male slaves and ƒ60 for females. Captain de Torres, the Brazilian negotiator, asked to be allowed to pay the 10 percent duty at Ouidah instead of at Elmina, which would make the voyage less cumbersome.40 It is not clear why an agreement was not reached, but while terms were being negotiated, WIC agents at Elmina sold 1,503 slaves to 37 Detailed accounts of the developments that followed have been provided by Ryder and Verger in their works cited above. 38 ARA, NWIC 103: 352; ibid., 104: 250, 282–84, 288; ibid., 485: 542, 731, 671, 696; ARA, NBKG 85: 30 November 1718. 39 ARA, NBKG 85: 17 May 1718, 20 September 1718. 40 ARA, NWIC 104: 235, 245, 485, 689, 714–15. L. Wimmer, ‘African Producers, European Merchants, Indigenous Consumers: Brazilian Tobacco in the Canadian Fur Trade’ (Ph.D. thesis, University of Minnesota, 1996), shows the mobilization of a number of transatlantic routes in the internationalization of the production and consumption of Brazilian tobacco.
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various Brazilian ships and reaped profits of more than ƒ166,000.41 The regular Dutch slave traders were upset with the Brazilian competition, and their complaints persuaded the bewindhebbers to agree with them and discontinue the arrangement with the Brazilians. What happened during the next few years is not clear, but in early 1722 the WIC directors, distrustful that Brazilians would pay their bills, ordered that no more than two hundred slaves be sold to them annually. At the same time, company officials at Elmina were ordered to keep a special account to monitor the slave trade with Brazilians. By the end of the following year, the WIC director general at Elmina complained bitterly that no Brazilian ships were coming to pay their 10 percent duties, and that he had been informed that they would rather risk being captured than come to Elmina.42 The decline in this traffic must have been only short-lived, because in 1724 WIC agents were warned to sell slaves to Brazilians only when Dutch ships had their demands satisfied.43 Twenty-one Brazilians ships paid their 10 percent duties at Elmina that year, as shown in table 7.4. Ironically, the Portuguese government in Lisbon tried to counter Brazilian interests in the Guinea trade by ordering the establishment of the Corisco Company in 1724. Headed by French and Portuguese merchants, this company was licensed to establish a fortress at Corisco Island or the nearby Cameroon coast, in order to control a significant share of the African slave trade. Lisbon enforced its policy by sending a few well-armed ships to the region, which attacked two WIC ships and confiscated nearly six hundred slaves from one of them. In response, the WIC dispatched armed cruisers from the Netherlands, which destroyed the unfinished Corisco fortress and sank a Portuguese war ship with a crew of 160 men. Additional confiscations followed, and Lisbon countered by allowing the Corisco Company to enlarge its trading sphere to the Slave Coast and sending two more war ships to the African coast in 1727. In retaliation, demonstrating that this was a conflict between Portugal and Brazil rather than between the Dutch Republic and Brazil, the Dutch opened the Gold Coast to the Brazilian traders. Lisbon and The Hague fired off protests and counter-protests, which were followed by consultations that led 41 42 43
ARA, NWIC 104: 511. Ibid., 56: 190–92; ibid., 486: 444, 447. Ibid., 56: 206, 299.
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to an agreement to pay mutual compensations. The whole episode turned out to be detrimental for both parties, with the Dutch losing two large ships and total damages of approximately ƒ300,000. By the end of the 1720s, the Corisco Company had clearly failed and it was dissolved in 1738.44 After these incidents of reciprocal destruction, all interested parties must have realized that compromise was preferable. Even though the Dutch insisted that Brazilians pay the 10 percent duty, the number of WIC confiscations declined significantly. But duty payments could be enforced only when the WIC sent well-armed ships, as they did in 1733 when the cruiser Beschutter imposed the 10 percent duty payment at Jakin. The Portuguese responded to this by sending a large cruiser of their own, which in turn intimidated the Beschutter.45 A compromise was reached by which Brazilian captains were allowed to obtain their 10 percent permits at WIC stations on the Slave Coast, but the following year WIC directors vetoed that agreement.46 Internal African developments on the Slave Coast also affected the Dutch-Brazilian connection. Brazilian traders improved relations with African rulers, first with the regional king of Aja, who allowed them to establish a trading station in the area, and subsequently with King Agaja of Dahomey, the rising star in the region who gradually claimed control over the Slave Coast. Agaja blamed the Dutch for trying to impede his advance and expelled them from the territory. The Portuguese and Brazilians gained the most from Dahomey’s rise, which enabled them to consolidate their presence in the region. Except for a brief revival of a Dutch trading station at Jakin during the early 1730s, the Dutch were forced to abandon their trading stations on the Slave Coast, and it seemed that Brazilians had replaced them among the foreign powers in that region.47 Brazilian ships continued to pay their duties at Elmina, but as table 7.4 illustrates, there were fewer than in previous decades.
44 Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, 201–04; Verger, Flux et reflux, 75–76; ARA, NWIC 55: 27 November 1724, 28 October 1727; ibid., 522: 54; ibid., 487: 18–20, 34–36, 40–43, 62, 89, 103–311. 45 ARA, NWIC 487: 627–34; ARA, NBKG 7: 31 January 1733; ibid., 238: 88–90. 46 ARA, NWIC 55: 29 October 1735; ibid., 57: 20; ibid., 110: 169. 47 See H. J. den Heijer, ed., Naar de koning van Dahomey. Het journaal van de gezantschapsreis van Jacobus Elet naar het West-Afrikaanse koninkrijk Dahomey in 1733, Werken uitgegeven door de Linschoten Vereeniging, no. 99 (Zutphen: Walburg, 2000).
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. Equilibrium and Cessation
In 1730, the WIC’s monopoly over the Dutch slave trade to the Gold Coast was curtailed, and four years later all of the African coast was opened to Dutch free traders. This weakened the WIC’s economic base significantly, although it still maintained several trading stations on the Gold Coast and collected fees from Dutch free trade ships.48 The number of duty-paying Brazilians that visited Elmina declined during the following decades, and those who did were undoubtedly motivated by commercial opportunities, much like Dutch free traders. WIC officials in Africa could only offer faint protests against Brazilian traders and feeble excuses for their impotence to their superiors in the Dutch Republic. In 1744 they requested a cruiser from the Dutch Republic to enforce the 10 percent duty payments, but the response was negative.49 Brazilian merchants and Dutch free traders also found it advantageous to trade with each other, although the WIC insisted on its exclusive right to serve as middleman. Several company protests concerning the intrusion of free traders were recorded, and occasionally these conflicts developed into legal battles.50 As the years passed, the company reduced the area over which it claimed a trading monopoly vis-à-vis the Portuguese, which initially included all of the Guinea Coast and southward to the Congo river. In fact, Brazilian ships had been captured by the WIC in the region just north of the Congo estuary, then also known as the Loango Coast. By 1768, the WIC redefined its monopoly limits to the coastal region from Cape Palmes to the Bight of Benin. The coastline to the west of Elmina, usually called the ‘Upper Coast’ and occasionally referred to as ‘Dutch Guinea’ (today’s Ivory Coast), was theoretically open to Brazilians only after they paid dues at Elmina. But during the second half of the eighteenth century, Brazilian ships regularly went there and traded with Africans before sailing to Elmina. In theory, only the Gold Coast remained off limits to Brazilians even after a permit had been obtained from either the Dutch or the British.51 48
See Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, chapter 6. ARA, NBKG 8: 24 December 1742; ibid., 11: 24 December 1759; ibid., 12: 18 January 1768; ARA, NWIC 113: 190. 50 ARA, NBKG 7: 31 January 1733; ibid., 9: 10 June 1747; ARA, NWIC 110: 729; ibid., 57: 59; ibid., 117: 389–90. 51 ARA, NBKG 12: 18 January 1768; ARA, VWIS 1167: 9 October 1768 (hereafter referred to as Woortman Memorandum). 49
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Starting in 1768, and particularly during the 1770s and 1780s, the Dutch renewed efforts to enforce their monopoly rights over Brazilian shipping, and a number of Brazilian vessels were captured and forced to pay the 10 percent duty, as illustrated in table 7.5. Perhaps this was in response to the declining number of Brazilian ships that paid their dues at Elmina during the 1760s. During the 1770s, the WIC expressed concern over increased trade between the Brazilians and the British on the Guinea Coast. Company officials actively tried to prevent the Brazilians to trade with the British. By 1773, negotiations were started between the Dutch and the British governments about the deteriorating situation on the Coast.52 In 1792, the British sent a protest note, claiming that the Dutch monopoly had ended and that they were now free to trade with Brazilians, a claim the WIC Council vehemently denied. By 1798 the Dutch admitted that the Brazilians no longer paid the 10 percent duties but merely presented token gifts for services when they anchored at Elmina.53 By this time almost five thousand slaves were reaching Bahia from the Mina Coast annually.54 Despite some conflicts over duty payments, for many years a mutually advantageous relationship existed between the Dutch and Brazilians on the African coast. Ships originating from Brazilian ports expected services, advice, trading opportunities, and protection from the Dutch after they paid their dues. Officers of Brazilian ships were given room and board during their stay at Elmina. As the years passed, a small number of Portuguese and Brazilians settled at Elmina, no doubt to serve visiting Brazilian crews and accommodate the trade between the two nations. In 1743, Brazilian sailors were allowed to practice their own Catholic religion, of which the Dutch Calvinists had been intolerant, and the following year they even built a small church and allowed Catholic priests to perform church services. By 1797 there was a Catholic chapel at Elmina, at which a pastor held regular services, signifying that an active Portuguese community had been reestablished there.55 52
ARA, Archief van Pieter van Bleiswijk 280: Concept Ordre, 6 June 1771; ibid., 283: Memorie, 21 June 1773; ibid., 286–288. 53 ARA, NBKG 13: 30, January 1781; ibid., 14: 11 December 1792; ibid., 15: 12 October 1792. 54 R. Bauss, ‘Rio de Janeiro: The Rise of Late Colonial Brazil’s Dominant Emporium, 1777–1808’ (Ph.D. diss., Tulane University, 1977), 229. 55 ARA, NBKG 5: 22 May 1716; ibid., 14: 7 April 1797; ARA, NWIC 57: 59; ibid., 106: 14, 219; ibid., 113: 209.
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. Merchandise in the Dutch-Brazil Trade
Tobacco and slaves were the primary products of trade in the BrazilDutch-African commercial chain. Slaves were Africa’s major export during the eighteenth century and they were in demand on the plantations and in the mines of Brazil. Tobacco was one of the main crops of the Northern provinces of Brazil, especially Bahia. Other commercial items of significance in this trade were gold, sugar, and hides, while African ivory, Brazilian rum, and Asian textiles were mentioned sporadically in the Dutch records. The WIC also purchased some ivory and lemon juice from Brazilians, after having initially obtained these products from African merchants, no doubt. Conversely, Brazilian traders bought Asian cowry shells and European textiles from the Dutch in order to purchase slaves from Africans on the Slave Coast.56 Manufactured products from Portugal were regarded as contraband by terms of the DutchPortuguese treaty of 1661, at least until 1724, and were often confiscated.57 This was undoubtedly intended to bar the Portuguese from the Guinea Coast and keep the door open for their Brazilian subjects who could supply complementary rather than competitive products. Ivory is rarely mentioned in Dutch documents in connection with the Brazilian trade. Apparently only ships from Pernambuco, from which only two or three per year came to the area, were interested in purchasing this commodity. Rum, listed as aguardente, was noted only twice in the sparse records, and seems to have gained prominence during the second half of the eighteenth century (see table 7.6).58 Quite frequently mentioned as a desirable Brazilian product are unprocessed hides. Among the 10 percent dues in 1725, hides easily rank as the most important item (see table 7.6), although this may well have been an exception to the overall pattern. They are not mentioned at all in the 10 percent payments of the years 1742–1748, nor in the available trade records of 1720, but hides are frequently mentioned in the WIC correspondence as desirable commodities for the European market.59 Hides, both untanned (couros em 56
ARA, NWIC 103: 23 November 1717; ibid., 106: 52; ibid., 113: 319. ARA, VWIS 36; ibid., 1167: Woortman Memorandum. 58 Ibid., 1167: Woortman Memorandum; ibid., 832: 31 October 1756. The sale of aguardente and similar alcoholic beverages (cachaça, geribita) became a major item in the slave trade between Rio de Janeiro and Angola. See Miller, Way of Death. 59 ARA, NWIC 107: 389; ibid., 104: 505, 932; ibid., 486: 447, 531. 57
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Table 7.6. Products as Ten Percent Payments, 1719–1768 Years
Ships
1719* 1725 1742 1743 1744 1745 1746 1748 1768
36 16 11 15 11 14 19 13
Tobacco (Rolls)** 2,071 1,059 1,253 917 1,234 896 1,166 1,590 1,064
Hides
31,644
Sugar (Barrels)
Rum Gold (Gallons) (Ounces)
320 743
1,711 1,395 23 403 80 400
Sources: ARA, NWIC 104: 511; ibid., 107: 389; ibid., 932: 3; ARA, VWIS 1167. * The figures for 1719 refer to goods traded instead of ten percent paid to the WIC. ** Rolls tobacco averaged about 250 pounds or about 125 kilograms.
cabello) and as shoe leather (me yos de sola), had become a major item of Brazilian export by the beginning of the eighteenth century as major cattle herds had developed to supply the sugar industry and the growing population centers of the mining zones. The fleet from Rio de Janeiro of 1735, for example, carried over 19,000 untanned hides and some 2,700 shoe leathers while the Bahian fleet of that year carried some 11,000 hides and over 180,000 shoe leathers.60 These exports became a regular and increasingly important item of Brazilian trade. The Companhia geral de Pernambuco e Paraiba, created in 1759, exported almost one million untanned hides from northeastern Brazil to Europe between 1760 and 1778.61 Brazilians also brought sugar, both white and muscovado, in sizable amounts to the Guinea Coast. The account of one ship lists enough sugar to purchase eighty-six slaves.62 Most of the sugar was evidently meant for trade on the Slave Coast, because it does not figure very prominently in the 10 percent payment records, as shown in table 7.6. 60 Newberry Library, Greenlee Collection, 344: Mapa dos cabedaes que vâo nesta frota do Rio de 1735. On the increasing importance of hide exports in the late eighteenth century, see D. Alden, ‘Late Colonial Brazil, 1750–1808,’ in Cambridge History of Latin America, ed. L. Bethell (London: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 2:601–60. 61 Ribeiro Jr., Colonização e monopólio, 153. 62 ARA, NWIC 104: 505; ibid., 105: 40.
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. The Significance of Gold
Gold figured very prominently in the Dutch-Brazilian trade. For most of the seventeenth century, gold had been a primary item in the Dutch exports from Africa, but during the beginning of the eighteenth century the production of West African gold mining dropped significantly.63 Just as African gold sources were declining, gold was discovered in Brazil. The Minas Gerais gold rush, beginning around 1698, resulted in an enormous increase in the demand for slaves in south central Brazil, as well as the production of large quantities of gold. For the decade of the 1720s, Brazilian gold production reached almost 15,000 kilograms.64 This was probably another reason why WIC authorities began to encourage Brazilian trade at the beginning of the eighteenth century. The Portuguese government forbade the export of gold to the Guinea Coast, a regulation that was not always obeyed, and WIC authorities repeatedly encouraged their agents in Africa to obtain such gold.65 In 1736, they instructed their agents in Africa as follows: We have been informed that the Brazilians always come to Africa with large quantities of gold. We charge you, therefore, to encourage the Brazilians to trade with you in order that you can exchange European goods for gold.66
During the turmoil on the Slave Coast in 1718, WIC agents there attempted to sell Brazilians a trading permit, in lieu of their sailing to Elmina to pay the required 10 percent dues, for approximately 250–300 ounces of gold.67 The Dutch were very hesitant to confiscate gold from captured Brazilian ships. Their explanation was that it was not a European contraband product, and they were therefore afraid to give the Portuguese a legal excuse to complain about violation of the treaty of 1661.68 In reality, they may also have been
63 J. Postma, ‘West African Exports and the Dutch West India Company, 1675–1731,’ in Economisch en Sociaal-Historisch Jaarboek 36 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973): 53–74. 64 V. N. Pinto, O ouro brasileiro e o comércio anglo-portuguès (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1979), 114. 65 ARA, NWIC 55: 12 March 1707, 17 October 1736; ibid., 57: 17 October 1736. 66 Ibid., 57: 17 October 1736. 67 ARA, NBKG 85: 29 May 1718. 68 ARA, NWIC 55: 19 October 1716; ARA, VWIS 36.
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cautious not to upset the profitable commercial relationship with the Brazilians. While the WIC always accepted Brazilian tobacco in exchange for slaves, they were also eager to accept gold as payment.69 It should be noted that the majority of Brazilian ships on the Mina Coast sailed from Bahia and therefore had less access to the gold of Minas, but Bahia also had some gold mining and there was contraband with Minas as well. There is one curious twist to this gold trade on the Guinea Coast. It is generally assumed that the gold brought on Brazilian ships came from Brazil, but there is evidence that by the middle of the eighteenth century some gold was, in fact, purchased from African merchants. A WIC document dating from 1768 explains that Brazilian ships had for many years not sailed directly to Elmina, to purchase their permits, but first went to the Cape Palmes region. After trading with Africans in that region they sailed eastward along the Ivory Coast, exchanging tobacco for gold dust and ivory. Director General Pieter Woortman, who wrote the report, calculated that about 25 percent of the tobacco from Brazil was intended for this trade; the remainder was used to purchase slaves and pay duties at Elmina.70 How much of this gold ended up in the possession of the WIC is not clear, but in 1772 a WIC communication from Africa reported with obvious disappointment that the Brazilians no longer brought much gold. This suggests that up until that time the Brazilians had supplied the WIC with an unknown but appreciable quantity of this precious commodity. As gold from Brazil declined, the WIC had to be content with tobacco primarily as the 10 percent duty payment.71
Brazilian Tobacco Brazilian tobacco and African slaves were the chief commercial items that drew the Brazilians to the Guinea Coast. The so-called ‘socas’ (refugo, refugado) or ‘third grade tobacco’ from Brazil became preferred by Africans along much of the Guinea Coast.72 Made of the more
69
ARA, NWIC 56: 173. ARA, VWIS 1167: Woortman Memorandum. 71 ARA, NWIC 57: 111–13. 72 Ryder, ‘The Re-establishment of Portuguese Factories,’ 158; Verger, Flux et reflux, 28–34. 70
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brittle tobacco leaves that were held together by molasses, the resulting product had a special taste. Pieter Woortman, the WIC director general who spent forty years on the West African Coast,73 described it as ‘very bitter,’ although others mentioned its sweet aroma. It was apparently not liked by most European users but was particularly popular among Africans. Curiously, North American Indians also preferred it as an item of payment in the fur trade, and the Hudson Bay Company kept agents in Lisbon to buy it from Brazilians.74 The British tried unsuccessfully to copy the process, and in 1768 Woortman suggested that the Dutch try to simulate the product with tobacco grown in the Netherlands.75 They also failed, and Brazilian tobacco continued to dominate the low end of the Atlantic markets. Bahia dominated Brazilian production and supplied about 90 percent of the tobacco sent to the Mina Coast. While Pernambuco also produced some tobacco, it was considered inferior. It was estimated that it took four rolls of Bahian or twelve rolls of Pernambucan tobacco to buy a slave in 1780. As a result, the Companhia geral de Pernambuco e Paraiba purchased over 150,000 arrobas (2.2 million kilograms) of Bahian tobacco for sale in Africa.76 Africans in the Costa da Mina region had developed a strong preference for this particular type of Brazilian tobacco, which was a major factor in the return of Brazilians and the Dutch determination to gain control of the distribution of the product. But while the Africans craved this type of tobacco, efforts to sell the product on the Amsterdam market resulted in financial losses. This led the WIC directors to urge their agents in Africa to cut back on buying Brazilian tobacco during the years 1719–1723, but later that trade stabilized again.77 For several years there seems to have been a misunderstanding between the WIC directors, who understood profits through commodities returned to the Dutch Republic, and the WIC agents in Africa, who had a better grasp of the local situation and profited from the regional trade. Occasionally, the African market
73
H. M. Feinberg, Africans and Europeans in West Africa: Elminans and Dutchmen on the Gold Coast during the Eighteenth Century (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1989), 7. 74 Wimmer, ‘African Producers, European Merchants, Indigenous Consumers.’ 75 ARA, VWIS 1167: Woortman Memorandum. 76 Ribeiro Jr., Colonização, 124–25. 77 ARA, NWIC 485: 485; ibid., 55: 13 September 1720, 16 October 1723; ibid., 56: 173; ARA, NBKG 4: 22 October 1708.
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also became so saturated with tobacco that it rotted in the WIC warehouses, as was the case in 1788.78 As table 7.6 shows, large quantities of Brazilian tobacco were obtained by the Dutch either through the 10 percent payments or through trade with Brazilians. Approximately 13,000 rolls (ca. 1.6 million kilograms) of Brazilian tobacco were shipped to the Costa da Mina in 1767, if one includes the two ships that did not pay their dues at Elmina.79 A comparison of the Dutch 10 percent tax figures with Portuguese records of tobacco exports to Mina presented in table 7.7 show that, in fact, many Brazilian ships were avoiding the tax and that only about one-third of the tax was being collected.80 Despite Dutch intention to control the trade, Brazilian shippers with access to gold and tobacco, principally Bahian, were driving their own bargains on the African coast. Bahia, in fact, produced about 90 percent of the tobacco traded on the Mina Coast.
Brazilian Slave Trade Via the WIC The cornerstone of the Brazil-Africa trade was the demand for slaves. Brazil had regular access to slaves from the Angola and Mozambique regions, but Guinea Coast slaves were always in great demand.81 As one merchant complained in 1812 when he could not sell a shipment of Angolan slaves, ‘the Minas have arrived and here they are [considered] the best.’82 Guinea Coast slaves were obtained primarily from the Slave Coast region, although during the years 1715–1731 Brazilians also purchased slaves from the WIC at Elmina. The earliest records of the WIC selling slaves to Brazilians date from 1704, and it was not until 1711 that this practice was formally
78
ARA, NWIC 55: 13 September 1720; ARA, Aanwinsten 60: 474. ARA, VWIS 1167: Woortman Memorandum. 80 Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo (ANTT), Junta do Tabaco, maços 96–106 passim. See the figure in S. B. Schwartz, ‘Colonial Brazil, c. 1580–c. 1750: Plantations and Peripheries,’ in Cambridge History of Latin America, ed. L. Bethell (London: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 2:459. 81 Ryder argues that Guinea Coast slaves were preferred, but, despite occasional comments about preferences, slave prices do not reflect them. See his ‘The Reestablishment of Portuguese Factories,’ 160. 82 Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa, Fundo Geral 224: Felipe Nery to Antonio Estes da Costa, 6 August 1812. 79
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Table 7.7. Brazilian Tobacco Shipped to the Mina Coast, 1698–1765 Date
Rolls*
1698 1699 1700 1701 1702 1703 1704 1705 1706/07 1708 1709 1710 1711/12 1713 1714 1715 1716 1717 1718 1719 1720/21 1722 1723 1724/25 1726 1727 1728 1729 1730 1731 1732/33 1734 1735/36
1,469 2,522
2,300 7,919
4,318 4,752
10,899 12,784
4,772 10,426 3,422
13,281 26,511 8,683
8,469 6,270
21,265 15,407
12,097 12,368 12,240
27,521 29,120 25,751
23,667 34,184
49,851 71,520
35,779 23,944
75,111 29,491
41,689 22,595 32,718 35,596 47,971
108,591 60,378 85,827 96,351 128,884
11,402
30,515
Arrobas**
Date 1737 1738 1739 1740/41 1742/43 1744/45 1746 1747/48 1749 1750 1751 1752/53 1754 1755 1756 1757 1758 1759 1760 1761 1762/63 1764 1765
Rolls
Arrobas
32,608 46,702 71,727 73,318 48,485 47,399 54,070
90,393 130,703 204,492 358,758 139,126 134,227 156,987
54,538 64,913 23,423
150,095 n.a. 66,891
34,565 26,675 45,531 50,432 52,932 74,228
97,675 75,923 124,923 139,165 146,095 203,685
65,033 34,413 86,089
179,364 95,521 23,745
Source: ANTT, Junta do Tabaco, maços 96A–106. * Rolls tobacco averaged 250 pounds or approximately 125 kilograms. ** One arroba is approximately 28 pounds, or 14.75 kilograms.
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approved by the WIC directors. Before 1717 the sale of slaves to Brazilians remained a small operation, but then it increased rapidly and became a lucrative business. In 1718, the Elmina-based Director General Willem Butler presented a slave trade scheme to the WIC directors that promised to produce much greater profits than the slave trade with the Dutch colonies in the West Indies. With the cooperation of the earlier mentioned Brazilian merchant Joseph de Torres, he even shipped small numbers of slaves to Brazil that brought considerable profits. In the end, the WIC directors rejected Butler’s suggestions, because they did not want to undermine their slave trade with the Dutch Guiana colonies.83 It was shortly after this that the Brazilians established a permanent trading base on the Slave Coast, and thus could obtain slaves without the assistance of the WIC. No accurate count can be made of the number of slaves that the WIC sold to Brazilians, but a calculation based on scattered data is presented in table 7.8. Estimating for missing data, the total for this sixteen-year period may have been in the range of five thousand slaves. The peak of this trade was in 1719, when the two parties were negotiating for a more active slave trade, and the number of slaves transacted reached nearly fifteen hundred. The remaining years averaged about two hundred annually, the figure that the WIC directors permitted for this trade in 1722.84 Table 7.8. Slaves Sold by the WIC to Brazilian-Based Vessels, 1715–1731 Year
Ships
Slaves
Year
Ships
1715 1717 1718 1719 Total
7 2 7 12 28
473 199 761 1,491 2,924
1721 1727 1728 1731
1 3 1 1 7
14 412 99 10 678
35
3,602
Grand Total Source: ARA, NWIC 102–05; ARA, NBKG 237.
83 84
Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, 196–200. ARA, NWIC 55: 12 April 1722.
Slaves
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.
The figures mentioned above are surely only a small fraction of the number of slaves who passed through the Bahian customs house in the period, as can be seen in table 7.9. An import tax of 3500 réis ( ƒ24) per slave was paid on some forty thousand Mina Coast slaves who sailed directly to Bahia without an intermediate stop between 1725 and 1744. The Viceroy, Count of Areos, estimated that in fact almost 100,000 Mina Coast slaves, or about five thousand a year, had reached Bahia between 1728 and 1748.85 At least another nine hundred a year went to Pernambuco in the same period.86 After 1730 the slave trade between the WIC and Brazilians must have diminished rapidly, and it may in fact have come to a complete halt. WIC documents after that date refer to Brazilian ships primarily in terms of the 10 percent duty. Several factors may account for this change. It was during this time that the Brazilians began to be firmly established on the Slave Coast and could obtain slaves from their own compatriots. This was also the time, 1730–1734, that the WIC lost its monopoly over the Dutch slave trade and the company’s involvement in this traffic was becoming limited to supplying Dutch free traders with a limited number of slaves at the company stations on the Gold Coast. Only the director general was allowed to trade with the Brazilians, giving him a monopoly over the tobacco trade among the Dutch as well, which was greatly resented by lesser company officials.87 A WIC document of 1745 points out that the Brazilians wanted to buy cowry shells and textiles at Elmina and then proceed quickly to the Slave Coast to get their human cargoes.88 After 1731, the Brazilian slave trade is only sporadically mentioned in WIC documents.
85 Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino (AHU), Bahia, caixa 59: Rellacao de todas as parcellas de receita e despeza dos thezoureiros que servião na alfandega desta Cidade de 19 de junio 1725 ate 29 Abril, 1744, pelo que respeita aos direitos de 3,500 rs que pagao por entrada us escravos vindos da costa da Mina em direitura a esta Bahia. Compare with L. V. Filho, ‘O trabalho do engenho e a reação do Indio,’ Congresso do Mundo Português, 10 (1940): 12–29. The Count of Arcos reported 99,809 slaves from Mina from 1728–1748. 86 AHU, Pernambuco, caixa 67, cited in Ribeiro Jr., Colonização, 130. 87 ARA, NWIC 113: 237; ibid., 57: 76. 88 Ibid., 115: 95.
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Table 7.9. Slaves Passing through the Bahian Custom House, 1725–1744 Year
Number Registered
1725 1726 1727 1728 1729 1730 1731 1732 1733 1734 1935 1736 1737 1738 1739 1740 1741 1742 1743 1744 1745 1746 1747 1748 1749 1750 1751 1752 1753 1754 1755
1,071 1,849 853 4,672 8,068 3,070 3,771 4,130 876 832 916 14 441 2,932 1,359 2,096 1,006 1,693 852 256
Other Estimates
2,749 (a)
1,715 (b) 4,872 (a) 3,468 4,028 3,186 4,288 1,843 3,853
Year 1757 1758 1759 1760 1761 1762 1763 1764 1765 1766 1767 1768 1769 1770 1771 1772 1773 1774 1775 1776 1777 1778 1779 1780
Estimates
4,209 3,319 4,071 4,021 3,427 2,651 2,863
(d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d)
(c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c)
Sources: (a) AHU, Bahia, caixa 44: 1st series uncatalogued (includes slaves arriving by way of São Tomé and Cacheu); (b) AHU, Bahia, caixa 59 (slaves arriving by way of São Tomé); (c) APB, Ordens régias, 54: 400–05; (d) Certidão de Diogo Pereira Marinho, Feb. 1765 cited in L. V. Filho, ‘O trabalho do engenho e a reação do indio,’ Congresso do Mundo Português 10 (1940): 26. See also note 85.
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. Conclusions
For Brazil, especially for Bahia, the Mina Coast trade remained a cornerstone of the economy. The perceived relationship between the prosperity of the colony and the slave trade and between Mina slaves and Bahian tobacco production was made clear by a group of Bahian merchants who complained that government regulations had caused a shortage of tobacco, which made the Mina trade more difficult. Petitioning in the 1790s for loosening control of the government tobacco contract and in defense of the slave trade, they argued: The happiness of these colonies consists in the expansion of their agriculture which has always depended on the number of workers devoted to it. Slave workers (for the lack of others) are those that cultivate the immense lands of Brazil; without them there would perhaps not exist those important articles like sugar, tobacco, cotton, and the other things carried to the Mother Country which increase and enrich national commerce and the treasury of Your Majesty. Any objections to the slave trade are attacks on the population, the commerce, and the income of Your Majesty.89
The argument that slavery and the slave trade were a national interest was already being made in Brazil in the eighteenth century and would intensify in the nineteenth century when Portugal came under British pressure to abolish the slave trade. The Dutch West India Company, because of its key position on the Guinea Coast, profited from the Brazilian trade in gold and tobacco for slaves and sought to control that trade according to existing treaty arrangements. The company profited in several ways from this commercial connection: the 10 percent duties that Brazilians paid at Elmina, the Brazilian ships and cargoes that were confiscated, profits made from the sale of slaves, various kinds of merchandise sold to Brazilian traders, and tobacco, gold, and other products that were brought in from Brazil and subsequently shipped to the Netherlands. In his recent appraisal of Dutch commerce with Africa, Den Heijer claims that around 1717–1720 the WIC trade with the Brazilians became the most profitable branch of the company’s activities in Africa.90
89 90
Arquivo Público do Estado da Bahia (APB), Ordens régias 83: 135–36. Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, 197.
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The arrival of other European nations on the Slave Coast, the rise of the kingdom of Dahomey, and the establishment of the Portuguese fort at Whydah, all made the enforcement of Dutch control increasingly difficult. Brazilian traders dealt with the Dutch when necessary, but after 1720 this trade drifted gradually outside the sphere of Dutch control.
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PART THREE
CARRIBEAN AND NORTH AMERICAN TRADE
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CHAPTER EIGHT
CURAÇAO AND THE CARIBBEAN TRANSIT TRADE W K
Trade with Curaçao and from there with the Spanish West Indies is very substantial and, for the common good, it deserves to be given special attention because of the large trade in merchandise, especially in our domestic drapery sent there. J. de Wildt, secretary of the Amsterdam Admiralty, 1703.1
Introduction In the period 1650–1800, the Dutch merchant marine engaged in two types of trade with foreign colonies in the Caribbean. Some ships sailed directly to the Spanish, French or English settlements in the West Indies, but most preferred to use the Dutch islands of Curaçao and St. Eustatius as transit stations. Direct or bilateral commerce was dominant in the Dutch trade with Spanish America before 1670 and never completely disappeared.2 But it was not very significant 1
A. J. Veenendaal Jr., De briefwisseling van Anthoni Heinsius, 1702–1720, pt. 2, 1703, Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën, grote ser., no. 163 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1976), 2:588, J. de Wildt, secretary of the Amsterdam Admiralty, to Pensionary Anthonie Heinsius, Amsterdam, 24 December 1703. 2 Among the companies participating in this trade during the eighteenth century was the Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie, which organized fifty-five voyages to the West Indies between 1723 and 1752, selling textiles, spices, and hardware in Cuba, Venezuela, and New Granada. From 1723 through 1744, the company’s turnover in the Caribbean was 2,619,479 pesos ( ƒ6,286,750). Imports were dominated by bullion and specie, which claimed 55.7 percent of the cargoes’ value, and further included cacao (17.4 percent), hides (14.5 percent), tobacco (8.3 percent), indigo (1.7 percent), and sugar (0.5 percent). Zeeuws Archief, Archief der Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie. See also, C. Reinders Folmer-van Prooijen, Van goederenhandel naar slavenhandel. De Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie, 1720–1755, Werken uitgegeven door het Koninklijk Zeeuwsch Genootschap der Wetenschappen, no. 10 (Middelburg: Koninklijk Zeeuwsch Genootschap der Wetenschappen, 2000), 137–143.
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in comparison with the intra-Caribbean trade, centered in Curaçao, which became the primary mode of Dutch trade with Spanish America in the last quarter of the seventeenth century. From then onward, the island of Curaçao assumed a significance far beyond its small size, both as an entrepôt which attracted merchants from all parts of the Caribbean, and as a transit point for trade with the United Provinces. A Dutch colony since 1634, it was only after the Peace of Münster (1648), which reconciled the Dutch Republic and the Spanish monarchy, that Curaçao became involved in trade with its Hispanic neighbors. Curaçao, or rather its port of Willemstad, soon became more than simply a harbor where the loading and unloading of goods took place. Financial institutions were established here, ships were repaired and fitted out, bought and sold, and sailors were enlisted for voyages to all parts of the West Indies. Curaçao owed its development as a trading center in part to its proximity to the Spanish Mainland and its excellent natural port, where sloops were fitted out that could outmaneuver Spanish coastguard vessels.3 These circumstances enabled Curaçao to overcome its main handicap – the absence of an agricultural hinterland or other resources of any significance. They also allowed it to develop into a place where supply and demand were concentrated, assuring buyers that the products sought were available and enabling sellers to gain a clearer notion of their sales potential. Compared to the Caribbean transit trade, ocean-going trade had one important drawback for Dutch merchants. Distant travel and the establishment of contact with local merchants at each port of call took up precious time and limited the volume of business they could conduct.4 It made more sense to work with resident merchants or factors, and the favorably located Dutch colony of Curaçao, from where lasting links could be forged with foreign ports, was the obvious place for them to settle. After this shift was completed, few 3 This received wisdom was lost on the owners and master of a large Dutch ship, which sailed from the Netherlands to Garrote near Panama in 1757 with a two-hundred-man crew and a cargo worth over 400,000 pesos ( ƒ960,000). Only then did the ship’s officers realize the advantages of Curaçao, and they subsequently had the cargo shipped from Willemstad to the Spanish Main in small local craft. Archivo General de Simancas (AGS), Secretaría de Marina 404: Francisco Garay to Luís de Cordova, Portobelo, 16 February 1757, and L. de Cordova to Julián de Arriaga, Cartagena, 30 April 1757. 4 R. B. Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery: An Economic History of the British West Indies, 1623–1775 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), 320.
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ocean-going ships sailed from Dutch ports directly to foreign Caribbean colonies; traders preferred instead to unload their merchandise at Curaçao and assemble and reload regional products that had been shipped there by small craft.5 Around 1670, therefore, numerous Dutch merchants or factors arrived from Cádiz in Spain, where they had been conducting business with Spanish America by means of the official Spanish fleet system. Equally important to Curaçao’s ascendancy as a trading center was the arrival from the 1650s onward of Sephardic Jews, who used their mastery of the Spanish language to deal with Spanish American merchants, and who eventually came to make up about one third of Curaçao’s European population. The Jewish settlers also started trading with Barbados and New Netherland. Family networks across the Atlantic sustained Jewish activities, especially during the eighteenth century, with various relatives acting as business associates. The bulk of their goods was obviously consigned to Jewish firms in Amsterdam, although several ties were forged with gentile companies in the United Provinces as well.6 The Dutch involvement in the African slave trade also contributed to Curaçao’s rise as a regional entrepôt. Only a few years after the first goods had been exchanged with the Spanish Main, Curaçao obtained a pivotal position in the slave trade to Spanish America. In 1662 the Spanish Crown signed a contract with two Genoese merchants to supply 24,000 African slaves to the American provinces in the next seven years. The Genoese subcontracted the shipment of slaves from Africa to the Dutch West India Company (WIC), which arranged for the transport of the slaves to Curaçao, serving as a way station to the mainland of Central and South America. This contract laid the foundation of a regular slave trade between Curaçao and Spanish America. As a result, more than 42,000 bonded 5 When the arrival of ships from Amsterdam was imminent, Curaçaoan vessels involved in the intra-Caribbean trade were frequently held up in Willemstad for lack of merchandise to carry to foreign destinations. AGS, Estado 6361: 103–04, Salomon Lopes Henriquez to Thomas de Meijer, Curaçao, 9 July 1747. 6 The 170-ton ship the Swaan may serve as an example. It left Curaçao for Amsterdam on 19 March 1749 with loads of cacao, coffee, sugar, indigo, tobacco, and logwood. Curaçao’s gentiles (non-Jews) consigned forty-five cargoes to gentile firms in Amsterdam and only one to a Jewish company. The island’s Jewish traders, on the other hand, sent twenty-nine consignments to fellow Jews and twenty-four to non-Jewish companies. Algemeen Rijksarchief (ARA), Archief van de Nieuwe West-Indische Compagnie (NWIC) 596: 920–27.
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Africans were transported along this route from 1676 through 1716 (see chapter 9).7 Despite the loss of the slave trade in the 1720s, Curaçao’s commercial network continued to grow in the eighteenth century. The number of vessels arriving in Willemstad more than tripled, from 231 to 741, between mid-century and the mid-1780s. The Spanish Main dominated Curaçao’s commercial contacts, although its share decreased in the last years of the century. On the Main, Curaçaoans preferred Central Venezuela, which claimed 82.7 percent of the ships in 1785–86 and 76.8 percent in 1796–98. Shipping to and from the Spanish and French Caribbean islands fluctuated considerably in the second half of the century, while the trade with North America remained about the same (around 11 percent). These data, however, conceal the dramatic shift in the composition of Curaçao’s shipping traffic that took place somewhere between 1786 and 1796. The shift would be a lasting one. Not only did the number of vessels entering the harbor of Willemstad decline sharply from 741 to 422 per annum,8 but the Dutch share of this traffic also plummeted. Whereas most vessels had still been in Dutch hands in 1785–86, a decade later less than a quarter of the ships departing from Willemstad sailed under the Dutch flag (22.6 percent), only slightly exceeding the Danish (18.0 percent) and North American (17.0 percent) shares, and far less than that of Spain (38.2 percent).9
Transatlantic Navigation Unfortunately, there is a great dearth of quantitative data on the seventeenth-century trade between the United Provinces and Curaçao. This article will therefore only deal with the eighteenth century. For the period 1701–1755 I have compiled a list of 791 merchantmen sailing from Curaçao to the United Provinces. The list is complete
7
J. Postma, The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade 1600–1815 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 45, 48. 8 The actual figure will even be much smaller than 422, since this number includes the vessels leaving empty. 9 This analysis pertains to the vessels with a cargo arriving on 16 October 1751–15 October 1752 and 1 July 1785–30 June 1786. They have been compared with the outgoing vessels in the period 19 September 1796–16 May 1798. Sources: ARA, NWIC 1173: 997–1004, 2030–32; ibid., 1174: 91–112, 213–29, 1461–70, 1794–98. Houghton Library, MS Dutch 9PF: Arrivals and departures of vessels from Curaçao.
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except for the year 1734, for which no data are available in the WIC records. Most ships leaving Curaçao (682, or 86.2 percent) cleared for Amsterdam, while 101 (12.8 percent) sailed to Flushing, Middelburg, or other ports in the province of Zeeland, and 3 (0.4 percent) to Rotterdam. The destination of five voyages is unknown. There was a sharp drop in voyages to Zeeland after 1735. In the next twenty years, only five ships were recorded as sailing to that province.10 The average annual number leaving Curaçao for the Netherlands was between fourteen or fifteen. The lowest number recorded for one year was seven, the highest was twenty-nine.11 In the second half of the century, shipping traffic between Curaçao and the United Provinces became more intensive, especially in war years: in 1759–1761 (the Seven Year War, 1756–1763), forty-nine, thirty-nine, and sixtytwo ships respectively entered from the Caribbean island, in 1783 as many as eighty.12 The bulk of the vessels plying the Atlantic were frigates, but brigantines and snows were employed as well. Not all vessels came to Curaçao directly. Forty-five of the 791 ships made the triangular route via West Africa.13 The average tonnage of these slaving ships was 146, slightly below the overall average of 166 ton for Curaçao-bound vessels. The ships leaving from Amsterdam were considerably heavier than those originating from Zeeland: 169 vs. 94 ton respectively. Ships in the smallest category, one to fifty ton, were rare after 1725; in the next thirty years only two such voyages were registered.14 Ships on the other end of the scale, those over 300 ton, were even more exceptional. In the period 1701–1755, only two such ships crossed the ocean.15 The majority In the same period, Dutch shipping to St. Eustatius was also firmly in the hands of Amsterdam merchants. Out of 206 vessels leaving Statia for the Netherlands in 1738–51, 196 sailed to Amsterdam, four to Flushing, two to Rotterdam, and one to Middelburg. No destination was listed for the three remaining ships. ARA, NWIC 621–24. 11 Only seven ships sailed in 1703, 1704 and 1754, while as many as twentynine sailed in 1749. 12 F. Snapper, ‘De generale lijsten van de schepen die in de perioden 1758–1761 en 1783–1786 in Holland zijn binnengelopen,’ in Economisch en Sociaal-Historisch Jaarboek 42 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1979), 26–44. 13 Thirty-seven of these first left Amsterdam, while eight had been fitted out in Zeeland. 14 The data may be somewhat distorted, as this group included mostly Zeeland vessels, about whose tonnage little information is available. 15 Both vessels, the Groote St. Jago of 310 ton and the Elisabeth en Maria of 420 ton, were probably part of a single trading venture in 1707. These ships left Curaçao around 31 May 1707. ARA, NWIC 569: 402–17. 10
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Table 8.1. Tonnage of Ships Sailing between Curaçao and the United Provinces, 1701–1755 (percentages per decade) Ton 1–50 51–100 101–150 151–200 201–250 251–300 301–350 351–400 401–450
1701–10 1711–20 1721–30 1731–40 1741–50 1751–55 Overall 17.4 18.8 11.6 26.1 23.2
13.0 16.3 17.4 23.9 16.3 13.0
5.7 35.2 30.5 23.8 2.9 1.9
18.2 19.5 39.0 23.4
0.8 10.7 13.7 27.5 43.5 3.8
1.8 8.9 12.5 32.1 42.9 1.8
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
1.4 1.4 100.0
6.0 18.5 18.1 28.1 25.1 3.8 0.2 0.0 0.2 100.0
Source: ARA, NWIC 566–98, 1146–61.
(53.2 percent) of the ships were between 151 and 250 ton. From 1730 onward, a growing number of ships belonged to this medium size group; after 1740, more than seventy percent fell in this category. The exact breakdown in ship tonnage is shown in table 8.1. In contrast with the ships fitted out in the shuttle trade between Amsterdam and the West Indies, in hindsight, some of the slave vessels were hardly seaworthy. Not only was their capacity often dangerously small for transoceanic traffic, some of them were also badly in need of repairs. The Coningin Ester, for instance, a ship of eighty ton, was in such a deplorable state that after its triangular voyage of 1713–15 (from Zeeland over the Slave Coast to Curaçao and back to Zeeland), it was described as being ‘so bad and so old that it is a miracle that the ship and its crew were not lost under way.’16 Two other slave ships were in such a poor condition that they had to be scrapped after their arrival in Curaçao.17 More than once, even sound ships did not reach their destination, when they lost the
16 The ship, also called the Koningin Hester, was hired for this occasion by the chamber Stad en Lande of the WIC. It carried 625 slaves to Curaçao, landing 499 alive. P. J. van Winter, De West-Indische Compagnie ter kamer Stad en Lande, Werken uitgegeven door de Vereeniging het Nederlandsch Economisch-Historisch Archief, no. 15 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1978), 197; Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, 310, appendix 1. 17 These ships, the Wakende Kraan and the Engelenburgh, were scrapped in 1704 and 1715, respectively. H. J. den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven. Scheepvaart en handel van de Tweede Westindische Compagnie op Afrika, 1674–1740 (Zutphen: Walburg, 1997), 108, 406, 411.
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battle with the elements while crossing the Atlantic or were wrecked in the English Channel.18 Privateering posed an even more serious threat than the elements, or pirates, for that matter.19 French privateers were most active during the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–1713), while British privateering was especially successful during the Seven Year War (1756–1763).20 Spanish American privateers were also much dreaded by the Dutch. In the 1730s and 1740s, they seized more than ten Dutch ships on the outward-bound or return voyages between Curaçao and Amsterdam.21 Spanish authorities claimed title to inspection and seizure of ships deviating from their normal route, in particular when 18 On 11 November 1749, while underway to Curaçao, the Anna Maria Galey was stranded on the Aves Islands. Gemeentearchief Rotterdam, Oud Notarieel Archief 2145: 66. In 1749 and 1752, respectively, the Hoop and the Johanna Elisabeth both ran aground at the Isle of Portland. Amsterdamse Courant, 6 February 1749, and 25 July 1752. In 1758, the Vrouw Anna ran onto a reef near the island of Great Inagua. Gemeentearchief Amsterdam (GAA), Notarieel Archief (NA) 10780: 629, 22 May 1759. Severe or repeated setbacks could cost long delays. Having sustained heavy damage in a storm, the Vrouw Maria, which left Curaçao on 28 November 1724, put into Baltimore (Ireland) to carry out repairs, and did not arrive in Amsterdam until 12 July 1725. GAA, NA 8611: 975, 26 July 1725. The Stad Amsterdam sailed from Curaçao on 15 October 1783 and was caught in heavy sea off the Dutch coast. After being repaired in Norway, the ship finally reached Amsterdam on 5 May 1784. M. Häberlein and M. Schmölz-Häberlein, Die Erben der Welser: Der Karibikhandel der Augsburger Firma Obwexer im Zeitalter der Revolutionen, Schwäbische Forschungsgemeinschaft bei der Kommission für Bayerische Landesgeschichte, no. 21 (Augsburg: Wissner, 1995), 84. 19 Only rarely did pirates capture ocean-going ships. The Maria Gallij in 1717 was an exception. ARA, NWIC 573: 427. 20 French prizes included the Duynenburg on its triangular route in 1707 from Zeeland to Ardra (West Africa) and Curaçao. ARA, NWIC 471: 115, J. Scott and Joseph Coymans to Governor Beck of Curaçao, Amsterdam, 22 April 1707. The British seized two ships from among other Dutch craft on their way from Texel, the usual point of departure from Amsterdam, to Curaçao. The Vrouw Anna was taken to New York in 1757, and the Rust van ’t Vaderland to New Providence, the Bahamas, in 1759. GAA, NA 10290: 1055, 17 December 1759; ibid., 10788: 1348 and 23 October 1760. In 1757–58, at least three ships were captured on the return voyage from Curaçao: the Princesse Gouvernante, the Curaçaosche Visser, and the Katharina Maria Galei. Nederlandsche Jaerboeken, inhoudende een verhael van de merkwaerdigste geschiedenissen, die voorgevallen zijn binnen den omtrek der Verenigde Provintien 1758 (Amsterdam: Houttuyn, 1758), 924–47. For the Curaçaosche Visser see also chapter 1, note 3 in this volume. In late 1780, British privateers seized three more ships bound for Amsterdam: the Vrouw Maria, the Vleyt, and the Susanna Catharina. The combined value of their cargoes was ƒ242,360. Häberlein and Schmölz-Häberlein, Erben der Welser, 58–59. 21 ARA, NWIC 1155: 136, Governor Juan Pedro van Collen to the WIC, Curaçao, 19 July 1734; ARA, Archief van de Staten-Generaal (SG) 7137: F. van der Meer to the Marquis de Villarías, Cienpozuelos, 27 May 1740.
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they were suspected of involvement in contraband trade.22 They seized numerous foreign vessels, which irritated the British so much that they went to war with Spain over this issue in 1739, starting the so-called War of Jenkins’ Ear.23 Spanish suspicion was also aroused by the shipping routes used by the Dutch. They normally sailed past Tobago, from there hugging the mainland coast until they reached Curaçao. Ships homeward bound to Europe sailed between Hispaniola and Puerto Rico and, Dutch officials claimed, were sometimes forced by easterly winds to sail down the coast of Hispaniola.24 The Spaniards maintained that the correct sea lane to the West Indies was that taken by the galeones, between Dominica and another Leeward Island, usually Martinique or Santa Lucia. The return voyage should indeed pass between Hispaniola and Puerto Rico, but Madrid observed that the alleged Dutch problems with the winds near Hispaniola were greatly exaggerated.25 Responding to reports that Spain would henceforth seize all Dutch craft in the Caribbean,26 the board of the admiralty of Amsterdam in 1737 dispatched two warships to the West Indies to convoy outward-bound ships over the ocean up to Tobago. Ships returning to the Netherlands were to be escorted from the Mona Passage between Puerto Rico and Hispaniola. In the next seven years, twelve more Dutch warships sailed to the West Indies.
Outgoing Commodities ‘There is not a port in the world out of Europe, where all sorts of European goods are to be seen in greater plenty than there, in 22 Archivo General de Indias (AGI), Santo Domingo, 385: Real Cédula, San Ildefonso, 20 July 1738; ARA, SG 7136: F. van der Meer to States General, Madrid, 22 December 1738. 23 The States General considered Spanish privateering incompatible with article 34 of the Utrecht peace treaty of 1713, arguing that Dutchmen manning the oceangoing ships could not be expected to investigate whether the transported merchandise and specie had been procured in Spanish America. AGS, Estado 6331: res. States General, 2 June 1747. 24 ARA, SG 5772: Joan Althusius, for the directors of the WIC, to States General, 1700, 25 AGI, Indiferente General 1596: Francisco de Campo de Arbe and José de la Quintana to King Philip V, Madrid, 28 May 1739; ibid., 1596: Advice to the Council of the Indies, 1739. 26 ARA, SG 5778: Sieuwert Back, master of the Hoop, to Jan Valk, merchant in Amsterdam, Havana, 7 October 1736, and WIC directors, chamber Amsterdam, to States General, Amsterdam, 2 February 1737.
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Curasoa. . . .’27 The Universal Dictionary of Trade and Commerce was certainly right in its assertion in 1774 that a wide variety of products were carried from Europe to Curaçao. Oddly enough, for all such observations in contemporary literature and correspondence, very little is actually known about the nature of these commodities. Only a handful of documents have survived that give us an idea of their composition: the invoices of two Curaçaoan sloops leaving port in 1714 and 1741 that traded with Spanish America (see table 8.2); the invoice of a ship sailing from Amsterdam to Curaçao in 1736; a 1763 list secured by the Spanish ambassador in The Hague, enumerating the Curaçaoan goods that sold best in Spanish America; and the order placed by a Curaçaoan merchant with his European suppliers in 1780. According to these sources, textiles dominated the merchandise. Linen products of many varieties were included: Flemish, Osnabrück, Elberfeld, Silesian, and Arabian. Often the only Dutch item in the consignments was the famous bleached linens from Haarlem. In addition, so-called bretañas, roanes, platillas, and coletas featured prominently on all five documents. Bretañas were Breton linen goods utilized in the production of delicate textiles for items like shirts and handkerchiefs; roanes were textiles which originally came from Normandy and were used for the manufacturing of knee breeches; platillas were imitation bretañas, bleached linens, mostly from Silesia; and linen cloths called coletas, often used for the production of sheets and shirts.28 Cotton print were also in demand in Spanish America, while other sources indicate that there was a large assortment of lace and silk fabrics trimmed with gold and silver, as well.29 Table 8.2 lists these various textiles. 27
M. Postlethwayt, The Universal Dictionary of Trade and Commerce: with Large Additions and Improvements, Adapting the Same to the Present State of British Affairs in America, since the Last Treaty of Peace Made in the Year 1763, 4th ed. (London: Knapton, 1774), Heading II, Linen. Reflections and Considerations, occasioned by the petition presented to the honorable House of Commons, for taking off the drawback on foreign linens, printed for T. Cooper, 1738. 28 How popular these products were in Venezuela was shown when the cabildo of Caracas drew up a list of goods that found a ready market in that town in 1761. The list includes roanes, coletas, bretañas, and hats. AGI, Caracas 932: Consult cabildo ordinario Caracas, 12 October 1761. 29 ARA, SG 5778: Invoice of the America, 4 February–13 June 1736; AGS, Estado 6339: Juan Manuel de Uriondo to Grimaldi, The Hague, 21 April 1763; Häberlein and Schmölz-Häberlein, Die Erben der Welser, 133–36, Pierre Brion to Obwexer, Curaçao, 4 July 1780. For the assortment of textiles in Curaçao in the early eighteenth century, see J. le M. de L’Espine and I. de Long, De koophandel van Amsterdam, naar alle gewesten des weerelds, bestaande in een verhandelinge van de waaren en koopmanschappen die men daar heen send en wederom ontfangt: benevens vergelykingen der munten, maaten en
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Table 8.2. Two Invoices of Curaçao’s Inter-Caribbean Trade, 1714 and 1741 Juffrouw Sara (1714) 1 2 Number Commodity 50 pieces 50 pieces 28 12 4 1 ⅓ 1 24
pieces pieces pieces piece piece lb
platillas bretañas coletas roanes listados barracanes black anascotes silk ribbon hats
3 Number 30 pieces 20 pieces 20 20 20 16 10 6 4 3 4 2 2 24 24 2 20 130 111 12 279 50 25
pieces pieces pieces pieces pieces pieces pieces pieces pieces pieces pieces reams cellars jugs lb lb lb
Anna Catharina (1741) 4 5 6 Commodity Pesos Reales coletas red and blue cotton hollandillas roanes calicoes barracanes Arabian linen borlones handkerchiefs palomitas bayetas canvas Valencia canvas fine hats coarse hats Genoese paper brandy choppers knives oil wax cinnamon pepper
330 115 105 262 117 208 13730
88 18 34 37 9 3 120 56 55 21 122 81 9
7 Maravedís
7 3
1 3
1 7
5 12
4
5 4 4
2 3
4 7 4 0 2 7
3 1
Source: ARA, NWIC 1151: 12, Invoice of the sloop Juffrouw Sara, Curaçao, 11 January 1714. ARA, SG 5779: Invoice of the sloop Anna Catharina, Curaçao, 24 October 1741. Note: Columns 1 and 2 refer to the vessel Juffrouw Sara, columns 3 through 7 to the Anna Catharina. Holandillas were colored linen sheeting, listados were striped colored linen, barraganes were coarse woolen camlets, used for rain wear, anascotes was wool fabric, borlones were linen and cotton fabrics with small knots and bulges. Bayetas were baizes, which were often converted to cloth to mop the floor.
gewigten, en op wat wyse men over en weer wisselt, 2nd ed. (Amsterdam: Van Damme en Ratelband, 1715), 466; R. D. Hussey, The Caracas Company, 1728–1784: A Study in the History of Spanish Monopolistic Trade (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934), 167; J. G. van Bel, De Linnenhandel van Amsterdam in de XVIIIe Eeuw (Amsterdam: Paris, 1940), 42, 130–33; J. Hartog, Curaçao: Van kolonie tot autonomie (Aruba: De Wit, 1961), 1:365. 30 The combined price for Arabian linen, borlones, handkerchiefs, and palomitas.
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Besides textiles, the cargoes included liquor, hardware, and spices. In 1736, the ship America carried to Curaçao, apart from textiles, 258 cellars of brandy and gin; one barrel and ca. 1,400 liter of wine; twenty pipes, fifty-seven hogsheads and two barrels of beer; 12,000 pounds, 300 pots, and 240 bars of iron; 14,000 clinkers, 9,000 pounds of gunpowder; and 530 pounds of pepper.31 The gunpowder might have been intended for Curaçao’s garrison, but occasionally, war materiel was exported to foreign colonies as well. The unsubdued Guajiro Indians in Santa Marta province in eastern New Granada, for instance, were regular buyers of Dutch arms and ammunition, which helped them sustain their fight against the Spanish authorities.32 In the 1770s and 1780s arms found a ready market in rebellious North America. After Governor Jean Rodier prohibited direct exports of ammunition and warlike stores, Curaçaoan traders were forced to take roundabout routes to supply the revolutionaries. It was, however, allowed to ship war materials to St. Eustatius, and that happened on a regular basis.33
Return Goods For lack of thorough studies regarding return goods, it is hard to reach definitive conclusions on this subject. We can safely assume, however, that the value of incoming products from Curaçao exceeded
31 The textiles it carried were 5,060 pieces of platillas, 100 pieces of bretañas, 680 pieces of holandillas, 130 pieces of Osnabrück linen, 100 pieces of Flemish linen, one case and one chest of Silezian linen, twelve cases of Elberfeld linen, seventyfour pieces of Arabian linen, one batch and forty-eight pieces of striped linen, 300 pieces and 700 yards of cotton linen, 304 pieces of cotton print, 486 hats, and eighty pieces of sailcloth. ARA, SG 5778: Invoice of the America, Amsterdam, February–June 1736. 32 AGS, Estado 6360: Manuel Antonio Florez to José de Galvez, Santa Fé de Bogotá, 31 March 1778; C. M. del Mena García, Santa Marta durante la Guerra de Sucesión española (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1982), 53. Similarly, the Dutch in Essequibo helped the Caribs sustain their war efforts, supplying an estimated 200,000 machetes between 1700 and 1742. See N. L. Whitehead, Lords of the Tiger Spirit: A History of the Caribs in Colonial Venezuela and Guyana, 1498–1821, Caribbean Series, no. 10 (Dordrecht: KITLV Press, 1988), chapter 7. 33 W. B. Clark and W. J. Morgan, eds., Naval Documents of the American Revolution (Washington: Naval Historical Center, 1964–1996), 3:44, Minutes of the New York Committee of Safety, 1 February 1776; C. C. Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean and in the Guianas, 1680–1791 (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1985), 121.
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that of the outgoing commodities.34 Furthermore, it is clear that Curaçao’s production and consumption were insignificant. In other words, the share of the commodities entering Curaçao from Amsterdam and Zeeland that was consumed on the island itself was equally negligible as the proportion of Curaçao’s exports that had been produced on the island. The manifests of the ships clearing for Dutch ports mirrored the whole gamut of crops grown in the Caribbean. Virtually all cacao that passed through Curaçao came from nearby Venezuela, indigo was imported from Guatemala and St. Domingue, sugar from St. Domingue, Martinique and Guadeloupe.35 Coffee was predominantly supplied by Martinique, and hides by Venezuela (71.9 percent of the specified consignments between 1701 and 1755), Santo Domingo (23.7 percent) and Cuba (2.3 percent). Tobacco came in many different varieties, with Puerto Rico leaf dominating (49.3 percent between 1701 and 1755), followed by Barinas tobacco from Venezuela (35.8 percent), and tobacco from Cuba (8.1 percent). In Amsterdam, ‘Barinas tobacco’ was probably used as a generic term, referring to six brands of Venezuelan tobacco, each priced separately: Maracaibo, Barinas, Guanare, Araure, Nutrias, and Valencia.36 On their return voyage, the ocean-going ships also carried loads of log- and dyewood, low-priced bulk goods that masters preferred to stones to fill the remainder of their holds. Logwood was procured in more than ten different parts of the New World, from Mexico to Brazil.37
34 In a few instances, it may have been the other way around. The combined value of the outgoing cargoes of three ships in 1780 surpassed that of the return cargoes. Mark and Michaela Häberlein suggest that the Curaçao merchant, Pierre Brion, who bought the Dutch commodities, sought exceptionally high-grade textiles. See Häberlein and Schmölz-Häberlein, Erben der Welser, 59. 35 In the period 1726–1755, 80.7 percent of Curaçao’s specified sugar imports were from St. Domingue, 8.3 percent from Martinique, and 5.5 percent from Guadeloupe. W. Klooster, Illicit Riches: Dutch Trade in the Caribbean, 1648–1795, Caribbean Series, no. 18 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1998), 192. 36 Klooster, Illicit Riches, 188–91, 193, 196–97. 37 Dyewood from Río de la Hacha (New Granada) initially dominated, while in the second part of the eighteenth century Coro (Venezuela) became the main supplier. Other areas included Campeche, Santa Marta (New Granada), Puerto Rico, and Cuba. AGI, Indiferente General 2412: Agustín Moreno Henríquez to José de Galvez, Amsterdam, 11 February 1778.
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Table 8.3. Selected Items Sent from Curaçao to the Netherlands, 1771–1755 Annual Averages (pounds) Years
Cacao
Hides
Dyewood
Tobacco
1701–10 1711–20 1721–30 1731–40 1741–50 1751–55
1,187,875 1,675,075 1,419,641 589,526 2,589,252 1,290,303
575,178 544,024 748,562 900,754 1,681,621 2,252,004
661,710 1,039,359 513,195 749,608 1,087,235 1,617,755
60,037 203,317 446,714 484,160 492,952 488,619
Overall Avg.
1,473,913
1,013,844
883,634
351,180
Source: ARA, NWIC 566–98, 1146–61.
Without a doubt, cacao was the main item in the holds of the ships clearing from Curaçao for the Netherlands. In the first three decades of the eighteenth century, 1,427,530 pounds were consigned annually on average and in the next twenty-five years 1,274,843 pounds, a figure masking an erratic development. The volume was conditional upon the accessibility of the Venezuelan coast, and beginning in 1730 a specially designed company, the Compañía Guipuzcoana, successfully fought foreign contraband along the Venezuelan littoral. The outbreak of the War of Jenkins’ Ear, however, forced the company in 1739 to employ its coastguard vessels in the defence of Venezuela’s ports of Puerto Cabello and La Guaira. The coast was left wide open to Curaçao’s smugglers for the duration of the war. When peace returned in 1748 so did the coast guards, and Curaçao’s cacao trade consequently collapsed. Since tobacco was also procured in other Spanish colonies, the substantial trade in this item was far less affected by the activities of the Compañía Guipuzcoana. Tobacco and cacao, along with logwood and hides, were listed as return goods throughout the century, while sugar was not added until 1719 and the first coffee beans in 1735. Coffee and indigo were among the foremost Curaçaoan export items during the War of Jenkins’ Ear, when the Dutch made the most of their neutrality in a conflict that found Britain and France in opposing camps. Due to naval warfare, the French colonies had to rely on products that the Dutch were eager to ship across the Atlantic. As a result of this development, 996,251 pounds of indigo and 613,746 pounds of coffee were carried to Amsterdam between
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Table 8.4. Product Trade Curaçao-Netherlands, 1701–1755 (guilders) Years 1701–10 1711–20 1721–30 1731–40 1741–50 1751–55
Overall Value
Value of Cacao
Percentage
1,012,753 1,210,000 1,227,131 1,113,606 2,487,306 1,025,072
691,540 562,269 759,768 507,020 1,244,513 624,763
68.3 46.5 61.9 45.4 50.0 60.9
Source: ARA, NWIC 566–98, 1146–61. Note: Overall values are based on cacao, tobacco, indigo, coffee, sugar, hides and dyewood shipments.
1745 and 1749. Both products had been marginal export items before and indigo would not fare better afterwards. Coffee became a major Curaçaoan export product as the century advanced.38 During the upsurge in coffee and indigo exports in 1745–49, the value of these crops averaged ƒ613,522 and ƒ199,250, respectively, but for the whole period of 1701–55 they were of little account, valued only at ƒ39,323 and ƒ70,552 respectively.39 This contrasts sharply with the value of cacao shipments. With a mean annual value of ƒ804,429, cacao was easily Curaçao’s prime remittance, far exceeding sugar (valued at ƒ148,472),40 and representing 55.5 percent of all products reshipped to the United Provinces, as table 8.4 illustrates. The overall value of Curaçao’s export trade to the Netherlands was fairly constant in the first half of the eighteenth century. The combined average annual value of cacao, sugar, coffee, tobacco, indigo and hides shipments was during the period 1701–1710: ƒ912,753; 1711–1720: ƒ1,110,000; 1721–1730: ƒ1,127,131; 1731–1740: ƒ1,013,606; 1741–1750: ƒ2,189,792; 1751–1755: ƒ925,072 respectively. An estimated ƒ100,000 may be added for logwood, so that we can trace an overall increase of Curaçao’s product trade from 38 Average coffee exports from Curaçao to the Netherlands amounted to 61,580 pounds in 1735–1744 and 32,960 in 1750–1755. Between 1775 and 1780, they fluctuated at around half a million pounds. ARA, NWIC 1179. Likewise, ship manifests reveal that in March 1794, 959,039 pounds were shipped to Amsterdam, ARA, Archief van de Raad van Coloniën 84. 39 The average value of Curaçao’s coffee exports in 1735–1755 was ƒ108,137. 40 Sugar imports from Curaçao were recorded only for 1719–1755, during which they were valued at ƒ216,608 on average on the Amsterdam market.
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Table 8.5. Curaçao’s Exports to the Netherlands, 1701–1780 (guilders) Years
Value
1701–1710 1711–1720 1721–1730 1731–1740 1741–1750 1751–1760 1761–1770 1771–1780
1,519,130 1,815,000 1,840,697 1,670,409 3,434,688 1,887,536 2,750,000 2,750,000
Source: Klooster, Illicit Riches, 174–75.
ƒ1.15 million in 1701–1730 to ƒ1.56 million in 1731–1755. It has been estimated that by the middle of the eighteenth century, precious metals accounted for more than half the American remittances to Europe. It is safe to assume that their share in Curaçao reexports was somewhat larger than 28 percent, because trade with New Granada normally brought in substantial amounts of cash. If we set this share at 33 percent for 1701–1755, the total value of Curaçao’s reexports increased from ca. ƒ1.5 million (1701–10) to ƒ2.75 million, as is shown in table 8.5.
Summary The 1670s were a watershed decade for the United Provinces. They marked the end not only of unchallenged global commercial hegemony, but of imperial designs in the Western Hemisphere. True, after previous decades had seen the loss of mainland Dutch colonies of Brazil and New Netherland, many merchants harbored plans to transform the recently acquired plantation colony of Suriname into a ‘second Brazil.’ But these plans never materialized, and the Dutch had to make the best of their American possessions, a string of colonies in northern South America that included Suriname, and a handful of tiny Caribbean islands. Although none of the islands initially showed great economic promise for the future, Curaçao soon flourished as a major commercial outpost of the United Provinces. Curaçao’s success as an emporium was enabled by the change that took place in the pattern of Dutch transatlantic trade. Dutch
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merchants tapping the riches of Spanish America had originally largely bypassed Curaçao, either dealing directly with Spanish American ports or sending their goods on board the Spanish fleets and galleons. Around 1670, they shifted their operations. From then onward, the Dutch firms relied on factors or commissioners resident on Curaçao who could react more adequately to regional changes in supply and demand. The island became an important transit station in the African slave trade to Spanish America, and started reexporting considerable amounts of linen goods and other textiles to foreign colonies in the Caribbean. Ships from the United Provinces transported these European products to Curaçao’s port, from where they were carried by sloops and later schooners to the myriad of coves, inlets, and ports of Venezuela, New Granada, and other parts of the (circum-) Caribbean. In return, New World crops were sent via Curaçao to the Dutch metropolis. Amsterdam benefited mostly from the rise of Curaçao as an entrepôt, becoming one of Europe’s leading staple markets for cacao and tobacco from Spanish America.
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CHAPTER NINE
THE CURAÇAO SLAVE MARKET: FROM ASIENTO TRADE TO FREE TRADE, 1700–17301 H J
Many business activities would seem inconceivable, were it not for the fact that they are very profitable. A good example of this is the slave trade, where the merchants’ profits alone would be reason enough to consider it legitimate. Gallandat, 1769.2
Introduction During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Dutch shipped roughly half a million enslaved Africans to the New World. More than half of them were transported by the Dutch West India Company (WIC), which enjoyed a monopoly over the Dutch slave trade until 1730. The Dutch became active participants in the Atlantic slave trade when they possessed a colony in northern Brazil (1630– 1654), but after its loss their traffic was directed to the Caribbean island of Curaçao, which soon became an important regional slave market. This market was most active during the last quarter of the seventeenth century, when the WIC became directly involved in supplying slaves to Spanish colonies through the so called asiento trade, which regulated the flow of slaves to these colonies. The WIC shipped more than 90,000 slaves to Curaçao between 1634 and 1730, of whom approximately 19,000 arrived during the focal period 1700–1730.3 1 This chapter is dedicated to the memory of Maritza Coomans-Eustatia (1940–2002), former librarian at the University of the Netherlands Antilles at Curaçao. Her encouragement provided the impetus for this contribution. 2 D. H. Gallandat, Noodige onderrichtingen voor de slavenhandelaaren (Middelburg: Gillissen, 1769), 3–4. For this reference I am indebted to G. Oostindie. 3 For an overview of the volume of the Dutch slave trade, see chapter 5 in this volume.
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Until 1714, the Curaçao market was dominated by trade with the Spanish colonies, although the volume of this trade diminished considerably after its peak in the last quarter of the seventeenth century. Between 1714 and 1730, the WIC no longer supplied the asiento organization with slaves, but it continued to ship slaves to private Curaçao merchants. After the Dutch slave trade was privatized, independent shippers landed nearly 10,000 slaves at Curaçao between 1730 and 1795, illustrating the island’s diminished role in the traffic. While we have a fairly good picture of Curaçao’s role as a Dutch slave market, very little has been published about its actual operation. This chapter examines its organization during the last three decades of the WIC slave trade monopoly. First, Curaçao’s role in providing slaves for the Spanish colonies through the asiento will be discussed. Next, the focus will be on the buyers and the slaves, and especially the latter’s treatment at Curaçao. Finally, the demand-side of the market and the arrangements for purchase and payment of the slaves will be addressed.
In Search of Historical Data The archives of the WIC contain the correspondence between Curaçao and the directors (bewindhebbers) of the company in the Dutch Republic, and they are well preserved for the years after 1700. These papers contain much detailed information about the Curaçao slave trade. The governor of Curaçao and other officials reported regularly to their superiors in the Netherlands, informing WIC directors about market activities. Their letters were usually accompanied by several attachments containing details about such matters as numbers of slaves arriving, their African origins, and their mortality during the middle passage and after their arrival at Curaçao. Also included is information regarding selection procedures and numbers of slaves judged fit or unfit, their age and gender, their sale prices and payment arrangements. The bulk of these materials date from the last thirty years of the WIC slave trade monopoly (1700–1730), the transitional period from asiento trade and the reduced slave trade activity that followed. Between 1700 and 1730 the WIC undertook forty-nine slaving ventures to Curaçao, which landed about 19,000 slaves (see appendix 9.1). This was approximately one-fifth of the total number of
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slaves shipped to the island between 1634 to 1795. Surviving documents clarify the fates of about 95 percent of these slaves – if and when they died, whether they were sold or kept in the service of the WIC at Curaçao. The exporter had to pay a fixed fee for each slave shipped from the island, and data on these reexports are preserved in the records of import and export duties (recognitielijsten), which were sent to the Dutch Republic once every three months. A minority of the slaves shipped to Curaçao remained on the island, as laborers for the WIC or private individuals. Periodic inventories of company possessions, including slaves, were sent to the Netherlands. Information about the numbers of privately owned slaves living at Curaçao in the early eighteenth century is scarce, and what is available is not very reliable. Among the few available sources are the so called ‘black poll-tax’ lists, which document the annual tax that owners paid on slaves. Because the Curaçao population fiercely resisted paying these taxes, many of these lists are inaccurate and represent merely estimates of the number of slaves owned.4 Since the Spanish peso, or piece of eight (1 peso = 8 reals), was the most common currency at Curaçao rather than the Dutch guilder, the island’s records sent to the mother country were kept in pesos. All amounts originally given in pesos have been recalculated into guilders, valuing one peso as 48 stuivers ( ƒ2:08:00).5
Curaçao and the Asiento When the Dutch captured Curaçao in 1634, they intended to use it as a naval base in the war against the king of Spain. The island is favorably situated near the mainland and possesses an excellent natural harbor, the St. Anna Bay. Other than that, Curaçao seemed 4 Algemeen Rijksarchief (ARA), Archief van de Nieuwe West-Indische Compagnie (NWIC) 273: Faesch to chamber Amsterdam, 25 May 1743; ibid., 605: 942–43, Governor and council to chamber Amsterdam, 14 December 1767. The slave owners feared that when the exact number of their slaves was known, the taxes would increase. Even an offer to half the poll tax from ƒ2:08:00 per slave to ƒ1:04:00 was turned down by the planters, who even threatened with an armed rebellion if the authorities pushed this matter further. 5 L. Knappert, Geschiedenis van de Nederlandsche Bovenwindsche eilanden in de 18de eeuw (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1932), 174; W. Klooster, Illicit Riches: Dutch trade in the Caribbean, 1648–1795, Caribbean Series, no. 18 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1998), glossary. For the value of the peso, see note 76.
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of little value to the Dutch. It had few natural resources to exploit, and its climate and soil were less suitable for the cultivation of cash crops such as sugarcane, tobacco, indigo, or cotton. So, instead of a typical Caribbean plantation colony, Curaçao became a commercial center with the town of Willemstad developing around Fort Amsterdam at the entrance of St. Anna Bay. Although agriculture was not the island’s economic mainstay, over a hundred plantations were laid out and by 1725 all arable land was in use. Until the early eighteenth century, attempts were made to grow commercial tropical products, but in the end the plantations concentrated mainly on cattle breeding and producing sorghum, also called ‘small maize,’ which became the staple food of Curaçao’s slaves. By 1707, 80 percent of all tax-payers were working in Willemstad, which by 1715 had a free white population of 850. Many citizens had a second residence in the countryside, since plantation ownership was a status symbol for the Curaçao elite.6 Curaçao’s slave population during this period is difficult to measure, but it was not large. Poll-tax lists of 1719 record only 2,072 privately owned slaves, but the real number may have been four times as high. According to a 1767 source, thirty-five slave owners taxed for 863 slaves actually owned 3,845. In 1789, 12,864 slaves were registered, of whom 7,445 lived in the countryside and the remainder in Willemstad. All of Curaçao’s arable land had been turned into plantations by the early eighteenth century, but since cultivation methods and production hardly changed, we may conclude that the number of slaves between 1700 and 1730 was about the same as later in the century, fluctuating between 8,000 and 13,000.7 The Asiento Trade Curaçao’s rise as an important slave market was linked to the WIC’s involvement in the asiento trade. Since Spain had no access to the African coast, due to the Treaty of Tordesillas with Portugal in 1494, it had to depend on other nations to supply African slaves to its American colonies. Slave importation was organized through the 6
Klooster, Illicit Riches, 61–63. ARA, NWIC 575:690; ibid., 605:1001–04; ARA, Archief van de Raad van Coloniën (RvC) 120: Report Sontag (1794), appendix 16; W. E. Renkema, Het Curaçaose plantagebedrijf in de negentiende eeuw (Zutphen: Walburg, 1981), 26–27, 112–15. 7
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asiento de negros, usually referred to as the asiento, in which the Spanish Crown appointed a prominent person to sell licenses to third parties, which shipped slaves to the Spanish colonies. Deliveries were made according to specific contracts. Portuguese merchants monopolized the asiento trade until 1640, when Portugal became independent from Spain. The asiento was suspended altogether between 1640 and 1662, but individual licenses were sold by the so-called Chamber of Commerce, a business agency in Seville. During this time, Spanish colonists also obtained slaves through illicit imports, especially by way of the Caribbean islands off the Caracas coast. Because of its favorable position vis-à-vis the Spanish main, Curaçao played an active role in this illicit trade.8 After Spain reinstated the asiento system in 1662, the WIC became its principal subcontractor and sold slaves to the Spanish on a regular basis. With the signing of a contract in 1667 for the delivery of 4,000 slaves a year, Curaçao became an important Caribbean slave market. Several contracts between agents of the asiento and the WIC were signed in Amsterdam. After 1675, the Amsterdam merchants Balthasar and Joseph Coymans became agents of the asiento, and Balthasar Coymans acted as director of the system (asentista) during the years 1684–1688. Afterwards, the Portuguese briefly regained control over the asiento, and the Curaçao slave trade went into decline. But in 1697, and again in 1699, the WIC signed contracts with the Royal Portuguese African Company and regained a portion of the traffic. By this time, many WIC slave ships bypassed Curaçao and delivered their human cargoes directly to ports in the Spanish colonies.9 Still, some slave transports landed at Curaçao, where local merchants Manuel Alvares Corea and the combination of Johannes Goetvrint, Philipo Henriques and David Senior, acted as agents of the asiento. Wealthy Curaçao merchant Philipo Henriques can be tied to both
8 J. Postma, The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1600–1815 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 29–32. For the development of the Curaçao slave trade during the seventeenth century, see also W. Klooster, ‘Slavenvaart op Spaanse kusten. De Nederlandse slavenhandel met Spaans Amerika, 1648–1701,’ Tijdschrift voor Zeegeschiedenis 16, no. 2 (1997): 121–40. 9 Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, 33–47; W. S. Unger, ‘Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis van de Nederlandse slavenhandel, 1. Beknopt overzicht van de Nederlandse slavenhandel in het algemeen,’ in Economisch-Historisch Jaarboek 26 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1956), 146–47, 152–53.
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the Portuguese asiento and the French asiento, which started in 1702 and lasted until 1714.10 Under the asiento, the terms of slave deliveries to the asentistas were regulated by contracts. Usually drawn up and signed in Amsterdam by representatives of the WIC and of the asentistas, they stipulated the number of slaves to be delivered, place of delivery, origin of the slaves, male/female ratio, the period in which the deliveries were to be made, the selection procedures to be followed after arrival, criteria for deliverable slaves, fixed price per slave, the manner of payment, and expenses for their maintenance.11 The French gained control over the asiento trade at the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession in 1702. At the death of Spain’s King Charles in 1700, the grandson of Louis of France inherited the Spanish Crown and this not only threatened the political balance in Europe, but also gave France access to the asiento. A coalition of the Dutch Republic, England, and the Holy Roman Empire, supported by Portugal, Savoy, and Brandenburg, tried to prevent the vast Spanish realm from falling into the hands of the Bourbon family. But France was allied with Spain and respected the late king’s will. These shifts in international politics influenced the Curaçao slave market, although slaves were still sold to merchants formerly associated with the Portuguese asiento, and the outbreak of the war with both Spain and France failed to halt Dutch slave shipments to the Spanish colonies. Private traders at Curaçao were also actively engaged in illicit trade with the Spanish colonies. The operation of the Curaçao slave market also changed when formal contracts between the WIC and third parties no longer governed transactions.12 As early as 1702, French merchants attempted to negotiate a slave contract with the
10 M. Alvares Correa bought 556 slaves, delivered by the Vergulde Vrijheid for the Royal Portuguese African Company in 1701, see ARA, NWIC 566: 9 April 1701. Goetvrient, Henriques and Senior are mentioned in several documents as agents of the asiento, ibid., 566: Letter from the asiento factor on the Spanish Main to the factors Goetvrint, Henriques and Senior at Curaçao, 9 April 1701. See also, Klooster, Illicit Riches, 67, 117. 11 ARA, NWIC 783: Slaefcontracten; [P. van Belle], Pertinent en waarachtig verhaal van alle handelingen en directie van Pedro van Belle omtrent den slavenhandel, ofte het assiento de negros (Rotterdam: Leers, 1689), bijlage A. S. van Brakel, ‘Bescheiden over den slavenhandel der West-Indische Compagnie,’ in Economisch-Historisch Jaarboek 4 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1918), 61–77. 12 Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, 49.
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WIC, but company directors were hesitant to deal with the French asentistas, and they failed to reach an agreement. Gaspard Martin, the representative of the French asiento, visited Curaçao in 1703 to discuss the purchase of slaves, but nothing came of this either. In 1708, French asiento agents Jean Chourio and Louis Chambert bought a limited number of slaves at Curaçao. This led to a dispute between local WIC officials and the Heren X, who feared that regular dealings with the asentistas would bring an influx of Frenchmen to the island, which was deemed a security risk, and Chourio was even detained for a short time. Chourio finally negotiated the delivery of 400 slaves from the next slave ship to arrive at Curaçao in 1711, and for a few years he continued to purchase slaves at Curaçao both in his official capacity of asentista and as a private merchant.13 At the conclusion of the War of the Spanish Succession in 1713, the British gained control over the asiento, reducing the need for large slave shipments to Curaçao. The factor of the British asiento also visited the island and requested permission to house slaves in WIC facilities behind Fort Amsterdam, but nothing came of this. During the 1720s, however, there was a slight increase in slave shipments to Curaçao. When the WIC monopoly over the Dutch slave trade ended in 1730, Dutch free traders periodically dispatched slave ships to Curaçao, but their numbers were insignificant compared to the earlier period.
Organization of the WIC Slave Trade at Curaçao Supreme authority over Curaçao was vested in the Heren X, but since this board usually met only once a year, day-to-day contacts with Curaçao were supervised by the Amsterdam chamber. Its directors took care of supplying the island with food, medicines, and other necessities, sent instructions on matters of administration, and received reports from Curaçao. Questions of great importance, however, were decided by the board at large, the Heren X.
13 ARA, NWIC 580: 264–65, 4 July 1731; Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, 221–22; 223, table 9.6; Unger, ‘Bijdragen Nederlandse Slavenhandel, 1,’ 155.
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Personnel The local administration at Curaçao was entrusted to a governor, or director, as he was also called, who was advised by a council (raad ). The number of councillors varied. Usually the WIC’s highest ranking civil and military officials, as well as members from the white elite of the Curaçao population, were represented. Agents of the asiento were explicitly barred from seats on the council. In addition to serving as an administrative body, governor and council acted as a court of justice.14 The two neighboring islands of Bonaire and Aruba, used primarily for cattle breeding, salt extraction, and agriculture, were dependencies of Curaçao and until the second half of the eighteenth century were exclusively controlled by the WIC. A commander was stationed on each island, who was assisted by a few subordinate company officials. Aruba was populated mainly with Amerindians, while Bonaire had a population of both African slaves and Amerindians. Curaçao’s governor was ultimately responsible for the smooth operation of the slave trade on the island. He received his commission from the Heren X, who expected him to make certain that all contracts and conventions concerning the slave trade were followed punctually and that all personnel under his authority did the same. He was also ordered to make absolutely certain the WIC monopoly on the slave trade was not violated.15 The governor was also instructed to make certain that slaves were kept in the best possible condition by giving them sufficient food and drink and by properly caring for the sick. Finally, he had to see that accurate accounts were kept on the status of the slaves: on the newly arrived slaves, the selection procedure or ‘separation’ process of each slave transport (armasoen) into deliverable ( piezas de india) and undeliverable slaves (manquerons). Besides a fixed salary of ƒ100 a month, free lodging and an annual allowance of ƒ2,000 to meet the expenses of his household, the governor enjoyed several other remunerations. For each pieza de india that was sold he received 24 stuivers ( ƒ1:04:00), and for each man-
14 Klooster, Illicit Riches, 63–64; J. A. Schiltkamp and J. T. de Smidt, eds., West Indisch Plakaatboek; Publikaties en andere wetten alsmede de oudste resoluties betrekking hebbende op Curaçao, Aruba, Bonaire, 1638–1782, West Indisch plakaatboek, no. 2 (Amsterdam: Emmering, 1978), 1:188–89, Instructie voor Isaac Faesch. 15 Schiltkamp and De Smidt, West Indisch Plakaatboek, 1:66–72, Instructie voor Nicolaes van Liebergen, 24 August 1679, articles 34–39.
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queron 12 stuivers. The governor was not allowed to engage in any private commercial activities.16 Second and third in the WIC administrative hierarchy at Curaçao were two commissioners, who were also members of the island’s council. The commissioner of implements and food supplies (Commissaris van de train en vivres), was charged with supervising all the warehouses and repositories, food supplies, equipment, building materials, ammunition, etc., as well as all the stored merchandise. He earned a monthly salary of ƒ50 and received 2.5 percent of the value of all goods, merchandise, and produce of the island, with the exception of minerals. He was explicitly forbidden to participate in the slave trade and was not allowed to own plantations or cattle farms.17 His main involvement with the slave trade was the distribution of food and supplies for the slaves and the handling of any goods received in payment. The commissioner of the slave trade (Commissaris van de slavenhandel ) supervised all the trade slaves (negotieslaven) and the regular company slaves (vaste slaven). Like the governor, he was instructed to carry out punctually all contracts and conventions concerning the slave trade and to make sure that WIC interests in the slave trade were not harmed by illegal trading or other activities. After the arrival of a slave ship, the commissioner of the slave trade had to board the vessel in order to inspect the armasoen and to search the ship for any smuggled slaves. He took possession of the ship’s log as well as the death affidavits, which the captains of slave ships were instructed to maintain, stating date and cause of a slave’s death, gender, and age. The death affidavits had to be confirmed under oath upon arrival at Curaçao. The commissioner of the slave trade also made sure that the ship was properly guarded to ensure that nobody entered or left the vessel illegally, clearly an effort to discourage smuggling.18 He also had to look after the well being and treatment of the slaves and regularly give detailed account
16
Schiltkamp and De Smidt, West Indisch Plakaatboek, 1:187–201, Instructie voor Isaac Faesch, articles 36, 42, 43, 45, 46. 17 Schiltkamp and De Smidt, West Indisch Plakaatboek, 1:72–73, Provisionele instructie voor Juan Pedro van Collen, 24 August 1679. 18 Schiltkamp and De Smidt, West Indisch Plakaatboek, 1:301–02, Reglement voor W. C. Beeldsnijder, Kommissaris van de slavenhandel, 20 August 1756; Instructie voor de schippers in dienst van de Geoctroyeerde West-Indische Compagnie op den Slaef-handel varende (Middelburg: B. de Later, ca. 1700).
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of their numbers and mortality. During the peak of the slave trade, the commissioner of the slave trade received a monthly salary of ƒ100, which confirms the importance of his position. This salary was later reduced to ƒ50 a month, and when the Curaçao slave trade became insignificant during the second half of the eighteenth century, he received no salary at all but kept his traditional emoluments of twelve stuivers ( ƒ00:12:00) for each pieza and six stuivers for each manqueron sold.19 A lower ranking WIC employee, the bookkeeper, registered the arrival, deaths, and sales of slaves, as well as all expenses for their maintenance, debts of buyers, and payments in money or goods. In a ledger of ‘general account of negroes,’ he had to record the exact number of slaves loaded on the African coast, the number that died during the voyage, the number landed, those specified as piezas and manquerons, and the number that were sold or that died after landing. He also had to maintain separate accounts for the shares of each individual chamber of the WIC. Since a pieza de india was simply a unit of account – children were recorded in fractions of an adult, according to their age – the number of individual slaves, also referred to as ‘heads,’ had to be recorded as well. For instance, six adults and four children between four and seven years old would be counted as ten heads but only eight piezas. Twice a year the books had to be closed and sent with a balance sheet to the directors in Amsterdam. At the same time, the individual chambers had to receive copies of all accounts concerning their share in the slave trade.20 Other employees directly involved with the slave trade were the medical personnel and the managers or factors of the company plantations. The WIC employed an extensive medical staff at Curaçao during the early eighteenth century, including a medical doctor, four surgeons and a subsurgeon. They were assisted by three or four selected company slaves who had received some medical training. The employment of an expensive academically trained physician, as well as several surgeons, demonstrates a strong concern on the part 19 Schiltkamp and De Smidt, West Indisch Plakaatboek, 1:75–76, 303–05, Instructie voor Directeur Joan van Erpecum en Apero van der Houven als commissarissen tot de saacken van de slavenhandel op het eylandt Curaçao, 14 September 1682, and Reglement voor W. C. Beeldsnijder, Kommissaris van de slavenhandel, 20 August 1756. 20 Schiltkamp and De Smidt, West Indisch Plakaatboek, 1:76–80, Reglement en instructie voor den boeckhouder op Curaçao, 17 September 1682.
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of WIC directors for good medical care of the slaves. The highest paid surgeon earned ƒ76:16:00 a month, while the lowest received only ƒ33:12:00. The medical doctor enjoyed a monthly salary of ƒ96.21 The WIC had employed a medical doctor at Curaçao since the final decades of the seventeenth century, but when the slave trade collapsed after the loss of the asiento trade, he was fired and no new doctor was appointed. The number of surgeons was reduced by half in 1718. Only two company surgeons remained on the payroll in 1722.22 The surgeon stationed at the company plantation of Hato, where most arriving slaves were housed, also lost his position, but he was given a new job as a baker at Fort Amsterdam. This was done at his own request in order to avoid his complete discharge, since he otherwise would have had no means of supporting his large family. The favor was only granted to him on the condition that he would go to Hato to visit sick slaves if necessary, while his monthly salary was reduced from ƒ57:12:00 to ƒ43:04:00.23 The factors in charge of the company plantations were entrusted with the daily supervision of the slaves, both the regular company slaves and the temporarily housed trade slaves. When slaves died, the factors had to submit written reports called death notes (doodbriefjes), which were used to compile mortality for the WIC directors.24 The labor of company slaves was indispensable to the operation of the Curaçao slave market. Besides the slaves trained as medical assistants, four others – two originating from Ardra on the Guinea Coast and two from Loango in the Congo region – were employed to watch over the newly arrived transports. Their familiarity with the language and background of many of the newcomers gave them a crucial role. When in 1717 all but one of the WIC plantations were leased out and most regular slaves were sold, a few slaves who were accustomed to handling newly arrived Africans were retained in case the slave trade should revive.25 21 ARA, NWIC 567:55–56, muster-roll, 25 June 1702; ibid., 200:15, 17; ibid., 205:582, list of WIC personnel, 1714. 22 A. M. G. Rutten, ‘Ziekten en geneesmiddelen op Curaçao in de eerste helft van de 18de eeuw,’ Pharmaceutisch Weekblad 125, no. 10 (1990): 246–47; ARA, NWIC 838:152, meeting, 4 October 1714; ibid., 70:31 October 1718; ibid., 208:103, 105. 23 ARA, NWIC 575:249, 576, letter to chamber Amsterdam, 31 August 1720; ibid., 575:268, 27 June 1721. 24 Ibid., 573:82. 25 Ibid., 1147: Inventory of WIC possessions including slaves, September 1704; ibid., 573:204, 4 September 1717.
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Facilities Most company slaves were employed on the WIC plantations around Willemstad and on the island of Bonaire, where they worked at plantations and saltpans. Originally intended to cultivate cash crops, WIC plantations were later used to support the slave trade by producing food, mainly small maize for trade slaves. They also served to board slaves not immediately sold after their arrival and separation. The plantations around Willemstad, Rooy Canary, Piscaderis, and Hato were most suitable for accommodating trade slaves, for if potential buyers showed up, slaves could easily be taken to Fort Amsterdam for inspection. Plantation Hato had a 200-foot-long so-called ‘negro house’ for this purpose since the end of the seventeenth century, and a smaller building that served as a hospital. The negro house burned down in 1716 but was rebuilt and was still in use in 1729. Although it is not clear where the trade slaves were housed on the other plantations, they were probably billeted with the company slaves in the slave village. Trade slaves were also lodged in WIC facilities near Fort Amsterdam.26 A few years after the War of the Spanish Succession, it became clear to the WIC directors that the Curaçao slave trade could not be revived, and they ordered the dismantling of the costly apparatus that had maintained it. As noted earlier, the medical staff was partly dismissed, and orders were given in 1717 that all company plantations at Curaçao be rented out and their cattle and slaves sold. WIC personnel working on the plantations were fired, and the slave workforce was reduced from nearly 600 to about 200. On the advice of the governor and council, Hato was kept to accommodate any future slave transports to Curaçao.27
26 W. Klooster, Illicit Riches, 61–63; ARA, NWIC 202:186, Jacob Beck to Heren X, 20 August 1707. In the mortality lists of the trade slaves usually the place of death is recorded. Besides Hato, Rooy Canary, Piscaderis, and St. Maria, ‘the fort’ or ‘behind the fort’ is also mentioned. See ibid., 579:335–36, J. N. du Faij to chamber Amsterdam, 21 March 1729; ibid., 572:693–94, 3 August 1716; ibid., 566:118, 120, 121, 131, 137, 160, 162, account for the use of lumber; H. Jordaan, ‘De veranderde situatie op de Curaçaose slavenmarkt, en de mislukte slavenopstand op de plantage Santa Maria in 1716,’ in Veranderend Curaçao. Collectie essays opgedragen aan Lionel Capriles ter gelegenheid van zijn 45-jarig jubileum bij de Maduro en Curiel’s Bank N.V., ed. H. E. Coomans and M. Coomans-Eustatia (Bloemendaal: Libri Antilliani, 1999), 488. 27 Jordaan, ‘Curaçaose slavenmarkt,’ 482, table 2, 495–96.
OASI/BRIL/POST/11374/05-05-2003
the curaçao slave market
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Procedures During the years of the asiento trade, slaves arriving at Curaçao were routinely examined and classified according to their salability and then branded according to the transport on which they arrived. Both procedures most likely took place within the walls of Fort Amsterdam. The selection, or separation, process divided the slaves into deliverable slaves ( piezas de india) and non-deliverable slaves, consisting of impaired and elderly people (manquerons), and slaves who were ill. To be classified as a pieza, a slave had to be between approximately 15 and 35 years of age, at least 1.60 meters tall, in apparent good health, and in the possession of all of his or her teeth and limbs. Healthy children between four and seven years of age were considered half a pieza, and children of seven to fifteen were counted as two-thirds of a pieza. Infants stayed with their mother and were not included in the counts.28 After the separation, the slaves were branded with a hot iron, all slaves in a transport receiving the same marking. Numbers were used until the number 100 was reached in 1703, and then the brand mark was changed to letters of the alphabet. In the first series of letter marks, the U and J were not used to avoid confusion with the V and the I. When the letter Z was reached in 1714, the next transport was again marked with an A, but in the second series some letters (I, O and R) were omitted. The iron with the letter O was reportedly ‘worn out,’ and this may have been the case with the others as well. Infants were not branded.29 The brand mark made the slaves recognizable as company property, and it also served other administrative purposes. In all separation rosters, sales lists, mortality lists, and inventories, the slaves were registered with their brand mark as well as with their gender and age, and whether he or she was categorized as pieza (P) or manqueron (M). Non-deliverable slaves could be sold immediately and were usually sold at public auction within a few days of the separation. Piezas, if not sold and delivered immediately, remained in the custody of the WIC and were generally lodged at a company plantation at com-
28
S. van Brakel, ‘Bescheiden over den slavenhandel,’ 55–56. ARA, NWIC 579:653–54, 5 September 1729. With only the seriously ill left on board, the slaves brought with the Stad en Lande were led into Fort Amsterdam to be branded. Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, 53. 29
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pany cost. Buyers could wait up to three months before collecting their slaves, but if they were not collected after three months the company could sell the slaves as it pleased. This policy was amended when the asentistas accepted responsibility for the cost of feeding the slaves.30 The selection procedure and sale of the slaves became shorter and less complicated during the eighteenth century. During the final years of the asiento, relaxed stipulations concerning the separation and asiento-related sales speeded up the process. Representatives of the asentistas had initially participated in the selection process. According to a 1668 contract, slaves were to be separated by the agents of the asiento within fourteen days of their arrival. But between 1700 and 1724, the separation was carried out by an independent commission which generally consisted of both WIC officials and private merchants. The commission’s impartiality was questionable, however. When the ship Duijnenburg arrived in 1705 with a great number of slaves suffering from scurvy and dropsy, Governor Beck instigated a more casual separation because demand for slaves was high and potential buyers were not expected to be choosy. This resulted in the classification of nearly 87 percent piezas and only 13 percent manquerons (see appendix 9.2). All of the sick and manquerons and most of the piezas were sold. But the condition of the remaining piezas quickly deteriorated, as explained by Beck: ‘Despite appropriate refreshments, we experienced that some died and almost all fell ill, and considering also that they were rejects, . . . [it was] resolved to auction them off . . . in order to prevent further mortality and losses to the . . . company.’31 The directors in Amsterdam were occasionally concerned about the way in which the selections were carried out. When a large number of slaves were designated sick or manqueron, they demanded written statements to justify the outcome of the separations.32 The separation procedure was discontinued during the 1720s, because the asiento trade no longer functioned at Curaçao.
30
Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, 68–69. ARA, NWIC 206:280, 20 April 1717. See for instance, separation lists in ibid., 201:75, 344, 472, 478; ibid., 572:165, 338; ibid., 568:391–92, 26 January 1706. 32 Ibid., 1298:20 April 1717. An exact list of all manquerons and sick slaves arriving on the Emmenes in 1718, drawn up by the medical doctor and stating ailments and infirmities, has been preserved. See ibid., 573:532–34. 31
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By that time, all the slaves – sick, manqueron, and healthy – were sold together at public auctions.
The Slaves For the enslaved people, these procedures must have been terrifying, humiliating, and painful. They were already traumatized by their enslavement in Africa and the frightful experiences of the middle passage. After their release from the claustrophobic condition in the swaying ship, a voyage that often lasted several months, they found themselves in a strange country with strange people and were apprehensive about their future. WIC administrators, on the other hand, were primarily interested in treating the slaves in a manner that would minimize losses and depreciation among their human ‘merchandise’ through death and disease. Conditions on Arrival The majority of the slaves arriving at Curaçao during the first three decades of the eighteenth century originated from the Guinea region, primarily from the Gold Coast (Elmina, Bercu) and from the Slave Coast (Ardra, Fida). About one-third came from the Angola-Loango region, north of the estuary of the Congo River. More than half were men, about a quarter were females, and the rest were children, with substantially more boys than girls (see appendices 9.1 and 9.2). The average mortality rate during the coasting period and the crossing of the Atlantic – from the moment the first slaves were taken on board until Curaçao was reached – was about 16 percent. But the losses varied enormously from one transport to another. Death affidavits indicate that four diseases were responsible for nearly 70 percent of the deaths during the middle passage. Dysentery, commonly called ‘flux’ or ‘red flux,’ caused about a third. Smallpox and scurvy were each responsible for about 15 percent, and tuberculosis about 8 percent. Slightly more than 1 percent of the slaves died while aboard ship in the Curaçao harbor or shortly after disembarkation (see appendix 9.1). Harbor deaths declined when time spent aboard ship decreased. In the first eleven transports arriving in the eighteenth century, slaves were kept on board for three weeks and registered harbor death rates of 2 percent. Afterwards, disem-
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barkation took place within a few days, and Curaçao harbor deaths declined to an average of 1 percent. The slave ship Emmenes, arriving in 1718, was an exception and had a much higher rate, perhaps due to its unusually long voyage.33 About a quarter of the slaves appeared to be ill upon arrival at Curaçao, but only 8 percent were judged to be manquerons (see appendix 9.2). Roughly two-thirds of the slaves were selected as healthy piezas. Like the mortality during the middle passage, arrival conditions varied significantly among individual shipments. Sometimes three-quarters or more of an armasoen were separated as healthy, but occasionally less than 40 percent of a transport qualified as piezas, as was the case with the ship Adrichem in 1715. Some of the slaves in this transport were so seriously ill that they had to be carried to the auction by other slaves; several died days or even hours after they had been sold.34 Even if the slaves reached Curaçao in apparent good health, it did not mean they would survive very long. They were invariably enfeebled and stressed, and often suffered from scurvy or other deficiencies. Diseases contracted aboard ships, such as dysentery, smallpox, and tuberculosis, could go undetected and spread after disembarkation. Successive transports could spread infection in this way. Dysentery, a common cause of death during the voyage, started as a bacillary infection that could later develop into amoebic dysentery, which had a longer incubation period. According to K. F. Kiple, new arrivals caused epidemics of dysentery on plantations in the British colonies.35 This explains why transports that looked generally healthy could afterwards produce high mortality rates. In 1701, the ship Eva Maria arrived at Curaçao with 644 slaves aboard, having had only 29 deaths during the crossing. ‘Certainly,’ wrote Governor Van Beeck, ‘this armasoen is as handsome and superior as ever could be brought in.’36 However, within a short time, fifteen slaves died while still in the harbor. Although over 75 percent of the Eva Maria’s slaves were
33
Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, 248–56, 390, table 17A, 144, table 10.5; A. M. G. Rutten, ‘Slavenhandel, ziekten en mortaliteit in de Curaçaose medisch-farmaceutische geschiedenis,’ Pharmaceutisch Weekblad 127, no. 15 (1992): 393–95; ARA, NWIC 573:540, 28 March 1718. 34 ARA, NWIC 206:123, October 1715. 35 K. F. Kiple, The Caribbean Slave: A Biological History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 65. 36 ARA, NWIC 566:347, 12 July 1701.
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selected as piezas, as many as 84 slaves died after separation, and the armasoen ended up having the highest mortality rate of all the transports arriving between 1700 and 1730 (see appendix 9.2). Dysentery was at that time not recognized as a contagious disease, and causes were mainly sought in climate, food, and especially changes of food and water. In neighboring Spanish colonies smallpox was considered ‘the plague,’ and very strict measures were taken to prevent epidemics. But at Curaçao there seemed to be little fear about the spread of this infection, and quarantine measures were only sporadically mentioned, although smallpox occurred on several slave ships destined for Curaçao and claimed many victims between 1700 and 1720. Only rarely were slaves excluded from auctions because of the disease. As a rule, all those who lived through the voyage were brought ashore to be separated and sold. Many slaves reportedly died from smallpox between November 1704 and April 1705, but no confirmation about any smallpox epidemic could be found in official Curaçao records of this time. But in 1724, company surgeons advised that smallpox patients on the ship Amsterdam be left on board because of the danger of an epidemic.37 Mortality after separation also varied. On average, 3.8 percent of the slaves died while awaiting their sale. Of course, the shorter the period between disembarkation and sale, the lower the death rate. But on the other hand, a prolonged stay in the custody of the WIC did not automatically result in very high mortality rates. Out of 723 deaths registered for the slaves awaiting sale at Curaçao, the cause of death is recorded for only 91. In 42 cases, slaves died of the flux, sometimes in combination with another illness. Scurvy was the cause of death in 19 cases. Of the remaining 30 deaths, 10 were executed for starting a rebellion, and 20 died of assorted causes, including tuberculosis, smallpox, and dropsy. In 1717, some of the 197 slaves reexported from Curaçao to Berbice suffered from smallpox and dysentery. According to the commissioner of the slave trade, scurvy and the flux were the most common diseases among the trade slaves.38
37 Ibid., 1146:68, 4 April 1702 and 1 April 1704; W. M. Brada, Pater Schabel, S.J., 1704–1713. (Willemstad: n.p., 1967), 18; ARA, NWIC 578:134, 20 October 1724. 38 Ibid., 206:340; ibid., 576:265; ibid., 578:309–14, 885; ibid., 573:17, 9 April 1717; ibid., 201:123–24.
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Nutrition The staple food served to slaves at Curaçao was small maize, which was cultivated at both Curaçao and Bonaire. Barley and horse beans were also fed to slaves, but they had to be imported from the Dutch Republic and the beans were considered less healthy because of their hard shells. The standard ration of both small maize and horse beans was one bushel (1 schepel = 27 litre) per adult per month, but trade slaves may have received a bigger ration. Small maize was ground into flour and then boiled into porridge (called funchi ) or baked into cakes. Sometimes, the slaves also received fresh fruits or vegetables.39 Complaints that the slaves received insufficient rations and rarely had meat date from the seventeenth century. Imported meat supplemented the cattle, goats and sheep raised on the islands, but neither was a common element in the slaves’ diet. New arrivals received meat because it was believed to aid their recuperation from the exhausting voyage. One commissioner said that, ‘besides God,’ meat was ‘the only salvation for the slaves while they suffered from the flux and scurvy.’40 Governor’s orders directing that a decent portion of meat be given to sick company slaves reflect this belief and indicate that meat was not commonly given to other slaves. Only a few company slaves, such as cooks, workers in the weighing house, and the governor’s slaves, received meat – mainly bony remnants of rations given to WIC personnel. If company slaves saw little meat, it is unlikely that trade slaves found much in their meals, especially not if they remained in the WIC’s custody for a long time. However, a shipload of slaves that arrived in 1724 received weekly rations of salted meat. One hundred fifty pounds of meat was divided among 269 adults and 70 children, for a weekly ration of two pounds per person, counting half portions for the children.41 39 Ibid., 204:96; ibid., 570:374; ibid., 202:266, 312, cash account, 21 September 1707–1 February 1708; ibid., 201:524; M. D. Teenstra, De Nederlandsche West-Indische eilanden (Amsterdam: Sulpke, 1836), 1:171; ARA, NWIC 208:171–72, inventory of plantation Hato, 31 December 1722. This document mentions three iron pots and two kettles for the trade slaves. Ibid., 202:411, cash account, 4 February 1708–17 May 1708; ibid., 572:444, cash account, 1 January 1716–12 March 1716; ibid., 578:338–40; ibid., 579:497, 486. 40 ARA, NWIC 201:312, G. Luls to Heren X, 5 July 1703; W. Klooster, ‘Slavenvaart op Spaanse kusten. De Nederlandse slavenhandel met Spaans Amerika, 1648–1701,’ Tijdschrift voor Zeegeschiedenis 16, no. 2 (1997): 128. 41 ARA, NWIC 578:35–36; ibid., 206:382; ibid., 208:105–06; ibid., 206:382, rantsoenlijst; Schiltkamp and De Smidt, West Indisch Plakaatboek, 1:196; ARA, NWIC 578:338–40, account of the costs made for the slaves landed with the Amsterdam.
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In addition to food, trade slaves regularly received alcoholic beverages, a potent, freshly distilled rum called killdevil, as well as pipes and tobacco. They also received Osnabrück linen to serve as clothing.42 Maintenance Problems Factors of climate and the number of slaves in custody complicated the maintenance of the trade slaves, especially during periods of abundant supply and slow trade. Adequate food supplies depended on successful harvests of small maize, which was usually sown at the beginning of the rainy season in October. But rainfall was unpredictable at Curaçao. When the rainy season came too late or was unsubstantial, crops failed. Frequent droughts resulted in erratic crops and high mortality among livestock. The complex triangular slave trade made the supply of slaves at Curaçao quite unpredictable, and slow communications across the Atlantic made it difficult to change arrangements of transport arrivals. Slave ships destined for Curaçao, sailing somewhere along the African coast or half way across the Atlantic, could not be called back or diverted to another destination. This was a constant concern for the governor. If the rains failed to come, he had to take steps to avoid a famine among the slaves, but he could not predict how many mouths had to be fed or for how long. Additionally, crop failure led to higher costs in maintaining the slaves.43 The price of maize could climb as high as 32 stuivers ( ƒ2:12:00) or ƒ3 per bushel, and maize
42 ARA, NWIC 567:393, 596, 132, cash accounts, 3 August 1702, 9 March to 17 June 1703, and 1 July–6 August 1703; ibid., 568:520, 530, 531, cash account, 21 October 1705–3 April 1706; ibid., 570:234, cash account 20 September 1707–1 February 1708, cash account, 31 January–8 May 1709; ibid., 571:132, cash account, 30 July 1711–12 January 1712; cash account, 10 July 1713–10 September 1713: 462; ibid., 572:393, cash account, 28 May–21 June 1715, cash account, 20 September–31 December 1712; ibid., 202:316, 253, cash accounts, 21 September 1707–1 February 1708, and 30 October 1708–31 January 1709; ibid., 203:422, cash account, 10 August–31 December 1709; ibid., 578:338–40, account of costs made on behalf of the slaves landed with the Amsterdam in 1724; ibid., 579:497, account of costs on behalf of the slaves landed with the Groot Bentveld, 1728; ibid., 579:486, account of costs of the slaves landed with the Juffrouw Helena, 1728; ibid., 1155:12, account of the costs made on behalf of the slaves landed with the Phenix, 1729. 43 Ibid., 566:64, 354, 545, 22 November 1700, 26 February 1701, 26 July 1701, 21 December 1701, and 26 February 1702; ibid., 1146:556–57, 4 April 1702; ibid., 203:550–51, Jeremias van Collen to Heren X, 13 January 1711; ibid., 205:418, 10 February 1714; ibid., 575:248–49, 31 August 1720.
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sometimes became so valuable that it was accepted as payment for slaves.44 Trade slaves were sometimes forced to work on the plantations where they were temporarily lodged. This practice was encouraged by the belief that exercise was a deterrent against ‘laziness, scurvy and other ailments.’45 While only moderate labor was supposed to be demanded from new arrivals, sometimes hard labor was exacted. Governor Van Liebergen received complaints that slaves were worked to exhaustion by burning lime and gathering salt. In 1703, the commissioner of the slave trade claimed that new arrivals were forced to carry heavy stones for the building of a fence on plantation Piscaderis, without receiving meat rations, and as a result some slaves had become ill. Since the accusation implicated the governor, the factors of the plantations Hato, Piscaderis, and Rooy Canarij were hastily summoned to testify that they were not requiring hard labor of the slaves and that they were supplying ample meat rations.46 But in some cases even good treatment did not prevent illness and death among trade slaves. Complaints arose on several occasions that despite adequate food supplies, slave mortality remained high. At times, the slaves themselves were blamed for this. Higher mortality and morbidity rates were reported among slaves originating from the Loango region in Central Africa, and some claimed that this resulted from their habit of eating filth and dirt.47 Dirt eating, or geophagy, has been explained as having a cultural origin or it may have been a symptom of mineral deficiency. It was not uncommon among slaves in the West Indies, and the habit was not fatal, although it was blamed for a deadly disease known as mal d’estomach (stomach illness), which probably had nothing to do with geophagy.48 44 Ibid., 570:215, J. van Collen to chamber Amsterdam, 15 May 1709; ibid., 566:674–75, N. van Beeck to chamber Amsterdam, 30 May 1702; ibid., 567:387; ibid., 203:422, cash account, 10 August–31 December 1709; ibid., 568:404, J. Beck to chamber Amsterdam, 26 January 1706. 45 Rutten, ‘Slavenhandel,’ 390; ARA, NWIC 206:141–42, W. de Bij to Heren X, 15 January 1716. 46 Klooster, ‘Slavenvaart,’ 128; ARA, NWIC 201:123, G. Luls to Heren X, 5 July 1703; ibid., 567:435–38. 47 ARA, NWIC 566:471, N. van Beeck to chamber Amsterdam, 12 November 1701; ibid., 1146, 85, N. van Beeck to chamber Zeeland, 6 March 1703; ibid., 204:467–68, 517; ibid., 604:343–44, Rodier to chamber Amsterdam, 31 August 1763. 48 Kiple, Caribbean Slave, 99, 103; R. B. Sheridan, Doctors and Slaves: A Medical and Demographic History of Slavery in the British West Indies, 1680–1834 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 216–18.
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240 Selling the Slaves
While the asiento still functioned at Curaçao, only manquerons and sick slaves were sold at public auctions. The piezas were sold for a fixed price, either as stipulated by contract with the asentista or set independently by the Heren X. Table 9.1 lists prices paid for slaves on the Curaçao slave market. Manquerons and sick slaves were most likely led individually before potential buyers who then inspected them and made their bids. Records indicate that men were sold first, then women, and finally the children. As a rule, the sick were auctioned off before the manquerons, because their condition could quickly deteriorate and there was a high risk that they might die. Once they were sold and delivered, any risk associated with them belonged to the new owner. Only in the case of ‘hidden defects,’ could the purchaser return a slave to the WIC.49 Table 9.1. Prices of Slaves Sold on the Curaçao Slave Market, 1700–1730 (guilders) Symbol Transport 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 A B C D E F G H I K
49
Price per Pieza Adults Children* 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 259 259 259 259 259
127 137 149 139 154 146 142 158 137 144 161 139 134 144 156 156 151 146
Average Price per Slave Sold in Auction Men Women Boys Girls 149 163 158 134 103 113 106 101 101 233 163 144 194 194 156 163 173 144
ARA, NWIC 210: 77–79, 17 January 1749.
144 180 144 142 98 103 122 120 113 173 211 161 125 180 192 134 170 166 146
84 142 130 120 127 98
154 168 122 98 103
103 161
120
142 110 146
125 96 144
130 144
108
89
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Table 9.1. (cont.) Symbol Transport
Price per Pieza Adults Children*
L M N O P Q R S T V W X Y Z A’ B’ C’ D’ E’ F’ G’ H’ K’ L’ ** M’ N’ P’ Q’ S’ T’
259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259
Average
252
158 151 173 173 173 173 151 173 173 187 151 144 161 161 151 154 149 170 161 151 161
154
Average Price per Slave Sold in Auction Men Women Boys Girls 170 132 142 137 158 137 144 158
151 134 115 149 149 163 144 175
156 163 161 144 82 89 91 146 122 103 49 144 151 149 353 194 235 209 194 192
202 185 156 154 72 98 103 132 89 113 144 156 151 194 122 269 312 264 276 278
153
159
161
113
74 74 122
82 77
94 106
142 113
115
132
108 163 173 254 235 209
58 151
133
140
331 259 259
Sources: ARA, NWIC 200–07, 567–76, 1146–53: Sales and auction lists. * Like the adults, healthy children were sold for a fixed price, depending on their age. Prices were calculated as one-third, one-half, or two-third of the price of a pieza. The prices listed are averages. ** The slaves of this transport were the last to be separated into piezas, manquerons, and sick slaves.
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Selling pieza de India at Curaçao often led to friction between selling and buying parties. Buyers were usually in no hurry to claim their purchased slaves because they were aware of the mortality risks. The seller (WIC), on the other hand, preferred to deliver the slaves as soon as possible and be assured of collecting the sale price. As Governor Van Beeck explained, the company’s interest was best served ‘in the speedy debiting of the slaves in order to be freed from the risk of mortality, deterioration and costs of feeding.’50 The seventeenth century asiento subcontracts explicitly stipulated the time allowable between separation and delivery, but this later became subject to negotiation. All the pieza slaves arriving with the ship Eva Maria in 1701 were sold to asiento agents, but the asentista had stipulated that actual delivery take place six weeks later. The governor tried to persuade the other party to take possession of the slaves immediately, but to no avail. In the end, the condition of forty of the slaves deteriorated to the point that they were reclassified as manquerons or ‘undeliverable,’ and the buyers refused to take them. They were probably auctioned off with other sick and manquerons, or died in the custody of the WIC. A similar case developed with slaves brought by the ship Margaretha Catharina in the same year. Of the 259 slaves originally sold as piezas, twenty-seven became undeliverable and sixteen died before the buyers took possession.51 The end of the asiento trade led to the elimination of the separation procedure. The last slave transport to employ this procedure arrived in 1720. The manquerons and sick that arrived with the ship Amsterdam in 1724 were not sold separately. Most were sold in small groups, which involved bargaining and fluctuating prices, and the remaining slaves were auctioned. Slaves arriving with the last five transports before 1730 were auctioned in two to four sessions, mostly within a week to ten days after arrival.52 Even though the official separation procedure was discontinued, some sort of selection could later be used under special circumstances. For example, when word arrived in 1729 that the slave ship Phoenix was approaching Curaçao with many sick slaves on board after a long and difficult voyage, the governor told the WIC direc50
Ibid., 1146:102, 4 July 1703. Ibid., 1146:62, 12 November 1701; ibid., 1146:68, 4 April 1702. 52 Ibid., 578:309, 611; ibid., 578:853, 873; ibid., 579:179, 252, 659, 671; ibid., 579:653–54, 5 September 1729. 51
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tors in advance, in order to avoid their displeasure, that he would have all the slaves inspected by the company surgeon and an independent surgeon.53 Anticipating problems, the governor did not want to be blamed for it. During the free trade period, after 1730, slaves were sold both at public auctions and individually (uit de hand – by hand) through direct negotiations between vendor and buyer, and some were sold for a fixed price set by the vendor. The ship captains or local agents probably chose the most profitable way to sell them. A few slaves were sent on consignment or freight, in which case the terms were agreed to beforehand. 54 An agent of the Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie (MCC), a trading company that sent several slave ships to Curaçao after 1730, advised the company to sell its slaves at public auction as the WIC used to do, but slaves on MCC transports were also sold individually.55
The Demand Side of the Market Between 1700 and 1730 nearly 1,500 different individuals purchased slaves at Curaçao. The vast majority of these buyers, 66 percent, purchased a mere 10 percent of the slaves sold, an average of only two slaves apiece. On the other end of the spectrum, fewer than sixty buyers purchased over half of the slaves, including four buyers who purchased 900 slaves each. Most of the buyers were residents of Curaçao, while those who bought large lots of slaves were agents of the asiento or other foreign merchants (see table 9.2). The Asiento Years Before 1714, when the asiento trade was still a going concern, foreign demand for slaves was virtually Curaçao’s raison d’être as a commercial
53
Ibid., 579:341, 21 March 1729. Ibid., 597:649–50, 22 May 1750; ibid., 598:50, 23 January 1751; ibid., 600:1190–91, 23 February 1756; ibid., 602:111, 21 June 1759; ibid., 604:949, 1069, 15 February 1765 and 12 July 1765; ibid., 608:540, 4 February 1773; ibid., 605:771–74, 7 July 1767 and 15 July 1767. 55 W. S. Unger, ‘Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis van de Nederlandse slavenhandel, 2. De slavenhandel der Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie, 1732–1808,’ in Economisch-Historisch Jaarboek 28–30 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1960), 5, 79. 54
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Table 9.2. Buyer Categories, According to Numbers of Slaves Bought, 1700–1730 Slaves Bought per Buyer < 5 Slaves 5 to 10 Slaves 11 to 20 Slaves 21 to 50 Slaves 51 to 100 Slaves 101 to 500 Slaves > 500 Slaves Paid in Cash Exported to Berbice Retained by WIC Total
Number of Buyers
Total Number of Slaves Bought
Average per Buyer
985 235 107 74 30 23 4
1,727 1,612 1,548 2,297 2,068 3,551 3,732
2 7 14 31 69 154 933
93 197 255 1,458
17,080
Sources: ARA, NWIC 200–07, 566–76, 1146–53.
center. Over half of the 2,331 slaves sold there in 1700–1701 (1,177) were purchased by Manuel Alvares Correa and the merchants Goedvrient, Henriques and Senior, all agents of the Portuguese asiento. Other purchasers included local merchants who traded illicitly with the Spanish colonies. The illicit activity was significant enough that it prompted Spain, in the fall of 1700, to close colonial ports to all foreign ships except Portuguese. When rumors circulated that strict controls on trading permits would be enforced, Curaçao merchants feared that this might mean the end of the island’s slave trade. They resolved the problem by contracting Portuguese vessels to deliver slaves for them.56 In 1701, a Spaniard from Hispaniola wanted to buy 300 slaves from the WIC on credit. When the governor forbade this, he sought an agreement with local merchants to purchase slaves for him. At that time the news of the expiration of the Portuguese asiento had not reached Curaçao, so the governor was still confident that two slave transports on their way from Africa could be sold easily.57 But Curaçao soon faced several problems. 56 ARA, NWIC 566 and 1146: Sales lists; ibid., 566:2–4, 18 September 1700; ibid., 1146:28, 29 November 1700; ibid., 84, 2 September 1702. 57 Ibid., 566:514, 26 November 1701.
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In 1702, uncertainties and rumors of war, as well as the French acquisition of the asiento, had negative effects on the slave market at Curaçao. After the arrival of 333 slaves on the ship Rachel in January 1702, the island saw no additional slave transports for over a year. The slowdown in trade is reflected in the increasing duration that slaves spent in the custody of the WIC before being sold (see appendices 9.1 and 9.2). This was thought to be temporary, however. The governor still expected to find buyers in the Spanish colonies for 2,000 to 3,000 slaves a year. Before news of the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–1713) reached Curaçao, four or five slave ships were on the agenda for the island, with the number of slaves per transport increased to a minimum of 500. In the absence of an asiento, merchants intended to smuggle these slaves into the Spanish colonies. During those early years, reports reached Curaçao that the French and Spanish colonies were in desperate need of slaves. Even an armasoen described as bad, such as that landed with the ship Hollandia in 1705, was sold relatively quickly and purchased mostly by local merchants.58 Between 1708 and 1714 foreign demand for slaves was dominated by the French asiento. Its French representative on the island, Jean Chourio, purchased at least 1,600 of the 4,200 slaves sold there in that period. The seventeen slaves bought by Chourio in September 1714 were his final purchases at Curaçao, for the English had taken over the asiento and they needed neither Curaçao nor Dutch ships to obtain slaves.59 Although foreign demand was an integral part of the Curaçao slave market, fewer than half of the slaves sold there appear on the export records (recognitielijsten). The records of both exports and sale of slaves are complete for the years 1704–1710, showing 2,680 slaves exported from the island, when as many as 6,720 were sold at the Curaçao market. There are export records for the years 1711–1712, but those for sales are incomplete.60 We may assume that many of
58 Ibid., 1146:70, Van Beeck to chamber Zeeland, 24 April 1702; ibid., 1146:80, Van Beeck to chamber Zeeland, 30 June 1702; ibid., 1147:1 August 1705; ibid., 1147: Sales lists armasoen D. 59 C. C. Goslinga, ‘Curaçao as Slave-Trading Center during the War of the Spanish Succession, 1702–1714,’ Nieuwe West-Indische Gids 77 (1977/78): 24–32; ARA, NWIC 202–05, 570–71, 1149–51: Sales lists; ibid., 205:27 September 1714. 60 ARA, NWIC 201–03, 568–70, 1147–49: Sales lists and recognitielijsten.
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the slaves bought by local merchants were illegally exported to avoid export duties. Post-Asiento, 1714 to 1730 Curaçao’s importance as a slave market faded after the asiento ended its activity there in 1714. Lack of foreign demand made it difficult for WIC officials to sell the 2,000 slaves landed there in 1715 and 1716, and with many slaves remaining six to twelve months in the company’s custody, maintenance costs increased greatly. In the end, buyers were found for 1,900 of the trade slaves, primarily because the illicit trade with the Spanish mainland had not ended. During these two years, 602 slaves were reexported, 197 of whom to Berbice in present-day Guyana and the remainder presumably to foreign colonies. Nearly 100 trade slaves were incorporated in the company labor force at Curaçao (see appendices 9.1 and 9.2).61 During the decade of the 1720s, only seven WIC slave ships arrived at Curaçao, delivering 2,417 Africans. In 1728, two years before the free trade began, WIC officials expected a revival of the Curaçao slave trade because, as Governor Du Fay explained, the Spanish were ‘screaming for negroes.’ Local demand for slaves was also high at that time, and slaves arriving on four slave transports in 1728 and 1729 were readily sold (see appendix 9.2). But the illicit trade with the Spanish mainland must have been the principal slave market for Curaçao, because only 542 slaves were officially exported from the island between 1720 and 1730.62 Local Demand As mentioned earlier, an estimated 7,000 to 12,000 slaves lived at Curaçao during the early eighteenth century, mostly in the countryside. The number of slaves on plantations varied, but only a few large private estates had more than 100 slaves. Since many well-todo merchants and high ranking company officials resided in Willemstad but also owned plantations or acreage (tuinen), it is difficult to 61 Jordaan, ‘De veranderde situatie op de Curaçaose slavenmarkt,’ 486; ARA, NWIC 1297: 3 May 1716; ibid., 572–73, 1151–52: Sales lists and recognitielijsten. 62 ARA, NWIC 579:116, J. N. du Fay to chamber Amsterdam, 20 March 1728; ibid., 574–80, 1152–54, recognitielijsten.
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determine by ownership which slaves lived in town and which in the countryside. Judging by nineteenth-century demographic figures, about one-third of Curaçao’s slaves lived in Willemstad and served primarily as domestic servants, artisans, and sailors. Some residents made a living from hiring out their slaves. It took two years to train a newly arrived slave in a particular trade, who could then earn twenty-four stuivers ( ƒ1:04:00) a day for his master. Slaves employed as dockhands were hired out for twelve stuivers a day, and sailors for ƒ24 a month. Fully trained and experienced artisan slaves could be sold for up to ƒ2,400, but this was rarely done because hiring them out was a lucrative source of income. After the WIC drastically reduced its slave workforce, some WIC officials made extra money hiring their slaves out to the company.63 Ownership of slaves varied significantly at Curaçao. In 1715, 177 slave owners were registered as having fewer than 10 slaves, fortytwo had between 10 and 40, and only ten owned more than 40. The poll tax lists of 1719 contain the names of 230 slave-owners, of whom 181 owned fewer than 10 slaves, thirty-eight owned 11 to 40, and only 11 had more than 40 slaves.64 According to these figures, during the early eighteenth century, nearly 78 percent of Curaçaoans owned relatively few slaves, and fewer than 5 percent were large slave owners, while the remaining 17 percent owned a moderate number of slaves. Most Caribbean slave populations had higher death rates than birth rates, so continued importation of Africans was necessary to keep the labor force at desired levels. Although Curaçao was not a typical Caribbean plantation society, it also required regular replacements. Data on births and deaths are scarce for the eighteenth century, with no surviving records for privately owned slaves. But WIC records for the period of 1700–1716 show that the company bought 255 slaves to maintain its slave-force of 600 to 700 at its Curaçao and Bonaire plantations. Since company slaves were reduced by sales as well as by deaths, it is difficult to extract death rates from these data. Reliable data for the nineteenth century show that the island 63 Ibid., 603:1450, ibid., 598:1059–72, Pax and Kock to chamber Amsterdam, with attachments, 23 March 1752; ibid., 208:710, 716, Juan van Collen to chamber Amsterdam; ibid., 598:1047, Faesch to chamber Amsterdam, 14 April 1752; ibid., 603:681–83, Rodier to chamber Amsterdam, 17 April 1761; ibid., 601:426, 954–55, C. Roelants to chamber Amsterdam, 21 May 1757, muster roll, 31 August 1758. 64 Ibid., 206:350ff.; ibid., 575:690ff.
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experienced a natural increase in the slave population, but this was probably not the case during the early eighteenth century.65 Local demand for slaves at Curaçao fluctuated with crop success and failure. In times of drought, when food had to be imported and slave maintenance was costly, both WIC and private slave owners got rid of dispensable slaves by either selling and exporting them or freeing them. ‘It is a sorry sight how badly crippled and old slaves are set free and chased away by their masters just because of the high prices of maize,’ wrote newly arrived Governor Jan van Beuningen in 1720. More compassion was shown for dogs in the Netherlands, he said, than Curaçao owners showed for their cast-off slaves, whom he described as ‘crawling along the streets, starving, [and] howling as they meet the end of their pitiful lives.’ Twenty of the WIC’s expendable slaves were sold to the factors of the asiento during the drought of 1700. Acting Governor Van Collen blamed drought and the high cost of food for the diminished local demand during his 1710–1711 tenure. He advised his superiors not to send more than one slaver a year, since little demand for slaves was expected.66 It is hard to assess the volume of local demand. Even though there was a fairly steady corps of small, mainly local buyers, they were probably not purchasing slaves only for their own needs. It is quite likely that many were trying their luck as speculators. L. C. Vrijman claimed in his 1937 study that Jews and surgeons speculated by buying sick slaves. Although he failed to identify a source for his allegation, the following cases seem to confirm it. Among company surgeons that can be identified as buyers on auction lists, Sigismund Druschky bought ten sick slaves and two manquerons between May 1703 and March 1707, paying ƒ1,583:16:00, while Pieter van Gorcum purchased five sick and three manquerons between June 1701 and November 1708, paying ƒ1,057:04:00. In 1714 Druschky and Van Gorcum earned monthly salaries of ƒ76:16:00 and ƒ57:12:00 respectively.67 It does not seem likely that either was in a financial 65
Jordaan, ‘De veranderde situatie op de Curaçaose slavenmarkt,’ 482 (table 2 lists the regular WIC slaves for 1700–1720); ARA, NWIC 566:494; ibid., 572:179; ibid., 1151:84; H. Lamur, ‘Demographic Performance of the Slave Populations of the Dutch Speaking Caribbean,’ Boletin de Estudias Latinoamericanos y del Caribe 30 ( June 1981): 87–102. See also Renkema, Het Curaçaose plantagebedrijf, 336–37. 66 ARA, NWIC 575:166, Jan van Beuningen to chamber Amsterdam, 7 August 1720; ibid., 208:276; ibid., 204:465–66, 468. 67 L. C. Vrijman, Slavenhalers en slavenhandel (Amsterdam: Van Kampen, 1937),
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position to buy this many slaves on such a regular basis for their own use and maintain them over a period of time. The average price paid for adult slaves in public auction varied between ƒ96 and ƒ192, while an adult pieza brought at least ƒ240 (see table 9.1). The slave’s condition, together with the mechanism of supply and demand, determined his price at auction. If treated and fed well, slaves suffering from scurvy or the flux had a good chance of survival, and when only one or two were bought at a time, the initial investment and costs of maintenance were limited. When fully cured, the slave could be sold at a significant profit within a few weeks. The number of people interested in making some extra money this way, and willing to take some risks, was no doubt greater than just a few surgeons assured of their own medical skills. Thus, it is possible that a small group of marginal merchants could have made a profit while lowering slave mortality rates in the process. Twenty-one free blacks formed another interesting group of local buyers. Together, these twelve men and nine women purchased sixtytwo slaves – primarily expensive piezas – for a total of ƒ14,042:08:00. The cost of their purchases and the fact that they bought only healthy slaves with little risk of premature death suggest that these buyers were well off and not interested in speculation. Probably most, if not all, of these buyers lived in Willemstad. Some may have been craftsmen who needed extra hands, or they may have wanted to train slaves in a trade and hire them out as many white Curaçaoans did. The biggest buyer in this group was a man named Anthony, who purchased nine men, five women, seven boys, and one girl. The other black buyers were primarily interested in buying women, so were not looking for the muscular power required in agricultural labor.68 Preferences Place of origin, gender, age, and labor potential, as indicated by categorizations as pieza or manqueron, all contributed to the purchasing
117; ARA, NWIC 200–02 and 566–69: Auction lists of transports numbered 94, 96, 100, A, C, D, E, F, G, H, K, and P; ibid., 205:582, list of company personnel, 1714. 68 ARA, NWIC 201–03, 568–72: Sales lists of transports A, F, G, H, K, L, M, P, Q , S, W, Z, and B’; ibid., 578–79: Sales lists of transports M, N, P, and Q.
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preferences of Curaçao’s slave merchants. WIC directors were often told that slaves from the Loango-Angola region were less desired than slaves from the Guinea Coast because they were considered lazy and vulnerable to disease. The Spanish were said to be very interested in young female slaves,69 especially the Spanish on the Caracas coast, where reportedly illicit trade could succeed only if it met the demand for female slaves. In 1730, Governor Du Fay wrote that this long-standing preference for young women would only increase, because the Spanish ‘first take them for their women and later give them to the common slaves on their plantations.’ Children were usually also much in high demand at Curaçao and always sold very quickly, even when trade was slow.70 Table 9.3, listing the numbers of men, women, boys, and girls purchased by the different groups of buyers, shows that both minor and major buyers preferred women over men, and children over adults. This was definitely so for the factors of the asiento. In Willemstad, the preference for women and girls can be explained by the need for domestic servants and their exploitation as prostitutes in the port’s many taverns. The preference for boys might have been due to the prospect of hiring them out as trained artisans. Less expensive than adult men, boys could be trained in carpentry, bricklaying, or some other trade and within a few years earn a living for their masters. The middle echelons of buyers, which probably included most Curaçao planters, bought proportionally more adult men slaves. The group included WIC officials, who mainly wanted workers for the warehouses and plantations on Curaçao and Bonaire. As indicated in table 9.4, which presents buyers’ preferences, asiento agents bought primarily pieza slaves, with only 10 percent of their purchases manquerons and sick slaves. Minor merchants, on the other hand, bought about one-third piezas and approximately 40 percent sick and manqueron slaves. It seems reasonable to assume that if a person wanted a valuable slave and could afford the price, he would purchase a pieza. Speculation must have been the main reason for buying sick slaves, and those who engaged in the practice were pri69 Ibid., 569:143–45, J. Beck to chamber Amsterdam, 28 January 1707; ibid., 575: 250, Jan van Beuningen to chamber Amsterdam, 31 August 1720; ibid., 579: 116, J. N. du Fay to chamber Amsterdam, 20 March 1728. 70 Ibid., 579:735, J. N. du Faij to chamber Amsterdam, 28 February 1730; ibid., 1146: N. van Beeck to chamber Zeeland, 27 March 1700.
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Table 9.3. Buyers and Preferences According to Gender and Age, 1700–1730 Buyers by Numbers of Slaves Bought
Men
%
Women
%
< 5 Slaves 5 to 10 Slaves 11 to 20 Slaves 21 to 50 Slaves 51 to 100 Slaves 101 to 500 Slaves > 500 Slaves
752 922 895 1,435 1,261 2,151 1,811
43.5 57.2 57.8 62.5 60.8 60.6 48.5
657 421 436 574 547 821 1,109
38.04 26.12 28.17 24.99 26.39 23.12 29.72
Paid for in Cash 3 3.4 Exported to Berbice 129 65.5 Retained by WIC 215 84.3 Total 9,574 56.1
6 68 38 4,677
6.82 34.52 14.90 27.38
Boys
221 194 163 226 194 445 607
%
Girls %
12.8 97 12.0 75 10.5 54 9.84 62 9.36 71 12.5 134 16.3 205
54 61.4
Total
5.6 4.7 3.5 2.7 3.4 3.8 5.5
1,727 1,612 1,548 2,297 2,073 3,551 3,732
25 28.0
88 197 255 17,080
2 0.78 2,106 12.30 723
4.2
Source: ARA, NWIC 200–07, 566–76, 1146–53.
marily minor buyers. Intermediate range buyers, many of whom were Curaçao planters wanting healthy and strong agricultural workers, tended to purchase pieza slaves. In this category also were some who balanced their risks by purchasing a few sick slaves in hopes of a quick profit. Payment Terms of payment were usually stipulated in contracts with the asentistas and in the auction lists. Occasionally they were open to negotiation, especially in sales between individual vendors and interested buyers. The time allowed between sale and delivery was either stipulated by contract, as in the case of the asiento, or was negotiable between buyer and seller. The first item on auction lists was the time and condition for settlements. Sometimes immediate payment was required, but sometimes payment was not due until three months after the sale. Methods of payment varied significantly. With cash payments, the silver peso of eight reals was standard, but golden doubloons valued at thirty reals were also acceptable. Payment in kind was also an option, and at times, even small maize was a welcome form of
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Table 9.4. Buyers’ Preferences in Purchasing Manquerons, Sick Slaves, or Piezas de India, 1700–1730 Buyers Categorized According to Slaves Bought < 5 Slaves 5 to 10 Slaves 11 to 20 Slaves 21 to 50 Slaves 51 to 100 Slaves 101 to 500 Slaves > 500 Slaves Cash Payment Exported to Berbice Retained by the WIC Total
Manquerons Total % 176 10.0 164 10.0 168 11.0 189 8.2 188 9.1 272 7.7 147 3.9 3
3.2
Sick slaves Total % 528 418 508 544 557 609 192
31 26 33 24 27 17 5.1
4
4.3
117 46.0 1,424 8.3 3,360
Piezas de India Unknown Total % Total % 542 579 571 1,033 1,053 2,445 3,393
31.4 35.9 36.9 45.0 50.9 68.9 90.9
481 451 301 531 270 225
27.9 28.0 19.4 23.1 13.1 6.34
86 92.5 197 100.0 138 54.1 20.0 10,037 58.8 2,259 13.2
Sources: ARA, NWIC 200–07, 566–76, 1146–53.
payment, especially in times of food shortages. Slaves could also be purchased with bills of exchange or bills of bottomry (bodemerijbrieven). Bills of exchange were documents signed by the buyer (drawer) ordering a third party (drawee) to pay a certain sum of money to the endorsee or payee – the WIC in this case. The names of the drawee and payee were mentioned on the documents, as were the place of issue, the place where payment would take place (usually in the Dutch Republic), and an indication of when payment was due. In 1701, for example, the asiento agent Manuel Alvares Correa paid for the purchase of slaves and the cost of exporting them with a bill of exchange.71 Since bottomry is today virtually forgotten, it requires further explanation. It was in essence a loan, usually contracted by a captain or a shipowner, by which a ship and/or part of its cargo was pledged as security. The advance might be needed to make necessary repairs to a ship while anchored in a foreign harbor. A unique feature of bottomry was that the creditor accepted the ‘risk of the sea’ 71 For terms of payment at different auctions, see for instance, ARA, NWIC 200:93, 107, 168, 278, 288, 294; ibid., 201: 77, 334, 480, 474; ibid., 202:42, 142, 158, 225, 285; ibid., 205:39, 336, 469, 644; ibid., 206:93; ibid., 566:225, attachment to a letter of N. van Beeck to chamber Amsterdam, 9 April 1701.
Total 1,727 1,612 1,548 2,297 2,068 3,551 3,732 93 197 255 17,080
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or ‘adventure of the sea,’ as it was called, forfeiting his claim if the collateral were lost or damaged. Because of this risk, the borrower had to pay a certain primage or insurance, which was very high, usually double the cost of customary insurance. The practice was therefore used only for emergencies and unintended costs. But during the seventeenth century, an intentional form of bottomry developed that was used to purchase goods, with the ‘risk of the sea’ remaining a basic characteristic. Bottomry was first mentioned as a method for purchasing goods in 1647, in a WIC instruction document (artikelbrief ).72 Without using the word bottomry, A. J. M. Kunst describes its practice in the shipment of West Indian produce to the Dutch Republic, accompanied by bills of exchange. The drawee in patria received the goods and paid the WIC in cash, including interest up to the moment of payment. The ‘adventure of the sea’ implied that if the goods were lost, no payment could be collected. Describing this method of financing slave purchases, P. J. van Winter referred to these bonds as bills of exchange and bills of bottomry. If the goods that served as collateral did not arrive or were damaged, the company that accepted the bonds lost its claim for payment.73 The practice of bottomry was also alluded to in seventeenth-century asiento trade at Curaçao. Contracts with the Coymans asiento initially mentioned only cash payments for slaves, but they later accepted goods as collateral for payment. The goods were shipped to the Netherlands and consigned to the company directors, who notified asiento representatives, who had six weeks to pay their debt for slaves. If not paid, the company was entitled to auction the goods and recover the debt from the proceeds. Since the WIC bore the risk of shipping the goods, the practice was bottomry even if the term was not used. A bill of bottomry did not have to be notarized; the signature of the debtor on the document was sufficient. If the drawee named in the bill of bottomry refused to pay, a notary was called in to draw up an official protest and the pledged goods were sold.
72 A. Verwer, Nederlants see-rechten, averyen en bodemeryen (Amsterdam: Boom, 1730), 151–202; M. Tydeman, Bijdrage tot de geschiedenis der bodemerij (Utrecht: Beijers, 1880), 78. 73 A. J. M. Kunst, Recht, commercie en kolonialisme in West-Indië vanaf de zestiende tot in de negentiende eeuw (Zutphen: Walburg, 1981), 177; P. J. van Winter, De West-Indische Compagnie ter kamer Stad en Lande, Werken uitgegeven door de Vereeniging het Nederlandsch Economisch-Historisch Archief, no. 15 (The Hague: Nijhoff 1978), 199.
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If the debt and its related costs could not be recovered from the proceeds, the debtor was responsible for the difference.74 WIC directors were not pleased when its Curaçao officials accepted bills of bottomry as payment for slaves. A shortage of cash, however, sometimes left little choice if slaves needed to be sold, as Governor Abraham Beck explained in 1709. He provided the directors extra security, however, by accepting as collateral only easily marketable merchandise at 15 to 20 percent under current market value. This ensured a better chance that the loan and its costs could be recovered from the sale of the merchandise.75 Rates of exchange for bills of bottomry were set slightly higher than for bills of exchange: 52 stuivers to a peso and 48 stuivers to a peso respectively, the latter being the going rate of exchange at Curaçao. This difference in rate of exchange, however, was not enough to cover the cost of primage associated with bills of bottomry. At Amsterdam, primage rates on round trip voyages to Curaçao fluctuated between 24 and 50 percent during the period 1700–1727.
74 [Van Belle], Pertinent en waarachtig verhaal, 25, 63, bijlage A, 3 (), 7 () and 10 (, ); Gemeentearchief Amsterdam (GAA), Notarieel Archief (NA) 4205:1109; 4206:559; 4207:880; 4209:305, 337, 341; 4218:561; 4775:1069, 1072, 1077, 1099; 4776:79, 98; 7373:1237; 7591:23 September 1713 and 27 October 1713; 7635:208, 341; 7639:364; 7644:510; 7955:718. 75 ARA, NWIC 203: Abraham Beck to Heren X, 13 July 1709. See for instance, ARA, NWIC 566:194; 567:39; 201:678; and 570:176. Until 1705, the document stated only that within fourteen days after the safe arrival in the Dutch Republic of the ship that carried the pledged goods, the debtor promised to pay a specified amount in guilders to the WIC through a person named at the bottom of the document. As a rule, this third party lived in Amsterdam. The buyer of the slave or slaves provided the collateral tropical products like dyewood, cacao, tobacco, or hides, which were specified according to product, weight, and containerization. The debtor acted as the drawer in a bill of exchange and the third party in the Netherlands as the drawee. Several copies of the same bill of bottomry were sent. The later forms of bills of bottomry are almost identical to the standard documents used for bottomry on merchandise, mentioned by Verwer, Nederlants see-rechten, 255–56. The amount was stated both in pesos and in guilders, and the rate of exchange in stuivers. The debtor acknowledged to having received this amount from the governor at Curaçao for the purchase of slaves, which was most likely a paper transaction. The pledged goods were specified according to type, weight, and containerization, as well as the vessel with which they were shipped and their destination. The debtor promised to pay the loan to the WIC fourteen days after the safe arrival of the ship in large denominations of silver coins, at least thalers ( groff silver gelt, ten minste daalders), through a named third party. In addition to the collateral, the debtor pledged all his present and future possessions. Finally, it was stipulated that in case the ship was wrecked or damaged, any of the pledged goods salvaged would be for the benefit of the creditor: the WIC.
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For bills of bottomry issued at Curaçao during the last quarter of the seventeenth century, a primage of 50 percent was specified.76
Conclusions The Curaçao slave market was tightly organized. By setting strict rules and instructions for its employees and creating an intricate administrative system, the WIC tried to maintain careful control in order to minimize losses through theft, illegal sales, and depreciation, as well as from disease and death among its human merchandise. Precise guidelines for the treatment of slaves aboard the ships and after landing at Curaçao aimed at keeping the slaves in the best possible physical condition. Ship captains and local company officials had to account for any unexpected losses and costs. In the whole process of separating and selling the slaves, speed was of utmost importance. The sooner slaves were sold, the smaller the chances of losses through mortality and the lower the cost of maintenance. The way the system was set up was largely determined by the asiento trade and by the wishes of the Heren X, who wanted to prevent illicit slave trading. When demand for slaves collapsed after the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–1713), company administration on the island was downsized and adjusted. Efforts to keep slaves in the best possible physical condition were not always successful. A major problem inherent in the traffic was the vulnerability of the human merchandise to disease. The enslaved Africans suffered primarily from dysentery, scurvy, tuberculosis, and smallpox, ailments contracted during the middle passage or after arrival at Curaçao. Fresh food and water probably offered the best chances for recovery, but they were often inadequate during the voyage. Mortality varied greatly from one transport to another. After arrival at Curaçao, care of the slaves was balanced against the cost of maintenance. Other factors hampering the care of trade slaves
76 The recognitie on export of slaves was set at ƒ4 a head or peso ƒ1:05:02. For six slaves, ten pesos would be paid, the equivalent of ƒ24; GAA, NA 4195: Bill of bottomry, 4 January 1702; 6011A: Bill of bottomry, 15 April 1700; 6590: 341: Bill of bottomry, 6 May 1700; 6049:1511, Bill of bottomry, 24 December 1709; 8607: 1347, Bill of bottomry, 8 November 1724; 8628: 962, Bill of bottomry, 27 June 1727; [Van Belle], Pertinent en waarachtig verhaal, 173, appendix .
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included periodic droughts that resulted in food shortages and rocketing prices of maize. In addition, market demands and duration of custody before sale could significantly increase slave mortality. The picture of the Curaçao slave market revealed by quantitative data is more complex than often assumed. In addition to foreign purchasers, buyers included local slave owners who purchased both for themselves and for trade. Many buyers participated in the market as small middlemen. Sick slaves could be bought for speculation, which helped distribute the financial risk of mortality. Planters were primarily interested in purchasing prime slaves or piezas, and more men than women. Asiento buyers were also mainly interested in piezas, but they also bought small numbers of manquerons and sick slaves. Slave exports to the Spanish colonies also revealed a special interest in purchasing women and children. Not every Curaçao resident was a planter, but nearly every free person seems to have been involved in the slave trade to some degree. Merchants often also owned plantations, and planters were often involved in exporting slaves, especially in times of drought when they wanted to reduce their labor force. Among the smaller buyers were a group of free blacks, who mainly purchased expensive piezas slaves. Like many other Curaçaoans, they probably trained their slaves and hired them out as artisans or for other jobs. Children were less expensive, and they could be taught skills and then hired out by their owners. This might explain why child-slaves were so much in demand at the Curaçao slave market. Small buyers may also have bought slaves for use as their own domestic servants, and they also bought a large proportion of sick slaves for speculative purposes. A surprisingly small number of slaves were legally reexported from Curaçao, although a large but undetermined number must have been smuggled to the Spanish colonies. The Curaçao slave market from 1700 to 1730 was characterized by a multi-layered structure. It included a variety of minor and major merchants and occasional middlemen, many of whom tried to make a profit on the fringes of the WIC slave trade. On the complex issue of profitability, many of these minor participants in the Curaçao slave-market undoubtedly benefited from this ignoble traffic. The Curaçao slave trade confronts us in a chilling way with its inhumane character. Men, women, and children were reduced to nameless items of merchandise, piezas that could be calculated in fractions. They were counted, branded, registered, and disposed of
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quickly if their deteriorating condition threatened to turn a profit into a loss. Their life or death often became an object of speculation. Human beings were treated and cared for only in the interest of profit, discarded and left to starve in the streets if their productivity no longer off-set their cost of maintenance.
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CHAPTER TEN
REPRESENTATIVE ATLANTIC ENTREPRENEUR: JACOB LEISLER, 1640–1691 C S
Jacob Leisler of New York wishes to sell 160 hogshead of Virginia tobacco to Jan Hendrick Sibingh and Cornelis Jacobs Moy, merchants at Amsterdam. Leendert Fruijt, Amsterdam notary, 26 July 1675.1
Introduction The above quote concerning the New York merchant Jacob Leisler (1640–1691) sounds innocent enough, but it had serious international implications. The tobacco was intended to be shipped directly from New York to Amsterdam, which involved a breach of the 1651 and subsequent English Acts of Trade and Navigation designed to end foreign trade with English colonies. Goods shipped from the colonies to foreign ports had to be cleared and taxed at English ports before proceeding to their destination. The Virginia tobacco deal was clearly not meant to follow that route. It is not surprising that New York merchants still had commercial connections with merchants in the Dutch Republic. The former New Amsterdam had changed allegiance only recently, in 1664, and adopted the New York name permanently only in 1674. Many New York merchants preserved their Atlantic trading networks despite the English regulations, which aimed to establish a closed national system. Although German by birth, Leisler strongly identified with the Dutch through marriage, religion, and former employment with the Dutch West India Company (WIC), and he maintained several of
1 Gemeentearchief Amsterdam (GAA), Notarieel Archief (NA) 3897:72, Jacob Leisler to Jan Hendrick Sibingh and Cornelis Jacobs Moy, 26 July 1675.
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his old trading connections. And WIC directors long maintained that Dutch merchants should be able to trade with former Dutch settlements on the Hudson River. This chapter explores the contradiction between established personal trading networks and the opposing efforts by developing nationstates to create an exclusively English or Dutch Atlantic economic system at the expense of other nations. The English Acts of Trade and Navigation, initiated by Oliver Cromwell (1599–1658) in 1651, exemplified these efforts. Its underlying economic theory was later called mercantilism by the Scottish economist Adam Smith (1723– 1790).2 In theory, the goal was to compartmentalize the Atlantic, with each nation trading only within its own sphere. In reality, compartmentalizing such a vast region was virtually impossible. The career of Jacob Leisler demonstrates how certain merchants defied mercantile restrictions at great risk and illustrates the difference between economic theory and commercial reality.3 A prominent New York businessman and representative of the colonial merchant class, Leisler gained both fame and notoriety – depending on one’s perspective – and was executed in 1691 for his participation in the 1689 New York uprising in favor of William of Nassau (1650–1702), Prince of Orange, and his English wife, Mary (1667–1694), oldest daughter of King James (1633–1701).4 Leisler supported the Dutch2 For a discussion of the Acts of Trade and Navigation, see C. Schnurmann, Atlantische Welten. Engländer und Niederländer im amerikanisch-atlantischen Raum, 1648–1713, Wirtschafts- und Sozialhistorische Studien, no. 9 (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 1998), 107ff.; J. E. Farnell, ‘The Navigation Act of 1651: The First Dutch War and the London Merchant Community,’ Economic History Review 16, no. 3 (1963/64): 439–54; J. O. Appleby, Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978); T. C. Barrow, Trade and Empire: The English Customs Service in Colonial America, 1660–1775 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967); R. Brenner, Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and London’s Overseas Traders, 1550–1653 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 3 For a London merchant who traded in tobacco with the Dutch Republic, and who in those days also defied mercantile restrictions, see H. Rosevaere, ed., Markets and Merchants of the Late Seventeenth Century: The Marescoe-David Letters, 1668–1680, Records of Social and Economic History, n. ser., no. 12 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). 4 For additional information about Leisler, see D. W. Voorhees, In Behalf of the True Protestant’s Religion: The Glorious Revolution in New York (Ph.D. diss., New York University, 1988); D. W. Voorhees, ‘The Fervent Zeal of Jacob Leisler,’ William and Mary Quarterly 51, no. 3 (1994): 447–72; D. Merwick, Possessing Albany, 1630–1710: The Dutch and English Experiences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); R. C. Ritchie, The Duke’s Province: A Study of New York Politics and Society, 1664–1691 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1977).
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born William as king of England and stadholder of Holland and Zeeland, but he despised English monarchs who favored Catholicism and harbored pro-French feelings, as did King James . The Legal Framework of Atlantic Communities and Commerce Since neither the Dutch nor the English originated the concept of exclusive national economic spheres, a brief summary of its feudalIberian origins might be useful. In addition, seventeenth-century charters and laws concerning Western-European overseas colonies also shed light on the evolution of closed-sphere concepts. The Iberians Fifteenth-century Spanish and Portuguese monarchs had used various laws to enlarge their royal domain, and papal charters in 1492–1493, and especially the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494, contributed to this movement by placing huge areas of newly discovered lands under royal control.5 Neither legislative bodies nor noblemen could impose limits on royal control over the colonial territories and their resources. The Iberian monarchs regarded their territories in the New World, as well as the Atlantic itself, as their private royal property. Colonial administration and all matters relating to colonies such as human migration, church missions, shipping, and trade, including the powerful commercial institution Casa de la Contratación de las Indias at Seville, were all subject to royal authority. Most of the newly discovered American territories were claimed by Spanish monarchs, and their Lusitanian counterparts claimed authority over Brazil and Africa, as the Treaty of Tordesillas stipulated. Accordingly, Portugal dominated the trade routes to Africa, African coastal trade, and the slave trade, but also the route around Africa to the Orient, and thus the spice and textile trade with Asia.6
5 See F. G. Davenport, ed., European Treaties Bearing on the History of the United States and its Dependencies, 4 vols. (1929; reprint, Gloucester, Mass.: Smith, 1967). 6 See C. Schnurmann, Europa trifft Amerika. Atlantische Wirtschaft in der Frühen Neuzeit, 1492–1783 (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1998).
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The English English fishermen frequented North American coasts as early as the fifteenth century, although this contact had little impact on English laws and royal power. Neither did the early English explorations during the fifteenth century,7 although they served as counterclaims to Spanish assertions and set a precedent for later explorations and colonizing enterprises. The voyages of Italian explorers to North America, employed by Tudor King Henry (1485–1509), were later used as legal precedent for English rights to these territories. European rulers in general regarded land and sea outside of Europe as legally theirs, but they often contested each other’s rights. Protestant rulers readily rejected papal decisions that favored Iberian claims. But as they joined the Iberians in the scramble for territory during the seventeenth century, Dutch and English Protestants readily modeled their practices of colonial rule and exploitation on Iberian precedents. In matters of territorial rights and natural resources such as precious metals, pearls, and diamonds, they used medieval and early modern Iberian legal precedents to stake their claims, citing charters and edicts to make private property claims. By granting charters in 1606, 1607, and 1629 to ostensibly devoted subjects, English monarchs employed medieval traditions of tenure to grant land as fiefs in return for feudal service. They also claimed prerogatives to colonial territories as part of their royal domain, without being subject to parliamentary approval. Colonial governors were appointed by the crown, except in proprietary colonies such as Maryland and Pennsylvania. However, in chartered colonies such as Virginia and Massachusetts, which were started by merchant companies, its English inhabitants first enjoyed the right to elect their own governors. Starting in 1651, the English government enacted a series of restrictive economic policies that came to be known collectively as the Acts of Trade and Navigation, or simply Navigation Acts, which dominated English commercial policy for nearly two centuries, until their repeal in 1849. In essence, all trade to and from English overseas settlements had to be carried out by English ships, and after 1707 by British subjects. Each successive act added new procedures, altered
7 H. Wellenreuther, Niedergang und Aufstieg. Geschichte Nordamerikas vom Beginn der Besiedlung bis zum Ausgang des 17. Jahrhunderts, Geschichte Nordamerikas in atlantischer Perspektive von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart, no. 1 (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2000).
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import duties, or added new products to a growing list of restrictions. The aim was to create an exclusive English economic domain in the Atlantic from which foreign merchants were barred. The acts have often been seen as a defense against the dominant position of Dutch merchants in the region, and they were instrumental in starting the First Anglo Dutch War (1652–1654).8 Scholars have often considered these mercantilistic Navigation Acts as the epitome of early modern progressive economic theory. In retrospect, however, they appear much like traditional medieval acts adapted to a wider world. They were a sign of national weakness rather than economic strength, because well-functioning national economies would not need such artificial protection. Nevertheless, the acts were effective tools to tie the colonies more closely to the mother country, and the English claimed that they were beneficial to overseas merchants as well. Many colonial subjects, however, resented the Navigation Acts as contrary to their private and regional interests and tried to evade their restrictions. The Dutch Although not a monarchy like most European powers at that time, leadership of the Dutch Republic had its own ways to legitimize its desire for overseas territory, resources, and commercial opportunities. Hatred of Catholic-Spain and Portugal, growing out of an eightyyear war for independence from the king of Spain (1568–1648), provided Dutch leaders an excuse to take colonial territory claimed by Spain or Portugal. In a sense, they viewed themselves as heirs of the Habsburg rulers of Spain, Emperor Charles (1500–1558) and his son King Philip (1527–1598). They also made use of the traditional claim of right by virtue of ‘first discovery’ and ‘settlement.’ Thanks to the voyages organized by Henry Hudson (ca. 1550–1611), an Englishman in the service of the Dutch East India Company who in search for the Northwest passage in 1609 had sailed into the river which later would bear his name, the Dutch Republic claimed the territory along the Hudson River.9 8 Farnell, ‘The Navigation Act of 1651,’ 439–54; S. Groenveld, ‘The English Civil War as a Cause of the First Anglo-Dutch War, 1640–1652,’ The Historical Journal 30 (1987): 541–66. 9 See O. A. Rink, Holland on the Hudson: An Economic and Social History of Dutch
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Although the United Provinces were long an advocate of free international trade, its leaders had their own designs for advancing national interest. In the founding charter of the WIC (1621), the States General sounded like stout promoters of a national economy and a Dutch hegemony in the Atlantic, in which colonies, colonial production, and commerce were to be subordinated to the interest of patria, the Dutch Republic and its citizens (see chapter 4). In its official correspondence with the States General, the WIC was referred to as ‘Compagnie van den lande,’ or company of the nation.10 No doubt was left that the colonies and their populations were expected to serve the interest and well-being of the mother country. This is the reason why foreign ships, mostly from North America, were initially not allowed to enter the Dutch colonies on the Guiana coast, although neither skippers not planters paid much attention to these regulations (see chapters 11 and 12). Point of Departure The reaction of the colonists to the Navigation Acts is, of course, the overriding issue in this presentation. Did they accept the theoretical arguments of their English rulers for a closed economic system, or did they disobey the various restrictions that governors, custom officials, and admiralty courts tried to impose on them? Transatlantic communications between England and the colonies were usually connected with commerce, and merchants on the North American east coast were therefore most affected by these measures. Their activities can be taken as a barometer of how the Navigation Acts were perceived by colonial merchants. In studying their reactions, it becomes clear that the mentality among many colonists was quite different from what European rulers anticipated. Instead of being tools to be exploited for the interest of the mother country, colonial merchants looked out for their own best interest, even if it violated the rules and regulations imposed by England. Leisler’s case exemplifies that attitude.
New York (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986); J. A. Jacobs, Een zegenrijk gewest. Nieuw-Nederland in de zeventiende eeuw, Cultuurgeschiedenis van de zeventiende eeuw, no. 2 (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 1999). 10 Algemeen Rijksarchief (ARA), Archief van de Staten-Generaal (SG), liassen West-Indische Compagnie.
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Leisler’s Atlantic Networks Jacob Leisler (1640–1691) was a typical merchant of the early modern Atlantic world in the sense that he blended European national claims with practical colonial necessities. Born in 1640 to deeply devoted Calvinist parents in Frankfurt am Main in Hessia, Germany, Leisler created a dramatic career for himself in the New World. He was employed at the age of twenty by the WIC, became a leader in the New Amsterdam militia in the early 1660s, became a prominent merchant in New Netherland and later New York from 1663/64 to 1689, and was involved in organizing New York’s revolution in 1689–1691. Typical of his times, Leisler held strong patriotic identification with his original home, although this had no impact on the practical affairs of his life as a merchant. In order to make a living, merchants in the Atlantic world had to deal with people of a variety of national and ethnic identities, and Leisler managed that admirably. On board the Otter, Leisler made his first Atlantic crossing in the service of the WIC in 1660, sailing to the Dutch colony in the North American mainland, New Netherland. His father, Jacob Victor Leisler (1606–1653), came from a well-connected family and was a man with considerable influence and numerous social connections, a solid foundation on which his son could build. Leisler Sr. was born of Swiss-German parents in Oettingen, Bavaria, and had strong links with Calvinist Geneva. He also had business connections with other Calvinist and Reformed communities in the Palatinate and Bavaria.11 Unlike his father, Dr. Jacob Leisler, who had studied law, Jacob Victor Leisler studied theology at the university at Altdorf in 1623 and went to the orthodox Calvinist Geneva Academy in 1625. He was ordained as a minister the following year and was thereby authorized to preach at Geneva’s Reformed Church. After a few months at the University of Basel, Switzerland, he became rector at the
11
Jacob Leisler’s grandfather, Dr. Jacob Leisler, served as legal counsel to the Lutheran count of Oettingen before he moved to Amberg, Bavaria, in 1614, where he worked as councillor for the Calvinist prince Christian of Anhalt. Dr. Jacob Leisler and his brother Dr. Caspar Leisler had not only managed to climb the social ladder through employment to important local Protestant principalities in Bavarian territories and in the Palatinate, but they had also managed to accumulate considerable wealth, or in Dr. Caspar Leislers’ case, enormous debts. Stadtarchiv Weissenburg (StAW) 12003: Erbschaftssache Dr. Caspar Leisler, 1618.
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French Reformed Church at Frankenthal in the German state of Palatinate on the German-French border.12 When Frankenthal was destroyed by Spanish forces in 1637, a casualty of the Thirty Year War (1618–1648), Leisler Sr. was severely traumatized and fled with his wife Susanne Adelheid Wissenbach (daughter of an eminent Calvinist professor at Geneva) and his young family to the Palatinate town of Kreuznach. Shortly afterwards, the French Reformed congregation in Frankfurt on the river Main requested that he become their pastor. The French congregation was in a difficult position, because the magistrate of the important German economic center of Frankfurt refused to grant the congregation the privilege of public worship within the city walls. This was no doubt the result of the Thirty Year War, which had raised the intolerance level considerably. These impediments prompted the French congregation to join forces with the Dutch-reformed congregation in Frankfurt. Thus, Jacob Victor Leisler became pastor of both congregations, who jointly paid his salary. With some difficulty, the new pastor acquired Frankfurt citizenship, which was a gesture of generosity at a time when religious fanaticism and war made life less than pleasant.13 Despite all the difficulties, Reverend Leisler managed to establish numerous connections with people all over Europe and the Atlantic world, creating his own Calvinist network.14 By relying on kinship,
12 E. von Steinmeyer, ed., Die Matrikel der Universität Altdor (Würzburg: Nedeln, 1912), 181; S. Stelling-Michaud, ed., Le Livre du Rectuer de l’Academie de Geneve, 1559–1878 (Geneva: Droz, 1975), 4:310; H. D. Wackernagel, ed., Die Matrikel der Universität Basel (Basle: Verlag der Universitätsbibliotheek Basel, 1962), 3:361; D. W. Voorhees, ‘European Ancestry of Jacob Leisler,’ New York Genealogical and Biographical Record 120 (1989): 193–202; E. J. Hürkey, ed., Kunst, Kommerz, Glaubenskampf. Frankenthal um 1600 (Worms: Wernersche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1995). 13 See Stadtarchiv Frankfurt am Main (StAF), Ratsprotokoll 1638: 9r, 19 July 1638; ibid., 1638: 13r, 23 August 1638; ibid., 1638: 23v, 20 November 1638; F. J. F. Scharff, ‘Die Niederländische und die Französische Gemeinde Frankfurt am Main,’ Archiv für Frankfurts Geschichte und Kultur 2 (1862): 245–318; F. C. Ebrard, Die französischreformierte Gemeinde in Frankfurt am Main, 1554 –1904 (Frankfurt am Main: Ecklin, 1906); H. Schilling, Niederländische Exulanten im 16. Jahrhundert. Ihre Stellung im Sozialgefüge und im religiösen Leben deutscher und englischer Städte (Gütersloh: Mohn, 1972); M. Meyn, Die Reichsstadt Frankfurt vor dem Bürgeraufstand von 1612 bis 1614. Struktur und Krise (Frankfurt am Main: Kramer, 1980). 14 O. P. Grell, ‘Merchants and Ministers: The Foundation of International Calvinism,’ in Calvinism in Europe, 1540–1620, ed. A. Pettegree et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); J. Arndt, Das Heilige Römische Reich und die Niederlande, 1566–1648. Politisch-konfessionelle Verflechtung und Publizistik im Achtzigjährigen Krieg, Münster Historische Forschungen, no. 13 (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 1998).
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friendship, faith, and professional contacts, he managed to get funding for his church from other reformed communities in Europe and arranged financial help for other church communities that were in even deeper trouble. Despite his poor health, Reverend Leisler became a veritable fund-raising wizard, organizing financial transactions with colleagues and old friends all over western Europe. Commercial centers such as Basle and Nürnberg were especially important for these financial schemes. Nürnberg was a center of trade and toy-production, and here Reverend Leisler relied on Laurenz Rambskopf, an important figure in the Nürnberg Calvinistic community and probably a boyhood friend, and later his brother-in-law. It is hardly surprising that one of his daughters, Susanna Leisler, later married one of the leading members of the Nürnberg congregation, Abraham Sies, who subsequently went into service with the elector of Brandenburg, a close relative of the prominent King William of Nassau, whose family originated from Nassau-Dillenburg, Germany.15 Reverend Leisler continued to correspond with colleagues and coreligionists in London, Hamburg, Emden, Amsterdam, Nürnberg, and Basle, and his activities were not limited to church affairs and fund raising. He also became involved in German and European politics. Several times he worked as a mediator, secretary, or messenger for noblemen who represented principalities at the peace negotiations in Münster and Osnabrück. In the course of these activities, he became acquainted with influential politicians such as Godert van Reede, Heer van Nederhorst, the Utrecht representative to the Westphalia peace talks (1645–1648). Van Reede happened to be a close associate of Cornelis Melyn, the Amsterdam proprietor at Staten Island next to Manhattan, and was an elder in the New Amsterdam Reformed Church. An Amsterdam notarial record suggests that Reverend Leisler knew Melyn personally.16 Without a doubt, Leisler knew Cornelis Melyn’s son, Jacob Melyn, who between 1689 and
15 See Landeskirchliches Archiv Nürnberg (LKAN), Nürnberg Familienregister 1723, 1800, 1825: 66 Bll, which contains lists of members of the Nürnberg reformedcongregation, 1644–1723, l, 6–7, 19, 44, 54. 16 For the Melyn-Leisler connection, see GAA, NA 1309: 13 June 1659; C. Melyn, ‘Melyn Papers 1640–1699,’ in Collections of the New York Historical Society for the year 1913 (New York: New York Historical Society, 1914), 97–138, Godert van Reede, Heer von Nederhorst, and Cornelis Melyn share property on Staten Island, witnessed by Amsterdam Notary Jan de Graeff, Amsterdam, 6 May 1641; and by notary F.Steur, Amsterdam, 16 January 1648.
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1691 became one of the strongest supporters of Jacob Leisler and his government of New York.17 Those political and financial contacts represent but one aspect of the Leisler family’s wide network of personal connections. Perhaps even more important was Reverend Leisler’s acquaintance with some of the leading merchants-families of western Europe, which probably resulted from the reverend’s fund-raising and church activities. Many Huguenot merchant-families, including D’Orville, de Famar, du Fay, and Malapert, not only resided in important port towns and trade centers like Amsterdam, Hamburg, or London, but also in the German Imperial city of Frankfurt am Main, where they had joined either Leisler’s French-Reformed congregation or the closely linked Dutch-Reformed congregation in Bockenheim. A good many of those influential merchants fled from Northern France and the Spanish Netherlands to Palatinate towns like Frankenthal and Frankfurt, where they had relatives who were connected with the WIC. Jacob Leisler Jr. must have learned a great deal from his father, for he also maintained many personal contacts, and these included Nürnberg citizens. When Leisler left Europe on the Dutch ship the Otter in 1660, he kept in the company of a Nürnberg citizen and soldier, Conrad Locker. Later, as merchant in New York, he imported Nürnberg products to the New World.18 Another early Leisler connection with New Netherland is provided by Leisler’s own family records. Although definite proof is still lacking, the family was probably related to one of New Netherland’s leading ministers, Johann Theodor Polhemus (1598–1676). He was born in Bavaria as the son of Johann Theodor Polhemus (1570–ca. 1611) and Elisabeth Leisler (1571–?), probably a daughter of Dr. Caspar Leisler, the ambitious uncle of Reverend Leisler and father of several illegitimate children and many debts. Elisabeth Leisler was born in the Palatinate village of Wolfstein, which belonged to a German prince who had conflicts with his councilor, Elisabeth Leisler’s father. Polhemus junior was a pastor in Dutch Brazil between 1635 and 1654, before he became pastor of the Dutch Reformed
17 American Antiquarian Society, Jacob Melyn’s Letterbook, 1691–1696; E. Haefeli, ‘Leislerians in Boston: Some Rare Dutch Colonial Correspondence,’ paper presented at the Rensselaerswijck Conference at Albany, New York, September 2000. 18 See Public Record Office (PRO), E 190/1047/12: Port Books Falmouth, import duties, 17 September 1683.
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congregation of Flatbush, Long Island, where he died in 1676.19 It is possible that these multi-layered kinship ties and skillful manoeuvering of widely connected Atlantic merchants included connections with the WIC and that these ingenious family connections landed young Jacob Leisler not only a job with the company in 1660, but also a leading position as a captain in the New Amsterdam militia in 1660/61, although Leisler followed normal procedures to obtain employment with the WIC. The militia appointment may seem surprising, because there is no proof that Leisler ever saw any military training; however, Dutch contemporaries called him an adelborst or midshipman, an apprentice of sorts.20 His younger brother Johann Heinrich Leisler, the black sheep in the family, certainly had acquired military training. But from Jacob Leisler’s point of view, his brother had made poor use of his expertise by signing up for the army of the families’ deadly foe, the French Catholic King Louis . It is possible that Leisler received his appointment with the WIC not only because of his Old World connections, but also his future wife through family connections. His marriage to Elsie Tymens, widow of New Amsterdam merchant Pieter Cornelissen van der Veen (?–1661), may have been arranged by strong transatlantic links of kinship, church, and acquaintances as well. Although Van der Veen is a common name in the Old as well as in the New World, it is hardly a coincidence that there happened to be quite a number of Van der Veens in the Frankfurt-Bockenheim community. They might have helped arrange the marriage between the twenty-three-year-old son of their highly respected pastor to the New Amsterdam woman, several years his senior. In April 1663, Leisler married Tymens, mother of several children and overburdened with inheritance problems. Leisler resigned from his post with the WIC at about the same time, but it is possible that his appointment was for only one year, which was not unusual for company employment. Without his WIC
19 For his Brazilian period, see F. L. Schalkwijk, The Reformed Church in Dutch Brazil, 1630–1654 (Zoetermeer: Boekencentrum, 1998). 20 See GAA, NA 1330: 21 April 1660. The index entry, prepared by Simon Hart, reads: ‘Jacob Lijslaer van Frankfoort als adelborst naar Nieuw Nederland gaande, bekent aan Henrick Henricksz Loen, gasterijhouder, 50 carolus guilders schuldig te zijn. . . .’
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salary, Leisler empowered one of his in-laws to demand ‘all such moneys as are due him for his military service’ from the company.21 During or shortly after his marriage to Tymens, Leisler became a businessman, and he was meticulous when it came to financial matters. He never gave up on legitimate financial claims and readily went to court to settle even minor indebtedness to him. It is still unclear what these funds were and where they originated. He was fortunate to start his career as a merchant with some financial reserves probably in the fall of 1662. It is still unclear how and where he obtained the necessary capital. Scholars have often assumed that the young merchant started his business with the money of his new wife. Yet David Voorhees, the leading scholar on Jacob Leisler, has demonstrated that it was just the other way around: Elsie Tymens profited tremendously from her young husband. He not only became guardian of the children from her first marriage and was appointed administrator of the Van der Veen estate, but he also paid her first husband’s extensive debts.22 Leisler’s capital did not come from the Van der Veen family, who at that time were facing serious financial problems. It is more likely that his family and friends in Europe assisted him initially. He had younger brothers, Franz and Johann Adam Leisler, who later became thriving merchants in the textile trade between Basle and Lyon, and who could have given him generous loans or donations. His uncles and grandparents were apparently well off, and his mother, Susanne, had moved to Hanau in 1658, supported by a two-hundred-guilders-per-year pension from the Bockenheim congregation.23 The lengthy negotiations over the estate of his uncle, Dr. Jacob Leisler, lasted till 1671, which perhaps indicates significant wealth in the family. Yet it seems unlikely that Leisler, later the sixth richest man in New Netherland, owed his success to Old World family donations. It is more likely that his start-up capital came from his late father’s old connections and the strong links that the wealthy merchants of the French and Dutch Reformed
21
D. W. Voorhees, C. Schnurmann, and H. Wellenreuther, eds., The Jacob Leisler Papers: Reconstructing Atlantic Networks, 1639–1691 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, forthcoming), 1: 12 May 1663. 22 Voorhees et al., Jacob Leisler Papers, 1:1663. 23 Franz Leisler became an important merchant in Basle and by marriage was related to the banker dynasty Sarasin. When he joined his late father’s congregation, he did it in the company of a member of the D’Orville clan. StAF, FranzösischReformierte Gemeinde (FRG) 31:52, 11 March 1659.
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congregations had with America. Nevertheless, Leisler’s initial financing remains a matter of speculation. A devoted Calvinist, Leisler joined the New Amsterdam Dutch Reformed Church in October 1661. He also maintained very friendly relations with leading Huguenot merchants on the Hudson and in Europe, including Nicholas de la Pleine (Bresuire, France/New Amsterdam), Henri Couturier (Leiden, Valenciennes/New Amsterdam, who later moved to London but stayed in contact with Leisler), and Charles Barbour (Amsterdam).24 When many Huguenots fled France and French colonies after 1685, Leisler sold land to them in order to increase the Calvinist population in New York and also to assist his co-religionists. These activities of Leisler are well documented, but his financial arrangements remain obscure.
Leisler’s Atlantic Commerce Leisler started his inter-colonial trade in 1662 or 1663, when he was still a young man in his early twenties. He probably profited a great deal from the advice of an old hand, Bohemian-borne Augustine Herman,25 who was involved in the New Nederland trade with the Chesapeake Bay area. Herman once appeared as a witness when Leisler gave a letter of attorney to a resident of Rappahannock, Virginia, in 1666. Leisler may also have received support and advice from members of the Dutch-New Netherland Gabry family, who had considerable business experience.26 In his first business venture, 24 The young bachelor even had the honor of appearing as baptismal sponsor to children of Calvinist couples with French-Dutch origins. See Voorhees et al., Jacob Leisler Papers, 1: 6 August 1662, 22 November 1662, 23 January 1670. 25 For details about Augustine Herman, first merchant in New Netherland, representing Pieter Stuyvesant in negotiations between New Netherland and Maryland in 1659, important cartographer and Lord of Bohemia Manor, Maryland, see Schnurmann, Atlantische Welten, passim; E. L. W. Heck, Augustine Herman: Beginner of the Virginia Tobacco Trade, Merchant of New Amsterdam, and First Lord of Bohemia Manor in Maryland (Richmond: William Bird, 1941; K. Kansky, ‘Augustine Herman: The Leading Cartographer of the Seventeenth Century,’ Maryland Historical Magazine 73, no. 4 (1978): 352–59. 26 Voorhees et al., Jacob Leisler Papers, 1: Letter of attorney from Charles Barbou to Jacob Leisler, to ask of New York merchant Timothy Gabry ƒ864, which Gabry owes to Barbou, 9 November 1668. For the business activities of the Gabry family, see Schnurmann, Atlantische Welten, 131ff.
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in January 1663, Leisler ran into a serious problem: he was accused by a fellow New Amsterdamer, Johannes de Witt, of having delivered bad tobacco.27 But after this clumsy start, Leisler did very well. It did not take long before he became dissatisfied with inter-colonial trade, buying Chesapeake-tobacco and selling it to merchants in New Netherland, and he promptly enlarged the scope of his business activities. Rather skillfully, Leisler managed to combine his trade across Dutch-English colonial borders with transatlantic commerce. He transported tobacco, furs, and hides to the Netherlands, to Dutch and French merchants in The Hague and Amsterdam. In May 1663, the young but ‘worthy Jacob Leisler, merchant and burgher of this city [of New Amsterdam]’ appeared before the local notary Waleyn van der Veen, perhaps another relative of his wife. He seems to have had problems with his former employers, the WIC, and he authorized two of his in-laws to secure money that the company owed him for his service. Leisler took the chance whenever he could to delegate tasks to his confidants, in order to, demand and receive from Sieur Artuy le Brethon, merchant at The Hague, or Sieur Charles Barbou, merchant at Amsterdam,28 and all others concerned 22 rolls of Spanish tobacco and 242 heavy deer skins, sent by Guy Jacobsen to said le Brethon and in his absence to said Charles Barbou by the ship Fox, Jacob Jansen Huys, skipper, on the 1st of January 1663, and belonging to him, the constituent, personally, according to vouchers, if these goods have not been sold and the proceeds have not been sent to New Netherland: to give receipt for them and guarantee against future demands: to follow instructions, given herewith: if circumstances require, to sue and plead before all courts and judges: to hear judgment pronounced, to ask for its execution or to appeal therefrom, cum potestate substituendi and further generally to proceed, as he, the constituent, being present would do etc.29
From the start, Leisler relied on his New Amsterdam in-laws as attorneys and in other capacities. Due to his wife’s first marriage, he had 27
Voorhees et al., Jacob Leisler Papers, 1: Court of Schout, Burgomasters and Schepens. Jacob Leisler is accused by Johannes de Witt of having delivered bad tobacco; the Court orders De Witt shall retain the tobacco, 16 January 1663. 28 To Charles Barbou, see Voorhees et al., Jacob Leisler Papers, 1: 11 May 1663, 9 November 1668. 29 Voorhees et al., Jacob Leisler Papers, 1: Power of Attorney granted by Jacob Leisler to Cornelis Albertsen van der Veen, kin of Elsie Leisler’s first husband Pieter Cornelissen van der Veen, 12 May 1663.
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become acquainted with fellow Calvinists Cornelis Albertsen van der Veen and Henri Couturier. His business connections crossed the Atlantic in 1674, when he employed the Amsterdam merchant Cornelis Jacobs Moy, who also worked for other colonial merchants as an agent. He became Leisler’s agent/representative for the next fourteen years, 1674–1688. Leisler kept a close watch on his business and constantly looked for new opportunities, especially in Atlantic commerce. He was a quick learner and soon demonstrated business acumen and flexibility, which was rewarded with considerable success. When the English took control of New Netherland in 1664, and after a brief Dutch interlude in 1673/74, the colony became New York, named after the English king’s brother, James, Duke of York. Leisler did not give up his carefully designed inter-colonial connections but continued to trade as he had done before. Like his colleagues in New York, merchants of many national, ethnic, and religious backgrounds, Leisler accepted the new political reality. He made good use of his newly acquired status as a citizen of an English colony, incorporating multiple national claims, privileges, and options in his widening Atlantic network. Initially, he appears to have intensified his trade with the Chesapeake Bay area. During the 1670s, he was firmly involved in the inter-colonial tobacco trade. Several times he chartered small New York-based vessels from Dutch masters, to sail to Virginia and Maryland for tobacco. But this produced conflicts, first in 1673–74 with skipper Pieter Pietersen van Essem, and then in 1676 with skipper William Derrick, master of the Hope.30 In 1667, Leisler hired as an agent the French-born Catholic Mark Cordea, who lived in St. Mary’s, Maryland. Cordea earned a living as a tavern-keeper, planter, and factor, and he worked as Leisler’s agent and factor for nearly twenty years (1667–1685). This business relationship was not without problems, however, and the legal proceedings that resulted from their disagreements supply us with important information about the organization and problems of inter-colonial trade, which blended legality and illegality in a devious mixture. On one hand, Leisler seemed to be such an upright and honorable citizen that the governor of New York, unpopular Edmund Andros, granted him a passport to travel overland to the Chesapeake Bay to do his business with several merchants and planters in Maryland.31 30 31
See Voorhees et al., Jacob Leisler Papers, 1:1676 passim. Voorhees et al., Jacob Leisler Papers, 1: 3 November 1676.
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On the other hand, he was clever and conniving enough to ship tobacco bought in Maryland and Virginia to the Netherlands, exploiting loopholes in England’s legal system. Although he bought large amounts of tobacco, his factors declared only small amounts of the exports to English custom officials. Large quantities of tobacco were mentioned in Leisler’s legal battles, and these discrepancies could hardly be coincidence. In 1679, for example, he argued with Cordea about 58,882 ‘pounds of good sound merchantable tobacco.’32 Three years later, Leisler’s English factor, Edward Franklin, paid import and export duties at Dover on only 30,000 pounds of tobacco.33 These comparisons are speculative, but the astonishingly large discrepancies between actual trade volume and legal declarations leave a strong impression of illegality. Eager to combine the advantages of different worlds, Leisler increased his interest in transatlantic trade during the 1670s, and he chartered ships and freight space for the inter-colonial as well as the transatlantic trade. In 1674, for instance, Leisler worked in cooperation with New York colleagues to buy shares of freight on the ship St. Michiel, for a voyage from New York to Amsterdam. Some very prominent New York businessmen, including members of the Van Rensellaers and French-born Gabriel Minvielle, were involved in this legally questionable trade with the Dutch Republic. In connection with this ship’s cargo, Leisler sent the following note to Cornelis Jacobs Moy, dated 6 April 1674: Monsieur and Friend Salut. I have written to you several times & I send with the ship St. Michiel a case and 13 huge deerskins, no. 62 lbs., following the enclosed bill of lading. In the case are: 14 otter skins, 4 wolf skins, 4 lynxes, a fisher, 9 foxes, 84 hams. Please receive and sell for my account. With my respects and greetings, Jacob Leisler.34
32 Voorhees et al., Jacob Leisler Papers, 1: Jacob Leisler vs. Mark Cordea, 15 October 1679. 33 It is unlikely that Leisler sold that much tobacco in inter-colonial trade. It seems more realistic that the skipper or Leisler himself manipulated the freight papers and smuggled large amounts to the Netherlands, covered by official custom declarations and thereby circumventing the risk of confiscation. See PRO, E 190/666/8: Port Books Dover, import duties concerning the customs declaration of the Hopewell of New York, coming from Maryland leaving for the Netherlands, 13 June 1682. 34 GAA, NA 2629: Freight list sent by Jacob Leisler, New York/Nieuw Orange to Cornelis Jacobs Moy, Amsterdam, 6 April 1674.
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One year later, using the contacts he had established with colleagues in Amsterdam and Boston, Leisler personally appeared before Amsterdam notary Hendrick Outgers to negotiate a charter treaty involving the New England skipper Nicholas Skimer, captain of the Dove of Boston, who agreed to grant Jacob Leisler passage from Amsterdam to Boston without a stop in England. This agreement is printed in its entirety as appendix 10.1.35 At the same time, Leisler expanded his business options. He chartered additional cargo space and bought at least two ships during the 1670s. The first was the Neptune, which his wife sold in 1675 while her husband traveled across southern England and in the Netherlands. Two years later he bought a pinck called the Susann[ah] of New Yorke, to be employed solely for his own transatlantic traffic.36 But Leisler’s good fortune did not last. After sailing the Susannah of New Yorke, laden with tobacco and hides, from Maryland to Dover, England, the ship was captured in the English Channel by North African corsairs in July 1677, while it was sailing either to or from Amsterdam.37 These so-called Barbary corsairs or privateers preyed on Christian shipping from cities like Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli.38 They were the most feared human menace of the Atlantic, since they enslaved their captives. Although ransom was possible, the fate of many sailors was enslavement for life. Slaves could be redeemed by commercial negotiations and consuls, and Dutch merchants often used Italian merchant houses to redeem their relatives. The price of a Christian slave was determined either by the slave market or by the social status of the buyer and was not negotiable. Of course, most of the captured sailors did not have the assets to purchase their freedom. By ways of private and public collection, by organizing lotteries, and sometimes by establishing an insurance box, local governments or church 35 GAA, NA 3222:387, Leisler’s agreement with Nicholas Skimer, captain of the Dove of Boston, Massachusetts, for an Amsterdam-Boston charter, 15 July 1675. 36 Voorhees et al., Jacob Leisler Papers, 1: Certificate of Governor Edmund Andros in regard to the ownership of the pinck Susannah, which belongs to Jacob Leisler, 16 February 1676 (or 1677), and purchase of Susannah from John Leggett, 17 February 1677. For a copy of the letter, see appendix 10.2. 37 PRO, E 190/664/2: Port Books Dover, import duties, 4 July 1677, export duties, 4–6 July 1677. 38 The Barbary corsairs were not pirates. They operated only in times of war, which was, unfortunately, almost always the case during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
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parishes tried to secure redemption money for their enslaved fellow citizens.39 Leisler, his two stepsons, twenty-two year-old Timothy van der Veen and Cornelis van der Veen, and the ship’s crew were imprisoned and taken to Algeria, where they could be sold as slaves. The ransom for Leisler was valued at 2,050 pieces of eight, or approximately £400 (pound sterling).40 Ransom was set at £175 for Timothy and Cornelis van der Veen each. Ransom for the other seven crew members ranged from £90 to £170. Leisler readily obtained money for the release of himself and the ship, but raising funds for the release of the rest of the crew required the assistance of his special Atlantic network. Support came from New York relatives of kidnapped crew members and from other sympathizers from New York City, Albany, Schenectady, and Brooklyn. Solidarity with their kidnapped fellow countrymen was strong, and by September 1679, about £250 had been raised in cash and goods by the Dutch-Reformed Church of New York. Amsterdam merchants Cornelis Jacobs Moy and Cornelis Darvall, together with Dutch and Italian bankers in Livorno, Italy, arranged the release of the captives within three years, which is quite expedient by the standards of that time. As David Voorhees observes, this episode opened ‘a small window into the complex world of seventeenth-century New York.’41 It demonstrates intimacy, trust, and cooperation involved in the transatlantic network that merchants like Leisler, Moy and Darvall had helped to establish. The encounter with pirates traumatized Leisler. The shock of having been taken hostage changed his attitude about Atlantic commerce, and his 1677–78 visit with friends in Europe was his last Atlantic crossing. Thereafter, he hired skippers, including some of his in-law relatives, to dispatch his ships the Hopewell, the Happy Return,
39 There is an extensive literature on the Barbary corsairs. For an introduction to the subject, see D. J. Vitkus and N. Matar, eds., Piracy, Slavery, and Redemption: Barbary Captivity Narratives from Early Modern England (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001). For the Dutch encounters with Barbary corsairs and the involvement of Livorno merchants in redeeming Christian slaves, see G. S. van Krieken, Kapers en kooplieden. De betrekkingen tussen Algiers en Nederland, 1604–1830 (Amsterdam: Bataafsche Leeuw, 1999). 40 One pound sterling equaled between ƒ10 and ƒ12. 41 See D. W. Voorhees, ‘Captured: The Turkish Slavery of the Susannah,’ Seaport Magazine 3 (1997): 6–11.
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and the Ann & Catherine to different places. He began to concentrate more on trade with America’s north eastern English colonies, using his New York base to good advantage. He traded with tobacco-producers on the Chesapeake Bay, and probably in New England as well, and with horse-breeders on Long Island. He sent his sons-inlaw to trade with Barbados.42 But Leisler also stayed involved with transatlantic traffic, shipping from both Maryland and New York to Madeira, England, and the Netherlands. With the latter, he traded especially in colonial products, including tobacco, sugar, furs and hides, exchanging them for European manufactured goods. He always tried to find loopholes in England’s protectionist laws. His captains were instructed to call dutifully on English ports, but then continue to Dutch ports with contraband such as tobacco and to return directly to the American colonies without stopping always at English ports as required by law. With the help of Cornelis Jacobs Moy, Leisler employed Dutch artisans from Flanders and the Dutch Republic to bring European craftsmanship to New York. Through his agents he also had access to Amsterdam’s amazing warehouses that contained a wide array of products. The variety of goods that he shipped from the Dutch Republic to New York was impressive. When the Hopewell of New Yorke stopped dutifully at Falmouth harbor in September 1683, on her way back to New York, Leisler’s local agent, George Thomson, arranged the customs declaration. The cargo included a variety of German-, Dutch-, and Asian-made textiles; household articles; personal items such as clothing, wigs, combs, stockings, toys; and a large variety of carpenters’ tools and supplies.43
Jacob Leisler and Dutch America Although he was one of the ten richest merchants in New York by the 1680s, Leisler was a typical colonial merchant using old and new connections on both sides of the Atlantic, moving in similar circles, doing business in similar fashion, and trading in the same goods. Like New York colleagues Frisian-born Frederick Philipps and French-
42 43
PRO, CO 33/13: Barbados shipping returns, 1678–1704, passim. PRO, E 190/1047/12: Port Books Falmouth, September 1683.
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born Gabriel Minvielle, Leisler made clever use of overlapping national identities and ethnic pride. He skillfully exploited his former Dutch citizenship as an inhabitant of New Amsterdam as well as his connection with the WIC, but also his new position as subject to the English Crown. To the disgust of Dutch governor Pieter Stuyvesant, Leisler and the majority of his colleagues had hurried to take the oath of allegiance to the English Crown and James, Duke of York, in 1664. But like his colleague Frederick Philipps, his long-time friend Gabriel Minvielle, and the Boston merchant Richard Wharton, Leisler also used the WIC’s stubborn reluctance to accept defeat to his advantage.44 Although the Dutch formally surrendered New Netherland in the Peace of Westminster, ending the Third Anglo Dutch War (1672–1674), WIC directors sometimes acted as if nothing had happened. In resolutions and meetings of its chambers, especially in Amsterdam, company directors still referred to New York as ‘Nieuw Nederland’ and still claimed it as part of their sphere of influence, as stated in the founding charter of 1621. In 1676, Leisler and Minvielle flattered the WIC chamber of Amsterdam by asking its permission to trade with Dutch Curaçao. Such trade would obviously violate English restrictions, but it was eagerly welcomed by the WIC directors, who wanted to invigorate Curaçao’s commerce. Leisler and Minvielle, whose wife belonged to the family of Nicholas van Beeck, a director of the WIC chamber of Amsterdam, asked the company for approval to send a ship from the English colony of New York to the Dutch colony of Curaçao to trade provisions for slaves. They wanted the undeliverable slaves (manquerons) who exhibited physical handicaps and could not be shipped to Spanish America (see chapter 9). The chamber assigned Minvielle’s in-law, Van Beeck, to consult with the WIC’s committee for American affairs, and after deliberation granted the New Yorker merchants passports to trade with Curaçao.45 Hoping that ‘over time we will trade many goods with the citizens of New York,’ the WIC indicated that the passports had been granted for the following reasons: the WIC wanted to get rid of the manquerons, who were difficult to sell and expensive to maintain; the company hoped to avoid the costs of providing 44 ARA, Archief van de Nieuwe West-Indische Compagnie (NWIC) 331:181–83, 2 June 1676. 45 Ibid.
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Curaçao with provisions that were usually shipped in from the Netherlands; and finally, with the loss of New Netherland, the WIC hoped to divert the fur trade from New York via Curaçao to the United Provinces.46 However, no evidence has been found to indicate that Minvielle and Leisler actually carried out the proposed trade with Curaçao. While there is no record that Leisler purchased slaves at Curaçao, a legal conflict with his Maryland agent Mark Cordea indicates that Leisler traded slaves for tobacco in the Chesapeake region.47 While the evidence of Leisler’s participation in the slave trade is scarce, there are indications that he traded with the Dutch colony of Suriname (see chapter 11), in spite of the fact that foreign ships were officially barred from the colony. In 1680, Leisler agreed to a Suriname venture with his New York neighbor, the merchant and baker Reinier Willemse. He entrusted Willemse with four hogshead (oxhoofd ) of salt, 1,111 pounds of flour, 813 pounds of tobacco, and some linen, which Willemse would ship to Suriname in exchange for raw sugar, although the export of sugar by foreign ships was prohibited.48 These small quantities were typical for inter-colonial trade, as were the problems that often arose from such transactions. Leisler took Willemse to court for his alleged mismanagement, and this is why records of the incident have been preserved.49 Leisler’s reluctance to become more fully involved in the Suriname trade is surprising, given his eagerness to locate new markets and new opportunities for profits. Many businessmen from virtually all East Coast ports traded with Suriname, but his negative experience with Willemse may have discouraged him from pursuing the trade.50 To be a successful long-distance trader in the Atlantic arena and survive hard times, one needed patience, stamina, and sufficient financial means to face setbacks, outstanding debts, and antagonistic business partners.
46
Ibid., 467:12–14, 11 July 1676. Voorhees et al., Jacob Leisler Papers, 1: Jacob Leisler vs. Mark Cordea, 15 October 1679. 48 Voorhees et al., Jacob Leisler Papers, 1: Agreement between Jacob Leisler and Reinier Willemse, New York merchant, 28 February 1680. 49 Voorhees et al., Jacob Leisler Papers, 1: Mayors Court Minute, Jacob Leisler vs. Reinier Willemse, 3 July 1683. 50 See Schnurmann, Atlantische Welten, 291–310. 47
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The Happy Return: A Case Study In order to make a case for Leisler’s involvement in the intricate Atlantic economy, in which national boundaries were routinely ignored, one needs to search in various archives around the Atlantic. Several sources are often necessary to piece together the complex exchanges in seventeenth-century Atlantic commerce. Leisler’s ship the Happy Return, and the records of its captain William Measure, show that tobacco was shipped from Maryland via England to the Netherlands, and European manufactured goods were shipped back to North America. It was part of a system that involved many North American businessmen and ports, as well as ports in the Caribbean and the Guiana colonies, including Suriname. The bark Happy Return of New England, under captain William Measure, arrived at Penrys, England, at the end of August 1687, after a safe voyage from Maryland. Authorized by Leisler, Measure filed the customs declaration on 23 and 24 August, and declared the importation of 23,000 pounds of tobacco and forty-five hides. On 25 August, he signed the declaration for the Happy Return’s departure with freight for Rotterdam.51 After his arrival in Rotterdam, Measure took care of his business on 10 December 1687, and was ready to leave Rotterdam and sail to New York by way of England. As a loyal subject of the English king, he declared his determination to pay his duties in England. Before he could set sail, however, he was forced to repair the ship at a cost of around ƒ840. He borrowed the money from Cornelis Jacobs Moy, promising to repay the money, plus a 20 percent advance, to Jacob Leisler in New York, who would then settle affairs with Moy. That deal was arranged in the presence of Amsterdam notary Hendrick Outgers, and it caused a chain reaction across the Atlantic.52 In order to cover the funds that Measure needed, Moy used bills of exchange issued by Governor Cornelis van Aerssen van Sommelsdyck in Suriname and countersigned by the Sephardic Suriname businessman and planter Samuel Cohen Nassy on 17 May 1687.53 Also involved in the transaction
51 PRO, E 190/1051/10: Custom on import to Plymouth/Penrys, 23–25 August 1687. 52 GAA, NA 3292: 55, 10 december 1687. For a copy of this transaction, see appendix 10.3. 53 ARA, Archief van de Sociëteit van Suriname (SvS) 216: 410, 17 May 1687.
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was the New England skipper Arthur Huddy, master of the Israel, who had arrived in Suriname from New England in April 1687 and left six weeks later for Barbados with the bill of exchange.54 Andrew Russell, a Scottish merchant stationed in Rotterdam, and Richard Wharton from Boston, were involved to pay the ƒ840 to Moy. After successfully completing these complex financial transactions and saddling Leisler with the consequences, Measure left Rotterdam with the repaired ship and arrived at Falmouth, England, on 2 January 1688. There he declared as imports certain amounts of cable, cordage, bricks, tar, and earthen wares. Bryan Rogers – an old hand in the Holland-New York business circuit and factor to many New York merchants, including Leisler, Philipps, Matthew Chitty, and the De Peyster family – took care of the customs declaration, representing Leisler.55 But that was not all. Before proceeding on the Atlantic crossing, Captain Measure had to borrow £20 ( ƒ200) from agent Rogers on 13 February 1688, and obviously charged it to Leisler, the owner of the Happy Return.56 When the ship finally reached New York, probably in March 1688, Leisler must have been pleased with its return and the much-needed supplies it carried. But the voyage and Measure’s transactions had gotten Leisler involved in a complicated web of financial entanglements that demonstrate how complex the Atlantic commercial network could become.
Conclusion Reading the bits and pieces of documents found in Dutch and English archives, it becomes clear how intricately the people in different parts of the Atlantic rim were linked to each other. Despite national borders and allegiances, efforts to separate business connections and confine them to national enclosures seemed impossible. Merchants, planters, skippers and investors with different nationalities and religious affiliations managed to overcome those restrictions. Somehow,
54 Ibid., 216:407, Lyste van de Scheepen gearriveert in Suriname zedert ’t vertrek van Marinus Willemsen, 5 March 1687. 55 PRO, E 190/1052/3: Port Books Falmouth, import and export duties, 2–7 January 1688. 56 GAA, NA 3294:84, 26 March 1688.
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they crossed the artificial boundaries and found ways to communicate and trade with each other, arrange complex financial transactions, and overcome legal impediments. Although the voyage of the Happy Return was within the guidelines of the English legal navigation restrictions, the financial actions taken by her master William Measure show that English efforts to establish a close commercial system and exclude Dutch capital and expertise had failed. Mercantilism, or keeping trade within the boundaries of the national economy was a splendid theory, but it did not coincide with the practical realities of Atlantic commerce. The way Leisler, Moy, and their colleagues organized business illustrates that clearly. Although it is impossible to quantify the goods and economic value of this type of Atlantic trade, these commercial activities had a significant impact and ultimately contributed to the economic success of the American colonies and the future United States. Their insistence on breaching imperial restrictions and continuing to trade with foreign nationals also contributed to the wealth of other nations, such as the Dutch Republic. By organizing connections both among colonies and across national boundaries, men like Leisler undermined imperial ambitions and existing economic theory, encouraged ideas of colonial identity, and refused to let the limitations imposed by the English Empire keep them from realizing their own dreams for advancement. It is not surprising that many American businessmen eventually supported the American Revolution in 1775–1783.
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PART FOUR
COMMERCE WITH THE GUIANA SETTLEMENT COLONIES
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
SURINAME AND ITS ATLANTIC CONNECTIONS, 1667–17951 J P
The seafarers of the capital [Amsterdam], send year upon year some fifty to sixty large ships to fetch the produce from this part [Suriname] of the New World. David de Ishak Cohen Nassy et al., 1787.2
Introduction The introductory quotation illustrates that some eighteenth-century contemporaries believed Suriname’s contribution to the economy of the Dutch Republic was substantial.3 Twentieth-century historians, however, have disagreed on Suriname’s place in the Dutch overseas empire and its contribution to the national economy. When Charles Boxer minimized the role of Suriname in his 1965 book The Dutch Seaborne Empire, historian-archivist M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofs objected, claiming that many ships had brought large quantities of produce from the West that far exceeded imports by the Dutch East India Company (VOC) from Asia.4 Recently, Pieter Emmer has reiterated
1 Much of the research and analysis of this subject was accomplished with support from the Netherlands Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS) at Wassenaar, during the academic year 1995–1996. 2 D. de I. Cohen Nassy et al., Geschiedenis der Kolonie van Suriname . . ., 2 pts. in 1 vol. (1791; reprint, Amsterdam: Emmering, 1974), 1:1, 11. Originally published in French in 1788; first published in Dutch in 1791. This work is hereafter cited as Nassy. 3 See G. W. van der Meiden, Bestwist Bestuur. Een eeuw strijd om de macht in Suriname, 1651–1753 (Amsterdam: Bataafse Leeuw, 1986), 9–11. 4 M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofsz, review of The Dutch Seaborne Empire, 1600–1800, by C. R. Boxer, Bijdragen voor de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden 21 (1967/68): 323. Her words are quoted at the outset of chapter 1 in this volume.
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the relatively weak position of Suriname by comparing it to the much more productive British and French colonies in the Caribbean.5 While the debate will undoubtedly continue, this chapter intends to clarify it by calculating more accurately what Suriname actually produced for the Dutch economy during the years 1667–1794. Several scholarly works have been published in recent years concerning various aspects of Suriname and Dutch Antillean history, but a systematic study of shipping, commercial traffic, and commodity transport to and from Suriname remains to be written. The most frequently cited source for commodity exports from Suriname is the work by the Suriname planter David Nassy and others, from which the introductory quotation is taken. Nassy’s figures have never been subjected to a systematic test of accuracy, which is one of the aims of this chapter.6 Any appraisal of the historic significance of Suriname must be based on reliable data, which have been amply preserved in the Dutch archives. Drawing primarily on archival sources, this chapter evaluates the major shipping links that connected Suriname with the Netherlands, Africa, and North America, and the goods shipped to and from the colony. Additionally, this chapter places Suriname’s economic significance in perspective by examining 1) Suriname’s unique history and location, 2) shipping and transport between the Dutch Republic and Suriname, 3) shipping and transport between North America and Suriname, 4) the slave trade to Suriname, 5) the colony’s exports to Europe and North America, and finally, 6) Suriname’s contribution to the economies of the Dutch Republic and British North America. Quantitative in nature, this study draws information from three sets of data constructed from various archival sources which collectively contain more than eight thousand shipping voyages.
5 P. C. Emmer, The Dutch in the Atlantic Economy, 1580–1880: Trade, Slavery and Emancipation (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), 31–32, 108–09, 200. 6 Important for Suriname economic history are J. P. van de Voort, De Westindische plantages van 1720 tot 1795. Financiën en handel (Eindhoven: De Witte, 1973), and A. van Stipriaan, Surinaams contrast. Roofbouw en overleven in een Caribische plantagekolonie, 1750 –1863, Caribbean Series, no. 13 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1993). See Nassy, Geschiedenis der Kolonie van Suriname, appendix. Both Van de Voort and Van Stipriaan drew on Nassy as their primary source for eighteenth-century Suriname exports, as did J. J. Reese, De suikerhandel van Amsterdam van het begin der 17de eeuw tot 1813 . . . (Haarlem: Kleynenberg, 1908).
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The Foundation and Early Decades of the Suriname Settlement The English were the first to establish a prospering plantation colony on the Suriname River, starting in 1651. Within twelve years their settlement had an estimated four thousand inhabitants, consisting of approximately three thousand enslaved Africans and one thousand European settlers. Among the colonists were several Sephardic Jews who had fled the ill-fated Dutch colony of New Holland in northern Brazil. The English located a small town, called Torarica, many miles upstream and built a fort closer to the coast, where the Dutch later established the town of Paramaribo. A map from that period lists 175 plantations, of which about fifty produced primarily sugar. By 1665, the colony experienced a downturn after some two hundred settlers departed, including Francis Willoughby, founder and governor of Suriname.7 In 1667, a small fleet outfitted by the States of Zeeland captured the Suriname settlement shortly after the British seized the Dutch colony of New Netherland, today’s New York City and hinterland. In the Breda peace settlement that ended the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665–1667), Dutch negotiators formally surrendered New York in exchange for Suriname.8 The record is silent on motives for this transaction, but having lost their colony in northern Brazil a decade earlier, the Dutch may have regarded Suriname as an acceptable replacement. Initially, the Suriname settlement was placed under administrative control of the States of Zeeland, whose fleet had captured the colony, but the Zeelanders failed to revitalize the colony’s economy to the level it had enjoyed under English administration. One reason for this declining economy was the departure of most English planters during the first decade of Dutch control. All but thirty-one English settlers had left by the end of the 1670s, and the Dutch were unable to replace them with fresh immigrants from the Netherlands. Another
7
H. C. van Renselaar, ‘Oude kaarten van Suriname,’ Nieuwe West-Indische Gids 45 (1966): 11; G. Warren, An Impartial Account of Suriname (London: Godbid, 1667), 17; Van der Meiden, Betwist Bestuur, 19–20. 8 V. Enthoven, ‘Suriname and Zeeland: Fifteen Years of Dutch Misery on the Wild Coast, 1667–1682,’ in Proceedings of the International Conference on Shipping, Factories and Colonization, ed. J. Everaert and J. Parmentier (Brussels: Koninklijke Academie voor Overzeese Wetenschappen en Wetenschappelijk Comité voor Maritieme Geschiedenis, 1996), 249.
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setback occurred in 1679, when war with the indigenous population nearly drove the European settlers from the colony. With military reinforcements and able leadership, however, the Dutch averted disaster by negotiating a series of peace settlements with various Indian groups.9 Meanwhile, the Zeeland administration found new investors and received support from Amsterdam merchants. By the early 1680s the number of Suriname plantations had reportedly rebounded to 150. Nevertheless, Suriname proved to be a poor investment and produced a deficit of nearly ƒ300,000 for the province of Zeeland during its fifteen-year management.10 Surviving shipping and export records during the Zeeland administration are sparse and fail to provide a clear picture of the Suriname’s economic condition. We know that two ships brought 400,000 pounds of sugar to Zeeland in 1668, a quarter of which was confiscated from the English settlers as the cost of their defeat. From one record we learn that private merchants purchased permits for ninety-six ships to sail to Suriname, though many of these intended voyages may not have taken place. In addition, the Dutch West India Company (WIC) sent ten slave ships to Suriname between 1667 and 1782, which delivered approximately 4,500 African slaves. Unidentified WIC slavers and interlopers may have landed another estimated 2,500 enslaved Africans. Efforts to invigorate the colony during the early 1680s produced an increase in population and shipping activity. During 1682–1683, at least twenty-six ships arrived in Suriname directly from the Dutch Republic, and at least four from Africa and North America, while fourteen ships departed from Suriname with about four million pounds of sugar in 1683 alone.11 Undoubtedly, additional sugar was shipped to Amsterdam, but no record of such shipments has been located.
9
R. Buve, ‘Gouverneur Johannes Heinsius. De rol van Van Aerssen’s voorganger in de Surinaamse Indianenoorlog, 1678–1680,’ Nieuwe West-Indische Gids 45 (1966): 14–26. 10 Enthoven, ‘Suriname and Zeeland,’ 252–54, 259–60. 11 Enthoven, ‘Suriname and Zeeland,’ 258–59. For the slave trade see J. Postma, The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1600–1800 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 179, 186, and table 8.2. The Postma Slave Trade Data Collection provides updated figures for the years 1675–1682.
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The Suriname Corporation and Expansion of the Colony After lengthy and intricate negotiations, the Suriname settlement was sold to the WIC for ƒ250,000 in 1682, and by prior agreement it was soon placed under the control of the newly created Suriname Corporation (Sociëteit van Suriname) in 1683. This curious organization was sanctioned by a charter of the States General and consisted of three corporate owners – the city of Amsterdam, the Amsterdam chamber of the WIC, and the aristocratic Van Aerssen van Sommelsdijck family. Part of the agreement was that Cornelis Van Aerssen van Sommelsdijck (1637–1688), as head of the family, became governor of Suriname. This gave the colony the appearance of a patroonship, although no Sommelsdijck succeeded Cornelis when he was killed by mutinous soldiers in 1688. After many decades of delay and controversy, the other two institutional partners bought out the Sommelsdijck family in 1770.12 The Suriname charter articulated the rights and obligations of various interested groups. Thus, the colony became a free trade zone for all Dutch subjects who purchased a shipping permit from the WIC and paid specified duties to the Suriname Corporation, including waaggeld or ‘weighing fees’ leveled on all exports from Suriname. The WIC preserved monopoly rights over the importation of African slaves, and article 6 of its charter required it to supply the colony with ‘as many slaves as were needed.’13 Each of the three members of the corporation could appoint an unspecified number of directors, to meet in Amsterdam and formulate general policies for the colony, with each of the three shareholders having a single vote. The Sommeldijck family was usually represented by only one person, while the WIC and Amsterdam often sent three or four directors each. Nearly all of the minutes of the board meetings have been preserved.14 The directors appointed
12 Algemeen Rijksarchief (ARA), Archief van de Sociëteit van Suriname (SvS) 63: 17. See also Van der Meiden, Betwist bestuur, chapter 2. See also chapter 14 in this volume. 13 A printed copy of the charter is in J. A. Schiltkamp and J. T. de Smidt, eds., West Indisch Plakaatboek. Plakaten, ordonantiën en andere wetten, uitgevaardigd in Suriname, 1667–1816, Werken der Vereeniging tot Uitgave der Bronnen van het OudVaderlandsch Recht, ser. 3, no. 24, West Indisch plakaatboek, no. 1 (Amsterdam: Emmering, 1973), 1:123–27. 14 They are located at ARA, SvS 1–85.
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administrative officials to provide on-the-spot management for the colony and selected a governor whose appointment had to be confirmed by the States General in The Hague. Most Suriname plantations were privately owned, although the Suriname Corporation also operated a few plantations, which were supervised by the governor. The inclusion of several prominent planters in the councils that advised the governors safeguarded the interest of the planter class.15 Suriname’s primary purpose was to produce tropical commodities for the benefit of its owners and planters. In 1700 there were approximately one hundred mostly privately owned sugar plantations in the colony. This number grew to 171 thirteen years later and to about four hundred by 1800, which produced a variety of tropical produce, primarily sugar, coffee, cacao, and cotton.16 But the population of Suriname remained relatively small. By 1700 it totaled approximately one thousand Europeans and ten thousand African slaves. Fifty-five years later these figures had increased to about 1,800 and 35,000 respectively, not counting maroons (escaped slaves) and the indigenous Indian population.17 To get a sense of what life was like in Suriname during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, from the perspective of the European settlers, one must realize that it was an isolated community, far removed from the rest of the world, surrounded by sea on one side and impenetrable tropical rainforest on all others. The Suriname estuary provided the primary outlet to the outside world, from which came mail, European immigrants, and African slaves, as well as horses, food, and supplies. But this approach also harbored dangers such as potential invasions by European competitors. This actually occurred twice during the eighteenth century, in 1712 by the French and in 1795 by the English.18 The tropical rain forest, however, was far more threatening and mysterious than the sea. It was controlled initially by the Caribs and Arawaks, with whom an uneasy peace had been negotiated by 1700. Later on, maroons established communities in the forests and from there often attacked plantations. 15
Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, 180; Van der Meiden, Bestwist bestuur, 31–36. R. Bijlsma, ‘Surinaamse Plantage-inventarissen uit het tijdperk, 1713–1742,’ West-Indische Gids 3 (1921/22): 325–27; Van der Meiden, Bestwist bestuur, 75; Van Stipriaan, Surinaams contrast, 33–34. 17 Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, 185. Because of the lack of any census, the demography of Suriname poses a difficult problem and has not yet been studied thoroughly. 18 Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, 182, 285. 16
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The plantations deep in the interior were most vulnerable to such attacks and therefore provided a more precarious life for settlers. The Suriname government organized several campaigns against these maroon communities but was unable to suppress them. Finally it negotiated peace treaties with some of the larger communities during the 1760s and recognized their liberty and independence.19 Paramaribo, the capital town and river-harbor of the colony, was in many ways the most enticing place for settlers. Not only did it offer a modicum of urban existence, but with its constant inflow of slaves, sailors, soldiers, merchants, and arriving and departing ships, it was the only place in the colony with cosmopolitan excitement. From the perspective of the slaves, who were the great majority of the population, Suriname held all of the dangers described for Europeans, plus the torment of forced labor, constant harassment and exploitation by the masters, and little hope of manumission.20
Suriname’s Life-Lines Much like most other European overseas settlements during the ancien régime, Suriname was not only isolated and far removed from the socalled ‘civilized’ world, but it also lacked manufacturing and processing facilities, as well as its own ships and capital, and therefore relied heavily on the outside world for labor, tools, building materials, and many essential food supplies, as well as transport. Acutely important for Suriname were three major life-lines that linked the colony with markets across the sea. First and foremost was the bilateral shuttle trade between the Dutch Republic and Suriname, which brought supplies, tools, food, European settlers, administrators, and soldiers, and exported most of the tropical produce cultivated in the colony. Second, and related to the former, the triangular slave trade 19 R. Price, The Guiana Maroons: A Historical and Bibliographical Introduction (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967); R. Price and S. Price, eds., Stedman’s Suriname: Life in an Eighteenth-Century Slave Society (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992); W. Hoogbergen, De Bosnegers zijn gekomen! Slavernij en rebellie in Suriname (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 1992). 20 The slave plantation society of Suriname has recently been analyzed by Van Stipriaan (see note 6) and by R. Beeldsnijder, ‘Om werk van jullie te hebben,’ Plantageslaven in Suriname, 1730–1750, Bronnen voor de studie van Afro-Suriname, no. 16 (Utrecht: CLACS, 1994); R. Brana-Shute, ‘The Manumission of Slaves in Suriname, 1760–1828,’ (Ph.D. diss., University of Florida, 1985).
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between Europe, Africa, and Suriname brought the labor supply without which the colony could not fulfill its intended purpose. The third life-line was the intra-Caribbean trade with Suriname, which was organized and operated primarily by British subjects from the North American mainland. Initially, the Dutch established a mercantilistic system that did not allow foreign ships to enter the Suriname River, although exceptions were made by administrators on the spot. But after much pressure from the governors in Suriname, the directors in Amsterdam adopted a resolution in 1704 that allowed North Americans to anchor at Paramaribo and bring a variety of merchandise, including horses, building supplies, and food, and in turn export sugar by-products such as molasses and rum.21 Map 11.1 sketches these various economic life-lines of Suriname, and table 11.1 tallies and compares the shipping volume of those routes.
Historical Evidence Before turning to an evaluation of Suriname’s major life-lines, an assessment of the search for historical evidence might be instructive. While several documentary collections contribute to our knowledge of shipping and commerce to and from Suriname, the surviving records of the Suriname Corporation are crucial, and they have been well preserved in the national archives (Nationaal Archief ), formerly the Algemeen Rijksarchief (ARA) at The Hague. The highest policymaking body of the Suriname Corporation, the board of directors, met regularly (on average twice monthly) at the West-Indisch Huys in Amsterdam. Directors were drawn almost exclusively from the city’s prominent merchant families. Many were members or former members of the Amsterdam city council or mayors of the city, and those representing the WIC were also directors (bewindhebber) of the company’s chamber of Amsterdam. Several directors were businessmen with strong West Indian interests, and some were suppliers for the
21 J. Postma, ‘Breaching Mercantile Barriers of the Dutch Colonial Empire: North American Trade with Suriname during the Eighteenth Century,’ in Merchant Organization and Maritime Trade in the North Atlantic, 1660–1815, ed. O. U. Janzen (St. Johns, New Foundland: International Maritime Economic History Association, 1998), 107–31.
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Table 11.1. Comparative Ship Traffic to Suriname, 1667–1795 Years
Dutch Annual Bilateral Annual Slave Annual American Annual Grand Annual Ships Avg. Ships Avg. Ship Avg. & Avg. Total Avg. Combined Traffic Caribbean Total Ships
1667–1674* 1675–1682* 1683–1689 1690–1699 1700–1709 1710–1719 1720–1729 1730–1739 1740–1749 1750–1759 1760–1769 1770–1779 1780–1789 1790–1795
40 45 119 142 178 213 271 313 462 516 716 742 504 288
4.4 5.6 14.9 14.2 17.8 21.3 27.1 31.3 46.2 51.6 71.6 74.2 50.4 48.0
35 35 99 128 161 197 250 274 379 416 575 596 470 256
3.9 4.4 12.4 12.8 16.1 19.7 25.0 27.4 37.9 41.6 57.5 59.6 47.0 42.7
5 10 20 14 17 16 21 39 83 100 141 146 34 32
0.6 1.2 2.5 1.4 1.7 1.6 2.1 3.9 8.3 10.0 14.1 14.6 3.4 5.3
18 22 46 69 161 257 344 438 526 501 482 508 536 578
2.0 2.8 5.8 6.9 16.1 25.7 34.4 43.8 52.6 50.1 48.2 50.8 53.6 96.3
58 67 165 211 339 470 615 751 988 1,017 1,198 1,250 1,040 866
6.4 8.4 20.6 21.1 33.9 47.0 61.5 75.1 98.8 101.7 119.8 125.0 104.0 144.3
1667–1794
4,549
35.5
3,871
30.2
678
5.3
4,486
35.0
9,035
70.6
1683–1794
4,464
39.9
3,801
33.9
663
5.9
4,446
39.7
8,910
79.6
Sources: Postma Suriname Data Collection, Postma Slave Trade Data Collection, and Postma Suriname-North America Data Collection. See also Enthoven, ‘Suriname and Zeeland,’ 258–59. * The figures for the years 1667–1682 are estimates, because data on individual voyages are not available.
Suriname market and processors of the colony’s commodities.22 Although bilateral shipping between Europe and Suriname was dominated by private firms, minutes of the board meetings show that the directors of the Suriname Corporation were often directly involved in supplying freight for Suriname. Furthermore, the directors appointed all government officials for Suriname, including governors, military and police officials, preachers, teachers, and auctioneers. The governor of Suriname received advice from two councils. The Political Council (Hof van Politie en Criminele Justitie) dealt with governmental and criminal affairs, and the Judicial Council (Hof van Civile Justitie) oversaw civil matters.23 Prominent planters and a few of the highest ranking corporate administrators served on these councils. The governor regularly presided over the Political Council and had 22 ARA, SvS 32:144. Several of the directors supplied meat for shipment to Suriname, and from 1683 to 1685 they were also involved in outfitting slave ships. Most of the minutes and resolutions of the meetings have been preserved, see ARA, SvS 1–85. 23 Schiltkamp and De Smidt, West Indisch Plakaatboek, Plakaten Suriname, 1:viii.
14
296 johannes postma
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veto power over the decisions of both councils. He exercised supreme authority in the colony and was accountable only to the corporate directors in Amsterdam. Governors and their subordinates were required to keep meticulous accounts of their transactions, and they had to forward copies of minutes, correspondence, and bookkeeping to Amsterdam. Therefore, a flood of correspondence and documents passed in both directions across the Atlantic, including commercial and taxation records, legal and fiscal reports, and documents about the frequent squabbles between governors and planters. It was not uncommon for planters who disagreed with the governor’s policies to form a cabal and carry on an informal correspondence with interested parties in the Dutch Republic.24 Much of the official paperwork has been preserved and makes it possible for us to gain reliable insight in the life of the settlers, but also in shipping to and from Suriname. This author’s investigation of the Dutch Atlantic trade started a few decades ago with a focus on the slave trade. The nature and documentation of that subject was such that it soon evolved into a quantitative study, with individual ships as cardinal units. Subsequent research made it apparent that the Dutch slave trade was only a small portion of the substantial shipping and trading network across the Atlantic, and that other aspects of Dutch Atlantic commerce had rarely been studied in depth. This was true not only of the trade with Africa, but also of trade with the Caribbean and Guiana settlements, including Suriname. Documentary research also brought to light the large number of North American ships trading with Suriname. They had to pay a variety of duties, including a 5 percent import and export tax, tonnage fees, and a special fee of one guilder for each horse they imported.25 Records of these transactions were shipped to Amsterdam, and they make a noteworthy contribution to our knowledge of the maritime history of colonial America, as well as of Suriname. Over the years, I gradually assembled three separate data collections. The first focused on the Dutch slave trade and is cited here as Postma Slave Trade Data Collection. The second is labeled Postma Suriname Data Collection, and the third is referenced
24 The title of Van der Meiden’s book about Suriname, Betwist Bestuur, translates as ‘Government in Dispute.’ 25 Schiltkamp and De Smidt, West Indisch Plakaatboek, Plakaten Suriname, 1:123–27.
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as the Postma Suriname-North America Data Collection. Together, these three data sets contain nearly 9,000 voyages. In addition to the crucial corporate documents of the Sociëteit van Suriname, the vast collection of WIC records also contributed relevant data to this study since that company continued to be a major shareholder in the Suriname Corporation and maintained a monopoly over the slave trade to that colony until 1739. Other archives mined for information include the papers of the Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie (MCC) in Zeeland, the Waterschout (harbor police) records, and the ships’ Monsterrollen (crew rolls) housed at Amsterdam. In addition, the Paalgelden (beacon tolls) records at Enkhuizen have proven to be a valuable corroborative source.26 Unfortunately, the last two sets of records (Paalgelden and Waterschout Monsterrollen) are not available before the year 1770, leaving the documentation for the earlier period deficient. In some categories, however, the earlier years are surprisingly well documented. The archival documentation on shipping and exports from Suriname for the years 1700–1742, for example, are substantial. Nearly all of the export records at Suriname, weighing fees (Waaggeld ) and cargo lists (Carga Calculaties)27 have been preserved. These provide a comprehensive record of ship clearances and exports from Suriname for those years. Such data are less plentiful for the years 1743–1769. The most valuable source for shipping and trade information for this period is the daily journals of the Suriname governors (Gouverneurs Journalen).28 In all cases, however, and particularly for years before 1700 and from 1743 to 1769, it is possible that certain ship records have escaped scrutiny. Nevertheless, I am quite certain that all but a very small percentage of the ship traffic to Suriname has been accounted for in the databases for the entire 1683–1794 period.29
26 The latter were collected and analyzed by fellow researcher, George Welling, and served as valuable complementary data. See also G. M. Welling, The Prize of Neutrality: Trade Relations between Amsterdam and North America, 1771–1817, A Study in Computational History, Amsterdamse Historische Reeks, kleine ser., no. 39 (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, 1998). See also appendix 14.1 in this volume. 27 ARA, SvS 212–69. These records constitute an essential source for the Postma Suriname Data Collection. 28 The Governors’ Journals are located in ARA, SvS 407–19. These are formal records of important developments and transactions which the governors were required to record, starting in 1742. 29 Table 11.1 tallies and compares the relative volume of the three major life-lines.
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Shipping Routes to Suriname Suriname’s least understood life-line with the outside world ran through the Caribbean Sea. Contemporaries referred to this shipping route as the ‘small circuit,’ or Kleine vaart in Dutch, in contrast to the transatlantic route as the ‘large circuit’ or Grote vaart.30 The contrasting terminology could refer to the difference in distance, commercial importance, or average size of ships employed; in each case, the distinction large or small would be appropriate. As illustrated in table 11.1, however, about an equal number of ships were involved in these two trading links. Approximately five hundred ships operating from various Caribbean islands traded with Suriname. Several were based at either Curaçao, St. Eustatius, or St. Martin, from whence they also traded with the Spanish mainland and the French and British Caribbean islands, as well as with Suriname and the Dutch settlements in what is now Guyana.31 Their captains, judging by their names, represented a variety of nationalities. A few Suriname residents also participated in this inter-Caribbean circuit. The prominent Nassy family, for example, outfitted an occasional small vessel for this trade.32 After 1780, an increasing number of ships flying foreign flags came to Paramaribo, and the harbor took on the appearance of an international trading depot not unlike that of St. Eustatius before 1780. But in general, Caribbean-based shipping with Suriname was limited in numbers and consequence, at least until the last two decades of the eighteenth century. The vast majority of shipping voyages to Suriname across the Caribbean were based in colonial North America. These ships often made stopovers at Caribbean islands and occasionally reported such islands as their ports of origin. Merchants based on the British Caribbean islands also traded with Suriname, which makes it sometimes difficult to distinguish Caribbean from North American traders.
30 C. C. Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean and the Guianas, 1680–1791 (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1985), chapter 6. 31 W. Klooster, Illicit Riches: Dutch Trade in the Caribbean, 1648–1795, Caribbean Series, no. 18 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1998), chapters 3–5. 32 The Nassy family has a long tradition in Suriname as planters, but they were wealthy enough to outfit their own small ships occasionally for the Caribbean trade. Postma Suriname-North America Data Collection.
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It is clear, however, that North American ships represented close to 90 percent of the trans-Caribbean traffic, or approximately 4,000 of the 4,478 documented ships anchoring at Paramaribo.33 North American ships sometimes sailed via Barbados and other British islands, thus developing a triangular trade. In some respects this was a breach of mercantilistic measures applied by European governments to protect the trade and shipping of their subjects. But colonial or regional interests frequently conflicted with national interests and forced both the British and Dutch governments to modify their policies in order to mollify the interests of their colonial subjects.34 The Dutch experience with Suriname planters serves as a good example of such accommodation.
Colonial American Trade with Suriname The shipping link between colonial North American ports and Suriname was a major life-line for Suriname. Approximately 4,000 American ships anchored at Paramaribo over a period of 112 years, bringing a variety of merchandise and exporting a variety of tropical commodities. The Sociëteit initially tried to maintain a closed mercantilistic system at Suriname, keeping foreign merchants out. American ships were initially also barred from the colony, but they often came illicitly during the last quarter of the seventeenth century, perhaps continuing trade patterns established when Suriname was an English colony.35 Suriname officials often tolerated and encouraged this illicit trade despite the disapproval of the directors in Amsterdam. In 1685, Governor Sommelsdijck pleaded with the corporate directors in Amsterdam: This colony is often destitute for all types of food . . . and could go to ruin unless horses are imported. . . . If only the foreign trade could be
33
Postma Suriname-North America Data Collection. C. Schnurmann, Atlantische Welten. Engländer und Niederländer im amerikanisch-atlantischen Raum, 1648–1713, Wirtschafts- und Sozialhistorische Studien, no. 9 (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 1998), 369–76. See also chapter 10 in this volume. 35 There are indications that New York ships traded with Suriname and Dutch Caribbean islands during the 1660s and subsequent decades. See C. Matson, Merchants and Empire: Trading in Colonial New York, Early America, History, Context, Culture, no. 4 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 76–77. 34
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opened . . . so we could export wood products, molasses, and killdevel [rum], which could bring great relief to the inhabitants of Suriname.36
In 1699, Governor Van der Veen asked his superiors back home to ‘permit, yes even encourage the New England bark ships to come here and bring us horses.’37 After repeated requests of this nature, the corporate directors adopted a new policy for Suriname in 1704, which permitted North American ships to conduct business at Paramaribo. There were many conditions and restrictions, as well as taxes, associated with this new policy. Among these was the requirement that each American ship should bring horses, later interpreted as at least one ‘token’ horse.38 With the introduction of this policy, the number of ‘English’ ships (as they were generally called by the Dutch) came in increasing numbers to Suriname, as table 11.1 illustrates. Horses from New England The desperate need for horses was a primary reason for allowing American ships to enter the Paramaribo harbor, and the Suriname establishment was generally not disappointed with the American response. Horses were used primarily as draft animals in the sugar mills, walking in circles to turn the heavy mill stones that crushed the sugar cane, and also for a variety of farm chores and at lumber mills. Some riding horses were imported to Suriname as well. As shown in table 11.2, American skippers landed at least thirty thousand horses at Paramaribo. An estimated three thousand horses may be added to account for lost documentation, of either missing cargo information or undocumented voyages. Most of the horse trade to Suriname took place between 1705 and 1770, with annual averages reaching more than six hundred horses during the 1720s and 1740s. Imports peaked in 1745, when more than nine hundred horses were landed at Paramaribo. After 1750, horse imports began to decline as increasing numbers of sugar plantations relocated to the coastal lowlands and used running water to power the mills.39 36
ARA, SvS 212:173. ARA, SvS 226:260. 38 Postma, ‘Breaching Mercantile Barriers,’ 116. The new policy of 1704 is printed in Schiltkamp and de Smidt, West Indisch Plakaatboek, Plakaten Suriname, 1:253–56. 39 Van Stipriaan, Surinaams contrast, 50–51. See also table 11.2, which is based on the Postma Suriname-North America Data Collection. 37
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Table 11.2. Horse Landings at Paramaribo, 1683–1794 Years
Ships No. Record Horses Average Not Doc. Grand Annual Arriving Horses Total Per Vessel Estimate Total Average (Documented)
1683–1704 1705–1709 1710–1719 1720–1729 1730–1739 1740–1749 1750–1759 1760–1769 1770–1779 1780–1789 1790–1794 Totals
181 77 243 343 437 522 498 480 494 465 463 4,203
155 1 5 3 1 74 56 66 289 364 446 1,460
550 1,112 2,896 6,014 5,019 5,874 3,290 3,860 563 831 111 30,120
21 15 12 18 12 13 7 9 3 8 5
2,325 15 61 53 12 947 410 602 289 100 50 4,863
2,875 1,127 2,957 6,067 5,031 6,821 3,700 4,462 852 931 161 34,983
Source: Postma Suriname-North America Data Collection.
New England traders, sometimes referred to as ‘the Dutch of England’s Empire’ because of their commercial entrepreneurial skills, brought most of the horses to Suriname. Very few horses came from the southern colonies, and the middle colonies contributed meagerly to the horse traffic. New York, the most active port in the middle colonies, shipped an average of five horses per consignment, while ships from Connecticut and Rhode Island carried an average of twenty-two and fifteen horses per vessel respectively. The Connecticut port of New London seems to have specialized in the horse trade, and the ships that carried its large horse consignments were often referred to as ‘horse jockeys.’ In terms of aggregate figures, however, Rhode Islanders were most active in the horse trade, carrying approximately 50 percent of the total number of horses landed at Paramaribo. Massachusetts was second in total numbers, although it averaged fewer than ten horses per ship.40 Average horse cargoes can be misleading, however, because there were so many ships that brought only a ‘token’ horse to meet minimal requirements. Some ships were admitted without any horses if 40 Postma, ‘Breaching Mercantile Barriers,’ 118–20. For Colonial American overseas trade see J. J. McCusker and R. R. Menard, The Economy of British America, 1607–1789 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 92; R. O. Decker, The New London Merchants, 1645–1909: The Rise and Decline of a Connecticut Port (New York: Garland, 1986), 32.
131 225 296 607 503 682 370 446 85 93 32 312
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they could prove through the ship’s manifest that horses had been boarded but had died during the voyage. Nearly 70 percent of the horse-carrying ships (1,886 out of 2,738) landed fewer than three at Paramaribo. Before 1770, American ships were regularly refused entry into the Paramaribo harbor if they did not bring horses. Occasionally, the absence of horses was used to force American captains to do transport services for Suriname authorities, who were particularly disagreeable when it was evident that horses had been sold at interim ports before their arrival at Paramaribo.41 After 1770, however, the demand for horses in Suriname dwindled, and the absence of horses on arriving ships was no longer noted in the governors’ journals, an indication that the 1704 regulation requiring horse imports was no longer enforced.42 New England exported horses not only to Suriname, but also to other West Indian colonies. Few historians have mentioned this trade, and until the traffic to other areas is scrutinized the true extent of the overall horse trade will remain a matter of speculation. That the horse trade to Suriname was well known in its time is reflected in the term ‘Suriname horses,’ used by merchants such as the Brown family of Providence in placing want-ads for export horses.43 A tragic element of this maritime horse trade was the extremely high mortality of the animals. According to available statistics, approximately 36 percent of the horses boarded in North America did not make it to Suriname alive. This means that more than fifty-four thousand horses had to be exported in order to land thirty-five thousand at Paramaribo (see table 11.2). Storms were the biggest killer of the horses, which were usually transported on the decks of small American ships, either in the open or under covers constructed for temporary shelters. Dutch and Rhode Island records show that horses were often washed overboard during storms or thrown overboard after sustaining injuries.44 41 J. D. Kratz, ‘The Colonial Balance of Trade: New England’s Horse Trade with Dutch Suriname, 1750 to 1780’ (master’s thesis, Minnesota State University, Mankato, 1995), 74. 42 Postma Suriname-North America Data Collection. 43 For a copy of such an advertisement in the Rhode Island Gazette, see J. B. Hedges, The Browns of Providence Plantations: The Colonial Years (1952; reprint, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), 1:77. See illustration no. 11.7. 44 ARA, SvS 248: 625 (In 1721, all 30 horses died as a result of a storm); ARA, SvS 251: 272 (In 1724, 45 of 50 horses died at sea); ARA, SvS 252: 4 (In 1725, all 25 horses lost in a storm); ARA, SvS 253: 226 (47 of 50 horses died in a storm). See also The John Carter Brown Library ( JCB), Brown Papers (BP).
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Table 11.3. Fiscal Values of North American Imports to Suriname, 1705–1744 (guilders) Years
Ships Estimated Values Doc.* Doc. Doc. Cargo Maximum Lost Data Total Annual Aggregate Ships Lost# Total Average Cargo Estim. Imports Average Surplus
1705–09 1710–14 1715–19 1720–24 1725–29 1730–34 1735–39 1740–44 Total
77 123 120 161 182 204 233 283 1,383
3 5 5 4 3 4 30 54
123,980 250,407 236,854 308,059 329,810 559,047 396,597 319,735 2,524,489
1,653 2,104 1,974 1,913 1,822 2,754 1,702 1,264
11,224 9,021 7,020 7,234 6,360 8,356 7,515 14,000
22,448 45,105 7,020 14,468 12,720 16,712
146,428 295,512 243,874 322,527 342,530 575,759 396,597 434,000 753,735 552,473 3,076,962
29,286 59,102 48,775 64,505 68,506 115,152 79,319 150,747
74,819 154,366 97,501 82,764 111,002 321,014 224,255 475,848 1,541,569
Source: Postma Suriname-North America Data Collection. * Documented data. # Estimates for lost or missing documentation.
Food and Supplies from Colonial America In addition to horses, North American ships brought a variety of food items, building materials, and household supplies, as well as livestock such as sheep, pigs, and geese. An excellent record of import and export duties paid in Suriname for the years 1705–1745 has been preserved; the records list all imported and exported items as well as their assessed fiscal values and the 5 percent duty payments.45 Tables 11.3 and 11.4 provide an overview of the tax and fiscal value of these imports in five-year units for the years 1705–1744.46 Statistics for earlier and subsequent years are less detailed in the archival records. After supplementary information is gleaned from American archives we may get a clearer picture for these years. The Brown family papers in Providence, Rhode Island, for example, provide a considerable amount of data on the trade with Suriname for the years after 1770. Table 11.4 clearly shows that North Americans benefited greatly from the trade with Suriname. The fiscal value of the goods they 45 Contained in ARA, SvS 233–76. Table 11.3 has been extracted from these documents. 46 For a more extensive treatment of the American trade with Suriname see Postma, ‘Breaching Mercantile Barriers.’
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Table 11.4. Fiscal Values of Suriname Exports to North America, 1705–1744 (guilders) Years
Doc. Ships
Missing Data
Export Total
1705–09 1710–14 1715–19 1720–24 1725–29 1730–34 1735–39 1740–44 Total
77 123 120 161 182 204 233 283 1,383
3 5 5 4 3 4
64,109 125,671 131,973 226,639 223,932 243,489 172,342 218,667 1,406,822
30 54
Cargo Maximum Average Cargo 844 1,056 1,100 1,416 1,244 1,199 740 864 1,059
2,500 3,095 2,880 3,281 2,532 2,814 1,650 1,974 3,281
Data Estimate
Total Exports
Annual Average
7,500 15,475 14,400 13,124 7,596 11,256
71,609 141,146 146,373 239,763 231,528 254,745 172,342 277,887 1,535,393
14,322 28,229 29,275 47,953 46,306 50,949 34,468 55,577 38,385
59,220 128,571
Source: Postma Suriname-North America Data Collection.
shipped to Suriname was twice as high as the tax value of the molasses and rum they obtained in return. This favorable balance of trade helped them offset the unfavorable balance of trade they continually had with Great Britain.47
The Transatlantic Slave Trade to Suriname The triangular slave trade between Europe, Africa, and Suriname, which brought the plantations their labor supply, was of vital importance to the colony. Without it, the colony could not have survived. According to the Suriname charter of 1682, only WIC ships were allowed to bring slaves to the colony, and until 1740 this traffic remained a company monopoly. After Dutch free traders gained permission to trade on the African coast, they dominated the traffic.48 As shown in table 11.5, a total of 551 vessels have been documented as carrying their full consignment of slaves to Suriname during the years 1668–1795. Another 126 slave ships stopped briefly at Paramaribo, and several of these landed a portion of their human cargo before they sailed to other West Indian destinations. For the 47
Kratz, ‘Colonial Balance of Trade,’ 64–78. Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, chapters 8 and 9; C. Reinders Folmer-van Prooijen, Van goederenhandel naar slavenhandel. De Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie, 1720–1755, Werken uitgegeven door het Koninklijk Zeeuwsch Genootschap der Wetenschappen, no. 10 (Middelburg: Koninklijk Zeeuwsch Genootschap der Wetenschappen, 2000). 48
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early years (1667–1675), both ships and slaves have to be estimated from qualitative data, as the quantitative documentation is inadequate. In terms of number of ships, the slave trade represented approximately 15 percent of the total shipping activity between the Dutch Republic and Suriname, but it fluctuated a great deal more than the bilateral trade with Suriname. When the slave trade was at its peak during the 1760s and early 1770s, slave ships constituted more than 20 percent of the total number of Dutch ships arriving at Paramaribo.49 Dutch ships brought nearly 185,000 enslaved Africans to Suriname, as is illustrated in table 11.5.50 Annual averages indicate that the slave trade had a modest beginning during the Zeeland administraTable 11.5. Slave Imports to Suriname, 1668–1803 Years
Dutch Consignments Ships# Slaves
1668–1674* 1675–1682* 1683–1689 1690–1699 1700–1709 1710–1719 1720–1729 1730–1739 1740–1749 1750–1759 1760–1769 1770–1779 1780–1789 1790–1795 1802–1803 Total
5 8 20 14 17 16 21 39 73 86 125 88 17 23 6 558
2,000 3,186 8,570 7,223 8,183 7,893 9,096 17,435 21,536 23,683 33,200 22,611 3,440 4,725 1,087 174,268
Partial Estimated Consignments Adjustments Ships Slaves 2
220
10 14 16 58 17 10
342 788 944 1,862 866 332
126
5,354
400 600 500 500 500 400 600 300 300 300 200 200 200 5,000
Dutch Totals
Annual Averages
2,000 4,206 9,150 7,723 8,683 8,393 9,496 18,035 22,178 24,771 34,444 24,673 4,506 5,057 1,287 184,622
286 601 1,019 772 868 839 950 1,804 2,218 2,477 3,444 2,467 451 843 644
American Slave Imports
57 22 4 26 11 1,279 5,732 7,131
Sources: Postma Slave Trade Data Collection; Postma Suriname Data Collection; Postma Suriname-North America Data Collection. * Estimates are used for years 1668–1674. # These do not include partial consignments of ships that sailed elsewhere with most human cargo.
49
Tables 11.1 and 11.2; Postma Suriname Shipping Data. This includes 1,287 slaves brought on six slave ships during the years 1802–1803, years that are not included in the comparison because the figures for the bilateral trade for those years are not available. Postma Suriname Data Collection. 50
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tion but increased significantly after the establishment of the Suriname Corporation in 1682. Extensive international warfare during the early eighteenth century impeded the slave trade, and subsequent economic uncertainty kept the importation of slaves to an average of fewer than a thousand per year. Slave importation increased dramatically during the 1730s and following decades and reached a peak in 1771 when Dutch ships disembarked 5,376 enslaved Africans at Paramaribo. After that year, the flow of slaves to Suriname declined as a result of diminishing creditworthiness of the planters. As their mortgage obliged them to make payments first, they were unable to purchase as many slaves as they had in the past.51 The Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780–1784) brought the Dutch slave trade to a complete halt, from which it only partially recovered during the following years.52 Dutch ships always monopolized the importation of slaves to Suriname and other Dutch West Indian possessions, not only when the WIC had a monopoly but also during the so-called free trade era that began during the 1730s. Only under very unusual circumstances, occasioned by emergency repairs for example, were foreign ships allowed to sell a limited number of slaves at Paramaribo – often only to cover the cost of repairs or supplies. The policy of foreign exclusion changed in 1789, when United States ships were permitted to take African slaves to Suriname. Although American ships had landed only 120 slaves at Paramaribo before 1789, between 1789 and 1794 they carried a total of 7,011 slaves in eighty-two ships. During the same six years, twenty-nine Dutch ships carried 6,236 slaves to Paramaribo.53 As table 11.5 illustrates, Dutch slave trade had been declining since the mid-1770s and came to a complete halt when the British captured Suriname in 1795. Only during the brief Peace of Amiens (1802–1803) did Dutch ships take enslaved Africans to Suriname again, but that was the final phase of the Dutch slave trade.54
51
For similar conditions in the colonies in Guyana, see chapter 12 in this volume. Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, 182–88. 53 Postma Suriname-North America Data Collection. Between 1720 and 1788, twelve American ships landed a total of 142 slaves, which averages about two per year (Postma Suriname Data Collection). 54 Postma Suriname-North America Data Collection and Postma Suriname Data Collection. 52
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There is evidence that small numbers of slaves were occasionally shipped to Suriname from various West Indian locations, including Curaçao and St. Eustatius. Some slaves were brought to the colony by planters who moved to Suriname from neighboring Berbice and French Cayenne. But in the overall picture, these numbers were not significant.55 Ships delivering slaves to Suriname invariably returned directly to the Dutch Republic, and on their return voyage they usually carried backhaul cargo (retouren), such as tropical commodities and passengers. This final leg of the triangular expedition was identical to the return voyage of ships in the bilateral trade. One important difference, however, was that slave ships tended to carry far less cargo from Suriname, despite the fact that they usually had equal carrying capacity. With larger crews than commodity traders, it may have been too costly for slave ships to wait for the harvest to make a return cargo available, causing several to complete their homeward voyages in ballast or with only a token cargo. This practice became quite common during peak years of the slave traffic during the 1760s and early 1770s.56
Bilateral Shipping between the Dutch Republic and Suriname The triangular slave trade comprised only about 15 percent of the shipping between the Dutch Republic and Suriname; 85 percent consisted of bilateral trading between the two. Bilateral traffic carried an assortment of supplies and commodities to the colony and returned a variety of tropical produce to the Dutch Republic. The latter was, after all, the fundamental purpose of the Suriname settlement. Fortunately, a nearly complete record of the shipping activity between Europe and Suriname has survived, from which the Postma Suriname Data Collection was derived. For the period 1683–1795, this collection provides information on nearly 3,800 individual voyages for the bilateral trade to Suriname and around 670 triangular slaving voyages. On average, some thirty-four ships arrived annually 55
Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, 186. For the Dutch slave trade, see Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, 172, 282–83, and H. den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven. Scheepvaart en handel van de Tweede Westindische Compagnie op Afrika, 1674–1740 (Zutphen: Walburg, 1997). 56
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at Paramaribo directly from Dutch ports between 1683 and 1795. During the busier years, 1720 to 1795, an annual average of fortytwo Dutch ships (fifty with slave ships included) arrived at Paramaribo.57 The bilateral trade between Suriname and the United Provinces came to a virtual standstill, except for a short period in 1803. Otherwise, only foreign ships carried Suriname commodities to the Netherlands, and sometimes via foreign ports (see chapter 14). Suriname’s exports in the years 1794–1802 are not well documented, but in 1803 the colony exported twelve million pound coffee, 20,000 hogshead (20 million pounds) sugar, three million pound cotton, and 500,000 pound cacao. And despite the ongoing war, the colony continued similar rates of export.58 Amsterdam-based ships overwhelmingly dominated the bilateral trade from the time of the establishment of the Suriname Corporation in 1683, which gave Amsterdam virtual control over the colony. The European ports of destination are known for about nine out of ten ships leaving Suriname, and of these 86 percent sailed to Amsterdam or other ports on the bay then known as the Zuiderzee.59 Ships destined for Zeeland ports accounted for 8 percent, and 6 percent sailed to Rotterdam. For a few years after the Suriname Corporation was founded, Zeeland-bound ships were more numerous, which was probably a holdover from the pre-charter era when Zeeland administered the colony. After the WIC ended its monopoly over the slave trade in 1739, Zeeland ships again became more frequent visitors to Paramaribo because they dominated the triangular slave trade during the free trade era.60 A variety of ships were used in the bilateral trade with Suriname, but frigates were most common, accounting for 52 percent of ship types recorded. Frigates tended to be smaller and faster than the bulkier flute types prominent in the Dutch merchant marine during the seventeenth century. The so-called hoeker ships, brigantines, and snows constituted the next largest types in use for this circuit, comprising 17, 10, and 8 percent respectively. These figures are based
57
Table 11.1. These averages do not include slave ships. J. F. E. Einaar, Bijdrage tot de kennis van het Engelsch tussenbestuur van Suriname, 1804–1816 (Leiden: Dubbeldeman, 1934), 21; Van Stipriaan, Surinaams contrast, 431, appendix 1. 59 Postma Suriname-North America Data Collection. 60 Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, 128–34. 58
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primarily on data from the last four decades of the eighteenth century since ship types are rarely indicated in the documents of prior years. A similar picture emerges for ships used in the Dutch slave trade to Suriname, with frigates and yachts most commonly used. Yachts, snows, and pinas had characteristics similar to the frigate, with an emphasis on speed.61 Dutch ships used in the bilateral trade with Suriname were mediumsized for their time. The small sampling of size and carrying capacity revealed in the records suggests an average capacity of 170 tons (85 last).62 Most of these vessels measured between 100 to 125 feet long and 20 and 30 feet wide. Crews averaged from twenty to thirty persons. Slave ships used by free traders after 1730 were roughly the same size as vessels used in the bilateral trade, but they had significantly larger crews because of the special care required for human cargoes. By comparison, the American ships anchoring at Paramaribo were considerably smaller, with a capacity of about 60 to 70 ton, and carrying crews of around ten persons. Dutch ships bound directly for Suriname were generally provisioned and loaded at their home ports, after which they sailed to a designated coastal region to wait for the captain, additional crew members, mail, and instructions. Once ready for departure, they had to wait for favorable winds to start the voyage. Ships from Amsterdam and other Zuiderzee ports generally anchored and waited off the island of Texel, while Zeeland ships waited on the coast of the island of Walcheren, close to the town of Flushing. Awaiting favorable winds often resulted in several ships departing on the same day. In time of war, ships often formed large convoys and departed collectively. The ocean crossing required an average of sixty-seven days, and return voyages averaged eighty-four days. Commodity ships remained anchored in the Suriname River an average of 194 days. 61 Most ship measurement data is derived from the Amsterdam harbor police records. Gemeentearchief Amsterdam, Archief van de Waterschout 1–42: Monsterrollen. For an analysis of ships used in the Dutch slave trade, see V. Enthoven, ‘Pinassen, jachten en fregatten. Schepen in de Nederlandse Atlantische slavenhandel,’ in Slaven en Schepen. Enkele reis, bestemming onbekend, ed. R. Daalder, A. Kieskamp, and D. J. Tang (Leiden: Primavera, 2001), 43–57. See also, Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, appendix 2. 62 Dutch ships of that time were measured in terms of carrying capacity (last or burden); one last was roughly equal to two maritime tons. In Atlantic shipping, this was not the actual load capacity of the ship, but a fiscal measure for paying duties (recognitiegeld ) to the WIC. Over time, the measuring of lasten of a ship varied.
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This tally includes stays of only a few days before moving on to other markets, as well as stays of more than one year. American ships remained an average of eighty days at Paramaribo. With such lengthy layovers by dozens of Dutch and North American ships, the many visiting sailors and officers must have made quite an impact on the isolated town of Paramaribo. The painter John Greenwood illustrated some of their pastimes in his painting Sea Captains Carousing in Suriname, a bar scene believed to have been painted in 1758.63
Measuring Suriname Exports Growing tropical produce and shipping it to the Netherlands was the primary purpose for the Dutch to obtain and maintain a the colony in Suriname. Importing slaves from Africa and manufactured goods from Europe were support activities. The defining measure of the colony’s success and its economic benefit to the Dutch economy was the volume and value of tropical produce shipped out of Suriname. For this reason, a basic goal of my research was to assemble a detailed record of Suriname exports. In compiling the data of shipping and commerce between the Dutch Republic and Suriname, however, the results exceeded that limited objective. As mentioned earlier, David Nassy’s export figures have generally formed the basis for calculating eighteenth-century exports from Suriname.64 For the years prior to 1700, the archivist R. Bijlsma made a compilation of Suriname exports, but his figures are clearly incomplete and warrant no further commentary here.65 The Nassy compilation is more compelling and covers many more years, but it also is far from perfect. In the first place, it is limited to cumulative yearly statistics and does not include individual shipments, as does the Postma Suriname Data Collection. Yet, in terms of aggregate exports, there is considerable agreement between the Nassy and Postma figures. Comparing data for the years for which Nassy provided information 63 Postma Suriname Data Collection and Postma Suriname-North America Data Collection. See illustration no. 11.4. 64 Most authors who have dealt with Suriname exports, including Reese, Van Stipriaan, Van de Voort, and Oostindie, cite Nassy, Geschiedenis der Kolonie van Suriname, as a primary source. 65 R. Bijlsma, ‘Suriname’s Handelsbeweging, 1683–1712,’ West-Indische Gids 2 (1919/20): 48–51.
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(1700–1787), discrepancies are relatively minor before 1764.66 Nassy’s annual figures tend to be slightly higher than mine, which may have resulted from his miscalculation of the content of hogshead barrels (oxhoofd ) in which sugar was transported. For example, Nassy was already counting one thousand pounds per hogshead during the 1780s, which was a significant exaggeration.67 It is also possible that a few ships have escaped my scrutiny, and that some records have been lost. There are, however, some serious errors in the Nassy data, as is illustrated in the comparative statistics listed in appendix 11.1. For the year 1706, Nassy underestimated sugar exports by 90 percent, an error most likely caused by the inadvertent omission of a zero. Nassy’s export figures for the years 1776 to 1787 are also clearly inaccurate. His sugar exports for the year 1781 are exaggerated eightfold.68 He may have included illegal exports by Americans, but there is no independent confirmation of such activities. When the data sets are correlated by decades rather than individual years, Nassy’s figures are slightly higher than the results of the Postma dataset for the 1720–1760 period, but significantly lower for the years 1770–1787. It is ironic that the most serious errors are in the years during which Nassy was actively involved in the economic life of the colony. Indeed, his data for the years after 1763 appear to be so seriously flawed that they are of little use in determining Suriname production. Did Nassy not have access to recent statistics, or did he purposely distort the record to advance his own interests? In the text accompanying his data, Nassy clearly advances the notion that Suriname had been prosperous and productive in the past but had begun to decline in recent years. He thus restated the contention of another Suriname planter, Philippe Fermin, who argued that the colony needed to be reinvigorated by new economic policies.69 66 Nassy, Geschiedenis der Kolonie van Suriname, pt. 2:7. It appears that Nassy had access to many of the same documents that I have consulted. It should be noted, however, that Nassy also borrowed from the writings of Philippe Fermin, another contemporary observer, especially for the years 1750–1775. See P. Fermin, Tableau Historique et actuel de la Colonie de Surinam, et de causes de sa décadence (Maastricht: Dufour et Roux, 1778). 67 Nassy recorded sugar transport in hogsheads (oxhoofd ), but other commodities such as coffee and cacao beans and cotton in pounds. 68 Annual figures are available in Postma Suriname Data Collection, and Nassy, Geschiedenis der Kolonie van Suriname, appendix. 69 Nassy, Geschiedenis der Kolonie van Suriname, pt. 2:5–11.
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There are also important discrepancies between the Nassy and Postma data sets concerning the number of ships sailing from Paramaribo to the Netherlands. Nassy’s ship data is incomplete and limited to the years 1707–1774. For these years his clearances total 2,630, while my research documents 2,823. The two data sets show considerable compatibility in ship clearances for the years prior to 1764, but here too, Nassy calculates 193 fewer than I have documented. Part of the explanation may be that sixty-three ships left Suriname without backhaul cargo, which Nassy may not have included in his list. But this still leaves 130 clearances unaccounted for by Nassy, which is an error of such proportion that the Nassy data set becomes virtually meaningless for those final years. The following assessment of Suriname commodity exports, summarized in table 11.6, is based primarily on the Postma Suriname Data Collection. Since the Nassy data list sugar and coffee exports somewhat higher than my findings for the years 1711–1763, I have adjusted these figures upwards by about 1 percent. I concluded that Nassy had no reason to purposely inflate these statistics, that my own research must have failed to uncover documentation of some ships, and that I may also have underestimated some of cargoes for which specific consignment data were lacking.70 The recent discovery of a third contemporary data set tends to support my calculations.71 The document was found among the Suriname papers of Laurens Pieter van de Spiegel, as raadpensionaris the highest executive official in the States of Holland during the years 1787–1795, and it demonstrates that government officials were keenly interested in Suriname’s contribution to the economy of the Dutch Republic. The document’s data cover the years 1701–1790 and resemble Nassy’s figures, except that they cover a longer period and provide more information about ships and their destinations. For the years covered by both data sets, the Van de Spiegel figures include
There were fifty-five departing ships for which I was unable to locate cargo statistics. In addition, 180 ships sailed home in ballast. Most of these were slave ships during the peak of the slave trade in the 1760s and early 1770s. Also, 230 ships arriving at Paramaribo left afterwards for other destinations, and a few dozen ships remained in Suriname because they were condemned or captured in war. 71 ARA, Archief van Pieter van de Spiegel (PvdS) 163: Lyste der voornaamste producten die uit Suriname zijn afgescheept. For this find, I am indebted to Victor Enthoven, who found the hand-written document and kindly shared its contents. 70
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on average two to three more ships per year, slightly more than my research uncovered (see appendices 11.1 and 11.2).
Tropical Commodities Shipped to the Dutch Republic Sugar was initially the principal export staple from Suriname, and it remained a major export commodity for nearly two centuries.72 As the settlement expanded during the end of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, its sugar exports increased steadily until reaching a plateau of fifteen to twenty million pounds annually during the 1720s (see table 11.6). This level of production remained quite steady, except for a slight decline during the 1750s. Sugar exports reached peaks of more than twenty million pounds in the years 1722, 1742, and 1750. Annual export dropped to fourteen million pounds in the 1780s, primarily because of the Fourth AngloDutch War (1780–1784). When the sea lanes opened again in 1783, shipping of stored commodities brought in a sudden rise in export figures.73 During the eighteenth century, the Dutch often gained commercial benefits from their wartime neutrality. But that advantage came to an abrupt halt in December 1780, when the British declared war on the Dutch Republic. In 1781, Suriname shipped out less than two million pounds of sugar, and that was carried primarily by ships sailing under foreign flags. In order to circumvent the British embargo, Dutch shipping companies established connections with firms in neutral countries such as the Austrian Netherlands (Belgium), Prussia, Denmark, the United States, and Sweden. They often sold their ships through phony contracts to their new partners while the ships’ captains took out temporary residency in the respective neutral country to enable them to register ships there and fly their flag. A good number of ships sailing between Europe and Suriname were able to make use of this deceptive method.74 During the war years, sixty72 See Van Stipriaan, Surinaams contrast, which extends Suriname’s economic history through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 73 Postma Suriname Data Collection. 74 E. S. van Eyck van Heslinga, ‘De vlag dekt de lading. De Nederlandse koopvaardij in de Vierde Engelse oolog,’ Tijdschrift voor Zeegeschiedenis 1 (1982): 102–13; J. Parmentier, ‘Profit and Neutrality: The Case of Ostend, 1781–1783,’ in Pirates and Privateers: New Perspectives on the War in the Eighteenth Century, ed. D. J. Starkey,
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Table 11.6. Tropical Commodities Shipped from Suriname to the Dutch Republic, 1683–1794 Years
Ships#
Sugar (Pounds)
1683–1689 109 35,742,397 1690–1699 139 66,439,943 1700–1709 176 108,045,887 1710–1719 206 139,244,900 Adjustments* 1,500,000 1720–1729 268 192,481,000 Adjustments* 2,500,000 1730–1739 310 174,480,950 Adjustments* 3,500,000 1740–1749 444 173,553,800 Adjustments* 3,500,000 1750–1759 498 165,495,200 Adjustments* 2,500,000 1760–1769 693 172,994,800 Adjustments* 2,000,000 1770–1779 648 166,274,144 1780–1789 474 143,994,160 1790–1794 245 85,005,796 1683–1794 4,210 1,639,252,977 Adjustments total* 15,500,000 Grand Total 1683–1794 1,654,752,977
Coffee (Pounds)
Cacao (Pounds)
Cotton (Pounds)
64,647 13,714
11,068 14,017
885,770
9,475
9,526
15,960,967
137,180
5,262
32,518,847 3,280,596 150,000 59,403,097 1,868,410
11,179 32,216
123,139,565 2,075,899 954,195 800,000 145,932,800 5,533,688 4,858,547 99,701,201 6,022,710 6,817,132 48,027,455 1,823,343 4,311,266 526,519,702 20,829,662 17,024,408 950,000 527,469,702 20,829,662 17,024,408
Source: Postma Suriname Data Collection; table 11.7. * Estimated additions extrapolated from Nassy Databank. # Ships clearing Paramaribo harbor and destined for the Dutch Republic.
one ships sailing between Europe and Suriname flew foreign flags, though nearly all were of Dutch ownership. Forty-one of these left Suriname in the year 1782, and sixteen during the following year.75 An interesting shift in the pattern of trade with Suriname occurred after 1792, when volatile political conditions in Europe forced the Dutch to rely increasingly on assistance from the United States. At
E. S. van Eyck van Heslinga, and J. A. de Moor, Exeter Maritime Studies, no. 9 (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1997), 206–26. 75 Postma Suriname Data Collection. Twenty-five of these ships flew the Imperial flag of the Austrian Empire and were ostensibly registered at Ostend, in present day Belgium.
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least fifteen American ships left Paramaribo during 1793–1794 with Amsterdam as their destination.76 The leveling in sugar exports has sometimes been interpreted as a decline of Suriname’s productivity. However, the colony’s crop diversification and resulting increase in the cultivation of other tropical products demonstrates the opposite. Coffee beans, first cultivated and exported from Suriname in 1723, soon rivaled the export of sugar as an export commodity. Exports averaged more than 1.5 million pounds during the 1730s and peaked at more than twenty million pounds in 1775. By that time, coffee exports equaled sugar exports in weight, but coffee had already surpassed sugar in market value by the 1750s and remained at nearly twice its value for the remainder of the century.77 Even before coffee was grown, Suriname planters had started diversifying cultivation by growing cotton and cacao beans. As early as 1702, these products were included in export cargoes to the Dutch Republic. Although initial shipments were small, they occurred much earlier than Nassy recorded.78 Cacao exports peaked during the 1780s, with an annual average of more than 600,000 pounds. Cotton exports initially lagged behind cacao but eventually became more important, reaching an eighteenth-century peak of nearly 700,000 pounds annually during the 1780s. Cocao exports peaked at an annual average of nearly 328,000 pounds during that decade, then dwindled during the 1790s and never revived.79 Table 11.7 lists the gross market values of Suriname exports, based on market prices averaged for the respective decades. Only Dutch ships were allowed to export the major tropical commodities of sugar, coffee, cocoa beans, and cotton from Suriname. Sugar byproducts of molasses and rum were not in demand in the Dutch Republic and were shipped primarily to New England ports. As with other exports from Suriname, sugar was taxed as it was weighed before being loaded on home-bound ships. These taxes,
76
Postma Suriname-North America Data Collection. J. Postma, ‘The Fruits of Slave Labor: Tropical Commodities from Suriname to Holland, 1683–1794’ paper presented at the Eleventh Congress of Economic History, Milan, Italy, September, 1994. 78 Nassy reported the earliest cacao exports as 1732 and cotton as 1760. 79 Van Stipriaan did not include cocoa beans as a major crop in his assessment of Surinam’s major exports, undoubtedly because of its declining importance during the nineteenth century. 77
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Table 11.7. Market Value of Suriname Commodities, 1683–1794 (guilders) Years
Sugar
1683–1689 5,003,936 1690–1699 11,294,790 1700–1709 20,852,856 1710–1719 21,861,449 1720–1729 25,984,935 1730–1739 19,576,763 1740–1749 31,239,684 1750–1759 26,975,718 1760–1769 29,236,121 1770–1779 30,594,442 1780–1789 29,230,814 1790–1794 26,550,520 Total 278,402,029
per lb 0.14 0.17 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.11 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.31
Avg. per Year 2,485,732 0.18 112 Years
Coffee
549,177 9,911,761 16,324,461 27,563,037 50,856,640 56,184,128 54,436,856 26,878,575 242,704,635
per lb
Cacao
per lb
Cotton
per lb
0.62 0.62 0.50 0.46 0.41 0.39 0.55 0.56
29 ,091 67,171 4,264 68,590 1,213,821 616,575 1,183,262 2,158,138 2,047,721 692,870 8,020,505
0.45 0.45 0.45 0.50 0.37 0.33 0.57 0.39 0.34 0.38
7,194 9,812 6,668 3,947 8,384 27,061 899,806 4,528,166 8,044,216 4,914,843 18,450,097
0.65 0.70 0.70 0.75 0.75 0.84 0.94 0.93 1.18 1.14
3,236,0162 0.51 75 Years
84,354 0.42 95 Years
194,212 0.86 95 Years
Source: appendix 11.1; For market values see N. W. Posthumus, Inquiry into the History of Prices in Holland. (Leiden: Brill, 1946), 1:126–28, 186–87, 197–98, 285–87, 507; and Van de Voort, De Westindische plantages, 77–78.
called weighing dues or waaggeld were calculated at 2.5 percent of the tax value of the exported products, as determined by the directors of the Suriname Corporation. These values remained quite stable with only sporadic adjustments, and they often varied significantly from market values. Thus, sugar was continually rated at one stuiver per pound. Cacao was rated at eight stuivers per pound, cotton at seven, and coffee at six. Market values fluctuated and were often considerably higher than weighing evaluations. The product values listed in table 11.7 require further refinement, since they do not allow for loss in transit, which Van Stipriaan has estimated as high as 14 percent for sugar.80 On the other hand, they also exclude adjustment figures for potential oversight in table 11.6. Nor does the tally include a variety of export products that were far less important than the four major items included in the table. These exports include about one million pounds of tobacco, several million pounds of lumber, and a wide assortment of hides, indigo, roku (a dye), and other less important exports that have not yet been 80
Van Stipriaan, Surinaams contrast, 433.
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analyzed.81 Until a more detailed analysis is feasible, I have assumed that these various omissions may come close to canceling each other out. Table 11.8 provides a summation of Suriname’s exports to the Dutch Republic and comparisons with earlier assessments of the colony’s contribution to the Dutch economy. A comparison of the value of Suriname exports with those of other Dutch colonies and other Dutch commercial branches in the West Indies clearly places Suriname as the single most productive entity before the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780–1784).82 After that, the Dutch settlements in today’s Guyana began to equal Suriname’s exports. My calculations suggest that for the years 1700–1779, the value of Suriname’s exports to Europe was only slightly higher than previous estimates, rising from ƒ4.58 to ƒ4.73 million per year.83 But when the years 1780–1794 are included, Surinam’s average annual exports increase to ƒ6.12 million. This rise may be partly due, however, to inflationary pressures during the 1790s.84
Supplies and Passengers from the Netherlands to Suriname Unfortunately, there is far less information about shipments of goods to Suriname from the United Provinces than about exports from Suriname. The primary reason for this lack of data is that, in contrast to exports from Suriname, no duties were leveled on goods shipped from the Dutch Republic to that colony. There are ample records of cargo intended for the governmental and military establishments of the Suriname Corporation (Magazijn), but so far only scanty documentation of shipments for the private sector has been located. Incomplete documentation shows that consignments arriving in Suriname regularly included a variety of manufactured goods such
81
Postma Suriname Data Collection. For a comparison with the other Dutch Atlantic commercial zones, see table 13.1 and table 14.16 in this volume. 83 When an error for the 1750s is corrected from ƒ4.9 to ƒ2.9 million for Suriname exports, the discrepancy increases from ƒ4.33 to ƒ4.73 million. See Klooster, Illicit Riches, 176. For the rapid growth of the Dutch settlements in Guiana, see chapter 12 in this volume. 84 No comparable figures are available for Curaçao and St. Eustatius, the focus of Klooster’s study. For Essequibo and Demerara, see table 12.7. 82
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Table 11.8. Values of Suriname Exports to the Dutch Republic, 1683–1794 (guilders) Years 1683–1689 1690–1699 1700–1709 1710–1719 1720–1729 1730–1739 1740–1749 1750–1759 1760–1769 1770–1779 1780–1789 1790–1794 1683–1794 1700–1779 1700–1794
Current Assessment
Annual Compression Recent Average Estimates*
(7 Years)
5,003,936 294,349 11,294,790 1,129,479 20,889,142 2,088,914 21,877,433 2,187,743 26,545,044 2,654,504 29,516,060 2,956,106 48,786,350 4,878,635 55,182,391 5,518,239 82,175,830 8,217,583 93,464,875 9,346,487 93,759,607 9,375,961 (5 Years) 59,036,808 11,807,362 (112 Years) 547,577,265 4,889,083 (80 Years) (95 Years)
0.29 1.13 2.09 2.19 2.65 2.96 4.88 5.52 8.22 9.35 9.38 11.81 4.89 4.73 6.12
1.8 1.5 4.9# 2.7 4.2 4.9 7.8 8.8
Source: table 11.7. * For recent estimates see Klooster, Illicit Riches, 176. Exports from Dutch Guyana are not included. # This estimate was an overstated error and has since been corrected (see table 13.1 in this volume).
as tools, clothing and shoes, building materials, household items, and utensils. Machinery, tools, and containers for sugar processing comprised a significant part of the cargoes, and military equipment and supplies were also regularly listed in the journals of the Suriname governors. The military garrison and civilian personnel of the governing corporation consisted of several hundred men and required large amounts of provisions. Surprisingly large quantities of food, such as dried bread and meat products, were shipped to Suriname. Americans also shipped large amounts of flour, fish, and other meat products to Suriname.85 One might expect that an agricultural community on the edge of the wilderness would be more self-sufficient, but apparently the European settlers and military personnel preferred salted or otherwise preserved meat from abroad, even though they frequently complained about barrels of spoiled meat. 85
Postma, ‘Breaching Mercantile Barriers.’
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Virtually every ship sailing between Europe and Suriname carried passengers. When the Suriname Corporation was established in 1683, it required each ship bound for Suriname to carry a minimum of twelve passengers.86 This policy, aimed at ensuring a steady supply of emigrants to the colony, was not enforced after a few years. Nevertheless a regular flow of passengers, emigrants, and military and service personnel sailed to Suriname and returned to the Netherlands. While several ships had few or no passengers at all, others brought more than twelve persons. A large percentage of inbound passengers were military recruits, most of whom did not return to Europe. Settlers and civil servants, on the other hand, tended to make the Atlantic crossing more than once, traveling back and forth on business and for education. In the period 1740–1794, at least 21,000 persons traveled from Suriname to Europe. While many passenger lists survive, so many have been lost that their usefulness is limited in unraveling the colony’s demographic development.87 Nevertheless, surviving passenger lists make it possible to trace particular individuals to the time and ship on which they made their ocean crossing. North American ships occasionally carried passengers to and from Suriname, but the numbers involved in this are not significant.
Summary and Conclusions Three major lifelines kept the Suriname settlement in existence and enabled the colony to produce large quantities of tropical produce. Contemporary observers such as Nassy claimed that the Dutch economy profited handsomely from Suriname products, and the current analysis confirms their judgment. Recent studies have shown that considerably larger amounts were exported from other Dutch colonies in the Atlantic, such as from Curaçao, St. Eustatius, Essequibo, Demerara, and the West African
86 The minutes (notulen) of the Suriname Corporation directors’ meetings make frequent reference to passenger traffic. See ARA, SvS 1–19. 87 J. Postma, ‘Populating a Tropical Slave Plantation Colony: European and African Population Movements to Suriname, 1651–1800,’ paper presented at the International Conference of Migrations and the Countries of the South, Avignon, France, March 1999.
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coast, as is demonstrated in other chapters of this book.88 Such studies have occasionally created the impression that Suriname was in decline. However, Suriname’s export statistics show that its production was quite stable in spite of declining importation of slave labor from Africa after the mid-1770s.89 Judging from the exports of tropical commodities, Suriname undoubtedly remained the single most important Dutch colony in the Atlantic region until at least the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780–1784). This chapter focuses on the shipping and volume of tropical exports from Suriname, corrects some flaws in earlier assessments, and maintains that the colony actually exported slightly more tropical commodities than previously thought. It is important to recognize that Suriname was not just a sugar-producing colony, but that coffee far exceeded the value of sugar during the second half of the eighteenth century. This chapter also defines the nature and volume of the North American trade with Suriname, which provided horses and other essential goods needed to grow tropical products for the Dutch Republic, as well as markets for molasses and rum not wanted in Europe. This trade was crucial for the colony, although it benefited the Americans more, enabling them to ease their negative balance of trade with Britain. This chapter also provides a comprehensive assessment of the importation of slave labor from Africa to Suriname. The earlier cited assertion by Meilink-Roelofs, that thirty-five ships annually carried large amounts of tropical produce from the West Indies was no exaggeration for Suriname for the period 1683–1794 as a whole. In fact, after 1750, the average number of ships sailing from Paramaribo to Dutch harbors was nearly sixty per year. Building and outfitting such fleets produced many jobs for sailors, ship builders, and processors of manufactures, victuals, and supplies shipped to the colony. Calculating the costs, as well as direct and indirect benefits from this capitalistic venture, is virtually impossible. And while some individuals lost on their investments, many others made a living from this enterprise. Although Suriname was only a small part of a complex and affluent economic system, its overall impact on the Dutch economy, and on the Amsterdam region in particular, should not
88 89
See chapters 6, 8, and 12 in this volume. Van Stipriaan, Surinaams contrast, 19, 407–11.
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be ignored. It will undoubtedly continue to be a subject for debate, and I hope this analysis will contribute to the discussion. Whatever the benefits and profits from the Suriname settlement may have been, they came at an extremely heavy price. The suffering and death toll by European sailors, soldiers, administrators, and settlers in an unfamiliar tropical climate was a high cost for making tropical produce available to European markets. But this is easily eclipsed by the cost exacted from enslaved Africans through coerced labor and extremely high mortality. The Dutch involvement in slavery and the slave trade, encouraged by the lure of profits from tropical commodities, left an ignoble scar on the reputation of the Dutch golden age.
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CHAPTER TWELVE
THE FORGOTTEN COLONIES OF ESSEQUIBO AND DEMERARA, 1700–1814 E W O
Zeeland lacks merchants . . . because serious businessmen, from tin smiths to candle makers and other tradesmen, never did or shall consider an open and free commerce, which is highly valued in the Dutch Republic. Ambrosius Tulleken, ca. 1771.1
Introduction This chapter examines the shipping and trade with two nearly forgotten Dutch colonies along the rivers Essequibo and Demerara, from which these settlements derived their names. The settlements were located in what is today Guyana, on the coastal region of South America that the Europeans often called the Wild Coast, or Guiana. In contrast to the Dutch colony of Suriname, Essequibo and Demerara have received little attention in historiography.2 Not until 1995 were shipping and trade to Essequibo, Demerara, and nearby Berbice, the subject of a scholarly analysis.3 The primary reason for this was that the Guyana colonies formally became British in 1814, with the result that many of its archival materials ended up at the Public Record
1 Algemeen Rijksarchief (ARA), Verspreide West-Indische Stukken (VWIS) 478: 2, Letter of Ambrosius Tulleken. 2 The most important publications regarding the Dutch colonies on the Wild Coast are J. J. Hartsinck, Beschryving van Guiana, of de Wilde Kust, in Zuid America . . . (1770; reprint, Amsterdam: Emmering, 1974), and P. M. Netscher, Geschiedenis van de koloniën Essequebo, Demerary en Berbice van de vestiging der Nederlanders aldaar tot op onzen tijd (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1888). 3 F. Souty, Trois rivières et l’histoire. La Guyane Neerlandaise Occidentale (Demerary, Essequebo, Berbice) au XVIII e siecle, 1700–1796 (Ph.D. diss., University of Paris, 1995).
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Office in London, including the thus-far ignored ship consignments that are the cornerstone of this study.4 Our image of the Dutch colonies in Guyana has been overshadowed by the economic developments of Suriname. In the years 1750– 1770, large investments were made in the Guiana colonies in the form of plantation mortgages, know as negotiaties.5 As a result, Suriname expanded and reached its peak with approximately four hundred plantations at about 1770, and a decline started a few years later. It is generally assumed that the Dutch plantation colonies declined after the Amsterdam stock market crisis in 1773.6 Essequibo and Demerara, however, continued to expand until it had seven hundred plantations and 60,000 slaves by 1806, as table 12.1 illustrates.7 A British visitor commented at about that time that ‘the estates on the river [Demerara] . . . greatly increased and extended themselves since 1796 . . . and where there was one sugar plantation, there are four now.’8 The performance of the plantation colonies of Essequibo and Demerara have long been underestimated. This chapter attempts to clarify the unique development of these colonies during the eighteenth century with emphasis on their 1) unusual history and expan-
4
This chapter is based on research of E. W. van der Oest, ‘Vergeten kolonies. De handel en scheepvaart op de kolonies Essequebo en Demerary, 1700–1791’ (master’s thesis, University of Leiden, 1992). 5 The loans issued to plantation owners in the period 1753–1794 totaled as follows: Suriname ƒ36,604,222; Essequibo and Demerara ƒ12,255,213; Berbice ƒ1,836,218; others ƒ256,585. See J. P. van de Voort, De Westindische plantages van 1720–1795. Financiën en handel (Eindhoven: De Witte, 1973), 265. 6 R. A. J. van Lier, Frontier Society: A Social Analysis of the History of Suriname (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1971), 40–41; Van de Voort, Westindische plantages, 199–201; P. C. Emmer, ‘Suiker, goud en slaven. De Republiek in West-Afrika en West-Indië, 1674–1800,’ in Overzee. Nederlandse koloniale geschiedenis, 1590–1975, ed. E. van den Boogaart et al. (Haarlem: Van Dishoeck, 1982), 153; A. van Stipriaan, Surinaams contrast. Roofbouw en overleven in een Caraibische plantagekolonie, 1750–1863, Caribbean Series, no. 13 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1993), 205; A. van Stipriaan, ‘Debunking Debts: Image and Reality of a Colonial Crisis, Suriname at the End of the Eighteenth Century,’ Itinerario 19, no. 1 (1995): 69–84. 7 Berbice experienced a similar development with six plantations in 1720, 138 in 1763, and about 250 around 1800. See Netscher, Geschiedenis van de koloniën, 149, 282, 290–91; C. C. Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean and in the Guianas, 1680–1791 (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1985), 456; Kortbondige beschrijvinge van de colonie de Berbice behelzende de leggings bevolking, uitgestrektheid . . . (Amsterdam: Baalde, 1763), 27. 8 H. A. Bolingbroke, A Voyage to the Demerary, Containing a Statistical Account of the Settlement There, and of Those on the Essequebo, the Berbice, and Others Contiguous Rivers of Guyana (Philadelphia: M. Cary, 1813), 23.
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sion, 2) the new historical sources used in this study, 3) importation of slaves, 4) financial exchanges with the mother country, 5) bilateral trade with the Dutch Republic, and 6) trade with North America and the Caribbean.
Essequibo’s Economic Development, 1596–1700 Dutch ships frequented the Wild Coast regularly after 1596, and Zeelanders probably started a settlement on the Essequibo River during the Twelve Year Truce with Spain (1609–1621). When the Dutch West India Company (WIC) was founded in 1621, its Zeeland chamber was granted administrative control over the settlement.9 Thereafter, only merchants who had a so-called wood- and-salt permit (hout- en zoutbrief ) from the Zeeland chamber were allowed to trade at Essequibo. The slave trade to the colony, as well as trade in war materials and dyewood, was a WIC monopoly, while sugar and tobacco could be exported by private merchants on payment of duties (recognitie).10 The Essequibo settlement remained small for many years. In the 1630s, the WIC directors (bewindhebbers) considered abandoning it, but after the loss of Brazil in 1654 the company anticipated developing it into a prosperous plantation colony. The WIC lacked the resources, however, and the three Zeeland towns of Middelburg, Flushing, and Veere accepted control in order to develop the settlement, and renamed it Nova Zelandia. In addition to trading with indigenous Indians and growing some tobacco, colonists established several sugar plantations around Fort Kijkoveral and across the river. After the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1664–1667), Essequibo was briefly governed by the States of Zeeland, but in 1670 it was returned to the local chamber of the WIC.11 9 J. F. Jameson, ‘Report on Spanish and Dutch Settlements prior to 1648,’ in Report and Accompanying Papers of the Commission appointed by the President of the United States ‘to investigate and Report upon the True Divisional Line Between the Republic of Venezuela and British Guiana . . ., comp. United States Commission on Boundary between Venezuelea and British Guiana (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1897), 1:35–69; Netscher, Geschiedenis van de koloniën, 40–43. 10 J. Hudig Dzn., De scheepvaart op West-Afrika en West-Indië in de achttiende eeuw (Amsterdam: De Bussy, 1926), 8; Netscher, Geschiedenis van de koloniën, 63. 11 J. G. van Dillen, Van rijkdom en regenten. Handboek tot de economische en sociale geschiedenis van Nederland tijdens de Republiek (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1970), 167; V. Enthoven, ‘Nova Zelandia and Cayenne: The Dutch on the Wild Coast, 1656–1666,’
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When the WIC was reorganized in 1674, private merchants were allowed to trade with the Americas, and WIC possessions were classified into different groups for this purpose. Essequibo was placed in the first group, for which the WIC retained a trade monopoly, while areas in the second group were partially opened to private trade on payment of duties.12 Under the new company charter of 1674, Essequibo was formally placed under the control of the Heren X, the highest governing board of the WIC, although chamber Zeeland managed the colony. Because of this formal change, Amsterdam merchants requested that the whole Guiana Coast be opened to private trade. Zeeland WIC directors were willing to share commerce in this region with other WIC chambers, but they opposed freeing the trade to private merchants.13 Because the company was short on ships, private traders were eventually allowed to trade with Essequibo, but they had to reside in Zeeland.
Essequibo during the Eighteenth Century Although the WIC administered the colony and owned a few plantations, most agricultural land in Essequibo belonged to private planters.14 The number of plantations increased significantly during the eighteenth century, and additionally, Essequibo was instrumental in establishing a settlement on the nearby Demerara River in 1746. The slave trade to this region was opened to private shipping
in D’un Rivage à l’autre. Villes et Protestantisme dans l’aire Atlantique, XVI e–XVII e siècles, ed. G. Martinière, D. Poton, and F. Souty (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale-Presses de la MSHS, 1999), 207–17; Netscher, Geschiedenis van de koloniën, 79. 12 A. J. M. Kunst, Recht, commercie en kolonialisme in West-Indië vanaf de zestiende tot in de negentiende eeuw (Zutphen: Walburg, 1981), 106. See chapter 4 of this volume for a discussion of the reorganization of the company. 13 Kunst, Recht, commercie en kolonialisme, 111; Emmer, ‘Suiker, goud en slaven,’ 113–75. 14 In 1719, the WIC plantations were Poelwijk and Duinenburg. The company also owned two areas for lumber and food cultivation. By 1729, it had added Pelgrim and Twee Agathen, two small plantations growing coffee and indigo. By 1779, the WIC still owned three plantations with 510 slaves. Public Record Office (PRO), Colonial Office (CO) 116/22: 75–86, 25: 280–302, 28: 158, and ibid., 116/37: 69–84; ARA, VWIS 53: Getal der slaven in Rio Essequebo, 1779.
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in 1738, while the bilateral trade with the Dutch Republic was likewise freed from restrictions in 1771. The WIC Administration in Essequibo The primary catalyst behind the development of Essequibo and Demerara was Commander Laurens Storm van ’s Gravesande (1704– 1775), who effectively governed Essequibo from 1743 to 1772 and Demerara until 1750. That year, the WIC rewarded him for his dedicated service with the new title director general of Essequibo, while appointing his son Jonathan commander of Demerara. The commander and director general were assisted by councils of planters and employees of the WIC. Together they governed the affairs of the colony, although chamber Zeeland retained paramount authority. A council of police and justice was established in 1718, which, under the leadership of the chief administrator, regulated administrative and judicial affairs. The colony’s treasurer, chief auctioneer, and military commander, as well as four prominent planters or citizens, were members of the council. In judicial cases, the treasurer assumed the role of plaintiff. After 1750, the commander of Demerara was subordinate to the director general of Essequibo. Twice a year, the two consulted with each other at Fort Zelandia about defense and other matters.15 As a result of its rapid development, Demerara became independent of Essequibo in 1772. During the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780–1784), the two colonies were briefly occupied by the British (February–March 1781) and, for a few years (1781–1784), by the French. Afterwards, Essequibo was again governed by a commander while Demerara had a director general, but in 1789 the two colonies were again united, this time under a governor. When the WIC was disbanded in 1791, the States General assumed control over the now languishing colony, although its governance structure hardly changed. The Dutch Atlantic colonies were now under the supreme authority of a government commission. Essequibo and Demerara were controlled by Britain from April 1796 until the
15
142.
Netscher, Geschiedenis van de koloniën, 141–42; Emmer, ‘Suiker, goud en slaven,’
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Peace of Amiens in March 1802, but still internally governed by a council of citizens. Many British planters began to settle there, which stimulated significant expansion. The colony was controlled by the Dutch again from March 1802 until September 1803, when the British returned and gradually proceeded to anglicize the colony. At the Peace of Paris in 1814, Demerara and Essequibo were permanently ceded to Britain, but their Dutch character did not disappear overnight. Two years later, King George (1738–1820) granted Dutch proprietors the right to trade with the Netherlands, and Dutch ships soon sailed to the colonies again. By that time, the colonies’ productive capacity far exceeded that of Suriname.16 Economic Development From the outset, most plantations in Essequibo were located along the river and around Fort Kijkoveral, approximately fifty kilometers from the coast. Due to soil exhaustion and the building of Fort Zelandia on Vlagge Island in the river delta, many new plantations were established on fertile soil closer to the estuary of the river in the late 1730s. Many British planters relocated here after 1746 because of soil depletion at Barbados and Antigua. And in order to stimulate development, the WIC encouraged settlement with tax advantages such as a ten-year exemption from the payment of the poll tax.17 In order to please the British settlers, Storm van ’s Gravesande asked the WIC to send a parson who knew English. But when the colonies were transferred to Britain in 1814, the colonists were still predominantly Dutch with a significant percentage of English descent.18
16 Netscher, Geschiedenis van de koloniën, 281, 289, 292; George . Regis., Cap. ., An Act to Regulate the Trade of the Colonies of Demerara, Berbice, and Essequibo, 26 June 1816. 17 A. O. Thompson, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in Guyana, 1580 –1803 (Bridgetown, Md.: Research and Publication, 1987), 44; Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean, 1680–1791, 444; Netscher, Geschiedenis van de koloniën, 114. 18 PRO, CO 116/31: Storm van ’s Gravesande to chamber Zeeland, 14 April 1753; ibid., 116/33: Storm van ’s Gravesande to chamber Zeeland, 17 December 1760; Bolingbroke, A Voyage, 16–28; G. Pinckard, Notes on the West Indies: Written during the Expedition under the Command of the Late General Sir Ralph Abercromby . . . (London: Longmans, 1806), 2:171–73, 182–85.
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Table 12.1. Plantations, Slaves, and Europeans in Essequibo and Demerara, 1700–1817 Year 1700 1716 1735 1766 1769 1780 1782 1796 1806 1817
Plantations Slaves Europeans Essequibo Demerara Total Essequibo Demerara Total 19 20 30 70 95 140
121 206 240
19 20 30 191 301 380 700
426 374 2,600 2,978 4,543 7,714 8,550 8,000
2,569 5,967 14,132 20,000
426 374 2,600 5,547 10,510 22,682 28,000 ca. 60,000 77,000
60 110
1,434 2,700
Sources: Souty, Trois rivières, 325; Bolingbroke, A Voyage, 23; Netscher, Geschiedenis van de koloniën, 108; Van de Voort, Westindische plantages, 88, 129; J. De Hullu, ‘De algemene toestand onzer West-Indische bezittingen in 1806,’ Westindische Gids 2 (1921), 407–21; A. O. Thompson, Some Problems of Slave Desertion in Guyana, 1750–1814 (Barbados: University of the West Indies, 1976), 5; PRO, CO 116/19: 51–54; ibid., 116/35: 108–15; ibid., 116/37: 69–84; ibid., 116/53: 13.
The Harbor The estuary of the Demerara River is about four miles south of the Essequibo River delta. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, ships usually anchored upriver near Fort Kijkoveral. Cargo was unloaded by barges, and the goods intended for the WIC were stored in the magazines at the fort. Ship repairs could be made on the river. Ships returning to the Dutch Republic would float down river to the plantations, where they loaded tropical produce for the return voyage and canoes (korjalen) ferried the commodities to the ships. Before 1720, the ships anchored at Stampers Island, between Fort Kijkoveral and Vlagge Island. In 1739, the colony’s administration was moved closer to sea, from Fort Kijkoveral to Fort Zelandia on Vlagge Island, a more convenient place for ships to moor.19
19 ARA, Archief van de Nieuwe West-Indische Compagnie (NWIC) 813: Chamber Zeeland to Storm van ’s Gravesande, 27 August 1720; ibid., 771: Instructions for Master Jan van Male to Essequibo, in galjoot Maria Jacoba, 1721; ibid., 814: Chamber Zeeland to Storm van ’s Gravesande, 8 July 1746.
16
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Ship masters were instructed to treat the commander of the colony cordially. Crew members were allowed to visit the fort and the slave quarters on the plantations, but they were not allowed to purchase colonial commodities. Before departure, captains had to make a report of all goods on board, and they could face a heavy fine if contraband was discovered on board. Passengers were not allowed on the return voyage unless they had a valid pass from the commander.20 While the move to Vlagge Island made Essequibo more convenient to reach, most ships sailed to Demerara, which rapidly outgrew Essequibo (see table 12.1). Although the Demerara River was deeper and could better accommodate the larger ships, they had to go thirty kilometers upriver to anchor at Borssele Island, which had weak fortifications.21 The planters at Essequibo were unhappy with this development. Contrary to earlier transport agreements, they had to pay for shipping their products to Demerara. In response to their complaints, the WIC provided a schooner in 1781 to compensate for the additional transport, but the planters still had to pay a fee for the transport.22 Historical Sources Before examining trade and ship traffic to and from Essequibo and Demerara, a survey of the sources used in this study is in order. High-ranking WIC employees in the colonies were required to account for their endeavors, which led to a steady flow of correspondence to chamber Zeeland. After Great Britain formally acquired the Guyana colonies in 1814, much of the administrative paperwork at Berbice, Essequibo, and Demerara was sent to London, where it has been preserved in the Public Record Office. These papers include original letters and their appendices, as well as personnel documents, financial accounts, bills of purchase, ship consignment records, duty payments by foreign ships, and some architectural drawing of Fort Zelandia.23
20 PRO, CO 116/58: 26–28, Instructions – Article 23, December 1765 and 16 March 1786. 21 Netscher, Geschiedenis van de koloniën, 136. 22 PRO, CO 116/30: Storm van ’s Gravesande to chamber Zeeland, 13 November 1747; Netscher, Geschiedenis van de koloniën, 136. 23 M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofsz, ‘Documents in the Public Record Office of London concerning the Former Dutch Colonies of Essequibo, Demerary and Berbice,’ in Dutch Authors on West Indian History, Historiographical Selection, KITLV, Translation Series, no. 11 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1982), 240–52.
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Correspondence of Director General Storm van ’s Gravesande has been published, and a biography has been written about him, but shipping and trade have largely been ignored in these publications.24 This is not surprising because the commanders said little about these matters in their correspondence, even though the bewindhebbers in Zeeland were eager to learn more about them, especially about trade with foreign ships.25 Before 1775, the commanders kept good accounts of ship arrivals from the Republic and of commodities shipped on return voyages, but their correspondence never provided much detail about trade with foreigners. Another important source publication about these colonies was issued by the United States Commission on the Boundary Between Venezuela and British Guiana.26 Venezuela and British Guyana had a serious border dispute at the end of the nineteenth century, for which the President of the United States became the arbitrator. A committee was appointed for this purpose, which authorized G. L. Burr to do research in Spanish, English, and Dutch archives, resulting in a large, multi-lingual publication.27 But this publication also pays little attention to shipping and trade. Illustration no. 12.1 shows a ship consignment, which is a small piece of paper with the name of the ship and its master, the owner or agent for the cargo, the addressee, the nature and amount of the cargo, and its destination. The consignment also states that the captain promises to deliver the goods properly and in good condition, and it concludes with the taxed value of the cargo and the captain’s signature.
24 C. A. Harris and J. A. J. de Villiers, eds., Storm van ’s Gravesande: The Rise of British Guiana, Hakluyt Society, 2d ser., no. 27 (London: Hakluyt Society, 1911); J. A. J. de Villiers, ed., Storm van ’s Gravensande, zijn werk en zijn leven uit zijne brieven opgebouwd (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1920). 25 ARA, NWIC 3: Resoluties (res.) Heren X, 19 September 1712; ibid., 817: Chamber Zeeland to Storm van ’s Gravesande, 5 February 1770. 26 Report and Accompanying Papers of the Commission appointed by the President of the United States ‘to investigate and Report upon the True Divisional Line Between the Republic of Venezuela and British Guiana . . .,’ comp. United States Commission on Boundary between Venezuelea and British Guiana (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1896–1897); Report of the special Commission appointed by the President, January 4, 1896, . . . comp. United States Commission on Boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1898). 27 See V. Enthoven, ‘A Dutch Treat. Een Amerikaan in Zeeland op zoek naar El Dorado,’ Zeeuws Tijdschrift 49, no. 3 (1999): 25–28.
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Ship Traffic with Essequibo and Demerara During the eighteenth century, the Dutch colonies in Guyana developed into valuable economic entities. Each year, perhaps one thousand ocean-going ships and coastal vessels arrived at Essequibo and Demerara. For example, in the seven-month period between 15 August 1791 and 20 March 1792, 431 ships of several nationalities moored at Demerara alone: 82 Dutch, 196 British, 112 American, and 42 ships that were not specified.28 The Wild Coast had become a mainstay of a commercial network. Table 12.2 provides an overview of ship traffic to the Essequibo and Demerara colonies. In the first column are all the ships that arrived in the colonies from the Dutch Republic, and these are subdivided by bilateral and triangular shipping routes. Ships arriving from North America (including the United States) and the Caribbean are listed together. Each of these shipping routes will be discussed in detail.
The Slave Trade Slave labor was the engine of the plantation colonies in Guiana. Slaves cultivated the land and produced sugar and other commodities for export. Enslaved Africans were forcibly exported and shipped to various destinations in the New World and received little or no remuneration for their labor. Amsterdam and Zeeland were the most active WIC chambers in the slave trade while the company had a monopoly in the traffic. In the years 1675–1738, nearly 35 percent of the company’s slave ships were based in Amsterdam, and nearly 30 percent in Zeeland.29 Seventeen WIC slave ships arrived at Essequibo in the years 1700– 1739. Twelve of them, 70 percent, operated from Zeeland ports, two from the chamber Maze (Rotterdam), and two from Amsterdam. The port of origin of one is unknown. In 1727, merchants in Zeeland took the initiative to push for liberalization of the slave trade. Although WIC directors defended the 28 ARA, Collectie Hinxt 11: Lijsten van de in Demerary binnengelopen en uitgeloopen schepen, 15 August 1791–20 March 1792. 29 J. Postma, The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1600–1815 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 131.
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Table 12.2. Comparative Ship Traffic to Essequibo and Demerara, 1700–1819 Years
Dutch Ships Ann. Bilateral Ann. Slave Ann. American Ann. Grand Ann. Combined Avg. Ships Avg. Ships Avg. & Carib. Avg. Total Avg.
1700–1709 1710–1719 1720–1729 1730–1739 1740–1749 1750–1759 1760–1769 1770–1779 1780–1789 1790–1799 1800–1809 1810–1819 Total
18 19 23 24 36 45 88 170 232 166 17 36 874
1.8 1.9 2.3 2.4 3.6 4.5 8.8 17.0 23.2 16.6 1.7 3.6 7.3
13 15 20 19 31 42 71 146 214 161 17 36 785
1.3 1.5 2.0 1.9 3.1 4.2 7.1 14.6 21.0 16.0 1.7 3.6 6.6
5 4 3 5 5 3 17 24 18 5
0.5 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.3 1.7 2.4 1.8 0.5
89
0.7
30 60 100 140 212 425 683 1,224 1,157 2,120 1,680 1,160 9,009
3 6 10 14 21 43 68 124 116 212 168 116 75
48 79 123 164 248 470 771 1,412 1,389 2,286 1,697 1,196 9,883
Source: Tables 12.3, 12.5, 12.8.
company’s monopoly vigorously, in 1730 the States General allowed private merchants to participate in the traffic in restricted areas if they paid duties to the WIC. The slave trade to the Guiana coast remained under company monopoly until 1738.30 The Traffic to Essequibo and Demerara Zeeland merchants dominated the Dutch slave trade after the WIC withdrew from the traffic, especially to Essequibo and Demerara. Between 1740 and 1793, seventy-two Dutch ships transported slaves to these colonies (see table 12.3). Sixty-three of the ships were based in Zeeland, thirty-two in Middelburg and twenty-five in Flushing. Prominent among Zeeland’s participants in the traffic were the Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie (MCC) and the firm of Snouck Hurgronje and Louissen from Flushing. Of the remaining nine, two were based in Rotterdam, one in Amsterdam. A home port has not been identified for the remaining six.
30 H. den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven. Scheepvaart en handel van de Tweede Westindische Compagnie op Afrika, 1674–1740 (Zutphen: Walburg, 1997), 302 ff. See also chapters 4 and 5 in this volume.
4.8 7.9 12.3 16.4 24.8 47.0 77.1 141.2 138.6 228.6 169.7 119.6 82.4
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Table 12.3. Dutch Slave Imports to Essequibo and Demerara, 1700–1793 Years 1700–1709 1710–1719 1720–1729 1730–1739 1740–1749 1750–1759 1760–1769 1770–1779 1780–1789 1790–1793 Total
Ships 5 4 3 5 5 3 17 24 18 5 89
Slaves Estimated Documented Adjustments 1,349 833 577 1,040 760 180 2,822 5,355 5,186 1,379 19,481
121 120 124 428
793
Total Imported
Annual Avg.
1,349 833 577 1,040 881 300 2,946 5,783 5,186 1,379 20,279
135 83 58 104 88 30 295 578 519 345 195
Source: PRO, CO 116/18–67; Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, appendices 1 and 2.
Slave Imports and Prices The importation of slaves to Essequibo and Demerara increased gradually during the eighteenth century. For all but six of the eightynine ships listed in table 12.3, the number of slaves disembarked are known. Estimates had to be made for the remaining transports. The total number of slaves imported in the years 1700–1793 was about 20,279, while 1,600 has been estimated for previous years (see chapter 5). Table 12.4 provides an overview of the pricing of slaves at Essequibo and Demerara. The WIC generally sold its slaves according to contracts agreed to before a slave ship left its harbor in the Netherlands, and one knew beforehand how many slaves needed to be acquired and at which price. These slaves were delivered to contracting planters. Other slaves were sold at auction, and captains often tried to sell slaves privately.31 Prices fluctuated enormously at auctions, which is illustrated in chapter 9. For a variety of reasons, death rates among the slaves were generally higher than birth rates in most plantation societies, and this
31 PRO, CO 116/28: Storm van ’s Gravesande to chamber Zeeland, 30 April 1741.
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Table 12.4. Average Slave Prices for Selected Transports Arriving at Essequibo and Demerara, 1700–1791 (guilders) Year
Ship Name
1700 1705 1707 1715 1718 1724 1731 1739 1762 1762 1768 1768 1769 1770 1776 1779
Casteel Souburgh Pynenburg Stad Moskou d’Agatha Bosbeek Duinvliet Jonge Daniel Jonge Daniel Eensgezindheid Spreeuwenburg Marianne Zeeberg Digna Johanna Zeeberg Vis Jonge Lambrecht
Total Number Slaves Sold 188 280* 91–210 79 53–250 30–70 126–180 29 121 315 80 176 268 229 108–113 174
Total Proceeds
Average Slave Price
32,550.11 8,603–? 17,305 51,890–? 4,525–15,625 46,835–? 8,320 54,000 86,592 40,640 92,620 122,459 121,605 49,380–? 69,613
210 210 95–? 219 208–? 151–223 260–? 287 446 275 508 526 457 531 457–? 400
Sources: PRO, CO 116/19–67; Zeeuws Archief (ZA), Archief van de Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie (MCC) 1135. * One hundred slaves were sold to a plantation owner of Berbice.
stimulated demand for slaves.32 The noticeably inflated slave prices around 1700, illustrated in table 12.4, were caused by higher freight costs, rising wages of seamen, and rising purchase prices in Africa. At that time, prices for a healthy slave between 15 and 35 years of age fluctuated between ƒ200 and ƒ250, although contracted slaves were still sold for ƒ210 as late as 1741. Nevertheless, rising slave prices increasingly led to credit problems for slave traders.33 The rapid expansion of plantations at Essequibo raised the demand for slaves and drove prices even higher. During the second half of the eighteenth century, slave prices were generally higher in Essequibo than in Suriname.34
32 P. C. Emmer, De Nederlandse slavenhandel, 1500–1850 (Amsterdam: Arbeiderspers, 2000), 141–47. 33 ARA, NWIC 69: Heren X to Samuel Beekman, 18 December 1702; PRO, CO 116/34: Storm van ’s Gravesande to chamber Zeeland, 23 June 1764. 34 PRO, CO 116/35: Adriaan Spoors to chamber Zeeland, 16 June 1767; Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, 275–76.
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When importation of slaves was unreliable, especially during wars, planters looked for other sources, such as buying slaves from British traders. This was a gross violation of the WIC charter and annoyed its directors immensely. For that reason, most illegal importations were not mentioned in official records. A few cases of illicit slave deliveries have been uncovered, however. In 1770, a bark from St. Christopher illegally delivered thirty-seven slaves at Essequibo. The arrest of its captain, John Bermingham, caused considerable consternation among the planters. The following year, the owner of plantation Amelisweerd bought thirty-two slaves from an British bark. In 1784, British barks illegally shipped two slave transports at Demerara, one with 160 and the other with eighty slaves. Three years later, British ships reportedly landed 1,200 slaves illegally.35 Although the Dutch slave trade declined after 1780, the number of plantations in Essequibo and Demerara increased significantly in those years. British and American traders brought large numbers of slaves from Africa and the West Indies, both legally and illegally. British planters who emigrated to Demerara and Essequibo were allowed to bring slaves from their plantations on the Caribbean islands. Although WIC directors allowed this, they were concerned this might lead to illegal imports, as well as sick and rebellious slaves. For this reason, slaves imported in this manner could not be sold within two years.36 After the British conquest of Demerara and Essequibo, the combined colony expanded rapidly. Within ten years, the slave population doubled to about 60,000 (see table 12.1).37 Financial Transfers between the Dutch Republic and the Colonies Most private planters in the colonies had business representatives, known as correspondents or commissioners, in the Netherlands. They 35 PRO, CO 116/37: Storm van ’s Gravesande to chamber Zeeland, 21 July 1770; ibid., 116/37: Storm van ’s Gravesande to Heren X, 18 August 1770; ARA, NWIC 817: Chamber Zeeland to Storm van ’s Gravesande, 1 July 1771; ibid., 818: Chamber Zeeland to Jan Lespinasse, 31 October 1784, and chamber Zeeland to Lespinasse, 13 December 1784; ARA, Verzameling Pieter Paulus – Gerrit van Olivier 44: Aan den Hoog. Edelen Gestregen Heer Den Heer & Mr P. Paulus Raad & Advocaat Fiscaal bij het Edele Mogende Collegie ter Admiraliteit op de Maze . . . van den Luijtenant Frans Smeer, Schiedam, 7 October 1787. 36 ARA, NWIC 817: Chamber Zeeland to Storm van ’s Gravensande, 1 May 1769 and 24 July 1769. 37 Netscher, Geschiedenis van de koloniën, 281; Pinckard, Notes on the West Indies, 2: 216–18; Bolingbroke, A Voyage, 58–59.
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consigned their commodities to the commissioners, who were responsible for organizing auctions and selling the goods; arranging financial transactions for the planters, including settling bills of exchange; making mortgage payments; and paying debts incurred from the purchase of slaves. Several prominent Zeeland merchants (Abraham van der Elst, Marinus Spoors and Johannes de Laver), magistrates of Middelburg (Samuel Radermacher and Isaak Parker), and shipping magnates ( Jacob Wulphert, Bartholomeus Pieter Kappeyne van de Coppello and Johannes Louissen) also functioned as correspondents or commissioners for planters.38 As a rule, private shipping firms sold slaves on credit, as the WIC had done before. Upon the delivery of slaves, the ship’s captain received a bill of exchange from the buyer, which the planter’s commissioner paid after the colonial products were delivered and sold. Slaves could be bought on credit and paid for over a twenty-sevenmonth period. Between 1750 and 1770, many planters secured large mortgages (negotiaties) on their plantations. A director supervised such mortgages in the Netherlands, and a representative in the colonies (agendaris) had to make sure the plantation was a sound investment.39 The mortgage payments were made through plantation produce sent directly to the mortgage director. After 1766, more and more of the colonial products went to the director than to the commissioners. Some bills of exchange were not accepted in the Dutch Republic, often because the representative of the mortgage had a poor credit rating, was suspected of having extended too much credit, or signed invalid bills of exchange. Even bills from credit-worthy planters were occasionally refused. When such occurrences increased, slave creditors could no longer count on receiving their payment, and both investors and shipping firms tried to collect what they could from the value of the plantation. However, the investors usually had priority since they held the mortgage while the Zeeland slaving firms were left empty handed. For this reason, slave traders increasingly demanded payment in tropical commodities, a practice the mort-
38
Van de Voort, Westindische plantages, 30. PRO, CO 116/43: 115–16, Conditien van eene Negotiatie, ten behoeve van eenige planters, in de Colonien van Rio Essequebo en Rio Demerary. 39
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gage holders resented because they also wanted to be paid with these products.40 Slave-trade companies were thus severely harmed by the longterm credit extended to and the impaired financial position of the planters. In 1762, for example, planters paid for the slave transport of the MCC ship Enigheid within two years, but they accumulated indebtedness of ƒ650,000 for slaves purchased in the years 1763–1769. Many planters had serious financial problems even before the Amsterdam stock market crisis of 1773.41 As a consequence, some Dutch slave traders began questioning the merits of engaging in the slave traffic. When Van Schuilenburg, governor of Demerara, surrendered his colony to the British forces in February 1781, even before admiral Rodney claimed the territories, it provoked an outrage in the United Provinces. According to Pieter ’t Hoen, the editor-in-chief of De Post van den Neder-Rhijn, the real motive for this quick surrender was not that the 180 soldiers had no chance to defend the old fort against overwhelming enemy forces, but that the British takeover redeemed the impoverished planters from their creditors in the Netherlands.42 Disputes about the Slave Trade Storm van ’s Gravesande’s concern about the inadequate supply of slaves prompted him in 1757 to propose to his superiors in Zeeland that North Americans should be allowed to deliver slaves. The bewindhebbers were not at all pleased and rejected the request as out of
40
Van de Voort, Westindische plantages, 70, 212–13; PRO, CO 116/53: 69–70, Conditien en Voorwaarden waarop Capiteijn C. Vervenne voerende het schip de Jonge Lambrecht desselfs Armazoen slaven aan de Meestbiedende Presenteerd te verkopen, 15 March 1779. 41 ARA, VWIS 48: Request van verscheide kooplieden, 10 January 1770; Van de Voort, Westindische plantages, 212; ZA, Archief van de familie Mathias-Pous-Tak van Poortvliet 104: Verslag van den Commandeur Laurens Storm van ’s Gravesande, Middelburg, 19 June 1750. Storm van ’s Gravesande argued that most planters were in debt and that the future was bleak because prices of sugar in the Dutch Republic were low in the mid-eighteenth century. Much sugar cane was still on the land, but due to a shortage of sugar mills (nineteen in Essequibo and only three in Demerary) and bad horses, most of the sugar cane spoiled in the fields. See also Van Stipriaan, ‘Debunking Debts.’ 42 P. J. H. M. Theeuwen, Pieter ’t Hoen en de De Post van den Neder-Rhijn, 1781–1787. Een bijdrage tot kennis van de Nederlandse geschiedenis in het laatste kwart van de achttiende eeuw (Hilversum: Verloren, 2002), 158–59.
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hand. Suggestions that planters outfit their own slave ships were likewise dismissed.43 Some slave traders obtained wood-and-salt permits for Essequibo and Demerara but sold all or some of their slaves at Suriname or elsewhere because the credit time-line there was considerably shorter (see appendix 12.1). In response to this, Commander Jan van der Heuvel of Demerara requested in 1769 that credit terms be made the same as in Suriname, which prompted Zeeland directors to try and correct the practice.44 Zeeland trading firms admitted that slave deliveries between 1749 and 1762 could have been better, but they still objected to North Americans bringing slaves, the apparent preference of British planters. This would hurt their business a great deal.45 The complaints about inadequate slave deliveries reached a climax in 1768 when local authorities denied the ship Amphitrite permission to sell slaves because the captain lacked the proper permits. Angry planters asked the States General to allow foreign ships to deliver slaves, but the request was turned down.46 The dispute over slave imports died down during the Fourth AngloDutch War (1780–1784), primarily because British shippers adequately supplied them, but the issue surfaced again after the war. Interrupted shipbuilding and the capture of many ships created a shortage of Dutch commercial ships. In January 1784, the trading firms of Snouck Hurgronje and Louissen received permission from the States General to purchase three ships for the slave trade from foreign suppliers. This started a new trend.47 A committee appointed by the States General in the spring of 1787 concluded that the sur43 PRO, CO 116/32: Storm van ’s Gravesande to chamber Zeeland, 27 December 1757; ARA, NWIC 817: Chamber Zeeland to Storm van ’s Gravesande, 19 February 1770; PRO, CO 116/35: Storm van ’s Gravesande to chamber Zeeland, 12 December 1766. 44 ARA, NWIC 817: Chamber Zeeland to Storm van ’s Gravesande, 28 November 1768, 9 October 1769, and 24 July 1769; PRO, CO 116/36: Jan Cornelis van den Heuvel to chamber Zeeland, 10 March 1769; Van de Voort, Westindische plantages, 174. 45 Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, 220. See ARA, VWIS 48: Requeste van verscheide Kooplieden, Burgers en Ingezetenen der Steden Middelburg en Vlissingen, concernerende den vrijen Invoer van Engelsche en andere vreemde Slaven in die Colonie, 18 January 1770. 46 PRO, CO 116/36: Van den Heuvel to chamber Zeeland, 10 March 1769, and Spoors to chamber Zeeland, 30 January 1768; ARA, VWIS 1222: Request van eenige inwoners van Essequebo en Demerary aan de Staten-Generaal . . . 19 December 1769; Van de Voort, De Westindische plantages, 128. 47 ARA, VWIS 983: Extract uit het Register der Resolutien . . ., 30 January 1784.
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vival of Essequibo and Demerara as colonies depended on adequate slave deliveries, and this could be accomplished only if shipping firms were allowed to obtain ships from foreign countries. The recommendation was accepted on condition that Dutch shipping firms hold title to such ships.48 While the planters appreciated these developments, they were still not satisfied. In their new request to the States General they argued that slaves should no longer be paid for in commodities with bills of exchange and that the British were better equipped to supply slaves. Dutch trading firms, especially the MCC, expressed grave concern about the danger of foreign competition. It was difficult for them already, they argued. Recently, the slave ship Brandenburg had to wait eighteen months for a return cargo.49 How could planters, already deeply in debt, acquire bills of exchange? The States General concurred with the shipping firms and rejected the planters’ request. Nevertheless, the planters got their way a few years later when the British captured the colonies and let British and North American ships provide the planters with many slaves.50
Bilateral Trade with the Dutch Republic Table 12.5 provides an overview of the bilateral trade between the Netherlands and Essequibo-Demerara, which had been primarily in the hands of Zeeland firms before 1770. Of the 211 Dutch ships leaving Essequibo and Demerara in the years 1700–1769, 129 sailed to Middelburg, nine to Flushing, one to Veere, and probably one to Amsterdam. The destination of seventy-one departures is unknown, but the majority appear headed for Zeeland. Twelve of these ships did not reach their destination.51 Table 12.5 provides a tally of shipping between the United Provinces and Essequibo-Demerara. 48
For the commission of Van Wijn, see note 61. ARA, VWIS 712: Request van planters en ingezetenen van Essequebo en Demerary, 6 February 1788, Relatijf tot de Staate Notulen van Zeeland, 7 April 1788; ibid., 712: 6–9, Request van Directeuren van de Commercie Compagnie C.S. te Middelburg en Vlissingen, Relatijf tot de Staten Notulen van Zeeland, 14 April 1788. 50 P. J. van Winter, Het aandeel van den Amsterdamschen handel aan den opbouw van het Amerikaansche Gemeenbest, Werken uitgegeven door de Vereeniging het Nederlandsch Economisch-Historisch Archief, no. 9 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1933), 1:15. 51 Four of the twelve ships were captured, six were shipwrecked, and two were condemned. 49
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Table 12.5. Bilateral Shipping Between the Dutch Republic and Essequibo and Demerara, 1700–1819 Years Zeeland 1700–1709 1710–1719 1720–1729 1730–1739 1740–1749 1750–1759 1760–1769 1770–1779 1780–1789 1790–1799 1800–1809 1810–1819 Total
1 11 9 18 39 64 70 82 16
378
Documented Amsterdam Not Specified
1 66 123 90 11 24 315
Estimate*
Total
Annual Average
54 6 12 72
13 15 20 19 31 42 71 146 214 161 17 36 785
1.3 1.5 2.0 1.9 3.1 4.2 7.1 15.0 21.0 16.0 1.7 3.6
Total
13 14 9 10 13 20 7 10 9 1
20
13 15 20 19 31 42 71 146 214 107 11 24 713
Source: Van der Oest Data Collection, based on PRO, CO 116/18–67, ARA, VWIS 73, 59, 114, 150, 151, 152; George Welling Data Collection: http://odur.let.rug.nl/~welling/paalgeld/appendix.html. See also appendix 14.1 in this volume. * After 1791, only ships arriving in Amsterdam are included. Estimates for Zeeland and Rotterdam arrivals for the years after 1791 are extrapolated from the 1790 and 1791 data.
Amsterdam’s involvement with Essequibo was virtually non-existent during the early eighteenth century, primarily due to the colony’s modest size. The town’s merchants were indirectly involved with the colony, however, as some of the correspondents who covered bills of exchange for Essequibo lived in the capital. The relevant commodities had to be trans-shipped from Zeeland to Amsterdam by interior waterways, and planters were not pleased by these cumbersome and costly arrangements.52 During the 1770s, Amsterdam became much more involved with Essequibo and Demerara. Of the 146 Dutch ships sailing to these colonies, nearly half (66) left from Amsterdam. During the 1780s, the bilateral trade was seriously interrupted by the Fourth AngloDutch War, as the following number of voyages illustrate: 1780 (25),
52
Van de Voort, Westindische plantages, 65, 129.
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1781 (4), 1782 (2), 1783 (9), and 1784 (28). Some losses were unavoidable. There were a few shipwrecks, and nine ships were captured by the British on their return voyage.53 This belated interest by Amsterdam shipping firms is best explained by the financing schemes that started during the 1750s. Although Amsterdam’s primary interest was in Suriname, more than half of the mortgages in Essequibo and Demerara were financed by Amsterdam merchants.54 But this is not the only reason for this city’s new interest in these colonies.
The Essequibo Conflict The privileged position that Zeeland enjoyed in the trade with Essequibo and Demerara had long been a bone of contention with Amsterdam merchants. In August 1750, the Heren X urged the various chambers to promote trade with these colonies because ships were needed to transport their commodities to the Dutch Republic.55 The WIC’s Zeeland directors claimed that commercial and slavetrade shipping was not part of the regular division of shipping (roulatiesysteem) among the chambers, but that Essequibo and Demerara were special cases justified by earlier Zeeland initiatives. They reminded the commander that no ships were to be admitted in the colonies without a proper wood-and-salt permit from the Zeeland chamber. In 1754, Storm van ’s Gravesande stopped the Amsterdam ship the Arend from auctioning its cargo until Zeeland’s ship the Achilles arrived.56 The conflict between Amsterdam and Zeeland over shipping with Essequibo developed into an intense juridical war of words, known as the Essequeebsche kwestie, which lasted about twenty years. The WIC and the States General could not resolve the issue, and in 1772 they referred it to William of Nassau, Prince of Orange (1748–1806) and director general (opperbewindhebber) of the WIC, who finally broke the impasse by ruling against Zeeland. William based his decision 53
See table 12.5 and its sources. Van de Voort, Westindische plantages, 265, and appendix 19. See also note 5. 55 Kunst, Recht, commercie en kolonialisme, 111; Van de Voort, Westindische plantages, 127; ARA, NWIC 12: res. Heren X, 11 August 1750. 56 ARA, VWIS 1192: Chamber Zeeland to States General, 24 November 1750; ARA, NWIC 815: Chamber Zeeland to Adriaan Spoors, 16 September 1750; PRO, CO 116/31: Storm van ’s Gravesande to chamber Zeeland, 19 February 1754. 54
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on the existence of free trade within the area of the WIC, which meant that all citizens of the United Provinces could trade there.57 Zeeland merchants and shipping firms were therefore no longer entitled to a monopoly. The new regulation for shipping to and from Essequibo and Demerara took effect in January 1771. It stipulated that Zeeland could still issue permits to the first sixteen ships that sailed to the two colonies. If fewer than sixteen Zeeland shippers were interested, merchants from other areas could apply. But these ships had to sail in ballast to Zeeland and there load a cargo and supplies. The return cargo also had to be taken to Middelburg. These conditions did not go over well in Amsterdam. Zeeland’s reaction to the limited opening of the trade led to the establishment of the shipping firm Sociëteit ter Navigatie op Essequibo, which, to avoid competition with the MCC, did not engage in the slave trade.58 In an effort to create greater harmony between Amsterdam and Zeeland shippers, William amended the regulations in January 1772. Accordingly, during the first half of each year only the Zeeland chamber could issue permits for trade with Essequibo and Demerara. Any Dutch citizen was eligible for a permit as long as at least nine of the ships returned to Zeeland to load and unload their freight. Ships arriving in the colonies before December would receive preference in loading their return cargoes. All WIC chambers could issue permits during the second half of the year, but these ships had to wait for return cargoes until ships of the early group were loaded.59 This complicated revision in shipping regulations temporarily resolved the Essequibo problem. Despite increased production at Essequibo and Demerara, ships often had to wait a long time to get a return cargo. To avoid the wait, some Zeeland ships left with a smaller cargoes than specified in their contract. Most Amsterdam ships did not wait for a return
57 ARA, Archief van de Stadhouderlijke Secretarie 1316–1318: Stukken over de vrije vaart op Essequebo en Demerary, 1750–1794; Van Dillen, Van rijkdom en regenten, 589–90. 58 Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean, 1680–1791, 451; ARA, Familiearchief Hop 99: S. Dedel to J. Hop, 16 December 1770; ARA, VWIS 47: 2; Van de Voort, Westindische plantages, 133. 59 ZA, Familiearchief Snouck Hurgronje 30: Nadere Pointen rakende de Vaart en Handel op de Colonie van Essequebo en Demerary . . ., 5 December 1770, provisionelyk beraamd en vastgesteld, 16 January 1772.
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cargo at all and left in ballast. Twenty-three ships did so between 1784 and 1789, and all but two returned to Amsterdam. Most planters continued to ship their products with the Zeeland firms, with whom they were familiar. Amsterdam shippers had trouble establishing connections with planters, and the local administration did not offer much assistance.60 Shipping After 1784 When the WIC requested a government subsidy of ƒ3 million in 1783, the problems concerning Essequibo and Demerara reemerged with a vengeance. The States of Holland demanded that the regulations of 1771 and the amendments of 1772 be rescinded. In 1786, the States General appointed a committee to reassess all the issues regarding shipping and trade with these colonies. This so-called Van Wijn Committee published its findings on 19 March 1789, recommending that the Dutch West Indian trade, valued at ƒ27 million annually for the Dutch Republic, be sustained and that the WIC be given a ƒ500,000 loan plus an annual subsidy of ƒ250,000.61 The committee also recommended that shipping regulations to Essequibo and Demerara be thoroughly revised. Shipping to these colonies should be open to all citizens of the Dutch Republic, and the existing advantages for Zeeland should be rescinded, although Zeelanders should still qualify for reduced duty payments. The committee also recommended that ships built in foreign countries be used in the slave trade for a period of three years. Dutch ships could not transport slaves to foreign colonies but could ship fish, mules, flour, and lumber to them. Foreign ships could only export rum, molasses, and lumber from Dutch colonies. To combat smuggling, the committee recommended that war ships be sent to the colonies.62 60 PRO, CO 116/34: 35, 37, Storm van ’s Gravesande to chamber Zeeland, 10 August 1767, 9 October 1765, 27 August 1771; ARA, VWIS 11: Lijst van Scheepen welke naar de ontruiming der colonie door de Franschen, van en naar dezelve zijn gegaan, 25 October 1791. 61 ARA, Archief van de Staten-Generaal (SG) 9424: Rapport van de gedeputeerden Hendrik van Wijn, Nicolaes Cornelis Crommelin en Hendrik Ludolf Lambrechtsen betreffende de vrije vaart op Essequebo en Demerary . . ., 19 March 1787. 62 At Essequibo and Demerara, Zeeland ships did not need to pay the usual ƒ3 per last (two tons) arrival and ƒ6 departing duty. Ships from other regions in the Dutch Republic were required to pay an extra duty of ƒ9 per last. See Van de Voort, Westindische plantages, 207. See also previous note.
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Amsterdam merchants were very pleased with the recommendations, and the new policy stimulated the city’s shipping with the colonies. The dominance of Zeeland had finally been dissolved. International conflicts Wars usually impeded ship traffic between Europe and the Western Hemisphere in the eighteenth century. The slave trade to Essequibo and Demerara came to a complete halt during the War of the Spanish Succession (1710–1714) and the Seven Year War (1756–1763). On the other hand, the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748) barely influenced shipping to these colonies, although a few Dutch ships became victims of North American privateers. Even before peace was restored, shipping between the Netherlands and Essequibo had resumed, in spite of the fact that Zeeland did not officially permit ships to leave their harbors because they were on notice to assist in the defense of the province.63 Although the Dutch Republic remained neutral during the Seven Year War, ship traffic with the colonies was seriously hampered by British and French privateers.64 Merchant ships at Essequibo remained safely in the river until it was safe to go to sea. The MCC urged the States General to organize convoys for ships on return voyages, because during the previous war they had lost two of their ships to French privateers, while the WIC lost 240,000 pounds of sugar and planters an additional 480,000 pounds. These losses, however, had not prevented shipping firms from intensifying trade with Essequibo and Demerara toward the end of the war.65 The Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780–1784) inflicted enormous losses on the Dutch merchant marine. The British captured and confiscated twelve Dutch slave ships and virtually halted the Dutch 63 C. E. Swanson, Predators and Prize: American Privateering and Imperial Warfare, 1739–1748, Studies in Maritime History, no. 10 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991), 197–98; ARA, NWIC 681: Resoluties (res.) chamber Zeeland, 18 April 1747. 64 See chapter 14, note 49, in this volume. 65 A. C. Carter, The Dutch Republic in Europe in the Seven Years War (London: Macmillan, 1971), 121–22; D. J. Starkey, British Privateering Enterprise in the Eighteenth Century, Exeter Maritime Studies, no. 4 (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1990); PRO, CO 116/33: Storm van ’s Gravesande to chamber Zeeland, 31 July 1762; ARA, VWIS 52; PRO, CO 116/30: 333, 335, 594–601, Spoors to chamber Zeeland, 23 December 1750, and the cargo lists of the ships Juffrouw Margaretha and Jalousie.
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7/18/03
30
25
20
10
5
00
17
10
17
20
17
30
17
40
17
50
17
60
17
70
17
80
17
90
17
00
18
10
18
20
18
Years
347
Graph 12.1. Shipping to Essequibo and Demerara, 1700–1819: Five-Year Moving Averages
Page 347
15
7:06 PM
No. of ships
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slave trade. The war took the WIC to the edge of bankruptcy as it forfeited most duty payments and lost several colonies to the British, including Essequibo and Demerara. The MCC and the Sociëteit ter Navigatie op Essequibo lost several ships – including fifteen ships captured by British privateers – and suffered significant financial losses.66 Despite the war, the amounts of sugar shipped to the Netherlands were at about the same level as before the war. Colonial products were obviously imported indirectly, both during and after the war, by way of French and British colonies. During the years of French control (1781–1784), Essequibo and Demerara exported nearly 15.8 million pounds of coffee, 3.2 million pounds of cotton, more than 1 million pounds of cacao, and 12.6 million pounds of sugar.67 Between March 1784 and May 1785, foreign ships transported 600,000 pounds of sugar, 600,000 pounds of coffee, and 325,000 pounds of cotton from Essequibo and Demerara to North America and French and British West Indian islands.68 How much of these products eventually ended up in the United Provinces is unknown. During the war, many Dutch ships sailed under neutral flags, listing neutral ports like Hamburg, Bremen, and Ostend as their destination. The Middelburg ship Jonge Jacob, for example, sailed in 1782 from Demerara to Ostend under the Austrian imperial flag.69 Recent research has shown that after 1783, a large number of United States ships sailed to Amsterdam (see appendix 14.1).70 These neu-
66 Starkey, British Privateering Enterprise, 233–34; Van de Voort, Westindische plantages, 133. 67 Souty, Trois rivières, 298–99. 68 Ibid., 286–88, 293–96; ARA, VWIS 150: Lijst der Uijtgeklaarde Vaartuijgen, 11 March 1784–12 May 1789. 69 E. S. van Eyck van Heslinga, ‘De vlag dekt de lading. De Nederlandse koopvaardij in de Vierde Engelse oorlog,’ Tijdschrift voor Zeegeschiedenis 1 (1982): 102–13; K. H. Schwebel, Bremer Kaufleute in den Freihäfen der Karibik. Von den Anfängen der Bremer Überseehandels bis 1815, Veröffentlichungen aus der Staatsarchiv der freien Hansestadt Bremen, no. 59 (Bremen: Staatsarchiv, 1995); J. Parmentier, ‘Profit and Neutrality: The Case of Ostend, 1781–1783,’ in Pirates and Privateers: New Perspectives on the War in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, ed. D. J. Starkey, E. S. van Eyck van Heslinga, and J. A. de Moor, Exeter Maritime Studies, no. 9 (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1997), 206–26. Parmentier shows that during the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War an economic boom took place in Ostend, which stayed neutral during the war. Many foreign merchants settled in the city and started to trade with the West Indies and America under imperial flag. Of the 1,944 officially issued imperial passports in Ostend, 37.2 percent were used for Dutch ships. 70 G. M. Welling, The Prize of Neutrality: Trade Relations between Amsterdam and North America, 1771–1817, A Study in Computational History, Amsterdamse Historische Reeks, kleine ser., no. 39 (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, 1998), 194.
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tral ships transported at least some of the commodities cultivated in Dutch colonies. Using neutral flags or ships was not risk free, however, and there was considerable fear in the Netherlands that foreign shipping might replace the Dutch merchant marine. How many neutral ships were employed in the manner is not certain, but the Jonge Jacob was not the only one.71 Exporting Colonial Commodities Sugar was undoubtedly the most important commodity produced at Essequibo. But during the 1720s, the WIC bewindhebbers gave orders to introduce other crops. Cacao, cotton, and rice were planted, but none was initially successful. Indigo was tried at a company plantation, but it was ruined by a caterpillar plague in 1747, and the orange harvest of 1761 was so disappointing that the WIC advised discontinuance of that crop. Tobacco was tried at a company plantation, but that also failed, although private plantations had somewhat better luck.72 Table 12.6 provides an overview of commodity exports from Essequibo and Demerara. Coffee cultivation initially enjoyed some success. Exports of coffee beans began in 1725, increased significantly during the 1730s, and declined again after 1745. After 1755, however, coffee exports increased steadily and reached a peak during the 1780s. The cultivation of cotton also seemed promising for a while, but cotton did not become a significant export crop until 1784. Cacao beans were first exported in 1734 and after a steady rise reached a peak during the 1760s but dwindled again after the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War. The British visitor Henry Bolingbroke observed in 1799 that ‘cultivation along the river [Demerara] is confined to sugar, coffee, and plantains, with a small quantity of cacao and rice. The latter was but recently introduced.’73 71 ARA, VWIS 983: Remarques op ’t Project . . . om onder Neutraale vlag met Neutraale Schepen . . . te mogen navigeeren na de Colonien . . . en ook van daar te retourneren, 16 February 1781; S. R. Waldra, ‘Schipper Cornelis Gerrits; een Medemblikker vaart op de West, 1783–1789,’ Tijdschrift voor Zeegeschiedenis 3, no. 2 (1984): 98–126. Waldra notes that after the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War, many neutral ships stopped at Demerara. 72 Netscher, Geschiedenis van de koloniën, 106; PRO, CO 116/21: Pieter van der Heyden Resen to chamber Zeeland, 16 September 1715; ibid., 116/23: De Heere to chamber Zeeland, 9 February 1721; ibid., 116/33: Storm van ’s Gravesande to chamber Zeeland, 18 May 1761; ibid., 116/24: De Heere to chamber Zeeland, 23 August 1724; ibid., 116/25: De Heere to chamber Zeeland, 1 March 1727. 73 Bolingbroke, A Voyage, 18.
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Table 12.6 (A). Tropical Commodities Exported from Essequibo and Demerara, 1700–1791 (pounds) Years 1700–1709 1710–1719 1720–1729 1730–1739 1740–1749 1750–1759 1760–1769 1770–1779 1780–1789 1790–1791 Total
Sugar Documented Adjustment* 5,191,000 4,464,400 7,036,000 9,070,400 10,149,600 14,512,000 17,078,200 2,147,500 106,540,000 36,920,000 213,109,100
Total
Coffee Documented Adjustment*
Total
5,191,000 4,464,400 7,036,000 6,800 6,800 9,070,400 70,600 70,600 10,149,600 24,660 24,660 14,512,000 48,330 48,330 7,834,600 24,912,800 849,430 4,005,920 4,855,350 33,152,700 35,300,200 3,000 54,609,480 54,612,480 106,540,000 21,830,400 69,189,608 91,020,008 36,920,000 11,541,530 11,541,530 244,441,000 34,374,750 162,179,758
Table 12.6 (B). Tropical Commodities Exported from Essequibo and Demerara, 1700–1791 (pounds) Years 1700–1709 1710–1719 1720–1729 1730–1739 1740–1749 1750–1759 1760–1769 1770–1779 1780–1789 1790–1791 Total
Cacao Documented
8,225 45,150 68,250 158,550 16,500 296,675
Documented
14,700 43,200 4,625,250 1,839,600 6,522,750
Cotton Adjustment*
172,800 2,593,280 4,723,324
Total
14,700 216,000 2,593,280 9,348,574 1,839,600 14,012,154
Source: PRO CO 116/19–67; ARA, NWIC 819, 983, 1135; ARA, VWIS 73, 151, 305; ARA, Familiearchief Hop 99. * Adjustments are based on the figures from Souty, Trois rivières, 286–97.
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Table 12.7. Market Value of Essequibo and Demerara Commodities, 1700–1791 (guilders) Years
Average Annual Values Sugar Coffee Cacao Cotton Amount Price Amount Price Amount Price Amount Price per lb per lb per lb per lb
1700–1709 98,629 0.19 1710–1719 71,430 0.16 1720–1729 98,504 0.14 422 0.62 1730–1739 99,774 0.11 4,377 0.62 1740–1749 182,693 0.18 1,233 0.50 1750–1759 232,192 0.16 2,223 0.46 1760–1769 423,518 0.17 199,069 0.41 1770–1779 635,404 0.18 2,129,887 0.39 1780–1789 2,130,800 0.20 5,006,100 0.55 1790–1791 5,722,600 0.31 3,231,628 0.56 Annual Avg. 969,544
1,057,494
485 0.33 2,462 0.57
1,235 20,304 241,175 157,259 0.34 1,103,132 349,524 0.38 1,048,572 50,973
241,442
0.84 0.94 0.93 1.18 1.14
Total
18,740 11,429 14,052 13,689 33,501 39,371 174,105 1,169,321 4,534,679 4,911,909 1,092,080
Source: table 12.6. For market values see table 11.7.
Both the WIC and private planters utilized private shipping firms to transport their crops to the Republic. Freight prices tended to fluctuate over time and varied according to product. In 1712, the WIC paid more than one stuiver per pound to transport eighty hogshead (oxhoofd ) of sugar. When the company transported sugar for private planters in 1739, it charged half a stuiver or eight penningen ( ƒ0:01:08) per pound.74 In 1740, the cost of freight from Suriname was one stuiver per pound for coffee and five duiten ( ƒ0:00:10) per pound for sugar. In Essequibo, planters paid one stuiver per pound for sugar transport, but the charge rose to 1.5 stuivers or 24 penningen ( ƒ0:01:08) after 1758 and declined to half a stuiver per pound by 1789. By that time, the freight charge for cotton was ƒ00:01:12 per pound. Freight prices for coffee beans fluctuated around ten penningen per pound in a barrel and twelve penningen in a bag.75 In addition to freight, export duties had to be paid to the WIC. For a hogshead of sugar, weighing approximately 800 pounds, planters
74 ARA, NWIC 813: Chamber Zeeland to Van der Heyden Resen, 25 April 1712; PRO, CO 116/28: 140, cargalijst der Jonge Daniël, 1739. 75 PRO, CO 116/31: Spoors to chamber Zeeland, 11 October 1754; Van de Voort, Westindische plantages, 65; ARA, NWIC 829: 4, res. States of Zeeland, 2 November 1789.
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paid ƒ54 or about one stuiver per pound. When sugar prices dropped in 1719, Zeeland merchants requested but were denied lower duties. In 1770, export duties were eight stuivers per pound of coffee and twelve stuivers per pound of cotton.76 The planter had to pay several other minor expenses to get his product converted to money. In 1773, a public auction at Middelburg for a Mr. Zwitser of Essequibo listed the following costs: duty payments, barrel costs, sea insurance, auction fees, storage rent, weighing fees, porter fees, legal fees, brokerage fees (1 percent of gross profit), insurance, and commission. Twenty hogshead of sugar, weighing collectively nearly 11,000 pounds, were sold for ƒ1,250. The commissioners Van de Perre and Meijnders received a 2 percent provision. After all costs were deducted, the planter cleared ƒ38 per hogshead, or twenty-two penningen ( ƒ0:01:06) per pound.77 Supplies from Europe In addition to passengers and mail, ships coming from the Dutch Republic also carried equipment (axes, drills, chisels, and nails), household articles (kettles, mirrors, spoons, tobacco pipes, and shaving knives), clothing (German linens, hats, Flemish textiles), building materials (bricks), food items (salted meat, dried fish, oils, salt, wine, beer, dried fruit), dairy products (butter and cheese), and spices (cinnamon and cloves). Such products were sent by the WIC and private merchants and were intended for WIC personnel, private planters, and for trade with indigenous Indians. Early on, the WIC used its own ships to carry these wares, but later they hired private ships for transport. A portion of the WIC materials was sold to private individuals in the company store. Private firms, such as the MCC, sent their wares to their agents or let the ship captain sell them.78
76
ARA, NWIC 664 and 665: res. chamber Zeeland, 21 December 1719 and 7 July 1721; ibid., 697: res. Heren X, 15 January 1770. 77 ZA, Archief Adriaan Anthony Brown 55: Factuur over 20 oxhoofden zuiker, Middelburg, 22 November 1773. 78 PRO, CO 116/21: 311–12, Lijste van goederen gesonden na Essequebo met het schip Poelwijk, schipper Jan de Mol, 1 June 1716; Van de Voort, Westindische plantages, 66.
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The transported goods varied greatly in value, quantity, and quality. Company personnel complained about quality on a regular basis but the bewindhebbers usually ignored them.79 Merchants and shipping firms that traded with the colonies were usually represented by part-time correspondents or agents, often local planters or merchants. During the second half of the eighteenth century, for example, the MCC hired the services of Demerara residents Abraham de Codin and Jan Ridder. Some WIC employees, including Adriaan Spoors, Hermanus Boter, Jan Lespinasse, Laurens Storm van ’s Gravesande, and Anthony Meertens also worked part time for the MCC. They received a commission for sending the Zeeland company information about markets, political conditions, and price levels. The commissions were higher than in Suriname, because agents had to travel between the two colonies and distances between plantations in Essequibo and Demerara were greater.80
Foreign Traders from North America and West India As mentioned earlier, many foreign ships came to Essequibo and Demerara toward the end of the eighteenth century. In the eleven-year period 1781–1791, 1,937 foreign vessels arrived at Demerara alone from the following ports: 368 from Curaçao, 598 from St. Eustatius, 197 from St. Croix in Puerto Rico, 581 from North America, and 193 from Essequibo. In the short period between 15 August 1791 and 20 March 1792, 196 British, 112 North American, and dozens more from other West Indian ports arrived at Demerara.81 The emphasis here will be on the North American commerce because its records have been better preserved than those for the West Indian trade.
79 For examples of such complaints, see De Villiers, Storm van ’s Gravesande, 61–63; PRO, CO 116/27: Hermanus Gelskerke to chamber Zeeland, 30 June 1733; ARA, NWIC 814: Chamber Zeeland to Gelskerke, 5 February 1733; ibid., 816: Chamber Zeeland to Storm van ’s Gravesande, 2 December 1765; ibid., 818: Chamber Zeeland to Schuijlenburg, 30 August 1779. 80 ZA, MCC 58: 1–2, and 59; Van de Voort, Westindische plantages, 68. 81 ARA, VWIS 305: Totaal der Recognitien van 1771–1789, 1790 and 1791. In the same period, the following numbers of ships left Demerara: 378 to Curaçao, 553 to St. Eustatius, 110 to St. Croix and Puerto Rico, 452 to North America, and 240 to Essequibo; ARA, Collectie Hinxt 11: Lijsten van de in Demerary binnengelopen en uitgeloopen schepen, 15 August 1791–20 March 1792.
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Initially, non-Dutch ships were not allowed to call at Essequibo and Demerara, but the governors permitted it in emergencies such as food shortages. WIC officials at Essequibo regularly bought provisions, including beef, bacon, fish, butter, spices, salt, biscuits, flour, wine, tobacco, lime, and tar, from foreigners.82 As a rule, foreign ships came from the Caribbean islands, the Spanish American mainland, and the North American mainland. Planters could profit from trade with foreigners because they often paid higher prices for tropical commodities. North Americans in particular were also interested in buying sugar by-products, such as molasses and locally distilled rum, which were not in demand in the Dutch Republic.83 North American Shipping Essequibo and Demerara’s commercial contacts with North Americans went back to the end of the seventeenth century, especially with merchants in Boston, New York, New London, Newbury, Salem, Baltimore, Portsmouth, and Philadelphia. As a rule, North Americans used small barks of about 30–100 tons capacity. They arrived at Essequibo and Demerara in growing numbers, especial after this trade was partially legalized in 1742. By the end of the eighteenth century, nearly two hundred North American ships traded at Demerara annually, and about twenty-five at Essequibo.84 The combined North American ship traffic is listed in table 12.8. The plantation colonies needed horses to drive the sugar mills but could never import an adequate number from Europe. One reason why company personnel repeatedly asked WIC directors to ease restrictions on foreign trade was that North Americans were able and eager to meet their needs. The bewindhebbers relented eventually and admitted the importation of horses in 1729.85 82 PRO, CO 116/19: 192, Rekeninghe van aangebrachte provisien door capitein Nicolaas Evertse, 10 August 1700; ibid., 116/25: De Heere to chamber Zeeland, 13 February 1726. 83 A. J. van der Meulen, Studies over het Ministerie van Van der Spiegel (Leiden: Kooyker, 1905), 432. Only between 1750 and 1770 was some rum exported to the Netherlands. See PRO, CO 116/30–36; ibid., 116/40: 387, 389, Rekeningen-courant van de Compagnie-plantages Luixbergen en Agtenkerke, 1774. If not exported, locally distilled rum was consumed primarily by military personnel and by slaves. 84 R. Pares, Yankees and Creoles: The Trade Between North America and the West Indies Before the American Revolution (London: Longman, 1956), 131; PRO, CO 33/14: Shipping lists of the Port of Bridgetown, Barbados, 1704–1719. 85 PRO, CO 116/21: Van der Heyden Resen to chamber Zeeland, 15 April 1711; Thompson, Colonialism and Underdevelopment, 49.
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Table 12.8. North American Shipping to Essequibo and Demerara, 1700–1817 Years
Essequibo Demerara Total Documented Estimate Documented Estimate Months Ships Monthly Ships Yearly Months Ships Monthly Ships Yearly Ships Yearly Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg.
1700–1709 1710–1719 1720–1729 1730–1739 1740–1749 1750–1759 1760–1769 1770–1779 1780–1789 1790–1799 1800–1809 1810–1819 Total
12 34 63 17
22 76 122 29
1.8 2.2 1.9 1.7
30 60 100 140 170 220 268 232 205 200 180 160 1,965
3 6 10 14 17 22 27 23 20 20 18 16
24 48 47 7
83 404 373 112
3.5 8.4 7.9 16.0
42 205 415 1,010 952 1,920 1,500 1,000 7,044
4 21 42 101 95 192 150 100
30 60 100 140 212 425 683 1,242 1,157 2,120 1,680 1,160 9,009
3 6 10 14 21 43 68 124 116 212 168 116
Source: PRO, CO 33/14–18; ibid., 116/19–67; ARA, VWIS 150, 152; ARA, Collectie Hinxt 11: Lijsten van de in Demerary binnengelopen en uitgelopen schepen, 15 August 1791–20 March 1792.
The price of imported horses averaged under ƒ100 in the early eighteenth century, but in time of war it could go as high as ƒ200. The British Molasses Act of 1733 contributed to a gradual rise of prices in the British Caribbean region, which stimulated the importation of horses from the Spanish Orinoco delta, to the east of Essequibo.86 But this trade link was cut off during the wars in 1740–1748 and 1756–1763. Spanish privateers attacked several plantations at Essequibo, and French privateers captured horse-carrying Spanish vessels. The demand for horses gradually declined after the mid-eighteenth century, because planters began to rely increasingly on water and wind to power the sugar mills.87
86 PRO, CO 116/20: Beekman to chamber Zeeland, 20 October 1707; ibid., 116/24: De Heere to chamber Zeeland, 15 August 1725; Pares, Yankees and Creoles, 126–33; PRO, CO 116/26: Gelskerke to chamber Zeeland, 5 December 1733. 87 PRO, CO 116/30: Storm van ’s Gravesande to chamber Zeeland, 11 November 1749, ibid., 116/33: Storm van ’s Gravesande to chamber Zeeland, 1 November 1761, and 24 November 1762; Van Stipriaan, Surinaams contrast, 174. In the case of Suriname, Van Stipriaan shows that 50 percent of the transition from animalpowered mills to alternative powers like water, took place in the second half of the eighteenth century. A similar development took place on the West Indian islands. See D. Watts, The West-Indies: Patterns of Development, Culture and Environmental Change since 1492 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 405–23.
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In 1742, the WIC allowed Essequibo planters to purchase building materials from foreign ships on condition that they pay a duty of one stuiver per pound. Although intended only for emergencies, this concession eventually became a regular practice. The combined values for provisions and horses purchased during the years for which records survive, 1753–1754 and 1774–1776, are ƒ11,570 and ƒ15,336 respectively.88 Exports to North America Lumber, molasses, and rum (kildevil or kiltum) were the primary commodities Essequibo and Demerara planters sold to foreign traders. Americans had to pay the WIC a 5 percent duty on the value of these exports. The WIC responded to the Molasses Act of 1733 by raising duties on molasses exports in 1735 and then temporarily banned the export of molasses and rum. The British prohibited the export of iron and provisions to the Dutch colonies and halted most Dutch exports to British colonies during the Seven Years War. After the war, Britain increased controls to prevent the smuggling of rum into their North American colonies, which reduced the export of rum from Essequibo and Demerara as well as the import of horses and provisions.89 North Americans also exported iron products and coffee from Essequibo and Demerara, but the WIC called a halt to this in 1770, when coffee-drinking increased in Europe. Sugar exports were never allowed to foreign markets. In 1771, the bewindhebbers briefly forbade all exports to North America, because they insisted on being paid in commodities and refused to accept bills of exchange.90 After the outbreak of the American War of Independence in 1775, it became increasingly more difficult for American ships to reach
88 ARA, NWIC 814: Chamber Zeeland to Gelskerke, 22 January 1742; PRO, CO 116/33: 477, Op verscheijden Engelse Venduen en uijt de hand gekogt in Rio Essequebo 1753, 1754; ibid., 116/40, 324–27; ibid., 116/42: 126–27; ibid., 116/45: 222–23, Extracten van de gekochte en betaalde vivres van de Engelsche vaart over den jaare 1774, 1775, 1776. 89 ARA, NWIC 814: Chamber Zeeland to Storm van ’s Gravesande, 24 August 1744; PRO, CO 116/27: 205–06, Ordonnantie van Daniël Uschner, 28 May 1735; ibid., 116/34: Storm van ’s Gravesande to chamber Zeeland, 28 February 1764. 90 ARA, NWIC 817: Chamber Zeeland to Storm van ’s Gravesande, 5 February 1770.
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Essequibo and Demerara. The ships that still managed to enter the river were advised by the director general to fly the Dutch tri-color in order to escape British retaliation. This was sound advice. A British privateer from Barbados captured an American schooner in 1777, in sight of the outward watch in the river delta.91 The planters’ trade with foreigners was quite profitable for the WIC. North Americans paid export duties of ƒ12 per hogshead of molasses and ƒ30 per hogshead of rum. There was no export duty on lumber. From 1771 to 1791, the company collected nearly ƒ4 million, ƒ190,000 per year, at Essequibo and Demerara alone. Foreign captains also paid a tonnage fee of ƒ25 to ƒ50, depending on the size of their ship, plus an assortment of fees, including assessments for the commander, ƒ5 to ƒ10; the physician, ƒ5:10:00; the church sexton, ƒ2; the poor fund, ƒ2; and the river pilot, ƒ15.92 The West India Trade The most frequent Caribbean contacts for Essequibo and Demerara were with Barbados and Dutch-controlled St. Eustatius. Commercial contacts between Essequibo and Barbados existed as early as the beginning of the eighteenth century. Lumber was in great demand for building homes on the island, and trees were forested at several mainland coastal areas and shipped there. Eight ships from Essequibo called yearly at Barbados during the 1720s. The threat of war occasionally impaired these contacts. Only one ship arrived in Essequibo from Barbados in 1745.93 The capture of St. Eustatius by the British in 1781 reduced shipping from that island, but an increase from other ports compensated 91 PRO, CO 116/43: Trotz to chamber Zeeland, 12 July 1776; ibid., 116/44: Trotz to chamber Zeeland, 28 August 1776; ibid., 116/46: Trotz to chamber Zeeland, 10 March 1777; ibid., 116/48: Trotz to chamber Zeeland, 23 August 1777 and 10 February 1778. 92 PRO, CO 116/39: Trotz to chamber Zeeland, 31 January 1774; ARA, VWIS 305: Totaal der Recognitien van 1771–1789, 1790 and 1791; PRO, CO 116/21: Van der Heyden Resen to chamber Zeeland, 13 August 1716; ibid., 116/40: 438–39, Verdeelinge der Recognitie, Last & Passen Gelden, der van hier uijt Zeijlende Vaartuijgen, 1 October–31 December 1774. 93 PRO, CO 33/14, 15, 16: Shipping lists of the port of Bridgetown, Barbados, 1700–1740; ibid., 116/30: Storm van ’s Gravesande to chamber Zeeland, 7 November 1745. All ships from Essequibo to Barbados arriving between March 1736 and March 1738 carried lumber only. Molasses and rum were still in the cargoes of the 1720s.
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for the loss. Subsequently, contacts were established with Martinique and St. Lucia, and to a lesser extent with Trinidad, Tobago, Guadeloupe, St. Christopher, St. Martin, Montserrat, St. Vincent, Grenada, Dominica, and New London. After 1790, perhaps as many as five hundred small vessels arrived in Demerara from over sixty regional trading centers.94 Illicit Trade Sugar could legally be exported only to the Dutch Republic, but it was occasionally exported illicitly to other destinations. Some sugar ended up in the United Provinces by way of North America or St. Eustatius. Some planters illegally processed their sugar crop into rum, which could be exported on foreign ships. In the 1760s, the planters brought rum specialists over from Jamaica, who flavored the rum so that it was regarded the best in the Caribbean region.95 The illicit trade increased especially after coffee and cotton began to be cultivated in Essequibo and Demerara. Initially, the Zeeland directors allowed the export of these products to North America, hoping this would deter illegal export of sugar, but they forbade the free export of coffee in 1771. Two years later, the Heren X introduced more stringent measures against illicit trade: smuggled goods were to be confiscated and fines were raised. For attempting to export one barrel of coffee illegally, a fine of ƒ300 was assessed. Foreign ships could now export only molasses, rum, lumber, and items manufactured in the Dutch Republic. Still, it appears that much coffee and cotton ended up illegally at various European markets.96 Why were coffee and cotton so prominent among illicit exports? As noted earlier, planters experienced serious financial difficulties after 1770 due to the disruption in the credit markets. Their bills 94 ARA, VWIS 152: Lijst der Ingeklaarde Scheepen en Vaartuigen in de Rivier Demerarij, 2 February 1785–1 May 1789; ARA, Collectie Hinxt 11: Lijsten van de in Demerary binnengelopen en uitgeloopen schepen, 15 August 1791–20 March 1792. 95 ARA, NWIC 815: Chamber Zeeland to Storm van ’s Gravesande, 22 May 1755; ARA, VWIS 478: 2, Letter of Ambrosius Tulleken; Bolingbroke, A Voyage, 58–59; ARA, NWIC 815: Chamber Zeeland to Storm van ’s Gravesande, 18 October 1764. 96 Thompson, Colonialism and Underdevelopment, 49; ARA, NWIC 72: Heren X to Trotz and the Raad van Politie en Justitie op Essequebo alsmede de Raaden in Demerary, 15 April 1773; ARA, VWIS 983: 19 January 1786.
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of exchange were often rejected. Sugar growers could always produce molasses and rum and use them as payment, but coffee and cotton could not be processed into other products that could be sold to foreigners. Smuggling was particularly rife at cotton plantations near the coast, where the company exercised less supervision. Its lightweight cotton made an unsuitable cargo for merchants ships, and was often transported as supplementary freight. Contemporaries confirmed that smuggling cotton was widespread.97 Illicit exports were costly for the WIC. American ships are believed to have exported two thousand hogshead of sugar in 1778, which robbed the WIC of ƒ200,000 in duty payments. The American trade was mostly responsible for illicit exports, but it supplied the colony with vital provisions and could not be suspended.98 The directors in the Republic were not ignorant of these developments, and in response improved the monitoring of foreign shipping. Starting in 1766, a military guard was placed on all foreign ships at Demerara while the ship unloaded its merchandise. When this turned out to be ineffective, a company bark was stationed as a guard in the river estuary, and in 1784 this was further intensified by hiring four hoeker ships (medium-sized ships with one, two, or three masts) to help reduce illicit trade. All these efforts had little effect. Frans Smeer, officer on the cruiser Maasnimph, reported extensively on the illicit trade to and from the two colonies on the Wild Coast. British ships imported an estimated 1,200 slaves illegally in 1787. This meant a loss of some ƒ30,000 in import duties for the WIC. They also exported cotton illegally, amounting to 2,000 bales that same year. It was shipped via Barbados to the United Kingdom, where the weaving industry started to take off. It has been estimated that these transactions caused the company a loss of up to ƒ700,000. It is, therefore, no surprise that the bewindhebbers wanted to increase guarding the estuaries of the Demarara and the wide Essequibo River. Smeer proposed to outfit two fast schooners for this purpose with forty to sixty crew members and eight to twelve canon each.
97
ARA, VWIS 983: 19 January 1786. Van der Meulen, Studies over het ministerie van Van der Spiegel, 435; ARA, Verzameling Pieter Paulus-Gerrit van Olivier 44: Nader Rapport aan den Hoog. Edelen Gestregen Heer Den Heer & Mr P. Paulus Raad & Advocaat Fiscaal bij het Edele Mogende Collegie ter Admiraliteit op de Maze . . . van den Luijtenant Frans Smeer, Schiedam, 7 October 1787. 98
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The outcome of this proposal is not known, but the need for it was evident.99
Conclusions The ‘forgotten’ colonies of Essequibo and Demerara experienced a dramatic development during the eighteenth century. From marginal WIC possessions, they developed into very important plantation colonies that together surpassed the productive capacity of Suriname after 1790. This development was stimulated by heavy investments in mid-century and by the settlement of many British planters in the area. Until 1771, these colonies were exclusively the business of the province of Zeeland, which managed them and dominated commerce with them. While Zeeland merchants were disappointed by the Compromise of 1771, the opening of the colonies to other merchants did not, in the end, remove Zeeland firms and merchants from a prominent role in the trade with Essequibo and Demerara. Amsterdam merchants sent only a few incidental ships to Essequibo and Demerara before the 1770s, but afterwards their share of this traffic greatly increased. Amsterdam financiers invested large sums in the colonies’ plantations, and this compelled planters to ship their commodities either directly to Amsterdam or via Zeeland. The inflow of capital in the form of loans to planters had a major impact on the slave trade. Although the loans enabled planters initially to purchase more slaves, and thereby inflated the Dutch slave trade, in the long run they brought that traffic to ruin. During the 1770s, many planters became so strapped financially that they were unable to meet their obligations. Because their mortgages obliged them to make those payments first, slave traders from Zeeland were unable to collect on the debts incurred through slave purchases. When planters went bankrupt, their property ended up in the hands
99 PRO, CO 116/35: Storm van ’s Gravesande to chamber Zeeland, 1 October 1766; ARA, NWIC 818: Chamber Zeeland to Trotz, 9 June 1777; ibid., 829: 4. See also the journal about small coast cruisers at Demerara in ARA, Collectie Hinxt 8: Journaal van de hulpkruiser tot wering van de smokkelhandel langs de kust van Demerary en Berbice, 9 March 1792–28 May 1792.
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of the Amsterdam financiers while the slave traders went empty handed. International conflicts also weakened the Dutch slave trade. In contrast with Suriname, where smuggling seems to have been less pervasive and where the importation of slaves by foreign ships was not allowed until 1789 (see chapter 11), Essequibo and Demerara were exposed to stronger British influence. They possessed a large contingent of foreign planters, and they were under foreign control during most of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War and during the Napoleonic era. Consequently, the importation of slaves continued during the war years and allowed these colonies to continue expanding. Essequibo and Demerara’s commercial contacts with North America and the Caribbean islands expanded immensely during the eighteenth century, providing them with an indispensable life-line. When supply lines from the Dutch Republic and slave deliveries from Africa deteriorated, foreigners were eager to fill the gap. Given the enormous increase of exports after 1784, one gets the impression that before 1780 much produce was smuggled out of the colonies on foreign vessels. The WIC’s unsuccessful attempts to halt the smuggling seems to affirm that. The big mistake on the part of the directors of the Zeeland chamber was their attempt to maintain a monopoly for Zeeland merchants in the trade with their colonies. Returning to the introductory words of Ambrosius Tulleken, they failed to see the true value and potential of the colonies, from which the whole Dutch Republic could benefit. By the end of the century, the planters had long forgotten the conflicts over who would control the trade, and they willingly participated in the economic expansion under foreign control while the Netherlands was under French domination and isolated from its colonies.
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PART FIVE
GENERAL TRENDS AND IMPACT OF THE DUTCH ECONOMY
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN
AN OVERVIEW OF DUTCH TRADE WITH THE AMERICAS, 1600–1800 W K
The Dutch are more fortunate in their trade than in the colonies: if not weary of Surinam, they will shortly be; they are no planters, sad souls for suffering any hardship. William Byam, Governor of Antigua, ca. 1670.1
Introduction On the fourth day of August 1600, the consul of the German and Flemish nations in Lisbon sent a letter to Philip , King of Spain (1598–1621). The letter contained a survey of the Dutch ships that had sailed so far that year from Dutch ports to the non-European world. Forty-seven ships had left for Asia and seventy-seven, mostly hulks, had sailed across the Atlantic. The consul listed the following Atlantic destinations: seven vessels went to Terceira (one of the Azores), nine to the African Gold Coast, twenty-seven went on privateering expeditions, and thirty-four sailed to the West Indies, a term which at the time referred to the whole New World.2 It is impossible to check if these data are correct, but two things are
1 Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and the West Indies, 1669–1674, ed. W. N. Sainsbury et al. (London: Her Majesty Stationary’s Office, 1889), 8:205, William Byam, Governor of Antigua, to William Lord of Willoughby, Governor of Barbados, ca. 1670. 2 Frédéric Mauro quotes the letter of the consul, German Conrad Rott, but places the data in the wrong context. Mauro seems to think that all these Dutch ships called at Lisbon, an error repeated by Stuart Schwartz in his book on the Brazilian sugar plantations. F. Mauro, Le Portugal, le Brésil et l’Atlantique au XVII e Siècle, 1570–1670 (Paris, Calouste Gulbenkian Fondation, 1983), 538; S. B. Schwartz, Sugar Plantations in the Formation of Brazilian Society, Bahia, 1550 –1835 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 180.
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clear: Dutch shipping in the Atlantic had definitely got under way by 1600, and practically all parts of America were receiving Dutch ships. In 1598–99, two huge ships sailed to Buenos Aires to establish commercial relations with the Río de la Plata, while around the same time the first direct voyages were organized to Newfoundland, where cod was procured from the local Iberian, French, and English fishing communities.3 However, most Dutch ships leaving for the West Indies around 1600 were bound for eastern Venezuela. From 1599 to 1605, hundreds of vessels were fitted out to collect salt in Punta de Araya, until a Spanish attack frightened off the salt-traders.4 This chapter will sketch the outlines of Dutch transatlantic trade from 1590 to 1800.5 The historiography of Dutch trade has traditionally painted the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in different colors. Jonathan Israel and others have suggested that Dutch overseas commerce reached its zenith in the third quarter of the seventeenth century and subsequently lost ground to rival powers.6 Is it really possible to draw a dividing line around 1672, or was there much more of a continuity? I will try to answer this question for Dutch trade with the Atlantic, focusing on the import trade from the Americas. The commercial relations with Western Africa and Angola are immaterial to this argument.
3 J. Kupp, ‘Le développement de l’intérêt hollandais dans la pêcherie de morue de Terre-Neuve. L’influence hollandaise sur les pêcheries de Terre-Neuve au dixseptième siècle,’ Revue d’Histoire de l’Amérique Française 27, no. 4 (1974): 565–69. 4 The Spanish embargo of November 1598 had made it illegal for Dutch vessels to purchase salt in Andalusia or Setúbal. After a desperate search for salt deposits, the Dutch ended up at Araya. After 1605, they were cut off from the high-grade salt of Araya. During the Twelve Year Truce (1609–1621) between Spain and the United Provinces, Dutch ships were allowed to enter Spanish ports again, and after the resumption of hostilities in 1621, Spain built a fortress that held off the enemy successfully. I. A. Wright ed., Nederlandsche zeevaarders op de eilanden in de Carïbische Zee en aan de kust van Colombia en Venezuela gedurende de jaren 1621–1648(9). Documenten hoofdzakelijk uit het Archivo General de Indias te Sevilla, Werken uitgegeven door het Historisch Genootschap, 3d ser., nos. 63–64 (Utrecht: Kemink, 1934/5), 1:5–40. 5 This means that a discussion of commercial ventures along the Pacific coast of the Americas will be left out. 6 For Dutch economic history in general, De Vries and Van der Woude take 1663 as the turning point, since this year marked the beginning of a prolonged decline of the price level. J. de Vries and A. van der Woude, Nederland, 1500–1815. De eerste ronde van moderne economische groei (Amsterdam: Balans, 1995), 773.
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The Triangular Trade with Brazil Let us distinguish between phase I (1590–1672) and phase II (1672– 1795). By far the most significant import region in the first half of phase I was Brazil, although it is not mentioned specifically in the consular report just cited.7 As early as the 1570s, Dutch merchantmen had sailed to this Portuguese colony to load sugar, hides, and brazilwood (see chapters 2 and 3).8 After the lifting of the first Spanish embargo against Dutch shipping (1585–1590), most of this trade was probably filtered through Portuguese ports, as is suggested by a letter of 1594. In this document the provinces of Holland and Zeeland obtain leave from Spanish King Philip (1527–1598) to send two annual fleets to Brazil over Lisbon. Both fleets were allowed to be made up of twenty ships of at least 200 tons each, and the crews could be Dutch; the only provision was that the pilot should be Portuguese.9 At first sight, this may be a surprising offer, but in point of fact it was not, given the superiority of Dutch ships to the Portuguese caravels, which were vulnerable to attacks by English privateers and pirates. Also, the Dutch ships had more capacity and were therefore better suited for carrying large amounts of sugar, Brazil’s main export crop. Trade between the northern Netherlands and Brazil was organized on a sound basis, with Portuguese intermediaries at work in Lisbon, Oporto and Viana, and Dutch and Portuguese factors operating in Brazil. Pieter Beltgens, for instance, spent six years in Brazil, and Pieter du Molijn carried on business in Brazilian port cities for 7 The importance of Dutch trade with Brazil has been suggested earlier by D. M. Swetschinski, ‘Kinship and Commerce: The Foundations of Portuguese Jewish Life in Seventeenth-Century Holland,’ Studia Rosenthaliana 15 (1981): 61–62; by E. van den Boogaart in La expansión holandesa en el Atlántico, ed. E. van den Boogaart, P. C. Emmer, P. Klein, and K. Zandvliet (Madrid: Niel-Gerond, 1992), 76–80, 100–01; and by O. Vlessing, ‘New Light on the Earliest History of the Amsterdam Portuguese Jews,’ in Proceedings of the Fifth Symposium on the History of the Jews in the Netherlands Jerusalem, ed. J. Michman (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1993) 3:43–75. 8 Compare with E. Sluiter, ‘Dutch Maritime Power and the Colonial Status Quo, 1585–1641,’ Pacific Historical Review 11 (1942): 29–41. 9 H. Livermore, ‘A marinha mercante holandesa no comércio do Brasil,’ Revista Portuguesa de História 5 (1951): 493–98. In some instances, the Portuguese connection was already in place before 1594. The Sampson, for instance, had completed three trading voyages to Brazil by that year, and the route of the third voyage was Zeeland-Lisbon-Bahia-Pernambuco. The return cargo was made up of 500 chests (107,000 kilograms) of sugar and a load of brazilwood. Gemeentearchief Archief Amsterdam (GAA), Notarieel Archief (NA) 73: 5, 26 November 1595.
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twelve years after 1594.10 Dutch supplies were almost exclusively luxury items: woven linen, Haarlem linen, bombasine ribbons, piles, damask, goat’s-hair cloth, silk clothing, and amber.11 Only a few years went by before the Spanish Crown reversed its policy, banning Dutch ships from all Iberian ports in November 1598. Not only was the flow of Brazilian sugar to Amsterdam and Middelburg halted by this embargo, it was also severely hampered by the stipulation in 1603 of the States General that indirect trade with Brazil was no longer safeguarded against confiscation.12 These measures notwithstanding, Dutch trade with Brazil took on large proportions after Spain and the United Provinces concluded the Truce of 1609.13 For this traffic alone, ten to fifteen ships were built in the Netherlands every year.14 Most shipments arrived in the Netherlands via the Portuguese ports of Viana and Porto and to a lesser extent through Lisbon, where the sugar tax was 10 percent higher. The merchants engaged in this business claimed that their overall share of the Brazil trade was between half and two-thirds.15 The 10 E. M. Koen, ed., ‘Notarial Records Relating to the Portuguese Jews in Amsterdam up to 1639,’ Studia Rosenthaliana 5 (1971): 106–24, 14 August 1609. According to another notarial deed, Du Molijn lived in Brazil for eighteen years. Ibid., 240, 30 January 1612. 11 H. Ottsen, Journael van de reis naar Zuid-Amerika, 1598–1601, ed. J. W. IJzerman, Werken uitgegeven door de Linschoten Vereeniging, no. 16 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1918), 98–106, Deductie vervaetende den oorspronck ende progres van de vaert ende handel op Brasil. In 1599, Jan Cornelisz. Velt, who served as a factor in Pernambuco, received a cargo of silk men’s cloths, silk stockings, silk ribbon, powder horn, glass crosses, and amber rosaries with a combined value of 102 milréis ( ƒ1,403). All goods were to be sold in Rio de Janeiro or Río de la Plata. See GAA, NA 34: 12, Pernambuco, 6 September 1599. 12 In 1618, this trade suffered a new setback when the Inquisition in Oporto imprisoned several agents of Jewish merchants based in Amsterdam. E. M. Koen, ‘Duarte Fernandes, koopman van de Portugese natie te Amsterdam,’ Studia Rosenthaliana 2 (1968): 178–93; E. M. Koen, ‘Notarial records relating to the Portuguese Jews in Amsterdam up to 1639,’ Studia Rosenthaliana 4 (1972), nos. 1553, 1556, 1557, 1587, 1591, 1594. 13 J. A. G. de Mello, Gente de Nação. Cristãos-novos e judeus em Pernambuco, 1542–1654 (Recife: Fundação Joaquim Nabuco & Editora Massangana, 1989), 21. 14 Most Dutch trade took place in Pernambuco, despite several attempts to establish commercial contacts with Rio de Janeiro. In 1611–12, the States General tried in vain to obtain consent of Spanish authorities to send three ships annually to Rio de Janeiro and the Río de la Plata. E. Stols, De Spaanse Brabanders, of de handelsbetrekkingen der Zuidelijke Nederlanden met de Iberische wereld, 1598–1648, Verhandelingen van de Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van België, klasse der letteren, edition 33, no. 70 (Brussels: Paleis der Academiën, 1971), 1:110–11. 15 Ottsen, Journael van de reis naar Zuid-Amerika, 98–106, Deductie.
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majority of these merchants were Jews and New Christians who had recently taken up residence in Amsterdam. Benefiting from the lifting of restrictions with Iberia during the Twelve Year Truce, they built an extensive commercial network with Portugal and its American colony Brazil. It has been argued with good reason that the merchants’ portrayal of the extent of Dutch control of the Brazil trade may have been exaggerated (see chapter 3).16 But assuming that one-third to onehalf of Brazil’s sugar exports found Dutch markets, the value of Dutch imports from Brazil alone was between ƒ3.3 and ƒ5 million annually, or about one-half to three-quarters of all Dutch Atlantic returns, including the gold imported from West Africa.17 It is, therefore, not difficult to explain why the Dutch West India Company (WIC), founded in 1621, took a keen interest in Brazil. But ironically it was the same company that killed the goose that laid the golden eggs. Once the company started its policy of conquest and privateering, Dutch participation in the fleets sailing from Portugal to Brazil declined markedly.18 This loss was not offset by the proceeds from sugar found on board prize-ships, however successful the WIC admiral Piet Heyn may have been off the Brazilian coast.19 Nor was the colonization of northeastern Brazil after 1630 nearly as lucrative as the pre-1621 trade. Sugar and brazilwood imports yielded
16 D. M. Swetschinski, Reluctant Cosmopolitans: The Portuguese Jews of Seventeenth-Century Amsterdam (London: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2000), 110. 17 The market value of the other Brazilian products was much smaller. In the first half of the seventeenth century, approximately 40,000 arrobas of brazilwood were exported to Portugal. Mauro, Le Portugal, 150–52. Using Posthumus’ data and assuming a Dutch share of 50 percent, the returns of the dyewood on the Amsterdam market may be estimated at ƒ182,004 in 1605–1609, and ƒ240,808 in 1615–1619. N. W. Posthumus, Inquiry into the History of Prices in Holland (Leiden: Brill, 1946), 1:522. 18 In some cases, the Dutch used a Portuguese disguise. In 1627, for instance, the Estrela Dourada, bound for Brazil, stopped at Azorean island of Terceira, where a Portuguese master and crew came on board. GAA, NA 634: 142, 20 August 1627. See J. I. Israel, The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, 1606–1661 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1982), 126. 19 Contemporary WIC historian Johannes de Laet claimed that the booty of sugar seized by privateers from 1624 to 1637 amounted to 19.7 million pounds, or ca. 1.5 million annually. J. de Laet, Jaerlyck verhael van de verrichtinghen der gheoctroyeerde West-Indische Compagnie in derthien boecken, ed. S. P. L’Honoré Naber and J. C. M. Warnsinck, Werken uitgegeven door de Linschoten Vereeniging, nos. 34, 35, 37, 40 (The Hague, Nijhoff, 1931–1937), 4:282–87.
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no more than ƒ2.5 million annually during the years of West India Company rule in Brazil.20
The Onset of Mercantilism Perhaps the second-most important type of Dutch trade with America during phase I was that with the Chesapeake. Tobacco imports from Virginia and Maryland eclipsed imports of beaver and otter skins from New Netherland. The Chesapeake, likewise, was a market for a wide array of goods, such as linen, coarse cloth, and brandies.21 During the English Civil War (1642–1646), the Dutch formed ties with local middlemen and planters, granted them long-term credit, and came to control part of the tobacco exports from the Chesapeake.22 Likewise, Dutch merchants dominated the trade of Barbados and St. Christopher, from where large shipments of sugar were sold to the Netherlands. The large-scale Dutch trade with English colonies, both in the Caribbean and mainland North America, was short-lived, as London introduced the Navigation Acts. The first Act of Trade and Navigation of 1651 stipulated that foreign goods had to be transported directly from the place of origin to English settlements. It was also forbidden to transport products from Asia, Africa or America to England, Ireland, or other English possessions, except in ships owned by Englishmen or colonists. The second Act, passed in 1660, required that only English ships were to carry the imports and exports of the American colonies.23 Whether English merchants were its architects or not, the First Act of Trade and Navigation was harmful to Dutch trade. An English naval expedition to the Lesser Antilles, launched
20 The average annual income derived from sugar imports between 1630 and 1654 was ca. ƒ1.7 million. Brazilwood imports came to ca. ƒ0.4 million. Calculated on the basis of Mauro, Le Portugal, 158–59, and Posthumus, Inquiry into the Prices, 1:443, 522. 21 J. R. Brodhead, Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York; Procured in Holland, England and France, ed. E. B. O’Callaghan (Albany: Weed and Parsons, 1856), 1:436–37, Petition of Dutch merchants to the States General, ca. November 1651. 22 J. R. Pagan, ‘Dutch Maritime and Commercial Activity in Mid-SeventeenthCentury Virginia,’ Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 90 (1982): 485–501. 23 C. M. Andrews, The Colonial Period of American History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938), 4:36–37, 61–62.
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shortly after the enactment of the first Act of Trade and Navigation, captured twenty-four Dutch ships at Barbados worth £100,000, making it clear that London was completely uncompromising.24 Trade with New York progressively declined after the Duke of York conquered New Netherland. Trade did not come to an immediate standstill, however. Shipments of merchandise from Amsterdam to Fort Orange, the former Dutch stronghold on the upper Hudson River, continued until the late 1680s and started to taper off only in the 1690s.25 Nor did merchants from the Netherlands suddenly shun New York. The United Provinces were even officially permitted to dispatch an annual ship. What is more, successive New York governors looked the other way when additional Dutch ships dropped anchor. After the Dutch reconquest of New York had been reversed in 1674, Anglo-Dutch trade in New York increasingly complied with the Acts of Trade and Navigation. Most ships now sailed to and from Amsterdam through the outport of Dover, where they cleared customs. They would return with goods consigned to English and Dutch merchants. New Yorkers, Dutchmen, and Englishmen joined hands as investors in these ventures.26 Mercantilist measures also seem to have forced the Dutch out of the French islands in the West Indies, where they were said to have carried on a highly lucrative trade involving sixty to eighty ships.27 For at least two decades their supremacy was uncontested, and French historiography still credits them today for having helped Guadeloupe and Martinique through the difficult early plantation years.28 It is
24 J. O. Appleby, ‘English Settlement in the Lesser Antilles during War and Peace, 1603–1660,’ in The Lesser Antilles in the Age of European Expansion, ed. R. L. Paquette and S. L. Engerman (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1996), 99; C. C. Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean and on the Wild Coast, 1580–1680 (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1971), 330. 25 J. Kupp, ‘Aspects of New York-Dutch Trade under the English, 1670–1674,’ New York Historical Society Quarterly 58, no. 2 (1974): 141. 26 D. J. Maika, ‘Commerce and Community: Manhattan Merchants in the Seventeenth Century,’ (Ph.D. diss., New York University, 1995), 392–93. 27 Its value was estimated by Colbert at three million livres (ca. ƒ2.5 million). J. Du Tertre, Histoire générale des Antilles habitées par le François (Paris: Thomas Lolly, 1667–1671), 5:98; S. L. Mims, Colbert’s West India Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1912), 45. 28 C. J. Munford, The Black Ordeal of Slavery and Slave Trading in the French West Indies, 1625–1715 (Lewiston, N.Y.: Mellen, 1991), 2:378; C. Frostin, Histoire de l’autonomisme colon de la partie de St. Domingue aux XVII e et XVIII e siècles. Contribution à l’étude du sentiment américain d’indépendance (Lille: Université de Lille, 1973), 31, 62, 65.
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unclear how fast the merchants from Zeeland and Holland were ousted. The privileges which the French State assigned to the Compagnie des Indes Occidentales (1664) did not immediately end Dutch participation in French colonial trade. There is every appearance that they continued to control this trade for another twentyfive years from their bases in Nantes, La Rochelle, and Bordeaux.29 A New Focus: Spanish America One aspect of Dutch activities in phase I that has never been discussed in any length is the lucrative ocean-going trade after 1648 with Spanish America.30 Dutch shipping traffic with the Spanish colonies resembled that with Brazil. During the Twelve Year Truce (1609–1621), this trade was conducted openly through Seville, although Dutch vessels were not allowed to be included in the Spanish fleets and galleons. After the resumption of the war, the Dutch resorted to various devices to carry on their commerce, but their share of Spain’s transatlantic trade was greatly reduced. The bulk of the Spanish silver that did enter the Netherlands was removed from prize-ships captured in the 1620s and 1630s. A major change set in with the signing of the Peace of Münster (1648). Dutch cargoes were subsequently shipped again to various parts of the Hispanic world. The two decades immediately after the war stand out as the years in which the Dutch dominated the trade of Cádiz, the Andalusian port which had succeeded Seville as the place from where Spain’s trade with its American colonies was concentrated. As late as 1686, a French marine intendant estimated that over 150 large Dutch vessels conducted trade in Cádiz annually, mostly selling textiles.31 In many years, goods and bullion shipped
29 M. Morineau, ‘La vraie nature des choses et leur enchaînement entre la France, les Antilles et l’Europe (XVIIe–XIXe siècle),’ Revue Française d’Histoire d’Outre-Mer 84 (1997): 7–8. 30 The only books that touch on this subject are J. I. Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585–1740 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), 242–43; and M. Herrero Sánchez, El acercamiento hispano-neerlandés, 1648–1678 (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2000), 72–73, 107–10. 31 J. Everaert, De internationale en koloniale handel der Vlaamse firma’s te Cádiz, 1670–1700, Werken uitgegeven door de Rijksuniversiteit Gent, Faculteit van de wijsbegeerte en letteren, no. 154 (Bruges: De Tempel, 1973), 91; Archivo General de Indias (AGI),
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back from Cádiz to the United Provinces in payment of Dutch supplies amounted to more than ten million guilders.32 In addition to this participation in the Carrera de Indias, there was a remarkably large number of Dutch ships that sailed to Spanish America avoiding the cumbersome system of fleets and galleons.33 Merchants from Amsterdam and Zeeland, in conjunction with colleagues from Flanders and France, chartered so-called register ships which were authorized to sail to the Spanish colonies outside the fleet system.34 Such ships would first drop anchor off the Canary Islands, where the Dutch had been doing business to some significant degree since the early 1620s, exchanging manufactures for Spanish colonial produce.35 Sometimes, the Dutch vessel was sold – for the sake of appearances – to local Canary traders by means of forged passports. But usually this charade was not necessary and registers to sail to Havana or other Spanish American ports were granted without much ado. Buenos Aires was the port in Spanish America most frequently visited by the Dutch. Between 1655 and 1665 large Dutch vessels called at this port at least six times a year. In 1658, a French traveler counted twenty-two Dutch ships anchored there, each loaded with thirteen or fourteen thousand hides.36
Indiferente General 1668: Esteban de Gamarra to the Spanish Crown, The Hague, 27 November 1663. 32 Archivo General de Simancas (AGS), Estado 2070: Esteban de Gamarra to King Philip , The Hague, 8 March and 29 November 1661, ibid., 8387:94; ibid., 8388:339, Esteban de Gamarra to King Philip , The Hague, 8 March and 29 November 1661; ibid., 8400:249, Esteban de Gamarra to Regent Mariana, The Hague, 24 April 1668. 33 This system amounted to the annual dispatch of two fleets to America, which were both convoyed by warships. Ideally, the flota sailed in April, called at Puerto Rico and dropped anchor in Veracruz. The galeones put to sea in August, heading for Cartagena de Indias and then Portobelo. In March of the following year, both fleets met in Havana and set off on the homeward voyage. 34 AGI, Indiferente General 1668: Esteban de Gamarra to King Philip , The Hague, 18 September 1663, 15 April 1664, 4 February 1665, 7 July 1665. 35 J. I. Israel, ‘Some Further Data on the Amsterdam Sephardim and Their Trade with Spain During the 1650s,’ Studia Rosenthaliana 14 (1980): 7–19. At least since the turn of the century, Spain’s enemies had used the Canaries as a way station to their contraband trade with the Americas. H. Kellenbenz, Unternehmerkräfte im Hamburger Portugal- und Spanienhandel, 1590–1625 (Hamburg: Verlag der Hamburgischen Bücherei, 1954), 55. 36 W. W. Klooster, ‘Illicit Riches: The Dutch Trade in the Caribbean, 1648–1795’ (Ph.D. diss., University of Leiden, 1995), appendix 2; A. du Biscay, An Account of a Voyage up the River de la Plata, and thence over Land to Peru. With Observations on the Inhabitants, as well as Indians and Spaniards; the Cities, Commerce, Fertility, and Riches of
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Circuitous voyages were no novelty to Dutch Atlantic shipping. Notarial records show the existence, prior to 1654, of a regular trade route from Pernambuco via the English West Indies (Barbados or St. Christopher) to Virginia, and from there back to the Netherlands with loads of tobacco. In 1642, for example, the WIC chamber of the Maze in Rotterdam dispatched the 200-ton ship James via Plymouth to Newfoundland. The ship then crossed over to Pernambuco, where it sold codfish and European merchandise, and returned to Europe by way of St. Kitts and Virginia.37 The value of this type of oceangoing voyages is difficult to assess, but it cannot have been nearly as lucrative as the short-lived multilateral trade to Spanish America.38 During the brief flowering of this trade in 1655–1665 the goods shipped back to the metropolis were worth at least ƒ4 million a year.39 Merchants organizing circuitous trading voyages often traveled with their commodities and transacted business themselves, either from a shop they opened upon arrival or after going inland and testing the market. They were always in a hurry – time was money – but to establish contacts the merchants were bound to spend some time in the ports of call. When the opportunity presented itself, these merchants did not hesitate to establish factors and commissioners in Curaçao. The task of these resident middlemen was to sell goods for their employer and remit the proceeds in the form of bills of exchange or return cargoes. In principle, their job was no different from that of merchants trading for themselves: utilizing ships to their full potential and creating a reliable network of suppliers and clients. The use of multiple Caribbean ports of call, therefore, had virtually come to an end by the 1670s, when the Dutch Republic faced
that Part of America (London: Samuel Buckley, 1698), 20–21; Z. Moutoukias, Contrabando y control colonial en el siglo XVII. Buenos Aires, el Atlántico y el espacio peruano (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina, 1988). 37 Gemeentearchief Rotterdam (GAR), Oud Notarieel Archief (ONA): Notary J. van Aller, 8 June 1642. For similar voyages, see GAR, ONA: Notary J. Delphius, 2 September 1648; ibid., 1589:387–89, 29 April 1650; ibid., Notary V. Mustelius, 16 November 1652. Compare with Maika, ‘Commerce and Community,’ 89–90. 38 The trade voyages encountered in the archives rapidly increased from two in 1656 to twenty-eight in 1661. Subsequently, a slump set in. Data on outbound or return goods were found for 39 of the 146 ships, or 26.7 percent. 39 The average value of the import and/or export trade of the ships in the database was 1,447,459 pesos ( ƒ3,473,902) per annum. It is safe to assume that all annual imports in this decade were above ƒ4.0 million.
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a major political crisis. The year 1672 was one of calamity for the United Provinces; a naval war with England and simultaneous invasions by French and German troops seemed to spell ruin to the country. Although it survived miraculously, this year has been taken by some historians to be a watershed in Dutch history, the dividing line between prosperity and adversity, between primacy and decline. Jonathan Israel argues this quite forcefully in his Dutch Primacy in World Trade. While Israel identifies a general trend, close reading reveals that he considers it valid for Atlantic trade as well, with the notable exception of the trade with Spanish America.40 But did misfortune come upon the Dutch in the Atlantic? The Second WIC, founded in 1674, at the start of phase II, was only a faint reflection of its mighty predecessor. The set of colonies now in Dutch hands was made up of Suriname, the colonies in present-day Guyana, and a number of Caribbean islands, and they contrasted poorly with the vast empire that had appeared to be in the making in the 1630s and 1640s. And not only was the size of the territories under company rule much reduced compared to phase I, but ambitions were scaled down as well. But to focus exclusively on company activities would be to miss the point. In phase II, the only Dutch West India Company monopolies left were the shipping traffic to Africa and the transatlantic slave trade (see chapters 4 and 5). Before too long, therefore, Atlantic trade was dominated by private merchants. The scale of their activities was, indeed, more modest than in phase I, resting mainly now on a two-pronged fork, the exports of plantation crops from the Dutch colonies of Suriname, Berbice, Essequibo, and Demerara on the one hand and the reexports from Curaçao and St. Eustatius, on the other hand. In general, the Dutch trade in the Atlantic continued to be highly significant after 1672. For a long time, the main source of Dutch Atlantic revenue in phase II was the transit trade with Spanish America. Dutch inroads into Spain’s commercial system assumed enormous proportions. One key to success was the Dutch ability to undersell their foreign colleagues systematically and to pay more for American products. Low interest and freight rates, as well as the custom of buying ahead, also accounted for this success. Another
40
Israel, Dutch Primacy, 285–87, 326–29.
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Dutch asset was the custom of supplying and purchasing on a regular basis, which for a long time contrasted sharply with the neglect shown by Spanish merchants for some of their own colonies. This helped Curaçao to act as a local counterpart of Amsterdam, an entrepôt where a wide range of commodities was offered for sale.
The Dutch Entrepôts of Curaçao and St. Eustatius After the loss of Dutch Brazil, Curaçao was transformed into the main center of slave distribution for the Spanish colonies. During the years 1663–1688, when there was a regular traffic in Africans between Curaçao and Cartagena, Portobelo, and Veracruz, the Dutch dominated the Atlantic slave trade. Although the WIC was no longer the main supplier of slaves to Spanish America after 1688, it imported nearly 100,000 slaves in the whole period from 1658 through 1729.41 Curaçao had started out as a slave depot, but in due course it also offered a variety of European manufactures, especially textiles and clothes. In exchange, tropical produce and bullion were imported and shipped to the Netherlands. The second quarter of the eighteenth century saw the rise of St. Eustatius, an even smaller island than Curaçao, which came to fulfill a similar function for the French West Indies. French, Dutch, British, Spaniards, and North Americans met in the roads of this so-called free port ‘as in great fair.’42 St. Eustatius partly derived its importance from taking up loads of sugar and coffee that exceeded the transport facilities of the French trade system. Authorities in the Netherlands did not realize how voluminous Statia’s reexport of French sugar was until the States General banned the import of refined French sugar in 1747. More than one hundred Amsterdam merchants were outraged about this measure and requested that it be revoked. Protests continued for another decade, but the States General never reconsidered their decision.43
41
Postma’s estimate is 96,708 slaves. J. Postma, The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1600–1815 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 54, table 2.6. See also, W. Klooster, ‘Slavenvaart op Spaanse kusten. De Nederlandse slavenhandel met Spaans Amerika, 1648–1701,’ Tijdschrift voor Zeegeschiedenis 16, no. 2 (1997): 121–40. 42 D. Macpherson, Annals of commerce, manufactures, fisheries, and navigation, with brief notices of the Arts and Sciences connected with them (London: Nichols, 1805), 3:677. 43 The ban was issued on 5 December 1747 and came into effect the 26th of
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In at least one important respect, St. Eustatius was different from Curaçao. Whereas the latter reshipped virtually all of its Caribbean imports to the ports of the United Provinces, Statia reshipped a considerable part to other areas in the Caribbean Sea. In 1745, for instance, Guadeloupe received 168 vessels from St. Eustatius.44 The difference was absorbed not only by the French, but increasingly by North American merchants, for whom Statia would continue to provide a market throughout the century, later reaping the full benefit of the situation caused by the American War of Independence, when the thirteen colonies were cut off from Britain. Imports now exceeded the capacity of the island’s warehouses, and sugar and cotton were piled high in the open air.45 In return, military stores were sold to the North American rebels. While St. Eustatius had been a source of gunpowder before the war, it became a major supplier now. It is said that in the first half of 1775, the North Americans obtained at least four thousand barrels of gunpowder from the roadsteads of Statia. By the end of that year, daily shipments of Dutch and French gunpowder were sent from there to ports in North America.46 Unlike other European trading states engaged in Atlantic commerce, the Dutch Republic in phase II relied heavily on its transit trade. British and French trade with foreign colonies in the New World was relatively modest, although it did bring in sizeable amounts
that month. Algemeen Rijksarchief (ARA), Archief van de Staten-Generaal (SG) 5782: J. van Loon and P. Backer, directors of the WIC, to the States General, Amsterdam, 9 January 1748. 44 In the previous year, 1744, Statia’s imports from Guadeloupe alone had amounted to 86 barrels and 4354 hogsheads of sugar, 1898 barrels and 1296 hogsheads of syrup, as well as 422 barrels and 314 hogsheads of rum. Reexports to the Netherlands in that year included only 2,784,355 pounds of sugar and no rum or syrup. ARA, Archief van de Nieuwe West-Indische Compagnie (NWIC) 623: Daily registers of St. Eustatius, 1744. 45 C. de Jong, Reize naar de Caribische eilanden, in de jaren 1780 en 1781 (Haarlem: François Bohn, 1807), 108. 46 Naval Documents of the American Revolution (NDAR), ed. W. B. Clark and W. J. Morgan (Washington: Naval Historical Center, 1964, 1:491, Count de Guines to Count de Vergennes, London, 23 June 1775; Documents of the American Revolution, 1770–1783, ed. K. G. Davies, Colonial Office Series (Shannon: Irish University Press, 1981), 9:40, President Phillips Callbeck to Earl of Dartmouth, Halifax, 5 January 1776; John Carter Brown Library, Brown Papers, Letters V 76 SP: Orders of Nicholas and John Brown for Benjamin Comstock, Providence, 31 January 1776; NDAR 6:1086, Committee of Secret Correspondence Memorandum, October 1776, signed by B. Franklin and Robert Morris. Compare with NDAR 7:213, Van Bibber and Harrison to the Maryland Council of Safety, St. Eustatius, 9 November 1776.
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of colonial Spanish bullion. The French enjoyed a relatively brief spell of intensive trade with the Pacific coast of South America in the first quarter of the eighteenth century, while British smugglers were invariably ubiquitous in the Spanish Caribbean. Although a plantation colony, Jamaica was to the British what Curaçao and later St. Eustatius were to the Dutch: their Caribbean entrepôt.47 But as a rule, exports from British and French America to the respective metropoles far outweighed the illicit riches that had been procured in Spanish America. In the Dutch case, however, reexports of foreign colonial products to the United Provinces from Curaçao and St. Eustatius were slightly more valuable than the export of crops grown in the Dutch colonies themselves, as is illustrated in table 13.3. Most of these crops were produced by Suriname, a Dutch colony since 1667. Although this colony experienced a slow start, it sent increasing loads of sugar, coffee, and tobacco to the metropolis. After 1780, the smaller Dutch Guiana settlements at the Berbice, Essequibo, and Demerara rivers began to expand and prosper, and their combined cash crop production may even have equaled that of Suriname (see chapters 11 and 12).48 Unlike other Atlantic empires, the produce of the Dutch plantation colonies did not receive preferential treatment in the home market. Surinamese sugar, cotton, and cacao had to compete with produce from French and English colonies, which was only feasible if Suriname maintained a high productivity level.49 The eighteenth century saw a resurgence of the trade between British America and the United Provinces. British American rather than Dutch ships were now used predominantly in this traffic. Rotterdam was their favorite destination. The number of ships arriving in the port on the Meuse River from the English colonies in the New World during the years 1722–24 are listed in table 13.2.
47 The governors of Jamaica and other English colonies guaranteed that smuggling proceeded smoothly by lending passports to ships’ captains, who then supposedly went fishing but actually often traded with Spanish settlements. By 1700, the English themselves claimed that their trade at Portobelo and Cartagena amounted to some six million pesos (ca. ƒ14.4 million) a year. C. Nettels, ‘England and the SpanishAmerican Trade, 1680–1715,’ Journal of Modern History 3 (1931): 1–32; N. Zahedieh, ‘The Merchants of Port Royal, Jamaica, and the Spanish Contraband Trade, 1655–1692,’ William and Mary Quarterly 43, no. 4 (1986): 570–92; H. R. Feliciano Ramos, El contrabando inglés en el Caribe y el Golfo de México, 1748–1778 (Seville: Excma. Diputación Provincial de Sevilla, 1990), 61. 48 De Vries and Van der Woude, Nederland, 1500–1815, 552. 49 Ibid., 551.
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Table 13.1. The Dutch Caribbean Trade, 1701–1780 (millions of guilders) Years 1701–10 1711–20 1721–30 1731–40 1741–50 1751–60 1761–70 1771–80
Curaçao
St. Eustatius
Suriname
Total
1.5 1.8 1.8 1.7 3.4 1.9 2.8 2.8
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.3 3.5 4.2 7.0
1.8 1.5 2.2 2.7 4.2 4.9 7.8 8.8
4.3 4.3 5.0 5.4 8.9 10.3 14.7 18.5
Source: Klooster, Illicit Riches, 176. Corrected for 1721–1730, see table 11.8.
Table 13.2. British American Trade with Rotterdam, 1722–1724 Origin West Indies Carolina Virginia Bay of Honduras Bay of Campeche River of ‘Camelay’** St. Eustatius
Number of Ships 13* 9 9 3 1 1 1
Source: ARA, Collection Van der Heim 396. * Including one ship from Jamaica and one from Antigua that were both listed separately. ** Unidentified
South Carolina occupies a remarkably prominent place on this list. Its staple product, rice, found a ready market in Rotterdam throughout the eighteenth century.50 The rice shipments were in breach of the official British stipulation that prohibited American exports to European ports other than those of Britain, the Iberian peninsula,
50 In 1750, nine vessels arrived with 1,647,240 pounds of rice; in 1751, fifteen with 2,091,222; in 1752, fourteen with 2,772,653; in 1753, fifteen with 1,898,400; and in 1754, seventeen with 3,595,480. ARA, Collectie Van der Heim 478. The weight in pounds was calculated with the use of measures given by J. F. Shepherd and G. M. Walton, Shipping, Maritime Trade, and the Economic Development of Colonial North America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 171–72.
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and the Mediterranean.51 Amsterdam, meanwhile, had better connections with New York52 and New England, where it sent ‘reels of yarn or spun hemp, paper, gunpowder, iron and goods of various sorts used for men and women’s clothing,’ as a New Englander reported in 1742.53 The so-called ‘Dutch tea’ was later added as an important export item from Amsterdam, which around 1770 was said to claim a considerable share of all tea imported into Boston and New York, competing with the heavily taxed variety of the British East India Company.54 Dutch trade with Brazil was also resumed during the second half of the seventeenth century, and only three years after the Dutch surrender, brazilwood was reportedly being smuggled directly out of Brazil to the United Provinces.55 Although the flow of their traffic was undoubtedly thinner in phase II, it should not be overlooked. Dutchmen were granted the same privileges as Englishmen by virtue of the Luso-Dutch peace treaty of 1661, which legalized the Brazil trade of Dutch nationals with use of their own ships in the Portuguese fleets (see chapter 7). A small group of Dutch merchants thereupon
51 In 1705, rice was included in the group of so-called ‘enumerated commodities’ that could be shipped to Britain only by British vessels. In 1731, however, Parliament decided that rice could be shipped directly to the Iberian Peninsula and the Mediterranean. Andrews, Colonial Period of American History 4:85–107; J. J. McCusker and R. R. Menard, The Economy of British America, 1607–1789 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 179. 52 V. D. Harrington, The New York Merchant on the Eve of the Revolution (1935; reprint, Gloucester, Mass.: Smith, 1964), 255–61, 268–75; C. Matson, Merchants and Empire: Trading in Colonial New York, Early America, History, Context, Culture, no. 4 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 208–11; Houghton Library, Sparks Manuscripts 433, vol. 4:39, Governor Cadwallader Colden to the Lords of Trade, New York, 7 December 1763; C. Colden, The Letters and Papers of Cadwallader Colden, 1688–1767 (reprint, New York: AMS Press, 1973), 7:249, Earl of Dartmouth to Lieutenant Governor Colden, Whitehall, 10 September 1771. 53 Quoted in T. C. Barrow, Trade and Empire: The British Customs Service in Colonial America, 1660–1775 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), 150. The ‘drawback’ was one of the curious features of the British customs service. It was a certain part of the import duty that was paid back when the commodity on which it had been paid was exported. It has been noted that most products smuggled from the Netherlands and Hamburg, such as linen, paper, and tea, were those on which no drawback was allowed. Harrington, New York Merchant, 249–50. 54 J. W. Tyler, Smugglers and Patriots: Boston Merchants and the Advent of the American Revolution (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1986), 15, 16, 22, 189, 192, 196, 208–09. 55 D. M. Swetschinski, ‘The Portuguese Jewish Merchants of Seventeenth-Century Amsterdam: A Social Profile’ (Ph.D. diss., Brandeis Univerity, 1979), 233.
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established themselves in various Brazilian ports.56 It was only in the course of the eighteenth century that they were forced to continue their activities with the help of Portuguese intermediaries, but even then their role was by no means negligible. The neutrality of the United Provinces may have paid off during the wars of the Spanish (1702–1713) and Austrian Succession (1740–1748), when the Dutch carried large amounts of gold from Bahia, Pernambuco, and Rio de Janeiro.57 Later in the century, they seem to have become involved, along with the British, in the contraband trade of Brazilian diamonds. In 1785, a Portuguese minister complained that many consignments of high-quality diamonds appeared in the marketplace of Amsterdam.58
Drawing up the Balance Sheet Where does all this leave us when we consider phase II of Dutch trade with the Americas? If we limit ourselves to the regions for which hard figures are available, such as Suriname, Curaçao, and St. Eustatius, the market value of their exports to the Netherlands was circa ƒ9.6 million by the mid-eighteenth century. De Vries and Van der Woude put total Atlantic imports, including the West African trade, at ƒ8.0 million for the 1770s, fractionally lower than Dutch
56 The admission of Dutch vessels into the Brazil fleets initially caused major problems, as Portuguese officials refused to implement the peace treaty. Aengemerckte voorvallen op de Vredens Articulen met Portugael Anno 1663 (n.p., 1663), 7, [no. 8725 in W. P. C. Knuttel, Catalogus Pamfletten-verzameling berustende in de Koninklijke Bibliotheek (Utrecht: Hes Publishers, 1978)]. See also, E. Pijning, ‘Controlling Contraband: Mentality, Economy and Society in Eighteenth-Century Rio de Janeiro’ (Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1997). 57 M. Morineau, Incroyables gazettes et fabuleux métaux; Les retours des trésors américains d’après les gazettes hollandaises, XVI e–XVIII e siècles (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 216–17. 58 H. Bernstein, The Brazilian Diamond in Contracts: Contraband and Capital (London: University Press of America, 1986), 62–63; J. F. dos Santos, Memórias do Distrito Diamantino da Comarca do Sêrro Frio Provincia de Minas Gerais. 3d ed. (Rio de Janeiro: Ediçôes O Cruzeiro, 1956), 206. According to the British traveler John Mawe, who wrote a quarter of a century later, the illicit export of Brazilian diamonds ‘has been carried on to a very considerable extent: there is strong presumptive authority for stating that, since the first discovery of the mines, diamonds to the amount of two million sterling ( ƒ20–ƒ25 million) have thus found their way to Europe.’ J. Mawe, Travels in the Interior of Brazil, particularly in the Gold and Diamond Districts of that Country (London: Longmans, 1812), 257. While this trade was being conducted, the Dutch consul in Lisbon, Daniel Gildemeester, was the sole diamond contractor in that city.
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imports from Asia.59 Compared with the New World trade of other European maritime countries, this may not seem to be very impressive; the Dutch always claimed a smaller share of foreign trade than that of rival Atlantic powers, especially of the two Iberian states for whom Atlantic returns represented half of all imports. Besides, the small territory the Dutch had at their disposal made their position relatively vulnerable, as was shown when Sir George Rodney carried out his raid on St. Eustatius in 1781. But we should not exaggerate the size of empire, because one of the conspicuous traits of the ‘second’ Dutch empire in the Atlantic region was that it was export-led to a greater extent than any other colonial empire in the Americas. This feature helped the Dutch continue to claim what was a fairly substantial share of trade with the Americas. In spite of the loss of their large mainland territories in North and South America, the Dutch managed to carve themselves a profitable niche in the Atlantic trade. When all is said and done, what was the Dutch share of European trade with the Americas? It has been estimated that the Dutch share of the West African slave trade fell from 20–30 percent in phase I to only 5 percent after 1675.60 Such a dramatic shift never took place in Dutch commercial relations with the Americas. Throughout the two centuries covered in this book, the Dutch share of the American trade was probably always close to 10 percent. It was higher in the early seventeenth century, when Dutch ships imported huge amounts of sugar from Brazil, and in the 1770s, when St. Eustatius performed such a crucial function for the revolutionary North Americans. Only counting the exports of Curaçao, St. Eustatius, and Suriname, I arrive at an average Dutch share of 6.8 percent in the middle decades of the eighteenth century, which would place the Dutch behind Spain (36.1 percent), Portugal (23.4 percent), England (20.9 percent), and France (13.2 percent).61
59
Klooster, Illicit Riches, 201; De Vries and Van der Woude, Nederland, 1500–1815,
575. 60
Van den Boogaart et al., La expansión holandesa, 247. In other words, for each guilder earned by the Dutch, France earned ƒ1,50, England ƒ2,50, Portugal ƒ2,75 and Spain ƒ4,25. This is based on a calculation for the years 1721–1760. 61
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Table 13.3. American Product Trade, 1721–1760 (percentages) Years
Spain
Portugal
England
France
Netherlands
1721–30 1731–40 1741–50 1751–60
43.6 38.9 25.5 36.4
25.4 24.7 26.2 17.3
19.5 19.6 22.2 22.3
8.1 11.8 17.5 15.4
4.9 5.1 8.5 8.6
Source: Klooster, Illicit Riches, 177. Corrected for 1721–1730, see table 11.8. Note: The Dutch figure does not include trade with British America nor with the Dutch Guiana colonies of Berbice, Essequibo, and Demerara.
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN
AN ASSESSMENT OF DUTCH TRANSATLANTIC COMMERCE, 1585–1817 V E
[The Dutch] are known to be the cheapest carriers in the world. Lewis Morris, Judge-Commissary of New York, 1750.1
Introduction Puffs of white smoke rose above St. Eustatius’ crowded roadstead as the cannons of Fort Orange fired their ritual greeting to the Andrea Doria on 16 November 1776. The Dutch guards inside the fort had no idea the ship’s red and white striped flag represented America’s new Continental Congress.2 What happened that day was symbolic of the history of Dutch involvement in the Atlantic. The small Fort Orange represented the limited power that the Dutch had at that time in the Western Hemisphere. Although they had expended considerable energy during the seventeenth century trying to establish a large maritime empire in the Atlantic, the Dutch were unable to secure a dominant position. Most other Europeans also failed to do so in the long run, but Dutch presence in the region remained especially limited. One reason for this may have been their indiscriminate choice of trading partners, exemplified by the reception of the Andrea Doria. Dutch merchants traded with anyone interested and ignored mercantilistic restrictions, as is illustrated by the
1 C. M. Hough, Reports of Cases in the Vice-Admiralty of the Province of New York and in the Court of Admiralty of the State of New York, 1715–1788, Yale Historical Publications Manuscripts and Edited Texts, no. 8 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1925), 64–65. 2 B. W. Tuchman, The First Salute (New York: Knopf, 1988), 15.
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large number of ships that moored at St. Eustatius, sometimes called the Golden Rock (see illustration no. 13.3). The Andrea Doria would come to symbolize the dramatic commercial relationship between the Dutch Republic and the fledgling United States of America during the final quarter of the eighteenth century. This concluding chapter gives an overview of more than two centuries of Dutch trade and shipping in the Atlantic region as is presented in the foregoing chapters and addresses the conjectures in the introductory chapter. Part I describes the Dutch Atlantic system and gives, for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries separately, an overview of the volume of Dutch shipping and trade. Part II focuses on investments and the enormous economic developments that took place in the Atlantic region during the eighteenth century, which contrasted greatly with the Asian trade of the VOC, at that time already considered the ‘sick old man of Asia.’ Part III estimates the volume of the Dutch Atlantic trade using the same methodology employed by economic historians J. de Vries and A. van der Woude. : The twentieth-century scholarly assessment of Dutch involvement in the Atlantic is aptly illustrated by the following citation from a respected general survey of Dutch economic history: ‘The 200-year [seventeenth and eighteenth centuries] history of the Dutch Atlantic economy is one of repeated cycles of hope, frustration, and failure.’3 This assessment, however, is based on limited research about commerce and shipping in the Atlantic region. It also reflects the misguided assumption that the operations of the Dutch West India Company (WIC) in the Atlantic and the Dutch East India Company (VOC) in Asia are comparable. What is generally disregarded in this comparison is the fact that the VOC enjoyed a continuous monopoly and dominance of Asian trade, while the WIC gradually lost its initial monopoly and had to compete with private Dutch shipping firms. Before a valid comparison can be made between Dutch Asian
3 J. de Vries and A. van der Woude, The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure, and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500–1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 479.
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and Atlantic shipping and commerce, the volume and value of the latter has to be ascertained. The very notion of comparing the two companies is not very useful, however, because the VOC’s role in the east could not have been duplicated in the Atlantic. The two regions were simply too different.
The Atlantic Shipping in the Atlantic region was easier for Europeans than it was with Asia. Once the dominant winds and currents were understood, crossing the Atlantic from the Madeira, Canary, or Cape Verde islands was relatively easy (see map 14.1). Voyages consisted of a number of relatively short stages and each stage rarely lasted more than a month.4 Making use of the westerly winds and the Gulf Stream, ships could conveniently sail the northern route back to Europe via Iceland and the Faeroe Islands.5 Sailing to Africa was largely a coastal voyage. Even the Atlantic crossing from Africa to the Americas was generally not a very difficult route. Because of the relatively short Atlantic crossing, fewer provisions needed to be loaded on the medium-sized ships generally used for that route. Compared with the Asian trade, Atlantic shipping required smaller investments and was less risky. Because the Atlantic’s vast expanse made it virtually impossible to keep interlopers out of the region by ordinary coast guard or cruisers, commerce in the Western Hemisphere was inherently more open than trade with Asia.6 This
4
The total duration of an ocean crossing between the United Provinces and Suriname, for instance, required, including one or more layovers, an average of sixty-seven days, and return voyages averaged eighty-four days. See chapter 11 in this volume. For the statistics for round-trip Atlantic voyages of ships of the Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie, see note 113. The distance of 15,000 sea miles from the Dutch Republic to Batavia (Djakarta, Indonesia) took about eight months (243 days on average), including a layover at Capetown in South Africa. See J. R. Bruijn et al., eds., Dutch-Asiatic Shipping in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, Rijksgeschiedkundige Publicatiën, grote ser., nos. 165–167 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1987), 1:74. 5 P. Butel, The Atlantic, Seas in History, no. 1 (London: Routledge, 1999), 2–3. 6 For efforts to protect against interlopers on the West African coast, see H. J. den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven. Scheepvaart en handel van de Tweede Westindische Compagnie op Afrika, 1674–1740 (Zutphen: Walburg, 1997), 265–83; For Spain’s fight against contraband, see W. Klooster, Illicit Riches: The Dutch Trade in the Caribbean, 1648–1795, Caribbean Series, no. 18 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1998), 141–72.
18
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was true for trade between maritime European countries as well as within the Dutch Republic. No single European power except for Great Britain during the Napoleonic era was ever able to establish a dominant position in the Atlantic during the ancien régime.7 The Spanish-American colonies generally depended on foreigners for provisions, be they Portuguese, Dutch, or English. The Portuguese Atlantic empire virtually collapsed during the seventeenth century, except for Brazil and some African holdings. The Dutch lost most of their colonies shortly after they reached the peak of their Atlantic expansion: Angola in 1648, Brazil in 1654, and New Netherland in 1667. The French were likewise unable to establish a stable Atlantic empire. In 1760 they lost New France, in today’s Canada. Even the British had their disappointments. Their settlements at Roanoke, Providence Island, and Montserrat could hardly be considered successful.8 The English lost the promising colony of Suriname at the Peace of Breda in 1667, and the Royal Navy could not prevent the loss of the thirteen North American colonies a century later. Of the once large British holdings in North America, only Quebec and Nova Scotia remained after 1783.9 Given the open and changing nature of the Atlantic economic, political, and military map, it is not surprising that the small Dutch Republic could not establish a vast emporium in the region.
The Dutch Atlantic10 According to conventional wisdom, the Dutch succeeded with their Atlantic initiatives early in the seventeenth century but lost ground
7 For a general overview of the Atlantic region, see Butel, The Atlantic. For the British role specifically, see N. Canny, ed., The Origins of Empire: British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century, vol. 1 of The Oxford History of the British Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); P. J. Marshall, ed., The Eighteenth Century, vol. 2 of The Oxford History of the British Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). 8 L. Miller, Roanoke: Solving the Mystery of England’s Lost Colony (London: Jonathan Cape, 2000); K. O. Kupperman, Providence Island, 1630–1641 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); D. H. Akenson, If the Irish Ran the World: Montserrat, 1630–1730 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1997). 9 C. Conway, ‘Britain and the Revolutionary Crisis, 1763–1791,’ in The Eighteenth Century, ed. P. J. Marshall, vol. 2 of The Oxford History of the British Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 325–46. 10 Most elements of this paragraph are based of preceding chapters in this volume.
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during the last quarter. That Atlantic commerce was hampered by many forms of protectionism, between countries (mercantilism) as well as within the Netherlands (monopolies), cannot be denied.11 European competitors protected their home and colonial markets by levying high import duties and barring foreign merchants, the Dutch in particular, from trading with their colonies. It has been suggested that as a result of England’s Acts of Trade and Navigation and similar measures by France, Portugal, and Spain, a type of ‘compartmentalization’ took place that divided the Atlantic into a number of isolated and separated trading channels.12 The Atlantic region was not so much characterized by compartmentalization, however, as by openness. Several chapters in this book indicate that many of the mercantilistic and monopolistic measures were evaded, escaped, or simply ignored, and that the expected compartmentalization simply did not materialize. Quite the opposite seems to have happened. For example, the intra-Caribbean trade, or small circuit (kleine vaart), expanded enormously after 1700. In their early Atlantic endeavors, as Chris Ebert advocates, the Dutch managed to trade with Brazil, albeit with assistance from certain Portuguese merchants and through their own shrewdness. Even after the WIC’s loss of Brazil in 1654, some Dutch trading contacts with Brazil, both direct and indirect, remained intact. Wim Klooster explains how, after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, Dutch merchants managed to penetrate Latin-American markets through Iberian intermediaries.13 He also illustrates how Curaçao and St. Eustatius developed into influential trading entrepôts in the West Indies.14 In 11 For an overview of Dutch mercantilism, especially measures to protect sugar refining industry, see W. D. Voorthuijsen, De Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden en het mercantilisme, Economisch- en Sociaal-Historische Onderzoekingen, n. ser., no. 2 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1965), 102–04. 12 P. C. Emmer, The Dutch in the Atlantic Economy, 1580–1880: Trade, Slavery and Emancipation (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), 5; P. C. Emmer and W. W. Klooster, ‘The Dutch Atlantic, 1600–1800,’ Itinerario 23, no. 2 (1999): 60. 13 See chapter 13 in this volume, note 30. 14 For the north-German port of Bremen, for instance, St. Eustatius was the most important West Indian entrepôt, at least before 1780. K. H. Schwebel, Bremer Kaufleute in den Freihäfen der Karibik. Von den Anfängen der Bremer Überseehandels bis 1815, Veröffentlichungen aus dem Staatsarchiv der freien Hansestadt Bremen, no. 59 (Bremen: Staatsarchiv, 1995), 141–93. The Augsburg (Germany) firm Obwexer used Curaçao as its most important West Indian entrepôt. M. Häberlein and M. Schmölz-Häberlein, Die Erben der Welser: Der Karibikhandel der Augsburger Firma Obwexer im Zeitalter der Revolutionen, Schwäbische Forschungsgemeinschaft bei der Kommission für Bayerische Landesgeschichte, no. 21 (Augsburg: Wissner, 1995).
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fact, illicit trade with the Latin American mainland by way of Curaçao was so extensive that the island became an important cacao exporter, even though no cacao trees grew there. There are many indications that the English were unable to keep the Dutch from trading with their colonies despite the Acts of Trade and Navigation. Claudia Schnurmann details how Dutch merchants, with the assistance of English agents, evaded the rules at the end of the seventeenth century, when mercantilism was at its height.15 There were many English grievances about Dutch incursions into their possession, especially in the West Indies. In 1688, for instance, Governor Thomas Lynch complained about Dutch aggressiveness in Jamaica: Sixteen of the thieves were Dutch . . . I wonder not that they [the Dutch] do this in the West as they have done so much more in the East Indies, and that there is in Holland this proverb ‘Jesus Christ is good, but trade is better.’16
During the eighteenth century, Dutch ships took approximately 100,000 German emigrants to Pennsylvania, usually stopping over at the English port of Cowes to acquire the proper immigration papers.17 On the other hand, the Dutch were unable to keep North American merchants from trading with their Guiana plantation colonies. The Dutch government was usually not generous in supporting its subjects with protective measures, and while the WIC tried desperately to preserve its charter-monopolies, its efforts failed in the long run. From the early years of the company’s existence, the WIC had limits imposed on its authority, and in the end it occupied a subservient position among the many Dutch participants in Atlantic commerce.18 15
C. Schnurmann, Atlantische Welten. Engländer und Niederländer im amerikanisch-atlantischen Raum, 1648–1713, Wirtschaft- und Sozialhistorische Studien, no. 9 (Cologne: Bölau Verlag, 1998), 263ff.; R. S. Dunn and M. M. Dunn, eds., The Papers of William Penn (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1987), 4:77, 26 August 1701; C. Matson, Merchants and Empire: Trading in Colonial New York (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 76–77, 207–08; Klooster, Illicit Riches, 99, note 30. See also chapter 13 of this volume, notes 49–53. 16 Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and the West Indies, 1681–1685, ed. W. N. Sainsbury et al. (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1898), 11:490, no. 1249, letter from Governor of Jamaica Sir Thomas Lynch, 12 September 1683. 17 M. S. Wokeck, Trade in Strangers: The Beginnings of Mass Migration to North America (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), 60–61, 92, 114–15, 240–54. 18 Between 1623 and 1636, the WIC dispatched an average of fifty-eight ships annually, and the number declined afterwards. In 1641, for example, the company outfitted forty-two ships. As will be shown later, the Dutch dispatched approximately
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Private entrepreneurs, both within and outside the WIC, managed to encroach on the company’s monopoly. Dutch authorities terminated the WIC’s monopoly on trade with Brazil because private merchants claimed they had controlled Brazilian sugar shipments in previous years.19 Commercial traffic between New Netherland and the Dutch Republic also reveals a weakening of the WIC monopoly. Toward the end of the 1630s, the fur trade from New Netherland was opened to private merchants, who could then freely trade with colonists after paying a standardized fee or duty (recognitiegeld ).20 Dutch private merchants also undermined the WIC’s monopoly position in West Africa by sailing into company territory and trading illegally with African merchants. They did this at great risk, however. Between 1674 and 1730, ninety-eight interloper ships (lorredraaiers) were captured and confiscated by the WIC.21 A more subtle way to get around the WIC’s monopoly was to work through a company headquartered on foreign soil. As early as 1626, Dutch investors were involved in such illicit ventures. Later, Dutch capital was behind three such firms: the Swedish-African Company, the DanishAfrican Company, and the Brandenburg-African Company. Ships sailing for these companies were usually Dutch, as were many of its crew members.22
250 ships per year for Atlantic destinations in the mid-seventeenth century, which would make the WIC share about 20 percent, but this vanished during the eighteenth century. See J. de Laet, Jaerlyck verhael van de verrichtinghen der geoctroyeerde WestIndische Compagnie in derthien boecken, ed. S. P. L’Honoré Naber and J. C. M. Warnsinck, Werken uitgegeven door de Linschoten Vereeniging, no. 40 (Den Haag: Nijhoff, 1931), 4:280; P. J. van Winter, De West-Indische Compagnie ter kamer Stad en Lande, Werken uitgegeven door de Vereeniging het Nederlandsch Economisch-Historisch Archief, no. 15 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1978), 137, note 6. 19 Gemeentearchief Rotterdam (GAR), Oud Stadsarchief (OSA) 3025: Kort vertooch ende remonstrantie bij eenige cooplieden handelende op Brazil aan Heren XIX, 5 March 1647; H. Wätjen, Das holländische Kolonialreich in Brasilien. Ein Kapitel aus der Kolonialgeschichte des 17. Jahrhunderts (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1921), 296. 20 J. A. Jacobs, Een zegenrijk gewest. Nieuw-Nederland in de zeventiende eeuw, Cultuurgeschiedenis van de Republiek in de zeventiende eeuw, no. 2 (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 1999), 84, 219–26; see also, O. A. Rink, Holland on the Hudson: An Economic and Social History of Dutch New York (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986). 21 H. J. den Heijer, ‘Zeeuwse smokkelhandel op West-Afrika, 1674–1730,’ Tijdschrift voor Zeegeschiedenis 16, no. 2 (1997): 141–59; Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, 271, table 81. 22 Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, 181–93; U. van der Heyden, Rote Adler an Afrikas Küste. Die brandenburgisch-preußische Kolonie Großfriedrichsburg in Westafrika (Berlin: Selignow, 2001); N. de Roever, ‘Twee concurrenten van de Eerste West-Indische Compagnie,’ Oud Holland, Nieuwe bijdragen voor de geschiedenis der Nederlandsche kunst,
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In addition to these intrusions, the WIC allowed private investors to get involved in its monopoly domains. Several patroonships were established in company territories, such as at Tobago, Berbice, and New Netherland,23 and company involvement gradually lessened in the plantation colonies on the Wild Coast. The WIC had shared ownership of Suriname with the City of Amsterdam and the Van Aerssen van Sommelsdijck family, under the umbrella of the Suriname Corporation (Sociëteit van Suriname). Under pressure from Zeeland merchants, the WIC relinquished its last monopolies in the trade with Africa and the slave trade during the 1730s, introducing a new and flourishing phase of Dutch Atlantic commerce. The Dutch West India Interest An integral element of Dutch activities in the Atlantic region was the investment of many individuals in the West Indies and the expectation that government would protect that interest. The WIC and the Sociëteit van Suriname were good examples of the symbiotic relationship between government and the business community.24 This relationship is reflected in the WIC directors’ accountability to the States General and the city of Amsterdam being part owner of the Suriname Corporation. The power of the West India interest can be seen in the conjunctive roles that government and private businessmen played in the reorganization of the WIC in 1674, and also letterkunde, nijverheid enz., no. 7 (1889), 195–222; H. Bontemantel, De regeering van Amsterdam soo in ’t civiel als crimineel en militaire, 1653–1672, ed. G. W. Kernkamp, Werken uitgegeven door het Historisch Genootschap, 3d ser., no. 7 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1897), 1:, 265–71; G. de Bruin, Geheimhouding en verraad. De geheimhouding van staatszaken ten tijde van de Republiek, 1600–1750 (The Hague: SDU, 1991), 526–29; V. Barbour, Capitalism in Amsterdam in the Seventeenth Century, Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, ser. 67, no. 1 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959), 134–35; GAR, OSA: 3025, Letter to States General, 3 June 1688. 23 The patroonships are examined by G. J. van Grol, De grondpolitiek in het WestIndische domein der Generaliteit, Antilliaanse Reeks, no. 6 (1934, reprint; Amsterdam: Emmering, 1980). For Tobago, see J. van Herwaarden, ‘Tobago, Koerland en Rotterdam: Mooie plannen voor een avontuurlijke onderneming,’ in Rotterdams Jaarboekje, 9th ser., no. 8 (Rotterdam: Gemeentelijke Archiefdienst Rotterdam, 1990), 190–229. 24 For a recent analysis of the government-business symbiosis in the Dutch Republic, see C. Lesger and L. Noordegraaf, Ondernemers en bestuurders. Economie en politiek in de Noordelijke Nederlanden in de late middeleeuwen en vroegmoderne tijd, NEHA 3d ser., no. 3 (Amsterdam: NEHA, 1999).
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in the removal of the final vestiges of the WIC’s monopoly during the 1730s.25 Aware of this powerful interest, the government also ensured that in both of these instances the WIC was maintained, albeit as a significantly smaller entity, to serve the interest of private business. The cooperation between government and business is also noticeable in the ownership transfer of Suriname from Zeeland, via the WIC, to the Sociëteit van Suriname in 1682.26 The Dutch government did nothing, however, when the Spanish complained that Dutch smugglers intruded into their colonies by way of Curaçao. British objection to the provisioning of American rebels (or freedom fighters) at St. Eustatius was not halted, although it eventually led to the devastating Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780–1784).27 Private West India interest has not yet been studied, although we know that merchants frequently asked the government to protect their interest.28 For example, when the British confiscated at least fifty-six Dutch ships in 1758, the government interceded on behalf of Amsterdam and Rotterdam merchants and succeeded in getting most of the ships set free.29 In 1768, sixty-three predominantly Amsterdam merchants petitioned the States General for support of West Indian trade, attaching an impressive list of more than one hundred products regularly exported to the West Indies.30 The Essequibsche kwestie, described by Eric Willem van der Oest, highlighted many issues important to the West India interest and showed that the intricate relationship between government and business went in both directions. As early as 1778, secret negotiations took place between E. F. van Berckel, pensionaris (executive administrator) of Amsterdam,
25
N. H. Schneeloch, Aktionäre der Westindischen Compagnie von 1674. Die Verschmelzung der alten Kapitalgebergruppen zu einer neuen Aktiengesellschaft, Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsgeschichte, no. 12 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1982). For WIC monopolies, see chapter 4 in this volume. 26 G. W. van der Meiden, Betwist bestuur. Een eeuw strijd om de macht in Suriname, 1651–1753 (Amsterdam: Bataafsche Leeuw, 1986), 31–40. 27 D. A. Miller, Sir Joseph Yorke and Anglo-Dutch Relations, 1774–1780 (The Hague: Mouton, 1970). 28 Gemeentearchief Amsterdam (GAA), Archief van de Burgemeesteren, Handel (AB) 540 (folder, Requesten plaatsen in Amerika): Requests from merchants, asking the mayors to look favorably at trade with the West Indies and North America. 29 See note 49. 30 Zeeuws Archief (ZA), Recueils van Citters 20: Lyst der Fabricquen en Producten . . . na onse Westindische Colonien . . .; J. P. van de Voort, ‘Negotie en negotiaties voor Suriname, 1750–1780,’ in Ik ben eigendom van . . . Slavenhandel en plantageleven, ed. F. B. Brommer (Wijk en Aalburg: Pictures Publishers, 1993), 81–91.
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Jean de Neufville, merchant, and William Lee, commissioner of the American Continental Congress, to negotiate a commercial treaty between the Dutch Republic and the United States. In the end, a loan was made available for the American cause.31 A few years later thirty-three Amsterdam merchants tried to convince the city council of the importance of the American trade for Amsterdam.32 This is one of many cases where government and business had mutual interests. Information about Atlantic activity was regularly dispatched to corporate directors in the Netherlands, and government and private businesses often had agents or correspondents overseas. WIC functionaries at the various outposts regularly sent detailed reports to their superiors in the Netherlands, which would reach the board of directors of the WIC, the Heren XIX, and later the Heren X. The directors of the Sociëteit van Suriname and the Berbice Corporation (Sociëteit van Berbice), as well as of private companies such as the Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie (MCC) and the Rotterdam firm Ferrand Whaley Hudig & Jan Hudig, also kept well informed about Atlantic affairs.33 Much of the material for this book was drawn from this voluminous correspondence and other papers of the authorities in the Netherlands and their overseas agents and subordinates. Because West Indian affairs were frequently on the agenda of the States General, WIC directors were obligated to keep it informed about their policies and results. The various provincial governments
31 GAA, AB 538 (folder, Declaratoir van pensionaris E. F. van Berckel): Resoluties Staten van Holland, 20 October 1780; P. J. van Winter, Het aandeel van den Amsterdamschen handel aan de opbouw van het Amerikaansche Gemeenebest, Werken uitgegeven door de Vereeniging het Nederlandsch-Historisch Archief, no. 9 (The Hague, Nijhoff, 1927), 1:34–35. 32 GAA, AB 538 (folder, Amerika): Requests of merchants, 1782. 33 Algemeen Rijksarchief (ARA), Archief van de Oude West-Indische Compagnie (OWIC) 11: Overgekomen Brieven en Papieren (OBP) van Afrika, 1634–1647; Archief van de Nieuwe West-Indische Compagnie (NWIC) 97–119: OBP van de Kust van Guinea, 1699–1792; NWIC 200–12: OBP van Curaçao, 1700–1788; NWIC 247–52: OBP van Sint Eustatius en Sint Maarten, 1697–1778; NWIC 181–83: OBP van Essequebo en Demerary, 1773–1778 (see chapter 12 in this volume, note 23); ARA, Archief van de Sociëteit van Suriname (SvS) 212–403: OBP van Suriname, 1683–1794; ARA, Archief van de Sociëteit van Berbice (SvB) 61–191: OBP van Berbice, 1726–1795. The MCC, for example, had correspondents at Suriname, Curaçao, St. Eustatius, Essequibo, Berbice, and Elmina. See ZA, Archief van de Middelburgse Commercie Compagnie (MCC) 54–79; Whaley Hudig & Hudig of Rotterdam corresponded with their agent in Suriname in the years 1762–1842. GAR, Coopstad & Rochussen (C&R) 114–41.
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were also interested in West Indian affairs.34 The company directors (bewindhebbers) generally represented their particular town or state and linked those governments directly with Atlantic affairs. Zeeland’s interest in the West Indies is well known. The fleet that captured Suriname in 1666, for instance, was outfitted by the States of Zeeland, without the consent of the States General. Even the province of Groningen, no strong maritime region, was well informed about Atlantic affairs through the WIC chamber Stad en Lande.35 Several government officials served as major shareholders or directors for the WIC, the Sociëteit van Suriname, and the MCC.36 Archival collections in the Netherlands form an excellent source of information and confirm that the political and economic elite were well informed about Atlantic affairs.37 In that sense, there was indeed a DutchAtlantic system, one in which settlements and stations in West Africa, the West Indies, and the Americas were governed from Amsterdam, Middelburg, and The Hague. The WIC was a curious phenomenon in the Dutch commercial establishment. By the 1650s, it was clear the company would never achieve a position equal to that of the VOC in Asia. In spite of that, when the WIC went bankrupt in 1674, the government saw to it that it was reorganized on a smaller scale. The value of WIC shares remained low during the eighteenth century, yet the major shareholders did not sell. Why such support for a failing enterprise? 34 ARA, Archief van de Staten-Generaal (SG) 5751–5817: liassen West-Indische Compagnie. Van der Meiden also confirms a strong concern for West India on the part of the States General, see Betwist bestuur, 7, 12. 35 Van Winter, De West-Indische Compagnie ter kamer Stad en Lande, 47–62. 36 For an analysis of investment practices of the Middelburg elite with the Zeeland chamber and with the MCC in the years 1680–1764, see M. van der Bijl, Idee en interest. Voorgeschiedenis, verloop en achtergronden van de politieke twisten in Zeeland en vooral in Middelburg tussen 1702 en 1715, Historische Studies uitgegeven vanwege het Instituut voor Geschiedenis der Rijksuniversiteit te Utrecht, no. 42 (Groningen: WoltersNoordhoff, 1981), 210–20. 37 Most relevant are ARA, SG 5751–5817: liassen West-Indische Comapgnie; Archief van Johan de Witt 2776; Archief van Caspar Fagel 189–204; Archief van Anthonie Heinsius 2133; Archief van Isaak van Hoornbeek 338–66; Archief van Anthonie van der Heim 634–41; Archief van Pieter Steyn 372–76; Archief van Pieter van Bleiswijk (PvB) 245–345; Archief van Pieter van de Spiegel (PvdS) 128–64; Archief van de Stadhouderlijke Secretarie 1237–1353. See also the provincial archives such as ARA, Archief van de Staten van Holland (SvH) 1358G–1358B; Groninger Archieven, Archieven der Staten van Stad en Lande 2677–78; ZA, Archief van de Staten van Zeeland (SvZ) 2035–36. See also GAA, AB 358–544 (folders, Handel 1–7). See also some personal collections such as ARA, Collectie Radermacher 553–635 and ZA, Archief van de familie Mathias-Pous-Tak van Poortvliet and Archief van de familie Schorer.
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The only reasonable explanation is that the company had increasingly become a special-interest organization for merchants concentrating on Atlantic trade, and as its merit declined, its infrastructure was geared to serve private interests. The company offered businesses several advantages and came to resemble a semi-governmental institution, what we today call a public business bureau, regulating the operation of the business sector. The WIC supervised commerce and represented merchants and shipping firms in their dealings with city and provincial governments and the States General.38 It kept in touch with the navy and maintained the infrastructure of the trading forts in West Africa, West India, and Guiana. The company’s income was derived from the slave trade, particularly before 1738; from duty payments for trading passes to various company-controlled regions; and from taxes and other duties paid by settlers in these areas. WIC directors and principal shareholders determined policies. And while dividends were low, they drew income from private interest in plantations and private trade, legal if possible, illicit if necessary.39 After 1650, the WIC became quite different from the VOC. It was more like a service institution, not unlike the Directie van de Levantsche Handel en Navigatie op de Middelllandsche Zee, the Directie der Oostersche Handel en Reederijen, and the Directie van de Moscovische Handel.40
Protection of Dutch Atlantic Interests The symbiotic relationship between government and West India interests, plus the openness of the Atlantic region, meant that Dutch 38
During the 1660s, the WIC represented the West India interest in the College van Commercie in Amsterdam, a type of chamber of commerce. See H. Brugmans, ‘De notulen en munimenten van het College van Commercie te Amsterdam, 1663–1665,’ Bijdragen en Mededelingen van het Historisch Genootschap 18 (1897): 181–330. 39 The private interest of the company’s major shareholders is clearly illustrated in the outfitting of the ship Phenix in 1678. Marten Roos and Joan ten Broeck, directors of the Noorderkwartier chamber, made an underhanded agreement with Mathijs ten Broeck and the ship’s owners. GAA, Notarieel Archief (NA) 2848: 87, 22 February 1678. I thank René Baesjou for this reference. Some important major WIC shareholders, Pieter de la Rue, and Cornelis Christiaansen, for instance, had actually outfitted two interloper ships, the Jager and the Vergulde Vrijheid. See Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, 282, 305. 40 For these various organization, see K. Heeringa, ed., Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van de Levantsche handel, 1590–1600, Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën, grote ser. 9, 10 (The Hague, Nijhoff, 1910–1917); I. H. van Eeghen, Inventarissen van de archieven van de Directie van de Moscovische Handel. Directie van de Oostersche Handel en Reederijen, commissarissen tot de graanhandel en commissie voor de graanhandel (Amsterdam: Gemeentelijke
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security policies had to be intricately involved in the region. The States General, however, were not able to get involved during the first decade of Dutch ventures across the Atlantic, except for the expedition of Pieter van der Does in 1599–1600.41 But this changed in 1621 with the establishment of the WIC, which became a military extension of the States General in the Atlantic, as the VOC was in Asia. An Atlantic empire was created as a result of extensive naval warfare, but it was primarily WIC squadrons and privateers that made life unpleasant for enemy merchant ships. It became clear by the 1640s that the war with Spain was winding down and the WIC was about to fall apart. The Dutch were not in a position to fight for Atlantic territory for a variety of reasons. With the public expecting peace, taxes were reduced and warships disbanded. The States General made one exception, however, sending forty-one warships to Brazil during the years 1646–1650. But this so-called secours accomplished very little, and in the end, both Brazil and Angola were lost to Portugal.42 The three Anglo-Dutch wars between 1652 and 1674 were fought primarily over commercial interests. Pressured by West India interests, naval squadrons were dispatched into the Atlantic, including one commanded by Michiel Adriaensz. de Ruyter to West Africa, West India, and North America (1664–1665), one by Abraham Crijnssen to Suriname and Virginia (1666–1667), and one by Cornelis Evertsen to North America (1672–1674).43 These expeditions secured the safety of the Dutch possessions in those regions, although New Netherland was exchanged for Suriname. Archiefdienst Amsterdam, 1961); Tijdschrift voor Zeegeschiedenis 9 (1990), the tri-centennial special issue of the Directie der Oostersche Handel en Reederijen. 41 V. Enthoven, ‘De nobili, sed non foelici expeditione navali. Deel 1 en 2 over de edele vlootexpeditie naar São Thomé van 1599,’ Marineblad 110 (2000) no. 2:50–53 and 110, no. 3 (2000): 80–83. 42 ARA, SG (liassen admiraliteiten) 5564II: 28 December 1655; J. E. Elias, Het voorspel van den eersten Engelschen oorlog (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1920), 2:129–33; W. J. van Hoboken, Witte de With in Brazilië, 1648–1649 (Amsterdam: Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1955). For naval warfare between the Dutch Republic and Portugal, see A. da S. S. Monteiro, ‘The Decline and Fall of Portuguese Sea Power, 1583–1663,’ Journal of Military History 65, no. 1 (2001): 9–20. 43 P. Verhoog and L. Koelmans, eds., De reis van Michiel Adriaanszoon de Ruyter in 1664–1665, Werken uitgegeven door de Linschoten Vereeniging, no. 62 (The Hague: Nijhoff 1961); J. C. M. Warnsinck, Abraham Crijnssen en de verovering van Suriname en zijn aanslag op Virginië in 1667, Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen, Werken uitgegeven door de Commissie voor Zeegeschiedenis, no. 4 (Amsterdam: NoordHollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1936); C. de Waard, ed., De Zeeuwsche expeditie naar de west onder Cornelis Evertsen den Jonge, 1672–1674: Nieuw Nederland een jaar
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Commerce was secondary to continental power politics in the wars with France (1672–1713).44 During the Dutch War (1672–1678), the Dutch fleet was able to protect most of the West Indian holdings, although Tobago was lost, and this definitely weakened the Dutch position in the Lesser Antilles. In 1677–78, the WIC also lost its forts in the Senegambia region and abandoned Gorée Island and Arguin. When the Nine Year War started in 1688, the fleet was no longer able to protect the Dutch West Indian possessions and was attached to the Royal Navy in a subordinate capacity.45 France prevented the Dutch from regular contact with their overseas possessions and looted several Dutch colonies, including Berbice (1689 and 1712), Suriname (1712), and Curaçao (1713). They even controlled St. Eustatius between 1690 and 1696.46 All participants in the Nine Year War (1688–1697) and the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–1713) were actively engaged in privateering, and trade with the West Indies was seriously hampered. As table 14.1 illustrates, enemy privateers captured thousands of merchant ships. No quantitative data about the losses in merchandise is available, but they must have been extremely high. Although the Dutch battle fleet did not operate in the Atlantic after 1688, a few Dutch warships tried to accompany and protect ships sailing to the West Indies during the peak of French preeminence.47 After 1713, the Dutch Republic remained an important player in European affairs but opted for the safe course of neutrality whenever possible.48 This did not endanger the Dutch position in the onder Nederlandsch bestuur, Werken uitgegeven door de Linschoten Vereeniging, no. 30 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1928); D. G. Shomette and R. D. Haslach, Raid on America: The Dutch Naval Campaign (Colombia: University of South Carolina Press, 1988). 44 For a brief overview of the problems that the Dutch Republic faced at the end of the seventeenth century, see J. Jonker and K. Sluyterman, Thuis op de wereldmarkt. Nederlandse handelshuizen door de eeuwen heen (The Hague: SDU, 2000), 75–81. 45 G. van Alphen, De stemming van de Engelschen tegen de Hollanders in Engeland tijdens de regeering van den koning-stadhouder Willem III, 1688–1702 (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1938), 128. 46 S. L. Mims, Colbert’s West India Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1912), 223–24; J. Pritchard, ‘The Franco-Dutch War in the West Indies, 1672–1678: An Early “Lesson” in Imperial Defence,’ in New Interpretations in Naval History: Selected Papers from the Thirteenth Naval History Symposium, ed. W. M. McBride (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1998), 3–22; C. Frostin, Histoire de l’autonomisme colon de la partie de St. Domingue aux XVII e et XVIII e siècles. Contribution à l’étude du sentiment américan d’indépendance (Lille: Université de Lille, 1973), 165. 47 Klooster, Illicit Riches, 165. 48 O. van Nimwegen, De Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden als grote mogendheid. Buitenlandse politiek en oorlogvoering in de eerste helft van de achttiende eeuw en in het bijzonder tijdens de Oostenrijkse Successieoorlog, 1740–1748 (Amsterdam: Bataafsche Leeuw, 2002).
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Table 14.1. Number of Prizes Captured, 1688–1713 Captured by Dutch Republic Great Britain France Total
Nine Year War
War of the Spanish Succession
1,016 1,394 5,680 8,090
1,759 1,389 4,173 7,321
Source: J. Francke, Utiliteyt voor de gemeene saake. De Zeeuwse commissievaart en haar achterban tijdens de Negenjarige Oorlog, 1688–1687, Werken uitgegeven door het Koninklijk Zeeuwsch Genootschap der Wetenschappen, no. 12 (Middelburg: Koninklijk Zeeuwsch Genootschap der Wetenschappen, 2001), 330–35; J. T. H. Verhees-Van Meer, De Zeeuwse kaapvaart tijdens de Spaanse Successieoorlog, 1702–1713, Werken uitgegeven door het Koninklijk Zeeuwsch Genootschap der Wetenschappen, no. 3 (Middelburg: Koninklijk Zeeuwsch Genootschap der Wetenschappen, 1986), 138.
Atlantic region. On the contrary, Dutch merchants traded with the British as well as the French. In the Western Hemisphere, the Dutch were still seen as the cheapest carriers, as the statement by Lewis Morris opening this chapter indicates. In time of war between Britain and France, Dutch ships ran the risk of capture by privateers of one of the belligerents, but not every seizure resulted in confiscation.49 In 1737, warships started protecting Dutch merchant ships to and from the Antilles, and this convoy service was extended to Suriname shipping ten years later.50 49 These seized Dutch ships are clearly an indication of extensive Dutch commerce with the French and British West Indies. During the Seven Year War (1756–1763), British privateers soon captured fifty-six Dutch ships and harassed the crews of at least one hundred more ships. See Rijksmuseum Nederlands Scheepvaartmuseum, B–I–0131 (a–c): Lysten van de Hollandsche scheepen, zo veel deeze stad Amsteldam betreft, welke op hunne reisen naar of van de West-Indiën, door de Engelschen . . . onregtmatig geconfisqueert zyn . . . mitsgaders van 100 scheepen . . . welke door de Engelsche kapers zyn berooft, geplunderd en mishandelt . . . (1758). By 1761, the British had seized 227 Dutch ships employed in the trans-Caribbean trade, which represented a loss of ƒ3,000,000, according to C. C. Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean and the Guianas, 1680–1791 (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1985), 210. The British saw most of the Dutch activities simply as smuggling with the French; see Hough, Reports of Cases in the Vice-admiralty of the Province of New York, 300–01. Eventually most of the seized ships were released and the cargos returned to their owners. J. Rogge, Het handelshuis Van Eeghen; Proeve eener geschiedenis van een Amsterdamsch handelshuis, 2d ed. (Amsterdam: Van Ditmar, 1949), 52. 50 J. C. de Jonge, Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche zeewezen (Zwolle: Van Hoogstraten en Gorter, 1869), 4:164; J. R. Bruijn, De admiraliteit van Amsterdam in rustige jaren, 1713–1751, Publicaties van de Gemeentelijke Archiefdienst van Amsterdam, no. 10 (Amsterdam: Scheltema en Holkema, 1970), 24–25; A. C. Carter, The Dutch Republic
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From the 1750s onward, the Dutch Republic drifted into the status of a second-rate power. For the time being, neutrality was maintained and naval convoys protected Dutch shipping with the West Indies.51 But it was during these years that St. Eustatius expanded into a formidable entrepôt, the Golden Rock, much to the chagrin of the British. During the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780–1784), precipitated by the American struggle for independence, the Dutch navy was no longer in the same class as the Royal Navy. The British plundered St. Eustatius and temporarily occupied Essequibo and Demerara.52 After the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War, the Netherlands were increasingly subjected to French influences. The United Provinces were invaded by the French in 1795 and remained in the French sphere until 1814. In the meantime, the Dutch tried in vain to organize a navy and protect its overseas possessions, but they were nearly all captured by Britain.53 When most of the captured colonies were returned in 1814, except for the Wild Coast ‘jewels’ – Berbice, Essequibo, and Demerara – the Dutch Atlantic system vanished.
Volume of Dutch Shipping and Trade The volume of Dutch shipping in the Atlantic region has long been a matter of speculation because the available information was insufficient to produce a realistic assessment. Increased interest and research in recent decades, however, has led to significant improvement, as is evidenced by the chapters in this collection. While we are still far from documenting every ship and cargo, it is now possible to make more realistic estimates of Dutch Atlantic trade in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. in Europe in the Seven Years War (London: Macmillan, 1971), 112–13; Klooster, Illicit Riches, 165. In 1739, several merchants requested convoy protection from the Amsterdam Admiralty for merchants ships that traded with Curaçao. See GAA, AB 540 (folder, Requesten Amerika, 1739). For later convoys, see GAR, C&R 166: Memorie . . . wegens een convoy naar de Americaanse colonies. 51 F. C. Spooner, Risks at Sea: Amsterdam Insurance and Maritime Europe, 1766–1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 197. 52 K. Breen, ‘Sir George Rodney and St. Eustatia in the American War: Commercial and Naval Distraction, 1771–1781,’ Mariner’s Mirror 84, no. 2 (1998): 193–203. 53 V. Enthoven, ‘Geld speelt (g)een rol. De financiën van de Bataafse marine, 1795–1805,’ Special issue: 1799 – De Brits-Russische invasie in Noord-Holland, ed. M. A. van Alphen and A. M. C. van Dissel, Mars et Historia. 33, no. 4 (1999): 47–81.
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Table 14.2. Estimated Dutch Atlantic Shipping, ca. 1650 Sector North America Spanish America Brazil Guiana Coast and Tobago West Indies West Africa (bilateral) Slave Trade Privateering Total
Annual Average 15 20 35 5 150 20 15 20 280
Source: notes 59–72 in this chapter.
The Seventeenth Century Little quantitative evidence remains of Dutch Atlantic shipping before the end of the sixteenth century. Shipping data for the seventeenth century remains fragmentary, but enough information has been collected to make realistic estimates. The elusive Austrian researcher Franz Binder, mentioned in the introduction, is said to have collected data on more than ten thousand Dutch Atlantic voyages for the seventeenth century alone.54 Table 14.2 provides estimates of the regional ship utilization. It appears that annually at least 250 Dutch ships were active in the Atlantic region during the mid-seventeenth century, which represent approximately 12.5 percent of the total Dutch merchant marine.55 Although destinations can be verified for no more than half of the voyages, reasonable estimates can be made for each of the routes by mid-seventeenth century, but they are still based on fragmentary observation and do not necessarily establish patterns for the whole century. At the height of its power in the 1630s, the WIC outfitted around sixty ships annually, although Atlantic trade was then already
54 Binder shared some of that data with other researchers, but unfortunately never published the results of his unfinished project. J. Postma, The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1600–1815 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 32, 34, 37. 55 In 1636, the Dutch merchant marine consisted of about 2,050 ships, of which 1,750 traded in Europe while 300 sailed to the West Indies or Asia. See J. R. Bruijn, ‘De vaart in Europa’, in Maritieme Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, ed. G. Asaert, P. M. Bosscher, J. R. Bruijn, and W. J. van Hoboken (Bussum: De Boer Maritiem, 1977), 2:200–41.
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dominated by private skippers.56 A 1634 report about duty payments (lastgelden) for Dutch ships indicates that about three hundred vessels were active in long-distance trade, and this included only a few dozen East Indiamen involved in trade with Asia.57 This meant that approximately 250 Dutch ships were engaged in Atlantic trade during those years.58 During the years 1640–1659, 103 Dutch ships arrived in the Dutch colony New Netherland, an annual average of eight ships.59 There are indications that in the period 1643–1649 at least thirty-five ships sailed to Virginia from Amsterdam and Rotterdam alone, and additional ships traded with Maryland and the Chesapeake Bay region. As late as 1670, there were still references to Virginia ships (Virginiesvaarders). I have assumed that no more ships traded with the English North American colonies than with New Netherland.60 For the years 1655–1665, Wim Klooster has documented 146 Dutch ships trading directly with the Spanish American colonies. Some of these were slave ships that sailed via Africa. Considering the often illicit nature of this trade, we may assume that many ships have not been accounted for yet. For this reason, I have estimated an average of twenty voyages per year.61 56
See note 18. The VOC had a fleet of 119 ships in 1659, the majority of which remained permanently in Asia and were not included in the duty payments. See J. de Vries and A. van der Woude, Nederland, 1500–1815. De eerste ronde van de moderne economische groei (Amsterdam: Balans, 1995), 470. The ships in the 1634 report averaged 250 last (500 ton). 58 ARA, SG (liassen admiraliteiten) 5512: Calculatie wat incomsten de Ho: Mo: Heeren, 20 maart 1634. This document has been published by G. W. Vreede, Inleiding tot eene geschiedenis der Nederlandsche diplomatie (Utrecht: Broese, 1865), 2:2, appendix 116. Brugmans also used these figures. European shipping accounted for a large number because these made several voyages per year. In Atlantic shipping, no more than one voyage per year was possible. Bruijn provides a reliable survey; see previous note 55; I. J. Brugmans, Welvaart en historie. Tien studies (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1970), 34–35. 59 J. A. Jacobs, ‘De scheepvaart en handel van de Nederlandse Republiek op Nieuw-Nederland, 1609–1675,’ (master’s thesis, University of Leiden, 1989). The thesis is available at the Nederlands Scheepvaartmuseum, Amsterdam. See also table 4.5 in this volume. 60 See chapter 13 in this volume, note 21. J. R. Pagan, ‘Dutch Maritime and Commercial Activity in Mid-Seventeenth Century Virginia,’ Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 90 (1982): 491; R. Bijlsma, ‘Rotterdams Amerika-vaart in de eerste helft der zeventiende eeuw,’ Bijdragen voor Vaderlandsche Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde 5, no. 3 (1916): 97–142; S. van Brakel, ‘Eene memorie over den handel der WestIndische Compagnie omstreeks 1670,’ Bijdragen en Mededelingen van het Historisch Genootschap 35 (1914): 88–104. 61 Klooster, Illicit Riches, appendix 2; W. Klooster, ‘Slavenvaart op Spaanse kusten. 57
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Altogether, 799 private and company ships sailed to Dutch Recife during the period 1631–1653, an annual average of almost 35 ships. Even after the loss of Brazil in 1654, Dutch trade with Brazil did not completely end.62 The small Dutch settlements at Berbice, Pomeroon, and Nova Zelandia did not amount to much at mid-seventeenth century. The WIC chamber of Zeeland governed the settlements, and Tobago was a patroonship of the brothers Lampsins from 1655 to 1676. Only a few ships sailed to these settlements each year.63 Ships identified as West Indiamen (West-Indiëvaarders) are assumed to have been trading with the Dutch, English, or French West Indies. In 1643, fifty such vessels harbored in Amsterdam, and there were many others based in Hoorn, Enkhuizen, Rotterdam, and Zeeland ports.64 At about 1650, the Amsterdam chamber of the WIC operated thirty-eight ships, including rented vessels.65 In the early 1650s, the English captured twenty-four Dutch merchant ships at Barbados in one swoop. In 1664, Zeeland had thirty-six ‘Caribisvaarders’ in operation.66 Another source indicates that 100 to 120 Dutch ships traded with the French West Indies annually at around 1660.67 Besides these West-Indiëvaarders, Dutch ships also fetched salt from the saltpans at Bonaire, Aruba, and St. Martin. Most of these vessels were based in the West Frisian ports of Hoorn and Enkhuizen, but little is known about their activities. We know, however, that eighty salt vessels arrived at St. Martin in 1631.68 The direct Dutch trade with West Africa before 1674 has not yet De Nederlandse slavenhandel met Spaans Amerika, 1648–1701,’ Tijdschrift voor Zeegeschiedenis 16, no. 2 (1997): 121–40. See also chapter 13 in this volume, note 36, and J. I. Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585–1740 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), 313–14. 62 Wätjen, Das holländische Kolonialreich in Brasilien, 331–34. See also chapter 13 in this volume, notes 55–56. For the sugar exports from Dutch Brazil, see table 4.2 in this volume. 63 P. M. Netscher, Geschiedenis van de koloniën Essequebo, Demerary en Berbice, van de vestiging der Nederlanders aldaar tot op onzen tijd (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1888), 82. 64 ARA, SG (liassen admiraliteiten) 5532II: Een aenwijsinghe van . . ., 27 November 1643. See also ARA, SG (liassen admiraliteiten) 5531: 7 August 1643. 65 GAA, AB 540 (folder, WIC): Lijste van de schepen ende jachten, soo eygene als bevrachte, circa 1650. 66 Netscher, Geschiedenis van de koloniën, 82. 67 Mims, Colbert’s West India Policy, 54. 68 C. C. Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean and on the Wild Coast, 1580–1680 (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1971), 131; Netscher, Geschiedenis van de koloniën, 82; Klooster, Illicit Riches, 29–31.
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been studied systematically. We do know that between 1599 and 1608, two hundred bilateral voyages took place, an average of twenty per year. At the end of the Twelve Year Truce (1609–1621), the Portuguese estimated the number of Dutch ships arriving annually on the Gold Coast at thirty. Another informant estimated the number of Dutch ships at twenty. Binder estimates the illicit Dutch trade with West Africa at a dozen ships per year during the decade preceding the establishment of the Second WIC in 1674.69 I have assumed that as many interlopers traded with Africa as legitimate WIC ships.70 There are several miscellaneous sources about the early Dutch involvement in the Atlantic slave trade. Eight slave ships left Elmina in 1645. Between August and September 1648, five Dutch ships with 2,001 slaves left Luanda. Postma estimates 132 slaving voyages for the years 1658 to 1674, and René Baesjou identified twenty-three illegal slave ships for the years 1652–1655. Van den Boogaart and Emmer conclude that about a dozen Dutch ships were active in the slave trade every year.71 For privateering activities at the end of the 1640s, see chapter 4. The Zeeland chamber of the WIC granted forty privateering permits between February 1659 and June 1661, and Binder claims that only about half of these actually went on privateering missions. The others were merchant ships that carried the permits in case they encountered an enemy ship. The Zeeland chamber actually granted seventy-six privateering permits during the period 1658–1662.72 69
Den Heijer, ‘Zeeuwse smokkelhandel op West-Afrika,’ 142. See chapter 2, notes 79 and 98, and chapter 6 in this volume, note 2. For a general overview of this trade, see Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, 11–30; and K. Ratelband, Nederlanders in West-Afrika 1600–1650. Angola, Kongo en São Tomé, comp. and ed. R. Baesjou (Zutphen: Walburg, 2000). 71 K. Ratelband, ed., Vijf dagregisters van het kasteel São Jorge da Mina (Elmina) aan de Goudkust, 1645–1647, Werken uitgegeven door de Linschoten Vereeniging, no. 55 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1953), 3, 7, 20, 36, 70, 80, 125; Ratelband, Nederlanders in West-Afrika, 197; Postma, Dutch Atlantic Slave Trade, 35, table 2.2; Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, 276; E. van den Boogaart and P. C. Emmer, ‘The Dutch Participation in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1596–1650,’ in The Uncommon Market: Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic Slave Trade, ed. H. A. Gemery and J. S. Hogendorn (New York: Academic Press, 1979) 353–75. R. Baesjou provided the information about the twenty-three illegal slave voyages. 72 ZA, SvZ 1277 (Stukken met onzekere bestemming, 1662): Extract uijt het Borchtochten boeck van de Cruissers van Zeeland; F. Binder, ‘Die zeeländische Kaperfahrt, 1654–1662,’ Archief, Mededelingen van het Koninklijk Zeeuwsch Genootschap der Wetenschappen (1986), 40–92. 70
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Slave West Suriname Ess./Dem. Berbice Curaçao St. West North Latin Not Missing Total Annual Trade Africa Eustatius Indies America America specified Data Avg.
Total
813
30 73 69 59 40 31 59 42 30 20 5 6 464
161 197 250 274 379 416 575 596 470 286
10 10 10 10 20 30 40 51 66 47 5 35
134 161 155 118 161 140 125 109 239 66 2 5
120 130 140 150 160 200 250 452 268 110
75 75 75 75 75 75 75 84 126 53 30 67
130 130 130 130 130 130 130 131 351 585 1,063 237
20 20 20 20 20 20 20 16 4 1 1 25
100 100 100 50
114
13 15 20 19 31 42 71 146 214 161 17 36
3,718
785
204
1,415
1,980
885
3,277
187
350
85 95 102 96 111 119 153 178 182 135 113 53
932 1,048 1,124 1,051 1,224 1,309 1,681 1,955 2,000 1,488 1,240 578
93 105 112 105 122 131 168 195 200 149 124 144
1,423 15,651
Sources per column: Figures in italic are estimates. Unless otherwise indicated, it is assumed that Amsterdam controlled about 75 percent of the Dutch Atlantic trade, but this varied from one sector to another. This information is based on George Welling’s statistics, presented in appendix 14.1. The same figures have been used for 1770 as were documented for 1771.
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54 42 53 50 97 106 183 150 50 24 4
1700–09 1710–19 1720–29 1730–39 1740–49 1750–59 1760–69 1770–79 1780–89 1790–99 1800–09 1814–17
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Period
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Table 14.3. An Overview of Ships Arriving in the Dutch Republic from the Western Hemisphere, 1700–1817
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1. The numbers in this column are based on tables 5.2 and 5.3. 2. Figures for the years 1700–1739 are drawn from table 6.1, and for the years 1740–1789 from Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, 96, table 5.1, and 363, 12.1, excluding the slave ships. Duty payments are used as the basis for shipping with Africa for the years 1771–1791. A new duty (lastgeld ) system was introduced in 1761, but since its new charges are unclear I have assumed the average levy to be ƒ3,015 per ship, see Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, 372, table 12.3; F. B. Brommer, ‘Naar de kust van Guinea; het uitreden van de Juffrouw Elisabeth in 1780,’ in Ik ben eigendom van . . . slavenhandel en plantageleven, ed. F. B. Brommer (Wijk en Aalburg: Pictures Publishers, 1993), 36. The figures for 1810–1817 are drawn from appendix 14.1. 3. Figures for the years 1700–1795 are based on table 11.1, and those for 1796–1817 are drawn from appendix 14.1. 4. Figures for Essequibo and Demerara are based on table 12.2. 5. An estimate for the years 1700–1769 has to suffice. Figures for the years 1770–1817 are drawn from appendix 14.1. 6. Figures for the years 1700–1755 are drawn from Klooster, Illicit Riches, 207–23. An estimate is made for the years 1756–1769, and the figures for the years 1770–1817 are drawn from appendix 14.1. 7. Figures for the years 1700–1739 are estimates based on Curaçao’s shipping figures, Klooster, Illicit Riches, 224–225. During the years 1738–1751, 206 ships sailed from St. Eustatius to the Dutch Republic, averaging sixteen per year, see chapter 8 in this volume, note 10. Figures for the years 1770–1817 are drawn from appendix 14.1. 8. This category includes all ships with Caribbean destinations except Curaçao and St. Eustatius. Figures for 1700–1769 are estimates, and those for 1770–1817 are drawn from appendix 14.1. 9. This includes North American ships (first referred to as British and later United States) as well as Dutch ships. I am assuming that on average an equal number of ships sailed to North America from Rotterdam as from Amsterdam. Van Winter, Het aandeel, 2:44, table 7. Sixty and sixty-nine ships left Rotterdam for North American ports during the 1730s and 1740s respectively. See Wokeck, Trade in Strangers, 240–54. In 1792, fifty-four and fifty-two ships arrived in Amsterdam and Rotterdam respectively from North America, according ARA, PvdS 139: Handel op Noord-Amerika over 1792. 10. This commerce has not yet been studied comprehensively. See, for instance, chapter 13 in this volume, notes 56–57. Only the figures for the Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie are well known. Klooster, Illicit Riches, 84–86; and C. Reinders Folmer-van Prooijen, Van goederenhandel naar slavenhandel. De Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie, 1720–1755, Werken uitgegeven door het Koninklijk Zeeuwsch Genootschap der Wetenschappen, no. 10 (Middelburg: Koninklijk Zeeuwsch Genootschap der Wetenschappen, 2000), 137–43. Figures for 1770–1817 are drawn from appendix 14.1 11. Until 1713, these include privateers and interlopers. This is an extrapolated estimate. Verhees-Van Meer, De Zeeuwse kaapvaart, 154–57; and Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, 412–13. 12. An estimate of 10 percent is assumed for unidentified data.
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For a variety of reasons to be discussed later, Dutch Atlantic shipping decreased gradually during the last decades of the seventeenth century, averaging about one hundred ships per year by 1700. The Eighteenth Century Much of the recent research on Dutch Atlantic trade has focused on the eighteenth century, making shipping data more abundant than for the previous century. Table 14.3 is based largely on contributions in this collection and is supplemented by data from appendix 14.1. It is clear that the early eighteenth-century annual average of about a hundred ships increased gradually and doubled by the 1780s. The growing sectors for the last decades of the eighteenth century were the Guiana colonies of Essequibo and Demerara, the free-trade entrepôts of Curaçao and St. Eustatius, and the North American trade. Commerce declined in a few other sectors during this period, including West Africa and Latin America, and war-time privateering also virtually disappeared after the War of the Spanish Succession.73 Enormous changes took place in Atlantic shipping during the years 1780–1817. During the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780–1784), many Dutch firms protected their ships by registering them with foreign ports such as Ostende or Bremen, thus sailing under neutral flags and relying on the age-old principle of ‘neutral ship, neutral cargo’ (vrij schip, vrij goed ).74 Thus, tropical commodities from the Guiana Coast still reached the Dutch Republic, but via harbors in North America, northern Germany, France, and Denmark. The trading firm Van Eeghen, for example, shipped West Indian cargoes via Baltimore, Copenhagen, Bordeaux, and Nantes.75 Ferrand Whaley Hudig & Jan Hudig at Rotterdam used the firm Brand & Co. in 73 The MCC tried unsuccessfully to outfit three privateering ventures during the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1747). Twenty-nine Dutch privateers were active during the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780–1784), but none were deployed in the Atlantic. D. J. Starkey, E. S. van Eyck van Heslinga, J. A. de Moor eds., Pirate and Privateers: New Perspectives on the War on Trade in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, Exeter Maritime Studies, no. 9 (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1997), 169–85, 191. 74 See chapter 11, note 74, and chapter 12 in this volume, note 66. Sometimes the opposite happened, such as with the French slave ship Juffrouw Elisabeth. Brommer, ‘Naar de kust van Guinea,’ 34–35. 75 Rogge, Het handelshuis Van Eeghen, 89.
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Ostend for shipping their sugar from Suriname.76 After 1784, a portion of this commodity shipping remained in American hands. Dutch ships also sailed under foreign flags during the Napoleonic Wars. Some north-German ports had offices that specialized in providing neutral coverage. Whaley Hudig & Hudig, for instance, used Altona to neutralize ( geneutraliseerd ) their ships.77 After the short-lived Peace of Amiens in 1803, Britain no longer admitted merchandise for transport in so-called neutral vessels and required that cargoes actually be owned by a person or firm from a neutral country. Dutch West Indian products were then often transported to the United States to be trans-shipped to Dutch harbors on commission by American trading firms. The Van Eeghen firm, among others, made frequent use of such commission transports. This practice accounts for the growing number of American ships arriving in Dutch harbors after 1804.78 Several Spanish colonies gained their independence after the Napoleonic era and opened up to foreign trade, diminishing the special place that Curaçao and St. Eustatius had enjoyed as free-market entrepôts. Berbice, Essequibo, and Demerara were handed over to the British.79 Despite these setbacks, Dutch Atlantic commerce revived after French control ended in 1814. Shipping firms like that of Anthony van Hoboken from Rotterdam resumed outfitting ships with Atlantic destinations.80 Within a year, over a hundred ships arrived at Dutch ports from the Western Hemisphere. Within two years, the number increased to three hundred. On the other hand, trade with Asia remained sluggish for several years. Only after King William
76
GAR, C&R 152: Letters from Suriname to Brand & Co., 1782/3. GAR, C&R 652: Lijsten van in Suriname geladen producten, 1796. 78 B. Kolff, ‘Achter de schermen van het onder onzijdige vlag brengen van koopvaardijschepen ten tijde van de Bataafsche Republiek,’ in Rotterdamsch Jaarboekje, 5th ser., no. 8 (Rotterdam: Brusse, 1944), 100–01. A similar shift in transportation took place in the Asian trade at this time. After the VOC was taken over by the Dutch government in 1795, spices were primarily transported to the Netherlands by American ships. Dutch shipping with Asia came to a complete halt between 1810 and 1814. E. S. van Eyck van Heslinga, Van compagnie naar koopvaardij. De scheepvaartverbinding tussen de Bataafse Republiek met de koloniën in Azië, Hollandse Historische Reeks, no. 9 (Amsterdam: Bataafsche Leeuw, 1988), appendix 13. 79 See chapter 1 of this volume for additional developments during the nineteenth century. 80 B. Oosterwijk, Anthony van Hoboken, 1756–1850. Koning van de koopvaart, 2d ed. (Amsterdam: Bataafsche Leeuw, 1996), 35–46, 56, 101–02. 77
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(1772–1843) established the Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij (NHM) in 1824 and introduced the so-called cultivation system in the Dutch East Indies in 1830 was there a dramatic improvement in Dutch commerce with Asia.81 By that time, Dutch Atlantic commerce had begun to decline, although even in the 1840s Suriname was still considered very important for the Dutch economy.82 The Intra-Caribbean and Island Trade The sector hardest hit during the last quarter of the seventeenth century was the Dutch bilateral trade with the French and English West Indian possessions. One of the success stories of the eighteenth century, however, was the intra-Caribbean trade, also known as the kleine vaart. Over time, this so-called island trade via the Dutch West Indian entrepôts more than compensated for lost bilateral commerce. The WIC had acquired several islands in the Caribbean during the 1630s – including Curaçao, Bonaire, Aruba, and St. Martin – which were initially of limited value and used as naval bases, for extracting salt, and as replenishing stations for ships. Increasingly, however, some were used as trading entrepôts.83 From the 1660s until about 1720, Curaçao functioned as a major slave trade market with Spanish American colonies. When during the 1670s the WIC declared Curaçao a free-trade port, which meant that foreign ships could trade freely at the port of Willemstad after paying a small fee (recognitiegeld ), the island’s business increased substantially.84 During the 1780s, approx81 Between 1817 and 1830, 217 ships arrived in Rotterdam from Asia, while 1,018 arrived from the Western Hemisphere, distributed as follows: 554 from the United States, 183 from Suriname and Curaçao, 198 from the West Indies, 53 from Latin America, and 30 from West Africa. The NHM also became involved in trade with Suriname and the Antilles. See P. A. A. van Mechelen, ‘Zeevaart en zeehandel van Rotterdam, 1813–1830,’ in Rotterdamsche Bijdragen voor Economische Geschiedenis (Rotterdam: Wed. S. Benedictus, 1929), 3:145–47; Oosterwijk, Anthony van Hoboken, 90ff., 113; W. M. F. Mansveld, Geschiedenis van de Nederlandsche HandelMaatschappij, 2 vols. (Amsterdam: Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij, 1924–1926). 82 In 1840, 60 Dutch ships were still active in the trade with Suriname. ARA, Archief van het Ministerie van Koloniën (Geheim Verbaal) 4271: Minister Baud to King William , 29 June 1841, no. 262. Attached to this letter is an overview of the export of Suriname. I am indebted to Henk den Heijer for alerting me to this source. 83 C. T. Gehring and J. A. Schiltkamp, eds., New Netherland Documents 17: Curaçao Papers, 1640–1665 (Interlaken, N.Y.: Heart of the Lakes Publishing, 1987). 84 Duty payments amounted to 8 percent of the value of the cargo at Curaçao, and 5 percent at St. Eustatius. Actually, most ships ended up paying these duties
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imately seven hundred ships entered Willemstad harbor annually, 80 percent of which were based in Latin America, as is illustrated in chapters 8 and 9. In 1696, the WIC acquired the island of St. Eustatius. It played a commercial role similar to that of Curaçao, and eventually earned the sobriquet ‘The Golden Rock’ because of the huge profits earned there. The number of ships anchoring at its roadstead climbed from 111 in 1732 to more than 1,500 per year during the 1770s. In 1779 more than 3,500 ships moored off the island.85 Many European ships included St. Eustatius as one of their destinations, and numerous American ships went there regularly. Initially used for plantations and salt mining, St. Martin also gained some recognition as a free port. In 1750, for example, 402 ships arrived at that island. It maintained shipping connections with most islands and ports in the region, and many different products were traded there.86 Even the plantation colonies on the Guiana Coast were involved in the intra-Caribbean trade. At Demerara, for example, in a fifteenmonth period – August 1791 to March 1792 – 431 ships arrived at and left the colony. These included 81 Dutch ships, 196 British, 112 United States, and 42 ships with unidentified nationality.87 The great number of British ships at Demerara and Essequibo may relate to the large number of English planters in the colonies. Other regional plantation colonies also had heavy shipping traffic, though not so many British ships. The Dutch certainly maintained a sizable commercial network in the Caribbean, with Curaçao and St. Eustatius as the most important trading entrepôts. The four most important trading partners were the Spanish colonies, the British and French West Indian possessions, and the North American mainland. Table 14.4 shows the on 25 to 50 percent of the value of the cargo. Van Winter, Het aandeel, 1:17; Klooster, Illicit Riches, 64–65. 85 For the volume of shipping at St. Eustatius, see Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean and the Guianas, 1680–1791, 199, 204–05, 224; W. R. Menkman, ‘Sint Eustatius’ gouden tijd,’ West-Indische Gids 14 (1932/33): 372; J. de Hullu, ‘De handel van Sint Eustatius in 1786,’ West-Indische Gids 3, no. 4 (1921/22): 35–52; Klooster, Illicit Riches, 95. 86 L. Knappert, Geschiedenis van de Nederlandsche Bovenwindsche Eilanden in de 18e eeuw (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1932), 224. 87 ARA, Collectie Hinxt 11: Lijsten van de in Demerary binnengelopen en uitgeloopen schepen, 15 August 1791–20 March 1792.
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Table 14.4. Shipping to and from St. Eustatius, 1744, 1762, 1776, and 1785 Port of Origin and Destination
in
1744 out
1762 in out
in
1776 out
in
1785 out
Averages in out
French West Indies 249 127 49 24 236 291 451 238 197 136 British West Indies 558 518 322 315 490 618 400 352 354 361 Neutral Islands 31 32 69 59 165 154 152 155 83 80 Dutch Colonies 285 380 274 372 391 451 508 625 292 366 Danish West Indies 26 24 38 31 61 68 91 100 43 45 Spanish Colonies 12 10 55 68 58 49 30 17 31 29 North America 41 37 18 8 59 55 46 89 33 38 Dutch Republic 7 13 9 14 23 44 16 11 11 16 Not Specified 21 22 55 42 35 26 26 53 27 29 Total 1,230 1,163 889 933 1,518 1,756 1,720 1,640 1,071 1,098 Source: Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean and the Guianas, 1680–1791, 204–05.
ties that St. Eustatius maintained with the French Caribbean islands of Guadeloupe, St. Domingue, and Martinique, which experienced considerable growth in the eighteenth century. During the war years around 1700, a large share of trade with the French colonies ended up at Dutch free-trade harbors. In 1745, for example, only one French ship arrived at Guadeloupe, while 168 arrived at St. Eustatius.88 Another important group of trading partners for St. Eustatius was the British leeward islands of Anguilla, Montserrat, St. Kitts, Nevis, Antigua, and Dominica. Table 14.5 illustrates that the Dutch also traded with the British windward islands. It is not clear, however, to what extent St. Eustatius and Curaçao benefited from this trade, but judging from the hundreds of ships that visited these islands annually, business must have been substantial. As with the French islands, the Dutch must have played an important role in this commerce as well. This illicit trade was possible only with the cooperation of French and British merchants. According to F. Pitman, the British merchants were ‘notorious for their immorality.’89
88 Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean and the Guianas, 1680–1791, 204–05; Klooster, Illicit Riches, 92–93. 89 F. W. Pitman, The Development of the British West Indies, 1700–1763, Yale Historical Publications, Studies, no. 4 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1917), 283; Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean and the Guianas, 1680–1791, 204–05; Klooster, Illicit Riches, 95–97.
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Table 14.5. Dutch Ships Calling at Barbados, 1700–1750 (annual averages) Period 1700s 1710s 1720s 1730s 1740s Average
Months Essequibo Suriname Curaçao St. Eustatius Berbice Yearly Average 57 46 37 52 12
4.0 4.2
1.0 7.8 2.3 7.0
2.0
3.6
2.0
2.3
0.5
0.3 2.9 2.3 2.0
2.9 0.2 7.0
4.0 7.8 13.6 4.8 18.0
1.5
2.0
9.7
Source: Public Record Office, Colonial Office 33: 14, 15, 16.
The Golden Rock became well known during the American War of Independence, when the Dutch supplied American freedom fighters with weapons. American trade with St. Eustatius should not be exaggerated, however. Perhaps no more than a few dozen American ships, including the Andrea Doria, visited St. Eustatius annually, and this was just a small fraction of the island’s overall trade, as is illustrated in table 14.6. The trade at St. Eustatius irritated Britain immensely, and in the summer of 1777, British privateers captured fifty-four Dutch merchantmen on their way to the island. As the war in America heated up, Britain became so irritated about this that it declared war on the Dutch Republic in December 1780. A British fleet under Sir George Rodney conquered St. Eustatius early in 1781, while 150 merchant ships were moored off shore. The confiscation of ships and commercial inventory worth two to three million pound sterling (ca. ƒ30 million) caused consternation not only in the Dutch Republic, but also among British merchants who lost property. The British victims organized the West India Planters and Merchant Committee in March 1781 to plead their case, and victimized French merchants took similar actions. A series of lawsuits followed. The British convoy that carried the spoils to Europe, however, was captured by the French. The capture of St. Eustatius was viewed by many as a failure, and the island subsequently resumed its role as a free port.90
90 R. Hurst, The Golden Rock: An Episode of the American War of Independence, 1775–1783 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996), 110–21; Breen, ‘Sir George Rodney.’ Several attempts were made afterwards to stimulate St. Eustatius as a free port. See ARA, PvdS 160: Plans to revive the trade at Sint Eustatius, ca. 1789.
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Table 14.6. American Ships Arriving at St. Eustatius, 1771–1779 Period
Total
American
Percent
1771 1773 1776 1776 1779 1779
265 263 142 195 324 308
38 14 5 12 22 30
14.3 5.3 3.5 6.2 6.7 9.7
Average
250
20
7.6
January May June November April November
Source: J. J. van Driel, ‘The Rise and Fall of an Emporium: St. Eustatius, 1768–1781’ (master’s thesis, University of Leiden, 1996), 22–28.
Dutch illegal trade with Spanish America via Curaçao made the former an important trading partner until the middle of the eighteenth century. Afterwards, substantial commerce with the French and British colonies raised St. Eustatius’s productivity above that of Curaçao, even though continuing trade between Curaçao and Venezuela should not be underestimated (see table 13.1). The exact volume of the intra-Caribbean trade may never be known. But the Dutch had a significant share in this trade, accounting for a large part of the goods carried to the United Provinces via St. Eustatius and Curaçao. At the time of the Peace of Paris in 1763, the value of the Dutch intra-Caribbean trade was estimated at ƒ20 million,91 and the subsequent growth of St. Eustatius and Curaçao trade must have increased this value significantly.92
Summary The foregoing presents a more positive picture of the Dutch presence in the Atlantic than conventional wisdom portrays. Instead of the repeated cycles of hope, frustration, and failure mentioned earlier, the Atlantic region offered Dutch merchants and skippers recur-
91
Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean and the Guianas, 1680–1791, 222–24. The value of the VOC’s intra-Asiatic trade, by comparison, peaked in the 1750s at a value of less than ƒ20 million and declined during the 1770s to about ƒ10 million. See E. M. Jacobs, Koopman in Azië. De handel van de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie tijdens de 18e eeuw (Zutphen: Walburg, 2000), 230, table 1. 92
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ring chances and new opportunities, as various chapters in this book suggest. The dramatic financial expansion of the eighteenth century, to be analyzed next, was largely responsible for these opportunities. : In standard comparisons of the WIC and the VOC, the WIC’s modest performance and ultimate failure are usually blamed on the ready accessibility, or openness, of the Atlantic. That accessibility, however, was also a cause of the eighteenth-century resurgence of West Indian trade. Apparently, a negative could be turned into a positive.
The Amsterdam Capital Market When the Dutch Republic emerged at the end of the sixteenth century, there were no banks from which merchants could borrow money.93 Merchant houses had to have their own resources to finance commercial ventures, making long-distance exploits particularly difficult, and this is why the innovative charter companies – the VOC and WIC – were created. These new charter companies had long-term entitlements and were financed by shareholder investments. Company shares (actiën) promised dividends and were listed at the Amsterdam stock market.94 This novel idea was later copied by shipping firms such as the MCC and the Sociëteit ter Navigatie op Essequibo.95
93
For information about the Dutch capital market, see De Vries and Van der Woude, Nederland, 1500–1815, chapter 4; P. W. Klein, ‘Kapitaal en stagnatie tijdens het Hollandse vroegkapitalisme,’ in Kapitaal, ondernemerschap en beleid. Studies over economie en politiek in Nederland, Europa en Azië van 1500 tot heden, ed. C. A. Davids, W. Fritschy, and L. A. van der Valk, NEHA 3d ser., no. 25 (Amsterdam: NEHA, 1996), 37–54. 94 As a forerunner of modern corporations, the VOC has been analyzed by E. J. J. van der Heijden, De ontwikkeling van de naamlooze vennootschap in Nederland voor de codificatie (Amsterdam: Van der Vecht, 1908); S. van Brakel, De Hollandse handelscompagnieën der zeventiende eeuw . . . (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1908); B. T. M. Steins Bisschop and T. Wiersma, ‘De moderne NV als Compagnie,’ in Kennis en Compagnie. De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie en de moderne wetenschap, ed. L. Blussé and I. Ooms (Amsterdam: Balans, 2002), 37–54. 95 J. P. van de Voort, West-Indische plantages van 1720–1795. Financiën en handel (Eindhoven: De Witte, 1973), 133; Reinders Folmer-van Prooijen, Van goederenhandel, 19–27.
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As the example of Van Eeghen & Co. will illustrate, over time a distinction developed between traditional cross-border commerce and the financing thereof. This led to the establishment of merchantbank houses, which specialized in various financial transactions including outfitting ships, buying and selling merchandise, lending money, and selling insurance. Their capital included private wealth as well as investment loans from other private individuals. The details of this development are beyond the scope of this volume, but it is clear that an international capital market in Amsterdam emerged. This capital market revealed most clearly the distinction between the monopolistic trade with the east and the open market of the west, which created enormous trading opportunities in the Atlantic while depriving the VOC.96
Merchant House Van Eeghen & Co.97 Van Eeghen & Co. was one of several merchant houses that specialized in West Indian trade.98 It developed and maintained an extensive commercial network, and its records provide valuable insight in Dutch participation in eighteenth-century Atlantic trade.99 One of the early family members, Christiaan van Eeghen, actively traded with Curaçao in 1735. He received merchandise on consignment and as payment for bottomry100 and also received bills of exchange taken out in his name with gold and silver as security. An expert in trading tobacco, cacao, furs, and indigo, he became involved in shipping in 1740 and regularly outfitted ships for the West Indies. His son Jan, who took over the business in 1747, concentrated even
96 Jonker and Sluyterman, Thuis op de wereldmarkt, 119–24. For the early phase of the Amsterdam capital market, see L. Neal, The Rise of Financial Capitalism: International Capital Markets in the Age of Reason, Studies in Monetary and Financial History, no. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 97 Unless stated otherwise, the source of this paragraph is Rogge, Het handelshuis Van Eeghen, 28–148. 98 Other interesting firms specializing in slave trade and the West Indian trade were the Rotterdam firms Coopstad & Rochussen (C&R) and Ferrand Whaley Hudig & Jan Hudig. 99 The extensive records of the firm are kept in the Amsterdam municipal archive. GAA, Archief van het handelshuis Van Eeghen en Co. 100 For an explanation of bottomry, see chapter 9 in this volume.
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more on the West Indian trade; with his own or with chartered ships, he financed numerous voyages across the Atlantic. Jan van Eeghen marketed his own cargoes as well as those sent to him on consignment, and his ships sailed to various West Indian ports to obtain large quantities of a variety of commodities: sugar from St. Domingue, Cuba, and sometimes from Berbice; coffee from Suriname, Venezuela, St. Domingue, and Santo Domingo; tobacco from Santo Domingo and Cuba; cacao from St. Domingue, Jamaica, and Venezuela; and indigo from Venezuela and Colombia. Furs, quinine, and dyewood were also found among his cargoes. After Jan van Eeghen’s death in 1760, his widow, Cornelia de Clerq, continued to manage the business. She owned shares in thirty-five ships, and through her trade with the West Indies she also became a mortgage-holder in several plantations in the Guiana settlements. In 1779, her two sons, Pieter and Christiaan, established the P. & C. van Eeghen merchant house. During the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780–1784), they moved into trade with North America, France, and Denmark. Along with their mother, the brothers invested their capital in American government bonds, amounting to ƒ2.7 million in the years 1787 to 1792. And they invested in American firms and participated in land speculation through the Holland Land Company (see table 14.7). As a banking house, they also invested in several American loans. While the Van Eeghens continued to trade in the customary West Indian products, the nature of their firm changed significantly during the Napoleonic period. Most of the merchandise came from the United States and was shipped directly to Amsterdam or via France or England. The brothers dealt mostly with consigned goods, rather than their own. During the years 1800–1810, the brothers Van Eeghen were primarily engaged as commissioners for American firms. This was, no doubt, in response to the British regulations that merchandise on neutral ships be owned by neutrals as well, which made business across the seas virtually impossible for Dutch citizens at that time. They were also much involved in financial affairs and owned several part-investments in ships. When the Netherlands were incorporated in the French Empire in 1810, the Van Eeghen business came to a complete halt. When independence returned in 1814, Van Eeghen & Co. resumed trading, although it no longer traded with the West Indies and its American consignments remained small. Many traditional
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Table 14.7. P. & C. Van Eeghen’s American Investments, 1793 (guilders) Investment
Value
American funds and bonds (negotiaties) Stocks in the National Bank of North America Stocks in the Bank of Maryland Stocks in the Potomac River Company Stocks in the James River Company Stocks in the North and West Canal Street of New York Stocks in the Manufacture Company of New Jersey Land sales in the Genesee Unspecified land sales in America Total
849,000 54,000 13,000 18,000 4,000 1,000 12,000 87,000 200,000 1,238,000
Source: Rogge, Het handelshuis Van Eeghen, 115.
Table 14.8. Commodities from the United States for P. & C. Van Eeghen, 1801 Commodity Sugar Coffee Cotton Rice
Quantity 2,500,000 1,560,000 18,000 18,000
Commodity lb lb lb lb
Potash Tobacco Dyewood Arak
Quantity 1,100 174 114 2
half barrels barrels barrels small barrels
Source: Rogge, Het handelshuis Van Eeghen, 127.
commodities such as sugar, coffee, and cotton were now barely included, but tobacco was still shipped to them in sizable quantities. As exemplified by the Van Eeghen activities, two major changes took place in Atlantic commerce during the eighteenth century. The first manifested itself in the commodity transport and in the dramatic increase of American shipping in the Atlantic. The second came in the form of a decisive financial revolution. Financing the VOC Comparing the financing of Atlantic commerce with that of the Asian trade of the Dutch East India Company demonstrates both the uniqueness and immense opportunities in the Atlantic region. Despite initial capital pledges of ƒ6,424,588 in 1602, it soon became appar-
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ent that the VOC lacked sufficient capital to finance its business activities, and its credit deficiency worsened as the seventeenth century advanced.101 The company dealt with its liquidity problems by converting short-term loans and bonds into bonds redeemable only at the wish of the company (onopeisbare obligaties). Dividends were also paid in bonds, and by 1687 the company’s unredeemable debt had grown to ƒ12 million. It had consolidated its short-term deposits (bonds) and covered future credit needs with specific short-term loans, the so-called anticipatiepenningen, summarized in table 14.9.102 Anticipatiepenningen Most company ships were outfitted and dispatched in the spring, while the spices were usually auctioned in the fall. To raise the money needed to equip ships, the company borrowed capital against future income and gave its creditors priority on the sales of commodities. Known as anticipatiepenningen, a term first used in 1676, these loans became the most important source of capital for the VOC by the eighteenth century.103 In addition to institutional investors such as the Amsterdam and Middelburg Banks of Exchange (wisselbank), many of the VOC’s private shareholders provided capital for the company in the form of anticipatiepenningen. According to the records of the Zeeland chamber of the VOC, many local magistrates participated in this type of investing. The bewindhebbers rewarded their political friends with lucrative anticipatiepenningen.104
101
By rounding the invested capital to guilders, the total amount pledged in 1691 was ƒ6,440,200. J. P. de Korte, De jaarlijkse financiële verantwoording in de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, Werken uitgegeven door de Vereeniging het Nederlandsch Economisch-Historisch Archief, no. 17 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1984), 3. The Nederlandsch Economisch-Historisch Archief has recently published an English companion to this book. For an excellent analysis of trading on VOC shares, see Neal, The Rise of Financial Capitalism, 118–40; L. Neal, ‘The Dutch and English East India Companies Compared: Evidence from the Stock and Foreign Exchange Markets,’ in The Rise of Merchant Empires: Long Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350–1750, ed. J. Tracy, Studies in Comparative Early Modern History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 195–223. 102 De Korte, De financiële verantwoording, 66. 103 V. Enthoven, ‘“Veel vertier.” De Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie in Zeeland, een economische reus op Walcheren,’ Archief van het Koninklijk Zeeuwsch Genootschap der Wetenschappen (1989), 78–80. 104 J. G. van Dillen ed., Bronnen tot de geschiedenis der wisselbanken, Amsterdam, Middelburg,
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Table 14.9. Annual Average Debt of the VOC, 1671–1796 (millions of guilders) Years
Bonds
Anticipatiepenningen
Not Itemized
Total Liabilities
1671–1680 1681–1690 1691–1700 1701–1710 1711–1720 1721–1730 1731–1740 1741–1750 1751–1760 1771–1780 1781–1790 1791–1796
10.9 12.5 12.5 11.7 9.4 7.8 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 38.7 114.7
0.9 1.6 0.2 0.5 0.8 2.7 3.8 10.1 20.5 18.8 17.3
1.1 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 2.4 3.0 3.2 5.1 8.1
12.9 14.6 13.3 13.0 11.9 11.4 12.2 20.7 31.0 29.5 61.0 122.8
Source: De Korte, De financiële verantwoording, appendix 1.
The VOC’s credit problems increased during the 1740s, not because of an increase in business activities but as a result of dividend payments. Shortfalls were covered primarily by anticipatiepenningen, which rose to more than ƒ20 million annually during the 1760s. Except for VOC directors Thomas and John Hope, of the banking house Hope & Co., it appears that Amsterdam bankers were not heavily involved in these loans. The bankruptcy case of Leendert Pieter de Neufville, of the trading house Gebroeders de Neufville, for example, revealed that he held ƒ42,112 in VOC shares, but had no other investments in the company.105 The VOC still turned primarily to the Bank of Exchange for short-term loans.106 Delft, Rotterdam, Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën, grote ser., nos. 59 and 60 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1925); Enthoven, ‘Veel vertier,’ 78–80. 105 H. J. M. van der Laar, Opperbankier en wetenschapsman Willem Cornelis Mees, 1813–1884 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1978), 45–82; F. S. Gaastra, ‘The Amsterdam Capital Market and the Dutch East India Company,’ in Cities of Finance, ed. H. A. Diederiks and D. Reeder, Verhandelingen, Afdeling Letterkunde, n. ser., no. 165, (Amsterdam: Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, 1996), 99–112. 106 De Jong-Keesing, De economische crisis, 100ff. Brother Jan Isaac de Neufville also held shares in the VOC and the WIC as well as bonds on Suriname plantations, but no outstanding loans to the VOC. See J. W. Veluwenkamp, Ondernemersgedrag op de Hollandse stapelmarkt in de tijd van de Republiek. De Amsterdamse handelsfirma Jan Isaac de Neufville, 1730–1764 (Meppel: Krips Repro, 1981), 54 and 72.
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Bonds As table 14.9 shows, during the eighteenth century the VOC gradually reduced its debts in unredeemable bonds from ƒ12 to ƒ7.5 million, but starting in the 1740s, its debt-burden steadily rose again, until it completely went out of control during the Fourth AngloDutch War (1780–1784). Despite a normal fall auction in 1780, the VOC chamber of Hoorn was unable to pay off its ƒ44,000 in anticipatiepenningen in December, and other chambers had similar difficulties. By 1781, the company was in serious trouble, and the directors requested aid from the States of Holland and from Stadhouder William . Banker and VOC director John Hope terminated his ƒ200,000 in anticipatiepenningen early in 1781, and others, including the company’s secretary, Frederik Boers, followed suit. Boers even warned several of his ‘friends’ to call in these loans. The States of Holland approved an extension of payment for the VOC chambers in Holland, but this destroyed the company’s credit completely; now virtually no one was willing to extend credit to the VOC. The company was kept in business only by private advances from the Bank of Exchange, made on orders of Amsterdam city officials. The anticipatiepenningen system had collapsed.107 After these events, all existing VOC loans required a government guarantee. The States of Holland guaranteed all outstanding anticipatiepenningen, converting them to bonds at 3 percent interest if the creditor advanced an additional 50 percent of the amount of the outstanding debt at the same rate. Various other methods were used to supply the company with operating capital during the following years, including loans, lotteries, and bonds. In 1796, when the newly established Batavian Republic took over the VOC’s liabilities and assets, the company’s debts amounted to ƒ128,519,381, of which
107
G. J. van Hardenbroek, Gedenkschriften van Gijsbert Jan van Hardenbroek, heer van Bergestein . . ., 1747–1787, ed. F. J. L. Krämer, Werken uitgegeven door het Historisch Genootschap, 3d ser., no. 17 (Amsterdam: Mueller, 1901), 2:372–73; F. S. Gaastra, ‘Succesvol ondernemerschap, falend bestuur? Het beleid van de bewindhebbers van de VOC, 1602–1795,’ in Kennis en Compagnie. De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie en de moderne wetenschap, ed. L. Blussé and I. Ooms (Amsterdam: Balans, 2002), 55–69, 63–65; Jonker and Sluyterman, Thuis op de wereldmarkt, 126.
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ƒ119,712,113 was guaranteed by the state.108 By then, these liabilities amounted to 15 percent of the national debt.109
Financing Atlantic Commerce Because of its open character, Atlantic trade offered many more opportunities for investors than trade with Asia. Capital needs of the Atlantic trade far exceeded those of the VOC, as is illustrated in table 14.10 A–B. Short term investment was possible through shares in ships and in commodities, and long-term investment through stocks and bonds in several different companies. Table 14.10 (A). Capital Invested in Asia and the Atlantic, ca. 1650 (guilders) Asia
Atlantic -
VOC Stocks VOC Bonds
6,440,200 10,000,000
WIC Stocks WIC Bonds Not Specified Stocks Plantations/Patroonships110
17,090,000 5,000,000 500,000 1,000,000
- Loans Total
2,000,000 18,440,200
Outfitting and Cargo
10,000,000 33,590,000
Source: text; table 14.9; chapter 4; De Korte, De jaarlijkse financiële verantwoording, appendix 1.
108 ARA, Archief van het Comité tot de Zaken van de Oost-Indische Handel en Bezittingen 114: Schulden van de Generale Compagnie, 1791–1796. 109 Enthoven, ‘Veel vertier,’ 80–87; De Korte, De jaarlijkse financiële verantwoording, 86–92. 110 Until 1650, the Amsterdam chamber of the WIC invested ƒ600,000 in the colony of New Netherland. GAA, AB 540 (folder, Requesten plaatsen in Amerika). Between 1656 and 1659 the city of Amsterdam invested ƒ132,00 in the colony Nieuwer Amstel (New Amstel) on the Delaware. GAA, AB 541 (folder, Kwijtingen van rente . . . wegens . . . de directie van de stadskolonie Nieuwer Amstel). Between 1657 and 1659 Zeelanders invested ƒ72,000 in Nova Zelandia (Essequibo). The States of Zeeland may also have invested ƒ500,000 in the colony, but this cannot be verified. V. Enthoven, ‘Nova Zelandia and Cayenne: The Dutch on the Wild Coast, 1656–1666,’ in D’un Rivage à l’autre. Villes et Protestantisme dans l’aire Atlantique, XVI e–XVII e siècles, ed. G. Martinière, D. Poton, and F. Souty (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale-Presses de la MSHS, 1999), 207–17.
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Table 14.10 (B). Capital Invested in Asia and the Atlantic, ca. 1750 (guilders) Asia
Atlantic -
VOC Stocks
6,440,200
VOC Bonds
7,500,000
WIC Stocks 8,305,863 Sociëtiet van Suriname Stocks 2,100,000 MCC Stocks 1,374,876 Sociëteit van Berbice Stocks 1,344,000 Stocks not Specified 500,000 Bonds 500,000 Plantation Mortgages 22,000,000
- Anticipatiepenningen 11,000,000 Total 24,940,200
Outfitting and Cargoes
9,100,000 45,224,739
Source: text; chapter 4; table 14.9.
Short-Term Investments Most of the Dutch private West Indiamen were financed with shortterm share-investment ( partenrederij ), an investment in a specific venture rather than in a company.111 A shipping firm that practiced share-investment was managed by a business agent – called a bookkeeper or boekhouder in Dutch, or husband in English – with experience in shipping who sought investors to buy shares in a specific shipping venture. As the central figure in the undertaking, the bookkeeper managed the whole activity, usually with some of his own capital invested. He obtained a ship and cargo commitments, outfitted the ship, hired a crew, and kept accounts of the endeavor. Investors bought a share in the undertaking, usually a 1/16 or 1/32 interest. When the ship completed its voyage, the bookkeeper balanced the
111 For early investments in Atlantic partenrederijen, see P. W. Klein, De Trippen in de 17e eeuw. Een studie over het ondernemersgedrag op de Hollandse stapelmarkt, Historische Bibliotheek, no. 76 (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1965), 139. In 1778, for example, Ferrand Whaley Hudig owned a 2/32 share in the Willem Suzanna en Elisabeth. The ship was sailing to Suriname, and he acted as its bookkeeper. Skipper Jan Molenberg also owned a share of 2/32. GAR, C&L 715: Rotterdam, 18 March 1778. Another example of the late eighteenth century is the ship Juffrouw Elisabeth of the Amsterdam merchant Daniel Cornelis Wesselman, who functioned as bookkeeper, but his partinvestors are unknown. The outfitting cost amounted to ƒ40,000. Brommer, ‘Naar de kust van Guinea,’ 34.
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books and returned the invested capital and shares of the profits. The ship was then usually sold. This system worked well for relatively short voyages within Europe, and many Dutch citizens participated in it.112 Even the WIC, for instance, frequently rented and freighted such privately financed ships. A two-way transatlantic voyage lasted an average of about a year, and ship rentals often cost ƒ2,000 per month. Around 1700, the WIC paid ƒ110,000 in rent for the seven slaving voyages made by the ship Rachel.113 With some two hundred ships participating in the various branches of Atlantic commerce around 1650, at least ƒ10 million must have been invested in cargoes and in freightage as well as in shared ventures of a partenrederij. The cost of outfitting Atlantic commercial ventures is thoroughly explained by Reinders Folmer-van Prooijen in her study of the MCC during the years 1720–1755.114 Much as in a shared-venture of a partenrederij, the MCC kept an account of each of its ship’s voyages, including the depreciation of the ship’s value. The accounts separated the cost of outfitting the ship and crew from the cost of the cargo. As illustrated in table 14.11, the average cost of outfitting an MCC ship for a transatlantic voyage was ƒ24,000, while the cost of an average cargo came to ƒ44,000, making the total investment ƒ70,000.115 112 For the spread of share-investment in rural areas in Holland and Friesland, see P. Boon, Bouwers van de zee: zeevarenden van het West-Friese platteland, c. 1680–1720, Hollandse Historische Reeks, no. 26 (The Hague: Stichting Hollandse Historische Reeks, 1996), 74–76; R. S. Wegener Sleeswyk, ‘Ownership and Finance During the Eighteenth Century: Ship-Owning in Friesland,’ in Anglo-Dutch Mercantile Marine Relations, 1700–1850, ed. J. R. Bruijn and W. F. J. Mörzer Bruyns (Amsterdam: Nederlands Scheepvaartmuseum, 1991), 67–76. 113 Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, 91. For ship rental in the 1620s, see Klein, Trippen, 150. The statistics for round-trip MCC voyages show the average voyage lasted 439 days. Slave trade voyages lasted 500 days; voyages to Latin-America, 482 days; to Africa, 540; to the Guiana colonies, 462; to the West Indies, 284; and to the Pacific Ocean, 366. See Reinders Folmer-van Prooijen, Van goederenhandel, appendices 7a, 4a, 12. 114 Reinders Folmer-van Prooijen, Van Goederenhandel, 136 and appendix 12. Table 14.11 does not include twelve voyages to Suriname and Essequibo because their costs were listed unrealistically low, averaging only ƒ72 for outfitting and ƒ11,460 for return cargoes. Part of the cargo, such as bills of exchange, may not have been included. 115 These outfitting costs are comparable with other individual voyages. For example, outfitting costs for the small ship Rensselaerswyck were ƒ50,000 in the 1630s. See Rink, Holland on the Hudson, 197.
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Table 14.11. Capital Outlay in MCC Shipping, 1720–1755 (guilders) Trade Areas
Voyages Outfitting Cargo Return Equipping No. Lost Costs Goods Results Profits*
Latin America Africa Slave Trade West India
59 28 35 7
Average
7 3
% Trade %
33,594 20,940 28,542 15,223
92,868 38,304 34,305 11,034
128,214 60,468 69,399 29,504
1,752 1,230 6,543 7,225
1.4 6,900 5.4 2.1 1,230 2.1 9.9 2,094 3.6 86.6
24,575
44,128 71,896
4,187
25.0
Source: Reinders Folmer-van Prooijen, Van goederenhandel, 13, appendices 7a–b, 9a–b. * Equipping Profits = Return Results – Cargo Goods – Outfitting Costs.
With some 130 ships participating in the various branches of Atlantic commerce in the 1750s, at least ƒ9.1 million must have been invested annually in outfitting the ships and cargoes. Long-Term Investments: Stocks and Bonds Even before the establishment of the WIC in 1621, there were opportunities for long-term investment in Atlantic shipping ventures. There were several shipping firms that had more capital at their disposal than a partenrederij, and they did not close their books after each shipping venture. Eight such firms were already operating in the African trade in 1598.116 In 1614, the Guinea Company was established with an operating capital of ƒ85,800, and its shares could be traded. That same year, the Nieuw Nederland Compagnie was founded.117 But the establishment of the WIC in 1621 signaled the end of such
116 W. S. Unger, ‘Nieuwe gegevens betreffende het begin der vaart op Guinea, 1561–1601,’ in Economisch-Historisch Jaarboek 21 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1940), 208; J. K. J. de Jonge, De oorsprong van Neerland’s bezittingen op de kust van Guinea, in herinnering gebracht uit de oorspronkelijke stukken, naar aanleiding van een voorgenomen afstand dier bezittingen aan Groot-Brittanië (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1871), 10. 117 Van Brakel, De Hollandsche handelscompagnieën. For the Nieuw Nederland Compagnie, see S. Hart, The Prehistory of the New Netherland Company: Amsterdam Notarial Records of the First Dutch Voyages to the Hudson (Amsterdam: City of Amsterdam Press, 1959). For the Guinea Compagnie, see ARA, SvH 2687:113. The list of shareholders is published in V. Enthoven, Zeeland en de opkomst van de Republiek. Handel en strijd in de Scheldedelta, c. 1550–1621 (Leiden: Luctor et Victor, 1996), 434, table 9.14. For the trade in company stocks, see Klein, Trippen, 139.
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private ventures. Although investment was still possible in companies based overseas – in Denmark, Sweden, or Brandenburg – information is difficult to obtain on these elusive undertakings.118 The WIC’s initial capitalization in 1623 was slightly above ƒ7 million, and it subsequently rose to ƒ17,090,000 in 1639. In addition, the First WIC eventually had ƒ6.5 million in bonds. With a total of ƒ12.5 million, Amsterdam investors were by far the WIC’s largest suppliers of capital.119 The First WIC went bankrupt in 1672, and its successor, established two years later, was a much smaller operation. The Second WIC’s capitalization was only ƒ4,505,863, but additional shares valued at ƒ3,800,000 were eventually issued during the financial ‘Bubble’ of 1720. In 1674, however, the company’s effective operating capital was only ƒ1.2 million, which was insufficient to carry out its business. This was apparent when the WIC became the principal supplier for the asiento, transporting slaves to the Spanish American colonies, a business that required large outlays of money. It is not clear how the WIC financed the slave trade during the last quarter of the seventeenth century. The compensation for delivering slaves was partly in bullion, but also in precarious financing through bottomry bills. At times, the Amsterdam agents of the asiento advanced money to the company in order to ensure slave deliveries. In 1675, Balthazar Coymans, who became director (asentista) of the asiento during the 1680s, advanced the WIC ƒ100,000. In 1701, the Belmonte and Souza brothers lost ƒ60,000 in deposits to the WIC as the result of a default. But the asiento owed the WIC ƒ459,740 at the end of 1687 and still ƒ80,000 in 1715.120 After the French gained control over the asiento in 1701 and the WIC no longer received advances, the company borrowed through a debenture of ƒ727,988 in bonds at 3 percent interest. Suriname planters also bought slaves from the company, mostly on credit. In 1683, they owed the Amsterdam chamber ƒ455,800, and these debts rose to ƒ1 million by 1713.121 118
See note 22. GAA, AB 540 (folder, WIC): 1660. 120 See Postma, Dutch Atlantic Slave Trade, 26–55; Barbour, Capitalism in Amsterdam, 109–111. 121 For instance, all 150 slaves delivered by the Orange Boom were sold on credit. ARA, Collectie Radermacher 609: Surinamburgh, 18 April 1683; Koninklijke Bibliotheek, The Hague, 550 C5: Stukken rakende de Sociëteit van Suriname, bijlage La C. 119
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After 1708, the WIC periodically financed its operations through bonds, and it apparently paid ƒ17,905 in interest to bond-holders in 1730.122 The company also sold bonds to pay dividends to stockholders.123 During the 1770s, the WIC borrowed ƒ300,000 in the form of bonds to pay for the enlargement of its share in the Sociëteit van Suriname (see chapter 4). During the final phase of the WIC’s involvement in the slave trade in the 1720s and 1730s, the company directors resorted to anticipatiepenningen in amounts of ƒ25,000 to ƒ70,000.124 The need for credit declined rapidly after the company withdrew from the slave trade at the end of the 1730s. Its bonds were soon liquidated, and between 1735 and 1772 the company paid out dividends twelve times, averaging 3 percent. The States General continued to compensate the company for maintaining a military infrastructure in the Atlantic region. From the start in 1674, the States General subsidized the Second WIC with 200 soldiers. The provinces of Zeeland, Holland, and Groningen collectively contributed ƒ28,000 each year. Governmental loans and subsidies totaled around ƒ6.4 million for the years 1674–1791.125 In December 1791, the WIC was abolished and its debt and possessions were taken over by the Dutch government. WIC shareholders received 30 percent of the nominal value of their investments in the company. The WIC was also deeply involved in the Sociëteit van Suriname, first as a 1/3 shareholder and later as a 50 percent partner with the city of Amsterdam. The corporate history of the Sociëteit has yet to be written, and much of its financial affairs are still unexplored. The WIC acquired Suriname from the States of Zeeland for ƒ260,000,
122 ARA, Verspreide West-Indische Stukken (VWIS) 904: Financieel overzicht WIC, 1675–1728; H. J. den Heijer, De geschiedenis van de WIC (Zutphen: Walburg, 1994), 175, note 1; ARA, NWIC 269: Verkorte generale staat, ultimo 1731. Henk den Heijer provided this information. 123 J. le M. de L’Espine and I. de Long, De koophandel van Amsterdam, naer alle gewesten der wereld . . ., 9th ed. (Rotterdam: J. Bosch, J. Burgvliet, R. Arrenberg, H. Beman, A. Lozel, 1780), 2:108. 124 Van Winter, De West-Indische Compagnie, 195. 125 ARA, NWIC 268–271: Generale driejaarlijkse rekeningen, 1674–1791. Only the three provinces with a chamber were involved in subsidizing the WIC. For the subsidies paid by Groningen, see L. van der Ent and V. Enthoven, Gewestelijke financiën ten tijde van de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden. Deel III, Groningen, 1594–1795, Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën, kleine ser., no. 94 (The Hague: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 2001), 323–25, table 4.4.6.
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and sold 2/3 interest in the colony the following year. This led to the establishment of the Sociëteit van Suriname, with the WIC chamber of Amsterdam, the city of Amsterdam, and the Van Aerssen van Sommelsdijck family as its three shareholders. The city of Amsterdam had advanced the ƒ260,000 to buy the colony. After Governor Van Sommelsdijck’s death in 1688, his family tried unsuccessfully to sell its share in the Sociëteit to the city of Rotterdam for ƒ519,999.126 Suriname produced revenues from various taxes and made it possible for the Sociëteit to repay its debt to the city of Amsterdam in about a decade.127 By 1705, the Sociëteit had produced ƒ40,000 in dividends for each of its three shareholders. A French attack and brief capture of Suriname in 1712 slowed the colony’s expansion, but the planters bore the main burden by paying the ƒ600,000 ransom money to the captors. From 1705 to 1772, the Sociëteit paid a total of ƒ3,015,000 in dividends.128 During the eighteenth century, groups of run-away slaves, generally known as maroons, attacked Suriname plantations with increasing frequency.129 Peace treaties were signed with the Saramaka and Djuka maroons, but the wars with the Boni Maroons between 1768 and 1791 took a heavy financial toll. In 1772, the Sociëteit requested aid from the States General, and by the end of the year a contingent of eight hundred soldiers was sent to Suriname, with smaller units following.130 These military expenses pushed Suriname’s deficits to ƒ1.3 million in 1784.131 126 GAR, OSA 2222: Project waar op het huys van Sommelsdijck presenteert te verkoopen haer derde deel in de Coloni van Suriname; Van der Meiden, Betwist bestuur, 34, 61. 127 For instance, in 1771 the revenues for the Sociëteit totaled ƒ317,750, including a ƒ36,000 subsidy from the States General. J. Hudig Dzn., De West-Indische zaken van Ferrand Whaley Hudig, 1759–1797 (Amsterdam: De Bussy, 1926), 74–75. 128 GAA, AB 542 (folder, Overneming 1/3 gedeelte van Suriname): Lyst van het geen door de stad Amsterdam is genooten geworden voor haar aandeel in de uitdeelingen bij de directie van Suriname gedaan; Van der Meiden, Betwist bestuur, 76–77; E. Slot, Vijf gulden eeuwen. Momenten uit 500 jaar gemeentefinanciën, Amsterdam 1490–1990 (Amsterdam: Stadsuitgeverij Amsterdam, 1990), 27–37. 129 See R. Price, The Guiana Maroons: A Historical and Bibliographical Introduction (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 26–29. 130 The States General set aside a little over ƒ1 million for the military operations in Suriname. ARA, PvB 301: Generale Staat expeditie naar Suriname, 1774; W. S. M. Hoogbergen, De Boni-oorlogen, 1757–1860. Marronage en guerilla in OostSuriname, Bronnen voor de Studie van Afro-Amerikaanse Samenlevingen in de Guyanas, no. 11 (Utrecht: Centrum voor Caribische Studies, 1985). 131 ARA, PvB 299: Volgens de staaten van baaten en lasten der colonie Suriname, 1784.
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These developments may explain why the Van Aerssen van Sommelsdijck family wanted to get rid of their share in the Sociëteit. After lengthy discussions, the WIC and the city of Amsterdam bought the Sommelsdijck share for ƒ700,000, which put the value of the Sociëteit at ƒ2,100,000.132 In 1774, the Sociëteit asked the States of Holland to guarantee bonds amounting to ƒ700,000 at 2.5 percent. The request was denied, and the city of Amsterdam ended up lending the Sociëteit ƒ2,181,500 between 1772 and 1801.133 Another joint stock company was the Sociëteit van Berbice, established by a few Amsterdam merchants during the notorious speculation ‘Bubble’ of 1720. The WIC had loaned the colony to the Zeeland family Van Pere in 1620 as a patroonship. Like Suriname, Berbice was captured by the French in 1712, and a ransom of ƒ300,000 was demanded, of which ƒ118,024 was paid in the form of slaves, sugar, and other commodities. The remaining ƒ181,976 had to be paid by the patroons, Abraham, Johan, and Cornelis van Pere.134 The latter refused to pay, enabling the French consortium that captured the colony to claim legal ownership. In vain, the Van Pere family appealed to the States General to intercede on their behalf.135 In the end, a consortium led by Nicolaas and Hendrik van Hoorn agreed to pay ƒ108,000 to gain ownership of the colony. The new owners incorporated the colony in 1720 under the name Sociëteit van Berbice and stimulated its economy by selling 941 shares at ƒ2,000 each. By 1732, ƒ1,126,440, or 42 percent of the nominal value of ƒ3,200,000, had been raised. The Sociëteit paid a total of ƒ445,369 in dividends to shareholders in the years 1722–1763. But the devastating slave rebellion of 1763 caused enormous losses and required the shareholders to make an additional 8 percent payment on their investment. This raised the Sociëteit’s capitalization
132 A. J. M. Kunst, Recht, commercie en kolonialisme in West-Indië vanaf de zestiende eeuw tot in de negentiende eeuw (Zutphen: Walburg, 1981), 91–92; Van der Meiden, Betwist bestuur, 76–77. 133 ARA, PvB 296. The Sociëteit is mentioned in the accounts of the Amsterdam Bank of Exchange for debenture loans of more than ƒ200,000 between 1786 and 1791. See Van Dillen, Bronnen tot de geschiedenis der wisselbanken, 2:792–94; GAA, AB 542 (folder, Afrekening): De colonie Suriname voor 1/3 gekogt. 134 At the death of Abraham van Pere Sr., the colony was inherited by his son Abraham van Pere Jr. and his son-in-law Pieter van Rhee. In 1678, the WIC granted Berbice to Abraham van Pere Jr. as a perpetual inheritance. 135 ARA, Collectie Radermacher 614: Verzoek aan de Staten van Zeeland, 1715.
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to ƒ1,600,000. It appears that the Sociëteit also took out a loan in 1765.136 The Sociëteit van Berbice was terminated in 1795, and the colony was taken over by the Dutch government. The Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie was also established during the speculation frenzy of 1720. The initial intent was to raise ƒ10 million in operating capital, but three years later only 368 investors had provided a total of ƒ1,374,876. Initially, the MCC traded commodities with the West Indies and Latin America, but after 1740 it became more involved in the transatlantic slave trade. The company was stingy in rewarding its shareholders, paying out only ƒ275,166 in dividends between 1720 and 1775. But many shareholders also profited by supplying merchandise to the company and earning commissions on the trade in commodities from the plantations. In contrast to many other offshoots of the 1720 financial ‘Bubble,’ the MCC was modestly successful and survived well into the nineteenth century.137 In addition to these well-known companies and corporations, many smaller participants engaged in Atlantic commerce.138 In 1737, some Curaçao merchants established the Sociëteit van Commercie en Navigatie der Burgerij to trade with the mainland Spanish colonies. Within three weeks, 250 investors provided 28,600 pesos ( ƒ68,640) in initial capital, and the company outfitted four small vessels to capture Spanish ships. But because the United Provinces were not at war with Spain and had treaty obligations that limited trade with the Spanish colonies, the WIC forbade their activities.139 Several other joint-stock firms were established during the eighteenth century that were involved in transatlantic commerce. In the 136 ARA, SvB 405: Grootboek van de uijtdeelingen; Netscher, Geschiedenis van de koloniën, 158–61; Kunst, Recht, commercie en kolonialisme, 89. The original 941 shares of ƒ2,000 still existed in 1772. ARA, SvB 403: Eijgenaars van de actien in de colonie de Berbice, 1772; ARA, PvB 298: Van Bleiswijk to Van der Hoop, 27 December 1773. 137 Reinders Folmer-van Prooijen, Van goederenhandel, 19–27, 35–36, 182–83. 138 In the 1630s, the settlements Rensselaerswyck and Swaenendael in North America were allegedly worth ƒ36,000 and ƒ15,600 respectively. The Zeeland-based commercial house of Lampsins sold Tobago for ƒ36,000 in 1676. Jacobs, Een zegenrijk gewest, 12, 126, note 92; I. N. van Cleaf Bachman, Peltries or Plantations: The Economic Policies of the Dutch West India Company in New Netherland, 1623–1639, Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, no. 87 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969), 135–37; C. K. Kesler, ‘Tobago. Een vergeten Nederlandsche Kolonie,’ West-Indische Gids 10, no. 11 (1928/29): 533. 139 Klooster, Illicit Riches, 168–171.
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early 1770s, Cornelis van den Helm Boddaert, a mayor of Middelburg, spearheaded the establishment of the Sociëteit ter Navigatie op Essequebo. During the years 1772–1787, the firm outfitted fifty vessels for trade with the Guiana coast. Most of its shareholders are not known, but the city of Middelburg invested ƒ24,000 in the company.140 The Zeeland-based saw mill association, the Sociëteit der Zaagmolens, sailed its two ships Essequebo’s Welvaren and Hof Ramsburg to the Guiana Coast between 1750 and 1767. The Middelburg Bank of Exchange was one of its stockholders.141 Plantation Mortgages By 1750, there were approximately three hundred plantations in Suriname, one hundred in Berbice, and forty in Essequibo.142 It was estimated in 1718 that the establishment of a plantation cost approximately ƒ23,100. An additional ƒ12,500 to purchase about fifty slaves brought the total to ƒ35,600. The rapidly rising cost of slaves pushed that figure to more than ƒ100,000 by the end of the eighteenth century. Few planters possessed so much capital and had to rely on creditors for start-up costs and maintenance before new plantations could market crops. In addition, they bought most of their slaves on credit, advanced by trading houses and shipping firms. Thus, planters developed close ties with creditors and correspondents in the Dutch Republic. Several trading houses and shipping firms functioned as commissioners for planters, supplying credit in exchange for a commission for marketing their commodities.143 Around 1750, planters had an average indebtedness of ƒ30,000 to ƒ35,000, while the taxable value of sugar plantations averaged ƒ150,000 and of coffee plantations ƒ100,000.144 With an average investment of ƒ50,000 and approximately 440 plantations, by 1750, some ƒ20 to ƒ25 million must have been invested in Dutch West
140
Kunst, Recht, commercie en kolonialisme, 88; Van der Oest Data Collection. See chapter 12 in this volume and Van der Oest Data Collection; Van Dillen, Bronnen tot de geschiedenis der wisselbanken, 2:1303, note 1. 142 See table 12.1 in this volume; A. van Stipriaan, Surinaams contrast. Roofbouw en overleven in een Caribische plantagekolonie, 1750–1863, Caribbean Series, no. 13 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1993), 33; Netscher, Geschiedenis van de koloniën, 174; Van der Voort, West-Indische plantages, 87. 143 See chapter 12 of this volume; Van der Voort, De West-Indische plantages, 83–85. 144 Van Stipriaan, Surinaams contrast, 125, table 22. 141
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Indian plantations, while the total value of the plantations has been estimated at ƒ50 million.145 After 1750, however, the Amsterdam capital market offered another attractive investment opportunity – the plantation mortgage known as negotiatie, which trading houses offered to planters with their plantations used as collateral. Individuals, firms, and institutions provided capital for these ventures.146 In 1753, the trading house of Willem Gideon Deutz, a mayor of Amsterdam, issued the first of these mortgages. By 1757, he had advanced ƒ872,365 in loans to several planters and had issued bonds for an additional ƒ3,756,000. Between 1753 and 1794, at least 241 such plantation negotiaties were sold, totaling about ƒ80 million.147 Issuing plantation negotiaties reached its zenith at around 1770, when it became clear that most planters would never be able to repay them. The practice declined rapidly during the 1770s, but several new negotiaties were issued until the early 1790s.148 Financing a New Nation: The United States of North America The American War of Independence offered another opportunity for Dutch investors. Until the British seized St. Eustatius at the end of 1780, Dutch merchants had provisioned the American freedom fighters via the island. On 1 March 1781, the American Continental Congress requested a ƒ1 million loan from the Dutch. On 19 April 1782, the States General formally recognized the independence of the United States, and within three months another ƒ5 million loan was approved for the Americans. By 1794, the Amsterdam capital market had
145 Van der Voort, De West-Indische plantages, 83–86. Just the purchase of slaves between 1700 and 1750 must have cost about ƒ15 million. 146 The city of Rotterdam, for instance, had invested at least ƒ55,000 in negotiaties. GAR, OSA 3709: Negotiaties verstrekt door Rotterdam, 1754–1788; GAR, C&R 102. 147 Van der Voort, De West-Indische plantages, appendices 19 and 20; De Vries and Van der Woude, Nederland, 1500–1815, 178. An estimate in 1806 puts the indebtedness at ƒ100 million, see J. de Hullu, ‘De algemeene toestand onzer West-Indische bezittingen in 1806,’ West-Indische Gids 2 (1921): 407–21. 148 For an analysis of plantation indebtedness and its relationship to the Amsterdam stock market crisis of 1773, see A. van Stipriaan, ‘Debunking Debts: Image and Reality of a Colonial Crisis, Suriname at the End of the Eighteenth Century,’ Itinerario, 19, no. 1 (1995): 69–84.
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issued twelve loans amounting to ƒ33,450,000 to finance the new nation.149 After 1788, Dutch investors were deeply drawn into long-term American portfolio investments, accepting securities as collateral. In 1804, such investments reached nearly ƒ40 million.150 Dutch capital was also invested in American banks, canal projects, and land speculation. While the amount of these investments is unknown, it must have amounted to many millions. Like many others, the trading house of Pieter and Cornelis van Eeghen became deeply involved in American investments as early as 1793, and this involvement increased in subsequent years.151 In less than twenty years, the Amsterdam capital market may have invested as much as ƒ100 million in the fledgling United States. Summary Starting in the sixteenth century, when Dutch skippers went beyond the familiar European waters and joined the European expansion, Dutch investors were more actively involved in the Atlantic region than in trade with Asia. This was true in both short-term and longterm investment. Between 1621 and 1700, capital invested in Atlantic enterprises was primarily in shares and bonds in the WIC, as well as in short-term investments in shipping shares and commodities. After 1700, less capital was needed for commercial shipping and shipping firms, and private investment diversified among various companies, West Indian plantations, and later the United States. While the VOC needed an infusion of more capital at the same time,
149 Van Winter, Het aandeel, 2:395, 476–477, appendix 5; C. J. Bullock, The Finances of the United States from 1775 to 1789, with Especial Reference to the Budget, Perspectives in American History, no. 52 (1895, reprint; Philadelphia: Porcupine, 1979), 147–48; E. J. Perkins, American Public Finance and Financial Services, 1700 –1815, Historical Perspectives on Business Enterprise Series, no. 11 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1994), 105, 110; B. Baack, ‘Forging a Nation State: the Continental Congress and the Financing of the War of American Independence,’ Economic History Review 54, no. 4 (2001): 639–56. 150 Van Winter, Het aandeel, 2:395, and appendix 4; Perkins, American Public Finance, 111. 151 See table 14.7. For other Dutch investors in the U.S., see Van Winter, Het aandeel; M. C. Buist, At spes non fracta. Hope & Co., 1770–1815: Merchant Bankers and Diplomats at Work (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974).
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Amsterdam bankers lacked trust in the ‘sick old man of Asia.’ After 1780, the VOC could obtain capital only through loans that were guaranteed by the government. The eighteenth-century success story in the Atlantic region is probably best illustrated by the government takeover of the overseas territories in the 1790s. In December 1791, the States General took over the debts and possessions of the WIC. In due course, the government also acquired the assets and liabilities of the Sociëteit van Suriname and the Sociëteit van Berbice. In 1796, the government assumed the VOC indebtedness of ƒ120 million, along with its circa ƒ4 million interest obligation. In a government budget of about ƒ60 million, with tax revenues of only ƒ25 million, this was a heavy burden. By contrast, while perhaps twice as much money was invested in the Atlantic region, losses there were absorbed by private banks. The government’s responsibility for West Indian debt came to no more than ƒ5 million, for which it paid an annual interest of only ƒ150,000, as shown in table 14.12.152 In the Table 14.12. West Indian Interest Payments, 1797 (guilders) Loans Interest Interest Interest Interest Interest Interest
Total
Interest paid on converted WIC stocks paid on the acquisition of 1/6 of the Sociëteit van Suriname on bonds (negotiaties) for Demerara and Essequibo for a loan guaranteed by the States General, 1782 paid on deposits on behalf of the city of Middelburg for loans (negotiaties) of ƒ1,000,000 for the Raad van Koloniën Annuity of 4 percent 19,040 Annuity of 10 percent 22,783 Annuity of 8 percent 17,792 Unconverted deposits (recepissen) 380
62,475 8,730 3,366 1,890 13,974 59,995
150,430
Source: ARA, Archief van de Rekenkamer voor 1813 335: Rekening ontvanger-generaal van de West-Indische Handel en Bezittingen, 1797. See also ARA, Archief van het WestIndisch Comité 177.
152 In 1793, the now defunct WIC was indebted to the States of Holland for slightly more than ƒ3.1 million. ARA, PvdS 139: Notitie van de geldlening door de provincie van Holland gedaan voor de WIC, 1793. For West Indian interest
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long run, the openness of the Atlantic turned out to be a better deal that the monopolistic and closed system with Asia. : Atlantic investment and trade were driven by the enormous European demand for scores of commodities produced overseas, the most important of which were gold, ivory, and melequeta (cayenne pepper) from West Africa; sugar and dyewood from Brazil; sugar, coffee, cotton, and cacao from the Guiana region; sugar and tobacco from the Caribbean islands; furs from New Netherland;153 tobacco from the North American mainland; and silver and cacao from the Spanish mainland colonies via St. Eustatius and Curaçao. In return for these and many other commodities, the Dutch traded an assortment of manufactured products that were in demand across the Atlantic, including equipment, tools, textiles, arms, alcoholic beverages, and food. Most Dutch ships crossing the Atlantic in either direction usually had a full cargo. Shipping with Asia was quite a different story. Never able to create a market for European goods in the east, the VOC obtained spices through the intra-Asiatic trade or by purchasing them with precious metals. During the seventeenth century, Dutch East Indiamen shipped between ƒ500,000 and ƒ1,000,000 worth of gold and silver to Asia each year. When the intra-Asiatic trade declined during the eighteenth century, the export of bullion increased to ƒ4 million annually, which caused a drain of precious metals from Europe.154 Since the Netherlands lacked its own precious metals, it obtained them through trade with West Africa, Spain, the Spanish American colonies, and the Caribbean entrepôts of Curaçao and St. Eustatius.
payments, see ARA, Archief van de Raad der Amerikaanse Bezittingen 240–45: Lijsten der betaalde interessen, 1801–1806. 153 According to a 1655 document, New Netherland exported the following products to the Dutch Republic: furs (beavers and otters), moose and deer hides, dried hides, tobacco, wheat, rye, peas and beans, linseed, rapeseed, flax, hemp, potash, boards and beams, staves, firewood, tar, pitch, seed-oil, bacon, and salted meat. GAA, AB 541 (folder, Nieuw Nederland): Volgens de lijste van de convoijen, 1 May 1655. 154 F. S. Gaastra, De geschiedenis van de VOC, 2d ed. (Zutphen: Walburg, 1991), 139–40.
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After 1650, the Dutch provided the Spanish colonies, direct and indirect via the Antilles, with a variety of consumer goods, food supplies, and African slaves, often in exchange for silver. There is evidence that silver was illegally loaded onto Dutch ships at Cádiz, and gold was imported from Africa.155 Much of the bullion from the Atlantic region was purchased by the VOC, and its success in Asia depended to a large extent on the viability of the Atlantic trade.
Reviewing the Atlantic Trade The volume of Dutch Atlantic commerce during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries can be assessed by noting estimates produced by contemporaries, analyzing the various branches of commerce presented in this collection, and by collecting data of shipping traffic and estimating the size and value of cargoes. The Seventeenth Century The actual volume and value of Dutch Atlantic trade before the middle of the seventeenth century remains elusive, and estimates have to be made for various sectors and years. In chapter 2, I estimated its value between ƒ4 and ƒ7.5 million annually during the Twelve Year Truce (1609–1621). During the following decades, Atlantic imports more than doubled to an estimated ƒ17.5 million annually. Trade with the Atlantic region – including West Africa, the West Indies, and the American mainland – had become one of the most important Dutch trading sectors, accounting for almost a third of the Republic’s total imports. Table 14.13 compares the value of Atlantic trade with other branches of Dutch overseas commerce. The trade with New Netherland was relatively small and amounted to no more than a few hundred thousand guilders per year. By contrast, sugar and dyewood trade with Brazil, by the WIC and private traders, was valued at some ƒ3 million annually at around 1640.
155 Barbour, Capitalism in Amsterdam, 87; A. Attman, Dutch Enterprise in the World Bullion Trade, 1550–1800, Acta Regiae Societatis Scientiarum et Litterarum Gothoburgensis, Humaniora, no. 23 (Uppsala: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1983).
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Table 14.13. Estimated Imports into the Dutch Republic in 1636 Trade Area
Value in Millions of Guilders Percent
Europe VOC Atlantic (the Americas, the West Indies, and West Africa) Total
30.4 8.0
54.4 14.3
17.5 55.9
31.3 100.0
Source: Jonker and Sluyterman, Thuis op de wereldmarkt, 62, table 1.2. For the Atlantic see text.
The bilateral trade with West Africa was also substantial, with a turnover of several million guilders per year.156 Dutch trade with French and English Caribbean colonies remains a matter of conjecture, but considering the many references to this commerce, it may have been worth several million guilders.157 Producing actual Atlantic commerce figures is impossible, but an estimate can be made based on shipping data of the 1630s, which averaged 200–250 ships per year,158 by calculating the average value of return cargoes. A conservative estimate of ƒ80,000 per voyage brings the cumulative value of Atlantic imports in the Netherlands to between ƒ16 and ƒ20 million per year.159 The value of Atlantic commerce may well have reached ƒ17.5 million around 1636, and may even have been higher.
156 Jonker and Sluyterman, Thuis op de wereldmarkt, 62; De Vries and Van der Woude, Nederland, 1500–1815, 467; Den Heijer, De geschiedenis van de WIC, 54, 130; E. van den Boogaart, ‘The Trade Between Western Africa and the Atlantic World, 1600–1690: Estimates of Trends in Composition and Value,’ Journal of African History 33, no. 3 (1992): 369–85; ARA, Collectie Sweers 8:115–22. 157 See chapter 1 in this volume, note 32. 158 See note 58. 159 No reliable data on the value of return cargoes is available for the seventeenth century. The only figures are from the WIC’s West Africa trade for the period 1675–1731, when 334 company ships imported ƒ24.4 million worth of goods: an average of ƒ73,000 per ship. See Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, 96, table 5.1, 127, table 5.7. The value of the cargoes of salt imported from the West Indies are of course much lower. On the other hand, the average value of the imports from Brazil and the West Indies was probably well over ƒ100.000 per ship, as was the case in the eighteenth century.
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Table 14.14. Atlantic Commodities: Amsterdam Imports and Exports, 1 October 1667–30 September 1668 (values in guilders) Products
Imports Price in Quantity Guilder per lb
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Brazil wood Hides Melequeta Ivory Sugar Sugar (refined) 6. Tobacco 7. West Indian goods Total
0.35 0.43 0.60 0.85 0.30 0.90 1.00
Exports Value
Quantity
Value
1,433,552 lbs 501,743 1,017,843 lbs 356,240 100,188 items 43,081 ? ? 120,000 lbs 72,000 124,245 lbs 74,547 41,160 lbs 34,986 82,803 lbs 70,383 7,242,130 lbs 2,172,639 633,275 lbs 189,983 1,700 lbs 1,530 1,727,729 lbs 1,554,956 271,467 lbs 271,467 526,736 guilders 526,736 202,130 guilders 202,130 753,743 guilders 753,743 3,299,576 3,526,592
Source: H. Brugmans, ‘Statistiek van den in- en uitvoer van Amsterdam, 1 october–30 september 1668,’ Bijdragen en Mededelingen van het Historisch Genootschap 19 (1898): 125–183. Notes: These figures exclude imports of silver from America and gold from Africa. For market values, see N. W. Posthumus, Inquiry into the History of Prices in Holland (Leiden: Brill, 1946), and Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, 127, table 5.7. 1. This included various types of West Indian dyewoods such as brazilwood, campeche wood, and wood from St. Martin. One listing of wood (39,150 lbs. incoming, and 140,821 lbs. outgoing) is not included because it also contained Asian wood products. 2. This includes hides from West Africa as well as from the West Indies. 3. Melequeta or cayenne pepper is indigenous to Africa. 4. The origin of the ivory is not mentioned, but since the WIC exported 89,000 pounds annually during the 1670s from West Africa, I assume that to be the origin. 5. The sugar came from the Atlantic region and consisted of blancos, moscavados, and panels of São Tomé. 6. Amsterdam processed and sold for ƒ526,736 and ƒ330,408 in 1667 and 1680 respectively. These are fiscal rather than market values. 7. These products are not specified and are fiscal rather than market values.
Atlantic commerce experienced significant changes after 1650. The end of war with Spain in 1648 liberalized West Indian trade, expanding trade with English and French colonies that supplied Dutch markets with large amounts of West Indian products.160 On the other hand, the English issued their Act of Trade and Navigation in 1651, intending to prevent Dutch merchants, among others, from trading 160 See chapter 1 in this volume, note 32. See also Barbour, Capitalism in Amsterdam, 90.
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with their colonies.161 Brazil was lost in 1654, but the increase in trade with Spanish America partially compensated for that. The fragile new settlements of Nova Zelandia in Guiana and Nieuwer Amstel (New Amstel) on the Delaware produced very little trade. As is illustrated in table 14.14, however, a significant quantity of Atlantic commodities still made its way to the Amsterdam markets during the late 1660s.162 Dutch Atlantic shipping decreased gradually during the last quarter of the seventeenth century to average about one hundred ships per year by 1700. According to Catherina Margaretha Schorer, wife of the Middelburg official Johan Schorer, Middelburg commerce had declined precipitously in those years and only the VOC trade remained profitable.163 There were several reasons for this decline. First, the efforts of other nations to keep foreigners from trading with their colonies, while not always effective, did have an impact.164 A more important reason for the decline, however, was the increase in warfare during those years. Extensive warfare in the years 1688–1713 had a negative effect on all Atlantic trade, but the Dutch, especially, lost a significant part of their bilateral trade with French and English West Indian colonies. English and French West Indian products, however, still reached Amsterdam by way of intermediate ports, mostly English, as chapter 10 demonstrates. In 1698–1699, for example, the English exported most of their sugar unrefined, and about half of it ended up in the United Provinces. The situation with tobacco was similar. Most of the commodities grown by French planters also ended up in Amsterdam.165 In order to avoid taxation, British and French planters often 161 For the consequences of these developments for Amsterdam merchants, see GAA, AB 540 (folder, WIC en requesten Amerika). 162 Morineau analyzed the Amsterdam statistics compiled by Brugmans. Unfortunately, the Atlantic trade is not clearly presented in these. See M. Morineau, ‘Hommage aux historiens hollandais et contributions à l’histoire économique des Provinces-Unies,’ in Dutch Capitalism and World Capitalism: Capitalisme Hollandais et Capitalisme Mondial, ed. M. Aymard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 285–304. See also Barbour, Capitalism in Amsterdam, 62–63. 163 ‘. . . ’t schijnt dat er niets voordeeliger gaet als de Oost-Indische Compagnie, sonder dat soud de negotie ook weinig in dese stadt [Middelburg] sijn.’ See Van der Bijl, Idee en interest, 231. 164 See also note 15. 165 Barbour, Capitalism in Amsterdam, 92–93; Mims, Colbert’s West India Policy, 44–55. The illicit trade in West Indian commodities between England and the Dutch
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sent their products illicitly to Curaçao and St. Eustatius, where they were trans-shipped to the Dutch Republic.166 The Eighteenth Century Dutch Atlantic commerce rebounded during the eighteenth century. The trading sectors that expanded the most were the plantation colonies on the Guiana coast, the trading entrepôts in the Caribbean, and trade with North America toward the end of the century. Table 14.3 provides an estimate of all Dutch Atlantic shipping from 1700 to 1817, showing annual averages for each decade. Table 14.11 illustrates that the average MCC return cargo for the years 1720–1755 was worth ƒ72,000, but this reflected only the cost and not the market value. Cargoes from Spanish America were particularly high in value. Data from ships captured by the British on their return voyages from the West Indies are also helpful in evaluating return cargoes. A list of twenty-one ships captured in 1758 was assigned an estimated value of ƒ3,557,500. Another list of thirty-five captured ships had cargoes with an estimated value of ƒ5,144,000. The value of the individual cargoes in these cases averaged ƒ169,405 and ƒ146,971 respectively.167 One West India fleet of forty-two ships arrived safely in Amsterdam in 1759 with cargoes valued on average at ƒ173,000 per ship (see table 14.15). In the same period, the Curaçaose Visser of the firm Van Eeghen had a cargo valued at ƒ500,000.168 Another large ship even had a cargo worth ƒ960,000. In the late 1780s, British privateers seized three Amsterdam-bound Dutch ships with cargoes valued at ƒ242,360.169 The cargo of the Friheden, captured by a British privateer on its return voyage from Suriname in 1797, was insured for ƒ159,170.170
Republic is discussed by H. Roseveare, ed., Markets and Merchants of the Late Seventeenth Century: The Marescoe-David Letters, 1668–1680, Records of Social and Economic History, n. ser., no. 12 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 65–73. 166 Barbour, Capitalism in Amsterdam, 92–93, note 31; Israel, Dutch Primacy, 326; Klooster, Illicit Riches, 90–97; Schnurmann, Atlantische Welten, 169ff. 167 Rogge, Het handelshuis Van Eeghen, 48. 168 Ibid., and chapter 1 in this volume, note 3. 169 See chapter 8, notes 3 and 20 in this volume. 170 GAR, C&R 654: Rekening van de kosten van het reclameren van het schip Friheden en lading, 1797.
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Table 14.15. Estimated Market Value of 42 West India Ships Arriving in Amsterdam, 1759 Products Coffee Sugar Cacao Indigo Cotton Total
Pounds
Price in Guilder per lb
Value in Guilders
3,480,536 7,661,856 573,414 575,170 110,000
0.46 0.24 0.60 5.84 1.25
1,601,047 1,838,845 344,048 3,358,993 137,500 7,280,433
Value per ship
173,344
Source: GAA, Archief Brants 189: Copyboek J. I. De Neuville, 15 September 1759; De Jong-Keesing, De economische crisis, 189.
These and other indicators suggest an average value of return cargoes from the Atlantic at ƒ150,000, which would put the annual worth of imported products at more than ƒ30 million at the end of the eighteenth century. This figure is supported by the material in various chapters in this publication, summarized in table 14.16. Table 14.16. Estimated Value of Dutch Atlantic Imports, ca. 1780 Trade Areas Curaçao St. Eustatius Suriname Essequibo and Demerara North America Not specified* Total
Value in Millions of Guilders 2.8 7.0 9.3 4.5 3.0 6.4 33.0
Source: tables 11.9, 12.7 and 13.1; Van Winter, Het aandeel, 2:58, table 9. * This is based on table 14.3. Besides ships from North America, Curaçao, St. Eustatius, Suriname, Essequibo and Demerara, some forty ships arrived at Dutch ports annually from West Africa, Berbice, other West Indian islands, and Latin America.
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Several contemporary estimates of the Dutch trade with the West Indies also support this figure. In 1785, Cornelis van der Oudermeulen van Graafland estimated the annual value of the import and export trade with the West Indies and Latin America at ƒ28 million and with North America at ƒ2.25 million.171 Two years later, the States General Commission Van Wijn reported that West Indian commerce was ‘one of the most generous sources of wealth and well-being for the nation.’ The trade with the Guiana colonies alone brought in ƒ27 million annually, excluding interest payments from plantation investments.172 Two 1806 reports estimated the exports from Suriname, Berbice, Essequibo, and Demerara for the year 1800 at 28,645,813 pounds of coffee, 21,573,000 pounds of sugar, and 10,479,500 pounds of cotton. This did not include other exports such as cacao, indigo, and other less prominent products. The market value of the coffee, sugar, and cotton listed above was estimated at ƒ30 million, and the overall annual commercial value of the plantation colonies at ƒ48.4 million, as shown in table 14.17.173 Table 14.17. Trade With the Plantation Colonies on the Guiana Coast, ca. 1800 Trade Sectors
Value in Millions of Guilders
Commodities Export to the Colonies Income from Shipping Interests from Loans Total
30.0 7.4 7.0 4.0 48.4
Source: De Hullu, ‘De algemeene toestand,’ 420.
171 Van der Oudermeulen was a bewindhebber of the VOC. In 1785, he put together a report to encourage support for the company, in which he estimated the value of the annual East India trade at ƒ35 million. See Brugmans, Welvaart en historie, 30–31. 172 ARA, SG 9424:19–20, Rapport van de gedeputeerden Hendrik van Wijn, Nicolaes Cornelis Crommelin en Hendrik Ludolf Lambrechtsen betreffende de vrije vaart op Essequebo en Demerary . . ., 19 March 1787. See chapter 12 in this volume, note 61, for the Commissie Van Wijn, and for its interpretation, see De Hullu, ‘De algemeene toestand,’ 412. 173 De Hullu, ‘De algemeene toestand,’ 420; J. de Hullu, ‘Memorie van den Amerikaanschen Raad over de Hollandsche bezittingen in West-Indië in juli 1806,’ West-Indische Gids 4, no. 5 (1922/23): 387–98.
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Table 14.18. The VOC and Atlantic Trade in the Context of Dutch Foreign Trade, ca. 1780 (millions of guilders) Asia
Atlantic
20.0 8.0 2.4 10.4 13.2 2.3 15.5 5.1 4.8
30.0 20.0 5.0 25.0 25.0 10.0 35.0 10.0 0.5
Total trade turnover 10. Colonial imports and exports (1+5) 11. European imports and exports (3+6) 12. Total (10+11)
33.2 4.7 37.9
55.0 15.0 70.0
Trade balance in Europe 13. Exports (5) 14. Imports (3) 15. Net exports
13.2 2.4 10.8
25.0 5.0 20.0
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
Total imports from the colonies Retained imports European imports for reexports to the colonies Total imports Reexport of colonial commodities Exports to the colonies Total exports Trade balance (7–4) Specie export
Source: De Vries and Van der Woude, Nederland, 1500–1815, 533, 548, and ibid., The First Modern Economy, 460, table 10.8A; 474, table 10.10. Notes: While new data from this chapter have been used for Atlantic trade, the figures for the VOC have not been changed. 1. During the 1770s and 1780s, the VOC auctioned an average of ƒ20 million worth of Asian commodities annually in the Dutch Republic. An estimated ƒ30 million worth of Atlantic commodities were imported. 2. Using Amsterdam foreign trade statistics, De Vries and Van der Woude calculated that 40 percent of eighteenth-century Asian imports remained in the Netherlands, and that 66 percent of Atlantic imports were reexported. 3. This represents a rough estimate for the Atlantic trade. Exports to the Guiana colonies totaled ƒ2.2 million per annum, while exports of European goods via the more volatile St. Eustatius and Curaçao entrepôts, was estimated by Van der Oudermeulen in 1785 at ƒ3 to ƒ4 million per year. An 1806 report estimated the value of exports to the colonies at ƒ7.4 million, not including North and South-America and Africa. Therefore, I estimate the total Atlantic export at ƒ10 million. De Vries and Van der Woude assumed that half of these exports consisted of home-produced goods and that half were first imported to the Dutch Republic. 5. The ƒ20 million of reexported Atlantic commodities included sugar, which was refined in the Netherlands and then mostly exported, increasing its value by over 50 percent. Other commodities were sorted, packaged, and otherwise processed before distribution. 6. See note 3 above. 9. This is an approximation. Although West-Africa, Latin America, and the West-Indies exported gold and silver, some precious metals were exported to the colonies on the Guiana Coast. Some MCC ships, for instance, destined for Suriname and Essequibo carried as much as ƒ6,000 worth of coins to pay for their cargoes. See Reinders Folmer-van Prooijen, Van Goederenhandel naar slavenhandel, 136.
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It is now possible to make a more realistic assessment of the value of the Dutch Atlantic trade around 1780, using the calculation method employed by De Vries and Van der Woude. Table 14.18 applies this formula to the Atlantic trade as well as to the Asia trade of the VOC. The result shows that imports of ƒ30 million annually from the Atlantic were substantially higher in value and had a greater impact on the Dutch economy than the trade with Asia. Total trade turnover from Asia and the Atlantic came to ca. ƒ38 million and ca. ƒ70 million respectively around 1780. During the second half of the eighteenth century, unrefined sugar was one of the top five import products for the Dutch Republic, and processed sugar, coffee, and tobacco were among the four most important export products.174 The official product weighers (Waag) at Amsterdam regularly emphasized the importance of West Indian commodities.175 Toward the end of the eighteenth century, the Atlantic trade represented nearly a quarter of Dutch external commerce, as illustrated in table 14.19.176 Table 14.19. Estimated Value of Dutch Overseas Trade, ca. 1780 Trade Areas
Millions of Guilders
Percent
Atlantic Asia Europe Not Specified Total
70.0 37.9 135.0 62.7 305.6
22.9 12.4 44.2 20.5 100.0
Source: For the Atlantic and Asia, see table 14.18. For other areas, see Jonker and Sluyterman, Thuis op de wereldmarkt, 118, table 3.1.
174 Asian products were not listed. See J. A. Faber, ‘The Economic Decline of the Dutch Republic in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century and the International Terms of Trade,’ in From Dunkirk to Danzig: Shipping and Trade in the North Sea and the Baltic, 1350–1850, ed. W. G. Heeres et al. (Hilversum: Verloren, 1988), 109. 175 GAA, AB 540 (folder, Requesten Amerika); ARA, PvdS 153: Lyste der producten uit de colonie van Demerary en Essequebo, 12 March to 25 June 1790; ARA, PvdS 155: De waag van Amsterdam geprofiteerd van de producten van Suriname, 1776. 176 Joh. de Vries estimates the external trade of the Dutch Republic at the end of the eighteenth century at about ƒ300 million. Joh. de Vries, De economische achteruitgang der Republiek in de achttiende eeuw (Leiden: Stenfert Kroese, 1968), 27.
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Conclusions This collection started with two basic premises: that the importance of Atlantic trade in the Dutch economy has consistently been underestimated, and that comparison of the Dutch Atlantic trade with VOC commerce with Asia has repeatedly assumed that the latter had more value and a much greater impact on the Dutch economy. The most obvious distinction between the two trading regions is the closed or monopolistic system of Asian trade and the permeable character or openness of Atlantic commerce. This openness made it possible for Dutch merchants to adjust to changing circumstances in the Atlantic region. Despite failures and disappointments, new possibilities and new opportunities continually presented themselves. On the basis of available data, it now appears that, except perhaps for a short period around 1700, Dutch Atlantic trade during the ancien régime was more important for the Dutch economy than commerce with Asia. Additional research and study, particularly of Dutch trade with British and French Atlantic possessions and of the intra-Caribbean trade, may further clarify the volume of the Dutch Atlantic trade. There can be no doubt, however, that Atlantic commerce played a much more formidable role in the Dutch economy than has previously been assumed.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 9.1. Slave Arrivals at Curaçao, 1700–1730 Ship
Transport African Symbol Origin*
Anaboa Vergulde Vrijheid Wapen van Holland Eva Maria Quinera Marg. Catherina Vergulde Son Rachel Duijnenburg Vrintschap d’Elmina Nwe Beurs v. A’dam Hollandia Verg. Son Duijnenburg Quirina Beurs v. A’dam Wakende Craan Cath. Christina Kon. van Portugaal De Son Carolus II d’Elmina Adrichem Quirina Axim Carolus II Honaert Johanna Machtelt Adrichem St. Clara St. Marcus Coninginne Hester Adrichem Emmenes Sonnestijn Engelenburgh Fida Nieuwe Post Vlissings Welvaren
92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 A B C D E F G H I K L M N O P Q R S T V W X Y Z A’ B’ C’ D’ E’ F’ G’
GC AN SC AN SC AN SC SC AN GC/SC GC AN AN AN SC GC AN GC GC SC SC GC GC SC SC GC SC SC AN SC SC GC GC/MX AN SC GC GC SC AN/MX AN
Date Arrival 25–10–1700 09–03–1701 23–06–1701 08–07–1701 11–09–1701 20–11–1701 11–12–1701 24–01–1702 07–03–1703 06–05–1704 12–12–1704 05–01–1705 10–04–1705 10–10–1705 14–11–1705 25–05–1706 25–10–1706 30–11–1706 11–03–1707 31–10–1707 30–12–1707 15–02–1708 18–11–1708 27–11–1708 12–05–1709 10–10–1710 07–12–1710 07–12–1711 27–12–1711 30–04–1712 16–11–1712 12–01–1714 17–09–1714 06–06–1715 09–06–1715 21–09–1715 10–12–1715 09–02–1716 09–02–1716 13–03–1716
Arrivals Total Men Women Boys Girls Infants 28 317 244 265 231 155 180 202 249 195 99 342 342 287 242 203 339 117 299 283 268 81 116 276 287 57 299
26 151 151 136 129 95 122 109 103 93 56 130 112 121 118 132 139 58 156 145 149 64 48 164 163 24 143
7 143 45 143 46 94 3 15 110 23 3 106 83 120 29 37 124
8 65 13 44 10 42 10 5 40 10
47
5
7 2
22 18 11 7 2 10
4
5
11 7
343 253 333 208 118 222 44 107 278 164 129
175 158 136 155 137 135 16 17 96 64 26
41 29 65 79 82 65 4 9 109 10 30
12 12 22 24 36 37 2 3 30 3 9
34 20 31 10 9 23
1 5 6 8 7 6 2 4 1 8 4 2
6
1
2 1
70 681 459 596 423 392 315 333 506 321 159 620 561 559 399 383 625 175 514 430 417 176 182 462 464 83 458 584 594 571 453 556 466 373 459 68 136 513 242 194
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448 Appendix 9.1. (cont.) Ship
Transport African Symbol Origin* H’ K’ L’ M’ N’ P’ Q’ S’ T’
Gelderland Emmenes Comp. Welvaren Amsterdam Delft Juffrouw Helena Groot Bentveld Stad en Lande Phenix
GC SC AN GC A GC GC SC GC
Date Arrival 07–06–1716 26–03–1718 18–02–1720 27–09–1724 31–12–1726 30–05–1728 25–08–1728 10–08–1729 14–08–1729
Total Average
Arrivals Total Men Women Boys Girls Infants 87 179 41 209 131 157 493 307 209
39 105 9 60 29 27 115 163 55
12 101 12 56 42 9 51 78 29
3 64 4 14 15 5 13 59 14
2
145 449 66 343 217 199 676 607 309
10,015 4,754
2,161
788
87
18,983
44
16
2
387
204
97
4 4 1 4
Sources for appendices 9.1 and 9.2: Algemeen Rijksarchief, Archief van de Nieuwe West-Indische Compagnie 200–07, 566–76, 1146–53, for arrival, separation, auction records, lists of sales ‘by hand’, and death affidavits; Den Heijer Data Collection. * AN = Angola; GC = Gold Coast; SC = Slave Coast; MX = mixed origin.
Appendix 9.2. Mortality and Sale of Slaves at Curaçao, 1700–1730 Ships
Days Harbor Slaves at Separation Registered Sales Registered Days till Deaths Sick Manq. Pieza Total** Manq. Pieza WIC Total Deaths in Auction Total Entrepôt
Anaboa Vergulde Vrijheid Wapen van Holland Eva Maria Quinera Marg. Catherina Vergulde Son Rachel Duijnenburg Vrintschap d’Elmina N. Beurs v. A’dam Hollandia Verg. Son Duijnenburg Quirina Beurs v. A’dam Wakende Craan
7 21 7 19 10 9 19 27 21 16 19 2 2 3 3 2 3 2
1 2 6 15 14 8 7 9 10 7 3 5 2 4 13 1 2
69 28 10 679 64 49 453 74 122 581 57 90 409 84 105 384 60 24 308 43 35 324 72 39 496 71 67 314 51 35 156 27 29 620 70 77 556 155 69 557 82 46 395 38 14 370 214 32 624 65 28 173 39 16
30 556 257 441 227 302 237 220 354 228 102 468 333 431 347 135 532 120
68 669 453 588 416 386 315 331 492 314 158 615 557 559 399 381 625 175
38 113 193 169 194 103 77 92 137 79 56 147 225 127 75 247 97 55
30 556 255 335 201 260 237 207 352 226 100 448 336 431 320 101 447 114
68 669 448 504 395 363 314 299 489 305 2 158 595 561 558 395 30 378 544 169
6 3 84 28 24 20 33 30 10 1 21 2 4 2 75 7
14 89 69 52 134 190 212 18 18 11 33 2 4 8 30 24
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Appendix 9.2. (cont.) Ships
Days Harbor Slaves at Separation Registered Sales Registered Days till Deaths Sick Manq. Pieza Total** Manq. Pieza WIC Total Deaths in Auction Total Entrepôt
Cath. Christina 3 Kon. van Portugaal 2 De Son 3 Carolus II 2 d’Elmina 2 Adrichem 2 Quirina 2 Axim 3 Carolus II 2 Honaert Johanna Machtelt Adrichem 3 St. Clara 4 St. Marcus 3 Coninginne Hester 3 Adrichem 6 Emmenes 4 Sonnestijn 3 Engelenburgh 5 Fida 4 Nieuwe Post 5 Vlissings Welvaren 6 Gelderland 9 Emmenes 26 Comp. Welvaren 9 Amsterdam 2 Delft 20 Juffrouw Helena 2 Groot Bentveld 2 Stad en Lande 5 Phenix 8 Total Average
7 1 8 1 12 10
2 22
191 7
Source: See appendix 9.1. ** Excluding infants.
2 6 3 4 1 1 1 1
4.4
512 424 414 172 181 461 463 82 458 577 594 570 445 555 466 361 449 68 136 513 240 194 145 427 66
98 44 95 6 123 6 62 46 107 102 37 46 12 111 174 94 154 85 177 232 189 40 37 112 169 52 61 144 10
38 10
365 327 288 109 136 355 362 335 403 477 298 471 289 141 270 26 99 129 344 142 80 245 46
507 428 417 171 182 462 464 83 458 577 594 571 452 556 466 373 459 66 136 241 513 194 141 427 66
142 113 148 67 46 115 110 37 123
351 306 247 94 136 322 348 44 321
74 154 85 127 232 199 40 41 112 165 52 65 173 22
112 459 294 471 177 125 224 25 91 126 282 61 66 226 40
5 4 25 25
67 1 21 2 1 72
493 419 395 161 182 442 462 81 444 25 137 533 448 556 371 358 444 65 134 238 448 185 131 399 62 288 211 195 667 596 303
15 9 20 8 23 9 3 3 6 54 15 2 23 15 21 2 4 9 38 10 10 27 4 35 6 3 5
17,165 723
57 144 40 24 1 90 37 7 101 18 24 13 46 120 304 150 295 193 242 388 188 105 94 44 20 2 5 7 9
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Appendix 10.1. Agreement for Chartering Merchandise, 1675 This Charter partei indemted this 15th of July Ao 1675 in Amsterdam between Mr. Jacob Leysler [Leisler] of New York freighter on the one side: and Nicolas Skimer Master of the good ship the Dove of boston in new Englandt, on the other side: who did aggree upon the affreightement of Som place in the sd ship, in manner form following, vizt. The Master doth hire & let to freight unto the sd marchand twenty five a[t] thirty tunns place in his sd ship, which must abide here twelf dunning dayes from the date here of for to receave the goods the marchand shall be pleased to put on board untill the sd place. butt being detained lonnger shall be payed for every day of democadge thirty English shillings per diem. After which time the master is to depart, with the first faire wind & weather, and saile directly for boston aforsd. where the voyadge shall be ended. The ship being arrived att boston, & the master having faitefully delivered his loaden goods, he & his ship shall be free there. The master shall be payed for his deserved freight three pounds sterlings for every tunn above specified, to say before his depart here in Amsterdam the half part in lawfull money of ould England, and the other have part Att boston aforsd in lawfull Money of ould England. There under Contained the passage of the freighter, wherefor he shall pay nothing. The accaridges & pilotadges shall be payed according to the Costume. Lastly He aggreed That by shipwright, loose or perishing of the ship & freighters goods, restitution shall be made unto the freighter of the halfe part of the freight payed him here in Amsterdam, wherefor Mr. David Baruk Louszada doth put himself, pledge, & security, promissing to Satisfy the same, if in Case the master faile in it, under renunciation of the benefices ordins & excussionns the contents thereof he declareth to be acquited with. To the performance whereof the parties doe bind their persons & goods, and spe[cific?] the freighter his loaden goods, & the master his ship, freight, & fasnitures thereof according to the Law. Given in Amsterdam, witnesses our hands, Signed Sealed Delivered in the presence of us notary & witnesses H: Outgers P.F. Not Laurent van Gangree Gysbert Hoppisacke
Jacob Leisler Nicholas Skimer David Barak Louzada
Source: Gemeentearchief Amsterdam, Notarieel Archief 3222: 387, Leisler’s agreement with Nicholas Skimer, captain of the Dove of Boston, Massachusetts, for a charter Amsterdam-Boston, 15 July 1675.
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Appendix 10.2. Leisler’s Purchase of the Susannah, 1677 To all Xpian People to whom this present writing Indented shall come, John Leggett of Westchester, within the province of New Yorke, Shipwright, sendeth greeting, in our Lord God everlasting: Know yee, That I the said John Leggett, for and in consideration of a certaine Summe of Money, to mee in hand paid, or seemed to bee paid, by Jacob Leysler [Leisler] of the City of New Yorke, Merchant, whereof, I the said John Leggett, for mee, my Executors and Administrators, do hereby acquit and discharge the said Jacob Leysler, his Executors and Administrators and Assigns, Have Bargained, Sold, given, graunted and confirmed; And by these presents do, for mee, my Executors and Administrators, Bargaine, sell, give, graunt and Confirme, unto the said Jacob Leysler, his Executors Administrators and Assignes, In my Right, Clayme, Title and Interest in, or unto the Hull of the good Pinck or Ship, called the Susannah of New Yorke, now lying in this Harbour, and by me Built in Broncks River, near Westchester, Together with the Masts, Yards and Long Boat, or other materialls, unto the said Ship belonging, or in any wise appertaining, used or serving; To have and to hold all the Hull of the said Pinck or Ship, Masts, Yards and Boat, or other materialls there unto belonging, unto the said Jacob Leysler, his Executors Administrators or Assignes, and to his and their owne proper use and behoofe for ever. And I the said John Leggett, for mee, my Executors and Administrators, do Covenant, to and with the said Jacob Leysler, his Executors Administrators and Assignes, That I the said John Leggett, at the time of this Bargaine and Sale, am the true, Sole, and Lawfull owner of the said Pinck or Ship, and of all and singular the premises before mentioned, And that I in my owne Right, have full, perfect, good and Lawfull Power and Authority, to Bargaine, Sell, give, graunt and Confirme, the said Pinck or Ship, in manner and forme aforesaid, And that hee the said Jacob Leysler, his Executors Administrators and Assignes, shall and may, Lawfully from time to time, and at all times hereafter, peaceably and quietly have, hold, dispose and Enjoy the said Pinck or Ship, and Appurtenances, with out any Lett, reclayme, molestation or trouble, of mee the said John Leggett, my Executors and Administrators or Assignes, or of any of us, And that I the said John Leggett my Executors and Administrators shall and will warrant and defend the said Pinck or Ship and Appurtenances, herein bargained and Sold, against all People, to the said Jacob Leysler, his Executors and Assignes for ever; In witnesse whereof I the said John Leggett, have here unto put my hand and Seale, in New Yorke the 30th day of November in the 28th yeare of his Maties Reigne, Annoq, Dñi, 1676/7. Sealed & delivered In the presence of John Leggett (sealed) Timotheus van der Veen Wm. Nicolls John Juxon. Source: D. W. Voorhees, C. Schnurmann, and H. Wellenreuther, eds., The Jacob Leisler Papers: Reconstructing Atlantic Networks, 1639–1691 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, forthcoming), 1: Certificate of Governor Edmund Andros in regard to the ownership of the pinck Susannah, which belongs to Jacob Leisler, 16 February 1677, and purchase of Susannah from John Leggett, 17 February 1677.
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Appendix 10.3. Notarial Deed for the Money Borrowed by Skipper William Measure of the Happy Return, 1687
To all People to whome this present writing shall come I William Measure master of the barck called the happy returne at present in the port of Rotterdam doe send greeting: Whereas the said Ship is now bound on a voyadge from the port of the said Citty of Rotterdam to any port in England to Cleare the Kings duties and from thence to newjorck in America there to end her voyadge and whereas mr Cornelis Jacobse Moy of Amsterdam marcht: hath at and before the Ensealing and Delivery hereof, at the reqt: of me the said Willm Measure lent and paid unto me the sume of Six hundred gilders Lawfull money of holland for the account of mr Jacob Leysler [Leisler] marcht at Newjorck aforesd wich I have Expenced and Disbursed in the fitting of the said ship out for Sea without wich She could not procbed on the said voyage and whereas alsoo the said mr Moy is Contented to beare the hazard and adventure of the said sume on the bolcke and body of the said ship during the said voyage. Now Know yee that I the said William Measure in Considiration of the premises doe for me my Exrs: & assignes covenant grant & agree to and with the said mr Moy his Exrs: and assignes by these presents that the said/Ship the Happy Returne shall with all Conveniently Speed depart from Rotterdam and as wind and weather will permit directly saile and apply without Daviation to the said port of the Citty of Newjorck haveing first Cleared in England the perils and Dangers of the Seas Exepted and alsoo that I the said William Measure my Exrs Admrs or assignes for satisfaction of the said Sume of Six hundred gilders principall and for the hazard and adventure thereof during the said voyage shall and will well and truely pay or cause to be paid unto the said mr Jacob Leysler his Exrs or assignes in Newjorck the Sume of two hundred and fifty pieces of Eight and more over twenty ptC= advance for the Dangers and perils of the Seas wich I the said master doe Covenant and agree that by the said mr Leysler shall be deducted of my freight of the said Ship upon my arrivall at the said port of newjorck. And for the true payment of the said principall Sume and advances aforesaid I the said William Measure doe bind and oblidge my self my Exrs= and admrs= unto the said mr Leysler his Exrs= or assignes and particularly my said Ship freight and fornitures thereof/in the penolty of five hundred pieces of Eight firmly by these presents in Witnesse whereof I the said William Measure have put my hand & seale hereunto in Amsterdam this tenth day of Decemb: A° Dm onethousand six hundred and Eighty Seaven Stilo Nove. Signed sealed and Delivered in the presence of us Wm Measure Tho: Larwood J Martini H.Outgers P:not: Source: Gemeentearchief Amsterdam, Notarieel Archief 3292: 152, 10 December 1687.
POSTMA_f16_446-459
Appendix 11.1. Suriname Exports Compared in Nassy, Van de Spiegel, and Postma Data Collections, 1683–1794 Year Ships
Ships
8,651,200 13,168,000 11,380,000 8,164,800 11,040,000 11,033,600 13,944,000 9,313,600 14,011,200
Ships
Postma Sugar lbs.
15 22 15 14 10 15 18 11 14 8 9 16 21 18 18 9 15 14 16 26 18 14 18 16 20 14 20
4,567,225 5,347,260 3,313,469 3,382,059 5,466,384 7,342,662 6,323,338 4,335,725 5,349,578 3,667,530 4,112,065 8,599,290 11,214,050 6,671,800 9,911,800 4,558,210 6,759,895 6,591,114 9,121,784 13,159,414 11,377,625 8,165,800 11,029,050 11,033,300 13,954,200 9,311,800 14,001,800
Coffee lbs.
Page 453
10,814 16,460 14,225 10,206 13,800 13,792 17,430 11,642 17,514
Coffee lbs.
11:00 AM
16 26 19 14 18 16 20 14 20
Van de Spiegel Sugar Sugar hogshead lbs.
7/15/03
8,400,000 8,440,000 8,457,600 8,560,000 9,680,000 10,288,000 1,170,600 14,799,400 9,700,200 14,720,800
Coffee lbs.
453
16 20 14 13
10,500 10,550 10,572 10,700 12,100 12,860 1,463 18,499 12,125 18,401
Nassy Sugar lbs.
1683 1684 1685 1686 1687 1688 1689 1690 1691 1692 1693 1694 1695 1696 1697 1698 1699 1700 1701 1702 1703 1704 1705 1706 1707 1708 1709
Sugar hogshead
15,661 21,546 22,696 14,569 22,028 19,532 17,639 14,553 12,436 17,316 19,480 25,848 29,866 20,734 25,818 22,190 24,834 26,661 25,836 26,249 27,100 23,242 27,356 20,756 22,488 17,170 25,525
12,528,800 17,237,000 18,156,400 11,654,800 17,622,720 15,625,800 14,111,400 11,642,000 9,948,400 13,853,000 15,584,200 20,678,720 23,893,120 16,587,200 20,654,400 17,752,200 19,867,000 21,328,400 20,668,800 20,998,800 21,680,000 18,593,200 21,884,800 16,605,040 17,990,400 13,735,800 20,420,200
Coffee lbs.
5,627 46,086 142,702 207,373 230,162 272,165 503,667 530,032 1,101,147 789,097 1,257,036 1,376,335 1,620,365
Ships 17 21 29 17 22 24 23 17 14 22 20 27 32 25 29 24 29 28 27 27 29 26 32 26 30 29 35
Van de Spiegel Sugar Sugar hogshead lbs. 15,121 20,825 21,965 14,346 21,091 18,802 16,936 13,920 11,934 16,633 18,906 25,114 29,109 20,909 24,963 21,405 24,141 26,156 25,168 25,269 26,150 22,392 26,308 19,929 21,699 16,431 24,549
12,096,800 16,660,000 17,572,000 11,476,800 16,872,800 15,041,600 13,548,800 11,136,000 9,547,200 13,306,400 15,124,800 20,091,200 23,287,200 16,727,200 19,970,400 17,124,000 19,312,800 20,924,800 20,134,400 20,215,200 20,920,000 17,913,600 21,046,400 15,943,200 17,359,200 13,144,800 19,639,200
Coffee lbs.
5,867 46,292 142,702 207,373 230,162 272,165 503,667 529,536 1,100,394 789,064 1,265,360 1,376,335 1,620,365
Ships
Postma Sugar lbs.
Coffee lbs.
17 21 28 16 22 23 22 17 14 22 20 27 32 25 29 24 29 28 27 27 28 28 29 27 30 28 36
12,096,800 16,660,200 17,565,200 11,478,700 16,876,600 15,023,700 13,552,700 11,136,400 9,947,500 13,307,100 14,524,600 20,091,500 23,514,800 16,727,200 19,907,200 17,126,200 19,323,100 20,845,800 20,195,200 20,225,400 19,881,600 18,977,000 18,618,400 16,870,800 17,965,600 11,826,850 20,964,200
3,425 5,868 46,904 142,702 207,373 207,333 272,165 468,446 561,672 1,012,632 789,478 1,266,231 1,217,741 1,780,058
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17 21 29 17 22 24 23 17 24 22 20 27 32 25 29 24 29 28 27 27 29 26 32 26 30 28 35
Nassy Sugar lbs.
11:00 AM
Sugar hogshead
1710 1711 1712 1713 1714 1715 1716 1717 1718 1719 1720 1721 1722 1723 1724 1725 1726 1727 1728 1729 1730 1731 1732 1733 1734 1735 1736
Ships
7/15/03
Year
POSTMA_f16_446-459
454
Appendix 11.1. (cont.)
20,842 21,817 18,275 23,363 24,627 29,749 18,990 21,477 22,009 18,971 17,223 19,039 21,889 29,741 27,187 27,433 14,784 18,487 15,294 21,506 17,411 14,301 17,877 20,148 21,423 21,247 20,969 23,601 21,047 21,042 21,231 21,774 22,411
16,673,600 17,453,600 14,620,000 18,690,400 19,701,600 23,799,200 15,192,000 17,181,600 17,607,200 15,176,800 13,778,400 15,231,200 17,511,200 23,792,800 21,749,600 21,946,400 11,827,200 14,789,600 12,235,200 17,204,800 13,928,800 11,440,800 14,301,600 16,924,320 17,995,320 17,847,480 17,613,960 19,824,840 17,679,480 17,675,280 17,834,040 18,290,160 18,825,240
3,256,472 2,401,260 3,184,933 4,971,246 4,863,477 2,765,707 3,007,014 3,497,121 2,392,776 2,577,864 4,100,001 1,407,547 3,167,021 3,536,339 4,331,298 5,356,480 2,888,650 6,350,745 2,879,572 6,763,627 8,696,486 6,789,286 10,853,985 10,203,897 10,897,659 12,235,858 13,706,856 10,805,915 13,385,028 12,388,397 13,664,601 12,349,180 14,007,073
34 33 36 44 50 50 47 46 47 43 37 40 40 50 48 59 39 56 38 51 52 46 54 52 55 62 70 65 74 76 80 70 87
16,679,000 17,553,800 14,620,500 18,692,000 19,701,000 23,802,400 15,193,600 17,145,600 17,524,800 15,259,200 13,779,200 15,224,000 17,232,000 24,646,800 21,027,200 21,952,000 11,440,800 14,750,400 12,314,400 16,649,600 13,917,600 11,968,800 14,077,600 16,176,000 17,139,200 16,973,600 16,658,000 18,880,800 16,837,600 16,188,000 17,204,000 17,419,200 18,218,400
3,246,472 2,401,258 3,184,931 5,109,002 4,864,348 2,786,707 2,786,054 3,477,121 2,345,033 2,486,976 4,099,892 1,407,517 3,156,197 3,593,423 4,229,891 5,360,480 2,821,931 6,349,600 2,786,910 6,407,610 8,300,745 7,519,710 11,682,797 9,987,805 10,645,728 12,487,781 13,467,406 10,806,407 13,541,547 11,703,013 14,200,361 11,878,220 14,371,297
Page 455
34 33 36 44 47 50 47 46 48 42 38 40 40 49 49 59 39 56 38 52 55 46 53 50 55 62 72 65 76 80 77 72 86
11:00 AM
3,256,472 2,401,260 3,184,933 4,971,246 4,863,447 2,765,702 3,007,014 3,497,121 2,392,776 2,577,864 4,100,001 1,407,547 3,167,021 3,536,339 4,331,298 5,356,480 2,888,650 6,350,745 2,872,572 6,763,627 8,696,486 6,789,286 10,859,313 10,206,487 10,899,749 12,239,001 13,712,281 9,454,390 13,809,000 14,200,200 13,780,400 10,906,000 14,786,045
7/15/03
17,248,200 18,118,600 15,304,800 19,379,200 20,290,000 24,554,600 15,790,600 17,873,800 18,282,600 15,753,000 14,507,600 16,055,200 18,193,000 24,603,400 22,522,800 22,659,200 12,224,000 15,427,200 13,134,000 18,000,800 14,535,200 11,998,400 14,989,800 17,651,760 18,625,740 18,447,240 18,370,380 16,825,200 16,901,640 16,648,800 17,655,960 18,280,920 17,568,600
POSTMA_f16_446-459
21,560 22,648 19,131 24,224 25,363 30,693 19,738 22,342 22,853 19,691 18,135 20,069 22,741 30,754 28,154 28,324 15,280 19,284 16,418 22,501 18,169 14,998 18,737 21,014 22,174 21,961 21,870 20,030 20,121 19,820 21,019 21,763 20,915
455
34 33 36 44 50 50 47 46 48 43 38 40 40 49 49 59 39 56 38 52 55 46 53 50 55 62 72 46 64 69 68 54 65
1737 1738 1739 1740 1741 1742 1743 1744 1745 1746 1747 1748 1749 1750 1751 1752 1753 1754 1755 1756 1757 1758 1759 1760 1761 1762 1763 1764 1765 1766 1767 1768 1769
12,962,400 17,876,320 17,406,400 14,943,280 11,715,440 17,824,400 15,268,000 14,344,000 14,058,000 13,019,600 15,072,000 16,300,800 16,633,920 15,046,080 13,751,040 15,528,960 16,080,000 15,114,240
Ships
9,860,750 11,971,000 12,680,125 16,315,138 12,016,117 13,300,000 11,750,000 12,950,500 11,150,300 13,100,800 11,750,000 11,971,116 10,812,814 12,587,535 12,913,465 9,787,300 12,976,170 12,129,756
65 93 73 72 58 72 56 67 59 61 43 10 30 49 55 48 57 49 42 48 56
Van de Spiegel Sugar Sugar hogshead lbs. 17,143 22,271 20,770 18,426 16,118 21,412 17,552 17,687 21,189 18,602 15,798 2,693 10,178 17,159 19,525 18,897 14,993 16,506 13,740 15,613 21,105
15,085,840 19,598,480 18,277,600 16,214,880 14,183,840 18,842,560 15,445,760 15,564,560 18,646,320 16,369,760 15,166,080 2,585,280 9,770,880 16,472,640 18,744,000 18,141,120 14,393,280 15,845,760 13,190,400 14,988,480 20,260,800
Coffee lbs.
Ships
6,968,399 14,320,574 13,891,197 14,699,743 13,431,785 20,231,941 13,900,020 20,214,562 16,473,762 11,465,817 11,363,077 4,001,836 7,396,781 11,214,961 15,495,957 6,024,970 12,427,636 9,436,663 7,037,877 11,149,305 14,856,275
64 92 71 68 51 71 52 65 57 57 42 10 55 58 57 49 59 49 46 49 56 58 50 9 57
Postma Sugar lbs. 14,948,696 19,420,312 18,111,440 15,538,168 14,054,896 18,632,024 15,280,928 15,264,360 18,476,808 16,346,512 14,185,488 2,056,032 12,185,024 21,107,456 18,333,856 17,644,304 14,716,512 14,176,048 12,966,784 14,772,656 20,429,640 18,557,528 16,502,464 5,093,616 23,352,516
Coffee lbs. 6,968,552 14,321,641 13,892,095 14,464,059 13,491,300 20,331,934 14,075,520 20,298,122 16,473,760 11,565,817 11,363,077 3,930,077 9,863,509 13,022,406 14,806,427 6,026,989 12,527,630 9,914,100 6,837,771 11,199,215 14,815,275 13,298,501 8,444,602 338,647 11,135,566
Sources for appendices 11.1 and 11.2: D. de I. Cohen Nassy et al., Geschiedenis der Kolonie van Suriname . . ., 2 pts. in 1 vol. (1791; reprint, Amsterdam: Emmering, 1974), appendix; Algemeen Rijksarchief, Archief van Pieter van de Spiegel 163: Lyste der voornaamste producten die uit Suriname zijn afgescheept; Postma Suriname Data Collection.
Page 456
14,730 20,314 19,780 16,981 13,313 20,255 17,350 16,300 15,975 14,795 15,700 16,980 17,327 15,673 14,324 16,176 16,750 15,744
Coffee lbs.
11:00 AM
52 65 53 57 46
Nassy Sugar lbs.
7/15/03
Sugar hogshead
1770 1771 1772 1773 1774 1775 1776 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794
Ships
456
Year
POSTMA_f16_446-459
Appendix 11.1. (cont.)
POSTMA_f16_446-459
Appendix 11.2. Suriname Exports Compared in Nassy, Van de Spiegel, and Postma Data Collections, 1701–1787 (Annual Averages) Year Ships
16,189,498
5,196,959
38.1 (1706–1774)
10,070,640 13,725,840 19,291,200 17,471,360 17,386,960 16,321,680 18,051,012 16,822,960 15,874,149
90,456 1,602,739 3,274,977 5,844,647 12,364,446 14,559,780 11,051,697
16,677,876
5,606,618
41.3 (1701–1787)
Coffee lbs.
18.0 20.2 26.8 30.9 44.4 49.3 69.1 64.8 47.4
10,115,477 13,764,490 19,248,100 17,395,775 17,355,380 16,274,520 17,169,480 16,607,414 16,343,531
88,577 1,592,892 3,251,885 5,905,310 12,308,957 14,588,280 11,636,316
17,303,291 6,033,136 41.3 (1701–1787)
Source: See appendix 11.1. * Nassy recorded ships only for the years 1706 to 1774.
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Annual Avg.
90,412 1,602,034 3,274,974 5,844,480 12,399,355 12,509,473 13,561,165
18.1 20.6 26.8 31.0 44.2 49.6 69.5 67.6 42.6
Ships
11:00 AM
1701–1787
8,581,660 14,238,032 19,801,284 18,158,104 18,067,960 17,009,480 17,697,624 14,941,784 17,646,720
Coffee lbs.
Postma Sugar lbs.
7/15/03
15.8 21.6 26.8 30.1 44.6 49.6 55.9 27.3
Coffee lbs.
Van de Spiegel Ships Sugar lbs.
1701–09* 1710–19 1720–29 1730–39 1740–49 1750–59 1760–69 1770–79 1780–87
Nassy Sugar lbs.
457
Comments
Adriaan Kroeff
11:00 AM Page 458
Sources: 1. Public Record Office (PRO), Colonial Office (CO) 116/37: Storm van ’s Gravesande to chamber Zeeland, 21 June 1771. 2. Algemeen Rijksarchief (ARA), Archief van de Nieuwe West-Indische Compagnie (NWIC) 812: Beekman to chamber Zeeland, 10 August 1704. 3. ARA, NWIC 812: Chamber Zeeland to Van der Heyden Reesen, 16 October 1708; J. Postma, The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1600–1800 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), appendix 1. 4. ARA, NWIC 677: Chamber Zeeland to Storm van ’s Gravesande, 5 May 1741. 5. PRO, CO 116/33: Storm van ’s Gravesande to chamber Zeeland, 24 November 1761; ARA NWIC 815: Chamber Zeeland to Storm van ’s Gravesande, 11 January 1762. 6. PRO, CO 116/36: Storm van ’s Gravesande to chamber Zeeland, 23 September 1769; ARA, NWIC 817: Chamber Zeeland to Van der Heuvel, 5 February 1770. 7. PRO, CO 116/37: 241–43, 26 May 1770. 8. ARA, NWIC 718: res. chamber Zeeland, 14 April 1788. 9. Ibid., 718: res. chamber Zeeland, 21 April 1788; Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, appendix 2.
Captain Cornelis la Moote refused to sail to Essequibo when the crew was unable to continue the voyage. Seventy-two of the slaves were sold at Suriname to A. de Codin, who shipped them by bark to Essequibo. 2. Fortuyn WIC: Zeeland The ship was wrecked along the shores of Rio Gambia in 1704. 3. Carolus Secundus WIC: Zeeland or Amsterdam Captain Pieter Crans delivered 458 slaves to Curaçao. 4. Lammerenburg Abraham Kroes Captain Michiel Vleeshouwer sold the slaves probably in Berbice. 5. Mercurius MCC Captured by two French privateers near Suriname and brought to Martinique in 1761. 6. Maria Snouck Hurgronje and Captain Jan Jansen delivered 210 slaves in Suriname because the crew refused to Abraham Louissen sail on to Essequibo. 7. Huis Hoorn Snouck Hurgronje and This ship intended to deliver 45 percent (³⁄ ) of its slaves to Essequibo, but ⁷ Abraham Louissen extensive mortality among the crew, damage to the ship, and fear of mutiny forced captain Noordhoff to sell the slaves in Suriname. 8. Africaan Johannes Louissen and Son The company requested for a wood-and-salt permit for Essequibo and Demerara, but captain Cornelis de Haaze delivered 260 slaves to another destination. 9. Vergenoegen MCC This ship delivered 207 slaves at Suriname, although the captain had a wood-andsalt permit for Essequibo and Demerara.
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Name Shipping Firm
458
Ship
POSTMA_f16_446-459
Appendix 12.1. Slave Ships Destined for Essequibo and Demerara that Did Not Reach Their Destination and Sold Slaves Elsewhere
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Appendix 14.1. Ships Arriving at Amsterdam from the Western Hemisphere, 1742 and 1771–1817 Year
West SuriCuraçao St. West Latin North Un- Total Africa name Guyana Berbice Eustatius Indies America America known A’dam
1742
36
1771 1772 1773 1774 1775 1776 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810
61 52 54 43 69 42 63 48 45 30
1814 1815 1816 1817 1771–1817
1 1
13 62 48 48 50 43 37 48 55 49 43 11 53 8 17 1
4
8
5
3
4
20
80
1 3 4 4 11 5 10 16 7 7 1
3 3 3 2 5 4 5 8 5 6
36 35 31 20 25 32 29 36 82 134 1
2 6 9 7 9 6 9 9 9 6 1 9 1 1 1
9 5 5 4 4 17 7 6 6 5 8 14 52 7 5 2 2 3 3 6 7 6 7 6 6 4 7
4 1
9 14 9 17 18 11 15 14 20 16 14 18 3 5
10 11 12 10 10 11 11 6 18 51 3 8 73 26 19 23 14 12 10 13 13 14 2 21 2
21 25 16 27 8 2 1 3 7 14 2 7 41 56 47 45 41 43 55 55 46 46 74 98 38 95 87 39 7 71 139 116 101 158 154 228 189 40 21 5
145 135 125 112 133 113 127 123 171 247 15 42 241 167 154 162 137 128 155 171 166 153 123 215 59 122 98 40 7 76 139 128 136 159 157 232 191 40 21 5
1 10 16 15 10 16 15 19 22 22 14 10 1
1
2 1 1
1 2
1
1 3 15 1
2 1 9
2
8 7
4
3 2 2
2
1 8 2 39 2 67 7 1,228
Avg. per Year 0.2
27.9
1
3 9 12 287 6.5
5 12 11 161 3.7
1 4 7 418 9.5
632 14.4
4 14 23 14 292 6.6
3 4 5 8 34 0.8
77 81 74 2,500 56.8
1
1 0.0
7 113 175 195 5,560 126.4
Source: G. M. Welling, The Prize of Neutrality: Trade Relations Between Amsterdam and North America, 1771–1817. A Study in Computing History, Amsterdamse Historische Reeks, kleine ser., no. 39 (Amsterdam: Amsterdamse Historisch Reeks, 1998), 193–97, and http://odur.let.rug.nl/~welling/paalgeld/appendix.html. I thank George Welling for providing his data.
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NOTES ON METHODOLOGY, CURRENCIES, MEASURES, AND THE DUTCH REPUBLIC
Dates and Annotation If not otherwise stated, all dates in this volume are in the new style of the Gregorian calender. The annotation of published works follows the Chicago Style Manual primarily, with some adaptations and modifications required by the publisher, and others necessitated by non-English literary styles and earlier Dutch printed material. Archival Names A few years ago, the Rijksarchief in Zeeland (RAZ) at Middelburg was merged with the municipal archives of Middelburg and Veere, and was renamed Zeeuws Archief (ZA). The new name is used in this volume. In June 2002, the Algemeen Rijksarchief (ARA) at The Hague was renamed Nationaal Archief. Since this change is not widely known yet, the old and familiar name and acronym ARA is used in this publication. Currencies An excellent guide on old currencies used in the Dutch Republic and the Atlantic region is J. J. McCusker, Money and Exchange in Europe and America, 1600–1775: A Handbook (Chapel Hill: University of North Caroline Press, 1978). Pages 291–96 present a valuable introduction to currencies used in the Dutch Atlantic. The Netherlands In most of the Dutch Republic, especially in the province of Holland, the currency unit was the guilder or gulden, the symbol for which is ƒ. ƒ1 = 20 stuivers = 40 groten = 320 penningen ( ƒ01:00:00). 1 stuiver = 16 penningen ( ƒ0:01:00). 1 duit = 1/8 stuiver = 2 penningen ( ƒ0:00:02). The guilder was in circulation in the Netherlands until 2001. ƒ1 = 100 cents. In 2002 the Netherlands adopted the Euro currency. 1 = ƒ2.20371.
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, ,
In the province of Zeeland, the official currency was pound Flemish, or pond Vlaams in Dutch ( £ Vl.). Stuivers and penningen were not used as currency in Zeeland. 1£ Vl. = ƒ6 = 240 groten. Suriname In addition to Dutch currency configurations and coins, the colony of Suriname used a variety of foreign denominations, including Spanish, Danish, and British coins. During the years 1684–1778, Surinamers used a dual guilder system, Dutch or Hollands guilders and Suriname guilders, the latter valued at about 20 percent less than Dutch currency. Thus, ƒ120 Suriname current to ƒ100 current money of Amsterdam. Shortage of hard cash was endemic in Suriname, and this led colonial officials to introduce paper money or kaartegeld during the last quarter of the eighteenth century. The colonial government stamped numbers on regular playing cards, which signified its value in legal tender.1 20 Dutch stuivers = 25 Suriname stuivers. Essequibo and Demerara At the end of the eighteenth century, the currency in Essequibo and Demerara was still the same as in the Netherlands. But like Suriname, the local guilder was probably valued 20 percent less than in Amsterdam. The coins in circulation included various foreign ones, including United States dollars and English guineas. During the British occupation, the latter were valued 25 percent higher than in Britain.2 1 stuiver = 1 penny. $1 = 5 shillings. Curaçao On the island of Curaçao, the Spanish peso, or piece of eight, was the most common currency instead of the guilder. The island’s financial records that were sent to the mother country were kept in pesos. All amounts orig-
1
J. A. Schiltkamp and J. T. de Smidt, eds., West Indisch Plakaatboek. Plakaten, ordonantiën en andere wetten, uitgevaardigd in Suriname, 1667–1816, Werken der Vereeniging tot Uitgave der Bronnen van het Oud-Vaderlandsch Recht, ser. 3, no. 24, West Indisch plakaatboek, no. 1 (Amsterdam: Emmering, 1973), 1:174–75, 181, 412, and 2:615–16, 691, 749, 781, 1054–1137. See illustrations of kaartegeld in ibid., 2:1137ff. 2 H. A. Bolingbroke, A Voyage to the Demerary, Containing a Statistical Account of the Settlement There, and of Those on the Essequebo, the Berbice, and Others Contiguous Rivers of Guyana (Philadelphia: M. Cary, 1813), 42.
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inally given in pesos have been recalculated into guilders, although the exchange rate varied over time.3 One Spanish peso consisted of 8 reals. 1 peso = 48 stuivers = ƒ2 and 8 stuivers ( ƒ2:08:00).4 Other Foreign Currencies The United States dollar was valued at 47 stuivers in 1785. $1 = 47 stuivers = ƒ2 and 7 stuivers ( ƒ2:07:00).5 In Amsterdam, one British pound Sterling fluctuated in value between ten and twelve guilders. £1 = ƒ10–ƒ12.6 One Portuguese or Brazilian cruzado was worth about 400 réis. In the seventeenth century, the exchange rate between a groot and a réis fluctuated between 102/400 and 119/400. The values in guilders here are based on an average exchange of 110 groten to 400 réis. 400 réis = $400 = 110 groten ( ƒ2:15:00).7 1 milréis = 1$000 = 1,000 réis. Weights and Measures In the Dutch West India trade the standard measure for most of the plantation products was the pound. In the tables of this volume, most of the products from the Dutch West Indies are reproduced in (Amsterdam) pounds, and are not converted to kilograms. The products of non-Dutch origin are reproduced in their original measure and converted to kilograms. One Amsterdam pound = 0.494 kilogram. Gold West African gold was measured by Europeans in ounces and marks. 1 mark = 8 ounces = 0.22680 kilogram.8 3 L. Knappert, Geschiedenis van de Nederlandsche Bovenwindsche Eilanden in de 18e eeuw (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1932), 174; W. Klooster, Illicit Riches: Dutch trade in the Caribbean, 1648–1795, Caribbean Series, no. 18 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1998), Glossary. 4 See chapter 9, note 76, in this volume. 5 P. J. van Winter, Het aandeel van den Amsterdamschen handel aan de opbouw van het Amerikaansche Gemeenebest, Werken uitgegeven door de Vereeniging Het NederlanschHistorisch Archief, no. 9 (The Hague, Nijhoff, 1927), 1:139. 6 McCusker, Money and Exchange, 52–60. In Essequibo and Demerara, for instance, £1 = ƒ12. Bolingbroke, A Voyage, 42. 7 See chapter 3, note 15, in this volume. See also, McCusker, Money and Exchange. 8 H. J. den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven. Scheepvaart en handel van de Tweede Westindische Compagnie op Afrika, 1674–1740 (Zutphen: Walburg, 1997), 425, appendix 8. See also chapter 4 in this volume.
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Sugar Sugar from the Dutch West Indies was generally shipped in large barrels known as hogsheads (oxhoofd ). Despite the excellent records for eighteenthcentury standards, calculating sugar exports is problematic because the containers used for storage and shipping varied in size. Hogsheads of sugar exported from Suriname in the last quarter of the seventeenth century contained an average of about 650 pounds. After 1695, however, the size of hogshead was standardized at ca. 800 pounds of sugar. Over the years, hogsheads gradually increased in size, averaging 875 pounds during the 1770s, 945 pounds during the 1780s, and 970 pounds during the 1790s.9 In Portugal and Brazil, sugar was measured in arrobas. One arroba weighed nearly 28 pounds or ca. 14.75 kilograms. In the years 1596–1618, sugar containers, crates or cases, generally held 14 to 15 arrobas (ca. 214 kilograms). The Spanish arroba weighed about 25 pounds or 11.5 kilograms.10 Brazilian Tobacco Tobacco was shipped in arrobas (approximately 28 pounds or 14.75 kilograms) and rolls. Tobacco rolls came in varying sizes. In the 1660s they equaled about 4 to 5 arrobas. In the 1690s they had increased to between 11 and 12 arrobas. In 1696 the crown ordered that rolls not exceeded 8 arrobas (118 kilograms).11 A Dutch report of 1720, however, stated that large rolls weighed about 300 pounds (150 kilograms).12 We conclude that on average Brazilian tobacco rolls weighed about 250 ponds or 125 kilograms. Coffee Coffee beans were generally transported in bags or barrels, one barrel containing ca. 350 pounds, and a bag ca. 120 pounds.13 9 These calculations are extrapolated from export data (carga calculaties) for which both weight and hogshead figures have been preserved in Algemeen Rijksarchief (ARA), Archief van de Sociëteit van Suriname 212–70. J. P. van de Voort, De Westindische plantages van 1720 tot 1795. Financiën en handel (Eindhoven: De Witte, 1973), 260; A. van Stipriaan, Surinaams contrast. Roofbouw en overleven in een Caribische plantagekolonie, 1750–1863, Caribbean Series, no. 13 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1993), 433. 10 Den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven, 425, table 2, appendix 8; S. B. Schwartz, Sugar Plantations in the Formation of Brazilian Society, Bahia, 1550 –1835 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 116–25, 165. See also chapter 3, note 14, in this volume and L. Bethell ed., Colonial Brazil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), VIII. 11 A. J. Antonil, Cultura e opulencia do Brasil (1711; reprint, São Paulo: Cia. Ed. Nacional, 1967). The text is available on: http://www.ufrgs.br; C. Hanson, ‘Monopoly and Contraband in the Portuguese Tobacco Trade, 1624–1702,’ Luso-Brazilian Review 19, no. 2 (1982). For this reference, we are indebted to Chris Ebert. 12 ARA, Nederlandse Bezittingen ter Kuste van Guinea 55: 13 September 1720. 13 Van de Voort, De Westindische plantages, 111, note 2.
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Cacao Cacao was generally shipped in bags containing ca. 350 pounds.14 Cotton Cotton was shipped in bales of around 300 pounds.15 Small maize On the island of Curaçao small maize was shipped in bushels (schepel ) of about 27 liters. Dyewood Dyewood or brazilwood was measured in quintais, weighing ca. 44.4 kilogram each.16 Fabric Textiles generally came in rolls and were measured in ells of 69 centimeters (27 inches). Schip Measures Dutch ships were measured in terms of last (burden); 1 last = ca. 2 ton. The last was primarily used for fiscal purposes. For instance, for the socalled lastgeld duty payments, the Dutch West India Company used its own formula for calculating the size of a ship. This formula changed over time. Only in a general way did it coincide with load capacity.17 The Dutch Republic The Dutch Republic, also known as the United Provinces or the Netherlands, was an anomaly in early modern Europe, governed by regenten, financially independent burghers (bourgeoisie). In 1579, the Union of Utrecht established a defensive alliance between certain regions of the Low Countries that revolted against their titular superior (landsheer), Philips (1527–1598), King of Spain. They agreed to make common cause in matters of war and
14
Ibid. Ibid. 16 See chapter 3, note 24, in this volume. 17 V. Enthoven, ‘Pinassen, jachten en fregatten. Schepen in de Nederlandse Atlantische slavenhandel,’ in Slaven en Schepen. Enkele reis, bestemming onbekend, ed. R. Daalder, A. Kieskamp, and D. J. Tang (Leiden: Primavera, 2001), 43–57. 15
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peace, sharing the costs of war, and established a common monetary union. Each province was represented in the States General (Staten-Generaal ). Issues concerning the common cause (de gemene zaak), also known as the Union (Unie) had to be decided by consensus. Eventually seven provinces gained full representation in the States General: Gelderland, Utrecht, Holland, Zeeland, Friesland, Groningen (also known as Stad en Lande), and Overijssel. The district (Landschap) of Drenthe was considered to be too poor to contribute to the common cause and was represented by an observer without a vote. Each province was financially autonomous and sovereign. Provincial governments called Staten were comprised of representatives of the larger towns, and in some cases rural areas as well. Thus, the province of Holland was governed by the States of Holland, and Zeeland by the States of Zeeland. Because of its economic resources, the province of Holland (today’s provinces of North and South Holland) dominated the States General. The most distinguished functionary in the Dutch Republic’s governing structure was the stadhouder – stadholder in English. Under the Spanish Habsburgs, the stadholder was appointed as the royal representative in a specific region. After the 1581 Act of Abjuration (Plakkaat van Verlatinge), repudiating Philips and his heirs in perpetuity, the stadholder became the highest ranking functionary of the Unie. Each province had to endorse the stadholder officially. At times there were two stadhouders, one endorsed in the northern regions of Friesland, Groningen, and Drenthe, and another acknowledged in the remaining provinces. There were also two periods in which no stadholder was appointed in Holland and Zeeland. The stadhouders of Holland and Zeeland also held the title of admiraal-generaal, and as such received 10 percent of the booty captured by privateers. In 1751, William (1748–1806) succeeded his father William (1711–1751) as stadhouder, and was additionally appointed as director general (opperbewindhebber) of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) and the Dutch West India Company (WIC). The Amsterdam merchant Jan van Marselis, banker Thomas Hope, and Nicolaas Geelvinck, heer van Stabroek, were his representatives with the WIC.18 The highest executive administrator of the province of Holland was the Advocate of Holland, the so-called advocaat van den Lande, later renamed raadpensionaris. Advocates mentioned in this collection are Johan van Oldenbarnevelt (1547–1619), Pieter van Bleiswijk (1724–1790), and Laurens Pieter van de Spiegel (1737–1800). The French invasion of the Netherlands in 1795 signaled the end of the Dutch Republic. With the help of their French allies, the so-called patri-
18 ARA, Archief van de Stadhouderlijke Secretarie 1237–38: Stukken betreffende het opperbewindhebberschap van de VOC en WIC, 1747–1765; J. Hovy, Het voorstel van 1751 tot instelling van een beperkt vrijhavenstelsel in de Republiek, Historische Studies uitgegeven vanwege het Instituut voor Geschiedenis der Rijksuniversiteit te Utrecht, no. 21 (Groningen: Wolters, 1966), 253; M. G. Buist, At spes non fracta. Hope & Co., 1770–1815. Merchant bankers and diplomats at work (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974), 8–9.
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ots ( patriotten) seized power and established the Batavian Republic. The old alliance of seven independent provinces came to an end, and a centralized state emerged. William , the last stadhouder, went into exile in Great Britain. In 1806, Napoleon Bonaparte crowned his younger brother Lodewijk Napoleon (1778–1848) king, and the Batavian Republic was transformed in to the Kingdom of Holland. In 1810, the Netherlands was annexed to the French empire. After the military reversals of Napoleon Bonaparte in 1813, the son of William was crowed King William (1772–1843) of the Netherlands. Stadhouders of Holland and Zeeland William the Silent (Willem de Zwijger), Count of Nassau and Prince of Orange (1559–1584) Maurits of Nassau, Prince of Orange (1585–1625) Frederik Hendrik of Nassau, Prince of Orange (1625–1647) William of Nassau, Prince of Orange (1647–1650) First period without a stadhouder (1650–1672) William of Nassau, Prince of Orange and King of England (1672–1702) Second period without a stadhouder (1702–1747) William , Prince of Orange (1747–1751) William , Prince of Orange (1751–1795)
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SOURCES AND CREDITS FOR ILLUSTRATIONS
1.1. Engraving by Jan Luyken. Frontispice in C. J. Vooght, De nieuwe groote lichtende zee-fakkel (Amsterdam: Johannes van Keulen, 1684). Courtesy of the Universiteitsbibliotheek, Leiden [Atlas 11: 1–2]. 2.1. Anonymous colored drawing, ‘Histoire Naturelle des Indes.’ Courtesy of the Pierpont Morgan Library, New York [MA 3900: 57]. 2.2. Engraving by Claes Jansz. Visscher. Courtesy of the Rijksprentenkabinet, Amsterdam [RP-P-AO-20–22/1–2]. 3.1. Anonymous engraving, in Reys-boeck van het rijcke Brasilien, Rio de la Plata ende Magallanes, daer in te sien is, de gheleghentheyt van hare landen en steden (Dordrecht: J. Canin, 1624). Courtesy of the Koninklijke Bibliotheek, The Hague [no. 3540 in W. P. C. Knuttel, Catalogus Pamfletten-verzameling berustende in de Koninklijke Bibliotheek (Utrecht: Hes Publishers, 1978)]. 3.2. Anonymous engraving, in Reys-boeck van het rijcke Brasilien, Rio de la Plata ende Magallanes, daer in te sien is, de gheleghentheyt van hare landen en steden (Dordrecht: J. Canin, 1624). Courtesy of the Koninklijke Bibliotheek, The Hague [no. 3540 in W. P. C. Knuttel, Catalogus Pamfletten-verzameling berustende in de Koninklijke Bibliotheek (Utrecht: Hes Publishers, 1978)]. 4.1. Anonymous engraving, first half of the seventeenth century. Courtesy of the Iconographisch Bureau, The Hague [E 12027]. 4.2. Engraving by I.V. ( Jan Veenhuysen), in T. van Domselaer, Beschrijvinge van Amsterdam, haar eerste oorspronk uyt den huyze der heeren van Aemstel en Aemstellant (Amsterdam: Marcus Willemsz. Doornick, 1665), 304. Courtesy of the Koninklijke Bibliotheek, The Hague [496 D 8]. 4.3. Anonymous engraving, in I. Commelin, Frederick Hendrick van Nassauw, Prince van Orangien: zyn leven en bedryf (Amsterdam: Jodocus Janssonius, 1651). Courtesy of the Stichting Atlas van Stolk, Rotterdam [1933–7]. 5.1. Engraving by William Blake, in J. G. Stedman, Narrative of a Five Years’ Expedition Against the Revolted Negroes of Surinam, in Guiana, on the Wild Coast of South America, from the Year 1772 to 1777 (London: J. Johnson & J. Edwards, 1796), 2: 394. Courtesy of the Universiteitsbibliotheek, Leiden [1799 B 12–13]. 5.2. Letter by Michiel Jooste van Eijck. Courtesy of the Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague (ARA) [Archief van de Nieuwe West-Indische Compagnie (NWIC) 180: 15, 8 December 1686]. 5.3. Anonymous manuscript. Courtesy of the ARA [Aanwinsten Eerste Afdeling, 2093, Lijst van de scheepen vaarende op de Kust van Afrika, 1762–1786. See also ARA [catalog 1.05.07]. 5.4. Engraving by William Blake, in J. G. Stedman, Narrative of a Five Years’ Expedition Against the Revolted Negroes of Surinam, in Guiana, on the Wild
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Coast of South America, from the Year 1772 to 1777. 2d ed. (London: Johnson, 1806), 1: 209. Courtesy of the Universiteitsbibliotheek, Leiden [459 B 10–11].
6.1. Anonymous engraving, in W. Bosman, Nauwkeurige Beschrijving van de Guinese Goud- Tand- en Slavekust, nevens alle desselfs Landen Koningryken, en Gemenebesten (Utrecht: Anthony Schouten, 1704), 1: 44. Courtesy of the Koninklijke Bibliotheek, The Hague [1027 C 40]. 6.2. Anonymous engraving, in O. Dapper, Nauwkeurige beschrijvinge der Afrikaensche gewesten van Egypten, Barbaryen, Lybien, Biledulgerid, Negroslant, Guinea, Ethiopië, Abyssinie (Amsterdam: Jacob van Meurs, 1676), 1: 413. Courtesy of the Koninklijke Bibliotheek, The Hague [185 B 12]. 6.3. Anonymous engraving, in J. B. Labat, Voyage du chevalier des Marchais en Guinée, isles voisines et à Cayennes, fait en 1725, 1726 et 1727 (Paris: Saugrain, 1730), 2: 48. Courtesy of the Koninklijke Bibliotheek, The Hague [1150 G 18]. 7.1. Anonymous engraving, in O. Dapper, Nauwkeurige beschrijvinge der Afrikaensche gewesten van Egypten, Barbaryen, Lybien, biledulgerid, Negroslant, Guinea, Ethiopië, Abyssinie (Amsterdam: Jacob van Meurs, 1676), 2: 68. Courtesy of the Koninklijke Bibliotheek, The Hague [185 B 12]. 8.1. Colored map from J. Bellin, Le petit Atlas Maritime. Recueil de Cartes et Plans des Quatre Parties du Monde, vol. 2 (Paris: s.n., 1764). Courtesy of the Osher Map Library, University of Southern Maine. 8.2. Woodcut from J. de Laet, Novus orbis seu descriptionis Indiae Occidentalis libri 17 (Leiden: Elzevirios, 1633). Courtesy of the Osher Map Library, University of Southern Maine. 9.1. Colored map by Jacob Daniël, Plan ter bebouwing van den grond zoo voor het fortres en tusschen de Willemstad en de zeekant gelegen is, van de uiterste hoek van Schrikkenburg tot de zeekant, 1707. Courtesy of the ARA [4. VEL, 1440]. 9.2. Detail of a map by Gerard van Keulen, Nieuwe Afteekeng van ’t Eyland Curacao, vertoonende alle desselfs geleegentheden. Courtesy of the ARA [4.MCAL, 3503]. 9.3. Unsigned manuscript. Courtesy of the ARA [NWIC 206: 185, 14 February 1716]. 11.1. Colored engraving by J. C. Heneman, detail (cartouche) from the map, Kaart van de Coloni Suriname en de Onderhorige Rivieren en Districten, 1784. Courtesy of the Universiteitsbibliotheek, Leiden [006–11–18]. 11.2. Engraving by V. van de Plaats Jr., in P. Fermin, Nieuwe algemeene beschryving van de colonie van Suriname: behelzende al het merkwaardige dezelve, met betrekkinge tot de historie, aardryksen natuurkunde (Harlingen: V. van der Plaats Jr., 1770), 20. Courtesy of the Universiteitsbibliotheek, Leiden [359 G 17]. 11.3. Anonymous drawing in ink on paper. Courtesy of the Gemeentearchief Amsterdam [Archief van de Burgemeesteren 543 (photograph D28135)].
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11.4. Oil on bed ticking by John Greenwood. Courtesy of the St. Louis Art Museum [1–256: 1948]. 11.5. Engraving by J. van Schley, in J. J. Hartsinck, Beschryving van Guiana, of de Wilde Kust . . . (Amsterdam: Gerrit Tielenburg, 1770), 2: 567. Courtesy of the Universiteitsbibliotheek, Leiden [356 B 4]. 11.6. Anonymous engraving, in J. G. Stedman, Narrative of a Five Years’ Expedition Against the Revolted Negroes of Surinam, in Guiana, on the Wild Coast of South America, from the Year 1772 to 1777, 2d ed. (London: Johnson, 1806), 2: 298. Courtesy of the Universiteitsbibliotheek, Leiden [459 B 10–11]. 11.7. Printed ink on paper, in Providence Gazette and Country Journal, 7 January 1764. Courtesy of the Rhode Island Historical Society [RHi (X3) 8917]. 12.1. Printed and handwritten ink on paper. Courtesy of the Zeeuws Archief, Middelburg [Archief Adriaan Anthony Brown 55]. 12.2. Oil on canvas by E. Hoogherheyden, the Essequebo Sociëteit, 1772. Courtesy of the Rijksmuseum Nederlands Scheepvaartmuseum, Amsterdam [A. 1171]. 12.3. Printed ink on paper by Bartholomeus de Later. Courtesy of the ARA [NWIC 1297: Brieven en papieren van de buitenlandsche kusten, kamer Maze, 1716]. 13.1. Copper engraving, presumably after Frans Post, in J. Blaue, Atlas Maior, vol. 5 (Amsterdam: Joan Blaue, 1692). Courtesy of the Osher Map Library, University of Southern Maine. 13.2. Copperplate engraving by J. Janssonius, in Nova Anglia, Novum Belgium et Virginia (Amsterdam: J. Janssonius, 1636). Courtesy of the Osher Map Library, University of Southern Maine. 13.3. Engraving by J. Weuijster, 1764. Courtesy of the Stichting Atlas van Stolk, Rotterdam [4131–1]. 14.1. Watercolor drawing by Johannes Vingboons, detail of a map of São Tomé, ca. 1650–1666. Courtesy of the ARA [VELH: 619–102]. 14.2. Oil on canvas by Willem van de Velde Jr., detail of A Dutch Ship at Anchor Drying Sails and a Kaag under Sail, 1650–1707. Courtesy of the Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam [SK-C-245]. 14.3. Painting by E. Hoogherheyden, The Ships of the Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie, ca. 1770s. Courtesy of the Collectie Gemeente Middelburg. 14.4. Drawing in watercolor by Gerrit Groenwegen, 1795. Courtesy of the Collectie Gemeentearchief Rotterdam [III 82].
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DATA COLLECTIONS
The following data collections contain a large variety of information on Dutch Atlantic shipping collected from several archives and published sources. The Welling Data Collection on ships arriving at Amsterdam from the Western Hemisphere, 1742 and 1771–1817. This electronic data set is based primarily on Harbor Toll Books ( paalgelden) of the former Zuiderzee, and can be accessed via internet at http://odur.let.rug.nl/~welling/paalgeld/appendix.html. See also G. M. Welling, The Prize of Neutrality: Trade Relations between Amsterdam and North America, 1771–1817, A Study in Computing History, Amsterdamse Historische Reeks, kleine ser., no. 39 (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, 1998). The aggregate data is presented in appendix 14.1 of this volume. The Postma Slave Trade Data Collection on the Dutch Atlantic slave trade between 1675 and 1803 is based on a wide variety of Dutch municipal, provincial, and national archives, as well as published sources. The collection is incorporated in The Transatlantic Slave Trade: A Database on CD ROM, ed. D. Eltis, S. D. Behrendt, H. S. Klein, and D. Richardson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). A revised edition is forthcoming. The Postma Suriname North America Data Collection on the bilateral trade between North America and Suriname between 1685 and 1795 is based primarily on the Algemeen Rijksarchief (ARA), Archief van de Sociëteit van Suriname (SvS), and is supplemented by the Brown Papers at the John Carter Brown Library as well as published sources. This electronic database is still being expanded and will be used for further publications. For information contact
[email protected]. The Postma Suriname Data Collection on the bilateral trade between the Dutch Republic and Suriname between 1683 and 1795 is based primarily on ARA, SvS, and is supplemented by published sources. This electronic database will be used for a future publication. For information contact
[email protected]. The Van der Oest Data Collection on the shipping and trade to and from Essequibo and Demerara between 1700 and 1817 is based on Public Record Office, Colonial Office 116/18–67, ARA, Verspreide West-Indische Stukkken (VWIS) 73, 59, 114, 150, 151, 152, and the George Welling Data Collection. For information contact
[email protected]. The Den Heijer Data Collection on Dutch shipping with West Africa between 1674 and 1740 is based primarily on ARA, Archief van de Nieuwe West-Indische Compagnie (NWIC), VWIS, and Zeeuws Archief (ZA), Recuels van Citters. Part of the dataset is listed in appendices 1–8 of H. J. den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven. Scheepvaart en handel van de Tweede Westindische
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Compagnie op Afrika, 1674–1740 (Zutphen: Walburg, 1997). For information contact
[email protected]. Dutch shipping with Curaçao between 1701 and 1755 is listed in appendix 2 of W. Klooster, Illicit Riches: Dutch Trade in the Caribbean, 1648–1795, Caribbean Series, no. 18 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1998). Shipping between the Dutch Republic and New Netherland, 1620–1674, is listed in J. A. Jacobs, ‘De scheepvaart en handel van de Nederlandse Republiek op Nieuw-Nederland, 1609–1675’ (master’s thesis, University of Leiden, 1989). A copy of this thesis is available in the Rijksmuseum Nederlands Scheepvaartmuseum in Amsterdam.
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ARCHIVES
The Netherlands Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague (ARA)1 First Section Aanwinsten, Eerste Afdeling Archief van de Staten-Generaal (SG) Archief van de Staten van Holland (SvH) Archief van de Stadhouderlijke Secretarie Archieven der Admiraliteitscolleges (AA) Archief van de Oude West-Indische Compagnie (OWIC) Archief van de Nieuwe West-Indische Compagnie (NWIC) Archief van de Sociëteit van Suriname (SvS) Archief van de Sociëteit van Berbice (SvB) Verspreide West-Indische Stukken (VWIS) Archief van het Comité tot de Zaken van de Oost-Indische Handel en Bezittingen Archief van Hugo de Groot Archief van Johan van Oldenbarnevelt Archief van Johan de Witt Archief van Caspar Fagel Archief van Anthonie van der Heim Archief van Anthonie Heinsius Archief van Isaak van Hoornbeek Archief van Anthoine van der Heim Archief van Pieter Steyn Archief van Pieter ven Bleiswijk (PvB) Archief van Pieter van de Spiegel (PvdS) Familiearchief Hop Collectie Hinxt Collectie Radermacher Collectie Sweers Collectie Van der Heim Nederlandse Bezittingen ter Kuste van Guinea (NBKG) Archief van de Raad van Coloniën (RvC) Second Section Verzameling Pieter Paulus – Gerrit van Olivier Archief van het Ministerie van Koloniën Archief van het West-Indisch Comité Archief van de Raad der Amerikaanse Bezittingen Archief van de Rekenkamer voor 1813
1
Renamed Nationaal Archief (NA) in June 2002.
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Groninger Archieven, Groningen Archieven der Staten van Stad en Lande Zeeuws Archief, Middelburg (ZA)2 Archief van de Staten van Zeeland (SvZ) Archief van de directe en indirecte belastingen Archief van de Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie (MCC) Archief van de familie Mathias-Pous-Tak van Poortvliet Archief van de familie Schorer Archief Adriaan Anthony Brown Familiearchief Verheye-Van Citters Familiearchief Snouck Hurgronje Gemeentearchief Veere Handschriftenverzameling Recueils Van Citters Verzameling Verheye-Van Citters Gemeentearchief Amsterdam, Amsterdam (GAA) Archief van de Burgemeesteren, Handel 1–7 (AB) Notarieel Archief (NA) Archief Brants Archief van het handelshuis Van Eeghen en Co. Archief van de Waterschout Gemeentearchief Rotterdam, Rotterdam (GAR) Oud Stadsarchief (OSA) Oud Notarieel Archief (ONA) Archief Coopstad & Rochussen (C&R) Koninklijke Bibliotheek, The Hague 550 C 5, Stukken rakende de Sociëteit van Suriname Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, land- en Volkenkunde, Leiden (KITLV) Handschriften (Hs) Rijksmuseum Nederlands Scheepvaartmuseum, Amsterdam B-I-0131 (a–c) Germany Stadtarchiv Weissenburg, Weissenburg (StAW) Stadtarchiv Frankfurt am Main, Frankfurt am main (StAF) Ratsprotokoll (RP) Französisch-Reformierte Gemeinde (FRG) Landeskirchliches Archiv Nürnberg, Nürnberg (LKAN) Nürnberg Familienregister
2
Formerly also known as Rijksarchief in Zeeland (RAZ).
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United States American Antiquarian Society, Worcester, Mass. Jacob Melyn’s Letterbook, 1691–1696 Houghton Library, Harvard University, Mass. MS Dutch 9PF Curaçao Sparks Manuscripts John Carter Brown Library, Providence, R.I. ( JCB) Brown Papers (BP) Newberry Library, Chicago Greenlee Collection United Kingdom Public Record Office, London/Kew (PRO) E 190/664 E 190/666 E 190/1047 E 190/1051 E 190/1052 Colonial Office (CO) 33, Barbados Colonial Office (CO) 116, Miscellaneous Dutch Association Papers regarding British Guyana Treasury 70/11 Brazil Arquivo Público do Estado da Bahia, Bahia (APB) Ordens régias Portugal Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa, Lisbon Fundo Geral Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino, Lisbon (AHU) Livro do Brasil Espírito Santo Bahia Pernambuco Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, Lisbon (ANTT) Junta do Tabaco Processos de Inquisição de Lisboa Spain Archivo General de Simancas, Simancas (AGS) Secretaría de Marina Estado
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Archivo General de Indias, Seville (AGI) Indiferente General Santo Domingo Caracas Consulta Consejo de Indias
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INDEX
Abrahamsz., Roelof, 63 Acts of Trade and Navigation, 260–64, 283, 390–91 English protectionism, 278, 390 First Act, 259–60, 370–71, 438 Second Act, 370 Adriaensz., Anthonis, 39 Africa bilateral shipping with, 13, 45n, 54, 121, 125, 127–28, 132, 140, 148, 402, 405, 437 free traders in, 101–4, 111, 125–33, 162–64 slave trade from, 12, 23, 103, 115–38, 160–62 trade with, 9–10, 13, 39–40, 42–43, 45, 77, 98–101, 104, 139–59, 410n, 437n, 441 the WIC in, 78–80, 85–86, 89–90, 100–1, 104, 112, 139 African exports (see also gold; ivory; slaves), 38–39 cardemom, 156–57 civet cats, 156 ginger, 26 gum, 149, 156–57 melequeta (cayenne pepper), 38, 90, 156, 435, 438 wax, 44, 90, 156–57, 212; fig. 12.3 African merchants and brokers (caboceers), 103, 126, 139, 155, 165, 171, 188, 191, 392; figs. 2.2, 7.1 Agaja, king of Dahomey, 185 Albany, N.Y., 95, 277 alcoholic beverages, 151, 153, 155, 172, 188n, 238, 435 beer, 155, 213, 352 brandy, 155, 212–13, 370 kildevil, 238, 356, 381 rum, 188–89, 238, 294, 305, 321, 345, 356–59, 377 wine, 18, 52, 54, 56, 69, 155, 213, 352, 354 Algarve, 53n Algemeen Rijksarchief (ARA), 294, 461 Algiers, 276 Alkmaar, 82
All Saints Bay, 87; fig. 3.2 Amazon River, 25, 31–34, 35n, 106 American Continental Congress, 385, 395, 432 American War of Independence (1775–1783), xx, 107, 110, 356, 377, 382, 413, 432 Amerindians, 30, 32, 38, 94–96, 192, 213, 226, 290, 292, 325, 352; figs. 1.1, 2.2 Amsterdam, 11n, 20, 22; fig. 2.2, 11.1 Admiralty of, 203, 210, 401n and Atlantic commerce, 61n, 95–96, 105, 109, 149–51, 192, 205n, 209n, 216n, 450, 459 bankers and investors (see also banks), 50, 105, 109 as center of culture, 7, 50, 78 insurers in, 67n investments, 50, 416–17, 419, 420–21 Jews, 50–53, 66–68, 72, 74 merchants, 32, 40, 44, 59, 63, 65–66, 70–74, 77, 111, 439n pensionaris of, 394 ships, 1, 11, 52, 71 shipping, 459 as staple market, 1, 73 stock market crisis, 111, 324, 415, 432 and the WIC, 38, 81–86, 94, 99–100, 110, 148, 176 Andalusia, 53n, 336n, 372 Andriesen, Adriaen, 67n Andriesz., Claes, 67n Andriesz., Jan, 63 Andros, Edmund, governor, 274, 41n Anglo-Dutch Wars First (1652–1654), 263 Second (1664–1667), 95–96, 289, 325 Third (1672–1674), 279 Fourth (1780–1784), 103, 110, 133, 307, 314, 318, 321, 327, 340, 342, 346, 348n, 349, 394, 401, 408, 417, 421; fig. 14.3
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Angola (see also Loango-Angola coastal region), 86, 89, 91, 97, 141, 147, 149–51, 172, 174, 188n, 193, 366, 389, 398 Annales School, 51 Anselmo, Antonio, 69 Anthony van Hoboken Co., 409 anticipatiepenningen, 419–21, 423, 427 Antigua, 28, 328, 379, 412 Antilles (see also Lesser Antilles), 5, 219n, 288, 400, 410n, 436 Antwerp, 19–21, 23, 26n, 64 and Brazil trade, 57–59 and Protestant diaspora, 19, 59, 66, 73, 78 Arana, Pedro de, 27 Arawaks, 292 Ardra (Aja) kingdom, 183, 185, 209, 229, 234; fig. 5.2 Arguin, 41, 141, 149, 399 arroba. See measurements artisans, craftsmen, 247, 249–50, 256, 278 Aruba, 28, 106, 226, 404, 410 Asante, 146, 158, 160, 165 Asia Dutch commerce with, 21, 78–79, 82, 112, 140, 287, 386, 409–10, 414n financing trade with, 143, 418, 422–23 intra-Asiatic trade, 414n, 435 products from, 139–40, 152–53, 174, 188, 261, 278, 370, 382 shipping to, 12, 18, 157, 365, 402–03 studies, 7–9, 12 asiento de negros (see also slave trade), 73, 117, 122, 124, 134, 160, 167, 219–20, 245 British-controlled, 161, 225, 245 at Curaçao, 120, 221–26, 229, 232–33, 240, 242–43, 246, 250–53, 256 Dutch-controlled, 122, 167, 223, 253, 255, 426 French-controlled, 224–25, 245, 426 Portuguese-controlled, 224, 244 asentistas, 96, 161–62, 167, 223–25, 233, 240, 242, 251, 426 Atlantic slave trade. See slave trade Austria, 315n, 346, 348, 381, 408n Aveiro, 52, 63 Aves Islands, 209n
Axim, 100–101, 146 Azores, 75, 296, 365, 388 Baeck, Laurens Joosten, 72 Baesjou, René, 116, 125n, 397n, 405 Bahia, 25, 55–56, 69n, 74, 86, 89, 196, 367 merchants of, 64, 174, 182, 198 Balessel, Nicolaes, 68 ballast, 53, 308, 313n, 344–45 Baltimore, Ireland, 209n Baltimore, Md., 209n, 354, 408 banks Amsterdam Bank of Exchange, 419, 420–21 Bank of Maryland, 418 merchant bank houses, 416–17, 420 Middelburg Bank of Exchange, 18, 419, 431 National Bank of North America, 418 Barbados, 28, 205, 278, 282, 300, 328, 357, 359, 370–71, 374, 404, 413 Barbary (North Africa), 69 Barbary corsairs, 276, 277n Barbour, Charles, 272–73 Barckman, Roelant, 67n Bartolotti, Jan Battista, 67n Basel, 265, 268, 271 Batavia (Djakarta), 387n Batavian Republic, 421, 467 beacon tolls ( paalgelden), 298, 473 Beaulieu, Tobias de, 42 beaver skins, 45, 370, 435n Beck, governor of Curaçao, 209n Beeck, Nicholas van, 235, 242, 279 Beer, Lenardo de, 72 Beijens, Pieter, 67n Belten, Pieter, 67n Beltgens, Pieter, 376 Benin, 145–46, 154, 157n, 183, 186 Benotenos, Jacob Jacobsz., 67n Berbice, 35, 96, 236, 308, 336, 383, 395n, 458 colony, 323–24, 387, 399, 401, 404 Corporation. See Sociëteit van Berbice government, 393, 395, 429–30 trade with, 134, 161, 244, 246, 251–52, 375, 406, 409, 413, 417, 441–42, 459 Berckel, E. F. van, pensionaris of Amsterdam, 394 Beuningen, Jonathan van, fig. 9.3
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bewindhebbers (WIC directors), 36, 82, 84, 98, 100, 110, 174–76, 184, 220, 325, 332, 339, 349, 353–56, 359, 396, 419 Biafra, 145 big circuit. See trade patterns bills of exchange. See finances Binder, Franz, 12, 93n, 120, 402, 405 Bisschop, Bartholomeus, 67n Bisschop, Paulus, 67n Blake, William, 469 Bleiswijk, Pieter van (1724–1790), advocate of Holland, 466 Blocq, N. de, 17, 40n Bockenheim, 269–71 Bonaire, 28, 106, 226, 230, 237, 247, 250, 404, 410 Boni maroons, 428 Boogaart, Ernst van den, 45, 60n, 405 booty (see also prizes), 85, 91–93, 178, 369n, 466 Bordeaux, 372, 408 Borssele Island, 330–31 Borssele van der Hooge, Joost (1585–1666), 35n Bosman, Willem, 116, 152 Boston, Mass., 266, 276, 279, 282, 354, 380, 450 Boter, Hermanus, 353 bottomry. See finances Boudewijns, François, 67n Bourbon royal family, 224 Bovenhuid, Jude, 68 Boxer, Charles, 1, 172, 287 Brabant, 21, 59 Brakel, S. van, 116 Brand & Co., 408 Brandenburg, 165, 168, 392, 426 Brandenburg-African Company, 392 branding (see slave trade, treatment of slaves) Brand Wacht, 330 Brasilse Directie, 93 Brazil (see also Dutch Brazil), 49–75, 77, 214, 369 Dutch trade with, 10, 12, 24, 26, 45–46, 49–72, 87, 367, 369, 381n, 390, 402, 404, 437n merchants, 56–57, 65n, 176–78, 182–83 Portuguese relations with, 23, 49, 54–57, 71–73, 75, 77, 87, 214, 219, 269, 289, 369, 376 Portuguese trade with, 23, 71–73
505
trade with West Africa, 13, 66, 148, 158, 171–199 Brazilian exports, 51, 57, 63, 66–69, 57–60, 73, 75, 156, 158, 179–80, 188, 435 brazilwood, 21, 24n, 26, 50n, 57, 64, 73, 367, 369, 380, 438, 465 diamonds and gold, 90, 165–66, 190–91, 381, 463 sugar, 23–24, 26, 38, 44, 50, 54–55, 59, 86, 88–89, 189, 367, 382, 392, 464 tobacco, 139, 174–76, 179–80, 186–89, 191–94, 196–98, 464 Brazilian ships captured by WIC, 74, 86, 148, 176–80, 187, 369, 392 Brederoo, G. A., 115 Bremen, 24, 348, 390n, 408 Brion, Pierre, 214n Britain Atlantic expansion by, 10, 288–89, 348, 389 encroaching on Dutch colonies, 51, 96, 131n, 289, 307, 314, 323, 327–29, 331, 337, 357, 361, 385–86, 394, 401, 409, 411, 413, 429 merchants of, 337, 412; fig. 6.3 Parliament of, 165, 168, 262, 380n ships of, 132, 340, 359, 380n, 407n, 411, 413, 440 slave trade of, 6, 161, 167, 225, 337, 341 wars of (see also Anglo-Dutch Wars), 109–10, 209, 314, 346, 756, 394, 401, 413–14, 432 British Caribbean, 299–300, 355, 400n, 412 Dutch colonies and, 131n, 133, 327, 333, 337, 339, 348, 353, 357, 361, 401, 409, 462 free traders, 163, 165, 169, 376–78 planters and settlers, 107, 262, 328, 337, 340, 360, 439 privateers, 2, 209–10, 343, 346, 348, 357, 400n, 413, 440 relations with Dutch, 6, 34, 181, 339, 355, 357, 417 smugglers, 387, 381 trade with Caribbean, 11, 437 British East India Company, 155, 380 Broeck, Joan ten, 397 Broeck, Mathijs ten, 397 Bronx River, 451
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Brooklyn, N.Y., 266, 277 Brown Co., 303–04; fig. 11.7 Brown, A. A., fig. 12.1 Bruijn, J. R., 403n Bubble of 1720, 105n, 107, 426, 429–30 Budd, W., 36 Buenos Aires, 124, 156, 317, 326, 366, 373 building materials, 30, 144, 227, 282, 293–94, 304, 319, 345, 352, 356–58 bullion (see also currency), 203n, 210n, 372, 376, 378, 426, 435–36 Burr, G. L., 332 Butler, Willem, 195 Byam, William, governor of Antigua, 365 Cabiliau, Adriaen, 32 Caboceers. See African merchants and brokers Cabo Verde, 40–41, 141, 149 cacao, 1, 105, 112, 203n, 205n, 214–16, 218, 254n, 292, 309, 312n, 315–17, 348–51, 378, 391, 416–17, 435, 441–42, 465; fig. 8.2 Cádiz, 68, 205, 372–73, 436 Calabar, 145–46 Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, 60n Calvinism, 78, 80, 187, 265, 267–68, 272, 274 Cameroons, 145, 184 Campeche Bay, 214n, 379, 438 Canary Islands, 17–18, 26n, 42, 53, 68, 69n, 71, 296, 373, 387–88 Cape Finisterre, 24n Cape of Good Hope, 9n, 80 Cape Palmes region, 186, 19 Capetown, 387n Cape Verde Islands, 18, 29, 40–41, 141, 149, 296, 387–88 capital investments (see also finances), 74, 360, 272, 416, 432n anticipatiepenningen, 419–21, 423, 427 bonds, 98–99, 109, 253, 417–24, 426–27, 429, 432–34 capital markets, 72, 109, 271, 415–17 for maritime commerce, 112, 283, 293, 392, 418–19, 422–25, 433 plantation mortgages, 452–432 WIC shares, 80–84, 87, 99–100, 107, 141–42, 422–27 Caracas, 211n, 223, 250
Carga Calculatie (weighing record), 298 Caribbean exports, 30, 45, 214, 218, 358, 435 Caribbean region, 9, 13, 28, 77, 86, 91, 109, 299–300, 337, 354–55, 377 intra-Caribbean or island trade, 10, 204–05, 212, 294, 299–300, 357, 390, 410–11, 414, 445 North American trade with, 281, 299, 325, 334, 361 privateering in the, 86, 91 settlements, 96, 111, 124, 205, 247 slave trade to, 91, 100, 104, 143, 126, 162, 219, 223, 247 transit trade, 203–18 Caribs, 295 Carrera de Indias, 373 Cartagena, 28, 161n, 373n, 376, 378n Casa de la Contratación de las Indias, 261 Casimir, Frederick, 96 Castille, 61, 67 Catholicism, 187, 261, 263, 270, 274 cattle farms, 189, 222, 226–27, 230, 237 Cayenne River and colony, 96, 106, 308 Ceará, 25, 70 Center of Latin-American and Caribbean Studies, 7 Ceuta Massagan, 69n Chambert, Louis, 225 Charles , king of England (1660–1665), 224 Charles , ruler of the Netherlands (1506–1655), 263 Chesapeake Bay region (see also tobacco), 36, 272, 274, 370, 403; fig. 13.2 Chitty, Matthew, 282 Chourio, Jean, 225, 245 civet cats, 156 Cleef, Christiaensz. van, 36 Clerq, Cornelia de (widow), 417 cloth. See textiles coast-guarding ships, 143, 147–48 coasting trade, 140, 143–47, 234 cod fish, 366, 374 Codin, Abraham de, 353 coffee, 1–2, 5, 205n, 215–16, 292, 378, 418, 435, 441–42, 444, 464, 453–57 cultivation, 109, 215, 326n, 431 Colbert, Jean Baptiste, 371n Cologne, 59
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colonial government, 111, 172, 261–62, 462 inter-colonial trade, 272–75, 280, 283, 372 markets, 128, 272, 390 merchants, 260, 264, 274, 278 products, 50–52, 57–58, 63, 68, 264, 278, 304, 331, 338, 348–49, 373, 378, 443 reports (Koloniale Verslagen), 6 Colonial Institute for the Tropics (KIT), 6 colonial North America. See North America commercial correspondents, 58–60, 63–66, 68–69, 70–74, 337–38, 342, 353, 395, 431 commercial credit, 65, 68, 70, 72, 252–54, 358, 370 creditors, 98–100, 109, 338 scarcity of, 105, 109, 131–32, 419–21 in slave trade, 164, 244, 336, 338–40, 426–27 Compagnie des Indes Occidentales, 372 Companhia geral de Pernambuco e Paraiba, 189, 192 Compañía Guipuzcoana, 215 Connecticut, 37, 266, 302 contraband. See illegal trade convoys, 26, 39, 93, 210, 310, 346, 373n, 400–401, 413 Coolhaas, W. P., 118 Coomans-Eustatia, Maritza, 219n Coopstad and Rochussen Co. (C&R), 126, 416n Cordea, Mark, 274–75, 280 Corea, Manuel Alvares, 223–24 Corisco Company, 41, 149, 184–85 Cornelisz., IJsbrant, 65 Costa da Mina. See Mina Coast cotton exports (see also textiles) from Brazil, 26 from Caribbean, 45, 222, 377–78 from Essequibo-Demerara, 348–52, 358–59, 442 from Suriname, 292, 309, 312n, 315–17 from the United States, 418 Courteen, Pieter, 34n, 36, 38 Courteen-De Moor Co., 34–36 Couturier, Henri, 272, 274 Cowes, 391
507
cowrie shells, 139, 151, 153, 155, 179, 188, 196 Coymans Asiento, 123, 253 (see also asiento) Coymans, Joseph, 123 Coymans, Balthasar, 122–23, 426 Cozumel, 23 craftsmen, 82, 249–50, 256, 278 crews. See ship crews Crijnssen, Abraham, 96, 398 Cromwell, Oliver, 260 cash crops (see also plantations), 5, 222, 230, 328 Cuba, 28–29, 87, 91, 203n, 214, 417 cultivation system (kultuurstelsel ), 5, 410 Cunha, Manuel da, 42 Curaçao, 5–6, 13, 28, 106, 203–19, 225–28, 231, 395n, 399, 401n, 416, 462–63; figs. 5.2, 8.1 as commercial entrepôt, xix, 13, 96, 111, 203–18, 220, 375–79, 381, 390, 394, 408–14, 435, 440 exports, 205n, 211–17, 416, 459 in the inter-Caribbean trade, 107, 213–15, 223–24, 279–80, 299, 353, 374, 382 population of, 205, 222 Curaçao slave market, 13, 119–20, 124, 134, 161, 167, 219–57, 447–49, 458; fig. 9.1 and the asiento, 119–20, 124, 134, 161, 167, 221–25 local demand for slaves, 40, 246, 248 private traders, 38, 78, 81, 87–88, 95–96, 100, 104, 154, 160–62, 225, 325–26, 334, 352, 375, 392, 436 marketing and pricing of slaves, 240–55 treatment of slaves, 222, 227–39, 252, 255–57 currency, 443, 461–63 daalder, 254n groff silver gelt, 254n groot, 55n, 69, 461–63 guilder (defined), 461 kaartgeld, 462 pieces of eight, 105, 203–04, 212, 221, 251, 254–55, 378n, 430, 452, 462–64 pound Flemish, 161, 462 pound sterling, 277, 381n, 413, 463 réis, 55, 367, 463
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stuiver, 221, 226–28, 247, 254, 317, 351–52, 356, 461 Curtin, Philip, 118 customs (see also duty payments) declarations, 139, 166, 278, 281–82, 371 offices, 57, 70n, 196–97, 264, 275, 380n Dahomey, 146, 185, 199 D’Orville family, 269, 271n Daniël, Jacob, 470 Danish-African Company, 392 Dantzig, 26 Dantzig, Albert van, 118 Darvall, Cornelis, 277 data collections, 115–16, 119–22, 131–32, 135–36, 297–98, 306, 308, 310–13, 315, 473–474 De Peyster family, 282 death affidavits (doodbriefjes), 227, 229, 234 Delft, 11n, 28, 34, 82 Demerara, 33, 35, 106, 133, 320, 323–61, 339n, 411, 458 twin colony of Essequibo (see also Essequibo), 5, 13, 131, 134–35, 323–61 Den Briel, 34n Den Heijer Data Collection, 473 Denmark, 82, 173, 206, 314, 408, 412, 417, 426 De Post van den Neder-Rhijn, 339 Derrick, William, 274 diamonds, 262, 381 Diemen, Jaspar van, 67n Djakarta (see also Batavia), 387n Djuka maroons, 428 Dodeur, Gillis, 67n Does, Pieter van der, 43, 398 Dominica, 28, 210, 358, 412 Donckelman, Herman, 67n Donnan, Elisabeth, 117 Dordrecht, 82 Dornhoven, Gillis, 27, 29 Dover, 275–76, 371 Druschky and Van Gorcum Co., 248 Du Fay, Jan Noach, 246, 250 Dutch Brazil (New Holland), 289 capture and loss of, 86–87, 90–91, 97–98, 141, 172, 325, 389 slave trade to, 89–91, 137 Dutch East Indies (see also Indonesia),
1–2, 36, 78, 152, 157, 263, 287, 386, 418, 466 commerce with, 2, 4, 442 Dutch East India Company. See VOC Dutch East Indiamen (ships), 46, 403, 435 Dutch maritime activities merchant marine, 63, 68, 71, 117, 133, 203, 309, 318n, 346, 349, 385, 400, 402–03, 406 naval force, 39–40, 78, 117, 345, 397, 401 privateers, 26–30, 50, 61, 74, 85–86, 91, 93–94, 96, 101, 117, 141, 365, 369, 398–99, 402, 405, 407n, 408, 466 Dutch Reformed Church (see also Reformed Church), 267, 269, 271–72 Dutch Republic (United Provinces), 20, 399n, 465–67 financial aid to companies, 210, 345, 391, 393–97, 421, 427, 434 government of, 42, 44, 78, 110–13, 151, 300, 313, 394, 409n, 430, 434, 466–67 historical synopsis of, 465–67 ports of, 24, 205, 214, 278, 309, 321, 365, 409 Revolt against Spain. See Eighty Year War Dutch ships captured, 27, 32, 38, 121, 276, 341, 399–400 by British, 2, 24, 209n, 313, 343, 346, 348, 371, 400, 404, 413, 440 duty payments, 102, 127n, 298, 345n 5 percent, 297, 304, 356, 410 recognitie, lastgeld, 126, 221, 245, 255n, 310, 325, 392, 410 10 percent, 57, 148, 174–75, 178–91, 193, 196, 198 weighing fees (waaggeld ), 291, 298, 317, 352, 444 dye substances, 21, 35, 45, 50, 52, 69, 90–91, 149–50, 156, 214, 317, 418, 465; fig. 12.3 from Africa, 157 from South America, 214–16, 254n, 317, 325, 369, 417, 435–46, 438 Ebert, Christopher, 12, 49, 390 Edam, 82 Eeghen, Christiaan van, 416
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Eeghen, Cornelis van, 433 Eeghen, Jan van, 417 Eeghen, Pieter van, 433 Eeghen, P. & C. Van Co., 2n, 408–09, 416–18, 440 Eighty Year War (1568–1648), 19–21, 140, 263, 465 Eijck, Michiel Jooste van, 469; fig. 5.2 Eijnde, Daniel van den, 67n Elisabeth , queen of England (1558–1603), 34n Elmina, 5, 41, 89–90, 101, 146, 172, 395n Brazilians at, 158, 166, 175–76, 178–98 castle at, 42, 89–90, 141; figs. 6.1, 7.1 commerce at, 43, 142, 148–49, 154, 157, 159 slave trade from, 157n, 158–59, 183–84, 193, 234, 405 WIC headquarters at, 142, 144–45, 165, 171, 195 Elst, Abraham van der, 338 Eltis, David, 168 embargoes, 31, 50–51, 60, 62–63, 73–74, 314, 366–68 Emden, 63 Emmer, Pieter, 118–19, 287, 405 engenho. See sugar mills England. See Britain; British Enkhuizen, 11n, 22, 77, 79, 82, 298, 404 Enthoven, Victor, xix, 1, 12–13, 17, 74n, 385 Ericksz., Barent, 29, 38–39, 140 Erp, Lambert van, 67n Erpecum, Joan van, 228n Espírito Santo, 25, 57, 70n Essem, Pieter Pietersen van, 274 Essequibo (see also Demarara), 33, 96, 209n, 325, 330, 395n bilateral shipping with, 333–34, 341–43 British connection with, 5, 96, 131, 327–28, 346 economic growth, 325–26, 328, 339n Essequibo conflict, 333–34, 394 North American trade with, 346, 353–58 shipping to and from, 333–34, 341, 345, 348 slave trade to, 103, 125, 131,
509
134–35, 151, 161, 329, 333–41, 458 twin colony of Demerara, 13, 213n, 320, 323–61 WIC government at, 106, 326–27 Zeeland dominance of, 342–45 European emigrants, 34, 320, 329 European exports (see also textiles; firearms), 18, 39, 71, 152–54, 190, 218, 153, 266, 278, 281, 296, 352–53, 374, 376, 394, 435, 442–43 Evertsen, Cornelis, 398 Faeroe Islands, 387 Fajardo, Don Luis de, 31 Falmouth harbor, 278, 282 Fermin, Philippe, 312 Fernandes, Duarte, 63 Ferrand Whaley Hudig & Jan Hudig Co. 395, 408–09, 416n, 423n finances (see also capital investments) account books, 65, 83, 100, 105, 108–09, 181, 184, 226, 228, 255, 297, 331–32, 423–24 bills of exchange, 65, 83, 161, 252–54, 281, 338, 341–42, 356, 374, 416 bottomry, 68, 98, 252–55, 416, 426 financial revolution, 418 fiscal and market values, 159, 240, 245, 304–05, 317, 321, 351, 369, 438, 440–41, 465 gross profits, 104, 161, 166–67 surcharges (bijlage), 100 financing Atlantic Commerce, 422–27 the Dutch East India Co. (see also VOC), 418–23 firearms, 78, 154–55, 213, 413 guns, 145, 148, 150–51, 154–55 gunpowder, 154–55, 179, 213, 377, 380 munitions, 24, 52, 213, 227 snaphaunches (muskets), 145, 154–55 Flanders, 19, 59, 72, 278, 373 Flemish, 57, 211, 213n, 352 (see also textiles; currency) Flinkenflögel, Willem, 119 Flushing (Vlissingen), 11n, 18, 22, 30, 34, 36, 38, 82, 93, 96, 101, 207, 310, 325, 334, 341; fig. 12.2
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Fort (see also Elmina) Amsterdam, 222, 225, 229–30, 231–32; figs. 8.1, 9.1, 9.2 Axim, 90n Coenraadsburg, fig. 7.1 Kijkoveral, 33, 35, 325, 328–30 Nassau, 37, 40–41, 85, 90 Orange, 37, 371, 385 Rammekens, 34n Zelandia, 327–31; fig.11.5 France, 27, 53, 81–82, 107 and Africa, 40, 84, 149, 168, 172 Atlantic expansion by, 361, 375, 401, 466 and Atlantic trade, 377–78, 382–83, 389, 399–400, 417 colonies of, 167, 372; fig. 13.2 merchants of, 61, 273, 413; fig. 6.3 naval activities of, 292, 327, 413, 428–29, 458 slave trade of, 137, 224–25, 245, 408, 426 French Caribbean, 11, 203, 206, 215, 288, 348, 371, 376, 400n, 404, 411–12, 437–39 Cayenne, 96, 106, 308 planters, 376, 439 Protestants, 267, 269, 271–72 Francken, François, pensionaris of Gouda, 78 Frankenthal, 267, 269 Frankfurt am Main, 265, 267, 269–70 Franklin, Edward, 275 Frederick Philipps, 278–79 free trade era, 101–03, 120, 123, 125–26, 159, 162 in Dutch slave trade, 125–37, 164–65 in English slave trade, 159, 163, 165, 168 freedom of the seas (vrij schip, vrij goed ), 408 freight contracts, 52–53, 56, 61n, 62, 65, 68–70, 72 Freire Costa, Maria Leonor, 56 Friesland, 11, 20, 81, 278, 466 Frisian islands, 11n Fruijt, Leendert, 259 Gabry family, 272 galeones (see also Spain, fleets), 210, 373n Gallandat, D. H., 219 Galway, 31n
Galver, José de, 214n Gangree, Laurent van, 450 Gardijn, Nicolas du, 68 Garrote, Panama, 204n Gates, Thomas, 30n Geel, Daniel van, 67n Geel, Elias van, 67n Geel, Giovanni van, 67n Geel, Pieter van, 67 Geleynsse, Michiel, 34, 44 Genoa, 81, 205, 212 geophagy (mal d’estomach), 239, 249 George , king of England (1738–1820), 328 German products, 153, 211, 213n, 278, 352 Germany, 63, 82, 259, 265, 267–69, 365, 375, 390–91, 408–09 Gerritsz., Pauwels, 24 Gildemeester, Daniel, 381n Goa, 17 Goetvrint, Henriques, 224n Goetvrint, Johannes, 223 Gold Coast, 38–41, 101, 141, 143, 165, 172, 186, 365, 405 forts and trading stations at, 85–86, 89–91, 141–42, 196; fig. 6.1 gold from, 154, 156, 158 slaves from, 150, 157n, 160, 234 trade at, 42, 102, 125, 130, 157, 159, 174, 177, 184 Gorcum, Pieter van, 248 Gorée Island, 41, 85, 399 Goslinga, C. C., 119 Gouda, 22, 78 governors’ journals (Gouverneurs Journalen), 297–98, 303, 319 grain, 52, 54, 68–69, 72 Grain Coast, 41, 145, 156 Great Inagua, 209n Greenwood, John, 311, 471; fig. 11.4 Grenada, 358 Groenwegen, Gerrit, 471 Groningen (Stad en lande), 20, 82, 396, 427n, 466 grote vaart (big circuit), 299 Guadalquivir, 53n Guadeloupe, 28, 214n, 358, 371, 377n, 412 Guadiana, 53n Guajiro Indians, 213 Guatemala, 214 Guiana region (see also Wild Coast; Berbice; Demarara; Essequibo; and
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Suriname), 10, 33, 85, 100, 104–06, 111–12, 125 settlements, 35, 86, 95, 102, 110, 130, 132–33, 143, 151, 167–78, 378, 383 Guinea Coast (see also West Africa; Mina Coast), 18, 111 commerce, 39, 140; fig. 6.2 Costa da Mina, 148–49 Guinea Company, 35n, 43–44, 425 Guyana (see also Berbice; Demarara; Essequibo), 5, 32, 105–06, 131–32, 134, 246, 299, 318–19, 323–24, 331–33, 375, 459 Haage, Pieter van der, 40n Haarlem, 22, 153, 211, 367 Habsburg Crown (see also Spanish government), 55, 59n, 60–61, 263, 466 embargoes, 62, 73 Haeff, Adriaen ten, 40n The Hague, 8, 20, 22, 174, 184, 211, 273, 292, 294, 396, 461 Hakluyt Society, 117 Hamburg, 26n, 59, 61, 66n, 67, 268–69, 348, 380n Hanau, 96, 271 Hanseatic League, 52, 58, 61 Hanswijck, Jacques van, 67n Havana, 27–29, 373 Heijer, Henk den, 3, 12–13, 77, 120–22, 124–25, 128, 139, 173, 179, 198, 410n Helm Boddaert, Cornelis van den, 431; fig. 12.1 Helmont, Jan Jansen van, 67n Hendricksz., Dirck, 63 Heneman, J. C., 470 Henríquez, Augustin Moreno, 214n Henriques, Philipo, 223, 244 Henry , king of England (1485–1509), 262 Henryckz., Claes, 26 Heren X. See bewindhebbers Heren XIX. See bewindhebbers Herman, Augustine, 272 Hermans, Guillaume, 43 Heuvel, Jan Martin van der, 67n, 340 Heuvel, Martin van den, 67n Heyn, Piet, 87, 89, 91n, 92, 368; fig. 4.3 hides, 189n, 203n, 438 from Africa, 157, 438n
511
from Argentine, 156, 189 from Brazil, 26, 180, 188–89, 367 from New Netherland, 45, 435n from North America, 273, 276, 228, 281 from Suriname, 317 from Venezuela, 214–16, 254, 367 from the West Indies, 26–27, 29–30 Hispaniola, 27–28, 210, 244 Hoen, Pieter ’t, 339 Hof van Politie en Criminele Justitie, 295 Holland Land Company, 417 Holland 11n, 21–22, 29, 38, 44, 52, 59, 67, 140, 367, 427, 461, 466–467 merchants of, 87, 289 raadpensionaris of, 40, 79, 110, 313, 466 States of (government), 39, 40, 78–80, 97, 99, 110, 140–41, 261, 313, 345, 421, 429, 434n, 466–67 Holleram, Willem, 31n Hommel, David de ’l, 67 Hooge, Joost van der, 35 Hoogherheyden, E., 471 Hoorn, Nicolaas and Hendrik van, 429 Hoorn, 11n, 22, 24, 77, 79, 82, 106, 404, 421 Hoppisacke, Gysbert, 450 horse trade to the Guiana colonies demand for, 292, 294, 300–301, 339n; figs. 11.2, 11.7 prices of, 297, 355–56 delivery of, 301–03, 339n, 354–55 household supplies, 278, 304, 319, 352 hout- en zoutbrief (wood- and-salt permit) 325, 340, 343, 458 Houwen, Apero van der, 228n Huddy, Arthur, 282 Hudig Co. See Ferrand Whaley Hudig & Jan Hudig Hudson, Henry, 36, 263 Hudson Bay Company, 192 Hudson River, 36–38, 85, 94, 260, 263, 266, 272, 371 Huguenot merchants, 269, 272 Hulscher, Evert, 26, 42n Hulscher, Karel, 42 Huys, Jacob Jansen, 273 Iberian Atlantic system, 21–24 commerce, 52, 57, 390
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nations and governments, 369, 382 people, 10, 23, 51, 55, 61, 78, 85, 261 ports, 50, 59, 74, 367 precedents, 261–62 Iceland, 387 IJ, fig. 2.2 IJzerman, J. W., 52–53, 61n, 62–63 Ilhéus, 25, 56 illegal trade (see also interlopers), 107, 274–75, 358, 378, 380, 392, 397, 405, 439n with Brazil, 50, 65–66, 380–81 from Curaçao, 440, 215, 394 to Dem.-Ess., 345, 356, 358–61 in the slave trade, 223–24, 227, 244–46, 250, 255–56, 337, 359 with Spanish America, 160, 366, 391, 403, 414 from St. Eustatius, 412, 400 with West Africa, 101, 148, 392, 405, 436 Indian Ocean, 172 Indian subcontinent, 17, 139, 152–53 Indians. See Amerindians indigo, 203n, 205n, 214–16, 222, 317, 326n, 349, 416–17, 441–42 Indonesia (see also Dutch East Indies), 5, 387n Inquisition, 52, 66, 73, 368n Institute Van Vollenhoven, 7 Institute Kern, 7 Institute of Dutch History (ING), 8 Institute of the History of European Expansion (IGEER), 2, 7 Institute of Modern Asian History (IMAG), 7 insurance, 63, 67–68, 70, 98, 276, 352–03, 416 interlopers (lorrendraaiers), 101, 121, 125, 147–48, 162, 165–66, 169, 175, 387, 392, 405, 407n in the slave trade, 123–25, 130, 134, 136–37, 290 International Institute of Asian Studies (IIAS), 7 Irish settlers, 34–35, 44 iron bars, 52, 153, 155, 213, 356, 380 Isle of Portland, 209n Israel, Jonathan, 53n, 62, 366, 375 Ita, Pieter Lodwijkse, 34 Italy, 53, 67–58, 64, 262, 267, 277
Itinerario, 7, 9 ivory, 21, 38–39, 44, 90–91, 112, 140, 143, 148–50, 156–57, 159, 163–67, 169, 188, 191, 435, 438n Ivory Coast, 41, 145, 154, 156–57, 186 Jacobs, J. A., 38, 67n Jacobsen, Guy, 273 Jacopsen, Jan, 59–60 Jakin ( Jaquim), 146, 183, 185 Jamaica, 358, 378–79, 391, 417 James , king of England (1633–1701), 260–61 Jamestown, V.I., 36 Janssonius, J., 471 Jansz., Pieter, 24 Jansz., Sybrant, 63 Jews, 43, 66–67, 70–74, 248, 369 Sephardic, 205, 289 as merchants, 50, 205, 367 Johan Maurits of Nassau-Siegen (1604–1679), governor of Dutch Brazil, 79, 87, 89, 91, 467 joint-stock firms. See trading companies Jol, Cornelis, 91 Jolink, Heyndrick Dirrecksen, 17–18, 38–39, 40n Jonge, Jasper Basiliers de, 64 Jong-Keesing, E. E. de, 1n Joosten van Eijck, Michiel, fig. 5.2 Jordaan, Han, 13, 219 Jorisz., Adriaen, 38 Judicial Council (Hof van Civile Justitie), 295, 327 Juxon, Nicolas John, 451 kaartgeld, 462 Kappeyne van de Coppello, Bartholomeus Pieter, 338 Kerckhove, Melchior van den, 29 Kernkamp, G. W., 116 Keta, 101 Keulen, Gerard van, 470 Keyser, Wijnant, 68 Kiple, K. F., 235 kleine vaart (small circuit), 299, 390, 410 Klooster, Wim, 13, 24n, 120, 124, 203, 365, 390, 403 Kroeff, Adriaan, 458 Kroes, Abraham, 458 kultuurstelsel (cultivation system), 5, 410 Kunst, A. J. M., 253
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La Guaira, 215 La Rochelle, 27, 59, 372 Laet, Johannes de, 8n, 32n, 88, 90, 92, 116, 369n Lam, Jan Dircksz., 89 Lampsins & Co., 404, 430n Larwood, Tho:, 452 Later, Bartholomeus de, 471 Latin America, 12, 23, 391, 408, 410–11, 425, 430, 441–43, 459 Laver, Johannes de, 338 Lee, William, 395 Leeward Islands, 28, 106, 210, 412 Leggett, John, 451 Leiden, 1, 6, 7, 22, 153, 272 Lemon juice, fig. 12.3 Leisler, Caspar, 265n, 269 Leisler, Franz, 271 Leisler, Reverend Jacob Victor, 265–69 Leisler, Jacob ( Jr.), 13, 259–60, 264–65, 450–52 Atlantic commerce of, 272–78, 450 family history of, 265–72 transatlantic network of, 205–06, 259–60, 265–72 Leisler, Johann Adam, 271 Leisler, Johann Heinrich, 270 Leisler, Susanna, 268 Lespinasse, Jan, 353 Lesser Antilles, 28, 370, 399 Liebergen, van, 293 lime juice, 156–57 Linschoten, Jan Huygen van, 8, 17 Lisbon, 23, 26, 52, 56–60, 62–63, 66, 68–69, 73, 173–74, 176, 182, 184, 192, 365, 367–68, 381 livestock, 238, 304 Lisle, Viscount de, 17, 40n Livorno, 59–60, 66, 277 Loango-Angola coastal region, 41, 149–50, 156, 157n, 159–60, 186, 234, 250, 296 Locker, Conrad, 269 Lodensteyn, Everard van, 34 Lodewycx, Pieter, 44 Lodewijk Napoleon (1778–1848), 467 London, 24n, 59, 61, 260n, 268, 272, 324, 331, 370–71 Lopes Homem, Manuel, 63 Lopes Homem, Miguel, 63 Lorimer, J., 32 lorrendraaiers. See interlopers
513
Louis , king of France (1643–1715), 224, 270 Louissen, Abraham, Co., 458 Louissen, Johannes, Co., 338, 458 Lou[s]zada, David Baruk, 450 Louw, Jacob Sijmonsz., 67n Luanda, 41, 86, 89, 91, 405 lumber, 52, 54, 205n, 214–16, 301, 317, 326n, 345, 356–58, 438n luxury items, 21, 45, 71, 155, 367 Luyken, Jan , 469 Lynch, Thomas, 391 macron (manqueron). See slave trade, identification Madeira Islands, 23, 56, 58, 69n, 75, 278, 296, 387 Majombo, 41, 149 Malapert family, 269 Maldive Islands, 139, 155 Male, Jan van, 329n Manhattan Island, 95, 268 manufactured goods, 39, 52, 58, 71, 159, 188, 278, 281, 311, 318, 321, 373, 376, 435 Marees, Pieter de, 116 maroon communities, 292–93, 428 Martin, Gaspard, 225 Martini, J., 452 Martinique, 28, 210, 214, 358, 371, 412 Mary Stuart, daughter of James , wife of William (1667–1694), 260 Maryland, 209n, 262, 272n, 274–76, 278, 280–81, 354, 403, 408, 418 Massachusetts, 262, 302 Matanzas, 87, 91; fig. 4.3 Maurits of Nassau (1567–1625), prince of Orange, stadholder of Holland and Zeeland, 79, 467 Mauro, Frédéric, 365n Mawe, John, 381n Maze (WIC chamber), 81–82, 84, 99, 333 MCC (Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie), 117, 126, 128–29, 163, 203n, 243, 298, 334, 339, 341, 344, 346, 348, 352–53, 377n, 387n, 395–96, 408, 415, 423–25, 430, 440, 443, 458; fig. 14.3 Measure, William, 281–83, 452 measurements and weights, 54, 157, 461–65 Amsterdam measures, 157
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aam, 157 arroba, 54n, 55, 88, 176, 192, 194, 369, 464 hogshead (oxhoofd ), 213, 259, 280, 309, 312, 351–52, 357, 359, 377, 464, 453–57 kilogram, 24, 54–55, 88, 90, 156–57, 189–90, 192–94, 367, 463–64 last. See ship carrying capacity liter, 155, 157n, 213, 465 mark, 90, 156–58, 463 Medemblik, 22, 29, 38, 82 Mediterranean trade, 19, 21, 45–46, 53, 380 Meertens, Anthony, 353 Meiden, G. W. van der, 297n Meilink-Roelofs, M. A. P., 1, 287, 321 melequeta (cayenne pepper), 38, 90, 156, 435, 438 Melyn, Cornelis, 268 Melyn, Jacob, 268 Mendes, Francisco, 63 Meneses, Vasco Fernandes César de, 182 Menkman, W. R., 116 mercantilism, 260, 283, 370, 390–91 Merchant Adventurers Co., 36 merchant marine, 19, 63, 68, 71, 133, 203, 309, 346, 349, 402 merchant networks, 23, 51, 56, 64–67, 73, 183, 205–06, 259, 260, 265, 272–83 Meteren, E. van, 18, 30n Middelburg Bank of Exchange, 18, 419, 431 Middelburg, 11n, 18, 20, 22, 36, 38, 40n, 82, 89, 93, 325, 352, 396, 461 merchants, 26, 39n, 43, 77–78, 101, 118, 396n, 419, 431, 434 shipping, 32, 207, 334, 338, 341, 344, 348, 368, 439 Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie. See MCC middle passage (see also slave trade), 133, 220, 234–35, 255 military (see also naval) affairs, 85, 105–06, 165, 270–71, 318, 427–28 control of, 78–79, 91, 290, 295, 398 operations of, 90, 428, 467 personnel, 226, 319–20 supplies, 151, 153–55, 319, 377
Mina Coast (see also Guinea Coast), 148–49, 173, 175–76, 178, 182, 191–94, 196, 198 Minas Gerais, 190 Minvielle, Gabriel, 275, 279–80 Miranda, Luis Pereira de, 67 moedernegotie (bulk trade), 72, 74 Mol, Pieter, 63 molasses, 294, 301, 305, 316, 321, 345, 354–59 Molasses Act, 355–56 Molijn, Pieter du, 367 Mona Passage, 28, 210 monopolistic trade in Dutch slave trade, 161, 164, 186, 219–20, 225–26, 291, 298, 305, 309, 333–34 of Portugal, 42, 56–57, 64, 73, 172 of VOC, 40, 386 of WIC, 2, 79–81, 86, 88, 97, 100–02, 107, 111, 141, 165, 172, 186–87, 325–26 monsterrollen. See ship crews Montserrat, 28, 358, 389, 412 Moor, Jan de, 34, 44 Mori, 40–41, 43, 146, 172 Morineau, M., 439n Morris, Lewis, judge-commissary of New York, 385, 400 mortality rates. See under slave trade mortgages (negotiaties), 109, 132, 307, 324, 338–39, 343, 360, 396, 417, 423, 427, 431–32 Moucheron, Balthasar de, 27, 29, 31, 42, 45 Moucheron, Cornelis de, 42 Moucheron, Daniël de, 31 Moy, Cornelis Jacobs, 259, 274–75, 277–78, 281–83, 452 Mulock, Anthonis, 18n Munnicx, Pieter, 67n Münster, 204, 268, 372 muscovado, 50n, 54n, 189. See also Brazilian exports, sugar Naader Reglement, 103 Nantes, 372, 408 Napoleon Bonaparte (1769–1821), 467 Napoleonic era, 5, 361, 389, 409, 417, 467 (see also France) Nassau-Dillenburg, 268 Nassy, David de Ishak Cohen, 281, 287–88, 299, 311–13, 315–16, 320, 453–57
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National Bank of North America, 418 naval affairs, 52, 78, 215, 370, 398, bases, 221, 410 convoys, 39–40, 401 warfare, 375, 398 Navigation Acts. See Acts of Trade and Navigation Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij (NHM), 410 Netscher, P. M., 35n Netherlands. See Dutch Republic Netherlands Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), 8, 287n Neufville, Jan Isaac de, 240 Neufville, Jean de, 395 Neufville, Leendert Pieter de, 420 neutrality and commerce, 24, 110, 214–15, 314, 346, 381, 399, 401, 409, 412 flags, 348–49, 408; fig. 14.4 cargoes, 349, 408–09, 417 New Amsterdam, xx, 37, 95, 259, 273, 279 merchants, 270, 272–73 militia, 265, 270 Reformed Church, 268, 272 New Amstel (Nieuwer Amstel), 422n, 439 Newbury, Mass., 354 New Christians. See Jews New England (see also North America), 66, 73, 267, 278 horse exports, 301–05; figs. 11.7, 13.2 ships, 281, 301 Newfoundland, 11, 366, 374 New Granada, 203n, 213–14, 217–18 New Guinea, 80 New Holland (see also Dutch Brazil), 87, 289 New London, Conn., 266, 302, 354, 358 New Netherland Company, 36, 44–45 New Netherland (see also New York), 36–38, 44, 86, 94–96, 279, 280, 289, 389, 393, 422; fig. 13.2 exports, 45, 370, 392, 398, 435 merchants, 205, 217, 265, 272, 371 trade and shipping, 94, 119, 392, 403, 436 New York (city), 95, 119, 259, 266, 269, 272, 274–78, 289, 354, 380, 385, 418, 452
515
commerce, 13, 209n, 259–60, 269, 275–82, 300n, 302, 354, 371 uprising, 260, 265 Nieuw Walcheren. See Tobago Niger Delta, 145–46 Nine Year War (1688–1697), 19, 21, 263 Noorderkwartier (WIC chamber), 81–82, 84, 99, 149, 397n Noordsche Compagnie, 11n, 44 North African corsairs. See Barbary corsairs North America (see also New Netherland; New England), 36, 137, 262 Dutch investments in, 213, 376–77, 417–18, 430n, 432–33 Dutch trade with, 36, 77, 206, 402–03, 407–08, 411, 441–42, 459 exports from, 36, 44, 192, 435 and Navigation Acts, 281, 370 ships, 132–33, 307, 348, 407, 410n, 411–12, 459 trade with Amsterdam, 52, 59, 149, 418 trade with the Caribbean, 281, 299, 325, 334, 339–41, 361 trade with Essequibo and Demerara, 325, 333, 353–58, 361 trade with the Guianas, 133, 264, 353, 356, 371, 391, 412, 440 trade with Rotterdam, 281–82, 378–89 trade with Suriname, 288, 294, 297–305, 311, 320–21; fig. 11.4 Northern Company. See Noordsche Compagnie Norway, 209n Nova Scotia, 389, Nova Zelandia, 33, 325, 422n, 439 Nunes, Manuel Lopes, 63 Nürnberg, 268–69 Obwexer Co., 214n, 222, 390n Oest, Eric Willem van der, 13, 120, 131, 323, 324n, 394 Oest Data collection. See Van der Oest Data collection oil and refineries, 6, 52, 54, 212, 352, 435 Oldenbarnevelt, Johan van, advocate of Holland (1586–1618), 40, 44, 79–80, 466
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Olinda, 87 Oostindie, G. van, 219n Oporto, 52, 56, 66–67, 69, 71–72, 74, 367, 368n opperbewindhebber (director general), 343, 466 Orange, princes of, 79, 92–93, 260, 343, 467 Oranjestad, xx Oriane paint, fig. 12.3 Orinoco River, 28, 32–33, 355 Osnabrück, 268 Osorio, Bento, 72 Ostend, 315n, 348, 408–09 otter skins, 45, 275, 370, 435n Oudermeulen van Graafland, Cornelis van der, 442–43 Ouidah (Fida), 146, 158, 182–83; fig. 6.3 Outgers, Hendrick, 276, 281, 450, 452 Oyapoc, 106 Paalgelden, 298 Palacios, Duarte, 66n Palacios, Jacome, 66n Palacios, Francisco, 66n Palma Island, 56 Pará River, 32 Paraíba, 25, 65, 70 Paramaribo, xx, 32–33, 132–33, 135–36, 289, 293–94, 302, 311; figs. 5.4, 11.4, 11.5, 11.6 harbor activities, 299–307, 309, 313, 315–16, 321 Parker, Isaak, 338 Parmentier, J., 348n, 349n partenrederij, 71, 423–25 passenger transport, 308, 318, 320, 331, 352 Pastoor, Dirck Willems, 68 patroonship, 95, 105, 291, 303, 393n, 404, 422, 429 Pauw, Willem, 67n peace settlements Luso-Dutch Peace Treaty (1661), 172, 380–81 Nonesuch Treaty (1585), 34n Peace of Breda (1667), 96, 289, 389 Peace of Münster (Westphalia) (1648), 204, 268, 372, 390 Peace of Paris (1763), 5, 414 Peace of Westminster (1674), 279 Settlement of 1641, 148 Treaty of Utrecht (1713), 210n
Twelve Year Truce (1609–1621), 21, 29–31, 35, 40, 42, 49, 60, 62–63, 66–68, 73–74, 77, 140, 325, 366n, 368–69, 372, 405, 436 with Suriname Amerindians, 290, 292 with Suriname maroons, 293, 428 pearls, 26–27, 29, 45, 92, 262, 381; figs. 2.1, 4.3 Peenen, Jan van, 67n Pennsylvania, 262, 266, 391 Penrys, 281 Pere, Abraham van, 35, 96, 105, 78, 110, 313, 394, 466, 429 Pere, Cornelis van, 429 Pere, Johan van, 429 Pernambuco, 25, 50n, 54–56, 69n, 71, 75, 188–89, 192, 196, 367n, 374, 381; figs. 3.1, 13.1 Perre, François van de, 352 Perre, van de and Meijnders Co., 352 pesos. See currency, pieces of eight Philadelphia, Pa., 266, 354 Philip , king of Spain (1555–1598), 24, 60, 263, 367, 465–66 Philip , king of Spain (1598–1621), 31, 34, 40, 60, 365 Philipps, Frederick, 278–79, 282 Pietersen, Jan, 44 Pietersz., Jan, 24, 34 Pietersz., Lambert, 24 pieza de india. See slave trade, identification Pimentel, Garcia, 66 Pina, Paulo de, 70 Pinto, Diogo Lopes, 72–73 pirates, 121, 209, 276–77, 367 Pitman, F., 413 Plaats Jr., V. van de, 470 Plancius, Petrus, 78 plantation colonies, 50, 105–06, 131, 289, 378 loans, 109, 420n, 442 mortgages, 132, 324, 338, 417, 431–32 products, 109, 349, 375, 430, 463 plantations, 105, 131, 167, 188, 235, 365, 371, 378, 391, 397, 423, 433, 440–42 in Berbice, 106, 324n, 336 at Curaçao, 222, 229–30, 239, 246–47, 250, 256 in the Caribbean, 96, 222, 230, 247, 411
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at Essequibo and Demarara, 106, 112, 143, 160–62, 324–26, 328–29, 333, 335–38, 353–55, 360, 393 at Suriname, 5, 13, 161, 217, 289–93, 301, 305, 324, 393, 428 of the WIC, 105, 228, 230, 232, 326, 349 plantations, mentioned Amelisweerd, Demerara, 337 Bohemia Manor, Maryland, 272n Duinenburg, Essequibo, 326n Duivelsklip, Curaçao, 231 Hato, Curaçao, 229–31, 239 Koraal Tabak, Curaçao, 231 Leliënberg, Curaçao, 231 Noordkant, Curaçao, 231 Oostpunt, Curaçao, 231 Pelgrim, Essequibo, 326n Piscaderis, Curaçao, 230–31 Poelwijk, Essequibo, 326n Rooy Canary, Curaçao, 230–31, 239 St. Maria, Curaçao, 230–31 Twee Agathen, Essequibo, 326n Pleine, Nicholas de la, 272 Plymouth, 31n, 374 Polhemus, Johann Theodor, 269 poll tax (hoofdgeld ), 95, 103–05, 164, 221n, 247, 328 Pomeroon River, 33, 96, 404 Poort, Wouter van der, 43 population statistics, 34, 71, 189, 205, 221–22, 226, 290, 292, 337 of slaves, 226, 247–48, 293 of Amerindians, 290, 292 Portobelo, 28, 161n, 373n, 376, 378n Portsmouth, 354 Portugal and Africa, 42, 54, 152, 174–87 Atlantic empire of, 23, 35, 38, 40, 42, 44, 62, 65, 97 in conflict with the Dutch Republic, 79, 86–91, 93, 97, 111, 141–42, 148, 172–78, 381 Dutch trade with, 52–54, 61n, 69, 73, 367–69, 380 ships of, 17, 23, 49, 65, 68, 71 ports of, 63, 68, 74 slave trade of, 23, 40, 156, 222–24, 244 Portuguese Brazil, 23, 50, 54–57, 173 Jews, 43, 50, 66–67, 70, 72–74
517
merchants, 18, 21, 51, 58, 61–63, 67, 69, 72–74, 390 union with Spain, 50, 60, 86 trade with northern Europe, 52, 58–61, 63–64, 67 Post, Frans, 471 Posthumus, N. W., 369 Postma, Johannes, xix, 1, 12–13, 115, 150n, 159, 161, 171, 287, 313, 405 Postma datasets, 132, 133n, 297–98, 306–08, 311, 313, 453–57, 473 Potomac River Company, 418 precious metals (see also gold; silver) demand for, 91, 143, 157, 166, 217, 262, 435, 443 bullion and specie, 54, 203, 210, 372, 376, 378, 426, 435–36, 443 Priester, L. R., 119 private pursuits in Atlantic region by companies, 5, 393, 416, 419, 421, 433–34 Atlantic traders, 86, 103, 263, 292, 318 planters and settlers, 94, 337, 349, 351–52, 394, 397 privateering, 11, 73, 93, 402, 405, 407 by British and French, 2n, 24n, 27, 107n, 209, 346, 355 by North Americans, 346 against Portugal and Spain, 29, 50, 61, 74, 93, 141, 210, 369 profits, 29, 61, 93, 117, 369, 466 by Spanish, 209–10, 355 and war, 209, 399, 408 in the West Indies, 26, 29, 85–86 by the WIC, 85, 91–96, 369, 398 by Zeelanders, 93, 101, 405, 408 prizes (see also ships, captured by the Dutch), 27, 209n, 369, 372, 400 protectionism, 390 Protestantism, 19, 21, 262, 265 Providence, R.I., 303–04, 389 Providence Island, 389 Prussia, 314 Public Record Office (PRO), London, 323, 331 Puerto Cabello, 28, 215 Puerto Rico, 28, 210, 214, 353, 373n Punta de Araya, 28, 31, 45–46, 366 Put, Guillaume van de, 29n Qua Qua Coast, 41, 145–46 Quebec, 389
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Querido, Diogo Dias, 43, 66 Quingeth, Jasper, 59 Raad van Koloniën, 434 Radermacher, Samuel, 338 Rambskopf, Laurenz, 268 Rammekens, fort, 34n ransom payments, 27, 276–77, 428–29 Rappahannock, Va., 272 Ratelband, Klaas, 116 Reaal, Laurens, 82 Recife, 25, 55, 65, 87, 91, 93, 96, 404 records accounts, 83, 104, 107–08, 147, 166 180, 332, 423–24 bookkeeping, 178, 181–82, 188, 255, 216, 228, 312, 331, 425 documentation, 53, 135, 230, 303, 311, 323 of commerce and taxation, 174, 180–84, 188–89, 193, 221–22, 227–28, 245, 281, 290, 297–98, 304, 353, 356, 462 journals of Suriname governors. See governors’ journals minutes (notulen), 291, 295, 297, 320n notary records, 52–53, 65, 67, 70, 72, 253, 267–68, 373–74, 259, 281, 452 ship manifests, 85, 214, 216, 303; figs. 5.2, 12.1 waterschout (harbor police), 298, 310n Reede, Godert van, Heer van Nederhorst, 268 Reeps, Jan, 106 Reformed Church, 265, 267–69, 270–72, 277 Reinders Folmer-van Prooijen, C., 120, 128, 163n, 424 Rensselaer, Kiliaen van, 95 Rensselaerswijck, N.Y., 37, 95, 424n, 430n return cargo (backhaul), 83, 213, 215, 308, 313 Rhee, Pieter van, 429 Rhode Island, 302–04 rice, 349, 379–80, 418 Ridder, Jan, 353 Rijksarchief in Zeeland (RAZ), 461 Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën (RGP), 8 Río de la Hacha, 214 Rio de Janeiro, 25, 54, 56, 67, 188n, 189, 367–68, 381
Rio de la Plata, 25, 54, 366–68 Roanoke, Va., 389 Rodier, Jean, 213 Rodney, Sir George, xx, 332, 339, 382, 413 Roos, Marten, 397 Rotterdam, 11n, 22, 62n, 77, 82, 89, 126, 207, 281–82, 309, 333–34, 342, 334, 378, 379, 394–95, 403–04, 407n, 408–10, 416, 428, 432, 452; fig. 14.4 Rouen, 59, 67 roulatiesysteem, 343 Royal African Company (RAC), 143, 158, 168, 177, 180 Royal Portuguese African Company, 177, 223–24 Royal Institute of Linguistics and Ethnology (KITLV), 7 Russell, Andrew, 282 Ruiters, Dierick, 43n Ruychaver, Jacob, director general, 90n Ruyter, Michiel Adriaensz. de, 398 Ryder, A. F. C., 173, 193n Saba, 28, 106 Salem, Mass., 266, 354 salt shipping of, 18n, 31, 77, 79, 81, 280, 437n from Portugal, 52, 59, 63, 68–69, 72–73, 174n, 177, 366n from Venezuela (see also Punta de Araya), 30–31, 45–46, 366 Salvador, 25, 55, 86–87, 89, 174, 176; fig. 3.2 Santa Lucia. See St. Lucia Santa Marta. See St. Marta Santo Domingo, 27–29, 214, 417 São Jorge da Mina (see also Elmina), 42, 86, 89, 141 São Paulo de Luanda, 86 São Tomé, 38, 41, 43, 438; fig. 14.1 São Vicente, 25, 56, 58 Saraiva, Duarte, 63 Saramaka maroons, 428 Sà, Salvador Correia de, 91 Scelle, Georges, 117 Schenectady, N.Y., 277 Schetz, Erasmo, 58 Schley, J. van, 471 Schuijt, Albert, 67n Schnurmann, Claudia, 13, 259, 391
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Schorer, Catherina Margaretha, 439 Schot, Hans de, 59, 69 Schram, Meijnert Willemsen, 72 Schuilenburg, van, 339 Schwartz, Stuart, 13, 55, 171, 365n Senegambia, 40, 42, 91, 141, 149, 156–57, 159, 168, 399 Senior, David, 223, 244 Sephardic Jews, 50, 66–67, 73, 205, 281, 289 Setúbal, 31, 366n Seven Year War (1756–1763), 2, 107, 207, 209, 346, 356, 400 Seville, 223, 261, 372 ship carrying capacity, 46, 53, 55–57, 67–69, 72, 122n, 205, 207–08, 310, 345n, 367, 374 ship crews, 32, 63, 71, 78, 92, 121, 145, 163, 178, 204, 277, 298, 308, 331, 367, 369, 392, 400, 423 ships (see also Dutch ships) rented, 404, 424 captured by the Dutch (see also prizes), 27, 40n, 91, 93, 101, 117, 148, 175–79, 181–84, 186–87, 190, 372, 392, 400 outfitting of, 85, 92, 98, 126, 149, 289, 299n, 321, 340, 391n, 397, 402, 408–09, 416, 419, 422–25, 430–31 ship types bark (barque), 151, 245, 281, 301, 337, 354, 359, 452 busse (buis), 145 canoe (korjaal ), 329 caravel, 49, 56, 71, 367 cruiser (kruiser), 144, 147–48, 183–86, 359, 387 flute ( fluit), 53, 149–50, 309 frigate ( fregat), 93, 144, 147, 150–51, 157, 176, 207, 309–10 galiot ( galjoot), 147, 151 hooker (hoeker), 145, 309, 359 pinck ( pink), 145, 276, 451 pinnache ( pinas), 150, 310 snow (snauw), 207, 309–10 yacht ( jacht), 43, 144–45, 148, 150–51, 310; fig. 14.2 size of, 145, 148, 151, 184, 310, 359 shipping routes (see also trading patterns), 45–47, 63–64, 67–73, 127, 183n, 207, 209–10, 259, 261, 299, 333, 367n, 374, 387, 402
519
ships, mentioned (see also appendices 9.1, 9.2, and 12.1 for additional listings) Achilles, 343 Adrichem, 235 Agatha, 336 Amphitrite, 340 Amsterdam, 237n, 238n Andrea Doria, 385–86 Ann & Catherine, 278 Anna Catharina, 212 Anna Maria Galey, 209n Arend, 343 Beschutter, 185 Bosbeek, 336 Brandenburg, 341 Casteel Souburgh, 336 Catte, 32 Centurion, 24n Companies Welvaren, 183 Coningin Ester, 208 Curaçaose Visser, 2n, 209n, 440 Digna Johanna, 336 Dove of Boston, 276, 450 Duinvliet, 336 Duynenburg, 209n Eenigheid, fig. 14.3 Eenhoorn, 18, 39 Eensgezindheid, 336 Elisabeth en Maria, 207n Emmenes, 233n, 235 Engelenburgh, 209n Enigheid, 339 Essequebo Sociëteit, fig. 12.2 Essequebo’s Welvaren, 431 Estrela Dourada, 369n Eva Maria, 235, 242 Faam, 147, 183 Fort Cormantijn, fig. 5.2 Fox, 273 Friheden, 440 Groot Bentveld, 238n Groote St Jago, 207n Happy Return, 277, 281–83, 452 Helena, 179, 238 Hof Ramsburg, 431 Hollandia, 245 Hoop, 209 Hope, 274n Hopewell, 277–78 Israel, 282 Jalousie, 346n James, 374 Johanna Elisabeth, 209n
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520 Johannes de Doper, 151 Jonge Daniel, 336 Jonge Jacob, 348–49 Jonge Lambrecht, 336 Juffrouw Elisabeth, 408n, 423 Juffrouw Helena, 238n Juffrouw Margaretha, 346n Juffrouw Sara, 212 Katharina Maria Galei, 209n Koningin Hester, 208n Maasnimph, 359 Margaretha Catharina, 242 Marianne, 336 Maria Gallij, 209n Maria Jacoba, 329n Maeght van Enkhuysen, 38 Middelburgs Hoop, fig. 12.1 Neptune, 276 Nieuwe Hoop, fig. 14.3 Nieuwe Post, fig. 9.3 Orange Boom, 426n Phenix, 238n Phoenix, 242 Poelwijk, 149 Princesse Gouvernante, 209n Pynenburg, 336 Rensselaerswyck, 424 Rode Gans, 31 Roode Leeuw, 68 Rust van ’t Vaderland, 209n Sampson, 24, 72, 367n São Francisco, 17 Sara Helena, fig. 13.3 Spreeuwenburg, 336 Stad Amsterdam, 209 Stad en Lande, 232n Stad Moskou, 336 St. Michiel, 275 Susanna Catharina, 209n Susann[ah] of New Yorke, 276, 451 Swaan, 205n, 215 Swarte Beer, 38 Vergulde Vrijheid, 224n Vigilantie, fig. 14.3 Vis, 336 Vleyt, 209n Vliegende Vis, 36 Vrouw Anna, 209n Vrouw Maria, 209n Wakende Kraan, 208n Willem Suzanna en Elisabeth, 423 Witte Hondt, 24 Zeeberg, 336 Zwemmende Leeuw, 27, 29
shipwrecks, 98, 121, 341, 343 Sibingh, Jan Hendrick, 259 Sies, Abraham, 268 silver pesos. See currency, pieces of eight silverfleet, 87; fig. 4.3 Skimer, Nicholas, 276, 450 Slave Coast, 41, 139, 145–46, 150, 155, 157–58, 160, 182–85, 188–90, 193, 195–96, 199, 208, 234 slave trade, Atlantic, 40n accommodations and feeding on ships, 150, 229–30, 238–39 destinations of slaves, 135, 234–36, 307, 335–37 identification of slaves, 447–48; fig. 9.8 child slaves, 228, 232, 234, 237, 240–41, 250, 256 macrons (manquerons), 226, 228, 232–35, 240–42, 248–50, 252, 256, 279 trade slaves, 227, 229–30 pieza de India, 226, 228, 232–33, 235–36, 240–42, 249–52, 256 illnesses among slaves, 233–37, 239, 249, 255 marketing of slaves, 127, 162, 164, 167, 184, 193, 204, 228, 233, 240–43, 246, 248–52, 255, 279, 307, 335, 340, 352 Middle Passage, 133, 220, 234–35, 255 mortality rates, 133, 160, 164, 220, 228–36, 239, 322, 448–49 origins of slaves, 134–36, 193, 220–21, 224, 229, 234, 239, 249, 447–48 slave rebellions, 236–37, 429 treatment of slaves, 226, 230, 232–33, 235–36, 241–42, 255–56; fig. 5.4 slave trade at Curaçao feeding of slaves, 222, 225–27, 230, 233, 236–39, 242, 248, 252, 255–56, 292–94 marketing of slaves, 204, 233, 240–43, 246, 248, 251; figs. 9.1, 9.3 small maize (sorghum), 222, 230, 237–38, 248, 251, 256, 465 Smeer, Frans, 359 Smidt, Jan and Company, 67n smuggling. See illegal trade
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Snellincx, Cornelis, 64 Snouck Hurgronje and Abraham Louissen Co., 334, 340, 458 Sociëteit ter Navigatie op Essequebo, 344, 348, 415, 431; fig. 12.2 Sociëteit der Zaagmolens, 431 Sociëteit van Berbice (Berbice Corporation), 105, 395, 423, 429–30, 434 Sociëteit van Commercie en Navigatie der Burgerij, 430 Sociëteit van Suriname (Suriname Corporation), 105, 291, 298, 300, 320, 393–96, 427–29, 434 Sommelsdijck, Cornelis van Aerssen van, 105, 281, 291, 300, 428 sorghum. See small maize South Africa, 9n, 387 South Atlantic, 79, 86 Spain government of, 23, 27, 60–62, 72, 167, 211, 223, 261–62, 466 and Atlantic slave trade (see also asiento), 205–06, 219–24, 245–46, 250, 256, 410–11, 426 Dutch conflict with (see also Eighty Year War), 19, 27, 45n, 62, 79, 85–86, 213, 400 Dutch trade with, 96, 122 embargoes of, 29, 63, 73–74, 366–68 empire of, 62, 97, 389 fleets of, 29, 31, 205, 218 privateers of, 209–10, 355 Spanish America Curaçao’s trade with, 160, 203–04, 211, 223–24, 230, 244–45, 278–79, 394, 409–10, 414, 430, 435 Dutch attacks on, 91–93, 97, 355, 408 Dutch trade with, 23, 27, 29, 203–06, 215, 218, 273, 299, 354, 372–76, 378, 402–03, 436, 439–40 slave trade with (see also asiento), 13, 96, 117, 122, 236, 245, 250, 255–56, 279, 426 Spanish Netherlands, 20, 269 spices, 26, 38, 90, 156–57, 203n, 212, 352, 435, 438 Spiegel, Laurens Pieter van de (1737–1800), advocate of Holland, 110, 313, 466, 453–57
521
Spieringh, Aart, 67n Spoors, Adriaan, 353 Spoors, Marinus, 338 St. Anna Bay, 221–22, 231; figs. 8.1, 9.2 St. Christopher, 28, 337, 358, 370, 374 St. Croix, 28, 353 St. Domingue, 28, 214, 412, 417 St. Eustatius (Statia), 28, 395n, 411n, 459; fig. 13.3 and American War of Independence, xix–xx, 213, 382, 385, 394, 413 captured by Britain, 357, 382, 401, 413, 432 as the Golden Rock, 386, 401, 411, 413, 435, 443 and the Dutch slave trade, 134, 160–61, 167, 308 as trade entrepôt, 5–6, 106–07, 203, 207n, 299, 320, 353, 357–58, 375–79, 390, 399, 400, 408–14, 435, 440–41 trade with Spanish America, 299, 394, 411–12 St. Kitts, 374, 412 St. Lucar, 31n St. Lucia, 28, 210 St. Marta, 213–14 St. Martin, 106, 299, 358, 404, 410–11, 438 St. Mary’s, 274 St. Vincent, 28, 358 Stad en Lande (see also Groningen), 81–83, 99, 208n, 396, 466 Stampers Island, 329–30 Stapels, Gelein van, 30n, 35 Stassaert, Joan, 67n States General (see also Dutch Republic, government of ), 35n, 44, 81, 84, 210, 432, 466 and Dutch colonies, 6, 42, 87, 110–11, 327, 341, 346, 367, 376, 394–96, 398 petitions to, 32, 40, 74, 340, 376, 429 resolutions of, 32, 44, 49, 85, 109, 162, 340 Van Wijn Committee, 110, 345, 442 and West India Company, 44, 100, 77, 79–83, 97–98, 100–02, 125, 141, 264, 334, 343, 393n, 427–28, 434
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States of Holland, 39, 40n, 78–80, 97, 99, 140–41, 345, 421, 429, 434n, 466 States of Zeeland, 40n, 78, 101, 141, 162, 289, 325, 396, 422, 427, 466 Statia. See St. Eustatius Stedman, John Gabriel (1744–1797), figs. 5.1, 5.4 Stipriaan, Alex van, 7, 288n, 316n, 317, 355n stock market crisis (Amsterdam), 111, 324, 415, 432 Stols, Eddy, 64–65 Storm van ’s Gravesande, Laurens, 327–28, 332, 339, 343, 353 Straten, Jan van der, 67n Studia Rosenthaliana, 70 Stuyvesant, Pieter, 95, 272n, 279 sugar, 1, 49, 50n, 54, 189, 198, 429, 435–36, 438–44, 464 from Atlantic islands, 23, 38, 77, 91, 141, 159 from Brazil, 21, 24–26, 44, 49–51, 54–59, 62–63, 69–75, 86–89, 93, 158, 175, 188–89, 367–70, 382, 464 from Caribbean islands, 167, 205, 214–16, 222, 376–78, 382, 392, 417 from Guiana region, 96, 112, 143 from Berbice, Essequibo, and Demerara, 324–25, 333, 339n, 348–52, 356, 358–59, 365; fig. 12.3 from Suriname, 109, 280, 289–92, 301, 309, 312–19, 321, 409, 464, 453–57 from Spanish America, 105, 203n from United States, 418 sugar mills, 54, 89, 339, 354–55; figs. 3.1, 11.2, 11.3, 13.1 sugar plantations, 5, 143, 292, 301, 324–25, 365n, 431 sugar refineries, 6, 54n, 89n, 112 Sumatra, 6 Suriname, xx, 5, 32–33, 96, 217, 287–322, 365, 462 bilateral shipping to, 124, 132, 135, 287, 290, 295, 298–300, 308–11, 387n, 400, 406, 410, 413 British control of, 96, 289–90, 292, 300 Dutch acquisition of, 96, 389, 396, 398
economic benefits, 288, 290, 444n exports, 169, 311–22, 328, 336, 355n, 361, 375, 381, 378–79, 417, 441–43, 453–57; fig. 11.1 food supplies to, 300, 304, 318–20, 326, 352, 354 government of (see also Sociëteit van Suriname), 295, 297 horse imports. See horse trade investments (see also mortgages), 109n, 396, 427 passenger traffic to, 318–20 plantations, 289, 290, 292, 420 population of, 290, 292 slave trade to, 102, 125, 134–35, 143, 151, 160–62, 164, 305–08, 426, 458 Zeeland administration of, 96, 289–90, 394 Suriname Corporation. See Sociëteit van Suriname Swaenendael, 430n Sweden, 172, 314, 392, 426 Sweerts, Barend, 67n Swieten, Thomas van, 67n Syvertsz., Jan, 63 tea, 380 Tenerife, 17, 56 Terceira, 56, 365, 369n Texel, 106, 209n Teudels, Hans, fig. 12.1 textiles, 39, 52, 54, 151–54, 196, 203n, 212–13, 291, 370–72, 376, 434–35, 465 African, 152, 154 Asian, 139–40, 152–53, 188, 211–13, 261, 278 German, 153, 211, 213n, 278, 352 Dutch, 71, 153, 213–14, 278, 380n Thibaut, Hendrick, 67n Thirty Year War (1618–1648), 267 Tholen, 82 Thomson, George, 278 timber. See lumber Timmerman, Jurgen, 67n tobacco, 26, 29–30, 44, 205n, 260n, 266, 274–75, 317, 325, 416, 438–39, 444 from Brazil, 50, 464 from Chesapeake, 273, 280, 370 from Maryland, 274–76, 281, 370 from North America, 36, 259, 278, 280, 418, 435
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third grade (socas or sweetened), 54, 139, 156, 158, 174–76, 179–80, 183, 188–89, 191–94, 196, 198 from Spanish America, 203n, 214, 218, 373 from Virginia, 36, 44, 259, 370 Tobago (Nieuw Walcheren), 28, 30n, 35, 210, 358, 393, 399, 402, 404, 430 Toledo y Osorio, Don Fadrique de, 87 Tonissen, Hendrick, 67n tools, 145, 213n, 278, 293, 319, 435 Torarica, 289 Torres, Joseph de, 182–83, 195 trading companies (see also MCC; VOC; WIC; Guinea Company; New Netherland Company; Noordsche Compagnie), 34–35, 43, 77, 79–80, 112, 140, 143 shared-ventures ( partenrederij ), 71, 423–25 trading patterns big circuit ( grote vaart), 299 bilateral shipping (see also under Africa; Essequibo; Suriname), 171, 203, 325, 327, 439 bulk trade (moedernegotie), 72, 74 inter-colonial trade, 272–75, 280, 283 intra-Caribbean trade. See Caribbean region merchant networks, 11, 23, 51, 56, 62, 64–68, 71, 73, 141, 205, 259–60, 265, 267, 269, 274, 277, 282, 297, 333, 369, 374, 411, 416 shipping links, 2, 31–32, 54–55, 72, 152, 171, 288, 293, 299–300 triangular trades, 53, 103, 112, 127–28, 143, 150–51, 207–09, 238, 300, 305, 308–09 trans-Caribbean traffic, 212, 299 small circuit (kleine vaart), 299, 390, 410 trading practices barter, 27, 30, 140, 152–54, 159, 161, 166 coasting trade, 143–45, 234, 140, 144 fixed pricing, 176, 24, 240–41, 243 trading permits, 126–27, 180, 185, 191, 244, 290, 340, 344, 405 fixed-location trade, 19, 127, 144, 186, 410 trinket trade, 155, 352
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Tordesillas (Treaty of ) (1491), 222, 261 Trinidad, 28, 31–32, 358 Trip, Elias, 77 Tripoli, 276 tropical commodities, 83, 109, 292, 296, 300, 308, 314–16, 321–22, 338, 350, 354, 408; figs. 4.3, 12.3 Tulleken, Ambrosius, 323, 361 Tunis, 276 Twelve Year Truce (1609–1621). See under peace settlements Tymens, Elsie, 270–71 Unger, W. S., 117–18, 173 Union of Utrecht (1579), 465n United Kingdom. See Britain United Provinces. See Dutch Republic United States (see also North America), 118, 133 currency, 462–63 Dutch investments in, 395, 432–33 slave trade to Suriname, 132–33, 307 trade with the Guianas, 283, 315, 333 trade with the Netherlands, 133, 314–15, 348, 386, 407, 409–10, 417–18 Usselincx, Willem (1567–1647), 74, 78–80; fig. 4.1 Utrecht, 6–7, 20, 81, 210n, 268 Van der Oest Data collection, 473 Veen, Cornelis Albertsen van der, 274, 277 Veen, P. van der, 301 Veen, Pieter Cornelissen van der, 270–71 Veen, Timothy van der, 277, 451 Veen, Waleyn van der, 273 Veenhuysen, Jan, 469 Veere, 11n, 22, 82, 325, 341, 461 Vega, Manuel Rodrigues, 66 Velaer, Abraham de, 67 Velde Jr., Willem van de, 471 Velt, Jan Cornelisz., 367n, 368n Venezuela, 77, 203n, 206, 211n, 214–15, 218, 332, 366, 414, 417 Venice, 66, 81 Veracruz, 161, 373n, 376 Verger, Pierre, 173 Veron, Andries, 89 Viana do Castello, 52, 56, 367–68 Viceroy, Count of Areos, 196
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Viegas, Antonio Martins, 72 Vigo, 26n Vila do Conde, 56 Vingboons, Johannes, 471 Virginia (see also tobacco), 30, 36, 117, 262, 272, 274, 374, 379, 398, 403; fig. 13.2 Visscher, Claes Jansz., 469 Vitori, Jeronimo, 67n Vlagge Island, 328–31 Vlissingen. See Flushing VOC (Dutch East India Company), 1–2, 7, 9n, 10, 36, 40, 46–47, 403n, 409n, 414n, 418–22, 433, 466 compared with WIC, 78–83, 97–98, 111–12, 287, 386–87, 396–98, 415–16, 423, 433–37, 439, 443–45 financing of, 418–23 Voerknecht, Salomon, 67n Voet, Hendrick, 67n Voorhees, David, 271, 277 Voort, J. P. van de, 288n Vries, Jan de, 47, 381, 386, 443–44 Vrijman, L. C., 118, 248 waag; waaggeld. See weighing fees Walbeek, Johannes van, 96 Walcheren, 22, 24, 35, 39, 43, 310 wars (see also Anglo–Dutch Wars; American War of Independence) Eighty Year War (1568–1648), 19, 21, 263 Nine Year War (1688–1697), 178, 399–400 Seven Year War (1756–1763), 2n, 107, 207, 209, 346, 356, 400 Thirty Year War (1618–1648), 267 War of the Spanish Succession (1702–1713), 101, 150, 160, 162, 167, 209, 224–25, 230, 245, 255, 346, 399, 408 War of the League of Augsburg (1688–1697), 178 War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748), 346, 381, 408n War of Jenkins’ Ear (1739–1742), 210, 215 warships, 40, 93, 210, 373n, 398, 400 Warwijck, Wijbrant, 67n Wassenaer, Nicolaes à, 36 waterschout (harbor police), 298, 310n Wätjen, H., 10n, 49n, 89
weighing fees (waaggeld ) 291, 298, 317, 352, 444 weighing house (waag), 237, 444 Welling, George M., 298n, 406, 459 Welling Data Collection, 473 Wesselman, Daniel Cornelis, 423n West Africa (see also Guinea Coast; Africa) Dutch trading stations in, 40, 42–43, 91, 103 Westchester, N.Y., 451 West Frisian ports, 77, 81, 404 West India (see also Caribbean region; Guiana region) colonies, 4, 29, 110, 125, 127, 303, 307, 399, 410–11, 439 commerce, 10n, 30, 132, 345, 353, 357–58, 415–17, 438, 441–42, 463 interests, 6, 9, 294, 393–98 investments, 425, 434 planters, 112, 413 products, 29, 253, 409, 417, 438–39, 444 shipping, 305, 404, 408, 423, 440–41, 459 studies, 9, 11 West India Company. See WIC West India Planters and Merchant Committee, 413 West-Indisch Huys, 294; fig. 4.2 West Indiamen (West-Indiëvaarders), 404, 423 Weuijster, J., 471 whaling, 11 Wharton, Richard, 279, 282 Wiapoco River, 33–34 WIC (Dutch West India Company), 2, 8n, 77–112, 391n bewindhebbers (WIC directors), 82, 98, 100, 110, 174–76, 184, 220, 325, 332, 339, 349, 353–56, 359, 396, 419 chambers (subdivisions), 24 Amsterdam, 81–86, 94–96, 99–100, 105, 110, 225, 291, 404, 422n, 426, 458 Maze, 81–82, 84, 99, 333 Noorderkwartier, 81–82, 84, 99, 149, 397n Stad en Lande, 81–84, 99, 208, 396, 466 Zeeland, 35, 43–44, 81–84, 99–100, 106, 110, 125–26, 141,
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298, 325, 331, 343–44, 352, 361, 396n, 404–05, 419, 427, 458 charters, 79–80, 84–85, 94–95, 97–98, 100–03, 110, 125, 127, 162, 264, 326, 337, 391 colonies and trading spheres Africa, 13, 89–91, 101, 104, 128, 140–69, 171–199, 406 Brazil, 49–51, 74–75, 87–88, 91, 172 Caribbean islands, 96, 104–35, 203–34, 376, 406–11 Guyana settlements, 35, 94–96, 103–05, 135, 323–61, 397, 401, 404, 406, 429 New Netherlands, xix, 38, 94–95, 279–80 Suriname, 96, 102–03, 105, 109–10, 143, 287–321, 406, 428 decline and dissolution of, 101–03, 107–112, 125–26, 392–94, 399 directors. See bewinhebbers finances of, 39, 80, 82, 92, 98–100, 111, 142, 396–97, 415, 422–23, 425–34 First, 2, 8n, 12, 36, 43–44, 49–51, 74–75, 77–100, 111–12, 123–24, 264, 369, 374, 391–92, 396–98, 404, 422–23, 425–27 monopoly and expansion of, 85–97, 125–26, 174–82, 291, 325–26, 391–92, 410 organization and governance of, 12, 36, 43–44, 74, 78–80 privateering of, 85, 91–96, 369, 398, 405 Second, 97–100, 120, 141–42, 375, 393, 396, 398, 405, 426 and slave trade, 102, 121–28, 130, 132–37, 150–51, 160–64, 193–96, 205, 219–34, 246–47, 256, 305–09, 369, 426; figs. 5.2, 5.3 VOC compared with, 2, 79, 83, 386, 397–98, 402, 415, 422, 434 Wijn, van, Committee, 110, 341n, 345, 442
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Wild Coast (see also Guiana region), 31–32, 34–35, 44, 70, 86, 94, 96, 106, 323, 325, 333, 359, 393, 401 Wildt, J. de, 203 Willekens, Jacob, fig. 3.2 William of Nassau (1772–1843), king of the Netherlands, 409, 467 William of Nassau (1650–1702), prince of Orange, stadholder of Holland and Zeeland, king of England, 260–61, 268, 467 William of Nassau (1711–1751), prince of Orange, stadholder of Holland and Zeeland, 466–67 William of Nassau (1748–1806), prince of Orange, stadholder and opperbewindhebber, 343–44, 421, 466–67 Willem Gideon Deutz. Co., 432 Willemse, Reinier, 280 Willemstad, xx, 204–06, 222, 230–31, 246–47, 249–50, 410–11; figs. 8.1, 9.2 Winter, P. J. van, 253 Wissenbach, Susanne Adelheid, 267 Witt, Johannes de, 273 Woortman, Pieter, 191–92 Woude, Ad Van der, 47, 381, 386, 443–44 Wright, I. A., 117 Wulphert, Jacob, 338 Xingu River, 25, 32–33 Zacuto, Henrico, 67 Zeeland, 21, 52, 207, 462, 466; fig. 12.3 Admiralty of, 34 chamber of the WIC. See WIC, chambers interlopers, 101, 147–48, 169 merchants, 21, 27, 338 privateers, 101, 405 privileges, 345n, 360–62 Zeeuws Archief (ZA), 461 Zierikzee, 18n Zuiderzee, 20, 22, 309–10, 473 Zuylen, Filips van, 8
