Energy in Brazil
Energy in Brazil Towards a Renewable Energy Dominated System
Antonio Dias Leite
London • Sterling, VA
First published by Earthscan in the UK and USA in 2009 Copyright © Antonio Dias Leite, 2009 All rights reserved ISBN: 978-1-84407-847-9 Typeset by 4word Ltd, Bristol, UK Cover design by Susanne Harris For a full list of publications, please contact: Earthscan Dunstan House 14a St Cross St London EC1N 8XA, UK Tel: +44 (0)20 7841 1930 Fax: +44 (0)20 7242 1474 Email:
[email protected] Web: www.earthscan.co.uk 22883 Quicksilver Drive, Sterling, VA 20166-2012, USA Earthscan publishes in association with the International Institute for Environment and Development A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Leite, Antonio Dias. [Energia do Brasil. English] Energy in Brasil : towards a renewable energy dominated system / Antonio Dias Leite. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-84407-847-9 (hardback) 1. Power resources--Brazil. 2. Energy policy--Brazil. I. Title. HD9502.B7213L437 2009 333.79'40981--dc22 2009016848 At Earthscan we strive to minimize our environmental impacts and carbon footprint through reducing waste, recycling and offsetting our CO2 emissions, including those created through publication of this book. For more details of our environmental policy, see www.earthscan.co.uk
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Contents
List of Figures and Tables Acknowledgements Foreword Preface List of Acronyms and Abbreviations
vii ix xi xiii xvii
Chapter 1
Historical Overview of the 20th Century
1
Chapter 2
Energy and Economic Growth: A Statistical Abstract
29
Chapter 3
Hydroelectric Power
43
Chapter 4
Fossil Fuels
77
Chapter 5
The Nuclear Issue
107
Chapter 6
The Role of Biomass and Land Use in Brazil
123
Chapter 7 New Energy, Small Hydro and Biomass-Fired Thermal Plants
159
Chapter 8
Energy Efficiency and Environment
171
Chapter 9
Brazil’s Energy Prospects within the World Context
201
Looking Forward
221
Appendix 1 Brazil in Maps Appendix 2 List of Main Sources of Information in Brazil Appendix 3 Brazilian Exchange Rate 1995–2007 Index
227 235 239 241
List of Figures and Tables
Figures 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 3.1 3.2 3.3 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 5.1 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 6.10 6.11 9.1
Per-capita economic growth, 1902–2007 Current foreign transactions Foreign debt GDP and total primary energy supply (TPES) Total primary renewable energy supply in Brazil Total primary non-renewable energy supply in Brazil Primary energy supply – renewable and non-renewable Hydro and thermal generation capacity Results from auctions of transmission lines since 1999 Price of electric power for the initial years of contracts Investments in exploration and new discoveries of oil fields Value of imports and exports of crude oil and oil products Results from auction rounds for oil exploration Deep-water wells Proven reserves of natural gas in Brazil Natural gas balance Regional distribution of natural gas sales Natural gas sales by consumer Natural gas prices at city gates Capacity factor of Angra I and Angra II power plants Automobile sales: domestic market share by type of fuel Production of ethanol Sugar cane yield in Brazil Charcoal consumption according to its origin Average productivity of forest plantations Results from auctions for the purchase of bio-diesel Land utilization in Brazil, 1970–2006 Grains – production, area and productivity Exports from agriculture – value, quantity and price Sugar cane and soybeans – regional distribution of planted areas Deforested area of the Amazon region Ratio between energy per capita and GDP per capita, 1965–2000
30 35 36 37 39 39 40 50 69 72 78 81 85 87 90 94 95 95 101 112 126 127 128 134 137 142 146 148 148 150 154 204
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9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5
World total primary energy consumption Projection of carbon dioxide emissions Final energy consumption by source Probable flow of liquid fuels in 2011
207 209 213 218
Tables 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 7.1 7.2 8.1 8.2 8.3 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.6 9.7 9.8
Economic growth and inflation, 1948–2007 Total primary energy supply in Brazil by source Total primary energy supply and CO2 emissions Total energy consumption in Brazil by sector Dependence on energy imports by source Privatization of the electricity system Results from auctions of rights to potential hydroelectric sites Results from auctions of transmission lines – first phase Results from auctions of transmission lines – second phase Taxes and other charges added to the electric power price Generating capacity expansion Direct foreign investments in exploration and production of oil Proven reserves and production of oil Dependence on oil imports PETROBRAS concessions Foreign oil companies in activity in the Campos Basin Charges on fuel prices in 2004 Primary energy supply from sugar cane Input and output of energy in the sugar agribusiness Breakdown of energy content in sugar cane Primary energy supply – wood and charcoal Bio-diesel plants authorized by ANP up to January 2008 Harvested area of major crops in 2006 Status of PROINFA projects in February 2008 Comparative expenditures for water heating Results from PROCEL initiatives Household consumption of electricity Number of vehicles and fuel consumption, 1995–2007 Total primary energy, population and GDP World population, GDP and primary energy growth rates Growth forecasts of worldwide energy consumption Economic forecasts for Brazil, 2006–16 Electricity forecasts for Brazil Forecasts for electricity-generation capacity Power plants construction schedule Production forecasts for oil and natural gas
30 36 38 41 41 55 60 60 68 75 75 79 79 80 84 88 100 127 130 131 134 143 147 165 167 190 190 195 202 203 207 212 214 214 215 217
Acknowledgements
This book, in the English language, would not have been completed without the assistance and friendly advice of many people to whom I would like to express my gratitude. I begin by thanking, for their criticism and advice, the professors from the energy group of the Institute of Economy at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), where I worked for 40 years: Adilson de Oliveira, Helder Queiroz Pinto Jr and Edmar Fagundes Almeida; and also Carlos Eduardo Frickman Young for his advice on the environment. I am also grateful for assistance and support from Marcos J. Marques, Jayme Buarque de Holanda and Pietro Erber from the National Institute of Energy Efficiency (INEE). I am grateful for the advice that I received from Jerson Kelman and Gilma dos Passos Rocha from the National Electric Energy Agency (ANEEL), Luiz Augusto Lattari Barreto from the National Systems Operator (ONS), Rubens Cristiano Garlipp from the Brazilian Forestry Society (SBS), James Bolivar Luna de Azevedo from the National Energy Research Company (EPE), Nelson Fontes Siffert from the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), Felipe A. Dias from the Brazilian Petroleum Institute (IBP), Jose Domingos Migues from MCT, Leo Hime and Nelson Silveira from Brazil Eco-Diesel, and Henrique Saraiva from Usina Verde, all of whom offered pertinent suggestions. Regarding the nuclear issue, I received valuable support from Witold Lepecki (retired), Adriano Maciel Tavares and Mozart Camara de Miranda Filho from Brazilian Nuclear Industries (INB), and Leonam dos Santos Guimarães from ELETRONUCLEAR. The maps were kindly organized by Edna Campello and Helena K. Ito from the National Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), Lilian Cordeiro de Mello and Leila Lobo de Mendonça from Centro da Memória da Eletricidade, and Haroldo de Moraes Ramos from PETROBRAS. I thank Aglen McLauchlan and Noreen Vanderput for their patience and a careful translation into English, as well as Cynthia Azevedo for her editing of the final text. A very special reference must be made to Hugh McManus (a Brazilian Scotsman), who patiently read the book from the first to the very last page and offered invaluable suggestions on the book’s coherence.
x Energy in Brazil
I must also thank Stephan Albrecshkirchinger from the World Energy Council and Norberto Medeiros from its Brazilian Committee for giving me the incentive to prepare this book, as well as Stephanie Flinth for her assistance. I must register, at this point, the decisive role of my daughter Maria Cristina, who always believed and insisted on the usefulness of this adventure in English. I must also express my gratitude to the rest of my family, especially to my wife Manira, for their moral support. I must thank my grandson, Antonio Fernando, an economist, who helped with statistics and graphs; and my granddaughters: Maria, a lawyer, who assisted in putting the book together; and Paula, a photographer residing in England, who gave decisive local support regarding the book format and editing, and her husband Pablo Ghetti, a law professor, for advice on legal concepts.
Foreword
Christoph Frei, Secretary General, World Energy Council Energy in Brazil: Towards a Renewable Energy-Dominated System, with its timely examination of Brazil’s renewable energy experience represents a valuable contribution to one of WEC’s core aims: to promote the sustainable supply and use of energy for the greatest benefit of all. In the spirit of WEC’s three sustainability goals to meet global energy demand – accessible, available and acceptable energy for all – the book offers the reader an outstanding case study on developing a sustainable energy mix in which renewable energy has a meaningful role. Antonio Dias Leite draws from his experience as Brazil’s former Minister of Mines and Energy in which role he was ultimately responsible for the development of sustainable energy production in Brazil. With his insights and practical experience, Energy in Brazil is a testimonial from one of the visionaries that made Brazil what it is today – one of the world’s most environmentally conscious energy producers. Brazil’s energy mix differs considerably from the rest of the world, including 46 per cent from renewable sources, with hydroelectric power overwhelmingly predominant. As a world first, in 2008 ethanol overtook gasoline as Brazil’s most used motor fuel. Facing an exciting and challenging energy future, where awareness and understanding of energy supply and the impact of climate change has never been greater, I highly recommend the book to decision- and policy makers in the energy business. The world needs exemplary cases and this book represents an excellent national case study for the development and implementation of a sustainable and diverse energy mix. The Brazilian energy success story, together with others around the world, must be the foundation for building a sustainable energy future for all. WEC is the world’s foremost multi-energy organization, with Member Committees in nearly 100 countries, including the world’s largest energy producers, and consumers covering all types of energy.
Preface
At the time of the publication of the second edition of my book A energia do Brasil,1 I began to consider the idea of an English version in a compact and readable format. It took me a year to complete the task. My objective is to focus on the original aspects of the Brazilian renewable energy experiences and on the complex relationship with both sustainable economic development and environment. This last issue is attracting attention from informed populations around the world. Compatible solutions take different forms in each nation depending on their territory, size and stage of development. They are extremely difficult in the poorest countries. The World Energy Council2 identifies three main aspects of the energy challenge to be analysed: accessibility, availability and acceptability, all of which gained importance after the Industrial Revolution and the entry of coal and subsequently of oil into our lives. At the present time, the main global concern with accessibility derives from the existence of some 1.6 billion people who are entirely dependent on highly inefficient traditional forms of energy. The access to affordable modern energy services is an inseparable part of acceptable economic and social development. The concern with availability was marked by the reports issued by the Club of Rome in the middle of the 20th century that pointed to a possible exhaustion of several natural resources, fossil fuels among them. The drastic conclusions were later moderated. The prospects are, however, being revived, especially regarding oil reserves that might have already reached a maximum. Many nations became dependent on fuel imports, a situation of such important economic and political consequences that in certain instances the quest for control over reserves gave way to military actions. The issue of acceptability of the ever-growing worldwide use of energy and of its corresponding aggression against the environment is continuously gaining force. The Rio-92 Conference3 became a landmark in the discussions on this subject due to its amplitude and global participation. Government goals and the society’s acceptance of proposed changes became relevant political issues. The concept of ‘sustainable development’ dates from that time. The geographical accident of the
xiv Energy in Brazil
choice of the city of Rio de Janeiro for this historical meeting made Brazilians feel like important interested parties. My initiative publishing the present book fits into this scenario. The concept of sustainability brought profound consequences to the decision process regarding new business ventures, especially to those related to energy production and use. Since then feasibility studies have to incorporate rigorous appraisal of damage to the environment, as well as social inconveniences to the population directly affected by the project. In a few countries, like Brazil, one must also consider the possible effects of any new project on the way of life of scattered groups of native Indian inhabitants. The industrialized countries only recently began to concentrate their technological capability on development of alternative sources such as wind and direct solar, as well as on increased efficiency in the use of energy. In most underdeveloped countries no significant efforts have been made in these directions. Due to the interrelation of all these aspects, the choice of new human projects to serve a defined purpose, including its time schedule and horizon, became a difficult task, for both entrepreneurs and licensing agencies. It is impossible to define precise quantitative criteria to compare alternative solutions to a certain need. Sometimes emotional, ideological or even political aspects dominate. Another consequence of the sustainable development concept is the classification of energy sources into the two groups, of renewable energy and non-renewable energy, which became part of everyday language and dominate the media and political discussions. To us in Brazil, the frequent exclusion of major hydroelectric power as a renewable source of energy in many international forums seems politically relevant. It is conceivable that in the industrialized world, which has already developed almost all of these natural resources, they represent an insignificant part of future domestic energy supply. However, on the basis of climate change studies, this question of developing all possible renewable forms of energy must be discussed on a worldwide basis, independently from its geographic location. There exists a large hydroelectric power potential to be harnessed in underdeveloped countries. And this may be accomplished at much less cost to the environment than some critical projects of the past. It also seems relevant to us in Brazil that ethanol production based on sugar cane has been mistakenly included as an example of diverting agricultural production capacity from foodstuffs to energy, which is not true in the Brazilian case since we are expanding both.
Preface
xv
In another scenario, public attention was recently attracted by the results of systematic studies that have been carried by scientists on climate change linked to greenhouse gas emissions produced in the combustion of fossil fuels. These studies provoked controversies within forums of scientists and businessmen, and entered the political scene, both local and international. In all these discussions a critical and difficult question is the quantitative estimate of the identifiable human causes of climate change. The dominant position is that, whatever the proportion, it is imperative that action be taken against further human contributions to climate change. In this worldwide context it seems to me that the present review of the Brazilian experience in renewable energies may be a useful case study, not only for developing countries but also for all those interested in the global energy and environment scene. Newcomers to renewable energy may profit from the analysis of our successful initiatives and innovations, as well as from our errors and failures. As an outcome of this history, Brazil now occupies an outstanding position in the world regarding the proportion of renewable energy in its energy matrix. This situation derives from the dominant use of hydroelectric power in electricity generation and of sugar cane ethanol in transportation. *** The book has nine chapters. The first two are dedicated to introducing Brazil as a country, through a historical overview and a statistical abstract covering recent trends in the economy and the energy sector. They are complemented by an appendix containing a collection of eight maps specially designed to help readers with geographic references in the text. Chapters 3–7 take care of each of the main primary energy sectors: hydro, fossil fuels, nuclear, biomass and new modern forms of energy. In Chapter 8 there is a description of the environment question in Brazil and its relationship with energy efficiency, and Chapter 9 presents the Brazilian energy scene within the world context. There are a few closing pages entitled ‘Looking Forward’. As this book is addressed to non-Brazilian readers, the Appendices include a list of main sources of information in Brazil. A table, ‘Brazilian exchange rates’, was also included in the Appendices to facilitate conversion to US$ values expressed in the Brazilian currency, real (R$). Antonio Dias Leite Rio de Janeiro, August 2008
Notes 1 A reference book (2007) covering one century of energy history in Brazil, Editora Campus-Elsevier, Rio de Janerio 2 World Energy Council (2000) Energy for Tomorrow’s World – Acting Now 3 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations
ABACC
ABIOVE
ABRAF AMFORP AMS ANA ANDE ANEC
ANEEL ANFAVEA
ANP BACEN BBPP
BEN BIG-GT
Agência Brasileira – Argentina de Controle e Contabilidade – Brazil–Argentina Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials Agency Associação Brasileira das Indústrias de Óleos Vegetais – Brazilian Association of Vegetal Oil Industries Associação Brasileira de Florestas Plantadas – Brazilian Association of Planted Forests American and Foreign Power Company Associação Mineira de Silvicultura – Minas Gerais Forestry Association Agência Nacional de Águas – National Water Resources Agency (a regulatory agency) Administración Nacional de Electricidad Associação Nacional dos Exportadores de Cereais – National Association of Grain Exporters Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica – National Electric Power Agency (a regulatory agency) Associação Nacional dos Fabricantes de Veículos Automotores – National Association of Vehicle Manufacturers Agência Nacional do Petróleo – National Petroleum Agency (a regulatory agency) Banco Central do Brasil – Central Bank of Brazil Holdings Ltd. International consortium comprised of British Gas Americas Inc., El Paso Energy and Broken Hill Proprietary Company [BHP] ‘Balanço Energético Nacional’ – ‘National Energy Balance’ Biomass Integrated Gasifier–Gas Turbine
xviii
Energy in Brazil
BNDES
BTU CANAMBRA
CAR CBTN
CCC CCEE CCOI
CDE CDM CDTN
CEA CEG CEMIG CENPES
CEPEL
CESP CGCE CGEE CGTEE
Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social – Brazilian Development Bank (government-owned) British thermal unit Consórcio Canadense-Americano-Brasileiro – A consortium of engineering firms organized for energy studies 1962–66 Curva de Aversão ao Risco – Risk aversion curve Companhia Brasileira de Tecnologia Nuclear – Brazilian Nuclear Technology Company (extinct, superseded by INB) Conta de Consumo de Combustíveis – Fuel Consumption Account Câmara de Comercialização de Energia Elétrica – Chamber of Electrical Energy Commercialization Comitê de Coordenação da Operação Interligada – Coordinating Committee for Grid Operations (extinct) Conta de Desenvolvimento Energético – Energy Development Fund Clean Development Mechanism Centro de Desenvolvimento de Tecnologia Nuclear – Centre for Development of Nuclear Technology Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique Companhia Estadual de Gás (RJ) – State Gas Company Companhia Energética de Minas Gerais (utility) Centro de Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento – Research and Development Center (belongs to PETROBRAS) Centro de Pesquisa de Energia Elétrica – Electric Power Research Center (belongs to ELETROBRÁS) Centrais Elétricas de São Paulo (utility) Câmara de Gestão da Crise de Energia – Energy Crisis Managing Committee Centro de Gestão e Estudos Estratégicos – Centre for Strategic Studies and Management Companhia de Geração Térmica de Energia Elétrica – Thermal Electricity Generation Company
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations xix CHESF CMSE
CNAEE
CNE CNEN
CNP
CNPE
COGEN
COMGAS CONAB CONAMA
CONPET
CONSIPAM
COPEL COPPE
CPFL
Companhia Hidroelétrica do São Francisco (utility) Controle de Monitoramento do Setor Elétrico – Monitoring Committee for the Electric Sector Conselho Nacional de Águas e Energia Elétrica – National Water and Electric Power Council (extinct) Conselho Nacional de Economia – National Economic Council Comissão Nacional de Energia Nuclear – National Nuclear Energy Commission (a coordinating body) Conselho Nacional do Petróleo – National Petroleum Council (extinct, superseded by ANP) Conselho Nacional de Política Energética – National Energy Policy Council (a coordinating body) Associação Paulista de Co-Geração de Energia – São Paulo Association for Co-Generation of Energy Companhia de Gás de São Paulo – São Paulo Gás Company Companhia Nacional de Abastecimento – National Supply Company Conselho Nacional do Meio Ambiente – National Council on Environment (a coordinating and regulatory agency) Programa Nacional de Racionalização do Uso de Derivados de Petróleo e Gás – National Programme for the Rationalization of the Use of Oil and Gas Products Conselho Deliberativo do Sistema de Proteção da Amazônia – Deliberative Council of the Amazonian Protection System Companhia Paranaense de Energia (utility) Instituto Alberto Luiz Coimbra de PósGraduação e Pesquisa de Engenharia – Alberto Luiz Coimbra Institute – Graduate School and Research in Engineering Companhia Paulista de Força e Luz (utility)
xx
Energy in Brazil
CTC CTM CTMSP
DETER E&P EDF EIA EIA/RIMA ELETROBRÁS
ELETRONUCLEAR EMBRAPA EMTU EPE ESCELSA ESCOS
FGV FOB FUNCEX GCOI
GCPS
GDP GEF
Centro de Tecnologia Canavieira – Sugar Cane Technology Centre Centro de Tecnologia da Marinha – Naval Technology Centre Centro de Tecnologia da Marinha em São Paulo – Naval Technology Centre in São Paulo (nuclear research) Deforestation in real time Exploration and production Electricité de France (utility) Energy Information Administration Estudo e Relatório de Impacto Ambiental – Environment Impact Study and Report Centrais Elétricas Brasileiras S.A. – Brazilian Electricity Company (a holding company under state control) Eletrobrás Termonuclear (operator of nuclear plants) Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agrícola – Brazilian Agricultural Research Company Companhia Municipal de Transporte Urbano (SP) – Municipal Urban Transport Company Empresa de Pesquisa Energética – Energy Research Company (belongs to the MME) Espírito Santo Centrais Elétricas (utility) Empresas de Serviços de Conservação de Energia – Energy Conservation Services Companies Fundação Getulio Vargas – Getulio Vargas Foundation (high-level education and research) Free on Board Fundação Centro de Estudos do Comércio Exterior – Foundation for Foreign Trade Studies Grupo Coordenador da Operação Interligada – Grid Coordinating Group (extinct, superseded by ONS) Grupo Coordenador de Planejamento do Setor Elétrico – Coordinating Group for Planning of the Electric System (extinct) Gross domestic product Global-Environment Facility
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations xxi GNC GTA GTB IAEA IBAMA
ICMS IEA IEN IGP-DI IMF INB
INEE INMETRO INPE IPCC IPEA IPEN IPI IRDB Itaipu Binacional IUCL IWRA
Gás natural comprimido – Compressed natural gas Grupo de Trabalho Amazônico – Amazon Working Group Gas TransBoliviano S.A. (Bolivian transportation company) International Atomic Energy Agency Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais. Renováveis – Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Resources (operator for the MMA) Imposto sobre a Circulação de Bens e Serviços – Commodities circulation tax International Energy Agency Instituto de Engenharia Nuclear – Nuclear Engineering Institute (research) Índice Geral de Preços – Disponibilidade Interna – General Price Index – Internal Offer International Monetary Fund Indústrias Nucleares Brasileiras S.A. – Brazilian Nuclear Industries (mining and nuclear fuel cycle) Instituto Nacional de Eficiência Energética – National Institute of Energy efficiency Instituto Nacional de Metrologia – National Metrology Institute Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais – National Institute for Spatial Research Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada – Institute for Applied Economic Research Instituto de Pesquisas Energéticas e Nucleares – Energy and Nuclear Research Institute Imposto sobre Produtos Industrializados – Tax on industrialized products International Reconstruction and Development Bank Itaipu Binational (utility jointly owned by Brazil and Paraguay) Imposto Ùnico sobre Combustíveis Líquidos – Sole tax on liquid fuels International Water Resources Association
xxii
Energy in Brazil
Light LPG Macrotempo MAE
MAPA
MCT MERCOSUR MMA MME MW MWh NGO NUCLEBRÁS
OECD ONS PCH PDVSA PETROBRAS PNF ppm ppp PROCEL
Light Serviços de Eletricidade – Light Electric Services (utility) Liquified Petroleum Gas Macrotempo Consultoria Econômica – Macrotempo Economic Consulting Mercado Atacadista de Energia Elétrica – Wholesale Energy Market (superseded by the Chamber of Electrical Energy Commercialization) Ministério da Agricultura Pecuária e Abastecimento – Ministry of Agriculture Livestock and Food Supply Ministério da Ciência e Tecnologia – Ministry of Science and Technology Common Market of the South Ministério do Meio Ambiente – Ministry of Environment Ministério de Minas e Energia – Ministry of Mining and Energy Megawatts Megawatt-hours Non-governmental organization Usinas Nucleares Brasileiras – Brazilian Nuclear Power Plants (extinct, superseded by ELETRONUCLEAR) Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Operador Nacional de Sistemas – Grid Operation Agency Pequenas Centrais Hidroelétricas – Small Hydroelectric Plants Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. Petróleo Brasileiro S.A. – Brazilian Petroleum Company (listed company under state control) Programa Nacional de Florestas – National Forestry Programme parts per million purchasing power parity Programa Nacional de Conservação de Energia – National Programme of Energy Conservation
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations xxiii PROCONVE
PRODES
PROINFA
PPT PT PWR RAP RAR RELUZ
RE-SEB REVAP REVISE
RIMA SBS SEMA SIVAM SWU TBG
TEP TNP
TOE
Programa de Controle de Emissões de Veículos – Programme to Control Air Pollution by Automotive Vehicles Projeto de Monitoramento da Floreta Amazônica por Satélite – Amazon Forest Satellite Monitoring Project Programa Nacional de Incentivo a Fontes Alternativas de Energia – National Programme of Incentives to Alternative Sources of Energy Programa Prioritário de Termoeletricidade – Priority Programme of Thermoelectricity Partido Trabalhista – Labour Party Pressurized Water Reactor Receita Anual Proposta – Annual Required Income Reasonably Assured Resources Programa Nacional de Iluminação Pública Eficiente – National Programme for Efficient Public Lighting Reestruturação do Setor Elétrico Brasileiro – Restructuring the Brazilian Electric Sector Refinaria do Vale do Paraíba (Francisco Lage) – Vale do Paraíba Refinery (Francisco lage) Revisão Institucional do Setor Elétrico – Institutional Revision of the Electric Power Sector Report of the EIA Sociedade Brasileira de Silvicultura – Brazilian Forestry Society Secretária Especial do Meio Ambiente – Special Environmental Secretariat Sistema de Vigilância da Amazônia – Amazon Vigilance System Project Separative Work Unit Transportadora Brasileira Gasoduto Bolívia– Brasil (owner of the Brazil–Bolivia gas pipeline in Brazil) Ton Petroleum Equivalent Tratado de Não-Proliferação de Armas Nucleares – Treaty for Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Tons of Oil Equivalent
xxiv Energy in Brazil
TPES TPS TUST TVA TWh UFMG UFRJ UNDP UNEP UNICA USP WEC WMO YPFB ZEE
Total Primary Energy Supply Tecniska Processor AB Tarifa de Uso do Sistema de Transmissão – Rate of Use of the Transmission System Tennessee Valley Authority Terawatt-hours Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais – Federal University of Minas Gerais Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro – Federal University of Rio de Janeiro United Nations Development Programme United Nations Environment Programme União da Indústria de Cana-de-Açúcar – Sugar Cane Industry Union Universidade de São Paulo – University of São Paulo World Energy Council World Meteorological Organization Yacimentos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (Bolivian state-owned oil company) Zoneamento Econômico Ecológico – Economic Ecological Zoning
Chapter 1
Historical Overview of the 20th Century
Brazil before 1900 Europe heard of Brazil’s existence in the year 1500, after Portuguese navigators reported to Lisbon that they had discovered and landed in a region of the American continent today known as Brazil. They said that the land was vast and sparsely populated but for a number of isolated Indian tribes, who were primitive when compared with the cultural level already achieved by European countries. No reliable population estimates exist for that time. Since then, the political structure of the country may be divided into four stages: 1 Until 1807 it was a colony of the Portuguese crown, which had a monopoly on foreign trade, controlled immigration and prohibited the building of factories. 2 The short period (1808–21), when D. João VI, Regent of the Portuguese monarchy, threatened by the Napoleonic forces, moved from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro and proclaimed it the capital of the Portuguese Empire. The opening of the ports to international trade, unrestricted immigration, suppression of the prohibition against factories, installation of the first schools of higher learning and the transformation of the city of Rio de Janeiro into a true capital all date from this period. 3 The Brazilian monarchy came into existence shortly after D. João VI returned to Portugal, leaving his son as Regent. Political independence, proclaimed in 1822 by the Regent who was later to be crowned D. Pedro I, Emperor of Brazil, continued under the reign of D. Pedro II. 4 The Republic was proclaimed in 1889. Portugal was a small country that did not have sufficient emigrants for an effective occupation of a vast territory of 8.5 million km2 (larger than both Europe and America). An attempt to adapt the native population to
2
Energy in Brazil
Portuguese ways and work methods was not a success. The trafficking of slaves from Africa, then common in the European colonies of the Americas, met the Colony’s need for a labour force. The influx of slaves was to reach 600,000 during the first 200 years. It intensified in the 18th century (1.8 million), doubling this figure by 1852, when it stopped, although slavery was only officially abolished in 1888. The immigration of Europeans in significant numbers began in 1808, and it is estimated that 1.3 million entered the country during the period of the monarchy. Immigration underwent a further impetus after the abolition of slavery and proclamation of the republic. It consisted mainly of Italians, Portuguese, Spaniards and Germans. Traditionally, successive cycles of the economic evolution are characterized by predominant activities, some temporary, others consolidated. The first cycle consisted of exploiting Brazil wood, the pau-brasil used in Europe for dyeing cloth. Before long, the cultivation of sugar cane was initiated and sugar mills were built, an activity that would permanently occupy an important position. The cultivation of coffee started in the 18th century; it continues today and has dominated the economic history of the country for a long time. Extractive activities, after the extinction of the use of pau-brasil, included gold mining and the harvesting of rubber in the Amazon region, both of limited duration. Industrialization was given its first boost after the declaration of independence and a more significant impetus in the second half of the 19th century. But technological innovations took time to be adopted, especially where energy was concerned.
Brazil in 1900 Due to slow colonization, Brazil had, at the beginning of the 20th century, a predominantly rural population: 17.4 million inhabitants living along its extensive coastline. Concentrated urban areas were still in their infancy. Some of them housed industries founded at the end of the previous century. In 1907, industry employed 150,000 workers, corresponding to less than 1 per cent of the population. Land in economic use barely occupied a territory at a distance of 500 km from the coast and was served by 14,000 km of railways used for the export of basic products. At that time, the USA already had 70 million inhabitants and more than 200,000 km of railroads. Within the context of new energy sources, the use of gaslight continued to be restricted. Only ten small generating plants for local consumption provided electric power.
Historical Overview of the 20th Century
3
Notwithstanding the limited dissemination of the benefits and the comfort provided by new forms of energy, there did not appear, at that time, to be any significant popular movements for the immediate expansion of gas and electric power services. With industry still taking its first steps and the abundance of firewood, it was also natural that the government was not greatly motivated to supply energy. The transition from empire to republic did not lead to new economic concepts regarding the role of the state, whose attitude was in general predominantly liberal. Concessions of public services and the exploitation of natural resources continued to be granted without distinction to national and foreign private enterprise. The first Constitution of the Republic, in 1891, left the matter of concessions for public services in suspense. For many years two provisos defined the bases for the survey and exploitation of mineral and energy resources. One determined that mines belonged to the owner of the land. This stipulation was not regulated and, as a result, private efforts to undertake surveys for minerals were relatively insignificant. The other strengthened the decision-taking power of the states in the matter of mineral surveys in detriment to the federal government by transferring to the former the ownership of most unoccupied lands. The Constitution made no reference to the exploitation of hydro resources. The draft legislation for a Water Code prepared in 1909 was not approved at that time. Congress delayed it until the 1920s. However, in the 1930s it served as a basis for a new draft bill. The official beginning of geological surveys of the country’s mineral resources was the creation of the Geological and Mineral Service of Brazil in 1907, headed by Orville Derby, an American geologist who was a longterm resident of Brazil. In spite of imported mineral coal, the progressive inflow of petroleum by-products and initiatives in the field of hydroelectric power, firewood had practically no competition. There was a regular supply, mainly based on the exploitation of the heterogeneous Atlantic rainforest. It encompassed a selective extraction of hardwood and the felling of other kinds of timber, as well as, in many cases, of the former also, for the production of firewood, mainly for the railways running on steam locomotives, the incipient vegetal-coal-driven metallurgy and other industries, aside from its domestic use. Since deforestation was carried out in an extremely varied manner, with total individual freedom, there is very little statistical information available. The firewood culture prevailed in Brazil for much longer than in any of the leading industrialized countries. Coal, the second source of energy, was imported on a regular basis until the beginning of the First World War, when the United Kingdom’s
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Energy in Brazil
shipping capacity lessened. Between 1900 and 1913, regular importations had increased at a rate of 8 per cent per year. During that time, a little coal was already produced in the south of Brazil. There is no statistical information available on this activity, which was carried out on a very small scale by private enterprise. Despite the position this raw material had acquired on the national scene, the level of consumption was insignificant when compared with the role played by coal worldwide. At the beginning of the 20th century, Brazilian consumption of 900,000 metric tons amounted to only 0.1 per cent of the world total. During the administration of President Prudente de Morais (1894–98), an attempt was made to foster coal mining by exempting equipment from import duties and effecting a change in the duties levied upon imported coal. During the Rodrigues Alves government (1902–06), a technical mission headed by Israel Charles White was contracted to investigate the potential of national coal in the south of the country. The mission’s report was published in 1908, giving rise to lengthy discussions.
Hydroelectric power makes its entrance In the absence of specific legislation, electric power services, from generation to distribution, were ruled by concession terms and a corresponding contract between the utility and the government. The latter was represented by the federal government or by state and municipal governments, depending on the nature and the scope of the contract. Each case was different and different solutions were applied. At the turn of the 20th century, several private projects for generating power were underway, strictly for localized interests, especially in the states of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais. The majority of these were being undertaken by entrepreneurs whose agricultural, commercial, industrial or financial activities were connected with the communities who benefited from the introduction of this service. At that time, there also appeared entrepreneurs and promoters of big business from abroad who were interested in participating from the start in the modernization and industrialization phase which was presumed to be imminent in the capital of the Republic and, especially, in São Paulo. These interested parties included some who jointly in 1897 started an enterprise that was of the greatest importance to the development of electric power in Brazil and the area of São Paulo. There were people of importance in this undertaking: entrepreneurs and technicians based in Canada, as well as prestigious Brazilians from São Paulo, well known in the world of business and politics. This group obtained the concession
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for the service of urban transportation in electric vehicles from the Municipal Chamber of São Paulo and promoted the creation, in Toronto, Canada, of the São Paulo Railway Light and Power Co. Ltd., with the participation of other Canadian capitalists. In order to meet the needs of the services that it had just contracted for, the new company built the Parnaíba hydroelectric plant on the Tietê River, inaugurated in 1901, whose capacity of 2,000 kW was soon doubled. In 1904, these same Canadian entrepreneurs started negotiations with Pereira Passos, the mayor of Rio de Janeiro, and with President Rodrigues Alves concerning an enterprise similar to that of São Paulo to be installed in Rio. Since the reaction of the authorities was favourable, the Rio de Janeiro Tramway Light and Power Co. Ltd. was founded in Toronto that same year. Similarly to what had occurred in São Paulo, the concessions for the supply of electricity in the Federal District and the utilization of the hydro power of the Ribeirão das Lages and the Paraíba do Sul River were granted, respectively, by the municipal and state governments. The erection of the Fontes hydroelectric plant began in 1905 and was completed in 1908, with an installed capacity of 12,000 kW, soon to be expanded to 24,000 kW. It was the largest plant in Brazil and one of the largest hydroelectric plants in the world. The entry of Light in the country’s two main urban centres was not always smooth. Several conflicts of interest arose with national kindred companies. In Toronto, however, the group became one when Brazilian Traction, the holding company, was founded in 1912. While the two Light companies ended up taking over Brazil’s main markets and carried out projects whose scope was large for those times, a number of local smaller projects entered the scene. In general, each one dealt with the supply of energy to a specific location, due to a municipal concession. The convenience of organizing bigger companies with a larger scope of action soon became clear. This resulted in a number of mergers and incorporations that were reinforced in the 1920s. Even if the major growth between 1885 and 1895 is only considered to be a starting point, it was sound and continuous in subsequent periods. The installed capacity was multiplied seven times between 1895 and 1905, and another seven times between 1905 and 1915. The growth of the generating capacity of electric power and the scope of the services by various means was noteworthy. At the same time, the supremacy of hydroelectric power, which reached 84 per cent of the total energy matrix in 1915, was being consolidated. Once again this differentiated the evolution of the energy economy in Brazil from that in the forefront industrial nations, where mineral-coal-driven thermoelectric power predominated.
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Energy in Brazil
Little interest in surveys for oil The evolution of the oil economy in Brazil differs somewhat from that of the electric power services. While the latter was already in full development at the beginning of the 20th century, local production of oil and its industrialization only became a cause for concern in the 1930s. Prior to that, theoretical debates upon the publication of the White Mission Report on the prospects of coal in the south of the country were of historical significance, but the Report was not favourable towards the use of oil. With no national production, all petroleum by-products were imported. The official record of importations starts with kerosene, in 1901. Petrol is mentioned in 1907, due to the need to fuel the first motor cars. The importation of fuel oil only begins in 1913, when it starts to compete with coal, although only on a modest scale, at least until 1920. Diesel oil appears later, in 1938, when the first three 450-CV diesel–electric locomotives, belonging to the Viação Férrea Leste Brasileiro in the state of Bahia, began operating. Consumption of petroleum by-products quadrupled between 1905 and 1915. Total Brazilian consumption in 1915 amounted to 355,000 m3 and corresponded to 0.6 per cent of the world consumption of 62 million m3. Although this figure was still small, petroleum by-products already occupied a more significant position than the coal market.
Industrialization, the First World War and the financial crisis of 1929 In the first few years of the 20th century, industrialization required major importations of equipment. With it came new technologies, most of which needed, on an increasing scale, new forms of energy, with emphasis on steam engines and electric power. With the eruption of the First World War, the importation of equipment for the construction of electric power plants suddenly became precarious. Nevertheless, prior to and during the war, there was a continued surge of industrialization in the country. It was sustained in three ways: the migration from the farmer’s capital funds to the cities; the substitution of imports, which had become more complicated; and, finally, the entry of immigrants, in their great majority without substantial financial resources, but with an industrial culture which was already consolidated in their countries of origin. Industrial production grew 44 per cent over the five-year period 1915–20 and, respectively, 35 per cent and 9 per cent in subsequent five-year periods, the latter affected by the 1929 financial crisis.
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After the First World War, these three events jointly caused the supply of electric power to change into a national and governmental concern, although there was much discussion and little practical action. Brazil lagged somewhat behind the leading countries and even behind some in Latin America.
A liberal policy and nationalistic demonstrations In principle, the national economic policy continued to be liberal during the governments of Wenceslau Brás and Epitácio Pessoa (1914–22). Agricultural and coffee export interests predominated. New and revolutionary political ideas gained weight at the beginning of the 1920s. Nationalistic demonstrations, though scarce, gathered strength and led to two relevant occurrences: one in the business sector and the other in the military. On the military scene, a movement known as lieutenant-ism was ostensibly initiated in 1922 and relied on the participation of the majority of young army officers. In political terms, the predominant thinking of this group was to bring about the end of oligarchic power that had existed since the beginning of the Republic, and establish a valid electoral system. In the economic field, they advocated government protection of domestic products, especially for industry, and less foreign dependence caused by foreign capital and foreign debts. These discussions led for the first time to the inclusion of nationalistic restrictions to economic activities in a constitutional amendment voted in 1926, by determining that ‘mines and mineral deposits essential to security and national defence and the lands on which they lie cannot be transferred to foreigners’. This was also the first time that the economic issue was officially linked to security and national defence. This attitude gained force later and took on dramatic aspects in the debate on oil policies. In practice, and within the electric power sector, national pioneer companies fell under the control of foreign capital and, in the oil sector, initiatives were on a moderate scale when compared with the tasks to be undertaken. The weakness of national private enterprise in meeting the challenge of the expansion of new forms of energy required – electric power and oil – reinforced the theory of state intervention.
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Energy in Brazil
The 1930 Revolution and political, economic and energy policies The worldwide financial crisis (1929) and the Brazilian political Revolution of 1930 resulted in huge changes in the nation’s political, economic and social makeup. Using the argument that the oligarchy was guilty of electoral fraud, the National Congress was closed and a provisional government, under President Getúlio Vargas, took over in a coup d’état. Under the Vargas administration, extremely nationalistic lieutenants were given substantial power and made themselves strongly felt. The state apparatus underwent a modernizing reform of a centralizing and regulatory nature. When Congress was reopened, the 1934 Magna Carta was approved, but later substituted by a Constitution, introduced in 1937, as a result of a new authoritarian coup d’état by President Vargas. Both constitutions contained the principle of progressive nationalization of productive activities that would only be dropped in the 1946 Constitution. After abandoning the former liberal policy, the government formulated draft bills on projects of industrialization, the majority of which were drawn up on a technical basis. They concerned the creation of an infrastructure for transportation and electric power plants, oil prospecting and the implantation of basic industries. Less efficient attempts to apply the same criteria to the social scenario received little attention due to greater political interference and did not have much success. Environmental issues had not yet gained any importance. The strategy of those days included a policy of substituting imports. It had a certain continuity, but erred at times by committing excesses. In Brazil, the first definitions for an energy policy were established in the 1930s. Formerly, the government had abstained from defining general rules and from intervening directly in productive activities. The Water and the Mine Codes were formulated at that time. They introduced the innovation of a distinction between property rights to the land on the one hand, and the hydro resources and mineral wealth existing on the surface or below the surface on the other. The latter could thus be exploited by means of concessions and controlled by the government. A Forestry Code of little practical significance was also approved. The ‘gold clause’ included in electric power and gas service contracts signed at the beginning of the 20th century was also abolished. The purpose of this clause had been to protect invested capital against the risks of devaluation of local currency. In parallel to these changes, the principle of predominance of the government in the taxation of mineral resources was established, as well as, in a still incipient form, in taxes that would
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later become the backbone of the state-owned system of electric power companies. The Water Code was not immediately implemented, creating a climate of uncertainty among the electric power utilities. Higher inflation during the war years, the difficulty of importing equipment and the emerging national equipment industry contributed to a drastic reduction in the rhythm of investment in expansion and in spending on the maintenance of existing installations. As the demand grew, a critical electric power-supply situation arose, leading to rationing in various parts of the country. The federal government appointed two councils (1938–39), which were made responsible for proposing and conducting the electric power (National Water and Electric Power Council, CNAEE) and the petroleum (National Petroleum Council, CNP) policies. The CNP was created concurrently with the start of a major debate on the oil policy that, at the time, was still inconclusive. The CNP trained personnel at all levels and intensified exploratory drilling. The latter resulted in the discovery of Brazil’s first productive well (1938) in Lobato. Firewood continued nevertheless to be by far the most important energy resource in the country. Since existing, inferior-quality coal was being mined on a small scale, consumption needs were, on the whole, met by imports. At the time of the Second World War, the insignificant coal mining efforts received a boost from the government’s decision to build the country’s first integrated metallurgical plant with US technology and funding. It used mineral-coal coke to valorize Brazil’s large reserves of iron ore. As a result, a great effort was made to promote the mining and industrialization of coal from Santa Catarina, the state producing the only coal considered to be of a quality good enough for making coke. Its by-product was coal that could be burned in boilers for generating electric power. This scheme lasted for approximately 40 years in Santa Catarina, while small thermal plants driven by local coal were gradually installed in the state of Rio Grande do Sul. Petroleum surveys still did not attract national or foreign investors. Brazil imported all the petroleum by-products it consumed. Major electric power projects continued to focus on hydroelectric power. For reasons unrelated to the energy policy, but rather resulting from the instability of the international sugar market, a programme for the production of anhydrous alcohol from sugar cane was implemented, the alcohol to be added to petrol used in motor cars in a proportion inferior to 10 per cent. This experiment with what became known as ‘motor alcohol’ would, years later, facilitate the gradual introduction of an extensive National Pro-Alcohol Programme funded by fiscal incentives.
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Energy in Brazil
Political reform, the atomic bomb and an oil monopoly After the Second World War, 15 years of an almost always arbitrary government under President Vargas came to an end. General elections were called and the Constitution (1946) was again reformed. President Dutra was elected, a discreet man, less centralizing and less of an interventionist. At the end of Dutra’s mandate, President Vargas returned to power, this time by means of direct elections. The concept of the need for economic planning, initially with a view to organizing the country after the war years, was consolidated during the Second World War. Economic planning continued for a long period. The atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima that ended the Second World War on 6 August 1945 brought about a revolution in the field of energy and a reshuffle of power on a world scale. It was believed at that time that nuclear energy used for peaceful purposes would create new opportunities for humanity, especially in developing countries, but this was unfortunately not the case. In Brazil, there was great interest in this matter, especially on the part of scientists connected with theoretical physics and in circles involved in international relations. The nation sought to draw up a domestic policy that was coherent with the stand taken internationally in order to gain access to the new technology that was in the hands of a very few countries which were gradually forming the ‘Nuclear Club’. The country was heading for a corporate structure in electricity services under direct control of the state. In the sphere of oil, where only incipient activities were taking place, the political debate intensified and ended up moving from Congress to class associations and the general public. So far, there had been no foreign projects for oil surveys within the country. The events that were presumably linked to the interests of international oil companies and culminated in the expropriation of oil companies in Mexico and the Chaco war (between Bolivia and Paraguay) were fairly recent. In Brazil’s controversial scenario only a few advocated freedom of action in the matter of oil. Opinions, however, were divided as to the form state actions should take. The government’s proposal, submitted to Congress in 1951, was moderate, but, after two years of debates, the approved legislation was radical, establishing a state monopoly on all activities related to oil, with the sole exception of the distribution of derivatives which had for a number of years already been carried out by private enterprise, subsidiaries of the large international oil corporations. PETROBRAS, a mixed-economy company, was founded in 1953 under this law and assigned to take charge of monopolistic activities. This extreme solution
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was the outcome of an emotional debate and gave PETROBRAS and its staff the impression that they were representatives of Brazil’s oil policy. The power PETROBRAS had acquired also caused a conflict between it and various governments that were involved in petroleum issues. In the post-war years, analyses and long-term plans followed each other. Among them was the Mixed Brazil-United States Commission (1951–53), which had the great merit of forcing those responsible for specific economic development projects to prove the technical feasibility of such projects and to study their economic and financial viability. Funding included in the programme approved by the mixed commission was granted by the International Reconstruction and Development Bank (IRDB) and the American Eximbank under exceptionally favourable conditions of maturity dates, grace periods and interest rates. The loans made no distinction between public and private ownership, national or foreign. They were mainly focused on electric power and transportation. The US section of the mixed commission took the stand that the oil sector did not involve funding problems since transnational companies would have been prepared to make risk investments if state monopoly had not been a closed issue in Brazil. The counterpart for international funding was provided by a fund of public resources and the creation of the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), as the investing agency and administrator of the programme. US integrated hydrographical basin programmes such as the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) influenced similar activities in Brazil. The most notable enterprise concerned the São Francisco River. The Companhia Hidroelétrica do São Francisco (CHESF), founded in 1948 and given the mission to build the Paulo Afonso plant, was an example of direct state intervention in the electric power sector. During its first stage alone, this plant doubled the installed capacity in the entire Northeast. There followed other state promoted projects by the federal government and several state governments. From a strictly political angle, however, the situation became so complex that it generated a crisis that culminated in the suicide of President Vargas. Several provisional governments followed upon his death until 1955, when Juscelino Kubitschek won the presidential elections.
An era of development President Kubitschek skilfully reinstated political calm and launched an economic development project under the slogan ‘fifty years of progress in five years of government’. The path he took considered pragmatic
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Energy in Brazil
solutions with the participation of national and foreign private enterprise, as well as of companies controlled by the state, and avoided radical ideological stands. A Development Council, whose secretariat was installed within the BNDES, was put in charge of planning. The energy sector absorbed nearly half the overall budget for this plan. At the end of his term of office, Kubitschek founded the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME). In keeping with the objective to expand the supply of electric power, funding was raised from the United Nations Special Fund to carry out a survey of the hydro resources of the Southeast Region, the most progressive in the country. The World Bank, in this case the executor of the fund, granted financing for this purpose. The engineering firms chosen to carry out the work formed a consortium under the name CANAMBRA that comprised the Canadian Montreal Engineering Co. and G.E. Crippen and Associates, as well as the American Gibbs and Hill. Thus their headquarters were in countries that had large hydroelectric resources similar to Brazil’s. On the other hand, the Coordinating Committee for Energy Studies of the CentreSouth Region, created in 1963, contracted local consultants. CANAMBRA’s work was based on making an inventory and organizing possible projects, while at the same time drawing up a methodology to be adopted for this purpose. The project became an initiative of long duration. In practice, a relevant fact at that time was the decision to found the Central Elétrica de Furnas, which was inaugurated in 1964, with an installed capacity of 1,100 MW. This move changed the scale of the hydroelectric projects in the country. After many years of waiting and discussion, the Water Code was finally regulated in 1957, by Decree 41,019. With only minor changes, it ruled the life of electric power utilities for more than 30 years. The Water Code did not include explicit recognition of the persistent inflation that was only to be solved later (1964). The sole tax on electricity bills was introduced and improved at the same time. It was earmarked for increasing the investment capacity of state-owned electric power companies. Private companies, still of major importance at that time, achieved stability although they had a smaller investment scope, either because they did not have easy access to funds of fiscal origin or because there was no longer a significant influx of foreign capital. As a result, they ceased to invest in new generating units, and this task became the responsibility of the state. After PETROBRAS was founded, a technically competent structure was progressively implemented in the oil sector. Activities were considerably expanded when compared with those that had been carried out under the government’s direct administration. Exploration results, however, were
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disappointing, giving origin to a new controversy, this time on a technical issue. Surveys had been entrusted to Walter Link, a well-known international expert, previously connected with Standard Oil. He was responsible for drawing up a scheme for survey and prospecting services, personnel training and for drafting plans and work methods. At the end of his contract (1961), Link submitted an extensive report. In his opinion, the existence of large oil reserves on Brazilian territory was improbable. No thought had as yet been given to a survey of the continental shelf. The report gave rise to all kinds of criticism, much of which were without technical foundation. There ensued a momentary loss of direction and it took a number of years before new directives were established for the continuation of work on land. Since the industrial segment was not subject to risks, the implantation of terminals, pipelines and refineries continued without major hitches. While the energy infrastructure in Brazil was growing rapidly, the peaceful use of nuclear power for producing electricity was beginning abroad and, in 1956, the National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) was founded in Brazil. A number of minor incursions into geological surveys of atomic minerals were made at that time without much success in finding uranium, which was the only mineral used in the reactors in operation. However, substantial reserves of thorium were discovered, a fertile material for which no processing technology existed. This led to the start of a programme to develop a prototype of a special reactor for a cycle in which thorium played a major role.
Temporary political upheaval After the inauguration of Brasília, Kubitschek passed the government to Jânio Quadros, elected in 1960 by a large majority. The new administration did not have the same majority in Congress. It also seemed that it did not know where it was headed. Nevertheless, in 1961, it succeeded in finalizing the lengthy process of creating ELETROBRÁS as a holding company for federal government investments in electric power. For reasons without a satisfactory explanation, Jânio Quadros resigned, plunging the country into a new institutional crisis. Eight months were lost. The succession of Vice-President João Goulart was also troubled and contested. There followed several ministries under the new president, including a parliamentary interregnum followed by a return to the presidential system. These were two periods with little action in the economic sphere, the country surviving from the impetus provided by the previous government.
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Energy in Brazil
Nationalists renewed their pressure, this time in close association with a populism whose objectives were strictly of an electoral nature and came very close to radical leftist stands. The political and administrative instability which dominated the national scenario at the beginning of the 1960s, the escalating and explosive inflation in 1963, when it reached 90 per cent per year, as well as the ambiguity as to where the government was leading the country, created such a confused cultural mixture that civilians and the military joined forces and launched a coup d’état in 1964, initiating an authoritarian era that would last 20 years.
Military governments, institutional and economic reform It is important to make a distinction between the two phases of military rule: the first, from 1964 to 1973, was financially stable, made economic and administrative reforms and promoted development based mainly on domestic savings; during the second phase, starting at the time of the first oil crisis and continuing until 1985, an attempt was made to maintain the country’s rapid growth by implementing a programme of investments in infrastructure based on foreign loans and the substitution of imports. During the first phase, a strategy based on the use of large, state-owned companies for promoting economic growth and dragging industries in the private sector along this path was combined with an efficient administration of public resources, especially while Minister Delfim Netto was in charge of a pragmatic administration of the Treasury. Major changes in energy policy were introduced during this period. From the beginning, a norm was established to implement a tariff based on the concept of a fixed return on historical investment, including protection against inflation. A key measure was to extend to the electric power utilities, and adapt to them, the norms for the monetary correction of assets and the periodic updating of the monetary expression of the historical cost of the investment. The acquisition of American and Foreign Power Company (AMFORP), the second-largest electric power distributor in Brazil, was concluded in a deal that had been negotiated during the turbulent former government and could no longer be reversed despite the new stable conditions offered to both private and public utilities. Only the sector’s pioneer, the Light Company, remained and continued to be responsible for a large market.
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Centralized investment planning in the electric power sector was intensified. On the other hand, however, the operation of electricity services became decentralized when the federal government transferred subsidiaries recently acquired from AMFORP to the states. In the Northeast, all secondary transmission lines of CHESF were passed on to the distribution utilities. This move consolidated the position of a number of sometimes very unsound state companies and restricted ELETROBRÁS’s control to regionally integrated corporations. At that time, the concept of integrated companies predominated, except in the Northeast, where the entire generation operation was concentrated at CHESF. The vertical integration of the companies greatly strengthened their expansion capacity and the organization of competent technical teams. It was, however, criticized at the end of the 1990s when the energy policy was revised, as it intensified the state monopoly and restricted competition. Brazil’s traditional preference for hydroelectricity continued in plans for new plants since this option offered the most opportunities; thermoelectric plants were considered strictly complementary. After years of indecision, Brazil began to build its first nuclear plant, acquired abroad (1967) mainly to familiarize national engineers with its construction and operation. The choice fell on a uranium-enriched and light water-cooled reactor, and on a bid submitted by Westinghouse, as this company was the most experienced in the world in building the reactors that later predominated in the market. Unfortunately, the objective of this choice, namely to reduce the technical and economic risks of the first installation, was not attained: some similar equipment from the same manufacturer installed in other countries had serious defects, even before the Angra I plant went on line and, in its turn, was found to be flawed. This resulted in the turbulent entry of Brazil into the field of nuclear power generation, with frequent interruptions, legal issues with Westinghouse and public discredit.
Inadequate oil prospecting While the expansion of electricity services took place safely and with increasing efficiency, the same did not apply to the critical need for oil prospecting. Reserves stayed stable and were insufficient to ensure a minimum of security for the country since production did not even cover one-third of consumption. PETROBRAS suffered the direct impact of the upheaval in the government at the beginning of the 1960s and needed time to reorganize. It was uncertain whether the problem was a result of inadequate discoveries, or if it was due to insufficient risk investment,
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Energy in Brazil
lack of initiative, confirmation of Link’s diagnosis or simply bad luck. Findings were unsatisfactory. Consumption increased, but reserves remained stagnant. It was nevertheless undeniable that PETROBRAS was too cautious in regard to work related to the recently discovered traces on the continental shelf. The extremely low oil prices on the international market discouraged prospecting for new reserves. A debate ensued in the very core of the federal government, this time with no leaks, not even to Congress, as to what procedure to follow. In 1970, the signing of risk contracts with international companies was suggested on a ministerial level, with a view to expanding activities and, more importantly, to diversify the concepts of surveys. Political pressure, however, was unable to overcome the company’s refusal with the backing of the nationalistic military. As a result of criticism of insufficient action, surveys on the continental shelf were finally intensified, funded by national financial resources, until the first oil crisis caused international oil prices to spiral. PETROBRAS concentrated its resources on transportation, terminals, refining and, principally, petrochemicals, relegating its mission to reduce the nation’s dependence on oil imports to a secondary position. This strategy would later, when the second oil crisis occurred, prove its weakness.
Itaipu Binational hydroelectric plant After lengthy and difficult negotiations with Paraguay and Argentina, the Itaipu Binational Company, controlled equally by Brazil and Paraguay, was founded in 1973. It was assigned the specific mission of building the Itaipu Hydroelectric Plant, with an installed capacity of 12,000 MW. When completed, it represented almost one-third of the integrated South–Southeast system and was, at that time, the largest hydroelectric enterprise in the world. In keeping with an agreement with Paraguay, the Brazilian government submitted a draft bill to Congress that gave priority of use of Itaipu energy to the Southern and Southeastern utilities. The price foreseen was relatively advantageous, decreasing over a period of time. Unfortunately the construction of the plant came up against the Brazilian government’s financial problems, causing delays. Consequently, the investment in its construction increased substantially, a circumstance that would subsequently lead to a number of issues with the utilities. The first two generating units went into regular operation in 1984.
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Response to the oil crises of 1974 and 1979 During the second stage of military governments, it was decided in 1973– 74, after the first oil crisis, that among the possible adjustments in macroeconomic policies it would be good to make a major effort of economic expansion based on foreign loans at market interest rates, considering that the World Bank and the like had suspended funding. It was intended to substitute imports and complete the infrastructure and industrialization, in the hope that this would result in a trade balance capable of permitting the future redemption of loans. The industrialization plan was, however, too ambitious and had several negative corollaries. Expecting continued economic growth and the resulting greater demand for electricity, it was forecast that the shortage of electric power would require nuclear complementation of the hydroelectric park and would justify a major nuclear programme. Under these circumstances, and according to the supposition that nuclear autonomy depended on a new industry for the manufacture of reactors, it was concluded that it would be necessary to order a minimum of eight 1,300-MW reactors. This led to a huge programme, submitted to the government of the Federal Republic of Germany with a proposal for co-operation. As was to be expected, this solution resulted in protests from the USA. Due to the decline in national investment capacity and the consequent financial problems, the project could not meet the established timetable and was finally stopped. There remained one plant under construction, the first of a series of eight. From the point of view of electricity supply, the others were not missed because, faced with the ensuing economic crisis, demand did not increase as expected. The second oil crisis and consequent price hike generated great uncertainty regarding its impact on the nation’s economy, especially on the trade balance. In 1983, oil imports amounted to as much as 55 per cent of the overall value of importations. In order to face the oil crisis, programmes for replacing petroleum by-products were launched. Another consequence of the first oil crisis was taking advantage of the experience acquired earlier with alcohol. A much more ambitious programme to replace petrol with alcohol than that in effect in the 1930s was launched. As of 1982, a programme known as Pro-alcohol sought to replace petrol with hydrated alcohol. It was implemented with official financing for the construction of distilleries at subsidized interest rates. Alcohol was known to be non-competitive despite the high prices that oil had already reached at that time. It was hoped that they would remain high, but this only happened years later. On the other hand, it was also hoped that the sugar cane agro-industry would become more efficient than
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Energy in Brazil
it actually did. It was thus a long-term policy directed to expanding the participation of renewable energy in the national energy matrix that led to a temporary expenditure of subsidies. Domestic mineral coal as a substitute for fuel oil began to receive a subsidy for transportation, when used outside the production region. Various industries converted from fuel oil to mineral coal. The programme was to last approximately ten years. Few of the converted industries continued using coal once the subsidies were abolished. A change in the direction taken by PETROBRAS investments had a major long-term effect: exploration concentrated on the continental shelf predominated and a successful deep-water prospecting technology was developed. The quantity of reserves discovered on the continental shelf increased rapidly.
The electric power sector loses its way The electric power policy took the wrong turn. The calculation of rates was altered by incorporating a uniform tariff on a national level. Besides the gigantic nuclear programme, a second large-scale enterprise was undertaken: construction of the Tucuruí plant on the Tocantins River began in 1975, with an expected capacity of 3,960 MW. Its construction was added to that of the Itaipu plant that had already been programmed, and its first units went on line in 1984. The investments forecast for these programmes were clearly higher than the resources available. Loans were raised at market rates over a medium term to meet the time schedules for long-term work. This aggravating circumstance caused an increase in interest rates that, in conjunction with the sole tariff, ruined the financial equation that had served as a basis for the development of the state electricity system.
Political opening, the 1988 Constitution and macroeconomic deterioration After the authoritarian governments, political opening culminated in 1985 with the transfer of power to a civilian government by means of indirect elections. This transfer was complicated due to the illness that led to the death of the president elect, Tancredo Neves, prior to his investiture. In this unusual scenario, Vice-President José Sarney took office and maintained the government structure that had already been defined. One of the first decisions demanded of the new administration was the formulation of a new Constitution to substitute that of 1967. It was to be
Historical Overview of the 20th Century
19
in line with the political commitment to reform the authoritarian regime and, reacting to the feared excesses of a central power, lead to a parliamentary regime. At the last minute, however, there was a return to the presidential regime that gave Congress considerable power. By means of numerous, mostly innocuous declarations, the tutelary state, whose validity had already been placed in doubt in many countries, was expanded. In the sphere of the economy and, especially, in that of natural resources, the most exacerbated level of nationalism since the 1920s was reached when this matter was included in texts of the Constitution. There were those who claimed at that time that the 1988 Constitution, intrinsically contradictory, would become an obstacle to the nation’s development. Its revision was already considered inevitable at the time of its promulgation. Even the constituents acknowledged these contradictions, as well as the weakness of the Magna Carta, when they approved the date of 7 September 1993 for the electorate to decide, by means of a plebiscite, whether they wanted a parliamentary or a presidential government system. It was also determined that the Constitution would be revised five years after its promulgation. In the field of energy, the 1988 Constitution established the principle of tenders for granting concessions for public services, eliminating the sole tax on electric power and fuels whose revenues were linked to investments in the energy sector itself. It also delegated to the states the concession for distributing piped gas, at that time still in its infancy. It redefined the concept of a Brazilian company in order to open space for the participation of foreign capital, revoking former restrictions in concessions for the utilization of mineral resources and the hydro energy potential. The constitutional provision concerning the oil monopoly was made slightly more flexible, the government now being allowed to contract the services of state or private companies to carry out the activities included in the monopoly under conditions to be determined under a law to be enacted. Therefore, the transition process became extremely complex. It included simultaneous discussions regarding legislation resulting from the provisions of the 1988 Magna Carta and the revision of that Constitution. Moreover, a concept started to take shape at the end of the 1980s concerning the privatization of public services that had so far been the sole responsibility of companies under state control. The ideological foundation of this movement was to reduce involvement of the state in productive activities, contrary, therefore, to the core of the 1988 Constitution. In practice, pragmatism predominated, because the exaggerated growth of the number of companies under state control, principally during the last authoritarian years, was an acknowledged fact.
20
Energy in Brazil
In parallel to the constitutional crisis, the country’s economic situation, which was facing a potentially explosive inflation, continued to worsen. There followed plans for economic stability, none of them successful. In these, the battle against inflation was an absolute priority over any other objectives of public interest, including those related to energy policies. Public service rates, including those for electric power, were used as an instrument for price control, resulting in a reduction of the companies’ capacity to generate resources for investment.
Return to direct elections for President of the Republic In 1991, in direct elections for the first time since 1960, the electorate chose candidate Fernando Collor de Melo for president, with an absolute majority of votes, more than those obtained by Jânio Quadros. Both were elected without majority support in Congress, which caused many of the difficulties that they faced. The short-lived Collor government was deposed in October 1992, as a result of a highly controversial impeachment process resulting from the institutionalization of a widespread corruption scheme on the level of the federal government. This result was made possible due to the difference between the votes received by the candidate and those that supported him in Congress. The Collor administration had two lasting consequences: one positive, namely a thrust in a direction opposed to the 1988 Constitution, stopping spuriousness, reducing traditional protectionism and fostering economic competition; the other negative, due to the cataclysm resulting from the joint action of Collor’s ministers who destroyed what was left of a weakened public federal administration without leaving anything in its place. The impeachment of a President of the Republic generated another political crisis until Vice-President Itamar Franco took over. Although the majority of public opinion found the long period of 26 months of the new presidency extremely difficult, it was left to him to implement, with strong support from his Ministers of Finance, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Rubens Ricupero, the financial austerity promised eight years earlier by Tancredo Neves. The plebiscite held during this period resulted in a clear preference for a presidential system of government.
Reorganizing the state Despite the difficulties that had accumulated in the financial sphere, including those resulting from the confiscation of personal savings, the
Historical Overview of the 20th Century
21
disorganized administration and traumas in the political sphere, the second direct election for President of the Republic occurred in a peaceful climate, with a clear-cut victory, in the first round, for Fernando Henrique Cardoso. No problems in economic policies arose in the transition period because the majority of the executive reforms became more systematic. Since the previous decade, a theory originating in the world’s main economic centres had been taking hold, namely that regardless of the level of their economic development, countries should adopt a strict market economy with the corollary of reducing state interference, particularly in the economy. This change in thinking occurred simultaneously with the globalization of the economy, strictly financial transactions predominating over the trade of goods and services, a remarkable acceleration in communications, the introduction of information technology and the automation of productive activities. In the scenario of domestic politics, an avalanche of legislative obligations was thrust at the National Congress in keeping with the regulatory 1988 Constitution, which was full of ambiguities. With its 245, sometimes contradictory, articles and proposals cross-current to the trends predominating at the time of its promulgation, the Constitution also contained the strange proviso that it was to be revised within a period of five years. This revision actually took place in 1995 and was based on the triple objective of eliminating the state from entrepreneurial activities, abolishing restrictions to foreign capital and establishing competitive markets in formerly monopolistic areas, by right and in fact. These guidelines also had pragmatic motives: to correct flagrant deficiencies in the government’s practical ability to function on its own or through its companies, which were difficult to remedy in any other fashion, and the federal and state treasuries’ need for cash. The revision also included an opening of the economy in areas such as oil and natural gas, mining and hydro resources, transportation and telecommunications, all of great significance to the development of the country. Draft bills for reforming public administration and social security were dealt with more slowly and were not well received by Congress. The draft bill for social security was not proportional to the seriousness of the imbalance. Unfortunately, the regulations of party politics drawn up by the 1988 Constitution were not revised, resulting in a proliferation of minor parties. An opportunity was lost to ensure that issues relevant to the country were submitted to Congress responsibly and on a large scale, the very existence of these parties making it difficult to find a solution. Besides continuing to revise policies implemented by the previous government, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who remained in office
22
Energy in Brazil
for two terms, from 1995 to 2002, gave priority to consolidating Brazil’s victory over inflation. The bases of the Real Plan, introduced in 1994, proved efficient in the effective eradication of the inflationary spiral, leading to a reduction in the price index rate from 66 per cent p.a., in 1995, to 16 per cent in 1996. Inflation continued to be contained in the following years, but economic growth rates remained unsatisfactory. The strategy adopted was based on the principles of opening trade and implementing an administered and overvalued currency exchange rate. It favoured the importation of consumer and durable goods in order to intensify competition in the domestic market and thus restrict price increases. Its results paid off. The importation of capital goods at moderate prices contributed to modernize industry. However, the continuing, ever more overvalued currency exchange rate, resulting from residual inflation produced as a corollary, caused an increasing imbalance in foreign trade. The negative trade balance had been very high since 1995, but was compensated by the ongoing entry of foreign capital that, under a regime of financial freedom, was mainly short term. This phenomenon accentuated Brazil’s weak position in foreign negotiations dating back to when it adhered to globalization. After the financial crises of Mexico in 1994, the Asiatic Southeast in 1997 and of Russia in 1998, there was in 1999 a foreign raid on the real, with immediate and serious consequences. Decisions in the sphere of the federal government regarding the currency exchange rate were taken amid turmoil and misunderstandings that culminated in a new team in the Central Bank. Devaluation, accepted and recognized as being inevitable, corrected the mistakenly too-lengthy continuation of the overvalued currency exchange rate used as an anchor. A flexible exchange rate regime followed which, although it had merit, impacted negatively on the companies recently acquired by foreign investors. In return for significant funding received from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Brazil assumed a firm commitment to adopt a satisfactory fiscal conduct. On the positive side, opening trade and implementing a flexible exchange rate made the national economic structure more realistic, demanding relative price readjustments, as well as new bases for exports, to which the country rapidly adapted. For eight years, extensive financial remedial action was taken in both federal and state governments. Innumerable liabilities had been accumulated during the 1980s. Some were settled, while some were ill-timed, and others continued to be threatening. The state was removed from activities that did not concern it; banks in danger controlled by the states were sold and fiscal responsibility was
Historical Overview of the 20th Century
23
implemented in public administration. The latter was generally accepted, despite ever-increasing aversion to the resulting restrictions applied to the administrators of Treasury resources concerning the freedom to spend. The administration of public budgets was greatly improved. In the social field, efforts to provide general basic schooling were made for the first time, although there was not sufficient time for a significant improvement in its quality. In the electric power sector there was an institutional reform and simultaneous privatization of state-controlled companies with the objective of introducing competitive markets. Insufficient new generation capacity, together with negative natural factors and the implementation of institutional changes, resulted in a supply crisis in 2001. This crisis, in turn, quashed any possibility of economic growth during that and the following year. In the oil sector there was a small breach in the monopoly centred on prospecting activities that were the object of tenders. Both sectors will be considered at length in Chapters 3 and 4.
Calm transition in 2002–03 and intrinsic contradiction of the new government Elections were held at the end of Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s second term of office. They were won by opposition candidate Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of the Labour Party, after three previous, failed attempts. He officially adopted his nickname ‘Lula’ for popularity reasons. His election had caused fear, especially in national and international financial circles, of a possible disruption in the conduct of the country’s macroeconomic policy. The new government, however, adopted the cautious and pragmatic stand not to change it, which resulted in an unexpectedly peaceful transition. At least at the start, this attitude was appreciated by politically antagonistic currents, who agreed to the appointment of a representative with orthodox economic views to the presidency of the Central Bank. This calmed international financial agencies and economic operations rapidly returned to normal. This attitude, however, had the political effect of dividing the Labour Party. Therefore, the government, faced with insufficient support in Congress, had to form alliances with factions of different political leanings in order to carry out its plans. Intrinsic contradictions were thus established: on the one hand the orthodox Labour Party, originating in the labour unions, and on the other the theoretical and ideological Labour Party; two pragmatic wings, one aimed at the perpetuation of power in the
24
Energy in Brazil
hands of the Labour Party on a national scale, and the other sustaining an orthodox economic-financial policy. Within the peaceful environment resulting from the continuity of the economic policy, the new government started out with inflation under control and a strong export drive, benefiting from the expansion of international trade. There were no indications, however, of picking up sustainable economic growth. The composition of the government’s administration was unfortunate; it had an excessive subdivision of responsibilities and created agencies inadequately organized to carry out their tasks. Difficult coordination was accentuated by the state apparatus, which created thousands of positions of trust. The internal governmental subdivision concerned with environmental issues continued, divided between an emotional green section and a section searching for a possible reconciliation of economic, social and environmental objectives. Opportunities arose for the dissemination of new forms of renewable energy. The economic policy carried out with continuity and even obstinately was benefited by what were to a certain extent independent and mainly favourable factors. Domestically, the progress of agricultural business was a highlight. It had begun in former years and became the major generator of trade balance surpluses. Internationally, the scenario was extremely favourable. There was a wave of expansion of international trade similar to that which resulted in China’s sustained growth and its powerful entry into international markets. In international economic relations, the successive trade balance surpluses strengthened the country’s finances, propitiating a continued reduction in its risk rating. Because Brazil’s economic policy constantly met its financial targets, it increasingly received the approval of international markets. Nevertheless, some of the economic policy directives were consistently controversial, similarly to what had happened in the previous government. Efforts to implement a regime of fiscal responsibility met the approval of informed public opinion. But the system of inflation targets and of sustaining a high primary surplus was contested. Continuing, extremely high interest rates, the second highest in the world, were repeatedly criticized by different currents of opinion. The federal government’s large domestic debt, fed by exorbitant interest rates, absorbed personal savings, leaving little space for productive investments. The economy grew very little up to 2006, less than the world average. Internationally, the government returned to a certain extent to a position of independence, according to the principles of traditional Brazilian diplomacy. Yet it slowly began to assume unrealistic and essentially
Historical Overview of the 20th Century
25
ideological stands, with traces of South Americanism and surges of antiAmericanism. In the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), which was already facing problems, it became even more difficult to achieve basic objectives. The policy of Latin-American integration, which was stressed in official speeches, passed through a number of reversals, mainly as a result of some traditional and other new bilateral misunderstandings. Both the MERCOSUR and the Andes Community were weakened by dissention concerning a free economy, exacerbation of conflicts of material interest, and misunderstandings of a material and political nature. Brazil’s stand was not comfortable in this context. Relations with Argentina in the energy field were hampered by a supply crisis, and those with Bolivia, where Brazil had made major investments through PETROBRAS, were not doing well. In a countercurrent, the theme of South American integration was reactivated, but in turn underwent a major reversal due to the unilateral intervention of Venezuela in a number of domestic issues of other countries. Social projects were of course ambitious. Their progress maintained a positive trend over the long-term that was reflected in the decline of infant mortality rates and higher academic levels. Comparisons of the respective qualitative results, such as school attendance and health benefits, were relegated to second place. Specific actions, together with the systematic increase in the real value of the minimum wage and the income transfer policy rapidly increased the portion of the population served. The Family Grant programme resulted in a one-degree increase in the income level of needy populations. Strictly from an income point of view, the impact of the extensive coverage reached by these programmes had a quantifiable distributive effect. Some of the social programmes restricted to actions of assistance were compromised by the fact that the respective administrations were unprepared. Several specific policies followed each other in the domain of energy and had continuity despite all kinds of damage caused by the turmoil resulting from the electricity supply crisis of 2001, together with the corrective measures then adopted. The previous organization of the electric power sector was again partially reformed with significant changes, which will be reviewed at length in Chapter 3. The earlier directive for partial privatization in the petroleum area was inverted with the return of PETROBRAS to petrochemicals. A movement that can be defined as a counter-reform will be reviewed at length in Chapter 4. The indecision concerning the entry of natural gas continued without an institutional solution. The issue of gas-driven thermoelectric plants continues without any prospect of a return to a balanced position.
26
Energy in Brazil
After a long period of uncertainty, the first step for reinvesting in nuclear energy was taken with the decision to proceed with the installation of Angra III. The progressive institutional progress expected from the Regulating Agencies of public services appointed by the previous administration was interrupted due to the reduction of their respective powers and resources. In 2005, the Lula administration was negatively affected by the eruption of an ethical crisis on the stage of the National Congress, involving the Labour Party and the government itself in illicit transactions. Several reforms and government programmes were hindered by the temporary paralysis of the Congress. President Lula’s first four years in office ended with his re-election for a second term, during which he intends to give greater importance to infrastructure and economic growth without disrupting income distribution policies. At the beginning of his second term, there continued to be a significant surplus in current foreign trade and foreign reserves remained at a comfortable level. However, due to an overvalued currency exchange rate, the positive margin between exports and imports decreased. The Central Bank did not reduce the referenced interest rates sufficiently, so Brazil continued to practise one of the highest interest rates in the world, keeping the government’s domestic debt at 47 per cent of the GDP. Inflation was contained. The stock market expanded and the stock exchange became stronger, which, together with substantial direct foreign investments, gave new life to the expansion of productive projects. At the end of 2007, there were clear signs of sustained economic growth, but at the same time some critical financial issues had to be faced at the federal government level, such as increasing current expenses and a social security deficit. An important feature was the improvement of all income distribution indicators, both at the personal income level and among regions. The proportion of an officially contracted labour force also increased.
The concentrated geography After four centuries of development, the Brazilian economy is concentrated geographically, both in terms of population density and economic activities. This is shown in Figure A1.1 (see Appendix 1), which represents the administrative subdivision of the country into states and regions. Figure A1.4 shows distribution of the population and Figure A1.5, industry. The Southeast and South enjoy the greatest development. The Northeast, although densely inhabited, suffers climate difficulties and
Historical Overview of the 20th Century
27
displays the lowest level of development. The Central-West has been the scene of rapid population growth since the second half of the 20th century, and the Northern Region, almost coincident with the Amazon biome, is the object of a new form of occupation with contradictory aspects of development and environment.
Chapter 2
Energy and Economic Growth: A Statistical Abstract
A retrospective of Brazil’s economic development Systematic and compatible unified economic statistics of domestic financial records related to national accounts, balance of payments and price indices only became available in Brazil as of 1947, when the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) was founded. Since then, debates on economic development and objective formulas have been more consistent, although there existed less concrete information on the nation’s economic organization and the living conditions of the population than there is as of 2009. Only in 1970 were systematic and compatible surveys carried out and an appropriate methodology established for regular studies of the supply and demand of the various forms of energy. These limitations did not stop evaluations of the magnitude of the evolution of some financial and energy indices since the beginning of the century. Figure 2.1 shows the evolution of the key indices of the entire economic process. Figure 2.1 shows that, until the 1940s, the country’s economic growth was sustained at a moderate rate and faced some temporary difficulties. It then took a new impetus until 1980, with a brief interruption between 1962 and 1964. At the end of the last century and at the beginning of the new, evolution was moderate and suffered a number of interruptions. Keeping in mind that there has always been inflation in Brazil to a greater or lesser degree, and that its relationship to economic growth has been the object of incessant debates both here and abroad, it seemed appropriate to prepare a synoptic table covering the evolution of the actual product and of the price index as of 1947, when more information became available. Table 2.1 is a much-simplified presentation of the data, which nevertheless allows us to note two very distinct periods in the economic history of the country: •
from 1947 to 1980, when accentuated sustained economic growth took place, accompanied by persistent, although moderate, inflation, with highs and lows;
30
Energy in Brazil
500
450 Interruption of growth 400
350
300 Discontinuities Temporary difficulties 250 200
150
100 50
0 1902 1907 1912
1917 1922 1927 1932 1937 1942 1947 1952 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992
1997 2002 2007
Years
Source: Brazilian Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA). Series GDP per capita, US$, 2007
Figure 2.1 Per-capita economic growth, 1902–2007 (Index, 1949 = 100)
Table 2.1 Economic growth and inflation, 1948–2007 (mean annual growth rates in percentages) Period
Years Gross domestic product
1948–61
14
1962–64 1965–67
3 3
1968–74
7
1975–80
6
1948–80 1981–94
33 14
1995–2002
8
2003–2007
5
1981–2007 27
Mean growth 7.6% and per capita 4.6% Abrupt drop Modest recovery Mean 4.4% and per capita 1.5% Strong growth, mean 10.7% and per capita 7.9% Fluctuating growth, mean 6.9% p.a. and per capita 4.4%p.a. Mean 7.5% and per capita 4.6% Stagnant. Mean 2.0% and per capita 0.5% Stagnant. Mean 2.3% and per capita 0.7% Modest recovery. Mean 3.5% and per capita 1.8% Mean 2.3% and per capita 0.8%
Inflation Increasing from less than 10% to >30%, more than 30% Rapid increase up to 90% in 1963 Decreasing. Returns to 30% Decreasing to 15.5% in 1973 Increase reaches 110% p.a. in 1980 Median 34% Hyperinflation. Maximum of 2,708% and median of 444% Stabilizing. Median 10% Stabilizing. Median 6% Means and medians have no meaning due to the hyperinflation period
Source: IPEA. For gross domestic product (GDP): Series – Gross Domestic Product (PIB), Annual Real Variation. For Inflation: Series IGP-DI, variation (% p.a.)
Energy and Economic Growth: A Statistical Abstract •
31
from 1981 to 2007, when sustained growth ceased, inflation went completely out of control and soared during a first stage, requiring a second stage of considerable effort to accomplish recovery until it gained relative monetary stability.
The years of sustained economic growth until 1980 Prior to 1950, and after the 1930 Revolution, the nationalistic strategy was based on the concept of national security and the need to reduce foreign dependence on basic imports considered to be strategic. There was an avalanche of sector plans including a major involvement of the state. After that, during the first of the periods under consideration, namely from 1948 to 1980, the federal government’s plans for industrialization were invariably based on specific physical projects, the majority of which were drawn up on a technical basis. Direct state action was always included, along with national and foreign private enterprise in different proportions, according to the times and the intensity of nationalistic or pro-state beliefs. The integration of these initiatives in an already more quantified global development project occurred during the government of President Kubitschek, who issued the Targets Plan (Plano de Metas) that was primarily aimed at strengthening the transportation and energy infrastructure. Less-efficient attempts to apply the same criteria to the social scenario received little attention due to greater political interference and did not have much success. Environmental issues had not yet gained any importance. As a result of good decisions, and despite mistakes and distortions, as well as a break in the development momentum between 1962 and 1964, Brazil achieved a noteworthy average economic growth of approximately 7.5 per cent per year over 33 years. The ever-present inflation, together with a growth rate of 10–30 per cent per year, spiralled in 1963 to more than 90 per cent. The economic and political crisis ended with the fall of the civilian government, which was replaced by a series of authoritarian administrations that lasted 15 years. The first military government after this crisis dealt with curbing the inflationary spiral, reorganized public finances mainly to achieve monetary stability and reduced inflation back to the 30 per cent level. At the same time, significant steps were taken to modernize Brazil’s administration and economy. Growth targets continued to predominate in subsequent governments and National Development Plans were drawn up with an ever increasing scope. These helped to consolidate the strategy for building a solid
32
Energy in Brazil
infrastructure and for industrialization founded on the substitution of imports, although the latter continued without much change until the end of the 1970s. Domestic savings were on the increase, rising from 13 per cent of the GDP in 1948 to 21 per cent in 1969; thereafter, they remained fairly stable at this level. The balance of government finances continued positively until 1982, but for the 1962–69 period of crisis and recovery. The government’s capacity to save was decisive for the country’s economy, together with the decision to use it to promote growth. No information on the social sector exists prior to 1960. Thereafter, major population growth, the continued increase in per-capita income and the creation of jobs propitiated the inclusion of a significant portion of the population who had previously been excluded from the market economy. Poverty was greatly reduced between 1970 and 1980, but the traditional unsatisfactory distribution of income was not solved.
The troubled years from 1980 to 1994 The 1980s commenced under the impact of the second oil crisis and the consequences of an overly ambitious development strategy. Inflation accelerated and spiralled to a new high, around 100 per cent. Government accounts toppled, reaching negative figures. Public administration and the majority of companies under state control deteriorated, weakening the economy, which faced serious difficulties that continued until the 1990s. Recovery plans followed each other, envisaging growth, which was, as always, a national objective. From a strictly economic growth point of view, the 1980s, during which the domestic economy fluctuated, were lost. With a drop in production lasting several years and other years with good results, the average domestic growth rate dropped to 2 per cent p.a. in the period from 1981 to 1994, so that the per capital income (0.5 per cent) was very close to stagnation. Inflation was the dominant feature in the domestic economy, always situated above 50%. Its first explosive upsurge occurred at the beginning of the 1980s, and was followed by another that started relentlessly in 1987. By 1989, inflation had spiralled out of control, reaching previously unimaginable levels. The social scenario remained relatively stable, both regarding inequality and poverty. The end of that period was also marked by important, predominantly political events: the 1988 Constitution, with its ambiguities and regulatory nature; the plebiscite, in which the population voted to confirm the
Energy and Economic Growth: A Statistical Abstract
33
country’s traditional presidential regime; the turbulent substitution of the president of the republic by his vice president; and, finally, the constitutional revision of 1993, based on the triple objective of eliminating the state from entrepreneurial activities, abolishing restrictions to foreign capital and establishing competitive markets in areas previously occupied by monopolies, by right or in fact. It also appeared that Brazil’s traditional and long trade protection barriers contributed to a generalized accommodation and inefficiency in national industry. It therefore became necessary to intensify the process of opening Brazil to imports, which had already been initiated. Aside from institutional reforms, the government elected in 1989 was unsuccessful in implementing a financial programme in keeping with the challenge posed by the hyperinflation that continued its unmitigated ascent, until it reached the unbelievable peak of 2,708 per cent in 1993! The succeeding government had to concentrate its attentions on the task of defeating inflation and establishing, in the short-term, a minimum of economic order so that production activities could revert to normal. The Real Plan (Plano Real) drawn up by the Minister of Finance, who was subsequently to be elected president, was of major importance.
In search of a new strategy, from 1995 Besides continuing and expanding the political reforms of the previous government, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who remained in office for two terms, from 1995 to 2002, gave immediate priority to consolidating the victory over inflation. The foundations of the Real Plan introduced in 1994 proved to be efficient in the effective reduction of inflation, leading to a drop from 59 per cent in 1995 to 6 per cent in 1996. Inflation was truly contained, fluctuating between a minimum of 3.6 per cent, in 1998, and a maximum of 12 per cent, in 2001. The median rate for the period 1995–2001 was 10 per cent. Notwithstanding a minor surge in 2000, growth continued at the modest level of 2.4 per cent. In the social sphere, the Real Plan led to a strong and immediate reduction in poverty and some improvement in the distribution of income. The basis of the strategy adopted consisted of allowing more imports and establishing a fixed and overvalued currency exchange rate, to allow the importation of consumer and durable goods for fomenting competition in the domestic market and thus containing price increases. The permanence of a fixed exchange rate, becoming increasingly overvalued as a
34
Energy in Brazil
consequence of residual inflation, produced, however, as a corollary, an increasing imbalance in the trade balance. After the financial crises of Southeast Asia in 1997 and of Russia in 1998, there was in 1999 an attack on the real that led to a change in the exchange policy of the Real Plan. Under this change, confused decisions were taken amidst misunderstandings within the federal government. These issues culminated in a change in the hierarchy of the Central Bank. Exchange devaluation, accepted and recognized as inevitable, corrected the mistake of a too-lengthy permanence of the exchange anchor through an overvalued currency. The exchange rate established at R$1.00 for US$1.00 was soon altered, reaching R$3.00 in 2003–04. It then declined continuously until 2007, when it remained just below R$2.00. Due to the alteration in the exchange rate policy in 1999, the national economic structure became more realistic and required new readjustments in relative prices and new bases for exports, to which the country quickly adapted. At the beginning of the 21st century, the annual inflation rate varied little, fluctuating between 6 per cent and 8 per cent p.a., except in 2003, when a momentary increase occurred. The exchange rate had been kept fairly steady since the Real Plan (R$1.00/US$) until 1998. It changed significantly in 1999, when the flexible exchange rate was implemented (R$1.80/US$). The real suffered constant devaluations until 2004 (R$3.10/US$), when it began to strengthen until it reached the level of R$1.80/US$ at the end of 2007.
The foreign scene Since the 1940s the world economic scenario had been favourable to the country’s development, and funds from international agencies were provided under excellent terms, although in moderate amounts when compared with the size of Brazil’s economy. Foreign capital did, however, have major qualitative impacts on the country’s industrial diversification. Traditionally, the domestic economic strategy included with some continuity a policy of substitution of imports that was usually cautious and moderate, but, at times, nationalization efforts were exaggerated. Exports were of little concern. Foreign transactions, usually resulting in deficits, fluctuated around –1 per cent of the GDP until 1975, when the oil crisis led to a price imbalance of 6 per cent of the GDP. The deficit remained very negative and worsened even more due to the impact of the second oil crisis in 1979. After the effects of the second oil crisis had been absorbed, balances of current transactions remained between –2 per cent and +1 per cent
Energy and Economic Growth: A Statistical Abstract
35
2% Moratorium
Oil price crises
‘Real’ Plan
1% Flexible Exchange 2007
2003
1999
1995
1991
1987
1983
1979
1975
1971
1967
1963
1959
1955
1951
1947
0%
( )
–1% –2% –3% –4% –5% –6% –7%
Source: IPEA, Series: Current Transactions (% of GDP), 2008
Figure 2.2 Current foreign transactions
(Figure 2.2). Under the Real Plan, Brazil suffered the impact of the Mexican moratorium and the subsequent crisis of the Latin American foreign debt. As a result, balances became once again very negative and remained thus until the introduction of a flexible exchange rate in 1999. The foreign debt, which had been kept at a moderate level until 1969 when compared with the GDP, proceeded to increase until 1986, coincidentally with the impetus of the country’s economic growth. Due to the ensuing difficulties, the government decided to decree a moratorium on the foreign debt. Foreign financial transactions came practically to a halt until extensive and successful negotiations in 1993 resulted in the country’s financial opening in 1994. The introduction of the flexible exchange rate not only had an impact on the balance of current deals; it also paved the way for a positive inflow of foreign capital. Together these two factors caused a dramatic reduction in the foreign debt (Figure 2.3).
Sources of primary energy up to 1970 Simultaneously with the economic evolution described above, major alterations took place in the energy field. The change in relative positions can, however, only be quantified as of 1940, when reliable surveys were carried out in Brazil. But the difficulties in relation to firewood, with its scattered production and consumption, were known and are calculated to
36
Energy in Brazil 600% Flexible exchange
Moratorium 500%
Exports (%)
400%
300%
200%
100%
2007
2004
2001
1998
1995
1992
1989
1986
1983
1980
1977
1974
1971
1968
1965
1962
1959
1956
0%
Year
Source: IPEA, Series: Foreign Debt and Exports FOB, 2008
Figure 2.3 Foreign debt correspond to well over 80 per cent of the domestic supply at the beginning of the 20th century. An approximate picture of the relative positions occupied by the different primary sources in the domestic energy supply between the years 1940 and 1970 is shown in Table 2.2. The basic change was the increase in the use of oil and the fall in the proportion of firewood, even though the latter continued at a high level at the end of the period.
Energy balance since 1970 At the beginning of the 1970s, a number of national consulting companies were founded in order to jointly evaluate the country’s energy matrix in 1970. Work was completed in 1973, and its results served as a basis for subsequent assessments that were published under the title of National Table 2.2 Total primary energy supply in Brazil by source (%) Source
1940
1950
1960
1970
Coal Oil Hydro Wood Sugar cane
6.4 6.4 1.5 83.3 2.4
4.8 12.9 1.6 78.1 2.7
2.9 25.7 3.2 63.9 4.3
3.6 38.0 5.1 47.6 5.7
Source: MME. Balanço Energético Nacional (BEN) 2007, Table 1.12a
Energy and Economic Growth: A Statistical Abstract
37
Energy Balance (BEN). The relationship between income and energy is depicted in Figure 2.4. It should be noted that the division of the periods in this figure, taken from the BEN, do not exactly match those adopted in Table 2.1. The fluctuations in the use of energy result not only from the growth–stagnation phases of the economy, the hyperinflation–monetary recuperation, but also from the favourable–unfavourable hydrological events, international oil prices and the 2001 crisis, which was due to various causes. In physical terms, domestic energy supply exceeded 67 million tons of oil equivalent (TOE) in 1970, reaching 226 million in 2006. During this period of strong economic growth (1970–80), the increase in the supply of energy was significantly below that of income. Before long, however, in the first economically difficult years that followed (1980–85), increases in the use of energy were much superior to those of the GDP. Due to the continuing economic difficulties (1985–93), both were reduced to much lower levels, less than 2 per cent p.a. After the hyperinflation, when the domestic economy began to be reorganized (1993–97), energy increased more than the GDP, tending to follow (1996–2006) the same fluctuations, both low. Average annual growth rates in the 36 years were 4.5 per cent for the GDP and 3.4 per cent for energy, in a ratio of 0.85 per cent. In 2005, primary energy supply in relation to the GDP was on a level of 0.31 TOE/GDP (in US$1,000) and 0.15/GDP purchasing power 10 9 GDP
TPES
8
Annual growth (%)
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1970–80
1980–85
1985–93
1993–97
1997–2007
1970–2007
Sources: MME, BEN 2007, Graph 18; and BEN 2008, Table 7.1
Figure 2.4 GDP and total primary energy supply (TPES) (mean annual growth, %)
38
Energy in Brazil
Table 2.3 Total primary energy supply and CO2 emissions Indicator TPES/Population (TOE/capita) TPES/GDP (TOE/US$1,000) TPES/GDP, ppp (TOE/US$1,000) Emissions (tCO2/TPES)
World
OECD
Brazil
1.80 0.31 0.20 –
4.70 0.19 0.18 2.32
1.18 0.29 0.15 1.48
Source: International Energy Agency (IEA) Key World Energy Statistics. Selected indicators for 2006
parity (ppp). Energy per capita consumption was 1.12 TOE/inhabitant, a moderate figure when compared with international indices. CO2 emissions per unit of energy utilized are very much lower in Brazil than in the Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development (OECD), and in the world as a whole, in keeping with the use of renewable energy (Table 2.3). The composition of the energy supply in Brazil shows gradual deviations between relative positions of the majority of primary sources, notwithstanding major institutional changes, the impact caused by oil discoveries, the electric power crisis and the entry of natural gas. The changes in position are gradual because they result mainly from the long period of maturation of investments in energy. Figures 2.5 and 2.6 depict the participation of primary sources of renewable and non-renewable energy between 1970 and 2006. Relevant changes took place. The firewood–vegetal-coal mix, whose participation dropped by 50 per cent during the 1970s and another 50 per cent by 2000, recovered a little in 2005. Natural gas doubled between 2000 and 2006 with imports from Bolivia, having started at a very low level. Lesser changes occurred in oil, which fluctuated between 47 per cent and 37 per cent. Hydroelectric power increased greatly until 2000, but declined slightly up to 2007. The share of sugar cane derivatives grew between 1970 and 1990, fluctuating later, with a steady increase in 2005– 07. Mineral coal, besides being relatively less important, remained stationary since the 1990s. Uranium started to make a modest appearance after Angra II entered into operation. Although they grew constantly, the sum of new sources enjoyed only a moderate increase, reaching 3.2 per cent in 2007.
Renewable energy in Brazil and worldwide The high proportion of renewable energy, 45 per cent of the Brazilian energy matrix in 2006, places the country in an unusual position within the world scenario, as can be seen in Figure 2.7.
Energy and Economic Growth: A Statistical Abstract
39
50% Hydro Wood Sugar Cane Others
45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% 1970
1980
1990
2000
2007
Source: MME, BEN 2008, Table 1.12b
Figure 2.5 Total primary renewable energy supply in Brazil (%)
60% Oil Natural Gas Coal Uranium
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0% 1970
1980
1990
2000
Source: MME, BEN 2008, Table 1.12b
Figure 2.6 Total primary non-renewable energy supply in Brazil (%)
2007
40
Energy in Brazil
100% 90%
Renewables Non-Renewables
80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Brazil
OECD
World
Source: MME. BEN 2007, Graph 7
Figure 2.7 Primary energy supply – renewable and non-renewable (%) (Brazil, the OECD and the World) The predominance of renewable sources in Brazil is even more accentuated when it comes to energy for generating electricity. The electric power system, notwithstanding the introduction of new sources of primary energy, continues to depend mostly on hydro sources which, in 2007, contributed 84 per cent to electricity generation. The expansion of hydro power was supported by the natural conditions prevailing in the coastal regions where rivers run to the interior with significant falls and rainfall is abundant (see Appendix 1, Figures A1.2 and A1.3). Other renewable sources, with emphasis on sugar cane, contributed 3 per cent, so that the total of renewable sources used in the generation of electricity reached 87 per cent.
Total energy consumption Major changes have taken place in the relative participation of the various sectors in the total consumption of energy from all sources during the last 34 years (Table 2.4). Concentration of energy consumption in industry and transportation, predominantly related to highways, has continued.
Energy and Economic Growth: A Statistical Abstract
41
Table 2.4 Total energy consumption in Brazil by sector (%) Sector
1970
1980
1990
2000
2007
Non-energy uses Energy Households Commerce and government Agriculture Transportation Industry
2.4 2.5 35.5 2.0 8.6 21.2 27.7
5.4 5.6 20.1 2.8 5.5 24.6 35.9
7.8 9.4 14.1 3.7 4.7 25.8 34.1
8.3 7.5 12.0 4.8 4.3 27.6 35.6
6.6 9.8 10.3 4.4 4.2 26.7 38.0
Source: MME, BEN 2008, Table 14b
Residential consumption has remained stable after losing its relative importance in the 1970s and 1980s.
Dependence on foreign energy An issue that has always been cause for concern in view of the persisting difficulties in the balance of payments has been dependence on foreign energy, especially on oil. There occurred a considerable change in this sphere. In Table 2.5 foreign dependence is calculated in physical terms such as the ratio between net imports (imports less exports) and national consumption. On the whole, between 1990 and 2004, this dependence dropped from a maximum of 37 per cent in 1990 to 9 per cent in 2006. The decline in dependence on oil imports during this period was spectacular, dropping from 49 per cent to nil. Metallurgical type coal for steel mills is still all imported since Brazil does not have economically exploitable reserves of an appropriate quality. Since 1990, the insignificant consumption needs of natural gas have been entirely covered by domestic sources. The importation of electricity corresponds to Paraguay’s portion of energy from the Itaipu hydroelectric plant that is acquired by Brazil.
Table 2.5 Dependence on energy imports by source (% of Brazilian consumption) Source Total Oil Coal Natural gas Electricity
1990
2000
2007
37 49 67 0 12
32 24 79 13 13
8 0 71 45 8
Source: MME, BEN 2008, Tables 1.7 and 2.1–2.4
Chapter 3
Hydroelectric Power
Brazilian electric power system Since the end of the 19th century, the Brazilian electric power system has been based on hydroelectricity. Compared with other large electric power systems, Brazil is the third largest producer of hydroelectricity, ranking after China and Canada, and fourth in installed capacity, after America, China and Canada. It has maintained a unique position regarding the proportion of hydro in total electric power generation, approximately 85 per cent. The predominantly hydro basis derives, on one hand, from the favourable natural conditions of a rugged surface and abundant rainfall in the southeastern and south regions (see Appendix 1, Figures A1.2 and A1.3) and, on the other hand, from the limitations of coal use due to the small reserves and their poor quality. More recently the arrival of natural gas has been dependent on unreliable importations and small domestic reserves.
Construction of the hydro-based system The construction of the electric power system involved three stages: the first, from the beginning of the 20th century until the Water Code of 1934; the second, until the CANAMBRA studies of 1963; and the third, from 1963 until the recent reforms. In the first stage practically all utilities were privately owned. There was no specific federal regulation; state and municipal governments granted licences and signed service contracts. A large number of small companies were founded to serve limited markets during the initial years of the 20th century. The most significant of these were the local subsidiaries of Brazilian Traction, a holding company from Toronto, the Light companies serving São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. They had a decisive role due to the scale of their hydro projects being amongst the largest and most economic in the world at that time. In 1905, the Ribeirão das Lages power plant produced 28 MW. From the local entrepreneurs there was an
44
Energy in Brazil
initiative to amalgamate several small companies into the Companhia Paulista de Força e Luz (CPFL; 1912). A little later the American and Foreign Power group (AMFORP) entered the country, setting up the Empresas Elétricas Brasileiras (1927), which became the second largest group in the country. The main feat was the construction by São Paulo Light of the Cubatão power plant (1926) conceived as a diversion to the coastal plain of waters running from the Serra do Mar range to the interior, with a drop of 700 m and a capacity of 76 MW. The second stage was marked by the Water Code of 1934, which distinguished the property rights of land from its hydro resources. The Water Code established a system of concessions and state regulation. The turning point, in 1945, was the creation of the Companhia Hidroelétrica do São Francisco (CHESF), a utility with the mission of building the Paulo Afonso power plant, with a capacity of 180 MW. It more than doubled the total existing capacity in the Northeast Region. Between 1953 and 1960, the foreign companies built two large plants: Nilo Peçanha, with 330 MW by Rio Light; and Peixoto, with 192 MW by CPFL (at the time a subsidiary of AMFORP). Later in the decade other significant events were the regulation of the Water Code and the founding of a federal governmentcontrolled company to build the Furnas project, producing 1,200 MW, with the first transmission line grid connecting the São Paulo, Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro systems. From there on, almost all new plants and transmission systems were federal or state owned. In 1961, the direct participation of the federal government in electric power was consolidated through the constitution of ELETROBRÁS, which became a holding of all federal government investments in the sector. The third stage resulted directly from studies and recommendations of the CANAMBRA, a group of consultants that worked closely with the staff of existing companies, centred in Furnas. The technical, economic and financial appraisal of individual power-plant projects was substituted by a global view of all projects available, which resulted in the definition of an ideal sequence of constructions. Centralized expansion planning and coordination of system operations marked subsequent developments until the partial privatization reforms of the 1990s, which will be analysed in detail in this chapter. The highlight of this period was the construction of the binational Itaipu power plant at the famous Sete Quedas natural waterfall, at the border with Paraguay, with a capacity of 12,000 MW. Brazil was again building the largest plant in the world at that time. It is relevant to recall that this system essentially differs from the thermal-based systems of industrialized countries, in which operational optimization is based on the physical demand of energy and the corresponding generation capacity, as well as on the value of energy at each
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45
point in time. The plants are staggered according to their cost and go online sequentially, starting with the most economical. In a predominant hydro system, the operation is closely linked to the inflow to the plant reservoirs, which in turn depends on the meteorology, with annual and multi-annual cycles. Under these circumstances, optimization of hydro resources over the long-term requires a confrontation between present and future values, especially as regards the water accumulated in the reservoirs. Thermal and hydro plants play an important complementary part in making the best use of hydro resources and reducing risks resulting from adverse hydrology. To allow thermal plants to fully carry out their complementary mission, flexible operational units are needed, which restricts the choice of projects. These characteristics have a decisive influence on programming expansion. In Brazil, there is the additional national concern with continued economic growth, and the resulting increase in the demand for energy requires a spread of optimistic and pessimistic estimates in an inevitably subjective plan, regardless of how efficient the procedures adopted. The gap between projections expands over time and is widest in the basic hydro system due to the longer maturity time of the generating plants. As a consequence, decisions taken by those responsible for the execution of the programmes gain in importance. Detecting the risk of rationing over the long-term is a complex procedure. As a result, continued efforts had to be made to create systematic procedures and, later, mathematical formulas, to deal with the many variables involved in optimizing the electric power system.
Methods of optimization The search for a way to optimize the hydrothermal system in long-term expansion plans, as well as in operational programmes, progressed as experience was acquired. The methodology adopted at the beginning was based on the concept of the firm energy originating from each plant that corresponded to the generation possible in case of recurrence of the hydro dry period of 1952–56, the worst ever recorded. As probabilistic studies were made, based on the same hydrological data, it was later realized that this methodology meant risking a shortfall of around 3 per cent. The studies served as a basis for the power plant construction programme to be followed, as well as for drawing up operational directives, synthesized in a lower storage limit curve that showed the minimum level that had to be observed in operations at each period for each regulating reservoir or each hydroelectric cascade in the same basin. A drop below
46
Energy in Brazil
this limit would lead to the need for adding thermal generation. The time unit used was one month. These general conditions continued to be valid in subsequent programmes. Coordinating the operation of the plants that were in increasing numbers connected to the integrated system was, thus, an attempt to optimize the physical hydro resources. The system’s load factor was relatively low, so that the design of hydroelectric plants was based on a capacity that was double the respective firmgenerating capacity. In view of the large investment in capacity and the low running costs, the binary tariffs in use contained a large demand component and a low proportion of the energy parcel. With the growing industrialization of the country, the load factor rose and the energy portion gained in importance in programming the system’s operations. ELETROBRÁS appointed permanent, informal study groups to carry out planning and operating tasks which, in time, gained in importance. Planning was consolidated in the Coordinating Group for the Planning of the Electric Power System (GCPS), appointed in 1980. This group included ten public utilities under federal and state control and one private company, the Light, the country’s main distributor. Distinctions were made between regions in the North–Northeast, Southeast–Central-West and South. The Coordinating Committee for Grid Operations (CCOI), which were active in the southeast (1969) and south (1971) systems, were in charge of operations. When Brazil and Paraguay took the decision to build the huge hydroelectric plant of Itaipu, the respective legislation officially assigned to ELETROBRÁS the responsibility for drawing up a plan to meet demand up to 1990 in the South and Southeast regions of Brazil. This ‘Plan 90’ was the first to consider the expansion of these systems jointly, including also part of the Central-West Region whose interconnection was made possible through transmission lines from Itaipu. It was drawn up with the cooperation of the state companies and published in December 1974. There followed equivalent plans at five-year intervals. Plan 90, as well as the two subsequent plans, included demand projections based on prospects of strong economic growth. They turned out to be over-dimensioned when the pace of the country’s growth slowed down. On the other hand, the investments made resulted in an excess capacity that allowed the physical survival of the system for some years after financial difficulties assailed it. The Itaipu legislation included the concept of hydrothermal operation to be guided by the principle of ‘sharing the onus and the advantages resulting from the consumption of fossil fuels for generating electric power’. Another consequence of the Itaipu legislation was the appointment of the Group of Interconnected Operations Coordination (GCOI) within
Hydroelectric Power
47
ELETROBRÁS. It incorporated the two CCOI and was made responsible for defining the volume of power and energy supplies to be contracted yearly from generation subsidiaries of ELETROBRÁS, respectively Furnas and ELETROSUL, by companies in the Southeast and South. These two subsidiaries also took on the responsibility for the flow of energy output from Itaipu. Thereafter, taking advantage of the hydrological diversity of the south and southeast basins became important. This attitude was only extended to the regions in the north and northeast at a much later date, when the corresponding interconnection was made. GCOI was responsible for annually programming operations, coordinating the output of the plants in the integrated system and administrating the Fuel Consumption Account (CCC), through which the thermal plants were paid for their fuel, the coal and petroleum by-products used. The fuel cost was shared by all consumers of the integrated system. It was also the responsibility of GCOI to calculate and settle accounts referring to transfers between plants, as well as to transfers resulting from the CCC mechanism. As an instrument of physical optimization, this procedure brought about significant gains and caused moderate expenditures. An analysis of the cost of the CCC, represented by the expense incurred with all fuels in relation to the gross receipts of the South–Southeast–Central-West system between 1992 and 1997, shows that annual estimates varied between 1.2 per cent and 2.3 per cent and that actual expenditures varied between 1.0 per cent and 1.6 per cent. The CCC system was, nevertheless, criticized by the major utilities under state control. They were of the opinion that it would be sufficient to maintain a surplus in the installed capacity of the hydroelectric plants in relation to expected demand to ensure market supply, even in a situation of critical hydrology. The complementary role of thermoelectric plants in the system was frequently criticized because it included a subsidy awarded to producers of coal when a price was accepted that did not correspond to that which could have been achieved in an efficient operation of both the mines and the plants. The subsidy could, however, have been corrected without necessarily abolishing the mechanism, as was done when the sector was reorganized.
Evolution of mathematical models In the sequence of work carried out within ELETROBRÁS since the CANAMBRA project, those responsible for operational simulations
48
Energy in Brazil
looked for a way to ensure market supply at the lowest total cost for a specific period, while allowing for a predetermined risk of failing to meet demand. When this work was transferred to the Electric Power Research Centre (CEPEL), the Newave model was developed and, after testing, came into official use in 1999. A ten-year forecast, later reduced to five years with monthly stages, was maintained. The model continued to be applied at a 5 per cent risk level, although it allowed for the adoption of other more rigid criteria. Instead of simple utilization of historical hydrology, presuming that it might recur, a probabilistic model was adopted based on the same hydrological data, but taking two premises into account: 1 that the influx during a specific month and place depended on the influx of ‘p’ previous months; 2 that in view of the seasonality of the hydrological regime, for each month of a cycle the ‘p’ number of previous months that had a significant influence over it would vary. Bearing in mind Brazil’s extensive territory, it became necessary when drawing up models not only to subdivide the market, but also to take into account all the restrictions on transmission lines which limit the transfer capacity between sub-markets. Considering the purpose of the model, it was deemed appropriate to simplify it by aggregating all the reservoirs of each region in one equivalent figure in which the volumes of water stored were converted into power (megawatt-hours), taking into account in each case the respective useful head of water and the cascade effect of the plants in the same hydrographic basin. The practical use of the Newave model requires prior definitions regarding four fundamental factors: a forecast of demand; expansion of the system (generation and transmission); variable costs of thermal generation; and corresponding cost of possible future rationing. Immediate costs of current expenditures are simple and easy to estimate and result from concomitant decisions. Future costs are more difficult to predict as they involve economic losses caused by possible power rationing as well as fuel costs. These losses are estimated in macroeconomic terms generally based on the ratio between variations in revenue and energy consumption and translated into the value of energy-elasticity. Finally, it becomes necessary to calculate the current value of future costs to be added to current costs in order to reach the total cost, and this involves the choice of an inevitably arbitrary discount rate. A 10 per cent rate was adopted. The Newave model came into use together with a discussion on the reform of the sector at a time when there already existed a scenario of a
Hydroelectric Power
49
continued decline in reservoir storage, pointing to future insufficiency in the ability to supply the market.
The role of thermal plants in Brazil Carrying out its complementary role in the Brazilian hydrothermal system requires flexibility of operation and this restricts the choice of the type of thermal plant. For technological reasons, nuclear plants are inflexible, and this reduces their participation in the optimization process notwithstanding their relevance at the base of the system. Coal-driven plants, on the other hand, can operate under greater seasonal variations thanks to their temporary fuel storage availability in open-air deposits, provided the minimum limits for the regular purchase of coal are observed and make economical mining viable. Similarly, fuel oil-driven plants can rely on reserve deposits in tanks. Gas-driven plants, when supplied with fuel based on take-or-pay contracts for supplies or on ship-or-pay in pipeline transportation, such as those used for gas imported from Bolivia, have less flexibility. The portion of obligatory payment, especially for transportation, is more onerous when the plants are not required to operate at a high-capacity factor. When planning for expansion of the system, ELETROBRÁS always gave preference to hydroelectricity. Therefore, the share of thermal plants in the national generation capacity, including the quota of the Itaipu Binational plant assigned to Brazil, decreased as of 1972, until it reached a minimum of 13 per cent in 1999 (Figure 3.1). Thereafter it increased slowly, reinforced by the constant entry of natural gas plants since 2001. It was already clear by the end of the 20th century that the proportion of thermal plants had fallen to a critically low level and that it would be necessary from an operational point of view to increase it substantially. While no in-depth study on the ideal proportion of flexible thermal plants had been made, it was presumed that it would be convenient to have a capacity to the order of 20 per cent available over the medium term. This level was surpassed statistically in 2006 and reached 22 per cent, including 2 per cent from nuclear plants. However, it should be borne in mind that this is a deceptive figure from the point of view of contributing to the system’s operational balance because the increase was almost entirely due to gas-driven plants. As a result of a series of negative coincidences, which will be referred to later, for some time these plants lacked sufficient fuel with which to carry out their mission. The true operational capacity of the flexible thermal park is thus still considerably below 20 per cent.
50
Energy in Brazil
100% 90% 80% 77.18%
Generation capacity
70% 60% 50% 40% 30%
22.8%
20% 10% 2005
2003
2001
1999
1997
1995
1993
1991
1989
1987
1985
1983
1981
1979
1977
1975
1973
1971
1969
1967
1965
0%
Note: Hydro capacity includes half the capacity of Itaipu; thermal capacity includes nuclear energy Sources: Up to 1973, Statistical Bulletin issued by the Brazilian Committee of the World Energy Council; after 1974, MME, BEN 2007, Table A1
Figure 3.1 Hydro and thermal generation capacity (%)
The electric power sector under discussion The troubles that Brazil’s economy faced in the 1980s (Table 2.1) had direct repercussions on the electric power sector. Between 1988 and 1989, the electric power companies jointly undertook a study of the situation and of the sector’s prospects, named Institutional Revision of the Electric Power Sector (REVISE). The overall analysis made at that time identified the main problems facing the system. The companies did not always see eye-to-eye in their work, conflicts arising principally between ELETROBRÁS and the state utilities in the Southeast Region, as well as with the governments of the politically more influential states, as to the solutions that should be adopted. There remained, however, substantial material for later studies. In essence, the electric power system in effect in Brazil since 1957 was still valid, but in the 1990s the financial and administrative crises were clearly revealed in the large electric power companies. They resulted from a number of events that led to stopping the construction of generation plants and to inadequate transmission and distribution systems. These facts pointed to the risk of a supply crisis over the medium term.
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51
The situation was as follows: 1 The supporting tripod had collapsed: one-third of resources generated by tariffs had been arbitrarily contained since 1976; one-third of resources from taxes and specific loans was eliminated by the 1988 Constitution; and one-third from loans taken from international agencies was reduced. The World Bank revised its position in support of investments in infrastructure under the responsibility of state companies, claiming that these were no longer playing their respective roles efficiently, and recommended a new model that would foster competition.1 The official financing was replaced by a system of private funding from abroad known as ‘Project Finance’, whose repayment terms were generally inadequate for investments in electric power generation. 2 There was no longer any confidence in the administrative quality of some of the major state companies. In the beginning, this was only felt by a limited circle of people who participated or had participated in one way or another in these administrations, but successive negative events caused the knowledge of the administrative deterioration to enter the public domain. The inability of the state to sustain the expansion became evident and this led them to seek means of attracting private capital; the structure had already received a fatal blow when a discussion concerning a reorganization of the sector started and preliminary corrective measures were adopted.
First steps towards reform A 1993 law revoked the Water Code in practice and the corresponding regulation as far as it concerned the economic system of the electric power utilities. Tariffs based on the prefixed and guaranteed remuneration of investment foreseen in the Water Code, as well as the unfortunate national equalization of rates which had been implemented in 1974, were abolished. Due to the arbitrary tariff containment, the utilities had accumulated credits against the federal government. This led to the need for a major settlement of accounts with the Federal Treasury. The crucial issue of the concession of public services was approved by two laws concerned, respectively, with ‘the regime of concession and permission to provide public services’ and ‘norms for granting and extending said concessions’. That ended the practice of the utilities to reserve their rights on hydroelectric utilizations for an indefinite period. Thirty-three concessions were cancelled. Deadlines and conditions were established for legalizing and completing constructions considered to be in arrears. The
52
Energy in Brazil
new scenario created opportunities for partnerships between utilities and other private interests that encouraged the completion of constructions underway but not yet finished.
First stage of the 1995 reorganization of the electric power sector The administration of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso began in 1995 with proposals for privatization and changes in the electric power system. The precept of free access to the basic transmission system became official and a National Electric Power Agency (ANEEL) was founded as an autonomous entity linked to the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME), ‘to regulate and oversee the production, transmission, distribution and sale of electric power, in conformity with the policies and the directives of the Federal Government’ (Law 9,421/1996). It was up to this agency to discuss with the states the utilization of the watercourses for energy purposes and to make it compatible with the policy on hydro resources, which was still under study. The agency was also made responsible for compliance with the law for concession of public services where it concerned the exploitation of electric power and the utilization of hydro potentials, posting the necessary call for tenders. While this latest law was still circulating in Congress, the MME posted a tender for a comprehensive study of a reform of the electric power sector. The call for tenders covered four generic areas: new marketing arrangements for the sector; legal measures and their necessary regulations; institutional changes in the government and in the sector to supplement the marketing arrangements and regulations; and an analysis of the funding mechanisms and allocation of risks. The call for tenders also included a list of key issues for which suggested solutions were requested. A consortium headed by the consultants Coopers & Lybrand and Latham & Watkins (UK), with the collaboration of the Brazilian organizations Ulhôa Canto Advogados, Engevix and Main Engenharia, was chosen to carry out this study. At the same time, another organization was created in the sphere of MME’s Secretariat of Energy that became known as the RE-SEB project. It was put in charge of discussions and an exchange of opinions with four working groups corresponding to the areas defined in the call for tenders and adopted by the consultants. Approximately 200 Brazilian professionals participated in these discussions under varying conditions. The work of the consultants and the RE-SEB took place between August 1996 and August 1997. The working groups met at countless specialized meetings while usually also holding monthly plenary meetings.
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In December 1997, the consultants submitted a consolidated 247-page report that was to serve as a basis for the subsequent implementation work.2 In amalgamating legal and regulatory issues, they submitted no less than 19 recommendations concerning laws, regulations and contracts. A large number of these recommendations were adopted by the government, which implemented them by means of laws and other appropriate measures. Law 9,648/1998 altered countless earlier legal provisions and, among others, established a clear separation between generation and transmission prices. Later, a decree (2,655/1998) was published, resembling a minor code. It dealt with the exploitation of generation, transmission, distribution and marketing services, the wholesale market and the national operator of the electrical system. It also issued final provisions that defined the directives for initial contracts between generators and distributors.
Privatization While studies and arrangements for the reform of the electric power sector were still underway, it was decided to enforce the National Privatization Programme introduced by the previous government, despite the uncertainties that surrounded the system still in transition. In keeping with the dual directive of the Privatization Programme and the reorganization of the electric power sector, it was left to the BNDESPAR, a subsidiary of BNDES, to coordinate the sale of companies under federal and state control. The federal government posted calls for tenders for the sale of two distribution companies, the Espírito Santo Centrais Elétricas (ESCELSA) and the Light Serviços de Eletricidade. The former was small and the risks involved were limited, while the sale of the latter, a major and traditional company, was only finalized at the last minute, in May 1996, thanks to the presence of BNDES, which, besides being the seller, also took part as a purchaser together with the principal buyer, namely the Electricité de France (EDF). Of the state companies, only one was sold in the first round of bids. Due to the lack of the specific regulation, which was still in the making, there was a return to a regime of negotiated contracts between each public utility and the conceding power, such as the original Light contract at the beginning of the 20th century. Several states, especially those that were in a precarious financial situation, were also getting ready to privatize companies under their control.
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Energy in Brazil
Thus sales began prior to the formulation of a new specific regulation. The process was, in principle, conducted from a predominantly financial aspect, not taking into account the diversity of the situations. In the organization of an electric power system there are segments that can, with relative ease, transform themselves into independent activities, as is the case of any other industry operating in a market economy. Energy-producing companies and their consortiums are included here. They can freely sign contracts with large consumers and utilities for the sale of gross energy. Industry-owned power plants are also included in this group. Intrinsic monopolies are at the other extreme; for example, distribution operations that involve extensive urban lines that cannot be duplicated are traditionally in the hands of a single utility. Companies that own large plants of key importance to the system, with transmission lines and regional interconnections, are in an intermediary position. There were four companies under federal control in this situation, plus three companies under state control. The Itaipu Binational undertaking is unique in this context. An essentially different operation is the production and transmission of hydroelectric power in the Amazon region. It covers an extremely large, sparsely populated area that includes the Amazon forest. ELETRONORTE was founded to coordinate long-term studies on enterprises in this region where a competitive market was hardly conceivable. Despite the legal directives, influential political forces continued to be successful in contesting the privatization of the federal generating companies Furnas, CHESF and ELETRONORTE. Of all the major federal generation companies, only ELETROSUL was privatized. Two major companies under state control, Companhia Energética de Minas Gerais (CEMIG) and Companhia Paranaense de Energia (COPEL), were not privatized due to decisions taken by their respective governments. Of the large state-owned systems, only Centrais Elétricas de São Paulo (CESP) was dismembered in compliance with recommendations made by the consultants. Although three segments were put up for sale, three large plants on the Paraná River continued under state control, bearing the CESP name. One CESP transmission company was dismembered and also remained under state control. At the time of the privatizations, ELETROBRÁS took control of five state-owned companies that were not in a condition to be sold and in which it had a part interest. Except for these, sales were intense and continuous between 1997 and 2000, and included 20 state-owned distributors. Financial results were significant.
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Table 3.1 Privatization of the electricity system Vendor
Federal government State governments Minority participants Total
Number of companies
Income from sales (US$ million)
Debts transferred (US$ million)
Total result (US$ million)
3 20 – 23
3,908 18,330 2,438 24,676
1,670 5,840 – 7,510
5,578 24,170 2,438 32,186
Source: BNDES, Infrastructure Area, Electric Power Department (private communication, 2005)
The principal purchasers included important foreign groups: EDF; the American AES Corporation; the Spanish Endesa Internacional; Energia de Portugal (EDP); and Tractebel of the Franco-Belgian Suez group. After the privatization sales undertaken between 2000 and 2005, BNDES took an active part in funding new investments in the electric power sector. The total amount was equivalent to US$10 billion, divided between publicly-owned (87 per cent) and government-owned (13 per cent) companies. In practice, the entire privatization project took three different directions: on one extreme was the almost complete privatization of distribution; and, on the other, transmission remained almost completely state controlled. Among generating companies, sales were partial, the majority of the existing installed capacity remaining under government control.
Establishing a competitive market The guiding principle of the new concept of a competitive market to be achieved in stages was free trade between generating companies and distributors by means of bilateral long-term contracts. The model proposed by the consultants for introducing competition included the need for two major changes in the organization of the electric power sector, along with privatization: elimination of the vertical structure of the integrated companies and a clear separation of generation, transmission and distribution activities; and a maximum limit stipulated for each company of the market share they were allowed to hold. In order to further open the market, independent marketing agents were authorized to sell electric power to end-consumers. The no-longer vertically structured companies would be subdivided geographically in order to meet market limitations. Some proposals
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Energy in Brazil
concerning the subdivision of generating companies were excessively artificial from a logistic point of view and were not implemented. End-consumers were divided into captive consumers, who had to purchase energy from the public utility to which grid they were connected, and free consumers authorized to choose their supplier. During the transition period, the still-valid contracts corresponding to the GCOI operating plan for 1998 served as a basis for initial contracts that involved annually decreasing quantities of energy, freeing 25 per cent in 2003 and up to 100 per cent in 2006, when negotiations between the parties would be entirely free. Since the production and demand of the companies that had been thus divided would inevitably differ from that contracted, another form of negotiation had to be introduced that would replace the former practice for these secondary types of energy. These contracts would be signed in the so-called Wholesale Energy Market (MAE), where all buyers and sellers could negotiate and fix a spot price for electric power. The MAE was founded by means of an agreement signed in August 1998 by almost all the companies operating in the electric power sector, and approved by ANEEL. In a general assembly of the MAE’s top deliberative board, votes were subdivided in specific proportion between the various categories of its members. This complicated organization was later modified. In the beginning, the MAE adhered to the operational methods previously adopted by the GCOI. Officially, operations started in September 2000. The attributions of the MAE included establishing a market spot price that would reflect the marginal cost of energy in the system to be utilized at each period and serve as a basis for deals between generating companies and distributors in a multilateral environment. A price was fixed for each sub-market: North, Northeast, Southeast and South; and classified in three levels of load: heavy, medium and light. Due to the advent of new forms of electric power generation that might be in the national interest but were not competitive in the market that was being organized, ANEEL decided to establish normative values for wind and photovoltaic sources, as well as for small hydroelectric plants, with a view to the legal provision that transfers the cost of the purchase of electric power to the supply tariffs (Chapter 7).
National system operator The National Electric Power System Operator (ONS) was instituted at the same time as the MAE for the purpose of optimizing the operation of the
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electric power system at the lowest cost, while maintaining current technical standards, reliability criteria and market regulations in order to guarantee all agents access to the transmission grid. The Operator would also contribute to ensuring that the expansion of the system was carried out at the lowest cost and under the best future operating conditions. Another major attribution was contracting and administrating transmission services, as well as submitting a proposal to ANEEL for expanding the basic transmission grid to be auctioned or authorized. The ONS was founded as a private entity comprising concession, permission or authorization holders, as well as free consumers. It was a successor of the extinct ELETROBRÁS coordinating groups and took over the majority of their technical teams. The General Assembly of the ONS consisted of representatives of associates empowered to choose an administrative council. This council comprised representatives of the three categories of associates in a preestablished proportion, and one representative of the government, indicated by the MME. The latter had powers of veto over decisions that were in conflict with government directives and policies for the electric power sector. The ONS also had an executive board of four members. Administrative costs were covered by an additional charge on the tariff for transmission use.
The market price issue Consultants Coopers & Lybrand were informed of the Newave model and its supplements. They thought that these mechanisms for the operation and expansion of the system could also be used to establish the MAE market spot-price for energy. Their suggestion was part of the procedure agreed upon by MAE members and approved by ANEEL. They preferred this option to competitive bidding among generating companies on the spot market, a procedure adopted under various circumstances in other countries for coordinating the generating companies. Many of those who followed up on the evolution of the reform voiced their opinion that extending the use of mathematical formulas to establish market prices was not a good idea. It was, however, known that this type of auction would necessarily require other modifications, so far undiscussed, in the process of operational optimization. The original algorithms were developed for a market consisting of monopolistic state companies and used a tariff regime based on the cost of the service. The new market would be operated mainly by private companies under a competitive bidding regime that authorized large consumers
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Energy in Brazil
to withdraw from the system whenever they did not consider the spot market price acceptable. The technical and economic parameters of these large consumers reflect expectations that differ from those of state utilities, especially insofar as they refer to the discount rate. Similarly to what occurred in the past, the execution of the programmes drawn up in line with the new models caused divergences in the reaction to the contracted flows, either for incidental reasons or in view of the demands of the optimization process, which required that the amounts transacted be recorded and accounted for.
Operational practices and accounting Prior to Itaipu going online and the resulting Southeast–South interconnection, the southeastern transmission grid, and to a lesser degree the southern grid, was expanded with countless possibilities of the physical transfer of energy and the use of available capacity. Substantial investments were made in telecontrol and the equipment of sub-stations that allowed more inside knowledge of what was taking place, both in the plants and in the transmission lines. It became necessary to improve the recording and accounting methods of the operations. Formerly, the GCOI had established a mechanism for measuring and accounting for the difference between energies contracted or agreed upon between companies, and those that were used in keeping with the centralized system operation coordinated by this agency, which prevailed until 1999, when the transition to the MAE market regulations occurred. Until privatization, the exact amount of the settlement of accounts between companies, almost all of them state owned, was not relevant. This situation changed with privatization, after which a centralized system operation included companies of different ownership. Now, the settlement between the amount of contracted energies and energies effectively transferred took on a new meaning. After the MAE came on the scene, they were made responsible for the accounting of market transactions. Energy contracted and energy effectively transferred had to be recorded according to information provided by the companies. The MAE settled the difference at market price.
Organizational changes in 1999 – ELETROBRÁS In the light of reform directives, the consultants made a study of the multiple attributions of ELETROBRÁS and submitted their recommendations
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of changes, the majority of which were based on the premise of the privatization of generation companies. Many of them were compromised because the large federal generating subsidiaries, as well as important stategenerating segments, failed to be privatized. The following changes in the internal organization of ELETROBRÁS were proposed and accepted: (1) the dissolution of the GCOI in 1999, whose staff and assets were transferred to the new ONS; (2) the suppression of the GCPS, whose attributes were to be transferred to a new independent agency that would be created only at a later date. Long-term generation planning, which now became merely indicative, was assigned to the Secretariat of Energy of the MME, but they were unable to form a technical organization capable of adequately carrying out this task. Various services, such as research at CEPEL and energy efficiency at PROCEL, were left with ELETROBRÁS.
Auctions for hydroelectric plants and transmission lines In the logical sequence of the partial privatization of enterprises already in existence under state control, auctions for possible utilization of hydro resources for generating electric power and for the construction of transmission lines were instituted (Law 8,987/1995). As of 1996, ANEEL became responsible for posting calls for tenders, a process that would be expanded between 1997 and 2002. In keeping with the financial spirit of the economic policy of that time, ANEEL decided that the winning tender for the construction of hydroelectric plants would be the one entered by the proponent offering the highest total annual payment during the 35-year concession period. It also stipulated a minimum bid. During this process, no consideration was given to the impact of such a criterion on the future cost of energy. Thirty-one rights to potential hydroelectric sites with a total capacity of 12,000 MW were offered. Although they had already been studied, many still did not have the necessary environmental licence. Noteworthy is the importance of the participation of large industrial consumers which aimed at ensuring self-sufficiency in energy. They were responsible, either directly or through consortiums, for approximately 42 per cent of the total contracted capacity. The potential contribution of the auctions to the expansion of the system, considering a minimum five-year maturity period, corresponded to an annual average of 1,842 MW, if all materialized. This increase was equivalent to 20 per cent of the installed capacity of 69,910 MW of the
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Energy in Brazil
Table 3.2 Results from auctions of rights to potential hydroelectric sites (up to 2002) Year
Number
Total Capacity (MW)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total
4 4 2 5 13 3 31
1,517 1,866 810 1,252 4,415 1,350 12,307
Capacity Large Consumers (MW) (%) 112 – 690 450 2,785 1,242 5,179
7 0 85 36 63 92 42
Source: ANEEL, Usinas elétricas licitadas pela ANEEL, 2003
Table 3.3 Results from auctions of transmission lines – first phase (up to 2002; 1,000 km) Nature of buyer
2000
2001
2002
Private company Consortiuma State company Total
2,833 828 6 3,667
1,691 – 606 2,297
1,536 180 127 1,843
a
Private and government companies
Source: ANEEL, Licitação de Linhas de Transmissão, 2007
hydroelectric plants operating in 2002 (Table 3.2). In practice, this figure amounted to less, since some contracts did not come to fruition, notably the large Santa Isabel project (1,087 MW) on the Araguaia River, for social– environmental reasons that caused licensing problems (see Chapter 8). Auctions for transmission lines in the basic grid with voltages equal to or more than 250 kV took place in keeping with an estimated investment and the annual required income (RAP) for the availability of the use of the line during the concession period (Table 3.3). In each case the winning tender was the one that required the lowest RAP. Substantial discounts were noted. The results were significant and varied in the stock composition, private enterprise predominating. This segment of the privatization process came closest to the original objectives, attracting private enterprise, possibly because it was based on simple rules. Government-owned companies continued building transmission lines for their own account. A total of 7,807 km of transmission lines were auctioned during this phase.
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Implementation of an electric power model with high hydrological risks Three adverse conditions arose at the beginning of the implementation of the complex new model. The first was the prospect of higher costs due to the progressively diminishing number of appropriately known and evaluated locations for building hydroelectric plants, and the need for thermal plants at greater cost than those under the existing system. The second was the anticipated major risk of a supply shortage due to construction of only a few generational plants in the 1980s and 1990s caused by the country’s economic problems (Table 2.1). The consistently high rate of construction and growing capacity up to 1981, practically always above 10 per cent per year, fell to less than 5 per cent thereafter. The ratio between average generation and capacity, which until 1992 had always stood below 55 per cent, ensuring an operational leeway, increased continuously until it reached 58.6 per cent in 1998. The third was the coincident low rainfall, the potential adverse consequences of which had been predicted by ELETROBRÁS since the 1996–2006 plan and reinforced in the 1999–2008 plan. In November 1999, the principal reservoirs located in the South– Central-West region were at a level of 19.7 per cent of the corresponding full capacity, while in the Northeast the level stood at 15.9 per cent, and in the North at 24 per cent. Only those in the south maintained an acceptable level, 66.2 per cent.3 The reservoirs of the country’s main sub-market, the South–Central-West region, were being drained incessantly. Coopers & Lybrand in May 1997 classified the situation as an ‘unusually high level of risk’,4 in view of which they suggested 16 lines of action that, in fact, were much beyond the human, material and organizational resources available in the MME’s central agencies or in new agencies that were just emerging. The majority of the proposed actions failed to be carried out. To complete the picture of unfortunate coincidences, the Thermoelectric Priority Programme, based on the importation of 15 gas power plants, which was introduced in February 2000, faced a number of obstacles; for example, the difficulty in acquiring turbines on the international market, which was already saturated with orders, and the lack of experience in dealing with gas, which was imported for the first time from Bolivia. There were significant delays in the dates stipulated for the entry into operation of these plants (see Chapter 4).
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Energy in Brazil
Collapse of the electric power system and rationing The year 2000 ended with the reservoirs in the Southeast–Central-West region at 30 per cent of their capacity, and the year 2001 remained dry at the beginning of the rainy season. In order to coordinate the emergency operations that had become necessary, an inter-ministerial group – Energy Crisis Managing Committee (CGCE) – was founded in 2001 and drew up an Emergency Consumption Reduction Plan. Rationing was introduced, determining differentiated cuts according to consumer groups, aside from other measures, but with load reduction as its main objective. In general, the operation was considered successful, especially due to the public’s positive reaction. Industry sought out equipment, procedures and practices conducive to increased efficiency. There occurred a spontaneous creation of an exchange market. Households began to control consumption and waste to a point where reductions affected their comfort. It is noteworthy that many of the savings measures became permanent, especially in the South-East Region. This definitely reinforces the theory that seeking efficiency and control in the use of electricity, and endeavouring to contain demand, should be an integral part of the national energy policy. The drop in electricity consumption, from 15 TWh, in April 2001, to 11 TWh, in July 2001, was followed by a relatively stable average at a level a little above approximately 12.5 TWh, from April 2002 until the end of 2004. The physical drain on reservoirs ended in September 2001, when there were signs that they were beginning to be replenished. Fortunately, 2002 started with a wet period.
Market crisis and its financial consequences At the time of the rationing the new market was already in trouble as a result of a one-year delay in the entry into operation of the Angra II Nuclear Plant (from June 1999 to July 2000), the lack of precise market regulation and misunderstandings among the participants. ANEEL’s intervention in the MAE became inevitable. It simplified their operational organization and introduced financial guarantees and penalties linked to the purchase and sale of electric power. From September 2000 until the beginning of the supply crisis, MAE prices fluctuated in line with expectations, but did not reflect the imminent risk.
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The MAE was a disaster. Although it was founded when the scarcity of energy was already known, its original model lacked essential regulations and measures. In 2001, rationing led to a significant reduction in the revenue of electric power companies. Losses continued in 2002, in line with only a partial recovery of invoiced consumption. The total dropped 7.7 per cent, from 307 TWh in 2001, to 284 TWh in 2002. Another crisis, this time financial, arose among the companies. They requested an extraordinary rate adjustment and financial support from BNDES to partly compensate them for the reduction in revenue. The 24 per cent devaluation of the exchange rate in the second half of 2002 affected the cost of Itaipu energy which had been set in American dollars, thereby adding to the issues faced by the financial recovery programme. With a view to mitigating the impact of rising costs on inflation, the government decided that the necessary readjustment would be postponed for 12 months, with BNDES providing further financial support corresponding to this postponement. The amounts involved in this complex financial setup reached the equivalent of US$9.3 billion (2002–05).
The 2003 debate on the electric power sector When President Lula da Silva, politically opposed to the former government, took over from President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the electric power sector was disorganized due to incomplete reform and the turmoil created by the emergency measures adopted during the 2001 supply crisis. New general guidelines for the electric power sector were announced at an early date and it was soon perceived, taking advantage of the experience acquired during the years of crisis, and later confirmed that the stand taken for improving the earlier model was not pragmatic. Similarly to what had occurred in the institutional reform introduced by earlier governments, the reform of the electric power sector in a government headed by the Labour Party (PT) was predominantly ideological, although with opposite foundations. The following is a recapitulation of the situation without discussing the merits of the two positions. The first model was apparently based on the following generic convictions: (a) the unquestionable merit of market economy; (b) the unwarranted public administration in utilities; and (c) the conviction that there was no need for long-term strategic planning coordinated by the government. Little attention was given to the basic physical peculiarities of the structure of the Brazilian electric power system.
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The convictions predominating in the new directives were apparently: (a) the possibility of ensuring low tariffs through institutional measures – despite the inexorable increase in the cost of new hydroelectric projects and the predictable increase in the cost of fuel; (b) confidence in the efficacy of measures taken by the government through government-owned companies; (c) lack of confidence in the conduct of private companies due to their predominantly profit-seeking objectives; and (d) the need for longterm strategic planning by the government, basically seeking to guarantee the supply of electric power. These divergences were so great that the process initiated in 2003 could be called a reform of the reform although, in practice, many of the initial radical guidelines were toned down. According to official opinions at that time, it was necessary to ‘revert to the planning role of the state and recover its capacity to formulate the country’s energy policy’. The key concept was that of a pool that would be managed by an organization specifically founded for this purpose. In the meantime, two working groups were appointed within the government to formalize proposals for a restructure; their results were slowly becoming known. Issues unresolved at the time of rationing were taking shape, including a tariff revision that had repercussions on the antiinflationary policy. Class organizations and state governments voiced their opinions on the proposals, principally against a pool and a uniform tariff, until an official document, the Proposal for an Institutional Model for the Electric Power Sector, was issued, ratifying the original key ideas and putting an end to discussions. The National Energy Policy Council (CNPE) met in July 2003 to study the proposal. Notwithstanding the doubts that still persisted, the green light was given for the MME to work on it, approving the proposal’s basic guidelines.5 Before the projects were submitted to Congress, the CNPE introduced a number of modifications to the ONS procedures, some important, such as that concerning the use of a mechanism called a risk aversion curve (CAR), created in 2001 by the CGCE. It determined monthly the storage levels required in each region so that, even in the event of critical rainfall scenarios over the next two years, it would not be necessary to adopt restrictive measures on consumption during that period. As soon as energy stocks in the reservoirs of a region were equal or below the CAR value, all available resources were to be used for storage to revert to a safe level. According to this new decision for preparing monthly operating programmes, the Newave methodology was to be used in its original form or including the CAR. This only became possible at a later date, the
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CAR being used to search for more conservative criteria from a safety point of view.
Discussion and adaptation of the proposal and debates in congress The MME made an official announcement of the revised version of the model in keeping with the suggestions they had accepted. This version was again submitted to the CNPE for discussion, upon which the conclusive report was approved. Public discussions became more objective after this announcement, and the MME made themselves available to provide further explanations. After listening to comments, and upon the completion of the preparation of the proposal, the government sent two independent texts to Congress. The Chamber of Deputies received 766 amendments, the majority of which hinged on details of direct interest to specific types of consumers or generators. Only a few were accepted. The approved projects were forwarded to the Senate, where further suggestions were added, few of which were accepted. Discussions did not take long and ended at the beginning of March 2004, with the approval of Law 10,848/2004, published together with Law 10,847/2004, which dealt specifically with the Energy Research Company (EPE). The former is long and regulatory in some points, but the latter is compact and deals with the sole objective of authorizing the forming of the EPE as a wholly owned government company to ‘render services in the sphere of research studies in order to provide subsidies to the planning of the energy sector’. The complexity of the system gave cause for concern.
Essence of the approved reform of 2004 The essence of the new legislation can be summed up by two basic concepts: 1 A return to state control in three ways: • re-establishing, with adaptations, traditional long-term governmental planning, which had previously been the responsibility of ELETROBRÁS; the EPE would now be responsible for it. The former planning had been obligatory for the companies, while the latter was merely indicative; EPE was obliged to submit it to public hearing;
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Energy in Brazil
• appointing a Monitoring Committee for the Electric Power Sector (CMSE), made responsible for following up each year on whether the demand was met over a period of five years and for recommending preventive measures against deficiencies in the system; • a withdrawal from the predominantly private management of the ONS; the MME to appoint directors, including the president of the entity. 2 A reform of the market based on the concept of a pool administrated by a new organization, the Electric Power Trading Company, to replace the MAE. The initial concept that this organization would be the only buyer of all energy generated for resale at a uniform price paid to distributors was abandoned. Instead, a system of bilateral contracts between generators and distributors mediated by the Electric Power Trading Company was established, fixing a sole supply tariff for each sub-market within this scenario. The generating companies became responsible for meeting market needs and the distributors were obliged to contract 100 per cent of the demand forecast for the five subsequent years, while also providing guarantees against defaulting. The following supplementary provisions, among many others, were also adopted with major repercussions: •
•
•
The criterion for granting a concession for the utilization of hydro resources was, according to the earlier reform, based on the highest offer of payment for its use during the period of concession. Under the new model, this was modified to the lowest annual revenue demanded by the utility. This ruling was already in effect for transmission, so the previous model remained in effect. The principle of contracting in two spheres, in which the generators of public services, independent producers, traders and self-producers were the sellers, was maintained. In the regulated contracting market, the buyers were distributing utilities and the contracts were the result of auctions. In the free market the buyers were free consumers and traders, and the contracts are freely negotiated. The responsibility for studies and proposals for long-term energy planning, as well as viability studies of new hydroelectric sites, was assigned to the EPE.
In closing this phase of definitions, ANEEL published the Electric Power Marketing Convention, which covered organization, operation and attributions of the Chamber of Electrical Energy Commercialization (CCEE),
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indispensable to the start of energy auctions. The CCEE started operations in November 2004, replacing the MAE.
Planning and optimizing interconnected operations Planning and optimizing the system as well as the role of the ONS were once again the centre of attention. Their development was undertaken along with the organizational reforms. Some of the fundamental concepts were reviewed, while new technical terms were introduced into the legislation. The concept of firm energy was, in practice, replaced by assured energy, which was defined as the total supply of the interconnected system. It resulted from a statistical simulation by using the Newave model and observing the pre-established deficit risk criterion. This total system energy was then shared among the generating plants in proportion to their respective installed capacities. The sellers had to put up collateral for the sale of energy. The collateral consisted of proving physical generating capacity in terms of power. Thermal plants had to sign contracts that allowed meeting 100 per cent of their installed capacity in case of need. This requirement could be met by means of their own capacity or that of third parties; in the latter case, through contracts for the purchase of energy or capacity. The MME, in keeping with criteria proposed by the CNPE, regulated the method of calculating the physical guarantee given by the EPE. The principle of planning the expansion of supply of electric power was that the risk of insufficient electric power supply to the interconnected system must not exceed 5 per cent in any of its sub-systems. The ONS was responsible for planning and defining transmission and the substations needed for a safe flow of the generated energy. Since it replaced the GCOI, the ONS has also been responsible for drawing up regulations for the operation of interconnected systems, in accordance with constantly improving procedures. The physical basis of the integrated Brazilian electricity system is schematically shown in Figure A1.6, where both the installed capacity, by basin, and the main transmission lines are shown.
Implementation of the transmission model The implementation of the new model was divided into two segments: a relatively simple one for transmission, and an extremely complex one for generation plants.
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High-voltage transmission (250 kV or more) had become an increasingly independent activity since the concept of free access was adopted in 1995–96. ANEEL improved the auction system and the definition of the Rate of Use of the Transmission System (TUST), which consists of two parts: one proportional to load, the other to energy. In 2003, ANEEL held the first Transmission Line auction of the new phase, a relatively simple procedure because the essence of the basic rules of the earlier mode, in use since 2000, remained unchanged. Since then, successive auctions until 2007 have led to contracting 13,775 km of new lines (Table 3.4) which, added to those that had been auctioned in the earlier phase (7,801), amount to a 31 per cent expansion over the basic 66,954 km grid existing in 1999. The construction of these lines was planned for completion after 2007. There was, nevertheless, a 29 per cent increase in the length of lines in operation, namely from 66,954 in 1999 to 86,229 in 2006. This significant physical increase should be compared with the ratio between transmission and generation capacity, which declined during that period from 0.98 km/MW to 0.89 km/MW. A relevant factor in these auctions is the discount in relation to the ceiling prices established in calls for tenders, which have amounted to more than 30 per cent since 2003. This was even more accentuated in the 2006 auctions at which Spanish companies participated. Regarding the ratio between RAP and the proposed investment, several changes were observed since the beginning of 1999, as shown in Figure 3.2. The spread between maximum and minimum requirements was very large in the first years and the maximum requirement was reached in 2002, before the transition to a new government in 2002–03. Since then there was a continuous downward trend. This result may possibly be explained by the simplicity and continuity of the rules and the increasing trust in the country’s financial status that attracted strong competition, thus meeting the objectives of the privatizing reforms.
Table 3.4 Results from auctions of transmission lines – second phase (2003–07; 1,000 km) Nature of buyer
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Private company Consortiuma State company Total
527 1,260 – 1,787
1,561 1,781 412 3,754
2,057 961 50 3,068
2,319 222 618 3,259
1,120 382 408 1,910
a
Private and state companies
Source: ANEEL. Auctions of Transmission Lines, Results of Bids, 2007
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35%
Maximum Minimum 30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0% 1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Note: RAP, annual required income/proposed investment Source: ANEEL, Summary of transmission lines auctions – RAP/investments, 2008
Figure 3.2 Results from auctions of transmission lines since 1999 The TUST, which depends on the RAP, was originally set at a very low figure since it was based on assets from state companies that had been already greatly depreciated. Later, as a result of auctions and with the expansion of the basic grid, it suffered from the entry into operation of new lines with more current investment costs. Discussions took place in search of simplifications in calculations and to avoid excessive value oscillations due to the frequent auctions.
Implementation of the generation model Contrary to what occurred with the transmission lines, in accordance with the regulations of the earlier model, which required payment for the concession, the sequence of auctions of electric power plants was suspended between 1997 and 2002. In 2004, the progressive freeing of energy included in the original contracts between generators and distributors, which had been the object of bilateral negotiations or had taken place within the MAE, was about to end. Once the Electric Power Trading Company was set up in November 2004, schedules and final terms for the first energy auction were defined. It
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would be a decisive test for the performance of the new model that allowed for two types of operations within the regulated sphere: short term and long term. The latter were the result of the deals for non-contracted energy negotiated between agents. The cost of Settlement of Differences was determined weekly, based on results of the mathematical models. The long-term operations resulting from energy auctions within the CCEE gave place to ‘Energy Marketing Contracts in a Regulated Environment’, in terms of quantity of energy (for major hydroelectric generators) and of energy availability (for thermal generators). The norms and parameters that regulate these contracts are complex. In view of the new orientation of the national economic policy which gave less importance to the financial aspect and greater importance to moderate rates, concessions were based on the offer of the lowest revenue demanded by the proponent over the concession period, which was 35 years for hydroelectric plants and 15 years for thermoelectric plants. Four auctions were held between 2004 and 2006 under these new terms, the first for energy from existing hydroelectric plants in operation prior to 2000. Such energy became known as ‘old energy’ and was intended to meet the demand of previously defined periods. The first auction, held in December 2004, was an occasion of major importance. Tenders were received from 35 purchasers, and 18 sellers were registered, six of which withdrew prior to the decisive phase of the auction, preferring to keep non-contracted energy. Deals were made for an average of 9,100 MW for delivery between 2005 and 2012, an average of 6,800 MW for 2006–13, and an average of 1,200 MW for 2007–14. Discounts in this first auction varied between 20 per cent and 28 per cent in relation to the initial megawatt-hour prices. The federal statecontrolled companies ELETRONORTE and CHESF were mainly responsible for prices below expectations. The financial turnover reached R$75 billion (a figure equivalent to US$38 billion), which required the CCEE to sign 973 contracts before publishing the official results. The second big auction of existing energy was open to plants that had entered into operation after 2000, as well as to plants under construction. Thirty-four purchasers and 16 sellers entered tenders, and an average of 1,300 MW were negotiated for 2008–15. Many companies that had existing plants and were given the option to take part in the auction of new energy preferred to hold back. Adjustment auctions of lesser importance were also held. The third auction, in October 2005, dealt with supplies for 2009–16 and the fifth, in December 2006, was supplementary. ‘New energy’ auctions began before the ‘old energy’ auctions had ended. The first, held in December 2005, consisted of two stages: (1) tenders for
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new hydroelectric plants according to the criterion of the lowest tariff proposal; and (2) auctions of energy for specific periods in which the companies that qualified in the first stage competed with the licensed thermoelectric plants. Due to the many difficulties in obtaining environmental licensing, it was decided at this new stage to require a licence prior to calling for tenders. Seven plants with a total capacity of 804 MW were auctioned. At the second stage, 100 per cent of the additional energy forecast for 2008, 2009 and 2010, amounting to an average of 2,500 MW, was contracted. There was an excess of offers, but natural gas-driven plants whose supply had already become precarious were notably absent (Chapter 4). These transactions amounted to R$69 billion in 1,823 contracts, a figure equivalent to US$28 billion. The apprenticeship for the new negotiation methods, both on the part of government agencies and companies, was thus completed over a threeyear period. In subsequent auctions, the June 2006 auction was a supplement for 2009 needs, and the October auction was held for supplying the 2011 needs. The July 2007 auction was for supplementing the needs of 2010 and ended the transition stage of the new model. Finally, the October 2007 auction served to supply the needs of 2012. In these four auctions, the volumes varied between an average of 1,100 and 2,300 MW, and the cost stood between R$23.1 and R$51.2 billion. In the auction for 2011, the volumes of hydroelectric and thermoelectric energy were identical, and for 2012 the volume of thermoelectric energy was double that of hydroelectric energy. Especially noteworthy was the introduction of two thermoelectric-imported coal-driven plants of, respectively, 315 MW in the North-East and 615 MW in the north, expected to go on stream in 2012. The latter result points in the direction of a reduction in the contribution of hydroelectricity to the national energy matrix as of 2011, if no significant projects are licensed in the Amazon region. With reservations regarding the difficulty in choosing an appropriate currency exchange rate, a rate of R$1.80 to US$1.00 was adopted, according to which the value of the energy contracted at the end of 2007 for delivery in 2012 stood at US$71/MWh. The tariffs established in the auctions held since 2004 rose for hydroelectric plants, while fluctuating without any definite trend for thermoelectric plants, as shown in Figure 3.3. They seem to converge. The amounts in the graph refer to the initial years of the contracts. The low prices in the first auctions reflect the weight of the major state-owned hydroelectric plants, whose investment was almost totally amortized. The price of the thermoelectric plants, predominantly natural gas driven,
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140 New Energy - Thermal
130 120
Price (R$/MWh)
New Energy - Hydro
110 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Source: CCEE, 2007
Figure 3.3 Price of electric power for the initial years of contracts includes a subsidy by means of a mechanism used in fixing the price of gas, as will be seen in Chapter 4. Besides those auctions, a special attention was given to the Hydroelectric Complex of the Madeira River in the Amazon region (state of Rondônia). It comprises two projects, the Santo Antonio and the Jirau, each one with a capacity of 3,300 MW. The Santo Antonio project was the object of an auction in October 2007, between two auctions for the sale of energy. The studies and the design were carried out by a public–private consortium, Furnas/ Construtora Odebrecht. This specific case required coordinated efforts in the sphere of the federal government to overcome legal obstacles of various origins that hampered its fruition. The difficulties encountered elucidate the upheaval caused by the intervention of multiple entities in environmental licensing (see Chapter 8). The auction turned out to be unusual because three consortiums, each with a state-owned company holding 49 per cent of the capital, took part. In view of predictable problems, the private companies preferred to enter into partnership with state companies. The auction was almost immediately won by the consortium responsible for the project that proposed a rate of R$78.90/MWh (corresponding to US$40.50/MWh) for delivery on the regulated market. This corresponded to a substantial discount on the maximum permitted tariff and was partly due to the fact that the winning consortium reserved 30 per cent of the energy for sale on the open market, looking for higher revenues. They are committed to start operating in 2012.
Hydroelectric Power
73
The Jirau project was the object of an auction in May 2008 which was won by the consortium Energia Sustentável do Brasil, headed by the Suez Group (50.1 per cent), with the participation of Camargo Corrêa and two subsidiaries of ELETROBRÁS (CHESF and ELETROSUL). The consortium based its proposal on a new engineering concept that resulted in a lower investment and a proposed rate of R$71.37/MWh for delivery on the regulated market. This corresponded to a substantial discount on the maximum permitted tariff and was also lower than the Santo Antonio auction price. The consortium also reserved 30 per cent of the energy for sale on the open market, looking for higher revenues. They are committed to start operating in 2012. The result of this second auction was not immediately accepted by the winning consortium of the first auction, because there was a change of the engineering project. The discussions delayed the final approval of the result. At the beginning of 2008 delays in the process of licensing hydroelectric plants became a reason for concern regarding the capability to supply the market after 2011. The seventh auction was scheduled for September of 2008 for delivery of energy starting in 2013. The hydro plants offer was insignificant. The majority of the thermal plants offered were based on diesel engines using fuel oil. While auctions were held in the regulated market, the free market expanded rapidly. From 69 consumers in 2003, it increased to 687 in 2007. The value of monthly transactions in 2007, calculated by CCEE, varied between a minimum average of 8,700 MW and a maximum of 9,500 MW. These figures show that free consumers were responsible for between 17.6 per cent and 19.1 per cent of the total energy contracted in 2007 within the framework of the CCEE. During the entire reorganization process, since 2004, the rules for operating the Itaipu Binational and ELETROBRÁS Termonuclear (ELETRONUCLEAR) plants remained unaltered. The former as a result of the treaty between Brazil and Paraguay, which stipulates the price in dollars and the obligation of ELETROBRÁS and Administración Nacional de Electricidad (ANDE) to acquire the entire energy generated; the latter in view of the nuclear power monopoly with prices set by the government.
Transformation and strengthening of ELETROBRÁS As a result of two reforms of the electricity sector (in 1997 and 2004) that directly affected ELETROBRÁS, the structure of this hybrid company
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Energy in Brazil
became complicated and included a number of internal contradictions. To give an example, two large generating subsidiaries with different partners competed with each other in an auction for the right to build a hydro plant. For this and many other reasons, restructuring became necessary. Therefore, the Board of Directors, in line with directives issued by the Ministry of Mines and Energy, initiated a process of institutional reforms in 2008. The existing structure, that of an open corporation whose stock was listed in the stock exchange and wherein the federal government held the majority of shares, was maintained. Corporate dual functions, those of being additionally in charge of the management of social energy programmes by assignment of the federal government, were officially recognized. The reformulation of this holding company of electric utilities resulted in the definition of a comprehensive, strategic coordination of three groups of entities: 1 The most relevant group encompasses three large regional generating companies (Furnas, CHESF and ELETRONORTE) and one mainly transmission company (ELETROSUL), as well as two thermal generation companies (ELETRONUCLEAR, based on uranium, and Thermal Electricity Generation Company (CGTEE), based on domestic coal). 2 A second group consists of small and inexpressive local distribution companies that for this reason could not be privatized and require an objective reform. 3 A third group comprises activities and joint ventures in other countries. A revision of ELETROBRÁS’s relationship with the federal government is also underway with a view to a clear definition of the responsibilities assigned to ELETROBRÁS in the management of fiscal funds.
Tax on electric power There was a time when taxation of electric power, like that of oil, was very simple. It was based on a sole tax whose revenue was shared among the federal, state and municipal governments, linking the use of the revenue obtained to the infrastructure of transportation and investments in the sectors themselves which, in those days, were almost all state-controlled (see Chapter 1). Sector contributions were also charged on the rate. The 1988 Constitution ended this link of tax revenues, and the sector was taxed like
Hydroelectric Power
75
Table 3.5 Taxes and other charges added to the electric power price (in % of total revenue) Nature
1999
2003
2006
Taxes, federal, state, city Payroll charges Electric sector contributions Total
29.3 4.8 6.2 40.2
29.8 2.4 10.1 42.2
35.9 4.9 8.3 49.0
Source: Price Waterhouse Coopers, Study of the impact of electric rates on the competitiveness of Brazilian industry, 2008
any other industry, with special reference to the ICMS (Commodities circulation tax). Since then, electric power has been undergoing ever-increasing taxation, to which other charges are added. An estimate of this incidence is not a simple task since there is a variety of structures and of state fiscal legislation. A recent study attempts to show the evolution (see Table 3.5). Unfortunately the trend has been to increase the burden added to basic electricity rates and it now represents about half of the price paid by the consumer.
Expansion of the electric power system As we have attempted to show in this chapter, the electric power system has undergone a comprehensive institutional reform since the end of the 20th century and its directives have suffered a certain lack of continuity. At the same time, physically, hydroelectricity continued to dominate despite the entry of natural gas-driven thermoelectric plants. The participation of national and foreign private enterprise increased, facing the challenge of adapting to the new regulations. Despite changes in criteria for the concession of new electric powergenerating plants, installed capacity continued to expand (Table 3.6). Table 3.6 Generating capacity expansion (thousand megawatts) Type
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007b
Hydroa Thermo Nuclear Totala,b
65.3 15.1 2.0 82.5
67.8 16.7 2.0 86.5
69.0 19.7 2.0 90.7
70.9 20.3 2.0 93.2
73.4 21.2 2.0 96.6
76.9 21.2 2.0 100.4
a
Includes half the capacity of Itaipu. bIn 2007, 0.25 MW wind energy was included
Source: Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME). For 2002 to 2005, Balanço Energético Nacional (BEN) 2007. For 2007, Generation Information Data Bank
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Energy in Brazil
The installed capacity increase over the five-year period 2003–07 consisted of 17,900 MW, 6,000 MW of which occurred in thermoelectric plants. In December 2007, 83 hydroelectric projects with an installed capacity of 6,500 MW (81.5 per cent) and 21 thermoelectric plants with an installed capacity of 1,400 MW were under construction. The construction of some approved projects had not yet begun, while no call for tenders had as yet been posted for others whose viability had been approved by ANEEL. Companies were undertaking viability studies; biomass and coaldriven plants were being studied. In 2007, the EPE, with an eye to the future, initiated plant viability studies as well as an inventory of hydrographical basins in the Amazon region. In 2007, hydroelectrical plants contributed 84 per cent of electricity out of a total production of 444.5 GWh, whereas they participated with only 76 per cent in installed capacity. Thermal plants contributed 14 per cent and nuclear plants 3 per cent (BEN 2008, Tables 5.3 and 5.4). The capacity factors in 2006 (BEN 2007) were, respectively, 50 per cent for the system as a whole, 54 per cent for hydroelectric plants, 36 per cent for thermal electric plants and 79 per cent for nuclear plants.
Notes 1 World Bank (1993) The World Bank’s Role in the Electric Power Sector – Policies for Effective Institutional, Regulatory and Financial Reform, Washington DC: World Bank 2 Coopers & Lybrand (1997) ‘Relatório Consolidado – Etapa VII’, Rio de Janeiro: Coopers & Lybrand 3 ELETROBRÁS (2002) O Planejamento da Expansão, Rio de Janeiro: Eletrobrás 4 Coopers & Lybrand (1997) ‘Relatório Consolidado – Etapa VII’, Rio de Janeiro: Coopers & Lybrand 5 Roussef, D. (2003) O Novo Modelo do Setor Elétrico, Gov. Brasília: Official Press
Chapter 4
Fossil Fuels
Traditional dependence on imported oil Brazil has traditionally been dependent on imported oil. There was no local or foreign interest in oil surveys until the 1930s, when a discussion on what to do to reduce the country’s dependence took shape. Technical and political discussions escalated until they culminated in a famous nationalistic, countrywide campaign that adopted the slogan ‘the oil is ours’. The trend of nationalism and government intervention was then very common in the world. In Brazil, as a result of debate, the government submitted a proposal to Congress and law was approved establishing a monopoly for all oil-related activities, except for the distribution of oil products already in the hands of international companies. Petróleo Brasileiro S.A. (PETROBRAS), a state-controlled company, was founded to administer the monopoly. Organizing the company was a relatively slow process during which specialized technical cadres were prepared. Results of surveys after the first discovery of oil in Lobato in 1939 were not encouraging. Aside from a number of disappointments, there were even moments of pessimism as to the country’s hydrocarbons potential. Concern in government circles grew and, in the 1970s, alternative measures were studied that would modify the strict policy in force at PETROBRAS, especially relating to exploration on the continental shelf. It was then that the worldwide oil crises of 1974 and 1979 occurred and had direct impacts on the then fragile Brazilian balance of payments. Investment priorities were reshuffled to give emphasis to surveys and technological development for work at sea. Investments increased with noticeable results. Unfortunately, such was not the case with natural gas, which continued to be scarce.
Investments and success in oil exploration PETROBRAS always invested a significant part of its total investments in the basic mission of oil exploration and production (E&P). For some time the proportion of approximately 70 per cent was maintained, but after
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Energy in Brazil
1,200
3,000
1,000
2,500
Million barrels
800
2,000 20 years
600
1,500
400
1,000
200
500
New discoveries
2002
2000
1998
1996
1994
1992
1990
1988
1986
1984
1982
1980
1978
1976
1974
1972
1970
1968
0 1966
0
US$ million (dollars of 2002)
1988 it dropped to 60 per cent, reaching a low of 46 per cent in 1996–97. The percentage then increased again until it had climbed to a new peak of 71 per cent in 2000. Throughout the company’s history, its average investment in oil E&P was 60 per cent. In PETROBRAS investments, the portion dedicated to exploration warrants greater attention because it makes it possible to increase exploration, which, allied to competence and luck, defines the probability of expansion of the reserves required by the country’s development. These investments do not have predictable and immediate effects and require persistence and patience. A lengthy period must be allowed for their maturation and quantitative evaluation. Figure 4.1 was prepared with a view to a 50-year search for oil. It compares investment in exploration, year by year, with the gross increase in proven oil reserves, the latter depicted in five-year averages. The chart clearly shows the interval of approximately 20 years between the extensive investments in research in the Campos Basin (1982) and the large increases in proven reserves during the five-year period of 2000–04. The sequence in ever-deeper waters is impressive in combination with the development of the necessary technologies. After the country’s easing of trade at the end of the 20th century and the institutional reform of the oil sector, exploration activities were
Exploration investments
Sources: Discoveries – National Petroleum Agency (ANP), Annual Statistics 2007 and previous editions. Investments – PETROBRAS, personal communication. Reference US$ of 2002 (Consumer Price Index of US Department of Labour) 2002=100
Figure 4.1 Investments in exploration and new discoveries of oil fields
Fossil Fuels 79 reinforced by foreign private capital in the blocks they had been awarded in auctions. In terms of size, their participation can be evaluated by means of information available from the Central Bank of Brazil (BACEN) (Table 4.1). Since the work of these companies is in its initial phase, most of these investments were presumably made at the exploration stage. It is interesting to note that the total amount of US$5,170 million is slightly below that of PETROBRAS investments in exploration during this period, which reached US$6,093 million. There has not yet been time to make the first evaluation of the efficacy of foreign investments in the discovery of proven reserves. The production of oil extracted from national reserves was relatively stable between 1990 and 1994, and has increased since 1995, due to the start of production from additional reserves in the sea. In 2003, they already amounted to 91 per cent of the country’s total. It should be noted that the continued increase in extraction was accompanied by an increase in reserves, maintaining a good reserve to production ratio (Table 4.2). As a result of the successful increase in reserves and their cautious use, the country became practically self-sufficient in physical terms in 2007–08 and thus attained the main objective of the national decision to found PETROBRAS.
Table 4.1 Direct foreign investments in exploration and production of oil (US$ million) Year
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Investment
1,022
1,360
508
365
285
896
734
Note: The amount for 2000 corresponds to stock Source: BACEN, Exchange and Foreign Capital, Direct Foreign Investment. Distribution by Sphere of Activity
Table 4.2 Proven reserves and production of oil (million barrels) Reserves, end of year Production in year Increase in reservesa Reserves/Production
2000
2001
2002 2003
2004 2005
2006 2007
8,464 464 774 18
8,496 9,805 10,601 11,243 11,773 12,182 12,624 472 531 546 541 596 629 639 504 1,840 1,340 1,183 1,126 1,038 1,181 18 18 19 21 20 19 20
a Prepared by the author: increase in reserves = difference of reserves above those of the former year + production within the year. Initial reserves in 1999 = 8,154 million barrels
Source: National Petroleum Agency (ANP), Annual Statistics 2008, Tables 2.4 and 2.9
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Energy in Brazil
Dependence on foreign oil and oil products During the period of successive changes in the domestic oil exploration scenario, the trend to reduce foreign dependence continued (Table 4.3) despite a small setback in 2004, when oil production did not develop at the expected rate, mainly due to the delay in entry into the operation of three platforms (P43, P48, P50). The delay in the first two was due to problems in the contract signed with Halliburton on an issue that was referred to international arbitrage. Net imports of oil and oil products dropped from 47 per cent of domestic consumption in 1995 to 1 per cent in 2005. In 2006, Brazil became an exporter. Heavy oils that cannot be absorbed by national refineries are exported and light oils are imported. Petroleum products are both imported and exported, due sometimes to temporary, partial natural imbalances between domestic supply and demand or because of operational characteristics of the refineries. For the country as a whole, the future balance will include, aside from PETROBRAS results, the expected results of private companies that operate in exploration and production. In economic terms, the scenario is less favourable. Losses incurred with the exchange of heavy oil for light oils continue, leaving a negative balance. In 2006, the price of heavy oil corresponded to approximately 75 per cent of the price of imported light oil. This situation leads to querying the choice of investments made in PETROBRAS programmes, bearing the large negative weight of the exported heavy oil in mind. The company has invested in some of its refineries, with technical support from the Research and Development Center (CENPES), in order to allow them to use a larger proportion of heavy oil; this effort was restricted by the technical impossibility of processing the excess, which is being exported. The potential annual loss of foreign exchange credits now and in the near future is, however, very significant. Based on the volume of 134 million barrels exported in 2006 and the difference between import and export prices, which was well over Table 4.3 Dependence on oil imports (thousand m3/day) Years
2000
2001
201 60 23 285 29
212 49 7 268 21
Production Net imports: crude oila Net imports: oil productsa Apparent consumption External dependence (%)
2002 2003 238 23 5 266 11
247 17 –6 258 4
2004 2005 245 38 –13 270 10
a
Net values = imports minus exports
Source: National Petroleum Agency (ANP), Annual Statistics 2008, Table 2.50
272 17 –14 275 1
2006 2007 288 –1 –9 277 –4
291 2.5 –4.6 289 –0.7
Fossil Fuels 81 20,000 Imports
18,000 16,000 Exports
US$ Million
14,000 12,000 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 Deficit
2,000 0 2000 2001 Note: Series was revised in 2008
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Source: National Petroleum Agency (ANP), Annual Statistics 2008, Tables 2.44 and 2.49
Figure 4.2 Value of imports and exports of crude oil and oil products US$10 per barrel, the negative balance would reach an appreciable amount to the order of US$2 billion during that year (Figure 4.2). This amount is comparable with the investment in a new refinery, even if its unit cost is higher than that of a standard refinery. Arguments in favour of a new refinery are supported by an analysis of the development of the capacity and the intensity of utilization of the national refining park that clearly shows there is room for expanding the capacity. The refining capacity rose 5 per cent from 2000 to 2007, although no new refinery was inaugurated after the Refinaria do Vale do Paraíba (REVAP) in São José dos Campos, state of São Paulo, in 1979. The utilization of refineries rose from 87 per cent to 92 per cent in the same period. The domestic oil processed varied between 74 per cent and, more recently, 79 per cent of the total load, while imported oil decreased to about 365,000 bbls/day (barrels/day). Two technically appropriate refineries for processing heavy oil are being considered: (1) one of a 200,000 bbls/day capacity to be installed in the state of Pernambuco, with investments to the order of US$2.5 billion, in partnership with Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA), designed to consume national and Venezuelan oil in equal quantities as of 2011; (2) the other, of 150,000 bbls/day, to feed a set of petrochemical industries to be installed in Rio de Janeiro, also to go on stream in 2011. The merits of the partnership in the former case are debatable, since they involve the importation of heavy oil, a product that Brazil already has in excess. The opening foreseen in the new legislation for the construction of refineries by private enterprise did not attract any investors.
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Energy in Brazil
An opening (1995) in the oil and gas sector Prior to the 1995 reform, the oil and natural gas sector consisted of a set of distributors dealing initially with imported oil products, the majority of which were foreign private companies established in Brazil since the beginning of the 20th century. All other activities were concentrated in one sole company, PETROBRAS. The National Petroleum Council (CNP) was, for most of the time, except at the initial stage, only an auxiliary institution that calculated the cost of oil products and granted authorizations of minor importance. Traditionally, PETROBRAS was autonomous but for rare exceptions, both in regard to the CNP and the Ministry of Mines and Energy. The reform that took place in the oil sphere since 1995 differed from that adopted for electric power, although it had the same declared objective of privatization and competitive markets. In the former case, excluding distribution, the structure could have been called monolithic, undergoing a moment of entrepreneurial success while carrying out its fundamental objective, that is, the discovery of oil reserves capable of ensuring selfsufficiency. In the latter, numerous and varied state companies predominated, all of them suffering a process of deterioration and insufficient expansion that risked shortages. By means of a Constitutional Amendment in 1995, Article 177 of the 1988 Constitution covering the oil monopoly was modified, as always in an intensely political climate. Discussions only reached a decisive stage when President Fernando Henrique Cardoso categorically guaranteed in a letter to the president of the Senate that his government would undertake the commitment not to privatize PETROBRAS and would grant the company the privilege of exploiting the 29 potentially oil-producing blocks which they had identified in Brazil. In the final text, paragraph 1 of Article 177 was substituted by another that authorized the government to contract state or private companies to carry out surveys, production, refining, importation and transportation under conditions established by law. Following on from this constitutional modification proposed to Congress in July 1996, a draft bill on oil was submitted that caused an intense debate until its approval (Law 9,478). It dealt with the creation of the National Petroleum Agency (ANP), with the responsibility to regulate current exploration and production activities, as well as with exploration, development and production in new areas. Auction norms were drawn up, as well as conditions for the transition of PETROBRAS from being the executor of the monopoly to becoming a mere public concession holder. The ANP, as the regulating agency of the oil industry, was made responsible for the implantation of the national oil and natural gas policy ‘with
Fossil Fuels 83 emphasis on guaranteeing the supply of oil products throughout the entire country’, and on the protection of the interests of consumers, fostering studies with a view to boundary lines of the areas intended for concessions; establishing criteria and promoting auctions for the concession of exploration, development and production; and authorizing refining activities, aside from other supplementary functions. This law confirmed that the government had full rights of exploration and production of oil and natural gas, and appointed the ANP as its administrator. The status of PETROBRAS was redefined. It became a mixed economy company linked to the MME, whose objective is the survey, production ..., to carry out its activities in an environment of free competition with other companies, and in keeping with market conditions. (PETROBRAS, ‘Annual Report 2001’) PETROBRAS was formally authorized to carry out any of the activities included in its social objectives outside Brazil. The constitutional provision of the monopoly of states regarding the distribution and marketing of natural gas was maintained, but the obligation that this activity be exercised by a state company was withdrawn. This allowed the concession of services to private companies by means of auctions.
Execution of the privatization programme of PETROBRAS The National Privatization Program affected PETROBRAS immediately, closing two subsidiaries of secondary importance dedicated to marketing and mining activities. Highly significant, however, was the withdrawal of PETROBRAS from the petrochemical industry which had developed since the 1970s, following a formula consisting of a division of capital into three parts: national private, foreign private and state. This model had fulfilled its mission to start the petrochemical industry in Brazil. Auctions were held between April 1992 and September 1996, comprising 27 typically industrial companies which PETROBRAS either owned, or in which it was associated with private companies. The sale reached an amount equivalent to US$2,698 million, with the transfer of debts to the value of US$1,003 million, attaining a total of US$3,701 million.1 PETROBRAS was moderately involved in petrochemical enterprises in subsequent years through its subsidiary Petrobras Química S.A. (PETROQUISA), complying with the government directive to keep these activities
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Energy in Brazil
in private hands. Yet, after the change in government in 2003, PETROBRAS again participated in large-scale petrochemical projects. In its other activities, PETROBRAS made significant investments in refineries, with an emphasis on adapting them to processing nationally produced heavy oil. In the distribution area, the predominant participation of Petrobras Distribuidora increased with the acquisition of Ipiranga and other smaller companies, but competition with the traditional distributors Esso, Shell and Texaco, as well as with some newcomers (e.g. Chevron and Repsol-YPF), continued. Repsol has an interest in the Alberto Pasqualini refinery. In compliance with Article 58 of Law 9,478/1997, which gives third parties free access to both oil and natural gas pipelines, the ANP published regulations referring, respectively, to the construction and operation of transportation and transfer pipelines, and to free access to them. In practice, few changes took place: PETROBRAS or its subsidiaries continued to be in control, except for private capital in Gasbol, transporting gas from Bolivia, and its ramification to Cuiabá. Public discussion on effective free access to the pipelines continued.
Auction of oil exploration areas Essential activities of oil exploration and production were covered by the auction policy for blocks in sedimentary basins on land and in the sea according to legal precepts (Law 8,987/1995). The recently created ANP was in charge of conducting the auctions. Before tenders were issued, blocks and fields that would continue to be the responsibility of PETROBRAS (Table 4.4), due to the advanced stage of the work undertaken on them, were defined. The auction of blocks during the first four years comprised 94 units, covering a total area of 144,000 km². The parts acquired by international private companies always amounted to more than half the total on offer. Those that were assigned to PETROBRAS started on a modest scale and came to less than a quarter. Adding these to that from their partnership Table 4.4 PETROBRAS concessions Stage Exploration Development Production Total
Number
Area (1,000 km²)
115 49 233 397
443.2 2.7 10.5 456.4
Source: National Petroleum Agency (ANP), 2003, Former Rounds Review, Round 0
Fossil Fuels 85 with private companies, the total was always less than half of what was on offer. Figure 4.3 shows the results of auctions during this first stage, which continued until 2002, as well as during the second stage, which started in 2003, already under a new government with a political orientation that differed from the former. With the impetus of the former process, ANP continued to prepare five new auction rounds of blocks for exploring oil and gas involving smaller areas than those offered in previous rounds, and demanded from candidates a greater participation in local expenditure. In the fifth round, which took place in 2003, the start of another government and of a second stage, there was a retrenchment of the private sector and the participation of PETROBRAS predominated, possibly due to doubts as to the direction the new government would take. Since 2004, private companies, with or without partnership with PETROBRAS, were again strongly in evidence. Inactive areas with marginal accumulations in Bahia and Sergipe, and areas with lesser investment requirements, were put on offer in the rounds held in 2005 and 2007 and attracted smaller entrepreneurs, the majority from private national capital. In the eighth round held in November 2006, among the foreseen offer of 284 blocks, 40 were held to be of major significance in view of their 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% Private Partnerships * PETROBRAS
50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Note: Number of blocks by nature of winning companies (%). *Partnerships are between PETROBRAS and private companies Source: ANP, 2006, Round 1–8 and Round 9
Figure 4.3 Results from auction rounds for oil exploration
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Energy in Brazil
prospects of natural gas. The ANP introduced an innovation in this call for tenders that restricted the maximum of blocks each candidate could bid for. ANP’s new norm caused a public outcry due to being interpreted as a measure intended to restrict PETROBRAS’s freedom of action. While the auction was held and after some contracts had been decided upon, it was interrupted due to a legal injunction against the clause adopted by the ANP. Regardless of the merit of the question, the suspension had a negative impact on the market by interrupting a process that had been regular and was transparent. The injunction was revoked by the court at the end of 2007. Procedures for the eighth auction remained undefined. The data in Figure 4.3 referring to this round are, therefore, of little significance. The ninth round, held at the end of 2007, put 271 blocks on offer. This total excluded 41 blocks withdrawn by the ANP as a result of the decision of the National Council for Energy Policy (CNPE), based on the information provided by PETROBRAS that tests in exploratory blocks pointed to the existence of a new and significant oil territory in Brazil that included areas initially part of the offer. PETROBRAS had drilled wells, independently or in partnership with other companies, to depths of 5,000–7,000 m, reaching a so-called pre-salt stratum. This area of 800 × 200 km was thought to be at a water depth of 1,500–3,000 m. In light of this information, and since they had the authority to propose measures aiming at safeguarding national interest by promoting the rational use of its energy resources, the CNPE ruled that the blocks located in this area be excluded. The tenth auction was scheduled for December 2008, excluding pre-salt blocks. In total, approximately 400,000 km2 were auctioned over nine years. Up to the seventh round, the bonuses obtained reached R$3.3 billion (approximately US$2 billion). With the exception of the fifth round, which was atypical, the participation of international companies in the blocks granted varied between 11 and 30 companies.
Oil exploration successes in deep waters increase Prior to the change in the process that attracted the interest of so many international companies, PETROBRAS’s tasks aimed at an increase in reserves, and the production of oil and gas continued regardless of foreign oil crises and changes in political orientation. A new era of oil started in Brazil with the discovery of the Garoupa field in the submerged area of the Campos Basin in 1974. Subsequent studies showed that the Campos Basin probably measured 100,000 km2. More and more discoveries followed, the most important being the fields of Namorado (1974) and Enchova (1975),
Fossil Fuels 87 both at water depths between 100 and 200 m. Production in these fields started in 1977, with 10,000 bbls/day. The work on the platform proceeded without interruption, pointing to ever-deeper waters. The undoubted success in the search for oil was due to a favourable association of teams of geologists and petroleum engineers working in the field with technological researchers in the CENPES, which was installed on the UFRJ campus in 1973. A technological development programme was instituted in 1986, to prepare the company for exploration and production in locations of water depths of 1,000 m. In 1992, a new programme was prepared for depths of up to 2,000 m and, in 2000, for 3,000-m depths. In practice, the performance regarding the depths reached is depicted in Figure 4.4, where the historical landmarks of Marlin, at a depth of 625 m in 1992, and Roncador, at 1,886 m in 2003, can be seen. These results had already been noted on the international scene from the mid-1980s. Exploration in the Campos Basin underwent a significant geographical expansion with the Espírito Santos Basin to the North and the Santos Basin to the South. The extension and location of the results of exploration are shown in Figure A1.7 (Appendix 1).
Source: PETROBRAS, personal communication, 2007
Figure 4.4 Deep-water wells
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Energy in Brazil
The discovery of a field named Tupi in the Santos Basin, at the end of 2007, was of particular importance. The exploratory drilling rig reached 7,000 m, something unconceivable a few years before. Subsequent exploration results confirm the early prospects are of very large reserves. Economic possibilities are great, but there are also many technical and economic problems to be resolved. These discoveries provoked renewed political discussions over the adequacy of the existing regulation to the deep-sea pre-salt reserves. There was a pause in the sequence of auctions. Aside from the exploration and production work conducted by PETROBRAS, international companies were also developing their activities independently. Since the opening of 1995, and during the eight auctions of blocks for exploration, the presence of major foreign companies on the Brazilian continental shelf has been significant. Aside from the activities in partnerships wherein PETROBRAS is the operator, some foreign companies have already reached an advanced stage in their work, notably those listed in Table 4.5. It is natural for private companies to be cautious in releasing information, but unofficially there are indications of favourable results. Only Shell and Devon are in full productive operation in their respective blocks. The product is exported directly by sea. When these companies expand their production, which should occur by 2010, they will have the option to
Table 4.5 Foreign oil companies in activity in the Campos Basin (preliminary results up to December 2007)
Projects at the development stage
Operator and share (%)
Project name
El Paso Oil & Gas – 100% El Paso Oil & Gas – 40% Shell Ltda. – 35%
Camarão/Pinauna Sardinha
Shell Ltda. – 35%
Nautilus/Ostra
Abalone/Argonauta
Chevron Brazil – 51.7%
Projects at the production stage
Anaduko – 50% Peregrino Shell Ltda. – 80% Bijupira/Salema Devon Energy – 60% Polvo
Partners and share (%)
PETROBRAS 40%/Norske 20% PETROBRAS 35%/Esso 30% PETROBRAS 40%/Chevron 20% Frade PETROBRAS 30%/Frade Japão 18.3% Norske Hidro 50% PETROBRAS 20% SK Brasil 40%
Source: ANP, Statistical Data. ‘Areas in Development Stage and in Production Stage’, 2008
Fossil Fuels 89 sell to PETROBRAS or to export directly from their own fields. Where associated gas is concerned, the flow is more complicated, due to the small volume from each field. It is believed that PETROBRAS will probably initially be the only buyer.
The entry of natural gas – a brief history Natural gas enters the Brazilian energy matrix by two different paths: on the one hand, that of the discovery by PETROBRAS in 1956 of a small volume in the Brazilian northeast and in the 1980s in marketable volumes; and on the other, negotiations with Bolivia in the 1990s that originated in a long history of issues since 1938. The reserves discovered by PETROBRAS in the Northeast, mainly in the form of gas associated to petroleum, had been increasing at a moderate rate since the end of the 1970s. Some local industrial consumers were supplied. Within the government, the issue of natural gas was discussed at the National Economic Council in 1986 and by a commission on making natural gas viable in 1991. Neither discussion went beyond speculations on how to proceed. In the expectation of a possible entry of natural gas in the national economy, the members of the 1988 Constitutional Assembly included a provision assigning to the states the right ‘to explore directly or by means of a concession to a state company, with exclusive distribution rights, the local service of piped gas’. This provision was later altered to omit the obligation to a ‘state company’. Brazil’s interest in natural gas in the 1990s was influenced by ideas that dominated the scene in the industrialized countries. The history of gas in Brazil was, however, very different from that of countries that since the 19th century had possessed networks installed at the time of manufactured gas obtained from coal. In order for Brazil to switch to the use of natural gas, it would not only have to build pipelines from the production sites or points of importation, but also have to substantially expand the distribution networks. While the increase in gas within the energy matrix was being discussed, PETROBRAS continued exploration work on two distinct fronts: on land in the Solimões Basin (Amazon region), and in the sea in the Campos Basin. In the former, the discoveries at the end of the 1970s resulted in confirmation of the Juruá and Urucu reserves, where productive operations started in 1998 (Figure 4.5). In the latter, discoveries of oil with associated
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400
Natural gas reserves (billion m3)
350 300 250 200 Campos fields 150 100 50 0 1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2006
2007
Source: ANP, Annual Statistics 2008, Table 2.6
Figure 4.5 Proven reserves of natural gas in Brazil gas succeeded each other in ever-deeper waters in the Campos Basin and resulted in 1999 in a faster growth of the volume of proven reserves. In 2007, 81 per cent of total reserves were found in the sea. Most of the reserves were in the Campos Basin, followed by Urucu, in the Amazon Basin, with 17 per cent. Discoveries in the Santos Basin and later in the Espírito Santo Basin led to prospects of an increase equivalent or higher than all that had occurred previously. Besides, the corresponding reserves are located at less than 200 km from the coast in the Southeast, the region with the greatest potential demand for gas. The national production of oil-associated natural gas by PETROBRAS in the Northeast and Southeast accompanied the production of oil. However, only part of this gas was marketed as a result of losses in several units in the Campos Basin, where gas was being flared, and continues to be, for lack of a solution to its outlet in the limited quantities in which it is available. Solutions in the form of compressed natural gas (GNC) are being studied.
Urucu gas in the Amazon region Of special significance in the exploration and production of hydrocarbons is the successful discovery of oil reserves and associated gas in Urucu, deep
Fossil Fuels 91 in the Amazon jungle, which warrants special treatment. The development of this reserve since the 1970s, when work began, has possibly the longest history in the country and faced considerable environmental and logistical issues. Work on the oil pipeline as far as the Coari base, from where the oil was transported to the Manaus refinery in barges, was completed in 1999. The gas is being reinjected into the field. The gas project was controversial from the very beginning: on the one hand, there was interference of political interests of the Amazonas state government; and, on the other, the choice of transporting the GNC in barges or of overcoming the environmental impact of a gas pipeline. The option of building a pipeline to Manaus gained support, and thought was given to an extension as far as Porto Velho. When the initial project of the programme was finally completed in 2005, a call for tenders for its construction was made. The Urucu–Coari–Manaus gas pipeline of more than 700 km in length will be able to transport 5.5 million m3/day. The Coari–Manaus section, with 680 km, was the object of a call for tenders, but the highest proposal was considered unacceptable. Another auction took place and the construction was contracted at a significantly higher cost than the original budget. Nevertheless, the construction faced new delays due to technical and environmental difficulties. From an economic point of view, the delay impacts on PETROBRAS, which is still unable to sell gas and has no return on investments already made, as well as on the price of electricity paid by all Brazilian consumers, which includes a subsidy for fuel oil consumed in the thermoelectric plants of Manaus. This subsidy had reached a figure equivalent to US$1 billion in 2007. Notwithstanding the obstacles, the pipeline is expected to go on line in 2009.
Brazil–Bolivia natural gas agreement The first initiative to import hydrocarbons to Brazil from Bolivia resulted in a treaty of co-operation between the two governments, signed in 1938. Other initiatives followed along the same lines, all without practical results. A study was carried out by PETROBRAS at the beginning of the 1970s of various ways to increase exploration, including the possibility of operations abroad so that the company would gain experience in other environments. Congress approved the authorization, giving PETROBRAS the authority to operate in other countries, irrespective of treaties between governments. PETROBRAS Internacional S.A. (BRASPETRO) was
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founded in 1973 and thought was then given to a greater expansion of exploration activities. Years later new talks were held with Bolivia between 1971 and 1973, at that time already dealing more specifically with natural gas, of which a volume of 2 million m3/day was offered. Negotiations developed at a meeting in 1972 of the governments of the two countries and the respective state companies. The volume of gas initially offered was considered insufficient. At subsequent meetings, the scope of the negotiations was expanded to allow the importation of 8 million m3/day, subject to checking on available reserves. The outcome of these meetings was unsatisfactory. Around 1990, the idea of importing gas from Bolivia was revived, and negotiations entered their final stage at the end of 1991. The overall Brazil– Bolivia agreement came into effect in 1992, and the contract for the purchase and sale of natural gas was signed by the presidents of the Yacimentos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) and PETROBRAS in 1993, giving rise to the Bolivia–Brazil gas pipeline project. An initial volume of 8 million m3/day was established in the contract, supposed to increase progressively until it reached 16 million in the eighth year after the start of operations. It also included an option for the purchase of an additional 14 million. As a result, the gas pipeline was designed to transport 30 million m3/day from Bolivia to Campinas. Highly significant in the gas purchase contract was the take-or-pay clause of 80 per cent and of the ship-or-pay clause of 100 per cent in the use of the pipeline. A 1,180-km extension of the gas pipeline to the southern states was added. This decision was greatly influenced by the political intervention of the three state governments in that region, as well as by industrial associations. The first stretch had a 6 million m3/day capacity. This extension would not have been economically viable, had it not been incorporated into the main project; however, it caused tariff problems, as will be shown. The entry of Bolivian gas brought into focus the interdependence of the various forms of primary energy in the energy balance that was becoming increasingly diversified. There were a multiplicity of issues to be resolved. On the one hand, the minimum capacity of the gas pipeline had to be attained rapidly to make it economically viable; on the other, the introduction of gas into small and medium industries in São Paulo, in substitution of oil, where its positive impact on the environment was greater, depended on a decision by hundreds of entrepreneurs and the efficacy of the distribution system. Automotive gas did not arouse much interest. A large, gas-fired thermoelectric plant to be built in São Paulo by an independent producer was considered a means to provide support for the cost of the pipeline. Next, the suggestion of building, possibly within a
Fossil Fuels 93 period of three years, several thermoelectric plants as an anchor in the Prioritary Programme of Thermoelectricity (PPT) gained importance. In quantitative terms, the sale of the domestic natural gas amounted to 15 million m3/day in the year Bolivian gas first entered the country (1999), bringing the prospect of tripling the supply of this product in Brazil. Negotiations held in April 1996 concerning the importation of gas from Argentina led to another, this time corporate, agreement without the explicit intervention of the respective governments. The agreement aimed at supplying the Uruguaiana thermoelectric plant located on the border of the two countries, as well as building an extension of the pipeline to Porto Alegre. The 600-MW plant was built by an AES Corporation subsidiary with the financial support of BNDES. The entire project failed to materialize because it turned out that Argentina did not have sufficient gas available for export. The pipeline from the border to Porto Alegre was not built, and supply, restricted to one plant, depended on availability. In 2008 the plant had to be disconnected. As there are no prospects of a supply of gas from Argentina, the plant’s future is being discussed between the AES and the respective government agencies.
Introduction of the gas programme In order to carry out the responsibilities attributed to it under the national gas programme, PETROBRAS created a wholly owned subsidiary in May 1998, the Petrobras Gás S.A. (GASPETRO). GASPETRO was put in charge of coordinating the structure of Transportadora Brasileira Gasoduto Bolívia–Brasil (TBG), in which it held 51 per cent of the capital and in which several groups of private investors participated, including the BBPP Holdings, with 29 per cent, and Transredes do Brasil, with 12 per cent. Its only objective was the construction of a 1,413-km gas pipeline on Brazilian territory. At the same time, the Gás Transboliviano (GTB) was founded to build the 557 km located on Bolivian territory. It consisted of several partners, coordinated by Transredes, a private company established in Bolivia with the participation of Shell and Enron (later closed) and in which Gaspetro held 11 per cent. The gas pipeline to Campinas, with a 32-inch diameter and 12 compression stations, was designed to transport up to 30 million m3/day. The investment is estimated to have cost US$2 billion. Including the 1,180-km extension to Porto Alegre, the whole pipeline measured 3,150 km, thus being the longest in Latin America. Bolivian gas reached São Paulo in July 1999 and Porto Alegre in March 2000. The gas programme also included a secondary-branch pipeline to Cuiabá, state of Mato Grosso, owned by a private consortium composed
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of Shell and Enron, with 362 km in Bolivia and 282 km in Brazil, starting from the Bolivian stretch of the main gas pipeline, having a capacity of 2.8 million m3/day for the specific purpose of supplying the thermoelectric plant of the Empresa Produtora de Energia with 529.2 MW in a combined cycle.
Natural gas within the energy matrix Natural gas became a significant part of the energy matrix, due to the increase in national production and importations from Bolivia. In 2003, at the end of the fourth year of the inauguration of the gas pipeline, importations from Bolivia, to the order of 5,597 million m3, corresponded to 15.3 million m3/day, almost reaching the target set for the eighth year in the original contracts, although only half the capacity of the pipeline was in use. Full capacity (30 million m3/day) was reached during a few days of July 2005. As of 1995, the joint balance of national and imported gas developed as shown in Figure 4.6, wherein the year 1999 clearly appears as the beginning of a new phase of natural gas in Brazil. The expansion of reserves and of the gross production of gas from PETROBRAS fields remained very much below the results achieved in the oil sector. At the end of 2007, proven reserves were at the level of 364 billion m3, and the production of the year amounted to 18.2 billion m3. Nevertheless, in the Brazilian gas exploration, the reserves:production ratio of 16 times is almost equal to the achieved ratio in the oil industry.
25 Sales
20 15 10
Sector Use
Natural gas (million m3/year)
30
5
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
0
Note: *Sector use includes consumption by PETROBRAS, re-injection and losses in flares Source: ANP, 2007. Balance of Natural Gas in Brazil, Table 3.29
Figure 4.6 Natural gas balance (million m³/year)
Prod. + Import. Production Sector Use*
Fossil Fuels 95 Gas sales to end-consumers enjoyed a new rate of growth from 2000, when Bolivian gas entered Brazil, to 2004: they increased from 17 million to 35 million m3/day in that four-year period. Sales in the Northeast developed very differently from those in the South–Southwest, due to the geographical location of gas supplies. There was no relevant discovery in the former region, and the pipeline of imported gas did not reach that far. Growth was slow. The South–Southwest, however, received gas from the Campos Basin in the East and from Bolivia in the West, and their sales increased substantially. The expansion of sales was thus extremely concentrated, especially in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, which absorbed 61 per cent of the total, taking advantage of the existing facilities for the distribution or manufacture of gas. In second place was Bahia, where natural gas extraction and distribution operations had started much earlier. There was also a concentration of customers. The industrial sector absorbed 56 per cent and thermoelectric plants, 29 per cent. In Figure 4.7 an attempt is made to show the gas sales distribution according to geographical locations, and in Figure 4.8 sales are shown by consumers.
South 10%
Central-West 5%
Southeast 65%
Northeast 20%
Source: Revista Brasil Energia, an energy monthly magazine
Figure 4.7 Regional distribution of natural gas sales Automotive 17%
Other 3%
Electricity 19%
Source: Revista Brasil Energia, an energy monthly magazine
Figure 4.8 Natural gas sales by consumer
Industry 61%
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Total consumption reached 41,000 m3/day in 2007. Distribution is the responsibility of 20 regional companies of which six are responsible for three-quarters of the total. Of these six, the São Paulo Gas Company (COMGAS) sold 13,000 m3, and State Gas Company (CEG) of Rio de Janeiro sold 10,000, providing half the national total. PETROBRAS participates in the capital of all the companies, in partnership with state governments, except COMGAS, which is controlled by Shell and British Gas, and CEG, controlled by Gas Natural (of Spain).
The adventure of gas-fired thermoelectric plants From the time of the entry of Bolivian gas, and with greater intensity after the hydrological crisis that jeopardized the supply of electric power, thoughts veered to using thermoelectric plants as an anchor for the outflow of imported gas and the full execution of the terms of the contract. However, the insertion of these plants into the Brazilian thermoelectric system was not simple (see Chapter 3). The old coal and fuel-oil-fired thermoelectric plants could operate without great difficulty in the South–Southeast integrated system, thanks to their relative flexibility and the Fuel Consumption Account (CCC), which reimbursed the fuel costs of generating companies. On the other hand, gas-fired plants with little flexibility due to rigid contracts for the purchase and transportation of fuel, and without the benefits of the CCC, which was being abolished, found it difficult to fulfil their supplementary mission, while being unable to compete with the old hydroelectric plants or with many of the new ones, when required to operate according to the market load factor. The supplementary mission would have been strengthened had the MME and the ANEEL not made the mistake of overestimating the capacity of assured energy from each hydroelectric plant, accepting the risk level of not meeting the demand which had been in effect prior to the privatization of the distributors. As was already shown in Chapter 3, subsequent studies indicated that in the Southeast Region alone, the excess of ‘certificates of assured energy’ over a realistic calculation of firm energy amounted to an average of 2,400 MW. The distributors were not interested in contracting for the thermal capacity that would provide a safety margin. Gas-fired thermoelectric plants were, therefore, operationally caught between the Priority Thermoelectricity Programme (PPT), introduced by the MME, in its mission to contain the drain of the hydroelectric plant reservoirs, and the long-term programme of the Bolivia–Brazil gas
Fossil Fuels 97 pipeline, having to meet the requirements of both. Many Brazilian government decisions were taken hastily at critical periods without defining proper regulations, either regarding the traditional electric power sector or the natural gas area in which Brazil lacked experience. Twenty-two plants were built with a total capacity of 7,373 MW, and were put into operation with considerable delay. Only four, of 1,986 MW, went on stream in the year of the crisis and even so only as of September, when the reservoirs had already reached rock-bottom, holding only 20 per cent of their capacity. When the majority were ready to start operations, electricity consumption had already been reduced, partly due to society’s extraordinarily positive reaction to saving requirements and the resumption of rainfall that allowed a rapid recovery of the reservoirs. Finding it difficult to attract companies willing to build plants, the government resorted to PETROBRAS for partnerships that materialized, thanks to PETROBRAS absorbing economic risks.
Entry of PETROBRAS into the field of electric power generation The entry of PETROBRAS into the field of thermoelectricity took place at the time of the national privatization policy, based on which a widereaching reform of the electric power sector took place, drastically reducing the role of ELETROBRÁS. PETROBRAS moved in the opposite direction. Its strategic ten-year plan, prepared in April 1999, established as a directive that the company, besides beginning to operate internationally, was also to be active in the electricity field, in order to ensure the existence of a natural-gas market. The inclusion of energy in a wide sense as one of the company’s objectives was concurrent with the entry of Bolivian gas, and was part of the ambitious government PPT plan to have private enterprise build gas-fired thermoelectric plants. Soon, PETROBRAS took part in the PPT programme. The entry of the company, principally as a participant in consortiums, offered more security to possible foreign investors in new gas-fired thermoelectric plants. To this end, PETROBRAS had to invest US$450 million and US$1,510 million in 2001 and 2002 respectively, a substantial figure, considering that it invested in its essential activity of exploration and production little more than US$2 billion per year. The company also took responsibility over the long-term for the purchase of some of the energy produced by the merchant plants that operated without contracts with distributors and were called on by the
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GCOI to supply at spot price (Macaé and Eletrobolt plants in Rio de Janeiro and the MPX plant in Ceará). Under these contracts it accepted responsibility for making contingent payments to reimburse operating costs, taxes and the opportunity cost of invested capital should the revenues from the sale of energy not be sufficient to cover these commitments. The involvement of the company also included the supply of natural gas for the production of electric power.
Price of gas and exchange rate Establishing the price of gas sold to the end-consumer is not a simple task. Other countries with a longer tradition in this field adopt a variety of criteria. In Brazil, since prices are mainly based on imported gas, everything starts with the conditions laid down in its contracts with Bolivia. In 1996, the price agreed upon for the acquisition of Bolivian gas was US$2.26 per million BTU, to which the acquired gas at the well head contributed US$1.00. The price in foreign currency corresponded to R$2.2 per million BTU at the exchange rate in effect at that time. The price of gas of US$1.00 at the well head was to be readjusted quarterly, in line with the price of a basket of fuel oil on the world market, taking into account 50 per cent of the price of the previous quarter. At that time gas was cheap. The parcel of the final cost corresponding to transportation by pipeline was to be adjusted every year according to the price index of the US currency. In the last two quarters of 1999, the city-gate price varied between US$2.55 and US$2.85/million BTU. The foreign-currency financial crisis that hit the country in 1999 led the government to adopt a new currency exchange policy based on a fluctuating rate. The nominal US$ rate, which had been rising slowly from R$0.92 in 1996, jumped under this new methodology to R$1.91 in the fourth quarter of 1999. Brazil was faced with an exchange rate double that which had been in effect at the time of the studies and the contracts with Bolivia. The impact on the cost of gas in national currency was immediate, rising to R$5.44 in the last quarter of 1999 and to R$6.47 at the end of 2000. The cost of gas delivered in Brazil increased from R$2.26 to R$6.00 in national currency.2 An intense debate erupted as to what to do, especially as regards the supply of the thermoelectric plants under construction. Gas in Brazil became expensive in national currency, while in Bolivia gas was still being sold cheaply compared with the international market. Rules for the domestic price of gas were drawn up in 2000, separating the value of the product from that of transportation and determining the respective readjustments in keeping with the terms agreed with Bolivia.
Fossil Fuels 99 From an institutional point of view, the regulation was to clearly define three parcels in the price of gas to the consumer: price at the well head or at the location where the producer makes it available; transportation services to the points of delivery to distributors; and distribution cost. It was considered ideal to work out a system where there would be no differentiation by type of consumer and where transportation was calculated according to distance.3 Unfortunately, this did not happen in Brazil. In the methodology adopted, three situations were considered when establishing prices: 1 Nationally produced gas, whose maximum commodity price was to be adjusted between PETROBRAS and the distributors or arbitrated by the ANP if negotiation was impossible. 2 Imported gas, whose price would result from a contract between the importer, in this case PETROBRAS, and the Bolivian producer, with the addition of the cost of transportation to the city-gates where it would be delivered to the distributing companies. 3 Gas for the PPT programme: plants whose price would result from the average between the price of imported gas in the proportion of 20 per cent, readjusted by the US consumer price index, and the price of national gas in the proportion of 80 per cent, readjusted by the domestic consumer price index. This artificial procedure was not in accordance with the proportion of gas available, most of which was Bolivian. Not considering the competitive policy intended by the energy sector, this price would be uniform throughout Brazil, regardless of the location of each plant. A maximum of US$2.58 per million BTU was also established. Brazil was heading for a new price equalization. Highly complex mechanisms were created for compensation among the parties involved, as well as to record the amounts charged to distributors through an annually established tariff and the quantities owed in line with the foreseen quarterly readjustments. Two types of transportation by gas pipeline are differentiated: transfer between two installations belonging to the same company, which in Brazil’s case is only PETROBRAS, and transportation of public interest, subject to the principles of free access (Law 9,478/1997). Two distinct methods were adopted for charging for transportation by gas pipeline: 1 A sole price was established for gas supplied by the Bolivia–Brazil pipeline to any city-gate, including the southern states supplied by the Campinas–Canoas extension. This price was called ‘postal’, due to its
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similarity with post office tariffs, which are the same throughout the country. 2 In all other cases of the still-incipient grid, the areas to be supplied were subdivided into zones; a specific ‘postal’ type tariff was also established for each zone. Aside from this relative parity of transportation prices, which had great practical consequences, PETROBRAS continued to rule the market by concentrating production and importation, as well as being the only transporters. This price system left the market in suspense as to future decisions in the probable event of private gas producers turning up.
The tangled knot of natural gas Natural gas became important within the Brazilian energy scenario after the inauguration of the Bolivia–Brazil gas pipeline in 1999. Regulations did not cover much territory and issues were dealt with on a case-by-case basis as they arose. There existed the risk of failing to consume the volume contracted with Bolivia, and the government sought to foster demand in two ways: that of the PPT, which has already been referred to, aiming at the implantation of thermoelectric plants; and by containing prices in national currency, as well as by differentiated taxation in relation to competitive energies, creating severe distortions in the market, as shown in Table 4.6. Amounts shown change according to the exchange rate and taxation, but, by order of magnitude, the table shows the direction of the deviations. The domestic price in national currency and, specifically, for consumption in thermoelectric plants that since the decisions taken in 2001 served as an anchor for the Brazil–Bolivia contract, developed as shown in Figure 4.9.
Table 4.6 Charges on fuel prices in 2004 (% of price) For industrial, transportation and electricity consumers Fuel US$/million % of BTU price
For residential and automotive consumers Fuel US$/million % of BTU price
Natural gas Fuel oil Diesel oil
Natural gas LPG Petrol
1.0 1.5 4.2
14.7 24.0 28.7
Source: Almeida, Edmar, Política de Preços do Gás Natural, 2005
3.3 3.4 14.4
12.7 20.5 64.3
Fossil Fuels 101
City-gate price for natural gas (US$/million BTU)
8.00 7.00 6.00 5.00 Local Production Thermal Use
4.00 3.00
Imported from Bolivia
2.00 1.00
1
4T 2007
2T 2007
4T 2006
2T 2006
4T 2005
2T 2005
4T 2004
2T 2004
4T 2003
2T 2003
4T 2002
2T 2002
4T 2001
2T 2001
4T 2000
2T 2000
4T 1999
0.00
Non-weighed averages, without sales tax. Current exchange rate
Source: PETROBRAS, Operational Highlights Gas and Energy, ‘Gas prices at city-gates’, 2008
Figure 4.9 Natural gas prices at city gates1 Until 2004 price trends were related. At that time there were growing concerns about the future capacity of gas supply. In 2007, PETROBRAS decided to make a significant increase in price. Measures taken to contain domestic prices in local currency to the endconsumer were partially counteracted by the devaluation of the real. The average price of Bolivian gas at city-gates in R$/million BTU, which had amounted to 7.63 between the first quarter of 2001 and the second quarter of 2002, rose to 9.89 and 12.15 in the second and third quarters of 2002. These figures corresponded to an average of the order of US$4.00/million BTU. Despite this price increase, consumption expanded substantially in all sectors, except for the thermoelectricity sector. Major industrial consumers converted to gas, where the increase in price was felt less since it corresponded in the majority of cases to an input that bore less weight within the total cost. A distribution system for automotive gas was developed in which the tax difference in comparison with petrol was enormous (Table 4.6).
Regulating the natural-gas market Natural gas had not yet taken shape within the energy matrix when the Oil Law (9,748/1997) was being finalized; it was still an expectation. Therefore, the country did not yet have any experience in marketing,
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which explains the lack of definitions concerning the regime desired for gas. After the successful entry of gas, several issues arose and, consequently, proposals for their solutions. How to regulate a regime desired to be competitive, based on a monopolistic reality? PETROBRAS was in charge of production, importation and gas pipelines, while also having a significant share in all state distributors with the exception of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Discussions of regulatory principles specific for natural gas intensified in 2004, and the MME extended invitations to a number of agents in the sector to take part in them. The preparation and discussion of a draft bill to be sent to Congress was unsuccessful. In the meantime, the Senate started to discuss a draft bill. It dealt, among other matters, with definitions of activities to be regulated and with auctions for concession contracts for the construction and operation of gas pipelines similar to those established for transmission lines. Another draft bill was submitted by members of Congress in 2006, but contained no significant alternative. The government finally submitted a draft bill that proposed a mixed regime of concessions in some cases, such as the storage of gas, and of authorizations in others, including gas pipelines, whose application would be at the discretion of the MME. Due to the beginning of an election period, the issue stagnated in Congress, awaiting new discussions. The transition to a competitive market was further jeopardized by the constitutional provision that assigned the right of exploiting piped gas services to the states, to be carried out either directly or by means of concessions. This caused the additional problem of conciliating federal and state regulations. In the tug-of-war between PETROBRAS on the one hand and the associations of regulatory agencies and the distributing companies on the other, the latter officially stated their position in April 2006, in a document called the ‘Maceió Letter’. A Special Congressional Commission was appointed in 2007, to combine the three proposals under study in an amendment that had a chance of being approved. There were difficulties in reaching a consensus, and approval of the new regulation was predicted for early 2008. The probable entry of new gas producers, holders of proven reserves and others, who may still have had positive results in the exploration of conceded areas, brought new emphasis to the need to establish clear rules.
Fossil Fuels 103
Domestic coal-fired thermoelectrical plants The national coal industry suffered a blow in 1990–91, due to the extinction of the obligatory consumption of metallurgical coal in steel plants and the freeing of prices. After this crisis, the industry requested the federal government to give a definite solution to its insertion in the energy matrix by establishing a national coal policy. The government, being involved in the in-depth reform of the electricity sector, adopted a predominantly passive attitude in relation to coal. Industry believed that the main issue was pointing coal production in the direction of the generation of electric power, which included establishing solid economic bases and the reduction of environmental aggression caused by the waste from the mines and the emissions from thermoelectric plants. Norms for the protection of the quality of the environment were laid down for thermoelectric plants. The National Council on Environment (CONAMA) Resolution 8/1990 established limits for the emission of gases and particles by plants fired by coal or petroleum products. As a result, studies and discussions were intensified. A workshop on the subject of coal policy was held at the CEPEL in February 1997, at which Brazilian and US teams coordinated by the US Department of Energy took part. These discussions led to a programme of systematic testing of national coals, using the new technologies available. Within the government, the MME took the initiative to appoint a commission in 1997, assigned to draw up a proposal for a coal-fired thermoelectric generation policy, but they never actually completed their report. In the meantime, discussions for a new legislation that would establish directives for the transition of the economic and operational regime of the thermoelectric plants that were part of the integrated South–Southeast system, were also taking place in Congress. It was decided that for existing plants the CCC methodology would continue until 2002 and that thereafter the corresponding onus and benefits would be systematically decreased until they were abolished at the end of 2005. After this basic legislation, the MME appointed a working group in January 1999, whose final report was submitted in January of the following year, together with an economic study regarding the applicability of the measures proposed. No practical results ensued. The coal industry unions re-approached the MME, requesting that the same fiscal treatment be granted to the competing natural-gas sector, as well as an accelerated depreciation over a ten-year period for new coal-fired plants. The subject arose again in 2002, when, already under the impact of the supply crisis in 2001, an Energy Development Fund (CDE) was created, intended to last 25 years.
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The CDE raises funds from end-consumers and uses them to various ends: universality of energy consumption; helping low-income consumers; reimbursement of fuel costs in coal-fired plants; and the construction of gas pipelines in states that had none when the law was published. The portion for coal also includes funds for the expansion of coal-fired thermoelectric generation, provided the projects meet environmental legislation and the minimum requisites of efficiency in burning of coal. During unending discussions on national coal, the construction of two projects, Jacuí and Candiota III, which had been initiated in Rio Grande do Sul, were stopped for a long time. Jacuí, with 254 MW, was contracted in the first auction for new energy for the period 2009–15, and Candiota, with 292 MW, for 2010–15. After studies and tests regarding clean coal and based on the new technologies available, private enterprise developed two projects for plants: one in Rio Grande do Sul, with a 500-MW capacity, based in the Seival mine; and another in Santa Catarina, with a 440-MW capacity, resulting from a reshuffle of the existing mining activities and the utilization of its waste in a proportion of 25 per cent in a mixture with coal from mines already in operation. The project for the Seival plant went ahead and in December 2007, already in possession of an environmental licence, was transferred from the COPEL mining company to the Tractebel power company. In the fifth energy auction, held in October 2007, the first plants based on imported coal were contracted for construction by national private companies: in Maranhão (in the North), 315 MW; in Ceará (in the Northeast), 615 MW, where thermal complementation is lacking. Due to the lack of new or renewed mines, the production of saleable coal in Brazil remained static between 1995 and 2002, at a level of 5 million metric tons, with a peak of 6.7 million tons in 2000. During the rationing of electricity, it was impossible to use more coal to run the thermoelectric plants in the south, due to the limitations in the interconnecting South–Southeast lines, which were improved at a later date. Importations of coal for the steel industry stayed at approximately 13 million tons per year. The share of national and imported coal in the domestic energy supply was 6 per cent in 2007.4
Notes 1 BNDES – Brazilian Development Bank (2002) Privatização, Rio de Janeiro: BNDES 2 PETROBRAS (2006) Preços do gás natural no city gate, Rio de Janeiro: PETROBRAS
Fossil Fuels 105 3 ANP – National Petroleum Agency (2002) Indústria Brasileira de Gás Natural. História Recente e Política de Preços, Brasília: ANP 4 MME – Ministry of Mines and Energy (2007) Balanço Energético Nacional (BEN), Brasília
Chapter 5
The Nuclear Issue
Brazil enters the nuclear era Brazil’s involvement in nuclear energy issues occurred both in the academic world and in the search for radioactive minerals. Activities related to the training of personnel and to pure and applied research were concentrated in four institutions: •