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Studies in European Culture and History edited by Eric D. Weitz and Jack Zipes University of Minnesota Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism, the very meaning of Europe has been opened up and is in the process of being redefined. European states and societies are wrestling with the expansion of NATO and the European Union and with new streams of immigration, while a renewed and reinvigorated cultural interaction has emerged between East and West. But the fast-paced transformations of the last fifteen years also have deeper historical roots. The reconfiguring of contemporary Europe is entwined with the cataclysmic events of the twentieth century, two world wars and the Holocaust, and with the processes of modernity that, since the eighteenth century, have shaped Europe and its engagement with the rest of the world. Studies in European Culture and History is dedicated to publishing books that explore major issues in Europe’s past and present from a wide variety of disciplinary perspectives. The works in the series are interdisciplinary; they focus on culture and society and deal with significant developments in Western and Eastern Europe from the eighteenth century to the present within a social historical context. With its broad span of topics, geography, and chronology, the series aims to publish the most interesting and innovative work on modern Europe.
Series titles Fascism and Neofascism: Critical Writings on the Radical Right in Europe Edited by Angelica Fenner and Eric D. Weitz Fictive Theories: Towards a Deconstructive and Utopian Political Imagination Susan McManus German-Jewish Literature in the Wake of the Holocaust: Grete Weil, Ruth Klüger, and the Politics of Address Pascale Bos Exile, Science, and Bildung: The Contested Legacies of German Intellectual Figures Edited by David Kettler and Gerhard Lauer Transformations of the New Germany Edited by Ruth Starkman The Turkish Turn in Contemporary German Literature: Towards a New Critical Grammar of Migration Leslie A. Adelson Terror and the Sublime in Art and Critical Theory: From Auschwitz to Hiroshima to September 11 Gene Ray
Fictive Theories Toward a Deconstructive and Utopian Political Imagination
Susan McManus
FICTIVE THEORIES
© Susan McManus, 2005. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews. First published in 2005 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN™ 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 and Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England RG21 6XS Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN 1–4039–6668–0 (alk. paper) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data McManus, Susan. Fictive theories : toward a deconstructive and utopian political imagination / Susan McManus. p. cm.—(Studies in European culture and history) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1–4039–6668–0 (alk. paper) 1. Political science––Philosophy. 2. Social epistemology. I. Title. II. Series. JA71.M345 2005 321’, 07–dc22 A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: May 2005 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.
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Contents Acknowledgments
vii
Introduction The Politics of Fictive Theories: Reading/Writing/Theory Part I
Speculative Beginnings
1 17
Chapter One
Hobbes: Restraining Fictions
19
Chapter Two
Rousseau: Conceiving the Inconceivable
37
Excursus
“Mere High-Flown Fantasy . . .?” (Kant on Holiday)
57
Part II
Fictions of Self-Evidence
Chapter Three Stirner (with Marx and Derrida): Neither Material nor Utopian? Chapter Four
77
Epiphany and / or Politics? Nietzsche
103
I. Reading/Writing Nietzsche II. Nihilism––and Beyond? Errors for Life III. Nietzsche’s Ressentiment? Or, What is Written on Zarathustra’s Tablets?
108 118
Part III Chapter Five
75
Fabricating the Future
Bloch’s Utopian Imagination: Fictive Theories
134 145 147
Toward a Conclusion: Fictive Theories and Creative Epistemologies of Possibility
167
Notes
171
Bibliography
209
Index
221
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Acknowledgments
I started working on this project as a doctoral student in the School of Politics at the University of Nottingham, U.K. My debts to Lucy Sargisson and Simon Tormey stem from this time, and simply (happily) could not be repaid. I also held the post of Economic and Social Research Council Postdoctoral Fellow in the School of Politics at the University of Nottingham, during which time more of the work was completed. As well as Lucy and Simon, I would particularly like to thank Andrew Robinson for his theoretical and political acuity over many conversations. In August 2003, I moved to Queen’s University Belfast, and I would like to acknowledge the collegial and friendly welcome I received. Thanks in particular to Debbie Lisle, Vincent Geoghegan, and Shane O’Neil. I would like to express my appreciation to all the friends and colleagues who read sections of the manuscript. I would also like to thank Vincent, Ruth Levitas, and Lyman Tower Sargent for their support and encouragement at crucial points of this work. I thank the people who worked with me at Palgrave: especially the series editors, Eric D. Weitz and Jack Zipes; my editor, Farideh Koohi-Kamali and Lynn Vande Stouwe; Yasmin Mathew, in Production; Maran Elancheran at Newgen Imaging Systems, and Jayashree Aradhyam, for her careful, thoughtful, and thorough copyediting. Most importantly, my parents, Rose and John McManus, my brother, John McManus, and Angela Cohen, have gone through much of this endeavor with me with love, good humor, good advice, and indulgence. And finally, to Tom. For whatever its worth, I dedicate this to them. Some of the material in chapter five has been published in Utopian Studies 14/2 (2003), and I thank the editor for permission to republish this material here. Note on gendered language: as feminist political theorists have consistently pointed out, the subject of politics is not incidentally gendered masculine. I have not tried to efface this when directly quoting. However, in my own writing, I prefer the pronoun “she,” “her,” and so on, as a very small contribution to changing that long his-story.
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Introduction The Politics of Fictive Theories: Reading/Writing/Theory
There is no outside-text. Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, 1997 I am. We are. That is enough. Now it is up to us to begin. Ernst Bloch, Spirit of Utopia, 1988 Without storytelling, there is no theory of ethics. J. Hillis Miller, The Ethics of Reading, 1987
This book is an exploration of the work of fictions in political theories: the epistemological status those fictions claim, on the one hand, and the effects that they secure, on the other. I propose that political theory has worked within epistemologically conservative forms of knowledge. In seeking to articulate grounded conceptions of order and justice, the claims to knowledge of political theory are at once claims to power, which work toward coherence, containment, and control. This mode of theorizing, however, is based on misrecognition or forgetting: in the attempt to ground political theory in substantive norms, such as nature, rights, or even knowledge of the “the real,” theory must efface, negate, and forget its own constitutive fictions. In this effacement of the fictions that make theory work inheres the reification of political theory into a legislative, authoritative, and programmatic mode. Put otherwise: epistemologies of “the given,” conservative and ostensibly authoritative modes of knowledge-production, are always already creative epistemologies, but creative epistemologies that efface their contingency and creative power in favor of their legislative and authoritative power. Tracing the fictions that lie at the core of political theory’s attempts to ground itself has profound ethical and political affects.1 If, as I seek to uncover in the chapters that follow, the “fictive” is the inescapable ground of political theory, then the disruption of the fictive is formidable. My deployment of the term “fictive” in contradistinction to the fictional is critical. In the first two chapters and excursus, exploring the constitutive fictions at work in Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Immanuel Kant, the fictive is used critically, genealogically, negatively. My explorations are an excavation of programmatic and ascetic fictions, fictions that work toward discipline, that regulate, restrain, control: the Natural, the Leviathan, the Legislator, the Moral Law. As the engagement with Max Stirner and Friedrich
2 / fictive theories
Nietzsche shows in chapters three and four, the specters and spooks of idealism and of ideologies, or the life-negating affects of slave moralities can also be negotiated via the fictive. Interrogating, questioning, and excavating the epistemological status of fictions interrupt the work that they can do, the effects that they can secure: that interruption is vital. First, then, I propose that if it is a fiction that inaugurates and sustains the project of political theory, then the possibility of the conceptual separation and epistemological control of the opposition of fictions and reality is itself deeply troubled. The movement from the fictional to fictive is subtle but crucial: whereas the fictional relies upon an opposition to its other, the true or real, and is thus epistemologically positivist, the fictive is that term beyond the opposition. Second, I argue that such fictions, when recognized as such, cannot ground a politics that aims to secure a legislative and programmatic coding of the political. Finally, with Nietzsche, and especially with Ernst Bloch in chapter five, I argue that this impossibility of privileging the legislative and authoritative capacities of an epistemologically secured political theory opens the space for exciting new possibilities: I reconceive the project of political theory as an open-ended project grounded in a future-oriented imagination. The possibilities, in other words, point toward an inventive political imaginary that is both deconstructive and utopian. Here, the fictive takes on a self-consciously anticipatory mode, guided by creative epistemologies of possibility. Briefly for now: a deconstructive and utopian mode of political theorizing, self-consciously fictive theories, speak in a language that “does not speak about something or someone who already exists and for whom a language and representations are somehow available, previously codified. Rather, it tries to anticipate. . . .”2 This book, then, draws upon and interweaves three different ways of telling stories that each seek to make the status, aims, and task of politics intelligible: political theory, utopian theory, and deconstructive theory. The use of the singular to describe each of these discourses is nevertheless a necessary grammatical error, covering a multiplicity of difference. As well, it would be a mistake to assume that that I bring three autonomous or “self-governing” disciplinary knowledges together, for on a substantive level, political theory undoubtedly has its utopian moments, and utopian theory is inherently political in its evocation of an “elsewhere” from which a critical eye is cast over the (foreclosed) possibilities of any given ordering of any given political present. It would also be misleading to think of the interweaving through the different functions of the disciplines, one, political theory, insistent on programmatics, the others, utopian and deconstructive theories undisciplined, wayward, and so disruptive of that possibility. Rather, it is more productive to seek out the deconstructive and utopian moments that already inhabit political theories, inhering in their very conditions of possibility. Similarly, utopian theory is not without its problematic legislative or programmatic claims, aiming toward a closure of possibility; I argue that the metaphysical and political terrain within which utopias have been conventionally understood itself needs to be reconfigured. Finally, deconstructive theory has been criticized for erring in the opposing direction. Resisting certain moments in both political and utopian theory that seek to overcode and so contain the future, deconstructive theory, it has been argued, remains “blithely unspecific about normative orientation in the here and now” even as it “carries a persistent utopian hope of a ‘not-yet.’ ”3 I argue, instead, that deconstructive theory entails an unremittingly critical attitude toward the status, and stasis, of the claims of normativity itself.
introduction / 3
At stake is precisely the tension or ambivalence (rather than equivalence) between two significant moments in each of these discourses: the imaginative moment, with its production of critical and perhaps even unruly and disruptive knowledges, which utopian and deconstructive theories solicit, and the moment of (re-)founding, (re-)ordering, and (re-)coding of the political that political theory aims to favor. It is this ambivalence that I explore in this introduction, first, through an exploration of the ways in which the project of political theory has understood itself. Second, via discussion of the “deconstructive narratology” I deploy throughout the book, I explore the ungrounding effects of Jacques Derrida’s “undecidability,” and Roland Barthes’s “Textuality,” as both contribute to a rethinking of the epistemological and temporal problematic of theorizing. Finally, I gesture toward the ways this deconstructive narratology renders impossible the legislative and programmatic inscription of political theory. The aim of the chapters that follow, then, as well as singular readings of certain theorists, is also to extrapolate, weave, and inscribe a new mode of political theorizing. Specters of Moses? Or “. . . a system without end or center . . .”?4 There is, I have suggested, a productive ambivalence in the very self-understanding of the status, aims, and project of political theory. I am concerned with the ways political theory negotiates meaning and order in the world. Specifically, I am interested in the ways in which political theorists have made claims that justify particular construals of, and interventions in, the political. The predominant strategy of justificatory discourse has been to posit a place outside of contestation: nature, foundations, reason, objectivity, universality, materiality . . . I further suggest, however, that such positions are riddled with ambiguities that can be read. In part I of the book, “Speculative Beginnings,” through readings of Hobbes, Rousseau, and Kant, I suggest that the foundationalism at work in a certain mode of political theorizing is always already fictive. In part II, “Fictions of Self-Evidence,” I negotiate theory/fiction hierarchies such as reality/fiction, material/utopian to propose that while there are many and competing fictive strategies there is, in terms of political intelligibility, no “outside” the fictive. For now, I wish to pause to consider that mode of political theorizing that I contest. Two caveats first need consideration. In describing a particular mode of theorizing, characterized by epistemological authority, and programmatic or legislative closure, am I treading dangerously close to the very practice I contest in other theorists, that of falsely universalizing a contingent structure? On this drive in narrative studies, Roland Barthes writes: There are said to be certain Buddhists whose ascetic practices enable them to see a whole landscape in a single bean. Precisely what the first analysts of narrative were attempting: to see all the world’s stories (and there have been ever so many) within a single structure: we shall, they thought, extract from each tale its model, then out of these models we shall make a great narrative structure . . .5
My writing of a particular, contestable, mode of theorizing is not, however, a reductive one, distilling all of the stories theorists tell into one; rather, as I suggest this mode as such, I simultaneously withdraw its epistemological security as I am attentive to abyssal moments, attuned to hiatus. A structuralist language, however, would put it
4 / fictive theories
thus: while the substantive content of the stories change, the structural imperatives, or formal properties, exhibit a similar drive: to legislate. Yet I proceed here with caution: a certain delicacy is necessary to avoid reinstating the coherence and validity of the idea of an epistemologically grounded, foundational or otherwise, model of political theory whose status I contest throughout this book.6 By attempting to write its ambiguity back in, then, I want to bypass its own logics, as I sidestep, suspend, and unwork that recalcitrant paradigm. My insistence on the interruption of the “alwaysalready fictive” is vital to such a process. The second objection that might be raised is this: contemporary political theorists no longer operate within such a model, at least since Jean-François Lyotard declared our loss of faith in the grand récits of modernity, and insisted that those stories were, precisely, tall tales indeed, their epistemological privilege always a ruse and a trickery. This claim has, to be sure, lost much of its capacity to unsettle, whether through repetition, denunciation, or plain weariness with the postmodern moment it announced. But contemporary political theory has certainly witnessed a move away from epistemology toward, on the one hand, narrative, and on the other, forms of proceduralism. However, in the work of many of those theorists who recognize and privilege narrative, there is simply a displacement of the original paradigm: it is narrative that tends toward settling questions of meaning and hence narrative works as an “ordering” mode. For example: “story-telling and literary imagining are not opposed to rational argument, but can provide the essential ingredients in rational argument”; or consider the following: narratives are a useful “supplement” to political theory because narrative discourses are similarly “rule-governed.” Or, consider the claim that in the “desire for order and unity, narrative can be a powerful tool.”7 On these accounts, narratives secure the orderly claims of political theorists. Within these approaches, fictions are still predicated on their truth-value, and a theory/fiction hierarchy is simply reformulated, with fiction in the service of theories, rather than excluded from their domain. In the terms that I have already introduced: narrative simply takes the place of epistemologies of “the given” that seek to contain or construct settled forms of order and justice. I find this a premature foreclosure of the possibilities of fictions. In the procedural turn in recent political theory I find, on the other hand, a premature foreclosure of the possibilities of politics. Whether of the Rawlsian or Habermasian variants, the procedural turn in political theory has sought to turn away from substantive norms and instead ground politics in terms of procedures that allow for a variety of viewpoints and positions to be negotiated. There are two problems with this that I shall simply point to: one recurrent critique is that this is a particular and located, Western and liberal conception of the “good life,” and so proceduralism simply effaces its own substantive content; and the second is that the liberal commitment to proceduralism is yet another way of defusing the political via a legislative mode. The foreclosures of both these new turns in contemporary political theory need to be challenged, and I return to this question throughout the book. And one way of unpacking what is at stake in those foreclosures is rethinking the relationship between modes of making meaning, and modes of ordering in political theory. Generically, a (dis)orderly structure or dream of political theory, always-already undermined, can be extrapolated around the legislative functions of the discourse. As
introduction / 5
I suggest here, pick up again in chapter two with Rousseau, and most productively with Nietzsche in chapter four, the figure of the legislator is perhaps the master trope of political theory; yet, it is also the position where the always-already fictive status of political theories can be discerned. I want to suggest here that the figure or trope of the legislator is an exemplary moment in figuring out a crucial way that creative epistemologies become epistemologies of the given, conservative, and ordering knowledges. To begin mapping this tension, I draw upon some key statements of the scope, task, and aims of political theory in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. In his important 1969 essay, “Political Theory as a Vocation,” Sheldon Wolin, an influential American political theorist, aims to bring out the “distinctive nature” of the task of the political theorist through the characterization of political theory as “epic.”8 Drawing on Thomas Kuhn’s deployment of the phrase “extraordinary science,” Wolin argues that the task of epic political theory is to “inaugurate a new way of looking at the world, which includes a new set of concepts, as well as new cognitive and normative standards.”9 The effects of such a conception of the task of theory are, as John Seery describes it, “audacious”: “because of the magnitude of its scope and claims [. . . i]t has the vision to suggest alternatives that may be available, even if such possibilities appear distant and foreclosed under current conditions.”10 This is, for sure, a distinctly utopian characterization of the task of the theorist, and is so for two reasons. First, the emphasis is on the capacity of theory to articulate visions, possibilities, beyond the political and conceptual resources of the current order. But second, and even more crucially, Wolin emphasizes the inventive role of the theorist, and the creation of cognitive as well as normative standards. The knowledge-production of the political theorist is as much a political and politicized task as it is a task concerning epistemological security or certainty. As I articulate throughout this book, creative epistemologies of possibility “make up” such profoundly utopian ways of knowing and acting in the world, without being in thrall to the given. And yet, in other understandings of the task of the political theorist, something happens to this creative moment. For Adriana Cavarero is surely correct when she criticizes the “Platonic inheritance” inherent to the practice of political theory. This inheritance is twofold, combining an epistemological hierarchy with a disciplinary conception of politics: “to ‘save’ politics from the unpredictability and contingency of action, the task of discovering universal principles capable of regulating politics was entrusted to theoria [. . .] One of the most noteworthy results is that politics is subsumed by the central problem of order.”11 Cavarero points to the ways in which the work of theoria is both fictional and repressive in its ordering: “In traditional political theory, the ontology of fictitious entities [. . .] is functional to the centrality of the issue of order or, to use Foucault’s term, discipline, insofar as it is subjection, normalization.”12 Cavarero argues that this paradigm of depoliticizing political theory and politics through epistemological certainty continues even (or especially) as we “adopt [. . .] science as a true and incontrovertible model of knowledge.”13 The epistemological claims of political theory, on this account, are constitutively a “formidable metaphysical lie.”14 To reiterate thus far: I have suggested that when political theory is based upon epistemological certainty, it will necessarily be practiced via legislative and programmatic modes. Such modes foreclose the possibilities of politics. I have further suggested,
6 / fictive theories
however, that the “formidable metaphysical lie” that Cavarero roots out is always-already a reification of a creative or inventive knowledge-production. It is only by attending to both moments that the status and project of political theory can be reconfigured via the fictive. (In claiming the always-already fictive status of claims to knowledge/ power, I echo John Seery, whose provocative and disarming proposal reverberates through my own text: “But what if, just what if, this elaborate story now in vogue about the history of Western philosophy, beginning with Plato as the founder of the Forms, turns out to be deeply mistaken about Plato? What if Plato never really was a Platonist? The scandal would be enormous. How could we all have been so wrongheaded?”15) In fact, the most potent accounts of the status and task of political theory are alert to the tension that Wolin and Cavarero sketch out. Rather than drawing on incontrovertible principles, political theory, for Norman Jacobson, itself circumvents the abyss between a lack of meaning and lack or order (nevertheless, this very equation of meaning/order needs to be unworked and not simply inverted). With no little sense of a melancholy dignity, Jacobson writes, “political theory has been a heroic business, snatching us from the abyss a vocation worthy of giants.”16 Jacobson’s position is complex, and recognizes the ways in which theory, in shaping meanings, and the orders they justify, makes the contingent necessary (or, indeed, the fictive foundational). For example: “politics begins with a lack: hence, directives are needed, precepts discovered, deduced or invented; political theories are created.”17 The task of the political theorist on this account is to provide the necessarily insecure security of a ground over an abyss (and I return to this figure with Jacques Derrida later in this introduction). In the dual questions of meaning and order lies the dream of political theory, as well as the epistemological fault lines that make that dream impossible. I suggest that in the terrain reconfigured via the fictive, it is precisely these “fault-lines” that make theory—and politics—possible. I am now in a position to “embody” this contestable construction of political theory through its encapsulation in the figure or trope of the legislator. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, peculiarly alert to the paradoxes and tensions, writes: The Legislator [. . .] must have recourse to an authority of a different order [than either his own authority or that ordained by the people], capable of constraining without violence and persuading without convincing. This is what has, in all ages, compelled the fathers of nations to have recourse to divine intervention, and credit the gods with their own wisdom, in order that the peoples, submitting to the laws of the State as to those of nature, and recognizing the same power in the formation of the city as in that of man, might obey freely [. . .] This sublime reason, far above the range of the common herd, is that whose decisions the legislator puts in the mouths of mortals, in order to constrain by divine authority those whom human prudence could not move. But it is not anybody who can make the gods speak, or get himself believed when he proclaims himself their interpreter.18
(In the same text, more elliptically: “it would take gods to give men laws.”19) A “formidable metaphysical lie” indeed: the settled order of the polity is justified, made metaphysical, and naturalized all at once (“recognizing the same power in the formation of the city as in that of man”); based around an epistemic hierarchy (“far above the range of the common herd”); and yet is, as Rousseau reveals, a manifest piece of fabrication! Precisely at stake is the problematic epistemological status of an
introduction / 7
ostensibly authoritative discourse whose effects are disciplinary. Precisely to the extent that political theory must move from the philosophical stories it tells to political ordering, it is subject to the epistemological paradoxes of the legislator: such a position must be one of epistemological privilege, to secure its powerful effects; and yet such a position is impossible, unavailable (and, contra Jacobson’s melancholy and nostalgia, has never been available). The “truth” is a creation in the radical absence of the truth. It is in this context that Jacobson writes of the double bind of political theory: “it is as if political thought from the beginning has exclaimed, however tacitly on occasion, ‘the civic god is dead, all is permitted’ ”; and yet, “the specter of Moses [still] haunts the pages” of political theory.20 Political theory, I propose, needs to lose that residual desire for “solace,” certainty, and security of programmatic thought. Can a mode of political theorizing be articulated that openly acknowledges its fictive origins? Can the failure of knowledge provide a new (groundless) ground of political theory that overcomes the desire to code and contain the political through the delineation of incontrovertible principles, or the stasis of forms of normativity and codification of forms of proceduralism, for once and all? And can that mode of political theorizing still be adequate to the vital and bold substantive—but no longer legislative—tasks of “inaugurat[ing] a new way of looking at the world, which includes a new set of concepts, as well as new cognitive and normative standards?”21 Yes: fictive theories, when conceived as distinctly deconstructive and utopian, are able to move beyond a politics based around legislative claims, without conceding any loss of political affectivity, but indeed a gain. As I argue throughout, I claim political and ethical advantages for a mode of theorizing that recognizes its fictive modality. I turn now to questions of how. A New Imaginary? The Text is that social space which leaves no language free, outside, and no subject of the speech-act in a situation of judge, master, analyst, confessor, decoder: the theory of the Text can only coincide with the practice of writing. Roland Barthes, “From Work to Text”
To approach the texts of political theory qua texts is an approach at once immediate, blatant, and tangible; and yet, without unpacking the textuality of these texts, such an approach can remain insensible to the ruptures affected by this awareness. Attention to the writing of political theory provokes a different recognition of the perceived status and task of the project (and discipline) of political theory. Becoming attuned to writing and interpretative activity performs the dissolution of any attempted grounding of political theory. At stake throughout this book are the core questions of the status, aims, and validity of the writing of political theory. Since responding to political texts is also to read as rewriting (or to “countersign”) also at stake is the position of theorist/commentator in the task of reading/rewriting political theory. Attending to the textuality of the grounding moments of discourse is, as Jacques Derrida has taught us to recognize, tricky, and possibly slightly mad: Are we obeying the principle of reason when we ask what grounds this principle which is itself a principle of grounding? We are not—which does not mean we are disobeying it, either. Are we dealing with a circularity or an abyss? The circle would consist in seeking to
8 / fictive theories account for reason by reason, to render reason to the principle of reason, in appealing to the principle in order to make it speak of itself at the very point where, according to Heidegger, the principle of reason says nothing about reason. The abyss, the hole, the Abgrund, the empty “gorge” would be the impossibility for a principle of grounding to ground itself. This very grounding, then, [. . .] would have to hold itself suspended above a most peculiar void.22
Stepping outside of the parameters that a text would allow means asking about the ways in which texts are enabled to define their own parameters, or their own authorizing principles: probing or interrogating the grounding principles of texts means not stepping back from their abyssal moments (as Jacobson would perhaps urge) but testing their edges and limits in ways whereby the meaning of the text is no longer guaranteed. Rather than moving from questions of making-meaning to constructing order, I ask the question, by what means are meanings created? William Corlett puts it this way: Political theories can be thought of as providing order for the world(s) they seek to encounter. This is not to say that political theories impose these forms on the world; it is more accurate to see any imposition involved as an attempt at self-governance. Political theories, then, do not impose order on the world in the way, for example, a sculptor might give shape and vitality to unformed clay. Rather, these theories govern themselves by giving themselves structure or orders. [. . . But] there remains the question of how theories themselves are related to their order.23
By exploring the ways in which theories govern themselves, by looking for the mechanisms by which theories negotiate the construction (and indeed, the dispersal and reconstitution of meanings), it is possible to open theories to their own fictivity and reflexivity. This is not in preference to how those theories engage with “the world”; as I go on to suggest, attention to this formal or reflexive moment is not to the exclusion of the “properly political” moment, or the legislative, programmatic task; rather, as I turn to now and throughout the book, such an attention reconfigures this moment through radical openings. A deconstructive narratology of political theory provokes an epistemic rupture in relation to the aims, status, and validity of the discourse of political theory. The aim of political theory has been to close the field of the political; the status of such work is seemingly epistemologically secured; and the validity of the closure is dependent upon that security. Yet, this relies upon problematic hierarchical oppositions, and assumptions of reference and an ontologically given opposition between fiction and reality that deconstructive practices disrupt. In this section, I explore two such moments: Derridean “undecidability,” and Barthesian Textuality. I claim both as deconstructively political moments. Even so, in an interview with Richard Kearney in 1984, Derrida suggested that he has “never succeeded in relating deconstruction to existing political codes and programs,” because “the available codes for taking a political stance are not at all adequate to the radicality of deconstruction.”24 He continued: this “absence of an adequate political code to translate or incorporate the radical implications of deconstruction has given many the impression that deconstruction is opposed to politics or is at best apolitical”; but, “this impression only prevails because all our political codes and terminologies still remain metaphysical, regardless of whether they originate from the left or the right.”25 Derrida, I suggest, refers to a
introduction / 9
“metaphysical” political code where I refer to an ostensibly authoritative and legislative or programmatic inscription of political theory. This is, then, a useful place to pause Derrida, and to both catch up on and add a further twist to that mode of theorizing by considering its metaphysics. We have already encountered this model in the epistemological fault lines that negate/enable the dream of political theory: its claims toward epistemological certainty, and its difficulties in establishing those claims. In a deconstructive questioning of this model, responsive to the moment of the failure of knowledge, Cathy Caruth asks: “in what ways could we define a politics or ethics which derives from a position in which full understanding is not possible?”26 Drawing on the impossibility of the legislative model, or, “the relation between knowing and responsibly doing,” she argues that “the demand for responsible action arises most urgently in the impossibility of a pregiven self-understanding or knowledge.”27 Undecidability occurs when knowledge is not possible; and this, deconstructive theorists claim, re-politicizes political theory: Drucilla Cornell suggests that “Derrida’s text leaves us with the infinite responsibility undecidability imposes on us. Undecidability in no way alleviates responsibility. The opposite is the case. We cannot be excused from our own role in history because we could not know so as to be reassured we were ‘right’ in advance.”28 Political theory accepts its most intense responsibility when epistemological certainty no longer de-politicizes the moment of action. Thomas Keenan pulls these strands together when he writes: Reading is what happens when we cannot apply the rules. [. . .] We have politics because we have no reliable grounds, no reliable standpoints—in other words, responsibility and rights, the answers and claims we make as foundations disintegrate, are constitutive of politics. So “deconstruction” is not offered here as an antiauthoritarian discourse, an attack on grounds, but as an attempt to think about this removal as the condition of any political action.29
There are a number of points of note here: first, deconstruction is not an oppositional discourse; just as I insist on the always-already fictive nature of the grounding claims of political theory, so too a deconstructive narratology of political theory inhabits discourses, working within them rather than opposing from outside. While Caruth and Cornell deal with epistemological fault lines, Keenan also begins to articulate why reading is crucial to this reconfiguration, and why reading is, as Derrida has resolutely maintained, “transformational.”30 To anticipate: reading is the site where both the status and the stasis of ordering and normative principles can no longer hold. This needs explanation. It is within the field of literary theory that challenges have been posed to the hierarchical, disciplinary, epistemologically grounded divide that separates literature from philosophy. This distinction is itself contiguous with an entire problematic of reference in its mapping of terms of oppositions such as true and false, real and illusory, factual and fictional, and so on. However, referring to both literary and philosophical modes of production of texts, Michael Shapiro writes that “it must be recognized that the production of all texts (as well as their reading or consumption) involves acts of imagination. There are thus no firm boundaries between the two.”31 This recalls the tension between imagination and knowledge mapped by Wolin, Cavarero, and others
10 / fictive theories
previously. However, literary studies have gone further: Wolfgang Iser, for example, has “challenged the conventional distinction between fiction and reality by bringing them into play with the concept of the imaginary.”32 It is precisely this move that the narrative turn within political theory has only partly incorporated. Within a deconstructive narratology I find the critical resources by which to uncover and move beyond a recalcitrant foundationalism. But this means questioning the coherence of narratives themselves: as Andrew Gibson argues, “a particular set of structures [. . .]— subject and object, observer and observed, narrative text and pre-existent, narrated world—has dominated throughout thought about narrative representation. These structures are metaphors to which we are so profoundly accustomed that we can hardly keep their metaphorical status in sight.”33 But “reading,” as Roland Barthes obliquely suggests, “is the site where structure is made hysterical.”34 Just as Derridean undecidability politicizes theory in the absence of epistemological security, textuality as an epistemological proposition “utopianizes” theory: the possibility of becoming other is inscribed in the movement of textuality itself. This latter move is vital to a political imagination that is both deconstructive and utopian. Textuality, then, is an epistemological proposition with effects. As Michael Clark argues, Barthes’s reference to the revolutionary and utopian significance of the text as a “social” space is not simply allegorized. Like Lacan’s insistence on the materiality of the signifier, and like Derrida’s critique of the binary sign as idealist in its inherent subordination of the signifier to the signified, and like the “language games” that constitute social bonds in Lyotard’s Postmodern Condition, Barthes’s Text does not situate the word in the world, as the formalists might argue: it confounds those terms entirely by treating the word as world, by recognizing in the word the weighty materiality of its worldly existence as part of our lived experience.35
Barthes’s Text does not simply “recognize in the word the weighty materiality of the world,” however, but reinscribes that weighty materiality not as something given, but as a movement of possibility. This is important. To allegorize Text would be to remain within narratorial and metaphysical structures: it would be to insist on a “real” to which the Text stands opposed. This is not how the term functions for Barthes. Barthes introduces into the playing field of Text the terms (they are precisely not concepts) of the lisible (readerly) and scriptible (writerly); I explore here the concomitant disruption of structure, of subject/object, and of ontology, that their explication and exploration precipitates.36 This is important substantively, as well as methodologically. The type of distinction Barthes is making between the readerly and the writerly cannot be stated too soon: this is a problematic to be uncovered. The writerly is, nevertheless, privileged: “Why is the writerly our value? Because the goal of literary work [. . .] is to make the reader no longer a consumer but a producer of the text.”37 However, the “writerly” text has a tenuous existence, for it is not a book as such: “Where can we find them? Certainly not in reading (or at least very rarely: by accident, fleetingly, obliquely, in certain limit-works): the writerly text is not a thing, we would have a hard time finding it in a bookstore” (ibid., pp. 4–5). Now, the dominant approach to the texts of political theory is to view them as “readerly” where, as Barthes explains, “[t]he ‘reader’ is left with no more than the poor freedom either to
introduction / 11
accept or reject the text: reading is nothing more than a referendum. Opposite the writerly text, then, is its countervalue, its negative reactive value: what can be read but not written: the readerly.”38 The “readerly” approach to a political text views it as a fixed object with a fixed function, from which a meaning can be unproblematically elicited for legislative purposes. This is, Barthes argues, a “theological” approach, tied to “God and his hypostases, reason, science, the law.”39 “Specters of Moses” (and many other strange specters and even monsters!) indeed haunt the texts and the readers of political theory. However, a core aim of my deployment of a deconstructive narratology is to change the model by which Text and specific texts are understood; to make the readerly text writerly. If these two types of texts do not “exist” ontologically, then it follows that the properties do not inhere within the texts. And, indeed, an important part of the readings of Hobbes, Rousseau, and Kant presented here is to disrupt the consensus that a message or a meaning can be unproblematically extracted for legislative purposes. Such readerly texts can, via the reading process, be made writerly. By reading through foundational moments, or indeed any moment of hypostatization, readerly texts become open to writerly re-appropriation and re-functioning (I explain this in a little more detail later). An important part of parts two and three of the book is to maintain the writerly aspects of Nietzsche and Bloch’s work. But what does this writerly re-functioning consist of? The importance of Barthes’s definitions here is that his distinctions are intransitive, verbal rather than ontological. This is clear when he writes about the writerly “model”: Further, its model being a productive (and no longer representative) one, it demolishes any criticism which, once produced, would mix with it: to rewrite the writerly text would consist only in disseminating it, in dispersing it within the field of infinite difference. The writerly text is a perpetual present, upon which no consequent language (which would inevitably make it past) can be superimposed; the writerly text is ourselves writing, before the infinite play of the world [. . .] is traversed, intersected, stopped, plasticized by some singular system (Ideology, Genus, Criticism) which reduces the plurality of entrances, the opening of networks, the infinity of languages.40
The writerly text, then, is constructed via an active process of reading that cannot and should not be stabilized: “The writerly is [. . .] production without product, structuration without structure. But the readerly texts? They are products. . . .”41 Barthes is talking here about the ways in which meaning is created: the readerly text—or to approach a text as readerly—is to privilege “separation and control” at an epistemological and political level; the writerly text—or to approach a text as writerly—is to privilege and work to maintain “immersion and participation” in the processes of sense-making, and again, at the epistemological and political levels.42 “Ourselves writing” as process, “production” and “structuration” without aiming to secure “product” or “structure” is necessarily a post-representational (indeed, anticipatory) mode suited to temporal becoming. The “final point” that both criticism and a legislative political theory would desire to attain is continually deferred through an underlying commitment to processes of becoming. And further, Barthes asserts the openness of a reading that would not privilege any one point of entrance: “[T]his text is a galaxy of signifiers, not a structure of signifieds; it has no beginning; it is reversible; we gain access to it by several entrances, not one of which can be authoritatively declared to
12 / fictive theories
be the main one. . . .”43 In interesting ways, the underlying structure of this model of reading/writing is one of disruption of linearity, beginnings, endings. The difference between the readerly and the writerly, then, is one of an active differential, a differential that is activated through the processes of making, creating, sense(s) of reading as rewriting. This is a discursively material operation: a self-reflexive, deconstructive narratology is utopian in the sense that rather than simply reflecting on its own limits, it in effect, opens the world as possibility. The deconstruction at work throughout this book is then already informed by a utopian commitment: as I explore in chapter five, it is Ernst Bloch’s insistence on reality as unfinished, and the not-yet as a category of the real that ultimately precludes the authority of epistemologies of the given underwriting legislative inscriptions of political theory. My alternative approach, guided by creative epistemologies of possibility, has a sense of becoming at its core: this is why the work of Derrida and Barthes is important. Both point toward ways of thinking and theorizing that are no longer guided by the desire for authority and closure, and so contribute at a very fundamental level to the rethinking of the status and the task of political theory. Indeed, Bloch has already pointed toward the necessity of thinking the substantive commitments of politics through a mode of becoming, or of thinking content through form, precluding a static mode of theorizing. In his Natural Law and Human Dignity, law is conceptualized as that moment of authoritative stasis, and revolution is theorized via becoming. However, for Bloch, the important political task was to rethink both these moments: the question of law and rights has, for the most part, been absent from the agenda of social revolution. [. . .] The conceptual frame that called for and accounted for change was largely resistant to the static demands of law and rights. Consequently, any effort to wed the demands of law and rights to the agenda of social revolution would require a fundamental rethinking of the structure of political thought in order to reconcile otherwise antagonistic intentions.44
Thinking beyond what has already become is vital to this mode of theorizing: undercutting any epistemological claims that would seek to close the movement of the political is central to this. In the chapters that follow, then, the object of my critique is not the theorists with whom I engage. Rather, the object of my critique is a particular mode of theorizing that can be characterized via the trope of legislation, which tends toward authority, toward closure, but that is, I argue, always-already fissured. In “Speculative Beginnings,” I focus my readings around the foundational paradox of founding theories on fictions, in the work of Hobbes, Rousseau, and Kant. The guiding narrative is that these theorists entered a space of imagination and speculation, a fictional space, in order to ground and sustain “the real.” Dominant modes of reading have, however, effaced the fictional space and moment. Nevertheless, while both Hobbes and Rousseau invoke the natural as the fictive/foundational moment, their modes of imagining and inscribing nature are radically different. This helps me address the questions of how, for example, does Hobbes turn a creative reading of “man” into the monstrous Leviathan? What traces of possibility remain to be reactivated? Hobbes helps me figure out both the logic and the dangers of an anti-utopian mode of theorizing. How does possibility still reside in the stories Rousseau tells of natural humanity? For
introduction / 13
in Rousseau’s inscription, I find a utopian reading of nature, coming close to a selfconsciously fictive mode: a transformative mode of theorizing works via creative epistemologies—a fictive mode—to free politics from epistemological dictates that are tied by forms of representational fixity to the given, by exposing and negating those restraining fictions. Rousseau is pivotal in figuring out that maneuver. My reading of Kant in the excursus is a reflexive moment concerning the guiding thematics of the book: through a close reading of some key Kantian oppositions—namely, reason/speculation, history/imagination, and, crucially, philosophy/fiction—I explore other kinds of “spaces” that Kant, reread via a deconstructive narratology, opens up: a very different space, not bound to the “real,” not already written by idealism, can be delineated. High-flown fantasy, indeed: but given the epistemologically complex nature of the space thus created, not merely so. I close this excursus and Part One with thoughts concerning these textual moments for fictive modes of theorizing. In “Fictions of Self-Evidence,” I explore Max Stirner and Friedrich Nietzsche. Both are unruly, disorderly thinkers epistemologically as well as politically. Stirner rejects as “spooks” any attempts to epistemologically or ontologically secure the political: he rejects the idea of separating any kind of ideal or imaginary realm—past or future, transcendent or natural—that would exert guidance or control over humanity. I describe Stirner as neither material nor utopian since he refuses and indeed, works to negate a real/ideal opposition. In Stirner’s attempt to rid thought of all didactic and “superior specters,” though, I am concerned that he also closes off the prospect of utopian spaces of possibility. While I reject Kantian idealism, I think it is possible and indeed necessary to rewrite Kant laterally instead of hierarchically. I find the resources to do so in Friedrich Nietzsche. I explore Nietzsche’s critique of all forms of naturalization and normativity in relation to nihilism as a crisis of epistemic and ontological “faith.” Asking ethical or political questions of ontology, I suggest, is a mistake in the sense that the ontological is always-already a prior epistemological/ moral/psychological construct. This means that there is no meaning that is “proper” to nature that can guide human morality and politics. Nietzsche’s project can be described as a form of philosophical atheism. For Nietzsche, foundational fictions such as human nature and god have only worked to enslave humanity. However, drawing in part upon Nietzsche’s genealogy, an antinarrative form of critical unpacking of how things have come to be the way they are is also a narrative dispersal of those reified meanings, a decolonization. Spaces of future possibility are thus opened. Part III of the book, “Fabricating the Future(s),” articulates the space of a creative epistemology of the possible. Nietzsche’s recognition was that we are always-already fictionalizing creatures (though often—most often—we have mistaken “our” fictions for truths). This understanding of fiction, however, exceeded the boundaries of the epistemological: it becomes self-consciously fictive. It also reconfigures a hierarchical and dualistic understanding of the world. In Stirner’s language, Nietzsche’s “spooks,” or fictions do not dominate, but instead, enable participation and creativity within the world, negating a Kantian hierarchical understanding, while not attempting to reduce the possible to the real. The present, in Nietzsche, is fissured, open. In chapter five, I suggest, through and with Ernst Bloch, that the language of utopias is uniquely placed to articulate a “new plot and potential,” responsive to the moment of the foundation as abyssal depth. Utopia, as I write it with Bloch, can always only be,
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as Zarathustra/Nietzsche put it, a “half-written tablet.” Each chapter, then, explores different modes of fictive theorizing: the mode I privilege is self-consciously fictive, deconstructive, and utopian. I claim ethical and political advantages for a mode of theorizing that recognizes its fictive modality, and contemporary theoretical currents, I argue, can be thematized via fictive theorizing. Before turning to this, a word, however, on my uses of the canon of political theory. The “teleology” immanent to this book is to deny teleology as nothing more than another fiction. But with my choices of Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, Stirner, Nietzsche, and Bloch, I simultaneously invite yet deny a canonical reading. My use of the canon is selective, appropriative, interrogative. I raid the canon, seeking not only a repository of hopes, fears, desires, values; but also, as Halperin puts it, seeking “our otherness to ourselves revealed,” seeking “sites of difference” that are also possible “sites of transformation.”45 The excavation of the fictive is, I argue, one such site, loaded with anticipation, whose reification needs to be undone. So, just as Derrida suggests, I am “explicitly and systematically posing the problem of the status of a discourse” by “borrow[ing] from a heritage the resources necessary for the deconstruction of that heritage itself.”46 The methodological “fiction” that I could exclusively and systematically justify the choices I have made is on a par with the other “fictions” explored and uncovered in this book. This remains, nevertheless, an interesting fiction, provoking alertness to the irreducible plurality that haunts a project such as this. Derrida has proposed that the choice of an example can never be justified absolutely, cannot be justified, either, “by way of anticipation and preface.”47 Through, with, and sometimes against the theorists I have chosen, I weave a story different, I think, to the one those theorists would recognize as their own, would sign their name to; with other examples, further stories could have been written. And yet, regardless of this contingency, as Hillis Miller writes of his Ethics of Reading, “does not the order of examples, whatever I say, magically generate narrative and seem to tell a story with beginning, middle and end, a logic and teleology of its own? What comes after presupposes what came before, and seems ‘deeper in’ or ‘further along’ toward some conclusion, so ingrained is the habit of narrative and its cognitive implications.”48 Freeing fictions, as I argue, generates its own political and ethical implications, and by way of a concluding, which can only be a further opening and a task, I shall for now do no more than gesture toward three significant points. At this historical juncture, work in political theory is embedded in a series of exciting new possibilities. The most significant recent works are a creative blending of political theory, philosophy, and utopian, cultural, and literary studies. In works such as Wendy Brown’s Politics Out of History and Jane Bennett’s The Enchantment of Modern Life, encountering the political is a simultaneously ethical, aesthetic, and indeed, a utopian encounter, however much the latter remains unarticulated. Imagination, and a willingness not to “sacrifice” theory by “capitulating to the demand that theory reveal truth, deliver applications, or solve each of the problems it defines” defines this new terrain that I argue can best be thematized via the fictive.49 The politics of creative epistemologies of possibility reside precisely in the alwaysalready political nature of the claims made in their name. I will be able to turn to this with greater clarity in concluding, but for now offer three guiding suggestions. The politics of fictive theories entails: viewing the political in terms of becoming
introduction / 15
rather than being (with Nietzsche, Bloch, Barthes, and Foucault) through finding the critical resources to resist all hypostatizations, whether temporal or epistemological; it means questioning the existing categories and organizations of the present (the critical-theoretical project); and vitally, it means seeing the world as unfixed and unfinished—as open (the utopian project). Fictive theories, then, can inform, guide, fabricate our desired futures, and it is to this task I aim the following chapters as a contribution.
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Part I Speculative Beginnings
The breeding of an animal which is entitled to make promises—is this not the paradoxical task which nature has set itself with respect to man? [. . .] But how much all this presupposes! [. . .] For that to be the case, how much man himself must have become calculable, regular, necessary, even to his own mind, so that finally he would be able to vouch for himself as future, in the way that someone making a promise does! Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, II, 2
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Chapter One Hobbes: Restraining Fictions
Nature it selfe cannot erre; and as men abound in copiousnesse of language; so they become more wise, or more mad than ordinary. . . . Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, 1968
I have argued thus far that all theorizing is a form of world-creation, and as such, is ineluctably fictive; but this does not mean that all modes of imagining tend toward creative possibility. This is the force of my claim that theories predicated upon epistemologies of the given (foundational modes of theorizing, or its epistemological “surrogates”) are always-already fictive, but fictive forms of thought that efface, negate, and forget their creative power in favor of their authoritative, and thus legislative and programmatic power. The “fictive” recognizes that foundational accounts are always and necessarily essentially narrational, imaginative, creative, and performative. The point of reading political theory with attention to its fictive groundings is to counter the negation that leads to a mode of theorizing that is legislative, characterized by authority and closure. One way of doing so is to find within that mode the representational sleight of hand that posits the given as such, as natural, or somehow necessary; and in so doing, to open that mode of theorizing to its own reflexive and creatively contingent moments. This is why I begin my exploration of the possibility of a deconstructive and utopian mode of political theorizing by working through Thomas Hobbes. The story that Hobbes tells, as conventionally narrated, is bleak and, despite the over seven hundred pages of Leviathan, surprisingly brief: the fundamental equality that exists among humans can be surmised from the equal capacity, if necessary, to kill one another. Given a world of scare resources, given each individual’s presumed preference for him or herself; given each individual’s right to judge what justice means in the absence of a sovereign political authority, an anarchic pre-political state prevails. There is no alternative: in order to prevent a life that would be “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short,” such subjects (at heart, Hobbes tells us, each one of us) would consent to an absolute political sovereign against whom there is neither a right of resistance, nor a right to question.1 Hobbes’s central concern is the excision of ambiguity, plural and competing meanings from the world. In this, even God, as intimation of the infinite, a realm beyond conceptualization, constitutes a rival. It is not simply that Hobbes’s Leviathan is a formidable exemplar of authority and closure in the practice of political theory; although it certainly is that. And I do not
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begin here simply to oppose, by arguing against, this literally monstrous construction. Neither does Hobbes represent, in some curiously perverse way, the utopian writing of an ideal commonwealth (he is too dark, disturbing, and oppressive for that). But neither does Hobbes stand in this book as a representation of utopia’s inversion, a dystopian and totalitarian nightmare (even as the political logic of his Leviathan forbids any questioning of the sovereign authority, and thus forbids any possibility of questioning the edges of the political community). Rather, the force of my argument in this chapter is that Hobbes exemplifies a logic of anti-utopianism itself, at the levels of ontology and epistemology, and in terms of his substantive political implications; and this while working within a fictive mode.2 Much, then, hinges on the crucial nexus between epistemology, representation, and intelligibility. This is an eminently political nexus. Representations of the world delineate what we can know about the world, and in so doing, make intelligible our political possibilities. My focus, then, is on the status and the effects of Hobbes’s particular way of making an ostensible “given”—nature, in this case—meaningful. In Hobbes’s persistent attempt to forcibly secure the stability of representations inheres a political logic of reduction and coercion. I explore this logic at various levels in Leviathan. After a brief exploration of the function of the state of nature exercise in political theory, I turn, in “Reading Hobbes Reading,” to tracing the ways in which Hobbes aims to persuade his readers that his rendition of the natural condition of humanity is the only possible reading. I then explore, in “Somatic Fictions,” Hobbes’s substantive claims concerning the material nature of the universe itself, the self, and how that self can know the world, through exploration of Hobbes’s construal of time and language. Hobbes seeks to foreclose possibility itself, ontologically, epistemologically, and politically. Despite his best efforts, ghosts nevertheless remain to haunt Hobbesian materialism; dreams threaten to undo both consciousness and conscience; the self who can promise—secure the future—is a fragile, fissured construct. I then discuss Hobbes’s explorations of the nature of knowledge as representation more broadly, and argue that there is in Hobbes a lateral tension wherein knowledge is both a naming and an invention of the given; and finally, I trace this tension through to the social contract and the nature of political representation in Hobbes. In each instance, pivotal for holding Hobbes’s authoritative political prescriptions together, Hobbes’s fictions aim toward restraint: but in tracing the shift from Hobbes’s assumption of representational stability, to a delineation of processes of stabilization, I trace the shift wherein the “always-already fictive” nature of the given is revealed. This is an important stage for the explorations of later chapters of this book, which argue that representational modes are always somehow post-representational, and so is an important moment in opening epistemologies of the given to their reflexive and contingent moments. However, that Hobbes exemplifies an anti-utopian logic while working within a fictive mode is perhaps less surprising than the conventional interpretive framework would assume. In many interpretations of Hobbes, particularly those that assume the “rational, self-interested individual” as the inescapable postulate and outcome of Hobbes’s work, there is a further reification involved, in the lack of attention given to the tensions that underlie such a reading.3 As Richard Kroll points out, “neoclassical texts [. . .] habitually reveal and examine the terms under which they construct themselves [. . .] their most distinctive device is to allude to and dramatize the reader’s
restraining fictions / 21
necessarily contingent activity when faced with the text.”4 A different way of putting this is to propose that Hobbes knows the tension between the foundational and the inventive or fictional, creative and performative in his text. The logic of antiutopianism in Hobbes, then, is all the more serious. The fictive is always revealing: in the reading of Hobbes that follows, I trace the edges of the maneuvers by which the creative and performative task of the “artificing” of the political subject and the political community simultaneously reveals and denies its own status as fictive. Reading Hobbes, then, requires a kind of double-vision (that he is both aware of, and eager to elide into a single vision).5 To recall Barthes: Leviathan has been read as an exemplary lisible (readerly) text, wherein the reader seems indeed to be left with “no more than the poor freedom either to accept or reject the text”; and in Hobbesian terms even the power of refusal is granted at a very high cost.6 And yet, Hobbes too can be read via the scriptable (writerly); this task means reactivating fictive traces. The object of my critique is a mode of theorizing that would efface those traces, which requires a reading strategy alert to them. Speculative States? The concerns of the early moderns certainly speak to the fissures of our “late” modern times.7 Then, as now, the intelligibility of the world, and the place of humanity within that world, and indeed, within the universe, could no longer be taken for granted. As William Connolly puts it, “[h]uman and non-human nature become material to work on. The world loses its earlier property as a text upon which the will of God is inscribed and through which humans can come to a more profound understanding of their proper place in the order of things.”8 The “project of philosophical atheism,” definitive of the aspiration of modernity to name and know itself in the face of God’s retreat from the world of humanity, is necessarily concomitant with a series of exciting openings.9 Throughout Europe, the intellectual and political landscape was radically re-shaped and irrevocably altered. In philosophy, skepticism and empiricism, a spirit of relentless questioning and of the privileging of the palpable rather than the metaphysical came to be articulated; in ethics, debates centered around new possibilities for human agency, autonomy, and will; in science, a confidence based, not so much around certain knowledge as the excitement of the venture still to come both opened the world as possibility, and configured the world as amenable to human shaping; in politics “the world turned upside down”—almost—as, radical and emancipatory ideas and practices challenged not only the medieval order of things, but also the emergent bourgeois, protestant order.10 The dynamics of modernity lie in the negotiation of competing tensions: possibility, flux, creativity coexist alongside a need for (a new) order, a re-founding, stability, control. The territory within which Hobbes is constructing his Leviathan is one in which the very conditions of knowledge and of political intelligibility are at stake and for the taking. It is in this context that a state of nature device is deployed. Its deployment can be seen as a secular successor to a kind of knowledge guaranteed by God. The use of a “state of nature” can be seen as a means of addressing, in the absence of a preordained meaning, the question of what it is to be human, and how political life should be ordered. Much, then, is at stake, concerning both the substantive concerns
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of political theory and the epistemological basis from which substantive claims emerge. Substantively, the state of nature has been conventionally invoked in political philosophy to provide answers to questions such as: to what ends should political life be directed? on what principle should politics operate? who should participate? how? In general terms, state of nature theses claim to be able to construct a rational and coherent political order that citizens are obligated to obey. Even if the state of nature is articulated critically in terms of existing society, as with Rousseau, the guiding impulse of such theses is to present and delimit the conditions of possibility of the political as such.11 The state of nature, then, aims to generate a form of knowledge that seeks authoritative and legislative status: seeking to articulate grounded conceptions of order/justice, its claims to knowledge are claims to power that work toward coherence, containment, and control. At the same time, however, what else can the state of nature be but a thought experiment, a heuristic fiction? Simultaneously foundational and fictional: epistemologically, the question that has been avoided, too quickly resolved, or passed over in silence, is not the state of nature, and its substantive implications, but the status of nature, and the theoretical implications of founding theory on fictions. For it cannot simply be coincidence, or purely a matter of the conventions of the time, that Hobbes (and later, Rousseau, and more problematically, Kant), theorists of reason (and therefore truth, knowledge, and right) and order (and therefore power and stability) had to begin by “laying all facts aside,” as Rousseau memorably wrote.12 These theorists began by entering a space of speculation and imagination to ground, and indeed, to inaugurate and to sustain the economy of the real. Perhaps the most striking manifestation of the narrative epistemology of political theory is in the social contract theorists use of “state(s) of nature” as a means to understand, to make known and, crucially, to make justifiable, conceptions of the political. The contention that the state of nature, the speculative space of founding, and the social contract generated from this space, was/is a fiction has been well established. David Hume, for example, referred to the “imaginary state which preceded society,” and argued in “Of the Original Contract” that it was absurd to infer binding political obligations from this fiction.13 Nevertheless, this kind of critique has tended not to invalidate the groundedness of the arguments of the social contract theorists, and even Hume can be seen to concede much of the substantive arguments of Hobbes and John Locke. In this chapter, and also in the following chapters on Rousseau and Kant, I want to pause at the absurdity that Hume impatiently brushed aside: the founding of a political theory on the basis of fictions. What kinds of fictionalizing do these imaginative and speculative spaces represent? Post-structuralist theorists are well attuned to the double-vision required to read the foundational and the fictional simultaneously (even as the perhaps occasionally over-earnest latter-day children of modernity we give too much credence to the stability of the former). For example, Judith Butler writes: “the political field is of necessity constructed through the production of a determining exterior [. . .] the very domain of politics constitutes itself through the production and naturalization of the ‘pre-’ or ‘non-’political.”14 The state of nature can certainly be read as one such “determining exterior” (but, of course, its production can be read, its necessity undermined). The natural, as Anna Yeatman explains, is “accorded a given ontological status” that
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determines the political.15 And indeed, the state of nature in Hobbes can be read as denoting essential or enduring characteristics of human nature.16 This is the predominant use of nature in Hobbes: at critical points in his argument, phrases like, “let him therefore consider with himself . . .,” clearly point toward the natural as a perennial, if submerged, condition that necessitates the restraining, educative, or the uncompromising force of the Sovereign of the Leviathan.17 Introspection, evident here, is also important to the force of Hobbes’s argument, and I return to this point. On this account, however, the connective movement between the natural state and the political state is one of direct and necessary, but inverse opposition: the “artificiall body” will remedy the defects and willfulness of the natural condition. In this sense, it is the essential (and essentialist) primacy of the natural condition that provides the structural, and by negative necessity, the substantive conditions of possibility of the political. The state of nature thus underwrites what Kirsty McClure, following Sheldon Wolin, has called the “architectonic impulse of the theoretician”: it is the foundational act that underlies the “world-creating” of political philosophy.18 However, following Wolin further, one might say that nature is a “metaphor” standing in for a “methodological requirement.”19 Inherent to the state of nature is a pivot between truth and invention. Is nature, the natural condition, ontologically given or/and a fiction? As I have suggested, the question that has been too quickly resolved, or passed over in silence, is not the state of nature, and its substantive implications, but the status of nature, and the theoretical implications of founding theory on fictions. The foundational and the fictional cannot simply be opposed; and so, the movement I trace in this chapter leaves behind an unproblematically “given” and an unproblematically “fictional” opposition, which recurs in both analytic and post-structuralist readings. Rather, I challenge, suspend, and transform it. The fictive is beyond such oppositions. Read in this way, nature affects a primary theoretical disruption: it becomes both empty and excessive, and ontotheological tales of origins and essences become precisely that: tales. This is not to say that stories such as Hobbes’s are “simply” false; but it is to negate foundational claims at the very moment they are made. And if philosophy’s claims to truth, which ground the power claims of politics, are simply the results of “telling stories,” then what happens when not only the story is changed, but different ways of telling stories (based on different epistemologies, different modes of representation) can be articulated? Reading Hobbes reading nature is a speculative venture into this reconfigured territory. Reading Hobbes Reading In the movement between the state of nature and the political state, then, inheres a sleight of hand: achieved not, perhaps, with smoke and mirrors, but certainly by means of some representational trickery that posits an exteriority as given, as necessary, and yet as always-already itself a form of world-creation. Hobbes is alert to this tension. But world-creating takes many and strange forms, often disconcerting, uncanny, and bewildering. Writing at the start of the modern age, before central organizing oppositions of the age have become entrenched and thus rendered invisible, what is fascinating about Hobbes is his refusal to oppose nature and artifice. This is
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evident in the Introduction to Leviathan, a formidable statement of intent. From the very start, politics is construed as a natural artifice. The opening sentence of Leviathan insists on this: “NATURE (the Art whereby God hath made and governes the World) is by the Art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an Artificial Animal.”20 Immediately, the natural is precisely not a given that is prior to or more essential than the artificial. Rather, to artifice, to create, to shape, is viewed by Hobbes as a natural capacity. (Perhaps whenever we read “artificial” as a noun, we should read instead the process of artificing, as a verb.) Hobbes’s Leviathan, and his Leviathan—both text and sovereign political authority—come from nothing that could be articulated beforehand, no a priori: “They resemble that fiat, or the Let us make man, pronounced by God in the creation.”21 So how, then, can Hobbes presume to write a natural condition, a state of nature, as something that is given? Interestingly, his language is first of all textual, but moves toward the explicitly performative, and toward the juridical. First, for Hobbes, the natural can indeed be read: There is another saying not of late understood [. . .] and that is, Nosce teipsum, Read thy self: [which was meant to teach us] that for the similitude of the thoughts, and Passions of one man, to the thoughts and Passions of another, whosoever looketh into himself, and considereth what he doth, when he does think, opine, reason, hope, fear &c; and upon what grounds; he shall thereby read and know, what are the thoughts, and Passions of all other men, upon the like occasions [. . .] He that is to govern a whole nation, must read in himself, not this, or that particular man; but Man-kind.22
This is Hobbes’s crucial statement in deciphering the natural state: read and know. Metaphors of textuality and representation ground and produce epistemological security. Hobbes interestingly and conspicuously mistranslates “nosce teipsum” as “read thyself ” rather than the more usual “know thyself.” Tracy Strong points out, Hobbes “goes on to suggest that such reading will cause the characters of our character to become ‘legible.’ Reading oneself is then Hobbes’s model for knowledge.”23 But what happens when “nature is implacably an artifice to be read?”24 What happens to the “givenness” of nature itself? Bruno Latour has suggested that the nature/culture opposition is itself productive in a complex way: he asks, did nature ever stand for “the realm of the given [. . .] defined in contrast to an artifactual realm of culture?” The opposition itself produces “creatures and concepts that are neither.”25 Latour provocatively suggests, complicating a nature/culture dualism from within, that humanity is a “weaver of morphisms,” which is to say, that humanity and the intelligibility of the natural themselves are, paradoxically, beyond nature/culture oppositions. But is not Hobbes pointing, however obliquely, to this very point, prior to that oppositions’ epistemic and political power? If the natural/artificial opposition is disrupted—if one inhabits the other, or if indeed “to artifice” is prior to the given— then what of those other oppositions that are laterally associated: the given/the created; the real/the fictional; necessity/freedom; determinism/agency? I find in Hobbes a most curious process of demonstration: Hobbes privileges a “given” that he must make intelligible before he can write; he recognizes his artificing in writing the nature of humans, yet upon this builds an authoritative and authoritarian politics. The implications of this palimpsest reverberate throughout modern political (authoritative, legislative)
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modes of theorizing, and the possibility of representing otherwise. What else have post-structuralist critiques been but an unearthing of this moment of contingency at the heart of foundationalist thought? Nevertheless, reading Hobbes also complicates the parallel that post-structuralism has drawn between foundational thought and closure and contingent thought and openness in political theorizing. For Hobbes is certainly aware of and alert to the contingency at the core of his Leviathan. So how, then, does Hobbes move from contingency to authoritarianism? The epistemological dilemma of what we can know is foregrounded at the heart of Hobbes’s political project. As I have suggested, nature comes to stand for the intelligibility of selves. Reading the natural is presented as a contemplative introspection, giving the “reader” access to the truth of selves. Followed by an imaginative comparison, an account of natural man should be generated. However, figures of unintelligibility quickly problematize this reading process: “the characters of men’s hearts, blotted and confounded as they are, with dissembling, lying, counterfeiting, and erroneous doctrines, are legible onely to him that searcheth hearts.”26 The problem of reading man is dual. First, idiosyncratic biases lie in the self who reads; but the self who reads is also the self who is read, a counterfeit, social person who lacks the necessary skills to render humanity intelligible, who interprets inadequately, or, as Hobbes puts it, “decypher[s] without a key, and [is] for the most part deceived, by too much trust, or by too much diffidence; as he reads, is himself a good or evil man.”27 Is there prior to the counterfeit a genuine, original, honest account of humanity that could act as a key to crack humanity’s coding? The difficulty of finding a vantage point “outside the text” of humanity is evident: when the nature of man is both the “matter” of the Leviathan as well as its “artificer,” and when to artifice is a natural capacity, we no longer have a simple dualism, but instead, a complex dialectical structure where nature can no longer stand as ontologically primary. What, then, is the “key” that allows Hobbes to “decypher” the natural? He (literally) closes his introduction by invoking a different terminology to supplement the textual metaphors relied upon thus far: “when I have set down my own reading orderly, and perspicuously, the pains left another, will be onely to consider, if he find not the same in himself. For this kind of Doctrine, admitteth no other Demonstration.”28 Hobbes’s story at this point becomes “performative” and “intellectually coercive.”29 Hobbes is enforcing an acceptance of his demonstration: the juridical connotations of “admitteth” include both to concede and to confess. As Silver puts it, “we need only to read to think we understand; for Hobbes leaves no reference or circumstance of the argument to the readers imagination,” by “so tightly regulat[ing] the course of discussion, defining, reiterating, expanding, and delineating.”30 But the acceptance is not simply a linguistic assent, but a somatic assent too. The Oxford English Dictionary lists several meanings for “admit.”31 First, as the “action of a voluntary agent,” it denotes permission, acceptance: “allow to enter.” Does the truth of Hobbes’s account inhabit the self? A secondary meaning listed is intriguing; figuratively, the following is listed: “To consent to the performance, doing, realization, or existence of; to allow, permit, grant.” These meanings are recorded as far back as the fifteenth century, and are thus available to Hobbes: and “to consent to the performance of ” the ostensible grounds of Leviathan is a remarkable reading, affectively entwining the reader’s response with his social actions, as he performs the “truth” of
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Hobbes’s account. As an “involuntary agent,” the recorded meanings are similar: to be a “channel of admission,” to “afford entrance to.” This all points to the necessary effects on the reader of Hobbes as the reader of man, and the nature of acceptance and embodiment of that reading by subjects, by his audience. Silver puts it thus: Hobbes’s “urgent concern [is] not simply for the intelligibility of his ideas, but for their admission by the reader”: and that admission is not purely an intellectual one.32 (On being inhabited by authoritarian ideas, or ideals of any sort, “spooks,” in Stirner’s idiosyncratic use, see chapter three, throughout.) Rather than simply assenting to a reading process, the connotations of “admitteth” are palpable and even bodily, affectively inhabiting Hobbesian subjects, in a strange kind of possession wherein Hobbesian subjects are embodied as such, inhabiting a fictive space posited by Hobbes. I suggested at the start of this chapter that closed, juridical, authoritative modes of theorizing the political can be opened by attention to their reflexive and fictive moments of grounding. In my exploration of the status of nature in Hobbes, I have suggested that the shift from reading and representation to “demonstration” is one such moment, wherein Hobbes privileges a “given” that he must make intelligible before he can write; and indeed, he recognizes his inventive artificing of humans is itself the vital originary gesture. It is time now to turn to substantive issues, of the restraining effects of fictive moments in the rest of Hobbes’s Leviathan, in his delineation of the “matter” of the Leviathan. Somatic Fictions If the state of nature is enigmatic, cryptic, indecipherable without strategies that render it intelligible, then such strategies will have a political import in delineating possibility. What, then, is the nature of nature for Hobbes? What possibilities reside in the ways Hobbes renders the universe intelligible for us? Put otherwise, what possibilities does Hobbes inscribe in nature? This is a significant question. Central to the project of the Leviathan is Hobbes’s “resolutive-compositive” method.33 The audacious proposition put forward by Hobbes is that the constituent components of the universe, of society, of humanity could be discerned, and recombined to form a revised (not, as we shall see, new) whole suited to “commodious living”: the Leviathan. In the Book of Job, Leviathan is described as a fearsome, awe-inspiring monster: “His heart is as firm as stone; yea, as hard as a piece of nether millstone. When he raiseth himself up, the mighty are afraid: by reason of breakings they purify themselves. [. . .] Upon the earth there is not his like, who is made without fear. He beholdeth all high things: he is king over all the children of pride.”34 This image, indeed, perfectly evokes the disciplining strength of the Leviathan as Sovereign. The Leviathan subdues the unruly matter of humanity; but as a composite image, is made out of that very matter. This poses the question of what kinds of imaginings or creations are possible in the Hobbesian universe? What kind of monster is the Leviathan, and how is it to be distinguished from other, spectral, creatures, such as ghosts, dæmons, and phantasms? Hobbes gives one oblique answer: “a man can fancy Shapes he never saw; making up a Figure out of divers creatures; as the Poets make their Centaures, Chimæras, and other Monsters never seen.”35 The monstrous Leviathan, according to this answer,
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can only be imagined or created because all its constituent parts are given in advance. “Fancy” or imagination constructs nothing new or other. Hobbes, it seems, would have us believe that the Leviathan, as a composite image constructed out of the “divers parts” of humanity in motion, is a mere reconfiguration of “the given” and nothing more: in this maneuver, I shall argue, inheres the deepest level of the logic of antiutopianism, where everything in the Hobbesian rendition of intelligibility works toward the preclusion of possibility. This needs much interpretive work on Hobbes’s part, to which I shortly turn. Nevertheless, a different response is possible: is there, rather, something perversely, strangely, quite magical about the creation of the Leviathan? Consider, as a lateral comparison with Hobbes’s resolutive-compositive method, Jane Bennett’s suggestive account of magic, drawing on Paracelsus, a fifteenth-century alchemist and medic: for Paracelsus, magic was a means by which the elements of the world could be made to form new alliances. Magic broke down the usual structure of a thing and then reconfigured the newly released parts with each other or with the disaggregated bits of other (former) wholes. The essence of such magic was mobility or the morphing transformations from one state, space, or form to another.36
There is, of course, a larger story that could be told here, concerning the shift from alchemical understandings of nature to Newtonian versions, wherein nature becomes passive, inert material to be worked upon, which could be further drawn out to suggest that a utopian understanding of nature writes a reconfigured alchemical vitality back in.37 What I find specifically productive for now, however, is recognition of an underlying conceptual shift that the comparison provokes. Magic, on this account, is explicitly a performative reshaping of the world, a creative way of knowing the world that always keeps open the possibility of “new alliances.” Magic is precisely fictive. For Hobbes, on the contrary, the magical reshaping of the world is effaced, as he aims to remove from the world the possibility of things other and new. Contrary to the plural becomings that magic evokes, the stasis of Hobbes’s “resolutive-compositive” method is neatly encapsulated in two associated claims: first, that “Imagination and Memory, are but one thing”; and second, “the Present onely has a being in Nature; things Past have a being in the Memory onely, but things to come have no being at all; the Future being but a fiction of the mind.”38 These are crucial moments in the work that Hobbes does to obviate the possibility of seeing the world otherwise. For if the imagination can only repeat what it already knows in memory, then the very idea of humanity as creative is precluded. Hobbes endeavors to repeat this gesture at the very molecular level of the stuff of the universe itself (for as we shall see, the matter of humanity, nature, and the universe, is the same). Similarly with the second claim, “the Present onely has a being in Nature”: the fabric and texture of the universe is such that, Hobbes would claim, alterity and potentiality are excised. And the only kind of fictionalizing he can allow for is a kind that will forever repeat that which it already knows. Magic allows for multiplicity; Hobbes allows for a singular, unitary story. But does this hold? What are the constituent parts of Hobbes’s universe? Hobbes’s central concern, then, is the creation of a bounded, finite ontology, and his metaphysical materialism, his conception the universe as composed of “matter in
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motion” is core to this: The World, (I mean not the Earth Onely [. . .] but the Universe, that is, the whole masse of things that are) is Corporeall, that is to say, Body; and hath the dimensions of Magnitude, namely, Length, Bredth, and Depth [. . .] and consequently every part of the Universe, is Body, and that which is not Body, is no part of the Universe: And because the Universe is All, that which is no part of it is Nothing; and consequently no where.39
This key statement of Hobbes works toward ruling out certain kinds of possibilities motivating human action (and remember, my concern here is with intelligibility, the rendering intelligible of possibility in the world-creating of theory through its strategies of making that world present to us). As we shall see, two crucial moments Hobbes aims to contain or discipline or render meaningless are the negation of ghosts (as cyphers of things past) and dreams (as cyphers of alternatives and alterity within the present and the future). But what, for now, is the significance of Hobbes’s materialism? His concern with corporeality is intriguing; for Hobbes, that which is corporeal signifies that which is real. Contrary to common misunderstandings that construe wind, for example, as non-corporeal, for Hobbes wind and breathe are also bodies, because they are part of the Universe, not “Spirits.”40 He vigorously denies any ontological status to those “Idols of the brain, which represent Bodies to us, where they are not, as in a Looking-glasse, in a Dream, or to a Distempered brain waking, they are [. . .] nothing; Nothing at all, I say, where they seem to bee.”41 Hence: “the proper signification of Spirit in common speech, is either a subtile, fluid and invisible Body, or a Ghost, or other Idol or Phantasme of the Imagination,” the latter of which, as incorporeal intangibles, impalpable, simply do not exist for Hobbes.42 The import of this, when read through to human bodies, is to deny a Cartesian mind/body dualism, whereby the mind is the locus and source of (incorporeal) agency, ideas, and freedom in contradistinction to a realm of material necessity. As he conceives of the universe as matter in motion, so too humanity can be inscribed within nature as such. This has caused no little concern amongst Hobbesian scholars who have worked within an interpretative framework that assumed such a mind/ body split. Samantha Frost has argued that by reading a mind/body dualism into Hobbes’s theory of the human subject, interpreters work to “safeguard a self-reflective subject and a voluntarist account of political action.”43 I have gestured to this problem in opening this chapter: those readings that assume the “rational, self-interested individual” as the inescapable postulate and outcome of Hobbes’s work neglect to pay attention to the processes by which that subject is constructed as such. Frost’s reading is a significant advance, as she rightly contends that “contrary to the misgivings that undergird twentieth-century rationalist readings of his work, Hobbes does not argue that desire and fear, and thus our actions, are simply the mechanistic reactions of an individual to environmental stimuli. Thinking-bodies are specifically thinkingbodies.”44 There are grave problems with Hobbes’s account of the human subject; but those problems are not to do with the materialism of his universe, but with its foreclosure of possibility. To draw out the logic and dangers of anti-utopianism in Hobbes, it is time now to turn to the body, and what it can know. While my reading of the Hobbesian subject is a critical one, I also want to remain alert to potentialities in his
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anti-essentialist and embodied account of subjectivity: for how else could we begin to understand a fictive subjectivity (a subjectivity attuned and alert to the future potential, the very temporal but yet material shivers and thrills of anticipation and dread, to say the least)? This means giving attention to the ways that Hobbes somatically disciplines his thinking-bodies, and interrupting the effects Hobbes aims to secure on those bodies. Human bodies, for Hobbes, exist as matter and nothing else. Interestingly prefiguring Nietzsche’s claim that “soul is only a word for something about the body,” agency, memory, and will, those aspects of the human self that are in many theoretical frameworks associated with the cognitive rather than the affective, or the ideal and rational rather than the carnal are in fact for Hobbes a manifestation of the bodily and somatic.45 Recent critical-theoretical work has turned back toward the body, interrogating the work that mind/body hierarchical dualisms have done. Elizabeth Grosz, for example, speaks of a “refiguring of the body [. . .] so that it can now be understood as the very stuff of subjectivity.”46 For, as Grosz continues, “the body is a peculiar thing. [. . .] If bodies are objects or things, they are like no others, for they are centers of perspective, insight, reflection, desire and agency. [. . .] Bodies are not inert; they function interactively and productively. They act and react. They generate what is new, unsurprising, unpredictable”—and so, in this unpredictability and newness, for Hobbes, those bodies need to be disciplined.47 In what ways? Subjects feel and thus know the world through the body. For Hobbes, from the most simple of sensual feelings, to the most complex train of thoughts, “there is no conception in a [man’s] mind, which hath not at first, totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of Sense.”48 Sense is tangible: “The cause of Sense, is the Externall Body, or Object, which presseth the organ proper to each Sense, either immediately, as in Taste and Touch; or mediately, as in Seeing, Hearing, and Smelling: which pressure, by the mediation of Nerves, and other strings, and membranes of the body, continued inwards to the Brain, and Heart, causeth there a resistance, or counterpressure.”49 In this visceral depiction of the exterior to the interior of the subject, from object to subject and back again, Hobbes exemplifies Grosz’s depiction of “theorists of corporeal inscription,” who make lucid, and, indeed, palpable, “the inflection of the mind into body, of body into mind [. . .] problematizing and rethinking the relations between the inside and outside of the subject, its psychical interior and its corporeal exterior [. . .] not the fundamental identity or reducibility but the torsion of one into the other.”50 The Hobbesian subject makes sense of the world through material negotiations. Provoking or underlying any sort of consciousness (or indeed, conscience), “Vitall motion” differentiates human “matter” from other matter. Vital motion is not at all metaphysical, but is, instead, simply the movement toward that which aids life, and away from that which hinders: “This Motion, which is called Appetite, and for the apparence of it, Delight, and Pleasure, seemeth to be, a corroboration of Vitall motion, and a help thereunto; [. . .] and the contrary, Molesta, Offensive, from hindering, and troubling the motion Vitall.”51 For Hobbes, then, the processes of deliberation and willing are somatic: agency consists in that bodily negotiation of the matter of the world; and willing, the “rational” moment par excellence, is simply the end point of this negotiation: “In Deliberation, the last Appetite, or Aversion, [. . .] is that wee call the WILL.”52 In this rendition of the matter of bodies, Hobbes seeks to find the true, basic motion of humanity. The matter of the universe inscribes and circumscribes the
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matter of humanity, shaping and limiting the desiring animal. It is in this very maneuver that Hobbes aims to circumscribe or secure humanity within a perpetual present. This comes across most clearly in Hobbes’s discussion of the faculty of imagination. As the interior of subjectivity is created through the encounters with exteriority, the makings of interiority are fashioned. Hobbes puts it this way: “For after the object is removed, or the eye shut, wee still retain an image of the thing seen, although more obscure than when we see it.”53 In that the external “images” itself on the internal, Hobbes can elide imagination and memory: “IMAGINATION therefore is nothing but decaying sense.”54 The future can, for Hobbes, be nothing but a reworking of the present configuration, as “Imagination” can only rework “those things which have been formerly perceived by Sense.”55 Nevertheless, this attempt to somatically discipline and bind the subject is fissured in interesting ways. The sensual is not consolidated as Hobbes would wish, but is itself manipulatable: “as pressing, rubbing, or striking the Eye, makes us fancy a light,” the senses themselves can be deceived.56 Differentiation between subject and object needs to be established, rather than being self-evident, since the “apparence” of an “objective reality” is, “Fancy, the same waking, that dreaming.”57 The very definition of sense contributes to a radical loosening of the ontology that Hobbes would rather claim to be stable and unquestionable, and the matter of humanity becomes strangely fluid and abstract: “seeming, or fancy, is that which men call Sense”; or, “Sense, in all cases, is nothing els but originall fancy.”58 The complex of imagination, sense, fancy, and “apparence” resounds strangely in modern ears; and this defamiliarization is itself productive. “Apparence,” indeed, has connotations of both definiteness as well as falsity. So, despite the substantial nature of matter, the body remains a manipulable entity, consciousness itself is vulnerable, given no privileged epistemological status. For while there is indeed matter, a “visceral register” as Connolly has recently put it, “facts” that could be gleaned from that material are, to echo Nietzsche, precisely what there are not.59 If “Fancy” or thought is “the same waking as dreaming,” then Hobbes implicitly suggests that the very distinction between sleeping and dreaming is a constructed, rather than natural, distinction. Indeed, in Friedrich Nietzsche’s genealogical excavations of how humanity has come to be the kind of creature capable of making a promise, thus rendering ourselves accountable for future actions, or securing, in some way, the future self the same as the self at the present of the promise, he has argued that the production of the distinction between waking “fancy” and dreaming “fancy” is crucial. Joshua Dienstag summarizes well: men of a “primeval” period (Urzeit) do not distinguish, or are incapable of distinguishing, as we do, between what they see while waking and sleeping [. . .]. Unable to banish dreams to their sleeping hours, they suffered (or enjoyed) them all the time, as visions, and reacted to them as sleepwalkers do. They could not perceive the “essential difference” between the two states that later people imagine. [. . .] By postulating consciousness as the barrier between waking and dreaming, and as something that has happened over the course of human history, Nietzsche argues that the wall between the two states has been built over time. [. . .] Nietzsche begins to wonder how these differences came about, how human beings came to possess consciousness. The historical account that responds to this query turns out to provide a narrative of morality and violence, a monstrous plot . . .60
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To recap thus far: I am arguing that in the very ways that Hobbes makes the universe intelligible inheres a deeply, profoundly anti-utopian logic. I have argued so far that fictionalizing is unavoidable. But the disciplinary strategies whereby Hobbes seeks to exclude certain types of experiences is indeed problematic and telling. So, my attention to both the status ascribed to the fiction of humanity as matter in motion and, just as importantly, to the effects secured by that fiction, is crucial in interrupting those effects. Is the somatic, the bodily matter of the universe, haunted by the possibility of other ways of experiencing the universe, other possibilities of intelligibility? The Hobbesian subject is not natural but a somatic fiction, as the construction of consciousness and thus conscience demonstrates. Hobbes’s attempt to limit the somatic experience of the body to the present and past only is symptomatic of the logic of anti-utopianism. The dangers of dreaming, for Hobbes, reveal how the sensual, experiential subject needs to be disciplined into rejecting as impossible night-time fancies and visions. For the distinction between sleep and waking is undoubtedly problematic and tricky for Hobbes: “because waking I often observe the Absurdity of Dreames, but never dream of the Absurdities of my waking thoughts; I am well satisfied, that being awake, I know I dreame not, though when I dreame I think myself awake.”61 The construction of consciousness and thus conscience is abbreviated and encapsulated in Hobbes’s remedying or entrenching of the distinction between sleeping and waking fancies: “For he that taketh pains, and industriously layes himself to sleep, in case any uncouth and exorbitant fancy come unto him, cannot easily think it other than a Dream.”62 Hobbes’s fear of the world of dreams, and their “uncouth and exorbitant fancies” provide a lateral fissure through which the construction of the Hobbesian subject can be glimpsed precisely as construction. The meanings of “exorbitant” that would have been available to Hobbes are similar to the present: “deviating from a specified rule or principle”; “wandering from the subject”; and following the term “exorbitas,” from Roman law there is: “Anomalous, not coming within the intended scope of a law”; “abnormal, not in accordance with general principle.” “Uncouth,” on the other hand, has epistemological implications that would be lost on present readers: the OED cites the following, now obsolete, meanings, “of facts or matters of knowledge: Unknown; also, not certainly known, uncertain.” A secondary meaning is listed as that “with which one is not acquainted or familiar,” which passes into the ontological sense of “places not commonly known or frequented, solitary, desolate, [. . .] rough” (an apt definition of the state of nature both as Book One and as concentrated in chapter 13).63 This uncouth and exorbitant place of imagination that Hobbes aims to contain in dreamtime points to a “deviating” or deviant subject, an “anomalous” self unrestrained by principles and laws; and a subject who cannot be known, who, indeed, ruptures the conceptual resources by which subjectivity pulls itself together as such, is constructed to be responsible, accountable, regular. As William Connolly has pointed out, rather than seeing “the self-interested individual,” as the problem, “it comes closer to being the solution that Hobbes offers for the problem he identifies”; and further, “every element in the Hobbesian system functions in its way to pull the self together.”64 Disciplining the subject out of the anomaly of taking dreaming seriously constructs the rule-governed, accountable subject. And yet, this is not via the somatic, for what else are dreams but another way of negotiating and experiencing the
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world? As the dream-time imaginings of the subject refigure the material (perhaps magically), there is an anticipation of Ernst Bloch’s utopian insight: “We live surrounded by possibility, not merely by presence. In the prison of mere presence, we could not even move nor even breathe.”65 More importantly for the moment, entrenching into consciousness the distinction between awake and asleep forms of dreaming suggests that personation is itself feigned. Nietzsche points to this insight: “actually, the waking human being is only clear about the fact he is awake thanks to the rigid and regular web of concepts, and for that reason he sometimes comes to believe that he is dreaming if once that web of concepts is torn apart by art.”66 Nietzsche crucially points toward the importance of intelligibility as conceptual creation; and further, to the necessary interconnectedness of dreaming and other forms of creative imaginings in maintaining the openness of the future as future (more of which in chapters four and five). The crucial tension that structures Book One of Leviathan, between defining the given or that which is the natural, or creating out of nothing, cannot be resolved by examination of the subject: on this account, the subject “beneath” to society is a strangely amorphous or even anomalous creature indeed. Hobbes reads “man”; but there is no tangible, hard, forming “real” under the complex of sense, imagination, fancy, and appearance. Bodies indeed matter; but intelligibility is artificed. It must be created. This suggests that when humanity puts a face on for the world, humanity constructs itself as such. Personation is itself a fiction—if we are artifice all the way down, then the ways in which that artifice is rendered intelligible is crucial. Ghosts, Phantasms, and dreams, nevertheless, remain inscribed in the Hobbesian text, if not as matter, then certainly as a disturbance or ruffle or fold through which something other than the foreclosure of the present can be glimpsed. Representational Trickery Revisited Let me begin to pull the political importance of this reading together. Rather than a representation of a true account of humanity, Hobbes’s text is post-representational: by this I mean rather than simply recording the given, Hobbes constructs the given as such, and is performative rather than referential. This has an important political resonance. The social contract in the Leviathan, the covenant that constructs the Leviathan, is described by Hobbes as follows: each individual should “conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men that may reduce all their wills to one” by each individual giving up their rights over their own person to institute and thus create the sovereign or “Mortall God.”67 Given that “willing” is somatic, or the last stage in deliberation, the institution of the political on this account is a violent matter. It is precisely this violence to which Nietzsche gestures when he writes, the breeding of an animal which is entitled to make promises—is this not the paradoxical task which nature has set itself with respect to man? [. . .] But how much all this presupposes! [. . .] how much man himself must have become calculable, regular, necessary, even to his own mind, so that finally he would be able to vouch for himself as future, in the way that someone making a promise does!’68
“Vouching for the future” in this sense means guaranteeing that the stability of selfrepresentation will not change. It means that Hobbesian subjects believe in their
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referential fixity, precluding the possibility of becoming other.69 But before Hobbes can secure this, he has some more work to do in stabilizing or constructing that very referential fixity: epistemological representation and political representation are curiously related. We have already seen that Hobbes rejects somatic alterity, dreams, and ghosts, in order to construct a “perpetual present” of referential fixity. What dreams and ghosts, and indeed, God and the future, all have in common is their resistance to conceptualization within that present: ghosts attest to temporal complexities as well as the motivating affects of the intangible. Hobbes is very clear that language can only inscribe the material: Whatsoever we imagine, is Finite. Therefore there is no Idea, or conception of anything we call Infinite. No man can have in his mind an Image of infinite magnitude; nor conceive infinite swiftness, infinite time, or infinite force, of infinite power. When we say anything is infinite, we signifie onely, that we are not able to conceive the ends, and bounds of the thing named; having no Conception of the thing, but of our own inability. And therefore the name of God is used, not to make us conceive him; (for he is Incomprehensible; and his greatnesse, and power are unconceivable;) [. . .] Whatsoever we can conceive, has been perceived first by sense, either all at once, or by parts; a man can have no thought, representing anything not subject to sense. No man can therefore conceive anything but he must conceive it in some place; and indued with some determinate magnitude.70
Sokoloff neatly puts it thus: “the future exceeds materiality,” and hence, for Hobbes, can only ever be a dangerous “fiction of the mind.”71 Again, the Hobbesian foreclosure is nevertheless evident here, as he excises from language the possibility of difference and alterity. The correct representation of things is critical for the Hobbesian project. Much of the natural condition is sensual, pre-linguistic, and language is given the critical task of constructing our understanding of the world (first individually, then collectively). The meaning of words in the natural state is, nevertheless, radically unstable. Language confronts the paradoxically empty and excessive nature. Empty, because there is nothing in nature to point toward a “correct” meaning: “for seeing all names are imposed to signifie our conceptions; and all our affections are but conceptions; when we conceive the same things differently; we can hardly avoyd different naming of them.”72 Nature is excessive, because of the plethora of meanings that can be imposed. The status of language prior to the social contract is as paradoxical as the status of the natural condition itself, as can be seen from these examples, first on the use of positive names, and second, on the use of language in thought. Naming is used to “mark somewhat which is in nature, or may be feigned in the mind of man, as Bodies that are, or may be conceived to be; or of Bodies, the properties that are, or may be feigned to be.”73 The tension between inherence and invention or counterfeit is made more evident in this example: “when imagining any thing whatsoever, wee seek all the possible effects, that can by it be produced [. . .] In summe, the Discourse of the Mind, when it is governed by Designe, is nothing but Seeking, or the faculty of Invention.”74 According to this account, causality is itself a human and linguistic fabrication. Much, then, relies upon Hobbes’s linguistic philosophy. What is crucial to note here, however, is that nature and science are analogous here: before nature can be read it must be written; and before science (linguistic philosophy) can be read,
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again, it must be inscribed in nature. Hobbes’s concern, rather than the correct representation of things, is instead the forcible stabilization of representation itself; and this constitutes rationality itself. For Hobbes, understanding is “nothing else, but conception caused by Speech.”75 Thus, reason consists of “not the finding of the summe, and truth of one, or a few consequences, remote from first definition and settled significations of names; but to begin at these.”76 With the right use of words, the Hobbesian ontology can be bounded, made finite. How does this affect the possibility of the social contract? In fact, the processes of securing the representation of words and the representation of the subject are similar, and similarly performative. Christopher Pye puts it like this: “The ‘Feigned person’ of the sovereign is capable of fully embodying any individual in the state because each individual is already a self-impersonator in a sense—a masked and mediated representation of himself.”77 The representational sleight of hand wherein naming is also invention is mirrored in the political representational sleight of hand of the social contract. Nevertheless, recognizing this means recognizing, not the necessity of the social contract, but its violence at the conceptual and political levels. As Bernasconi has pointed out, “in the Hobbesian state of nature, it seems that words can mean one thing today and another tomorrow. This would not only apply to a word like ‘justice’ or even a word like ‘good,’ but to every word. However, if words can mean whatever one wants them to mean, one’s promises are undone at the time of their formulation.”78 As Hobbes writes, For these words of Good, Evill and Contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: There being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common Rule of Good and Evill, to be taken from the nature of objects themselves; but from the person of the man (where there is no Common-wealth;) or, (in a Common-wealth,) from the Person that representeth it [. . .] whom, men disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the Rule thereof.79
Thus, the meanings that the political contract secures are in no way inherently necessary, but pragmatically so. The political, on this account, is pure creation. This lends a slightly different nuance to Hobbes’s much-quoted assertion that, “Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all.”80 The “unity of the Common-wealth” depends upon the people contracting to create the sovereign; but since it is the sovereign who determines meaning, this act is only valid retroactively: it is thus unsecured (as Rousseau would put it, discussed in chapter two, “the effect must become the cause”). In a similar context, Derrida writes of this structure: “The signature invents the signer. The signer can only authorize him- or herself to sign once he or she has come to the end, if one can say this, of his or her own signature, in a sort of fabulous retroactivity.”81 There is violence on every level, here: in the construction of the subject (securing a man); linguistic violence; and the threat of physical force, as Hobbes recognizes the purely arbitrary character of his construction. The status of the theoretical enterprise, for Hobbes, becomes one of construction, rather than of analysis; the status of the real, or the problem of reference, becomes a linguistic violence; and the logic of the construction of the political is shown to be aporetic, not linked by necessity, and preceded by a catachrestic narrative that simply tells of its impossibility. The nature of the Hobbesian state of nature and social contract, then,
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for it to secure its own self-reproducing future, would need to believe in its own referential fixity, whereas Hobbes reveals the processes of securing such fixity to be violent. Toward a conclusion: Hobbes’s representation is fundamentally performative; but the nature of his “demonstration” is perhaps similar to the nature of the conjuring trick. Utopia(n materialism), needing to always keep open the possibility of “new alliances,” needs a different kind of magic. I have suggested that world-creating takes many and strange forms: in an eerie reshaping of what his spectators believe to be the givens of their reality, Philip Pullman’s conjuror (inflected, for sure, by a certain Nietzsche?) speaks to this moment: He didn’t just perform tricks; he turned flowers into goldfish bowls, plucked cards from the empty air, and made solid silver candlesticks disappear just as ordinary magicians did, but the tricks were a means to an end in his performance, and that was the creation of a world. It was a world in which nothing was fixed, everything was changeable; in which identities merged and dissolved, qualities such as hard and soft, up and down and sorrow and joy changed into their opposites in the twinkling of an eye and became meaningless, where the only reliable guide was suspicion, the only constant theme mistrust.82
The conjuring trick, nevertheless, ends in a puff of smoke, and Kroll suggests something similar for Hobbes’s performative demonstration: Hobbes’s rhetorical practice in Leviathan reveals a Hobbes whose geometrical and demonstrative urge is belied by his assumption that the reader’s assent to the entire edifice of his argument is provisional. Because Hobbes treats as unique the workings of his own mind evinced in his treatise, they can only achieve suasive force when the reader provisionally accepts the analogy between his own and Hobbes’s mental fictions. At the end of Leviathan, indeed, Hobbes releases the reader from absolute submission to his argument, just as he sees himself as now free to continue with other, and different, projects.83
The forcible demonstration ends; and revealing the fictions that make Hobbes’s theory work simultaneously effaces any epistemological status to the closure of the political, and interrupts the effects that Hobbes would aim to secure. In chapter two, I refer to this post-representational moment as “catachrestic,” and suggest that the implications point toward there being no meaning that is proper to the political.
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Chapter Two Rousseau: Conceiving the Inconceivable
HAMM: Nature has forgotten us. CLOV: There’s no more nature. HAMM: No more nature! You exaggerate. CLOV: In the vicinity. Samuel Beckett, “Endgame,” The Complete Dramatic Works
What lessons have I derived from reading Hobbes, the theorist of referential fixity, as a cautionary tale, delineating the logic and the dangers of anti-utopianism? First, that such fixity is always feigned, always-already artificed; second, that alterity, potentiality, and temporal complexity should and must be theorized as “matter”; third, that some forms of conceptual creation efface the movement of différance (the difference that fissures self-identity, and its temporal processes that preclude the closure of identities) even as they reveal its (complicated) presence; most importantly, then: “there are many things we haven’t yet learned to read.”1 Hobbes (and Kant, as we shall see) are—radically different—examples of didactic and disciplinary fictive theorizing. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who I take, albeit warily for he is problematical and twisty, as an ally in my endeavor, sits between them in many ways. What does Rousseau add to my tale? Time and again, Rousseau complicates both the status and the effects secured by the work of fictions in theories—his own, as well as those of others. Through and with Rousseau, and sometimes just using his ideas as a spur for further musing, I find that I can trace the dual work of fictions: after Rousseau, it will be impossible to unthinkingly invoke nature as a substantive and evaluative category of being. And yet, via his critique or critical excavation of natural law, Rousseau proposes new ways of knowing, making humanity intelligible, via that very natural condition (as utopian anticipation). So, not only does he make it impossible to unreflexively believe the truth of natural accounts, but he simultaneously inscribes (or, perhaps better, “inflects”2) nature (as fiction) with other and different possibilities, provoking a radical rethinking of the situatedness of the natural with regard to humanity and human possibility. My reading of Rousseau, then, while attentive to the limits of how far he can take me, is candidly, unapologetically, and unequivocally utopian, in motivation, method, and in substance.3 As Wendy Brown has more recently put it: “connecting our work to political theory’s rich canonical past while
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honing it for the work of understanding a singular present” demands a strategic reclamation, a “deliberate art, at once tactical and open-ended, that emanates from an anti-hegemonic sensibility.”4 And so, just as Ernst Bloch’s revision of natural law theories was an “effort to retrieve the unclaimed heritages and unfulfilled forwardlooking impulses of the past,” I read Rousseau’s natural law in the spirit of Bloch: the model of the principles of nature cannot have anything about it which usurps the place of novelty and openness of history. Rather than being ordered after a sense of nature that is calculable and mathematically ordered [. . . r]adical natural law is [. . .] an emancipation into the openness of the future as the place of human hope and worth. [. . . I]t does not domesticate but rather liberates.5
To quickly reiterate the story so far: I have suggested that political theory has sought to work via the trope of legislation. Through Hobbes, I explored and exposed the ways in which political narratives seek to set boundaries, to close politicized interpretation, thus enabling the establishment of (a) definition(s) of the natural and human conditions. (Already, with the plural, the impossibility of this project is evident.) This/these definition(s) were to serve a justificatory function, as the necessary a priori of a concept of “the political,” and the properly political. On the basis of epistemological security, an ostensible epistemology of the given, a programmatics of the political is generated. It is this mode of theorizing that I am arguing is both epistemologically and ethically unsustainable. But as we have seen already with Hobbes, epistemologies of the given cannot be sustained as such, problematizing distinctions between the fictional and its others. This is why I prefer to deploy the idea of fictive theories. As I explore further in this chapter, reading Rousseau in this way forms an exemplary moment with broader implications for the whole enterprise of political theory, based as it has been around the legislative trope. The force of the fictive underpins the distinction I am teasing out between two different modes of theorizing: the legislative mode, and fictive theories. The first is operative via epistemologies of the given; but the second, which works via creative epistemologies of possibility, suggests that epistemologies of the given were always already creative epistemologies that effaced, negated, or forgot contingency and creative power in favor of legislative and thus authoritative power. We have already traced this moment in Hobbes. The political potential of this argument can be demonstrated in rereading the role and the status of the Legislator in Rousseau’s Social Contract (not, though, a reading that Rousseau would perhaps authorize) in concluding this chapter. Such a reading can be described as deconstructive; and the broad aim of this reading is to begin to delineate some of the contours of a new modality of political theorizing. In concluding this chapter, I gesture forward to Nietzsche and Bloch by suggesting the ways in which the fictive mode is always necessarily a utopian mode. The Fable of Humanity or a Fabulizing Humanity? In some remote corner of the universe, flickering in the light of the countless solar systems into which it had been poured, there was once a planet on which clever animals invented cognition. It was the most arrogant and mendacious minute in the “history of the world”; but a minute was all it was. After nature had drawn just a few more breaths the planet froze and
conceiving the inconceivable / 39 the clever animals had to die. Someone could invent a fable like this and yet they still would not have given a satisfactory illustration of just how pitiful, insubstantial and transitory, how purposeless and arbitrary the human intellect looks within nature; there were eternities during which it did not exist; and when it has disappeared again, nothing will have happened.6
The two texts of Rousseau’s that I explore in this chapter, A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (hereafter, Second Discourse) and The Social Contract, are not unproblematically related. The epistemological dilemma of their relationship mimics the whole problem of the movement from the natural to the political, and the grounding of the political on that foundation. Yet, Rousseau’s method and aims bear a greater resemblance to Nietzsche’s genealogical scrutiny of how we have come to be the “clever animals” we are than they do to the conventional natural law tradition. Substantively, Rousseau’s concerns are thus: the Second Discourse does indeed try to imagine the complexity of the shift from natural to “clever animal,” that is, the emergence of humanity as such; but this is made overwhelmingly difficult by imagining the “eternities” in which the clever animal did not exist. Rousseau’s theory of human history is “catastrophic”: the emergence of humanity is made possible via eruptions into human history that cannot be accounted for immanently, or in terms of a linear narrative of development.7 In his exploration of the concurrent development of cognition and morality, Rousseau questions the status and the very value of knowledge in terms of how we now understand how we have come to be who we are, and what potential remains open to humanity. That which has been taken to be “essential” to humanity is, for Rousseau, supplementary, external, additional. In following these substantive concerns through Rousseau’s texts, we encounter an aporetic structure of impossibility: that is, Rousseau’s attempts to tell a sequential and causal narrative are continually frustrated, and the task of representation (which would work via referential epistemologies of the given) proves to be impossible, so far as humanity is concerned. To simply gesture toward The Social Contract for now, these aporias erupt around the figure of the Legislator, his status, and his task of law-giving. The Legislator emerges, on Rousseau’s account, as the “someone” who must “invent the fable” of humanity, and conceive what is on Rousseau’s account, inconceivable. There is a further level of complexity, however. If the fable of humanity does indeed remain to be invented, then we need to figure out what modes of fictionalizing are adequate to that task, and what ways of knowing (and thus creating) humanity will not compound the condition that prior fictions have consolidated and entrenched: for as Rousseau fervently and passionately shows in the Second Discourse, fictions have also underwritten the pathologies of modernity, the psychological, existential, moral, political, and economic inequalities and bourgeois relations of dependency that have thwarted and distorted humanity. Like Hobbes’s “counterfeit” social man who is artifice from the very start, however, Rousseau’s “human animal” is distortion from the outset. My second question, then, is critical: what effects do fictions secure, and how can those effects be interrupted (and interrupted via the fictive)? From Discourse to Contract? I have suggested that the relation between the texts I have chosen mimics the state of nature problematic: the problem of making known and justifiable a conception of the
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political founded upon human nature itself, and thus creating obligations that bind political subjects as citizens. However, in exploring the relationship between these texts, we see Rousseau attempting to uphold this model, that is, showing the natural to generate political axiomatics via the programmatic mode, but he also reveals its impossibility; that is, attention to Rousseau’s texts (attending to textuality) shows this to be impossible. Before exploring Rousseau’s substantive concerns, then, I pause to consider this textual relationship. One concise statement of the conventional understanding is “to consider Rousseau’s two texts as providing a single composite theory of the human condition in its relation to government and politics.”8 Jean Starobinski nevertheless suggests two possibilities as to how this composite works: first, a revolutionary, “Marxist” synthesis in the work of Friedrich Engels; second, an “idealist,” Kantian, educative synthesis. Common to both is the “reconciliation of nature and culture in a society that returns to nature and transcends the injustices of society.”9 Common to both accounts, then, is the introduction of linearity, immanence, and transcendence. The Second Discourse looks backward. It outlines the problematic of the “dialectic of enlightenment” (as Adorno and Horkheimer would later term a similar narrative), or the ambivalences of human “perfectibility” that turn into the historical enslavement and immorality of humanity even and especially when it thinks itself most free and just. (Later in this chapter I will suggest this is an important symptom of the problem of political modernity as it operates through programmatic modes.) The Marxist interpretation proposes “that the Social Contract can be read as the sequel to, indeed, as the denouement of, the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality.”10 While Rousseau’s texts do not explicitly engage with the question of historical grounding for a revolutionary reordering of society, this interpretation reads the Social Contract as the revolutionary resolution to the problems of bourgeois dependency. On the other hand, Rousseau’s narrative could be read as uncovering a natural form of human freedom and sociability, where human interaction is guided by a natural compassion, that could itself be reconfigured in the political terms of the prescriptive and futureoriented Social Contract. Hence the crucial opening section of Social Contract: “Man is [/was] born free; and everywhere he is in chains. One thinks himself the master of others, and still remains a greater slave than they. How did this change come about? I do not know. What can make it legitimate? That question I think I can answer.”11 In the Kantian reading, natural freedom and equality is replaced by a moral freedom and a civic equality; or, as Kant puts it, “art, when it reaches perfection, once more becomes nature.”12 It is only via culture that autonomy can be achieved, not by any nostalgic, backward glance to the natural: The Social Contract, read alongside Emile, proposes education and the just institutions of a moral polity as a way of achieving such transcendence. So, also common to both types of synthesis is the necessary work outside of the texts, as it were, that has to be done to secure the synthesis. I wish, instead, to pause at the gap between the two texts. For Rousseau, the relationship—between his texts and between the natural and political conditions—is at once an epistemological, moral, and historical problem: “it would take Gods,” he markedly wrote, “to give men laws.”13 In the absence of such gods, we must pause to reread the opening
conceiving the inconceivable / 41
section of Social Contract and note that there is both a claim and a disclaimer. The claim? “Man is [/was] born free; and everywhere is in chains.” The disclaimer: “How did this change come about? I do not know.”14 I want to sidestep the problem of synthesis for the moment: the claim and disclaimer taken together suspend the conventional understanding of the relationship between the Second Discourse and the Social Contract, interrogating the epistemological status of the state of nature, and perhaps even the natural, compassionate equality narrated in the Discourse. Through a close reading of Rousseau’s reading of the state of nature, however, I argue that the disclaimer gives rise to an epistemological and political aporia such that, when (a particular kind of ) knowledge itself is the problem, this epistemological disclaimer may paradoxically provide the solution. This is an exemplary moment of the fictional inaugurating the real, and shows Rousseau to be an important moment in a broader problematic concerning the status of political theory more generally. In order to decide whether Rousseau does indeed practice a legislative and programmatic model of theorizing, we need to figure out what principle underlies Rousseau’s two texts, that is, whether the conventional relationship should be upheld, or whether we should prioritize the disclaimer. Core to addressing this problem is figuring out the status that Rousseau ascribes to the origin of humanity. In the preface of the Second Discourse, Rousseau connects nature and origin in the form of a series of questions to which the reader may anticipate the answers within the text: how shall man hope to see himself as nature made him, across all the changes which succession of time and place must have produced in his original constitution? How can he distinguish what is fundamental in his nature from the changes and additions which his circumstances and the advances he has made have introduced to modify his primitive condition?15
What was fundamental to humanity, suggests Rousseau, was easily discernible in his primitive condition; the loss of this condition is the cause of his present discontent: Discontented with your present state, for reasons which threaten your unfortunate descendants with still greater discontent, you will perhaps wish it were in your power to go back; and this feeling should be a panegyric on your first ancestors, a criticism of your contemporaries, and a terror to the unfortunates who will come after you.16
This disconcerting passage immediately disturbs an unreflexive reading of human history as a history of “progress,” and suggests in its place a history of decline that should invoke sheer dread to future generations. Nevertheless, it also implies that redemption can be sought by uncovering what is natural (historically and logically primary) in humanity: by doing so, Rousseau suggests, we can also discover the principles by which the political present is to be reformed. Rousseau then brings together three aspects of the natural condition: the chronological (because prehistorically first), ontological (because of the implication of essential primacy), and logical (since these provide the parameters of the reformation and salvation of humanity). In one of the most powerful statements of his critique and
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transformation of the state of nature thesis, he writes: If we look at society with a calm and disinterested eye, it seems, at first, to show us only the violence of the powerful and the oppression of the weak. The mind is shocked at the cruelty of the one, or is induced to lament the blindness of the other; and as nothing is less permanent in life than those external relations, which are more frequently produced by accident than wisdom, and which are called weaknesses or power, riches or poverty, all human institutions seem at first glance to be founded merely on banks of shifting sand. It is only by taking a closer look, and removing the sand and dust that surround the edifice, that we perceive the immovable basis on which it is raised, and learn to respect its foundations.17
The natural, to recapitulate this argument thus far, should be recuperable as lost origin, hidden essence, and thus exert a logical necessity in the process of correcting corrupt social and political institutions, wherein we “learn to respect the foundations” of human society. However, at the start of the Second Discourse, the very possibility of knowing man is put into question. This disrupts the connections that would otherwise conjoin the two texts, and thus enable the correct movement from the natural to the political. It also disrupts the epistemological security of the legislative and programmatic mode of theorizing within which Rousseau has been read. The first hint of this is Rousseau’s critique of the Hobbesian state of nature. For Hobbes, as we have seen, nature denoted essential or enduring characteristics of human nature. Rousseau argues that this category of human nature confuses the natural and the historical in a disingenuous and insidious manner: “in speaking of the savage, they described social man.”18 Such a categorical confusion makes essential what are contingent, historical, and social problems that, precisely as contingent, historical, and social, are open to political negotiation. Noting that “the philosophers, who have inquired into the foundations of society, have all felt the necessity of going back to a state of nature; but not one of them has got there,” Rousseau, significantly, points to the presumptuous epistemological error of thinking one has found and knows the natural.19 The “preface” to the Discourse refers to the same inscription of the Temple of Delphi as Hobbes referred to, this time more conventionally translated as “know thyself.” Nevertheless, like Hobbes’s figures of unintelligibility, Rousseau has his own metaphors denoting the problematic of how to know: Like the statue of Glaucus, which was so disfigured by time, seas, and tempests, that it looked more like a wild beast than a god, the human soul, altered in society by a thousand causes perpetually recurring, by the acquisition of a multitude of truths and errors, by the changes happening to the constitution of the body, and by the continual jarring of the passions, has, so to speak, changed in appearance, so as to be scarcely recognizable. Instead of a being, acting constantly from fixed and invariable principles, instead of that celestial and majestic simplicity, impressed on it by its divine Author, we find only the frightful contrast of passion mistaking itself for reason, and of understanding grown delirious.20
The statue of Glaucus is indeed “enigmatic.”21 The body has been distorted, passions distressed, weathered, scarred, reason inverted and perverted. Disfigured, dissembling man cannot be read or represented to even himself; as Nietzsche will later argue even
conceiving the inconceivable / 43
more forcefully, humanity has embodied its errors. Here, Rousseau aligns moral and epistemological failings with a distorted humanity, while problematizing the natural underneath the artifice. But there is a worse epistemological dilemma to be encountered: it is still more cruel that, as every advance made by the human species removes it still farther from its primitive state, the more discoveries we make, the more we deprive ourselves of the means of making the most important of all. Thus it is, in one sense, by our very study of man, that knowledge of him is put out of our power.22
Paul de Man interprets this passage to mean that “the specificity of man forever escapes our grasp”; but crucially, this is no ontological condition or necessity. We cannot “know man” precisely because, as Eli Friedlander powerfully puts it, “in our way stands no less than our knowledge.”23 The very tools we have to know ourselves only further distance us from ourselves, and thus compound the alienated state that Rousseau diagnoses.24 This is a complex but crucial moment, where Rousseau begins his journey away from the terrain of referential and representational epistemologies of the given, and moves beyond. Since we cannot use our knowledge—historical, logical, or ontological—to know ourselves, Rousseau embarks on his impossible narrative with the profoundly paradoxical statement, “Let us begin then by laying all the facts aside, as they do not affect the question [of humanity’s ‘proper’ nature] . . . The investigations we may enter into, in treating this subject, must not be considered historical truths, but only as mere and hypothetical reasonings, rather calculated to explain the nature of things, than to ascertain their actual origin.”25 Rousseau further insists that the state of nature is a no-place (but this is not the reason why I later suggest Rousseau writes in a utopian mode): “a state which no longer exists, perhaps never did exist, and probably never will exist.”26 What can this epistemological denial tell us about knowledge itself, what does it tell us about the relation between the Second Discourse and the Social Contract, and of the relation between the natural and the political conditions? Pointing toward the fictional status of Rousseau’s state of nature as well as his insistence that normative implications can be derived from such a state and such a fiction, Keith Ansell-Pearson writes that “Rousseau is ambivalent on the precise status of his description of the state of nature, informing us that it has merely the status of a legal fiction, but then proceeding to offer us a historical account of human nature as a basis for understanding, if not man’s real ‘origins,’ then at least his real ‘nature’. ”27 “Merely” a fiction? Capturing and continuing this paradox of fictions fabricating the real that Ansell-Pearson has gestured toward, Horowitz writes, curiously but aptly, that Rousseau’s “savage man” is the “hypothetically real starting point of a hypothetically real historical evolution,” insisting on a peculiar confusion or simultaneity of the hypothetical and the real.28 Responding to this idiosyncrasy, Paul de Man suggests, “Rousseau seems to want to have it both ways, giving himself the freedom of the fabulator but, at the same time, the authority of the responsible historian.”29 This is a compelling suggestion; but the two are nowhere near as opposed as de Man implies, as we shall see. I return to this in the context of the Legislator. de Man further comments, very few informed readers would today maintain that Rousseau’s state of nature is an empirical reality, present, past or future. Most commentators would agree that, at least up to a point, the state of nature is a state “that no longer exists, that has perhaps never
44 / fictive theories existed and that will probably never come into being . . .” It is a fiction; but in stating this, the problem has merely been displaced, for what then is the significance of this fiction with regard to the empirical world?30
I shall not yet attempt to offer solutions to this epistemological quandary, and indeed, epistemological displacement of the problem of “reference,” since to do so too quickly serves to obscure its significance and implications. Recalling that our knowledge stands in the way of knowing who we are (how we have come to be who we are, and who we could possibly be) Friedlander suggests: “calling Rousseau’s account hypothetical would merely serve to hide our ignorance and push back the problem since the question is precisely how Rousseau can have this vision of human nature on which to base his construction.”31 The state of nature is clearly not referential; it is exterior to, or perhaps itself inaugurates, factual/fictional, natural/artificial oppositions, and as such cannot be held within those binaries that would presuppose that logic preestablished. And indeed, an intriguing part of Rousseau’s account of the state of nature is the role that various forms of (bad) fictionalizing play within it. Rousseau’s fictive state of nature, then, is opposed to the true and the real in interesting ways. For as we shall see, humanity’s advent into history is, for Rousseau, also humanity’s advent into illusion, artifice, appearance, and evil. As Starobinski has argued, “the clash between appearance and reality is echoed in a series of other conflicts: between good and evil [. . .], between nature and society.”32 As I have suggested, we need to figure out what modes of fictionalizing are adequate to the task of rethinking ways of knowing (and thus creating) humanity that will not compound the condition that prior fictions have consolidated and entrenched. Paul de Man puts the question thus: “what kind of epistemology can hope to ‘know well’ a radical fiction?”33 To anticipate my response: fictions that come to believe in their own referential validity reify, whereas fictions that remain critical and open-ended are suited to post-referential, becoming creatures. The kind of epistemology that can hope to “know well” a “radical fiction,” then, is necessarily creative. This question cannot be addressed further without exploring the narrative difficulties with the Second Discourse itself, and the account of the state of nature, and so I turn now to explore the substantive concerns there. Change does happen within the state of nature, but its appearance is incomprehensible within the given structure. (“How did that change come about? I do not know.”) I shall suggest throughout this section that the task of representation (which would work via referential epistemologies) proves to be impossible, so far as humanity is concerned. Rousseau’s task is to account for the emergence of inequalities between humans. His first description of men is a sensuous one: if we consider him . . . just as he must have come from the hands of nature, we behold him as an animal weaker than some, and less agile than others; but, taking him all round, the most advantageously organized of any. I see him satisfying his hunger at the first oak, and slaking his thirst at the first brook: finding his bed at the foot of the tree which afforded him a repast; and with that, all his wants satisfied.34
This man is at one with the nature of which he is an indistinguishable part, and at one with himself: without the additions of society, he “carr[ies] one’s self, as it were, perpetually whole and entire about him.”35 This is an undifferentiated nature,
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within which (pre)humanity moves without cognition, without comparison, without awareness, without consciousness. In this condition, Rousseau imagines the self negotiating its encounters with others of its kind, though scarcely recognizable as such to the nascent self, on the basis of an unadulterated amour de soi, or self-love/preservation of self, combined with a preconceptual compassion, pitié, that precludes inflicting unnecessary suffering on other animals. Rousseau imagines these attributes, prior to conceptualization, prior to thought, and perhaps even to a basic instinctual recognition, simply in order to articulate an innocence prior to knowledge (or “morality”), and a lack of violence, aggression, or possession—neither of self nor of others. Keith Ansell-Pearson points to the “inconceivability” of amour de soi and compassion when he suggests that these concepts presuppose an “identification” of other human animals that Rousseau has said does not (yet) exist; in this context, nevertheless, I rather like Rousseau’s gentle, affective fictions, whose truth he comes to feel to be more true than his “given” societies. (Amour propre, on the contrary, depends upon recognition of, and comparison with others, and is thus already social, historical, unnatural: I explore this later.) Everything that prehuman animals need to survive is present, within reach. James Swenson describes this as “the adequation of needs, means and desires” that obviates the disjunctures that would necessarily provoke consciousness.36 Amour de soi, then, is that necessarily unacknowledged “principle” of preservation of a self that does not yet exist, and it remains unarticulated (but felt) within the state of nature; it is simply there, unalienated, unmixed. In this condition, Rousseau comments, who does not see, without recurring to the uncertain testimony of history that everything seems to remove from savage man both the temptation and the means of changing his condition? His imagination paints no pictures; his heart makes no demands on him. His few wants are so readily supplied, and he is so far from having the knowledge which is needful to make him want more, that he can have neither foresight nor curiosity.37
The absence of imagination indicates the unavailability of any understanding of temporality or the future: the first pre-clever animals do not have temporality: “His soul, which nothing disturbs, is wholly wrapped up in the feeling of its present existence, without any idea of the future.”38 How can life be experienced in this context? If at all, purely as a succession of instants: Rousseau’s original humanity is entirely subsumed by the present. Rousseau suggests the concepts that make change possible (both conceptually and empirically) are radically unavailable in the state of nature. The recurrent refrain of the Second Discourse is “it is impossible to conceive . . .”; Rousseau’s narrative is itself a profoundly paradoxical attempt to conceive the inconceivable. The “metaleptic” structure of the Social Contract, where “the effect would have to become cause,” also permeates the Second Discourse.39 For example, Rousseau’s accounts of both temporality and language display metaleptic properties, abyssal moments: “the more we reflect on this subject, the greater appears the distance between pure sensation and the most simple knowledge [and recall, if we can trust Rousseau at all, that knowledge will obfuscate knowledge itself ]: it is impossible indeed to conceive how a man, by his own powers alone, without the aid of communication and the spur of necessity, could have bridged so great a gap.”40
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And yet, in Rousseau’s natural condition, such “spurs” are unavailable. The human animal is selflessly sufficient. Consciousness of temporality and of language is crucial for social development. But again, language is itself part of a philosophical problematic that Rousseau considers when he writes of the “inconceivable pains and infinite space of time that the inventions of the first language must have cost.”41 In a state without recognition of self and thus of the other, Rousseau asks, “how can language have become necessary; for as there was no communication among men and no need for any, we can neither conceive of the necessity of this invention, nor the possibility of it, if it were not somehow indispensable.”42 As Rousseau describes the state of nature however, language is rendered unnecessary. Again, effect must become cause: “which was more necessary, the existence of society to the invention of language, or the invention of language to the establishment of society?”43 And the stabilizing of language, Rousseau comments, is “itself still more difficult to conceive, since such a common agreement must have had motives, and it seems that speech must have existed before its use could be established.” He continues, “I am so aghast at the increasing difficulties which present themselves, and so well convinced of the almost demonstrable impossibility that languages should owe their original institution to merely human means” that he leaves this problem unanswered, simply supposing the “first difficulty obviated.”44 So in response to the question of how the change from natural to human animal came about, Rousseau foregrounds unintelligibility. This is not to say he does not give a substantive answer, but it is to remind us once again of the epistemologically complicated nature of Rousseau’s answer. The awakening of “perfectibility” signals the birth of the human animal. Of course, Rousseau is ambivalent regarding the very value of perfectibility, as well as its unintelligibility in the natural order of things: “perfectibility, the social virtues, and other faculties which natural man possessed, could never develop of themselves, but must require the fortuitous concurrence of many foreign causes that might never arise, and without which he must have remained forever in his primitive conditions.”45 As Swenson has pointed out, human qualities remain “latent” or “virtual” in the state of nature.46 The discovery of temporality and imagination, and the “ever-increasing burden of artifice” mark human development; both underpin the growth of inequalities and relations of dependency.47 How? Rousseau continues his story: however inconceivably, humanity did awaken, and did become social. Small communities came to be established, bringing with them the possibility of new forms of social relationships, inextricably entwined with new dangers of dependencies. As sociability increased, so too did comparison: “each one began to consider the rest, and wish to be esteemed in turn; and thus a value came to be attached to public esteem. Whoever sang or danced best, whoever was the handsomest, the strongest, the most dexterous, came to be of consideration; and this was the first step toward inequality, and, at the same time, toward vice.”48 Even in this scene of innocence and enjoyment, Rousseauian ears detect a sinister shift: from amour de soi to amour propre, the kind of comparison that changes difference into inequality. “Natural” inequality is simply difference, and unacknowledged because it is necessarily unrecognized difference. I would argue that Rousseau, rather than referring to “natural” talents and “natural” inequalities, is actually at his most radical in this passage: he does not naturalize differential talents and abilities, since they themselves
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only gain meaning via comparison, which is always social and hence unnatural. Inequalities, I would argue, are always artificial. (The impossible hero of the state of nature is, perhaps, the one who would simply sit under the tree, at one with himself. But this hero is as impossible as the one who would have had the foresight to pull up the stakes of the first property claim, as we shall see.) So, on the one hand, people begin the (subtle, insidious, creeping) journey toward appearance and thus artifice taking priority over simply being. And structural factors combine to compound this imbalance: “the poets tell us it was silver and gold, but, for the philosophers, it was iron and corn, which first civilized men, and ruined humanity.”49 Technological factors entrench chains of dependence by introducing a division of labor, a further reification of “roles” that are an artificial yoke to the once natural animal. As the earth becomes cultivated, “civilized” people are trapped by their very own creations: “the cultivation of the earth necessarily brought about its distribution; and property, once recognized, gave rise to the first rules of justice; for, to secure each man to his own, it had to be possible for each to have something. Besides, as men began to look to the future [. . .] all had something to lose.”50 From nature to society; from good to evil; from unalienated being to relations of dependency among rich and poor alike; from free to enchained: Behold then all human faculties developed, memory and imagination in full play, amour-propre interested, reason active [. . .]. It now became the interest of men to appear what they really were not. To be and to seem became two totally different things; and from this distinction sprang insolent pomp and cheating trickery, with all the numerous vices that go in their train. On the one hand, free and independent as men were before, they were now, in consequence of a multiplicity of new wants, brought into subjection, as it were, and particularly to one another [. . .]. All these evils were the first effects of property, and the inseparable attendants of growing inequality.51
This is a devastating critique of modernity, at once economic, political, moral, existential, psychological, and even organic, or ecological in terms of humanity’s detachment from and dominance over nature. And from hereon in, with greater speed, and greater menace, Rousseau rewrites the Hobbesian/Lockean social contract as the most duplicitous, treacherous, and damaging fiction or artifice to ever secure a future. The most radically “bad fictive” moment is announced in the still compelling opening section of the second part of the Second Discourse: The first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, bethought himself of saying “This is mine”, and found people simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of civil society. From how many crimes, wars and murders, from how many horrors and misfortunes might not any one have saved mankind, by pulling up the stakes, or filling in the ditch, and crying to his fellows: “Beware of listening to this impostor; you are undone if you once forget that the fruits of the earth belong to us all, and the earth itself to nobody”. But there is a great probability that things had then already come to such a pitch, that they could no longer continue as they were; for the idea of property depends on many prior ideas, which could only be acquired successively, and cannot have been formed all at once in the human mind . . .52
To condense a long story:53 this moment has its political equivalent in the fraudulent social contract, where the chains of dependence are made illegitimately “legitimate,”
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or at least, legal, to the detriment of all: in the historical institution of government, and the protection thus afforded to private property. The “plausible arguments” that enchained humanity meant that “all ran headlong into their chains in the hopes of securing their freedom.”54 And the outcome is, as I have already suggested, that humanity, at this point, becomes enslaved and immoral—as both an epistemological and ethical error—even, and especially, when it thinks itself most free and just. This is of course a crucial historical moment. It is the codification of the modern political state and capitalist economy, the moment, historically, of a peculiar freeing of humanity from previous fictions (of, e.g., divinely ordained hierarchies in the name of natural rights); but also a moment of reification, as the programmatic side of modernity encodes and closed political spaces once more (yet this time in the name of freedom). To reiterate: fictions as appearance, evil, delusion are the problem; what kinds of fictionalizing can provide the solution? As Swenson points out, human qualities remain “latent” or “virtual” in the state of nature: “the state of nature is indeed the closed circle of self[less] sufficiency. [. . .] If we agree that the state of nature contains no principles that account for its end, then the causal factors that must be introduced will necessarily be external and fortuitous with respect to nature itself.”55 The force of this argument is to dissociate human “nature” from human history with interesting implications. Jacques Derrida comments: “there is something catastrophic in the movement that brings about the emergence from the state of nature and in the awakening of the imagination which actualises the natural faculties and essentially actualises perfectibility.”56 Further, the discourses that have “naturally” legitimated such a development simply have no priority, chronologically, logically, or essentially: “The Discourse sur l’inégalité as a whole,” argues Swenson, “designates the fact that human history is in no way an expression of human nature.”57 There is, to summarize the implications of the logic of the Second Discourse, more than catastrophe: the question of origin involves neither event nor structure; it escapes the simple alternatives of fact and right, of history and essence. The passage from one structure to the other—from the state of nature to that of society, for example—cannot be explained by any structural analysis: an external, irrational, catastrophic factum must burst in [. . .] And when history is incapable of determining this fact, or facts of this order, philosophy must, by a sort of free and mythic invention, produce factual hypotheses playing the same role [. . .] The passage from the state of nature to the state of language and society, the advent of supplementarity, remains, then, outside the grasp of the simple alternatives of genesis and structure, of fact and principle, of historical and philosophical reason.58
What is vital in Rousseau’s text are the ways in which he exposes philosophy’s “free and mythic inventions” as by no means a representation of humanity’s “nature,” since humanity is that which exceeds referential fixity. In this way, Rousseau opens a space within which we can think about other uses of the fictive in theorizing. The entry into history is the story of bad fictions; but as de Man notes, “The very conception of the future is linked with the possibility of a free imagination.”59 What this suggests, of course, is the necessity of conceiving humanity as necessarily fictive. I want to explore the broadly political implications of this discursive discovery. In Rousseau’s text, nonnecessity is inscribed in every development that he nevertheless presupposes must have happened. He no longer refers to any continuum between
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the natural and historical/political. Derrida asks, then, should we conceptualize the “birth of society, therefore, not [as] a passage, [but] a point, a pure, fictive and unstable, ungraspable limit?”60 On Rousseau’s account, we can no longer understand the political with the conventional disciplinary resources of political theory. I began this section by suggesting that Rousseau’s attempt in the Second Discourse was profoundly troubled by the paradoxical thought of attempting to write and know what is natural to humanity in order to generate just political principles, because our very knowledge stood in the way. James Swenson expands this point: One might say that Rousseau’s own definition of the state of nature is formed primarily by excluding, to as great an extent as possible, any elements of continuity between nature and civilization. If the state of nature is the logical presupposition of human history, if “it is necessary to have a correct understanding” of this fiction “in order to properly evaluate our present condition,” then that does not mean that the state of nature is in any way the cause of civilization. The concept of the state of nature makes causality and intelligibility radically discontinuous.61
Swenson suggests here that Rousseau’s theorizing works precisely as a transformative mode of theorizing works: by freeing politics from epistemologies that are tied by forms of representational and referential fixity to the given, and by means of creative epistemologies that expose and negate prior, constraining fictions. It is this that I call self-consciously fictive theorizing, both utopian and deconstructive. Rousseau’s investigation into radical humanity radically frees us from “given” constraints on fictive/future possibilities. This is why I propose that Rousseau inscribes a nature that is vital and alive; for it is a nature that is mobile and critical. This is also why the Social Contract begins with the epistemological disclaimer: the fictive point of origin, for Rousseau as Legislator must “freely and mythically” reconfigure society outside the parameters of a knowledge that is itself saturated with ideological, historical assumptions that can only compound and reproduce the existent, not recreate. It is only by the radical distancing that Rousseau inscribes between what is taken as knowledge of humanity that a very different reading of the Social Contract can be proposed. Louis Althusser was not the only critic to take Rousseau to task for his flight from history to fiction.62 However, this too can be read differently, and Rousseau can be read as problematizing the opposition between fiction and history itself. As Judith Still writes, “if the contemporary symbolic is understood as dominating the way we think, any questioning of it, any reaching out to another symbolic, necessarily involves a kind of leap, a disjunction in logic which is hard to think, and which always runs the risk of being incomprehensible in general, or risible in detail.”63 Rousseau’s state of nature works as the utopian mode works: via distancing, alterity, and critique, and by provoking, not merely different meanings to life, but changing the modes by which meanings are made, by thinking differently. Rousseau’s empty and excessive nature finds its parallel in the fictive moment of grounding the social contract, in order to negotiate such a disjuncture by negating what we thought our very knowledge was. Given that, in terms of conventional critiques of the totalitarian nature of the Social Contract, this may seem somewhat outlandish, the next task is to see in what ways, in the light of thinking about the social contract via a creative epistemology, conceptual—and political—spaces can be opened to contest those readings.
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The Social Contract Let me reiterate some of the main claims guiding this book before moving on. Political theory, as discipline and discourse, seeks to settle questions of justice and power through a legislative, programmatic mode, where the basis of such legislation, political programs, as well as other forms of juridical authority and institutionalization, are sought in truth or knowledge of the real. It is this mode that I argue is both epistemologically and ethically unsustainable: epistemologically, since certainty is sought in always-already fictional (reified) ways; and ethically, since such programs tend toward coherence, containment, and control, or closure of the political. This precludes possibility and human becoming (in the fictive mode.) Again, Rousseau is exemplary in illustrating how ways of reading (as rewriting) political theory are critical in changing the modality of theorizing. Now, central interpretative concerns of the Social Contract have been focused around the conflict between Rousseau’s democratic impulses and his totalitarian outcomes, embodied in the paradox of “forcing freedom.” Rousseau has been read and interpreted diversely within this dominant imaginary.64 “Forcing freedom,” however, is not an anomaly exclusive to Rousseau: it can be seen as the central contradiction of the legislative mode of theorizing. Indeed, even utopian political thought has been entwined in that paradox: as Ken Roemer has argued, the utopian dilemma, like the dilemma of political theory when practiced via the legislative, is that it is “born of two conflicting impulses—to enable change by disrupting given orders and to create peace and calm by establishing order.”65 (We return to this issue in chapter five.) However, to stay with Rousseau, if (social) knowledge has precluded understanding, then perhaps the creation of different spaces within which Rousseau can be read can be discerned by attending to the paradoxical moment of founding his legitimate political society in the Social Contract. In the Discourse Rousseau exposed as false (one, pejorative, sense of fictional) the fictions of the natural law philosophers in their presumptuous epistemological error of supposing they had found nature. His own account was radically fictive in the absence of a “true” account, and in the absence of methodological tools that would not work toward reifying the existent. Attention to the fictive moment in Rousseau, as that which is neither fictional (since the prior “norm” to which the fictional must refer has been thoroughly disrupted) nor (yet) real opens future possibilities, and disrupts conventional readings of Rousseau’s “forcing freedom.” In the Social Contract, Rousseau’s fictive moment of founding tends toward a process of opening. The structure is thus parallel to that of the Discourse, and Irene Harvey describes this parallel structure thus: “the improper will be shown to found the proper.”66 The impropriety of the epistemological disclaimer at the start of the Social Contract provides the very conditions of possibility for inaugurating a very different real to that outlined in the Second Discourse. In this section, then, I shall reread the role and status of the Legislator as creative, and as working on the basis of an unknowable future human potential, rather than as essentialist and dogmatic. This means that the Legislator can be shown to operate via a creative epistemology of the possible, rather than an epistemology of the given that can only reify, and reproduce relations of power. This error—reading Rousseau as foreclosing human possibility through the General Will, and thus engaging in an exercise that can only reproduce given relation of power—gives rise to the figure of the Legislator as authoritative; the
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former reading connects the legislative moment with an ongoing process, and thus an open and participatory democracy. As with the previous section, a crucial point again concerns the textual/historical/ political relationship between the two texts. The conventional reading runs thus: in the Second Discourse, Rousseau uncovers the “natural goodness” of humanity that has been corrupted, as humans became slavish, dependent creatures. The Social Contract works on a different level to transcend this condition, positing a second state of nature67 and an ideal resolution within which a social simulacrum of the natural condition can be generated and maintained. There is much in this depiction to suggest that the Social Contract is a blueprint for an ideal society—a utopia that works to change the people from this Second Discourse into the kind of people who could populate the ideal society. (I argue in chapter five that this definition of utopia is inadequate. On the contrary, utopia should be resolutely disruptive, not institutional or legislative: disruptive of thought that accepts the given realities as the only realities; disruptive of attempts at recuperation of the radical; and transgressive to any given order of things.) We have already seen, however, that the narrative in the Second Discourse did not lead to any coherent ordering of historical experience, but rather to a disruption of the necessity of what must nevertheless have happened. What can be taken unproblematically, however, is one significant outcome: Rousseau’s audience, the political community, is not receptive to his message. Exploring the problematic of founding the political community, and the intervention of the Legislator, further exemplifies the logic of fictions founding the real. The problem is one of collective action and community: “as men cannot engender new forces, but only unite and direct existing ones, they have no other means of preserving themselves than the formation, by aggregation, of a sum of forces great enough to overcome the resistance. These they have to bring into play by means of a single motive power, and cause to act in concert.”68 This would be necessary to overcome the disaggregation and fallacious individualism that stratifies “society” on so many levels, as the Second Discourse has already told us. Once the people have formed themselves as such, overcome such individualism, the social compact, the creation of the sovereign body of all the people can be described as follows: “At once, in the place of the individual personality of each contracting party, this act of association creates a cooperative and collective body, composed of as many members as the assembly contains voters, and receiving from this act its unity, its common identity, its life and its will.”69 The social compact forms the political association that replaces unsecured natural liberty, or indeed, a legal but illegitimate state of alienation, with a moral and legitimate equality. The structure of the Social Contract is, however, curious. In the Second Discourse, we saw the metaleptic structure, whereby Rousseau’s desire to establish the correct “order of things” was continually thwarted. Similarly here: Rousseau first describes the act of total alienation involved in the moment of compact before discussing its necessary “precondition,” the preparation of the community who is to undergo the alienation that restores it to itself, or creates those selves for the first time. On the alienation, he writes, “the peculiar fact about this alienation is that, in taking over the goods of individuals, the community, so far from despoiling them, only assures them legitimate possession, and changes usurpation into true right, and enjoyment into
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proprietorship.”70 The problem is in fact similar to that diagnosed by Marcuse two centuries later: Freedom would become the environment of an organism which is no longer capable of adapting to the competitive performances required for well-being under domination, no longer capable of tolerating the aggressiveness, brutality, and ugliness of the established way of life. The rebellion would have taken root in the very “nature,” the “biology” of the individual; and on these new grounds, the rebels would redefine the objectives and the strategy of political struggle, in which alone the concrete goals of liberation can be determined.71
Like Rousseau, Marcuse inscribes the nature of humanity as potentiality. Potentiality is a fictive operator: attentiveness to the effects of the claim of potentiality appeals to a politics that speaks to the possibility of becoming-other, and this possibility is significantly connected to a radical politics of resistance. For Rousseau (as for theorists such as Marcuse) inscribing human nature as potential enables thought about the radical leap from who we are to who we could become. But for Rousseau, as for any radical politics, there is a further problem. How can creatures who are no longer capable of reproducing the power relations of the given be created? How to make the leap from the one to the other? The social compact is a one-off event; laws are necessary from the preservation of the community; but the people who must form the community are simply not so constituted as to be able to create, negotiate, and legislate, the just state. The “correct order of things” is impossible: For a young people to be able to relish sound principles of political theory and follow the fundamental rules of statecraft, the effect would have to become cause; the social spirit, which should be created by these institutions, would have to preside over their very foundation; and men would have to be before law what they should become by means of law.72
And to reiterate, the lesson learned from the Second Discourse is that we simply cannot assume “presence of the effect within the cause,” which is to assume given or present categories are the only available ones, and thus preclude understanding of the new and the possible.73 The answer, for Rousseau, is a Legislator: a “superior intelligence” who knows, but is not of, humanity, and who, importantly, can negotiate the changes that his intervention will effect in humanity. But as I have discussed in my introduction, and as Zygmunt Bauman reminds us, the trope of the legislator “engenders an acute asymmetry in the deployment of social power.”74 The ostensible epistemic privilege of the legislator is a formidable lie, and a powerful one, with effects. “It would take gods,” Rousseau soberly avows, “to give men laws.”75 And in the absence of gods, The legislator [. . .] must have recourse to an authority of a different order [than either his own authority, or that ordained by the people], capable of constraining without violence and persuading without convincing. This is what has, in all ages, compelled the fathers of nations to have recourse to divine intervention, and credit the gods with their own wisdom, in order that the peoples, submitting to the laws of the State as to those of nature, and recognizing the same power in the formation of the city as in that of man,
conceiving the inconceivable / 53 might obey freely. [. . .] This sublime reason, far above the range of the common herd, is that whose decisions the legislator puts into the mouths of mortals, in order to constrain by divine authority those whom human prudence could move. But it is not anybody who can make the gods speak, or get himself believed when he proclaims himself their interpreter.76
But, Rousseau here has already decoded the ostensible epistemic privilege of the Legislator: the Legislator must use fictions, epistemologically dubious of status, in order to create the very people who can effectively listen to, and live, his words. To reiterate Derrida: when “history is incapable of determining this fact, or facts of this order, philosophy must, by a sort of free and mythic invention, produce factual hypotheses playing the same role, explaining the coming into being of a new structure.”77 What are the political implications of this? Irene Harvey describes the Legislator in the following terms: “nothing can authorize the legislation since he is essentially outside of constitutional legitimacy and propriety [. . .] He acts without example, without precedent; and in order to create, he creates ex nihilo and without authority—unlawfully founding the law.”78 The acts of the legislator are “already beyond actuality as such.”79 The Legislator, then, can also be read as that creative cypher of possible futures, beyond the given, beyond the logical, and beyond the factual. His creative epistemology is, for Rousseau, a way to create the conceptual and political spaces within which society, and its alienated subjects, can be transformed. There is a further implication, but here I too begin to work “outside” of Rousseau’s texts, outside a reading he may have authorized: what happens if we think of the Legislator, not in terms of a singular figure of epistemic privilege, but as a plural process? This is not so far fetched: Irene Harvey, for example, has suggested the Legislator is a “personification of General Will prior to its establishment.”80 Can the General Will be read itself as sustaining this creativity beyond the real and given? It is enough for now to be brief (the General Will, as we shall see, has been something of an interpretative problem). If the legislator founds the political community, the General Will is the more-or-less institutional set of processes or mechanisms by which the community is sustained and maintained. Of what, then, does the General Will consist, and what are its effects? The general will in Rousseau has been read as tyrannical, but Rousseau intends precisely the opposite: Therefore, in order that the social compact not be an empty formula, it tacitly includes the undertaking, which alone can give force to the rest, that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body. This means nothing less than he shall be forced to be free; for this is the condition which, by giving each citizen to his country, secures him against all personal dependence. In this lies the key to the working of the political machine; this alone legitimizes civil undertakings, which, without it, would be absurd, tyrannical, and liable to the most frightful abuses.81
The general will defines the parameters of the whole community; as such, it cannot be a purely formal process, not can it be a-temporal: “if then the people simply promises to obey,” which would be a submission to a static law, “by that very act it dissolves itself and loses what makes it a people; the moment a master exists, there is no longer a sovereign, and from that moment there is no longer a body politics.”82
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Steven Affeldt reads this important section as follows: “as essentially an act of willing, will cannot be equated with or ensured by any concrete embodiment in established laws.”83 Tracy Strong concurs: “sovereignty and thus the being of political society is held to exist solely in the present tense”; that is, laws that would assume an a-temporal validity, not subject to continual contestation and reaffirmation or otherwise in fact negate sovereignty and thus the political community.84 We have seen Hobbes try and fail to stabilize such a perpetual present. This recontextualizes some of the stranger things Rousseau has to say about the social contract, for example: “The clauses of the contract are so determined by the nature of the act that the slightest modification would make them vain and ineffective”; or, “The sovereign, merely by virtue of what is, is always as it should be.”85 I have suggested that a transformative politics works by freeing politics from epistemologies that are tied by forms of representational and referential fixity to the given. Rousseau associates the condition of referential fixity, of representation that is also and simultaneously reification, with an alienated humanity. The general will, however, moves beyond such representational actualities: “sovereignty, for the same reason as makes it inalienable, cannot be represented; it lies essentially in the general will, and will not admit of representation: it is either the same or it is other; there is no intermediate possibility.”86 Any kind of referential fixity is problematic for Rousseau; willing political communities is necessarily a temporal process. Just as the import of the legislator does not derive from the epistemological privilege of the moment of founding, neither is the general will of the community defined by the status accorded to law. “Forcing freedom,” then, becomes a more complex moment, less coercive and authoritative. Indeed, Affeldt comments that the general will is not equivalent to the common interest, and thus the threat of forcing freedom “may be operative even when individuals are scrupulously obeying what is conventionally but wrongly taken to be law. Indeed, for Rousseau, it is precisely in this form that this threat to society is mostly operative.”87 I have previously suggested that programmatic modes of theorizing are an important symptom of the historical enslavement and immorality of humanity even and especially when it thinks itself most free and just. Forcing freedom can be read so as to circumvent such legislative stasis. Rather than privileging the epistemic and authoritative force of given laws, as Affeldt argues, it means “active participation in the continuous constitution of a general will, rather than passive compliance [. . .] In the Social Contract Rousseau proposes the kinds of philosophical instruction, critique and self-presentation that the text itself contains as forms of force that constrains to freedom.”88 In this crucial sense, then, Rousseau can be read “as if ” he devolves the creative insights of the legislator to each citizen, gesturing toward the future that they could bring into being. And he does so with the simultaneous, no longer opposed, “freedom of the fabulator” and “authority of the historian.”89 In Rousseau, the impossibility of his foundational moments, both the state of nature and the legislator, has fruitful and productive implications for the status and task for political theorizing as an activity. However, have I simply legitimated the use of fictions in political theory without a means of controlling or evaluating them (thus calling to mind the excesses of, e.g., a Sorel, or the exclusionary fictions of, e.g., a Plato, or indeed, a Hobbes)? To echo Rousseau: that question I think I can answer.
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We can discern in Rousseau the contours of a post-representational, post-referential mode of theorizing. This deconstructive way of reading Rousseau opens these utopian spaces. Derrida for one has, always tried to expose the way in which philosophy is literary, not so much because it is metaphor but because it is catachresis. The term metaphor implies a relation to an original “property” of meaning, a “proper” sense to which it indirectly or equivocally refers, whereas catachresis is a violent production of meaning, an abuse which refers to no anterior norm. The founding concepts of metaphysics—logos, eidos, theoria, etc.—are instances of catachresis rather than metaphors.90
Just as Rousseau uncovered the natural condition as a fiction with no “proper” meaning, so too, the political can have no “proper” meaning except as a process of contestation and becoming. What is meant by fiction here? The word itself has various connotations that we have traversed in this chapter with Rousseau, ranging from the pejorative— untruth, falsehood, a lie, inauthentic—to the connotations of imagination, fantasy, fanciful, mythical, make-believe—through to the performative—made-up, improvised, fabricated, invented, created. To read the fictional in this former sense is to place it in a binary opposition with truth, in such a way that the problematic of reference is in no way disrupted. This is precisely what I want to avoid, since foundational supports are not something that is confused with fictive or narratorial accounts, but are inhabited by the fictive and narratorial at the very core. I propose, then, that we read these narratives in the second sense, which works beyond truth and lies: as acts of imagination and creation, as fundamentally performative. Two modalities of political theorizing have been suggested. But, epistemologies of the given (and foundational thought) are always-already fictive thought that effaces, negates, and forgets its contingency and its creative power in favor of its legislative and thus its authoritative power. Rousseau’s critique of the fictional state of nature of Hobbes, for example, uncovers this. A deconstructive narratology of political theory provokes an epistemic rupture with relation to the aims, status, and validity of the discourse of political theory. The aim of political theory has been to close the field of the political; to reiterate Bonnie Honig’s arguments, most political theorists [. . .] confine politics (conceptually and territorially) to the juridical, administrative, or regulative tasks of stabilizing moral and political subjects, building consensus, maintaining agreements, or consolidating communities and identities. They assume that the task of political theory is to resolve institutional questions, to get their politics right, over and done with, to free modern subjects.91
The status of such work is seemingly epistemologically secured; and the validity is dependent upon this security. Yet, these terms rely upon a whole series of hierarchical oppositions that are dependent on assumptions of reference, particularly, of an ontologically given opposition between fiction and reality, which deconstructive practices and utopian temporalities disrupt. As we see in chapter four, Nietzsche gently chides that we are always-already fictionalizing creatures; and thus that epistemologies of the “given” are creative epistemologies that have forgotten or negated their creativity, or, put otherwise, have become reified. Nietzsche’s recognition was
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that we are always-already fictionalizing creatures (though often—most often—we have mistaken “our” fictions for truths). Rousseau provokes us to recognize such reifications as politically repressive and constraining. By entering a space of imagination and speculation to inaugurate the real, Rousseau does indeed “force freedom.”92 And yet, dominant approaches to Rousseau have tended to elide or negate critical tensions and openings via programmatic modes of thought that aim to code and contain. Rousseau’s fictive thought, however, is transformative: freeing politics from epistemologies that are tied by forms of representational and referential fixity to the given. Rousseau’s investigation into natural humanity paradoxically, radically, frees us from “given” constraints on fictive/future possibilities. The fable of humanity remains to be invented: and the language that political theory can and should use is a fictive language. Utopian and post-referential, this language, as Gilles Deleuze suggests, supports thinking in its most valuable function: “not to direct or methodically apply a thought which pre-exists in principle and in nature,” but to “create,” to “bring into being that which does not yet exist.”93 Before we can continue with this task, however, we must encounter the guardian of modernity and of reason, and thus the keeper of the core metaphysical dichotomous boundaries we are engaged in deconstructing: those between the real and the fictional, reason and speculation, history and imagination, and—crucially—the philosophical and the fictional: could Immanuel Kant possibly be read via a fictive mode of theorizing?
Excursus: “Mere High-Flown Fantasy . . .?” (Kant on Holiday)
The true world—unattainable, indemonstrable, unpromisable; but the very thought of it— a consolation, an obligation, an imperative. (At bottom, the old sun, but seen through mist and skepticism. The idea has become elusive, pale, Nordic, Königsbergian.) Nietzsche, “How the ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fable,” in Twilight of the Idols Not magnitude, not lavishness, But form—the site; Not innovating wilfulness, But reverence for the archetype. Herman Melville, “Greek Architecture,” in The Norton Anthology of Poetry everything goes past like a river and the changing tastes and various shapes of men make the whole game uncertain and delusive. Where do I find fixed points in nature, which cannot be moved by man, and where I can indicate the markers by the shore to which he ought to adhere? hand-written by Immanuel Kant, in his Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime
The Strange Case of the Double Life of Immanuel . . . From Rousseau’s impassioned critique, and his ardent, affective, and creative fictions, I move, but without quite coming back to earth, to Immanuel Kant, abstemious, austere, literally self-denying, who, like Hobbes, I see as a further (but also potentially productive) writer of disciplinary and didactic fictions. I again pose the dual question of what modes of imagining underlie theoretical world creation, and what those imaginings make possible. In fact, opinion is sharply divided, and the innocent reader casually glancing through the books on the library shelves may find herself somewhat bewildered that, in addition to all the various dualisms that organize Kant’s texts, curiously, Kant himself seems to have left a bifurcated or dualistic legacy to modern philosophy; or rather, she may find herself unsure as to which is the real Kant, and which the doppelganger (the double or forbidding ghostly apparition . . .?). For example, Nietzsche sinisterly (or perhaps impishly, but most likely both) writes that Kant’s
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“categorical imperative gives off a whiff of cruelty,” and for Theodor Adorno, Kant is “repressive.”1 And yet, in an altogether different tenor and key, Ernst Bloch claims for Kant’s categorical imperative the attempt to think “a Humanum which is so little merely abstractly general and so clearly also anticipatorily general that it is not accommodated with its human landscape in any class society.” For Bloch, the categorical imperative contains a utopian forward impulse toward solidarity and away from violence, so that it “seems almost like an anticipatory formula directed toward a nonantagonistic society, that is, to a classless one, in which real generality of moral legislation is possible for the very first time.”2 More simply, in accord with Bloch, Jane Bennett writes, “one of the most enchanting claims of modern ethics comes from Kantian lips.”3 Is it possible to decide which is the true Kant? For Walter Benjamin proposes, “it is of the greatest importance for the philosophy of the future to recognize and sort out which elements of the Kantian philosophy should be adopted and cultivated, and which should be reworked, and which should be rejected.”4 In the space of this excursus, I shall do no more than suggest that the strange case of the double life of Kant is entwined with the structuring oppositions within Kant’s work: the supersensible world of the noumenal is privileged over the sensible phenomenal world; reason is privileged over both feeling and body; the moral is privileged over and above the empirical and merely contingent. I further explore, however, whether this hierarchical, dualistic organization of the world of the senses and the worlds of cognition and morality can itself be grounded, is foundational for Kant, or whether, in fact, the hierarchical reason/affect, moral/empirical that negates the body and all that is merely contingent is somehow inaugural, creative, or productive of a certain kind of (ascetic) subjectivity. If the latter, then, again, this ascetic mode of imagining can be interrupted: and working through the “whiff of cruelty” could then open up the possibility of new or refigured conceptual spaces. Ian Hunter has recently suggested that “to approach philosophy as a way of working on the self means to begin not with the experience it clarifies and the subject it discovers, but with the acts of selftransformation it requires, and the subjectivity it seeks to fashion”: this precisely points, not to the veracity of the representation of the self to the self, but with the productive and yet disciplinary, creative yet didactic fictive moment at work in Kant.5 It is this I seek to unearth and rework. In this excursus, I wish to explore liminal moments in Kant’s work. Liminal, first, because the texts I choose to explore are off the recognizable track of Kant’s major works, such as the Critiques, particularly of pure and practical reason, which deal with epistemology and ethics respectively. I also wish to explore ethics and epistemology; but even when Kant tells us he is on holiday (as he does in the “Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History,” the first text I turn to), there are ethical and epistemological implications. The explicitly fictional narrative logics of the “Conjectures . . ,” begin to delineate the logics of the second text I turn to: Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals. This delineation can be described as liminal because reading via the (e)strange(d) perspective of the first text precipitates a disruption of the moment of universality and transcendence in the second work, a moment that Kant would otherwise insist as necessary for an ethical act. Bringing these two texts together, however, is intended as a speculative, gestural moment concerning the guiding themes of this book, more than an intervention in Kantian moral philosophy. Such an intervention
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would require a vaster engagement that I provide. This excursus, then, deals with Kant only insofar as these two texts impinge upon the argument of the book: concerning, first, the function of foundations, or the status of Kant’s theorizing; second, the effects secured via the status accorded to Kant’s narrative; and third, to continue to articulate the territory within which “fictive theories” can begin to function, beyond foundationalism, empiricism, or any accounts of the given. A brief review of what has previously been suggested in each of these areas before turning to Kant shall prove valuable. In the introduction, I was concerned to avoid reinstating a singular paradigm of “foundationalism,” accepting, instead, as a provisional definition that foundations were moments (always-already within discourse) that attempted to guarantee stability of judgment, or provide incontestable (or de-politicized) starting points for generating certain political conclusions, or grounding the acceptance of certain political principles and programmatics. I wanted, then, to simultaneously uphold this as a model, and yet also suggest it was always internally fissured; foundations work differently dependent upon function, or upon context. Indeed, my first two chapters, by drawing on the natural as a foundation (a foundation which I read as problematic) I have insisted upon this fissured moment. First, the natural was simply read differently by Hobbes and Rousseau, as essence and as origin respectively. Second, that which the natural was meant to found, to secure, and to justify along a (narrative) logic was, I suggested, impossible: Hobbes’s narrative shifts from reading, discovering, to inventing without reference to this natural, prior norm, without a grounding principle in nature. A structurally similar impossibility was manifested for Rousseau at three moments. First, the narrative logic itself, as that which would hold together nature and history, in the Discourse was ruptured, inconceivable. Second, nature as providing the structural conditions of freedom of which political society should have been a simulacrum could not be logically upheld—the Discourse was disowned by the Contract. Third, just as Hobbes’s Leviathan was shown to be created, so too, with Rousseau: the fictive, and no longer simply fictional legislator provided a tenuous, epistemologically dubious—and necessarily creative—security over this abyss, a fictive foundation that could only be futural, forward-looking. I used the term “catachrestic” to describe this suggestion that there is no meaning that is proper to nature or the political. The point, then, is that foundations (always a curious metaphor) move (as Hobbes looked inward, Rousseau looked back), are fictional or fictive. For Kant, as we shall see, the “foundational” moment, to further mix already problematic metaphors, is the moment of transcendence. Stanley Fish (a “card-carrying antifoundationalist”) writes the following: By foundationalism I mean any attempt to ground inquiry and communication in something more firm and stable than mere belief or unexamined practice. The foundationalist strategy is first to identify that ground and then so order our activities that they become anchored to it and thereby rendered objective and principled. The ground so identified [. . .] must be invariant across contexts and even cultures; it must stand apart from political, partisan, and “subjective” concerns in relation to which it must act as a constraint.6
According to such a definition, a transcendent universalism is ostensibly operative according to foundational “logics,” read in the first, unproblematic, sense, as that
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which works to secure, to justify; but this logic, as we have seen, and as I continue to demonstrate by exploring another, again very different speculative beginning, is not univocal or singular. I have further suggested the functional entwinement of two sets of discourses. First are those discourses that claim epistemological privilege (the discourse of the “natural condition,” or, in Kant’s case, the discourse of rationality, and a freely willing will). The second type of discourses are those which, while not claiming such privilege, are also sense-making narratives, and are centered structures that tend toward resolution, coherence. I suggested the latter can act as the epistemological surrogate of the former.7 Kant is exemplary in his articulation, in the two texts I have chosen to examine, in outlining this elision. Subsequently, outlining the contours of the epistemologically grounded discourse, on the one hand, and the fictional (its perceived opposite) on the other, the fictive—the term beyond the opposition—becomes demarcated.8 In this sense, this section on Kant acts as a demonstration of the logic that has gone before in previous chapters, and a link to what is to come. Choosing Kant for this demonstration, however, is by no means an innocent choice, given his pivotal position in Enlightenment thought.9 Simply reading these two short texts is an attempt to circumvent, and then perhaps rethink that over-determined and canonical history. I return, in concluding this section, to some thoughts on the status of the theoretical act; the status of the real it ostensibly grounds and guides; and the narrative logic of the construction of the political rather than its epistemological security. Addressing such questions is informed throughout this book by the deconstructive narratology I present. “Conjectures . . .” After Rousseau, the status of the natural condition can be nothing other than fiction. Kant, in his short text, “Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History,” writes a “brilliant satire”10 on the convention of state of nature narratives, self-consciously framing his narrative around the biblical story. However, the intent is just as serious as the exercise was for Hobbes and for Rousseau. Reflecting on a similar problematic to Rousseau’s, on the decadence of culture in comparison with a postulated natural innocence and inherent drive to freedom and respect active within humanity, Kant writes, The very impulses which are blamed as the causes of vice are good in themselves, fulfilling their function as abilities implanted by nature. But since these abilities are adapted to the state of nature, they are undermined by the advance of culture and themselves undermine the latter in turn, until art, when it reaches perfection, once more becomes nature—and this is the ultimate goal of man’s moral destiny.11
“Nature,” then, is both speculative beginning and moral end, the origin and telos, of Kant’s ethical thought. Kant suggests a dialectical contest between nature and culture, via our natural emergence to art-ifice that attains a transcendence and reconciliation between the forces of nature and art. Kant makes the natural condition in its temporal, or chronological phase fictional, opting for speculation and conjecture in the absence of historical records. I later argue for the stronger claim that even in the
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Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant cannot escape the fictional and narrativity, and that this structural status of the natural is mimicked in the status of the Categorical Imperative—that natural artifice that could become perfection—and in its deduction. In his “Conjectures . . .,” Kant uses as a “map” the biblical text of Genesis to structure his historical account of the emergence of man as a political creature. Kant terms this the “transition [. . .] from the guardianship of nature to the state of freedom,” and thus his concomitant concern is with rationality and autonomy: living, as Rousseau put it before Kant, in “obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves” that alone is freedom.12 (I turn, in chapter three with Max Stirner, to the problem of the ways in which if this law is given only once, it becomes dogmatic, enslaving, a fetter or a “spook.”) Delineating the move from nature to politics (and its parallels in the move from living in accordance to impulses, whims, transitory desire, to living in accordance with morality and rationality, universal imperatives) is Kant’s aim; his method, however, is curious. The chronological, developmental account given by Kant is profoundly ironic; or perhaps better, both profound, and ironic. Presented explicitly as a “conjectural history” this account nevertheless holds certain verifiable claims.13 However, there is already the possibility of a dual reading here: are these conjectures on history, on an available account and record? Or do the conjectures stand in for history, are Kant’s conjectures the only available history themselves? Again, however, Kant needs to do some explicatory groundwork, which, as with Hobbes and Rousseau, has more of an ungrounding effect. This (non)groundwork reveals that the conjectural narrative Kant is endeavoring to establish will provide a sequential account of humanity’s transition described above: “To introduce conjectures at various points in the course of a historical account in order to fill gaps in the record is surely permissible; for what comes before and after—i.e. the remote cause and the effect retrospectively—can enable us to discover the intermediate causes with reasonable certainty, thereby rendering the intervening process intelligible.”14 Kant is clear here: an imaginary narrative will efface the historically unavailable gaps in a chronological, sequential process by imagining what could have happened, and thus lend intelligibility, continuity, and coherence. Aware that this move may strike his readers as problematic—it is, after all, an elision of the imaginary with both the actual, historical account and with the moral narrative (which must of necessity remain unconfined by the limits of historicity)—Kant suggests “what it may be presumptuous to introduce in the course of a history of human actions may well be permissible with reference to the first beginning of that history, for if the beginning is a product of nature, it may well be discoverable by conjectural means.”15 Kant is here talking about human nature as much as nature as origin, which is why he can suggest that the origin can be conjectured. We have encountered this idea already: the origin is simultaneously temporally/ historically prior, as well as essential through time; and furthermore, exerts a foundational primacy. Kant’s twist in this tale is that he writes it as precisely that: a tale. The speculative, however it is read, and I shall shortly turn to this, provides a strange kind of narrative reassurance, the paradoxes of which Kant is not blind to. Indeed, he goes on to claim that “to base a historical account solely on conjectures would seem little better than drawing up a plan for a novel. Indeed, such an account could not be
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described as a conjectural history at all, but merely as a work of fiction.”16 Kant, however, is not attempting to write that novel; he intends, rather, to uphold (and yet play with, bring into contact, to uphold as in to suspend) the generic boundaries between history and fiction, nature and narrative, reason and speculation or imagination. However, in order to proceed, these generic boundaries have to be elided, and this is precisely what Kant is doing when he suggests that the “first beginning [. . .] may well be discoverable by conjectural means.”17 This gives rise to a series of linked questions. Either it is nature, or it is narrative, which provides the conditions for understanding how humanity can become rational, autonomous; or, put otherwise, the chronology of nature may itself be inhabited by the narrative imaginary, by speculation, and it is this that provides intelligibility. I shall return to this point. It is the nature of that elision and opposition— the suspension of generic boundaries that Kant here performs—that can address the two parallel sets of questions I have gestured toward: does conjecture merely fill in gaps in a historical process? Or do these conjectures stand in for, constitute, an absent history? Can we understand reason and autonomy by natural means? Or by narrative (and thus imaginary, speculative, fictional, and potentially fictive) means? These sets of linked questions begin to define the problem (but shall not be answered yet). Reading between Kant’s “Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History” and his Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals further confirms the relation between the natural, the historical, and the moral. The Groundwork, which works to assert the moral primacy of a good will in the categorical imperative, raises this reservation: There is [. . .] something so strange in this idea of the absolute worth of a mere will in the estimation of which no allowance is made for any usefulness, a suspicion must yet arise that its covert basis is perhaps mere high-flown fantasy and that we may have misunderstood the purpose of nature in assigning reason to our will as its governor.18
Although nature is antithetical to reason, Kant also reiterates the assignation of nature as the “cause” of rationality. Nevertheless, Kant also raises the suspicion that the notion of duty, a good will, the categorical imperative, may not be rationally grounded (rationally grounded via nature), but may rather be the product of “highflown fantasy.” A formulation of the categorical imperative is: “Act as if the maxim of your action were by your will to turn into a universal law of nature.” Derrida, reading Kant’s categorical imperative alongside Kafka’s fable, “Before the Law,” writes: I was concerned with the “as if ” (als ob) in the second formulation of the categorical imperative [. . .]. This “as if ” enables us to reconcile practical reason with a historical teleology and with the possibility of unlimited progress. [. . . Yet,] it almost introduces narrativity and fiction into the very core of legal thought, at the moment when the latter begins to speak and to question the moral subject. Though the authority of law seems to exclude all historicity and empirical narrativity, and this at the moment when its rationality seems alien to all fiction and imagination [. . .] it still seems a priori to shelter these parasites. [. . .] A space, then, in which it is difficult to say whether [. . .] pure practical reason contains an element of the fantastic or of narrative fiction.19
Derrida puts forward an undecidable claim here, parallel to those I have already suggested: although, then, his question is finally directed to Kafka’s fable of the law,
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it can be equally posed to Kant, before his law. The undecidable claim is whether pure practical reason is “generically” pure, or whether it does contain traces of the “fantastic,” or of “narrative fiction.” By following the first clue given by Kant, that nature assigned reason as our governor, structures of narrative and imagination can be shown to inhabit the rational from the first, the “Conjectural Beginning.” Although reason is necessary to achieve morality, the emergence of reason is ambiguous: as Kant puts it, “the history of nature begins with goodness, for it is the work of God; but the history of freedom begins with evil, for it is the work of man.”20 It is also the work of nature. The first man, like Rousseau’s, “must have been guided solely by instinct, that voice of God which all animals obey,” and inhabited a prerational, undifferentiated, sensual world of nature.21 Contrary to Rousseau, however, Kant’s first “couple”22 can already talk and think. In an odd move, Kant assumes that language, although not innate, has already been acquired: “for I merely wish to consider the development of human behaviour from the ethical point of view, and this necessarily presupposes the skills in question already present.”23 This move seems to rather beg the question: given that the intelligibility of rationality is itself at stake, to presuppose meanings already articulated and articulable seems “metaleptic.” However, rationality emerges in four stages in Kant’s account, the first relating to food: “reason soon made its presence felt and sought to extend his knowledge of foodstuffs beyond the bounds of instinct.”24 Instinct guided humanity toward naturally good sustenance; reason disrupts the continuity of nature and instinct, but does not do so alone. There is a concomitant first mention of the imagination: “it is a peculiarity of reason that it is able, with the help of the imagination, to invent desires which not only lack any corresponding natural impulse, but which are even at variance with the latter.”25 This development is itself double-edged, ambiguous, but Kant does not distinguish between the capacities of reason and imagination in the creation of “unnatural inclinations [and] lasciviousness”: “the outcome of that first experiment whereby man became conscious of his reason as a faculty which can extend beyond the limits to which all animals are confined was of great importance, and it influenced his way of life decisively.”26 Important to note is that both reason and imagination are “unnatural.” Via imagination, or at least concomitant with imagination, reason invents the human animal. I return to this with Nietzsche, who radicalizes and also undermines Kant’s account by suggesting that, yes, we are the clever animals who invent the fable of knowledge—but only within fables.27 For Kant, however, the disruptive affects of reason/imagination means that a “momentary gratification [. . .] was inevitably followed by anxiety and fear [. . .] given that he did not yet know the hidden properties or remote effects of anything.”28 Indeed, as “an infinite range of objects now opened up,” the task of reason and imagination is to create a bounded and rational ontology, to provide reassurance (just as Hobbes’s introspection was intended to, but did not textually maintain, such security): man “stood, as it were, on the edge of an abyss”; an abyss invented by the combination of reason and imagination.29 This differentiation from animal nature (Kant terms it superiority, a designation which has turned out problematic to say the least) is continued in his second stage, where rationality and imagination again combine to control and enhance sexual instinct: “Man soon discovered that the sexual stimulus, which in the case of animals
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is based merely on a transient and largely periodic urge, could in his case be prolonged and even increased by means of the imagination.”30 Imagination, when used in this way, “already displays a consciousness of some rational control over the impulses, and not just an ability, as in the first stage of rationality, to obey the impulses to a greater or lesser extent.”31 Interestingly, imagination used in this way, provides control, and with it, discipline: “refusal,” a “sense of decency,” and “concealment” are all invoked by the rational Kantian imagination, as figures of reassurance against the abyssal bodily lust, constraining a random and capricious sexual appetite by the invention of love.32 As with other appetites, as soon as a new world is opened, reason and imagination conjointly work to secure, to close it again. For Kant, the primacy of the body, its hungers, desires, and lusts can only be a “primitive” stage for humanity; the controlling and shaping forces of the moralizing and imaginatively rational tale of love “justifies” the desirous body. This pattern is continued in the third stage of rationality, which emerges as the dual problematic of anticipation of the future and anticipation of death: the annihilation of the self. With the opened vistas of reason/imagination, already the structure of temporality, and its disciplining, has been touched upon. Kant writes that this is “the most inexhaustible source of cares,” that “both [men and women] foresaw with apprehension [. . .] the fate which must befall all animals but which causes them no concern, namely, death; and they seemed to reproach themselves for, and regard as a crime, that use of reason which had brought these ills upon them.”33 This time, it is reason that provides the guilt and discipline, while imagination provides a tentative sense of continuity and reassurance: “perhaps the only comfort and reassurance they had was the prospect of living through their off-spring.”34 This tentative reassurance provided by imagination is disrupted in a footnote, which emphasizes the discontinuity in progress: for just when the most fortunate of thinkers is on the verge of the greatest discoveries which his skill and experience entitle him to expect, old age intervenes; he loses his acuteness, and must leave it to the next generation (which starts once more from ABC and must again traverse the entire distance which had already been covered) to take a further step in the progress of culture.
This is, of course, central to the Kantian theory of progress that asserts that while progress is possible for the species as a whole, it is not possible for the individual.35 The larger point, though, is that it is not by reason alone that such progress can be made known, and that the imaginative, or speculative is crucial in such a narration. The fourth step is the realization that man is the “true end of nature.”36 End as telos; end as death: the nature that, by its very recalcitrance, provoked humanity to rationality, is finally dominated by that humanity. Bennett comments, a “key point at least with regard to noting the wonders of Kantian philosophy, is not only that we are ‘right’ to treat nature as purposive, we must do so. Reason demands it, and reason has what seems to me to be the magical power to get what it demands.”37 As a result of the intrusion of reason and imagination into the Edenic temporal immediacy, humanity is provoked to a progress “toward perfection”: this progress is, however, discontinuous, inhabited by figures of fear, anxiety, the abyss that reason and imagination both create and negotiate.
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I have deferred thus far dealing with central questions posed earlier: whether nature or narrative provides the conditions for understanding how humanity can become rational, autonomous; I shall now suggest that the chronology of nature is indeed inhabited by the narrative imaginary, by speculation, and it is this that provides intelligibility. Related questions concerned the nature of the elision and opposition—the suspension of generic boundaries—that Kant performs: does conjecture merely fill in gaps in a historical process? or do these conjectures stand in for, constitute, an absent history? Can we understand reason and autonomy by natural means? or by narrative (and thus imaginary, speculative, fictional, and potentially fictive) means? What is the relation between nature and narration, speculative imagining and reason in this account? Bonnie Honig, noting that progress is discontinuous, “not smoothly evolutionary,” suggests that it is, “like the subject matter of Kant’s fable of beginnings, a series of discrete events separated by gaps. But man’s future, like his past, can be turned into a continuous and univocal narrative by way of the very mechanisms that enable Kant to write his speculative history.” That is, it is conjecture, or speculation, “imagination in the company of reason,” which “produces an ordered, continuous—hence a therapeutic narrative—of a past that makes sense of and gives purpose to a deeply alienating and aporetic condition.”38 Reason and imagination are those sense-making mechanisms. Speculation, reason, and imagination together both create humanity as humanity; and also create the means by which Kant can write this tale. Is it possible that reason and imagination are different names for the capacity in humans to look beyond the given? Nevertheless, it is by all these means that the promise of moral perfection—that would be the end of the narrative, in a dual sense (telos, and no more narrative)— is given by Kant. Reason and imagination together create the conditions for the Kantian moral narrative, each simultaneously disruptive, but each promising the means to complete the narrative, reach the perfection that Kant sees as, “the ultimate goal of man’s moral destiny.” So, the means by which morality can be understood are by no means unproblematically natural: perhaps it is only by writing the kind of fiction that Kant has written here that a rational purposiveness can be generated. It is, in effect, narrative, and not nature that provides intelligibility; or, nature only constitutes itself as the origin of rationality insofar as it is made intelligible by the narrative imaginary that rationality begins to both constitute and then to read in nature. Humanity’s moral history, and possible moral future, then, is constituted on this basis: reason itself is inhabited by an imaginative and narrative component, and the genres—of an originary nature, and an uncontaminated rationality—will not remain pure. The further question of whether there is or can be a (meaningful or significant) ontological distinction between nature and narrative in philosophical (epistemological) contexts remains to be explored via Stirner and Nietzsche. This reading of Kant’s “Conjectures . . .” recontextualizes the comments made by Derrida, earlier, by situating narrativity and speculation at the center of Kant’s moral political theory: precisely where Kant does not want them to be. For, as we have discerned in Kant’s “Conjectures . . .,” reason is not merely disciplinary, but has its creative, magical, imaginative moments: can such moments also be unearthed in Kant’s deduction of the Categorical Imperative in his Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals? And, again, to what effect?
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Action Without Self or Words? Kant’s Categorical Imperative I have written that the structural status of a fictional natural condition is mimicked in the deduction of the categorical imperative: that is, for the categorical imperative to be made intelligible (even in its unintelligibility, as we shall later see), it will need to be inhabited by a narrative imaginary. In this section, I shall outline the problematic to which the categorical imperative is a response, and suggest that reading Kant’s deduction is also to (re)write the categorical imperative as a fantastic invention. My concluding remarks concern, then, the generic relationship and distinction—troubled, suspended— between Kant’s fictions and his philosophy as exemplified in the two texts I have chosen; and the implications of these textual moments for fictive theories.39 Kant opens the Groundwork with a division of philosophical labors: philosophy is constituted by three sciences, physics, ethics, and logic. The philosophy of ethics has two parts: if based “on the grounds of experience [it] can be called practical; but insofar as it sets forth its teachings simply from a priori principles, it can be called pure philosophy.”40 This is a crucial moment for Kant: he explains, “physics will therefore have its empirical part but it will also have a rational part; so too will ethics, though here the empirical part might be given the name practical anthropology, while the rational part might properly be called morals.”41 So, the task for the metaphysics of morals is, “to work out for once a pure moral philosophy, completely cleansed of everything that may only be empirical and that belongs to anthropology.”42 However, Kant’s metaphors are suggestive of the problems encountered in his attempt to write the metaphysics of morals: we see philosophy put in fact in a precarious position, which is to be firm even though there is nothing from heaven or on earth from which it depends or on which it is based. Here philosophy must manifest its purity as sustainer of its own laws, not as herald of laws that an implanted sense or who knows what tutelary nature whispers to it, all of which—though they may always be better than nothing at all—can still never yield basic principles that reason dictates and that must have their source entirely and completely a priori and, at the same time, must have their commanding authority from this: that they expect nothing from the inclination of human beings but everything from the supremacy of the law and the respect owed it or, failing this, condemn the human being to contempt for himself and inner abhorrence.43
The metaphysics of morals must be firm, even though as ethereal as an angel; must be commanding, even though, as we shall see, it is without voice. This is a complete statement of Kant’s aims. The metaphysics of morals is the “deduction” of the law that commands respect purely for its own sake, detached from self-interest, pleasure, or any other motive that could be attached to the self, its needs and desires (this is the pure “good will”). To follow its dictates is what Kant calls “duty,” which again is purged from all hint of “anthropology,” inclination, or the merely human; thus the concept of duty cannot be derived from our experiences of responding to the moral law. Further, this law must be entirely rational, grounded in and governed by the processes of reason. And, for Kant, this “precarious position” of philosophy constitutes its necessary ground: “the present groundwork is [. . .] nothing more than the search for an establishment of the supreme principle of morality”; and again, the “doctrine of morals is grounded on metaphysics.”44 Kant’s framing of the problem of the ultimate
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principles of morality within metaphysics is such that all empiricity and contingency is expressly excluded; even such contingency as humans themselves are.45 In this work, Kant is clearly no longer on holiday. And yet, the search for the categorical imperative seems to partake of a different genre; perhaps that of the detective story: “a metaphysics of morals is indispensably necessary [. . .] because morals themselves remain subject to all sorts of corruption as long as we are without that clue and supreme norm by which to appraise them correctly.”46 We encounter the idea of philosophy as a detective trail in Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s philosophical detective trail is epitomized as, “to read well, that is to say, to read slowly, deeply, looking cautiously before and aft, with reservations, with doors left open, with delicate eyes and fingers. . . .”47 Nietzsche’s method is to shadow in order to expose the philosophical solution presented by Kant (see chapter four). The Groundwork, however, is undeniably compelling: it is a densely plotted philosophical adventure. Tracing and following Kant’s search for this clue, however, gives rise to a very different type of venturing from that in “Conjectures . . .,” however analogous, ultimately, the means to get there is. The structure of the Groundwork is telling: Kant moves progressively further from the world of experience, narrating what the good will and duty are like as subjective motivations, through to the “critique of pure practical reason,” the metaphysical deduction of the categorical imperative in all its philosophical complexity.48 It is worthwhile extrapolating the problems Kant raises in the first section, as he goes on to resolve these in the second and third. First, however, a word is necessary on the world in which, for Kant, humanity lives. As already encountered in Kant’s “Conjectures . . .,” we live in a purposeful world: nature purposively awoke reason; reason is purpose in itself, and as reason is the highest end of humanity, we too are rational and purposive creatures. (Nietzsche will later characterize those who live in this world, full of a wholly imagined hidden design, as living in the “shadows” of the dead god: “God is dead [. . .] and we—we still have to vanquish his shadows too.”49 Max Stirner, who I turn to next, would most likely have agreed, as we shall see.) The principle of purposiveness (or shadow of the dead god) is articulated by Kant thus: “in the natural constitution of an organized being, that is, one constituted purposively for life, we assume as a principle that there will be found in it no instrument for some other end than what is also most appropriate to that end and best adapted to it.”50 (This intuitively strikes me as a crazy assumption!) The assumption of purposiveness has direct implications throughout Kant’s text; and thus, the Stirnerian, Nietzschean, or indeed, Derridean, critique of thinking of this kind, by reading through, questioning, or dissolving the foundations on which it is based, has direct substantive implications for the whole system it supports. The implications of “Conjectures . . .” regarding the emergence of reason as expanding human vistas and thus leading to a greater insecurity, to fear, to multiplied and thus potentially unsatisfiable and thwarted desires for humanity are reiterated by Kant here. His point is that if reason is our uniquely rational—not merely human— instrument given by nature, then we cannot have as an end simply self-preservation, or welfare, or happiness.51 In order to purge the human (and all too human) from the concepts of a good will, duty, reason, and morality, Kant insists that the moral law calls equally to all rational beings, not just humans (metaphysics meets science fiction!).
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In order to avoid morality being merely “practical anthropology,” angels and aliens populate Kant’s text, “pure intelligences, only some of which are human”; and indeed, Ian Hunter proposes that we see the categorical imperative as the “performative personification of this purified intelligence.”52 I return to this fascinating proposition. The assumption of a naturally distributed purposiveness in the world, combined with the priority of reason, leads Kant to the following review and conclusion: Since reason is not sufficiently competent to guide the will surely with regard to its objects and the satisfaction of all our needs (which it to some extent even multiplies)— an end to which an implanted natural instinct would have led much more certainly; and since reason is nonetheless given to us as a practical faculty, that is, as one which is to influence the will; then, where nature has everywhere else gone to work purposively in distributing its capacities, the true vocation of reason must be to produce a will that is good, not perhaps as a means to other purposes, but good in itself, for which reason was absolutely necessary.53
The assumption of purposiveness itself leads Kant to deduce why reason exists. From this, Kant extrapolates the concept of duty in responding to the call of the moral law. In the first section of his deduction he begins to define duty for “common” purposes, as the moral worth of a good will. I shall move quickly through this territory, selecting just one telling example. Acting from genuine moral worth is difficult: indeed, in contrast to the incredible detective and deductive skill of the rest of the Groundwork, there is something almost miserly and certainly joyless—indeed, ascetic—in Kant’s description. For example, Kant imagines, in a typically eighteenth-century example, a philanthropist: Suppose [. . .] that the mind of this philanthropist were overclouded by his own grief, which extinguished all sympathy with the fate of others, and that while he still had the means to benefit others in distress their troubles did not move him because he had enough to do with his own; and suppose that now, when no longer incited to it by any inclination, he nevertheless tears himself out of this deadly insensibility and does the action without any inclination, simply from duty; then the action first has its genuine moral worth.54
The purity of the motive (the “maxim,” or “subjective principle of volition”) is crucial; and further, it does not matter if the philanthropist even benefits anyone, for moral worth, to summarize, lies solely in “the principle of the will without regard for the ends.”55 Therein however, lies Kant’s first problem: one can live “in conformity with duty” without necessarily living “from duty.”56 This is important because Kant suggests that his examples of actions done from respect for the moral law, rather than other, nonmoral motives, will “bring out [the concept of a good will] by contrast, and make it shine more brightly.”57 Instead, however, the territory becomes that of the difficulty of recognizing a good will, and when an action is done out of duty—or just looks that way. The moral proposition that “duty is the necessity of an action from respect for law” is, at this stage, tenuous, unreadable.58 Kant deals with this problem in section two, “transition from popular moral philosophy to metaphysics of morals.” Nevertheless, attempting to purge the (empirical, anthropological, desiring) self from the concept of duty is troublesome: “if we look more closely at the intentions and
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aspirations in [our actions] we everywhere come upon the dear self, which is always turning up; and it is on this that their purpose is based, not on the strict command of duty, which would often require self-denial.”59 This gives rise to a strange stratification and disciplining of the self, where duty and reason have a volition apart from the self, and push in one direction toward the all-encompassing moral law, which again constrains in another direction.60 Put otherwise, the “dear self ” is trained to perform in a certain way: recalling Hunter’s suggestion, the self learns how to imagine its actions differently. Again, the centrality of the modes of imaginings that underlie theorizing is critical: what is imagined, and how is it imagined? Reason, on this account, is an affective will-to-power; and as Nietzsche knows, asceticism is also creative of subjectivities. Duty must work beyond the boundaries of the self, and this thus requires governance of that self by reason. Kant thus proposes two formulae for acting morally, for understanding the categorical imperative. These are: “Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.” And the universal imperative of duty: “act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature.”61 J. Hillis Miller refers to these moments as “radically inaugural,” by which he simultaneously suggests foundationalism and creativity.62 I shall return to this suggestion. Miller also points to a further troublesome moment for Kant, where he tries to define the feeling of “respect” before the law: Kant insists that it is a feeling “self-wrought” by recognition of the rationality of the law, but Miller points to the connotations of the sensible world of inclination and desire behind that feeling. As with the difficulties in separating reason from imagination, this time, it is the moment of “respect” that “eludes both poles of the binary opposition reason/feeling that inaugurates Western metaphysics.”63 This is a complex moment, worth pausing over. Kant writes that, “The mere concept of a categorical imperative [. . .] also provides its formula containing the proposition which alone can be a categorical imperative.”64 A categorical imperative contains an “ought” that nevertheless is no compulsion, and is not felt ascetically, Kant argues, since it is self-willed. I have already referred, via Derrida, to the “as if ” formulation of the second expression of the categorical imperative. This would seem to depend upon the possibility of narrating the law to oneself, and defining one’s actions in accordance with its imperatives. However, Kant wants to deny this possibility of simply narrating the law: For, since the imperative contains, beyond the law, only the necessity that the maxim be in conformity with this law, while the law contains no condition to which it would be limited, nothing is left with which the maxim of action is to conform but the universality of the law as such; and this conformity alone is what the imperative properly represents as necessary.65
To conform to the categorical imperative is to conform to universality as such (in chapter three, I explore Max Stirner, who refers to this attempt to realize the infinite or the universal “non-sense” within a sensual, finite being as unbearable, intolerable, and violent). Conformity to universality rules out the possibility of narration, telling ethical tales; this would be particularity (purely practical). Further, Kant raises the following issue: “if all imperatives of duty can be derived from [the categorical imperative] then,
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even though we leave it undecided whether what is called duty is not as such an empty concept, we shall at least be able to show what we think by it and what the concept wants to say”: what the concept would say if it could speak.66 Rather, as we saw earlier, it can only circumscribe its universality as empty and unfillable, and yet powerfully compelling and constraining for Kantian subjects. The categorical imperative simultaneously writes and erases the law: it is itself the reaching out to construct the universal through the very moment of thinking it, which is also the very moment of realization that it cannot be thought except formally: a strange thought indeed. The logic of the “practical rules,” then, in comparison with the moral law, can be described thus: “In whose comparison all whites are ink/ Writing their own reproach”: the narration, the moment of writing, is the reproach, the point where the moral law degrades itself to the status of a practical rule.67 The difference between the reading Kant intended, and this reading, then, is that I do not presuppose a purposive design—a universal law that can be reached via the categorical imperative—is already existent. Could such a purposive design be thought of as to be created, however obscure that moment of reaching for the universal is described by Kant? For, the narrative moment does not work except to erase its own particularity—it is an impossible way of writing or narrating. I shall suggest, following Kant’s further problematization of the categorical imperative, that the narrative moment is nevertheless necessary; but in an “inaugural” rather than simply representative way; and thus it is epistemologically creative rather than grounded. To say that the moment of grounding the categorical imperative is “inaugural” is to see that moment as founding; but founding in a very different sense. Gibson writes, “the concept of ‘inauguration’ is radically opposed to any thought of the work as reflection. [. . . I]t resists all thought of the work in terms of either ‘empirical origin’ or ‘essential province.’ ”68 Drawn from narratology, this term thus denotes, instead of representation, creativity; perhaps even the new. The movement away from empiricity is also important, and I shall return to this in my concluding comments. Derrida writes of this moment: “it takes place properly and only in the work”; this would mean, as I have already suggested, that the categorical imperative is thinking the thought itself, attempting to create through that thought the moment of universality—not seeing that moment as already “out there”—within which it would make sense. (This is precisely to suggest that if the categorical imperative is a powerful form of imagining—could it be imagined differently?) This is not, then, end of the story; for Kant, always critical and questioning within his own text, asks: “is it a necessary law for all rational beings always to appraise their actions with such maxims as they themselves could will to serve as universal laws? If there is such a connection, then it must already be connected (completely a priori) with the concept of the will of a rational being as such. . . .”69 In order to answer the question of proving that the categorical imperative is binding, Kant introduces the concepts of autonomy and heteronomy. Given his initial postulate of purposiveness, humanity, insofar as we are rational, and all rational beings, are defined as “ends in themselves,” and only in this way can we be a “ground of determinate laws.”70 In suggesting “the will of every rational being as a will giving universal law,” Kant radicalizes Rousseau’s idea that, “obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves” alone is freedom.71 “Autonomy” is thus defined by Kant as the property of giving the law to
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oneself apart from heteronomous causes, such as natural necessity, inclination, desires, or any other cause in which the “dear self ” has an interest: “in it and it alone would lie the ground of a possible categorical imperative, that is, of a practical law.”72 Again, we have the very construction of the universal from will and from reason, both of which are given an agency beyond the human self and its language (the universal, we recall, cannot speak, and indeed, must erase its words if it so limits itself ). To return to Kant’s plot, however: having discerned the relationship between autonomy, rationality, and morality, Kant closes his second section. The third section, “Transition from metaphysics of morals to the Critique of Pure Practical Reason,” opens with that very relationship. Having postulated that we must obey the law because in doing so we obey our rational freedom, and act in accordance with a universal law giving good will, Kant suggests his plot may be circular, and thus, “we cannot yet see how [a categorical imperative] is possible, and hence on what grounds the moral law is binding”: It must be freely admitted that a kind of circle comes to light from here from which, as it seems, there is no escape. We take ourselves as free in the order of efficient causes in order to think ourselves under moral laws in the order of ends; and afterwards, we think ourselves as subject to these laws because we have ascribed to ourselves freedom of will: for, freedom and the will’s own law-giving are both autonomy and hence reciprocal concepts, and for this very reason one cannot be used to explain the other or to furnish a ground for it . . .73
How to escape this circularity? How to bind free subjects to a moral law that they both construct and obey? Kant’s answer, as is well known, is the rupture of the world into two, the production of another world in which freedom makes sense. In this act of rupture, Kant severs the world of experience from the world of rationality, or, the world of sense (subject to the laws of nature and heteronomy) from the world of understanding (the intelligible world, governed by rational laws wherein autonomy can be understood). It is in the latter where the ideas of freedom and rationality belong, aporetically separate from the “determining causes of the world of sense”: Even with the most strenuous attentiveness and distinctness that the understanding can ever bring [. . .] we can achieve only cognition of appearances, never of things in themselves. As soon as this distinction has once been made (perhaps merely by means of the difference noticed between representations given us from somewhere else and in which we are passive, and those which we produce simply from ourselves, and in which we show our activity) then it follows of itself that we must admit and assume behind appearances something else which is not appearance, namely things in themselves, although since we can never become acquainted with them but only with how they affect us, we resign ourselves to being unable to come any closer to them, or even to know what they are in themselves [. . . Man] must count himself as belonging to the intellectual world, of which however he has no further cognizance.74
This is a phenomenal (or rather—“noumenal”) passage: freedom, morality, universality are precisely beyond knowledge, the foundation is that which we have no “further cognizance of.” (Which is not to say it does not have effects!) Further, the production of this world comes entirely from self-activity that creates, imagines, and produces the
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realm in which such ideas can make sense. As Kant calls it, “pure self-activity”—but governed by something that precisely is not and cannot be knowledge. For Kant, however, this aporetic rupture of the world provides the solution to the whole problematic of a freely willing good will being bound to the universal law via the categorical imperative: The suspicion that we raised above is now removed, the suspicion that a hidden circle was contained in our inference from freedom to autonomy and from the latter to the moral law—namely that we perhaps took as a ground the idea of freedom only for the sake of the moral law, so that we could afterwards infer the latter in turn from freedom, and that we were thus unable to furnish any ground at all for the moral law but could put it forward only as a petitio principii well disposed souls would gladly grant us, but never as a demonstrable proposition. For now we see that when we think of ourselves as free we transfer ourselves into the world of understanding as members of it and cognize autonomy of the will along with its consequence, morality.75
Kant has transported us from one world to another in order to understand without comprehending our freedom within law. The dear self lives only in the world of appearances; the rational self alone lives in the true world. I suggested earlier, with Hillis Miller, that this movement was “radically inaugural,” not representative; and epistemologically creative rather than grounded: Kant’s very language here suggests that he recognizes this. He writes, “in the case of the categorical imperative or law of morality the ground of the difficulty (of insight into its possibility) is [. . .] very great. It is an a priori synthetic proposition,” meaning that it is pure, necessary, and universal, without demonstration; but it is also radical otherness.76 From where does the voice of reason speak: “from man, from the perfected voice of his own reason, or [. . .] from an other, whose essence is unknown to us . . .”?77 Reason, Kant writes: restlessly seeks the unconditionally necessary and sees itself constrained to assume it without any means of making it comprehensible to itself [. . .] It is therefore no censure of our deduction of the supreme principle of morality, but a reproach that must be brought against human reason in general. Thus we do not indeed comprehend the practical unconditioned necessity of the moral imperative, but we nevertheless comprehend its incomprehensibility.78
This ending is indeed aporetic: in the words of Beardsworth, “the aporia of the law emerges from the impossibility of finding, or inventing the origin of law. The origin of law is an ‘impossible’ invention, and the condition of all inventions of law.”79 The origin of the law, on this account, can only be the impure but productive activity of the very selves Kant wished to deny. * * * I suggested in opening this excursus that the explicitly fictional logics of “Conjectures . . .” provided an e(strange)d perspective by which an other logic of Groundwork could be read. This is why I called this a liminal reading. By way of concluding this section on speculative natural beginnings, and opening on to the next,
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comprising Max Stirner and Friedrich Nietzsche’s questioning of any manifestation of foundationalism, I shall address the larger thematic questions within which this reading of Kant found its relevance. Focusing on the function of foundations and the function of narrative within political theory led to a set of three questions. These concerned the status of the theoretical act; the status of the real that it (should?) ground and guide; and the narrative logic of the construction of the political as opposed to its epistemological security. Further, the logic of narrative is itself a problematic question. The specific manifestation of these questions concerning Kant related to the performance of a generic suspension of the boundaries between nature and narrative in “Conjectures . . . .” In order to write the emergence of humanity from nature to reason, Kant used both reason and imagination, just as, for the first couple in his fable, both reason and imagination operated to provoke awareness of the uniquely human condition. In that context, I argued that the chronology of nature was itself inhabited by a narrative imaginary that provided its intelligibility. This reading, however, provoked awareness of Kant’s desire to maintain the purity of generic boundaries—such as between nature and narrative, between history and conjecture—and also, crucially for Groundwork, between philosophical rationality, and thus morality, and an imaginative narrative. What I would like to suggest in concluding, and in drawing more clearly the liminal moment, the analogy between the method of “Conjectures . . .” and of Groundwork, is that for Kant, this philosophic rationality had to be itself inhabited by an imaginative narrative of a special type. Put simply, I have so far worked toward suggesting that Kant the deductive detective is also Kant on holiday: is the Kant who works to create and transport humanity, or rather, rationality, to a very different space. Does this mean that the categorical imperative is “mere high-flown fantasy”? Yes; but also no. I shall return to Derrida to explain this. Derrida wrote, “though the authority of the law seems to exclude all historicity and empirical narrativity, and this at the moment when its rationality seems alien to all fiction and imagination [. . .] it still seems a priori to shelter these parasites.” Derrida then posed the following question to Kafka; I want to pose it to Kant: does his work “propose [. . .] a powerful philosophical ellipsis” or, does “pure practical reason contain [. . .] an element of the fantastic, or of narrative fiction”?80 Answering this suggests why Kant’s deduction both is and is not mere high-flown fantasy. The idea of the categorical imperative as inaugural resists both fiction and philosophy. It resists fiction, because, while creative, its space must remain uninscribed; any narrative account unduly limits and thus negates its universality. This imaginative narrative does not merely allow us to represent our actions to ourselves as moral, but also produces the kinds of subjects who could think that thought. ( Just as Kant’s “Conjectures . . .” used the very mechanisms to write a coherent narrative that the first couple used to explain and understand their alienation from nature.) However, it also resists philosophy, since in order to be thought in the first place, an attempt at narrating must be made. The moment of thinking the categorical imperative, then, as the moment of reaching out to construct and create the universal, can only be fictive: it must not rely on knowledge; it must not rely on empiricity or historicity. I shall suggest in later chapters that this space is itself stratified, and can be called utopian.
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High-flown fantasy, indeed—but given the epistemologically complex nature of the space thus created, not merely so. A very different kind of space—not bound to the real, and not already written by idealism—can be thought from this point onward. Just as Derrida has argued that the moment of undecidability (that attests to both alterity within the present and the temporal movement toward an unknown, radical futurity) precludes the political from being reduced to programmatic calculations, Kant too effectively negates the given as foreclosing possibility through the codification of a program. As Jane Bennett writes, this is perhaps what should be saved from Kant: I am ambivalent about the “over” or “above and beyond” connotations of meta, as in a Kantian metaphysics of the supersensible. Etymology does seem to warrant the thesis that meta can also mean “that which bridges” [. . .]. There is, however, also a bit of Kant’s meta that I wish to retain. I like its utopian gesture, aura, or scent, that is, its willingness to venture above and beyond, onto the plain of virtual things and not-yet-realized possibilities.81
I like Hobbes’s privileging of the bodily, the somatic, even as I like Kant’s opening up of alter-spaces within the present, spaces of alterity that rupture the self-presence of the present. What I want to reject, through a critical excavation of the constitutive fictivity, and hence contingency, is their effects, and the binaries they then work within to circumscribe their fictions: Kant’s rejection of the bodily and sensual, Hobbes’s rejection of the cyphers of possibility in the present, and more so for the future. A utopian subjectivity is necessarily fictive, alert to radical alterity, grounded in her bodily possibilities, even as that soma is itself part of the possible. I propose, however, that new possibilities can be inscribed in those imaginative spaces. If Hobbes attempts to write once and once only the “tablets” of political theory; if Rousseau uncovers layers and layers of bad fictionalizing on those very tablets; Kant blanks them out with a white ink too pure for the merely human. Nevertheless, Kant, following Rousseau, laid “all facts aside” and created a space that can be described, at the moment, as neither material nor utopian. With Bloch, in this space we shall see that “no absolute objections to utopia can be raised by merely factual analysis.”82 Tracing the possibilities of a utopian fictive further, in the next section, drawing on the work of Max Stirner, Karl Marx, and then extensively, Friedrich Nietzsche, I argue that even the “real” cannot give rise to its own literal story.
Part II Fictions of Self-Evidence
One need not be a Chamber—to be Haunted— One need not be a House— The Brain has Corridors—Surpassing— Material Place— Emily Dickinson
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Chapter Three Stirner (with Marx and Derrida): Neither Material nor Utopian?
Prisons are built with the stones of Law, Brothels with the bricks of Religion. Eternity is in love with the productions of time. William Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Plate 8, Proverbs of Hell The “true world”—an idea which is no longer good for anything, not even obligating—an idea which has become useless and superfluous—consequently, a refuted idea: let us abolish it! (Bright day; breakfast; return of bons sens and cheerfulness; Plato’s embarrassed blush; pandemonium of all free spirits.) Nietzsche, “How the ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fable,” in Twilight of the Idols
Political theory is haunted. Max Stirner is prepared to dispel and exorcise the monsters, specters, demons, ghosts, and phantasms, rational or otherwise, that stalk its pages, inhabit its subjects, and foreclose human potentiality. To read Max Stirner’s The Ego and Its Own, Marx (and Engels) reading of Stirner in The German Ideology, and Derrida’s readings of both these texts in his Specters of Marx is to explore the problematic that the attempt to read the “real” literally gives rise to. It is also to read a tale of hauntings, obsessions, accusations; a battle to reclaim the real against the illusory. Stirner, haunted by illusory forms of authority, the “superior specters” haunting brains and bodies that are simultaneously embodied yet fantastic and spectral, writes an “ego-logical” critique where, in a radically defined “real,” the sole source of authority is an inarticulable profoundly creative “I”; and Marx, through two-thirds of The German Ideology rewrites this “undisguised ghost story,” attempts to exorcise Stirner’s specters in order to reclaim the really real.1 As for Derrida . . .? At stake in this part of the book are both the possibility and the politics of a post-representational epistemology. There are nevertheless potential dangers in such a project that working through Stirner helps to illuminate. In this chapter, I argue that Stirner aims to perform, through his egological critique, a post-representational renaming of the world. His endeavor is significant and important, and the politics of “insurrection” provocative and necessary. Nevertheless, Stirner’s post-representational renaming of the world is dissociated from a transformative praxis just at the moment when the politics of
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insurrection seems to demand such a thing (which is not to say, as I shall argue, that he cannot help me figure out “strategies of resistance”).2 If I am claiming for the “fictive” a politics that is both post-representational and transformative, then Stirner is clearly important but flawed. Marx’s (admittedly obsessive) critique of Stirner suggests two reasons why. First, the ontological problem: Stirner, Marx claims, has chased so many ghosts he can now only fight “imaginary” monsters. Second, the praxis problem: while Stirner portrays actual social phenomenon as being reductively interpreted through the narrowing lens of their “spook” concepts, Marx argues that Stirner’s position effectively entails a reinterpretation of the world but does not mean changing those actual social phenomenon.3 At stake in both these points, then, is the politics of the real. For Stirner and Marx, the beginning of philosophy, its “premise” or “presupposition” (and these terms, as we shall see, are important) had to be the “real.”4 After Stirner and Marx, the final part of this chapter explores the status of the real with Derrida, pointing toward—and back—to Nietzsche, and the possibilities of utopianism with Bloch. Stirner and Marx, in spite of, and because of their closeness, seem to mark two irreconcilable positions, but these positions come from a search for a real on which to ground, guide, and sustain political action. In the cases of both Stirner and Marx, this search for the materially real is paradoxical, difficult. But, if the very domain of the political is shown to be dependent upon a particular logic of the narrative of the real, is this not one foundation that cannot be said to be contingent? Combating Phrases or Intriguing with the World? First, then, to clarify schematically and quickly a complex, multilayered word, the “real,” and to suggest what is at stake this strategy of founding, and its undoing. The real, like the natural, is invoked as a status word, conferring authority, privilege. Moving from the questions of truth that preoccupied Kant, to questions of the accuracy of representations, the real denotes a “positivist” or empiricist insistence on actuality, on the tangible, solid, concrete, the real, as we have seen with Hobbes, speaks the language of materialism.5 However, the real also connotes the language of truth, of authenticity, of genuineness. The real is the given, that-which-cannot-be-denied (and occasionally, that which evades, or is prior to the linguistic): thus, at the level of ontology, the real opposes intangibles, the immaterial, while at the level of epistemology, it opposes falsehoods, untruths, lies.6 Opposing the real, then, are idealism and utopianism—and it is this organization of reality I wish to challenge and disrupt. For the language of reality is always political language, and the real functions in political discourse as a strategy of founding. If the real acts as a “guarantee,” however, just what does it guarantee? Political theory deals with questions of knowledge: it “combats phrases.”7 Questions of existence and truth, of interpretation and meaning must lead to, invoke, initiate questions of justice. In his younger years, Marx wrote that, “there are moments when philosophy turns its eyes to the external world, and no longer apprehends it, but, as a practical person, weaves, as it were, intrigues with the world, [. . .] and throws itself on the breast of the worldly siren.”8 Political theory, then, must deal with questions of doing, of action, of actualization: with the actually material and real. This is of particular importance for emancipatory and transformative politics.
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The relation between theory and practice, on this account, is again nevertheless one in which epistemic privilege is invoked, and accounts of political action revolve around the oppositions of truth and falsity, materiality and immateriality, idealism and speculation, or the materially real. At the end of the previous section, with and against Kant, I gestured toward a fictive space that was neither material nor utopian. With Stirner, and with Marx’s critique of and response to Stirner in The German Ideology, I delineate in this chapter a little more about this space via the opposition of the material and the utopian. I am not presupposing a definition of the utopian: this would be to allow the priority of “the real” to construct and delimit utopian spaces. To anticipate: following Stirner’s paradoxical grounding of the real (his “presupposition” is self-consuming), we find in Marx a critique of any speculative, idealistic, and utopian attempts to engage with the world. The debate between scientific socialism (real, material, determined) and ethical or utopian socialism (idealistic, speculative) nevertheless relies heavily on the over-determined opposition of the material and the utopian. However, I work toward undoing this opposition; this is why I begin with Max Stirner.9 To invoke Stirner already one might say that the problem of meaning is provoked when we no longer have a system of meaning and belief that relies upon a structure of foundations and transcendence. In terms of political theory, the model I have drawn out in the introduction, and especially with Rousseau and with Kant, is simple, but not, as I read and re-wrote it, untroubled: it is the model of an epistemologically grounded political theory, the model of knowing before responsibly doing. I have suggested this model is both authoritative and legislative, and thus best understood via the trope of the legislator. A certain failure in this model can be expressed in terms of a crisis in the link between meaning and justice. For Marx, this crisis can only be resolved through a transformation of the world: as Marx’s Thesis Eleven states, “The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.”10 But what kind of knowledge makes this transformation possible? Is it representational (an accurate representation of the real) or post-representational? “An interpretation that transforms the very thing it interprets,” is Jacques Derrida’s post-representational definition of a performative interpretation, and it is clear that Marx’s Thesis Eleven demanded (and still demands) its own performance.11 The disappointment—indeed, the failure—of Thesis Eleven encompasses the dual disappointment of politics in terms of the problem of meaning and interpretation, its function in generating its own performance, generating meaningful political action and change. The problematic of both Stirner and Marx’s texts is precisely, as Derrida puts it, “the question of the idea, the question of the concept and of the concept of the concept [. . .] (nominalism, conceptualism, realism, but also rhetoric and logic, literal meaning, proper meaning, figural meaning),” the economy of the speculative and ideal (the rationally real), opposed to the economy of the materially real.12 I have already suggested that the material and the utopian map—but are not reducible— to oppositions such as the real and the fictional, the actual and the speculative (in chapter five, I read utopia in a very different way). In this critical debate, the very relation between words and the world, between knowing and doing, between meaning and justice is put on trial. Further, Derrida suggests that Marx, in his pursuit of Stirner, “pursues relentlessly someone who almost resembles him to the point that we
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could mistake one for the other: a brother, a double, thus a diabolical image. A kind of ghost himself. Whom he would like to distance, distinguish: to oppose.”13 There is implicit here a warning on my own pursuit—in order to dissolve, or make evident the fictivity of—foundations, which I have suggested, provokes a different recognition of the perceived status and task of the project and discipline of political writing, it will not do to simply oppose. Supplement This debate between Stirner and Marx is analogous with a contemporary debate whose terminology, despite the passing of almost one hundred and fifty years, deals with similar questions of the status of the real, the status of the theoretical act, and the place of the real within theory. Richard Rorty, in a typically brisk manner puts the challenge to Derrida in the following terms: Deconstruction is marginal to politics [. . .] If you want to do some political work, deconstructing texts is not a very efficient way to set about it. Getting rid of phallogocentrism, metaphysics and all that, is an admirable long-term cultural goal, but there is still a difference between such goals and the relatively short-term goals served by political deliberation and decision.14
Rorty’s challenge to the possibility of a deconstructive politics (which would be a post-representational politics) is interesting in two respects: he points to the complex relationship between words and worlds first; but second, Rorty is further concerned to sever the relationship between projects of self-creation (associated with the creation of a private language) and projects of social justice through arguing that the creation of a self is necessarily a private project, while justice is public. The mutually reinforcing sets of oppositions within this rendition of a post-representational politics are instructive: self-creation opposes justice, private opposes public, and so his endorsement of the inventive power of imaginative language is curiously apolitical in effect, precluding the power to generate new political concepts. As I explore through Stirner’s politics of insurrection, this is politically dubious to say the least. I suggest at the close of this chapter that Rorty’s project of “redescription,” while post-representational, remains that of a “critical critic” in the face of Derrida’s “spectral” Marxism. For now, it is enough to suggest that a similar movement occurs in the preface to The German Ideology. Here, Marx levels this charge to the Young Hegelians: “The Young Hegelian ideologists, in spite of their allegedly ‘world-shattering’ phrases, are the staunchest conservatives,” and in opposition to these “young conservatives,” Marx privileges “the real”: The most recent of [the Young Hegelians, namely, Feuerbach, Bauer, and Stirner] have found the correct expression for their activity when they declare they are only fighting against “phrases.” They forget, however, that they are opposing nothing but phrases to these phrases, and that they are in no way combating the real existing world when they are combating solely the phrases of this world.15
This supplements the conceptual mapping that I have been drawing out: a new level has been added, where combating phrases (deconstructing texts?) is opposed to
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“combating the real existing world.” (I have suggested, in my introduction, however, that attention to this formalist moment reconfigures the “properly political” moment, undoes or suspends the opposition that many critics would otherwise insist on—at stake is what Derrida has said does not yet exist: a “code” that is not metaphysical, and within which deconstruction and politics are not opposed.) That Derrida’s first extended engagement with Marx (and by implic