Forced Migration in Eastern Africa
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Forced Migration in Eastern Africa
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Forced Migration in Eastern Africa Democratization, Structural Adjustment, and Refugees
Cassandra R. Veney
FORCED MIGRATION IN EASTERN AFRICA
© Cassandra R. Veney, 2007. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews. First published in 2007 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN™ 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 and Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England RG21 6XS Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–1–4039–7610–9 ISBN-10: 1–4039–7610–4 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Veney, Cassandra R, 1959– Forced migration in Eastern Africa : democratization, structural adjustment, and refugees / Cassandra R. Veney. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1–4039–7610–4 (alk. paper) 1. Refugees––Africa, Eastern. 2. Refugees––Kenya. 3. Refugees––Tanzania. 4. Forced migration––Africa, Eastern. 5. Social conflict––Africa, Eastern. I. Title. HV640.4.A354V46 2006 362.87561096762––dc22
2006046362
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: January 2007 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.
Contents
List of Tables and Figures
vii
Acknowledgments
ix
List of Abbreviations
xi
Chapter 1 Chapter 2
Rethinking African Refugees and Forced Migration
1
Wars and Rumors of War: The Politics of Forced Migration for Kenya and Tanzania
19
Chapter 3
Changes in Official Refugee Policies
63
Chapter 4
Local Host Communities’ Responses to Refugees
105
The International Community and Refugees in Tanzania and Kenya
151
Chapter 6
Refugee Women in Kenya and Tanzania
189
Chapter 7
Conclusion
217
Chapter 5
Notes
225
Bibliography
237
Index
273
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List of Tables and Figures
Tables 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 2.1 2.2
Refugee Population by World Region of Origin, 1993–2002 in ’000 Refugee Population by African Regions, 1993–2002 in ’000 Top Ten African Countries of Asylum, 1993–2002 in ’000 Top Ten African Countries of Refugee Origin, 1993–2002 in ’000 Refugees into Kenya, 1992–2002 in the ’000 Refugees into Tanzania, 1992–2002 in ’000
5 6 6 7 22 40
Figures 4.1 4.2
Refugee Camps in Kenya Operational Refugee Camps in Tanzania
112 136
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Acknowledgments
Many people were instrumental in providing a variety of assistance that
allowed me to complete this book. I only wish that I could acknowledge them all individually. However, I must thank K C Morrison, Paul Wallace, and Charles Sampson for their scholarly, financial, and personal support for my field research in Kenya while I was at the University of Missouri-Columbia. I also give thanks to the several friends and colleagues who provided contacts for my interviews and housing. I could not have conducted the research in Kenya without the assistance of the representatives of the nongovernmental organizations who were so generous with their time and resources. I give special thanks to David Kamau and Dr. Barry Hopkins who arranged my visits to the refugee camps and Endita Kiarie who arranged interviews with refugees in Nairobi. I want to thank the families and individuals who found housing for me, opened their homes to me, shared many meals and evenings with me, and made sure that I experienced much that Nairobi has to offer—Joe and Lucy Muchekehu, Albert Kamau, Esther and Jeffery Kibachi, William Okwirry, and Gretchen Sanders. I thank my former dean and my former chairperson of the Department of Politics and Government at Illinois State University for the leave that allowed me to conduct research in Tanzania. I thank Eleanor Mohammed for taking care of all of my financial and personal matters while I was in Tanzania. I was in Tanzania during El Nino against the advice of several friends and colleagues. Travel to western Tanzania would have been difficult under good weather conditions, but with the rains with El Nino, travel was made even more difficult. I would not have made it to Kibondo without the insistence, encouragement, and contacts from Dr. Emmanuel Kandusi and his brother-in-law Captain George Chabandi. After reaching Kibondo, Dr. William Chabandi and Captain Chabandi were instrumental in introducing me to the area, finding housing for me, and arranging my visits the refugee
x
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Acknowledgments
camps. I thank all of the nongovernmental representatives who took the time to share with me their experiences in working with refugees in Kigoma and Kagera Regions. I also want to thank Albert Walls who put me in contact with the Rev. Ntirugelegwa and his family. I thank the Ntirugelegwa family for their assistance in securing housing for me and for providing transportation to my many appointments in Dar es Salaam. I also thank them for the many hours that I spent at their house and for them making me a part of their family. I thank the College of Liberal Arts at Pennsylvania State University for travel money that allowed me to travel to Geneva to conduct the last part of the research at the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees during the summer of 2004. I thank Paul Desanker for his geographical expertise on the refugee camp figures. Moreover, I sincerely appreciate the time and effort that Margaret Mwangi spent on configuring the maps for the camps. I owe a particular debt to my parents, Lewis and Rachel Saunders, for their constant support and encouragement even into adulthood. I also thank my two sisters, Valerie and Sarita Veney for support that sustained me throughout the years. The last person on this journey with me is my husband, friend, partner, and as he calls himself, cheerleader, Paul Tiyambe Zeleza who I owe the greatest gratitude for endorsing the research trip to Tanzania after meeting me three months earlier and the phone calls and e-mails that sustained me. I am very much indebted to him for his judicial readings and analyses of the manuscript and for his very discerning criticisms that helped to sharpen and strengthen the manuscript. I thank him for believing, practicing, and pushing me to achieve excellence. Finally, I cannot leave out the refugees because without them, there would be no book. I thank them for their strength, determination, dignity, and humanity.
List of Abbreviations
AACC ACT ADLF ADRA AIDS AMREF ANC BBC CARE CCM CDR CIDA CNDD CUF CWS DRC DUP ECHO EDORM ELF EPDM EPLF EPRDF FAC FAO FAR FDD FDRE FNL FORD
All Africa Conference of Churches Action by Churches Together Alliance for Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire Adventist Development Relief Agency Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome African Medical and Research Foundation African National Congress British Broadcasting Corporation Cooperative American Relief Everywhere Chama Cha Mapinduzi Coalition for the Defense of the Republic Canadian International Development Agency Council for the Defense of Democracy Civic United Front Church World Service Democratic Republic of Congo Democratic Unionist Party European Community Humanitarian Office Ethiopian Democratic Officers’ Revolutionary Movement Eritrean Liberation Front Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement Eritrean People’s Liberation Front Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front Congolese Armed Forces Food and Agriculture Organization Rwanda Armed Forces or Forces Armee Rwandaise Forces for the Defense of Democracy Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Forces for National Liberation Forum for Restoration of Democracy
xii
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List of Abbreviations
FRODEBU Frolina HIV ICVA IDPs IFRC IGOs IMF INGOs IOLF IOM IPPG IRC IRCRCS IRIN JRS JVAR KANU KCS KRC LWF MLC MRND MRNDD NCCK NCEC NDA NGOs NIF NRA NRM OAU OLC OLF ONLF OPDO OPLO PAC Palipehutu QIPS
Front for Democracy in Burundi Front for National Liberation Human Immunodeficiency Virus International Council of Voluntary Associations Internally Displaced Persons International Federation of the Red Cross Intergovernmental Organizations International Monetary Fund International Nongovernmental Organizations Islamic Oromo Liberation Front International Organization for Migration Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group International Rescue Committee International Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Integrated Regional Information Networks Jesuit Refugee Services Joint Voluntary Agency Representative Kenya African National Union Kenya Catholic Secretariat Kenya Red Cross Lutheran World Federation Movement for the Liberation of Congo National Revolutionary Movement for Development National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development National Council of Churches of Kenya National Convention Executive Council National Democratic Alliance Nongovernmental Organizations National Islamic Front National Resistance Army National Resistance Movement Organization of African Unity Oromo Liberation Council Oromo Liberation Front Ogaden National Liberation Front Oromo People’s Democratic Organization Oromo People’s Liberation Organization Pan African Congress Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People Quick Impact Projects
List of Abbreviations
RCD RPA RPF SADC SAPs SLA SNA SNM SPF SPLA SPLM SPM SRC SRSP SSA SSIM/A STDs TBA TCRS TGE TPLF TRCS UDSF UMATI UNDP UNESCO
●
Rally for Congolese Democracy Rwanda Patriotic Army Rwanda Patriotic Front Southern African Development Community Structural Adjustment Programs Sudan Liberation Army Somali National Alliance Somali National Movement Somali Patriotic Front Sudan People’s Liberation Army Sudan People’s Liberation Movement Somali Patriotic Movement Supreme Revolutionary Council Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party Somali Salvation Alliance Southern Sudan Independence Movement/Army Sexually Transmitted Diseases Traditional Birth Attendant Tanganyika Christian Refugee Services Transitional Government of Ethiopia Tigray People’s Liberation Front Tanzania Red Cross Society United Democratic Salvation Front Chama Cha Uzazi na Malezi Bora Tanzania United Nations Development Program United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UNFPA United Nations Population Fund UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UNMONUC United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo UNOSOM United Nations Operations in Somalia UOPLF United Oromo People’s Liberation Front UPRONA Union for National Progress Party USAP Union of Sudanese African Parties USC United Somali Congress USCR U.S. Committee for Refugees WFP World Food Program WHO World Health Organization WVV Women Victims of Violence
xiii
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CHAPTER 1
Rethinking African Refugees and Forced Migration Introduction The magnitude of the African refugee crisis remains as daunting as ever. Yet, it does not receive the attention it deserves either in the popular media or from the international community preoccupied by “more important” world events or overwhelmed by donor fatigue. The occasional media attention given to the subject rarely goes beyond superficial stereotypes as the refugee crisis is attributed to Africa’s numerous alleged pathologies. Pride of place is given to “tribal” conflicts and civil wars perpetrated by ruthless warlords, militia groups, and inept governments. African governments are uniformly depicted as corrupt and authoritarian, and accused of abusing their citizens’ human rights and running down their countries’ economies resulting in multitudes of innocent civilians fleeing to neighboring countries. Even the African environment is not spared: drought is depicted as the source of hunger and famine that drives hundreds of thousands of emaciated people away from their homes and communities in search of food. The academic literature often seeks to confirm, or ends up confirming, these popular perceptions because of the tendency to lay the crisis squarely at the door of the “failed” postcolonial state and portrays refugees as hapless victims devoid of agency. To be sure, African political dynamics are crucial to understanding the refugee crisis. But it is important to remember the fact that African politics is not only influenced by external political forces and events, but also that it has changed over time. Thus, explanations predicated on internal and static conceptions of the political processes that generate the refugee crisis is inadequate. Similarly, while refugees are often forced by circumstances beyond their control to become refugees in the first place and their lives are heavily
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Forced Migration in Eastern Africa
circumscribed, it is important to note that they remain active human agents and they retain the capacity to shape their own lives. Indeed, the content and constructions of the refugee’s life and the refugee camp can only be fully understood if they are conceived as vibrant and complex social processes. This volume seeks to enrich our understanding of the refugee situation in East Africa by examining the conditions that gave rise to it and how the refugees themselves sought to reconstruct their lives. It focuses on a specific time period, the decade of the 1990s, and compares two adjacent countries in East Africa, Kenya and Tanzania. The period was chosen because it marked a crucial watershed in contemporary African history, marking the transition from authoritarianism to democratization. This raises several important questions. How did democratization affect the generation and flow of refugees? Did the overall numbers of refugees increase or decline? Were there changes in the social composition of the refugee populations? What changes occurred in the ways refugees were treated in the host countries undergoing democratization? Were the changes for the better or worse? How did governments that were now more accountable and local communities that were now freer to articulate their views react to the refugees, respectively? What new opportunities and constraints opened up for refugees and how did the different groups of refugees respond based on their status, principally in terms of gender, class, and generation? Kenya and Tanzania share many similarities and some remarkable differences, which make them intriguing case studies for comparison. They are adjacent countries that share a common colonial history,1 yet after independence they adopted vastly different development policies. Kenya pursued the capitalist path and Tanzania the socialist path of development, a difference that was a source of much regional rivalry and attracted many scholars who produced comparative studies of the two concerning which was achieving more rapid and impressive levels of socioeconomic development. In a sense, this study continues in this long tradition of comparative studies between the two countries. Notwithstanding the differences in their developmental policies and priorities, both embraced the one-party state as a mode of governance and in the 1980s the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) imposed structural adjustment programs (SAPs). Moreover, the winds of democratization began blowing in both countries at the turn of the 1990s. Thus, the processes of economic liberalization and political democratization have affected both Kenya and Tanzania. This has opened new lines of inquiry in comparative studies of the two
Rethinking African Refugees
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3
countries concerning the pace, patterns, and impact of liberalization and democratization. It is in this context that a comparative analysis of refugee policies in Kenya and Tanzania in the 1990s can be framed. How did liberalization and democratization affect the refugee policies of the two countries? In this regard, they share some important similarities and differences, which this study seeks to investigate. For one thing, in the 1990s neither of them generated many refugees, but became important refugee-hosting countries in the region. As a result, they were obliged to reformulate and clarify their refugee policies at a time of immense political and socioeconomic transformations in their own internal affairs. There was a shift from a policy of free refugee settlement to forced encampment, asylum was no longer conferred on an individual basis, and the granting of citizenship rights became more restricted. The refugee policies of Kenya and Tanzania in the 1990s showed some variations, however, which will be demonstrated. Yet, there were more similarities than differences, which raises the question of whether there was a narrowing of systemic options at the policy level among African states, as has been suggested by some studies on the impact of globalization on African states.2 Overview of African Refugee Populations 1990–2003 Forced migration is of course not new. African history is replete with the phenomenon, most tragically the slave trades to the Americas, Europe, and Asia, as well as the numerous instances of forced migrations that occurred during the colonial period.3 Unfortunately, forced migration did not end with the attainment of independence. In fact, new patterns emerged which saw millions of people flee their homes for asylum in foreign countries or within their national borders. According to international conventions, the former are recognized as refugees and the latter as internally displaced persons (IDPs).4 In 2003, there were 17.1 million forced migrants worldwide, of whom 9.7 million were refugees, and 5.3 million were internally displaced, stateless, or returned internally displaced, and 912,291 were described as various. Africa’s total number of refugees at the end of 2003 stood at 2.9 million—this figure excludes refugees in North Africa (UNHCR 2004c, 2).5 Although this study does not include the internally displaced, their conditions and problems are often similar to those of refugees. Moreover, they often flee for the same reasons as refugees—to escape human rights violations carried out by government forces, rebel groups,
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Forced Migration in Eastern Africa
and other civilians that are caused by political, civil, and ethnic unrest as well as economic, environmental, and other forms of dislocation. The major difference between this population and refugees is that the internally displaced have not crossed an international border. Moreover, while the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has a mandate to provide assistance and protection to refugees, it will protect and assist IDPs only if requested by another UN agency. For these reasons alone, issues that surround their plight need to be addressed and examined, however, they are beyond the scope of this study, which concentrates on refugee populations in Kenya and Tanzania from the neighboring countries. In 1960, often regarded as the year of African independence when 17 countries regained their freedom from colonial rule, the entire continent only had 300,000 refugees. By 1989, this number had increased to 5 million (USCR 1990, 31). During the colonial period, which for some countries in the settler strongholds of southern Africa lasted well into the 1970s and 1980s, many of the refugees consisted of displaced people engaged in struggles for liberation from colonial rule. This was certainly the case in the former Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau, where brutal and protracted wars of liberation produced thousands of refugees for the neighboring countries. After independence, new waves of refugees now found themselves fleeing from the effects of postcolonial misrule: human rights violations, religious intolerance, political repression, civil war, ethnic strife, and problems surrounding general unrest as disaffected and disfranchised groups engaged in armed struggles against the government or segments of the national population. However, these problems were not entirely generated locally or created by Africans. Dynamics associated with the Cold War, especially the superpower rivalry between the United States and the former Soviet Union, not to mention the machinations of the former colonial powers, the destabilization of apartheid South Africa in the southern African region, and interstate struggles for regional supremacy played a major role in engendering the conditions and conflicts that forced tens of thousands of civilians to flee. In the 1990s, the African refugee population reached record levels. As table 1.1 indicates, while the world’s refugee population peaked in 1993 at a little more than 16 million, Africa’s peaked at nearly 7 million in 1994. This represented 43 percent of the total world refugee population that year. In the next eight years, Africa’s refugee numbers fluctuated, although the overall trend was downwards, and the continent was overtaken by Asia from 1996. By 2002, Africa’s refugee population had fallen to 31.6 percent of the world’s total.
Rethinking African Refugees Table 1.1
●
5
Refugee Population by World Region of Origin, 1993–2002 in ’000
Region
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
Africa Asia Europe Latin Am. & Caribbean North America Oceania
6,417.1 5,873.2 3,016.6 125.3
6,752.2 5,064.9 2,920.2 109.1
5,972.9 4,886.9 3,089.5 93.9
4,361.2 4,812.5 3,266.2 88.4
3,482.0 4,735.5 2,939.3 83.2
3,345.4 4,747.5 2,586.8 65.6
3,523.4 4,782.0 2,599.5 61.5
3,627.1 5,383.4 2,374.9 37.9
3,283.9 5,770.3 2,312.3 37.1
3,343.7 4,188.1 2,336.1 40.9
806.3
817.6
775.4
745.5
689.0
653.3
644.5
635.2
645.1
615.1
65.1
69.7
77.5
83.3
78.7
82.3
76.4
71.0
68.1
70.1
Total
16,303.6 15,733.7 14,896.1 13,357.1 12,007.7 11,480.9 11,687.3 12,129.5 12,116.8 10,594.0
Source: UNHCR 2004c, Table A3.
Despite this overall decline, some regions began to face the crunch of the refugee crisis. While the number of refugees fell in southern Africa, they rose in West Africa and the Great Lakes region. In the Horn of Africa, the refugee crisis did not fundamentally change—the numbers fluctuated between 1.7 million in 1994 and 1.36 million in 2002. The end of civil wars in Angola and Mozambique and the abolition of apartheid in South Africa led to a significant degree of stabilization in the region that contributed to the decline in the region’s refugee population from 1.5 million in 1993 to 285,000 in 1996, although it crept up a little afterwards. In the meantime, civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone and other conflicts in the region led to an exponential increase in West Africa’s refugee population—reaching over a million each year between 1993 and 1996—which few could have predicted in the 1960s and 1970s.6 A similar trend is evident in the Great Lakes region, which became embroiled in devastating conflicts that generated unprecedented numbers of refugees rising to nearly 3 million in 1994 alone. The regional trends can be seen in table 1.2 The continuing refugee crisis in the Horn of Africa and the eruption of a new refugee crisis in the Great Lakes region spilled over into Kenya and Tanzania, which witnessed a rise in their refugee populations mostly derived from the two regions. As can be seen in table 1.3, between 1993 and 2002 Tanzania and Kenya were among the top ten refugee-hosting countries on the continent. In fact, Tanzania ranked first from 1997 to 2002. In addition, in 2002 Tanzania had the third largest refugee population in the world after Pakistan and Iran. Yet, as can be seen from table 1.4, Tanzania and Kenya were not among the top ten refugee-generating countries. Indeed, they generated negligible numbers of their own refugees. Kenya produced 44,000
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Table 1.2 Region
Forced Migration in Eastern Africa Refugee Population by African Regions, 1993–2002 in ’000 1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
East & 1,681.1 1,743.7 1,523.3 1,596.6 1,449.1 1,388.0 1,450.2 1,450.0 1,365.5 1,362.5 Horn of Africa Central 1,610.2 2,933.3 2,320.3 1,116.1 838.0 818.4 959.2 1,142.4 1,130.9 1,172.3 & Great Lakes West 1,459.8 1,482.1 1,341.7 1,291.9 882.9 818.9 826.1 712.4 465.5 516.1 Southern 1,507.3 519.4 373.3 285.0 301.9 321.9 354.7 436.7 473.6 440.5 Source: UNHCR 2004c, Table A5.
Table 1.3
Top Ten African Countries of Asylum, 1993–2002 in ’000
Country of Asylum
1993
1998
1999
2000
2001
DRC Tanzania Guinea Burundi Cote d’Ivoire Ethiopia Kenya Uganda Sudan Liberia
572.1 1,724.4 1,433.8 676.0 297.5 240.2 564.5 883.3 829.7 498.7 570.4 543.9 577.2 553.2 672.3 663.9 435.3 482.5 271.9 300.3 173.0 20.7 22.0 25.1 251.6 360.1 297.9 327.7 208.5 151.2
285.3 622.2 501.5 22.1 138.4
332.5 680.9 427.2 27.1 120.7
362.0 333.0 646.9 689.4 178.4 182.2 27.9 40.5 126.2 44.7
272.6 301.6 286.5 745.2 150.2
257.7 223.7 218.2 391.0 96.3
198.0 206.1 236.6 414.9 69.3
152.6 239.2 199.7 349.2 54.8
1994
348.1 252.4 286.5 727.2 120.2
1995
393.5 234.7 229.4 674.1 120.1
1996
390.5 223.6 264.3 393.9 120.1
1997
323.1 232.1 188.5 374.4 126.9
262.2 238.2 204.5 391.5 96.3
2002
132.9 233.7 217.3 328.2 65.0
Source: UNHCR 2004c, Table A7.
refugees for the entire period from 1993 to 2002 (they mostly went to Ethiopia). Tanzania hardly produced any refugees during this period, except for the 2,000 refugees who fled from political clashes in Zanzibar during the 2000 elections (most returned in 2001). Predictably, such a sudden and large influx of refugees had a serious impact on the two countries. Typically, large movements of people have tended to result in a crisis for refugee-hosting countries and for the international community, which are sometimes not adequately prepared to protect and assist the refugees. In many cases, some refugees even die before they reach a country of asylum, and others perish in poorly prepared refugee camps after they cross national borders. Even in the best of
Rethinking African Refugees Table 1.4
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7
Top Ten African Countries of Refugee Origin, 1993–2002 in ’000
Origin
1993
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
Angola Burundi DRC Eritrea Liberia Rwanda Sierra Leone Somalia Sudan Ethiopia
323.8 282.6 246.7 249.7 871.4 389.7 350.6 428.7 74.8 73.3 89.7 158.8 427.2 422.4 286.7 332.2 704.1 797.8 744.6 784.0 450.5 2,257.6 1,819.4 469.1 311.2 275.3 379.5 375.1
267.7 519.1 174.0 319.1 493.3 68.0 329.3
319.4 502.6 158.8 346.8 365.4 77.7 406.1
353.5 527.4 256.0 347.1 294.7 88.9 490.1
433.8 568.1 371.7 376.9 266.9 119.1 402.8
470.6 554.0 392.1 333.2 244.6 84.5 179.1
435.3 574.5 420.9 317.9 275.4 75.2 141.4
574.6 393.9 251.8
1994
631.4 405.1 226.4
1995
638.7 637.7 608.1 558.0 524.6 465.7 440.1 431.2 445.3 475.3 364.6 390.0 485.5 494.4 490.0 508.7 101.0 96.3 84.4 70.7 71.1 66.4 59.0 61.0
Source: UNHCR 2004c, Table A6; A7.
circumstances, refugee settlements are not immune from human rights abuses including detentions, beatings, and harassment at the hands of the police and security services, and occasionally from ordinary citizens of the host countries. For those who survive, life is precarious as they struggle to secure food, housing, medical care, employment, money, and moreover, recognition of their status as refugees that is needed to legally remain in the host country. In addition, refugees are in a constant struggle to obtain a semblance of protection whether they are in camps or urban areas. Female refugees are prone to specific hardships and violations involving sexual and gender violence. Rape and other forms of sexual abuse are used as weapons of war against vulnerable populations throughout the world. Africa is most certainly not an exception to this phenomenon. In the countries that have produced refugee populations women and girls have been forced to flee their homelands because they were raped, they feared being raped, or they experienced other forms of sexual and physical abuse. For example, many Somali women refugees reported that they fled to Kenya because they were either raped in Somalia or they feared being raped. Unfortunately, the act of crossing a national border did not protect them as they fell prey to abuse by other refugees, Kenyan nationals, police, and other security personnel (Omaar and de Waal 1993). Growth of the Refugee Populations in Tanzania and Kenya It was not until the 1990s that both Tanzania and Kenya became major refugee-hosting nations. Up to then they had been spared the refugee
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Forced Migration in Eastern Africa
crisis that afflicted countries in the Horn of Africa or in parts of southern Africa such as Malawi. Nevertheless, Tanzania more than Kenya periodically hosted sizeable groups of refugees from some of its neighboring countries. This is because Tanzania shares borders with countries in the conflict-prone Great Lakes region and those engaged in wars of liberation in southern Africa that it actively supported. The first sizeable influx of refugees into Tanzania came two years before independence when 21,000 Rwandan refugees flocked into the country following the 1959 revolution in that country that saw the ouster of the Tutsi monarchy that paved the way for the assumption of power by leaders representing the Hutu majority. Altogether, 120,000 Tutsi refugees gathered in the neighboring countries including Tanzania (UNHCR 1995b, 32). Following independence under the leadership of Julius Nyerere, the country served as a safe haven for pockets of refugees from such countries as Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Mozambique, Namibia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Malawi, and South Africa. In 1972, a large influx of 200,000 refugees came from Burundi fleeing from genocide that killed approximately 100,000 Hutus who had risen in revolt against the minority Tutsi-led government (Msanjila 1998, 1; USCR 1991, 57). Later, in 1985, Tanzania served as a safe haven for 72,000 refugees fleeing from civil war in postcolonial Mozambique. Kenya experienced a relatively smaller influx of refugees from its neighbors, especially Uganda, Rwanda, and Ethiopia following independence in 1963. By 1983, its refugee population totaled a mere 8,000 and by 1989 Kenya hosted only 15,500 refugees mainly from Uganda, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Mozambique, and Somalia (USCR 1990, 31). Most of these refugees were largely from urban backgrounds, were highly educated and skilled, and, therefore, they were easily integrated into urban areas, mainly the capital, Nairobi. This would later change as a much larger influx of refugees came from Somalia, Burundi, Sudan, and the DRC. Beginning in 1990, both Kenya and Tanzania witnessed a sudden influx of refugees that would last well into the new century. More than 300,000 Somalis—mostly victims of violence, anarchy, and famine— fled to Kenya in 1990–1993. Kenya’s refugee population peaked at 427,000 in 1992 (UNHCR 1993e, 1). Other large refugee populations in Kenya included the 80,000 Ethiopians who fled to escape political conflict and environmental problems (drought) and the 40,000 Sudanese mainly from southern Sudan who were caught between government forces and various rebel forces in the country’s protracted civil war. By 1998 Kenya’s refugee population had fallen to 235,700, and then fell
Rethinking African Refugees
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9
to 205,600 in 2000 before rising slightly to 231,700 in 2002, of whom 155,800 were from Somalia, 57,800 from Sudan, 11,200 from Ethiopia, 4,400 from Uganda, and 2,500 from Rwanda (UNHCR 2004c, Table A7).7 Tanzania hosted an even larger influx. In fact, Tanzania experienced one of the world’s largest and swiftest refugee arrivals immediately following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda that resulted in approximately 250,000 individuals crossing the border in search of asylum in a single 24-hour period (Rutinwa 1999; Smith 1999). The number of Rwandan refugees jumped overnight from 51,900 in 1993 to 626,200 in 1994. There was an equally sudden drop following their forcible repatriation. In one year, the number of Rwandan refugees fell from 548,000 in 1995 to 20,000 in 1996. By 1998, there were 536,900 refugees in the country, rising to 676,200 in 2000 before falling slightly to 683,900 in 2002. The bulk of the refugees in 2002 came from Burundi (540,900), followed by the DRC (140,300), and Rwanda (2,700) (UNHCR 2004c, Table A7).8 The dramatic rise in refugee populations in the 1990s compelled the two countries to devise new refugee policies, especially as it coincided with the processes of liberalization and democratization that led both governments to become more frugal economically and more responsive politically to their citizens. Thus, as it will be argued and demonstrated in subsequent chapters, the heavy inflow of refugees was occurring precisely at a time when governments were becoming less generous and increasingly attracted to the containment model of managing refugees. National legislation and practices became more restrictive or ruthless: asylum was increasingly determined in terms of groups rather than individuals; camps that were virtually beyond the rule of law became the mainstay of refugee protection; and forced repatriation assumed prominence over local integration and third-country resettlement. The refugee influx raised complex political issues for the governments of Kenya and Tanzania in their dealings with the refugees themselves, the international humanitarian community, and their own local communities among whom the refugees were settled. It brought into sharp focus the fraught questions of territoriality, sovereignty, and citizenship as demonstrated in the location of refugee camps, regulation of refugee mobility, and marginalization of groups sharing ethnic affinities with the refugee populations. The latter is quite evident in Kenya where ethnic Somalis who were Kenyan citizens began to be viewed and treated as refugees and illegal immigrants. The government even forced them to carry color-coded identity cards to prove that they resided in the country legally. Even with the proper documentation many ethnic Somali
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Kenyans were apprehended in round-ups and sweeps conducted to rid the country of refugees and illegal immigrants. Approximately 3,500 Kenyan citizens of Somali origin were deported (USCR 1991, 44). Reconceptualizing Forced Migration and Refugees Migration encompasses both voluntary and involuntary movements of people from their places of residence. The forces that generate and affect “forced” and “free” migration are often quite similar, but the two are treated quite differently in legal conventions and also in the scholarly literature. Many of the analytical models focus on voluntary migration, which is often explained in terms of push and pull factors, neoclassical micro and macro concepts that focus on the rational choices of migrants or wage differentials between countries, or dual market and world systems theories that emphasize the broad structural forces operating in the world economy as keys to understanding migration flows.9 There is also a large body of literature that seeks to explain the factors that perpetuate migration. Some attribute it to the existence of networks in sending and receiving countries that sustain migration flows and the role of private institutions and voluntary organizations in providing social capital for migrants.10 Undoubtedly, these explanations do shed light on the causes, courses, and consequences of forced migration. But many students of refugees have tried to develop explanatory models more directly focused on the dynamics of coercive migration. Among the well-known typologies is that of E.F. Kunz (1973, 1981) who distinguishes between two types of refugees and three types of refugee movements. Based on their intentions, there are what he calls reactive fate groups—those who flee their countries with no plans on how they will return, and purpose groups who leave to use the countries of asylum to organize resistance for an eventual return. As for refugee migration, there are anticipatory movements characterized by individuals leaving their home country before conditions deteriorate, acute movements that occur when people flee from impending calamity, and intermediate movements that fall between the two. William Petersen (1958) distinguishes between coercive push factors that are “impelled” and “forced” based on the relative choices the migrants have on their destinations—in the latter they have no options. Some of these distinctions are quite artificial and do not adequately account for the diversity of conditions that generate refugee flows or characterize refugee experiences. It was once quite common for refugee studies based on the European experience to confine themselves to the
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role of political persecution and inter-state conflicts. To be sure, the impact of state action in producing refugees cannot be underestimated, nor can the fact be ignored that the state that receives the refugees determines largely the conditions under which the refugees will live and be resettled and repatriated. Nevertheless, recent studies stress the role of economic, environmental, and other factors as well. In his typology of African refugees, John Rogge (1979) elaborates on Petersen’s model. He puts refugees who are pushed out of their country mainly by the government into the forced category, while the impelled group has the opportunity to consider if it wants to move. In other words, it has the chance to weigh the pros and cons of migration before it is actually forced out by an external threat. Rogge’s forced migrants include all those who exhibit refugee-like characteristics from escapees, evacuees, and expellees to victims of hostilities and ecological disasters, refugee’s sur-place (people who become, while abroad, entitled to protection as refugees because of the risk of political persecution should they return), and individuals forced into resettlement sites. William Wood (1994) seeks to bring all these elements together in his model of forced migration that identifies four overlapping domains—political instability, persecution and war, life-threatening economic decline and ecological crisis, and ethnic and religious conflicts. Similarly Milica Z. Bookman (2002) provides a typology of forced migrants and refugees that include people who are sometimes not thought of as refugees, such as the internally displaced and oppressed indigenous peoples. The work of Thomas Homer-Dixon helps elucidate the environmental aspects of forced migration in his analysis of the relationship between environmental scarcities and conflict (1995a; 1995b). He concludes that environmental scarcity has negative effects that can facilitate the rise of authoritarianism and subsequent weakening and fragmentation of the state, and generate violence—all of which sometimes lead to a mass exodus of people. The refugee condition, in turn, produces its own social effects and can exacerbate environmental conflicts in the areas of refugee settlement between the refugees and host communities. Thus, environmentally induced civil strife may contribute to forced migration. Ethnic/land clashes in Kenya in the early 1990s, during which the country was also undergoing a transition to democratic rule that created a large internally displaced population, were explained using this model (Kahl 1998, 80–81). There can be little question that in so far as the refugee condition is multifaceted in its temporal and spatial dimensions, causal dynamics, and effects on the refugees themselves a comprehensive examination of
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refugees needs to be informed by five analytical imperatives. First, it needs to be historical both in the sense of identifying the historical roots of the refugee crisis in Africa—many of which are derived from the legacies of colonialism (how postcolonial Africa has tried to grapple with the problems and challenges of state-building, nation-building, economic development, ethnic diversity, and social integration)—and paying attention to the changing temporal contexts in which the refugee crisis has developed (Kibreab 1985; Hatch 1970; Zolberg et al. 1989; Loescher 1993). In our case, we seek to understand how new developments in the 1990s in the political economy of Tanzania and Kenya affected the refugee situation. Second, it is important to adopt a transnational perspective because the factors that generate the refugee crisis and its consequences transcend national borders. Indeed, as defined by international conventions refugees are those who cross national borders in search of protection, assistance, safety, and security that they cannot get in their own countries. The refugee regime is one in which refugee-producing and refugeehosting states engage with each other and with other states and various international actors from international intergovernmental to nongovernmental organizations. The interactions and policies of these actors, together with domestic actors including local communities, are important as they relate to the issues of humanitarian assistance, refugee protection, third-country resettlement, and repatriation. This study adopts such an approach in examining the regional and international dynamics and assessing the role played by each of the actors in the production and treatment of refugees in Kenya and Tanzania. Third, refugee studies cannot avoid being interdisciplinary in terms of employing concepts and insights from various disciplines. In so far as the refugee crisis is both a product of and subject to political forces and calculations, understanding the politics of refugee influx, relief, and regulation benefits from political science conceptions of the postcolonial state, national security, policy formation, processes of democratization, international relations, ethnic conflicts, civil society, and citizenship just to mention a few (Zolberg et al.1989; Loescher and Manahan 1989; Gordenker 1987; Ferris 1985; Simmance 1987; Weiner 1995). Moreover, since the status of refugees falls under international, national, and regional laws, legal perspectives and principles on international and national human rights laws, refugee conventions and instruments, and state sovereignty are invaluable (Aboni 1978; Goodwin-Gill 1995; Melander and Nobel 1978; Eggli 2002; Steiner et al. 2003; Verdirame 1999a). No less important are geographical perceptions on the spatial
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dynamics of refugee settlement and encampment, territoriality and reconstruction of identities, and the environmental causes and effects of forced migration (Kulhman 1990; Rogge 1985; 1987; Black 1991; 1998; Black and Robinson 1993; Kibreab 1990; 1996a; Chambers 1979; Daley 1993). Fourth, this study incorporates a gender perspective by examining the experiences and struggles of refugee women and changes in gender relations and identities among the refugees. It is essential for refugee studies to incorporate gender analysis not only because many of the refugees, in some cases the vast majority, are women, but also because the refugee experience leads to the reconstruction of gender identities and relations as previous conceptions of masculinity and femininity and family roles and responsibilities come under severe strain in refugee settlements and camps, which are themselves gendered spaces. Until recently many studies of African refugees did not directly or adequately address gender by assuming that a “migrant” is a man and a “migrant family” consists of a man, his wife, and their children. Feminist theory and interventions in migration and refugee studies have amply demonstrated the importance of probing the questions of who migrates, the role gender plays in making the decision to migrate, gender politics in the provision of protection and the distribution of refugee relief, and access to educational and employment opportunities, as well as issues of gender violence against and among refugees (Grieco and Boyd 2003; Langer 2002; Quizar 1998; Hackett 1996; Indra 1999; Forbes Martin 2004; Callamard 2002; Camus-Jacques 1989; Camino and Krulfeld 1994). Fifth, the issue of refugees’ agency will be addressed in the study. It is tempting to regard refugees, together with other vulnerable and confined populations, as helpless victims given their dependence on the international and host communities to meet their basic needs, which is particularly pronounced during the initial phase of their flight and settlement, especially if they cross the border into rural, remote parts of the country of asylum. However, refugees demonstrate a great deal of agency and ingenuity as they often try to make the best of their situation. As it will be demonstrated in this study, they engage in economic activities including farming, trading, and other income-generating projects. They also pursue educational opportunities and vocational training, and participate in leisure and political activities (Whitaker 1999; Verdirame 1999a; Veney 2003a). The study will specifically highlight the agency of women refugees who are often seen as more at risk than are male refugees. It will be shown that they are involved in a wide range of economic, political, educational, and social pursuits that serve as empowerment mechanisms.
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Chapter Overviews The rest of the book is divided into six chapters. Chapter 2 provides an analysis of the factors that forced refugees into Kenya and Tanzania by addressing political, economic, ethnic, and environmental issues in the refugee producing countries—Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC—to determine if these factors were different from the factors that forced refugees out of Malawi, South Africa, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe in earlier decades. Chapter 3 discusses how and more importantly why both Kenya and Tanzania changed their refugee policies in the 1990s and how these policies served to violate refugees’ human rights. It compares the new policy regime to previous policies that allowed refugees to apply for asylum, integrate into local communities, obtain employment, business permits, and an education, and even to apply for citizenship. Both countries suspended these policies and the chapter addresses the new policies developed in the 1990s—forced encampment, forced deportation and repatriation, roundups and sweeps, detention, and the refusal to grant individual asylum. The policies are examined within the context of both countries’ transition to democratic rule, economic liberalization under SAPs, and mounting insecurity in the Great Lakes and East Africa regions. Chapter 4 focuses on the various local communities that have hosted the refugees in Kenya and Tanzania and discusses how refugees were received, along with the environmental, economic, and political effects of hosting refugees. It will explore the ways in which refugees interacted with local communities both inside and outside of camps, both in the rural and urban areas. This will be done to determine what effects refugees had on local communities and vice versa to illustrate that a refugee influx did not always lead to instability and insecurity and various members of local communities had different interactions with and benefits from refugees. An analysis of the host communities provides another means to explain the changing refugee policies of governments and the congruence and contradictions between the state and civil society in the treatment of refugees. Chapter 5 critically examines the role of the UNHCR in both countries because it has the international mandate to assist and protect refugees. It will analyze the external and internal factors that influence UNHCR’s actions. For example, the chapter explores the UNHCR’s role in the location of thousands of Hutu Rwandans along the Tanzanian– Rwandan border in 1994, the forced repatriation of thousands of Rwandans from Tanzania in 1996, and the expulsion of thousands of refugees from Burundi in 1997 and 1998, and the sweeps and round-ups conducted by
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the Tanzanian police and security personnel. For Kenya, it addresses the UNHCR’s role in the closure of camps along Kenya’s coast, the forcible deportation of Somali refugees in 1991, the use of identity cards for Kenyan-Somali citizens who were deported along with Somali refugees, the involuntary repatriation of Somali refugees following camp consolidations and closures, and the government’s forced encampment policy. The chapter also looks at the assistance provided by the UNHCR and discusses how this assistance has or has not helped refugees and members of the local communities. Chapter 6 highlights women who made up the bulk of the refugee populations in both countries and who often had different reasons for fleeing and different experiences once they reached Kenya or Tanzania. The experiences of women refugees will be investigated along with how the changes in official policies affected them and the strategies women adopted to cope with these changes. How did women reinvent themselves and reconstruct their roles inside and outside of camps to earn money to take care of their families, as they often were the head of the household and had to make all the financial, educational, and medical decisions? How did they empower themselves in the camps through their own initiatives and by taking advantage of programs established by international nongovernmental organizations—income-generating projects and educational programs that provided information on domestic violence, rape, sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), and reproductive health? Chapter 7 provides a summary of the findings from this study. It discusses possible directions of future research. Finally, recommendations are offered for academics, practitioners, host governments, host communities, and concerned individuals given the fact that the issue of forced migration is a global one that concerns us all and extensive research is an essential ingredient for effective policies. It is important to have a comprehensive understanding of the multiple factors that generate refugees in the region and devise strategies that could ameliorate the conditions that generate the refugee crisis in the first place as well as how refugees are treated. In addition, more scholarship needs to be devoted to local communities that host refugees because if their needs are not met or if their governments are drawn into the disputes of the refugee-producing countries, they, too, may join the long lines of the internally displaced or become refugees. Conclusion This study seeks to advance our understanding of the refugee crisis during a critical period in contemporary African history. Its main contribution is
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that it seeks to bring together previously unconnected streams of analysis on economic liberalization, political democratization, and refugee crises, by arguing that the restrictive refugee policies that were adopted in Tanzania and Kenya were a direct product of the processes of liberalization and democratization that the two countries were going through. Scholars have analyzed the impact of SAPs on women, workers, students, peasants, et cetera, but their effects on refugees and refugee policies are often not included in the discussions. Similarly, the voluminous literature on democracy in Africa in general and Tanzania and Kenya in particular has not paid enough attention to the implications of democratization on refugees. An examination of the analytical and policy intersections of structural adjustment, democratic reform, and refugees is therefore long overdue. The study also attempts to examine how the various actors involved— host governments, the international relief agencies, local relief agencies, host communities, and the refugees themselves—interacted with each other to advance their respective agendas, meet their mandates, and satisfy their constituents—all in the wake of international and national transformations connected to liberalization, democratization, and new national security imperatives. All too often, analytical attention is paid to only one or two of these actors, yet it is in their complex and multifaceted interactions that we can get a fuller picture of the refugee condition in Africa. The expectations and roles of the key actors tend to change over time and the period of the 1990s, with its tumultuous transformations, offers a wonderful opportunity to analyze the changes that took place. Citizens, members of civil society, and international donors demanded more democratic institutions and government accountability. We need to know more about how refugees fit into the equation and responded to and were affected by these changes. There is a growing literature critical of the role of international humanitarian assistance to which this study makes a contribution. It will be shown that international relief agencies charged with providing protection and assistance to refugees including the UNHCR are, to use the scathing indictment of Monica Juma, “compromised brokers” (Juma 2003). For example, on several occasions the UNHCR refused to recognize people fleeing from civil wars and conflicts in Sudan and Uganda as refugees and did not offer them assistance or protection. Thus, the governments’ changing refugee policies need to be analyzed in conjunction with the complicity of international actors. Local communities have also played important roles as to whether refugee rights are protected or abused. So important is this that an entire chapter is devoted to the complex and sometimes contradictory interactions between refugees and local communities.
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Kenya and Tanzania provide good case studies not only because of the rich comparative historiography that has been produced on the two countries over the past few decades, but because they offer a unique opportunity to examine refugee policies, conditions, and experiences in a context whereby they were themselves not significant refugee-generating countries. Prior to the 1990s both countries had a similar policy of accepting and hosting refugees, and allowing them to enjoy a fair amount of freedom including local integration and citizenship. Then they radically changed their policies, which demands explanation and can benefit from comparative analysis. The selection of Tanzania also makes sense because of the sheer size of its refugee populations, ranked in 2003 as the largest in Africa and the fourth largest in the world.11 Of course at certain points during the 1990s, the DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi had large refugee populations as well. No less important, Tanzania needs to be addressed because of its importance in the region—its past history of hosting refugees and its stability that has made it such a magnate for refugees from strife-torn neighboring countries. Kenya was not selected because it hosted the most refugees in the region—thousands of refugees also sought sanctuary in Sudan, Uganda, and Ethiopia. However, it too has enjoyed relative stability that has made it an attractive haven for refugees and the adoption of harsh policies contrasts with previous practices and popular expectations. This study has benefited from extensive field research conducted in Kenya in 1993 and in Tanzania in 1998, during which I visited refugee camps and conducted interviews with representatives of nongovernmental organizations (both international and local) and intergovernmental organizations both at the camps and in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi. I spent considerable time at several camps that allowed me to witness refugees engaged in various activities and to get a better feel of refugee life, which helped trigger my interest in investigating issues of refugee agency, which are examined in Chapter 6.12 These visits provided me with a fuller understanding of how camps are designed and managed and the role of the international community in providing relief. In addition, over the years I have collected a vast set of secondary sources from refugee and human rights organizations (UNHCR, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, The International Rescue Committee, Lutheran World Federation, Jesuit Refugee Services), not to mention unpublished reports and newspaper articles in both countries and consulted the rapidly growing body of scholarly literature on refugees and forced migration.
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CHAPTER 2
Wars and Rumors of War: The Politics of Forced Migration for Kenya and Tanzania
Introduction Kenya and Tanzania have never been major refugee-producing countries. In the early post-independence years in the 1960s Kenya was not a key refugee-hosting country either, except for relatively small numbers of refugees fleeing from the wars of liberation in southern Africa. On the other hand for Tanzania, “from the 1950s, internal conflicts within neighbouring states have periodically forced a considerable number of refugees to seek sanctuary in Tanzania” (Daley 1993, 10). This makes the two countries rather unique in a region dominated by countries that have simultaneously produced and hosted large numbers of refugees. For Kenya and Tanzania, therefore, refugees have tended to be viewed largely as an “external” problem, which has had serious implications in the way that they are received and treated. The changing refugee policies in the two countries will be examined in the next chapter. This chapter seeks to identify and analyze the factors that produced refugees in the neighboring countries—principally Somalia, Ethiopia, and Sudan for Kenya and Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC for Tanzania. The fact that for Kenya and Tanzania refugees are largely a product and an embodiment of a “transnational” problem rather than a domestic one, helps throw into sharp focus the regional dynamics of refugee flows, the factors that produce refugees, and their reception in asylum countries. The influx of refugees into Kenya and Tanzania rose dramatically from the early 1990s as the surrounding states descended into conflicts
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and crises that generated large numbers of refugees who sought asylum in the two countries. Broadly, the forces and factors behind the emergence of large refugee populations are related to changing political, economic, ethnic, and environmental conditions in the refugee-producing countries, although it cannot be overemphasized that the ways in which these factors were articulated varies among the different countries and have changed over time. The previous chapter outlined several theoretical perspectives that have been advanced to explain forced migration and refugee flows. A close examination of the countries generating refugees for Kenya and Tanzania clearly shows that singular explanations are inadequate, that refugee migrations are caused by a series of interlocking crises—political, ethnic, social, economic, ecological—including outright war, and that these migrations encompass multiple stages and movements that are sometimes prolonged and occasionally sudden. There are cases in which many of the refugees are victims fleeing from various types of insecurities in their home countries and others where some of the refugees are themselves the perpetrators of the insecurities. For example, some of the Hutu refugees who flocked to the neighboring countries including Tanzania in the 1990s were active participants in the civil wars in Burundi and Rwanda and the genocide in the latter. Similarly, among the Somali and Ethiopian refugees were both victims and perpetrators of violence and civil conflict in their respective countries. Nevertheless, it is possible to isolate the dominant factors that contributed to the forced migrations in the refugee-producing countries at specific moments. It can be argued, for example, that the refugees who streamed into Tanzania and Kenya in the 1960s from southern Africa were primarily products of the politics of the protracted wars of liberation from settler colonialism. The relatively steady refugee influx into Kenya from Somalia, Ethiopia, and Sudan was spawned by two primary factors, environmental crisis and civil war, whereas the swift refugee invasion into Tanzania from Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC was principally driven by war, both intrastate and interstate. The regional war over the DRC has even earned the dubious distinction of being called Africa’s “First World War.” Lurking in the background in all these cases, and in some instances serving as the catalyst and trigger, were new political and economic developments in the 1980s and 1990s associated with SAPs and democratization struggles that sought to fundamentally restructure African economies and political systems in the process of which simmering struggles over resources and power were exacerbated or new conflicts
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were engendered. The Rwandan genocide, for example, which generated masses of refugees, cannot be fully understood without factoring in the effects of SAPs on the country’s coffee-dependent export economy and the growing movement for democratization in which the citizenry including moderate Hutus and exiled Tutsis demanded political reforms. Nor can historical and international factors be ignored. As numerous commentators have noted, many of postcolonial Africa’s political crises are rooted in the legacies of colonialism. These include the territorial instabilities of colonial map-making that have engendered border disputes leading to refugee-producing interstate wars as in the case of the war between Ethiopia and Somalia, or Somalia’s expansionist claims in Kenya that affected the latter’s rather harsh treatment not only of Somali refugees but of its own Somali population. Colonialism also left behind the challenges of nation building, of forging coherent nation-states often out of multiple ethnic, cultural, and religious communities, of accepting the realities of moral ethnicity, and minimizing the dangers of political ethnicity.1 Almost invariably, conflicts and refugees have been generated in countries that have faced the most difficulties in realizing the nationbuilding project. The role of international factors in creating or aggravating conditions that produce refugees looms large in many of the continent’s conflicts. The Cold War had a particularly devastating impact on the Horn of Africa, and the international community through acts of both commission and omission had an equally damaging effect on the Rwandan genocide. Regional power politics has been another key ingredient in national and intraregional conflicts. For example, the role of Uganda in Rwanda, which initially sponsored the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) formed by exiled Tutsis living in Uganda, is crucial to understanding the Rwandan conflict. The motivations of subregional players scrambling for the vast resources of the DRC are equally important to explaining the conflagration in the DRC. This chapter seeks to identify and analyze how these various factors have played themselves out in each of the three sets of countries that have generated refugees for Kenya (Somalia, Ethiopia, and Sudan) and Tanzania (Burundi, Rwanda, and the DRC) since the 1990s. Not only is understanding the dynamics behind the flow of refugees important in its own right, it can be argued that the ways in which Kenya and Tanzania received and treated the refugees were intricately connected to the way the refugees were generated in the first place and how the two states interpreted the potential threat the refugees posed to their national security. For example, Tanzania’s pitiless reaction to Hutu refugees from
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Table 2.1 Country
Refugees into Kenya, 1992–2002 in the ’000
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
Somalia 285,600 219,000 206,300 172,200 171,300 174,100 164,700 141,100 137,400 144,3300 155,800 Ethiopia 68,600 26,500 10,500 8,500 7,100 8,600 8,100 8,200 4,100 13,500 11,200 Sudan 21,800 31,600 27,200 41,200 33,500 37,400 48,200 64,300 55,600 69,800 57,800 Other 5,500 4,400 5,000 11,800 10,900 11,800 14,700 8,800 8,500 9,100 6,900 Source: UNHCR 2002f: Annex and A7; UNHCR 2004c: Annex A7.
Rwanda, who were summarily deported, was influenced by the government’s fears that these refugees, some of whom were members of Hutu militias, posed a grave threat to the country’s security. Similarly, Kenya was especially insensitive to Somali refugees whom it associated with long-standing irredentist activities. The Generation of Refugees for Kenya As table 2.1 illustrates, Kenya hosted a large population of Somali refugees as the civil unrest began to unfold in the early 1990s. Throughout the period under review, Somali and Sudanese refugees tended to dominant the population followed by Ethiopian refugees. The Collapse of the Somali State and Somali Refugees Somalia became a major source of refugees into Kenya from the late 1980s. Thousands of Somalis became refugees while others were internally displaced during and after the civil war that began at that time as one militia after the other was formed in response to the harsh rule of Siad Barre (also spelled Siyad). According to Hussein Adam, “from 1969 to early 1991, Somalia, was for all practical purposes, under the personal rule of Siyad Barre. . . . The regime was favorably compared with Nyerere’s Tanzania during its early period; it was considered worse than Idi Amin’s Uganda during its declining years” (Adam 1998, 357). Thus the civil war was at the heart of the refugee crisis. It was the tragic outcome of a bankrupt dictatorship and is essential to understanding the factors that led to the emergence of a large refugee population that spilled into Kenya. The rule of Barre and the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) was ushered in by the military coup of 1969. Under the SRC “the national constitution, all political parties, courts, trade unions and voluntary associations were abolished. The army, assisted by the police, ruled the country” (Adam 1998, 365). Similar to Ethiopia, the military regime
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adopted a socialist ideology in 1976 and transformed the SRC to the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) which “ushered in the formation of party investigation committees as well as workers, women and youth organizations (the last three were called social organizations) . . . [e] ach and every one of those terror organizations was part of a comprehensive network, reporting directly to Siad Barre himself from whom they took their orders. With the exception of the social organizations, they all had powers of arrest, search and seizure of property, torture and detention without trial” (Ghalib 1995, 127). By 1980 Barre had taken on all the characteristics of a ruthless dictator and the “tyranny which Siad Barre exhibited in the 1980s was one of predatory rule in which his need or desire to control the voices of dissent led to ever deepening repression” (Hashim 1997, 80). Thousands of Somalis were subjected to human rights abuses as Barre attempted to use repression, fear, and intimidation to hold onto power. Beginning in 1978, Somalia became one of Africa’s major refugeehosting nations as the result of the Ethiopian-Somali conflict over the Ogaden that was rooted in pan-Somali nationalism, manifested in the attempt by Somalia to bring all Somalis scattered in the nearby countries into a greater Somalia. When the colonial borders were drawn, the disputed territory of the Ogaden was ceded to Ethiopia, and other lands occupied by Somalis went to Kenya and Djibouti, although Somalia claimed the territory belonged to it. Barre’s faltering dictatorship sought to shore up its nationalist credentials by trying to regain the territories purportedly lost as the result of colonial conquest. He turned his gaze to Ethiopia, then embroiled in revolutionary turmoil following the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassia’s government in 1974, which he invaded in 1977 in an attempt to recover the Ogaden. Thousands of ethnic Somalis from the Ogaden region of Ethiopia fled to Somalia and they resided in the northern part of the country where the Isaaq clan lived. The Ogadeni were not initially a problem for the Isaaq, but the Barre regime was and they were “already bitter over having been left out of the government and omitted from development projects, resented the government’s latter-day attempt to implement government control over the livestock trade and expatriate labor remittances” (Hashim 1997, 103). The Somali National Movement (SNM), a predominantly but not solely Isaaq, northern-based rebel group, first formed in 1981 by Isaaq exiles in London, was now more determined than ever to rid the country of Barre and his rule of tyranny that violated their human rights in many ways including rape, torture, and detention. In the meantime, other groups had their own grievances that led them to
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take up arms against the Barre regime that ultimately plunged the country into civil war and then state collapse in 1991, a cataclysm fomented by Somalia’s intractable clan politics and economic woes fueled by the Barre dictatorship. According to Florence Sserero, “political conflict, government crisis, and clan-based civil war in Somalia between 1989 and 2000 have both revealed the negative consequences of clan politics and the manipulation of clan differences to achieve power” (Sserero 2003, 27). Although the Barre government adopted the concepts of communism and socialism in theory, which meant that political and economic power and privileges were not supposed to be based on one’s membership in a particular clan or subclan, clan politics did not wither away because they were so deeply embedded in the social, political, and economic fabric of the country’s institutions and the existence of inequalities between and among families continued to be manifested (Chopra et al. 1995). Politics, based on clan identity and affiliation, was made worse by Barre who used it as an attempt to maintain power. In the end “a clan-democracy or clan-political hegemony was institutionalized by the military of President Siad Barre, and politics was commanded through a military chain of officers. The clan has played a strong part in social, economic and political interactions, and has acted both as a cause of social cohesion and paradoxically, as a cause of political conflict” (Sserero 2003, 27). Reno (1993, 7) also agrees with the importance of clan and lineage in any analysis of the Somali crisis and contends that they are “crucial units of analysis.” The Somali state did not solely collapse due to clan politics because the country had operated under this type of political and economic system for centuries in which clans and subclans would join alliances based on patrilineal kinship. These bonds could foster cooperation in terms of securing resources or they could foster hostilities toward other groups (Lewis 1980). Also, clan politics operated under the assumption that people had multiple identities based on subclans, region, occupation, and genealogy. Therefore, alliances were fluid and changed over time. On the other hand, these multiple identities could produce cleavages in society that could lead to conflict. However, the system of Xeer, which served as a social contract, called for social justice and did not allow one group to dominate another. Therefore, conflicts were better contained (Chopra et al. 1995). What needs to be addressed in terms of clan politics is how the state and its military apparatus were unable to accommodate and contain clan politics in the wake of economic and political challenges. Therefore, conflicts that could have been avoided or
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contained in the past now spilled into the open with deadly consequences. Because the military had become closely identified with particular clans who were appointed to high-ranking positions by Barre based on his belief that they were loyal to him, this left the door open for groups opposed to the government to form their own militias, again under the belief that these disgruntled and disaffected Somalis would be loyal to them. This leads us to the economic dimension of the fall of the Somali state. The clan-based armies could readily recruit mostly young males because the economic conditions in the country left them without educational and employment opportunities. Another important component of clan politics in Somalia that eventually led to the downfall of the state surrounds the intersection of clan and economics that in turn led to the struggle over state resources because Barre rewarded only certain clans who were loyal to him with state resources in terms of land, jobs, businesses licenses, international aid, and contracts. By “the 1980s state power in Somalia was controlled by a cluster of military officers and businessmen associated with President Siad Barre and his Marehan clan . . . it embarked upon a decade-long attempt to concentrate power in its own hands, and use that power—particularly control of the army and security forces—to control a greater share of national resources” (de Waal 2003/2004). The UNHCR reported that “in modern Somalia, clans are no longer localized or attached to specific territories but are more and more taking the shape of socio-economic and political organizations based on kinship which have led to a proliferation of clan-based militias and no region in the country is controlled by a specific militia to protect civilians” (UNHCR 1994, 5). Prior to the Ogaden War, Somali nationalism and Barre’s tyranny were able to contain clan rivalries and prevent open conflict, but the Ogaden debacle “led to a search for clan scapegoats, and clan cleavages burst into the open” (Lyons and Samatar 1995, 15). The Barre regime had simultaneously “encouraged animosity among clan groups and used massive military force to put down popular protests” (Lyons and Samatar 1995, 8). While pitting one clan and subclan against the other, Barre at the same time surrounded himself and thus rewarded members of his own clan—the Darod and its subclans, Marehan, Dolbahante (his sonin-law’s clan), and the Ogaden (his mother’s clan). The national army, feared and resented by several clans, was increasingly made up of Barre’s Marehan clan, which “sat at the top of the hierarchy” and they disproportionately occupied officer positions (Adam 1998, 378). By 1990, clan and subclan rivalries were out in the open as people retreated to the
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safety of clan and kinship bonds. The national army itself was in disarray as it collapsed along subclan lines. This made it easier for opposition groups, formed along clan lines, to organize and overthrow Barre. In the meantime, the country’s economy was experiencing a number of severe problems. A disproportionate amount of the national budget was earmarked for the military in an attempt to ensure regime survival. Furthermore, Somalia, like other countries in the region, was under the financial yoke of the IMF and World Bank after the “decline in oil prices, the internationalization of the livestock market, and the anxiety of the Somali state about the possibility of losing” the critical Saudi Arabian livestock market “led to a sharp decline in export prices” (Lyons and Samatar 1995, 15). In the 1970s, in the aftermath of the oil price increases, Abdi Samatar notes, there was a construction boom in Saudi Arabia, the result of which were “shortages of both skilled and unskilled labor in Saudi Arabia [that] necessitated the importation of thousands of workers from . . . Northeast Africa, which in turn led to increased demand for . . . meat. Somalia, which accounted for nearly 90 percent of Saudi livestock imports, reaped fantastic windfalls, for the whole decade” (Abdi Samatar 1994, 71). By the late 1980s, the Saudi market was no longer as buoyant thanks to a fall in oil prices and the corrupt and authoritarian model of economic management, combined with the disastrous effects of structural adjustment, had taken its toll (Ghalib 1995). Thanks to all these developments from the late 1980s, Somalia became a significant refugee-producing country as the civil war erupted in 1988 in the north between government troops and the forces of the SNM, especially after the SNM gained control temporarily of the capital Hargeisa and the town of Burao. The government’s response was quick and brutal—bombing and shelling the two towns that left scores dead and many others injured. This conflict produced refugees, some of whom went to Kenya, marking the first major influx of refugees into the country. Before long, the conflict spread to other parts of the country leading to widespread human rights violations, especially the round up of the Isaaq in Mogadishu, who faced “daylight looting of private property and wanton killing, deepening [their] bitterness toward the state” (Ahmed Samatar 1994, 118). To make matters worse, the Somali government armed ethnic Ogadeni refugees from Ethiopia to assist in the fight against the SNM rebels in exchange for the promise of land. In turn, the SNM attacked refugee camps that housed Ethiopians in an attempt to root out armed refugees and to defend their land (Hashim 1997; USCR 1991, 52). The SNM was soon joined by three other major
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rebel groups, including the Somali Patriotic Front (SPF), formed in 1985 by the Ogadeni who resented and blamed Somalia’s defeat by Ethiopia on the Barre regime; the United Somali Congress (USC) formed in 1989 and dominated by the Hawiye, the country’s largest clan centered in Mogadishu; and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) was also formed in 1989 by members of the Ogadeni (Hashim 1997). By 1990, the civil war had spread to the southern parts of the country. In December 1990, the USC captured the central regions of the country. By January 1991, Siad Barre was finally ousted from power by the combined forces of the USC and the SPM. It was in the context of the disruptions and devastation caused by the struggle for power among the armed opposition groups and the Barre dictatorship that large numbers of Somali refugees began to seek sanctuary in Kenya. After the ouster of the Barre regime, the rebel groups that had succeeded in building a coalition to oust a common enemy proved incapable of working together and reaching a power-sharing agreement. Thus, the end of Barre’s harsh rule did not bring peace and stability as anticipated, but more bloodshed and fighting as the various forces that had helped to overthrow Barre began to fight for control over state power and other valuable resources. The USC announced the establishment of a new government and named Ali Mahdi Mohamed the interim president, but this did not sit well with all members of the USC, especially General Mohamed Farah Aideed who played a crucial role in removing Barre. General Aideed strongly believed that he was entitled to head the new government. Although both men were members of the Hawiye clan, they belonged to different subclans. Furthermore, the nomination of Ali Mahdi as interim president was not in agreement with leaders of either the SNM or the SPM. Before long fighting broke out among the followers of Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi in the USC as well as between the USC and the SPM. Indeed, several parts of the country were engulfed in all-out interclan conflicts, including Mogadishu the capital where the fiercest battles were fought. (Lyons and Samatar 1995). The result was a breakdown in all civil authority in the country. The anarchy and chaos that followed led thousands to flee south to Kenya and many more were internally displaced. The U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR) reported “by late 1992, some 300,000 to 500,000 persons had died due to violence, famine, and disease, including half of all children under age 5, according to estimates by the UN and the International Committee for the Red Cross. . . . One million Somalis fled the country, and two million became displaced within Somalia” (USCR 1994, 66).
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Refugees began pouring into Kenya as the fighting intensified in the capital of Mogadishu. Members of clans and subclans associated with the Barre regime were subjected to retribution and they too fled to Kenya. Women were victims of wartime rapes. According to one author, the “atrocities carried out by individuals and militia groups against women and girls in Somalia between 1991 and 1992 were unprecedented in Somali history” (Musse 2004, 69). The Western media began to pay attention to the dire conditions of the refugees and to the Somalis who remained in the country trapped between warring factions. Media images of gangs of heavily armed youths (“some as young nine or ten) scavenging for food or anything else they could get their hands on” roaming the streets of Mogadishu terrorizing innocent civilians and relief workers also focused the minds of Western governments and NGOs (Ahmed Samatar 1994, 126). The dispatch of 34,000 troops by the United States and other countries (24,000 were U.S. troops) to Somalia in December 1992 as part of United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) in an effort to secure the delivery of food supplies did not contain the violence and refugees continued to flee. The would-be refugees now had to contend with fighting between multinational troops and the various militias. By this time, Aideed had formed the Somali National Alliance (SNA) and Ali Mahdi had formed the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA). This split pitted Aideed’s Habir Gedir subclan against Ali Mahdi’s Abgal subclan. However, the U.S. government viewed Aideed as the main instigator behind the civil unrest. To many U.S. policymakers, he had to be stopped and removed. An order went out for Aideed’s arrest along with a reward for his capture. The 1993 U.S.-led UN mission to capture Aideed in Mogadishu resulted in thousands more civilians losing their lives. The fortunate ones were able to escape and many fled to Kenya. When it became apparent that the militias were not going to lay down their weapons, Aideed could not be captured, and American troops were in danger of losing their lives, the United States and other countries began withdrawing their troops from the country and the final UN troop withdrawal was in 1995. The withdrawal of the troops gave the warring factions the green light to continue fighting in the capital and in the southern and central parts of the country. The insecurity in the southern parts of the country, mainly Gedo, Lower Juba, and Kisamyo caused by interclan fighting, coupled with severe drought followed by floods, continued to force refugees into Kenya as refugees found themselves either fleeing from famine, fighting, or floods.
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Altogether 381,500 refugees found their way into Kenya in 1992—the same year that the Somali refugee population peaked at 285,600. As table 2.1 shows, they clearly represented the largest percentage of the refugee population at 75 percent. The other major groups of refugees in the country consisted of Ethiopians and Sudanese, who represented 18 percent and 6 percent respectively of the total refugee population in 1992. Revolution, War, and Ethiopian Refugees As illustrated in table 2.1 above, Ethiopians constituted the third largest group of refugees in Kenya in the early 1990s. Ethiopia, like many other countries covered in this book, has served as both a refugee-producing and refugee-receiving country. For Kenya, most of the Ethiopian refugees who sought sanctuary within its border from 1990 to 2003 did so initially to escape the fighting that ensued following the overthrow of the government of Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1991. From 1991–1992, more than 80,000 Ethiopians fled to Kenya (USCR 1994, 57). As in Somalia, the conflict in Ethiopia that spilled into Kenya and created masses of refugees was rooted in the politics of authoritarianism and protracted struggles against it, and exacerbated by drought and other environmental stresses. Ethiopia’s long history of authoritarian rule entered a new phase following the overthrow of the monarchy and Emperor Haile Selassie in September 1974. The new revolutionary government that was established known as the Derg (also spelled Dergue) was initially popular as it embarked on socialist programs of land distribution and nationalization, but soon proved intolerant and uncompromising in its policies and ruthless in its dealings with opponents. The Derg’s totalitarianism reached new heights when Mengistu Haile Mariam seized power in a coup in 1977 and launched the “Red Terror” involving mass executions and as the regime found itself fighting against rebel forces in Eritrea and Tigray as well as the war with Somalia over the Ogaden. There was no let up following the transformation of the Derg into a vanguard MarxistLeninist party, the Workers’ Party of Ethiopia in 1984, and the formal establishment of civilian rule in 1987. In fact, conditions worsened as wars by various rebel groups flared across the country and famine broke out in 1984–1985 thanks to a severe drought and its disastrous handling by the beleaguered regime. Among the first to feel the brunt of the regime’s brutality were students, teachers, professionals, and other people viewed as “enemies of the revolution” who were killed or run out of the country as part of the Red Terror campaign (Human Rights Watch 1999a). Egregious human
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rights violations were associated with this campaign. Many more people were victims of the government’s mishandling of the 1984 famine in the northern parts of the country controlled by Tigrean and Eritrean rebel groups where forced villagization schemes were implemented. These schemes inflamed local populations and increased the popularity of the rebel forces and swelled their ranks (Zewde 1998; Human Rights Watch 1999a). Estimates indicate that as many as 1 million people died from the 1984–1985 famine, which was far worse than the famine of 1972–1974, which claimed an estimated 200,000 victims (Ezra and Kiros 2000; Sen 2004). This clearly indicates that while the drought itself may have been an act of nature, the subsequent famine was the result of political turmoil, a point that studies of the political economy of food shortages and famine have emphasized in many other contexts.2 As in Somalia, the Ethiopian rebel groups fighting the Mengistu regime had different agendas and constituencies, but they were united in their loathing for the regime and in their determination to see it toppled. The leading groups were the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (EPDM), and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), the EPLF’s predecessor was created in 1958 and spent the next thirty years fighting for Eritrea’s autonomy and independence. Eritrea was a former Italian colony that was federated with Ethiopia by UN mandate in 1952, but within a decade the federal arrangement collapsed and in 1962 Eritrea was annexed by Ethiopia, fueling Eritrea’s war of liberation.3 Created in 1975 and initially a strategic ally of the EPLF, the TPLF drew its support largely from the Tigreyan population in north-central Ethiopia that felt marginalized and was vehemently opposed to the autocratic policies of the Mengistu regime. The EPDM was formed in 1987 as an opposition movement among the Amhara, historically the country’s dominant nationality.4 The OLF was created in 1973 to liberate the Oromo in southern Ethiopia, the country’s largest nationality, from what it regarded as “Ethiopian colonialism.” The EPDM and TPLF were key allies and together by the end of 1989 they had managed to push government troops out of several regions including Tigray, Wollo, and Gondar before they began their long march to the capital, Addis Ababa. By then the EPLF had also liberated large areas of Eritrea and was advancing toward Asmara, the Eritrean capital. The Mengistu dictatorship was cornered. In May 1991, the combined forces of the TPLF and the EPDM overthrew it and Mengistu fled into exile to Zimbabwe. The two groups, together with
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the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO), a group sponsored by the TPLF to weaken the OLF, and the Ethiopian Democratic Officers’ Revolutionary Movement (EDORM) comprised of captured Ethiopian army officers, formed the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which became the country’s new ruling party, under the leadership of Meles Zenawi, the former TPLF leader (Joireman 1997). Unlike Somalia, the Ethiopian state did not collapse. Eritrea was granted its independence in May 1993 following an internationally supervised referendum in which 99.8 percent of the people voted for independence. But the wars to oust the Mengistu regime, combined with the lingering effects of drought and famine, proved disastrous. They left behind widespread devastation and millions of people were dislocated, some of whom trekked across the country’s borders as refugees. Indeed, turmoil within Ethiopia continued and relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea soon deteriorated as the erstwhile allies fell out. A bitter, and to many, inexplicable war erupted between the two countries from 1998 to 2000, leaving behind hundreds of thousands of casualties and the already impoverished economies even more destitute.5 More critical in sustaining the flow of Ethiopian refugees into Kenya were the continuing internal conflicts in Ethiopia. The collapse of the Mengistu regime did not lead to calm and tranquility. Rather, it resulted in thousands of refugees for Kenya—more than 80,000 Ethiopians fled to Kenya during 1991–1992 to escape the ethnic violence that erupted following the overthrow of the Mengistu regime. Many of the refugees were repatriated after a peace accord was signed in late 1992 that ended the fighting between some of the warring factions and approximately 56,000 refugees returned home (USCR 1994, 57). But even after the peace accord was reached, thousands of Ethiopian refugees remained in Kenya and new waves flocked to the country as ethnic clashes and tension continued between various ethnic groups and communities especially in the southern part of the country. Other refugees remained in Kenya or fled to Kenya to escape the drought that no longer allowed them to farm and to raise livestock. The refugee flows were sustained by continuing struggles over environmental resources that were under stress and fierce competition among various groups vying for political power. The new EPRDF government, despite appearances and rhetoric to the contrary, was effectively dominated by the TPLF. This became a source of political tension and conflict, especially in southern Ethiopia from where the majority of Ethiopian refugees into Kenya came. Some have claimed that
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the establishment of the EPRDF as a multiethnic coalition served to promote the interests of the TPLF and camouflage the hegemony of the country’s new Tigrean leadership. According to Zewde (1998, 284), when the TPLF forces “achieved the total liberation of their home province, Tigray, in 1989, their thesis appeared to have been vindicated. But to lord it in a landlocked region not particularly famous for its natural resources was hardly an attractive proposition. Hence the need to spread out into the rest of Ethiopia. But that required a multinational front. And such was the genesis of the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front.” Initially, the TPLF’s goal had been to achieve self-determination and autonomy from the Ethiopian state in whatever form it would eventually take, but “after a period of ambivalence . . . [the TPLF] proclaimed its intention to remain within a democratic, pluralistic decentralized Ethiopian state, if such could be attained” (Markakis 1994, 230; Joireman 1997, 391). The TPLF’s newfound commitment to the preservation of the Ethiopian state was not shared by many Oromo, who have “always been divided, with some of its members supporting a completely independent ‘Oromia’ and others seeking representation within the Ethiopian state” (Markakis 1994, 230; Joireman 1997, 391). During the rule of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) that lasted from July 1991 to May 1995 when the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) was established, “significant numbers of Oromo . . . opposed anything short of their goal of immediate independence for Oromia” (Lyons 1996, 125). It did not take long before the OLF broke with the transitional government and decided to resume armed struggle. This was prompted by the decision by the OLF to boycott the 1992 elections, which meant that it was unable to participate in the political process. This was bound to create problems, especially after violent clashes erupted between the forces of the OLF and the TGE “that threatened to return the country to full-scale civil war” (Lyons 1996, 126). Besides the OLF, the government was engaged in an ongoing war of sorts with other rebel Oromo groups in the southern part of the country bordering Kenya. These groups included the United Oromo People’s Liberation Front (UOPLF) and Oromo People’s Liberation Organization (OPLO). In July 2000 these groups together with the Islamic Oromo Liberation Front (IOLF) and the Oromo Liberation Council (OLC), announced their commitment to “struggle together for the liberation of Oromiya” (Loltu 2000). The civilian population in southern Ethiopia was often caught in the middle of the fighting that forced them to seek asylum in Kenya. The
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ongoing conflict also led to the persecution of many ethnic Oromo in other parts of the country and some opted for the exile of refugee life.6 The Oromo refugees in Kenya claimed that they had a well-founded fear of persecution by the Ethiopian government because many of them feared arrest, detention, and human rights violations while others feared forced conscription (Human Rights Watch 2002e). In 1999, eight years after the EPRDF was supposed to restore peace in Ethiopia, approximately 20,000, mainly Oromo refugees, fled to Kenya (USCR 2000, 98). Oromo students fled to Kenya in 1999–2001 following clashes between students and the police and security forces at Addis Ababa University when students peacefully protested against the presence of police on the campus that they characterized as systematic persecution by the Ethiopian government (Human Rights Watch 2002e). Such were their fears of persecution that the students waged a hunger strike in front of the UNHCR offices in Nairobi after they were informed that they were to be sent to Kakuma or Dadaab refugee camps. They claimed that Ethiopian government agents would kill them if they were sent to the camps. On the other hand, some Oromo refugees in Nairobi claimed that they were targets for attacks and murder by the Ethiopian government (USCR 2000). In addition to the students and ordinary civilians, Ethiopian refugees in Kenya also included several members of the military (officers) and civil servants sought asylum in Kenya—all claiming that they would be killed if they remained or were sent back to Ethiopia, especially after the assassination of the head of the Ethiopian National Security and Immigration Authority in 2001. Another large contingent of Ethiopian refugees in Kenya was made up of ethnic Somalis from the Ogaden region. Some members of this ethnic group, like the Oromos, had long wanted to secede from the Ethiopian state, not to form their own state but rather to join a reconstituted Somali state (IRIN 1999). The EPRDF government, like previous Ethiopian governments, found continued Ogden Somali irredentism intolerable. The armed clashes between government troops and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) pushed refugees across the border into Kenya. Finally, there were Amhara refugees who made asylum claims in Kenya. They were mostly opponents of the government in Addis Ababa who had a well-founded fear of persecution because of their opposition activities. At the heart of the Ethiopian political conundrum that has generated waves of refugees into Kenya since the late 1980s, is the question of how to organize the Ethiopian state, specifically how to restructure federalism. After the overthrow of the Mengistu regime, the new EPRDF government embarked on a bold experiment of ethnic federalism, in
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which ethnicity (nationality) and the right of nationalities to selfdetermination would serve as the cornerstone of regional government and representation and foster federal state reconstruction and legitimacy. To its supporters, the recognition and valorization of ethnicity and institutional arrangements based on ethnic representation are essential to maintaining and promoting democracy and development. To quote Hashim Tewfik Mohammed: The political prevalence of ethnicity and conflict in Ethiopia is largely the consequence of usurpation of institutions of self-governance and the consistent exclusion of ethnic minorities from the political process under the pretext of national integration and unity. The suppression of group identities has become ideological and mobilizing factors against state nationalism. . . . Ethiopia’s transition to democracy and a viable system of governance demands the adoption of ethnic federalism since it allows the effective participation of ethnic communities in the governance process. . . . Accordingly, it is their free will and agreement to live together for mutual economic, social and political benefits that underpins and sustains their union (2004).
Critics have pointed out that the EPRDF government did not practice what it preached. As Zewde (1998, 284) puts it, “in order to continue to maintain its sway over the whole country, while remaining true to its hallowed principle of national self-determination, the EPRDF has had to create a host of puppet ethnic organizations while at the same time harassing and undermining relatively authentic national fronts.” Others have pointed out that, both in principle and reality, power based on ethnicity and region is bound to facilitate the proliferation and predominance of ethnic and regional identities and politics that can lead to national dissension, conflict, and violence that creates refugees (Lyons 1996; Joireman 1997; Keller 2002; 2003). There can be little doubt that whatever the merits of the experiment in ethnic federalism, in the 1990s conditions in Ethiopia remained conducive for the outflow of refugees. Similarly, it cannot be disputed that refugee flows from Ethiopia to the neighboring countries including Kenya will only cease once a workable and sustainable political and economic system has been established in the country, one that promotes security, democracy, and development for the country’s citizens. Protracted Turmoil in the Sudan and Sudanese Refugees Refugee-generating conflicts in the Sudan are equally complex, indeed have an even longer history than in Somalia and Ethiopia. They began
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on the eve of Sudan’s independence in 1955 and from that point onward civil war and unrest have led to tens of thousands of people seeking sanctuary in neighboring countries including Kenya to escape fighting, human rights violations, and the outbreak of famine and diseases. Like its neighbors in the Horn of Africa, the country witnessed refugee outflows, inflows, large internal displacements, and the repatriation of its citizens from neighboring states from the seemingly intractable political conflicts and environmental distress. Fighting in the Sudan has proved apparently impervious to institutional and ideological shifts, as it has “spanned the opposite poles of political activity from a multi-party system through the restrictions of one-party rule, to the extreme military dictatorships. The conflict has survived every form of rule in Sudan” (Ali and Mattews 1999, 192). The Sudan, Africa’s largest country, is extraordinarily complex, composed as it is of people from many different ethnic, linguistic, and cultural backgrounds that go beyond the Arab-Christian, Arab-Black African, and North-South dichotomies often peddled in the popular media. Its conflicts are rooted in colonial histories of divide and rule and uneven regional development and postcolonial despotism and inequalities. The enduring struggles for resources and power that lie behind many of the country’s conflicts have been framed by shifting political and economic regimes within the country as well as by the changing imperatives of regional and geopolitical dynamics and pressures. The various conflicts have been articulated in different ideological languages at different times. Some have been secessionist in their inspiration, others for regime change of the central government; some have been driven by secular struggles over the distribution of resources, and others by religious fervor.7 As far as the Sudanese refugee influx into Kenya in the 1990s is concerned, the most important conflict has been the current civil war that began in 1983—the country’s second civil war following its independence from Great Britain in 1956. A major catalyst for the civil war was the imposition of Islamic shari’a law throughout the country that served to further alienate large populations in the southern part of the country, most of whom were not Muslim. But this was not simply a religious conflict between northern Muslims and southern Christians or a battle based solely on regional, religious, and ethnic differences between “Arabs” and “Africans” as portrayed in the Western media (Jok and Hutchinson 1999).8 To be sure, the Sudanese government was pitted against the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its military wing, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) headed by John
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Garang, a member of the Dinka ethnic group, the largest in southern Sudan. Besides the Dinka, the SPLA/SPLM also attracted widespread support from the Nuer, the second largest ethnic group in southern Sudan (Human Rights Watch 2003). People from the two groups are disproportionately Christian or adherents of “traditional” religions. But support for the SPLA as a movement or for its objectives was not confined to the south, nor was opposition to the Sudanese government confined to the south. For example, the Union of Sudanese African Parties (USAP) and the United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF) are based in the north and they support the interests and plight of the southern Sudanese population (Global Security 2004). There are several groups found throughout the country that would like to see the current administration overthrown. They include the Sudan Alliance Forces, which is a group of northern former military officers; Beja Congress (located in the eastern part near the border with Eritrea) consists of non-Arab Muslims who are opposed to the government’s attempt to impose the Arabic language and culture on non-Arab populations. Also, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) were opposed to the government and in 1995 the SPLA joined with the NDA “giving further credence to its claim that it was not a southern regional movement, but was national in character” (Institute for Security Studies 2005, 4). Finally, the Darfur region, located in western Sudan has continued to be a thorn in the side of the government, especially after the Sudan Liberation Movement/ Army (SLA/M) was founded in 2003. Leaders of the organization allege that they were forced to take up arms against the government due to the “underdevelopment and marginalisation” of the region (Amnesty International 2003a). The war between the SPLA and the government and other struggles in the Sudan in the 1980s and 1990s were essentially about the configuration of power in the country and how that power should be reconfigured in order to allow more groups to have access to state power and resources. The SPLA did not advocate secession as the Anyanya movement had done in the 1960s. According to Anderson (1999, 70–71), “the rebels wanted a unified but reformed and progressive Sudan, with equal democratic rights for all. They called for ‘liberation’ of the entire country, a new and democratic government, solution of national and religious issues in a democratic and secular context, federal-style regionalism, and end of the monopoly of power in Khartoum.” Kok (1992, 104) has memorably characterized the conflict as “a fight over strategic resources—oil and water.”
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Thus, the distribution and democratization of political power and control over key resources especially the oil fields, not to mention agricultural land, were at the center of the conflict. The south had demanded autonomy to end the first civil war that began in 1956, which the government, headed by Gaafar Mohamed Nimeiri, agreed to in the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement. But in a move designed to show its control and power, which in the end helped fuel the outbreak of war, Nimeiri ordered southern troops to move to the north, although under the Addis Ababa Agreement the soldiers were to be stationed in the south. When they refused, the government invaded the south and the troops fled to Ethiopia (Johnson 2003). Quite crucial in the government’s calculations to weaken the 1972 peace accord was oil, which was “discovered after the Addis Ababa agreement had been signed and the regional government for the South was established” (Jok 2001, 135). This meant that the government did not have “immediate control over or easy access to the south’s mineral and oil wealth” (Ali and Mattews 1999, 208). To remedy this, Nimeiri simply redrew regional boundaries and made the oilfields a part of the north (Khalid 2003). The government was determined that economic revenues from the oil would benefit the north and not the south. It proceeded to craft an oil policy that excluded the south. For example, Chevron Oil, the company that discovered the oil reserves, at the government’s behest moved its main operations out of the south to the north. To add insult to injury, government officials in the south were deliberately not informed about oil policy; the government decided to locate an oil refinery in a newly created province in the north (Nimeiri named himself governor of this province) instead of the south without consulting with officials in the south; and the government even gave the oil fields a name that did not reflect their southern locations (Kok 1992; Khalid 2003). Finally, the government decided to construct an oil pipeline to Port Sudan where a refinery would be built instead of refining the oil where it was located. The pipeline was completed in 1999 and oil reserves from the south were brought to the north to be refined and then exported. All this enraged people in the south. It meant that neither the ordinary people nor the administration in the south could take advantage of this valuable regional resource through employment and tax revenues, all of which could promote the region’s economic development. Thus, there was hardly any compensation to the communities—mainly the Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups—living on or near these valuable reserves for the losses they incurred through removals. On the contrary, people in the oil-producing areas lost valuable lands and other resources for their
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livelihoods. When students demonstrated in 1982 throughout southern Sudan several were killed (Jok 2001). By the 1990s, the government had “embarked upon a more sophisticated displacement campaign, through the use of divide-and-conquer tactics: it bought off rebel factions and exacerbated south-south ethnic differences with arms supplies” (Human Rights Watch 2003, 49). In this way, argue Jok and Hutchinson (1999), Dinka and Nuer identities were militarized and politicized and thus polarized. In the past the Dinka and Nuer had fought over cattle, water, and grazing land for their livestock. They frequently engaged in cattle raids, but disagreements were settled and the scale of killings that was evident during the 1990s did not exist. It is evident that the issue of oil had wider implications for the country’s economic development and the escalating civil war. In addition, there was a growing conflict over agricultural lands as well (Jok 2001). The northern part of the country for the most part had a hot desert climate, which limited its farming potential. Therefore, the government sought new agricultural resources in the south, a region endowed with more fertile soils and rainfall than the north. The north’s quest for water was illustrated in the Jonglei Canal project—a joint project with Egypt designed to provide water for irrigation. “Designed to save enormous amounts of water otherwise evaporating from the vast Sudd swamp, the canal would drain the swamp and create new agricultural land. More water would flow in the Nile, benefiting agriculture in northern Sudan and Egypt” (Anderson 1999, 38). Again, as with the oil plans, the southern population was not informed about the project and demonstrations erupted because people feared that the environmental damage caused by such a scheme would cause irreparable harm to the land and their livelihoods. The SPLA viewed the Jonglei Canal project and the oil operations by Chevron as part of the government’s plans to exploit the south’s land and minerals—both sites were dragged into the civil war when they become targets of attacks by the SPLA (Warburg 2000; Kok 1992). Clearly, the issues of oil, land, and water were all intertwined in the conflict. Although the SPLA, under Garang, declared in its Manifesto that it did not want secession for the south, it was clear that it wanted to control the oil fields and the rich agricultural lands and water supplies of the south. When Nimeiri’s military dictatorship was replaced in 1986 by the civilian government of Sadiq al-Mahdi, leader of the moderate Islamic Ummah Party, it appeared that the war, which continued, might deescalate. But it was not to be. Al-Madhi’s government was overthrown in a military coup
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in 1989. The new military regime led by Omar Hassan al-Bashir was supported by influential Muslim clerics who saw the opportunity to entrench shari’a. The fighting between the government and the SPLA intensified and took on a new turn and tone—Sudan was now an Islamic state and not just the south, but the entire country was subject to the strictures of the new dispensation. This was the objective of the National Islamic Front (NIF), led by Hassan Abdullah al-Turabi a key ally of al-Bashir before the two fell out in 2000. The NIF “was committed not just to an Islamic state, but to a particular interpretation of Islamic law that included the death penalty for apostasy” ( Johnson 2003, 79). The escalating fighting between government troops and SPLA from 1983 to 1991 (the SPLA split in 1991) led to the death of thousands of Sudanese, the emergence of refugees who mainly fled to Ethiopia, and a massive internally displaced population as women, men, and children trekked to Khartoum and other urban areas in the north in hopes of finding food, shelter, and peace. However, for many their nightmare simply took a turn for the worse as the government and its agencies wantonly violated their human rights. The government viewed the internally displaced population as illegal squatters and their self-constructed dwellings were frequently demolished. In any case, the crumbling infrastructure of the cities could not accommodate the new arrivals and most went without basic social services such as housing, medical care, and educational facilities (Jok 2001). Women were particularly vulnerable. Many were detained and jailed, and some were forced into prostitution or turned to brewing beer to earn money to survive. It is important to note that women suffered human rights violations from all parties involved in the war including abuses by the SPLA in the south. Women were abducted and forced to provide domestic and sexual services to the fighters; they had their property stolen and destroyed; and government troops and rebel groups denied them access to food provided by relief agencies (Salam and de Waal 2001). Sudan’s long-running civil war intensified in 1991 as parts of the country spiraled into further violence after the SPLA split into factions, although it had “succeeded in driving the national army out of most of the South and stood poised for an assault on the regional capital at Juba” (Jok and Hutchinson 1999, 126). From now on innocent civilians who were previously caught between government troops and the SPLA found themselves caught between warring factions of the SPLA as the Dinka/Nuer coalition within the SPLA disintegrated. The SPLA was now split into two clear factions—SPLA-Mainstream (Torit Group) led
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Table 2.2 Country
Refugees into Tanzania, 1992–2002 in ’000
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
Burundi 149,500 444,900 202,700 227,200 385,500 459,400 473,800 499,000 538,400 521,200 540,800 Rwanda 50,000 51,900 626,200 548,000 20,000 400 4,800 20,100 27,400 3,000 2,700 DRC 16,000 16,000 16,100 16,000 55,200, 74,300 58,300 98,500 110,400 117,500 140,300 Other 75,200 48,700 34,700 34,700 33,200 33,200 — — — — — Source: UNHCR 2002f, A7; UNHCR 2004c, Annex A7.
by Garang and SPLA-United (Nasir Group) led by Riek Machar an ethnic Nuer.9 Machar later formed the Southern Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A) that subsequently was changed to the UDSF and was still later changed to the South Sudan Defense Force (SSDF) following its alliance with the national government. Civilians in the rural areas “were caught off-guard by this sudden turn of events but were soon swept up in a spiral of military raids and counter-raids with little hope of mediation” in fighting that appeared to be based on ethnic lines and to stoke ethnic animosities (Jok and Hutchinson 1999, 126). Thousands of people fleeing from the expanding conflict slipped across the border and ended up in Kenya’s Kakuma refugee camp as the Nuer and Dinka communities became more polarized and militarized beginning in 1991 (Johnson 2003). The Khartoum government appeared only too willing to enter into alliances with militia groups (formed along ethnic lines) in the south and to supply them with arms in order to turn these movements against each other and weaken them collectively. This only served to prolong the war, which in turn, produced tens of thousands of refugees for Kenya throughout the 1990s as shown in table 2.1 above. As the cases of Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan clearly demonstrate, the forces and factors that generated refugees for Kenya from the three countries were exceedingly complex, certainly more complex than what is often described in the Western media. Similarly, the refugees from the neighboring countries who fled to Tanzania from 1990–2003 were created by conditions and conflicts that were also complex and multifaceted. This is as true of Rwanda as it is of Burundi and the DRC, the three countries that supplied the largest numbers of refugees to Tanzania as illustrated in table 2.2. The Generation of Refugees for Tanzania Refugees from the Great Lakes region who sought sanctuary in Tanzania did so to escape civil wars and human rights violations that accompanied
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the wars and in the case of Rwanda, genocide. All parties involved in the various conflicts perpetrated human rights violations and crimes that included: rape, abductions, extra judicial killings, beatings, detention, and looting. Civil wars broke out in all three countries that had their roots in ethnic, political, regional, and economic factors. The civil wars in each country pitted various militia and rebel groups against government forces. The governments attempted to hold onto their political power and the economic benefits that accompanied it. At the same time, rebel or insurgent groups attempted to oust the ruling government in order to control the state and its resources. Refugees from the Horn of Africa who fled to Kenya faced a similar predicament—fighting and human rights violations by government troops and insurgent groups that found civilians caught in the middle. Whether in the Horn of Africa or the Great Lakes region, refugees were further forced to flee when fighting broke out among the various insurgent groups. Finally, the accompanying conditions and problems of civil wars forced individuals into Kenya and Tanzania—the destruction of the infrastructure, people’s inability to farm and to engage in economic activities, and an increase in hunger, famine, and disease. Table 2.2 indicates that in 1992 Tanzania had a small refugee population compared to the numbers that followed beginning in 1993 with 444,900 refugees from Burundi. The next two years saw the country’s refugee population increase with the thousands of refugees from Rwanda. Conflicts, Genocide, and Rwandan Refugees Like the coverage of most conflicts in Africa, the Western media portrayed the 1994 genocide in Rwanda strictly in “tribal” terms—the Hutus were bent on annihilating all Tutsis and anyone who sympathized with them. However, the mass killings that erupted in Rwanda were caused by much more than the Hutus’ hatred of the Tutsis. In other words, this was more than ethnic genocide and “the unit of analysis is not the relationship between the Tutsi or Hutu, but the political nature of the nation-state” (Waters 1995, 345). The causes of the genocide were rooted in longstanding economic, historical, ethnic, and political problems in the country that had not been adequately addressed and resolved. As with the conflicts between the Dinka and Nuer in Sudan and among the various clans in Somalia, the Hutus and Tutsis had disagreements previously and each group was responsible for killing the other, but the level of bloodletting in 1994 was unprecedented. For example,
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during the 1959 “revolution” that expelled the Tutsi monarchy and ushered in Hutu power, approximately 20,000 people were massacred, and “from December 1963 to January 1964 . . . between 10,000 and 13,000 Tutsi civilians” were killed by the Rwandan army that mainly constituted Hutu soldiers (Bhavnani and Backer 2000, 286). And the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA), the armed wing of the RPF, killed hundreds of Hutus as it advanced to Kigali following the genocide in 1994 and in previous military campaigns (Lemarchand 1998). But the genocide itself was horrific in its scale and the swiftness with which it was executed. An estimated 800,000 to 1 million people were killed within a spate of six weeks (USCR 1995, 70). Like the mass killings in southern Sudan, but on a larger scale, the Rwandan genocide was sustained by the proliferation of weapons into the country that ended up in the hands of ethnically based militias, although it was reported that most Rwandan victims were killed by machetes. For the purposes of this study and this chapter, it is not necessary to provide a detailed examination of the colonial policy and treatment of the two groups, first by the Germans and then the Belgians that resulted in the manifestation of a Tutsi and Hutu identity in racial terms. At this point, it is sufficient to state that historically the two groups were very similar—they spoke the same language and practiced the same religion; they intermarried; they enjoyed a mutually interdependent economic relationship that for the most part found Tutsis (patrons) as cattle owners and Hutus (clients) as farmers and; they lived peacefully side by side (Clapham 1998; Uvin 1997). According to Lemarchand (1970, 40), although the patron–client relationship in the precolonial era depended on reciprocity, it left the Hutus in an inferior position, which “reinforced social and political inequalities between Hutu and Tutsi which are still manifested today.” For his part Fisiy (1998, 20) contends, “what instead served as a frame of reference for ethnic identity was the historical fact that the Hutu were farmers while the Tutsi were herdsmen. This provided the basis for different trajectories in wealth formation and accumulation of social capital.” But another scholar has argued that neither group had a monopoly on farming or pastoralism and as such “agricultural and pastoral activities were hardly exclusive; they tended to be carried out jointly in most regions” (Mamdani 1996, 61). Whatever the case, the relationship between the two groups changed during the course of colonial rule. The Germans followed by the Belgians were preoccupied with placing people in neat, inflexible categories and when none existed, they invented them. The European colonizers decided that the Tutsis were the descendents of Nilotic (East
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African/Ethiopian) or Hamitic (Middle Eastern and European) people who migrated to Rwanda and in their minds they did not share the same physical characteristics of the Hutu or Twa ethnic groups they encountered (Jefremovas 2002). They were convinced that the Tutsi were tall in stature, slender in build, and lighter in complexion—all traits that made them superior to the Hutus. Hutus, on the other hand, were supposedly darker in complexion, larger in build, and possessed more “indigenous African or Negroid” facial features. For these reasons, the colonizers viewed them as inferior and began to construct an administration to exploit these invented differences. Thus, these new differences began to take on political, economic, and social significance as the colonial administration blatantly favored the Tutsi over the Hutu in terms of jobs in the colonial administration, educational facilities, and placement in the military. When the Belgians began the policy of issuing identity cards in the 1930s, ethnicity was easily identified and made more concrete (Fisiy 1998). Another scholar notes that “under indirect rule, social relationships in Rwanda changed greatly: they became more uniform, rigid, unequal and exploitative, with a clear hierarchy from Bazungu to Tutsi to Hutu to Twa, with persons at each higher level having privileges denied to those at lower levels and disdaining those below them. The Bazungu were the Europeans who controlled the colony and the Twa were the minority ethnic group that comprised approximately one percent of the population” (Uvin 1997, 96). Before the imposition of colonial rule, a Tutsi monarchy and government had existed in Rwanda. The Germans and Belgians incorporated them into the colonial administration, but as independence approached, the Belgians decided to side with the Hutus after a bloody revolt in 1959 and the Tutsi monarchy was overthrown in 1961 (Clapham 1998). Thus, the country gained its independence in 1962 with the majority population, the Hutu, in power, but not before thousands of Tutsis were killed and thousands more were forced to flee to Uganda, Tanzania, and Burundi (Valentino 2004). The groundwork for civil war and civil strife was laid due to these economic and political conditions, although when Juvenal Habyarimana came to power in a 1973 coup orchestrated by the Forces Armee Rwandaise (FAR), the prospects for building harmonious relations between the Hutus and Tutsis looked positive. In fact, as one author observed, “in spite of nearly ten years of independence under a Hutu regime, the Tutsi continued to hold prominent positions in education, the civil service, and the economy” (Reed 1996, 482). They also held positions in the church. Mamdani (2001, 134) is less sanguine,
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noting that, “after 1964, Tutsi presence was forcibly removed from the political arena. The political sphere was confined to the Hutu, members of the Hutu nation.” However, under Habyarimana’s one-party regime led by the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND), efforts were made to include the Tutsis in the political process, but on a limited basis “for power must remain Hutu” (Mamdani 2001, 140). At the beginning of his rule, Habyarimana enjoyed widespread popularity among the Tutsis, however, it could not be sustained after the government attempted to enact quotas (they were not often enforced), that were designed to limit Tutsi advancement and placement in the government, schools, the creation of militias that spouted anti-Tutsi propaganda, and the government’s refusal to negotiate on the issue of the return of Tutsi refugees. The government made the argument that the country did not have enough room to accommodate the refugees and “the Tutsi residents outside Rwanda must find a way to regularize their stay outside Rwanda” (Mamdani 2001, 38). Further complicating the Rwandan political landscape was regionalism, which also played a crucial role in determining the allocation of state resources that often flowed into the regions of the ruling party and its supporters. This was how it was under Gregoire Kayibanda, who headed the first Hutu government, and that was how it continued under Habyarimana (Pottier 2002). This meant that under Kayibanda the central and southern parts of the country benefited and under his successor, the northern and western regions enjoyed greater access to state resources and power and “in all likelihood, during the last two decades, Hutus from the South were as discriminated against in access to, for example, schools and universities, as Tutsi” (Uvin 1997, 101). The end result was not only Hutu-Tutsi animosity but also Hutu-Hutu animosity often based on regions, which “explains why the first victims of Hutu extremist genocide in 1994 were mostly Hutu from Central and Southern Rwanda regions” (Kakwenzire and Kamukama 2000, 65). Thus, in the years leading to the genocide, Rwanda was politically a one-party state with all of the characteristics of dictatorial rule and human rights abuses, not just against the minority Tutsi population but also against many Hutus. The regime targeted all those who were opposed to it, including Hutus it viewed as sympathetic toward the Tutsis, members of the former Kayibanda regime, and those who were not from Habyarimana’s northern district (Uvin 1997). In addition, Rwandans who were interested in upholding human rights, establishing a multiparty democracy, and engaging in talks with representatives of the
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rebel movement operating from Uganda, the RPF ran the risk of being killed or run out of the country (Destexhe 1995). However, the Habyarimana dictatorial regime was unable to escape the winds of democratization that swept over so many African countries in the 1990s and the call for multiparty democratic elections by both Hutus and Tutsis within civil society could not be ignored. This was a powerful backdrop to the crisis of state power that exploded into the genocide of 1994. The economic crisis that faced the country beginning in the late 1980s also played a role in the events that led to the genocide. As noted in the introduction, Rwanda’s principal export crop, coffee was not providing the government with its usual revenues as world prices remained stagnant and began to decline in the 1980s and the country suffered from a reduction in food production from 1985 to 1990 (Hintjens 1999; Mamdani 2001). This, coupled with a debt burden that could not be sustained (estimated at $951.7 million in 1994 or 127 percent of the country’s gross domestic product), increasing pressure and competition over scarce land, high unemployment in urban areas, a peasantry that was frustrated and disgruntled by its increasing inability to eke out an existence, and farmers who could either not produce due to the conflict or received lower prices for their crops than before, put the country on the brink of implosion. Finally, with the imposition of SAPs by the IMF and World Bank that called for the devaluation of Rwanda’s currency in 1990 all segments of society were pressured to find money for school fees, food, medical care, housing, and land as inflation rose, which was why members of the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi militias disproportionately came from the ranks of the unemployed and landless (Pottier 2002). All of these economic problems did not convince the government to relax its grip on power. In fact, they had the opposite effect—the government and its supporters closed rank in an attempt to maintain what power was left regardless of increasing internal and external pressure to open up the political process. The invasion by the RPF in 1990 had economic and political ramifications that contributed to the genocide. The economic ramifications were that at a time when the economy was undergoing structural changes demanded by the IMF and almost all segments of the population experienced the effects of devaluation, falling coffee and tea prices, rising prices for basic commodities, and a decrease in spending for social services, the government had to appropriate scarce resources to its military budget to fend off the RPF. In this context, the role of the international players and arms suppliers also needs to be addressed. According to Goose and Smyth (1994, 89),
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“more than a dozen nations helped fuel the Rwandan war, and both sides appear to have purchased considerable weaponry through private sources on the open market. By its own admission, the Rwanda government bankrupted its economy to pay for those weapons.” As a result of the RPF’s invasion and the ensuing civil war, approximately 1 million people were displaced one year before the genocide began (Unvin 1998). Many of these people were from the northwest and they were coffee and tea farmers, therefore, if the country was experiencing a reduction in external revenues, the internal displacement problem did not bode well for improving it. In the meantime, the government’s main external supporter, France, demanded a political solution to the domestic problems in Rwanda and threatened to cut off military assistance if Habyarimana continued to drag his feet on the issue of democratization, although it must be stressed that it was Rwandan civil society including many Hutus rather than the French who first called for a change in government, and an end to regional favoritism and corruption (Valentino 2004). However, the role of regional powers in events that led to the genocide in Rwanda needs to be discussed, especially the role of Uganda. During the 1960s, thousands of Tutsi refugees from Rwanda sought sanctuary in Uganda, but under the regimes of Idi Amin and Milton Obote, they suffered right along with Ugandan citizens. Therefore, when Yoweri Museveni, Uganda’s current president, and others formed the National Resistance Movement (NRM) and its military wing, the National Resistance Army (NRA) in 1980 to overthrow Obote, the children of the Rwandan refugees who fled to Uganda during the 1960s joined. In addition, one of the founders of the NRM/NRA, included Rwanda’s current president, Paul Kagame, who fought alongside Museveni to overthrow the Milton Obote government in 1986—in total 4,000 exiled Tutsi refugees served in the NRA (Reed 1996; Khadiagala 1993). Kagame also served as head of the NRA’s military intelligence and the two were longtime allies (BBC November 14, 2000). Furthermore, Fred Rwigyema, who was also one of the founders of the NRA and an exiled Tutsi, led the invasion into Rwanda from Uganda. Following the ouster of Obote, Kagame and other Rwandans in exile in Uganda enjoyed the support of Museveni’s government, but there were critics due to the heavy involvement of Rwandans in Uganda’s military. According to Reed (1996, 487), “indeed, critics began to characterize the NRA as an army of foreigners, and some went as far as to say Yoweri Museveni himself was a Rwandan.” The writing was on the wall that the RPF, founded in 1987, regardless of its role in the ouster of Obote, would have to leave Uganda. Rwandan members of the NRA, along with the RPF used their military training in
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Uganda and proceeded to launch an invasion into Rwanda in October 1990 from Uganda. Frank Smyth (1994) asserts that the RPF invaded “with Museveni’s silent blessings, and with Ugandan weapons.” The RPF was not able to defeat the Rwandan government troops that were assisted by troops from the DRC, and it resorted to operating from the remote Vumba mountains that border Uganda (Reed 1996). In sum, the economic situation before the war was made worse by internal displacement and farmers’ inability to produce crops while war raged all around them. In the end, the government agreed, at least on paper as part of the 1993 Arusha Accord, to a ceasefire with the RPF/A, power sharing, multiparty elections, an integrated military that would incorporate elements of the RPF/A, and the refugees’ right of return (Clapham 1998). However, none of these concessions would come to fruition partly because the people who believed they had the most to lose were not included in the negotiations nor should they have been according to Clapham (1998) because they were not committed to a peaceful resolution. The latter included members of the ruling party (whose name had been changed to National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development—(MRNDD), Coalition for the Defense of the Republic (CDR), and the Akazu, described by Scherrer (2002, 105) as the “invisible government of Rwanda during Habyarimana’s reign.” These were a few powerful elites connected to Habyarimana’s wife, her brothers, and the government. The agreement stated that the RPF would receive “five cabinet seats in the transitional government, as many as Habyarimana’s own party. Fifty percent of the command positions in the integrated army were to be filled by members of the RPF. The new political system substantially reduced the authority of Rwanda’s president, emphasizing parliamentary politics and thereby increasing the RPF’s power as a major opposition” (Valentino 2004, 181). All this was too much for the supporters of Habyarimana and Hutu power to accept. Powerful opponents of these concessions used organs of the state to derail the agreement and to spread anti-Tutsi propaganda in newspapers, on the radio, and through political parties and militias that portrayed the Tutsi as the enemy of all Hutu who had to be completely eliminated (Unvin 1998). Thus, bloodletting that the world had not witnessed since the Khmer Rouge genocide in Cambodia in 1975–1979 that killed 1.7 million people was unleashed in April 1994. All the surrounding countries to Rwanda including Tanzania were forced to deal with one of the world’s largest refugee crises. At that time Tanzania had just weathered another large influx of refugees from Burundi in 1993 as table 2.2 illustrates.
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Altogether 626,200 Rwandan refugees went to Tanzania as compared to 1.3 million to DRC in 1994, this represented 71 percent of Tanzania’s total refugee population. Still, other surrounding countries accommodated the refugee influx—278,100 in Burundi, 97,000 in Uganda, and 2,100 in Kenya (UNHCR 2004c, Table A7). Burundi’s Recurrent Conflict and Burundian Refugees The history of Burundi parallels that of Rwanda in many important respects and the factors that created refugees for the neighboring countries including Tanzania are broadly similar. The two countries are comparable in their ethnic composition—they have a Hutu majority, Tutsi minority, and an even smaller Twa population. Refugees from Burundi who fled to Tanzania between 1993 and 2003 were similar to refugees who fled in 1965, 1969, 1972, 1988, and 1991—they were mostly Hutus who fled political violence that left thousands of people dead and others were forced into exile. As in Rwanda, more was at play in Burundi than ethnicity per se, and the ethnic typologies were not primordial identities, they only became so in the course of colonial rule and after independence (Lemarchand 1996). According to Waters (2003:68) Burundi’s “social world has been divided (at different times and contexts) into Hutu, Tutsi, Twa and Ganwa; Rwandan and Burundian; Highlander and Lowlander, and northerner and southerner.” Political power was actually exercised by the princely Ganwa. Both Hutu and Tutsi clans obtained influence and economic benefits by serving the Ganwa aristocracy. Burundi, like Rwanda, had a history of both groups coexisting because they also shared a common culture, history, language, and religion, intermarriage occurred, and particular occupations were not the monopoly of the Tutsi or Hutu, and one’s position could shift from Hutu to Tutsi and vice versa. In fact, “identity was instrumentally defined by the monarch, with primordial assumptions of ethnic differences less important than social status in the kingdom” (KadendeKaiser and Kaiser 1997, 31). Like Rwanda, Burundi was first under German then Belgian colonial rule, and both colonial powers drew sharp distinctions between the Hutu and Tutsi. People were placed in ethnic categories and the Tutsi were believed to be superior to the Hutu and Twa for the same reasons— the Tutsi had allegedly migrated to the area and possessed distinctive physical characteristics that made them more beautiful, attractive, and cultured than the Hutu and Twa (Lemarchand 1996). These invented standards of beauty and behavior allowed the colonizers to racialize and
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rigidify ethnic distinctions. Although Hutu and Tutsi were both farmers and pastoralists, the Europeans made the determination that raising cattle was strictly the occupation of the Tutsi and the Hutu were solely farmers. The Belgians used the Tutsi chiefs to maintain order and control as well as the Ganwa monarchy that ultimately benefited the Tutsis who were viewed as superior. Thus, “in order to strengthen their control of the territory, German and Belgian colonizers exploited the existing social hierarchy to codify and institutionalize the domination of the royal family and the Tutsi over the Hutu and the Twa” (Ndikumana 1998, 32). This had profound implications for the future because “sub-ethnic, clan identity played a crucial role in determining one’s status during the monarchy. Both Hutu and Tutsi participated in royal activities before the arrival of the Germans and Belgians, who deliberately increased Tutsi participation in Ganwa-dominated monarchical governance at the expense of select Hutu clans” (Kadende-Kaiser and Kaiser 1997, 32). Therefore, the Tutsis were able to take advantage of colonial rule in terms of jobs, educational opportunities, and other colonial perks. The social unrest/revolution that occurred in neighboring Rwanda in 1959 had a profound effect on Burundi. As thousands of Rwandan Tutsi refugees streamed into Burundi to escape ethnic violence, the Tutsi king Mwambusta IV, leaders, and politicians began to wonder if the same unrest could erupt in Burundi and whether they would lose their privileged positions in society. Throughout the pre-independence period in Burundi, politicians and other leaders both Hutu and Tutsi were unable to build a coalition that allowed both groups to engage in power sharing, although early attempts were made through the nationalist party, the Union for National Progress (UPRONA), that “had both Hutu and Tutsi membership from the grassroots level” (Rutake and Gahama 1998, 87). UPRONA served as the country’s only party until the 1990s when the winds of democratization began blowing and pressure mounted for political liberalization. The period following independence did not show many signs of improvement in the relations between Hutu and Tutsi. In 1965, the prime minister, Pierre Ngendandumwe, a Hutu, was assassinated by a Tutsi refugee. In fresh parliamentary elections UPRONA was swept back into power with a Hutu majority, but King Mwambutsa IV refused to name a Hutu prime minister and instead appointed a Tutsi prime minister. Hutu soldiers retaliated by killing the Tutsi prime minister; Hutu and Tutsi military personnel engaged in killings. In 1966, there was a Tutsi-led military coup that brought Michael Micombero and the military to power and led to the abolition of the monarchy. The result was
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“while the Hutu make up the majority of the population . . . the minority Tutsi . . . controls the government, the military, and the economy” (Ndikumana 1998, 30). Attempts by the Hutu to level the political, economic, and social playing field were met with harsh repression, reprisals, and human rights abuses that generated refugees for Tanzania. This led to growing Hutu resentment and the ethnic clashes of 1972, prompted by a Hutu-led coup attempt and killings of 2,000 Tutsis by returned Hutu refugees, and in reprisal the Tutsi-dominated army massacred about between 100,000 and 200,000 Hutus and another 300,000 fled to the neighboring countries, mostly Tanzania. Hutu intellectuals and professionals were particularly targeted (Human Rights Watch 1998). As in Rwanda, there were complex regional dynamics that cannot be ignored. The real beneficiaries of the shift in power to the Tutsis were the southern Tutsis, especially those who were in the military. Tutsis in the southern part of the country were targeted during the 1972 violence (Ould-Abdallah 2000). Under the regime of Jean-Baptiste Bagaza that came to power in a 1976 bloodless coup, “the army and government became increasingly under the control of Bagaza’s political confidants, many of who were Tutsi from the south” (Kadende-Kaiser and Kaiser 1997, 35). In an effort to silence the Hutus, Bagaza discouraged people from referring to themselves in ethnic terms, and made it difficult for churches and missionaries to operate in the country because he believed they sided with the Hutus (Human Rights Watch 1998). In the opinion of Rutake and Gahama (1998, 79) “the bloody events of the 1970s occurred at a time when the regime in power was characterized by intrigue, clientelism, nepotism, regionalism and ethnicism. The Hutu/ Tutsi problem is neither a social nor an economic problem. It is essentially a political problem of how this or that ethnic group comes to and stays in power.” In 1987, Bagaza was overthrown in a coup led by Pierre Buyoya, who tried to open the doors for “more political and religious liberalization” (Ould-Abdallah 2000, xxii). During the latter part of the 1980s and first part of the 1990s, it appeared that Burundi was on its way to achieving national unity and many segments of society felt, despite continuing violence that killed thousands of people, that ethnic strife would eventually be contained for it appeared that dialogue on ethnicity and the redistribution of power was now possible thanks to mounting internal and external pressures for democratization (Scherrer 2002). Some saw political liberalization as an opportunity “to openly express their ethnic identities without fear of government reprisal. During this period, there was a proliferation of newspapers published in the capital city that articulated a
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variety of ethno-nationalist perspectives on the rapidly changing political landscape” (Kadende-Kaiser and Kaiser 1997, 35). In the face of the demands for political reform, the Tutsi political elite seemed more willing to accept that colonial rule and successive postcolonial governments had indeed disadvantaged the Hutu in terms of employment and educational opportunities, and attempted to rectify the situation. But many Hutus were impatient for meaningful change in political power and representation to reflect the country’s population distribution, in which the Hutu enjoyed a clear majority (Weinstein and Schrire 1976). In the meantime, some Hutu refugees in Tanzania organized the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (Palipehutu) and the Front for National Liberation (Frolina) and attempted to invade the country in 1991 and 1992. The desperate efforts of Hutu refugees to return to Burundi echoed those of Tutsi refugees to return to Rwanda. The military responded in customary manner—hundreds of Hutus were killed. Thus, political liberalization did not reduce tensions in the country, despite the adoption, through a national referendum, of a charter of unity and a democratic constitution, and the appointment of a Hutu prime minister, Melchior Ndadaye, after the elections of June 1993, which were won by the Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU). The political parties were formed along ethnic lines and the previously multi-ethnic UPRONA became associated with the Tutsi while many Hutus joined FRODEBU (Kadende-Kaiser and Kaiser 1997). After FRODEBU’s electoral victory, the new government began making strenuous efforts to reverse decades of discrimination against Hutus and between 10,000 and 30,000 mainly Hutu refugees returned and sought to reclaim their property seized by Tutsis (USCR 1995; Rutake and Gahama 1998; Ndikumana 1998). In the ensuing political turmoil, Ndadaye was assassinated, along with other high-ranking political figures and the military stepped back into power. Following Ndadaye’s assassination, “Hutu blockaded roads in the northern, central, and eastern parts of the country . . . . In a period of only a few weeks, anywhere from 30,000 to 50,000 people were slain, roughly an equal number from each ethnic group. Thousands of Hutu fled into exile” and militias were formed along Hutu and Tutsi lines (Human Rights Watch 1998, 15; Scherrer 2002). “One more time,” laments Ndikumana (1998, 36), “democracy was derailed for the sake of ethnic and military supremacy. Unlike earlier ethnic conflicts (in 1965, 1969, 1972, 1988, and 1991) the crisis that followed the October 1993 military coup attempt has been longer, bloodier, and has affected the entire country.”
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In the aftermath of Ndadaye’s assassination and the ensuing political crisis and violence, 200,000 refugees fled to Tanzania and at one point during the year as many as 500 per day entered the country prompting the government to close its border (USCR 1994, 71). Burundi’s president, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya (Hutu) was killed in 1994 in the same plane crash that killed Rwanda’s president, Habyarimana and by the end of the year Burundi’s long simmering civil war had erupted. In the meantime, yet another coup took place in 1996 (Buyoya resumed power) that sent thousands of Hutus fleeing to Tanzania as interethnic violence erupted. Clearly, the almost constant stream of refugees into western Tanzania from Burundi was generated by war and rumors of war that left people afraid, dead, insecure, and struggling to maintain their farms and businesses. The creation of new militias and factions during the 1990s was another nail in the coffin of the country’s tentative democratic project as it merely added more actors to the conflict who were responsible for human rights abuses (USCR 1996b). The refugees who fled to Tanzania between 1993 and 1998 were escaping the fighting between government troops and several insurgents groups.10 Rebel forces abused civilians’ human rights if it appeared that they were not cooperating—they used rape, torture, and executions to terrorize, control, and kill. Government forces were also guilty of killing and abusing people they suspected of supporting the rebel groups. Indeed, “all parties both to the original larger conflict and to the second more limited one deliberately slaughtered, raped, and otherwise injured civilians and destroyed or pillaged their property” (Human Rights Watch 2004). In 1998, 473,800 Burundian refugees were in Tanzania or 88 percent of the total refugee population (UNHCR 2004c, Table A7). In 1998, the three main rebel groups agreed to end their military struggle against the government and transformed themselves into political parties. But there were two other rebel groups that were not prepared to enter into peace negotiations with the government and continued to wage war against the government and showed little interest in participation in the ongoing peace talks that were initially brokered by two of Africa’s most outstanding leaders and statesmen—former President Nelson Mandela of South Africa and the late President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania (Chhatbar 2001).11 Buyoya agreed to a power-sharing agreement after surrounding countries imposed an economic embargo against the country following his 1996 military coup. The Arusha Peace Agreement was finally hammered out in 2000, but the fighting that produced refugees for Tanzania did not end. Two Hutu insurgent
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groups—Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD) and the Forces for National Liberation (FNL)—refused to participate in the Arusha Peace Agreement and to disarm, accusing the transitional government of dragging its feet in integrating the largely Tutsi-dominated armed forces, and failing to cease fighting along Tanzania’s northeastern border, and to release political prisoners (Chhatbar 2001; Scherrer 2002). This meant that there was no ceasefire agreement between them and the government and no respite for the long-suffering people of Burundi. The government’s policy of forced regroupment did not allay the fears of the Hutu population. These camps were ostensibly established, “to ensure the security of the population in areas subject to systematic destabilization by rebel groups. According to some observers, the undeclared aims were in fact to deprive the rebel forces from local support and to regain control of territory” (Norwegian Refugee Council 2002). The government dismantled the camps in July and August 2000 as part of the peace talks, but not before people were killed or forced to flee to avoid the human rights abuses that occurred in the camps by government forces and rebel groups. In addition, people’s health was affected by the lack of sanitation, health, and water facilities and limited access to fresh food in the camps (Human Rights Watch 1998). In 2003, a peace agreement was finally concluded between the government and the FDD. This left the FNL as the lone holdout (Human Rights Watch 2004). As fighting continued between the FNL and the government the outflow of refugees to Tanzania continued. In late 2003 major fighting erupted in the capital, Bujumbura, that once again sent people in search of safety—25,000 fled to Tanzania. As late as 2004, Burundian refugees still entered Tanzania (3,400 from January to June). For some of them, it was not the first time they had sought asylum in the country. Many had repatriated back to Burundi in 2003 and early 2004, but found that the country was still too unsafe to stay (Edgerton 2003). The FNL eventually agreed to participate in talks with the government in 2004, but it is still unclear at the time of writing whether and to what extent the FDD will commit to putting down its weapons. If the massacre of 160 Tutsi refugees that the FDD claimed responsibility for in August 2004 was any indication, the end of hostilities between the government and the FDD is not certain (UNWire 2004). Struggle for the DRC and Congolese Refugees As can be seen in table 2.2 above, the DRC became a major source of refugees for Tanzania in the 1990s. The factors generating refugees in the
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DRC have involved external players and dynamics to a degree unparalleled in Rwanda and Burundi and many other countries in the region. It could even be argued that the internationalization of the politics of the DRC goes back to the partition itself, during which European rivalries over this vast region was a key factor in the convening of the Berlin conference of 1884–1885 that sought to regulate the European scramble for Africa. The country’s vast mineral resources ensured that the DRC remained a key regional theater in international politics, especially during the Cold War when it found itself buffeted between independent Africa to the north and the intransigent settler regimes in the south fighting desperately against liberation movements supported by the socialist countries. Later, following the fall of the Mobutu dictatorship in the 1990s, regional powers became embroiled in the Congo in support of various internal warring factions, in the midst of which the lives of millions of people were disrupted and many became internally displaced or refugees. Thus, the tribulations of the DRC that have produced waves of refugees have had a long history, going back to the unimaginable atrocities and violence at the hands of Belgium’s King Leopold II in his insatiable demand for rubber, ivory, palm oil, minerals, labor, and taxes from the inhabitants of this immense territory, a record of plunder, brutality and genocide graphically recorded by many writers from Morel (1904) in the early 1900s to Hochschild (1998) in the late 1990s. An estimated 10 million people may have been killed under Leopold’s ruthless regime, making it one of the first and largest genocides of the twentieth century.12 The situation in the Belgian Congo did not markedly improve after the colony was transferred to the Belgian government in 1908: people continued to be killed, displaced, dismembered, and brutalized for simply being unwilling or unable to be worked to death. The colonizers, with the help of the Catholic Church and the mining companies, constituted what Nzongola-Ntalaja (2004, 4) calls “the colonial trinity [that] sought to impose its hegemony through paternalism, white supremacy, and administratively imposed ethnic divisions among Africans.” The legacies of this ruthless, predatory state were to cast a long shadow over the subsequent history of the colonial and postcolonial state as Young and Turner (1985) have demonstrated. Although the multi-ethnic population of the Belgian Congo was not put in strict “racial” categories as in Rwanda and Burundi, in keeping with colonial practice, ethnic distinctions were still emphasized and became a basis for politicization, division, and conflict. In addition, people were categorized according to their “level of cultural development”
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and physical characteristics. At the top of the social hierarchy (excluding Europeans) were those who had converted to Christianity, spoke French, and had graduated from a mission or European primary and secondary school (Biaya 1998, 332). The combustible interplay of internal ethnic, regional, and class divisions on the one hand and machinations of the departing colonial power and international intervention by the United States and the United Nations and others, played themselves out, with tragic consequences during the crisis that rocked the country almost immediately after independence in 1960. The Belgian and U.S. governments harbored great animosity for the new prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, whose fierce nationalism was seen as a threat to their economic and political interests in the country.13 The U.S. government, in particular, was determined that its muchneeded minerals for its military arsenal would not fall into the hands of a nationalist or communist such as Lumumba. Therefore, Lumumba was assassinated and replaced by the pro-West, pro-American, Mobutu Sese Sekou. In the political turmoil during the next few years, thousands of people were killed—100,000 people lost their lives from 1960–1965 as a result of civil war (Marshall 2003). Others were internally displaced or turned into refugees. For example, in 1963, 9,000 refugees fled to Sudan and a much smaller number, 700, sought refuge in Tanzania from 1966 to 1971 (Stein and Clark 1990). But larger waves were yet to come. Under Mobutu, who gained power in 1966 and was not ousted until 1997, the country steadily descended into one of Africa’s harshest and most kleptocractic dictatorships, notwithstanding Mobutu’s cynical efforts in the 1960s and 1970s to nationalize the economy and promote “cultural authenticity.” For example, he began to use his African name and encouraged the population to do the same, and changed the name of the country to Zaire.14 More crucially, he also began to consolidate power under the one-party state (People’s Revolutionary Movement) and to crush his detractors in the midst of mounting corruption, nepotism, and debt following the decline of the country’s major export commodity—copper. As early as 1977, the country came under a structural adjustment program of the World Bank and IMF (Biaya 1998). Despite all his economic and political venality, Mobutu continued to receive military and economic support from his Western backers—especially the United States under the guise of protecting the country and the region from communism. The truth of the matter is that Zaire’s minerals were needed to maintain the Cold War with the Soviet Union that was predicated on the stockpiling of nuclear weapons. As elsewhere on the continent, by 1990 the winds of change for democracy could be felt in Mobutu’s Zaire where an opposition movement
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had emerged in the cities and unrest by workers and rural peasants was rising. In fact, large parts of the country were virtually beyond the reach of the central government, thanks to years of economic neglect and deterioration in the communication and transport infrastructure. The end of the Cold War also made Mobutu less valuable to his American and other Western backers. There appeared to be a window of opportunity for democratic reform when in 1990 multiparty politics was allowed and a transitional government appointed to prepare for promised national elections. But the wily dictator sought to maintain control and manipulate the transitional government and national conference on democratic change and by the mid-1990s it had become abundantly clear to everyone that real change would never come as long as Mobutu was in power. The rapidly evolving situation in the DRC was embroiled with events in the neighboring countries, principally Rwanda, which exacerbated political and ethnic tensions. As we saw in the other countries, ethnic tensions began to mount as early as 1991 when Mobutu was forced to address the issue of democratization and multiparty elections in a national conference that he did not want dominated by particular ethnic groups. Distinctions were increasingly made between “natives” and nonnatives. “From that moment on, a new inter-ethnic inferno was kindled in Zaire; in Kisangani, in Shaba and in Kivu” (Biaya 1998, 339). Ethnic and political tensions escalated in 1994 with the arrival of thousands of Hutu refugees following the Rwandan genocide as Zairian citizens found themselves competing with the refugees for land, water, food, and security in one of the country’s poorest and most remote regions and political dynamics began to shift in eastern Zaire. Because of the size and composition of this refugee population—participants of the genocide, former members of the FAR, members of Interahamwe, and innocent civilians—conflict was bound to arise. Furthermore, ex-FAR members and Interahamwe were armed, determined to return to Rwanda, and they virtually held the refugees hostage with very little resistance from the Mobutu government that had supported the former Rwandan regime of Habyarimana (Gnamo 2000). Some elements of the Rwandan refugee population viewed their stay in eastern Zaire as an opportunity to engage in ethnic cleansing against the Banyamulenge (Tutsis). In sum, the influx of large numbers of Hutus from Rwanda “broke a centuries-old Tutsi-Hutu alliance in Zaire . . . and the Banyarwanda (Hutu and Tutsi of Rwandan extraction), who largely intermarried and expressed solidarity during different conflicts with other ethnic groups in eastern Zaire, lost their cohesion after the Rwandan genocide because both the conflict and the Hutu refugees in Zaire set the two communities
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in opposition” (Gnamo 2000, 327). The Alliance for Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL) headed by Laurent Kabila, with the support of the Rwandan government and its military, launched an offensive in the eastern part of the country that had two results— Hutu refugees were forced from their camps (others died when they attempted to avoid the troops and hid in the forests) and this put Mobutu’s regime on its last legs as he no longer controlled large swaths of the east and refugees who did not return to Rwanda “became the focus of military activity in the coming months” (Waters 2001, 150). The first influx of refugees from Zaire who entered Tanzania fled fighting between the Zairian army and Tutsi forces assisted by the Rwandan military. For example, in late 1996, 90,000 Zairians entered western Tanzania from three regions in eastern Zaire (Uvira, Baraka, and Fizi) that faced fierce fighting (IRIN 1997). In addition, Rwandan and Burundian (some were rebels) refugees who were in camps near Uvira were also forced to seek safety in Tanzania. As the ADFL captured more towns, more refugees entered Tanzania. The ethnic dimension of this first influx of refugees into Tanzania cannot be ignored. Kabilia’s ADFL was backed by the Rwandan government (read Tutsi) and elements of the Banyamulenge (read Tutsi) community in eastern Zaire. The refugees who fled to Tanzania were disproportionately members of the Bemba ethnic group who sided with the government forces against the ADFL, which resulted in an acrimonious relationship between the Banyamulenge and the Bemba. Moreover, the question of citizenship began to play an important role in the conflict, however, “[e] xclusionary notions of citizenship have been used in Congolese politics as part of the counterrevolution against the national independence movement in 1959–1962 and again as part of the authoritarian backlash against the democracy movement in 1992–1996” (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2004, 2). Nevertheless, “citizenship is automatically conferred to all descendants of the ethnic groups with legitimate claim to land within the territorial boundaries of the country as set in 1885, the year of the creation of the Congo Free State by King Leopold II of the Belgium” (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2004, 3–4). The Banyamulenge, who have resided in the country for the last two hundred years, were viewed as Tutsi outsiders with too much economic clout. The harassment of Rwandan Tutsis had started long before this conflict. For example, in 1981 Rwandan Tutsis who had fled to Zaire in 1959 were stripped of their citizenship rights after a high-ranking official in the Mobutu government of Tutsi descent crafted legislation in 1972 that provided them with the right to vote and to hold public office. The law was changed to define “a citizen as someone who is a descendant
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of an ethnic group found in the country within its borders as of 1 August 1885” (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2004, 6). Later in 1982, the Banyarwanda (Hutus and Tutsis of Rwandan origin) were denied citizenship rights. The more recent arrivals of Rwandan immigrants who settled in the eastern part of the DRC were both Hutus and Tutsis who arrived in the 1950s and 1960s. “While many became Zairian citizens, the prominent economic position of the Tutsi give rise to considerable tensions and conflicts with the local population, who still considered them as foreigners” (Halvorsen 2000, 309). The removal of the tyrant, Mobutu, did not lead to diminishing ethnic hostilities let alone the establishment of a pluralistic democracy. Rather a feeding frenzy developed among internal and external actors over the spoils of war—especially the country’s rich minerals that appeared to once again serve as a curse not a blessing. Rebel groups, Kabila’s government, surrounding countries’ governments, international and national corporations, and ordinary citizens all wanted to get their hands on the vast deposits of coltan (used in the manufacture of computer chips and electronics, especially cellular phones), cobalt, diamonds, and gold. There were other economic resources that various parties wanted to control that undergirded the war—water and timber resources (Amnesty International 2003b). Furthermore, the democracy promised by Kabila was not forthcoming as he too attempted to consolidate power to restore an authoritarian regime and engaged in corruption. Moreover, Kabila played the ethnic card in 1998 when he called for the deportation of the Banyamulenge soldiers who helped him overthrow Mobutu, and his allies, the Rwandan officers who were key in creating the new army. People who resided in the local areas began to resent the presence of the “Tutsi” armed forces. As before, the country was brought to the brink by “the question of citizenship of the Kinyarwanda-Kirundi speakers, the third largest language group in the DRC” (Scherrer 2002, 252). Following Kabila’s directive, Rwanda and Uganda invaded the eastern part of the country in an attempt to protect the Banyamulenge. In turn, Kabila used growing anti-Tutsi sentiment to rally domestic support and the invasion of Rwanda by Uganda to mobilize backing from countries such as Zimbabwe, Angola, Chad, and Namibia, which sent their troops to fight alongside the troops of his government. Each of these countries had their own specific motives that we cannot go into here, except to point out that the war over the Congo became postcolonial Africa’s first multinational war; some have even called it Africa’s “First World War.”15
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The result of these intertwined wars—civil and regional wars over the DRC—was a catastrophe for people of the country. An estimated 3.3 million people perished between 1998 and 2003. Tens of thousands of refugees from the DRC sought asylum in Tanzania. The Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD), an insurgent group backed by Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi, and some troops from the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC), was formed and it launched a rebellion to oust Kabila in 1998. Its membership was diverse—Tutsis, former supporters of Mobutu, et cetera (Human Rights Watch 1999d). The RCD was able to wrest large parts of the country from Kabila’s government. To further clutter the landscape, the Mai Mai, who consisted of “many of the groups of indigenous militia of difference ethnic origins in eastern Congo opposed to the RCD and its allies” (Gough 1999; Human Rights Watch 1999d, 2). The RCD later split into factions—RCD-Goma (backed by Rwanda), RCD-National, RCD-Liberation Movement, and the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) (Human Rights Watch 2000c). Masses of civilians were forced out of eastern DRC, especially in the mineral-rich areas, as they tried to escape the spiraling violence perpetrated by the warring factions. The domestic and regional governments entered into peace negotiations in December 1998, thanks to massive international pressure. Despite the signing of the Lusaka Agreement in July 1999 by the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia, along with the RCD and the MLC (both groups signed the agreement in August 1999) that called for a ceasefire and disengagement, the formation of a national army, a national dialogue and reconciliation, disarmament of the armed groups, the normalization of the security situation along the borders that the DRC shared with its neighbors, and the establishment of the United Nations Organization Mission in DRC (UNMONUC), peace did not prevail (US Institute for Peace 1999). Parties to the agreement continued to fight, and Kabila was not able to remain in power—he was assassinated in 2001 and his son, Joseph Kabila, assumed power with little commitment to put the country on the road to democracy. Rather, his rule was just as authoritarian as Mobutu’s and his father’s, especially after he attempted to give himself unlimited power. By 2002, the prospects for peace in the DRC seemed to be improving with the signing of an all-inclusive peace agreement that included RCDGoma, the MLC, the government, and opposition parties. Finally, in 2003, foreign governments had begun to remove their troops, but this served as an opportunity for groups not committed to peace to continue their fight for territory, people, resources, and local control. For
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example, before Rwanda and later Burundi withdrew from the DRC in 2002, large sections of eastern DRC were under the control of their troops and their ally, the RCD. After their departure, hostilities erupted between Mai Mai rebels and RCD-Goma as both groups tried to step in to fill the power vacuum (Amnesty International 2003b). What appeared to be one of the main stumbling blocks for a lasting peace was the warring parties’ reluctance to relinquish control over what they gained from the conflict. As in the other countries we have examined in this chapter, the civil war in the DRC and the other conflicts in the country that created tens of thousands of refugees for the neighboring countries including Tanzania were fundamentally about the restructuring of state power and the distribution of resources. But the direct involvement of other countries in the region in the DRC war, which swelled the refugee outflows, shows the transnational dimensions of the struggles over the very political boundaries of the postcolonial state, underscoring the conjunction of internal and external forces arrayed against nation-states created out of colonialism that have yet to find their stride in terms of democracy and development. Conclusion The countries in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region that contributed to the influx of refugees into Tanzania and Kenya experienced wars and rumors of war for the time period covered in this study. The underlying factors or root causes that produced the civil wars were varied, but yet, a common thread wove through them all from Ethiopia to the DRC. The colonial experience produced very deep cleavages in society among regions, ethnic groups, rural and urban dwellers, and socioeconomic groups that continued to manifest themselves to this day. The opportunities to conduct a national dialogue on these various issues were never taken or when they were, national unity and reconciliation were not the by products. Instead, democratization and multiparty politics were portrayed as the panacea that would cure all ills. At the same time that democratization and its accompanying economic liberalization were being touted, the above countries that produced the refugees and the receiving countries—Tanzania and Kenya faced their own political problems and the issue of ethnicity burst into the open. Ethnicity is a good starting point for analyzing the issue of forced migration in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa, but it is not the only issue. Furthermore, the outbreak of violence between ethnic groups that was
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not common before needs to be explained—in the southern Sudan and eastern DRC in terms of the proliferation of weapons in those areas, contestations over land and resources, and ultimately local power and authority. In other words, how and why ethnicity becomes politicized has to be addressed and what does this mean historically in terms of who had access to the colonial state and who had or has access to and control over the independent state. In sum, in one way or the other, all of the above civil wars and civil unrest discussed had their foundations in various groups from national government troops, to foreign troops, to insurgent groups, to militias locked in battles to control the state and the economic benefits accrued from it, along with resources (land, water, and minerals) and people within the various parts of the national territory. As a result, thousands of people fled to Kenya and Tanzania to escape the direct results of the wars (fighting) or the indirect ramifications of the wars—hunger and starvation due to a lack of food as a result of the reduction or stoppage of agricultural productivity and their inability to obtain access to food supplies provided by the international community, lack of access to health care and educational facilities due to the destruction of infrastructure by the warring parties, and the extrajudicial killings, burning of homes and whole villages, looting, pillaging, and extortion that accompanied the fighting. Many women and girls became refugees as rape was used as a weapon of war. Overall, it was difficult if not impossible for the areas within each country that experienced fighting to maintain a semblance of social and economic stability that allowed most of their populations to remain there—some became internally displaced within the country while others crossed an international border that placed them in the refugee category. Given these various factors, an interdisciplinary approach is needed to unravel the many causes of forced migration in the Great Lakes region and Horn of Africa. The history discipline is useful for an understanding of some of the causes of forced migration in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region in that some of the factors are rooted in colonialism in terms of creating or exacerbating ethnic and regional differences, for example, Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, Ethiopia, and the DRC and creating artificial arbitrary borders that split groups who shared a common history, language, and culture into different countries (Ethiopia and Somalia). The political science discipline is valuable for the study of forced migration in terms of examining the role of the state in generating refugees, especially as it engaged in civil wars with insurgent groups—all of the states covered in this study. And foreign policy decisions, regional,
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and interstate relations were all critical to civil war and subsequent fighting in the DRC that produced refugees for Tanzania. Homer-Dixon’s environmental scarcity model did not apply to the DRC. In fact, it can be argued that the country’s surplus in minerals, water, and timber contributed to the refugee crises because the areas in the eastern part of the country endowed with these natural resources were the center of the conflict as the government, militias, insurgent groups, and companies all wanted to exploit the areas for their economic benefit. The model could be used to explain the conflict in the Sudan in terms of the central government based in the north that wanted to control the oil supplies and water resources in the south. In addition, rebel groups in the south split and each group was willing to fight to the end to control these resources. Burundi and Rwanda can be examined within the context of the environmental scarcity model because both countries depended upon agriculture as the mainstay of their economies. However, the amount of land available for the population was limited. In addition, both countries faced the issue of accommodating large returning refugee populations and when the time was near for those populations to return, civil war erupted that produced refugees for Tanzania. This leads to the next chapter. Whatever factors served to push the refugees out of their home countries had a tremendous effect on Kenya and Tanzania because they ended up hosting thousands of refugees at a time when their citizens were clamoring for economic, political, and social opportunities. At the same time, the international community, in the form of donors, was demanding political and economic reforms. Political leaders in both countries were caught between meeting the demands of their citizens, the donors, and the refugees while at the same time remaining in power and exercising sovereignty over their borders.
CHAPTER 3
Changes in Official Refugee Policies
Introduction Throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the Tanzanian and Kenyan governments were both credited by their citizens, African leaders, the international community, and the refugees who they hosted as having open and generous asylum policies. To quote one observer, “for decades Kenya, Tanzania . . . have provided security and refuge for hundreds of thousands of African refugees . . . they have offered land for settlement, integration, and, at times, even citizenship” (Nowrojee 2000). Tanzania allowed refugees from Rwanda, Burundi, South Africa, Somalia, Mozambique, Malawi, and Zimbabwe to have access to free medical services and free education, and they could travel around the country freely (USCR 1989, 46). Kenya’s refugee policies were characterized as “laissez faire” as refugees from Uganda, Rwanda, and Ethiopia were basically free from governmental restrictions. They too had access to free education and various social services. They were not forced into camps and they enjoyed freedom of mobility (Verdirame 1999a). However, beginning in the late 1980s for Kenya and in the early 1990s for Tanzania these relatively welcoming and open policies turned cold and restrictive, which resulted in less protection for refugees and the abuse of their human rights. The new oppressive and containment regimes were characterized by forced encampment that restricted the mobility of refugees to obtain employment outside camps, attend schools, engage in economic activities, and enjoy leisure activities. In an effort to enforce the new policies, the governments used their militaries to round up refugees in sweeps to force them into camps. Still, others
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were forcibly deported. Rutinwa (1996a; 1999) and Chaulia 2003) attributed the governments’ harsher policies toward refugees to security concerns resulting from the crisis in the Great Lakes region, the effects of democratization, and economic liberalization policies under structural adjustment programs. This chapter seeks to examine and compare the factors behind the changes in refugee policies in the two countries and explain why they took place. It is argued that the changes were the result of three major developments. First, the two governments had become increasingly constrained by structural adjustment programs that curtailed public expenditures, promoted liberalization and privatization, and in the view of many scholars contributed to economic retrenchment. Second, this is the period when the two countries began undergoing, as in much of Africa, a transition to democratic rule. The process of democratization, with all its twists and turns and which is still ongoing, recast state–civil society relationships. Not only was the state forced to become more transparent and accountable in its actions and in the formulation of domestic and foreign policies, democratization also resurrected ethnic politics and identities and reopened the question of citizenship, of who were nationals and who were foreigners. In this context, refugee policies acquired a new meaning and urgency. Third, regional instabilities were escalating of which the very explosion in the refugee population was a clear indication and product. In addition to the perennial troubles in the Horn of Africa, worsened by the collapse of the Somali state and continuing conflicts in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, now there was the implosion of the Great Lakes region, most tragically illustrated by the Rwandan genocide and the multinational war in the DRC, dubbed by some as Africa’s “First World War.” In such circumstances, the refugee policies of Kenya and Tanzania were bound to change as they sought to protect themselves from regional instability. The policy changes raise interesting questions about liberalization and democratization and human rights as far as the rights and protection of refugees are concerned. The emergence of more restrictive refugee policies shows that there was no democratic dividend for refugees. Indeed, the positive correlation between democracy and respect for human rights is not always borne out even for citizens during moments of transition from autocracy to democracy. Several writers have shown that in many instances repression may actually increase in new democracies because of lagging repressive tendencies from the past and the propensity for protest behavior to increase at such times as once suppressed communities and movements rediscover their voices and as
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conflicting group claims and struggles escalate and the state tries to put a lid on them. This is particularly so in countries such as Kenya and Tanzania with traditions of political centralization and authoritarianism, ethnic pluralism and polarization, poverty, and underdevelopment. The establishment of a new refugee policy regime also challenges widespread notions of the African state as “weak” and increasingly incapable of protecting its sovereignty. These depictions of the state are quite old in African studies, but they have found a new resonance in the globalization literature that emphasizes the corrosive impact of globalization on state power, especially for the developing countries. The policies and actions taken by Tanzania and Kenya clearly demonstrate that even in poor countries the state is more than able to exercise its sovereignty by deciding who to let in, who to keep out, how to treat those who are let in, and who to kick out when they are no longer wanted. The difficulties that refugees face also show that while globalization may indeed facilitate the flows of capital, goods, services, and technology, for people barriers to mobility remain strong. In fact, almost everywhere the movements of refugees across national borders are probably more restricted now than ever. In the past restrictions against refugees and their confinement were justified in economic terms, now they are increasingly justified in security terms, especially following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in the United States, which have led to a so-called global war on terror that governments are now using to harass domestic opponents and keep out foreigners, including refugees.1 The chapter is divided into three main sections. It begins by examining the economic effects of structural adjustment programs on the refugee policies of the two countries. Then it looks at the links between democratization and human rights abuses by focusing on refugee policies prior to democratization and after democratization. Within the context of these new developments, the issue of security will be analyzed as the two governments have often used it to justify the enactment of harsh refugee policies. Finally, each country is discussed in turn beginning with Tanzania. The Political Economy and Gender Dynamics of Structural Adjustment Programs It was in the early 1980s that African countries seeking relief from economic recession and crises of various magnitude adopted SAPs. Tanzania and Kenya were no exception. SAPs were stabilization and reform packages based on neoliberal economic principles. They called
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upon African governments to undertake liberalization and privatization of their economies, deregulation, cuts in public expenditures and employment, and massive and repeated currency devaluations, among various policy conditionalities. Almost from their inception critical voices were raised among African scholars and policy makers about the long-term efficacy and effects of these programs. By the end of the 1990s, critiques of SAPs had become commonplace and even the loudest supporters of SAPs had become more cautious in their zeal.2 Most scholars contend that the donor community led by the World Bank and the IMF ruthlessly imposed these programs on reluctant African governments. Certainly there were countries such as Tanzania, at the time pursuing “African socialism,” that held out as long as they could during the 1980s. Tanzania finally gave in to the World Bank and IMF and by 1986 SAPs were a part of the national economic system and policy framework. The government was required to devalue its currency, control inflation, reduce food subsidies, downsize the civil service, and to allow the private sector to have a larger role in the economy (Sandbrook 1997). Even Kenya, a country more favorably predisposed to free enterprise, found several aspects of the SAP package quite objectionable (Coughlin and Ikiara 1991). Much of the analysis on SAPs has centered on the role of African states in their design and implementation, the political implications of these programs, and their effects on patterns of development and on various social groups, although the gender dimensions of these processes are usually not fully drawn out. Like states everywhere, Christopher Clapham (1996) has argued, African government officials knew how to survive and preserve their interests so that they often circumvented the policies when necessary—policies that could be easily monitored and enforced by the international financial institutions were implemented while others were not. Indeed, the World Bank and IMF began to distinguish between “good” and “poor” adjusters, and blamed the failures of SAPs to put African economies on a sustainable path of recovery and development on African governments rather than the fundamentally flawed nature of the policies themselves that were designed in the financial capitals of the global North with little African input. The claim was that African governments did not sufficiently “own” and show “commitment” to their own structural adjustment policies (Mkandawire 2003). Initially SAPs strengthened the authoritarian propensities of the postcolonial state. In the words of Maria Nzomo (2001, 147), a leading Kenyan political scientist, “politically, the already authoritarian African state has had to become even more repressive in order to force the
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unwilling African populations to comply with the cutbacks on social services and to accept lower incomes and higher costs of living.” In Tanzania, Issa Shivji (1994, 20), the renowned legal scholar tells us, the state “lost whatever initiative it had vis-à-vis its foreign backers and creditors. . . . The state was no longer seen as an agent of development,” and increasingly seemed to “confine itself to law and order functions,” which it exercised through roundups, detentions, deportations, and the forced encampment of refugees. But widespread opposition to the austerities of SAPs contributed to the growth of social protests and movements bent on dismantling the authoritarian state. In this sense, then, SAPs helped create conditions that contributed to the growth of the prodemocracy movement. Thus, liberalization and democratization, which will be examined below, were connected. The developmental and social effects of SAPs in both countries were far reaching and spared no one. According to Richard Sandbrook (1997, 492), “public employees, organized workers in general, students and professionals were adversely affected at first by economic decline and the structural adjustment” as were rural peasants. Many scholars have commented on the deleterious effects on living standards and social services. Writing on Tanzania, Bagachwa et al. (1995, 68) lamented: “since the start of economic adjustment, living standards have deteriorated according to most measurements.” This is reflected, for example, “in the fall of life expectancy figures from 52 years in the early 1990s to 48 years in 2000, as well as the highest infant mortality rate on the continent” (Ahulwalia and Zegeye 2002, 100). Chachage (1993, 242) sums up the effects of SAPs as follows: “inversely, as far as the majority of the working people are concerned, those who were not poor before SAPs have become poorer in relative and absolute terms; those who were relatively better off have also become poor and women and children have become more vulnerable because they now have to fend for themselves as far as social services (cost of medicine, school fees, etc.) are concerned.” The social effects of SAPs were especially grave. As Wangwe et al. (1998, 72) noted in the late 1990s, “the quality of education and health in the country is on the decline. Essential inputs are lacking and delivery is inefficient.” Specifically commenting on education, once the pride of Tanzania’s socialist experiment, Wagao (1992, 110) observed, “parents were [being] asked to raise their contribution for books, uniforms and other recurrent inputs. However, the requested contribution came to represent a considerable burden on household resources, particularly rural peasant and low- and middle-level urban workers.”
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Although SAPs affected all segments of the population in one way or the other, in both the rural and urban areas, the impact was far greater on women and in different ways. According to Vuorela (1992, 110), “a general trend from liberalization is the increased pressure on women in Tanzania in terms of both productive and reproductive labor inputs relative to their material and social grains.” Urban women employed in the formal sector have been forced to develop “survival strategies to complement their official earnings, while women who have worked as housewives have become active in generating cash to subsidize the wages of their husbands” (Vuorela 1992, 112). Women in rural areas have not fared much better under SAPs as they were compelled to assume multiple working lives and identities in order to survive and provide for their families. Making an observation in the mid-1990s, Mbilinyi (1994, 179) did not hold out much hope for SAPs improving the lives of rural women either, emphasizing the fact that “alternative employment possibilities have been undermined, real wages and producer prices lowered in real terms, and the costs of living increased. The most probable outcome is that more women will be forced to work as low-paid casual seasonal farm workers in plantations and large farms and as unpaid family workers in peasant farms.” In addition, women’s productivity was affected by SAPs when the government no longer provided funding for extension services and subsidies were reduced for fertilizers and other farm inputs (African Development Bank and Development Centre of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 2003, 298). When fertilizer prices were liberalized and subsidies withdrawn, the cost of production increased and this cost was passed on to the urban consumer who had lost her purchasing power due to the rise in inflation and stagnation of wages (Ponte 1998). Moreover, due to land reform facilitated by a new property regime under SAPs, land was no longer assigned to a particular village free of cost. It now became “commoditized” and many women could not afford to purchase land for farming (Waters 1997, 72; Manji 1998, 647). Women’s health has been affected in ways that cannot be duplicated for men in terms of reproduction. Because of the decrease in funding for health clinics and hospitals, giving birth increasingly became “a serious hazard” because women without the financial means did not have access to prenatal and antenatal care and hospitals were often not equipped to accommodate a normal routine birth let alone a complicated delivery requiring emergency surgery, a blood transfusion, certain drugs and supplies, and so on (Vuorela 1992, 110; Wangwe et al. 1998, 75). Women
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in rural areas lacked access to hospitals because of the reduction in government funding and most could not afford the private and nonprofit medical facilities. Urban hospitals were not a better alternative under SAPs for women who could not afford the user fees and to pay for a bed, mattress, and drugs. Moreover, because of overcrowding, they posed the danger of contributing to additional health problems (Lugalla 1995, 84). Needless to say, people responded in various ways to the new conditions. Politically, this led to the erosion of the legitimacy of the state as protests against SAPs mounted. One effect was the growth of civil society and the emergence of new social movements and prodemocracy politics. Economically, people engaged in various income-generating activities from selling cooked meals, operating kiosks, sewing clothes, and hawking various items on the streets (Lugalla 1997). Thus, both women and men in rural and urban areas regardless of their class status and level of education found themselves involved in the informal sector as a means to survive as wages and incomes failed to keep pace with the cost of living. Most interestingly, people increasingly turned to urban farming that included raising chickens and dairy cattle. In fact, by the late 1990s urban farming had become the “second largest source of employment after petty trade and labor” (Mlozi 1997, 2). For women the burdens and pressures of SAPs have entailed the intensification of their labor time, the doubling or tripling of their “workdays without the advantage of long-term security and social benefits” (Vuorela 1992, 112). But Tripp’s study of women working in the informal sector in urban Tanzania (1997, 106) sees a silver lining in this otherwise bleak situation: “although it is true that women have borne more responsibility for feeding their families than they did in the past, their involvement in income-generating activities also has given them greater autonomy within the household.” The effects of structural adjustment in Kenya were broadly similar, although it could be argued that in so far as Kenya was already a freeenterprise economy SAPs did not require a fundamental restructuring of development policy as was the case for “socialist” Tanzania. However, the social effects of SAPs were no less severe for the groups, sectors, and regions most affected. SAPs sought to make Kenya’s economy even more market oriented and the government was required to devalue its currency, eliminate import licensing, reduce the budget deficit, and raise agricultural prices (Nzomo 1992, 103–105). Initially, as in Tanzania, the Kenyan government dragged its feet in implementing the total package of IMF/World Bank adjustment measures. In fact, the “first adjustment attempt (1980–84) was marked by a total lack of compliance . . . trade
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reforms were not carried out, and grain marketing was not liberalized” (Swamy 1994, 193). Compliance increased in later years as the economy continued to slide and donor pressure mounted. Also, as in Tanzania, the effects of SAPs were felt by most segments of the population in both rural and urban areas, by men and women, and by the old and young. There was an increase in unemployment in the formal sector as both the manufacturing and agricultural sectors experienced slow growth or stagnation, and wages and incomes fell and failed to keep up with the rise in prices and inflation (Ikiara et al. 1993). Like their Tanzanian sisters, Kenyan women were “more impoverished and marginalized in employment” than men and under SAPs the gender inequalities deepened as women’s access “to basic social services and amenities such as health and shelter” diminished (Nzomo 1992, 107). Thus, SAPs in Kenya were gendered in their implementation and impact. Urban Kenyan women bore “the brunt of the short term costs of the adjustment process” as factories that previously employed large numbers of women closed (such as textile and food processing plants), and costsharing measures were introduced for education, health care, and other social services (Musyoki and Orodho 1993, 106). They spent more time “buying cheaper foods that take longer to cook, and in making and repairing clothes. In the case of water, the service in Nairobi has deteriorated to the point where women and female children have to spend considerable periods queuing to obtain water and carrying it from the decreasing number of functioning outlets” (Musyoki and Orodho 1993, 130). The rolling back of the state also affected rural women who saw remittances from husbands and relatives employed in the shrinking public and manufacturing sectors in the towns and cities decline (Mwendwa 1995). They were of course also affected by price decontrols that resulted in an increase in prices for staples such as milk, tea, and edible oils (Ongile 1999). Moreover, these women already suffered from unequal access to land in Kenya’s highly commercialized land tenure system, which SAPs and the pressures associated with them only made worse. As SAPs reinforced trends toward land privatization, women faced greater obstacles in obtaining access to land through purchase or inheritance, credit, and agricultural inputs (Silberschmidt 1992).3 With the pressure to increase export crop production, women found themselves having to labor longer and harder in so far as they still had to grow crops for food consumption. At the same time, agricultural inputs, especially fertilizer, rose in prices due to SAPs induced currency devaluations (Ongile 1999). Giving birth also became a health hazard as health services deteriorated, and the numbers of women giving birth at home increased as they
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could not afford the costs of hospital care. The overall responsibility of providing for the health and welfare of children increasingly fell on women as the state reduced its funding and provision of health care services. No wonder, concluded Nzomo (1992, 108), “many more women these days show signs of psychological stress.” The coping and survival strategies devised by people in Kenya to offset the negative consequences of SAPs were both similar and different from Tanzania. The main difference is that Kenyans were already more attuned to private enterprise and engaging in a wide range of income-generating activities. While in Tanzania SAPs led to the demise of Ujamaa (socialist collective self-reliance), in Kenya the institution of Harambee (voluntary self-help activities) expanded and more people, both men and women in rural and urban areas became more dependent on it to meet educational and medical expenses (Mwendwa 1995; Widner 1992, Thomas-Slayter 1991; Barkan 1991; Barkan and Holmquist 1989). One key similarity is that the informal sector in Kenya, which was already much larger and more vibrant than in Tanzania when SAPs were first implemented, also expanded and offered growing numbers of men and women an important avenue for redress from the pauperizing effects of SAPs. As elsewhere in Africa, informal sector opportunities varied according to location and gender. Kenyan women were concentrated in the more crowded and less profitable segments of the sector such as cooking and selling food, making and sewing clothing, hawking and petty trade, while men dominated the more skilled and lucrative activities including craft manufacturing, metal work, and vehicle repair. As several studies have shown, women in the informal sector were more likely to face harassment, exploitation, insecurity, and environmental and health hazards given the locations and working conditions associated with their activities (Nzomo 1992; Musyoki Orodho 1993; Tsikata 1995; Zeleza 1997). The struggle for survival and self-reliance in the face of economic crisis reinforced by SAPs led to the proliferation of women’s groups as coping/survival mechanisms and as strategies for women’s broader empowerment. By the early 1990s there were more than 23,000 women’s groups in Kenya (World Bank 1996). Through these groups, women saved money, generated income, and provided social services that were reduced or eliminated by the government (Silberschmidt 1992). Also, as in Tanzania urban farming increased in Kenya in the 1980s and 1990s. To quote Memon and Lee-Smith (1993, 32), who examined urban agriculture in Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, Kakamega, Isiolo, and Kitui, “the majority of urban households in Kenya are unable to feed
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themselves adequately from their earnings, and those who can, cultivate land in backyard spaces near their dwellings, on roadside verges, or on other publicly owned vacant land.”4 Transition to Democratic Rule After many years of one-party rule, in the 1990s both Kenya and Tanzania, as with much of Africa, began the long and complicated process to democratic rule. Up to 1990 the vast majority of African states were dictatorships, either civilian or military, but by 2000 most had made the transition to democracy or were in various stages of transition. The 1990s therefore constituted a period of momentous political change in Africa’s recent history, although it cannot be overstated that the transitions to democracy were quite varied and characterized by progress, blockages, and reversals. As might be expected, there is wide disagreement concerning the factors that generated Africa’s democratic wave of the 1990s. Debate has centered on the relative roles of internal and external factors, and economic and political factors, as well as the extent to which democratization was a product of historical or contemporary dynamics, structural or contingent forces. It can reasonably be argued that all these factors played a role. To quote Zeleza (2004, 5), “clearly, then struggles for democracy in the 1980s and 1990s represented the latest moment of accelerated change in a long history of struggles for freedom, an exceptionally complex moment often driven by unpredictable events and new social movements and visions, anchored in the specific histories, social structures and conditions of each country, in which national, regional, and international forces converged unevenly and inconsistently, and economic and political crises reinforced each other, altering the terrain of state-civil society relationships, the structures of governance, and the claims of citizenship.” No less complex and varied are the visions and institutional practices of democracy among African countries and the prospects for democratic consolidation. Among the competing visions are the nativist model (that democracy should be based on traditional political institutions), the liberal model (equates democracy with multipartyism and periodic electoral contests), the popular democratic model (advocates the construction of distributionist developmental democratic states), the theocratic model (seeks religiously sanctioned governance), and the transnational model (envisions the construction of regional or continental democratic governance or government).
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The modalities of transition from dictatorship to democracy took three broad paths. In countries like Ghana and Nigeria military regimes tried to oversee and tightly control the process of transition to democracy, while in Francophone countries such as Benin the political class and the elites of civil society gathered at national conferences to forge a new political and constitutional order. Tanzania and Kenya represented the third path, where opposition parties were legalized and multiparty elections authorized through amendments to the existing constitutions by the incumbent regimes. In both countries the ruling parties proceeded to win the subsequent multiparty elections, in the case of Kenya it was in 2002 when the opposition finally won. In Tanzania this has yet to happen.5 The role played by civil society and old and new social movements [from trade unions and professional associations to women’s movements and environmental movements, and the ubiquitous nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)] in forcing dictatorial African regimes to democratize cannot be underestimated. The impact of SAPs on these social forces and movements is equally crucial. In short, economic liberalization and political democratization were interconnected. In Tanzania, “the Government officially sanctioned political debate on multi-partyism as an alternative to continued rule by Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), while simultaneously permitting the proliferation of independent publications and newspapers formerly restricted by the state” and held its first multiparty elections in 1995 (Kaiser 1996, 234). Commentators on Tanzania’s democratization have clearly tied the process to anti-SAP agitation and the “demonstration effects” of developments elsewhere on the continent (rather than the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 that some have highlighted). In the view of Chachage (2002, 1), the democratization process in Tanzania was triggered by “popular democratic opposition to Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), which were eroding the public provisioning of social and economic services through liberalization of the economies and the privatization of public enterprises.” This narrative is echoed in many accounts by Tanzanian scholars who point to the fact that the economic hardships created by SAPs forced various social groups including women, workers, peasants, the unemployed, and students to begin voicing their frustrations with the state that was implementing these austerity measures and to fight for their human and legal rights through civil society movements and organizations (Mukandala 1994; Mpangala 1999). University students were particularly vocal in attacking government corruption, poor university leadership,
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poor housing conditions both on and off campus, inadequate funding for universities, the new cost-sharing schemes, and the overcrowding of campus classrooms and other facilities due to the increase in student enrollments. The escalating political tension between students and the government led to unrest in several universities. For example, students boycotted classes at the University of Dar es Salaam between 1990 and 1991 when the government introduced the new cost-sharing policy. After an agreement was not reached, the government closed the university for eight months. One year later in 1992, students boycotted classes again over the cost-sharing policy. In 2000, when presidential elections were held, students demonstrated their displeasure with the government by refusing to attend classes because they wanted more money for their meal plan allowance. Between 1990 and 2000, Sokoine University of Agriculture faced one student crisis after another as students boycotted classes to demand an increase in their maintenance allowance and loans and to protest against mismanagement, poor living conditions, and the cost-sharing policy. University College of Land and Architectural Studies did not fare much better. Students boycotted classes throughout the 1990s mainly against the cost-sharing policy and a reduction in funding for their accommodation and maintenance allowance (Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education 2004). The political crisis began gathering strength under the administration of Ali Hassan Mwinyi who became president in 1985. In that year an Economic Recovery Program was implemented that paid little attention “to social services and infrastructure such as education, health and roads” (Ahluwalia and Zegeye 2002, 92). To correct this, in 1989, the Economic and Social Adjustment Program was enacted to reverse some of the social and economic damages caused by previous programs, but it was too little too late and various sectors of civil society continued to demand a democratic government. The momentum for transforming the political system was in full force as the former president, Julius Nyerere, also called for multiparty elections. The internal pressure to reform the political system, coupled with pressure from Western donors culminated in the appointment of the Nyalali Commission. Although its members were affiliated with the CCM, the commission recommended the formation of a multiparty government, along with repealing “40 pieces of repressive legislation,” and a constitutional commission based on input from various segments of the population in rural and urban areas (Ahluwalia and Zegeye 2002, 93; Mpangala 1999, 42; Tenga and Peter 1996). The level of political violence surrounding the transition to democratic rule in Tanzania was nowhere nearly as high as it was in Kenya and
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the process did not produce an internally displaced population as it did in Kenya. However, the growing pains of democratization were quite evident before the first multiparty elections were held in 1995. The opposition that had “initially gained a great deal of momentum and support,” began to suffer from internal dissension “once the government acceded to its demands for a multiparty system.” The opposition’s poor organizational skills and its inability to mobilize its social base mirrored the problems that plagued an equally fractured “Kenyan opposition that also split once a multiparty system was established. Once the task of freeing the political system was achieved, the opposition in both countries found themselves in disarray as sectional interests became paramount” (Ahluwalia and Zegaye 2002, 94). But, the opposition was not the only stumbling block on the road to democracy. The CCM still wielded considerable power and influence because “it established the rules under which new political parties were to operate and frequently intervened in the ‘national interest’ ” (Ahluwalia and Zegaye 2002, 97). The CCM acted in many ways similar to the ruling party in Kenya, Kenya African National Union (KANU) that intimidated the opposition, refused to allow the opposition to have access to the national media, and operated as if there was little distinction between the party and the government in the period preceding the 1992 multiparty elections. Tanzanian women who had believed that democratization would enable them to participate in the political process and voice their concerns and issues were not spared from harassment by the government and ruling party. Pressure was put on the women’s movement to the extent that “its leaders felt obliged to reduce the level of political engagement in the run-up to the elections, following threats from the CCM, and several warnings by the president of the Republic” (Tenga and Peter 1996, 160). Tanzania’s road to democracy became bumpier on the island of Zanzibar. In the 1995 elections the main opposition party, the Civic United Front (CUF), accused the CCM of intimidation, but more serious problems developed following the 2000 elections after the CUF asserted that the elections were rigged. It refused to accept the results of the very close election and demanded a re-run. Protests were held on Zanzibar, Unguja, and Pemba Islands and violent clashes erupted between security forces and the CUF that left several hundred people in detention. Twenty-three people were killed on Pemba Island and many more on Zanzibar Island. Up to 2,000 people eventually fled the islands and sought asylum in Kenya near Mombasa where they were less than welcome.6 The refugees returned in 2001 when the unrest and political
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stability between the ruling party, the CCM, and the CUF appeared to be resolved after a reconciliation agreement was signed that called for electoral reforms. Despite these problems, and the fact that the CCM was able to retain power in the elections of 1995 and 2000, Tanzania was a more democratic country than it had been a decade earlier. Civil society was freer and more vibrant as shown by the proliferation of a vast array of associations and movements including NGOs, newspapers, and other media outlets. Yet, the cost had been high for some, including those who were killed or forced to become refugees, and for many democratization did not translate into significant improvements in their human rights situation as Luitfried Mbunda (2004) has shown. Although a bill of rights was incorporated into the constitution in 1984, state protection of human rights, Mbunda argues, has remained half-hearted at best. The executive branch continues to override parliament and the judiciary, and to make efforts to frustrate the enforcement of the bill of rights by retaining old or introducing new countervailing legislation, instituting cumbersome and costly judicial procedures that limit individuals’ access and litigation, and harassing activist lawyers and judges. For the bill of rights to work, not only has there to be political will by the state to respect the rule of law, there is need to cultivate a human rights culture, for civil society to be aware and ready to protect its rights. Specifically, support structures for legal mobilization are essential. If the protection of the human rights of Tanzanian citizens remained precarious during the democratic transition, for refugees they could only be worse. In fact, the reality that democratization led to the country generating its own refugees, albeit in small numbers, may have made the Tanzanian state less sympathetic to refugees. More importantly perhaps, the state had to be more sensitive to the needs, interests, and voices of its own citizens at the very time that its capacity to do so—to deliver development and welfare—was severely limited. In short, one could argue that because of democratization the government began to change its refugee policies to respond to public opinion that was increasingly not on the side of the refugees. According to Rutinwa (1996a, 299), “politicians of all parties were aware of this and decided to play to the sentiment of the people by promising to send all refugees back if elected. The ruling party then took advantage of being in power to demonstrate that they could do this immediately.” In 1995 the border with Burundi was shut for security reasons, the government claimed. Was it merely pandering to public opinion? The connections between democratization and refugee policy do indeed raise fascinating questions, but before
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looking into that in detail let us consider the patterns of democratization in Kenya. By the turn of the 1990s, Kenya, like Tanzania, had been under a oneparty state for much of its postcolonial history, at first de facto then de jure since the failed attempted coup in 1982. But it, too, felt the winds of democratic change blowing across Africa. According to Gibbon (1993, 17), “the revival of civil society activity in Kenya, which contributed to the reintroduction of multiparty democracy in November 1991, was mainly the result of widening opposition to an increasingly dictatorial government.” The country witnessed the proliferation of organizations that constituted civil society (Holmquist and Ford 1998). Prominent representatives of civil society prior to the first multiparty elections of 1992 included lawyers, established churches, the women’s movement, students, the opposition media, and ordinary working people in urban areas who were facing hard economic times and were increasingly tired of authoritarian rule (trade unions were quiescent for their leadership had been incorporated into the structures of the ruling party). University students had long been a thorn in the flesh of the regime. In the late 1980s their protests against corruption and the government’s neglect of higher education had become more frequent and resulted in violent clashes that often led to closures of the universities. A vigorous opposition media also emerged and was very vocal in speaking out in favor of democratization and the ouster of the Moi regime despite the continuing threats of harassment, beatings, and detention against critical journalists. The new culture of political agitation drew on domestic and foreign political symbols, including memories of the Mau Mau anticolonial liberation struggle of the 1950s. It found expression at funerals and football matches, at barazas (public gatherings) and in matatus,7 “but also in theatre and popular culture, including widely circulated audio-cassettes of music and sermons which the state termed ‘seditious’ and attempted to ban” (Haugerud 1995, 17). In addition, opposition activities crystallized in the rural areas through organizations formed around specific agricultural commodities—coffee, tea, sugar, milk, and rice—whose prices were plummeting. Thus, the prodemocracy movement in Kenya, as in Tanzania, embraced various social movements focused on political, socioeconomic, women’s, human rights, and cultural issues (Holmquist and Oendo 2001). The movement soon gave rise to opposition parties. The opposition parties in Kenya had difficulty in maintaining unity and solidarity as they had in Tanzania. The Forum for Restoration of Democracy (FORD)
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and the Democratic Party of Kenya (DP) served as the main opposition parties, but they later split into FORD-Kenya, led by Oginga Odinga and FORD-Asila, led by Kenneth Matiba. FORD-Asila later split into the Kenya National Congress. The other opposition party was the Democratic Party, led by the former Vice President Mwai Kibaki, who eventually became president when the opposition finally won the elections of 2002. The splits were caused by various cleavages based more on ethnicity, regionalism, class, and personality differences than ideology (Kanyinga 1993; Throup and Hornsby 1998). The opposition parties were further weakened, as in Tanzania, by the fact that they had to operate under draconian rules established by the ruling party (Harbeson 1998). In addition to the domestic pressures, the donor community rediscovered the merits of democratic governance and began to put pressure on the government to open up political space. The donors could back up their demands with the threat of cutting aid. At first the Moi regime sought to resist these pressures. The president vociferously claimed “that Kenya was not ready for liberal democracy and repeatedly accused the West for using aid to force free elections. He warned that such changes would result in chaos and ethnic killings” (Matua 1994, 51). And sure enough, the country was soon engulfed by ethnic/land clashes. State-sponsored political violence began in late 1991 in the Rift Valley, Western, and Nyanza Provinces that “pitted members of Moi’s own ethnic group, the Kalenjin, as well as members of the Maasai, Samburu, and Turkana minority groups aligned with the Moi regime against the Kikuyu, Kisii, Luhya, and Luo communities—all communities associated with the opposition” (Kahl 1998, 101). The number of Kenyans internally displaced from the ethnic/land clashes from 1991 to 1992 numbered 300,000 and another 1,500 were killed. By 1995, the number of internally displaced had decreased to 210,000 (USCR 1996a, 53). Land clashes later erupted in other provinces—Coast, resulting in approximately 400,000 internally displaced people from 1993 to 2003. It is quite clear that “the instigation of rural violence served a number of parochial political and economic interests held by state elites and their allies” (Kahl 1998, 112).8 Human Rights Watch/Africa (1994, 4) angrily charged that “the ethnic violence had been deliberately manipulated and instigated by Moi and his inner circle in order to undermine the political opposition and limit the effect of democratic reforms. The government had failed in its duty to punish those responsible for the violence and had exhibited outright hostility towards those who sought to help the victims.”
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The clashes demonstrated that the state was either unable or unwilling to protect its citizens, and that it was willing to stall on democracy. Indeed, many opposition leaders were detained, beaten, tortured, and some died in police custody. Thus, although the Moi government acceded to domestic and donor demands for multiparty politics, “many features of the legal system remained compatible with authoritarian rule. These laws, among other restrictions, allowed detention of persons without trial, required government licensing of public meetings and registration of political parties” (Holmquist and Ford 1998, 235). In the meantime, the economy remained sluggish and the number of people living in poverty actually increased, reaching 12.6 million in 1997 from 11.5 million in 1994 (Holmquist and Ford 1998, 230). Thus, with incumbency on its side, a divided opposition, along with a war chest to buy votes and some opposition members, Moi was reelected in the first multiparty elections of 1992 (he won only 36 percent of the vote but this was higher than any other candidate).9 His government showed little inclination to advance further democratic reform, which entailed constitutional reform. It was politics as usual as “the aftermath of elections brought a combination of authoritarian continuity, economic decline, opposition immobilism, and democratic possibilities” (Holmquist et al. 1994, 99). The second attempt at multiparty elections in 1997 produced more political violence and ethnic/land clashes into 1998 after some government officials called “for majimbo (federalism— here a form of ethnically based regional autonomy that implied the expulsion of ‘outsiders,’ such as those belonging to the large up-country-based Kikuyu and Luo communities)” (Harbeson 1998, 179). KANU and President Moi proceeded to win the 1997 election again despite the valiant efforts of civil society organizations to bring about democratic reform.10 These organizations included Ufungamano, led by the religious sector—the Catholic Church, the Protestant National Council of Churches of Kenya, the Muslim Supreme Council of Kenya, the Hindu Council of Kenya—the National Convention Assembly, Muungano wa Mageuzi, which represented both civil society groups and members of the opposition, and the National Convention Executive Council (NCEC), a coalition of opposition political parties and NGOs (Human Rights Watch 1999e, 2001; Steeves 2002). These groups and others were targeted by the government and several members experienced human rights violations as “high ranking government and ruling party officials continued to use the state machinery to obstruct freedom of association and assembly for the opposition” (Human Rights Watch 2001, 1). Members of civil society groups, churches, and donors
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pressured the government to institute constitutional reforms in the wake of demonstrations against the government. The Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group (IPPG), made up of the ruling party and opposition party members, but excluding the NCEC, agreed on a series of reforms. Some of the reforms included “restructuring the Electoral Commission, to make it more bipartisan, the abolition of colonial-era statutes hindering freedom of political expression and association, immediate registration of all unregistered political parties, a requirement that the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation achieve balance in airing competing political viewpoints, and removal of legal barriers to multiparty representations in the cabinet” (Harbeson 1998, 180). The government finally granted licenses to television and FM radio stations following the 1997 elections, but they were basically only allowed to broadcast in urban areas (Human Rights Watch 2001). In the next five years the struggle for democracy in Kenya intensified. Finally, in 2002 the opposition parties, that had formed a coalition of convenience, were able to win the election against KANU. The fact that President Moi was ineligible to stand for reelection according to the twoterm limit imposed in the constitutional amendment that ushered in the 1992 multiparty election probably helped. It is quite evident that in Kenya the democratization process was far more violent than in Tanzania. If the state was willing to persecute and even murder its own citizens fighting for democracy, there should be little wonder that “refugees and migrants were also regular targets of police harassment, relocation to rural camps, arbitrary detention, and deportation” (Human Rights Watch 1999e). Clearly, if Kenyan citizens faced human rights violations including those perpetrated by the state, that same state could not be relied upon to respect and protect the human rights of refugees. The Implications of Liberalization on Refugee Policies It is quite clear that the imposition of SAPs and the transition to democratic rule had a profound impact on refugee policies in both Tanzania and Kenya. The generosity that was previously accorded to refugees from the neighboring countries by the governments and host communities in the two countries virtually disappeared. Government policies became more stringent and restrictive and the host communities no longer accepted the refugees’ dependence on local resources that were already stretched too thin. In the 1960s and 1970s the two countries were generally able to provide basic services to their citizens such as free or low cost education and health care and the expanding public sector offered
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reasonable employment opportunities and incomes. By the 1980s, this was no longer the case. In other words, the economic crisis and austerity measures imposed by the IMF and World Bank as a condition for economic aid forced most African governments, including those of Tanzania and Kenya, to withdraw free services and to abandon welfare programs. However, when refugees were provided these services (and to a certain extent police protection), local populations began to resent the presence of refugees and to call for their deportation or expulsion. Local communities believed that they should be provided with the same services and compensated by the international community for the use of their hospitals, roads, land, crops, and other property used, destroyed, or stolen by refugees (Whitaker 1999; Aukot 2003). The fact that the refugees were located in some of the poorest regions in the two countries—western Tanzania and northern Kenya—where most people earned a living in the agricultural sector (approximately 80 percent in the case of the former) only made matters worse (The World Bank 2001, 48). The economic effects of SAPs included less governmental inputs for seeds, fertilizers, extension services, and credit. This, coupled with falling prices for agricultural commodities, put a strain on the refugee-hosting regions and their people. Moreover, the influx of refugees affected poor local people including women as prices soared for water, sugar, salt, and foodstuffs. Prior to SAPs, especially in Tanzania, refugees were often seen as an economic asset in many communities. While during the emergency phase some might complain about refugees stealing their crops and looting property, as the refugees became more settled they helped boost local economies in so far as they depended on local farmers, many of whom were women, for staple crops such as cassava and bananas and meat— items that were not provided by the World Food Program (WFP). In order for refugees to secure this food, they either had to work, barter, trade, or steal (Whitaker 1999). Besides providing a market for local produce, the presence of refugees had other economic consequences for local communities, including women, principally as a new source of labor. Local farmers soon realized that they had a willing and able workforce and many refugees were hired and paid in the form of cash, crops, or other goods. In western Tanzania, for example, this new cheap source of labor “allowed many farmers to expand their production and higher yields were achieved benefiting the farmers, although refugees continued to be blamed for the theft of crops and some farmers were willing to sell too much of their own food putting their families at risk” (Whitaker 1999, 8).
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Needless to say, women participated in all of these activities: they produced and sold staple crops to the refugees, they bartered and traded with the refugees; and they hired refugees to work on their farms. Some women were able to expand their farms, open shops, and buy and rent property (Whitaker 1999). Prior to the implementation of SAPs in Kenya, its refugee population was small and most of its members were educated, from urban backgrounds, and were easily integrated into occupations in urban areas. Therefore, their skills, expertise, and ability to invest in the economy were welcomed. Following the implementation of SAPs and the arrival of larger numbers of refugees, members of local communities in rural and urban areas began to complain that the refugees were a drain on local resources and served as a detriment to the local economies. When refugees were forced into camps or forcibly deported, local women and men’s economic activities were affected. They could no longer depend on refugees’ labor to increase their crop productivity, barter and trade with them both inside and outside of refugee camps, sell them food items, and receive surplus goods from refugee relief supplies that ranged from pots, pans, cooking oil, plastic sheeting, and other items.11 The health of the local community was also affected when refugee camps were closed or dismantled. Tanzanians and Kenyans had been given access to the camps’ hospitals and clinics free of charge and they enjoyed the use of the camps’ water pumps—all of which were very valuable in these rural areas because under SAPs local governments were not able to provide these services. I observed several Tanzanian and Kenyan women in the camps with their children seeking medical assistance. Dr. William Chabandi, a Tanzanian doctor employed by the International Rescue Committee, stated, “it is difficult to tell who is a refugee and who is a Tanzanian so we have to treat them all.”12 After the camps were dismantled, Tanzanians and Kenyans no longer had access to the medical care and other services previously available in the refugee camps. Quite remarkably, even the price for water apparently increased substantially. Before the 1990s, the Tanzanian government also granted work permits to refugees from Rwanda, Burundi, Malawi, South Africa, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe and allowed them to engage in various economic activities—these are rights that are guaranteed under international humanitarian law. The government of Kenya also allowed refugees to gain access to employment by granting them work permits and business licenses (Verdirame 1999a). The new policy of forced encampment virtually ended this practice.
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In the 1990s, the effects of SAPs were all too evident as unemployment levels in both countries rose. In Tanzania, the unemployment rate reached 10.7 percent in 1995 (the rate for men was 9.2 percent and for women 12.3 percent), whereas in Kenya it was 21 percent (13 percent for men and 28.4 percent for women) (World Bank 2001; 2002). To be sure, the Tanzanian economy began to record positive economic growth from the mid-1990s. One author even claimed as early as 1994 that “the Tanzanian economy is better off now than it was before the reform program began” (Mans 1994, 356). The economy experienced a growth rate of 3.5 percent between 1990 and 2002 (World Bank 2004). The inflation rate dropped from 30 percent in 1995 to 6 percent in 2001. Despite these economic improvements, unemployment remained high. The situation was no better in Kenya, which in fact experienced much slower growth—1.9 percent between 1990 and 2002 (World Bank 2004). The inflation rate was 6.2 percent in 2000 (OECD 2003). The high unemployment rate may explain why the governments of Tanzania and Kenya stopped granting work permits to refugees. In other words, the government did not want refugees to compete with its citizens for the few scarce jobs that were available, especially in urban areas. Also, unlike in the 1960s and 1970s when the government welcomed refugees to contribute to the agricultural sector in western Tanzania, this was no longer the case when SAPs were implemented. Because refugee women who were solely responsible for the care of their households increasingly dominated the refugee population, they did not provide a reliable source of labor. Many in fact preferred to engage in trade. For example, Rwandan refugees in Tanzania established lucrative trading businesses, along with thriving markets and shops in the camps—these developed into second economies because they were exempt from government control. The markets had for sale, among other things, the surplus agricultural products from refugee farm plots in and around the camps. A lot of people from the local communities began to depend on the markets for products and services. Because a refugee camp cannot be taxed, the government was not accruing any economic gain from their business activities. On the other hand, refugees were welcomed in Kenya not to work in the agricultural sector, but for investments in the economy. It seems reasonable to suggest that refugees were forced into camps, rounded up, and sometimes forced out of the countries because of their economic activities—they were too successful economically and the local community and government officials resented this. In Tanzania, government officials and members of local communities held the belief that the
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refugees’ living conditions were better than the deteriorating standard of living for Tanzanians. The government’s political decision in 1996 to ban economic activity in the camps for Rwandan refugees and to impose an exclusionary zone around the camps had economic consequences on refugees and especially women, who often were the heads of households. This severely curtailed their ability to earn cash and the government believed that this would serve to push them out of the country (Dodd 1996). The government hoped that restricting refugees to camps would enable it to keep better track of the refugees, reduce crime, improve security for local communities, temper the growing hostility among local populations against refugees and increase government popularity. In Kenya, the government came under increasing pressure from the business community in and around Mombasa because they found it difficult to compete with refugee businesses in and out of the camps because they were tax-exempt entities. Outside the camps, refugees managed to bring goods into the country and sold them on the streets at much lower prices than local businesses could afford (Verdirame 1999b). The Kenyan government pushed for the consolidation and closure of some camps in Coast Province, along with forced encampment in an effort to curtail the economic activities of refugees in Mombasa, to remove refugees from its tourist attractions, to silence its political critics and members of the local communities who blamed refugees for security and economic problems, and to push refugees out of the country. Forced encampment was justified in the northeastern camps because of the increase in crime in the region that resulted from the influx of weapons from the Somali conflict, the continuation of shifta activity because people had few other options to earn a living, and increasing hostility between refugees and members of the local communities. Refugees became a convenient scapegoat for rising crime in Tanzania and Kenya, which was another manifestation of the social disruptions unleashed by structural adjustment. Refugees were accused of creating insecurity in the regions that hosted them that crime and banditry escalated after their arrival, and women in local communities were put at risk as robberies, rapes, and other forms of sexual and physical violence went unchecked. This was especially difficult for women who lived alone and were responsible for taking care of their families. However, according to the UNHCR and international relief agencies Tanzanian and Kenyan citizens were also guilty of these crimes. Obviously, the increase in crime in the regions cannot be solely attributed to the presence of refugees. But the refugees became a convenient target, not least because of their economic activities. Their presence reinforced feelings of insecurity
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among local communities increasingly deprived of protection and provision from governments that were increasingly constrained fiscally and administratively, while at the same time the state could demonstrate its strength through the round ups, sweeps, beatings, and detention of refugees—all in the name of security. Tanzania’s Refugee Policies Prior to Liberalization and Democratization Tanzania had served as a country of asylum for many years prior to the 1990s for thousands of people who fled Rwanda, Uganda, South Africa, Mozambique, Malawi, Burundi, Zimbabwe, and the DRC. It has been argued, “refugees were welcome largely due to their potential as a useful labor force” (Chaulia 2003, 156). The government’s asylum policies allowed refugees to be integrated into society and some refugees were granted citizenship and work permits. The Tanzanian government passed refugee/immigration laws in 1965 and in 1972. The government provided land for settlements in order for refugees to achieve the goals of self-sufficiency and integration. For example, settlements were established in 1972 (Ulyankulu and Matimba) and 1974 (Mishamo) for refugees from Burundi who had fled ethnic strife (Daley 1993). These settlements had several social facilities that included primary and secondary schools, health centers, a vocational training center, and water wells. Although the international community provided assistance, this was no small feat for Tanzania considering it was and still is one of the poorest countries on the African continent and in the world. Prior to the 1990s, refugees encountered few obstacles from the government and local communities. They had access to land to produce crops and they cooperated with their neighbors to build schools and other community infrastructure. Rwandan refugees who fled from Uganda—mainly Tutsis—in the 1980s were resettled in Kagera region after the government established Burigi Settlement. Land was provided for the establishment of the settlement in order that the refugees could continue to raise cattle and to become self-sufficient. The government provided them with “full rations in the first year, full ration, seeds and training in the second year and a half ration in the third year by which time, some progress would have been made towards self-sufficiency . . . farm plots were allocated to them in 1985” (UNHCR 1997a, 6–7). To further illustrate the government’s generous reception and treatment of these refugees, not only were they allowed to keep their cattle, but when it was discovered that the areas
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were infested with tsetse flies, they were sprayed. Nevertheless, many refugees left and were integrated into surrounding villages. The government’s commitment to the refugees and this settlement did not wane and those who left were encouraged to return. During the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, Tanzania also hosted a number of refugees who had fled racist settler colonial states (South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique) who were actively involved in the liberation movements in their home countries (Daley 1992). In 1982, for example, freedom fighters from the Pan African Congress (PAC) sought asylum in the country and in 1984 members of the African National Congress (ANC) were on the run from the apartheid government in South Africa (UNHCR 1997a, 7). Tanzania welcomed them. Other refugees fled authoritarian states (the DRC, Uganda, and Malawi) where many people experienced gross human rights violations. The government welcomed these refugees because they were viewed as freedom fighters for democracy, justice, the establishment of the rule of law, and the end to colonial and white minority rule. The above policies illustrate that the Tanzanian government upheld the various international laws that protect refugees’ rights including the right to work, attend school, and move around freely. However, beginning in the 1990s, new political, economic, and social dynamics in the country transformed these generous policies from open door to semi-closed and for some refugees to closed-door policies. Increasingly, refugees were seen as a security threat. For example, the government accused refugees from Rwanda and Burundi of using the camps for military purposes. National security was further undermined, it was claimed, by the threat of military incursions over the border from Rwanda and Burundi. Yet, during the 1960s when the colonial government of Mozambique regularly conducted military raids across the border into Tanzania in search of guerrilla leaders, Mozambican refugees were neither forced into camps nor deported and the government continued to accept new refugees from Mozambique. The Adoption of Restrictive Refugee Policies in Tanzania An analysis of the intersection of democratization, the imposition of SAPs, and regional insecurity can shed some light on Tanzania’s changing refugee policies and their effects on refugees in general, women refugees, and women in host communities. Tanzania’s political system has radically changed from the one-party socialist model that was adopted at the time of independence to the current multiparty capitalist
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one. One can argue that Tanzania’s once generous asylum policies toward refugees shifted from warm and friendly to cold and hostile at the same time that the political system was making its transition to democratic rule and adopting liberal economic policies under SAPs. As the virtues of democracy were being espoused to Tanzanian citizens that included human rights, these same rights were being denied to refugees flocking in waves from the war-torn neighboring countries of Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC. The new restrictive system was demonstrated in the forced expulsions of refugees and others who were viewed as being in the country illegally. This was particularly evident in the government’s treatment of Hutu refugees from Rwanda (Rutinwa 1996a). The Tanzanian government was vehemently opposed to this refugee population residing in camps because they were suspected of being participants in the 1994 genocide. In addition, the government and relief workers accused them of using the camps as training grounds for exiled soldiers and militia members. Many refugees from Burundi were viewed in the same light—armed former militia personnel who used the camps to launch incursions over the border into Burundi or for political activity that would pose a threat to the government (Human Rights Watch 1996). It was an open secret that the former Hutu Rwandan army and militia leaders (Interahamwe) used the camps for military training and arms were present in the camps—the government and the UNHCR banned both activities. Moreover, when the Rwandan government made good on its threat to empty camps in eastern Zaire of Hutu refugees, the Tanzanian government feared that it would take similar actions against Hutu refugees in its camps, which would create an insecure environment for its citizens in the refugee-hosting communities. In the end, the government demanded the repatriation of all Rwandan refugees by the end of December 1996, although the political climate in Rwanda was too precarious to guarantee the refugees’ safety. Human rights organizations reported that police and security personnel used teargas and sticks to force refugees toward the border. The order to leave Tanzania was targeted at all refugees regardless of their legitimate asylum claims. The issue of security had some validity because the refugee-hosting regions of Kagera and Kigoma, bordering three refugeeproducing countries of Burundi, Rwanda, and the DRC, experienced a proliferation of weapons. To make matters worse, these communities had stagnating economies and “it was not altogether surprising that crime was on the increase in Kigoma when public services and facilities there had been stretched by a significant rise in the population due to
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refugees” (All Africa News Service 2002). However, the effects of these actions on refugees’ human rights were clearly disastrous and even more so for women refugees who made up the bulk of the refugee population; they were the most vulnerable in terms of poor health, pregnancy, child and family responsibilities, and being at risk for sexual and physical abuse. The government showed no signs of relenting following the expulsions of 1996. In the following year, during which the refugee population reached 346,703, of whom 266,498 were from Burundi, the government began to target this refugee population and the remnants of the Rwandan refugee population that were not forced out in late 1996. The government flexed its “democratic” muscles in January 1997 when it expelled more than 100 Burundi refugees and 2,000 Rwandan refugees claiming that they had participated in criminal activities (USCR 1997, 1). In the meantime, the government of Burundi accused the Tanzanian government of harboring rebels who “engaged in arms trafficking and cross-border incursions. . . . The Burundian government threatened to act if the Tanzanian government did not” (Human Rights Watch 1999b). The Burundian army killed several refugees upon their return. Tanzania’s action was clearly in violation of international law. Host governments that accuse refugees of violating their laws are obligated to provide them with due process in a court of law instead of forcing them back to their countries of origin that are often unsafe. Refugees’ rights were again violated in October 1997 when approximately 5,000 Burundian refugees, mainly women and children were forcibly deported. The men were taken to camps while women and children were involuntarily repatriated—many of them walked for several days without adequate food and water (Foreign Broadcasting Information Service 1997a, 1). The government’s actions violated international law pertaining to the protection of refugees—the principle of non-refoulement—that no one should be forcibly returned to a country where her life or freedom could possibly be threatened. Refugees were entitled to due process under the law that meant they should not have been forcibly repatriated before their applications for asylum were adjudicated. Finally, in an effort to force the refugees out of the country, the government denied the international community and others access to the refugee camps and areas around them. In sum, the fact that the country held the first democratic multiparty elections in 1995 meant very little for the protection of refugees—one could argue that their lives became nastier and more brutish. The Tanzanian government exercised sovereignty over its borders and decided what to do with the refugees regardless of international laws, the
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presence of the international community in the form of the UNHCR, and its own refugee laws for several reasons, some of which were selfserving. First, refugees were accused of causing environmental damage to the local communities when they cut down large numbers of trees for shelter and cooking. Second, the government cited the increase in crime and the proliferation of weapons in refugee-hosting communities as causes for growing insecurity that put citizens and police at risk. Third, the government did not want to become entangled in the political affairs of Burundi. Finally, the necessary assistance from the international community to host the refugees was not forthcoming. Forced Encampment In the 1990s, Tanzanian officials became increasingly concerned that military and political activities occurred in refugee camps, which they feared undermined state sovereignty and turned refugees into a source of insecurity. In addition, the government was worried that conflicts in Burundi would spill over into its territory. Therefore, the new refugee law of 1998 required all refugees to live in designated locations, usually near border areas. Given these concerns, justifiable or not, the refugee policies and practices that were enacted were not in line with previous policies or with a country that had recently made the transition to democratic rule. Moreover, they had profound ramifications on the human rights of all refugees especially refugee women and women in refugee-hosting communities in four main ways. First, the government established a forced encampment policy that required all refugees to reside in camps. Furthermore, the government enacted an exclusion zone around the camps—refugees could not travel more than 2.5 miles from the camps, but the restrictions intensified to include “household curfews between 8 pm and 6 am; no movement of refugees outside some camps, and other camp perimeters, no permits for any refugee to travel outside some camps, including for medical emergencies; and arrests of refugees who are traveling without issued permits” (Edgerton 2003). Clearly, this is in violation of international law that guarantees refugees freedom of movement in countries of asylum without discrimination. This right is found in Article 26 of the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees that states “host governments shall accord to refugees lawfully in its territory the right to choose their place of residence and to move freely within its territory, subject to any regulation applicable to aliens generally in the same circumstances.” Article 12
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of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights contains this same right. Moreover, it was in violation of the Tanzanian constitution [Section 3(15)(1)] that states, “everyone has the right to be free and to live as a free person.” Again, this demonstrates a shift in refugee policy because these actions were not taken against refugees in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s who were allowed to be integrated into society and some refugees were granted citizenship, work permits, and attended state-funded schools. The new policy also illustrated the government’s determination to maintain sovereignty over its territory regardless of international and national law that provides these human rights to refugees. However, the international community (UNHCR) went along with the government’s policy that can only be characterized as “don’t ask, don’t tell” in an effort to continue its relief operations. Second, for those refugees who attempted to avoid the camps, the government conducted a number of police sweeps and round ups in an effort to force all refugees into the camps. For example, in late 1997, members of the military rounded up approximately 35,000 refugees and illegal immigrants and forced them into camps or out of the country. In carrying out these sweeps, the state demonstrated its coercive capacities, at the same time that the country’s infrastructure was crumbling under the weight of the effects from El Nino that left roads, railways, bridges, and communications facilities badly damaged. Many of the refugees had lived in the country for years and were fully integrated into local communities. The swiftness of the sweeps did not allow refugees the opportunity to secure their belongings nor to locate family members. It was not only refugees who were affected by the round ups and sweeps, but Tanzanian women married to refugee men were also affected. They were often separated from their husbands or forced to reside in camps if they wanted to remain with their husbands and keep their families intact. This was a blatant violation of their human rights and citizenship rights under the constitution that provided the right to be free and for her family and household to be protected. As Tanzanian citizens, women married to refugees should not have to reside in refugee camps if they want to be with their husbands and families. Third, there was the question of citizenship. The 1995 Citizenship Act “does not allow Tanzanian women to apply for citizenship on behalf of their foreign spouses . . . the Act discriminates on the basis of sex contrary to the Tanzanian constitution and international law” because Tanzanian men can apply for citizenship on behalf of their spouses (Nowrojee 2000). The Tanzanian constitution states that everyone deserves the respect and protection of his life, his individual rights and
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that of family and household, and also respect and protection of his abode and his personal communication. It appeared that Tanzanian women who were married to refugees could not exercise these rights when their husbands were rounded up and forced into camps. In addition, refugees, even those born in the country, were not eligible to apply for citizenship. “Citizenship rules,” Jeffrey Herbst (2000, 230) has reminded us, “are especially important as boundary mechanism; they determine who is and who is not a citizen. Nationality laws are important in defining nations. Citizenship is important regardless of weak borders.” Referring specifically to Africa, he notes, “African nations are still insecure about their sovereignty because they do not exercise authority across their territory. African states jealously guard their sovereignty because it is critical to their exercise of power. Citizenship will continue to be important because it is the only badge of status and privilege that sovereignty allows them to allocate.” Fourth, some of the most serious ramifications of the forced encampment policy were the high incidents of rape and other forms of sexual and physical violence against female refugees. Often, refugee camps were viewed as economic and sexual opportunities for local men, refugee men, and police and security personnel because large numbers of women and girls were in the camps without husbands, uncles, brothers, or older male children and relatives. In addition, the encampment policies forced large numbers of people to reside in restricted areas that put additional pressure on the environment. This contributed to the increase of rapes and the abuse of women refugees’ human rights in that as women and girls had to walk longer distances in search of firewood for fuel or water supplies for cooking and washing, they were put at risk for rape and other forms sexual violence. The conditions of refugee women and women in refugee-hosting communities will be addressed in greater detail in chapter 6. In this new era of democratization, national leaders used refugees to gain votes and “politicians like Mkapa made trips to the refugee camps, and against Nyerere’s wishes expressed in retirement, promised to send refugees back if voted to power, both before the 1995 election and in the most recent 2000 polls” (Chaulia 2003, 162). To make good on his campaign promise, the newly democratically elected president, Benjamin Mkapa, closed Tanzania’s border with Burundi, and stated “Tanzania will not allow refugees to stay indefinitely” (USCR 1996a, 71). Thus, when public opinion turned against the refugees, the government shifted its refugee policies to reflect this new mood. This was in part due to the country’s transition to democratic rule in which the state attempted to
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respond to the needs and demands of its citizens who were freer to voice their opinions and was frustrated with an economy that continued to erode their standard of living. However, it is possible that the refugees were used as a scapegoat to mask the real economic and development problems in the country and refugee-hosting regions because as the refugees flowed in, these regions, and all of their problems, were put in the spotlight both nationally and internationally and the government lacked the political will, capacity, or wherewithal to solve them. If a host government could not meet the basic needs of its own citizens, it was unlikely that it would push for assistance and protection of refugees’ human rights. But it is also understandable that local communities found it difficult to understand why their police and security personnel were stationed in the camps to protect refugees— some of whom were thought to be mass murders—while their lives and those of their families, along with their property were at risk. The evidence seems compelling that the economic effects of SAPs made citizens of refugee-receiving countries in East Africa more and not less xenophobic because they began to view refugees and immigrants as “foreigners” who enjoyed social and economic benefits that they did not (Rutinwa 1999). Kaiser (1996) pointed out the increased resentment in Tanzania toward Asians, although they were Tanzanian citizens. While the standard of living of most Tanzanians decreased following the advent of SAPs, the minority Asian community continued to do relatively well because it was not dependent on the state for education, health care, and other social services. In addition, Asians and other foreigners were in a position to take advantage of the sale of parastatals (public enterprises including marketing boards that determined the prices of various commodities from sugar to wheat) that the IMF and World Bank insisted that the government sell. Again, this served to exacerbate antiforeign sentiments among some members of the population who viewed SAPs as helping “foreigners” and hurting Tanzanian citizens. A more detailed discussion of the interactions between refugee-hosting communities and refugees will be provided in chapter 4. The issues of human rights, refugee laws and policies, and their effects on refugees and women refugees in particular in Tanzania and Kenya have to be examined within the framework of SAPs and the relationships between local and global actors and decision makers and how these affect refugees and individuals in refugee-receiving communities. The responses, experiences, and pressures brought forth by SAPs and the political and economic transformation of refugee-receiving countries provide the context within which changes in refugee policies in
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countries such as Tanzania must be explored. The connections between the state, democratization, SAPs, and evolving state–society relations provide new frameworks for refugee policymaking both on the global and local levels. Kenya’s Changing Refugee Policies Refugees in Kenya also experienced more restrictive and repressive policies in the 1990s. Kenya served as a beacon of hope in East Africa following its independence from Great Britain in 1963. Compared to some of its neighbors, the country enjoyed reasonable economic growth and a relatively stable political system with ethnic conflict kept at a minimum. For these reasons, Kenya was host to refugees from surrounding countries initially from Uganda and Rwanda. Other refugees came from South Africa, the DRC, and Malawi. These refugees enjoyed a host of rights that included the right to work, obtain a business license, attend school, to live wherever they liked, and to obtain access to social services. As stated earlier, the generous policies can be termed “essentially laissez faire” as they allowed refugees to have a fair amount of autonomy from the Kenyan state. It was argued that these refugees were given these privileges because of what they contributed to the economy—skilled labor and investment (Verdirame 1999b, 27). Unlike Tanzania, Kenya lacked specific refugee laws, which meant that refugees had no claim to legal status and “this lack of legislation means that refugee protection has tended to be governed by the vagaries of charity rather than viewed as a matter of rights” (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 2003). The government’s Refugee Eligibility Commission, which granted refugee status on an individual basis, even stopped operating in the early 1990s when the country began to experience large refugee caseloads. A leading scholar of refugee human rights in Kenya argues “this system based on individual status determination by the Kenyan Government, began to come under pressure as the numbers of asylum-seekers increased as a result of the continued strife in Uganda after 1986 and, later, in Ethiopia and Somalia. The war in Somalia, and the subsequent arrival of some 400,000 Somali refugees in Kenya, combined with the arrival of the ‘walking boys’ in the northwest, led to the final collapse of the system of individual status determination by the Kenyan Eligibility Committee” (Verdirame 1999a, 56). However, the country is a signatory of both the United Nations 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention on the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.
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In addition, it is the signatory of other human rights treaties that have a mandate to protect refugees. These include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. However, when civil wars and human rights violations occurred in Ethiopia, Sudan, and Somalia, the Kenyan government began to reverse its generous policy of granting asylum to refugees. As civil strife began to engulf Somalia, Kenya was faced with an unprecedented refugee crisis as early as 1988 and it was obvious that the days of generous asylum were rapidly coming to an end as the refugees were not encouraged to remain in the country and some were forcibly repatriated. By 1991, additional numbers of Somalis fled to Kenya to escape the fighting in Mogadishu. The government did not want to encourage an additional influx, therefore, the construction of refugee camps was delayed, but the government was coming under intense international pressure and donors were threatening to withhold aid that the country desperately needed. It was only then that camps were finally opened, but health and sanitation facilities were poor and the government was not anxious to improve them. To the government, this was a temporary situation and additional refugees were not wanted. As more refugees sought to enter the country, they were refused entry and later Kenya closed its border with Somalia. It is interesting to observe, as noted earlier, that as large numbers of refugees were seeking asylum in Kenya in 1991, the country was beginning to have an internally displaced population that was directly linked to the upcoming multiparty elections of 1992. At the same time, the country’s economy decelerated sharply. The economic growth rate declined from 5.2 percent in 1988 to 2.2 percent in 1991; agriculture registered negative growth; inflation rose to 19.6 percent, and workers’ real wages declined by 8.3 percent (Holmquist and Oendo 2001, 201). To further complicate the country’s political and economic landscape, the country’s staple food—maize—was in short supply. Writing in 1992, Holmquist and Ford argued that “the so-called ‘tribal clashes’ have also disrupted production. Farms have been abandoned, crops left unharvested, and homes and equipment destroyed. Most donors are continuing with what is termed humanitarian and project specific aid, but a great deal will be needed to meet the demands of the normal domestic market, let alone the enormous problem of feeding and sustaining refugees from war-stricken Somalia . . . as well as others from Ethiopia and Sudan” (Holmquist and Ford 1998, 104). Although the government bore considerable responsibility for generating the
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problem of the internally displaced population that contributed to economic problems, refugees became a convenient scapegoat for the country’s economic woes. Forced Repatriation and Encampment Like Tanzania, Kenya adopted forced encampment as the model of refugee containment and control. As noted in chapter 1, as late as 1988, Kenya’s refugee population stood at 10,600 and those refugees were not consigned to camps. Beginning in the 1990s, however, the government tried to force all refugees to reside in camps except for those who were in need of major medical care that was not available in the camps. Several camps were located in the North Eastern Province where the inhabitants largely engaged in pastoralism. The region has had a long history of shifta activity, which affected refugees and the local communities. Shifta is the Swahili word for bandit. Security was an important issue for the government because the amount of weapons flowing into this region that had been a major theater of the Cold War in Africa increased following the collapse of the dictatorial governments in both Ethiopia and Somalia in 1991. Refugees and rebel fighters brought their guns with them to Kenya. Due to the economic conditions in the country and in this region, guns could be purchased for a few shillings. Although the rebel fighters made up a small part of the refugee population, the government blamed them for the insecurity and crime in the region and “the frequent xenophobic or anti-refugee statements, police harassment, arbitrary arrests and extortion by government officials have created an increasingly hostile environment for the thousands of refugees not implicated in arms trafficking” (Human Rights Watch 2002b, 5). Because of this, Somali refugees were forcibly repatriated on several occasions. For example, when 5,000 refugees crossed the border into Kenya at the town of Liboi in 1989, most of them were promptly forced back across the border and those who remained were treated roughly by border patrols guards and security personnel. The USCR reported, “the treatment given Somali refugees reflects a general deterioration in human rights practices in Kenya and in what was, until recently, a more hospitable Kenya policy towards refugees” (USCR 1990, 46). From the onset of the refugee crisis, former president Daniel arap Moi claimed that the refugees were bandits who entered the country disguised as refugees and security sweeps and security checks were necessary to apprehend them. Kenyans of Somali origin and
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Somalis living in the North Eastern Province came under harassment and abuse as the government hunted down illegal immigrants and refugees, and anyone who the government thought was illegally residing in the country. People were requested to provide birth certificates, identity papers, or a passport to determine their eligibility to remain in the country (Africa Watch 1990b). Those who were unable to provide proof of Kenyan citizenship were subject to forcible repatriation. Africa Watch (1990b) reported that there were a number of cases where Kenyan-Somalis were forcibly deported to Somalia even when they were born in Kenya or had resided legally in the country for years. Hundreds of ethnic Somalis fled to Tanzania and Uganda to escape the government’s policy of forcible deportation. Moi publicly acknowledged the mistreatment received by the refugees, but the government continued to deny them refugee status and continued to forcibly deport them. Other refugees from Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Burundi were also deported. The government continued its campaign to deport refugees in 1990 when Moi issued a directive that ordered all Ugandan and Rwandan refugees to leave the country following an armed invasion of Rwanda by exiles who resided in Uganda. Moi condemned the use of Ugandan territory to launch the invasion and demonstrated his concern for security by ordering, “all refugees engaged in illegal activities” out of the country (Africa Watch 1990a). This was followed by a number of security sweeps in major urban towns including Nairobi, Nakuru, and Eldoret in which people were deported or detained regardless of whether they could prove that they were in the country legally. Many were fined and kept in police custody before deportation. The police and security personnel routinely breeched refugees’ rights by destroying their residence documents and denying them access to legal representation. Many refugees were caught off guard by the sweeps and they had to leave children, families, property, and businesses. Several women reported cases of sexual abuse and rape while being detained (Africa Watch 1990a). The insecurity in North Eastern Province in and around refugee camps was evident in the killings, rapes, and robberies that became more brazen in 1993. Several relief workers were killed and vehicles stolen as NGOs attempted to deliver assistance. One incident resulted in the deaths of nine Kenyan security personnel who were escorting relief food. Unfortunately, insecurity remained a problem in this province even after the government closed most of the camps because of tensions between refugees and the local community and among Somali clans. Drought conditions made the
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competition for land and water worse and instability from the fighting in Somalia remained an issue. To quote a report by Human Rights Watch (2002b): “social services were already severely strained and the area was suffering from drought and inter-communal disputes over scarce pastures and water and tensions caused by small arms trafficking aided by wars in neighboring states . . . have brought chronic fighting and loss of life that the government has been unable to curtail, and in some instances has exacerbated.” Refugees and local residents began to compete for food relief, housing, limited watering holes, and police protection from rising rates of crime. Bandits in the North Eastern Province were of Kenyan and Somali origin. Girls as young as five were reportedly raped in Kenya’s northeast refugee camps by bandits, other refugees, Kenyans, and security and police personnel. The problems and issues surrounding rape and other forms of sexual violence will be addressed in chapter 6 that specifically examines refugee women. Liboi refugee camp, which housed the first group of Somali refugees in northeastern Kenya and later refugees from Ethiopia, opened in 1991. Due to its close proximity to the Somali-Kenyan border, refugees were later transferred to Ifo, which was established also in 1991, and Dagahaley and Hagadera were established in 1992. Before the closure of Liboi camp in 1994, it had a refugee population of 45,000; Ifo had 46,000 refugees, Dagahaley had 45,296, and Hagadera had 42,941 (UNHCR 1996a). Ifo, Dagahaley, and Hagadera are the remaining camps in the province—the term given to all three camps is Dadaab, which is the closest town to the camps (Riungu 1999). Meanwhile by 1992, Mandera housed 50,000 refugees mainly from Somalia, Banissa housed 30,000 mainly Ethiopians, and El-Wak housed an additional 18,000 Somali refugees (UNHCR 1993d). The government began to establish camps in its Coast Province in 1991 and by 1993 the camps’ populations were Utange (31,193 refugees), Marafa (11,878), St. Annes (10,525), Hatimy (2,873), and Jomvu (602) to house the thousands of mainly Somali refugees who began to arrive in the country. The camps were closed by 1998 for three reasons, all related to economics. The refugees were given the options of returning to Somalia or transferring to Dadaab or Kakuma refugee camps. Approximately 8,000 Somali refugees were transferred to Kakuma camp from 1997 to 1998 following the closure of coastal camps while another 12,000 were relocated to the Dadaab camps (Center for Refugee Research 2003). The remaining refugees continued to reside in
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and around Mombasa, some refugees moved to other parts of the country including Nairobi while others opted to return home. First, the ones located near Mombasa were closed because, according to the government, the refugees were an economic threat to its thriving tourist business. Because the camps were open, refugees were free to go into Mombasa to conduct business or to enjoy leisure activities and because these camps housed the first wave of refugees—students, professionals, business people, and military personnel, they had more money to spend and were willing to go into Mombasa. The government contended that the presence of these refugees drove European tourists and their muchneeded hard currency away. But media reports in Europe on the ethnic/land clashes and other political violence in the country probably played more of a role in scaring would-be tourists away than the refugees (Holmquist and Ford 1998). The second economic dimension that led to the closure of the camps near Mombasa was that they were tax-free havens and refugees established a variety of businesses in the camps that included: tea and coffee shops, restaurants, guesthouses, tailoring shops, and shoe repair shops. There was a thriving market in the camps that sold a variety of goods from spaghetti noodles to Coca Cola to fresh fruits and vegetables. This was how Utange camp could be described before its closure.13 Again, because the camps were open, members of the local community used them for shopping and other services. Third, while some members of the local community were employed by refugees to work in the camps many in the local community did not see this as a mutually beneficial relationship and began to resent the lifestyle of the refugees and relief that was provided by the international community. For example, acrimony between the refugees and local youth developed in 1993 when violent clashes broke out between them and the Somali refugees for the above reasons. Because members of the local community had access to the camps, they could witness firsthand the assistance provided to refugees and not to them, along with the many businesses that refugees established in the camps, which left some Kenyans with the impression that, refugees were better off economically than them. Tensions between the two groups mounted to the point that some local youth blocked the road to the camp in an effort to prevent the delivery of refugee relief (interview, NCCK Representative, 1993). All these developments and tensions at the coast were compounded by an overall economic downturn in the economy that was exacerbated by the imposition of SAPs. The government did not want refugees drifting into urban areas in search of employment, education, health care,
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and other social services that it could not provide for its citizens under SAPs’ austerity measures. As early as 1993, the government announced that it could no longer host refugees, claiming they were a threat to the security of the country and a drain on the country’s hospitals overburdened with Somali refugees who had been wounded in the civil war. It asked the UNHCR to repatriate all refugees. Despite forced encampment, presidential directives to deport all refugees and illegal immigrants, as well as detentions, beatings, and round ups, refugees remained in the country and several thousand resided outside of the camps. If we accepted the government’s reasons for closing Utange refugee camp and similar camps, what was its reason for closing Marafa refugee camp whose population consisted mainly of peasants, farmers, and pastoralists from the rural areas of Somalia? Marafa refugee camp was also located in the Coast Province 20 miles from Malindi another popular destination for tourists. Refugees were free to leave the camp, but they demonstrated little desire to travel to Malindi or Mombasa, therefore, they were not a threat to the tourism industry and they did not compete with members of the local community for jobs or other social services. If anything, members of the local community benefited from the refugees because they had access to the camp’s water pump, which meant that women and girls in the local areas did not have to walk long distances to collect water as they had done previously. Moreover, the refugees purchased animals from the local community, which caused conflict over water and land for grazing the animals. To reduce the level of conflict, the refugees constructed a slaughterhouse in the camp where surplus animals owned by members of the local community were slaughtered and the meat was sold to refugees and members of the local community. Members of the local community used the camp’s market to purchase a variety of goods including surplus food from refugees’ food baskets issued by the WFP. In sum, this refugee camp did not appear to present a threat to the security of the local community—the tourism industry was not under threat, crime against the local population did not increase, the proliferation of weapons into the local community did not occur, and refugees did not compete with Kenyans for jobs, education, or other social services in urban areas. The camp fell victim to the government’s new policy of “centralized refugee settlement” or camp consolidation (ACT 2000b). When the government closed the last remaining refugee camps in Coast Province in 1998 and closed or consolidated camps in the North Eastern Province in 1995, refugees were given the option of repatriation, removal to Kakuma and Dadaab camps, or remain in the northeastern
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camps. In total, from 1992 to 1998, Kenya closed 13 refugee camps. Kenya has two remaining camps—Kakuma and Dadaab. Kakuma refugee camp, which consists of three camps, was established in northwestern Kenya in the Rift Valley Province. The first camp, Kakuma I was established in 1992 to house Sudanese refugees. In 1998, Kakuma II was established to accommodate Somali refugees following the closure of coastal camps and Kakuma III was established in 1999 as Sudanese refugees continued to seek sanctuary in this part of Kenya (Save the Children 1999). Due to the government’s policy of centralized refugee settlement, Kakuma accommodates refugees from various countries including Liberia, Rwanda, Ethiopia, and the DRC (ACT 2000b). Three camps make up Dadaab: Ifo, which was established in 1992, and Hagadera and Dagahaley were both established in 1992 (Riungu 1999). Prior to this, Kakuma hosted refugees mainly from Sudan and “they were advised by the Kenyan government officials to make friends with their Turkana neighbors” (IRIN 2003b). However, hostilities and tensions between refugees and the host communities developed over “the regular raids on the camps, looting of their few possessions, killing of their community and raping of their women” (IRIN 2003b). Members of the local community, the Turkana, and the Dinka refugees from southern Sudan, were primarily engaged in pastoralism which meant “cattle ownership is a way of life, a means of trading and paying dowries, and a manifestation of a person’s worth” (IRIN 2003a). But the Dinka were not allowed to keep cattle in Kakuma camp, plant gardens, and leave the camp in an effort to appease the Turkana who “have long been recognized as one of Kenya’s most marginalized ethnic groups, both by the government and the humanitarian community” (IRIN 2003a). Insecurity in and around the camps increased and violence erupted as the local community resented the arrival of additional refugees who put pressure on their dwindling water and forest resources. In addition, refugees from different nationalities and ethnic backgrounds were forced to live together and harmony among them was not always achieved. Moreover, security in the region was affected by the proliferation of weapons that ended up in the hands of the Turkana who used them against the refugees. Refugees who defied the government’s orders to reside in camps and who continued to live in urban areas may have had better access to social services if they could afford them, but frequently their situation remained precarious due to various government policies. In an effort to restrict refugees to camps, they were often fined or detained when they were apprehended during a round up. Individuals who registered for
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refugee status had their documents destroyed by police and security forces and charged with illegal residence. The government periodically conducted sweeps in urban areas to round up refugees and those who resided in the country illegally. For example in 1990, sweeps were conducted in Nairobi and Mombasa—Kenya’s largest cities where Kenyans, refugees, and other nationals went in search of employment, better housing, education, and social services. Other sweeps were conducted against refugees and others deemed to be residing in the country illegally in July and August 1997. Additional sweeps and round ups were conducted in late 2002 in response to a terrorist attack on an Israeli-owned hotel and an Israeli airplane. The police in Nairobi conducted raids, arbitrary arrests, and some refugees were beaten and detained, although the terrorist attacks took place in Mombasa hundreds of miles from Nairobi (Rowan 2002). These sweeps served as opportunities for the police and security personnel to extort money from the refugees. It became customary for the police to arrive in the middle of the night, collect bribes from some refugees, and detain them. During the sweeps, refugees were rounded up and held in detention. The detention centers were overcrowded, lacked basic sanitary facilities, and contained adult, convicted criminals. Refugee women in urban areas who were not harassed, rounded up, or detained were still affected when these actions were taken against their spouses, children, and other family members. Due to their visibility, many refugee women who worked in bars, restaurants, hotels, and lodges became easy targets during the sweeps. Many refugees were caught off guard by the sweeps and were forced to leave their children, families, businesses, and property (Africa Watch 1990a). Conclusion Tanzania has hosted refugees from neighboring countries for decades. At first, it hosted refugees who fled from the colonial rule of white minority governments such as South Africa, Mozambique, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. The Tanzanian government was steadfast in its support of liberation/freedom fighters and granted many from the African National Congress, the Pan-African Congress, and so on asylum. Kenya initially granted asylum to refugees from Uganda, South Africa, and Rwanda. For more than a decade, both countries experienced large refugee influxes while at the same time grappling with the economic, political, and social effects of SAPs, along with internal and external pressure to hold multiparty elections and to make their political systems more democratic. The
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refugee influxes occurred as the result of civil wars and political unrest in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa regions. Both countries addressed the issues of security, crime, and environmental damage as consequences of refugee influxes. This chapter has attempted to examine both countries’ shifts in refugee policies from fairly open and generous to closed and hostile within the context of internal and external demands for democratic governments and economic reforms, and a proliferation of weapons into refugee-hosting communities that put refugees and citizens at risk. There were similarities and differences in both countries’ experiences in hosting refugees. First, Kenya did not have a rural settlement strategy similar to Tanzania’s that allowed refugees to be integrated into local communities. Therefore, Tanzania’s refugee population traditionally has been more rural than Kenya’s. Refugees initially in Tanzania were welcomed for their labor that was intended to boost agricultural productivity and development. Kenya’s refugee population traditionally was more urban and the government did not have to establish camps nor settlement schemes. Refugees were also welcomed for their labor as professionals and entrepreneurs. However, beginning in the 1990s, both countries enacted forced encampment policies and refugees in urban areas in Kenya were often rounded up and sent to camps in rural areas. Refugees in rural areas in Tanzania were rounded up and sent to camps—many of them had resided in the country for years and had contributed to the establishment of social services such as hospitals and schools in these rural areas through their labor and taxes. Chaulia (2003, 160) attributes the change in refugee policies to a certain extent on “the side-effects of liberalization” because donors are no longer interested in funding development projects that would include rural settlements for refugees and the government cannot afford to provide health care, education, and other social services to its own citizens let alone refugees. Moreover, according to Chaulia (2003), refugees simply are not needed in Tanzania’s economy as they were previously because the role of the agricultural sector has somewhat decreased in importance. Finally, as part of the democratization process, politicians used refugees to garner votes as antiforeign sentiments were expressed by some segments of the population. Kenya’s change in refugee policies can be attributed to the same economic and political pressures. When the thousands of Somalis, Ethiopians, and Sudanese sought sanctuary in Kenya in the last 15 years, the government faced internal and external pressure to improve it economic and political record. At the same time, the number of weapons in
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refugee-hosting areas increased as armed militias crossed the border terrorizing refugees and citizens. The combination of arms, poverty, the lack of educational and economic activities, and refugees was bound to cause acrimony among the refugees and their hosts. Hence, policies were enacted to keep the two groups separate—forced encampment and even forcible deportation as the government cannot justify the use of schools, hospitals, and other infrastructure for the use of refugees while its own citizens rural and urban are suffering as a result of SAPs. The following chapter addresses the social, economic, and environmental dynamics between refugees and their hosts.
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CHAPTER 4
Local Host Communities’ Responses to Refugees Introduction Kenyans and Tanzanians who resided in refugee-hosting communities, like other segments of the population, were affected by the economic changes brought forth by SAPs during the 1990s. While most regions throughout both countries grappled with a decline in living standards as a result of structural adjustment, Kenyans and Tanzanians who lived in areas that hosted refugees often faced new challenges as refugees competed with them for scare resources, fragile infrastructure was endangered, and new economic dynamics developed as a result of assistance provided by the international community, refugee labor, and businesses. Moreover, refugee-hosting communities bore the brunt of the fallout from regional conflicts and instability in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa regions that was one of the factors that undergirded a change in refugee policies for both governments. At the same time, the transition to democratic rule allowed issues concerning human rights, citizenship, democracy, and the relationship between the state and civil society to be openly discussed among all citizens. This chapter has three goals. First, it will discuss the local communities that hosted refugees in Kenya and Tanzania in terms of how the refugees were received, along with the economic, environmental, and political effects of hosting refugees. Second, it will explore the ways in which refugees interacted with local communities both inside and outside of camps, both in the rural and urban areas. This will be done to determine what effects refugees had on local communities and vice versa to illustrate that a refugee influx did not always lead to problems and various members of local communities had different interactions and benefits
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from refugees. Third, it will provide an analysis of the host communities that can be used as another means to dissect the governments’ changing refugee policies. In other words, did the policies change although host communities benefited from refugee labor, businesses established by refugees, and assistance provided by the international community? And, how did these new policies affect the local communities that had access to various services and facilities in the camps? Furthermore, did these new policies have a particular effect on women in the local communities in terms of curtailing their access to water pumps, medical facilities that provided information on reproductive health, childbirth, and sexually transmitted diseases, and markets for them to purchase and sell goods and services? The chapter will discuss both countries separately by regions and only address the large refugee influxes that had a major effect on local communities. The overall argument made in the chapter is that depending on the economic and environmental conditions of local communities or the material landscape, refugees had different experiences and interactions with their hosts. The acceptance by host communities of large numbers of refugees in their midst was largely dependent on “the shared identity, in the form of cultural, linguistic or ethnic affinity” between the two groups and to what extent host communities benefited from the refugees (Jacobsen 2001, 21). Through various directives and announcements by both governments to repatriate refugees and references to the environmental and security problems produced by refugees, it was clear to host communities that refugees were not welcomed in either country. As African nations such as Kenya and Tanzania faced problems caused by environmental degradation, deeper indebtedness, less land for agricultural cultivation, and less employment for everyone, it became more and more difficult to host and help refugees. In addition, when the UNHCR and its partners provided the host communities with material benefits in the form of clinics, water pumps, vaccinations, contracts for various projects, water boreholes, and created or improved new infrastructure (schools, roads, bridges), refugees were more readily accepted—for a while at least. Finally, it is argued that when members of refugee-hosting communities benefited from the presence of refugees in terms of their labor, businesses created by refugees, and items from their assistance packages, they were more welcomed and relations between hosts and refugees were more amicable. However, according to Jacobsen (2001, 21) a shared identity between refugees and host communities is not enough to keep tensions at bay during an economic crisis.
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An Overview of the Refugee-Hosting Communities in Kenya and Tanzania The interactions and relations between the host communities and refugees had ethnic, social, economic, and environmental dynamics. Several studies have found that where refugees shared a similar cultural background with the local population, relations with the host community initially were less conflict-ridden—Sudanese in Uganda, Angolans in Zambia, Mozambicans in Zimbabwe, Liberians and Sierra Leoneans in Guinea, and Palestinians in Lebanon (Coulibaly 2003; Merkx 2000; Gilen et al. 1994; Bakewell 1999a). The literature on borderlands and border identities cautions against making clear distinctions between refugees and host nationals because both populations move back and forth across the border; they share a common identity; both groups engage in economic activities across the border creating “transnational links,” and they have other linkages through families and marriage (Allen 1996; Merkx 2000, 22). However, even when refugees share a common language and culture, conflicts and tensions will arise between them and host communities during times of shortages for food, medical care, and other services, when host communities feel that the refugees have an economic advantage due to assistance from the international community, and when their presence leads to insecurity, especially in borderlands, underdeveloped areas where refugees were located in Kenya and Tanzania (Merkx 2000; Bascom 1998). Even under the best refugeehosting conditions, “an initial welcoming response to refugees can evolve into resentment and threats against them if the community perceives the refugees to be causing more problems than benefits” (Jacobsen 2002, 10). Where refugees were from different ethnic groups than the host community, relations would be strained (Sudanese in northwestern Kenya and Somali Bantus in North Eastern Province). Refugees and local communities would have less conflict when the economic and environmental effects of hosting refugees were not adverse, which was the case with refugees in western Tanzania in the 1960s and 1970s who contributed to agricultural production, Sudanese refugees in Uganda in the 1960s whose labor was welcomed on the cotton and tobacco plantations, and the current Sudanese refugee population in northern Uganda who contribute to the agricultural sector (Merkx 2000; Daley 1993). Following the closure of camps in the Coast Province beginning in 1995 and ending in 1998, the camps in the North Eastern Province were home to more Somali refugees who shared the same language, culture, and religion as their hosts with the exception of the Somali Bantus.
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However, relations between host communities and refugees would be amicable regardless of ethnicity if host communities benefited from the presence of refugees—jobs and other employment opportunities, health facilities and other forms of infrastructure, more governmental attention for the host communities, and where the environmental effects of hosting refugees were kept to a minimum. The social connections that refugees share with their host communities can serve to reduce tensions between the two communities. One important social connection that forges bonds between the two and creates other social and economic networks is marriage (Gilen et al. 1994). Because these borderland areas have porous borders, “it is not uncommon for such communities to trade, and inter-marry irrespective of supposed occurrences of borders” (The Centre for Conflict Research 2002, 9). The regions in Kenya affected by the influx of refugees included the North Eastern, Coast, and Rift Valley Provinces because of their close proximity to Somalia, Ethiopia, and Sudan—all major refugeeproducing countries. The Rift Valley and North Eastern Provinces were further affected following the closure of refugee camps in Coast Province after refugees who refused to be repatriated were sent to camps (Kakuma and Dadaab) in these provinces. The western part of Tanzania was host to refugees primarily in the regions of Kagera and Kigoma. The local host communities’ response and relations to refugees in both countries will be examined within the context of geographical spatial dynamics, especially in rural areas where refugees often share the same language and culture with the host population. The geography of the regions is also important because it often determines the ways in which people earn a living and can affect refugee–host relations if both communities engage in the same occupations. Kenya’s northwestern Rift Valley and North Eastern Provinces are arid and semi-arid, therefore, agriculture is not the main livelihood. People rely on nomadic pastoralism (cattle, goats, sheep, and camels) and agropastoralism to earn a living, along with small-scale trade and wage employment (ACT 2002a). The Coast Province has a climate that supports agriculture in some areas and livestock production and its coastline is ideal for beach resorts that attract tourists and Kenyan nationals, and the Indian Ocean undergirds the fishing industry. Therefore, the economy is based on these economic sectors. Tanzania’s Kagera and Kigoma regions do not have an arid or semiarid climate but rather have a rainy climate and agriculture is the backbone of both provinces’ economies, along with livestock production. Both countries had refugees residing in urban areas despite government policies that restricted refugees to camps unless they were exempt for
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medical or educational reasons. Tanzania’s camps were all located in rural areas. After Kenya closed its urban camps by 1998, it hosted refugees in rural, remote parts of the country where the national populations were relatively low, refugees often outnumbered citizens, both the national government and international community had created very little economic development, and the regions were politically marginalized. Kenya’s North Eastern Province is classified as “backward and abandoned” which was made worse when the area was closed to outsiders and put under an emergency order (Baker 1998, 18). Nationals in Rift Valley, North Eastern, Kagera, and Kigoma were cut off from the economic and political mainstream because of their locations and most Kenyans and Tanzanians did not travel to these regions. Kenya’s North Eastern Province had a refugee population (Somali) that was almost identical in terms of language, religion, and ethnicity to its majority Somali population who previously tried to reunite with its brethren across the border and there has been simmering resentment against both populations from the national government and its citizens. Jennifer Hyndman (1997, 161) puts it bluntly when she states, “The Government of Kenya has not hidden its disdain for Somali refugees living in Kenya, nor for its own Kenyan nationals of Somali ethnicity.” Tanzania’s Haya ethnic group in both regions share a common language and culture with the Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi and Rwanda and there is a long history of economic and social interactions between the groups (Daley 1993). Refugees from the DRC were mainly from the ethnic group the Bembe and “in northwestern Tanzania, the town of Kigoma and the Lake Tanganyika shore have long been target areas of migration for Congolese on the other side of the lake. Refugees and locals mix together for purposes of trade, marriage, entertainment, seasonal work” (Maina et al. 2003; Jacobsen 2001, 10). When refugees from the DRC first arrived in Tanzania some of them stayed with relatives in and around Kigoma town before they went to camps. The northwestern part of Kenya’s Rift Valley Province hosted refugees who had no cultural or linguistic ties to the local community, especially the predominant Sudanese with the local Turkana population, followed by Somali Bantus who were transferred to Kakuma from camps where they had no ties to the ethnic Somali community (Crisp 1999). A similar situation exists between the other Somali refugees from various clans and the Turkana, along with Ethiopians and the Turkana. Finally, the Ethiopian, Sudanese, and few Ugandan refugees in North Eastern Province also do not share a common identity with the local Somali community. The vast majority of the Somali refugees who ended up in
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Coast Province had some commonalities with members of the host populations and there is a small ethnic Somali community. The principal ethnic groups in Coast Province include the Mijikenda who make up nine groups that include the Giriama, Kauma, Chonyi, Jibana, Kambe, Ribe, Rabai, Digo, and Duruma, along with the Taita, Swahili, Pokomo, Orma, and Arabs (Zeleza 1995; Yahya 1998). The Swahili, Arabs, and Orma are disproportionately Muslim like the Somali refugees and the members of the Mijikenda and Taiti are both Muslims and Christians (small percentage) while a sizeable percentage of the Pokomo are Christian and others are Muslim (Mazrui 2001). The Digo and Duruma are primarily Muslim (Cooper 1987). Still, large segments of the Mijikenda population adhere to traditional religious beliefs, including the Giriama. The main shared identity that the Somali refugees have with some members of the local community is both are adherents to Islam which is similar to refugees in North Eastern Province, but the two groups do not have the same social and economic ties that Somali refugees have with Kenyan-Somalis. Because of the province’s varied climate and coastline, economic activity is more varied than in the North Eastern and Rift Valley provinces. Members of the Mijikenda are involved in a number of economic sectors such as farming, fishing, trading, and cattle production and they live in the urban areas of Mombasa and Malindi—both refugee-hosting areas. The Swahili also rely on fishing to earn a living and they are also engaged in trade and small businesses, and the Taita are involved in agriculture, livestock production, and fishing (Frontani 2004). Many Mijikenda, especially the youth, have attempted to find employment in the tourism industry, which put them in closer contact with Somali refugees in the cities of Mombasa and Malindi. One of the major similarities between the first wave of Somali refugees who entered Coast Province and the Swahili Kenyans was both were traders and businesspeople. This put them in competition with one another and this served as one of the reasons why the coastal camps were closed. The business community in and around Mombasa put pressure on the government to close the camps that had flourishing tax-exempt businesses. In addition, Somali refugees outside the camp were accused of bringing goods into the country from Somalia and the United Arab Emirates and selling them at prices that undermined Kenyan businesses (Mohamed 1994). Another factor that affected refugee–host relations was the proliferation of weapons into both countries’ refugee-hosting communities. Weapons entered western Tanzania as the result of conflicts in the Great Lakes region whereas weapons left over from Somalia’s role in the Cold
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War and its civil war poured into Kenya’s North Eastern Province. Rift Valley Province’s northwestern region experienced an increase in weapons from the conflicts in southern Sudan, Somalia, and Ethiopia. Both countries have very porous borders that make it difficult to keep out illegal weapons. There was competition for jobs, contracts, and access to the resources of the refugee relief agencies in all provinces in both countries. Due to the educational and economic opportunities available in Tanzania’s western provinces and Kenya’s northwestern Rift Valley and North Eastern provinces, local people often could not take advantage of the employment opportunities offered by the relief agencies. Refugee-Hosting Communities in Kenya The provinces of Rift Valley, Coast, and North Eastern, along with the capital Nairobi, are the main refugee-hosting communities covered in this study (see figure 4.1 below that indicates when the camps were closed and which ones are currently operational). Within Rift Valley Province, Turkana District was the main area that hosted refugees initially from Sudan. When other camps were closed or consolidated many Somali and Ethiopian refugees were moved there, along with smaller numbers from Rwanda, the DRC, Burundi, and so on. The majority ethnic group that resides in the district is the Turkana. The district has an arid, semi-arid climate and suffered from drought followed by heavy rains from El Nino that resulted in severe food shortages and the destruction of scarce infrastructure during the 1990s. The drought caused the main backbone of the area’s economy, pastoralism, to virtually come to a standstill as water and pasture resources dried up and income and sustenance were not derived from the animals’ milk, meat, blood, skins, and hides. The severity of the problem was illustrated by the influx of the local population into and around refugee camps in search of food as malnutrition rates increased. In particular, Turkana District faced a high internally displaced population as the result of the drought that produced violent conflicts as people competed for scare water and pasture resources. A report by the Intermediate Technology Development Group (renamed Practical Action) attributed the conflict to several main sources that included: competition over scare resources, cattle rustling, and the availability of small weapons in the region, the inability of traditional governing bodies to solve the conflicts, lack of police and security personnel in the areas, and ethnocentrism. The report also outlined the effects of this violence on the local communities such as hundreds of
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Figure 4.1
Refugee Camps in Kenya
Key: 1 Jomvu (1998), 2 Utange (1995), 3 Swaleh Nguru (1998), 4 Hatimy (1998), 5 Marafa (1995), 6 Liboi (1994), 7 Habaswein, 8 El Wak (1994), 9 Mandera (1994), 10 Banissa (1994), 11 Walda (1993).
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people lost their lives, property was destroyed, and starvation and malnutrition rates increased, and relations between ethnic communities were damaged. All of these did not bode well for the reception of refugees as a large number of the displaced were from Kakuma, which is where the refugee camps first for the Sudanese and then Somalis were constructed. It is also important to note that Turkana District is one of the poorest districts in the country with low school enrollment rates, a large population dependent on food relief, and high poverty and mortality rates. In addition, most people did not have access to health facilities, clean water, and other sanitary services. Problems that refugees faced such as human rights abuses, sexual and physical assault, and forced prostitution were also faced by the internally displaced in this region (Pkalya et al. 2003, 10). This level of poverty and lack of social services may shed light on the state of refugee–host community relations. Garissa and Mandera Districts in North Eastern Province hosted large numbers of refugees from Somalia. Ethnic Somalis from the Ogaden clan that are divided into subclans (the Aulihan and Abdwak) along with the Borans, Rendilles, Gallas, Oromos, and Turkana are the principal Kenyan populations residing in the areas. They mostly engage in agriculture and pastoralism (Environment and Development Challenges 2001). North Eastern Province has an arid climate and these areas too were struck by drought and people found it difficult to earn a living from livestock and agricultural production. The district has one main river, the Tana, and agricultural production is mainly along this river’s banks. Life did not improve in the district when floods led to the outbreak of diseases and ended the drought in the late 1990s. As a result, some people in the drought-affected areas in Turkana, Mandera, and Garissa turned to criminal and banditry activity to survive. This was made easier with the proliferation of small arms and light weapons into both areas as the result of conflicts in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia. In addition, pastoralists and farmers in all three districts had to compete for scarce resources and the availability of weapons had the potential to turn competition deadly. Therefore, these areas became more insecure with or without the presence of refugees. What both districts have in common is borderland status and lack of economic development that have made them some of the least developed areas in the country and with the rise in crime and insecurity, the districts have become more estranged from the rest of the country. Saad Yahya (1998, 4) argues that the Coast Province has had quite the opposite experience. He contends that there was a concerted effort on the part of the government following independence to incorporate and
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integrate this region “into the mainstream of Kenya’s economic and social life.” On the other hand, Alamin Mazrui (2001) argues that the Coast Province, along with the North Eastern Province, is one of the most marginalized in terms of civil society because of the lack of investments in the economy and infrastructure in the area. Nevertheless, refugee camps in Coast Province were located near Mombasa and Malindi, which were certainly not borderland outposts as northwestern Rift Valley and the North Eastern Province. Moreover, Turkana and Garissa districts were underpopulated whereas Mombasa and Malindi experienced a rapid population growth rate that made land for farming, livestock production, and the tourism industry a scarce commodity (Yahya 1998). Mombasa served as the province’s most urbanized area and as such experienced an increase in its population and urban problems associated with inadequate infrastructure that could not accommodate the population boom. One of the glaring manifestations of urban growth and the shortage of land for housing in Mombasa and Malindi is the large population of squatters—many of whom belong to the Mijikenda ethnic group (Mazrui 2001). In addition, the province’s economic asset, tourism, contributed to environmental and infrastructure problems as business owners acquired more land to construct new hotels, restaurants, and other structures associated with tourism. According to Yahya (1998, 7), “this situation is complicated by an unpredictable influx and temporary settlement of refugees, creating huge demands on the meager public facilities and degradation of the local environment.” Because the entire country suffered from the drought, Coast Province was not spared and for those Kenyans who made their living in the agricultural and animal husbandry sectors, life was hard as food production plummeted and, similar to people in Turkana and Garissa Districts, people were dependent on international food aid to survive the drought as malnutrition rates increased. One of the worst affected areas in Coast Province was Kilifi District that serves as the ancestral home of the Mijikenda who have lost much of their land and have resorted to squatting on others’ land to survive (IRIN 2005; Zeleza 1995). To make matters worse, this district is one of the poorest and “least developed areas in the country” (Mazrui 2001, 279). Other people in the province were employed in the businesses connected to the tourism industry such as hotels, restaurants, tour operators, wood sculpturing, and the selling of various crafts. Some people were engaged in professional and semi-professional work while others were engaged in informal work as traders, hawkers, food vendors, and kiosk operators. When this sector was affected by the land clashes in the early 1990s, some workers lost their
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jobs. In addition, particular ethnic groups (Kikuyu, Luo, Kamba, and Luyha) who were affected by the land clashes in Rift Valley Province attempted to rebuild their lives in Coast Province and they became the targets of ethnic violence meted out by the Mijikenda (Kagwanja 2001). The addition of this new “upcountry” population in and around Malindi, Mombasa, and Kwale Districts, along with the refugees, caused not only tension between refugees and host communities, but interethnic conflicts erupted among Kenyans. Tensions between Kenyan ethnic groups were manifested in a series of violent confrontations in the 1990s, especially before multiparty elections were held. Similar to the land clashes in Rift Valley Province in the early 1990s, the government was accused of instigating violence between ethnic groups indigenous to the Coast Province and those who had moved there in an effort to prevent upcountry ethnic groups from voting for the opposition (Mazrui 2001). In particular, Digo youths were recruited as they had become increasingly disgruntled and frustrated over the lack of economic opportunities in the tourism sector, educational and skills training, and previous generations had lost “ancestral land or sacred forests” to the state (Human Rights Watch 2002d; Yahya 1998, 5). The Digo are again in danger of losing additional farmland and other land and forests that serve as sacred spaces when a titanium mine is opened (BBC July 10, 2002). Local politicians with the support of some national politicians were accused of arming the Digo youth in order for them to carry out raids against other ethnic groups who did not support former President Moi and his party KANU in the 1992 elections costing the party three seats in parliament (Mazrui 2001). It was the goal of these “raiders” to “drive away members of ethnic groups originating from inland Kenya— ‘up-country’ in order to gain access to jobs, land, and educational opportunities” (Human Rights Watch 2002b). In 1997, ethnic violence killed approximately 70 people, property was destroyed or stolen, churches and even police stations were burned, and thousands were left homeless. The violence occurred in Mombasa and Malindi sending tourists scurrying for cover as arsonists set hotels ablaze. The economic effects on the province were felt immediately as hotels and other businesses connected to the tourism industry shut down leaving Kenyans without employment, infrastructure was damaged or interrupted, and prices for food and transportation increased. Finally, residents from up-country left the area abandoning businesses and jobs. There were a number of Europeans (Italians, Germans, and British) who bought property, opened businesses, and made other investments in the province, along with Indian business owners (Yahya 1998). The indigenous
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ethnic groups of the province, the Mijikenda, Taita, Digo, Giriama, and Pokoma “have lost control of their rich natural endowments . . . hundreds of thousands are landless or squatters, with access to neither land nor water” (Yahya 1998, 20). In turn, they often felt threatened by the foreigners who dominated the tourism industry and had purchased large tracts of land for their businesses, up-country land clash victims who sought refuge in the province, and finally the refugees from Somalia. Given the political and economic dynamics in the province, especially in Mombasa, it is no wonder that group and individual interests in terms of having access to land, jobs, and economic opportunities trumped any ethnic, religious, or cultural ties that Kenyans in Coast Province shared with the refugees. Like most urban areas in any given country, nationals from all over the country go there in search of opportunities, therefore, several ethnic groups are found here. This is true for Nairobi as well which serves as Kenya’s economic and political capital. As in Mombasa, residents of Nairobi were employed in the formal and informal economic sectors and as structural adjustment got underway, people combined work in formal and informal sectors or others were pushed into the informal sector. The capital continued to be home to wealthy businesspeople, politicians and civil servants, and large landowners (Van Beurden 2000). Nairobi became a popular destination for refugees because of perceived economic, educational, and social opportunities. It also allowed refugees to have easier access to medical care and to communicate with relatives back home. Moreover, refugees could more easily receive remittances from their relatives in Nairobi. Both Mombasa and Nairobi were the main urban areas where refugees resided. They were allowed to legally reside in camps in or near Mombasa, although many refugees lived outside of camps. Refugees were not allowed to legally reside in Nairobi unless they were there to attend school or to receive medical treatment. Local Communities and Refugees in Kenya: North Eastern Province The North Eastern Province was host to thousands of refugees, mainly from Somalia, who had first fled to Ethiopia, but following the overthrow of Mariam Haile Mengistu in early 1991, they fled to Kenya. The civil war and anarchy that followed the overthrow of Siad Muhammad Barre produced 320,000 refugees in Kenya and thousands more were not counted by the UNHCR (USCR 1993, 63). As many as 500–1,000 a day streamed into Kenya at the beginning of the influx and as many as
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2,000 per day entered during the peak of the influx, some along with their animals. The local communities could not accommodate the sheer magnitude of the population in terms of meeting their medical, water, and sanitation needs. Many Somali refugees arrived in Kenya with wounds or injuries from the civil war and Kenyan hospitals and medical facilities provided assistance and care. The government of Kenya was reluctant to allocate additional land for the establishment of new camps because it did not want to encourage an even larger influx, but it was forced to do so and camps were built. Somali refugees who came from a nomadic pastoralist background and Kenyan-Somali citizens in the North Eastern Province share a common history, language, religion, culture, and economic links to the extent that “in Dadaab, ethnic allegiances (usually along clan lines) and related trade have ensured something of a symbiosis between camp and local populations. This is not the case in Kakuma” (World Food Program/UNHCR 2000, 12). Somali refugees and members of the local communities have economic and social linkages that were not severed with the drawing of an arbitrary border that placed one community in Somalia and the other in Kenya and despite the government’s attempt to restrict refugees to camps, the two groups had a great deal of contact with one another. Because there is continuous travel, trade, and other interactions between the two communities, it was difficult to distinguish a Somali national from a Kenyan-Somali. Therefore, when large numbers of Somali refugees began to enter the North Eastern Province, it was difficult to determine who was a refugee and who was a Kenyan citizen and many Kenyan-Somalis registered as refugees and went to reside in the camps. The social bonds in terms of blood ties and marriage forged links between both communities as many people on both sides of the border have relatives in both countries. Finally, as argued by Karen Jacobsen (1996, 668), the treatment of refugees in Islam is a determining factor in the interactions between refugees and the host community that may further explain the cooperative relations between the two groups because the religion calls for the “offering of temporary refuge or asylum from political persecution.” The Somali Bantu refugees had a different experience. They too fled Somalia to escape the civil war and the human rights violations that followed. They were first given sanctuary in the camps located in Coast Province, but by 1998, some of the refugees were relocated to camps in Dadaab. But, unlike other Somali refugees, they did not share the same ethnic and cultural identities, although they were all Somali. The Somali Bantu have retained many of their cultural traditions including various
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languages. The Somali Bantu are descendents of slaves captured by Arabs in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries from Tanzania, Malawi, and Mozambique. They continue to speak languages from these countries (CWS 2000). They are not nomadic pastoralistists or traders, but they rely on farming and because they belong to a minority group that is viewed historically as inferior, some worked in low-skilled, menial jobs such as janitorial work and road construction while others worked in skilled professions such as welding and mechanics (CWS 2000; UNHCR/Save the Children 2002). Because they were viewed as “outcasts” in Somali society, intermarriage between Bantus and other Somalis was virtually nonexistent, therefore, kinship and family ties that led to economic and social ties with Kenyan-Somalis did not exist. The Somali Bantu are also Muslims and speak Somali, but this religious commonality was not enough to get the local Kenyan-Somali community to welcome them in the same manner as they welcomed other Somali refugees. However, not all Somali Bantus were the same—some were more integrated into Somali culture than others through education and social interaction. Moreover, it was difficult to expect the local community to accept them when their fellow Somali refugees perpetrated violence against them. Several Somali Bantu women were raped in and around the camps in Dadaab which prompted yet another move for them to Kakuma camp. Because of the economic conditions in the region, Kenyan-Somalis registered as refugees and went to the camps to reside in order to take advantage of monthly food rations, water, sanitation, education, medical, and other services available in the camps. This meant that they lived side-by-side and interacted on a daily basis with refugees from Somalia. The close ties between the refugees and members of the hosting community cannot be overlooked. Because both Kenyan-Somalis and Somalis engage in the same livelihood—pastoralism, they have deep-rooted economic links and both are dependent on water and pasture resources. As the drought affected Somalis and Kenyans, both groups crossed back and forth across the Kenyan-Somali border in search of water and grazing lands that again put them in close contact with one another. Although the Kenyan government attempted to restrict refugees from keeping animals in and around the camps, some refugees were able to defy the government and they continued their economic activities with the local community in terms of buying and selling animals, milk, and meat. The Dadaab Firewood Project served to illustrate the economic relations between refugees and the host community. In an effort to address the security of women and girl refugees who were responsible for collecting
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firewood and environmental effects surrounding the large amounts of firewood used by refugees that caused tension between refugees and host communities, the UNHCR implemented a firewood project in the three Dadaab camps. The United States’ government provided the initial funding for the project in 1997 and the first free distribution of firewood was made in 1998. Firewood was distributed to every refugee family based on the family’s size. Before the project was implemented, refugees either had to collect their own firewood for cooking, shelter, and so on or they had to purchase it from other refugees or from the local community. Before the project, local businesses and individuals were given contracts to provide firewood to refugees in the camps. Refugees were still allowed to collect firewood and in turn sell their supplies to the Kenyan contractors, other refugees, and to the local community. The end result of the project was that local citizens and refugees supplied firewood for the project and the ones in the camps were provided firewood. In addition, Kenyans were also hired to monitor the collection, storage, and distribution of the firewood. This allowed an economic relationship between refugees and the local community and among members of the community (firewood contractors and Kenyans in the camps) as both groups were “gainfully employed harvesting, bundling, or loading firewood” (UNHCR 2001e, 18). However, an evaluation report on the project pointed out “80% of the donkey carts employed are refugee owned and operated, and 42% of the labour provided for collection and splitting, is provided by refugees, with the balance from local labour” (UNHCR 2001e, 50). The other mode of transportation to collect and distribute the wood was by truck and as part of this project refugees’ trucks were leased to the contractors. The Dadaab Firewood Project benefited both refugees and the local community economically by providing contracts and jobs for the local community and jobs for the refugees who in turn did not have to risk their safety (especially women and girls) in search of firewood. Members of the local community who had donkey carts and trucks were given contracts to transport the wood to the camps. Despite the melding and blending of both communities due to their economic and cultural ties, tensions and hostilities do develop, especially when refugees enter an area that was already suffering economically. Economic ties were forged between the refugees and local populations in the markets located in and around the camps “where almost any commodity (from fresh milk and all foodstuffs, to fashionable shoes and clothing, radios, watches, firewood, etc.) can be obtained in exchange for Kenyan shillings” (UNHCR 2001e, 14). Refugees also interacted
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economically with the local community by establishing various businesses that included bicycle and truck taxis and employing donkey carts to transport goods other than firewood. Although the government enacted several policies that appeared to restrict the interaction between refugees and the local community, there was “a surprising level of economic integration between refugees and the local populations. In Dadaab in particular, a large number of Kenyans act as ‘middlemen’ for trade in food commodities between the camps and regional town” (World Food Program/UNHCR 2000, 9). Refugees were engaged in economic activities that included selling vegetables, clothes, wood, and food rations. Other economic activities pursued by refugees that allowed them to interact with the local community included owning donkey and handcarts and working as domestics in the homes of local community members. Through economic and social interactions ties developed. For example, when refugees and members of the local community shopped in the markets, this was not purely an economic endeavor, but it served a social function—both groups talked to each other, exchanged gossip, and discussed political events in Somalia and in Kenya. The social ties developed through economic interactions were also evident with Palestinian refugees in southern Lebanon who created close bonds through marriage with members of the host community and “intermarriage thus serves to underline other kinds of networks between the host and refugee communities, represent thereby alliance-building between the two groupings” (Gilen et al.1994). Palestinians and south Lebanese had a history of social and economic interaction before the Palestinians became refugees, which was also the case with Somali refugees and ethnic Somalis in Kenya. Therefore, intermarriage between the two groups was common. Also, when local Kenyans moved into the refugee camps, they socialized with the refugees in the markets, at the water taps, when they went to collect their food rations and firewood supplies, and in other activities from income generating projects, to classrooms, to workshops and seminars on peace and resettlement opportunities. Social relations were deepened in restaurants, coffee/teashops, tailoring shops, and other businesses established in the camps by refugees and Kenyan-Somalis. However, what is important to bear in mind is that often these were not two distinct groups because “it was as if the refugees who came to Garissa had ‘returned’ there. They returned to settle with their relatives, and now can barely be distinguished from them. Initially, they were assisted by these relatives to re-establish their lives. . . .” Furthermore, “the refugees own the majority of the businesses and live among the
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community” (Horst 2001, 2). Mandera District in North Eastern Province also has an ethnic Somali community that maintains economic and social ties to Somalia through marriage and trade and when 6,000 refugees fled there in 2002, the local community absorbed them (Famine Early Warning Systems Network 2002). Given this reality, economic and social ties were strong between refugees and the local community because the two groups did not have distant ties, but close ties that allowed daily contact and interaction. Marriage ties between these two communities meant that people lived, worked, and socialized together. They celebrated marriages, births, and deaths together. They went to the markets, tap stands, hospitals, and schools together. They both participated in environmental programs where refugee and local women were given solar cookers and encouraged to use them instead of using firewood to prepare meals. The women were given the cookers as a reward after they planted trees near their homes (Solar Cookers International 1995). According to a report by the Famine Early Warning System Network (2003), the economies of southern Somalia and northeastern Kenya are highly integrated through the trade in cattle and the interdependence between the two economies deepened from 1993 to 2003. The variety of people employed in this trade ranged from cattle owners, branders, herders, and brokers, to veterinarians (Famine Early Warning Systems Network 2003). Therefore, when drought, floods, and civil war occurred in southern Somalia, trade between the two was disrupted, people could no longer earn a living, and people fled from Somalia into Kenya. The opposite also occurred when drought brought the production of livestock to a standstill and Kenyan-Somalis fled into southern Somali when the rains were slight and they did not have enough water and pasture for their cattle. Because camps were established on the Kenyan side of the border, Somalis became refugees. Despite this symbiotic economic relationship between refugees and members of the same clans and subclans, tensions existed between both communities and they were rooted in the poverty, lack of development and infrastructure in the area, along with the security situation that did not improve with the civil war in Somalia and the proliferation of weapons not only from Somalia but from Sudan and Ethiopia (Centre for Conflict Research 2002). Because employment and economic opportunities were not plentiful, refugees and local Kenyans were lured into illegal activities that included armed robbery, rape, muggings, cattle rustling, murder, carjacking, gun running, and the sale of narcotics (Obura 2002; Crisp 1999; Centre for Conflict Research 2002). Conflict
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also stemmed from the perception that refugees benefited from the assistance provided by the international community at the expense of the local community and tensions among Somali-Kenyans and Somali refugees in Dadaab developed when food shortages occurred. Despite both groups sharing a Somali identity, the lack of food put a strain on family and clan relationships, along with increasing violence in the camps from local Kenyans or Somalis who crossed the border (Refugees International 2000; Ngunjiri 1999). Finally, the activities and presence of rebel/militia groups from Somalia and Ethiopia did not lead to improved relations between refugees and host communities. Refugees and Host Communities: Rift Valley Province The bulk of the refugees who resided in the northwestern part of Rift Valley Province fled from the ongoing civil war between government forces and various rebel groups in southern Sudan. They ended up in Kakuma refugee camp, which was opened in 1992. Of the 40,000 refugees in the camp in 1993, 34,000 were Sudanese and the remaining were Ethiopians—mainly Oromos from southern Ethiopia. The first group of refugees who arrived were the Dinka and they did not share the same ethnicity or language as the predominantly Turkana who resided near the camp, but the two groups had several commonalities that included the same livelihood—livestock production and the same values concerning the importance of cattle ownership for purposes of trade and bridal payments (Crisp 1999; Juma 2000). Relations between the Turkana and their hosts were initially cooperative despite their shared economic interests, which put them in competition for scarce resources (Aukot 2003). The Oromo did not share the same ethnicity or livelihood, as they were mostly farmers, which meant that they too needed water and land to sustain their families. Given this ethnic difference and economic similarity that made them competitors for scarce water and grazing lands, the interactions between the groups of refugees and the host community were often strained. Somali refugees joined the Dinka and Nuer following the closure of camps in Coast Province in 1997 and 1998 and the consolidation of camps in North Eastern Province (Save the Children 1999). Because refugees in Coast Province were viewed as an economic threat to local businesses and a threat to the valuable tourism industry, the government in conjunction with the UNHCR decided to close the camps and repatriate or relocate refugees. Camps in North Eastern Province were closed
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or consolidated after hundreds of refugees decided to return home voluntarily or involuntarily. The government pushed for the closures or consolidations because international assistance could be more readily streamlined and refugees could be more geographically contained in these borderland areas. For those refugees who refused to be repatriated, they were transferred to Kakuma and Dadaab where government policies attempted to confine refugees to camps giving them little access to the local community and curtailing interactions between refugees and the host community. Over time, the local Turkana population, which was outnumbered by the refugees, and the Sudanese refugees, had conflicts over scarce grazing land and water for their animals and firewood. Thus, the government implemented a policy that prevented refugees from owning animals and using land, which meant that they could not graze their animals or have garden plots. In the absence of any means to produce their own food, refugees were solely dependent on international food relief. However, this did not lessen the tensions between refugees and local community residents, but rather, it heightened tensions because “local Kenyans resent the regular, reliable distribution of food to refugees as they await the less frequent emergency food distribution” (Costello 2000). Because refugees received food assistance from the international community, they were viewed as having a higher standard of living than the local community (Brown and Thompson 2003). This was because the camp had various social services and educational facilities that were not found in the local communities that included kindergartens, elementary and secondary schools, health facilities, and recreational/sports programs (Field Research Notes 1993). The insecurity in the region contributed to the less than cordial relations between refugees and the local community, especially with the Sudanese refugees. Because the camp was located approximately 75 miles from the Sudanese border, the SPLA conducted recruitment exercises in the camp that the local community blamed on the refugees and it was feared that the local community would be drawn into the civil war. When refugee camps are located in such close proximity to borders, “the camp setting facilitates military recruitment and training of refugees in camps. The location of camps along borders encourages cross border raids as well as the use of camps by fighters for ‘Rest&Recuperation’ ” (Rutinwa 1996b, 2). On the other hand, refugees claimed that members of the local community were responsible for crimes committed in the camps—rape and robbery (Brown and Thompson 2003). What we do know is that as the supplies of food for refugees and the local community
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decreased, the security in and around the camps decreased as well (IRC 2002b). Despite the resentment on both sides, refugees and the host community were able to engage in mutually beneficial relations as various actors that included the government, international nongovernmental organizations, and refugee and host community elders/leaders worked to maintain peaceful relations (ACT 2002b). Economic relations between the majority Sudanese refugee population and the local Turkana population were different from relations between the Somali refugees and ethnic Somalis in North Eastern Province who shared the same identity in terms of language, history, and culture. As stated in the previous section, both populations had long-standing economic relations that were interconnected with social bonds through kinship and marriage ties. When refugees from Somalia crossed the border into northeastern Kenya, they joined relatives who assisted them economically and they engaged in trade with those relatives and other KenyanSomalis both inside and outside the camps. Although both groups engaged in the same economic sector, pastoralism, they managed to co-exist. This was not duplicated on the same level between the Sudanese and Turkana who did not share a common identity in terms of language and ethnicity, but they do share common values over the ownership and importance of cattle (Juma 2000). Economic interactions were found between the two groups despite the hostility and acrimony that existed as the result of both groups competing over scarce resources because they were engaged in the same livelihood—pastoralism. To underscore the hostility between the refugees and local community concerning livestock production, there was a ban on refugees owning livestock that was imposed by the local community and not the Kenyan government (Save the Children 1999). Government policies that located refugees in remote areas made it difficult for refugees and local community members to engage in economic interactions. In an effort to reduce conflicts between the refugees and local community over land for grazing animals, refugees were not granted access to land, wood, and food outside the camps and did not have access to “the local banking (credit and savings) sector. A thriving, localized market has built up around the international refugee aid economy . . . benefiting both refugee and local Turkana alike, but this market is severely constrained for refugee entrepreneurs by the factors above” (Phillips 2004, 7). Nevertheless, Kurimoto (2002, 5) describes this market as a shopping center “full of kiosks selling a variety of commodities, butcheries, groceries, tea and coffee houses, bars and restaurants, hotels, satellite TV and video theatres, hair salons. There is even a place where international fax and telephone services are available.” Therefore, both groups were present
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in the market, talking to one another, exchanging goods that led to some social interaction. The Somali refugees on the other hand had access to money and credit from relatives throughout Kenya and abroad through the informal hawilaad system (Horst 2004). Other economic interactions involved the first group of refugees who lived in Kakuma, especially the unaccompanied Sudanese boys who had access to garden plots and other refugees who were encouraged to plant small gardens around the water tap stands inside the camps. Refugees sold their surplus crops to members of the local community, which served as an economic and social interaction as both bartered over prices. Members of the Turkana community, like the Kenyan-Somalis in the North Eastern Province, provided the refugees with firewood, which served as a main avenue for economic interactions. The Turkana population also sold charcoal to the refugees and refugees who operated butcheries in the market were dependent on the Turkana to supply the animals (Save the Children 1999; Aukot 2003). Again, these “business” interactions put both groups in contact with one another and provided a space for social interactions. However, local bandits often robbed refugee businesses that created strained relations between the two groups. Despite the refugees’ inability to gain access to land, livestock, employment, and credit, trade with the local community occurred through the markets in the camps where refugees operated bars, restaurants, tailoring shops, and they sold various commodities that included meat, mandazis (similar to a donut), spaghetti noodles, fish, vegetables, and items from the food baskets (Phillips 2004; Save the Children 1999). Again, refugees and members of the local community frequented the market, which can be characterized as a business and leisure space. In the process of conducting business in the markets, refugees and members of the local community engaged in leisure—talking, socializing, gossiping, and exchanging news. Therefore, through the markets and refugee businesses in the camps, there was an economic and social relationship between the refugees and the local community. Refugees in Kakuma camp had a similar pattern to refugees in the Dadaab camps in terms of traveling in and out of the camps to conduct business, although they were not allowed to do this without permission from the government and the UNHCR. Some Sudanese refugees were involved in the tobacco trade in other parts of Kenya, which put them in contact with local communities. Refugees also had interactions with the local communities when they traveled outside the camps to pursue educational, employment, and resettlement opportunities with or without government permission (Save the Children 1999).
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Because the mainly Sudanese and Somali refugees do not share a common culture or identity with the host Turkana population in Rift Valley Province, relations and interactions appeared to center around trade and employment with both groups trading with the local population and some of the wealthier Somali refugees hired the Turkana to work for them. However, social relations in the form of marriages occurred between Sudanese refugees and members of the local community, which led to family and kinship ties, but on the other hand, these ties also led to social tensions. This was because some refugees eloped with Turkana women and girls breaking “a tradition that involved two families” (Aukot 2003, 3). To make matters worse, the traditional dowry was forfeited when the couple eloped depriving her family of animals that could garner cash, milk, meat, and blood. Nevertheless, through marriages and children who were born from these unions, family and kinship bonds developed between refugees and certain members of the host community and both communities participated in certain social events such as marriage ceremonies, birth and death celebrations, and they attended church services together. The UNHCR sponsors yearly celebrations as part of its World Refugee Day. The day is filled with social activities that most refugees participate in such as singing, dancing, games, and sports, but the day is not just for refugees. Members of the hosting communities also join in the fun and festivities to learn more about refugees, but it allows both communities to socialize together. The Somali refugees who came to Kakuma after camps were closed in Coast Province had interesting and somewhat different economic relations with the host community. Save the Children in a report (1999, 22) concludes: “it appears that the links between the Somali community and host community are stronger than between the Sudanese and host community, although all refugee buy firewood from the Turkana. Somali households and businesses tend to employ local Turkana, rather than refugees. They also talk of how they may assist individual Turkana with gifts, particularly food.” Crisp (1999) found that wealthier Somali refugees employed local Turkana. Similar to refugees from Sudan, Somali refugees did not share a common identity with the majority Turkana population, but they had a few advantages over the Sudanese refugees. The Somali refugees represented the first wave of refugees, which meant that they came from urban backgrounds, had higher levels of education, brought money with them, and had business ties and connections in Kenya, especially in Mombasa and Nairobi, through their activities in
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large trade which meant that their economic interactions went beyond the immediate local community (Save the Children 1999). Whether through long distance trade beyond the confines of the camp, or Somaliowned businesses in the camps and personal relations, interactions between the Somali refugees and host Turkana community were ongoing and strong with the exception of the Somali Bantu refugees who had a tense relationship with the host community. This group of refugees was not wealthy before they fled as they occupied a subordinate position in Somali society unable to own land, attend school beyond the primary level, and enjoy other citizenship rights, therefore, they did not come to Kenya with money, business connections, and other resources (CWS 2000). They could not afford to hire members of the local community or give them gifts, therefore, security and peace continued to elude them in Kakuma as they were “victims of assault and theft by the local Turkana villagers. In the pecking order of the refugee camp, the Bantus are at the bottom” (Thibodeaux n.d.). In both Rift Valley and North Eastern Province, relations between refugees and the host community were strained when refugees were viewed to be better off in material terms than the host community and left unresolved, it leads to a situation that has the potential to produce conflict between the refugees and host communities (ACT 2002b). Turkana District was hit hard by drought, floods from El Nino, and general insecurity as the result of cattle rustling, the proliferation of arms into the area, and interethnic violence. To compound this situation, additional refugees were transferred to the district when camps were closed in Coast Province. For example, between August 1997 and November 1998, 8,000 Somali refugees were transferred to Kakuma and 10,000 new Sudanese refugees joined them (Save the Children 1999). The local community witnessed more refugees receiving assistance from the international community “whose food is directly and unconditionally meant for the refugees.” At the same time, famine gripped the district with not enough attention given to the situation from the government and the international relief agencies. The security situation around the camps was threatened by the local community’s hostility toward the refugees’ material benefits. Conflicts between the two communities erupted into violence that caused a loss of life and property. For example, in June 2003, both refugees and members of the local community (12 total) were killed when violence broke out in the refugee camp that stemmed from the assistance given to refugees and not to local Kenyans (IRIN 2003b).
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Local Communities and Refugees: Coast Province As discussed in chapter 3, refugee camps located in Coast Province that housed mainly Somali refugees were located in peri-urban areas near Mombasa and Malindi. In the Coast Province, the mostly Somali refugees were mainly housed at Utange (the largest of the coastal camps), established in 1991 and Marafa camp established in 1992. The Somali refugees at Utange camp were largely from urban backgrounds, had held professional positions in Somalia in the government, army, or the private sector, and some were students. Given their urban background and levels of education, it would be expected that they would be able to be integrated into the local community regardless of any differences in ethnicity with the local population because they could contribute to the local economy with their money, skills, and expertise. In contrast, the Somali refugees in the Marafa refugee camp came from rural backgrounds and most of them lacked formal education. The government announced in February 1997 that the remaining camps located in Mombasa were closed—the last camp was closed in 1999 (FBIS 1997b; Verdirame 1999a). The author dates the year of closure as that given by the government and not when the refugees actually left the camps (figure 4.1). Chapter 3 described the relationship between the local community and refugees in Marafa camp. It is important to reiterate that clashes and hostilities did not develop between refugees and the local host community. However, it is also important to point out as Zeleza (1995), Yahya (1998) and Mazrui (2001) do that Coast Province has been ignored for economic development and the Mijikenda have suffered from colonial policies that pushed them off their land followed by post-independence policies and land grabbing schemes that have turned too many into squatters. Despite these realities, refugees were not viewed as an economic or environmental burden and through the efforts of the international community and the refugees, facilities were installed in the camps that the local community used, thus allowing the refugees to interact with the local community. Because most of the refugees had some expertise and experience in livestock herding in Somalia, the UNHCR and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IRCRCS) that administered the camp realized that the refugees’ expertise in raising and slaughtering animals could be used as an economic asset. Moreover, resentment would develop if the refugees used local land to graze their animals and local water holes. To reduce the number of animals that used scarce land and water, to avoid local hostility, and to provide economic incentives for refugees and host community members, a slaughterhouse
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was established in the camp (interview, Marafa refugee camp 1993). Refugees and local residents used the slaughterhouse to butcher animals and the meat was sold in the camp and in the local community. A venture to reduce tensions between refugees and the local community resulted in more social and economic relations between the two communities because both groups used the slaughterhouse and the meat was sold inside and outside the camps. Again, work in the slaughterhouse and in the process of selling the meat allowed for more social interaction where refugees and members of the local community could get to know one another. The market and water pump in the camp were tangible benefits to the local community and served to reduce tensions between refugees and the local community, but they also served as a social space for refugees and members of the local community. Prior to the arrival of the refugees, Kenyans in the local community did not have access to a nearby water pump which meant that women and girls had to walk long distances to collect water for cooking, washing, and so on. The construction of Marafa camp and the installation of the water pump helped the local community by providing a source of clean water and reducing the amount of time that women and girls spent in collecting water, but it also opened up a space for the refugees and local women to talk, interact, and get to know each other. However, a similar harmonious relationship did not exist between the refugees at Utange camp, located near an urban area Mombasa, and the local community. It was situated on only 30 acres of land donated by the government, but it housed approximately 42,000 refugees from Somalia. Utange refugee camp was closed in April 1995 in part because the local community was opposed to the economic activities engaged in by the refugees and for the assistance that they received from the international community and the government blamed refugees for an increase in crime that it alleged hurt its tourism industry. The groups who were affected by the refugee businesses inside and outside the camps wanted them to leave and the groups who were squatters, unemployed, and marginalized also wanted them out of the province. Nevertheless, people from the local community frequented refugees’ businesses in the camps and purchased goods that they sold in the streets. Hence, an economic relationship was forged between the refugees and the local community. In addition, the Coast Province experienced ethnic land clashes that coincided with the influx of refugees. These clashes illustrated the dire economic conditions that a lot of Coast residents faced, especially the youth who not only resented the presence of the refugees, but other
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Kenyans who had moved there, and the tourism industry that was dominated by foreign companies (Okoth 2003). It is no wonder that one year following the 1997 land clashes that left hundreds of people homeless, others killed and injured, some of the camps in Coast Province were closed. If Kenyans were having a difficult time getting along with each other, there was little reason to believe that they would form lasting economic or social bonds with the refugees. Because Utange was operated as an open camp, refugees were free to come and go as they chose, which put them in contact with the local community. And in turn, members of the local community could enter the camp to shop in the market and to work. It is important to emphasize the fact that economic activities in refugee camps are tax exempt which means “the camps became centres of economic activity in the area . . . this had the effect of skewing the local Kenyan economy in favour of the camp location, much to the resentment of the local business community” (Verdirame 1999a, 68–69).1 Because of the urban nature of the camp and the economic backgrounds of the refugees, they were more visible to the local community that observed refugees conducting business in the markets, shopping, in restaurants, bars, and on local minibuses. In addition, because of the money that some refugees brought with them, some refugees hired members of the local community to work for them. Local community residents were observed carrying water, doing laundry, and cooking for refugees. These interactions were clearly that of employee-employer— the Kenyan provided a service and the refugee paid for it. Some members of the local community believed that if the refugees were able to afford hired help, were able to frequent bars and restaurants, and shop in Mombasa, they did not need assistance from the international community and especially from the Kenyan government. The local community believed that the government and international community provided services and assistance to refugees that they did not provide for Kenyan citizens. Refugees who did not have a lot of financial assets were still able to interact with the local community outside the camp when they walked around Mombasa, rode a matatu, window shopped, or spent a day at the beach. The acrimony between the refugees and local community was manifested in the violent clashes that erupted between local youth, especially the Giriama (one of the groups that comprise the Mijikenda), and Somali refugees in 1993. The Giriama too had lost their land and some were squatters. In addition, the youth were frustrated with the lack of economic and educational opportunities available to them and when
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they saw the international assistance that was provided to the refugees, tempers flared. Tension between the two groups mounted to the point that some youth blockaded the road to the camp in an effort to prevent the delivery of relief supplies. Additional tension was manifested when arson occurred in the camp that was linked to the conflict between refugees and the local community, although relief workers believed that the refugees were responsible for the fire in an effort to prevent the UNHCR from taking a census count (Muiruri 1993; JRS 1993b). Refugees believed that a census count would result in less food rations because the head of each family would be identified and that person would receive one ration card instead of individual family members receiving their own cards. Some families received several food baskets and the surplus food served as capital and was sold or bartered often for items that were not contained in the food baskets—soap, matches, and cigarettes. Refugees in Nairobi Most refugees throughout the African continent reside in rural camps and settlements and Tanzania and Kenya are no exceptions (Landau and Jacobsen 2003). Therefore, there is a paucity of research on refugees in urban areas. Kibreab (1996b) provided an invaluable analysis of Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees in Khartoum, Sudan; Macchiavello (2003) examined Rwandan, Burundian, Somali, Congolese, Eritrean, Ethiopian, and Sudanese refugees in Kampala and Al-Sharmani (2003) studied Somali refugees in Cairo. All of these were useful in this study of refugees in urban Tanzania and Kenya because the refugees faced similar issues surrounding the difficulty of obtaining official refugee status, protection from the host government, housing, education, employment, and access to social services. Kibreab (1996b) found that refugees in urban areas were blamed for an increase in the costs of housing and basic commodities and for an increase in the rates of crime. Similarly, refugees in Mombasa and Nairobi were viewed as causing the same problems. As stated earlier, when refugees and host communities share a common identity, language, and culture social and economic interactions can be forged and deepened, which were what existed between Somali refugees and ethnic Somali Kenyans in North Eastern Province. However, when refugees were in urban areas it was difficult for them to find a common language that connected them to various groups of Kenyans who spoke a variety of languages including Kiswahili and English. Therefore, if refugees were not able to converse in these two languages and any
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Kenyan language, it was difficult for them to foster relations with Kenyans. Macchiavello (2003) found that language served as a barrier that prevented more interactions between refugees and hosts in Kampala, especially for those refugees who did not speak English or Kiswahili, which is also spoken Uganda. Al-Sharmani (2003) found that Somali refugees in Cairo, although they practiced the same religion as their hosts, were either unwilling or unable to interact with their hosts citing differences in language, racism on the part of their hosts, and fear. Sommers (2001) and Mann (2002) found that fear among Burundian and Congolese refugees respectively in Dar es Salaam also prevented more refugee–host interactions. Refugees, who resided in urban areas illegally, were afraid that their hosts would discover that they were refugees and report them to governmental authorities. The government of Kenya and some members of the local communities welcomed the first wave of refugees to enter urban areas, especially Mombasa and Nairobi because of the economic benefits that were accrued from the refugees. This group of refugees often was from urban areas, economically independent, had the financial means to open businesses, and was willing and able to pay the high rents demanded by property owners who realized they could exploit the refugees. These refugees were given a hearty reception because they contributed to the local economy by providing much-needed employment for Kenyans, renting personal and commercial properties, and buying goods and services from Kenyans. Therefore, the refugees’ business activities were responsible for economic and social interactions. In addition, refugees lived alongside Kenyans in urban areas where friendships developed and both groups interacted socially at such events as funerals, weddings, soccer games, births, and various religious and national holidays and celebrations. However, relations between refugees and their neighbors had the potential to turn hostile. For example, the landlords in a section of Nairobi called Eastleigh quickly realized that the Somali refugees were desperate for housing and were willing to pay the exorbitant rents. Thus, some Kenyans were evicted who could not pay the high rents. This served to heighten tensions between Kenyans who were looking for affordable housing and the Somali refugees when the government blamed the refugees for the higher rents and not the landlords. It was reported that in late 2004, due to food shortages, Somali refugees left Dadaab refugee camp via public transportation. They joined other refugees, who the government did not recognize, in Eastleigh (The Standard 2004). These refugees also had interactions with Kenyans in order to secure housing, food, and leisure activities.
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Refugees who were financially comfortable were basically sheltered from the day-to-day struggles of refugee life in urban areas to find food, shelter, and employment. Also, they were less likely to face extortions for money by Kenyan police and security personnel; they were not harassed and detained as much because they were able to pay a bribe; they were not threatened with deportation or forcible deportation, and finally, they were not apprehended in security sweeps and round ups and if they were apprehended, they could afford to pay a bribe and be released. On the other hand, the groups of refugees who followed the first wave of refugees were not accorded the same treatment. These refugees were often from rural, farming backgrounds and they did not have the means to be economically independent nor could they contribute to the economy in the same manner as the first wave of refugees. Their presence in urban areas was resented by the government and by large numbers of unemployed urban dwellers. Thus, the government adopted the policies discussed in chapter 3 that required all refugees to reside in camps. Nonetheless, large numbers of refugees continued to make their way to urban areas from the camps while others initially arrived in urban areas, although the Kenyan government officially did not recognize them. This meant that they received inadequate assistance for food, medical care, education, and housing. Moreover, they received almost no protection from sexual and physical abuse and assault (Human Rights Watch 2002a). Because of their vulnerability, some refugees were attacked, raped, and robbed by Kenyan citizens with very little legal recourse to prosecute the perpetrators because refugees were not supposed to be in urban areas without permission. These types of encounters with Kenyans did very little to foster positive interactions and exchanges between the two groups. There were a number of nongovernmental agencies that worked with refugees in Nairobi and they employed Kenyans in various capacities that generated interactions. The treatment afforded refugees in urban areas by the police and security personnel, who are an important component of the host community, is well-documented and shows that refugees were detained, beaten, rounded up, deported, and threatened with deportation if they were not able to pay bribes. According to Human Rights Watch (2002a), one of the primary ways in which the police extorted money/bribes from refugees was to ask them for their national identity cards. When refugees were unable to produce them, they were threatened with arrest, detention, or deportation. Moreover, when refugees produced materials given to them by the UNHCR that stated their refugee status, their documentation was often destroyed. For example, following the 2002 terrorist
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attack on an Israeli-owned hotel and an attempted attack on an Israeli charter plane, the government conducted police sweeps under the guise of rounding up terrorists, but bona fide refugees were apprehended in Nairobi, which is quite a distance from where the attack and attempted attack occurred—Mombasa. However, as long as refugees were perceived to be responsible for the rise in crime and terrorist attacks in urban and peri-urban areas and posed as a danger to the country’s internal security, the police continued to “carry out raids in refugee-dominated areas during which they have been known to search refugees homes, abuse, assault, intimidate and wrongfully arrest refugees . . . harassment, extortion and intimidation of refugees by police officers continue unabated” (Refugee Consortium of Kenya 2003, 17). Given these actions and policies, relations between refugees and those in urban areas who were responsible for protecting them were tense and often hostile. Refugees in Nairobi as in most urban areas must find the means to survive which often allowed them to interact with their hosts.2 The Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS) in Nairobi established an income-generating project to specifically assist single women refugees who resided in the city legally. Many of the women already had marketable skills, but most were unable to find work due to the high unemployment rate, police harassment, sickness, and family obligations. In addition, most of these refugees lacked the initial capital to start their businesses. Through loans provided by the JRS, several women began to operate businesses that ranged from bakeries to tailoring shops. JRS also opened a center where refugees sold and marketed their products. Again, these economic activities allowed refugees to interact with their Kenyan customers. The National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) also worked with refugees in Nairobi to provide them with medical assistance, counseling, and loans for income-generating projects. It also provided scholarships and education assistance. The refugees had close contacts and interactions with the Kenyan staff of the NCCK and through the business and educational opportunities had interactions with Kenyans throughout the city. The Kenya Catholic Secretariat (KCS) also worked with refugees in Nairobi to provide them with job and language training in English and Kiswahili, along with training and skills in dressmaking, tailoring, car mechanics, metalwork, and carpentry. When refugees were able to utilize these skills by opening businesses or working in Kenyan-owned businesses, this put them in greater contact with their hosts allowing them to establish economic and social relations. The language training, especially in Kiswahili, allowed refugees to communicate better with their neighbors, co-workers, customers, government officials, and Kenyans who
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worked in the refugee relief field. The All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) also worked with and assisted refugees in Nairobi by providing counseling, medical care, education, and self-help projects. One of the more interesting relationships between refugees and an NGO in Nairobi was with the Adventist Development Relief Agency (ADRA). This was a small NGO that provided food assistance, medical payments and referrals, and money to refugees. When word spread that ADRA was providing these services, refugees congregated in front of its office leaving residents in the neighborhood wondering what was happening. The agency helped as many refugees as possible, but it did not have adequate funding to provide assistance to all refugees who requested it. Subsequently, the director was threatened and when refugees disliked food provided by the agency, it was dumped at ADRA’s doorstep. For Kenyans who lived nearby, the refugees became a public nuisance and the government demanded that the agency discontinue its assistance to the refugees and began to arrest refugees. Because the agency was located in a residential area and refugees were very visible to the surrounding community, coupled with the behavior of the refugees, host community–refugee relations were strained. Refugees in Western Tanzania Western Tanzania (Kagera and Kigoma regions), which was one of the world’s largest refugee-hosting areas, is also one of the poorest areas in Tanzania and in the world (see figure 4.2 for a list of the operational camps as of May 2005; the total number of camps from 1993 to 2002 were too numerous to include). It also suffered from drought conditions followed by rains from El Nino during the 1990s.3 Under normal circumstance, the highland plateau climate produces low humidity and rains that supports its main economic sector—agriculture. Crops that are produced in this area include beans, maize, bananas, cassava, sweet potatoes, groundnuts, and a host of fruits and vegetables. Primary cash crops are coffee, tobacco, and sunflower seeds (Malkki 1995). While most of the population in the region is engaged in agricultural production, some farmers also are engaged in livestock production, which is hampered by the presence of the tsetse fly. Transport, crafts, beer and liquor brewing, petty trade, and fishing also support the local economy (Smith 1999; Malkki 1995). A small segment of the population is employed in the governmental sector as teachers, doctors, and administrators. There is a distinction between Kigoma Town and Kigoma Rural where camps were established for the refugees. Kigoma Town, which is
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Figure 4.2.
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Operational Refugee Camps in Tanzania
Key: 1 Lugufu, 2 Mtabila, 3 Moyovosi, 4 Nyarugusu, 5 Mkugwa, 6 Nduta, 7 Kanembwa, 8 Mtendeli.
located on Lake Tanganyika, has an economic base supported by fishing and food processing plants and due to its location on Lake Tanganyika, it has served as a major trade and transportation route (Malkki 1995). With the arrival of the refugees, some members of the local community attempted to take advantage of employment opportunities offered by international relief agencies while others started their own businesses to either cater to the refugees or the staff of the relief agencies by opening guest houses, restaurants, bars and offering a wider variety of products in the markets, including game meat. Some camps were located near game reserves and because meat was not provided in the food basket, Tanzanians sold this meat to the refugees. In 1993, approximately 80,000 refugees were forced to flee the political and ethnic violence in Burundi and they found a safe haven in Ngara District which is located in Kagera Region, but this was just the tip of the iceberg compared to the massive wave of refugees who entered Tanzania following the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Camps were built in Kagera Region to accommodate the Rwandan refugee population. Again, as in Rift Valley and North Eastern Provinces in Kenya, these were remote, marginalized, and borderland areas and often the refugees
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outnumbered the population in the local communities (Maina et al. 2003). For example, both regions experienced population increases of 50 percent; Karagwe District (Kagera Region) received 200,000 refugees while its population was 362,000; Nyabionza division (Kagera Region) had a population of 56,000 and a refugee population of 113,541. Benaco camp in Ngara District (Kagera Region) accommodated as many as 700,000 refugees from Rwanda, which made its population second only to Dar es Salaam (USCR 1995; Rutinwa 1999). Although Benaco camp was located in a rural remote part of the country, with that many refugees, it manifested all of the characteristics of an urban area. And in 1998, 35 percent of Kibondo District’s (Kigoma Region) population was refugees— 81,200 refugees out of a population of 232,000 (Liganga 1998c). The majority of the Rwandan refugees were repatriated at the end of 1996, but throughout the 1990s, refugees from Burundi continued to seek asylum in Tanzania and additional camps were constructed in Kibondo District (Kigoma Region), which was similar to Kagera Region in terms of its economic underdevelopment and lack of infrastructure. Finally, the influx of refugees from the DRC ebbed and flowed following the civil war and accompanying human rights and ethnic violence in the country during the later part of the 1990s. Those refugees were accommodated in camps in Kigoma Region. As stated earlier, refugees from the DRC who were primarily Bembe, crossed Lake Tanganyika to enter the country and they had family ties with Tanzanians in the area who were able to assist them with housing and food upon their arrival. Kigoma Town and the surrounding villages have large Bembe populations. However, most refugees were not allowed to reside with their relatives and they were later transported to camps. Refugees from Rwanda and Burundi, who were disproportionately Hutu, had historical, social, and economic ties to the Ha in both Kigoma and Kagera Regions (Daley 1993). Tony Waters (1997, 72) argues that “linguistically, Kigoma’s Ha language is mutually intelligible with modern Kirundi” which is spoken by the Hutu refugees from Burundi. Because of these linkages based on a shared identity, interactions between the refugees and host community should be amicable (Jacobsen 2001; 1996). Rwandan and Burundian refugees shared similar religious affiliations with their host populations in Kagera and Kigoma—large segments were Christians. Most of the refugees from Rwanda and Burundi were farmers like the local population in Kigoma Rural that made them competitors for arable land in this part of Tanzania that is considered the country’s breadbasket as opposed to people who lived in Kigoma Town. This mirrored the situation in Rift Valley and North Eastern Province with the Turkana and Somali host
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populations and refugees from Sudan and Somalia—both groups were pastoralists. On the other hand, refugees from the DRC who came from urban backgrounds with some levels of formal education were not farmers. By early 1994, most of the Burundian refugees had returned home, but the worst was still to come when large numbers of Hutu Rwandans (700,000) crossed the border into western Tanzania beginning in April 1994 resulting in the country experiencing one of the world’s largest refugee influxes (Eggli 2002, 243). The number of Rwandan refugees was estimated to be as high as 800,000 (interview, International Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 1998). This was followed by yet another influx of refugees from Burundi following the 1996 coup and when the Rwandan army forced refugees out of the DRC refugee camps, Burundian refugees were included and they crossed into Tanzania (Waters 2001). Camps were established along the border in two of the most remote regions in the country—Kigoma and Kagera to accommodate the new refugees from Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC and to comply with the government’s new encampment policy—Lumasi, Kitali, Lukole, Kasulo-Benaco, Nyaragusu, Lugufu, Mtendeli, Nduta, and Kanembwa were some of the major camps (Field Research Notes 1998). In 1996 and again in 2002, the government ordered all Rwandan refugees out of the country and in 1997 it began to expel refugees from Burundi despite the fact that the refugees and host communities had strong ethnic and cultural ties (Drumtra 1997; Kopka 1998). To better understand the social and economic ties or lack thereof between the refugees and host communities, the two refugee-hosting regions will be discussed separately. In 1993, Tanzania had a large number of refugees from Burundi who had been in the country following ethnic violence in 1972. This group of refugees was integrated into local communities on agricultural settlement sites and some were allowed to serve in the military (International Crisis Group 1999a). This earlier group of refugees was joined by thousands more refugees from Burundi who fled ethnic violence following the murder in October 1993 of the first democratically elected Hutu president—Melchior Ndadaye, who the Tanzanian government supported. Members of the local communities in Kagera Region initially welcomed the refugees due to the close family and ethnic ties between the Ha and the Hutu refugees. Both groups shared a common language (International Crisis Group 1999a). The late president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, stated in one of his last speeches that “the people in neighbouring Rwanda and Burundi are the same people as people in Ngara in Tanzania; they speak the same language despite the artificial
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boundaries set by colonialists” (UNHCR n.d., 6). This was manifested when Tanzanians were mistaken for refugees from Burundi during the 1997 round ups and placed alongside refugees in camps (Human Rights Watch 1999a). Because the outpouring of refugees was so sudden and unexpected, the international community was unprepared to meet their needs. Members of the local communities, who were poor themselves, stepped in and assisted the refugees with their food needs and “villagers depleted their grain reserves to accommodate the refugees” (Ponte 1998, 318). Therefore, the interactions between the refugees and the host communities were humanitarian, but during the same year, growing xenophobia was reported (Edgerton 2003). In addition, the practice of refugees stealing and destroying crops did not contribute to harmonious refugee–host relations (Whitaker 1999). Most of the 1993 refugees soon returned home, but for the ones who remained, they were allowed to farm, before government policies restricted them to camps, which put them in contact with the local communities. Refugees sold or exchanged their surplus crops to local villagers. Refugees who fled to Tanzania in 1995 from Burundi were also allowed to farm and “local villages allocated 5,000 acres of land to the refugees for farming” (USCR 1996a, 72). In sum, as Whitaker (2002, 352) put it “during the height of the refugee presence in Ngara and Karagwe districts in 1994 and 1995, there were few restrictions on the mobility of refugees and hosts. Tanzanian and refugee owned businesses thrived. Refugees provided labour on Tanzanian farms throughout the area and Tanzanians moved in and out of the camps to conduct business, socialize, and make use of camp-based resources such as water taps and hospitals.” Because several camps were located close to local villages, there was much movement and trade between refugees and host populations (Caspersons 2003). Refugees created family and kinship ties with the local communities through marriages and those marriages produced children who further strengthened ties to the communities. Again, this was evident during the round ups that left Tanzanians married to Burundian refugees and the children from these unions separated. Human Rights Watch (1999a) found that Burundian women married to Tanzanian men were temporarily forced to reside in camps. Their husbands could apply for them to obtain citizenship. On the other hand, Tanzanian women married to Burundian refugee men were forced to reside in the camps and these women could not apply for citizenship for their husbands. Refugees and the host communities had strong ties despite the difficulty the two governments experienced in finding a lasting peace settlement in Burundi, along with military incursions across
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the border by Tanzania and Burundi. However, additional refugees coming to the areas, made local communities grow weary and began to call for refugees to return home (UNHCR 1997a; Landau 2003). This was especially evident with the arrival of refugees from Rwanda in 1994. Interactions between refugees and hosting communities were made more difficult by governmental policies that attempted to restrict refugees to camps, but interactions were not impossible because try as it may, the government cannot keep track of every single refugee and many have avoided the camps entirely while others taken to camps have left. Some of them married Tanzanian citizens; some of them found employment in the local communities; some of them attended school; some of them raised crops—all of these activities put them in daily contact with Tanzanians enriching social and economic ties. Tanzanians were able to use the camp facilities such as water taps and medical clinics that put them in contact with refugees and Tanzanians started businesses in the camps. Tanzanians continued to use the markets in the refugee camps and refugees continued to sell items from their food baskets and other relief items to Tanzanians such as water and firewood (Landau 2003; Whitaker 2002). Even the UNHCR contributed to interactions between the refugees and host communities when it encouraged refugees to produce crops “despite a restrictive government policy on land” (UNHCR 2002e, 138). Refugees produced a surplus in beans and maize in 2001, which they sold to the local communities and they exchanged or sold some of their food and rations for items that were not included in the food basket such as cassava, bananas, and vegetables (United Nations 2004). Finally, although the numbers were not large, some members of the local community were employed in the refugee camps. This allowed them not only to interact with the refugees, but they could observe their daily activities such as collecting their food rations, water, and firewood, using the clinics, attending schools, engaging in income-generating projects, operating their business, and simply surviving. Furthermore as Whitaker (2002, 344) states “Tanzanians also established extensive social relations with refugees. They socialized together, visited one another, and attended social functions such as weddings and funerals of the other. They competed in soccer and other sports. Some Tanzanian men even took refugees as wives.” For those men who married refugee women, they too like Turkana men who married Sudanese refugee women did not have to pay a bride price, which has become more costly and is paid in cash (Smith 1999; Aukot 2003). Nonetheless, “certain locals tended to disappear into the ‘cities,’ and did not return home for hours and even days” (Whitaker 2002, 45). Some may have
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disappeared for economic reasons and others may have for social reasons. Refugees established businesses in the camps that included restaurants, hair salons, and shops that sold various items and despite an effort to forge a more nationalist identity in an attempt to distinguish or distance themselves from refugees, members from the local community continued to enter the camps to shop and conduct business with the refugees. Refugees from Rwanda: Kagera Region Rwandan refugees in Kagera Region can be divided into long-term Tutsi refugees who had been in the country for decades and short-term Hutu refugees who entered in 1994 because of the genocide. When the RPF seized control of the country following the genocide, thousands of Tutsi refugees in this region returned home—some of them literally returned overnight. Their hosts for years, who had allowed them to integrate into local communities, attend schools, open businesses, cultivate farms, take governmental positions, and even become citizens, were not amused. Van Hoyweghen (2001, 20) warns, “the hatred against Tutsi populations in Kagera is not to be underestimated. Some even believe that the new government in Kigali has plans to annex Kagera as a solution to the demographic pressure.” Because this region was sparsely populated, the overnight disappearance of thousands of people affected the area economically as many Rwandan refugees were doctors, teachers, nurses, and so forth. In addition, the refugees took their cattle and other animals with them (UNHCR 1997a). The Rwandan Hutu refugee presence in Kagera Region was short-lived—from only mid-1994 until late 1996 when they were forcibly repatriated. However, their numbers were huge and their interactions with the local community were varied. The local communities’ reactions to such a large refugee population in their midst were varied as well—they ranged from open-arm welcoming to outright hostility. Because such a large number of refugees entered Tanzania at one specific entry point during a short period of time, relief agencies did not have time to construct camps let alone set up provisions for food and other needs, especially at Benaco camp, which became one of the world’s largest refugee camps and Tanzania’s second largest city. Members of the local communities shared their food supplies with the refugees until the camp was operational. The economic interactions with the local communities were strong as refugees opened markets and immediately began to operate businesses that included tailoring shops, shoe repair, tea shops, and so on. Thus they created a parallel economy that enjoyed a
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tax-exempt status (Reynolds 1995). To further contribute to this parallel market, refugees exchanged or sold food and nonfood relief commodities such as pots, pans, kitchen sets, cloth, plastic sheets, blankets, buckets, basins, and jerry cans (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 2002). The same was true with markets and businesses established by refugees in Kenya’s camps. One could argue that refugees’ businesses were too successful and this led to the government putting a ban on economic activity in 1996 following a directive to oust all Rwandan refugees (Dodd 1996). Whatever the reason for the repatriation of Rwandan refugees, the camps served to forge economic linkages between refugees and the local community because they “still host the largest markets of the region and have as such become the nexus for trade networks between Rwanda and the towns on Lake Victoria or even further afield. Within these trade networks a variety of people participate including camp populations . . . and locals” (Van Hoyweghen 2001, 18). When refugees initially arrived, they were able to cultivate garden plots. They in turn sold their surplus crops to the local communities. The labor that Rwandan refugees provided to local farmers was a clear indication of an economic relationship between refugees and host communities. As stated above, Kagera is a very sparsely populated region that is dependent on agricultural productivity therefore, some local farmers who could afford to pay refugees either in cash or in kind, welcomed their labor as they served to increase the agricultural production, especially with bananas (Van Hoyweghen 2001). Government policies that restricted the movement of refugees outside of camps made it difficult for Tanzanians to utilize refugee labor, however, farmers who cultivated crops near the camps still hired refugees (Whitaker 1999). Regardless of governmental restrictions, some refugees continued to travel longer distances from the camps in order to take advantage of employment opportunities on farms “and often stayed for several weeks before returning to the camps to receive rations and visit their families” (Whitaker 1999, 4). During these extended periods of time away from the camps, refugees temporarily resided in local communities where they had economic and social interactions with Tanzanians when they purchased food, shopped in the markets, and frequented bars and restaurants. Refugees from Burundi and DRC: Kigoma Region In the latter part of the 1990s, refugees continued to enter Tanzania from Burundi and thousands more from the DRC joined them as they fled the violence in both countries. These two groups of refugees will be
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discussed together because they entered Kigoma Region (Kibondo, Kasulu Districts) at a time when the government put more restrictions on refugee movement in and out of camps, economic activities pursued by refugees, and refugees’ access to agricultural land. More importantly, perhaps, was the growing divide between Tanzanians and Burundian refugees that was based more on nationality rather than ethnicity and a shared identity that led to fewer interactions. For example, Landau (2003, 32) found that “Kasulu residents are actively strengthening their identitive ties to a distinctively Tanzanian population and national leadership.” And the social bonds that are forged through marriage and kinship ties are in danger as “few of Kasulu’s Tanzanian citizens now accept the possibility of common origins or a shared legacy, and most shudder at the prospect of intermarriage.” Landau further argues that residents of Kasulu made concerted efforts to distance themselves from the Burundian refugees by language. Both groups may have had a common language Kiha for Tanzanians and Kirundi for Burundians, but only Tanzanian citizens spoke Swahili. In this case, the use of language became a marker of national difference. This corresponds to the “growing xenophobia” in Tanzania that threatened harmonious refugee–host relations (Refugees International 2002). Perhaps to counteract this growing xenophobia, refugees in urban areas from Burundi have attempted to construct a Tanzanian rather than a Hutu identity (Sommers 2001; Malkki 1995). Refugees in Kigoma Region had less interaction with the local communities because of governmental policies and because of the physical location of the camps—farther away from local communities (Field Research Notes 1998). Because camps in Kagera Region were located within close proximity of local communities, there were more opportunities to create economic and social ties between refugees and host communities. In particular, Rwandan refugees who arrived in 1994 had more interactions with local communities because they had more to offer initially in terms of international assistance. As Tony Waters (2001) argues, the international community committed considerable funds for the refugee camps. In turn, the refugees had adequate or even a surplus in food and nonfood items that they could either sell or exchange with the host populations. When donors began to decrease their contributions to refugee relief operations in the later part of the 1990s, coupled with governmental restrictions on refugees’ mobility, economic and social relations between refugees and host populations decreased or at least were made more difficult (UNHCR 2003a). For example, nonfood items such as kitchen sets, jerry cans, blankets, and so on were only given to newly arrived
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refugees and not to refugees who had resided in the camps over an extended period of time which meant that this refugee population had less food and nonfood items to trade or sell to the local communities. The days of refugees having a surplus of beans and maize to sell or trade as the Rwandans had were over and the international community found it difficult to maintain basic food ration levels (United Nations 2004). The UNHCR reported in a 2003 Global Report that it “struggled to maintain a minimum level of health care, shelter and food assistance to the refugees in face of reduced budgets” (UNHCR 2004e, 165). If it could barely afford to assist the refugees, it was more than likely that the host populations received less and not more assistance as well. Similar to refugee–host relations in Kenya, when members of the local communities feel that refugees benefit from international relief at their expense, relations were strained. To compound the problem, host communities blamed the refugees for violence and other security issues surrounding the camps. However, there was a correlation between the reduction in funding for food rations and an increase in crime in the camps and surrounding areas (United Nations 2004). Economic and social interactions will be limited or cut off if host populations believe that the refugees put their lives and property at risk regardless of any shared ethnic, historical, or cultural identities. One of the major differences between the refugees who came in the earlier part of the 1990s and refugees who came later was that the latter group was almost totally dependent on international relief to meet their food needs which resulted from the implementation of a forced encampment policy that did not allow refugees to farm or engage in economic activities. This had profound implications for host–refugee relations. On one hand, it appeared as if the government attempted to restrict all contact between local communities and refugees. On the other hand, refugees were still able to circumvent the policies out of the sheer need to survive if nothing else. Refugees, mainly women and girls, traveled outside the camps to collect firewood which put them in contact with other women and girls from the local communities who also were responsible for collecting firewood, along with men and boys who lived in nearby communities. Refugees also continued to leave the camps in search of paid employment and food and to produce crops, especially when rations were reduced. And finally, the reduction of food assistance and other assistance by the international community put women and girls in close contact with the local community because this exacerbated the sex trade. Women and girls were forced to sell or exchange sex for food, water, firewood, and other necessities.
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Members of local communities in Kigoma Region were in contact with refugees from Burundi and the DRC because they were allowed to use camp facilities that included medical clinics and therapeutic and supplementary feeding centers (United Nations 2004). Refugees in Urban Tanzania Sommers (2001) points out the difficulty in identifying, locating, and interviewing refugees in Dar es Salaam and his study disproportionately focuses on young, male Hutu refugees from Burundi whose lives centered around their work as tailors and their attendance and involvement in the Pentecostal church. There was also a group of refugees in Dar es Salaam who made their living as fishermen (Sommers 2001). This group of refugees grew up in settlement camps and with the help of relatives, friends, and the church pastor were able to leave the settlements and secure jobs and housing in Dar es Salaam. Mann (2002) also examined the situation of refugees in Dar es Salaam by focusing on boys and girls and their families from the DRC. With the restrictive policies enacted by both governments, refugees were left with little choice—reside in refugee camps to receive assistance and a semblance of protection or take one’s chances and relocate to an urban area. Despite the government’s forced encampment policy that required all refugees to live in camps in rural western Tanzania (refugees needed a permit to leave the camps) and a draconian travel restriction that only allowed refugees to travel within a 2.5 miles radius of the camps, along with jail sentences (as much as two years) and deportations if they disobeyed these policies, several thousand refugees managed to live in urban areas, mainly without assistance, and their experiences were similar to refugees in Kenya’s urban centers—a precarious daily existence that centered on securing food, shelter, and employment and avoiding the police and security personnel. Moreover, the 1998 terrorist bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam made Tanzanian government officials and citizens even more leery of refugees in urban centers. Thus, the interactions between refugees and members of local communities in urban areas were often limited and strained. Nevertheless, some refugees were willing to encounter the risks of living outside camps in urban areas because of the perceived economic benefits of urban areas, along with their ability to enjoy more freedom and autonomy. Because they did not want to be “discovered” as illegally residing in the city, their interactions and connections to Tanzanians were stifled (Sommers 2001; Mann 2002). Refugees attempted to keep their interactions with Tanzanians
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limited, but they existed through attending church services and other church-related activities, having Tanzanian neighbors, and, for the tailors who Sommers studied, having Tanzanian customers. Most of the thousands of refugees who entered Tanzania during the time frame for this study traveled by foot, bicycle, or boat to reach the rural camps in western Tanzania. They were processed at UNHCR assembly centers and then were sent directly to camps regardless of their urban or rural backgrounds. For example, although the majority of the Congolese refugees who entered Tanzania in 1997 were from urban areas, paid $10 for their transportation by boat to cross Lake Tanganyika, and made their way to Kigoma Town, the majority was quickly transferred to refugee camps where they found the living conditions unfamiliar and harsh. Others managed to live with relatives in nearby villages along the lake (IRIN 1997). However, it is worth noting that besides the approximately 500,000 Rwandan Hutu refugees, who resided in the country from 1994 to 1996, the next largest group of refugees was from Burundi and they were disproportionately peasants who remained in the rural camps of western Tanzania. For the refugees who resided in Dar es Salaam, their lives were shrouded in fear and insecurity. Mann (2002) reported that many parents of Congolese refugee children feared that school children and school officials would discover the children’s refugee status. To avoid this, many refugee parents refused to send their children to school. On the other hand, many refugee children were sent to school where they and their parents interacted with Tanzanians. Unlike refugees in urban areas in Kenya who were at least granted a letter of protection from the UNHCR that stated their refugee status, refugees in urban Tanzania did not even enjoy this protection. Therefore, many of them did not register with the UNHCR for refugee protection. On the other hand, because they were not registered with the UNHCR, they were invisible and hidden from view (Ameda 1999). In addition, because they clearly resided in the country illegally, they were forced to work in the informal sector without labor rights and were subjected to exploitation. This was particularly evident among uneducated or poorly educated refugees, especially women refugees. These refugees had daily contacts with Tanzanians either through petty trade, jobs, and living arrangements. As in any urban refugee situation, those refugees who were educated, skilled, or brought money with them were able to escape the harsh reality of refugee life. For the educated, skilled, and wealthy refugees from Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC who resided in Dar es Salaam, their interactions with the host community were open and varied. Some of
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them were employed while others operated businesses, which allowed them to establish and maintain economic and social interactions. They were able to send their children to public and private schools that put them in contact with Tanzanian parents and teachers and Tanzanian and refugee children interacted. The more wealthy refugees engaged in leisure activities along with their Tanzanian hosts. Mann (2002, 117) found that “in a few rare cases, a child may live with a Tanzanian family, an arrangement that usually results from a long-standing friendship with the child’s deceased or absent parent.” This living arrangement would result in the integration of the child into the family and into Tanzanian society providing long-term social and kinship bonds. This is a more positive interaction. However, Mann (2002) found negative and harmful interactions between refugee children and their hosts through the involvement of refugee girls in the sex trade. The other interaction that was revealed in the research that had a negative effect on the refugee children and the host community was among street children. Both groups of children did not have parents or adult relatives or adult guardians to care for them, therefore, they were forced to live on the streets and put their lives and safety in danger. Conclusion There are several similarities between Tanzania and Kenya in terms of refugees’ interactions with local communities and their ability to integrate into local communities. Because of the governments’ forced encampment policy, it was difficult for refugees to interact with members of the host communities and the possibility of integration was not an issue for most refugees. Nevertheless, some refugees were given official permission to leave the camps and others left without permission. Refugees who resided outside of camps integrated into local villages while others made their way to urban centers such as Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. Both governments kept refugees in camps near the borders in remote isolated parts of the countries citing security as their main concern. In terms of urban centers, the government of Kenya, following the 1998 embassy bombings in both countries, terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, and a terrorist attack in Mombasa in late 2002, again cited the insecurity posed by refugees and conducted sweeps and round ups to apprehend those suspected of involvement in terrorist activities. On the other hand, these sweeps can be viewed as a mechanism utilized by the governments to force refugees out of urban centers if not entirely out of the country.
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Despite both governments’ attempts to restrict refugees to camps, and thus, curtail their interactions with local communities, economic and social relations existed between refugees and their hosts. In the cases of Somali refugees in North Eastern Province and Rwandan and Burundian refugees in Kagera and Kigoma Provinces in Tanzania, these relationships and interactions were not new. Refugees and the refugee-hosting communities had economic, kinship, social, and cultural ties. The two groups had a long history of cross-border trade and intermarriage that were made easier by sharing a similar language. Refugees from Rwanda and Burundi worked on Tanzanian farms before they were forced into camps or out of the country (Rwandans). Refugees and Tanzanians in the host communities socialized together in the camps’ bars, restaurants, markets, and shops. They participated in each other’s rites of passage such as weddings and funerals. They socialized together at sporting and religious events. When refugees did not have a shared identity based on language or other cultural ties such as the Somali refugees in northwestern Kenya and Coast Province with their hosts, interactions still existed through trade and the wealthier Somali refugees hired the Turkana and Mijikenda to work for them. Refugees from various nationalities established businesses in the North Eastern Province’s camps in Kenya and members of the local community patronized the markets, shops, restaurants, teashops, and other enterprises. Also, refugees who had the economic means purchased meat and firewood from their Turkana hosts. Somali refugees in Kenya’s Coast Province had established economic ties to their hosts through the variety of businesses both inside and outside the camps. Social and kinship ties were also established between the Dinka and Turkana communities through marriage and the children from these unions. Again, the lack of a shared identity did not prevent economic or social interactions. Interactions also existed between the refugees and their hosts through the use of camp facilities such as health clinics and water pumps. The refugees interacted with individuals who used the facilities and Kenyan and Tanzanian personnel who provided the services. Although refugees who resided in urban areas illegally attempted to live as clandestinely as possible, they had interactions with Kenyans and Tanzanians. They lived in the same neighborhoods. They bought goods and services from each other. Because both countries have a large informal economic sector in urban areas, refugees worked alongside Kenyans and Tanzanians in petty trading. In the case of Nairobi, refugees who lived there legally had ties with their hosts through the nongovernmental organizations that provided assistance through counseling, medical
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services, small loans, and language and job training. Some of the refugees who benefited from the loans and job training were able to establish businesses or work for Kenyans. This fostered economic ties between refugees and Kenyans. The wealthier refugees who legally resided in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam had more interactions with their hosts through social and business connections. Finally, refugees who could afford it attended the same schools as Kenyans and Tanzanians. In sum, the social and economic ties between refugees and refugee-hosting communities in both countries already existed, were strengthened, or established. However, there were factors that served to undermine the ties such as the forced encampment of refugees, the dismantlement of camps, the reduction in refugee food and aid, and insecurity in the refugee-hosting areas. Finally, when refugees were viewed by the host communities as having a higher standard of living as the result of international assistance, relations between refugees and their hosts were strained. The next chapter addresses the role, programs, and problems faced by the international community in Kenya and Tanzania with a particular emphasis on the UNHCR and the WFP—the two principal agencies that provide relief to refugees worldwide, along with their local and international partners.
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CHAPTER 5
The International Community and Refugees in Tanzania and Kenya Introduction Besides the host governments and local communities examined in the last two chapters, the international humanitarian community plays a major role in determining the lives and fate of refugees. This is the subject of this chapter. The focus will be on the UNHCR, WFP, and other intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), and NGOs that worked in conjunction with the UNHCR in Kenya and Tanzania. The UNHCR has the international mandate to assist and protect refugees throughout the world and it carries out these functions by contracting work to various INGOs and NGOs. The WFP is the primary international agency responsible for delivering food to refugees, which is essential to their survival. The mandate to protect and assist refugees appears to be simple on the surface— the international community has a moral responsibility to save refugees’ lives (Loescher 2001). Refugees who flee their homelands under very stressful conditions arrive in the country of asylum often sick, malnourished, and wounded from war and conflict. They are in need of immediate assistance that includes shelter, food, clean water, medicine, and clothes and they are often in need of protection from various segments of the refugee-hosting populations and from other refugees. Once the host government invites these agencies to work with refugees, they are free to carry out their duties and because these are humanitarian entities, personnel who are employed in these organizations are expected not to violate refugees’ human rights.
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The focus of the chapter is on the work of these agencies, what issues and factors served to promote or constrain their work, and how this work has served to benefit refugees. The seemingly straightforward work of the humanitarian agencies is much more complex and fraught with political, economic, bureaucratic, and institutional problems. Harrell-Bond (2002) concludes that the humanitarian agencies have not been “humane” in their work, but rather, they have violated refugees’ human rights, especially within the confines of the authoritarian refugee camp. The international relief agencies are not necessarily nonpolitical, charitable, benevolent “helpers” who provide assistance on a level playing field nor can they protect refugees (Harrell-Bond 2002; Megret and Hoffman 2003). There is an unequal relationship that allows the international agencies to wield power over the refugees. This is compounded by the role of the donors who the agencies are accountable to and not the refugees. Waters’ (2001) study of the Rwandan refugees in Tanzania following the 1994 genocide makes the argument and concludes that because the donors had the power of the purse, they controlled the relief operations. There is a common theme in the literature that contends that NGOs are more interested in their ability to survive than they are in assisting refugees. Cooley and Ron (2002) theorized that international organizations and international nongovernmental organizations are in a “scramble” for contracts to provide relief and as part of this competition they may engage in activities that are not beneficial to the aid recipients. Juma (2003) makes the argument that NGOs serve as “compromised brokers” in the displacement of individuals in East Africa through their relationship with the state. Because NGOs’ work is often constrained by the state in which they operate, there have been instances when NGOs and the UNHCR have turned a blind eye to human rights violations perpetrated by their personnel, host governments, and host nationals (Harrell-Bond 2002). Megret and Hoffman (2003) support the argument that the UNHCR can be a violator of human rights instead of a protector and promoter. It will be argued in this chapter that the UNHCR and its implementing partners, the IGOs, INGOs, and NGOs, faced political and economic problems both internally and externally that determined their ability to assist and protect refugees. Funding was a main issue, especially as developments in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia, Croatia, Central Asia, East Timor, Afghanistan, and Iraq diverted money from Africa to these refugees (Waters 2001). Africa in general and African refugees in particular, except for Rwandan refugees in Tanzania and the DRC driven by the short-lived media attention, became more marginalized and
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insignificant to the international community. Thus, it was difficult to raise money to support UNHCR programs; resettlement to northern countries was kept to a minimum; forcible repatriation was done with very little international protests, and refugees found their human rights violated in a number of ways. Because funding was controlled by the donors, and a handful at that, (the European Community, the United States, and Japan), they controlled the purse strings. This left the UNHCR and its partners to assist refugees with shrinking budgets and inadequate resources. Because the international humanitarian community operated within the confines of states that often exercised sovereignty over their territory, the human rights of refugees were often violated and it appeared that the UNHCR and its partners colluded with the states. Finally, the political, economic, and environmental developments underway in Kenya and Tanzania affected the work of the international humanitarian community. Citizens in refugee-hosting communities were often worse off than the refugees and their needs had to be addressed as well. For most refugee crises throughout the world, refugee flows have occurred only once and international assistance has been long-term and extensive, for example, Palestinians in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and Lebanon, Afghans in Pakistan, Eritreans in Sudan, and the Saharawis in Algeria. Far too often, this has not been the experience for most African refugees who have been forced out of their country of first asylum. Examples include the lost boys of Sudan who were forced out of Ethiopia back to Sudan and then fled to Kenya; Somali refugees in the late 1980s who fled to Tanzania after they were either not allowed entry into Kenya or they were forcibly deported. Hundreds of the Rwandan refugees who entered Tanzania following the genocide in 1994 first sought sanctuary in Burundi and some refugees from Burundi fled to the DRC before ending up in Tanzania. Finally, some refugees from Rwanda and Burundi who fled to Tanzania decided that it was not safe to remain there or they wanted to avoid the round ups and eventual repatriation and ended up fleeing again to Uganda. Thousands of refugees, including many of those in Kenya and Tanzania, found themselves in protracted refugee situations. One noted expert on African refugees notes, “the presence of so many protracted refugee situations in Africa can be linked to the fact that countries of asylum, donor states, UNHCR and other actors have given so little attention to the solution of local integration during the past 15 years” (Crisp 2003, 3). This chapter has three goals. First, it will examine the external and internal factors that influenced the UNHCR’s actions in Kenya and
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Tanzania in terms of the location of refugee camps near borders despite the danger that this posed for refugees, forced encampment policies, the closure of refugee camps, forcible repatriation, and the sweeps and round ups conducted by the governments of both countries in the name of security, along with travel restrictions designed to “warehouse” refugees in remote, rural communities. The economic constraints that determined the effectiveness in providing refugee relief and protection will be examined in terms of reduced funding caused by donor fatigue and the changing priorities of the international community. The disintegration of the former Soviet Union and its Eastern European bloc, the war on terrorism, and other international priorities left Africa and its refugees with less funding by the principal donors. In turn, the UNHCR had to reduce funding to INGOs and NGOs. A worst-case scenario was the agency’s inability to renew contracts with some of its partners. This chapter seeks to analyze the relationship between refugees, host governments, and the international humanitarian community led by the UNHCR in the context of changing refugee policies and political and economic conditions in Kenya and Tanzania in the 1990s and early 2000s. Because the UNHCR has the international mandate to assist and protect refugees, it serves as the premier humanitarian relief organization. That makes an analysis of its role imperative; however, its work is carried out in conjunction with its partners, other UN agencies, and the governments of Kenya and Tanzania.1 In Kenya, the UNHCR and its partners worked with the Ministry of Home Affairs and was responsible for virtually all of the refugee-related activities and services that included: identifying refugees for resettlement and processing their cases for resettlement, repatriating refugees to their home countries, constructing and repairing roads, boreholes, classrooms, medical facilities, and other infrastructure, distributing blankets, kitchen sets, plastic sheeting, soap, and firewood, working to protect refugees’ rights when they were arrested, detained, and forcibly deported, and working with local communities on environmental and peace education projects. The UNHCR worked closely with local officials, leaders, and refugees on security measures to make the camps and surrounding areas safer for refugees and Kenyans. The UNHCR also worked with local communities on water, sanitation, education, and immunization programs. In addition, it worked with the government in its efforts to pass a refugee bill. The role of the UNHCR, its implementing partners, and other UN agencies in Tanzania, was just as important in terms of the assistance provided to refugees, its efforts to protect refugees, and its work with the refugee-hosting communities. 2 The UNHCR in Tanzania also
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worked with the government of Tanzania in terms of its Refugee Department in the Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Health, Regional Administrative Secretaries in Kigoma and Tanga regions, and district councils in areas that hosted refugees (Kibondo, Kasulu, Ngara, Kigoma). The government was responsible for security in the camps and it provided, with the help of the UNHCR, police officers that attempted to “maintain the civilian and humanitarian character of the refugee camps” (UNHCR 2001f, 59). The UNHCR was responsible for identifying refugees for resettlement to a third country, facilitating and then promoting the repatriation of refugees back to their home countries, assisting the government in its efforts to provide security in the camps, providing assistance in the forms of blankets, firewood, kitchen sets, jerry cans, soap, constructing and maintaining infrastructure that included roads, airports, wells, bridges, boreholes, schools, medical facilities, and working with the local communities, refugees, and governments on projects that focused on the environment, gender-based violence, security in and around the camps, and refugees’ rights (UNHCR Global Report 2000–2003). Two very interesting government partners with the UNHCR in Tanzania were the Commissioner of Prisons and the Office of the Inspector General that were not found in Kenya or their equivalents. The UN Population Fund (UNFPA) and UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) had programs in Tanzania but not in Kenya. Furthermore, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) was active in Kenya, but it did not operate in Tanzania. This indicates that the large numbers of refugees from Burundi, Rwanda, and the DRC did not participate in resettlement to third countries, whereas, Somalis, Sudanese, Ethiopians, and others in Kenya had more of an opportunity for resettlement and the IOM was needed to transport them out of the country. Although the UNHCR is the main international entity that will be addressed, the WFP will also be discussed in terms of funding that is predicated on external donors, along with the work of various INGOs. The work of the Kenyan and Tanzanian NGOs will also be addressed. While the chapter will show that the UNHCR was complicit in a number of policies that violated refugees’ rights, it was responsible for several programs that aided the refugees and host communities and was in the forefront of initiatives that served to assist and protect refugees. International Assistance and African Refugees In the late 1950s and 1960s, the UNHCR began to assume responsibility for populations displaced by wars of liberation, civil wars and civil
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unrest, and environmental disasters. It became evident that the refugee crises were not temporary and countries of asylum did not have the financial resources to adequately assist the refugees. The UNHCR does not usually get involved in assisting refugees until after an influx has begun and the host government seeks assistance. In other words, it does not go out looking for refugees to help. However, to achieve its mandate, the UNHCR works in conjunction with other UN agencies, INGOs, and local NGOs. These groups were awarded contracts by the UNHCR to work in certain sectors. Waters (2001, 112) reported that during the Rwandan refugee crisis in Tanzania, local NGOs and church groups were “told that their assistance was not needed, even if they brought donations of cash, staff, or relief items, the assistance was turned down and they were sent a way.” The role of all the actors in the humanitarian relief efforts in Kenya and Tanzania was dependent on two conditions: if the governments allowed them to operate in the respective countries (discussed in chapter 3) and funding from donors who were most likely located in northern countries. The NGOs and INGOs received contracts from the UNHCR and these contracts were predicated on funding from northern donors. Because of the dependency of these NGOs on external funding, they were not free to act independently and they had to cooperate with policies adopted by the UNHCR whether or not they were in the best interests of the refugees. In essence, any of the actors that were unable to act independently, and most of them were not, ran the risk of colluding with governmental and UNHCR policies that were not always moral or benevolent. In order to better understand the funding difficulties faced by the UNHCR in African countries in general, and in Kenya and Tanzania in particular, we need to know who funds the agency. From its establishment in 1951, the agency “was granted only a small administrative budget from the UN General Assembly, and a small emergency fund. For additional funding, the agency was granted the right to seek voluntary contributions for each emergency appeal, with General Assembly approval” (Bookstein 2001, 46). In other words, potential donors made pledges, but there was no mechanism to force them to actually contribute the money. Shortfalls are bound to occur with the UNHCR unable to cover them. But not all shortfalls were equal. For example, in 1997, the Great Lakes Operation required $140.9 million, but only $119.6 was contributed. The Horn of Africa required $39.2, but only $24.4 was contributed. In addition, in “2000 The Great Lakes and Horn of Africa had shortfalls of 18% and 16%, respectively, while
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Central Europe and the Baltic States had a shortfall of 4%” (Bookstein 2001, 46). 3 Funding played a key role in determining if the UNHCR could fulfill its assistance mandate in Kenya and Tanzania as both countries received a large number of refugees at a time when donor fatigue was rampant. Many Western donor countries were simply tired of providing funds for Africa whether they were to support refugee relief programs or development programs alleging that African governments were corrupt and were not accountable for how the funds were spent. In addition, funds that were earmarked for Africa now were made available to the former Soviet Union and the former Eastern European bloc countries. This resulted in less money for food assistance, counseling, medical programs, incomegenerating programs, education, and security. For example, the UNHCR provided much-needed firewood to refugees in both Kakuma and Dadaab, but it had to reduce the amount of firewood distributed to refugees due to funding cuts and food rations were reduced that sparked rioting and “tension between local Turkana and the Sudanese in Kakuma and among Somali-Kenyans and Somali refugees in Dadaab” (Costello 2000). Other difficulties that refugees experienced due to a reduction in UNHCR funds included overcrowded classrooms, roofless shelters, and the UNHCR discontinued distributing nonfood items (USCR 2003b, 77). Because the refugees were unable to work outside camps and only a small number were employed in the camps, they had to use their food rations to barter for items not contained in the food basket. And when those rations were reduced, refugees did not have enough surplus food to barter for soap and other nonfood items. A reduction in funding also meant that there was less money for host governments such as Kenya that used the financial burden of hosting refugees as an excuse to repatriate them. With the war on terrorism following the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States and subsequent attacks in Spain, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Iraq, and Kenya, and the fear of additional attacks in Europe and the United States, Western governments have channeled money toward their antiterrorism programs. This meant that less money was available for refugee programs and “the effects of such funding cuts have been detrimental to refugee programs with Africa” (Trans Africa Forum 2002). Governments such as Kenya have jumped on the counterterrorism bandwagon promising to hunt down terrorists even if they were bona fide refugees in an effort to remain in the good graces of Western donors. However, the donor fatigue syndrome was not cured and the funds made available for the operation fell far short of the appeal. Although
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the program was a valuable attempt to prevent additional influxes of refugees into Kenya and to provide a semblance of infrastructure in the absence of a functioning national government, the question remained why could refugees not be admitted into Kenya and provided protection and assistance if they were bona fide refugees? Simply put, the government of Kenya did not want additional Somali refugees to be placed in camps in close proximity to its border while civil unrest was still apparent. Finally, for the refugees who decided to be repatriated the issue of assistance needed addressing in terms of the level and types of assistance provided. Were they given enough assistance that allowed them to become self-sufficient in their home areas? It appeared that the provision of “transportation to the village of origin, one jerry can per family, plastic sheeting, two blankets per family, a three-month supply of cereals, pulses and oil based on the standard camp ration” was not hardly enough to motivate and encourage refugees to return home (UNHCR 1993b, 11). The UNHCR’s social services programs, despite reductions in funding, were an important aspect of relief because they targeted vulnerable groups that included rape survivors, the elderly, the physically challenged, unaccompanied minors, families headed by a single parent (read women), and other refugees in need of particular services. In addition, the UNHCR established several hospitals/clinics and health care posts in the camps. Many of the health care workers were refugees who were trained in the camps while others had their previous training upgraded. Through the work of the UNHCR, mortality rates dropped after the initial emergency phase ended and the most common health problems such as respiratory infections, malaria, and diarrhea were addressed. Mosquito nets and insecticides were distributed, and environmental management was stressed to improve the sanitation in the camps, and immunization campaigned were conducted. Programs that addressed reproductive health issues such as maternal care, antenatal care, and STDs will be examined in chapter 6, along with the agency’s Women Victims of Violence (WVV) Project. Despite cuts in funding, the UNHCR attempted to assist the Kenyan government in its efforts to provide more security in refugee camps and in the surrounding communities in the North Eastern and Rift Valley Provinces. The UNHCR provided funds for the Kenyan government to increase the number of security personnel in the areas, improve the police communications equipment, purchase bullet-proof vests, and repair and maintain police vehicles and “UNHCR has supported the local authorities with the construction of a Police Post in each camp and
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a Police Station in Dadaab town, and has provided . . . incentives to police officers based in the area” (UNHCR 2001b, 2). Bushes were planted around the camps that served as fences in an effort to deter bandits from entering the camps to commit crimes against the refugees. The voluntary contributions to assist refugees in Kenya and Tanzania have come from a few sources—the United States, the European Union, and Japan and the latter two contributed 35 percent of the UNHCR’s budget and these donors decided what programs were funded—“80% of funds are earmarked according to donor priorities” (Bookstein 2001, 46). In 2003, the United States was “one of the largest donors to the UNHCR in Tanzania as well as the single largest donor to the World Food Program (WFP) providing about 60% of the refugees’ needs” (Embassy of the United States Dar es Salaam Tanzania 2003). Nonetheless, “insufficient donor contributions forced the World Food Program . . . to reduce refugees’ food rations by 20 percent for most of 2001” (USCR 2002, 102). From 2000–2002, “the United States has provided nearly 70% of food aid for Kakuma. . . . But with global attention and charity being directed toward other refugees, such as the Afghans, resources for Kakuma are drying up and it’s having an effect on the refugees who found sanctuary there” (IRC 2002b). Moreover, the UNHCR admitted “whether the entire food package agreed upon is delivered to refugees ultimately depends to a large extent on donors making good on their pledges to WFP” (The UNHCR 1996d, 16). Therefore, these two major actors in refugee relief were basically dependent on international donors to fulfill their mandates and without pressure to pledge or to make good on their pledges, it was no wonder that food rations and other programs were reduced because donors had more pressing priorities. Most African refugees depend on international assistance to meet their basic needs for food, shelter, water, and health care, as most host governments do not have the requisite resources to meet these needs for their own citizens. It does not need to be repeated here how most African governments, including Kenya and Tanzania, have been unable to provide basic social services to their citizens under austere SAPs. When the emergency phase