GLOBAL STAKEHOLDER DEMOCRACY
This page intentionally left blank
Global Stakeholder Democracy Power and Representati...
52 downloads
1426 Views
976KB Size
Report
This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form
GLOBAL STAKEHOLDER DEMOCRACY
This page intentionally left blank
Global Stakeholder Democracy Power and Representation Beyond Liberal States
T E RRY MACD ONA LD
1
3 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford ox2 6dp Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York © Terry Macdonald 2008 The moral rights of the author has been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published 2008 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose the same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Macdonald, Terry. Global stakeholder democracy : power and representation beyond liberal states / Terry Macdonald.—1st published 2008. p. cm. Includes index. ISBN–13: 978–0–19–923500–1 1. Democracy. 2. Power (Social sciences) 3. Representative government and representation. 4. Political participation. I. Title. JC423.M153 2008 321.8—dc22 2008011601 Typeset by SPI Publisher Services, Pondicherry, India Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by Biddles Ltd., King’s Lynn, Norfolk ISBN 978–0–19–923500–1 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2
For Tom and Zoe
This page intentionally left blank
Acknowledgements Many thanks go to Andrew Hurrell, David Miller, Henry Shue, Charles Beitz, Thomas Pogge, Kate Macdonald, and an anonymous reviewer for OUP, who have read drafts of this book at various stages of its development and provided incisive and challenging criticisms and comments. Thanks also go to Patti Lenard, Zofia Stemplowska, Jonathan Symons, Daniele Archibugi, participants in the Nuffield College Political Theory Workshop, and several former colleagues at Merton College, Oxford, and the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics (CAPPE), at the ANU—all of whom have contributed stimulating conversations and valuable insights along the way. I am grateful also to Nuffield College, Oxford, Merton College, Oxford, and CAPPE, ANU, for providing me with such supportive and motivating working environments during my research on this book. Finally, heartfelt thanks go to my family for their support, and in particular to Tom, for his generosity and patience as I have worked to complete this book. Terry Macdonald
This page intentionally left blank
Contents Introduction The issues The project The strategy The argument The limitations
1 1 4 7 12 16
PART I. DEMOCRATIC BOUNDARIES IN THE NEW GLOBAL POLITY 1. Democracy Beyond ‘Closed’ Societies 1.1. Introduction 1.2. The standard theoretical model of a ‘closed’ democratic society 1.3. Beyond ‘closed’ societies: A ‘realist’ democratic agenda 1.4. Public power and political participation in a ‘pluralist’ democratic order 1.5. Conclusions: Towards a ‘pluralist’ democratic global order
21 21 23 29 35 40
2. Public Power Beyond ‘Sovereign’ States 2.1. Introduction 2.2. Assessing arguments for state-based accounts of public power 2.3. Public power and the institutional practice of law-making 2.4. Public power and the use of force 2.5. Public power and centralized or ‘constitutionalized’ decision-making structures 2.6. Conclusions
43 43
3. The Public Power of NGOs in Global Politics 3.1. Introduction 3.2. Public power and influence in regulative social norm-building 3.3. Public power and the imposition of material constraints 3.4. Conclusions
62 62
4. From Nation-States to ‘Stakeholder’ Communities 4.1. Introduction 4.2. The idea of democratic ‘stakeholder’ communities 4.3. Delineating stakeholder communities in practice: stakeholders in the public power of NGOs 4.4. Conclusions
83 83 85
44 45 51 52 61
63 71 81
92 101
x
Contents PART II. DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION IN THE NEW GLOBAL POLITY
5. Global Social Choice Beyond Nation-State Representation 5.1. Introduction 5.2. A critique of social choice through ‘national’ representation 5.3. A theoretical critique of the justificatory Burkean framework 5.4. A critique of global social choice through state representation 5.5. A ‘liberal individualist’ justification for state representation 5.6. Conclusions
105 105 107 117 120 122 138
6. Global Social Choice Through Multi-Stakeholder Representation 6.1. Introduction 6.2. The multi-stakeholder model of global constituencies 6.3. ‘Liberal pluralist’ interest representation as a justification for the multi-stakeholder model 6.4. Strengths and weaknesses of the multi-stakeholder model of global representation 6.5. Conclusions: The need for a hybrid model of global social choice
139 139 140 146 150 160
7. Theorizing Global Representative Agency: Non-Electoral Authorization and Accountability 7.1. Introduction 7.2. Elections as mechanisms of stakeholder control 7.3. Authorization and accountability as mechanisms of democratic stakeholder control 7.4. The institutional mechanisms of authorization and accountability 7.5. Conclusions
170 177 192
8. Instituting Global Representative Agency: The Authorization and Accountability of NGOs 8.1. Introduction 8.2. The democratic authorization of NGOs in global politics 8.3. The democratic accountability of NGOs in global politics 8.4. The challenge of democratic equality 8.5. Conclusions
193 193 194 211 218 220
Conclusion
223
Index
231
163 163 165
Introduction THE ISSUES In November 1999 the streets of Seattle became the scene of huge public demonstrations against what protest organizers called ‘one of the most powerful, secretive, and anti-democratic bodies on Earth’. 1 The protestors’ target was the Ministerial Meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which was to have launched the much-vaunted ‘Millennium Round’ of trade talks among the organization’s 135 member states. Instead, the talks collapsed under the shadow of the public demonstrations. On the first day of the scheduled talks, an estimated 50,000 demonstrators flooded the streets of Seattle. By evening, a civil emergency had been declared and hundreds arrested, but protesters continued to deliver their message to conference organizers: ‘This is what democracy looks like,’ they chanted, as they encircled the city’s prison to demand the release of the 500 protesters detained inside. 2 The demonstrations were organized by an international coalition of NonGovernmental Organizations (NGOs), representing a wide spectrum of divergent interests. While their objectives in relation to trade policy were often conflicting, many of the demonstrators were united by their demands for greater access to and inclusion within the WTO’s decision-making processes, framed in terms of calls for ‘a global citizen-based and citizen-driven democratic order’. 3 The Seattle protests brought the issue of global democracy for the first time into the glare of prime-time global news. As such, they represented a watershed for the broad-based social movement seeking to salvage the democratic project in the context of the complex technological, economic, political, and social transformations commonly referred to as ‘globalization’. In recent years, networks of political activists have mounted various high-profile campaigns seeking greater democratization of powerful international institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, and increased ‘corporate accountability’ for the many powerful economic entities in the so-called ‘private’ sector. In part as a response to such political demands, many key global decision-makers—including national governments 1 ‘International Forum on Globalization’, Statement by Jerry Mander, President of the International Forum on Globalization, at a Press Conference Regarding the WTO, 4 November (1999 [cited February 2002]); available from http://www.ifg.org/media.html 2 John Vidal, ‘Real Battle for Seattle’, The Observer, 5 December 1999. 3 Vandana Shiva, The Historic Significance of Seattle (1999 [cited February 2002]); available from http://www.wtowatch.org/library/admin/uploadedfiles/Historic_Significance_of_Seattle_The.html
2
Introduction
as well as leaders of international organizations, corporations, and NGOs—now recognize the need for democratic reform to ensure the stability, effectiveness, and legitimacy of global decision-making. Although the Seattle protests thus served on one level to bolster NGO demands for the democratization of powerful international organizations such as the WTO, they had the additional effect of highlighting NGOs’ own increasing power on the global stage, and raising parallel questions about the democratic legitimacy of NGOs themselves. The rise of NGOs as a force in global politics has been underway for many years; between 1960 and 1995, the number of international NGOs grew from roughly 1,300 to over 36,000, 4 and by 1999, the UNDP estimated the number of such NGOs to be around 44,000. 5 By 1996, the United Nations had adopted extensive formal provisions for NGO consultation and participation within UN institutions, 6 and these provisions served as part of a wider agenda for accommodating NGOs as recognized participants within a range of international institutions. 7 The influence of NGOs has also grown within the corporate sector, as many corporations have attempted to enhance their perceived public legitimacy by establishing ‘partnerships’ or ‘stakeholder dialogues’ with NGOs. These ‘partnerships’ and ‘dialogues’ entail various consultation mechanisms which grant NGOs some input into corporate decision-making in issue areas such as human rights and environmental policy. 8 In recognition of this growing role, NGO leaders were invited in 2000 to participate for the first time in World Economic Forum discussions alongside political and business leaders. Moreover, in addition to these increasing roles within such high-level decision-making processes, many NGOs now exercise significant forms of power through operational roles in various development and humanitarian contexts, in which they commonly engage in important public decision-making about issues such as service-provision and resource-distribution within communities. The political momentum behind NGOs’ political demands for participation in these various forms of public decision-making in global politics has been strengthened by high levels of public trust in NGOs, which in many parts of the world have begun to rival levels of public trust in both business and government. Indeed, 4 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, ‘An Agenda for Democratization: Democratization at the International Level’, in Barry Holden (ed.), Global Democracy: Key Debates (London: Routledge, 2000), 111. 5 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2000 (2000 [cited February 2005]); available from http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2000/en/pdf/hdr_2000_ch0. pdf p. 8. 6 See United Nations Secretary-General, Arrangements and Practices for the Interaction of NonGovernmental Organizations in All Activities of the United Nations System (United Nations, 1998 [cited February 2002]); available from http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/docs98/kofi998.htm 7 For a fuller discussion of these developments, see Boutros Boutros-Ghali and United Nations Dept. of Public Information, An Agenda for Democratization (New York: United Nations Dept. of Public Information, 1996); Daniele Archibugi, Sveva Balduini, and Marco Donati, ‘The United Nations as an Agency of Global Democracy’, in Holden (ed.), Global Democracy: Key Debates. 8 See, e.g., Kelly Currah, ‘How Corporations Absolve Their Sins’, Guardian, 28 August 2000; Andy Rowell, ‘Corporations “Get Engaged” to the Environmental Movement’, PR Watch Archives, 8/3 (2001).
Introduction
3
a recent survey of public opinion leaders in the USA, Europe, and Australia measured public trust in government, business, media, and NGOs, and found that NGOs are beginning to surpass all other institutions in terms of their public credibility. 9 An author of the study, Richard Edelman, told political and business leaders in a speech to the World Economic Forum in New York that NGOs are now the Fifth Estate in global governance—the true credible source on issues related to the environment and social justice. . . . Now companies must communicate with multiple stakeholders, especially NGOs, with speed, transparency, and an offer of interactivity. 10
The growing influence of NGOs is underpinned by their perceived legitimacy, and this derives to some degree from their claims to serve as democratic representatives of global peoples. Consistent with this, it is commonly argued that as processes of ‘globalization’ transfer public political decision-making capacities from statebased to intergovernmental and corporate decision-making processes, NGOs are able to play an important democratic role as civic representatives in these new political domains. Many global leaders have responded to such arguments by embracing some of the claims to democratic legitimacy made by NGOs and their public supporters. Over the last decade or so, democratic arguments in favour of greater ‘civil society’ participation in global decision-making have been advanced at the highest level of international leadership. 11 Former UN Secretary-General Boutros BoutrosGhali has argued that NGOs are ‘a basic form of popular representation in the present-day world’, and that accordingly ‘[t]heir participation in international relations is, in a way, a guarantee of the political legitimacy of those international organizations.’ 12 Former United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Kofi Annan has also added his voice to the call for greater civil society participation, maintaining that for the UN and other international organizations ‘a partnership with civil society is not an option; it is a necessity.’ 13 Despite the rhetorical endorsement of these global leaders, there is still much scepticism about the democratic legitimacy of NGOs. Many critics of NGO participation challenge the legitimate status of NGO constituencies, labelling them 9 Edelman PR Worldwide, Edelman Trust Barometer 2005: The Sixth Global Opinion Leaders Study (January 2005 [cited March 2005]); available from http://edelman.com/image/insights/content/ Edelman_Trust_Barometer-2005_final_final.pdf 10 Edelman Survey: NGOs Trusted More Than Business or Governments (2002 [cited February 2005]); available from http://solidar.org/Document.asp?DocID=3598&tod=487 11 Prominent discussions include Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighbourhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Commission on Global Governance, The Millennium Year and the Reform Process (1999 [cited February 2002]); available from www.cgg.ch/millenium.htm Boutros-Ghali and United Nations Dept. of Public Information, An Agenda for Democratization. 12 Quoted in Riva Krut, Globalization and Civil Society: NGO Influence in International DecisionMaking (Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1997), 18. 13 United Nations, Partnership with Civil Society Necessity in Addressing Global Agenda, Says Secretary-General in Wellington, New Zealand Remarks (Press Release) (2000 [cited February 2002]); available from www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000229.sgsm7318.doc.html
4
Introduction
pejoratively as ‘interest groups’ with no special entitlement to representation. Critics of NGO participation also question how ‘representative’ NGOs actually are of the constituencies for whom they purport to speak. They assert that NGOs are unelected and unaccountable, arguing that unlike national governments, NGOs ‘need not answer to the broad public they claim to represent’. 14 Consequently, some commentators dismiss them as ‘self-appointed spokesmen for their cause’ 15 or in even more unsympathetic terms as ‘a self-serving coterie of elitists’. 16 Advocates of NGO participation therefore face the further challenge of establishing that NGOs are in some democratic sense ‘representative’ of the constituencies that can legitimately claim a voice in global decision-making, whichever these may be agreed to be. Since the Seattle protests, the general challenge of building global democracy and these more specific democratic challenges posed by NGO power have been closely intertwined in the global democratic consciousness. Reflecting further upon this connection is potentially of great theoretical utility, since the controversies surrounding the democratic legitimacy of NGOs, and wider debates about the democratization of powerful international organizations, transnational corporations (TNCs), and other global actors, are underpinned by parallel theoretical dilemmas and practical difficulties. The challenges associated with democratizing this wider range of global actors—like the specific challenge of democratizing NGOs—can best be met by moving away from traditional state-based models of democracy, and better coming to terms with the complex normative implications of institutional pluralism. Questions about the democratic legitimacy of NGOs are therefore of great significance not only because of the considerable power exercised by NGOs themselves in the global domain. Even more importantly, global NGOs are of significant democratic interest because they provide an ideal political lens through which to examine the larger theoretical and institutional questions of how we could conceivably build democratic institutions beyond liberal states, which have traditionally provided the central focus of democratic aspiration and critique.
THE PROJECT Despite the prominence of these democratic issues on recent global political agendas, they have to date received surprisingly little analytic attention from normative political theorists. Much of the existing literature on global political legitimacy is framed as ‘ideal’ theory, and accordingly focused on abstract questions of rights and duties, rather than on the ‘non-ideal’ questions of how political power should 14 Jenny Bates, ‘The Third Sector in Global Affairs: Civil Society Deserves a Voice, but Not a Vote, in International Institutions’, New Democrat (2000). 15 Bruce Stokes, ‘New Players in the Trade Game’, National Journal, 18 December 1999. 16 Pranay Gupte, ‘Whose Cause Is It, Anyway?’, Newsweek, 6 December 1999.
Introduction
5
be constrained through representative institutions. Moreover, the widespread preoccupation of post-Rawlsian political theory with issues of distributive justice has directed the focus of much recent work on global political legitimacy, reinforcing the tendency of authors to neglect traditional democratic issues of power and representation in favour of issues related to the distribution of social and economic goods. Several works have proved exceptions to this general theoretical tendency, and have directly tackled the political questions of power and representation in global politics. However, these have often tended to proceed by extrapolating institutional schemes from the domestic to the global level, and in doing so have not dealt satisfactorily with the distinctive organizational pluralism of the global polity. Political theorists have been for so long accustomed to preoccupation with the state (and its associated ideas of ‘sovereign’ or ‘constitutionalized’ public power) that it has thus far proven difficult to develop adequate theoretical responses to the powerful new roles of non-state actors on the global stage. The most prominent theoretical alternatives that have been offered to the statism of ‘communitarian’ democrats have been various models of ‘cosmopolitan’ democracy. 17 These ‘cosmopolitan’ theories are extremely valuable in highlighting the normative and practical imperatives for adopting a global perspective on the democratic project. They are also valuable in exploring and articulating legitimate directions for future global institution-building. Although it may not be realistic to implement cosmopolitan democratic blueprints in full in the near future, some elements of them may be feasibly achievable. Moreover, ideal blueprints of this kind are helpful for orienting more long-term reform processes, even if they cannot be realized in the foreseeable future. As guides to contemporary projects of global institutional reform, however, their utility is limited in two key ways: first, by their universalist ideals of a unified global polity, which fit poorly with the fragmentation of existing global society; and second, by the constitutionalized structure of their institutional prescriptions, which I will argue in Chapter 1 has minimal prospects of implementation within a proximate time frame. My central project in this book is to develop a theory of global democracy that can transcend the existing impasse between ‘communitarian’ statism and ‘cosmopolitan’ universalism, and deal more satisfactorily with the organizational pluralism of contemporary global politics. The theoretical arguments I develop here share much more in common with cosmopolitan than with communitarian democratic theories, and can be understood as an attempt to adapt rather than to overturn the broader cosmopolitan democratic project. But as will become clear as my arguments unfold, my pluralist institutional framework of stakeholder 17 For a prominent ‘communitarian’ approach to the problem of global democracy, see David Miller, On Nationality, Oxford Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); for ‘cosmopolitan’ approaches, see David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Cambridge: Polity, 1995); Andrew Kuper, Democracy Beyond Borders: Justice and Representation in Global Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); and Daniele Archibugi and David Held (eds.), Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order (Cambridge: Polity, 1995).
6
Introduction
democracy diverges in normatively and practically significant ways from some prominent cosmopolitan institutional models. Throughout the book, I develop the stakeholder model of global democracy by systematically reflecting upon the democratic dilemmas surrounding the power of NGOs in contemporary global politics. One obvious advantage of focusing the analysis on NGOs is that doing so can help to answer important practical normative questions about how democratic policymakers should assess and respond to the power exercised by NGOs—and by extension, other non-state actors—within contemporary global politics. In addressing these practical normative challenges, this book seeks to counter some of the sceptical challenges to the legitimacy of non-state actors, and to make sense of certain widespread intuitions that the political activities of non-state actors need not threaten democracy, but rather have the potential to satisfy certain rigorous democratic standards, if the right institutional reforms are undertaken. The other advantage of focusing analysis on NGOs in this way is that it can help us to develop more general democratic concepts and institutions that are suitable for our ‘pluralist’ global polity, by forcing us to rethink some standard state-centric assumptions about the fundamental elements of a democratic system. When we examine widespread intuitions about the way in which NGOs can attain democratic legitimacy in global public decision-making, it becomes evident that many of the theoretical conceptions invoked in these democratic arguments diverge significantly from those inherent in traditional, state-centric, democratic models. First, the ‘public’ forms of power that NGOs exercise in global decision-making, and which common intuitions suggest should be subject to democratic standards of legitimacy, are quite different in character from the ‘governmental’ forms of public power that are the focus of conventional state-centric democratic theories. The governmental forms of power that we traditionally see as the rightful focus for democratic scrutiny are generally underpinned by the use or threat of force, are invested with law-making capacities, and to a significant degree are organizationally centralized, or at least constitutionalized. In contrast, many of the ‘public’ forms of NGO power that attract democratic criticism display few or none of these state-like characteristics. Second, the ‘constituencies’ that NGOs commonly claim to represent are quite a different kind of entity from the territorially bounded populations that usually serve as electoral constituencies within democratic nation-states. Significantly, NGO constituencies—such as religious communities, indigenous peoples, women, environmental and human rights advocates, trade unionists, and business and professional communities—tend in general to be non-national and non-territorial in character, and moreover tend to overlap in terms of their individual memberships. Third, the kind of democratic ‘representation’ in which NGOs could plausibly claim to be engaged is quite different in structure from the kind associated with representative institutions within democratic states. Whereas representation in state democracies is characterized primarily in terms of mechanisms associated with formal election procedures, NGOs can claim no such electoral mandate.
Introduction
7
Therefore, if it is to be plausibly argued that NGOs are ‘representative’ of their various constituencies, it is necessary to invoke a conception of representation that does not rely on the formal mechanisms of electoral authorization and accountability. In this light, it is evident that if we are to succeed in constructing a coherent framework for understanding the legitimate democratic role of NGOs in global decision-making, we must in the process confront fundamental theoretical questions about the character and scope of democratic public power, the basis for delineating democratic boundaries, and the institutional properties of democratic representation. We cannot merely seek to apply old theoretical conceptions of ‘governments’, ‘peoples’, and ‘representation’ to the new political phenomenon of global NGOs. Rather, we must re-examine the theoretical conceptions themselves, and consider how they must be reformulated if they are to accommodate the emerging norms and social realities of a globalizing world in which NGOs— as well as other non-state actors—play an increasingly significant role. For this reason, an examination of the democratic debates surrounding NGOs can help to bring the broader theoretical questions of global democracy into focus, and chart a productive route to the development of a wider theoretical argument which could potentially be applied to a more extensive range of global actors. Through reflecting upon the democratic dilemmas surrounding the political power of global NGOs in this way, my arguments in this book challenge the widespread assumption that ‘sovereign’ power, nationally or territorially bounded societies, and ‘electoral’ processes are essential institutional foundations of a democratic system, serving, respectively, as the subjects, agents, and means of democratic control. In this book, I present a critique of these traditional democratic ideas, and proceed to rethink the democratic project from its conceptual foundations, posing the questions: What needs to be controlled? Who ought to control it? How could they do so? In the course of answering these questions, I develop a distinctive theoretical model of representative democracy based on the new concepts of ‘public power’, ‘stakeholder communities’, and ‘non-electoral representation’.
THE STRATEGY Before outlining in more depth the substance of these practical and theoretical arguments, it is helpful to say a little more about the ‘contextual’ method of theory-building I employ. By developing my theoretical arguments via examination of policy-debates surrounding the democratization of NGOs, I employ what can be described as a kind of contextual ‘reflective equilibrium’. The idea of reflective equilibrium has been employed by many political theorists since John Rawls to denote the outcome of a process of developing normative principles by making mutual adjustments between intuitions (or ‘considered judgements’, in Rawls’s terms) and some kind of ideal conceptions, or abstract theoretical
8
Introduction
formulations. The ‘correct’ principles, which are derived through this process of mutual adjustment, are those that most coherently reconcile our abstract ideal conceptions with our more specific intuitions, or judgements. The contextual method of seeking reflective equilibrium is distinctive insofar as it requires that the specific intuitions with which we attempt to reconcile our ideal theories should be derived not from hypothetical scenarios or thought experiments, of the kind favoured by many political theorists, but rather from concrete political problems, entangled as they are in all the complexity, ambiguity, and emotion of the real political world. 18 The primary advantage of this approach is that it best enables our political theories to fulfil their central function: to guide us about how to act politically, in constructing our political institutions and formulating our political policies. We do not need to know how we should act in hypothetical worlds, but rather how we should act in our own world, in the present time, confronted as we are with the concrete imperatives and choices imposed by political life. Principles derived directly from, and addressed directly to, this world will be more useful to us than principles derived and delivered behind veils of abstraction. John Rawls, a prominent advocate of more abstract forms of normative reasoning, claims that whereas the politician looks to the next election, and the statesman to the next generation, the philosopher should look to ‘the indefinite future’. 19 The contextualist philosopher, more modestly, looks to the foreseeable future, since the practical problems that lie beyond this horizon are unknowable, while the problems within it are all too readily accessible. Principles derived contextually in this way will be more useful than those derived through more abstract reasoning processes for three key reasons. First, the meanings and prescriptive implications of our abstract theoretical formulations will be clearer, as they will have been interpreted, applied, and reformulated with respect to the very problems with which we are grappling, and on which we must make decisions and take action. Second, contextually derived principles will be more useful because they will embody normative insights that are implicit in institutions and practices but obscured through the process of theoretical abstraction. 20 Third, they allow us to incorporate more readily into our normative analysis the empirical assessments and constraints that are most evident in analysis of real rather than hypothetical examples, and that must always be recognized and accommodated within any practically viable and stable normative structures. 21 18 Iris Young calls this kind of historically and socially contextualized theorizing ‘critical theory’; see Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). 19 John Rawls, ‘The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 7 (1987), 24. 20 Joseph Carens makes similar points in his defence of a contextual method in political theory in Joseph H. Carens, Culture, Citizenship, and Community: A Contextual Exploration of Justice as Evenhandedness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 21 Here I mean ‘stable’ in the colloquial political sense (incorporating elements of both normative agreement and strategic ‘modus vivendi’), rather than in the exclusively normative sense in which Rawls employs the term. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism, New edn. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
Introduction
9
In relation to my project here, it can be seen that deriving democratic principles through a process of mutual adjustment between our intuitions about the legitimate political roles of NGOs, on the one hand, and our abstract theoretical conceptions of ‘public power’, ‘constituencies’, and ‘representation’, on the other, will generate principles that are of greater practical utility and normative validity than principles generated through more abstract reasoning processes. Principles generated in this fashion are inevitably more pertinent to the decisions we have to make about the problem of NGOs; they embody normative insights that are implicit in the actual practices that we employ to deal with NGOs in the real world; and they can accommodate and function within the empirical constraints inherent in the contemporary global order. I also need to explain here my choice of which (and whose) ideal theoretical conceptions should be invoked to engage our intuitions within a process of reflective equilibrium. As already noted, the abstract conceptions that I invoke and articulate in this book are ideals of democracy (and their constituent conceptions of public power, constituencies, and representation) that are embedded within real discourses about political legitimacy in global politics. These ideals are embedded to some extent in certain philosophical writings addressing the subject of global political legitimacy, but more importantly they are embedded also in the public and intra-organizational debates about legitimacy in which a wide range of global political practitioners are engaged. They have significant currency within various international organizations (such as the UN and the World Bank), within many NGOs and in parts of the wider NGO community, among a broad range of grassroots citizen groups and public commentators, and even to some smaller degree among some state governments and transnational corporations. In the course of developing my democratic arguments in this book, I draw upon some of these practitioners’ contributions to the debate, although the sources I cite here only scratch the surface of this vast public discourse. I certainly do not want to make the claim that the ideal of Global Stakeholder Democracy is universally endorsed by participants within these public discourses on global political legitimacy. Rather, these discourses are composed of a jumbled mix of different and incompatible norms and ideals, and characterized by a high degree of normative disagreement and disorientation. In this context, no single normative ideal could claim universal endorsement within global public discourse—neither Global Stakeholder Democracy nor any of its competitors. My claims about the connections between the Stakeholder model of global democracy and these public discourses about global political legitimacy are more modest: the model represents an attempt to draw out a range of concepts and norms with wide currency in these discourses, and tie them together within a coherent and potentially workable democratic framework. Once this model has been properly fleshed out, and its various implications more fully revealed, it may well be that some of those who had unreflectively invoked some central concepts and norms on which the stakeholder model is based would reject it in favour of more conventional democratic models. But my hope is that demonstrating how these concepts and norms can form the basis of a coherent and workable democratic model
10
Introduction
will have the overall effect of strengthening commitment to these ideas within global society. Either way, the project of articulating the central norms of Global Stakeholder Democracy should be a useful one, since it can help build a better understanding of what is at stake, normatively and practically, in the political contests among competing norms of global political legitimacy. We can see the democratic norms identified through the process I have described as ‘free-standing’ in the process of global public justification, rather than derivative of or subordinate to some wider normative framework. Our global democratic values can be seen as ‘free-standing’ in two senses. First, they are ‘freestanding’ in terms of the source of their justification; this means that democratic arguments can be publicly evaluated solely on the basis of their ‘fit’ within the limits of public democratic discourse, in the manner that I have described. 22 Second, they are ‘free-standing’ in terms of the scope of their application; this means that global democratic arguments can be distinguished from other normative arguments with currency in certain global discourses (such as arguments about global ‘justice’, social ‘utility’, or some other more ‘comprehensive’ moral standard) in accordance with the particular range of human actions or institutions that each seeks to regulate within the global domain. Viewing global democratic principles as wholly ‘free-standing’ in this second sense is somewhat unconventional in the existing philosophical literature, because of a common tendency to subsume democratic arguments within broader frameworks of ‘global justice’. 23 Philosophers often observe that whereas ‘comprehensive’ or ‘ethical’ principles apply to all domains of individual action and social interaction, principles of ‘global justice’ apply only to some more limited domain, commonly characterized as a global ‘basic structure’, or something similar. 24 However, the analogous question as to the particular range of activities and relationships that is the rightful domain of democratic principles (as distinct from principles of ‘justice’) is rarely examined, perhaps because the question is assumed to be unproblematic for one of two reasons. First, the question of the scope of democratic principles is sometimes avoided by viewing democratic principles as secondary norms of ‘procedural justice’, derived from a broader theory of social justice. 25 By viewing principles of justice 22 Any further disagreements must then be resolved through political contestation rather than public justification; by ‘political’ contestation here I refer to opposing assertions of power in pursuit of both conflicting strategic interests and conflicting moral commitments. 23 David Held, for example, suggests that global democratic theory should be grounded in a wider cosmopolitan theory of global justice in this way. See Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance; David Held, ‘Law of States, Law of Peoples’, Legal Theory, 8 (2002); David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, Global Governance and Public Accountability (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005). 24 See Rawls, Political Liberalism; Thomas Pogge, Realizing Rawls (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). 25 Thomas Pogge characterizes democracy as ‘procedural justice’ in this way in Pogge, Realizing Rawls. John Rawls was the first to make this move, by grounding his theory of justice in the values shared by citizens of a democratic society. See Rawls, Political Liberalism.
Introduction
11
as those regulative of the ‘basic structure’ of a paradigmatically closed democratic society, traditional democratic values of ‘political representation’, ‘political equality’, and so on are simply assimilated within the theory of social justice, such that they need not be accorded any independent scope or subject matter. 26 Second, to the extent that these more traditional democratic values are ascribed an independent subject, or domain, these values are commonly assumed to be selfevidently concerned with structures of ‘governmental’ decision-making within the (settled) constitutional constraints of a liberal state. 27 Both of these responses to the problem are unsatisfactory, however, when we are seeking to apply democratic principles to the domain of global politics. The problem with the former response—that of subsuming democratic principles within a theory of social justice—is that it limits democratic discourse to the confines of the ‘closed’ societies that have the kinds of intransient memberships and shared institutions that provide settings for wider systems of social justice. 28 Although some theorists of justice argue that global politics incorporates such a ‘global society’ along with such appropriate ‘institutional schemes’, 29 this position is sustainable only in limited contexts and respects, because of the unevenness of global solidarities and institutions. 30 Consequently, an insistence that traditional democratic principles cannot apply outside broader institutional systems of social justice would impose significant theoretical limitations upon the scope of application of these principles in global politics. In practice, however, I would maintain that democratic values such as political representation and political equality are in fact publicly embraced and advanced by political actors in various kinds of relationships, independently of claims about the appropriate scope of 26 Charles Beitz refers to this democratically grounded theory of justice as ‘democratic theory in the broader sense’. See Charles R. Beitz, Political Equality: An Essay in Democratic Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), ix. Rawls takes this approach to the assimilation of theories of justice and democracy most clearly in his later work. See Rawls, Political Liberalism. 27 Charles Beitz refers to these more traditional issues of democratic theory as ‘democratic theory in the narrower sense’ (as distinct from the former ‘democratic theory in the broader sense’), and then makes precisely this assumption about the scope of these ‘narrower’ democratic values. See Beitz, Political Equality: An Essay in Democratic Theory, x–xi. Rawls appears to view the scope of these traditional democratic principles in this way in his early writing, insofar as he presents democratic mechanisms of public political control as subordinate to the constitutional principles of the liberal state, which, in turn, rest on a comprehensive doctrine of individualist liberalism. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Rev. edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 28 The precise role of pre-existing social institutions in generating obligations of justice is a disputed subject among theorists of global justice. Most agree that the existence of certain shared institutions is not a sufficient condition for principles of justice to apply, since there must also be a commitment to the more general cosmopolitan moral solidarism necessary to attribute moral significance to institutions. Within such a broadly cosmopolitan moral framework, however, various substantive moral ideas that most think to be entailed in the ideal of justice (such as reciprocity and desert) can provide grounds for designating certain institutions as having a special role in generating substantive duties of justice towards others. See, e.g., Pogge, Realizing Rawls; Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations. 29 See Thomas W. Pogge, ‘An Egalitarian Law of Peoples’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 23/3 (1994); Allen Buchanan, ‘Rawls’s Law of Peoples: Rules for a Vanished Westphalian World’, Ethics, 110/4 (2000); Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations. 30 I discuss these issues further throughout Part I of this book.
12
Introduction
wider distributive principles of social justice. In the normative discourses of global politics, these distinctively democratic values thus possess a kind of ‘free-standing’ quality, which compels us to articulate and apply them as ‘free-standing’ at a theoretical level. The second common theoretical response to the question of the scope of democratic discourse—that of linking its scope to the structures of ‘governmental’ decision-making within a constitutional liberal state—is similarly untenable in the context of global politics. Although this solution to the problem may seem satisfactory to those democrats who are concerned only with the kinds of democratic dilemmas that arise within liberal states, it cannot suffice for democrats concerned with the problem of democracy in global politics, where many fewer state-like constitutional structures exist. As with the former common theoretical response, this latter view of the scope of democratic principles would imply the need for significant restrictions on the application of democratic principles in global politics, given the limited scope of state-like constitutional structures and governmental agents in that domain. Thus, like the former view, this latter view is belied by the extent to which democratic principles are in practice invoked and applied in non-state contexts and to non-governmental actors in global politics. These objections to the standard theoretical viewpoints concerning the appropriate scope of democratic principles do not of course answer the question of how we should delineate this scope; ultimately this is not a methodological question but a normative one, and as such I address it in some depth in the course of developing my substantive argument in Part I of the book. These objections do, however, help to explain both how it is possible to construct a democratic argument that is ‘free-standing’ and independent of wider arguments about social justice or other moral obligations and also why we should think that it is desirable to approach democratic theory in this way, in the context of global politics.
THE ARGUMENT The argument presented in this book in response to these practical and theoretical challenges is developed in two parts, addressing the two key conceptual elements of a theory of global representative democracy. In Part I (Chapters 1, 2, 3, and 4), I tackle the task of delineating the legitimate boundaries of democratic societies in global politics, and identifying the legitimate subjects and agents of democratic control. I then turn in Part II (Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8) to the problem of how to construct legitimate institutions for representative decision-making within such societies. In Chapter 1, I begin the task of developing a new account of legitimate global institutional boundaries by arguing that we need to abandon the assumption,
Introduction
13
entrenched within traditional liberal democratic theory, that democracy must take place within a ‘closed’ society. By ‘closed’, I mean to denote a society constituted, on the one hand, by a unified agent of public power advancing collective purposes as its subject of democratic control and, on the other hand, by a community of ‘citizens’ (sharing an exclusive and all-encompassing political status of civic membership) as its agent of democratic control. The paradigmatic case of the former is a state, and the paradigmatic case of the latter is a nation (or ‘people’, or similar social entity). Instead, we should embrace the prospect of a ‘pluralist’ liberal democratic order in global politics, composed of multiple agents of public power held to account by their multiple overlapping ‘stakeholder’ communities. What this requires, I argue, is that multiple state and non-state agents of public power in global politics should be identified as the legitimate subjects of democratic control in accordance with their autonomy-constraining impact on populations. Correspondingly, individual ‘stakeholders’ should be accorded participatory entitlements as the legitimate agents of democratic control, in accordance with the impact of this public power upon their lives. In Chapter 2, I develop and further defend my central proposition that what I call ‘public power’ is the legitimate subject of global democratic control. The material in this chapter is aimed at sceptical readers, who are not prepared to relinquish standard state-based accounts of public power on the basis of the arguments presented in Chapter 1. My additional arguments here attempt to counter some plausible theoretical objections to my autonomy-based criterion for identifying agents of ‘public power’ which are based on the claim—implicit in much liberal writing—that public power should be delineated in accordance with certain organizational features of statehood: centralized decision-making, the use of force, and law-making capacity. I argue that none of these organizational features embodies any uniquely ‘public’ political qualities, and that each of these organizational features qualifies as ‘public’ only to the extent that it satisfies the autonomy-based criterion I have proposed. Having made these efforts to bolster my autonomy-based criterion of public power, Chapter 3 then applies this criterion to the contemporary global domain, and illustrates its practical implications. Here, I identify some concrete forms of NGO power in contemporary global politics that can be designated as ‘public’ and rightly subjected to democratic contestation and control. In Chapter 4, I elaborate and illustrate my theoretical account—sketched initially in Chapter 1—of how the agents of democratic control should be identified in global politics. Here, I develop the argument that we should accord democratic agency (i.e. entitlement to exercise control over public power) to the members of ‘stakeholder’ communities, composed of all those individual ‘stakeholders’ whose autonomous capacities are constrained by the exercise of public power. My analysis here begins by elaborating the concept of a jurisdictional ‘stakeholder’ community—which is grounded in the global liberal democratic discourse surrounding attempts to democratize non-state actors such as NGOs—and explaining how the conception of democratic ‘community’ underpinning it differs
14
Introduction
from the ideals associated with the ‘closed’ societal model of democracy. I then turn to the question of how this ‘stakeholder’ model can in practice be instituted. Here, I illustrate how this new conception of democratic communities could be applied in practice, by addressing some issues and dilemmas that commonly arise for practitioners who invoke the idea of ‘stakeholder’ communities in their attempts to democratize the activities of NGOs. In the next two chapters, I develop the first part of my framework for representative decision-making in a democratic global polity, which comprises an account of legitimate social choice in a representative global democracy—that is, an account of the process through which stakeholder communities can identify the specific policies, or more generally the substance of the ‘interests’, that their representatives can legitimately advance through public policymaking. In Chapter 5, I challenge the widespread idea that legitimate social choice in global politics can be achieved solely through representation by nation-states—either as a means of aggregating individual preferences across territorial states or as a means of conducting deliberative decision-making among the cultural entities of ‘nations’. I begin my discussion in this chapter by explaining that any representative democratic theory of legitimate social choice must be built upon two kinds of argument: an explication of and justification for the underlying normative conception of interest representation; and an explanation of how the proposed constituency boundaries can effectively enact the ideal of interest representation in practice. I then develop a substantive critique of the conventional nation-state-based model of global representation, critically examining both some normative and practical justifications for this model that are based upon a ‘burkean’ model of interest representation and linked to the notion of a nation and some alternative justifications that are based upon a ‘liberal individualist’ model of interest representation and linked to the notion of a state. My analysis here highlights several significant normative weaknesses of nation-state representation, and I conclude accordingly that nation-state representation cannot alone achieve legitimate social choice in global politics. In Chapter 6, I argue that achieving legitimate social choice in global politics instead requires the establishment of a decision-making process involving deliberation among multi-stakeholder representatives, which could redress the weaknesses of the nation-state model in crucial ways. I begin here by outlining the key institutional features of the ‘multi-stakeholder’ model, and explaining how it can employ the representation of ‘multi-stakeholder’ interests by NGOs either to supplement or to substitute for the representation of nation-state constituencies by governments. I then examine the theoretical basis of the multi-stakeholder model, and argue that it can be justified within the framework of a theoretical model of interest representation that is characterized here as ‘liberal pluralist’. I further examine the strengths and weaknesses of the multi-stakeholder model as a framework for global representation. At a theoretical level, I argue that it has stronger normative foundations than either the burkean or liberal individualist models which underpin the nation-state representative system. It does, however, have certain practical limitations, which mean that it would be unworkable on
Introduction
15
its own as the sole basis for delineating constituencies in public global decisionmaking institutions. Accordingly, I conclude that we should endorse a hybrid approach to delineating democratic constituencies in global politics—one that incorporates multi-stakeholder representation within more conventional structures of representation by nation-states. In the final two chapters, I develop the second part of my framework for representative decision-making in a democratic global polity, which comprises an account of legitimate representative agency within a representative global democracy—that is, an account of how to identify the specific individuals or organizational agents that are entitled to wield public power as legitimate ‘representatives’ of stakeholder communities (in pursuit of the policies or general interests identified through social choice mechanisms). In Chapter 7, I argue that establishing legitimate representative agency in global politics does not require election mechanisms, of the kind that are employed to identify legitimate representatives within established nation-state democracies. Rather, legitimate representative agency can be established through alternative non-electoral mechanisms of authorization and accountability. My analysis in this chapter begins by elaborating a fundamental reason for viewing elections as a legitimate means of establishing representative agency: that elections have the capacity to deliver stakeholders some degree of political control over their representatives’ actions and hence some degree of political control over the public political decision-making in which they have a legitimate stake. It follows from this that, at least in principle, we could establish legitimate nonelectoral representative agency if it were possible to identify alternative institutional mechanisms that could deliver equivalent forms of political control to stakeholders. First, though, we would need to specify more clearly the character of the particular forms of political control that are instituted through election mechanisms. With this prospect in view, the chapter turns next to an analysis of these forms of stakeholder control, arguing that the specific forms of political control over representatives’ actions that elections deliver to stakeholders are those entailed in institutional mechanisms of authorization and accountability. I explain how appropriate mechanisms of authorization and accountability can deliver certain forms of political control to stakeholders, and defend the proposition that mechanisms of authorization and accountability are sufficient to constitute a conceptually complete model of democratic representation. Finally, having defended the claim that mechanisms of authorization and accountability (whether electoral or non-electoral) can establish legitimate representative agency, I elaborate the institutional mechanics of democratic authorization and accountability in greater theoretical detail. In Chapter 8, I then consider how non-electoral mechanisms of the kind elaborated in the previous chapter might function in practice in contemporary global politics. Here, I examine (in a tentative and preliminary fashion) some possible pathways for institutional reform via which NGOs could build stronger democratic credentials as representatives of various stakeholder groups. To this end, I draw on some examples of contemporary practice among NGOs to illustrate
16
Introduction
the general institutional form such mechanisms might take. I begin by considering how the two elements of authorization—delegation and empowerment— might potentially be enacted through non-electoral mechanisms so that NGOs can function as legitimate representatives of certain stakeholder constituencies. I then consider how the two elements of accountability—transparency and disempowerment—might potentially be enacted through non-electoral mechanisms. Finally, I discuss how it may be possible to meet the challenge of ensuring appropriate forms of democratic equality for all stakeholder participants, in the absence of the formal equality embodied in an election. I do not attempt to argue in this chapter that current practices are fully democratic, nor do I purport to be able to offer fully developed institutional solutions. Rather, the purpose of the material presented here is to provide a focal point for exploration of some practical possibilities, and to point towards some potential future directions for innovation and reform.
THE LIMITATIONS Before getting started with this substantive argument, it is important to clarify a few issues regarding the parameters and limitations of the arguments that are to follow. First, I have said that although I explore and illustrate my theoretical arguments primarily by examining a single category of non-state actors— NGOs—I want to claim that the core concepts and norms of Global Stakeholder Democracy have broader applications, and can be invoked also in relation to other political actors such as TNCs and IOs. One implication of this is that we need not be overly concerned with precisely how the category of non-state actors called ‘NGOs’ is defined for the present purposes. To focus my discussion, I draw mainly upon examples of NGOs that fall within fairly conventional definitions of the category—non-profit groups engaged in humanitarian, development, and advocacy work, and so on. However, this does not reflect any underlying theoretical distinction that I am making between these and other organizations that might also be included as ‘NGOs’. Instead, I suggest that different kinds of actors in global politics should attract differentiated democratic critiques based on the forms of power that they exercise over others in their global activities, rather than on some organizational typology that designates them as ‘NGOs’ or otherwise. Moreover, it may well be that the process of democratizing NGOs in accordance with the Stakeholder model would, in some cases, transform their organizational structures so significantly that they would become quite different institutional creatures from the contemporary NGOs whose standard organizational structures have become familiar over recent decades. To the extent that significant organizational transformations would be required by the Stakeholder model— both within ‘NGOs’, and between NGOs and the broader communities in which they operate—my arguments here cannot be understood merely as an attempt
Introduction
17
to confer democratic legitimacy upon NGO structures and practices in their current forms. Rather, the process of democratizing a political entity must always transform the structure of the entity itself in some important respects; this is true in relation to the democratization of state entities, so we should not be surprised or puzzled to find it true also in relation to non-state actors. The extent of the transformations to existing NGO structures required to achieve democratic legitimacy will likely vary greatly in different cases and contexts. But irrespective of the extent of the organizational transformations required, focusing on NGOs in their current form as a starting point for theoretical analysis can help identify novel pathways to global democratization, which involve treating non-state actors quite differently from how traditional state-based democratic models have treated them. Despite not wanting the applications of my arguments to be limited to any specific category of organizational entities, it is true that the cluster of organizations I focus on for illustrative purposes does fall within the quite narrow category of non-state institutional entities defined as ‘NGOs’ on standard organizational typologies. 31 An important limitation of this methodological strategy is that the material I present in this book may not be sufficient to illustrate clearly the broader applications of the theoretical framework I develop, to the satisfaction of a sceptical reader. I acknowledge that there are many significant institutional differences between the kinds of NGOs I look at here and other kinds of nonstate actors wielding power in the contemporary global polity, like TNCs, IOs, and states wielding external power. Moreover, these institutional differences are likely to have some important implications for the forms of democratization that the Stakeholder model would prescribe in relation to each. These other actors differ from NGOs in a number of important respects: the forms of power they wield and the institutions through which they wield it; the kinds of communities that would likely qualify as ‘stakeholders’ in their public power; and the forms of countervailing power that could be harnessed effectively (via processes of authorization and accountability) to ensure their public decision-making is appropriately representative of stakeholder interests. These differences certainly generate a number of important theoretical and institutional challenges of their own, which I do not claim to tackle fully in this book. In the book’s Conclusion, I say something brief about these matters, but this discussion attempts only to flag some key challenges that would arise in applying the Stakeholder model to other actors, and present a few tentative suggestions about how these challenges might be overcome. My hope is that this cursory discussion will be enough to convince readers that my claim about the broader applicability of the Stakeholder model is plausible, and deserving of further exploration and development as a project for future research, but I do not claim that it will be enough to defend this claim fully. This task is one that I must postpone to another occasion. 31 For a discussion of some such typologies, see Anna C. Vakil, ‘Confronting the Classification Problem: Toward a Taxonomy of NGOs’, World Development, 25/12 (1997).
18
Introduction
Finally, it is worth saying something more about the sense in which readers can expect this book to engage in ‘realist’ analysis, as I have so far claimed it will do. In applying the ‘realist’ label to the theoretical arguments I develop, I do not intend to commit myself to delivering detailed blueprints for institutional reform, realizable at their existing level of specification and ready for practical implementation. Rather, I mean only to commit myself to sketching a framework for global democracy that is realizable in broad outline—that is, a framework that sketches a realistic rather than a utopian path towards global democratization. What precisely the institutions of Global Stakeholder Democracy will ultimately look like once we advance further along this path is something I do not claim to be able to answer with a high degree of clarity or finality in what follows here. I do certainly undertake to elaborate the Stakeholder framework with specific institutional details to the extent that my own empirical expertise and institutional imagination permit. But it is also important to acknowledge that there is a limit to the kind of practical prescription that I can credibly engage in within a normative theoretical book of this kind. I think it would be unhelpful to try to prescribe detailed institutions without more thorough empirical investigation and analysis of various alternatives. And although empirical analysis of this kind would be crucially important to a practical project of building stakeholder democracy, it would require extensive original empirical research of a kind that is beyond the scope of this book’s ambitions. As a work of normative political theory, the arguments in this book aspire to contribute to practical institutional debates by conceptually framing—and helping to set a new agenda for—subsequent empirical investigation (and practical experimentation) in relation to how global democracy can best be achieved. I think that this kind of intellectual and practical agenda-setting is the kind of practical work that normative political theorists are best suited to perform. For this reason, if the book were to succeed in persuading empirical scholars and practitioners to take up the institutional challenges that it poses, then I would think it had made a useful practical contribution of the ‘realist’ character that I am committing myself to here.
Part I Democratic Boundaries in the New Global Polity
This page intentionally left blank
1 Democracy Beyond ‘Closed’ Societies 1.1. INTRODUCTION The first challenge that we must confront in developing a framework for global democracy is the problem of political boundaries: how should we delineate the scope of democratic ‘societies’ within the global order? To be clear about the nature of the boundary problem I am concerned with here, I am not referring to the familiar question of moral boundaries—that is, the boundaries of ‘moral concern’, or of those to whom political institutions must be morally ‘justifiable’. 1 The political boundaries I am concerned with here, instead, are the concrete institutional boundaries that delimit the scope of democratic processes of social choice and political control. These institutional boundaries are constituted by answers to the following two questions. First, what is the scope of the political power that must be held to democratic account as the legitimate subject of global democratic control? In what follows, I refer to the legitimate subject of democratic control as ‘public power’. 2 Second, which populations comprise the decision-making ‘publics’ or ‘peoples’ entitled to wield this democratic control as the legitimate agents of global democratic control? Developing answers to these two questions must be the first task of a theoretical project concerned with global democracy, since we cannot begin to devise legitimate institutions for global social choice and political control until we have identified the boundaries within which these institutional processes are to take 1 I take moral boundary questions of this kind to subsume most discussions of the scope of ‘justice’ (even when justice is conceptualized as ‘political’—or in other terms even when one is a ‘dualist’ rather than a ‘monist’ with respect to justice claims). This is because whether or not we think of our theories of justice as moral in any comprehensive or metaphysical sense, we generally agree at least that they specify the community of moral concern for the purposes of critical reflection on legitimate political institutions (which is the topic of my discussion here). A recent discussion of the scope of justice that invokes a ‘political’ conception is Thomas Nagel’s; see Thomas Nagel, ‘The Problem of Global Justice’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 33/2 (2005). The distinction between ‘monist’ and ‘dualist’ conceptions of justice is Liam Murphy’s; see Liam Murphy, ‘Institutions and the Demands of Justice’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 27/4 (1998). 2 The concept of ‘public power’ is rarely problematized or given clear articulation within democratic theory; rather, the term ‘public power’ is commonly employed loosely and interchangeably with a family of related but distinct concepts—including ‘authority’, ‘sovereignty’, ‘statehood’, and ‘governance’ or ‘government’. Accordingly, one of the functions of my analysis in Chapters 1, 2, and 3 will be to explicate the concept of ‘public power’ as distinct from these other related concepts, and to present specifically ‘public’ forms of power as the appropriate targets for democratization in global politics.
22
Democracy Beyond ‘Closed’ Societies
place. As such, the absence of satisfactory answers to these boundary questions is widely recognized, by empirical scholars and practitioners concerned with issues of institutional legitimacy, as a serious impediment to their analytic and reformist endeavours. 3 It is commonplace for democratic theorists to acknowledge institutional boundary questions of this kind as important, yet resist the notion that they could be resolved from within democratic theory itself. As Robert Dahl puts the point, ‘one cannot decide from within democratic theory what constitutes the proper unit for the democratic process’. 4 The reasons given for this usually invoke the notion that a democratic resolution of its own boundaries would be paradoxical, since democracy ‘depends on a decision-rule, usually some variant of majority rule, but the rule’s operation assumes that the question “majority of whom?” has already been settled’. 5 Certainly it is true that democratic theory cannot answer questions about institutional boundaries if we conceptualize democracy procedurally—that is, if we think it is defined by the operation of some specified social choice procedure. This is not true, however, if we conceptualize democracy substantively—that is, as a system that gives institutional expression to the fundamental democratic values of individual autonomy and equality. Democratic theory viewed in this latter sense has the resources within it to say much more about the institutional boundary problem than is often thought. In this chapter, I present a new democratic framework for answering these institutional boundary questions, and in doing so I establish some clear theoretical foundations upon which my wider account of global democracy can be built. I argue that we need to abandon the assumption, entrenched within traditional liberal-democratic theory, that democracy must take place within a ‘closed’ society. By ‘closed’, I mean to denote a society constituted on the one hand by an organizationally unified (or ‘constitutionalized’) agency of public power as its subject of democratic control, and on the other hand by a community of ‘citizens’ (sharing an exclusive and all-encompassing political status of civic membership) as its agent of democratic control. The paradigmatic case of the former is a state, and the paradigmatic case of the latter is a nation (or ‘people’, or similar social entity). 3 See, for example, the discussions of this problem in Ruth W. Grant and Robert O. Keohane, ‘Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics’, American Political Science Review, 99/1 (2005); Robert O. Keohane, ‘Global Governance and Democratic Accountability’, in D. Held and M. KoenigArchibugi (eds.), Taming Globalization (2003); Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, and Richard B. Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’, Law and Contemporary Problems, 68/3–4 (2005); Nico Krisch, ‘The Pluralism of Global Administrative Law’, European Journal of International Law, 17/1 (2006). 4 Robert Dahl, ‘Federalism and the Democratic Process’, in J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (eds.), Liberal Democracy (New York, London: New York University Press, 1983), 103. 5 Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordón, ‘Outer Edges and Inner Edges’, in Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordón (eds.), Democracy’s Edges (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1.
Democracy Beyond ‘Closed’ Societies
23
Instead, we should embrace the prospect of a ‘pluralist’ liberal-democratic order in global politics, composed of multiple agents of public power held to account by their multiple overlapping ‘stakeholder’ communities. What this requires, I argue, is that multiple state and non-state agents of public power in global politics should be subject to direct democratic control in accordance with their impact on the capacities of populations to lead autonomous lives. Correspondingly, individual ‘stakeholders’ should be accorded participatory entitlements as the legitimate agents of democratic control with respect to these multiple powerful actors, in accordance with the impact of particular public political actors upon their capacities to lead autonomous lives. This argument does not constitute a complete theory of global democracy, since it does not provide an institutional model of the mechanisms through which collective political decisions can be legitimately reached, and power legitimately controlled, within a pluralist global order. These two sets of normative problems— those concerning the boundaries of democratic decision-making, and those concerning the internal mechanisms of this decision-making—are not wholly independent of one another, insofar as the same fundamental liberal-democratic ideals of individual autonomy and equality must underpin legitimate solutions to both. However, developing a detailed account of these political institutions is to a significant extent a separate and subsequent theoretical problem, which I address in some depth in Part II of the book. In this chapter and the following three chapters, then, my central focus can cogently remain on the narrower—but more fundamental—problem of global political boundaries.
1.2. THE STANDARD THEORETICAL MODEL OF A ‘CLOSED’ DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY Although the institutional boundary problem has not been tackled extensively in the democratic literature, a number of democrats have addressed it via one of two polarized responses. Many democrats have endorsed a ‘communitarian’ solution to the boundary problem, which prescribes that institutional boundaries should correspond with nation-states (or ‘peoples’, or some similar concept). Several others have endorsed an alternative ‘cosmopolitan’ solution, which prescribes that institutional boundaries ought to be, at least in certain respects, global in scope. 6 6 For a prominent defence of ‘communitarian’ democratic boundaries, see David Miller, On Nationality: Oxford Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). For prominent ‘cosmopolitan’ accounts, see David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Cambridge: Polity, 1995); Daniele Archibugi and David Held (eds.), Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order (Cambridge: Polity, 1995); Daniele Archibugi, David Held, and Martin Köhler, Re-Imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998); Richard A. Falk and Andrew Strauss, ‘On the Creation of a Global People’s Assembly: Legitimacy and the Power of Popular Sovereignty’, Stanford Journal of International Law, 36/2 (2000);
24
Democracy Beyond ‘Closed’ Societies
Despite the obvious differences between these standard answers in terms of the scope of the institutional boundaries they prescribe, these existing answers do share certain crucial—though tacit and generally unexamined—assumptions about the structure that democratic boundaries must take. More specifically, I want to highlight (in order to subsequently challenge) the widespread theoretical assumption that democratic boundaries must delineate ‘closed’ societies of a particular kind. This standard conception of democratic boundaries views them as ‘closed’ with respect to both the structure of public power (the legitimate subject of democratic control) and the structure of the community of democratic decision-makers (the legitimate agent of democratic control). First, democrats commonly assume that public power within a democratic society must be ‘closed’ in the sense that it is structured as an organizationally unified framework of public power to which each member of the democratic society is equally subject. Paradigmatically, public power is concentrated in a ‘state’ agent, or ‘sovereign’ power, which exercises public power through law-making. As such, public power is thought to impact equally upon all members by virtue of the fact that each is equally subject to the same set of laws, through which public power is wielded. In this sense, we can say that it is ‘closed’ with respect to its organizational structure. This conception of the structure of public power is closely tied to a certain set of assumptions about where this public power comes from, in the first place. The standard assumption is that public power comprises an institutional agency that has been actively constructed by the relevant ‘public’ (hypothetically, if not temporally, prior to any democratic process for controlling its exercise) to provide a collective political framework for the pursuit of a shared democratic ‘common good’ or ‘public interest’. This assumption is associated at a deep level with the ‘social contract’ tradition, as well as with ‘republican’ strands of democratic thought. This theoretical assumption about the origins of public power is reflected most clearly in conventional state-based models of democratization, which present the process of democratization as entailing two components. The first of these components involves the creation of a state—comprising a centralized institutional apparatus within a given territory—with extensive regulatory powers. The statebuilding project is supposed to ensure that the power of the plural actors within ‘civil society’ is controlled and limited in such a way as to protect a designated democratic ‘common good’ or ‘public interest’. Through this first phase of democratization, ‘public power’ (the subject of democratization) is concentrated in the state. As a product of this concentration of public power, the domain of ‘civil society’—composed of multiple individuals as well as associations such as NGOs and corporations—is ‘depoliticized’, through the state’s regulatory limitation of Thomas Pogge, ‘Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty’, Ethics, 103/1 (1992); Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Andrew Kuper, Democracy Beyond Borders: Justice and Representation in Global Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). I review both communitarian and cosmopolitan responses to the boundary problem in Terry Macdonald, ‘Boundaries Beyond Borders: Delineating Democratic “Peoples” in a Globalizing World’, Democratization, 10/3 (2003).
Democracy Beyond ‘Closed’ Societies
25
the range of powers that these ‘private’ actors can wield over one another. In the second element of the democratization process, the public power of the state is brought under collective democratic control by all the individuals within ‘civil society’ who are subject to its regulatory restraints. In this way, the standard model of democratization suggests that a ‘closed’ framework of public power is constructed through a process of state-building, prior to the establishment of democratic procedures for political control. Although this standard account of the ‘closed’ structure of democratic public power is linked paradigmatically to the idealized structure of state power, it is reflected also in most cosmopolitan models of democratic boundaries. To avoid any ostensible misrepresentation of cosmopolitan arguments, I should emphasize that cosmopolitan democratic models do not require all public political decisions in global politics to be made by a single centralized decision-making agency, in the image of a conventional ‘sovereign’ decision-maker. (Correspondingly, they do not imply that all members of a cosmopolitan democratic society must be equally subject to every specific political decision.) On the contrary, they typically allow that many specific policy decisions will be made at more localized and disparate jurisdictional levels, by multiple agencies of public power operating within an overarching public political apparatus. Such a jurisdictionally divided framework of public power is structurally similar in key respects to ‘federalist’ frameworks of public power, of the kind we see in many nation-states (like the USA and Australia) and to some extent also in the emerging European Union. But despite the jurisdictional division of public power within cosmopolitan democratic models, global public power is still ‘closed’ in an important sense, insofar as all public power is entrenched within an encompassing constitutional structure, which allocates public political power across multiple decision-making jurisdictions in accordance with unified global democratic purposes, and which applies equally to all individuals. Such a global structure of public power need not be institutionalized through formal legal norms to count as ‘constitutionalized’ in the relevant sense, and indeed many cosmopolitans do not advocate such legal institutionalization of global public power. Let me clarify then what I mean instead when I talk about a constitutional structure of global public power, as something endorsed within conventional cosmopolitan democratic models. Establishing a shared framework of public power within a society is one of the central tasks performed by a democratic constitution. This is of course not the only task performed by a democratic constitution; at a more general level, the ‘constitution’ of a democratic society functions to specify the fundamental purposes and institutions of that society, and correspondingly the rights and duties of members. This includes specification not only of the framework of public power but also of the scope of the community of decision-makers, and the structure of institutions for political decision-making. Here, though, I am not concerned with all functions of a democratic constitution in general, but only with the specific function of instituting a unified framework of public power. A democratic constitution functions structurally to constitute the agencies of public power within a society by specifying each of the following. To begin with,
26
Democracy Beyond ‘Closed’ Societies
it specifies the constitutive purposes for which public power is to be wielded. This involves specification of certain ‘public’ democratic purposes, and the prescriptive requirement that agencies of public power should be structured so as to best advance these purposes. In some contexts this implies the imperative to impose certain constraints or limits upon the purposes for which public power can be wielded, and the proscription of the exercise of public power in violation of these purposes. Limits imposed upon public power through the constitutional entrenchment of certain individual ‘rights’ would fall into this category. In other contexts, this implies the imperative actively to construct enabling agencies, with special capacities to advance public purposes. The constitutional construction of political agencies with special coordinating or administrative capacities would fall into this latter category. Second, a constitutional structure of public power entails specification of the identities of the actors that can be empowered to wield such power. There are many and varied ways in which constitutions can restrict the range of actor identities that can be accorded access to the exercise of public power. To take one example, they can specify that particular public powers are to be reserved for members of particular families (as in democratic constitutional monarchies), or alternatively for members of particular ethnic or religious groups (as in ‘consociational’ democracies). To take another example, democratic constitutions can reserve access to a range of important public powers for citizens (as distinct from non-citizen residents), or for certain subcategories of citizens (such as those born rather than naturalized into citizenship, as in the case of the US Presidency). Third, a constitutional structure of public power entails specification of the particular sources of empowerment that are to underpin and secure its exercise. Here, constitutions can entrench answers to questions of the following kind. Must public power be wielded through the instrument of law, and subject to the constraints of the ‘rule of law’, or can it be wielded extra-legally? Can force or the threat of force be employed in the exercise of public power, and if so what limits are there on the forms and circumstances of its permissible use? Are agents of public power to be accorded material resources to sustain their power, such as special property rights or sources of revenue (e.g. land titles and entitlements to impose taxation)? If so, under what conditions? Are public political agents to be granted special entitlements to access information about others’ activities (as are sometimes accorded through investigative police powers), or special entitlements to speech and dissemination of ideas (as are sometimes accorded through parliamentary privilege), as means of bolstering their public political capacities? Finally, a constitutional structure of public power entails specification of whether and how public power is to be divided among multiple agencies. Should public power be centralized in a single (executive) agent? If not, should it be divided functionally (as in standard separation of powers among executive, legislative, and judicial branches)? And if so, what functional jurisdictions should be accorded separate public agencies? Should it alternatively (or additionally) be divided territorially, through devolution of public power to local jurisdictional
Democracy Beyond ‘Closed’ Societies
27
levels? If so, where should such devolved public agencies be located, and how should public powers be divided among them? Ultimately, different answers to each of these four sets of questions will lead to the creation of different structures of public power within a given democratic society. But the construction of any framework of public power based on coherent answers to these four sets of questions results in some kind of constitutional structure of public power in the sense I am concerned with here. With this understanding in mind, we can recognize how cosmopolitan democrats do generally endorse the necessity of a constitutional framework of public power of this kind, and in doing so incorporate a ‘closed’ structure of public power in the relevant sense. In line with this standard model, cosmopolitan David Held refers to the need for multilevel decision-making structured by a unifying framework of ‘cosmopolitan democratic law’, 7 which ‘sets the form and limits of public power—the framework in which public debate, deliberation and policy-making can be pursued and judged’. 8 On Held’s account, ‘public power’ is thus delimited through global constitutional protections devised to establish a ‘common structure of political action’ within which members of a democratic society can engage in collective decision-making. 9 In a related proposal, Thomas Pogge refers to the need for ‘sovereignty’ to ‘be widely dispersed in the vertical dimension’—across multiple territorial levels—in such a way that it best serves the functions required by the overarching collective purposes entailed in his cosmopolitan account of justice. 10 Similarly, Allan Buchanan places the importance of a ‘closed’ constitutional structure of public power at the centre of his cosmopolitan account of global political justice. 11 Once again, it is not clear that these cosmopolitans intend to endorse any legally formalized constitutional framework for global public power; it could well be that the notion of ‘cosmopolitan democratic law’ and similar concepts are only meant to denote informal norms and principles which underwrite global democratic practice. But whichever way we interpret their prescriptions, the same central point remains: the structure of global public power is presented as a target for active institutional design, as a key element of the cosmopolitan democratic project. In other words, global democratic legitimacy is seen to require—among other things—the construction of a ‘closed’ global structure of public power that is designed to limit, enable, identify, empower, and divide agencies of public power in optimal service of global democratic norms.
7
Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance,
270. 8
9 Ibid. 154–5. Ibid. 200–5. Pogge, ‘Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty’, 58. Another cosmopolitan democrat, Andrew Kuper, proposes a similar dispersal of public power through a global constitutional framework, but allows for functional as well as territorial dispersions of this public power. See Kuper, Democracy Beyond Borders: Justice and Representation in Global Institutions. 11 See Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law. 10
28
Democracy Beyond ‘Closed’ Societies
In addition to this ‘closed’ model of public power, standard democratic theories conceptualize institutional boundaries as ‘closed’ also with respect to the community of public decision-makers, which serves as the collective agent of democratic control. Here, democrats commonly assume that the democratic decision-making community must be composed of a collective of democratic ‘citizens’ sharing an exclusive and encompassing status of civic membership. First, the community is conceptualized as exclusive in the sense that it has a discrete membership, whereby members share the status of citizen only with one other, and are not simultaneously members of multiple other political communities. 12 Second, the community is conceptualized as politically all-encompassing, in the sense that the political relationships taking place within its boundaries encompass all aspects of its members’ political lives. Crucially, this means that the political roles and responsibilities allocated to individuals as members of a ‘closed’ political community encompass the complete set of political roles and responsibilities allocated to each individual. As a result of this, there is no possibility of conflict between the political roles and responsibilities that an individual may possess via membership in multiple political communities. The concept of ‘citizenship’ is then deployed to denote membership in a ‘closed’ community with these two related characteristics. Paradigmatically, ‘closed’ decision-making communities of this kind are linked to the idea of a ‘nation’ or ‘people’, or similar social entity. But this conception of the democratic decision-making community as ‘closed’ is not confined to communitarian democrats. Cosmopolitans, too, portray their global demos as ‘closed’ in this way, with common references by many to the notion of global ‘citizenship’, and the conceptions of exclusive and all-encompassing political membership associated with this term. 13 Just as the idea of a ‘closed’ or ‘constitutionalized’ structure of public power does not preclude the possibility of internal jurisdictional divisions (within a federalist constitutional framework or some such thing), the idea of a ‘closed’ democratic community of citizens does not preclude the possibility of multiple overlapping spheres of membership internal to the overarching democratic society. An individual can participate in decision-making processes, and possess a range of political roles and responsibilities, at multiple levels within the democratic society—for example at regional, national, state, and local levels. But this individual will still remain a citizen of a ‘closed’ democratic society so long as the various roles and responsibilities associated with each of these overlapping democratic memberships are mutually compatible and hierarchically ordered such that 12 The practice of dual citizenship represents an exception to this, but this practice remains controversial in many democracies precisely because it violates the assumption of exclusivity paradigmatic of citizenship in standard democratic models. 13 See, for example, James Bohman, ‘Cosmopolitan Republicanism: Citizenship, Freedom and Global Political Authority’, Monist, 84/1 (2001); Richard A. Falk, On Humane Governance: Toward a New Global Politics (Cambridge: Polity, 1995); Falk and Strauss, ‘On the Creation of a Global People’s Assembly: Legitimacy and the Power of Popular Sovereignty’; Richard A. Falk and Andrew Strauss, ‘Not a Parliament of Dreams’, Worldlink: The Magazine of the World Economic Forum (2002).
Democracy Beyond ‘Closed’ Societies
29
there are no conflicts among them. That is, the rights and duties of membership within various internal democratic communities are encompassed by, or subsumed within, the overarching framework of rights and duties constituting their status as ‘citizens’ within the democratic society as a whole. Within an idealized ‘constitutionalized’ cosmopolitan democratic society—just as within a federalist state structure—individuals’ democratic rights and duties are coherently ordered in this way, and it is for this reason that we can identify such a democratic society as ‘closed’, despite its many internal divisions. In sum, the standard conception of democratic boundaries as ‘closed’ is closely linked to the structure of democratic boundaries in a nation-state, and is perhaps a reasonable way of conceptualizing democratic boundaries in this context insofar as it reflects common (though certainly far from universal) facts about the structure of state power, and of national decision-making communities. 14 However, what is more noteworthy (and, I will argue, problematic) is that this conception has been abstracted and transposed to the global level by cosmopolitans also, as though ‘closed’ boundaries of this particular kind were essential for any legitimate democratic order.
1.3. BEYOND ‘CLOSED’ SOCIETIES: A ‘REALIST’ DEMOCRATIC AGENDA Although most cosmopolitan models of democracy devised for application at the level of global politics tacitly suppose that democratic boundaries must be ‘closed’ beyond nation-states—just as they are within nation-states—I argue here that this unduly limits cosmopolitan thinking about the range of institutional possibilities for global democratization. In departure from the standard picture of democratic boundaries, I propose that a legitimate global democratic society should be constituted through boundaries of a very different kind, which better reflect the ‘pluralist’ political character of the global order. Endorsing the ‘closed’ model of democratic boundaries at the global level is highly problematic, I argue, because of serious pragmatic difficulties with the requirement for public power to be wielded through a unified (constitutionalized) structure of the kind I have discussed. In our contemporary ‘globalizing’ world order, global public power is not currently allocated among regulatory agencies in accordance with any underlying democratic principles, or ‘constitutional’ structure. The existing system of ‘sovereign’ states and international law can perhaps be said to perform such regulatory functions to a limited degree. However, non-state actors such as Transnational Corporations (TNCs), Non-Governmental 14 It may be that we should not think of boundaries this way within many states either, since many do not fit the ideal mould of the nation-states I have described. I do not resist this possibility, nor seek to pursue it; my interest is primarily in the global case so it is with respect to this case that I direct my critique of the ‘closed’ model of democratic boundaries.
30
Democracy Beyond ‘Closed’ Societies
Organizations (NGOs), and International Organizations (IOs), alongside a plurality of states, wield many of the forms of ‘public’ decision-making power (in fields of law-making, economic development, public service-provision, etc.) that democrats have traditionally sought to subject to public regulatory control. 15 The significance of these plural non-state agencies of public power is that they tend to emerge in ad hoc, varied, and unstructured ways—that is, their public power is not the product of any project of grand institutional design. As such, the overall institutional structure of global public power lacks the kind of underlying principled order which a cosmopolitan democratic blueprint would seek to deliver. The present structure of global public power can thus be characterized as pluralist both because its organizational structure is fragmented and uneven in impact and because its structure is not designed to serve optimally any unifying democratic purposes (as a constitutional structure of public power would do). Cosmopolitans do not deny this contemporary global reality; their institutional proposals are presented merely as normative ideal standards, intended to guide the future development of the international system. As such, they prescribe that the existing global political pluralism should be countered through the creation of a new ‘closed’ structure of global regulatory agencies capable of limiting and controlling the exercise of these other actors’ power, in the same way that state agencies regulate the power of non-state actors within their own territorial boundaries. What this would entail, effectively, would be a project of global constitutionbuilding—with the transfer of global decision-making power from these existing plural actors to some new constitutionally structured agencies. Following this path may provide a largely satisfactory solution at the level of purely ‘ideal’ theory. To the extent that such global constitution-building is feasible then, there is a strong case for maintaining that democrats should attempt to pursue it, and it is possible that over time there would be some modest successes in this endeavour. However, we should expect that the extent to which democrats are likely to succeed in such global constitution-building will be minimal, at least in the foreseeable future. Any attempt to transform substantially the structure of global public power would be a massive undertaking in social engineering, the enormity of which should not be underestimated, and the prospects of achieving extensive success in such a project would be dim. Shared democratic values at a global level cannot be straightforwardly converted into a new structural framework of global public power through some functionalist process of political transformation, driven by the intentional, instrumental, and far-sighted choices of reformist global political actors. This is because 15 See, for example, Susan Strange, ‘The Declining Authority of States’, in D. Held and A. G. McGrew (eds.), The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate (2000); Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance; A. Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler, and Tony Porter, Private Authority and International Affairs, Suny Series in Global Politics (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999); A. Claire Cutler, Private Power and Global Authority: Transnational Merchant Law in the Global Political Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Rodney Bruce Hall and Thomas J. Biersteker, The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
Democracy Beyond ‘Closed’ Societies
31
the choices made by the political actors who drive historical processes of institutional development and transformation are not always (or even usually) intentional, instrumental, and far-sighted. For a start, political actors are commonly motivated by short-term goals of various kinds, instead of by the sort of longterm interests that are at stake in large-scale institutional development. Moreover, political actors commonly act on the basis of ‘logics of appropriateness’ rather than socially detached instrumentality, and this can inhibit the rational pursuit of long-term interests in institutional reform. Finally, many important political consequences of actors’ decisions are unintended rather than rationally calculated; since the extent to which political actions have unintended consequences increases with social complexity, this factor is likely to have significant salience at the global level. 16 In other words, the fundamental distributions of power within the global order are a product not of any grand constitutional design, instituted through the coordinated pursuit of collective ‘public’ purposes, but rather of many uncoordinated factors (technological, sociological, economic, and political) which interact in unplanned ways to generate structural outcomes in terms of the framework of power to which populations are subject. That is, distributions of power arise to a large extent through the uncoordinated interplay of all the different things that people do in the course of their lives—including the most personal, socially inconspicuous, and unplanned activities. Such social action by uncoordinated individuals and groups can lead, for example, to the development of new technologies, to new distributions of material resources, to new forms of communication and social mobilization, to new sources of political identity and solidarity, to new ideological movements and cultural value-systems, and so on. And in turn, these wider social transformations play key roles in generating and shaping opportunities for the exercise of power, thus contributing to the process of structuring the overall distribution of power in global politics. Because structural opportunities for the exercise of power are thus created—at least in significant part—through such haphazard and complex sociological processes, the development of any new framework of global public power over time will inevitably be directed to a large degree by many highly contextual and path-dependent factors. It cannot be expected to conform to any functionalist logic arising simply from the identification of shared cosmopolitan democratic values. It is for precisely these reasons that the existing structure of global public power has so far developed in the pluralist manner I have described, and the institutional dynamics that have generated the existing structure of global public power are likely to remain resistant to the future constitutionalization of global public power. 16 Paul Pierson, ‘The Limits of Design: Explaining Institutional Origins and Change’, Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, 13/4 (2000); Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); John Gerald Ruggie, ‘Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations’, International Organization, 47/1 (1993).
32
Democracy Beyond ‘Closed’ Societies
As a result of this, the coordination problems associated with trying to transform a deeply pluralist structure of power into a ‘closed’ or ‘constitutionalized’ structure of power would seem insurmountable, at least within any but the longest of time frames. A democratic framework concerned with the practical political project of institutional reform must therefore confront and accommodate existing realities regarding the structure of global power, rather than expect that a project of democratization could begin by overturning and rearranging them in any fundamental way. I therefore propose that democrats should identify a more pragmatic path to global democratization, which can be accommodated within the existing institutional structures of global politics. Instead of seeing the creation of a ‘closed’ or ‘constitutionalized’ framework of public power as a necessary first step in a project of global democratization, we should seek to democratize the framework of global power in its current pluralist structure. We should identify the multiple organizationally disparate agents that wield power within our existing pluralist global order of a kind that we think requires democratic regulation (states, NGOs, IOs, corporations, etc.) as direct subjects of democratic control (i.e. as agents of ‘public’ power), and then see the establishment of institutions to hold them to direct democratic account as a central task of global institutional reform. To understand the basis for this ‘pluralist’ account of global public power more fully, we must recognize that it is underpinned by a ‘realist’ approach to democratic theory, which accepts the structure of our existing political order as axiomatic in the democratic analysis, and takes it as a motivating precondition for the democratic project. This ‘realist’ approach is underpinned by a particular view of the purpose of democratic theory, which is to provide a theoretical framework for guiding the practical task of democratizing political life in the most effective way possible under prevailing political circumstances. This pragmatic view of the democratic project has firm historical roots in the liberal-democratic tradition, which has from its outset been focused on the practical task of institutional reform and political transformation, and not only the task of philosophical critique. Theorists with nominally ‘ideal-theoretical’ methodological commitments do not always acknowledge the role of pragmatic considerations in normative argument. Moreover, functionalist and rational-choice empirical accounts of institution-building processes can further reinforce the assumption that conventional state-based democracy embodies some context-neutral normative ideal— by implying that democracy has historically developed within state structures because states provide the ideal institutional framework for performing democratic functions. Nonetheless, I suggest that the prominence accorded to a centralized framework of public power within mainstream normative democratic theories did not emerge solely (or even primarily) through the articulation and rational implementation of ‘ideal-theoretical’ constructions about how democratic public power ought to be structured within a social order. Rather, the historical development of democratic systems that emphasize the role of centralized regulatory agencies has been driven to a large degree by a contextual pragmatic
Democracy Beyond ‘Closed’ Societies
33
interest in imposing greater standards of legitimacy upon already existing unified public structures of sovereign power. Thomas Nagel has recently reiterated this point, in the context of a closely related set of debates about the prospects for global ‘justice’ more broadly conceived: [I]n thinking about the future, we should keep in mind that political power is rarely created as a result of demands for legitimacy, and that there is little reason to think that things will be different in this [global] case. . . . First there is the concentration of power; then, gradually, there grows a demand for consideration of the interests of the governed, and for giving them a greater voice in the exercise of power. The demand may be reformist, or it may be revolutionary, or it may be a demand for reform made credible by the threat of revolution, but it is the existence of concentrated sovereign power that prompts the demand, and makes legitimacy an issue. 17
In the present context, the implication of this important insight is that the empirical facts about the present pluralist structure of power in the global order are of great relevance to the project of democratic theory—at least insofar as we seek democratic theory that can serve as a practical guide to institutional reform and institution-building in the real political world. 18 To prevent misunderstanding of this ‘realist’ approach, it is important to emphasize that it does not imply that overall structures of public power are of no democratic significance, or that these structures should not in any sense be the target of democratic critique and reform. Rather, one of the long-term effects of instituting democratic control over the multiple agents of public power that currently exist in global politics is likely to be an ultimate transformation— perhaps even an increasing ‘constitutionalization’—of the overall structure of public power. This is so because when agents of public power are brought under democratic control, the ‘public’ constituencies wielding this control are likely to demand changes to certain structural features of these agents, as an institutional means of increasing the likelihood that, over time, these public political agents will more fully and reliably act in the service of public interests. To take an example, the stakeholder constituency of a powerful corporation may demand that its current constitutive purpose (maximizing shareholder profits) be structurally amended (through corporations laws, informal codes of conduct, etc.) to incorporate recognition of the importance of protecting certain stakeholder interests. Moreover, the development of formal accountability mechanisms as a means of holding the corporation to democratic account would ultimately result in structural changes to the decision-making processes and power-bases of the corporation in question, insofar as these changes would be necessary to accommodate the 17
Nagel, ‘The Problem of Global Justice’, 145. Although I concur with Nagel on this historical question about the importance of pre-existing power in prompting demands for democratic legitimacy and thus structuring existing democratic theories, I differ from him in my answer to the normative question of which particular forms of preexisting power ought to be seen as prompting such demands. 18
34
Democracy Beyond ‘Closed’ Societies
consultative processes and sanctioning mechanisms that are inherent in accountability mechanisms. Over time, then, we would expect that the overall structure of public power in the global order would be significantly transformed as a result of reforms to institute democratic control of existing agents of public power. It may be the case that these changes would eventually result in an overall structure of public power somewhat akin to the ideal blueprints articulated by cosmopolitan advocates of the ‘closed’ model of democratic public power. On the other hand, we may find instead that the process of establishing democratic control of existing agents of public power leads to quite different overall structures, of kinds that have not yet been imagined by philosophers but which nonetheless serve ideal democratic purposes through alternative (more practicable) structural means. For this reason, we should not expect the outcome of a ‘realist’ approach to yield any less ‘ideal’ democratic results over time. The key factor distinguishing the ‘realist’ approach from the standard approach, instead, is that the former articulates a clear reformist vision of how we can get from here to there—from a highly undemocratic global political order to a highly democratic one, through a legitimate process of democratization. 19 The articulation of ideal constitutional structures of public power would serve a more useful reformist purpose if there were some way to transpose these static ideal structures directly onto the political world straight from a philosophy classroom, bypassing the need for the dynamic process of political action and reform. Often cosmopolitans talk as though the question of transformative political agency is unproblematic— presumably because it is implicitly assumed that the ‘we’ engaged in democratic critique is allied with some benevolent superpower (either a single agent or some coordinated collective) willing and able to implement the just democratic blueprints devised by philosophers. However, even the most steadfast of optimists must surely be deeply sceptical about the prospect of locating such an omnipotent and benevolent hegemony in global politics, willing and able to subject its own power along with that of others to democratic control. And in the absence of such an agency, it seems clear that the top–down approach to democratization implied by the standard emphasis on grand constitutional design is untenable as a pragmatic theoretical framework for democratic reform. In contrast, the ‘realist’ approach I advocate here provides an approach to democratization that engages directly with the power of real global actors, by targeting its normative demands to existing political agencies. As such, it provides us with a more action-oriented and strategically viable theoretical framework for conceptualizing and pursuing the project of global democratic 19 The sense in which we can speak of this democratic control as conferring democratic legitimacy is thus somewhat different from the sense in which ‘ideal’ theorists attribute legitimacy to the closed societal model of democracy. Whereas ‘ideal’ theoretical approaches characterize democratic legitimacy as something inherent only in the ideal democratic end-states resulting from a democratic reform process, the ‘realist’ approach I am advocating here characterizes democratic legitimacy as inherent in a (dynamic) legitimate reform process, within a society that lacks an ideal constitutional structure of public power but is undergoing democratization over time.
Democracy Beyond ‘Closed’ Societies
35
reform, capable of harnessing the real political dynamics of the contemporary global order in the pursuit of long-term democratic transformation. It should be clear from what I have said, also, that the ‘realist’ approach to delineating public power ought not to be seen as incompatible with a project of global democratic constitution-building. Rather, the two approaches to the project of global democratization can be complementary, and pursued simultaneously. To the extent that we can identify collective global purposes and establish the collective public political agencies to advance them, then we should certainly do so. All I am arguing here is that we should not see the practical limits of a project of global constitution-building as dictating the limits of the project of global democratization. Where global constitution-building fails—due to the enormous practical constraints I have pointed to here—democratization can still proceed, by targeting powerful agencies in their current pluralist structures.
1.4. PUBLIC POWER AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN A ‘PLURALIST’ DEMOCRATIC ORDER If we are willing to make the pragmatic move I have so far defended, and accept that the structure of global public power will remain (for the foreseeable future at least) pluralist rather than unified, we are confronted with a normative theoretical challenge rather different from the standard cosmopolitan project of ideal institutional design. Our new challenge is to provide normative criteria for specifying what forms of power count as ‘public’, and what communities of individuals should be empowered to participate in their democratic control. First, we need to articulate a normative criterion for identifying which of the many organizationally disparate forms of state and non-state power in global politics qualify as ‘public’ forms of power, such that they should be subject to democratic control. That is, we must provide an account of what makes some forms of power problematic and in need of special democratic legitimation, while other forms of power are unproblematic and permissible within a domain of ‘private’ conduct. Correspondingly, we must identify a criterion for delineating the jurisdictional boundaries of each agent of global public power, so that we know which populations should be empowered to hold each of these to democratic account. In response to the first of these questions, I propose the central liberal value of individual autonomy as the appropriate standard to invoke in determining whether the impact of an act of power by one political agent upon another constitutes an act of public power. The liberal-democratic ideal has the value of individual autonomy at its core, and as such it is the protection of individual autonomy that should be the primary concern of liberal-democratic institutions. As such we can specify that power should be designated as ‘public’ and subject to democratic control whenever it impacts in some problematic way upon the capacity of a group of individuals to lead autonomous lives.
36
Democracy Beyond ‘Closed’ Societies
It is important to emphasize that this autonomy-based criterion for delineating the scope of public power makes a certain set of background assumptions about the underlying purposes of a democratic system. Here, I am articulating a criterion appropriate to a specifically liberal conception of democratic legitimacy, which sees the protection of autonomy (and conversely, the resistance of tyranny) as democracy’s fundamental purpose. Democratic institutions are of course not the only means of advancing this general liberal objective; it can also be pursued via a range of other (non-democratic) institutional devices—most notably, various constitutional constraints on power (such as bills of rights, separations of powers) and various mechanisms of ‘horizontal’ accountability, or ‘balance of power’ among powerful elites. These institutional avenues are not mutually exclusive, however, and I would maintain that democratic control is an especially effective and reliable means of pursuing this liberal purpose. Democracy could of course be justified in other ways—for instance, as a system for protecting certain objectively specified human interests (either at an individual level or at an aggregative level). If we were to think of democracy as justified in some other such way, then the criterion for delineating the scope of public power would need to differ accordingly. For instance, if we were to think that democracy’s purpose is to protect certain objective interests, then we would need to designate relevant threats to these interests, rather than threats to individual autonomy, as the basis for delineating public power. Accepting my autonomy-based criterion, then, requires first accepting my general liberal orientation towards the democratic project. The scope of liberal-democratic principles is thus delineated in accordance with the normative function of liberal representative institutions: if the purpose of democratic institutions is to resist oppressive (autonomy-constraining) forms of power, it follows that it is these forms of power that should be subject to the normative constraints imposed through democratic institutions. Such democratic institutions function to confer legitimacy upon public power because they reinstate (to some degree) the autonomy of individuals, by according each individual a share in decision-making control. It must be recognized that the autonomy reinstated through representative institutions differs from (and is less extensive than) that limited by public power insofar as it is expressed through collective rather than individual decision-processes. 20 Since a share in democratic control of public power does not fully compensate an individual for the autonomy constrained through the exercise of public power, democratic institutions can only confer legitimacy upon public power if it is assumed that the existence of some public power is necessary or unavoidable in the first place. This could be assumed either on the normative grounds that some public power is desirable as a means for maintaining social order or on the pragmatic grounds that it is 20 It is for this reason that Robert Wolff rightly rejects the capacity of democratic institutions completely to counteract the autonomy-constraining impact of public power. See Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998). In his analysis here Wolff focuses on forms of public power he characterizes as ‘authority’.
Democracy Beyond ‘Closed’ Societies
37
a pervasive and unavoidable feature of social life. But if such an assumption is accepted, democracy confers liberal legitimacy insofar as it preserves individual autonomy to the greatest degree that is compatible with the existence of public power. If, then, we are to invoke some standard of impact on individual autonomy as the criterion for differentiating public from private acts of power, we must further specify the theoretical content of two aspects of this criterion: what elements of individual autonomy should be protected and promoted within a democratic polity? and what are the responsibilities of members of democratic polities to protect and promote the autonomy of others? These are big questions, and the task of articulating an operationalizable criterion for delineating public power would require fleshing out complete answers to both. The answers to these questions cannot be wholly philosophical, however, so I cannot here undertake to provide full or definitive answers to either. Rather, an important implication of the democratic pluralism I am defending here is that we must accept there is no universally applicable set of understandings of autonomy, and (egalitarian) responsibility for autonomy which can be invoked to delineate democratic boundaries in all political contexts within the global domain. Instead, answers to these questions must to some degree be politically determined, within each of the specific contexts in which the need for democratic control arises. However, there does still need to be some conceptual core of autonomy and equality which is preserved and shared, common in all political contexts, in order for the political framework to count as ‘democratic’; otherwise, the notion of ‘democracy’ would lose any substantive meaning. Here, my purposes are limited to the task of sketching this conceptual core of the democratic public power criterion, and highlighting the residual normative questions on which final political determinations of the scope of public power would then turn in each political context of democratic control. First, with respect to the value of individual autonomy, we can say in general terms that this is concerned with ensuring that individuals are empowered to formulate and effectively pursue authentic personal goals. To be autonomous in the broad (etymological) sense of ‘self-rule’, an individual must be capable both of formulating authentic desires and of acting upon them in the real political world. 21 The conception of autonomy that can be employed to delineate public power within a liberal representative system, however, is narrower than this broad definition, insofar as it is a specifically democratic conception of autonomy—that is, one that can be protected and enacted through democratic political institutions. In some social contexts—of the kind discussed in certain debates within moral 21 In some recent literature on the concept of ‘autonomy’, the idea is defined in relation only to the formulation of choices, and thus distinguished from the concepts of ‘freedom’ and ‘liberty’, which are defined instead in relation to the capacity to act upon choices. See, for example, John Christman, ‘Introduction’, in John Philip Christman (ed.), The Inner Citadel: Essays on Individual Autonomy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). I use the term here, however, in a broader democratic sense which incorporates both formulation of choices and action upon them.
38
Democracy Beyond ‘Closed’ Societies
philosophy—it is feasible to promote forms of autonomy that can be limited by aspects of the self, or aspects of the material world. In contrast, a specifically democratic ideal of autonomy must be conceptualized as a condition that can be limited only by the activity of other agents (and not by aspects of the self, or by aspects of the material world). Moreover, since public power is something that must always be exercised by agents, we need to think also about what is normatively entailed in the act of constraining another’s autonomy—that is, what will count as an act with impacts or effects upon the autonomous capacities of another. To answer this question, we must identify the range of democratic responsibilities each agent possesses for protecting and promoting the autonomy of others. When one political agent fails to meet these responsibilities towards another, we can say that it has exercised public power over that other agent, since it is—through its (in)actions—responsible for some constraints upon the autonomy of that other. To avoid possible misunderstanding of my position here, it is important to emphasize that I do not intend, by linking public power to impacts of agents’ actions upon others’ autonomy, to attribute any intrinsic normative significance to the common analytic distinction between ‘acts’ and ‘omissions’, or between ‘doing’ and ‘allowing’. Rather, I see this analytic distinction as a tool for invoking—in common-sense moral shorthand—fundamental and widely shared assumptions about the scope of agents’ responsibilities. As such, autonomy-constraining effects for which we view a particular agent as clearly responsible we will characterize as emanating from the agent’s ‘actions’, and we will accordingly say that the agent has wielded ‘public power’. Conversely, autonomy-constraining effects for which the agent is less evidently responsible we will say that the agent has merely ‘allowed’; in this latter scenario, we will not say that the agent has wielded ‘public power’. As such, it should be clear that I do not mean to link the criterion of autonomyconstraining impact to any substantive normative stipulations about the scope of different actors’ responsibilities, based on any philosophical distinction between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ duties, or some such thing. Rather, I think that it is helpful to employ the concept of ‘impact’ (of one agent upon another) as a basis for delineating public power only because this concept denotes (in common-sense moral shorthand) those effects for which we broadly agree particular actors are responsible. In this way, the question of how responsibilities should be distributed remains largely open on my account of public power, and will be reflected in (rather than determined by) our conception of what it is for particular actors to ‘have effects’ on others through their actions. All that is conceptually required with respect to the conception of responsibility underpinning a criterion of public impact is that it must be egalitarian in some central respect. That is, the account of responsibility for others’ autonomy must treat all individuals—at some level—with equal concern. This is necessary since the value of equality—alongside that of individual autonomy—is a foundational value within the democratic project, and a conception of social responsibility that
Democracy Beyond ‘Closed’ Societies
39
accorded greater priority to the autonomous capacities of some individuals than those of others would not meet the minimal standard required to qualify as ‘democratic’ in character. However, the substantive responsibilities that are implied by a democratic ‘equal concern’ for individuals’ autonomy can be interpreted quite differently in different political contexts, and there can be a great deal of variation in the positions adopted on this issue without undermining the core democratic credentials of a political system. Beyond these basic conceptual elements that I have identified—with respect to the character of individual autonomy, and the range of responsibilities political actors possess for protecting the autonomy of others—the specifics of this public power criterion must be worked out in detail in each political context in which democratic control is to be established. As such, the fully operationalized public power criterion will vary in different political contexts, to reflect the varying degrees of responsibility for others’ autonomy that can gain broad political consensus (and thus deliver legitimacy) in each. (I will say more about the implications of this democratic pluralism in Chapter 4.) If we invoke shared views about autonomy and (egalitarian) responsibility in this way as the basis for delineating global public power, which range of actors are likely to qualify, in many political contexts, as the legitimate subjects of democratic control? To begin with, application of such a criterion would certainly be likely to identify most forms of power wielded by states as ‘public’, since state power would generally be considered to have the requisite impact on others’ autonomy. We commonly view states as responsible for effects upon individual autonomy that arise through a range of state activities such as law-making, law-enforcement, resource distribution, and so on. However, what is crucial to recognize here is that states are unlikely to be the only actors to satisfy this criterion of public power, since the criterion attributes states no intrinsic or exclusive public status. We can accordingly identify many examples of non-state power that would also appear likely candidates for designation as ‘public’, and subjection to democratic control. I do not elaborate these in this chapter; this task is postponed to Chapter 3, where I outline a range of NGO activities in contemporary global politics that can plausibly be viewed as wielding ‘public’ forms of power. Having sketched the basis for delineating the legitimate subjects of global democratic control, it remains to identify a corresponding criterion for delineating the decision-making communities that are to serve as the legitimate agents of global democratic control. In other words, how can we delineate the boundaries of the communities of decision-makers that should hold plural agents of public power to democratic account through appropriate institutions of social choice and political control? In accord with the above analysis of the scope of public power, I propose that democratic decision-making communities in global politics should be delineated based on an assessment of the impact of power upon the autonomous capacities of populations within the global order. Just as power qualifies as ‘public’ whenever it impacts detrimentally upon the autonomous capacities of a group of individuals,
40
Democracy Beyond ‘Closed’ Societies
individuals should be entitled to participate in any political decision-making that impacts in problematic ways upon their autonomous capacities. 22 Accordingly, it is the communities of individuals whose autonomous entitlements are affected by the exercise of power that should be identified as the legitimate agents of democratic control, with respect to the particular political actors that wield this public power. The institutional implications of this criterion for allocating participatory entitlements (delineating a democratic decision-making community) can perhaps be best understood with reference to a concept that has gained significant currency in recent global democratic discourse—the idea of ‘stakeholder’ communities. In general, this idea embodies the proposition that political decision-making should be undertaken by the communities of ‘stakeholders’ who are affected by given political decisions. A liberal-democratic account of shared responsibility for others’ autonomy can then be invoked to specify what kind of ‘effects’ or ‘impact’ are required—both to generate an imperative for the democratic control of a political actor and correspondingly to delineate the population of individuals entitled to wield this control. It is by interpreting the concept of stakeholding through the lens of liberal-democratic values that we arrive at the criteria I have identified for delineating the legitimate subjects and agents of democratic control. (In Chapter 4, I elaborate this idea of stakeholder communities in more depth, and examine some practical institutional problems that arise in identifying the stakeholders of non-state actors such as NGOs.)
1.5. CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS A ‘PLURALIST’ DEMOCRATIC GLOBAL ORDER The arguments I have presented in this chapter identify a strong imperative to abandon the long-established conception of democratic boundaries as necessarily ‘closed’, which has so far maintained a firm grip upon the theoretical and institutional agendas of liberal democrats in the global domain. Instead, I have defended an alternative ‘realist’ democratic framework, which seeks to allocate decisionmaking control to individuals in accordance with the impact of powerful agents’ actions upon their lives. Instead of seeing public power as something that must be constructed via a ‘closed’ constitutional structure, as the first task of democratic institution-building, we should instead identify as ‘public’ any existing forms of power that impact problematically upon the autonomous capacities of others. 22 This general liberal intuition about the importance of autonomy in delineating the scope of participatory entitlements is shared by certain other liberal democrats, including John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Rev. edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Nagel, ‘The Problem of Global Justice’; Michael Blake, ‘Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 30 (2001); R. M. Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue (Harvard University Press, 2000); Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance. However, the precise nature of their justificatory arguments differs in some important ways from my own.
Democracy Beyond ‘Closed’ Societies
41
Moreover, instead of seeing the entitlement to political participation as something that should be allocated to all individuals equally by virtue of membership in a ‘closed’ democratic society, participatory entitlements should be accorded to individuals only in relation to those forms of power that impact in problematic ways upon their autonomy. This implies that global democracy can be achieved through a ‘pluralist’ democratic order, whereby multiple organizationally disparate state and non-state agents of ‘public power’ are subject to the democratic control of their respective communities of ‘stakeholders’. As I have said, these criteria for delineating democratic boundaries would require fuller elaboration before they could be operationalized in real-world institution-building. We would need to specify more fully not only which forms of individual autonomy are sufficiently valuable to warrant protection through democratic institutions but also how (egalitarian) responsibilities for this protection should be distributed among the many state and non-state actors in global politics. At a deeper theoretical level, then, this framework for delineating democratic boundaries points us back to the same basic normative questions that underpin traditional approaches to the project of democratization, focused on building and controlling ‘closed’ or ‘constitutionalized’ frameworks of global public power. Traditional cosmopolitan approaches of this kind proceed by asking these same fundamental normative questions about the substance of democratic autonomy and social responsibility, and then invoke their answers as the basis for their democratic constitutional designs. The difference between my ‘pluralist’ model and these traditional accounts thus rests not on any divergent underlying normative questions (or divergent normative answers to these questions); rather, it rests on the level of abstraction and generality at which these questions are posed. First, there is a difference in the level of abstraction at which these questions are posed by each: by asking about the responsibilities of real existing actors to protect autonomy in the real existing political world (instead of asking, more conventionally, about the responsibilities of hypothetical actors in hypothetical democratic societies), the pluralist democratic model directs us to reflect upon which agents of public power and their decision-making communities should engage in real processes of democratization in contemporary global politics. Second, there is a difference in the level of generality at which these questions are posed by each: whereas the ‘closed’ model of global democracy requires a uniform set of answers to these questions to be applied in the delineation of democratic boundaries throughout the global polity, the ‘pluralist’ model permits different answers to be applied in different political contexts. Although each set of answers must conform to a core conceptual structure, the details can vary in each of the sets of political relationships where democratic control is to be established. The framework I have presented here for delineating global democratic boundaries raises many significant questions, which require much more detailed consideration than I have been able to provide within the constraints of this chapter. In the following three chapters, I elaborate this framework further, and demonstrate how the concepts of public power and stakeholder communities can be applied
42
Democracy Beyond ‘Closed’ Societies
concretely to non-state forms of power in contemporary global politics. But even in the preliminary form in which I have presented it so far, we can see that the framework for a pluralist global democratic order that I have sketched out here can serve to articulate a new and promising direction for thinking about the democratic boundary problem. A key advantage of embracing ‘pluralist’ democratic boundaries is that doing so provides a means of transcending the impasse between ‘communitarian’ and ‘cosmopolitan’ democratic models that has dominated recent discussion of the global democratic problem. Political theorists have been for so long accustomed to preoccupation with the state (and its associated ideas of ‘sovereign’ power and ‘closed’ societies) that they have struggled to find adequate theoretical responses to the powerful new roles of non-state actors on the global stage. On the one hand, communitarians can tend to serve as political stalwarts for an increasingly obsolete statist world order, while on the other, cosmopolitan models are somewhat hampered by their commitment to the unrealistic goal of global constitutionalism. The ‘pluralist’ democratic model that I have proposed here has the advantage of transcending the limitations of both ‘communitarian’ statism and ‘cosmopolitan’ constitutionalism. It achieves this by developing conceptual and institutional alternatives which deal directly and systematically with the myriad non-state actors—as well as the states and global institutions—that exercise significant power in contemporary global politics. By so doing, this framework provides a theoretical basis for the progressive development of a new democratic reform agenda aimed at bringing greater democratic legitimacy to the exercise of global public power in all of its myriad institutional forms.
2 Public Power Beyond ‘Sovereign’ States 2.1. INTRODUCTION Claims about the democratic credentials of non-state actors such as NGOs— whether laudatory or derogatory—nearly always begin with some declaration about the scope of their power. Pronouncements about the power of NGOs in global politics are commonly framed in revolutionary language, characterizing the emerging power of NGOs as a significant challenge to the dominant power of states within global politics. In one widely cited passage, Lester Salamon described the rise of NGOs as a ‘global associational revolution’, evoking connotations of a non-governmental insurrection against the power of states. 1 Echoing this suggestion, Jessica Mathews claimed that in the face of the growing power of NGOs, ‘the steady concentration of power in the hands [of states that] began with the Peace of Westphalia, is over, at least for a while.’ 2 United Nations SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan has similarly compared the power of NGOs to that of the most powerful states, claiming that the global community of NGOs ‘has become the new Super-Power—the peoples determined to promote better standards of life in larger freedom’. 3 It makes good sense to preface a discussion of NGOs’ democratic legitimacy with a discussion of their power, because democratic norms (as I have argued) are rightly applied only to the political subject of ‘public power’. For this reason, any demands for the democratization of NGOs must begin by establishing that they exercise the kind of ‘public power’ that would warrant such democratic imperatives. In the following chapter, I demonstrate how myriad NGOs can indeed be seen to wield public power within the contemporary global political arena. But before doing so, I think it is helpful to say more to bolster my theoretical account of public power, by examining and refuting some plausible theoretical arguments in favour of the traditional view that public power is uniquely tied to the institutional properties of statehood. The arguments I present in this chapter are accordingly directed primarily to those sceptical readers who may at this point remain unconvinced of Chapter 1’s 1
Lester M. Salamon, ‘The Rise of the Nonprofit Sector’, Foreign Affairs, 73/4 (1994). Jessica Mathews, ‘Power Shift’, Foreign Affairs, Jan./Feb. (1997). 3 Kofi Annan, The Emerging Power of Civil Society, Text of Speech Delivered 14 July 1998 (United Nations, 1998 [cited February 2005]); available from http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1998/ 19980714.sgsm6638.html In this speech Annan refers to the community of NGOs as ‘global civil society’. 2
44
Public Power Beyond ‘Sovereign’ States
central claim about the independence of public power from institutions of ‘states’ or ‘sovereignty’. Readers who are already on board with this central theoretical proposition may find little in this chapter to advance the book’s argument, and may wish to skim quickly through it, straight on to the following chapter. However, I take it that my attempt to sever the concept of public power from the concepts of ‘state’ and ‘sovereignty’ is sufficiently subversive of widely held theoretical assumptions that some readers will not yet be convinced, on the basis of what I have said so far. There are several strands of argument, running through mainstream literatures in Political Theory and International Relations, which could be invoked to defend the traditional view that public power is necessarily linked in some way to institutional structures of statehood, or ‘sovereignty’; the material in this chapter represents my attempt to pre-empt and counter such arguments.
2.2. ASSESSING ARGUMENTS FOR STATE-BASED ACCOUNTS OF PUBLIC POWER The proposition that NGOs can exercise ‘public power’ may seem highly counterintuitive to some readers, who are accustomed to quite different traditions of thinking about the status of non-state actors within democratic societies. It is customary in mainstream liberal traditions to take for granted separations among different ‘spheres’ of society—most central of which is the separation of the ‘state’ (the locus of public power and authority) from ‘civil society’ (the locus of individual liberty and free association). As Michael Walzer argues, this division between state and civil society is a crucial partition within liberalism’s ‘world of walls’, which is a function of the liberal ‘art of separation’. 4 On this picture of the differentiated political roles within a liberal democracy, NGOs are identified as key players within the associational sphere of ‘civil society’, and thus precluded— effectively by definition—from a role in the exercise of ‘public’ power. More broadly, the conventional association between ‘public’ power and the state is deeply entrenched in the liberal theoretical worldview and taken for granted in much liberal analysis. Robert Wolff articulates the view of many liberals when he claims that ‘[p]olitics is the exercise of the power of the state, or the attempt to influence that exercise’, and consequently that political philosophy ‘must begin with the concept of the state’. 5 Even much liberal literature on ‘global governance’—a paradigm that explicitly ‘rejects the conventional statecentric conception of world politics and world order’ 6 —maintains a state-centric 4
Michael Walzer, ‘Liberalism and the Art of Separation’, Political Theory, 12/3 (1984), 315. Robert Wolff, ‘The Conflict Between Authority and Autonomy’, in Joseph Raz (ed.), Authority, Readings in Social and Political Theory (New York: New York University Press, 1990), 20. 6 Held and McGrew, ‘Introduction’, in David Held and Anthony McGrew (eds.), Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002), 9. 5
Public Power Beyond ‘Sovereign’ States
45
account of the distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ power. Writers in this literature commonly refer to the growing role of non-state actors in global governance as the ‘privatization’ of global ‘governance’ or global ‘authority’— terminology that maintains the association of ‘public’ with ‘state’, and ‘private’ with ‘non-state’. 7 The widespread association of the idea of ‘public power’ with the idea of the ‘state’ has the implication that public power is commonly assumed to entail a range of organizational characteristics linked to statehood. 8 There are three organizational characteristics of states that I suggest are especially strongly linked to the idea of public power in much theoretical writing. The first of these is the reliance upon law-making and law-enforcement as the central institutional vehicle for the exercise of power; the second is a capacity to use force or violent coercion to sustain the exercise of power; and the third is a centralized or ‘constitutionalized’ structure of power. In what follows I raise and challenge some plausible arguments in support of the common belief that power must exhibit one or more of these characteristics to qualify as ‘public’ power. In doing so, I hope to demonstrate that none of these organizational characteristics of statehood is in fact essential for the exercise of public power, and to reinforce the case for adopting the account of public power proposed in Chapter 1.
2.3. PUBLIC POWER AND THE INSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE OF LAW-MAKING One important set of liberal arguments that could be advanced to defend the link between state power and ‘public’ power involves the claim that there is something special (and uniquely ‘public’) about the first of the organizational characteristics of states I have identified: reliance upon law-making as the central institutional vehicle for the exercise of power. To clarify the way in which this organizational characteristic is distinct from the other two I will discuss (centralized power and the use of force), it is helpful to begin by emphasizing the difference between a focus on one particular theoretical account of law and law-making (one that 7 For an account of Held and McGrew’s use of this terminology, see Ibid. 10. See also articles by Mathias Koenig-Archibugi and Ngaire Woods in that volume. See also literature on what is sometimes referred to as ‘private authority’, which is the terminology used to refer to the authority (in the broad sense of legitimate power) of non-state actors in global politics. See A. Claire Cutler, Private Power and Global Authority: Transnational Merchant Law in the Global Political Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); A. Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler, and Tony Porter, Private Authority and International Affairs, Suny Series in Global Politics (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999); Rodney Bruce Hall and Thomas J. Biersteker, The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 8 All such organizational accounts of public power are clearly consistent with ‘liberal’ conceptions of public power, whereby public power is something exercised by particular kinds of agents over others. On these organizational accounts, agents that wield public power are distinguished from agents that do not by one of (or some combination of) these characteristics of their organizational form.
46
Public Power Beyond ‘Sovereign’ States
reflects the other two criteria of statehood I have distinguished), and a focus on law-making per se. The close association between statehood and law-making has had the implication that some prominent theoretical models of law and law-making have characterized law as something that is enforceable (ultimately) through the use of violent sanctions and made by a unified ‘sovereign’ agent. 9 In this way, such theories connect the idea of law-making, at a definitional level, with the other two characteristics of statehood that I discuss below—the use of force and centralized power. In the context of global politics, however, most now recognize that law-making is actually a pluralist process in which multiple political agents participate, and moreover that normative rules need not be enforceable by violence to constitute law. 10 By characterizing law without reference to violent sanction mechanisms or a unitary sovereign, ‘law’ and ‘law-making’ can be theorized on their own terms, independently from theories of the state. The practice of law-making can be characterized without reference to either unitary power structures or the use of force, insofar as it involves a distinct institutional framework for the exercise of power, with four key characteristics. First, the practice of law-making is distinguished from certain other methods of exercising power by virtue of its concern with rule-making (as distinct from social control through broader norms, markets, or material social architecture). 11 Second, the rules of law are binding, in the sense that they make legitimate demands upon individuals for compliance—a characteristic that they share with moral rules, but not with others such as rules of protocol. 12 Third, even among such normative forms of rule-making, law-making is a distinctive institutional practice (and can thus be distinguished from morality) insofar as it involves distinctive forms of 9 ‘Command’ theories of law, such as those espoused by John Austin, claim that law must emanate from a single ‘sovereign power’ capable of issuing a command, rather than from some ‘uncertain aggregate of persons’. See John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (London: J. Murray, 1832). Moreover, Austin and some later legal ‘positivists’ have argued that law requires enforcement through effective sanctions, such as the use of force, to generate compliance. See also Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (New York: Russell & Russell, 1961). 10 First, the structure of law-making in global politics is radically decentralized; as Cassese puts it, ‘[t]he relations between States comprising the international community remain largely horizontal. No vertical structure has as yet crystallized, as is instead the rule within the domestic systems of States.’ See Antonio Cassese, International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 5. Further, the criterion of force as the basis for international law, and for recognition as an authoritative actor within it, is no longer generally taken to require effective control. As Anthony D’Amato has argued, international law can be enforceable through other mechanisms, which he characterizes as ‘reciprocal entitlement violation’. See Anthony D’Amato, ‘Is International Law Really “Law”?’, Northwestern University Law Review, 79/5–6 (1985). 11 See Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane, ‘Introduction’, in Joseph S. Nye and John D. Donahue (eds.), Governance in a Globalizing World (Cambridge, MA, and Washington, DC: Visions of Governance for the 21st Century and Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 12, for a discussion of the distinctions among various forms of social control, of which rule-making is only one. 12 See Anthony Clark Arend, ‘Toward an Understanding of International Legal Rules’, in Robert J. Beck, Anthony C. Arend, and Robert D. Vander Lugt (eds.), International Rules: Approaches from International Law and International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), for a discussion of this point.
Public Power Beyond ‘Sovereign’ States
47
reasoning and normative argumentation. As Kratochwil puts it, law can be understood as ‘a choice-process characterized by the principled nature of the norm-use in arriving at a decision’, such that the distinctive mode of norm-use constitutes ‘legal reasoning as a particular “style” of practical reasoning’. 13 Finally, the practice of law-making must be characterized with respect to not only the specific contents of the reasoning styles that can be deployed but also the specific social contexts in which this deployment can effectively occur. The distinct styles of argumentation through which law is constituted are not equally accessible to all social actors in all social contexts; rather, international legal discourse incorporates some stipulations with respect to how particular agents can gain recognition in the process of legal argumentation. Legal theorists of different schools give differing accounts of these: Hart characterizes these stipulations as ‘secondary rules’ of a legal system, 14 while McDougal and Lasswell point to the particular role of ‘specialized organs’ within social processes of law-making—specialized institutions that have been developed for the specific purpose of performing legal decision-making tasks. 15 In domestic legal systems, these institutions include legislative and judicial institutions; in global politics, the primary institutions are intergovernmental forums of various kinds, while other international organizations, courts, and agencies can play secondary and subsidiary roles. 16 With this understanding of the institutional practice of law-making in mind, we can recognize how law-making capacity is identified in much liberal literature as a definitive element of ‘public’ power. The suggestion is that power only qualifies as public power if it is exercised through the creation and enforcement of laws. On this view, power exercised through other mechanisms—including ad hoc 13 Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 18–19. 14 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Clarendon Law Series (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961). 15 Myres S. McDougal and Harold D. Lasswell, ‘The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order’, American Journal of International Law, 53 (1959), 10. See also Myres Smith McDougal, Studies in World Public Order (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960); Myres Smith McDougal and Florentino P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order: The Legal Regulation of International Coercion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961). 16 Intergovernmental institutions remain the key sites of international law-making because agreement among states (through treaties and custom) remains the key source of international law. Unilateral actions and declarations of states, certain judicial decisions and decisions by international organizations, and ‘general principles’ of international law can also play important roles. A wider range of institutions play a role in the formation of ‘soft law’—a ‘body of standards, commitments, joint statements, or declarations of policy or intention’, which do not impose legally binding obligations but nonetheless shape common guidelines and policies, and can gradually ‘harden’ into legally binding customary rules or treaty provisions. See Cassese, International Law, 117–61, for a discussion of the various institutions recognized within legal discourse as valid ‘sources’ of international law. See also Vaughan Lowe, ‘The Politics of Law-Making: Are the Method and Character of Norm Creation Changing?’, in Michael Byers (ed.), The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), for a discussion of the role of ‘interstitial norms’—which ‘direct the manner in which competing or conflicting norms that do have their own normativity should interact in practice’—in international law, and the distinct institutional processes through which they are developed.
48
Public Power Beyond ‘Sovereign’ States
directives, non-legal rules, economic incentives, and social infrastructure—would not qualify as ‘public’. The prevalence of this view is reflected in the fact that the idea of public power is commonly used interchangeably with that of ‘authority’— a term that is predominantly defined with reference to some idealized theoretical model of law-making. Definitions of ‘authority’, such as that provided by Joseph Raz, generally denote a form of power that is exercised through issuing rules that generate an obligation to obey—a form of power that is a key constitutive element of the institutional practice of law-making. 17 As Raz puts it, [t]he exercise of coercive or of any other form of power is no exercise of authority unless it includes an appeal to compliance by the person(s) subject to the authority. This is why authority is typically exercised by giving instructions of one kind or another. 18
In this book, I use the term ‘public power’ rather than ‘authority’ to avoid these legalistic connotations that the latter term has acquired. Nonetheless, it is helpful to highlight the semantic connection between these terms, since this clearly illustrates the deeper theoretical associations between law-making and public power that are commonly assumed. The proposition that law-making capacity is essential for the exercise of public power has some intuitive plausibility, insofar as it captures most instances of what we call ‘public’ power in the context of states. We do usually characterize all instances of law-making as ‘public’ power; moreover, within democratic states there are few instances of public power that do not involve law-making, since state power (generally taken as paradigmatically ‘public’) is exercised nearly exclusively through legal apparatus. This is true even of forms of state power that are exercised through control of public infrastructure (such as roads) via decisions about financial expenditure, which do not directly involve issuing rules in the way we commonly think of these (such as criminal laws proscribing certain behaviours by individuals). It is true even of such examples as these, for two reasons: first, public funding is commonly obtained through compulsory payment of taxes, as dictated by law; and second, government budgets and expenditure programmes require legislative authorization. However, establishing a contingent empirical correlation between law-making and public power in the context of state-based democracy is not enough to show that there is any necessary theoretical correlation. That is, identifying a correlation in the context of the state does not establish that there are good normative reasons for connecting the idea of public power to the capacity for law-making in global politics. We must therefore consider further: can we identify any convincing normative arguments for maintaining this connection in the global political domain? I can think of two plausible arguments that could be advanced for claiming that law-making capacity is essential for the exercise of ‘public’ power in any 17 A notable exception to this is the definition of authority provided by Robert Ladenson, which excludes reference to the obligation to obey. See Robert Ladenson, ‘In Defense of a Hobbesian Conception of Law’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 9/2 (1980). 18 Joseph Raz, ‘Authority and Justification’, in Raz (ed.), Authority, 116.
Public Power Beyond ‘Sovereign’ States
49
democratic polity. First, it could be argued that law applies to all equally within a polity (at least formally), and in doing so it satisfies some egalitarian conception of ‘publicity’. While some non-legal forms of public control can operate in more uneven, partial, and ad hoc ways between and among various agents within a political community, laws formally apply equally to, and require equal compliance from, all members of some designated political community. For this reason, it seems to make at least semantic sense to refer to law-making power as ‘public’ in a way that more ad hoc forms of power, which impact unevenly upon members of some designated community, are not. Moreover, a normative argument could be made, in support of this semantic connection, that democratic principles (based in part upon the value of equality) can only be coherently applied to power structures that themselves apply equally to all. If the power structure that is the subject of democratic control does not apply equally to all, then it could plausibly be argued that the democratic control of these structures would fail to result in an equal democratic society (which some people may take to be the ultimate goal of democracy). Accordingly, it could be argued, only power that is ‘public’ in the sense of impacting equally upon all can be the rightful target of democratization. There are two points to make in response to this argument. First, even if we were to accept both the general normative claim that public power must be inclusive in the sense of impacting equally upon all within a society and the further proposition that all law-making satisfies this standard of equal impact, it would still not follow that law-making is the only kind of power that can have equal social impact in this way. Rather, it remains a theoretical possibility that there are some forms of non-state power that have as equal an impact upon the various individuals within a population as any legislation. Moreover, we can find many empirical examples in practice of ‘public’ programmes and infrastructures—such as a public roadway system of the kind alluded to in a previous example—that can impact equally upon all, irrespective of whether the power to undertake them has been conferred through a legislative process or through some non-governmental organizational channels. My second response to this argument is simply to reject the normative claim that public power must be inclusive in the sense of impacting equally upon all within a society, since this claim is based on a mistaken view of the requirements of democratic equality. As I argued in Chapter 1 (and argue further in Chapter 4), a commitment to the democratic value of equality in a pluralist global order does not require public power to be constitutionally structured, in such a way that it impacts equally upon all individuals. Rather, a commitment to democratic equality requires only that public power is structured in accordance with a normative account of responsibility (for protecting others’ autonomy) which treats all individuals in a given democratic context with equal concern. This difference is significant: whereas a law-based framework of public power treats all individuals equally at the institutional level of applying the same prescriptive rules to all, a pluralist framework demands equality only at the more abstract level of normative justification. As such, a pluralist framework allows for the institutional
50
Public Power Beyond ‘Sovereign’ States
possibility that a structure of public power will create different sets of constraints and opportunities for different individuals that are subject to it (in circumstances where doing so does not violate the justificatory requirement of equal concern). If we accept my broader normative claim about the role played by the value of equality in structuring a framework of democratic public power, the equalitybased argument for linking the concept of public power to law-making capacity will be unconvincing. Another plausible argument for seeing law-making as an essential organizational characteristic of public power involves the proposition that law-making constrains the autonomy of those subject to it in some uniquely problematic way, and so is uniquely in need of democratic legitimation. Robert Wolff seems to suggest something along these lines, by arguing that since law-making authority is ‘the right to rule’ and autonomy is ‘the refusal to be ruled’, authority and autonomy are irreconcilably in conflict. 19 The problem with this argument, however, is that even if we accept that law-making does constrain the autonomy of those subject to it in the special way that generates a demand for democratic legitimation, it does not follow that legal instructions must be the only forms of power that constrain autonomy in this special way. This is because social decisions and activities conducted through the vehicle of legislation, and those conducted outside of legislative institutions, can sometimes have wholly equivalent impacts on the autonomy of those subject to them. To take an example, we can consider two programmes of social expenditure that affect individual autonomy (say, expenditure on the construction of a public roadway determining patterns of mobility in the community), one of which is performed by a state agent through the vehicle of legislation, and the other performed by a non-state actor outside the legislative process. We can assume, to avoid the introduction of complicating factors, that both programmes have the same funding source (say, an aid donation from some third party—to a state government in the first instance and to an NGO in the second). If both of these expenditure programmes were to have equivalent impact on the autonomy of those affected, an autonomy-based argument could provide no basis for designating the legislatively enacted programme as ‘public’ power (in need of democratic legitimation) and the non-state programme as ‘private’, and unproblematic from a democratic perspective. This suggests that although practices of law-making generally satisfy an autonomy-based criterion for delineating public power, non-legislative forms of power can also satisfy this criterion, and so the organizational characteristic of law-making is not in itself a criterion for public power. We can conclude here, then, that the organizational characteristic of law-making capacity has no special ‘public’ political status, and embodies no grounds for resisting the more general criterion of public power that I presented in Chapter 1. 19
Robert Wolff, in Raz (ed.), Authority, 29.
Public Power Beyond ‘Sovereign’ States
51
2.4. PUBLIC POWER AND THE USE OF FORCE The next set of liberal arguments that could be advanced to defend the link between state power and ‘public’ power involves the claim that there is something special (and uniquely ‘public’) about the second of the organizational characteristics of states I have identified: the capacity for force or violent coercion. The state is commonly defined, at least in part, according to the Weberian criterion of holding a monopoly of (legitimate) violence within a territory. 20 This is reflected in traditional accounts of ‘sovereign’ authority in international law. An historically important idea in international law has been that a political agent must exercise ‘effective’ control over a territory in order to qualify for the status of ‘statehood’ or ‘sovereignty’, which has been achieved nearly invariably (though not necessarily exclusively) through the effective use of force. 21 Correspondingly, it is sometimes thought that only power undergirded by capacities for force and violent coercion can qualify as ‘public’, insofar as it is ‘sovereign’ states of this kind that are identified as the appropriate targets for democratization. Even if the ‘monopoly’ element of this account of public power were to be abandoned, as I argue below in my defence of institutional pluralism that it should be (and if judgements about legitimacy were also set aside on the grounds that such judgements, at this stage of the analysis, would beg the democratic question), the use or threat of force could still remain as an essential organizational characteristic of ‘public’ power. As Elizabeth Anscombe articulates a version of this belief, ‘government is distinguished from authority in voluntary cooperative enterprises by “bearing the sword”, by its exercise, actual and threatened, of coercive force.’ 22 The suggestion here is that only power undergirded by the use of force or violent coercion requires democratic legitimation as ‘public’ power, while power undergirded by other, non-violent, social capacities should be regarded as ‘private’. At an intuitive level it seems plausible to link public power to the use of force in this way, since we do generally think that the use of violence to secure power requires democratic legitimation. But what liberal argument could be advanced in support of the designation of violent coercion as uniquely ‘public’? The most plausible such argument I can think of involves the claim that violence of any kind violates individuals’ autonomy in some special way, and so warrants special 20 See Max Weber, ‘Politics as Vocation’, in Max Weber, Peter Lassman, and Ronald Speirs (eds.), Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 21 For a discussion of the traditional requirement of ‘effectiveness’ and force in securing authoritative status under international law, see Cassese, International Law, 12–13. 22 Elizabeth Anscombe, ‘On the Source of the Authority of the State’, in Raz (ed.), Authority, 144. In this article, Anscombe is not seeking to give an account of public power, but rather one of ‘authority’, accordingly, she further argues that government must administer a system of justice to qualify as authoritative. The issue I am concerned with here, though, is not the legitimacy component of ‘authority’, but only the power component—and so the relevant point here is that the kind of ‘public’ power, for which she seeks this special form of legitimation, is that of force and violent coercion.
52
Public Power Beyond ‘Sovereign’ States
democratic legitimation for this reason. However, although the use or threat of violence is certainly a prime example of autonomy-constraining power, there seems no reason for thinking that it is the only kind of power that imposes problematic constraints upon individuals’ autonomy. On the contrary, most of us would readily accept that other (non-violent) forms of coercion, such as those involving the exploitation of an agent’s material deprivation, can restrict individuals’ autonomy in ways that are just as problematic. A starving person forced into the servitude of another to secure essential supplies of food, or a sick person forced into servitude to secure supplies of life-saving medicines, is hardly more autonomous than someone who is forced into servitude at the barrel of a gun. But if we are willing to accept the normative equivalence of these kinds of constraints upon individual autonomy, it follows that power wielded through these latter forms of coercion has just as great a need for democratic legitimation as does power wielded through the threat or use of violence. In other words, we could not conclude that the use of force is necessary for the exercise of public power; rather, that it is an instance of power that generally satisfies a broader autonomy-based criterion for identifying public power, of the kind outlined in Chapter 1. But the fact that the violent coercion exercised by states generally qualifies as ‘public’ power does not preclude non-violent forms of power (wielded by both state and non-state actors) from similarly qualifying as ‘public’.
2.5. PUBLIC POWER AND CENTRALIZED OR ‘CONSTITUTIONALIZED’ DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURES The final set of liberal arguments that could be advanced to defend the link between state power and ‘public’ power involves the claim that there is something special (and uniquely ‘public’) about the third of the organizational characteristics of states I have identified: centralized or ‘constitutionalized’ structures of political decision-making agency. The ideas of ‘centralized’ and ‘constitutionalized’ power are closely related insofar as both are concerned with the implications of the underlying structures that constitute political agency. The idea of ‘centralized’ power is more specific, however, since it entails not only that the power in question is constitutionally structured but also that these structures concentrate power within a single decision-making agency. Here I want to examine arguments for linking the idea of ‘public’ power both to this specific organizational form of constitutionalized power and to constitutionally structured power more broadly. This discussion is of course related to what I have already said about the role of constitutional structures of public power within the democratic project, but adds a new dimension to my analysis of the issue. In Chapter 1, I presented some arguments for rejecting the claim that a structure of power must be constitutionalized to qualify as ‘public’, but the arguments presented there were wholly pragmatic
Public Power Beyond ‘Sovereign’ States
53
in nature, and based on acceptance of a ‘realist’ philosophical orientation to the democratic project. Here, I want to consider some more ideal-theoretical arguments that could be advanced in support of insisting on the traditional connection between ‘public’ and ‘constitutionalized’ forms of power. First, let us consider what arguments might be advanced for the view that ‘public’ power must involve centralized power, whereby the power that is exercised over a society of individuals emanates ultimately from an institutionally unified agency of some kind. This characteristic of statehood is strongly linked to the traditional idea of ‘sovereignty’. 23 Such unitary power, which was once conceptualized as emanating from a single individual ‘sovereign’, is now more commonly linked to the agency of the ‘sovereign’ state. The agency of the state can be characterized as ‘unitary’ insofar as the authority structures linking the many individuals that comprise it are centralized through hierarchical relationships, which tie decisionmaking actors at the ‘centre’ to other social actors within this structure. What normative reasons could be presented for claiming that power emanating from a unified agency of this kind is uniquely ‘public’, and in special need of democratic legitimation? Very few arguments are explicitly advanced for this claim; when such normative significance is attributed to political centralization, it is generally just assumed as axiomatic, through its association with the idea of the state and that of ‘sovereignty’. Nonetheless, there is a plausible argument that could be advanced for presenting institutional unification of this kind as being crucial to the ‘public’ character of political power. It could be argued that a single dominant or monopolistic political agent at the centre of a system of power is necessary to produce responsible political agency, capable of exercising the sort of deliberate and coordinated actions that could effectively be subject to democratic legitimation. Let me say more here about what I mean by the idea of responsible political agency. What I mean is that the power in question must be vested in organizational agents capable of producing outcomes based on intentional decisions (of the kind for which they can be held responsible), rather than distributed through diffuse social structures that are incapable of deliberate and responsible action. Without the ability to take responsibility for actions and their outcomes, a collective organizational entity cannot be expected to engage with and respond to the democratic demands of those subject to its power, and therefore cannot exercise the kind of ‘public’ power that we can reasonably seek to hold democratically accountable. 24 This is true at least if we accept that ‘ought implies can’, and that we 23
As I established earlier, ‘command’ theories of law claim that law must emanate from a single ‘sovereign power’ capable of issuing a command. For a broader discussion of the evolution and transformation of the unitary conception of sovereignty, see Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). David Held has attempted to delink the conception of sovereignty from this unitary model, though this use of the idea of ‘sovereignty’ is somewhat unconventional in the literature. See David Held, ‘Law of States, Law of Peoples’, Legal Theory, 8 (2002). 24 I discuss the importance of responsible agency to democratic accountability in greater depth in Chapter 7.
54
Public Power Beyond ‘Sovereign’ States
cannot coherently apply democratic standards to those agents that are empirically incapable of meeting them. (It is, I would suggest, precisely this criterion that distinguishes an ‘NGO’ from a ‘social movement’, and explains why the former can reasonably be subject to demands for democratic legitimation within a liberal framework, while the latter cannot.) To exercise responsible agency of the kind that can feasibly be held democratically accountable, collective entities must have capacities to comprehend and engage in communication with other social actors, in order to formulate collective purposes guiding their organizational activity, and to take coordinated strategic action in pursuit of these purposes. A case could therefore be made for seeing the organizational characteristic of unified power as essential for the exercise of ‘public’ power, by advancing some empirical argument demonstrating that responsible agency, of the kind I have described, can only be achieved via a centralized structure of power. What empirical arguments of this kind could be found to advance such a proposition? First, it could be argued—in a manner akin to some ‘Hobbesian’ or ‘Realist’ writers in International Relations theory—that all political agents are motivated by the pursuit of self-interest, and so multipolar systems inevitably result in conflict rather than responsible political rule. By adopting such a Realist view, it could be argued that only unipolar systems (systems in which some unitary agent of power enjoys political supremacy) can achieve responsible political rule. In contrast, it could be argued that the pluralistic global domain is a system of anarchy whereby no agent has the kind of political supremacy that would enable it to exercise responsible power. Without a system of centralized power, the pluralistic domain of global politics would as such inevitably remain a Hobbesian state of perpetual war. Realists commonly argue that empires or ‘hegemony’ can moderate this state of conflict and achieve some responsible rule in global politics, since they restore some degree of political monopoly, but nonetheless it could be argued from this perspective that responsible rule can never be achieved in a genuinely multipolar—or ‘pluralist’—global order. 25 It certainly seems true that an organizational structure with some degree of centralization and hierarchy would provide an effective way of facilitating the kind of communicative engagement and purposive activity that are necessary for responsible agency, since it would provide a collective entity with the requisite ability to coordinate decision-making and action. But the issue here is whether the centralization of power is the only way to achieve such responsible political 25
Although all realists deny the possibility of responsible political rule in a multipolar global order, some do claim that the more limited goal of ‘stability’ can be achieved in multipolar orders. See Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Addison-Wesley, McGraw-Hill, 1979). However, the goal of responsible political rule, which is my focus here, is more extensive and demanding than the Waltz’s notion of ‘stability’. The idea of responsible rule that I am concerned with here does, however, have more in common with notions of ‘stability’ advanced by some ‘hegemonic stability’ theorists, such as Robert Gilpin. See Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 1st Paperback edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
Public Power Beyond ‘Sovereign’ States
55
agency. A range of arguments advanced in liberal institutionalist and constructivist International Relations literature on the concept of ‘global governance’ can be invoked to argue that the construction of a centralized political agency is not the only way to achieve such responsible agency. First, ‘liberal institutionalist’ arguments point to an alternative way in which responsible social decision-making and action can be achieved: through the establishment of various systems of rules and regimes that harness the harmonies of interest among the multiple actors in an interdependent global order. On this liberal account, the decentralization of power in a system only precludes purposive collective political action (and thus responsible collective political agency) if there are no institutions to coordinate the mutually beneficial cooperative activities of social actors. 26 In the absence of centralized state-like power structures, it follows that responsible social decision-making and action in global politics can be achieved instead through instituting a range of coordinating rules and processes, commonly described as global ‘governance’. 27 The so-called ‘constructivist’ theorists of global governance reinforce these liberal arguments by documenting how coordinated social decision-making and action can also be achieved in the absence of centralized power through the operation of shared norms, values, and identities of various kinds. 28 In sum, liberal institutionalist and constructivist arguments suggest that systems of rules, institutional processes, and norms can serve as the functional equivalent of a centralized structure of public power, by regulating and constituting individual decisions in such a way as to facilitate responsible collective decision-making and action within the group. 29 26 See Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Stephen D. Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). 27 James Rosenau defines ‘governance’ as ‘systems of rule, as the purposive activities of any collectivity that sustain mechanisms designed to insure its safety, prosperity, coherence, stability, and continuance’. See James N. Rosenau, ‘Change, Complexity and Governance in a Globalizing Space’, in Jon Pierre (ed.), Debating Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 171. Also see James N. Rosenau, ‘Governance in the 21st Century’, Global Governance, 1 (1995). For extensive discussion of the infrastructure of ‘global governance’, see Held and McGrew (eds.), Governing Globalization. 28 See, for example, John Gerald Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization (New York: Routledge, 1998); Friedrich V. Kratochwil and John Gerald Ruggie, ‘International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State’, International Organization, 40/4 (1986); Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, International Organization, 46/2 (1992); Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, International Organization, 52/4 (1998); Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, ‘The Politics, Power and Pathologies of International Organizations’, International Organization, 53/4 (1999); Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.), The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 29 On this account, the question would still remain of where these rules, processes, and norms themselves come from, and which actors exercise public power in determining them. I address this question in more depth in the following chapter with some illustrations of forms of norm-building power exercised by NGOs.
56
Public Power Beyond ‘Sovereign’ States
But even once we have set aside these ‘Realist’ arguments linking institutional centralization to responsible political agency in the sense I have described so far, it could be argued further that centralized power is necessary for ‘responsible’ agency in another important sense. If a political agent is to be effectively subjected to democratic control it does not merely need to be responsible in the sense of having the capacity to formulate and act intentionally in pursuit of goals, it must also be responsible in the sense that it is possible for other social actors to hold it responsible. What this means is that it must be possible for other social actors to identify the key range of political actions the agent undertakes, and trace the key political impacts which result from these actions. Following from this, it could be argued that although the ‘global governance’ literature demonstrates that a pluralist order can generate responsible political agency in the primary sense, it does not show so clearly how responsibility for specific social outcomes produced through particular governance institutions can be attributed to specific agents within these collective institutions, such that they can be held responsible for these outcomes via institutions of democratic control. The problem here is that the multiplicity of actors participating in processes of global ‘governance’ may produce a vacuum of responsibility in this latter sense, since nobody is sure which agent or agents caused any given outcomes. 30 It is not usually difficult to establish in general terms when political power is being wielded through governance structures. As a number of writers have argued, many— if not most—existing structures of ‘global governance’ are ‘distorted’ by power relationships, in the sense that they ‘[promote] the interests of the most powerful states and global social forces’, as a result of vast asymmetries of power among social actors. 31 In many cases it will be possible to identify the politically dominant actors within governance structures, and we would presumably say that these dominant actors should be attributed more responsibility than other participants for the outcomes produced by these structures. But it is one thing to recognize that certain actors are ‘dominant’ in general terms, and another—much more difficult—task to trace the particular responsibilities of these powerful actors, for specific political outcomes in specific governance contexts. This problem is certainly significant, and it may well be that there are many instances in which centralization is the best way of ensuring that responsibility can be allocated to specific agents for specific political outcomes, such that it is possible to hold decision-makers responsible for these outcomes. However, there are grounds for thinking that this will not be true all of the time, and that there 30
Criticisms of this kind are sometimes made about forms of ‘network governance’ in global politics. See, for example, Michael Zürn, ‘Global Governance and Legitimacy Problems’, Government and Opposition, 39/2 (2004). 31 David Held and Anthony McGrew, ‘Introduction’, in Held and McGrew (eds.), Governing Globalization, 13. See also Philip Cerny, ‘Globalization, Governance and Complexity’, in Aseem Prakash and Jeffrey A. Hart (eds.), Globalization and Governance (London: Routledge, 1999); Hurrell, ‘Global Inequality and International Institutions’, in Thomas Pogge (ed.), Global Justice (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001); Craig Murphy, ‘Global Governance: Poorly Done and Poorly Understood’, International Affairs, 76/4 (2000); Cutler, Haufler, and Porter, Private Authority and International Affairs.
Public Power Beyond ‘Sovereign’ States
57
are still many cases in which such responsible agency can be identified in the absence of centralized political structures. Most straightforwardly, there are many instances of multilateral interstate institutions in which the responsibilities of particular state participants can be quite easily identified. Sometimes this is because the responsibilities of each state are formally assigned and entrenched within the organizational apparatus, and sometimes it is because the power dynamics of interstate politicking are sufficiently transparent to enable tracing of the informal decision-making processes leading to outcomes. It is also commonly possible to trace in similar ways the roles of particular non-state actors in governance processes—either because their roles and responsibilities are formally codified in some way or because their activities are sufficiently stable and transparent to expose the scope of their influence upon (and thus responsibility for) outcomes. (I will discuss many concrete examples of such non-state power in the following chapter.) On the basis of these considerations, we can conclude that a centralized structure of power is not necessary to generate responsible political agency, in either of the senses I have discussed, since many forms of such responsible political agency can be identified within the existing pluralist global political order. However, these considerations also point us towards the recognition that many other political outcomes within a pluralist political order are not generated through responsible political agency of the kind that can be held to democratic account. So although we do not need to go as far as centralizing political decision-making powers, the pluralist global order in its present institutional configuration does not generate as much responsible political agency as would be optimal for the establishment of effective democratic control. If we look more closely at the institutional contexts in which examples of responsible political agency do arise in the contemporary pluralist order, we can identify an alternative set of institutional characteristics (distinct from centralization) which appear to be important in generating responsible agency of the kinds I have discussed. First, political roles in the exercise of power must have some fair degree of institutional stability if it is to be practical to identify them as ‘public’ and subject them to democratic control. Social actors can sometimes generate significant and problematic political impacts through haphazard or ‘oneoff ’ decisions or actions, but it will not be feasible or productive to subject these instances of power to democratic control if the agents in question do not engage in political actions of these kinds in a reasonably ongoing fashion, in a reasonably predictable way. One key reason for this is that institutions of democratic control—both ‘social choice’ institutions for collective stakeholder decision-making and ‘representative’ structures of authorization and accountability—take time to establish effectively, and work best as means for controlling political decision-makers wielding power over a longer time frame. For example, a wealthy individual could make a decision to donate her entire fortune to some philanthropic project with significant political impact, of the kind that we would usually seek to subject to democratic control—such as some major infrastructure project. But it would not be
58
Public Power Beyond ‘Sovereign’ States
appropriate to designate this individual as an agent of ‘public’ power despite this impact, given that the individual would possess no ongoing capacity for the exercise of public power. Once her fortune had been spent in this one-off act, her capacity for future actions with similar impact would be eliminated, so by the time effective institutions of democratic control could be established in response to the exercise of power it would be too late for these institutions to wield control over any significant political outcomes. Another reason it is important that those wielding power do so in a reasonably stable and institutionalized fashion is that stability of political roles will generally make it much easier for others to trace and identify the political impacts generated by particular agents’ actions, which is a necessary pre-requisite for holding political agents responsible. To put this in more general terms, institutional stability of political roles can contribute to a second institutional characteristic essential for responsible political agency: transparency of political roles within the institutional structure—that is, the availability and accessibility of information about the kinds of political actions undertaken by particular actors, and the kinds of political impacts these actions generate. Some degree of institutional stability is an important pre-requisite for establishing transparency of political roles, but such transparency can be promoted also through other means. One important means is the formal codification of the political roles and responsibilities of particular actors. Sometimes codification can take the form of formal legal instruments (such as those establishing the institutional capacities and roles of an International Organization), and sometimes it can take more informal forms (such as Charters, Codes of Conduct, Organizational Goals of the kind adopted by some NGOs and corporations). Broader forms of organizational transparency—documenting not only generalized roles but also the nature and impact of specific decisions and actions—can also play an important role in identifying appropriate targets for democratic control. Institutions that provide social recognition of these organizational roles and responsibilities (such as codes of conduct for organizations formulated and monitored by external social actors—like corporate codes maintained by NGOs and governments) can also generate ‘external recognition’ of political roles, and further enhance their transparency. 32 In sum, all institutional mechanisms focused on clarifying and making available information about the roles and responsibilities of particular political actors can play an important role in establishing the pre-conditions for instituting democratic control, and thus instituting forms of political agency that are ‘public’ in appropriate ways. The recognition that these various organizational characteristics are important to the kind of ‘public’ power amenable to effective democratic control does not support the claim that public power must be centralized in structure, as I have said; however, it does lend some credence to the suggestion that a constitutionalized 32 The claim that ‘external recognition’ of political roles is important to the status of ‘public’ political agency mirrors the familiar idea that ‘external recognition’—alongside ‘effective control’— is a key constitutive element of ‘sovereignty’—a prominent institutional form of public power.
Public Power Beyond ‘Sovereign’ States
59
structure of power, more broadly conceived, may be helpful in generating responsible political agency. A constitutionalized structure of power may be helpful in generating responsible political agency insofar as it can help to stabilize and codify political roles and responsibilities, and thus generate the kind of recognition and transparency of political roles and impacts that I have explained is important for responsible agency. The more stable and formally codified a structure of power, and the more entrenched the broader institutions of social recognition surrounding it, the easier it will be to attribute responsibility for the political impacts generated by the agencies constituted through it. Correspondingly, the easier it will be to identify these political agencies as ‘public’, and subject them to democratic control. Insofar as a project of political constitution-building seeks explicitly to achieve the task of increasing the stability, clarity, and recognition of roles and responsibilities within a political structure, it is undoubtedly true that building a constitutionalized structure of public power would be a highly effective way of instituting responsible political agency. Nonetheless, it is not obvious that the required degrees of institutional stability, and of codification and social recognition of political roles, would be sufficient to constitute a fully constitutionalized structure of public power. In other words, while constitutionalization might be a clear and effective way of generating these institutional characteristics, it is not obvious that we need to take the development of these characteristics as far as to constitute ‘constitutionalization’, if our goal is only to achieve the degree of responsible agency necessary to facilitate effective democratic control. The question of exactly what degrees of institutional stability and codification and social recognition of political roles are needed for democratic control is one that I cannot answer with any precision here. Here I want only to make the broader theoretical observation that it is possible to achieve responsible political agency within a fundamentally pluralist political structure, so long as the pluralist structure demonstrates enough of the other institutional characteristics that I have identified. What are the implications of this, then, for the account of public power I presented in Chapter 1? My account there of what it is that makes power ‘public’ is focused exclusively on the impact of power (and not at all on its organizational structure), so the question arises: do the concessions I have made here to the importance of certain organizational characteristics point to the need to amend my account of public power, to incorporate this organizational dimension? I do not think that my account of public power does need to be amended in this way, given the analytic purpose my theoretical model is intended to serve. The account of public power I presented in Chapter 1 was focused on articulating the normative considerations that should be at play in the delineation of public forms of power. Nothing that I have said here about organizational structure undermines the basic point that there is a normative imperative to subject all forms of power to democratic control when they have the right kind of impact on the autonomous capacities of groups of individuals. Rather, the issues I have raised here are concerned with the practical limitations on efforts to subject power to democratic control. What I have said here recognizes that although there
60
Public Power Beyond ‘Sovereign’ States
might be good democratic reasons to want to control all instances of autonomyconstraining power, it will not always be possible to do so; rather, it will likely be possible to do so only when the power in question is structured in appropriate ways. But I do not want to incorporate these practical organizational requirements into my definition of public power, because I think that to do so would undercut the critical utility of my theoretical model. That is, it would direct theoretical and reformist energies away from the task of developing innovative institutional means of subjecting the fullest possible range of political actors (with public impacts in the primary normative sense) to effective democratic control. If we were to think of the institutional characteristics I have identified here as definitional components of ‘public’ power (i.e. as elements of the subject of democratic control) this would imply that such institutional structures must already exist as pre-requisites for a project of democratization. Given the critical function that I would like the Stakeholder model to serve, I think it is more helpful instead to present the development of institutional characteristics of this kind as objectives of a project of democratization. This is because if we were to demand that political actors need already to wield power via fully stable and transparent structures in order to qualify as eligible candidates for democratization, then many highly tyrannical political agencies would be immediately off the democratic hook. It is characteristic of many political tyrannies that they try to conceal the full extent of their political powers and impacts, and the full range of strategies they employ to secure their political control; clandestine modes of political control can sometimes be helpful tools for political tyrants, since they can make the target of political reform more elusive and thus less vulnerable to oppositional political forces. As a result, I think it is more helpful to see these institutional characteristics as elements of an institutional framework for achieving democratic control of public power, rather than as elements of the institutional subject of democratic control— that is, as elements of public power itself. In line with this, I present these institutional components of responsible political agency later in this book as elements of institutional mechanisms of authorization and accountability, devised to bring public power under democratic control, rather than as elements of public power. But I should emphasize again that the decision to view these institutional characteristics in this way—as elements of authorization and accountability mechanisms, rather than as elements of a structure of public power—reflects a strategic calculation about the most effective strategy of advancing a project of global democratization, rather than any conceptual assessment of the democratic function of these institutional forms. It would be perfectly coherent, from a conceptual perspective, to view these institutional characteristics in either of the two ways I have indicated; there is no wholly conceptual answer to the question of where the line should be drawn between those institutional characteristics that constitute power as ‘public’ (i.e. as an appropriate target for democratization) and those institutional characteristics that invest power with democratic legitimacy (by subjecting it to effective democratic control). Rather, exactly where we choose to draw this line depends on how ‘realist’ we are in our orientation to the democratic project, and where along a progressive ‘realist’ path of democratic development we
Public Power Beyond ‘Sovereign’ States
61
judge ourselves to be situated in any given political context. The further advanced we are along this path the more it makes sense to talk of these characteristics as elements of ‘public’ power, and the less advanced the democratic project the more it makes sense to talk of them as elements of democratic control. My decision to view these institutional characteristics in the way I do therefore reflects both the ‘Realist’ orientation to the democratic project I defended in Chapter 1 and the empirical judgement that global democratization is still at a very embryonic stage.
2.6. CONCLUSIONS In this chapter, I have countered some plausible arguments for maintaining that there is a necessary connection between public power and the organizational characteristics of states or ‘sovereignty’, and defended the view that public power should be delineated in accordance with the impact-based criterion outlined in Chapter 1. This theoretical approach to thinking about public power has both normative and empirical advantages over traditional statist approaches. Delineating public power in accordance with this criterion has clearer normative foundations than traditional organizational accounts, and it also has clearer application to the myriad patterns and structures of political interaction and domination in global politics. As Andrew Hurrell argues, the current global institutional order is a ‘hybrid’ one ‘in which solidarist and cosmopolitan models of governance coexist, usually rather unhappily, with many aspects of the old Westphalian order’. 33 Insofar as power is exercised globally, on a centralized state-like model of the kind advocated by some cosmopolitan democrats, or insofar as it is exercised within discrete territorial states, the account of public power that I have given here can subsume them. But my autonomy-based account can also be applied to those more patchy and partial forms of power—exercised by and among non-state actors—which traditional organizational accounts of public power exclude from their purview. 33 Andrew Hurrell, ‘Global Inequality and International Institutions’, in Pogge (ed.), Global Justice, 41.
3 The Public Power of NGOs in Global Politics 3.1. INTRODUCTION In the previous chapter I developed and defended my claim that there is no reason in principle for thinking that only states can wield public power. Rather, nonstate actors such as NGOs should be identified as agents of public power when they impact, in autonomy-constraining ways, on some population of individuals. Having made this effort to bolster my theoretical arguments about public power against some likely objections, this chapter takes up the task of explaining how my account of public power might play out in practice. Here I draw on the impactbased theoretical criterion of public power presented in Chapter 1, to illustrate some of the ways in which NGOs can in fact be seen to exercise public power of this kind in contemporary global politics. In what follows I distinguish, and present some examples of, two key forms of ‘public power’ wielded by NGOs in contemporary global politics: influence in regulative social norm-building and the imposition of material constraints upon populations of individuals. The following analysis of NGOs’ public power is not intended to be precise or comprehensive; my aim is only to delineate a range of forms of public NGO power upon which we may wish to focus critical attention, as likely candidates for democratization. At a normative level, my account lacks precision insofar as the relevant normative standards (of valued individual autonomy and egalitarian responsibility for its protection) will necessarily be context-specific, and must be worked out politically in each context in which democratization is to be pursued. There is therefore no uniform or definitive interpretation of the normative criterion that I can invoke here to underpin a precise account of which forms of NGO power should count as ‘public’. Instead, my goal here is to draw on examples of NGO power that I think are underpinned by plausible interpretations of the relevant normative standards, around which I would expect there to be a fair deal of agreement in many political contexts. My account here of NGOs’ public power also lacks precision at an empirical level, insofar as it is beyond the scope of my analysis to conduct a rigorous assessment of the scope and impact of NGO power—although such empirical analysis would certainly deliver greater insight with respect to the range of specific empirical practices that would qualify as ‘public’. The more cursory analysis I present here does, nonetheless, serve to identify some prominent instances of
The Public Power of NGOs in Global Politics
63
NGO practices that are plausible candidates for identification as ‘public’ forms of power in the contemporary global domain.
3.2. PUBLIC POWER AND INFLUENCE IN REGULATIVE SOCIAL NORM-BUILDING The first important way in which individuals’ autonomous capacity to pursue their goals can be affected problematically is through the operation of regulative social norms that (directly or indirectly) proscribe specific activities. This form of public power not only encompasses power wielded through the traditional institutional instruments of law-making but also incorporates power wielded through non-legal regulative norms. While constructivists in International Relations theory have documented many ways in which regulative norms can be deployed to wield some form of ‘power’ in international politics, not all power of this broad kind will qualify as ‘public’. Such power will only qualify as public when the imposition of regulative norms impacts upon the autonomous capacities of a population in some problematic way. Whether the imposition of regulative norms satisfies this criterion will generally depend on the strength of the norms in question, and the severity of the psychological costs and social sanctions associated with violating them. 1 I suggest that it is possible in global politics to identify some norms that are strong enough to place significant and potentially problematic constraints on individuals’ capacities to pursue their goals. Of these, international legal norms and policy norms generated through the UN system would perhaps provide the clearest examples. 2 We can also find examples of norms generated through more informal non-state institutions—such as corporate codes of conduct established by non-state actors and imposed through effective advocacy—that can have a significant constraining effect on those actors subject to them. 3 I discuss some of these in more detail below. There are a few cases where the regulatory norms in question apply directly to individuals—as in the case of certain human rights norms pertaining to war crimes, for example. However, there are few examples of norms of this kind; more commonly, the subjects of international regulatory norms are collective agents 1 When I refer to ‘social sanctions’ here, I am excluding sanctions that involve the use of force or the deployment of material resources, since I deal with these later, as distinct forms of public power. 2 As I noted in the previous chapter, it is common to refer to ‘authoritative’ laws as wielding autonomy-constraining power over those individuals subject to them. 3 Again, it is important to stress that the constraints imposed through the weight of the norms themselves are not the only kind of constraints associated with the imposition of such strong norms. When these norms are enforced through force or economic sanctions, this imposes other constraints associated with the other two kinds of public power that I discuss elsewhere in this chapter. In this section, though, it is the constraints imposed through the weight of the norms alone—rather than the further constraints imposed through their violent or resource-based enforcement—that is the focus of my attention.
64
The Public Power of NGOs in Global Politics
such as states and corporations. In such instances, the autonomy of individuals can be affected indirectly, through flow-on effects of a state or corporation’s compliance with the norms. For example, the autonomy of some individuals may be problematically affected through a state’s compliance with certain formal environmental norms regulating fishing practices, if these norms prevent them from engaging in traditional fishing practices that they depend upon for their livelihood. Alternatively, the state’s compliance with liberal trade rules could have a similar impact upon such individuals, by subjecting them to forms of economic competition that make their traditional productive activities unprofitable. Similarly, the autonomy of some individuals may be problematically affected by a corporation’s compliance with labour-related norms regulating issues such as child labour, if this compliance results in their loss of livelihood, either through sackings or through the retreat of the corporation from operations within their community. 4 In order to relate the constraining impact of global norms to the exercise of public power, we must take the further step of linking the operation of norms to the actions of particular political actors. What role in the production and maintenance of regulative norms must a political agent have, then, to be attributed the ‘public power’ that is wielded through the impact of these norms? I propose that any political agent can be said to exercise public power if it plays some prominent and influential role in the processes of production and maintenance of autonomyconstraining regulative norms. It is crucial to recognize here that the standard of influence must be a relative one, such that an agent exercises public power if its influence over the process is significantly greater than that of other social actors that are subject to the norms. It is thus the asymmetry in the roles of different social agents in generating regulative norms that enables us to say that one agent exercises power over others through this norm-building process. How, then, can NGOs and other political agents exercise such significant influence within the processes through which strong global norms are produced and reproduced? Although this is not the place for a rigorous empirical analysis of these processes, it is possible here to point in general terms to certain processes of authoritative normative production and reproduction that are especially susceptible to significant influence by powerful elements within society, and so are especially likely to serve as institutional vehicles for the exercise of public power. One way in which certain political agents can exercise significant influence in these processes is by gaining privileged access to those institutional arenas that are designated as key sites for authoritative normative production. In many social and cultural contexts, various religious or educational institutions may provide examples of such key institutional sites for authoritative normative production. In global politics, I suggest that prominent instances of such sites include institutions of the UN system that are generative of ‘soft law’ of the kind outlined in Section 3.1, as well as some emerging non-governmental institutions that I discuss in more depth below. In situations where access to these institutions is distributed 4 See Institute of Development Studies, The Cost of Compliance: Global Standards for Small-Scale Firms and Workers (2003); available from http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/bookshop/briefs/Pb18.pdf
The Public Power of NGOs in Global Politics
65
with sufficient asymmetry—that is, when it is concentrated very strongly in the hands of a few, while others subject to the norms are largely denied access—then we can say that those who wield significant influence in these processes of norm production are exercising ‘public power’ over those who have minimal access to these productive processes. To what extent do NGOs exercise public power that is based on their privileged access to the authoritative institutional sites through which strong regulative norms in global politics are generated? In considering this question, it is crucial to distinguish clearly between such public norm-building power and private forms of power exercised by NGOs, which similarly operate by building norms in global politics. There is now an established body of literature highlighting the ways in which NGOs exercise power in global politics through various advocacy activities that succeed in influencing and transforming other actors’ ideas and values, and building social norms. 5 As Kathryn Sikkink argues, NGOs are sometimes very effective in the exercise of ‘soft’ or ‘communicative’ power: This may take the form of information politics, symbolic politics, accountability politics, or leverage politics. It may be relatively dull reports, or lively street protests, or private meetings, but in all cases, the stress is on changing discourses and practices. By creating new issues and placing them on international and national agendas, providing crucial information to actors, and most importantly by creating and publicizing new norms and discourses, transnational advocacy groups help restructure world politics. 6
Although such advocacy activities are undoubtedly important forms of NGO ‘power’, they often constitute private rather than public forms of power, for two reasons. First, some of the norms generated through advocacy work may not be strong enough, in terms of the regulative constraint they impose upon others, for us to consider them problematic from the point of view of individual autonomy. Second, in many advocacy contexts NGO activities do not enjoy the kind of privileged access that I have identified for norm-building activity to be problematic with respect to other individuals’ autonomy, rather, many of these wider normbuilding processes are open to a broad range of social actors on a more inclusive basis. Accordingly, when NGOs alter others’ preferences and build norms by presenting ideas and arguments at grassroots levels, through technological and institutional vehicles that are widely available to other political actors, the communicative power of NGOs should be seen as private power—residing in the sphere of ‘civil society’—rather than as the kind of power that should be subject to public democratic contestation and control. If effective NGO advocacy does not always satisfy the criterion for this kind of public power, what are the circumstances under which NGO activities do satisfy 5 See Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); Sanjeev Khagram, James V. Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.), Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks and Norms (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002). 6 Kathryn Sikkink, ‘Restructuring World Politics: The Limits and Asymmetries of Soft Power’, in Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink (eds.), Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks and Norms, 305–6.
66
The Public Power of NGOs in Global Politics
these conditions? I suggest here that they exercise this form of public power through privileged access to a range of International Organizations and other less formal institutional sites in which strong regulative norms—legal and non-legal— are produced in global politics. 7 One of the important ways in which NGOs exercise public power—and have potential to exercise it further, should certain proposed reforms be adopted—is by playing an influential role in the production of the international laws and key policy norms that are generated through the various International Organizations and interstate decision-making forums entailed in the UN system. At the centre of the formal relationship between the UN and NGOs is the consultative status accorded to NGOs within the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). 8 The participatory entitlements accorded to NGOs through this mechanism range from the minimal entitlements of access to agendas and observer status at a restricted range of meetings, to more substantial entitlements including the right to place items on the provisional agenda of the Council and of the Council’s subsidiary bodies, and the right to present statements to members of the Council or subsidiary bodies. 9 Most of the funds, agencies, and programmes within the wider UN system have also developed a wide range of mechanisms to work with NGOs, many of which are similar to the procedures and arrangements for ECOSOC consultative status. 10 Of particular note is the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), which is the first UN programme to include NGO representatives on its governing body as full participants, rather than simply as observers. 11 The International Labour Organization (ILO) also warrants special mention as the only tripartite institution within the UN system. Its constituents are state governments, employers’ organizations, and workers’ organizations, all three of which are represented on an equal footing within each of the ILO’s main bodies. Thus, the ILO fosters consultative relationships with NGOs representing employer and worker constituencies via their separate inclusion, as well as by inclusion of NGOs within national delegations. 12 NGOs can also gain accreditation to attend UN conferences and other occasional events, which facilitates considerable participation in informal sessions. 13 Within the WTO, the role of NGOs has developed separately and more restrictively, due to its recent evolution from a series of 7
It is important to note that I do not claim that NGOs play an influential role relative to all other political actors in the production of these key international norms. Such a claim would clearly be false, since states—as well as some other key actors—play far more significant roles than NGOs in the production of many international norms. All I claim here is that NGOs enjoy special roles and forms of access to these norm-making processes, which result in their role being influential relative to many other political actors who are excluded from participation in the production of these norms. The process through which these key international norms are generated is thus a pluralist one involving a range of actors who all exercise public power over excluded parties, at levels proportionate to their power in the process. 8 For details of these arrangements, see United Nations Secretary-General, Arrangements and Practices for the Interaction of Non-Governmental Organizations in All Activities of the United Nations System (United Nations, 1998 [cited February 2002]); available from http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/ docs98/kofi998.htm p. 1–2. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 5–10. 11 Ibid. 9. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 16–17.
The Public Power of NGOs in Global Politics
67
multilateral trade negotiations to a fully fledged institutional member of the UN system. 14 However, in 1996 the WTO General Council adopted new guidelines for NGO participation, and since then there have been significant moves towards enhanced NGO access. 15 This incremental progress towards greater NGO access within the various institutions in the UN system has not been smooth, and there has been pressure from several national delegations within these institutions to wind back some reforms. 16 At the same time, many NGOs and supportive national delegations are working to institute a broader range of formal mechanisms for NGO participation. 17 The rhetoric accompanying these proposals for greater NGO participation within the UN system has spoken of ‘partnership’ and ‘full participation’. Kofi Annan and his deputy, Louise Frechette, regularly referred to the need for a ‘partnership’ between the UN and ‘civil society’, 18 and Boutros Boutros-Ghali claimed that the United Nations is no longer ‘considered to be a forum of sovereign states alone’, as ‘[n]on-governmental organizations are now considered full participants in international life.’ 19 Despite this rhetoric, proposals for NGO participation do not extend to granting NGOs equal status with nation-states within the public decision-making processes of global institutions. Significantly, the monopoly of states on decision-making mechanisms such as votes and vetoes is not currently being challenged, and it is only in the deliberative aspects of decision-making that 14 For a comprehensive historical account of NGOs’ role in the WTO, see Steve Charnovitz, ‘Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the World Trade Organization’, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law, 17/1 (1996). 15 For details of these changes, see World Trade Organization, The WTO and Civil Society: Comments by the Director-General to US NGOs (2002 [cited February 2002]); available from http:// www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/ngospe_e.htm World Trade Organization, WTO and NGOs: Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations/Civil Society (2002 [cited February 2002]); available from http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/intro_e.htm 16 See Global Policy Forum, NGOs and the United Nations: Comments for the Report of the Secretary General (1999 [cited February 2002]); available from http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/ docs99/gpfrep.htm p. 4–5; James A. Paul, NGO Access at the UN (1999 [cited February 2002]); available from http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/analysis/jap-accs.htm 17 For discussions of various proposed reforms to increase the level and quality of NGO access to participation in decision-making, see Steve Charnovitz and J. Wickham, ‘Nongovernmental Organizations and the Original International Trade Regime’, 29/5 (1995); Charnovitz, ‘Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the World Trade Organization’; World Trade Organization, The WTO and Civil Society: Comments by the Director-General to US NGOs (cited 2002b); Global Policy Forum, NGOs and the United Nations: Comments for the Report of the Secretary General (cited); Commission on Global Governance, The Millennium Year and the Reform Process (1999 [cited February 2002]); available from www.cgg.ch/millenium.htm Peter Willetts, ‘Consultative Status for NGOs at the United Nations’, in Peter Willetts (ed.), The Conscience of the World: The Influence of NonGovernmental Organisations in the UN System (London: Hurst, 1996); United Nations SecretaryGeneral, Views of Member States, Members of the Specialized Agencies, Observers, Intergovernmental and Non-Governmental Organizations from All Regions on the Report of the Secretary-General on Arrangements and Practices for the Interaction of Non-Governmental Organizations in All Activities of the United Nations System (United Nations, 1999 [cited February 2002]); available from http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/docs99/kofi99.htm 18 See various speeches at: http://www.un.org (cited March 2005). 19 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, ‘We the Peoples: Building Peace’, paper presented at the UN Department of Public Information Forty-Seventh Annual Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations, New York, 20 September 1994.
68
The Public Power of NGOs in Global Politics
greater NGO participation is proposed. In the language commonly employed to describe their emerging role, it is proposed that NGOs should be given ‘a voice, but not a vote’ in decision-making within the UN system. Another important way in which NGOs exercise public power through normbuilding is via non-state institutional processes outside the UN system. There have been many initiatives in recent years by NGOs, often acting in collaboration with governments and other organizations, that have been devised to establish and monitor various social and environmental standards for corporations. Collaborative initiatives among multiple non-state (and sometimes also governmental) actors include a range of very different schemes such as AccountAbility1000, the Ethical Trading Initiative, the Fair Labor Association, the Global Alliance, the Global Compact, the Global Reporting Initiative, the International Forest Stewardship Council, and the Worker Rights Consortium. 20 Some prominent NGOs, such as Amnesty International and Social Accountability International, have also developed their own standards, which they seek to impose directly upon corporations. These include initiatives such as Amnesty International’s Human Rights Principles for Companies and Social Accountability International’s Social AccountAbility 8000 framework of labour standards. 21 These various initiatives—and the many others that have been developed in recent years—employ very different strategies in developing norms and imposing them upon individuals in global politics. Some of these regulatory processes involve the formulation and imposition of quite formal norms in the form of codes of conduct, while other processes entail quite emotive public advocacy campaigns, yielding broader and more emotionally grounded normative standards. In a detailed analysis of the forms of public power that may be entailed in each of these norm-building processes, it would be important to recognize and take account of these important empirical differences among them. For the purposes of the cursory analysis I am undertaking here, however, the non-state character of these various initiatives provides sufficient commonality to warrant examining them together. The norms developed and imposed through these non-state norm-building mechanisms can acquire special authoritative status, and thus impose some 20 For a detailed discussion and evaluation of some aspects of these multistakeholder initiatives, see Peter Utting, Regulating Business Via Multistakeholder Initiatives: A Preliminary Assessment (2001 [cited March 2005]); available from http://www.un-ngls.org/documents/publications.en/develop.dossier/ dd.07%20(csr)/Section%20II.pdf See also http://www.codesofconduct.org/interest.htm Simon Zadek, ‘The Future of Nongovernmental Organizations in a World of Civil Corporations’, in David Lewis and Tina Wallace, New Roles and Relevance: Development NGOs and the Challenge of Change (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2000); Melanie Beth Oliviero and Adele Simmons, ‘Who’s Minding the Store? Global Civil Society and Corporate Responsibility’, in Helmut K. Anheier, Marlies Glasius, and Mary Kaldor (eds.), Global Civil Society 2002 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Dara O’Rourke, Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Non-Governmental Systems of Labor Standards and Monitoring (2002); available from http://web.mit.edu/dorourke/www/ PDF/OutsourcingReg.pdf 21 For more details, see http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGACT700011998 and http://www. cepaa.org/SA8000/SA8000.htm (cited March 2005).
The Public Power of NGOs in Global Politics
69
regulative impact on global actors, in two ways. First, the kind of special authoritative status that is attached to formal international law and UN institutions can to some extent be replicated by those NGOs that have forged for themselves highly trusted ‘brands’ in the domain of global norm-building. NGOs like Amnesty International are among the organizations that are most trusted by the public to ‘do the right thing’ in political life, and the trust they are accorded can ascribe special weight to the norms that they develop and impose in global politics. 22 Second, as Vaughan Lowe argues in some depth, the norms promoted by NGOs can feed back into the formal international legal system by acquiring the status of ‘interstitial norms’ of international law. 23 Lowe argues that certain norms, such as ‘sustainable development’, lack normativity as elements of customary international law, but nonetheless exercise ‘an interstitial normativity by establishing the relationship between the neighbouring primary norms when they threaten to overlap or conflict with each other’. 24 Although these interstitial norms ‘have no independent normative charge of their own’, he argues that they can nonetheless have a significant impact on the operation of primary norms by directing ‘the manner in which competing or conflicting norms that do have their own normativity should interact in practice’. 25 These norms differ from traditional treaty- and custom-based international law in the sense that states are not the only agents who can contribute to their development. 26 Accordingly, NGOs that have forged a special authoritative status in global politics—such as Greenpeace in Lowe’s example of norms of sustainable development—can contribute to the development of legal norms through their wider participation in normative debate and regulation in global politics. So far, then, I have outlined some of the ways in which NGOs enjoy an influential role (relative to many actors in global politics) in the production of certain strongly regulative global norms. It may be that not all of the norms produced through these institutions and processes would constrain the autonomy of those affected by them in problematic ways; however, many of these norms (and thus the powers exercised in creating them) do problematically impact on individuals’ autonomy. This is because decisions to apply particular norms often entail tradeoffs between different public social goals, such as health care versus environmental protection, with consequent trade-offs also among the resulting levels of autonomy of the various individuals affected by these policies. NGO critics Roger Bate and Richard Tren argue that there are many ways in which the impacts of NGO norm-building activity can be detrimental to some 22
See Edelman PR Worldwide, Edelman Trust Barometer 2005: The Sixth Global Opinion Leaders Study (January 2005 [cited March 2005]); available from http://edelman.com/image/insights/content/ Edelman_Trust_Barometer-2005_final_final.pdf See also World Economic Forum, Results on The ‘Voice of the People’ Survey on Trust (2002 [cited March 2005]); available from http://www.weforum. org/site/homepublic.nsf/Content/Annual+Meeting+2003%5CResults+of+the+Survey+on+Trust 23 Vaughan Lowe, ‘The Politics of Lawmaking: Are the Method and Character of Norm Creation Changing?’, in Michael Byers (ed.), The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 24 Ibid. 216. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 219.
70
The Public Power of NGOs in Global Politics
groups of individuals. In general, they argue that NGOs, through opposition to free trade, to low wages for poor workers and to various products and technologies, ‘pursue politics that are detrimental to the long-term growth of Africa and even . . . exacerbate poverty and increase death and disease’. 27 In relation to environmental campaigns against the use of DDT in combating malaria, they argue that NGO environmental campaigns against DDT use have resulted in more malaria deaths and poverty in affected communities. In relation to campaigns to persuade drug companies to lower prices of life-saving medications, they argue that the NGO focus on drug companies diverted attention and resources away from more basic causes of poor drug access such as donor funding and health care infrastructure. Finally, in relation to NGOs’ opposition to the distribution of genetically modified (GM) food as aid in Africa, they argue that NGO campaigns contributed to African governments’ decisions to reject GM food aid, exacerbating the famines in their countries. 28 Similar arguments have been made in relation to the many other campaigns in which NGOs have been engaged. Previously, I mentioned environmental and labour rights campaigns, and noted the detrimental impacts these can have on the autonomy of some individuals. Especially compelling examples of such impacts can be drawn from the experience of past NGO campaigns that sought to impose norms prohibiting child labour within certain communities. In some situations, these campaigns were successful in removing children from the jobs in which they had previously been employed. However, some analysts have claimed that one effect of this displacement was to drive some of these children into prostitution— an outcome that most would agree was detrimental to the autonomy of these individuals. 29 The question of whether each of the various norm-building activities engaged in by NGOs is beneficial or detrimental overall to the affected community is of course a subject of much dispute, since the harms and advantages conferred by such activities are rarely distributed equally among all affected individuals. Whether the trade-offs among individual interests entailed in the judgements underlying these activities are judged as overall right or wrong, however, the point remains that these trade-offs involve problematic impacts upon the autonomy of some individuals in each instance. As such, these activities should be seen as ‘public’ forms of power that require democratic legitimation, whatever judgements we may make about their benefits overall. 27 Roger Bate and Richard Tren, Do NGOs Improve Wealth and Health in Africa? (2003 [cited February 2005]); available from http://www.aei.org/docLib/20030624_bate.pdf 28 Ibid. 29 See United States Department of Labor, The Apparel Industry and Codes of Conduct: A Solution to the International Child Labor Problem? (1996 [cited March 2005]); available from http:// www.dol.gov/ILAB/media/reports/iclp/apparel/apparel.pdf G. Stoikov, ‘Presentation on Behalf of ILO to Hearing of the United States Department of Labor’ (Washington, DC: 12 April 1994). For a discussion of some such problems that can arise in the process of tackling the problem of child labour, see Jo Boyden, Birgitta Ling, and William E. Myers, What Works for Working Children (Florence: UNICEF International Child Development Centre, 1998).
The Public Power of NGOs in Global Politics
71
3.3. PUBLIC POWER AND THE IMPOSITION OF MATERIAL CONSTRAINTS Individuals’ democratic autonomy can be affected by non-state political agents in global politics not only through the imposition of strong regulative norms but also through material obstruction that entails the use or threat of force and/or resource-deprivation. The forms of power associated with the coercive powers of state agents are subsumed within this category of public power, although the range of material constraints that qualify as ‘public’ on my account here is broader. There is a wide literature on the conditions under which the restriction of an individual’s capacity to pursue her goals through force or resource-deprivation constitutes a problematic constraint upon her autonomy (or ‘freedom’, or ‘liberty’). 30 I do not attempt here to resolve or contribute to these debates; my more limited task here is simply to outline the key types of constraints upon individuals that can usefully be distinguished as plausible candidates for identification as ‘public’ forms of power. As I have indicated, in the first instance we can distinguish between material constraints that are imposed through the use of force or violence of some kind and those that are imposed through deprivation of crucial social resources. Within these categories, we can further distinguish at a general level between those constraints that constrain an individual’s autonomy through direct mechanisms (acting directly upon individuals) and those constraints that constrain autonomy through indirect mechanisms (acting through effects on the social environment in which the individual lives). In terms of direct imposition of material constraint, it is easy to see how force or violent coercion can be employed directly against an individual to constrain her freedom of action. In global politics, most uses of force or violent coercion against individuals would be considered problematic with respect to the autonomy of those individuals, and would qualify as ‘public’ in this way. It is also easy to see how a political agent can constrain the free action of others by controlling the distributions of crucial resources to a group of individuals, and depriving some individuals within this group of the resources they need. The precise kinds of resource-deprivations that would be considered problematic from the point of view of individual autonomy are of course contested. In general terms, though, we can say that resource-deprivations involve acts of public power in situations where certain individuals are denied access to crucial social resources (such as food and water supplies, public transportation infrastructure, health care facilities) by powerful actors who control access to these resources. The control of (and restriction of access to) some portion of 30 For some important discussions of these ideas, see Isaiah Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, in Isaiah Berlin (ed.), Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969); David Miller (ed.), Liberty, Oxford Readings in Politics and Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); Charles Taylor, ‘What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty’, in Charles Taylor (ed.), Philosophy and the Human Sciences, Philosophical Papers, 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
72
The Public Power of NGOs in Global Politics
crucial social resources does not constitute public power in circumstances where these resources are in ample supply, since such control would not then have the requisite autonomy-constraining impact on others. Similarly, control of (and restriction of access to) non-critical social resources (such as luxury consumer goods of some kind) does not constitute public power, since the resources are not crucial enough to be considered pre-requisites for individual autonomy. Precisely which resources are crucial to individuals’ autonomy, and precisely how readily available these resources must be to individuals, remain matters of dispute. Nonetheless, it is a criterion of this kind that we must seek, in identifying which forms of resource-control count as ‘public’ and which count as ‘private’ acts of power. The autonomy of individuals can be further constrained by the power of other political actors through the indirect imposition of material constraints, based on violence or on resource-deprivation. That is, the power of other agents can constrain the autonomy of individuals by playing a significantly influential role in contributing to the creation of a social environment that is conducive to, or permissive of, violence or material deprivation. The wider social conditions affecting the levels of violence and resource-deprivation to which individuals are subject are a result of many political agents acting in aggregate, and it would be a rare situation in which sole, or even primary, responsibility could be attributed to a single political actor. Nonetheless, at times it is possible to identify the roles of some political actors as particularly critical in creating social conditions that affect individuals’ autonomy, and in such instances the power wielded by these actors over such conditions can be seen as ‘public’ forms of power. In most situations, states are key political agents responsible for violent social conditions, although sometimes agents such as armed rebel groups, international armies, and occasionally NGOs can play key roles in the exercise of this kind of public power. There is a wider range of political actors who have significant influence over social conditions that determine the availability and distribution of resources; these can include governments and private corporations as well as some NGOs.
3.3.1. NGOs, Public Power, and the Use of Force and Violent Coercion First, we can examine the extent to which NGOs exercise public power in global politics through the direct use of force. There are of course some non-state actors in global politics that impose force directly upon individuals, such as mercenary organizations and guerrilla organizations. 31 I do not discuss these here, however, because where such non-state use of violence occurs it is far more common for those affected to seek its outright eradication than it is for them to seek its democratization; here I confine my attention to examples of NGOs’ public power 31 See Bernedette Muthien and Ian Taylor, ‘The Return of the Dogs of War? The Privatization of Security in Africa’, in Rodney Bruce Hall and Thomas J Biersteker (eds.), The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
The Public Power of NGOs in Global Politics
73
that are likely to conform more closely with widespread democratic intuitions among relevant stakeholder populations. 32 The most important instances of violence-based NGO power arise, then, not when NGOs themselves wield force, but when their activities or decisions are supported or enforced through the use of force by others—generally states or statesponsored international armies and police-forces. Decisions made (in part) by NGOs—within interstate organizations for instance—can sometimes be enforced through the use or threat of violence by states. NGOs do not generally participate in the kinds of international decisions that involve the use of international force, since they have negligible influence in UN Security Council or other such securityrelated decision-making. There are, however, many international laws and policies that are implemented and enforced domestically within states by police wielding force. The support of state and international armies and police-forces is also essential for many humanitarian NGOs operating in crisis situations—especially crises in conflict zones. The capacity of NGOs to perform even basic humanitarian activities such as the distribution of food aid, within refugee camps and wider communities, can often depend on the use or threat of force by those state agents that provide security to the NGOs in these contexts. 33 In such situations, the use of force in the enactment of NGO decisions and more general facilitation of their activities makes the power of NGOs in these situations effectively dependent—at least to a significant degree—on the use of force. Even though the NGOs do not wield force themselves in these situations, force is nonetheless an aspect of their power because it is instrumental in implementing their decisions and facilitating their activities which impact upon individuals. Accordingly, the NGOs whose actions are materially facilitated and enforced through the violence of armies and police-forces should in some sense be accountable for the impacts upon individuals of the violent or coercive enactment of their decisions. Since in most cases the use of force or violent coercion upon individuals is considered to impose problematic constraints upon those individuals’ autonomy, the impacts upon individuals are of the kind that 32 It would be interesting to examine in more depth the reasons why such non-state power is generally excluded from the kinds of NGO power subject to claims of democratization. One key reason may be that the arguments for centralization of public power discussed in the previous chapter have much greater merit in relation to the use of force than they do in relation to other kinds of power. That is, it may be that democratic regulation of violence is difficult to achieve without the centralization of power in agents such as states, while other forms of public power can be responsibly exercised by plural non-state actors operating within decentralized structures. On the other hand, it may be that the use of violence by non-state actors could rightly be considered ‘public power’ of the kind that should be subject to direct democratic control, but that common intuitions have not yet come to terms with this democratic possibility. 33 For some discussions of such situations, see Nicolas de Torrenté, ‘Humanitarianism Sacrificed: Integration’s False Promise’, Ethics and International Affairs, 18/2 (2004); CARE USA, Care Decries Murders of Aid Workers in Afghanistan (2004 [cited March 2005]); available from http:// www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/aid/2004/0227murder.htm Joanna Macrae and Humanitarian Policy Group Overseas Development Institute (London England), The New Humanitarianisms: A Review of Trends in Global Humanitarian Action (London: HPG Overseas Development Institute, 2002).
74
The Public Power of NGOs in Global Politics
require democratic legitimation, and thus we should see activities of NGOs that are supported by agents of violence in this way as acts of public power. 34 Sometimes NGOs also exercise public power in global politics in circumstances whereby their activities have wider social impacts that lead to some individuals being subject to increased levels of violence. In particular, much has been written about the ways in which humanitarian NGOs operating in conflict situations can sometimes contribute (unwillingly, although predictably) to the perpetuation or even escalation of violence. Mary Anderson argues that humanitarian NGOs can contribute to violence in conflict situations in a variety of ways. First, the aid resources they bring into the community can be appropriated by warring parties and used to support the war effort. Sometimes warring factions may ‘tax’ the NGO for the right to deliver aid; aid may be stolen and redirected to the war effort; resources given to civilians may be passed on to those engaged in fighting; NGO-built infrastructure such as road systems can be used by militaries to assist their operations; and NGO-trained locals may be conscripted into military service. 35 Peter Marsden has similarly argued that NGO activities in Afghanistan during the period of the Soviet occupation at times contributed to violence within that community by bolstering the war economy, and enabling warring parties to divert all their resources to conflict by relieving them of their responsibilities to provide for the civilian populations under their control. Moreover, he argues, they contributed directly to the war efforts of the Mujahidin fighters in this conflict by providing first aid to wounded Mujahidin, and by making decisions to operate almost exclusively in Mujahidin-held areas of the country. 36 The role of NGOs in contributing to wider conflicts through their humanitarian work has also been widely highlighted in relation to NGO operations in refugee camps in Goma in 1994 and 1995. Around 200 NGOs played key roles in running refugee camps in Goma during that period, and these NGOs encountered widespread criticism because the camps were used as safe havens for Hutu fighters, and as bases for some military operations against civilians. 37 34 In such situations, NGOs are not the sole agents of public power that are accountable for the use of force; the state and international forces directly wielding the force, and making key decisions about when and where the force should be deployed, are in most cases the primary agents of this public power and the primary agents to be held democratically accountable for it. When NGO decisions are enacted through the use of force, however, they join the direct agents of force as democratically accountable wielders of public power. 35 Mary Anderson, ‘Humanitarian NGOs in Conflict Intervention,’ in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall, Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 343–54. See also Mary B. Anderson, Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace—Or War (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999). 36 Peter Marsden, ‘Afghanistan: State Disintegration and the Role of NGOs’, in Jon Bennett (ed.), NGOs and Governments: A Review of Current Practice for Southern and Eastern NGOs (Oxford: INTRAC, 1997). 37 Alexander Cooley and James Ron, ‘The NGO Scramble: Organizational Survival and Transnational Action’, International Security, 27/1 (2002), 28.
The Public Power of NGOs in Global Politics
75
Furthermore, Anderson argues that NGO activities can contribute to violent conflict by fuelling attitudes within communities that exacerbate the antagonisms between factions. NGO advocacy that publicizes human rights abuses can both provoke defensive responses from perpetrators and promote dehumanized images of perpetrators in the wider community. More materially, she argues that ‘NGOs must choose to employ some people (and not others), purchase goods from some (and not others), and target their aid toward some people (and not others); these decisions can fuel separate group identities, inequalities, and jealousies.’ 38 In such situations, we can say that NGOs indirectly impact upon the autonomy of individuals subject to this violence. Even though the impact is indirect rather than direct, however, the NGOs should still be held accountable for this impact, so long as it is sufficiently predictable and preventable. It is important to emphasize that the role of NGOs in contributing to violence in these communities is far smaller than the role of direct perpetrators of violence, and often far smaller also than the role of state and international security-forces with more direct responsibilities for security situations. Nonetheless, the contributions of NGOs to security situations cannot be disregarded, since it can have real impact on the autonomy of some individuals who are subject to violence through NGOs’ involvement. Accordingly, the power that NGOs wield through their capacity to contribute to wider security situations within communities in which they operate should be regarded as ‘public’ and held to democratic account.
3.3.2. NGOs, Public Power, and the Control of Critical Resources Second, I will examine the public power that is exercised by NGOs when they control critical resources to which individuals have access—at both individual and social levels. One way in which NGOs can exercise resource-based public power is directly analogous to the way in which they can exercise public power through the use of force, as outlined above. Similarly, we can say here that NGOs exercise public power when international laws and key policy decisions that they have played a significant role in producing are enforced through economic sanctions or other forms of economic pressure and coercion. For example, to the extent that NGOs play an influential role in the development of coercive programmes of ‘economic conditionality’, imposed by states or International Organizations such as the IMF, NGOs must be viewed as agents of this public power. Just as NGOs must be held accountable for those of their decisions that are enacted or enforced through violence by other parties, so they must be accountable for those of their decisions that are enacted or enforced through economic sanctions imposed by other parties. But the resource-based public power of NGOs is not limited to their reliance on the economic clout of other actors in the same way that their force-based 38 Mary Anderson, ‘Humanitarian NGOs in Conflict Intervention,’ in Crocker, Hampson, and Aall (eds.), Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict, 348.
76
The Public Power of NGOs in Global Politics
public power is limited in this way. Rather, NGOs themselves wield substantial material resources in contemporary global politics, and deploy it with significant material impacts on some target populations. According to some recent research, the NGO sector is now a huge economic force in global politics. In the thirtyfive countries surveyed in one study, the ‘civil society’ sector was found to have aggregate expenditures of US$1.3 trillion as of the late 1990s—a figure that represents 5.1 per cent of the GDP of these countries. Taken collectively, this makes the ‘civil society’ sector the world’s seventh largest economy, compared with the economies of states. 39 The overwhelming majority of the sector is engaged in service provision to communities, particularly in areas of education and social services. 40 The extent to which NGOs’ control and deployment of resources affects individuals’ autonomy is dependent not on the absolute quantities of resources controlled, but the extent to which these resources are significant to individuals, and sufficiently monopolized by the NGOs. In many situations, the resources controlled by NGOs—such as private educational services in communities where public education is available, to take one example—are not critical in this way. For such reasons, it tends to be in developing countries rather than developed countries that NGOs’ resource-based power has the greatest impact on autonomy, because the NGO contributions are a higher proportion of the total, even though the absolute sums spent in these communities may often be smaller. It is therefore worth examining the role of NGOs in developing countries in particular. NGOs now play a major role in the provision of basic goods and services in developing communities, alongside states and international development agencies. From 1970 to 1985 the total development aid disbursed by NGOs increased tenfold, and by 1992 international NGOs were channelling over US$7.6 billion of aid to developing countries, out of a total of US$58 billion in overseas development aid disbursed that year. 41 By the end of the 1990s, between 15 and 20 per cent of total overseas development aid was being channelled through NGOs, 42 and the total value of this aid disbursed through NGOs was estimated at around US$10 billion annually. 43 This is significantly greater than the amount of such aid disbursed through the UN system; in terms of net transfers, NGOs are collectively 39 Lester M. Salamon, S. Wojciech Sokolowski, and Regina List, Global Civil Society: An Overview (Baltimore, MD: Center for Civil Society Studies Institute for Policy Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 2003), 13–15. These figures include not only the narrower group of organizations called ‘NGOs’ on some common organizational typologies but also a broader range of non-state institutions like schools and other educational organizations, which fall within common definitions of ‘civil society’ institutions. As I noted in the book’s Introduction, my focus here on forms of power rather than organizational structures means that these distinctions between ‘NGOs’ and other kinds of non-state institutions are not important to the arguments I am making here. 40 Ibid. 22. 41 John Greensmith, Trends in Fundraising and Giving by International NGOs (2001 [cited February 2005]); available from www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/fund/2001/12trends.htm 42 Ibid. 43 Leelananda Silva, Aid Cooperation, Discussion Paper for the UNDP/MDGD (1999 [cited March 2005]); available from http://magnet.undp.org/Docs/aidcoord/study1.htm
The Public Power of NGOs in Global Politics
77
the second largest source of development and relief assistance, second only to bilateral donors. 44 Given that NGOs also raise significant funds of their own, and further contribute unquantified value through volunteer labour within the organizations, the real value of their contributions to the provision of crucial goods and services in developing countries is much higher. It is worth noting also that much of this aid money is channelled through ten or twenty big international NGOs, though the percentages channelled through southern NGOs are increasing. This is significant because it means that there are several key NGOs that play an especially critical role in delivering resources to these communities. In evaluating the significance of these contributions to the individuals within these communities—that is, in evaluating how critical these resource-provisions are to the autonomy of the individuals—it is necessary to examine both the extent to which there is dependence in developing communities upon resources disbursed by NGOs and the character of the goods and services being disbursed. A rigorous economic analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of my analysis here, though such an analysis would be very helpful in more clearly delineating the scope of NGOs’ public power. Nonetheless, we can point here to some figures that are at the least suggestive in identifying contexts in which NGOs can be said to exercise public power. First, identifying the extent to which communities depend on NGO-provided resources requires consideration of both the proportion of aid money disbursed through NGOs and the extent of reliance on aid money by developing communities to meet their resource needs. The significance of development aid for many developing countries declined through the 1990s, as a result of a large increase in private capital flows to developing countries. In 1990 these private capital flows constituted only 34 per cent of total net resource flows to developing countries, but by the end of the 1990s they accounted for 78 per cent. However, since 95 per cent of private capital flows are received by only 26 developing countries and the balance of 5 per cent was spread among 140 countries, development aid still plays a critical role within many developing countries. 45 The role played by NGOs is particularly significant in communities that are in conflict and post-conflict situations, and within certain remote, vulnerable, or marginalized groups within given countries, where NGOs are sometimes more effective than state and international agencies in delivering critical resources. In Mozambique, to take one example, foreign aid in 1991 accounted for 78 per cent of the country’s GDP, making Mozambique the most aid-dependent country in the world. 46 Moreover, in Mozambique, a single NGO—World Vision International—recently became the largest donor and employer in the country, and possibly also the largest provider of welfare services. 47 Mozambique 44
Antonio Donini, Surfing on the Crest of the Wave until It Crashes: Intervention and the South (2000 [cited March 2005]); available from http://www.jha.ac/articles/a006.htm 45 Silva, Aid Cooperation, Discussion Paper for the UNDP/MDGD. 46 United Nations Department of Public Information, ‘Mozambique: Out of the Ruins of War’, Africa Recovery Briefing Paper No. 8 (1993). 47 Donini, Surfing on the Crest of the Wave until It Crashes: Intervention and the South.
78
The Public Power of NGOs in Global Politics
provides an especially spectacular case of NGO domination of resource-provision, but NGOs play significant roles in many other developing countries as well. In Kenya, for example—a state with a far more functional government sector than Mozambique—NGOs provide a high percentage of all health care services to the population. 48 The resources that NGOs play a key role in disbursing in developing communities are generally deployed in the provision of crucial goods and services, which most would agree are critical to securing individuals’ autonomy. Such services include not only food, medication, and water supplies but also health and education services, and infrastructure such as public roadways. In postconflict Afghanistan and Rwanda, for example, NGOs have played critical roles in delivering key health and educational programmes, which the fragile governments of these countries have been unable to provide. 49 In Afghanistan, NGOs have provided significant support to the agricultural sector and played a key role in providing clean water in some regions. NGOs have also played important roles in areas such as waste disposal, repairs of basic infrastructure such as bridges and roads, and the clearing of mines. 50 It is clearly evident, then, that NGOs can play significant roles within many communities, controlling many of the key resources upon which individuals depend to lead autonomous lives. However, while I have established that individuals’ autonomy can be affected by NGO activities, it may not be immediately clear how these NGO roles can affect individuals’ autonomy in a problematic way (thus qualifying as public power). Indeed, many people would argue that the impact of NGOs’ resource-provision upon individuals’ autonomy is overwhelmingly positive, and most would certainly agree that NGOs’ resource allocations in developing communities have many positive impacts. If we were to think that these impacts were positive for all affected individuals, then it could be argued that this NGO power would not qualify as public. That is, if it were possible to identify certain communities in which the impact of NGOs’ resource allocations upon all individuals were incontestably positive, these NGO activities may not require democratic legitimation. In most real-world examples, however, the impact of NGOs’ resource-based power upon the capacity of some individuals to live autonomous lives is more contestable. Most straightforwardly, such NGO power can have a detrimental impact on individuals’ autonomy in cases where certain global norms, which are enforced through economic sanctions imposed by third parties, have detrimental 48 Alan Fowler, ‘Distant Obligations: Speculations on NGO Funding and the Global Market,’ Review of African Political Economy, 55 (1992); Richard Wamai, ‘NGO and Public Health Systems: Comparative Trends in Transforming Health Care Systems in Kenya and Finland,’ in International Society for Third Sector Research (ISTSR) Sixth International Conference (Ryerson University and York University, Toronto: 2004). 49 Bennett, NGOs and Governments: A Review of Current Practice for Southern and Eastern NGOs, 4. 50 Peter Marsden, ‘Afghanistan: State Disintegration and the Role of NGOs’, in Ibid. 20.
The Public Power of NGOs in Global Politics
79
impacts on individuals’ autonomy in the various ways discussed in Section 3.3.1. Beyond these situations of norm-enforcement, however, most detrimental impacts on individual autonomy of NGOs’ resource-based power arise as a result of the various ‘opportunity-costs’ of NGOs’ resource allocations in developing communities. First, it is important to consider the direct ‘opportunity-costs’ of NGOs’ activities, which arise from the diversion of resources, through NGOs, from other potential uses to which these resources could be directed. Many of the resources disbursed by NGOs in developing communities are acquired from private and governmental donors, who are seeking to assist the populations of developing communities and see NGOs as the most effective vehicles for allocating these resources. If NGOs were not serving as intermediaries for these funds, then developing communities would not be deprived of all of these resources; rather, in many instances the resources now disbursed by NGOs would be delivered through different channels—either directly by donors or, more probably, through local state institutions or International Organizations. In evaluating the impact of NGOs’ activities on the autonomy of recipient individuals, then, we should not be considering the impact of NGOs’ resource allocations relative to a situation where communities were entirely deprived of these resources. Rather, we should be considering the impact of NGOs’ resource allocations relative to situations in which the resources were allocated in a different way within these communities— either by NGOs or by alternative organizations—through different decisions with respect to priority programmes, and different (more or less effective and efficient) management practices. Once we view the impact of NGOs’ activities in light of opportunity-costs as well as their actual outcomes, we see that the impacts for which they should be accountable are very similar to those of elected state governments with respect to resource allocation. In evaluating the impact of NGOs’ resource allocations on individuals’ autonomy, we must evaluate first of all whether NGOs are disbursing the resources optimally overall—with the greatest efficiency and fairness, to achieve the best overall impact on the autonomy of all potential recipients. If they are not (or if this question is sufficiently contested) then we should view their resource-based power as ‘public’ and in need of democratic control. Moreover, in evaluating NGOs’ impact on individual autonomy, we must consider the impact on each affected individual, not just overall impacts; we must consider, that is, the impacts on particular individuals of the distributional decisions that NGOs make with respect to the allocations of resources. In allocating their available resources, NGOs commonly must decide how to prioritize particular programmes and populations—whether to focus on urban or rural populations, on health care or infrastructure projects, and so on. In making these distributional decisions, there will inevitably be not only winners but also losers—individuals who would have benefited had different priority decisions been made, but who failed to benefit through the actual decisions. Given the impact of distributional decisions on these individuals’ autonomy, these decisions should also be regarded as
80
The Public Power of NGOs in Global Politics
‘public’ and subject to democratic contestation and control by affected beneficiary communities. 51 Second, it is important to consider the indirect ‘opportunity-costs’ of NGOs’ activities, particularly those associated with their significant role in delivering goods and services. Within some developing communities, there can be a major structural impact of this NGO role upon the longer-term capacity-building of local governance institutions (especially local state institutions). It is sometimes argued by critics of NGOs’ predominant role in resource-delivery to developing communities that the entrenched role of NGOs in key service-delivery roles can be counterproductive in the long term, since they erode—or at best stunt the development of—the capacity of local state institutions to perform these roles. This can lead in the longer term, some argue, to entrenched dependence on aid within these communities. As Kamal Malhotra argues, [o]nly governments and intergovernmental multilateral institutions are equipped to operate on the scale that is necessary if poverty-eradication, full employment and social integration are to be achieved in a sustainable manner. Assigning such roles to NGOs instead of to governments and intergovernmental organizations whose main duty this should be is, therefore, both inappropriate and counterproductive, especially in the long run. 52
To the extent that these criticisms may be valid, we can see that there is a potentially detrimental impact on many individuals’ long-term autonomy due to the lost opportunity for local capacity-building that may arise through NGOs’ operations. In relation to this potential problem, then, we can say that NGOs exercise public power through their delineation of the scope and character of their operations within communities, and the trade-offs they make between the short-term resource-based benefits they can deliver to populations and the longer-term needs of the communities to develop the institutional capacities required to meet their own needs. Many NGOs now recognize the importance of directing resources to capacity-building within their recipient communities, and include this among their key operational priorities, but judgements about how best to balance such capacity-building against short-term assistance are highly contested. According to Ricky Stuart of Oxfam, a ‘multi-horned dilemma confronting Northern international development NGOs is their role in direct implementation, versus their role in funding and “capacity-building” of local organizations, versus their role in partnering with Southern organizations to achieve global-level change.’ 53 The key point here is that the decisions NGOs make with respect to these trade-offs can have significant impacts on the autonomy of individuals—impacts that can be 51 In the following chapter, I discuss the question of how communities that have a democratic stake in such public power should be delineated. 52 Kamal Malhotra, ‘NGOs without Aid: Beyond the Global Soup Kitchen’, Third World Quarterly, 21/4 (2000), 665. 53 Rieky Stuart, ‘Ethics in Action: The Oxfam Response’, paper presented at the Ethics in Action: The Successes, Compromises, and Setbacks of Transnational Human Rights and Humanitarian NGOs, Workshop I, Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, New York, 2002.
The Public Power of NGOs in Global Politics
81
detrimental for many in the short or long term if the wrong (for them) trade-offs are made in allocating resources. Accordingly, these decisions by NGOs should be regarded as ‘public’ and held to democratic account by the affected recipient communities. 54 Finally, in evaluating the extent of NGOs’ resource-based public power, we must recognize that the role of NGOs in delivering resources to needy communities, while significant, is often secondary to the roles played by governmental and other international actors. Nonetheless, given the widespread significance of their roles at a community level, many NGO activities in the areas of development and humanitarian work have significant impacts upon some individuals’ autonomy, and should thus be considered ‘public’ and held to democratic account.
3.4. CONCLUSIONS In this chapter I have illustrated some plausible empirical grounds for my claim that non-state actors wield important forms of public power in contemporary global politics, and I have highlighted some key forms of ‘public’ NGO power. Both of the two key forms of public power that I have identified—significant influence over processes of social norm-building, and the imposition of significant material constraints—are strongly associated with the family of concepts to which ‘public power’ belongs (along with concepts of government, governance, authority, sovereignty, and statehood). My analysis here of public power differs from analyses of these related concepts, however, in that it focuses on impact (on individual autonomy) as the criterion for identifying those instances of normbuilding, coercive, and resource-based power that are in need of democratic control. This analysis is important on one level because it identifies some of the key forms of NGO activity that are the rightful targets of democratic critique, and that should serve as subjects for democratic control. But clearly delineating NGOs’ ‘public power’ is also important because it helps distinguish these public activities from other ‘private’ NGO activities, which should be seen as immune from demands for democratic accountability, or attributions of democratic deficits. As I have argued, not all NGO activities satisfy the criterion of autonomy-constraining impact that makes them ‘public’ and in need of democratic control, and the common failure to clearly distinguish ‘public’ from ‘private’ activities can result in private NGO activities being subjected to unfounded democratic demands. The agenda of ‘NGO democratization’ and ‘NGO accountability’ has been enthusiastically embraced by several ‘right-wing’ think tanks and political opponents 54 NGOs operating in conflict situations face further dilemmas regarding how to balance material benefits from resource allocations against potential detrimental effects of the kinds discussed above. These wider trade-offs, also, involve the kind of public power that require democratic control.
82
The Public Power of NGOs in Global Politics
of NGOs, as a means of weakening the public credibility and resource-bases of NGOs, which they perceive to be predominantly ‘left-wing’ in orientation. 55 Clear identification of those organizations and activities that are legitimate targets of democratic demands can thus serve also as a basis for defending and strengthening those organizations and activities that do not qualify as public against any unwarranted political assaults. 55 Several articles critical of NGOs’ democratic legitimacy are available at http://www.ipa.org.au/ units/ngos.html (accessed January 2008) and at http://www.ngowatch.org (accessed January 2008). Criticisms of NGOs’ lack of democratic credentials have been used not only in public campaigns against these organizations’ reputations but also in lobbying for government policies restricting NGOs’ access to benefits such as tax concessions associated with charity status in some countries. For discussion of these policies in the Australian context, see Ravi Tomar, Redefining NGOs: The Emerging Debate, Current Issues Brief No. 5, 2003–4 (Information and Research Services, Parliamentary Library, Commonwealth of Australia, 2004 (cited); available from http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/CIB/200304/04cib05.pdf
4 From Nation-States to ‘Stakeholder’ Communities 4.1. INTRODUCTION With its opening words, ‘We the peoples’, the preamble to the charter of the United Nations appeals evocatively to the democratic ideal of popular sovereignty. Gone is the statist language of ‘The High Contracting Parties’ that introduced the covenant of the organization’s predecessor—the League of Nations—and in its place is the language of global citizenship. It is not the sovereign states, but rather the ‘peoples’ of the world, whose authority the preamble invokes in establishing these global institutions. The choice of the plural ‘peoples ’ rather than the singular ‘people’ is also significant. It implies that global citizens are invested with democratic status as members of communities, and not simply as individuals. These communities, which serve as democratic constituencies within the global polity, were originally understood to be nations (or at least those nations that enjoy the status of statehood). Accordingly, having invoked the authority of ‘the peoples’, the preamble delegates this authority to ‘our respective governments’ who, having ‘exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations’. Although the preamble’s proclamation that it was the peoples of the world who were creating the UN was primarily just a rhetorical flourish in what was overwhelmingly a charter of sovereign states, it symbolized hopes that the organization could one day become something more. 1 And in recent years, global leaders have recalled these opening words in attempts to realize such progressive aspirations through democratization of the UN institutions and of wider global structures of public power. 2 The words have found particular resonance among advocates of increased participation in decision-making of non-state actors such as NGOs. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan claims that the UN ‘derives its mandate to 1 This observation is also made in Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighbourhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 2 Prominent discussions of democratization proposals by global leaders include Commission on Global Governance, The Millennium Year and the Reform Process (1999 [cited February 2002]); available from www.cgg.ch/millenium.htm Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighbourhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance; Boutros Boutros-Ghali and United Nations Dept. of Public Information, An Agenda for Democratization (New York: United Nations Dept. of Public Information, 1996).
84
From Nation-States to ‘Stakeholder’ Communities
work with civil society from the Charter itself and its opening words “We, the peoples” ’, 3 and accordingly argues that ‘a partnership with civil society is not an option; it is a necessity.’ 4 Former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali similarly told a conference of NGOs that they are ‘a basic form of popular representation in the present-day world’, and consequently that ‘[t]heir participation in international relations is, in a way, a guarantee of the political legitimacy of those international organizations.’ 5 Only with NGO involvement, he declared, can the UN be ‘faithful to the urgent exhortation with which the preamble to the Charter begins: We the peoples of the United Nations’. 6 Invocation of the language of ‘the peoples’ in support of the participation of non-state actors such as NGOs in global decision-making has engendered some evolution in the meaning of the phrase. NGOs commonly stake their democratic claim to global public power on the grounds that they represent a multitude of intranational and transnational ‘stakeholder’ communities, such as religious groups, indigenous peoples, women, environmental and human rights advocates, trade unionists, business and professional communities, local communities, or the global poor. NGOs and their advocates—by claiming that ‘the peoples’ of the world include such non-national ‘stakeholder’ communities as well as national (or rather, nation-state-based) communities—have thus challenged the assumption that nation-states are the only ‘peoples’ that should count as democratic communities within the global polity. Although NGOs and their advocates are clear in claiming that certain ‘stakeholder’ communities have the kind of status that enables them to serve as legitimate agents of democratic control, the theoretical basis for this claim requires further elaboration. As I have previously explained, my proposition is that every individual whose autonomy is problematically constrained by the exercise of power is designated as a democratic ‘stakeholder’ in that power, and entitled to participate in its democratic control. My goal in this chapter is to build upon the arguments presented in Chapter 1 about the nature of a democratic ‘stakeholder’ community, and elaborate in more detail the implications of my claim that stakeholder communities should be delineated in accordance with the impact of public power upon populations of individuals. I begin my discussion in Section 4.1 by elaborating the concept of a stakeholder community, which is broadly derived from the global liberal-democratic discourse surrounding attempts to democratize non-state actors such as NGOs. Here, 3 United Nations Secretary-General, Arrangements and Practices for the Interaction of NonGovernmental Organizations in All Activities of the United Nations System (United Nations, 1998 [cited February 2002]); available from http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/docs98/kofi998.htm p. 2. 4 United Nations, Partnership with Civil Society Necessity in Addressing Global Agenda, Says Secretary-General in Wellington, New Zealand Remarks, Press Release (2000 [cited February 2002]); available from www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000229.sgsm7318.doc.html 5 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, ‘We the Peoples: Building Peace’, paper presented at the UN Department of Public Information Forty-Seventh Annual Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations, New York, 20 September 1994. 6 Ibid.
From Nation-States to ‘Stakeholder’ Communities
85
I explain how the concept of ‘community’ entailed in the stakeholder model differs from those linked to the ‘closed’ model of democratic society that I discussed in Chapter 1. In Section 4.2, I then turn to the question of how this ‘stakeholder’ model of democratic community can be instituted, at a more practical level. To illustrate some of the considerations that must be invoked in such practical application of the stakeholder model, I identify and address some issues and dilemmas that commonly arise for practitioners who invoke the idea of ‘stakeholder’ communities in their attempts to democratize the activities of NGOs in global politics.
4.2. THE IDEA OF DEMOCRATIC ‘STAKEHOLDER’ COMMUNITIES The concept of ‘stakeholders’ in global public power is not a novel one; on the contrary, it is gaining widespread currency in contemporary discussions about the democratization of global political decision-making. Increasingly, public political agents including NGOs, corporations, and International Organizations consult a range of groups during their decision-making processes, on the grounds that these groups are ‘stakeholders’ in the decisions. According to a definition coined by the Environmental Council, ‘stakeholders’ are ‘people who have an interest in a particular decision, either as individuals or as representatives of a group’. 7 A democratic stakeholder community, then, is composed of all individuals whose interests are affected (in a normatively relevant way) by the decisions made by a particular agent of public power. The idea of ‘stakeholders’ is sometimes used very broadly, to include individuals and groups with a very wide range of interests in a decision. However, it is arguable that in our highly interdependent world there are very few decisions that impact exclusively upon isolated groups, and that everybody is affected at least to some minimal degree by all political decisions. Accordingly, there is a need to employ clearer normative criteria to specify the kinds (and intensities) of interests that qualify an individual as a democratic stakeholder in a decision. The arguments presented in Chapter 1 provide a rationale for embracing a more restrictive view of what should count as a normatively relevant interest or ‘stake’ in a decision. In accordance with the liberal representative conception of democracy presented there, we should narrow the conception of stakeholders down to those individuals who are subject to problematic impacts on their autonomous capacities. What this means is that the range of individuals who will qualify as democratic stakeholders is significantly narrower than the range of individuals commonly identified as stakeholders in broader discussions of the concept by NGOs and other global political actors. To take a prominent example of the broader use of 7 Cited in Minu Hemmati, Multi-Stakeholder Processes: What Are They About? And How Should They Be Done? 4 (2001 [cited February 2002]); available from www.sustdev.org
86
From Nation-States to ‘Stakeholder’ Communities
the concept, an International Non-Governmental Organizations Accountability Charter adopted by Oxfam and several other major International NGOs defines NGOs’ stakeholders to include Peoples, including future generations, whose rights we seek to protect and advance; ecosystems, which cannot speak for or defend themselves; our members and supporters; our staff and volunteers; organizations and individuals that contribute finance, goods or services; partner organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, with whom we work; regulatory bodies whose agreement is required for our establishment and operations; those whose policies, programmes or behaviour we wish to influence; the media; and the general public. 8
While this broader list of stakeholders may well provide a good account of the range of parties who have interests of some kind in NGOs’ decision-making, it is quite clear that not all the parties on a list of this kind will qualify as democratic stakeholders. It would be very hard to imagine circumstances under which members of NGOs’ regulatory agencies, for example, would be affected in the autonomy-constraining sense required for designation as democratic stakeholders; in most cases also it would be hard to argue that ‘media’ institutions, financial donors, and some others on this list would qualify as democratic stakeholders according to the criterion I have set out. But although this normative criterion does narrow down significantly the range of plausible candidates for designation as democratic ‘stakeholders’ in relation to a given agent of public power, the criterion is still open to quite a wide range of different interpretations. To begin with, there is a range of plausible interpretations of which forms of individual autonomy should be valued by liberals, and accorded protection through democratic institutions. There is an even wider range of plausible interpretations of what range of responsibilities particular political actors should be accorded for protecting the autonomy of others. I suggest that it is on this latter question that the most difficult debates will turn, in identifying the democratic stakeholders of powerful particular actors. To see how the delineation of stakeholder communities will turn to a large degree on judgements about the distribution of responsibilities among different political actors, we can consider for example the following question: how should we delineate the stakeholder community of a humanitarian NGO that controls certain resources for providing assistance in crisis situations? If this NGO decides to use these funds to provide assistance to the members of community A but not to the members of community B, who then are the stakeholders of this NGO? Are members of the beneficiary community, who are affected by the direct actions of the NGO upon them, the only stakeholders? Or are the members of community B, who have been denied NGO assistance, also stakeholders by virtue of the fact that they have been adversely affected (relative to what could have been if a different decision had been made) by the NGOs’ policy decision to divert funds elsewhere? An answer to this question clearly depends on whether 8 See ‘International Non-Governmental Organizations Accountability Charter’; available from http://www.oxfam.org/en/files/INGO_accountability_charter_0606 (accessed January 2008).
From Nation-States to ‘Stakeholder’ Communities
87
a case can be made that the NGO is responsible for the autonomy of members of community B. It is not possible to identify any definitive or universally valid answers to such questions about the range of responsibilities individuals (and collective political agents) within the global order bear for the autonomy of others. As I explained in Chapter 1, the range of such responsibilities accepted by liberal democrats will vary in different democratic contexts (i.e. in relationships between different sets of political actors), so must be worked out separately in each, via appropriate forms of political debate and consensus-building. There is of course a great deal that philosophical discussion can contribute to political debates of this kind, and this broad set of philosophical questions—about the range of democratic responsibilities particular political actors should accept in particular relationships—is one that certainly warrants much further theoretical attention. It is beyond the scope of this book, though, to contribute any new arguments to such philosophical debates. My theoretical goal here is limited to articulating the broad conceptual framework of Global Stakeholder Democracy, and highlighting the substance of the underlying normative questions which must be resolved politically, within each specific political context in which democratic control of public power is to be established. (Though political resolution of these normative questions raises a number of additional practical challenges, about which I say a little more later in the chapter.) Beyond saying that the stakeholder criterion will need to be interpreted and operationalized within specific political contexts—in relationships between specific political actors—it is possible to say something more here about how this contextualism would play out in relation to the stakeholder communities of particular public political agents, such as NGOs. On this issue, it is important to highlight how the organizational complexities of NGO decision-making and activity, and the correspondingly complex patterns of political impact NGOs can have on varying populations, make the delineation of stakeholder communities a far from straightforward process. First, the one NGO might have different groups of stakeholders implicated in different elements of its activity. For example, an NGO such as Oxfam with a diverse range of operational activities might have multiple distinct stakeholder communities relating to different areas of its activity and decision-making: one group of stakeholders in its emergency-relief operations, a different set of stakeholders in its advocacy work on fair trade issues, and so on. For this reason it would be mistaken to think that the political task would be to identify one unified stakeholder community for each NGO (or other organizational entity wielding public power); it is not the case that a single NGO will always have a single stakeholder constituency. Rather, the normative objective should be to ensure that the right group of stakeholders is consulted in relation to the right set of decisions that a given organizational entity might be undertaking. Second, the one NGO might need to deploy different interpretations of the stakeholder criterion to identify stakeholders in relation to the same type of its activity, but in different political contexts in which that activity is undertaken.
88
From Nation-States to ‘Stakeholder’ Communities
The reason for this is that the precise interpretation of the stakeholder criterion that will apply to an NGO’s activity must depend in part on how problematic the impacts of its activities are viewed as being by the affected populations in question, and these views might vary significantly among different affected groups. To illustrate this point, we can take the above example of Oxfam campaigning on labour standards applicable to international trading relations. If Oxfam were to reflect upon who should count as stakeholders in its decision-making about what minimum labour standards to endorse through its advocacy work, it may begin by noting that these decisions will affect the economic interests of a wide range of populations. These would include current workers in export-industries subject to the standards; potential workers elsewhere who might gain employment in these industries if labour standards were to be reformed (perhaps due to manufacturers relocating in light of recalibrated efficiency calculations); owners and managers of the companies engaged in the labour practices in question, whose profits may be affected; and families and wider communities dependent on income generated by these workers and corporate actors. Then, to determine who among these affected parties would qualify as democratic stakeholders, it would be necessary to consider which of these various economic interests that might be detrimentally affected implicate the autonomous capacities of the individuals concerned. A plausible way of making this determination might be to link the judgement to some operationalized benchmark of (autonomy-constraining) economic deprivation—which could be conceptualized as an agency-based (as distinct from welfare-based) account of ‘poverty’, or in some other way. Those individuals for whom the decision determined whether or to what extent they would end up living below this minimum benchmark—such as many workers, prospective workers, and their families—would thus count as democratic stakeholders. Those individuals who were not at risk of falling beneath this benchmark and had only higher-order interests in the decision—such as those corporate shareholders who might stand to lose only a small portion of their (large) profits if tougher labour standards were to be imposed—would not count as democratic stakeholders. Once we start to think about delineating stakeholder communities according to a benchmark of this kind, it becomes clear that the operationalized criteria for identifying problematic impacts on individuals’ autonomous capacities will often need to vary in different political contexts. In relation to the present example, the income levels and other specific measures of economic deprivation that would need to be invoked to operationalize a benchmark of autonomy-constraining deprivation would need to vary in different social and political contexts in which Oxfam may operate, because of the significance of socially relative deprivations for social dimensions of individuals’ autonomous capacities. For instance, it would seem implausible to use exactly the same standards of economic deprivation to evaluate the democratic stake of Southern-based workers and that of Northernbased shareholders or employees, since the ways in which specific economic deprivations are likely to impact upon individuals’ autonomous capacities in these very
From Nation-States to ‘Stakeholder’ Communities
89
different social contexts may vary considerably, given different levels of economic affluence and different value accorded to specific economic goods in each context. In this way, we can see that a single NGO may reasonably invoke variable specific criteria in relation to different populations affected by its decisions, in making assessments about how to identify the democratic stakeholders in these decisions. Although (such context-specific interpretations of) this normative stakeholder criterion must provide the primary basis for delineating stakeholder communities, a number of additional practical considerations may also need to come into play. These considerations mirror the sorts of practical considerations that can arise also in delineating public power, which I discussed in Chapter 2. In Chapter 2, I explained how the organizational characteristics of institutional stability, and of codification and social recognition of political roles—while not normative requirements for designating a political actor as an agent of public power—are nonetheless required to some degree if the project of subjecting their power to democratic control is to be achievable in practice. Correspondingly, we can say here that—as a practical matter—a population of individuals will need to be affected by a particular political actor (such as an NGO) in a reasonably stable, ongoing, and transparent fashion if these individuals are to qualify as democratic stakeholders. This is so because otherwise it is not going to be feasible to establish effective institutions of democratic control linking them to power wielders in appropriate ways. As I discussed in Chapter 2, the fact of being subject to a one-off political impact by another actor will not be sufficient to constitute any workable democratic stakeholder community, since democratic institutions of social choice and control (of the kind I discuss in Part II of this book) can only work effectively within political relationships that have some reasonable degree of stability over time. Moreover, it will not be possible for a population to establish effective democratic control over forms of power that are insufficiently institutionalized to identify clearly which political decision-makers are responsible (and can be held responsible) for the relevant political impacts. Since these institutional characteristics embody pragmatic rather than principled requirements, it will necessarily be a matter of contextual strategic judgement what kind and degree of institutional stability and transparency the political impacts in question must have, in order for the affected population to qualify as democratic stakeholders in any workable sense. I have so far sketched the central normative and practical questions that must be answered in delineating the ‘stakeholder’ communities that should be empowered to wield democratic control over agents of public power. However, the sense in which these collectivities of individuals constitute democratic ‘communities’ requires some further elaboration. This is required because these stakeholder groups constitute collectives of a somewhat different kind from those that most democrats—who are committed to conventional ‘closed’ conceptions of democratic society—associate with the idea of a democratic ‘public’ or ‘people’ (or alternatively, a ‘demos’). Stakeholder communities will necessarily share some constitutive characteristics in common with traditional ‘closed’ democratic societies, of
90
From Nation-States to ‘Stakeholder’ Communities
the kind I discussed in Chapter 1, but there are also some important differences, which it is important to spell out clearly. To begin with, a fundamental pre-requisite for the existence of a democratic stakeholder community will be the existence of certain basic shared political values across the population in question: specifically, there must be basic consensus around the core constitutive democratic values of individual autonomy, and shared (egalitarian) responsibility for protecting the autonomous capacities of others within the population group. Agreement within the population in question on these core democratic values would be a pre-requisite for them to constitute a democratic ‘stakeholder’ community, since such agreement would necessarily underpin the legitimacy of any democratic institutions that would be established among them. 9 To be clear about the implications of this claim, it is not the case that everyone who shares these core democratic values will as such be members of the one stakeholder community; rather, particular stakeholder communities will be constituted from within the wider community of democrats sharing commitments to these core norms of democratic political legitimacy. For the framework of Global Stakeholder Democracy to be fully global it would be necessary for everyone to share a commitment to these core values at least at some very thin or minimal level. But the thick interpretations given to these core values can vary widely in different contexts within the overarching global democratic society. The need for an underlying political consensus on core democratic values is of course shared in common with standard theoretical accounts of the constitutive features of a democratic community—so at this level the concept of a stakeholder ‘community’ is quite conventional. Since most democratic theories have been developed with the nation-state in mind, this kind of underlying democratic value consensus is sometimes talked about as though it must be embedded within a much thicker set of shared values and solidarities, usually associated with quite thick shared conceptions of egalitarian justice. 10 However, a democratic stakeholder community does not need thick shared values of this kind, and can instead accommodate quite broad social and cultural diversity, so long as there is some minimal thin agreement on core democratic values. Differences in the thick interpretations given to the core democratic values of individual autonomy and egalitarian responsibility will have implications for how particular stakeholder communities are constituted in these various political contexts; stakeholder communities will be delineated differently in political contexts where broader political values and solidarities are shared than in more diverse and less solidaristic contexts. The more extensive the range of egalitarian responsibilities towards others accepted within the group, the more forms of 9 The assumptions I am making here about the connection between political legitimacy and such underlying value consensus are articulated in greater depth in the Introduction to this book. 10 The democratic theories of John Rawls and Michael Walzer provide clear examples of this portrayal of democratic values as embedded within a broader social consensus on egalitarian justice. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism, New edn. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985).
From Nation-States to ‘Stakeholder’ Communities
91
power will qualify as ‘public’, and the wider the population of individuals that will qualify as ‘stakeholders’. But even when the range of egalitarian responsibilities endorsed within a group are quite narrow (such as within certain transnational political contexts where agreement may be