Governance and Innovation
This book focuses on the relationships between rules of decision-making and economic develop...
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Governance and Innovation
This book focuses on the relationships between rules of decision-making and economic development, concentrating on the similarities and differences between old and modern modes of governance in both business and politics. Maria Brouwer uses concepts such as uncertainty and expectations to analyze political and corporate governance models from an economic theoretical perspective. Governance and Innovation analyzes the emergence of organizations and institutions conducive to commerce and growth and the relationship with political organization in both past and present in order to improve our understanding of economic development. The author shows how maritime trade spawned many organizational innovations in the past that still feature in modern innovative enterprise, and highlights how political governance can stimulate or hinder innovation, taking issue with existing legislation on bankruptcy and corporate governance. The effects of political governance on innovation are modeled to analyze how competition for novelty enhances the value of human capital. This book will be of great use to students and researchers engaged in political and corporate governance, leadership and entrepreneurship, as well as policy-makers interested in economic development. Maria Brouwer is Professor in Economics at the University of Amsterdam.
Routledge Studies in Global Competition Edited by John Cantwell, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, USA, and David Mowery, University of California, Berkeley, USA
1 Japanese Firms in Europe Edited by Fre´de´rique Sachwald 2 Technological Innovation, Multinational Corporations and New International Competitiveness The case of intermediate countries Edited by Jose´ Molero 3 Global Competition and the Labour Market Nigel Driffield 4 The Source of Capital Goods Innovation The role of user firms in Japan and Korea Kong-Rae Lee 5 Climates of Global Competition Maria Bengtsson 6 Multinational Enterprises and Technological Spillovers Tommaso Perez 7 Governance of International Strategic Alliances Technology and transaction costs Joanne E. Oxley
8 Strategy in Emerging Markets Telecommunications establishments in Europe Anders Pehrsson 9 Going Multinational The Korean experience of direct investment Edited by Fre´de´rique Sachwald 10 Multinational Firms and Impacts on Employment, Trade and Technology New perspectives for a new century Edited by Robert E. Lipsey and Jean-Louis Mucchielli 11 Multinational Firms The global-local dilemma Edited by John H. Dunning and Jean-Louis Mucchielli 12 MIT and the Rise of Entrepreneurial Science Henry Etzkowitz 13 Technological Resources and the Logic of Corporate Diversification Brian Silverman
14 The Economics of Innovation, New Technologies and Structural Change Cristiano Antonelli 15 European Union Direct Investment in China Characteristics, challenges and perspectives Daniel Van Den Bulcke, Haiyan Zhang and Maria do Ce´u Esteves 16 Biotechnology in Comparative Perspective Edited by Gerhard Fuchs 17 Technological Change and Economic Performance Albert L. Link and Donald S. Siegel 18 Multinational Corporations and European Regional Systems of Innovation John Cantwell and Simona Iammarino 19 Knowledge and Innovation in Regional Industry An entrepreneurial coalition Roel Rutten 20 Local Industrial Clusters Existence, emergence and evolution Thomas Brenner 21 The Emerging Industrial Structure of the Wider Europe Edited by Francis McGowen, Slavo Radosevic and Nick Von Tunzelmann
22 Entrepreneurship A new perspective Thomas Grebel 23 Evaluating Public Research Institutions The U.S. Advanced Technology Program’s Intramural Research Initiative Albert N. Link and John T. Scott 24 Location and Competition Edited by Steven Brakman and Harry Garretsen 25 Entrepreneurship and Dynamics in the Knowledge Economy Edited by Charlie Karlsson, Bo¨rje Johansson and Roger R. Stough 26 Evolution and Design of Institutions Edited by Christian Schubert and Georg von Wangenheim 27 The Changing Economic Geography of Globalization Reinventing space Edited by Giovanna Vertova 28 Economics of the Firm Analysis, evolution and history Edited by Michael Dietrich 29 Innovation, Technology and Hypercompetition Hans Gottinger 30 Mergers and Acquisitions in Asia A global perspective Roger Y. W. Tang and Ali M. Metwalli
31 Competitiveness of New Industries Institutional framework and learning in Information Technology in Japan, the U.S and Germany Edited Cornelia Storz and Andreas Moerke 32 Entry and Post-Entry Performance of Newborn Firms Marco Vivarelli 33 Changes in Regional Firm Founding Activities A theoretical explanation and empirical evidence Dirk Fornahl 34 Risk Appraisal and Venture Capital in High Technology New Ventures Gavin C. Reid and Julia A. Smith 35 Competing for Knowledge Creating, connecting and growing Robert Huggins and Hiro Izushi
36 Corporate Governance, Finance and the Technological Advantage of Nations Andrew Tylecote and Francesca Visintin 37 Dynamic Capabilities between Firm Organisation and Local Systems of Production Edited by Riccardo Leoncini and Sandro Montresor 38 Localised Technological Change Towards the economics of complexity Cristiano Antonelli 39 Knowledge Economies Innovation, organization and location Wilfred Dolfsma 40 Governance and Innovation A historical view Maria Brouwer 41 Public Policy for Regional Development Edited by Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Franc¸ois Vaillancourt
Governance and Innovation A historical view
Maria Brouwer
First published 2008 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2008. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.”
# 2008 Maria Brouwer All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Brouwer, Maria. Governance and innovation / Maria Brouwer. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Organizational change. 2. Economic development. 3. Institutional economics. 4. Political stability. I. Title. HD58.8.B758 2008 2007037741 658.40 063–dc22 ISBN 0-203-92951-9 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN13 978-0-415-43705-9 (hbk) ISBN13 978-0-203-92951-3 (ebk)
Contents
List of tables Preface and acknowledgments Prologue
viii ix xi
1
Governance and prosperity
2
Entrepreneurship and economic development
20
3
Organizations and uncertainty: the management of perceptions: from medieval Italy to Silicon Valley
44
4
Entrepreneurship and the state
61
5
Valuation and authority in failing firms: the role of reorganization in US and European bankruptcy law
81
6
7
8
9
1
Performance pay and uncertainty in entrepreneurial and bureaucratic firms
100
Executive pay and tenure: founding fathers, mercenaries and revolutionaries
120
Decision agents in corporate and political democracies: Venice, Florence and the Low Countries
141
Democracy and dictatorship: the politics of innovation
161
10 Waning and emerging empires Notes References Index
185 216 218 229
Tables
4.1
5.1 5.2 7.1
7.2 7.3 7.4
Financial development measured by stock market capitalization over GDP and the number of listed companies per million people, 1913–90 Outside finance as a percentage of GNP for five countries Creditors’ rights in five countries Comparison of compensation structures of Dutch CEOs of AEX listed companies in 2004 and of US CEOs of S&P 500 in 2002 Tenure data for founder/family CEOs Tenure data for non-family CEOs Average tenure of departed non-family CEOs, 1974–2005
77 84 85
129 130 131 131
Preface and acknowledgments
This book is the product of a journey that took me to several places and allowed me to meet many people. My stay in Amsterdam as a young student of economics was enlivened by meeting several people who guided me on my way. Tiny Fekkes-Peters, Suze Aleven, Madge Kalff-de Vries-Robbe´, Phia de Vries Robbe´-Polak and Jeanette de Vries Robbe´ were several of the noteworthy people I met then. My professional career started at Nijenrode Business School and from there to the University of Amsterdam with notable colleagues such as Rob de Lange and Derk Haank. My intellectual journey introduced me to Schumpeter’s writings on innovation, which resulted in a doctoral thesis and a book. After this, my interest in entrepreneurship took me to Boston on a study trip sponsored by Bert van Twaalfhoven, a Dutch entrepreneur. The visit to several venture capital firms during the Boston trip opened my eyes to the importance of finance for entrepreneurship. Several of my articles on entrepreneurship were published in Small Business Economics and I thank the editors Zoltan Acs and David Audretsch for their guidance. I also thank Albert Link, editor of the Journal of Technology Transfer, for his help in publishing my work. My interest in issues of management and strategy took me to Haarlem Business School and Nijmegen School of Management where I taught executive courses on Corporate Strategy and Organization Theory, and I am grateful to all my students for the interesting discussions we had. I would also like to thank the organizers of various Schumpeter Society conferences where I presented parts of the work: Stan Metcalfe (2000), Bob Lanzillotti (2002); Franco Malerba (2004) and Jean-Luc Gaffard (2006). Also thanks to EUNIP, Copenhagen Business School and the University of Antwerp for participation in their interesting conferences. Three papers that appear in this book were previously published in journals. ‘Weber, Schumpeter and Knight on Entrepreneurship and Economic Development’ was published in The Journal of Evolutionary Economics (2002) 12: 83–105. ‘Managing Uncertainty through Profit Sharing Contracts from medieval Italy to Silicon Valley’ appeared in the Journal of Management and Governance (2005) 9: 237–55, and ‘Reorganization in US and European Bankruptcy
x
Preface and acknowledgments
Law’, appeared in the European Journal of Law and Economics (2006) 22: 5–20. Thanks to Springer Publishers for their permission to republish these articles and editors Stan Metcalfe, Anna Grandori and Juergen Backhaus for their support. I also want to thank my students at the University of Amsterdam and especially Linda de Jong, Roderick Verkleij and Freek van Waveren whose theses contributed to Chapter 7 of the book. Yolande Vroons of the University of Amsterdam helped me prepare the manuscript. I also want to thank Routledge (Taylor & Francis) editors Terry Clague and Thomas Sutton for their support and assistance. Maria Brouwer, July 2007, Amsterdam
Prologue
The US government under President George W. Bush made the promotion of democracy and freedom a keystone of its foreign policy. However, there was less freedom in Venezuela, Russia and Thailand in 2006, according to a Freedom House report. Moreover, the performance of democratic countries was dismal in several instances. Nigeria, a formal democracy with an ailing economy, in spite of its rich oil resources is a case in point. Newsweek commentator Fareed Zakaria commented, ‘The basic problem facing the developing world to-day is not an absence of democracy but an absence of governance. This is what American foreign policy should be focused on’ (Zakaria, Jan. 29, 2007). Democracy thus is not enough on its own to create stable government that pursues peace and prosperity. This fact was also known by the people of the republic of Siena, who in 1297 commissioned Ambrogio Lorenzetti to paint frescoes depicting the ‘Allegory and Effects of Good and Bad Government’ on the walls of the Palazzo Pubblico. Good government was depicted as featuring an impartial judiciary endowed with wisdom and a city populated by virtuous citizens. Trade prospers under good government and the people are dancing in the streets. Bad government, by contrast, features crime, disease and a crumbling city. In the same vein, Ronald Reagan, in his farewell address of 1989, drew a picture of a shining city on a hill teeming with people of all kinds, living in harmony and peace; a city with free ports that hummed with commerce and creativity that was open to anyone with the will and heart to get there. The pictures of good government have not changed much in 700 years. Prosperity, peace and justice characterize good government. Both the Sienese and Reagan depicted good government by its results and not by its intentions. The question arises, how are these beneficial results created? The concept of governance refers to the allocation and exercise of authority (Zingales, 2000). Governance systems determine who is entitled to make decisions. Governance also indicates who is held responsible for the outcome of decisions and how this affects decision-makers. Governance encompasses both institutions and organizations. Institutions are ‘the rules of the game’ as recorded in laws and regulations. Examples of institutions are contract law, family law, property law, money and finance.
xii
Prologue
Economists agree that ‘good institutions’ are essential for economic development (La Porta et al., 1999). Upholding private property rights; the legal enforcement of contracts, an independent judiciary and a non-corrupt executive government branch promote economic growth. The same applies to an advanced financial and monetary system. Organizations are the players who play the game set by the rules. Democracy and autocracy are two political governance systems that differ with respect to how rules are made and decision-makers are selected. Democratic executives are elected for limited office terms at modest remunerations. They have to stick to the rules set by elected law-makers. Autocratic decision-makers, by contrast, obtain power by force or inheritance and have life tenure. They can change the rules without popular approval and use the country’s wealth for their own purposes. Democracy involves an open discussion of policies, whereas autocracy lacks open discussion. Leaders in both politics and business develop and execute strategies to achieve their goals. Executives only want to take risks, if expected profits outweigh losses. Commanders in chief, who win a war, can either seize the country or return home with a fixed pension. Successful business leaders can get a share of profits or a fixed salary. Modest remuneration should be paired with small losses in the case of failure. Executives in democracies and corporations do not have to give up their wealth or their life if their strategies fail. The stakes for failed autocratic leaders are usually higher. Democracies can elect a president with great authority or leave decisionmaking to a collective. Both democracy and autocracy can thus involve a single decision-maker. The same applies to the corporate world. Some corporations have a CEO, who is also chairman of the board, whereas others spread authority and responsibility over a larger group. Hence, both political and corporate governance show a rich variety of governance modes. Nations and corporations give up (some of) their authority, if they join an alliance or are acquired by another firm or nation. Historically, regional political entities were often subject to a higher imperial power. History records the existence of many empires from Mesopotamia to the British Empire and Germany’s Third Reich. Corporations also outgrew their home countries and expanded across national boundaries. Present instabilities of both political and corporate governance have spurred comparative and historical research on institutions and leadership. The law and finance literature points to the importance of ‘good for growth’ institutions and well-developed capital markets. The democracy and dictatorship literature wants to explain the evolution of government models (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006, 2007). Historians like Niall Ferguson have investigated the characteristics of former and present empires. This book will add to this literature by studying the relations between individual motivation and the performance of organizations. Political and economic change is fueled by individuals who want to improve their station in life and that of their family. Initiative in the business world is often labeled entrepreneurship
Prologue xiii and is closely related to new business formation. Some societies promote entrepreneurship, while others forbid it. Freedom for political action also differs considerably among nations. Democracy features freedom of political organization, whereas dictatorship forbids it. But, freedom in the political and the economic realm do not need on a par. Democracies can curtail the freedom of business formation and curb international trade, whereas dictatorships can open their economies and allow the incorporation of new business.
Outline of the book Chapter 1 discusses the literature on globalization; democracy, empire and institutional innovation. Economic theory has developed the persona of the entrepreneur as the main economic ‘change agent’. The meaning of the term, however, has undergone some changes, as is recorded in Chapter 2, which discusses entrepreneurship in the works of Max Weber, Joseph Schumpeter and Frank Knight. Weber’s original work on medieval maritime enterprises distinguished between the financier as the principal and the leader of the venture as his agent. However, decision-making was not restricted to the principal as the captain had to use his own judgment in situations of contingency. Chapter 3 discusses Weber’s treatise in the light of modern principal-agent theory. Chapter 4 expands the analysis of maritime ventures to the Dutch and English Indian trading companies and discusses the role of the government in European entrepreneurship. Risk-sharing contracts and limited liability arose in the medieval citystates and spread to the rest of Europe. Limited liability is essential to modern bankruptcy law. Chapter 5 discusses changes in bankruptcy law in the US and some European countries. Chapter 6 investigates the use of incentive pay in small and large firms. Incentive pay is a feature of entrepreneurial firms that are subject to large uncertainty. Large incumbents can better diversify their risks and practice fixed pay. Promotion can be used to stimulate employee motivation, but will not work, if the outcome is known beforehand and if it is independent of performance. Chapter 7 discusses recent changes within the corporate world, involving CEO compensation and tenure. CEO tenure has been considerably shortened, while remuneration has increased. These developments can be explained by the increased responsibility of CEOs for performance, more than was common in the past. Chapter 8 discusses the political evolution of the Italian city republics and the Low Countries in the late Middle Ages. Florence and Venice developed new governance models that ranged from direct democracy to guild democracy and dictatorship. The call for a strong man prompted Florence to push democracy aside at several points in its history. The same happened in the Low Countries, where military leadership prevailed. This
xiv Prologue was not the case in Venice, where responsibility for military ventures was shared among appointed generals and elected executives. Chapter 9 discusses some appropriation models and their relationship to innovation. Autocrats can appropriate a surplus by monopolizing markets, paying people less than their market worth or by innovation. Innovation thrives on competition and is hardly reconcilable with autocratic allocation. Chapter 10 discusses the evolution of past and present empires. It discusses the relationship between empire and democracy and raises the question whether empire is still a viable governance model in our days.
1
Governance and prosperity
Institutional innovation Institutions, as the rules of the game, structure human interaction. Institutions need to be distinguished from organizations, who are the players of the game. Institutional change emerges out of the interaction between organizations and institutions (North, 1990: 70). The type of organizations that emerge in certain periods and places is largely determined by rules and regulations (ibid.: 5). Institutional change also occurs when people break the rules in crime or by regime change. The type of institutional change thus depends on the type of organizations that come to the fore in a legal or illegal manner. Organizations like the trading companies emerged in medieval Italy to finance maritime ventures. Liability problems arose that could not be solved by existing laws. New concepts like limited liability emerged out of discussions on how to solve the problems in a manner that satisfied all parties. Representative democracy emerged in city-states to curtail the authority and liability of political decision-makers. New organizations that undermine peace and prosperity are war gangs and exploitative autocracies. North argues that institutions exist to reduce the uncertainties involved in human interaction (ibid.: 25). People will abide by rules, if they know if they are applied judiciously. Certainty in this area facilitates human interaction, but uncertainty can also have positive effects. Certainty about the coming of disaster will paralyze people, whereas uncertainty will prompt them to change the odds in their favor. Likewise, people will stay passive, if they fear the outcome of their actions, but will jump at new possibilities if they expect gains to outweigh costs. Traditional societies inflicted grave consequences on those violating tradition, which kept society stable though stagnant. Modern societies diverge from tradition and create room for initiative. Nontraditional organizations like cities and corporations have developed new codes of conduct that encourage experimentation and innovation. North argues that institutional change is driven by transaction costs. The gains from trade that generations of economists have modeled are reduced by the costs of exchange. Transaction costs involve the costs of writing
2
Governance and prosperity
contracts, but also the problems of moral hazard. Parties to a contract want to maximize their own objectives regardless of how these affect others. Employees want to shirk; suppliers want to provide lousy products; employers want to exploit employees and sellers want to monopolize markets. Moral hazard increases the risk premium to transactions and curbs investment (ibid.: 33). But uncertainty due to moral hazard needs to be distinguished from uncertainty that springs from uncontrollable forces like competition. We do not want sports teams to control the outcome of a game; likewise we do not want companies to control the market. Ventures may fail beyond the fault of the parties involved; markets may clear at prices below costs; competitors may appear on the scene causing the demise of a company. Competition makes the outcome of investments uncertain but this type of uncertainty bolsters the trust in the fairness of the game, whereas uncertainty due to moral hazard can spoil the whole game. Investment is ultimately based on the expectation that parties to a contract will put in an effort to meet their obligations. Otherwise, we have to create a command economy, in which each person fulfills prescribed activities under close supervision. Such arrangements will hardly turn out to be profitable. Moreover, they will stifle innovation, which is based on investments in novelty. Innovation requires a discourse on how to improve things. Ideas will only carry weight, if people are deemed loyal to the organization. Organizations have developed several ways to cope with moral hazard. Novices had to swear an oath before they entered a monastic order. Guild members had to go through a period of training before becoming master. Modern business corporations have developed new ways of control, such as behavioral codes, performance pay, corporate training and rituals to cement a common corporate culture. Investment and trade thus assume that organizations find ways to curb moral hazard. This applies with the greatest force to organizations that surpass national boundaries. However, some eras were more conducive to international trade and investments than others.
The ebb and flow of globalization Globalization involves a process of expanding world trade and increasing the mobility of production factors. Investors nowadays move their capital around the globe at lightning speed; people leave their hometowns to move to domestic or foreign cities to flee poverty and political turmoil. Some people abhor globalization because of the alleged exploitation of people and the environmental damage it would cause. It is argued that globalization widens income differences both within and between nations (Hardt and Negri, 2000). Large multinational corporations would replace indigenous industries. Local communities would lose their cultural identity and submerge in Western mass culture. Others contend that globalization creates opportunities for the many who have been excluded from prosperity up till now and consider it the ultimate vehicle of emancipation.
Governance and prosperity
3
Globalization is also assumed to affect politics. Nation-states are assumed to wither away and a new empire would emerge that obeys the dictates of the large multinationals and pushes democracy aside (Forrester, 2000). Others argue that small ethnic enclaves and city-states are arising in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union (Kaplan, 2000). The political effects of globalization are thus not undisputed. Some see nations disappearing due to emerging empire, whereas others foresee political fragmentation due to waning empire. History shows periods of rise and fall of long-distance trade. Trade was more extensive in ancient Greek and Roman times than in the early and high Middle Ages (400–1000 AD). Trade peaked in the nineteenth century and declined after World War I to rise again after World War II. The 1913 level of trade was only restored in 1973 (Krugman, 1995). Historically, trade surged, when cities grew, whereas the decline of cities coincided with a decline of (longdistance) trade. This applies to the cities that arose in the river valleys of Sumeria, Mesopotamia and Egypt. Maritime civilizations such as those of Phoenicia and Greece endorsed the rise of autonomous city-states. Greek citystates obtained autonomy after the Mycenaean Kingdom fell apart. Trade flourished in Athens of Antiquity and Athenian colonies were established along the Mediterranean coast. Some Greek city-states spawned democratic government, such as fifth-century BC Athens. Not all Greek city-states, however, furthered commerce and democracy. Corinth was ruled by a small aristocracy; Sparta by two kings and five ephors. Trade played a minor role in the economies of both Corinth and Sparta (McNeill, 1963: 202). However, Athenian democracy was not stable; Athens repeatedly altered the ‘rules of the political game’. Tyrants overthrew democratic government and installed autocratic rule. Oligarchs threatened Athenian democracy in 411 and 404 BC in an attempt to reduce progressive taxation. Inter-city warfare also undermined city-states. Athens was beaten in the Peloponnesian War after Sparta had concluded an alliance with her enemies (431 BC). Military defeat brought the end of Athenian glory. Many colonies chose Sparta’s side and the ones that had supported Athens were overrun by Sparta’s allies. The feelings of solidarity that had characterized Greek city culture disappeared in the wake of defeat. Thucydides recorded how Athenian society was divided into camps of friends and enemies. Sophists and other Greek philosophers put Athenian leadership under heavy scrutiny after the defeat. Plato (427–347 BC) wanted to cure Athenian society by abolishing all economic and social change. Everybody in his Republic carried out his hereditary duties as slave, soldier or aristocrat. The slaves labored, the soldiers fought and the aristocrats ruled. Freedom of speech was limited. Plato’s idea of social and cultural ossification to ward off change was not novel and was practiced by many later civilizations that preferred stability to innovation. Greek cities lost their independence in the Hellenistic period. The freedom of the cities of Antiquity was swept away by a bureaucratically organized world (Weber, 1978: 335). Overseas trade declined and the countryside gained political weight.
4
Governance and prosperity
The example of Athens illustrates how city-states rose and fell due to internal and external causes. The same applied to old imperial civilizations, whose existence was threatened by recurrent barbaric invasions and cultural ossification. The need for river regulation and an irrigation policy in the Near East and in Egypt, and to a lesser degree also in China, caused the development of royal bureaucracies (ibid.: 1261). The bureaucracy was charged with construction tasks and with the organization of the army. The Mesopotamian King Hammurabi, whose empire extended from the Mediterranean to the Bay of Bengal, founded the first royal bureaucracy and codified existing law (the famous Hammurabi Code). His royal judges, tax collectors and garrison commanders were sent all over the empire and he communicated with them by way of written reports. The development of a written language and of codified law greatly facilitated trade. Merchants could reckon on a universal judicial system and on royal military protection. The market mechanism arose as a new coordinating device distinct from command, but this period of economic and cultural bloom was brief. Stagnation set in round 1500 BC, when officials were required to undergo long periods of training, which ‘could scarcely fail to produce in each successful pupil a thoroughly conventional mind. Schools became jealous corporations, guarding both professional standards and professional privileges with an impartial rigor. Science – especially mathematics – which had flourished under Hammurabi, came to a standstill.’ (McNeill, 1963: 60–1). Sailors from Phoenicia ventured as far as Britain and the Atlantic coast of Africa. However, Babylonian culture was deeply conservative and the cultural bloom of Hammurabi’s days was never restored (ibid.: 136). Literature was only available in old styles of writing. Simplified scripts were developed for commercial purposes but were not used by the ruling elite. The Mesopotamian valley civilization reached its end, when nomadic tribes invaded the empire, which then broke up into many smaller states. Imperial rule was re-established, when local warlords submitted to a successful leader. Hammurabi’s laws were re-established and trade revived. The Persian Empire succumbed to barbarian attacks in 200 AD. Nomadic tribes also overran India and China on several occasions; most notable were the raids by Genghis Khan. The same applies to Ancient Rome, whose decline was hastened by Hun invasions. Nomadic steppe peoples distinguished themselves from civilized societies by their lack of investments in infrastructural works, such as temples and palaces. However, nomadic societies were capable of military and organizational innovation. Warriors were not highly esteemed in oriental literate civilization, but military prowess was considered the main virtue of a man in the nomadic war bands. Many civilizations could not overcome the steppe peoples, once they had organized themselves in a confederation of tribes. A charismatic leader such as Genghis Khan could overcome tribal differences and organize people under his leadership. The horse-mounted nomads constituted a rather egalitarian society during periods of war. This changed, when they
Governance and prosperity
5
settled down in the conquered territories and changed to more permanent organizations. Both city-states and imperial bureaucracies established institutions conducive to trade. This does not apply to feudalism. Feudalism was first introduced by the Parthans in 400 BC, who established military aristocracies to supervise provinces. Aristocratic titles were first granted to the most courageous and successful warriors, but became hereditary later on. A peasant village provided sufficient income to a lord, who – in turn – defended his subjects against nomad attacks. Feudal organization was not conducive to long-distance trade due to contributions in kind made by its subjects. Feudal military organization was better equipped to ward off foreign invasions and suppress domestic rebellion than a bureaucracy. Feudal lords were eager to expand their territory. However, feudal strife would weaken stability and create tensions between emperor and local rulers. Mercenary and slave armies were sometimes used to counterbalance local feudal military power. Religious authority was also invoked to strengthen central authority. Another device to overcome the inherent tension between centralization and decentralization was to move the aristocracy to the capital for at least part of the year. The feudal model was adopted by the Byzantine, Carolingian, Arab and Ottoman Empires. The military success of Islam was due to the confederate tribal factor, which remained important in the first centuries of Moslem rule. Islam rewarded its warriors in a feudal manner and adopted feudal organization and ethics (Weber, 1978: 624–6). Several Moslem empires or caliphates existed. The last was the Abbasid Caliphate – located in Baghdad – which lasted from 750 till 1258, when it fell due to Mongol and Turkish invasions. The Moslem world then fragmented into many local lordships. The period of political fragmentation ended, when the Ottoman Empire espoused Islam. The exploitation of feudal fiefs constituted the most profitable enterprise in the Ottoman Empire and the locus of power resided in the countryside. Only a few towns in Anatolia and Iran approached the autonomy of the free towns of Europe during the same age (McNeill, 1963: 496). Central power was supported by a slave army of converted Christian boys from the Balkan, the Janissaries. Trade flourished in the Roman Republic, but the Empire replaced trade privileges by the distribution of land to the military. Land ownership became hereditary in imperial Rome and tributes to the state took the form of either compulsory contributions or compulsory labor. The entire grain harvest was distributed to the cities according to their needs; surpassing the market mechanism. Trade revived in the late medieval and Renaissance period, when citystates such as Venice, Florence, Antwerp and Amsterdam prospered due to overseas trade. European globalization developed by fits and starts after 1500. The Italian city-states were succeeded by Holland and Britain as the main maritime powers, which – in turn – were superseded by rising powers
6
Governance and prosperity
like the United States, whose growth surpassed that of Great Britain in the nineteenth century. International trade peaked in the nineteenth century and declined after 1913, when protectionism and mercantilism recurred. Capital also flowed freely between the continents in the nineteenth century and World War I constituted a watershed in this respect. The recent wave of globalization thus does not constitute a new phenomenon. Each new wave of globalization has occurred when new organizations emerge that thrive on trade. Both political fragmentation and integration can spur trade. The decline and fall of the Mycenean Empire and the Roman Holy Empire gave rise to city-states that reinvigorated trade. The British Empire promoted trade in the nineteenth century. The question whether either a strong empire such as the British Empire or a weak empire such as the Holy Roman Empire promotes trade and growth has not been answered unequivocally. The answer varies according to time and place, depending on the new organizations it spawns.
The end of history? The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 inspired some people to predict the end of the ideological quest for dominance. Liberal democracy had become the uncontested government of choice of millions of people around the globe, preferred to monarchy, communism and fascism (Fukuyama, 1992). People were to be organized in nation-states, whose relations were peaceful and based on the principle of mutual recognition. Autocratic regimes based on ideologies like communism and fascism had proved to be unsuited to cope with the exigencies of post-industrial society. Hence, there is no alternative to liberal democracy and capitalism in our times. Democracy expresses the equality of all citizens and therewith calls for the end of dominance both within and between nations, in Fukuyama’s view. The desire for recognition and prestige had driven people into bloody battles for domination in the past, making masters out of victors and enslaving the conquered. This Hegelian interpretation of history leaves no other distinction between people than that of victor and victim. However, the French and American Revolutions created opportunities for all people to become equal citizens in a democracy. Liberal democracy replaced the irrational desire to be recognized as greater than others with a rational desire to be recognized as equal (ibid.: xx). With equal and reciprocal recognition the reasons for tyranny and imperialism would end too, as nobody wanted to impose their will on others. Without the desire for superiority, history would witness its ‘last man’: a person without ambition. The end of history would thus entail the end of progress. Fukuyama’s Hegelian analysis of people’s motives is somewhat limited, in my opinion. The same applies to his analysis of democracy. I want to argue that although liberal democracy is based on the ex ante political equality of individuals, this does not need to imply that each person has equal authority.
Governance and prosperity
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Some people rise to leadership, whereas others lack decision-making power. Some people gain wealth, whereas others do not. Fukuyama limits ‘recognition’ to the military powerful, whose superiority is ‘recognized’ by weaker people, but such ‘recognition’ is shallow, as it is involuntary. ‘Recognition’, in a liberal sense, refers to political and corporate leaders that are chosen. Democratic political leaders are chosen by the many, whereas entrepreneurs are initially chosen by a few investors. Investors in art and business gain, if they discern value before others do. Such ‘recognition’ is the main source of capitalist profits. It requires that investors hold different views on the value of a certain person or project. We could argue that ‘recognition’ is the essential ingredient of capitalism, which created a new peaceful game creating winners and losers, but benefiting all. Investment decisions are tested by the market, which can prove them wrong. An investor can refuse to invest in a certain venture, but is proved wrong, if other investors turn it into a success. Employers can refuse to hire certain workers, but will pull their hair out, if they become the star of their competitors. Economic theory points out that homogenous labor receives equal rewards but human capital is heterogeneous from the perspective of a business organization that wants to select those individuals that fit its organization best. Education is only an imperfect predictor of the value of human capital for a certain organization. Business firms, therefore, turn to unorthodox ways to select their favorite employees as Google did, when it developed an algorithm to select its employees, instead of relying on interviews and educational achievements. Liberal democracy is thus all about diversity and not the bland, homogenous soup of Fukuyama’s description. Liberal democracy can only achieve higher per capita growth, if its innovative powers exceed that of other governance systems. Innovation involves the introduction of novelty in economic life, whose value exceeds that of former ways of doing things. Successful innovation generates profits for investors and value for consumers. Liberal democracy has to be better at discovering the best people with the best ideas to out-compete other governance systems. Market competition forces firms to look for yet undetected human capital. The discrepancy between ex ante valuation and ex post realization generates profits and losses. Economic competition makes social positions volatile and therefore differs from feudal and bureaucratic governance, where a person’s fate was largely determined at birth. Only a few individuals could improve their position by joining the military or entering the royal palace. There were wars and battles, victories and defeats, but the greater part of the population remained unaffected by these changes. They tilled the land according to time-honored traditions, on subsistence incomes. Surpluses accrued to local and far-off rulers; shortages caused famines. Traditional societies largely lacked incentives for innovation and can be described more as a population of last men than our modern post-industrial society. Liberal democracy that offers incentives to individuals to improve their lives can better be described as a society of first men and women.
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Fukuyama’s analysis rests on the premise that the ‘best’ political system wins the contest, which ends the game. He argues that fascism was defeated together with Hitler, after which fascism lost its appeal and legitimacy. The collapse of the Soviet Union points to the economic defeat of communism. However, Fukuyama’s argument entails that democracy could also lose its appeal and be superseded by a new ideology or a militarily superior power. His argument of the end of history thus depends crucially on both the economic and military superiority of liberal capitalism. Arguably, capitalism won the race for production figures during the years of the Cold War, but has not yet won the hearts and minds of everyone.
The stability of democracy Francis Fukuyama predicted the end of history and the permanent success of liberal democracy. However, democracy has proven to be a rather unstable form of government. This applies to antiquity but also to modern democracies. History does not seem to support the hypothesis that democracy entails the ‘end of history’. The French Revolution did not mark the beginning of the end of history for France, but brought Napoleon and his drive for imperial power. The American Revolution did not prevent the occurrence of the American Civil War. The road to the end of history also made many detours in the twentieth century, when many European nations fell prey to autocratic regimes of both the Right and the Left. Fascism was based on the denial of the equality of all men and assumed the existence of a master race. Communism was based on the equality of all men, but some were more equal than others. Political leaders wanted to replace the vagaries of the market by state control of the economy and incomes. Consequently, people’s lives were put in the hands of a single authority, which turned out to be more interested in finding hidden enemies than hidden talent. The relationship between democracy and prosperity is also puzzling. Democracy was found to be positively related to per capita income (Lipset, 1959). The relationship between democratization and economic growth, however, is less obvious (Acemoglu et al., 2005). The positive relationship between democracy and income can be explained by the fact that, historically, democracy was the preferred governance model of commercial societies. Democratic government first arose in commercial city-states such as Athens, Venice, Genoa, Florence and the cities of the Low Countries. These governments were ruled by wealthy merchants, who wanted to preserve the rules of the game and protect property rights. The twentieth century featured many rapid movements from democracy to dictatorship and back in many countries. Many newly established democracies were unstable and fell prey to coups and revolutions. The history of Argentina is a case in point. Democracy was set up in Argentina in 1912, but a military coup led to the Peron era and a military regime. No Latin American democracy was stable in the twentieth century. The same
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applies to many Sub-Saharan democracies that emerged in the wake of decolonization. The development path of these newly founded democracies differs from British experience, whose democracy – once installed – was never threatened. Continental Europe, however, saw democracy alternate with dictatorship during the twentieth century in most continental European countries. We can argue that democracy provided new instruments for resolving disputes; such as the majority vote and consensus-building instead of using physical force. Yet, political disputes, which cannot be repressed, as in autocratic regimes, can destabilize democracy. Such disputes are not always resolved by parliamentary discussions, as the many regime changes in democracies in the past centuries testify. Hence, democracy carries the seeds of its own destruction in military coups and revolutions. Moreover, democracy can be abolished by democratic means. Democratically elected leaders can extend their tenure by decree. Such processes of aggrandizement could be witnessed in Germany, the Philippines, Zimbabwe and a host of other countries. Democracy is called stable, if it is not defeated by a foreign power or overthrown from within. The instability of democracy seems to follow naturally from the ever shifting balance of power between a rich oligarchy and a less well-endowed mass. Acemoglu and Robinson modeled coups as attempts by minorities (elites) to impose their will on the majority. Elites are always outvoted in democracies, since people’s opinions are derived from their economic position (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006: 211). The poor would always outnumber the rich in societies without a middle class. The logic of the ‘median voter’, therefore, impels the masses to support revolutions that expropriate the rich and elites to support coups. Change of government would spell the end of the old game and the start of a new one on a clean slate! The analysis of Acemoglu and Robinson, which is based on the distribution of the national produce according to either majority rule or military force, is not representative of liberal democracy, in my opinion. That is because the market as an allocation and distribution mechanism is largely absent in their models. Acemoglu and Robinson’s models are based on the assumption that distribution is determined by politics, i.e. the tax rate. The fear of the wrath of the masses forces ruling elites in dictatorships to distribute some of the national product to the poor in order to keep them from overthrowing the government by revolution. Hence, the revolution constraint would stop the ruling elite from complete expropriation. Moreover, a revolution would diminish the national product due to the destruction of assets (ibid.: 121). Acemoglu and Robinson model revolutions as a collective action problem; some will undertake revolutionary activities for the benefit of the many. Hence, revolutionaries are scarce due to the public good character of revolutions and the inherent ‘free rider’ problems (ibid.: 123). Yet this seems to ignore the fact that many revolutionary leaders
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Governance and prosperity
assume political leadership after they succeed in overthrowing the incumbent government. Lenin, Mao and Fidel Castro became leaders for life. Moreover, many former revolutionaries were not ‘rewarded’, but were eliminated as they posed a threat to single political leadership. Revolutions and coups need to offer ‘glittering prizes’ to the few who succeed in grasping power in a post-revolutionary society. A failed politician in a democracy loses his job, but not his wealth or his life. However, failed attempts at absolute rule carry great risks of losing both property and life. We could, therefore, argue that revolution does not suffer from a free rider but from a high risk problem. Democracy introduced the concept of limited liability into the political realm. Dictatorship, by contrast, raised both the rewards and the risks of political entrepreneurship. Dynastic rule can stabilize autocracy. Stable democracy, by contrast, does not depend on individuals, but on institutions.
Democracy versus oligarchy Alexis de Tocqueville, who wrote a perceptive analysis of early American democracy, also identified democracy with equality. US incomes were rather equal at the time of his visit to the US in 1831–32. We can argue that the US economy at the time consisted of small enterprises, which did not allow great differences of wealth and income. Anyway, De Tocqueville was struck by the equality of condition that he found there. Another of his observations involved the degree of organization by voluntary associations in both politics and business. He perceived the US as a society without an elite, and therefore characteristically different from oligarchy. He foresaw that equality would also be Europe’s future. De Tocqueville, who was born into a French aristocratic family that survived the French Revolution, compares US democracy to oligarchy, which had prevailed in France during the 700 years before the Revolution. The French territory came to be ruled by a small number of families with hereditary succession. Equality increased in this feudal context by the opportunities for advancement opened by the Church and commerce. Consequently, military prowess became less important over time; education paid off and the value of nobility depreciated (De Tocqueville, 2001: 26–7). The Crusades limited the number of nobles and their possessions. Eventually, all privileges were abandoned and royal power increased. His analysis describes how oligarchy gave way to single rule in France. The French Revolution toppled this structure and installed democracy, which was, however, of an unstable nature. He attributed the several regime changes that occurred in post-revolutionary France to be flowing from two different tendencies, which arose in the French Revolution. The first was favorable to liberty, as it loosened the absolute power of the monarch. The second was favorable to despotism as it did away with provincial institutions and installed centralized administration (ibid.: 71). The remnants of feudalism that were present in France before the Revolution gave at
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least some people a voice. They could hold a dissenting opinion, since their possessions and hereditary title made them largely independent of royal power. Only independent people can hold an opinion of their own in De Tocqueville’s analysis. Their independence derives from the fact that they cannot lose their title and possessions. The question, however, arises whether these magistrates were also responsible for their opinions. Moreover, De Tocqueville does not answer the question how many divergent opinions can lead to one decision. This might have been superfluous in French oligarchic government, if oligarchs had jurisdiction in their own estate. It seems, however, doubtful whether such decentralized government could curb the evils of arbitrary power. People could only escape arbitrary power by moving to another jurisdiction. De Tocqueville argues that a centralized democracy can entrust all decision power to a single person, chosen by the people. He predicts that representative government will fall prey to what he calls ‘the tyranny of the majority’. He here touches on the heart of the governance problem; the effects of leaving decision-making to one or a few persons. Both nobles and kings were infallible in the oligarchic system; if something went wrong; it was blamed on the advisers. De Tocqueville suggests that the democratic leader cannot fail either, because he represents majority opinion (which in his view is crafted by the press). Nobody would want to deviate from majority opinion in a democracy at the expense of total isolation. De Tocqueville sees two antidotes to this tyranny of the majority. The first involves the decentralization of government, which leaves some decisions to local government. This would open up possibilities for people to choose their own jurisdiction. People can thus vote with their feet, if democracy allows freedom of movement. Another mechanism for institutional improvement involves the way the US judiciary operates. De Tocqueville describes how US judges can diverge from general principles by declaring that a decision along these lines in a certain case would violate the Constitution (ibid.: 73). Hence, an individual judge can rejuvenate the law by offering a new interpretation. De Tocqueville was most struck by the abundance of associations he found in the US. He points primarily to political associations, which in contrast to Europe were largely peaceful; they wanted to convince and not to fight (ibid.: 100). Freedom of association extended to the economic realm, where people were free to found their own businesses. Freedom of association heightened motivation, in his view, because people could choose their own organization, which unleashed the energy of multitudes. De Tocqueville considers freedom of association the main comparative advantage of democracy. The disadvantages lie in the realm of culture and quality. His aristocratic background led him to presume that art that is made for the masses must be of a lower quality than art produced for elites. He applied the same analysis to science. The detached scientist of former days, who was more interested in general principles than in practical solutions, would not thrive in a democratic society, in contrast to oligarchic
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society. His assumption that a hereditary elite would always feature the best and brightest seems beyond the mark. However, his idea that people whose position is secure are more inclined to speak their mind freely contains some truth. However, their opinions are uncontested in the absence of competition.
The end of empire? Both Fukuyama and De Tocqueville saw democracy as the government of the future. Niall Ferguson, however, advocates a return of empire. He argues that the end of history will not come, since the struggle for mastery is both perennial and universal (Ferguson, 2004: xxii). He advocates empire as the governance model of choice, since history shows that the absence of a world power leads to the darkness of anarchy. Ferguson discerns a period of a-polarity that prevailed between 843 and 1095 AD, when the two halves of the Roman Empire – Rome and Byzantium – had passed the height of their power and imperial power in the Abbasid Caliphate and imperial China was on a steep decline. He describes this period as one in which people were inward-looking instead of outward-looking. The a-polar period constituted the antithesis of globalization. The world was broken up into disconnected, introverted civilizations, which were susceptible to raids on urban centers by less civilized people such as the Vikings (ibid.: xxvi). However, not all empires are considered beneficial. Ferguson distinguishes between liberal and illiberal empires; the former promotes trade, while the latter curbs trade. Liberal empires establish and enforce the ‘rules of the capitalist game’ on territories under their jurisdiction. International trade requires that both parties agree on the rules of the game. This can be accomplished, if both nations adopt one set of rules, or when nations mutually recognize each other’s rules. Institutions can also be imposed on people by an imperial power. Foreign investment is hampered, when nations are expected to change the rules and declare former obligations null and void. Twentieth-century empires defaulted on their debts and introduced new laws that expropriated people. Drastic institutional renewal also occurs in democracies that redistribute wealth. Expected, institutional instability hampers economic growth, as it adds a risk premium to investments. The British Empire was able to eradicate the risk premium on foreign investments by removing the risk of default. Bond yield figures for Indian bonds were below 4 percent in between 1870 and 1914 (ibid.: 191). Empire was a better guarantee than adherence to the gold standard, which did not prevent countries from defaulting on their debt. Argentina defaulted in 1888– 93 and Brazil both in 1880 and 1914. Consequently, Argentine bond yields were more than 200 basis points higher than Indian yields in the pre-World War I period. Hence, the British Empire boosted investment. A large number of developing nations defaulted on their debts after 1945. Consequently, investments in poor countries have decreased to a much lower level than was the case before 1914 (ibid.: 189). New institutions such
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as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) could not change this trend. Liberal and illiberal empires differ with respect to their attitude towards trade, but most empires were multi-ethnic. Some empires made government the reserve of an ethnic master class; other empires allowed subjects of various origins to move up the ranks of military and government bureaucracies. Non-Romans could reach high positions in Ancient Rome. But the possibilities for upward social mobility of subject people were far from perfect in most empires. Access to the elite was largely determined by birth. Some bureaucratic empires used learning as a method of ascent; China and Byzantium are cases in point. Feudal empires used military prowess, but entry into the ruling elite was restricted and the vast majority lacked any possibility of social improvement. Another question involves the extent to which liberal empire improved the living standards of people under their rule. The figures of nineteenthcentury British rule are not unequivocally positive. Indian per capita income more or less stagnated under imperial rule; it grew by only 0.12 percent per annum between 1820 and 1950 (ibid.: 194). This differed considerably from the growth in the British Dominions (Canada, Australia) and the United States. Moreover, growth in the Dominions also largely surpassed that of Great Britain. India’s meager growth occurred in spite of large capital exports to India to build railroads and other infra-structural works. True, India did better under British rule than China at the time and India’s economic performance deteriorated after becoming independent (ibid.: 175). The same rather bleak performance of British imperialism appeared in Egypt, whose years under British rule (1882–1956) were characterized by stagnant per capita incomes (ibid.: 222). This also happened in spite of large capital exports from Britain to Egypt. The primary reason for British involvement with Egypt was the protection of British investments and of safe passage for British ships through the Suez Canal. The British had heavily invested in Egyptian government bonds, which would lose their value if the country was unable to repay its debts. Ferguson argues that Britain acted in the same way as the IMF does today with bad debtor nations; they reorganize the debt and put good policies in place. But Britain could bolster their policies by naval force, unlike the IMF. The economic successes of nineteenth-century British imperialism were thus underwhelming. This differed from the performance of nations that had just become independent, such as the Latin American countries, which gained independence at the beginning of the nineteenth century. These grew as rapidly as the US in 1870–1913. Independence or promotion to commonwealth status, which signaled the achievement of maturity as a nation, spurred economic growth. We can argue that the British, Dutch, French, Spanish and Portuguese Empires had outstayed their economic welcome. Nationalist groups in both India and Egypt expressed their desire for independence in an increasingly forceful manner. But many nations, after gaining
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independence, choose economic isolation instead of pursuing trade. Moreover, they are subject to coups and subsequent regime changes, which deter foreign investment. The dismal performance of many independent nations seems to indicate that imperial rule is preferable. Ferguson considers the present predicament of many nations as a failure of de-colonization. Many new nations were not up to the job of nation- and institution-building and instead fell prey to ethnic clashes and corrupt government, which transferred a large share of international aid monies to foreign bank accounts (ibid.: 180). The consequence of political instability was that capital flows have been diverted from the poorest nations to developed countries and emerging countries in Asia, like India and China. Britain invested four times as much in Africa in 1913 than in 2000. But Britain invested even more in independent countries in the Americas than in Africa and Asia in 1913 (Ferguson, 2003: 244). The question, whether the world needs a new liberal empire could thus be answered in the negative, if we look at nineteenth-century data. The question only gains relevance, if we compare it to twentieth-century performances of independent nations. Ferguson has selected a successor to British imperialism; he considers the United States the best candidate for the job (Ferguson, 2004: 301). The US, however, has no imperial ambitions. It is an empire in denial that does not want to occupy nations. However, Ferguson argues that the few successes of US attempts at nation-building after 1945, i.e. Germany, Japan and South Korea, involved lengthy occupations and large military deployments. We could argue that the three countries mentioned above crafted development models of their own. The three countries opened themselves up to trade, but kept foreign direct investment largely at bay. This differed from the nineteenth-century development model, which thrived on foreign investment. The late twentieth century saw a revival of foreign direct investment, when India, China and other emerging economies countries were opened up to foreign direct investment.
Ethnicity as an organization principle The break-up of twentieth-century empires triggered the formation of independent nation-states and the rise of new empires such as Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union and Japan. We could argue that the twentieth century saw the fruits of nineteenth-century liberalism go sour. The promise of independence and equality that looked so shining in 1913 was smothered in wars and revolutions that entailed the rise of murderous dictatorships. The twentieth-century empires were short-lived in contrast to former ages, when empires lasted for hundreds of years. Both Byzantium and the Holy Roman Empire existed for more than thousand years. The Ottoman and the Habsburg and Roman empires existed for more than 300 years. The Dutch, British, Spanish and Portuguese maritime empires also existed for hundreds
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of years (Ferguson, 2006: lxiv). The Soviet Union lasted less than 70 years; Hitler’s millennial empire only seven years (1938–45). The twentieth century also witnessed the birth of nation-states based on ethnic identity, which signified a departure from multi-ethic empire. Ferguson ascribes the rise of ethnic nation-states after 1900 to the backlash to assimilation that emerged at the end of the nineteenth century, when people came to sort themselves according to ethnicity. Ethnicity is defined as ‘a combination of language, custom and ritual inculcated in the home, the school and the temple’ (ibid.: xlvii). This definition makes ethnicity similar to culture. However, a culture that is determined at birth and not by choice. Ethnicity as an organizational principle is diametrically opposed to organization based on voluntary association. Ethnicity can influence organizations in several ways. Organizations can give people of various ethnic origins equal rights, which can result in an equal distribution of leadership positions among ethnic groups within organizations. Organizations can also prefer one ethnic group to others, which results in a subordinate position of some ethnic groups, as prevailed in many empires. Ethnic preference can also lead organizations to exclude people of different ethnic origin. Exclusion can also take different forms. Ethnic groups can build their own organizations within larger political entities. Both government policies and a preference for within-group marriages (endogamy) contributed to the model of ethnic self-organization that prevailed in many societies. This model was discernible in the US, where ethnic communities had their own business enterprises, churches, schools and neighborhoods. Self-organization and segregation were also common in Europe, where Jews, Armenians and other minorities lived in their own quarters. This dates back to old city-states such as Venice and Constantinople, where ethnic communities lived segregated lives; sometimes voluntarily, sometimes involuntary. The model of ethnic self-organization has some drawbacks, as it locks people into their indigenous culture. Ethnic communities are basically involuntary associations, as they organize people according to inalterable characteristics and, therefore, lack free entry and exit. The closed character of ethnic organizations made them prone to crime, as in the Mafia. Another model of ethnic exclusion came to the fore around 1900, when ethnic groups wanted to establish their own nation-states. Ethnic groups like the Greeks, Italians, Germans and Romanians established their own nation-states at the beginning of the twentieth century. Others, like the Armenians and the Jews, aspired to do so. Ethnic differences, which had played a part in empires, were exacerbated in the new nation-states. Minorities which were predominantly occupied in commerce lost the rights of self-organization that had prevailed in empires, where they could live by their own (family) laws. The principle of self-determination introduced by the American President Wilson at the Peace Conference of Versailles at the end of World War I involved nation-building based on ethnicity. The treaty concluded at Versailles ceded part of German imperial territory to Denmark, Poland, Belgium
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and France. The treaty also involved the foundation of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and Yugoslavia as nation-states. Danzig became a ‘free’ city under the protection of the League of Nations. Poland expanded its territory beyond that of the treaty by wars against Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania and other countries. However, these new nation-states had sizable ethnic minorities, particularly Germans and Jews. Self-determination thus had its limits. It obviously did not apply to the United States, which was a multiethnic society. It also did not apply to minority groups within nations. It also did not apply to the Soviet Union. The expectations of self-determination held by the various ethnic groups within the new Soviet Union were brutally suppressed by Stalin. He dismissed the idea of a federal Union of Soviet republics and established a one-party dictatorship over an area that comprised almost the whole former Tsarist empire (ibid.: 157–8). A new multi-ethnic empire emerged out of the ruins of the civil war, epidemics and famine that raged from 1918 till 1922 and which cost about 6 million Russian lives. Ferguson argues that the main problem with the newly founded European nation-states was the contradiction between self-determination and the existence of minorities. Majorities were tempted to claim to be the sole proprietor of the nation and its assets (ibid.: 166). Discrimination gained importance as the role of the state increased in the 1920s and a national ethnic culture was imposed on minorities, which lost their own schools, theatres and universities. A policy of self-organization was thus no longer tolerated within the new nation-states. The most threatened minority were the Jews, who often lost their jobs in schools and universities in the new Eastern European nation-states. This differed from the widespread tendency towards cultural assimilation and intermarriage that had prevailed in Europe before the emergence of the new states. This applied particularly to intermarriages between Jews and gentiles, which had risen to large proportions before the 1930s. The number of mixed marriages in the German Reich had risen to 20 percent of all marriages involving a Jewish partner in 1914 (ibid.: 28). The Danish and Italian rates were comparable. Legal obstacles to marriage between Jews and gentiles were removed in most Western European countries and the US in the nineteenth century. Jews differed from other minorities by their prominent role in business and the professions in Western Europe and the US. Anti-Semitic parties arose concomitantly with the legal equality of Jews in Germany at the end of the nineteenth century, although their popular appeal was limited at the time. Ferguson argues that the formal equality of minorities in nineteenth-century Europe triggered a discriminatory response, which culminated in twentiethcentury policies of racial discrimination. This extended also to the Turkish state that emerged out of the former Ottoman Empire, which persecuted Armenians and expelled its Greek population. Twentieth-century nation-building differed from its nineteenth-century counterpart, when new nations experienced a huge influx of both people
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and capital. The population of the Americas became ethnically mixed due to the immigration of people from Europe, Africa and Asia. However, ethnic cleansing was the corollary of nation-states based on ethnicity. Mass migration ensued after the foundation of nation-states in Turkey and Greece. The same happened later in the twentieth century after the break-up of Yugoslavia and the foundation of Israel. These new nations differed from their nineteenth-century counterparts by their emphasis on ethnicity as a basis of nation-building in contrast to the ethnic heterogeneity that had characterized nations that arose in earlier times. The idea of ethnic homogenous nation-states raises two problems. The first involves the inferior position of minorities who lack the opportunity to create their own state. The second problem involves the wars that nations based on ethnicity want to fight to expand their territory and subjugate other peoples. Both Nazi Germany and the Japanese empire were expansive empires that wanted to vindicate their racial superiority by subjugating and/ or annihilating peoples they considered inferior.
The Cold War and after The defeat of the German, Italian and Japanese empires in World War II spawned the birth of a new host of nation-states. The same occurred in the Southern hemisphere, where new nation-states emerged out of collapsing European colonial empires. The bi-polar world of the Cold War divided nations into either friends or foes. The Soviet Union fought its ideological wars in the new nation-states largely by proxy. The direct intervention in Afghanistan constituted a rare exception to this rule as it preferred to spread its ideological message largely by supporting liberation movements abroad. The United States army fought several wars to protect their interests and their allies. The Korean War was a draw and the Vietnam War a defeat. The only war they won, the Cold War, was won without open military conflict between the two superpowers. The Cold War was won by manifest success and not by military force or persuasion. Ferguson notes the fierce hostility against liberal development models in both the West and the East at the time of the Cold War. Japan, China, North Korea, Vietnam and Cambodia all adopted non-liberal models of economic development in the twentieth century. The Soviet model of socialism plus one-party rule was more popular among new nations in the 1960s and 1970s than the American model of capitalism and democracy (Ferguson, 2006: 613). In a one-party system, the first winner takes all; socialism enabled the rulers to appropriate all the assets they wanted to seize. The US response was to support right-wing dictators in Guatemala, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Chile who were as lethal to their enemies as the communist dictatorships. The US also backed Pol Pot in his war with Vietnam; Saddam Hussein in his war with Iran and the Mujahedin in Afghanistan. This were all moves in the game of chess played between the Soviet Union and the United States
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in far-away theatres, which undermined the credibility of the US as an advocate of liberalism and democracy. Moreover, many US allies turned into US enemies. Saddam Hussein and the Mujahedin illustrate this principle most clearly. Those alliances were not based on shared political preferences, but on the existence of a temporary common enemy. The attraction of communist ideology has waned after the collapse of the Soviet Union and its end as a sponsor state, but religion has taken its place. Khomeini, who established the Islamic Republic in Iran in 1979, wanted to purify Iranian society and challenge the United States. Al Qaeda established itself first in Sudan and then in Afghanistan and Iraq to fulfill its mission of removing the US from Saudi Arabia and the Middle East by overthrowing Arab governments sympathetic to the US and by destroying the state of Israel (Ferguson, 2004: 120). The establishment of a Moslem empire akin to the Abbasid caliphate may loom as a future goal, but is impeded by a lack of military power and sectarian strife among Moslems. The Islamist movement is not so much based on notions of racial, but of moral superiority. Western civilization is depicted as decadent and its influence should be completely removed from Moslem societies. Islamism also expands by proxy and supports adherents both in and outside the Middle East. Terrorism – not explicit warfare – is their preferred mode of combat. They also avoid elections. Terrorism had for long been the favorite mode of combat of liberation movements in Russia, Ireland, and Bengali in their struggle against imperial rule (ibid.: 121). The US attempt to bring democracy to Iraq ran counter to the sectarian and ethnic fragmentation that followed in the wake of the disappeared dictatorship. The installation of democracy tends to unleash centrifugal forces as it allows people to grasp political power for their own group by all possible means. The situation in the Middle East bears some resemblance to the wars of religion that ravaged Europe in the sixteenth century after the downfall of the Holy Roman Empire. The new nation-states that arose had state religions and either expelled religious minorities, or made them secondclass citizens. History shows that the collapse of empire provokes new forms of integration. The two opposite movements of fragmentation and integration are discernible in the twentieth century, but also in earlier times. Ferguson regrets the collapse of liberal empire and the descent into the hell of hatred that was characteristic of the twentieth century. However, it is questionable whether empire offers the best integrative device. Empire gave rise to feelings of superiority, which provoked resentment. These feelings of superiority that the English expressed towards their colonies were not limited to people of different ethnicity, but were also expressed towards the inhabitants of the New World. The colonists were treated as a mixed rabble of Scotch, Irish and foreign vagabonds, descendants of convicts and ungrateful rebels by the English (Ferguson, 2003: 91). However, British notions of superiority were proved false by the rapid growth of the (former) colonies of white settlement.
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Moreover, a rentier empire like the British one, does not suit the United States. First, the US has a rapidly growing economy, in contrast to late nineteenth-century Britain, which was in relative decline. Second, the US is a net importer of human capital in contrast to the nineteenth century, when people left Britain in droves to build a new life in the (former) colonies of white settlement. The flight of capital and people indicates that opportunities outside the British Isles were considered more attractive than inside the country. The reverse applies to the United States, which attracts both money and people like a magnet. The countries of the European Union also attract many immigrants. But immigrant communities with high levels of unemployment pose a threat to the stability of European societies. The US seems to have largely overcome racial segregation by offering people opportunities in its buoyant economy. The US has become an ethnically mixed nation where the descendants of the Pilgrim Fathers constitute a minority, without losing its character through successful Americanization of newcomers. The people of the United States have one of the highest per capita incomes in the world. Their wealth is largely based on human resources and innovations in technology, organization and legislation.
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Entrepreneurship and economic development
Introduction Economic growth is considered a normal phenomenon in developed economies. However, economic stagnation has been the norm for long periods of history. Per capita income in Western Europe was stagnant or even regressed in the first millennium (Maddison, 2001) and was below that of Africa, Asia and Japan in the year 1000. Many African, Eastern European and Latin American economies in our times have experienced zero growth or even decline. Economic growth occurs when more production factors such as capital, labor and natural resources are put to economic use (extensive growth) and when factor productivity increases (intensive growth). Economic theory has produced several explanations for productivity growth. Investments in both physical and human capital figure prominently as explanations in neo-classical growth theory. However, neo-classical theory can only partially explain the productivity growth of the past centuries. The best explanation for the rest is technological progress that made both capital and labor more productive. The question of what triggers technological progress is, therefore, important. Technological progress is associated with advances in knowledge and their diffusion. Both the generation and diffusion of new knowledge depend on how new ideas are generated and adopted. Scientific knowledge spreads in a wave-like fashion; a new idea is adopted by only a few in the beginning and then by more people. However, societies have not always been receptive to new knowledge. The adoption of novelty requires a positive attitude towards new ideas, which can discard past knowledge and brush aside tradition. The adoption of new knowledge could also entail a power shift, if old leaders are dethroned and replaced by new ones. Progress assumes that existing ideas and ways of doing things can be improved. Entrepreneurial theories of economic development assume that economic development is shaped by individuals who start new organizations. Capitalism is special since it channels ambition towards the economic arena instead of the military where it was located in feudal times. Theories of entrepreneurship span a long period, at least from Cantillon’s time up to the present. Many scholars have contributed to the literature on
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the subject. They all wanted to unravel the way in which entrepreneurial initiative has contributed to economic development (He´bert and Link, 1982). This chapter analyzes the contributions of three leading social scientists: Max Weber, Joseph Alois Schumpeter and Frank Hyneman Knight. Schumpeter defined the entrepreneur as the individual, who founds a new firm that has a comparative advantage vis-a`-vis incumbent firms. The definition of entrepreneurship as new firm formation also applies to Weber and Knight. All three authors wrote their theories during the first two decades of the twentieth century and were well aware of each other’s writings. Their work constitutes a fascinating debate on the motives and effects of entrepreneurship. Their theories explain why new ventures emerge and how they are financed. Weber held the view that Calvinist parsimony would finance investment, whereas both Schumpeter and Knight considered external finance to be the main source of entrepreneurial investment. Entrepreneurship had only been a sideshow in economic theory after World War II. Neo-classical economics had pushed the entrepreneur out of the economic model, leaving no room for enterprise and initiative but only for passive calculation (Baumol, 1968). Entrepreneurship escapes neo-classical modeling by definition due to its relationship to novelty and change. The lack of interest in entrepreneurship in the second half of the past century can be attributed to the widespread idea that entrepreneurship would become more and more obsolete as capitalism developed. Weber contributed to this idea by emphasizing that economic life would become ever more rational. Large bureaucracies would take over as the predominant organizational form of capitalism. Schumpeter also became convinced that large firms would become the main vehicles for innovation and economic progress. He predicted that market societies would evolve from competitive to trust capitalism, which in time would give way to socialism. Schumpeter also contended that the demise of capitalism would be hastened by an increase of rationality in all realms of life. People would no longer tolerate the irrational elements of capitalism such as the incidence of business cycles and income inequalities. Hence, he considered entrepreneurship in the sense of new firm formation to be a relic of the past. Knight did not have such a strong opinion on the matter, but he expected that large diversified companies would become predominant due to their ability to reduce uncertainty. The view that large firms would become increasingly important was supported by the facts in the developed world during the latter part of the twentieth century. Firms did get larger on average, but this trend has been reversed since 1973. The increased importance of small firms and start-ups is indicated by empirical research, which indicates that the share of large firms in employment has decreased since the 1970s in Europe, Japan and Northern America (OECD, 2000). Political and economic events of the turn of the twenty-first century thus seem to mark a break from the evolutionary path that these authors foresaw. Let us now discover which elements of Weber, Schumpeter and Knight’s works are most relevant for contemporaneous entrepreneurship.
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Life and work of Weber, Schumpeter and Knight The German social scientist Max Weber (1864–1920) exerted a great influence on American social science. Weber studied law in Berlin; held chairs in economics in Freiburg and Heidelberg before he became seriously ill and was kept from working for about four years. After then he lived as a private scholar in Heidelberg. He only accepted a regular appointment at the University of Munich one year before his sudden death in 1920 (Weber, 1947). Joseph Schumpeter (1883–1950) was born in Moravia, which now belongs to the Czech Republic but at that time was part of the AustroHungarian Empire. As a young boy he moved to Vienna with his mother after the sudden death of his father. He was a brilliant student of law and economics at the famous University of Vienna, where prominent economists such as Boehm-Bawerk and von Wieser taught. Schumpeter was an economic prodigy, who wrote a history of economic thought at the age of 25 (Schumpeter, 1908). After taking stock of existing theory, he wrote his own treatise, Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (Theory of Economic Development), which was first published in 1911. Schumpeter contended that all economic theories up to that date only applied to a stationary economy and could not explain development, i.e. productivity growth. He gained a professorship at the University of Cnernowitz, located on the borders of the Empire and was later appointed in Graz, in which provincial intellectual climate he did not feel well at ease. A brief career in politics followed in the aftermath of World War I, when he became Minister of Finance in the Renner Coalition Cabinet in Austria in 1919, but he was forced to resign after one year due to heavy political struggles over the issue of nationalization. Schumpeter became a banker, but this career was unfortunate, when the Biedermeier Bank, of which he was president, failed in 1925. He became a Professor of Economics in Bonn in the same year and moved to Harvard University in 1932, where he stayed until his death in 1950. He wrote two major works while at Harvard: Business Cycles (1939) and Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1943). Frank Hyneman Knight (1885–1972), a farmer’s son from Illinois, studied chemistry, German drama, and philosophy at the universities of Iowa and Cornell. He also studied with Max Weber in Heidelberg. He completed his doctoral dissertation in economics in 1916 at Cornell, which was published in 1921 as Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, while he was Professor of Economics at the University of Iowa. Knight moved to the University of Chicago in 1928 and published several works on ethics and economic reform, of which The Ethics of Competition (1935) and Freedom and Economic Reform (1947) are the best known (Knight, 1982). This chapter starts with Weber’s articles on Protestantism and the Rise of Capitalism, which were first published in 1904 and 1905 in the Archiv fu¨r Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik. Schumpeter’s Theory of Economic Development, which was first published in 1911, can be considered a refutation of
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Weber’s theory. He stated that not the Puritan ethic, but innovation could explain economic development. Weber sketched a historical sequence of business organizations from antiquity till the early twentieth century in General Economic History (GEH). He pointed out that many organizational forms were designed to support the status quo and thus unable to cope with change. Knight translated Weber’s book on economic history, which was published in German in 1923. Weber’s book was compiled from lecture notes of a class he had taught a year before his death. Knight was an ardent admirer of Weber, who he referred to as ‘the most outstanding name in German social thought since Schmoller’ in his Preface to General Economic History. Weber had more admirers among American academics. Talcott Parsons, a leading sociologist at Harvard, translated Weber’s essays on the Protestant ethic in English.1 The book was first published as The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (PE) in 1930. Parsons also translated Part II of Weber’s Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft which had been published posthumously in 1921 and came out in English as Social and Economic Organization (SEO) in 1947. Apparently, prominent American scholars made great efforts to read German scientific publications, because of the fact that the German-speaking world was considered foremost in the social sciences at that time. Knight contributed to the debate by making uncertainty instead of rationality or innovation the central feature of his theory of entrepreneurship. In this way, he solved some of the puzzles, which had emerged from the works of Weber and Schumpeter.
Weber on Calvinism and economic development Weber sought the reason for the relatively rapid growth of western capitalism in the specific attitude to life of the Calvinist Puritans. In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (PE), his best-known book, he associated the economic rise of Holland, England and the American colonies with the presence of Puritan and Calvinist religious groups in those regions, such as the ‘Hervormden’, the Mennonites, the Methodists and the Baptists. These Calvinist groups distinguished themselves from Catholics and Lutherans by their specific concept of salvation, which cannot be attained through the church, but will only fall upon the predestined ‘elect’. The concept of predestination did not lead to fatalism, as Weber explained. ‘The true believer held it to be an absolute duty to consider oneself chosen and to combat all doubt as temptations of the devil’ (PE: 111). Lack of selfconfidence could be seen as a sign of insufficient faith. People were thus largely self-elected. Calvinism favored rationality in business matters, because material success acted as ‘proof’ of being one of the chosen (PE: 114). Weber calls the Calvinist attitude to life a rationalization of the world, because magic had been banned as a means of salvation (PE: 117). Calvinism also honored the acquisitive motive, whereas other Christian denominations had often denounced riches. Confession and good works had been
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replaced by duty and hard work and by abstinence of worldly pleasures. Calvinism – in Weber’s view – perfectly fitted a society of free laborers, who were no longer tied to master and soil by extra-economic considerations as in tribal and feudal societies. Such a situation existed in seventeenth-century England, after the enclosure movement had driven many peasants from the land. The Puritans, in Weber’s view, followed the example given by the Catholic monks, who also had applied rational methods to economic activities. Weber considered rationality the outstanding characteristic of both (industrial) capitalism and Calvinism. He drew a sharp line between adventurous and rational capitalism (PE: 20), placing speculative voyages for land and booty, the results of which could not be calculated in advance, in the first category. Weber thus portrays the Puritans as a group driven by religious zeal to apply rationality to the pursuit of economic activities. This differs sharply from the idea of the Austrian economists of his days, such as Menger and Boehm-Bawerk, who saw the equation of (marginal) utility to revenue as the main motivation of rational economic man. Such a scheme of things was insufficient to explain saving and entrepreneurship in Weber’s view, because economic man would only put in as many hours as were required to meet his daily needs. The Puritan, however, would be forward-looking. He would save to obtain wealth, which was considered a sign of godly approval. There was no room for feelings of class resentment in the Puritan world, because the unequal distribution of goods of this world was seen as divinely ordained in a pursuit of secret ends unknown to men (PE: 177). However, the wealthy could never rest in comfort, because their wealth would make it more difficult for them to lead the life of the righteous. But Puritanism also had its hard, judgmental side. The consciousness of divine grace by the elect and holy was accompanied by utter hatred and contempt for people who were considered sinners. Since the dividing line between saints and sinners was never known, sectarian divestitures were common among Puritans in order to keep a ‘pure’ church (PE: 122). Moreover, the formation of a new sect gave its followers the opportunity to escape from ecclesiastical regimentation of life as had happened in the Calvinist State churches, which amounted almost to an inquisition (PE: 152). Such despotism would enforce external conformity but weaken the motives for rational conduct, according to Weber (PE: 152). Calvinism thus had its authoritarian features, which is also apparent from the iron collectivist way Calvin had organized his church in Geneva, as Tawney wrote in his Introduction to the English translation of The Protestant Ethic. However, the Protestant religion could not prohibit the foundation of new sects due to its lack of central control. The late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were a period of religious revolts and nation-building. Many cities in Southern Germany and Northern Italy had gained autonomy, when imperial power started to decline in the twelfth century (McNeill, 1963: 541). The French, English and Spanish nation-states
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arose out of the collapsing empire. The new monarchies in England and France protected the corporate liberties of the townsmen in exchange for royal taxes. Germany and Italy remained divided until the nineteenth century. The Reformation also emerged in this era of imperial decline. Lutheranism and Calvinism arose as major Protestant denominations. Religious sects such as the Huguenots and ‘Wederdopers’ emerged who wanted to establish their ideal communities and obtain state power. The collapse of imperial and papal powers ignited the wars of religion of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (1500–1650). The Lutherans had conquered some territories in the Habsburg Empire, which they were allowed to keep in the Peace of Augsburg (1555). Princes could choose which religion would prevail in their territories, whereas converted bishops had to give up their territorial claims. However, the Peace of Augsburg did not hold due to the rise of Calvinism and the fact that some converted bishops refused to give up their bishoprics. Catholic rulers wanted to re-establish Catholic rule in the territories, whose ruler had converted to either Lutheranism or Calvinism. The Cologne War (1582–83) started, when its Prince-Archbishop converted to Calvinism. A majority of Protestant electors in the Electoral College would threaten the Catholic foundation of the Holy Roman Empire. The Thirty Years War (1618–48) started, when Bohemia rebelled against Catholic rule. All major European powers were involved in a war that cost many lives from both battle and disease. The 1648 Peace of Westphalia divided Germany into many territories with de facto sovereignty. The Dutch Republic obtained independence in 1648. France, which had fought on the Protestant side, emerged as the main European power and Spain as the main loser. The wars of religion were fought, because states were considered religious homogeneous entities. The events of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries demonstrate how the collapse of empire entails political fragmentation along ethnic/religious lines. The division between Catholic and Protestant states at the Peace of Westphalia curbed the freedom of religious association that existed in the Empire. Monastic orders and sects had been established during the Middle Ages and were often protected by feudal lords. This imperial tolerance could have extended to the new Protestant movements. Emperor Charles V had attacked the new religions, but his successor Rudolf II allowed the new sects to spread. It was the rise of the nationstates that caused the rise of religious homogeneity. The Dutch war of independence against Spain (1568–1648) was inspired by religious rebellion, but also constituted a tax revolt. The Reformers pillaged the Dutch Catholic churches and monasteries in 1566 at the beginning of their insurrection. Many Northern cities adopted Calvinism as a state religion. Amsterdam did so in 1578 and confiscated Catholic churches. The Dutch Calvinists obtained state power and constituted a theocracy for a limited period of time. However, some forces counteracted the movement towards a rigorous Calvinist state in the Netherlands. Most important was the loose federal character of the United Provinces, which lacked strong state power. The
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cities could, therefore, take their own stance in economic and judicial affairs. The city lawyers and magistrates were opposed to harsh persecution of the non-reformers. Moreover, the cities needed extra hands and, therefore, welcomed immigrants. Jews, who fled from Spain and Portugal after being extradited, could take shelter in Dutch cities, predominantly in Amsterdam. Catholics were tolerated after 1630, which meant that they could practice their religion, if it was done non-conspicuously. However, only members of the Hervormde Church could hold official positions in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in the Netherlands (Schama, 1987). Religious inflexibility was thus counteracted by the tolerance that commerce requires. The distinction between the preacher and the merchant has become a popular image of the dual character of Dutch culture. The Dutch have their principles, but they should not interfere with business! Some Dutch practices seem to fit Weber’s portrayal of Calvinist culture. Weber describes the repugnance of idleness and begging as a trait of the Puritan, who considers work a holy duty. This attitude is reflected in the harsh policies pursued by the seventeenth-century Dutch cities towards vagabonds, beggars and idle people, who were either put to work in the towns’ workhouses or deported (ibid.). This contrasted with Catholic (and Buddhist) attitudes that considered begging a respectable way of life. The Protestants lost their grip on Dutch government after the French Occupation of 1795–1806, which made everyone equal before the law. Many Catholic churches and monasteries were built in the nineteenth century. Religion remained a major organizational principle in the Netherlands until the 1950s. Each individual participated in organizations of a certain religious denomination, such as political parties, schools, hospitals, soccer clubs, and so on. This segregation of social life called ‘Verzuiling’ (pillarization) weakened in the 1960s. A special feature of Dutch segregation involves the right of each group to state funding of schools, hospitals and other services. A Calvinist state was never founded in England, because the Puritan sect members were outnumbered by the Anglicans. The English Puritans contested the authority of the state in religious and economic matters and were considered a threat to the English nation. Their fight against state monopolies and military conscription are cases in point. Weber considers this the main reason for the early emergence of a professional army in England. As a consequence they were kept from land leases and official occupations. Weber’s theory of the Puritan ethic applied equally to the businessman, the professional and the laborer (PE: 177). However, many Puritans took up entrepreneurship in England, since they constituted a religious minority to which other routes of social advance were closed. The same had applied to other religious minorities in the civilized world: Jews and Christians were the merchants and moneylenders of the Ottoman Empire. But those occupations were not highly esteemed in Oriental civilizations that placed them at the bottom of the social pyramid. A career in the state bureaucracy or
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army constituted the only road to social prestige in those countries. England and the Low Countries, just like the northern Italian cities of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries gave more scope to commerce and manufacturing, which gave rise to an influential middle class of merchants and bankers.
Schumpeter’s Theory of Economic Development Schumpeter contributed regularly to the Archiv fu¨r Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, which was edited by Weber in the 1920s (Augello, 1990). Schumpeter sketched a model of a dynamic economy in his Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (WE) in 1920. His theory can be considered a refutation of Weber’s hypothesis on the importance of the Calvinist attitude for economic development. He instead stresses innovation and leadership. Schumpeter defined the entrepreneur as the founder of a new firm and innovator, who breaks established traditions and opposes the old way of doing things. Schumpeter’s entrepreneur only undertakes those ventures, which turn out to be successful (WE: 177). The entrepreneur’s special leadership qualities enable him to see the right way to act. Others will follow in his wake. In order to introduce his innovations, the entrepreneur needs to withstand the opposition of the environment, which is usually hostile to deviating behavior and novelty. ‘All deviating behavior of a member of a community meets with disapproval from the other members’ (WE: 118). Moreover, the individual is also restrained from doing something new, due to the psychic and physical efforts it requires to leave familiar paths (WE: 120); it is the difference between swimming with the current and against the current (WE: 121). Schumpeter’s entrepreneur, however, takes a delight in this opposition (WE: 132). He is a creative non-conformist and not a religious dissident. He is warmly welcomed by the banking community that grants him credit to finance his attack on established positions. Bankers are supposed to be gifted with perfect foresight, for they can discern the best and brightest entrepreneurs without difficulty. Schumpeter’s entrepreneur is a leader, who breaks the ‘circular flow’, actively steering the economy away from old paths and opening up possibilities hitherto unknown. The circular flow describes a stationary economy, in which economic processes are repeated period after period without change. Prices and quantities do not vary in the circular flow and can be completely deduced from the data. The interest rate equals zero, and net investments are absent. Schumpeter used the concept of the circular flow as a point of reference to indicate the changes that are caused by the introduction of innovations. His concept of the circular flow had many predecessors as is indicated by the various references to the concept of a stationary state in his History of Economic Analysis (HEA). The first reference is to Plato’s utopian vision of a Perfect State, described in his Republic. Born out of dissatisfaction with the changes that Athens went through in
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his lifetime, Plato outlined the preconditions for a stationary Utopia such as a stationary population, constant wealth, division of labor according to ability and limited freedom of speech (HEA: 55–6). The authoritarian aspects of Plato’s Perfect State are absent in Schumpeter’s description of a circular flow, which is not directed by command, but by perfect competition and established routines. Schumpeter unravels how productivity increases are produced by the appearance of clusters of innovative firms, which set off (cyclical) waves of investments and disinvestments. Entrepreneurs who founded new firms introduce innovations, because established firms are reluctant to change their routines. Established businesses will postpone innovation until their old assets have become obsolete. New firms are not impeded by former investments and will, therefore, speed up economic progress by introducing innovations before incumbent firms would. Schumpeter pointed out that innovation could inflict losses on incumbent firms, which he labeled ‘creative destruction’. Schumpeter explains how innovations gain a premium due to lower costs or higher value. The differential with previous methods and products accrues to the entrepreneur until it vanishes due to competition by imitators. Schumpeter argued that the positive price–cost margin constitutes the source of all profits and interest payments. Consequently, all former theories of interest, including Boehm-Bawerk’s, were incorrect, in his view. Neither waiting nor the lengthening of the production period constitutes the source of interest and profits, but innovation is the source. Capital -deepening means that labor is replaced by capital, but it does not need to entail overall productivity increases. This can only occur, if fewer production factors are used to produce a certain product or the same quantity of production factors produces more value-added. Schumpeter sketched a theory, in which the interest rate equals the profitability of the marginal entrepreneur (Schumpeter, 1912: 383). Hence, innovative profits are split between interest payments and a residual that accrues to entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurial income reflects entrepreneurial quality; the best entrepreneur receives the highest incomes, whereas the marginal entrepreneur’s profits just suffice to pay his banker. Schumpeter agrees with Weber on the non-hedonistic nature of the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur does not resemble ‘economic man’, who weighs (marginal) costs and benefits and stops working at the moment when the costs of the extra effort (fatigue) exceed the extra satisfaction (WE: 126). Such behavior, according to Schumpeter, is characteristic of the circular flow. The entrepreneur – by contrast – is prepared to work countless more hours in order to achieve his goal. However, Schumpeter’s entrepreneur is not a Puritan. He does not abstain from the world, but participates fully in politics and culture. He is not motivated by the belief of belonging to the ‘elect’, since the banking community has already chosen him. The main difference from Weber’s picture of the entrepreneur thus involves the distinction between self-selection coupled with saving and selection by the financial
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community. Schumpeter’s entrepreneur is motivated by the joy of creating and by the pleasure success brings (WE: 141). He is not motivated by rewards beyond his lifetime, but wants to improve his social position (and that of his family). Leaders in former ages had largely based their leadership on military and bureaucratic expedience and not on commercial qualities. But innovative qualities can occur everywhere and are thus not system-specific, in Schumpeter’s view. The clan-leader could also lead his people into new territories, as could the feudal knight. However, not all economic and social systems are equally well equipped to innovate; he mentions India and China as two countries without much innovation to prove his point that economic development is not obvious and automatic (Schumpeter, 1912: 113). He also remarks that it is harder for individuals to break established traditions in primitive societies without upsetting others due to their communal way of living (ibid.: 119). Schumpeter considered entrepreneurial behavior to be non-rational, because it did not fit in with the model of ‘economic man’ designed by the marginalist school. Weber’s Puritan and Schumpeter’s entrepreneur are both forward-looking, whereas rational economic man is supposed to live only by the day. But such long-term thinking could be called rational by modern standards. Weber’s concept of rationality was not always perfectly clear. Schumpeter pointed this out in a seminar, which he gave at Harvard University in 1940; among those present were Parsons, Sweezy and Leontief. Schumpeter distinguished between formal or objective and substantive or subjective rationality in this seminar. Formal rationality applies, if costs and benefits can be calculated accurately: a means–end relationship. Subjective rationality refers to the achievement of absolute values irrespective of costs. Salvation fits in with the latter rationality concept. However, the two concepts coincide in Weber’s portrait of the Calvinist, who only engages in profitable enterprise. Schumpeter rejected Weber’s portrait of the scrooge capitalist and replaced it by the well-mannered gentleman, who wanted to build his own estate. But calculability also featured largely in Schumpeter’s work. The absence of uncertainty could explain why financiers are only meagerly rewarded by base rate interest payments, whereas the entrepreneur obtains the rest of the innovation premium in accordance with his capabilities. Hence, innovative investment is considered devoid of any risk. Schumpeter, however, did mention risk in the German edition of Theory of Economic Development, where he stated that foreseeable risk can be reduced to costs (Schumpeter, 1912: 49). Interest rates will rise by a certain percentage, if some of the new ventures are expected to fail (ibid.: 387). The percentage of failures can be calculated based on experience. Moreover, losses would mainly occur in the old firms, which were unable to adapt to new economic conditions in time (ibid.: 493). Schumpeter’s ideas on this matter lie at the foundation of Knight’s theory of profit, as will be demonstrated below.
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Knight on investment and entrepreneurship Frank Knight, in his seminal contribution to economics, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, remedied Schumpeter’s disregard of uncertainty and in so doing laid the foundation for modern finance and organization theory. He was one of the founding fathers of the famous Chicago School in economics. Knight was acquainted with German economics texts. It seems, therefore, plausible to assume that he was familiar with Schumpeter’s Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, when he wrote his thesis, Theory of Profits and Uncertainty in 1916, which was published as Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (RUP) in 1921. Knight agreed with Schumpeter on the matter of capital deepening. He stated that the length of life of capital goods is a matter of choice and can never be a source of profits (Knight, 1939). Knight also agreed with Schumpeter that profits and interest can only exist in a progressive society, although interest could be paid for consumption loans (RUP: 328). Innovation is the source of profits and can only occur when investment is used to create new resources. Knight differed somewhat from Schumpeter on entrepreneurial motivation. He considered the desire to excel, to win the game, the biggest and most fascinating game yet invented, not excepting even statecraft and war, the main motivating force (RUP: 360). But his theory differs from Schumpeter’s on one essential point. Schumpeter did not deal with uncertainty, as was mentioned above. Bankers would always pick the right entrepreneurs. It might have been Schumpeter’s (and Weber’s) familiarity with the credit mobilier type of banking and the disastrous consequences of the failures of these banks that made them emphasize calculability. Knight, however, contended that only uncertainty can explain profits (and losses). Not all ventures will become successes; some will fail. However, which ventures will succeed and which fail cannot be predicted in advance. He also remarked that the profits (and losses) of change come largely in the form of readjustments of capital values. Hence, where Schumpeter assumed that bankers do not make mistakes in selecting entrepreneurs, Knight made errors the basis of his theory of entrepreneurial profits (and losses). The crucial type of decision in all organized activity, according to Knight, involves the selection of men to make decisions. Any other sort of decision-making or exercise of judgment is automatically reduced to a routine function (RUP: 297). Uncertainty needs to be sharply distinguished from risk in Knight’s view. Risk is calculable a priori and can, therefore, be treated as a cost. Experience can teach us what percentage of bottles is going to burst in a champagne factory. These damages can be included in our cost calculations (RUP: 213). Other types of risk, such as the incidence of fires, can be insured. ‘Uncertainty, in contrast, is uninsurable, because it depends on the exercise of human judgment in the making of decisions by men and although these estimates tend to fall into groups within which fluctuations cancel out and
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hence to approach constancy and measurability; this happens only after the fact.’ (RUP: 251). The major difference between risk and uncertainty thus consists of the possibility of making ex ante calculations of the incidence of an event. That can be done for fires, but not with respect to the outcomes of investment projects that can only be calculated after everything is said and done. Knight borrowed from Schumpeter the idea that entrepreneurs are not self-selected but chosen by investors, who – in contrast to Schumpeter’s portrayal – are not infallible but subject to error. Knight’s theory portrays investment as a discovery process. Many new ventures will be launched, but only some will survive and prosper. Such a sketch of events fits actual developments. Many new businesses were launched in the 1990s, of which a few obtained astronomically high valuations. This happened before they actually made profits, which supports Knight’s thesis that not actual profits but profit expectations are the decisive element in investment. The development of financial markets has made it possible to measure success by readjustments of capital values before actual profits have been reaped. We can also conclude that investment under conditions of uncertainty requires other methods of finance than debt. (High) chances of failure require a risk premium on interest, which curtails investment. Equity capital is therefore more suited to the task of financing uncertain ventures than debt. Knight pointed out that only the investor with above-average skills of perception would earn (excess) profits, whereas investors, whose perceptiveness was below average, would lose out on their ventures. Perceptiveness refers both to project choice and to the timing of investment. Knight contended that the average rate of return on investment does not need to exceed the riskfree rate of return in the long run (RUP: 284). Hence, both Knight and Schumpeter argued that investors as a group do not need to earn excess profits. Knight’s investor/entrepreneurs only need to be compensated for losses caused by uncertainty out of profits. Founders do not need to be residual claimants in Knight’s view. Their incomes could take the form of salaries. It is obvious that uncertainty in investment, just as in sports, only exists, if more than one company/team vies for the same prize and if the result cannot be predicted with any accuracy. The match would be superfluous, if the ‘best’ team can be indicated before the event. The same applies to the business world. Only one innovative firm needs to be launched, if the best innovator can be discerned ex ante. The best employee is also the best entrepreneur, if standards of excellence apply equally to entrepreneurs and employees. As a consequence, all investors would flock to the designated winner, which would drive up the price of that person to the point at which no profits are left for the investor. Moreover, this innovator has no incentive to start his own company but will earn exactly as much as an employee (Brouwer, 2000). I hold the view that Knight has corrected Schumpeter’s theory on an essential point. Profits (and losses) can only appear, if uncertainty is
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present. In fact, all profits would vanish, if the winning person or company could be indicated ex ante. If everybody had known beforehand that Microsoft would become the most successful company of the 1990s, investors would have rushed to provide funding and the list of prospective employees would have been infinite. As a consequence, Bill Gates could have obtained all the money he wanted at risk-free rates of interest and could have paid his employees just standard wage rates. However, Gates was funded by venture capital firms, which took equity shares in his firm. The same applies to him and his co-founders, who were also paid (partly) by equity shares. Most founders of ‘high tech’ start-ups receive modest salaries, but get equity shares in compensation. Microsoft became an enormous success and everybody was handsomely rewarded for their wise choices. However, a host of start-ups, which turned out to be failures and whose investments were largely lost, counterbalance the Microsoft success story. Uncertainty can explain many features of innovation, such as the relatively small size at which innovative ventures are launched. The rationale for this is that losses are limited in the case of failure. It can also explain why many start-ups are short-lived and why some grow very rapidly. Only firms that are expected to become successful will receive several rounds of finance to expand. Moreover, uncertainty is also a major motivating force. This applies to sports, but also to economics. No firm would invest in innovation, if it knew that it would lose out to an objectively better competitor. But this competitor in turn would have no incentive to disrupt existing routines, since this could hurt former investments. Both Weber and Schumpeter came to believe that innovation can proceed unhindered in socialism. This becomes plausible when we realize that both authors did not incorporate uncertainty into their theories.
Weber’s history of organizations Weber’s General Economic History (GEH) gives a powerful sketch of economic history from ancient times until 1920. He analyzes several historical forms of economic organization, such as the clan, ancient bureaucracy, the manor, the guilds and modern bureaucracy. The two volumes of Science and Society (SEO) analyze political organizations and legal systems in a crosssectional sense without pointing at an evolutionary trend. Some political organizations had flourished, but were overwhelmed by more powerful adversaries. Some legal systems such as Roman Law had succumbed to more primitive legislation. Hence, there is no progress discernible in governance systems. Weber discerns progress in the evolution of economic organizations from the late Middle Ages to the twentieth century. New organizations arose which were superior to former ones. Hence, economic development from that date is pictured as a process of organizational and institutional innovation, in which more rational forms prevail over irrational ones.
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Most primary organizational forms were directed towards protection of their members against outside aggression. This applies to the clan, which Weber saw as the primal organizational unit and as an agency of blood revenge and the prosecution of feuds (SEO: 128). The clans did not possess written laws; clan members were totally dependent on their leaders for their lives and livelihood. The clan and later the sedentary agricultural village were composed of several families. The power of the clans could only be broken, if a political system was established, which eroded the absolute power of the chieftain. All early civilizations, in his view, such as the Egyptian, Greek and Roman civilizations, had loosened the grip of clan and family on people and had established more rational forms of organization. Weber mentioned Ancient Egypt as an example of a huge bureaucracy with a very extensive division of labor. Officers in a bureaucracy are chosen on the basis of some kind of proven expertise. This contrasts with the selection of officers (such as the medicine man) in a tribal society, which relies largely on magic. Feudalism constitutes a form of political organization, which superseded kinship and blood ties and, therefore, embodies some rational aspects, in Weber’s view. In feudalism, the tribes are subjugated to an overlord, who in turn has been appointed by the emperor or prince. Feudalism emerged gradually through either the contracting out of taxation benefices to administrators (such as to the mandarins in China) or through the granting of fiefs to militaries (the feudal lords of the Occident and the Ottoman Empire). The power of the clans was completely broken in the Occident, but not in the Orient according to Weber (GEH: 45). Life on the countryside in occidental feudalism revolved around the estate or manor. Peasants were either obliged to pay fixed or variable fees (such as in sharecropping) to their landlords and/or were subjected to compulsory labor on the estate. A landed aristocracy replaced the clan leader in its task of defending the life and good of the people. But, the manor or oikos was not organized along rational lines. Holdings were usually of sub-optimal size. Income was largely determined by privileges and obligations, which were passed on from generation to generation. Part of the medieval populations lived in cities, which had their own organizations. The inhabitants of the towns in Western Europe usually did not start out as free men, but fell under the jurisdiction of a feudal lord. It was only when they became engaged in trade that they reached the status of mercator and of free citizen. The citizens of the medieval towns were relieved from feudal obligations but had to pay taxes to the emperor or king. The lords of the manor were opposed to town privileges. The prince and the emperor, however, were willing to grant privileges to the towns in order to increase tax incomes. The cities featured new economic organizations, such as guilds and maritime ventures. The guilds as associations of free craftsmen did not develop outside Western Europe (GEH: 137). Instead, every individual belonged to a clan or caste in the Orient. Guilds never existed in China, because clan organization was dominant. Guilds did not develop in
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India either, since the division of labor was organized along lines of castes, which can be seen as ritualistic guilds (GEH: 137). Craftsmen and merchants populated the towns, whereas peasants, who were attached to the land by feudal obligations and rights, populated the countryside. The establishment of the towns introduced trade, because the town people needed to be fed by agricultural surpluses, which were exchanged for handicraft and imported products on local markets or by peddlers. Towns were much more numerous in occidental than in Eastern Europe. Weber remarks that the power of the towns reduced that of the estates (GEH: 89). This happened first in the ‘free’ city-states of southern Germany and northern Italy. The cities thrived on trade and were the seedbeds of organizational and institutional innovations that favored market transactions. Its military basis made occidental feudalism rather unstable. The power of a king or prince was never absolute, as he had to rely on the military capabilities of local lords to sustain his power. The inherently instability seems to have contributed to the development of towns and therewith to commerce and enterprise in Western Europe. The emperor or king could curb the power of the aristocracy and expand its tax revenues by granting royal privileges to cities in exchange for a guarantee of their corporate liberties and protection against the feudal lords (McNeill, 1963: 542). Some cities came to develop their own military capability and supplanted the feudal lords. Towns established their own states. Italian towns such as Florence and Venice are cases in point. Free guilds became the dominant organizational form for craft workers in Western Europe after craftsmen had thrown off the feudal shackles. Weber indicated that several organizational forms were not up to the transition to a market economy. The manorial system in agriculture, which had existed in Europe for many centuries, was bound to shatter, when faced with market forces. The newly developed bourgeois interests of the towns promoted the weakening of the manor to expand their market opportunities. The manorial system curbed the purchasing power of the rural population due to the compulsory services and payments it demanded from the tenants. The manorial system also prevented the creation of a free labor market because it attached the peasants to the soil (GEH: 94). The guilds promoted production for the market, which gradually supplanted the division of labor within the manor. Where the guilds were not victorious or did not arise at all, home industry and tribal industry persisted (GEH: 147). This applies to Eastern European feudalism. Russian peasants could not break loose from the soil because of eternal rights and obligations to the estate and to the communal Mir organization until serfdom was abolished in the late nineteenth century. Weber considered Western guild organization to be more rational than the manor. Craft guilds promoted professional competence. People could only become a master and open their own shop after a long period of training. More importantly, admission to the western guilds was usually
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based on skills and not on family ties, although minorities were often excluded from the guilds. The guilds were first regulated by the town lords, who demanded both taxes and military services from guild members, but all these prerogatives were later acquired by the guilds (GEH: 148). The guilds used their newly won freedom to establish an effective monopoly in their trade. Guild regulation protected its members from competition. It was impossible to set up a shop without the guild’s consent. Moreover, the number of masters and therewith of shops was strictly regulated in order to restrain output. Equality prevailed within the guild organization. No master could improve his position beyond that of another. Hence, no shop could ever increase its market share. The guilds’ initial boost to progress petered out, when the adverse effects of their regulations became dominant. Moreover, guild members could own no capital of their own, and were therefore restricted to non-capital-intensive production methods. The few capital goods in existence such as grain and wood mills were often owned by the town or by a cooperative. New organizations appeared in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which broke the power of the guilds. Journeymen, who were not allowed to become masters, set up their own businesses. They could do that outside the jurisdiction of the towns in the countryside; the putting-out system resulted from the attempt to escape guild regulation. Rural labor was amply available in England due to the enclosure movement. Production could expand beyond local demand to supply export markets (GEH: 94). But guild regulation persisted in many trades especially in Germany. The German princes more or less operated on behalf of the guilds and the guilds remained strong within Germany for a long time. The remnants of the guild system can still be found in some German trades, in which the Handwerkergesetze apply. The putting-out form of enterprise could thus only flourish outside the guild organizations. The same applies to the trading companies of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which were organized in a corporate form. The Dutch East India Company (VOC) was a joint stock company with indefinite life, which raised capital by issuing shares to participating merchants. The VOC was preceded by maritime ventures that were organized along the lines of the Italian commenda organizations. The VOC existed from 1602 till 1790 and employed several thousand people in its heyday. It was a multi-plant company consisting of six local chambers. It employed shipyards and warehouses as well as organizing maritime expeditions. The VOC and other trading companies had many traits in common with the modern corporation. However, they were chartered by the state, and endowed with monopoly rights. As a consequence the VOC was considered to represent the national interest. The English adopted ‘the Statute of Monopolies’ in the early seventeenth century, which ended the Crown’s prerogative to grant monopoly rights. Monopolies could now be challenged in courts and disappeared rapidly from the English scene. Incorporation of voluntary groups spread rapidly in seventeenth-century Elizabethan England
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as is shown by the popularity of the joint stock company (North and Thomas, 1973: 154). The guilds were initially conducive to progress, but arrested progress later on. The guilds came to eschew novelty and wanted to maintain existing privileges and therewith the status quo. They began to show traits of caste organizations as in India, which forbade all use of new roduction methods. Guild organizations gradually gave way to capitalist organizations such as the joint stock company; but this process was initially limited to England and Holland. Other Western European nations such as France and Spain upheld monopoly privileges much longer and only allowed free incorporation at a much later date (ibid.: Chapter 10). Weber wanted to demonstrate in General Economic History that organizational and institutional change is not immanent to all types of societies. He emphasized that capitalist business enterprise could only emerge after production factors had become mobile and property rights had been established. Labor should not be bound to master and soil by hereditary and, therefore, irrational traditional ties. Migration dates back to ancient times, when people moved from the hills to the riverbed valleys of Mesopotamia and Egypt. The clan chieftain and also the father as the head of the family were robbed of (part of) their possessions and privileges, when new organization arose. The same happened when Greek and later Italian cities rose to prominence and contractual labor relations gradually replaced serfdom, royal privileges and communal land ownership Apart from labor, land also needed to become freely negotiable before capitalism could take off. Private property in land emerged during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Western Europe, but the process knew several different forms and the dissolution of the feudal system therefore resulted in the different agricultural systems of today: ‘In part the peasantry was freed from the land and the land from the peasantry as in England; in part the peasantry was freed from the proprietors as in France; in part the system is a mixture as in the rest of Europe, the east inclining more to the English conditions.’ (GEH: 108). France became a country of small and medium-sized agricultural owners, when the estates were broken up and distributed among the peasants after the French Revolution (GEH: 99). The absence of primogeniture – in contrast to England – also contributed to the emergence of small lot sizes in France. The landlords were also expropriated in south and western Germany. The change was the same as in France except that it took place slowly and according to a more legal process (GEH: 100). ‘With the dissolution of the manors and of the remains of the earlier agrarian communism through consolidation, separation etc., private property in land has been completely established’ (GEH: 111). The West thus turned into a world which was dominated by a division of labor based on free labor and private property in land. An additional condition, which needed to be met before capitalism could flourish – in Weber’s view – is the establishment of a rational state. This means
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a state, which is based on rational law and expert officialdom (GEH: 339). He contrasted this with states whose officials were trained in ancient literature or religious texts as was common in the Orient. Many feudal empires such as China were foremost concerned with preserving their centralized power structure. Their local representatives were not selected by military or technical criteria but on their expedience in Chinese literature. Such vassals had to be completely loyal to the emperor, because another recruit could easily replace them. The mandarins were also prevented from building a local power base among the population, because they were continually transferred from one province to another and did not speak the local dialect. Rational law, in Weber’s view, was based on Roman law, which revived in great parts of the West, during the late Middle Ages and Renaissance. Weber considers its calculability to be the main advantage of Roman formal-legalistic law, which contrasts to materialistic, theocratic or absolutist law (GEH: 340–1). Roman law provided reasoned and consistent principles of jurisprudence. Most empires had only developed criminal law, apart from the famous Hammurabi Code of Ancient Mesopotamia that also addressed commercial matters.
The change agent Weber explained how new organizations arose that replaced old ones and boosted economic growth. Organizational innovation required freedom of organization and mobility of both capital and labor. However, new organizations had to persuade financiers, employees and customers to adopt their vision. Weber introduced the concept of charismatic authority in Social and Economic Organization (SOE) to explain why people leave old ways of doing things behind and adopt new ones. He distinguished three types of authority: legal-rational, traditional and charismatic. Some leaders derive their authority from tradition, such as the clan leader and the lord of the manor. Bureaucracy, by contrast, is based on rational-legal authority. We can summarize Weber’s historical view by stating that the Western world changed from traditional towards formal-legal societies. Traditional authority is opposed to change by definition. Legal-rational authority spurs efficiency, but it is doubtful whether it can break existing traditions. Both traditional authority and rational-legal authority were, therefore, suited to an established social system of a routine character (SEO: 64). Charismatic authority, however, wants to lead people away from existing traditions and beliefs and is, therefore, an agent of change. The charismatic leader – as described by Weber – promises people a better future. A charismatic leader is usually not elected, but is recognized or acclaimed by his followers (Weber, 1978: 1123). A charismatic leader has to deliver. The accuracy of his vision needs to be proven by events, or people will turn their backs on him. Schumpeter’s innovative entrepreneur, who leads the production process into new paths, has many things in common with Weber’s charismatic
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leader. They both oppose established authority and lead their flock in new directions. Charismatic authority loosens all former ties to family and clan and forges completely new loyalties. The people who have ‘recognized’ the charismatic leader are completely devoted to him in a non-rational way. There is no such thing as promotion or dismissal in the early stages of new religious movements or military bands; there is no hierarchy either. Hence the charismatic organization is exactly the opposite of the rational-legal bureaucracy. The charismatic organization also does not demand formal qualifications. Everybody who recognizes the greatness of the charismatic leader can follow him and become a member of his community. The charismatic leader expects much of his disciples. They are expected to achieve extraordinary things. Rewards are not formalized but consist of free gifts or booty, which are distributed on a communal basis. However, this charismatic organization cannot endure – in Weber’s view – and will in time turn into an organization based on either traditional or legal-rational authority. Charismatic leadership is temporary and turns into routine once its leadership has been established. This applied to monastic orders and religious sects, which stuck to old routines and came to eschew novelty. New leaders are chosen who preserve the heritage of the founder. The charismatic leader is often succeeded by his offspring, or by somebody he appointed before his death (ibid.: 1123). Some elements of charismatic leadership can be found in entrepreneurial start-ups. The (innovative) entrepreneur often has a mission. He believes in his own capabilities and those of his employees. No entrepreneur would ever start his business if he were not convinced of its ultimate success. Most of the time he needs to convince at least a few others to join him in his venture and to defer income until the moment of success has arrived. He also needs to convince financiers and ultimately customers of the superiority of his product. Many start-ups are organized along non-bureaucratic lines and the founders are prepared to put in many extra hours. The lack of hierarchy and formal roles and the vicissitudes of income as determined by stock options are also characteristic of start-up firms. This applies most forcefully to the founders of the organization, but also to employees, as the example of Microsoft demonstrates. More than a thousand of its (early) hires became millionaires, thanks to stock options. Weber’s hypothesis of the charismatic leader is certainly powerful, because it can explain why people are prepared to leave their old ways of life in order to start anew. His theory of the charismatic leader can explain the rise of Protestant sects. Dissidents are found in all times, but their rise is often arrested by repression. Examples of the persecution of deviants or dissidents abound. We can think of Ancient Rome, which persecuted the Christians, as well as of the Russia of Catharine the Great, which sent its religious dissidents off to Siberia. Religious dissidence was, therefore, limited to periods of imperial decline. This no longer applies to the Western world, where freedom of religion allows people to found new religious
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communities. The same applies to the business world. People are free to found their own firm, although it is easier in some countries than in others. The development of entrepreneurial finance varies among countries as does the regulatory burden.
Schumpeter’s later work Schumpeter wrote a second edition of his Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung of about two-thirds the size of the original version. The new edition was published in 1926 and became the basis of the English translation, which appeared as The Theory of Economic Development (ED) in 1934. The second edition – apart from its smaller size – differs from the first on a number of points. First, all passages criticizing Boehm-Bawerk and other economists had been removed. Schumpeter presented his work as a piece of economic analysis and himself as an economist. The professionalization of the social sciences had advanced to a stage that seemed to require a strict demarcation between economics, sociology and history. Schumpeter thus complied with his critics, who had claimed that he had not produced a historical, evolutionary theory of economic change. Schumpeter returned to history in his Business Cycles (1939) and History of Economic Analysis (1954). Another criticism involved the emphasis Schumpeter had placed on the role of the individual in economic development. ‘One of the most annoying misunderstandings that arose out of the first edition of this book was that this theory of development neglects all historical factors of change, except one namely the individuality of entrepreneurs’ (ED: 60). Schumpeter is not prepared to give up his original position that the entrepreneur is the dynamic element in capitalism. He now puts a greater emphasis on the intuitive capacities of the entrepreneur: ‘He has the capacity to see things in a way, which afterwards proves to be true, although it cannot be proven at the time.’ Schumpeter even adds: ‘thorough preparatory work, and special knowledge, breadth of intellectual understanding, talent for logical analysis may under certain circumstances be sources of failure’ (ED: 85). Schumpeter made some superficial changes in his description of entrepreneurial motives, but he stuck to his former statement that entrepreneurial motivation is unlike that of economic man, who is balancing probable result against disutility of effort. The entrepreneur is still motivated by the dream of founding a private kingdom, which most closely resembles the position of medieval lordship. New motives involve the will to conquer, the impulse to fight; to prove oneself superior to others, to succeed for the sake of success. Pecuniary gain is therefore not the main motive for entrepreneurial action, but it is a very accurate expression of success, especially of relative success (ED: 93–4). Schumpeter’s rephrasing of entrepreneurial motives brought him more in line with Knight’s description of what moves the entrepreneur. Knight emphasized sportsmanship to explain entrepreneurship, whereas
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Schumpeter had stressed creativity in his first edition. They now both share the view that entrepreneurship can best be understood as an element of the game spirit and the ambition to win. However, Schumpeter rejects Knight’s definition of the entrepreneur as the capitalist and risk-taker. Schumpeter argues that the usual shareholder has no impact on company policy and hence cannot fulfill entrepreneurial functions (ED: 75). Schumpeter also strongly repudiates the Marshallian definition of entrepreneurship, which treats the entrepreneur as a manager. He draws a sharp line between managers and entrepreneurs. ‘The manager chooses from the most advantageous among the methods which have been empirically tested and become familiar at a certain point in time, whereas the entrepreneur looks for the best method possible at the times’ (ED: 83). He also firmly rejects Weber’s definition of the entrepreneur as the person with a calling. ‘The carrying out of innovation can no more be a vocation than the making and execution of strategic decisions’ (ED: 77). The elements of charismatic leadership that could be discerned in the first edition have now faded. Schumpeter still describes the entrepreneur as a leader, yet the heroism with which the entrepreneur was adorned in the first edition is largely gone. He now calls the entrepreneur a leader against his will, whose only followers are the imitating firms that rob him of his profits. The entrepreneur only needs to convince the banker who finances him (ED: 89). Schumpeter contended that the days of the heroic entrepreneur were almost over. The entrepreneur still needed to confront the opposition from the environment, but this opposition has largely succumbed in modern times. He attributed this to the increased calculability and rationality of the capitalist world. Schumpeter had first depicted the entrepreneur as the man of action who could lead society into new ways of doing things. This figure was replaced by the socially much less apt entrepreneur, who only cared about business and left politics to the politicians. This line of reasoning made Schumpeter predict that innovation could be delegated to experts without affecting performance. Schumpeter foresaw that innovation would become a matter of routine, executed by employees in R&D laboratories. He did not like this course of events, because the world would lose much of its splendor due to these changes. But he thought that increasing rationalization would make it inevitable. Hence, Schumpeter held the view that increased rationality spells the end of capitalism. The origins of Schumpeter’s bleak outlook on the viability of capitalism, which he exposed magnificently in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, can thus already be found in the second edition of Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung. Schumpeter, however, came to retrace his steps and emphasized competition and liberalism as crucial conditions for economic development in his posthumously published History of Economic Analysis (HEA) (Brouwer, 1996). Schumpeter describes in HEA how competitive capitalism could only develop unfettered after liberalism had become the main political movement. Liberalism – in Schumpeter’s words – entailed the subjugation of
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politics to commerce and reigned only from the end of the eighteenth century till about 1900 (HEA: 761). We could, therefore, conclude that Schumpeter narrowed his theory even further at the end of his life. His theory now only applied to nineteenth-century Western and especially English capitalism, where the state had largely withdrawn from the economic arena and the bourgeoisie had become the leading class. Modern authors on Western history also hold the view that absolutism and its inherent monopolization of economic life have impeded Western economic ascent. North and Thomas explain the economic bloom of England and the Low Countries after 1500 by the absence of absolutism in those countries. A delicate balance was struck between central and local powers, in which neither got the upper hand. In England, the power of the crown was curbed by Parliament, which obtained substantial power under the Tudors (North and Thomas, 1973: 147). A federal form of government, which derived from a league of autonomous medieval towns, ran the seven unified Dutch provinces (McNeill, 1963: 581). However, these were the exceptions. Absolute monarchs ruled in France, Spain, Scandinavia, Poland and Hungary. Local taxes were abandoned and replaced by national taxes such as the French taille and the Spanish alcabala. Absolute rulers created vast bureaucracies whose functionaries were loyal to the crown. Trade, free incorporation and labor mobility were impeded. These measures prevented the emergence of a merchant class in countries that were governed along absolutist lines, which greatly hampered their economic progress (North and Thomas, 1973: Chapter 10).
Rationality of capitalist enterprise Weber defined capitalism as rational calculation applied to the pursuit of economic gain. Rational capitalist enterprise exists – in Weber’s view – when rational methods such as double entry bookkeeping and capital accounting are used (GEH: 275). He distinguished rational from adventurous capitalism. The latter is represented by the overseas trading companies of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries whose ventures were subject to high uncertainty. This is attested by the fact that many people who embarked on ships of the East Indian companies never returned from their voyages. Weber dates the beginning of rational capitalism to seventeenth- and eighteenth-century mercantilist states. This period was characterized by monopolies granted by the state. Weber calls mercantilism the first rational economic policy, because this policy was primarily directed towards economic welfare instead of reassuring peace among rival groups and classes. Mercantilism meant that the state was run as a single firm. The objective of the state was to generate as much tax income as possible through national monopolies. Mercantilism favored managed instead of free trade. Schumpeter traced the origins of capitalism back to the medieval citystates that largely depended on commerce. ‘Capitalist institutions, such as
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big business; stock and commodity speculation and ‘‘high finance’’ had already established themselves firmly at the end of the 15th century, and had entailed the ascent of the bourgeoisie’ (HEA: 78). Schumpeter contended that capitalist progress was arrested by the rise of the absolutist nation-states that ascended from the fifteenth century onwards. ‘The rising bourgeoisie had to submit for centuries to come to the rule of a warrior class of feudal origins that milked the bourgeoisie to fight their endless series of wars’ (HEA: 144). It was only in the nineteenth century that capitalism regained its bloom under liberal governments, especially in England. Weber considered the ability to calculate profits in advance to be the most distinctive feature of (rational) capitalism, marking it off from its (irrational) predecessors. Capitalist enterprise would take the form of large bureaucracies that would reward people according to their abilities. However, to restrict rationality to capitalism seems somewhat misplaced, as Schumpeter remarked. The lord of the manor also behaved rationally within the feudal setting. The same applied to courtiers, who lived at the French royal court at Versailles, or aspirant Chinese mandarins, who made great efforts to become proficient in reciting Chinese verse. All these people used the possibilities open to them to improve their social position: a clear means–end relationship (Schumpeter, 1991: 325). Knight launched a more devastating criticism on Weber’s identification of capitalism with rationalism. He explained that all ex ante calculations can only be educated guesses of prospective returns. So, it is not so much rationality, but perception that makes a capitalist entrepreneur successful. We could argue that Knight’s financier ‘recognizes’ the innovator and his venture. It is essential that he is ‘recognized’ by some financiers but not by all. Competition among financiers assures competition among innovative firms. Perception can be considered subjective rationality. We might, therefore, argue that (objective) rationality is not the distinctive factor of capitalism. Investment can only be subjectively rational in competitive capitalist societies, where there is always a distinction between ex ante calculations and ex post results.
Conclusion Comparing the three authors, we can note that Weber did not pay attention to either financial matters or uncertainty. Savings funded investment and uncertainty was antithetical to his conception of capitalism as a rational system. Weber sketched the course of Western economic history as a process of increasing rationalization, which resulted in modern capitalism. Schumpeter contested Weber’s view of capitalism as a predominantly rational system, but adopted some of Weber’s points in his later work. Schumpeter attributed a central role to the financial sector, but largely neglected uncertainty in his work. His emphasis on credit as one of the main institutions of capitalism derives from his idea that capitalism allows people from all social classes to introduce innovations. It was Knight who explained how developed financial
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markets absorb uncertainty. Knight’s analysis stresses the game-like and intuitive and, therefore, largely non-rational aspects of entrepreneurship. The entrepreneur can perceive qualities in people, which remain hidden from the average observer. Only the more than average perceptive investor can make a profit, if capital markets are well organized. But capital and IPO markets (Initial Public Offerings) have only recently and in only a few countries achieved the degree of sophistication required for the smooth operation of investment under uncertainty.
3
Organizations and uncertainty The management of perceptions: from medieval Italy to Silicon Valley
Introduction Economic progress is not a smooth, continuous process, but has occurred in fits and starts. Some periods and regions have experienced periods of rapid growth, whereas stagnation, if not outright decline, has prevailed at other times and places. Technological progress is considered the main engine of economic development, but the merit of new technologies is not always obvious from the start. Societies, therefore, need mechanisms to find and select innovations and innovators. New ways of doing things exist as plans before they enter the economy through investments. Innovations can either be introduced by established or by newly founded firms. Schumpeter’s model of economic development was based on innovations that were introduced by new firms, unencumbered by former investments (Schumpeter, 1934). He mentioned the discovery of new trade routes, markets and organizations as innovation types as well as product and process innovations. Schumpeter emphasized the relationship between the innovative entrepreneur and his banker. Weber had advocated saving plus hard work as essential for economic development in his Protestant Ethic. However, his earliest work had centered on the relationship between the financier and the entrepreneur in the medieval commenda organizations. He cast this relationship in the principal–agent mode, which is still applied by modern organization theorists. Weber considered uncertainty, which prevents accurate prediction of future events, to be a negative investment-depressing force. Schumpeter also argued that investors should only choose people, whose qualities were obvious. Entrepreneurship was open to people of all walks of life, in Schumpeter’s view, since bankers would provide the qualified with credits. However, choosing too many entrepreneurs inflates credit creation and creates a depression. Knight, by contrast, contended that both uncertainty and profits derive from differences in perception among investors (Knight, [1921] 1964). The investor will select the venture, through which he expects to become most successful. Investors should hold different views on a project’s prospective worth. Otherwise all investors would flock to the same ventures and drive up the price of the ‘coveted’ people, who would be entitled to the whole residual.
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This chapter builds on Weber’s principal–agent analysis and proposes a revised principal–agent model based on Knightian uncertainty. Organizations conducive to entrepreneurship prevailed in highly successful regions such as medieval Northern Italy and late twentieth-century Silicon Valley. Medieval Italy spawned a revival of trade that later spilled over to the Low Countries and England. The rise of trade allowed a more efficient division of labor and created new institutions to facilitate trade. Both the sea loan and the equity-based commenda organization supported trade in medieval Europe. They share many characteristics with modern institutions such as venture capital and angel finance that were pivotal to the rise of Silicon Valley in the late twentieth century. Both regions featured contracts between investors and entrepreneurs that have similar characteristics. First, contracts were for limited time periods. Second, success and failure were measured impartially by market outcomes. The success of maritime ventures was determined in the product markets where they sold their cargoes. Success and failure of modern ‘high tech’ ventures are largely determined in financial markets that value companies at an IPO or acquisition. A third characteristic involves the sharing of profits between investor and entrepreneur. A fourth feature involves the limitation of liability to opportunity costs. The chapter discusses the evolution of medieval maritime organizations. Weber described the evolution of these organizations into limited liability companies with autonomous management. This feature sat somewhat uneasily with the link he posited between authority and liability. The person authorized to take decisions should be liable for failure, in his view. Weber’s definition of the entrepreneur as decision-maker could apply to both the investor and the captain of a maritime venture. Schumpeter reserved the term for the founder and leader of the venture. Knight designated the investor the main decisionmaker. Common parlance has not adopted the concept of entrepreneur as financier, but as founder of a venture. We will stick to this convention.
The analysis of medieval maritime ventures Maritime ventures in medieval Italy Maritime ventures of old were subject to uncertainty. Sailing ships could be wrecked by storms or fall into the hands of pirates. Trade routes could be lost to competitors. The destination was never reached and the riches that were expected to await the adventurers sometimes were never found. Transport over land also had its hazards, but was considered safer. Uncertainty was increased by the fact that all investments in cargo, ship and crew could be lost in the case of failure. We can say that events like ship wrecks literally sunk the investments. We will analyze medieval commercial partnerships using Weber’s (1889) essay on the topic and some succeeding publications. Weber studied the contracts and judicial decisions of several Italian city-states to explore the
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evolution of these partnerships. Venice, Pisa and Genoa were pivotal areas of maritime trade, whereas Florence and Piacenza were oriented towards overland trade. Maritime partnerships can be traced back to ancient times. The Roman foenus nauticum or sea loan was preceded by the Greek sea loan that was mentioned by Demosthenes in a speech he gave in 340 BC. The sea loan was a contractual relationship between an entrepreneur and an investor and was especially designed to bear the risks of trade. However, medieval maritime organizations differed from their predecessors, in Weber’s view, ‘The Middle Ages attempted to establish independent rules for the risk that maritime trade carried’ (Weber, 2003: 63). The medieval legal rules for maritime partnerships emerged through decisions made by special commercial courts. Court judgments were codified as happened in Pisa in the Constitutum Usus and in Genoa in the Rota Genoa. These procedures allowed the law to adapt to changing circumstances. Weber described how someone could rise in early medieval Venetian society. He could secure credit or obtain money from the upper-class families and try to amass riches through trade. This would allow his ascent into the Venetian nobility up to the closing of the Great Council. He could either carry on trade after returning home successfully or retreat to the countryside. He could also invest his fortune in new ventures (Weber, 1995: 324). Italian maritime partnerships were of two broad categories: the sea loan and the commenda. The sea loan was a contract between an entrepreneur and an investor to buy and sell goods on a certain journey. The risk attached to the sea loan is expressed by the customary interest rate of 35 percent that these loans carried in Pisa (ibid.: 206). Genoa, where sea loans were in extensive use, had standard rates for each destination. The interest rate to Syria was usually about 50 percent; to Sicily the rate was customarily between 25 and 30 percent, to North Africa from 20–30 percent and to Sardinia and Corsica from 10–20 percent (Hoover, 1926: 505). The rates differed with the length of the journey and the expected risk. The entrepreneur did not have to repay the sea loan, if failure was caused by peril beyond his control, as he was only liable for avoidable damages. Principal and interest payments were only due if the ship arrived safe in the harbor. The entrepreneur got some days or weeks (depending on the destination) to sell his merchandise and pay off his debt and interest (ibid.: 502). At the end of the thirteenth century, merchants could obtain loans by mortgaging their share of a ship or the cargoes. It was no longer necessary to mortgage their private possessions and those of their family (ibid.: 509–10). The commenda organization that was especially popular in Pisa and Venice also developed into a contract which featured limited liability of both investor and entrepreneur. The commenda organization was based on equity instead of debt and became the most popular organizational form of maritime ventures in medieval Italy. This development had nothing to do with the ban on usury that was proclaimed by the Catholic Church, since the
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commenda organization had already become popular before the canonical prohibition of the sea loan in 1234 (Weber, 2003: 138). Commenda partnerships were common in twelfth-century Pisa. The Venetian Collegantia even dates back to the eleventh century. Commenda-type partnerships consisted of investing and managing partners (the stans and the tractator). Agency problems could be avoided, if the investor personally sailed on the ship but investors remained at home most of the time. The manager’s compensation consisted of a share of profits in the commenda organization. Weber distinguished between the unilateral commenda and the bilateral commenda (Societas Maris). Investing and managing partners were different people in the unilateral commenda. The managing partners did not contribute to capital and were entitled to one quarter of the profits. This differed from the Societas Maris, where the venture’s leader contributed one-third to capital and was entitled to half of the profits. Entrepreneurial shares were identical in the two cases, since the entrepreneur of the Societas Maris received his share plus one-third of the share of the profits of the investing partner(s): 1 1 1 3 ¼ þ 2 4 3 4 Hence, profit shares of one quarter were common for entrepreneurs in those days, who only invested their human capital. We may note here that standardized rates prevailed in both sea loans and commenda contracts. Interest on the sea loan was considered an insurance premium in medieval Europe. Insurance premiums cannot be exactly established, if the risk cannot be quantified. The equity-financed commenda organization was, therefore, better equipped to deal with Knightian uncertainty than the sea loan. Most commenda contracts were concluded for the length of one journey or round trip. Profits were distributed after the merchandise was sold. Venetian commendas were founded for a certain period of time instead of a journey. In 1271, the city of Venice restricted this period to two years. Weber reserved the term entrepreneur for the party that was authorized to make decisions. The investor was the entrepreneur, when the non-investing partner was not authorized to represent the venture in transactions with third parties. Weber contended that the captain was only an entrepreneur, if he were on an equal footing with the investor(s). This applied to general partnerships, where both authority and liability were shared and decisions were taken collegially (Weber, 2003: 122). Partnerships, in which authority was not shared, were considered associations between persons who were not socially equal (ibid.: 147). Joint liability indicates social equality, in his view. We could argue that the main strategic decisions had already been taken before the journey started. The captain knew where to go to and what to buy. But, he had to act according to his own judgment in situations of
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contingency. Contact between captain and investor was not possible while at sea, but could be conducted, although with considerable delay, at sea ports. A principal–agent relationship involves that the principal hires an agent to achieve his goals. The agent has to follow the principal’s instructions, but this causes problems, if the principal is not always around to supervise the agent. The relationship between stans and tractator, therefore, represents an essential principal–agent problem. An agent can only be held liable if failure is due to neglecting the principal’s instructions. Commenda organizations – like sea loans – distinguished between failures that were due to avoidable mistakes and those that were not. The tractator was not liable for the whole investment, if the venture failure was not his fault. The burden of proof in this case rested with the investor (ibid.: 82). The tractator was only personally liable for the debts he incurred on his own account during the voyage. Side contracts could occur, when the tractator did not have the authority to act on behalf of the other partners. The authority of the tractator increased, as the commenda organization developed. The commenda became an organization with a common fund (hentica) and tractators, who could act on behalf of the company. Jurisprudence shows this evolution of the commenda organization into a legal person (ibid.: 171). The commenda became a limited liability company, in which liability of both stans and tractator were restricted to their investments in the venture in the case of bankruptcy. The investor was only liable for the amount of his investment, and his personal creditors could not seize the partnership fund in case of personal bankruptcy. The tractator’s liability was also limited to his opportunity costs (ibid.: 77). The commenda organization further evolved into a corporation with many investors and one managing partner. Shares became widely held and the commenda organization became a banker’s business, in Weber’s words. Weber notes that this evolution towards a separate fund had progressed further in Pisa and Venice than in Genoa (ibid.: 136). Weber’s interpretation of the evolution of maritime enterprise Weber interprets the evolution of the commenda organization as the development from a general to a limited partnership (Weber, 2003: 179). The early commenda organizations were general partnerships, in which authority and liability were shared equally. Both investor and captain could lose their personal wealth in the case of failure. Investors became limited partners, when their numbers grew and they all contributed to a separate fund. The investors only had an impact on decision-making, if their numbers were few. The tractator could follow his own judgment, if he could act on behalf of the other socii without consultation (ibid.: 179 fn). Hence, Weber pointed out the separation between ownership and control in corporations in his 1889 thesis. Berle and Means made this distinction popular in their 1932 classic. Weber argued that the tractator who operated on behalf of a widely
Organizations and uncertainty
49
dispersed fund had great autonomy. This applied to the Venetian Collegantia, which often counted thousands of investors. Weber noted that the common case was that wherein the tractator was the person in authority (ibid.: 130). However, the tractator could lose only his share of profits in limited partnerships. His personal property remained unaffected, if failure was not his fault. The combination of limited liability and full authority of the tractator struck Weber as odd. He argued that the tractator should be held personally liable, if he was the sole decision maker. But, his view on this matter was not supported by what he found in the documents (ibid.: 134). Weber identified rational capitalism with calculable risks in his later work. He came to portray maritime ventures as belonging to an era of adventurous capitalism due to the incalculability of their profits. Liability figures largely in his best-known work, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. The Calvinist Puritan believed that commercial success and failure were divinely ordained and predestined one’s position in future life. Liability was thus extended beyond this lifetime. We could, however, argue that limited liability of the tractator is plausible, even if he acted without consulting the investors. That is because the traveling partner could not diversify his risks the same way as investors could. The captain and his crew were thus more committed to the venture. Liability for unforeseen events would be an inappropriate incentive under these conditions. People would be deterred from undertaking entrepreneurship, if they (and their family) were held personally liable for things beyond their control. Diversification was common among medieval investors. Andrea Barbarigo, a fifteenth-century Venetian merchant, invested his capital in various ventures (Lane, 1944). Undeterred by losses in many ventures, he persevered until gains greatly exceeded his losses. The spread of the commenda organization Limited liability was specific to maritime ventures. The medieval societas terra organization resembled the commenda organization, but lacked its limited liability features. The tractator assumed the risk in the societas terra that was created to organize overland ventures for the citizens of Piacenza. The investors were limited partners and had no voice in decision-making. The entrepreneur was personally liable in the societas terra and ‘only an Act of God relieves him of the obligation to have to return the investment in full’ (Weber, 2003: 82). Weber argued that adventurous capitalism preceded rational capitalism, which features mass production (Weber, 1995: 310). However, many institutional innovations sprang from European long-distance trade. The bill of exchange, weights and measures, double entry book-keeping and commercial law were institutional innovations that originated in Europe after 1100. These diverse innovations and institutions created large-scale markets and stimulated growth and commerce (North, 1990: 130).
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Commenda organizations became less popular in Italy after 1500, but spread to other parts of Europe (Kohn, 2003). The corporation with limited liability became popular in England in the fourteenth century. The North German Hanseatic Union also used commenda-type contracts in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The same applies to the Spanish trade with the Americas in the sixteenth centuries (Postan, 1973). Commenda-type contracts became extremely popular in the Netherlands in the sixteenth century for investments in shipping companies (rederijen). The companies undertook voyages to the Baltics, Africa, the Americas and the Indies (Gelderblom, 2003). The rederijen preceded the large trading companies such as the Dutch East India Company. The latter was founded in 1602 and had – in contrast to the rederijen – a monopoly on Dutch trade with the East Indies. The rederijen hardly took on any debt and were almost completely financed by equity. Additional capital was furnished by issuing additional shares (Riemersma, 1952). The rederijen were enterprises of indefinite duration in contrast to the commenda organizations. However, profits were paid out after every voyage and shareholders could decide either to abandon the enterprise or to continue participation (Christiensen, 1941). The captain usually received one-eighth of profits. Many shareholders in the shipping companies were passive and were not involved in the company’s decision-making. Joint stock companies arose in England in the sixteenth century. Firms were formed for a single venture and profits were distributed after the venture was concluded (Baskin, 1988). However, the end of the venture could be postponed in the case of failure. Initial shareholders could be called upon to invest additional capital to make the company successful. However, they could not be forced to pay up and many refused to do so (Shammas, 1975). So, investment was de facto limited to the initial deposit. Weber’s view of principal–agent relationships Weber made extensive use of the term ‘agent’ in his insightful analysis of maritime partnerships. His treatise can be considered a predecessor of modern analyses of principal–agent relationships. Weber describes maritime ventures primarily as voluntary associations of people, whose interests are aligned. The principal–agent relationship in maritime ventures was characterized by the principal’s trust in the agent. This transpires from Lane’s description of how Andrea Barbarigo, a Venetian investor selected his agents: ‘He had to pick an agent, who was expected to show good judgment in his appreciation of market situations’. Barbarigo’s business letters to his agents contained numerous expressions of affection and trust (Lane, 1944: 99). The relationship between principal and agent was expressed in the maxim: ‘If you distrust a man do not employ him, if you employ a man do not distrust him’ (ibid.: 107). Principal–agent theory addresses the incentive problems facing principals who have to rely on agents for the execution of certain tasks. Principal– agent problems arise in all situations in which people work together. Weber’s
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picture of the principal–agent relationship differs from modern approaches stressing moral hazard problems of agency. This literature assumes that agents are inclined to pursue their own goals instead of the principal’s. Moral hazard problems were attenuated in maritime ventures that were formed for one specific voyage or a limited time period. The venture was dissolved after the merchandise was sold and everyone had received his contractual share of profits. The limited length of the venture and its mission as stated in the contract thus reduced possibilities for post-contractual opportunistic behavior. Rational bureaucracy featured as the organizational ideal in Weber’s later writings. He foresaw bureaucracy becoming the dominant organizational form in all types of society, both capitalist and socialist. Rational bureaucracy would imply a strict hierarchical order of command with the leader at the head of the organization (Weber, 1978: 120). Bureaucracy – in his view – is superior to other forms of organization in its precision, stability, the stringency of its discipline and its reliability (ibid.: 223). Authority in rational bureaucracy rests on expertise. Communication is unidirectional and limited in Weber’s bureaucracy where one person gives orders. However, innovation requires more sophisticated modes of communication and selection. This applies particularly to the valuation of human capital in ‘high tech’ ventures in both emergent and established firms.
Modeling investor–entrepreneur relationships A model when investor and entrepreneur have identical perceptions The commenda contracts depended on the risk perceptions of both the investor and the entrepreneur. We model the investment decision of an investor, who is seeking entrepreneurs to start new ventures such as setting up a ship for sail to faraway shores or starting a technology firm. The investor has to decide on several issues. He needs to decide how much to invest; whom to hire as entrepreneur, how to govern the venture and how to reward the entrepreneur. We assume that the entrepreneur is presently employed and receives wages equal to Y. His present wages are a fixed income and constitute his opportunity costs. The potential entrepreneur considers his talents to be underestimated up till now and deems his worth to be Y þ Z. His extra worth needs to be ‘recognized’ by an investor. We assume that one investor perceives an entrepreneur’s extra worth and is prepared to pay a bonus equal to Z over his present income Y, if the outcome were certain. But, competition or natural hazards make the outcome of the venture uncertain. Two outcomes are possible; success or failure. The entrepreneur’s income in the case of success exceeds that of failure (W s > W f ). Both investor and entrepreneur attach certain probabilities to the occurrence of both states. We will first assume that investor and entrepreneur attach identical probabilities to the occurrence of the two states. An investor favors a certain entrepreneur over others, because he perceives his
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chance of success to be higher. We’ll assume that both the investor and the entrepreneur of his choice expect to accomplish their mission with an 80 percent chance of success. There are two constraints to such a contract (Shy, 1996: 398). The first constraint involves that a prospective entrepreneur will only enter into a contract with an investor, if he expects to earn Y þ Z. The second constraint involves that the investor will hire this person and not somebody else. The agent will only choose entrepreneurship, if he expects to receive his ‘full worth’ as entrepreneur: The incentive constraint for the entrepreneur is: 0:8W s þ 0:2W f Y þ Z ! W s 1:25ðY þ ZÞ 0:25W f
ð3:1Þ
The second constraint involves that the investor will only enter into a contract with the entrepreneur of his choice, if he does not expect to pay a higher income to this entrepreneur than to an entrepreneur whose chances he estimates lower. We assume that he expects the other entrepreneur’s success rate to be 40 percent. The incentive constraint for the investor is: 0:8W s þ 0:2W f Z 0:4W s þ 0:6W f 0:4ðW s W f Þ Z ! W s W f 2:5Z
ð3:2Þ
W f W s 2:5Z The wages to be paid in cases of success and failure can be calculated from this: W s ¼ 1:25ðY þ ZÞ 0:25ðW s 2:5ZÞ 3 Ws ¼ Y þ Z 2 Wf ¼ Y Z The entrepreneur thus receives a bonus of 1:5Z, if the venture is successful and pays a penalty of Z below his opportunity costs Y, if the venture fails. The entrepreneur will thus receive less than he would get in a position with a fixed remuneration in the case of failure. The investor expects to pay and the entrepreneur expects to receive: 3 E W ¼ 0:8ðY þ ZÞ þ 0:2ðY ZÞ ¼ Y þ Z 2
ð3:3Þ
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Hence, the principal does not expect to pay more than Y þ Z. This applies to all success and failure ratios. Uncertainty thus does not affect expected remuneration, but entails that revenues will differ for the two states. We could call this an expectational equilibrium where the entrepreneur expects to receive and the investor expects to pay Y þ Z. When investor’s and entrepreneur’s perceptions differ The entrepreneur will only enter the agreement, if he expects to earn Y þ Z. We have assumed this far that investor and entrepreneur have identical perceptions. However, we can demonstrate that risk-loving persons have higher chances on entrepreneurship. The entrepreneur would expect to earn more than Y þ Z, if he is more confident than the investor. We explore what he would expect to earn, if the entrepreneur estimates his chance of success to be 90 percent, whereas the investor’s estimate is 80 percent: 3 W Eent ¼ 0:9ðY þ ZÞ þ 0:1ðY ZÞ ¼ Y þ 1:25Z 2 Hence, the entrepreneur expects to receive more than the investor expects to pay, if he is more confident of the venture’s outcome than the investor. Accordingly, the entrepreneur will expect to earn less than Y þ Z, if he is less confident than the investor. Optimistic persons are thus more inclined to become entrepreneurs than pessimistic ones. Optimism could induce entrepreneurs to conclude agreements with investors, who are only prepared to pay low entrepreneurial bonuses. Investors will thus prefer confident entrepreneurs to less confident ones. Pessimistic entrepreneurs would only enter contracts with investors, who are prepared to pay high premiums; which makes them unlikely candidates for entrepreneurship. Weber’s idea that people who think they are predestined to be successful will enter more easily into entrepreneurship can thus be modeled in this way. Why investors’ perceptions should differ The model can be put in more general terms. We assume that the chance of success for the entrepreneur that is chosen by a certain investor is estimated at 1 a, whereas the chances for the entrepreneur, who is rejected by a certain investor are estimated at 1 bð0 < b; a < 1; b > a). Another investor can hire the rejected entrepreneur. The incentive constraint for the entrepreneur then takes the following form: ð1 aÞW s þ aW f Y þ Z 1 a ðY þ ZÞ Wf Ws 1a 1a
ð3:4Þ
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The incentive constraint for the investor is shown in (3.5). The investor would not want to pay more to the chosen entrepreneur than to a nonfavored entrepreneur: ð1 aÞW S þ aW F Z ð1 bÞW S þ bW F ðb aÞðW S W F Þ Z Z WS WF ba
ð3:5Þ
The investor would always expect to pay Y + Z: E W ¼ ð1 aÞW S þ aW F Y þZ a W F þ aW F E W ¼ ð1 aÞ½ 1a 1a EW ¼ Y þ Z
ð3:6Þ
We can conclude from (3.6) that the investor always expects to pay Y þ Z equal to what was demonstrated above. Equation (3.5) indicates that the difference in revenues from success and failure narrows, if investors’ perceptions are further apart and widens, if their perceptions are more aligned. In the above example with probabilities of 0.8 and 0.4; the difference between success and failure W s W f amounts to 2:5Z. However, if one investor were to attach a probability of 0.95 to a certain venture, which another investor only estimates to be only 0.05, the difference between success and failure would shrink to 1.11 Z. This points to the fact that the investor who considers success almost certain is prepared to pay only a small bonus in the case of success. The expected wage in the case of success would approach Y þ Z and the wage paid in the case of failure would approach Y , if b a are further apart. A situation, where an entrepreneur is pursued by several investors, paints a different picture. Entrepreneurs who get identical offers from more than one investor can demand a bonus equal to Z upfront. Investors would have to pay Y þ Z irrespective of outcomes, if investors valuate entrepreneurs equally. That is because W s ¼ W f , if b ¼ a in (3.5). W s ¼ W f then ¼ Y þ Z in (3.4). Hence, an entrepreneur who is favored by more than one investor can seize the entrepreneurial premium Z irrespective of the actual outcome of the venture. We can distinguish two opposite cases of coinciding preferences. The first involves an entrepreneur that is each investor’s first choice. All investors would then choose the same entrepreneur and reject all others. We can conjecture that such an entrepreneur can bid the entrepreneurial premium Z up and demand a high ex ante income. He is the manager that every corporation wants to employ. This implies a bidding process, which would leave investors without (surplus) rates of return. The opposite case
Organizations and uncertainty
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involves indifferent investors, who do not prefer one entrepreneur to another. Investors might not want to pick a particular venture, but to create a portfolio in order to spread their risks. Complete diversification would signal that investors are indifferent among investment projects, which reduces the bonus Z. But, entry into entrepreneurship would be reduced in both cases of coinciding perceptions. Investors who all favor one potential entrepreneur foreclose entry into entrepreneurship to all others. Investors who are indifferent to all entrepreneurs cannot choose. Their inability to pick entrepreneurs entails that they will diversify their investments among an existing set of entrepreneurs. Entry into entrepreneurship is stimulated, if investors have clear, but differing opinions about the prospective worth of entrepreneurial ventures. The difference between ex ante and ex post valuations triggers investment due to the hopes of above normal rates of return. Share of profit contracts Contracts between investors and entrepreneurs are usually designed in a way that entitles an entrepreneur to a share of profits. Investor and entrepreneur usually both have an equity stake in the business. The profit share of the entrepreneur is independent of perceived risk and amounts to his perceived worth as a percentage of total investments (I) as perceived by one investor. Hence, an entrepreneur, who leads a venture, whose perceived worth is Y + Z will obtain: Y þZ I as a share of profits. Share of profits contracts entail that the entrepreneur will receive nothing in the case of failure. The income that entrepreneurs receive in the case of success will then equal (see 3.5): Ws ¼
Z ba
Inserting W f ¼ 0 in (3.4) would make the wage that would be paid in the case of success: Ws ¼
Y þZ : 1a
Combining the two equations gives us an indication of the size of the entrepreneurial premium:
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Organizations and uncertainty ba Y Z¼ 1b
It follows from these two equations that: Ws ¼
Y ; if W f ¼ 0: 1b
Hence, an entrepreneur would receive twice his opportunity costs, if other investors would attach a probability of 12 to his venture and four times his opportunity costs, if other investors estimated his chances of success to be 14. The entrepreneur’s remuneration in share of profit contracts is thus determined by his opportunity costs and by how other investors perceive his venture. This type of contract differs from the bonus contracts discussed above where the revenue in the case of success was negatively related to the difference in perceptions between investors. The expected revenue in the case of profit-sharing contracts, by contrast, is positively related to other investors’ opinions. We could explain this by identifying 1-b with general investor sentiment. Little will be invested, if the investment community at large expects low returns on entrepreneurial ventures. Consequently, a venture that is launched during an investment slump can reap high revenues once the general mood has improved. Both investor and entrepreneur can benefit from the change of mood. Entrepreneurial investments are subject to recurrent waves of over- and under-investment. More capital will flow into the market, if outcomes exceed expectations. The reverse will happen if the investment community was too optimistic. The perceptions of the investor community thus determine the amount that is invested in new ventures. Venture finance will only be viable in the long term, if unexpectedly high profits balance unforeseen losses. Equity finance creates self-adjusting expectational equilibria.
Investments and uncertainty People will be drawn to entrepreneurship as long as some glittering prizes are to be won and if losses can be curtailed. Share of profit contracts extend the upside gain and limit entrepreneurial losses to opportunity costs. Equity finance will be preferred to debt, if uncertainty about a venture’s outcome prevails. Sunk costs will increase uncertainty and contribute to a choice of equity over debt. We assume that an investor grants a loan of one unit to each venture, in which he participates. Both principal and interest will be paid at the end of the period that is assumed to be one year. An expected success rate of 80 percent (4 out of 5) would require an ex ante rate of return of 1.375 to obtain a realized rate of return of 10 percent, if we assume that the whole investment were lost in the case of failure [x.ðn-1Þ ¼ 1:1n. For, n ¼ 5; x would be 1:375]. An expected failure rate of 40 percent would require a return of 1.83 times the initial investment to reap
Organizations and uncertainty
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an overall rate of return on investment of 10 percent. Unexpected gains can balance out unexpected losses in equity finance. This differs from debt finance, where interest rates of 83 percent are inadmissible. It can also be demonstrated that incentive contacts in which investor and entrepreneur share profits do not hurt the investor. The investor would need returns on his investment of 2.43 if the entrepreneur has an equity stake of 25 percent (1:83 43 ¼ 2:43). However, a profit-sharing agreement would save him Y þ Z per venture, if entrepreneurs do not receive wages. Assuming that the entrepreneur’s profit share of 14 equals his worth as estimated by the investor means that the investor can reduce his investment to 34th of the sum he would invest without a profit-sharing contract. Hence, a profitsharing agreement does not affect his rate of return under these conditions. Equity finance also addresses moral hazard problems. Debt finance would heighten moral hazard problems, if credits were granted to entrepreneurs under conditions of limited liability (Jensen and Meckling, 2000). The entrepreneur would be the sole residual claimant in the case of success, which could inspire him to take undue risks. Equity finance means that both the entrepreneur and the investor are in the same boat. The above model indicates that share of profit contracts do not affect investors’ expected profits. The model also indicated that people would only choose entrepreneurship, if they expect to earn more as entrepreneur than in other lines of occupation, which points out the selection function of such contracts. Investors have to search for people they value more than their present employers. Another conclusion that can be drawn from the model is that entrepreneurship thrives on differences of opinion among investors. Investors as a group will only receive long-run ‘normal rates’ of return, if markets for entrepreneurial capital are competitive. Only the more perceptive investors would earn above average returns on their investments, whereas others lose out. Competition among investors spurs diversity, because investors have to look for hidden potential. Perceptive investors who favor entrepreneurs without easily observable characteristics that reveal their ‘true’ worth can earn high rates of return. Competition will thus spur perceptiveness, which can explain why investors constitute a specialized profession. Another conjecture of the model involves that entrepreneurial profit shares would tend to standardize in competitive capital markets. Chosen entrepreneurs would all receive equal profit shares in the case of success, if the perceived worth of each entrepreneur amounted to (Y þ Z) for a class of ventures, requiring equal investment outlays (I). This hypothesis was borne out by the facts in the case of maritime ventures. We noticed that the profit shares of the entrepreneur in the commenda enterprise were standardized at 25 percent. We could argue that ships were more or less identical and required equal investment expenditures. Ventures can be governed in several ways. Investor and entrepreneur could enter into a partnership and decide collegially. Authority could be
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delegated to the entrepreneur, if equity is widely dispersed among many shareholders. We can also conjecture that each venture should be of limited duration, if equity shares are illiquid, to allow investors to periodically re-allocate their capital. Liquidity of shares would remove the limitation on enterprise length of life. But high liquidity would increase the entrepreneur/manager’s authority at the expense of investors.
Comparing old and new venture capital Modern organizations feature limited liability of both shareholders and managers. The separation between ownership and control that Weber noted in the medieval commenda organizations can also be found in modern corporations. Modern public corporations have an indefinite length of life in contrast to their medieval counterparts. We conjectured above that indifferent investors would impede entry into entrepreneurship, since they would only diversify from a set of existing entrepreneurs. We can, therefore, argue that some investors should specialize in picking novice entrepreneurs in an expanding economy. This consideration casts some doubts on the alleged evolutionary path of commenda organizations from private partnerships to publicly held corporations. It seems reasonable to assume that both types of organization coexisted in medieval times as they do in modern economies with their mix of private and public companies. Modern economies have institutions that specialize in selecting new ventures. Retired businessmen with some money to spend (angels) can fund novice entrepreneurs. US venture capital firms have specialized in seeking and financing new ventures of non-kin. European venture capital, by contrast, was less inclined to fund new enterprises (Brouwer and Hendrix, 1998). American venture capital firms are usually limited partnerships and act as intermediaries between investors and entrepreneurs. They raise capital from a variety of investors and establish venture capital funds with a limited length of life (usually 10 years). Investors are wealthy individuals, companies and institutional investors. The investors are limited partners and the managers of the fund are general partners or venture capitalists. Both types of partners have limited liability. Venture capital funds invest in equity or convertible securities of companies without collateral. They especially finance ventures in ‘high tech’ industries. Investments in those companies can be considered sunk. The average time that passes before a company receives a first round of venture capital is one year. Investment takes place in rounds of limited length (roughly one year) (Gompers, 1995). This staged investment process allows venture capitalists to revise their opinions regularly and resembles commenda practices, where opinions could be revised after each journey. Successful companies have usually received several rounds of investment before exiting the venture capital fund. A venture capital
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firm usually comprises several funds. Each venture is picked by a lead venture capitalist, who monitors the venture. Founders receive a part of equity in return for their human capital and may invest some capital of their own. A venture capitalist usually monitors several ventures and can thus spread his risk. The entrepreneur/founder lacks possibilities to diversify his human capital and is thus most committed to the venture. We noticed above that entrepreneurs were entitled to standard profit shares in medieval ventures. The same happens in venture capital, where the standard venture capital ‘cut’ for venture capital managers amounts to 20 percent. Successful funds can raise more capital, but usually do not increase their stake. Only very successful funds could bid up their stake. This happened with the later Kleiner & Perkins funds, where the venture capital stake was raised to 30 percent (Kaplan, 2000: 201). The venture capital firm can diversify its investments through syndication. Several venture capital firms usually participate in a deal. We hypothesized above that entrepreneurship would flourish, if investors’ preferences differed. Syndication seems to run counter to this idea. However, venture capital decisions are not coordinated. Entrepreneurs who were rejected by one venture capital firm were able to obtain finance from another. The venture capitalist fulfills the Knightian entrepreneurial function of selecting the venture. The founder is the entrepreneur in a Schumpeterian and Weberian sense, if he leads the new enterprise. Authority is shared in venture capital-backed firms, as both venture capitalist and founder(s) have seats on the board of directors. Ultimate authority remains with the venture capitalist, who can fire the CEO/entrepreneur and/or cause the company’s demise by withholding further finance (Sahlman, 1994). This is similar to commenda finance, where investors could also decide not to conclude new contracts with a certain entrepreneur. Executive authority can be assigned to the founder, if he becomes the new firm’s CEO, but can also be assigned to non-founders. Sometimes, the venture capitalist becomes CEO, as happened at Tandem Corporation where Perkins of Kleiner & Perkins was the first CEO (Kaplan, 2000). Venture capitalists who become CEO usually leave the venture capital firm to avoid conflicts of interest due to over-commitment. There are also instances where an investor acts as CEO. That happened in the early days of Netscape, when Jim Clark, a main investor, led the company. Jim Clark, a former Stanford professor and founder of Silicon Graphics, obtained one-third of Netscape equity in exchange for his directorship and an investment of $4.5 million in the company. Noyce and Moore also invested $245,000 each, when they founded Intel after leaving Fairchild Semiconductors in 1968. The Netscape and Intel deals resemble the Italian Societas Maris organization, where the entrepreneur is also a main investor. We can argue that founders who became wealthy in a former venture had to show their commitment by investing part of their wealth in the new start-up. CEOs of new companies can also be recruited from the existing management pool. This happened at Netscape, where Jim Barksdale of McCaw
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Cellular was hired to become CEO, when Jim Clark gave the position up. Sequioa Capital hired Tim Koogle, an in-house venture capitalist at Motorola, to become CEO of Yahoo instead of founders Jerry Yang and David Filo. Venture capitalists have to look for hidden potential with low opportunity costs. This can explain why they look for new graduates or college dropouts. People with low opportunity costs are attractive, but are also considered risky. This can explain why some very successful entrepreneurs were college drop-outs. Bill Gates, the founder of Microsoft, who dropped out of Harvard at age 19 to found Microsoft is the most telling example. Oracle founder Larry Ellison and Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniack of Apple fame were also college dropouts. Their opportunity costs might have been too low to attract venture capital initially. This happened to the founders of Apple, who were rejected by two venture capital firms. The initial funding of Apple came from Markkula, who had made his fortune when Intel went public. He helped Jobs and Wozniack to write a business plan, wrote some software and invested $91,000 in exchange for one-third of the company. Oracle bootstrapped its growth by obtaining CIA assignments in its early days.
Conclusion Maritime ventures of old have triggered many organizational and institutional innovations. The robustness of profit and property-sharing arrangements to manage uncertainty is demonstrated by the similarities in the general structure of contracts backing entrepreneurship. Limited length of life, limited liability and profit-sharing contracts characterize both medieval maritime ventures and modern ‘high tech’ enterprises that are financed by venture capital. The use of equity finance prevails in both time periods. Modern venture capital firms also finance ventures of non-kin, whose outcomes are uncertain. Silicon Valley ventures display organizational forms that were found in medieval Italy. The pool of venture capital-backed entrepreneurs is composed of novice and seasoned entrepreneurs. Novice entrepreneurs invest their human capital in return for a share in the venture. Seasoned entrepreneurs, who made a fortune in earlier ventures, have to demonstrate their commitment by investing both human and financial capital in repeat ventures. The contracts concluded with these two groups of entrepreneurs resemble those of the commenda and Societas Maris organizations of medieval times.
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Entrepreneurship and the state
Introduction The previous chapter explained how uncertainty causes investment outcomes to differ from expectations. This applies primarily to individual ventures, but also to entrepreneurial investment as a whole. Such deviations from expectations do not need to affect investment expenditures, if longterm average expectations are upheld. Average rates of return meet expectations, if profits exceed losses enough to satisfy investors. Expected average rates of return can be as low as the risk-free interest rate, if capital markets are perfectly competitive. Imperfect capital markets will reach equilibrium at higher expected rates, which curbs investments. The expected rate of return is influenced by the institutional set-up of (national) capital markets and government policies. Well-developed financial markets will fund more investments than weakly developed financial markets. The concept of expectational intertemporal equilibrium was developed by Edmund Phelps and Milton Friedman. An expectational equilibrium is one of self-fulfilling expectations.We can refer to the natural rate of unemployment as an expectational equilibrium. The natural rate of unemployment is determined by institutional arrangements with respect to wage determination, job security, real interest rates and productivity increases. Lower real interest rates boost employment and reduce the natural unemployment rate, since they increase investments. Social welfare programs increase the natural rate because they reduce the gap between work and non-work income (Phelps and Zoega, 1998). Disequilibrium includes both random expectations errors and fundamental disequilibrium (Phelps and Zoega, 1997: 283). Random deviations do not need to affect long-run expectational equilibrium, if the economy veers back onto its long-term trend after a crisis or recession. The economy does not need to depart for long periods from longrun growth paths, if former expectational equilibrium can be restored. Long-run expectational investment equilibrium requires that financial markets withstand crises and develop to higher degrees of sophistication. The analysis of medieval entrepreneurial ventures indicated what happens, if each entrepreneur is preferred to others by only one investor. We can express
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this by saying that investors have different private valuations of entrepreneurial hopefuls. Each investor chooses different entrepreneurs and each entrepreneur only receives one bid that exceeds his opportunity costs. The ex ante valuation of all chosen entrepreneurs tends to be identical. This transpires from the fact that entrepreneurs received equal profit shares in Italian commenda organizations. We can argue that equal profit shares indicate an equal playing field for entrepreneurial ventures. Each chosen entrepreneur is considered to be fit to play the game and expected to be successful. Constant shares of profits also prevail in modern venture capital contracts, where fund managers receive 20 percent of profits. It also prevails in hedge funds, where fund managers also receive 20 percent of profits. Ex post outcomes can differ considerably among ventures. This does not need to hurt investments as long as average expectations are met (in the long run). It was pointed out above that a diversity of investors’ views is essential for the launch of a multitude of ventures. Entrepreneurs that are valued equally by more investors can ask their (high) worth upfront. We can compare this to bestseller authors, who can ask a fixed fee before the book is published, whereas less popular writers depend on royalty payments, the size of which is determined after publication. The fact that somebody has written a bestseller reduces uncertainty about their future publications and triggers a bidding war. Only a few books would be published, if publishers all chased the same authors. Private valuations thus stimulate diversity. Investment decisions are also interrelated. Better than average returns are reaped, if investors collectively underestimate future profits. The opposite will happen, if they overestimate future profits. We could call this the common value problem of investment. Investors who come in late and pay high prices for stocks suffer from the winners’ curse, if it turns out that they have overestimated the stock values and share prices collapse after buying. These swings in investor mood generate boosts and busts on the stock market. Investments will decline, if average returns on investments fall below expectations, whereas investments increase, if returns exceed average expectations. The market will correct these deviations from expectations. However, investments can be completely frozen, if busts are considered to be caused by misconduct and fraud. These allegations come to the surface at almost every stock market collapse and have led to regulations on investments that forbade certain financial instruments. This applied to the reaction to Tulipmania in Holland in the seventeenth century and to the legislation that was triggered by the South Sea Bubble Company of 1720 (Day, 2006). These institutional changes arrested financial development and shut down stock markets for long periods. Some argue that the Sarbanes– Oxley Act also curbed investments in new US ventures. Political decisions can damage investor confidence more severely than private misconduct. Inflation erodes savings and curbs investments. Governments can decide to nationalize businesses and expropriate owners. Such decisions can be made by a parliamentary majority or by an autocratic
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ruler. Both types of government can change the rules of the game. But, such changes need to be unpredictable or investment will be curbed from the onset; nobody would want to invest, if it was certain that expropriation would occur. Unpredictable shifts of governance have occurred at several points in history. Some have benefited investors as happened in medieval Italy when institutions conducive to trade were developed. Other changes have hurt financial development by transferring the losses of risky enterprise to the people at large. This undermined confidence and created a new expectational equilibrium at low levels of external investment. History shows several dry spells of external investments. Financial markets have grown into the capital markets of our day only by fits and starts. The capital market allows a plurality of views to exist simultaneously and weeds out the ‘wrong’ opinions as time passes. It is essential to this process that successes cannot be predicted accurately. Both investors and entrepreneur are convinced that their valuations are correct, but it is the market who decides who wins and who loses. We can argue that the view of the perceptive investor is corroborated, whereas the view of losing investors is not supported by the market. Firms tap different financial sources, if they grow from start-up to large company. Successful ventures that survive the early years can become listed companies and enter a different league. But former success does not guarantee future successes and uncertainty is perpetuated after listing, although at lower levels. Uncertainty is reduced by diversification. State guarantees will only reduce uncertainty, if the state is bound to fulfill its obligations and does not default on its debt. However, state-led enterprise is usually of the monopoly type, which stifles diversification. Moreover, granting royal privileges to only a few firms destroys the level playing field of investments. One firm that is preferred to all others by the state seems to make it more or less infallible. Government can change the rules to the benefit of the state monopoly, but this blurs the line between private and public authority and confuses responsibility. Government chartered monopolies raise governance problems that differ from those of competitive enterprises. Clashes of opinion between the monopoly firm and the state would lead to the prevalence of either the state’s or the company’s view. This differs from clashes within private firms, where dissidents can leave and join another organization. The demarcation of authority between the investor and the entrepreneur was discussed at length before and after Weber’s treatise. Differences of opinion can arise, if authority is shared between investors and entrepreneurs. A clash of opinions is most productive, if it does not represent a conflict of interests, but arises among people pursuing a common goal. It was noted above that contracts between investor and entrepreneur were designed to align the interests of the two parties. Different opinions can still arise, if parties have different views on the best way to move forward. Such differences can be solved in several ways. One party can persuade the others and reach agreement or one of the parties can leave the venture. We can also
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imagine that decision-making is delegated to a single person, as happened when the commenda ships were at sea and the captain was on his own. We can argue that the investor, who has tied up his investment in the venture for a certain period should also be allowed to express his views. This applies with less force to investors who can easily sell their shares on the stock market; shareholders of listed companies can vote with their feet. Investors in privately held companies have more control of the company than a widely dispersed group of shareholders. Limited liability means that nobody can lose more than their opportunity costs. This applies, if both capital and labor can easily be redeployed. Labor can endure spells of unemployment in between jobs, which entitles them to severance payments. This does not apply to investors, who lose their investment. We can argue that investors only lose their opportunity costs, if their investments fail, whereas employees can also lose their future income, if they are not easily rehired. The consequences of ‘wrong’ decisions are restricted under conditions of limited liability and perfect markets. A permanent loss of income in the case of failure would hamper entrepreneurship; people would avoid risk and adapt their behavior to a common standard. However, conformism eliminates the competition of ideas and therewith hurts progress. The rewards and penalties for adopting new ideas should thus be balanced to encourage novelty. This applies to all realms of social life that seek to progress. Business and science are prominent examples. Each business is a hypothesis that can either be supported or rejected by the evidence (Phelps, 2006). Competition in the market for ideas determines which people are allowed to launch their ventures. Competition in product markets determines which ventures will be successful. The market test consists of the confrontation between the ideas of a few people and a relevant audience. Democracy requires that ideas are acceptable to the majority. Markets, however, also allow ideas to survive that appeal to small segments of the population. Capital markets have developed institutions that promote diversity and absorb uncertainty. The development of maritime ventures in medieval Italy demonstrated this. However, institutional development did not follow a straight upward line, but is characterized by many lapses back into autarky and internal finance. We will now investigate financial development in the Low Countries in the seventeenth century, England and France in the eighteenth century and in the developed world in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
From rederijen to the Dutch East India Company The shipping companies (rederijen) that sprang up in the Low Countries at the end of the fifteenth century resembled the commenda-type organization. They were organized for one trip around an entrepreneur and several (often unnamed) investors, who were repaid after the ship returned. Only the main investors had a say in how the business was run. They were the active
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partners, whereas other investors remained passive (silent partners). New business opportunities arose after the Portuguese discovered a route to the Indies. The Dutch merchants sailed to Lisbon to buy spices and other goods to sell in Amsterdam and beyond. The Portuguese had discovered a trade route to the East in 1595, which gave them a monopoly in the spice trade of that region. The Spanish king acquired Portugal in 1580, after which date the port of Lisbon was closed to Dutch merchants. The Dutch Revolt of 1568 that started the 80 years war with Spain triggered the Spanish reaction. The closure prompted the Dutch to find their own routes to the East. The first attempt to reach the Indian Ocean from the North failed and van Heemskerck and his crew were forced to stay out the winter of 1596–97 in their self-built house at Nova Zembla. A second attempt to round the Cape of Good Hope in 1597 was more successful. Houtman and his crew returned home after two and a half years, but had lost 160 of the 249 men who started the journey (Frentrop, 2002: 51). The lucrative spice trade attracted many other entrepreneurs and investors. Twenty-two ships set sail to the East Indies from Dutch towns in 1598; only half of them came home safely and made money. The East Indian route was thus a risky business, but this did not deter people from taking part in these ventures. The ships were useful for the government of the seven Dutch provinces as they could fight the Spanish in the East in the Dutch war of independence (1568–1648). The military role played by the Dutch merchants was one of the reasons for the States General to regulate the East Indies trade. Competition among ships from various towns in Holland and Zeeland were deemed to undermine the military effort. Moreover, the English had set the example by establishing the East India Company in 1600. Maritime ventures had military aspects in those days, as the sailors had to fight off competitors and establish ports and forts on foreign shores. Several models were developed to govern foreign strongholds. The Venetian model involved setting up an administration and a naval force in port cities, while leaving trade to private ventures. The Venetians assumed government in several locations; Crete is a case in point. They founded their own communities in others, as happened in Constantinople, the seat of the Byzantine Empire. Competition between Italian cities often evoked warfare. Constantinople, for example, was a Venetian stronghold for long periods of time, but was the territory of the Genoese for brief spells in which they held the favor of the Byzantine emperor. The Portuguese model was to set up state enterprises that combined commercial and military functions. The Portuguese had strongholds on the Banda Islands and Ceylon. The Dutch, however, developed a third model. The Dutch provinces established a private company with a monopoly charter to conduct both trade and military protection. The design was planned by the Secretary of State of the seven provinces, Johan van Oldenbarneveldt. The Dutch East India Company (VOC) was chartered in 1602 and incorporated all former shipping companies from Holland and Zeeland. The VOC
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had six chambers, located in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Enkhuizen, Hoorn, Delft and Middelburg. The Dutch East India Company raised 6.45 million guilders, a huge amount in those days. The British East India Company, by contrast, only raised 820,000 guilders, when it was chartered in 1600 (Frentrop, 2002: 59). But the British East India Company was engaged in only commerce and left fighting to the military. Amsterdam merchants provided more than half of the capital (57.4 percent). The province of Zeeland was the second largest contributor with 20.1 percent. Enkhuizen, Hoorn, Delft and Rotterdam all provided less than 10 percent. The VOC fought vigorously to oust the Portuguese from their Indian strongholds and take over their trade. They expelled the Portuguese from the Banda Islands which gave them a monopoly on nutmeg and mace. The Dutch obtained the cinnamon monopoly in 1658, when the Portuguese were driven from Ceylon (Wikipedia). The Dutch East India Company became the owner of fortifications, which tied up capital (Frentrop, 2002: 57). The same applied to the vessels that needed to stay in harbor in order to defend the stronghold. The investments in the East Indian trade required longer lead times for investors than former ventures. The Dutch East India Company, therefore, obtained a monopoly charter for a period of 21 years; the entire capital was redistributed after 10 years with the proviso that old shareholders needed to pay half of the new capital. The effective depreciation period was thus 20 years (ibid.: 57). The monopoly charter was granted by a government, which was formed after the renunciation of Habsburg rule and the declaration of a republic in 1588. The seven provinces and their organizations were treated as trustworthy partners by other nations. The VOC was a capital-intensive undertaking in contrast to its predecessors, as it built its own ships. This differed from Venetian practices, where ships were built at the communal shipyards. The new trade thus required larger investment outlays over longer periods than the former shipping companies. We can argue that institutional changes made it possible to raise huge sums of capital for longer periods than was customary at the time. The monopoly charter was an institutional change that was intended to boost profits. Payment was not required in full at the time of foundation of the VOC, but was paid in installments. Shares in the VOC were held by wealthy merchants, but also among large numbers of the population. In Amsterdam, 80 people invested more than 10,000 guilders and more than 1,000 invested a smaller amount. The same distribution roughly applied to other cities. More than half of capital was raised from small shareholders. The total number of shareholders exceeded 1,400; the majority were located in Amsterdam. The 70 directors of the VOC were large shareholders. Small shareholders did not have a say in the company’s management, similar to the governance structure of the shipping companies. Small shareholders had a continuous exit possibility on the second-hand market, which emerged immediately after the VOC was founded. A futures market for VOC shares also emerged as VOC shares were traded on the Amsterdam bourse from 1611 onwards.
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The 70 directors were divided among the six city chambers. Investors paid up at their own chamber. The 70 directors constituted the executive bodies that took care of affairs in the six cities. Ships that sailed from a certain port also had to return and unload their cargo there, and the local chambers paid for fitting out the ships. Hence, the VOC resembled a corporation with six divisions. A council consisting of 17 men (the Heeren 17) designed the grand strategy of the VOC. The Heeren 17 was appointed by the 70 directors. Amsterdam did not have a majority vote, as it could only appoint eight of the Heeren 17, although it provided more than half of capital. Zeeland got four of the Heeren 17, whereas the other cities appointed one member each. The seventeenth member was to be appointed by each chamber in turn except Amsterdam. It was specified in the Charter that the Heeren 17 would convene in Amsterdam for the first six years, followed by two years in Zeeland, and so on (ibid.: 63). The VOC Charter had few disclosure requirements to small shareholders. The chambers got reports every three months. Merchants who had invested more than 50,000 guilders had the right to peruse the books but this right was denied to small investors, who had to wait ten years before results were presented to them. However, the establishment of the Amsterdam Bourse in 1611 strengthened the liquidity of investments in the VOC, which compensated for their lack of control. Shareholders could always recoup their money as long as the stock traded above par. The commander of the latest fleet (the admiral) was the highest authority in the overseas region. The commander, Jan Pietersz Coen, founded the city of Batavia (now Djakarta) in 1619. He held the title of Governor-General of the Indies, the highest official overseas. Governor-Generals were appointed by the Heeren 17 for a limited period of time. However, this policy was soon abandoned, and Governor-Generals often served long periods (up to 25 years). The Governor-General had to comply with the wishes of the Heeren 17, but had some leeway in doing so as he operated at long distance. He could conclude contracts on behalf of the VOC. Trading posts of the VOC were established in the Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon, India (Hougly) and Japan (Decima). Sailors earned a fixed fee and also got a share of the profits. Directors who did not agree with VOC policy resigned. One example was Isaac Lemaire, who resigned as director in 1605. He wanted to venture into South American territory, which also fell under the VOC monopoly charter. He offered a petition to van Oldenbarneveldt, who dismissed it. He then tried to drive down the share price by going short. However, the Heeren 17 petitioned the states of Holland in 1609 to forbid futures trade in VOC shares. Share price dropped from 180 to 126 based on rumors of mismanagement and the loss of several vessels and strongholds in the Indies. Losses reached one million guilders at that time, but the government decided in favor of the incumbent management and restricted futures trade (Frentrop,
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2002: 75). Moreover, the VOC was relieved of the obligation to pay out after ten years. The second accounting session, which was due in 1622. also failed to materialize. Complaints about the absence of disclosure to small shareholders were again dismissed by the States General, which ruled that the VOC charter should be extended for another 50 years and that all directors would retain their seats. The dissenting investors’ request that onethird of all directors would step down every two years, which would make room for directors from their own ranks, was thereby dismissed. However, investors’ protests induced the States General to change course and amend the corporate governance code of the VOC in 1622. A committee of Nine Men was established to oversee the operations of the VOC on a continual basis. They could inspect the ships and the goods that were stored in the warehouses. Directors were no longer appointed for life but only for a three-year period. They could only be reappointed after another three years. The directors were paid by commission (1 percent of revenues) and not by a fixed salary. A fixed dividend was to be paid to investors annually, which was set at 12.5 percent in 1632. This amounted to twice the interest paid on loans. The fixed dividend reduced small shareholders to perpetual bondholders. Frentrop argues that this was in line with their lack of participation rights (ibid.: 103). Further amendments to the VOC Charter were made in 1623, when the Nine Men were allowed to peruse the purchase accounts on an annual basis. They were also permitted to attend meetings of the Heeren 17, but did not have voting rights. The Nine Men were held to strict confidentiality concerning matters discussed by the Heeren 17 (ibid.: 96). The VOC was dissolved in 1798, when the Batavian Republic was founded under French tutelage and Napoleon’s brother Louis became king of the Netherlands. Governance changes implemented by the VOC in 1622 were inspired by different governance arrangements that had been adopted by the Dutch West India Company, which was chartered in 1621. Both trading companies competed for funds. The West India Company (WIC) was granted a monopoly charter for trade with the Americas by the States General for a period of 24 years. We could argue that the initial monopoly granted to the VOC was split in two. The West India Company had staggered boards of two years with six-year terms for all directors. The West India Company granted the right to fit out ships to each town that had invested more than 100,000 guilders (ibid.: 108). The WIC had five chambers: one based in Amsterdam and four regional chambers located in Middelburg, Rotterdam, Hoorn and Groningen. The first WIC directors were appointed by the Provincial States. The appointees chose their successors from a binding slate prepared jointly with the chief participants. Amendments to the WIC governance code were made on the instigation of investors. More disclosure requirements were offered and the influence of incumbent directors on appointing directors decreased. New directors were chosen by the Provincial States or town magistrates of the chambers from a slate of three names made up by the incumbent directors and chief investors. The West India
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Company collected 7.1 million guilders in a period of two years, 2.8 million of which was a subscription from the Amsterdam chamber (ibid.: 110). WIC operations were coordinated by the Heeren 19. The WIC established settlements in North America (now New York); the Netherlands Antilles, the Caribbean, Surinam and Guyana. In 1630, the Dutch took over some possessions in Brazil from the Portuguese (modern Recife), which were lost to the Portuguese in 1654. In Africa, posts were established on the Gold Coast (now Ghana) from where the slave trade was conducted. The original WIC folded in 1674 and a new reorganized company was formed, which lasted until 1791.
The state and risk absorption Institutional development helped economic development in seventeenthcentury Holland. The Dutch East India Company combined ventures from different towns to different destinations. Such diversification enabled risk spreading within the VOC. The long length of life of the VOC contributed to achieving a long-run expectational equilibrium with positive profits. The VOC developed into a company with fixed dividends, and investors could earn additional profits on the stock exchange. The Dutch East India Company fared better than its British counterpart. The people who invested in the second British East India Company, which lasted from 1617 to 1623, lost money (Ferguson, 2003: 21). The monopoly charter of the trading companies did not protect them from foreign competition. The English and the Dutch fought three wars between 1652 and 1674 to obtain control of the trade routes from Western Europe to Asia and the Americas. The Dutch were victorious at this point in time and obtained control of trading posts on the West African coast (ibid.: 21). Hostilities between the Dutch and the English came to an end, when Stadtholder Prince William of Orange invaded Britain and ascended the British throne after the Glorious Revolution of 1688. He was backed by London merchants who wanted to combine the Dutch and British East India operations. A merger between the two East India companies brought hostilities between the British and the Dutch in the Indies to an end and led to a division of markets between the two nations. Indonesia and the spice trade were left to the Dutch, whereas the English could develop the Indian textiles trade. The demand for textiles soon outgrew the market for spices to the benefit of the English. Moreover, the British could learn from Dutch modern finance. The Bank of England was founded in 1694 on the model of the Dutch Wisselbank, which was founded in 1609 to manage the government’s borrowings as well as the national currency. London also imported the Dutch system of a national public debt funded through the Stock Exchange where long-term bonds could easily be bought and sold. These sophisticated financial institutions allowed the British government to borrow at reduced interest rates (ibid.: 23). We can argue that trustworthiness validating low rates of interest
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on government debt depended on the assumption that the government would not default on its debt. Ferguson points out how nations that developed political representation contributed to financial development. The identity of the prince and the government in feudal times made princes notably non-creditworthy. After all, the lender had no legal means to compel the borrower to repay the loan. Private enterprise was better able to raise money than government at the time. The separation of the ruler’s private finances from that of the state enabled the state to become creditworthy and obtain loans. The first government borrowing occurred in Genoa and Venice in the late Middle Ages, where the town councils borrowed on a commercial basis from the newly developed banks (ibid.: 2001). The Dutch Republic raised money on the capital market through the VOC. The Government borrowed two million guilders from the VOC in 1672 that raised the money on the capital market. The Heeren 17 decided the next year to distribute these national ‘bonds’ among the shareholders of the VOC as a dividend (Frentrop, 2002: 116). VOC shares thus obtained features of government bonds with fixed rates of interest. King William III could borrow £1.2 million at 8 percent interest, which was guaranteed by Parliament in 1694. Hence, the formation of a state where decisions were not made by a single ruler, but by a representative assembly (States-General, parliament) allowed the rise of a market for government debt. A single ruler could more easily renege on his promises than a representative assembly that had tied itself to the promise not to devalue the currency. This differed from an autocratic ruler who could raise taxes at will or print money to repay his debt. The British Parliament, however, created a fiscal system, in which expenditures were tied to revenues, which laid the ground for the development of a capital market (North, 1990). Arguably, private enterprise was deemed more reliable by investors than the government in the seventeenth century. The loans paid a certain interest, which was returned to shareholders as a fixed dividend. The liquidity of the shares allowed shareholders to reap extra income through appreciation of the equity, or an extra loss, if share price fell. The financing of government debt by private trading companies developed into a system, in which the companies were prepared to pay the government to grant them monopoly rights. This happened in France, where the Scot John Law founded the Mississippi Company in 1716. The Mississippi Company obtained monopoly rights on trade in French Louisiana for 25 years. The Mississippi Company was organized along the lines of the British South Sea Company, which was founded in 1711 and obtained a monopoly on West Indies trade. Both companies raised money from the public that was loaned to the government in exchange for a trade monopoly (Frentrop, 2002: 121). However, the South Sea Company was barred from using its monopoly on West Indies trade, because Louis XIV did not allow Britain four safe harbors in the region at the Treaty of Utrecht that concluded peace with Spain. The
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South Sea Company obtained a contract to supply the Spanish colonies with slaves, which did not consume the £10 million it had raised before the negotiations were completed (ibid.: 122). A new life for the South Sea Company emerged in 1713, when it successfully conversed government shortterm to long-term debt with a corresponding reduction of interest rates paid on the annuities (Dickson, 1967: 92). Several new equity issuances were made by the South Sea Company until its share price collapsed in 1720. The French Parliament had too little influence to credibly underwrite government loans in the manner of its English counterpart (Frentrop, 2002: 123). Government revenues were increased by the use of inflationary schemes. In 1701, Louis XIV introduced a law under which citizens were compelled to swap their coins for government paper bills. The value of the paper bills declined to half their face value soon after issue. The Mississippi Company’s operations in Louisiana were a failure and the Company, like its South Sea Company counterpart, changed its activities from commerce to a restructuring of government debt. Law obtained a charter for a new central bank in 1716, which could issue bank notes. The bank obtained the right to collect taxes on behalf of the French king. The Mississippi Company was financed by converting government debt into shares of the company (Ferguson, 2001: 313). The company could raise up to 100 million livres in this way. The government paid 5 percent interest on this capital, which gave the company a working capital of over four million livres (Frentrop, 2002: 124). The bank issued 240 million livres of additional bank notes to finance a new equity issue for the acquisition of French trading monopolies on China, Senegal and Guinea, together with the tobacco monopoly. A new share issue of 1719 was used to buy the rights to the French Mint. The company took over all the government’s debt in 1719 in exchange for the right to take over tax collection (ibid.: 125). John Law’s bank became the Banque Royale; a position akin to that of the Bank of England. His bank controlled the money supply by its monopoly on issuing bank notes. The bank extended its monopoly on tax payments with a monopoly on transactions exceeding 600 livres. The public was no longer allowed to use silver but had to use the paper money. The price of the shares of the Mississippi Company grew rapidly from 500 livres in May 1719 to 10,000 livres in December of the same year, but the financing schemes fuelled inflation and confidence in the bank notes issued by Law soon collapsed. Investors were forbidden to convert their bank notes into gold, which heightened the public mistrust. The price of the Mississippi Company shares fell sharply at the beginning of 1720. A government guarantee to pay 9,000 livres in bank notes for all shares offered further fuelled inflation and gold and silver coins were taken out of circulation. The value of bank notes halved within half a year. The price of the shares was reduced to 5,000 livres. There was a run on the bank, which further precipitated the collapse of both equity trading and paper money and with it that of the French economy. French experience of these two
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financial instruments had lasted less than two years (Frentrop, 2002: 136). Gold and silver were reinstated by edict in October 1720. The crashes of 1720 had more grave consequences for France, since the Mississippi Company was closer connected to the French state than the South Sea Company was to the British government. The stock market bust was not limited to France and Britain, but also extended to the Netherlands. Many companies went bankrupt in the crisis of 1720, which left its mark for a period of over 100 years on West European economies.
Discussion The Dutch East India Company, the South Sea and Mississippi Companies all converted government debt. The Dutch East India Company, however, did not collapse, in contrast to its British and French counterparts. We can explain the different fates of the companies by their different origins. Both the South Sea and the Mississippi Companies started as single state-chartered monopolies, in contrast to the Dutch East India Company, which combined numerous maritime enterprises (rederijen). These enterprises had maintained an expectational equilibrium featuring long-term positive rates of return on those investments for some time. Meeting those expectations supported a continuous flow of investment into these entrepreneurial ventures. The Dutch East India Company obtained a monopoly charter, but followed in the footsteps of the rederijen by decentralizing its operation among the six chambers. The state supported the VOC in difficult times by lifting the obligation to repay shareholders, which effectively created the first corporation with an indefinite length of life. However, this did not stop investors’ trust and money continued to flow into the VOC and thereby into the coffers of the Dutch government. We can argue that the close relationship between private enterprise and public finance did not collapse, because the Dutch government did not default on its debt and the VOC ventures were on average profitable enough to sustain increasing investments. However, the close relationship between private and public finance posed a distinct danger. The public/private companies of the late seventeenth century could not fail without pulling the government down with them in their collapse. This scenario became a reality, when the South Sea and the Mississippi ventures turned out to be failures. Measures taken to prevent a collapse actually intensified the problem. This happened with the passage of the Bubble Act of 1720 by which the British Parliament outlawed the non-chartered companies that had arisen on the stock market boom. The Act intended to curb competition for the South Sea Company by prohibiting companies to raise money on the securities market without a government license. Consequently, the government became the sole ex ante judge of commercial ventures. This prevented the launch of enterprises representing different views of individual investors. Risk actually increased due to a lack of diversification caused by the
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requirement of ex ante government approval. The Bubble Act, therefore, prevented a return to a new expectational equilibrium featuring high investments in entrepreneurial enterprise. By contrast, entrepreneurial investment evaporated for more than a century to come after the South Sea bubble burst. The eclipse of the listed company that could raise capital in the form of shares from a large part of the public had become a fact. Authors on the topic agree that the 1720 bubble and its aftermath robbed industry for more than a century to come of capital that could have been available for economic development (Hunt 1936; Baskin, 1988). Economic growth in Western Europe as a whole stagnated and only took off after 1820 (Maddison, 2004).
Waves of investments The crises of 1720 marked the end of an era that featured the merger of government finance and entrepreneurial investments. The practice pioneered by the VOC to relieve the military burden of the new Dutch state was turned on its head, when taxes were used to finance the trade companies. The creation of new joint stock companies came to a halt in France, England and Holland after 1720 and only slowly re-emerged after 1820. Public opinion in both France and the Netherlands had turned against financial markets. The British government was reluctant to grant licenses to raise money as a joint stock company under the Bubble Act; only public utilities such as canals and railways obtained a license. Other companies founded in Britain took the form of partnerships, which did not have limited liability (Frentrop, 2002: 139). Private corporations with limited liability re-emerged in Britain at the beginning of the nineteenth century after the Bubble Act was withdrawn in 1825. The 1720 stock market crash constituted the largest price fall in British financial history (Ferguson, 2001: 307). Several stock market crashes took place in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries but the severity of the burst of the South Sea bubble remained unsurpassed. Joint stock companies appeared at an even slower pace in the European continental countries, where the state remained an important economic player. Dutch incorporation was hurt by the need for royal approval in the newly established monarchy of 1813. The Dutch king William I took the lead in Dutch entrepreneurship. He founded the Nederlandse Handelsmaatschappij (NHM or Dutch Trading Company) in 1825 especially to conduct trade with the East Indies. We can consider the NHM to be the successor to the VOC, which had been wound up in 1798, when its assets were nationalized. The VOC was unable to pay dividends after 1781 and was moving towards bankruptcy, a process that could not be stopped by the States General. The Dutch Trading Company resumed the monopoly on trade with the East Indies. The king participated in NHM equity and guaranteed a dividend
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of 4.5 percent, which exceeded the 3 percent paid on government bonds. The six-person board of the NHM was appointed by the king. Supervisors (commissioners) were nominated by the various towns participating in the venture and were also appointed by the king (Frentrop, 2002: 147). However, the NHM was not successful in its early years; the equity was trimmed by a third, but it was still unable to achieve a 4.5 percent dividend. By 1830, the company’s activities were limited to Java. It had built up a debt with the king of three million guilders in order to pay its dividends. The NHM introduced the culture system to secure a continuous stream of revenues. Plantations were established on Java, which were run by the NHM under a monopoly charter to ship all goods produced in Java (especially coffee) to the Netherlands. This turned out to be a profitable state-run enterprise, which allowed the Dutch king’s debt to be repaid (ibid.: 149). We can argue that the Dutch had adopted the Portuguese model of colonization where trade was carried out by state-run enterprises at the time of the NHM. The plantations used both indigenous labor and immigrants from India. Freedom of incorporation increased, when the Dutch Code of Commerce was approved by Parliament in 1838. Incorporation of a company still required royal approval, but this could only be denied on good grounds (ibid.: 155). Freedom of incorporation was enhanced in England with the passage of the Joint Stock Company Act of 1844, which allowed firms to be incorporated without the permission of Parliament. The first general incorporation law in the United States was in 1837 in the state of Connecticut. The new era differed from the past with respect to the role of the state. The government had tried in the past to guarantee dividend payments, which turned shares into bonds. But government interference did not reduce, but instead increased risk, due to a lack of diversification. John Law became the favored entrepreneur of the French government and his demise affected the whole economy. The monopoly charter did not protect the ventures against the uncertainties of entering unknown territories and the competition from other (chartered) companies. The new liberal era of the nineteenth century restricted the role of the state to that of a guarantor that the game would be played according to the rules. The rules had become more liberal in the first half of the nineteenth century, when free incorporation and limited liability were on the increase. Prudent monetary and fiscal policies aimed at achieving price stability and balanced budgets. The exchange rate was stabilized by the adoption of the Gold Standard in the nineteenth century. Great Britain and many countries in their sphere of influence adopted the Gold Standard. Britain, Portugal, Egypt, Canada, Chile and Australia had currencies that were convertible into gold on demand, but France and the other members of the Latin Monetary Union as well as Russia and Persia were on the bi-metallic system, while most of the rest of the world was on the Silver Standard. All trading countries, with the exception of China, Persia and a handful of Central American countries, had adopted the Gold Standard by 1908 (Ferguson, 2001: 189–90). The Gold Standard
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acted as a guarantee for sound monetary and fiscal policies. Governments promised not to print money or to default on their debts. Governments thus needed to bind their hands to gain confidence and attract capital. However, this was only a promise, which could be broken. This is in fact what happened in the financial crises of the nineteenth century that rocked Argentina, Brazil and Chile in the period 1880–1914, when both Argentina and Brazil defaulted on their debt. Ferguson argues that belonging to the British Empire was a better guarantee of no default than the Gold Standard; the only risk was the possible collapse of the British Empire. The British Empire imported institutions to their colonies, such as British administration, commercial law and a judiciary that promoted growth. British bonds had the lowest average bond yields in the period (ibid.: 191). Latin American bond yields, by contrast, were much higher. Britain financed the construction of railroads and other infrastructural work in Rhodesia, Nigeria, India and other colonies. Being part of the British Empire thus actually facilitated growth, in Ferguson’s view. Arguably, ‘natural’ interest rates can be quite low, if currency crises and government defaults are deemed non-existent.
The political economy of financial development The nineteenth century was an era of rapid economic growth. Sound monetary and fiscal policies and the diffusion of ‘good’ institutions over the globe contributed to this effect. Hard currencies and balanced budgets created a good environment for financial development, which grew rapidly in that era. Financial development points to the availability of external finance for business operations. Common indicators of financial development involve the value of outside equity and debt over GDP and the number of firms listed on the stock exchange on a per capita basis (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). Financial and economic development were found to be closely related (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998). The rationale for this relationship lies in Schumpeter’s and Knight’s ideas on entrepreneurial investment; ample availability of external finance reduces the costs of obtaining money and so enhances the possibilities for the foundation of new firms. Moreover, competition between entrant and incumbent firms allocates capital more efficiently than when capital is only allocated to incumbent firms (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Hence, financial development spurs economic development. External finance will be amply available, if creditors and shareholders expect to make a profit on their investments. Expectations of making money on government bonds are not met, if currencies devalue due to money printing and governments default on their debts. Such bad government policies affect equity investment by raising the interest rate. The government can raise money by levying taxes, if investor confidence has waned, but business has to rely on internal funds, if it cannot raise external finance.
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Standards for government policies such as the Gold Standard and budget rules contribute to financial development, if the investment community expects them to be maintained. Government debt remained the largest part of security trade in the nineteenth century and encompassed 70 percent of all securities quoted on the London Stock Exchange in 1853. This figure fell to 10 percent in 1913, but the effects of the world wars drove the percentage up again to 64 percent in 1950. The failure of the infant equity markets had a lasting impact on financial history (Ferguson, 2001: 311). The burst of a stock market bubble does not need to shake investors’ confidence as long as it is not caused by government actions. Moreover, the alleged excesses that lead to a crisis should not be remedied by government regulation that curbs profits and thereby investment opportunities. Bubbles might induce a cyclical pattern of regulation, limiting financial development after they burst, ensuing a long period of damage to be undone. Such regulation helps explain the emergence of the stock market drought of the eighteenth century, as pointed out above. Investors and the public at large were convinced that shares were too risky and shied away from the stock market. Regulation inhibited free incorporation. Cycles of investor confidence can even last a century, as happened after 1720. Both outside equity and debt increased at a rapid rate in the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, as did the number of listed companies. Financial development was not restricted to the US and Europe, but extended to Egypt, Cuba, Brazil, Australia and Japan, which all had comparable levels of financial development in 1913, as measured by stock market capitalization over GDP and the number of listed companies per million people (see Table 4.1). India’s financial development lagged behind that of other countries with a stock market capitalization of 2 percent of GDP, which contrasted dramatically with the 109 percent of the UK at the time. Russia, Argentina, Chile and Brazil were also relative laggards with stock market capitalization percentages below 25 percent. We could argue that the financial development of some Latin American countries was hampered, because they had defaulted on their debts around the turn of the twentieth century. Argentina defaulted in 1888–93 and Brazil in both 1898 and 1914 (Ferguson, 2004; 2001: 190). However, indicators of financial development fell after 1929 to regain strength only after 1980 (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). In most countries, equity markets were larger relative to GDP in 1913 than in 1980. Only by the end of the 1990s did they exceed their 1913 levels. Within the Western world, the UK and the US were least affected by the decline of the stock markets. Austria and Egypt never regained the levels of stock market development they had in 1913. Continental Europe and the UK were more financially developed than the United States in 1913. France’s stock market capitalization in that year as a percentage of GDP was twice that of the US. The ‘Grand Reversal’ points to the decline of former most financially developed countries such as France, Belgium and Austria that were replaced
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Table 4.1 Financial development measured by stock market capitalization over GDP and the number of listed companies per million people, 1913–90 Country/Year
Stocks 1913
1990
Listings 1913
1990
Australia Austria Belgium Brazil Chile Egypt France Germany India The Netherlands The UK The US
0.39 0.76 0.99 0.25 0.17 1.09 0.78 0.44 0.02 0.56 1.09 0.39
0.37 0.17 0.31 0.08 0.50 0.06 0.24 0.20 0.16 0.50 0.81 0.54
62 39 109 12 21 17 13 28 1 66 47 5
64 13 18.5 4 16 11 15 6.5 7 17 30 26
by the US as the financial centre of the world during the twentieth century. The UK more or less held its own as did Switzerland and the Netherlands. The decline of financial markets set in after World War I when inflation was rampant in several countries and was precipitated by the Depression of the 1930s that followed the stock market crash of 1929 and by World War II. Financial markets only regained strength long after the end of World War II. We could argue that investors’ trust was again shattered as it had been in 1720 and that it took a long period before trust was regained. This was due to a turn towards autarky following the crash. The decline of financial markets occurred concomitant to a decline of world trade, which lasted till the 1970s, indicating a link between international trade and financial development. Per capita income grew slowly from 1913 to 1950 and more rapidly thereafter. The fall in financial development was considerably more pronounced in continental Europe than in the UK and the US. This applies particularly to France, Austria and Belgium that belonged to the top group of financially developed countries in 1913, but had moved to the second tier in 1990. Japan, India and the US were least affected by the decline of financial development, but Latin American stock markets experienced a large setback. Their decline was hastened by the defaults on government debt in Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and Mexico in between the two world wars, which spawned periods of high inflation in those countries (Ferguson, 2001: 192). Inflation in Brazil became a problem in the 1930s after the Great Depression. Getulio Vargas secured the presidency after a civil war and dismissed Congress. A state of emergency was declared by Vargas in 1937 and an authoritarian regime was established. Brazilian inflation was also sky high, reaching levels of over 80 percent in the 1960s (Musacchio, 2006). Rampant inflation occurred in Austria and Germany after World War I, which greatly eroded savings in those countries (Rajan and Zingales, 1998:
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14). The UK, the US, the Netherlands and Switzerland were largely spared the damages of World War I and the ensuing expropriation through hyperinflation. Countries that were spared the inflationary aftermath of World War I did not lose trust in the market economy. Financial development recovered relatively quickly in countries, where the middle classes were not expropriated through inflation and/or dictatorship. Government-induced inflation offers one explanation for the long recovery time of financial markets in some countries. A concomitant explanation involves the pressure exerted by interest groups of incumbent enterprises that were opposed to liberal legislation (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). They argued that incumbent firms can finance themselves through cash flows and do not need outside finance. Ample outside finance would assist the start-up of new companies and therefore intensify competition. Financiers who prefer to do business with a small group of insiders also reduce entrant competition. Rajan and Zingales call financial practices that establish exclusive relationships between a financier and a company ‘relationship lending’. Consequently, competition in both financial and product markets is impaired, if financial development is impeded by government legislation. Incumbents can also ask organized labor to assist their cause to establish a political majority. Another explanation for the collapse of financial development in between the two world wars can be found in the rise of dictatorship in the 1930s. Authoritarian leadership in Germany, the Soviet Union and Italy reduced the dependence on international trade. A move towards dictatorship reduces financial development with autarky in the causal role (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). Openness to trade was restricted in the 1930s as a way to curb the effects of the Depression. Country after country abandoned the Gold Standard and devalued its currency. Protectionism was used to prevent currency competition between countries but the surge of protectionism eroded financial development. Stock and bond markets declined till well below their pre-1913 levels. Autarky thus spread like a virus when ever more countries closed their markets for trade. Rajan and Zingales apply the same argument to explain the increasing trade openness that emerged after 1980. Countries did not want to be left out of the globalization game, when this was deemed to benefit their economies. Rajan and Zingales (2003) also argue that the welfare states that arose in the 1930s and thereafter were incompatible with the Gold Standard and strengthened a tendency to autarky. These policies impeded financial development for decades after World War II, which contrasted sharply with the quick financial recovery that occurred after World War I (ibid.: 7). The government share of national income in 17 developed economies rose from 12.7 percent in 1913 to 45.6 percent in 1996 largely due to the introduction of social insurance and welfare. Hence, autarky was partly prompted by the recession that followed the 1929 crisis, but was strengthened by deliberate policy choices after that date. Governments wanted to absorb uncertainty
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caused by the Great Depression by insuring their citizens against unemployment and sickness and guaranteeing them a pension at retirement age. Autarky – or beggar your neighbor policies – seemed a good device to boost national industries, but worked against economic recovery, when all countries adopted it. The Bretton Woods Agreement allowed national governments to control capital movements, on the instigation of Lord Keynes (ibid.: 39). The breakdown of the Bretton Woods system led to the abandonment of capital controls, which were effectively removed by the end of the 1980s in Europe, Scandinavia and Japan. The breakdown of the Bretton Woods system spurred financial development. The US and the UK were the big movers in the new age of financial development and cross-border capital flows that ensued. The number of listed companies per capita grew fastest in the Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries, but never regained its 1913 level in the continental European countries. The continental European countries thus opted for a model that was not conducive to financial development, which showed most clearly in the decline of the number of listed companies these countries experienced in the post World War II period. The number of listed companies per capita fell in France, Germany, Belgium, Austria and the Netherlands after 1950, which contrasts sharply with the US. Arguably, financial markets in many European countries did not facilitate creative destruction, but were geared towards protecting incumbent firms (ibid.). Impediments to free incorporation created an expectational equilibrium wherein less investment is financed by equity issuances and more by cash flows or borrowing against collateral. Such equilibrium reduces entrepreneurial investments and protects incumbent firms. More external investment at equal rates of return could emerge, if investments were spread over a wider population of firms; both old and new. This could cause a wider spread of return rates than could be obtained by investing in a fixed population of incumbent firms. But average returns could remain unaffected at higher outside investment levels. In fact, research shows that the development of stock markets is positively related to the administrative ease in founding a new firm. This indicates that well-developed stock markets facilitate creative destruction through new firm formation (Djankov et al., 2002).
A new empire for the twenty-first century? Some eras feature virtuous circles, wherein cross-border trade, financial development and growth increase in tandem. However, such development can turn into vicious circles when both trade and financial markets collapse in times of crisis. Trust is not easily regained, if the crisis was government instigated. The 1720 crisis was a case in point. The crisis of 1929 had a long aftermath, which was not primarily due to government being instrumental in creating the crisis. The 1929 stock market crisis, however, spurred a loss of confidence in (capital) markets and witnessed several experiments in
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replacing the market by state control. This applies to the Soviet Union and fascist Germany. But the loss of faith in the working of (capital) markets also spawned increased government control of the economy in France and the US, where Roosevelt’s New Deal wanted to control prices and wages. Its main instrument, the National Recovery Act, was, however, declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. The stock market crisis of 2000 did not shatter confidence in financial markets, which soon regained their upward movement, although employment lagged behind and stayed above its ‘natural rate’ for some time (Phelps, 2004). The contemporary era of globalization features investments by corporations and not by hybrids of private and state enterprise. The spread of institutions conducive to growth is not imposed on people, as in colonial times, but comes from voluntary agreements between nations. The prospect of growth is sufficiently alluring to make countries want to join the capitalist game. We can argue that countries that want to play the capitalist game will voluntarily adopt its rules. Expropriation of assets by a government through seizure or the printing press inducing rampant inflation breaches the rules of the game and deters foreign investment. Consequently, governments should refrain from expropriation policies in order to build a reputation as a reliable trading partner and profitable receiver of foreign direct investment. Obviously, such self-restraint is not practiced everywhere, but history demonstrates that financial self-restraint of governments is a prerequisite for maintaining the trust of financial markets.
5
Valuation and authority in failing firms The role of reorganization in US and European bankruptcy law
Introduction Financial development is hindered, if government defaults on its debt or pursues inflationary, monetary policies. Such failure to live up to expectations shatters the previous expectational equilibrium and damages investment. Failing firms, however, do not need to create the same effect. Losses of failing firms can be compensated by profits made by others without undermining investor confidence. Limited liability restricts losses to opportunity costs. Failing firms usually retain some value, which restricts losses below the opportunity costs of all claimants. Several groups of claimants can be distinguished in bankruptcy procedures. Employees have claims on wage payments; tax authorities on tax and social security payments; creditors want to retrieve their loans and shareholders want to recoup their investments. Failing companies can either be liquidated or continue their existence in reorganization. Reorganization should be preferred to liquidation or acquisition, if more value is preserved in that way. Company bankruptcy law sets rules to either liquidate a company or restructure its debt in reorganization. The US has a larger share of reorganization in bankruptcy proceedings than European countries, which demands an explanation. Differences in the incidence of reorganization could ensue from differences in bankruptcy legislation. US bankruptcy proceedings are considered debtor-friendly in contrast to tougher policy stances taken by other countries. Bankruptcy law orders the various claims and regulates authority. The owners of the company have the authority to take decisions in normal times, which can be delegated to a CEO. Creditors usually have no authority, as they are assumed to receive secure interest payments. However, authority structures are reversed in bankruptcy proceedings. Creditors assume decision rights and the incumbent management is often ousted. Hence, shareholders as residual claimants lose their decision rights, if the residual evaporates and turns into losses. Many variations on this theme can be found in bankruptcy legislation. Some national laws put the rights of the tax authority and of employees above those of creditors.
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Creditors do not constitute a homogeneous group, but groups of creditors have different rights. Some creditors have secured their claim against collateral; others have priority rights meaning that their claims supersede those of other creditors. The chapter starts out by analyzing the differences between common and civil law legislations. The effects of legal origin on creditors’ rights are discussed. The chapter then discusses US bankruptcy procedures and practices and compares them with European countries. Recent changes in bankruptcy legislation in the UK, the Netherlands, France and Germany are discussed in order to find out whether bankruptcy legislation is moving toward a common model.
Legal origins and their consequences The law and finance literature analyzes the effects of differences in legal origin, especially the difference between civil and common law, on economic performance. Common law is of English origin and prevails in Anglo-Saxon countries and former British colonies. The judge has a great degree of discretion in common law systems. He may do anything that has not been explicitly forbidden, as long as his judgments are reasonable and comply with the rule of precedent. Common law evolves gradually through decisions in specific disputes. Judges’ rulings can set the tone for future judicial decisions, if higher courts uphold them. The civil law tradition is the other widespread legal system. It depends on legal statutes and comprehensive codes. It may, therefore, be less flexible, but more calculable. The legislator in civil law systems wants to provide rules for as many situations as possible. The judge can only use his discretion, if the legislator either overlooked the problem or left it deliberately open for the courts (Buetter, 2002: 29). Civil codes originate in the French Code Napoleon of 1804. The French Revolution created the desire to replace the fragmented system that had prevailed hitherto with a uniform legal system. Custom law was applied in the North of France, while Roman law ruled in the South (Danet, 2002). The Code Napoleon abolished feudal rights and offered equality under the law to everybody (although not to married women). The Napoleonic Code was imposed on subjugated territories during Napoleon’s rule. However, many of these countries voluntarily adopted the Napoleonic Code after the French defeat. The French Civil Code also had a paramount influence on the Dutch Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek) of 1838. Several attempts at writing a new Dutch Civil Law had failed, because these proposals had been rejected by Parliament (Meijer and Meijer, 2002). The country adopted the French Code Civil, because it constituted a coherent legal system and was acceptable to broad social groups. The States of the Rhine Confederation also adopted the French Code to break up the stalemate between aristocratic and bourgeois interests in Germany (Weinacht, 2002). The German Civil Law of 1896 is considered an offshoot of the Code Civil, but constitutes a separate class due to its differences from the French Code. Scandinavian law countries are also considered to differ from both
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common and civil law countries. Legal origin, therefore, divides countries in four groups: (1) common law countries; (2) French civil law countries; (3) German civil law countries; and (4) Scandinavian law countries. Countries that become independent can either make up new laws from scratch or adopt a foreign Code completely. The latter procedure seems preferable for both reasons of practicality and legal principle. Legal codes that have proved their value for many centuries pose a smaller risk than a new code that has not withstood the test of time. Many former colonies adopted the legal codes of their former rulers. This applies among others to Australia, Canada, the United States, India and Nigeria that adopted the English common law system. Argentina, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Mexico and Portugal are a few examples of countries that adopted the French Civil Code. Japan, China and Switzerland are countries with legal systems of German origin (La Porta et al., 1998). Codes differ in the degree to which they allow systematic review and revision. French civil law, by putting the state above the courts, relegated the judges to a minor, bureaucratic role (Dawson, 1968). In England, by contrast, the law was put above the crown, which limited the monarch’s ability to alter property rights and grant monopoly rights (Beck and Levine, 2004: 12). Moreover, a common law system is supposed to be more open to a discussion of legal interpretations than a state-dominated system.
Legal origin, financial development and creditors’ rights Financial development The law and finance literature launched the hypothesis that financial development is related to legal protection of shareholders and creditors. Law and finance researchers argue that common law countries are more conducive to economic development due to the greater autonomy of the judiciary in those countries and less procedural formalism (Beck and Levine, 2004: 9). Moreover, common law countries do protect outside investors best against expropriation by insiders (i.e. management). Evidence was found supporting the hypothesis that common law countries were financially better developed than (French) Civil Code countries in the 1990s. Cross-country research found that French civil law countries have smaller stock markets; less active initial public offering markets; and lower levels of bank credit as a percentage of GDP than common law countries (La Porta et al., 1997). The large involvement of the state in French civil law countries seems to hinder the development of financial markets in these countries. The Netherlands is exceptional within the group of French law countries, because it has a welldeveloped equity and especially debt market. The predominance of debt over equity finance is characteristic of civil law countries. Debt finance is especially important in Germany and Japan. Debt finance is nine times more important than outside minority equity finance
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Table 5.1 Outside finance as a percentage of GNP for five countries Minority equity finance The United States The United Kingdom France The Netherlands Germany
0.58 1.0 0.23 0.52 0.13
a
Debt finance
b
0.81 1.13 0.96 1.08 1.12
Source: La Porta et al. (1997: 1138). Notes: a: Ratio of stock market capitalization held by minority owners and gross national product in 1994. b: Ratio of bank debt of the private sector and outstanding non-financial bonds to GNP in 1994.
in Germany and four times more important in France. External debt finance is twice as important as equity finance in the Netherlands. This differs from common law countries, where outside equity and debt finance were almost equally important. Table 5.1 summarizes the data for the five countries investigated in this chapter. Creditors’ rights The effects of external investors’ (shareholders and creditors) rights on financial development were examined for a number of countries in a crosscountry analysis. La Porta et al. (1998) and Beck and Levine (2004) found that shareholders’ rights are more developed in common law than in civil law countries. French legal origin countries have weakest liability rules and information disclosure requirements of managers vis-a`-vis shareholders. Weak shareholders’ rights could explain the relative underdevelopment of equity finance in civil law countries in the 1990s. La Porta et al. define creditors’ rights as the inability of management to seek protection from creditors’ claims in bankruptcy proceedings (La Porta et al., 1998: 1116). Managers are considered insiders, who can expropriate outside investors to benefit themselves. La Porta et al. investigated the prevalence of four creditors’ rights in bankruptcy proceedings in a cross-country fashion: 1 Filing for a reorganization petition does not imply an automatic stay on the assets of the firm, so that secured creditors can still gain possession of the assets. 2 Secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds that result from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm. 3 Creditors can decide whether a reorganization petition should be filed (and not managers) 4 Managers are removed during reorganization proceedings.
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La Porta et al. found that creditor protection was twice as high in common law origin as in French law origin countries. German law origin countries ranked in between. The position of secured creditors is strongest in German origin countries, where they are always paid first. The large majority of common law countries also adhered to this principle (except Sri Lanka and New Zealand). Secured creditors were only paid first in two-thirds of French origin countries. Secured creditors in France, Greece and a number of Latin American countries are only paid after the state and/or employees are compensated. Legal origin thus makes a difference. The United States diverges from the characteristic pattern of common law countries with respect to most creditors’ rights as shown in Table 5.2. The US has an automatic stay; management does not need creditor consent to petition for reorganization proceedings and management usually stays in reorganizations. The only right upheld is that secured creditors’ claims rank first in US bankruptcy proceedings. The US pattern differs from UK and German practices, where all four creditors’ rights are upheld. More importantly, only US bankruptcy law knows the construct of the ‘debtor in possession’, which implies that incumbent management continues to control the firm in reorganization proceedings. This differs from arrangements, where management is not ousted, but in which management has to take instructions from a court-appointed administrator as happens in European reorganization proceedings (Hahn, 2003). This difference was not captured by the La Porta et al. methodology. La Porta et al. (1998) concede that measuring the strength of creditors’ rights is more complicated than measuring shareholders’ rights as the rights of some creditors might prevail at the expense of others. Especially the rights of secured and unsecured creditors might be opposed. Arguably, La Porta et al. approached creditors’ rights from an angle that emphasizes the conflicts of interest between managers and creditors which risks neglecting the conflicting interests among creditors. Moreover, the conflict of interest approach overlooks the fact that all parties could benefit Table 5.2 Creditors’ rights in five countries
The US The UK France The Netherlands Germany
No automatic stay
Secured creditors paid first
Creditor consent required for reorganization filing
Management does not stay
0 1 0 0 1
1 1 0 1 1
0 1 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 1
Source: LaPorta et al. 1998, p.1137. Note: 0 = not applicable; 1 = applicable.
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from an optimization of the value of the distressed company, if there is more to be distributed. Robustness of bankruptcy law The legal origins approach seems to imply that institutions are long-lasting. The colonial past determines the legislative system adopted by countries and thereby the quality of their institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2001). However, bankruptcy laws have been subject to recurrent revisions and thereby have changed to a considerable extent. Common law countries can change their laws by judicial rulings, whereas civil law countries use the legislature to do so. Civil law countries are more subject to drastic overhauls of existing legislation than common law countries. The reversal of financial development noted by Rajan and Zingales can, therefore, be explained by drastic changes in legislation. This is the approach taken by Musacchio, who relates the decline of the Brazil bond market after 1920 to political changes and changes made to bankruptcy legislation (Musacchio, 2006). Brazil is a French civil law country that gained independence from Portugal in 1821 and adopted the Napoleonic Code which was strict with debtors in default, considering them criminals. During most of the nineteenth century, debt repudiation by businesses and individuals was considered a crime, often punished by jail sentences (ibid.: 17). The same harsh approach was adopted by common law countries such as England for the larger part of its history. The concept of limited liability only gradually evolved after the repeal of the Bubble Act in 1825. I would doubt the positive effects of such harsh legislation on financial development. The decriminalization of bankruptcy could, in my view, constitute a more important issue than the comparative strength of creditors’ rights in various legal origins as is illustrated by the slow growth of Brazilian external debt before 1890. A strong bond market developed in Brazil only after 1890, when bondholders obtained priority in new legislation issued that year. The bond market evolved rapidly from 5 percent of GDP in 1880 to 18 percent in 1920 (ibid.). The dictatorship that was established in 1930 affected bond markets badly because of the inflationary policies pursued by the Brazilian dictatorship. New bankruptcy legislation was only installed in 1945, whereby the tax authority and employee claims obtained priority over those of creditors. After 1945, secured creditors became third in line after the labor and the Treasury (ibid.). The same strong position of the Treasury and labor can be found in French civil law countries, such as France and the Netherlands, as will be pointed out below. Legal origin thus makes a difference but this is due more to the way legal practices are changed than to the alleged inherent anti-investor character of civil law. The greater influence of politics in civil law countries makes them more susceptible to pressure from interest groups. Changes conducive to financial development are introduced in periods when
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business groups are in control. This happened in Brazil at the end of the nineteenth century, when commercial associations had a large influence on government. This contrasts with the situation in 1945, when an authoritarian regime, which relied on the support of organized labor, introduced legislation benefiting this group. This appeared in the new Constitution of 1937, which featured legislation on minimum wages and compulsory union membership (ibid.). However, such legislation can deter investment, which could explain the weak financial development of French civil law countries. The dearth of foreign finance in French civil law countries applies to