INTRODUCTION
TO THE SERIES
The aim of the Handbooks in Economics series is to produce Handbooks for various branches of economics, each of which is a definitive source, reference, and teaching supplement for use by professional researchers and advanced graduate students. Each Handbook provides self-contained surveys of the current state of a branch of economics in the form of chapters prepared by leading specialists on various aspects of this branch of economics. These surveys summarize not only received results but also newer developments, from recent journal articles and discussion papers. Some original material is also included, but the main goal is to provide comprehensive and accessible surveys. The Handbooks are intended to provide not only useful reference volumes for professional collections but also possible supplementary readings for advanced courses for graduate students in economics. KENNETH J. ARROW and MICHAEL D. INTRILIGATOR
PUBLISHER'S
NOTE
For a complete overview of the Handbooks in Economics Series, please refer to the listing at the end of this volume.
CONTENTS OF THE HANDBOOK
VOLUME 1A PART 1 - E M P I R I C A L A N D H I S T O R I C A L P E R F O R M A N C E
Chapter 1 Business Cycle Fluctuations in US Macroeconomic Time Series JAMES H. STOCK and MARK W WATSON
Chapter 2 Monetary Policy Shocks: What Have we Learned and to What End? LAWRENCE J. CHRISTIANO, MARTIN EICHENBAUM and CHARLES L. EVANS
Chapter 3 Monetary Policy Regimes and Economic Performance: The Historical Record MICHAEL D. BORDO AND ANNA J. SCHWARTZ
Chapter 4 The New Empirics of Economic Growth STEVEN N. DURLAUF and DANNY T. QUAH PART 2 - M E T H O D S O F D Y N A M I C A N A L Y S I S
Chapter 5 Numerical Solution of Dynamic Economic Models MANUEL S. SANTOS
Chapter 6 Indeterminacy and Sunspots in Macroeconomics JESS BENHABIB and ROGER E.A. FARMER
Chapter 7 Learning Dynamics GEORGE W. EVANS and SEPPO HONKAPOHJA
Chapter 8 Micro Data and General Equilibrium Models MARTIN BROWNING, LARS PETER HANSEN and JAMES J. HECKMAN
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viii PART 3 - M O D E L S O F E C O N O M I C G R O W T H
Chapter 9 Neoclassical Growth Theory ROBERT M. SOLOW
Chapter 10 Explaining Cross-Country Income Differences ELLEN R. McGRATTAN and JAMES A. SCHMITZ, Jr.
VOLUME 1B PART 4 - C O N S U M P T I O N A N D I N V E S T M E N T
Chapter 11 Consumption ORAZIO R ATTANASIO
Chapter 12 Aggregate Investment RICARDO J. CABALLERO
Chapter 13 Inventories VALERIE A. RAMEY and KE;NNETH D. WEST PART 5 - M O D E L S O F E C O N O M I C F L U C T U A T I O N S
Chapter 14 Resuscitating Real Business Cycles ROBERT G. KING AND SERG10 T. REBELO
Chapter 15 Staggered Price and Wage Setting in Macroeconomics JOHN B. TAYLOR
Chapter 16 The Cyclical Behavior of Prices and Costs JULIO J. ROTEMBERG and MICHAEL WOODFORD
Chapter 17 Labor-Market Frictions and Employment Fluctuations ROBERT E. HALL
Chapter 18 Job Reallocation, Employmant Fluctuations and Unemployment DALE T. MORTENSEN and CHRISTOPHER A. PISSARIDES
Contents of the Handbook
Contents of the Handbook
VOLUME 1C PART 6 - F I N A N C I A L M A R K E T S A N D T H E M A C R O E C O N O M Y
Chapter 19 Asset Prices, Consumption, and the Business Cycle JOHN Y. CAMPBELL
Chapter 20 Human Behavior and the Efficiency of the Financial System ROBERT J. SHILLER
Chapter 21 The Financial Accelerator in a Quantitative Business Cycle Framework BEN S. BERNANKE, MARK GERTLER and SIMON G1LCHRIST PART 7 - M O N E T A R Y A N D F I S C A L P O L I C Y
Chapter 22 Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy TORSTEN PERSSON and GUIDO TABELLINI
Chapter 23 Issues in the Design of Monetary Policy Rules BENNETT T. McCALLUM
Chapter 24 Inflation Stabilization and BOP Crises in Developing Countries GUILLERMO A. CALVO and CARLOS A. VI~GH
Chapter 25 Government Debt DOUGLAS W ELMENDORF AND N. GREGORY MANKIW
Chapter 26 Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy V.V CHARI and PATRICK J. KEHOE
ix
PREFACE TO THE HANDBOOK
Purpose The Handbook of Macroeconomics aims to provide a survey of the state of knowledge in the broad area that includes the theories and facts of economic growth and economic fluctuations, as well as the consequences of monetary and fiscal policies for general economic conditions.
Progress in Macroeconomics Macroeconomic issues are central concerns in economics. Hence it is surprising that (with the exception of the subset of these topics addressed in the Handbook of Monetary Economics) no review of this area has been undertaken in the Handbook of Economics series until now. Surprising or not, we find that now is an especially auspicious time to present such a review of the field. Macroeconomics underwent a revolution in the 1970's and 1980's, due to the introduction of the methods of rational expectations, dynamic optimization, and general equilibrium analysis into macroeconomic models, to the development of new theories of economic fluctuations, and to the introduction of sophisticated methods for the analysis of economic time series. These developments were both important and exciting. However, the rapid change in methods and theories led to considerable disagreement, especially in the 1980's, as to whether there was any core of common beliefs, even about the defining problems of the subject, that united macroeconomists any longer. The 1990's have also been exciting, but for a different reason. In our view, the modern methods of analysis have progressed to the point where they are now much better able to address practical or substantive macroeconomic questions - whether traditional, new, empirical, or policy-related. Indeed, we find that it is no longer necessary to choose between more powerful methods and practical policy concerns. We believe that both the progress and the focus on substantive problems has led to a situation in macroeconomics where the area of common ground is considerable, though we cannot yet announce a "new synthesis" that could be endorsed by most scholars working in the field. For this reason, we have organized this Handbook around substantive macroeconomic problems, and not around alternative methodological approaches or schools of thought.
xi
xii
Prefiwe
The extent to which the field has changed over the past decade is considerable, and we think that there is a great need for the survey of the current state ofmacroeconomics that we and the other contributors to this book have attempted here. We hope that the Handbook of Macroeconomics will be useful as a teaching supplement in graduate courses in the field, and also as a reference that will assist researchers in one area of macroeconomics to become better acquainted with developments in other branches of the field. Overview
The Handbook of" Macroeconomics includes 26 chapters, arranged into seven parts. Part 1 reviews evidence on the Empirical and Historical PerJbrmance of the aggregate economy, to provide factual background for tile modeling efforts and policy discussion of the remaining chapters. It includes evidence on the character of business fluctuations, on long-run economic growth and the persistence of crosscountry differences in income levels, and on economic performance under alternative policy regimes. Part 2 on Methods of Dynamic Analysis treats several technical issues that arise in the study of economic models which are dynamic and in which agents' expectations about the future are critical to equilibrium determination. These include methods for the calibration and computation of models with intertemporal equilibria, the analysis of the determinacy of equilibria, and the use of "learning" dynamics to consider the stability of such equilibria. These topics are important for economic theory in general, and some are also treated in the Handbook of Mathematical Economics, The Handbook of Econometrics, and the Handbook of Computational Economics, for example, from a somewhat different perspective. Here we emphasize results - such as the problems associated with the calibration of general equilibrium models using microeconomic studies - that have particular application to macroeconomic models. The Handbook then turns to a review of theoretical models of macroeconomic phenomena. Part 3 reviews Models" of Economic Growth, including both the determinants of long-run levels of income per capita and the sources of cross-country income differences. Both "neoclassical" and "endogenous" theories of growth are discussed. Part 4 treats models of Consumption and Investment demand, from the point of view of intertemporal optimization. Part 5 covers Models" of Economic Fluctuations. In the chapters in this part we see a common approach to model formulation and testing, emphasizing intertemporal optimization, quantitative general equilibrium modeling, and the systematic comparison of model predictions with economic time series. This common approach allows for consideration of a variety of views about the ultimate sources of economic fluctuations and of the efficiency of the market mechanisms that amplify and propagate them. Part 6 treats Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy. The chapters in this part consider the relation between financial market developments and aggregate economic
Preface
xiii
activity, both from the point of view of how business fluctuations affect financial markets, and how financial market disturbances affect overall economic activity. These chapters also delve into the question of whether financial market behavior can be understood in terms of the postulates of rational expectations and intertemporal optimization that are used so extensively in modern macroeconomics-an issue of fundamental importance to our subject that can be, and has been, subject to special scrutiny kn the area of financial economics because of the unusual quality of available data. Finally, Part 7 reviews a number of Monetary and Fiscal Policy issues. Here we consider both the positive theory (or political economics) of government policymaking and the normative theory. Both the nature of ideal (or second-best) outcomes according to economic theory and the choice of simple rules that may offer practical guidance for policymakers are discussed. Lessons from economic theory and from experience with alternative policy regimes are reviewed. None of the chapters in this part focus entirely on international, or open economy, macroeconomic policies, because many such issues are addressed in the Handbook of International Economics. Nevertheless, open-economy issues cannot be separated from closed-economy issues as the analysis of disinflation policies and currency crises in this part of the Handbook of Macroeconomics, or the analysis of policy regimes in the Part I of the Handbook of Macroeconomics make clear.
Acknowledgements Our use of the pronoun "we" in this preface should not, of course, be taken to suggest that much, if any, of the credit for what is useful in these volumes is due to the Handbook's editors. We wish to acknowledge the tremendous debt we owe to the authors of the chapters in this Handbook, who not only prepared the individual chapters, but also provided us with much useful advice about the organization of the overall project. We are grateful for their efforts and for their patience with our slow progress toward completion of the Handbook. We hope that they will find that the final product justifies their efforts. We also wish to thank the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, and the Center for Economic Policy Research at Stanford University for financial support for two conferences on "Recent Developments in Macroeconomics" at which drafts of the Handbook chapters were presented and discussed, and especially to Jack Beebe and Rick Mishkin who made these two useful conferences happen. The deadlines, feedback, and commentary at these conferences were essential to the successful completion of the Handbook. We also would like to thank Jean Koentop for managing the manuscript as it neared completion. Stanford, California Princeton, New Jersey
John B. Taylor Michael Woodford
Chapter 19
A S S E T PRICES, C O N S U M P T I O N , A N D THE BUSINESS CYCLE * JOHN Y. CAMPBELL Harvard University and NBER. Department of Economics, Littauer Center, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
Contents Abstract Keywords 1. Introduction 2. International asset market data 3. The equity p r e m i u m puzzle 3.1. The stochastic discount factor 3.2. Consumption-based asset pricing with power utility 3.3. The riskfree rate puzzle 3.4. Bond returns and the equity premium and riskfrce rate puzzles 3.5. Separating risk aversion and intertemporal substitution 4. The d y n a m i c s o f asset returns and c o n s u m p t i o n 4.1. Time-variation in conditional expectations 4.2. A loglinear asset pricing framework 4.3. The stock market volatility puzzle 4.4. Implications for the equity premium puzzle 4.5. What does the stock market forecast? 4.6. Changing volatility in stock returns 4.7. What does the bond market forecast? 5. C y c l i c a l variation in the price o f risk 5.1. Habit formation 5.2. Models with heterogeneous agents
1232 1232 1233 1238 1245 1245 1249 1252 1255 1256 1260 1260 1264 1268 1272 1275 1277 1280 1284 1284 1290
* This chapter draws heavily on John Y. Campbell, "Consumption and the Stock Market: Interpreting International Experience", Swedish Economic Policy Review 3:251-299, Autumn 1996. I am grateful to the National Science Foundation for financial support, to Tim Chue, Vassil Konstantinov, and Luis Viceira for able research assistance, to Andrew Abel, Olivier Blanchard, Ricardo Caballero, Robert Shiller, Andrei Shleifer, John Taylor, and Michael Woodford for helpful comments, and to Barclays de Zoete Wedd Securities Limited, Morgan Stanley Capital International, David Barr, Bjorn Hansson, and Paul S6derlind for providing data. Handbook of Mactveconomics, Volume 1, Edited by J.B. lhylor and M. WoodJbrd © 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All tqghts reserved 1231
1232 5.3. Irrational expectations 6. Some implications for macroeconomics References
J..Y Campbell 1293 1296 1298
Abstract This chapter reviews the behavior of financial asset prices in relation to consumption. The chapter lists some important stylized facts that characterize US data, and relates them to recent developments in equilibrium asset pricing theory. Data from other countries are examined to see which features of the US experience apply more generally. The chapter argues that to make sense of asset market behavior one needs a model in which the market price of risk is high, time-varying, and correlated with the state of the economy. Models that have this feature, including models with habitformation in utility, heterogeneous investors, and irrational expectations, are discussed. The main focus is on stock returns and short-term real interest rates, but bond returns are also considered.
Keywords JEL classification: G12
Ch. 19." Asset Prices, Consumption, and the Business Cycle
1233
1. Introduction
The behavior of aggregate stock prices is a subject of enduring fascination to investors, policymakers, and economists. In recent years stock markets have continued to show some familiar patterns, including high average returns and volatile and procyclical price movements. Economists have struggled to understand these patterns. If stock prices are determined by fundamentals, then what exactly are these fundamentals and what is the mechanism by which they move prices? Researchers, working primarily with US data, have documented a host of interesting stylized facts about the stock market and its relation to short-term interest rates and aggregate consumption: (1) The average real return on stock is high. In quarterly US data over the period 1947.2 to 1996.4, a standard data set that is used throughout this chapter, the average real stock return has been 7.6% at an annual rate. (Here and throughout the chapter, the word return is used to mean a log or continuously compounded return unless otherwise stated.) (2) The average riskless real interest rate is low. 3-month Treasury bills deliver a return that is riskless in nominal terms and close to riskless in real terms because there is only modest uncertainty about inflation at a 3-month horizon. In the postwar quarterly US data, the average real return on 3-month Treasury bills has been 0.8% per year. (3) Real stock returns are volatile, with an annualized standard deviation of 15.5% in the US data. (4) The real interest rate is much less volatile. The annualized standard deviation of the ex post real return on US Treasury bills is 1.8%, and much of this is due to short-run inflation risk. Less than half the variance of the real bill return is forecastable, so the standard deviation of the ex ante real interest rate is considerably smaller than 1.8%. (5) Real consumption growth is very smooth. The annualized standard deviation of the growth rate of seasonally adjusted real consumption of nondurables and services is 1.1% in the US data. (6) Real dividend growth is extremely volatile at short horizons because dividend data are not adjusted to remove seasonality in dividend payments. The annualized quarterly standard deviation of real dividend growth is 28.8% in the US data. At longer horizons, however, the volatility of dividend growth is intermediate between the volatility of stock returns and the volatility of consumption growth. At an annual frequency, for example, the volatility of real dividend growth is only 6% in the US data. (7) Quarterly real consumption growth and real dividend growth have a very weak correlation of 0.06 in the US data, but the correlation increases at lower frequencies to just over 0.25 at a 4-year horizon. (8) Real consumption growth and real stock returns have a quarterly correlation of 0.22 in the US data. The correlation increases to 0.33 at a 1-year horizon, and declines at longer horizons.
1234
J.Y. Campbell
(9)
Quarterly real dividend growth and real stock returns have a very weak correlation of 0.04 in the US data, but the correlation increases dramatically at lower frequencies to reach 0.51 at a 4-year horizon. (10) Real US consumption growth is not well forecast by its own history or by the stock market. The first-order autocorrelation of the quarterly growth rate of real nondurables and services consumption is a modest 0.2, and the log pricedividend ratio forecasts less than 5% of the variation of real consumption growth at horizons of 1 to 4 years. (11) Real US dividend growth has some short-run forecastability arising from the seasonality of dividend payments. But it is not well forecast by the stock market. The log price-dividend ratio forecasts no more than about 8% of the variation of real dividend growth at horizons of 1 to 4 years. (12) The real interest rate has some positive serial correlation; its first-order autocorrelation in postwar quarterly US data is 0.5. However the real interest rate is not well forecast by the stock market, since the log price-dividend ratio forecasts less than 1% of the variation of the real interest rate at horizons of 1 to 4 years. (13) Excess returns on US stock over Treasury bills are highly forecastable. The log price-dividend ratio forecasts 18% of the variance of the excess return at a 1-year horizon, 34% at a 2-year horizon, and 51% at a 4-year horizon. These facts raise two important questions for students of macroeconomics and finance: • Why is the average real stock return so high in relation to the average short-term real interest rate? • Why is the volatility of real stock returns so high in relation to the volatility of the short-term real interest rate? Mehra and Prescott (1985) call the first question the "equity premium puzzle". 1 Finance theory explains the expected excess return on any risky asset over the riskless interest rate as the quantity of risk times the price of risk. In a standard consumptionbased asset pricing model of the type studied by Hansen and Singleton (1983), the quantity of stock market risk is measured by the covariance of the excess stock return with consumption growth, while the price of risk is the coefficient of relative risk aversion of a representative investor. The high average stock return and low riskless interest rate (stylized facts 1 and 2) imply that the expected excess return on stock, the equity premium, is high. But the smoothness of consumption (stylized fact 5) makes the covariance of stock returns with consumption low; hence the equity premium can only be explained by a very high coefficient of risk aversion. Shiller (1982), Hansen and Jagannathan (1991), and Cochrane and Hansen (1992) have related the equity premium puzzle to the volatility of the stochastic discount factor, or equivalently the volatility of the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of a representative investor. Expressed in these terms, the equity premium puzzle is
I For excellent recent surveys, see Cochrane and l-lansen (1992) or Kocherlakota(1996).
Ch. 19:
Asset Prices, Consumption, and the Business Cycle
1235
that an extremely volatile stochastic discount factor is required to match the ratio of the equity premium to the standard deviation of stock returns (the Sharpe ratio of the stock market). Some authors, such as Kandel and Stambaugh (1991), have responded to the equity premium puzzle by arguing that risk aversion is indeed much higher than traditionally thought. However this can lead to the "riskfree rate puzzle" of Weil (1989). If investors are very risk averse, then they have a strong desire to transfer wealth from periods with high consumption to periods with low consumption. Since consumption has tended to grow steadily over time, high risk aversion makes investors want to borrow to reduce the discrepancy between future consumption and present consumption. To reconcile this with the low real interest rate we observe, we must postulate that investors are extremely patient; their preferences give future consumption almost as much weight as current consumption, or even greater weight than current consumption. In other words they have a low or even negative rate of time preference. I will call the second question the "stock market volatility puzzle". To understand the puzzle, it is helpful to classify the possible sources of stock market volatility. Recall first that prices, dividends, and returns are not independent but are linked by an accounting identity. If an asset's price is high today, then either its dividend must be high tomorrow, or its return must be low between today and tomorrow, or its price must be even higher tomorrow. If one excludes the possibility that an asset price can grow explosively forever in a "rational bubble", then it follows that an asset with a high price today must have some combination of high dividends over tile indefinite future and low returns over the indefinite future. Investors must recognize this fact in forming their expectations, so when an asset price is high investors expect some combination of high future dividends and low future returns. Movements in prices must then be associated with some combination of changing expectations ("news") about future dividends and changing expectations about future returns; the latter can in turn be broken into news about future riskless real interest rates and news about future excess returns on stocks over short-term debt. Until the early 1980s, most financial economists believed that there was very little predictable variation in stock returns and that dividend news was by far the most important factor driving stock market fluctuations. LeRoy and Porter (1981) and Shiller (1981) challenged this orthodoxy by pointing out that plausible measures of expected future dividends are far less volatile than real stock prices. Their work is related to stylized facts 6, 9, and 11. Later in the 1980s Campbell and Shiller (1988), Fama and French (1988a,b, 1989), Poterba and Summers (1988) and others showed that real stock returns are highly forecastable at long horizons. The variables that predict returns are ratios of stock prices to scale factors such as dividends, earnings, moving averages of earnings, or the book value of equity. When stock prices are high relative to these scale factors, subsequent long-horizon real stock returns tend to be low. This predictable variation in stock returns is not matched by any equivalent variation in long-term real interest rates, which are comparatively stable and do not seem to move with the stock market.
1236
J.Y. Campbell
in the late 1970s, for example, real interest rates were unusually low yet stock prices were depressed, implying high forecast stock returns; the 1980s saw much higher real interest rates along with buoyant stock prices, implying low forecast stock returns. Thus excess returns on stock over Treasury bills are just as forecastable as real returns on stock. This work is related to stylized facts 12 and 13. Campbell (1991) uses this evidence to show that the great bulk of stock market volatility is associated with changing forecasts of excess stock returns. Changing forecasts of dividend growth and real interest rates are much less important empirically. The stock market volatility puzzle is closely related to the equity premium puzzle. A complete model of stock market behavior must explain both the average level of stock prices and their movements over time. One strand of work on the equity premium puzzle makes this explicit by studying not the consumption covariance of measured stock returns, but the consumption covariance of returns on hypothetical assets whose dividends are determined by consumption. The same model is used to generate both the volatility of stock prices and the implied equity premium. This was the approach of Mehra and Prescott (1985), and many subsequent authors have followed their lead. Unfortunately, it is not easy to construct a general equilibrium model that fits all the stylized facts given above. The standard model of Mehra and Prescott (1985) gets variation in stock price-dividend ratios only from predictable variation in consumption growth which moves the expected dividend growth rate and the riskless real interest rate. The model is not consistent with the empirical evidence for predictable variation in excess stock returns. Bond market data pose a further challenge to this standard model of stock returns. In the model, stocks behave very much like long-term real bonds; both assets are driven by long-term movements in the riskless real interest rate. Thus parameter values that produce a large equity premium tend also to produce a large term premium on real bonds. While there is no direct evidence on real bond premia, nominal bond premia have historically been much smaller than equity premia. Since the data suggest that predictable variation in excess returns is an important source of stock market volatility, researchers have begun to develop models in which the quantity of stock market risk or the price of risk change through time. ARCH models and other econometric methods show that the conditional variance of stock returns is highly variable. If this conditional variance is an adequate proxy for the quantity of stock market risk, then perhaps it can explain the predictability of excess stock returns. There are several problems with this approach. First, changes in conditional variance are most dramatic in daily or monthly data and are much weaker at lower frequencies. There is some business-cycle variation in volatility, but it does not seem strong enough to explain large movements in aggregate stock prices [Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner (1992), Schwert (1989)]. Second, forecasts of excess stock returns do not move proportionally with estimates of conditional variance [Harvey (1989, 1991), Chou, Engle and Kane (1992)]. Finally, one would like to derive stock market volatility endogenously within a model rather than treating it as an exogenous variable. There is little evidence of cyclical variation in consumption or dividend volatility that could explain the variation in stock market volatility.
Ch. 19:
Asset Prices, Consumption, and the Business Cycle
1237
A more promising possibility is that the price of risk varies over time. Time-variation in the price of risk arises naturally in a model with a representative agent whose utility displays habit-formation. Campbell and Cochrane (1999), building on the work of Abel (1990), Constantinides (1990), and others, have proposed a simple asset pricing model of this sort. Campbell and Cochrane suggest that assets are priced as if there were a representative agent whose utility is a power function of the difference between consumption and "habit", where habit is a slow-moving nonlinear average of past aggregate consumption. This utility fi.mction makes the agent more risk-averse in bad times, when consumption is low relative to its past history, than in good times, when consumption is high relative to its past history. Stock market volatility is explained by a small amount of underlying consumption (dividend) risk, amplified by variable risk aversion; the equity premium is explained by high stock market volatility, together with a high average level of risk aversion. Time-variation in the price of risk can also arise from the interaction of heterogeneous agents. Constantinides and Duffle (l 996) develop a simple framework with many agents who have identical utility functions but heterogeneous streams of labor income; they show how changes in the cross-sectional distribution of income can generate any desired behavior of the market price of risk. Grossman and Zhou (1996) and Wang (1996) move in a somewhat different direction by exploring the interactions of agents who have different levels of risk aversion. Some aspects of asset market behavior could also be explained by irrational expectations of investors. If investors are excessively pessimistic about economic growth, for example, they will overprice short-term bills and underprice stocks; this would help to explain the equity premium and riskfree rate puzzles. If investors overestimate the persistence of variations in economic growth, they will overprice stocks when growth has been high and underprice them when growth has been low, producing time-variation in the price of risk [Barsky and DeLong (1993)]. This chapter has three objectives. First, it tries to summarize recent work on stock price behavior, much of which is highly technical, in a way that is accessible to a broader professional audience. Second, the chapter summarizes stock market data from other countries and asks which of the US stylized facts hold true more generally. The recent theoretical literature is used to guide the exploration of the international data. Third, the chapter systematically compares stock market data with bond market data. This is an important discipline because some popular models of stock prices are difficult to reconcile with the behavior of bond prices. The organization of the chapter is as follows. Section 2 introduces the international data and reviews stylized facts 1-9 to see which of them apply outside the USA. (Additional details are given in a Data Appendix available on the author's web page or by request from the author.) Section 3 discusses the equity premium puzzle, taking the volatility of stock returns as given. Section 4 discusses the stock market volatility puzzle; this section also reviews stylized facts 10-13 in the international data. Sections 3 and 4 drive one towards the conclusion that the price of risk is both high and time-varying. It must be high to explain the equity premium puzzle, and it
1238
J. Y Campbell
must be time-varying to explain the predictable variation in stock returns that seems to be responsible for the volatility o f stock returns. Section 5 discusses models which produce this result, including models with habit-formation in utility, heterogeneous investors, and irrational expectations. Section 6 draws some implications for other topics in macroeconomics, including the modelling of investment, labor supply, and the welfare costs o f economic fluctuations.
2. International asset market data
The stylized facts described in the previous section apply to postwar quarterly US data. Most empirical work on stock prices uses this data set, or a longer annual US time series originally put together by Shiller (1981). But data on stock prices, interest rates, and consumption are also available for many other countries. In this chapter I use an updated version o f the international developed-country data set in Campbell (1996a). The data set includes Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) stock market data covering the period since 1970. ! combine the MSCI data with macroeconomic data on consumption, short- and long-term interest rates, and the price level from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the International Monetary Fund. For some countries the IFS data are only available quarterly over a shorter sample period, so I use the longest available sample for each country. Sample start dates range from 1970.1 to 1982.2, and sample end dates range from 1995.1 to 1996.4. I work with data from 11 countries: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States 2. For some purposes it is useful to have data over a much longer span of calendar time. I have been able to obtain annual data for Sweden over the period 1920-1994 and the U K over the period 1919-1994 to complement the US annual data for the period 1891-1995. The Swedish data come from Frennberg and Hansson (1992) and Hassler, Lundvik, Persson and S6derlind (1994), while the UK data come from Barclays de Zoete Wedd Securities (1995) and The Economist (1987) 3. In working with international stock market data, it is important to keep in mind that different national stock markets are o f very different sizes, both absolutely and in
2 The first version of this paper, following Campbell (1996a), also presented data for Spain. However Spain, unlike the other countries in the sample, underwent a major political change to democratic government during the sample period, and both asset returns and inflation show dramatic shifts fi'om the 1970s to the 1980s. It seems more conservative to consider Spain as an emerging market and exclude it from the developed-countrydata set. 3 1 acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Bjorn Hansson and Paul S6derlind with the Swedish data, and David Barr with the UK data. Full details about the construction of the quarterly and annual data are given in a Data Appendix available on the attthor's web page or by request fi'om the author.
1239
Ch. 19." Asset Prices, Consumption, and the Business Cycle
Table 1 MSCI market capitalization, 1993a Country
V/ (Bill. of US$)
--
vl
(%)
GDPi
v,
- -
VusMxcl
(%)
-
vi -
(%)
~f';4 Vi
AUL
117.9
41.55
4.65
1.85
CAN
167.3
30.62
6.60
2.63
FR
272.5
22.49
10.75
4.29
GER
280.7
16.83
11.07
4.41
ITA
86.8
9.45
3.42
1.37
JAP
1651.9
39.74
65.16
25.98
NTH
136.7
45.91
5.39
2.15
SWD
62.9
36.22
2.48
0.99
SWT
205.6
87.46
8.12
3.23
758.4
79.52
29.91
11.93
USA
UK MSCI
2535.3
37.25
100.00
39.88
USA
CRSP
4875.6
71.64
192.30
a vi is the stock index market capitalization in billions of 1993 US dollars. All stock index data are
from Morgan Stanley Capital International(MSCI), except for USA-CRSP which is from the Center for Research in Security Prices. Vi/GDP i is the index market capitalization as a percentage of 1993 GDP, Vi/VtjsMscI is the index market capitalization as a percentage of the market capitalization of the US MSCI index, and V i / ( ~ i Vi) is the percentage share of the index market capitalization in the total market capitalization of all the MSCI indexes. Abbreviations: AUL, Australia; CAN, Canada; FR, France; GER, Germany; 1TA, Italy; JPN, Japan; NTH, Netherlands; SWD, Sweden; SWT, Switzerland; UK, United Kingdom; USA, United States of America. proportion to national GDP's. Table 1 illustrates this by reporting several measures of stock market capitalization for the quarterly MSCI data. Column 1 gives the market capitalization for each country's MSCI index at the end of 1993, in billions of $US. Column 2 gives the market capitalization for each country as a fraction of its GDP. Column 3 gives the market capitalization for each country as a fraction of the US MSCI index capitalization. Column 4 gives the market capitalization for each country as a fraction of the value-weighted world MSCI index capitalization. Since the MSCI index for the United States is only a subset of the US market, the last row of the table gives the same statistics for the value-weighted index of New York Stock Exchange and American Stock Exchange stocks reported by the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago. Table 1 shows that most countries' stock markets are dwarfed by the US market. Column 3, for example, shows that the Japanese MSCI index is worth only 65% of the US MSCI index, the U K MSCI index is worth only 30% of the US index, the French and German MSCI indexes are worth only 11% of the US index, and all
1240
J.Y. Campbell
other countries' indexes are worth less than 10% o f the US index. Column 4 shows that the U S A and Japan together account for 66% o f the world market capitalization, while the USA, Japan, the UK, France, and Germany together account for 86%. In interpreting these numbers one must keep in mind that the M S C I indexes do not cover the whole market in each country (the US M S C I index, for example, is worth about h a l f the US CRSP index), but they do give a guide to relative magnitudes across countries. Table 1 also shows that different countries' stock market values are very different as a fraction o f GDP. I f one thinks that total wealth-output ratios are likely to be fairly constant across countries, then this indicates that national stock markets are very different fractions o f total wealth in different countries. In highly capitalized countries such as the UK and Switzerland, the MSCI index accounts for about 80% o f GDP, whereas in Germany and Italy it accounts for less than 20% o f GDR The theoretical convention o f treating the stock market as a claim to total consumption, or as a proxy for the aggregate wealth o f an economy, makes much more sense in the highly capitalized countries 4. Table 2 reports summary statistics for international asset returns. For each country the table reports the mean, standard deviation, and first-order autocorrelation o f the real stock return and the real return on a short-term debt instrument 5. The first line o f Table 2 gives numbers for the standard postwar quarterly US data set summarized in the introduction. The next panel gives numbers for the 11-country quarterly MSCI data, and the bottom panel gives numbers for the long-term annual data sets. The table shows that the first four stylized facts given in the introduction are fairly robust across countries. (1) Stock markets have delivered average real returns o f 5% or better in almost every country and time period. The exceptions to this occur in short-term quarterly data, and are concentrated in markets that are particularly small relative to GDP (Italy), or that predominantly represent claims on natural resources (Australia and Canada). (2) Short-term debt has rarely delivered an average real return above 3%. The exceptions to this occur in two countries, Germany and the Netherlands, whose sample periods begin in the late 1970s and thus exclude much o f the surprise inflation o f the oil-shock period.
4 Stock ownership also tends to be much more concentrated in the countries with low capitalization. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) have related these international patterns to differences in the protections afforded outside investors by different legal systems. 5 As explained in the Data Appendix, the best available short-term interest rate is sometimes a Treasury bill rate and sometimes another money market interest rate. Both means and standard deviations are given in almualized percentage points. To annualize the raw quarterly numbers, means are multiplied by 400 while standard deviations are multiplied by 200 (since standard deviations increase with the square root of the time interval in serially uncorrelated data).
Ch. 19." Asset Prices, Consumption, and the Business Cycle
1241
Table 2 International stock and bill returns a Country
Sample period
re
o(r~)
p(rc)
-~ rj
a(rf )
p(rj )
USA
1947.2-1996.4
7.569
15.453
0.104
0.794
1.761
0.501
AUL
1970.1 1996.3
2.633
23.459
0.008
1.820
2,604
0.636
CAN
1970.1-1996.3
4,518
16,721
0.119
2.738
1.932
0.674
FR
1973.2-1996.3
7.207
22.877
0,088
2.736
1.917
0.714
GER
1978.4-1996.3
8.135
20.326
0,066
3.338
1.161
0.322
ITA
1971.2-1995.3
0.514
27.244
0.071
2.064
2.957
0.681
JPN
1970.2--1996.3
5.831
21,881
0,017
1.538
2.347
0.493
NTH
1977.2-1996.2
12.721
15.719
0.027
3.705
1.542
SWD
1970.1-1995.1
7.948
23.867
0.053
1.520
2.966
SWT
1982.~1996,3
11.548
20.431
0.112
1.466
1.603
0.255
UK
1970.1-1996,3
7,236
21,555
0,103
1,081
3.067
0,474
USA
1970.1-1996.4
5.893
17.355
0.076
1.350
1,722
0.568
SWD
1920-1994
6.219
18.654
0.064
2.073
5.918
0,708
UK
1919-1994
7.314
22.675
-0.024
1.198
5.446
0.591
USA
1891 1995
6.697
18.634
0.025
1.955
8.919
0.338
-0.099 0.218
a ~ is the mean log real return on the stock market index, multiplied by 400 in quarterly data or 100 in annual data to express in annualized percentage points, tY(re) is the standard deviation of the log real return on the market index, multiplied by 200 in quarterly data or 100 in annual data to express in annualized percentage points, p(re) is the first-order autocorrelation of the log real return on the market index, rT, o(rf), and p(t).) are defined in the same way for the real return on a 3-month money market instrument. The money market instruments vary across countries and are described in detail in the Data Appendix. Abbreviations: AUL, Australia; CAN, Canada; FR, France; GER, Germany; ITA, Italy; JPN, Japan; NTH, Netherlands; SWD, Sweden; SWT, Switzerland; UK, United Kingdom; USA, United States of America.
(3) The annualized standard deviation o f stock returns ranges from 15% to 27%. It is striking that the market w i t h the highest volatility, Italy, is the smallest market relative to G D P and the one w i t h the lowest average return, (4) In quarterly data the annualized volatility o f real returns on short debt is around 3 % for the UK, Italy, and Sweden, around 2 . 5 % for Australia and Japan, and below 2 % for all other countries. Volatility is higher in l o n g - t e r m annual data because o f large swings in inflation in the interwar period, particularly in t 9 1 9 - 2 1 . M u c h o f the volatility in these real returns is probably due to unanticipated inflation and does not reflect volatility in the ex ante real interest rate.
1242
J Y. Campbell
These numbers show that high average stock returns, relative to the returns on shortterm debt, are not unique to the United States but characterize many other countries as well. Recently a number o f authors have suggested that average excess returns in the U S A may be overstated by sample selection or survivorship bias. i f economists study the U S A because it has had an unusually successful economy, then sample average US stock returns may overstate the true mean US stock return. Brown, Goetzmann and Ross (1995) present a formal model o f this effect. While survivorship bias m a y affect data from all the countries included in Table 2, it is reassuring that the stylized facts are so consistent across these countries 6. Table 3 turns to data on aggregate consumption and stock market dividends. The table is organized in the same way as Table 2. It illustrates the robustness o f two more o f the stylized facts given in the introduction. (5) In the postwar period the annualized standard deviation of real consumption growth is never above 3%. This is true even though data are used on total consumption, rather than nondurables and services consumption, for all countries other than the USA. Even in the longer annual data, which include the turbulent interwar period, consumption volatility slightly exceeds 3% only in the USA. (6) The volatility o f dividend growth is much greater than the volatility o f consumption growth, but generally less than the volatility o f stock returns. The exceptions to this occur in countries with highly seasonal dividend payments; these countries have large negative autocorrelations for quarterly dividend growth and much smaller volatility when dividend growth is measured over a full year rather than over a quarter. Table 4 reports the contemporaneous correlations among real consumption growth, real dividend growth, and stock returns. It turns out that these correlations are somewhat sensitive to the timing convention used for consumption. A timing convention is needed because the level o f consumption is a flow during a quarter rather than a point-in-time observation; that is, the consumption data are timeaveraged 7. If we think o f a given quarter's consumption data as measuring consumption at the beginning o f the quarter, then consumption growth for the quarter is next quarter's consumption divided by this quarter's consumption. If on the other hand
6 Goetzmalm and Jorion (1997) consider imernational stock-price data from earlier in the 20th Century and argue that the long-term average real growth rate of stock prices has been higher in the US than elsewhere. However they do not have data on dividend yields, which are an important component of total return and are likely to have been particularly important in Europe dtmng the troubled intei~ar period. 7 Tilne-averaging is one of a number of interrelated issues that arise in relating measured consumption data to the theoretical concept of consumption. Other issues include measurement error, seasonal adjustment, and the possibilitythat some goods classified as nondurable in the national income accounts are in fact durable. Grossman, Melino and Shiller (1987), Wheatley (1988), Miron (1986), and Heaton (1995) handle time-averaging, measurement error, seasonality, and dinability, respectively, in a much more careful way than is possible here, while Wilcox (1992) provides a detailed account of the sampling procedures used to constxuct US consumption data.
1243
Ch. 19." Asset Prices, Consumption, and the Business Cycle
Table 3 International consumption and dividends a Country
Sample period
Ac
o(Ac)
p(Ac)
Ad
~r(Ad)
p(Ad)
USA
1947.2-1996.4
1.921
1.085
0.221
2.225
28.794
-0.544
AUL
1970.1-1996.3
1.886
2.138
0.351
0.883
36.134
-0.451
CAN
1970.1 1996.3
1.853
2.083
0.113
-0.741
5.783
FR
1973.2 1996.3
1.600
2.121
--0.093
1.214
GER
1978.4 1996.3
1.592
2.478
-0.328
1.079
8.528
0.018
ITA
1971.2-1995.3
2.341
1.724
0.253
-4.919
19.635
0.294
JPN
1970.2-1996.3
3.384
2.347
-0.225
2.489
4.504
0.363
NTH
1977.2 1996.2
1.661
2.772
-0.265
4.007
4.958
0.277
SWD
1970.1-1995.1
0.705
1.920
0.305
1.861
13.595
0.335
SWT
1982.2-1996.3
0.376
2.246
-0.4t9
4.143
6.156
0.165
13.383
0.540 -0.159
UK
1970.1-1996.3
1.991
2.583
-0.017
0.681
7.125
0.335
USA
1970.1 1996.4
1.722
0.917
0.390
0.619
17.229
0.581 0.214
SWD
1920 1994
1.790
2.866
0.159
0.423
12.215
UK
1919-1994
1.443
2.898
0.281
1.844
7.966
USA
1891-1995
1.773
3.256
-0.117
1.485
14.207
0.225 -0.087
a Ac is the mean log real consumption growth rate, multiplied by 400 in quarterly data or 100 in annual data to express in annualized percentage points, cr(Ac) is the standard deviation of the log real consumption growth rate, multiplied by 200 in quarterly data or 100 in annual data to express in annualized percentage points, p(Ac) is the first-order autocorrelation of the log real consumption growth rate. Ad, a(Ad), and p(Ad) are defined in the same way for the real dividend growth rate. Consumption is nondurables and selwices consumption in the USA, and total consumption elsewhere. Abbreviations: AUL, Australia; CAN, Canada; FR, France; GER, Germany; ITA, Italy; JPN, Japan; NTH, Netherlands; SWD, Sweden; SWT, Switzerland; UK, United Kingdom; USA, United States of America. we think o f the c o n s u m p t i o n data as m e a s u r i n g c o n s u m p t i o n at the end o f the quarter, then c o n s u m p t i o n growth is this quarter's c o n s u m p t i o n divided by last quarter's consumption. Table 4 uses the former, " b e g i n n i n g - o f - q u a r t e r " timing convention because this p r o d u c e s a higher c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s correlation b e t w e e n c o n s u m p t i o n growth and stock returns. The t i m i n g convention has less effect on correlations w h e n the data are m e a s u r e d at l o n g e r horizons. Table 4 also shows h o w the correlations a m o n g real c o n s u m p t i o n growth, real dividend growth, and real stock returns v a r y w i t h the horizon. Each pairwise correlation a m o n g these series is calculated for h o r i z o n s o f 1, 4, 8, and 16 quarters in the quarterly data and for horizons o f 1, 2, 4, and 8 years in the l o n g - t e r m annual data. The table illustrates three m o r e stylized facts f r o m the introduction.
J.Y. Campbell
1244
%
I
I l l
II
II
[I
I I
I
', ~ '~ , .o ~" ~b o
m 0
I I
I I
II
I
I I
I
I
I
~
fa,
>~
I
N
0
~
;a4zaaza;a
d e m ~ : d ~ d ~ d o
NN~
~
a ca
Ch. 19: AssetPrices', Consumption, and the Business Cycle
1245
(7) Real consumption growth and dividend growth are generally weakly positively correlated in the quarterly data. In many countries the correlation increases strongly with the measurement horizon. However long-horizon correlations remain close to zero for Australia and Switzerland, and are substantially negative for Italy (with a very small stock market) and Japan (with anomalous dividend behavior). The correlations of consumption and dividend growth are positive and often quite large in the longer-term annual data sets. (8) The correlations between real consumption growth rates and stock returns are quite variable across countries. They tend to be somewhat higher in high-capitalization countries (with the notable exception of Switzerland), which is consistent with the view that stock returns proxy more accurately for wealth returns in these countries. Correlations typically increase with the measurement horizon out to 1 or 2 years, and are moderately positive in the longer-term annual data sets. (9) The correlations between real dividend growth rates and stock returns are small at a quarterly horizon but increase dramatically with the horizon. This pattern holds in every country. The correlations also increase strongly with the horizon in the longer-term annual data. After this preliminary look at the data, I now use some simple finance theory to interpret the stylized facts.
3. The equity premium puzzle 3.1. The stochastic discount factor To understand the equity premium puzzle, consider the intertemporal choice problem of an investor, indexed by k, who can trade freely in some asset i and can obtain a gross simple rate of return (1 +Ri, t+l) o n the asset held from time t to time t + 1. If the investor consumes Ck~ at time t and has time-separable utility with discount factor 6 and period utility U(Ckt), then her first-order condition is
g'((~t) = 6E~ [(1 +Ri, l+l)Ut(Ck,t+l)].
(1)
The left-hand side of Eqnation (1) is the marginal utility cost of consuming one real dollar less at time t; the right-hand side is the expected marginal utility benefit from investing the dollar in asset i at time t, selling it at time t + 1, and consuming the proceeds. The investor equates marginal cost and marginal benefit, so Equation (1) must describe the optimum. Dividing Equation (1) by U'(C~) yields
v'(G,,+,)]j
1 = Et (1 +Ri,,~,)6 ~
--E, [(1 +Ri,,+,)Ma,,+lJ,
(2)
where Mk,t.~l = 6U'(Ck, t+l)/U/(Ct) is the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of the investor, also known as the stochastic discountjdctor. This way of writing the
1246
J..Y Campbell
model in discrete time is due originally to Grossman and Shiller (1981), while the continuous-time version of the model is due to Breeden (1979). Cochrane and Hansen (1992) and Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) have developed the implications of the discrete-time model in detail. The derivation just given for Equation (2) assumes the existence of an investor maximizing a time-separable utility function, but in fact the equation holds more generally. The existence of a positive stochastic discount factor is guaranteed by the absence of arbitrage in markets in which non-satiated investors can trade freely without transactions costs. In general there can be many such stochastic discount factors for example, different investors k whose marginal utilities follow different stochastic processes will have different M~, t+l - but each stochastic discount factor must satisfy Equation (2). It is common practice to drop the subscript k from this equation and simply write
1 = E, [(1 +&t+,lMi+~].
(3)
In complete markets the stochastic discount factor Mt+l is unique because investors can trade with one another to eliminate any idiosyncratic variation in their marginal utilities. To understand the implications of Equation (3) it is helpful to write the expectation of the product as the product of expectations plus the covariance,
E1[(1 +Ri,,~l)m~+l] = Et[(l + Ri,,+I)]E~[M,+I] + Covt[R~,l.~,M,+~].
(4)
Substituting into Equation (3) and rearranging gives 1 + E,[R~,,+I] -
1 - Covt[Ri, ¢+1,Mr+l] Et[Mt+l]
(5)
An asset with a high expected simple return must have a low covariance with the stochastic discount factor. Such an asset tends to have low retunas when investors have high marginal utility. It is risky in that it fails to deliver wealth precisely when wealth is most valuable to investors. Investors therefore demand a large risk premium to hold it. Equation (5) must hold for any asset, including a riskless asset whose gross simple return is 1 + Ry;t ~1. Since the simple riskless return has zero covariance with the stochastic discount factor (or any other random variable), it is just the reciprocal of the expectation of the stochastic discount factor: 1 1 +R/;,+t - Et[M,+I]"
(6)
This can be used to rewrite Equation (5) as 1 +Et[Ri,,+t] = (1 +RLt+I)(1 -Cov,[Ri,~+L,Mi+l]).
(7)
For simplicity I now follow Hansen and Singleton (1983) and assume that the joint conditional distribution of asset returns and the stochastic discount factor is lognormal
Ch. 19." Asset Prices, Consumption, and the Business Cycle
1247
and homoskedastic. While these assumptions are not literally realistic - stock returns in particular have fat-tailed distributions with variances that change over time - they do make it easier to discuss the main forces that should determine the equity premium. When a random variable X is conditionally lognormally distributed, it has the convenient property that log E t X
E~ l o g X + ½Vart logX,
(8)
where VartlogX = G [ ( l o g X - E t l o g X ) 2 ] . I f in addition X is conditionally homoskedastic, then Var, l o g X = E[(logX - E, l o g X ) 2] = Var(logX - Et logX). Thus with joint conditional lognormality and homoskedasticity of asset returns and consumption, I can take logs of Equation (3) and obtain 2 0 = Etri, t+l + Etmt+l + (1) [02 + O£, + 20,m].
(9)
Here rnt - log(Mr) and r , - - log(1 + Ri,), while 02 denotes the unconditional variance of log return innovations Var(r/, t+t - G r i , t+l), a 2 denotes the unconditional variance of innovations to the stochastic discount factor Var(mt~l Etmt+l), and G,, denotes the unconditional covariance of innovations Cov(ri, t+l - Elri, t v l , rntel - Etmt+l). Equation (9) has both time-series and cross-sectional implications. Consider first an asset with a riskless real return rt; ¢ ) 1. For this asset the return innovation variance c~2 and the covariance aim are both zero, so the riskless real interest rate obeys
rj;l+l = - E t m t + l
02
2
(10)
This equation is the log counterpart of Equation (6). Subtracting Equation (10) from Equation (9) yields an expression for the expected excess return on risky assets over the riskless rate:
o.2 Et[ri,/+1 - 9; tM] + ~ - - - o i ....
2
(ll)
The variance term on the left-hand side of Equation (11) is a Jensen's Inequality adjustment arising from the fact that we are describing expectations of log returns. This term would disappear if we rewrote the equation in terms of the log expectation of the ratio of gross simple returns: log G [(1 + Ri, t + I ) / ( 1 + Rf, ~+1)] = - a i m . The righthand side of Equation (11) says that the log risk premium is determined by the negative of the covariance of the asset with the stochastic discount factor. This equation is the log counterpart of Equation (7). The covariance O,m can be written as the product of the standard deviation of the asset return a,., the standard deviation of the stochastic discount factor (7,,,, and the
J Y. Campbell
1248
V~=7
>,~° ~
•~ ,.=
03 r.~
L) '~
:~
Z
q,
~
~P
•~ = o° f~
,.~
~'"
~o
~
II
rm ~ .
3
o,~o
2~=~
.~#
o
.-
o
o
&S .o~ <
Ch. 19: Asset Prices, Consumption, and the Business Cycle
1249
correlation between the asset return and the stochastic discount factor Pim. Since Pim ~ - 1 , - ~ m <, ~YiOrn. Substituting into Equation (11), Om >1
Et[ri, t+l - rl;t-, 1] + 0,2/2
(12)
This inequality was first derived by Shiller (1982); a multi-asset version was derived by Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) and developed further by Cochrane and Hansen (1992). The right-hand side of Equation (12) is the excess return on an asset, adjusted for Jensen's Inequality, divided by the standard deviation of the asset's return - a logarithmic Sharpe ratio for the asset. Equation (12) says that the standard deviation of the log stochastic discount factor must be greater than this Sharpe ratio for all assets i, that is, it must be greater than the maximum possible Sharpe ratio obtainable in asset markets. Table 5 uses Equation (12) to illustrate the equity premium puzzle. For each data set the first column of the table reports the average excess return on stock over shortterm debt, adjusted for Jensen's inequality by adding one-half the sample variance of the excess log return to get a sample estimate of the numerator in Equation (12). This adjusted average excess return is multiplied by 400 to express it in annualized percentage points. The second column of the table gives the aunualized standard deviation of the excess log stock return, a sample estimate of the denominator in Equation (12). This standard deviation was reported earlier in Table 2. The third column gives the ratio of the first two columns, multiplied by 100; this is a sample estimate of the lower bound on the standard deviation of the log stochastic discount factor, expressed in annualized percentage points. In the postwar US data the estimated lower bound is a standard deviation greater than 50% a year; in the other quarterly data sets it is below 10% for Italy, between 15% and 20% for Australia and Canada, and above 30% for all the other countries, in the long-run annual data sets the lower bound on the standard deviation exceeds 30% for all three countries. 3.2. Consumption-based asset p r i c i n g with p o w e r utility
To understand why these numbers are disturbing, I now follow Mehra and Prescott (1985) and other classic papers on the equity premium puzzle and assume that there is a representative agent who maximizes a time-separable power utility function defined over aggregate consumption G:
u(G)
C¢-Y-1
-
- - ,
1-7
(13)
where y is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. This utility function has several important properties. First, it is scale-invariant; with constant return distributions, risk premia do not change over time as aggregate wealth and the scale of the
1250
J g CampbeH
economy increase. Related to this, if different investors in the econonW have different wealth levels but the same power utility function, then they can be aggregated into a single representative investor with the same utility function as the individual investors. A possibly less desirable property of power utility is that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, which I write as ~p, is the reciprocal of the coefficient of relative risk aversion y. Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991) and Weil (1989) have proposed a more general utility specification that preserves the scale-invariance of power utility but breaks the tight link between the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. I discuss this form of utility in section 3.4 below. Power utility implies that marginal utility UI(C,) = Ct r, and the stochastic discount factor Mt+l = CS(Ct+t/CI) -r. The assumption made previously that the stochastic discount factor is conditionally lognormal will be implied by the assumption that aggregate consumption is conditionally lognormal [Hansen and Singleton (1983)]. Making this assumption for expositional convenience, the log stochastic discount factor is mt+l = log(cS)- 7Ac,+1, where c, --- log(Q), and Equation (9) becomes 0 = Etri,,+l +log (5- yE, Act~l + (½) [a,.2+ y20~2-
2ro, c].
(14)
Here a 2 denotes Var(ct+l -Etct+l), the unconditional variance of log consumption innovations, and eric denotes Cov(ri, t + l - Etri, t Fl, ct+l - EtCt+l), the unconditional covariance of innovations. Equation (10) now becomes tj/;,+t =
log C5+
]/EtAct+l
~,2at2 2
(15)
This equation says that the riskless real rate is linear in expected consumption growth, with slope coefficient equal to the coefficient of relative risk aversion. The conditional variance of consumption growth has a negative effect on the riskless rate which can be interpreted as a precautionary savings effect. Equation (11) becomes Et[ri, t+~ --rj;t+l] + ~ - = 7oic.
(16)
The log risk premium on any asset is the coefficient of relative risk aversion times the covariance of the asset return with consumption growth. Intuitively, an asset with a high consumption covariance tends to have low returns when consumption is low, that is, when the marginal utility of consumption is high. Such an asset is risky and commands a large risk premium. Table 5 uses Equation (16) to illustrate the equity premium puzzle. As already discussed, the first column of the table reports a sample estimate of the left-hand
Ch. 19." Asset Prices, Consumption, and the Business Cycle
1251
side of Equation (16), multiplied by 400 to express it in annualized percentage points. The second column reports the annualized standard deviation of the excess log stock return (given earlier in Table 2), the fourth column reports the annualized standard deviation of consumption growth (given earlier in Table 3), the fifth column reports the correlation between the excess log stock return and consumption growth, and the sixth column gives the product of these three variables which is the annualized covariance a,~. between the log stock return and consumption growth. Finally, the table gives two columns with implied risk aversion coefficients. The column headed RRA(1) uses Equation (16) directly, dividing the adjusted average excess return by the estimated covariance to get estimated risk aversion 8. The column headed RRA(2) sets the correlation of stock returns and consumption growth equal to one before calculating risk aversion. While this is of course a counterfactual exercise, it is a valuable diagnostic because it indicates the extent to which the equity premium puzzle arises from the smoothness of consumption rather than the low correlation between consumption and stock returns. The correlation is hard to measure accurately because it is easily distorted by short-term measurement errors in consumption, and Table 4 indicates that the sample correlation is quite sensitive to the measurement horizon. By setting the correlation to one, the RRA(2) column indicates the extent to which the equity premium puzzle is robust to such issues. A correlation of one is also implicitly assumed in the volatility bound for the stochastic discount factor, Equation (12), and in many calibration exercises such as Mehra and Prescott (1985), Campbell and Cochrane (1999), or Abel (1999). Table 5 shows that the equity premium puzzle is a robust phenomenon in international data. The coefficients of relative risk aversion in the RRA(1) column are generally extremely large. They are usually many times greater than 10, the maximum level considered plausible by Mehra and Prescott (1985). In a few cases the risk aversion coefficients are negative because the estimated covariance of stock returns with consumption growth is negative, but in these cases the covariance is extremely close to zero. Even when one ignores the low correlation between stock returns and consumption growth and gives the model its best chance by setting the correlation to one, the RRA(2) column still has risk aversion coefficients above 10 in most cases. Thus the fact shown in Table 4, that for some countries the correlation of stock returns and consumption increases with the horizon, is unable by itself to resolve the equity premium puzzle. The risk aversion estimates in Table 5 are of course point estimates and are subject to sampling error. No standard errors are reported for these estimates. However authors such as Cecchetti, Lam and Mark (1993) and Kocherlakota (1996), studying the long-
8 The calculation is done correctly, in natural units, even though the table reports averageexcess returns and covafiances in percentage point units. Equivalently, the ratio of the quantities given in the table is multiplied by 100.
1252
J E Campbell
run annual US data, have found small enough standard errors that they can reject risk aversion coefficients below about 8 at conventional significance levels. O f course, the validity o f these tests depends on the characteristics o f the data set in which they are used. Rietz (1988) has argued that there may be a peso problem in these data. A peso problem arises when there is a small positive probability of an important event, and investors take this probability into account when setting market prices. If the event does not occur in a particular sample period, investors will appear irrational in the sample and economists will mis-estimate their preferences. While it may seem unlikely that this could be an important problem in 100 years of annual data, Rietz (1988) argues that an economic catastrophe that destroys almost all stock-market value can be extremely unlikely and yet have a major depressing effect on stock prices. One difficulty with this argument is that it requires not only a potential catastrophe, but one which affects stock market investors more seriously than investors in short-term debt instruments. Many countries that have experienced catastrophes, such as Russia or Germany, have seen very low returns on short-term government debt as well as on equity. A peso problem that affects both asset returns equally will affect estimates o f the average levels of returns but not estimates of the equity premium 9. The major example of a disaster for stockholders that did not negatively affect bondholders is the Great Depression of the early 1930s, but o f course this is included in the long-run annual data for Sweden, the UK, and the USA, all of which display an equity premium puzzle. Also, the consistency o f the results across countries requires investors in all countries to be concerned about catastrophes. I f the potential catastrophes are uncorrelated across countries, then it becomes less likely that the data set includes no catastrophes; thus the argument seems to require a potential international catastrophe that affects all countries simultaneously.
3.3. The riskf?ee rate puzzle One response to the equity premium puzzle is to consider larger values for the coefficient of relative risk aversion ~/. Kandel and Stambaugh (1991) have advocated
9 This point is relevant for the study of Goetzmann and Jorion (1997). These authors measure average growth rates &real stock prices, as a proxy for real stock returns, bnt they do not look at real returns on short-term debt. They find low real stock-price growth rates in many countries in the early 20th Century; in some cases these may have been accompanied by low returns to holders of short-term debt. Note also that stock-price growth rates are a poor proxy for total stock returns in periods where investors expect low growth rates, since dividend yields will tend to be higher in such periods.
Ch. 19:
Asset Prices, Consumption, and the Business Cycle
1253
this l°. However this leads to a second puzzle. Equation (15) implies that the unconditional mean riskless interest rate is
Er];t+l = - l o g 6 + g g -
y2~ 2 '
(17)
where g is the mean growth rate o f consumption. Since g is positive, as shown in Table 3, high values o f 7 imply high values o f 7g. Ignoring the term -y2o~2/2 for the moment, this can be reconciled with low average short-term real interest rates, shown in Table 2, only if the discount factor 6 is close to or even greater than one, corresponding to a low or even negative rate of time preference. This is the riskfree rate puzzle emphasized by Weil (1989). Intuitively, the riskfree rate puzzle is that if investors are risk-averse then with power utility they must also be extremely unwilling to substitute intertemporally. Given positive average consumption growth, a low riskless interest rate and a high rate of time preference, such investors would have a strong desire to borrow from the future to reduce their average consumption growth rate. A low riskless interest rate is possible in equilibrium only if investors have a low or negative rate o f time preference that reduces their desire to borrow 11 O f course, if the risk aversion coefficient g is high enough then the negative quadratic term -V2a~/2 in Equation (17) dominates the linear term and pushes the riskless interest rate down again. The quadratic term reflects precautionary savings; risk-averse agents with uncertain consumption streams have a precautionary desire to save, which can work against their desire to borrow. But a reasonable rate o f time preference is obtained only as a knife-edge case. Table 6 illustrates the riskfree rate puzzle in international data. The table first shows the average riskfree rate from Table 2 and the mean consumption growth rate and standard deviation o f consumption growth from Table 3. These moments and the risk aversion coefficients calculated in Table 5 are substituted into Equation (17), and the equation is solved for an implied time preference rate. The time preference rate is reported in percentage points per year; it can be interpreted as the riskless real interest rate that would prevail if consumption were known to be constant forever at its current level, with no growth and no volatility. Risk aversion coefficients in the RRA(2) range imply negative time preference rates in every country except Switzerland, whereas larger risk aversion coefficients in the RRA(I) range imply time preference rates that are often positive but always implausible and vary wildly across countries.
J0 One might think that introspection would be sufficient to rule out very large values of V, but Kandel and Stambaugh (1991) point out that introspection can deliver very different estimates of risk aversion depending on the size of the gamble considered. This suggests that introspection can be misleading or that some more general model of utility is needed. I~ As Abel (1999) and Kocherlakota (1996) point out, negative time preference is consistent with finite utility in a time-separable model provided that consumption is growing, and marginal utility shrinking, sufficiently rapidly. The question is whether negative thne preference is plausible.
J.Y. Campbell
1254 Table 6 The riskfree rate puzzle a Country
Sample period
r~
Ac
o(Ae)
RRA(1)
USA
1947.2-1996.3
0.794
1 . 9 0 8 1.084
246.556
112.474
47.600
-76.710
AUL
1970.1 1996.2
1.820
1 . 8 5 4 2.142
45.704
-34.995
7.107
-10.196
CAN
1970.1-1996.2
2.738
1 . 9 4 8 2.034
56.434
8.965
-13.066
FR GER
1973.~1996.2 1978.4-1996.2
2.736 3.338
1 . 5 8 1 2.130 1.576 2.495
<0 343.133
ITA
1971.2 1995.2
2.064
2.424
JPN NTH
1970.2-1996.2 1977.2-1996.1
1.538 3.705
3.416 2.353 1 . 4 6 6 2.654
SWD
1970.1 1994.4
1.520
0.750
1.917 >1000
SWT
1982.2-1996.2
1.466
0.414
2.261
UK USA
1970.1 1996.2 1970.1-1996.3
1.08i 1.350
2.025 2.589 1 . 7 1 0 0.919
SWD
1920 1993
2.073
1 . 7 4 8 2.862
65.642
63.778
11.091 -12.274
UK USA
1919-1993 1891-1994
1.198 1.955
1 . 3 5 8 2.820 1 . 7 4 2 3.257
39.914 20.861
10.364 11.305
14.174 10.366
1.684 >1000
TPR(1)
41.346 N/A >1000 >1000
14.634 -15.536 13.327 12.142 4.703
-9.021
13.440 23.970
-39.375 -11.201
>1000
20.705
-6.126
N/A
26.785
8.698
134.118 41.222 >1000 >1000 <0
RRA(2) TPR(2)
1 5 6 . 3 0 8 503.692 1 5 0 . 1 3 6 -160.275
14.858 -21.600 37.255 -56.505
-10.057 10.406
a ~: is the mean money market return from Table 2, in annualized percentage points. Ae and cr(Ae) are the mean and standard deviation of consmnption growth from Table 3, in annualized percentage points. RRA(1) and RRA(2) are the risk aversion coefficients from Table 5. TPR(1)= 7 - RRA(1)Ac + RRA(1)2g2(Ac)/200, and TPR(2) = ~ - RRA(2)Ac + RRA(2)2oZ(Ac)/200. From Equation (17), these time preference rates give the real interest rate, in annualized percentage points, that would prevail if consumption growth had zero mean and zero standard deviation and risk aversion were RRA(1) or RRA(2), respectively. Abbreviations: AUL, Australia; CAN, Canada; FR, France; GER, Germany; ITA, Italy; JPN, Japan; NTH, Netherlands; SWD, Sweden; SWT, Switzerland; UK, United Kingdom; USA, United States of America.
A n interesting issue is h o w m i s m e a s u r e m e n t o f average inflation m i g h t affect these calculations. There is a g r o w i n g consensus that in recent years conventional price indices have overstated true inflation by failing to fully capture the effects o f quality improvements, c o n s u m e r substitution to cheaper retail outlets, and price declines in n e w l y introduced goods. I f inflation is overstated by, say, 1%, the real interest rate is understated by 1%, w h i c h by itself m i g h t help to explain the riskfree rate puzzle. U n f o r t u n a t e l y the real growth rate o f c o n s u m p t i o n is also understated by 1%, w h i c h worsens the riskfree rate puzzle. W h e n y > 1, this second effect d o m i n a t e s and understated inflation m a k e s the riskfree rate p u z z l e even harder to explain.
Ch. 19." Asset Prices, Consumption, and the Business Cycle
1255
Table 7 International yield spreads and bond excess returns Country
Sample period
USA
1947.2-1996.4
AUL
1970.1-1996.3
a(s)
p(s)
er~
1.199
0.999
0.783
0.938
1.669
~
a
a(erb)
p(erb)
0.011
8.923
0.070
0.750
0.156
8.602
0.162
CAN
1970.1 1996.3
1.057
1.651
0.819
0.950
9.334
-0.009
FR GER
1973.2 1996.3 1978.4-1996.3
0.917 0.99l
1.547 1.502
0.733 0.869
1.440 0.899
8.158 7.434
0.298 0.117
ITA
197t.~1995.3
0.200
2.025
0.759
1.386
9.493
0.335
JPN NTH
1970.2-1996.3 1977.2-1996.2
0.593 1.212
1.488 1.789
0.843 0.574
1.687 1549
9.165 7.996
-0.058 0.032
SWD
1970.1-1995.1
0.930
2.046
0.724
0.212
7.575
0.244
SWT
1982.2 1996.3
0.471
1.655
0.755
1.071
6.572
0.268
UK USA
1970.1 1996.3 1970.1-1996.4
1.202 1.562
2.106 1.190
0.893 0.737
0.959 1.504
11.611 10.703
0.057 0.033
SWD UK
1920-1994 1919-1994
0.284 1.272
1.140 1.505
0.280 0.694
-0.075 0.318
6.974 8.812
0.185 -0.098
USA
1891 1995
0.720
1.550
0.592
0.172
6.499
0.153
a S is the mean of the log yield spread, the difference between the log yield on long-term bonds and the log 3-month money market return, expressed in annualized percentage points. ~7(s) is the standard deviation of the log yield spread and p(s) is its first-order autocorrelation, erh, a(ert,), and p(erb) are defined in the same way for the excess 3-month return on long-term bonds over money market instruments, where the bond return is calculated from the bond yield using the par-bond approximation given in Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997), Chapter 10, equation (10.1.I9). Full details of this calculation are given in thc Data Appendix. Abbreviations: AUL, Australia; CAN, Canada; FR, France; GER, Germany; ITA, Italy; JPN, Japan; NTH, Netherlands; SWD, Sweden; SWT, Switzerland; UK, United Kingdom; USA, United States of America.
3.4. Bond returns and the equity premium and riskfree rate puzzles S o m e authors have argued that the riskfree interest rate is low because short-term g o v e r n m e n t debt is m o r e liquid than l o n g - t e r m financial assets. Short-term debt is " m o n e y l i k e " in that it facilitates transactions and can be traded at m i n i m a l cost. The liquidity advantage o f debt reduces its e q u i l i b r i u m return and increases the equity p r e m i u m [Bansal and C o l e m a n (1996), H e a t o n and Lucas (1996)]. The difficulty with this argument is that it implies that all l o n g - t e r m assets should have large excess returns over short-term debt. L o n g - t e r m g o v e r n m e n t bonds, for example, are not m o n e y l i k e and so the liquidity a r g u m e n t implies that they should offer a large t e r m p r e m i u m . But historically, the t e r m p r e m i u m has been m a n y times smaller than the equity p r e m i u m . This point is illustrated in Table 7, which reports two
1256
J g Campbell
alternative measures of the term premium. The first measure is the average log yield spread on long-term bonds over the short-term interest rate, while the second is the average quarterly excess log return on long bonds. In a long enough sample these two averages should coincide if there is no upward or downward drift in interest rates. The average yield spread is typically between 0.5% and 1.5%. A notable outlier is Italy, which has a negative average yield spread in this period. Average long bond returns are quite variable across countries, reflecting differences in inflationary experiences; however in no country does the average excess bond return exceed 1.7% per year. Thus both measures suggest that term premia are far smaller than equity premia. Table 8 develops this point further by repeating the calculations of Table 5, using bond returns rather than equity returns. The average excess log return on bonds over short debt, adjusted for Jensen's Inequality, is divided by the standard deviation of the excess bond return to calculate a bond Sharpe ratio which is a lower bound on the standard deviation of the stochastic discount factor. The Sharpe ratio for bonds is several times smaller than the Sharpe ratio for equities, indicating that term premia are small even after taking account of the lower volatility of bond returns. This finding is not consistent with a strong liquidity effect at the short end of the term structure, but it is consistent with a consumption-based asset pricing model if bond returns have a low correlation with consumption growth. Table 8 shows that sample consumption correlations often are lower for bonds, so that RRA(1) risk aversion estimates for bonds, which use these correlations, are often comparable to those for equities. A direct test of the liquidity story is to measure excess returns on stocks over long bonds, rather than over short debt. If the equity premium is due to a liquidity effect on short-term interest rates, then there should be no "equity-bond premium" puzzle. Table 9 carries out this exercise and finds that the equity-bond premium puzzle is just as severe as the standard equity premium puzzle 12.
3.5. Separating risk aversion and intertemporal substitution Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991) and Weil (1989) use the theoretical framework of Kreps and Porteus (1978) to develop a more flexible version of the basic power utility model. That model is restrictive in that it makes the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, % the reciprocal of the coefficient of relative risk aversion, 7. Yet it is not clear that these two concepts should be linked so tightly. Risk aversion describes the consumer's reluctance to substitute consumption across states of the world and is meaningful even
12 The excess return of equities over bonds must be measured with the appropriate correction for Jensen's Inequality. From Equation (16), the appropriate measure is the log excess return on equities over short-term debt, less the log excess return on bonds over short-term debt, plus one-halfthe variance of the log equity return, less one-half the variance of the log bond return.
1257
Ch, 19.• Asset Prices, Consumption, and the Business Cycle
~, ~
o
~,,
~
.
,
~
r¢3 t'4
V
V
,.n
~
~.
~
~.. V
•~
z
I
,.~
%
t-'q
~
t" ~
~
~
rz
t
0
t'-q
,,6 ~6 ,,6
•
"
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
r~
2
Z
JK Campbell
1258
¢S"~ ~
o O9 oo ~
V
V
~
~
<~
%
~o ~ ,
~
~~
~ .~q
L~ i ~~
_ ~ ~2
.
.
~
~
.
~
.
°<%
.
~
"~'" "~
J
~ ~.~
I!~ ~ -~
< ~.~
o
~
o
o
~
,~ ~.~
1259
Ch. 19: Asset Prices, Consumption, and the Business Cycle
in an atemporal setting, whereas the elasticity of intertemporal substitution describes the consumer's willingness to substitute consumption over time and is meaningful even in a deterministic setting. The Epstein-Zin--Weil model retains many of the attractive features of power utility but breaks the link between the parameters y and ~p. The Epstein-Zin-Weil objective function is defined recursively by 0
U,=
(1-6)C 7+6
G_.f\
,
(18)
where 0 = (1 - y ) / ( l - l/W). When y - I/W, 0 = 1 and Equation (18) becomes linear; it can then be solved forward to yield the familiar time-separable power utility model. The integemporal budget constraint for a represemative agent can be written as V/t+1 - (1 + Rw, t+l) (J4zt CI),
(19)
- -
where Wt+l is the representative agent's wealth, and (1 + Rw, t+l) is the gross simple return on the portfolio of all invested wealth 13. This form of the budget constraint is appropriate for a complete-markets model in which wealth includes human capital as well as financial assets. Epstein and Zin use dynamic programming arguments to show that Equations (18) and (19) together imply an Euler equation of the form
I=G
\CT-t /
(1 +Rw, t < )
(1 +R,,,+I)
1 .
(20)
If I assume that asset returns and consumption are homoskedastic and jointly lognormal, then this implies that the riskless real interest rate is rj;t+l = - l o g 6 +
0-1 2 0 E,[Act+l] + ~ 2 - - cG - ~ 2
2 o~.
(21)
The riskless interest rate is a constant, plus 1/~p times expected consumption growth. In the power utility model, 1/ip = y and 0 = 1, so Equation (21) reduces to Equation (15). The premium on risky assets, including the wealth portfolio itself, is 62 o,, E,[ri,,+l] - rj;,+l + " - 0 +(1 - O)oiw. 2 ~0
(22)
The risk premium on asset i is a weighted combination of asset i's covariance with consumption growth (divided by the elasticity of intertemporal substitution W) and
13 This is often called the "market" return and written Rm,t~ i, but l have already used m to denote the stochastic discount factor so I write R,,,t~l to avoid confusion.
J.Y. Campbell
1260
asset i's covariance with the return on wealth. The weights are 0 and 1 - 0 respectively. The Epstein-Zin-Weil model thus nests the consumption CAPM with power utility (0 = 1) and the traditional static CAPM (0 = 0). Equations (21) and (22) seem to indicate that Epstein-Zin-Weil utility might be helpful in resolving the equity premium and riskfree rate puzzles. First, in Equation (21) a high risk aversion coefficient does not necessarily imply a low average riskfree rate, because
Erj;t+l = - l o g 6 +
g +
0--1
2
~rw -
0
or2.
(23)
The average consumption growth rate is divided by ~p here, and in the Epstein-ZinWell framework ~p need not be small even if ~ is large. Second, Equation (22) suggests that it might not even be necessary to have a high risk aversion coefficient to explain the equity premium. I f 0 ~ 1, then the risk premium on an asset is determined in part by its covariance with the wealth portfolio, a/w. If the return on wealth is more volatile than consumption growth, as implied by the common use of a stock index return as a proxy for the return on wealth, then Oiw may be much larger than oic, and this may help to explain the equity premium. Unfortunately, there are serious difficulties with both these potential escape routes from the equity premium and riskfree rate puzzles. The difficulty with the first is that there is direct empirical evidence for a low elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption. The difficulty with the second is that consumption and wealth are linked through the intertemporal budget constraint; if consumption is smooth and wealth is volatile, this itself is a puzzle that must be explained, not an exogenous fact that can be used to resolve other puzzles. I now develop these points in detail by analyzing the dynamic behavior of stock returns and short-term interest rates in relation to consumption.
4. The dynamics of asset returns and consumption 4.1. Time-variation in conditional expectations
Equations (21) and (22) imply a tight link between rational expectations of asset returns and of consumption growth. Expected asset returns are perfectly correlated with expected consumption growth, with a standard deviation 1/~p times as large. Equivalently, the standard deviation of expected consumption growth is ~p times as large as the standard deviation of expected asset returns.
Ch. 19: Asset Prices', Consumption, and the Business Cycle
1261
This suggests a way to estimate % Hansen and Singleton (1983), followed by Campbell and Mankiw (1989), Hall (1988), and others, have proposed an instrumental variables (IV) regression approach. I f we define an error term t/i, t+l ~ ri, t+l
- -
Et[ri, t+l] - 7(Act+t - Et[ACt+l]),
then we can rewrite Equations (21) and (22) as a regression equation,
(24) In general the error term t/i,t+l will be correlated with realized consumption growth so OLS is not an appropriate estimation method. However t/i,t+l is uncorrelated with any variables in the information set at time t. Hence any lagged variables correlated with asset returns can be used as instruments in an IV regression to estimate 1/% Table 10 illustrates two-stage least squares estimation o f Equation (24). In each panel the first set o f results uses the short-term real interest rate, while the second set uses the real stock return. The instruments are the asset return, the consumption growth rate, and the log price-dividend ratio. The instruments are lagged twice to avoid difficulties caused by time-aggregation of the consumption data ]Campbell and Mankiw (1989, 1991), Wheatley (1988)]. For each asset and set o f instruments, the table first reports the R 2 statistics and significance levels for first-stage regressions o f the asset return and consumption growth rate onto the instruments. The table then shows the IV estimate of 1/~p with its standard error, and (in the column headed "Test (1)") the R 2 statistic for a regression of the residual on the instruments together with the associated significance level of a test o f the over-identifying restrictions o f the model. The quarterly results in Table 10 show that the short-term real interest rate is highly forecastable in every country except Germany. The real stock return is also forecastable in many countries, but there is weaker evidence for forecastability in consumption growth. In fact the R 2 statistic for forecasting consumption growth is lower than the R 2 statistic for stock returns in all but four of the quarterly data sets. The IV estimates of 1/~p are very imprecise; they are sometimes large and positive, often negative, but they are almost never significantly different from zero. The overidentifying restrictions of the model are often strongly rejected, particularly when the short-term interest rate is used in the model. Results are similar for the annual data sets in Table 10, except that twice-lagged instruments have almost no ability to forecast real interest rates or stock returns in the annual US data 14
14 Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997), Table 8.2, shows much greater fbrecastability of returns using once-lagged instruments in a similar annual US data set. Even with twice-lagged hlstruments, US annual returns become forecastable once one increases the return horizon beyond one year, as shown in Table 12 below.
1262
J Y. Campbell
Table 10 Predictable variation in returns and consumption growth a Count~2¢
USA
AUL
CAN
FR
GER
ITA
JPN
NTH
SWD
Sample period
1947.~1996.3
1970.2 1996.2
1970.2 1996.2
1973.2-1996.2
1978.4-1996.2
1971.2-1995.2
1970.~1996.2
1977.2-1996.1
1970.2 1994.4
Asset
First-stage regressions
(1/~--~) (s.e.)
Test b (s.e.)
1
2
ri
Ac
rf
0.160 0.000
0.037 0.077
0.260 0.740
0.025 0.114
0.165 0.000
0.037 0.027
re
0.065 0.003
0.037 0.077
-8.187 7.069
0.021 0.028
0.035 0.033
0.025 0.090
rf
0.404 0.000
0.013 0.432
4.450 2.973
0.099 0.107
0.017 0.419
0,008 0,676
r,,
0.060 0.034
0.013 0.432
20.250 13.145
0.038 0.026
0.004 0.828
0.003 0.856
rf
0.292 0.000
0.048 0.042
-0.970 0.677
-0.174 0.177
0.142 0.001
0.041 0.123
r~
0.040 0.269
0.048 0,042
6.635 4.536
0.130 0.092
0.004 0.822
0.004 0.819
r!
0.519 0.000
0.010 0.751
-2.189 2.170
-0.051 0.133
0.073 0.037
0.009 0,667
r~
0.111 0.006
0.010 0.751
-27.662 29.994
-0.021 0.026
0.006 0,750
0.004 0.833
1)-
0.062 0.328
0.057 0.085
0.481 0.354
1.773 1.141
0.005 0.840
0.005 0.841
r~
0.046 0.050
0.057 0.085
-6.117 4.992
0.079 0.066
0.017 0.569
0.018 0.547
rj
0.405 0.000
0.010 0.877
-2.432 3.353
-0.019 0.113
0.171 0.000
0.010 0,624
re
0.048 0.278
0.010 0.877
19.919 26.244
0.016 0.034
0.013 0.540
0.007 0.734
rf
0.203 0.002
0.044 0.081
-0.446 0.464
-0.093 0.266
0.162 0.000
0.04 l 0.121
r~
0.115 0,001
0.044 0.081
11.028 5.458
0.047 0.027
0.026 0.260
0.019 0.376
rj
0.248 0.000
0.024 0.373
0,167 0.385
0.052 0.428
0.218 0,000
0.023 0.428
re
0.021 0.756
0.024 0.373
-4.532 6.571
-0.138 0.162
0.005 0,835
0,005 0.832
rj
0.262 0.000
0.005 0.806
-1.056 2,949
-0.007 0.085
0.197 0000
0.005 0,779
r~,
0.110 0.039
0.005 0.806
15.210 21.187
0.004 0.017
0.047 0.107
0.005 0.790
continued on next page
1263
Ch. 19." Asset Prices, Consumption, and the Business Cycle
Table 10, continued Country
SWT
UK
USA
SWD
UK
USA
Sample period
1982.2 1996.2
1970.~1996.2
1970.2-1996.3
1920-1993
1920-1993
1891-1994
Asset
First-stage regressions
(1/~-~) (s.e.)
~ (s.e.)
1
Test b 2
ri
Ac
rf
0.194 0.000
0.007 0.887
0.731 1.273
0.065 0.397
0.074 0.136
0.006 0.844
re
0.033 0.270
0.007 0.887
20.084 31.100
0.048 0.070
0.000 0.996
0.000 0.996
rf
0.306 0.000
0.057 0.042
1.992 0.988
0.260 0.136
0.047 0.090
0.028 0.238
re
0.097 0.094
0.057 0.042
-4.493 3.793
0.038 0.034
0.056 0.058
0.040 0.132
J)
0.307 0.000
0.071 0.015
1.573 0.704
0.t02 0.111
0.188 0.000
0.062 0.041
rC
0.069 0.095
0.071 0.015
4.977 7.677
0.016 0.023
0.069 0.029
0.071 0.025
rf
0.302 0.000
0.052 0.202
2.740 1.466
0.194 0.t61
0.037 0.266
0.023 0.437
r~
0.041 0.342
0.052 0.202
-1.537 3.349
0.043 0.082
0.034 0.304
0.041 0.236
r~/
0.265 0.000
0.061 0.140
2.499 1.509
0.197 0.123
0.056 0.139
0.033 0.314
r~,
0.147 0.096
0.061 0.140
5.861 4.569
0.037 0.021
0.115 0.017
0.055 0.144
~/
0.013 0.783
0.065 0.004
-0.293 0.892
-0.202 0.341
0.012 0.552
0.049 0.085
r,,
0.037 0.184
0.065 0.004
0.723 2.003
0.038 0.070
0.040 0.132
0.074 0.024
a This table reports two-stage least squares eshination results for Equations (24) and (25). The first set of results for each country uses the short-term real interest rate, while the second set uses the real stock return. The instruments are the asset return, the consumption growth rate, and the log price-dividend ratio, lagged twice. For each asset and set o f instruments, the first two colunms show the R 2 statistics, with significance levels below, lbr first-stage regressions o f the asset return and consumption growth rate onto the instruments. The third column shows the IV estimate of 1/~p from Equation (24) with its standard error below, and the fourth column shows the IV estimate of ~p from Equation (25) with its standard error below. The fifth column, headed "Test (1)", shows the R 2 statistic for a regression of the residual from Equation (24) on the instruments, with the associated significance level below of a test of the over-identifying restrictions of the model. The sixth column, headed "Test (2)" is the equivalent of the fifth column for Equation (25). Abbreviations: AUL, Australia; CAN, Canada; FR, France; GER, Germany; ITA, Italy; JPN, Japan; NTH, Netherlands; SWD, Sweden; SWT, Switzerland; UK, United Kingdom; USA, United States of America. b Tests: (1)ri,t~ j =t, ti-t-(1/~O)Act+t+rli,t+l; (2) Act+t - Ti + ~/)1~,1~1 +~z,t41.
J E Campbell
1264
Campbell and Mankiw (1989, 1991) have explored this regression in more detail, using both US and international data, and have found that predictable variation in consumption growth is often associated with predictable variation in income growth. This suggests that some consumers keep their consumption close to their income, either because they follow "rules of thumb", or because they are liquidity-constrained, or because they are "buffer-stock" savers [Deaton (1991), Carroll (1992)]. After controlling for the effect of predictable income growth, there is little remaining predictable variation in consumption growth to be explained by consumers' response to variation in real interest rates. One problem with IV estimation of Equation (24) is that the instruments are only very weakly correlated with the regressor because consumption growth is hard to forecast in this data set. Nelson and Startz (1990) have shown that in this situation asymptotic theory can be a poor guide to inference in finite samples; the asymptotic standard error of the coefficient tends to be too small and the overidentifying restrictions of the model may be rejected even when it is true. To circumvent this problem, one can reverse the regression (24) and estimate A c t + 1 = ~ -t- ~gri, t+ 1 + ~i,t+l.
(25)
If the orthogonality conditions hold, then the estimate of 'qJ in Equation (25) will asymptotically be the reciprocal of the estimate of 1/~p in Equation (24). In a finite sample, however, if ~p is small then IV estimates of Equation (25) will be better behaved than IV estimates of Equation (24). In Table 7 ~p is almost always estimated to be close to zero. The estimates are much more precise than those for 1/% The overidentifying restrictions of the model are sometimes rejected, but less often and less strongly than when Equation (24) is estimated. These results suggest that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution ~p is small, so that the generality of the Epstein-Zin-Weil model, which allows ~p to be large even if ~/is large, does not actually help one fit the data on consumption and asset returns 15.
4.2. A loglinear asset pricing J?amework in order to understand the second momems of stock returns, it is essential to have a framework relating movements in stock prices to movements in expected future dividends and discount rates. The present value model of stock prices is intractably nonlinear when expected stock returns are time-varying, and this has forced researchers to use one of several available simplifying assumptions. The most common approach is to assume a discrete-state Markov process either for dividend growth [Mehra and
15 Attanasio and Weber (1993) and Beaudry and van Wincoop (1996) have argued that this conclusion depends on the use of aggregate consumption data. They work with cohort-level and state-level data, respectively, and fred some evidence for a larger elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
Ch. 19: Asset Prices', Consumption, and the Business Cycle
1265
Prescott (1985)] or, following Hamilton (1989), for conditionally expected dividend growth [Abel (1994, 1999), Cecchetti, Lam and Mark (1990, 1993), Kandel and Stambaugh (1991)]. The Markov structure makes it possible to solve the present value model, but the derived expressions for returns tend to be extremely complicated and so these papers usually emphasize numerical results derived under specific numerical assumptions about parameter values 16. An alternative framework, which produces simpler closed-form expressions and hence is better suited for an overview of the literature, is the loglinear approximation to the exact present value model suggested by Campbell and Shiller (1988). Campbell and Shiller's loglinear relation between prices, dividends, and returns provides an accounting framework: High prices must eventually be followed by high future dividends or low future returns, and high prices must be associated with high expected future dividends or low expected future returns. Similarly, high returns must be associated with upward revisions in expected future dividends or downward revisions in expected future returns. The loglinear approximation starts with the definition of the log return on some asset i, ri, t+l ~ log(Pi, t+l + Di, t+l) - log(Pit). The timing convention here is that prices are measured at the end of each period so that they represent claims to next period's dividends. The log return is a nonlinear function of log prices Pit and pi, t+l and log dividends di, t+l, but it can be approximated around the mean log dividend-price ratio, (dit - P a ) , using a first-order Taylor expansion. The resulting approximation is ri, t+l ~ k +/)Pi, t tl +(1 -/))di, t + l - P i t ,
(26)
where/) and k are parameters of linearization defined b y / ) = 1/(1 + e x p ( ~ ) ) and k log(/)) - (1 - / ) ) l o g ( l / / ) - 1). When the dividend-price ratio is constant, then p P i / ( P i + Di), the ratio of the ex-dividend to the cum-dividend stock price. In the postwar quarterly US data shown in Table 3, the average price-dividend ratio has been 26.4 on an annual basis, implying that/) should be about 0.964 in annual data 17 The Taylor approximation (26) replaces the log of the sum of the stock price and the dividend in the exact relation with a weighted average of the log stock price and the log dividend. The log stock price gets a weight/) close to one, while the log dividend gets a weight 1 - p close to zero because the dividend is on average much smaller than the stock price, so a given percentage change in the dividend has a much smaller effect on the return than a given percentage change in the price. =
Ic, A partial exception to this statement is that Abel (1994) derives several analytical results for the first moments of retarns in a Markov model for expected dividend growth. 17 Strictly speaking both p and k should have asset subscripts i, but 1 omit these for simplicity. The asset pricing formulas later in this chapter assume that all assets have the samep, which simplifiessome expressions but does not change any of the qualitative conclusions.
1266
JE Campbe#
Equation (26) is a linear difference equation for the log stock price. Solving forward, imposing the terminal condition that limj~o~ PJPi, t+j = 0 , taking expectations, and subtracting the current dividend, one gets 0<3
pit-d#-
k 1 -p
kE~ Zp.i[Adi,~+l+j-ri,,+l+j].
(27)
.i=o
This equation says that the log price-dividend ratio is high when dividends are expected to grow rapidly, or when stock returns are expected to be low. The equation should be thought of as an accounting identity rather than a behavioral model; it has been obtained merely by approximating an identity, solving forward subject to a terminal condition, and taking expectations. Intuitively, if the stock price is high today, then from the definition of the return and the terminal condition that the stock price is non-explosive, there must either be high dividends or low stock returns in the future. hwestors must then expect some combination of high dividends and low stock returns if their expectations are to be consistent with the observed price. The terminal condition used to obtain Equation (27) is perhaps controversial. Models of "rational bubbles" do not impose this condition. Blanchard and Watson (1982) and Froot and Obstfeld (1991) have proposed simple, explicit models of explosive bubbles in asset prices. There are however several reasons to rule out such bubbles. The theoretical circumstances under which bubbles can exist are quite restrictive; Tirole (1985), for example, uses an overlapping generations framework and finds that bubbles can only exist if the economy is dynamically inefficient, a condition which seems unlikely on prior grounds and which is hard to reconcile with the empirical evidence of Abel, Mankiw, Summers and Zeckhauser (1989). Santos and Woodford (1997) also conclude that the conditions under which bubbles can exist are fragile. Empirically, bubbles imply explosive behavior of prices in relation to dividends and other measures of fundamentals; there is no evidence of this, although nonlinear bubble models are hard to reject using standard linear econometric methods is Equation (27) describes the log price-dividend ratio rather than the log price itself. This is a useful way to write the model because in many data sets dividends appear to follow a loglinear unit root process, so that log dividends and log prices are nonstationary. In this case changes in log dividends are stationary, so from Equation (27) the log price-dividend ratio is stationary provided that the expected stock return is stationary. Thus log stock prices and dividends are cointegrated, and the stationary linear combination of these variables involves no unknown parameters since it is just the log ratio. Table 11 reports some summary statistics for international stock prices in relation to dividends. The table gives the average price-dividend ratio, the standard deviation
t8 Campbell,Lo and MacKinlay (1997), Chapter 7, gives a somewhatmore detailedtextbook discussion of the literature on rational bubbles.
1267
Ch. 19." Asset Prices, Consumption, and the Business Cycle
Table 11 International stock prices and dividends a Country
Sample period
P/D
a(p-d)
ADF(1)
Ap
Ad
USA
1947.~1996.4
27.121
0.265
0.941
-1.752
3.547
2.225
1.688
AUL CAN FR GER ITA JPN NTH SP SWD SWT UK USA
1970.1 1996.3 1970.1-1996.3 1973.2-1996.3 1978.4-1996.3 1971.2-1995.3 1970.2-1996.3 1977.2 1996.2 1984.2 1996.2 1970.1-1995.1 1982.2-1996.3 1970.1 1996.3 1970.1 1996.4
25.919 30.108 22.718 27.787 41.345 91.251 21.139 22.509 35.021 47.320 18.434 27.882
0.267 0.221 0.541 0.300 0.318 0.642 0.272 0.319 0.439 0.217 0.280 0.235
0.856 0.902 0.971 0.922 0.882 0.964 0.932 0.823 0.941 0.814 0.913 0.904
3.273 -1.900 -1.3t0 -1.660 -3.743 -1.574 -0.727 -3.075 -1.632 -1.588 -1.657 -1.372
-1.410 0.754 1.358 4.186 2.172 4.192 7.540 6.843 4.922 9.291 1.464 2.034
0.883 -0.741 -1.214 1.079 4.919 2.489 4.007 -3.086 1.861 4.143 0.681 0.619
-2.477 1.200 2.538 3.853 3.531 6.974 3.637 10.078 3.499 6.074 0.579 1.582
SWD UK USA
1920-1994 1919 1994 1891-1995
26.706 20.806 22.733
0.333 0.238 0.279
0.746 0.514 0.778
0.768 4.093 -1.868
2.129 2.064 2.064
0.423 1.844 1.485
2.054 0.220 0.477
p(p
d)
Ap-d
a P/D is the mean price-dividend ratio, c~(p - d ) is the standard deviation of the log price-dividend ratio in natural units (not annualized percentage points), p(p - d) is the first-order autocorrelation of the log
price-dividend ratio. ADF(1) is the augmented Dickey-Fuller t-ratio for the lagged log price--dividend ratio when the change in the log price-dividend ratio is regressed on a constant, four lagged changes, and the lagged log price dividend ratio. Ap, Ad, and A p - d are the mean changes in log prices, log dividends, and the log price-dividend ratio respectively, in annualized percentage points. Abbreviations: AUL, Australia; CAN, Canada; FR, France; GER, Germany; ITA, Italy; JPN, Japan; NTH, Netherlands; SWD, Sweden; SWT, Switzerland; UK, United Kingdom; USA, United States of America.
of the log p r i c e - d i v i d e n d ratio in natural units, the first-order autocorrelation o f the log p r i c e - d i v i d e n d ratio, average growth rates o f prices, dividends, and the log p r i c e dividend ratio in percentage points per year, and a test statistic for the null hypothesis that the log p r i c e - d i v i d e n d ratio has a unit root. Following standard practice, the p r i c e dividend ratio is m e a s u r e d as the ratio o f the current stock price to the total o f dividends paid during the past year. Average p r i c e - d i v i d e n d ratios vary considerably across countries but generally lie b e t w e e n 20 and 30. The extreme outlier is Japan, w h i c h has a n average p r i c e - d i v i d e n d ratio o f 91. The volatility and first-order autocorrelation o f the log p r i c e - d i v i d e n d ratio are also unusually high for Japan, reflecting an u p w a r d trend in the Japanese log p r i c e -
J.Y. Campbell
1268
dividend ratio for much of the sample period which is also visible in the average growth rates of prices and dividends at the right of the table. Other countries in the quarterly data set, with the exception of France, have firstorder autocorrelation coefficients for the log price-dividend ratio of between 0.85 and 0.95. Unit root tests do not reject the unit root null hypothesis for most of these countries, but this may reflect low power of the tests in short data samples. Equation (27) implies that the log price-dividend ratio must be stationary if real dividend growth and stock returns are stationary, so this gives some reason to assume stationarity for the series. So far I have written asset prices as linear combinations of expected future dividends and returns. Following Campbell (1991), I can also write asset returns as linear combinations of revisions in expected future dividends and returns. Substituting Equation (27) into Equation (26), I obtain OO
ri, l+l - E t ri, t+l = (Et+l - E t ) ~ P J A ~ , t , 1 .i- o
OO
pJri, t +l+j.
i:j- (Et ~l - E t ) ~ j -
(28)
1
This equation says that unexpected stock returns must be associated with changes in expectations of future dividends or real returns. An increase in expected future dividends is associated with a capital gain today, while an increase in expected future returns is associated with a capital loss today. The reason is that with a given dividend stream, higher future returns can only be generated by future price appreciation from a lower current price.
4.3. The stock market oolatility puzzle I now use this accounting framework to illustrate the stock market volatility puzzle. The intertemporal budget constraint for a representative agent, Equation (19), implies that aggregate consumption is the dividend on the portfolio of all invested wealth, denoted by subscript w:
dwt = ct.
(29)
Many authors, including Grossman and Shiller (1981), Lucas (1978), and Mehra and Prescott (1985), have assumed that the aggregate stock market, denoted by subscript e for equity, is equivalent to the wealth portfolio and thus pays consumption as its dividend. Here I follow Campbell (1986) and Abel (1999) and make the slightly more general assumption that the dividend on equity equals aggregate consumption raised to a power )~. In logs, we have
det - ,~ct.
(30)
Abel (1999) shows that the coefficient )~ can be interpreted as a measure of leverage. When )~ > 1, dividends and stock returns are more volatile than the returns on the
Ch. 19." AssetPrices, Consumption, and the Business Cycle
1269
aggregate wealth portfolio. This framework has the additional advantage that a riskless real bond with infinite maturity - an inflation-indexed consol, denoted by subscript b can be priced merely by setting )~ = 0. The representative-agent asset pricing model with Epstein-Zin-Weil utility, conditional lognormality, and homoskedasticity [Equations (21) and (22)] implies that
Etre, t+l=~e+(@)EtAct+l,
(31)
where g~ is an asset-specific constant term. The expected log return on equity, like the expected log return on any other asset, is just a constant plus expected consumption growth divided by the elasticity of intertemporal substitution % Power utility is the special case where the coefficient of relative risk aversion y is the reciprocal of ~p so the effect of expected consumption growth on expected asset returns is proportional to y; but this is not true in general. Substituting Equations (30) and (31) into Equations (27) and (28), I find that
~-t-
(32)
)~-- ~)) Et ZpJmct+l±f, j=0
and
re, t+l -Et re, t+l = Z(Act+l -E/AG+I)+
Z-
(Et+l - E t )
Zp/Act+I+j.
(33)
j=[
Expected future consumption growth has offsetting effects on the log price-dividend ratio. It has a direct positive effect by increasing expected future dividends X-forone, but it has an indirect negative effect by increasing expected future real interest rates (1/~0)-for-one. The unexpected log return on the stock market is X times contemporaneous unexpected consumption growth (since contemporaneous consumption growth increases the contemporaneous dividend X-for-one), plus (3,- 1/~p) times the discounted sum of revisions in expected future consumption growth. For future reference I note that Equation (33) can be inverted to express consumption growth as a function of tile unexpected return on equity and revisions in expectations about future returns on equity. Rearranging Equation (33) and using Equation (31), ACt+l - Et Act+l =
(re, t ~q- Efre, t+l) +
-~P (Et~l-Et)ZpJr.,t+l+j. j=l
(34) An innovation in the equity return raises wealth by a factor (1/;~), and this raises consumption by the same factor. Increases in expected future equity returns have offsetting income and substitution effects on consumption; the positive income effect is (t/)~), and the negative substitution effect is - %
1270
1 Y. Campbell
These equations can be simplified if I assume that expected aggregate consumption growth, which I write as zt, follows an AR(1) process with mean g and positive persistence O: Act+l = zt + Cc, t+l,
(35)
zt+l = (1 - O)g + ~zt + ez, t+l.
(36)
This is a linear version o f the model used by Cecchetti, Lam and Mark (1990, 1993) and Kandel and Stambaugh (1991), in which expected consumption growth follows a persistent discrete-state Markov process. The contemporaneous shocks to realized consumption growth ~c,t+~ and expected future consumption growth c~,t+~ may be positively or negatively correlated. The correlation between these contemporaneous shocks controls the univariate autocovariances of consumption growth; the first-order autocovariance is ~bVar(zt)+ Cov(ez, t ~1, co, t+l), and higher-order autocovariances die out geometrically at rate ~b. Thus consumption growth inherits the positive serial correlation of the zt process unless the contemporaneous shocks are sufficiently negatively correlated. An important special case of the model sets Cz,t+l = ~ec, t+l to make consumption growth itself an AR(1) process; this is a linear version of the model of Mehra and Prescott (1985) 19 From Equation (21), the riskless interest rate is linear in expected consumption growth zs, so this model implies a homoskedastic AR(1) process for the riskless interest rate, with persistence 0. It is a discrete-time version of the Vasicek (1977) model o f the term structure o f interest rates. Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997), Chapter 11, gives a detailed textbook exposition of this model following Backus (1993), Singleton (1990), and Sun (1992). Equations (35) and (36) allow me to rewrite Equations (32) and (33) as _Pc, - det
-
1-p
+
,~-
+
~
(37)
1-p~bJ '
and =
-
ez,~+l.
(38)
Equation (38) shows why it is difficult to match the volatility of stock returns within this standard framework. The most obvious way to generate volatile stock returns is
19 The empirical evidence on univariate serial correlation in consumption growth is mixed. Table 4 shows small negative autocorrelation in 8 out of 12 quarterly data sets, but only 1 out of 3 annual data sets. Measurement problems may bias these autocorrelations in either direction. Durability of consumption tends to bias autocorrelation downwards, but time-averaging and seasonal adjustment tend to bias it upwards. Empirical estimates of discrete-state Markov models by Cecchetti, Lain and Mark (1990, 1993), Kandel and Stambaugh (1991), and Mehra and Prescott (1985) find some evidence for modest but persistent predictable variation in consumption growth.
Ch. 19: Asset Prices', Consumption, and the Business Cycle
1271
to assume a large ,t, that is, a volatile dividend, increasing )~, however, has mixed effects; it increases the volatility of the first term in Equation (38) proportionally, but as long as '1 < 1/*p it diminishes the volatility of the second term because the dividend and real interest rate effects of expected consumption growth offset each other more exactly. The overall volatility of stock returns may actually fall, or grow only slowly, with '1 until the point is reached where '1 > 1/~p. The empirical evidence for small ~p presented in Table 10 suggests that very high ,t will be needed to generate volatile stock returns. A similar point has been made by Abel (1999), who emphasizes that predictable variation in expected consumption growth can dampen stock market volatility and exacerbate the equity premium puzzle. This model also tends to produce highly volatile returns on real (inflation-indexed) bonds. By setting '1 = 0 in Equations (37) and (38), the log yield and unexpected return on a real consol bond, denoted by a subscript b, are
Ybt = db~ Pbt -
kl, ~ 1- p
+
1 - p~ ] '
(39)
and
rb, t+l-Etrb, t + l - - - ( ; )
( 1 P _ ~ ) e z , t+l .
(40)
When ~p is small, even modest variation in zt will tend to produce large variation in the riskffee interest rate and in the yields and returns on long-term real bonds. The correlation of stock and real bond returns is positive if )~ < 1/% but turns negative if '1 is large enough so that ,~ > 1/~p. Of course, all these calculations are dependent on the assumption made at the beginning of this subsection, that the log dividend on stocks is a multiple )~ of log aggregate consumption. More general models, allowing separate variation in dividends and consumption, can in principle generate volatile stock returns without excessive variation in real interest rates. For example, we might modify Equation (30) to allow a second autonomous component of the dividend: det -'1c~ ~ at,
(41)
where Aat ~q has a similar structure to consumption growth, being forecast by an AR(1) state variable:
Aat~l - Yt + ~a,t+l,
(42)
Yt+l = (1 - 0)v + Oy, -~ ey,~+l.
(43)
This modification of the basic model would add a term v/(1 ---p) + (Yt v)/(1 -pO) to the formula for the log price-dividend ratio, Equation (37), and would add a term
JY. Campbell
1272
~a,t+l + p~y,t+l/(l - p O ) to the formula for the unexpected log stock return, (38). Cecchetti, Lain and Mark (1993) estimate a discrete-state Markov model allowing for this sort of separate variability in consumption and dividends. While such a model provides a more realistic description of dividends, it requires large predictable movements in dividends to explain stock market volatility. Unfortunately, as section 4.5 shows, there is little evidence for this.
4.4. Implications Jbr the equity premium puzzle I now return to the basic model in which the log dividend is a multiple of log aggregate consumption, and use the formulas derived in the previous subsection to gain a deeper understanding of the equity premium puzzle. The discussion of the puzzle in section 3 treated the covariance of stock returns with consumption as exogenous, but given a tight link between stock dividends and consumption the covariance can be derived from the stochastic properties of consumption itself. This is the approach of many papers including Abel (1994, 1999), Kandel and Stambaugh (1991), Mehra and Prescott (1985), and Rietz (1988). An advantage of this approach is that it clarifies the implications of Epstein-ZinWeil utility. The Epstein-Zin-Weil Euler equation is derived by imposing a budget constraint that links consumption and wealth, and it explains risk premia by the covariances of asset returns with both consumption growth and the return on the wealth portfolio. The stochastic properties of consumption, together with the budget constraint, can be used to substitute either consumption or wealth out of the EpsteinZin-Weil model. To understand this point, note that Equation (33) applies to the return on the wealth portfolio when ,~ = 1. Setting e = w and )~ = 1, Equation (33) becomes rw, t+~-Etrw, t+l
Act+l-EtAct~l +
1-
(Et+~-Et)ZpJAc~+l~/,
(44)
j=l
an equation derived by Restoy and Weil (1998) applying the approach of Campbell (1993). It follows that the covariance of any asset return with the wealth portfolio must satisfy
aiw- o~c+ ( 1 - ~ )
ai~,
(45)
where agz denotes the covariance of asset return i with revisions in expectations of future consumption growth: oc
aig =~ Coy (ri, t +~- E~ri, t +1, (Et+ l - Et) Z pJ Act+ l+j). j-1
The letter g is used here as a mnemonic for consumption growth.
(46)
Ch. 19." Asset Prices, Consumption, and the Business Cycle
1273
Substituting this expression into the formula for risk premia in the Epstein-Zin-Weil model, Equation (22), that formula simplifies to
Et[ri,t+l]-rj;t+l + ~- = ]/(Yic-~ Y-
Oig.
(47)
The risk premium on any asset is the coefficient of risk aversion 3/times the covariance of that asset with consumption growth, plus ( 7 - 1/~p) times the covariance of the asset with revisions in expected future consumption growth. The second term is zero if X = 1/% the power utility case, or if there are no revisions in expected future consumption growth 20. I now return to the assumption made in the previous subsection that expected consumption growth is an AR(1) process given by Equation (36). Under this assumption, (E,+I - Et) Z j=l
pJAct+L+j=
ez, t +1.
(48)
Equations (38), (47) and (48) imply that E,[r~,,t+l]-
rf, l+l + -~
y
(49) This expression nests many of the leading cases explored in the literature on the equity premium puzzle. To understand it, it is helpful to break the equity premium into two components, the premium on real consol bonds over the riskless interest rate, and the premium on equities over real consol bonds:
4 E,[rt,,,+ll-rt,t+l+T=7[-~ (1 P--@)
_}_(~/_~) [_@{1_~)20z21 " Et[re,,+l- r<,+I] + 022
(50)
~-Y'~Ia~2+(
(51) 20 Using a continuous-time model, Svensson (1989) also emphasizes that risk premia in the Epstein Zin Weil model are determined only by risk aversion when investment opportunities and expected consumption growth are constant.
1274
J. Z Campbell
Equations (50) and (51) add up to Equation (49). The first term in each of these expressions represents the premium under power utility, while the second term represents the effect on the premium of moving to Epstein-Zin utility and allowing the coefficient of risk aversion to differ from the reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Given the evidence for small ~p presented in section 4.1, the key issue is whether Epstein-Zin utility allows y to be smaller than 1/lp and in this sense helps resolve the equity premium puzzle. Under power utility, the real bond premium in Equation (50) is determined by the covariance oc., of realized consumption growth and innovations to expected future consumption growth. If this covariance is positive, then an increase in consumption is associated with higher expected future consumption growth, higher real interest rates, and lower bond prices. Real bonds accordingly have hedge value and the real bond premium is negative. If oc~ is negative, then the real bond premium is positive 21. Under Epstein-Zin utility with g < 1/% assets that covary negatively with expected future consumption growth have higher risk premia. Since real bonds have this characteristic, Epstein-Zin utility with ]/ < 1/~p tends to produce large term premia. This runs counter to the empirical observation in Tables 7 and 8 that term premia are only modest; while the term premia measured in the tables are on nominal rather than real bonds, nominal term premia should if anything be larger than real term premia because they include a reward for bearing inflation risk which is unlikely to be negative. The premium on equities over real bonds is proportional to the coefficient )~ that governs the volatility of dividend growth. Under power utility the equity-bond premium is just risk aversion y times 7~times terms in G2 and ocz. Since both G.2 and G.z must be small to match the observed moments of consumption growth, it is hard to rationalize the large equity-bond premium shown in Table 9. Epstein-Zin utility with g < 1/~p adds a second term in oc~ and 62. Unfortunately the o~2 term is negative, which makes it even harder to rationalize the equity-bond premium. In conclusion, the consumption-based model with Epstein-Zin-Weil utility is no more successful than the consumption-based model with power utility in fitting equity and bond premia with a small coefficient of relative risk aversion. Given the time-series evidence for a small intertemporal elasticity of substitution % relative risk aversion y must be large - close to the reciprocal of ~p as implied by power utility - in order to produce the large equity premia and small bond premia that are measured in the data. Campbell (1993) uses these relations in a different way. Instead of substituting the wealth return out of the Epstein-Zin-Weil model, Campbell substitutes consumption
21 Calnpbetl(1986) developsthis intuition in a univariatemodel for consumptiongrowth.
Ch. 19." Asset Prices, Consumption, and the Business Cycle
1275
out of the model to get a discrete-time version of the intertemporal CAPM o f Merton (1973). Setting e = w and )~ = 1 in Equation (34), the innovation in consumption is O(3
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j=l Thus the covariance o f any asset return with consumption growth must satisfy ~c = ~w + (1 - ap)~.h,
(53)
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The risk premium on any asset is the coefficient o f risk aversion y times the covariance of that asset with the return on the wealth portfolio, plus (y - 1) times the covariance of the asset with revisions in expected future returns on wealth. The second term is zero if y - 1; in this case it is well known that intertemporal asset demands are zero and asset pricing is myopic. Campbell (1996b) uses this formula to study US stock price data, assuming that the log return on wealth is a linear combination of the stock return and the return on human capital (proxied by innovations to labor income). He argues that mean-reversion in US stock prices implies a positive covariance O~w between US stock returns and the current return on wealth, but a negative covariance a~h between US stock returns and revisions in expected future returns on wealth. Equation (55) then implies that increases in y above one have only a damped effect on the equity premium, so high risk aversion is needed to explain the equity premium puzzle. This conclusion is reached without any reference to measured aggregate consumption data.
4.5. What does the stock market Jorecast? All the calculations in sections 4.3 and 4.4 rely heavily on the assumptions of the representative-agent model with power utility, lognormal distributions, constant variances, and a deterministic link between stock dividends and consumption. They
1276
J.Y. Campbell
leave open the possibility that the stock market volatility puzzle could be resolved by relaxing these assumptions, for example to allow independent variation in dividends in the manner discussed at the end of Section 4.3. A more direct way to understand the stock market volatility puzzle is to use the loglinear asset pricing framework to study the empirical relationships between log price-dividend ratios and future consumption or dividend growth rates, real interest rates, and excess stock returns. According to Equation (27), the log price-dividend ratio embodies rational forecasts of dividend growth rates and stock returns, which in turn are the sum of real interest rates and excess stock returns, discounted to an infinite horizon. One can compare the empirical importance of these different forecasts by regressing long-horizon consumption and dividend growth rates, real interest rates,and excess stock returns onto the log price dividend ratio. Table 12 (p. 1278) reports the results of this exercise. For comparative purposes real output growth, realized stock market volatility, and the excess bond return are also included as dependent variables. For each quarterly data set the dependent variables are computed in natural units over 4, 8, and 16 quarters (1, 2, and 4years) and regressed onto the log price-dividend ratio divided by its standard deviation. Thus the regression coefficient gives the effect of a one standard deviation change in the log price-dividend ratio on the cumulative growth rate or rate of return in natural units. The table reports the regression coefficient, heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent t statistic, and R 2 statistic. In the benchmark postwar quarterly US data, the log price-dividend ratio has no clear ability to forecast consumption growth, output growth, dividend growth, or the real interest rate at any horizon. What it does forecast is the excess return on stocks, with t statistics that start above 4 and increase, and with R 2 statistics that start at 0.20 and increase to 0.55 at a 4-year horizon. In the introduction these results were summarized as stylized facts 10, 11, 12, and 13. Table 12 extends them to international data. (10) Regressions of consumption growth on the log price-dividend ratio give very mixed results across countries. There are statistically significant positive coefficients in Germany and the Netherlands, but statistically significant negative coefficients in Australia, Canada, Italy, Japan, and Switzerland. The other countries resemble the USA in that they have no statistically significant consumption growth forecasts. The regressions with output growth as the dependent variable show a similar pattern across countries. (11) Results are somewhat more promising for real dividend growth in many countries. Positive and statistically significant coefficients are fotmd in Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK. It seems clear that changing forecasts of real dividend growth have some role to play in explaining stock market movements. (12) The short-term real interest rate does not seem to be a promising candidate for the driving force behind stock market fluctuations. One would expect to find high price-dividend ratios forecasting low real interest rates, but the regression
Ch. 19: Asset Prices, Consumption, and the Business Cycle
1277
coefficients are significantly positive in France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. This presumably reflects the fact that stock markets in most countries were depressed in the 1970s, when real interest rates were low, and buoyant during the 1980s, when real interest rates were high. (13) Finally, the log price-dividend ratio is a powerful forecaster of excess stock returns in almost every country. The regression coefficients are uniformly negative and statistically significant. In the long-term annual data for Sweden, the UK, and the USA, I use horizons of 1 year, 4 years, and 8 years. In the US data the log price-dividend ratio fails to forecast real dividend growth, suggesting that authors such as Barsky and DeLong (t993) overemphasize the role of dividend forecasts in interpreting long-run US experience. Consistent with the quarterly results, the log price-dividend ratio also fails to forecast consumption growth, output growth, or the real interest rate, but does forecast excess stock returns. The UK data are similar, although here the 8-year regression coefficients for consumption growth and dividend growth are even statistically significant with the wrong (negative) sign. The 8-year regression coefficient for the real interest rate is also significantly negative, consistent with the idea that the UK stock market is related to the real interest rate. But much the strongest relation is between the log pricedividend ratio and future excess returns on the UK stock market. The Swedish data are quite different; here the log price-dividend ratio forecasts short-run dividend growth positively but has no predictive power for consumption growth, output growth, the real interest rate, or the excess log stock return. The rightmost column of Table 12 considers one more dependent variable, the excess bond return. The predictive power of the stock market for excess stock returns does not generally carry over to excess bond returns; there are significant negative coefficients only in Australia and the UK (and in Germany and Switzerland at long horizons). Overall, these results suggest that a new model of stock market volatility is needed. The standard model of section 4.3 drives all stock market fluctuations from changing forecasts of long-run consumption growth, dividend growth, and real interest rates; forecasts of excess stock returns are constant. The data for many countries suggest instead that forecasts of consumption growth, dividend growth, and real interest rates are variable only in the short run, so that long-run forecasts of these variables are almost constant; stock market fluctuations seem to be driven largely by changing forecasts of excess stock returns.
4.6. Changing volatility in stock returns
One reason why excess stock returns might be predictable is that the risk of stock market investment, as measured for example by the volatility of stock returns, might vary over time. With a constant price of risk, shifts in the quantity of risk will lead to changes in the equity risk premium.
1278
J. Y Campbell
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There is a vast literature documenting the fact that stock market volatility does change with time. However, the variation in volatility is concentrated at high frequencies; it is most dramatic in daily or monthly data and is much less striking at lower frequencies. There is some business-cycle variation in volatility, but it does not seem strong enough to explain large movements in aggregate stock prices [Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner (1992), Schwert (1989)]. A second difficulty is that there is only weak evidence that periods of high stock market volatility coincide with periods of predictably high stock returns. Some papers do find a positive relationship between conditional first and second moments of returns [Bollerslev, Engle and Wooldridge (1988), French, Schwert and Stambaugh (1987), Harvey (1989)], but other papers find that when short-term nominal interest rates are high, the conditional volatility of stock returns is high while the conditional mean stock return is low [Campbell (1987), Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle (1993)]. French, Schwert and Stambaugh (1987) emphasize that innovations in volatility are strongly negatively correlated with innovations in returns. This could be indirect evidence for a positive relationship between volatility and expected returns, but it could also indicate that negative shocks to stock prices raise volatility, perhaps by raising financial or operating leverage of companies [Black (1976)]. Some researchers have built models that allow for independent variation in the quantity and price of risk. Harvey (1989, 1991) uses "the Generalized Method of Moments to estimate such a system, and finds that the price of risk appears to vary countercyclically. Chou, Engle and Kane (1992) find similar results using a GARCH framework. Within the confines of this chapter it is not possible to do justice to the sophistication of the econometrics used in this literature. Instead i illustrate the empirical findings of the literature by constructing a crude measure of ex post volatility for excess stock returns - the average over 4, 8, or 16 quarters of the squared quarterly excess stock return - and regressing it onto the log price-dividend ratio. The results of this regression are reported in the sixth data column of Table 12. There are nmnerous significant coefficients in these regressions, but they are all positive, indicating that high price-dividend ratios predict high, not tow volatility in these data. These results reinforce the conclusion of the literature that the price of risk seems to vary over time in relation to the level of aggregate consumption. Section 5 discusses economic models that have this property. 4.7. What does the bond market forecast?
I conclude this section by briefly comparing the results of Table 12 with those that carl be obtained using bond market data. Table 13 repeats the regressions of Table 12 using the yield spread between long-term and short-term bonds as the regressor. Many authors have found that in US data, yield spreads have some ability to forecast excess bond returns [Campbell (1987), Campbell and Shiller (199l), Fama and Bliss (1987)].
Ch. 19:
Asset Prices', Consumption, and the Business Cycle
1281
This contradicts the expectations hypothesis of the term structure, the hypothesis that excess bond returns are unforecastable. Other authors have found that yield spreads are powerful forecasters of macroeconomic conditions, particularly output growth [Chen (1991), Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991)]. Fama and French (1989) have argued that both price-dividend ratios and yield spreads capture short-term cyclical conditions, although yield spreads are more highly correlated with conventional measures of the US business cycle. The results of Table 13 are strikingly different from those of Table 12. In the quarterly data, yield spreads forecast positive output growth in almost every country, and positive consumption growth in many countries. Outside the USA, there is also a strong tendency for yield spreads to forecast low real interest rates. Thus the findings of Chen (1991) and Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) carry over to international data. Yield spreads are much less successful as forecasters of excess stock returns, stock market volatility, or even excess bond returns; the ability of the yield spread to forecast excess bond returns appears to be primarily a US rather than an international phenomenon 2~. Similar conclusions are reported by Hardouvelis (1994) and B ekaert, Hodrick and Marshall (1997). While these authors do report some evidence for predictability of excess bond returns in international data, the evidence is much weaker than in US data. These results are consistent with the view that there is some procyclical variation in tile short-term real interest rate which is not matched by the long-term real interest rate. Thus yield spreads tend to rise at business cycle troughs when real interest rates are predictably low and future output and consumption growth are predictably high. This interpretation is complicated by the fact that yields are measured on nominal bonds rather than real bonds. Inflationary expectations and monetary policy therefore have a large impact on yield spreads. The particular characteristics of US monetary policy may help to explain why previously reported US results do not carry over to other countries in Table 13. US monetary policy has tended to smooth real and nominal interest rates, which reduces the forecastability of real interest rates and increases the sensitivity of the yield spread to changes in bond-market risk premia. Mankiw and Miron (1986) have found that the yield spread was a better forecaster of US interest rates in the period before the founding of the Federal Reserve, while Kugler (1988) has found that the yield spread is a better forecaster of interest rates in Germany and Switzerland and has related this to the characteristics of German and Swiss monetary policy. The findings in Table 13 are consistent with this literature.
22 Results at a one-quarter horizon, not reported in the table, are qualitatively consistent with the longhorizon results.
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5. Cyclical variation in the price of risk In previous sections I have documented a challenging array of stylized facts and have discussed the problems they pose for standard asset pricing theory. Briefly, the equity premium puzzle suggests that risk aversion must be high on average to explain high average excess stock returns, while the stock market volatility puzzle suggests that risk aversion must vary over time to explain predictable variation in excess returns and the associated volatility of stock prices. This section describes some models that display these features.
5.1. Habit formation Constantinides (1990), Ryder and Heal (1973), and Sundaresan (1989) have argued for the importance of habit formation, a positive effect of today's consumption on tomorrow's marginal utility of consumption. Several modeling issues arise at the outset. Writing the period utility function as U(Ct,Xt), where Xt is the time-varying habit or subsistence level, the first issue is the functional form for U(.). Abel (1990, 1999) has proposed that U(.) should be a power function of the ratio CJX~, while Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher (1995), Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Constantinides (1990), and Sundaresan (1989) have used a power function of the difference Ct-Xt. The second issue is the effect of an agent's own decisions on future levels of habit. In standard "internal habit" models such as those in Constantinides (1990) and Sundaresan (1989), habit depends on an agent's own consumption and the agent takes account of this when choosing how much to consume. In "external habit" models such as those in Abel (1990, 1999) and Campbell and Cochrane (1999), habit depends on aggregate consumption which is unaffected by any one agent's decisions. Abel calls this "catching up with the Joneses". The third issue is the speed with which habit reacts to individual or aggregate consumption. Abel (1990, 1999), Durra and Singleton (1986), and Ferson and Constantinides (1991) make habit depend on one lag of consumption, whereas Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher (1995), Constantinides (1990), Sundaresan (1989), Campbell and Cochrane (1999), and Heaton (1995) assume that habit reacts only gradually to changes in consumption. The choice between ratio models and difference models of habit is important because ratio models have constant risk aversion whereas difference models have time-varying risk aversion. To see this, consider Abel's (1990, 1996) specification in which an agent's utility can be written as a power function of the ratio CSXt, C~
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Ch. 19: Asset Prices, Consumption, and the Business Cycle
1285
where Ct i is aggregate past consumption and the parameter t¢ governs the degree of time-nonseparability. Since there is a representative agent, in equilibrium aggregate consumption equals the agent's own consumption, so in equilibrium
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With this specification of utility, in equilibrium the first-order condition is 1 = OEt [(1 +Ri, t+I)(Ct/Ct_I)~V(Y-1)(CI_I/Ct)Y].
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Equation (60) says that the riskless real interest rate equals its value under power utility, less t c ( y - 1)Act. Holding consumption today and expected consumption tomorrow constant, an increase in consumption yesterday increases the marginal utility of consumption today. This makes the representative agent want to borrow from the future, driving up the real interest rate. Equation (61) describing the risk premium is exactly the same as Equation (16), the risk premium formula for the power utility model. The external habit simply adds a term to the Euler equation (59) which is known at time t, and this does not affect the risk premium. Abel (1990, 1999) nevertheless argues that catching up with the Joneses can help to explain the equity premium puzzle. This argument is based on two considerations. First, the average level of the riskless rate in Equation (60) is - l o g 6 - y2o~.2/2+ (y - tc(y - 1))g, where g is the average consumption growth rate. When risk aversion y is very large, a positive t¢ reduces the average riskless rate. Thus catching up with the Joneses enables one to increase risk aversion to solve the equity premium puzzle without encountering the riskless rate puzzle. Second, a positive t¢ is likely to make the riskless real interest rate more variable because of the term -tc(y-1)Ac, in Equation (60). If one solves for the stock returns implied by the assumption that stock dividends equal consumption, a more variable real interest rate increases the covariance of stock returns and consumption oic and drives up the equity premium. The second of these points can be regarded as a weakness rather than a strength of the model. The puzzle illustrated in Table 5 is that the ratio of the measured equity premium to the measured covariance oic is large; increasing the consumption covariance oic does not by itself help to explain the size of this ratio. Also, Table 2 shows that the real interest rate is fairly stable ex post, while Table 7 shows that at most half of its variance is forecastable. Thus the standard deviation of the expected
1286
J. Y C a m p b e l l
real interest rate is quite small, and this is not consistent with large values of t¢ and y in Equation (60). This difficulty with the riskless real interest rate is a fundamental problem for habit formation models. Time-nonseparable preferences make marginal utility volatile even when consumption is smooth, because consumers derive utility from consumption relative to its recent history rather than from the absolute level of consumption. But unless the consumption and habit processes take particular forms, time-nonseparability also creates large swings in expected marginal utility at successive dates, and this implies large movements in the real interest rate. I now present an alternative specification in which it is possible to solve this problem, and in which risk aversion varies over time. Campbell and Cochrane (1999) build a model with external habit formation in which a representative agent derives utility from the difference between consumption and a time-varying subsistence or habit level. They assume that log consumption follows a random walk. This fits the observation that most countries do not have highly predictable consumption or dividend growth rates (Tables 7 and 9). The consumption growth process is Act+l = g + ~c, t+l,
(62)
where co, t+1 is a normal homoskedastic innovation with variance ao2. This is just the ARMA(1,1) model (35) of the previous section, with constant expected consumption growth. The utility function of the representative agent takes the form oc
Et
[C
V ' 6J ~ t+j-
X~
1-y
j-0
,~ 1 .y
t+jj
-1
(63)
Here Xt is the level of habit, 6 is the subjective discount factor, and 7 is the utility curvature parameter. Utility depends on a power function of the difference between consumption and habit; it is only defined when consumption exceeds habit. It is convenient to capture the relation between consumption and habit by the surplus consumption ratio St, defined by St =-
G-X, C,
(64)
The surplus consumption ratio is the fraction of consumption that exceeds habit and is therefore available to generate utility in Equation (63). If habit Xt is held fixed as consumption Ct varies, the local coefficient of relative risk aversion is -Cute_ uc
7 St'
(65)
where uc and ucc are the first and second derivatives of utility with respect to consumption. Risk aversion rises as the surplus consumption ratio St declines, that
Ch. 19." Asset Prices, Consumption, and the Business Cycle
1287
is, as consumption approaches the habit level. Note that y, the curvature parameter in utility, is no longer the coefficient of relative risk aversion in this model. To complete the description of preferences, one must specify how the habit Xt evolves over time in response to aggregate consumption. Campbell and Cochrane suggest an AR(1) model for the log surplus consumption ratio, st -= log(St): s~+l = (1 - q0)~+ q)st + Z (st) ~c,t+l.
(66)
The parameter q0 governs the persistence of the log surplus consumption ratio, while the "sensitivity function" Z(st) controls the sensitivity of st~-i and thus of log habit xt+l to innovations in consumption growth ce, t+l. Equation (66) specifies that today's habit is a complex nonlinear function of current and past consumption. A linear approximation may help to understand it. If I substitute the definition st =- log(1 - exp(xt - ct)) into Equation (66) and linearize around the steady state, I find that Equation (66) is approximately a traditional habit-formation model in which log habit responds slowly and linearly to log consumption, CxD
xM ,-~ (1-q0)a+qvxt+(1
q))~cpJct=i.
q0)ct= a + ( l
(67)
j-0
The linear model (67) has two serious problems. First, when consumption follows an exogenous process such as Equation (62) there is nothing to stop consumption falling below habit, in which case utility is undefined. This problem does not arise when one specifies a process for st, since any real value for st corresponds to positive S~ and hence Ct > Xt. Second, the linear model typically implies a highly volatile riskless real interest rate. The process (66) with a non-constant sensitivity function Z(st) allows one to control or even eliminate variation in the riskless interest rate. To derive the real interest rate implied by this model, one first calculates the marginal utility of consumption as
d(Ct) = ( G - X , ) 7 = S r C r .
(68)
The gross simple risktess rate is then (i +RIll) = (0E, UU'(Q) t ( G ' l ) ~) ' = (OEt ( ~ t i J
7
,/(C'4~-Y)' \-GI. ' .
(69)
Taking logs, and using Equations (62) and (66), the log riskless real interest rate is 2
r/) 1 = - log(0) + yg - y(1 - cp)(s, - s) - -7~G'
-
2
[Z(s,) + 1]2 .
(70)
The first two terms on the right-hand side of Equation (70) are familiar from the power utility model (17), while the last two terms are new. The third term (linear in
1288
JY. Campbell
(st -~)) reflects intertemporal substitution. If the surplus consumption ratio is low, the marginal utility of consumption is high. However, the surplus consumption ratio is expected to revert to its mean, so marginal utility is expected to fall in the future. Therefore, the consumer would like to borrow and this drives up the equilibrium riskfree interest rate. Note that what determines intertemporal substitution is meanreversion in marginal utility, not mean-reversion in consumption itself. In this model consumption follows a random walk so there is no mean-reversion in consumption; but habit formation causes the consumer to adjust gradually to a new level of consunlption, creating mean-reversion in marginal utility. The fourth term (linear in D~(s~)+ l] 2) reflects precautionary savings. As uncertainty increases, consumers become more willing to save and this drives down the equilibrium riskless interest rate. Note that what determines precautionary savings is uncertainty about marginal utility, not uncertainty about consumption itself. In this model the consumption process is homoskedastic so there is no time-variation in uncertainty about consumption; but habit formation makes a given level of consumption uncertainty more serious for marginal utility ,when consumption is low relative to habit. Equation (70) can be made to match the observed stability of real interest rates in two ways. First, it is helpful if the habit persistence parameter q~ is close to one, since this limits the strength of the intertemporal substitution effect. Second, the precautionary savings effect offsets the intertemporal substitution effect if A(s~) declines with st. In fact, Campbell and Cochrane parametrize the ,~(st) function so that these two effects exactly offset each other everywhere, implying a constant riskless interest rate. With a constant riskless rate, real bonds of all maturities are also riskless and there are no real term premia. Thus in the Campbell-Cochrane model the equity premium is also an equity-bond premium. The sensitivity function ,~(st) is not fully determined by the requirement of a constant riskless interest rate. Campbell and Cochrane choose the function to satisfy three conditions: (1) The riskless real interest rate is constant. (2) Habit is predetermined at the steady state s~ = 3. (3) Habit is predetermined near the steady state, or, equivalently, positive shocks to consumption may increase habit but never reduce it. To understand conditions (2) and (3), recall that the traditional notion of habit makes it a predetermined variable. On the other hand habit cannot be predetermined everywhere, or a sufficiently low realization of consumption growth would leave consumption below habit. To make habit "as predetermined as possible", Campbell and Cochrane assume that habit is predetermined at and near the steady state. This also eliminates the counterintuitive possibility that positive shocks to consumption cause declines in habit. Using these three conditions, Campbell and Cochrane show that the steady-state surplus consumption ratio must be a function of the other parameters of the model, and that the sensitivity function )~(st) must take a particular form. Campbell and Cochrane pick parameters for the model by calibrating it to fit postwar quarterly US data. They choose the mean consumption growth rate g = 1.89% per year and the standard
Ch. 19:
Asset Prices, Consumption, and the Business Cycle
1289
deviation of consumption growth oc = 1.50% per year to match the moments of the US consumption data. Campbell and Cochrane follow Mehra and Prescott (1985) by assuming that the stock market pays a dividend equal to consumption. They also consider a more realistic model in which the dividend is a random walk whose innovations are correlated with consumption growth. They show that results in this model are very similar because the implied regression coefficient of dividend growth on consumption growth is close to one, which produces similar asset price behavior. They use numerical methods to find the price-dividend ratio for the stock market as a function of the state variable st. They set the persistence of the state variable, ~, equal to 0.87 per year to match the persistence of the log price-dividend ratio. They choose y = 2.00 to match the ratio of unconditional mean to unconditional standard deviation of return in US stock returns. These parameter values imply that at the steady state, the surplus consumption ratio = 0.057 so habit is about 94% of consumption. Finally, Campbell and Cochrane choose the discount factor 6 = 0.89 to give a riskless real interest rate of just under 1% per year. It is important to understand that with these parameter values the model uses high average risk aversion to fit the high unconditional equity premium. Steady-state risk aversion is y/S = 2.00/0.057 = 35. In this respect the model resembles a power utility model with a very high risk aversion coefficient. There are however two important differences between the model with habit formation and the power utility model with high risk aversion. First, the model with habit formation avoids the riskfree rate puzzle. Evaluating Equation (70) at the steadystate surplus consumption ratio and using the restrictions on the sensitivity function )~(&), the constant riskless interest rate in the Campbell-Cochrane model is
r/+j
- log(6) + y g -
~-.
(71)
In the power utility model the same large coefficient y would appear in the consumption growth term and the consumption volatility term [Equation (17)]; in the CampbellCochrane model the curvature parameter ]e appears in the consumption growth term, and this is much lower than the steady-state risk aversion coefficient y/5: which appears in the consumption volatility term. Thus a much lower value of the discount factor 6 is consistent with the average level of the risk free interest rate, and the model implies a less sensitive relationship between mean consumption growth and interest rates. Second, the model with habit formation has risk aversion that varies with the level of consumption, whereas a power utility model has constant risk aversion. The time.variation in risk aversion generates predictable movements in excess stock returns like those documented in Table 12, enabling the Campbell-Cochrane model to match the volatility of stock prices even with a smooth consumption series and a constant riskless interest rate.
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5.2. Models' with heterogeneous agents All the models considered so far assume that assets can be priced as if there is a representative agent who consumes aggregate consumption. An alternative view is that aggregate consumption is not an adequate proxy for the consumption of stock market investors. One simple explanation for a discrepancy between these two measures of consumption is that there are two types of agents in the economy: constrained agents who are prevented from trading in asset markets and simply consume their labor income each period, and unconstrained agents. The consumption of the constrained agents is irrelevant to the determination of equilibrium asset prices, but it may be a large fraction of aggregate consumption. Campbell and Mankiw (1989) argue that predictable variation in consumption growth, correlated with predictable variation in income growth, suggests an important role for constrained agents, while Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) and Brav and Geczy (1996) use US panel data to show that the consumption of stockholders is more volatile and more highly correlated with the stock market than the consumption of non-stockholders. Such effects are likely to be even more important in countries with low stock market capitalization and concentrated equity ownership. The constrained agents in the above model do not directly influence asset prices, because they are assumed not to hold or trade financial assets. Another strand of the literature argues that there may be some investors who buy and sell stocks for exogenous, perhaps psychological reasons. These "noise traders" can influence stock prices because other investors, who are rational utility-maximizers, must be induced to accommodate their shifts in demand. If utility-maximizing investors are risk-averse, then they will only buy stocks from noise traders who wish to sell if stock prices fall and expected stock returns rise; conversely they will only sell stocks to noise traders who wish to buy if stock prices rise and expected stock returns fall. Campbell and Kyle (1993), Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1991), DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmalm (1990), and Shiller (1984) develop this model in some detail. The model implies that rational investors do. not hold the market portfolio - instead they shift in and out of the stock market in response to changing demand from noise traders - and do not consume aggregate consumption since some consumption is accounted for by noise traders. This makes the model hard to test without having detailed information on the investment strategies of different market participants 23. It is also possible that utility-maximizing stock market investors are heterogeneous in important ways. If investors are subject to large idiosyncratic risks in their labor income and can share these risks only indirectly by trading a few assets such as stocks
23 Recent work surveyed by Shiller (1999) attempts to place the behavior of noise traders on a firmer psychologicalfolmdation. Benartzi and Thaler (1995), fbr example, argue that psychologicalbiases make noise traders reluctant to hold stocks, and that this helps to explain the equity premium puzzle.
Ch. 19: Asset Prices, Consumption, and the Business Cycle
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and Treasury bills, their individual consumption paths may be much more volatile than aggregate consumption. Even if individual investors have the same power utility function, so that any individual's consumption growth rate raised to the power - y would be a valid stochastic discount factor, the aggregate consumption growth rate raised to the power - y may not be a valid stochastic discount factor. This problem is an example of Jensen's Inequality. Since marginal utility is nonlinear, the average of investors' marginal utilities of consumption is not generally the same as the marginal utility of average consumption. The problem disappears when investors' individual consumption streams are perfectly correlated with one another as they will be in a complete markets setting. Grossman and Shiller (1982) point out that it also disappears in a continuous-time model when the processes for individual consumption streams and asset prices are diffusions. Recently Constantinides and Duffle (1996) have provided a simple framework within which the effects of heterogeneity can be understood. Constantinides and Duffle postulate an economy in which individual investors k have different consumption levels Ckt. The cross-sectional distribution of individual consumption is lognormal, and the change from time t to time t + 1 in individual log consumption is cross-sectionally uncorrelated with the level of individual log consumption at time t. All investors have the same power utility function with time discount factor 6 and coefficient of relative risk aversion y, In this economy each investor's own intertemporal marginal rate of substitution is a valid stochastic discount factor. Hence the cross-sectional average of investors' intertemporal marginal rates of substitution is a valid stochastic discount factor. I write this as
M,+~ = 6E,\~ L \ ~ - k , )
/
'
(72)
where E[ denotes an expectation taken over the cross-sectional distribution at time t. That is, for any cross-sectionally random variable Xk~,
E:x,,
- lim
K 1 ~Xkt, k-I
the limit as the number of cross-sectional units increases of the cross-sectional sample average of Xkt 24. Note that E[Xkt will in general vary over time and need not be lognormally distributed conditional on past information.
24 Constantinides and Duffle (1996) present a more rigorous discussion.
J.Y. Campbell
1292
The assumption of cross-sectional lognormality means that the log stochastic discount factor, m[+1 = log(M~ 1), can be written as a function of the cross-sectional mean and variance of the change in log consumption: mr+ t
= - l o g ( b ) - yEt+jAck, t+1 +
Var~+lAck, t+l,
(73)
where Var[ is defined analogously to E[ as K
Var/Xl, = lim 1 K--,oo K
~(X~ lEt&,)2 ' k=l
and like E[ will in general vary over time. An economist who knows the underlying preference parameters of investors but does not understand the heterogeneity in this economy might attempt to construct a representative-agent stochastic discount factor, M/~, using aggregate consumption: /E/+l[G,t+l] )
r
-'uF+'l - b k
(74)
The log of this stochastic discount factor can also be related to the cross-sectional mean and variance of the change in log consumption: me+]=-log(b)-yEt+,Ack, t + l - (~)[Vart+lck, t+ 1 - Var/c?,l]
(7s) - - l o g ( O ) - y E 2 i . , A c k , , + , - (7)[Var,*~_iAc'k,,+,], where the second equality follows from the relation ck, tH ckf + Ack,t+l and the fact that Ack, t+l is cross-sectionally uncorrelated with ckt. The diflbrence between these two variables can now be written as m/~ 1 - m " lI~A = Y(Y2+ 1)Vart+lACk, . t kl.
(76)
The time series of this difference can have a nonzero mean, helping to explain the riskfree rate puzzle, and a nonzero variance, helping to explain the equity premium puzzle. If the cross-sectional variance of log consumption growth is negatively correlated with the level of aggregate consumption, so that idiosyncratic risk increases in economic downturns, then the true stochastic discount factor m[+1 will be more strongly countercyclical than the representative-agent stochastic discount factor constructed using the same preference parameters; this has the potential to explain the high price of risk without assuming that individual investors have high risk aversion. Mankiw (1986) makes a similar point in a two-period model.
Ch. 19: Asset Prices, Consumption, and the Business Cycle
1293
An important unresolved question is whether the heterogeneity we can measure has the characteristics that are needed to help resolve the asset pricing puzzles. In the Constantinides-Duffie model the heterogeneity must be large to have important effects on the stochastic discount factor; a cross-sectional standard deviation of log consumption growth of 20%, for example, is a cross-sectional variance of only 0.04, and it is variation in this number over time that is needed to explain the equity premium puzzle. Interestingly, the effect of heterogeneity is strongly increasing in risk aversion since Var~*+lAck,t+l is multiplied by y(g + 1)/2 in Equation (76). This suggests that heterogeneity may supplement high risk aversion but cannot altogether replace it as an explanation for the equity premium puzzle 25. It is also important to note that idiosyncratic shocks have large effects in the Constantinides-Duffie model because they are permanent. Heaton and Lucas (1996) calibrate individual income processes to micro data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Because the PSID data show that idiosyncratic income variation is largely transitory, Heaton and Lucas find that investors can minimize its effects on their consumption by borrowing and lending. This prevents heterogeneity from having any large effects on aggregate asset prices. To get around this problem, several recent papers have combined heterogeneity with constraints on borrowing. Heaton and Lucas (1996) and Krusell and Smith (1997) find that borrowing constraints or large costs of trading equities are needed to explain the equity premium. Constantinides, Donaldson and Mehra (1998) focus on heterogeneity across generations; in a stylized three-period overlapping generations model they find that they can match the equity premium if they prevent young agents from borrowing to buy equities. All of these models assume that agents have identical preferences. But heterogeneity in preferences may also be important. Several authors have recently argued that trading between investors with different degrees of risk aversion or time preference, possibly in the presence of market frictions, can lead to time-variation in the market price of risk [Aiyagari and Gertler (1998), Grossman and Zhou (1996), Sandroni (1997), Wang (1996)]. This seems likely to be an active research area in the next few years. 5.3. Irrational expectations
So far I have maintained the assumption that investors have rational expectations and understand the time-series behavior of dividend and consumption growth. A number of papers have explored the consequences of relaxing this assumption. [See for example
25 Lettau (1997) reaches a similar conclusion by assuming that individuals consume their income, and calculating the risk-aversion coefficients needed to put model-based stochastic discount factors inside the Hansen-Jagannathan volatility bounds. This procedure is conservative in that individuals trading in financial markets are normally able to achieve some smoothing of consumption relative to income. Nevertheless Lettau finds that high individual risk aversion is still needed to satisfy the Hansen,~ Jagannathan bounds.
1294
JY
CampbeH
Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), Barsky and DeLong (1993), Cecchetti, Lam and Mark (1998), Chow (1989), or Hansen, Sargent and Tallarini (1997)] 26 In the absence of arbitrage, there exist positive state prices that can rationalize the prices of traded financial assets. These state prices equal subjective state probabilities multiplied by ratios of marginal utilities in different states. Thus given any model of utility, there exist subjective probabilities that produce the necessary state prices and in this sense explain the observed prices of traded financial assets. The interesting question is whether these subjective probabilities are sufficiently close to objective probabilities, and sufficiently related to known psychological biases in behavior, to be plausible. Many of the papers in this area work in partial equilibrium and assume that stocks are priced by discounting expected future dividends at a constant rate. This assumption makes it easy to derive any desired behavior of stock prices directly from assumptions on dividend expectations. Barsky and DeLong (1993), for example, assume that investors believe dividends to be generated by a doubly integrated process, so that the dividend growth rate has a unit root. These expectations imply that rapid dividend growth increases stock prices more than proportionally, so that the price-dividend ratio rises when dividends are growing strongly. If dividend growth is in fact stationary, then the high price-dividend ratio is typically followed by dividend disappointments, low stock returns, and reversion to the long-run mean pric~dividend ratio. Thus Barsky and DeLong's model can account for the volatility puzzle and the predictability of stock returns. In general equilibrium, dividends are linked to consumption so investors' irrational expectations about dividend growth should be linked to their irrational expectations about consumption growth, interest rates are not exogenous, but like stock prices, are determined by investors' expectations. Thus it is significantly harder to build a general equilibrium model with irrational expectations. To see how irrationality can affect asset prices, consider first a static model in which log consumption follows a random walk (q} = 0) with drift g. Investors understand that consumption is a random walk, but they expect it to grow at rate ~ instead of g. Equation (37) implies that the log price-dividend ratio is
P e t - d e t -- i - p +
(77)
~ --
Equation (21) implies that the riskless imerest rate is 0-1
rL ,+1 - - log 6 + ~ + ~ - -
26 There is also import.
2
0
2
ow - ~-~- o7,
(78)
Ch. 19: Asset Prices, Consumption, and the Business Cycle
1295
and the rationally expected equity premium is Et[r~,,+,l
4
- rf, t-t-1 -t- T
(79)
= ~I-~0"2 -I- ~L(M- D)"
The first term on the right-hand side of Equation (79) is the standard formula for the equity premium in a model with serially uncorrelated consumption growth. This is investors' irrational expectation o f the equity premium. The second term arises because dividend growth is systematically different from what investors expect. This model illustrates that irrational pessimism among investors @ < g) can lower the average riskfree rate and increase the equity premium. Thus pessimism has the same effects on asset prices as a low rate o f time preference and a high coefficient o f risk aversion, and it can help to explain both the riskfree rate puzzle and the equity premium puzzle 27. To explain the volatility puzzle, a more complicated model o f irrationality is needed. Suppose now that log consumption growth follows an AR(1) process, a special case of Equation (35), but that investors believe the persistence coefficient to be ~} when in fact it is q)28. In this case the riskfree interest rate is given by ^
(80)
r/;t+l = / ~ f + ~ ( A c t - g ) , while the rationally expected equity premium is
<
E,fr~,,~,I-,r~;,,,+T=~-(,}-O)
~
,~-
+,~ (A<-g),
(81)
where/~f and/J~ are constants. If 0 is larger than ~b, and if the term in square brackets in Equation (81) is positive, then the equity premium falls when consumption growth has been rapid, and rises when consumption growth has been weak. This model, which can be seen as a general equilibrium version of Barsky and DeLong (1993), fits the apparent cyclical variation in the market price of risk. One difficulty with this explanation for stock market behavior is that it has strong implications for bond market behavior. Consumption growth drives up the riskless
27 The effect of pessimism on the average price-dividend ratio is ambiguous, for the usual reason that lower riskfree rates and lower expected dividend growth have offsetting effects. Hansen, Sargent and Tallarini (1997) also emphasize that irrational pessimism can be observationally equivalent to lower time preference and higher risk aversion. 28 All alternative formulation would be to assume, following Equation (35), that log consumption growth is predicted by a state variable x~ that investors observe, but that investors misperceive tile persistence of this process to be ~ rather than ~. In this case investors correctly forecast consumption growth over the next period, but incorrectly forecast subsequent consumption growth. Their irrationality has no effect on the riskfiee interest rate but causes time-variation in equity and bond premia.
JY. Campbell
1296
interest rate and the real bond premium even while it drives down the equity premium. Barsky and DeLong (1993) work in partial equilibrium so they do not confront this problem. Cecchetti, Lain and Mark (1998) handle it by allowing the degree of investors' irrationality itself to be stochastic and time-varying 29. 6. Some implications tbr m a c r o e c o n o m i c s The research summarized in this chapter has important implications for various aspects of macroeconomics. I conclude by briefly discussing some of these. A first set of issues concerns the modelling of production, and hence of investment. This chapter has followed the bulk of the asset pricing literature by concentrating on the relation between asset prices and consumption, without asking how consumption is determined in relation to investment and production. Ultimately this is unsatisfactory, and authors such as Cochrane (1991, 1996) and Rouwenhorst (1995) have argued that asset pricing should place a renewed emphasis on the investment decisions of firms. Standard macroeconomic models with production, such as the canonical real business cycle model of Prescott (1986), imply that asset prices are extremely stable. The real interest rate equals the marginal product of capital, which is perturbed only by technology shocks and changes in the quantity of capital; when the model is calibrated to US data the standard deviation of the real interest rate is only a few basis points. The return on capital is equally stable because capital can costlessly be transformed into consumption goods, so its price is always fixed at one and uncertainty in the return comes only from uncertainty about dividends. If real business cycle models are to generate volatile asset returns, they must be modified to include adjustment costs in investment so that changes in the demand for capital cause changes in the value of installed capital, or Tobin's q, rather than changes in the quantity of capital. Baxter and Crucini (1993), Jermann (t998), and Christiano and Fisher (1995), among others, show how this can be done. The adjustment costs affect not only asset prices, but other aspects of the model; the response of investment to shocks falls, for example, so larger shocks are needed to explain the cyclical behavior of investment. The modelling of labor supply is an equally difficult problem. Any model in which workers choose their labor supply implies a first-order condition of the form
OU OC~G~-
OU ON,'
(82)
where Gt is the real wage and Nt is labor supply. A well-known difficulty in business cycle theory is that with a constant real wage, the marginal utility of consumption
29 The work of Rietz (1988) can be understood in a similar way.Rictz argues that investors are concerned about an unlikely but serious event that has not actually occurred. Given the data we have, investors appear to be irrational but in fact, with a long enough data sample, they will prove to be rational.
Ch. 19: Asset Prices, Consumption, and the Business Cycle
1297
OU/OCt will be perfectly correlated with the marginal disutility of work -OU/ON~. Since the marginal utility of consumption is declining in consumption while the marginal disutility of work is increasing in hours, this implies that consumption and hours worked will be negatively correlated. In the data, of course, consumption and hours worked are positively correlated since they are both procyclical. This problem can be resolved if the real wage is procyclical; then when consumption and hours increase in an expansion the decline in marginal utility of consumption is more than offset by an increase in the real wage. In a standard model with log utility of consumption only a 1% increase in the real wage is needed to offset the decline in marginal utility caused by a 1% increase in consumption. But preferences of the sort suggested by the asset pricing literature, with high risk aversion and low intertemporal elasticity of substitution, have rapidly declining marginal utility of consumption. These preferences imply that a much larger increase in the real wage will be needed to offset the effect on labor supply of a given increase in consumption. Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher (1995) and Lettau and Uhlig (1996) confront this problem; Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher try to resolve it by using a two-sector framework with limited mobility of labor between sectors. In their framework the first-order condition (82) does not hold contemporaneously, but only in expectation. Models with production also help one to move away from the common assumption that stock market dividends equal consumption or equivalently, that the aggregate stock market equals total national wealth. This assumption is clearly untrue even for the United States, and is even less appropriate for countries with smaller stock markets. While one can relax the assumption by writing down exogenous correlated timeseries processes for dividends and consumption in the manner of section 4.3, it will ultimately be more satisfactory to derive both dividends and consumption within a general equilibrium model. Another important set of issues concerns the links between different national economies and their financial markets. In this chapter I have treated each national stock market as a separate entity with its own pricing model. That is, I have assumed that national economies are entirely closed so that there is no integrated world capital market. This assumption may be appropriate for examining long-term historical data, but it seems questionable under modern conditions. There is much work to be done on the pricing of national stock markets in a model with a perfectly or partially integrated world capital market. Finally, the asset pricing literature is important in understanding the welfare costs of macroeconomic fluctuations. There has recently been a tendency for economists to downplay the importance of economic fluctuations in favor of an emphasis on long-term economic growth. But models of habit formation imply that consumers take fluctuations extremely seriously. Fluctuations have important negative effects on welfare because they move consumption in the short term, when agents have little time to adjust; reductions in long-term growth, on the other hand, allow agents' habit levels to adjust gradually.
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This conclusion is not an artifact o f a particular utility function and habit formation process. As A t k e s o n and Phelan (1994) emphasize, it m u s t result from any utility function that explains the level o f the equity p r e m i u m . The choice b e t w e e n risky stocks and stable m o n e y market instruments offers investors a tradeoff b e t w e e n the m e a n growth rate o f their wealth and the volatility o f this growth rate. The fact that so m u c h extra m e a n growth is available from volatile stock market investments implies that investors find volatility to be a serious threat to their welfare. E c o n o m i c policymakers should take this into account w h e n they face policy tradeoffs between e c o n o m i c growth and m a c r o e c o n o m i c stability.
References Abel, A.B. (1990), "Asset prices under habit formation and catching up with the Joneses", American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 80:38 42. Abel, A.B. (1994), "Exact solutions for expected rates of return under Markov regime switching: implications for the equity premium puzzle", Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 26:345 361. Abel, A.B. (1999), "Risk premia and term premia in general equilibrium", Journal of Monetary Economics 43:3-33. Abel, A.B., N.G. Mankiw, L.H. Sumxners and R.J. Zeckhauser (1989), "Assessing dynamic efficiency: theory and evidence", Review of Economic Studies 56:1-20. Aiyagari, S.R., and M. Gertler (1998), "Overreaction of asset prices in general equilibrium", Working Paper No. 6747 (NBER). Atkeson, A., and C. Phelan (1994), "Reconsidering the costs of business cycles with incomplete markets", in: S. Fischer and J.J. Rotentherg, eds., NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1994 (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA) 187507. Attanasio, O.R, and G. Weber (1993), "Consumption growth, the interest rate, and aggregation", Review of Economic Studies 60:631-649. Backus, D. (1993), "Cox-Ingersoll Ross in discrete time", unpublished paper (New York University). Bansal, R., and W.J. Coleman II (1996), "A monetal7 explanation of the equity premium, tern1 premium, and risk-free rate puzzles", Journal of Political Economy 104:1135-1171. Barberis, N., A. Shleifer and R.W. Vishny (1998), "A model of investor sentiment", Journal of Financial Economics 49:307 343. Barclays de Zoete Wedd Securities (1995), The BZW Equity-Gilt Study: investment in the London Stock Market since 1918 (London). Barsky, R.B., and J.B. DeLong (1993), "Why does the stock market fluctuate?", Quarterly Jomnal of Economics 107:291-311. Baxter, M., and M.J. Crucini (t993), "Explaining saving investment correlations", American Economic Review 83:416-436. Beaudry, R, and E. van Wincoop (1996), "The intertemporal elasticity of substitution: an exploration using a US panel of state data", Economica 63:495 512. Bekaert, G., R.J. Hodrick and D.A. Marshall (1997), "'Peso problem' explanations for term structure anomalies", Working Paper No. 6147 (NBER). Benartzi, S., and R.H. Thaler (1995), "Myopic loss aversion and the equity premium puzzle", Quarterly Journal of Economics 110:73-92. Black, E (1976), "Studies of stock price volatility changes", Proceedings of the 1976 Meetings of the Business and Economic Statistics Section (American Statistical Association) 177--181.
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Blanchard, O.J., and M.W. Watson (1982), "Bubbles, rational expectations, and financial markets", in: E Wachtel, ed., Crises in the Economic and Financial Structure: Bubbles, Bursts, and Shocks (Lexington Publishers, Lexington, MA). Boldrin, M., L.J. Christiano and J. Fisher (1995), "Asset pricing lessons for modeling business cycles", Working Paper No. 5262 (NBER). Bollerslev, T., R. Engle and J. Wooldridge (1988), "A capital asset pricing model with time varying covariances", Journal of Political Economy 96:116 131. Bollerslev, T., R.Y. Chou and K.E Kroner (1992), "ARCH modeling in finance: a review of the theory and empirical evidence", Journal of Econometrics 52:5-59. Bray, A., and C.C. Geczy (1996), "An empirical resurrection of the simple consumption CAPM with power utility", unpublished paper (University of Chicago). Breeden, D. (1979), "An intertemporal asset pricing model with stochastic consumption and investment opportunities", Journal of Financial Economics 7:265-296. Brown, S., W. Goetzmann and S. Ross (1995), "Survival", Journal of Finance 50:853-873. Campbell, J.Y. (1986), "Bond and stock returns in a simple exchange model", Quarterly Journal of Economics 101:785-804. Campbell, J.Y. (1987), "Stock returns and the term structure", Journal of Financial Economics 18: 373~99. Campbell, J.Y. (1991 ), "A variance decomposition for stock returns", Economic Journal 101 : 157-179. Campbell, J.Y. (1993), "lntertemporal asset pricing without consumption data", American Economic Review 83:487-512. Campbell, J.Y. (1996a), "Consumption and the stock market: interpreting international experience", Swedish Economic Policy Review 3:251-299. Campbell, J.Y. (1996b), "Understanding risk and return", Journal of Political Economy 104:298-345. Campbell, J.Y., and J.H. Cochrane (1999), "By force of habit: a consumption-based explanation of aggregate stock market behavior", Journal of Political Economy 107:205-251. Campbell, J.Y., and A.S. Kyle (1993), "Smart money, noise trading, and stock price behavior", Review of Economic Studies 60:1-34. Campbell, J.Y., and N.G. Mankiw (1989), "Consumption, income, and interest rates: reinterpreting the time series evidence", in: O.J. Blanchard and S. Fischer, eds., National Bureau of Economic Research Macroeconomics Annual 4:185~ 16. Campbell, J.Y., and N.G. Mankiw (1991), "The response of consumption to income: a cross-cotmtry investigation", European Economic Review 35: 723-767. Campbell, J.Y., and R.J. Shiller (1988), "The dividend-price ratio and expectations of future dividends and discount factors", Review of Financial Studies 1:195-227. Campbell, J.Y., and R.J. Shiller (1991), "Yield spreads and interest rate movements: a bird's eye view", Review of Economic Studies 58:495 514. Campbell, J.Y., A.W. Lo and A.C. MacKinlay (1997), The Econometrics of Financial Markets (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ). Carroll, C.D. (1992), "The buffer-stock theory of saving: some macroeconornic evidence", Brookings Papers on Economic Activity t992(2):61-156. Cecchetti, S.G., E-S. Lain and N.C. Mark (1990), "Mean reversion in equilibrium asset prices", American Economic Review 80:3984 18. Cecchetti, S.G., E-S. Lain and N.C. Mark (1993), "The equity premium and the risk-fiee rate: matching the moments", Journal of Monetary Economics 31:2t~45. Cecchetti, S.G., R-S. Lain and N.C. Mark (1998), "Asset pricing with distorted beliefs: are equity returns too good to be true?", Working Paper No. 6354 (NBER). Chen, N. (1991), "Financial investment opportunities and the macroeconomy", Journal of Finance 46:52%554. Chou, R.Y., R.E Engle and A. Kane (1992), "Measuring risk aversion from excess returns on a stock index", Journal of Econometrics 52:201~24.
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Chow, G.C. (1989), "Rational versus adaptive expectations in present value models", Review of Economics and Statistics 71:376 384. Christiano, L.J., and J. Fisher (1995), "Tobin's q and asset returns: implications for business cycle analysis", Working Paper No. 5292 (NBER). Cochrane, J.H. (1991), "Production-based asset pricing and the link between stock returns and economic fluctuations", Journal of Finance 46:209-237. Cochrane, J.H. (1996), "A cross-sectional test of an investment-based asset pricing model", Journal of Political Economy 104:572~521. Cochrane, J.H., and L.R Hansen (1992), "Asset pricing lessons for macroeconomics", in: O.J. Blanchard and S. Fischer, eds., NBER Maeroeconomics Annual 1992 (The MIT Press, Cambridge). Constantinides, G.M. (1990), "Habit formation: a resolution of the equity premium puzzle", Journal of Political Economy 98:519-543. Constantinides, G.M., and D. Duffle (1996), "Asset pricing with heterogeneous consumers", Journal of Political Economy 104:219-240. Constantinides, G.M., J.B. Donaldson and R. Mehra (1998), "Junior can't borrow: a new perspective on tile equity premium puzzle", Working Paper No. 6617 (NBER). Cutler, D.M., J.M. Poterba and L.H. Summers (1991), "Speculative dynamics", Review of Economic Studies 58:529-546. Deaton, A.S. (1991), "Saving and liquidity constraints", Econometrica 59:1221-1248. DeLong, J.B., A. Shleifer, L.H. Summers and R.J. Waldmann (1990), "Noise trader risk in financial markets", Journal of Political Economy 98:703-738. Dunn, K.B., and K.J. Singleton (1986), "Modeling the term structure of interest rates under non-separable utility and durability of goods", Journal of Financial Economics 17:27-55. Epstein, L.G., and S.E. Zin (1989), "Substitution, risk aversion, and the temporal behavior of consumption and asset returns: a theoretical fiamework", Econometrica 57:937-968. Epstein, L.G., and S.E. Zin (1991), "Substitution, risk aversion, and the temporal behavior of consmnption and asset returns: an empirical investigation", Journal of Political Economy 99:263-286. Estrella, A., and G.A. Hardouvelis (1991), "The term structure as a predictor of real economic activity", Journal of Finance 46:555-576. Fama, E.E, and R. Bliss (1987), "The information in long-maturity forward rates", American Economic Review 77:68(~692. Fama, E.E, and K.R. French (1988a), "Permanent and temporary components of stock prices", Journal of Political Economy 96:246-273. Fama, E.E, and K.R. French (1988b), "Dividend yields and expected stock returns", Journal of Financial Economics 22:3 27. Fama, E.E, and K.R. French (1989), "Business conditions and expected returns on stocks and bonds", Journal of Financial Economics 25:23~49. Ferson, W.E., and G.M. Constantinides (1991), "Habit persistence and durability in aggregate consumption: empirical tests", Journal of Financial Economics 29:199-240. French, K., G.W. Schwert and R.E Stambaugh (1987), "Expected stock returns and volatility", Journal of Financial Economics 19:3-30. Frennberg, R, and B. Hansson (1992), "Computation of a monthly index for Swedish stock returns 1919-t989", Scandinavian Economic History Review 40:3-27. Froot, K., and M. Obstfeld (1991), "Intrinsic bubbles: the case of stock prices", American Economic Review 81:t189-1217. Glosten, L, R. Jagannathan and D. Runkle (1993), "On the relation between the expected value and the volatility of the nominal excess return on stocks", Journal of Finance 48:177%180I. Goetzmmur, W.N., and R Jorion (1997), "A century of global stock markets", Working Paper No. 5901 (NBER). Grossman, S.J., and R.J. Shiller (198l), "The determinants of the variability of stock market prices", American Economic Review 71:222 227.
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Grossman, S.J., and R.J. Shiller (1982), "Consumption correlatedness and risk measurement in economies with non-traded assets and heterogeneous information", Journal of Financial Economics 10:195-210. Grossman, S.J., and Z. Zhou (1996), "Equilibrium analysis of portfolio insurance", Journal of Finance 51:1379 1403. Grossman, S.J., A. Melino and R.J. Shiller (1987), "Estimating the continuous time consumption based asset pricing model", Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 5:315-328. Hall, R.E. (1988), "Intertemporal substitution in consumption", Journal of Political Economy 96:221~273. Hamilton, J.D. (1989), "A new approach to the analysis of nonstationary returns and the business cycle", Econometa%a 57:357-384. Hansen, L.P, and R. Jagannathan (1991), "Restrictions on intertemporal marginal rates of substitution implied by asset returns", Journal of Political Economy 99:225-262. Hansen, L.P., and K.J. Singleton (1983), "Stochastic consumption, risk aversion, and the temporal behavior of asset returns", Journal of Political Economy 91:249-268. Hansen, L.P, T.J. Sargent and T.D. Tallarini Jr (1997), "Robust permanent income and pricing", unpublished paper (University of Chicago and Carnegie Mellon University); Review of Economic Studies, fbrthcoming. Hardouvelis, G.A. (1994), "The term structure spread and future changes in long and short rates in the G7 countries: Is there a puzzle?", Journal of Monetary Economics 33:255283. Harvey, C.R. (1989), "Time-varying conditional covariances in tests of asset pricing models", Journal of Financial Economics 24:289-317. Harvey, C.R. (1991), "The world price of covariance risk", Journal of Finance 46:111-157. Hassler, J., E Lundvik, T. Persson and E S6derlind (1994), "The Swedish business cycle: stylized facts over 130 years", in: V. Bergstr/Sm and A. Vredin, eds., Measuring and Interpreting Business Cycles (Clarendon Press, Oxford). Heaton, J. (1995), "'An empirical investigation of asset pricing with temporally dependent preference specifications", Econometrica 63:681-717. Heaton, J., and D.J. Lucas (1996), "Evaluating the effects of incomplete markets on risk sharing and asset pricing", Journal of Political Economy 104:443-487. Jermann, U.J. (1998), "Asset pricing in production economies", Journal of Monetary Economics 41: 257-275. Kandel, S., and R.E Stambaugh (t991), "Asset returns and intertemporal preferences", Journal of Monetary Economics 27:39-71. Kocherlakota, N. (1996), "The equity premium: it's still a puzzle", Journal of Economic Literature 34:42~ 1. Kreps, D.M., and E.L. Porteus (1978), "Temporal resolution of uncertainty and dynamic choice theory", Econometriea 46:185-200. Kxusell, E, and A.A. Smith Jr (1997), "Income and wealth heterogeneity, portfolio choice, and equilibrium asset returns", Macroeconomic Dynamics 1:387-422. Kugler, E (1988), "An empirical note on the term structure and interest rate stabilization policies", Quarterly Journal of Economics 103:78%792. La Porta, R., E Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R.W. Vishny (1997), "Legal determinants of external finance", Journal of Finance 52:1131-1150. LeRoy, S.E, and R.D. Porter (1981), "The present value relation: tests based on variance bounds", Econometriea 49:555-577. Lettan, M. (1997), "Idiosyncratic risk and volatility bounds", unpublished paper (CentER, Tilburg University). Lettau, M., and H. Uhlig (1996), "Asset prices and business cycles: successes and pitfalls of the general equilibrium approach", unpublished paper (CentER, Tilburg University). Lucas Jr, R.E. (1978), "Asset prices in an exchange economy", Econometrica 46:1429-1446.
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Mankiw, N.G. (1986), "The equity premium and the concentration of aggregate shocks", Journal of Financial Economics 17:211-219. Mankiw, N.G., and J.A. Miron (1986), "The changing behavior of the term structure of interest rates", Quarterly Journal of Economics 101:211228. Mankiw, N.G., and S.E Zeldcs (1991), "The consumption of stockholders and non-stockholders", Journal of Financial Economics 29:97-112. Mehra, R., and E.C. Prescott (1985), "The equity premium puzzle", Journal of Monetary Economics 15:145-161. Merton, R. (1973), "An intertemporal capital asset pricing model", Econometa@a 41:867-887. Miron, J.A. (1986), "Seasonal fluctuations and the life cycle-permanent income hypothesis of consumption", Journal of Political Economy 94:1258 1279. Nelson, C.R., and R. Startz (1990), "The distribution of the instrumental variables estimator and its t-ratio when the instrument is a poor one", Journal of Business 63:S125-$140. Poterba, J.M., and L.H. Summers (1988), "Mean reversion in stock returns: evidence and implications", Journal of Financial Economics 22:27-60. Prescott, E.C. (1986), "Theory ahead of business cycle measurement", Carnegie-Rnchester Conference Series on Public Policy 25:11-66. Restoy, E, and E Weil (1998), "Approximate equilibrium asset prices", Working Paper No. 6611 (NBER). Rietz, 32 (1988), "The equity risk premium: a solution?", Journal of Monetary Economics 21:117-132. Rouwenhorst, K.G. (1995), "Asset pricing implications of equilibrium business cycle models", in: T.E Cooley, ed., Frontiers of Business Cycle Research (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ). Ryder Jr, H.E., and G.M. Heal (1973), "Optimum growth with intertemporally dependent preferences", Review of Economic Studies 40:1-33. Sandroni, A. (1997), "Asset prices, wealth distribution, and intertemporal preference shocks", unpublished paper (University of Pennsylvania). Santos, M.S., and M. Woodford (1997), "Rational asset pricing bubbles", Econometrica 65:19 57. Schwert, G.W. (1989), "Why does stock market volatility change over time?", Journal of Finance 44:1115 1153. Shiller, R.J. (i 981), "Do stock prices move too much to be justified by subsequent changes in dividends?", American Economic Review 71:421-436. Shiller, R.J. (1982), "Consumption, asset markets, and macroeconomic fluctuations", Carnegie Mellon Conference Series on Public Policy 17:203-238. Shiller, R.J. (1984), "Stock prices and social dynamics", Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1984(2):457M98. Shiller, R.J. (1999), "Human behavior and the efficiency of the financial system", ch. 20, this Handbook. Singleton, K. (1990), "Specification and estimation ofintertemporal asset pricing models", in B. Friedman and E Hahn, eds., Handbook of Monetary Economics (North-Holland, Amsterdam). Sun, T. (I992), "Real and nominal interest rates: a discrete-time model and its continuous-time limit", Review of Financial Studies 5:581-611. Stmdaresan, S.M. (1989), "Intertemporally dependent preferences and the volatility of consumption and wealth", Review of Financial Studies 2:73 88. Svensson, L.E.O. (1989), "Portfolio choice with non-expected utility in continuous time", Economics Letters 30:313--317. The Economist (1987), One Hundred Years of Economic Statistics (The Economist, London). Tirole, J. (1985), "Asset bubbles and overlapping generations", Econometrica 53:1499-1527. Vasicek, O. (1977), "An equilibrium characterization of the term structure", Journal of Financial Economics 5:177-188. Wang, J. (1996), "The term structure of interest rates in a pure exchange economy with heterogeneous investors", Journal of Financial Economics 41:75 110. Weil, E (i989), "The equity premium puzzle and the risk-t?ec rate puzzle", Journal of Monetary Economics 24:401-421.
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Wheatley, S. (1988), "Some tests of the consumption-based asset pricing model", Journal of Monetary Economics 22:193~ 18. Wilcox, D. (1992), "The construction of US consumption data: some facts and their implications for empirical work", American Economic Review 82:922-941.
Chapter 20
HUMAN
BEHAVIOR
EFFICIENCY
AND
THE
OF THE FINANCIAL
SYSTEM*
ROBERT J. SHILLER Yale Unioersity
Contents
Abstract 1306 Keywords 1306 Introduction 1307 1. Prospect theory 1308 2. Regret and cognitive dissonance 1313 3. Anchoring 1314 4. Mental compartments 1317 Overconfidence, over- and under-reaction and the representativeness heuristic 1318 1324 6. The disjunction effect 1325 7. Gambling behavior and speculation 1325 8. The irrelevance o f history 1328 9. Magical thinking 1329 10. Quasi-magical thinking 1330 11. Attention anomalies and the availability heuristic 1331 12. Culture and social contagion 1332 13. A global culture 1333 14. Concluding remarks 1334 References .
* An earlier version was presented at a conference Recent Developments in Maclveconomics at the Federal Reselwe Bank of New York, February 27-28, 1997. The author is indebted to Ricky Lain for research assistance, and to Michael Krause, Virginia Shiller, Andrei Shleifer, David Wilcox, and the editors for helpful comments. This research was supported by the National Science Foundation. Handbook o f Macroeconomics, Volume 1, Edited by ~B. ~l~ylor and M. WoodJbrd © 1999 Elsevier Science B. l( All rights reserved
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Abstract
Recent literature in empirical finance is surveyed in its relation to underlying behavioral principles, principles which come primarily from psychology, sociology, and anthropology. The behavioral principles discussed are: prospect theory, regret and cognitive dissonance, anchoring, mental compartments, overconfidence, over- and under-reaction, representativeness heuristic, the disjunction effect, gambling behavior and speculation, perceived irrelevance of history, magical thinking, quasi-magical thinking, attention anomalies, the availability heuristic, culture and social contagion, and global culture.
Keywords efficient markets, random walk, excess volatility, anomalies in finance, stock market, prospect theory, regret and cognitive dissonance, anchoring, mental compartments, overconfidence, overreaction, underreaction, representativeness heuristic, the disjunction effect, gambling behavior and speculation, irrelevance of history, magical thinking, quasi-magical thinking, attention anomalies, the availability heuristic, culture and social contagion, global culture JEL classification: G10
Ch. 20." Human Behavior and the Efficiency of the Financial System
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Introduction
Theories of human behavior from psychology, sociology, and anthropology have helped motivate much recent empirical research on the behavior of financial markets. In this paper I will survey some of the most significant theories (for empirical finance) in these other social sciences and the empirical finance literature itself. Particular attention will be paid to the implications of these theories for the efficient markets hypothesis in finance. This is the hypothesis that financial prices efficiently incorporate all public information and that prices can be regarded as optimal estimates of true investment value at all times. The efficient markets hypothesis in turn is based on more primitive notions that people behave rationally, or accurately maximize expected utility, and are able to process all available information. The idea behind the term "efficient markets hypothesis", a term coined by Harry Roberts (1967) l, has a long history in financial research, a far longer history than the term itself has. The hypothesis (without the words efficient markets) was given a clear statement in Gibson (1889), and has apparently been widely known at least since then, if not long before. All this time there has also been tension over the hypothesis, a feeling among many that there is something egregiously wrong with it; for an early example, see Mackay (1841). In the past couple of decades the finance literature has amassed a substantial number of observations of apparent anomalies (from the standpoint of the efficient markets hypothesis) in financial markets. These anomalies suggest that the underlying principles of rational behavior underlying the efficient markets hypothesis are not entirely correct and that we need to look as well at other models of human behavior, as have been studied in the other social sciences. The organization of this paper is different from that of other accounts of the literature on behavioral finance [for example, De Bondt and Thaler (1996) or Fama (1997)]: this paper is organized around a list of theories from the other social sciences that are used by researchers in finance, rather than around a list of anomalies. I organized the paper this way because, in reality, most of the fundamental principles that we want to stress here really do seem to be imported from the other social sciences. No surprise here: researchers in these other social sciences have done most of the work over the last century on understanding less-than-perfectly-rational human behavior. Moreover, each anomaly in finance typically has more than one possible explanation in terms of these theories from the other social sciences. The anomalies are observed in complex real world settings, where many possible factors are at work, not in the experimental psychologist's laboratory. Each of their theories contributes a little to our understanding of the anomalies, and there is typically no way to quantify or prove the relevance of any one theory: It is better to set forth the theories from the other social sciences themselves, describing when possible the controlled experiments that demonstrate their validity, and give for each a few illustrations of applications in finance. I The Roberts (1967) paper has never been published; the fame of his paper apparently owes to the discussion of it in Fama (1970).
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Before beginning, it should be noted that theories of human behavior from these other social sciences often have underlying motivation that is different from that of economic theories. Their theories are often intended to be robust to application in a variety of everyday, unstructured experiences, while the economic theories are often intended to be robust in the different sense that, even if the problems the economic agents face become very clearly defined, their behavior will not change after they learn how to solve the problems. Many of the underlying behavioral principles from psychology and other social sciences that are discussed below are unstable and the hypothesized behavioral phenomena may disappear when the situation becomes better structured and people have had a lot of opportunity to learn about it. Indeed, there are papers in the psychology literature claiming that many of the cognitive biases in human judgment under uncertainty uncovered by experimental psychologists will disappear when the experiment is changed so that the probabilities and issues that the experiment raises are explained clearly enough to subjects [see, for example, Gigerenzer (1991)]. Experimental subjects can in many cases be convinced, if given proper instruction, that their initial behavior in the experimental situation was irrational, and they will then correct their ways. To economists, such evidence is taken to be more damning to the theories than it would be by the social scientists in these other disciplines. Apparently economists at large have not fully appreciated the extent to which enduring patterns can be found in this "unstable" human behavior. Some examples below will illustrate the application of theories from other social sciences to understanding anomalies in financial markets will illustrate. Each section below, until the conclusion, refers to a theory taken from the literature in psychology, sociology or anthropology. The only order of these sections is that I have placed first theories that seem to have the more concrete applications in finance, leaving some more impressionistic applications to the end. in the conclusion, I attempt to put these theories into perspective, and to recall that there are also important strengths in conventional economic theory and in the efficient markets hypothesis itself.
1. Prospect theory Prospect theory [Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Tversky and Kahneman (1992)j has probably had more impact than any other behavioral theory on economic research. Prospect theory is very influential despite the fact that it is still viewed by much of the economics profession at large as of far less importance than expected utility theory. Among economists, prospect theory has a distinct, though still prominent, second place to expected utility theory for most research. I should say something first about the expected utility theory that still retains the position of highest honor in the pantheon of economic tools, it has dominated much economic theory so long because the theory offers a parsimonious representation of truly rational behavior under uncertainty. The axioms [Savage (1954)] from which
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expected utility theory is derived are undeniably sensible representations of basic requirements of rationality. For many purposes, it serves well to base an economic theory on such assumptions of strictly rational behavior, especially if the assumptions of the model are based on simple, robust realities, if the model concerns wellconsidered decisions of informed people, and if the phenomenon to be explained is one of stable behavior over many repetitions, where learning about subtle issues has a good chance of occurring. Still, despite the obvious attractiveness of expected utility theory, it has long been known that the theory has systematically mispredicted human behavior, at least in certain circumstances. Allais (1953) reported examples showing that in choosing between certain lotteries, people systematically violate the theory. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) give the following experimental evidence to illustrate one of Allais' examples. When their subjects were asked to choose between a lottery offering a 25% chance of winning 3000 and a lottery offering a 20% chance of winning 4000, 65% of their subjects chose the latter, while when subjects were asked to choose between a 100% chance of winning 3000 and an 80% chance of winning 4000, 80% chose the former. Expected utility theory predicts that they should not choose differently in these two cases, since the second choice is the same as the first except that all probabilities are multiplied by the same constant. Their preference for the first choice in the lottery when it is certain in this example illustrates what is called the "certainty effect", a preference for certain outcomes. Prospect theory is a mathematically-formulated alternative to the theory of expected utility maximization, an alternative that is supposed to capture the results of such experimental research. (A prospect is the Kahneman-Tversky name for a lottery as in the Allais example above.) Prospect theory actually resembles expected utility theory in that individuals are represented as maximizing a weighted sum of "utilities", although the weights are not the same as probabilities and the "utilities" are determined by what they call a "value function" rather than a utility function. The weights are, according to Kalmeman and Tversky (1979) determined by a function of true probabilities which gives zero weight to extremely low probabilities and a weight of one to extremely high probabilities. That is, people behave as if they regard extremely improbable events as impossible and extremely probable events as certain. However, events that are just very improbable (not extremely improbable) are given too much weight; people behave as if they exaggerate the probability. Events that are very probable (not extremely probable) are given too little weight; people behave as if they underestimate the probability. What constitutes an extremely low (rather than very low) probability or an extremely high (rather than very high) probability is determined by individuals' subjective impression and prospect theory is not precise about this. Between the very low and very high probabilities, the weighting function (weights as a function of true probabilities) has a slope of less than one. This shape for the weighting function allows prospect theory to explain the Allais certainty effect noted just above. Since the 20% and 25% probabilities are in the range of the weighting function where its slope is less than one, the weights people attach to
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the two outcomes are more nearly equal than are the probabilities, and people tend just to choose the lottery that pays more if it wins. In contrast, in the second lottery choice the 80% probability is reduced by the weighting function while the 100% probability is not; the weights people attach to the two outcomes are more unequal than are the probabilities, and people tend just to choose the outcome that is certain. If we modify expected utility function only by substituting the Kahneman and Tversky weights for the probabilities in expected utility theory, we might help explain a number of puzzling phenomena in observed human behavior toward risk. For a familiar example, such a modification could explain the apparent public enthusiasm for highprize lotteries, even though the probability of winning is so low that expected payout of the lottery is not high. It could also explain such a phenomenon as the observed tendency for overpaying for airline flight insurance (life insurance policies that one purchases before an airline flight, that has coverage only during that flight), Eisner and Strotz (1961). The Kahneman-Tversky weighting function may explain observed overpricing of out-of-the-money and in-the-money options. Much empirical work on stock options pricing has uncovered a phenomenon called the "options smile" [see Mayhew (1995) for a review]. This means that both deep out-of-the-money and deep in-the-money options have relatively high prices, when compared with their theoretical prices using Black-Scholes formulae, while near-the-money options are more nearly correctly priced. Options theorists, accustomed to describing the implied volatility of the stock implicit in options prices, like to state this phenomenon not in terms of option prices but in terms of these implied volatilities. When the implied volatility for options of various strike prices at a point in time derived using the Black-Scholes (1973) formula are plotted, on the vertical axis, against the strike price on the horizontal axis, the curve often resembles a smile. The curve is higher both for low strike price (out-of-themoney) options and for high strike price (in-the-money) options than it is for middlerange strike prices. This options smile might possibly be explained in terms of the distortion in probabilities represented by the Kahneman-Tversky weighting function, since the theory would suggest that people act as if they overestimate the small probability that the price of the underlying crosses the strike price and underestimate the high probability that the price remains on the same side of the strike price. The Kahneman-Tversky weighting function might even explain the down-turned corners of the mouth that some smiles exhibit [see Fortune (1996)] if at these extremes the discontinuities at the extremes of the weighting fi.mction become relevant 2.
2 There are other potential explanations of the options smile in terms of nonnormality or jump processes for returns, and these have received the attention in the options literature. Such explanations might even provide a completerational basis for the smile, though it ishard to know for sure. Since the 1987 stock market crash, the options smile has usually appeared distorted into an options "leer", with the left side of the mouth higher (e.g., the deep out-of-the-moneyputs are especially overpriced), see Bates (1995), Jackwcrth and Rubinstein (1995) and Bates (1991). Public memories of the 1987 crash are apparently at work in producing this "leer"
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We now turn to the other foundation of prospect theory, the Kahneman and Tversky (1979) value function. The value function differs from the utility function in expected utility theory in a very critical respect: the function (of wealth or payout) has a kink in it at a point, the "reference point", the location of which is determined by the subjective impressions of the individual. The reference point is the individual's point of comparison, the "status quo" against which alternative scenarios are contrasted. Taking value as a function of wealth, the Kahneman-Tversky (1979) value function is upward sloping everywhere, but with an abrupt decline in slope at the reference point (today's wealth or whatever measure of wealth that is psychologically important to the subject). For wealth levels above the reference point, the value function is concave downward, just as are conventional utility functions. At the reference point, the value function may be regarded, from the fact that its slope changes abruptly there, as infinitely concave downward. For wealth levels below the reference point, Kahneman and Tversky found evidence that the value function is concave upward, not downward. People are risk lovers for losses, they asserted. Perhaps the most significant thing to notice about the Kahneman-Tversky value function is just the discontinuity in slope at the reference value, the abrupt downward change in slope as one moves upward past the reference value. Prospect theory does not nail down accurately what determines the location of the reference point, just as it does not nail down accurately, for the weighting function, what is the difference between very high probabilities and extremely high probabilities. The theory does not specify these matters because experimental evidence has not produced any systematic patterns of behavior that can be codified in a general theory. However, the reference point is thought to be determined by some point of comparison that the subject finds convenient, something readily visible or suggested by the wording of a question. This discontinuity means that, in making choices between risky outcomes, people will behave in a risk averse manner, no matter how small the amounts at stake are. This is a contrast to the prediction of expected utility theory with a utility function of wealth without kinks, for which, since the utility function is approximately linear for small wealth changes, people should behave as if they are risk neutral for small bets. That people would usually be risk neutral for small bets would be the prediction of expected utility theory even if the utility function has such a slope discontinuity, since the probability that wealth is currently at the kink is generally zero. With prospect theory, in contrast, the kink always moves with wealth to stay at the perceived current level of wealth (or the current point of reference); the kink is always relevant. Samuelson (1963) told a story which he perceived as demonstrating a violation of expected utility theory, and, although it came before Kahneman and Tversky's prospect theory, it illustrates the importance of the kink in the value function. Samuelson reported that he asked a lunch colleague whether he would accept a bet that paid him $200 with a probability of 0.5 and lost him $100 with a probability of 0.5. The colleague said he would not take the bet, but that he would take a hundred of them. With 100 such bets, his expected total winnings are $5000 and he has virtually no chance of losing any money. It seems intuitively compelling to many people that
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one would readily take the complete set o f bets, even if any element o f the set is unattractive. Samuelson proved that if his colleague would answer the same way at any wealth level, then he necessarily violates expected utility theory. Samuelson's colleague is not, however, in violation o f prospect theory. When viewing a single bet, the kink in the value function is the dominant consideration. If he were to judge 100 bets sequentially, the kink would always be relevant (the reference point would move with each successive bet) and he would reject all o f them. But if he were to judge 100 bets together, the collective outcomes would be far above today's value function kink, and the bet is, by prospect theory, clearly desirable. The failures to accept many such bets when one considers them individually has been called "myopic loss aversion" by Benartzi and Thaler (1995). They argue that, assuming estimated values for the magnitude of the kink in tbe Kahneman-Tversky value function, the "equity premium puzzle" of Mehra and Prescott (1985) can be resolved; see also Siegel and Thaler (1997). Today, the term "equity premium puzzle", coined by Mehra and Prescott (1985), is widely used to refer to the puzzlingly high historical average returns o f stocks relative to bonds 3. The equity premium is the difference between the historical average return in the stock market and the historical average return on investments in bonds or treasury bills. According to Siegel (1998), the equity premium of US stocks over shortterm government bonds has averaged 6.1% a year for the United States for 1926-1992, and so one naturally wonders why people invest at all in debt if it is so outperformed by stocks 4. Those who have tried to reconcile the equity premium with rational investor behavior commonly point out the higher risk that short-run stock market returns show: investors presumably are not fully enticed by the higher average returns o f stocks since stocks carry higher risk. But, such riskiness o f stocks is not a justification o f the equity premium, at least assuming that investors are mostly long term. Most investors ought to be investing over decades, since most o f us expect to live for many decades, and to spend the twilight o f their lives living off savings. Over long periods o f times, it has actually been long-term bonds (whose payout is fixed in nominal terms), not the stocks, that have been more risky in real terms, since the consumer price index has been, despite its low variability from month to month, very variable over long intervals o f time, see Siegel (1998). Moreover, stocks appear strictly to dominate bonds: there is
3 Mehra and Prescott did not discover the equity premium. Perhaps that honor should go to Smith (1925), although there must be even earlier antecedents in some forms. Mehra and Prescott's original contribution seems to have been, in the context of present-value investor intertemporal optimizing models, to stress that the amount of risk aversion that would justify the equity premium, given the observed correlation of stocks with consumption, would imply much higher riskless interest rates than we in fact see. 4 Siegel (1998, p. 20). However, Siegel notes that the US equity premium was only 1.9% per year 18161870 and 2.8% per year 1871-1925.
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no thirty-year period since 1861 in which a broad portfolio o f stocks was outperformed either by bonds or treasury bills 5. Benartzi and Thaler (1995) show that if people use a one-year horizon to evaluate investments in the stock market, then the high equity premium is explained by myopic loss aversion. Moreover, prospect theory does not suggest that in this case riskless real interest rates need be particularly high. Thus, if we accept prospect theory and that people frame stock market returns as short-term, the equity premium puzzle is solved. Benartzi and Thaler (1996) demonstrated experimentally that when subjects are asked to allocate their defined contribution pension plans between stocks and fixed incomes, their responses differed sharply depending on how historical returns were presented to them. If they were shown 30 one-year returns, their median allocation to stocks was 40%, but if they were shown 30-year returns their median allocation to stocks was 90%. Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman and Schwartz (1997) show further experiments confirming this response. Loss aversion has also been used to explain other macroeconomic phenomena~ savings behavior [Bowman, Minehart and Rabin (1993)] and job search behavior [Bryant (l 990)].
2. Regret and cognitive dissonance There is a human tendency to feel the pain of regret at having made errors, even small errors, not putting such errors into a larger perspective. One "kicks oneself" at having done something foolish. If one wishes to avoid the pain of regret, one may alter one's behavior in ways that would in some cases be irrational unless account is taken of the pain o f regret. The pain o f regret at having made errors is in some senses embodied in the Kahneman-Tversky notion o f a kink in the value function at the reference point. There are also other ways of representing how people behave who feel pain o f regret. Loomes and Sugden (1982) have suggested that people maximize the expected value of a "modified utility function" which is a function o f the utility they achieve from a choice as well as the utility they would have achieved from another choice that was considered. Bell (1982) proposed a similar analysis. Regret theory may apparently help explain the fact that investors defer selling stocks that have gone down in value and accelerate the selling o f stocks that have gone up in value, Shefrin and Statmau (1985). Regret theory may be interpreted as implying that
5 Siegel (1998). It should be noted that one must push the investor horizon up to a fairly high number, around 30 years, before one finds that historically stocks have always outperformed bonds since 1861; for ten-year periods of time one finds that bonds oRen outperform stocks. There are not many thirty-year periods in stock market history, so this information might be judged as insubstantial. Moreover, Siegel notes that even with a thirty-year period stocks did not always outperform bonds in the US before 1861.
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investors avoid selling stocks that have gone down in order not to finalize the error they make and not to feel the regret. They sell stocks that have gone up in order that they cannot regret failing to do so before the stock later fell, should it do so. That such behavior exists has been documented using volume of trade data by Ferris, Haugen and Makhija (1988) and Odean (1996). Cognitive dissonance is the mental conflict that people experience when they are presented with evidence that their beliefs or assumptions are wrong; as such, cognitive dissonance might be classified as a sort of pain of regret, regret over mistaken beliefs. As with regret theory, the theory of cognitive dissonance [Festinger (1957)] asserts that there is a tendency for people to take actions to reduce cognitive dissonance that would not normally be considered fully rational: the person may avoid the new information or develop contorted arguments to maintain the beliefs or assumptions. There is empirical support that people often make the errors represented by the theory of cognitive dissonance. For example, in a classic study, Erlich, Guttman, Schopenback and Mills (1957) showed that new car purchasers selectively avoid reading, after the purchase is completed, advertisements for car models that they did not choose, and are attracted to advertisements for the car they chose. McFadden (1974) modeled the effect of cognitive dissonance in terms of a probability of forgetting contrary evidence and showed how this probability will ultimately distort subjective probabilities. Goetzmann and Peles (1993) have argued that the same theory of cognitive dissonance could explain the observed phenomenon that money flows in more rapidly to mutual funds that have performed extremely well than flows out from mutual funds that have performed extremely poorly: investors in losing funds are unwilling to confront the evidence that they made a bad investment by selling their investments.
3. Anchoring It is well-known that when people are asked to make quantitative assessments their assessments are influenced by suggestions. An example of this is found in the results survey researchers obtain. These researchers often ask people about their incomes using questionnaires in which respondents are instructed to indicate which of a number of income brackets, shown as choices on the questionnaire, their incomes fall into. It has been shown that the answers people give are influenced by the brackets shown on the questionnaire. The tendency to be influenced by such suggestions is called "anchoring" by psychologists. In some cases, at least, anchoring may be rational behavior for respondents. They may rationally assume that the deviser of the questionnaire uses some information (in this case, about typical people's incomes) when devising the questionnaire. Not fully remembering their own income, they may rely on the information in the brackets to help them answer better. If the brackets do contain information, then it is rational for subjects to allow themselves to be influenced by the brackets.
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While anchoring undoubtedly has an information-response component in many circumstances, it has also been shown that anchoring behavior persists even when information is absent. In one experiment Tversky and Kahneman (1974), subjects were given simple questions whose answers were in percentages, e.g., the percentage of African nations in the United Nations. A wheel of fortune with numbers from 1 to 100 was spun before the subjects. Obviously, the number at which the wheel of fortune stopped had no relevance to the question just asked. Subjects were asked whether their answer was higher or lower than the wheel of fortune number, and then to give their own answer. Respondents' answers were strongly influenced by the "wheel of fortune." For example, the median estimates of the percentage of African countries in the United Nations were 25 and 45 for groups that received 10 and 65, respectively, as starting points (p. 184). Values in speculative markets, like the stock market, are inherently ambiguous. Who would know what the value of the Dow Jones Industrial Average should be? Is it really "worth" 6000 today? Or 5000 or 7000? or 2000 or 10000? There is no agreed~ upon economic theory that would answer these questions. In the absence of any better information, past prices (or asking prices or prices of similar objects or other simple comparisons) are likely to be important determinants of prices today. That anchoring affects valuations, even by experts, was demonstrated by Northcraft and Neale (1987) in the context of real estate valuation. All subjects were taken to a house for sale, asked to inspect the house for up to 20 minutes, and were given a ten-page packet of information about the house and about other houses in the area, giving square footage and characteristics of the properties, and prices of the other properties. The same packet was given to all subjects except that the asking price of the property under consideration and its implied price per square foot were changed between subjects. Subjects were asked for their own opinions of its appraisal value, appropriate listing price, purchase price, and the lowest offer the subject would accept for the house if the subject were the seller. The real estate agents who were given an asking price of $119900 had a mean predicted appraisal value of $114204, listing price of $1 l 7 745, purchase price of $111454 and a lowest acceptable offer of $11l 136, while the real estate agents who were given an asking price of $149900 had a mean appraisal value of $128 754, listing price of $130 981, predicted purchase price of $127318, and a lowest offer of $123818. The changed asking prices thus swayed their valuations by 11% to 14% of the value of the house. Similar results were found with amateur subjects. While this experiment does not rule out that the effect of the asking price was due to a rational response to the assumed information in the asking price, the effects of asking price are remarkably large, given that so much other information on the house was also given. Moreover, when subjects were asked aftelwards to list the items of information that weighed most heavily in their valuations, only 8% of the expert subjects and only 9% of the amateur subjects listed asking price of the property under consideration among the top three items. Note that the valuation problem presented to these subjects is far less difficult or ambiguous than the problem of determining the "correct" value for the stock market, since here they are implicitly
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being asked to assume that the comparable properties are correctly valued. [See also McFadden (1974) and Silberman and Klock (1989).] One might object that the notion that anchoring on past prices helps determine present prices in the stock market might be inconsistent with the low serial correlation of stock price changes, that is with the roughly random-walk behavior of daily or monthly stock prices that has been widely noted 6. This conclusion is not warranted however. Models of "smart money" (i.e., people who are unusually alert to profit opportunities in financial markets) seeking to exploit serial correlation in price, models which also include ordinary investors, are consistent with the implications that serial correlation is low and yet the anchoring remains important for the level of stock prices [see Shiller (1984, 1990)]. By extension from these experimental results, it is to be presumed that very many economic phenomena are influenced by anchoring. Gruen and Gizycki (1993) used it to explain the widely observed anomaly 7 that forward discounts do not properly explain subsequent exchange rate movements. The anchoring phenomenon would appear relevant to the "sticky prices" that are so talked about by macroeconomists. So long as past prices are taken as suggestions of new prices, the new prices will tend to be close to the past prices. The more ambiguous the value of a commodity, the more important a suggestion is likely to be, and the more important anchoring is likely to be for price determination. The anchoring phenomenon may help to explain certain international puzzles observed in financial markets. US investors who thought in the late 1980s that Japanese stock price-earnings ratios were outrageously high then may have been influenced by the readily-available anchor of (much lower) US price-earnings ratios. By the mid 1990s, many US investors felt that the Tokyo market is no longer overpriced [see Shiller, Kon-Ya and Tsutsui (1996)]. The price-earnings ratios remain much higher than in the US perhaps because of the anchor of the widely-publicized high Tokyo price-earnings ratios of the late 1980s. Anchoring may also be behind certain forms of money illusion. The term money illusion, introduced by Fisher (1928), refers to a human tendency to make inadequate allowance, in economic decisions, for the rate of inflation, and to confuse real and nominal quantities. Shafir, Diamond and Tversky (1997) have shown experimentally that people tend to give different answers to the same hypothetical decision problem depending on whether the problem was presented in a way that stressed nominal
6 The notion that speculative prices approximately describe "random walks" was tirst proposed by Bachelier (1900). It became widely associated with the efficientmarkets hypothesis, the hypothesis that market prices efficientlyincorporate all availablehlformation, with the work of Fama (1970). For further information on the literature on the random walk and efficient markets theory see also Cootner (1964), Malkiel (1981), and Fama (1991). 7 For a discussion of the anomaly, see Backus et al. (1995) and Froot and Thalcr (1990)
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quantities or in a way that stressed real quantities. The quantities that were shown in the question (whether nominal or real) may have functioned as anchors 8.
4. Mental compartments Related to the anchoring and framing phenomena is a human tendency to place particular events into mental compartments based on superficial attributes. Instead of looking at the big picture, as would be implied by expected utility theory, they look at individual small decisions separately. People may tend to place their investments into arbitrarily separate mental compartments, and react separately to the investments based on which compartment they are in. Shefrin and Statman (1994) have argued that individual investors think naturally in terms o f having a "safe" part of their portfolio that is protected from downside risk and a risky part that is designed for a chance o f getting rich. Shefrin and Thaler (1988) have argued that people put their sources of income into three categories, current wage and salary income, asset income, and future income, and spend differently out of the present values of these different incomes. For example, people are reluctant to spend out of future income even if it is certain to arrive. The tendency for people to allow themselves to be influenced by their own mental compartments might explain the observed tendency for stock prices to jump up when the stock is added to the Standard and Poor Stock Index [see Shleifer (1986)]. It might also help explain the widely noted "January effect" anomaly. This anomaly, that stock prices tend to go up in January, has been observed in as many as 15 different countries [Gultekin and Gultekin (1983)]. The anomaly cannot be explained in terms o f effects related to the tax year, since it persists also in Great Britain (whose tax year begins in April) and Australia (whose tax year begins in July), see Thaler (1987). If people view the year end as a time of reckoning and a new year as a new beginning, they may be inclined to behave differently at the turn o f the year, and this may explain the January effect. A tendency to separate out decisions into separate mental compartments may also be behind the observed tendency for hedgers to tend to hedge specific trades, rather than their overall profit situation. Ren6 Stulz (1996, p. 8), in summarizing the results of his research and that o f others on the practice o f risk management by firms, concludes that: It immediately follows from the modern theory of risk management that one should be concerned about factors that affect the present value of future cash flows. This is quite different from much of the current practice of risk management where one is concerned about hedging transaction risk or the risk of transactions expected to occur in the short rtm.
s There appears to be much more to money illusion than just anchoring; people associate nominal quantities with opinions about the economy, anticipated behavior of the government, fairness, and prestige, opinions that are not generally shared by economists, see Shiller (1997a,b).
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The Wharton/CIBC Wood Gundy 1995 Survey of Derivatives Usage by US Non-Financial Firms [Bodnar and Marston (1996)] studied 350 firms: 176 firms in the manufacturing sector, 77 firms in the primary products sector, and 97 firms in the service sector. When asked by the Wharton surveyors what was the most important objective of hedging strategy, 49% answered managing "volatility in cashflows", 42% answered managing "volatility in accounting earnings", and only 8% answered managing "the market value o f the firm" (1% answered "managing balance sheet accounts and ratios"). Fifty percent o f the respondents in the survey reported frequently hedging contractual commitments, but only 8% reported frequently hedging competitive/economic exposure. It is striking that only 8% reported that their most important objective is the market value of the firm, since maximizing the market value of the firm is, by much financial theory, the ultimate objective of the management of the firm. It is o f course hard to know just what people meant by their choices of answers, but there is indeed evidence that firms are driven in their hedging by the objective o f hedging specific near-term transactions, and neglect consideration o f future transactions or other potential factors that might also pose longer run risks to the firm. In the Wharton study, among respondents hedging foreign currency risks, 50% reported hedging anticipated transactions less than one year off, but only 11% reported frequently hedging transactions more than one year off. This discrepancy is striking, since most o f the value of the firm (and most o f the concerns it has about its market value) must come in future years, not the present year 9.
5. Overconfidence, over- and under-reaction and the representativeness heuristic People often tend to show, in experimental settings, excessive confidence about their own judgments. Lichtenstein, Fischhoff and Phillips (1977) asked subjects to answer simple factual questions (e.g., "Is Quito the capital o f Ecuador?") and then asked them to give the probability that their answer was right: subjects tended to overestimate the probability that they were right, in response to a wide variety of questions. Such studies have been criticized [see Gigerenzer (1991)] as merely reflecting nothing more than a difference between subjective and frequentist definitions o f
9 Recent surveys of hedging behavior of firms indicates that despite extensive development of derivative products, actual use of these products for hedging is far from optimal. Of the firms cited in the Wharton study, only 40.5% reported using derivatives at all. On the other hand, Dolde (1993) surveyed 244 Fortune 500 companies and concluded that over 85% used swaps, forwards, futures or options in managing financial risk. Nance et al. (1993) in a survey of 194 farms reported that 62% used hedging instruments in 1986. These studies concentrated on rather larger companies than did the Wharton study. Overall, these studies may be interpreted as revealing a suq~risingly low fraction of respondents who do any hedging, given that firms are composed of many people, any one of whom might be expected to initiate the use of derivatives at least tbr some limited purpose.
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probability, i.e., critics claimed that individuals were simply reporting a subjective degree of certainty, not the fraction times they are right in such circumstances. However, in reaction to such criticism, Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein (1977) repeated the experiments asking the subjects for probability odds that they are right and very clearly explaining what such odds mean, and even asking them to stake money on their answer. The overconfidence phenomenon persisted. Moreover, in cases where the subjects said they were certain they were right, they were in fact right only about 80% of the time: there is no interpretation o f subjective probability that could reconcile this result with correct judgments. A tendency towards overconfidence among ordinary investors seems apparent when one interviews them. One quickly hears what seem to be overconfident statements. But how can it be that people systematically are so overconfident? Why wouldn't people learn from life's experiences to correct their overconfidence? Obviously, people do learn substantially in circumstances when the consequences of their errors are repeatedly presented to them, and sometimes they even overreact and show too little confidence. But still there seems to be a common bias towards overconfidence. Overconfidence is apparently related to some deep-set psychological phenomena: Ross (1987) argues that much overconfidence is related to a broader difficulty with "situational construal", a difficulty in making adequate allowance for the uncertainty in one's own view o f the broad situation, a more global difficulty tied up with multiple mental processes. Overconfidence may also be traced to the "representativeness heuristic", Tversky and Kahneman (1974), a tendency for people to try to categorize events as typical or representative of a well-known class, and then, in making probability estimates, to overstress the importance o f such a categorization, disregarding evidence about the underlying probabilities 10. One consequence o f this heuristic is a tendency for people to see patterns in data that are truly random, to feel confident, for example, that a series which is in fact a random walk is not a random walk l l Overconfidence itself does not imply that people overreact (or underreact) to all news. In fact, evidence on the extent o f overreaction or underreaction of speculative asset prices to news has been mixed. There has indeed been evidence of overreaction. The first substantial statistical evidence for what might be called a general market overreaction can be found in the literature on excess volatility o f speculative asset prices, Shiller (1979, 1981a,b) and LeRoy and Porter (1981). We showed statistical evidence that speculative asset prices show persistent deviations from the long-term trend implied by the presentvalue efficient markets model, and then, over horizons o f many years, to return to this
l0 People tend to neglect "base rates", the unconditional probabilities or frequencies of events, see Meehl and Rosen (1955). tt Rabin (1998) characterizes this judgment error as a tendency to over-intbr the probability distribution from short sequences. Part of overconfidence may be nothing more than simple tbrgetting of contrary evidence; a tendency to forget is by its very nature not something that one can learn to prevent.
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trend. This pattern o f price behavior, it was argued, made aggregate stock prices much more volatile than would be implied by the efficient markets model. It appears as i f stock prices overreact to some news, or to their own past values, before investors come to their senses and correct the prices. Our arguments led to a spirited debate about the validity o f the efficient markets model in the finance literature, a literature that has too many facets to summarize here, except to say that it confirms there are many potential interpretations o f any statistical results based on limited data 12. M y own view o f the outcome o f this debate is that it is quite likely that speculative asset prices tend to be excessively volatile. Certainly, at the very least, one can say that no one has been able to put forth any evidence that there is not excess volatility in speculative asset prices. For an evaluation o f this literature, see Shiller (1989), Campbell and Shiller (1988, 1989), West (1988), and Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997, ch. 7). Since then, papers by De Bondt and Thaler (1985), Fama and French (1988), Poterba and Summers (1988), and Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1991) have confirmed the excess volatility claims by showing that returns tend to be negatively autocorrelated over horizons o f three to five years, that an initial overreaction is gradually corrected. Moreover, Campbell and Shiller (1988, 1989) show that aggregate stock market dividend yields or earnings yields are positively correlated with subsequently observed returns over similar intervals; see also Dreman and Berry (1995)13. Campbell and Shiller (1998) connect this predictive power to the observed stationarity o f these ratios. Since the ratios have no substantial trend over a century and appear mean reverting over nmch shorter time intervals, the ratio must predict future changes in either the numerator (the dividend or earnings) or the denominator (the price); we showed that it has been unequivocally the denominator, the price, that has restored the ratios to their mean after they depart from it, and not the numerator. La Porta (1996) found that stocks for which analysts projected low earnings growth tended to show upward price j u m p s on earnings announcement dates, and stocks for which analysts projected high earnings growth tended to show downward price jumps on earnings announcement dates. He interprets this as consistent with a hypothesis that analysts (and the market) excessively extrapolated past earnings movements and only gradually correct their errors as earnings news comes in. The behavior o f initial p u n i c offerings around
t2 There has been some confusion about the sense in which the present=value efficient markets model puts restrictions on tile short-run (or high-frequency) movements in speculative asset prices. The issues are laid out in Shiller (1979), (appendix). Kleidon (1986) rediscovered the same ideas again but gave a markedly different interpretation of the implications for tests of market efficiency. 13 An extensive summary of the literature on serial correlation of US stock indcx returns is in Campbell et al. (1997). Chapter 2 documents the positive serial correlation of returns over short horizons but concludes that the evidence for negative serial correlation of returns over long horizons is weak. Chapter 7, however, shows evidence that long-horizon returns are negatively correlated with the price earnings ratio and price-dividend ratio. Recent critics of claims that long-horizon returns can be forecasted include Goctzmann and Jorion (1993), Nelson and Kim (1993) and Kirby (1997). In my view, they succeed in reducing the force of the evidence, but not the conclusion that long-horizon returns are quite probably forecastab/e.
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announcement dates appears also to indicate some overreaction and later rebound, see Ibbotson and Ritter (1988) and Ritter (1991). On the other hand, there has also been evidence o f what might be called underreaction. Most days when big news breaks have been days o f only modest stock market price movements, the big movements tending to come on days when there is little news, see Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1989). Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1991) also found that for a number o f indices o f returns on major categories o f speculative assets there has been a tendency for positive autocorrelation o f short-run returns over short horizons, less than a year; see also Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Chart, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996)14. This positive serial correlation in return indices has been interpreted as implying an initial underreaction o f prices to news, to be made up gradually later. Bernard and Thomas (1992) found evidence o f underreaction of stock prices to changes, from the previous year, in company earnings: prices react with a lag to earnings news; see also Ball and Brown (1968)15. Irving Fisher (1930, ch. XXI, pp. 493-494) thought that, because o f human error, nominal interest rates tend to underreact to inflation, so that there is a tendency for low real interest rates in periods o f high inflation, and high real rates in periods o f low inflation. More recent data appear to confirm this behavior o f real interest rates, and data on inflationary expectations also bear out Fisher's interpretation that the phenomenon has to do with human error; see De Bondt and Bange (1992) and Shefrin (1997) tr. Does the fact that securities prices sometimes underreact pose any problems for the psychological theory that people tend to be overconfident? Some observers seem to think that it does. In fact, however, overconfidence and overreaction are quite different phenomena. People simply cannot overreact to everything: if they are overconfident they will make errors, but not in any specified direction in all circumstances. The concepts o f overreaction or underreaction, while they may be useful in certain contexts, are not likely to be good psychological foundations on which to organize a general theory o f economic behavior. The fact that both overreaction and underreaction are observed in financial markets has been interpreted b y Fama (1997) as evidence that the anomalies from the standpoint
14 Lo and MacKinlay (1988) and Lehmann (1990), however, find evidence of negative serial corrclation of individual weekly stock returns between successive weeks. As explained by Lo and MacKinlay (1990), weekly returns on portfolios of these same stocks still exhibit positive serial correlation from week to week because the cross-covariances between returns of individual stocks arc positive. They conclude that this pattern of cross-covariances is not what one would expect to find based on theories of investor inertia. Lehmann, however, has a different interpretation of the negative week-to-week serial correlation of individual weekly stock returns, that the negative serial correlation reflects nothing more than the behavior of market makers facing order imbalances and asymmetric information. ~5 Firms' management appear acutely aware that earnings growth has a psychological impact on prices, and so attempt to manage earnings accotmting to provide a steady growth path. Impressive evidence that they do so is found in Degeorge et al. (1999). 16 Modigliani and Cohn (1979) argue that public failure to understand the relation of interest rates to inflation has caused the stock market to overreact to nominal interest rate changes.
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of efficient markets theory are just "chance results", and that therefore the theory of market efficiency survives the challenge of its critics. He is right, of course, that both overreaction and underreaction together may sometimes seem a little puzzling. But one is not likely to want to dismiss these as "chance results" if one has an appreciation for the psychological theory that might well bear on these phenomena. In his survey of behavioral finance Fama (1997) makes no more than a couple of oblique references to any literature from the other social sciences. In fact, Fama states that the literature on testing market efficiency has no clearly stated alternative, "the alternative hypothesis is vague, market inefficiency" (p. 1). Of course, if one has little appreciation of these alternative theories then one might well conclude that the efficient markets theory, for all its weaknesses, is the best theory we have. Fama appears to believe that the principal alternative theory is just one of consistent overreaction or underreaction, and says that "since the anomalies literature has not settled on a testable alternative to market efficiency, to get the ball rolling, I assume that reasonable alternatives must predict either over-reaction or under-reaction" (p. 2). The psychological theories reviewed here cannot be reduced to such simple terms, contrary to Fama's expectations. Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) provide a psychological model, involving the representativeness heuristic as well as a principle of conservatism [Edwards (1968)], that offers a reconciliation of the overreaction and underreaction evidence from financial markets; see also Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1997) and Wang (1997). More work could be done in understanding when it is that people overreact in financial markets and when it is that they underreact. Understanding these overreaction and underreaction phenomena together appears to be a fertile field for research at the present time. There is neither reason to think that it is easy obtain such an understanding, nor reason to despair that it can ever be done. Overconfidence may have more clear implications for the volume of trade in financial markets than for any tendency to overreact. If we connect the phenomenon of overconfidence with the phenomenon of anchoring, we see the origins of differences of opinion among investors, and some of the source of the high volume of trade among investors. People may fail to appreciate the extent to which their own opinions are affected by anchoring to cues that randomly influenced them, and take action when there is little reason to do so. The extent of the volume of trade in financial markets has long appeared to be a puzzle. The annual turnover rate (shares sold divided by all shares outstanding) for New York Stock Exchange Stocks has averaged 18% a year from the 1950s through the 1970s and has been much higher in certain years. The turnover rate was 73% in 1987 and 67% in 1930. It does not appear to be possible to justify the number of trades in stocks and other speculative assets in terms of the normal life-cycle ins and outs of the market. Theorists have established a "nonspeculation theorem" that states that rational agents who differ from each other only in terms of information and who have no reason to trade in the absence of information will not trade [Milgrom and Stokey (1982), Geanakoplos (1992)].
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Apparently, many investors do feel that they do have speculative reasons to trade often, and apparently this must have to do with some tendency for each individual to have beliefs that he or she perceives as better than others' beliefs. It is as if most people think they are above average. Odean (1998), in analyzing individual customer accounts at a nationwide discount brokerage house, examined the profits that customers made on trades that were apparently not motivated by liquidity demands, tax loss selling, portfolio rebalancing, or a move to lower-risk securities. On the remaining trades, the returns on the stocks purchased was on average lower, not higher, than on those sold. This appears to be evidence of overconfidence among these investors. Within the week of the stock market crash of October 19, 1987 1 sent out questionnaires to 2000 wealthy individual investors and 1000 institutional investors, asking them to recall their thoughts and reasons for action on that day; see Shiller (1987b). There were 605 completed responses from individuals and 284 responses from institutions. One of the questions I asked was: "Did you think at any point on October 19, 1987 that you had a pretty good idea when a rebound was to occur?" Of individual investors, 29.2% said yes, of institutional investors, 28.0% said yes. These numbers seem to be surprisingly high: one wonders why people thought they knew what was going to happen in such an unusual situation. Among those who bought on that day, the numbers were even higher, 47.1% and 47.9% respectively. The next question on the questionnaire was "If yes, what made you think you knew when a rebound was to occur?" Here, there was a conspicuous absence of sensible answers; often the answers referred to "intuition" or "gut feeling." It would appear that the high volume of trade on the day of the stock market crash, as well as the occurrence, duration, and reversal of the crash was in part determined by overconfidence in such intuitive feelings 17 If people are not independent of each other in forming overconfident judgments about investments, and if these judgments change collectively through time, then these "noisy" judgments will tend to cause prices of speculative assets to deviate from their true investment value. Then a "contrarian" investment strategy, advocated by Graham and Dodd (1934) and Dreman (1977) among many others, a strategy of investing in assets that are currently out of favor by most investors, ought to be advantageous. Indeed, there is much evidence that such contrarian investment strategy does pay off, see for example, De Bondt and Thaler (1985), Fama and French (1988, 1992), Fama (1991), and Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vislmy (1994). That a simple contrarian strategy may be profitable may appear to some to be surprising: one might think that "smart money", by competing with each other to benefit from the profit opportunities, would ultimately have the effect of eliminating any such profit opportunities. But, there are
17 See also Case and Shiller (1988) ~br a similar analysis of recent real estate booms and busts. On the other hand, Garber (1990) analyzes some famous speculative bubbles, including the tulipomania in the 17th century, and concludesthat they may have been rational.
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reasons to doubt that such smart money will indeed have this effect; see Shiller (1984), DeLong et al. (1990a,b), and Shleifer and Vishny (1995)Is.
6. The disjunction effect The disjunction effect is a tendency for people to want to wait to make decisions until information is revealed, even if the information is not really important for the decision, and even if they would make the same decision regardless o f the information. The disjunction effect is a contradiction to the "sure-tbing principle" of rational behavior [Savage (1954)]. Experiments showing the disjunction effect were performed by Tversky and Shafir (1992). They asked their subjects whether they would take one o f the bets that Samuelson's lunch colleague, discussed above, had refused a coin toss in which one has equal chances to win $200 or lose $100. Those who took the one bet were then asked whether they wanted to take another such bet. If they were asked after the outcome o f the first bet was known, then it was found that a majority o f respondents took the second bet whether or not they had won the first. However, a majority would not take the bet if they had to make the decision before the outcome of the bet was known. This is a puzzling result: if one's decision is the same regardless of the outcome of the first bet, then it would seem that one would make the same decision before knowing the outcome. Tversky and Shafir gave their sense of the possible thought patterns that accompany such behavior: if the outcome o f the first bet is known and is good, then subjects think that they have nothing to lose in taking the second, and if the outcome is bad they want to try to recoup their losses. But if the outcome is not known, then they have no clear reason to accept the second bet. The disjunction effect might help explain changes in the volatility of speculative asset prices or changes in the volume o f trade of speculative asset prices at times when information is revealed. Thus, for example, the disjunction effect can in principle explain why there is sometimes low volatility and low volume of trade just before an important announcement is made, and higher volatility or volume of trade after the announcement is made. Shafir and Tversky (1992) give the example o f presidential elections, which sometimes induce stock market volatility when the election outcome is known even though many skeptics may doubt that the election outcome has any clear implications for market value.
18 Even public expectations of a stock market crash does not prevent the stock market fiom rising; there is evidence from options prices that the stock market crash of 1987 was in some sense expected before it happened; see Bates (1991, 1995). Lee et al. (1991) argue that investor expectations, or rather "sentiment" can be measured by closed-end mutual fund discounts, which vary through time.
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7. Gambling behavior and speculation A tendency to gamble, to play games that bring on unnecessary risks, has been found to pervade widely divergent human cultures around the world and appears to be indicative of a basic human trait, Bolen and Boyd (1968). Kallick et al. (1975) estimated that 61% of the adult population in the United States participated in some form of gambling or betting in 1974. They also estimated that 1.1% of men and 0.5% of women are "probably compulsive gamblers", while an additional 2.7% of men and 1% of women are "potential compulsive gamblers." These figures are not trivial, and it is important to keep in mind that compulsive gambling represents only an extreme form of the behavior that is more common. The tendency for people to gamble has provided a puzzle for the theory of human behavior under uncertainty, since it means that we must accommodate both riskavoiding behavior (as evidenced by people's willingness to purchase insurance) with an apparent risk-loving behavior. Friedman and Savage (1948) proposed that the co-existence of these behaviors might be explained by utility functions that become concave upward in extremely high range, but such an explanation has many problems. For one thing, people who gamble do not appear to be systematically risk seekers in any general sense, instead they are seeking specific forms of entertainment or arousal 19. Moreover, the gambling urge is compartmentalized in people's lives, it tends to take for each individual only certain forms: people specialize in certain games. The favored forms of gambling tend to be associated with a sort of ego involvement: people may feel that they are especially good at the games they favor or that they are especially lucky with these. The complexity of human behavior exemplified by the gambling phenomenon has to be taken into account in understanding the etiology of bubbles in speculative markets. Gamblers may have very rational expectations, at some level, for the likely outcome of their gambling, and yet have other feelings that drive their actual behavior. Economists tend to speak of quantitative "expectations" as if these were the only characterization of people's outlooks that mattered. It is my impression, from interviews and survey results, that the same people who are highly emotionally involved with the notion that the stock market will go up may give very sensible, unexciting forecasts of the market if asked to make quantitative forecasts. 8. The irrelevance of history One particular kind of overconfidence that appears to be common is a tendency to believe that history is irrelevant, not a guide to the future, and that the future must 19 According to the American Psychiatric Association's DSM-1V (1994), "Most individuals with Pathological Gambling say that they are seeking 'action' (an aroused, euphoric state) even more than money. Increasinglylarger bets, or greater risks, may be needed to continue to produce the desired level of excitement" (p. 616).
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be judged afresh now using intuitive weighing only of the special factors we see now. This kind of overconfidence discourages taking lessons from past statistics; indeed most financial market participants virtually never study historical data for correlations or other such statistics; they take their anchors instead from casual recent observations. Until academic researchers started collecting financial data, most was just thrown away as irrelevant. One reason that people may think that history is irrelevant is a human tendency toward historical determinism, a tendency to think that historical events should have been known in advance. According to historian Florovsky (1969, p. 364): in retrospect we seem to perceive the logic of events, which unfold themselves in a regular order, according to a recognizable pattern, with an alleged inner necessity, so that we get the impression that it really could not have happened otherwise. Fischhoff (1975) attempted to demonstrate this tendency towards historical determinism by presenting experimental subjects with incomplete historical stories, stories that are missing the final outcome o f the event. The stories were from historical periods remote enough in time that the subjects would almost certainly not know the actual outcome. Subjects were asked to assign probabilities to each of four different possible conclusions to the story (only one of which was the true outcome). There were two groups of subjects, one of which was told that one of the four outcomes had in fact happened. The probability given to the outcomes was on average 10% higher when people were told it was the actual outcome. Fischhoff's demonstration o f a behavior consistent with belief in historical determinism may not demonstrate the full magnitude of such behavior, because it does not capture the effects of social cognition o f past events, a cognition that may tend to remember historical facts that are viewed as causing subsequent historical events, or are comaected to them, and to forget historical facts that seem not to fit in with subsequent events. It will generally be impossible to demonstrate such phenomena of social cognition in short laboratory experiments. A human tendency to believe in historical determinism would tend to encourage people to assume that past exigencies (the stock market crash of 1929, the great depression, the world wars, and so on) were probably somewhat known in advance, or, at least, that before these events people had substantial reason to worry that they might happen. There may tend to be a feeling that there is nothing definite on the horizon now, as there presumably was before these past events 2o. It is in this human tendency toward believing history is irrelevant that the equity premium puzzle, discussed above, may have its most important explanation. People may tend just not to think that the past stock market return history itself gives any indication of the future, at least not until they perceive that authorities are in agreement that it does.
20 This ~belmg can of course be disrupted, if a sudden event calls to mind parallels to a past event, or if the social cognition memorializes and interprets a past event as likely to be repeated.
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According to the representativeness heuristic, discussed above, people may see past return history as relevant to the future only if they see the present circumstances as representative in some details o f widely remembered past periods. Thus, for example, the public appears to have made much, just before the stock market crash o f 1987, o f similarities in that period to the period just before the crash o f 1929. Newspapers, including the Wall S t r e e t J o u r n a l on the morning o f the stock market crash o f October 19, 1987, showed plots o f stock prices before October 1929 superimposed on a plot o f stock prices before October 1987, suggesting comparisons. In this way, historical events can be remembered and viewed as relevant, but this is not any systematic analysis o f past data. Lack o f learning from historical lessons regarding financial and economic uncertainties may explain why many investors show little real interest in diversification around the world and why most investors appear totally uninterested in the correlation o f their investments with their labor income, violating with their behavior one o f the most fundamental premises o f financial theory. Most people do not make true diversification around the world a high priority, and virtually no one is short the company that he or she works for, or is short the stock market in one's own country, as would be suggested by economic theory 21 . A prominent reason that most people appear apathetic about schemes to protect them from price level uncertainty in nominal contracts is that they just do not seem to think that past actual price level movements are any indicator o f future uncertainty. In a questionnaire I distributed [Shiller (1997a)] to a random sample from phone books in the U S A and Turkey, the following question was posed: We want to know how accurately you think that financial experts in America (Turkey) can predict the price level in 2006, ten years from now. Can you tell us, if these experts think that a "market basket" of goods and services that the typical person buys will cost $1,000 (100 million TL) in 2006, then you think it will probably actually cost: (Please fill in your lower and upper bounds on the price:) Between $ (TL) and $ (TL) The median ratio between high and low was 4/3 for US respondents and 3/2 for Turkish respondents. Only a few respondents wrote numbers implying double- or tripledigit ratios, even in Turkey. The ratios not far from one that most respondents revealed would seem to suggest excessive confidence in the predictability o f price levels. Note that in Turkey the CPI increased three-fold between 1964 and 1974, 31-fold between 1974 and 1984, and 128-fold between 1984 and 1994. But, Turkish respondents appear to connect the price level movements with prior political and social events that may be perceived as having largely predicted the price movements, events that are themselves
2~ Kusko et al. (1997) showed, using data on 10000 401k plan participants in a manufacturing firm, found that barely 20% of participants directed any of their own balances into an S&P index fund, while nearly 25% of participants directed all of their discretionary balances into a fund invested completely in the own company stock.
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not likely to be repeated in the same way. While these people have apparently learned to take certain steps to protect themselves from price level uncertainty (such as not investing in long-term nominal bonds), they do not appear to have a well-developed understanding of the potential uncertainty of the Turkish Lira that would allow them to deal systematically with such uncertainty. For example, they have shown relatively little interest in government indexed bonds.
9. Magical thinking B.E Skinner (1948) in what is now regarded as a classic experiment fed starved experimental pigeons small quantities of food at regular fifteen-second intervals with no dependence whatsoever on the bird's behavior. Even though the feeding was unaffected by their behavior, the birds began to behave as if they had a "superstition" that something in their behavior caused the feeding [see also McFadden (1974)]. Each pigeon apparently conditioned itself to exhibit a specific behavior to get the food, and because each bird exhibited its characteristic behavior so reliably, it was never deconditioned: One bird was conditioned to turn counter-clockwise in the cage, making two or three turns between reinforcements. Another repeatedly thrust its head into one of the upper corners of the cage. A third developed a " tossing" response, as if placing its head beneath an invisible bar and lifting it repeatedly ... Skinner (1948, p. 168)
Arbitrary behaviors that are so generated are referred to with the term "magical thinking" by psychologists. A wide variety of economic behaviors are likely to be generated in exactly the same way that the arbitrary behaviors of the pigeons are generated. Thus, for example, firms' investment or management decisions that happened to precede increases in sales or profits may tend to be repeated, and if this happens in a period of rising profits (as when the economy is recovering from a recession) the notion that these decisions were the cause of the sales or profit increase will be reinforced. Because firms are similar to each other and observe each other, the magical thinking may be social, rather than individual, and hence may have aggregate effects. Roll (1986), with his hubris hypothesis concerning corporate takeovers, aigued that managers of bidder firms may become overconfident of their own abilities to judge firms, because of their luck in their first takeovers. This overconfidence can cause them to overbid in subsequent takeover attempts. The tendency for speculative markets to respond to certain news variables may be generated analogously. The US stock market used often to be buoyed by positive news about the economy, but in recent years it appears to tend to be moved in the opposite direction by such news. This new "perverse" movement pattern for the stock market is sometimes justified in the media by a theory that the good news will cause the Federal Reserve to tighten monetary policy and that then the higher interest rates will lower the stock market. But the whole belief could be the result of a chain of events that was
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set off by some initial chance movements of the stock market. Because people believe these theories they may then behave so that the stock price does indeed behave as hypothesized, the initial correlations will persist later, and thereby reinforce the belief.
10. Quasi-magical thinking The term quasi-magical thinldng, as defined by Shafir and Tversky (1992), is used to describe situations in which people act as if they erroneously believe that their actions can influence an outcome (as with magical thinking) but in which they in fact do not believe this. It includes acting as if one thinks that one can take actions that will, in effect, undo what is obviously predetermined, or that one can change history. For example, Quattrone and Tversky (1984) divided subjects into a control and experimental group and then asked people in both groups to see how long they could bear to hold their hands in some ice water. In the experimental group, subjects were told that people with strong hearts were better able to endure the ice water. They found that those in the experimental group in fact held their hands in the ice water longer. If indeed, as appears to be the case, those in the experimental group held their hands in the ice water longer to prove that they had strong hearts, then this would be quasimagical, since no notion was involved that there was any causal link from holding hands in ice water to strengthening the heart. While this particular experimental outcome might also be explained as the result of a desire for self deception, Shafir and Tversky report as well as other experiments that suggest that people do behave as if they think they can change predetermined conditions. Shafir and Tversky (1992) show, with an experimental variant of Newcomb's Paradox, that people behave as if they can influence the amount of money already placed in a box. Quasi-magical thinking appears to operate more strongly when outcomes of future events, rather than historical events, are involved. Langer (1975) showed that people place larger bets if invited to bet before a coin is tossed than after (where the outcome has been concealed), as if they think that they can better influence a coin not yet tossed. It appears likely that such quasi-magical thinking explains certain economic phenomena that would be difficult to explain the basis of strictly rational behavior. Such thinking may explain why people vote, and why shareholders exercise their proxies. In most elections, people must know that the probability that they will decide the election must be astronomically small, and they would thus rationally decide not to vote. Quasi-magical thinking, thinking that in good societies people vote and so if I vote I can increase the likelihood that we have a good society or a good company, might explain such voting. The ability of labor union members or oligopolists to act in concert with their counterparts, despite an incentive to free-ride, or defect, may also be explained by quasi-magical thinking~
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The disposition effect [Shefrin and Statman (1985)] referred to above, the tendency for individuals to want to hold losers and sell winners might also be related to quasimagical thinking, if people feel at some level that holding on to losers can reverse the fact that they have already lost. Public demand for stocks at a time when they are apparently overvalued may be influenced by quasi-magical thinking, a notion that if I hold, then the stocks will continue to rise.
11. Attention anomalies and the availability heuristic William James (1890, p. 402) criticized earlier psychologists, who in their theories effectively assumed that the human mind takes account o f all sensory input, for taking no note of the phenomenon o f selective attention: But the moment one thinks of the matter, one sees how false a notion of experience that is which would make it tantamount to the mere presence to the senses of an outward order. Millions of items of the outward order are present to nay senses which never properly enter into my experience. Why? Because they have no interest for me. My experience is what 1 agree to attend to. Only those items which l notice shape my mind - without selective interest, experience is utter chaos. The same criticism might equally well be applied to expected utility maximization models in economics, for assuming that people attend to all facts that are necessary for maximization o f the assumed objective function [Berger (1994) elaborates on this point]. Attention is associated with language; the structure of our language invites attention to categories that are represented in the language. Taylor (1989) showed, for example, that certain concepts o f "the self" were apparently absent from languages in the time o f Augustine. The language shapes our attention to even the most inward o f phenomena. In economics, certain terms were apparently virtually absent from popular discourse fifty or more years ago: gross national product, the money supply, the consumer price index. Now, many economists are wont to model individual attention to these concepts as if they were part o f the external reality that is manifest to all normal minds. Attention may be capricious because it is affected by the "salience" o f the object; whether it is easily discerned or not [Taylor and Thompson (1982)] or by the "vividness" o f the presentation, whether the presentation has colorful details. Judgments may be affected, according to the "availability heuristic", that is, by the "ease with which instances or associations come to mind" [Tversky and Kahneman (1974)]. Investment fashions and fads, and the resulting volatility o f speculative asset prices, appear to be related to the capriciousness o f public attention [Shiller (1984, 1987a)]. Investor attention to categories o f investments (stocks versus bonds or real estate, investing abroad versus investing at home) seems to be affected by alternating waves o f public attention or inattention. Investor attention to the market at all seems to vary through time, and major crashes in financial markets appear to be phenomena
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of attention, in which an inordinate amount of public attention is suddenly focused on the markets 22 Economic theories that are most successful are those that take proper account of the limitations and capriciousness of attention. One reason that the hypothesis of no unexploited arbitrage opportunities (a hypothesis that has led to the Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing theory, the Ross (1976) arbitrage pricing theory, and other constructs of finance) has been so successful is that it does not rely on pervasive public attention. The essence of the no-arbitrage assumption, when it is used successfully to produce theories in finance, is that the arbitrage opportunities, were they to ever exist, would be exploited and eliminated even if only a tiny fraction of investors were paying attention to the opportunity.
12. Culture and social contagion The concept of culture, central to sociology and cultural anthropology ever since the work of Tylor (1871), Durkheim (1893) and Weber (1947), is related to the selective attention that the human mind exhibits. There is a social cognition, reenforced by conversation, ritual and symbols, that is unique to each interconnected group of people; to each nation, tribe, or social group. People tend not to remember well facts or ideas that are not given attention in the social cognition, even though a few people may be aware of such facts. If one speaks to groups of people about ideas that are foreign to their culture, one may find that someone in the group will know of the ideas, and yet the ideas have no currency in the group and hence have no influence on their behavior at large. The array of facts, suppositions, symbols, categories of thought that represent a culture have subtle and far-reaching affects on human behavior. For a classic example, Durkheim (1897), in a careful study of differing suicide rates across countries, found that there was no apparent explanation for these differing rates other than cultural differences. Cultural anthropologists have used methods of inferring elements of primitive culture by immersing themselves in the society, observing their everyday life, and talking and listening to them nonjudgmentally, letting them direct the conversation. From such learning, for example, Ltvy-Strauss (1966, pp. 9-10) wrote persuasively that the customs of primitive people that we may tend to view as inexplicably savage actually arise as a logical consequence of a belief system common to all who belong to the society, a belief system which we can grow to understand only with great difficulty:
22 There is evidence that the stock market crash of 1987 can be viewed in these terms, see Shiller (1989).
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The real question is not whether the touch of a woodpecker's beak does in fact cure toothache. It is rather whether there is a point of view from which a woodpecker's beak and a man's tooth can be seen as "going together" (the use of this congruity for therapeutic purposes being only one of its possible uses) and whether some initial order can be introduced into the universe by means of these groupings.... The thought we call primitive is founded on this demand for order. The same methods that cultural anthropologists use to study primitive peoples can also be used to study modern cultures. O ' B a r r and C o N e y (1992) studied pension fund managers using personal interviews and cultural anthropological methods. They concluded that each pension fund has its own culture, associated often with a colorful story o f the origin o f their own organization, akin to the creation myths o f primitive peoples. The culture o f the pension fund is a belief system about investing strategy and that culture actually drives investment decisions. Cultural factors were found to have great influence because o f a widespread desire to displace responsibility for decisions onto the organization, and because o f a desire to maintain personal relationships within the organization 23. Psychological research that delineates the factors that go into the formation o f culture has been undertaken under the rubric o f social psychology and attitude change, or under social cognition. There is indeed an enormous volume o f research in these areas. For surveys, one may refer to McGuire (1985) for attitude change or Levine and Resnick (1993) for social cognition. One difficulty that these researchers have encountered with experimental work is that o f disentangling the "rational" reasons for the imitation o f others with the purely psychological. Some recent economic literature has indeed shown the subtlety o f the informational influences on people's behavior (learning from each other), see Bannerjee (1992), Bikhchandani et al. (1992), Leahy (1994), and Shiller (1995).
13. A global culture We see many examples o f imitation across countries apparently widely separated by both physical and language barriers. Fashions o f dress, music, and youthful rebellion, are obvious examples. The convergence o f seemingly arbitrary fashions across nations is evidence that something more is at work in producing internationally-similar human behavior than just rational reactions to c o m m o n information sets relevant to economic fundamentals, see Featherstone (1990). A n d yet it will not be an easy matter for us to decide in what avenues global culture exerts its influence [Hannerz (1990), p. 237]: There is now a world culture, but we had better make sure that we understand what this means. it is marked by an organization of diversity rather than by a replication of uniformity. No total
23 The psychologist Janis (1972) has documented with case studies how social patterns ("groupthink") within decision making groups can cause even highly intelligent people to make disastrously wrong decisions.
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homogenizationof systems of meaning and expression has occurred, nor does it appear likely that there will be one any time soon. But the world has become one network of social relationships, and between its different regions there is a flow of meanings as well as of people and goods. Sociologists have made it their business to study patterns of influence within cultures, and we ought to be able to learn something about the nature of global culture from their endeavors. For example, one study of patterns of influence regarded as a classic among sociologists is the in-depth study of the town of Rovere by sociologist Robert Merton (1957). After extensive study of the nature of interpersonal influence, he sought meaningful ways to categorize people. He found that it was meaningful to divide people into two broad categories: locals (who follow local news and derive status by their connectedness with others) and cosmopolitans (who orient themselves instead to world news and derive status from without the community). He found that the influence of cosmopolitans on locals transcended both their numbers and their stock of useful information. We must bear this conclusion in mind when deciding how likely it is that incipient cultural trends are pervasive across many different nations. Reading such sociological studies inclines us to rather different interpretations of globally similar behaviors than might occur naturally to many traditional economists. Why did the real estate markets in many cities around the world rise together into the late 1980s and fall in the early 1990s? [See Goetzmarm and Wachter (1996) and Hendershott (1997).] Why have the stock markets of the world moved somewhat together? Why did the stock markets of the world show greater tendency to move together after the stock market crash of 1987? [See von Furstenberg and Jeon (1989) and King, Sentana and Wadhwani (1994).] If we recognize the global nature of culture, there is no reason to assume that these events have anything to do with genuine information about economic fundamentals.
14. Concluding remarks Since this paper was written in response to an invitation to summarize literature on behavioral theory in finance, it has focused exclusively on this topic, neglecting the bulk of finance literature. Because of its focus on anomalies and departures from conventional notions of rationality, I worry that the reader of this paper can get a mistaken impression about the place of behavioral theory in finance and of the importance of conventional theory. The lesson from the literature surveyed here, and the list of varied behavioral phenomena, is not that "anything can happen" in financial markets. Indeed, while the behavioral theories have much latitude for interpretation, when they are combined with observations about behavior in financial markets, they allow us to develop theories that do have some restrictive implications. Moreover, conventional efficient markets theory is not completely out the window. I could have, had that been the goal of this paper, found very many papers that suggest that markets are impressively efficient in certain respects.
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Financial anomalies that intuitive assessments of human nature might lead one to expect to find, or anomalies one hears casually about, often turn out to be tiny, ephemeral, or nonexistent. There is, for example, virtually no Friday the thirteenth effect [Chamberlain et al. (199 l), Dyl and Maberly (1988)]. Investors apparently aren't that foolish. Heeding the lessons of the behavioral research surveyed here is not going to be simple and easy for financial researchers. Doing research that is sensitive to lessons from behavioral research does not mean entirely abandoning research in the conventional expected utility framework. The expected utility framework can be a workhorse for some sensible research, if it is used appropriately. It can also be a starting point, a point of comparison from which to frame other theories. It is critically important for research to maintain an appropriate perspective about h u m a n behavior and an awareness of its complexity. When one does produce a model, in whatever tradition, one should do so with a sense of the limits of the model, the reasonableness of its approximations, and the sensibility of its proposed applications.
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Chapter 21
THE FINANCIAL ACCELERATOR IN A QUANTITATIVE BUSINESS CYCLE FRAMEWORK* BEN S. BERNANKE, MARK GERTLER and SIMON GILCHRIST Princeton University, New York University, and Boston Unicersity**
Contents Abstract Keywords 1. Introduction 2. The model: o v e r v i e w and basic assumptions 3. The d e m a n d for capital and the role o f net worth 3.1. Contract terms when there is no aggregate risk 3.2. Contract terms when there is aggregate risk 3.3. Net worth and the optimal choice of capital 4. General e q u i l i b r i u m 4.1. The entrepreneurial sector 4.2. The complete log-linearized model 4.2.1. Two extensions of the baseline model 4.2.1.1. Investment delays 4.2.1,2. Heterogeneous firms 5. M o d e l simulations 5.1. Model parametrization 5.2. Results 5.2.1. Response to a monetary policy shock 5.2.2. Shock to technology, demand, and wealth 5.2.3. Investment delays and heterogeneous firms 6. A h i g h l y selected r e v i e w o f the literature 7. D i r e c t i o n s for furore w o r k A p p e n d i x A. The o p t i m a l financial contract and the d e m a n d for capital A. 1. The partial equilibrium contracting problem A.2. The log-normal distribution A.3. Aggregate risk
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* Thanks to Michael Woodford, Don Morgan and John Taylor for helpful conanents, and to the NSF and C.M Starr Center for financial support. ** Each author is also affiliated with the National Bmeau of Economic Research. Handbook of Macroeconomics, Volume 1, Edited by J..B. laylor and M. WoodJb~d © 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved 1341
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Appendix B. Household, retail and government sectors B. 1. Households B.2. The retail sector and price setting B.3. Government sector
References
B.S. B e r n a n k e et al.
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Abstract This chapter develops a dynamic general equilibrium model that is intended to help clarify the role of credit market frictions in business fluctuations, from both a qualitative and a quantitative standpoint. The model is a synthesis of the leading approaches in the literature. In particular, the framework exhibits a "financial accelerator", in that endogenous developments in credit markets work to amplify and propagate shocks to the macroeconomy. In addition, we add several features to the model that are designed to enhance the empirical relevance. First, we incorporate money and price stickiness, which allows us to study how credit market frictions may influence the transmission of monetary policy. In addition, we allow for lags in investment which enables the model to generate both hump-shaped output dynamics and a lead-lag relation between asset prices and investment, as is consistent with the data. Finally, we allow for heterogeneity among firms to capture the fact that borrowers have differential access to capital markets. Under reasonable parametrizations of the model, the financial accelerator has a significant influence on business cycle dynamics.
Keywords financial accelerator, business fluctuations, monetary policy
JEL classification: E30, E44, E50
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1. Introduction
The canonical real business cycle model and the textbook Keynesian IS-LM model differ in many fundamental ways. However, these two standard frameworks for macroeconomic analysis do share one strong implication: Except for the term structure of real interest rates, which, together with expectations of future payouts, determines real asset prices, in these models conditions in financial and credit markets do not affect the real economy. In other words, these two mainstream approaches both adopt the assumptions underlying the Modigliani-Miller (1958) theorem, which implies that financial structure is both indeterminate and irrelevant to real economic outcomes. Of course, it can be argued that the standard assumption of financial-structure irrelevance is only a simplification, not to be taken literally, and not harmful if the "frictions" in financial and credit markets are sufficiently small. However, as Gertler (1988) discusses, there is a long-standing alternative tradition in macroeconomics, beginning with Fisher and Keynes if not earlier authors, that gives a more central role to credit-market conditions in the propagation of cyclical fluctuations. In this alternative view, deteriorating credit-market conditions - sharp increases in insolvencies and bankruptcies, rising real debt burdens, collapsing asset prices, and bank failures are not simply passive reflections of a declining real economy, but are in themselves a major factor depressing economic activity. For example, Fisher (1933) attributed the severity of the Great Depression in part to the heavy burden of debt and ensuing financial distress associated with the deflation of the early 1930s, a theme taken up half a century later by Bernanke (1983). More recently, distressed banking systems and adverse credit-market conditions have been cited as sources of serious macroeconomic contractions in Scandinavia, Latin America, Japan, and other East Asian countries. In the US context, both policy-makers and academics have put some of the blame for the slow recovery of the economy from the 1990-1991 recession on heavy corporate debt burdens and an undercapitalized banking system [see, e.g., Bernanke and Lown (1992)]. The feedbacks from credit markets to the real economy in these episodes may or may not be as strong as some have maintained; but it must be emphasized that the conventional macroeconomic paradigms, as usually presented, do not even give us ways of thinking about such effects. The principal objective of this chapter is to show that credit-market imperfections can be incorporated into standard macroeconomic models in a relatively straightforward yet rigorous way. Besides our desire to be able to evaluate the role of creditmarket factors in the most dramatic episodes, such as the Depression or the more recent crises (such as those in East Asia), there are two additional reasons for attempting to bring such effects into mainstream models of economic fluctuations. First, it appears that introducing credit-market frictions into the standard models can help improve their ability to explain even "garden-variety" cyclical fluctuations. In particular, in the context of standard dynamic macroeconomic models, we show in this chapter that credit-market frictions may significantly amplify both real and nominal shocks to the economy. This extra amplification is a step toward resolving the puzzle of how
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relatively small shocks (modest changes in real interest rates induced by monetary policy, for example, or the small average changes in firm costs induced by even a relatively large movement in oil prices) can nevertheless have large real effects. Introducing credit-market frictions has the added advantage of permitting the standard models to explain a broader class of important cyclical phenomena, such as changes in credit extension and the spreads between safe and risky interest rates. The second reason for incorporating credit-market effects into mainstream models is that modern empirical research on the determinants of aggregate demand and (to a lesser extent) of aggregate supply has often ascribed an important role to various credit-market frictions. Recent empirical work on consumption, for example, has emphasized the importance of limits on borrowing and the closely-related "buffer stock" behavior [Mariger (1987), Zeldes (1989), Jappelli (1990), Deaton (1991), Eberly (1994), Gourinchas and Parker (1995), Engelhardt (1996), Carroll (1997), Ludvigson (1997), Bacchetta and Gerlach (1997)]. In the investment literature, despite some recent rehabilitation of a role for neoclassical cost-of-capital effects [Cummins, Hassett and Hubbard (1994), Hassett and Hubbard (1996)], there remains considerable evidence for the view that cash flow, leverage, and other balance-sheet factors also have a major influence on investment spending [Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991), Whited (1992), Gross (1994), Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), Hubbard, Kashyap and Whited (1995)] 1. Similar conclusions are reached by recent studies of the determinants of inventories and of employment [Cantor (1990), Blinder and Maccini (1991), Kashyap, Lamont and Stein (1994), Sharpe (1994), Carpenter, Fazzari and Petersen (1994)]. Aggregate modeling, if it is to describe the dynamics of spending and production realistically, needs to take these empirical findings into account 2. How does one go about incorporating financial distress and similar concepts into macroeconomics? While it seems that there has always been an empirical case for including credit-market factors in the mainstream model, early writers found it difficult to bring such apparently diverse and chaotic phenomena into their formal analyses. As a result, advocacy of a role for these factors in aggregate dynamics fell for the most part to economists outside the US academic mainstream, such as Hyman Minsky, and to some forecasters and financial-market practitioners, such as Otto Eckstein and Allen Sinai (l 986), Albert Wojnilower (1980), and Henry Kaufma~ (1986). However, over the past twenty-five years, breakthroughs in the economics of incomplete and asymmetric information [beginning with Akerlof (1970)] and the extensive adoption of these ideas in corporate finance and other applied fields [e.g., Jensen and Meckling (1976)], have made possible more formal theoretical 1 A critique of the cash-flowliterature is given by Kaplan and Zingales (1997). See Chirinko (1993) for a broad survey of the empirical literature in inveslment. 2 Contemporarymacroeconometricforecasting models, such as the MPS model used by the Federal Reserve, typicallydo incorporatefactors such as borrowing constraints and cash-flow effects. See for example Braytonet al. (1997).
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analyses of credit-market imperfections. In particular, it is now well understood that asymmetries of infonnaIion play a key role in borrower-lender relationships; that lending institutions and financial contracts typically take the forms that they do in order to reduce the costs of gathering information and to mitigate principal-agent problems in credit markets; and that the common feature of most of the diverse problems that can occur in credit markets is a worsening of informational asymmetries and increases in the associated agency costs. Because credit-market crises (and less dramatic malfunctions) increase the real costs of extending credit and reduce the efficiency of the process of matching lenders and potential borrowers, these events may have widespread real effects. In short, when credit markets are characterized by asymmetric information and agency problems, the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance theorem no longer applies. Drawing on insights from the literature on asymmetric information and agency costs in lending relationships, in this chapter we develop a dynamic general equilibrium model that we hope will be useful for understanding the role of credit-market frictions in cyclical fluctuations. The model is a synthesis of several approaches already in the literature, and is partly intended as an expository device. But because it combines attractive features of several previous models, we think the framework presented here has something new to offer, hnportantly, we believe that the model is of some use in assessing the quantitative implications of credit-market frictions for macroeconomic analysis. In particular, our framework exhibits a "financial accelerator" [Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996)], in that endogenous developments in credit markets work to propagate and amplify shocks to the macroeconomy. The key mechanism involves the link between "external finance premium" (the difference between the cost of funds raised externally and the opportunity cost of funds internal to the firm) and the net worth of potential borrowers (defined as the borrowers' liquid assets plus collateral value of illiquid assets less outstanding obligations). With credit-market frictions present, and with the total amount of financing required held constant, standard models of lending with asymmetric information imply that the external finance premium depends inversely on borrowers' net worth. This inverse relationship arises because, when borrowers have little wealth to contribute to project financing, the potential divergence of interests between the borrower and the suppliers of external funds is greater, implying increased agency costs; in equilibrium, lenders must be compensated ~br higher agency costs by a larger premium. To the extent that borrowers' net worth is procyclical (because of the procyclicality of profits and asset prices, for example), the external finance premium will be countercyclical, enhancing the swings in borrowing and thus in investment, spending, and production. We also add to the framework several features designed to enhance the empirical relevance. First, we incorporate price stickiness and money into the analysis, using modeling devices familiar from New Keynesian research, which allows us to study the effects of monetary policy in an economy with credit-market frictions. In addition, we allow for decision lags in investment, which enables the model to generate both
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hump-shaped output dynamics and a lead-lag relationship between asset prices and investment, as is consistent with the data. Finally, we allow for heterogeneity among firms to capture the real-world fact that borrowers have differential access to capital markets. All these improvements significantly enhance the value of the model for quantitative analysis, in our view. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model analyzed in the present chapter. Section 3 considers the source of the financial accelerator: a credit-market friction which evolves from a particular form of asymmetric information between lenders and potential borrowers. It then performs a partial equilibrium analysis of the resulting terms of borrowing and of firms' demand for capital, and derives the link between net worth and the demand for capital that is the essence of the financial accelerator. Section 4 embeds the credit-market model in a Dynamic New Keynesian (DNK) model of the business cycle, using the device proposed by Calvo (1983) to incorporate price stickiness and a role for monetary policy; it also considers several extensions, such as allowing for lags in investment and for differential credit access across firms. Section 5 presents simulation results, drawing comparisons between the cases including and excluding the credit-market friction. Here we show that the financial accelerator works to amplify and propagate shocks to the economy in a quantitatively significant way. Section 6 then gives a brief and selective survey that describes how the framework present fits in the literature. Section 7 then describes several directions for future research. Two appendices contain additional discussion and analysis of the partial-equilibrium contracting problem and the dynamic general equilibrium model in which the contracting problem is embedded.
2. The model: overview and basic assumptions Our model is a variant of the Dynamic New Keynesian (DNK) framework, modified to allow for financial accelerator effects on investment. The baseline DNK model is essentially a stochastic growth model that incorporates money, monopolistic competition, and nominal price rigidities. We take this framework as the starting point for several reasons. First, this approach has become widely accepted in the literature 3 It has the qualitative empirical appeal of the IS-LM model, but is motivated from first principles. Second, it is possible to study monetary policy with this framework. For our purposes, this means that it is possible to illustrate how credit market imperfections influence the transmission of monetary policy, a theme emphasized in much of the recent literature 4. Finally, in the limiting case of perfect price flexibility, the cyclical properties of the model closely resemble those of a real business cycle framework. In
3 See Goodfriend and King (1997) for an exposition of the DNK approach. 4 For a review of the recent literature on the role of credit market fiqctions in the transmission of monetary policy, see Bernanke and Gertler (1995).
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this approximate sense, the DNK model nests the real business cycle paradigm as a special case. It thus has the virtue of versatility. Extending any type of contemporary business cycle model to incorporate financial accelerator effects is, however, not straightforward. There are two general problems: First, because we want lending and borrowing to occur among private agents in equilibrium, we cannot use the representative agent paradigm but must instead grapple with the complications introduced by heterogeneity among agents. Second, we would like the financial contracts that agents use in the model to be motivated as far as possible from first principles. Since financial contracts and institutions are endogenous, results that hinge on arbitrary restrictions on financial relationships may be suspect. Most of the nonstandard assumptions that we make in setting up our model are designed to facilitate aggregation (despite individual heterogeneity) and permit an endogenous financial structure, thus addressing these two key issues. The basic structure of our model is as follows: There are three types of agents, called households, entrepreneurs, and retailers. Households and entrepreneurs are distinct from one another in order to explicitly motivate lending and borrowing. Adding retailers permits us to incorporate inertia in price setting in a tractable way, as we discuss. In addition, our model includes a government, which conducts both fiscal and monetary policy. Households live forever; they work, consume, and save. They hold both real money balances and interest-bearing assets. We provide more details on household behavior below. For inducing the effect we refer to as the financial accelerator, entrepreneurs play the key role in our model. These individuals are assumed to be risk-neutral and have finite horizons: Specifically, we assume that each entrepreneur has a constant probability y of surviving to the next period (implying an expected lifetime of 1@)" The assumption of finite horizons for entrepreneurs is intended to capture the phenomenon of ongoing births and deaths of firms, as well as to preclude the possibility that the entrepreneurial sector will ultimately accumulate enough wealth to be fully self-financing. Having the survival probability be constant (independent of age) facilitates aggregation. We assume the birth rate of entrepreneurs to be such that the fraction of agents who are entrepreneurs is constant. In each period t entrepreneurs acquire physical capital. (Entrepreneurs who "die" in period t are not allowed to purchase capital, but instead simply consume their accumulated resources and depart from the scene.) Physical capital acquired in period t is used in combination with hired labor to produce output in period t + 1, by means of a constant-returns to scale technology. Acquisitions of capital are financed by entrepreneurial wealth, or "net worth", and borrowing. The net worth of entrepreneurs comes from two sources: profits (including capital gains) accumulated from previous capital investment and income from supplying labor (we assume that entrepreneurs supply one unit of labor inelastically to the general labor market). As stressed in the literature, entrepreneurs' net worth plays a critical role in the dynamics of the model. Net worth matters because a borrower's financial position
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is a key determinant of his cost of external finance. Higher levels of net worth allow for increased self-financing (equivalently, collateralized external finance), mitigating the agency problems associated with external finance and reducing the external finance premium faced by the entrepreneur in equilibrium. To endogenously motivate the existence of an external finance premium, we postulate a simple agency problem that introduces a conflict of interest between a borrower and his respective lenders. The financial contract is then designed to minimize the expected agency costs. For tractability we assume that there is enough anonymity in financial markets that only one-period contracts between borrowers and lenders are feasible [a similar assumption is made by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997)]. Allowing for longer-term contracts would not affect our basic results 5. The tbrm of the agency problem we introduce, together with the assumption of constant returns to scale in production, is sufficient (as we shall see) to generate a linear relationship between the demand for capital goods and entrepreneurial net worth, which facilitates aggregation. One complication is that to introduce the nominal stickiness intrinsic to the DNK framework, at least some suppliers must be price setters, i.e., they must face downward-sloping demand curves. However, assuming that entrepreneurs are imperfect competitors complicates aggregation, since in that case the demand for capital by individual firms is no longer linear in net worth. We avoid this problem by distinguishing between entrepreneurs and other agents, called' retailers. Entrepreneurs produce wholesale goods in competitive markets, and then sell their output to retailers who are monopolistic competitors. Retailers do nothing other than buy goods from entrepreneurs, differentiate them (costlessly), then re-sell them to households. The monopoly power of retailers provides the source of nominal stickiness in the economy; otherwise, retailers play no role. We assume that profits from retail activity are rebated lump-sum to households. Having described the general setup of the model, we proceed in two steps. First, we derive the key microeconomic relationship of the model: the dependence of a firm's demand for capital on the potential borrower's net worth. To do so, we consider the firm's (entrepreneur's) partial equilibrium problem of jointly determining its demand for capital and terms of external finance in negotiation with a competitive lender (e.g., a financial intermediary). Second, we embed these relationships !n an othe1~ise conventional DNK model. Our objective is to show how fluctuations in borrowers' net worth can act to amplify and propagate exogenous shocks to the system. For most of the analysis we assume that there is a single type of firm; however, we eventually extend the model to allow for heterogeneous firms with differential access to credit.
So long as borrowers have finite horizons, net worth influences the terms of borrowing, even ai~er allowing for nmlti-period contracts. See, for example, Gertter (1992).
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3. The demand for capital and the role of net worth
We now study the capital investment decision at the firm level, taking as given the price of capital goods and the expected return to capital. In the subsequent section we endogenize capital prices and returns as part of a general equilibrium solution. At time t, the entrepreneur who manages firm j purchases capital for use at t + I. The quantity of capital purchased is denoted K/+I, with the subscript denoting the period in which the capital is actually used, and the superscript j denoting the firm. The price paid per unit of capital in period t is Qt. Capital is homogeneous, and so it does not matter whether the capital the entrepreneur purchases is newly produced within the period or is "old", depreciated capital. Having the entrepreneur purchase (or repurchase) his entire capital stock each period is a modeling device to ensure, realistically, that leverage restrictions or other financial constraints apply to the firm as a whole, not just to the marginal investment. The return to capital is sensitive to both aggregate and idiosyncratic risk. The ex post gross return on capital for firmj is t'~JPk * ' t + l , where coy is an idiosyncratic disturbance to firmj's return and Rk+l is the ex post aggregate return to capital (i.e., the gross return averaged across firms). The random variable (.0j is i.i.d, across time and across firms, with a continuous and once-differentiable c.d.f., F(~o), over a non-negative support, and E{{oJ} = 1. We impose the following restriction on the corresponding hazard rate h((o):
O(coh(o))) 0a)
> 0,
(3.1)
where h(co) _= ~dF(~o) F(o~" This regularity condition is a relatively weak restriction that is satisfied by most conventional distributions, including for example the log-normal. At the end of period t (going into period t + 1) entrepreneur j has available net worth, N/+ 1. To finance the difference between his expenditures on capital goods and his net worth he must borrow an amount BJ<, given by BtJl = Q, K ,+, j -N,+J 1.
(3.2)
The entrepreneur borrows from a financial intermediary that obtains its funds from households. The financial intermediary faces an opportunity cost of funds between t and t + 1 equal to the economy's riskless gross rate of return, Rt+l. The riskless rate is the relevant opportunity cost because in the equilibrium of our model, the intermediary holds a perfectly safe portfolio (it perfectly diversifies the idiosyncratic risk involved in lending). Because entrepreneurs are risk-neutral and households are risk-averse, the loan contract the intermediary signs has entrepreneurs absorb any aggregate risk, as we discuss below. To motivate a nontrivial role for financial structure, we follow a number of previous papers in assuming a "costly state verification" (CSV) problem of the type first
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analyzed by Townsend (1979), in which lenders must pay a fixed "auditing cost" in order to observe an individual borrower's realized return (the borrower observes the return for free). As Townsend showed, this assumption allows us to motivate why uncollateralized external finance may be more expensive than internal finance without imposing arbitrary restrictions on the contract structure. There are many other specifications of the incentive problem between the entrepreneur and outside lenders that can generate qualitatively similar results. The virtues of the Townsend formulation are its simplicity and descriptive realism. Following the CSV approach, we assume that the lender must pay a cost if he or she wishes to observe the borrower's realized return on capital. This auditing cost is interpretable as the cost of bankruptcy (including for example auditing, accounting, and legal costs, as well as losses associated with asset liquidation and interruption of business). The monitoring cost is assumed to equal a proportion/~ of the realized k .i I. gross payoff to the firm's capital, i.e., the monitoring cost equals /~ ~oi Rt+lQtKi+ Although one might expect that there would be economies of scale in monitoring, the proportionality assumption is very convenient in our context and does not seem too unreasonable. 3.1. Contract terms when there is no aggregate risk To describe the optimal contractual arrangement, it is useful to first work through the case where the aggregate return to capital Rt:'+l is known in advance. In this instance the only uncertainty about the project's return is idiosyncratic to the firm, as in the conventional version of the CSV problem. Absent any aggregate uncertainty, the optimal contract under costly state verification looks very much like standard risky debt (see Appendix A for a detailed analysis of the contracting problem): In particular, the entrepreneur chooses the value of firm capital, QtKi+J t, and the associated level of borrowing, B/+L, prior to the realization of the idiosyncratic shock. Given QtKi+l, / B[+I, and Rt+ k l, the optimal contract may be characterized by a gross non-default loan rate, Z/~I, and a threshold value of the idiosyncratic shock ~)i, call it ~sJ, such that for values of the idiosyncratic shock greater than or equal to ~J, the entrepreneur is able to repay the loan at the contractuai rate, Z j 1. That is, N./ is defined by ....j ~ - j ./ .J ~ R~+lQtKi~ 1 = Zt ~lBt ~1
(3.3)
When ~o/ ) c~-j, under the optimal contract the entrepreneur repays the lender the r j j j /~ j ,- j j promised amount Zi+lBt+ 1 and keeps the difference, equal to co Rt+l QtKi~. ~ - Zi +~B:, 1. If coy < N:, the entrepreneur cannot pay the contractual return and thus declares default, in this situation the lending intermediary pays the auditing cost and gets to keep what it finds. That is, the intermediary's net receipts are (1 -l~)v)R~+~ Q~K/+ 1. A defaulting entrepreneur receives nothing.
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The values o f NJ and Z/~ 1 under the optimal contract are determined by the requirement that the financial intermediary receive an expected return equal to the opportunity cost o f its funds. Because the loan risk in this case is perfectly diversifiable, the relevant opportunity cost to the intermediary is the riskless rate, Rt+l. Accordingly, the loan contract must satisfy P
[ 1 - F ( ~ S ) I Z• / + I B" / + ," + ( 1 - ~ t )
/~
~oJ
k j ' ~oRt+lQtKi+ 1 dF(~o)= R,+,S/+t,
(3.4)
where the left-hand side o f Equation (3.4) is the expected gross return on the loan to the entrepreneur and the right side is the intermediary's opportunity cost o f lending. Note that F ( ~ j) gives the probability o f default. Combining Equations (3.2) and (3.3) with Equation (3.4) yields the following expression for ~5i: p
[1 - F ( ~ J ) ] ~ j -+-(1-:-~) ./0
(o dF(co) R~+IQtK/+ , -- Rt+I(QtKJ1 - N,{ 1).
(3.5)
By using Equation (3.4) to eliminate Z~I, we are able to express the lender's expected return simply as a function of the cutoff value o f the firm's idiosyncratic productivity shock, k5s. There are two effects o f changing ~ J on the expected return, and they work in opposite directions. A rise in NJ increases the non-default payoff; on the other hand, it also raises the default probability, which lowers the expected payoff. The assumed restrictions on the hazard function given by Equation (3.1) imply that the expected return reaches a maximum at an unique interior value of N i : As NJ rises above this value the expected return declines due to the increased likelihood of default 6. For values of ~Os below the maxinmm, the function is increasing and concave 7. I f the lender's opportunity cost is so large that there does not exist a value of NJ that generates the required expected return, then the borrower is "rationed" from the market. Appendix A provides details. For simplicity, in what follows, we consider only equilibria without rationing, i.e., equilibria in which the equilibrium value of b5j always lies below the maximum feasible value a. Under the parametrizations we use later, this condition is in fact satisfied. r' Flb see that the maximmn must be in the interior of the support of co, note that as cO/ approaches its upper bound, the default probability converges to unity. Appendix A shows that the interior optimum is unique. 7 The change in the expected payoff fl'om a unit increase m cOJ is {[ 1 -F(cOJ)] -#cO/dF(cOJ)}R~+IQtKii 1 The first term in the expression in brackets reflects the rise in the non-default payoff. The second term reflects the rise in expected default costs. Note that we can rewrite this expression as {1 - ~SJh(USJ)}[1 - F(?O/)]RI+1QtK/+I, where h(a0 = VdF(co) - ~ is the hazard rate. Given Equation (3.i), the derivative of this expression is negative for values of COj below the maxinmm one feasible, implying that the expected payoff is concave in this range. 8 Note also that since we are restricting attention to non-rationing equilibria, the lender's expected return is always increasing in COJ.
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3.2. Contract terms when there is aggregate risk With aggregate uncertainty present, NJ will in general depend on the ex post realization of R)+~. Our assumption that the entrepreneur is risk-neutral leads to a simple contract structure, despite this complication. Because he cares only about the mean return on his wealth, the entrepreneur is willing to bear all the aggregate risk 9. Thus he is willing to guarantee the lender a return that is free o f any systematic risk, i.e., conditional on the ex post realization ofR~+l, the borrower offers a (state-contingent) non-default payment that guarantees the lender a return equal in expected value to the riskless rate. (Note that the only residual risk the lender bears arises from the idiosyncratic shock o)/+1, and is thus diversifiable.) Put differently, Equation (3.5) now implies a set of restrictions, k 1. The result is a schedule for 75j, contingent on the one for each realization o f Rt+ realized aggregate state. As we are restricting attention to non-rationing equilibria, we consider only parametrizations where there in fact exists a value o f N / for each aggregate state that satisfies Equation (3.5). Diversification by intermediaries implies that households earn the riskless rate on their saving. Descriptively, the existence o f aggregate uncertainty effectively ties the risky loan rate Z/+~to macroeconomic conditions. In particular, the loan rate adjusts countercyclically. For example, a realization o f R~k+l that is lower than expected raises
Zi/~ ; that is, to compensate for the increased default probability due to the low average return to capital, the non-default payment must rise. This in turn implies an increase in the cutoff value o f the idiosyncratic productivity shock, ~5j. Thus the model implies, reasonably, that default probabilities and default premia rise when the aggregate return to capital is lower than expected ~0
3.3. Net worth and the optimal choice o f capital
Thus far we have described how the state-contingent values of N / and ziJ~ are determined, given the ex post realization of R~/'+l and the ex ante choices of Q:K j i and B/~ I. We now turn to the entrepreneur's general problem o f determining his demand for capital.
9 The entrepreneur's value function can be shown to be linear in wealth because (i) his utility is linear in consumption and (ii) the project he is investing in exhibits constant returns to scale. [See, e.g., Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990).] 10 This kind of state-contingent financial arrangement is a bit stylized, but may be thought of as corresponding to the following scenario: Let the maturity of the debt be shorter than the maturity of the firm's project. The debt is then rolled over after the realization of the aggregate m~certainty. If there is bad aggregate news, then the new loan rate is higher than would be otherwise. To implement the sort of risk-sharing arrangement implied by the model, therefore, all that is necessary is that some component of the financing have a shorter maturity than that of the project.
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Given the state-contingent debt form of the optimal contract, the expected return to the entrepreneur may be expressed as E
{fi /
k
j
o)Rt+ 1QtKi+ 1 dF(co) - (1 - F ( ~ J ) ) N J R ~ I QtK/+ l
)
(3.6)
,
k where expectations are taken with respect to the random variable, Rt+l, and it is understood that ~ / may be made contingent on the realization of this variable. Combining this relation with Equation (3.5) allows us to simplify the entrepreneur's objective to maximization of
{ Jo
}
O9 )
L1 -
-U;+O,J
(3.7)
k k 1} is the ratio of the realized return to capital to the expected where U[a~I =_ Rt+j/E{Rt+ return. Given that the intermediary must receive a competitive return, the entrepreneur internalizes the expected default costs, as Equation (3.7) suggests. The formal investment and contracting problem then reduces to choosing K/+I and a schedule for N/ (as a function of the realized values of R)+I) to maximize Equation (3.7), subject to the set of state-contingent constraints implied by Equation (3.5). The distributions of the aggregate and idiosyncratic risks to the return to capital, the price of capital, and the quantity of net worth that the entrepreneur brings to the table are taken as given in the maximization. Let st ~ E{R~+I/Rt+I } be the expected discounted return to capital. For entrepreneurs to purchase capital in the competitive equilibrium it must be the case that st ~> 1. Given s: ~> 1, the first-order necessary conditions yield the following relation for optimal capital purchases (see Appendix A for details): QaK/~, = *p(st)N/+j,
with
W(1) == l, W:(') > O.
(3.8)
Equation (3.8) describes the critical link between capital expenditures by the firm and financial conditions, as measured by the wedge between the expected the return to capital and the safe rate, st, and by entrepreneurial net worth, Art/1 JL. Given the value o f K/+ l that satisfies Equation (3.8), the schedule for NJ is pinned down uniquely by the state-contingent constraint on the expected return to debt, defined by Equation (3.5). Equation (3.8) is a key relationship in the model: It shows that capital expenditures by each firm are proportional to the net worth of the owner/entrepreneur, with a proportionality factor that is increasing in the expected discounted return to capital, st. Everything else equal, a rise in the expected discounted return to capital reduces the expected default probability. As a consequence, the entrepreneur carl take on more
l J In the costly enforcememmodel of Kiyotakiand Moore (1997), ~p(.)- 1, implyingQ,K,. t - Ni+j .
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Demandf 0 ~ , i .
,,///,, .,.'"
E .2 o
c~
c5 --f
6
l
[
I
i
7
8
9
10
~ - - T - -
11
12
CapitalStock Fig. 1. Effect of an increase in net worth. debt and expand the size o f his firm. He is constrained from raising the size o f the firm indefinitely by the fact that expected default costs also rise as the ratio of borrowing to net worth increases. An equivalent way of expressing Equation (3.8) is
/ E{Rf,.l} = s[
Nj \ ~',+1. | R,~,,
\ o,K/+,]
s'(.) < 0.
(3.9)
For an entrepreneur who is not fully self-financed, in equilibrium the return to capital will be equated to the marginal cost of external finance. Thus Equation (3.9) expresses the equilibrium condition that the ratio s o f the cost of external finance to the safe rate - which we have called the discounted return to capital but may be equally well interpreted as the external finance premium - depends inversely on the share of the finn's capital investment that is financed by the entrepreneur's own net worth. Figure 1 illustrates this relationship using the actual contract calibrated for model analysis in the next section. Firm j ' s demand for capital is on the horizontal axis and the cost o f funds normalized by the safe rate of return is on the vertical axis. For capital stocks which can be financed entirely by the entrepreneur's net worth, in this case K < 4.6, the firm faces a cost of funds equal to the risk free rate. As capital acquisitions rise into the range where external finance is necessary, the costof-funds curve becomes upward sloping, reflecting the increase in expected default costs associated with the higher ratio o f debt to net worth. While the supply o f funds curve is -upward sloping, owing to constant returns to scale, the demand for capital is horizontal at an expected return 2 percentage points above the risk free rate.
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Point E, where the firm's marginal cost of funds equals the expected return to capital yields the optimal choice of the capital stock K = 9.2. For this contract, the leverage ratio is 50%. It is easy to illustrate how a shift in the firm's financial position affects its demand for capital. A 15% increase in net worth, Ni~ L, for example, causes the rightward shift in the cost-of-funds curve depicted by the hatched line in Figure 1. At the old level of capital demand, the premium for external finance declines: The rise in net worth relative to the capital stock reduces the expected default probability, everything else equal. As a consequence, the firm is able to expand capacity to point U . Similarly, a decline in net worth reduces the firm's effective demand for capital. In the next section we incorporate this firm-level relation into a general equilibrium framework. Before proceeding, however, we note that, in general, when the firm's demand for capital depends on its financial position, aggregation becomes difficult. The reason is that, in general, the total demand for capital will depend on the distribution of wealth across firms. Here, however, the assumption of constant returns to scale throughout induces a proportional relation between net worth and capital demand at the firm level; further, the factor of proportionality is independent of firm-specific factors. Thus it is straightforward to aggregate Equation (3.8) to derive a relationship between the total demand for capital and the total stock of entrepreneurial net worth.
4. General equilibrium We now embed the partial equilibrium contracting problem between the lender and the entrepreneur within a dynamic general equilibrium model. Among other things, this will permit us to endogenize the safe interest rate, the return to capital, and the relative price of capital, all of which were taken as given in the partial equilibrium. We proceed in several steps. First we characterize aggregate behavior for the entrepreneurial sector. From this exercise we obtain aggregate demand curves for labor and capital, given the real wage and the riskless interest rate. The market demand for capital is a key component of the model since it reflects the impact of financial market imperfections. We also derive how the aggregate stock of entrepreneurial net worth, an important state variable determining the demand for capital, evolves over time. We next place our "non-standard" entrepreneurial sector within a conventional Dynamic New Keynesian framework. To do so, we add to the model both households and retailers, the latter being included only in order to introduce price inertia in a t~cactable manner. We also add a government sector that conducts fiscal and monetary policies. Since much of the model is standard, we simply write the log-linearized framework used for computations and defer a more detailed derivation to Appendix B. Expressing the model in a log-linearized form makes the way in which the financial accelerator influences business cycle dynamics reasonably transparent.
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4.1. The entrepreneurial sector Recall that entrepreneurs purchase capital in each period for use in the subsequent period. Capital is used in combination with hired labor to produce (wholesale) output. We assume that production is constant returns to scale, which allows us to write the production function as an aggregate relationship. We specify the aggregate production function relevant to any given period t as
Yt = AtKaL]-a,
(4.1)
where Yt is aggregate output o f wholesale goods, Kt is the aggregate amount of capital purchased by entrepreneurs in period t - 1, L~ is labor input, and At is an exogenous technology parameter. Let It denote aggregate investment expenditures. The aggregate capital stock evolves according to
K,+I =
k,K, j K t + ( 1 - 6 ) K t ,
(4.2)
where /5 is the depreciation rate. We assume that there are increasing marginal adjustment costs in the production o f capital, which we capture by assuming that aggregate investment expenditures of L yield a gross output of new capital goods • (I~/Kt)Kt, where q~(.) is increasing and concave and q~(0) = 0. We include adjustment costs to permit a variable price o f capital. As in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), the idea is to have asset price variability contribute to volatility in entrepreneurial net worth. In equilibrium, given the adjustment cost function, the price o f a unit o f capital in terms of the numeraire good, Qt, is given by 12
=
.
(4.3)
We normalize the adjustment cost function so that the price of capital goods is unity in the steady state. Assume that entrepreneurs sell their output to retailers. Let 1/X~ be the relative price o f wholesale goods. Equivalently, Xt is the gross markup of retail goods over wholesale
~2 1b implement investment expenditures in the decentralized equilibrium, think of there being competitive capital producing firms that purchase raw output as a materials input, I~ and combine it with rented capital, Kt to produce new capital goods via the production function q3(g~ I, )Kt. These capital goods are then sold at the price Qt. Since the capital-producing technology assumes constant returns to scale, these capital-producing firms earn zero profits in equilibrium. Equation (4.3) is derived from the first-order condition for investment for one of these firms.
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goods. Then the C o b b - D o u g l a s production technology implies that the rent paid to a unit o f capital in t + 1 (for production o f wholesale goods) is 13
1 aYl+l Xt+l Kt+l The expected gross return to holding a unit o f capital from t to t + 1 can be written k E{Rz+ 1} = E
1 aYt+l
x,2, x,+~ + Q t + l ( 1 - 6 ) Ot
} '
(4.4)
Substitution o f Equations (4.1) and (4.3) into Equation (4.4) yields a reasonably conventional demand curve for new capital. As usual, the return on capital depends inversely on the level o f investment, reflecting diminishing returns. The supply curve for investment finance is obtained by aggregating Equation (3.8) over firms, and inverting to obtain: l, I: Nt+l E{Rt+ I } = s
(4.5)
As in Equation (3.9), the function s(.) is the ratio o f the costs o f external and internal finance; it is decreasing in Nt+l/QtKt+l for Nt~l < QtKt+l. The unusual feature o f this supply curve, o f course, is the dependence o f the cost o f funds on the aggregate financial condition o f entrepreneurs, as measured by the ratio Nt+l/QtI(t+l. The dynamic behavior o f capital demand and the return to capital depend on the evolution o f entrepreneurial net worth, N:+l. N:+I reflects the equity stake that entrepreneurs have in their firms, and accordingly depends on firms' earnings net o f interest payments to lenders. As a technical matter, however, it is necessary to start entrepreneurs off with some net worth in order to allow them to begin operations. Following Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), we assume
t~ To be consistent with our assumption that adjustment costs are external to the firm, we assume that entrepreneurs sell their capital at the end of period t + 1 to the investment sector at price Q~+I. Thus capital is then used to produce new investment goods and resold at the price Q,j. The "rental rate" (Q, 1- Qt+l) reflects the influence of capital accumulation on adjustment costs. This rate is determhled by the zero-profit condition
Q,~2 /
1t \
It
Q,)=o.
In steady state q~( ~ ) = 6 and ~ ' ( U~ :t ) = 1, implying that Q = Q = 1. Around tile steady state, the diffbrence between Qt~l and Qt is second order. We therefore omit the rental term and express Equation (4.4) using Q:~ I rather than Qt+l-
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that, in addition to operating firms, entrepreneurs supplement their income by working in the general labor market. Total labor input Lt is taken to be the following composite of household labor, HI, and "entrepreneurial labor", HI:
L, =Ht++(H/)t-+.
(4,6)
We assume further that entrepreneurs supply their labor inelastically, and we normalize total entrepreneurial labor to unity 14. In the calibrations below we keep the share of income going to entrepreneurial labor small (on the order of .01), so that this modification of the standard production function does not have significant direct effects on the results. Let Vt be entrepreneurial equity (i.e., wealth accumulated by entrepreneurs from operating firms), let W[ denote the entrepreneurial wage, and let ?st denote the state+ contingent value of ?5 set in period t. Then aggregate entrepreneurial net worth at the end of period t, N1+1, is given by
N++I = yVt + W[
(4.7)
with
gt=R)Qt 1Kt-(Rt
~fO°' ~R)Qt-IKtdF(o)~ ~~-t5 ] (Qt-IK" - ~Vt-1)' \ 4-
(4.8)
where g V~ is the equity held by entrepreneurs at t - 1 who are still in business at t. (Entrepreneurs who fail in t consume the residual equity (1 - 7)V, That is, C 7 = (1 - y)V,) Entrepreneurial equity equals gross earnings on holdings of equity from t - 1 to t less repayment of borrowings. The ratio of default costs to quantity borrowed,
# f~, (eRrk Qt jKt dF(co) Qt 1Kt
-- Nt-i
reflects the premium for external finance. Clearly, under any reasonable parametrization, entrepreneurial equity provides the main source of variation in Nt+l. Further, this equity may be highly sensitive to unexpected shifts in asset prices, especially if firms are leveraged. To illustrate, let U[k =- R) - E t j{R~} be the unexpected shift in the gross return to capital, and let
14 Note that entrepreneurs do not have to work only on their own projects (such an assumiption would violate aggregate returns to scale, given that individual projccts can be of different sizes).
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U/p =-- f o ' o)Q~_~Kt dF( co) - Et .i { ~ ' ~oQt 1Kt dF(~o)} be the unexpected shift in the conditional (on the aggregate state) default costs. We can express Vt as V, = [U~k(1-ttU/P)]Qt 1Kt+E, l{V~}.
(4.9)
Now consider the impact of a unexpected increase in the ex post return to capital. Differentiating Equation (4.9) yields an expression for the elasticity of entrepreneurial equity with respect to an unanticipated movement in the return to capital:
ovt/E, l{v,} _ Et I{R~}Qt-IKt /> 1. or;kin, 1{R? } E,, { )
(4.10)
According to Equation (4.10), an unexpected one percent change in the ex post return to capital leads to a percentage change in entrepreneurial equity equal to the ratio of gross holdings of capital to equity. To the extent that entrepreneurs are leveraged, this ratio exceeds unity, implying a magnification effect of unexpected asset returns on entrepreneurial equity. The key point here is that unexpected movements in asset prices, which are likely the largest source of unexpected movements in gross returns, can have a substantial effect on firms' financial positions. In the general equilibrium, further, there is a kind of multiplier effect, as we shall see. An unanticipated rise in asset prices raises net worth more than proportionately, which stimulates investment and, in turn, raises asset prices even further. And so on. This phenomenon will become evident in the model simulations. We next obtain demand curves for household and entrepreneurial labor, found by equating marginal product with the wage for each case:
(1 - a ) ~
= x, N,
(1 -a)(1 - ~ ) ~
(4.11)
= x, wf,
(4.12)
where W~ is the real wage for household labor and Wf is the real wage for entrepreneurial labor. Combining Equations (4.1), (4.7), (4.8), and (4.12) and imposing the condition that entrepreneurial labor is fixed at unity, yields a difference equation for Nt+l:
(4.13) + (1 - a)(1
O)AtK~H~ l-")o.
Equation (4.13) and the supply curve tbr investment funds, Equation (4.5), are the two basic ingredients of the financial accelerator. The latter equation describes how
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movements in net worth influence the cost of capital. The former characterizes the endogenous variation in net worth. Thus far we have determined wholesale output, investment and the evolution of capital, the price of capital, and the evolution of net worth, given the riskless real interest rate Rt+l, the household real wage Wt, and the relative price of wholesale goods I/X, To determine these prices and complete the model, we need to add the household, retail, and government sectors. 4.2. The complete log-linearized model
We now present the complete macroeconomic framework. Much of the derivation is standard and not central to the development of the financial accelerator. We therefore simply write the complete log-linearized model directly, and defer most of the details to Appendix B. As we have emphasized, the model is a DNK framework modified to allow for a financial accelerator. In the background, along with the entrepreneurs we have described are households and retailers. Households are infinitely-lived agents who consume, save, work, and hold monetary and nonmonetary assets. We assume that household utility is separable over time and over consumption, real money balances, and leisure. Momentary utility, further, is logarithmic in each of these arguments is. As is standard in the literature, to motivate sticky prices we modify the model to allow for monopolistic competition and (implicit) costs of adjusting nominal prices. It is inconvenient to assume that the entrepreneurs who purchase capital and produce output in this model are monopolistically competitive, since that assumption would complicate the analyses of the financial contract with lenders and of the evolution of net worth. To avoid this problem, we instead assume that the monopolistic competition occurs at the "retail" level. Specifically, we assume there exists a continuum of retailers (of measure one). Retailers buy output from entrepreneur-producers in a competitive market, then slightly differentiate the output they purchase (say, by painting it a unique color or adding a brand name) at no resource cost. Because the product is differentiated, each retailer has a bit of market power. Households and firms then purchase CES aggregates of these retail goods. It is these CES aggregates that are converted into consumption and investment goods, and whose price index defines the aggregate price level. Profits from retail activity are rebated lump-sum to households (i.e., households are the ultimate owners of retail outlets.) To introduce price inertia, we assume that a given retailer is free to change his price in a given period only with probability 1 - 0. The expected duration of any price change is 1@0- This device, following Calvo (1983), provides a simple way to incorporate staggered long-term nominal price setting. Because the probability of changing price is independent of history, the aggregation problem is greatly simplified. One extra
~5 In particular, householdatilityis givenby £ {~;~ 0[3~[ln(C~,k) + _~ln(Mt.JP, .-/~) + ~ In{1 l[,+i,)]}.
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twist, following Bernanke and Woodford (1997), is that firms setting prices at t are assumed to do so prior to the realization of any aggregate uncertainty at time t. Let lower case variables denote percent deviations from the steady state, and let ratios of capital letters without time subscript denotes the steady state value of the respective ratio. Further, let ~ denote a collection of terms of second-order importance in the equation for any variable z, and let e[ be an i.i.d, disturbance to the equation for variable z. Finally, let Gt denote government consumption, :rt =-p~ - p t - i the rate of inflation from t - 1 to t, and r'/+1 ==- r~+~ + E { p t + l - P t } be the nominal interest rate. It is then convenient to express the complete log-linearized model in terms of four blocks of equations: (1) aggregate demand; (2) aggregate supply; (3) evolution of the state variables; and (4) monetary policy rule and shock processes. Appendix B provides details. (1) Aggregate d e m a n d C
1
G
Ce
y~ = ]7c, + ~ i t + ~ g t + --c~'yt + "
+ q~,
(4.14)
ct = -rt+L + Et {ct+l },
(4.15)
c~ = nt,l + " " +0~:~,
(4.16)
Et{r~÷I}
-Fz+I
-"-u[¥1t+l
r ) + t - ( 1 -- e ) @ t kl -
(qt +kt÷l)],
kt--i Xt+l) @ eqt~ 1 q ,
qt = cp(it - kt).
(4.17) (4.18) (4.19)
(2) Aggregate Supply yt = a, + a k t + (1 - a ) g 2 h ,
(4.20)
Yt- ht-xt -ct
(4.21)
=
~-Iht,
YL) : E t l{l~(-Xt)+ ~2Tt+l }.
(4.22)
(3) Evolution of State Variables kt+l = 6it + (1 - 6 ) k ,
yRK
t,
(4.23)
(4.24)
B.X Bernanke et al.
1362 (4) M o n e t a r y Policy R u l e a n d S h o c k P r o c e s s e s
r, - p r t 1 + gac~ I + el",
17 I
t~
(4.25)
& = pggt-i + ~ ,
(4.26)
aL = p,,at-i + g/,
(4.27)
with
(;
log Iz
~ P
D
# j)
e)dF(~o)R~Qt_IK/DK
)l
,
?O
6o dF(~o)R/',
O~'e = log(1-Ce+l/Ni+~ ) i T c~T;/N ' q~t" =
(Ri'lR-
N 1)K (r~"+q~-i +kt)+
lp(Rk/R) ~'(Rk/R) ' 1),,'
N
[2)(Y/X)
Yt-x~,
1- b (1 - cs) + a Y / ( X K ) '
( ~ ( I / K ) 1)t q) ~ ((D(I/K)
(1 - a)(1 -
(1~_) K" ~
(1 -- 0/~).
Equation (4.14) is the log-lineafized version of the resource constraint. The primary determinants of the variation in aggregate expenditures Yt are household consumption ct, investment it, and government consumption gL. Of lesser importance is variation in entrepreneurial consumption c~ 16. Finally, variation in resources devoted monitoring cost, embedded in the term ~ , also matters in principle. Under reasonable parametrizations, however, this factor has no perceptible impact on dynamics. Household consumption is governed by the consumption Euler relation, given by Equation (4.15). The unit coefficient on the real interest rate (i.e., the intertemporal elasticity of substitution) reflects the assumption of logarithmic utility over con.sumption. By enforcing the standard consumption Euler equation, we are effectively assuming that financial market frictions do not impede household behavior. Numerous authors have argued, however, that credit constraints at the household level influence a non-trivial portion of aggregate consumption spending. An interesting extension of
16 Note that each variable in the log-lmearizedresource constraint is weighted by the variable's share of output in the steady state. Under any reasonableparametrizationof the model, c~ has a relativelylow weight.
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this model would be to incorporate household borrowing and associated frictions. With some slight modification, the financial accelerator would then also apply to household spending, strengthening the overall effect. Since entrepreneurial consumption is a (small) fixed fraction of aggregate net worth (recall that entrepreneurs who retire simply consume their assets), it simply varies proportionately with aggregate net worth, as Equation (4.16) indicates. Equations (4.17), (4.18), and (4.19) characterize investment demand. They are the log-linearized versions of Equations (4.5), (4.4) and (4.3), respectively. Equation (4.17), in particular, characterizes the influence of net worth on investment. In /, the absence of capital market frictions, this relation collapses to Et{rf+~ } -rt+l = 0: Investment is pushed to the point where the expected return on capital, Et{r~+ 1 }, equals the opportunity cost of funds rt+117. With capital market frictions present, however, the cost of external funds depends on entrepreneurs' percentage equity holding, i.e., net worth relative to the gross value of capital, nt~l - (qr + ktf-l). A rise in this ratio reduces the cost of external funds, implying that investment will rise. While Equation (4.17) embeds the financial accelerator, Equations (4.18) and (4.19) are conventional (loglinearized) relations for the marginal product of capital and the link between asset prices and investment. Equations (4.20), (4.21) and (4.22) constitute the aggregate supply block. Equation (4.20) is the linearized version of the production function (4.1), after incorporating the assumption that the supply of entrepreneurial labor is fixed. Equation (4.21) characterizes labor market equilibrium. The left side is the marginal product of labor weighted by the marginal utility of consumption 18. In equilibrium, it varies proportionately with the markup of retail goods over wholesale goods (i.e., the inverse of the relative price of wholesale goods.) Equation (4.22) characterizes price adjustment, as implied by the staggered price setting formulation of Calvo (1983) that we described earlier [along with the modification suggested by Bernanke and Woodford (1997)]. This equation has the flavor of a traditional Phillips curve, once it is recognized that the markup xt varies inversely with the state of demand. With nominal price rigidities, the retail firms that hold their prices fixed over the period respond to increased demand by selling more. To accommodate the rise in sales they increase their purchases of wholesale goods from entrepreneurs, which bids up the relative wholesale price and bids down the markup. it is tbr this reason that - x t provides a measure of demand when prices are sticky. In turn, the sensitivity of inflation to demand depends on the degree of price inertia: The slope coefficient t¢ can be shown to be decreasing in 0, the probability an individual price stays fixed from period to period. One difference between Equation (4.22) and 17 In the absence of capital market frictions, the first-ordercondition from the entrepreneur'spartial equilibrium capital choice decision yields E{R)+ I } = Rt+ L. In this instance if E{R~'4 l} > R , j, the entrepreneurwould buy an infinite amount of capital, and if E{R~+1} < R~+l,he wouldbuy none. When E{Rt+ I } - R ~ 1, he is indifferentabout the scale of operation of his firm. i~ Given logarithmicpreferences,the marginal utility of consumption is simply -%.
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a traditional expectations-augmented Phillips curve is that it involves expected future inflation as opposed to expected current inflation. This alteration reflects the forwardlooking nature of price setting 19 Equations (4.23) and (4.24) are transition equations for the two state variables, capital kt and net worth nt. The relation for capital, Equation (4.23), is standard, and is just the linearized version of Equation (4.2). The evolution of net worth depends primarily on the net return to entrepreneurs on their equity stake, given by the first term, and on the lagged value of net worth. Note again that a one percent rise in the return to capital relative to the riskless rate has a disproportionate impact on net worth due to the leverage effect described in the previous section. In particular, the impact of r) - r~ on nt+l is weighted by the coefficient y R K / N , which is the ratio of gross capital holdings to entrepreneurial net worth. How the financial accelerator augments the conventional D N K model should now be fairly transparent. Net worth affects investment through the arbitrage Equation (4.17). Equation (4.24) then characterizes the evolution of net worth. Thus, among other things, the financial accelerator adds another state variable to the model, enriching the dynamics. All the other equations of the model are conventional for the D N K framework [particularly King and Wohnan's (1996) version with adjustment costs of capital]. Equation (4.25) is the monetary policy rule 2°. Following conventional wisdom, we take the short-term nominal interest rate to be the instrument of monetary policy. We consider a simple rule, according to which the central bank adjusts the current nominal interest rate in response to the lagged inflation rate and the lagged interest rate. Rules o f this form do a reasonably good job of describing the variation of short term interest rates [see Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1997)]. We also considered variants that allow for responses to output as well as inflation, in the spirit of the Taylor (1993) rule. Obviously, the greater the extent to which monetary policy is able to stabilize output, the smaller is the role of the financial accelerator to amplify and propagate business cycles, as would be true for any kind o f propagation mechanism. With the financial accelerator mechanism present, however, smaller countercyclical movements in interest rates are required to dampen output fluctuations. Finally, Equations (4.26) and (4.27) impose that the exogenous disturbances to government spending and technology obey stationary autoregressive processes. We next consider two extensions of the model.
-~oc k t9 Iterating Equation (4.22) forward yields zct = ~,z¢=0/3 ~c(p,w ~ -Pt+k)- With forward-looking price setting, how fast prices adjust depends on the expected discounted stream of future demand. 2o The interest rate rule may be thought of as a money supply equation. The associated money demand equation is given by m, -Pt = ct - ( ~ ) r~l~. Note that under interest-rate targeting this relation simply determines the path of the nominal money stock. To implement its choice of the nominal interest rate~ the central bank adjusts the money stock to satisfy this equation.
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4.2.1. Two extensions o f the baseline model
Two modifications that we consider are: (1) allowing for delays in investment; and (2) allowing for firms with differential access to credit. The first modification permits the model to generate the kind of hump-shaped output dynamics that are observed in the data. The second is meant to increase descriptive realism. 4.2.1.1. Inoestment delays. Disturbances to the economy typically appear to generate a
delayed and hump-shaped response of output. A classic example is the output response to a monetary policy shock [see, e.g., Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996) and Bernanke and Mihov (1998)]. It takes roughly two quarters before an orthogonalized innovation in the federal funds rate, for example, generates a significant movement in output. The peak of the output response occurs well after the peak in the funds rate deviation. Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) address this issue by assuming that consumption expenditures are determined two periods in advance (in a model in which non-durable consumption is the only type of private expenditure). We take an approach that is similar in spirit, but instead assume that it is investment expenditures rather than consumption expenditures that are determined in advance. We focus on investment for two reasons. First, the idea that investment expenditures take time to plan is highly plausible, as recently documented by Christiano and Todd (1996). Second, movements in consumption lead movements in investment over the cycle, as emphasized by Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Christiano and Todd (1996). For example, Bernanke and Gertler (1995) show that in response to a monetary policy shock household spending responds fairly quickly, well in advance of business capital expenditures. Modifying the model to allow for investment delays is straightforward. Suppose that investment expenditure are chosenj periods in advance. Then the first-order condition relating the price of capital to investment, Equation (4.3), is modified to I
1
(4.28) Note that the link between asset prices and investment now holds only in expectation. With the time4o-plan feature, shocks to the economy have an immediate effect on asset prices, but a delayed effect on investment and output 21. To incorporate the investment delay in the model, we simply replace Equation (4.19) with the following log-linearized version of Equation (4.28): Et{qt+j - q)(it+j - kt+j)} - 0.
In our simulations, we take j = 1.
21 Asset prices move inunediately since the return to capital depends on the expected capital gain.
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4.2.1.2. Heterogeneous firms. The baseline model assumes that all firms are alike ex ante, except for initial net worth. In practice, o f course, there is considerable heterogeneity among firms along many dimensions, in particular in access to credit [see, e.g., the discussion in Gertler and Gilchrist (1994)]. To see how heterogeneity affects the results, we add to our model the assumption that there are two types o f firms, those that have easy access to credit, ceteris paribus, and those that (for various informational or incentive reasons, for example) have less access to credit. To accommodate two different types o f firms, we assume that there are two types o f intermediate goods (one produced by each type o f firm) which are combined into a single wholesale good via a CES aggregator. Production of the intermediate good is given by
Yit =A itKaI-[~tH it it t i~(1 J a £2),
i = 1,2.
(4.29)
Aggregate wholesale output is composed o f sectoral output according to (4.30)
= [ . Y ~ + (1 - . ) Y 2 ] ('/"~
We also assume that capital is sector-specific, and that there are costs of adjusting the capital stock within each sector: (4.31)
Ki, t , 1 - Kit = ()(Ii#K.)K. - 6K..
Let ji denote the number of periods in advance that investment expenditures must be chosen in sector i (note that the lag may differ across sectors): Then the link between asset prices and investment in each sector is given by
Note that the price of capital may differ across sectors, but that arbitrage requires that each sector generate the same expected return to capital k Et{ IRkk1,t+l - R2,t+I] [3CI/Cg+I}
=0,
where
~1P5
x,,t+~ + Q,,,+I(I - ,5) /Q,~.
and
Pit p~=a\
(Y1L) p-1 r, j '
Pzt Py
(l_a)(Y2t)P \ r, j
I
are the relative (wholesale) prices of goods produced in sectors t and 2 respectively.
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As we discuss in the next section, it is easy to parametrize the model so that firms in each sector face differential costs o f credit. Further, as we illustrate below, the financial accelerator can still be quite potent, even if only a portion o f firms face significant capital market frictions. Indeed, there may spillover effects from constrained to nonconstrained firms. it is straightforward to log-linearize these equations and append them to the general model. Modified will be the aggregate supply block, to allow for the two types of intermediate output, and the law o f motion for capital, to allow for two distinct types of capital.
5. Model simulations
In this section we present the results of some quantitative experiments to illustrate how the financial accelerator influences business cycle dynamics within the DNK framework. Specifically, we consider how credit-market imperfections amplify and propagate various shocks to the economy. We also examine the effects of allowing for delays in investment and of allowing for some firms to have better access to credit market than others. 5.1. M o d e l parametrization
We choose fairly standard values for the taste and technology parameters. We set the quarterly discount factor fi to 0.99 (which also pins down the steady state quarterly riskless rate, R = [3-1). We fix the labor supply elasticity, t/, at 3.0, in keeping with much o f the literature 22. As is also within convention, the capital share, a, is 0.35, and the household labor share, (1 - a)(1 - g2), is 0.64. The share of income accruing to entrepreneurs' labor is accordingly equal to 0.01. The quarterly depreciation rate for capital, 6, is assigned the usual value of 0.025. We take the steadystate share o f government expenditures in total output, G / Y , to be 0.2, the approximate historical average. The serial correlation parameters for the technology and government expenditure shocks, pa and pg, are assumed to be 1.0 and 0.95, respectively. Finally, the elasticity o f the price of capital with respect to the investment capital ratio, q), is taken to be 0.25. There is no firm consensus in the literature about what this parameter value should be 23. Reasonable assumptions about adjustment costs suggest that the value should lie within a range from 0.0 to 0.50.
22 in particular, we fix average hours worked relative to total hours available at a value that, in conjunction with logarithmic preferences over leisure, generates the desired labor supply elasticity. 23 King and Wolman (1996) use a value of 2.0, based on estimates fi-om aggregate data by Chirinko (1993). Because this value implies implausibly high adjustment costs, we do not use it.
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The non-standard parameters of our model pertain to the interplay between real and financial factors within the entrepreneurial sector 24. Specifically, we choose parameters to imply the following three steady state outcomes: (1) a risk spread, R ~ - R , equal to two hundred basis points, approximately the historical average spread between the prime lending rate and the six-month Treasury bill rate; (2) an annualized business failure rate, F(N), of three percent, the approximate rate in the data; (3) a ratio of capital to net worth, ~, K of 2 (or equivalently, a leverage ratio of 0.5), the approximate value in the data. l b obtain these steady state values we choose the "death rate" of entrepreneurs, 1 - y, to be 0.0272 (quarterly), we take the idiosyncratic productivity variable, log(o)), to be log-normally distributed with variance equal to 0.28, and we set the fraction of realized payoffs lost in bankruptcy,/~, to 0.12. We note that our choice for/~ is within the reasonable set of estimates for bankruptcy costs 25. The final parameters to be selected are those related to the rate of price adjustment and to the policy rule. We let the probability a firm does not change its price within a given period, 0, equal to 0.75, implying that the average period between price adjustments is four quarters. In the policy rule, Equation (4.25), we set the autoregressive parameter, p, to 0.9 and the coefficient on inflation equal to 0.11 (implying a long-run rise in the nominal interest rate of one hundred and ten basis points in response to a permanent one hundred basis point increase in inflation.) These numbers are roughly in line with the evidence, allowing for the fact that there have been shifts in the actual feedback rule over time [see Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1997)]. 5.2. Results
In our experiments we consider four types of aggregate shocks: (1) a monetary policy shock, (2) a technology shock, (3) a government expenditure shock, and (4) a one° time, unanticipated transfer of wealth from households to entrepreneurs. We first study the response of the economy to these shocks in our model, excluding and including the financial accelerator. We then consider the implications of allowing for investment delays and heterogeneous firms. 5.2.1. Response to a monetary policy shock
The first experiment we consider is a monetary policy shock, specifically an unanticipated exogenous movement in the short-term interest rate. Analyzing the response of the model economy to a monetary policy disturbance provides a good way to evaluate our framework since a lengthy literature has produced a consensus of
24 Ore parameter choices here follow closely Fisher (1996) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (t997). 2s See the discussion of bankruptcy costs in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). They actually use a higher number than we do (0.20 versus 0.12).
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Fig. 2. Impulse response to a funds rate shock. opinion about how the economy responds to this kind o f shock 26. Figure 2 summarizes this evidence, and also presents some new evidence on the behavior of several rate spread variables that proxy for premium for external funds, a key element o f our model. The results in Figure 2 are based on a five-variable quarterly VAR that includes four "standard" macroeconomic variables - the log o f real GDR the log o f the GDP deflator, the log o f a commodity price index, the federal funds rate -- along with two rate spread variables. To identify the policy shock, we order the funds rate after the price and output variables, based on the view that monetary policy can respond contemporaneously to these variables but can affect them only with a lag. We order tile spread variable after the funds rate based on the assumption that innovations in these variables do not contain any marginal information that is useful for setting current monetary policy. The two rate spread variables we consider are the difference between the six-month commercial paper rate and the six-month T-bill rate and the difference between the prime lending rate and the six-month T-bill rate.
26 See, for example, Ctmstiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (t996), Bernanke m~d Gertler (1995), Bernal~e and Mihov (1998), and Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996).
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Figure 2 illustrates the impulse responses of several variables to a negative innovation in the federal funds rate. As is typically found in the literature, output declines after about two quarters, and the price level declines after about six quarters. The output decline, further, persists well after the funds rate reverts to trend. Finally, each of the spread variables rises fairly quickly, leading the downturn in output 27. Figure 3 reports the impact of the same experiment, but this time using the model economy. As in all the subsequent figures, the time units on the graphs are to be interpreted as quarters. In each picture the hatched line designates the "baseline" impulse response, generated by fixing the external finance premium at its steady state level instead of allowing it to respond to changes in the capital-net worth ratio. In other words, the baseline simulations are based on a model with the same steady state as the complete model with imperfect credit markets, but in which the additional dynamics associated with the financial accelerator have been "turned off". The solid line in each picture indicates the response observed in the complete model, with the financial accelerator included. The figure shows the impact of an unanticipated 25 basis point (on an annual basis) decline in the nominal interest rate. Although the addition of credit-market frictions does not substantially affect the behavior of the nominal rate of interest, it does lead to a stronger response of real variables. In particular, with the financial accelerator included, the initial response of output to a given monetary impulse is about 50% greater, and the effect on investment is nearly twice as great. Further, the persistence of the real effects is substantially greater in the presence of the credit-market factors, e.g., relative to trend, output and investment in the model with credit-market imperfections after four quarters are about where they are in baseline model after only two quarters. The impact of the financial accelerator is mirrored in the behavior of the external finance premium, which is passive in the baseline model (by assumption) but declines sharply in the complete model, slowly reverting to trend. The unanticipated decline in the funds rate stimulates the demand for capital, which in turn raises investment and the price of capital. The unanticipated increase in asset prices raises net worth, forcing down the external finance premium, which in turn further stimulates investment. A kind of multiplier effect arises, since the burst in investment raises asset prices and net worth, further pushing up investment. Entrepreneurial net worth reverts to trend as firms leave the market, but the effect is slow enough to make the external finance premium persist below trend. This persistence in net worth and the external finance premium provides the additional source of dynamics. It is interesting to observe that the response of the spread in the model economy matches the VAR evidence reasonably well.
27 It is worth noting that the impulse response of the prime-rate spread is twice as large as the impulse response of the commercial-paperspread. Since commercial paper issuers are high quality firms, this result is consistent with our model's implication that lower-quality borrowers experience larger spread movementsin response to business cycle shocks.
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It is worth emphasizing that this experiment generates substantial output persistence without relying on an unusually high labor supply elasticity, as is required for the baseline model [see, e.g., the discussion in Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (1996)]. The countercyclical movement in the premium for external funds (which is the essence of the financial accelerator) serves to flatten the marginal cost curve, as does making labor supply elastic in the baseline model. Overall, these results lend some supports to the claims of Bernanke and Gertler (1995), that credit-market effects can help explain both the strength of the economy's response to monetary policy and the tendency for policy effects to linger even after interest rates have returned to normal. The fact that the model economy replicates the VAR evidence reasonably well is particularly encouraging. The one major point of discrepancy is that the response of output to a monetary shock is delayed in the data, but occurs immediately in the model economy 28. We show shortly, however, that this problem can be fixed by allowing for investment delays.
2~ It is also true that the output response is large relative to the interest rate shock. This partly reflects the high degree of intertemporal substitution embedded in the household savings decision, It may also reflect unreasonably short investment delays.
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5.2.2. Shock to technology, demand, and wealth
Figure 4 displays the effects on output of three alternative shocks: a technology shock, a demand shock (specifically a shock to government expenditures), and a redistribution of wealth between entrepreneurs and households. Once again, the hatched lines show impulse responses from the baseline model with the financial accelerator shut off, and the solid lines show the results from the full model. As the figure shows, the financial accelerator magnifies and propagates both the technology and demand shocks. Interestingly, the magnitude of the effects is about the same as for the monetary policy shock. Again, the central mechanism is the rise in asset prices associated with the investment boom, which raises net worth and thus reduces the external finance premium. The extra persistence comes about because net worth is slow to revert to trend. A positive shock to entrepreneurial wealth (more precisely, a redistribution fi:om households to entrepreneurs) has essentially no effect in the baseline model, but has both significant impact and propagation effects when credit-market frictions are present. The wealth shock portrayed is equal in magnitude to about 1% of the initial wealth of entrepreneurs and about 0.05% of the wealth of households. The transfer of wealth drives up the demand for investment goods, which raises the price of capital and thus entrepreneurs' wealth, initiating a positive feedback loop; thus, although the exogenous shock increases entrepreneurial net worth directly by only 1%, the total effect on entrepreneurs' wealth including the endogenous increase in asset prices exceeds 2%. Output rises by 1% at an annual rate, and substantial persistence is generated by the slow decay of entrepreneurial net worth. Thus the addition of credit-market effects raises the possibility that relatively small changes in entrepreneurial wealth could be an important source of cyclical fluctuations. This case is an interesting one, as it is reminiscent of(and motivated by) Fisher's (1933) "debt-deflation" argument, that redistributions between creditors and debtors arising from unanticipated price changes can have important real effects. Indeed, Fisher argued
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that this kind of mechanism accounted for the depth and protractedness of the Great Depression 29. The same kind of reasoning, further, helps explain why the recent spate of currency crises have had devastating real effects. To the extent loans from abroad are denominated in units of a foreign currency, an exchange rate collapse redistributes wealth from domestic borrowers to foreign lenders. 5.2.3. Investment delays and heterogeneous firms
We now suppose that investment expenditures must be planned one quarter in advance, as in Section 5.2, and consider the effect of a monetary shock. As Figure 5 illustrates, an expansionary monetary policy shock (again, an unanticipated 25 basis point decline in the funds rate) now generates a hump-shaped response of output, as in the data. This hump-shaped response is considerably more accentuated when the financial accelerator is allowed to operate. The initial response of output is still too strong, suggesting that it may be desirable to build in other types of lags. On the other hand, the persistence of the response of output is considerably greater than in the case without investment delays, and comes much closer to matching the data. Interestingly, there remains an immediate response of the external funds premium as the data suggest. The reason is that asset prices rise immediately, in anticipation of the investment boom. We next consider the model with heterogeneous firms. We choose parameters so that firms in sector 2 face a steady-state premium for external finance of 3% per year, while firms in sector l face a premium of only 1%. We set a = .5125 to generate an average steady-state premium of 2%. As a consequence of this assumption, roughly half of the economy's output is produced by credit-constrained firms, a breakdown which is in accord with the rough evidence summarized in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilctu'ist (1996). We set p = 0.9, implying that the goods produced in the two sectors are close substitutes. Assuming a high degree of substitutability biases the results against finding important aggregate effects of credit-market frictions in this setup; however, our results turned out to be not very sensitive to the choice o f p . With sector-specific adjustment costs, the effective marginal cost of adjusting the aggregate capital stock is dramatically increased owing to the additional curvature implied by the two sector model. To achieve the same degree of overall capital adjustment as in the one-sector model we lower the adjustment cost elasticity q) from 0.25 to 0.1. Finally, we allow for a one-period delay in the investment of sector-2 firms and a two period delay for sector-1 firms. This choice is based on the observation that credit-constrained firms tend to be smaller, and rims likely more flexible [see, e.g., Gertler and Gilchrist (1994)]. All other parameters are the same as in the baseline DNK model. Figure 6 shows the results of a shock to monetary policy in the model with heterogeneous firms. The top left panel shows the response of output (the solid line),
29 Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990) argue that the tinancial accelerator mechanismprovides a tormal rationale for Fisher's debt-deflationtheory of the Great Depression.
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relative to the baseline case with the financial accelerator shut off (the hatched line). In response to an unanticipated fall in the funds rate, output rises by approximately the same amount as it did in the aggregative New Keynesian model with investment delays, both for the baseline model without credit-market frictions and for the complete model with differential access of firms to credit. One interesting difference is that the differential investment delays across sectors smooth out the hump-shaped response of output, adding to the overall persistence of the output response. Thus, the effect of credit-market frictions on the propagation of shocks is roughly the same in the onesector and two-sector versions of the model. The two-sector model also has cross-sectional implications, of course. The top and bottom panels on the right side of Figure 6 show the sectoral responses of output and investment. The solid line corresponds to the sector facing the relatively higher cost of external finance and the dotted line corresponds to the other sector. We find that, in response to an expansionary monetary policy shock, investment by firms with relatively poor access to external credit markets rises by nearly three times as much as the investment of firms with better access to credit. This "excess sensitivity" of the more constrained firms is consistent with evidence reported by Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), Kashyap, Lamont and Stein (1994), Oliner and Rudebusch (1994), Morgan ( 1998), and
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Fig. 6. Monetaryshock multisectormodel with investmentdelays. All panels: time horizon in quarters. Aggregate output: models with and without financial accelerator; other panels: model with financial accelerator. others. Although investment differs sharply across firrns in the simulation, changes in output are similar for the two types of firms. Differing output effects could be produced, for example, by introducing inventories or inputs to production that must be financed by borrowing. Our finding that constrained firms' investment spending reacts more strongly to monetary policy contrasts with that of Fisher (1996), who obtains an ambiguous result. We suspect that the main source of the difference in predictions is that, in our setting, borrowers' net worth is endogenous and is a key channel through which monetary policy affects credit availability. In Fisher's model, in contrast, borrowers' equity positions are exogenously fixed and are unaffected by changes in policy.
6. A highly selected review of the literature The theoretical and empirical literatures on credit-market imperfections are immense, Until recently, the great bulk of this research has been partial equilibrium in nature, e.g., theoretical analyses of equilibria in credit markets with asymmetric information
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and agency costs, or empirical studies of the effects of credit-market imperfections on various types of spending, including consumption, housing, business investment, and inventory investlnent. Some leading recent examples of the latter category are cited in the introduction; see, e.g., Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) tbr additional references. Other surveys of these literatures which the reader may find useful include Gertler (1988), Gertler and Hubbard (1988), Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990), Bernanke (1993), Calomiris (1993), Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), Kashyap and Stein (1994), Oliner and Rudebusch (1994), Bernanke and Gertler (1995), and Hubbard (1995). To keep our survey of relevant literature brief, we limit consideration to the more recent work that, like the present research, studies the implications of credit-market frictions for macroeconomic dynamics. Even within this limited field our review must necessarily be selective; we focus on the work that bears the closest relationship to the model we have presented. In particular, we do not discuss the burgeoning related literature on the role of financial markets in economic growth [see, e.g., Levine (1997) for a survey of this topic] or in economic development [see, e.g., Townsend (1995)]. Nor do we consider research focusing on the role of banks in business cycles, primarily because there has been little work on the "bank lending channel" and related effects in an explicitly dynamic context 3o. We do believe however that the incorporation of a banking sector into our model would be a highly worthwhile exercise. Indeed, given that commercial banks borrow to order to fund investments in information-intensive, risky projects, and in this way bear resemblance to the entrepreneurs in our model, one could envision a relatively straightforward that allows for agency frictions int tile intermediary sector. On the theoretical side, the two principal antecedents of the approach used in the present chapter are Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Bernanke and Gertler (1989) analyze an overlapping-generations model in which borrowers/firms with fixed-size investment projects to finance face the "costly state verification" problem of Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985) 31. As we discussed in detail in the presentation of our model above, the optimal contract in this setting has the features of a standard debt contract. As we noted earlier, the principal virtue of this setup, other than simplicity, is that it motivates an inverse relationship between the potential borrower's wealth and the expected agency costs of the lenderborrower relationship (here, the agency costs are equated with monitoring/bankruptcy costs). In particular, a potential borrower with high net worth needs to rely relatively little on external finance; he thus faces at most a small risk of bankruptcy and a small
3o Interestingrecent exceptions are Gersbach (t997) and Krishnamurthy (t997). Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) analyzethe role of bank collateral and monitoring in a static context. Severalpapers have studied the role of banks in the context of "limited participation" models, see for example Fisher (1996) and Cooley and Quadrini (1997).] 31 Williamson (1987) also incorporates the costly state verification assanaption into a modified real business cycle naodel.
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premium on external finance. A borrower with less resources of his own to invest, in contrast, faces a high bankruptcy risk and a high external finance premium. In the Bernanke-Gertler model, shocks to the economy are amplified and propagated by their effects on borrowers' cash flows. For example, an adverse productivity shock lowers current cash flows, reducing the ability of firms to finance investment projects from retained earnings. This decline in net worth raises the average external finance premium and the cost of new investments. Declining investment lowers economic activity and cash flows in subsequent periods, amplifying and propagating the effects of the initial shock. Bernanke and Gertler show that this effect can generate serially correlated movements in aggregate output, even though the exogenous shocks to the system are i.i.d. They also show that in their model the dynamics of the cycle are nonlinear; in particular, the weaker the initial financial condition of borrowers, the more powerful is the propagation effect through cash flows. A number of subsequent papers have shown that this basic analysis can be extended and deepened without affecting the qualitative results: For example, Gertler (1992) considers the case of multi-period financial contracts. Aghion and Bolton (1997) give an extensive analysis of the shortrun and long-run dynamic behavior of a closely-related model. And Aghion, Banerjee and Piketty (1997) show how the dynamics of this sort of model are affected when interest rate movements are endogenous (Bernanke and Gertler assume that the real interest rate is fixed by the availability of an alternative technology.) The model that we presented utilizes a number of the features of the Bernanke-Gertler model, notably the overlapping-generations assumption for entrepreneurs and the costly state verification model of intermediation. As in Bernanke and Gertler (1989), our model here implies a central role for the endogenous evolution of borrowers' net worth in macroeconomic dynamics. Other authors have developed dynamic macroeconomic models in which cash flows play a critical role in the propagation mechanism. Notably, Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) construct a model in which, as in Bernanke and Gertler (1989), firms have access only to debt financing (equity finance is ruled out by assumption). Because bankruptcy is costly, firms are reluctant to become highly levered; their initial equity or net worth thus effectively constrains the quantity of funds that they can raise in capital markets. Greenwald and Stiglitz assume that there is a one-period lag between the use of variable inputs and the production of output. A firm that suffers a decline in cash flow is able to finance fewer inputs and less production. Lower production implies lower profits, which propagates the effects of the initial fall in cash flow. The Greenwald-Stiglitz model thus illustrates that financial factors may affect the level of inputs, such as employment or inventories, as well as the level of capital investment (as in Bernanke-Gertler). The basic intuition concerning how credit-market imperfections propagate the cycle is similar in the two models, however. The net worth of borrowers changes not only in response to variations in cash flow, but also (and often, more dramatically) to changes in the valuation of the real and financial assets that they hold. Indeed, changes in asset values are taken by Fisher (1933) and other classical writers on the subject to be the principal means by which
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financial forces propagate an economic decline. This element was added to the formal literature by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), who develop a dynamic equilibrium model in which endogenous fluctuations in the market prices o f an asset (land, in their example) are the main source o f changes in borrowers' net worth and hence in spending and production 32. Kiyotaki and Moore analyze a stylized example in which land serves both as a factor o f production and as a source o f collateral for loans to producers, in this economy, a temporary shock (to productivity, for example) lowers the value o f land and hence o f producers' collateral. This leads in turn to tightened borrowing constraints, less production and spending, and finally to still further reductions in land values, which propagates the shock further through time 33. We consider the asset-price channel to be an important one, and it plays an important role in generating the significant quantitative effects we obtained in our calibration exercises 34. Turning from theoretical to empirical research, we note that there are very few examples o f fully articulated macro models including capital-market imperfections that have been estimated by classical methods (the major exception being some large macroeconometric forecasting models, as noted in the introduction). The quantitative research most closely related to the present chapter uses the calibration technique. Our work here is particularly influenced by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), which in turn draws from analyses by Fisher (1996), Fuerst (1995) and Gertler (1995), as well as from the theoretical model o f Bernanke and Gertler (1989) discussed above. As we do in the model presented in this chapter, Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) study the optimal lending contract between financial intermediaries and entrepreneurs when verifying the return to entrepreneurs' projects is costly for the lender. They then embed the resulting representation o f credit markets in an otherwise conventional real business cycle model. They find that the endogenous evolution o f net worth plays an important role in the simulated dynamic responses o f the model to various types o f shock.
32 Suarez and Sussman (1997) present a dynamic model in which asset price declines, induced by "fire sales" by bankrupt firms, contribute to cyclical fluctuations. 33 In the model we presented earlier, entrepreneurs do not obtain insurance against aggregate shocks because their indirect utility functions are linear in wealth (due to the assumptions of risk neutrality and constant returns to scale), while households are risk-averse. Krishnamurthy (1997) points out that in more general settings entrepreneurs are likely to want to obtain this kind of insurance, which raises the question of why the posited credit-market effects should be empirically relevant. Krishnamurthy's answer is that the ability of lenders or other insurers to insure against large aggregate shocks depends in turn on the insurers' own net worth, which may be reduced during a severe recession. He goes on to develop a model with implications similar to that of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), except that it is the net worth of lenders or insurers, rather than that of borrowers, that plays the crucial role. See Kiyotaki and Moore (1998) tbr a related argument. 34 Another potentially interesting chatmel, emphasized by Kiyotaki and Moorc (1998), involves the interdependency that arises from credit chains, where firms are simultaneously lending and borrowing. These authors show that small shocks can induce a kind of domino effect, due to the chain, that leads to big effects on the economy.
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An interesting finding of their research is that the model with credit-market frictions generates a hump-shaped output response, consistent with most empirical findings. Our model presented above has many features in comrnon with that of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). Putting aside some technical details, there are however two major differences between the two models. First, we consider a sticky-price setting in the Dynamic New Keynesian tradition, while Carlstrom and Fuerst restrict themselves to a model with flexible prices. Thus we are able to examine the interaction of credit-market frictions with shocks to monetary policy, or to other nominal variables. The second difference is more subtle but is also important: Carlstrom and Fuerst assume that the agency problem applies only to producers of investment goods, who produce capital directly from the output good. The output good is produced, using both capital and labor, by separate firms who do not face agency problems in external finance. As a result of these assumptions, in the Carlstrom-Fuerst model, changes in net worth affect the economy primarily by affecting the supply price of capital (when net worth is low, less capital is produced at any given price). In our model, in contrast, the agency problem applies to producers of final output, who own the economy's durable capital stock. Since borrowers own the economy's capital stock, changes in the price of capital directly affect their net worth; that is, our model more directly incorporates the asset price effects stressed by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). As a result, we find that creditmarket frictions amplify shocks to the economy to a greater degree than do Carlstrom and Fuerst. On the other hand, a clear virtue of Carlstrom-Fuerst model is that the credit-mechanism helps able to explain the real world auto-correlation properties of output.
7. Directions ti)r future work In subsequent research we hope to consider several extensions to the work so far: First, as noted above, we have not addressed the role of banks in cyclical fluctuations, despite considerable attention to banking in the previous theoretical and empirical literatures. There are several ways to incorporate a nontrivial role for banks into our framework; one possibility is to allow the financial intermediaries which lend to entrepreneurs to face financial frictions in raising funds themselves. In this case, the net worth of the banking sector, as well as the net worth of entrepreneurs, will matter for the models' dynamics. Second, an important institutional fact is that debt contracts in low-inflation countries are almost always set in nominal terms, rather than in real terms as in this chapter. It would be relatively easy to incorporate nominal contracting into this model, in order to evaluate whether the redistributions among debtors and creditors associated with unanticipated changes in the price level are of quantitative significance. Doing so would enable us to critically assess recent arguments that deflation may pose a serious threat to the US economy.
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Third, we have restricted the analysis to a closed economy. It would be interesting to extend the analysis to the open economy. By doing so it would be possible to analyze how a currency crisis may induce financial distress that is transmitted to the real sector 35. As we discussed in Section 5, to the extent an exchange rate collapse redistributes wealth from domestic borrowers to domestic lenders (owing to the fact that loans are denominated in units o f foreign currency), the model o f our chapter predicts a contraction in real activity. Finally, in this chapter we have restricted the credit-market frictions to the investment sector. It would be interesting to study how the results might be affected if these frictions affect other components o f spending, such as consumption, inventory investment, and housing.
Appendix A. The optimal financial contract and the demand for capital In this appendix we provide a detailed analysis of the partial equilibrium costly-stateverification problem discussed in Section 3. We start with the case of no aggregate risk and show that under the assumptions made in the text, the optimal contract provides a monotonically increasing relationship between the capital/wealth ratio and the premium on external funds: QK/N = ~(RX/R) with ~p/(.) > 0. We also establish that the default probability N is a strictly increasing function o f the premium RX/R, implying that the optimal contract guarantees an interior solution and therefore does not involve quantity rationing of credit. This appendix also provides functional forms for the contract structure. In particular, for the case o f the log-normal distribution we provide exact analytical expressions for the payoff functions to the lender and entrepreneur. In the final section of this appendix we extend the analysis to the case of aggregate risk and show that the previously established results continue to hold.
A. L The partial equilibrium contracting problem Let profits per unit of capital equal coRk, where co ~ [0, ec) is an idiosyncratic shock with E(co) = 1. We assume F(x) = Pr[co < x] is a continuous probability distribution with F(0) = 0. We denote b y f ( c o ) the pdf o f o . Given an initial level o f net worth N, and a price of capital Q, the entrepreneur borrows QK - N, to invest K units o f capital in the project. The total return on capital is thus o)RkQK. We assume co is unknown to both the entrepreneur and the lender prior to the investment decision. After the investment decision is made, the lender can only observe co by paying the monitoring cost l~coR~QK, where 0 < ¢~ < 1. Let the required return on lending equal R, with R < R K,
35 See Mishkin (1997) for a discussion of how the financial accelerator mechanism may be useful ~br understanding the recent currency crises in Mexico and Southeast Asia.
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The optimal contract specifies a cutoffvalue N such that i f co ~> N, the borrower pays the lender the fixed amount NR KQK and keeps the equity (co - - ~ ) R K QK. Alternatively; if co < N, the borrower receives nothing, while the lender monitors the borrower and receives (1 - IJ)coRK QK in residual claims net o f monitoring costs, in equilibrium, the lender earns an expected return equal to the safe rate R implying [NPr(co ~> N ) + (1 -/OE(colco < N) Pr(co < N)]RKQK = R ( Q K - N ) . Given constant returns to scale, the cutoff N determines the division o f expected gross profits RXQK between borrower and lender. We define F(~5) as the expected gross share o f profits going to the lender: F(~) =
f0
cof(co) d o + N
f(co) dco, ,]co
and note that F'(~) = 1-F(~),
F'(N)
-f(N),
implying that the gross payment to the lender is strictly concave in the cutoff value N. We similarly define g G ( N ) as the expected monitoring costs:
14G (~) ==-p
f0~ col(co) do,
and note that
~ c ' (~) -: p~f(~). The net share o f profits going to the lender is F(~0) - t~G(N), and the share going to the entrepreneur is 1 - F(N), where by definition F(o--) satisfies 0 < F ( N ) < 1. The assumptions made above imply: F(bS)-pG(~)>0
for
N C ( 0 , oo)
and lim F ( N ) - p G ( N ) = 0, ~ 0
lim F(cd) - #G(bS) = l - ~. 75 .---* o c
We therefore assume that Rk(1 - #) < R, otherwise the firm could obtain unbounded profits under monitoring that occurs with probability one s6.
36 The bound on F(~5) can be easily seen 17oii1the Ihct that both F(N) = E(~@~ < W)Pr(w < (~).-~ NPr(co ~>N) and 1 F(N) = (E(~o!(o >~~) -N)Pr(~o/> N) are positive. The limits on F(~5) -/~G(~]) can be seen by recognizing that G(?5) = E(co[~o < ~)Pr(m < N) so that lim~o~ G(N) = E(~o) = 1.
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Let h(N) = (f(~o)/(1 - F ( N ) ) , the hazard rate. We assume that Nh(N) is increasing in N 37. There are two immediate implications from this assumption regarding the shape of the net payoff to the lender. First, differentiating F(N) - #G(N), there exists an ~* such that
F'(~5)--t~G'(N) = (1 - F ( N ) ) ( 1 -/~Nh(N)) > 0
for
N < o) ,
implying that the net payoff to the lender reaches a global maximum at N*. The second implication of this assumption is that
F'(~)G"(~)-r"(~)6'(co)
- d(--d@T0°)))(1- F ( e ) ) ) 2 > 0
for all
These two implications are used to guarantee a non-rationing outcome. The optimal contracting problem with non-stochastic monitoring may now be written as
F (N) )Rk QK
max(1 K,~O
subject to [F(N) - pG(o)]RI'QK = R(QK - N). It is easiest to analyse this problem by first explicitly defining the premium on external funds s = Rk/R and then, owing to constant returns to scale, normalizing by wealth and using k = Q K / N the capital/wealth ratio as the choice variable 3s. Defining 2 as the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint that lenders earn their required rate of return
37 Any monotonically increasing transformation of the normal distribution satisfies this condition. To see this, define the inverse transformation z = z(?5), z'(N) > 0, with z ~ N(0, 1). The hazard rate for the standard normal satisfies h(z) = O(z)/(t - qS(z)), implying
(1
~o0(z(co)) ~(z(~)))
Difl'erentiating Nh(N) we obtain
d(o~h((o))
h(z(N)) + Oh'(z(N)) z'(N) > O,
dN where the inequality follows from the fact that the hazard rate for the standard normal is positive and strictly increasing. 3s It is worth noting that the basic contract structure as well as the non-rationing outcome extends in a straightforward manner to the case of non-constant returns to capital, as long as monitoring costs remain proportional to capital returns.
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in expectation, the first-order conditions for an interior solution to this problem may be written: : r ' ( ~ - ~ [ r ' ( @ - ~ G ' ( ~ ) ] = 0, k " [(1 - F(o~)) + ,~(F(o---)- # 6 ( 0 ) ] ;t" [ F ( N ) -
yG(N)lsk
- (k -
s - )~ = 0,
1) = 0.
Since F ( ~ k~G(N) is increasing on (0,N*) and decreasing on (N*, oo), the lender would never choose N > N*. We first consider the case 0 < co < N* which implies an interior solution 39. As we will show below, a sufficient condition to guarantee an interior solution is 1
s < F ( ~ * ) - ~tG(~*) - s * . We will argue below that s / > s* cannot be an equilibrium. A s s u m i n g an interior solution, the EO.C. with respect to the cutoff-(5 implies we can write the Lagrange multiplier )~ as a function o f N:
Z(~) =
r,(~
F'(~) ~G'(~)
Taking derivatives we obtain ~,(~)
-
~ [r'(~)a"(@ [r'(~
- F"(~)G'(@] -
~G'(~] 2
>0
for
~C(0,~*),
where the inequality follows directly from the assumption that ~ h ( ~ ) is increasing. Taking limits we obtain lim 2 ( ~ )
1,
~/--~0
lim )~(~o)= +oo. ?5 --~ i5"
Now define X(@ p(~5) =_ (1 - F(?~) + 3,(F(~) - / ~ G ( ~ ) ) ' then the EO.C. imply that the cutoff ~ satisfies s = p(N)
(A. 1)
so that p ( N ) is the wedge between the expected rate o f return on capital and the safe return demanded by lenders. Again, computing derivatives we obtain 2~ ( ) 1 - C(~) p'(?~-) = p ( ~ ' ~. . ( 1 - F ( ~ ) + J ~ ( F ( ~ ) - ~ G ( ~ ) )
> 0
for
N 5 (0, N~),
and taking limits: lim p ( ~ ) - - 1, ~-~0
lim p ( ~ ) = .,-.,~3"
1 1 ( F ( N * ) - # G ( N * ) ) ~ s* < -1--. / 2
Thus, for s < s*, these conditions guarantee a one-to-one mapping between the optimal cutoff N and the premium on external fhnds s. By inverting Equation (A.1) we may 39 Obviously, 65 = 0 cannot be a solution if s > 1.
B.X Bernanke et al.
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express this relationship as N = ~(s), where N~(s) > 0 for s E (1,s*). Equation (A.1) thus establishes the monotonically increasing relationship between default probabilities and the premium on external funds. Now define T ( ~ ) -- 1 +
x(r(~)
- ~G(~))
1 - r(~
Then, given a cutoff N C (0, ~*) the EO.C. imply a unique capital/wealth (and hence leverage) ratio: k
kv(~.
(A.2)
Computing derivatives we obtain
~'(~) r'(~) ~'(~): ~ (~(~)-- 1)+ q~(~5) > 0 1- r ( ~ )
for
co E (0, ~*),
and taking limits: lim ~ ( N ) = 1, ~--+0
lim
tp(N) = +oc.
o) ---~ a~*
Combining Equation (A. 1) with Equation (A.2) we may express the capital/wealth ratio as an increasing function of the premium on external funds: k - ~p(s),
(A.3)
with
'q/(s) > 0 tbr s c (I,s*). Since lim~o~o, q-t(~o) - +oc and lim~o--+~o*p(~5) - s*, as s approaches s* from below, the capital stock becomes unbounded. In equilibrium this will lower the excess return s. Now consider the possibility that the lender sets o) - co*. The lender would only do so if the excess return s is greater than s*. In this case, the lender receives an expected excess return equal to
(c(~*)
~G(~*)) sk k =
S
--
S*
S*
k >0.
Since the expected excess return is strictly positive for all k, the lender is willing to lend out an arbitrary large amount, and both the borrower and lender can obtain unbounded profits. Again, such actions would drive down the rate o f return on capital
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in equilibrium, ensuring s < s* and guaranteeing an interior solution for the cutoff ~ (o, ~*). A.2. The l o g - n o r m a l d i s t r i b u t i o n
In this section, we provide analytical expressions for F(~--) and _F(N) - /~G(N), for the case where co is distributed log-normally 4°. Under the assumption that ln(co) ~ N(-½cr 2, cr2) we have E(co) = 1 and 1 -
E(co]co/> ~ ) -
4,(~ 1 -
-
a)
¢(z)
'
where @(.) is the c.d.f, of the standard normal and z is related to N through z - 0n(N) + 0.502)/o ". Using the fact that 1 - F ( N ) = (E(co]co ~> 05) - co) Pr(co ~> ~)), we obtain
r ( m ) - O(z
c0 + m[l - o(~)1
and r(co)-
~ G ( m ) = (l - ~ ) q , ( ~ -
,J) + co[1 - O(z)].
A.3. A g g r e g a t e r i s k
To accommodate the possibility o f aggregate risk, we modify the contracting framework in the following manner. Let profits per unit o f capital expenditures now equal rcoR k where co represents the idiosyncratic shock, r represents an aggregate shock to the profit rate, and E(co) = E ( r ) = 1. Since entrepreneurs are risk neutral, we assume that they bear all the aggregate risk associated with the contract. Again, letting Rk the ex ante premium on external funds, and k = Q K / N , capital per dollar of s = ~self-financing, the optimal contracting problem may be now be written: m a x E { ( 1 - F(zoD)risk ~ X [(F(N)
t~G(~5))risk - ( k - 1)1},
where ,l is the ex post value (after the realization of the aggregate shock r) of the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint that lenders earn their required return and E{ } refers to expectations taken over the distribution o f the aggregate shock ~. We wish to establish that with the addition of aggregate risk, the capital/wealth ratio k is a still an increasing function o f the ex ante premium on external funds. Define
40 Since the log-normal is a monotonic transformation of the normal, it satisfies the condition d(~h((~)))/d?~ > O.
B.S. Bernankeet al.
1386
F ( N ) -= I - F ( ~ ) + )~(F(co) - # G ( N ) ) . T h e first-order conditions for the contracting p r o b l e m m a y be written as
N - r ' ( N ) - z [ r ' ( ~ ) -- ~ c ' ( N ) ]
= 0,
k : E { F ( o ) ~s - ,t(N)} = 0, Z : (r(~
- ~G(~)
~s - (k - l) = 0.
A g a i n , under no rationing, the first-order condition with respect to ~) defines the f u n c t i o n 3,(N). This function is identical to )~(N) defined in the case o f no a g g r e g a t e risk. The constraint that lenders earn their required rate o f return defines an implicit function for the c u t o f f N = N(fi, s, k) 41 . C o m p u t i n g derivatives we obtain 0F
-(F(N)--- ~G(N))
Os
<0
(r,(~-
~a,(N))s
(r,(o)-
~a,(N))(~s)
and 0F
ok
1 --
>0.
To obtain a relationship o f the f o r m k = ~p(s), ~p'(s) > 0 we totally differentiate the first-order condition with respect to capital:
E ~D"(N)ds+~tsFt(N) Os-dS+o~dk
-)~'(~)
~-sdS+~dk
=0.
R e a r r a n g i n g gives
dk
E/(~sr'(N)--
OF + ~F(N)} X'(~o)) N
U s i n g the fact that F ' ( N ) --- ~ ' ( N ) ( F ( N ) - ~ O ( N ) )
41 As a technical matter, it is possible that the innovation in aggregate returns is sufficiently low that N(/~, s, k) > N*, in which case the lender would set N = N* and effectively absorb some of the aggregate risk. We rule out this possibility by assumption. An alternative interpretation is that we solve a contracting problem that is approximately correct and note that in our parametrized model aggregate shocks would have to be implausibly large before such distortions to the contract could be considered numerically relevant.
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we obtain = ~'(~)k
~,
implying that dk/ds simplifies to the expression d k _ E{fisF(~) - ~ ' ( ~ ) ~ ds
}
t -- OF
Since ON/Os < O, Oo)/Ok > 0, and U(N) > 0, the numerator and denominator of this expression are positive, thus establishing the positive relationship between the capital/wealth ratio k and the premium on external funds s. Appendix B. Household, retail and government sectors
We now describe the details of the household, retail, and govermnent sectors that, along with details of the entrepreneurial sector presented in Section 4, underlie the log-linearized macroeconomic framework. B.1. Households
Our household sector is reasonably conventional. There is a continuum of households of length unity. Each household works, consumes, holds money, and invests its savings in a financial intermediary that pays the riskless rate of return. Ct is household consumption, Mt/P~ is real money balances acquired at t and carried into t + 1, H/ is household labor supply, W~ is the real wage for household labor, Tt is lump sum taxes, Dt is deposits held at intermediaries (in real terms), and Ht is dividends received from ownership of retail firms. The household's objective is given by OG
max Et Z
[3k [ln(Ct+:~)+ ~ ln(Mt,/~/P~ k) + ~ ln( 1 Ht ~k)]-
(B. 1)
k-0
The individual household budget constraint is given by Ct = WtH: - Tt +17: + RtD~- Dt+l +
(M,-I - iV/:) P:
(B.2)
The household chooses C/, D~+I, Hi and Mt/Pr to maximize Equation (B. 1) subject to Equation (B.2). Solving the household's problem yields standard first-order conditions for consumption/saving, labor supply, and money holdings: 1
E f
1
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1388
W, 1
e
1
(B.4)
* Ct = b 1 - ~ '
Mt
-
~Ct ( R ; + I ~ I ) - I
Pt
\
,
(t3.5)
Rt+l
where R~ 1 is the gross nominal interest, i.e., n Pt~.l _ 1. it+ I -7_ Rt+ 1 Pt
Note that the first-order condition for M,/Pt implies that the demand for real money balances is positively related to consumption and inversely related to the net nominal interest rate. Finally, note that in equilibrium, household deposits at intermediaries equal total loanable funds supplied to entrepreneurs:
D l -- Bt. B.2. The retail sector and price setting
As is standard in the literature, to motivate sticky prices we modify the model to allow for monopolistic competition and (implicit) costs of adjusting nominal prices. As is discussed in the text, we assume that the monopolistic competition occurs at the "retail" level. Let Y,(z) be the quantity of output sold by retailer z, measured in units of wholesale goods, and let Pt(z) be the nominal price. Total final usable goods, Y{, are the following composite of individual retail goods:
=E/01 with e > 1. The corresponding price index is given by
Final output may then be either transformed into a single type of consumption good, invested, consumed by the government or used up in monitoring costs. In particular, the economy-wide resource constraint is given by
Y[=Ct+C[+L+Gt+/J
J0 ~odF(co)R~Q,~K~,
where C[ is enta'epreneurial consumption and # fo~)'o)dF(co)RfQ gate monitoring costs.
(B.8) 1I£t reflects aggre=
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Given the index (B.6) that aggregates individual retail goods into final goods, the demand curve facing each retailer is given by r,(z) =
(P,(z) /
yi
(B9)
The retailer then chooses the sale price Pt(z), taking as given the demand curve and the price of wholesale goods, P~. To introduce price inertia, we assume that the retailer is free to change its price in a given period only with probability 1 - 0, following Calvo (1983). Let P[ denote the price set by retailers who are able to change prices at t, and let Yt*(z) denote the demand given this price. Retailer z chooses his price to maximize expected discounted profits, given by
o~ r p . pw -[ /a t_ ~ t + k * /~=o Ol'Et-I [l,t,/, Pt+k Yt+lc(z)~ ,
(B.10)
where the discount rate A,/, = fiCJ(Ct~/,) is the household (i.e., shareholder) intertemporal marginal rate of substitution, which the retailer takes as given, and where P ~ =-- PriNt is the nominal price of wholesale goods. Differentiating the objective with respect to P[ implies that the optimally set price satisfies
~OkE,
1 At,k \Pt+k/
kp.k -
p~+~j
:0.
(B.11)
k=0
Roughly speaking, the retailer sets his price so that in expectation discounted marginal revenue equals discounted marginal cost, given the constraint that the nominal price is fixed in period k with probability Ok. Given that the fraction 0 of retailers do not change their price in period t, the aggregate price evolves according to
Pt = [OP~_~ + (10)(P;)(I-~)] ~/(t c),
(B.12)
where P[ satisfies Equation (B.11). By combining Equations (B.11) and (B.12), and then log-linearizing, it is possible to obtain the Phillips curve in the text, Equation (4.22).
B.3. Government sector We now close the model by specifying the government budget constraint. We assume that government expenditures are financed by lump-sum taxes and money creation as follows:
Gt-
M,-M,~ Pt
4 Tt.
The government adjusts the mix of financing between money creation and lnmp-sum taxes to support the interest rate rule given by Equation (4.25).
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This, in conjunction with the characterization in Section 5 o f the entrepreneurial sector and the m o n e t a r y policy rule and shock processes, completes the description o f the model.
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Greenwald, B., and J. Stiglitz (t993), "Financial market imperfections and business cycles", Quarterly Journal of Economics 108:77-114. Gross, D. (1994), "The investment and financing decisions of liquidity-constrained firms", unpublished paper (MIT). Hassett, K.A., and R.G. Hubbard (1996), "Tax policy and investment", Working Paper No. 5683 (NBER, July). Holmstrom, B., and J. Tirole (1997), "Financial intermediation, loanable funds, and the real sector", Quarterly Journal of Economics 1 t3:663-692. Hoshi, T., A.K. Kashyap and D. Scharfstein (1991), "Corporate structure, liquidity, and investment: evidence from Japanese industrial groups", Quarterly Journal of Economics 106:33-60. Hubbard, R.G. (1995), "Is there a "credit channel" for monetary policy?", Review 77 (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, May/June) 63-77. Hubbard, R.G., A.K. Kashyap and T. Whited (1995), "Internal finance and firm invesmlent", Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 27:683 701. Jaffee, D.M., and J. Stiglitz (1990), "Credit rationing '°, in: B.M. Friedman and EH. Hahn, Handbook of Monetary Economics (North-Holland, Amsterdam). Jappelli, T. (1990), "Who is credit-constrained in the U.S. economy?", Quarterly Journal of Economics 105:219~34. Jensen, M., and W. Meckling (1976), "Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and capital structure", Journal of Financial Economics 3:305-360. Kaplan, S.N., and L. Zingales (1997), "Do investment-cash flow sensitivities provide useful measures of financing constraints?", Quarterly Journal of Economics 112:159~16. Kashyap, A.K., and J.C. Stein (1994), "Monetary policy and bank lending", in: N.G. Mankiw, ed., Monetary Policy (University of Chicago Press fbr NBER, Chicago, IL) 221-262. Kashyap, A.K., O.A. Lamont and J.C. Stein (1994), "Credit conditions and the cyclical behavior of inventories", Quarterly Journal of Economics 109:565 592. Kaufman, H. (1986), "Debt: the threat to economic and financial stability", in: Debt, Stability, and Public Policy (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City) 15-26. King, R.G., and A.L. Wolman (1996), "Inflation targeting in a St. Louis model of the 21st centtuy", Working Paper No. 5507 (NBER, March). Kiyotaki, N., and J. Moore (1997), "Credit cycles", Journal of Political Economy 105:211-248. Kiyotaki, N., and J. Moore (1998), "Credit chains", unpublished paper (London School of Economics). Krishnamurthy, A. (1997), "Collateral constraints and the credit channel", unpublished paper (MIT). Leeper, E.M., C.A. Sims and T. Zha (1996), "What does monetary policy do?", Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1996(2): 1 63. Levine, R. (1997), "Financial development and economic growth: views and agenda", Journal of Economic Literature 35:688-726. Lndvigson, S. (1997), "Consumption and credit: a model of time-varying liquidity constraints", unpublished paper (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, October). Mariger, R.E (1987), "A life-cycle consumption model with liquidity constraints: theory and empirical results", Econometrica 55:533-558. Mishkin, F.S. (1997), "The causes and propagation of financial instability: lessons ~br policymakers", in: C. Hakkio, ed., Maintaining Financial Stability in a Global Economy (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City). Modigliani, E, and M. Miller (1958), "The cost of capital, corporation finance, and the theory of investment", American Economic Review 48:261-297. Morgan, D. (1998), "The lending view of monetary policy and bank loan commitments", Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 30:102-118. Oliner, S.D., and G.D. Rudebusch (1994), "Is there a broad credit channel for monetary policy'?", unpublished paper (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
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Rotemberg, J.J., and M. Woodford (1997), "An optimization-based econometric framework for the evaluation of monetary policy", NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 297-345. Sharpe, S. (1994), "Financial market imperfections, firm leverage, and the cyclicality of employment", American Economic Review 84:1060~1074. Suarez, J., and O. Sussman (1997), "A stylized model of financially-driven bushless cycles", unpublished paper (CEMFI and Ben-Gurion University, September). Taylor, J.B. (1993), "Discretion versus rules in practice", Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 39:195-214. Townsend, R.M. (1979), "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification", Journal of Economic Theory 21:265-293. Townsend, R.M. (1995), "Fhlancial systems in northern Thai villages", Quarterly Journal of Economics 110:1011-1046. Whited, T, (1992), "Debt, liquidity constraints, and corporate investment: evidence from panel data", Journal of Finance 47:1425-1460. Williamson, S. (1987), "Financial intermediation, business failures, and real business cycles", Journal of Political Economy 95:1196-1216. Wojnilower, A. (1980), "The central role of credit crunches in recent 151ancial history", Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1980(2):277-326. Zeldes, S.E (1989), "Consumption and liquidity constraints: an empirical investigation", Journal of Political Economy 97:305-346.
Chapter 22
POLITICAL ECONOMICS AND MACROECONOMIC POLICY* TORSTEN PERSSON Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden. E-mail:
[email protected]. GUIDO TABELLINI IGIER, Bocconi University, via Salasco 3/5, 20136 Milano, Italy. E-mail:
[email protected]
Contents Abstract Keywords 1. I n t r o d u c t i o n
Part A. Monetary Policy 2. C r e d i b i l i t y o f m o n e t a r y p o l i c y 2.1. A simple positive model of monetary policy 2.2. Ex ante optimal monetary policy 2.3. Discretion and credibility 2.4. Reputation 2.5. Notes on the literature 3. Political cycles 3.1. Opportunistic governments 3.1.1. Moral hazard in monetary policy 3.1.2. The equilibrium 3.1.3. Adverse selection 3.2. Partisan governments 3.2.1. The model 3.2.2. Economic equilibrium 3.2.3. Political equilibrium 3.3. Notes on the literature
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* We are grateful to participants in the Handbook conference at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to our discussant Adam Posen and to Roel Beetsma, Jon Faust, Francesco Lippi, Ken Rogofl, Lars Svensson and Jolm Taylor for helpful comments. The research was supported by Harvard University, by a grant fi:om the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation and by a TMR Grant fi:om the Europema Commission. We are grateful to Christina Lrnnblad and Alessandra Startari for editorial assistance. Handbook of Macroeconomics, Volume 1, Edited by J.B. Taylor" and M. WoodJbrd © 1999 Elsevier Science B. I( All tights reserved 1397
1398 4. Institutions and incentives 4.1. Fixed exchange rates: simple rules and escape clauses 4.2. Central bank independence 4.3. Inflation targets and inflation contracts 4.4. Notes on the literature
Part B. Fiscal Policy 5. Credibility o f fiscal policy 5.1. The capital levy problem 5.1.1. The model 5.1.2. The e x a n w optimal policy 5.1.3. Equilibrium under discretion 5.1.4. Extensions 5.2. Multiple equilibria and confidence crises 5.3. Public debt management 5.4. Reputation and enforcement 5.5. Notes on the literature 6. Politics o f public debt 6.1. Political instability in a two-party system 6.1.1. Economic equilibrium 6.1.2. The political system 6.1.3. Equilibrium policy 6.1.4. Endogenous election outcomes 6.1.5. Discussion 6.2. Coalition governments 6.2.1. Equilibrium debt issue 6.2.2. A stronger budget process 6.3. Delayed stabilizations 6.4. Debt and intergenerationat politics 6.5. Notes on the literature
Part C. Politics and Growth 7. Fiscal policy and growth 7.1. Inequality and growth 7.2. Political instability and growth 7.3. Property rights and growth 7.4. Notes on the literature References
77. P e r s s o n a n d G. Tabellini
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Abstract
This chapter surveys the recent literature on the theory of macroeconomic policy. We study the effect of various incentive constraints on the policy making process, such as lack of credibility, political opportunism, political ideology, and divided government. The survey is organized in three parts. Part I deals with monetary policy in a simple Phillips curve model: it covers credibility issues, political business cycles, and optimal design of monetary institutions. Part II deals with fiscal policy in a dynamic general equilibrium set up: the main topics here are credibility of tax policy, and political determinants of budget deficits. Part II! studies economic growth in models with endogenous fiscal policy.
Keywords politics, monetary policy, fiscal policy, credibility, budget deficits J E L classification: E5, E6, H2, H3, O1
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1. Introduction
Traditional macroeconomic policy analysis asks the positive question of how the economy responds to alternative, but exogenous, policy actions or rules. Knowing these responses, the analyst can go on to the normative problem of policy advice. The best action or rule is selected, given a specific objective function. But as macroeconomists, we should also be able to shed light on a more ambitious set of questions. Why is it that we observe such different inflation rates across countries and time? Why did we not observe peace-time accumulations of government debt until the seventies, and why did they arise only in some countries? Why are growth rates so different in different parts of the world? To answer such questions, we need a positive theory, explaining why different countries choose different macroeconomic policies. Early steps towards such a theory were taken about twenty years ago; the credibility problem in macroeconomic policy was introduced by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Calvo (1978), and the first models of electoral and partisan motivations in policymaking were suggested by Nordhaus (1975) and Hibbs (1977). The literature did not really take off until ten years later. But since then "political economy", or "political economics" as we prefer to call it, has been one of the most active fields in macroeconomics as well as in other branches of economics 1. With its emphasis on institutions as important determinants of policy, this literature has taken the normative analysis one step further, replacing the question: Which policies should be followed? with the question: What policymaking institutions produce better policy outcomes? In surveying this literature, we split the material into three parts: Part I deals with monetary policy, Part II with fiscal policy, and Part III with growth. Following the conventional approach in the literature, this division is based both on substance and on methodology. The monetary policy part relies on quadratic loss functions over macroeconomic outcomes and on models incorporating rational expectations, but assuming an ad hoc Phillips Curve. The fiscal policy and growth parts have better microfoundations: agents' preferences, technologies and endowments govern their economic and political interactions in simple, but complete, two-period general equilibrium models. Each part emphasizes the credibility and politics ofpolicymaking, and includes a normative evaluation of different institutions. The general approach of this line of research is to explain deviations in observed economic policies from a hypothetical social optimum by appealing to specific incentive constraints in the decision problem of optimizing policymakers. The positive analysis focuses on identifying the relevant incentive constraints, while the normative analysis focuses on institutional reforms which may relax them. Despite the separation into three parts, several common themes run throughout the chapter, reflecting similar incentive constraints. It is useful to summarize already here the nature of these incentive constraints, when they arise, and their positive and normative implications.
Many recent contributionshave been collectedin Persson and 'labellini (1994a).
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Desirable policies may suffer from lack o f credibility when policy decisions are taken sequentially over time (under "discretion") and the government lacks a nondistorting policy instrument, so that the socially optimal policy (the optimal policy in the absence of the incentive constraint) yields a second-best outcome. Lack of credibility has several positive implications, and arises both in monetary and in fiscal policy. When the government takes private expectations embodied in private economic decisions as given, it neglects the policy effects rumfing through expectation formation. This way, equilibrium average inflation or wealth taxes become too high. Moreover, in a Natural Rate world, monetary policy and inflation respond to all shocks, and not only to those over which the monetary authority has an information advantage, as the optimal policy should do. Losing control of private expectations also makes the governanen~ a prospective victim of confidence crises: runs on public debt, capital flight, or speculative attacks on the currency. All these events stem from the same fundamental problem: the government is forced to react to self-fulfilling private expectations. Finally, lack of credibility breaks a Modigliani-Miller theorem of government finance, in the same way as incentive constraints in the relationship between owners and managers break the Modigliani-Miller theorem of corporate finance. The composition of the outstanding public debt into nominal or real securities (i.e. indexed to the price level) affects the propensity of a govenmaent to rely on unexpected inflation as a source of government revenue. Similarly, the maturity composition o f government debt affects the likelihood of debt runs or the interest rate policies that future governments want to pursue. Thus, public debt management can relax future incentive constraints and thereby affect private sector expectations. Lack of credibility also has implications for institution design. First, it makes delegation to an independent policymaker desirable. Second, it makes it desirable to restrict the tasks of the policymaker. Rather than pursuing loosely defined social welfare, the central bank should target a specific variable, such as inflation, or the money supply, or the exchange rate. I f a sufficiently rich incentive mechanism - a complete contract - can be designed and enforced, the credibility problem can be eliminated completely. If state-contingent payments are not feasible, however, or if narrowly defined tasks are inappropriate, as in fiscal policy, incentive mechanisms are necessarily incomplete. But in order to gain credibility, strategic delegation of the decision-making authority to a policymaker with "distorted" preferences may still be desirable. This insight has been exploited in monetary policy, to advocate the benefit of an independent and "conservative" central bank. It also applies to the election of a conservative policymaker facing the task of selecting a wealth tax, or to the delegation of certain policy choices to a foreign government, as in the case of multilateral exchange rate arrangements, or currency boards 2. 2 International competition is another institutional device %r coping with credibility which is emphasized in the literature but not in this survey. Tax competition, or exchange rate competition, conhibute to overcoming a domestic credibility problem because they can reduce the ex-post incentives to unilaterally increase tax rates or inflation.
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A second incentive constraint is political opportunism, by which we mean that the incumbent government is prepared to introduce distorted policies to increase its chances of re-election. This incentive constraint typically applies when politicians value holding office p e r se and voters, although rational, are uninformed. We study the consequences of political opportunism in monetary policy only, but the empirical implications for fiscal policy have been spelled out in the literature. The main prediction is an electoral cycle in aggregate demand policies: the incumbent government has an incentive to stimulate the economy just before elections to appear more competent in the eyes of uninformed voters, thus boosting of the probability of re-election. This always leads to an electoral cycle in inflation which, depending on the information advantage of the government, could also increase output volatility at the time of elections. The normative implications tend to reinforce those of the credibility literature: central bank independence and monetary or inflation targets reduce the scope for electoral cycles in monetary policy. Other, deeper reforms, such as who should have the right to call the elections and at what time, remain to be investigated. Political ideology may shape policy formation if different parties pursue different "partisan" (i.e. ideological) platforms once in oNce, and if the election outcome is uncertain. Political polarization and political instability thus induce another incentive constraint, which also gives rise to an electoral cycle in aggregate demand, output or public spending. But here the cycle takes place after, rather than before, elections and reflects the winning party's desire to influence economic outcomes. In a dynamic context, this incentive constraint may generate "strategic myopia". The government in office realizes that it may be replaced by a policymaker with different ideological preferences. This gives an incentive to accumulate public debt or postpone investment, so as to influence the future behavior of the opponent. Political ideology also implies strategic manipulation of state variables to influence the voters; for instance, an extremist incumbent may restrain his own future behavior by appropriate institutional reforms to increase his own electability. The strategic manipulation of future opponents and voters are both stronger, the more unstable and polarized the political system. From a normative point of view, the benefits of delegation and targeting in monetary policy are further reinforced. More generally, there may be advantages of institutional checks and balances and institutions that moderate political conflict and policy extremism. The discussion, so far, applies to a single decision-maker facing static or dynamic incentive constraints. Often, however, decision-making power is dispersed among several political actors. This creates another incentive constraint, which we may call divided government. Examples include coalition governments, soft budget constraints on public enterprises or local governments, veto rights held by key individuals in government or by organized groups in society, or the lobbying activities of special interests. Divided government arises almost exclusively in fiscal policy. In a static context its central implication is over-spending, as every decision-maker fully internalizes the benefits of public spending but only a fraction of the cost: this is the so called "common pool" problem. In a dynamic context, myopic behavior emerges: each decision-maker has an incentive not only to over-spend, but also to spend
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sooner rather than later. Leaving tax revenues for tomorrow can be counter-productive, because they are partly appropriated by other decision-makers. Hence, models of divided government also predict debt accumulation and/or under-investment. In some circumstances, the dispersion of veto rights delays stabilization in an unsustainable fiscal situation. The most straightforward institutional remedy is to centralize power in the hands of a single decision-maker (a prime minister, or a president, or the Secretary of the Treasury). Alternatively, one might rely on two-stage budgeting, with a decision on aggregate items (total spending, or total borrowing) preceding the decision on how spending is allocated. Such budgetary solutions entail a trade-offbetween an allocative distortion (a lopsided spending result from centralized decision-making power) and an aggregate distortion (over-spending resulting from inadequate centralization). At a deeper political level, the incentive constraints induced by divided government and political ideology can be traded off. Political reforms that centralize power in the hands of single parties or individuals also exacerbate polarization between the majority and the opposition, and may thus imply that political instability becomes a more binding incentive constraint. The last incentive constraint considered in this chapter arises when there is income heterogeneity, so that tax policies are motivated by pressure .for redistribution. The positive implication is that the overall size of government is determined by the extent of inequality in pre-tax income or, in the case of social insurance policies, by inequality in risk. This, in turn, has implications for the link between inequality and measures of economic performance. But the redistributive motive is also an important force shaping the composition of spending or the structure of taxation. Public financial policies that redistribute along different dimensions become non-equivalent, because they are supported by different coalitions of voters. For instance, public debt and social security redistribute across generations in the same way; nevertheless in a political equilibrium they give rise to different allocations, because they redistribute between rich and poor in different ways. A similar non-equivalence result holds with regard to alternative instruments of geographic redistribution. As in the case of lacking credibility, an incentive constraint on policy formation breaks the Modigliani-Miller theorem of government finance. Some of the topics covered in this survey partly overlap with a companion survey, Persson and Tabellini (1999). There we cover the literature on public economics and public choice, dealing with static allocation issues in fiscal policy, rather than the intertemporal policy issues emphasized here. Neither do we cover the literature on monetary and fiscal policy in an international context, which is surveyed in Persson and Tabellini (1995). Each part starts with a separate introduction, in which we highlight a number of empirical regularities, motivating the sections to follow, and provide a more detailed road map. We comment on the original literature both as we go along and in separate "Notes on the Literature" at the end of each section.
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Part A. Monetary Policy The empirical evidence for the (democratic) OECD countries in the post-war period suggests the following stylized facts: (i) Inflation rates vary greatly across countries and time. But there is a common time pattern: in most countries inflation was low in the 1960s, but very high in the 1970s; it came down in the 1980s and 1990s in all countries, though at different speeds and to different extents 3. (ii) Inflation rates are correlated with real variables, such as growth or unemployment, in the short run. But there is little evidence o f a systematic correlation over longer periods. Across countries, average inflation and average growth tend to be negatively correlated or not correlated at all 4. (iii) There is little evidence o f systematic spillover effects between monetary and fiscal policy. Specifically, higher budget deficits are not systematically associated with higher inflation rates 5. (iv) Inflation increases shortly after elections; budget deficits tend to be larger during election years; there is also some (not very strong) evidence that monetary policy is more expansionary before elections. On the other hand, real variables such as growth or unemployment are not systematically correlated with election dates. (v) Output displays a temporary partisan cycle just after elections: newly appointed left-wing governments are associated with expansions, right-wing governments with recessions. This cycle tends to occur in the first half o f the inter-election period and is more pronounced in countries with two-party systems. Inflation displays a permanent partisan cycle: higher inflation is associated with left-wing governments 6 (vi) Average inflation rates and measures of central bank independence are negatively correlated; this holds up when controlling for other economic and institutional variables (even though the correlation is less robust). There is also some evidence that fixed exchange rates are associated with lower inflation. Real variables, on the other hand, have no systematic correlation with the monetary regime (although the variance o f the real exchange rate is lower under fixed than floating exchange rates) 7 These stylized facts will be taken as the starting point for Part I. Fact (i) clearly calls tbr a positive model of inflation. Fact (ii) is not well understood and the profession See, for instance, Bordo and Schwartz (1999). 4 Time-series evidence (for the USA) can be found in Stock and Watson (1999), whereas (broad) cross-country evidence can be found in Barro (1997) and in Fischer (1991). s See for instance Grilli et al. (1991). This fact no longer applies if one considers the interwar period or developing countries. In particular hyperinflations are typically associated with fiscal problems. 6 Statements (iv) and (v) are suggested by the comprehensive study by Alesina and Roubini (t997). 7 See Grilli et al. (1991), Cukierman (1992), Jonsson (1995), Eijffinger and de Haan (1996), Mussa ~1986), Baxter and Stockman (1989). The robusmess of these findings has been questioned by Posen (1993, 1995), however.
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is still searching for a satisfactory model of the joint determination of nominal and real variables. But it suggests that a plausible model would encompass the natural rate hypothesis that the Phillips curve is vertical and monetary policy is neutral in the long run, while preserving some scope for aggregate demand policies to affect output in the short run. Fact (iii) suggests that abstracting from fiscal policy may not be a bad first approximation. Facts (iv) and (v) indicate that political variables might be important ingredients in successful positive models of inflation and macroeconomic policy. Fact (vi) finally suggests that the institutional features of the monetary regime particularly the statutes regulating the central bank - should also play a role in a successful model. In Section 2 we formulate and discuss a model of macroeconomic policy and inflation which has been the workhorse in much of the recent literature. We illustrate how credibility problems in monetary policy may arise and how these may be fully or partly resolved by reputation. Section 3 extends the simple model with political institutions and incentives. We illustrate how political business cycles and partisan cycles, consistent with the stylized facts above, may come about. Designing nqonetary institutions to tackle the distortions created by credibility problems and political cycles is the topic of Section 4.
2. Credibility of monetary policy In this section, we first formulate and discuss a model of macroeconomic policy and inflation, in the spirit of Kydland and Prescott (1977), Fischer (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983a), which has been the starting point for much of the recent literature. In subsection 2.1 we set up the model and make general comments. Subsection 2.2 derives a normative benchmark. In subsection 2.3 we emphasize how the credibility problems tied to the central banks' ability to temporarily boost the economy result in excessively high equilibrium inflation - the celebrated "inflation bias". Subsection 2.4 briefly illustrates how reputation may provide full or partial solutions to such credibility problems, drawing on the work by Barro and Gordon (1983b), Backus and Driffill (1985), Canzoneri (1985) and others that - in turn - borrow heavily from the literature on repeated games. 2.1. A simple positive model o f monetary policy
The demand side of our model economy is represented by :~: = m + v + # ,
(2.1)
where o~ is inflation, m is the money growth rate, v is a demand (or velocity) shock, and ?2 is a "control error" in monetary policy. Letting output enter the implicit money demand function underlying Equation (2.1) complicates the algebra, but does not yield
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important additional insights. The supply side of the model assumes that nominal wage setting (unilaterally by firms, unilaterally by labor unions, or bilaterally by bargaining between these actors) aims at implementing an exogenous, but stochastic, real wage growth target ~o 8. Letting er° denote rationally expected inflation, nominal wage growth w then becomes w = (o + :r e.
(2.2)
Employment (or output growth), x, satisfies x= y-(w-er)-e,
where 7 is a (potentially stochastic) parameter, and e is a supply shock. Combining this relation with Equation (2.2), we obtain an expectations-augmented short-run Phillips curve
x = 0 + (er
ere)_ e,
(2.3)
where 0 - 7 - ~o can be interpreted as the stochastic natural rate of employment (output growth). We assume that all shocks are i.i.d., orthogonal to each other, have (unconditionally) expected values of zero, well-defined variances ~7~,~ { , and so on. The timing of events is as follows: (0) rules of the monetary regime may be laid down at an institution design stage; (1) the value of 0 is observed both by the private sector and the policymaker; (2) er~ is formed, given the information about 0; (3) the values of v and e are observed; (4) the policymaker determines m; (5) /~ is realized together with er and x. The assumed timing captures the following concerns: Some shocks, related to the labor market, are commonly observable and can therefore be embodied in privatesector wage-setting decisions, here captured by expectations formation. Other shocks can only be embodied in policy. This distinction is best interpreted as reflecting the ease with which monetary policy decisions are made, relative to the laborious wage-setting process, but could also reflect a genuine information advantage of the policymaker (which is perhaps only plausible for financial sector shocks). O f course, it is this advantage that allows monetary policy to stabilize the economy. Finally, there is some unavoidable noise in the relation between policy and macroeconomic outcomes.
As is well-!~lown, the "surprise supply" formulation wc end up with below could also be derived from a model of price-setting finns, or from a Lucas-style "island model".
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Clearly, Equation (2.1) and the assumed information implies that rationally expected inflation is Jr° --E(ar ] 0 ) = E(m I 0),
(2.4)
where E is the expectations operator. Substituting Equations (2.1) and (2.4) into (2.3), we have x=O+m-E(m[
O)+v~-~
&
(2.5)
The model thus entails the usual neutrality result: only unanticipated aggregate demand policy affects real variables. But if policy responds to shocks, it can still stabilize employment. 2.2. Ex ante optimal monetary policy
We follow the rational expectations literature in thinking about policy as a rule. Suppose society has the quadratic loss function E[L(0r, x)] : ½E[(ar - yg*)2+ ~(X --
X*)2],
(2.6)
where a~* and x* are society's most preferred values for inflation and employment, and ,~ is the relative weight on fluctuations in these two variables. As the objective is quadratic in macroeconomic outcomes, which in turn are linear in the shocks, the optimal policy rule is of the form m - k + k ° O + k V v ~k%';
(2.7)
that is, policy potentially responds to all shocks observable to the policymaker. Suppose furthermore that the policymaker can make a binding commitment to the rule (2.7) at the institution design stage (0), i.e. before the observation of 0. Clearly, since E(v) = E(E) = 0, this implies private sector expectations: E(m [ O) = k + k°O.
(2.8)
By Equations (2.1), (2.5), (2.7) and (2.8), macroeconomic equilibrium under the rule is
Jc - k +k°O+ (k ~ + 1) v + U E + t~, x - O+(k~+ 1) v + g + ( k e - 1)e.
(2.9) (2.10)
What is the optimal rule? Substitute Equations (2.9) and (2.10) into (2.6), take expectations over all shocks, and set the derivatives of the resulting expression with regard to the intercept and the slope coefficients in Equation (2.7) equal to zero. The following results emerge:
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(i)
k - :~* and k ° = 0. The optimal rule provides an "anchor for inflationary expectations". Expectations are right where society wants them to be, namely at the preferred rate o f inflation: E(Jv [ 0) - zc*. The optimal rule is thus neither conditional on the observable shock to the natural rate, 0, nor on society' s output target, x*. Such conditionality would be embodied in expectations; it would therefore do nothing to stabilize employment, only add costly noise to inflation. (ii) k ~ = - 1 . Demand (velocity) shocks are fully stabilized. As policy also operates via aggregate demand, a complete stabilization o f demand shocks nullifies their effects on inflation as well as on employment. (iii) k e = ~ / ( i + 30. Supply shocks are stabilized according to the policymaker's tradeoff between inflation and employment fluctuations. The higher the weight on employment, the more these shocks are stabilized. The optimal state-contingent policy rule can thus be written as /l m = Yg* - v + ( 1 ~ 6 . Macroeconomic omcomes -- indexed by R - when the rule is ~bllowed are Jr j~ = ~* + ~ - ~ e q 1 xa = 0- ~e+/~.
/~,
(2.11) (2.12)
Results such as these have been - and continue to be - very influential for academic economists' thinking about policy. They suggest that delivering low inflation and stable employment is essentially a technical (not a strategic) problem: inflation can be kept low by clearly announcing a rule aiming at low average inflation. Demand shocks should be completely stabilized. The inflation and employment consequences o f supply shocks should be traded off according to society's preferences. Control errors are unavoidable, but can perhaps be reduced by better forecasting or operating procedures in monetary policy. Even though this picture is too rosy for a realistic positive model o f macroeconomic policy, it still provides a useful normative benchmark that we can use to evaluate the outcome in the positive models below. In the remainder o f the chapter, we simplify the stochastic structure by setting v = /~ = 0. Demand shocks, as we saw, present no problem for the policymaker in this class o f models, provided that they can be identified in time and that there are no other policy goals such as interest-rate smoothing. Control errors do present problems, but are unavoidable 9. With these simplifications, there is no meaningful
9 Abstracting from conUol errors is irmocuous as long as the public can monitor monetary policy perfectly and as long as policymaker competency and efforts are exogenous. Below, we comment on where control errors would matter. Moreover, in a richer (dynamic) setting with expectations entering the aggregate demand function, demand shocks and control errors may give rise to incentive problems similar to those discussed below.
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distinction in the model between m and st. For simplicity, we therefore assume that the policymaker sets .re directly. Why don't we eliminate the shocks to the natural rate 0, with a similar motivation? The answer is that such shocks do not affect the solution under commitment, whereas they do affect policy in an interesting way under alternative assumptions about the policymaking process. 2.3. Discretion and credibility
In reality, decisions on monetary policy are taken sequentially over time, rather than once and for all. Assuming ex ante commitment to a state-contingent policy rule rhymes badly with this practice. In our static model, reality is better captured by an alternative timing: policy is chosen under "discretion" when the policy instruments are set at stage (4) above, after wages have been set (37e formed) and shocks have been realized. This adds an ex post incentive compatibility condition to our positive model: policy has to be optimal ex post - when it is actually enacted. This additional credibility constraint makes the solution less advantageous for the policymaker (and society). The policymaker still sets sr (that is, m), seeking to minimize the loss in Equation (2.6). But all uncertainty has been resolved at the new decision stage, so the expectations operator is redundant. Consider how the loss is affected by a marginal expansion, for given :U and e. Using Equations (2.3) and (2.6), we have dL(yG x)
d~
-Ljr(zc, x)+L~(Jv, x)-~2 - ( z r - ~ * ) + ) ~ ( O + ( z C (lJ~
~)-~'-x*),
(2.13)
where a subscript denotes a partial derivative. By Equation (2.13), the benchmark policy rule is not incentive compatible under discretion. Suppose that wage setters believed in an announcement of that rule, implying that :ve - sT*. Using the optimal-rules outcome in Equations (2.1 1)-(2.12), and evaluating the derivative in Equation (2.13) at the point prescribed by the ex ante optimal policy rule, we get dL(~R'Xa)dz z~::z* = X(O x*). If preferred employment (output) exceeds tile natural rate (if x* > 0), ar~ expansioii reduces the loss, rendering the ex ante sub-optimal policy rule ex post inoptimal. Once wages have been set, the marginal inflation cost - the first term on the RHS of Equation (2.13) - is always smaller than the marginal employment benefit - the second term on the RHS 10. Thus, the ex post incentive-compatibility constraint is binding and the low-inflation rule is not credible.
l0 To make this more clear, consider the case when c - 0, such that tile optima| rule prescribes the policy sTR = ~*, implying xR = 0. Then, by Equation (2.13) the marginal inflation cost is acmalty zero (to first order), whereas the marginal employment benefit is positive (if x* > 0).
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17 Persson and G. Tabellini
A credible policy must simultaneously fulfill two conditions: (i) the policy is e x optimal, ~y dL = 0, given :re and e; (ii) expectations are rational, i.e. ~e = E(s~ I 0). In game-theoretic terms, those are the conditions for a Nash Equilibrium in a game with many atomistic private wage setters (desiring to minimize the deviation of the realized real wage w - ~e, from the targeted real wage co) moving before the policymaker 11. Condition (i) requires that the expression in Equation (2.13) equals zero. Taking expectations of that expression, condition (ii) can be expressed as E(zc ] 0) = ~* + 3,(x* - 0). Combining the two conditions, we get
post
a -D = st* + ,~(x* - 0) + ~ e , +A,
(2.14)
where the D superscript stands for discretion. The employment outcome remains as in Equation (2.12) except that /~ = 0 by assumption, if we assume x* - 0 > 0, the discretionary policy outcome in Equation (2.14) and the commitment outcome in Equations (2.11)-(2.12) illustrate the celebrated "inflation bias" result: equilibrium inflation is higher under discretion than under commitment to a rule, whereas employment is the same, independently of the policy regime. The bias is more pronounced the higher is ;, (the more valuable is employment on the margin) and the higher is x* relative to 0 (the higher is preferred employment relative to the natural rate); both factors contribute to a greater "temptation" for the policymaker to exploit his short-run ability to boost employment by expansionary policy once wages are fixed. Since the natural rate 0 is random, whereas the employment target x* presumably is constant (or at least more stable than 0), inflation is also more variable under discretion than under the rule. The inflation bias is due to two key assumptions. The first is the sequential timing of monetary policy decisions. The second is the assumption that the employment target is higher than the natural rate, that is: x* - 0 > 0. This assumption must reflect a lack of policy instruments: some distortion in the labor or product market keeps employment too low. The government does not remove this distortion; either because it does not have enough policy instruments or because the distortion is kept in place by some other incentive problem in the policy-making process. These assumptions capture important features of monetary policymaking in the real world. In this static model, the policy response to the supply shock e is not distorted: shocks are stabilized in the same way under discretion and commitment. This equivalence does not, however, carry over to a dynamic model where employment (but not the employment target) is serially correlated. In such a dynamic model, the future inflation bias depends on current employment (since the future equilibrium employmem depends on current employment). To reduce the future inflation bias, the
1 The equilibrium would also apply identically to a simultaneous game between the government and a single trade union. If the union moved before the government, the equilibrium might differ slightly, but the fundamental incentive problem would not be affected.
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policymaker thus responds more aggressively to supply shocks under discretion than under commitment. Moreover, the systematic inflation bias increases, as an ex post expansion today expands both current and future employment 12 The "distortion" in the policymaking process can be described as follows: under discretion, the policymaker (correctly) fails to internalize the mapping from actual policy to expected policy. He is not being foolish: he really cannot influence private sector expectations. This is what we mean when saying that a (low inflation) policy "lacks credibility". Yet, actual policy maps into expected policy in equilibrium when private agents have rational expectations. Under commitment, on the contrary, the policymaker internalizes this equilibrium mapping; indeed announcing the optimal policy rule brings rationally expected inflation down precisely to the preferred rate of inflation. The conclusions are pretty stark. First, a desirable policy rule does not become credible just by announcing it; is thus pointless to recommend a noncredible policy rule. Second, the inability to commit to a policy rule has obvious costs. Institutional reforms that give policymakers greater commitment ability can thus be desirable. This simple model of monetary policy credibility is often criticized with reference to the plausible objection that "real world policymakers are not trying to surprise the private sector with unexpected inflation". But this criticism misses the point of the analysis. The model does not predict that the policymaker tries to generate policy surprises in equilibrium. On the contrary, in equilibrium the policymaker would like to bring inflation down but refrains from doing so as his lack of credibility would turn any anti-inflationary policy into a recession, in other words, the model predicts an inertia of expectations to a suboptimally high inflation rate, and a difficulty in curbing these expectations down to the socially efficient rate. What the model does rely on, however, is an assumption that the policymaker would want to generate policy surprises outside o f equilibrium to a more favorable outcome. Is this a plausible positive model of inflation? Some observers, like McCallum (1996), apparently do not think so. A convincing rebuttal should address the question already posed by Taylor (1983), who - in his discussion of Barro and Gordon (1983b) - asked why society has not found ways around the credibility problem in monetary policy, when it has found ways around the credibility problem of granting property rights to patent holders. This question is best addressed in connection with a closer discussion of the institutions of monetary policymaking, so we come back to it in Section 4. What are the observable implications of the analysis so far? One implication is that a binding credibility problem would show up by the central bank reacting to variables that entered the private sector's information set (before policy is set), whereas the
12 Svensson (1997a) proves this result formally, drawing on earlier work by Lockwood et al. (1998) and Jonsson (1997). See also Obstfeld (1997b) for a related result in a dynamic model of seignorage. Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998) show that stabilizationbias mises also when monetary and fiscal policy are pursued by different authorities with diverging objectives.
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T. Persson and G. Tabellini
reaction function would not include such variables under commitment. Hence, the unconditional variance of inflation is higher under discretion. If the credibility problem is caused by a high )~, the model indeed predicts a positive correlation between average inflation and the variance of inflation, in conformity with international evidence. The discretionary model also suggests a plausible explanation of the secular trend in inflation experienced by the industrialized countries and mentioned in the introduction. The 1950s and 1960s were a period without serious supply shocks and with a low natural rate of unemployment (low variance of e, high realizations of 0), which made it easy to keep inflation low. Enter the 1970s with severe supply shocks (high realizations of E) pushing up the natural rate (to capture this in the model would require serial correlation in employment) and inflation; we may then interpret the rise in inflation as the result of policymakers maintaining their earlier high employment objectives (x* staying constant or falling by less than 0). The gradual decline in inflation from the mid-1980s and onward, despite continued high natural rates (in Europe), can be understood to derive from policymakers gradually adapting their employment ambitions to the structural problems in the labor market (x* drifting downwards over time) and from the institutional reforms in central banking arrangements in a number of countries in the recent decade. Naturally, learning from past policy mistakes is also likely to have played an important role. To date, time-series implications of this type have received too little attention in the credibility literature 13. Instead, the literature has focused on normative issues of institutional reform, and to some extent on explaining cross-sectional differences in macroeconomic outcomes by different institutions. 2.4. Reputation
One can criticize the simple model discussed so far for being static and failing to capture the repeated nature of policymaking. Specifically, the model rejects repeated interaction with the public and hence ignores reputational forces. A branch of the literature has studied reputational forces in detail. The main result is that a link from current observed policy to future expected policy can indeed discipline the policymaker and restore credibility. With repeated interaction, a policymaker operating under discretion faces an intertemporal trade-off: the future costs of higher expected inflation, caused by expansion today, may more than outweigh the current benefits of higher employment. To illustrate the idea, consider the model of subsection 2.3, repeated over an infinite horizon. The policymaker's intertemporal loss function, from the viewpoint of some arbitrary period s, can be written as E~.
[±
6' "L(JG xt)
,
(2.15)
[=S
1.~ See,however,the recentpapers by Parkin(1993), Barro and Broadbent(1997) and Broadhent(1996).
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where 6 is a discount factor. To simplify the algebra, we assume the static loss function to be linear, not quadratic, in employment: (2.16)
L(Tg, x) = ~2rl 2 _ /~.,x.
With the simpler loss function, the ex ante optimal policy rule is simply to have zero inflation all the time and to accept employment x = 0 - e (since ~* = 0 and employment volatility is not costly), while the static equilibrium under discretion has inflation equal to )~ and employment still at x = 0 - e. We now show that, even under discretion, reputation can indeed create strong enough incentives to enforce zero inflation. As an example, assume that wage setters set wages on the basis o f the following expectations: ~[=
0 iff ~ = ~ [ , 3, otherwise.
u= t-1 ..... t-T,
(2.17)
Equation (2.17) says that wage setters trust a policymaker who sticks to zero inflation in period t to continue with this same policy in the next period. But if they observe any other policy in period t, they lose this trust and instead expect the discretionary policy to be pursued for the next T periods. A policymaker confronted with such expectation formation, in effect, faces a non-linear incentive scheme: he is "rewarded" for sticking to the rule, but he is "punished" if deviating from it. Consider a policymaker that enjoys the trust of the public (i.e. :Vs~ = 0). When is the punishment strong enough to outweigh the immediate benefit of cheating on the rule? To answer formally, note that the optimal deviation (found by minimizing the static loss function, given e and COs ~ = 0) is simply ~. = 3,, thus implying employment x~. = )~ + Os - es. After some algebra, the current benefit from cheating can then be expressed as B = L(0, 0s -- e,) - L(,~, ,~ + 0~ - e,) = ~,~.~ 2
(2.18)
Due to the simpler loss function, the benefit is independent o f the realizations of 0 and e. The punishment comes from having to live with higher expected and actual inflation in the next T periods. Why higher actual inflation? As the expectations in Equation (2.17) are consistent with the static Nash Equilibrium outcome in subsection 2.3, it is indeed optimal for the policymaker to bear the punishment if it is ever imposed. In other words, the private sector's expectations will be fulfilled, both in and out o f equilibrium 14. Thus, the cost of a deviation is C=Es
6 t "(L(.,t, 0,-et)--L(O, Ot-e,))
~ Lt=s+
.... 6
)-Z2,
(2.19)
1
14 By this argument the analysis identifies a sequentially rational (subgame perfect) equilibrium. For other expectation formation schemes, in which expectations changed more drastically after a deviation, we would have to impose a separate incentive-compatibility constraint, namely that it is indeed optimal to carry out and bear the ptmishment after a deviation [see Persson and Tabellini (1990, ch. 3) on this point].
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T. Persson and G. Tabellini
which is clearly stationary if we assume that 0 is i.i.d, over time. Obviously, the policymaker finds it optimal to stick to the zero-inflation rule as long as B ~< C. Inspection of Equations (2.19) and (2.18) reveals that this is more likely the higher the discount factor c5 and the longer the horizon T for which inflationary expectations go up after a deviation. Many extensions of this basic framework are feasible; and some have been pursued in the literature. For instance, if we retained the quadratic loss function of the previous subsection, the benefit of cheating would be an increasing function of the actual realization of 0, while the cost would depend on the variance and the expected value of 0. As a result, even with reputation, equilibrium inflation would continue to depend on the actual realization of 0: a high value of 0 makes the incentivecompatibility condition more binding, as it increases the benefit B but not the cost C. The lowest sustainable inflation rate (defined by the condition that B = C) would be an increasing function of 0. Thus, reputation would reduce average inflation but would not change the main positive implications of the model of the previous section. Canzoneri (1985) studied a framework with shocks to inflation that are unobservable to private agents both ex ante and ex p o s t ; an example could be the /~ shocks in Equation (2.1) above. If observed inflation exceeds some threshold, such monitoring problems give rise to temporary outbreaks of actual and expected inflation, because the public cannot clearly infer whether high inflation is due to large shocks or to deliberate cheating. Backus and Driffill (1985), Barro (1986), Tabellini (1985, 1987) and Vickers (1986) studied reputational models where the private agents are uncertain about the policymakers "type" (as his )~ in the model above). They use the information embodied in current observations of policy to learn about this type, and the policymaker sets policy optimally with a view to this private learning process. Such models illustrate how a "dovish" policymaker (someone with a high )~ or without access to a commitment technology) can temporarily borrow the reputation of a "hawkish" policymaker (someone with a low )~ or with access to a commitment technology). They also illustrate how a hawkish policymaker may have to impose severe output costs on the economy to credibly establish a reputation. This differs from the equilibrium considered above, where the policymaker merely maintains a reputation he is lucky enough to have. Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) also studied credibility and private learning but in a richer dynamic setting, where parameters in the central bank's objective function vary stochastically over time. The central insight of the reputation literature is that ongoing interaction between a policymaker and private agents can mitigate the inflation bias and restores some credibility to monetary policy. Whether the problem is entirely removed is more controversial, however, and depends on details of the model and the expectations formation mechanism. Even though the insight is important, the reputation literature suffers from three weaknesses. As in the theory of repeated games, there is a multipleequilibrium problem, which strikes with particular force against a p o s i t i v e model of monetary policy. Moreover, the problem of how the players somehow magically
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coordinate on one of the many possible equilibria is worse when the ganle involves a large number of private agents rather than a few oligopolists. Finally, the normative implications are unclear. The existence of reputational equilibria with good outcomes is not helpful to a country where inflation is particularly high at a given moment in time. The lack of suggestions for policy improvements is another reason why researchers largely turned away from reputational models, towards an analysis of the policy incentives entailed in different monetary policy institutions Js 2.5. N o t e s on the literature
Textbook treatments of the general material in this section can be found in Persson and Tabellini (1990, Chs. 1-4), and in Cukierman (1992, Chs. 9-11, 16), both covering the literature up to around 1990. The literature on credibility in monetary policy starts with Kydland and Prescott (1977), who included a brief section with the basic insight of the static model in subsection 2.3. Barro and Gordon (1983a) formulated a linearquadratic version and pushed its use as a positive model of monetary policy. Calvo (1978) studied the credibility problem of monetary policy in a dynamic model, where the short-run temptation to inflate arises for public-finance reasons. Obstfeld (1997b) provides an insightful analysis of the credible policies in a dynamic seignorage model. Dynamic models of the employment motive to inflate were developed by Lockwood and Philippopoulus (1994), Lockwood et al. (1998), and Jonsson (1997). Parkin (1993) argues that the great inflation of the 1970s can be explained by an increase in the natural rate in the kind of model dealt with here. Ball (1996) points to indirect evidence that many disinflationary episodes in the 1980s lacked credibility. Barro and Gordon (1983b) started the theoretical literature on reputation in monetary policy, drawing on the work on trigger strategies in repeated games with complete information. Backus and Driffill (1985), Tabellini (1985, 1987) and Barro (1986) developed incomplete information models of reputation, emphasizing how a dovish policymaker can borrow a reputation from a super-hawkish policymaker who only cares about inflation and not at all about employment. Vickers (1986) instead emphasized how a policymaker who seriously wants to fight inflation may have to engage in costly recessionary policies in order to signal his true identity to an incompletely informed public. Reputation with imperfect monitoring of monetary policy was first studied by Canzoneri (1985). Grossman and Van Huyck (1986) and Horn and Persson (1988) studied reputational models dealing with the inflation tax and exchange rate policy, respectively. Rogoff (1987) includes an insightful discussion about the pros and cons of the reputational models of monetary policy.
15 Some interesting recent work, however, suggests an institutional interpretation of some of these reputational equilibria arguing that some institutional arguments are more conducive to reputation building than others; see Jensen (1997), al Nowaihi and Levine (1996) and Herrendorf(1996). The ideas are related to Schotter (1981) and to the view that international institutions may facilitate cooperation in hade policy [see Staiger (1995) tbr a survey].
1416 3o Political
T Persson and G. Tabellini
cycles
The empirical evidence for the democratic OECD countries during the post-war period suggests systematic pre-electoral expansionary policies - fact (iv) in the introduction as well a post-election partisan cycle in real variables and inflation - fact (v). These "facts" vary somewhat depending on the country and the time period considered, and their robustness has not been checked with the same standards as, say, in the modern macroeconometric literature attempting to identify innovations in monetary policy 16 But they are interesting enough to motivate this line of research. The empirical evidence also indicates that there is so-called "retrospective voting": the likelihood of election victory for the incumbent government or legislature depends largely on the state of the economy; as expected, a higher growth rate boosts the reelection probability of the incumbent iv. It is then tempting to "explain" fact (iv) the political business cycle - by opportunistic governments seeking re-election by taking advantage of the voters' irrationality. But how can we claim that the same individuals act in a rational and forward-looking way as economic agents, but become fools when casting their vote? One of the puzzles any rational theory o f political business cycles must address is thus how to reconcile retrospective voting with the evidence of systematic policy expansions before elections. This puzzle is addressed in subsection 3.1, under the assumption that voters are rational but imperfectly informed, and that 'the government is opportunistic and mainly motivated by seeking re-election. This section builds on work by Lohman (1996), Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Persson and Tabellini (1990). The correlations between macroeconomic outcomes and the party in office are easier to explain, provided that we are willing to assume policymakers to be motivated by ideology (have preferences over outcomes) and, once in office, prepared to carry out their own agenda. These assumptions lead to a theory of "partisan" political business cycles, which is summarized in subsection 3.2, following the pioneering work by Alesina (1987). 3.1. Opportunistic gooernments
Throughout this section~ we discuss political business cycles in the simple monetary policy model of Section 2, as does most of the literature. But the ideas generally apply to aggregate demand management, including fiscal policy. We deal in turn with "moral
~ Faust and Irons (1999) criticize the literature on partisan cycles in the USA tot failing to control for simultaneity- and omitted-variable bias and argue that the support for a partisan cycle in output is much weaker than what a cursory inspection of the data would suggest. Mishra (1997) uses modern panel data estimation techniques trying to control for similar biases in a panel of 10 OECD countries. He finds strong support for a post-electoral partisan cycle and weaker support for a pre-electoral cycle. J; See, for instance, Fair (1978).
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hazard" and "adverse selection", where the labels refer to the informational asymmetry between voters and the elected policymaker. 3.1.1. Moral hazard in monetary policy
The model in this first subsection is adapted from Lohman (1996), whose work builds on that by Persson and Tabellini (1990) and Holmstrom (1982). Its main insight is that elections aggravate the credibility problem of monetary policy, because they raise the benefit of surprise inflation for the incumbent. Consider a version of the model in subsection 2.4. Voters are rational, have an infinite horizon and are all identical. Their preferences are summarized by a loss function defined over inflation and employment, identical to Equations (2.15) and (2.16) above - and are thus linear in employment. Political candidates have the same objectives, defined over output and inflation, as the voters. In addition, they enjoy being in office: their loss is reduced by K units each period they hold office. Candidates differ in their ability to solve policy problems. One candidate may be particularly able to deal with trade unions, another to deal with an oil-price shock, a third is better able to organize his administration. This competence is reflected in output growth (employment): a more competent candidate brings about higher growth, ceteris paribus. To capture this, we write the Phillips curve exactly as in Equation (2.3), except that we set 0 to zero; we thus consider only e shocks, but change their interpretation. Throughout this section, e captures the competence of the incumbent policymaker, not exogenous supply shocks. We assume that the competence of a specific policymaker follows a simple MA-process: e, = -~h - /~t-1, where ~/ is a mean zero, i.i.d, random variable, with distribution F(.) and density f ( . ) (in this formulation a positive realization of ~/ leads to high output). Competence is assumed to be random, as it depends on the salient policy problems, but partially lasting, as the salient policy problems change slowly and as competence may also depend on talent. Serially correlated competence is the basis of retrospective voting: as competence lasts over time, rational voters are more likely to re-elect an incumbent who brought about a high growth rate. In the very first period of this repeated game, we assume r/0 = 0. The timing in a given period t is as follows. The previous period's policy instrument and inflation & 1 are observed. Wages (and expected inflation) are determined. The policymaker sets the policy instrument for t. Competence is realized and output growtb xt is observed by everybody. Finally, if t is an election year - which happens every other year -~ elections are heldo Two remarks should be made about these assumptions. First, unlike in Section 2, the policymaker does not have any information advantage over private agents: when policy is set, the current competence shock ~/i is unknown to everyone, including the incumbent. The voters do not face an adverse selection problem in that the policymaker cannot deliberately "signal" his competence. This assumption distinguishes the model in Lohman (1996) from the earlier work by Rogoff and
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71 Persson and G. Tabellini
Sibert (1988), Rogoff (1990) and Persson and Tabellini (1990). The voters still face a moral hazard problem: through his monetary policy action, the incumbent can appear better than he really is. The voters understand these incentives, but can do nothing about them, as policy is unobservable. A model o f this kind was first studied by Holmstrom (1982) in a standard principal-agent set-up, where the agent has career concerns, subsection 3.1.3 discusses the alternative, and more complicated, setting when the policymaker is better informed about his own competence than the voters. Second, at the time o f the elections, voters only observe output growth and wages (expected inflation), but not inflation or policy. This assumption is not as bad as it may first appear. Inflation typically lags economic activity. A n d even though monetary policy instruments are immediately and costlessly observed, this information is meaningless unless the voters also observe other relevant information that the policymaker has about the state o f the economy. To properly understand an expansion o f the money supply six months before the elections, voters would have to know the policymaker's forecasts o f money demand and other relevant macroeconomic variables. Assuming that policy itself is unobservable is just a convenient shortcut to keep the voters signal-extraction problem as simple as possible is Finally, we make two other simplifying assumptions. Once voted out o f office, an incumbent can never be reappointed. The opponent in any election is drawn at random from the population and his pre-election competence is not known. Thus the expected competence o f any opponent is zero. 3.1.2.
The equilibrium
First, consider wage-setters. They have the same information as the policymaker and Call thus compute equilibrium policy and perfectly predict inflation. Hence, in equilibrium sr - Jv~ in every period. Next, consider voters. By observing output and knowing the previous period shock to competence, tk 1, they can correctly infer the current competence o f the incumbent by using Equation (2.3): tlt = xt - rlt i 19. The equilibrium voting rule is then immediate. Voters always prefer the policymaker with the highest expected competence. As the opponent has zero expected competence, the voters re-elect the incumbent with probability one i f and only i f xt > r/t--l, as in this c a s e t h > 0 (if xf --= rk 1, we can assume that the voters randomize, as they are indifferent). To an outside econometrician, who observes x~ but not t/l-l,
18 As Lohman (1996) observes, however, this assumption is not easily made consistent with a surprise supply formulation (like in Section 2) where employment (output growth) is determined by realized real wages in a one-sector setting. Lohman instead formulates her model as a Lucas island model where firms observe tile local inflation but not economy-wide inflation (the policy instrument). i9 Voters know that Jr = JU. Also, recall that in period 0 we have, by assumption, tl0 0. Hence in period 1: x I = t/l, and output fully reveals the policymaker's competence. Knowing r/l , in period 2, voters can intbr r/2 from x2 = t12+ th, and so on.
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this voting rule appears consistent with retrospective voting: the probability of reelection, Pr(~h i ~< x t ) - F ( x ~ ) , increases with output growth in the election period. Next, consider the policymaker's optimization problem. In @ e l e c t i o n years, he can do nothing to enhance future re-election probability, as competence shocks last only one period and are observed with the same lag. Hence, the equilibrium inflation rate minimizes the static loss in Equation (2.1 6) with respect to ~, subject to Equation (2.3) and taking yL"e as given. As in subsection 2.4, this yields 76 = X. O n - e l e c t i o n years entail different incentives: by raising output growth through unexpected inflation, the incumbent policymaker would increase his election probability. In equilibrium, wagesetters correctly anticipate these incentives, and raise expected inflation accordingly, so that output continues to grow at its natural rate. To formally derive these results, we first compute the equilibrium probability of re-election from the point of view of the incumbent. Recall that he is re-elected iff [xt > t/t_,], or - by Equation (2.3) and our definition of E - iff [tit > gete - Jrt I • When setting policy, the incumbent has not yet observed t/t. His perceived probability of reelection is 1 - Prob(r/t ~< xe _ ~ ) ~ 1 -- F(aVre - a~t), where F(.) is the cumulative distribution of t/. This probability is clearly an increasing function of unexpected inflation. Next, we need some additional notation. Let V R and V N be the expected equilibrium continuation values of reappointment and no reappointment, at the point when policy in an on-election year is chosen. Furthermore, let ~ be equilibrium inflation during on-election years, to be derived below. Simple algebra establishes that: VN _
~2 q_ 6~-g2
2(1 - 62) ,
K(1 + 6)
vR _ VN _
1
~2(1
(3.1)
F(0))'
where 1 F(O) is the equilibrium probability of re-election perceived by the incumbent in all . f u t u r e elections (he recognizes that future inflation surprises are not possible in equilibrium). Intuitively, the expected value of winning the elections - the difference V R - V N - depends on K, the benefits from holding office, but not on the equilibrium policies, ,~ and Yv, since those are the same irrespective of who wins. Note also that these continuation values do not depend on the policymaker's competence, as competence is not known when policy is set. We are now ready to formulate the problem of an incumbent during an on-election year. The incumbent takes expected inflation as given and chooses current inflation to minimize E[L t ]
[½yc 2 - )~(Jv - off) - K + 6(1 - - F ( s r ? - Jvt)) V ~ + 6F(¢c~ - Jrt) V N I .
(3.2) The first two terms in Equation (3.2) capture the expected loss in the current period. The last two terms capture the expected value of future losses, as determined by reappointment or not in the upcoming elections. Taking the first-order condition for a
Persson and G. Tabellini
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given ~e and then imposing the equilibrium condition Jr - :re yields the equilibrium inflation rate during on-election years: 6(1 + 6)f(O) = ~q-(~f(O)(VN - v R ) = "~ q - K 1 - 6 2 ( 1 - F(0))'
(3.3)
where the last equality follows from Equation (3.1). The LHS of Equation (3.3) is the marginal cost of inflation. The RHS is the marginal benefit: 3. is the usual benefit of higher output growth~ present at all times; the second term is tile additional on-election-year benefit; higher output growth increases the chance of re-election. This additional benefit of surprise inflation undermines credibility and makes policy more expansionary during on-election years. Thus, equilibrium inflation right after the election is higher, the more the policymaker benefits from holding office, as measured by K, and the more surprise inflation raises the probability of reappoinmlent, as measured by the density f(0). Finally, as the incentives to inflate before elections are perfectly understood by private agents, expected inflation is also higher, and equilibrium output growth is not affected. Thus, the equilibrium is consistent with stylized fact (iv) in the introduction. Elections aggravate the credibility problem, as the incumbent cares even more than usual about output growth. 3.1.3. A d v e r s e s e l e c t i o n
What happens when policy is instead chosen after the incumbent has observed the realization of current competence th, but the sequence of events is otherwise exactly as before? In this setting, studied by Rogoff and Sibert (1988), Rogoff (1990) and Persson and Tabellini (1990), the policymaker enjoys an information advantage over wage-setters, who do not know the realization of t/t when forming expectations. Output fluctuations can still reveal the policymaker's type, but in a less straightforward fashion: voters have to deal with an adverse selection problem, where output can be used as a deliberate signal of the incumbent's competence. To cope with this more intricate problem, we postulate that in each period tl can only take one of two values: ~ > 0 and tl < 0 with probabilities P and (1 - P ) , respectively. As before, ;'/is i.i.d, and has an expected value E(t/) = P ~ + (1 - P)~ = 0. We refer to an incumbent with a high (low) realization of t/as competent (incompetent). The opponent's competence is still unknown to everyone. In the moral hazard model, all incumbent types choose the same action, because e x a n t e they were all identical. Here, a more competent incumbent has stronger incentives to surprise with higher inflation. There are two reasons for this. First, a more competent incumbent cares more about winning the elections, since he knows that he can do a better job than his opponem. Second, a more competent incumbent also has a lower cost of signalling his competence through high output growth. Here, we only sketch the arguments needed to characterize the equilibrium A full derivation is provided by
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Persson and Tabellini (1990, Ch. 5). As a first step, compute the expected net value o f winning the elections:
(1 + 6 ) K V R - V N = A,r/+ 1 - 62(1 - P )
(3.4)
Comparing Equations (3. l) and (3.4), the net value of winning now depends on the competence o f the incumbent: a competent incumbent knows he is more likely to bring about higher future output growth than his opponent, and hence values office more. A incompetent incumbent realizes the converse - and is less eager to be re-elected 2°. The equilibrium inflation rate trades off this net value of winning against the short-run cost o f signalling. Both types want to appear competent and are prepared to artificially boost the economy through unexpected inflation to increase the chances of winning. But the competent type can signal at a lower cost: he needs to inflate less to produce any level o f output growth. As the value o f winning is also higher for the competent type, a "separating equilibrium" generally emerges: rational voters re-elect the incumbent only if output growth exceeds a minimum threshold. The threshold is so high that only a competent incumbent finds it optimal to reach it through unexpected inflation. The incompetent type instead prefers to keep inflation low, knowing he will not be re-elected. Recall that wage-setters have to form inflation expectations without knowing which incumbent type they face. expost, they will always be wrong, even though their ex ante inflation forecast is rational. If the incutnbent is incompetent, he chooses the short-run optimal inflation rate Uv = X in the model), which is lower than expected; hence, the economy goes through a recession. If the incumbent is competent, inflation is higher than expected and the economy booms. How do the conclusions o f this model compare with the stylized facts? Clearly, retrospective voting applies: voters reward pre-electoral booms with reappointment and punish pre-electoral recessions. Output is not systematically higher before elections; on average, inflation is higher just after the elections, but this cycle is weaker than in the moral hazard model, as only the competent type now raises equilibrium inflation. Overall, the predictions of this model are not inconsistent with the stylized facts. Which model is more satisfactory? The moral hazard model has more clear-cut predictions and makes less demanding assumptions about the rationality of the voters. Moreover, multiplicity of equilibria is an additional problem in the adverse selection model. With enough data, one could discriminate between the two models: output
2o We assume that K is sufficiently high that even an incompetent incmnbent values being re-elected. Note also that here the equilibrium probability of winning future elections coincides with P, the probability of a high realization of~t. That is, in equilibrium a competent incumbent is alwaysreappointed and an incompetent one is not. This is a feature of all separating equilibria, that will be discussed below; some equilibria may exist that are not separating, but we neglect them here. Persson m~d Tabellini (1990) contains a more general discussion of this issue.
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volatility before the elections and inflation volatility after the elections are higher only in the adverse selection model. Note that these two models also have different normative implications. With moral hazard, the political cycle is entirely wasteful, whereas it conveys valuable information to voters in the adverse selection model 21 . 3.2. Partisan gooernments
The prior section relied on two crucial assumptions. All voters are alike and policymakers are opportunistic: their main purpose is re-election to enjoy the rents from office. Elections serve only one purpose: to select the most competent policymaker. But voters are not alike, and policymakers are also motivated by their own "ideological" view of what ought to be done and which group o f voters to represent. Therefore, elections serve another goal: they resolve conflicts and aggregate preferences. The policy outcome then hinges on the partisan interests o f the elected government. In monetary policy, and more generally aggregate demand policies, one crucial concern is the relative weight assigned to stabilizing output. For left-wing governments output and employment may weigh more heavily than prices; if so, they will also pursue more expansionary aggregate demand policies than right-wing governments. Elections thus create uncertainty about economic policy. This uncertainty is greater in a two-party system with very polarized parties. It may create a post-electoral cycle in the policy instruments, and a resulting macroeconomic cycle. We now extend our simple monetary policy model to illustrate these ideas, showing how one can account for stylized fact (v) in the introduction. The ideas originate with the work o f Alesina (1987, 1988). 3.2.1. The model
Consider the same model as in the previous section, but suppose that individual voters differ in their relative evaluation o f output and inflation. The preferences o f voter i are still described by an intertemporal loss function like (2.15), but the static loss o f individual i has an idiosyncratic relative weight on output: Li(zc, x) = ~:vl 2
)~ix.
(3.5)
Two political candidates or parties, called D and R, have the same general loss function as the voters, with relative weights )LD > )~R. The D candidate thus cares more
21 Rogoff (1990) shows in a closely related adverse selection model of fiscal policy that society may actually be worse off if one tries to curtail pre-election signalling through, say, a balanced budget amendment (the loss of losing the information may more than outweigh the gain of eliminating the distortions associated with signalling). In a recent paper, however, al Nowaihi and Levine (1998) demonstrate that political cycles can be avoided and social welfare increased by delegating monetary policy to an independent central bmlk faced with an inflation contract of the type discussed in subsection 4.3 below.
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about output growth and less about inflation than the R candidate. The candidates' preferences are known by everybody, but the outcome of the election is uncertain. For simplicity, there are no competence or supply shocks: output growth is described by Equation (2.3), without any e so that x = 0 + ¢c - ¢ce. The timing of events is as follows: Wages are set at the beginning of each period. Elections are held every other period, just after wages are set for that period. Thus, wage contracts last through half the legislature and cmmot be conditioned on the election outcome. Finally, to capture the electoral uncertainty about policy, we assume that candidates can only set policy once in office. In other words, electoral promises are not binding and the policy must be ex post optimal, given the policymaker's pret~rences. 3.2.2. Economic equilibrium
Under these assumptions, voters are perfectly informed and the state of the economy does not reveM anything to them. Hence, policymaker I chooses the same inflation rate in office whether it is an on- or off-election period. Given the assumed timing, it is easy to verify that ¢d = )~I, I = D, R. In off-election periods, this inflation rate is perfectly anticipated by wage-setters, and output grows at the natural rate: x = 0. But just before the elections, wage-setters do not know which policymaker type will win. Suppose they assign probabilities P and (1 - P ) to the events that D and R win. During on-election periods, expected inflation is thus :ve = )~R + p()~o _ )~R). If party R wins, it sets 7c = XR < ¢ce and causes a recession in the first period of office: output is x = -P(3. D -tlR). If D wins, the opposite happens: actual inflation is higher than expected and a boom occurs: x = (1 - P ) ( ) ~ - 3.R). Thus, uncertain election outcomes may cause economic fluctuations. But this political output cycle occurs after the election and is due to different governments having different ideologies, in contrast to the previous model where the political output cycle is due to signalling and occurs beJore elections. interpreting these ideological differences along a left-right political dimension, we get a possible explanation for stylized fact (v). The model predicts that left-wing governments stimulate aggregate demand and cause higher inflation throughout their tenure, while the opposite happens under right-wing governnaents. An election victory of the left brings about a temporary boom just after the elections; victory of the right is instead tbllowed by a recession. These partisan effects are more pronounced under a more polarized political system (i.e. with large differences between tlD and )~R in the model), or more generally if the elections identify a clear winner, like in two-party systems. Alesina and Roubini (1997) argue that these predictions are consistent with the evidence for industrial countries. 3.2.3. Political equilibrium
The partisan model tbcuses on the role of party preterences in elections. Voters anticipate what each party would do if elected, and choose the party closest to their
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17. Pe~5'son and G. Tabellini
ideal point. Thus, the probability that one party or the other wins is entirely determined by fluctuations in the distribution of voters' preferences for the two parties. Moreover, as electoral promises are not binding and voters are rational and forward-looking, the policy platforms of the two candidates do not converge towards the median voter. In the model, voters face a trade-off. If R wins, inflation is lower but output is temporarily lower, while the opposite happens if D wins. How voters evaluate this trade-off depends on their relative weight parameter )~i. Computing the losses to a generic voter after an R and a D victory, respectively, and taking differences, it is easy to verify that voter i strictly pret~rs R to win if
,V < ½(1 + 6)(,~ R + X~)).
(3.6)
The probability (1 ~-P) that R wins is the probability that the relative weight of the median voter ~" satisfies inequality (3.6). Electoral uncertainty thus ultimately relies on the identity of the median voter being unknown, because of random shocks to the voters' preferences or to the participation rate. Ceteris paribus, right-wing governments enjoy an electoral advantage: because all policymakers suffer from an inflation bias, a high value of )~ is a political handicap 22. Inequality (3.6) implies that a voter whose ideological view is right in between R and D [that is, such that ,~i _ ½(3j~+ )j))] votes for the right-wing candidate. This suggests that an incumbent can act strategically to increase its chances of re-election. Specifically, a right-wing government can make its left-wing opponent less appealing to the voters by increasing the equilibrium inflation bias. This could be done by reducing wage indexation, by issuing nominal debt (to raise the benefits of surprise inflation), or by creating more monetary policy discretion, via a less disciplining exchange rate regime or weaker legislation regarding central bank independence, or even by current monetary policy if unemployment is serially correlated. These ideas have their roots in the literature on strategic public debt policy, further discussed in Section 6 below. On the normative side, electoral uncertainty and policy volatility are inefficient, and voters would be better off ex-ante by electing a middle-of-the-road government that enacted an intermediate policy. But in the assumed two-party system, there is no way of eliminating this unnecessary volatility. The stark result that there is no convergence to the median position, is weakened under two circumstances. One, studied by Alesina and Cukierwian (1988), is uncertainty about the policymaker type. Then each candidate has an incentive to appear more moderate, so as to raise the probability of winning the next election. The second, studied by Alesina (1987), is repeated interactions. Then the two candidates can sustain self-enforcing cooperative agreements: a deviation from a moderate policy would be punished by the opponent who also reverts to more extreme behavior once in office. Alternatively, cooperation could be enforced by the v o t e r s
22 This observation is related to the argument about the benefits of appointing a conservative central banker discussed in subsection 4.3 below.
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punishing a government that enacted extreme policies. Naturally, there is the same problem of multiple equilibria as in the reputational equilibria of subsection 2.4. Institutional checks and balances can also moderate policy extremism. In a presidential system, for instance, actual policies often result from a compromise between the legislature and the executive. The model of partisan policymakers suggests that the voters would take advantage of these institutional checks and balances to moderate the behavior of the majorities. Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) argue that the voters' attempt to moderate policy extremism can explain split ticket voting in Presidential systems (i.e., the same individuals voting for different parties in Presidential and Congressional elections) and the mid-term election cycle (the party who won the last general elections loses the interim election). 3.3. N o t e s on the litetz~ture
Alesina and Roubini (1997) present existing and new evidence on electoral cycles in OECD countries. They also survey the theoretical work on political cycles in aggregate demand policy. Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) focus on the United States in particular. The evidence for a partisan cycle is scrutinized by Faust and Irons (1999) (for the USA) and by Mishra (1997) (for a panel of OECD countries). Fair (1978), Fiorina (1981) and Lewis-Beck (1988) discuss the evidence on retrospective voting in the USA and elsewhere. The first models of political business cycles with opportunistic government are due to Nordhaus (1975) and Lindbeck (1976). The first theory of a partisan political cycle is due to Hibbs (1977). All these papers relied on the assumption that private agents are backward-looking, both in their economic and voting decisions. The model of an opportunistic govermnent and adverse selection with rational voters, summarized in subsection 3.1.3, was developed by Rogoff and Sibert (1988) in the case of fiscal policy, and adapted to monetary policy by Persson and Tabellini (1990). Rogoff (1990) generalized the fiscal policy results to two-dimensional signalling by the incumbent. Ito (1990) and Terrones (1989) considered political systems in which the election date is endogenous and chosen by the incumbent himself, after having observed his own competence. The moral hazard model studied in subsection 3.1.1 is very similar to a principalagent problem with career concerns developed by Holmstrom (1982). It was studied in the context of monetary policy by Lohman (1996) and, in a somewhat different set-up, by Milesi-Ferretti (1995b). Ferejohn (1986) and Barro (1973) study a more abstract moral hazard problem where an incumbent is disciplined by the voters through the implicit reward of reappointment. The model of partisan politics with rational voters is due to Alesina (1987, 1988). This model is extended by Alesina et al. (1993) and by Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) to allow for ideological parties who also differ in their competence. Milesi-Ferretti (1994) discusses how a right-wing incumbent might increase his popularity by reducing the extent of wage indexation; similar points with regard to nominal debt and the choice of
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an exchange rate regime were investigated by Milesi-Ferretti (1995a,b). Jonsson (1995) discusses strategic manipulation of monetary policy for political purposes when there is autoregression in employment. Uncertainty about the policymaker's ideological type is considered in Alesina and Cukierman (1988). The role of moderating elections, in theory and in the US data, is studied by Alesina and Rosenthal (1995).
4. Institutions and incentives
Theoretical work on institutions and incentives in monetary policy has developed over the last ten years. Below, we give a selective account of key ideas in that development. We do not follow the actual course of the literature over time, but we exploit what, in retrospect, appear to be the logical links between different ideas. The main issue is how the design of monetary institutions can remedy the incentive problems discussed in Sections 2 and 3. Even though we focus on lack of credibility, some results extend to the political distortions of Section 3. The ideas in this section rely on a common premise: institutions "matter". A constitutional or institution-design stage lays down some fundamental aspects of the rules of the game, which cannot be easily changed. Once an independent central bank has been set up, an international agreement over the exchange rate has been signed, or an inflation target has been explicitly assigned to the central bank, it has some such staying power, in the sense that changing the institution e x p o s t is costly or takes time. This premise is questioned by some critics [in particular by McCallum (t996) and Posen (1993)], who argue that some of the proposed institutional remedies discussed in this section "do not fix the dynamic inconsistency" that is at the core of this literature, they "merely relocate it". The criticism is correct, in that the institutions are assumed to enforce a policy which is e x p o s t suboptimal from society's (or the incumbent government) point of view. Hence, there is always a temptation to renege on the institution. But the staying power of institutions need not be very long to be effective. In the model that dominates the literature, what is needed is a high cost for changing the institution within the time horizon of existing nominal contracts. Beyond the contracting horizon, expectations would reflect any constitutional change, which removes the distinction between e x p o s t and e x a n t e optimality. As already remarked in subsection 2.4, the cost of suddenly changing the institution could also be a loss of reputation. By focusing political attention on specific issues and commitments, institutions alert private individuals if govermnents explicitly renege on their promises. To pick up the thread from Section 2, one purpose of successful monetary institutions is to make monetary policy a bit more like patent legislation. In our view, real-world monetary institutions do have such staying power. They can be changed, but the procedure for changing them often entails delays and negotiations between different parties or groups that were purposefully created when the institution was designed. We thus think that the premise of the literature is generally appropriate. But it would be more convincing to derive
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the institutional inertia as the result o f a well-specified non-cooperative strategic interaction between different actors, something the literature - so far - has failed to do 23. 4.1. Fixed exchange rates." simple rules and escape clauses
Pegging the value o f the exchange rate to gold or to some reserve currency has been a common device, particularly in smaller countries, to anchor inflationary expectations, discipline domestic price and wage setting, or prevent political interference in monetary policy. Such attempts have met with mixed success. A m o n g the industrialized countries during the post-war period, the Bretton Woods system and (part of) the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) were reasonably successful. But unilateral attempts o f some European countries to peg their exchange rates in the 1970s and 1980s often ended up in failure: with lack o f credibility generating a spiral of repeated devaluations, domestic wages and prices running ahead of foreign inflation. What can explain such differences? To shed light on this question, let us study a slight modification of the static model in Section 2. A small open economy is specialized in the production o f a single good which is also produced by the rest o f the world. The central bank controls 37 through the exchange rate, given a foreign inflation rate denoted 37*. The rest of the model, including the expectations-augmented Phillips curve (2.3), the rational-expectations assumption, the objective function o f the policy maker (2.6), and the timing o f events are as in subsection 2.2 or 2.3; except that we assume not only 0, but also 37* to be known when wages are set (7c° are formed). Note that 37* denotes both foreign and target inflation, as pegging the exchange rate to a low-inflation currency can be seen as an explicit or implicit attempt to target a low inflation rate. Under discretion, the model is formally identical to that in subsection 2.3 and thus generates the inflation and employment outcomes in Equations (2.12) and (2.14). As E(37) > 37*, the model is consistent with the idea o f a devaluation spiral, fuelled by low credibility among wage-setters and a devaluing exchange rate. Consider now the following institution. At stage (0), society commits to a simple rule o f holding the exchange rate fixed, or of letting it depreciate at a fixed rate k. There is commitment, in the sense that the rate o f depreciation k is chosen at the start of each period, and cannot be abandoned until one period later. The rule is simple, because it cannot incorporate any contingencies. In practice, simple commitments of this kind can be enforced by multilateral agreements such as the Bretton Woods system or the ERM, where the short-rnn interests of other countries are hurt if one country devalues. Policy commitments to complex contingent rules would require implausible assumptions on verifiability and foresight.
23 Jensen (1997) in tact studies a simple model related to the contracting solution to be studied in subsection 4.3 - where the government can renege on the initial institution at a continuous (nonlump sum) cost. In this setting institution design generally improves credibility, but cannot remove the credibility problem cmnpletely.
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What is the optimal rule? As the depreciation rate is known in advance of wage setting and expectation formation and is not contingent on the e shocks, it is neutral with respect to real variables. Hence, the optimal rule has k = 0. Under this simplicity constraint, a fixed exchange rate is thus the optimal commitment. This results in the following equilibrium outcome: ~s = jr., x s _ 0 - e, where the S superscript stands for simple rule. Is the simple rule better than discretion? It depends. The rule brings about lower average inflation, but employment is more variable. A formal comparison of the two regimes can be made by substituting Equations (2.12)-(2.14), and the previous expression for ~s and x s, into Equation (2.6) and taking expectations o f the difference in their payoffs. Recalling that E(O) = 0, this gives
E[L(~t)'xD)]-E[L(~S'xS)] = 2)'2- {E(x*)2 + o~ - -(1- ~ 2 ; ).
J
The first two "terms on the RHS capture the benefit of credibility under the simple rule the sum of the squared average inflation bias and its variance. The last term is the loss from not being able to stabilize employment. A simple rule is better than discretion if the gain o f credibility is larger than the loss o f stabilization policies. This trade-off between credibility and flexibility is a recurrent theme in the literature on institution design. The benefit o f the simple rule is further enhanced if, under discretion, monetary policy is also distorted by the electoral incentives discussed in Section 3. Another monetary regime, often advocated though harder to enforce, is a commitmerit to a k% money growth rule. Suppose we add a simple quantity-theory equation to our model, where money demand depends on output growth (or employment), so that + x = m + v. The policy instrument is m, like in Section 2. Under a simple money growth rule, velocity shocks v destabilize employment and prices. A simple exchange rate peg, on the other hand, automatically offsets velocity shocks. But a money supply rule might better stabilize supply shocks; as these destabilize both output and prices, the price response acts as an automatic output stabilizer. In the limit, if ~, = 1, a k% money rule mimics the optimal policy response to a supply shock 24. The assumption that an exchange rate peg, once announced, cannot be abandoned until next period, may be too stark. Multilateral exchange rate agreements often have escape ,clauses: European countries have temporarily left the ERM or realigned their central parities when exceptional circumstances made it difficult to keep the exchange rate within the band. An escape clause can be thought o f as follows. Define normal times as a range of possible realizations o f the unobservable supply shock: e C [eL(o), EU(o)]. Inside this interval, the central bank remains committed to the simple rule. During exceptional times, defined by the complementary event, an 24 A literature dating back to the 1970s has studied the choice between alternative rules in richer models - for surveys, see Genberg (t989) and Flood and Mussa (1994). Recent contributions to the comparison of exchange rate versus money based stabilizations of inflation are surveyed by Calvo and V6gh (1999).
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escape clause is invoked. The central bank abandons the simple rule and pursues a discretionary (ex p o s t optimal) policy, given inflationary expectations. At normal times, the exchange rate is fixed and output is destabilized by (small) supply shocks. There is also a p e s o problem: as the escape clause will be invoked with positive probability, expected inflation is always positive. Normal times with actual inflation at zero, thus has some unexpected deflation and employment below the natural rate. At exceptional times, on the other hand, the central bank abandons the rule and sets an ex p o s t optimal policy to stabilize (unusually large) supply shocks. But less inflation is now needed compared to the regime with pure discretion, because expected inflation is lower. Hence, a simple rule with an escape clause strikes a better balance between credibility and flexibility, by allowing for flexibility when it is most needed. Indeed, Flood and Isard (1989) have shown that a rule with an escape clause always dominates pure discretion and, if supply shocks are sufficiently volatile, it also dominates a simple rule. As Obstfeld (1997a) has stressed, however, escape-clause regimes can give rise to multiple equilibria. Intuitively, expected inflation depends on how often the escape clause is invoked. At the same time, the e x p o s t decision whether or not to invoke the escape clause depends on expected inflation. As higher inflationary expectations make it more tempting to abandon the rule, high inflationary expectations may become self-fulfilling. How can a regime with an escape clause be implemented? In a multilateral exchange rate regime where realignments have to be approved by an international body, the bounds would depend on the bargaining power of the devaluing (revaluing) country, which, in turn, would depend on the details of the institution (the prospective sanctions, the procedure for making the decisions, etc.). In a domestic context, we could suppose that at the institution design stage (before 0 is realized) society sets a pair of fixed costs [ct'(0), cU(0)] incurred whenever the escape clause is invoked. These costs would capture the public image loss for the central banker from not fulfilling his mandate, or the costs for the government of overriding a central bank committed to the simple rule. They would implicitly define bounds eL(0) and eu(0), that leave the central bank indifferent between sticking to the simple rule and bearing the cost of no stabilizing policies, or paying tile cost and invoking the escape clause, in neither of these interpretations it is reasonable to assume that the costs could be calibrated very carefully ex ante. For instance, costs may have to be state-dependent or symmetric; cL(O) = c j~, cU(O) = c ~j or c u = c1" = c. Such plausible constraints would prevent society from reaping the full value of the escape-clause regime, but still generally improve on the discretionary outcome. Flood and Marion (1997) point out that an important consideration behind the ex ante choice of c might be to prevent multiple equilibria. 4.2. Central b a n k independence
The first example of strategic delegation in monetary policy is the independent and conservative central banker, suggested by Rogoff (1985). To illustrate the idea in our simple model, we continue to make a formal distinction between society and the central bank. Society's true preferences take the form (2.6). At the institution design stage (0)
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o f the model, society appoints a central banker. The central banker is independent: once appointed, society can no longer interfere with his decisions. (Towards the end o f this subsection, we ask how reasonable this assumption really is.) Prospective central bankers have loss functions o f the form (2.6), but differ in their personal values of)L 25. The appointment thus boils down to the choice o f a parameter, say )~. The private sector observes )~B and forms its inflationary expectations accordingly. The appointed central banker sets monetary policy freely at stage (4), according to his own private preferences. As already discussed in subsection 2.3, this choice gives the equilibrium outcomes
XB ~(2, B, 0, e) - :v* + ,~B(x* -- 0) + 1 ~ - - ~ E, 1
x(,!, B, O, e) -- 0 - 1 + ~,R e. Note that the outcomes do not only depend on the realized shocks, but also on the bankers' preferences. These expressions illustrate a basic trade-off in the strategic delegation: a central banker more hawkish on inflation, i.e. someone with a lower 2,B, has more credibility in keeping inflation low, but is less willing to stabilize supply shocks. To formally study delegation, consider society's expected loss function, as a function of the central banker type: E[L(~B)] = 1E[(x()~ B, O, e ) - go*) 2 + ~ ( x ( ) f , O, e) -x*)21,
(4.1)
where the expectation is tal{en over 0 and E, for any 3~~. Next, insert the expressions for equilibrium inflation and employment into Equation (4.1) and take expectations. The derivative of the resulting expression with regard to At is dE[L(Jf)] d)~~
)~(x .2 + a0) + ( ) f - "~)(1 +a~)~B)3 '
(4.2)
The first term is the expected credibility loss of choosing a central banker with a higher ,~B. The second term measures the expected stabilization gain. The optimal appointment involves setting this expression equal to zero. Evaluating the derivative (4:2) at the extreme points implies that ~, > 3,~ > 0 26 Thus, by optimally choosing an independent central banker, society strikes a different compromise between credibility and flexibility than in the fixed exchange rate regime. 25 This suggests a heterogeneity in the population with regard to the relative weight placed on inflation versus employment, which ore formal model abstracts from. As discussed in Section 3, however, such heterogeneity can be formally introduced in the model without any difficulties. Alesina and Grilli (1992) indeed show that strategic delegation of the type to be discussed below would take place endogenously in a model where heterogeneous voters elect the central banker directly. 26 Equation (4.7) is a ~burth-order equation in ,~B, which is difficult to solve. But as the derivative is negative at )f = 0, positive for all 2~ > 2~, and the second-order condition is fulfilled for any ,~e in the interval (0, ,~), we kaaowthat the solution must be inside the interval (0,)~).
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But it is still a compromise: it is optimal to appoint a central banker who is more conservative on inflation than society itself (to address the inflation bias), but still not ultraconservative (to preserve some of the benefits of stabilization). Note also that fluctuations in the inflation bias arising from observable 0 shocks remain. If 3~8 could be chosen after the realization of 0, society would want to meet a more serious incentive problem - a smaller 0 - with a more hawkish central banker - a smaller XB. In practice, the extent of the incentive problem is serially correlated over time, so that making appointments at discrete points is probably a good way of dealing with this problem. Like in the escape-clause model, we could give society or government the option of overriding the central bank decision in exceptional circumstances. The override option could involve firing the central banker, introducing ad-hoc legislation or an explicit override clause under a prespecified procedure (the latter arrangement is indeed observed in the central bank legislation of many countries). An implicit escape clause mitigates the ex p o s t suboptimality of central bank behavior, inducing even a conservative central banker to stabilize extreme supply shocks to the same extent as society would do 27. This option should not be overemphasized, however; escape clauses can hardly be optimally designed ex ante. Moreover, as already noted in the introduction, if the government has an override option, why does it not use it all the time to get the policy it wants ex p o s t ? We may also note that having an independent central bank also protects society from the distortions introduced by the electoral business cycles discussed in Section 3. In this case, however, only independence is required, and no special emphasis on inflation relative to other macroeconomic goals. Waller (1989) was probably first in formulating a model of central bank independence under partisan politics 2s. Waller and Walsh (1996) study the optimal term length of central bankers in the context of partisan cycles, where society's objectives may change over time. The literal interpretation that society picks a central banker type is not very satisfactory: individual priorities or attitudes towards inflation and employment are often unknown and vaguely defined. Moreover, individual attitudes are probably less important than the general character and tradition of the institution itself. A better interpretation is that, at the constitutional stage, society drafts a central bank statute spelling out the "mission" of the institution. Thus, the parameter ,~ reflects the priority assigned to price stability relative to other macroeconomic goals. As instrument independence is a necessary condition for delegation to work, we should expect such a strategic setting of goals to work better if combined with institutional and legislative features, lending independence to the central bank and shielding it from short-run political pressures. In this interpretation, the model yields observable implications: countries or time periods in which the central bank statute gives priority to price stability and protects central bank independence should have lower average inflation and higher employmem 27 This is indeed proved by Lohman (1992). 28 Fratianni et al. (1997) formally analyze the role of central bank independence in the absence of a traditional credibility problem, but in the presence of explicit electoral incentives.
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(or output) volatility - since if )~B < )~, stabilization policies are pursued less vigorously. Moreover, electoral business cycles in inflation or output should be less pronounced with greater central bank independence. By now, a number o f studies have constructed measures o f central bank independence based on central bank statutes, also taking the priority given to the goal o f price stability into account 29. Crosscountry data for industrial countries show a strong negative correlation between those measures of central bank independence and inflation, but no correlation between output or employment volatility and central bank independence. Thus, central bank independence seems to be a free lunch: it reduces average inflation, at no real cost. Different interpretations o f this result have been suggested. Alesina and Gatti (1996) note that an independent central bank could reduce electorally induced output volatility, as would be predicted by the models of Section 3, and Lippi (1998) provides evidence that could support this proposition. Posen (1993, 1995) argues that the cross-country correlation between central bank independence and lower inflation is not causal, and suggests that both may be induced by society's underlying preferences for low and stable inflation. Finally, Rogoff (1985) also suggests another interpretation o f the model: the conservative central banker might be interpreted as a targeting scheme supported by a set of punishments and rewards. Having a conservative central banker is formally equivalent to having an additional term in inflation in his loss function, 0 ( B -- X)(J'g -- 3"g*) 2, where Z ~ > Z. The central banker thus has the same objective function as everybody else, but faces additional sanctions if actual inflation exceeds the target. In this simple model, a conservative central banker is thus equivalent to an inflation target 3o. This alternative interpretation has been picked up by a more recent literature, asking which targets are more efficient, and more generally how a targeting scheme should be designed to optimally shape the central bank ex-post incentives. 4.3. Inflation targei~ and inflation contracts'
Central banks have traditionally operated with intermediate targets, like money or the exchange rate. in the 1990s, several central banks started to target inflation: whereas some central banks imposed the procedure on themselves, the transition has been mandated by some governments 31. Such targeting schemes have recently been studied 29 See in particular Bade and Parkin (1988), Grilli et al. (1991), Alesina and Summers (1993), Cukierman (1992) and Eijffmger and Schaling (1993). 30 Rogoff (1985) compares an inflation target to other nominal targets, such as money and nominal income. He shows that strategic concerns of the type considercd here, can indeed overturn the ranldng of intermediate targets, based on parameter values and relative variance of shocks, in the traditional non-strategic literature on monetary targeting. 31 A substantial literature discusses real-world inflation targeting. See in particular Leiderman and Svensson (t995), Haldane (1995), McCallum (I996), Mishkin and Posen (1997) and Ahneida and Goodhart (1996). In practice, an inflation target means that the central bank is using its own inflation Jorecast as ml intermediate target; see Svensson (1997b) for instance
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from the point of view of the theory of optimal contracts. Society, or whoever is the principal of the central bank, presents its agent - the central b a n k with punisbments or rewards conditional on its performance. The question is what constitutes an optimal contract, and what kind of behavior it induces on the agent. We illustrate the basic ideas of this recent literature in our simple model of credibility. The optimal contract can easily be modified so as to implement the optimal monetary policy even in the presence of political distortions, but we do not pursue this extension. Much of the discussion in this subsection is based on results in Persson and Tabellini (1993) and Walsh (1995a). The central bank holds the same quadratic preferences as everybody in society. It operates under discretion, setting policy at stage (4). At the constitutional stage (0), the government formulates a publicly observable complete contract for the central bank which formulates state-contingent punishments (or rewards) conditional on realized inflation: P(2C; O, e) -po(O, e) +Pl (0, e) ~ + ½P2(O, e) at;2.
(4.3)
Our goal is to optimally set the terms pi(O, 0, i = 0, l, 2, that define the contract. We only include up to second-order terms in the contract, since that is sufficient for our purposes. Units are normalized so that, at stage (4), the central bank minimizes the sum of the loss function and its punishment with respect to inflation: L(zc, x)+ P(jr; 0, e). Going through the same steps as in subsection 2.3 (deriving the central bank optimum condition for inflation, given the contract and expected inflation, solving for rationally expected inflation, and combining the resulting expressions), we get the equilibrium condition ( l + p 2 ( 0 , e))jr
,~(1 + p2(0, e)) Jr* pj(O,e)+X(x*--O)+ l + • + p 2 ( O , e ) e .
(4.4)
The benchmark optimum in Equation (2.11) can be implemented by settingp2(0, e) = 0 and pl(O, e) = pl(O) = X(x* - 0). Since the constant po(O, e) does not afl?ct any of the central bank marginal incentives, it can be set freely - for instance, it can be set negative enough that the participation constraint is satisfied: the central bank leadership finds it attractive enough in expected terms to take on the job. Thus a remarkably simple linear performance contract - imposing a linear penalty on inflation - removes the inflation bias completely. The credibility-flexibility trade-off has disappeared: average inflation is brought down to the target, at no cost of output volatility. Once the simple contract has been formulated, the central bank has the right incentives to implement ex ante optimal policy. Note that the optimal contract is not conditional on e; this is because the marginal incentives to stabilize the economy are correct under discretion (in the terminology of Section 2, there is an inflation bias but no stabilization bias). But the slope of the penalty for inflation is conditional on 0; as the incentive to inflate the economy also varies linearly with 0. To see the intuition for this result, think about the punishment for inflation as a Pigovian corrective tax. As
T. Persson and Ca. Tabellini
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discussed in subsection 2.3, the distortion we want to address is that the central bank does not internalize the effect o f its policy on inflationary expectations, when acting expost. Since expected inflation E ( ~ I 0) is a linear projection o f Jr, a linear penalty for inflation makes the central bank correctly internalize the marginal cost o f its policy 32. To see this formally, substitute Equation (2.3) into the objective function (2.6) and calculate the equilibrium marginal cost o f expected inflation in state 0 as:
dE[L(~,x) l O] d~ e
= ,Vx* - O) =p~(O, e).
That there is no credibility-flexibility trade-off with an optimal contract contrasts with the previous subsection, where - under a quadratic inflation target - lower expected inflation was associated with distorted stabilization policy. A quadratic inflation target is thus not an optimal contract. The Rogoff (1985) targeting solution, discussed at the end o f the last section, is equivalent to an inflation contract with 1 B P2 = (X ~ - 2'), Pl = (2"B _ 2")st*, and P0 = ~(X - 2")(zc*)2. This clearly gives the central banker incorrect marginal incentives. Nevertheless, the optimal linear inflation contract can be reinterpreted as similar to an inflation target. As the intercept can be set freely, we can write the optimal contract as
P ( x ; O)
=~o + pL ( O)(x - zc*);
(4.5)
the central banker is punished linearly, but only for upward deviations from society's preferred inflation rate. Walsh (1995b) shows that the marginal penalty on inflation can be interpreted as resulting from an arrangement where the governor o f the central bank faces a probability o f being fired which increases linearly in inflation. Such an arrangement resembles the Price Targeting Agreement in force in New Zealand since 1990. Other looser interpretations would be to associate the penalty with altered central-bank legislation, a lower central-bank budget, or a loss o f prestige of the institution and the individuals heading it, for failing to deliver on a publicly assigned or self-imposed "mission". Naturally, it may be impossible to specify the penalty exactly as a linear function o f inflation. But to approximate an optimal incentive scheme, the punishment for upward deviations from an inflation target should not increase too rapidly with the size of the deviation. In fact, if the central bank is risk averse, the optimal contract entails a diminishing marginal penalty on inflation (to reintroduce linearity in the incentive scheme). Svensson (1997a) has proposed an alternative interpretation o f inflation targets, related to - but somewhat different from - the optimal performance contract interpretation. In his formulation the central bank is not assumed to have any generic
32 Indeed, tinearity of the optimal contract is preserved for any general loss ~unctions~ and not just for the quadratic one.
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preferences over macroeconomic outcomes; instead society can impose a specific quadratic objective function on the central bank o f the form in Equation (2.6). Suppose that society manages to assign a loss function with a lower goal for inflation, say avB(0) rather than ~*, to the central bank. Then the optimal central bank goal for inflation is ~ ( 0 ) = 0c* - ,a.(x* - 0). Pursuing this goal would eliminate the inflation bias, without giving up on stabilization policies. That is, the lower inflation goal is equivalent to our previous setting with a central bank minimizing L + P, where L is society's loss function and P is an inflation contract o f the form in Equation (4.3), with parameters p2 = 0, p~ = )~(x* - 0) and P0 = ½[)~(x* - 0) 2 - 2~*)~(x* - 0)]. This representation of an inflation target suggests an alternative explanation for the empirical observation discussed in the previous subsection. A lower zce is associated with lower inflation but not with higher output variability, as in the data. It is not without problems to associate this scheme with real-world institutions, however. Suppose that the optimal inflation rate for society, sT*, is about 2%, and that the average inflation bias, )~(x* - 0), is about 5% (not an outrageous number, given the recent monetary history of many European countries). The central bank should then be given an inflation goal, S~(0), o f - 3 % . But in equilibrium, tile central bank would not take any action to bring inflation below 2%, which may present it with some problems when explaining its policy to the public. A second, more important, problem relates to enforcement. How can we ensure that the central bank accepts to evaluate the costs and benefits o f the policy according to the imposed objective function, rather than according to society's preferences? A plausible answer is that the central bank is held accountable for its actions and that there is a performance based scheme o f rewards or punishments that makes the central bank behave in the desired fashion. But then we are back to the performance contract interpretation o f inflation targets explicitly suggested by Equation (4.5) 33 A natural question is whether to base the contract on inflation or on other measures of performance, such as money, the exchange rate, or nominal income. Persson and Tabellini (1993) show that if the central bank is risk neutral, if the constraints faced by the central bank (i.e. the behavioral equations o f the economy) are linear, as assumed so far, and if the marginal penalties under the contract can be contingent on 0, there is an equivalence result: alternative targets yield the same equilibrium. With relevant non-linearities, however, an inflation-based contract is simpler; to replicate the ex ante optimal policy with other measures o f performance, the contract must be contingent on a larger set of variables, such as shocks to money demand, or to the money multiplier. In this sense, an inflation target dominates targeting schemes based on other nominal variables: simplicity implies enhanced accountability and thus easier enforcement. Intuitively, the whole purpose of optimal contracts is to remove an inflation bias. This is most easily done by means o f a direct penalty on inflation, rather than in a
3~ The best assignment if society could really freely impose an objective f~nction on CB, would be to set x*(O) = 0, thereby eliminating the inflation bias completely.
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more rotmd about way, by targeting other variables that are only loosely related to inflation. What happens if the contract cannot be made state-contingent, so that P0, pl and p2 in Equation (4.3) each have to be constant across 0? This question and its answer are related to the problem in Herrendorf and Lockwood (1997), who study delegation in a model with observable shocks, and to the problem in Beetsma and Jensen (1998), who study delegation via an optimal contract when the central banker's preferences are tmcertain e x ante. To find the optimal incomplete contract in this case, we first plug the solution for Jr in Equation (4.4) with the slope coefficients constant, as well as the associated solution for x, namely x= 0-
1 +P2
1 +~+P2
E,
into the quadratic objective function. We then take expectations o f the resulting expression over 0 and e and maximize with regard to Pl and P2. After tedious but straightforward algebra, we can write the optimality conditions as ~. /!)1 -- ~x* --P2
,
(l +/92) 3 -- a2 P2 (1 + ~t,+p2) 3 02.
(4.6)
These conditions are both intuitive. It is easy to show that the first condition says E(3r) = 3:*: unconditionally expected inflation should coincide with society's preferred rate o f inflation. The second condition says that the coefficient on the quadratic term in the contract should be a positive hacreasing function o f the relative importance o f observable to unobservable shocks (the left-hand side is increasing in p2). Thus, when fluctuations in the observable incentives to inflate cannot be handled by a statecontingent linear punishment, the constrained optimum gives up a little bit on (firstbest) stabilization in order to diminish the costly fluctuations in Jr. Asp~ contains a term in Jr*, we can rewrite the optimal non-state contingent contract as
P(~c) - p o + P l ~ +p2(a: - ~.)2, with P2 given by Equation (4.6) and Pl - ( ~,x* +P2g~) • According to this expression, the central bank should be targeting society's preferred rate of inflation and face an extra reward for low inflation. It is perhaps not too far-fetched to interpret the inflation targeting schemes enacted in the 1990s in many countries as an instance o f this arrangement 34. The simple contracting model discussed here has been extended in several directions. I f some shocks are observable, but not verifiable and hence not contractible, the central :~ In the model of Beetsma and Jenscn (1998) with uncertain CB pre~brences, the optimal inflation target may instead be above society's target.
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bank can be required to report the value of these shocks. Persson and Tabellini (1993) show that the optimal contract is related both to the inflation outcome and to the central bank announcement; it is structured in such a way as to induce optimal behavior as well as truth telling. Policy announcements matter not because they convey information to the private sector (that already observes everything), but because they change central bank incentives, by providing a benchmark against which performance can be assessed e x p o s t 35. Walsh (1995a) shows that the optimal contract can also handle costly effort by the central bank. Dolado et al. (1994) as well as Persson and Tabellini (1996) extend the contract approach to the international policy coordination problems that arise when central banks fail to internalize the international externalities of their monetary policies, al Nowaihi and Levine (1998) show how delegation via inflation contracts may eliminate political monetary cycles. McCallum (1996) and others have argued that the contracting solution makes little sense, because it just replaces one commitment problem with another: who enforces the optimal contract? This question reintroduces the general question about institutional reforms raised at the beginning of this section, although it might apply more forcefully to a more ambitious incentive scheme such as the optimal contract. As in the case of the fixed-exchange rate regimes of subsection 4.1, enforcement is more likely if agents have heterogenous ex p o s t benefits of inflation and agents hurt by inflation are given a prominent role in the enforcement. Interestingly, Faust (1996) argues that a desire to balance redistributive interests for and against surprise inflation was a clear objective in the mind of the framers of the Federal Reserve. As stated before, we also do believe that changing institutions takes time. The public image of a policymaker who emphatically announces an inflation target, would be severely tarnished, if he explicitly abandoned it shortly afterwards. This is one of the main reasons why in the real world inflation targets can alter the ex p o s t incentives of policymakers. The emphasis of the contracting solution on accountability and transparency is helpful for thinking more clearly about these issues, and about the trade-offs that emerge if the reward scheme cannot be perfectly tailored to mimic the optimal contract. We cannot demand much more than that from simple theoretical models. But where the literature should go next is probably not to other variations of the objective function in the simple linear-quadratic problem. Instead it would be desirable to model the different steps and the incentives in the enforcement procedure as a well-defined extensive-form, non-cooperative game. 4.4. Notes on the literatuFe
The literature on institutions in monetary policy has been surveyed in textbook fbrm by Persson and Tabeltini (1990), Cukierman (1992) and Schaling (1995).
3s In the reputationat model of Cukierman and Liviatan (1991), by contrast, atmouncements matter because they convey information about the policymaker'stype.
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The formal theoretical literature on central bank independence starts with Rogoff (1985), whose analysis of the conservative central banker is the basis of the model in subsection 4.3, although the treatment of society's problem as a principal agent problem is suggested by Barro and Gordon (1983b) in an anticipatory footnote. Giavazzi and Pagano (1988) discuss the commitment ability in multilateral fixed exchange rate regimes, although their analysis is carried out in a richer dynamic framework than the simple model of subsection 4.1. Flood and Isard (1989) introduce the formal analysis of the rules with escape clauses. Lohman (1992) discusses the implementation of an escape clause, by costly government override, in a monetary policy model that also includes delegation to a Rogoff-type central banker. Obstfeld (1997a) applies an escape-clause model in his analysis of realignments within the ERM, emphasizing the possibility of multiple equilibria. Bordo and Kydland (1995) argue that the classical gold standard worked like a rule with escape clauses. Flood and Marion (1997) include an insightful discussion of escape-clause models and speculative attacks. The optimal contracting solution to the credibility problem, in subsection 4.3, was developed by Walsh (1995a) and by Persson and Tabellini (1993), and was further extended by Beetsma and Jensen (1998) and by Herrendorf and Lockwood (1997). Insightful recent general discussions about the appropriate institutional framework for monetary policy can be found in Fischer (1995), McCallum (1996) and Goodhart and Vinals (1994). Cukierman and Lippi (1998) study theoretically and empirically how the optimal central banking arrangement varies with the structure of labor markets. The early real-world experience with inflation targeting is surveyed in Leiderman and Svensson (1995). More recent surveys include Haldane (1995) and Mishkin and Posen (1996). A number of studies - including Bade and Parkin (1988), Alesina (1988), Grilli et al. (199 l), Cukierman (1992) and Eijffinger and Schaling (1993) - have developed empirical measures of central bank independence and studied their relation to inflation and other macroeconomic outcomes in a cross-section of countries during the last few decades. Capie et al. (1994) study historical evidence on inflation before and after major central bank reforms in twelve countries since the end of the 19th century. Jonsson (1997) uses pooled time-series and cross-section data from the OECD countries since the early 1960s and finds that the negative relation between central bank independence and inflation is robust to the control of a number of other institutional and economic variables. Posen (1993) criticizes this kind of finding and argues that it is caused by an omitted variable problem, the causal variable for both independence and inflation being the resistance against inflation in the financial community. A survey of empirical studies is found in Eijffinger and de ttaan (1996). Each subsection above refers to additional relevant studies on specific topics.
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Part B. Fiscal Policy This part o f the chapter focuses mainly on intertemporal aspects of fiscal policy, such as government debt issue and taxation o f wealth. A companion piece [Persson and Tabellini (1999)] surveys the research on static "public finance" problems. The main stylized facts regarding the intertemporal aspects o f post-war fiscal policy in the industrialized countries include: (i) Tax rates on capital vary considerably across countries and fluctuate over time, with an upward trend. In many countries, estimates of effective tax rates on capital are quite high and often higher than tax rates on consumption or labor 36. (ii) Many countries have accumulated large debts, even in peace time. For most countries, debt accumulation in the post-war period started in the early 1970s. The cross-sectional pattern o f deficits is far from homogeneous; some countries have been endemically in deficit and built up massive debts, whereas others have not 37 (iii) Large deficits and debts have been more common in countries with proportional rather than majoritarian and presidential electoral systems, in countries with coalition governments and frequent government turnovers, and in countries with lenient rather than stringent government budget processes 3s. It is difficult to account for these regularities by the theory of optimal taxation or, more generally, any theory that assumes policy to be set by a benevolent social planner. According to Chamley (1986), the optimal capital tax should decline over time, asymptotically approaching zero, as the long-run elasticity o f investment is very high compared to that of other tax bases. Similarly, Barro's (1979) tax-smoothing model o f deficits can successfully explain war-time deficits, but not the persistent accumulation o f debt that has occurred in many industrial countries since the 1970s. Moreover, the correlations between policies and political institutions suggest that political and institutional factors play an important role in shaping fiscal policy. In this second part o f the chapter, we survey some recent literature that speaks to these stylized facts on the basis o f positive models o f fiscal policy. As in monetary policy, these recent contributions try to explain departures from socially optimal outcomes by various incentive constraints in the policy formation process. In Section 5 we discuss credibility again, abstracting from politics and individual heterogeneity. In Section 6 we add politics to our basic model o f fiscal policy and discuss alternative explanations for large government borrowing. 3~ Mendoza et al. (1996), building on earlier work by Mendoza et al. (1994), compute effective tax rates for a sample of 14 industrial countries, during the period 1965-1991. For the most recent six-year period, the average capital tax rate for these countries was close to 40%, higher than both the average labor tax rate and the average consumption tax rate. Furthemmre, the average tax rate on capital was higher than that on labor and consumption during every five-year period since 1965, and kept rising over time. 37 See ibr instance Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999) and Alesina and Perotti (1995b). 3s See von Hagen and Harden (1995), Alesina and Perotti (1995b), Grilli et al. (1991), Roubffli and Sachs (1989).
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5. Credibility of fiscal policy We first discuss the ex p o s t incentive compatibility constraints that imply a lack of credibility for desirable tax policies. Many insights parallel those in monetary policy. But by adding microeconomic foundations, we can now make more meaningful welfare statements. And by adding an explicitly dynamic setting, we can investigate how state variables link policy decisions over time. As in monetary policy, sequential (or discretionary) decision-making and a lack of policy instruments may imply that the government lacks credibility and loses control of private sector expectations. The economy gets trapped in a third-best equilibrium, where the government relies excessively on a highly distorting policy instrument. The most obvious example is the "capital levy problem". But credibility problems are not confined to capital taxation: they are the norm rather than the exception in a dynamic economy. These issue are discussed in subsection 5.1. Subsection 5.2 treats another consequence of lack of credibility: the possibility of multiple equilibria and confidence crises, features often observed in countries with high punic debts. In a dynamic economy current policy credibility depends on previous policy decisions; for instance, it depends on the size and denomination of the outstanding public debt; this new dimension is discussed in subsection 5.3. Finally, as in monetary policy, reputation can mitigate the adverse effects of the ex p o s t incentive constraint and institutions can be designed to relax it. These remedies are briefly discussed in subsection 5.4. 5.1. The capital l e w problem
According to the standard theory of optimal taxation, capital should be taxed at a much lower rate than labor or consumption. Moreover, the tax rate on capital income should generally decrease over time and approach zero asymptotically. The reason is that the elasticity of investment tends to be higher than those of labor supply and consumption, and it is even higher over longer horizons, as there are more opportunities for intertemporal substitution. This prescription sharply contrasts with stylized fact (i) above. Lack of credibility offers a reason why even a benevolent government can end up with such a suboptimal tax structure 39. 5.1.1. The m o d e l
Consider a two-period closed economy, t -- 1,2, with one storable commodity. A representative consumer has preferences defined over consumption in both periods, ca, and leisure in the second period, x, represented by u - U ( c l ) + c 2 + V(x).
(5.1)
In the first period, the consumer either consumes his exogenous and untaxed endowment, e, or invests a non-negative amount in a linear storage technology with 39 The next two subsections draw oil Persson and Tabellini (1990, ch. 6).
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unitary gross returns. In the second period, he devotes his unitary time endowment to labor l, or leisure time x, and consumes all his income and wealth after having paid taxes. His budget constraints are cl + k = e,
(5.2)
c2 = (1 - 0) k + (1 - r) l,
(5.3)
where k is the investment in the storage technology, 0 and r are the capital and labor income tax rates, and the real wage is unity. Finally, the government must finance a given amount o f second-period per-capita public consumption, g. Thus, the government budget constraint is (5.4)
g = rl + Ok.
Taxes are only paid in the second period, and lump-sum (i.e. non-distorting) taxes are not available. We follow the public-finance tradition o f treating the set o f available Ramsey taxes as exogenous; but ultimately, the non-availability of (personalized) lump-sum taxes must be due to some heterogeneity that can only be imperfectly observed by the government. What is the optimal tax structure in this economy? And what is the equilibrium tax structure if the government lacks credibility? We address both questions in turn. 5.1.2. The ex ante optimal policy
To derive a normative benchmark, we assume that at the start of period 1 - before any private decision is made - the government commits to a tax structure (0, r) for period 2. The decision is observed by the private sector, and cannot be changed. There is no uncertainty, and period-2 public consumption, g, is known already in period 1. We first describe how the private sector responds to the tax rates. The private sector first-order conditions are: U c ( e - k ) >~ 1 - 0 ;
Vx(l-l) = l-r,
(5.5)
where the equality in the first condition applies at an interior optimum with positive investment. Each tax rate thus drives a wedge between the relevant marginal rates of transformation and substitution. Optimal policy seeks to minimize the resulting distortions. Inverting these two expressions, we obtain the private sector savings function k = Max[O,K(1 - 0)], where K(1 - O) ~- e - Ucl(1 - 0), and labor supply function l = L(1 - r) _--_ 1 - vxl(1 - r). The partial derivatives Ko and Lr are both negative. By the separability and quasi-linearity o f the utility function, each tax base depends on its own tax rate only. For future reference, it is useful to define the
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T. Persson and G. Tabellini
elasticities of these two tax bases with respect to their own net of tax returns, as ek(0) and el(O, respectively 4°. The optimal tax structure maximizes consumer welfare, subject to the private sector and government budget constraint (5.2)-(5.4), and the private sector first-order conditions (5.5). Solving this optimization problem yields the following version of the Ramsey Rule41: 0
r
(5.6)
1 - 0 ek(O) = ~ e l ( r ) .
Equation (5.6) implicitly defines the ex a n t e optimal tax structure. What are its general properties? First, optimal tax rates are higher on the more inelastic tax base. Second, it is always optimal to tax both bases, as long as both elasticities are finite and strictly positive. Finally, both tax rates move in the same direction if the revenue requirements change; higher public consumption drives up both tax rates, in proportion to their elasticities. If, as empirically plausible, labor supply is much more inelastic than investment, the optimal tax rate on labor is much higher than that on capital. As taxes are distorting, the economy reaches a second best - not a first best. 5.1.3. E q u i l i b r i u m u n d e r d i s c r e t i o n
Suppose instead that the policy decision is taken at the start of period 2, after period-1 investment decisions have been made. This timing is much more plausible, as a sovereign country can change its tax structure at any time, under a normal legislative procedure. Under this timing, however, every tax structure promised in period 1 is not credible. A credible tax structure must be optimal e x p o s t ; from the vantage point of period 2. More precisely, a credible equilibrimn tax structure satisfies three requirements. (i) Individual economic decisions are optimal, given the expected policies and the decisions of all other individuals in the economy. (ii) The tax structure is e x p o s t optimal, given outstanding aggregate capital and individual equilibrium responses to the tax structure. (iii) Individual expectations are fulfilled and markets clear in every period. Let us consider each of these requirements. (i) Optimal individual behavior is still summarized by the functions K and L and by the corresponding elasticities. But the investment function and the corresponding elasticity are now defined over the expected, not the actual, capital tax rate, as the tax structure is decided in period 2, after the investment decision. Thus, k = K(1 0 e) and ei~(0e). We call this elasticity the ex a n t e elasticity of investment, since it is defined over 0 e rather than 0. 4o These elasticities are, respectively: (1 0) ek(O) -
K
dK d(1 - 0)
U,~ KUcc > 0,
el(r) ~
(1 r) dL L d(1 v)
41 See Persson and Tabellini (1990, ch. 6), for a derivation.
V~
LV~ >0.
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(ii) The ex p o s t optimal tax structure also continues to be described by the Ramsey Rule (5.6), but with one important proviso. The investment elasticity that enters Equation (5.6) is the ex p o s t elasticity, that is the elasticity with respect to the actual tax rate 0, since that is what the government is choosing. By the argument at point (i), this e x p o s t elasticity is zero: k depends on 0 e, not on 0. Equation (5.6) then implies that for any given capital stock k the ex p o s t optimal capital tax rate, 0", must satisfy 0* - Min[1, g / k l .
(5.7)
The optimal labor tax rate r follows from the govenmaent budget constraint. In particular, r - 0 if 0* = g / k < 1. This result is very intuitive. When tax policy is chosen, the supply of capital is completely inelastic at k, whereas the supply of labor continues to have a positive elasticity, as it is chosen by the private sector after observing tax policy. Hence, the government finds it ex p o s t optimal to set either a fully expropriating capital tax rate of 1, or a tax rate sufficiently high to finance all of public consumption with capital taxes, driving labor taxes to 0. (iii) Rational individuals correctly anticipate government policy. Hence, 0 e = 0* and k = K(1 - 0"). Combining this last result with Equation (5.7), the equilibrium tax rate is defined by 0* = M i n [ 1 , g / K ( 1 - 0")]. We illustrate the possible equilibria in Figure 1. The solid curve is the ex a n t e revenue function for different values of 0. Tax revenues first grow with the tax rate, but at a decreasing rate, since the tax base shrinks as 0 rises. Once we reach the "top of the Laffer Curve", tax revenue begins to shrink, as the reduction in the tax base more than offsets the higher tax rate. l f g is sufficiently high (higher than point G) only one equilibrium exists, in which 0* = 1 and k = 0 (point C in the diagram). Irrespective of private expectations, the government fully expropriates any outstanding capital stock. Anticipating this, nobody invests. It is easy to verify that all three requirements for an equilibrium are fulfilled. Private individuals optimize and have correct expectations about policy. And the government also optimizes, for even with no capital outstanding, 0 = 1 is (weakly) optimal, as confirmed by Equation (5.7). This equilibrium is disastrous: there is a prohibitive tax on capital, but still a large tax on labor which is the only available tax base. Yet, the government can do nothing to change the outcome. No promise to tax capital at a rate lower than 1 would be believed, because it would not be ex p o s t optimal for the government to fulfill it. If g is below point G in Figure 1, this disastrous outcome continues to exist together with two other equilibria. Suppose that government spending corresponds to the horizontal line in Figure 1. Then points A and B are also equilibrium outcomes. At point A, every consumer expects 0 e = 0 a and invests K(1 - 0a). Hence, the government can just finance g by setting 0 exactly at 0 A, while keeping the labor tax equal to 0. Thus, the government is at an ex p o s t optimum. The same argument establishes that point B is also an equilibrium.
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oK(1 -o) G
C 0
0A
0B
l
0
Fig. 1.
These equilibria are clearly Pareto ranked: A is better than B which is better than C. They are all worse than the e x a n t e optimal tax structure, since they tax capital too heavily and labor too lightly (except at point C where both bases are taxed too heavily). If the government is unable to commit, the economy is trapped in a third-best, or worse, allocation. 5.1.4. E x t e n s i o n s
Results similar to those above, apply to the taxation o f other forms o f wealth, in particular to public debt and real money balances; in the case of money, naturally, the tax takes the form of inflation. The logic is always the same. Once an investment decision has been made, the tax base is fixed and it becomes ex p o s t optimal to tax it as much as needed, or as much as possible. Moreover, credibility problems are not confined to wealth taxes, but are generic in a dynamic economy with sequential policy decisions. The reason is that the e x p o s t and e x a n t e elasticity o f tax bases generally differ from each other. In general this difference is not as stark as with wealth taxes, where the ex p o s t elasticity is zero. In the case o f other tax bases than wealth, we can no longer conclude that the optimal tax rate is always higher e x p o s t than e x ante. To gain some intuition for why, consider an increase in a labor tax rate in a given period t. If the tax increase is u n a n t i c i p a t e d , the household substitutes from labor into leisure in the current period. But if the tax increase was a n t i c i p a t e d in period t - 1, some intertemporal substitution has already taken place: the household works less in period t, but has already worked more in period t - 1. We cannot generally tell whether an anticipated or an unanticipated tax hike is more distorting, however. Intertemporal substitution increases the distortion at time t, the period of higher taxes, as the tax base is more elastic. But this greater distortion is offset by a larger tax base in period t 1, when the household is working more in
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anticipation of higher future taxes. In general, therefore, we can say that optimal tax rates are different, but not whether they are higher ex ante or e x post 42. We close this discussion with two remarks. First, characterizing the equilibrium with sequential government decisions is relatively easy in a two-period economy, and doable in a finite-horizon economy. But it becomes very difficult in an infinite-horizon economy 43. Second, so far we have considered a representative consumer economy in which the government lacks a non-distorting tax and has incentives to raise revenues in less distorting ways. Lump-sum taxation may, however, not be enough to avoid lack of credibility. If the goverlmaent also has distributive goals, but not enough lump-sum taxes and transfers to reach its desired income distribution, the optimal tax policy may still lack credibility despite the availability of (non-personalized) lump-sum taxation. What matters ultimately is thus a scarcity of policy instruments relative to objectives. 5.2. Multiple equilibria and confidence crises'
When discussing reputational equilibria in monetary policy, we argued that multiple equilibria indicated an incomplete theory. Here, multiplicity of equilibria instead reflects an indeterminacy in the economy, and helps explain the occurrence of sudden speculative attacks or capital flights that have plagued many economies. Absent a commitment technology, policy is driven by private expectations rather than the other way around. Equilibria under discretion thus become intrinsically fragile, as investors face a difficult coordination problem. The ex post optimal policy depends on aggregate investment. But aggregate investment depends on the simultaneous decisions of many atomistic individuals, which in turn depend on expectations about policy. Thus, there is a strategic complementarity. A single investor expecting nobody else to invest also finds it optimal not to invest: he realizes that aggregate capital will be small, and hence full expropriation is inevitable. Thus, individual expectations are self-fulfilling and, as they are not nailed down by any economic fundamentals, can fluctuate widely. The resulting policy uncertainty is yet another drawback of a discretionary policy environment. These problems arise in many policy decisions. Consider public-debt repayment in a two-period economy, and suppose that in the second period debt can be partially defaulted or taxed away, at a cost proportional to the size of the default. Calvo (1988) shows that we then get multiple equilibria, in a good equilibrium, every investor expects the debt to be fully repaid and demands a low interest rate. To avoid the cost of default, the government indeed services the outstanding debt. In a bad equilibrium, every investor expects partial default and demands a higher interest rate. The cost of servicing this debt is now higher, and with distorting taxes the government prefers a partial default; hence, default expectations are self-fulfilling. The equilibrium with default is Pareto inferior, as the net amount serviced is the same, but default costs are borne. 42 For a further &scussion, see Persson and Tabellini (1990, ch. 8). 43 See also the survey by Krusell et al. (1997).
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Another example, studied by Velasco (1994) and Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), concerns exchange-rate crises in a high public debt economy. By assumption, the cost o f outright default is prohibitive, but the outstanding debt could be monetized away. In a good equilibrium, investors expect the exchange rate peg to be viable and the domestic interest rate equals the foreign interest rate; at this low interest rate, it is optimal to service the outstanding public debt by tax revenue alone. In a bad equilibrium, investors expect the peg to collapse. They demand a higher interest rate, which raises the cost o f servicing the debt through tax revenue; at the higher interest rate, it becomes optimal to fulfill the expectations, the peg is abandoned and the debt is partially monetized through higher inflation 44. Related coordination problems arise in s e q u e n t i a l (as opposed to simultaneous) investment decisions. Alesina et al. (1990) and Cole and Kehoe (1996a,b) study an infinite-horizon economy with a large public debt. Like in Calvo (1988), default is costly, but the cost is assumed to be a lump sum cost. In the good equilibrium, the debt is rolled over forever at low interest rates, and distorting taxes are raised to pay interest on the debt. In the bad equilibrium, there is a debt run, as nobody wants to buy the outstanding debt for fear that - next period - investors will refuse to roll it over. Faced with such a situation, it is indeed e x p o s t optimal for the government to default on the debt, rather than repaying it all at once. Thus the investors' fears are indeed rational and self-fulfilling. Here, the coordination problem thus concerns investment decisions at different points in time. 5.3. P u b l i c d e b t m a n a g e m e n t
The papers discussed in the previous subsection have implications for debt management policies, as the occurrence of a confidence crisis depends on the maturity structure or currency denomination o f outstanding debt. For instance, tile debt-run equilibrium discussed by Alesina et al. (1990) disappears if the outstanding debt has a long enough maturity, whereas it is more likely with a short-maturity debt that must be rolled over every period. Similarly, the results in Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) suggest that issuing foreign currency debt can reduce the risk o f capital flight, as investors are already protected against depreciation. More generally, public debt management policies alter the future incentives of the monetary and fiscal authorities in many subtle ways, even if the ex a n t e and ex p o s t elasticities o f all tax bases are the same. This point was first noted in the seminal paper by Lucas and Stokey (1983) with regard to the maturity structure o f public debt. They start from the observation that fiscal policy typically alters real interest rates. The resulting wealth effect can benefit or harm the government, depending on the composition o f its balance sheet. With a lot of long-term debt, a higher long-term 44 A high cost of servicing the debt is not the only reason why an exchange rate peg may not be credible~ in a related argument, Bensaid and Jeanne (1997) show that multiple equilibria can arise if raising the interest rate to det?nd an exchange-rate peg is too costly lbr the government.
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real interest rate depreciates the outstanding debt and acts like a non-distorting capital levy. Alternatively, if it has long-term assets and short-term liabilities, the government benefits from a policy that reduces the short-term real interest rate. Under sequential decision making, the government's ex a n t e optimal policy may not be credible: the government may have an incentive to deviate from it e x p o s t , in order to change the value o f its outstanding assets and liabilities. Conversely, these incentives give an additional role for public debt management policies: if the maturity and contingency structure o f the debt is rich enough, it can be revised over time so as to maintain credibility o f the e x a n t e optimal tax policy under sequential decision making, even if ex a n t e and e x p o s t elasticities of relevant tax bases differ from each other 45. Naturally, these results only hold if the economy is closed or large enough to affect intertemporal world prices. Not only the maturity structure o f the public debt shapes policy incentives. Its composition into nominal and indexed debt plays a similar role, as the real value of the former, but not the latter, depends on the price level 46. Based on this observation, Persson et al. (1987) show that the capital-levy incentive for the government to dilute the real value o f its outstanding nominal liabilities - such as the money stock - can be relaxed if the govermnent holds claims on the private sector, denominated in nominal terms, if the nominal claims and liabilities are balanced, the e x a n t e Ramsey solution may be sequentially sustained. But nominally denominated liabilities can also offer valuable insurance against unanticipated fluctuations in government spending, if the government does not have access to contingent debt. Calvo and Guidotti (1990) study the choice between nominal and indexed debt as a trade-off between credibility and flexibility. The upshot is thus that the structure of the public debt becomes a strategic variable that can be manipulated by a government to relax incentive constraints which it will meet in the future. As a result, the "government capital structure" again becomes nonneutral, even if a Modigliani-Miller theorem about the irrelevance of the govenmaent financial structure would apply in the absence o f these incentive constraints. In this section, we have only considered governments that continue to make decisions in the future with full certainty. But the idea of using public financial policies strategically to influence future fiscal policy decisions, obviously extends to the case which is more relevant for real-world democracies (dictatorships), where elections (coups and revolutions) shift the identity and policy preferences o f governments over time. Strategic public financial policies have indeed received attention in the literature on the politics of public debt that we survey in Section 6.
45 "Rich enough" generally means that there are as many goverrmlent debt instruments as there are policy instruments. ,16 Public debt denominated in foreign currency is similar to indexed debt in this regard, but will not be considered here.
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5.4. R e p u t a t i o n a n d e n J b r c e m e n t
As in monetary policy, repeated interaction creates incentives to maintain a reputation, which may mitigate the capital-levy problem. Suppose that future expected capital tax rates depend on the current tax structure. Even though existing capital is taken as given by the government, it still perceives future investment to respond to current tax rates, through expected future tax rates, and this discourages overtaxation. Chari and Kehoe (1990) have studied this reputation mechanism in an infinitely repeated version of the simple two-period model of subsection 5.1. The equilibrium with reputation comes arbitrarily close to the ex a n t e optimal Ramsey rule, under appropriate assumptions about the government discount factor and the length of the punishment period. Kotlikoff et al. (1988) show that a related enforcement mechanism may be available in an overlapping-generations economy. A misbehaving government is not deterred by investors' expectations, but by the threat that future generations of tax payers will withdraw their intergenerational transfers to a generation that breaks "the social contract" by overtaxing capital. Naturally, multiplicity of equilibria remains in both models. When we consider default on public debt, however, reputational equilibria encounter additional difficulties. Suppose that a defaulting government is "punished" by savers, who refuse to buy public debt in the future. The punishment thus consists of not being able to smooth tax distortions overtime, in the face of fluctuating public spending or tax bases. Is this sufficiently strong to deter default? Bulow and Rogoff (1989) argue that it is not. Suppose that a defaulting government can never borrow again, but can nevertheless still invest budget surpluses in assets earning the market rate of return (for instance, by accumulating reserves of a foreign asset). Then, a simple arbitrage argument implies that the government is always better off defaulting rather than repaying its debt 47. Thus, simple reputation models cannot explain public debt repayment. There must be other reasons why governments honor their debts: either reputational spillovers across policy instruments, or other costs in a default, such as distress in the banking system, arbitrary redistributions, or sanctions credibly enforced by the international community. In Part I, we discussed various institutional reforms that might raise the credibility of desirable policies. In the case of fiscal policy, such reforms are less effective, however, as the tasks of a sovereign legislature cannot be narrowly defined. Nevertheless, some institutional devices could mitigate the capitaMevy problem. Political delegation to a conservative policymaker is one way. International tax competition is another. As discussed in a companion survey [Persson and Tabellini (1995)], capital controls or international tax agreements that limit tax competition exacerbate the domestic credibility problems, and could thus be counterproductive. 47 Bulow and Rogoff (1989) develop their argument in the case of sovereign loans that finance consumption or investment, with no tax distortions, for arbitrary concave utility and production function. But their result generalizes to a model with tax distortions.
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5.5. Notes' on the literature
Much of this section is based on Persson and Tabellini (1990, chs. 6-8). There is a large game-theoretic literature on dynamic games with sequential decision-making. What started this line of research are again the papers by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Calvo (1978). The book by Basar and Olsder (1982) provides a game-theoretic analysis of these problems in an abstract setting. The "capital levy problem" has a long history in economics. Eichengreen (1990) provides a historical account. It has been formally analyzed (although with numerical solutions) in a two-period economy by Fischer (1980). An early treatment of surprise inflation to tax real money balances is Auernheimer (1974), but Calvo (1978) is the classic here. A large literature deals with speculative attacks and multiple equilibria. In this section we have only focused on multiple equilibria that arise when policy is endogenous and there is a credibility problem. Confidence crises on public debt have been studied by many authors; in particular by Calvo (1988), Alesina et al. (1990), Cole and Kehoe (1996a,b) and Giavazzi and Pagano (1990). Multiple equilibria with discretionary monetary policy have also been extensively treated in the literature, in particular by Obstfeld (1997a), Bensaid and Jeanne (1997), Chari et al. (1996) and Velasco (1994). Reputation and capital taxation is discussed by Kotlikoff et al. (1988), Chari and Kehoe (1990) and, more recently, by Benhabib and Rustichini (1996), while Grossman and Van Huyck (1988) and Chari and Kehoe (1993) applied reputation to a model of public debt repayment. The idea that reputation can fail in the case of sovereign debt repayment is due to Bulow and Rogoff (1989), whereas Chari and Kehoe (1993) show that enforcement problems on both sides of the market can restore a role for reputation. Reputational spillovers across contracts are discussed by Cole and Kehoe (1994). Political delegation and capital levies are modeled in Persson and Tabellini (1994c) and discussed by North and Weingast (1989) in a fascinating historical context. The literature on international tax competition and credibility is surveyed by Persson and Tabellini (1995). The credibility of optimal tax structures in a general intertemporal context and without capital has been studied by Lucas and Stokey (1983). Their seminal paper discusses both debt management and the credibility of tax policy. Subsequently, Persson and Svensson (1984) and Rogers (1987) reinterpret and clarify some of the general issues concerning the credibility of optimal intertemporal taxation. The debt management implications of the Lucas and Stokey paper are also generalized and interpreted, by Chari et al. (1992) and by Persson and Svensson (1986). Persson et al. (1987) extend the Lucas and Stokey result to a monetary economy, whereas M. Persson et al. (1997) show that the temptation to generate surprise inflation may be much stronger than the theoretical literature suggests, once the full set of nominal rigidities in public expenditure and tax programs are taken into account. Rogers (1987) discusses strategic debt management and credible tax policy in an economy with endogenous
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government consumption, while Rogers (1986) considers distributive goals. Missale and Blanchard (1994) study how the maturity structure required to make a low-inflation policy incentive compatible varies with the level of debt. Calvo and Guidotti (1990) study the credibility-flexibility trade-off in the optimal decomposition of public debt into indexed and non-indexed securities. Finally, Missale et al. (1997) as well as Drudi and Prati (1997) have studied public debt management as a signal of the government resolution to enact stabilization policies.
6. Politics of public debt As noted in the introduction to Part II, many industrial countries have accumulated large debts in peace time. Moreover, debt and deficits appear to be correlated with specific political and institutional features. The goal of this section is to survey the literature that addresses these issues. We begin with the idea that deficits may be a by-product of political instability. Section 5 emphasized that governments can manipulate their debt structure to resolve their own future credibility problems. Subsection 6.1 takes up this thread, showing how the debt level itself can be used strategically to bind the hands of succeeding governments with different political preferences, in a way first suggested by Alesina and Tabellini (1990) and Persson and Svensson (1989). This idea typically applies to political systems with two parties and a government that clearly represents the view of a cohesive political majority. The debt level can also be used to enhance the incumbent government's re-election probability, in a way first suggested by Aghion and Bolton (1990) and also discussed in Section 3. We construct a simple two-period example that incorporates both of these mechanisms. The remainder of the section then looks at political systems with more dispersed political powers, as in the case of coalition govermnents or powerful political interest groups. In subsection 6.2, we discuss why such a situation may be particularly prone to generate deficits. The argument is a dynamic version of the common-pool problem formulated by Levhari and Mirman (1980) - in the context of natural resources and applied to government debt by Velasco (1999). In subsection 6.3 we follow the approach of Alesina and Drazen (1991), showing how the struggle between powerful groups, about who will bear the cost of necessary cuts in spending, may lead to a war of attrition delaying the elimination of existing deficits. In both these subsections, we reduce the full-blown dynamic models found in the literature to simple two-period examples. In subsection 6.4, finally, we discuss briefly how the politics of intergenerational redistribution may trigger government deficits, as suggested by Cukierman and Meltzer (1989), Tabellini (1991) and others.
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6.1. Political instability in a two-party system 6.1.1. Economic equilibrium
Consider a two-period economy without capital, but otherwise similar to that of subsection 5.1. A continuum of individuals have identical preferences over consumption and leisure. First we describe their preferences over private economic outcomes and their private economic behavior, for a given economic policy. Individual preferences over public policy and different parties are described later. Preferences over private economic outcome are given by the utility function: (6.1)
U = C 1 + C 2 + V ( X l ) + V(x2).
Every consumer faces the same constraints. Leisure and labor in period t, xt and lt, must sum to unity. Budget constraints are c2=(1
cl+b=(1-rl)ll,
rz)12+Rb,
where Tt is a labor tax rate, R is the gross interest rate, and b is the holding of public debt - the only available form of saving. By the absence of discounting and the linearities in the utility function, an interior equilibrium f o r b requires R = 1. Recognizing this, we can write the equilibrium consolidated budget constraint as Cl +C2 = (1 - ' g l ) l l
+ ( 1 - T 2 ) I 2.
Solving the consumer problem, leads to labor supply functions L(1 - rt) identical to those of subsection 5.1. Public spending only takes place in period 2. Let g denote total per capita public consumption. Using R = 1, the government budget constraints are - b = rill,
b+g-
T212.
It is useful to re-express private utility as an indirect utility function defined over the policy variables b and g. Private equilibrium utility is only a function of the two tax rates T~ and r2. From the govermment budget constraints, these tax rates can be expressed as functions of b and g. Thus we can rewrite Equation (6.1) as J ( b , g ) - Max[c1 + c2 + V(xl) + V(x2)]. This indirect utility function has intuitive properties. First, Jg < 0, is the private marginal cost of government spending which is increasing in g: Jgg < 0. Second, Jb is the private marginal cost of government debt. The symmetry of labor supply implies > O as Jt, ~
1 b ~< -~g.
(6.2)
That is, when tax rates are equal over time, tax distortions are optimally smoothed out (orb = 0). But if more (less) than half the revenue necessary to finance g is raised in
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period 1, so that b < - ½ g (> -½g), private utility could be enhanced by higher (lower) debt issue. Finally, as taxes are distortionary and as higher b adds to the government's tax bill in period 2, the cross-derivative Jbg is negative 48.
6.1.2. The political system Individuals belong to two different groups, which we label d and r, o f given sizes s and (1 - s ) . The two groups are identified with the supporters of two political parties: D and R. Individuals and parties differ in their preferred allocation of public spending over two types o f public consumption: gd and gr. The two types of public consumption each require one unit o f output, but they provide different utilities to the two parties and their individual supporters. For simplicity we assume that individuals belonging to group d (r) only care about gd (g,.) and that each party only cares about the utility o f its own supporters. If elected, party I thus maximizes the utility function
u1 = J(b, g) + H(gi).
(6.3)
Thus, party I correctly internalizes the welfare effects of economic policy on private economic outcomes, according to the indirect utility function J defined over debt and total spending, and evaluates the benefits o f public consumption for its constituency according to the (concave) H function, defined over gi. Political parties are "outcome motivated" rather than "office motivated". It is easy, however, to amend the model with a separate benefit o f holding office, as in Section 3. Finally, we assume that relative group size s is a random variable, the realization o f which determines the election outcome. We define P = Pr(s ~< 0.5) as the probability, from the viewpoint of period 1, that party R wins. This electoral uncertainty can be due to a random participation rate, or to uncertainty about the relative popularity of parties on other policy dimensions. Below we suggest an explicit model for P, but for now we take it as exogenous.
6.1.3. Equilibrium policy Events in the model unfold as follows: (1) One o f the parties holds office in period 1; this party sets debt (tax) policy b. (2) Economic decisions in period 1 are made. (3) The elected party takes office and sets public spending. (4) Economic decisions in period 2 are made. As before, we consider a sequentially rational equilibrium, and we characterize it by backward induction.
48 Note that our formulation of the model rules out credibility problems of the type discussed in Section 5. The asstuned preferences imply that labor supply fimctions depend on the current after-tax wage only, so that there is no difference between ex ante and ex post elasticities. Also, incentives for debt repudiation do not arise, because the government is a creditor and has no opportunity to manipulate the equilibrium interest rate.
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Optimal private decisions at stages (2) and (4) are already subsumed in the indirect utility function. Suppose party I holds office in period 2. It chooses g so as to maximize its objective in Equation (6.3), given the outstanding debt level b. The first-order condition for good i is Jg(b, g) + Hg(g i) = O.
(6.4)
Thus party I spends on good i only (good j # i has only costs and no benefits) and equates the marginal cost of supplying good i to its marginal benefit (to group i). Clearly, this condition defines a reaction function gi = G(b) which is the same for both parties. Since higher debt implies higher period-2 tax distortions, any government type is less willing to spend on public goods if it inherits a higher public debt; hence: Gb < 0. We can look at the period-1 incentives to issue debt at stage (1). The identity of that government does not matter for the results, but to fix ideas we suppose that party D is the incumbent. Its expected payoff, given the expected election outcome, depends on debt policy according to the incentive constraint imposed by equilibrium policy choices in period 2: E(uD (b)) - J (b, G( b)) + (1 - P ) H ( G ( b ) ] . Optimal debt policy thus has to satisfy & + [Jg + (1 - P ) Hg]@, : & - P H g G b : O,
(6.5)
where the second equality follows once we impose condition (6.4). Condition (6.5) has an intuitive interpretation. To strengthen the intuition, first consider the special case in which party R stands no chance at winning - that is, P - 0 for any b. Then Equation (6.5) reduces to Jh = 0. In words, a government that is certain of re-election chooses the efficient debt policy, smoothing completely over time the tax distortions from the financing of its preferred public good. When re-election is not certain, however, other incentives come into play. The larger is the probability that the opponent will win, the more party D deviates from the efficient debt policy, as is evident from the second term. As this term is positive, party D sets Jt~ < 0 whenever P > 0. A positive probability of losing the election leads to excessive debt issue - or more precisely to an insufficient surplus today [recall Equation (6.2)]. Whereas the incumbent government fully internalizes the benefits of borrowing associated with tax smoothing, it does not fully internalize the cost of lower public spending in the future, because these costs are borne only if the government is re-elected. Thus, the over-issue of debt is larger the slimmer is the re-election probability. To express the intuition in an alternative way: it is optimal for the party-D government to tie the hands of a prospective party-R government, as that party will spend on a good not valued by the natural constituency. This strategic motive, creating
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facts for a successor with different preferences, was first stressed by Persson and Svensson (1989) and Alesina and Tabellini (1990). 6.1.4. Endogenous election outcomes As mentioned already in Section 3, governments also manipulate state variables to increase their chances of re-election. We now modify our model to show how this incentive applies to public debt, illustrating an idea first stressed by Aghion and Bolton (1990). Consider the same model, but suppose that parties and individuals also differ along a second - not explicitly modeled - dimension capturing aspects of public policy that do not directly affect the economy. Specifically, we assume that individual utility depends on the identity of the party holding office, in addition to the public good it provides. But we allow individuals belonging to the same group to have different preferences over policymakers in this second dimension. Thus, we postulate the following overall preferences for individual j in group i, for i = D, R: u ij = J ( b , g ) + H ( g i) + ( U +/3)K o,
(6.6)
where H(.) is the same concave function as in Equation (6.3), and the dummy variable K z) equals 1 if party D holds office in period 2, and 0 if party R holds office. The parameter aJ is distributed around a mean value of 0 in the population of each group, according to the symmetric and unimodal distribution function F(-). In period 1 the precise value of/3 is not known, but only its expected value E(/3). The aJ parameter thus measures an idiosyncratic "ideological" (and exogenous) bias for party D, and to the extent that/3 is positive, party D enjoys a popularity advantage. That is, individuals evaluate public consumption according to their group affiliation, and each party cares about its natural constituency. But voters also trade off the economic benefits obtained from their party against other (exogenous or noneconomic) aspects of public policy, according to the parameters a and [3. These "non~ economic" determinants of political preferences are not related to group affiliations in any precise way. This specification of political preferences implies that group affiliation does not completely determine how individuals vote, so that the vote share of each party is endogenous. Finally, we assume that the relative size of the two groups, given by s, is now a fixed parameter, not a random variable. The timing of events is as before, except that just before the date of elections the realization of aggregate popularity,/3, becomes known. What determines the election outcome? At the time of elections, debt policy b is given by previous decisions. Consider voter j in group d. She votes for party R if and only if J ( b , g ) + H(G(b)) + a j +/3 > J(b,g), or if aJ > - ( H ( G ( b ) ) + [3). Thus, unless party D is generically unpopular ~3 < 0), only group-d individuals with a strong idiosyncratic ideological bias against party D vote for party R. Next, consider voter j in group r. She votes for party R if and only i f J ( b , g ) + aJ +/3 > J ( b , g ) + H(G(b)),
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or if aJ > H ( G ( b ) ) - / 3 . Not surprisingly, a group-r voter is more likely to support party R, since she draws economic benefits from its election. Combining these conditions and using the law of large numbers, we get the total vote share for party R: SR(b,/3) = s F ( - H ( G(b)) - [3) + (1 - s) F ( H ( G(b)) - [3),
where fi is a random variable; everything else is known or chosen by the incumbent government. Thus, before knowing the realization of/3, the probability that R wins is P(b)
-
p[[se(b,/3) >~ 0.51.
We want to know how this probability depends on public debt. As a preliminary step, note that dSR db - HgGh[(1 - s))C(H(G(b)) - [3) - s f l ( - H ( G ( b ) ) -/3)], where f is the derivative (density) of F. As HgG~ is negative, the sign hinges on the expression in square brackets. Consider first the case/3 = 0. By symmetry of F, we see that the vote share of party R goes up for any/3 if s > (1 - s ) . Intuitively, higher b leads to lower furore spending, which increases party R's advantage among voters in group d, but it reduces it among voters in group r. if group d is larger, the 1 Then, by former effect prevails. Consider next the case in which s = (1 - s) = g. symmetry and unimodality of F, the vote share for R goes up as b increases if and only if/3 < 0. Again the voters in group d are more important, not because the whole group is larger, but because at the margin the voters in group d are more mobile when party D is generally unpopular. It follows from this discussion that Pb > 0 is more likely the larger is s and the smaller is E(/3). That is, from the point of view of a party-D incumbent, issuing more debt reduces the probability of re-election (Pb > 0) if its economic policies benefit a large group of voters (s is large) or if it is unpopular among all the voters (/3 < 0). It is now easy to characterize the equilibrium debt issued by a party-D government Going through the same steps as in the previous subsection, the optimality condition for public debt - the analog of (6.5) is & - P ( b ) Hg Gb - P b H ( G ( b ) ) - O.
(6.7)
The first two terms on the left-hand side of Equation (6.7) are identical to those in Equation (6.5) and have the same meaning. The government trades off the efficiency considerations of public debt (captured by Jb) and the strategic effects on the future spending decisions of its opponent (captured by P H x G v ). The last term captures the effect of debt on the re-election probability. If issuing debt enhances the re-election
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chances for party D, so that Pb < 0, this effect adds to the incentives to issue debt, but when Pb > 0 it pulls in the opposite direction. From the previous discussion we know that Pb < 0 is more likely when s is small and when E([3) > 0. Intuitively, a party-D government whose spending policies benefit only a small "minority" - one for which s is small - enhances it re-election chances by constraining its own future spending, that is by issuing more debt, since this makes him more attractive to swing voters in the larger group r. Similarly, a party-D government whose non-economic policies are generically popular finds it more beneficial to go after swing voters in the opposition party's natural constituency, group r. 6.1.5. Discussion
What happens if the disagreement between the two parties is not as extreme as we assumed, so that both parties always spend on both goods, g~ and gr, although the preferred composition of public spending differs across parties? The answer depends on the shape of the utility function: more debt forces future spending cuts, but which public good is cut the most depends on preferences. If lower total spending is associated with a more similar mix of the public goods by the two parties, Tabellini and Alesina (1990) show that more instability (a lower probability of re-election) still leads to larger equilibrium debt 49. The model thus yields the empirical prediction that political polarization (i.e. sharp disagreement between the majority and the opposition) and political instability (i.e., frequent government turnovers) lead to larger debt accumulation. The simple idea that political instability causes government to behave myopically can be applied in more general models. Adding government spending in period 1 does not change the argument in any respect. Similarly, the results go through if policies are chosen directly by the voters, rather than by the government, as long as there is a probability that the current majority will be replaced by a future majority with different preferences. In fact, the prediction is more general and really applies to any intertemporal aspect of public policy, such as the choice of public investment [Glazer (1989) and Part Ill below], or the implementation of tax reforms [Cukierman et al. (1992)]. If" political disagreement concerns the overall size of public spending, rather than its composition, the result that public debt policy is economically inefficient continues to apply. But-now the direction of the inefficiency depends on which government is in office. Persson and Svensson (1989) show that a conservative government facing a more liberal opposition has an incentive to borrow, to force future spending cuts if the liberal is elected; but a liberal government has the opposite incentives and underissues debt (runs an excessively large surplus). Hence the empirical prediction that on average left-wing governments are more disciplined than their opponents, because they are more willing to raise tax revenue. ~t9 Tabellini and Alesina (1990) tbrmulate this condition in a precise way, referring to thc concavity index of the function H.
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As we saw in the introduction to this part, the general idea that govenmlent turnover is positively associated with debt issue is consistent with the stylized facts. Some of the models' specific predictions regarding public debt issue have been taken to the data by Ozler and Tabellini (1991) for developing countries and by Lambertini (1996) for industrial countries, with supportive results in the first paper but not in the second one
50 ,
Stretching the model somewhat, it also predicts that minority governments would be more prone to issue debt, as the two strategic effects pull in this direction for a government with a small natural constituency (a small s tends to raise P and to make Pb negative) 51. For a government with popular candidates, the two effects pull in opposite directions, though. The specific positive implications concerning the effect o f debt on re-election probabilities are not necessarily robust, but depend on the assumptions about voters' preferences in Equation (6.6). But the general idea, that public financial policies can also be used to manipulate the relative popularity of the two parties, is sound and has many other applications besides public debt. Clearly, these determinants of economic policy would be even more important if parties were also opportunistic, i.e., also cared about staying in office p e r se. Finally, note that all of these predictions are confined to a two-party system, and in particular to a political system in which a government, once elected, behaves as a single decision-maker. We now turn to coalition governments.
6.2. Coalition governments
To see why coalition governments may issue debt, consider a two-period, two-group, two-party model, silnilar to that in the previous section. As tax distortions are not central to the argument here, we assunae taxes to be exogenous and lump-sum. Furthermore, we abstract from elections and popularity and instead assume that the two parties share office, both in period 1 and period 2. Public spending occurs in each period. As before, the two groups have sharply different preferences over the composition o f public consumption. We can write the utility of a typical group-i individual as u i = cl ~ c2 + H ( g { ) + H(g~) = 2 ( y -- r) + H(g{) + H ( g '2),
where y and r are exogenous per capita incomes and per capita taxes assumed to be equal over time.
50 Petterson (1997) test the Persson-Svensson and Aleshla-Tabellini models of strategic debt issue on panel data from Swedish municipalities. He finds support for the former model but not for the latter. 51 Questioning the stylized fact cited in the Introduction to Part II, Edin and Ohlsson (1991) argue that minority governments, rather than coalition govermnents, are associated with larger debt issue.
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To simplify further, let us assume that s = ½, so groups (or parties) d and r are of equal size. The government budget constraints are g,--(g~+g~):r+b,
g2
(g~+g~):r-b.
It is easy to see that in this setting the optimal cooperative policy (giving equal weight to the two groups) would set b = 0, and g~ = gI T f o r i = d, r a n d t = 1,2, sincethat would smooth the benefits of government spending optimally across groups and time. This is not the equilibrium outcome, though, if groups do not cooperate. In each period, the coalition partners simultaneously and non-cooperatively propose a spending level for their constituency. Period-2 debt is always honored. I f jointly feasible, these proposals are implemented; if infeasible, each group gets a share of the feasible spending level in proportion to its proposal. More precisely, using p(g~) to denote the proposal of group i in period t we assume that 52
gl
f p(g~)
if
] @
~2r
f p(gi2)
if
(p(gl)+p(gi/)) <~2r, otherwise,
~, p(gl)+p(gi )
g~ = /
(p(g~) +p(gJ)) <~ r - b,
P(g£) n ( r - b )
k P(g'2)+P(g~)
(6.8)
otherwise
Clearly, this model implicitly assumes a weak budget process, where each of the coalition partners is given responsibility for one separate part of the government budget, and none of them has responsibility for the overall budget constraint. We can also interpret the model as referring to a very weak government where spending ministers are in the hands of powerful interest groups. Given the relation between proposals and outcomes in Equation (6.8), there is a unique Nash equilibrium in period 2: each party proposes that the whole remaining pool of government resources, r - b, be allocated to its own group. Bidding for the whole pie in period 2, by setting p(g~) = (r - b), is costless. Such a proposal is a dominant strategy, as any lower proposal reduces the share of group i. Equilibrium spending thus satisfies g~ = g~/= ½(T - b).
(6.9)
6.2.1. Equilibrium debt issue In period 1 the situation is diffbrent, because insisting on high spending eats up future resources. This cost is not high enough, though, to prevent equilibrium over-issue of ~ We also asstune that no group can bid for m o r e than the total available resources. Thus, P(gl) <~ 2"r and p(g~) <~ r - b for i - r, d.
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debt. To see this, consider how debt links spending in periods 1 and 2. Given future equilibrium spending in Equation (6.9) and the budget constraints (6.7), we can write the objective of party I in period 1 as u1 = 2(y - T) + H ( g l ) + H [ z " - (g{ + g J)/2]. When contemplating its spending proposal and taking party Y's proposal as given, party I thus does not internalize more than half the cost of current spending. The optimal proposal satisfies
As the proposals of both parties are identical, they are clearly feasible: the second expression in parentheses is positive, satisfying the feasibility constraint in Equation (6.9). They are thus implemented and the equilibrium spending profile for group i satisfies
H ~ ( g l ) - ' g H g ( g 2 ')
- 0.
AS e~l °-i > g£ for i = d, r, it follows from Equation (6.8) that b > 0. This result is an instance of the familiar common pool argument: as the property rights to future income are not well defined, each of the parties only internalizes a fraction of the cost of current spending and debt issue. The result is a collective irrationality, which departs radically from the cooperative solution. Naturally, with N > 2 groups the problem becomes even worse, because now each party only internalizes I / N of the future costs of debt issue. This model can be generalized in several directions. Velasco (1999) studies a genuine multi-period model. This gives richer debt dynamics, including the possibility of delayed endogenous stabilizations. Chari and Cole (1993) study a two-period model which combines ideas from this and the previous subsection. Legislators facing a free-rider problem that drives spending too high try to constrain future spending and avoid collective irrationality by issuing more debt. Lizzeri (1996) applies a related idea to a very different model of redistribution, originally formulated by Myerson (1993). He considers a two-period economy where elections are held every period. Candidates can make binding promises before elections, over how to redistribute the available resources across voters and over time. Rational voters reward myopic behavior, however, favoring a candidate who promises to distribute all resources today. The reason is that resources left for the future can be taken away by the opponent if the first-period incumbent is not re-elected 53.
53 Tile commonpool problem has also been extensivelystudied in a static context. Persson and 'Ihbellini (1999) smvey that literature.
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6.2.2. A stronger budget process
The over-issue o f debt is obviously caused by a flawed government budget process, where each party o f the coalition (each group) is given decision-making authority over part of the budget, but nobody is given decision-making authority over the aggregate outcome. Which institutional reforms could address this problem? A natural idea is to centralize decision-making authority completely to one of the parties (or perhaps to reform the electoral system, to make majority governments, rather than coalition governments, more likely). I f the same party fully controlled all spending decisions, it would indeed appropriately internalize the cost o f overspending and o f debt issue. Such centralization o f decision-making power could be abused, however. In the model o f subsection 6.1, party I would spend all the revenue evenly over time on its own group, if it had the power to do so. The allocation o f spending across time would thus be fine, but the allocation across groups would be terrible. Moreover, in such a world, electoral uncertainty would re-introduce the incentives for debt issue considered in that section. This problem could be mitigated by institutional "checks and balances", for instance by splitting agenda-setting power between the two groups, giving, say, party D agenda-setting power over the budget size and party R agenda-setting power over its allocation 54. It turns out that a simple institution can implement the socially optimal allocation in the model. The solution is to split the decision in stages. First public debt is chosen. Then the allocation o f g t across different types o f public goods is sequentially determined, first in period 1 and then in period 2, with a separate budget constraint for each period. Suppose that the allocation o f spending is made according to Equation (6.8), except that (r + b) replaces 2 r in the expression for first-period spending on the RHS of Equation (6.8). It is easy to see that both groups now agree to a balanced budget (b = 0), as any other choice would be inefficient for both of them. Since there is unanimity, any mechanism for choosing b would give the same result. Interestingly, the empirical evidence in yon Hagen (1992), von Hagen and Harden (1995) and Alesina et al. (1996) suggests that certain features of the budget process makes it less likely that countries run into public debt problems. One o f the indicators that make up the index of budget stringency in their work is precisely whether the budget process entails a decision on the overall budget, before the decision on its allocation 5s.
54 Fhe effects of some of these checks and balances are investigated in a difterent set up by T. Persson et al. (1997). s5 Hallerberg and yon Hagen (1997) argue that countries with majoritarian electoral systems (and which thus are more likely to have one-party governments) have chosen to centralize power to the finance minister in the budget process, whereas coantries with proportional electoral systems (more likely to have coalitions and minority governments) instead have tried to limit their deficits by adopting formal budget targets.
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Ch. 22." Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy 6. 3. D e l a y e d stabilizations
In this section we do not focus on why budget deficits arise, but on why it may take time to get rid of them once they have arisen. Following Alesina and Drazen (1991), we illustrate the possibility o f delayed stabilizations when two parties in a coalition government, or two powerful interest groups, both have an incentive to let the other party bear the brunt o f the necessary adjustment. Alesina and Drazen's continuoustime model built on the biological war-of-attrition model o f Riley (1980) and on the public-goods model o f Bliss and Nalebuff (1984). We adapt their analysis to our simple two-period setting. In the model of the previous section, assume that aggregate government spending has got stuck at a level higher than aggregate tax revenue. In particular, assume that gd + gr = g = r +/3, with/3 > 0. As before, tax revenue is exogenously fixed at the same level in each period. We study two possible outcomes: (i) Stabilization is delayed, in which c a s e g ~ + g ~ " = gl = r + / 3 , b = /3, a n d g ~ + g ~ = g2 = r - j 3 . (ii) Stabilization occurs in period 1, in which case aggregate overspending is cut by [3 so that gl = r = g2 and hence b = 0. The allocation o f spending cuts across the two groups in case (ii) depends on how stabilization came about. We return to this question below. We are interested in the probability that stabilization is delayed, and what factors make delay more likely. To simplify the algebra, we assume that the utility o f group i is linear in gi. We assume that the costs o f debt policy enter additively in the utility function. They can be thought o f as either a suboptimal spending allocation over time, or other costs associated with debt issue - perhaps part of the deficit is financed by a distortionary inflation tax. We thus write utility o f group i as u i = 2 ( y - z') + g{ + g i9 - lcib.
(6.10)
The parameter t¢i measures the cost to group i of postponing the stabilization. A crucial assumption is that this cost is private information to group i. G r o u p j only knows that K"i is distributed on the interval [0, ?(] according to the distribution function F(lfi). The corresponding parameter tcJ has the same distribution, but the realizations o f ~ci and tcJ are independent. All political action takes place at the beginning o f period 1, when each party, simul. taneously and non-cooperatively, makes a proposal p/ of whether to stabilize (pl = s) or not (pI = n). If both parties propose n, the stabilization is delayed. But i f at least one party proposes s, stabilization takes place. If only one party "gives in" and proposes s, that party bears the main burden of the necessary cutbacks. Specifically, we assume: gi(n,n)=½(r+/3),
g ~ ( n , n ) = ½(r -/3),
g~(s, n) = g[(n, s) = ~i r - a , g~(n,s)=g~(s,n)=½"r+a, g~(s, s) = gr, '
i=d,r,
t = 1,2, t=l,2~ t=1,2,
i=d,r,
(6.11)
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where gi(pt),pD) denotes how spending on group i depends on the two proposals, and where a > 0 measures the advantage of not giving in. Implicit in Equation (6.11) is the idea that the political process gives veto rights to some party or interest group. Thus, this model applies to countries ruled by coalition governments, or more generally to a situation where the executive is weak and faces effective opposition by organized interests in the legislature or outside of Parliament. Consider one of the parties, say party D. It compares expected utility when proposing n, denoted by E[u d I pd = n], and when proposing s, denoted by E[u d ] pd _ s]. Let q = Pr[p" = s] be the probability that party R proposes s (q is determined in equilibrium). Then, Equations (6.10)-(6.11) and some algebra imply E[ ud I S = n ] - E [ ud [ S = s] = a - ( l
q)tedb.
(6.12)
Thus, it is more advantageous to propose n if the gains from not giving in are large (a is large), if the costs of deficit finance for group d is low (k d is low), and if the probability that party R proposes s is high (q is high). Clearly, party D says no whenever ted is below some critical number K. But, since party R faces an identical decision problem, it also proposes n whenever te" < K. Thus it must be the case that (1 - q ) = F ( K ) . Using that and setting the expression in (6.12) equal to zero, we can implicitly define the equilibrium value of K by: X F ( K ) = all3.
The LHS of this expression is increasing in K. Therefore, K = K ( a , fi), with Ka > 0 and Kf~ < 0. We can now answer the main questions, namely how often we would observe a delayed stabilization and what factors make equilibrium delay more likely. Delayed stabilization requires that both groups propose n. As teJ and te" are independently distributed, the unconditional probability o f observing delay is (1 - q)(1 - q) -- F ( K ( a , f i ) ) F ( K ( a , fi)). The likelihood of delay is thus increasing in a, the gain from winning the war of attrition when the other party gives in first. If we interpret a as a measure of cohesion in the political system, this result thus says that delayed stabilizations and prolonged deficits are more likely in polarized political systems. Note that if a = 0, there is never any delay; postponing adjustment only implies losses for each party. The likelihood of delay is also decreasing in fi, the initial fiscal problem. The model is consistent with the general idea that a worse fiscal crisis makes adjustment more likely; here we get that result because the expected cost of waiting becomes individually larger with a higher ft. Thus, the model supports the general idea that financial crises and times of economic distress resulting from budgetary instability are catalysts of reform, and
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should not be feared too much [Drazen and Grilli (1993)]. The mechanism causing delay in the model, namely a conflict over how to distribute the losses from cutbacks in government programs, also rhymes well with casual observation. Finally, the model can be used to study the consequences of financial aid to developing countries and conditionality [Casella and Eichengreen (1995)]. To be effective, external financial aid should not ease the pain of an unsustainable situation (in terms of our model, it should not reduce fi), for this would simply delay the stabilization. Effective financial aid should instead be conditional on a stabilization taking place and shrink over time if the stabilization is postponed, to increase the incentives to give in early for the rivaling parties. 6.4. Debt and intergenerational politics
The models in this section all focus on how debt redistributes tax distortions, or benefits of government spending, over time. But they ignore another role of debt: redistribution across generations. They also all assume any outstanding debt to be honored by the government that inherits it. But as we have seen in Section 5, this requires a strong form of commitment. Reputational or institutional forces facilitate commitments, but then they should really be part of the argument; such forces may also not go all the way. In conventional representative-agent macroeconomics, debt issue and pay-as-yougo social security are identical policies. Several authors have addressed the political determinants of such policies in a median-voter setting without altruism - see Browning (1975) for an early contribution, Boadway and Wildasin (1989), and Cooley and Soares (1999). In these papers, future social-security policies are honored by assumption (at least in the next period); i.e. commitment is assumed. Working agents not too far from retirement favor introducing pay-as-you-go social security, as this allows them to free ride on younger agents. Old-age agents are, of course, also in favor. Therefore a majority of voters typically favors social security and equilibrium policy depends, in a predictable way, on age-earning profiles and the population growth rate. Cukierman and Meltzer (1989) analyze budget deficits in a similar way, but introduce inter-generational altruism. The degree of altruism varies across households: some households leave positive bequests, but others are bequest-constrained. Nonconstrained voters, who can undo any intergenerational redistribution, are only concerned with the general equilibrium effects of the policy, and not on how it redistributes across generations. But a budget deficit is favored by the bequestconstrained voters, because it allows them something they cannot do privately redistribute resources towards themselves. In a median voter equilibrium, the size of the budget deficit depends of the efficiency effects and the number of bequest-constrained voters. Even though these contributions introduce important aspects of politics, they still hinge on the commitment assumption. At any moment social security strictly benefits
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only a minority (the retired) but imposes a cost on a majority (the workers). A similar problem exists for debt. Why then does the majority not repeal the policy? Reputational concerns may help, if honoring the current program enhances the probability that it will be honored in the future. But as we have already discussed in Section 5, this argument is not without problems. Tabellini (1990, 1991) suggests one should allow intra-generational heterogeneity in income, when thinking about these questions. Pure intergenerational policies rarely exist, at least when generations are altruistically linked. Social security programs thus redistribute not only from kids to parents, but also from rich to poor. Similarly, public debt default would have both intergenerational and intragenerational effects (as the rich are likely to hold more debt). A policy redistributing across generations may therefore be upheld in equilibrium, without ex ante commitments, by a coalition of voters that contains members of different generations who belong to similar income groups. But the coalitions that form ex p o s t to support existing social security and outstanding debt are different. Social security is supported by the old and the kids of poor parents, whereas debt is supported by the old and the kids of rich parents. These two intergenerational policies are thus not equal under heterogeneity and lack of commitment. As in Section 5, incentive constraints in policymaking violate the Modigliani-Miller theorem of government finance. Majority voting is not the only way of thinking about how the policy preferences of different generations get aggregated in the political process. In many societies, different age-groups - the old, in particular - have well-organized interest groups that lobby and take other political action to support policies benefitting their members. Rotemberg (1990) discusses the repayment of government debt as the outcome of bargaining between living generations. Grossman and Helpman (1996) formulate a dynamic model of intergenerational redistribution where policy commitments are again not feasible. In the model, pressure groups of living generations make contributions to the government conditional on the support given to their members. The model has multiple expectational equilibria, which remind of the equilibria in capital taxation studied in Section 5. But it is the expectations of the current goverm'nent - rather than the expectations of private agents - about the policy of the next government that introduce the self-fulfilling property. One can easily end up in a very bad equilibrium, where the pressure groups get engaged in a very stiff and costly competition for policy favors and Where capital formation suffers.
6.5. N o t e s on the literature
A huge literature deals with the politics on government deficits. Here we only refer to the more recent contributions, that typically study general equilibrium models with rational voters and politicians. A broader survey of the public choice literature is Mueller (1989). Much of the modern macroeconomic literature on public debt is surveyed in Alesina and Perotti (1995a).
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The idea that political instability induces a govermnent to use public debt strategically, to influence the future policies of its opponent, was first independently studied by Alesina and Tabellini (1990) and Persson and Svensson (1989). The model of subsection 6.1 is related to Alesina and Tabellini (1990), while Persson and Svensson (1989) studied a model where parties disagree on the overall size (as opposed to the composition) of public spending. Since then, many other papers have applied this idea to intertemporal fiscal policy. In particular, Tabellini and Alesina (1990) provide a generalization of these results, Alesina and Tabellini (1989) study capital flight and external borrowing, Tabellini (1990) looks at these models in the context of international policy coordination, Glazer (1989) applies the same idea to the choice of duration in public investment, Cukierman et al. (1992) analyze tax reforms from this point of view and provide empirical evidence that political instability is associated with more inefficient tax systems, and Roubini and Sachs (1989), Grilli et al. (1991), Ozler and Tabellini (1991) and Lambertini (1996) analyze the empirical evidence. Finally, the result that public debt policies also affect the re-election probability was first studied in this context by Aghion and Bolton (1990). Modeling the voters' preferences as entailing a trade-off between economic and non-economic dimensions, as we do in subsection 6.1, is a common strategy in some of this literature - see in particular Lindbeck and Weibull (1987). The dynamic "common pool" problem has a long history. It has been studied in industrial organization, where it refers to dynamic games among oligopolists facing an exhaustible resource, such as an oil field or a fishery [Levhari and Mirman (1980), Benhabib and Radner (1992)]. In fiscal policy, it was studied by Tabellini (1987) in a dynamic game of monetary and fiscal policy coordination, and by Velasco (1999) in a setting more similar to that of this model. This idea is also at the core of the more empirically oriented literature on budgetary procedures, such as Alesina and Perotti (1995a), von Hagen and Harden (1995), and Hallerberg and yon Hagen (1997). There is also an interesting (mainly empirical) line of research, that has investigated the effects of various restrictions on government borrowing. Most of this literature has studied the variety of institutional arrangements in US states. See for instance Bohn and Inman (1996), Poterba (1994), and Eichengreen and yon Hagen (1996). The model of delayed stabilizations is due to Alesina and Drazen (1991), who in turn have elaborated on earlier ideas by Riley (1980) and Bliss and Nalebuff (1984). Since then, the model has been extended in several directions, among others, by Drazen and Grilli (1993), Casella and Eichengreen (1995) and Alesina and Perotti (1995b). Finally, a large literature deals with intergenerational redistribution. Besides the papers quoted in the previous subsection, a separate line of research has investigated the sustainability of social-security systems in reputational models [Kotlikoff eta!. (1988), Boldrin and Rustichini (1996)].
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Part C. Politics and Growth Distorted fiscal policies, such as those emerging from the political equilibria in Part II, are likely to affect economic performance. It is therefore natural to ask whether political factors and political institutions are correlated with long-run economic growth. Here, too, there are some stylized facts. Most notably, after controlling for the conventional determinants o f growth: (i) Inequality in the distribution o f income or wealth is significantly and negatively correlated with subsequent growth in cross-country data. On the other hand, the evidence on the effect o f growth on the distribution o f income (the Kuznets curve) is quite mixed, both in cross section and time series data 56. (ii) Political instability, as measured by more frequent regime changes, or political unrest and violence, is significantly and negatively correlated with growth in cross-country data 57. (iii) Better protection of property rights is positively and significantly correlated with the growth. Whereas political rights and the incidence o f democracy are strongly correlated with the level o f income, there are no robust findings regarding the effect o f democracy on economic growth. 58 A recent literature has tried to explain these regularities in a setting where both economic growth and fiscal policies are endogenous. Section 7 surveys this literature.
7. Fiscal policy and growth Subsection 7.1 illustrates how income inequality can produce a negative effect on investment and growth, because it provides stronger incentives for redistributive policies that hurt growth-promoting investment. This idea was suggested by Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994b). As in these papers - and a great deal of subsequent work - we rely on a simple median-voter model inspired by Roberts (1977) and Meltzer and Richards (1981). Subsection 7.2 then illustrates how political instability can hurt growth, by inducing the incumbent government to follow more myopic policies, as in the work by Svensson (1996) and Devereux and Wen (1996). The argument here is closely related to that on strategic debt policy in subsection 6.1. Finally, subsection 7.3 briefly discusses how poor protection o f property rights may hurt investment and growth, as in Tornell and Velasco (1992)
56 This finding was first obtained by Atesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellmi (1994b). For a recent and comprehensive survey of the empirical evidence on inequality and growth, see Perotti (1996). 57 On this point see Alesina et al. (t996) and Barro (1991). 58 On the relation be~ieen property rights and growth see Knack and Keefer (1995). A survey of the voluminous literature on the links fi-om democracy to growth can be found in Przeworski and Limongi (1993).
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and Benhabib and Rustichini (1996). The underlying ideas are closely related to the dynamic common-pool problem discussed in subsection 6.2. 7.1. I n e q u a l i t y
and growth
Consider again a two-period economy inhabited by a continuum of heterogenous agents. Everyone has the same quasi-linear preferences over private consumption in periods 1 and 2 and over government (per capita) consumption in period 2. The utility of consumer i is:
u' = u(c~)+ c~ +H(g)
(7.1)
The budget constraints are C i1
e i - r - k i,
(7.2)
C2i = (1 - O) A ( 1 ) k i,
where k i is private investment, r and 0 lump-sum and capital taxes, and A ( I ) the gross return to private capital, which is increasing in public investment 1. We abstract from credibility problems; the government can commit to these policy instruments before private capital accumulation. Finally, e i is the endowment of agent i. These endowments are distributed in the population with mean e and a distribution function for the idiosyncratic part F ( e i - e). To proxy empirical income distributions, we assume that F is skewed to the right: the median value o f e i - e, labeled e" - e and defined by F ( e " - e) ½, is negative. Assuming a balanced budget in every period, the government budget constraint in per capita terms is: I = "r,
(7.3)
g = OA(l)k,
(7.4)
where k denotes per capita (average) capital. Following the approach of subsection 5.1, we can derive equilibrium private investment from Equations (7.1)-(7.3) as k i = e - I - UcI(A(I)(1
- 0)) + ( e i - e) =~ K ( O , I )
+ ( e i - e),
where the common investment function satisfies K0 < 0 and K1 > 0. It is again convenient to express the utility from private consumption as an indirect utility function defined over the policy variables: ji(o,[,
e i) --~
Max[U(ci0 + c~]
=U(e-I-K(O,I))+(I = J(O,I)
O)A(I)K(O,I)+A(I)(t-O)(e
i
e)
~ A ( I ) (1 - O)(e i - e).
(7.5) By the envelope theorem, the direct welIhre cost of the capital tax Jo = - A ( I ) K is negative. Moreover, the welfare effect of public investment, .11 = -U~ + (1 - O ) A t K , is
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monotonically decreasing in I (by Ucc < 0 and AH < 0). Substituting Equation (7.5) into (7.1) and using (7.3), we obtain individual-/policy preferences over the two policy instruments 0 and I: u i = j i ( o , I, e i) + H ( O A ( I ) K ( O , I)).
These policy preferences are linear in the idiosyncratic variable e i. They therefore fulfill a monotonicity (single-crossing) condition, such that the preferred policy of the agent with endowment e m will be a Condorcet winner, even though the policy space is two-dimensional. If we imagine that policy decisions are taken at the begilming of period 1 by direct democracy, the winning proposal is thus the policy preferred by this decisive voter. I f the second-order conditions are fulfilled 59, the equilibrium values for I and 0 thus satisfy dl + It~,O(KAI + A K D + (em -- e)(1 - O)AI = O, Jo + H g A ( K + OKo) - (e" - e ) A = O.
(7.6)
To understand these conditions, first assume that the distribution is symmetric, so that e m = e. Then the third terms in both conditions are zero, and Equation (7.6) characterizes the optimal policy for the average agent, which by quasi-linear preferences - would be chosen by a utilitarian planner. The first condition says that it is optimal to provide more public investment than would maximize private indirect utility (i.e. Jr < 0) due to the beneficial effects on the future tax base and hence on public spending (if public debt were allowed this result would be different). The second condition equates the average private marginal cost of raising revenue (Jo < 0) with the marginal benefit it generates via public consumption. But if e m < e, redistributive effects come into play. The decisive voter's capital falls short of average capital by exactly (e m - e). This implies that I is smaller and 0 is higher than in the hypothetical planning solution. The reason is that the decisive w,ter does not benefit from public investment as much as the average capital holder, and he also does not suffer as much from capital taxes. To see this formally, notice that the third term in the first equation of (7.6) is negative and the third term in the second equation is positive. By the second-order conditions, ! has to be lower and 0 has to be higher than in the social planner's solution. We thus see that inequality hampers growth via two different channels. The growth rate from period 1 to period 2, given by [ A ( 1 ) K ( O , I ) / e ] - l, is increasing in I (both directly and indirectly) and decreasing in 0. Furthermore, the higher is inequality, as measured by the distance between median and average income, the lower is growth as equilibrium public investment is smaller and capital taxation - as well as government consumption - is higher. ~') As hi all optimal taxation problems, this assumption is not necessarily innocuous, but can involve restrictive assumptions on underlying fimctional forms.
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Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994b) developed this kind of reduced-form prediction in related but explicitly dynamic models. Whereas Persson and Tabellini (as we have done) focused on the size distribution of income, Alesina and Rodrik focused on the functional distribution of income between labor and capital. Both papers also took the reduced-form prediction to the data - here Alesina and Rodrik too look at the size distribution of income. And they indeed found a strong negative effect of inequality on growth in a cross section of post-war data from a broad sample of countries 60. These papers stimulated a body of subsequent work scrutinizing both the empirical and the theoretical argument. Whereas the reduced-form relation from inequality to growth indeed seems empirically robust, the structural links implied by the theory have not generally found support in later empirical work 61. Thus, it has been hard to identify both the implied link from inequality to redistribution and the link from redistribution to growth, as emphasized in the recent surveys by Perotti (1996) and Benabou (1996). The model in this section suggests that these links could be pretty subtle, however (with opposite effects of inequality on government consumption and investment, for example, and ambiguous effects on total government spending). Moreover, the failure to find a robust link from tax rates and redistribution to economic growth is a problem for conventional growth theory, not just for political theories of growth. The literature has also searched for other reasons why inequality and growth may be inversely related. Perotti (1996) stresses that one link may run via political instability or via other, non-political, channels such as education. Benabou covers a whole range of recent theoretical work showing that the links between income distribution, policy and growth may run in different directions. For instance, redistribution may promote growth when agents are credit constrained, or when it promotes education.
7.2. Political instability and growth We now modify the previous model as follows. First, every private agent has the same first-period endowment: that is, e i = e and the average investment function K(O,I) applies for everyone. Instead, as in subsection 6.1, agents belong to two different groups, d and r, and public spending is of either of two types: gJ (benefitting only group d) or g" (benefitting only group r). Second, and again following subsection 6.1, policy is not set by majority rule but by an incumbent government D that acts so as to maximize the utility of group-d agents. The incumbent may be replaced by an alternative government R in the future.
r,0 Perssonand Tabellini (1994b) also round a similar relation in a small historical panel of industrialized countries with data going back to the late 19th century. ~l Later empirical work based on better data has also questioned an empirical finding by Persson and Tabellini (1994b) that was interpreted as giving indirect support for the theory-,namely that the relation between inequality and growth was only present in democracies and not in dictatorships.
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For simplicity, we take the re-election probability (1 - P ) as exogenous. It is natural to interpret P as a measure o f political instability. Third, to introduce a meaningful policy choice in period 2, policies are chosen sequentially. Thus, public investment I is chosen in period 1, before private capital, and the capital tax rate 0 is chosen in period 2. To avoid the capital-levy problem discussed in Section 5, we assume that in period 2 the private sector can still avoid some of the tax, though at a cost, by reallocating some o f its accumulated capital to a non-taxed asset with a lower return. We could think o f this as tax avoidance, or capital flight. A convenient formulation, following Persson and Tabellini (1992), is to rewrite the period-2 budget constraint as c2 = (1 - O)A(I)(k - f ) + f - M ( f ) , where M ( f ) is a concave and increasing function o f the amount f shielded from taxation and where we have recognized that everybody makes the same savings decision. It is easy to show that average savings are still given by the function K(O, I) and that tax avoidance is given by the function F ( O , I ) with Fo > 0 and FI < 0 62. The government's tax base can thus be written as a function K ( O , I ) = A ( I ) K ( O , I ) - F(O,I). The ex ante properties o f this function (that is from the viewpoint of period 1) are the same as before: decreasing in 0 and increasing in I. in period 2, when K and I are given from previous decisions, the ex post tax base K 2 ( 0 , I ) is still decreasing in 0 but with a smaller slope (intertemporal substitution possibilities are eliminated). The bottom line after these modifications is similar to the previous section: we can write the ex ante indirect utility of an agent in group i as u i = J(O, I) + H ( g i) - J (0, I) + H(OK(O, I)).
(7.7)
We can also define ex post indirect utility (for given K and I) as j2(O, I) + H ( O K --2 (O,D). Both J(O,I) and j2(0, I) have the same qualitative properties as the corresponding function in subsection 7.1. Any government holding power in period 2 spends all revenue on the public good favored by its own constituency. The expost optimal tax rate is given by the condition: +H
(K 2 +
= 0,
(7.8)
which has the same interpretation as the second condition in Equation (7.6). Thus, both prospective governments will set the same tax rate. Condition (7.8) implicitly defines the optimal tax rate as a function o f past public investment O(I), with slope o, =
4 + --2 ° Jgo + HggKo0
(i? The first--order condition for optimal tax avoidance is for the consumer to set A(I)(1 Mr(f) = 0. When this condition is inverted, we get the desired tax avoidance function.
O)
1 -I
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Unless H is very concave, Ol > O, as the numerator is positive and the denominator is negative (by the second-order condition). Public investment enlarges the tax base and this drives up the optimal tax rate. The incumbent party-D government in period 1 chooses I so as to maximize
E ( S ) : PJ(O(1),I) + (1
P)[J(O(I),I) + H(O(1)K(O(1),I))]
= J(O(I), I) + (1 - P)[H(O(I)K(O(1), 1-))]. We can rewrite the first-order condition to this problem with Equation (7.8), recognizing that J~ = Jo and g2 = ~ at the equilibrium tax rate. Some additional algebra gives
Jl +Hg[OKI + O(Ko --K2o)Ol] PHg[OKI + 0I(K + OKo)] = O.
(7.9)
Suppose first that D is certain to be re-elected: P = 0. Then the optimal choice o f / b o i l s down to the familiar weighting of private welfare (the first term) against government revenue (the second term), where the latter are fully internalized as the government is certain to remain in office. The resulting condition is the same as the second condition in Equation (7.6) of the previous subsection, adjusted for the different timing of tax policy and for the lack of heterogeneity. But when re-election is uncertain, P > 0, future government revenue is less valuable and policy myopia sets in. As the third term in Equation (7.9) is negative, a higher probability P of losing office makes public investment less attractive and reduces it in equilibrium. Higher instability not only draws down public investment, but reduces growth in this model. Second-period income, c2 + g = A(I)K(O, I ) - M(F(O, I)), unambiguously goes down as I falls. The direct negative effects of lower public investment and the indirect negative effects of higher waste due to more tax avoidance always outweigh the positive effects of the smaller equilibrium capital tax. Much of the informal discussion of why political instability is harmful for growth seems to suggest a direct effect of uncertainty or unpredictability on private investment. We know, however, that uncertainty in returns has ambiguous effects on private investment. Here a different mechanism is at work: political instability induces more myopic fiscal policies, which in turn cause lower public investment and growth. This is related to Svensson (1998), who shows that political instability may make a forwar& looking government abstain fi'om improvements in the legal system that enforce private property rights. He also finds empirical support for this idea. Political instability [as measured by Alesina et al. (1996)] indeed reduces the protection of private property rights [as measured by the same index as in Knack and Keefer (1995)] in a wide crosscountry sample. And controlling for property-rights protection, political instability drops out of a cross-country investment regression. The theoretical paper by Devereux and Wen (1996) emphasizes a somewhat different mechanism: political instability induces incumbent governments to leave smaller assets to their successors, thereby forcing theln to tax capital at a higher rate; the expectation of higher taxes drives down private investment, which leaves a smaller tax base for the successor government.
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7. 3. Property rights and growth
As mentioned in the introduction, the data support the idea that poor enforcement of property rights is harmful for investment and growth. This idea is also derived from some recent theoretical work. Benhabib and Rustichini (1996) study a growth model where two groups try to redistribute consumption towards themselves at the expense of the economy's capital stock. They show how such incentives may arise both at low and high levels of income, and how they may be exacerbated by greater inequality in the two groups' incomes. Their model abstracts from the political mechanism and the channels of redistribution, however. Tornell and Velasco (1992) focus on redistribution through the fiscal policy process in a linear (Ak) growth model. Their argument, as Benhabib and Rustichini's, is another instance of the common pool problem discussed in subsection 6.3. The common pool is now a part of the economy capital stock rather than the government tax base, but the incentive to over-exploit this common pool is the same. Because the redistribution is supposed to take place via the governlnent policy process, the poorly enforced property rights are closely related to weak government. Tornell (1995) studies a related model, but allows for endogenous property rights. in particular, property rights can be created and destroyed at a cost. He shows that the economy can go through a cycle with low property-rights protection at low and high levels of income. I f so, this pattern is perfectly foreseen and leads to gradually falling growth rates at intermediate levels of income. Lane and Tornell (1996) show that an exogenous positive shock due to productivity or the terms of trade may actually reduce the growth rate in an economy with powerful interest groups and poorly defined property rights. The mechanism is again a coordination failure between the interest groups, whereby the initial increase in the incentives to invest is more than outweighed by an increase in redistributive transfers. Svensson (1996) produces a related result, where the incentives of the interest groups to hold back on their demand for transfers vary negatively with government income. 7.4, Notes" on the literature
Beyond the papers cited in the text, early contributions to the theory of income distribution," investment and growth were made by Perotti (1993), who studied human capital accumulation, and tax-financed subsidies in the presence of borrowing constraints, by Bertola (1993) who studied tax policy and the functional distribution of income, by Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) who studied private versus public provision of education, and by Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993) who also studied redistributive policies that finance public education in a setting with wealth-constrained individuals. Perotti (1996) and Benabou (1996) provide additional references to recent empirical work. Finally, Caballero and Hammoar (1996) focus on the rents created by factor specificity and how the distribution of those rents affects the incentives to invest. As stated in the text, few theoretical models spell out the mechanisms whereby political
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instability is harmful for growth. As emphasized by Benabou (1996), there is thus scope for new work to provide better theoretical underpinnings for the empirical findings. Sharper theory is also needed to sort out the empirical channels whereby politics interacts with growth. This is not going to be easy, however, given the strong empirical correlations between inequality, instability and lacking enforcement of property rights. We want to end with a methodological note. In this section, as in the previous one, we have relied exclusively on simple two-period examples. This avoids a major difficulty: a full-fledged treatment o f the dynamic interactions between collectively chosen policy decisions and income distribution rapidly becomes analytically complex. As a result, the dynamic models studied in the literature have often relied on simplifying assumptions: dynamic links are assumed away in the model's economic structure, voting only takes place at an initial point in time rather than sequentially over time, or agents are assumed to be myopic and ignore some o f the dynamic implications of their actions. The clearest formulation of a general solution concept for dynamic political models with heterogenous agents is made in Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996). This paper also makes a contribution by showing how the endogenous build-up of vested interests, as agents acquire monopoly skills in operating new technologies, can lead to a growth cycle: the political majority at different points in time will shift between less and more growth-promoting policies. Krusell et al. (1997) survey parts of the literature on politics and growth from a methodological angle. They also show how to go from their proposed solution concept to quantitative (numerical) applications.
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Herrendorf, B., and B. Lockwood (1997), "Rogoff's 'conservative' central breaker restored", Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 29:476-495. Hibbs, D. (1977), "Political parties and macroeconomic policy", American Political Science Review 71:1467-1478. Holmstrom, B. (1982), "Managerial incentive problems a dynamic perspective", in: Essays in Economics and Management in Honor of Lars Wahlbeck (Swedish School of Economics, Helsinki). Horn, H., and T. Persson (1988), "Exchange rate policy, wage formation and credibility", European Economic Review 32:1621-1636. Ito, T. (1990), "The timing of elections and political business cycles in Japan", Journal of Asian Economics 1:135 146. Jensen, H. (t997), "Credibility of optimal monetary delegation", American Economic Review 87: 911-920. Jonsson, G. (1995), "Institutions and macroeconomic outcomes - The empirical evidence", Swedish Economic Policy Review 2:181-212. Jonsson, G. (1997), "Monetary politics and unemployment persistence", Journal of Monetary Economics 39:303 325. Knack, S., and R Keefer (t995), "Institutions and economic peribrmance: cross-country tests using alternative institutional measures", Economics and Politics 7:207 227. Kotlikoff, L., T. Persson and L.E.O. Svensson (1988), "Social contracts as assets: a possible solution to the time-consistency problem", American Economic Review 78:662-677. Krusell, E, and V, Rios-Rull (1996), "Vested interests in a positive theory of stagnation and growth", Review of Economic Studies 63:601-631. Krusell, E, V. Quadrini and V Rios-Rull (1997), "Politico-economic equilibrium and economic growth", Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 2t :243~72. Kydland, EE., and E.C. Prescott (1977), "Rules rather than discretion: the inconsistency of optimal plans", Journal of Political Economy 85:473M90. Lambertini, L. (1996), "Are budget deficits used strategically'?", mimeograph (UCLA). Lane, E, and A. Tornell (1996), Power, growth and the voracity effbct, Journal of Economic Growth 1:213-241. Leiderman, L., and L.E.O. Svensson, eds (1995), inflation Targets (CEPR, London). Levhari, D., and L. Mirman (1980), "The great fish war: an example using the Cournot-Nash solution", Bell Journal of Economics 11:322-334. Lewis-Beck, M. (1988), Economics and Elections: The Major Western Democracies (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI). Lindbeck, A. (1976), "Stabilization policies in open economies with endogenous politicians", American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 66:1-19. Lindbeck, A., and J. Weibull (1987), "Balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition", Public Choice 52:272-297. Lippi, E (1998), "On central bank independence and the stability of policy targets", Scandinavian Journal of Economics 100:495-512. Lizzeri, A. (1996), "Budget deficits and redistributive politics", mimeograph (Princeton University). Lockwood, B., and A. Philippopoulus (1994), "Insider power unemployment and multiple inflation equilibria", Economica 61:59 -77. Lockwood, B., M. Miller and L. Zhang (1998), "Designing monetary policy when unemployment persists", Economica 65:327-345. Lohman, S. (1992), "The optimal degree of conmritment: credibility and flexibility", American Economic Review 82:273-286. Lohman, S. (1996), °'Democracy and inflation", mimeograph (UCLA). Lucas, R.E., and N.L. Stokey (1983), "Optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital", Journal of Monetary Economics 12:55-94.
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von Hagen, J., and I. Harden (1995), "National budget processes and fiscal performance", European Economy, Reports and Studies 3. Waller, C. (1989), "Monetary policy games and central bank politics", Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 21:422-431. Waller, C., and C.E. Walsh (1996), "Central bank independence, economic behavior, and optimal term limits", American Economic Review 96:1139-1 t 53. Walsh, C.E. (1995a), "Optimal contracts for central bankers", American Economic Review 85:150-167. Walsh, C.E. (t995b), "Is New Zealand's Reserve bank act of 1989 an optimal central bank contract?", Journal of Money Credit and Banking 27:1179-1191.
Chapter 23
ISSUES
IN THE
DESIGN
OF MONETARY
POLICY
RULES *
BENNETT T. McCALLUM Carnegie Mellon University and National Bureau of Economic Research
Contents Abstract Keywords 1. Introduction 2. Concepts and distinctions 3. Special difficulties 4. Choice o f target variable 5. Choice o f instrument variable 6. Issues concerning research procedures 7. Interactions with fiscal policy 8. Concluding remarks References
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The author is indebted to Peter B. Clark, 'lodd Clark, Charles Evans, Robert Flood, Marvin Goodfriend, Charles Goodhart, An(hew Haldane, Robert Hetzel, Lars Joining, Allan Meltzer, Edward Nelson, Christopher Sims, Lars Svensson, John Taylor, John Whittaker, and especially Michael Woodford for helpful suggestions and criticisms. Handbook qf Macroeconomics, Volume 1, Edited by AB. laylor and M. WoodJbrd © 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved
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This chapter begins with a number of important preliminary issues including the distinction between rules and discretion in monetary policy; the feasibility of committed rule-like behavior by an independent central bank; and optimal control vs. robusmess strategies for conducting research. It then takes up the choice among alternative target variables - with the most prominent contenders including price level, nominal income, and hybrid (inflation plus output gap) variables - together with the issue of growth-rate vs. growing-level target path specifications. One conclusion is that im'tation and nominal income growth targets, but not the hybrid target, would have induced fairly similar policy responses in the US economy over 1960-1995. With regard to instrument choice, the chapter argues that both nominal interest rate and monetary base measures are feasible; this discussion emphasizes the basic conceptual distinction between nominal indeterminacy and solution multiplicity. Accordingly, root-mean-square-error performance measures are estimated for interest rate and base instruments (with nominal income target) in the context of a VAR model. Other topics emphasized in the chapter include the operationality of policy-rule specifications; stochastic vs. historical simulation procedures; interactions between monetary and fiscal policies; and the recently-developed fiscal theory of the price level.
Keywords JEL classification: E52, E58
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1. Introduction The topic o f rules for the conduct o f monetary policy has a long and distinguished history in macroeconomic analysis, with notable contributions having been made by Thornton (1802), Bagehot (1873), Wicksell (1907), Fisher (1920, 1926), Simons (1936), M. Friedman (1948, 1960), and others 1. A major reorientation in the focus of the discussion was provided as recently as 1983, however. In particular, Barro and Gordon (1983a) built upon the insights of Kydland and Prescott (1977) in a manner that put an end to the previously widespread notion that policy rules necessarily involve fixed settings for the monetary authority's instrument variable. This step served to separate the "rules vs. discretion" dichotomy from the issue o f "activist vs. nonactivist" policy behavior and thus opened the door to possible interest in policy rules on the part o f actual monetary policymakers - i.e., central bankers. In fact there has been a great increase in apparent interest in rules by policymakers during recent years - say, 1990-1996. Evidence in support o f that claim is provided by several studies conducted at the Federal Reserve's Board o f Governors of the rule introduced by John Taylor (1993b), such as Brayton et al. (1997) and Orphanides et al. (1998), as well as by discussions of this rule in speeches by members o f the Board [e.g., Blinder (1996)]. In the United Kingdom, interest by the Bank o f England in Taylor's rule as well as an alternative due to McCallum (1988, 1993a) is clearly indicated in an article by Stuart (1996) that attracted considerable attention in the British press. Numerous analytical studies of these rules 2 have been conducted by central bank economists from a number of countries 3. To some extent this upsurge in interest is related to the arrival o f inflation targeting as a leading candidate for the provision o f a practical guideline for monetary policy, significant applications having been introduced during 1990-1993 in Canada, New Zealand, Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom 4. There are, to put it mildly, numerous issues concerning monetary policy rules on which professional agreement is far from complete, even among academics that is, even neglecting the split between academic and central-bank views, which itself has probably diminished in recent years. The main purpose o f this chapter is to survey the most critical of these issues. The first to be discussed, which concerns the fundamental nature of policy rules and an independent central bank's capacity to
1 For other early rule proposals, see Laidler (1996) and Humphrey (1992). Also see Jonung (1979) for an interesting discussion of the Swedish experience of the 1930s. 2 Including proposals of Meltzer (1984, 1987), Hall (1984), Hall and Mankiw (1994), Feldstein and Stock (1994), and Gavin and Stockman (1990). 3 An incomplete list of notable studies would include those mentioned above plus Hess, Small and Brayton (1993), Clark (1994), Croushore and Stark (1995), Dueker (1993), Dueker and Fischer (1995), Estrella and Mishkha (1997), Judd and Motley (1991, 1992), Haldane and Salmon (1995), King (1996), and Jefferson (1997). Many more have been added since this chapter was written, most featuring Taylor's rule. 4 There is a sizable and growing litcrature on inflation targeting that will be mentioned below.
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behave in accordance with a rule - i.e., the commitment problem - is reviewed in Section 2. Next, Section 3 takes up some special difficulties that bedevil all attempts to design good policy rules and also to study ones previously proposed, namely, the lack of agreement (especially among academics) concerning models of monetary policy effects - and the associated social costs of inflation and unemployment - plus the existence of ongoing changes in economic structure relevant to monetary policymaking (e.g., improvements in payments technology). Two major substantive areas of rule design, the specification of target and instrument variables, are then taken up in Sections 4 and 5. In the first of these, the choice among basic target variables - such as exchange rate, price level, or nominal income measures - is considered along with the desirability of specifying target paths in trendstationary or difference-stationary form (i.e., levels vs. growth rates). In the second, the classic dispute between advocates of interest-rate and monetary-base (or bank reserve) instruments is reviewed, brief discussions being given of the rather extreme views that one or the other is actually infeasible as an instrument. The following pair of sections, 6 and 7, take up a number of analytical issues involving the study of candidate rule specifications. Among these are the design of simulation exercises; issues involving operationality (i.e., feasibility of specified instruments and information sets); and the interaction of monetary and fiscal policy rules. Finally, a brief conclusion is included as Section 8. Since the author has been writing on the subject of monetary rules for well over a decade, it would be futile to pretend that the chapter's discussion will be entirely "balanced" or "unbiased". What is intended, rather, is that important alternative points of view are mentioned and presented with reasonable accuracy even where agreement is lacking. Another recent overview is provided by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999).
2. Concepts and distinctions The crucial point that a policy rule can be activist has already been mentioned. Of course this is a matter of definition; thus the use of a terminological system that does not permit rules to be activist i.e., to involve policy instrument settings that are conditional on the state of the economy - cannot be ruled out on strictly logical grounds. But since the publication of Barro and Gordon (1983a), standard usage in the profession has been virtually unanimous in permitting activist rules and in basing the "rules vs. discretion" distinction on the manner in which (typically activist) instrument settings are determined. Roughly speaking, discretion implies period-byperiod reoptimization on the part of the monetary authority whereas a rule calls for period-by-period implementation of a contingency formula that has been selected to be generally applicable for an indefinitely large number of decision periods. The foregoing distinction is satisfying and straightforward to apply in the context of the simple "workhorse" model that features a surprise Phillips curve as utilized by Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983a,b), and a host of subsequent
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writers. When it comes to practical application to the behavior o f actual central banks, however, the distinction is not so easily drawn. Suppose that a particular central bank, which presumably cares about both inflation and unemployment outcomes, is observed regularly to be more stimulative when recent unemployment is high and/or current macroeconomic shocks threaten to increase unemployment. How does one decide whether this central bank's behavior should be classified as discretionary or rule-based but activist? Within a simple model one can calculate the settings implied by each type of behavior, or simply observe whether inflation exceeds its target value on average (i.e., whether the discretionary inflation bias is present). But such steps are not possible for an actual central bank, because there will typically not be any clear-cut agreement concerning the nature and magnitude o f shocks that have occurred in specific historical periods or even (in many cases) agreement as to the prevailing target inflation rate expressed in precise quantitative terms - even for analysis within the central bank itself. Taylor (1993b) explicitly addressed the problem of distinguishing "rule-like" from discretionary behavior in practice, recognizing that no actual central bank would be likely to follow literally a simple formula for its instrument settings but contending that the distinction could be of importance nevertheless 5. The key, Taylor suggested, is that rule-like behavior is systematic in the sense of"methodical, according to a plan, and not casual or at random". Clearly, being systematic is a necessary condition for rule-like behavior, but even those central bankers who defend discretionary behavior do not think of it as unsystematic. Accordingly, McCallum (1993b) argues that being systematic is not sufficient and points out that discretionary behavior in the workhorse model can, even with the inclusion o f random shock terms, be accurately represented by systematic application o f a simple formula. The needed additional criterion, McCallum suggests, is that the monetary authority "must also design the systematic response pattern [so as] to take account o f the private sector's expectational behavior" (p. 217), i.e., to optimize once, not each period. Taking such account is basically what Barro and Gordon (1983a) specified in their characterization, within the workhorse model with rational expectations, o f policy according to a rule. There is then no attempt to exploit temporarily given inflationary expectations for brief output gains 6. Qualitative knowledge of the policymaking process o f an actual central bank may then be sufficient in some cases to determine whether or not policy responses are designed to try to exploit temporarily given expectations.
5 Taylor, like Judd and Motley (1992), envisions the genuine possibility that central bard~ policy committees would enrich their considerations by referring to the instrument settings suggested by a numerical rule, e.g., taking them as a starting point for their policy deliberations. 6 It may be asked why a one-time optimization will not involve the exploitation of expectations that happen to exist at the time. But my meaning of systematic implies that the same actions are specified each time the same conditions are faced, so the response pattern cannot be different for the "first" or "first few" periods. Basically, the optimization calculation must be made fi:om the perspective of a dynamic stochastic steady state.
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It is interesting to note, parenthetically, that although Milton Friedman has never embraced the concept o f activist rules, in one o f his most carefully considered arguments on b e h a l f o f nondiscretionary monetary policy the crucial advantage o f a rule is said to be that decisions are made in the form o f a policy applicable to many distinct cases, not on a case-by-case basis, with such a form o f policymaking having favorable effects on expectations. In particular, Friedman (1962) suggests that monetary policymaking is in important ways analogous to freedom-of-speech issues, in the sense that adopting a rule that applies in general will on average lead to different and preferable - outcomes than those generated by decision making on a case-by-case basis. After presenting the analogy and remarldng on "our good fortune o f having lived in a society that did adopt the self-denying ordinance o f not considering each case o f [contested] speech separately" (1962, p. 241), Friedman contends that: Exactly the same considerations apply in tile monetary area. if each case is considered on its [individual] merits, the wrong decision is likely to be made in a large fi'action of cases because the decision-makers are ... not taking into account the cumulative consequences of the policy as a whole. On the other hand, if a general rule is adopted for a group of cases as a bundle, the existence of that rule has favorable effects on people's attitudes ... and expectations that would not follow even from the discretionary adoption of precisely the same [actions] on a series of separate occasions. ]~ Friedman (1962, p. 241) Thus we see that the logic o f Friedman's argument is basically the same as that identified by Barro and Gordon (1983a) and is entirely compatible with "activism," i.e., conditioning clauses in the rule 7. A controversial issue is whether it is feasible for an independent central bank to behave in a rule-like fashion. The most straightforward point o f view- is that expressed b y Taylor (1983, 1993b), McCallum (1995b, 1997b), Kydland and Prescott (1977), and Prescott (1977), namely, that an independent central bank is perfectly free to choose its instrument settings as it sees fit. Since it will generate superior outcomes on average i f it does so in a rule-like manner, and is presumably capable o f understanding that, the well-managed central bank will in fact behave in such a maimer. This requires it to adopt instrument settings that are different, however, from those that would appear optimal i f it were making a fresh optimization calculation each period (i.e., not considering the cases as a group). Thus many authors have suggested that, since there is no tangible "commitment technology" to guarantee that future choices will be made similarly, independent central banks are inevitably destined to behave in a discretionary fashion, making a fresh optimization calculation each period. One o f the strongest explicit statements o f this position has been made by Chari, Kehoe and Prescott (1989, p. 303), as follows: "We should emphasize that in no sense can societies choose between commitment [and] time-consistent [i.e., discretionary] equilibria. Commitment technologies are like teclmologies for making shoes in an A r r o w - D e b r e u
"1 An example of a conditioning clause in the fieedom-of-speech example would be one pertaining to cases of false alarms shouted in "crowded theaters".
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model - they are either available or not". But while this form o f language is rather extreme, the position taken is probably more representative o f academic thought over (say) 1984-1994 than is the pragmatic Taylor-McCallum position. That is, most analyses o f the consequences o f various issues simply presume, often without explicit justification, that central bank behavior will be o f the uncommitted discretionary type ~. In many cases it is contended that there is a necessary tradeoff between commitment and flexibility, which the Taylor-McCallum position denies. The justification typically given, explicitly or implicitly, for tile assumption o f (suboptimal) discretionary behavior is that although rule-like behavior is superior on average, it remains true that within each period prevailing expectations are "given" so each extra bit o f inflation or monetary ease will add output or reduce unemployment, implying that the discretionary choice would typically be superior from the perspective of that single period. Furthermore, the public understands this feature o f policy choice, according to the usual position, so individuals will expect the central bank to behave discretionarily, thereby making the discretionary action preferable (from the singleperiod perspective). But to conclude that the central bank will therefore consistently choose the discretionary outcome is analytically to adopt a particular equilibrium concept - see Chart, Kehoe and Prescott (1989). The solution concept preferred by Taylor, McCallum, Lucas (1976, 1980), and Prescott (1977) is simply rational expectations in a competitive model with a monetary authority that behaves as a Stackelberg leader vis-a-vis the private sector 9. To the present writer the latter concept seems more plausible 10, but the key point here is that neither o f the two modes of central bank behavior - rule-like or discretionary - has as yet been firmly established as empirically relevant or theoretically appropriate. Also, it would seem to be indisputable that there is nothing tangible to prevent a central bank from behaving in a rule-like
A particularly strildng example of tile importance of this assumption is provided by Svensson (1996), who argues that in the workhorse model, extended to inchide persistence of output or unemployment in the surprise Phillips relationship, price-level targeting will lead to less inflation variability (as well as less price-level variability) than will inflation targeting. This dramatic result depends, however, upon the presence of discretionary behavior on the part of the monetary authority. It does not obtain if the central bank is behaving in a rule-like fashion. Svensson (1996) recognizes this point but his discussion emphasizes the discretionary case. This exposition does not explicitly refer to thc reputational models pioneered by Barro and Gordon (1983b), the reason being that the author finds these models implausible. Of course the argunlent here advanced relies upon reputational effects, but does not utilize the type of equilibria featured in the reputation literature. i0 Empirically it is unlike the usual position consistent with tile "free lunch" finding that increased CB independence provides improved inflation performance without increased output employment variability. On this finding, see Fischer (1995) or Debelle and Fischer (1995, p. 201). It should be noted, incidentally, that my hypothesis is quite different from that of Mervyn King (1996), who suggests that CBs do not aim for output in excess of the natural rate value (as they do in the worldlorse model). The latter implies, since inflation and output desires are reflected in separate terms in King's loss function, that actual CBs would not want to keep output above the natural rate value even if they could do so without generating any inflationary tendency.
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fashion 11 so that there is no necessary (i.e., inescapable) tradeoff between "flexibility and commitment", as has often been suggested ~2. This position does not deny that central banks are constantly faced with the temptation to adopt the discretionary policy action for the current period; it just denies that succumbing to this temptation is inevitable. In practice, adoption o f rule-like decision making procedures is one mechanism for combating these temptations.
3. Special difficulties To economists who do not specialize in monetary or macroeconomic issues, it may seem surprising or perhaps a matter for professional embarrassment that a large volume o f debate can be sustained on the subject o f monetary policy rules. Surely, the argument would go, it should not be terribly difficult to conduct an optimal control exercise using some reasonably good macroeconometric model and thereby discover what an o p t i m a l monetary policy rule would be. This would have to be done for a number o f different economies, o f course, but the problems involved are in principle almost negligible and in practice are easily surmountable. Admittedly, the model would have to be one that is structural - policy invariant - so as not to be subject to the Lucas critique (1976), but that necessity has been well understood for many years by now 13 In fact, however, such an argument fails entirely to recognize one basic and fundamental difficulty that underlies a large fraction o f the issues concerning monetary policy rules. This difficulty stems from the lack o f professional agreement concerning the appropriate specification o f a model suitable for the analysis o f monetary policy issues. There are various aspects o f such a model that different researchers would emphasize. Many would suggest that money demand theory is quite undeveloped and inadequate for policy analysis. The viewpoint taken in McCallum (1997a), by contrast, contends that it is the dynamic connection between monetary policy actions and real aggregative responses that is the main source o f difficulty 14. Others, including
1t In the workhorse model, policy settings of both the committed and discretionary type may be expressed as resulting from policy feedback equation of the form or, = a o + a l E ~ 1 ~ +a2u~, with different coefficient values. Here E t l¢gt represents prevailing expectations and u~ is a current macroeconomic shock. There is nothing tangible to prevent a~ choices that represent conmaitment. t2 The absence of any inescapable tradeoffis implicit in the central bank contracting approach pioneered by Walsh (1995) and Persson and Tabellini (1993). 13 Taylor (1979) conducted an optimal policy exercise in the context of a dynamic macro model with rational expectations almost 20 years ago. 14 In this reference, the argument is stated as follows. It is not just that the economics profession does not have a well-tested quantitative model of the quarter-to-quarter dynamics, the situation is much worse than that: we do not even have any basic agreement about the qualitative nature of the mechanism. This point can be made by mentioning some of the leading theoretical categories, which include: rcal business cycle models; monetary misperception models; semi-classical price adjustment models; models with overlapping nominal contracts of the Taylor variety or the Fischer variety or the Calvo Rotemberg
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King (1993) and Fuhrer (1997) would point to weaknesses in modeling investment or consumption behavior, and o f course empirical understanding o f exchange rates and other open-economy influences is widely regarded as highly unsatisfactory. But whatever the particular model component that is singled out for special criticism, it seems extremely hard to avoid the conclusion that agreement upon macroeconomic model specification is predominantly absent - and that different models carry highly different alleged implications for monetary policy. The upshot, clearly, is that in practice one cannot simply conduct an optimal control exercise with an "appropriate" model. That approach simply collapses in response to the question "What is the appropriate model?" In light of this mundane but fundamental difficulty, the research strategy recommended by several writers including Blanchard and Fischer (1989, p. 582), McCallum (1988, 1997a), and to some extent Brunner (1980) - is to search for a policy rule that possesses "robustness" in the sense o f yielding reasonably desirable outcomes in policy simulation experiments in a wide variety o f models. In effect, the same type o f approach is collectively utilized by the various teams o f researchers participating in the Brookings projects directed by Ralph Bryant [Bryant et al. 1988, 1993)] ts. It is worth mentioning briefly that the research strategy based on robustness may serve to some extent as a protection against failures o f the Lucas-critique type. That critique is best thought o f not as a methodological imperative regarding model building strategies, but as a reminder o f the need to use policy-invariant relations in sinmlation studies and especially as a source o f striking examples in which policy invariance is implausible. The construction o f a policy-invariant model faces a major difficulty, however, in the above-mentioned absence o f professional agreement about model specification. Thus it would seem sensible to consider a variety o f models in the hope that one will be reasonably well specified - and therefore immune to the critique - and search for a rule that will perform satisfactorily in all o f them 16. O f course, there is no need for such a project to be carried out by a single researcher; furthermore, attempts to make each contending model policy invariant would enhance the effectiveness
type; models with nominal contracts set as in the recent work of Fuhrer and Moore; NAIRU models; Lucas supply function models; MPS-style markup pricing models; and so on. Not only do we have all of these basic modeling approaches, but to be made operational each of them has to be combined with some measure of capacity output - a step that itself involves competing approaches - and with several critical assumptions regarding the nature of different types of unobservable shocks and the timeseries processes generating them. Thus there are dozens or perhaps hundreds of competing specifications regarding the precise nature of the connection between monetary policy actions and their real short-term consequences. And there is little empirical basis for much narrowing of the range of contenders. 15 For the optimal-design point of view, see Fair and Howrey (1996). 16 From the perspective of the robustness approach, there is something to be said in favor of expressing "satisfactorily" in terms of nominal variables - even though individuals are concerned ultimately with real magnitudes because the relationship between monetary policy instruments and nominal variables may be less subject to Lucas-critique difficulties than is the case with real variables. An argument to this effect is attempted in McCallum (1990b, pp. 21-22).
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o f the overall project. Thus there is no necessary conflict between a robustnessoriented strategy and studies by individual researchers that involve construction o f single models [e.g., Ireland (1997), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)]. The lack of professional agreement over model specification also makes it difficult to reach any firm conclusions about the proper goals o f monetary policy, as is discussed at the end o f this section, before the related but more pragmatic issue o f target variables is taken up. Other issues that are of greater technical interest but less fundamental importance - for example, issues concerning operationality and the simulation techniques appropriate for investigating a rule's properties - will be considered below, in Section 6. In any discussion of monetary policy, but especially in ones involving the design o f rules, it is useful to adopt a terminology regarding goals, objectives, targets, instruments, etc., that clearly reflects basic conceptual distinctions and at the same time is reasonably orthodox (or at least non-idiosyncratic). With those criteria in mind, we shall below use the word goals" to refer to the ultimate but typically nonoperational objectives of the monetary authority, and the term target to refer to an operational variable that takes precedence in the actual conduct of policy. The leading contenders for a central bank's target variable would be some comprehensive price index, nominal GDP or some other measure of nominal spending, a monetary aggregate, or a foreign exchange rate - with growth rates rather than (growing) levels perhaps pertaining in the case o f the first three. The choice among target variables will be considered in some detail in Section 4. At the opposite end o f the scale from goals are instrument variables, i.e., the variables that central banks actually manipulate more or less directly on a daily or weekly basis in their attempts to achieve specified targets. For most central banks, some short-term interest rate would be regarded as the instrument variable, but some analysts continue to promote the monetary base (or some other controllable narrow aggregate) in that capacity. It must be said that a term such as "operating target" would probably be nearer to standard for central bank economists or even policy-oriented academics, and there is a sense - to be described momentarily - in which it is more accurate than "instrument variable". But in an article such as the present one it would seem desirable to employ a terminology that promotes a clear distinction between target and instrument variables. Thus we seek to avoid ambiguous usage such as "interest rate targeting" to refer to a central bank's weekly instrument (or operating target) settings, rather than its policy-governing target variable. The sense in which "operating target" would be preferable to "instrument" is as follows. Many actual central banks choose not to manipulate their interest rate instruments in a literally direct fashion but rather to conduct open-market operations only once a day with quantities chosen so as to be expected to yield a market-influenced interest rate that lies within (or close to) some rather narrow band. The USA's Federal Reserve, for example, typically enters the Federal Funds market only once a day (normally around 10:30-10:45 a.m.) so the end-of-day or daily average value of the Federal Funds rate (FF rate) can depart from the open-market desk's "target value" by
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20-30 basis points on any given day. Thus writers such as Cook and Hahn (1989) or Rudebusch (1995) will distinguish between "actual" and "target" values at the daily level. But the Fed keeps the FF rate within a few basis points o f its operating target on average over periods as short as a week. Thus there is little harm, in a study such as the present one, in using the term instrument variable and pretending that the Fed controls its interest instrument directly. There is, it should be said, a significant amount of debate over the feasibility of a central bank's using one variable or another as its instrument (even in our sense). Those issues will be taken up in Section 5. In our terminology, then, a policy rule might be thought o f as a formula that specifies instrument settings that are designed to keep a target variable close to its specified target path. If rt and xt were the instrument and target variables, then, the simplest prototype rule might be o f the form r, = rt-i +)~(x~ 1 xi-l),
X < 0,
(3.1)
which specifies that the instrument setting should be decreased if xt fell short o f its target value x T in the previous period. Somewhat more realistic examples involving more variables and other timing patterns will be considered below. Some writers have taken the position that the specification o f a policy rule is complete when a target variable has been selected and a target path (or perhaps a tolerance range) has been designated. Hall and Mankiw (1994, p. 79), for example, recommend that the central bank behave so as to keep each period's externallygenerated forecast o f future nominal income equal to a value given by a selected target path, but beyond that "we see no need to tel! it how to go about achieving the peg." Also, Svensson (1997a) distinguishes between "instrument rules" and "target rules" and expresses a preference for the latter, which specify target values but not instrument settings 17. The position taken in the present chapter, however, is that a monetary policy rule is by definition a formula that specifies instrument settings, with the choice of a target variable and path constituting only one ingredient. For some particular target choices it might be the case that the problem o f designing instrument settings would be extremely simple or uninteresting, but in general such will not be the case. McCallum's series o f rule studies (1988, 1993a, 1995a), for example, was undertaken partly in response to a claim by Axilrod (1985) - who was at the time a principal monetary policy advisor at the Fed's Board of Governors - that the achievement of nominal GNP targets was technically infeasible. From this practical perspective, the investigation o f a rule expressed in terms of a feasible instrmnent variable becomes
J7 As a related matter, Svensson has suggested that behavior conforming to a rule of the form (3.1) should not be referred to as involving a x t target; that terminology should be reserved (he suggests) to cases in which the central bank's instrument is set so as to make Etxt~/= xt*+j. But a rule such as (3.1) with 3.(x~i - E~xt~:i) on the right-hand side leads to equivalent behavior in the limit as )~---,oo,and so is a compatible but more general formulation.
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an essential portion of the selection of a desirable target. For there is little point in designating a particular target if in fact it is not achievable. Svensson's (1997a) preference for what he terms target rules is not based on any lack of interest in the instrument-target relationship, but stems (apparently) from a point of view that does not recognize the difficulty emphasized above, namely, the absence of a satisfactory model of the economy. Thus Svensson presumes that any change in knowledge about the economy's workings will typically require some change in an instrument rule, whereas "with new information about structural relationships ... a target rule implies automatic revisions of the reaction function" [Svensson (1997a), pp. 1136-1137]. Indeed, if the central bank were conducting policy by conducting optimal control exercises each period with a single model, it would be true that changes in the latter would typically entail changes in the implied instrument rule. But under the presumption presented above, that it would be unwise to design a rule optimally on the basis of any single model, Svensson's conclusion does not follow. Instead, if an instrument rule has been designed so as to work reasonably well in a wide variety of models, then new information about the economy's structure is unlikely to entail any change in rule specification even when the rule designates instrument settings. Terminologically, moreover, it seems best to distinguish between the choice of policy rules and policy targets. The selection of a target variable is an extremely important aspect of systematic policy-making and may involve sophisticated analysis, as in the work of Svensson. But nevertheless a target is just that, a target. A rule, by contrast, is a formula that can be handed to a central banker for implementation without any particular knowledge of the analysts' views about model specification or objectives, in any event, in what follows it will typically be presumed that the term monetary policy rule refers to a formula or guide such as Equation (3.1) for period-by-period setting of instrument values in response to specified conditions. In evaluating candidate formulas such as Equation (3. l), it would clearly be desirable to have at hand an established specification of the appropriate ultimate goals of monetary policy. In that regard there exist important issues, such as whether a CB should keep actual or expected inflation close to some normative value, what that normative value is, and precisely how variability of output - or is it output relative to capacity (measured how?) or consumption? - should be weighed in relation to the inflation criterion. Now, in optimizing models that are specified at the level of individuais' tastes and technology, such as Ireland (1997) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), the answers to such questions are unambiguous and implicit in the solution to the optimal control problem. But again the fundamental difficulty mentioned above intrudes in a crucial manner, for these answers will depend nonnegligibly upon the specification of the model at hand 18. Consequently, the marked
is One rather prominent issue is whether there exists some externality that makcsthe appropriateoutput reference value greater than the natural-rate value that is relevant for price and wage behavior. Another crucial issue concerns the validity or invMidityof strict natural-rate hypothesis, i.e., the proposition that
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absence o f professional agreement regarding model specification implies that there can be (at least at present) no consensus as to the CB goals that are appropriate from the perspective o f an economy's individuals. In practice, nevertheless, there seems to be a substantial anaount o f agreement about actual (not ideal) CB objectives; namely, that many CBs strive to keep expected inflation close to zero (allowing for measurement error) and to keep output close to a capacity or natural-rate value that is itself a variable that grows with the capital stock, the labor force, and technical progress 19. Although it cannot be established that these objectives are optimal, it would seem to this writer that they probably provide a fairly good specification o f appropriate CB macroeconomic goals.
4. Choice of target variable After a long dose o f preliminaries, let us now finally turn to substantive issues in the design o f a monetary rule. In this section we shall be concerned with the choice o f a target variable - both its idemity and the question o f whether its path should be specified in growth-rate or level form. For the reasons just outlined, our discussion will be pragmatic rather than theoretical in nature. In recent years, the most fashionable target variable for the monetary authority has been a nation's inflation rate - in other words, a comprehensive price-level variable with its target path set in growth-rate terms. A great deal has been written about inflation targeting in policy-oriented publications, and substantial scholarly efforts have been contributed by A l m e i d a and Goodhart (1996), Bernanke and Mishkin (1997), Goodhart and Vinals (1994), McCallum (1997a), and others, as well as the individual authors represented in books edited by Leiderman and Svensson (1995) and Haldane (1995). Other leading target-variable choices are aggregate spending magnitudes such as nominal GNP or G D P - often in growth rate form - and a "hybrid" variable that sums inflation and real output measured relative to some sort o f trend or reference value 2°. A l l o f these choices presume, however, that the economy in question does not have its monetary policy dedicated to an exchange rate target, so a brief prior discussion o f exchange rate policy should be appropriate.
output cammt be kept above its natural-rate value permanently by any monetary policy strategy, even one that features a permanently increasing (or decreasing) rate of inflation [Lucas (i972)]. J9 This variable capacity value may, however, exceed the natural-rate value, as mentioned in footnotes 10 and 18, and as is typically assumed in the CB credibility literature. 2o The magnitude of inflation rates depends upon the length of a single time period whereas the percentage (or fractional) deviation of output from its reference path does not. The usual convention with this hybrid variable is to add percentage inflation rates measured lbr annual periods to percentage output deviations. It would be equivalent to use inflation over a quarter plus one-fom'th of the relative output deviation. Use of fractional units for both variables would also be equivalent, with appropriate adjustments in the response coefficient. This last convention will be utilized below.
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Perhaps the most basic of all monetary policy choices is whether or not to adopt a fixed exchange rate. The principal considerations involved in this choice are those recognized in the optimal currency area literature began by Mundell (1961) and extended by M c K i n n o n (1963) and Kenen (1969). Basically, these all boil down to the question of whether the lnicroeconomic (i.e., resource allocation) advantages of an extended area with a single medium of exchange outweigh the macroeconomic (i.e., stabilization policy) disadvantages of being unable to tailor monetary policy to local conditions 2j. Some analysts [e.g., Bruno (1993), Fischer (1986)] have contended that there are some macroeconomic advantages of a fixed exchange rate22 but the arguments seem actually to be based on political or public-relations considerations, not economic costs and benefits 23. Thus in the case o f small economies for which large fractions of their market exchanges are international in character, and which tend frequently to experience the same macroeconomic shocks as their neighbors and trading partners, it is clearly advantageous to forgo the flexibility of an independent monetary policy by keeping a fixed exchange rate (and common currency) with a specified currency or basket of currencies 24. And at the other extreme, the macroeconomic advantages o f a floating exchange rate would seem to be clearly dominant for pairs of nations such as the USA, Japan, and the prospective European monetary union. The main point of the previous paragraph is that the advantages that might lead a nation to choose to have a fixed exchange rate, and thus to dedicate its monetary policy actions to that criterion, are basically either microeconomic or political in nature. Thus the type of considerations involved are quite different than those that are involved in the selection among macroeconomic target variables such as inflation, nominal spending growth, or the above-mentioned hybrid variable. Because of the scope of the present chapter, we shall henceforth focus our attention on the latter type of choice 25.
21 If a set of countries is to have permanently fixed exchange rates, it would seem that from a purely economic perspective there are extra benefits (reduced transaction costs) with no extra costs of having a common currency. (No ongoing costs, that is; there may obviouslybe significantchangeover costs, as in the EMU example.) As for rates that are fixed, but not permanently,the European experiences of 1992 and 1993 support Friedman's (1953) classic argmnent that such an arrangement is undesirable because of the self;destructive speculativeimpulses that are encomaged. 22 From the monetary-policyperspective, a moving peg or narrow bm~dfalls into the same category as a fixed exchmlge rate, since it entails the dedication of monetary policy to its maintenance. 23 This statement is applicable to much of the literature relating to the planned European monetary union, of course. 24 A relatively clear-cut example is provided by Luxembourg, which has had a monetary union with Belgium since 1921 (except for an intenuption during World War II), Belgian francs serving as a legal tender in both nations, Luxembourgalso issues franc notes and coins, but has kept these interchangeable -with their Belgian counterparts. 25 It should be recognized, however, that it would be possible to consider a target that consists of a weighted average of (say) exchange rate changes and inflation. This example couid alternatively be thought of as an inflation target with an unusual specificationof the price index to be utilized.
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In the literature on this subject, which is large, the most popular approach is to determine how well the various targets would perform in terms of yielding desirable values of postulated social and/or policy-maker objective fimctions, with these pertaining primarily to root-mean-square (RMS) deviations from desired values of variables such as inflation or real GDP relative to capacity 26. Such studies may be conducted with theoretical or estimated models, but in either case need to take account of the various types of macroeconomic shocks that may be relevant - need to take account, that is, of the variance, covariance, and autocovariance magnitudes of the shock processes. Some of the leading examples of theoretical studies are those of Bean (1983), West (1986), Aizenman and Frenkel (1986), Henderson and McKibbin (1993), Frankel and Chinn (1995), Ratti (1997), and Ireland (1998), while welllcnown simulation studies with estimated models have been conducted by Taylor (1979, 1993a), Feldstein and Stock (1994), Haldane and Salmon (1995), and the individual authors in Bryant et al. (1988, 1993). In some of these studies it is pretended, for the sake of the issue at hand, that the selected target variables are kept precisely on their target path; the Bean, West, Aizemnan-Frenkel, Frankel-Chinn, Ratti, and (in part) Henderson-McKibbin studies are of that type. Others, however, focus on RMS deviations in simulations with policy rules expressed in terms of instrument variables. Proponents of the first approach would argue, presumably, that they prefer to keep the issue of whether a variable can be controlled separate from the evaluation of its effects if well-controlled. Those who disagree would point out that there is little need to know such properties tbr variables that in fact can be controlled only very poorly. Indeed, they might argue that unless controllability is taken into account, the issue is simply that of specifying an appropriate social objective function; i.e., that "targeting" is not the matter under investigation. In this regard it is worth keeping in mind the point emphasized above, namely, that there is in fact no professional agreement on the appropriate specification of a dynamic macroeconomic model. This implies not only an absence of agreelnent on the "true" social objective function, but also the absence of agreement on a matter as basic as the listing of relevant macroeconomic shocks. Keynesians and real-businesscycle analysts, for example, would disagree sharply as to the very nature of the relevant shock processes. For the candidate target variables mentioned above, other than the hybrid variable, an important question is whether it is preferable to specify a growth-rate target or one of the growing-levels type, i.e., whetber the target should be specified in a differencestationary or trend-stationary manner. This issue is often discussed under the heading of "inflation vs. price-level targeting," but similar considerations would apply if the target variable were nominal GDP, some other measure of nominal spending, or even
~' These are the two valiables that are most closely related to the utility t~mctions of individuals m explicit optimizing models such as those of Ireland (1997) or Rotemberg and Woodtbrd (1997).
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a money-stock variable 27. Specifically, the weakness o f the growth-rate choice is that it will - by treating past target misses as bygones - introduce a random walk (or more general unit root) component into the time-series processes for all nominal variables, including the price level. Thus there will exist a possibility that the price level would drift arbitrarily far away from any given value (or predetermined path) as time passes, implying considerable uncertainty as to values that will obtain in the distant future. By contrast, the main disadvantage with a levels-type target path is that the target variable will be forced back toward the preset path after any disturbance that has driven it away, even if the effect o f the disturbance is itself o f a permanent nature. Since any such action entails general macroeconomic stimulus or restraint, this type o f targeting procedure would tend to induce extra cyclical variability in demand conditions, which may imply extra variability in real output i f price-level stickiness prevails. Furthermore, variability in output and other real aggregative variables is probably more costly in terms o f human welfare than is an equal amount o f variability in the price level about a constant or slowly-growing path. Also, although it is not entirely clear that fully permanent shocks are predominant, most time-series analysis seems to suggest that the effects o f shocks are typically quite long lasting - indeed, are virtually indistinguishable from permanent. Consequently, it would seem desirable not to drive nominal variables back to preset paths - or at least not to do so quickly and frequently. Thus, it seems preferable to adopt a nominal target o f the growth-rate type, rather than the growing-levels type 28. One reason for the foregoing conclusion is that very few transactions are based on planning horizons as distant as 50 years. A more representative long-lasting arrangement might be more like 20 years in duration. But price-level uncertainty 20 years into the future might not be very large even i f the (log o f the) price level included a unit root component. Suppose that the log price level were to behave as a pure random walk relative to a preset target path (say, a zero-inflation path). Then i f it is assumed that the random, unpredictable component at the quarterly frequency has a standard deviation o f 0.0045 (which is approximately the standard deviation o f one-step ahead forecast errors for the U S A over 1954-1991) 29, it follows that a 95% confidence interval for the (log) price level 20 years ahead would be only about 8% (plus or minus) 3°. This, it seems to the writer, represents a rather small amount o f price level
27 Here and below the language will often be stated in terms of nominal variables such as nominal GDP or a price index when it is the natural logarithm of that variable that is actually meant. 28 For alternative argmnents that reach this conclusion, which is taken for granted by Feldstein and Stock (1994), see Fischer (1995) and Fillion and Tetlow (1994). The opposing position is taken by Hall and Mankiw (1994) and Svensson (1996) [but see footnote 8 above]. 29 Thus it is being tentatively assumed that the control error, if inflation targeting were adopted, would have a mean of zero and a variance equal to that of the currently-prevailing one-step-ahead forecast error, which might be taken as an approximation of the minimum feasible control error variance. 3o I am taking the control error to be serially lmcorrelated. Then the 80-period ahead error would have variance (80) (0.00452) -0.00162 whose square root is 0.040. Thus two standard deviations equals 0.08
Ch. 23." Issues in the Design of Monetary Policy Rules
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uncertainty - at least in comparison with the magnitudes that prevailed over the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, because of non-zero and uncertain trend rates. The foregoing argument seems moderately persuasive to the present writer, but it is clearly not compelling and the conclusion is certainly not accepted by all analysts. Furthermore, even if it were accepted, it might be possible to obtain the benefits of trend stationarity by adopting a target that is a weighted average of ones o f the growth-rate and growing-level types 31. Accordingly, in the simulations reported below, consideration will be given to growth-rate, growing level, and weighted average types. Now let us consider some points regarding the comparative merits of three leading target-variable possibilities. Because they seem at present to command the most support, we will discuss (i) the inflation rate, (ii) the growth rate o f nominal GDP, and (iii) the above-mentioned hybrid variable. As some notation will be useful, henceforth let xt, Yt, and Pt denote logs of nominal GDP, real GDP, and the price level (as represented by the deflator so that xt = Yt +Pt), with time periods referring to quarteryears. Then the three contending target variables in their simplest form are Apt, Act, and ht - A p t + 0.253~t, where yt - y t -j~t with )Tt denoting the reference value of real GDR In choosing among these three contenders, a straightforward approach would be to select the target variable that corresponds most closely to the central bank's views about social objectives that are influenced by monetary policy. From that perspective, it would appear that the hybrid variable ht might be the most appropriate of the three, a point o f view taken implicitly by Blinder (1996), with Axt arguably ranking second 32 But among actual central banks that have adopted formal numerical targets, virtually all have (as o f early 1997) opted for inflation targets. So apparently the straightforward approach is not the only one that needs to be considered. There are undoubtedly several reasons for this tendency for actual central banks to choose Apt over the others as their formal target, but three o f these seem justifiable and in any event deserve to be mentioned. First, it is believed by a large number of policymakers and a large number o f scholars that monetary policy has, from a
so a 95% confidence interval will have width roughly ±0.08 or ±8 percent. If the control error is serially correlated, then the relative effect of the unit root term will depend on the autocorrelation pattern but is likely to be more serious. 31 If used in a rule of form (3.1), this sort of weighted-average target would be equivalent to a pure growing-levels target with both "proportional" and "derivative" feedback. 32 The case for nominal income targeting is that it should, from a long-term perspective, provide almost as good inflation control as direct inflation targeting, since average real outpnt growth will be virtually independent of monetary policy and reasonably ~brecastable, while probably providing somewhat better automatic stabilization of real variables. About the latter advantage one cannot be certain, because of the absence of professional understanding mentioned in footnote 14. The basic logic of nominal income targeting applies, moreover, to other aggregative measures of nominal spending, not just to nominal GDP or GNP per se. The sharp criticism of nominal income targeting recently expressed by Ball (1997) is, it is argued below, fundamentally misguided.
1500
B.T. McCallum
long-rml perspective, no substantial effect on fit = Y t - ) S t 33. In other words, while monetary policy may have significant effects on output relative to capacity, these are only temporary. Therefore, so the argument goes, central banks should concentrate their attention on the Apt variable that their policy actions affect strongly on a longrun basis 34. Second, measurement of)Tt and therefore )~t is difficult and controversial, even in comparison to measurement o f Aps. We have described Yt as a capacity, trend, or reference value, but that does not define the appropriate variable even in conceptual terms, much less in operationally measurable terms 35. in particular, errors in measuring )Tt are likely to be much larger than errors in measuring the long-term average value o f Ayt, which is all that is necessary for correct design o f a Axt target. Thus the ht target is more demanding o f knowledge concerning the economy than is either o f the other contenders under discussion. The third reason is related to the other two, especially the first. It is that communication with the public is thought by practitioners to be much easier when only the inflation variable is involved. Typical citizens have an understanding o f the concept o f inflation, so the argument goes, but not o f the national income accounting concepts xt andyt, much less the reference value)Tt. In addition, it must be mentioned that in practice actual inflation targets are typically based on yearly average inflation rates, and with those values forecasted to prevail 1-2 years into the future 36. Since inflation forecasts are in practice based in part on recent levels or growth o f real output, the three target variables under consideration may be fairly closely related to each other. Furthermore, inflation targets are usually accompanied by provisions stating that the occurrence o f "supply shocks" - such as crop failures, terms-of-trade changes, or indirect tax-rate changes - will entail temporary modification o f the current inflation target measures. Thus, for example, the New Zealand legislation includes several such escape clauses - termed "caveats" that are built into the Reserve Bank's targeting procedures 37. Because o f considerations such as these, it would probably be unrealistic (and unreasonable) to expect that a truly compelling argument could be made for any one 33 This proposition, often termed the "natural rate hypotlaesis", is subscribed to by a large fraction of macroeconomic researchers. 34 This position is explicitly expressed by McCallum (1997a) and by Reserve Bank of New Zealand (1993). 35 In recent years there has been a tendency, most marked in media discussions but also present in professional literature, to speak as if "natural rate" and "NAIRU" conccpts and theories were equivalent. To the present writer that is far from being the case. The strict version of the natural rate hypothesis, due to Lucas (1972), is the proposition that there is no monetary policy that will keep output permanently high in relation to its natural rate (i.e., market clearing) value. By contrast, the NAIRU (non-acceleratinginflation rate of unemployment) approach posits a stable relationship between tmemployment (or output relative to its reference value) and the "acceleration" magnitude, i.e., the change in the inflation rate. But the latter implies that permanent acceptance of a positive acceleration magnitude (i.e., increasing inflation) will result in a permanent increase in output relative to its reference value, in stark contradiction to the natural rate hypothesis. 36 Of course the same sort of averaging could be applied to the Axt and h~ variables. 37 On this subject, see Reserve Bank of New Zealand (1993).
Ch. 23: Issues in the Design of Monetary Policy Rules'
1501
0.06 l
o.o4.1
t
0.02 -
0.00 -0.02.
-004
~ 60
_ 65
[--
~ 70
_ 75
80
~ 85
DLXGAP ....... DLPGAP . . . . .
90
95
ZERO I
Fig. 1. Gap measures for inflation and nominal GDP targets, 196~1995. of the candidate target measures. Consequently, it should be of interest to compare actual past values of the three leading measures with those values that would have been called for if corresponding targets had been in place. For the purpose of this exercise, it will be assumed that the desired value of Apt is 0.005, which amounts to approximately two percent inflation on an annual basis. Also, for simplicity it will be assumed that 37t values are given by deterministic trends obtained by regression ofyt on time for the sample period under consideration. This last assumption is unsatisfactory, of course - as will be discussed again - but should suffice for the limited purpose at hand of making comparisons. Let us first consider the time period 1960.1-1995.4, with United States GDP data used for xt and with Yt based on GDP in 1992 fixed-weight prices (i.e., using the fixedweight rather than the chain-weight deflator). Over this period, the 37t trend variable is given by the expression fit = 7.520749 + 0.006881t (with t = 1 in 1947.1). Therefore, Aft = 0.006881 is assumed and the target value for Axt is 0.011881, with 0.005 being the target value for both Apt and h , For each of the three variables we calculate the gap between actually observed values and these retrospective, hypothetical target values. These gaps are denoted Ap(gap)t - Apt - 0.005, Ax(gap)t = A& - 0.011881, and h(gap)t = Apt + 0.25yt- 0.005. Their values for the first two variables (over 1960.1-1995.4) are plotted in Figure 1 and those for the second and third are plotted in Figure 2. In Figure 1 we see that the Ap~ and Axt targets both suggest that monetary policy was excessively expansive most of the time between 1965 and 1989. The Ax(gap) measure is considerably more variable from quarter to quarter than the Ap(gap) measure, basically because Ayt is more variable than Apt. Averaging over the whole period, the two measures give the same signals simply because the A& target value was calculated
1502
B.T. McCallum 0.06
0.04
0.02
0,00
-0.02.
-0.0460
65 [
70
75
80
85
DLXGAP ....... HGAP . . . . .
90
95
ZERO]
Fig. 2. Gap measures for hybrid and nominal GDP targets, 1960-1995.
so as to yield the desired inflation rate given the realized average growth rate of output over the sample period, Of course, actual policymakers could not know this rate in advance, when choosing their target value for Axt. Thus desired inflation would tend to differ from the average realized value to the extent that average output growth is forecast incorrectly. The magnitude of this error would not be large, however, when averaged over long spans of time. By and large, a striking feature of Figure 1 is that the two target variables do not give greatly different signals when averaged over periods as short as 2-3 years. Nevertheless, there are a few quarters when the Axt variable suggests that policy should be loosened whereas the Apt variable suggests the opposite, and this situation prevails for over a year during 1990-1991. Those analysts who favor Axt targeting believe, of course, that keeping Axt values steady would result in smaller fluctuations in Yt than would a policy of keeping Ap~ values steady. Whether such is the case in fact will depend upon the precise nature of the economy's short-term, dynamic Phillips relation, a point emphasized in McCallum (1988, 1997a) 3s. Figure 2 compares gap values for ht and Axt targets. In this case there is much more divergence in signals, with the hybrid measure calling for more monetary expansion over lengthy periods during the early 1960s and 1990s, and tighter monetary policy during much of the 1970s, in. comparison with the zk~ct measure. (Of course both measures signal that policy was too inflationary from 1965-1989, as before.) These features of the plots in Figure 2 are basically a consequence of the fact that a linear trend line for yt implies negative residuals in the early 1960s and 1990s and many
3~ See fbotnote 14 above.
Ch. 23:
1503
Issues in the Design of Monetaly Policy Rules
0.06. 0.04. 0.02-
-0.02-
8'5' '86 '87 '88 I
DLXGAP85
89
90
91
92
93
..... HGAP85 . . . . .
94
95
ZERO]
Fig. 3. Gap measures for hybrid and nominal GDP targets, 1985 1995. positive residuals during the 1970s, which it does because o f the sustained period o f rapid growth in real G D P from 1960 to 1973. To emphasize this last point, Figure 3 gives results for the same type o f exercise but with the sample period limited to 1985.1-1995.4. Here it will be noted that the h(gap)t values are quite different from those for 1985-1995 in Figure 2, solely because the y~ trend line is estimated differently and yields a significantly different residual pattern 39. Now there are no major discrepancies that persist as long as in Figure 2, although the two measures give quite different policy signals over most o f 1990 and 1992, the Axt target calling for a relatively more expansionary monetary stance in the former year and a more restrictive stance in the latter year. The sizable difference between the h(gap)t figures shown in Figures 2 and 3 illustrates the main weakness o f the hybrid target variable, namely, its sensitivity to alternative calculations o f y t reference values. Proponents o f the hybrid variable might argue that more sophisticated measures o f f t should be used, and it is certainly true that our linear trends are not conceptually attractive. But neither are, say, HodrickPrescott (HP) filtered series, for reasons emphasized by Cogley and Nason (1995) plus a recognition o f what the HP filter would imply about US GNP for the period 1929-1939 4°. Other measures exist, but have attracted little professional support. In
39 It also has a reduced slope, which changes the definition of Ax(gap) to Axt 0.010336. 40 If the HP filter were applied to US real GNP over a period including 1929-1939, the HP "trend" series would turn down fairly sharply during the early 1930s. If this series were used as one's measme of trend or capacity output, it would then be concluded that the Great Depression was not very serious i.e., that output was low over 1932 1938 largely because capacity was low. But measured unemployment figures suggest strongly that this conclusion would be misleading.
B.T. McCallum
1504
0.06 . 0'04 t 0.024 0.00-
--7~, ~
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
-0,02-
'6's ....
7'0 ....
7'6 ....
6'0 ....
6'2 ....
9'0 ....
9's
DLXFGAP ....... DLPFGAP ..... ZERO] Fig. 4. Gap measures for inflation and nominal GDP values forecast 4 quarters ahead, 1960-1995. sum, there is no widely accepted and conceptually sound measure for f~, but use o f the hybrid target variable requires such a measure and its value is rather sensitive to the particular measure adopted. One weakness o f the indicators presented in Figures 1-3 is that they pertain to currently-measured values of the target gaps whereas in practice actual central banks focus upon gaps expected to prevail several months in the future. Also, Svensson (1997a) has argued rather convincingly that "inflation forecast targeting" has several attractive features. Consequently, indicators o f expected future gaps were obtained by regressing gap values on information variables observed 4 to 7 quarters in the past. The variables used in these regressions are Axt, Apt, Ab, and Rt (four lagged values o f each), where bt is the log of the monetary base and Rt is the 3-month Treasury bill interest rate. Also one lagged value o f fit was included; a second lagged value would create perfect collinearity among the regressors. Values o f these forecasted future gaps are presented in Figures 4 and 5, where the measures should be interpreted as giving policy signals one quarter in advance of the dates shown. Clearly, the values are smoothed greatly for zXxt and Apt, relative to the previous graphs, but the overall messages remain the same: that there is apparently little basis for choice between Axt and Apt while the ha indicator appears to give signals that are quite different. Recently, Ball (1997) has put forth, in rather strong language, some striking propositions regarding target variables 41. Among these are claims to the effect that efficient monetary policy 42 consists o f a special case o f a Taylor rule that is equivalent
41 Some of these have been noted favorably by Svensson (1997a,b). 42 The paper's concept of"efficient monetary policy" is one that focuses on the variances of inllation and output (relative to capacity) while assmning tmrealistically that the central bank has full contemporaneous
Ch. 23:
1505
Issues in the Design of Monetary Policy Rules
0.06 . 0.04 t 002
,,,
',
,:
",
" ~ , ' "~" i
0.00-"
;';
", , ,"~' ',', "\l L';, -^""
b'
,J -'V
-0.02
i , ,615 ....
7~0 ....
I --DLXFGAP
7~5 ....
810 ....
8~5 ~
90
95
....... HFGAP ..... ZERO]
Fig. 5. Gap measures for hybrid and nominal GDP values forecast 4 quarters ahead, 1961~1995. to a partial-adjustment variant of inflation targeting (even when output variance is important); that efficient monetary policy requires much stronger responses to output fluctuations than is implied by historical practice or Taylor's (1993b) suggested weights; and that nominal income targeting would be "disastrous" as it would give rise to non-trend-stationary behavior o f output and inflation processes. These results are shown to hold, however, only in a single theoretical model, with no attempt being made to determine their robustness. In fact, the last one depends sensitively upon details of the utilized model that are not justified either theoretically or empirically. The model's Phillips curve, in particular, has a superficial similarity in appearance to the Calvo Rotemberg specification as exposited by Roberts (1995), but differs by being backward rather than forward-looking. If a forward-looking version were utilized, the implied coefficient relating inflation to current output would have the opposite sign and Ball's instability result would be overturned, as it would be with several other prominent Phillips curve specifications,
5. Choice of i n s t r u m e n t variable In this section we consider the choice o f a variable to serve as the instrument through which a central bank's policy rule will be implemented. It is well known that, although a substantial number o f academic economists have favored use o f a monetary base or
knowledge of all variables (oil this, see Section 6 below)• Thus it simply assumes away thc first-order problem of designing an operational rule that will generate the desired mean value tbr :r~ while avoiding explosions.
1506
B. Z McCaHum
reserve aggregate instrument, almost all actual central banks utilize some short-term interest rate in that capacity. Before turning to a review o f their relative desirability, however, it will be appropriate to consider the sheer feasibility o f interest rate and monetary base instruments, since there are a few scholars who have contended that one or the other would be infeasible in some sense. In this category the most well-known argument is that of Sargent and Wallace (1975). That paper put forth the claim that, in a model in which all private agents are free of money illusion and form their expectations rationally, the economy's price level would be indeterminate if the central bank were to use an interest rate as its instrument. Specifically, the Sargent-Wallace (1975) paper included a result suggesting that if the interest rate Rt were set each period by means of a policy feedback rule that specifies Rt as a linear function o f data from previous periods, then all nominal variables would be formally indeterminate. Sargent (1979, p. 362) summarized this conclusion as follows: "There is no interest rate rule that is associated with a determinate price level. ''43 Subsequently, however, McCallum (1981, 1986, p. 148) showed that the SargentWallace claim was actually incorrect in such a model; instead, all nominal variables are fully determinate provided that the policy rule utilized for the interest rate instrument involves some nominal variable, as suggested previously by Parkin (1978) and in the classic static discussion of Patinkin (1961). The problem with the alleged proof o f Sargent and Wallace is that it showed that the model at hand imposed no terminal condition on the price level, but did not consider the possibility of an initial condition. In the present context it is important to distinguish between two quite different types of price-level behavior that have been referred to in the literature as involving "indeterminacy". Both involve aberrational price level behavior, but they are nevertheless very different both analytically and economically. Consequently, McCallum (1986, p. 137) proposed that they be referred to by terms that would recognize the distinction and thereby add precision to the discussion. The proposed terms are "nominal indeterminacy" and "solution multiplicity (or nonuniqueness)" 44, The former refers to a situation in which the model at hand fails for all nominal variables (i.e., variables measured in monetary units) to pin down their values. Thus money stock values and values o f (say) nominal income, as well as the price level, would not be defined by the model's conditions. Paths o f all real variables are nevertheless typically well defined. In terms of real-world behavior, such a situation could conceivably obtain
43 Sargent and Wallace (1982) advanced arguments quite different from those of their 1975 paper, and attributed this difference to their use in (1982) of a model with agents who solve explicit dynamic optimization problems, in contrast to the linear IS-LM model with a Lucas supply function in (1975). in fact, however, the main relevant difference is that the 1982 analysis is based on a model in which monetary and nonmonetary assets cannot be distinguished and hldeterminacy does not actually prevail in any case. On this, see McCallum (1986, pp. 144-154). An important recent contribution is Benassy (1999). 44 Actually,McCallam (1986) proposed "indeterminacy~ for the tormer, but the addition of the adjective is clearly desirable.
Ch. 23:
Issues in the Design of Monetary Policy Rules
1507
if the monetary authority failed entirely to provide a nominal anchor 45. This type of phenomenon has been discussed by Gurley and Shaw (1960), Patinkin (1949, 1961), Sargent (1979, pp. 360-363), Sargent and Wallace (1975), McCallum (1981, 1986), and Canzoneri, Henderson and Rogoff (1983), among others. Solution multiplicity, by contrast, refers to aberrational behavior usually described as involving "bubbles" or "sunspots" that affect the price level. In these situations it is typically the case that the path of the money stock - or some other nominal instrument controlled by the monetary authority - is perfectly well specified. Nevertheless, more than one path for the price level - often an infinity of such paths - will satisfy all the conditions of the model. In terms of real world behavior, arbitrary yet selfjustifying expectations is the source of this type of aberration. It has been discussed by a vast number of writers including Taylor (1977), Sargent and Wallace (1973), McCallum (1983), Brock (1975), Black (1974), Obstfcld and Rogoff (1983), and Flood and Hodrick (1990). Nominal indeterminacy is a static concept that concerns the distinction between real and nominal variables whereas solution multiplicity is an inherently dynamic concept involving expectations. An important application of this distinction is to the "indeterminacy" results of Brock (1975, pp. 144-147) and Woodford (1990, pp. 1119-1122). These results pertain to cases in which (base) money is manipulated by the central bank and involve non-uniqueness of rational expectations equilibria when the imposed money growth rates are low, close to the Chicago Rule rate that satiates agents with the transaction-facilitating services of money. But since these equilibria involve wellspecified paths of nominal money holdings, the non-uniqueness is clearly not of the nominal indeterminacy type. Instead, it is of the solution multiplicity type, involving price level bubbles or sunspots. Such theoretical multiplicities may or may not be of practical significance 46, but in any event are not examples of "price level indeterminacy" in the sense of Gurley and Shaw (1960), Patinkin (1949, 1961), S argent (1979, pp. 360-363), or Sargent and Wallace (1975). To some readers, this fact may diminish the force o f Woodford's (1990, 1994) argument in favor of an interest rate instrument. Let us now return to the issue of instrument feasibility, switching to the extreme opposite side of the debate. In a recent article, Goodhart (1994) has argued not just that monetary base control by a modern central bank is undesirable, but that it is essentially infeasible. In particular, Goodhart states that "virtually every [academic?] monetary economist believes that the CB can control the monetary base . . . " so that if the CB does not do so, then "it must be because it has chosen some alternative
45 And the system lacked sufficient inertia or money illusion to make the nominal paths determinate requirements that are actually almost inconceivable. 46 It is unclear whether there is any compelling evidence in support of tile notion that macroeconomic bubbles or stalspots are empirically relevant [Flood and Hochick (1990)]. In any event, it is a plausible hypothesis that, in cases with an infinity of solutions, there is a single bubble-free or fundamentals solution that obtains in practice.
1508
B.T. McCallum
operational guide for its open market operations" (p. 1424). But, he asserts, "almost all those who have worked in a CB believe that this view is totally mistaken; in particular it ignores the implications o f several o f the crucial institutional features o f a m o d e r n commercial b a n k i n g system, notably the n e e d for unchallengeable convertibility, at par, b e t w e e n currency and deposits, and secondly that commercial b a n k reserves at the CB receive a zero, or below-market, rate o f interest" [Goodhart (1994), p. 1424]. T h e n as the discussion proceeds it b e c o m e s clear that Goodhart is h i m s e l f taking a position that is predominantly, if n o t entirely, supportive o f the opinions o f those who have worked in a CB. Thus he asserts, o n his own account, that "if the CB tried to r u n a system o f m o n e t a r y base control, it would fail" (p. 1425). A n d he goes on to outline the putative flaws in logic or factual knowledge that invalidate the cited views o f academic economists (pp. 1424-1426). In fact, however, although Goodhart's discussion is apparently i n t e n d e d to be c o n c e r n e d with feasibility, the actual a r g u m e n t a t i o n presented pertains to desirability. Specifically, the m a i n analytical points are those made in the first three complete paragraphs o f p. 1425, which argue that tight base control would lead in practice to overnight interest rates that at the end o f most days would equal either the CB's penal rate or a value "near zero ''47. H a v i n g developed that point, Goodhart concludes as follows: "Some economists might prefer such a staccato pattern o f interest rates, b u t it would not seem sensible to practitioners" (p. 1425). But clearly this is an a r g u m e n t that pertains to the desirability, not the feasibility, o f tight base control 48 H a v i n g concluded, then, that neither interest rate nor m o n e t a r y base i n s t r u m e n t s are infeasible 49, we turn to the task o f considering their relative desirability 5°. In that
47 If required-reserve averaging is practiced, then the statements referred to pertain only to days near the end of reserve maintenance periods. 48 More extensive but still inconclusive arguments are presented by Whittaker and Theunissen (1987) and Okina (1993). The latter presumes lagged reserve requirements, an arrangement that is inappropriate with a base instrument [McCallum (1985)]. 49 A different objection to use of a base instrument is that central batiks do not literally control the stun of currency and reserves, since currency is demand determined and only the non-borrowed component of total reserves is directly controlled, since banks can use the discount window to add to or subtaact from reserve holdings. But there are three flaws with this position. First, since the base can be read from the CB's own balance sheet, it can observe it frequently and make whatever adjustments are needed to keep the magnitude closer to its target. Second, the CB could, if it chose, close the discount window. Third, it would be possible to consider the non-borrowed base as the instrument under discussion. s0 Brief mention should be made of a study by Howitt (1992), who finds that an interest rate peg would lead to dynamic instability in a model that includes a sticky-price Phillips curve and a generalized adaptive form of dynamic "learning behavior" rather than rational expectations. Whether or not one finds the latter feature appealing, Howitt's results do not pertain to the issue at hand since the type of "pegging" that he is concerned with involves keeping Rt at some preset value indefinitely, not varying Rt period by period in an instrument capacity. Several writers have shown that, under rational expectations, nominal indeterminacy does not prevail with an interest rate peg. Canzoneri, Henderson and Rogoff (1983) and McCallum (1986) have established this in models of the IS-LM-AS type under the assumption that the peg is a limiting version of a money supply rule designed to reduce interest rate fluctuations.
Ch. 23." Issues in the Design of Monetary Policy Rules
1509
regard, m o s t proponents o f a base instrument do not deny that such a r e g i m e w o u l d involve substantially m o r e variability o f short-term interest rates than is e x p e r i e n c e d under today's typical procedures, w h i c h involve interest-rate instruments and shortterm interest rate smoothing 51. B a s e proponents w o u l d contend, however, that with a base instrument it m a y be possible to design simple p o l i c y rules that are m o r e effective f r o m a m a c r o e c o n o m i c perspective than are c o m p a r a b l e rules with interestrate instruments 52, 53. In order to illustrate the plausibility o f that contention, let us consider s o m e counterfactual historical simulations o f the general type u s e d by M c C a l l u m (1988, 1993a, 1995a) with quarterly U S data. In order to keep the m o d e l specification from biasing the results, the m a c r o e c o n o m e t r i c m o d e l in these simulations will be an unconstrained V A R w i t h four lags included for each o f the four variables Ayt, Apt, Abt, and Rt 54 H e r e Rt is the t h r e e - m o n t h treasury bill rate, bt is the log o f the St. Louis Fed adjusted m o n e t a r y base, and G N P data is utilized for Yt and Pt. The estimation and s i m u l a t i o n p e r i o d is 1954.1-1991.4. We have seen above that there has not b e e n a large discrepancy, historically, between signals p r o v i d e d by Ax~ and Apt targets, when the target values are gauged so as to imply the s a m e average inflation rate. Accordingly, let us concentrate our attention on rules for Abt and Rt designed to keep xt close to three target paths, all o f w h i c h provide e x p e c t e d Axe, values o f 0.01125 ( i . e , approximately 4.5 n o m i n a l G N P growth per year,
Woodford (1990, 1994) and Sims (1994) extend tlfis type of result to a "pure peg" and conduct their analysis in general equilibrium models with explicit optimization on the part of individual agents. 51 The concept of interest rate smoothing that I have in mind is keeping R~ close to Rt 1, but there is no major conflict here with concepts such as a tendency to minimize E(Rt-Et iRt)2 [Goodfriend (1987)]. 52 The reason why design of a simple interest rate rule may be more difficult stems fxom the ambiguity of nominal interest rates as indicators of monetary tightness or ease. High interest rates, that is, are associated with tight monetary policy from a short-run or point-in-time perspective, but with loose monetary policy from a long-ran (i.e., maintained) perspective. This means that the interest rate effects of an open market action are in opposite directions ~?omshort-term and long-term perspectives. Accordingly, the design of a policy rule for the control of target variables would seem to be more complex and dynamically delicate if an interest rate is the instrument variable than if a nominal quantity variable serves in that capacity. 53 One objection to use of a base instrument lbr the USA is that much of the currency component of the base - which is by far the larger component - is believed to be held outside the comatry. Recently, Jefferson (1997) has indicated that use of only that portion held in the country [as estimated by Porter and Judson (1996)] alters the estimated relationship between the base and nominal GDR and yields improved base-rule simulation results for the period 1984-1995. 54 The use of an unconstrained VAR is undesirable because such a model is almost certainly not policy invariant. However, the small "structural models" used in McCallum (1988) are biased in favor of the base instrument because the real monetary base (and no interest rate) appears as an explanatory variable in these models' common aggregate demand relation. In Hess, Small and Brayton (1993), by contrasi, the small macro model discussed on pp. 1 4 ~ t might be considered to be biased in favor of an interest rate instrument. The author hopes to conduct simulations with a more appropriate model in the near future.
1510
B. Z M c C a l l u m
designed to yield 2.0 percent inflation). These three paths will be of the growth-rate, growing level, and weighted average types. For the monetary base instrument, the rule to be considered is
Abt = 0 . 0 1 1 2 5 - ~ ( x t
1 - b t 1 - x t 17+bt 17)-t-/~(x] 1 - x t 1),
(5.1)
where ,~ > 0 is a policy adjustment parameter and the target variable x; can be defined in various ways 55. To yield a growing-levels target, we would have x 21 = xt11 + 0.01125 whereas a growth-rate version would use instead x23 = xt 1 + 0.01125. Besides these, we will consider x[ 2 = 0.2x] l + 0.8x)"3, where the weights are chosen semi-arbitrarily but so as to give more importance to the growth-rate target. According to the policy rule (5.1), monetary base growth is set in each quarter so as to equal the target value for nominal GNP growth minus average base velocity growth over the past four years 56, plus a cyclical correction term that reacts to past target misses. Note that x~31-&l =(xt2+0.01125)-x*l
.... 0.01125
A&.I
and that x;21 x,-1 = 0.2(x~ll
x , q ) + 0.8(0.01125-zZv, 1)
= 0.2(Xtll-Xt 1)+ 0"8(z~Xt 1 --/~Ct 1) so that use of x22 is equivalent to having a growing-levels target but using derivative as well as proportional feedback, in the terminology o f Phillips (1954). So as to obtain some indication of robustness to rule specification, a range of ;. values from 0 to 1 will be examined. For the interest instrument rule, no velocity growth term is needed so the comparable rule can be expressed as Rt = Rt-I -
100~.(x2
1 - xt-I).
(5.2)
Thus, the value of the interest rate instrument is lowered relative to the previous quarter when target spending x; exceeds the actual level in the previous quarter. The - 1 0 0 factor is inserted so as to make the same range o f )~ values as in Equation (5.1)
55 This is the type of rule studied in McCallmn (1988, 1993a, 1995a). 56 The velocity connection term serves implicitly as a forecast of the average growth rate of base velocity over the indefinite future, i.e., the long-lasting component of velocity growth that is due to institutional change (not growth due to cyclical effects, which are accounted for in the third telan). More sophisticated methods of forecasting the permanent component of both velocity growth and real output growth would be used in practice by actual central banks.
Ch. 23." Issues in the Design of Monetary Policy Rules
1511
Table 1 RMS errors with base/interest instruments, rules (5.1) and (5.2), VAR Model, US Data 1954.1-1991.4 ~ = 0.00
3.=0.25
Ni 1
0.0503 1.153
0.0235 expl a
0.0376 expl
expl expl
x~2
0.0133 0.2415
0.0ll3 expl
0.0184 expl
expl expl
x~3
0.0097 0.0184
0.0112 expl
0.0188 expl
expl expl
x~ I
0.0503 1.153
0.0284 0.0619
0.0232 0.0381
0.0201 0.0254
x~2
0.0133 0.2415
0.0109 0.0155
0.0106 0.0123
0.0114 0.0147
x~3
0.0097 0.0184
0.0100 0.0105
0.0105 0.0107
0.0118 0.0142
RMS error relative to:
~ = 0.50
,~= 1.00
Panel A: x~ 1 target
Panel B: x2 2 target
Panel C: x~ 3 target
x~J
0.0503 1.153
0.0418 0.3321
0.0361 0.t825
0.0292 0.0959
x~'2
0.0133 0.2415
0.0123 0.0680
0.0117 0.0378
0.0116 0.0217
x~3
0.0097 0.0184
0.0099 0.0104
0.0102 0.0100
0.0111 0.0123
a expl, explosive oscillations.
a p p r o p r i a t e a g a i n 57. T h e s a m e trio o f x~ definitions is e m p l o y e d as with the b a s e instrument. Table 1 r e p o r t s results o f c o u n t e r f a c t u a l h i s t o r i c a l s i m u l a t i o n s e a c h u s i n g rule (5.1) or (5.2) w i t h V A R e q u a t i o n s for Ayt, Apt, a n d e i t h e r Rt or A b , In these, e s t i m a t e d r e s i d u a l s for Aye, Ap~, a n d e i t h e r Rt or Abt are f e d into the s y s t e m as e s t i m a t e s o f s h o c k s that o c c u r r e d historically, w i t h the s i m u l a t i o n s b e g i n n i n g w i t h initial c o n d i t i o n s
57 The factor 100 is needed because R/ is expressed in tern~ls of percentage points whereas Ab~ is in logarithmic (i.e., fractional) units. Comparability is not complete, however, because R t is measured as percentage points on a per annum basis. Use of -400 as the scale factor would, however~ result m dynamically unstable behavior for most 3~values over 0.25.
B.T. McCallum
1512
as o f 1954.1 and running for 152 periods 5s. The table's entries are RMS errors, i.e., deviations o f xt from target values x~, with the top figure in each pair pertaining to the Abt instrument and the bottom figure to the Rt instrument. The three panels A, B, and C refer to simulations with the three target values (x2 l, x~ 2, x~3), and for each simulation the RMS error performance is reported relative to each o f the three target paths. Thus, we are able to see if performance relative to alternative criteria is sensitive to the target utilized, for each o f the targets. Comparing the three panels we see that when tile levels target is used (with only proportional feedback) performance is very bad with the Rt instrument, explosive fluctuations in xt resulting with ,~ = 0.25, 0.5, and 1.0. Even with the base instrument, the levels target does not perform too well and leads to instability when ;~ = 1.0. With = 0.25, somewhat better performance relative to the xj'1 target path obtains than when x~ 2 or x~3 is the target, but the difference is not large. Panel C, by contrast, shows that when the pure growth rate target xt 3 is adopted, successful stabilization o f x~ is achieved for all )~ values with both instruments. Performance relative to the growing levels path x; 1 is much better in Panel B with the x; 2 target, however, and brings about very little deterioration in performance relative to the pure growth rate criterion (i.e., the x; 3 path). Accordingly, the weighted average criterion xt 2 seems quite attractive, as was noted for Japan in McCallum (1993a). Equivalently, application o f a limited amount o f proportional as well as derivative feedback is evidently desirable 59 As for the comparison between monetary base and interest rate instruments, the results in Table 1 are distinctly more favorable to the former. In only one o f 30 separate comparisons 6° is the R M S error value smaller with the Rt instrument 61. And, more significantly, the number o f cases in which explosive oscillations result is larger with the interest instrument. These cases, should be noted, all involve the growing-levels target, xt ~. Some proponents o f an interest instrument might argue that it is important that Rt be adjusted relative to a reference level, rather than to the previous quarter's value. Following the practice o f Taylor (1993b), therefore, let us also consider performance o f a rule o f the following type:
R t = 10010.029 + (Pt 1 --Pt 5)] - 100~(xt-1 -xt-1).
(5.3)
s8 Stochastic simulations, with shocks generated randomly, have been conducted by Judd and Motley (t992) in a related study mentioned below in Section 6. 59 Judd and Morley's (1992) findings with regard to the use of some proportional control are less encouraging, evidently because their mixture is more heavily weighted toward proportional control. Also, they do not consider performance relative to the x*lt path when x*2~ is the target utilized. 60 Note that the first-colurrm cases are the same with the three different targets, since with ~ - 0 there is no feedback from target misses. (,I Michael Wood~brd has emphasized to me that there is no inherent interest in comparing base and interest instruments with equal values of k; that we want to compare entire families. These comments are correct. But Table 1 attempts to do that by scaling the 3, values - recall that the factor -100 has been inserted in Equation (5.2) - so that instrument instability occurs for about the same value of (scaled))~.
1513
Ch. 23: Issues' in the Design o f Monetary Policy Rules
Table 2 RMS errors with level-style interest instruments, rule (5.3), VAR Model, US Data 1954.1-1991.4 = 0.00
3,= 0.25
x~ x~,2 x~3
0.3825 0.0809 0.0118
0.1541 0.0326 0.0104
x~l x~2 x~3
0.3825 0.0809 0.01 t 8
0.2996 0.0630 0.0111
RMS error relative to:
2~- 0.50
2 - 1.00
Panel A: x~ 1 target
0.0915 0.0208 0.0108
0.0551 0.0169 0.0143
0.24l 6 0.0507 0.0110
0,1702 0.0366 0.0129
Panel B: x; z target
Panel C: x~ 3 target
x~t x~2 x~3
0.3825 0.0809 0.0118
0.3687 0.0780 0.0118
0.3559 0.0754 0.0120
0.3328 0.0711 0.0153
Here the (p~_j pt 5) term uses the past year's inflation rate as a forecast o f the next quarter's so as to make the rule one that sets a real interest rate in relation to the (annualized) target value o f 0.029, which is designed to be consistent with a long-run real interest rate o f 2.9 percent. The latter follows Taylor's (1993b, p. 202) suggestion of using the sample average rate o f growth o f real output. The feedback term is as before. Results are presented in Table 2 for cases using rule (5.3) that are exactly analogous to those in Table 1. |t will be seen that the performance is better than with interest instrument rule (5.2) for all 12 comparisons when x~ 1 is the target, i.e., when a levels target is utilized. A m o n g the 18 remaining comparisons, however, rule (5.3) outperforms (5.2) in only a single case. So, it is unclear whether the levels form o f interest instrument rule is superior to the form that calls for adjustment of R~ relative to the previous quarter's value. In comparison to the base instrument, rule (5.3) avoids the explosive outcome in the case in which 3, = 1 and the levels target x~ 1 is used, and also does better relative to the x23 path in two more cases (with the levels target). But for all cases in which the growth rate target x~ 3 or the weighted average target x/" is used, the R M S error is larger with rule (5.3) than with (5.1) - and is substantially larger when the criterion path is either x~ 1 or x~2. It must be emphasized that the foregoing is just a single illustration, not a study purporting to be conclusive - especially since the model used is o f the VAR t y p e
1514
B.T.. M c C a l l u m
Nevertheless, the apparent superiority o f the base instrument gives rise to the question o f why it is that, in actual practice, almost all central banks utilize operating procedures that are akin to use o f an interest rate instrument. It is almost certainly the case that use o f a base instrument would entail more short-term interest rate variability, but it is unclear that this would have any substantial social costs 62. One hypothesis is that interest rate instruments and interest rate smoothing are practiced because financial communities dislike interest variability and many central banks cater to the wishes o f financial institutions with which they have to work in the course o f their central-banking duties. The extent o f interest-instrument preference by CBs suggests, however, that there are additional reasons. Accordingly, Goodfriend (1991) and Poole (199l) have made interesting efforts to understand the Fed's attachment to an interest rate instrument. Despite their contribution o f various insights, however, the question remains unanswered 63. M y own thoughts on the subject suggest two intelligible reasons for a CB to prefer a R~ instrument, one having to do with beliefs concerning possible instrument instability and the other involving the CB's role as a lender o f last resort. Regarding the former, consider a grossly simplified base money demand function that includes lagged as well as current interest rates: bz = ao + a l R t + (x2Rt ] + th,
6It < O.
(5.4)
Here the absence o f price level and income/transaction variables reflects the presumption that their movements are slow in comparison to those of bt and Rt 64. N o w suppose that the CB were to manage bf exogenously 65. Then Rt will behave as R~ -- [30 + [3 t Rt 1 + [32 rh + [~3
(bt determinants),
(5.5)
where/31 = - a 2 / a l . Thus, if a2 < 0, there will be oscillations in Rt. More importantly, if la2t > lal I, then the system will be explosive. B e l i e f that market demand for the monetary base is such that la21 > la~ I represents the actual state of affairs would then lead one to believe that use o f a base instrument would be disastrous, as suggested by Goodhart. And, in fact, there is some reason to
(,2 Between 19'75 and 1987 the Swiss National Bank used procedures that were akin to use of a base instrument. [See Rich (1987, pp. 11-13).] Short-term interest rate variability in Switzerland was much greater than in other economies, but macroeconomic performance was excellent. (In 1987 there were two major institutional changes, involving new required-reserve structures and a new clearing system, that seriously disrupted monetary control and resulted in altered operating procedures.) 63 It is possible that Goodhart's (t 994) belief, that a base instrument would be infeasible, is shared by many central bankers. But why? One possible reason is developed in the next two paragraphs. 64 This simplification should not be misleading for the purposes at hand, although it would be ~5tal for many other issues. In Equation (5.4), th is a stochastic disturbance term. 65 Here l do not literally mean exogenous, but rather that bt is varied for macroeconomic reasons, not so as to s m o o t h R t values.
Ch. 23: Issues in the Design of Monetary Policy Rules
1515
think that such beliefs might be held by central bankers. In particular, econometric estimates o f base money demand functions (direct or indirect) sometimes indicate that la2l > la~l in fact. Central bank analysts would be aware o f these estimates. My own belief is that it is not true that fa2 ] > ]ctl [ holds in reality, for time periods of one month or longer, so that the posited CB attitude is unjustified. 66 But it could be prevalent, nevertheless, even if my belief is correct. A second intelligible reason for CB interest instrument preference concerns the lender-of-last-resort (LLR) role. That role is to prevent financial crises that involve sharply increased demands for base money [Schwartz (1986), Goodfriend and King (1988)]. To prevent such crises, the CB needs to supply base money abundantly in times o f stress [Bagehot (1873)]. This is usually conceived o f as occurring by the route o f discount-window lending. But Goodfriend and King pointed out that a policy involving interest rate smoothing i.e., not allowing R: to change much relative to Rt t - would amomatically provide base money in times o f high demand 67. Then if a CB is going to practice R~ smoothing it is quite natural for it to use a R~ instrument 6s. This last discussion leads one to consider the possibility o f using an interest rate instrument - and smoothing its movements at a high frequency (e.g., weekly) so as to keep monetary base values close to target levels implied by a policy rule such as (5.1). The motivation, of course, is the notion that quarterly base rules seem to function better macroeconomically than interest rules. The preliminary investigation in McCallum (1995a) attempts to study this question while accounting realistically and in quantitative terms for shock variances and market responses in the US economy. The results suggest that the federal funds rate could be manipulated weekly to approximate monetary base values that are designed to hit desired quarterly-average nominal GNP targets, with considerable smoothing o f the funds rate on a weekly basis (only about twice as much weekly variability as now obtains).
6. Issues concerning research procedures In this section consideration will be given to a number o f issues concerning procedures used in investigations of the properties o f monetary policy rules. One set of issues has to do with the operationality of various rule specifications while another set focuses
G6 In part my belief stems from the fact that for base demand in period t the value ofR t 1 is an irrelevant bygone, so Rt 1 does not belong in a properly specified demand function. There are reasons, involving omission of expectational variables, why econometric studies would nevertheless tend to find strong R~ ~ effects. On this, see McCallum (1985, pp. 583 585). 67 As would a practice of keeping R~ from rising above some preset penal rate. 68 Goodfriend (1991, p. 15) and Poole (1991, pp. 37-39) observe, however, that this is not a stricl logical necessity. Also, many actual CBs apparently do not accept the Goodfriend-King argument that the LLR role can be fulfilled by Rt smoothing without discount-window lending.
1516
B. Z McCallum
on the types of simulations used to generate model outcomes. Regarding the latter, a weakness of the simulation results reported above in Section 5, and also those in McCallum (1988, 1993a, 1995a), is that they are based on simulation exercises with a single set of shock values, i.e., shocks estimated to have occurred historically. As explained by Taylor (1988) and Bryant et al. (1993), there are several advantages to be obtained by using true stochastic simulations with a large number of shock realizations generated by random selection from (multivariate) distributions that have covariance properties like those of the historical shock estimates. The studies of Judd and Motley (1991, 1992) for example, improve upon those of McCallum (1988) by conducting "experiments" each of which consists of 500 stochastic simulations with a given model, policy rule, and policy parameter values, rather than a single simulation with the historical residuals used as shocks. One obvious advantage of stochastic simulations over historical counterfactuals is that they avoid the possibility that the historical residuals happen to possess some particular quirk that makes performance unrepresentative for the shock moments being utilized. Another advantage is that sample-mean values of shocks may not equal zero, as they must by construction in the case of historical residuals. This feature is especially important in considering the consequences of rules that feature difference stationarity (rather than trend-stationarity) of nominal variables. The residual values used as shocks in the simulations in Tables 1 and 2, for example, sum to zero for each equation's shock tenn. Thus the extent of a tendency for xt (say) to drift away from a levels target path such as xt 1 is understated by the results in those tables 69. Bryant et al. (1993, pp. 373-375) suggest that, in addition, stochastic simulations are helpful from a robustness perspective. Perhaps the most ambitious project undertaken to date on the characteristics of alternative monetary policy rules is the Brookings-sponsored study reported in Bryant et al. (1993). In this study, which is a follow-up to Bryant et al. (1988), eight prominent modeling groups (or individuals) reported on policy rule simulation exercises conducted with the following multicountry models: GEM, INTERMOD, MSG, MX3, MULTIMOD, MPS, LIVERPOOL, and TAYLOR. These studies were designed to explore the macroeconomic consequences of adopting different target variables for monetary policy, with contenders including nominal GDP (in levels form) and the hybrid variable discussed above in Section 4, as well as monetary aggregates and the exchange 'rate. Most impressively, the conference organizers took pains to arrange for the various modeling groups all to consider the same range of policy alternatives, thereby creating the possibility of obtaining results that would gain m credibility as a consequence of being relatively robust to model specification. At the strategic level of research design, therefore, this Brookings project possessed the potential for contributing greatly to knowledge concerning the design of monetary
69 Understated, but not entirely absent; thne plots of xt hldicate the absence of any path-restoring behavior except toward the end of the 152-quartersimulation (and sample) period.
Ch. 23: lssues in the Design of Monetary Policy Rules
1517
and fiscal policy rules (even in the face of potential weaknesses of the models' specifications). It is argued in McCallum (1993b, 1994), however, that this potential was significantly undermined by the particular generic form of policy rule specified for use by all the modeling groups. The alleged problem is that the rule form permits rule specifications that are not operational and, in addition, suggests performance measures that can be seriously misleading. The rule form in question, which has also been used in several other studies, may be written as Rt - Rbt
=/l(zt
- z~),
(6.1)
where Rt is an interest rate instrument and zt is a target variable such as nominal GDP. Here the "b" superscripts designate baseline reference paths for the variables, baseline paths that may be defined differently by different investigators. Also, the performance of various targets is evaluated by measures such as E[(zt - - Z bt ~~2 l J, which pertain to target variable(s) for the rule and perhaps also other criterion variables. In terms of operationality there are two problems with this rule form (6.1)7o. The more obvious is that it is unrealistic to pretend that monetary policymakers can respond to the true value of current-period realizations of zt for several leading specifications of the latter. It is reasonable to assume that contemporaneous observations are available for interest rates, exchange rates, or other asset-market prices. It would be unreasonable, however, to make such an assumption for nominal or real GDP (or GNP) or the price level. One could make arguments pro and con in the case of monetary aggregates such as M1 or M2, but in the case of national-income values, data are not produced promptly enough for actual central bankers to respond to movements without an appreciable lag. Ignoring that lag, as is done throughout the Bryant et al. (1993) studies, clearly makes it possible for the simulated performance to be significantly better than could be obtained in reality. Furthermore, simulations that ignore this lag also intend to understate the danger of instrument-induced instability, a bias that is quite important because instrument instability is one of the most serious dangers to be avoided in the design of a policy rule. The second and less obvious way in which rules like (6.1) are not operational involves the baseline values R ) and z ). ttere the problem is that an actual policymaker could not implement any rule of form (6.1) without knowledge of these reference paths. But by definition these paths may be related to each other by the model being investigated, so the policy rule is model-specific and therefore of reduced interest to a practical policymaker. In terms of misleading performance measures, the problem is that the instrumem variable under consideration may be one that can be used to smooth out fluctua~ tions in zt but not to control the long-term growth o f z , Then by using fluctuations in z,
70 It should be noted favorablythat the instrument variable is operational and realistic.
1518
B. 717.McCallurn
relative to the baseline path z b in a performance measure like E [ ( z t - - z b ) 2 ] , the investigator may conclude that Rt is a desirable instrument when in fact it is highly unsuitable 71. Another type of nonoperationality involves the specification of instrument variables that would, in actual practice, be infeasible in this capacity. Broad monetary aggregates such as M2 or M3 would seem clearly to fall into this category and, under typical current institutional arrangements, probably the same applies to variants of M1. Studies that pretend that such variables are feasible instrument have declined in frequency in recent years, as the practice of specifying an interest instrument has gained in popularity [e.g., Taylor (1993a), Bryant et al. (1993), Fuhrer and Moore (1995)]. Objections based on the operationality criterion have been directed at rules that use nominal GDP or GNP targets, even when these rules refer only to values lagged by at least one quarter. The point is that national income statistics are not produced often enough or quickly enough, and are significantly revised after their first release. But this criticism seems misguided since the essence of nominal income targeting is to utilize some rather comprehensive measure of aggregate (nominal) spending; the variable does not need to be GDP or GNP p e r se. Other measures could readily be developed on the basis of price and quantity indices that are reported more often and more promptly -in the USA, for example, one could in principle use the product of the CPI and the Fed's industrial production index (both of which are published monthly). It might even be possible to develop a monthly measure that is more attractive conceptually than GDP, by making the price index more closely tailored to public perceptions of inflation and/or by using a quantity measure that treats government activity more appropriately.
7. Interactions with fiscal policy The relationship between monetary and fiscal policy has been quite an active topic recently, possibly in part as a response to the magnitude and duration of fiscal deficits experienced in many developed countries and/or to controversies concerning proposed fiscal rules for the planned European monetary union. It is obviously impossible to discuss in this chapter all of the many ramifications of monetary/fiscal policy interactions, but it seems important to recognize some recent arguments which suggest that it is necessary, or at least desirable, for the monetary authority to take account of fiscal policy behavior when designing its monetary policy rule 72. Such a recommendation is implicitly critical of the policy rules discussed in previous sections and runs counter to the spirit of much current central-bank thinking, as expressed for example in the practice of inflation targeting. Consequently, three strands of literature will be considered. :1 Some examples are described in McCallum (1994). 72 Among these contributions are papers by Alesina and Tabellini (1987), Debelle and Fischer (1995), Leeper (1991), Sims (1994, 1995), and Woodford (1994, 1995).
Ch. 23: Issues in the Design of Monetary Policy Rules
1519
An early paper on the subject that has received a great deal of attention is the Sargent and Wallace (1981) piece entitled "Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic". As many readers will be aware, that paper's principal contention was that an economy's monetary authority cannot prevent inflation by its own control of base money creation if an uncooperative or irresponsible fiscal authority behaves so as to generate a continuing stream of primary fiscal deficits 73. Whether the central bank has control over inflation is viewed as depending upon, in the words of Sargent and Wallace (1981, p. 7), "which authority moves first, the monetary authority or the fiscal authority. In other words, who imposes discipline on whom?" Having posed the problem in that way, the Sargent-Wallace paper then goes on to suggest that it might well be the fiscal authority that dominates the outcome. In fact, however, the paper's analysis proceeds by simply assuming that the fiscal authority dominates, an assumption that is implicit in the procedure of conducting analysis with an exogenously given path of primary deficits. Proceeding in that fashion, the Sargent-Wallace paper seems to show that even a determined central bank could be forced by a fiscal authority to create base money along a path that is inflationary when a non-inflationary path is intended. It is argued by McCallum (1990a, pp. 984-985), however, that this suggestion is unwarranted. It is of course true that fiscal authorities may be able to bring political pressure to bear on central banks in ways that are difficult to resist. But the SargentWallace analysis is not developed along political lines; instead it seems to invite the reader to conclude that a politically independent central bank could be dominated in some technical sense by a stubborn fiscal authority. My basis for disputing this is that an independent central bank is technically able to control its own path of base money creation, but fiscal authorities cannot directly control their own primary deficit magnitudes. The reason is that deficits are measures of spending in excess of tax collections, so if a fiscal authority embarks on a tax and spending plan that is inconsistent with the central bank's (perhaps non-inflationary) creation of base money, it is the fiscal authority that will have to yield. Why? Simply because in this circumstance, it will not have the purchasing power to carry out its planned actions 74. In other words, the fiscal authority does not actually have control over the instrument variable - the deficit - that it is presumed to control in the Sargent-Wallace experiment. Thus a truly determined and independent monetary authority can always have its way, technically speaking, in monetary versus fiscal conflicts. This simple point is one tha~ seems to the author to be of great importance in the design of central bank institutions. The point is also intimately related to a quite recently developed body of theorizing that takes a strongly "fiscalist" stance, leading examples of-which include Woodford
73 The result pertains to primary deficits, i.e., deficits exclusive of interest payments, but not to deficits measured in the conventional interest-inclusive way. 74 This is directly implied by the government's budget constraint which limits purchases to revenue raised by taxes, net bond sales, and base money creation. In this regard it should be recognized that the government cannot compel pfivatc agents to buy its bonds (i.e., lend to it), since such would represent taxation.
1520
B.77 McCallum
(1994, 1995), Sims (1994, 1995), and Leeper (1991). Perhaps the most dramatic theme in this literature is the presentation o f a "fiscal theory o f the price level" [Woodford (1995, pp. 5-13), Sims (1994)]. For an introductory exposition and analysis, let us consider the simplest case, which involves a Sidrauski-BrockT5 model with constant output y and utility function u(ct, mr)+ [3u(ct+l, m r + t ) + . . , with u ( c , m ) = (1 - a ) - I A l c 1-~ + (1 - rl) IA2ml-rl, where a, , / > 0 and fi = 1/(1 + p ) with p > 0. Also we assume t / < 1, in order to facilitate presentation o f the fiscalist theory, not the counter-argument outlined subsequently. In this setup, the households' firstorder conditions include mt+l _ A R 1/8 Pt+l t , 1 P, 1
l + R, - / 3 P, '
A =
R, > 0
(7.1)
(7.2)
for all t = l, 2 . . . . . Here Pt is the money price o f output, Mt is nominal money at the start o f period t, mt = M t / P , ca is consumption during t, and R¢ is the rate o f interest on government bonds, the household's budget constraint being Pt(Y
vt) - Ptct + Mt+l - M t + (1 + Rt)-I Bt+l _ Bt '
(7.3)
where vt is lump-sum taxes and Bt is the nominal stock o f bonds at the end o f t. In per-household terms, the government budget constraint with zero purchases is - P t v t = Mt+j - M r + (1 + Rt) 1Bt+l - B~,
(7.4)
so vt is the per-household value o f the fiscal surplus. If the government chooses time paths for M t and vt (or Bt), then Equations (7.1)-(7.4) give equilibrium values for ct, Pt, Rt, and Bt (or vt) provided that two transversality conditions are satisfied, these requiring that [3tMt/Pt and [3tB/pt approach zero as t---+ oo. Note that Equations (7.3) and (7.4) imply ct = y , the constancy o f which is utilized in formulations (7.1) and (7.2). Following the fiscalist argument v6, now suppose that the value o f Mr is kept constant at M and that vt = v > 0 for all t = 1, 2 . . . . . Then the price level is determined as follows. The GBR can be written as
b._, = (1 +RO
[b,-v~] = B1 b , - l
(7.5)
implying that bt = B,/P~ will explode as t ~ o c , since 1/fi > l, unless it is the case that B1/P1 = o/(1 -/~), which would induce bt to remain constant at the level bt = v / ( l [3) 75 That is, a model in which infinite-lived households with time-separablc preferences makc their decisions in a optimizing fashion and interact with each other and the government (monetary authority and fiscal authority) on competitive markets. Woodford's (1995) version of the model, and ours, does not include capital goods but that feature of the setup is not relevant to the issues at hand. 76 I am indebted to Michael Woodford for special efforts to explain the argumcnt to me, bm lie is certainly not responsible for the point of view expressed here.
Ck. 23: Issues in the Design of MonetalT Policy Rules
1521
thereafter. Therefore, so the theory says, PI = B1 (l -/3)/v is determined by the fiscal surplus magnitude v and the initial stock of nominal debt B1. At the same time, Equations (7.1) and (7.2) imply a difference equation relating Pt+~ to Pt in an unambiguously explosive fashion, starting from P1, provided that PI exceeds a critical value Pc. That explosion in Pt makes M / P t approach zero and so, with bt constant, both transversality conditions are satisfied although Bt is exploding. Thus the fiscal theory of the price level asserts that with a constant money stock and constant fiscal surplus, the price level explodes as time passes, starting from a level that is directly related to the size of the pre-existing nominal bond stock and to the magnitude of the maintained surplus. No other path could be an equilibrium because it would imply an exploding bt, which would violate a transversality condition. The foregoing is an ingenious argument but, in the opinion of the writer, is open to a crucial objection. It is that there is another equilibrium - typically ignored by fiscalist writers that does not rely upon explosive-bubble behavior of the price level. This more fundamental "monetarist" equilibrium features Pt+l = P t - MPl/'t/A, i.e., a constant price level, together with values Bt+l = 0 for all t = 1, 2 , . . . . With these paths for Pt and Bt it is clear that Equations (7.1)-(7.3) and both transversality conditions are satisfied. It might be objected that this solution does not satisfy the budget constraint (7.4) for the values of vt = v specified by the fiscalist writers, but it has been argued above that the fiscal surplus is actually not a variable that can legitimately be specified as exogenous 77. What the monetarist solution says is that if the fiscal authority tried to keep vt = v as in the fiscalist solution, then households would refuse to purchase the bonds that are required to be sold by the fiscal authority. It would be necessary to distinguish between bonds supplied in (7.4) and bonds demanded in (7.3), with Bt = 0 in the latter. If there were an initial stock of bonds outstanding, B I ~ 0, then they would be retired in period 1 with a resulting real primary surplus of B1/P1. In sum, a formally correct and arguably more plausible solution than the fiscalist candidate is one in which the price level remains constant, with a magnitude that is proportional to the money stock. At the same time, the stock of bonds offered for sale by the fiscal authority may be explosive bm if so these bonds will not be purchased by optimizing households. The fiscal authority's realized surplus will then be zero after the initial period leaving us with a traditional non-fiscalist result 78. There are, of course, several other cases and more complex models featured in the recent fiscalist literature~ indeed, a rather bewildering variety. But it would appear to the present writer that the sta'iking fiscalist outcomes typically result from emphasizing the possibility of bubble
77 This is also the basis for the argument hi a recem paper by Buiter (1998), which reaches conclusion,s predominantly compatible with those presented here. 78 Note that it is not being claimed that this is the only solution, but merely that it is a solution (and one that might be thought likely to prevail by analysts who are skeptical of the empirical importance of macroeconomic bubbles).
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solutions while ignoring the existence of a non-bubble or fundamentals solution that would deliver an entirely traditional policy message. 79, 8o The third strand of the monetary-fiscal interaction literature to be discussed is represented by papers by Alesina and Tabellini (19 87) and Debelle and Fischer (1995). In the former, the workhorse Barro-Gordon model is extended by assuming that real government purchases are controlled by a fiscal authority (FA) that may have different objectives - concerning the level of these purchases as well as inflation and output than those of the central bank (CB). The FA's revenues come from non-lump-sum (distorting) taxes and money growth, government debt being excluded from the m o d e l In this setting, Alesina and Tabellini derive outcomes pertaining to both discretionary and rule-like behavior by the CB 81. Their most striking result is that when preferences of the CB and the FA are sufficiently different 82, equilibrium outcomes with monetary policy commitment can be inferior 83 to those obtained under discretion. This result is with independent behavior by the CB and FA, so the message is that monetary-fiscal policy cooperation is needed. In a more recent paper, Debelle and Fischer (1995) have modified the AlesinaTabellini framework by also including a social objective function, one that can be different from those of the CB and FA. Only the latter cares, in their setup, about the level of government purchases. In this model, Debelle and Fischer conduct analysis always assuming discretionary behavior by the CB but under different assumptions regarding the Stackelberg leadership positions of the CB and FA. A major aim of the analysis is to determine the optimal value, in terms of society's preferences, of the "conservativeness" of the CB, i.e., the relative importance that it assigns to ilfftation. It is not optimal, they find, for the CB's preferences to match those of society - i.e.,
79 Dotscy (1996) shows that a reahstic specificationof parameter values gives rise to a more traditional policy message than one promoted in the fiscalist literature, for an issue concerning the responsiveness of the CB to fiscal variables under the assumption that the fiscal anthority's policy rule tends to prevent debt explosions. 8o One other feature of the recent fiscalist literature is its contention that pegging the nominal interest rate at a low value will result in a correspondinglylow inflation rate and in no indeterminacyproblem, implying that such a policy would be preferable to the maintenance of a low growth rate of the (base) money supply. The analyticalkey to this argument is that explosive price level (bubble) solutions, which are possible with a low money stock growth rate, would be precluded by a constant interest rate in models with a well-behaved (possibly constmat) real rate of interest - see, e.g., Equation (7.2) above. It has been established above, however, that when money growth is exogenous, the possible aberration reflects multiple (bubble) solutions, not nominal indeterminacy.But the empirical relevance of bubble solutions for macroeconomicvariables is dubious, this writer would contend, and if such solutions are not relevant then the theoretical disadvantage for the low money growth policy is itself irrelevant. 81 In the absence of debt, the FA has no incentive for dynamic inconsistency, i.e., no commitment problem. 82 The CB is assumed to assign at least as much weight to the inflation rate (relative to each of the other goal variables) as does the FA. 83 Inferior in terms of both authorities' prelbrences; the private sector is assumed to care only about real wages.
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the private sector. And they find that it is undesirable socially for the FA to dominate (in a Stackelberg sense) the CB, requiring the CB bank to finance FA deficits 84 An objection to this last strand of analysis stems from its reliance on the presumption that an economy's CB and FA will have preferences that differ from each other's and from social (i.e., household) preferences. While such might be the case in some nations, one would expect that in democratic societies, CBs and FAs will be aware of and tend to reflect the basic preferences of the population. That tendency might be combatted by various devices, but it seems likely that (e.g.) attempts to appoint CB governors with tastes more anti-inflationary than society's would often result in ex-post surprises regarding these tastes. Also, one might expect that fiscal or monetary legislation would be overturned fairly promptly if it were to yield results that are truly inconsistent with the preferences of the society's voters. In any event, it would seem that designing institutions nnder the presumption that CB and/or FA preferences differ from those of the society at large is unlikely to be fruitful.
8. Concluding remarks This final section will consist of a brief and perhaps opinionated recapitulation of conclusions obtained for the main topics of discussion. First, in actual practice the defining characteristics of rule-like behavior are that the central bank conducts policy in a systematic fashion, and while doing so systematically abstains from attempts to exploit existing expectations for temporary gains in output. Central banks can behave in this committed manner if they choose; there are dynamic-inconsistency pressures on them to act in a more discretionary fashion, but there is nothing tangible to prevent committed behavior. Indeed, the adoption o f a monetary policy rule is one technique for overcoming discretionary pressures. In terms of research strategy, the chapter's discussion has promoted the robustness approach - i.e., searching for a rule that works reasonably well in a variety of models rather than the more straightforward approach of deriving an optimal rule relative to a particular model, No strong claims are made in this regard, however, and the value of the optimal design approach is recognized. The importance of operationality of any proposed rule is also emphasized, as well as the merits of stochastic simulations as opposed to simpler historical counterfactual simulations. Regarding the choice of a target variable, the chapter suggests that in practice the difference between an inflation target and one that aims for nominal spending growth, at a rate designed to yield the same target inflation rate on average, is unlikely to be large. More dissimilar is the hybrid target variable that adds together inflation and output relative to capacity. This hybrid variable is probably more closely related to
~4 Of course, it is argued above that tile FA will not be able to dominate if the CB has independence (i.e., can choose its own base money creation rates),
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actual central bank objectives, but the absence o f any reliable and agreed-upon method o f measuring capacity or trend output creates a major drawback for this variable. Also, it is argued that the magnitude o f future price-level uncertainty, introduced by the unit root component that results from a growth-rate type of target, is probably rather small. Thus growth-rate targets appear somewhat more desirable than growing-level targets as the latter requires stringent actions to drive any nominal target variable back toward its predetermined path after shocks have led to target misses. Turning to the choice o f an instrument variable, the chapter presents a small bit o f evidence designed to illustrate why it is that a number o f academic economists are inclined to prefer quantity instruments, such as the monetary base, rather than short-term interest rates. The exposition includes arguments against some literature claims that either short-term nominal interest rates or the monetary base are infeasible as instruments. In this discussion, particular emphasis is given to the distinction between two quite different types o f abberational price level behavior, namely, nominal indeterminacy and multiple solutions. The former has to do with the distinction between real and nominal variables while the latter concerns self-fulfilling dynamic expectational phenomena - i.e., bubbles. Also, the former pertains to all nominal variables whereas the latter involves real variables. Finally, with regard to prominent fiscalist positions two points are made. First, the recently developed fiscal theory o f price-level determination typically leads to a solution that is not unique; there also exists a less exotic bubble-free solution that has a much more traditional (indeed, monetarist) flavor. This conclusion stems from recognition that central banks can dominate in any conflicts with fiscal authorities. Also, there are some results in the literature that suggest that monetary/fiscal cooperation is important, but these depend upon the assumption that central banks and fiscal authorities have fundamentally different objective fimctions. It is doubtful whether such an assumption can play a fruitful role in the design o f desirable central bank institutions and behavior patterns.
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