International Encyclopedia of the
SOCIAL SCIENCES
Associate Editors Heinz Eulau, Political Science Lloyd A. Fallers, ...
151 downloads
4587 Views
23MB Size
Report
This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form
International Encyclopedia of the
SOCIAL SCIENCES
Associate Editors Heinz Eulau, Political Science Lloyd A. Fallers, Anthropology William H. Kruskal, Statistics Gardner Lindzey, Psychology Albert Rees, Economics Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Sociology Edward Shils, Social Thought
Special Editors Elinor G. Barber, Biographies John G. Barley, Applied Psychology Bert F. Hoselitz, Economic Development Clifford T. Morgan, Experimental Psychology Robert H. Strotz, Econometrics
Editorial Staff Marjorie A. Bassett, Economics P. G. Bock, Political Science Robert M. Coen, Econometrics J. M. B. Edwards, Sociology David S. Gochman, Psychology George Lowy, Bibliographies Judith M. Tanur, Statistics Judith M. Treistman, Anthropology
Alvin Johnson HONORARY EDITOR
W Allen Wallis CHAIRMAN, EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD
International Encyclopedia of the SOCIAL SCIENCES D A V I D L . S I L L S EDITOR
VOLUME
The Macmillan Company & The Free Press
14
r
5
v ./V
COPYRIGHT © 1968 BY CROWELL COLLIER AND MACMILLAN, INC.
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. NO PART OF THIS BOOK MAY BE REPRODUCED OR TRANSMITTED IN ANY FORM OR BY ANY MEANS, ELECTRONIC OR MECHANICAL, INCLUDING PHOTOCOPYING, RECORDING, OR BY ANY INFORMATION STORAGE AND RETRIEVAL SYSTEM, WITHOUT PERMISSION IN WRITING FROM CROWELL COLLIER AND MACMILLAN, INC.
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOG NUMBER 68-10023
MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
International Encyclopedia of the SOCIAL SCIENCES
[ C O N T I N U E D ]
SANCTIONS Social control involves the process by which a group perpetuates its culture and system of social relations. In what has become an anthropological locus classicus, Radcliffe-Brown (1934) defined the sanction as a social reaction to a mode of behavior that was thereby approved or disapproved. In his view the concept is of primary significance to sociology because sanctions provide an effective instrument for regulating conduct in conformity with social usage. This formulation, however, seems to obscure a number of important points. RadcliffeBrown's argument clearly implies that the sanction, at least in one of its aspects, has a deterrent function. But if this object is to be achieved, logic demands that the sanction must precede the reaction: the sanction must already be in operation when a breach of norm occurs. It seems preferable therefore to define sanctions in terms of a promise of reward for fulfillment of the norms of behavior that are socially recognized and accepted, or in the liability to suffer the consequences that attend their breach. According to this view, the sanction is thus characterized by a quality of latency that is expressed most clearly, in the case of negative sanctions, in a general belief in the continuing likelihood of the execution of the threat. This implies two further properties of the sanction. A sanction cannot be arbitrary or ad hoc: its existence must be generally known, and it must be regular in its incidence. In fulfilling these conditions, the sanction serves not merely to deter; it also indicates the appropriate steps that may be taken to redress the situation when a norm has been infringed or to express approbation when it has been overfulfilled. The sanction is, of course, a concept of funda-
mental importance in jurisprudence and has played a paramount role in different legal theories. But there seems no good reason why its use should be restricted in this way. The legal sanction, manifested in the form of the penalties, remedies, and modes of redress of the law, represents only one particular means of enforcing conformity to norms and restating their validity when they are breached. Each group and subgroup within a society tends to develop its own distinctive pattern of usages and the means of maintaining them without necessary recourse to the municipal law. Sanctions therefore come to operate within every conceivable set of group relationships: they include not only the organized sanctions of the law but also the gossip of neighbors or the customs regulating norms of production that are spontaneously generated among workers on the factory floor. In small-scale communities, or within segments of a large-scale society, informal sanctions may become more drastic than the penalties provided for in the legal code. Thus the concept of sanctions is not merely of jurisprudential interest; it also has immediate sociological relevance to the analysis of the problem of social control. It will be apparent then that social control is achieved through no single mechanism. On the contrary, different principles and processes will frequently be found working together in any given situation. Accordingly, it is only by specifying the character of the sanctions present in the situation that one can isolate the different elements for analytical purposes and give them their proper weighting. The institution of law represents, of course, one major instrument of social control, and it is most usually marked off from other such agencies by virtue of the fact that its sanctions are
SANCTIONS imposed by politically organized society. As Seagle (1941) has observed, for example, it is the fact that the sanction is applied exclusively by organized political government that distinguishes the sphere of law from the spheres of religion, morals, and custom. The mechanism of sanction. The differentiation of the instruments of social control in stateless and state societies and in peasant communities and bands of hunting and gathering people has provided ground for controversy between jurists and anthropologists and among anthropologists themselves. Although their discussions have not always clarified the nature of law in different types of societies, they have been fruitful in opening up the broader sociological problem of social control. Malinowski's position as a pioneer in this field remains undisputed. Working in an island society that lacked any of the familiar machinery for the enactment, administration, and enforcement of law, Malinowski was led to seek elsewhere for the sources of social cohesion. He came to the conclusion that there was a class of rules "too practical to be backed up by religious sanctions, too burdensome to be left to mere goodwill." This constituted the Trobriand "civil law," the binding character of which lay in the sanctions of reciprocity and systematic incidence (Malinowski 1926). Later critics have pointed out that reciprocity is a concept of such wide generality that it cannot usefully serve to delineate the sphere of law. A curious feature of Malinowski's thinking on these matters is that, despite his emphasis on conflict, he appears not to have appreciated that just as the sanction implies the potential breach of norm, so much of law has to be concerned with what may be called the "pathology" of social relations. The emphasis on reciprocity has been important in deepening our understanding of why rules of behavior are accepted in so many areas of social life without the need to resort to formal mechanisms of redress. The question that remains unanswered is what happens when reciprocity breaks down and breach actually occurs. The point had been raised often enough, but it was left to Llewellyn and Hoebel (1941) in their now classic study of the Cheyenne to repair the defect and put the anthropological study of legal sanctions back on its proper path. In their succinct and expressive phrase, "the law has teeth": their procedure was to show that, even in societies lacking instituted juridical bodies, the investigation of instances of "hitch," dispute, grievance, and trouble led directly into the way in which physical coercion was organized. Pospisil (1958), on the basis of his work among
Kapauku Papuans, has suggested that too great an emphasis has been placed upon physical force in defining the character of the legal sanction, pointing out that cultures exist where physical sanctions are practically lacking. This introduces an unnecessary confusion. The crucial question is not the actual mode of coercion employed but recognition of the legitimate authority in which is vested the power of coercion. Such authority is certainly recognized among the Kapauku, although coercion may frequently be achieved by other than purely physical means. Where, in a society lacking developed forensic institutions, rules of conduct may be enforced through the powers of coercion vested in a legitimate authority, I propose to speak of jural rather than legal sanctions, indicating that here we are in the realm of ius, but not of lex. Jural sanctions. Once the criterion of legitimate coercion is adopted, it becomes apparent that primitive societies, lacking the formal machinery of the law, may yet display a remarkable range of sanctions that can be distinguished as jural. It has sometimes been claimed of many of the simplest societies that their social life is dominated by notions of the supernatural: there is a paucity of rules of law that is the reflex of the comprehensiveness of taboo. Such views, however, do not do justice to the facts. Thus it is reported of the Eskimo, for example, that persistent breach of taboo may be met by a shaman's decree of banishment. More strikingly, it is also reported that recidivist homicides may be dispatched by an individual acting at the request of the local community or with its compliance; this individual does not incur vengeance. Another interesting type of jural sanction was reported by Radcliffe-Brown in the Andaman Islands (1922). There, aggrieved persons were apparently able to vent their spleen by destroying any property they could lay their hands on, but unfortunately there are a number of points touching the operation of the sanction which the sources do not make very clear. It is possible that the Andamanese practice was somewhat similar to the custom of kamara reported from the Gazelle Peninsula of New Britain. Kamara took a number of variant forms, but essentially it was a device whereby a person who had suffered injury could damage or distrain the property of someone of acknowledged influence within the community. This individual was expected then to bring pressure on the offender to make retribution. But in general, within the range of primitive societies, the most common mode of redress for wrong is found to rest on the principle of self-help. In these circumstances, the legal initiative lies in-
SANCTIONS variably with the individual or group against whom a wrong has been committed. Yet the exacting of vengeance is not an arbitrary procedure. It has to be carried out according to certain rules and is undertaken only when morally supported by the community or because, indeed, it has been pressed upon individuals or groups by expressions of public approval or disapproval. The principle of self-help involves a point of considerable importance for the discussion of sanctions. This is what Nadel (1947) has called the social range of offenses, where the kind of sanction provoked depends upon the nature of the social units involved in the offense. Thus, in some societies if adultery or homicide occurs within the local lineage it may be regarded more as a sin than as a legal wrong, calling for ritual expiation rather than the application of jural sanctions. If, however, it involves members of different clans within a larger political unit, the offense may be met by a punitive raid or may have to be compounded by payment of compensation. In other words, it is not enough to regard a given sanction simply as the appropriate response to, or mode of redress for, any particular offense. Rather the sanction has to be viewed as it pertains to the set of social relationships involved in any given situation and at a particular moment in time. Failure to see the sanction in these terms can lead to misconceptions and to misguided hypotheses of an either/or character, as in attempts, for example, to correlate the importance of sorcery with the presence or absence of "superordinate justice" (Whiting 1950). Formulations of this kind pose a false dichotomy; they also miss the point that because each individual is the focus of a number of different social relationships, combining in his person a number of different roles, a variety of sanctions may attach to a single act of behavior. Thus, to take an example from our own society, a member of one of the professions who commits a serious breach of professional etiquette faces the possibility not only of prosecution in the courts, but also of being struck off the roll; he may also find that he has sacrificed his position as chairman of the local literary and philosophical society and that his wife and children have lost the good will of friends and neighbors. In other words, there is in all societies a coincidence of sanctions, some of a jural, some of a mystical or other character, all operating simultaneously toward the goal of achieving social control. Thus the problem that has to be faced is only partly the clear demarcation of one kind of sanction from another; more important is the need to classify and analyze the typical situations in which
3
the different kinds of sanctions are provoked or achieve dominance. Analytic examples. Some progress in examining the social context of sanctions has been made by Turner (1957) in an analysis of the conflicts operating within the social system of the Ndembu of Northern Rhodesia. Among the various redressive mechanisms known to the Ndembu are informal arbitration, formal courts under the control of chiefs, and certain kinds of public ritual. Turner has suggested that jural machinery is likely to be invoked when a dispute is conducted in terms of an appeal to common norms, or, alternatively, when the dispute itself involves an appeal to different or opposed norms, but it can still be settled fairly easily because there exists "a common frame of values which organize a society's norms into a hierarchy." There are, however, other kinds of conflict, which have their source in the contradictions inherent in the social structure itself. For example, when the rules of nepotic and adelphic succession both operate within a matrilineal system, they tend to promote faction within local groups. If these conflicts are not effectively sealed off, they may lead to the disruption of the group. For disputes of this kind, usually sparked by the breach of some legal or customary norm, jural sanctions are likely to be inappropriate and ineffectual. A court of law, employing rational techniques of inquiry, hears the arguments of the various parties and on its reading of the evidence proceeds to allocate blame to one or the other of the disputants. Such a procedure cannot "relieve the quarrels so as to preserve the threatened relationships." This explains why it is that among the Ndembu and other peoples of the central African "matrilineal belt" so few cases arising out of disputes within the matrilineage come before the tribal courts. These indeed are the kinds of situations par excellence in which the sanctions associated with accusations of witchcraft and sorcery or the wrath of ancestral spirits are predominant and where group unity can be reaffirmed only by ritual means. So, too, in modern Western society the invocation of legal sanctions may be found inadequate for the handling of certain kinds of domestic disputes. A court of law, by concentrating on husband and wife as right-bearing and duty-bearing units, excludes itself from examining a close and complex relationship in its totality; the less rigid techniques of a marriage guidance council or other similar agency may have to be invoked if reconciliation of the parties is the end to be achieved. With the development of recognized courts, a new and important phase has been reached in the
4
SANCTIONS
eternal task of achieving social control. Once forensic institutions have been established, little comes to escape their purview, and there are few matters that may not be the subject of judicial scrutiny. Yet, perhaps for this very reason, it is important to remember, as the last eximple cited itself suggests, that adjudication ma) cover a range of different procedures. The distiiguishing criteria of a court appear to be that it is capable of enforcing the principle of jurisdiction aid that it is led to the apportionment of liability ty the rational assessment of the evidence and a'guments adduced before it. In many African societi<s, informal hearings before village elders and the letection of the causes of personal and natural misfortune by divination share certain of the characteristics of the judicial process, but clearly it would :>e a mistake to equate them with courts. Similarly, as Gluckman (1962) argues, it seems a mistake t) speak of the institutionalized song duels of the Eskimo as "juridical instruments" even though tiey do serve to settle disputes and restore norrral relations between estranged members of the community. It may be true that the result of the contest is a "judgment" in favor of one of the constants, but, so far as can be gathered from the Iterature, the mode of arriving at that judgment las little in common with a judicial process. Here a lack of clear analytical distinctions can blur the important sociological problem of why in different s)cieties, or in different ranges of relationship with'n the same society, different kinds of sanctions may be invoked for similar kinds of breach of n«rm. Nevertheless, the instanct of the Eskimo song encounter does direct attertion to a variety of sanctions occupying a borderland between the realms of law, morals, and tustom. The literature on the song contest does not nake clear how points are scored in the duel, nor does it indicate what part the spectators play in tlis connection. On the other hand, the fact that the tontestants are obliged to accept the taunts, jibes, aid accusations of their opponents without taking aff:ont suggests parallels with forms of licensed "joiing" familiar in the anthropological literature. There is, for example, the system of clan joking relationships described for the Plateau Tonga of Nortiern Rhodesia. Among the Tonga, the clans are th> only enduring units of social organization, and they are linked in a complex arrangement of jokng partnerships. The Tonga explain these relatiorships by reference to some antagonism between the animals from which the clans derive their names or to some legend of origin. Whenever members of such paired clans
meet, they tease one another and indulge in mutual abuse. Joking of this kind occurs in informal situations, but this, like the Eskimo song contests, which are conducted for pure entertainment, has to be seen as a necessary preparation of the stage, so to speak, for those more serious occasions when culturally licensed abuse may be employed as a public sanction. The jural unit of Tonga society is the matrilineal group, but there are many situations where this group is not free to act without destroying the very principle of lineage unity on which the social structure is built. Those who waste their kin's property or commit incest provide instances of this kind. Their offenses are, in a sense, jural wrongs; but they also touch questions of ultimate social morality. For the protection of the community, the sanction of public castigation and ridicule of the offender by his clan joking partner is invoked (Colson 1953). Institutions embracing the "joking" principle are widespread; and they are not confined to tribal societies. It appears that "youth groups" may perform a similar role in some of the rural communities of present-day Spain and Wales (see Peters 1967). Such groups, which initially establish their "irresponsibility" by playing childish pranks as part of their normal behavior, are on occasion able to express the outraged moral feelings of the community by playing offensive practical jokes on those who have offended but who cannot be readily reached by straightforward legal sanctions. These instances, incidentally, illustrate another important mechanism in the process of social control. This is the principle whereby the enforcement of the sanction is thrust upon a "stranger" to the group; it is used in situations involving the unity of the group rather than the claims of aggrieved individuals. Through the medium of the clan joking partners, or the youth group, who are strangers to the adult community by virtue of their customary infantile behavior, the fiction of group cohesion can be maintained and group norms reaffirmed. Function of integration. The importance of the sanction lies, then, as Radcliffe-Brown noted (1934), in its integrative function. The social system is made up of many different kinds of groupings, frequently based on different principles of social organization and serving different sets of interests. Associated with these groupings and with the different and sometimes conflicting sets of social relationships in which their members are involved, there is a wide range of social sanctions, at the back of which are the organized sanctions of the law, supported by the coercive authority of society. Even in those systems where "legal totali-
SANCTIONS, INTERNATIONAL tarianism" has been carried furthest, it is clear, as Lewin (1947) has documented with reference to South Africa, that social control is not achieved exclusively through the operation of the sanctions of the law. Faced with this problem, certain jurists have been led to postulate a "general habit of obedience" to explain why, everywhere in society, laws are more often obeyed than disobeyed. A sociological approach, on the other hand, would stress that the efficacy of law rests, in the final analysis, on the support it receives from the operation of nonlegal sanctions in the various domains of social life. We can see something of the way this process operates in some analyses of the judicial process in African tribal societies. Barotse judges, for example, had behind them the full power and authority of their nation as well as of the British colonial administration. In the handling of disputes, however, the sanctions of morality and custom and, indeed, the whole normative structure of the society are channeled into the judicial process itself. Litigants and judges alike appeal to, and couch their arguments in terms of, the same body of norms. When a man is condemned, it is usually because he has failed to measure up to the standards of behavior that he himself has invoked in his statements to the court (Gluckman 1955). It is, of course, patent that there are important differences between the judicial processes in African societies and those in modern Western societies. Unfortunately the classic studies of the judicial process in Anglo-American systems have concentrated on judicial reasoning in the upper levels of the juridical hierarchy or upon exposing the nonlegal influences that play upon the mind of the judge. What seems to be required for purposes of significant comparison is the more intensive sociological investigation of courts and other similar bodies at the lower levels of the hierarchy, in the context of the communities within which they operate. Such studies might prove to be very important in illuminating the way in which social norms and sanctions are brought into relationship with the legal system. A. L. EPSTEIN [Directly related are the entries JUDICIAL PROCESS; LAW; POLITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY.] BIBLIOGRAPHY BOHANNAN, PAUL 1957 Justice and Judgment Among the Tiv. Published for the International African Institute. Oxford Univ. Press. COLSON, ELIZABETH (1953) 1962 Clans and the Jokingrelationship Among the Plateau Tonga of Northern Rhodesia. Pages 66-83 in Elizabeth Colson, The Plateau Tonga of Northern Rhodesia. Manchester Univ.
5
Press. -> First published in Kroeber Anthropological Society, Papers. GLUCKMAN, MAX 1955 The Judicial Process Among the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia. Manchester Univ. Press; Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. GLUCKMAN, MAX 1962 African Jurisprudence. Advancement of Science 18:439-454. GLUCKMAN, MAX 1965 Politics, Law and Ritual in Tribal Society. Oxford: Blackwell; Chicago: Aldine. HOEBEL, E. ADAMSON 1954 The Law of Primitive Man: A Study in Comparative Legal Dynamics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. LEWIN, JULIUS 1947 Studies in African Native Law. Cape Town: African Bookman; Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press. LLEWELLYN, KARL N.; and HOEBEL, E. A. 1941 The Cheyenne Way: Conflict and Case Law in Primitive Jurisprudence. Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press. MALINOWSKI, BRONISLAW (1926) 1961 Crime and Custom in Savage Society. London: Routledge. -» A paperback edition was published in 1959 by Littlefield. NADEL, SIEGFRIED F. 1947 The Nuba: An Anthropological Study of the Hill Tribes in Kordofan. Oxford Univ. Press. PETERS, E. L. 1967 Group Joking Relationships. Unpublished manuscript. POSPISIL, LEOPOLD 1958 Kapauku Papuans and Their Law. Yale University Publications in Anthropology, No. 54. New Haven: Yale Univ. RADCLIFFE-BROWN, A. R. (1922) 1948 The Andaman Islanders. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. RADCLIFFE-BROWN, A. R. 1934 Social Sanction. Volume 13, pages 531-534 in Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. New York: Macmillan. -» Reprinted in Radcliffe-Brown's Structure and Function in Primitive Society, published by Cohen and West in 1952. SEAGLE, WILLIAM (1941) 1946 The History of Law. 2d ed. New York: Tudor. -» First published as The Quest for Law. TURNER, V. W. 1957 Schism and Continuity in an African Society: A Study of Ndembu Village Life. Manchester Univ. Press. WHITING, BEATRICE B. 1950 Paiute Sorcery. Viking Fund Publications in Anthropology, No. 15. New York: Viking Fund.
SANCTIONS, INTERNATIONAL The term "sanction," in its widest sense, means "any measure taken in support of a social order regulating human behavior" (Kelsen 1957, p. 101). The purpose of a sanction is to bring about a behavior considered to be in conformity with the goals and standards of a society and to prevent that behavior which is inconsistent with these goals and standards. Consequently, in its widest sense, a sanction can have the objective of suppressing and terminating a particular form of undesirable behavior and the objective of deterring or discouraging such behavior in the future. The word "sanction" originated in Roman law, where it meant a penalty imposed upon a person who violates the law. The word continues to be used in this narrow
6
SANCTIONS, INTERNATIONAL
sense, particularly in municipal law. In international relations, the term is customarily used in the wider sense. It is sometimes asserted, particularly with reference to Austin's definition of law, that international law is not law because it lacks the sanctions of municipal law. That there is a difference of degree is no doubt true, but what is often not recognized is that municipal law, like international law, is basically dependent upon custom and consent, while international law has sanctions comparable with those of municipal law, though admittedly weaker. The organization of sanctions in support of an international order faces a special difficulty not encountered within the state to anything like the same degree. This is the difficulty of enforcing standards against organized groups which, as states, make exclusive claims on governmental authority and on the loyalty and support of their citizens. Even within the state, constituted authorities experience difficulties in enforcing their decisions against organized groups such as trade unions and component political units, as witness the difficulties experienced by the organs of the federal government of the United States in enforcing their decisions against the states. Experience Customary international law has in the past admitted the right of states to take certain measures of self-help in support of their legal claims if it was not possible to achieve satisfaction by negotiation or third-party settlement. These measures included withdrawal of diplomatic representatives, acts of reprisal such as embargo and pacific blockade, display of force, landing of armed forces for purposes of protection of persons and property, and resort to war. Under agreements concluded to meet particular situations, special guarantees were accorded and the right of intervention admitted, as, for example, in the collective guarantee of Belgian neutrality (1839) and the United States guarantee of Cuban independence (1901). Under the Covenant of the League of Nations, the concept that peace should be maintained by the combined forces of peace-loving states was substituted for the principles of balance of power and self-help. "Resort to war" under denned conditions was prohibited. Provision was made under article 10 for joint guarantee of member states against external aggression and in article 16 for sweeping economic and financial sanctions to be applied "immediately" by every member against any state resorting to war in violation of its obligations under the Covenant. The Covenant provisions were seri-
ously weakened by resolutions adopted by the Assembly in 1921 that were intended to take account of the failure of the League to achieve universality. Military sanctions under the Covenant were optional on recommendation of the Council. No serious consideration was given to the application of the sanctions of article 16 until the mid-1930s. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 was not treated as a resort to war under the Covenant. The Assembly did, however, recommend to members that they withhold recognition of the fruits of Japan's military action, in line with the announced policy of the United States. This constituted a mild form of sanction, which had, however, no observable practical effect. In 1935, however, Italy's military invasion of Ethiopia was recognized by all except a small minority of members as an illegal resort to war, and limited economic and financial sanctions were applied. These were not adequate, however, to achieve the declared objective of frustrating Italy's military action, and leading members of the League were unwilling, for political reasons, to agree to measures that might have been effective. The Charter of the United Nations adopts a different approach to the problem of sanctions. Like the Covenant, its objective is limited to the maintenance of peace; the Charter prohibits any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state "or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations" (art. 2, paragraph 4). The sanctions envisaged, however, are not automatic, being left to the discretion of the Security Council. In cases of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression, it may take decisions requiring members to apply collective measures, including the severance of diplomatic relations, economic and financial nonintercourse, and "action by air, sea or land forces" (art. 42). But the taking of military measures is made dependent on the conclusion of agreements by which members undertake to place forces and facilities at the disposal of the Security Council (art. 43). In addition, a member against whom preventive or enforcement action has been taken may be suspended from "the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership" by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council (art. 5), and a member who has "persistently violated the Principles" contained in the Charter may be expelled in like manner (art. 6). The Charter does not confer upon the General Assembly any explicit powers with respect to the imposition of sanctions. It does give to the Assembly the general authority to discuss and make
SANCTIONS, INTERNATIONAL recommendations with respect to any matter within the scope of the Charter (art. 10). In United Nations practice, the Security Council has largely been prevented from using its powers to apply sanctions—its enforcement powers—by the inability of the permanent members to agree. In the early stages of its handling of the Palestine question (1948) it specifically invoked these powers and threatened to use them. In the Korean case, the Council, in the absence of the Soviet representative, recommended assistance to the Republic of Korea and, under this authorization, members took measures of the kind described in articles 41 and 42. More recently, in dealing with policies of racial discrimination by South Africa, the Security Council, by its resolution of December 4, 1963, called upon members to refrain from shipping arms and munitions to that country so long as it practiced this discrimination, which it found was "seriously disturbing international peace and security." The General Assembly, in the exercise of its broad powers under the Charter, has on numerous occasions recommended to members the adoption of various measures of a coercive nature to bring the conduct of particular states into line with standards set by the Charter, international law, and United Nations resolutions. Examples include such recommended measures as the withdrawal of heads of missions to Spain and its exclusion from UN conferences in order to eliminate the Franco regime (1946); an embargo on the shipment of arms and strategic materials in general to North Korea and Communist China to suppress their aggressive action (1951); and an embargo on export of arms and petroleum products to South Africa to achieve the termination of policies of racial discrimination (1963). The measures recommended by the General Assembly have had a range of purposes extending beyond the maintenance of international peace and security, to the implementation of obligations and policies in respect to self-determination and human rights. Provisions for the application of international sanctions are not limited to the constitutions of global international organizations. The Inter-American Treaty of Mutual Assistance, for example, provides that in case of aggression by an American state, the Organ of Consultation may decide that the other signatory states apply sanctions, including political, economic, financial, and military measures. Decisions may be taken by a vote of two-thirds and are binding, except that no member can be required to use military force against its will. In August 1960, the decision was taken to sever diplomatic relations and partially interrupt
7
economic relations with the Dominican Republic because of its aggression against Venezuela. Evaluation Experience with organized international sanctions in support of international order has been limited and does not give much encouragement to those who believe in the efficacy of such arrangements. The League system of sanctions was a system of collective security which rested "upon the proposition that war can be prevented by the deterrent effect of overwhelming power upon states which are too rational to invite certain defeat" (Claude 1964, p. 228). It also assumed that an ethical and legal difference existed between military force used by a state to advance its national interests and the use of force by members of an international organization to restrain a state after it has been adjudged guilty of illegal use of force. This experiment was handicapped from the beginning by the League's lack of universality. The limited economic and financial sanctions imposed against Italy showed that international sanctions were technically feasible. The necessary machinery could be organized and decisions could be taken to permit sanctions to become operative promptly and with substantial impact on the transgressor. Their failure was due to political difficulties—the conflicting interests and purposes of the sanctioning powers and the unwillingness of some states to risk war to make sanctions effective. United Nations experience has not been encouraging either. Sanctions against Franco Spain were applied half-heartedly and were soon terminated. In the Korean case, the measures taken to assist the Republic of Korea and to defeat the aggressive actions of North Korea and Communist China were essentially United States measures dictated by United States policy considerations. The United Nations served as a useful framework to provide legitimacy and as a moderating influence. Measures recommended against South Africa to achieve fuller respect by that member for basic human rights have had little observable effect. What conclusions are to be drawn from this and other experience regarding the role of international sanctions in the implementation of international order? Statesmen and scholars have arrived at a variety of conclusions. One conclusion which appears to be widely held is that the theory of international sanctions, particularly as it involves the use of military force, is fallacious. According to this view, no effective pressure can be applied against a state except by another state, and consequently, an international
8
SANCTIONS, INTERNATIONAL
order that depends on that form of pressure is a permanent source of conflict instead of a medium of order. As early as 1787 Hamilton wrote in The Federalist: "In an association where the general authority is confined to the collective bodies of the communities that compose it, every breach of the laws must involve a state of war; and military execution must become the only instrument of civil obedience" (No. 15). Another conclusion that has wide support is that forces of coercion which are effective when applied to individuals are not effective, at least not to the same degree, when applied to states. Even those forms which might be expected to be particularly effective, such as embargoes and blockades, may at least temporarily have the opposite effect. In the case of the economic sanctions against Italy, among the immediate effects was a strengthening of popular support for the regime. A view which is widely held by those who stress national interest as the motivating force in international relations is that international sanctions are unrealistic because they require a willingness to accept general commitments for situations which cannot be foreseen in detail and to carry them out under circumstances where the immediate national interest appears to dictate a different course. Thus, in the case of League sanctions against Italy, France was a reluctant participant because of her primary interest in having Italian support against Germany. Many members of the United Nations were reluctant to press sanctions against Communist China in 1950 and 1951 because of their greater concern at the time with the security of western Europe. A more optimistic and positive view regarding sanctions is that while experience to date may not have been encouraging, a system of organized sanctions in support of law and order is the only alternative to anarchy. Scholars and writers who take this view—Quincy Wright and Myres McDougal are examples—argue that our experience with sanctions as applied to organized groups is not so discouraging as is often contended, that sanctions have been effective in deterring undesirable conduct by states, and that with a fuller appreciation of the extent of the coincidence of particular and general interests in public order, sanctions can be expected to become more effective. Problems and prospects It is obvious that the organization and application of international sanctions in support of international order present difficulties that do not exist to the same degree in the case of sanctions in sup-
port of domestic order. With respect to international legal claims, states generally continue to rely upon good faith and reciprocity of interest in compliance, and upon retaliatory measures when these fail. It is primarily for the maintenance of peace and, to an increasing extent of late, for the implementation of certain human rights that organized sanctions are seriously considered. Much study has been given to the organization and application of collective sanctions to these ends, both by private scholars and by official groups. A group of members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs made a study of international sanctions in the light of the League experience of 1935-1936 (1938). During the period when the United Nations was engaged in supporting collective measures in Korea, the General Assembly, by its Uniting for Peace Resolution of November 3, 1950, established the Collective Measures Committee to study methods which might be used to strengthen international peace and security. In its report, published in 1951, it made detailed recommendations for the organization and application of collective measures (United Nations . . . 1951). The scope of the prohibition of the use or threat of force under the Charter, combined with the lack of any effective provision for the enforcement of legal rights, has led some scholars to take the view that unilateral use of force to secure respect for legal rights is permissible as a sanction consistent with "the Purposes of the United Nations" (Stone 1958, pp. 94-95). Others take the view that the Charter does not permit the individual use of force, without United Nations authorization, except as it can be justified as an exercise of the right of selfdefense in case of an armed attack. There is an extensive scholarly literature dealing particularly with the theory and legal aspects of international sanctions, but research and writing have thus far neglected the more practical aspects of the problem. While scholars have explored the legal, organizational, and administrative problems involved in the establishment and operation of a system of sanctions, and furthermore have analyzed the influence of the international political environment on a system of sanctions, relatively little attention has been given to the effects of sanctions upon the delinquent states as well as upon those states joining in their application. It is too readily assumed that the recalcitrant state can be coerced by material pressures into conforming to a desired mode of conduct or into ceasing an undesirable mode of conduct. We need to know more about the effect of sanctions upon the people of the state that is the object of sanctions, and the
SAPIR, EDWARD: Contributions to Cultural Anthropology processes by which that state, once its resistance is overcome, can be restored to good standing in the international community. Furthermore, while the problem of the unequal effects of sanctions upon those states applying them or expected to apply them is recognized, more study needs to be made of the extent of these inequalities and of procedures by which burdens will be more equally shared. It is clear that reluctance to participate in the application of sanctions has in large measure been due to unequal burdens and risks that states have been asked to assume. LELAND M. GOODRICH [See also ECONOMIC WARFARE; INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION; INTERNATIONAL LAW. Other relevant material may be found under INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION; INTERNATIONAL POLITICS;
WAR.] BIBLIOGRAPHY BRIERLY, J. L. 1931 Sanctions. Grotius Society, Transactions 17:67-82. CLAUDE, INIS L. 1964 Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization. 3d ed. New York: Random House. -* The first edition was published in 1956. GOODRICH, LELAND M.; and SIMONS, ANNE P. 1955 The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security. Washington: Brookings Institution. KELSEN, HANS 1957 Collective Security Under International Law. U.S. Naval War College, International Law Studies, Vol. 49. Washington: Government Printing Office. KUNZ, JOSEF L. 1960 Sanctions in International Law. American Journal of International Law 54:324-347. McDoucAL, MYRES S.; and FELICIANO, FLORENTINO P. 1961 Law and Minimum Worid Public Order: The Legal Regulation of International Coercion. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. NIEMEYER, GERHART 1941 Law Without Force: The Function of Politics in International Law. Princeton Univ. Press. ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1938 International Sanctions: A Report by a Group of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Oxford Univ. Press. STONE, JULIUS (1954) 1959 Legal Controls of International Conflict: A Treatise on the Dynamics of Disputes and War Law. 2d impression, rev., with supplement 1953-1958. New York: Holt. STONE, JULIUS 1958 Aggression and World Order: A Critique of United Nations Theories of Aggression. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. TAUBENFELD, RITA FALK; and TAUBENFELD, HOWARD J. 1964 The "Economic Weapon": The League and The United Nations. American Society of International Law, Proceedings [1964]: 183-205. UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY 1951 Report of the Collective Measures Committee. United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records Sixth Session, Supplement no. 13.
9
SAPIR, EDWARD i. CONTRIBUTIONS TO CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY David G. Mandelbaum ii. CONTRIBUTIONS TO LINGUISTICS Z. S. Harris
CONTRIBUTIONS TO CULTURAL
ANTHROPOLOGY
Edward Sapir (1884-1939) was one of the founders of modern linguistic anthropology, a main contributor to the development of formal descriptive linguistics, a leading figure in cultural anthropology, and a chief stimulator of studies in the relations between personality and culture. His ideas continue to excite lively interest; his writings are widely read; his one book, Language, and a volume of his papers have continuously been reprinted. The range of his ideas is great. They are founded on an extraordinary breadth of knowledge, which Sapir used with incisive power of thought and subtlety of analysis. He wrote poetry, literary essays, and music as well as scholarly works; all his writings are characterized by an unusual felicity of style. Sapir was born in Pomerania (Germany) and was five years old when his family emigrated to the United States. His intellectual gifts were recognized while he was a schoolboy in New York City. He was awarded scholarships to the Horace Mann School and then a Pulitzer fellowship to Columbia College, from which he was graduated in 1904. He went on to do a year of graduate work in Germanics at Columbia, and at that time his interest in language brought him into contact with Franz Boas. He quickly learned from Boas the great potentialities of the anthropological study of language, and from then on his principal work was in linguistic anthropology. [See the biography of BOAS.] In 1910 Sapir went to Ottawa as chief of the division of anthropology in the Geological Survey of Canada. His 15 years in that post gave him fine opportunities for field research and writing, but it was also a period of relative isolation from the main centers of anthropological work. He welcomed the invitation to join the department of anthropology at the University of Chicago, all the more because his wife had died after a long illness. He came to Chicago with his three children in 1925 and remained at the university for six years; his work and his influence flourished there. He was married again, to Jean McClenaghan, and they had two children. In 1931 he accepted a Sterling professorship at Yale and founded the department of anthropology there. His years at Yale were active and productive until he suffered a series of heart
10
SAPIR, EDWARD: Contributions to Cultural Anthropology
attacks in 1937, which ended his life two years later. Sapir's primary work was always in the study of language (his achievements in that field are discussed in the second section of this biography). His writings on other subjects, such as culture, society, and personality, were often done in response to a request for an article on a particular topic or as offshoots of his linguistic studies. Yet a good many of them have been major contributions which still command attention. These writings are of three main kinds—ethnological studies of American Indians, essays on general concepts, and papers on personality in culture and society. Ethnological studies. Sapir's ethnological contributions appeared in steady succession from his earliest writings to some that were published posthumously. Many were brief studies of the kind that provide the necessary groundwork for more general formulations, as the account of Takelma religion, or of a Nootka puberty ceremony, or of Sarsi pottery. In some, a large body of data is summarized and underlying principles demonstrated. For example, in "The Social Organization of the West Coast Tribes" (1915) Sapir showed how the idea of social ranking pervaded many aspects of these societies—how the emphases on inherited privileges and on ritual insignia were linked to that prevailing idea. When Robert Lowie wrote an appraisal of Sapir's work long after Sapir's death, he noted that Sapir was one of the very best of ethnographers—able to immerse himself in the phenomena under scrutiny, plumb them to the depths, and present them deftly and incisively (Letters From Edivard Sapir to Robert H. Lowie, p. 10). Sapir's most substantial contribution to ethnological theory is his monograph of 1916, "Time Perspective in Aboriginal American Culture: A Study in Method." A main objective of field research among American Indians at that time was understanding the actual processes of culture change as against the presumed universal processes, which had been postulated by nineteenthcentury evolutionists. In order to understand how American Indian cultures had actually changed, anthropologists had to reconstruct cultural histories. In this monograph Sapir surveyed the methods useful in such reconstructions; he particularly illuminated the use of inferential evidence, such as that from the study of cultural associations, geographic distributions, cultural strata, and from grammatical and lexical analyses. He presented the logical basis for evaluating different kinds of inferential evidence. The arguments are
closely reasoned; supporting evidence is compactly presented; broad concepts are tersely stated. It is a work that requires close study, and generations of graduate students studied it closely because it was for many years one of the major theoretical pieces on American Indian anthropology. Some of these students found that a single paragraph or even a sentence could open fruitful leads for their own research. In recent years, the shift of anthropological attention to peoples in other parts of the world and the development of interest in other theoretical approaches have lessened the importance of this work, but it held a leading place for some forty years. General concepts. Sapir's less technical, more general essays have had a wider audience; they have a way of including some ideas which appear, decades later, to be at the frontiers of thought. Thus, in "Culture, Genuine and Spurious" (1924), Sapir defined the anthropologist's characteristically objective view of a people's way of life and then went on to distinguish genuine and worthy cultures from spurious and morally shoddy ones. He valued those cultures that encourage harmonious and selfsatisfying lives for the people who live by them, whatever the level of technical achievement and efficiency. He decried those life styles, as of some modern industrial and service workers, in which a person finds little relationship or reciprocal gratification among his various roles and pursuits. This thesis, although strange to anthropology, was true to the intellectual temper of the time. Sapir's special touch is found not only in the evidence he selected and the telling way in which he presented it, but even more in the intriguing ideas he mentioned, as it were, in passing. Thus, he commented on the nexus of self and society, on the place of art in a genuine culture, on the cultural pressures generated by political forces. Of this last matter he wrote, "Our national-political units are too small for peace, too large for safety" ([1924] 1949, p. 330). There is a good deal in this essay that belongs to the 1920s, but there is also a good deal that holds interest still. Other essays clarify fundamental concepts and categories. In "The Meaning of Religion" (1928) Sapir took a subject which, in other hands, is often hackneyed; in his, the subject is treated freshly and lucidly, with proper anthropological objectivity and yet with sympathy. Here also he threw off a number of productive ideas, pointing out, for example, that a basic distinction among religions is exemplified by the contrast between Plains and Pueblo Indian practices. The two types tend to differ "according to whether they find the last court of appeal in mat-
SAPIR, EDWARD: Contributions to Cultural Anthropology ters religious, in the social act, or in the private emotional experience" ([1928] 1949, p. 350). The article "Anthropology and Sociology" (1927a) appeared as a chapter in a book on the social sciences and their interrelations. In it Sapir was not at all concerned with separating the two domains or negotiating boundaries between them. He concentrated instead on the ideas that anthropology can contribute toward an understanding of people and behavior. He began by noting that a main error of earlier theorists lay in taking primitive people to be archaic, unchanging prototypes. Sapir expressed the view that has now become accepted, that "we are to be at least as much interested in the many points of accord between primitive and sophisticated types of social organization as in their sensational differences" ([1927a] 1949, p. 336). These similarities, he continued, are not readily apparent from reconstructions of culture histories of American Indian tribes. It is rather from the "stupendous facts" about common human trends that sociologists will in the long run have most to learn from anthropology. The separate historical explanations are little more than a necessary clearing of the ground for a social interpretation; they are not to be mistaken for the interpretation itself. In his "Time Perspective" (1916) Sapir had provided a major theoretical foundation for the work of historical reconstruction, which then preoccupied most American ethnologists. In the article of 1927 he recognized the work he had done in 1916 as only a preliminary step toward the anthropologist's principal tasks. Another development of Sapir's thought appears in several of the articles he wrote for the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences: an emphasis on the relation between individual and society, between personality and culture. This emphasis arose partly because of Sapir's humanist feeling that the proper study of man must include real men and partly because of his realization that formal, nonpersonalized formulations about people can be very misleading unless they are coupled with insights into the real experience and reactions of actual persons. In the article "Group" (1932a), for example, Sapir sketched the essential definition and dimensions of the concept in his clear, succinct way. He outlined three types of classification based on objective observation and three based on subjective engagement of the participant. He noted the bases for group formation and changes, then posed the fundamental question of the bonds that hold together the members of a group. The psychological basis of the group, he observed, must rest on the psychology of specific social relations. Loyal-
11
ties to an entire group do not mean that direct relationships between individual and individual have been completely transcended, but rather that the attributes of interpersonal experience have been transferred to the group as a whole. Thus the psychological realities of group participation can best be understood through studies of the actual kinds of understanding and expectation that grow up between two or more human beings when they are brought into significant contact. Culture and personality. Sapir's interest in the interplay of culture and personality dated from the beginning of his anthropological studies. "I remember being rather shocked than pleased," he wrote in a paper of 1938, "when in my student days I came across such statements in J. O. Dorsey's 'Omaha Sociology' as Two Crows denies this'" ([1938] 1949, p. 569). The paper is devoted to an assessment of Two Crows' denial and of what the anthropologist should make of it. Sapir found conventional ethnographic statements inadequate because they were generalized formulas which said little or nothing about variation, conflict, denial, or emotion. Even as a student Sapir recognized that such generalized formulations might be necessary but could not be sufficient for a thorough understanding of behavior. So Dorsey was ahead of his age in recognizing that he was not dealing with an abstracted society or a set of specimens but with a number of human beings who could give themselves the privilege of differing from each other on matters that were, in the conventional anthropological definition, part of the official tribal culture. Sapir was moved to point out the inadequacy of rigidly depersonalized studies in his response of 1917 to A. L. Kroeber's formulation of the concept of the superorganic. In "Do We Need a Superorganic?" he granted that few individuals, as individuals, make a marked impress on social movements, and yet it is always the individual who thinks and acts and dreams and revolts. The difference between social and individual data in behavior studies results from the observer's choice of what to select for systematic notice. Hence it is not valid to draw an abidingly sharp line between the two types of data, since "individual" reactions constantly spill over and give color to "social" reactions (1917, p. 442). This insistence on the significance of the person appears recurrently in Sapir's writings on culture and society. His paper "Speech as a Personality Trait" (1927b) is one instance of this theme; other expressions of it came in a series of papers written in the last decade of his life. In a paper of 1932 he restated the idea that
12
SAPIR, EDWARD: Contributions to Cultural Anthropology
the true locus of culture is in the interactions of specific individuals and in the meanings which the participants abstract from these interactions ([1932b] 1949, p. 515). And in an article of 1938 he proposed a research procedure that has only lately been appreciated. Instead of arguing from a supposed objectivity of culture to the problem of individual variation, Sapir recommended that for certain kinds of analyses we should operate as though we knew nothing about culture but were interested in ascertaining what a. set of human beings who are accustomed to live with each other actually think and do in their day-to-day relationships ([1938] 1949, p. 574). This simple discovery procedure, as it turned out, involves complex questions as to when and how it is to be used, but it can also lead to considerable advances in anthropological understanding. As for the interpretation of a particular sequence of behavior as being either social or personal, Sapir's paper of 1934 on this matter shows that the duality of reference is an inevitable part of human experience as well as of the social scientist's method. When one is confronted with familiar circumstances and familiar people, interest is likely to be focused on the individual. With unfamiliar people or situations, in socially distant or casual relations, one's interest is more likely to center on cultural or social observations. Each type of interest "is necessary for the psychic preservation of the individual in an environment which experience makes increasingly complex and unassimilable on its own simple terms" ([1934] 1949, p. 591). Every person must use both frames of reference in his own conduct. In the study of man the anthropologist must also use both, but with explicit awareness of what he is doing, and he must be able to deploy each in ways best suited for analysis and explanation. Sociology and anthropology, Sapir continued, are rooted in the social kind of reference, a kind which perhaps is characteristic of the child's earliest experience with the seemingly irresistible authority and knowledge of his parents. Psychiatry and social psychology proceed more from the personal kind of reference and from the necessity felt to assert oneself significantly. All these are "preliminary disciplines" and provide an invaluable first ordering of research. But sooner or later their obscure opposition of spirit must be transcended for an objectivity which is not merely formal and non-evaluative but which boldly essays to bring every cultural pattern back to the living context from which it has been abstracted in the
first place and, in parallel fashion, to bring every fact of personality formation back to its social matrix. ([1934] 1949, p. 592) For such purposes, the descriptions and classifications of abstracted culture patterns are no longer very relevant, useful as they are to clear the observational ground. The more anthropologists become concerned with interactional meanings and values rather than with segregated traits, Sapir commented, the more a culture seems to take on the characteristics of a personality organization, and the growth of culture is understood in the spirit of the development of a personality. Thus, such ethnological questions as that of clan membership may well become subsidiary to inquiries as to whether a father is in the habit of acting toward his son as an indulgent guide or as a disciplinarian. One result of taking this point of view is that the bizarre or exotic in alien cultures tends to be minimized, while the broad human base on which all culture has developed is revealed more clearly (ibid., pp. 594-595). Anthropologists who appreciate that a culture is not given in a neat package to the child, but is gropingly discovered and assimilated by him, and who can see that a people change their culture with similar groping assimilation, will join with psychologists in phrasing more fruitful questions about culture and behavior ([1932b] 1949, p. 521; [1934] 1949, p. 597). Influence. Sapir taught students of anthropology for only about a dozen years, but his influence on several generations of anthropologists and linguists has been considerable. Hearing him in lectures or discussions could be an exhilarating experience. He was not at all dramatic; his talk was low-keyed and anything but hortatory. But he could give his students glimpses of intellectual vistas the like of which they had neither seen before nor would soon forget. He came to differ with his teacher in anthropology, Franz Boas, on a number of fundamental matters, but Boas always maintained a high respect for Sapir's work. Colleagues and friends of his own generation showed how much they owed to his work by the formal honors they gave him during his life and by the appreciations they wrote after his death at age 56. Parts of his correspondence with two of his friends, Robert H. Lowie and Ruth Benedict, have been published (Lowie & Sapir 1965; Benedict 1959, pp. 45-54, 158-197). These letters between friends contain private banter, trade gossip, and transient comment. But they also tell something of the day-to-day context of Sapir's
SAPIR, EDWARD: Contributions to Linguistics life and work—for example, at one period in Chicago he was teaching as much as fourteen hours a week—and they reflect something of both the warm charm and the occasional friction in his personal relations. The letters to Lowie show Sapir in the course of developing ethnological and linguistic ideas, sometimes surely and swiftly, sometimes haltingly and piecemeal. Those to Ruth Benedict show his sharp insight into the world of poets and poetry, a world seemingly very far removed from the technical universe which he discussed with Lowie but actually interwoven in his personality and his work. In her account of Ruth Benedict's poetry, Margaret Mead has noted that "it was in the vivid, voluminous correspondence with Edward Sapir that her own poetic interest and capacity matured." And in another passage Margaret Mead mentions that among those who benefited most from Sapir's speculations about personality and culture were Ruth Benedict, John Dollard, and herself (Benedict 1959, pp. 90, 209). The memorial volume for him written by some of his students (Language, Culture, and Personality 1941) was reprinted in 1960. In the generation of the students of his students, there is not only quite lively interest in what Sapir had to say, but also a good many who are urging their students to read Sapir. Sapir's death cut short a number of scholarly enterprises, among them the analysis of a large collection of American Indian ethnological data, extensive explorations in Indo-European linguistics, preliminary formulations of linguistic relationships on the largest scale, and extensive ethnological and linguistic notes in Semi tics. Toward the end of his life he turned increasingly to Semitic studies. His father had been a cantor, and he had been raised in the strict tradition of Orthodox Judaism. Although he soon discarded what he felt to be the intolerable restrictions of orthodoxy, he retained his delight in the scholarship and spirit of Judaism. His strong commitment to human rights, opposing all invidious discrimination and oppression, appears in his writing, especially in articles done for general audiences. As the grave world events of the 1930s developed, he participated actively in the defense of these rights. The weight of his scholarly influence is in linguistic anthropology, where the weight of his published contributions also lies. In American Indian ethnology his ideas on method and leads for further research have had notable effect. In the field of culture-personality studies he remains one of the principal pathfinders. For anthropology in gen-
13
eral he continues to be a heartening example of how much can be accomplished when a superb mind plays over a wide and richly yielding field. DAVID G. MANDELBAUM [See also ANTHROPOLOGY; COMMUNICATION; CULTURE, article on THE CONCEPT OF CULTURE; INDIANS, NORTH AMERICAN.] BIBLIOGRAPHY The bibliography for this article is combined with the bibliography of the article that follows. II CONTRIBUTIONS TO LINGUISTICS
Sapir was, with Leonard Bloomfield, a founder of formal descriptive linguistics and the distributional method that characterizes it. He developed phonemic theory, the analysis of the sounds of a language according to the pattern of their distribution—that is, the sequence in which sounds occur and are systematized and perceived by the speakers of the language. Phonemic analysis thus recognizes language as behavior resulting from a process of selection. This method of analysis classifies each part of an utterance (sound, morpheme, etc.) on the basis of its environment rather than on the basis of its meaning, phonetic properties, and so forth. The distributional method is important not only because it is self-contained but also because its universe and its terms of reference are so explicit that one can discover all sorts of hidden relations that are observable only as second-order disturbances in the overt distributional system: masked and combined phonemes, neutralized phonemic differences, zeroed morphemes, and the like. To be sure, Sapir did not always formulate aberrant phenomena in distributional terms; he sometimes used formulations drawn from biological processes. While this reduced the incisiveness and generality of the distributional theory he was developing, it did indicate some of the other systemic factors (factors of equilibrium, of dynamics, etc.) that may be required to understand the sources of aberrant phenomena or of the place these phenomena occupy in the descriptive system. These additional factors may even aid ultimately in understanding the source of the system itself. Thus Sapir might say that if, in a given language, a two-vowel sequence never occurs inside a morpheme and only rarely occurs when two morphemes adjoin each other in a word, the language will develop a "protective mechanism" to avoid the two-vowel sequence. Examples of such
14
SAPIR, EDWARD: Contributions to Linguistics
mechanisms are the glottal stop and the French liaison t. Distributional methods came to be widely used in the formulation of linguistic process. Phonemic phenomena were regarded as processes of change (for example, "suppletion," or the replacement of stems in certain word groups, e.g., in am, is, be} that are structural and thus related to the environment in which they occur. Sapir was also one of the originators of the concept of the morphophoneme. The morphophoneme classifies together all those phonemes that replace each other in the paradigm-—that is, the different phonemic shapes that a word or morpheme has as it occurs in different morphemic environments. This concept was also based partly on the speaker's perception of phonemic replacement (Sapir 1933; Sapir & Swadesh 1939). Sapir also did much work in historical and comparative linguistics, tracing the genetic relationships among languages. His interest in pattern and process led him to speak of configurational pressure as a source of change. By configurational pressure he meant that linguistic change (phonemic and morphemic) is influenced by relevant patterns inherent in the language itself. He suggested that configurational pressure is a factor in what he called drift, the process that occurs in a language whose speakers have separated and can no longer imitate ("borrow from") each other, but whose linguistic habits continue in some respects to change in the same way in the separated communities (e.g., Old Norse in Denmark and Iceland). Although this suggestion has not received sufficient study, it does accord with systematizations of linguistic change. In historical linguistics Sapir is particularly noted for a series of intricate analyses of the earliest stages of Indo-European. He based his work partly on the difficult data from Tocharian and partly on the laryngeal hypothesis that reconstructed various laryngeal consonants lost in early Indo-European with consequent changes in neighboring vowels (1937a; 1937b; 1939). Related to this work were his investigations of the similarities and connections of Indo-European to Semitic and other Mediterranean languages. Sapir thought that Indo-European and Semitic might have descended from the same parent stock. Although it was impossible to establish this hypothesis by reconstructions using the accepted comparative method, he could point to many unexpected connections and to a great over-all structural similarity in the earliest stages of both Indo-European and Semitic. Sapir worked with examples of structural simi-
larity in his famous attempt to group the extremely numerous and apparently unrelated families of North American Indian languages into six superfamilies (1929). Most of Sapir's linguistic work (like his ethnological studies) was with American Indians, and his mastery of the data and his analyses of the Indian languages were unequaled. He worked particularly in Navajo, Yana, Nootka, Tlingit, Sarsi, Kutchin, Chinook, Ingalik, Hupa, and Southern Paiute. Z. S. HARRIS [See also LANGUAGE; LINGUISTICS, article on THE FIELD; and the biographies of BLOOMFIELD; SAUSSURE; WHORF.]
WORKS BY SAPIR (1915) 1949 The Social Organization of the West Coast Tribes. Pages 468-487 in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. (1916) 1949 Time Perspective in Aboriginal American Culture: A Study in Method. Pages 389-462 in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press 1917 Do We Need a Superorganic? American Anthropologist New Series 19:441-447. 1921 Language: An Introduction to the Study of Speech. New York: Harcourt. (1924) 1949 Culture, Genuine and Spurious. Pages SOSSSI in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. (1927a) 1949 Anthropology and Sociology. Pages 332345 in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. (1927b) 1949 Speech as a Personality Trait. Pages 533543 in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. (1928) 1949 The Meaning of Religion. Pages 346-356 in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. (1929) 1949 Central and North American Languages. Pages 169-178 in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. (1932a) 1949 Group. Pages 357-364 in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. -> First published in Volume 7 of the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. Sapir also wrote the Encyclopaedia articles "Communication," "Custom," "Dialect," "Fashion," "Language," "Personality," and "Symbolism." (1932&) 1949 Cultural Anthropology and Psychiatry. Pages 509-521 in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. 1933 La realite psychologique des phonemes. Journal de psychologie normale et pathologique 30:247-265. (1934) 1949 The Emergence of the Concept of Personality in a Study of Cultures. Pages 590-597 in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. (1937a) 1949 Hebrew "Helmet": A Loanword and Its Bearing on Indo-European Phonology. Pages 285-288
SARTON, GEORGE in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. (1937b) 1949 [A Book Review of] The Ras Shamra Mythological Texts, by James A. Montgomery and Zellig Harris. Pages 289-293 in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. (1938) 1949 Why Cultural Anthropology Needs the Psychiatrist. Pages 569-577 in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. (1939) 1949 From Sapir's Desk: Indo-European Prevocalic s in Macedonian and The Indo-European Words for "Tear." Pages 294-302 in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. 1939 SAPIR, EDWARD; and SWADESH, MORRIS Nootka Texts: Tales and Ethnological Narratives With Grammatical Notes and Lexical Materials. Philadelphia: Linguistic Society of America. Letters From Edward Sapir to Robert H. Lowie. With an introduction and notes by Robert H. Lowie. Privately published, 1965. Selected Writings of Edward Sapir in Language, Culture, and Personality. Edited by David G, Mandelbaum. Berkeley: University of' California Press, 1949. -» Includes a chronologically arranged bibliography of Sapir's writings, SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BENEDICT, RUTH 1959 An Anthropologist at Work: Writings of Ruth Benedict, by Margaret Mead. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. -> A selection of Benedict's writings, with extensive commentary by Margaret Mead. [Bibliography: Edward Sapir.] 1938 Psychiatry 1:154157. HARRIS, Z. S. 1951 [A Book Review of] Selected Writings of Edward Sapir in Language, Culture, and Personality. Language 27:288-333. Language, Culture, and Personality: Essays in Memory of Edward Sapir. Edited by Leslie A. Spier, A. Irving Hallowell, and Stanley S. Newman. (1941) 1960 Salt Lake City: Univ. of Utah Press. PRESTON, RICHARD J. 1966 Edward Sapir's Anthropology: Style, Structure, and Method. American Anthropologist New Series 68:1105-1128.
SARTON, GEORGE George Sarton, historian of science, was born in Ghent, Belgium, in 1884 and died in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 1956. He married Eleanor Mabel Elwes, an English artist, in 1911; their daughter, May, who became a poet and novelist, was born in 1912. As a youth Sarton wrote romantic poems and essays. At the University of Ghent he studied the natural sciences and mathematics, winning a medal for a chemical memoir in 1908 and completing a doctoral dissertation on Newton's mechanics in 1911. He became increasingly interested in the history and philosophy of science and dedicated the rest
15
of his life to establishing the history of science as an independent discipline. In 1912 he founded Isis, a scholarly journal for this new field, and continued to be its editor through 1952. After only five issues, publication was interrupted by World War i, but it was resumed in 1919. Meanwhile Sarton had fled Belgium and moved to the United States in 1915. As a research associate of the Carnegie Institution, from 1918 on, he used Harvard's Widener Library and offered a course in the history of science at Harvard, where he became a professor in 1940. The History of Science Society was formed in the United States in 1924; it provided a professional organization for the new discipline and guaranteed the publication of Isis. Isis has published a continuous series of valuable critical bibliographies; the first 79 of these were prepared by Sarton himself. Osiris was founded in 1936 to accommodate studies that were too long for Isis but too short for separate publication. When Sarton was invited, in 1916, to deliver the Lowell lectures, he chose Leonardo da Vinci as his subject. On this occasion he was struck with how little was known about ancient and medieval science leading up to Leonardo, and he decided that a comprehensive history needed to be written. In 1919 he recovered his notes and a good part of his library, which he had had to abandon in Belgium, and two years later he began to write his Introduction to the History of Science (1927-1948). Ultitimately, Sarton did not take this history beyond the fourteenth century; he realized how much time would be required to handle the fifteenth century on the same scale as the earlier centuries and preferred to spend his remaining years on more limited subjects; for example, he wrote A Guide to the History of Science (1952a), The Appreciation of Ancient and Medieval Science During the Renaissance (1955), and Six Wings: Men of Science in the Renaissance (1957). His aim in writing the history of science was not only to establish and define that field of study but also to show its importance for the philosophy of science and for any positive philosophy. Sarton called science "systematized positive knowledge," picturing it as a living, continually developing organism. He maintained that science is the only cumulative and progressive human activity and that the study of the history of mankind must focus on the history of science; any tolerably complete history of civilization must devote considerable space to explaining scientific progress. He believed that the historian of science has a mission to defend the traditions of science, not because they differ essentially from those of other fields, but
16
SARTON, GEORGE
because "they are all that makes life worth living, they are the nobility and the goodness of life" (1952a, p. 15). For Sarton, science has grown "out of the minds and hearts of living men" (1954, p. 67), and its history is therefore often best written in terms of biography. He did not limit his account to the achievements of outstanding scientists, because he found that a number of smaller discoveries usually contributed to the gradual preparation of major ones. He warned that the history of science must not be confused with the history of scientific method, nor be approached from the economic point of view, which overemphasizes applications. Influenced by Comte and Tannery, Sarton repeatedly emphasized that the history of science is the integration of the histories of the separate sciences, not their summation; it is itself a specialty built on a thorough understanding of the methods of science and of history; it covers ancient, medieval, and modern science; and it requires more than the leisure hours of capable scientists or of scholarly historians. The historian of science must be trained in science; indeed, he should be acquainted with all advancing knowledge, not just scientific and historical material. Moreover, Western science cannot be properly understood without an appreciation of the extent of the influence of Islam on Western civilization, and Sarton learned Arabic in order to comprehend this influence. Sarton's history of science, an all-embracing picture of the impact of scientific progress on mankind and of man's environment on science, tells "not only of the spreading light but also of the contracting darkness" (1952a, p. 11). Sarton saw the history of science as a means of understanding science and making it live—creating a philosophy of science that would have continuing validity. He combated the tendency of scientific studies to supplant humanistic ones. He strove to "humanize" science, to reveal its integration with the other elements of our culture, and to instill in scientists some reverence of the past and some awareness of the relevance of the history of science for science as an ongoing activity. The history of science seemed to him the only possible bridge across a growing abyss. Warm and subtly humorous, Sarton made friends throughout the world. He was tireless in his own work and expected similar patience and critical attitudes from others. Sometimes his genuine humility seemed like self-righteousness (e.g., [1931] 1956, p. 109). His lecture courses were popular, but he had few graduate students.
A new generation of historians of science, while appreciative of Sarton's pioneering service, is reassessing his aims and methods. Present-day emphasis is on the structure and development of scientific ideas rather than on the ideas themselves. Sarton has been described as naive about history (Williams 1960, p. 160) and insufficiently selective in his methods, too lost in pedantic minutiae to appreciate their relevance for the overall development. He has been accused by some of stressing the content of science at the expense of its integration into a complex whole. On the other hand, Sarton's interpretation of the history of science is alleged to be incompatible with the compartmentalism of modern science and to stress the cultural framework and the normative implications of science at the expense of its content (Grmek 1965, pp. 140-143). Grmek questioned whether one man can handle the history of science if it is interpreted as broadly as it was by Sarton, but he admitted that collaborative studies by teams of specialists have gained technical insight at the expense of the kind of synthesis that Sarton provided. Clearly, Sarton's critics are in disagreement. However, the monumental scholarly edifice he erected can become a basis for a revision of the historiography of science. C. DORIS HELLMAN [See also SCIENCE, article on THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE.] WORKS BY SARTON
1927-1948 Introduction to the History of Science. 3 vols. Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins. (1931) 1956 The History of Science and the New Humanism. 3d ed. New York: Braziller. -» A paperback edition was published in 1962 by the Indiana University Press. 1952a A Guide to the History of Science: A First Guide for the Study of the History of Science, With Introductroy Essays on Science and Tradition. New York: Ronald Press. 1952fo A History of Science: Ancient Science Through the Golden Age of Greece. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. 1954 The Old World and the New Humanism. Pages 6368 in Man's Right to Knowledge; First Series: Tradition and Change. New York: Muschel. 1955 The Appreciation of Ancient and Medieval Science During the Renaissance (1450-1600). Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press. 1957 Six Wings: Men of Science in the Renaissance. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press. -> Published posthumously. 1959 A History of Science: Hellenistic Science and Culture in the Last Three Centuries B.C. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. On the History of Science: Essays. Selected and edited by Dorothy Stimson. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1962.
SAUER, CARL O. SUPPLEMENTARY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
AGASSI, JOSEPH 1963 Towards an Historiography of Science. History and Theory, Beiheft 2. The Hague: Mouton. BUCHDAHL, GERD 1965 A Revolution in Historiography of Science. History of Science 4:55-69. The George Sarton Memorial Issue. 1957 Isis 48, part 3. GRMEK, MIRKO D. 1965 Prolegomenes a une histoire generale des sciences. Annales: Economies, societes, civilisations 20:138-146. HELLMAN, C. DORIS 1958 George Sarton: Historian of Science and New Humanist. Science 128:641-644. KUHN, THOMAS S. 1962 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Univ. of Chicago Press. -» A paperback edition was published in 1964. STRELSKY, KATHARINE 1957 Bibliography of the Publications of George Sarton. Isis 48:336-350. WILLIAMS, L. PEARCE 1960 [A Book Review of] A History of Science, Vol. 2, by George Sarton. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 11:159-161.
SAUER, CARL O. Carl O. Sauer, for more than thirty years chairman of the department of geography at the University of California, Berkeley, is one of the most influential figures in twentieth-century geography. The study of cultural geography, especially as it has developed in the United States, owes more to Sauer than to any other man. His concern for the quality of human life in its physical setting, for historical and ecological processes, and for the origins and dispersals of culture traits and complexes that have modified the cultural landscape is in the tradition of German geographical thought, of which Sauer has been a principal interpreter. Born of German ancestry in Warrenton, Missouri, in 1889, he graduated from the local and now defunct Central Wesleyan College in 1908, having earlier studied for a time in a school in Wiirttemberg, Germany, where he had family ties. His attachment to the rural and small-town ways of life and landscape of the Middle West of that period has played an important role in his teaching and writing, and he has frequently returned there for study and reflection. Sauer next studied at the University of Chicago, where the first full-fledged graduate program in geography in the United States had recently been instituted. His PH.D. dissertation, The Geography of the Ozark Highland of Missouri (1920), was acclaimed as a model of regional cultural geography. In 1915 he was appointed to the staff of the new department of geology and geography at the University of Michigan, where in a period of seven years he advanced from the rank of instructor to that of full professor. His work in designing the
17
Michigan Land Economic Survey brought him national recognition. He left Ann Arbor in 1923, at the age of 33, to become chairman of the department of geography at Berkeley. Sauer retired from active teaching in 1957, except for occasional graduate seminars and guest lectureships, but his scholarly output has been undiminished. Sauer also served the development of geography outside the university. He played an important role in the early development of land-use mapping in the United States and in the establishment of the U.S. Soil Conservation Service. For a time in the 1930s he was consultant to the President's Science Advisory Board. For many years he served as a member of the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation selection committee, in which capacity he had a unique opportunity to observe and influence a wide range of American scholarship. He has received honorary degrees from Heidelberg University, Syracuse University, and the University of California and medals from the American Geographical Society, the Berlin Geographical Society, and the Swedish Society for Anthropology and Geography. Soon after Sauer came to California, he and many of his students turned their attention to northern Mexico, especially to the historical geography of the settlement of the dry northwestern part. Later he was to concern himself increasingly with tropical Mexico and Central America and, finally, with the Caribbean. Latin America was thus the strategic site for his observation of the interaction between the simpler, peasant cultures and the sustaining earth. Here, where the mark of the past is so deeply imprinted on the land, he found an especially congenial atmosphere for the study of the interplay between habitat and habitant. His careful reconstructions of past Latin American landscapes and economies, based on a combination of archival work and detailed field inspection, are models of historical geography. The Early Spanish Main (1966), an analysis of the Spanish conquest on the islands of the Caribbean and its margins, is their capstone. Several of his publications on Latin American subjects appeared in the University of California monograph series Ibero-American a, which he founded in 1932 with A. L. Kroeber. Sauer's outspoken rejection of environmental "influences" as the focus of geographical inquiry, enunciated in his Morphology of Landscape (1925), was a critical turning point in the development of American academic geography. Instead of the deterministic view that had largely dominated Ameri-
18
SAUER, CARL O.
can geography since the turn of the century, he advocated geographical inquiry into such themes as the man-modified landscape and the origin, spread, limits, and alteration of the elements of that landscape. Holding that all geography is essentially historical, he systematically used any kind of data pertaining to human settlement and activity, and he often found archeological evidence fully as pertinent as written documents. For him the kitchen midden, the colonial archive, the relict plant community or soil profile, and the wisdom of the countryman at work on his hillside garden patch provided information equally relevant to the problems of cultural geography. A recurring theme in Sauer's work is the tremendous importance and antiquity of the domestication of plants and animals. In Agricultural Origins and Dispersals (1952a), he summarized his efforts to locate the principal hearths of domestication and the subsequent routes and extent of* dispersal. Using archeological and ethnographic evidence, Sauer argued that the origins of cultivation must have been in the woodlands rather than in riverine valleys of the world. He made a basic distinction between the agricultural complexes of monsoon Asia and northwestern South America, which are largely dependent on vegetative reproduction by slips and cuttings, and the seed cultures of southwest Asia and of Mexico and Central America. Sauer hypothesized that the earliest form of plant selection involved asexual plant propagation and that it was probably first practiced by the sedentary fishing peoples living around the shallow seas of southeast Asia. The early domestic animals of these peoples were household animals such as the dog, pig, and chicken. Sauer accepted the view that plant selection by seed reproduction came later, and he was influenced by N. I. Vavilov in pointing to China, India, and Ethiopia as Old World centers of seed domestication. He associated herd animals with cereal cultivation and accepted Eduard Harm's theory of a mixed economy in which milking of animals was a culture trait integrally involved in the process and purpose of their domestication, probably for noneconomic ends. His research along these lines has especially attracted the attention of anthropologists and archeologists. Many of his speculations regarding the antiquity of man in the New World, Pleistocene ecology, and the relation of changing sea levels and shore configurations to human occupation sites continue to stimulate new research. Sauer has insisted on the close links of cultural geography with both biology and the earth sciences. He sees man as the ecologic dominant in nature,
intervening more and more decisively to change the balance and nature of organic life. He has, for example, insisted that the problems of increasing world-wide desiccation are caused by agricultural and grazing practices and not by "climate deterioration." He has repeatedly written about the historical processes of biotic destruction and soil depletion as reflections of changing technology and changing attitudes about the earth. Another theme in his writings has been the role of fire, especially of fires set by man, in the modification of the vegetative covering of the earth and the establishment of grasslands. He was the principal organizer of an international symposium held at Princeton in 1955 that focused on "Man's Role in Changing the Face of the Earth" (1956a). Sauer has viewed with misgivings the growing emphasis of some of his colleagues on techniques and tools of analysis that produce quantitative results: he has insisted that the qualities of both human society and the man-made landscape are often other than those that permit quantitative processing (1952b). Leighly has observed that to Sauer the investigation of human beings and their behavior by mechanical processes of organization and computation is as repugnant as the environmental determinism he rejected years earlier (see the introduction by Leighly, to Sauer's Land and Life, p. 6). Human geography, Sauer has said, exists because of the diversification that exists in human ways, and no approach to its questions is more rewarding than that of comparative culture history, soundly based on ecological and geographical principles and concepts. JAMES J. PARSONS [See also DOMESTICATION; ECOLOGY; GEOGRAPHY, especially the articles on CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY and SOCIAL GEOGRAPHY.] WORKS BY SAUER
1920 The Geography of the Ozark Highland of Missouri. Geographic Society of Chicago, Bulletin No. 7. Univ. of Chicago Press. 1925 The Morphology of Landscape. University of California Publications in Geography, Vol. 2, No. 2. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. 1932 The Road to Cibola. Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press. 1935 Aboriginal Population of Northwestern Mexico. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. 1938 Theme of Plant and Animal Destruction in Economic History. Journal of Farm Economics 20:765775. 1941 Foreword to Historical Geography. Association of American Geographers, Annals 31:1-24. 1948a Colima of New Spain in the Sixteenth Century. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.
SAUSSURE, FERDINAND DE 1948& Environment and Culture During the Last Deglaciation. American Philosophical Society, Proceedings 92:65-77. 1950 Grassland Climax, Fire, and Man. Journal of Range Management 3:16-21. 1952a Agricultural Origins and Dispersals. New York: American Geographical Society. 1952& Folkways of Social Science. Pages 100-109 in Minnesota, University of, Social Science Research Center, The Social Sciences at Mid-century. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press. 1956a The Agency of Man on the Earth. Pages 49-69 in International Symposium on Man's Role in Changing the Face of the Earth, Princeton, N.J., 1955, Man's Role in Changing the Face of the Earth. Univ. of Chicago Press. 1956& The Education of a Geographer. Association of American Geographers, Annals 46:287-299. 1957 The End of the Ice Age and Its Witnesses. Geographical Review 47:29-43. 1958 Man in the Ecology of Tropical America. Pages 104-110 in Pacific Science Congress, Ninth, Bangkok, 1957, Proceedings. Volume 20: Special Symposium on Climate, Vegetation, and Rational Land Utilization in the Humid Tropics. Bangkok: The Secretariat. 1962a Homestead and Community on the Middle Border. Landscape: Magazine of Human Geography 12, no. 1:3-7. 1962i> Seashore—Primitive Home of Man? American Philosophical Society, Proceedings. 106:41-47. 1966 The Early Spanish Main. Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press. Land and Life: A Selection from the Writings of Carl Ortwin Sauer. Edited by John Leighly. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1963. SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY HAHN, EDUARD 1896 Die Haustiere und ihre Beziehungen zur Wirtschaft des Menschen: Eine geographische Studie. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. HAHN, EDUARD 1909 Die Entstehung der Pflugkultur. Heidelberg (Germany): Winter. HAHN, EDUARD (1914) 1919 Von der Hacke zum Pflug. 2d ed. Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer.
SAUSSURE, FERDINAND DE Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913), Swiss linguist, was the chief forerunner of structural linguistics. He was born in Geneva, where he received his secondary and university education. He was awarded his doctorate at Leipzig in 1880, taught at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes in Paris from 1881 to 1891, and taught subsequently at Geneva for the remainder of his career. De Saussure's fame rests almost exclusively on two works—his earliest, the Memoire sur le systeme primitif des voyelles dans les langues indoeuropeennes (1879), and the posthumously published Cours de linguistique generale (1916). The Memoire is a brilliant tour de force, whose basic method foreshadows the fundamental structuralist notion of language as an organized system, the
19
central doctrine of de Saussure's mature thought. [See LINGUISTICS, article on THE FIELD.] In the Memoire it is boldly hypothesized that certain apparently divergent aspects of the IndoEuropean system of vowel alternations (the socalled ablaut system, which still survives in English in such vowel changes as the present sing, the preterite sang, the past participle simg) can be explained in accordance with the dominant regularities, if one assumes that certain sounds had formerly existed and produced certain effects before being lost. While this theory of lost sounds, subsequently called laryngeals, was admired in de Saussure's lifetime, the absence of any direct evidence for these sounds prevented its acceptance by scholars. After de Saussure's death the main points of his doctrine regarding the Indo-European vowels received confirmation when a newly discovered Indo-European language, cuneiform Hittite, was shown to have an actual laryngeal consonant (h) in almost all the instances that one would expect to find it on the basis of de Saussure's theory. In one variant or another, the laryngeal theory is now accepted by all IndoEuropean scholars. A far wider influence was exercised by the Cours. This work is based on students' notebooks of the three courses in general linguistics given by de Saussure at the University of Geneva in 1907, 1908-1909, and 1910-1911. Two of de Saussure's leading disciples, Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye, utilized these as their chief source in putting together the Cours. Given these circumstances of the book's composition, it is not surprising that an extensive exegetical literature has arisen concerning the true nature of de Saussure's doctrine. Godel (1957) published a considerable number of resumes and direct quotations from the notebooks and other unpublished sources, e.g., de Saussure's class notes and letters. It is quite likely that in some instances "fruitful misunderstandings" of de Saussure's ideas have exerted an influence on the development of European linguistic theory. Language as signs. Language is a system of signs and as such forms the central part of a discipline—semiology—which takes the general study of signs as its subject matter. De Saussure thus anticipated the concept of general semiotics, found in the work of Charles Morris and others [see SEMANTICS AND SEMIOTICS]. The sign has two indissoluble aspects, likened to the two sides of the same paper—the signifier (signifianf) and the signified (signifie"). De Saussure felt the need for the double terminology because of the ambiguity of the word "sign" in common usage, which refers
20
SAUSSURE, FERDINAND DE
both to the relation (between a sign and what it designates) and to the physical sign vehicle. The signifier and the signified are, in thoroughgoing mentalistic fashion, the acoustic image and the concept respectively, not the physical sound and the thing meant. The relation between signifier and signified is arbitrary in the sense that any signifier can, in principle, be connected with any signified. Both of these elements are, abstracted from their functioning in signs, unstructured. Language is thus pure form. Although arbitrary in the sense described above, the sign relation in any particular case is a historically imposed one about which the individual has no choice. It is a social fact that in a given community a particular sequence of sounds is connected with a particular concept. Simply because it is arbitrary, there is no reason to change it once established. One can argue the relative merits of monogamy or polygamy, but there is no rational basis for choosing between boeuf and Ochse as designations for "ox." Because language is arbitrary and because there is no social awareness of its true nature, it is never subject to radical change. From the formal nature of the components of the linguistic sign further important conclusions follow. Thus, in the case of the signifier, it is not the particular physical nature of the sound that counts but merely the fact that one sound is distinct from another. A favorite Saussurean simile likens language to a chess game. If the knight is replaced by a different kind of physical object it makes no difference to the game as long as the object is distinct from the other pieces. But if the rules for moving the knight are modified, then the system of chess has been modified in its very nature. This distinction is one aspect of a central Saussurean dichotomy, that between language (tongue} and speech (parole}. Phonetics in its physical aspect belongs to the latter. Likewise in grammar, we have a network of two types of relations, the syntagmatic, the relation between elements which actually occur together in the chain of speech—e.g., a verb and its object—and the paradigmatic, the relation of a present element to one which is not there but has the potentiality of appearance in place of the one chosen. Thus, in the sentence "Black is a color," "white" is a paradigmatic associate of "black," while "is a" constitutes a syntagmatic relation. The grammar of a language (langue) is the set of these two types of relations: it is a social product, never perfect in the individual but only in the mass of speakers (masse parlante). The way individuals actually construct sentences by using
langue constitutes parole. Within langue it is the position within the system that counts, not the physical realization. Thus a grammatical category may even be signaled by nothing (zero}, provided it has a particular place in a network of relations, e.g., the absence of an ending in the genitive plural of feminine nouns in Czech such as zen ("of women") is significant when it is opposed to the nominative plural, zeny. To be is to be related. Synchronic and diachronic study of language. Another dichotomy of fundamental importance in de Saussure's thought is that between the synchronic study of language as a state and the diachronic study of language as change through time [see LINGUISTICS, article on HISTORICAL LINGUISTICS]. These now current terms are terminological inventions of de Saussure. The insistence on the separation of synchronic and diachronic and the emphasis on synchronic states, not only as worthy autonomous subjects for investigation but even as having a certain priority, were perhaps de Saussure's most revolutionary ideas. Linguistics in its recognizably modern form arose in the early nineteenth century as a historical discipline, and de Saussure was the first to state clearly the viewpoint of modern structuralism—that language studied in a single time plane constitutes a systematic set of relations that can be studied without reference to the historic process by which these have come to be what they are. Thus, to revert to de Saussure's figure of the chess game, the man who has seen the entire game up to a particular point has no advantage over the newly arrived bystander in understanding the existing position. In spite of differences in detail, structuralism in linguistics is fundamentally allied with functionalism in social science generally and is part of the same intellectual movement. In the case of de Saussure, his notion of langue, a social phenomenon imposed on the individual, brings him closest to the social functionalism of Durkheim. Although Durkheim cited language as an ideal example of a social institution, there is apparently no evidence of any direct influence of either man on the other. The posthumous influence of de Saussure's ideas in general linguistics was enormous, particularly on the Continent. His work was most directly continued by the so-called Geneva school, which included among its leading figures Albert Sechehaye, Charles Bally, Robert Godel, and Henri Frei and which sponsored the journal Cahiers Ferdinand de Saussure (from 1941 to the present). The glossematic approach developed by the Danish linguist Louis Hjelmsler was founded on Saussurean con-
SAVIGNY, FRIEDRICH CARL VON cepts. De Saussure exercised a more diffuse influence on the chief European structuralist school, that of Prague, by which he was looked upon as a leading pioneer of structuralism in linguistics. JOSEPH H. GREENBERG WORKS BY SAUSSURE Memoire sur le systeme primitif des voyelles dans les langues indo-europeennes. Leipzig: Teubner. (1916) 1959 Course in General Linguistics. New York: Philosophical Library. -» First published posthumously as Cours de linguistique generale.
1879
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BENVENISTE, E. 1962 "Structure" en linguistique. Pages 31-39 in Colloque sur le mot structure, Paris, 1959, Sens et usages du terme structure dans les sciences humaines et sociales. Janua linguarum, Series minor, no. 16. The Hague: Mouton. Cahiers Ferdinand de Saussure. -> Published in Geneva by Droz since 1941. FREI, HENRI 1947 La linguistique saussurienne a Geneve depuis 1939. Word 3:107-109. GODEL, ROBERT 1957 Les sources manuscrites du Cours de linguistique generale de F. de Saussure. Geneva: Droz. WELLS, RULON S. 1947 De Saussure's System of Linguistics. Word 3:1-31.
SAVIGNY, FRIEDRICH CARL VON Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779-1861) was the founder of the older, romantic branch of the German historical school of law. He was born in Frankfurt am Main of an ancient and wealthy noble family from Lorraine, and his selection of an academic career was unusual for a member of his class. He began that career at the University of Marburg in 1800, teaching Roman law, and became professor of Roman law at Landshut in 1808. Two years later, at the suggestion of Wilhelm von Humboldt, he was appointed professor at the newly founded University of Berlin, where for three decades he had a most successful and influential career in legal teaching and research. From 1842 until the German revolution of 1848 he was Prussian minister for the revision of legislation. In the academic year 1802/1803, Savigny gave a lecture on legal methodology at Marburg (see Juristische Methodenlehre), which shows him still poised between rationalistic and historical jurisprudence. (His student Jacob Grimm recorded this lecture.) However, the lecture contains some of the basic principles of his later doctrine, for example, that jurisprudence must be empirical and that it should be a synthesis of historical and systematic treatments of the law. He first applied these early
21
theories in Das Recht des Besitzes (see 1803), a treatise that immediately established his reputation as one of the leading professors of civil law. What contemporary legal scholars saw as the particular significance of the treatise was the way Savigny took from the sources of ancient Roman law the leading principles of the law of possession, demonstrating the superiority of the Roman principles over the modifications that this law had undergone in Continental jurisprudence since the Middle Ages. Savigny's famous pamphlet Vom Beruf unserer Zeit fur Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft (1814) was published as an argument against the popular demand for the codification of German civil law on the model of the French and the Austrian codes. The pamphlet established the doctrine and program of the early historical school of law. In this pamphlet, as well as in his introductory essay (1815) to the first volume of the Zeitschrift fur geschichtliche Rechtswissenschaft, founded as the organ of the school in 1815, Savigny outlined a new theory of the creation of law, culminating in a strictly genetic conception and analysis of law. Taking off from the ideas of Montesquieu, Burke, and Justus Moser, he asserted that positive law is not a product of reason. From its true basis, the common beliefs of a particular nation, it develops in a continuous, "organic" process as do a nation's language and customs; it is the result of silent, anonymous, and irrational forces, of an implicit consensus, not of an intentional creative effort. Law is, therefore, of the same nature as custom; it is determined by the whole past of the nation and by its peculiar character (what was later called the Volksgeist), and it cannot be changed arbitrarily by legislation. Instead, Savigny advocated the reform of jurisprudence by means of historical research, holding that a strictly genetic study is the only way to conceive and develop contemporary positive law. While some of Savigny's contemporaries (Thibaut, P. J. A. von Feuerbach, Conner, and especially Hegel and his school) rejected his doctrine, the historical school of jurisprudence dominated German universities for nearly half a century. Its program of historical research, though neither wholly nor rigorously fulfilled, made the history of law a scientific discipline, by basing it on the idea of evolution. Savigny's own chief contribution in this field was his Geschichte des romischen Rechts im Mittelalter (1815-1831), which deals with the history of the sources, the literature, and the teaching of Roman law from the fifth through the fifteenth centuries. It initiated the modern study of medieval jurisprudence and has served ever
22
SAVING
since, corrected in many respects but unequaled, as the standard work on the history of medieval jurisprudence in Europe. Savigny also wrote a number of historical monographs, mainly on ancient Roman law (collected in his Vermischte Schriften ). In the field of legal dogmatics, Savigny's doctrine re-created, by reviving the study of ancient Roman law, a common field of legal study in the individual German states—the "modern Roman law," or Pandects. His most important dogmatic works, System des heutigen romischen Rechts (1840-1849) and Das Obligationenrecht als Theil des heutigen romischen Rechts (1851-1853), show that the theories that he had put forward in 1814 and 1815 about the nature of law had not produced a radical change even in his own legal dogmatics. His early theories had been provoked by his reaction, influenced by romanticism, against the natural law theories of the French Revolution and of liberalism generally. Later, however, he not only retained the fundamental doctrines of the rationalist jurisprudence of the eighteenth century in his dogmatic teaching but actually made these doctrines the backbone of his legal system. Both of Savigny's works are based on fundamental notions of German natural law theory as well as on Kant's legal philosophy. Within the framework of these categories, Savigny transcended Roman law in many respects, adapting it to modern requirements or developing new solutions, many of which have become influential in German and other legal science; for example, his doctrines of contract and corporation, and particularly his system of private international law—which, like the systems of Story and Mancini, counts among the classic theories in this branch of law. WALTER WILHELM [For the historical context of Savigny's work, see CONFLICT OF LAWS; JURISPRUDENCE; LEGAL SYSTEMS, article on CODE LAW SYSTEMS; and the biographies of BURKE; MONTESQUIEU.] WORKS BY SAVIGNY
(1803) 1848 Von Savigny's Treatise on Possession: Or, the Jus Possessionis of the Civil Law. 6th ed. London: Sweet. -> First published as Das Recht des Besitzes. A 7th German edition, enlarged and revised, was published in 1865 by Heyer. (1814) 1840 Vom Beruf unserer Zeit fur Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft. Heidelberg: Mohr. ->• Translated from the 2d edition by A. Hayward and published by Littlewood in 1831 as Of the Vocation of Our Age for Legislation and Jurisprudence. (1815) 1850 Ueber den Zweck der Zeitschrift fur geschichtliche Rechtswissenschaft. Volume 1,-pages 105126 in Friedrich Carl von Savigny, Vermischte
Schriften. Berlin: Veit. -> First published in Volume 1 of Zeitschrift fur geschichtliche Rechtswissenschaft. (1815-1831) 1834-1851 Geschichte des romischen Rechts im Mittelalter. 7 vols. Heidelberg: Mohr. -» Volume 1 was translated by E. Cathcart and published by Black in 1829 as The History of the Roman Law in the Middle Ages. 1840-1849 System des heutigen romischen Rechts. 8 vols. Berlin: Veit. -> Volume 1 was translated in 1867 by William Holloway as System of the Modern Roman Law, published in Madras, India, by Higginbotham. An index volume, edited by O. L. Heuser, was published in 1851. 1851-1853 Das Obligationenrecht als Theil des heutigen romischen Rechts. 2 vols. Berlin: Veit. Juristische Methodenlehre, nach der Ausarbeitung des Jakob Grimm. Edited by Gerhard Wesenberg. Stuttgart: Koehler, 1951. ->• Published posthumously. Vermischte Schriften. 5 vols. Berlin: Veit, 1850. -> Contains works first published between 1800 and 1844. SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
GAGNER, STEN 1960 Studien zur Ideengeschichte der Gesetzgebung. Uppsala, Universitet, Acta universitatis upsaliensis, Studia iuridica upsaliensia, No. 1. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell. -» See especially pages 15-51. GUTZWILLER, MAX 1923 Der Einftuss Savignys auf die Entwicklung des Internationalprivatrechts. Collectanea friburgensia, Vol. 28. Fribourg (Switzerland): Universitats Buchhandlung. KANTOROWICZ, HERMANN 1912 Was ist uns Savigny? Berlin: Heymann. KANTOROWICZ, HERMANN 1934 Savigny, Friedrich Carl von. Volume 13, pages 546-548 in Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. New York: Macmillan. KANTOROWICZ, HERMANN 1937 Savigny and the Historical School of Law. Law Quarterly Review 53:326-343. KOSCHAKER, PAUL (1947) 1966 Europa und das romische Recht. 4th ed. Munich: Beck. KUNKEL, WOLFGANG 1962 Savignys Bedeutung fur die deutsche Rechtswissenschaft und das deutsche Recht. Juristenzeitung 17:457-463. STINTZING, RODERICK VON; and LANDSBERG, ERNST (1910) 1957 Geschichte der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft. Volume 3, part 2: Das 19. Jahrhundert, der Historismus in der Rechtswissenschaft. Aalen (Germany): Scientia Antiquariat. -> See especially pages 186-253 of the text section, and pages 94-110 of the notes. STOLL, ADOLF 1927-1939 Friedrich Karl v. Savigny: Ein Bild seines Lebens mit einer Sammlung seiner Briefe. 3 vols. Berlin: Heymann. WIEACKER, FRANZ 1956 Friedrich Carl von Savigny. Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung fur Rechtsgeschichte Romanistische Abteilung 72:1-38. -> Reprinted on pages 107-143 in Franz Wieacker, Griinder und Bewahrer: Rechtslehrer der neueren deutschen Privatrechtsgeschichte, published by Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1959. WOLF, ERIK (1939) 1963 Grosse Rechtsdenker der deutschen Geistesgeschichte. 4th ed. Tubingen (Germany): Mohr. -> See especially pages 467-542.
SAVING See CONSUMPTION FUNCTION; INTEREST; INVESTMENT.
SAY, JEAN BAPTISTE SAY, JEAN BAPTISTE Jean Baptiste Say (1767-1832) was born in Lyons of a cultivated Protestant merchant family. After a sound education and a two-year stay in England, he joined an insurance company. Say was an enthusiastic supporter of the ideas of the French Revolution and took part as a volunteer in the military campaign of 1792. Bookish and inclined to philosophy, in 1793 he joined the editorial board of a new magazine entitled La decade philosophique litteraire et politique, par une societe de republicains, which took as its motto "Enlightenment and morality are as much needed for preserving the Republic as courage was needed for winning it." He soon became the editor-in-chief of the journal, which announced that its aim was "to keep the public informed on everything new concerning literature, science, agriculture, and the arts." In 1799 Say was appointed a member of the Tribunate, under the Consulate. He took part in a competition arranged by the Institut de France on the subject "By what means and what institutions can morality be established in a people?" His contribution, "Olbie: Ou, essai sur les moyens de reformer les moeurs d'une nation," gave promise of his gifts as a moralist and economist. Following up his thesis that "the first book on morality for the Olbians should be a good Treatise on Political Economy" (Oeuvres diverses, p. 593), he set about composing such a work, inspired to a great extent by the ideas expounded by Adam Smith in his celebrated Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, with which Say had become acquainted as early as 1789. Say's book appeared in 1803 and soon had considerable success. In the meantime, Say's disapproval of the Napoleonic regime led to his dismissal from the Tribunate. He moved to a small town in northern France, Auchy-les-Hesdin, to set up a cotton-spinning plant. He stayed there seven years before he sold out in 1813 and returned to Paris. The fall of the empire and the return of the Bourbons permitted him to resume intellectual activity aimed at the general public. In 1815 he began to teach at the Athenee what was probably the first public course of political economy ever given in France, and in the same year he published his Catechisme d'economie politique. Two years later the government established a chair of industrial economy for him (the term political economy still frightened people) at the Conservatoire des Arts et Metiers. Finally, in 1830, the aged master did become professor of political economy at the College de France, in the first chair of its kind to be established. Meanwhile, he had
23
published his Cours complet d'economie politique pratique (1828-1829) in six volumes, a work, as the long subtitle indicates, "designed to teach statesmen, landowners and capitalists, men of learning, agriculturalists, manufacturers, businessmen, and in general all citizens, about political economy." Although it has been alleged that Say was a mere expositor and popularizer of Adam Smith's ideas, he did more than merely transmit these ideas. He did, of course, present the ideas that he borrowed from Smith with typical French order and clarity, and he justly complained of obscurity and confusion in Smith's own statements in The Wealth of Nations. Say wanted to produce what he described as "a work in which sound observations were reduced to general principles that could be accepted by any judicious man; in which those observations and principles were so completed and coordinated as to reinforce one another, so that they could fruitfully be studied at any time and in any place" (1803, p. xlviii in 1860 English edition). And this was not merely an interpretative work: at important points Say showed originality, and he undoubtedly contributed to advancing the science of economics. Philosophical position. In his basic philosophy, Say was strongly influenced by the ideological ambience of his time. Like many of his contemporaries, he was at once deist, liberal, and rationalist. In the realm of scientific and doctrinal convictions, however, he showed little toleration but instead a dogmatism that may have been related to his authoritarian nature. This is one of several ways in which he differed sharply from Adam Smith: he was never touched by doubt. As a disciple of the Encyclopedists, he was an intransigent scientist, even a passionate one, and convinced of the predominant influence of economic phenomena in the life of the whole society. On this point, as in the case of the preponderant role of industrial activity in production as a whole, it may be possible to establish a connection between Say's ideas and certain theories of Karl Marx, and in any event, with those of Saint-Simon and the Saint-Simonians. His belief in economics as a science led Say to try to reconcile his naturalism and his rationalism. He was able to do so because he conceived of the laws of nature as necessarily rational (or providential); in this respect, he was adopting a point of view the physiocrats had developed a half century earlier. But it is noteworthy that Say went on to establish similarities between the science of economics and physiology, transposing the latter from the individual to the social level and preferring a
<24
SAY, JEAN BAPTISTE
biological model of the economy to a purely mechanical one. He was later to be followed on the same track by Alfred Marshall, the great English economist. It should be pointed out, however, that Say's method was never made rigorously explicit. While asserting the sovereignty of facts in scientific matters, he nonetheless interpreted them according to the results that he intended to reach. Thus, he appeared as an "ideologue" to some of his contemporaries. Relationship to Adam Smith. Say deeply admired the work of Adam Smith. Of The Wealth of Nations he said, "Whenever the Inquiry Into the Wealth of Nations is perused with the attention it so well merits, it will be perceived that until the epoch of its publication the science of political economy did not exist" (1803, p. xxxviii in 1860 English edition). But Say was not content merely to repeat or rethink the ideas of his master. He filtered them, clarified them, and at several points went beyond them. He made a more systematic critique of physiocratic ideas, based on an expansion of the concept of productivity and the inclusion of immaterial products among the positive results of economic activity. Say gave greater depth to value theory by introducing the notions of need and utility. As a true precursor of the marginalist school, he noted that the needs of men may be classified according to their urgency in scales of preference, that they give rise to utility, which in turn determines demand. Demand then interacts with supply, which in turn is determined by the cost of production. For Say, however, in contrast to Ricardo, for example, utility is the stronger determining factor in prices; the cost of production enters only as a kind of restrictive condition. There too Say appears to have anticipated Alfred Marshall's well-known theory. It is of interest to see that Say realized perfectly that the explanation of the phenomena of value and price is not to be sought in terms of unilateral causal relationships but in terms of the concept of interdependence. Even more than Adam Smith, Say strongly emphasized that the role of science is primarily one of observation and explanation. Where Smith, following the physiocrats, came forward as a physician for society, Say aimed exclusively at being a naturalist. His Traite professes to be a "simple exposition" of a body of exact knowledge, applicable under all circumstances. Although agriculture still had a predominant position for Smith, it no longer did for Say. To be sure, the half-century separating their work witnessed the entire industrial revolution in Britain, and in France its beginning. Say was in a position
to observe its first manifestations, in the seven years that he devoted to business. Thus he made industry and even commerce as important as agriculture in the total productive activity of society. Major contributions. Say appreciated the importance of the entrepreneur in economic life, a role Smith had neglected to define and which has remained, since Say's time, a permanent feature of economic analysis. This essential actor has functions that are quite distinct from those of the capitalist strictly so called (British authors confused these two conceptions). The entrepreneur, whether he be an industrialist, businessman, or farmer, has a truly strategic position in economic life, in that he is par excellence the intermediary between landowners, capitalists, workers, and consumers. He is also pictured as performing a truly creative function as the organizer responsible for production, striving unceasingly to improve it, especially in the industrial sector. Over a century later, Schumpeter was to take up and perfect this dynamic conception of the role of the true entrepreneur, the creator of new combinations (innovations). Say's development of the theory of the distribution of the social product, deduced from the previous analysis, was a marked advance over current theories. Say coordinated this theory precisely and harmoniously with the theories of exchange and production. The entrepreneur, a buyer of productive services at known prices (the services of men, capital, and lands) and a seller of products at uncertain prices, is thus seen as assuming a set of fundamental functions, as presiding in a way over activity that is both production and distribution. His specific share is the profit, a share that is described as essential, residual, and precarious. This brings us to the very threshold of Walras's grand conception of economic equilibrium. Another of Say's highly original contributions to economic analysis is his famous law of markets, which undoubtedly did more to make its author celebrated than all the rest of his work. This law (cf. Schumpeter in History of Economic Analysis 1954, pp. 615-626) may be interpreted in many different ways. We know its very simple, almost lapidary content: "Products are exchanged for products." This may be taken as meaning that the role of money in the economy is, after all, secondary (the conception of the "monetary veil"). But one may also infer that everyone taking part in an exchange is interested in the prosperity of his partner, whether it be an individual or a nation, a thesis that goes counter to the mercantilist conception that "one gains only what the other loses." Finally, the law may imply a theory of crises, based
SCALING on rejection of the concepts of general overproduction and underconsumption and the assertion of the essentially transitory and limited nature of these imbalances. The remedy is therefore not the limiting of production but its expansion. "Produce, produce, that is the whole thing!" Say concluded, in his Cours complet, that although "there is an excess in certain products, there is a shortage in others." Importance and influence. All in all, it would appear that Say's work, without bearing the marks of really great genius, does give its author an eminent place in the development of economic thought. Say was not entirely an innovator, even in fields where he was not following Adam Smith and did show real originality: on many points he links up to a tradition solidly rooted in France. As Schumpeter remarked judiciously (1954, p. 492): "Say's work is the most important of the links in the chain that leads from Cantillon and Turgot to Walras." He opened up new paths, but later authors followed them with more success than he. This was the case with the members of the marginalist school—Carl Menger, Stanley Jevons, and especially Leon Walras—who were able to employ the notion of utility in a much more precise and scientifically valid manner than their common precursor, Say. (Walras tended to minimize his debt to Say, but it was nevertheless important.) Again, the fine effort at synthesis made by Alfred Marshall and the neoclassical school is not entirely untouched by the teachings of Say. His influence can be traced beyond the general equilibrium school to such essentially modern authors as Schumpeter. It is true that in the eyes of many of our contemporaries Say is seen primarily as the author of the law of markets, one of the favorite butts of Keynesian and Neo-Keynesian criticism, and this "law," interpreted and misinterpreted as it has been, may remain his chief title to fame. But perhaps he will be remembered for his power to build on established intellectual traditions and to stimulate other thinkers: there lay his true merit, which only time will confirm. GAS TON LEDTJC [For the historical context of Say's work, see ECONOMIC THOUGHT, article on PHYSIOCRATIC THOUGHT; and the biographies of SAINT-SIMON; SMITH, ADAM. For discussion of the subsequent development of his ideas, see DEMAND AND SUPPLY; ENTREPRENEURSHIP; UTILITY; and the biographies of JEVONS; MARSHALL; MENGER; SCHUMPETER; WALRAS.] WORKS BY SAY (1803) 1964 A Treatise on Political Economy: Or, the Production, Distribution and Consumption of Wealth.
25
New York: Kelley. -» First published as Traite d'economie politique: Ou, simple exposition de la maniere dont se forment, se distribuent, et se consomment les richesses. Translation of extract in text provided by the editors. (1815) 1816 Catechism of Political Economy: Or, Familiar Conversations on the Manner in Which Wealth Is Produced, Distributed, and Consumed in Society. London: Sherwood. -> First published as Catechisme d'economie politique. (1828-1829) 1852 Cours complet d'economie politique pratique. 2 vols. 3d ed., enl. With notes by Horace Say. Paris: Guillaumiri. -» First published in 6 volumes. Translation of extracts in text provided by the editors. Oeuvres diverses. Paris: Guillaumin, 1848. -» Translation of extract in text provided by the editors. SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
GoETZ-GiREY, ROBERT 1966 Croissance et progres a I'origine des societes industrielles. Paris: Montchrestien. SCHUMPETER, JOSEPH A. (1954) 1960 History of Economic Analysis. Edited by E. B. Schumpeter. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. TEILHAC, ERNEST 1927 L'oeuvre economique de JeanBaptiste Say. Paris: Sirey.
SCALE, ECONOMIES OF See ECONOMIES OF SCALE. SCALES OF MEASUREMENT See PSYCHOMETRICS; STATISTICS, DESCRIPTIVE; SCALING. SCALING Measurement of a property involves assignment of numbers to objects as a way of representing that property. The process thus includes both a formal, logical system, e.g., the real number system, and an empirical system, the set of instances of the property. Scale types. An important aspect of measurement is the correspondence between some of the characteristics of the number system involved and some of the relations between instances of the property. The particular set of characteristics of the formal number system that is used determines the type of scale that is obtained. Scale types can most easily be described by the type of transformation that can be applied to a given scale without changing the numerical interpretation of the basic empirical relations. Although there is no limit to the number of scale types that might be devised, only a relatively small number have been found useful. Some of the more important scale types are described here. In ordinal scales the only relevant property of numbers is their order. Numbers are assigned to
26
SCALING
objects so that the order of the numbers corresponds to the order of the objects with respect to the property of interest. Any transformation of a given numerical assignment that preserves order, i.e., any monotonic transformation, would serve as well. An ordinal scale is therefore said to be determined up to a monotonic transformation. Fixed-origin ordinal scales are rarely discussed, but are of some empirical importance in the fields of social psychology and personality, where bipolar attributes are not uncommon. Of relevance in such scales is the fact that numbers have a unique origin. Numbers are assigned not only so that their order corresponds to the order of the objects but also so that the origin of the numerical series corresponds to an empirically meaningful origin or zero point of the property. Any monotonic transformation that does not change the origin leaves the numerical interpretation of the basic relations unchanged. In interval scales, in addition to order, differences between the numbers correspond, in some generalized sense, to the distances or differences between the instances of the property. Interval scales are thus determined up to a linear transformation of the form
y = ax + b, where a is any positive number and b is any number whatsoever. Log interval scales are closely related to the interval scale. In the interval scale, numerical differences correspond to empirical differences; in the log interval scale, numerical ratios correspond to empirical ratios. The transformation characterizing the log interval scale is given by
y = ax*, where a and b are positive. Ratio scales can be described either as those in which the order, the differences, and the ratios of the assigned numbers correspond to the order, differences, and ratios of instances of the property or as those in which order, differences, and origin all receive numerical interpretation. For either description, the ratio scale is determined up to a linear transformation of the form y = ax, where a is positive. Difference scales and ratio scales are related in a way similar to the way that interval and log interval scales are related; in each case one scale is equivalent to the logarithm of the other. In the difference scale, the procedures used to assign numbers serve to fix the order, the differences between numbers, and the unit of measurement. The char-
acterizing transformation is y = x + a. [For a more extensive discussion of scale types, see PSYCHOMETRICS; STATISTICS, DESCRIPTIVE; see also Suppes & Zinnes 1963.] The concept of scale type is important because the type of scale on which a property is measured restricts the kinds of information that can be obtained in an experiment. The scale type therefore limits the kinds of meaningful questions that can be asked regarding the property. Consider the following three questions: Do high-scoring subjects increase in ability more than low-scoring subjects (after some specified treatment)? If the ability is measured on a scale that contains only ordinal information, and if both low and high scorers increase in ability with no overlap in distribution, then the question cannot be answered. The question deals with the relative magnitude of differences (or perhaps ratios), and in a purely ordinal scale the relative magnitude of numerical differences or ratios is meaningless. Is amount of aggression directly proportional to degree of frustration (in some specified situation)? Let A denote amount of aggression and F the degree of frustration. The question then concerns the form of the equation that relates A to F, that is, one asks whether these two variables are functionally related by an equation of the form A — kF, where k is some positive constant. Clearly, an affirmative answer cannot be given unless both A and F are measured on ratio scales. Do college sophomores differ more widely in their attitude toward civil rights than in their attitude toward the Asian policy of the United States? Questions such as this require a scale type ordinarily ignored in physical measurement. Consider the formally equivalent question "Does this set of containers differ more widely in their volume than in their weight?" The question, which does not seem particularly unreasonable in the attitude context, now appears absurd: a difference of x cubic inches is neither more nor less nor equal to a difference of y pounds. The two differences are simply not comparable. However, volume and weight are measured on ratio scales. If they, or the two attitude variables, were measured on difference scales, then a basis for the comparison would exist. Kinds of measurement. So far, scale type has been treated as though it were an inherent part of a given numerical assignment. In one sense, this is correct; each scaling procedure includes a set of rules governing assignment of numbers to instances of the property. The rules limit to varying extents and in varying ways the freedom of the investigator to decide which numbers to assign to the instances
SCALING of the property. The characterization of scale type by admissible transformations is simply a compact way of stating the particular restrictions imposed. But scaling procedures also differ markedly in the quality of information the numbers represent. At one extreme are measurement procedures that rely almost entirely on definition or assumption. An experimenter might simply define the attitude of a subject to be equal to the number of favorable responses he gives to a specified collection of items. Such measurement by fiat has been both useful and common throughout the behavioral sciences. The type of scale resulting from such a procedure is simply a matter of definition or assumption. Although these procedures determine a unique number to be assigned to a given subject, the experimenter may have reasons for wanting to attribute meaning only to the ordinal property of the numerical assignment. Or he may want to attribute meaning to both ordinal and interval properties, thus obtaining an interval scale. Suitable modifications of the definition could therefore result in any of the scale types already described. Obviously, such modifications do not change the empirical basis of the numerical assignment, which, in the present instance, is simply the number of favorable responses to the particular set of items. The usefulness of such defined scales depends heavily on the experience and intuition of the investigator. The scales tend to be exceedingly special. Different investigators, when defining scales in this way for the same attribute, would ordinarily select different, or at best only partially overlapping, sets of items. Because favorable responses depend as much on the nature of the items as on the attitude of the subject, the value assigned to a given subject would clearly be expected to differ from one scale to another. While the scales might be ratio scales by definition, it is unlikely that they would differ from each other only in unit of measurement. The procedures themselves provide no basis for choosing among the many scales of a given attribute that might be defined in this way. Hence, confidence in any one cannot be expected to be great. A somewhat different procedure for obtaining scale properties by definition relies on assumptions made about the distribution of subjects. The investigator might stipulate, for example, that the number of favorable responses to his set of items only serves to order the subjects on the attribute. But he then might go on to assume that his population of subjects is distributed in some specified way on the attribute (ordinarily, the assumption of a normal distribution is made, but other distributions could serve as well). Knowledge of order and
27
of the properties of the assumed distribution enables the investigator to increase the level of the scale from ordinal to interval or perhaps even to ratio. But again, the meaning of the interval or ratio properties of the scale is derived only from the definition. There is no limit to the number of base populations that can be defined. And scales simply defined through use of the distribution assumption on one population cannot be expected to match those based on other populations. A more appealing basis for establishing interval or ratio properties is provided by fundamental measurement procedures. In these procedures, the meaning of the properties of the final scale is determined, at least to some extent, by the empirical relations between the observables. Fundamental measurement procedures involve verifiable scientific models or theories, place restrictions on the behavior of the observables, and are subject to empirical test. One possible outcome of an application of a fundamental procedure, of course, is the conclusion that the scale in question does not fit the data, that the theoretical assumptions are not appropriate for that particular situation. Under these circumstances, no scale is obtained. But when the empirical fit of data to the theory is acceptable, the result is a scale whose properties are based to some extent on empirical law rather than arbitrary definition alone. It is with such fundamental measurement procedures in scaling that this article is concerned. Two broad classes of scaling models. The fundamental scaling procedures can be grouped into two broad classes: those concerned with the measurement of stimulus attributes and those concerned primarily with measurement of individual difference or responder attributes. Different models within each class represent alternative rationales for attaining essentially the same objective. The objective itself ordinarily differs between classes. Stimulus models The stimulus models use responses of subjects to stimuli to establish scales for attributes of stimuli. Scale values are assigned only to the stimuli. The subject, or group of subjects, is characterized by the entire scale. Individual or group differences in this context refer to differences between scales, and not to differences in scale values on the attribute. The stimulus models are therefore concerned with psychological attributes of stimuli for subjects or groups of subjects. In the stimulus model, the subject himself acts as a judge or evaluator of the stimuli. His task is a particularized one—he does not simply judge or
28
SCALING
respond to the stimuli per se but, rather, evaluates the stimuli with respect to some specified attribute. Hence, the same set of stimuli can be scaled with respect to several different attributes. A set of statements all designed to reflect an attitude toward some topic might, for example, be scaled with respect to such attributes as degree of favorability toward the topic, relevance, complexity, or intensity. The subject's task in each case is to evaluate the stimuli solely with respect to the attribute of interest. The resulting scale is then indicative of how these particular statements are perceived with respect to the defined attribute by that particular subject or group of subjects. Stimulus models are used to obtain both psychophysical and psychometric scales. The models appropriate for psychometrics are actually a subset of the psychophysical models, but the measurement problem itself differs considerably in the two fields. Measurement in psychophysics has been concerned primarily with determining functional relations between physical variables and the corresponding subjective attributes. The usual experimental strategy holds constant or controls all relevant physical dimensions but one, and then determines how the subjective attribute varies as a function of that single physical variable. The resulting psychophysical magnitude function is thus a relation between two variables that is expected to hold when other physical variables influencing the subjective attribute are fixed or controlled as specified. For example, a psychophysical function for loudness might relate the perceived loudness of 1,000-cycle sinusoidal tones of a given duration to sound energy measured at the ear. Other functions ordinarily are needed for white noise, for clicks, or for tones of another duration or a different frequency. Although each separate function is monotonic for the relevant physical variable, no such simple relation exists relating sound energy to subjective loudness for stimuli that vary on several relevant dimensions. Development of equations specifying the loudness of any stimulus that possesses sound energy would be a great deal more complex. [See HEARING; PSYCHOPHYSICS.] In psychophysics the physical variable determines the set of stimuli to which the results apply. In psychometrics, it is more nearly the reverse. Psychometric scaling begins with the psychological attribute. The procedures are applicable to any set of stimuli possessing the attribute, and the problem is to scale the set of stimuli as it exists. The stimulus set is typically complex, varying with respect to other subjective dimensions and with respect to a host of correlated physical variables. There is, of
course, no single, monotonically related physical correlate. Monotone relations are to be expected only when all but one of the physical correlates are held constant. Complexity of the stimulus set is therefore the chief characteristic distinguishing psychophysical from psychometric scaling problems. Several major consequences of this complexity are listed below. [See PSYCHOMETRICS.] Recognizability of individual stimuli—The subject can often identify psychometric stimuli because of their variation on extraneous attributes. Since he may tend to remember earlier responses to the same stimulus, independent judgments on successive trials cannot routinely be expected. Replication over trials with the same subject is therefore troublesome. Most psychometric scales have been based on groups of subjects, so that the recognition problem is not so severe. Ordinal properties—When there is awareness of a monotonically related physical variable, knowledge of order on the subjective attribute is automatically implied. For the complex stimulus sets of psychometrics, order of the stimuli is typically an unknown that must be determined. Experimental procedures that require prior knowledge of order of the stimuli often then cannot be used. Production techniques—When a physical variable is monotonically related to a psychological attribute, there is ordinarily a procedure for easily generating a virtually continuous set of stimuli that are ordered with respect to the psychological attribute. This in turn makes possible the use of the various production techniques—procedures that require the subject to adjust a variable, i.e., to generate a new stimulus, with specified properties. On the other hand, with psychometric stimuli such production techniques typically cannot be used: the subject cannot on demand paint a painting halfway between two standards in aesthetic quality, write an essay twice as good as a standard, or create a worker whose merit falls between that of two others. Interpolation—A monotonic physical attribute can be used as a basis for interpolation. The stimulus that could be judged greater than a standard 75 per cent of the time can be estimated from data obtained by using other stimuli. In addition, a subset of stimuli can be used to establish the functional relation between the two variables. Given the relation, the scale values of all remaining stimuli can be determined numerically or graphically, without resort to additional experimental observations. Neither technique is available for the complex stimulus sets of psychometrics, the closest approximation of which is the establishment of a scale of
SCALING standards against which new stimuli can be evaluated by direct comparison. The stimulus scaling models can be classified into two types on the basis of the rationale used to obtain scale properties above and beyond order. In the variability models, the discriminability of the stimuli, or the variability of judgment with respect to the stimuli, is used as the basis for deriving the higher-level metric scale properties. In the quantitative judgment models, the additional metric properties are obtained directly from the quantitative aspects of the judgments themselves. Variability models. Perhaps the best-known variability model is that developed by Thurstone (1927). Thurstone's general model begins with a set of elements called discriminal processes. Each element has a value on a postulated, underlying psychological continuum. Presentation of a stimulus to a subject results in arousal of a discriminal process. Different presentations of the same stimulus may arouse different discriminal processes— there is thus no one-to-one relation between the two. Rather, a distribution of discriminal processes is associated with each stimulus. Presentation of a stimulus is equivalent to sampling a discriminal process from the distribution associated with that stimulus. [See CONCEPT FORMATION; LEARNING, article on DISCRIMINATION LEARNING.] In Thurstone's model it is postulated that these distributions (one for each stimulus) are normal with means s; and variances crj. The mean is taken as the scale value of the stimulus. The standard deviation, cr ; , called the discriminal dispersion, is the index of the ambiguity or conf us ability of the stimulus; the smaller the cr,•, the less ambiguous and the more readily discriminable the stimulus. The general model, therefore, provides both location and spread parameters for the stimuli. The conceptual framework of the model is illustrated in Figure 1. We will consider here two particularizations of
the Thurstone model, one developed for comparative judgments and another developed for categorical judgments. The law of comparative judgment. The law of comparative judgment postulates that in any comparison of two stimuli, the psychological difference between the stimuli is indirectly measured by the relative frequency with which the difference is perceived. For example, two stimuli, j and k, are presented to the subject, with instructions to indicate which one appears greater with respect to some designated attribute. Since each stimulus is held to arouse a discriminal process, dj or dk, the subject selects as greater the stimulus which on that occasion arouses the discriminal process having the greater value on the underlying continuum. If the difference d/v — dj > 0, stimulus k is selected; if dk — d; < 0, stimulus j is selected. Exact equality is not allowed. Each paired presentation is formally equivalent to drawing an element from a bivariate normal distribution. An indefinitely large number of such observations generates a distribution of discriminal differences. From a large number of such judgments one can also determine the proportion of times that stimulus k is judged greater than stimulus j. One of the characteristics of the normal distribution that makes it particularly valuable for distribution models of this type is that differences between paired observations drawn from a bivariate normal distribution are normally distributed. The mean of the difference distribution is equal to the difference between the original means, or scale values, s,c —s ; -; the variance is cry + cr| — 2r/7ccr)o-/., where rj7. represents the correlation between the pairs of discriminal processes. If we define pjlc as the probability that stimulus k is judged greater than stimulus j (that is, that dk - d,•> 0) on any given presentation, and define xjk as the unit normal deviate corresponding to p j k , then the general form of the law of comparative judgment for n stimuli is given by the set of equations (1)
Figure I — Distributions on the psychological continuum of discriminal processes associated with four stimuli Source: From Torgerson 1958, p. 157.
29
sk - s} = xi1t V o-f + 0-2 - 2rj/covo-7v,, j,k= 1,2,- • -,n. The quantity xjlt is the (theoretical) observable; the remaining terms are unknowns. Given n stimuli, there are n(n — l)/2 possible equations and, since both the origin and unit are arbitrary, there are 2 ( n — l ) + n ( n — l ) / 2 unknowns. Hence there are always more unknowns than independent equations, and further restrictions on the data are necessary to establish scale values. Three such specializations have been proposed, of which only one, Thurstone's case v, the most restrictive, has been
30
SCALING
found generally useful. In case v, it is assumed that the value under the radical in (1) is constant, i.e., that the distributions of discriminal differences all have the same variance. Then, arbitrarily defining the variance as unity, for convenience, there remain simply the n(n — l)/2 equations (2)
S
•—•
j,k= 1,2, • • -,n.
Efficient procedures for estimating the scale values from these equations are available. The scale obtained is an interval scale, because the unit of measurement must be defined arbitrarily, and a constant can be added to all of the scale values without changing the solution. Furthermore, the interval properties are based on empirical law. Consider any three ordered stimuli, i < j < k, and the three unit normal deviates X a , xj1e, and xik. From (2), since the numerical differences between scale values must add, (S* - Sy) + (Sj - Si) = (Sfc -
Si),
for all i<j
xjk + xn — XM ,
for all i < j < k.
The additivity-of-difference rule can therefore be said to provide the empirical basis for the interval properties of the final scale. Actually, of course, one would not expect (3) to hold exactly for empirical data. Among other things, the obtained proportions on which the deviates are based are only estimates and not population values. A statistical test for the goodness of fit of the model to data has been provided by Mosteller (1951). Graphical and numerical procedures can also be used to aid the investigator in deciding whether the fit is close enough for his purposes even though it does not meet the statistical criterion. Given estimates of the scale values of the stimuli, one can compute the set of theoretical proportions that would fit the estimated scale values perfectly. The discrepancies between these derived proportions and the corresponding observed proportions can then be examined. Alternatively, for any two stimuli, i and j, one can plot the obtained values of xik versus xjk for all values of k. From (2) it is clear that the model requires that the plotted points fall along a straight line with unit slope. [See GOODNESS OF FIT.] The law of categorical judgment. Several additional postulates are used to adapt the general Thurstone model to categorical data and to derive a set of equations relating stimulus values and category boundaries to the relative frequency with which each stimulus is judged to be in each category. In the usual experimental procedures, the
subject is required to rate or sort a set of n stimuli into a fixed number of ordered categories. Graphic rating procedures or arrangement methods can also be used, but these require that the data first be artificially divided into a limited set of ordered categories. Thurstone's general model illustrated in Figure 1 deals with a set of n stimuli and their associated distributions of discriminal processes, with means s;- and standard deviations cr ; . The present extension adds parallel notions dealing with the location of boundaries between adjacent categories. Data are presented in the form of ratings of stimuli on an m + 1 step scale. It is assumed that the psychological continuum is divided by the m category boundaries into m + 1 intervals, which may or may not be equal in extent. In the original version of the model, the boundaries were treated as fixed. We shall follow the more general version that allows the boundary locations to vary from observation to observation. The location of the gth category boundary is treated as a random variable with mean ta and variance o-|. If we assume that these distribution functions are also jointly normal, then precisely the same reasoning that led to (1) leads to the set of mn equations for the general law of categorical judgment: (4)
= 1,2,- • • , w, where ta — sf denotes the difference between the mean location of category boundary g and the mean location of stimulus j . Eq. (4) is again too general to be of more than academic interest. As was true for (1), there are always more unknowns than equations. One common restricted version of the general equation is based on the assumption that the radical is a monotone function of the stimulus standard deviations, a,. This would occur, for example, if both the correlation term and the variances of the category boundaries were constant, or if constant variances or* and independence (rjff = 0) were assumed. If we now let of = J
t iff
— O) <;
— JijgfXj -Y fV
,
7 J
—• l,xi, 1 9 • • • , 17 II,
g = 1,2,- • •, m. Eqs. (5) are formally identical to the equations underlying the "method of successive intervals" (Saffir 1937; Gulliksen 1954), although in the traditional version the assumption of fixed boundaries leads to the interpretation of a} as the standard
SCALING deviation (discriminal dispersion) of stimulus j rather than as a more general spread parameter only monotonically related to a-j. Efficient and practical estimation procedures have been developed for both complete and incomplete data matrices and are discussed in Torgerson (1958). Another common restricted case assumes that the difference distributions all have the same variance. Then, if the unit of measurement is denned so that the value under the radical in (4) is 1, we can write the nm equations, (6)
j = 1,2,- • -, n, g - 1,2,- • -, ra.
Eqs. (6) represent the most restricted version of the law and underlie Attneave's method of graded dichotomies (1949), Garner and Hake's equidiscriminability scaling procedure (1951), and Edwards and Thurstone's method of successive intervals (1952). Note that this version allows a single parameter for both stimuli and category boundaries, whereas the other version allowed a second parameter for the stimuli. The final scale, if achieved, is therefore an equidiscriminability or equiconfusability scale, with properties similar to those of (2) for comparative judgments. The logistic model for choice data. The logistic model is the major alternative to Thurstone's general model for obtaining a scale based on discriminability or variability of judgment. The model was developed for the paired comparison case by Bradley and Terry (1952). Luce's choice axiom (1959) extended the model to choice data in general and gave the procedure a more elegant, axiomatic basis. Luce's version of the model requires, in essence, that the subjects' choices behave in a manner analogous to conditional probabilities. Where S and T are both subsets of a set U and where p(T), the probability of choosing an element of T, is greater than 0, then the formula for the conditional probability of S given T, p(S|T), is p(S n T)/p(T). The interesting property of conditional probability for present purposes is the multiplication rule. Given three subsets, such that R C S C T, p(R|S) . p ( S | T ) = p ( R | T ) . Luce's axiom, for the case where the probability of choosing any element is neither 0 nor 1, is the empirical analogue: (7)
p s (R) • p r ( S ) = p T ( R ) .
That is, the probability that the subject will choose an R-element when presented with the set T is equal to the probability that he will choose an R-
31
element when presented with the set S multiplied by the probability that he will choose an S-element when presented with the set T. An alternative form of the axiom is known as the constant ratio rule (Clarke 1957). Let x and y denote any two stimuli, let p(x,y} denote the probability that stimulus x is chosen when only x and y are presented, and let pK(x) denote the probability that stimulus x is chosen when the subset S is presented. The constant ratio rule states that (8)
where Cxy denotes the constant ratio of the probability of choosing stimulus x to the probability of choosing stimulus y. The rule requires that for any set S containing both stimulus x and stimulus y, the ratio of the probability of choosing stimulus x to that of choosing stimulus y be invariant. For a given pair of stimuli the ratio is constant regardless of either what or how many other stimuli are included in the set from which the choice is made. The complete experiment for evaluating Luce's axiom or the constant ratio rule would therefore require the experimenter to obtain separate estimates of the probability of choosing stimulus x (for all x e T) for every subset of T containing x as a member. When the requirements of the axiom are met, then there exists a iy-scale such that for every subset of stimuli S, (9)
where v(x~) denotes the scale value of stimulus x. From (9) and the constant ratio rule it is also clear that
(10) Given the axiom and the definition, the scale values are determined up to multiplication by a positive constant, i.e., the x>-scale is a ratio scale. It should be noted, however, that the ratio property depends on the particular definition chosen, as well as on the requirements placed on the data by the axiom. The empirical requirements of the choice axiom may limit the scale to determination up to a multiplicative constant and an exponent. Eq. (9), in effect, specifies a particular exponent in the same way that the unit was specified in (2). The axiom places two rather severe restrictions on the data. Consider first the paired comparison case, and let x, y, z denote any three stimuli. Then
32
SCALING
the probability ratios must follow a multiplication rule: ,z) _ p(x,y~) _ p(y,z~)
(11)
Hence, any two probabilities determine the third. It can also be shown that the pairwise probabilities determine all probabilities of choice from larger sets and, in fact, 1 (12)
v^
An adequate test of the model as stated would require evaluation of the extent to which both restrictions are met. The simpler version of the logistic model, as developed by Bradley and Terry, is limited to paired comparison data and, hence, only the first restriction is applicable. Efficient estimating procedures and tests of goodness of fit are available (Bradley & Terry 1952; Bradley 1954). Thurstone's case V and the logistic model. If we consider only the paired comparison situation, then the equation relating scale values to observable proportions for the logistic model can be written simply as
(13)
p(x,y~)
or, equivalently, as v(x)
(14)
Eq. (14) shows that in the i;-scale a simple function of the observable is interpreted as a ratio of scale values. From (11) it is apparent that the metric properties of the z;-scale are based on a multiplication-of-ratios rule, with log interval properties. In Thurstone's case v, the corresponding basis for the metric properties was an additivity-of-differences rule, which yielded an interval scale. Bradley and Terry, as well as Luce, have shown that the logistic model can also be used to generate an interval scale based on additivity of differences. If one defines r(x) = In v(x) and w(x,z/) = r(x} — r ( y ) , then (14) can be written
(15)
In
- r(z/) -
and from (13),
(16)
p (*,i
1
which is a simple form of the logistic function. The logistic function and the normal ogive are markedly similar over most of the empirically in-
teresting range. As a result, a close fit of the data to Thurstone's case v insures a fit to the logistic model that can be only trivially better or worse. For all practical purposes, the values from the r-scale of the logistic model will be linearly related to the scale values from the Thurstone case v model. And both, of course, will be logarithmically related to the x>-scale values. It might be noted that the Thurstone model can also be easily modified to yield a log interval scale similar to the iy-scale of the logistic model. We need only to substitute log normal distributions for normal distributions and subjective ratios for subjective differences. The new scale will be exponentially related to the Thurstone case v scale, and will therefore be related to the x^-scale by a power transformation. In general, any model in which the observable is interpreted as a subjective difference in scale values can be paralleled by one in which the observable is interpreted as a subjective ratio. The difference-based scale will be logarithmically related to the ratio-based scale, and the fit of one model to any given set of data will be precisely matched by the fit of the other, parallel model. Quantitative judgment models. The variability methods require only ordinal judgments by the subject; the higher-level, metric properties of the obtained scales are derived through models relating variability of judgment to subjective differences or ratios. In the quantitative judgment models, the higher-level properties are obtained directly from the subject's judgments. There are two classes of quantitative judgment methods: the difference, or distance, methods and the ratio methods. The difference methods have long been used to develop scales in the social sciences (Thurstone & Chave 1929). Serious application of the ratio methods in the context of social science is more recent (see, for example, the summary of research in Stevens 1966). In the difference methods, the metric properties of the obtained scale depend upon the ability of the subject to evaluate or equate subjective differences. In the ratio methods, the metric properties depend upon his ability to evaluate or equate subjective ratios. Scales obtained from the two types of procedures are not ordinarily linearly related. Difference methods. Difference methods include the methods of equisection, equal-appearing intervals, category rating, and category production. The methods differ from one another in the specific nature of the experimental procedure employed, but they all have the same objective: to obtain a scale in which the differences in numbers assigned to the stimuli directly reflect the corresponding subjective differences between the stimuli.
SCALING In equisection, the subject produces a set of stimuli that divides a given range of the attribute into subjectively equal steps. In equal-appearing intervals and category rating he sorts or rates the stimuli into a given set of subjectively equally spaced steps or categories. In category production, he produces on each trial a stimulus that corresponds to one of a set of equally spaced categories. The usual procedures do not include built-in checks for the adequacy of the assumption that the subject can produce such judgments in an internally consistent manner. The assumption does place empirical restrictions on the behavior of the judgments, however, so appropriate checks are possible. The simplest and most direct check uses the method of bisection. Here, the subject first bisects the interval between two standard stimuli, a and e, to produce a new stimulus, c, halfway beween. He next bisects the interval a-c, producing a stimulus b, and bisects the interval c—e, producing a stimulus d. Finally, he bisects the interval between b and d. If the subject's bisections are made in an internally consistent manner, the stimulus produced by the final bisection between b and d will be equal to c, the stimulus produced by the bisection of a and e. For psychometric stimuli, where production techniques are unavailable, a more or less equivalent procedure involves imbedding a given subset of stimuli in several different larger sets. If the subject's rating or sorting judgments fulfill the requirements of an interval scale, the scale values assigned to the members of the subset will be linearly related across the several experiments. Ratio methods. Ratio methods include the methods of fractionation, constant sum, magnitude and ratio estimation, and magnitude and ratio production. In all of these methods, the subject's task is to adjust stimuli or assign numbers so that the ratios between the numbers correspond to the subjective ratios between the stimuli. In fractionation, the subject adjusts a variable to be equal to 1/k of a standard. In the constant sum method, he divides 100 points between two standards so that the ratio between the assigned points corresponds to the subjective ratio. In the magnitude estimation procedure, his task is to assign numbers so they are proportional to the subjective magnitudes, whereas in the ratio estimation method, he assigns numerical ratios to pairs of stimuli. In the corresponding production procedures, the roles of numbers and stimuli are reversed: the experimenter chooses the numbers and the subject produces the appropriate stimuli or stimulus ratios. Only the constant sum method has a built-in
33
check for adequacy of the basic assumption. But again, appropriate checks of internal consistency are available for the other methods and, in fact, parallel those for the difference methods. Differences versus ratios. The logarithmic, or nearly logarithmic, empirical relationship between difference scales and ratio scales has led to the conjecture that the subject's quantitative judgments are based on a single perceived quantitative relation (Torgerson 1961). According to this argument, when the subject is told to equate differences, he interprets the subjective relation as a difference. When he is told to equate ratios, he interprets the same relation as a ratio. The conjecture receives additional support from the behavior of quantitative judgments when the direction of the attribute is reversed, i.e., when the subject reports on smoothness rather than roughness, or darkness rather than lightness. For difference scales, the attribute and its reverse are linearly, though negatively, related. Stimuli that are separated by equal differences in one direction remain equally different when the direction of judgment is reversed. For the ratio scales, the attribute and its reverse are reciprocally related. Here the equal ratio property is invariant, but differences of course change markedly. The empirical results based on quantitative judgment are thus similar to the formal limitations of the variability methods. Each set of procedures yields scales on which either differences or ratios, but not both, are empirically meaningful. Additional procedures seem necessary to obtain a scale where both relations have an empirical basis. One such procedure has been devised by Cliff (1959). Individual difference models The individual difference, or responder, models use subjects' responses to stimuli as a way of establishing scales for attributes on which the subjects (responders) themselves differ. The models are based upon individual differences; an ultimate aim is to assign scale values to the subjects to represent amount or degree of the attribute possessed by each. Stimuli may also be assigned scale values on a parallel attribute, or they may be assigned parameter values relating them in some more general manner to the attribute of interest. Individual difference models are therefore those in which a response to a stimulus is interpreted as a function of both the scale value of the responder and the parameter values of the stimulus. The relation between the task set for the subject and the attribute continuum differs markedly between the stimulus models and the individual dif-
34
SCALING
ference models. In the stimulus models, the task is a particularized one—the subject evaluates stimuli with respect to the attribute being measured. In the individual difference models, the task itself has no obvious relation to the underlying attribute. In the categorical response methods, the subject simply indicates whether or not (or the extent to which) he agrees with, likes, or can pass a particular item. In the comparative response methods, he indicates which item he agrees with most, or which he prefers. In neither case, however, is the attribute of interest one of agreement or preference. It is, rather, a latent or underlying attribute that serves to explain or account for the variation in the responses of the subjects to the stimulus items. A concrete example might serve to clarify the distinction. Suppose we are given a set of samples of coffee that differ only in the amount of sugar that has been added. The samples are presented, two at a time, to a population of subjects. Each subject chooses the member of each pair that he prefers. If a stimulus model were successfully applied to the data, the result would be a scale of preferability of the samples, ranging from the least preferred to the most preferred for that population of subjects. But if an individual differences model were successfully applied to the data, the result would be a scale of sweetness, with the stimuli ranging from least sweet to most sweet and each subject characterized by a scale value denoting the degree of sweetness that he considers ideal. The subjects' responses do not tell us, of course, that the underlying variable is degree of sweetness. If the coffee samples had varied in strength or in amount of cream added rather than in sweetness, their responses would still have been of exactly the same form. In general, the individual differences models are explicitly concerned solely with the question of whether or not the responses of a given group of subjects to a given set of stimuli can be accounted for by a single underlying attribute. They do not tell one how to select the stimuli in the first place or, given that the stimuli form a scale, how the underlying attribute should be interpreted. Individual differences models can be classified in a number of ways. One important difference, which will be used to organize the remainder of this section, is the distinction between the simple deterministic models and the more elaborate probabilistic models. Deterministic models are developed in terms of the ideal case; there is no provision in the model itself for unsystematic variance. Since the ideal case virtually never occurs, the empirical question is one of the extent to which the ideal approximates the actual behavior of the subjects.
The probabilistic models represent more realistic attempts to account for the behavior of the subjects, provide explicitly for unsystematic variance, and, at least theoretically, lend themselves to statistical evaluation of goodness of fit. Simple deterministic models. Three general models will be considered here: Coombs's distance models for preferential choice data, Guttman's scalogram model for categorical responses to monotone items, and the scalogram models for categorical responses to point items. Distance models. In Coombs's distance models, both subjects and stimuli are represented as points along an underlying, latent continuum. According to the general model, the subject's preferential choices among stimuli are determined by the relative distances of the stimuli from that subject. A stimulus located at the same point as the subject represents his ideal, the one he would prefer above all others. As distance from the subject increases, the desirability of the stimulus to that subject decreases. Subject A thus will prefer stimulus X to stimulus Y when the distance dAB. Scales such as this, which provide not only an order for the elements themselves but also an order for some of the distances between elements, are called ordered metric scales. With suitable modifications (Coombs 1953), the general approach described above can also be applied to data obtained from the "order k\n" and "pick k\ri" methods. In the "order k\n" methods, the subject rank-orders only the first k out of the n stimuli presented to him, and in the "pick k\n" methods, he simply chooses the k out of n stimuli
SCALING he prefers most. Procedures for ordering the stimuli and for locating the subjects in ordered classes are given in Coombs ( 1 953 ) and Torgerson (1958). Monotone and point scalogram models. The scalogram models for categorical data are concerned with subjects and items, where an item is defined as any stimulus or procedure that partitions the set of subjects into two or more mutually exclusive categories. In these models, both subjects and category boundaries can be considered as points on an underlying continuum. The scaling problem is to determine whether the subjects and category boundaries can be positioned along the continuum so that all subjects are located within the appropriate categories of all items. Three types of ideal items are of interest: the monotone multicategory item, the monotone dichotomous item, and the nonmonotone, or point, item. A monotone item divides the underlying continuum into as many segments as there are response categories, with each category corresponding to one and only one segment. The following multicategory item provides an example of the general form: My weight is (a) between 150 and 175 pounds; (fo) 150 pounds or less; (c) 175 pounds or more. Dichotomous monotone items provide only two response alternatives. For example, I weigh over 150 pounds. True _ False __ Different items ordinarily partition the underlying continuum in different places. In general, n monotone items, with a total of m categories in all, partition the underlying continuum into m — n + 1 segments. Guttman's general scalogram procedure (see Stouffer et al. 1950) is a routine for determining whether the n items (a) are monotonic and (b~) can be considered as partitioning the same underlying attribute for the given population of subjects. If so, the final result is, first, a rank order of the item category boundaries on the underlying continuum and, second, the locations of subjects in the segments defined by adjacent category boundaries. The general procedure can be used with any combination of multicategory and dichotomous monotone items. Somewhat simpler procedures are available if all items are dichotomous. Nonmonotone, or point, items also partition the underlying continuum into segments, but not in a one-to-one fashion. An example of one form of nonmonotone item is My weight is between 150 and 175 pounds. True _ False __
35
The positive response to this type of nonmonotone item corresponds to a single segment—in this example, the range from 150 to 175 pounds. But a negative response corresponds to two segments: subjects weighing over 175 pounds and those weighing under 150 pounds both respond negatively. In order to evaluate the scale hypothesis and to obtain an ordinal scale, it is necessary for the segments corresponding to the positive alternatives to overlap. If no overlap occurs, the data contain information sufficient only to locate the subjects into a set of unordered categories. The procedures for uncovering the underlying scale for nonmonotone items are different from, but conceptually similar to, those appropriate for monotone items. An alternative ideal model for nonmonotone items treats the positive category of the item as a point and represents each subject by a segment of the underlying continuum. An example of an item which might fit such a model better would be I weigh about 150 pounds.
Yes No .
Here, subjects might differ with respect to their ideas of the range encompassed by the term "about." Since the two models are formally equivalent— they differ only in the interchange of the role of subject and item—the same analytical routines are applicable. Probabilistic models: the general theory. Most of the models developed for measuring individual difference attributes can be considered within the framework of a single general probabilistic model whose conceptual basis is essentially that of Lazarsfeld's latent structure analysis (1954; see also Stouffer et al. 1950), in which the attribute to be measured is represented formally by an underlying or latent space of one or more dimensions, subjects are represented by points in the latent space, and the stimuli are treated as variables. Stimuli may be psychological test items, attitude statements, rating scales, or, in general, anything that classifies the subjects into two or more exclusive and exhaustive categories. The observations, or manifest data, thus consist of an N by n matrix of the scores of the N subjects on the n stimuli. The stimulus variables are characterized in the general model by the parameters of the equation describing the regression of that variable on the underlyling latent attribute. An important general notion is the principle of local independence. Since each stimulus variable is related to the underlying attribute, the stimulus variables will be related to each other in some fashion. The principle of local independence re-
36
SCALING
quires that the systematic relations among the stimuli be accounted for entirely by the separate relations of each stimulus variable to the underlying attribute. Thus, at any given point in the latent space, the stimuli are all mutually independent. The over-all theory or conceptual framework clearly is completely general. In order to turn it into a testable model—one which places restrictions on the data—additional postulates or conditions are necessary. Three important considerations are the nature of the manifest data required, the nature of the postulated latent attribute, and the form of the regression equation relating the stimulus variables to the latent attribute. A particular model or testable specialization of the general theory depends on making a decision about each of the three. [See LATENT STRUCTURE.] Three levels or types of manifest response data are of major concern here, but obviously others are possible: Dichotomous items—the stimulus variable classifies the subject into one of two categories; ordered classes—the stimulus variable classifies the subject into one of several ordered categories; interval scale—the stimulus variable provides an interval scale value for the subjects. Three restrictive assumptions that can be placed on the postulated latent attribute are the following: the subjects are assumed to be located only at a relatively small number of points or regions in the space; the underlying attribute is assumed to be unidimensional; and the underlying attribute is assumed to be a multidimensional Euclidean space.
Four types of regression equations that relate the stimulus variables to the latent attribute are the various step functions, the linear equation, the normal ogive equation, and the logistic equation. The models also differ in whether or not they provide for or allow variance about the regression line or surface. The distinction here is essentially that made earlier beween deterministic and probabilistic models. The deterministic models for categorical data, which make no provision for extraneous variance, can be considered as limiting cases for certain of the probabilistic versions. Some specializations of the general theory. All of the models described in this section can be treated as specialized instances of general regression theory. In all cases, subjects can be considered as points in an underlying attribute space, stimuli as manifest variables related to the underlying space by a regression equation, and interrelations between manifest variables in terms of their separate relations to the underlying attribute space. The models differ in the kind of data required, the kind of space allowed, the form of the postulated regression equation, and in whether or not explicit provision is made for variance about the postulated regression surface. Table 1 provides a summary of the characteristics of and differences between a number of the more common models. Lazarsfeld's latent class model. In Lazarsfeld's latent class model the stimuli (items) are dichotomous and are scored either as 0 or as 1. The latent space is nominal—subjects are located at discrete
Table 1 — Characteristics of some individual difference models that fall within the general regression approach DETERMINISTIC
General scalogram Observable Dichotomous Ordered classes Interval Latent space Points Unidimensional Multidimensional Regression Step function Linear Normal ogive Logistic Variance about regression
Yes No
Multidimensional Dichoto- extensions mous of scalogram scalogram
PROBABILISTIC
Latent class
Latent profile
Latent distance
Linear
Twofactor
Multiple factor analysis
Normal ogive
Logistic
SCALING points or, equivalently, along arbitrarily ordered intervals of a unidimensional continuum. The regression equation is then a step function, and provision is made for variance about the regression line. If the classes are ordered arbitrarily, the height of the regression line for an item j, over the interval denned by class s, is the average score of the subjects in class s on that item. Since only scores of 0 and 1 are used, the height of the regression line for class s is also the probability that a person in class s will answer item j correctly. This probability is denoted by vjs. The unknowns to be determined are the set of probabilities vjs and the proportion of subjects in each class, ns. The observational information can be expressed by the following set of manifest proportions:
37
1.0
a,- V X < Xj
X > Xj
Figure 2 — Form of item regression or trace line for the latent distance model Source: From Torgerson 1958, p. 375.
the individuals, Lazarsfeld provides the following set of accounting equations:
Pi = the proportion of subjects in the entire sample answering item j positively; +00
Pit — the proportion of subjects answering both item j and item k positively;
/
fi •CO
/ + 00 fj
iu = the proportion answering items j, k, and / positively;
Lazarsfeld has shown that this information can be incorporated into a set of accounting equations, and several procedures have been devised for solving such equations (Green 1951; Anderson 1954). The solutions themselves do not directly indicate the class membership of individual subjects but, rather, give only the proportion of subjects in a class. Additional procedures are needed to assign subjects to classes. Gibsons latent profile model. Gibson's latent profile model (1959), which differs from Lazarsfeld's only in the type of data required, is designed for manifest responses measured on an interval scale. Since the equations for latent profile analysis are formally identical to those of latent class analysis, no new analytical procedures are needed for their solution. Lazarsfeld's continuous models. In Lazarsfeld's continuous models the stimuli are dichotomous items scored either as 0 or as 1, but the latent space is generally assumed to be a unidimensional continuum, although multidimensional extensions have also been suggested. Hence, the several continuous models proposed by Lazarsfeld differ from each other only in the form of the regression line. Where x — the latent variable, fj(x} — the regression of item j on x, and g ( x } = the density function of
•CO
In the latent distance model, the regression, or trace line, for the items j is assumed to be a step function of the form shown in Figure 2. It is assumed that the probability of a response is some constant value (a, — b/) up to a particular point Xj, and at this point it jumps to another value (ttj + bj) and remains constant thereafter. The equation for the regression can be written
(x} = a, — (x) = a, +
for x^ for x>
Each item is thus represented by three parameters : aj , bj , and a break point, Xj . It is a general rule that step-function regression lines provide no metric information about the shape of the underlying distribution of subjects. Any monotonic transformation of the underlying continuum leaves the form of such regression lines unchanged; hence, the final scale is ordinal. Solutions for the latent distance model have been provided by Hays and Borgatta (1954). It is interesting to note that if the parameters a, and bj are both assumed to have values of -| for all items, the latent distance model reduces to Guttman's scalogram model for dichotomous items. Lazarsfeld's linear model assumes that the regression lines can be represented by an equation of the form
38
SCALING
where 0 < f ; (x) ^ 1 for all items over the region of the continuum containing the distribution of subjects. Solutions for the item parameters a; and bj are available (see Torgerson 1958). Spearman s two-factor model. Spearman's twofactor model (1927) differs from Lazarsf eld's linear model only in the form of the manifest data. When it is assumed that the stimulus variables are measured on an interval scale and standardized with a mean of zero and unit variance, then one can write the equation Sij — Cigttjg
' "ij ?
where s iy = score of subject i on stimulus j, cig = score of subject i on the general factor g, ajg = loading of stimulus ; on the general factor, and 6ij represents variance due to unique factors and to error. The regression line can be written simply as fj(x^) = a}x, which differs from Lazarsfeld's linear model only by the lack of an additive constant. Multiple factor analysis. The standard procedures of multiple factor analysis require manifest data on interval scales and differ from Spearman's model by the substitution of a multidimensional latent space for the unidimensional general factor. The basic equation for the score of subject i on stimulus j becomes M Sij
- / jCim Ujm
~T~ "%j ,
m=l
where m — 1, 2, • • •, M is an index for dimensions. The corresponding regression function becomes
[See FACTOR ANALYSIS ; the biography of SPEARMAN.] Normal ogive and logistic models. Normal ogive and logistic models require dichotomous items scored either as 0 or as 1, and assume a unidimensional latent attribute. They differ from the latent distance and linear models in their assumption of regression lines that seem intuitively to be more reasonable, particularly for measuring aptitudes and abilities. Models using the normal ogive trace lines have been developed by Lord (1953) and Tucker (1952). Birnbaum (1957) and Rasch (1960) have worked with the logistic function. WARREN S. TORGERSON [Directly related are the entries LATENT STRUCTURE; MATHEMATICS; PROBABILITY; PSYCHOMETRIC s. Other relevant material may be found in FACTOR ANALYSIS;
the articles listed under MEASUREMENT; PSYCHOPHYSICS; QUANTAL RESPONSE; and in the biographies of FECHNER; SPEARMAN; THURSTONE; WEBER, ERNST HEINRICH.] BIBLIOGRAPHY ANDERSON, T. W. 1954 On Estimation of Parameters in Latent Structure Analysis. Psychometrika 19:1-10. ATTNEAVE, FRED 1949 A Method of Graded Dichotomies for the Scaling of Judgments. Psychological Review 56:334-340. BIRNBAUM, A. (1957) 1958 Probability and Statistics in Item Analysis and Classification Problems. Texas: U.S. Air Force School of Aviation Medicine, Randolph Air Force Base. BRADLEY, RALPH A. 1954 Incomplete Block Rank Analysis: On the Appropriateness of the Model for a Method of Paired Comparisons. Biometrics 10:375390. BRADLEY, RALPH A.; and TERRY, MILTON E. 1952 Rank Analysis of Incomplete Block Designs. I. The Method of Paired Comparisons. Biometrika 39:324-345. CLARKE, FRANK R. 1957 Constant-ratio Rule for Confusion Matrices in Speech Communication. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 29:715-720. CLIFF, NORMAN 1959 Adverbs as Multipliers. Psychological Review 66:27-44. COOMBS, CLYDE H. 1950 Psychological Scaling Without a Unit of Measurement. Psychological Review 57:145— 158. COOMBS, CLYDE H. 1953 Theory and Methods of Social Measurement. Pages 471-535 in Leon Festinger and Daniel Katz (editors), Research Methods in the Behavioral Sciences. New York: Dryden. COOMBS, CLYDE H. 1964 A Theory of Data. New York: Wiley. EDWARDS, ALLEN L.; and THURSTONE, L. L. 1952 An Internal Consistency Check for Scale Values Determined by the Method of Successive Intervals. Psychometrika 17:169-180. GARNER, WENDELL R.; and HAKE, HAROLD W. 1951 The Amount of Information in Absolute Judgments. Psychological Review 58:446-459. GIBSON, W. A. 1959 Three Multivariate Models: Factor Analysis, Latent Structure Analysis, and Latent Profile Analysis. Psychometrika 24:229-252. GREEN, BERT F. JR. 1951 A General Solution for the Latent Class Model of Latent Structure Analysis. Psychometrika 16:151-166. GULLIKSEN, HAROLD 1954 A Least Squares Solution for Successive Intervals Assuming Unequal Standard Deviations. Psychometrika 19:117-139. HAYS, DAVID G.; and BORGATTA, EDGAR F. 1954 An Empirical Comparison of Restricted and General Latent Distance Analysis. Psychometrika 19:271-279. LAZARSFELD, PAUL F. 1954 A Conceptual Introduction to Latent Structure Analysis. Pages 349-387 in Paul F. Lazarsf eld (editor), Mathematical Thinking in the Social Sciences. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. LORD, FREDERIC M. 1953 An Application of Confidence Intervals and of Maximum Likelihood to the Estimation of an Examinee's Ability. Psychometrika 18:5776. LUCE, R. DUNCAN 1959 Individual Choice Behavior: A Theoretical Analysis. New York: Wiley. MOSTELLER, FREDERICK 1951 Remarks on the Method of Paired Comparisons. Part 3: A Test of Significance
SCHELER, MAX for Paired Comparisons When Equal Standard Deviations and Equal Correlations Are Assumed. Psychometrika 16:207-218. RASCH, GEORG W. 1960 Probabilistic Models for Some Intelligence and Attainment Tests. Copenhagen: No publisher listed. SAFFIR, MILTON A. 1937 A Comparative Study of Scales Constructed by Three Psychophysical Methods. Psymetrika 2:179-198. SPEARMAN, CHARLES E. 1927 The Abilities of Man: Their Nature and Measurement. London: Macmillan. STEVENS, S. S. 1966 A Metric for the Social Consensus. Science New Series 151:530-541. STEVENS, S. S.; and GALANTER, E. H. 1957 Ratio Scales and Category Scales for a Dozen Perceptual Continua. Journal of Experimental Psychology 54:377411. STOUFFER, SAMUEL A. et al. 1950 Measurement and Prediction. Studies in Social Psychology in World War II, Vol. 4. Princeton Univ. Press. -» See especially the chapters by Louis Guttman and by Paul F. Lazarsfeld. SUPPES, PATRICK; and ZINNES, JOSEPH L. 1963 Basic Measurement Theory. Volume 1, pages 1-76 in R. Duncan Luce, Robert R. Bush and Eugene Galanter (editors), Handbook of Mathematical Psychology. New York: Wiley. THURSTONE, L. L. 1927 A Law of Comparative Judgment. Psychological Review 34:273-286. THURSTONE, L. L.; and CHAVE, ERNEST I. (1929) 1937 The Measurement of Attitude: A Psychophysical Method and Some Experiments With a Scale for Measuring Attitude Toward the Church. Univ. of Chicago Press. TORGERSON, WARREN S. 1958 Theory and Methods of Scaling. New York: Wiley. TORGERSON, WARREN S. 1961 Distances and Ratios in Psychophysical Scaling. Acta psychologica 19:201205. TUCKER, L. R. 1952 A Level of Proficiency Scale for a Unidimensional Skill. American Psychologist 7:408 only.
SCHELER, MAX Max Scheler (1874-1928), German philosopher and sociologist, was born in Munich. His father came from an upper-middle-class Protestant family which can be traced to the sixteenth century; a number of his forebears had been clergymen and jurists in the city of Coburg. His mother was descended from a Jewish Orthodox family that had been settled in Franconia for many centuries. The clash of religious and cultural traditions in his home may account in part for the strains and tensions in his personality and work. Scheler studied medicine and philosophy at the University of Jena. There, Rudolf Eucken, the Nobel prize-winning idealistic philosopher and defender of Protestant cultural liberalism, was his most prominent teacher. Scheler's early work, beginning with his dissertation at Jena (1899), where
39
he became a Privatdozent in 1901, clearly derived from Eucken. The distinctive aspects of Scheler's thought became apparent only after he moved to the University of Munich in 1907. There he assimilated the phenomenological method: Franz Brentano, who had been Edmund Husserl's teacher, continued to lecture there in Scheler's day, and Scheler was also influenced by Husserl's eminent disciples at the university. Although he was never an "orthodox" phenomenologist, his subsequent philosophizing moved within the orbit of Brentano's and Husserl's thought. [See the biography of HUSSERL.] In 1910 Scheler gave up his connection with the University of Munich and moved to Berlin to live as an academically unattached writer. His first major works were written in this Berlin period. Among his close intellectual companions in those days were Walther Rathenau and Werner Sombart. The outbreak of World War i marked a turning point in Scheler's career. He threw himself with great ardor into the defense of the German cause. The articles and books in which he defended the "German war" with passionately nationalistic fervor brought him to the attention of a wider public than had noticed his more scholarly productions. In 1917 and 1918 he worked at various diplomatic and propagandistic tasks for the German Foreign Office in Geneva and The Hague. During the war years Scheler, despite his intense nationalistic commitment to the "fatherland," moved closer to a Christian position in the realm of ethics, becoming finally a Roman Catholic convert. In 1919 Scheler accepted a call to the chair of philosophy and sociology at the University of Cologne. During the next five years he gradually developed his sociology of knowledge. About 1924 he began slowly to turn away from his previous commitment to Catholicism and eventually left the church. He then began to work on a comprehensive Anthropologie, in which he attempted to expound a kind of vitalistic pantheism that he had come to adopt. But he was not able to develop this new conception fully. He accepted a call from the University of Frankfurt in the beginning of 1928, but he died on May 19, 1928, at the age of 54, before assuming his new post. Quite different strands of thought were woven into the texture of Scheler's thought at different times in his intellectual development. He was ever open to new ideas and did not fear to contradict himself. As a consequence, he failed to achieve a full synthesis of his thought but was able to appeal by virtue of his own intellectual restlessness to the restless young intellectuals of the postwar period.
40
SCHELER, MAX
An erratic man, he was always to be a somewhat disturbing figure to the more settled members of the academic community while he gained considerable influence among younger sociologists and philosophers. Although he did not found a "school," he was a major intellectual pathsetter in pre-Nazi Germany as a social critic and moralist and as a sociologist and philosopher. Since World War n the vogue of phenomenology and existentialism in France has led to vigorous interest there in Scheler's work. In the Anglo-Saxon countries, Scheler was until recently little known, except among scholars interested in the sociology of knowledge or among certain theologians and philosophers. The recent translation of certain of his writings has stimulated wider interest among social scientists. Work in social psychology. Scheler's major contributions to the social sciences lie in the domain of social psychology and the sociology of knowledge. His first major work, Ressentiment (1912), contains a comprehensive phenomenological description of this sentiment as well as an attempt to locate the res sentiment-laden man within the social structure. He developed the notion that certain social roles—the spinster, the mother-in-law, the priest, for example—predispose their occupants to ressentiment, an attitude arising from a sense of impotence in the face of the cumulative repression of feelings of hatred, envy, and desire for revenge. In contrast to Nietzsche, who coined the term, Scheler located the breeding ground of ressentiment in the modern bourgeois and postbourgeois world rather than in Christianity. In The Nature of Sympathy (1913), Scheler presented a detailed description of this feeling state. Here he wedded the phenomenological method to the Pascalian endeavor to outline a "logic of the heart." Scheler attempted to uncover eternal uniformities in feelings and emotions and to show that these, far from being the blind results of mechanistically operating associations, are actually means of knowing which reveal, through their intentionality, the situation of man in the universe and the ethical a prioris of a distinct realm of eternal values. As in much of his later work, Scheler defended the thesis that values exist independently of the men who make the evaluations and justified his resolute opposition to all pragmatist, naturalist, or positivist theories of value. Polemics against such philosophical currents, more especially against Kantianism and Neo-Kantianism, form a major part of Scheler's work. His Formalismus in der Ethik . . . —first published in 1916 but written before the war (Gesammelte Werke, vol. 2)—-contains the most elaborate development
of his anti-Kantian polemics as well as ethical speculations and sociological considerations that anticipate many of his later sociological ideas. On the Eternal in Man (1921) is the fullest exposition of Scheler's religious thought and also contains germs of his later sociological views. The sociology of knowledge. Scheler's contribution to the sociology of knowledge is to be found in his "Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens" (1924), two years later expanded in Die Wissens for men und die Gesellschaft (Gesammelte Werke, vol. 8). He attempted to synthesize a Platonic doctrine of eternal immutability of a world of value essences with a comprehensive relativism. He described how different groups of men have striven, each in its socially and historically limited way, to grasp aspects of the eternal sphere of value essences. The infinite variety of subjective a prioris, the fact that different groups, or periods, or individual types elaborate their own forms of knowledge, meant to Scheler that men are striving to attain the value essences in different ways at different times rather than that the immutability of these very essences is limited. Real factors (such as biological, political, or economic constellations) favor or oppose the actualization of ideal factors (for example, moral, religious, or intellectual values), but they can never determine their content. They can only act as "sluice gates of the spirit." Scheler rejected Comte's "law of three stages" and stressed that religious, metaphysical, and scientific knowledge do not succeed each other in regular progression but rather coexist in every age, rooted though they are in the conditions of life of different groups of men and different human types. Yet Scheler found a grain of truth in Comte's dogmatic assertion that there are stages in human history in the sense that in different periods different substructural elements determine the predominant cultural outlook of the age. At the dawn of history, "blood"—that is, racial and vital factors—chiefly controlled cultural life. After the emergence of the state, political factors moved to the foreground. With the bourgeois age, economic factors have achieved unquestioned predominance. While earlier periods accorded preeminence to religious and metaphysical types of knowledge, the bourgeois age is primarily the age of the scientist. Scheler's world view has a deeply aristocratic cast. The idea of hierarchy is central to it, and the equalitarian tendencies of the modern age were therefore deeply abhorrent to him. His doctrine of moral values is hierarchical: pleasure values, those concerning the pleasant or unpleasant, are inferior to vital values, those promoting well-being and
SCHELER, MAX health, while these are again inferior to spiritual values; the highest values, however, are of a religious or sacred character. To such a hierarchy of values corresponds a hierarchy of men representing them. The saint incarnates the sacred values at the very top of the hierarchy; the genius stands for the spiritual values; the hero stands for the vital values; even in the lowest world, that of pleasure, "artists of consumption" are needed to guide our uncertain taste. To the hierarchy of values and of men embodying them there corresponds a hierarchy of forms of sociation. The lowest form is the simple horde, in which emotional contagion and unconscious imitation constitute the only bond. In the vital community, on the other hand, in the family or tribe as well as in classes or professions, conscious solidarity binds the participants. As against the horde, the social here prevails over the individual; each member can easily be substituted for any other. In the third type of sociation, Tonnies' Gesellschaft, superficial contractual bonds between individuals replace supra-individual goals that are consciously supported. Finally, at the apex of the hierarchy, the Gesamtperson, the "complex collective personality," represents a type of sociation in which a quintessential solidarity binds the members in a community of love. This last form, of which the church and the nation are central examples, is eminently superior to all others; within it alone can the higher values be realized. To posit equality between persons and so to level essential differences of value was, to Scheler, the chief aberration of the modern age. His full-scale attack against the post-Christian world, his rejection of liberalism, altruism, humanitarianism, and democracy can best be understood as resulting from his conviction that the modern world with its leveling tendencies has undermined the objective hierarchy of men and values. His cultural criticism hence proceeds from a profoundly elitist point of view. The modern social scientist will of necessity have to sift Scheler's very real contributions to sociology and social psychology from the antidemocratic ideology in which they are all too often embedded. LEWIS A. COSER [For the historical context of Scheler's work, see KNOWLEDGE, SOCIOLOGY OF; and the biographies of COMTE; HUSSERL; KANT; TONNIES. For discussion of the subsequent influence of Scheler's ideas, see EXPRESSIVE BEHAVIOR; PERCEPTION, article on PERSON PERCEPTION; PERSONALITY, POLITICAL; PHENOMENOLOGY; SYMPATHY AND EMPATHY; and the biography of MANNHEIM.]
41
WORKS BY SCHELER
1899
Beitrdge zur Feststellung der Beziehungen zwischen den logischen und ethischen Prinzipien. Jena: Vopelius. -» Inaugural dissertation, University of Jena. (1912) 1961 Ressentiment. Edited with an introduction by Lewis A. Coser. New York: Free Press. -> First published as Uber Ressentiment und moralisches Werturteil. The second German edition appears on pages 33-147 of Volume 3 of Scheler's Gesammelte Werke under the title "Das Kessentiment im Aufbau der Moralen." (1913) 1954 The Nature of Sympathy. Translated by Peter Heath, with an introduction by Werner Stark. London: Routledge. -> First published as Zur Phdnomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefiihle und von Liebe und Hass. The second German edition was published as Wesen und Formen der Sympathie. (1921) 1961 On the Eternal in Man. Translated by Bernard Noble. New York: Harper. -* First published as Vom Ewigen im Menschen. 1924 Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens. Pages 5—146 in Max Scheler (editor), Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens. Munich and Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. (1927) 1961 Man's Place in Nature. Translated with an introduction by Hans Meyerhoff. New York: Farrar; Boston: Beacon. -> First published in German in Volume 8 of Der Leuchter. (1929) 1958 Philosophical Perspectives. Translated by Oscar A. Haac. Boston: Beacon Press. -» First published as Philosophische Weltanschauung. Gesammelte Werke. Vols. 1—. Bern (Switzerland): Francke, 1954- . -» Thirteen volumes are projected, of which the following have appeared: Volume 2: Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik: Neuer Versuch der Grundlegung eines ethischen Personalismus (1913-1916) 1954. Fourth edition, revised. Volume 3: Vom Umsturz der Werte: Abhandlungen und Aufsdtze (1911-1914) 1955. Fourth edition, revised. Volume 5: Vom Evrigen im Menschen (1921) 1954. Fourth edition, revised. Volume 6: Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre (1923-1924) 1963. Second edition, revised. Volume 8: Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft (1926) 1960. Second edition, revised. Volume 10: Schriften aus dem Nachlass (1933) 1957. Second edition, revised and enlarged. SUPPLEMENTARY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BECKER, HOWARD; and DAHLKE, HELMUT OTTO 1942 Max Scheler's Sociology of Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2:310-322. COSER, LEWIS A.; and HOLDHEIM, WILLIAM W. 1961 Max Scheler: An Introduction. New York: Free Press. DUPUY, MAURICE 1959 La philosophie de Max Scheler: Son evolution et son unite. 2 vols. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. GURVITCH, GEORGES D. (1930) 1949 L'intuitionnisme emotionnel de Max Scheler. Pages 67-152 in Georges Gurvitch, Les tendances actuelles de la philosophic allemande: E. Husserl, M. Scheler, E. Lash, N. Hartmann, M. Heidegger. Paris: Vrin. KANTHACK, KATHARINA 1948 Max Scheler: Zur Krisis der Ehrfurcht. Berlin and Hannover: Minerva. McGiLL, V. J. 1942 Scheler's Theory of Sympathy and Love. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2: 273-291. -» The entire issue is devoted to Scheler.
42
SCHIZOPHRENIA
MANNHEIM, KARL (1925) 1952 Sociology of Knowledge From the Standpoint of Modern Phenomenology (Max Scheler). Pages 154-179 in Karl Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. -> Contains a discussion of the differences between Mannheim's and Scheler's approaches to the sociology of knowledge. First published in German. STARK, WERNER 1958 The Sociology of Knowledge: An Essay in Aid of a Deeper Understanding of the History of Ideas. London: Routledge; Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. STAUDE, JOHN R. 1967 Max Scheler: An Intellectual Portrait. New York: Free Press.
SCHIZOPHRENIA Schizophrenia constitutes the core problem of insanity. The conditions subsumed under the heading are among the most devastating to which man is heir, blighting him in the process of development or in the prime years of life and commonly leading to his progressive enclosure in an autistic world beset by delusion, hallucination, and fear of involvement with life and people. Because of the diverse manifestations, courses, and outcomes, schizophrenic reactions elude precise definition and concise description. They may be defined as gross failures to achieve or maintain integrated personality functioning in which a person, unable to cope with problems of living and irreconcilable conflicts, withdraws and seeks solutions by breaking through the confines imposed by the culture's ways of thinking and reasoning and by regressing to a period of childhood when reality gave way to fantasy and when the self and others were not yet clearly distinguished. The condition tends to be self-perpetuating because the patient abandons testing his ideas in terms of how they help master his environment and promote collaborative interaction with others. However, restitutive efforts are usually made because a person cannot achieve an equilibrium as an isolate and because fears of uncontrollable impulses interfere with autistic gratification. Incidence and prevalence. Schizophrenia is among the most common conditions leading to profound incapacitation. Of the daily hospital census in the United States of about 1.4 million patients, approximately one-fourth are hospitalized because of schizophrenia. Although the large majority are discharged within the first year after admission, the average length of stay is 13 years because a sizable number remain in hospitals from adolescence or early adulthood until death from old age or some disease. Incidence and prevalence can be estimated only very roughly because of the
number of schizophrenic patients who are never hospitalized or even diagnosed and because of the vague boundaries of the condition. It has been estimated that between 14 and 20 of every 1,000 children born in the United States will be hospitalized at some time in their lives with an illness diagnosed as schizophrenia. A minimum annual prevalence rate of 290 per 100,000 has been suggested for Western societies (Lemkau & Crocetti 1958). Surveys in New Haven (Hollingshead & Redlich 1958) and in England (Brooke 1959) have shown that both incidence and prevalence are much higher among the lower socioeconomic segments of the population than among the uppermiddle and upper classes. [See MENTAL DISORDERS, article on EPIDEMIOLOGY.] Concepts of schizophrenia The profound divergencies of opinion concerning the nature, etiology, and treatment of schizophrenic conditions reflect differing concepts of the nature of human adaptation and integration more than they reflect divergent findings. Traditionally, psychiatrists have considered that the profound incapacitations of schizophrenic patients and, particularly, the disordered thinking that forms a critical aspect of the condition must be due to some unknown biological impairment—a structural defect of the brain or some hereditary metabolic or toxic factor influencing cerebral functioning. A large majority continues to believe that the high familial incidence indicates a hereditary predisposition that is affected by environmental factors, perhaps through aggravating a metabolic dysfunction. However, others consider schizophrenic reactions as an extreme type of aberrant personality functioning resulting from faulty and distorting child rearing in deviant family environments. The way in which schizophrenia is conceptualized is not simply a matter of academic interest but of vital moment, as it influences the direction of scientific investigations and therapeutic efforts and, as will become apparent, has even profoundly influenced the clinical picture and course of the condition. The conviction that schizophrenia is a disease due to a biological impairment leads to concentration of research in neuropathological, physiological, and biochemical fields and has created therapeutic pessimism. This attitude has often contributed to the neglect of patients and, at times, virtually condemned them to crowded and impersonal institutions that aggravated their autistic withdrawal. Such orientation left little room for the participation of social scientists, other than in studies of the economic and social implications
SCHIZOPHRENIA of a devastating disease. In contrast, the conceptualization of schizophrenia as a type of aberrant personality development has made it possible to consider schizophrenic reactions in the study of how the developmental process can go awry and thus perhaps to clarify critical issues concerning human integration and emotional homeostasis. Investigations of such matters as the role of language in human adaptation, of the family as a critical social institution that mediates between biological and cultural directives and between the individual and society, of the influence of social class on the incidence of mental illness and how it relates to child-rearing practices, of cross-cultural influences on personality development, and of the social and political structure of mental hospitals and the society's system of caring for the ill, and numerous other areas of study become a vital part of the effort to understand, control, and treat schizophrenic reactions. Further, as schizophrenia constitutes one of the dominant unsolved health problems, the training of all physicians as well as of psychiatrists in particular will be affected profoundly by the conceptualization of the problems and the projection of an approach to their solution. Historical considerations. The concept of schizophrenia as a clinical entity derives from Emil Kraepelin's recognition in 1896 of the relationship between three forms of insanity—catatonia, described by K. Kahlbaum in 1863; hebephrenia, described by E. Hecker in 1871; and the deteriorating paranoid psychoses—and his uniting them under the designation "dementia praecox," which B. Morel had used for a type of deteriorating adolescent psychosis. Kraepelin brought a degree of order to psychiatric taxonomy by differentiating dementia praecox from the manic-depressive psychoses. He emphasized the progressive course of dementia starting in youth and envisioned a distinct disease entity for which a specific structural pathology or causative agent would be found. The term "schizophrenia" was introduced by Eugen Bleuler in 1911, because not all sufferers from dementia praecox were youthful and not all became demented; it also served to emphasize the splitting of the psychic functions—the intellectual, affective, and conative—in these patients. Bleuler considered the possibility of a psychological causation but favored a hereditary etiology. He considered that the unknown etiologic agent produced primary symptoms of disturbances in associations, abnormalities of affect, emotional and intellectual ambivalence, and turning from reality to fantasy, as well as autism, whereas such symptoms as delusions, hallucinations, motor disorders, etc., were secondary and
43
amenable to psychological treatment. He also stressed the intact capacities for perception, memory, and intellectual functioning that differentiate schizophrenia from the organic and toxic psychoses. In essence, he outlined the critical paradox of schizophrenic conditions: thought disorders form a critical aspect and diagnostic requisite, but the anatomical and physiological capacities for perceiving, thinking, and remembering remain intact. Together with Carl Gustav Jung, Bleuler brought psychoanalytic insights into the study of the psychology of schizophrenia. [See the biographies Of BLEULER; JUNG; KRAEPELIN.] Adolf Meyer's view. For the vast majority of psychiatrists throughout the world, the schizophrenic syndrome has remained essentially unchanged since the publication of Bleuler's monograph (1911), although many have adhered more closely to Kraepelin's concepts of a clear-cut disease entity, as the collected papers of the 1957 World Congress devoted to schizophrenia demonstrate (World Congress . . . 1959). However, Adolf Meyer, the dominant American contemporary of Bleuler, did not consider schizophrenia as an illness but as a reaction type that could be brought on by faulty "habit patterns," including habits of thinking and relating (Meyer 1896-1937). For many years Meyer was almost the only important influence advocating longitudinal dynamic studies of life histories of schizophrenic patients, and he countered the prevailing therapeutic pessimism with his melioristic approach which advocated a type of psychotherapeutic management in a socializing milieu. Meyer is largely responsible for the different perspectives concerning schizophrenia held by many American psychiatrists in contrast to those of their Continental colleagues. [See the biography of MEYER.] Psychoanalysis. Even though Freud had excluded the treatment of schizophrenia from the province of psychoanalysis because he tacitly accepted an organic or toxic etiology and considered that the regression to narcissism prevented formation of a transference relationship, psychoanalysis still made many major contributions to understanding schizophrenic patients and their symptoms. Such concepts as narcissistic fixation and regression, the psychosexual stages of development, infantile sexuality, the withdrawal of cathexes (libidinal investment) from objects, primary process thinking, the interpretation of dreams, the exposition of the defense mechanisms —particularly those of projection and introjection— and of the importance of homosexuality to paranoid states, etc., opened the way for a dynamic under-
44
SCHIZOPHRENIA
standing of schizophrenic patients and for comprehension of productions that previously had seemed to be the incomprehensible utterances of a diseased mind. Harry Stack Sullivan was among the first analysts who focused attention on the treatment of schizophrenic patients and whose psychoanalytic orientation was greatly modified by work with them. In the process he found need and use for contributions from various behavioral sciences. Sullivan (1924-1933) and his colleague FrommReichmann (1948) were major forces in demonstrating by determined efforts that psychoanalytic therapy could be adapted to the treatment of schizophrenic patients. [See the biography of SULLIVAN.] Clinical descriptions The nature of the disorder varies widely. Most often schizophrenic reactions become manifest in the adolescent or young adult when the impact of sexual drives and the attainment of independence, an identity, and a way of life present critical problems. The young person may gradually and insidiously become increasingly withdrawn, preoccupied, and resistant to direction from others. He may avoid facing problems and relating to others by sleeping through much of the day. Sudden outbursts of irritability or hostility toward family members ward off intrusions. Rumination over personal and philosophical problems increases, and intellectualizations displace commitment and show of emotions. Differentiation from adolescent "identity crises" or other types of adolescent turmoil is difficult, and the future of the youth may hang in the balance. Gradually withdrawal becomes more extreme, indecision paralyzing, and ambivalence of feelings pronounced. Appearance and bodily hygiene may be neglected. Communication becomes vague, missing the mark and leaving the listener puzzled. Feelings of unreality and depersonalization are common. Self-direction is rescinded or paralyzed, allowing drive, impulse, and fantasy to gain increased motivating force. Control of drives and hostilities becomes a major preoccupation, while motivation is sought through interpreting coincidental events and reading meanings into people's expressions and gestures. Then delusional solutions and hallucinated directives are found. Unacceptable feelings and impulses are projected onto others, who become malevolent figures. Hypochondriacal complaints are common and may reflect fears of transformation into the opposite sex. Increasingly the patient lives in an autistic world, gaining a sense of worth or even greatness through fantasy; he is also a prey to delusions of persecution and to terror lest homicidal, suicidal,
or incestuous impulses overwhelm him. In some patients the first serious indication of the psychosis comes in an outbreak of panic over loss of control or over projected dangers. Frequently, when the patient can remain isolated or when he is neglected in an institution, habits and bodily care deteriorate, communications become disorganized and bizarre, and the patient comes to live in a world of delusion and hallucination. He exists in a state of almost living death, a nonparticipant in society and its conventions, virtually beyond the reach of therapeutic intervention. However, such outcomes are not inherent to schizophrenic reactions and need not occur, and with improved treatment they are becoming less common even in large institutions. The course and outcome vary widely and are influenced markedly by the treatment provided. Under average current conditions, approximately two-thirds of hospitalized patients will be discharged within 12 months: about half of these will remain reasonably well, while the remainder will have further serious difficulties and tend to have a downhill course. The outlook is poor for those who cannot be discharged within the first year. However, as less flagrant forms of schizophrenia are now diagnosed more often than formerly and as better treatment opportunities are available to some, the diagnosis need not imply so poor a prognosis. Schizophrenic reactions are most likely to occur in persons who have socialized poorly and who tend to be shy, introspective, somewhat eccentric, and, perhaps, compliantly overconscientious. Still, a fair proportion have not been notably schizoid, and some have been outgoing but impetuous individuals. Lifelong difficulties in socializing and an early progressive withdrawal decrease chances of recovery. Types of schizophrenia. Conventionally, four types of schizophrenia are described. Actually, most patients can be fitted into these types only arbitrarily, showing admixtures of two or more types, with shifts in the dominant symptomatology over time. However, brief outlines of these subgroupings will serve to describe some of the different clinical pictures. Catatonic schizophrenia. In catatonic schizophrenia extremes of violent motor excitement or rigid immobility dominate the picture. Onset is often abrupt. The patient may maintain difficult postures for hours, days, or months and requires complete care. Alternations between extreme excitement and rigidity may occur. Frequently these patients are in the midst of some mystical experience, believing themselves in heaven or hell; they are often immobile and refuse to speak because
SCHIZOPHRENIA they believe any movement or word can produce a universal catastrophe. Although they may appear out of contact, they are aware of and sensitive to their surroundings. The prognosis is more favorable than for other types but unpredictable in the individual case. Chronic catatonic states, once fairly common, are becoming infrequent in modern hospitals. Simple schizophrenia. Simple schizophrenia usually refers to a gradual withdrawal of interest and a progressive decline of responsible behavior with absence of commitment to a definite way of life. The potentialities shown in youth dissipate, and the patient idles about the home or becomes a vagrant, etc. Theoretically, Bleuler's primary symptoms are present with minimal secondary symptoms; however, many patients given this diagnosis are delusional but noncommunicative about their delusions and hallucinations. Hebephrenic schizophrenia. Hebephrenic schizophrenia usually starts in adolescence and progresses rapidly: the patient soon displays silly, impulsive, and disorganized behavior. Delusions and hallucinations are poorly organized and shifting. Speech is often fragmented and almost incomprehensible, marked by frequent intrusions of primary process material. Paranoid schizophrenia. In paranoid schizophrenia delusions of a persecutory type dominate thought and behavior; ideas of reference are common and blend with auditory hallucinations. Megalomanic delusions relate to ideas of being the focus of widespread plots. The later in life the onset, the more likely it is that the delusions will be systematized and the reaction type approach the condition described under paranoid states. [See PARANOID REACTIONS.] Other subcategories. The current official nomenclature includes a schizoaffective type to cover the numerous patients who display an admixture of schizophrenic and manic-depressive symptoms: if these are considered separate entities, such patients would be suffering from both conditions. However, if schizophrenic reactions are regarded as a type of aberrant development leading to failures of personality integration, other such combined diagnoses will be used. Sociopathic youths can also be more or less schizophrenic; hypochondriacal neuroses may shift to psychoses with somatic or hypochondriacal delusions; obsessive patients can decompensate with obsessive thoughts becoming increasingly bizarre and delusional. Further, although the typical schizophrenic reactions are readily diagnosed, there are no clear boundaries that delimit the use of the diagnosis.
45
Those who are reluctant to relinquish the concept of schizophrenia as a progressive deteriorating disease seek to distinguish between process and nonprocess schizophrenia or between schizophrenia and schizophreniform conditions (Langfeldt 1933): the patients who recover or who are amenable to psychotherapy, etc., are not considered as true schizophrenics and supposedly can be distinguished by their premorbid behavior, heredity, and symptomatology—a view not widely shared in the United States. The diagnosis of pseudoneurotic schizophrenia (Hoch & Polatin 1949) is used by some psychiatrists to indicate patients with panneurotic symptomatology who are not amenable to psychotherapy because they are really schizophrenic, but others consider these as "borderline" patients whose neurotic symptoms form a defense against personality disorganization. Borderline schizophrenia refers to patients who maintain a tenuous integration with meager defenses against incursions of primitive impulses and strange primary process material into consciousness. Childhood schizophrenia refers to cases occurring before adolescence. It is not clear if cases occurring early in childhood are related to the adult condition. Early infantile autism is a puzzling illness that occurs in the first few years of life; the child begins to display peculiar repetitive behavior and regresses, paying little attention to other persons. Some of these children clearly suffer from brain anomalies or brain damage; others have been raised by unempathic, intellectualizing parents. These conditions cannot be discussed adequately in this section. [See MENTAL DISORDERS, article on CHILDHOOD MENTAL DISORDERS.]
The confusions concerning nomenclature have been presented because the various terms are in common usage but also because they reflect the difficulties and ambiguities in the field. Terms may be used in the literature with a certainty that can be misleading, leaving the inexperienced person— and even the experienced one—feeling ignorant rather than perplexed when he cannot make a clear-cut diagnosis. Concepts of etiology Impairment of brain functioning. The conviction that such profound personality disorganizations, marked by disordered thinking and often progressing to an almost vegetative state of existence, must reflect impairment of brain functioning has led to intensive investigations of post-mortem and biopsy sections of the brain and of every endocrine, toxic, and biochemical factor that might
46
SCHIZOPHRENIA
conceivably affect cerebral functioning. The erroneous assumption that insulin coma therapy cured schizophrenia led to an upsurge of such studies in the 1930s and 1940s, and currently the meliorating effects of the phenothiazine drugs have provided renewed impetus. Investigators have again and again reported some biochemical factor they consider specific to schizophrenia, and each of these findings has been invalidated sooner or later. A number of these factors have turned out to be related to such things as dietary inadequacies or are concerned with physiological disturbances secondary to chronic emotional disturbances or to prolonged inactivity or some other influence of chronic hospitalization. Neuroanatomical investigations. None of the numerous reports of an abnormality of the brain has been validated. The similarities of the personalities and developmental histories of patients with psychomotor epilepsy and schizophrenia form an interesting lead that is under study. Endocrine investigations. Although the thyroid, pituitary, gonadal, pineal, and adrenal cortical and medullary secretions have all been implicated, no evidence has held up. The intriguing hypothesis that epinephrine undergoes an anomalous breakdown into psychotoxic substances is being pursued (Hoffer 1964), but recent evidence does not bear out the initial enthusiasm. Biochemical investigations. Recently emphasis has been directed to the study of brain amines and indole excretion, and to psychotogenic agents such as LSD-25 and the supposedly psychotogenic extracts of schizophrenic serum. Various theories relating several such factors have been proposed. Intensive work is advancing knowledge of brain chemistry and fosters hope for future discoveries pertinent to schizophrenia, but recent premature enthusiasms indicate a need for more carefully controlled and validated work before publication. [See MENTAL DISORDERS, article on BIOLOGICAL ASPECTS.]
Genetic hypothesis. The high familial incidence of schizophrenia had led to virtual acceptance of the belief that some genetically transmitted factor plays an important role in the etiology of schizophrenia [see MENTAL DISORDERS, article on GENETIC ASPECTS]. It has been primarily the evidence from twin studies that seemed to demand acceptance of a strong hereditary influence. Until very recently all twin studies reported a much higher concordance rate in identical twins than in samesexed fraternal twins or siblings—as high as 86 per cent in identical as against 17 per cent in samesexed fraternal twins. Lately, several investigators
noted puzzling inconsistencies in the data. The only two studies of all twins born within a given span of time rather than of samples of hospitalized patients fail to validate the earlier findings. A survey of all male twins born in Finland between 1930 and 1935 found that none of the 16 schizophrenic patients among the identical twins had a schizophrenic co-twin (Tienari 1963). Studies in Norway of an even larger sample, although still incomplete, indicate that concordance rates for identical twins will not be much higher than for same-sexed siblings (Kringlen 1964). It appears as if the striking results of prior twin studies were due to sampling errors and that this basis for the genetic hypothesis of schizophrenia has been badly shaken. Family environment. A high familial incidence of personality traits or illnesses has often led to erroneous overemphasis of genetic factors. Attention has been directed increasingly to the role of the family environment in producing schizophrenic offspring. Psychoanalytic theory, in considering schizophrenia related to fixations at the oral stage of development, drew attention to failures in the earliest mother-child transactions. As early as 1924, Sullivan emphasized the noxious influence of certain mothers on the development of their schizophrenic sons, both directly and because of their attitudes toward their husbands (1924-1933). Considerable etiologic significance has been given to the "schizophrenogenic mother" who is either aloof, unempathic, and unable to cathect in the child properly or, more typically, cannot establish boundaries between herself and the child, engulfing and controlling a child she needs to complete her life. Studies since 1949 (Lidz et al. 1965) have revealed deficiencies and abnormalities in the total intrafamilial environment. The fathers are frequently just as severely disturbed as the mothers. The family is split by enduring conflict between the parents in which each demolishes the worth of the other to the children, or the family transactions are distorted because one parent acquiesces to the spouse's strange ways of rearing children and patterning the family life. The generation roles within the family are confused in a variety of ways such as parental rivalry with a child or parental dependency upon an immature child, including heterosexual or homosexual incestuous proclivities. Parents fail to adhere to their respective sex-linked roles, either because of homosexual tendencies or through reversing maternal and paternal roles, or because a mother cannot fill an affectional-expressive role or a father an instrumental role. The parent of the same sex as the child who becomes schizophrenic
SCHIZOPHRENIA does not form an adequate model for identification, a situation that is often aggravated because this parent's worth is undercut by the spouse. Communication within the family is always disturbed and often clearly irrational or paralogical. The intrafamilial culture may deviate markedly from that of the society into which the child must eventually emerge. These families teach or indirectly inculcate irrationality, providing a poor foundation in reality testing and for understanding verbal and nonverbal communications outside of the family. The schizophrenic patient's siblings are almost always seriously affected: more are psychotic than are reasonably well-integrated, and with rare exception their occasional "normality" is achieved at the price of serious constriction of the personality. The finding that schizophrenic patients always grow up in seriously disturbed families forms the most consistent lead concerning the etiology of schizophrenia. Essentially similar phenomena have been reported by research groups in many different countries. In conceptualizing how such disturbed family transactions can lead to schizophrenia in an offspring, some investigators focus primarily upon how the disturbed patterns of communication foster the schizophrenic thought disorder. The "double bind" hypothesis (Bateson et al. 1956) notes how the patient is habitually caught in a bind because a parent covertly sends conflicting messages that perplex and paralyze, causing him to be rebuffed whichever way he responds; or he is caught between the opposing needs and demands of his two parents, and satisfying either parent provokes rejection by the other. Various other communication problems have been noted: the ways in which the child is taught to deny or ignore what should be obvious; the distortions of meanings to support a parent's tenuous emotional equilibrium; the fostering of distrust in the utility of verbal communications; the teaching of eccentric or delusional beliefs; the blurring of the system of meanings and constructs by inconsistent reinforcement by parents, etc. (Lidz et al. 1965). The amorphous or fragmented nature of the thinking and communicating of one or both parents has been carefully documented (Wynne & Singer 1963). Studies of the family communication patterns clarify why the patient suffers from a thought disorder and how such resultant impairments in thinking and communicating create profound disturbances in ego functioning. The family disturbances, however, clearly affect the child's development deleteriously in other significant ways. A broader approach to the problem
47
takes cognizance of how failures of parental nurturance, particularly the mother's difficulties in relating to the child, interfere with the development of adequate autonomy; how the disturbances in the family structure distort the structuring of the child's personality by improper channeling of drives, through confusing child and parent roles, by creating confusions in sexual identity, by impeding proper resolution of the oedipal situation, etc.; as well as of how parents' failure to transmit adequately basic adaptive or instrumental techniques of the culture, including its system of meanings, impairs ego functioning and socializing capacities (Lidz et al. 1965). The family studies have thus far been largely exploratory, paving the way for the formulation of hypotheses that are now being studied with more rigorous methodology. Although not definitive, they have served to move research concerning the etiology of schizophrenia out of the frustrating whirlpool in which it had been caught. Many puzzling aspects of schizophrenia now seem far more comprehensible. The findings interdigitate with those of other approaches, such as studies of the relationship between social class and incidence of schizophrenia, twin studies, and psychoanalytic concepts of developmental dynamics. The knowledge gained from these studies has also had a marked impact upon therapy, particularly through drawing attention to the need to consider the family as a unit rather than simply to focus upon the individual patient. Therapy Despite the absence of any specific method of treatment, marked changes have taken place in the therapy of schizophrenic patients since 1940. Perhaps the most important change has been the gradual but progressive abandonment of the defeatist attitude concerning schizophrenia that had pervaded most of psychiatry since the mid-nineteenth century. Although debates have waged concerning the value of insulin coma, electroshock, frontal lobotomy, milieu therapy, and various forms of individual and group psychotherapy, psychiatrists and other personnel finding something they could do or try to do became interested in the patients, and the patients responded. It became apparent to increasing numbers of psychiatrists that schizophrenic patients need not follow a downhill course, and that many of the extreme manifestations were products of neglect and virtual abandonment in impersonal institutions. The enormity of the problem of caring for and attempting to treat the masses of institutionalized patients
48
SCHIZOPHRENIA
has been overwhelming, and adequate treatment for any other than selected patients has had to await reorganizations of hospital systems and the training of the necessary personnel. Therapeutic efforts must be suited to the patient, the facilities available, and the therapist's abilities. Whereas the prognosis for schizophrenic reactions collectively is generally discouraging, the outlook for the individual patient, particularly if treatment begins soon after symptoms appear and intensive care can be provided, may be regarded hopefully. "Organic" treatments. Although insulin coma therapy, introduced in 1933, did much to revive interest in the treatment of schizophrenic patients, it has now been virtually discarded, its apparent efficacy having resulted from the increased attention to patients it required. Electric convulsive treatments are of occasional value as a means of quieting extremely excited patients. Various tranquilizing drugs, particularly the phenothiazines, have largely replaced other "organic" treatments. The phenothiazines serve to lessen anxiety and agitation and probably dimmish distraction by extraneous stimuli and primary process intrusions. Trifluoperazine may be particularly useful in diminishing hallucinations. An array of psychotropic drugs is now available, and opinions differ as to the merits of each. Properly controlled experiments on the relative worth of these medications are extremely difficult to conduct. It seems reasonably certain that many patients can return to or remain in the community largely because of these agents. A major influence of tranquilizing drugs has been indirect; they have helped quiet the wards in mental institutions and provided a means of controlling seriously disturbed patients. This has helped produce great changes in mental hospitals through unlocking doors, permitting patients greater freedom, and allowing the staff time and opportunity to improve the therapeutic milieu. [See MENTAL DISORDERS, TREATMENT OF, article On SOMATIC TREATMENT.]
Milieu therapy. Establishing a suitable therapeutic hospital milieu has altered the prognosis for schizophrenic patients as much as the tranquilizing drugs, but in all except certain select institutions, reorganization had to await the quieting effects of the shock therapies and then the tranquilizers. Milieu therapy seeks to counter schizophrenic patients' tendencies to withdraw; it also fosters socialization, promotes responsibility, and provides retraining in interpersonal relationships. The therapy includes a gamut of measures ranging from discarding restraints; minimizing isolation; giving attentive care and interest; fostering socializing, edu-
cational, and occupational activities; and providing group therapy to holding patient-staff meetings and setting up patient government to provide channels of communication and to encourage responsibility for the self and others. Opening the doors of hospitals has a salutary influence and can markedly change the attitudes of both patients and staff, but some patients who are afraid of their impulsivity, aggressions, or suicidal tendencies feel more secure and can socialize more readily when protected within a limited area until they are ready to assume responsibility for their actions. As schizophrenic patients tend to regress, withdraw, and become passively dependent in institutions, there has been a movement to return such patients to the community as soon as feasible or to attempt to keep them out of hospitals altogether. On the other hand, efforts are often made to promote early hospitalization, for the chances of recovery are greater if treatment starts before symptoms become well established and if the patient can be removed from a pathogenic environment. The paradox revolves around the nature of the treatment a hospital can offer; optimally a hospital should be able to counter regressive tendencies. As yet, relatively few institutions can provide intensive care and treatment that seeks to promote essential personality change rather than mere remission from a psychotic state. Psychotherapy. Establishing a relationship to another person often—perhaps always—provides the impetus and forms the bridge for the schizophrenic patient's return from psychotic withdrawal. The crux of the initial phases of psychotherapeutic work with these patients is the therapist's use of himself to gain the patient's trust and willingness to risk relating again despite the shattering disillusionments of the past. A persistent warm and honest interest by an untrained person may suffice and succeed where a highly trained but intellectualized and uncommitted therapist fails. Schizophrenic patients are usually highly sensitive to pretense, to being used by another person, and to another person's withdrawal in the face of their intense needs or their hostilities. Usually, however, considerable skill and understanding of schizophrenic patients are required. Trust follows upon understanding, understanding requires communication, and the therapist faces the task of establishing communication across barriers imposed by the patient's idiosyncratic language usage, his personalized metaphor, his efforts to conceal and yet convey, the delusions and hallucinatory interruptions, and the projections of the patient's thoughts and feelings onto the therapist, etc. The therapist
SCHIZOPHRENIA must be prepared and able to counter or weather the patient's flights into withdrawal, particularly when the patient feels on the verge of trusting and becoming involved—setbacks that test the therapist's commitment. Bringing a patient out of his psychotic regression and withdrawal can be a very real and rewarding achievement, but something that often occurs without specific psychotherapy; the process is more successful when the therapist is a focal point in a proper therapeutic milieu that counters the patient's regression in many ways than when the emphasis is solely upon the individual psychotherapy. Psychotherapy of schizophrenia usually implies more than bringing the patient out of the psychotic episode or into socially acceptable behavior. It often involves the effort to promote profound personality changes through psychoanalytically oriented interpersonal transactions. Such work with schizophrenic patients differs markedly from the analysis of psychoneurotic patients. It seeks to strengthen ego functioning through fostering a more cohesive identity, firmer boundaries between the self and others, and control of primitive impulses. Treatment almost always includes extensive re-evaluation of parental figures and efforts to modify the sway of sabotaging parental introjects. The intense nature of the transference relationship once it is established, together with the frangibility of the relationship, places great demands upon the therapist. It is a task for highly skilled therapists with specific experience and training in the field and will not be discussed here. The effectiveness of intensive psychotherapy with schizophrenic patients cannot be evaluated in statistical terms: the belief in its value derives from the excellent results obtained with a number of individuals and from the meaningfulness of the material gained in the process. Much depends on the specific therapist as well as on the specific patient. The aims of such work are directed in part toward the future—to increasing knowledge and improving techniques. [See CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY; MENTAL DISORDERS, TREATMENT OF, especially the article on PSYCHOLOGICAL TREATMENT; PSYCHIATRY.]
Family therapy. Recent advances in understanding of the pathology in the schizophrenic's family of origin have brought the family into the therapeutic efforts in a variety of ways. Social workers or psychiatrists have worked with parents individually or in groups to allay their anxiety and guilt; to counter the common tendency of parents to interfere v/ith or disrupt the patient's therapy; to modify the parents' attitudes toward each other as well as toward the patient; and to foster more
49
direct and forthright communication. With some families a major effort is made to prevent exclusion of a hospitalized patient and withdrawal of interest in him and in others to help prevent disintegration of the family after the patient has been hospitalized. Conjoint family therapy in which parents and patient or the entire family are seen in group sessions has been found advantageous. The therapist has an opportunity to view directly the nature of the disturbed relationships and communications; the patient may gain a new perception of his parents and an appreciation of their limitations and idiosyncrasies; and other family members may recognize their own roles in provoking or continuing the patient's illness, gain insights concerning the family transactions, and begin to relate differently. Although some psychiatrists consider conjoint family therapy to be the optimal treatment procedure, others use it as an important adjunct to alternative therapeutic measures. Perspective The disagreements between virtually all schools of psychiatry concerning the nature and etiology of schizophrenia have interfered with the presentation of a coherent and cohesive approach to the problem. Although schizophrenia is traditionally considered a disease of unknown etiology, a great deal is now known about the developmental problems and the dynamic psychopathology of these patients and about the family environments that tend to produce them. Man is unique in the degree that his adaptation rests on a lengthy period of dependency upon parental figures during which he must assimilate the instrumental techniques of his culture to implement his inborn adaptive capacities. There are countless chances for misdirection, confusion, and conflict to arise in the process. The very mechanism that permits his inordinate adaptability contains a major vulnerability. He depends upon language and a coherent way of thinking to guide him into the future and on an ability to communicate to enable collaborative interaction. Yet linguistic meanings and a system of logic are not inborn but acquired as a means of problem solving by communication with others and by sorting out life experiences. How correctly meanings are learned and how firmly they become ingrained depend largely on the parental tutors—the consistency of their communications as an aid to problem solving and the emotional relationships between parents and child. There are countless ways in which the enculturation process can go wrong. When a person is caught in insoluble conflicts, when a path into the future is barred, when
50
SCHIZOPHRENIA
even regression serves little because the persons upon whom one could depend are distrusted or feared, there is still a way. One can alter the perception of his own needs and motives and those of others. One can abandon causal logic, change his internal representation of events, retreat to a period of childhood when reality gave way to fantasy, and cut off movement toward a realistic future; that is, one can become schizophrenic. This path is so clearly open to man, particularly to those who have had confused or confusing guides to follow into adulthood and have received poor foundations in meaning systems and reality testing, or who have actually been trained to irrational ways in childhood, that conditions such as schizophrenia must be expected as anomalies of the human developmental process. The acceptance of such a theory that schizophrenic reactions result from anomalous socialization processes and that the family forms the primary enculturating agency provides numerous guides for research and therapy, and it directs the psychiatrist toward increased collaboration with behavioral scientists. THEODORE LIDZ [Directly related are the entries MENTAL DISORDERS; PSYCHOSIS. Other relevant material may be found in MENTAL DISORDERS, TREATMENT OF; PSYCHIATRY; PSYCHOANALYSIS; and in the biographies of KRAEPELIN; MEYER; SULLIVAN.] BIBLIOGRAPHY ALANEN, Y. O. 1958 The Mothers of Schizophrenic Patients: A Study of the Personality and the MotherChild Relationship of 100 Mothers and the Significance of These Factors in the Pathogenesis of Schizophrenia in Comparison With Heredity. Acta psychiatrica scandinavica 33 (Supplement 124). ARIETI, SILVANO 1955 Interpretation of Schizophrenia. New York: Brunner. -» A readable and cogent presentation of a modern dynamic approach. BATESON, GREGORY et al. 1956 Toward a Theory of Schizophrenia. Behavioral Science 1:251-264. BELLAK, LEOPOLD (editor) 1958 Schizophrenia: A Review of the Syndrome. New York: Logos. -» Reviews work in the field between 1946 and 1956; contains 4,000 references. BLEULER, EUGEN (1911) 1950 Dementia Praecox: Or, the Group of Schizophrenias. New York: International Universities Press. -» Still an outstanding work on the topic. Includes an extensive bibliography to 1950. First published as "Dementia Praecox oder die Gruppe der Schizophrenien" in Aschaffenburg's Handbuch der Psychiatric. BRODY, EUGENE B.; and REDLICH, F. C. (editors) 1952 Psychotherapy With Schizophrenics. New York: International Universities Press. BROOKE, EILEEN M. 1959 National Statistics in the Epidemiology of Mental Illness. Journal of Mental Science 105:893-908. ->• Now called the British Journal of Psychiatry.
CAMERON, NORMAN A. 1938 Reasoning, Regression and Communication in Schizophrenics. Psychological Monographs. Vol. 50, no. 1. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University. -» A classic study of schizophrenic thinking. DELAY, JEAN; DENIKER, P.; and GREEN, A. 1957-1962 Le milieu familial des schizophrenes. 3 parts. Encephale 46:189-232; 49:1-21; 51:5-73. -» Part 1: Position du probleme, 1957. Part 2: Methodes d'approche, 1960. Part 3: Resultats et hypotheses, 1962. FREEMAN, THOMAS; CAMERON, JOHN L.; and McGniE, ANDREW 1958 Chronic Schizophrenia. New York: International Universities Press. FROMM-REICHMANN, FRIEDA 1948 Notes on the Development of Treatment of Schizophrenics by Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy. Psychiatry 11:263-273. HOCH, PAUL; and POLATIN, PHILLIP 1949 Pseudoneurotic Forms of Schizophrenia. Psychiatric Quarterly 23:248-276. HOFFER, ABRAM 1964 The Adrenochrome Theory of Schizophrenia: A Review. Diseases of the Nervous System 25:173-178. HOLLINGSHEAD, AUGUST B.; and REDLICH, F. C. 1958 Social Class and Mental Illness: A Community Study. New York: Wiley. JACKSON, DON D. (editor) 1960 The Etiology of Schizophrenia. New York: Basic Books. -» An excellent collection of papers on various contemporary theories. KASANIN, J. S. (editor) 1944 Language and Thought in Schizophrenia. Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press. -» Brief articles by various authorities that can serve as an introduction to the topic. KRINGLEN, EINAR 1964 Schizophrenia in Male Monozygotic Twins. Acta psychiatrica scandinavica 40 (Supplement 178):1-76. LANGFELDT, G. 1933 Some Points Regarding the Symptomatology and Diagnosis of Schizophrenia. Acta psychiatrica et neurologica scandinavica Supplement 80:7-26. -» Now called Acta psychiatrica scandinavica. LEMKAU, PAUL V.; and CROCETTI, GUIDO M. 1958 Vital Statistics of Schizophrenia. Pages 64-81 in Leopold Bellak (editor), Schizophrenia: A Review of the Syndrome. New York: Logos. LIDZ, THEODORE; FLECK, STEPHEN; and CORNELISON, ALICE R. 1965 Schizophrenia and the Family. New York: International Universities Press. -> Collected papers of an intensive study of the intrafamilial environment of schizophrenic patients. MEYER, ADOLF (1896-1937)1951 Collected Papers. Volume 2: Psychiatry. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. -> For the origins of the genetic-dynamic approach, see the chapters "Dementia Praecox" and "Paranoia" on pages 413-560. REES, W. LINFORD 1957 Physical Characteristics of the Schizophrenic Patient. Pages 1-14 in Derek Richter (editor), Schizophrenia: Somatic Aspects. London: Pergamon. Die Schizophrenic. 1932 Volume 9, special part 5 in Karl Wilmanns (editor), Handbuch der Geisteskrankheiten. Berlin: Springer. -» An authoritative source for the German approach in the Kraepelinian tradition. Contains an outstanding bibliography. SINGER, MARGARET T.; and WYNNE, LYMAN C. 1965a Thought Disorder and Family Relations of Schizophrenics: III. Methodology Using Protective Techniques. Archives of General Psychiatry 12:187—200. SINGER, MARGARET T.; and WYNNE, LYMAN C. 1965& Thought Disorder and Family Relations of Schizo-
SCHLESINGER, KARL phrenics: IV. Results and Implications. Archives of General Psychiatry 12:201-212. SULLIVAN, HARRY STACK (1924-1933) 1962 Schizophrenia as a Human Process. New York: Norton. Symposium international sur la psychotherapie de la schizophrenic. 1957 Acta psychotherapeutica, psychosomatica et orthopaedagogica 5:99-360. SYMPOSIUM ON SCHIZOPHRENIA, SAN FRANCISCO, 1958 1959 Schizophrenia: An Integrated Approach. Edited by Alfred Auerbach. New York: Ronald Press. TIENARI, P. 1963 Psychiatric Illnesses in Identical Twins. Acta psychiatrica scandinavica 39 (Supplement 171). -» The whole supplement is devoted to Tienari's study. WORLD CONGRESS OF PSYCHIATRY, SECOND, ZURICH, 1957 1959 Report. 4 vols. Zurich: Fiissli. WYNNE, LYMAN C.; and SINGER, MARGARET T. 1963 Thought Disorder and Family Relations of Schizophrenics. 2 parts. Archives of General Psychiatry 9: 191-206. -» Part 1: A Research Strategy. Part 2: A Classification of Forms of Thinking.
SCHLESINGER, KARL Karl Schlesinger (1889-1938) was bom in Budapest and died in Vienna, committing suicide on the day Hitler took possession of that city. (He had moved there after Bela Kun's 1919 communist revolution in Hungary.) A wealthy financier and a member of many industrial and financial boards, Schlesinger was one of the very few important contemporary theoretical economists who was not part of the academic world; he never held an academic post but was an active and highly respected member of the Vienna Economic Society. Although his contributions to economics were greatly appreciated in Vienna, his important early work of 1914, Theorie der Geld- und Kreditwirtschaft (see 1914a), was not readily available at the time he moved there; its direct influence upon Viennese monetary theory was less than might have been expected. In his 1914 book Schlesinger made extensive use of some simple mathematics, uncommon at that time in German economic writing, particularly in the field of monetary theory. His interest in mathematics led him to take instruction from A. Wald in the 1930s; he eventually proposed to Wald a problem relating to Walras' production equations. This problem concerned Schlesinger's modification of the Walras-Cassel system of production equations by introducing the notion that all factors of production—not only the scarce ones—have to be considered and that whether a factor is scarce or free depends on the demand functions. This led to Wald's famous work on the determinacy of the Walrasian system. [See ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM.] (Schlesinger acknowledged that Zeuthen had earlier
51
suggested a similar modification without, however, following up the matter.) These problems were discussed in Karl Menger's mathematical colloquium under Menger's continuing and stimulating guidance. Schlesinger also contributed to Menger's work on the theory of returns. Schlesinger's Theorie der Geld- und Kreditwirtschaft made him the only immediate follower of Walras, other than Wicksell, to advance Walras' theory of money. Schlesinger stressed that in addition to the indirect utility of money derived from its ability ultimately to provide desired consumers' goods, cash balances also have a direct utility. He introduced a probabilistic approach to monetary theory by distinguishing between fixed and uncertain future due dates for payments; the former offer no choice, while the latter permit the individual to maximize utility by choosing appropriately between holding cash and purchasing goods. He further showed that if the number of transactions increases, it is possible to economize in the relative size of cash balances, although this will not be the case if only the magnitude of transactions increases. Schlesinger derived an excess demand equation for money that is virtually identical with the one commonly ascribed to Keynes. [See MONEY.] He also was probably the first to develop the notion of the equilibrium rate of interest [see INTEREST]. Schlesinger was one of the first economists to expound the purchasing power parity theory. In his pamphlet on the variations in the value of money (1916), he stated the theorem that the parity of a country's currency is determined by the quotient of the domestic and foreign general price levels. The equilibrium rate of exchange can only be changed if foreign borrowings are used to reduce the indebtedness of the bank of issue. In 1931 Schlesinger published a lengthy review of F. Somary's Bankpolitik (see 193la), in which he presented a detailed mathematical analysis of the theory of credit creation by commercial banks, incorporating this theory into the general process of circulation. Assuming there are n equal banks, that deposits require some cash reserve, and that each individual pays partly in cash and partly by check, Schlesinger analyzed the effects of introducing new metal or new bank notes into the system. He traced the path that credit expansion follows until equilibrium is reached and derived formulas for debtors, creditors, and the system as a whole. He also considered the flow of checks back to their starting point. Several of his restrictive assumptions can be relaxed, but the whole approach is an early model for careful, rigorous analysis of monetary operations. [See BANKING.]
52
SCHLICK, MORITZ
During the international financial crisis of the 1930s Schlesinger proposed that the Austrian government control capital movements, but he was strictly opposed to exchange control as then practiced. Schlesinger's most significant contributions were to monetary theory, but this work was widely neglected, which caused Schumpeter to comment that "in our field first-class performance is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for success" (1954, p. 1082, note 5). More recently, however, he has been given more credit, especially by V. Wagner and D. Patinkin. In addition to his analytical contributions to the numerous discussions about capital theory, business cycles, and general equilibrium theory conducted among economists in Vienna—frequently at odd hours in coffee houses —Schlesinger had important economic insights in which his great experience as a financier and administrator provided a valuable counterweight to his theoretical analysis. Thus, his considerable influence on Viennese economics was far greater than his few publications might indicate. OSKAR MORGENSTERN
[See also the biographies of WALD and WALRAS.] WORKS BY SCHLESINGER
1914a Theorie der Geld- und Kreditwirtschaft. Munich: Duncker & Humblot. (1914b) 1959 Basic Principles of the Money Economy. International Economic Papers 9:20-38. -» This is a partial translation of Theorie der Geld- und Kreditwirtschaft. 1916 Die Veranderungen des Geldwertes im Kriege. Vienna: Manz. 193la [A Book Review of] Bankpolitik, by Felix Somary. Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 66: 1-35. 1931i> Das "Raise!" der franzosischen Goldpolitik. Zeitschrift fur N ationalokonomie 2:387-407. 1935 Uber die Produktionsgleichungen der okonomischen Wertlehre. Ergebnisse eines mathematischen Kolloquiums 6:10-11. 1936 Ein Beitrag zu Mengers "Bemerkungen zu den Ertragsgesetzen." Zeitschrift fur N ationalokonomie 7: 398-400. SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
ELLIS, HOWARD S. 1934 German Monetary Theory, 1905-1933. Harvard Economic Studies, Vol. 44. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. MARGET, ARTHUR W. 1931 Leon Walras and the "Cashbalance Approach" to the Problem of the Value of Money. Journal of Political Economy 39:569-600. PATINKIN, DON (1956) 1965 Money, Interest, and Prices: An Integration of Monetary and Value Theory. 2d ed. New York: Harper. SCHUMPETER, JOSEPH A. (1954) 1960 History of Economic Analysis. Edited by E. B. Schumpeter. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.
WAGNER, VALENTIN F. 1937 Geschichte der Kredittheorien: Eine dogmenkritische Darstellung. Vienna: Springer.
SCHLICK, MORITZ Friedrich Albert Moritz Schlick (1882-1936), philosopher and epistemologist, was born in Berlin. He studied physics at Heidelberg and Lausanne and took his doctorate at Berlin under Max Planck with a dissertation on the physics of light. He then qualified himself for an academic post in philosophy and taught first at Rostock, then Kiel, and finally at Vienna from 1922 to 1936, where he occupied the chair in the philosophy of the inductive sciences, held earlier by Ernst Mach and Ludwig Boltzmann. Schlick became the leading figure of the so-called Vienna circle—a group of thinkers concerned with developing a scientific philosophy in opposition to the prevailing metaphysical orientation of German philosophical thought. After a brief but highly productive period this school was disrupted and scattered, first by Schlick's death on June 22, 1936 (he was murdered by a mentally disturbed former student), and then by the Nazi invasion of Austria in 1938. However, its influence continued and was strongly felt for another two decades, especially in English-speaking countries (where it became known as logical positivism), as a consequence of the emigration of some of its leading members and sympathizers, among them Rudolf Carnap, Hans Reichenbach, and the somewhat less closely connected Karl Popper. Although trained as a physicist and strongly motivated by the desire to bring philosophical clarity to the knowledge of nature and to render philosophy more scientific in method and results, Schlick was sensitive to the whole range of problems of knowledge, human existence, and values. He had a simple, clear style free of all technical jargon, rising on occasion to something like the level of poetry. His first book, Lebensweisheit (1908; "Wisdom of Life"), as the name indicates, was devoted to nonscientific issues, as was his last, Problems of Ethics (1930a), which, while largely an attempt to give an account of ethics from the causalexplanatory point of view, contains many profound observations on life and values. Aside from these two books and a small separately published essay on the meaning of life, Vom Sinn des Lebens (1927), Schlick's contributions to philosophy fall in the fields of the philosophy of science and epistemology.
SCHLICK, MORITZ He did not, however, concern himself with the philosophy of the social sciences; at least he published nothing dealing directly with its special problems (however, see Natur und Kultur). The most important of his ideas pertaining to this area are those that are contained in his ethical writings mentioned above. A few words will be said about them before we turn to his principal contributions dealing with knowledge as such. Moral philosophy Schlick distinguished sharply between cognition and experience. Reality is given to us in experience, but that experience is not itself knowledge. This distinction, between Erlebnis and Erkenntnis ("experience" and "cognition"), which plays so fundamental a role in his theory of knowledge, is no less important in his ethics and Lebensphilosophie. Thus, the moral philosopher seeks only to understand moral phenomena, moral conduct—not to guide or create them. The moralist, wise man, or prophet, on the other hand, is interested in the quality of life itself, seeks to enlighten men with respect to the good life, and thus has a practical, not theoretical, goal. As a moralist, Schlick taught that the good life is the life full, to the highest degree, of activity valued for its own sake. Activities valued in and for themselves are properly called play, and Schlick agreed with Schiller that man is truly man only when he plays. And, as youth is characteristically the time of play, the concept of "youth" is the clue to the meaning of life. Whenever man acts out of the joy in acting, apart from considerations of ends to be achieved, then he is, regardless of his age, youthful in the philosophical sense, and then his life is meaningful. "If we need a rule for life let it be: 'Preserve the spirit of youth!', for it is the meaning of life" (1927, p. 354). As a moral philosopher, Schlick viewed his task as that of explaining moral conduct, i.e., how it comes about that man does what is required of him by society, which is the moral lawgiver making demands upon him to act, even when such conformance might seem contrary to his own desires. Normative ethics—defining "the good," "what ought to be"—he considered as at most a preliminary to ethics. It is not the task or privilege of the moral philosopher to decide what society ought to mean by these terms but only to ascertain what it does mean. But this does not imply that the philosopher docilely accepts as good whatever society holds to be such; his task is to understand and explain norms, not to accept or reject them. Schlick's view was that society deems and calls good that which
53
it supposes is beneficial to it—i.e., makes for its happiness—and it demands that its members act accordingly. The ultimate ethical norms, if such there be, are facts in human experience and, precisely because they are ultimate, they neither need nor admit of justification—a senseless requirement but one all too frequently made in the history of ethical thought. Schlick wrote that "even if ethics were a normative science it would not cease because of this to be a science of facts . . ." ([1930a] 1939, p. 21). According to Schlick, in a situation of choice a man selects that goal the idea of which at the time of choice is relatively more pleasure-tinged or less tinged with unpleasant feeling than the alternatives. Thus men can, and often do, knowingly choose goals that are in their realization unpleasant. In the long run, however, the motive pleasure is in turn affected by the realization pleasure in such a way that goals regularly found to be unpleasant upon achievement, whether because of their own nature or because of social sanctions, cease to be attractive. The combined effect of man's natural sympathy and of social sanctions is to make man identify his own happiness with that of his fellow men. Thus arises that close connection between virtue (moral conduct, i.e., altruism) and happiness, which explains why men act morally. Of possible interest to students of society is Schlick's analysis of the concept of "responsibility," which he thought should replace the traditional concept of so-called freedom of the will, a concept that in his view is irrelevant to ethics and based on a series of confusions, namely, between causality (determinism) and compulsion, indeterminism (chance) and freedom. That a man's actions are determined means only that they are predictable, not that they are coerced. " 'Compulsion' occurs where a man is prevented from realizing his natural desires. How could the rule according to which these natural desires arise itself be considered as 'compulsion'?" (ibid., p. 148). Morality and society are both concerned only with who is responsible for the acts they wish to discourage or encourage, and this influence would be impossible if acts were free in the sense of undetermined, i.e., uncaused. Philosophy of science and epistemology Schlick's work in the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of science dominated his scholarly career. It falls into two periods: one culminating in the publication of his chief work, Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre (1918), and another beginning with his move to Vienna in 1922 and ending with his death in 1936.
54
SCHLICK, MORITZ
Experience and knowledge. The most important single idea of Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre is that the experience of something (Erlebnis} is not the same as the knowledge of it (Erkenntnis). To know something is basically to recognize it, i.e., to find in it something already familiar. Schlick frequently made use of the pair of German terms kennen and erkennen to make this distinction; the former refers to being acquainted with something, the latter to recognizing it as an instance of something else. This recognition ranges from the simplest cases, such as finding a shade to be a certain color, to recognizing in the phenomena of light something governed (described) by the same laws as those governing electrical phenomena. The whole goal of knowledge as theory is to achieve conceptual unification, to discover identity amid diversity. This is a joy in itself, but in addition it gives man the power to master endlessly diverse phenomena with a minimum of basic concepts. Knowledge is correct description, a true statement or judgment. Contrary to the teaching of Kant, our knowledge is not confined to the realm of phenomena, what is sensibly given, but reaches over into the realm of "things-in-themselves," if by this term we refer to what is not phenomenon, not given in experience. For we can make true judgments about what we do not and cannot experience, as well as about what we can. Knowledge is symbolic, not intuitive. Such things-in-themselves are defined not in terms of experienced "content" but implicitly, in terms of their relational properties. To know something about such things is not to intuit their qualities but to be acquainted with the laws that describe their behavior. To be real is not to be simply an object of sensible intuition but rather to occupy a position in time. The moment it is shown that for any object the rules of some particular scientific discipline force us to grant it a definite time and place, its real existence is assured. Thus, the existence and nature of atoms, of fields of force, or of the experiences of other persons are vouched for by the laws that describe them correctly, enabling us to predict and control, not by their entering qualitatively into our experience. Physical space and time are not identical with their sensible (subjective) correlates (visual space is not Euclidean) but are known through the laws that describe them. Considerations of a similar nature were used by Schlick in his polemic against the phenomenalism and "positivism" of such thinkers as Hume, Avenarius, and Mach, whose doctrines he called the "immanence idea" and subjected to sustained and effective criticism.
Analysis and verification. Under the influence of Wittgenstein, with whom he was in close personal contact during his Vienna period, certain aspects of Schlick's thought underwent a gradual but appreciable shift of emphasis. Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy as the activity of clarifying meaning furnished Schlick with a clearer line of demarcation between philosophy and science, or positive knowledge: the former clarifies concepts and analyzes the meaning of statements, determining their experiential truth conditions; the latter seeks to verify them, determine their truth values. Philosophical activity constitutes the necessary precondition of science but does not itself put forth doctrines, does not take the form of a body of knowledge. It consists rather in those sometimes verbal acts by means of which meanings are "shown." The ultimate meanings of words and statements must be found in what is given in experience, in content. The great error of metaphysics has been the effort to express the inexpressible, the content of experience. Here again appears the main theme that knowledge is not mere awareness of the given but concerns its form or structure, which alone is capable of being expressed and communicated. Knowledge describes the relations which hold between the elements of content, their structure, and specifically, the laws connecting them. The meaning of a proposition is given by describing the experiential conditions under which it will be true and those under which it will be false, i.e., the conditions in the given that verify and falsify it. This meaning principle, the verifiability principle, plays the dominant role in the philosophical writings of Schlick's final period. Since all meaningful statements must be verifiable and falsifiable in the given, there are no limits to knowledge, for what transcends possible ascertainment does so by transcending significance itself. It does not follow from the verifiability that only the given exists. This doctrine is itself senseless, as is the opposite view that the given is unreal, mere appearance. "To be real always means to stand in a definite relationship to the given" ([1932] 1959, p. 99). It is in the given that we verify or falsify (strictly, confirm or disconfirm) statements about existence and reality by inferring, from the hypothesis that something exists, that certain experiences will be forthcoming consequent on certain tests or operations and then testing for the truth of these predictions. The laws on the basis of which we make these predictions are the true objects of science. "The subject matter of physics is not sensations but laws. The formulation, used by some positivists, that bodies are only
SCHLICK, MORITZ 'complexes of sensations' is therefore to be rejected. What is correct is only that propositions concerning bodies are transformable into equivalent propositions concerning the occurrence of sensations in accordance with laws" (ibid.., p. 107). Schlick, in keeping with his nontechnical manner of writing, did not always give very precise formulation to the verifiability principle. In general he distinguished between analytic (logical, necessary) and synthetic (empirical, contingent) statements. Only the latter, and not all of them, are propositions in the fullest sense of being verifiable and falsifiable. Analytic statements are limiting cases, necessary truths, not expressing possible states of the world but definitional, "grammatical" decisions or rules. The logical is the purely formal, the a priori; that there are no synthetic a priori truths is a central theme of his polemic against Kant and a view common to the school as a whole. Statements of laws—general hypotheses—not being strictly verifiable, are not genuine, fullfledged propositions but are treated as rules for making predictions, thus as heuristic principles. Since they are not even theoretically verifiable, the question constituting the problem of induction cannot arise, for laws are not propositions (true or false) whose truth values might be inferred from others. Induction is but a methodical kind of guessing about useful rules. The question of whether determinism is true, whether all events are related to others by regularities expressible in laws, is to be distinguished from the question of the nature of causality. The statement that determinism is true is not verifiable or falsifiable and hence is not a genuine proposition. As a guiding principle, however, determinism might be expressed by the precept "Seek causal laws!" A causal law is a formula enabling us to make successful predictions, given certain data. That it holds necessarily (universally), i.e., that determinism is true within a given domain, cannot be finally established or refuted, but we can find good empirical grounds for accepting or rejecting the view in particular cases. Despite his stress on verifiability and falsifiability, Schlick in fact considered all propositions formulated in daily life and science to be hypotheses, at best confirmable or disconfirmable but not strictly verifiable—at least from the point of view of ascertainment, if not of logical theory. The only contingent statements whose truth can be, in the strict sense, established are those that, on the moment of their utterance, report or announce the given (a here-now-thus) in experience. These confirmations (Konstatierungen, as he called them) consti-
55
tute the ultimate connections between language and the world, "the unshakeable point of contact between knowledge and reality" ([1934] 1959, p. 226). All testing of other propositions is in terms of the data constituting the referents of these basic propositions, which immediately cease to have meaning when they lose contact with these referents. The propositions actually made use of in science and daily life are "a means of finding one's way among the facts; of arriving at the joy of confirmation . . ." (ibid., p. 226). The pragmatic nature of Schlick's concepts of knowledge and propositions is thus evident. Limits of knowledge. Since knowledge is of laws describing events and since content is incommunicable and cannot be expressed in propositions, we can know the nature of things only in terms of the laws that apply to them, laws that enable us to make successful predictions in the manner described above. The age-old problem of the relation of mind and body finds its solution here. Mind or, better, the mental is what obeys the qualitative laws of psychology; body, matter, or the physical is what obeys the quantitative laws of physics, which, in contrast to the (nonbehavioristic) laws of psychology, are intersensual and intersubjective. The problem of the connection of mind and body is thus the problem of the connection of the languages of psychology and physics. The as yet unestablished but not implausible hypothesis of physicalism (materialism freed of its metaphysical connotations) is that the qualitative aspects of experience (content) are correlated with certain physical, quantitative, measurable properties in such a way that from determination of the latter (brain states, nerve impulses, etc.) universally correct inferences could be made to the former; and in general that a complete description of the world can be made on the basis of physical concepts. If this should be correct, then the mental would be explained by the physical, would in a certain sense be the physical. That this is so we do not know, but the problem is insoluble and senseless if it requires explaining how extended substance, i.e., traditional "body," can interact with unextended substance—"mind." The mental is in any case often extended, for example, a pain can be spread over an area or occupy a place; hence the traditional problem disappears, to be replaced by one concerning the empirically determinable relation between certain kinds of propositions, not kinds of substances. And if solved, it will be solved by scientific experimentation and discovery, not by "philosophical" or metaphysical considerations. The reworking of his central ideas in the manner just illustrated—on the basis of his conception
56
SCHMIDT, WILHELM
of knowledge as symbolic, essentially concerned with communication and expression, and of expression as dealing with form, not content—was the task that confronted Schlick when he was cut down so tragically in the prime of life. DAVID RYNIN [See also CAUSATION; ETHICS, article on ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND SOCIAL STRUCTURES; POSITIVISM; SCIENCE,
article on THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE.] WORKS BY SCHLICK 1908 Lebensweisheit. Munich: Beck. (1917) 1920 Space and Time in Contemporary Physics. Oxford: Clarendon. -» First published in German. (1918) 1925 Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre. 2d ed. Berlin: Springer. 1927 Vom Sinn des Lebens. Sonderdrucke des Symposion, Heft 6. Berlin: Weltkreis-Verlag. (1930a) 1939 Problems of Ethics. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. -» First published in German. A paperback edition was published in 1962 by Dover. (1930Z?) 1959 The Turning Point in Philosophy. Pages 53-59 in A. J. Ayer (editor), Logical Positivism. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. -> First published as "Die Wende der Philosophic" in Volume 1 of Erkenntnis. (1931) 1961-1962 Causality in Contemporary Physics. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 12, no. 47:177-178; no. 48:281-298. -> First published in German. (1932) 1959 Positivism and Realism. Pages 82-107 in A. J. Ayer (editor), Logical Positivism. Glencoe, IllFree Press. -» First published in German in Volume 3 of Erkenntnis. (1934) 1959 The Foundation of Knowledge. Pages 209227 in A. J. Ayer (editor), Logical Positivism. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. -» First published in German in Volume 4 of Erkenntnis. Aphorismen. Edited by Blanche Hardy Schlick. Vienna: Privately published, 1962. -» Published posthumously. Gesammelte Aufsatze: 1926-1936. Vienna: Gerold, 1938. -» Chapters 6, 7, 8, 14, and 15 were written in English. An abridged edition was published in 1948 as Gesetz, Kausalitdt und Wahrscheinlichkeit. Natur und Kultur. Edited by Josef Rauscher. Vienna and Stuttgart: Humboldt, 1952. -> Published posthumously. Philosophy of Nature. New York: Philosophical Library, 1949. -» First published posthumously in German in 1938. SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY FEIGL, HERBERT 1937/1938 Moritz Schlick. Erkenntnis 7:393-419. KRAFT, VICTOR (1950) 1953 The Vienna Circle: The Origin of Neo-positivism; a Chapter in the History of Recent Philosophy. New York: Philosophical Library. ->• First published in German.
SCHMIDT, WILHELM Wilhelm Schmidt was born in 1868 in Horde, Westphalia, and died in 1954 in Fribourg, Switzerland. He joined the Divine Word Missionaries (Societas Verbi Divini, or S.V.D.) in 1883 and
was ordained a priest in 1892. From 1893 to 1895 he studied at the University of Berlin, majoring in Oriental languages; he was appointed professor in the St. Gabriel Mission Seminary at Modling, near Vienna, in 1895 and remained there until 1938. He also taught at the University of Vienna, beginning in 1921, and after he left Austria, he taught at the University of Fribourg from 1939 to 1951. He founded the periodical Anthropos in 1906, was director of the Museo Missionario-Etnologico Lateranense in Rome from 1927 to 1939, and was director of the Anthropos Institut at St. Augustin near Bonn from 1932 to 1950. Early in his career, Schmidt was very interested in linguistic studies, but later he turned increasingly to studies in ethnology and the science of religion. The impetus to his work in these latter fields came from his philosophical, theological, and linguistic training and from the observations made by S.V.D. missionaries, especially in New Guinea and Togo. He was influenced as well by the folklorist Andrew Lang, by the Indologist Leopold von Schroder, and by the ethnologists Friedrich Ratzel, Leo Frobenius, Ernst Grosse, C. N. Starcke, Alfred Vierkandt, Edward Westermarck, Franz Boas, and, above all, by Fritz Graebner and his theories of Kulturkreise. In his studies of the evolution and forms of the family, Schmidt followed Grosse in correlating family types with economic activities. He refined Graebner's theory of Kulturkreise, which differentiated between matrilineal and patrilineal societies, seeking to explain their origins on the basis of subsistence patterns; thus, food planters would be matrilineal in descent and residency rules, while nomads would be patrilineal. He agreed with others, such as Havelock Ellis and Westermarck, in offering psychological explanations for exogamy. Also, his arrangements of traits in Kulturkreise are frequently in accord with functionalist ideas (although he did not want to be associated with "functionalism"—see 1944 for his violent criticism of functionalism). Thus totemism is identified with clan exogamy, in contrast with the consanguineal basis of local exogamy; education is linked to initiation ceremonies, which are usually obligatory for all the young men of the tribe, rather than to secret societies, which often constitute an elite and have special requirements for admission. Schmidt was concerned with the variability of individuals and their relationship to society. He asserted that the individual, even among primitives, exerts an influence on the institutions of his community. In his 12-volume work, Der Ursprung der Gottes-
SCHMIDT, WILHELM idee (1912-1955), he made use of extensive material supporting the theory that the Supreme Being occupied a position so superior (compared with spirits and other beings of religious significance) in the religion of primitive hunters and gatherers that this religion may properly be considered monotheistic. Subsequently, such monotheism persisted especially in nomadic pastoral civilizations, while in the Kulturkreise of the matrilineal agricultural peoples and the more advanced totemic hunting cultures, the figure of the Supreme Being was stifled or supplanted by other religious elements, e.g., fertility cults, ancestor worship, magic. Totemism itself was regarded by Schmidt as essentially social; he particularly stressed its significance for clan exogamy. Although totemism does imply a certain reverence for the totem animal, Schmidt did not consider it a religious phenomenon—an actual animal cult. From the time that Schmidt became familiar with Graebner's concept of Kulturkreise (Graebner believed that he established such Kulturkreise for Oceania, including Australia), this concept exerted an influence on his linguistic work. He tried to show that when Australian languages are classified, different groups coincide with totemistic and matrilineal cultures respectively. Furthermore, he attributed certain linguistic phenomena to economic and social change: thus, he felt that the change to uxorilocal residence and the ownership of land by women might result in the learning of a foreign tongue by the men, and thus contribute to the disintegration of the language. Indeed, Schmidt made an even more comprehensive attempt to relate all aspects of linguistic evolution to general cultural evolution, to explain the former largely in terms of the latter, and to set up parallels between linguistic areas and Kulturkreise. Schmidt's influence was far-reaching, especially in the German- and English-speaking regions of the world, where his journal Anthropos was a repository of field data collected by missionaries around the world. Schmidt was also concerned that his findings have a practical application to colonial policy and missionary practice. Many of his publications, especially those dealing with family and social ethics, were addressed to a public wider than the academic one. JOSEPH HENNINGER [For the historical context of Schmidt's work, see ANTHROPOLOGY; and the biographies of BOAS; ELLIS; FROBENIUS; GRAEBNER; RATZEL; WES TERM ARCK. For discussion of the subsequent development of Schmidt's ideas, see HISTORY, article on CULTURE HISTORY; LINGUISTICS, article on HISTORICAL LINGUISTICS; and the biography of KOPPERS.]
57
WORKS BY SCHMIDT
1906 Die moderne Ethnologie; L'ethnologie moderne. Anthropos 1:134-163, 318-387, 592-643, 950-997. 1908-1910 L'origine de 1'idee de Dieu. Anthropos 3:125162, 336-368, 559-611, 801-836, 1081-1120; 4:207250, 505-524, 1075-1091; 5:231-246. -» A revised German version appeared in book form in 1912 as Volume 1 of Der Ursprung der Gottesidee. 1910 Die Stellung der Pygmaenvolker in der Entwicklungsgeschichte des Menschen. Studien und Forschungen zur Menschen- und Volkerkunde, Vols. 6-7. Stuttgart (Germany): Strecker & Schroder. 1912-1955 Der Ursprung der Gottesidee: Fine historischkritische und positive Studie. 12 vols. Miinster in Westfalen (Germany): Aschendorff. -> A second edition of Volume 1 appeared in 1926. 1924 SCHMIDT, WILHELM; and KOPPERS, WILHELM Volker und Kulturen. Regensburg (Germany): Habbel. (1925) 1964 Familie. Pages 13-42 in Wilhelm Schmidt, Wege der Kulturen: Gesammelte Aufsdtze. Anthropos Institut, Studia, Vol. 20. St. Augustin bei Bonn (Germany): Verlag des Anthropos-Instituts. -» First published in the Handworterbuch der Staatswissenschaften. 1926 Die Sprachfamilien und Sprachenkreise der Erde. Heidelberg (Germany): Winter. (1927) 1946-1949 Rassen und Volker in Vorgeschichte und Geschichte des Abendlandes. 3d ed. 3 vols. Lucerne (Switzerland): Stocker. -> First published as Rasse und Volk. 1930 Handbuch der vergleichenden Religionsgeschichte zum Gebrauch fur Vorlesungen an Universitdten, Seminaren usw. und zum Selbststudium: Ursprung und Werden der Religion. Theorien und Tatsachen. Miinster in Westfalen (Germany): Aschendorff. 1935 The Position of Women With Regard to Property in Primitive Society. American Anthropologist New Series 37:244-256. (1937) 1939 The Culture Historical Metbod of Ethnology: The Scientific Approach to the Racial Question. New York: Fortuny. -> First published as Handbuch der Methode der kultur-historischen Ethnologie. 1937-1942 Das Eigentum auf den dltesten Stufen der Menschheit. 3 vols. Miinster in Westfalen (Germany): Aschendorff. 1944 Untersuchungen zur Methode der Ethnologie. Anthropos 35/36:898-965. 1952 Entstehung der Verwandtschaftssysteme und Heiratsregelungen. Anthropos 47:767-783. 1955 Das Mutterrecht. Anthropos Institut, Studia, Vol. 10. Vienna: Missionsdruckerei St. Gabriel. -» Published posthumously. Wege der Kulturen: Gesammelte Aufsdtze. Anthropos Institut, Studia, Vol. 20. St. Augustin bei Bonn (Germany): Verlag des Anthropos-Instituts, 1964. SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BAUMANN, HERMANN 1958 P. Wilhelm Schmidt und Das Mutterrecht. Anthropos 53:212-228. BORNEMANN, FRITZ. 1954 Verzeichnis der Schriften von P. W. Schmidt, S.V.D. (1868-1954). Anthropos 49: 397-432. BORNEMANN, FRITZ 1956 P. W. Schmidts Studien iiber den Totemismus in Asien und Ozeanien. Anthropos 51:595-734. BORNEMANN, FRITZ 1958 P. W. Schmidts Studien iiber den Totemismus in Afrika. Anthropos 53:945-1003.
58
SCHMITT, CARL
BURGMANN, ARNOLD (1954) 1966 P. W. Schmidt als Linguist. Volume 2, pages 287-328 in Portraits of Linguists: A Biographical Source Book for the History of Western Linguistics, 1746-1963. Edited by Thomas A. Sebeok. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press. -* First published in Volume 49 of Anthropos. Festschrift: Publication d'hommage offerte au P. W. Schmidt. Edited by Wilhelm Koppers. 1928 Vienna: Missionsdruckerei St. Gabriel. HENNINGER, JOSEPH 1956 P. Wilhelm Schmidt, S.V.D. (1868—1954): Eine biographische Skizze. Anthropos 51:19-60. SEMAINE D'ETHNOLOGIE RELIGIEUSE Comptes rendus. -> Proceedings of meetings held between 1912 and 1929; published in 5 volumes between 1913 and 1930.
SCHMITT, CARL Carl Schmitt, German political theorist, was born in 1888 in Plettenberg in Westphalia. He studied law and obtained his habilitation for public law at Strasbourg in 1916. His subsequent academic career was a successful one: he taught at Greifswald from 1921 to 1922; at Bonn from 1922 to 1928; at Berlin from 1928 until early in 1933; at Cologne during the year 1933; and again at Berlin, from the beginning of the academic year 1933/1934 until 1945. Schmitt is an important representative of a school of thought in German public law which, after World War i, turned away from the German tradition of legal positivism and tried to broaden the scientific study of law and legal institutions by introducing into it historical, sociological, and political considerations. Accordingly, his publications cover a wide variety of subjects: the relationship between written law and judicial decision making, the romantic movement in political thinking during the early nineteenth century, and the history of dictatorship as a political idea and as an institution. He developed a systematic theory of constitutional law and made the history of European public law an object of philosophical investigation. He studied particular issues of constitutional, international, and martial law, and he engaged in polemics over the actual political situation in Germany. Schmitt's participation in the antiliberal intellectual and political movement in Germany did not preclude his making significant contributions to political science. Observing the importance of arbitrary decisions both in the process of adjudication and in systematic jurisprudence, he established the concept of Dezisionismus to designate the fact that any legal order is ultimately based on sovereign decisions. These decisions are based not on positive norms but on the ultima ratio of emergency
decrees [see POLITICAL JUSTICE]. Schmitt traced this philosophy back to Hobbes's doctrine that auctoritas non veritas facit legem (laws are based on authority rather than truth), as well as to what he called the political theology of de Maistre, Bonald, Donoso Cortes, and other counterrevolutionary thinkers. Schmitt believed that the decisionistic method of looking for extreme and critical cases would lead to a new concrete way of thinking about the political order and political action (konkretes Ordnungs- und Gestaltungsdenken). However, the decisionistic method became more than an approach to political phenomena: Schmitt's preoccupation with the "extreme cases," as well as with the counterrevolutionary thinkers' pessimistic view of man, led him to convert the decisionistic method into a moral interpretation of politics and history that, in the turbulent situation in German politics between the two world wars, was to serve as a political ideology. Schmitt defined politics as emerging from the friend-foe constellations that challenge the polity to distinguish between allies and enemies; friendfoe constellations arise in the situations in which civil war or war between states has to be considered an immediate possibility. All human groups, whether of economic, religious, or ethnic origin, may enter into extreme conflicts. The state, therefore, is valued because it is the institution which protects its citizens against the enemy within and without. Schmitt considered this defensive and repressive function of the state to be the precondition and the guarantee of all law and order in human affairs. He interpreted the modern history of continental Europe as a development from the absolute state of the eighteenth century, through the neutral state of the nineteenth, to the total state of the twentieth [see TOTALITARIANISM]. This total state would overcome the neutralization of political power and the cleavage between the state and sqciety that had resulted from nineteenth-century liberalism. Liberalism and democracy were, in Schmitt's view, incompatible political principles, and the institutions of parliamentary government, once based on genuine political discussion and on the efficient functioning of public opinion, had, in twentieth-century mass society, lost their raison d'etre and their legitimacy. The Weimar Republic was, according to Schmitt, a distorted version of what he called a parlamentarischer Gesetzgebungsstaat, a distortion which he attributed to the waning of the nation's political homogeneity, which he considered to be caused in turn by the anarchical pluralism of incompatible political forces. Schmitt did not believe that Germany under the Weimar Republic could become
SCHMITT, CARL politically integrated. He therefore defended the National Socialists' seizure of power as a way of regaining the authority necessary to restore substantive justice. Thus he provided the ideological justification of a new German constitution. Based on the defense of national and racial homogeneity (Artgleichheit^), and guided by the principles of leadership and loyalty, Germany should be rebuilt as a threefold totality comprising (1) a bureaucratic apparatus that included the judiciary, (2) a one-party political movement, and (3) a politically neutralized sphere of professional and communal administration ( Selbstverwaltung ). In matters of international law, Schmitt criticized all global constructions of international legal order and defended a European Monroe Doctrine based on German hegemony. He distrusted concepts of international legal order because they could be used to justify imperialism and illegitimate imperialist intervention in the affairs of foreign states. He also deplored political universalism, because it produced a concept of warfare according to which both the enemy's state and its citizens could be prosecuted as criminals (the difference between the enemy and a criminal being blurred). [See INTERNATIONAL CRIMES.] As Germany approached defeat in World War n, Schmitt tried to discover what historical conditions had once enabled the European states to distinguish between an enemy and a criminal and to conduct war as an honorable duel between honorable adversaries. He believed he had found those conditions in a so-called Nomos der Erde, which originally had been shaped by the jus publicum europaeum. Schmitt believed that this Nomos could be found in a special geopolitical order, based on the division of the world into different areas of influence, dominated by the great European powers. These powers would recognize each other as independent sovereignties united by a common civilization of martial law. Schmitt compared his own role under the Nazi regime to that of Benito Cereno in Herman Melville's story, who, after a mutiny on his slave ship had succeeded, served under the victors as a pirate, unable to disentangle himself from a situation in which protection was contingent on obedience. Schmitt's teaching, however, was often very near to the "mutinous" ideology which destroyed the Weimar Republic and helped the Nazi movement gain power. Yet by making the character of enmity, among citizens as well as nations, the crucial theme of systematic jurisprudence and political thinking, Schmitt created a new awareness of important problems. JiJRGEN FlJALKOWSKI
59
[For the historical context of Schmitt's work, see CRISIS
GOVERNMENT;
DELEGATION
OF
POWERS;
LEGITIMACY; NATIONAL SOCIALISM. Other related material may be found under JURISPRUDENCE; POLITICAL SCIENCE.] WORKS BY SCHMITT 1912 Gesetz und Urteil. Berlin: Liebmann. (1919) 1925 Politische Romantik. 2d ed. Munich: Duncker & Humblot. (1921) 1928 Die Diktatur: Von den Anfdngen des modernen Souverdnitdtsgedankens bis zum proletarischen Klassenkampf. 2d ed. Munich and Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. (1922) 1934 Politische Theologie. 2d ed. Munich: Duncker & Humblot. (1923) 1961 Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus. 3d ed. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. 1926 Die Kernfrage des Volkerbundes. Berlin: Diimmler. (1927a) 1963 Der Begriff des Politischen. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. 1927& Volksentscheid und Volksbegehren. Berlin: Gruyter. (1928) 1957 Verfassungslehre. 3d ed. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. 1931 Der Hilter der Verfassung. Tubingen: Mohr. 1932 Legalitdt und Legitimitdt. Munich and Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. 1933 Staat, Bewegung, Volk. Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt. 1934a Staatsgefiige und Zusammenbruch des zweiten Reiches: Der Sieg des Burgers iiber den Soldaten. Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt. 1934£> Uber die drei Arten des rechtswissenschaftlichen Denkens. Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt. 1938a Der Leviathan in der Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes. Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt. 1938i> Die Wendung zum diskriminierenden Kriegsbegriff. Munich: Duncker & Humblot. 1939 Volkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung, mil Interventionsverbot fur raumfremde Mdchte. Berlin: Deutscher Rechtsverlag. 1940 Positionen und Begriffe im Kampf mit WeimarGenf-Versailles, 1923-1939. Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt. (1942) 1944 Land und Meer. Leipzig: Reclam. 1950a Donoso Cortes in gesamteuropdischer Interpretation. Cologne: Greven. 1950fo Ex captivitate salus: Erfahrungen der Zeit 1945/47. Cologne: Greven. 1950c Der Nomos der Erde im Volkerrecht des Jus publicum Europaeum. Cologne: Greven. 1963 Theorie des Partisanen: Zwischenbemerkung zum Begriff des Politischen. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsdtze aus den Jahren 1924-1954: Materialien zu einer VerfassungsleJire. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1958. -> Essays originally published between 1924 and 1954, with commentaries by Schmitt on his own earlier articles. SUPPLEMENTARY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BARION, HANS; FORSTHOFF, E.; and WEBER, W. (editors) 1959 Festschrift fur Carl Schmitt zum 70. Geburtstag. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. -» Contains a comprehensive bibliography of Schmitt's works and of works about Schmitt, compiled by Piet Tomissen. FIJALKOWSKI, JURGEN 1958 Die Wendung zum Filhrerstaat: Ideologische Komponenten in der politischen Philosophic Carl Schmitts. Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag.
60
SCHMOLLER, GUSTAV
FIJALKOWSKI, JURGEN 1965 Das politische Problem der Feindschaft. Politische Vierteljahresschrift 6:105-111. HOFMANN, HASSO 1964 Legitimitdt gegen Legalitdt: Der Weg der politischen Philosophic Carl Schmitts. Neuwied (Germany): Luchterhand. KROCKOW, CHRISTIAN 1958 Die Entscheidung: Eine Untersuchung iiber Ernst Jiinger, Carl Schmitt, Martin Heidegger. Stuttgart: Enke. KRUPA, HANS 1937 Carl Schmitts Theorie des "Politischen," mit einem Verzeichnis der Schriften Carl Schmitts, Leipzig: Hirzel. SCHMIDT, HERMANN 1963 Der Nomosbegriff bei Carl Schmitt. Staat 2:81-108. SCHMITZ, MATHIAS 1965 Die Freund-Feind-Theorie [in der politischen Philosophic] Carl Schmitts. Cologne and Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. SCHNEIDER, PETER 1957 Ausnahmezustand und Norm: Eine Studie zur Rechtslehre von Carl Schmitt. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt. WOHLGEMUTH, HEiNRicH 1933 Das Wesen des Politischen in der heutigen neoromantischen Staatslehre: Ein methodenkritischer Beitrag zu seiner Begriffsbildung. Emmendingen: Dolter.
SCHMOLLER, GUSTAV Gustav Schmoller (1838-1917), German economist, came from a family of Wiirttemberg civil servants, and he began his own career in the financial department of the Wiirttemberg civil service. This experience gave him practical insights into the administration of a territory with a strong cameralist tradition and may have shaped his belief in the close interrelations between the economy and the government. At the University of Tubingen Schmoller studied Staatswissenschaften, a peculiarly German discipline derived from cameralism, which combines public finance, statistics, economics, administrative science, history, and even sociology. Later he became professor of Staatswissenschaften at the universities of Halle, 18641872; Strassburg, 1872-1882; and finally Berlin, 1882-1913. In the early 1860s Schmoller defended the commercial treaty between France and the German Zollverein. Since he was supporting the point of view of the Prussian government against that of Wiirttemberg, he ruined his career in Wiirttemberg but gained favor with the Prussian authorities. In the Wilhelmian period, Schmoller became one of the most ardent Prussian patriots. He was appointed the official historian of Brandenburg and Prussia in 1887, became a member of the Prussian Staatsrat (state council) in 1884, and the representative of the University of Berlin in the Herrenhaus (upper house) in 1889. He was also a member of several academies (Berlin, Munich, St. Petersburg, Copenhagen, Vienna, and Rome) and
the recipient of honorary degrees from Breslau and Heidelberg. As founder and leader of the Verein fur Sozialpolitik, the association of German academic economists, and as editor or coeditor of several series of publications (Staats- und sozialwissenschaftliche Forschungen, from 1879; Jahrbuch fur Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reiche—later known simply as Schmollers Jahrbuch—from 1881; Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preussischen Geschichte, from 1888; and Acta borussica, from 1892) he became one of the first great organizers of research in the social sciences. Thus, he dominated the development of economics and of related social sciences in his country; for several decades, hardly a chair of economics was filled without his approval. He and his followers were called the "younger historical school" because their methodological approach was derived from, but also differed from, the approach of the "older historical school" of Roscher, Hildebrand, and Knies [see ECONOMIC THOUGHT]; they were also called the Kathedersozialisten (most nearly translated as academic socialists) because of their sociopolitical aims and were able to influence contemporary social legislation, since Schmoller was close to many high civil servants and to the crown. In his political activities, Schmoller may be called a conservative social reformer. He was a royalist, favored strong government, and displayed the highest respect for the Prussian civil service; but he was also deeply preoccupied with the "social question," the improvement of the condition of the lower classes. He believed that a variety of means should be used to solve this problem: better education of the working classes; governmental regulation of working conditions; cooperatives; and changes in the law, in institutions, and in the attitudes of the ruling classes. He was hostile both to Manchesterism and to Marxism, but he was open to all kinds of reforms that would produce more "social justice," a concept central to his thinking. Contributions to the social sciences. Schmoller's interests embraced history, applied statistics, economic and social institutions and behavior (including social psychology), social anthropology, geography, demography, the theory and practice of economic and social policy, and even ethics and philosophy, but he regarded himself primarily as an economist. His voluminous Grundriss (19001904), comparable in scope, though not in method, to Alfred Marshall's Principles, assembled pieces of all these social sciences into a great mosaic or panorama of the social world, past and present.
SCHMOLLER, GUSTAV The only thing the work lacked was an analytical framework to hold the pieces together. Although Schmoller often claimed to have such a framework, he was basically eclectic. Schmoller's rejection of analytical theory of the Smith-Ricardo type was of the utmost importance for his own thinking and for the development of economics in Germany under his "regime." He believed classical analysis to be useless or at best of minor importance, since it is applicable only to very small and artificially isolated fragments of the social reality that he wanted to perceive in all its many facets. It is not true, as many have asserted and as the term "historical school" suggests, that he wanted to replace analytical theory with purely historical research, but he was convinced that a genuine theory can only be the final outcome of an immense amount of descriptive work on past as well as present events, institutions, and structures. His conception of theory is the central defect in his thought and accounts for most of the weaknesses in his own works and in those inspired by him. It is difficult to decide whether he was led to this position by his inability to grasp the nature of theory or by his ethical disapproval of liberal economic doctrines, which he scorned as "business economics." Reception of Schmoller. Schmoller's view of theory was attacked in 1883 by the Viennese professor Carl Menger, who wrote a treatise on method in the social sciences, Problems of Economics and Sociology (Untersuchungen iiber die Methode der Socialwissenschaften und der politischen Oekonomie msbesondere). Schmoller replied in his Jahrbuch (1883), and Menger renewed the attack in the pamphlet Die Irrihumer des Historismus in der deutschen Nationalokonomie (1884), "which fairly steamed with wrath and of course elicited rebuttal" (Schumpeter 1954, p. 814). This famous Methodenstreit dominated the economic and social sciences in Germany for at least two generations. There can be little doubt that logically Menger was in a far better position. What he advocated as the appropriate methodology for economics was the use of the partial-equilibrium models that have since become the common method of theorists in most parts of the world. Nevertheless, Schmoller was not entirely wrong when he favored a much broader and more differentiated approach. He wanted to grasp all at once what has since become the object of many different branches of the social sciences. As a consequence, he touched on many important things, but often only superficially and seldom with clear insight about the implications of his observations and judgments. He was attacked
61
not only by theoretical economists but also by professional historians, such as Georg von Below (1904). Interestingly enough, both the theorists and the historians had basically the same objections to the Schmollerian type of social science: both missed a coherent and systematic approach. The issue, then, was not simply one of theory against history, but of how research in the social sciences ought best to be done. Although Schmoller often stated that his method alone was an "exact" one, even his friends and students agreed that he wrote without precision. The very qualities of Schmoller's work that were criticized in the academic community won him a broad public audience. He took up many urgent issues of the day, examined them from different points of view, and came to general conclusions that many people could agree with. This made him an effective leader of public discussion and a popular, though not a brilliant, academic lecturer. He was at his best when dealing with those issues of social policy (Sozialpolitik*) that urgently required compromise. In political debates he exhibited a considerable amount of personal commitment and civic courage, fighting against aggressive social conservatism (e.g. Treitschke 1875) as well as against the revolutionary position of Lassalle and Marx and their followers. In these debates he made plain his belief in the necessity of more social justice. However, he did not distinguish clearly between the value judgments he made in political debates and the axioms of his scientific thought. This led to another methodological attack on Schmoller, led by Max Weber and Werner Sombart, to eliminate value judgments from the social sciences (see Weber 1910; Sombart 1910). An appraisal of Schmoller. Given his many weaknesses, one asks what made Schmoller the leader of German social scientists during the Wilhelmian period. Undoubtedly, others were stronger as theorists, as historians, or as sociologists. However, except for Max Weber, who was much younger, no one was quite as universal as Schmoller. Moreover, no one combined so many of the personal qualities of a leader: he was charming but dictatorial; confident in his views but able and willing to accept ideas; basically simple in his thinking but with a broad outlook; fully committed to sharply defined positions but prepared to compromise. Much of his influence appears to derive from his ability to express the leading ideas of his time. He swam with the stream of contemporary opinion, not against it, as is obvious in his views on foreign affairs, on which he had no ideas of his own but shared the nationalistic, imperialistic,
62
SCHMOLLER, GUSTAV
even chauvinistic outlook of the German elite. When the tide of sentiment and opinion turned, shortly after his death in 1917, his views were quickly outdated, and people began to wonder how he could ever have been the great leader he certainly was. His influence on the development of the social sciences in Germany was, on the whole, rather unfortunate. He is mainly responsible for the neglect of economic theory in Germany between 1870 and 1920, and he can be made indirectly responsible for the extreme reaction that produced the subsequent neglect of economic history in twentieth-century Germany. In his attempt to construct a theory mainly by historical methods, he damaged both theory and history, and hampered their development in Germany for nearly a century. Outside Germany, his influence was never considerable, although American institutional economics was based partly on his ideas. WOLFRAM FISCHER WORKS BY SCHMOLLER
1870
Zur Geschichte der deutschen Kleingeiuerbe im 19. Jahrhundert: Statistische und nationalokonomische Untersuchungen. Halle: Waisenhaus. (1874-1875) 1875 Uber einige Grundfragen des Rechts und der Volkswirthschaft: Ein offenes Sendschreiben an Herrn Professor Dr. Heinrich von Treitschke. Jena: Mauke. -» First published in Volumes 23 and 24 of Jahrbiicher filr Nationalokonomie und Statistik. (1874-1897) 1904 Uber einige Grundfragen der Sozialpolitik und der Volkswirtschaftslehre. 2d ed., enl. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. 1879 Die Strassburger Tucher- und Weberzunft; Urkunden und Darstellungen nebst Regesten und Glossar: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der deutschen Weberei und des deutschen Gewerberechts vom XIII.-XVII. Jahrhundert. Strassburg: Triibner. 1883 Zur Methodologie der Staats- und Sozialwissenschaften. Jahrbuch filr Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reiche 7:975-994. 1897 Wechselnde Theorien und feststehende Wahrheiten im Gebiete der Staats- und Socialwissenschaften und die heutige deutsche Volkswirthschaftslehre. Berlin: Biixenstein. 1898 Umrisse und Untersuchungen zur Verfassungs-, Verwaltungs- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte besonders des preussischen Staates im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. (1900-1904) 1923 Grundriss der allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftslehre. 2d ed. 2 vols. Munich and Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. 1913 Charakterbilder. 2 vols. Munich and Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. -> A collection of biographical essays, including those on Adam Smith, Friedrich List, Adolf Wagner, and Georg F. Knapp. 1918 Die soziale Frage, Klassenbildung, Arbeiterfrage, Klassenkampf. Edited by Luzie Schmoller. Munich and Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. -» Published posthumously. A revised and augmented edition of the
sociological chapters contained in Schmoller's Grundriss der allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftslehre, 1900—1904. 1921 Preussische Verfassungs-, Verwaltungs- und Finanzgeschichte. Berlin: Tagliche Rundschau. -* Published posthumously. 1922 Deutsches Stddtewesen in alterer Zeit. Bonner Staatswissenschaftliche Untersuchungen, No. 3. Bonn and Leipzig: Schroder. -» Published posthumously. Zur Litteraturgeschichte der Staats- und Sozialwissenschaften. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1888. -> A collection of articles dated 1863-1883. Zur Social- und Gewerbepolitik der Gegenwart (Reden und Aufsdtze). Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1890. -> A collection of articles dated 1872-1890. Zwanzig Jahre deutscher Politik (1897-1917): Aufsdtze und Vortrdge. Munich and Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1920. -» Published posthumously. SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BELOW, GEORG VON 1904 Zur Wiirdigung der historischen Schule der Nationalokonomie. Zeitschrift fur Sozialwissenschaft 7:145-185, 787-804. BELOW, GEORG VON 1924 Zur Stellung G. Schmollers in der Geschichte der Nationalokonomie. Schmollers Jahrbuch fur Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reiche 48:315-319. BIERMANN, WILHELM E. (editor) 1922 Briefwechsel zwischen Wilhelm Roscher und Gustav Schmoller. Greifswald: Bamberg. -» Letters dated 1861-1881. BRINKMANN, CARL 1937 Gustav Schmoller und die Volkswirtschaftslehre. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. BRINKMANN, CARL 1953 Gustav Schmoller. Volume 9, pages 135—137 in Handworterbuch der Sozialwissenschaften. Stuttgart: Fischer. EUCKEN, WALTER 1940 Wissenschaft im Stile Schmollers. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 52:468-506. GIDE, CHARLES; and RIST, CHARLES (1909) 1948 A History of Economic Doctrines From the Time of the Physiocrats to the Present Day. 2d English ed. Boston: Heath. -» First published in French. HERBST, JURGEN 1965 The German Historical School in American Scholarship: A Study in the Transfer of Culture. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press. HERKNER, HEINRICH 1924 Zur Stellung G. Schmollers in der Geschichte der Nationalokonomie. Schmollers Jahrbuch fur Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reiche 47:3-10. HINTZE, OTTO 1908 Gustav Schmoller als Historiker. Volume 4, pages 183-191 in Otto Hintze, Historische und politische Aufsdtze. Berlin: Deutsche Biicherei. LANE, FREDERIC C. 1956 Some Heirs of Gustav von Schmoller. Pages 9-39 in Architects and Craftsmen in History: Festschrift fur Abbott Payson Usher. Tubingen: Mohr. MEINECKE, FRIEDRICH 1933 Drei Generationen deutscher Gelehrtenpolitik: Friedrich Theodor Visher.—Gustav Schmoller.—Max Weber. Pages 136-164 in Friedrich Meinecke, Staat und Personlichkeit: Studien. Berlin: Mittler. MELTZEL, C. 1925 Gustav v. Schmoller. Volume 7, pages 251-253 in Handworterbuch der Staatswissenschaften. 4th ed. Jena: Fischer. MENGER, CARL (1883) 1963 Problems of Economics and Sociology (Untersuchungen uber die Methods der Socialwisseuschaften und der politischen Oekonomie insbesondere). Edited with an introduction by Louis Schneider. Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press.
SCHRIEKE, BERTRAM MENGER, CARL 1884 Die Irrthumer des Historismus in der deutschen N ationalokonomie. Vienna: Holder. -» The main attack against Schmoller and the historical school by an economic theorist and the culmination of the Methodenstreit. MITSCHERLICH, WALDEMAR 1936 Die okonomischen Querschnitte Schmollers. Pages 129-149 in Waldemar Mitscherlich, Die Lehre von den beweglichen und starren Begriffen erldutert an der Wirtschaftswissenschaft. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. RITZEL, GERHARD 1950 Schmoller versus Menger: Eine Analyse des Methodenstreits im Hinblick auf den Historismus in der N ationalokonomie. Frankfurt am Main: Enz & Rudolph. SALIN, EDGAR 1924 Zur Stellung G. Schmollers in der Geschichte der Nationalokonomie. Schmollers Jahrbuch fur Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reiche 48:307-314. SCHUMPETER, JOSEPH A. 1926 Gustav v. Schmoller und die Probleme von heute. Schmollers Jahrbuch fur Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reiche 50:337-388. SCHUMPETER, JOSEPH A. (1954) 1960 History of Economic Analysis. Edited by E. B. Schumpeter. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. SOMBART, WERNER 1910 Debatte [Uber die Productivitat der Volkswirtschaft]. Verein fiir Socialpolitik, Schriften 132:563-572. SPIETHOFF, ARTHUR 1924 Zum Abschluss. Schmollers Jahrbuch fiir Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reiche 48:321-324. -> This article summarizes a series of assessments of Schmoller's work. SPIETHOFF, ARTHUR (editor) 1938 Gustav von Schmoller und die deutsche geschichtliche Volkswirtschaftslehre: Festgabe zur hundertsten Wiederkehr seines Geburtstages 24. Juni 1938. Schmollers Jahrbuch fiir Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reiche 62:385-757. TREITSCHKE, HEINRICH G. VON 1875 Der Socialismus und seine Conner: Nebst einem Sendschreiben an Gustav Schmoller. Berlin: Reimer. WEBER, MAX 1910 Debatte [Uber die Productivitat der Volkswirtschaft]. Verein fiir Socialpolitik, Schriften 132:580-585, 603-607.
SCHOOLS See ACADEMIC FREEDOM; ADULT EDUCATION; EDUCATION; EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY; TEACHING; UNIVERSITIES.
SCHRIEKE, BERTRAM When the Dutch anthropologist Bertram Johannes Otto Schrieke (1890—1945) was studying at the University of Leiden, where he finished his studies with a doctor's degree in "languages and literature of the East Indian archipelago," sociology as a discipline was in its infancy in the Netherlands. It was taught only at the University of Amsterdam, where Schrieke attended the lectures of S. R. Steinmetz—through whom he was influ-
63
enced by the theories of Max Weber. At Leiden he was a pupil of Snouck Hurgronje, the eminent Islamologist and Arabist; of C. Van Vollenhoven, for adat law; and of other orientalists. His career was to be as diversified as his training. Schrieke was not a theorist. Rather he took exception to existing theories as being too one-sided or too narrow. He held the view that "a culture forms an organic whole, which cannot be split up into different parts as if these components had no relation to each other," an approach not generally shared in the 1920s (Indonesian Sociological Studies, vol. 1, p. 232). As demonstrated by his lifelong work in the social and economic aspects of the history of Indonesia and of Indonesian foreign contacts, Schrieke's forte lay in maintaining a critical attitude toward the generally accepted approaches to these subjects, which relied on archeology and colonial history. In his doctoral thesis, Het boek van Bonang (1916), he analyzed the text of a manuscript, written in Javanese and ascribed to a legendary Muslim saint, which had been in the library of the University of Leiden since the beginning of the seventeenth century. His study of this manuscript, as well as of the early history of the Portuguese and Dutch trade contacts with Indonesia and of the published material on the voyages of Chinese and Arabs in the previous centuries, enabled him to revise the existing theory that the Islamization of the archipelago was the result of penetration pacifique. He came to the conclusion that Islamization, hitherto considered to be primarily the product of trade relations, had been equally influenced by political conflicts and military struggles. In this work he acknowledged his debt to his mentor, G. P. Rouffaer, honorary member of the Royal Institute for Philology, Geography, and Ethnology of the Netherlands Indies at The Hague, whose own work of collecting and comparing source material was an inspiration to Schrieke. Returning later to this problem in parts of a wide-ranging study, "Ruler and Realm in Early Java" (published posthumously, in an English translation only; 1957), Schrieke suggested that it is "impossible to understand the spread of Islam in the archipelago unless one takes into account the antagonism between the Muslim traders and the Portuguese," antagonism which caused the Indonesians to side with the Muslims. During the 1920s, when Schrieke was acting as adviser on native and Arab affairs to the Netherlands Indies government, it was his intention to write a sociological study of the peoples of Sumatra
64
SCHRIEKE, BERTRAM
based on these ideas. He had written only the first, historical section of the "Prolegomena" to this study (see 1925) when he was called upon to conduct an inquiry into the so-called communist uprisings on the west coast of Sumatra in 1926. In order to explain the success of the communists' tactics, Schrieke incorporated in his report facts relating to the historical background and structure of Minangkabau society and dealt with the impact of the introduction of a money economy. He was thus able to point to the factors in this transitional period which had helped to foster the antigovernment attitude of the population. Here again his natural approach was to gather any relevant data, including the seemingly unimportant and the controversial. In 1955 the parts of his report that deal with the situation underlying the uprisings were published in an English translation, together with the above-mentioned "Prolegomena" and a number of his other publications (Indonesian Sociological Studies, vol. 1). The Fourth Pacific Science Congress, convened at Batavia (now Jakarta) in 1929, afforded Schrieke the opportunity of editing a symposium entitled The Effect of Western Influence on Native Civilisations in the Malay Archipelago, to which his own contribution was "Native Society in the Transformation Period." As director of the Netherlands Indies Department of Education from 1929 to 1933, Schrieke stressed the need for a sociological approach to educational problems. He defended the existing diversified educational system, adapted as it was to serve the needs of a heterogeneous population. He did further field research in applied sociology at the invitation of the Julius Rosenwald Fund, which resulted in Alien Americans (1936). This was an "American Dilemma" avant la lettre: a oneman attempt to study the Negro problem in the United States and to interpret it against the background of other race relations there. Apart from the influence he exerted in sociology and history when he was professor of sociology in the law school at Batavia, from 1924 to 1929, and later at the University of Amsterdam, from 1936 to 1945, Schrieke's ideas can best be traced in the work of J. C. van Leur (1934) and M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofsz (1962). He fostered surveys of research on both Indonesia and the Netherlands Caribbean territories; he also encouraged such surveys in connection with the work of the International Refugee Colonization Society, established in 1938. He also applied his organizational ability as museum director of the 150-year-old Batavian Society of Arts and Letters in 1923 and later, from
1938 to 1945, as director of the ethnological department of the Royal Colonial Institute (now Royal Tropical Institute), Amsterdam. Schrieke died suddenly in London in September 1945 while attending a United Nations conference as a Netherlands government delegate on Indonesian affairs. JOHANNA L. G. FELHOEN KRAAL [See also ASIAN SOCIETY, article on SOUTHEAST ASIA; COLONIALISM; ISLAM; and the biography of SNOUCK HURGRONJE.] WORKS BY SCHRIEKE 1916 Het boek van Eonang. Utrecht: Boer. 1925 Prolegomena tot eene sociologische studie over de volken van Sumatra: Deel I (A. Historisch gedeelte), Schets van de politieke en economische machtsverschuivingen in den Indischen Archipel in de 17de eeuw (Prolegomena to a Sociological Study of the Peoples of Sumatra: Part I [A. Historical Section], Outline of the Shifts in Political and Economic Power in the Indonesian Archipelago in the Seventeenth Century). Tijdscrift voor taal-, land- en volkenkunde 65:90-207. -> For a partial translation, see pages 1-82 of Indonesian Sociological Studies: Selected Writings of B. Schrieke. (1926) 1928 The Evolution of Culture in the Pacific in Relation to the Theories of the "Kultur-Historische" and the "Manchester" Schools of Social Anthropology. Volume 2, pages 2423-2441 in Pacific Science Congress, Third, Tokyo, Proceedings. Tokyo: National Research Council of Japan. 1929 Native Society in the Transformation Period. Pages 237-247 in Bertram Schrieke (editor), The Effect of Western Influence on Native Civilisations in the Malay Archipelago. Batavia (Java): Kolff. 1936 Alien Americans: A Study of Race Relations. New York: Viking. 1938 The Educational System in the Netherlands Indies. Netherlands Indies: Bulletin of the Colonial Institute, Amsterdam 2:14-24. 1948 SCHRIEKE, BERTRAM (editor) Report of the Scientific Work Done in the Netherlands on Behalf of the Dutch Overseas Territories During the Period Between Approximately 1918 and 1943. Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing. ->• Published posthumously. 1957 Ruler and Realm in Early Java. Volume 2, pages 1-267 in Indonesian Sociological Studies: Selected Writings of B. Schrieke. The Hague: Van Hoeve. -»• Published posthumously from Schrieke's Dutch manuscript. Indonesian Sociological Studies: Selected Writings of B. Schrieke. 2 vols. The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1955-1957. -» Contains parts of the 1925 Prolegomena to a Sociological Study of the Peoples of Sumatra, parts of the 1926 report on uprisings on the west coast of Sumatra, and a number of later writings, some previously unpublished. SUPPLEMENTARY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Foreword by the Editors of "Selected Studies on Indonesia by Dutch Scholars." 1957 Volume 2, pages v-vii in Bertram J. O. Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies: Selected Writings of B. Schrieke. The Hague: Van Hoeve.
SCHULTZ, HENRY LEUR, JACOB C. VAN (1934) 1955 On Early Asian Trade. Pages 1-44 in Jacob C. van Leur, Indonesian Trade and Society: Essays in Asian Social and Economic History. The Hague: Van Hoeve. -» First published in Dutch. LINDGREN, ETHEL J. 1948 Bertram Johannes Otto Schrieke: 1890-1945. Man 48:113-117. H> Includes a bibliography on pages 116-117, prepared by Lindgren and her associates. MEILINK-ROELOFSZ, MARIE A. P. 1962 Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago Between 1500 and About 1630. The Hague: Nijhoff.
SCHULTZ, HENRY Henry Schultz (1893-1938), American econometrician, was born in Russian Poland. After attending public schools in New York City and the College of the City of New York, he began his graduate studies at Columbia University in 1916. At Columbia he responded enthusiastically to the influence of Henry L. Moore, but his studies were interrupted by military service in World War i. After the war an army scholarship enabled him to spend the spring and summer terms of 1919 at the London School of Economics and Political Science and at the Galton Laboratory of University College. In London he attended lectures on statistics by A. L. Bowley and Karl Pearson and on economic theory by Edwin Cannan. Once back in the United States, he conducted statistical and economic investigations for, successively, the War Trade Board, the Bureau of the Census, the Bureau of Efficiency, the Institute of Economics, and the Children's Bureau of the United States Department of Labor. His PH.D. thesis, "The Statistical Law of Demand as Illustrated by the Demand for Sugar," was published in 1925, and in 1926 he joined the department of economics at the University of Chicago, where he remained until his death. It was Moore's early investigations into the statistical approximation of Marshallian demand curves (1914; 1917) that had a determining influence on Schultz's career. Under Moore's inspiration, Schultz made intensive studies of the works of those economists—Cournot, Walras, and Pareto -—who had made the most explicit and sophisticated use of mathematics in formulating economic theory. Schultz also studied probability theory and statistics in considerable depth. His years in various statistical and economic research agencies in Washington, 1920 to 1926, no doubt contributed to his sophistication in the use and interpretation of published economic data. When Moore ceased writing in 1929, Schultz was almost the only American economist who com-
65
bined a mastery of the theoretical work of Walras and Pareto with an intense interest in empirical studies of demand. He was fully abreast of the revolution in value theory associated with the names of J. R. Hicks and R. G. D. Allen (1934); they also drew their inspiration from Walras and Pareto. Keynesian macroeconomic theory, however, was not of direct significance to Schultz's work, and the lengthy bibliography of his most important book, The Theory and Measurement of Demand (1938, pp. 779-803), contains no reference to Keynes. Schultz published a number of short notes on regression theory and methods and one major article (1930) on the derivation of standard errors of forecast for curves of various types. In Statistical Laws of Demand and Supply (1928), he thoroughly explored the literature on weighted regression—the estimation of a single line or plane of best fit when all variables are subject to error -—and was probably the first to apply such methods to economic data. This book presented supply-anddemand curves for sugar, an internationally traded commodity, and led him to write three articles on methods of measuring the effectiveness of a tariff. His contributions to statistical theory must be regarded as by-products of his intense concern with statistical demand analysis, and the work on the tariff was similarly incidental to his main concern. Schultz also published a number of expository articles on the more general contributions of mathematics and statistics to economic research and in book reviews called attention to significant translations or interpretations of Walras and Pareto and to major works on mathematical economics and statistics. Schultz's lifework is essentially summed up in his monumental 817-page work The Theory and Measurement of Demand (1938). Chapters 1, 18, and 19 together provide an excellent statement of the theory of consumer demand, incorporating the Hicks-Allen and Slutsky extensions of Pareto's basic formulation; Chapters 2 and 3 deal with the logical and theoretical validity of various proposed methods for deriving demand curves from time series and from family-budget data; Chapter 4 contains a statement of the assumptions, methods, and procedures to be used in the empirical section. The empirical section, Chapters 5-17, presents statistical demand analyses for ten major crops along with summary comparisons and interpretations of the results for the various commodities, time periods, and functional forms. Further empirical studies are included in Chapters 18 and 19, on related demands. A fifty-page appendix on ele-
66
SCHULTZ, HENRY
ments of curve fitting and correlation provides an excellent guide to least-squares regression methods, and there is also an extensive bibliography. In The Theory and Measurement of Demand Schultz emerges as the complete demand analyst of his generation. It would be difficult to point out any other econometric work of large scope written in the 1930s that achieved a better integration of economic theory and statistics with painstaking and realistic attention to institutions, markets, and data. Jan Tinbergen's Statistical Testing of Business-cycle Theories (1938-1939) is one of the few econometric works of the 1930s which would bear comparison with Schultz's masterpiece. While Moore was the first economist in the United States to attempt a creative synthesis of economic theory and statistics as a basis for estimating economic relationships, Schultz achieved a similar creative synthesis at a much higher level of sophistication. Econometricians who have done large-scale empirical investigations, among them Tinbergen, Herman Wold, Richard Stone, Paul Douglas, and Lawrence Klein, have referred to The Theory and Measurement of Demand in terms of the highest respect. Schultz participated in the organizational meeting of the Econometric Society on December 29, 1930, and was active in the affairs of the Society until his death. He was an untiring worker—"his own work day was a 12-hour one or longer, and his work week, 7 days" (H. Gregg Lewis, quoted in Hotelling 1939, p. 101). He appears to have been thoroughly constructive in his relationships with his graduate assistants and colleagues. Several of the students who came under his influence at the University of Chicago (Milton Friedman, Jacob Mosak, Martin Bronfenbrenner, Paul Samuelson, and others) subsequently made outstanding contributions to econometrics and economic theory. KARL A. Fox [For the historical context of Schultz's work, see the biographies of COURNOT; MOORE, HENRY L.; PARETO; WALRAS; for discussion of the subsequent development of Schultz's ideas, see DEMAND AND SUPPLY; ECONOMETRICS.] WORKS BY SCHULTZ The Statistical Measurement of the Elasticity of Demand for Beef. Journal of Farm Economics 6:254— 278. 1925 The Statistical Law of Demand as Illustrated by the Demand for Sugar. Journal of Political Economy 33:481-504, 577-637. 1927a Cost of Production, Supply and Demand, and the Tariff. Journal of Farm Economics 9:192-209. 1924
1927& Theoretical Considerations Relating to Supply. Journal of Political Economy 35:437-464. 1928 Statistical Laws of Demand and Supply With Special Application to Sugar. Univ. of Chicago Press. 1929 Marginal Productivity and the General Pricing Process. Journal of Political Economy 37:505-551. 1930 The Standard Error of a Forecast From a Curve. Journal of the American Statistical Association 25: 139-185. 193la Henry L. Moore's Contribution to the Statistical Law of Demand. Pages 645-661 in Social Science Reseach Council, Committee on Scientific Method in the Social Sciences, Methods in Social Science. Univ. of Chicago Press. 1931& The Italian School of Mathematical Economics. Journal of Political Economy 39:76-85. 1932 Marginal Productivity and the Lausanne School: A Reply [to J. R. Hicks]. Economica 12:285-296. 1933a Frisch on the Measurement of Utility. Journal of Political Economy 41:95-116. 1933b Interrelations of Demand. Journal of Political Economy 41:468-512. 1935 Interrelations of Demand, Price and Income. Journal of Political Economy 43:433-481. 1938 The Theory and Measurement of Demand. Univ. of Chicago Press. 1939 A Misunderstanding in Index-number Theory: The True Koniis Condition on Cost-of-living Index Numbers and Its Limitations. Econometrica 7:1-9. SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY CHICAGO, UNIVERSITY OF, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 1942 Studies in Mathematical Economics and Econometrics: In Memory of Henry Schultz. Edited by Oskar Lange et al. Univ. of Chicago Press. -» Includes a bibliography on pages 32-33. DOUGLAS, PAUL H. 1939 Henry Schultz as Colleague. Econometrica 7:104-106. HICKS, J. R.; and ALLEN, R. G. D. 1934 A Reconsideration of the Theory of Value. Economica New Series 1:52-76. HOTELLING, HAROLD 1939 The Work of Henry Schultz. Econometrica 7:97-103. -» Includes a bibliography of Schultz's works. LINK, GEORGE K. 1942 Henry Schultz: Friend. Pages 3-10 in Chicago, University of, Department of Economics, Studies in Mathematical Economics and Econometrics: In Memory of Henry Schultz. Univ. of Chicago Press. MOORE, HENRY L. 1914 Economic Cycles: Their Law and Cause. New York: Macmillan. MOORE, HENRY L. 1917 Forecasting the Yield and the Price of Cotton. New York: Macmillan. TINBERGEN, JAN 1938-1939 Statistical Testing of Business-cycle Theories. 2 vols. Geneva: League of Nations, Economic Intelligence Service. -> Volume 1: A Method and Its Application to Investment Activity. Volume 2: Business Cycles in the United States of America: 1919-1932. YNTEMA, THEODORE O. 1942 Henry Schultz: His Contributions to Economics and Statistics. Pages 11-17 in Chicago, University of, Department of Economics, Studies in Mathematical Economics and Econometrics: In Memory of Henry Schultz. Univ. of Chicago Press.
SCHUMPETER, JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, JOSEPH A. Joseph Alois Schumpeter (1883-1950) was born in Triesch, Moravia, into a middle-class family. His education at the Theresianum in Vienna was, however, aristocratic, as was the influence of his stepfather, a high-ranking officer in the AustroHungarian army. His extraordinary mind ranged over many fields—classics, history, law, the history of art, sociology, mathematics, and economics. He mastered several of these scholarly fields, but it was in economics that he made important original contributions. Schumpeter's first marriage, to an Englishwoman, took place in 1907; it lasted only a few months and ended ultimately in divorce. His second wife, whom he married in 1925, was an Austrian; she died in childbirth in the same year, and for a long time after her death Schumpeter withdrew from social life. He married again in the United States, in 1937, and was survived for a few years by his widow. Academic career. Schumpeter spent most of his life as an academic. His first position, in 1909, was in Czernowitz (now in the U.S.S.R.). For him this was a somewhat exotic place, and he had a happy time there—including in his activities a duel with the university librarian over the rights of students to have freer access to books. Czernowitz must have provided an intellectually lively atmosphere, since the Austro—Hungarian monarchy seems to have used it as a sort of glamorous exile for its "young Turks." From Czernowitz Schumpeter moved to Graz, in Styria, a provincial capital whose lack of a frontier type of excitement was compensated for by its proximity to Vienna. During his tenure at Graz, Schumpeter visited the United States for the first time, as an exchange professor at Columbia University. After an interlude of political and business activity, he returned, in 1925, to academic life as professor of public finance at the University of Bonn. He remained at Bonn, except for one year in Japan and at Harvard, until 1932. Then, when internal political dissension prevented him from obtaining the chair of economics at Berlin, he went to Harvard. He stayed at Harvard until his death. Schumpeter was elected president of the American Economic Association shortly before his death. He was also a founding member and president of the Econometric Society: although he himself did not become well qualified either in mathematical economics or in econometrics, he enouraged the development of both.
67
Nonacademic activities. Schumpeter's forays into nonacademic life were as many-sided as his academic interests. In 1907 he became a junior partner in a law firm in Cairo. In 1918 he was for a brief time a member of the German socialization commission, and in 1919 he became minister of finance in the government of the new Austrian Republic. Both of these governmental positions were offered him despite the fact that he was not a socialist, because of his intellectual and professional qualifications and possibly because of his friendship, dating back to his student days, with Otto Bauer, the famous Austrian Marxist. Later he became president of a small Austrian bank. The Cairo law practice was a success. On the other hand, hardly anyone could have solved Austria's financial problems, given the domestic and international environment; and the same was true of the bank, whose failure was only one of the first in the series of Austrian bank failures that culminated in the collapse of the Creditanstalt. Even before the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, Schumpeter had written "The Crisis of the Tax State" (1918). In this work he anticipated the problems that Austria would face at the end of the war and predicted that political incompetence would vitiate possible solutions to her economic difficulties. The book still has relevance for the making of economic policy: it develops the theme that the state, as guardian of the common interest, is the necessary counterpart of the individual, particularly in a liberal capitalist economy, and it discusses the crucial role of budget and fiscal policy in the well-being of the economy. Schumpeter's interest in public policy continued when he was no longer in a policy-making position. Many of his articles for the Osterreichische Volkswirt and the Deutsche Volkswirt as well as some of his lectures at Bonn and Harvard dealt with such urgent current problems as tax policy, depression policies, and the New Deal; he was convinced that the New Deal was slowing down "natural" recovery. Schumpeter as teacher. Despite all his interest in policy, practical affairs, sociology, and history, Schumpeter's primary love was economics as a scholarly pursuit, and he was anxious to make good training in economics available to students. While in Germany he became involved in discussions of curricular reform, arguing that the training of economists and lawyers should be strictly separated; otherwise neither group would be adequately trained. His lectures at Bonn, ostensibly on public finance, were actually in large part discus-
68
SCHUMPETER, JOSEPH A.
sions of Book v of Marshall's Principles and other theoretical topics. At Harvard he taught one of the first modern courses in pure theory. His lectures were never dull; often they were brilliant. But what distinguished Schumpeter's lectures and seminars most was neither their brilliance nor their organization (which occasionally left something to be desired); rather, it was his persistent effort on all occasions, formal or informal, to make it possible for students to work out their own ideas. In nine years of attending his lectures and seminars in Bonn and at Harvard, I remember only two occasions when he talked about his own work and then only at the prodding of his students. He spent much time with his students outside the classroom. In Bonn he frequently went on walks with them, discoursing, interrupting his walk suddenly to jot down an idea. At Harvard he regularly met his students socially. He also circulated a sheet of paper during each lecture on which six students signed up to see him. He was not the kind of teacher who provided his students with clear-cut answers, to the despair of the less-gifted students. But for others this method had a delayed effect that years later would make them sit up and exclaim, "So this is what Schumpeter meant!" The Schumpeterian system Because of Schumpeter's many-sided gifts and the variety of fields to which he contributed, it is difficult to trace his intellectual ancestry. His teachers at the University of Vienna included Friedrich von Wieser, E. von Phillipovich, and E. von Bohm-Bawerk. But among all economists, he had the greatest esteem for Leon Walras, and he thought very highly of English and American economists, particularly F. Y. Edgeworth and John Bates Clark. The similarity of Schumpeter's thought to Marx's has frequently been noted, although Marx's influence on Schumpeter may have been overestimated because of Schumpeter's ability to admire and understand Marx even when he disagreed with him. Schumpeter was more aware than many other theoretical economists, the most notable exception being Marx, that economic reality is only a part of total reality. The division of the economic from the noneconomic was for him purely a matter of scientific convenience. He contributed significantly to the understanding of noneconomic, particularly sociological, phenomena, as in his synthesis, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (1942). If his work lacks the mathematical precision he urged
upon others, this was not the result of unclear thinking but of the complexity (one might almost say the messiness) of the problems he tackled. Any brief characterization of an elaborate and subtle system is necessarily something of a caricature. Bearing this limitation in mind, Schumpeter's vision of the economic process might be summarized as follows: There is only one single historical reality, which consists of unique "events." To understand this reality one must always be aware of its quality of uniqueness. But one must also realize that events are related to each other, not just simultaneously but over time. Simultaneous relationships are the subject of equilibrium theory; intertemporal relationships are the subject of dynamic theory. Both equilibrium theory and dynamic theory are necessary to explain any event at any given moment of time. Statics and dynamics. The essential difference between statics and dynamics—a dichotomy that Schumpeter distinguished from the dichotomy between stationary and evolutionary—is not fully expressed by stating that dynamics involves time and statics does not. For Schumpeter static, or equilibrium, theory deals with processes of adaptation that are found in reality: he believed he could identify particular periods in history in which the economic system was "in the neighborhood of equilibrium." His equilibrium, however, has no normative content; it is not in any sense an ideal state of affairs, a golden age. It follows, therefore, that the dynamics that concerned Schumpeter was not the time sequence of adjustment to some change that had somehow occurred. Rather, he sought to discover what causes the movement away from equilibrium, what is responsible for the destruction of equilibrium. For reasons of scientific convenience, he centered his attention on those disruptions of equilibrium that arise inside the economic system, although he believed that equilibrium can also be disrupted by forces outside the economy, such as wars or natural catastrophes. (While for Marx, and certainly for Lenin, wars arise from the inner contradictions of capitalism, Schumpeter stressed the essentially pacific and constructive nature of capitalism and its evolution.) Business cycles. The distinction between statics and dynamics is fundamental to Schumpeter's ideas on the business cycle. It explains not only why a recession, being an adaptive phenomenon, must follow a boom, but also why a boom requires a different explanation from a recession. It shows
SCHUMPETER, JOSEPH A. both why historical data are needed to arrive at an explanation and how such data are fitted into a general framework and thereby become meaningful. It explains in what sense business cycles are essential to progress: business cycles occur because equilibrium is destroyed by innovations, and the economy must adapt to the destruction before there can be any further innovation. Finally, the distinction accounts for the institutional requirements that must be met if an economy is to remain dynamic. The essential institutional arrangements are two: first, scope for the operation of innovators, the Schumpeterian entrepreneurs; and second, the possibility for innovators to break into the circular flow of the economy, this being achieved through the creation of credit. Credit creation permits the entrepreneur to take resources out of the income stream for productive purposes before he has contributed anything to the income stream. Schumpeter distinguished three types of business cycles, each of whose length depends on the disturbance that brought it about. He named the cycles for pioneers in business cycle theory. The shortest, the Kitchin cycle, is identified with inventory accumulation and decumulation lasting about three years. The medium cycle, of about 8-11 years, usually referred to as the business cycle, he named for Clement Juglar, and he related it to individual innovations, such as new textile machines, dynamos, electric motors, radios, and refrigerators. The long cycle, named for Kondratieff, is caused by the appearance of major innovations, such as railroads or electrification, which cannot be carried through in one "juglar." Thus, long-run trends become part of cyclical phenomena and, indeed, can be understood as the result of shorterrun changes. Schumpeter believed that each cycle consists of four phases. He characterized the recovery and recession phases as adaptive processes, while the upswing and depression phases represent movements away from the neighborhood of equilibrium, caused, respectively, by innovation and by such extrinsic and inessential phenomena as speculation, panics, or poor economic policies. The upswing and recession phases are essential to the capitalist process, but the depression and recovery phases are not. Since the acute social and personal hardships occur in the inessential phases, policy can eliminate them. Development of Schumpeter's system. Beginning in 1908, Schumpeter published a series of books in which he progressively developed these economic theories. His first major book was Das
69
Wesen und der Hauptinhalt der theoretischen N ationalokonomie (1908), which was probably conceived during his days as a graduate student and written in Cairo. It was a brilliant statement of general equilibrium theory, making clear both what static theory could explain and what it could not. This was followed in 1912 by The Theory of Economic Development, which contained the first important vision of the "Schumpeterian system"— a term he would have abhorred. The book dealt primarily with dynamics—the entrepreneurial function, the role of the banking system, and the creation of credit. Finally, in Business Cycles (1939), he fleshed out the bones of theory with historical material. Moreover, Business Cycles contains numerous partial mathematical models. Assessment of the system. Schumpeter's detailed discussion of historical data in the context of his theory has, of course, led to criticism of his interpretation of particular facts. Also, it has been suggested that his emphasis on the innovating entrepreneur tends to limit his theory to the past. Schumpeter himself felt that reality fitted his three-cycle schema better than his theory warranted, since nothing in his theory required or even suggested any particular regularity of timing. He also felt that he had accomplished his task if he had adequately explained capitalism from the eighteenth century to the early twentieth century, and he apparently agreed that in the future trustdominated capitalism and planned socialism might make his theory obsolete. Many years later Schumpeter wrote that he was "trying to construct a theoretic model of the process of economic change in time, or perhaps more clearly, to answer the question how the economic system generates the force which incessantly transforms it" (Essays, pp. 158-159). Because of this, and despite his own skepticism about the future relevance of his theory, Schumpeter's approach retains its usefulness in underdeveloped as well as in developed countries, and in socialist as well as in market economies. In order for there to be economic development, the Schumpeterian problem of when to introduce a change, when to introduce an investment, must be solved. There is nothing automatic about the introduction of new investments, and planners, in both market and socialist economies, must think like Schumpeterian entrepreneurs if their plans are to lead to self-sustaining growth. If a theory is understood to be a collection of formulas that can be applied with a minimum of analysis and thought, then Schumpeter's theory is indeed obsolete. But if it is understood to be a
70
SCHUMPETER, JOSEPH A.
view of the economy that enables a policy maker to ask pertinent questions and develop appropriate programs of action, then the relevance of Schumpeter's thought to any changing economy cannot be doubted. Other economic writings Schumpeter's contribution to the history of economics, like his contribution to economic theory, developed over many years. The posthumously published History of Economic Analysis (1954) is an elaboration of his much earlier Economic Doctrine and Method (1914). Both are histories of economic theories, which Schumpeter believed develop in the same manner as do theories in the natural sciences. In other words, economic theories, unlike philosophies, are not self-contained and develop over time in a cumulative fashion. The History of Economic Analysis was published from an unfinished manuscript. It is, by any standard, an outstanding intellectual achievement. While it met with detailed criticism (for example, Schumpeter was charged with having been less than fair to the neoclassical economists), it is, of course, impossible to say to what extent these criticisms would have been avoided if Schumpeter had lived to finish the work. Schumpeter also wrote many articles on monetary theory, relating monetary theory to his general view of development. As early as 1917, when it was not common to do so, he discussed money in relation to national income and economic policy. While he was writing a book on monetary theory, Keynes's Treatise on Money appeared. Schumpeter admired the Treatise and insisted that all his students read it, but he felt that its substance required a complete rewriting of his own work. Sociological writings Schumpeter considered from a sociological point of view a variety of phenomena that others had interpreted in mainly economic terms—imperialism, social classes, taxation, socialism, and even the entrepreneur. He attempted to relate economic phenomena to the larger social context. Thus, for example, he rejected the view that economic explanations can adequately account for the phenomenon of imperialism, which is an "atavism" of social structure and of emotional habits of an individualpsychological nature, and he stressed that any explanation of the entrepreneur must include the social and political conditions necessary for him to fulfill his functions. Schumpeter brought together his sociological and economic analyses primarily in Capitalism,
Socialism, and Democracy (1942), a work remarkable for its style as well as for its vision. Essential to his argument is his analysis of Marxian doctrine. Schumpeter did not think that capitalism shows the inherent contradictions that Marx claimed would lead to the immiserization of the masses and to revolution; nor does capitalism per se lead to imperialistic adventures or to wars. But he sympathized with the Marxian idea that the achievements of capitalism, which Marx himself had praised so highly, have their own inherent logic: because capitalism has a historic function to perform, it will come to an end as the function disappears. Socialism is possible, perhaps even inevitable, but what Schumpeter meant by socialism is different from what is commonly understood by the term. Socialism is denned by Schumpeter as "an institutional pattern in which the control over means of production and over production itself is vested with a central authority—or, as we may say, in which, as a matter of principle, the economic affairs of society belong to the public and not to the private sphere" (1942, p. 167). This is quite consistent with the fact that "some freedom of action must be left, and almost any amount of freedom might be left, to the 'men on the spot,' say, the managers of the individual industries or plants" (p. 168). It is noteworthy that the definition does not necessarily include ownership of the means of production. Schumpeter made short shrift of the numerous reasons that have been adduced to prove the approaching collapse of capitalism. He argued that capitalism cannot be even approximately identified with perfect competition and, therefore, to criticize it for monopolistic practices or for temporary recessions misses the point. "Capitalism . . . is by nature a form or method of economic change and not only never is but never can be stationary" (1942, p. 82), and most criticism overlooks this essential fact. The Achilles' heel of capitalism lies elsewhere, namely in its achievements. The very success of capitalism will bring about its doom for two reasons : as societies grow richer, and production and productivity increase spectacularly, the need for further growth and for the specific contribution of the entrepreneur will disappear. Administrators can deal with what will become essentially routine problems, and the desiderata of economic life will shift. At the same time, the successes of capitalism will lead to an increasingly hostile intellectual environment, to a trahison des clercs, in which entrepreneurs will find it increasingly difficult to fulfill
SCHUMPETER, JOSEPH A. their essential function. Schumpeter was also prepared to consider that the process of innovation might itself become more and more routine. He foresaw the eventual triumph of socialism, but he thought its chances for success and indeed its relevance negligible in precisely those situations where most people believed (and still believe) it necessary—to make poor economies grow. Economically, capitalism has performed miracles, and in another fifty to one hundred years it will have created such a powerful productive machine as to eliminate poverty. (Indeed, Schumpeter's own projections—in Chapter 5—have already been far surpassed.) Culturally, capitalism has brought about the spread of a rational and pacific view of the world: "Modern mathematicoexperimental science developed . . . not only along with the social process usually referred to as the Rise of Capitalism, but also outside . . . of scholastic thought and in the face of its contemptuous hostility" (1942, p. 124). The same is true of painting and literature. Schumpeter also discussed the problem of the transition to socialism. The socialism that can work is one that comes "in the fullness of time," when the problem of poverty has been solved by the preceding creation of a powerful productive economy. Schumpeter believed that he and Marx were basically in agreement on this point: Evolution was for him [Marx] the parent of socialism. He was much too strongly imbued with a sense of the inherent logic of things social to believe that revolution can replace any part of the work of evolution. . . . The Marxian revolution therefore differs entirely, in nature and in function, from the revolutions both of the bourgeois radical and of the socialist conspirator. It is essentially revolution in the fullness of time. . . . To say that Marx, stripped of phrases, admits of interpretation in a conservative sense is only saying that he can be taken seriously. (1942, p. 58)
If socialism is built on a powerful productive economy, then the problems of transition will be negligible; if this condition does not obtain, these problems of transition may jeopardize the success of socialism. Schumpeter also considered the rationality of socialist decision making, first discussed by Enrico Barone in 1905, and the human problems involved. .According to Schumpeter, socialism can be run on democratic lines. His definition of democracy may not, however, command general assent—an "institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (p. 269). What will actually
71
happen will depend on many accidents as well as on the inherent logic of social (including economic) evolution: ". . . there is little reason to believe that. . . socialism will mean the advent of the civilization of which orthodox socialists dream. It is much more likely to present fascist features. That would be a strange answer to Marx's prayer. But history sometimes indulges in jokes of questionable taste" (p. 375). It is difficult to present Schumpeter's thought in a brief form: its complexity is such that the many pages Schumpeter himself devoted to it are entirely necessary. This complexity might have prevented the development of a Schumpeter school, even if he himself had not actively discouraged its formation. Moreover, it is not easy to locate Schumpeter in a history of economic analysis: although he was an Austrian by birth and training, he was not an "Austrian" economist. He belongs to that recent trend in economics that is characterized by an absence of schools of economic thought, though not of good economists. The economists Schumpeter himself trained will never put reality into the straitjacket of any particular theory; they will be able to use any logical theory while remaining conscious of the variety and uniqueness of the real social and economic problems. WOLFGANG F. STOLPER [See also BUSINESS CYCLES; CAPITALISM; ECONOMIC THOUGHT, article on THE AUSTRIAN SCHOOL; ENTREPRENEURSHIP; and the biographies of BOHMBAWERK; CLARK, JOHN BATES; EDGEWORTH; MARX; WALRAS; WIESER.] WORKS BY SCHUMPETER Das Wesen und der Hauptinhalt der theoretischen N ationalokonomie. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. (1912) 1934 The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry Into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle. Harvard Economic Studies, Vol. 46. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. -» First published as Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung. (1914) 1954 Economic Doctrine and Method: An Historical Sketch. London: Allen & Unwin. -» First published as Epochen der Dogmen- und Methodengeschichte. (1918) 1954 The Crisis of the Tax State. International Economic Papers 4:5-38. -> First published as Die Krise des Steuerstaats. (1919-1927) 1951 Imperialism and Social Classes. New York: Kelley. -» First published as "Zur Soziologie der Imperialismen" (1919) and "Die sozialen Klassen im ethnisch homogenen Milieu" (1927). A paperback edition was published in 1955 by Meridian. 1939 Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process. 2 vols. New .York and London: McGraw-Hill. -» An abridged version was published in 1964. 1908
72
SCHUTZ, ALFRED
(1942) 1950 Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. 3d ed. New York: Harper; London: Allen & Unwin. -» A paperback edition was published by Harper in 1962. (1954) 1964 History of Economic Analysis. Edited by E. B. Schumpeter. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. -» Published posthumously. Aufsdtze zur okonomischen Theorie. Edited by Arthur Spiethoff and Erich Schneider. Tubingen (Germany): Mohr, 1952. Aufsdtze zur Soziologie. Edited by Arthur Spiethoff and Erich Schneider. Tubingen (Germany): Mohr, 1953. Dogmenhistorische und biographische Aufsdtze. Edited by Arthur Spiethoff and Erich Schneider. Tubingen (Germany): Mohr, 1954. Essays. Edited by Richard V. Clemence. Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1951. -> Contains essays first published between 1909 and 1950. Ten Great Economists: From Marx to Keynes. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1951. -» Contains essays first published between 1910 and 1950. A paperback edition was published in 1965. SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY HABERLER, GOTTFRIED 1950 Joseph Alois Schumpeter: 1883-1950. Quarterly Journal of Economics 64:333372. HABERLER, GOTTFRIED 1951 J. A. Schumpeter, 18831950. Pages 24-47 in S. E. Harris (editor), Schumpeter: Social Scientist. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. HARRIS, SEYMOUR E. (editor) 1951 Schumpeter: Social Scientist. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. KESSLER, MARTIN 1961 The Synthetic Vision of Joseph Schumpeter. Review of Politics 23:334-355. SCHUMPETER, ELIZABETH B. 1950 Bibliography of the Writings of Joseph A. Schumpeter. Quarterly Journal of Economics 64:373-384. SMITHIES, A. 1951 Memorial: J. A. Schumpeter, 18831950. Pages 11-23 in S. E. Harris (editor), Schumpeter: Social Scientist. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. SPIETHOFF, ARTHUR 1949 Josef Schumpeter: In Memoriam. Kyklos 3:289-293. -» Dated 1949, but published after Schumpeter's death in 1950. WRIGHT, DAVID McCoRD 1950 Schumpeter and Keynes. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 65, no. 2:185-196.
SCHUTZ, ALFRED Alfred Schutz (1899-1959) was born in Austria, studied at the University of Vienna, and from 1939 until his death lived in New York City, where he was professor of philosophy and sociology at the New School for Social Research. His principal philosophical work consisted of the application of Edmund Husserl's phenomenology to the problems of social reality, while his major methodological contribution was an attempt to relate phenomenological concepts to the sociology of Max Weber. He believed that the cardinal problem for the social sciences is the study of the world of daily life, of the common-sense reality that each individual shares with his fellow men in a taken-for-granted
manner, and both his major intellectual efforts focused on this problem. As Schutz saw it, the task of the phenomenological philosopher concerned with social reality is to uncover, describe, and analyze the essential features of this mundane world; and consequently all of his writings, beginning with The Phenomenology of the Social World (1932), take the reality of everyday life as a point of departure and as a subject for detailed examination. For Schutz, the world of common-sense reality rests on certain basic epistemological presuppositions: that the mundane world exists, that man and his fellows exist in that world, and that man can communicate with Others. In daily life, men take for granted the reality of their experience: they assume, naively, that they share the same world with all other "normal" perceivers; and they assume that were they to change places with Others, they would see the world in essentially the same way the Others do. Upon analysis, it is found that these fundamental presuppositions imply a number of structural characteristics. (1) The "biographical situation" of the individual depends on his particular location in the social world as he himself defines it and as he interprets that location in terms of his previous experiences. The biographical situation is unique to the individual, although it includes typical features he does share with Others. (2) Commonsense man possesses a "stock of knowledge at hand." It includes elements handed down to him by Others, parents and teachers among them, and it is in a typically organized form. This knowledge is accepted without question as generally valid, though it is always potentially questionable. (3) The spatial coordinates of "here and there" are essential features of the social matrix by which the individual locates himself. The individual's own body is the reference point in terms of which he locates himself as "here" and the Other as "there." (4) The "alter ego" is given to the individual as a being like himself in a mundane world. Moreover, the Other exists simultaneously with the self, his thought is grasped in a vivid present, and alter ego's speech and the individual's listening coexist in a relationship that is the essence of intersubjectivity. (5) Ego's world, as an intersubjective social reality, includes alter egos with different temporal and spatial characteristics: predecessors, or those who lived before him and are known to him through report; contemporaries, who share the same temporal world; consociates, or those who are alive at the same time and who also share ego's spatial segment of the world through face-to-
SCHUTZ, ALFRED face relationships; successors, who will live after he dies, including those who will be born only after he is dead. The social world is as much constituted by consciousness of predecessors and successors as it is by contemporaries and consociates. To explain the structural relationships that hold among all of these aspects of social order, a theory of social action is necessary. Schutz distinguished between "action" and "act." Action is understood as purposive conduct projected by the actor; an act is denned as accomplished action. Action has a subjective form as well as an objective form: purposively refraining from doing something is no less action than overtly behaving in one way or another. What is of decisive importance to Schutz's conception of action is his view that action is grounded in the interpretative consciousness of the actor. It is at this point that Schutz turned to Weber, in particular to his conception of interpretative understanding (Verstehen^ and to his postulate of the subjective interpretation of meaning. To understand social action is to grasp the meaning which the actor gives to or bestows upon his action, to comprehend what that action means to him. The "subjective" interpretation of meaning signified for Weber what the actor means by his action, not, as Schutz stressed, some private idiosyncratic and unverifiable domain. In Schutz's adaptation of Weber, subjective interpretation of meaning appears primarily as a fundamental typification of the common-sense world. All men in mundane life, then, practice Verstehen, but there is a distinction between Verstehen (1) as an experiential form of commonsense knowledge, (2) as an epistemological problem, and (3) as a distinctive method of the social sciences. Schutz believed that it was the great merit of such men as Durkheim, Pareto, Marshall, and Veblen, and above all of Weber, to have developed the technique that "consists in replacing the human beings which the social scientist observes as an actor on the social stage by puppets created by himself, in other words, in constructing ideal types of actors" (Collected Papers, vol. 2, p. 17). The social scientist, according to Schutz, proceeds as follows: [He] observes certain events within the social world as caused by human activity and he begins to establish a type of such events. Afterwards he coordinates with these typical acts typical because motives and in-order-to motives which he assumes as invariable in the mind of an imaginary actor. Thus he constructs a personal ideal type, which means the model of an actor whom he imagines gifted with a consciousness. . . . The social scientist places these constructed types in
73
a setting which contains all the elements of the situation in the social world relevant for the performance of the typical act under inquiry. Moreover, he associates with him other personal ideal types with motives apt to provoke typical reactions to the first ideal type's typical act. So he arrives at a model of the social world, or better at a reconstruction of it. (ibid., pp. 17-18) Action is never an isolated phenomenon; it has its phenomenological "horizons" of relevance and relatedness to social reality, and it has its "motivation." As already noted, typical acts have two kinds of motives, "in-order-to" motives and "because" motives. The first are explained in terms of the actor's goals and ends; the second, in terms of his background and disposition. The in-order-to motive is "the future state of affairs to be realized by the projected action," and the project itself is determined by the because motive, which in turn is dominated by the past tense. Other people's acts can be fully understood only insofar as their because and in-order-to motives are known, but since this is impossible, it must suffice to know their typical motives, including their reference to typical situations, typical ends, typical means, etc. (ibid., pp. 11-12). The temporal disequilibrium between the two orders of motive suggests a larger problem in the conception of the ego. According to Schutz, the ego cannot seize its own immediacy; it can capture itself only as an object of a reflexive act. Schutz here came close to George H. Mead's distinction between the "I" and "me" aspects of the self. He pointed, however, to a larger implication of the distinction, for man is understood as a being who presents himself to Others, takes his place in the social world, and, finally, knows himself only in a partial and fragmentary way. Such fragmentation is itself a primordial typification of reality. Schutz's philosophical position has significance for the choice of models to be used in the social sciences, and it suggests, in particular, that the use of natural science models is not satisfactory. He believed that the natural and social sciences differ qualitatively: the natural sciences investigate objects that are constructs of the first degree, i.e., objects in the field of the scientific observer; the social sciences are properly concerned with second-degree constructs, i.e., objects that not only are themselves in a world but that also have a world. The human beings who are the central concern of the social scientist are interpreters of their own lives and actions. The task of the social scientist is to comprehend the world of daily life (Lebenswelt) from which these lives derive their significance, and the phenomenological approach
74
SCIENCE: The History of Science
—its concern with essential structure, with founding relationships, with "sedimentation" of meaning, and with the uncovering of root presuppositions— provides the means by which social science may reconstruct mundane reality. At the same time, the use of Verstehen and of the subjective interpretation of meaning may lead to valid knowledge. Although Schutz's work is profoundly indebted to Husserl and Max Weber, it has affinities with that of other European thinkers, Henri Bergson and Georg Simmel in particular. In the AngloAmerican tradition, Schutz found the thought of Santayana, Whitehead, and James especially congenial. The sociologists who influenced him the most were Cooley, Thomas, and Mead. All these men stressed the activity of the actor and his action in relation to the experiential world. It was Schutz's distinctive achievement to develop these intellectual orientations by centering on the paradigm of action instead of the traditional theme of perception and by approaching both actor and action by way of the typifications of common-sense life. In the last decade, Schutz's work has aroused increasing interest among both philosophers and social scientists in the implications of phenomenology for a humanistic sociology and a theory of man. MAURICE NATANSON [See also KNOWLEDGE, SOCIOLOGY OF; SOCIAL STRUCTURE, article on SOCIAL STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS; VERSTEHEN; and the biographies of COOLEY; HUSSERL; MEAD; SIMMEL; THOMAS; WEBER, MAX.] WORKS BY SCHUTZ (1932) 1967 The Phenomenology of the Social World. Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press. Collected Papers. 3 vols. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1962-1965. -> Volume I : The Problem of Social Reality. Volume 2: Studies in Social Theory. Volume 3: Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy. SUPPLEMENTARY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BERGER, PETER; and LUCKMANN, THOMAS 1966 The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday. GURWITSCH, ARON (1957)1965 The Field of Consciousness. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press. -» First published in French. NATANSON, MAURICE (editor) 1963 Philosophy of the Social Sciences: A Reader. New York: Random House. NATANSON, MAURICE 1966 The Phenomenology of Alfred Schutz. Inquiry 9:147-155. SPIEGELBERG, HERBERT (1960) 1965 The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction. 2d ed. 2 vols. Phaenomenologica, Vols. 5-6. The Hague: Nijhoff. STONIER, ALFRED; and BODE, KARL 1937 A New Approach to the Methodology of the Social Sciences. Economica New Series 4:406-424. ZANER, RICHARD M. 1961 Theory of Intersubjectivity: Alfred Schutz. SociaZ Research 28:71-93.
SCIENCE i. ii. in. iv.
THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE SCIENCE-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS v. SCIENTISTS vi. SCIENTIFIC COMMUNICATION
Thomas S. Kuhn Michael Scriven Bernard Barber Don K. Price Warren O. Hagstrom Norman Kaplan and Norman W. Storer
THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE
As an independent professional discipline, the history of science is a new field still emerging from a long and varied prehistory. Only since 1950, and initially only in the United States, has the majority of even its youngest practitioners been trained for, or committed to, a full-time scholarly career in the field. From their predecessors, most of whom were historians only by avocation and thus derived their goals and values principally from some other field, this younger generation inherits a constellation of sometimes irreconcilable objectives. The resulting tensions, though they have relaxed with increasing maturation of the profession, are still perceptible, particularly in the varied primary audiences to which the literature of the history of science continues to be addressed. Under the circumstances any brief report on development and current state is inevitably more personal and prognostic than for a longer-established profession. Development of the field. Until very recently most of those who wrote the history of science were practicing scientists, sometimes eminent ones. Usually history was for them a by-product of pedagogy. They saw in it, besides intrinsic appeal, a means to elucidate the concepts of their specialty, to establish its tradition, and to attract students. The historical section with which so many technical treatises and monographs still open is contemporary illustration of what was for many centuries the primary form and exclusive source for the history of science. That traditional genre appeared in classical antiquity both in historical sections of technical treatises and in a few independent histories of the most developed ancient sciences, astronomy and mathematics. Similar works—together with a growing body of heroic biography—had a continuous history from the Renaissance through the eighteenth century, when their production was much stimulated by the Enlightenment's vision of science as at once the source and the exemplar of progress. From the last fifty years of that period come the earliest historical studies that are sometimes still used as such, among them the historical narratives embedded in
SCIENCE: The History of Science the technical works of Lagrange (mathematics) as well as the imposing separate treatises by Montucla (mathematics and physical science), Priestley (electricity and optics), and Delambre (astronomy). In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, though alternative approaches had begun to develop, scientists continued to produce both occasional biographies and magistral histories of their own specialties, for example, Kopp (chemistry), Poggendorff (physics), Sachs (botany), Zittel and Geikie (geology), and Klein (mathematics ). A second main historiographic tradition, occasionally indistinguishable from the first, was more explicitly philosophical in its objectives. Early in the seventeenth century Francis Bacon proclaimed the utility of histories of learning to those who would discover the nature and proper use of human reason. Condorcet and Comte are only the most famous of the philosophically inclined writers who, following Bacon's lead, attempted to base normative descriptions of true rationality on historical surveys of Western scientific thought. Before the nineteenth century this tradition remained predominantly programmatic, producing little significant historical research. But then, particularly in the writings of Whewell, Mach, and Duhem, philosophical concerns became a primary motive for creative activity in the history of science, and they have remained important since. Both of these historiographic traditions, particularly when controlled by the textual-critical techniques of nineteenth-century German political history, produced occasional monuments of scholarship, which the contemporary historian ignores at his peril. But they simultaneously reinforced a concept of the field that has today been largely rejected by the nascent profession. The objective of these older histories of science was to clarify and deepen an understanding of contemporary scientific methods or concepts by displaying their evolution. Committed to such goals, the historian characteristically chose a single established science or branch of science—one whose status as sound knowledge could scarcely be doubted—and described when, where, and how the elements that in his day constituted its subject matter and presumptive method had come into being. Observations, laws, or theories which contemporary science had set aside as error or irrelevancy were seldom considered unless they pointed a methodological moral or explained a prolonged period of apparent sterility. Similar selective principles governed discussion of factors external to science. Religion, seen as a hindrance, and technology, seen as an occasional prerequisite to advance in instrumenta-
75
tion, were almost the only such factors which received attention. The outcome of this approach has recently been brilliantly parodied by the philosopher Joseph Agassi. Until the early nineteenth century, of course, characteristics very much like these typified most historical writing. The romantics' passion for distant times and places had to combine with the scholarly standards of Biblical criticism before even general historians could be brought to recognize the interest and integrity of value systems other than their own. (The nineteenth century is, for example, the period when the Middle Ages were first observed to have a history.) That transformation of sensibility which most contemporary historians would suppose essential to their field was not, however, at once reflected in the history of science. Though they agreed about nothing else, both the romantic and the scientist-historian continued to view the development of science as a quasi-mechanical march of the intellect, the successive surrender of nature's secrets to sound methods skillfully deployed. Only in this century have historians of science gradually learned to see their subject matter as something different from a chronology of accumulating positive achievement in a technical specialty defined by hindsight. A number of factors contributed to this change. Probably the most important was the influence, beginning in the late nineteenth century, of the history of philosophy. In that field only the most partisan could feel confident of his ability to distinguish positive knowledge from error and superstition. Dealing with ideas that had since lost their appeal, the historian could scarcely escape the force of an injunction which Bertrand RusseJl later phrased succinctly: "In studying a philosopher, the right attitude is neither reverence nor contempt, but first a kind of hypothetical sympathy, until it is 'possible to know what it feels like to believe in his theories." That attitude toward past thinkers came to the history of science from philosophy. Partly it was learned from men like Lange and Cassirer who dealt historically with people or ideas that were also important for scientific development. (Burtt's Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science and Lovejoy's Great Chain of Being were, in this respect, especially influential.) And partly it was learned from a small group of Neo-Kantian epistemologists, particularly Brunschvicg and Meyerson, whose search for quasi-absolute categories of thought in older scientific ideas produced brilliant genetic analyses of concepts which the main tradition in the history of science had misunderstood or dismissed. These lessons were reinforced by another deci-
76
SCIENCE: The History of Science
sive event in the emergence of the contemporary profession. Almost a century after the Middle Ages had become important to the general historian, Pierre Duhem's search for the sources of modern science disclosed a tradition of medieval physical thought which, in contrast to Aristotle's physics, could not be denied an essential role in the transformation of physical theory that occurred in the seventeenth century. Too many of the elements of Galileo's physics and method were to be found there. But it was not possible, either, to assimilate it quite to Galileo's physics and to that of Newton, leaving the structure of the so-called Scientific Revolution unchanged but extending it greatly in time. The essential novelties of seventeenth-century science would be understood only if medieval science were explored first on its own terms and then as the base from which the "New Science" sprang. More than any other, that challenge has shaped the modern historiography of science. The writings which it has evoked since 1920, particularly those of E. J. Dijksterhuis, Anneliese Maier, and especially Alexandre Koyre, are the models which many contemporaries aim to emulate. In addition, the discovery of medieval science and its Renaissance role has disclosed an area in which the history of science can and must be integrated with more traditional types of history. That task has barely begun, but the pioneering synthesis by Butterfield and the special studies by Panofsky and Frances Yates mark a path which will surely be broadened and followed. A third factor in the formation of the modern historiography of science has been a repeated insistence that the student of scientific development concern himself with positive knowledge as a whole and that general histories of science replace histories of special sciences. Traceable as a program to Bacon, and more particularly to Comte, that demand scarcely influenced scholarly performance before the beginning of this century, when it was forcefully reiterated by the universally venerated Paul Tannery and then put to practice in the monumental researches of George Sarton. Subsequent experience has suggested that the sciences are not, in fact, all of a piece and that even the superhuman erudition required for a general history of science could scarcely tailor their joint evolution to a coherent narrative. But the attempt has been crucial, for it has highlighted the impossibility of attributing to the past the divisions of knowledge embodied in contemporary science curricula. Today, as historians increasingly turn back to the detailed investigation of individual branches of science, they study fields which actually existed
in the periods that concern them, and they do so with an awareness of the state of other sciences at the time. Still more recently, one other set of influences has begun to shape contemporary work in the history of science. Its result is an increased concern, deriving partly from general history and partly from German sociology and Marxist historiography, with the role of nonintellectual, particularly institutional and socioeconomic, factors in scientific development. Unlike the ones discussed above, however, these influences and the works responsive to them have to date scarcely been assimilated by the emerging profession. For all its novelties, the new historiography is still directed predominantly to the evolution of scientific ideas and of the tools (mathematical, observational, and experimental) through which these interact with each other and with nature. Its best practitioners have, like Koyre, usually minimized the importance of nonintellectual aspects of culture to the historical developments they consider. A few have acted as though the obtrusion of economic or institutional considerations into the history of science would be a denial of the integrity of science itself. As a result, there seem at times to be two distinct sorts of history of science, occasionally appearing between the same covers but rarely making firm or fruitful contact. The still dominant form, often called the "internal approach," is concerned with the substance of science as knowledge. Its newer rival, often called the "external approach," is concerned with the activity of scientists as a social group within a larger culture. Putting the two together is perhaps the greatest challenge now faced by the profession, and there are increasing signs of a response. Nevertheless, any survey of the field's present state must unfortunately still treat the two as virtually separate enterprises. Internal history. What are the maxims of the new internal historiography? Insofar as possible (it is never entirely so, nor could history be written if it were), the historian should set aside the science that he knows. His science should be learned from the textbooks and journals of the period he studies, and he should master these and the indigenous traditions they display before grappling with innovators whose discoveries or inventions changed the direction of scientific advance. Dealing with innovators, the historian should try to think as they did. Recognizing that scientists are often famous for results they did not intend, he should ask what problems his subject worked at and how these became problems for him. Recognizing that a historic discovery is rarely
SCIENCE: The History of Science quite the one attributed to its author in later textbooks (pedagogic goals inevitably transform a narrative), the historian should ask what his subject thought he had discovered and what he took the basis of that discovery to be. And in this process of reconstruction the historian should pay particular attention to his subject's apparent errors, not for their own sake but because they reveal far more of the mind at work than do the passages in which a scientist seems to record a result or an argument that modern science still retains. For at least thirty years the attitudes which these maxims are designed to display have increasingly guided the best interpretive scholarship in the history of science, and it is with scholarship of that sort that this article is predominantly concerned. (There are other types, of course, though the distinction is not sharp, and much of the most worthwhile effort of historians of science is devoted to them. But this is not the place to consider work like that of, say, Needham, Neugebauer, and Thorndike, whose indispensable contribution has been to establish and make accessible texts and traditions previously known only through myth.) Nevertheless, the subject matter is immense; there have been few professional historians of science (in 1950 scarcely more than half a dozen in the United States); and their choice of topic has been far from random. There remain vast areas for which not even the basic developmental lines are clear. Probably because of their special prestige, physics, chemistry, and astronomy dominate the historical literature of science. But even in these fields effort has been unevenly distributed, particularly in this century. Because they sought contemporary knowledge in the past, the nineteenth-century scientist-historians compiled surveys which often ranged from antiquity to their own day or close to it. In the twentieth century a few scientists, like Dugas, Jammer, Partington, Truesdell, and Whittaker, have written from a similar viewpoint, and some of their surveys carry the history of special fields close to the present. But few practitioners of the most developed sciences still write histories, and the members of the emerging profession have up to this time been far more systematically and narrowly selective, with a number of unfortunate consequences. The deep and sympathetic immersion in the sources which their work demands virtually prohibits wide-ranging surveys, at least until more of the field has been examined in depth. Starting with a clean slate, as they at least feel they are, this group naturally tries first to establish the early phases of a science's development,
77
and few get beyond that point. Besides, until the last few years almost no member of the new group has had sufficient command of the science (particularly mathematics, usually the decisive hurdle) to become a vicarious participant in the more recent research of the technically most developed disciplines. As a result, though the situation is now changing rapidly with the entry both of more and of better-prepared people into the field, the recent literature of the history of science tends to end at the point where the technical source materials cease to be accessible to a man with elementary college scientific training. There are fine studies of mathematics to Leibniz (Boyer, Michel); of astronomy and mechanics to Newton (Clagett, Costabel, Dijksterhuis, Koyre, and Maier), of electricity to Coulomb (Cohen), and of chemistry to Dalton (Boas, Crosland, Daumas, Guerlac, Metzger). But almost no work within the new tradition has as yet been published on the mathematical physical science of the eighteenth century or on any physical science in the nineteenth. For the biological and earth sciences, the literature is even less well developed, partly because only those subspecialties which, like physiology, relate closely to medicine had achieved professional status before the late nineteenth century. There are few of the older surveys by scientists, and the members of the new profession are only now beginning in any number to explore these fields. In biology at least there is prospect of rapid change, but up to this point the only areas much studied are nineteenth-century Darwinism and the anatomy and physiology of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. On the second of these topics, however, the best of the book-length studies (e.g., O'Malley and Singer) deal usually with special problems and persons and thus scarcely display an evolving scientific tradition. The literature on evolution, in the absence of adequate histories of the technical specialties which provided Darwin with both data and problems, is written at a level of philosophical generality which makes it hard to see how his Origin of Species could have been a major achievement, much less an achievement in the sciences. Dupree's model study of the botanist Asa Gray is among the few noteworthy exceptions. As yet the new historiography has not touched the social sciences. In these fields the historical literature, where it exists, has been produced entirely by practitioners of the science concerned, Boring's History of Experimental Psychology being perhaps the outstanding example. Like the older histories of the physical sciences, this literature is
78
SCIENCE: The History of Science
often indispensable, but as history it shares their limitations. (The situation is typical for relatively new sciences: practitioners in these fields are ordinarily expected to know about the development of their specialties, which thus regularly acquire a quasi-official history; thereafter something very like Gresham's law applies.) This area therefore offers particular opportunities both to the historian of science and, even more, to the general intellectual or social historian, whose background is often especially appropriate to the demands of these fields. The preliminary publications of Stocking on the history of American anthropology provide a particularly fruitful example of the perspective which the general historian can apply to a scientific field whose concepts and vocabulary have only very recently become esoteric. External history. Attempts to set science in a cultural context which might enhance understanding both of its development and of its effects have taken three characteristic forms, of which the oldest is the study of scientific institutions. Bishop Sprat prepared his pioneering history of the Royal Society of London almost before that organization had received its first charter, and there have since been innumerable in-house histories of individual scientific societies. These books are, however, useful principally as source materials for the historian, and only in this century have students of scientific development started to make use of them. Simultaneously they have begun seriously to examine the other types of institutions, particularly educational, which may promote or inhibit scientific advance. As elsewhere in the history of science, most of the literature on institutions deals with the seventeenth century. The best of it is scattered through periodicals (the once standard book-length accounts are regrettably out-of-date) from which it can be retrieved, together with much else concerning the history of science, through the annual "Critical Bibliography" of the journal Isis and through the quarterly Bulletin signaletique of the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris. Guerlac's classic study on the professionalization of French chemistry, Schofield's history of the Lunar Society, and a recent collaborative volume (Taton) on scientific education in France are among the very few works on eighteenth-century scientific institutions. For the nineteenth, only Cardwell's study of England, Dupree's of the United States, and Vucinich's of Russia begin to replace the fragmentary but immensely suggestive remarks scattered, often in footnotes, through the first volume of Merz's History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century.
Intellectual historians have frequently considered the impact of science on various aspects of Western thought, particularly during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. For the period since 1700, however, these studies are peculiarly unsatisfying insofar as they aim to demonstrate the influence, and not merely the prestige, of science. The name of a Bacon, a Newton, or a Darwin is a potent symbol: there are many reasons to invoke it besides recording a substantive debt. And the recognition of isolated conceptual parallels, e.g., between the forces that keep a planet in its orbit and the system of checks and balances in the U.S. constitution, more often demonstrates interpretive ingenuity than the influence of science on other areas of life. No doubt scientific concepts, particularly those of broad scope, do help to change extrascientific ideas. But the analysis of their role in producing this kind of change demands immersion in the literature of science. The older historiography of science does not, by its nature, supply what is needed, and the new historiography is too recent and its products too fragmentary to have had much effect. Though the gap seems small, there is no chasm that more needs bridging than that between the historian of ideas and the historian of science. Fortunately there are a few works to point the way. Among the more recent are Nicolson's pioneering studies of science in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century literature, Westfall's discussion of natural religion, Gillispie's chapter on science in the Enlightenment, and Roger's monumental survey of the role of the life sciences in eighteenth-century French thought. The concern with institutions and that with ideas merge naturally in a third approach to scientific development. This is the study of science in a geographical area too small to permit concentration on the evolution of any particular technical specialty but sufficiently homogeneous to enhance an understanding of science's social role and setting. Of all the types of external history, this is the newest and most revealing, for it calls forth the widest range of historical and sociological experience and skill. The small but rapidly growing literature on science in America (Dupree, Hindle, Shryock) is a prominent example of this approach, and there is promise that current studies of science in the French Revolution may yield similar illumination. Merz, Lilley, and Ben-David point to aspects of the nineteenth century on which much similar effort must be expended. The topic which has, however, evoked the greatest activity and attention is the development of science in seventeenth-century England. Because it has become the
SCIENCE: The History of Science center of vociferous debate both about the origin of modern science and about the nature of the history of science, this literature is an appropriate focus for separate discussion. Here it stands for a type of research: the problems it presents will provide perspective on the relations between the internal and external approaches to the history of science. The Merton thesis. The most visible issue in the debate about seventeenth-century science has been the so-called Merton thesis, really two overlapping theses with distinguishable sources. Both aim ultimately to account for the special productiveness of seventeenth-century science by correlating its novel goals and values—summarized in the program of Bacon and his followers—with other aspects of contemporary society. The first, which owes something to Marxist historiography, emphasizes the extent to which the Baconians hoped to learn from the practical arts and in turn to make science useful. Repeatedly they studied the techniques of contemporary craftsmen—glassmakers, metallurgists, mariners, and the like—and many also devoted at least a portion of their attention to pressing practical problems of the day, e.g., those of navigation, land drainage, and deforestation. The new problems, data, and methods fostered by these novel concerns are, Merton supposes, a principal reason for the substantive transformation experienced by a number of sciences during the seventeenth century. The second thesis points to the same novelties of the period but looks to Puritanism as their primary stimulant. (There need be no conflict. Max Weber, whose pioneering suggestion Merton was investigating, had argued that Puritanism helped to legitimize a concern with technology and the useful arts.) The values of settled Puritan communities—for example, an emphasis upon justification through works and on direct communion with God through nature—are said to have fostered both the concern with science and the empirical, instrumental, and utilitarian tone which characterized it during the seventeenth century. Both of these theses have since been extended and also attacked with vehemence, but no consensus has emerged. (An important confrontation, centering on papers by Hall and de Santillana, appears in the symposium of the Institute for the History of Science edited by Clagett; Zilsei's pioneering paper on William Gilbert can be found in the collection of relevant articles from the Journal of the History of Ideas edited by Wiener and Noland. Most of the rest of the literature, which is voluminous, can be traced through the
79
footnotes in a recently published controversy over the work of Christopher Hill.) In this literature the most persistent criticisms are those directed to Merton's definition and application of the label "Puritan," and it now seems clear that no term so narrowly doctrinal in its implications will serve. Difficulties of this sort can surely be eliminated, however, for the Baconian ideology was neither restricted to scientists nor uniformly spread through all classes and areas of Europe. Merton's label may be inadequate, but there is no doubt that the phenomenon he describes did exist. The more significant arguments against his position are the residual ones which derive from the recent transformation in the history of science. Merton's image of the Scientific Revolution, though long-standing, was rapidly being discredited as he wrote, particularly in the role it attributed to the Baconian movement. Participants in the older historiographic tradition did sometimes declare that science as they conceived it owed nothing to economic values or religious doctrine. Nevertheless, Merton's emphases on the importance of manual work, experimentation, and the direct confrontation with nature were familiar and congenial to them. The new generation of historians, in contrast, claims to have shown that the radical sixteenth- and seventeenthcentury revisions of astronomy, mathematics, mechanics, and even optics owed very little to new instruments, experiments, or observations. Galileo's primary method, they argue, was the traditional thought experiment of scholastic science brought to a new perfection. Bacon's naive and ambitious program was an impotent delusion from the start. The attempts to be useful failed consistently; the mountains of data provided by new instruments were of little assistance in the transformation of existing scientific theory. If cultural novelties are required to explain why men like Galileo, Descartes, and Newton were suddenly able to see wellknown phenomena in a new way, those novelties are predominantly intellectual and include Renaissance Neoplatonism, the revival of ancient atomism, and the rediscovery of Archimedes. Such intellectual currents were, however, at least as prevalent and productive in Roman Catholic Italy and France as in Puritan circles in Britain or Holland. And nowhere in Europe, where these currents were stronger among courtiers than among craftsmen, do they display a significant debt to technology. If Merton were right, the new image of the Scientific Revolution would apparently be wrong. In their more detailed and careful versions,
80
SCIENCE: The History of Science
which include essential qualification, these arguments are entirely convincing, up to a point. The men who transformed scientific theory during the seventeenth century sometimes talked like Baconians, but it has yet to be shown that the ideology which a number of them embraced had a major effect, substantive or methodological, on their central contributions to science. Those contributions are best understood as the result of the internal evolution of a cluster of fields which, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, were pursued with renewed vigor and in a new intellectual milieu. That point, however, can be relevant only to the revision of the Merton thesis, not to its rejection. One aspect of the ferment which historians have regularly labeled "the Scientific Revolution" was a radical programmatic movement centering in England and the Low Countries, though it was also visible for a time in Italy and France. That movement, which even the present form of Merton's argument does make more comprehensible, drastically altered the appeal, the locus, and the nature of much scientific research during the seventeenth century, and the changes have been permanent. Very likely, as contemporary historians argue, none of these novel features played a large role in transforming scientific concepts during the seventeenth century, but historians must learn to deal with them nonetheless. Perhaps the following suggestions, whose more general import will be considered in the next section, may prove helpful. Omitting the biological sciences, for which close ties to medical crafts and institutions dictate a more complex developmental pattern, the main branches of science transformed during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were astronomy, mathematics, mechanics, and optics. It is their development which makes the Scientific Revolution seem a revolution in concepts. Significantly, however, this cluster of fields consists exclusively of classical sciences. Highly developed in antiquity, they found a place in the medieval university curriculum where several of them were significantly further developed. Their seventeenth-century metamorphosis, in which university-based men continued to play a significant role, can reasonably be portrayed as primarily an extension of an ancient and medieval tradition developing in a new conceptual environment. Only occasionally need one have recourse to the Baconian programmatic movement when explaining the transformation of these fields. By the seventeenth century, however, these were not the only areas of intense scientific activity, and the others—among them the study of electricity
and magnetism, of chemistry, and of thermal phenomena—display a different pattern. As sciences, as fields to be scrutinized .systematically for an increased understanding of nature, they were all novelties during the Scientific Revolution. Their main roots were not in the learned university tradition but often in the established crafts, and they were all critically dependent both on the new program of experimentation and on the new instrumentation which craftsmen often helped to introduce. Except occasionally in medical schools, they rarely found a place in universities before the nineteenth century, and they were meanwhile pursued by amateurs loosely clustered around the new scientific societies that were the institutional manifestation of the Scientific Revolution. Obviously these are the fields, together with the new mode of practice they represent, which a revised Merton thesis may help us understand. Unlike that in the classical sciences, research in these fields added little to man's understanding of nature during the seventeenth century, a fact which has made them easy to ignore when evaluating Merton's viewpoint. But the achievements of the late eighteenth and of the nineteenth centuries will not be comprehensible until they are taken fully into account. The Baconian program, if initially barren of conceptual fruits, nevertheless inaugurated a number of the major modern sciences. Internal and external history. Because they underscore distinctions between the earlier and later stages of a science's evolution, these remarks about the Merton thesis illustrate aspects of scientific development recently discussed in a more general way by Kuhn. Early in the development of a new field, he suggests, social needs and values are a major determinant of the problems on which its practitioners concentrate. Also during this period, the concepts they deploy in solving problems are extensively conditioned by contemporary common sense, by a prevailing philosophical tradition, or by the most prestigious contemporary sciences. The new fields which emerged in the seventeenth century and a number of the modern social sciences provide examples. Kuhn argues, however, that the later evolution of a technical specialty is significantly different in ways at least foreshadowed by the development of the classical sciences during the Scientific Revolution. The practitioners of a mature science are men trained in a sophisticated body of traditional theory and of instrumental, mathematical, and verbal technique. As a result, they constitute a special subculture, one whose members are the exclusive audience for, and judges of, each other's work. The problems on which such
SCIENCE: The History of Science specialists work are no longer presented by the external society but by an internal challenge to increase the scope and precision of the fit between existing theory and nature. And the concepts used to resolve these problems are normally close relatives of those supplied by prior training for the specialty. In short, compared with other professional and creative pursuits, the practitioners of a mature science are effectively insulated from the cultural milieu in which they live their extraprofessional lives. That quite special, though still incomplete, insulation is the presumptive reason why the internal approach to the history of science, conceived as autonomous and self-contained, has seemed so nearly successful. To an extent unparalleled in other fields, the development of an individual technical specialty can be understood without going beyond the literature of that specialty and a few of its near neighbors. Only occasionally need the historian take note of a particular concept, problem, or technique which entered the field from outside. Nevertheless, the apparent autonomy of the internal approach is misleading in essentials, and the passion sometimes expended in its defense has obscured important problems. The insulation of a mature scientific community suggested by Kuhn's analysis is an insulation primarily with respect to concepts and secondarily with respect to problem structure. There are, however, other aspects of scientific advance, such as its timing. These do depend critically on the factors emphasized by the external approach to scientific development. Particularly when the sciences are viewed as an interacting group rather than as a collection of specialties, the cumulative effects of external factors can be decisive. Both the attraction of science as a career and the differential appeal of different fields are, for example, significantly conditioned by factors external to science. Furthermore, since progress in one field is sometimes dependent on the prior development of another, differential growth rates may affect an entire evolutionary pattern. Similar considerations, as noted above, play a major role in the inauguration and initial form of new sciences. In addition, a new technology or some other change in the conditions of society may selectively alter the felt importance of a specialty's problems or even create new ones for it. By doing so they may sometimes accelerate the discovery of areas in which an established theory ought to work but does not, thereby hastening its rejection and replacement by a new one. Occasionally, they may even shape the substance of that new theory
81
by ensuring that the crisis to which it responds occurs in one problem area rather than another. Or again, through the crucial intermediary of institutional reform, external conditions may create new channels of communication between previously disparate specialties, thus fostering crossfertilization which would otherwise have been absent or long delayed. There are numerous other ways, including direct subsidy, in which the larger culture impinges on scientific development, but the preceding sketch should sufficiently display a direction in which the history of science must now develop. Though the internal and external approaches to the history of science have a sort of natural autonomy, they are, in fact, complementary concerns. Until they are practiced as such, each drawing from the other, important aspects of scientific development are unlikely to be understood. That mode of practice has hardly yet begun, as the response to the Merton thesis indicates, but perhaps the analytic categories it demands are becoming clear. The relevance of the history of science. Turning in conclusion to the question about which judgments must be the most personal of all, one may ask about the potential harvest to be reaped from the work of this new profession. First and foremost will be more and better histories of science. Like any other scholarly discipline, the field's primary responsibility must be to itself. Increasing signs of its selective impact on other enterprises may, however, justify brief analysis. Among the areas to which the history of science relates, the one least likely to be significantly affected is scientific research itself. Advocates of the history of science have occasionally described their field as a rich repository of forgotten ideas and methods, a few of which might well dissolve contemporary scientific dilemmas. When a new concept or theory is successfully deployed in a science, some previously ignored precedent is usually discovered in the earlier literature of the field. It is natural to wonder whether attention to history might not have accelerated the innovation. Almost certainly, however, the answer is no. The quantity of material to be searched, the absence of appropriate indexing categories, and the subtle but usually vast differences between the anticipation and the effective innovation, all combine to suggest that reinvention rather than rediscovery will remain the most efficient source of scientific novelty. The more likely effects of the history of science on the fields it chronicles are indirect, providing increased understanding of the scientific enterprise itself. Though a clearer grasp of the nature of
82
SCIENCE: The History of Science
scientific development is unlikely to resolve particular puzzles of research, it may well stimulate reconsideration of such matters as science education, administration, and policy. Probably, however, the implicit insights which historical study can produce will first need to be made explicit by the intervention of other disciplines, of which three now seem particularly likely to be effective. Though the intrusion still evokes more heat than light, the philosophy of science is today the field in which the impact of the history of science is most apparent. Feyerabend, Hanson, Hesse, and Kuhn have all recently insisted on the inappropriateness of the traditional philosopher's ideal image of science, and in search of an alternative they have all drawn heavily from history. Following directions pointed by the classic statements of Norman Campbell and Karl Popper (and sometimes also significantly influenced by Ludwig Wittgenstein), they have at least raised problems that the philosophy of science is no longer likely to ignore. The resolution of those problems is for the future, perhaps for the indefinitely distant future. There is as yet no developed and matured "new philosophy" of science. But already the questioning of older stereotypes, mostly positivistic, is proving a stimulus and release to some practitioners of those newer sciences which have most depended upon explicit canons of scientific method in their search for professional identity. A second field in which the history of science is likely to have increasing effect is the sociology of science. Ultimately neither the concerns nor the techniques of that field need be historical. But in the present underdeveloped state of their specialty, sociologists of science can well learn from history something about the shape of the enterprise they investigate. The recent writings of Ben-David, Hagstrom, Merton, and others give evidence that they are doing so. Very likely it will be through sociology that the history of science has its primary impact on science policy and administration. Closely related to the sociology of science (perhaps equivalent to it if the two are properly construed) is a field that, though it scarcely yet exists, is widely described as "the science of science." Its goal, in the words of its leading exponent, Derek Price, is nothing less than "the theoretic analysis of the structure and behavior of science itself," and its techniques are an eclectic combination of the historian's, the sociologist's, and the econometrician's. No one can yet guess to what extent that goal is attainable, but any progress toward it will inevitably and immediately enhance the signifi-
cance both to social scientists and to society of continuing scholarship in the history of science. THOMAS S. KUHN [Other relevant material may be found in the biographies of KOYRE and SARTON.] BIBLIOGRAPHY
AGASSI, JOSEPH 1963 Towards an Historiography of Science. History and Theory, Beiheft 2. The Hague: Mouton. BEN-DAVID, JOSEPH 1960 Scientific Productivity and Academic Organization in Nineteenth-century Medicine. American Sociological Review 25:828-843. BOAS, MARIE 1958 Robert Boyle and Seventeenth-century Chemistry. Cambridge Univ. Press. BOYEE, CARL B. (1939) 1949 The Concepts of the Calculus: A Critical and Historical Discussion of the Derivative and the Integral. New York: Hafner. -> A paperback edition was published in 1959 by Dover as The History of the Calculus and Its Conceptual Development. BUTTERFIELD, HERBERT (1950) 1957 The Origins of Modern Science, 1300-1800. 2d ed., rev. New York: Macmillan. -> A paperback edition was published in 1962 by Collier. CARDWELL, DONALD S. L. 1957 The Organisation of Science in England: A Retrospect. Melbourne and London: Heinemann. CLAGETT, MARSHALL 1959 The Science of Mechanics in the Middle Ages. Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press. COHEN, I. BERNARD 1956 Franklin and Newton: An Inquiry Into Speculative Newtonian Experimental Science and Franklin's Work in Electricity as an Example Thereof. American Philosophical Society, Memoirs, Vol. 43. Philadelphia: The Society. COSTABEL, PIERRE 1960 Leibniz et la dynamique: Les textes de 1692. Paris: Hermann. CROSLAND, MAURICE 1963 The Development of Chemistry in the Eighteenth Century. Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century 24:369-441. DAUMAS, MAURICE 1955 Lavoisier: Theoricien et experimentateur. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. DIJKSTERHUIS, EDWARD J. (1950) 1961 The Mechanization of the World Picture. Oxford: Clarendon. -» First published in Dutch. DUGAS, RENE (1950) 1955 A History of Mechanics. Neuchatel (Switzerland): Editions du Griffon; New York: Central Book. -» First published in French. DUHEM, PIERRE 1906-1913 Etudes sur Leonard de Vinci. 3 vols. Paris: Hermann. DUPREE, A. HUNTER 1957 Science in the Federal Government: A History of Policies and Activities to 1940. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap. DUPREE, A. HUNTER 1959 Asa Gray: 1810-1888. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. FEYERABEND, P. K. 1962 Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism. Pages 28-97 in Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell (editors), Scientific Explanation, Space, and Time. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 3. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press. GILLISPIE, CHARLES C. 1960 The Edge of Objectivity: An Essay in the History of Scientific Ideas. Princeton Univ. Press.
SCIENCE: The Philosophy of Science GUERLAC, HENRY 1959 Some French Antecedents of the Chemical Revolution. Chymia 5:73-112. GUERLAC, HENRY 1961 Lavoisier; the Crucial Year: The Background and Origin of His First Experiments on Combustion in 1772. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press. HAGSTROM, WARREN O. 1965 The Scientific Community. New York: Basic Books. HANSON, NORWOOD R. (1958)1961 Patterns of Discovery: An Inquiry Into the Conceptual Foundations of Science. Cambridge Univ. Press. HESSE, MARY B. 1963 Models and Analogies in Science. London: Sheed & Ward. HILL, CHRISTOPHER 1965 Debate: Puritanism, Capitalism and the Scientific Revolution. Past and Present No. 29:88-97. -> Articles relevant to the debate may also be found in numbers 28, 31, 32, and 33. HINDLE, BROOKE 1956 The Pursuit of Science in Revolutionary America, 1735-1789. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press. INSTITUTE FOR THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN, 1957 1959 Critical Problems in the History of Science: Proceedings. Edited by Marshall Clagett. Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press. JAMMER, MAX 1961 Concepts of Mass in Classical and Modern Physics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 1957 Roots of Scientific Thought: A Cultural Perspective. Edited by Philip P. Wiener and Aaron Noland. New York: Basic Books. -» Selections from the first 18 volumes of the Journal. KOYRE, ALEXANDRE 1939 Etudes galileennes. 3 vols. Actualites scientifiques et industrielles, Nos. 852, 853, and 854. Paris: Hermann. -> Volume 1: A I'aube de la science classique. Volume 2: La loi de la chute des corps: Descartes et Galilee. Volume 3: Galilee et la loi d'inertie. KOYRE, ALEXANDRE 1961 La revolution astronomique: Copernic, Kepler, Borelli. Paris: Hermann. KUHN, THOMAS S. 1962 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Univ. of Chicago Press. -> A paperback edition was published in 1964. LILLEY, S. 1949 Social Aspects of the History of Science. Archives internationales d'histoire des sciences 2:376-443. MAIER, ANNELIESE 1949-1958 Studien zur Naturphilosophie der Spdtscholastik. 5 vols. Rome: Edizioni di "Storia e Letteratura." MERTON, ROBERT K. (1938) 1967 Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth-century England. New York: Fertig. MERTON, ROBERT K. 1957 Priorities in Scientific Discovery: A Chapter in the Sociology of Science. American Sociological Review 22:635-659. METZGER, HELENE 1930 Newton, Stahl, Boerhaave et la doctrine chimique. Paris: Alcan. MEYERSON, EMILE (1908) 1964 Identity and Reality. London: Allen & Unwin. -» First published in French. MICHEL, PAUL-HENRI 1950 De Pythagore a Euclide. Paris: Edition "Les Belles Lettres." NEEDHAM, JOSEPH 1954-1965 Science and Civilisation in China. 4 vols. Cambridge Univ. Press. NEUGEBAUER, OTTO (1951) 1957 The Exact Sciences in Antiquity. 2d ed. Providence, R.I.: Brown Univ. Press. -> A paperback edition was published in 1962 by Harper.
83
NICOLSON, MARJORIE H. (1950) 1960 The Breaking of the Circle: Studies in the Effect of the "New Science" Upon Seventeenth-century Poetry. Rev. ed. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. -» A paperback edition was published in 1962. O'MALLEY, CHARLES D. 1964 Andreas Vesalius of Brussels, 1514—1564. Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press. PANOFSKY, ERWIN 1954 Galileo as a Critic of the Arts. The Hague: Nijhoff. PARTINGTON, JAMES R. 1962— A History of Chemistry. New York: St. Martins. -» Volumes 2-4 were published from 1962 to 1964; Volume 1 is in preparation. PRICE, DEREK J. DE SOLLA 1966 The Science of Scientists. Medical Opinion and Review 1:81-97. ROGER, JACQUES 1963 Les sciences de la vie dans la pensee francaise du XVIIIe siecle: La generation des animaux de Descartes a. FEncyclopedie. Paris: Colin. SARTON, GEORGE 1927-1348 Introduction to the History of Science. 3 vols. Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins. SCHOFIELD, ROBERT E. 1963 The Lunar Society of Birmingham: A Social History of Provincial Science and Industry in Eighteenth-century England. Oxford: Clarendon. SHRYOCK, RICHARD H. (1936) 1947 The Development of Modern Medicine. 2d ed. New York: Knopf. SINGER, CHARLES J. 1922 The Discovery of the Circulation of the Blood. London: Bell. STOCKING, GEORGE W. JR. 1966 Franz Boas and the Culture Concept in Historical Perspective. American Anthropologist New Series 68:867-882. TATON, RENE (editor) 1964 Enseignement et diffusion des sciences en France au XVIIIe siecle. Paris: Hermann. THORNDIKE, LYNN (1923-1958) 1959-1964 A History of Magic and Experimental Science. 8 vols. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. TRUESDELL, CLIFFORD A. 1960 The Rational Mechanics of Flexible or Elastic Bodies 1638-1788: Introduction to Leonhardi Euleri Opera omnia Vol. X et XI seriei secundae. Leonhardi Euleri Opera omnia, Ser. 2, Vol. 11, part 2. Turin (Italy): Fussli. VUCINICH, ALEXANDER S. 1963 Science in Russian Culture. Volume 1: A History to 1860. Stanford Univ. Press. WESTFALL, RICHARD S. 1958 Science and Religion in Seventeenth-century England. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. WHITTAKER, EDMUND 1951-1953 A History of the Theories of Aether and Electricity. 2 vols. London: Nelson. -> Volume 1: The Classical Theories. Volume 2: The Modern Theories, 1900-1926. Volume 1 is a revised edition of A History of the Theories of Aether and Electricity From the Age of Descartes to the Close of the Nineteenth Century, published in 1910. A paperback edition was published in 1960 by Harper. YATES, FRANCES A. 1964 Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition. Univ. of Chicago Press. II THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
The general topic of the philosophy of science can be divided into subareas by subject matter: the philosophy of physics, the philosophy of biology, the philosophy of the social sciences, and so
84
SCIENCE: The Philosophy of Science
on. But it may also be divided into discussion of structural problems in science, on the one hand, and substantive problems within specified sciences, on the other. Structural problems are those traditionally associated with such topics as scientific inference, classification, explanation, prediction, measurement, probability, and determinism. Substantive problems arise when a question is asked such as "How can learning theory be axiomatized?" or "How should anxiety be defined?" Substantive problems, as a class, merge gradually into abstract scientific problems, which are properly handled by scientists themselves. The substantive philosophy of science usually requires some professional training in the relevant field, whereas the structural philosophy of science may require only a general scientific education. Both require professional training in philosophy or, to be more specific, in logic, broadly conceived (that is, not only in classical or in symbolic logic). The history of science is also of very great importance to the philosopher of science, for it provides him with more numerous and more diverse examples of conceptual schemes and theories than he could ever find in contemporary science, and such schemes and theories are his raw data. It will be seen, then, that a large part of the philosophy of science stands to scientific theorizing, classifying, and so on, as experimental design stands to scientific experimenting. For the philosophy of science is simply the discussion of general criteria for theories, classifications, and the rest, and is necessary as long as the intuitions or assertions of scientists about what constitutes good procedure are in conflict or might be improved by analysis. Curiously enough, however, many scientists reject the philosophy of science as irrelevant to their own activities, although they constantly talk it and teach it and illustrate its relevance in their work, sometimes under the title "methodology" and sometimes just as advice without a title. It is only the hyperspecialized, rock-ribbed empiricist who can entirely avoid discussing the subject in his scientific work and teaching, and even he usually contradicts himself by espousing operationism as the epitome of empiricism—a rather elementary mistake which would have grave consequences for the validity and utility of his results if he acted on it. Often the antagonism of science to philosophy seems due to a low tolerance of ambiguity, and particularly to insecurity about involvement with the more debatable and less decidable issues of philosophy. This is surely an immature reaction, unless it can be shown that
these issues need not be raised in the teaching and practice of science. This article will provide (a) a brief discussion of those aspects of the structural philosophy of science which have special relevance for the social sciences and (£>) some reference to substantive issues in the philosophy of particular social sciences. In general, these aspects will be intertwined, in order to illustrate the immediate relevance of the structural topics to substantive isues. Main concerns of the philosophy of science. Science has been said to be concerned with observation, description, definition, classification, measurement, experimentation, generalization, explanation, prediction, evaluation, and control of the world. This list is of course much too comprehensive; to be at all useful it has to be narrowed down in the course of examining individual scientific activities (for instance, instead of analyzing description in general, we might ask what kind of describing is scientific, as opposed to poetic). In any case, there are as many (though probably no more) points of view about main topics in the philosophy of science as about main topics in any of the sciences. If the area of dispute sometimes appears greater than it is, this is because when a subtopic in philosophy is settled, it is given a new name and called a science. Philosophy is the mother of sciences and has spawned physics, astronomy, symbolic logic, economics, and psychology, among other subjects. The domain of fundamental and still unresolved conceptual disputes at any time is called philosophy and, of course, bears the cross of conflict. But, perhaps for that very reason, it is a residue that eternally regenerates, is perpetually fertile. The social sciences began with a similar handicap; what was well known about human behavior was called common sense, and only the muddy residue was left for psychology and the other social sciences to clarify. It is no wonder that a subject is difficult and debatable when it is defined to exclude the easy and certain. Because "science" is a term for an activity as well as for a body of knowledge, we ought not to be surprised if it is continuous with the prescientific activities directed to the same ends, and if these, in turn, are an extension of prelinguistic adaptive behavior. This synoptic view of man's cognitive development and current equipment should—and, I believe, does—provide some criteria for good scientific practice. We can begin by applying it to the various procedures connected with scientific concept formation: observation, description, definition, and classification, with meas-
SCIENCE: The Philosophy of Science urement and generalization as closely related activities. Concept clarification. It is now widely accepted in the philosophy of science that we must qualify or reject the traditional idea that the basic data from which the scientist forms his hypotheses and classifications are provided by a faculty of observation which is somehow independent of science. Not only has the attempt by sense-data theorists and phenomenologists to identify these basic data been a total failure, but the failure begins to appear explicable. We have come to see the "observation language"—the nonscientific language in which such basic data were supposed to be reported —as really just a "theory language," with somewhat higher interjudge reliability than more abstract language, yet still subject to perceptual errors in its application and even to pervasive errors caused by infiltration by unnoticed theory. When errors of the latter kind are recognized, we may redescribe our observations or we may retain the old language and simply reinterpret it, perhaps metaphysically. Thus Feyerabend has pointed out (in conversation with the author) that the expression "The sun is rising," although it originally incorporated a false astronomical theory, has been retained as a statement of pure observation. So there is no absolutely basic observation level on which all theory rests and, even more clearly, no sharp distinction between observation and theories. We must think instead of a constant interaction and exchange between observation, which seems immune from correction, and speculative theory. Indeed, the development of new instruments may simply render observable the hitherto unobservable (as when the electron microscope was developed) or the observed mistaken (as when it became possible to measure the curvature of the seemingly flat earth). Does this relativization of the distinction between observation and theory destroy the distinction's utility? Not at all. Indeed, it strengthens our understanding of the hierarchical structure of science as a whole when we realize that observables of the nth level (for instance, in neurophysiology) may include some hypothetical constructs from the (n + l)th level (in this case, individual psychology). What leads us, then, to introduce concepts at a given level? Not just the pressure of their existence on our blank brain. Rather, the preconscious selective effect of certain environmental and internal pressures began the process of concept formation in our ancestors, as in other organisms—a sequence of events that can be summarized as "dis-
85
crimination under drive conditions." The preverbal organism comes to react to certain stimulus configurations that represent ingestibles or predators, and it is simply an extension of this process when an interpersonal vocabulary is introduced to refer to these configurations. The psychologist refers to both the preverbal and the verbal stages of this process as concept formation, and although many philosophers prefer to restrict the term to the verbal stage, there is no doubt that the verbal stage develops from the preverbal one, whether or not it becomes qualitatively different in the course of development. [See CONCEPT FORMATION.] Definition. Given the pragmatic view of concept formation outlined above, it is very natural to abandon classical definition theory (in which a definition is a set of logically necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of a term) and to adopt instead an approach based on the notions of indicator and of indicator clusters. The rationale for such an approach may be stated as follows. Within a formal system, such as mathematics or an invented language, we can find examples of classical definitions, but seldom, if ever, can we find them within a natural language or the language of a developing science. The reason for this is simply that natural phenomena are extremely untidy, and a language for referring to them must be flexible enough to accommodate this untidiness if it is to be scientifically useful. For instance, the concepts "subject," "length," "response," "group," "aggression," and "temperature" cannot be given classical definitions (other than trivially circular ones). But we have no serious difficulty in learning or teaching these concepts, which we do by giving paradigm examples, contrasts, and explicitly approximate or conditional definitions. Any paradigm provides us, if it can be successfully analyzed, with a set of sufficient conditions for the application of the term, but it is not possible to insist that paradigms, let alone analysis of them, can never turn out to be erroneous. So the sense in which these conditions are sufficient is still not that of logical sufficiency. It is still more obvious that we often cannot specify any properties that are logically necessary for the application of the concept. We therefore adopt the notion of "weighted indicators," or criteria—that is, properties which are relevant to the application of the term, but in varying degrees. Some of the properties may, in some cases, be virtually necessary; some small groups of them may be sufficient; but these are special cases. The clustering of these properties in property space indicates an entity for which it is useful to have
86
SCIENCE: The Philosophy of Science
a name, but there is typically considerable scatter and no sharp boundary to the cluster (the so-called open texture of concepts). The charm of a concise translation (that is, of a classical definition) is not often provided by the cluster approach, but it does preserve that most valuable feature of classical theory—a reliable verbal response that can be successfully taught. Contrasting and approximating, which are the other procedures involved in specification of meaning, depend on the psychological superiority of discrimination skills over absolute recognition skills and involve no new logical points. At this point, it should be stressed that there are two elements in the theory of definition: the pragmatic and the literal. We have been talking about the limitations of the literal theory of definition as a kind of translation. But there is the independent question of how one can best—that is, most usefully—select the terms that one will mention in the definition, whether it is a translation or a cluster of indicators. A famous answer to this has often been taken as both literal and pragmatic, which makes it nonsensical instead of good pragmatic advice of a limited range of applicability. I refer to operationism (for which see especially Bridgman 1927). There are, of course, some areas where it is to be taken very seriously as advice, and psychology is one of them. (In theoretical physics, contrary to the common impression, it is extremely rare to seek or find operational definitions.) But if operationism is taken as requiring that definitions actually contain nothing but operations, then it is absurd, a category error —and, in addition, it is self-refuting, since the concept of an operation cannot be defined operationally. Definitions should therefore be of such a kind that we can apply some independently determinable criteria to decide when the defined term should be used (we can, if we wish, call the process of determining whether these criteria apply "operations"). But we cannot require that the only content of definitions should be operations, or we find ourselves caught in the dilemma of deciding when we have only one operation and, hence, only one concept. . . and so on. Classification. The traditional requirements for classification also need to be relaxed. Instead of the Aristotelian requirement of exclusive and exhaustive subcategories, we must settle for minimized overlap and maximized coverage, balancing these desiderata against considerations of simplicity and applicability. The development of a scientific classification scheme is essentially a remapping of property space, using a new system of
coordinates or a new projection. Hence, assessment of the scheme's value very much depends, as in the map analogy, on the purposes for which it is intended (which may be as diverse as fast labeling, representation of a new theoretical insight, and easy recall) and very little on the idealized and context-free notion of "cutting Nature at the joints," which was the goal of earlier taxonomists (and which still admirably expresses the feeling inspired by a successful classification scheme). Measurement. The urge to measure is a kind of conditioned reflex among empirically trained scientists, and with some reason. Measurement requires—or, when developed, provides—an intersubjectively reliable procedure for applying the potentially infinite descriptive vocabulary of number. For describing any continuous variable we need such a vocabulary, and for describing many discrete variables it is exceedingly useful because it creates the possibility of applying some mathematical apparatus. But the social scientist all too often assumes that scaling and measuring will make it likely that we can discover useful laws. In fact, many scales disguise the existence of regularities, and many others fail to reveal them. The descriptive utility of a scale must be considered independently of its theoretical fertility, for the two considerations may lead in different directions. The proliferation of scales, like the proliferation of statistical analyses, often merely clogs the channels of communication. There is no magic about numbers per se, and only hard thinking and good fortune, in combination, achieve a worthwhile new scale. The same is true of classification. The cluster concept is peculiarly suited to the needs of statistical scaling and to those of statistical inference in general. [See CLUSTERING; SCALING.] Evaluation. The notion of measurement phases quite gradually into that of evaluation. "Pecking order," "peer-group ranking," and "intelligence quotient" can all, in certain contexts, appear as value-impregnated scales. This is often disputed by those who think "value" is a dirty word. Social scientists are peculiarly susceptible to the charms of the Weberian myth of a value-free social science, which rests on a one-sided interpretation of the distinction between facts and values. In its more defensible form this distinction amounts to the assertion that (a) evaluation depends on establishing certain facts; and (£>) evaluation goes beyond the facts on which it depends. To this it can be objected that evaluation may well result in facts, albeit facts different from those with which it begins. Thus Consumer Reports can often substantiate
SCIENCE: The Philosophy of Science evaluations such as "Brand X is the best dishwasher on the market today" on the basis of performance data plus data about the consumers' wants. And that evaluation, when suitably supported, simply states a fact about Brand X. It is one thing to be cautious about importing dubious value premises into an argument; it is another to suppose that all value premises or conclusions are dubious, "mere matters of opinion." It is not at all dubious that dishwashers should get the dishes clean, that clocks should keep good time, and so on. It may simply be a fact that Brand X of dishwasher excels at its task. Since the evaluation is nothing more than a combination of these facts, it is itself a fact, although it is also an evaluation. Precisely this analysis applies to myriad issues in the social sciences—evaluation of the relative merits of protective tariff barriers and direct subsidies or of different forms of treatment for dysfunctional neurosis, to name only two examples. Of course, there are many other issues where only a relativized answer is possible, since legitimate differences of taste exist (that is, differences where no argument can establish the superiority of any particular taste). But this in no way distinguishes evaluation from theoretical interpretation. It will not do to say that "in principle" these differences can be resolved in the theoretical area when more facts are available, but not in the evaluation area. Not only are there very fundamental disagreements about the function of theory that make this improbable, but additional facts often reduce value disagreement. In any case, relativized answers, which are still value judgments, admit of no disagreement, and therefore do not involve subjectivity. It is simply naive to suppose that fields must, if they are to be regarded as objective, always contain answers to questions of the form "Which is the best X?" Neither mathematics nor engineering has this property, or any corresponding property with respect to "Which is the true solution to X?," where the conditions of X are incompletely specified. As to the final defense of the distinction between fact and value—that a particular choice of ultimate values, or ends, cannot be proved true—three answers apply: (1) No such choice has to be proved true, only relevant. (2) No one has yet produced a demonstrably ultimate value, and it seems clear that the hierarchical model is as inappropriate here as it is in epistemology. (There are no ultimate, or basic, facts, only some that are more reliable than others; and all can—under pressure—be given support by appeal to others.) (3) In the case of moral values, where some need for a single
87
answer can be demonstrated, there is a perfectly good way of handling any moral disputes that are likely to arise in the social sciences. This is by appealing to the equality of prima-facie rights— the fundamental axiom of democracy. Justification of this is itself one of the most important tasks of the social sciences and requires contributions from game theory, political science, economics, sociology, and psychology, as well as from the obvious candidate, anthropology. It is the problem of deciding on the best system of sublegal mores—insofar, of course, as any answer is possible. But this type of problem is already familiar: it is an efficiency problem. Indeed, the social sciences have for too long been reticent about pointing out the extent to which it is possible both to give answers to moral problems and to refute some of the current answers to them. For some reason, the sound point that there are many areas of morality where there cannot yet be any proof of the superiority of a particular answer is taken to imply that acting as if any answer were correct is defensible. But of course the only defensible position in such a situation is a compromise or, if possible, a suspension of action. In my opinion, the axiom of equal primafacie rights can be shown to be superior to any alternative, and also to be capable of generating a complete moral system. It achieves both of these ends by being the only such axiom that can be satisfactorily supported, and of course it roughly coincides with the Golden Rule and other basic maxims (details of this line of argument will be found in Scriven 1966). At any rate, it is time that the possibility of this kind of "strategic ethics" was examined by all the strategists who have sprung up to look at other kinds of social interaction in terms of the language of games. In summary, the scientific approach to evaluation necessarily involves both applied science (finding the best solution to a practical problem) and pure science (finding the best estimate, hypothesis, or experimental design). Moreover, the element of evaluation enters into much "straight" measurement—that of intelligence, creativity, and social acceptability, for instance. The reason for this is as simple as the reason for introducing new classifications: we have to order our knowledge if we are to use it efficiently. It follows that the most appropriate kind of order is determined by the use to which that knowledge is to be put. One might put the point paradoxically and say that all science is applied science. The application may be to efficient explanation, accurate prediction, or improvement of the world, but it is still—in one important
88
SCIENCE: The Philosophy of Science
sense—an application. Nor can we assess (that is, evaluate) theories or instruments unless we have some analysis of their proposed use. Data analysis. There are obviously limitations on the memory storage capacity of the human brain that would make it impotent in the face of even a modest amount of data about the path of a projectile or a planet, if these data were presented in discrete form. But if we can find some simple pattern that the data follow, especially if it is a pattern that we are familiar with from some other, preferably visual, experience, then we can handle it quite easily. (The preference for visual models is due to the vastly greater channel capacity of the visual modality; the notion of "handling" involves more than simple recovery, and even that involves more than storage capacity, since it includes look-up and read-out time.) This simple point can be taken as the start for a complete data-processing approach to the aspects of structural philosophy of science that remain to be discussed. It also pervades the parts already discussed, for the introduction of concepts is itself a device to cope with the "buzzing, blooming confusion" of sense experience. Generalizations and laws. The simplest examples of the cognitive condensation described in the preceding section are laws and generalizations. They are so necessary that we are prepared to forgive them a very high degree of inaccuracy if only they will simplify the range of possibilities for us. Contrary to Karl Popper's view, which stresses the equivalence of a law to the denial of counterinstances, the present view suggests that we are rightly very unimpressed by counterinstances in this irregular world, and extremely thankful if we can find a regularity that provides a reasonable approximation over a good range of instances. This is as true in the physical sciences as in the social, for the laws of gases, the laws of motion, gravitation, radiation, and so on, are all merely approximations at best. There are occasional exceptions (for example, the third law of thermodynamics), but the important feature of a law is that it introduces a pattern where none was before. In this sense its truth is its utility, not its lack of error. A great deal has been made in the literature of the fact that a law will support counterfactual inferences while an accidental generalization will not (Nagel 1961, pp. 68-73; compare Strawson 1952, pp. 85, 197, 200). On the present view, all this means is that we think natural laws are true of continuing or pervasive phenomena, i.e., of the nature of things. All other attempts to give logical analyses of the concept of law—for instance,
the view that laws cannot contain reference to particular entities, or must support predictions— seem to me simply arbitrary. Explanation. The task of explanation is the integration of "new" phenomena (whether subjectively or objectively new makes no difference) into the structure of knowledge. Typically, this consists in fitting these phenomena into a pattern with which we are already familiar. But explanation is not simply reduction to the familiar. Indeed, it may involve reducing the familiar to the unfamiliar, as Popper (1963, p. 63) has pointed out. But it must involve reducing the uncomprehended phenomenon to phenomena that are comprehended, and it is hardly surprising if this sometimes increases the sense of familiarity. It has long been argued that the way in which explanation is performed in science always involves subsuming the phenomenon to be explained under a known law [see SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION]. In view of the known deficiencies in our scientific laws, explanation, if this theory were acceptable, would in any case be a rather imprecise affair. But the restriction to laws is too confining, unless one treats the term "law" so loosely that it covers almost any statement except a pure particular. The real danger in this model of explanation—the "deductive" model, as it is usually called—is that it seems to support the view that explanations are closely related to predictions. In contrast, the "pattern" model of explanation, which I prefer, allows for retrospectively applicable patterns as well as for those which can be grasped in advance , of their completion. It happens that this is very important in the behavioral sciences, since there is, and always will be, a real shortage of "two-way" laws (that is, laws that both predict and explain). This has typically been treated by social scientists as a sign of the immaturity of their subject; but in fact it is simply a sign of its nature and is very like the situation in the "messier" areas of the physical sciences, especially engineering. When a bridge fails, or a mob riots, or a patient commits suicide, there are often a number of possible explanations, of which only one "fits the facts." We thus have no difficulty in saying that this one is the explanation, although the facts available before the event were not enough to permit us to tell what would happen. Indeed, it may be that the chances in advance were very strongly against the actual outcome, and that we would therefore have been entitled to make a well-founded scientific prediction of the event's nonoccurrence. It is not helpful to suggest in such cases that we are explaining by deduction from a law. What sort of
SCIENCE: The Philosophy of Science law? That some factors can cause others? That only certain factors cause a certain effect? These are indeed general propositions, but they do not look much like laws of the usual kind, and they do not support any predictions at all. It is not in the least important whether or not we call them laws, but it is important to understand that we often support explanations by appealing to general claims that will not support predictions. Prediction. On the other hand, it is often possible to predict on the basis of laws that do not explain. Any reliable correlation, however little we understand it, will give us a basis for predicting (that is, of course, provided there is temporal separation between the two correlated factors). To be able to predict, we need only to be able to infer that an event must occur at some conveniently remote time in the future. To explain, on the other hand, we have only to show why something occurred, not necessarily that it had to occur. For a long time it was thought that the only way we could be sure to avoid ad hoc explanations was to require that (a) the grounds for the explanation be known to be true and (fo) these same grounds imply only one possible outcome, the event or phenomenon to be explained. But there are many ways in which we can show that a particular explanation is correct in a particular case without having to show that the factors mentioned in the explanation would enable one to infer the explained event. For example, we may demonstrate the presence and operation of a particular cause by exhibiting some clues that uniquely identify its modus operandi. Of course, we may still have reason to believe that there are certain other factors present which, in conjunction with the factors we have identified, would enable us to make a formal inference that the event we have explained was bound to occur. But in many cases we do not know what those other factors are, and we do not know the laws that would make the inference possible. In fact, our belief that we may still be able to make this inference merely indicates that we believe in determinism. It certainly does not prove that a good scientific explanation demonstrates the necessity of what it explains. No doubt it is tempting to remark that a complete explanation would have this property, but even this approach is wrong. In the first place, there are many so-called complete scientific explanations that do not have it. Second, this approach recommends a use of the term "complete explanation" that has the unpromising property of identifying mere subsumption under a generaliza-
89
tion as complete explanation. But the genius of Freud, for instance, was not manifested by proving that the "explanation" of obsessive behavior in a particular neurotic was that this behavior was common in neurotics. Rather, he claimed to show a causal connection between certain other factors and obsessive behavior; and a causal connection is neither as strong nor as weak as a high correlation, it is simply quite different. Causes. We are often able to identify causes in the social sciences without being able to give the laws and other factors in conjunction with which they operate to bring about their effects. The basic control group study is a case in point. It may give us excellent grounds for supposing, let us say, that a particular drug accelerates the subjects' rate of response, but it does not tell us what other factors are necessary conditions for this effect. Of course, we know that it is some set of the factors which are present, but we do not know which set. In more complex cases, even though a particular factor does not reliably lead to this effect, we may establish it as the cause simply by elimination of the alternative possible causes, either through their absence or through the presence of clues showing that, although present, they could not have been active this time. Of course, causal explanations are incomplete in the sense that there are always further interesting questions about the phenomenon that we would like answered. But this is also true even when we can subsume the explanation under a law: for instance, we can ask why the law is true. But causal explanations are often complete in the sense that they tell us exactly what we need to know, for our interest in a phenomenon is often very specific. Thus explanation is a context-dependent notion; explanations are devices for filling in our understanding, and the notion of the explanation makes sense only when there is a standard background of knowledge and understanding, as in the normal pedagogical development of an academic subject. Understanding. The key notion behind that of explanation, and hence that of cause, is understanding. It must not be thought of purely as a subjective feeling; the feeling is only something associated with it. The condition of understanding itself is an objectively testable one; in fact, it regularly is tested by examinations, which are supposed to stress the detection of "real understanding," not just rote knowledge. Understanding is integrated, related knowledge; more generally—so that the definition will apply to the understanding possessed by machines, animals, and children— it is the capacity to produce the appropriate re-
90
SCIENCE: The Philosophy of Science
sponse to novel stimuli within a certain range or field. It is a characteristic of tests for understanding that they present the student with new problems, and the possession of understanding is valuable just because it does embody this capacity to handle novelty. Approaching it in this way, we see immediately that the question of how the brain can provide this capacity is of interest not only from a neurophysiological point of view but possibly also as a way of obtaining better insight into the nature of understanding itself. In fact, a remarkable overlap emerges between the requirements of efficient storage and understanding, as it is commonly conceived. Efficient storage, both to economize on storage capacity and to facilitate fast recovery and input, must use mapping, modeling, and simplifying procedures. But these are exactly what we use in the process of trying to understand phenomena, even in the more pragmatic process of trying to improve our classifications, descriptions, and predictions. Thus, to mention one example of how fruitful this conception is, the idea of simplicity, which has often been recognized as a criterion for satisfactory scientific theories, can be seen as equivalent to the familiar notion of economy, not as some mysterious aesthetic requirement. Nor is the whole aim of understanding to be seen as a concession to human weakness; for the most sophisticated and capacious computers we shall ever design will be hard pressed to store even part of the brain's data and will therefore have to employ procedures that economize on storage space. Putting the matter more strongly, a simple map stores an infinity of facts with very little complication in the read-out procedures, in comparison with list storage, and an enormous improvement in speed of readout (that is, of recall); it also handles a quantity of information that would be beyond the capacity of ordinary list storage. (The difference between the use of models and the use of mnemonics is that the model stores an indefinite number of facts, which the mnemonic does not, and the model stores them in a way that is more directly related to truth.) Models, from analogies to axiomatizations, are the key to understanding. [See VERSTEHEN.] Experimentation. The use of applied science for the purpose of controlling reality has its counterpart within the methodology of science itself in the area of experimentation. Thus applied science is to pure science as experimentation is to pure observation. In each case the armory of relevant methods is importantly different: the "purer" subjects are more concerned with understanding and
description; the more applied ones, with causation and manipulation. Indeed, it does not appear possible to give an analysis of "cause" without some reference to manipulation, though a great deal can be said before coming to the irreducible element of intervention or action. [See CAUSATION.] A number of topics have not been discussed here, although they are closely related. For example, the problem of the reduction of one science or theory to another is a combination of a problem about explanation with one about definition. I have also said very little, even implicitly, about the issue of free will versus determinism, and wish only to state that it now seems possible to reconcile the two positions, provided we first make a distinction between predictive and explanatory determinism. In conclusion, I should stress my conviction that there is very little in the social sciences that does not have a parallel in the physical sciences, but it has not been to these parallels that social scientists have turned for paradigms. They have turned instead to the absurdly oversimple paradigms of Newtonian mechanics and astronomy. Even there, the significant fact is that the problem of predicting the motion of pure pointmasses, moving under the sole influence of the very simple force of gravity, passes from the realm where solutions and predictions are possible to the realm where solutions give way to (at best) explications as soon as the number of bodies is increased from two to three. It is surely absurd to imagine that the forces acting on human beings are simpler than those involved in the "three-body problem." And if this is so, then we need a new "methodology of the complex domain," perhaps along the lines indicated above. MICHAEL SCRIVEN [Directly related are the entries CAUSATION; EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN; MODELS, MATHEMATICAL; MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS; POSITIVISM; PREDICTION; PROBABILITY; SCIENCE, article on THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE; SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION; STATISTICS, article on THE FIELD; SYSTEMS ANALYSIS, article OU GENERAL SYSTEMS THEORY; VALUES; VERSTEHEN;
and in the biographies of COHEN; GALTON; HUME; KOYRE; PEARSON; PEIRCE; SCHLICK; WEBER, MAX; YULE.] BIBLIOGRAPHY Contemporary philosophers of science can be roughly classified as either post-positivists (who form the majority) or linguistic analysts. For examples of work by leading post-positivists, see Popper 1934; 1957; Carnap 1950; Reichenbach 1951; Hempel 1952; 1965; Braithwaite 1953; Nagel 1961; Feyerabend 1962; Kemeny & Snell 1962; Suppes & Zinnes 1963. There are many important topics on which
SCIENCE: The Philosophy of Science these authors disagree, but it seems fair to say that among the predecessors they would be prepared to acknoivledge are such founders of modern positivism as Karl Pearson, Moritz Schlick, and Ernst Mach. Other outstanding earlier writers who, although somewhat untypical of the field, have contributed to the philosophy of science in general, not just the post-positivist branch of it, include C. S. Peirce, Max Weber, N. R. Campbell, P. W. Bridgman, and Harold Jeffreys. Works by philosophers of science who use at least some of the methods of the linguistic analysts, even if they would not all classify themselves as such, include, in the study of the physical sciences, Toulmin 1953; Polanyi 1958; in the study of the social sciences, Dray 1957; Winch 1958; Kaplan 1964; Scriven 1966; and, in the field of measurement and probability, Ellis 1966; Hacking 1965. Certain trends in the history of science, particularly in the emphasis, developed in Butterfield 1950 and Kuhn 1962, and by Alexandre Koyre, on autonomous conceptual schemes as units of progress, have influenced the philosophy of science. These trends have in turn been influenced by philosophical works such as Feyerabend 1962; Hesse 1963. Among the extremely valuable contributions to the philosophy of science made by practicing social scientists, special note should be taken of Simon 19471956; Skinner 1953; Meehl 1954; Stevens 1958; Chomsky 1966. Of the general treatises available in 1966, only McEwen 1963 and Kaplan 1964 are concerned principally with the social sciences, although Nagel 1961 and Hempel 1965 deal with them to some extent. Lazarsfeld 1954; Natanson 1963; Braybrooke 1966 are interesting collections that focus exclusively on the social sciences. As an introduction to the philosophical problems of the social sciences, Kaplan 1964 is to be recommended to layman and expert alike, although the work takes an approach somewhat different from that presented in this article. BRAITHWAITE, R. B. 1953 Scientific Explanation: A Study of the Function of Theory, Probability and Law in Science. Cambridge Univ. Press. -» A paperback edition was published in 1960 by Harper. BRAYBROOKE, DAVID (editor) 1966 Philosophical Problems of the Social Sciences. New York: Macmillan. BRIDGMAN, P. W. (1927) 1946 The Logic of Modern Physics. New York: Macmillan. BUTTERFIELD, HERBERT (1950) 1957 The Origins of Modern Science, 1300-1800. 2d ed., rev. New York: Macmillan. -» A paperback edition was published in 1962 by Collier. CAMPBELL, NORMAN R. (1920) 1957 Foundations of Science: The Philosophy of Theory and Experiment. New York: Dover. -> First published as Physics: The Elements. CARNAP, RUDOLF (1950) 1962 The Logical Foundations of Probability. 2d ed. Univ. of Chicago Press. CHOMSKY, NOAM 1966 Cartesian Linguistics: A Chapter in the History of Rationalist Thought. New York: Harper. DRAY, WILLIAM (1957) 1964 Laws and Explanation in History. Oxford Univ. Press. ELLIS, BRIAN 1966 Basic Concepts of Measurement. Cambridge Univ. Press. FEIGL, HERBERT; and SCRIVEN, MICHAEL (editors) 1956 The Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Psychology and Psychoanalysis. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 1. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press. FEYERABEND, P. K. 1962 Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism. Pages 28-97 in Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell (editors), Scientific Explanation, Space, and Time. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 3. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press.
91
HACKING, IAN 1965 Logic of Statistical Inference. Cambridge Univ. Press. HEMPEL, CARL G. 1952 Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science. Volume 2, number 7, in International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. Univ. of Chicago Press. HEMPEL, CARL G. 1965 Aspects of Scientific Explanation, and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. New York: Free Press. HESSE, MARY B. 1963 Models and Analogies in Science. London: Sheed & Ward. JEFFREYS, HAROLD (1931) 1957 Scientific Inference. 2d ed. Cambridge Univ. Press. KAPLAN, ABRAHAM 1964 The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science. San Francisco: Chandler. KEMENY, JOHN G.; and SNELL, J. LAURIE 1962 Mathematical Models in the Social Sciences. Boston: Ginn. KUHN, THOMAS S. 1962 Ihe Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Univ. of Chicago Press. -> A paperback edition was published in 1964. LAZARSFELD, PAUL F. (editor) (1954) 1955 Mathematical Thinking in the Social Sciences. 2d ed., rev. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. McEwEN, WILLIAM P. 1963 The Problem of Socialscientific Knowledge. Totowa, N.J.: Bedminster. MEEHL, PAUL E. (1954) 1956 Clinical Versus Statistical Prediction: A Theoretical Analysis and a Review of the Evidence. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press. NAGEL, ERNEST 1961 The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation. New York: Harcourt. NATANSON, MAURICE (editor) 1963 Philosophy of the Social Sciences: A Reader. New York: Random House. POLANYI, MICHAEL 1958 Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-critical Philosophy. Univ. of Chicago Press. POPPER, KARL R. (1934) 1959 The Logic of Scientific Discovery. New York: Basic Books. -» First published as Logik der Forschung. POPPER, KARL R. 1957 The Poverty of Historicism. Boston: Beacon. POPPER, KARL R. 1963 Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knoivledge. New York: Basic Books; London: Routledge. REICHENBACH, HANS (1951) 1959 Probability Methods in Social Science. Pages 121-128 in Daniel Lerner and Harold D. Lasswell (editors), The Policy Sciences: Recent Developments in Scope and Method. Stanford Univ. Press. SCRIVEN, MICHAEL 1956 A Possible Distinction Between Traditional Scientific Disciplines and the Study of Human Behavior. Pages 88-130 in Herbert Feigl and Michael Scriven (editors), The Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Psychology and Psychoanalysis. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 1. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press. SCRIVEN, MICHAEL 1959 Truisms as the Grounds for Historical Explanations. Pages 443-475 in Patrick L. Gardiner (editor), Theories of History. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. SCRIVEN, MICHAEL 1962 Explanations, Predictions and Laws. Pages 170-230 in Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell (editors), Scientific Explanation, Space, and Time. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 3. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press. SCRIVEN, MICHAEL 1965 An Essential Unpredictability in Human Behavior. Pages 411-425 in Benjamin B.
92
SCIENCE: The Sociology of Science
Wolman and Ernest Nagel (editors), Scientific Psychology: Principles and Approaches. New York: Basic Books. SCRIVEN, MICHAEL 1966 Primary Philosophy. New York: McGraw-Hill. SIMON, HERBERT A. (1947-1956) 1957 Models of Man; Social and Rational: Mathematical Essays on Rational Human Behavior in a Social Setting. New York: Wiley. SKINNER, B. F. (1953) 1964 Science and Human Behavior. New York: Macmillan. STEVENS, S. S. 1958 Problems and Methods of Psychophysics. Psychological Bulletin 55:177-196. STRAWSON, P. F. 1952 Introduction to Logical Theory. London: Methuen; New York: Wiley. SUPPES, PATRICK; and ZINNES, JOSEPH L. 1963 Basic Measurement Theory. Volume 1, pages 1-76 in R. Duncan Luce, Robert R. Bush, and Eugene Galanter (editors), Handbook of Mathematical Psychology. New York: Wiley. TOULMIN, STEPHEN 1953 The Philosophy of Science: An Introduction. London: Hutchinson's University Library. -» A paperback edition was published in 1960 by Harper. WINCH, PETER (1958) 1963 The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy. London: Routledge; New York: Humanities. Ill THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE
If the sociology of knowledge is defined as the part of sociology that studies the nature of and relations between different types of idea systems, on the one side, and the relations between these idea systems and a variety of institutional (or social-structural) and personality factors, on the other, then the sociology of science is one part of the sociology of knowledge. It is the part that specializes in defining the nature of scientific ideas and in describing their relations both to other kinds of ideas (e.g., ideological, philosophical, aesthetic, religious) and to various institutional and personality factors. Parsons (1951, especially chapter 8) has given us what is still the best analytic definition of idea systems in general and their several specialized subtypes, although further analysis and operational specification of his classification are necessary. The sociology of science, as is the case with all sociology, general or special, is primarily interested in the construction of a set of highly generalized, systematic, and relatively exhaustive concepts and propositions of relationship. In this enterprise it uses data from all historical periods and all cultures, since its main concern is not with history as such, but with establishing sociological concepts and propositions. The history of science, although it always should use such explicit sociological concepts and propositions, often does not, preferring
its traditional, less examined, and frequently common-sense ways of treating its materials. In either case, the history of science, both advertently and inadvertently, may be productive of materials or even of new concepts and propositions for the sociology of science, but this is not its essential task. Thus, the sociology of science and the history of science overlap but do not coincide. The sociology of science, finally, is interested both in fundamental scientific ideas themselves and in the application of these fundamental ideas, or of more empirical ideas, to technology. In its study of technology, again, the sociology of science uses both historical and contemporary data, drawn from a variety of cultures, regardless of the original purpose for which these data were collected, so long as they serve its primary goal of constructing a system of analytic concepts and propositions. The social nature of science. One of the basic working assumptions of structural-functional theory in sociology is that man's behavior in society is a response to certain functional problems that he confronts in his nonsocial and social environments. On this assumption, sociology sees man's scientific behavior as his response to the functional problem created by his need to have adequate adjustive knowledge of the physical, biological, and social aspects of the empirical world. Such knowledge is indispensable for some form of adjustment to that world in its three essential and different aspects. Everywhere, as archeology, ethnology, history, and sociology have severally demonstrated, man in society has a certain amount of this scientific knowledge. The amount, of course, varies a great deal among societies. In other words, science, as Malinowski recognized (1916-1941), is a matter of degree, with some societies having only a relatively small amount and others having a great deal more. This, indeed, sets some of the essential problems for the sociology of science. For it is not only the universal occurrence of at least a small amount of scientific knowledge, but also the patterns of variation in the degree of development of such knowledge in different societies, and variations at different stages in the evolution of a single society, that the sociology of science has undertaken to explain. In order to explain the degree of development of science considered as a complex whole, it is necessary to distinguish its component cultural, social, and psychological parts, for each of these can develop at somewhat different rates in different social situations. It is useful to define at least four general components of science as a whole,
SCIENCE: The Sociology of Science each of which has a measure of autonomy: substantive scientific ideas; scientific methodology, including both ideas and instruments; scientific roles; and motivational and reward systems for scientific roles. Let us consider, again because this sets important problems that the sociology of science has been trying to explain, how each of the components varies along certain dimensions. Substantive scientific ideas vary along three dimensions: of generality, or abstractness, as it is also often called; of systematization; and of exhaustiveness for the relevant aspects of the phenomena. We may say that the more abstract, the more systematic, and the more nearly exhaustive a set of substantive scientific ideas is, the greater the degree of its scientific development. Among the interesting problems that the sociology of science tries to explain is the question of why the physical sciences on the whole have developed more rapidly in all three respects than have the biological sciences and why these, in turn, have developed more rapidly than the social sciences. Within each of these broad sectors of science, moreover, further variation in the degree of development of specialized subsciences poses similar problems for explanation. For example, the more rapid recent development of economics than of political science or sociology can be explained, in part, by the greater accessibility of data on price phenomena than of data on people's political and social norms and actual behavior. This greater accessibility is due, in turn, and again in part, to the more pressing felt needs that governments and business firms have for price data. Knowledge about the ideas and instruments (or technology) that make up scientific methodology also varies in its degree of development. It is clear that modern science has made great advances over earlier science in the sophistication of its knowledge about such essential methodological matters as the character of concepts and classifications, the logic of comparison and inference, and the functions of contrived and natural experimentation. Modern science is also at a great advantage over earlier science in the degree of its access to ordering and measuring facilities. Mathematics is, of course, the most important of such facilities, and its development has been of very great moment in the closely related development of all the sciences, although, again, to varying degrees among the several sciences, for interesting sociological reasons. In addition to mathematics, such instruments as thermometers, high-speed electronic computers, and a thousand others have contributed significantly to the advances of the sciences. Both
93
the development of these measuring facilities and their adoption by the several sciences are important focuses for research in the sociology of science. Since they may develop sometimes as a direct result of changes in scientific ideas, but also sometimes independently, methodological ideas and instruments have various types of relationships with substantive scientific ideas. When they develop to some extent independently, as in the cases of the telescope or the computer, for example, methodological ideas and instruments may at certain times play the leading part in the development of a whole sector or subsector of science. Or again, it is an important sociological fact about the prospects of the social sciences that their ability to borrow a great deal of the methodological sophistication developed in the other sectors of science is a key asset for their own development. There is also considerable variation among societies in the degree of differentiation and specialization of social roles for engaging in the many types of scientific behavior, in the proportion of members of the society engaged in these roles, in the kinds and amounts of support given to these roles, and in the degree of institutionalization of scientific roles. The sociology of science has been much concerned with these essential problems of the social organization or role component of science, so much so that we shall take them up below, in a separate and detailed discussion. Finally, motivational and reward systems for scientific roles also vary among and within societies. They differ in the type of rewards, in the strength of motivation, and in the degree of diffusion of adequate incentives throughout the population as a whole. Again, we shall consider this matter more fully below. The development of science Viewed in the long perspective, science shows a history of continuity and cumulation from the earliest prehistory of man to the present. However, this history has been marked by quite different rates of development in different times and places. It is this unevenness in its progress, viewed in terms of shorter perspectives, that calls for explanation by the sociology of science. As the sociology of science has itself made progress, a few basic principles of explanation have come to appear sound. One is the principle that no single cultural, social, or psychological factor, such as religion or economic forces, can account for the growth of science as a whole or any of its several components or subsciences. Another such principle
94
SCIENCE: The Sociology of Science
is that not even any single combination of factors, such as the religious and the economic, or the political and the educational, is sufficient for the tasks of the sociology of science. This is not to say that there are not some combinations of factors more favorable than others for certain kinds of specific development in science, as our discussion of the Protestant ethic will illustrate. There definitely are such favorable combinations, and the sociology of science has improved its ability to discover them by accepting the principle that certain types and rates of development may come from one set of factors (or one set of values of these factors taken as variables) and that other types and rates may come from a different set of factors (or a different set of variables-values). The following discussion will consider some of the major factors that affect the development of science. They exert their influence on science always in combination, and the relative weight of the influence of each may vary in different specific instances. Structural and cultural differentiation. The greater the degree of structural differentiation in a society, that is, of the specialization of roles between the major institutional sectors and within them as well, the more favorable the situation for the development of science. Greater structural differentiation provides the necesary situation not only for a variety of highly specialized scientific roles but also for their highly specialized ancillary and supporting roles in other institutional sectors. Besides role differentiation, differentiation within culture, that is, in the various systems of ideas in society, is also favorable to the development of science. For example, as Charles Gillispie (1960) has shown, the development of what he calls "the edge of objectivity" of scientific ideas has increased as these ideas have progressively been differentiated from moral ideas about man's place in the universe. The more that values, ideologies, aesthetic ideas, and philosophical ideas are distinguished both from one another and from substantive scientific ideas, the easier it is to see the special problems of each and to develop each and all of them. Value systems. Certain values which the modern world tends to take for granted, but which have not existed in many past societies, certainly in nothing like the same degree, are much more favorable to the development of science than are their opposites. The high value the modern world puts on rationality as against traditionalism, on this-worldly activities as against other-worldly activities, on libertarianism as against authoritarianism, on active striving as against passive adapta-
tion to the world, and on equality as against inequality—all these values support the development of the several components of science. Sometimes the support is direct, as in the case of the values of rationality and this-worldly interest, values which are especially powerful in combination, as they are in the modern world. Libertarianism is essential for academic freedom, which is one kind of important foundation for scientific progress. Sometimes the support from values is indirect, as when the value of equality increases the amount of social mobility and thus helps to select better talent for scientific roles. Instrumental needs. Scientific knowledge is power, that is, power to adjust more or less satisfactorily to the nonsocial environment and to the internal and external social environment. Some scientific discovery and technological innovation, then, is a response to immediate instrumental needs for adjustment to what are defined as dangerous and harsh environments. Certainly this must have been an especially large influence on the development of science in the early stages of human society, when every bit of scientific knowledge was of great instrumental importance in a threatening and severe physical and social environment. But even powerful modern industrial societies respond strongly to their instrumental needs for science. Whatever their values in regard to science, they feel an urgent need to use it to strengthen their national defense, promote industrial and agricultural growth, and improve the health of their populations. Some scientists deplore this "exploitation" of science, that is, this encouragement of science "not for science's own sake." But the instrumental needs of even already powerful societies are defined by their citizens as more important under some circumstances than the value considerations that are preferred by scientists and by those who share the values that support science directly. Finally, the nonindustrial or underdeveloped societies of the present also push the acquisition of science for urgent instrumental needs, to cope with "the revolution of rising expectations" in their populations. Economic factors. A variety of economic structures, needs, and resources, often combined with one or more other social factors, have had very large direct and indirect influences on the development of science. There is no blinking this fact, no matter how much some scientists may think it stains the "purity" of science and regardless of whether one thinks some Marxist sociologists of science have exaggerated it. Only a few of the myriad effects of economic activities on science
SCIENCE: The Sociology of Science can be given in illustration here. As Merton has shown (1936; 1939), in the case of seventeenthcentury England, for example, the growing maritime interests, both commercial and naval shipping, were in need of more reliable techniques of navigation. The existing techniques included neither good chronometers nor any sure way of determining longitude at sea. These economic and military-political needs were a direct stimulus, through prizes offered for discoveries and inventions, to basic discoveries in astronomy and on the nature of the spring. Or again, earlier, in sixteenthcentury Europe, economic needs for more powerful methods of pumping water out of mines than were provided by the existing Archimedean screw pumps led to work by Evangelista Torricelli and Vincenzo Viviani on the relations between atmospheric pressure and water level. On the basis of this work, successful suction pumps for industrial use were constructed. But this scientific work also led to the invention of the barometer by Torricelli, to the creation of a vacuum by Otto von Guericke, and to a whole host of scientific experiments and results with the so-called "air pump" by Robert Boyle and his colleagues in the newly founded Royal Society. This example shows how economic needs, science, and technology affect each other in complex and often mutually beneficial ways. In the modern world, both industrial organizations and governments in all societies have provided many kinds of support for science in order to pursue economic interests and needs. Direct support exists in the form of governmental and industrial research laboratories; indirect support is given through tax provisions and other subsidies to both the universities and industry. One of the largest areas of governmental response to economic needs has been agricultural research, which is largely biological research but also includes the physical and social sciences. It should be noted that both "capitalist" and "socialist" societies and both "planning" and "nonplanning" societies have supported science through their responsiveness to the economic interests of special groups in the society and of society as a whole. The desirability of using science to meet economic needs and increase economic resources is no longer anywhere in question among the societies of the modern world. Political structures and needs. Political and economic factors have often tended to be closely combined in their effects on science. Of course, the political factor has also had a great influence on science separately, for example, because of the military needs that governments have had. After the recent history of the part that governments have
95
played in the development of atomic science for politico-military needs, this point hardly needs further illustration. But this connection between politico-military needs and science is far from new. Governments have always sought to increase military firepower through the development of science. Research on the nature of metals, on the causes of chemical reactions and explosions, and on the mathematics of the curves of ballistic missiles has been spurred by military needs. Religion. Values and religion are closely connected in every society. A religion that supports modern values, which in turn favor science, is, of course, a strong support for the development of science. This specific connection is what Merton has sought to demonstrate in his analysis of the relations between the complex of values and religious beliefs that constitute the Protestant ethic, on the one hand, and the great development of seventeenth-century English science (1936; 1939). The values and beliefs of the Protestant ethic have now been secularized and diffused to many social milieus other than the ones in which they originally arose. In their secular form they are even more powerful supports for the development of science. The relations between a religion and science are always, it should be carefully noted, complex and at partial cross purposes. Thus, although the general beliefs and values of the liberal forms of Protestant Christianity have been favorable to the development of science, even these liberal elements have sometimes protested against specific scientific discoveries that have apparently contradicted basic doctrines of their own. Thus, as Gillispie (1951) has shown, some liberal Protestants who still held to the Biblical conceptions of miraculous floods and other catastrophes were opposed to the notion of geological uniformitarianism when this new scientific idea was first developed in the early nineteenth century. And, a little later, as Dupree (1959) and Lurie (1960) have suggested, there was the same kind of resistance for a while to Darwin's discovery of uniformities in the development of man and the other animal species. In analyzing the relations between religion and science, the sociology of science treats them both as complex phenomena and looks for specific connections between their specific components. The educational system. The maintenance and development of science is facilitated by an educational system that is sufficiently specialized for, and sympathetic to, the growing science of its time. For example, as we may learn from BenDavid (1960), new educational institutions developed for that purpose played an essential role in
96
SCIENCE: The Sociology of Science
the development of French science during the early nineteenth century and in Germany a little later. All the modernizing countries of recent times, from Russia to the small and weak African countries, have greatly strengthened their educational systems at all levels because of their desire to improve their science. Before modern times, the universities were not the home of scientific development, which they have since become. As late as "the Great Instauration" of science in seventeenth-century England, the universities were still indifferent or hostile to science, but a variety of other extremely favorable social conditions helped science to flourish. This hostility continued for some time. Now, of course, a university that is hostile or indifferent to science can exist only in a society, or in one of its parts, that is content to remain a scientific backwater. Social stratification system. A system of social stratification that emphasizes the value of equality and that, in fact, realizes a high degree of social mobility for the members of a society seems to be more favorable for the development of science than is the opposite, or closed, type of system. By providing a greater degree of equality for talent, wherever in the society it originates, the open type of system can provide greater resources of talent for manning scientific posts. Of course, if scientific roles are not highly valued, rising talent will go elsewhere, but the two factors in combination—a high value on science and the openness of the channels of social mobility—are very favorable to the development of science. In the modern world, both of these conditions have been realized in ever greater measure in the older industrial societies. And the newly modernizing societies, as Dedijer (1961) has described them, are making great efforts to bring them into being almost overnight. Differentiation of the scientific role In relatively undifferentiated societies, past or contemporary, there are few roles for full-time "intellectuals," as we may roughly characterize all those whose special function is to deal in some kind of idea system. However, as societies become less simple and more structurally differentiated, the role of intellectual enlarges and is occupied by at least a few individuals on a full-time basis and with support from a variety of sources: a religious organization, the political magnates, or inherited wealth. Certainly in Greece by the fifth century B.C., the role of intellectual had emerged and was occupied with great distinction by men who have influenced all subsequent thought—men like Plato and Aristotle. It should be noted, however, that the
ideas with which such intellectuals dealt were relatively much less differentiated than ideas are in the modern world. On the whole, the intellectual still deals alike with religious, scientific, ethical, political, and philosophical ideas; indeed, the term "philosophy" covers all knowledge, all types of ideas. But it is not until the beginnings of the modern world that this further process of differentiation occurs, that is, differentiation between types of ideas, and makes way for the specialized roles dealing wholly or primarily with scientific ideas. This differentiation of the scientific role from other intellectual roles was slow in occurring, even in the modern world. In seventeenth-century England, the new science was still called "the new philosophy." And the oldest scientific society in the United States, founded in 1743 by Benjamin Franklin, among others, was called the American Philosophical Society. So little differentiated was the specialized role of scientist and so few were those who occupied this role, by whatever name and with whatever means of support, that it was not until the nineteenth century that the very term "scientist" was coined (by the Rev. William Whewell, in England in the 1840s). The process of differentiation of the role of scientist went slowly until the middle of the nineteenth century because of the difficulty of finding sources of support for it in the securely established social organizations and arrangements. Beginning in the sixteenth century, newly founded scientific societies provided various necessary facilities and supports for scientists, but only a handful of fulltime jobs. Governments did something more, but still there were very few full-time positions in government museums or research organizations. Some distinguished scientists, men like Franklin and Boyle, supported themselves on inherited or earned wealth. Others worked at nonscientific jobs as well, or alternated between scientific and other activities; such a scientist was Antoine Lavoisier. Very little was done by the universities and colleges of the time; not until the nineteenth century, and in most places only in the latter half of that century, did they open their doors wide to scientists. Full institutionalization was achieved, then, when universities, various governmental organizations, and many industrial firms recognized their great need for science, and established regular and permanent roles and careers for scientists. In addition, a variety of special research institutes, endowed by foundations, trade associations, and other special interest groups, or sometimes operated by private individuals for profit, provided further and ever more specialized jobs for scientists.
SCIENCE: The Sociology of Science The necessity and the legitimacy of the scientific role were increasingly acknowledged. One rough measure of the establishment of the scientific role in the modern world is the quantitative increase in the numbers of those who occupy the role. As Derek Price (1963) has shown, during the last 300 to 400 years there has been an exponential growth rate in the number of scientists in the modern world. Starting from very small numbers, to be sure, the rate of growth is such that there has been a doubling of the number of scientists in something like every 10 to 15 years. Because of the nature of exponential growth rates, the recent increase in the number of scientists has been especially large. Price estimates that about 90 per cent of all the scientists who have ever lived are still alive today. Given this growth rate, as well as other reasons, it is small wonder that the place of science in the modern world is not yet as settled as many would like. There is, unfortunately, no room here to treat some other aspects of the social organization of science. Such matters as patterns of authority, of collaboration, and of careers in scientific work have recently been well studied by Glaser (1964), Hagstrom (1965), and Zuckerman (1965), among others. Motivations and rewards for scientists The mere existence of social roles is not enough for their full institutionalization. Adequate and legitimate motivations in those who occupy the roles, and adequate and legitimate rewards from those who support the roles, must also exist. On the whole, in the modern world, and especially in the societies that modernized early, these motivations and rewards exist in sufficient measure. What little evidence we have on the motives of wrorking scientists indicates that, as in all other social roles, a variety of motives in different combinations is at work. For example, because the role of scientist now provides considerable stability, security, and prestige, many scientists are motivated in some measure to achieve these goals. Also, because specialization in basic scientific research provides considerable autonomy to the working scientist, many are motivated to achieve the independence and self-control that the role makes possible. In future social-psychological research on motivation for the scientific role, it will be desirable to keep in mind both the multiplicity of motives that can engage the competent scientist and the way in which the nature of his role structures certain typical combinations of motives. It would be interesting to establish the precise role
97
of much-vaunted "curiosity" in the motivation of scientists. And it would also be desirable to use a typology of different scientific roles, along the lines suggested by Znaniecki (1940), such as theorist, experimenter, synthesizer, and similar functional types, to see if various typical combinations of motives exist in these different scientific specialties. As for rewards, the scientific role is now given satisfactory measures of such rewards as security, prestige, and money income to attract its fair share of the talented members of modern societies. As compared with those in business occupations, scientists tend to be rewarded with relatively more prestige for professional standing and relatively less money income. Among scientists themselves, and among the lay public to a lesser extent, there has developed a very elaborate set of symbolic rewards for differential prestige bestowed for differential achievement in science. The awarding of titles, prizes, medals, offices, and eponymous distinctions symbolizes the existing hierarchy of differential prestige. A Nobel Prize in any of the four scientific fields in which it is granted is only the best-known of the symbols of scientific achievement. The reward of prestige in science is given primarily for originality in scientific discovery, but, since it is sometimes difficult to appraise the degree of originality, sheer productivity may carry off the honors. Like other men in other roles, scientists are deeply concerned about the just distribution of rewards for their activities. Despite the norm of humility that prevails among them and that does influence their behavior, they are motivated to achieve credit for being original, just as businessmen are motivated to receive credit for making a profit. As a result of their concern, as Merton (1957) has so well shown, scientists take pride in priority of discovery and often engage in bitter quarrels over claims to priority. In sum, the role of the scientist is subject, as are all social roles, to a structured set of motivations and rewards, some of which are similar to those in other roles and some of which are different. The scientist is in no sense a "selfless" creature above and beyond the influences of his social role. During the last decade there has occurred the beginning of systematic research on what is called "the image" of the scientist that the public at large and various segments of the whole society, such as youth or the scientists themselves, actually hold. A favorable image of a social role is, of course, an important reward for those who fill it. The evidence accumulated by this research shows, on the whole, that the image of the scientist is a favorable one.
98
SCIENCE: The Sociology of Science
But as Mead and Metraux (1957-1958) and Beardslee and O'Dowd (1961) have shown in their research, there are some negative tones in the picture—a fear and dislike for some of the characteristics and consequences of the scientific role. In short, there is some ambivalence toward scientists. In certain quarters, this admixture of negative feelings has been much deplored, despite the fact that such feelings probably exist for every social role. Because all social roles probably work at least some negative consequences for some people in some situations, it is Utopian to expect a wholly positive image for scientists or for those who occupy any other social-role category. Communication among scientists Since one essential ingredient in the development of science is the combination of already existing ideas, effective communication among scientists is an indispensable part of scientific activities. One of the important social inventions in the early modern period in science was the creation of local, national, and international societies and journals as means for the speedier and more general communication of scientific work within the community of scientists. In order to "keep up" in any branch of science, that is, to learn about the new ideas he can use to discover still further new ideas, the working scientist now has to spend a valuable part of his time with the professional journals, carefully studying a few and scanning many others. In addition to reading the journals, scientists communicate at the meetings of professional associations, both formally and informally. Here, too, as science has developed, there has been a proliferation of specialized groups to match the specialized journals and the specialized activities they report. And, finally, through informal visits, letters, telephone calls, and preprint mimeographed materials, scientists strive to maintain the effective communication without which their activities would be slowed down and even stopped. In his description of the exponential growth rates for different aspects of science, Price (1963) has also shown that there has been a doubling in the number of scientific journals every 10 to 15 years over the last three or four centuries. Because of this large increase, much of it necessary because of the growth of new scientific specialties, there has been some concern among scientists about the possibility of an excess of information; for some scientists, just "keeping up" has become ever more difficult. In response to this felt difficulty, abstracting services have been created and have multiplied, but still the problem of excessive and inefficient
communication is felt to persist. At the present, therefore, various groups of scientists are trying to codify and computerize the processes of what is called "information retrieval" in science. So far they have not had very great success, partly for reasons suggested below. [See INFORMATION STORAGE AND RETRIEVAL.] The structure and functions of communications processes among scientists present an obvious set of problems for the sociology of science—one on which much remains to be done. One interesting suggestion from general sociological ideas and from the research that has been done by Herbert Menzel (1959) is that scientists themselves sometimes think in terms of too rational a conception of the communication process; that is, they may be expecting too much from the journals and the formal meetings. In addition to these formal, manifest, and planned communication processes in science, there are the informal, latent, and unplanned ones. Scientists cannot always know precisely what they want and merely push a computer button to get it. Often, through "milling around" at meetings, through chance visits, through indirect channels, they get essential information which they can recognize as essential only when they get it. As a journey into emergent novelty, science must use both planned and unplanned patterns of communication. One of the newer and more interesting focuses of research in the sociology of science is the question of the function of each pattern of communication for different scientific needs and the distribution of these patterns among the different social situations in which scientists find themselves. [See DIFFUSION, article on INTERPERSONAL INFLUENCE.]
The processes of scientific discovery In contrast with an individualistic, "heroic" conception of the processes of scientific discovery that has prevailed in some quarters, though less now than formerly, the sociology of science has sought to redress the balance of our understanding of these processes by demonstrating that they have essential social components. Starting with the fact of the cumulative nature of science, sociologists have pointed out that the established body of scientific ideas and methodologies at any given time itself has the most important influence on setting problems for scientists to solve and on providing leads for their solution. This determining effect of the established ideas and methods is the source of the innumerable examples of the pattern of independent multiple discovery in science. Given the prerequisites of a discovery in the established body
SCIENCE: The Sociology of Science of science, it is almost inevitable, as Ogburn (1922) and Merton (1961) have argued and demonstrated from the history of science, that independent multiples will occur. Some discoveries, of course, break somewhat more sharply than others with the fundamental notions of the established science; they have more emergent novelty. These are what Kuhn (1962) has called "scientific revolutions." However, even these are far from ex nihilo. Although cumulative in important measure, they also set new directions for the relevant fields and specialties in science. Recent theory and research in the sociology of science have also qualified the older picture of the processes of scientific discovery as based entirely on foresight, planning, rationality, and ready acceptance. These characteristics certainly can be seen in large measure in most discoveries. But, in addition, in many discoveries there is an admixture of the unplanned, the nonrational or irrational, and the obstructive, contributed by the discoverer himself or by others. These characteristics manifest themselves in the pattern of serendipity in discovery and in the pattern of resistance by scientists themselves to certain scientific discoveries. The serendipity pattern occurs, and in actual research it occurs very often, when the researcher comes by happy chance on something he was not looking for, that is, some anomaly that presents him with the unexpected opportunity to change his preconceptions about his research and make a new discovery (Barber 1952, pp. 203-205). The resistance pattern occurs when the scientist refuses to accept his own or someone else's discovery because of theoretical or methodological preconceptions, the force of superior authority or prestige, or the prejudices of particular schools of thought (Barber & Hirsch 1962, chapter 32). Of course, there has always been some resistance to scientific discoveries on the part of cultural and social institutions outside science. Religion, political and economic interests—indeed, the whole range of social factors that interact with science— have under some conditions opposed one or another scientific idea or requirement, just as they have also supported others. An important task for the sociology of science is to analyze specific sources of acceptance and resistance for specific types of scientific ideas and needs. Science as a social problem Like the relations among any of the parts of society, the relations between science and various other parts of society are often inharmonious, as the participants in these relations see them, or
99
dysfunctional, as the objective observer sees them. Thus, sociology can also study science as what it calls, in general, "a social problem." There are two aspects of science as a social problem. In one aspect, science is an activity whose participants feel, in some important measure, angry or hostile to society because their values and needs are not being properly met or respected. For example, scientists resent what they define as unnecessary controls on their work: they complain about insufficient financial support for their preferred types of research; they deplore politically imposed secrecy; and they try to throw off all nationalistic and other parochial limitations on their research and communication activities. However much these frustrations may be necessary in the light of other social needs than those of science, to scientists they are social problems calling for protest and reform. A variety of organized and unorganized means of protest now exist among scientists to cope with these problems. In another aspect, science is a social problem to various social groups who consider some of its consequences harmful to themselves and who therefore want to restrict or even eliminate science. Over both the short run and the long, many of the consequences of science are in fact harmful to various social groups. However unintended in most instances, these harmful consequences raise the issue of the social responsibilities of scientists, who are in part their source. It has come to be seen that responsibility for the harmful social consequences of science belongs not directly with scientists but with the several established social and political processes for handling social problems. It has also come to be seen that scientists can play a variety of useful roles in these social and political processes. If scientists have no absolute responsibility for the troubles they help to bring, neither are they absolved from all concern. A number of social and political arrangements are now being worked out to permit scientists to act as expert advisers on the technical aspects of the social problems they have helped to bring into being or that they can foresee arising out of their activities. BERNARD BARBER [See also DIFFUSION; INNOVATION; KNOWLEDGE, SOCIOLOGY OF; MEDICAL CARE, article on ETHNOMEDICINE; TECHNOLOGY; and the biographies of OGBURN; WEBER, MAX; ZNANIECKL] BIBLIOGRAPHY BARBER, BERNARD 1952 Science and the Social Order. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. -» A paperback edition was published in 1962 by Collier.
100
SCIENCE: Science-Government Relations
BARBER, BERNARD 1956 Sociology of Science: A Trend Report and Bibliography. Current Sociology 5, no. 2. BARBER, BERNARD; and HIRSCH, WALTER (editors) 1962 The Sociology of Science. New York: Free Press. -> Contains 38 selections and a bibliography. BEARDSLEE, DAVID C.; and O'Dowo, DONALD D. 1961 The College-student Image of the Scientist. Science 133:997-1001. BEN-DAVID, JOSEPH 1960 Scientific Productivity and Academic Organization in Nineteenth-century Medicine. American Sociological Review 25:828-843. DEDIJER, STEVAN 1961 Why Did Daedalus Leave? Science 133:2047-2052. DUPREE, A. HUNTER 1959 Asa Gray: 1810-1888. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. GILLISPIE, CHARLES C. 1951 Genesis and Geology: A Study in the Relations of Scientific Thought, Natural Theology, and Social Opinion in Great Britain, 17901850. Harvard Historical Studies, Vol. 58. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. -» A paperback edition was published in 1959 by Harper. GILLISPIE, CHARLES C. 1960 The Edge of Objectivity: An Essay in the History of Scientific Ideas. Princeton Univ. Press. GLASER, BARNEY G. 1964 Organizational Scientists: Their Professional Careers. Indianapolis, Ind.: BobbsMerrill. HAGSTROM, WARREN O. 1965 The Scientific Community. New York: Basic Books. KUHN, THOMAS S. 1962 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Univ. of Chicago Press. LURIE, EDWARD 1960 Louis Agassiz: A Life in Science. Univ. of Chicago Press. MALINOWSKI, BRONISLAW (1916-1941) 1948 Magic, Science and Religion, and Other Essays. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. -> A paperback edition was published in 1954 by Doubleday. MEAD, MARGARET; and METRAUX, RHODA 1957-1958 Image of the Scientist Among High-school Students. Science 126:384-390, 1200; 127:349-351. MENZEL, HERBERT (1959) 1962 Planned and Unplanned Scientific Communication. Pages 417-441 in Bernard Barber and Walter Hirsch (editors), The Sociology of Science. New York: Free Press. MERTCN, ROBERT K. (1936) 1962 Puritanism, Pietism and Science. Pages 33-66 in Bernard Barber and Walter Hirsch (editors), The Sociology of Science. New ' r ork: Free Press. MERTON, ROBERT K. (1939) 1957 Science and Economy of 17th Century England. Pages 607-627 in Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. -> First published in Volume 3 of Science and Society. MERTON, ROBERT K. 1957 Priorities in Scientific Discovery: A Chapter in the Sociology of Science. American Sociological Review 22:635-659. MERTON, ROBERT K. 1961 Singletons and Multiples in Scientific Discovery. American Philosophical Society, Proceedings 105:470-486. OGBURN, WILLIAM F. (1922)1950 Social Change, With Respect to Culture and Original Nature. New edition with supplementary chapter. New York: Viking. PARSONS, TALCOTT 1951 The Social System. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. PRICE, DEREK J. DE SOLLA 1963 Little Science, Big Science. New York: Columbia Univ. Press.
ZNANIECKI, FLORIAN 1940 The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. ZUCKERMAN, HARRIET A. 1965 Nobel Laureates in the United States: A Sociological Study of Scientific Collaboration. Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia Univ. IV SCIENCE-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS
The spectacular achievements of scientists during World War n not only made science obviously more important as an instrument of national policy but also gave it a role of greater independence and initiative in the economic and political systems of the world. At least since the Enlightenment, it had generally been assumed that the advancement of science would contribute to social and political progress, but the specific role of science, and of scientists, in economic affairs had generally been thought of as subordinate to that of the entrepreneur or manager and, in matters of government policy, to that of the politician and bureaucrat. Especially in the Englishspeaking countries, the way of thinking initiated by Bacon, and re-emphasized by Franklin and Jefferson, assumed that scientific progress would be maintained by the patient accumulation of facts required for the solution of practical problems, and that research should therefore be supported as incidental to particular industrial enterprises or governmental programs or as a by-product of the system of higher education. Among leading scientists, this assumption had come to seem less obviously true in the late nineteenth or early twentieth century, in view of the superior accomplishments in fundamental science of various countries in western Europe. The success of Napoleonic France in creating, under governmental auspices, strong institutions for the support of basic science as well as technology, and the state-encouraged systematic advancement, late in the nineteenth century, of research in the universities and industry of Germany, made British and American scientists begin to doubt that the inductive and applied approach in the laboratory and the complete independence of science from political issues and governmental support were still the best means of advancing science. These doubts were confirmed by the institutional innovations of World War n, which, particularly in the United States, put science in a quite different relation to government. In its military application, it was no longer merely an instrument for the improvement of weapons at the request of military planners; it was a source of independent initiative in the invention of entirely new systems of weapons, to which war planners were forecd to adapt
SCIENCE: Science-Government Relations their strategies and diplomats their systems of international relations. Similarly, industrial research or development was no longer to be undertaken only at the initiative of the individual inventor or supported only on the basis of the calculation of the individual corporation; government planners began to look on it as a possible instrument by which government might foster the growth of the national economy and the solution of major social problems, and local communities became eager to foster it as an incentive to the development of their prosperity. Even more important, political leaders no longer assumed that basic research would be adequately supported as a by-product of the system of industrial enterprise or private education; in the United States, where private universities were most jealous of their independence from political control, the federal government was called on to support, on an unprecedented scale, the basic research carried on in universities and in industrial laboratories. At the same time, scientists and scientific societies began to think of their role in society, not as one of detachment from governmental affairs and not as one of subordination to industrial managers and bureaucrats, but as one of responsibility for the nature of policies and of the institutional system in which science would be fostered and protected. As a result, the relationship of science to government took on a new degree of significance and interest in the eyes of social scientists. Since the fostering of science was to be a deliberate policy of government, the sociologists and psychologists were concerned with the identification of the types of personality and the nature of the educational and social environment that would develop creativity and encourage innovation (Research Conference . . . 1963; Roe 1953). In practical terms, they had to deal with the new systems of communication and computation, the management of laboratories, the relationship of scientists to administrators, and the status of professional and scientific groups in the social and political system (Hill 1964). Since science was considered a potent force for economic growth, economists were led to study the criteria for the allocation of resources for the support of research and development (Nelson 1959). The relation of science and technology to the business cycle, the processes of innovation, and the relationship of business to government in the advancement of technology posed problems quite different from those of either classical or Marxian economics. Students of politics and administration were
101
similarly required to consider how far the new techniques of operations research and other methods developed by scientists could go in determining political issues, and what effect they would have on the traditional values and on legal and political processes. These theoretical questions had their practical parallels within government: the relationship of scientific to administrative personnel within the civil service, the status of scientists as advisers to political executives or as participants in political action, and the extent to which representative legislative bodies should organize themselves to deal directly with scientists and with issues concerning the support and application of science (Gilpin & Wright 1964; McCamy 1960). Major areas of concern Problems like those mentioned above had their greatest impact, of course, in the major nations, notably the United States, the United Kingdom, the nations of western Europe, and the Soviet Union, but during the 1950s they also began to be a concern of those interested in the economic and political development of other countries. Let us note three of the major fields in which these new problems arose and then consider their effect on scientific institutions, on governmental institutions, and on the nature of their relationship. Science and military strength. The success of scientists in creating weapons that were not merely improvements on existing weapons systems but entirely beyond the imagination of military planners gave scientists quite a different status in government. Military strength could no longer be measured mainly in terms of mass armies and a system of industrial mobilization for the manufacture of munitions. It depended on the rate of scientific advance and the innovating ability of scientific institutions. Accordingly, a substantial portion of the budgets of major countries came to be devoted to military research and development programs, and scientists and scientific institutions came to have a large share in the control of such programs. As a result, the expenditures for research and development by government increased sharply, both in actual amounts and in proportion to other sources of support. In the United States, for example, total expenditure on research and development in 1940 (public and private) was well under $1 billion, the government share of the total was certainly less than one-fifth, and the military services provided much less than the Department of Agriculture. In 1964 the federal government provided about $15 billion, roughly two-thirds of
102
SCIENCE: Science-Government Relations
the national total, but spent four-fifths of its funds through private corporations and universities. About $14 billion of the government total was contributed by the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the three agencies whose motive for expenditure was most clearly the strengthening of national power and international prestige (U.S. National Science Foundation, Federal Funds . . .). The newest and most powerful weapons systems have been developed, not in the traditional military laboratories, but in technological institutions directed by civilians. In the United States during World War n, the Office of Scientific Research and Development, a civilian agency within the Executive Office of the President, set up an extensive network of contractual relations with universities and industrial corporations, and the Manhattan District of the Army Engineers, which finally developed the atomic bomb, followed the same general pattern (Hewlett & Anderson 1962). As a result, the postwar structure of weapons research and development was one involving heavy reliance on private institutions by the military services, the Atomic Energy Commission, and (later) the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. In the planning of these programs, considerable influence was exercised by advisory committees representing the private scientific institutions. Their influence was greater in the decisions relating to the support of basic research, but it carried considerable weight even in the development of weapons systems (Price 1954). Scientists in wartime proved to be useful not merely in developing particular weapons but also in devising more effective systems and procedures of tactics and strategy. Operations research applied rigorous and quantitative methods to the solution of problems faced by the military commander, the industrial manager, or the political executive. Such work was organized either within the regular framework of the military services or under the sponsorship of independent research corporations. The flexibility of the contracting method in the United States was shown when the government proceeded to sponsor the creation of private corporations, supported by government funds, for the purpose of assisting governmental authorities in making major decisions on government administration or policy (U.S. Bureau of the Budget 1962). Of these new institutions the RAND Corporation, set up to serve the Air Force, was perhaps the best known, and the techniques that it developed, drawing on the skills of social as well as physical scien-
tists, became important tools for the civilian executives in the Defense Department who sought, in the 1960s, to exercise more effective control over military affairs. [See MILITARY POLICY.] Science and economic growth. Soon after World War n, even those countries committed to the preservation of private economic enterprise had also committed themselves to a policy of maintaining a high degree of employment and fostering economic growth and prosperity. To these countries and others, it was obvious that some of the most dynamic economic growth was taking place in branches of industry which had been stimulated by the advance of technology for military purposes —notably, electronics, aircraft, plastics, and computers. Economists accordingly took note of the extent to which scientific research and technological development, as well as capital investment, contributed to economic growth. Accordingly, one of the principal motives which led governments to support scientific research was the belief that research and technical education were major factors in the increase in productivity (Denison 1962). Even though economists may not agree on the precise percentage of economic growth which may be attributed to technological advance and the improvement in technological and managerial education, the belief in their efficacy has helped to persuade the United States and most nations of western Europe to increase their research and development expenditures in recent years at a much more rapid rate than their gross national product (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 1963, p. 22). In the United States the state governments and local business organizations have been persuaded that federal research subsidies have much to do with the location of new industries in their respective areas, and accordingly the expansion of universities and research laboratories has taken on an importance within the American political system much like that of the traditional forms of public works (such as the improvement of harbors or the building of dams). At the same time, economists have become more skeptical about the extent to which research undertaken for military purposes will have useful byproducts for the civilian economy. In western Europe, where various countries have undertaken to plan the development of the economy, including those sectors carried on by private industry, efforts have been made to develop scientific research as a means of economic growth (Parliamentary and Scientific Conference . . . 1965). The National Economic Development Council of Great Britain and
SCIENCE: Science-Government Relations the Commissariat au Plan of France, for example, have set up special relationships with their respective national organizations for the planning of scientific research expenditures. In the United States, on the other hand, it proved more difficult to build up federal government research and development programs specifically for the purpose of assisting in the development of private industry. The opposition of private business interests restrained the expansion of certain programs of scientific research and technological assistance in the Department of Commerce, for example, even while federal research support was being increased in other fields relating to the private economy, notably in agriculture and natural resources. The apparent influence of science and technology in advancing economic growth led naturally to the hope that science could play an important role in the advancement of the underdeveloped countries. This hope found expression in the programs of the several specialized agencies of the United Nations, notably UNESCO, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the World Health Organization. It became an important element also in the foreign aid and technical assistance programs of various individual nations—notably the United States, which was able to draw on its century of experience in agricultural education and research. [See ECONOMIC GROWTH.] The health sciences. Some of the most striking practical accomplishments of the sciences have been in the fields of medicine and public health, and the medical profession and hospitals accordingly have been involved in the research programs supported by government to a rapidly increasing degree. In the United States the National Institutes of Health (NIH) of the U.S. Public Health Service became during the 1950s the principal supporter of biological and medical sciences, not merely in the United States but throughout the world. American universities were receiving grants for basic research in even larger amounts from the NIH than from the military services or the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and NIH grants throughout Europe had begun to add significantly to the research funds available to university scientists and to encourage the development of new patterns of research organization. The official health programs supported by grants from the U.S. government and from the World Health Organization continued and extended the earlier international programs for the eradication of disease of such charitable organizations as the
103
Rockefeller Foundation and developed them further with the help of techniques developed or advanced by wartime research programs. The success of such efforts in reducing the death rate intensified concern with the problem of a population increasing at a rate which seemed to threaten the food supply and the economic progress of the various underdeveloped regions, especially the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa. [See PUBLIC HEALTH.] Institutions of basic science Universities, which in their organization still retain traces of their medieval ecclesiastical origin, are in most countries the principal institutions for the conduct of basic research. In the major countries of continental Europe, they generally came under the patronage of the state, and their programs of scientific and technological research were seen as serving national purposes. Particularly in France and Germany, strong centers of fundamental research were thus developed with government support at a time when the ancient British universities were still dominated by classical studies and were generally uninterested in the advancement of science, and American institutions of higher learning were either denominational colleges or state institutions preoccupied with comparatively low levels of vocational and technical education (Ashby 1958; Cohen 1963). The twentieth-century progress of science in the United Kingdom came in the basic sciences and mathematics at Cambridge (and later Oxford) and even more notably in some of the newer universities that even in the nineteenth century had been concerned with technological training and the needs of industry. A major share of the cost of these universities was taken over by the national treasury but was channeled through the University Grants Committee in such a way as to insulate the universities from political control. In the United States, basic research before World War ii was carried on mainly by the major universities, private or state, which received extensive assistance from the philanthropic foundations in the form of grants for special research projects. The leadership of the scientific societies and some of the philanthropic foundations had, by World War n, been persuaded that the nation should greatly increase its emphasis on fundamental research (U.S. National Science Foundation 1960). The patterns that had been developed by the grantmaking programs of the private foundations were influential in determining the system of government support for such research in private and state
104
SCIENCE: Science-Government Relations
universities after 1945. That system supplied funds from several executive departments and agencies to universities and private corporations, under a system in which panels and committees of advisers from the private institutions were given great influence in the allocation of grants for specific projects. At the same time, the President's Science Advisory Committee, its members drawn mainly from private institutions, put great emphasis on a policy of keeping basic research and the teaching of graduate students closely connected within the universities, a policy that in addition to its pedagogical advantages had the merit of strengthening the autonomy of the academic and scientific community (U.S. President's Science Advisory Committee 1960). The Soviet Union, on the other hand, chose to divide the functions of higher education from those of advanced research and generally to assign them to separate institutions. Research was directed through a system headed by the Committee on the Coordination of Research and Development, the Academy of Sciences, and corresponding academies for the several constituent republics (DeWitt 1961, pp. 434-435). In theory, the entire program is under the guidance of the principles of dialectical materialism; in practice, this guidance seems to affect the conduct of research least in the physical sciences, more in the biological sciences, and still more in the social sciences and humanities. Scientists in administration and politics Basic as well as applied research is conducted not merely in universities but also in government laboratories set up to further the purposes of particular departments or ministries. The way in which their work, as well as the work of scientists in industry and universities, will be related to government policy and government programs depends to a great extent on the status, within the political system and the administrative service, of men trained in the sciences and related professions. In the Soviet Union, the break with traditional systems of education and the great emphasis on scientific and technological training cleared the way for the advancement of scientists and engineers to positions in the higher ranks of the bureauracy, and their advancement was further encouraged by the absence of separate cadres of private business managers and of institutions for their education. By contrast, the career administrative systems of western Europe and the United Kingdom have been comparatively resistant to the promotion of scientists and engineers to high administrative positions. In Germany, for example, a
legal education remains the normal basis for administrative advancement, and in Great Britain the highest class of the civil service is still dominated by permanent officials whose education was in history, the classics, and related fields of knowledge. The personnel system of the United States, which lacks an elite corps and encourages exchanges between the civil service and private life at all levels in the hierarchy, has made it comparatively easy for scientists and men with technological education to rise to high administrative positions. The continuous interchange between governmental and private careers makes the government service a much less distinct part of society, and the distinction between governmental and private careers is further confused by the recent growth of the practice of contracting with private corporations and universities for the performance of government functions, especially research and development programs. As a result, the leading scientists, based in private institutions, who are called on to serve in a part-time or advisory capacity within the structure of government acquire an unprecedented degree of influence. In the United States this advisory function takes the institutional form of a hierarchy of advisory committees, some of a continuing nature and some ad hoc, set up in the principal civilian agencies and military services, and in the White House itself. The most difficult administrative problems relating to the use of such committees have to do with their relationship to the main line of administrative authority, including the full-time staff. The first tendency after World War n was to look to the parttime advisers alone for the principal policy and administrative decisions, notably in the major advisory committee attached to the Executive Office of the President and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. But with the abolition of the Research and Development Board of the Department of Defense and the eventual substitution of a much more powerful individual officer, the director of defense research and engineering, and with the transformation of the President's Science Advisory Committee by the provision of a full-time chairman supported by a full-time staff, a more effective relationship was devised between the part-time adviser and the full-time official, and more sophisticated concepts were worked out with respect to the particular ways in which part-time advisers could most usefully be employed (Gilpin & Wright 1964). The entire system is under the powerful influence, and often the detailed control, of congressional committees that have been making direct
SCIENCE: Science-Government Relations use of independent scientific advisers, especially through the mechanism of the National Academy of Sciences. In countries with parliamentary forms of government the general response to a similar need was the creation of interministerial committees to deal with government-wide scientific problems, often drawing on the advice of committees including private scholars. Thus in the Federal Republic of Germany an interministerial committee exists side by side with an advisory council on science and the humanities and a committee on cultural policy and publicity of the parliament. Similarly, in France an interministerial committee reporting to the premier is advised by a consultative committee of scientists and economists, both committees being served by a single secretariat (the Delegation Generale a la Recherche Scientifique et Technique). The Delegation Generale works closely with the national planning agency (Parliamentary and Scientific Conference . . . 1965). In the United Kingdom the Advisory Council on Scientific Policy was set up to advise the lord president of the council, who was responsible for the general program of civilian science in Great Britain. The lord president's responsibilities were later transferred to a newly created minister for science, whose functions were divided in 1964 by the newly elected Labour government between a minister for science and education and a minister for technology. Unlike the United States or the major countries of western Europe, the United Kingdom has no standing parliamentary committees dealing with particular scientific and technological programs, but it has the informal Parliamentary and Scientific Committee, including members of both houses of Parliament and representatives of more than one hundred scientific and technical organizations, to further the processes of consultation and the exchange of information between the worlds of politics and science. The interest of national governments in science policy has been furthered by studies conducted by various international organizations. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have all urged more comprehensive and consistent policies for the support and the coordination of scientific programs, and for more responsible forms of organization to deal with science at high policy levels. Similar international discussions led to the formation of more effective international associations for the promotion of the several sciences, most
705
of them being grouped under the International Council of Scientific Unions with the support of UNESCO, and to the formation of international organizations for the conduct of scientific programs. Some of these latter organizations were set up for the operation of specific temporary programs, such as the International Geophysical Year, and others provided regional organizations for tasks too expensive or complex for single nations to undertake (for example, the European Organization for Nuclear Research, the European Atomic Energy Community, and the European Space Research Organization). The conviction that scientists have a moral and political responsibility for the consequences of their research led many of them to abandon their old posture of political indifference or neutrality and to organize to take part in public affairs not merely as subordinate advisers but as active participants. This conviction led to the formation of many organizations for public education and the expression of policy opinions, their status and methods of operation depending greatly on the degree of freedom permitted to voluntary associations by the philosophy and traditions of the various countries. In the United Kingdom and western Europe, the leadership of such organizations tended before World War n toward a socialist or Marxist political philosophy. Since 1946 this tendency has been counterbalanced by theoretical arguments and organizing efforts in support of scientific freedom and against political control of research or economic enterprise. A good example is the program of the Congress for Cultural Freedom. In the United States, the political activity of scientists has been less influenced by ideology and less committed to particular political parties; it has concentrated more on specific policy issues and on the fostering of interest in public affairs within the scientific community (Price 1965). DON K. PRICE [See also NATIONAL SECURITY; POLICY SCIENCES; TECHNOLOGY, article on TECHNOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.] BIBLIOGRAPHY
Some of the principal sources in the field are government reports and documents. International Science Report deals with the organization of science in various countries (the first two reports dealt with India and Germany.) The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has published a series of Country Reviews on the policies for science and education, and a series of Country Reports on the organization of scientific research of various European countries. The most useful bibliographies are U.S. National Science Foundation, Office of Special Studies 1959 and Current Projects in Economic
106
SCIENCE: Science-Government Relations
and Social Implications of Science and Technology, a survey issued annually since 1957 by the foundation. U.S. data on the financing of research appear in the annual series of the U.S. National Science Foundation, Federal Funds for Research, Development, and Other Scientific Activities. In the United States a valuable additional source of data is the hearings and reports of various congressional committees, notably the Appropriations Committee of each house, the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, the committees of the two houses on government operations, and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Discussions of continuing problems may be found in the periodicals Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Minerva, and Science. ASHBY, ERIC 1958 Technology and the Academics: An Essay on Universities and the Scientific Revolution. London and New York: Macmillan. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. -» Published since 1945. COHEN, I. BERNARD 1963 Science in America: The Nineteenth Century. Pages 167-189 in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. and Morton White (editors), Paths of American Thought. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. DENISON, EDWARD F. 1962 The Sources of Economic Growth in the United States and the Alternatives Before Us. New York: Committee for Economic Development. DEWITT, NICHOLAS 1961 Education and Professional Employment in the U.S.S.R. Washington: National Science Foundation. DUPREE, A. HUNTER 1957 Science in the Federal Government: A History of Policies and Activities to 1940. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap. GILPIN, ROBERT; and WRIGHT, CHRISTOPHER (editors) 1964 Scientists and National Policy-making. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. GREAT BRITAIN, COMMITTEE OF ENQUIRY INTO THE ORGANISATION OF CIVIL SCIENCE 1963 [Trend Report]. Papers by Command, Cmnd. 2171. London: H.M. Stationery Office. HEWLETT, RICHARD G.; and ANDERSON, OSCAR E. JR. 1962 A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission. Volume 1: The New World: 1939-1946. University Park: Pennsylvania State Univ. Press. HILL, KARL (editor) 1964 The Management of Scientists. Boston: Beacon. HITCH, CHARLES J. 1958 Character of Research and Development in a Competitive Economy. Pages 129139 in Conference on Research and Development and Its Impact on the Economy, Washington, D.C., 1958, Proceedings. Washington: National Science Foundation. HITCH, CHARLES J.; and McKEAN, R. N. 1960 The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. HOGG, QUINTIN M. 1963 Science and Politics. London: Faber. H> The author is Viscount Hailsham. International Science Report. -» Published since 1962 by the National Science Foundation, Office of International Science Activities. KIDD, CHARLES V. 1959 American Universities and Federal Research. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap. KUHN, THOMAS S. (1962) 1963 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Univ. of Chicago Press. McCAMY, JAMES L. 1960 Science and Public Administration. University: Univ. of Alabama Press. MERTON, ROBERT K. (1936) 1962 Puritanism, Pietism and Science. Pages 33-66 in Bernard Barber and
Walter Hirsch (editors), The Sociology of Science. New York: Free Press. Minerva (London). -» Published since 1962. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 1964 Federal Support of Basic Research in Institutions of Higher Learning. Publication No. 1185. Washington: National Academy of Sciences—National Research Council. NELSON, RICHARD R. 1959 The Economics of Invention: A Survey of the Literature. Journal of Business 32: 101-127. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 1963 Science, Economic Growth and Government Policy. Paris: The Organization. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, ADVISORY GROUP ON SCIENCE POLICY 1963 Science and the Policies of Governments: The Implications of Science and Technology for National and International Affairs. Paris: The Organization. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT Country Reports on the Organisation of Scientific Research. -» Published since 1963. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT Country Reviews. PARLIAMENTARY AND SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE, SECOND, VIENNA, 1964 1965 Science and Parliament. Paris: Council of Europe and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. PECK, MERTON J.; and SCHERER, FREDERICK M. 1962 The Weapons Acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis. Boston: Harvard Univ., Graduate School of Business Administration, Division of Research. PRICE, DON K. 1954 Government and Science: Their Dynamic Relation in American Democracy. New York Univ. Press. -» A paperback edition was published in 1962 by Oxford University Press. PRICE, DON K. 1965 The Scientific Estate. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap. RESEARCH CONFERENCE ON THE IDENTIFICATION OF CREATIVE SCIENTIFIC TALENT 1963 Scientific Creativity: Its Recognition and Development. Edited by Calvin W. Taylor and Frank Barren. New York: Wiley. ROE, ANNE 1953 The Making of a Scientist. New York: Dodd. Science. -> Published since 1883 by the American Association for the Advancement of Science. SNOW, CHARLES P. 1961 Science and Government. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. UNIVERSITIES-NATIONAL BUREAU COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1962 The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors. National Bureau of Economic Research, Special Conference Series, No. 13. Princeton Univ. Press. U.S. BUREAU OF THE BUDGET 1962 Report to the President on Government Contracting for Research and Development. Washington: Government Printing Office. U.S. NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION 1960 A Study of Scientific and Technical Manpower; A Program of Collection, Tabulation, and Analysis of Data of the National Science Foundation: A Report . . . . U.S. House of Representatives, 86th Congress, 2d Session. Washington: Government Printing Office. U.S. NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION Federal Funds for Research, Development, and Other Scientific Activities. -> Published since 1950/1951. Volumes 1-12 were published as Federal Funds for Science.
SCIENCE: Scientists U.S. NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, OFFICE OF SCIENCE INFORMATION SERVICE Current Projects in Economic and Social Implications of Science and Technology. -» Published since 1957. U.S. NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, OFFICE OF SPECIAL STUDIES 1959 Bibliography on the Economic and Social Implications of Research and Development. Washington: The Foundation. U.S. OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 1945 Science: The Endless Frontier. Washington: Government Printing Office. U.S. PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE 1960 Scientific Progress, the Universities and the Federal Government: Statement. Washington: Government Printing Office.
SCIENTISTS
The word "scientist" was introduced into the English language around 1840 to distinguish those who seek empirical regularities in nature from philosophers, scholars, and intellectuals in a more general sense (Ross 1962). Mathematicians and logicians are usually regarded as scientists, although mathematics ceased being regarded as an empirical science by 1890-1910, and today the rubric also covers specialists in the social sciences almost without qualification. Other European languages have no terms strictly equivalent to "scientist." The French savant, Italian scienziato, German Wissenschaftier, and Russian ucheny also refer to philosophers, historians, and other systematic scholars. The absence of a verbal distinction is sometimes reflected in the organization of science and scholarship; for example, philosophers and historians are included in the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Persons in a wide variety of statuses and roles are described as scientists or identify themselves as scientists in English-speaking societies today. In a narrow sense, a scientist is a man of scientific knowledge—one who adds to what is known in the sciences by writing articles or books. This is perhaps the only sense in which the word should be used without qualification. However, "scientists" also engage in applied research, attempting to make discoveries which will lead to new industrial, medical, and agricultural products or processes; in industrial development, applying scientific knowledge to specific problems of innovation in production; and in the routine testing and analyzing of commodities and processes. Such persons are called applied scientists and are not easily distinguished from engineers and technicians. Persons called scientists may also engage in teaching science in institutions of higher education, in writing accounts of science for laymen, and in administration. Finally, a scientist may be defined as a person
707
who has received a college degree in a scientific field. The population of scientists. Estimates of the number of scientists vary according to the definition of the term and are, in any case, difficult to make. In the United States around 1962, there were more than one million persons with scientific or technical degrees, more than 275,000 members of professional scientific societies, more than 118,000 persons listed in American Men of Science, and roughly 100,000 engaged in basic or applied scientific research. The number of persons making substantial contributions to knowledge is, of course, much less than 100,000. The United States leads the world in the number of scientists. Between onefourth and one-third of all scientists may be Americans, and most of the remainder are in the other industrialized nations. (For example, seven leading industrial nations accounted for more than 80 per cent of the articles abstracted in Chemical Abstracts in 1960. There is naturally an even greater concentration of scientific languages: English, German, Russian, and French accounted for more than 90 per cent of the more than ten thousand articles abstracted in Index Chemicus for 1963.) Many scientists move to the United States from other nations, industrialized as well as underdeveloped, to obtain better conditions for performing research; this concentration has caused concern among leaders in many nations. The numbers cited above are changing rapidly. The growth in the number of scientists since the later Middle Ages has been exponential; thus, the scientists living in 1960 probably constituted more than 90 per cent of all those who ever lived (Price 1963). The rate of growth around 1960 would double the number of research scientists in roughly fifteen years. This rate of growth, however, must decline within the next generation in developed nations. In the United States in 1952, about half of the science doctorates were received in the physical sciences and mathematics, about 22 per cent in the biological sciences, and about 28 per cent in the social sciences, including psychology. The relative proportions in these major subareas of science have not changed much in the last half century. Social scientists constitute a much larger proportion of scientists in the United States than they do in most other nations. Evolution of scientific roles. The concept of the scientist developed only with the professionalization of science in the first half of the nineteenth century; previously, scientific activities were a subsidiary aspect of other social roles. Florian Zna-
108
SCIENCE: Scientists
niecki (1940) has written a concise sociological account of the historical differentiation of scientific roles. In most preindustrial societies, science has been the activity of practical actors. In ancient and medieval Europe, scientists were academic and often religious teachers. Beginning about the time of Galileo's move in 1611 from the University of Padua to the court of Cosimo de' Medici in Florence, scientists left the universities, and during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the amateur scientist flourished: either the gentleman scientist, like Robert Boyle, or the middle-class amateur, like Joseph Priestley. Scientists again became established in universities after the French Revolution. The twentieth century has seen the rapid growth of research establishments in business firms and government agencies. Of Americans receiving the doctorate in 1958, 56 per cent of the physical scientists, 31 per cent of the biological scientists, and 19 per cent of the social scientists took employment in industry or government. In the United States, most basic research is conducted in academic settings, but most of it is conducted in nonacademic research institutes in the Soviet Union and in some western European nations. Scientific careers Roughly 90 per cent of American physical scientists, and slightly smaller proportions of biological and social scientists, are men. Like other professionals, they are recruited disproportionately from upper-middle-class families; but, unlike others, they are much less likely to be from Roman Catholic families and more likely to be from Protestant or Jewish families than would be expected by chance. During the interwar years, a small number of small liberal arts colleges contributed a disproportionately large share of those who went on to become scientists. Much of this resulted from selective recruitment into these colleges, but some probably resulted from their distinctive scholarly ethos. The growth of scientific education has been accompanied by a growth in the proportion of scientists produced by large public and private undergraduate institutions. Education. Scientific education was revolutionized in nineteenth-century Germany by the dissertation: the requirement that the student conduct original research before receiving a degree. This innovation was soon copied in other nations. Today scientific education is prolonged and highly specialized, especially in its later stages. The dissertation research is usually conducted in a quasiapprenticeship relation with a university professor, and students often make significant contributions to the research of their professors. Almost all
American graduate students in the sciences receive stipends for this work. The median number of years elapsed between the bachelor's degree and the doctorate for Americans receiving the doctorate in 1957 was six in the physical sciences, seven in the biological sciences, and eight in the social sciences (see Berelson 1960 on this and other aspects of graduate education). Although many American universities give advanced training in the sciences (110 gave doctorates in chemistry in 1960), students tend to be concentrated in those institutions best known for basic research; the 15 universities with highest prestige accounted for almost half the doctorates in the sciences in 1957. The best graduate schools tend to recruit students from the best undergraduate schools, and their students are much more likely to be employed in leading universities than are graduates of institutions of lesser renown. Among those receiving advanced degrees, those who do best academically and identify most closely with their professors are most likely to go on to do research and teaching in universities; government and industrial laboratories tend to recruit those who do less well and are less committed to a research career. Career mobility. There is now considerable mobility between universities and research establishments in government and industry; for example, more than one-third of American chemists have been employed in at least two of the three locales (Strauss & Rainwater 1962, chapter 6). The barriers to mobility of this sort were much greater before World War n and apparently are still great in most of the countries of western Europe. There is much less mobility between the major fields of science because of the specialized education required to enter any one of them. Scientists in all types of establishments are likely to combine research with other activities; a large majority of scientists combine research with such other activities as teaching, administration, and technical consultation. Vertical mobility takes different forms in different locales. Advancement in universities does not usually involve a qualitative change in the nature of the work; it still involves teaching and research. In government, and especially in industry, vertical mobility often involves advancement to administrative positions and the abandonment of research; many firms recruit managers for line operations from among their research scientists (Kornhauser 1962, chapter 5). Incentives and occupational personality Scientists in basic research are strongly motivated to solve intellectual problems that they re-
SCIENCE: Scientists gard as intrinsically important, but the most important social incentive for them is their desire to obtain recognition from their colleagues for their research accomplishments. This desire leads the scientist to publish his results, and it influences his decisions in the selection of research problems and methods. Scientists compete strenuously to be the first to publish discoveries, and simultaneous discoveries by two or more scientists occur frequently. When there is some question about which scientist made a discovery first, a priority dispute may arise. The frequency of such disputes and the intense bitterness which often accompanies them are telling evidence of the value scientists place upon the esteem of their colleagues (Merton 1957; 1963); however, priority disputes have become less frequent in the twentieth century. Industrial and governmental research establishments which conduct applied or secret research make it more difficult for their scientific employees to be recognized, and such establishments must offer relatively high salaries to scientists in order to induce them to accept this deficiency. Values and personality. Compared with nonscientists, scientists are more inclined to prize the recognition of their colleagues and their professional autonomy above the rewards of income, organizational power, and community prestige. They are nevertheless among the most prestigious occupational groups. "Scientists" were ranked third in prestige among 90 occupations—just behind U.S. Supreme Court justices and physicians—by a cross section of the U.S. population in 1963; some scientific specialties were, however, ranked a good deal lower. There is some evidence that these distinctive occupational values characterize scientists even as university undergraduates (Rosenberg 1957; Davis 1966). Many of the distinctive personality characteristics of scientists also appear to be produced more by selection than by university or occupational socialization. Scientists tend to be highly intelligent; possessors of U.S. doctorates in the sciences have a mean IQ of over 130 (from a population with mean 100 and standard deviation 20), which is not much different from the mean IQ of similarly qualified persons in other fields or the mean IQ of medical and law school graduates (Price 1963, chapter 2). Although the evidence is sketchy and incomplete, and although there is much variation among scientists, it also appears that physical and biological scientists tend to be "intensely masculine," to avoid close interpersonal contacts, and to avoid and be disturbed by emotions of hostility and dependency. These characteristics may help generate the scientist's desire for recognition for
109
his accomplishments from his colleagues. Physical scientists tend to like music and dislike poetry and art. As might be expected, creative scientists are unusually hardworking, to the extent of appearing almost obsessed with their work (see Research Conference . . . 1963 for summaries of studies on the personality characteristics of scientists). Stereotypes of scientists held by high school and university students are in crude accord with these psychological findings (Mead & Metraux 19571958; Beardslee & O'Dowd 1961). It has been argued that the values of the Puritans —rational mastery of one's environment, worldly activity for the glorification of God, and individualism—helped to motivate them to pursue science in seventeenth-century England, and have resulted, even today, in a higher valuation of science among Protestants than among Roman Catholics; ihis is a matter of dispute, however (Merton 1939; Feuer 1963). In any case, scientists today are among the least religious groups in the American population, with respect to both religious beliefs and religious practices. Those in the behavioral and biological sciences, where religion and science are most likely to come into conflict, are least likely to be religious. Scientists also tend to support parties of the left in national politics. With regard to both religion and politics, there is evidence that the more productive scientists are less conservative than the less productive. Scientific productivity. It is generally difficult to account for variations in scientific productivity in terms of personality or background variables. There is great variation in productivity; the probability that a scientist will produce n or more papers (if he produces at least one) is roughly proportional to 1/n, and 50 per cent of the papers are written by about 6 per cent of the scientists (Price 1963, table 2, p. 45). The best background predictors of scientific productivity are the times required to get the doctorate and college grades, but these account for little of the variation. Contrary to common belief, productivity does not decline with age until advanced ages, 60 or over, are reached. Social contexts may have greater effects on productivity, but these effects are not readily distinguished from the selectivity of the contexts themselves. Graduates and faculty of leading universities are more productive than others. Scientists who have adequate facilities and research assistance are more productive than those who do not, and those who maintain continuity in their research topics are more productive than those who do not. However, the kinds of contacts with colleagues and the quality of specialization make a difference. Scientists who perform multiple func-
110
SCIENCE: Scientists
tions, combining research with teaching or administration, have been shown to be more productive than those who devote full time to research. Scientists who have frequent contacts with colleagues possessing different research interests are more productive than those with few contacts or contacts only with others of very similar interests. Social isolation especially is associated with low productivity for most scientists; this is a major handicap for scientists working in underdeveloped nations. The organization of science Scientists engaged in basic research are necessarily given considerable autonomy. If they are not free to evaluate the truth or falsehood of theories or the adequacy of research findings, science ceases to exist; and scientists also are usually free to select research problems and techniques within broad limits. Such autonomy exists in many universities and in a few governmental arid industrial establishments. University departments place some restrictions on this freedom; for example, some research in logic or statistics may be felt to be not "really" mathematics, and scientists in mathematics departments may be discouraged from performing it. This may produce organizational strains, and these strains are sometimes resolved by the differentiation of existing disciplines and departments. The number of recognizably different scientific disciplines probably trebled between 1900 and 1960, and the formation of new disciplines shows no signs of stopping. The autonomy of basic scientists conflicts with a frequent need to engage in cooperative research. Traditionally this conflict has been resolved by forming temporary teams of freely collaborating scientists or teams of a professor and his students. More recently, in fields like nuclear physics, cooperative research has been formalized; permanent groups of professional scientists are formed in which authority is centralized and a formal division of labor is established. In most fields in universities, however, the traditional forms of teamwork are much more common than such formally organized groups. Industry and government. The importance that scientists place upon purely scientific goals, their desire to be autonomous, and their sensitivity to the responses of their disciplinary colleagues produce strains when they are employed by industrial and governmental agencies to help achieve practical goals. For example, the desire to select their own research problems leads them to resist accepting directions from organization superiors. Also, scientists tend to prefer working in units with their
disciplinary colleagues to working in professionally heterogeneous groups that are organized on the basis of industrial functions; and the desire to inform others of their discoveries conflicts with requirements of industrial and military secrecy. The typical industrial incentives of salary and power are less important for scientists than for other categories of employees, and, if scientists accept these incentives as primary, their commitments to scientific values and their scientific competences may be eroded. Various ways have evolved for accommodating industrial organization and the typical organization of the scientific community (Kornhauser 1962). Industrial scientists are selected from among those most willing to accept the importance of industrial goals, and occupational socialization furthers this acceptance. In addition, industrial research organizations are often differentiated into fundamental research units and units more directly involved in practical tasks, and scientists are assigned to different units on the basis of interests and skills. Research supervisors are recruited from among superior scientists and tend to use persuasion more than formal direction. "Parallel hierarchies" of advancement may be offered, so that some scientists are promoted to positions giving them greater autonomy in research, while others are promoted to administrative positions. Finally, the patent system and similar procedures make it possible for scientists to publish some research findings while safeguarding the proprietary interests of firms in discoveries. These types of accommodations make possible the incorporation of scientists into industry without the sterilization of science. Professional societies. In addition to their work establishments, scientists as scientists are organized into a wide variety of societies and associations. Most of the vast number of such groups are devoted to a specialized subject matter, and their major activities involve the communication of discoveries through meetings and journals. The oldest societies and those with highest prestige, like the Royal Society of London and the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, are interdisciplinary, and membership in them is by election. Such groups engage in facilitating scientific communication, but they also play important roles in formulating the science policies of national governments. So also do large national groups that are open to almost all scientists, such as the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the British Association for the Advancement of Science, and the Deutscher Verband Technisch-Wissenschaftlicher Vereine. While there has been a tendency for the scien-
SCIENCE: Scientists tific "society" to give way to the professional "association," none of these types of organizations is directly involved with questions of wage rates and working conditions. At most, these groups forward the occupational interests of scientists by protecting job titles through state licensing and certification, by elevating educational standards, and by lobbying for increased governmental support. There are a few trade unions for "scientists," but engineers and technologists dominate them and they are relatively ineffective. What is a scientist? The concept of the scientist was originally formulated primarily to distinguish specialists in the natural sciences from philosophers, historians, and other intellectuals; the distinction began to emerge as clear and significant only around 1800. Today the differences between philosophy and an empirical, generalizing, value-free science are clearly recognized. It is known that the pursuit of science requires the full-time efforts of its workers, and provisions for scientific employment are abundant. Perhaps we have succeeded only too well in distinguishing scientists from other intellectuals. Today our major difficulties involve distinguishing scientists from engineers and technicians. Even when a scientist is clearly a man of knowledge, his knowledge is apt to be highly specialized and communicable to few others, even within his own discipline. Are scientists intellectuals? Or are they a culture (or cultures) apart? C. P. Snow's 1959 book, The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution, stimulated extensive public discussions of this (the essays in Holton 1965 are a good sample of the result). Perhaps university professors find it too easy to discover a cleavage between scientists and others. Taking a longer view, one might conclude that scientific knowledge and the scientific approach to the world have been dispersed very widely and deeply in the populations of industrialized nations. Most of us have been deeply influenced by scientists in what we believe and how we believe. The willingness of populations to tolerate and support scientists may be some testimonial to this influence. WARREN O. HAGSTROM [See also CREATIVITY, article on SOCIAL ASPECTS; ENGINEERING; INTELLECTUALS; KNOWLEDGE, SOCIOLOGY OF; and the biography of ZNANIECKL] BIBLIOGRAPHY
BARBER, BERNARD; and HIRSCH, WALTER (editors) 1962 The Sociology of Science. New York: Free Press. ->
111
The articles by Beardslee & O'Dowd (1961), Mead & Metraux (1957-1958), Merton (1939; 1957) are reprinted in this collection. Includes a bibliography. BEARDSLEE, DAVID C.; and O'DowD, DONALD D. 1961 The College-student Image of the Scientist. Science 133:997-1001. BERELSON, BERNARD 1960 Graduate Education in the United States. New York: McGraw-Hill. DAVIS, JAMES A. 1966 Undergraduate Career Decisions. Chicago: Aldine. FEUER, LEWIS S. 1963 The Scientific Intellectual: The Psychological and Sociological Origins of Modern Science. New York: Basic Books. HAGSTROM, WARREN O. 1965 The Scientific Community. New York: Basic Books. HARMON, LINSEY R. 1965 Profiles of Ph.D.'s in the Sciences: Summary Report on Follow-up of Doctorate Cohorts, 1935-1960. Publication 1293. Washington: National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council. HOLTON, GERALD (editor) 1965 Science and Culture: A Study of Cohesive and Disjunctive Forces. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. -» First published in Volume 94 of Dsedalus. KORNHAUSER, WILLIAM 1962 Scientists in Industry: Conflict and Accommodation. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. MEAD, MARGARET; and METRAUX, RHODA 1957-1958 Image of the Scientist Among High-school Students. Science 126:384-390, 1200; 127:349-351. MERTON, ROBERT K. (1939)1957 Science and Economy of 17th Century England. Pages 607-627 in Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. -> First published in Volume 3 of Science and Society. MERTON, ROBERT K. 1957 Priorities in Scientific Discovery: A Chapter in the Sociology of Science. American Sociological Review 22:635-659. MERTON. ROBERT K. 1963 Resistance to the Systematic Study of Multiple Discoveries in Science. Archives enropeennes de sociologie 4:237-282. PRICE. DEREK J. DE SOLLA 1963 Little Science, Big Science. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. RESEARCH CONFERENCE ON THE IDENTIFICATION OF CREATIVE SCIENTIFIC TALENT 1963 Scientific Creativity: Its Recognition and Development. Edited by Calvin W. Taylor and Frank Barren. New York: Wiley. -» Includes a bibliography on pages 391-407. ROSENBERG, MORRIS 1957 Occupations and Values. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. Ross, SYDNEY 1962 "Scientist": The Story of a Word. Annals of Science 18:65-85. SNOW, C. P. 1959 The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution. Cambridge Univ. Press. SNOW, C. P. 1964 The Two Cultures: And a Second Look. 2d ed. Cambridge Univ. Press. -> An expanded version of Snow 1959. STRAUSS, ANSELM L.; and RAINWATER, LEE 1962 The Professional Scientist: A Study of American Chemists. Chicago: Aldine. U.S. NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION 1965 Scientific and Technical Manpower Resources: Summary Information on Employment Characteristics, Supply and Training, prepared by Norman Seltzer. NSF 64-28. Washington: Government Printing Office. ZNANIECKI, FLORIAN 1940 The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge. New York: Columbia Univ. Press.
112
SCIENCE: Scientific Communication VI SCIENTIFIC COMMUNICATION
The term "scientific communication" refers to the exchange of information and ideas among scientists in their roles as scientists. Menzel (1958, p. 6) defines it as "the totality of publications, facilities, occasions, institutional arrangements, and customs which affect the direct or indirect transmission of scientific messages among scientists." It is distinguished from everyday communication about physical reality in that it has reference to a particular body of generalized, codified knowledge. Ideally, each and every communication contributes to the corpus of accepted knowledge identified as science. This is accomplished chiefly by extending the boundaries, by modifying previously held hypotheses, and by introducing additional precision, clarification, or verification of existing knowledge. Although the preferred means and the practices associated with scientific communication have undergone change in the last few centuries, full and open communication of scientific results has always been a foundation sto.ie of modern science. With the establishment of the academies in the seventeenth century, word-of-mouth exchange of information and informal meetings were very quickly supplemented by informal correspondence and exchange of letters concerning scientific work and, later, by a quasi-institutionalized arrangement embodied in the office of secretary or correspondent; finally, these were followed by formal journals containing the proceedings of meetings and other communications. The scientific enterprise of that era was small enough to permit reasonably adequate communication on the basis of the small number of journals and the occasional publication of books, supplemented by face-to-face interaction and correspondence by letter. The so-called "communications explosion" in science is new primarily in the sense that it is now widely recognized as a problem. But as Price (1963) has pointed out, the amount of scientific publication has been growing exponentially, doubling every ten to fifteen years over the past three centuries. While there is no universal agreement, one of the more "conservative" estimates is that there are over thirty thousand scientific journals presently in existence and that there are more than a million papers published in them each year (Gottschalk & Desmond 1962; Bourne 1962). The sheer number of papers being produced annually has brought open recognition of a number of serious communication problems. Among the more important ones are the time lag between the completion of a paper
for publication and its appearance in a journal; the increasing difficulty of "keeping up with the literature"; and the increasing difficulties in searching the literature and retrieving relevant information. For these as well as a number of other reasons centering on a growing awareness of the importance of science for national welfare, economic growth, and even survival, interest in the communications problems of science has mushroomed since the 1950s. The communications explosion within science has given rise to concerted efforts to deal with the problem on many fronts, especially with the aid of new technological advances. Through the use of computers and a variety of other technical devices, efforts are being made to facilitate the storage and retrieval of information, and considerable progress is being made along these lines (see Stevens 1965). However, some questions have been raised about this approach in terms of the changing functions of scientific communication. While professional librarians, documentalists, editors, linguists, abstractors, mathematicians, and others now broadly characterized as information experts seek to improve the effectiveness of scientific communication largely by technical means, social scientists have begun to examine the social aspects of the scientific communications process. The study of scientific communication Despite the growing interest in and support for studying the scientific communications system, there is still little systematic knowledge about it. A review of what is known must, therefore, be guided by a broad conceptual scheme rather than restricted to the specific questions now thought to be crucial for an understanding of the subject. The scheme has three major components: the functions of scientific communication, for scientists as well as for science generally; the various channels through which communications flow; the intervening variables or situational factors which influence the relationships beween channels and functions. Functions of communication. Menzel (1958) lists a number of functions performed by scientific communication: (1) providing answers to specific questions; (2) helping the scientist to stay abreast of new developments in his field; (3) helping him to acquire an understanding of a new field; (4) giving him a sense of the major trends in his field and of the relative importance of his own work; (5) verifying the reliability of information by additional testimony; (6) redirecting or broadening his span of interest and attention; and (7) obtaining critical response to his own work. He notes, too,
SCIENCE: Scientific Communication Merton's seminal discussion (1957) of the importance to scientists of professional recognition—a major reward for scientific achievement which is also carried by the communications system of science. An understanding of these functions helps to pinpoint specific problems in the communications process and calls attention to the importance of the many different forms of communication behavior in which scientists engage. This is undoubtedly an important first step in going beyond the purely technical aspects of the storage and retrieval of scientific information, and studies concerned with these functions should lead not only to a better understanding of the communications process in science but also, it is hoped, may have practical utility in suggesting ways to improve the process. One of the most important functions of communications for science as a whole is to provide a cumulative record of the "certified" knowledge which exists at any given point in time. Without such a record it is doubtful that science could continue to develop as a viable system. This record constitutes the point of reference for each scientist, providing him with the foundation from which he may make his own contributions toward extending what is known. This is not to imply that what is already in the record is immutable. Quite the contrary—the record is always subject to change in the light of new evidence, newly available techniques, and new discoveries. But whether a contribution is an extension of previously accepted knowledge or a new interpretation of what is already known, it is always and necessarily a matter of the record. The current communications crisis raises questions about the nature of this record as well as about a number of widely held assumptions concerning the nature of the scientific communications process. For example, the fact that a paper has been published has usually implied that it has been reviewed by a jury of competent peers. However, there is at least the suspicion that the continued proliferation of journals has inevitably "watered down" the rigor of professional review. It is not even always possible to establish a simple correlation between the quality of any particular scientific paper and the reputation of the particular journal in which it appears. In any case, the quality of papers published is becoming an increasingly important problem. No matter how much retrieval procedures may be improved, the question of what is worth retrieving deserves much more attention. Another major assumption has been that once a paper is published, not only is it accessible to the
113
scientific community, but also it will actually be read by the scientists concerned. However, the flood of publications has tended to undermine the accessibility of relevant papers, at least within the traditional communications practices. Not only may a single paper be buried in the flood of all papers published, but accessibility is also impeded by the growing trend toward increased specialization of journals, so that relevant papers may appear in sources not normally reviewed. Finally, the flood of publications has made it impossible for any one scientist to read more than a small fraction of what is potentially relevant. Some preliminary studies indicate that perhaps only about 25 scientists may actually read any particular paper which is published. Further, an increase in the amount of information in the field tends to place greater strain on the integrative capacities of theory in that field, so that relationships among the contributions of different scientists become more difficult to determine. As a body of knowledge becomes "disorganized" in this way, the significance and even the validity of new contributions are more difficult to assess, and effective scientific communication may become a property only of small networks of scientists working on the same specific topics rather than of an entire discipline (Hagstrom 1965). Channels of communication. The growing awareness of informal or relatively private channels of communication among scientists (U.S. President's . . . 1963; Schilling 1963-1964; Kaplan 1964) is but one aspect of the general problem of the different channels of communication and the different functions of each. The various channels of scientific communication are usually thought of as ranging from the most formal to the most informal, in terms of the degree to which the information flowing through them is codified and generally available to all scientists. It is perhaps more useful, however, to think of them as ranging from structured or planned channels which are known about in advance (such as journals, books, and even announced meetings) to unstructured channels through which information is accidentally acquired (such as finding useful information in the literature while searching for something else, or a casual conversation which yields unlooked-for information). A further complication must be introduced insofar as we are dealing with a highly fluid situation in which yesterday's unstructured channels become tomorrow's structured ones. The ease with which one can talk by telephone to a colleague three thousand miles away may make this a far more effective means of finding particular bits
114
SCIENCE: Scientific Communication
of information than the ordinarily accepted techniques of searching the literature. While precise knowledge of the proportion of information important to scientists acquired through various channels is still lacking, everything we know indicates that there is a much greater reliance on "accidental" and unstructured channels than has formerly been realized. Menzel (1958, p. 47) emphasizes that "it becomes imperative to consider the information network as a system. . . . What is little better than an accident from the point of view of an individual may well emerge as a predictable occurrence from a larger point of view." While it is possible to try to match different channels with the different functions performed by scientific communication as discussed above, in practice such an exercise appears to be futile. Each of the functions listed can be, and apparently is, actually served by many different channels. Thus, it is entirely possible that the answer to a specific question can be found in an article in a published journal, in a preprint which arrived in the morning mail, during the course of a telephone conversation with a colleague about some other matter, or in a chance encounter in the corridors outside a scientific congress. A review article might be the best single source for providing a sense of the major trends in a field, but one might also get the same results, and often more quickly, from talking to a number of colleagues closely involved in the field. In the present circumstances, it seems safe to say that merely exploring one channel or source (especially a traditional one) is not necessarily the most effective way of treading through the maze of messages being communicated. Participation in structured channels. The literature of science, primarily journals, constitutes the most important structured channel of communication within science; roughly two-thirds of the scientists studied by several investigators cited the journals as the most important single channel through which they learned of new developments in their fields of primary interest (Menzel 1958; 1960). To keep up with secondary fields, scientists typically turn first to recent textbooks and then to abstracts and review articles for guidance (Menzel 1958). The degree to which a body of knowledge is theoretically well-organized seems to influence the concentration of important information in specific channels; Menzel found chemists (a relatively well-organized field) reporting that two-thirds of the articles they read would be found in the three journals they listed as "most important," while zoologists (a relatively unorganized field) reported that only a quarter of their reading would
be found in three such journals. He found also that an average of 8.18 journals was needed to account for 75 per cent of the nominations of "three most important journals" by chemists, while the comparable figure for zoologists was 15.76 journals (1960). Price (1963, table 2, p. 45) suggests that 6 per cent of the men in a field will produce half the published literature in that field and 2 per cent will produce about a quarter of it. Reasoning after Lotka (1926) that the number of scientists producing n papers is proportional to 1 /n2 ( an inversesquare law of productivity), he calculates that the average scientist should produce about 3.5 papers during his working career. Meltzer (1956), however, found that U.S. physiologists had produced an average of four to five papers (including chapters in books and coauthored papers) within three years, and Schilling (1963-1964) seems to arrive at an even higher figure for the lifetime productivity of bioscientists. Such figures are not directly related to the use of the literature; Price (1963) finds that the "half life" of a given article is about 15 years; that is, half of the articles cited by papers published in a given year will be less than 15 years old. Various other studies indicate that the half life in use is much shorter than this; more than half of the withdrawals from two technical libraries studied were less than five years old, and more than half of the "reading acts" by scientists in a U.S. government laboratory were devoted to materials less than two months old (Menzel 1960). The amount of time a scientist devotes to the use of structured channels probably varies greatly with situational factors, although little is known about this at present. On the basis of some 25,000 random-time observations of 1,500 U.S. chemists, Halbert and Ackoff (1958) conclude that nearly 50 per cent of their subjects' time is spent in some form of communication and a third of it in specifically scientific communication. Roughly 10 per cent of the chemists' time is spent in general discussion, slightly less than this in receiving information orally, the same amount in reading unpublished materials, and about 5 per cent is spent in reading published materials. Estimates of the proportion of reading done for "specific uses" rather than for "general interest" vary from 20 to 80 per cent, and they are probably influenced heavily by the ways in which the data were gathered as well as by situational factors (Menzel 1960). A number of studies report that the average amount of time per week spent in reading published materials is about five hours, but situational
SCIENCE: Scientific Communication factors are again highly important. Scientists in basic research seem to devote only half as much time to reading as do scientists in applied research; however, the former are much more concerned with archival literature, while the latter make greater use of unpublished literature (Menzel 1960). Tornudd (1958) suggests that physical isolation from channels of oral communication produces greater dependence among Danish and Finnish scientists upon published literature, and the rate at which a field is developing seems also to be important—the more rapid the advances, the greater the reliance upon relatively unstructured channels (Menzel 1958). Schilling's study of bioscientists (1963-1964) found that age is unrelated to dependence on written, as compared with oral, channels; the bioscientists typically rate the latter as only half as important as the former. Moreover, women in the biological sciences seem slightly more dependent on the literature, probably because they have fewer opportunities to engage in unstructured communication : they visit other laboratories less often, hold fewer professional offices, and receive fewer preprints. As the amount of published literature increases, scientists are turning to other structured channels as well as to unstructured channels. Orr (1964) notes a steady increase in the number of meetings and conferences held in the biomedical sciences each year since 1927, an increase in the attendance at such meetings, and a slight increase since 1947 in the percentage of research funds used for travel. Menzel's study of 76 scientists (1958) found that they attended an average of 2.5 meetings per year, and Garvey (see American Psychological Association . . . 1964) found that psychologists in an academic setting attended an average of three per year, while those in a government laboratory averaged about two. Yet Menzel notes that relatively few scientists admit obtaining significant information from the formal presentations at meetings and concludes that "the functions of scientific meetings are not those which ostensibly motivate the bulk of their programs, but other forms of communication —symposia, corridor meetings, the presence in one room of those interested in a single area . . ." (1960, vol. l,p. 47). Unstructured communication. Unstructured (sometimes called informal or unplanned) communication among scientists often provides specific information which a scientist knows he needs, but probably its major importance lies in providing him with useful information which he did not know existed. Scientists generally report between 65 and
11 5
90 per cent success in locating needed information in the literature (Menzel I960; Tornudd 1958), but they obviously cannot estimate their success in obtaining information of which they are unaware. Such unknown information varies from the specific (a new experimental technique) to the general (news that another individual is working on a particular problem), but it is almost always obtained, directly or indirectly, "by accident." Considering the usual delays in publication and the general difficulties involved in keeping abreast of the literature, it is presumptive evidence of the efficiency of unstructured channels that only about one scientist in five reports ever having received information "too late"—that is, information which would have influenced the course of his research had he received it sooner (Menzel 1960). Menzel notes four major unstructured channels through which information reaches scientists: a scientist informs a colleague of his current interests and is given an item of pertinent information in return; a colleague conveys information which he knows the scientist will be interested in; a colleague volunteers the information while they are together for a different purpose; and he finds a useful item of information in the literature while searching for something else. In all but the last, the scientist is dependent on his colleagues, who will know of his needs and interests only if he tells them or if they are indicated by his previous publications. The effectiveness with which a scientist uses these channels, then, would seem to be related both to his ability to make his needs known and to the frequency with which he comes into contact with other scientists in his field. The flow of professional recognition. Unstructured channels can operate effectively only so long as scientists feel the need to assist each other and share the values of "communism" and "disinterestedness" which encourage them to share their findings freely, without regard for personal gain (Merton [1949] 1957, pp. 556-560). Yet personal gain of an honorific nature is involved; Merton has referred to this as professional recognition (1957), and Storer (1966) has suggested that it is "competent response" to a contribution. If information flows in one direction through the various channels of scientific communication, response to it flows in the other. Anything which signifies the value, to one or more scientists, of information received from others—eponymy, prizes, election to professional office, footnotes, even personal thanks—serves to sustain the scientist's motivation through confirming the goodness of his work and his successful performance as a scientist. Glaser (1964) has docu-
116
SCIENCE: Scientific Communication
merited some of the consequences for the motivation and career plans of scientists when there is a lack of "adequate recognition," but work on the various channels through which recognition flows has barely.begun (Kaplan 1965a). Improving scientific communication The extent and success of efforts to speed and to make more effective the dissemination of information in science vary greatly by fields. In physics, the weekly Physical Review Letters has made it possible to bring brief announcements of recent findings to readers, usually within a month of submission, and there is a variety of other newsletters, data-card services, and regular announcements of work in progress which are now being established in different fields. The American Psychological Association's Project on Scientific Information Exchange in Psychology represents a major effort to develop and then apply new information to the improvement of communication within the field of psychology. Another technique, facilitated by the use of highspeed computers, is the citation index, which enables one to trace the influence of a given paper forward in time; this will apparently be of value to historians and sociologists of science as well as to those concerned with the substantive content of the materials cited (Institute for Scientific Information 1964). The suggestion that archival publication be partially replaced by central depositories, from which materials may be acquired on request after learning of them through title lists and abstracts, has not yet met with success; the obstacles to its adoption apparently lie more in the desire of scientists to be assured that their contributions will go to a "guaranteed" audience (as when published in a journal) than in the technical problems involved (U.S. President's . . . 1963). Suggestions have also been made toward providing greater opportunity for scientists to make use of unstructured channels of communication: encouraging attendance at meetings and visits to other institutions, arranging teaching duties so as to leave some days free for travel, and allowing more time at announced meetings for discussion sessions (Menzel 1958). Such suggestions are basically concerned with increasing the amount of personal contact among scientists, and their success will probably be contingent upon the amount of funds available for such purposes. It may be predicted that the study of scientific communication will become increasingly important as the difficulty of disseminating information widely and rapidly mounts. The field requires much
more work in conceptualizing the nature of the communications network and its relation to the social structure of science, as well as in the collection of more data. While much of the concern expressed today about problems of scientific communication focuses on developing new techniques for the storage and retrieval of information, and while some concern is focused on the social aspects of the communications process, very little attention has been devoted to the underlying problem of what should be communicated and in what form. Finally, there is little doubt that each scientist will have to bear a greater responsibility for the transfer of information and not leave it largely to the professional documentalist. As a recent analysis of the problems of scientific communication (U.S. President's . . . 1963, p. 1) notes, "The technical community generally must devote a larger share than heretofore of its time and resources to the discriminating management of the ever increasing technical record. Doing less will lead to fragmented and ineffective science and technology." NORMAN KAPLAN AND NORMAN W. STORER [See also CONFERENCES; DIFFUSION, article on INTERPERSONAL INFLUENCE; INFORMATION STORAGE AND RETRIEVAL.] BIBLIOGRAPHY AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, PROJECT ON SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION EXCHANGE IN PSYCHOLOGY 1964 The Discovery and Dissemination of Scientific Information Among Psychologists in Two Research Environments. American Psychological Association, Project on Scientific Information Exchange in Psychology, Report No. 11. American Psychologist 21, no. 11. -* This issue (November, 1966) contains eight articles on scientific communication, particularly in the field of psychology. BARBER, BERNARD; and HIRSCH, WALTER (editors) 1962 The Sociology of Science. New York: Free Press. BOURNE, CHARLES P. 1962 The World's Technical Journal Literature: An Estimate of Volume, Origin, Language, Field, Indexing, and Abstracting. American Documentation 13:159-168. GLASER, BARNEY G. 1964 Organizational Scientists: Their Professional Careers. Indianapolis, Ind.: BobbsMerrill. GOTTSCHALK, C. M.; and DESMOND, W. F. 1962 Worldwide Census of Scientific and Technical Serials. Paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Documentation Institute. Unpublished manuscript. HAGSTROM, WARREN O. 1965 The Scientific Community. New York: Basic Books. HALBERT, MICHAEL H.; and ACKOFF, RUSSELL L. 1958 An Operations Research Study of the Dissemination of Scientific Information. Pages 87-120 in International Conference on Scientific Information, 1958, Preprints of Papers for the International Conference on Scientific Information, Washington, D.C., November 16-21, 1958. Area i. Washington: National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council.
SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION INSTITUTE FOR SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION 1964 The Use of Citation Data in Writing the History of Science, by Eugene Garfield et al. Philadelphia: The Institute. -> Constitutes a report of research for the U.S. Air Force Office of Scientific Research under contract AF 49(638)-1256. INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION, 1958 1958 Preprints of Papers for the International Conference on Scientific Information, Washington, D.C., November 16-21, 1958. Areas i-viii. Washington: National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council. KAPLAN, NORMAN 1964 Sociology of Science. Pages 852-881 in Robert E. L. Paris (editor), Handbook of Modern Sociology. Chicago: Rand McNally. KAPLAN, NORMAN 1965a The Norms of Citation Behavior: Prolegomena to the Footnote. American Documentation 16:179-184. KAPLAN, NORMAN (editor) 1965& Science and Society. Chicago: Rand McNally. LITTLE [ARTHUR D.] INC. 1959 Basic Research in the Navy. 2 vols. Cambridge, Mass.: Arthur D. Little, Inc. LOTKA, ALFRED J. 1926 The Frequency Distribution of Scientific Productivity. Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences 16:317-323. MELTZER, LEO 1956 Scientific Productivity in Organizational Settings. Journal of Social Issues 12, no. 2: 32-40. MENZEL, HERBERT 1958 The Flow of Information Among Scientists: Problems, Opportunities and Research Questions. Unpublished manuscript, Columbia Univ., Bureau of Applied Social Research. MENZEL, HERBERT 1960 Review of Studies in the Flow of Information Among Scientists. 2 vols. in 1. Unpublished manuscript, Columbia Univ., Bureau of Applied Social Research. MERTON, ROBERT K. (1949)1957 Social Theory and Social Structure. Rev. & enl. ed. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. MERTON, ROBERT K. 1957 Priorities in Scientific Discovery: A Chapter in the Sociology of Science. American Sociological Review 22:635-659. ORR, RICHARD H. 1964 Communication Problems in Biochemical Research: Report of a Study. Federation Proceedings 23:1117-1132. PRICE, DEREK J. DE SOLLA 1963 Little Science, Big Science. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. SCHILLING, CHARLES W. 1963-1964 Informal Communication Among Bioscientists. Parts 1-2. Unpublished manuscript, George Washington Univ., Biological Sciences Communication Project. STEVENS, MARY E. 1965 Automatic Indexing: A Stateof-the-art Report. National Bureau of Standards Monograph No. 91. Washington: Government Printing Office. -> Includes a bibliography of 662 items on pages 183-220. STORER, NORMAN W. 1966 The Social System of Science. New York: Holt. TORNUDD, ELIN 1958 Study on the Use of Scientific Literature and Reference Services by Scandinavian Scientists and Engineers Engaged in Research and Development. Pages 9-65 in International Conference on Scientific Information, 1958, Preprints of Papers for the International Conference on Scientific Information, Washington, D.C., November 16-21, 1958. Area i. Washington: National Academy of SciencesNational Research Council.
117
U.S. PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE 1963 Science, Government, and Information: The Responsibilities of the Technical Community and the Government in the Transfer of Information; a Report. Washington: Government Printing Office.
SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION There is little disagreement that explanation is a major aim of science; there is much about the conditions that a proposed explanation must satisfy. Most of this disagreement, especially in history and in the social sciences, concerns the so-called nomological and deductive models of satisfactory explanation. There is also a more general controversy: many—perhaps most—scientists and philosophers maintain that these models clearly apply to the natural sciences and should apply to the social sciences as well, while others insist that they do not apply to any science, natural or social. For the most part, however, I shall bypass this controversy and discuss the applicability of the two models to the social sciences. But first let us raise the logically prior question "What is an explanation?" There are three traditional answers to this: (1) to explain is to remove perplexity; (2) to explain is to change the unknown to the known; (3) to explain an event or type of event is to give its causes. The first two answers have the virtue of reminding us of the psychological conditions that frequently obtain when we request an explanation. But this virtue is, in a way, the defect of these two approaches: they are too psychological, in the sense that they do not stipulate the logical conditions that must obtain before we have a satisfactory explanation. Clearly, not every way of removing perplexity can count as an explanation. Again, it should be noted that both of these approaches fail to point out that when we explain an event or type of event, we attempt to relate it to others like it and to give a systematic account of phenomena which will show how they are interrelated. In short, these answers fail to emphasize the systematic interconnection between explanation and theory construction. The third answer does not share in these defects. The thesis that to explain an event is to give its cause is one that goes back to Aristotle and has been defended at length by Mill (1843) and other distinguished logicians. But this approach, whatever its virtues, cannot count as an adequate theory of explanation. At best it is a partial account of the explanation of events, but not of regularities, dispositions, and other types of phenomena
118
SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION
which we try to explain. Moreover, since the term "cause" is not in itself a very clear one, a theory which builds on it without attempting any explication of it is not a reliable guide. However, many philosophers and social scientists have been convinced by the arguments offered by Hume and his followers that a causal statement entails a lawlike one, i.e., that a statement of the form "Event A caused event B" entails a statement of the form "Events like A regularly precede and are contiguous with events like B." If this analysis be granted, then the approach to explanation which emphasizes causation is compatible with the deductive and nomological models. Nomological and deductive models. Supporters of the nomological model of scientific explanation insist that no event or regularity is explained by a proposed explanation unless it contains a scientific law (nomos is Greek for law). Supporters of the deductive model accept this but go further; they maintain that an event or regularity is explained if a sentence describing that event or regularity is deduced from a set of premises containing (a) a scientific law and (b) any other premises that may be required to make the deduction logically correct (provided, of course, that these premises are true). Thus, given a sentence P that can be used to describe an event, the nomological model states that the event is not explained by a series of sentences Sl, S 2 , • • • , Sn unless this series contains a scientific law. To this the deductive model adds that if S-L , S2, • • • , Sn contains one or more laws, and if P can be deduced from S a , S 2 , • • • , Sn, then 8-1,82, '' • , Sn is a satisfactory conjunction of explaining sentences. This assumes that P stands for a sentence describing a particular event. When we want to explain not an event, but a trend or a regularity, all the sentences needed, both descriptive and explanatory, would of course be far more complex, but the over-all form of the explanation would stay the same. On occasion some defenders of the deductive or the nomological models add that the explaining premises S x , S2, • • • , Sn must contain or constitute a theory. But this addition does not clarify matters at all, because the meaning of the term "theory" is itself unclear. Sometimes the term is applied to any systematically interconnected set of sentences; sometimes it appears to mean the same as "hypothesis"; sometimes it is used interchangeably with "law." Clearly, if "theory" and "law" are to be used interchangeably, acceptance of either the deductive or the nomological model requires us to believe that when we explain, we appeal to or use a theory. Since the term "theory" has so many
uses, it is perhaps best to avoid using it in this context and to say simply that the premises of nomological and deductive explanations contain laws. Candor demands, however, the admission that we are far from a completely satisfactory statement of either model. Thus, in the nomological model the meaning of "law" is just as much in dispute as that of "theory," while in the deductive model the kinds of sentences that may appear in the series Sj, So, • • • , Sn need to be specified in greater detail. On the other hand, there is little point in being concerned with such details if this whole approach to explanation is not valid. To see whether it is, I shall try to remove some misunderstandings about the nature of the nomological and deductive models, and in so doing to counter some of the arguments against them and admit the truth of others, at least in qualified form. Do the models involve determinism? Both the deductive and the nomological models have been criticized on the grounds that they involve commitment to determinism. But this criticism is irrelevant. One may accept either model and still be agnostic about the thesis that every event is covered by laws—a thesis frequently given as one specification of determinism. Thus, philosophers who accept this thesis frequently argue that any sentence truly descriptive of an event is in principle deducible from some series of sentences containing one or more laws. But clearly this is not the same as claiming, with the supporters of the nomological and deductive models, that if a sentence truly descriptive of an event is deduced from a series of sentences containing a law, then the event is explained. Of course, many defenders of the nomological and deductive models do accept an even stronger version of determinism than the thesis that every event is covered by laws. But they often accept it as a "guiding principle of inquiry," to use C. S. Peirce's phrase. Thus, they may insist that the scientist should not merely seek a variety of general laws for explaining various events and regularities but should construct and confirm one general theory that would explain all events and regularities, or at least all those within the purview of a particular science. But obviously a guiding principle is not the same thing as an article of faith, and many supporters of the nomological and deductive models agree that there may very well be no such general theory or theories for scientists to discover. Can social scientists use the models? The deductive and nomological models are sometimes
SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION criticized on the grounds that social scientists have not succeeded in confirming any laws and therefore cannot use either model. To this it can be objected that some social scientists at least claim to have discovered laws, and that in any case only true or completely acceptable explanations, of which social scientists admit to having provided very few, are supposed to conform to the models' requirements. But though the criticism as it stands is irrelevant, it does indicate that it is not enough to consider only true explanations or fully acceptable ones; we must consider not only the truth of proposed explanations but also their degrees of acceptability. Clearly, when a scientist proposes an explanation and employs a generalization, he obviously does not know that the generalization is true and, hence, that he is in possession of a law. The nomological and deductive models must therefore be supplemented, as follows. Let us use the term "lawful statement" to denote any highly confirmed lawlike statement—that is, any statement that (a) would be a law if it were true and ( b ) has in fact been found to hold true on numerous occasions. Explanations containing such statements have, other things being equal, a high degree of acceptability, and many of them also turn out to be true explanations—that is, the lawful sentences that they contain are true. But, of course, explanations that at one time were highly acceptable because the lawlike sentences they contained were at that time highly confirmed may turn out to be false (a classic case of this is Newtonian mechanics). This distinction between explanations that are acceptable at a given time and true explanations that simply conform to the deductive model is not ad hoc. Rather, it corresponds to the distinction, usually applied to statements, between "true" and "well confirmed." Here it may be objected that social scientists do not refer to laws and, hence, that it is misleading to appeal to laws when discussing the logic of social scientific explanation. But this objection is a weak one. Social scientists tacitly employ many laws that are so well known that no special reference to them is needed. Furthermore, it should be emphasized that many social scientists do in point of fact refer to laws—economists, for instance, to Say's law of markets, and sociologists to Michels' "iron law of oligarchy." It may also be objected that the distinction between a highly confirmed generalization and a lawlike one is artificial. But once again the answer is readily available. Thus, in everyday life we would not treat the generalization "All American presidents are Christian" as lawlike
119
or as a candidate for a law, even though all the evidence to date for it is positive and, in that sense, it is well confirmed. Observe further that the distinction we are discussing here is parallel to, although admittedly identifiable with, the frequently made distinction between causal statements, on the one hand, and statements of mere association, or statements of correlations which may be spurious, on the other. What, then, are we to make of proposed explanations that do not contain lawful statements? We certainly do not always know on what law, if any, an investigator has based his explanation of certain data, even if we are inclined to accept what he says. As an argument against the nomological and deductive models this is not a very strong one, since most social scientists would admit that such proposed explanations should be replaced by more carefully stated ones. Besides, if the acceptability of such an explanation depends, as it usually does, on the degree to which it approximates a nomological or a deductive explanation, then it cannot be called an alternative to these latter, but merely an inferior substitute for them. Motivational explanations. It is a commonplace that social scientists offer motivational explanations, but it is not at all obvious how such explanations should be interpreted from a logical point of view. Note first that when a motivational explanation is offered, there is no necessary commitment to the thesis that there are private internal entities called motives which are responsible for behavior or action; all that is involved is some reference to the wants, preferences, or aims of the individual or group whose action is being described or explained. In this sense all Freudian theory, for instance, makes tacit or explicit reference to motives, and so do all explanations by economists that refer to the utility of the agent or group whose behavior is being discussed. Similarly, tacit reference is made to the aims of a person when sociologists or social psychologists appeal, in order to make sense of his behavior, to the reference group with which he identifies himself. What then are we attributing to a person when we attribute a motive to him? The answer can readily be suggested: we are attributing to him a disposition to behave in a certain way or a disposition to prize certain outcomes over others. But this constitutes another possible objection to the nomological and deductive models. When a motivational explanation is offered, no appeal is made to a general law about the way human beings behave but, rather, to a dispositional statement about an individual. But it is very difficult to give the exact grounds upon which we can distinguish
120
SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION
between laws and dispositional statements. Admittedly, it seems possible to do without general laws if we restrict our attention to those cases in which the action seems to have been inspired by only one motive and in which there is no need, for explanatory purposes, to consider what the agent thought about the alternative ways available to him for the satisfaction of his motive. But when we consider the more usual cases of action—action performed out of many motives and action after deliberation about alternatives—-it will not do to consider only the agent's disposition. Can we handle both these latter cases by reference to law? The answer is not clear. Some social scientists have thought it plausible to assume, as at least a first approximation, that insofar as people are rational, they try to maximize expected utility. But many suspect that the generalization tacitly appealed to here is a disguised tautology. Nevertheless, the defense of this generalization, or of alternatives to it, indicates that in order to explain actions for which there are many motives, some social scientists do look for laws and, hence, act in accord with the deductive model. Others suggest that we should not seek general laws but construct ideal types instead [see TYPOLOGIES]. To construct an ideal type explanation for an action A by a person P is (1) to impute at least one motive, T, to P; (2) to list the alternatives confronted by P; (3) to show that an action of the same type as A is a rational one—perhaps the only rational one—for P to perform, given T; (4) to show that performing A, given alternatives A,, A 2 , An, is an efficient way of satisfying T. If, given the same motive and set of alternatives, P does not perform A, defenders of the ideal type approach would suggest that we must institute a search for the factors making for irrationality on the part of P. One argument against this version of the ideal type model of explanation is that the motive imputed to the agent may in fact be the wrong one; another is that the model is incomplete unless the terms "rational" and "efficient" are explicated. Moreover, ideal type explanation sometimes appears to depend on a general law about the behavior of 'rational agents and, hence, to approximate either the deductive model or, at least, the nomological one. Functional explanations. Conclusions similar to those drawn above can, I think, be applied to so-called functional explanations, for these either lack prima-facie acceptability or, when they have it, are not evidently at variance with the deductive or nomological models. Thus, a common type of functional "explanation" may state merely that a certain institution plays an indispensable role in
a society. Such a statement provides us with nothing more than a necessary condition and, hence, lacks prima-facie acceptability as an explanation. However, the stronger types of functional explanation do show that, holding certain things constant, the presence of a certain mechanism is a sufficient condition for the existence of a certain state of affairs. In my opinion, explanations of this type conform to the deductive model, for to say that S is a sufficient explanatory condition for T is, I think, equivalent to saying that the statement "If S, then T" is not only true but also lawful. Of course, we need more complex laws than the ones thus far discussed if we are to provide descriptions and explanations of events in systems that are purposive and self-corrective. But it is far from obvious that this requires a special kind of explanation called ideological, or functional, explanation, and even less obvious that societies—-at least complex ones—can be analyzed in teleological terms. Certainly, societies are not totally purposive, nor do such purposes as they may sometimes be said to have (making war, for example) always remain the same. At most, societies may tend to reorganize themselves in order to keep certain properties constant. But it is hard to say which properties these are [see SYSTEMS ANALYSIS, especially the article on SOCIAL SYSTEMS]. Causal explanation. It has been maintained at least since Aristotle that to explain an event is to give its causes. But this does not necessarily involve controverting the nomological or the deductive models, since it can be argued that to give the causes for an event is to present a deductive explanation containing a causal law. Given this approach, we may then try to explicate the uses of the term "causal law." A statement is occasionally called a causal law if it specifies either a sufficient condition or necessary and sufficient conditions for a certain type of occurrence. In logic, such a statement may take any of these forms: (1) if A then JB; (2) A if and only if B; (3) A is a function of B (when A and B stand in the place of terms designating measurable properties). Deterministic laws, which describe how a system, with states that are described mathematically, evolves over time, are also called causal laws. Finally, the term "causal" is applied to laws of the form "if A then B" when (1) A denotes a type of event that comes just before an event of type B; (2) A and B are events or episodes in bodies or agents that are spatially contiguous; (3) the occurrence of A is to be considered a sufficient condition for the occurrence of B even though an event of type B might occur without one of type A
SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION preceding it. Stimulus-response generalizations frequently meet these three criteria—criteria that represent perhaps the most legitimate use of the term "causal law." Not all explanations that appeal, whether overtly or tacitly, to the notion of cause make use of causal laws in any of the senses discussed above. Accordingly, it is not evident that all causal explanations should conform to the nomological model, and still less to the deductive. Nevertheless, the view I am advocating has good philosophical precedent. At least since Hume many philosophers have argued that to assert of an event, A, that it caused another event, B, is equivalent to appealing tacitly to a law of the form "Events of type A are sufficient conditions of events of type B and precede them." This view is not completely persuasive. Often we say that an event A caused an event B when we mean only that the event A was a necessary condition for the event B. Also, we sometimes refer to an event A as the cause or a cause of an event B when we mean to assert that A was either a sufficient or a necessary condition for the occurrence of B only when conjoined with other such conditions. Moreover, when we say that A caused B, we are often unprepared to specify a general law relating events of type A to events of type B. Thus, we might be convinced that a given remark had caused the hearer to blush, but we might not be ready at the same time to cite a general law about the relation between remarks and- blushing. Nevertheless, it does seem that when we specify a cause for an event and believe that this specification provides us with an explanation of the event, we tacitly commit ourselves to some generalization, however vague. Thus, to revert to the illustration given above, a person who insists that X blushed because Y said something might be challenged by Z to the effect that X didn't blush the last time he heard a similar remark, and that therefore the present remark couldn't have been responsible for his blushes. But this observation, though it helps to diminish the distance between explanations that contain causal laws and explanations that merely appeal to the notion of cause, does not abolish that distance completely. Whether it can ever be abolished is still under debate. Statistical explanation. The status of statistical explanation, and its relation to nomological and deductive explanation, are topics subject to much philosophical controversy. Statistical explanations are explanations containing lawlike statements based on observation of statistical regularities and/or on the statistical theory of probability. It is generally accepted that probabilistic statements, as interpreted in the sci-
121
ences, cannot be finally confirmed or even disconfirmed by observational evidence. It is also accepted that we cannot deduce from any statistical generalization a statement to the effect that any particular event must occur. [See PROBABILITY.] It is not so widely recognized, however, that the problem of statistical explanation is much harder to deal with in the case of statistical generalizations that are either spatially or temporally restricted. Thus, if we knew that 90 per cent of the people in Milwaukee are Democrats and that 85 per cent of all living graduates of Yale University are Republicans, we could not use these generalizations as they stand to explain the voting habits of Yale graduates living in Milwaukee. It is therefore most important, when discussing statistical explanations, to appeal to the nomological, and not the deductive, model, for clearly we cannot expect to construct deductive explanations on every occasion when we use statistical generalizations for explanatory purposes. However, it would be a mistake to think that we can never have a deductive explanation under these circumstances, for we may deduce a statistical generalization from a conjunction of two or more other statistical generalizations. It is important to note that we have not discussed the very complex but relatively typical situation that arises when social scientists who are using statistical data in an attempt to distinguish between the effects of several factors note that one factor is more relevant than the others for the purpose of explaining the phenomenon. Discussion of this and other such situations has been omitted because their logic is under much dispute. Many of the issues involved have been considered by Nagel (1952), though for some of the problems that are raised by statistical data and their analysis, the interested reader should consult works by Blalock (1964) and Boudon (1965; see also Ando etal. 1963). Amplifying the models. We have discussed some objections to the nomological and deductive models; it is now time to consider amplifying them in order to meet these objections. Let us begin by emphasizing the trivial point that we never explain an event as such, but only selected aspects of it. In other words, it is not the event itself that is explained but the event under a given description. Thus, if a person sits aown on a. tack and yells, we may say that he yelled because he sat on the tack. But we obviously are not ready to claim that we can explain the specific pitch or duration of the yell in the same terms. Observe, however, that an explanation may be totally satisfactory once we specify what aspect of the event we are trying to explain. This is of special
122
SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION
relevance to the discussion of historical explanation. Historians have often noted that any event can be described in many ways and that some explanations of events are satisfactory only if the events are described schematically. Thus, we might be able to explain that a group migrated because it hoped to improve its lot but not be able to explain why it migrated on a specific date and to a specific country. Some historians, noting that there seems to be no end to the detail in which a given event can be described, have concluded that, for this reason, no event can ever be explained, nor can the causes of an event be fully specified. Against this view, I would like to urge that we discuss not the explanation of an event but the explanation of an event under a given description. This would allow us to accept some explanations as totally satisfactory even if we wanted to replace them with explanations of the same event under a more refined description. Finally, it should be noted that in order to give an explanation of an event of a certain type, it is not necessary to cite laws or theories about events of that type. This is often overlooked in discussion of how to explain certain social phenomena; for instance, many social scientists seem to believe that in order to explain instances of crime or divorce, they need a general theory of crime or divorce. But this is dubious. To explain why a man slipped on a banana peel, we do not need a general theory of slipping. Rather, the laws that we need to cite are general laws in which terms like "slipping" do not occur. The essential point is that in order to explain an event, we often must redescribe it in terms of a given theory; moreover, two events that in ordinary life are both classified under the same general term may, for purposes of explanation, have to be described differently and explained by different general theories. To take an everyday example: A man who hurries to meet a friend and a man who flees to avoid disaster may both be running, yet the explanations for their behavior are different. More complicated examples, requiring explanations based on abstract theories, would require that the events needing explanation be redescribed in terms drawn from those theories. Although this type of redescription was not required in our example, the point remains that two events ordinarily classified as instances of the same type may have different explanations. The same applies to explanations involving not events but groups, epochs, social systems, and societies; we must specify what aspects of these entities we want to have explained. SIDNEY MORGENBESSER
[Directly related are the entries CAUSATION; EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN; FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS, article OU VARIETIES OF FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS; PREDICTION;
SCIENCE, article on THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE. Other relevant material may be found in HISTORY, article on THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY; MOTIVATION; MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS; POSITIVISM; STATISTICS,
DESCRIPTIVE; and the biographies of COHEN; PEIRCE.] BIBLIOGRAPHY
ANDO, ALBERT; FISHER, F. M.; and SIMON, HERBERT A. 1963 Essays on the Structure of Social Science Models. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press. -» See especially pages 5-31 and 107-112. ARGYLE, MICHAEL 1957 The Scientific Study of Social Behaviour. London: Methuen. BLALOCK, HUBERT M. JR. 1964 Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press. BOUDON, RAYMOND 1965 A Method of Linear Causal Analysis: Dependence Analysis. American Sociological Review 30:365-374. BRAITHWAITE, R. B. 1953 Scientific Explanation. Cambridge Univ. Press. BROWN, ROBERT R. 1963 Explanation in Social Science. Chicago: Aldine. BUNGE, MARIO 1959 Causality: The Place of the Causal Principle in Modern Science. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. -> A paperback edition was published in 1963 by World. CHRIST, CARL F. 1966 Econometric Models and Methods. New York: Wiley. -» See especially the Foreword by Jacob Marshak. COHEN, MORRIS R.; and NAGEL, ERNEST 1934 An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method. New York: Harcourt. -» The first part of the original text was published in a paperback edition in 1962 by Harcourt, under the title An Introduction to Logic. DRAY, WILLIAM 1957 Laws and Explanation in History. Oxford Univ. Press. FEIGL, HERBERT; and MAXWELL, GROVER E. (editors) 1962 Scientific Explanation, Space, and Time. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 3. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press. H» See especially pages 231-273, "Explanation, Prediction and 'Imperfect Knowledge,'" by May Brodbeck. FODOR, JERRY A.; and KATZ, JERROLD J. (editors) 1964 The Structure of Language: Readings in the Philosophy of Language. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: PrenticeHall. GIBSON, QUENTIN B. (1960) 1963 The Logic of Social Inquiry. New York: Humanities. GREENWOOD, ERNEST 1945 Experimental Sociology: A Study in Method. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. HEMPEL, CARL G. (1952) 1963 Typological Methods in the Social Sciences. Pages 210-230 in Maurice A. Natanson (editor), Philosophy of the Social Sciences: A Reader. New York: Random House. HEMPEL, CARL G. 1965 Aspects of Scientific Explanation, and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. New York: Free Press. KAPLAN, ABRAHAM 1964 The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science. San Francisco: Chandler. LOWE, ADOLPH 1965 On Economic Knowledge. New York: Harper.
SCREENING AND SELECTION MADDEN, EDWARD H. 1962 Philosophical Problems of Psychology. New York: Odyssey. -> See especially Chapter 3. MILL, JOHN STUART (1843) 1961 A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation. London: Longmans. -» See especially Book 6. MORGENBESSER, SIDNEY 1966 Is It a Science? Social Research 33:255-271. NAGEL, ERNEST (1952) 1953 The Logic of Historical Analysis. Pages 688-700 in Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck (editors), Readings in the Philosophy of Science. New York: Appleton. -* First published in Scientific Monthly. NAGEL, ERNEST 1961 The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation. New York: Harcourt. -» See especially pages 582-588. POINCARE, HENRI (1908) 1952 Science and Method. New York: Dover. -» First published in French. POPPER, KARL R. (1934) 1959 The Logic of Scientific Discovery. New York: Basic Books. ->• First published as Logik der Forschung. REICHENBACH, HANS 1951 Probability Methods in Social Science. Pages 121-128 in Daniel Lerner and Harold D. Lasswell (editors), The Policy Sciences: Recent Developments in Scope and Method. Stanford Univ. Press. SCHOEFFLER, SIDNEY 1955 The Failures of Economics: A Diagnostic Study. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. SEGERSTEDT, TORGNY T. 1966 The Nature of Social Reality. Copenhagen: Munksgaard. SKINNER, B. F. 1953 Science and Human Behavior. New York: Macmillan. TOULMIN, STEPHEN E. 1953 The Philosophy of Science: An Introduction. London: Longmans. -» A paperback edition was published in 1960 by Harper. WINCH, PETER 1958 The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy. London: Routledge; New York: Humanities. WOLMAN, BENJAMIN B.; and NAGEL, ERNEST (editors) 1965 Scientific Psychology. New York: Basic Books. -» See especially "Concerning an Incurable Vagueness in Psychological Theories," by Benbow F. Ritchie, and "Mathematical Learning Theory," by Richard C. Atkinson and Robert C. Calfe.
SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT See ADMINISTRATION, article on THE ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION; AUTOMATION; BUSINESS MANAGEMENT; OPERATIONS RESEARCH.
SCREENING AND SELECTION Screening and selection procedures are statistical methods for assigning individuals to two or more categories on the basis of certain tests or measurements that can be made upon them. Of concern usually is some desired trait or characteristic of the individuals that cannot be measured directly. All that can be done is to obtain an estimate for each individual from the results of the available tests
123
and then to make the assignment on the basis of these estimates. The central statistical problem is to evaluate the properties of alternative schemes for utilizing the available data to make the assignments in order to choose the scheme that best achieves whatever objectives are considered to be most relevant for the particular application. For example, some educational selection schemes may be regarded in this light. The individuals might be high school students and the categories "admit to college" and "do not admit to college." The desired trait is future success in college, but only tests at the high school level are available. (As will be seen, many examples of selection and screening are somewhat more complex than this, particularly in their use of more than one level of screening. In this educational context one might instead use three categories: "admit," "put on waiting list," and "do not admit.") Denote by N the number of individuals to be assigned and let c be the number of categories. For any individual, let Y denote the unknown value of the desired trait and let X a , • • • , Xp denote the measurements or scores that can be obtained and used as predictors of Y. The screening or selection procedure is a scheme that specifies in terms of X-i, • • • ,XP how each individual is to be assigned to one of the c categories. The screening may be done at one stage—that is, all the measurements X ± , • • • , Xv become available before an individual is assigned—or it may be multistage. The advantage of a multistage procedure is that it may allow some individuals to be assigned at an early stage or, at least, to be eliminated from contention for the categories of interest, thus permitting the resources available for performing the tests to be concentrated on fewer individuals in the later stages. The terms screening and selection are largely synonymous, although in particular applications one or the other may be preferred. Sometimes, in order to avoid the possible connotation that certain categories may be more desirable than others, a neutral term such as allocation is used. The term classification has a different shade of meaning, referring to the identification of which of several distinct distributions each individual belongs to (in taxonomy, for example, classification involves the assignment of an organism to its proper species) [see MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS, article on CLASSIFICATION AND DISCRIMINATION]. Various formulations of screening and selection problems have been proposed and investigated. A bibliography containing more than five hundred references has been given by Federer (1963). Of
124
SCREENING AND SELECTION
special interest is the case c — 2, in which the individuals are separated into two categories, a selected group and the remainder; the success of the screening procedure is judged by the values of Y for the individuals in the selected group. This article will be primarily devoted to this case of two categories. The case where N is large This section deals with the case of separation into two categories where either the number, N, of individuals is large enough for their Y-values to be considered as forming a continuous distribution or, alternatively, the N individuals themselves are considered as a random selection from a conceptually infinite population. The object of the screening procedure is to produce a distribution of Y-values in the selected group that is, in an appropriate sense, an improvement on the original distribution. For example, one might want the selected group to have as high a median Y as possible. In many applications, tiie feature of the distribution of Y that is considered most important is its mean. For example, in a plant-breeding program, Y might stand for the crop yield of the individual varieties, and the purpose of the program might be to select a set of varieties whose mean Y is as high as possible. The difference in the mean Y for the selected varieties from that of the original group is referred to as the "advance" or the "gain due to selection." Cochran (1951) summarized the mathematical basis for selection procedures designed to maximize the mean Y in the selected set. He showed that the optimum selection rule to use at each stage should be based on the regression of Y on the X's that are known at that stage. In the case where the joint distribution of these variates is multivariate normal, this regression is the linear combination of the X's that has maximum correlation with Y. [See MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS, articles on CORRELATION.]
Plant selection. In a plant-breeding program for improving the yield of a particular crop, a large number of potential new varieties become available in any year. These are tested in successive plantings, and the better-yielding types in each planting are selected to produce the seed for the next sowing, until finally a small fraction of the original number remain as possible replacements for the standard varieties in commercial use. Finney (1966) and Curnow (1961) have carried out an extensive theoretical and numerical investigation of a fairly general type of selection procedure that is particularly applicable to plant
selection. The problem is to reduce in k stages an initial set of N candidates to a predetermined fraction, TT, called the "selection intensity," using a fixed total expenditure of resources, A. At stage r (I ^ r ^ k), the candidates selected at stage r — 1 are tested, using resources Ar, to obtain for each a score, X r , which estimates Y with a precision dependent upon A , ; the fraction, P r (0 < Pr ^ 1), having the highest scores are selected, and the remainder are discarded. Stage 0 consists in selecting at random a fraction, P ( ,, of the initial set. The problem is to choose Pr and Ar to maximize the expected mean Y-value in the selected group, subject to AT + • • • + A7c = A and P0 P t • • • P/£ = TT , where A and TT are given. The authors found that approximately optimum results were obtained with Ar = A/k, P,. = \/TT, for r — 1, • • • , k, called the "symmetric" scheme, usually with P0 — 1, although in some circumstances a value P0 < 1 effected further improvement. Three or four stages at most were sufficient. In the context of plant selection, the N candidates are the new crop varieties produced in a particular year, and the resource expenditure, A, is the area of land available for testing, which must be divided into separate portions for varieties being tested for the first time, varieties selected on the basis of last year's tests to be tested in stage 2, and so on. For example, suppose N = 200 varieties are started in a two-year program to select 8 to compare with the standard commercial types (thus, TT = .04). Then at the end of each year, V-04 = ^ of the varieties should be selected—-that is, 40 at the end of the year 1 and 8 at the end of year 2— with equal areas of land to be divided among the 200 varieties in year 1 and the 40 varieties in year 2. Drug screening. In drug screening, the problem is to screen a large supply of chemical compounds by means of a biological test, usually in laboratory animals, in order to select for further testing the few that may possess the biological activity desired. Here Y stands for the unknown activity level of a compound (averaged over a conceptual population of animals), estimates being provided by the test results, X t , X 2 , • • • . The distribution of Y in the population of compounds available for screening will usually have a large peak at Y = 0, since most of the compounds do not possess the activity being sought unless a specific class of compounds chemically related to known active compounds is being screened. The number of compounds available for testing usually exceeds the capacity of the testing facilities; therefore, part of the problem in drug screening is to determine the optimum number, N, of compounds to screen in a given period of time.
SCREENING AND SELECTION The mean Y in the selected group does not have as much relevance in drug screening as it does in plant selection. Instead, a value, a, is usually specified such that a drug is of interest if its activity equals or exceeds level a. The screening procedure is then designed to maximize the number of compounds in the selected group having Y ^ a, usually subject to the requirement that the total number of compounds selected over a certain period of time is fixed. Davies (1958) and King (1963) have considered in detail this approach to the statistical design of drug-screening tests. Educational selection. The consideration of selection procedures to allocate school children to different "streams" is necessarily much more complex than in the applications considered above. For one thing, there can be no question of rejection; the object, at least in principle, is to provide the education most suitable for each child. Furthermore, it can be expected that the characteristic Y of each child will be altered by the particular stream in which he may be placed. An admirable discussion of the problems was given by Finney (1962), who described, as an illustration of the methodology, a simplified mathematical model of the educational selection process then in operation in the British school system. Finney considered university entrance as a twostage selection process: the first stage is the separation of students at the age of 11+ into those who will receive a grammar school education and those who will go instead to a secondary school, and the second stage is university entrance. Denoting by X-L the composite score of all test results available at the first stage, by X2 the composite score at university entrance, and by Y the "suitability" of a student for university study as determined by his subsequent university grades, Finney considered Y, X,, and X2 to have a multivariate normal distribution with correlation coefficients estimated from available data. He studied the effects that varying the proportion of students admitted to grammar school, as well as the relative proportions admitted to universities from the two types of school, had on the average value of Y in the selected group and on the proportion of university entrants having Y ^ a. Interesting numerical results are presented, but the main feature of the paper is its demonstration of how the approach can bring about a clearer insight into the issues involved in a selection process. The case where N is small Rather different methods of approach have been developed for selection when the number N is small
125
enough so that the individual values of Y, rather than their distribution, may be considered. The object of the selection procedure is expressed in terms of the Y's; for example, the object may be to select the individual with the largest value of Y, to select the individuals with the t largest values, or to rank the N individuals in order according to their values of Y. These are special cases of the general goal of dividing the N individuals into c categories, containing respectively the nl: individuals with the highest values of Y, the «<._-, individuals with the next highest values, and so on, down to the n, individuals with the lowest values of Y. Bechhofer (1954) developed expressions for the probability of a correct assignment of the N individuals to the c categories. Selecting the "best" of N candidates. Of most frequent interest in practical applications is the selection of the best of several candidates, "best" being interpreted to mean the one with the largest Y. Estimates of the unknown Y's are obtained from experimentation, and the problem usually is to decide how much experimentation needs to be done. In a single-stage selection procedure, an experiment consisting of taking n observations for each candidate is performed, and the candidate with the highest observed mean is selected. The probability of a correct selection is the probability that the candidate with the highest Y will also have the highest observed mean value; this is a function not only of the number n of observations but also of the unknown configuration of values of Y. Bechhofer (1954) recommended that the experimenter choose n so that the probability of a correct selection would exceed a specified value, P, whenever the best value of Y exceeded the others by at least a specified amount, d. His paper contains tables of the required value of n, calculated on the assumption that the Y's are in the "least favorable" configuration, which in this case is the configuration where all the Y's except the best one are equal and are less than the best one by the amount d. Another approach to determining the value of n is based on striking an optimum balance between the cost of taking observations, which is a function of n, and the economic loss incurred if some candidate other than the best one is selected. The loss due to an incorrect selection is assumed to be a function, usually linear, of the difference between the largest Y and the selected Y. With the probability of selecting any particular candidate taken into account, an expected loss or risk function, which is a function of n and the unknown Y's, is determined. Somerville (1954) showed how the minimax principle can be used to determine the
126
SCREENING AND SELECTION
optimum sample size; this procedure is appropriate out of three" basis achieved the highest probability if no prior information is available about the unthat the best player will win, but at the "expense" known Y-values [see DECISION THEORY]. In the case of requiring a higher average number of games. where prior information is available, Dunnett (1960) showed how such information can be uti- Other problems There are many other interesting topics in screenlized in determining the sample size; he also made ing and selection. One is group screening, in which numerical comparisons between alternative proa single test is performed on several candidates as cedures. a group to determine whether any of them possess Gupta (1965) considered the situation in which the characteristic of interest. When an affirmative the experimenter is willing to select a larger group answer is obtained, further tests are performed to than is actually needed and is concerned with determine which ones possess the characteristic. guaranteeing a specified probability, P, that the One application of this procedure is in blood testing best candidate is included in the selected group. for the presence of some disease; a great saving in In this way, the need to specify a minimum differthe number of tests necessary is accomplished by ence, d, as in Bechhofer's method, is avoided, but physically pooling several samples and making a there is the drawback of not necessarily having a single test. Another application is in factor screenunique selection. Gupta investigated the effect of ing in industrial research (see Sobel & Groll 1959; the sample size, n, and the configuration of the Y's on the expected size of the selected group. Watson 1961). In practice, many screening problems are multiSequential procedures have also been investivariate—-that is, there is more than one trait, Y, of gated; for example, Paulson (1964) considered a interest, and the traits are likely to be correlated. sequential method for dropping candidates from Sometimes the measurements on the several traits contention at each stage until only one remains, are reduced to a single variate by combination inso as to achieve a specified probability, P, that the to a suitable index, perhaps with weights deterbest one is selected whenever its value Y exceeds the others by at least d. [See SEQUENTIAL ANALYSIS.] mined by the economic worth of each trait. SomeA medical selection problem. An interesting times only one trait is dealt with at a time, the method (Colton 1963) for selecting the better of candidates considered for selection on the basis of two medical treatments uses some of the principles trait Y r being those who have previously been discussed above but also contains ingenious points selected on the basis of Y x , • • • , Y r _ x in turn. Much of difference. In the problem considered, there is work remains to be done to determine the best a fixed number of patients to be treated. A clinical procedures for use in multivariate screening. (See trial is performed on a portion of them, with equal Rao 1965 for a treatment of some of the mathenumbers being given each treatment. On the basis matical problems.) C. W. DUNNETT of the trial, one of the two treatments is selected to treat the remainder of the patients. The problem is to determine how many patients to include in the [See also CLUSTERING; MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS, artitrial in order to maximize the expected total numcle On CLASSIFICATION AND DISCRIMINATION; STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF, article OH ber receiving the better drug. Sequential proceOUTLIERS.] dures for making the selection are also discussed. Tournaments A tournament is a series of contests between pairs of N players (or teams) with the object either of selecting the best player or of ranking the players in order. It may be regarded as a selection procedure in which the experiments consist of paired comparisons between candidates. David (1959) studied some properties of two types of tournaments, the knockout and the round robin. Glenn (1960) compared the round robin and several variations of the knockout tournament for the case of four contestants; he found that a single knockout tournament with each contest being on a "best two
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BECHHOFER, R. E. 1954 A Single-sample Multiple Decision Procedure for Ranking Means of Normal Populations With Known Variances. Annals of Mathematical Statistics 25:16-39. COCHRAN, W. G. 1951 Improvement by Means of Selection. Pages 449-470 in Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability, Second, Proceedings. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. COLTON, THEODORE 1963 A Model for Selecting One of Two Medical Treatments. Journal of the American Statistical Association 58:388-400. CURNOW, R. N. 1961 Optimal Programmes for Varietal Selection. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B 23:282-318. -^ Contains eight pages of discussion.
SEASHORE, CARL E. DAVID, H. A. 1959 Tournaments and Paired Comparisons Biometrika 46:139-149. DAVIES, O. L. 1958 The Design of Screening Tests in the Pharmaceutical Industry. International Statistical Institute, Bulletin 36, no. 3:226-241. DUNNETT, C. W. 1960 On Selecting the Largest of k Normal Population Means. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B 22:1-40. -* Includes 10 pages of discussion. FEDERER, WALTER T. 1963 Procedures and Designs Useful for Screening Material in Selection and Allocation, With a Bibliography. Biometrics 19:553-587. FINNEY, D. J. 1962 The Statistical Evaluation of Educational Allocation and Selection. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A 125:525-549. -» Includes "Discussion on Dr. Finney's Paper," by T. Lewis et al. FINNEY, D. J. 1966 An Experimental Study of Certain Screening Processes. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B 28:88-109. GLENN, W. A. 1960 A Comparison of the Effectiveness of Tournaments. Biometrika 47:253-262. GUPTA, SHANTI S. 1965 On Some Multiple Decision (Selection and Ranking) Rules. Technometrics 7:225245. KING, E. P. 1963 A Statistical Design for Drug Screening. Biometrics 19:429-440. PAULSON, EDWARD 1964 A Sequential Procedure for Selecting the Population With the Largest Mean from k Normal Populations. Annals of Mathematical Statistics 35:174-180. RAO, C. R. 1965 Problems of Selection Involving Programming Techniques. Pages 29-51 in IBM Scientific Computing Symposium on Statistics, Yorktown Heights, N.Y., 1963 Proceedings. White Plains, N.Y.: IBM Data Processing Division. SOBEL, MILTON; and GROLL, PHYLLIS A. 1959 Group Testing to Eliminate Efficiently All Defectives in a Binomial Sample. Bell System Technical Journal 38: 1179-1252. SOMERVILLE, PAUL N. 1954 Some Problems of Optimum Sampling. Biometrika 41:420-429. WATSON, G. S. 1961 A Study of the Group Screening Method. Technometrics 3:371-388.
SEASHORE, CARL E. Carl Emil Seashore (1866-1949), psychologist and leader in the development of American graduate education, was born in Morlunda, Sweden, where his family had been farmers for several generations. His parents migrated to Boone County, Iowa, in 1869, settling on an 80-acre farm in a Swedish community. Seashore's father acted as a lay Lutheran preacher and served as carpenter and cabinetmaker; he also had a considerable interest in music. Seashore's early education, in Swedish, included the memorization of chapters of the Bible, a cherished feat in Sweden. At the age of 13 he went to live in the home of a Lutheran pastor "to improve his English, manners, and music." A year later he
127
became a church organist. He helped to run his father's farm for a few years and then attended the Lutheran college Gustavus Adolphus at a time when, according to his autobiography, "within an area of fifty square miles around our home only one man had gone to college . . ." (1930, p. 240). He received his A.B. in 1891. Seashore went on to Yale to study philosophy with George T. Ladd, who introduced him both to the new branch of philosophy called experimental psychology and to Edward W. Scripture, a new faculty member not much older than Seashore. Seashore, nearing 26, was stimulated by working both with a mature scholar like Ladd and with Scripture, who after studying at Leipzig with Wundt had come to Yale to start a psychology laboratory. In Seashore's five years at Yale a threefold foundation for his career as a psychologist was built. First, as Scripture's research assistant, he shared the problems of developing the laboratory course for psychology. In the laboratory he experimented in classical, physiological psychology through studies of visual accommodation time, perception of pressure and weight, and the laws determining illusions and hallucinations. He worked with Scripture on a spark chronometer and an audiometer. Second, in Ladd's seminar he undertook to defend the point of view that whereas evolution holds sway in all organic life, it does not apply to mental life. His conclusions, however, turned out to be the opposite of his initial hypotheses. Thus he developed a scholarly logic and a scientific Darwinian philosophy. While at Yale Seashore lived with a Swedish family and attended the Lutheran church. Here the third element of the foundation for his career was developed. Although unwilling to preach sermons, he at times lectured the congregation on the relationship of philosophy and psychology to everyday life and developed a form of presentation understandable to an intelligent but untrained audience. In 1895 he received his PH.D. and spent that summer visiting psychology laboratories in France and Germany. He then returned to Yale as a fellow in psychology. Two years later Seashore became assistant professor of philosophy at the State University of Iowa and thus an associate of George T. W. Patrick, professor of mental and moral philosophy and didactics at Iowa since 1887. Having taken work in psychology at Johns Hopkins with G. Stanley Hall, Patrick favored a strong development of the subject at Iowa and had set aside funds with which to build up a laboratory. Seashore developed several
128
SEASONAL ADJUSTMENT OF TIME SERIES
important pieces of apparatus for use in a laboratory course and for research studies. This original equipment soon made the Iowa Psychology Laboratory prominent in the profession. Of special note was the equipment designed for the study of musical abilities. In addition to his five papers on the problems of perception, published while he was at Yale, Seashore published papers in the University of Iowa Studies in Psychology, ten of them by the time he was promoted to professorial rank in 1902. In 1905 he became chairman of the department of philosophy and psychology, succeeding Patrick. Under Seashore's chairmanship, the department increased the number of higher degrees awarded. This strong interest in promoting graduate work led to his appointment, in 1908, as dean of the graduate school. In addition, he served as chairman of a committee on the teaching of psychology appointed by the American Psychological Association and in 1911 as the association's president. Seashore was a national leader in the field of graduate education as well as psychology. Under the auspices of the National Research Council, for example, he originated and carried out a project for gifted students, arguing that colleges and universities should devote as much attention to gifted students as to poor ones. He traveled widely both in his capacity as dean and in his efforts on behalf of the gifted student. Yet during this entire period he continued to do research and to publish. He saw possibilities for the enrichment of teaching and research by developing the psychological aspects of several fields of learning and human welfare. A psychological clinic was established to supplement the services undertaken by the local psychiatric hospital. Collaboration with the speech department resulted in a speech clinic. Seashore initiated and supported an experimental approach to many problems associated with the Iowa School of Music, and a section for applied psychology of music was organized. Similar developments took place in graphic arts, plastic arts, and physical education. Among Seashore's honors were several honorary degrees, including an SC.D. from Yale in 1935 and an MUS.D. from the Chicago Musical College in 1939. He was elected to the National Academy of Sciences and was a member of the Acoustical Society of America and the American Musicological Society, among others. He was also an honorary fellow of the British Psychological Society. WALTER R. MILES
[For the historical context of Seashore's work, see the biography of HALL.] WORKS BY SEASHORE
1893
On Monocular Accommodation Time. Yale University Psychological Laboratory, Studies From the Yale Psychological Laboratory 1:56-70. 1895 Measurements of Illusions and Hallucinations in Normal Life. Yale University Psychological Laboratory, Studies From the Yale Psychological Laboratory 3:1-67. 1896a Weber's Law in Illusions. Yale University Psychological Laboratory, Studies From the Yale Psychological Laboratory 4:62-68. 1896fc Influence of the Rate of Change Upon the Perception of Differences in Pressure and Weight. Yale University Psychological Laboratory, Studies From the Yale Psychological Laboratory 4:27-61. 1897 A New Factor in Weber's Law. Psychological Review 4:522-524. (1908) 1935 Elementary Experiments in Psychology. Rev. & enl. New York: Holt. 1912 Measure of a Singer. Science New Series 35:201212. (1913) 1925 Psychology in Daily Life. New York: Appleton. 1919 The Psychology of Musical Talent. Boston and New York: Silver, Burdett and Co. 1923 Introduction to Psychology. New York: Macmillan. 1927 Learning and Living in College: Psychology of Individual Differences Applied to the Organization and Pursuit of Higher Education. Iowa University Series on Aims and Progress of Research, No. 21. Iowa City, Iowa: The University. 1930 Autobiography. Volume 1, pages 225-297 in A History of Psychology in Autobiography. Worcester, Mass.: Clark Univ. Press; Oxford Univ. Press. 1931 The Graduate College in the State University of Iowa: A Survey of Thirty Years With Forecast. Pages 9-63 in John W. Ashton (editor), Trends in Graduate Work. Iowa University Series on Aims and Progress of Research, No. 33. Iowa City, Iowa: The University. 1938a A Preview to College and Life. Iowa University Series on Aims and Progress of Research, No. 55. Iowa City: Univ. of Iowa Press. 1938& Psychology of Music. New York: McGraw-Hill. 1940 The Junior College Movement. New York: Holt. 1941 Why We Love Music. Philadelphia: Ditson. 1942 Pioneering in Psychology. Iowa University Series on Aims and Progress of Research, No. 70. Iowa City: Univ. of Iowa Press. 1947 In Search of Beauty in Music: A Scientific Approach to Musical Esthetics. New York: Ronald Press. SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BATHURST, J. E.; and SINCLAIR, R. D. 1928 A Complete Annotated Bibliography of the Writings of Carl Emil Seashore. Psychological Monographs 39, no. 2:3-22. MILES, WALTER R. 1956 Carl Emil Seashore: 18661949. Volume 29, pages 265-316 in National Academy of Sciences, Biographical Memoirs. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. -> Includes a bibliography.
SEASONAL ADJUSTMENT OF TIME SERIES See under TIME SERIES.
SECHENOV, IVAN M. SECHENOV, IVAN M. Ivan Mikhailovich Sechenov (1829-1905), Russian physiologist, neurologist, and founder of objective physiological psychology, was born the son of a small landowner in the village of Tyoply Stan (now Sechenovo) in Simbirsk Province (now Arzamas Region). Taught first by private tutors, he mastered German and French in addition to Russian. At 14 he entered the St. Petersburg Military Engineering School. He served from 1848 to 1850 as a field engineer in a Kiev brigade. Then he resigned his military commission and from 1850 to 1856 studied medicine at the University of Moscow. He spent the next three and a half years doing postgraduate research and studying physiology, chemistry, and physics at Berlin, Heidelberg, Leipzig, and Vienna. Among his teachers were Johannes Miiller, Emil DuBois-Reymond, Hermann von Helmholtz, Carl F. W. Ludwig, Robert W. Bunsen, and Heinrich Magnus. Sechenov returned to Russia in 1860 to become at first adjunct and then full professor of physiology in the St. Petersburg Medico-Surgical Academy. Ten years later he resigned from that institution, giving as the reason, according to his Autobiographical Notes (1907), his distaste for its administrative policy and citing specifically the veto of his proposal to appoint Ilya I. Mechnikov to a vacant chair. (Mechnikov presumably was turned down because he was a Jew; later, in 1908, he won the Nobel prize.) For a while, Sechenov was without a professorial position and worked in the chemistry laboratory of his friend Dmitri Mendeleev, but he was soon appointed professor of physiology at the University of Odessa. He left that university in 1876 for the University of St. Petersburg and stayed there until 1888, when he resigned —alienated again by the academic atmosphere of St. Petersburg—and in 1889 moved finally to the University of Moscow. In 1862 Sechenov took a year's leave to do experimental work in the laboratory of Claude Bernard at the College de France. There he discovered "central inhibition," namely, that spinal reflex movement may be "inhibited"—diminished or stopped—by the stimulation of higher-neural inhibitory centers. Further experimentation led to the important conception of higher-neural action as an interplay of excitation and inhibition. [See NERVOUS SYSTEM, article on STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF THE BRAIN.] This view was taken over wholly by Pavlov and more recently has won increasing acceptance as a result of direct microelectric neural
129
probing. Sechenov's report on inhibition was published in German and French (1863a). Sechenov's physiological contributions soon became part of Western science. This is not true of his psychological essays—"Reflexes of the Brain" (1863b), "Who Must Investigate the Problems of Psychology, and How" (1873a), "Elements of Thought" (1878), and a number of others—which presaged the systems of psychology of Pavlov and Bekhterev and radically affected the world views not only of such distinguished men of science as Mendeleev, Mechnikov, Vladimir O. Kovalevskii, and Arkadii K. Timiriazev but also of such widely known men of letters as Turgenev, Gorki, and Tolstoi. Translated in part into French in 1884 and into English only in 1935, the radical Sechenov system of psychology was for years almost unknown outside Russia and had no influence whatever on Western and American thought in the field, from Wundt through James to Watson and the neobehaviorists. Only in 1950, in the second edition of Boring's A History of Experimental Psychology (1929), is Sechenov first mentioned in English in any significant sense. Recently, in A History of Psychology, by Esper (1964), a ninepage passage is devoted to his contributions, and it is asserted that Sechenov "wrote the first 'objective' psychology and became the first 'behaviorist' of modern times" (p. 324). Briefly stated, Sechenov's psychological system rests on five interrelated theses: (1) A consistent physical monism: Sechenov held that psychology will become a science only insofar as it studies the muscular and neural action of the psyche. He asserted that no "conceivable demarcation [from a scientific point of view] can be found between obvious somatic, i.e., bodily, nervous acts and unmistakable psychical phenomena" (1873b, p. 151). (2) Physiological and psychical reactions are both considered to be reflex actions: in Sechenov's words, "All movements bearing the name of voluntary in physiology are reflex in a strict sense" ([1907] 1965, p. 109), and a thought "is the first two-thirds of a psychical reflex" ([1863Z?] 1935, p. 321). (3) The reflex as the mechanism of association: "An association is," according to Sechenov, "an uninterrupted series of contacts of the end of every preceding reflex with the beginning of the following one" (ibid., p. 312). The actual experience of an event and the memory of it are both represented by identical psychical reflexes but are evoked by different stimuli.
730
SECTS AND CULTS
(4) The psychic as associative in genesis and central neural in mediation: perception and ideas emerge from associations of reflexes and their integration in the sensory sphere; both association and integration are mediated by the central nervous system. (5) A radical environmentalism: the largest part of thoughts and ideas, 999 parts out of 1,000, as Sechenov would have it, derives from training, and only a minimal part is due to heredity. Of these five theses, the first and last do, of course, have roots in earlier Western thought; the middle three are essentially original contributions by Sechenov. GREGORY RAZRAN [See also the biographies of BEKHTEREV and PAVLOV.] WORKS BY SECHENOV
1863« Physiologische Studien iiber die Hemmungsmechanismen fur die Reflexthdtigkeit des Riickenmarks im Gehirne des Frosches. Berlin: Hirschwald. -*• Also published as "Etudes physiologiques sur les centres moderateurs des mouvements reflexes dans le cerveau des grenouilles" in Volume 19 of the Annales des sciences naturelles. (1863b) 1935 Reflexes of the Brain. Pages 263-336 in Ivan M. Sechenov, Selected Works. Moscow: State Publishing House for Biological and Medical Literature. -» First published as "Refleksi golovnogo mozga" in Volume 3 of the journal Meditsinskii vestnik. (1873a) 1935 Who Must Investigate the Problems of Psychology, and How. Pages 337-391 in Ivan M. Sechenov, Selected Works. Moscow: State Publishing House for Biological and Medical Literature. -» First published as Komu i kak razrabatyvat' psikhologiiu? 1873b Psikhologicheskie etudy (Psychological Studies). St. Petersburg: Sushchinskii. (1878) 1935 Elements of Thought. Pages 401-498 in Ivan M. Sechenov, Selected Works. Moscow: State Publishing House for Biological and Medical Literature. -> First published as "Elementy mysli" in the journal Vestnik evropy. (1907) 1965 Autobiographical Notes. Washington: American Institute of Biological Sciences. -» First published posthumously as Avtobiograficheskie zapiski. Izbrannye filosofskie i psikhologicheskie proizvedeniia (Selected Physiological and Psychological Works). Moscow: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, 1947. Selected Works. Moscow: State Publishing House for Biological and Medical Literature, 1935. SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BORING, EDWIN G. (1929) 1950 A History of Experimental Psychology. 2d ed. New York: Appleton. -> See especially pages 635-636 on I. M. Sechenov. BUDILOVA, E. A. 1954 Uchenie I. M. Sechenova ob oshchushchenii i myshlenii (Sechenov's Views of Sensations and Thinking). Moscow: Akademiia Nauk SSSR. ESPER, ERVIN A. 1964 A History of Psychology. Philadelphia: Saunders. IAROSHEVSKII, M. G. 1961 Problema determinizma v psikhofiziologii XIX veka (The Problem of Determinism in the Psychology of the 19th Century). Dushanbe
(U.S.S.R.): Dushanbinskii Gosudarstvennyi Pedagogicheskii Institut. RAZRAN, GREGORY 1965 Russian Physiologists' Psychology and American Experimental Psychology: A Historical and a Systematic Collation and a Look Into the Future. Psychological Bulletin 63, no. 1:42-64. SHATERNIKOV, M. N. 1935 The Life of I. M. Sechenov. Pages ix-xxxvi in Ivan M. Sechenov, Selected Works. Moscow: State Publishing House for Biological and Medical Literature.
SECTS AND CULTS The term "sect" is used in the sociology of religion to designate a particular kind of religious group. This usage is both more precise and more technical than the use of the word in everyday speech. It is part of a typology of religious groupings which has been found useful in the study of religious movements and bodies. The term "cult" has also been given a special technical meaning as part of this typology, but it has remained less precisely defined, less useful, and less used in empirical research. Church and sect In his study of the relationship between Christianity and the world, Ernst Troeltsch (1912) examined the tensions, problems, and dilemmas that confronted the Christian church as it attempted to come to terms with four aspects of classical civilization : family life, economic activity, politics and power, and intellectual endeavor. He found this history characterized by two major tendencies which exhibited themselves in varied forms over a long period of time. The first was the tendency to come to terms with secular society and culture, although often with considerable qualification, and generally to compromise with the world; the second, a highly significant rejection by a minority of the whole spirit of compromise and an opposition to important aspects of the secular culture and its institutions. These tendencies found organized expression in two basic and contrasting sociological types, which Troeltsch called the church and the sect. The church represents the majority reaction and involves within its structure considerable variation of accommodation and compromise. It defines itself as the established expression of the relation between God and men, the institutional channel of divine grace, whose mission it is to enter the world in order to sanctify it. Thus, the church attempts to dominate the world with its values and is eventually dominated by the world to one extent or another. The church is characterized by what is vir-
SECTS AND CULTS tually membership on the basis of birth for the children of believers, although formally all are members through baptism. Thus, the practice of infant baptism is characteristic of churches, and churches become educational agencies. The church is the means for the administration of grace and exhibits the theological and sociological concomitants of this function: dogma and hierarchy. It is universal in its aspirations and addresses itself to the conversion of all. Consequently, its social structure is inclusive and often coincides with geographical or cultural entities or, as in the Middle Ages, with a whole civilization—Christendom. The sect, as defined in the sociological literature since Troeltsch, represents a contrapuntal ideal type to the church form of social organization. It is a voluntary society of strict believers who live apart from the world in some way. Its foundation upon contracted or upon freely elected membership marks a sharp contrast with the ecclesiastical body of the church, as does its smallness of size and its spirit of austerity and asceticism. The sect expresses defiance of the world or withdrawal from it, a greater or lesser rejection of the legitimacy of the demands of the secular sphere. It emphasizes a conversion experience prior to joining. Sociological theory presents the church as the ideal type of religious body accommodating to the world and the sect as the ideal type of the protest group, protesting both the church's accommodation to the world and the world itself. The sect's refusal to compromise with secular values and institutions may find expression in either an active or a passive form. Hence there are two fundamental sect types: the militant oppositionist sect, which is active in its antagonism to the world, and the passive sect, which prefers withdrawal to militant defiance. Accommodation of sects. H. Richard Niebuhr (1929), Liston Pope (1942), and others have delineated the sequential pattern in the course of which sects themselves are accommodated to the secular society and make their own compromise with the world. The birth of children to the sectaries, the better adjustment to conditions of life, including an increasing prosperity, and the passage of time itself—all contribute to a routinization of the sect into an established sociological entity which has accepted the social world in which it exists. Niebuhr observed that the sect, if defined rigorously in the terms presented here, cannot last beyond the founding generation. Pope's study would indicate that often considerable accommodation occurs in the lifetime of the founding generation. The routinized sect has been given the
1 31
name of denomination. Here once again, as in the use of the term sect, a word of common speech is given a more precise and technical designation. The typical picture presented in a number of sociological studies is that of the establishment of sects as protest groups against accommodation to the world and then their gradual acceptance of the world and their routinization as a reconciled part of it. This process is often associated with increasing wealth and respectability for the membership, in part at least the fruit of their ascetic and austere sectarian behavior. Established sects. However, the work of J. Milton Yinger (1946) and Bryan R. Wilson (1959; 1961) has shown that not all sects, by any means, go through this sequence from sect to denomination arid lose their earlier spirit of militancy and segregation. Some sects are successful in maintaining themselves over a long period of time in an established condition of opposition, or at least nonacceptance, with respect to secular society and its values. They become established sects, which, despite changes in their composition and milieu and the passing of the founding generation, retain a sectarian organization and an antagonistic or withdrawn posture in the face of the world. Of these established sects two types may be seen. There are those which secede from the world in a literal geographic sense and live in a territorial isolation in which they attempt to establish total communities after the model of their own values. The Amish, Hutterites, and others offer examples. There are also established sects such as the Jehovah's Witnesses and Christadelphians which remain within the general urban society and which nevertheless successfully maintain their opposition to it. Although such groups have not separated themselves geographically, they are separate in less palpable but not any less real ways, and they succeed in keeping their membership apart from genuine, intimate nonsectarian social participation. Sect ideology. All sects display a considerable degree of totalism in dominating the lives of their membership. Ideological domination is usually supplemented and supported on the social level by measures which set the group apart, such as endogamy, limitations on the forms of participation with outsiders, refusal to take part in significant common societal activities (military service, saluting the flag, or medical practice), peculiar habits of eating and abstinence, and with some groups, even peculiarities of dress. Related to these social forms of segregation is the notion of the sect members as comprising the "elect," some kind of religious elite.
132
SECTS AND CULTS
Social bases of sectarianism Sects are opposition groups, and they arise in opposition to the accommodation of churches or developing denominations, in rejection of some other aspects of their milieu, or in some combination of the two. Troeltsch has shown that the sect form asserted itself early in the Middle Ages. It is to be seen in the period of the Gregorian agitation (c. 1080) when the sectarianism of the Albigensians spread in Italy and France. This movement had complex social and religious sources. It was greatly affected by the reform efforts and struggles of Pope Gregory vii; it expressed the opposition of the devout laity to what they considered immorality and simony in the church; and it also represented the aggressive reaction of new urban classes against the established order in both church and city. This correspondence and interpenetration of religious and social interests has often been found associated with the origin and formation of sects. It has often been observed in the sociological literature that the sect is a lower-class protest phenomenon. The conditions of life of different social strata influence the psychological make-up and need dispositions of their members. Consequently, social classes and strata develop different religious needs and sensibilities. Niebuhr stated that the religion of the disinherited may be observed in the rise of many sects and that Christianity was at first the religion of those who had little stake in the civilization of their time. Troeltsch concluded that all really creative religious movements are the work of lower strata. Niebuhr stressed the importance of economic success in the transformation of protesting sects into denominations and pointed to the fact that the churches of the poor sooner or later become churches of the middle class. Functions of the sect. The sect exhibits complex functions in society. It often offers an outlet for strains and frustrations incumbent upon lowerclass status and for the condition of being socially and economically disinherited. In allowing catharsis, it at the same time provides a meaningful community, together with a set of values that promotes a personal reorganization of the members' lives and often their eventual reincorporation into the general society. Not only may the sect reconcile the disinherited to their situation through the various compensations of this-worldly community and other-worldly expectations, but it may also bring new meaning to them in its reinterpretation of their life experience. In doing this it may socialize its members in virtues which lead to economic and
worldly success. Moreover, the sect, with its close community of human beings and its new values which give meaning to life, offers a way out of anomie to many who have been disorganized in the impersonal milieu of the modern city. When the founding generation passes away, the established sect continues to perform similar functions for individuals who are attracted to it and provides for its born members the setting for acting out their established values. Sects may take on a number of new functions when their social composition and their specific social situation change over time. When established organizational conditions offer insufficient expression to the religious needs of people or when established institutions fail to meet needs of particular strata and groups at all, it is easy for charismatic leaders to arise and organize a following. Such developments issue in movements of protest of a marked sectarian character. The charismatic leader as a rallying focus and an active initiator plays a strategic role in the origin of sects and often impresses his own self-interpretation upon the group as the model for its behavior and beliefs. The accommodation and routinization of churches and the development of sects into denominations is often the occasion for schism, which is an important source of sectarian movements. Moreover, conditions and social change within the general society, altered economic status for particular groups, urbanization, increased mobility— geographic and psychological—and other phenomena associated with industrialization all contribute to the rise of sects. The sect as a sociological ideal type is therefore to be understood as the embodiment and expression of rejection of some significant aspect of secular life. It represents a protest against compromise with the society and its values and the institutional development of the church itself as an aspect of this accommodation. It is charismatic, lay, egalitarian, and voluntaristic religion in contrast to the established, professional, hierarchical, and ascribed religion of the church. In this typology the sect represents an ideal type: empirical reality and specific historical development present a greater variety than does the typology itself. Allied types of religious protest Many protest movements display sectarian characteristics but to different degrees and often in somewhat different respects. Most of the important protest movements in Christianity, while highly influenced by sectlike elements, endeavored to achieve organizational forms which also involved many of the characteristics of the church. Thus the
SECTS AND CULTS Reformed churches of the Protestant Reformation vary along a complex continuum from Anglicanism with its episcopate and quite ecclesiastical structure, at one end, to the sectlike organizations of the Baptists, at the other, with interesting combinations of church and sect attributes characterizing the inbetween groups, for example, the Churches of the Standing Order in colonial Massachusetts. Joachim Wach (1944) has called a number of them independent groups and has pointed out that they vary in form from churchlike hierarchical structures to egalitarian covenants of laymen. However, not all protest is secessionist in intention, nor does protest necessarily issue in separate organization outside the established bodies. Monasticism and the later religious orders offer an outstanding example of protest groups which remain within the older ecclesiastical body. Monasticism exhibits a number of sectarian qualities: it establishes a separate community, practices austerity and asceticism, and employs segregating rules and peculiarities of dress. Like the geographically isolated sects, it creates its own distinct community but remains dependent upon the larger body for replacement of personnel. In its origin Christian monasticism was both a protest against the accommodation of the church and a rejection of the world. Its relationship to the sacramental church was ambiguous, and it could have become a secessionist movement. But in the rule of Basil in the East and of Benedict in the West, it was reintegrated formally and solidly into the structure of the church. Here it continued to play a role of witness and to advocate reform. Moreover, it placed its enormous energy at the disposal of the church for missionary and other activity. In the High Middle Ages, the Franciscan movement represented a similar tendency. It was contained within the church at first by the personal character of its founder. Later on, its integration into the church was the cause of a great struggle in which both schism and heresy as well as reintegration of the order into the church resulted. Moreover, the routinization process from sect to denomination is also found in the history of religious orders. Such routinization is often the cause of schism and divisions and the rise of reforming leaders of the charismatic type. The Mormons. A religious body of a marked sectlike character which seeks geographical isolation may, when circumstances are propitious, develop into an entity resembling an ethnic group or even a nation. The Mormons, a sectlike group choosing to imitate the Biblical model of Israel, found themselves in circumstances where such recapitulation took on realistic significance. Perse-
133
cuted and driven from their settlements, achieving victories and suffering defeats, the Mormons built up in a decade and a half a folk tradition and mentality of their own. In moving to the West they found a vast unoccupied expanse of land upon which they could expand their vision of an earthly kingdom of God to imperial dimensions. As a result - the semiecclesiastical organization which developed was at the same time the organized core of a Mormon people held together by kinship ties, common beliefs and values, a common history of achievement and suffering, and a common homeland. The Mormon "Zionism" of the nineteenth century had led to a development from near sect to near nation. When the Mormons applied for admission of their state of Deseret to the federal union, they attempted to find a political form for their achievement which stopped just short of nationhood; and in times of stress and conflict, frankly separationist sentiment was widespread (O'Dea 1954). Churches have also become the core of ethnic groups, as under the Turkish millet system in the Middle East, which granted a degree of political autonomy to religious communities. Typological study of sects Wilson has shown that it is possible to distinguish types of sects on the basis of their ideological orientations. He does this within the context of Protestantism on the basis of the sect's self-definition, specifically its conception of its calling and mission. He distinguishes first the conversionist sect, which seeks to convert others and thereby to change the world; second, the adventist sect, which expects drastic divine intervention and awaits a new dispensation; third, the introversionist sect, which is pietistic in its orientation, withdrawing from the world to cultivate its inner spirituality; and the gnostic sect, which offers some special esoteric religious knowledge. Such sects will experience the effects of routinization differently and will also exhibit different structural tendencies to some degree (Wilson 1959; 1961). Moreover, since the terms church and sect are ideal-typical constructions, what is observed in real life situations only approximates the specifications of the theoretical definitions. Such ideal-typical concepts have an analogical character and are most useful for observation, analysis, and interpretation when utilized with flexibility. This analogical character of the Troeltschian concepts is best seen in the behavior of churches when placed in circumstances which elicit sectlike behavior from them. The Roman Catholic church in the United States in the nineteenth century found itself a minority
134
SECTS AND CULTS
religion, largely lower class in character, constituted in its vast majority by ethnic groups of recent immigrant origin, and therefore of lower prestige in the general American society. Moreover, the value system of American society was largely derived from Protestantism, and the various forms of Protestantism constituted something like an unofficially established national religion. The Roman Catholic church responded by separating itself from the surrounding Protestant world in a wide range of activities and by constructing its own institutional contexts for education from the primary grades through the university, for social welfare work, for hospitals and other institutions for aid, and for sports and entertainment. Moreover, the mentality of American Catholics took on a number of sectlike attributes, such as apartness and defensiveness, rigorism in morality, and militancy in religious identification. While this situation was in part conditioned by the defensive character of post-Tridentine Catholicism in Europe and by the Irish background of so many American Catholics, there is no question of the importance of American conditions in bringing about a sectlike result. It is significant in this connection that the first heresy conflict in many decades to be seen in American Catholicism concerned a student center at Harvard University which displayed a militant sectarian response to secularism in the intellectual sphere and against the church's accommodation to the secular world. This group ended in heresy and excommunication (O'Dea 1961). What has evolved from the time of Troeltsch is a typology of religious groups which has proven its utility in description and analysis in the sociological study of religion. It may be summarized briefly as follows: The church is the embodiment of institutional religion and accommodation to the world. It gives rise to protest groups and movements. These may vary from reformed churches to independent groups to sects, or they may give rise to groups which remain within the older body, affecting and reforming it in various ways. Sects may be either actively in opposition or passive and withdrawing with respect to the world. They may be geographically isolated, or they may exist within the general society, practicing forms of social separatism. Sects may go through a process of social mobility and routinization and develop into denominations, accepting in one way or another the secular society and its values. The sect may also institutionalize its oppositionist character and become an established sect. Under propitious circumstances a sect or near sect can develop into a
new ethnic or quasi-ethnic entity; it can become a people. While this typology has been useful and represents the contributions and insights of a number of sociologists and scholars, it remains unsatisfactory. Like all ideal type concepts, it is unwieldly to use in analysis and possesses severe limitations with respect to refinement or adaptation to mathematical use. What is necessary is to analyze these ideal-typical constructs and to state their components in terms of factors or variables. This would mean replacing the global concept with a number of dilemmas or choice points which give rise to one kind of organizational tendency rather than another or, in a like manner, breaking up the ideal types into tendencies which vary from group to group along a series of continua. A similar kind of analysis was made by Talcott Parsons with respect to the ideal type conceptions of Tonnies (Geraeinschaft and Gesellschaft^), which he broke down into five pattern variables. Such factors or variables would make it possible to compare groups with respect to a number of characteristics instead of the present, more cumbersome process of using ideal types as an analytical model. The cult. To this already complex typology, von Wiese and Howard Becker (1932) have added the cult. While this term has been less clearly defined, it has been most generally used in the scholarly literature to designate a more loosely organized and more individualistic group than those already discussed (this usage must be distinguished from the scholarly use of the world cult to refer to the ritual act of worship). Based on individual concerns and experiences, the cult is often transient, its membership often highly fluctuating. Belonging to the cult often does not involve an acceptance of common discipline and need not necessarily preclude membership in other kinds of religious groups. Both theosophy and New Thought have been labeled as cults. Wilson (1961) considers the cult a gnostic sect and, in his study of Christian Science in Great Britain, shows a group that combines aspects of bureaucratized organization with characteristics of both sect and cult. What is involved in this type of group may be best understood by returning to Troeltsch's original treatment, with which this article began. American sociologists have tended to make only a partial use of the paradigm of analysis introduced by Troeltsch and to develop only the implications of the churchsect dichotomy. Troeltsch, however, emphasized another kind of religious reaction to accommodation to the world
SECTS AND CULTS and routinization in the development of religious forms of expression. He speaks of mysticism, which is found particularly when the formalization of worship and doctrine makes individual religious experience difficult and unfruitful within the established forms. Just as the sect tends to be a lowerclass phenomenon (the religious form of those without a stake in the social system), so mysticism is characteristic of the educated classes. It has been an element enriching the life of the established religious bodies, as it has also been an expression of protest against them. It is of great significance in the development of the religious life of the Catholic church and was a tremendously important element in the Reformation and in post-Reformation Protestantism. When it does affect the lower classes and when found in religious movements of the poor, it often involves emotional excesses and a taste for heterodox novelties. The religious experience of worship and a relationship to the Deity, the gnostic experience involving secret knowledge and skill not available to all, and the mystical effort to achieve a personal relationship with God outside the established forms of worship and even of language are all obviously related. Consequently, some element of mysticism may be found in varied versions of the religious experience, although religious traditions placing their emphasis upon law often discourage mysticism, evidently fearing its antinomian possibilities. Sects in non-Christian cultures. Most of the work on sects in the sociological literature concerns Christian groups. It is obvious, however, that the typology refers to aspects and characteristics of religious groups and movements to be found outside the Christian tradition. Wach has pointed out that Zoroastrianism and Mahayana Buddhism have produced ecclesiastical bodies which fit the Troeltschian definition of the church in its main outlines and that groups in Islam and Confucianism have evolved semiecclesiastical bodies. Monasticism has been developed in a number of quite different religious and cultural traditions. Sects which fit many of the characteristics we have presented above may also be found in the other world religions. For example, in Islam the rise of Wahhabism represents an active oppositionist sect, while Bahai arose as a sect of the passive withdrawing character. Sectarianism in politics. Finally, it should be noted that the typology given here is to some extent applicable to organizations other than those of a religious character. Groups with situationally transcendent ideals seem to display similar organ-
135
izational types. This may be seen in political parties with some degree of utopianism in their programmatic aspirations. For example, social democratic parties in Europe were formed upon situationally transcendent ideals and in opposition to existing conditions. A degree of success both for membership and officialdom led to a process of routinization and accommodation analogous to that experienced by a church in the religious sphere (Michels 1911). As a consequence, protest movements developed, such as the Spartacus group in Germany, or even the Third International. Thus, the basic variables involved in this typology would appear to be found whenever organized expression of interests based upon situationally transcendent aspirations occurs. THOMAS F. O'DEA [Directly related are the entries MILLENARISM; RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION. Other relevant material may be found in COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR; MASS PHENOMENA; SOCIAL MOVEMENTS; and in the biographies of MANNHEIM; TROELTSCH; WEBER, MAX.] BIBLIOGRAPHY
BERGER, PETER L. 1954 The Sociological Study of Sectarianism. Social Research 21:467-487. BESTOR, ARTHUR E. JR. 1950 Backwoods Utopias: The Sectarian and Owenite Phases of Communitarian Socialism in America: 1663-1829. Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press. CLARK, ELMER T. (1937) 1949 The Small Sects in America. Rev. ed. Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon-Cokesbury. COHN, NORMAN (1957) 1961 The Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary Messianism in Medieval and Reformation Europe and Its Bearing on Modern Totalitarian Movements. 2d ed. New York: Harper. FRANCIS, E. K. 1950 Toward a Typology of Religious Orders. American Journal of Sociology 55:437—449. FREND, WILLIAM H. C. 1952 The Donatist Church: A Movement of Protest in Roman North Africa. Oxford: Clarendon Press. JOHNSON, BENTON 1957 A Critical Appraisal of the Church-Sect Typology. American Sociological Review 22:88-92. JOHNSON, BENTON 1961 Do Holiness Sects Socialize in Dominant Values? Social! Forces 39:309-316. MANN, WILLIAM E. 1955 Sect, Cult and Church in Alberta. Univ. of Toronto Press. MANNHEIM, KARL (1929-1931) 1954 Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge. New York: Harcourt; London: Routledge. -» A paperback edition was published in 1955 by Harcourt. Part 1 was written for this volume. Parts 2-4 are a translation of Ideologic und Utopie (1929); Part 5 is a translation of the article "Wissenssoziologie" (1931). MICHELS, ROBERT (1911)1959 Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy. New York: Dover. -» First published as Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der modernen Demokratie.
1 36
SECURITIES MARKETS
MUELDER, WALTER G. 1945 From Sect to Church. Christendom 10, no. 4:450-462. NIEBUHR, H. RICHARD (1929) 1954 The Social Sources of Denominationalism. Hamden, Conn.: Shoe String Press. -> A paperback edition was published in 1957 by World. O'DEA, THOMAS F. 1954 Mormonism and the Avoidance of Sectarian Stagnation: A Study of Church, Sect, and Incipient Nationality. American Journal of Sociology 60:285-293. O'DEA, THOMAS F. 1961 Catholic Sectarianism: A Sociological Analysis of the So-called Boston Heresy Case. Review of Religious Research 3:49-63. POBLETE, RENATO; and O'DEA, THOMAS F. 1960 Anomie and the "Quest for Community": The Formation of Sects Among the Puerto Ricans of New York. American Catholic Sociological Review 21:18-36. POPE, LISTON 1942 Millhands and Preachers: A Study of Gastonia. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press; Oxford Univ. Press. TROELTSCH, ERNST (1912) 1931 The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches. 2 vols. New York: Macmillan. -» First published as Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen. A paperback edition was published in 1960 by Harper. WACH, JOACHIM (1944) 1951 Sociology of Religion. Univ. of Chicago Press. WEBER, MAX (1906)1946 The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism. Pages 302-322 in Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. -> First published in German. WEBER, MAX (1915) 1946 Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions. Pages 323-359 in Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. -» First published in German. WHITLEY, OLIVER R. 1955 The Sect-to-Denomination Process in an American Religious Movement: The Disciples of Christ. Southwest Social Science Quarterly 36:275-281. WIESE, LEOPOLD VON (1924-1929) 1932 Systematic Sociology: On the Basis of the "Beziehungslehre and Gebildelehre" of Leopold von Wiese. Adapted and amplified by Howard Becker. New York: Wiley. -> First published as System der allgemeine Soziologie. WILSON, BRYAN R. 1959 An Analysis of Sect Development. American Sociological Review 24:3-15. WILSON, BRYAN R. 1961 Sects and Society: A Sociological Study of the Elim Tabernacle, Christian Science, and Christadelphians. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. YINGER, J. MILTON (1946) 1961 Religion in the Struggle for Power: A Study in the Sociology of Religion. Sociological Series, No. 3. Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ. Press.
SECURITIES MARKETS Securities markets exist in more than sixty countries and on all continents. They have grown in number and importance with the increase in the number and size of corporations, the volume of government debt instruments, and the diffusion of ownership of corporate and government securities. Securities markets are organizations of security
dealers and brokers whose operations reduce the cost of transferring ownership of government and corporate bonds and stocks and increase the liquidity of these assets. The reduction in transaction costs is achieved by the specialization of these organizations in transmitting information relevant for the decisions of potential buyers and sellers, by the provision of standardized contracts with respect to their purchase, sale, and financing, and frequently by furnishing specialized facilities for the execution of security transactions. Securities markets—especially organized exchanges—increase the liquidity of securities by providing almost continuous information regarding market prices, maximum bids, and minimum offers. Liquidity is increased in the sense that owners of securities can have greater knowledge of the current market value of their securities. This reduces the risk of incorrectly assessing the value of one's securities. This increase in liquidity is important not only for holders of existing securities but also for issuers of new securities who are raising capital for their enterprises. Securities markets, especially those operating through major exchanges, have some of the characteristics of perfectly competitive markets. The things that are bought and sold—shares of common stock of the General Motors Corporation, for example—are perfect substitutes for each other, and the dissemination of information on market prices is accurate, extremely rapid, and very widespread. Information relevant for appraising the prospects of a corporation is also widely available. Further, there are many buyers and sellers, most of whom buy and sell in quantities insufficient to have a significant impact on the price. Although large institutional investors can temporarily raise the price of shares of even very large corporations by placing large "market" orders (and conversely depress the price of shares by selling), this impact can be greatly diminished by spreading the orders over a period of time. The liquidity of even very large holdings of common stock was dramatically illustrated in recent years by the sale of millions of shares of Ford Motor Company stock by the Ford Foundation with no apparent large impact on prices. Security prices are highly sensitive to information bearing on the prospective profitability of the corporations whose shares are involved. The opportunities to profit from changes in the prices of securities have attracted the attention and the money of millions of investors and speculators and have generated many points of view about ways to predict future security prices. Th^ numerous points of view fall into two general categories: (1) efforts
SECURITIES MARKETS to predict the profitability of firms by forecasts of general business conditions, by forecasts of costs, revenues, and profits for particular industries, and by analyses of the competitive position of particular firms, and (2) efforts to predict future prices by an analysis of the historical course of prices themselves. This latter point of view has been subjected to considerable analysis by academic economists and statisticians (Cootner 1964), and the predominant view among academic economists is that historical analyses of prices do not enhance one's ability to predict prices. In the short run, prices are believed by many to follow a "random walk." [See MARKOV CHAINS.] This academic view is at variance with the views of many members of the financial community. The view that prices follow a random walk is consistent with a market in which numerous pieces of relevant information bearing on future prospects are frequently generated and widely and rapidly disseminated. The pieces of information themselves, however, must be causally unrelated to the historical course of security prices. Another essential condition is that prices adjust "instantaneously" to new information, since gradual adjustment would create trends. Organized exchanges. The most important securities markets in terms of the value of securities traded are organized exchanges. Such exchanges differ from less formal markets in that they centralize communication and trading, impose rules for the admission of persons or firms privileged to trade in securities, impose rules with respect to the securities that can be traded, and closely regulate the procedures used. By far the largest securities market in the world in terms of the dollar volume of securities traded is the New York Stock Exchange. This exchange, started in 1792 as an informal organization of 24 merchants and auctioneers dealing in securities, has grown throughout most of its history. At the end of 1966 there were 1,366 members of the exchange, most of them associated with approximately 660 organizations, including single proprietorships, partnerships, and corporations. About 1,200 companies with approximately 1,600 different issues of stock were listed, and the more than 10,000 million shares listed had an aggregate value of more than $495,000 million. In addition, about 500 companies and government agencies with approximately 1,200 different issues of bonds were listed, and these bonds had an aggregate market value of approximately $120,000 million. At the end of 1966 there were more than 250 listings of foreign securities, including both stocks and bonds,
137
having an aggregate value of more than $9,000 million. The value of securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange at the end of 1966 was more than four times as great as the value of securities listed on the world's second largest exchange, The Stock Exchange (of London), which trades a larger number of issues and has more than twice as many members. The New York Stock Exchange accounts for more than 90 per cent of the dollar volume of trading on the 18 organized exchanges in the United States, and this proportion has been maintained for many years (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 1963a). The number of members of the New York Stock Exchange has been fixed in recent years. Memberships, called "seats," are bought and sold. The price of a seat in 1966 was approximately $250,000. In 1875 seats sold for as little as $4,250, and in 1929 they reached an all-time high of $625,000. To be eligible for membership, persons must meet standards established by the exchange with respect to age, citizenship, character, and knowledge of the securities business. About one-half of the members of the New York Stock Exchange belong to organizations whose primary purpose is to act as brokers on behalf of those wishing to buy or sell listed securities. These members are paid according to a fixed shedule of brokerage fees averaging roughly one per cent of the value of the security bought or sold, although the fees vary somewhat in a prescribed manner according to the number of shares and the aggregate value of shares or according to whether the securities traded are stocks or bonds. About one-fourth of the members are "specialists." They are important in the operation of the New York Stock Exchange and other American exchanges, but other devices are used outside the United States, except in Japan, to perform the specialist's function. The specialist receives information from brokers regarding offers to sell and to buy at various prices. Each specialist concentrates his activities in a small group of securities, and brokers wishing to transact business on behalf of the public typically deal with one or another of the specialists handling the stock in question, although brokers may deal directly with other brokers. The specialist secures for the seller the highest available bid and for the bidder the lowest available offer. When there is a wide discrepancy between the highest bid and the lowest offer, the specialist has the responsibility, neither fully enforceable nor precisely defined, to use his own capital to maintain a "reasonably continuous" mar-
138
SECURITIES MARKETS
ket in such a stock. The specialist is also permitted to buy and sell securities for the account of others, thus acting as a brokers' broker. Regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) require that the specialist must execute orders on behalf of the public prior to executing them for his own account. Part of the justification given for the existence of the system of specialists is that their trading on their own behalf increases liquidity and reduces the likelihood of large changes in prices between successive transactions. A detailed investigation of the impact of specialists on prices during the period immediately following the assassination of President Kennedy in 1963 revealed that specialists vary widely in their trading practices and in their impact on prices (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 1963fo). A substantial number of specialists traded so as to diminish volatility, and a substantial number so as to increase it. Approximately one-fourth of the members of the New York Stock Exchange are either odd-lot dealers or "floor brokers." The former buy and sell blocks of stock of less than 100 shares (odd lots) from brokers representing the public. The latter assist brokers from the commission houses when the volume of business exceeds their capacity to handle it. Most transactions involve a small enough volume of stock so that the ordinary market mechanism can be used without having a large impact on prices. Transactions, however, which involve very large numbers of shares and dollars are often handled through specialized procedures designed to lessen this impact. The most important type of block distribution is a "secondary distribution" (the sale by an underwriter or group of underwriters of a large volume of stock not for the benefit of the corporation whose shares are being sold), but "exchange distributions" (within brokerage houses) and other specialized means of dealing with large volumes of stock are growing in importance. Although the details of these various specialized methods differ, they have in common an effort to accumulate orders to buy from large numbers of investors over a period of time in order to match the large volume of stock that is being offered by a single seller. For instance, in mid-1964, 250,000 shares of a stock selling for $33 were offered by a single seller. The stock was distributed within one day through the facilities of a single brokerage organization whose customers bought all the stock. The individual purchases were bunched and executed as a package on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange. They were represented as a single
transaction through the national and international communications system that virtually instantaneously transmits information on stock prices. This particular method of distributing stock is known as an "exchange distribution." The number of shares traded as a percentage of the number of shares listed has been declining secularly. Around 1900, the number of shares traded in a year was approximately 200 per cent of the average number of shares listed in that year, and as recently as 1929 the number of shares traded during a year exceeded the average number listed. Since World War n the number of shares traded in any year has never exceeded 25 per cent of those listed, and in recent years only about 15 per cent of listed shares have been traded in any year. In order for the shares of a company to achieve initial listing on the New York Stock Exchange, the company must demonstrate earning power, after charges and taxes, of $1.2 million annually; must have net tangible assets of $10 million, or more than $10 million in market value for publicly held shares; and must have at least 600,000 shares publicly held and not fewer than 1,500 owners, each of whom must own at least 100 shares. Similar though less stringent criteria are applied for delisting a stock. For numerous periods between January 1926 and December 1960 average rates of return to investors investing equal amounts of money in each of the common stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange were generally higher than earnings in alternative investments, such as government and corporate bonds, savings accounts, and mortgages (Fisher & Lorie 1964). For the entire 35-year period, the average annual rate of return (compounded) to a tax-exempt investor, with reinvestment of dividends, was 9.0 per cent. Without reinvestment of dividends the rate was 6.9 per cent. During the decade of the 1950s, the average annual rates with and without reinvestment were about 15 per cent. (Rates of return with reinvestment may be higher, lower, or the same as without reinvestment. The rate of return is based on the relationship between a change in the value of assets and the volume of assets initially invested. Reinvestment increases both the change in value and the amount invested, and the effect on the rate of return depends on the relative magnitude of these increases.) Data are also available on the variability of rates of return (Fisher 1965). Considering all possible purchases and sales, at monthly intervals, of all common stocks on the New York Stock Exchange
SECURITIES MARKETS for the period 1926-1960, it was found that slightly over three-fourths of the transactions were profitable and over half provided rates of return in excess of 9 per cent. Of course, this past experience is not a certain guide to the future. The Stock Exchange (of London) lists more than 9,000 different securities that had at the end of 1963 a market value of approximately $125,000 million, about a third of which was represented by debt instruments of the government of Great Britain, Commonwealth governments, local councils, and nationalized industries. The Stock Exchange had about 3,400 members in mid-1964. The relative importance of foreign shares is greater for this stock exchange than for the New York Stock Exchange. The major difference in the method of operation of The Stock Exchange—-and almost all exchanges outside the United States— as compared with the New York Stock Exchange is that brokers who buy and sell securities on behalf of the public deal with jobbers who own securities and act as wholesalers. These jobbers, who do not deal directly with the public, serve much the same purpose as the specialist on the New York Stock Exchange, but the specialist in the United States typically has a dual role—broker and dealer— while the jobber in London operates solely as a dealer adding to or depleting his inventory of the securities in which he trades. There are about 280 firms of brokers and about 65 firms of jobbers operating on The Stock Exchange. A jobber may deal in any listed security, but most specialize in certain groups of shares, or "markets." The chief markets are as follows: giltedged (government issues and other securities grouped with them); banks and insurance; shipping; foreign government bonds; American and Canadian shares; breweries; commercial and industrial; iron, coal, and steel; financial, land, and property; investment trusts; rubber and tea plantations; oil; South African mines; Rhodesian, Canadian, Australian, and miscellaneous mines; West African mines; cables and transportation. Rates of return on British shares between 1919 and 1963, averaged by 11-year periods, were substantially higher in most of these periods—excluding wartime—-than rates on consols—-government bonds with no maturity date (Merrett & Sykes 1963). For the entire period, the rates on shares were 8.0 per cent in money terms and 5.8 per cent in real terms, while the comparable rates for consoles were 1.4 per cent and —1.4 per cent. There are other important exchanges in the world, but none approaches in importance either the New York Stock Exchange or The Stock Ex-
739
change (of London). Among the other leading exchanges are the Stock Exchange of Paris, the Brussels Stock Exchange Commission, the Zurich Stock Exchange (the leading Continental market), the Dusseldorf and Frankfurt stock exchanges in the Federal Republic of Germany, the Milan Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange (United States), the Toronto and Montreal exchanges in Canada, and the Melbourne Stock Exchange. There are many regional exchanges in the countries whose leading exchanges are listed above, and there are many exchanges in other countries as well. The largest of these exchanges is not more than about one-fifth the size of The Stock Exchange (of London) or one-twentieth the size of the New York Stock Exchange, and most are much smaller. The mechanisms of these various exchanges differ, but the principles underlying their operation are very much like either The Stock Exchange or the New York Stock Exchange. Information about many of these exchanges can be found in Spray (1964). Over-the-counter markets. Unlike the organized exchanges, the over-the-counter market is informal and permits unlimited right of entry by securities and virtually free access of persons into the business of dealing in unlisted securities. At the end of 1963 over 3,300 firms listed with the SEC dealt in unlisted securities. The over-the-counter market differs from the organized exchange in many ways. There is no fixed schedule of fees for buying and selling securities. Dealers more frequently buy and sell from inventories and derive their profit from markups on this inventory. Dealers and brokers are informally organized in the National Association of Security Dealers (NASD). Under pressure from the SEC, the NASD began to publish in February 1965 wholesale or 'inter-dealer" quotations for the 1,300 issues on its national list. Accurate information on retail prices is not yet available for the over-the-counter market. The SEC estimates that as of December 31, 1962, about 4,500 stocks in about 4,100 domestic companies were quoted only in the over-the-counter market (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 1963a). These stocks had an aggregate value of about $90,000 million, almost half being constituted by stocks in banks and insurance companies. The value of stocks traded over-the-counter was only about one-fourth of those traded on the New York Stock Exchange but far exceeded the value of stocks traded on any other American exchange. The volume of stock trading over-the-counter is estimated to have grown about eightfold between 1949 and 1961, reaching $40,000 million in the
140
SECURITIES MARKETS
latter year. Although most of the very large companies are traded on listed exchanges, this is not true of stocks in banks, insurance companies, and mutual funds, which are frequently large and seldom listed. (In 1964, a Disclosure Act was passed by Congress which may substantially increase the listing of stocks in banks and insurance companies.) In recent years a so-called third market has increased in importance. This market involves trading in shares listed on exchanges, but the trading takes place in the over-the-counter market rather than through the exchanges. The only definitive estimate of the volume of such trading indicates that in 1961 about $2,000 million worth of stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange were traded over-the-counter. This constituted almost 4 per cent of trading on the New York Stock Exchange. This percentage is undoubtedly increasing. The third market is growing in importance because the brokerage costs on the exchanges are fixed and do not permit quantity discounts, despite the lower cost per share of handling large orders. The overthe-counter market has no fixed schedule of fees and thereby permits large buyers and sellers to consummate transactions at lower cost than is possible on the exchanges. The increased importance of institutional investors, who frequently trade in large volumes, has contributed to the growth of the third market. Outside the United States, most trading in securities is probably through exchanges, but some
Table 1 — Distribution of total market value of individually held stock, by income class, 1960 Per cent of total market va/oeb
Adjusted gross income" Less than $5,000
12.4
$5,000
13.9
-$9,999
$10,000 -$14,999
11.4
$15,000 -$24,999
14.0
$25,000 -$49,999
15.9
$50,000 -$99,999
12.9
$100,000-$149,999
4.8
$150,000-$199,999
3.3
$200,000 and over
11.5
Total
100.1
a. Excludes income not subject to federal income tax. b. Percentages do not add to 100 because of rounding. Source: Crockett & Friend 1963, p. 156.
is over-the-counter and through institutions such as commercial banks. In most foreign countries, listing requirements and permission to trade on exchanges are less restrictive than in the United States. Share ownership. In the United States the number of individuals owning stock directly has risen from about 6 million in 1954 to about 20 million in 1966. This ownership is widely distributed among all income groups, as is indicated by Table 1. Somewhat more is known about the importance of stock ownership by institutions. Such ownership has increased rapidly both absolutely and as a percentage of all stocks, as is indicated by Table 2. Information regarding share ownership in 60 different countries is contained in a study by the
Table 2 — Estimated holdings of NYSE-listed stocks by financial institutions and relation to total value (billions of dollars) 7949
J956
7961
7962
7963
7964
7965
Life
1.1
Non-life
1.7
2.3 4.5
4.0 7.7
4.1 7.1
4.6 8.2
5.3 9.5
6.4 10.1
1.4 1.6
7.1 4.0
17.2 5.6
15.4 5.3
18.6 5.7
21.8 6.6
26.5 5.6
0.5
*
5.3 0.4 0.2
18.7 1.1 0.7
17.9 1.0 0.8
22.6 1.3 1.1
27.5 1.6 1.5
32.5 1.9 1.9
1.1 1.1 1.0
2.4 4.1 3.1
3.7 7.2 5.6
3.3 6.7
4.0 8.3 5.9
4.5 9.5 6.8
5.1 10.1 7.7
* 0.2
1.0
1.9
1.7
2.2
2.6
3.2
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.5
68.7
82.9
97.6
111.5
Type of institution Insurance companies:
Investment companies: Open-end Closed-end Non-insured pension funds: Corporate Other private State and local government Nonprofit institutions: College and university endowments Foundations Other Common trust funds Mutual savings banks Total Total market value of all NYSE-listed stock Estimated per cent held by all financial institutions
9.7 76.3
12.7%
34.6
73.7
5.0
219.2
387.8
345.8
411.3
474.3
537.5
15.8%
19.0%
19.9%
20.2%
20.6%
20.7%
Less than $50 million. Source: New York Stock Exchange 1967.
SECURITIES MARKETS New York Stock Exchange (1962). Three facts stand out: (1) there is no information about share ownership in most countries; (2) for all countries for which information is available, the number of shareholders is growing rapidly; and (3) share owners constitute a larger portion of the populations of western European countries, Japan, and the United States than of other sections of the world. In Great Britain, it is estimated by the Wider Share Ownership Council that at the end of 1963 there were about 3.5 million individuals owning stocks directly and that about two-thirds of all adults of the United Kingdom owned stocks indirectly through various institutions. Institutional investors are of greater relative importance in Great Britain than in the United States. British institutions own about 50 per cent of all the securities listed on The Stock Exchange (of London) while the comparable figure for American institutions on the New York Stock Exchange is about 20 per cent. The greater importance of institutions in the United Kingdom is accounted for primarily by the fact that their insurance companies are not so narrowly restricted with respect to the ownership of shares. Japan had about 4.5 million individual share owners in 1963, over eight times as many as were estimated for 1946. The regulation of securities markets. In the United States, securities markets are regulated to some extent by state laws, but by far the most important regulation stems from the following federal statutes: (1) The Securities Act of 1933. (2) The Securities Exchange Act of 1934. (3) The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. (4) The Investment Company Act and the Investment Advisers Act, both of which became effective in 1940. (5) The Securities Act of 1964. (For an extensive bibliography on the first four of these statutes, their amendments, and judicial decisions and administrative rulings derived from them, see Dun ton 1963.) Provisions of the federal statutes are administered by the SEC, which was established in 1934. The Securities Act of 1933 requires the disclosure of financial information judged by the SEC to be relevant for the evaluation by investors of the prospects of corporations issuing new securities. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 regulates securities markets and the operations of security brokers and dealers. It requires registration of securities exchanges and of securities traded on such ex-
141
changes; it restricts borrowing by brokers and dealers; it prohibits manipulation of prices of securities; it requires periodic filing of reports on listed securities and the provision of specified information and statements soliciting proxies. Exchanges make rules governing the conduct of their members, and the SEC passes upon the adequacy of such regulation. The over-the-counter market was brought within the purview of the SEC through a section of the Securities Exchange Act authorizing national associations of security dealers to regulate their members. The NASD, authorized under the Securities Exchange Act, has an extensive set of rules governing the conduct of its members. The Securities Act of 1964 extends to the larger over-thecounter issues the regulations governing registration of securities, financial reporting, and the issuance of proxies that apply to issues listed on exchanges. About 2,000 over-the-counter issues are affected. The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 was designed to eliminate or control public utility holding companies that either operated in or sold securities in interstate commerce. The Investment Company Act and the Investment Advisers Act provide for the registration and regulation of investment companies and investment advisers in order to insure a code of conduct and a level of financial responsibility acceptable to the SEC. Since enactment of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the dissemination of financial information by corporations has greatly increased, and the practices of firms buying and selling securities or advising investors have changed significantly. Much of this change has taken place through self-regulation by the organized exchanges and through the NASD. The impact of these changes and the adequacy of existing regulation were subjected to exhaustive study by a special group established by the SEC, which the Congress had directed to conduct such a study. The study (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 1963Z?) consists of five volumes covering the operation of exchanges and the adequacy of existing regulation, the over-the-counter market, the qualifications of persons in the security industry, security credit, mutual funds, and other matters. A great deal of information, much of it quantitative, is contained in the so-called Special Study, but there is controversy as to whether there was an adequate factual basis for the recommendations that wer<; made (Stigler 1964a; 1964b; Friend & Herman 1964; Robbins & Werner 1964).
142
SECURITIES MARKETS
One major change resulting from the Special Study was to subject the over-the-counter market to regulation more like that imposed upon formal exchanges. For the formal exchanges, the major changes, in addition to those resulting from the Securities Act of 1964, were modifications in the regulations concerning floor traders and specialists. The intent of these new regulations was to reduce the advantage of floor traders and specialists relative to the trading public and to decrease possible conflict of interest between their role as speculators and their role of providing liquidity. The new regulations reduce the opportunity of specialists to profit from their access to "book information" about bids and offers, and to execute orders on their own behalf prior to orders on behalf of the public. Security credit. Stocks and bonds are widely used as collateral for loans. At the end of 1964, such loans exceeded $5,000 million in the United States. This was less than one per cent of the value of all securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Loans based upon collateral consisting of securities are subject to special regulation in the United States. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 required the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to issue rules and regulations concerning security credit, and Regulation T accordingly was issued by them and became effective October 1, 1934. Regulation T specifies the amount of credit that can be extended by security brokers and dealers relative to the value of the collateral. At the end of 1964, such loans were limited to 30 per cent of the value of securities at the time that the loan was made. On May 1, 1936, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System issued Regulation U relating to loans by banks based on collateral in the form of securities. (Extensive information about security credit can be found in Bogen & Kroos 1960.) Security prices and business conditions. Prices of stocks generally move in the same direction as business conditions, rising during periods of expansion and-falling during recessions. Prices of common stocks are considered to be a "leading" indicator in that turning points in indexes of these prices typically precede turning points in general business conditions (Moore 1961). The prices of bonds, too, generally move in the same direction as business conditions (Kessel 1965). While stock prices tend to lead general business conditions, movements in bond prices are roughly coincident with movements in business conditions. Changes in the general price level have different effects upon the prices of stocks according to
the capital structure of the underlying corporation (Kessel 1956). The general principle which explains these variations is that corporations with a large amount of net debt per dollar of equity benefit most from inflation and suffer most from deflation. Net debt is defined as a corporation's monetary assets (cash, government securities, accounts receivable, and notes receivable) minus its liabilities (accounts payable, notes payable, mortgages, preferred stock, and bonds). The relationship between changes in general business conditions and the prices of stocks is complex because the changes in each series affect each other. Changes in business conditions obviously affect the prosperity of corporations and hence the value of stocks in them. Conversely, changes in prices of stock affect the wealth of individuals and institutions and their willingness and capacity to spend money and to make investments and hence affect general business. From October 1929 to June 1932, the prices of stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange declined by over 80 per cent, and this reduction of many billions of dollars in the assets of owners of stocks undoubtedly contributed to the great depression of that time. JAMES H. LORIE BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOGEN, JULES I.; and KROOS, HERMAN E. 1960 Security Credit: Its Economic Role and Regulation. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. COOTNER, PAUL H. (editor) 1964 The Random Character of Stock Market Prices. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press. CROCKETT, JEAN; and FRIEND, IRWIN 1963 Characteristics of Stock Ownership. Pages 146-168 in American Statistical Association, Business and Economic Statistics Section, Proceedings. Washington: The Association. DUNTON, CHESTER 1963 Legal Bibliography on Federal Securities Regulation. Mimeographed, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. FISHER, LAWRENCE 1965 Outcomes for "Random" Investments in Common Stocks Listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Journal of Business 38:149-161. FISHER, LAWRENCE; and LORIE, JAMES H. 1964 Rates of Return on Investments in Common Stocks. Journal of Business 37:1-21. FRIEND, IRWIN; and HERMAN, EDWARD S. 1964 The S.E.C. Through a Glass Darkly. Journal of Business 37:382-405. FRIEND, IRWIN et al. 1958 The Over-the-Counter Securities Markets. New York: McGraw-Hill. KESSEL, REUBEN A. 1956 Inflation-caused Wealth Redistribution: A Test of a Hypothesis. American Economic Review 46:128-141. KESSEL, REUBEN A. 1965 Cyclical Behavior of the Term Structure of Interest Rates. National Bureau of Economic Research, Occasional Paper No. 91. New York: The Bureau.
SEE, HENRI MERRETT, A. J.; and SYKES, ALLEN 1963 Return on Equities and Fixed Interest Securities: 1919-1963. District Bank Review (Spring Gardens, Manchester, England) [1963], no. 148:17-34. MOORE, GEOFFREY H. (editor) 1961 Business Cycle Indicators. 2 vols. National Bureau of Economic Research Studies in Business Cycles, No. 10. Princeton Univ. Press. -> See especially Volume 1, pages 674 and 676. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE (1962) 1963 Individual Share-ownership Around the World. 2d ed. New York: The Exchange. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC RELATIONS AND MARKET DEVELOPMENT 1967 Fact Book. New York: The Exchange. ROBBINS, SIDNEY; and WERNER, WALTER 1964 Professor Stigler Revisited. Journal of Business 37:406-413. SPRAY, DAVID E. (editor) 1964 The Principal Stock Exchanges of the World: Their Operation, Structure, and Development. Washington: International Economic Publishers. STIGLER, GEORGE J. 1964a Public Regulation of the Securities Markets. Journal of Business 37:117-142. STIGLER, GEORGE J. 1964b Comment. Journal of Business 37:414-422. U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 1963a Twenty-ninth Annual Report. Washington: Government Printing Office. U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 1963b Special Study of Securities Markets: Report. 88th Congress, 1st Session, H. Doc. No. 95, Parts 1-5. Washington: Government Printing Office.
SEE, HENRI Henri See (1864-1936), French economic historian, was born at Saint-Brice (Seine-et-Oise). He attended the Lycee Henri iv in Paris and then the Sorbonne. In 1887 he became agrege d'histoire and taught for several years in the provinces. After successfully defending his doctoral thesis on the policy of Louis xi toward the cities, he was appointed professor at the University of Rennes in 1893. He remained there until a serious illness compelled him to retire prematurely in 1920. He continued to do historical research for the remainder of his life. The work of See has a remarkable unity, which derives from his conception of the aims and the methods of history. His teachers, including Fustel de Coulanges, Ernest Lavisse, and Charles Seignobos, had trained him always to respect the rules of historical criticism. See believed that history must be rigorously objective, eschewing, on the one hand, grand systems and philosophies, and on the other hand, the domination of bias. But See also realized the futility of a kind of erudition that consists of data increasingly scattered among compartmentalized specialties, no longer useful for the development of synthetic knowledge.
143
See's Histoire economique de la France (1939— 1942) is the work of a historian who cannot imagine studying economic facts apart from the milieu in which they occur and evolve, and the same spirit prevails in his L'evolution commerciale et industrielle de la France sous I'ancien regime (1925a) and his Esquisse d'une histoire du regime agraire en Europe aux XVIII6 et XIXe siecles (1921). As a historian who was ever aware of the complexity of the facts, he found the Marxist doctrine of historical materialism unacceptable: from his viewpoint its great defect was its unilateral character. Although he was faithful to the socialist ideal all his life, it was from the effort of human thought rather than from "the blind movement of economic forces" that he expected humanity to progress, and his historical research was designed to show some of the conditions of rational progress. Like his teacher Fustel de Coulanges, See was primarily interested in collective entities and institutions, even though he felt that Fustel had given too short shrift to the actions of individuals and the importance of "accidents." He believed that history should provide knowledge of the institutions, beliefs, and customs of a society, its way of thinking, its dominant concerns, and its guiding ideas. See felt that the most certain way of making his contribution to history as the "science of human societies" was to devote himself to both social and economic history and the history of ideas. Neither political or military history nor the biographies of rulers serve to reveal peoples to themselves. The most important dynamic factors in the evolution of societies are economic necessities, which predominantly determine the feelings and actions of governments and of social classes; however, the economic factor does not explain everything, and economic interpretations of history by no means have the character of laws. See was a prolific author, his writings comprising no less than 28 books and 194 articles. As economics editor of the Revue historique he performed an important service to his profession. A. CHABERT [See also HISTORY, article on ECONOMIC HISTORY; MARXIST SOCIOLOGY; and the biography of FUSTEL DE COULANGES.] WORKS BY SEE Les classes rurales et le regime domanial en France au moyen age. Paris: Giard & Briere. 1921 Esquisse d'une histoire du regime agraire en Europe aux XVIIIe et XIXe siecles. Paris: Giard & Briere. 1925a L'evolution commerciale et industrielle de la France sous I'ancien regime. Paris: Giard & Briere. 1901
144
SEGREGATION
1931 Economic and Social Conditions in France During the Eighteenth Century. New York: Croft. -» First published in French. (1926) 1931 Modern Capitalism: Its Origin and Evolution. 2d ed. New York: Adelphi. -» First published in French. 1927 La vie economique de la France sous la monarchic censitaire. Paris: Alcan. (1927) 1929 The Economic Interpretation of History. New York: Adelphi. -» First published as Materialisme historique et interpretation economique de I'histoire. (1928) 1933 Science et philosophie de I'histoire. 2d ed., rev. Paris: Alcan. 1929 Evolution et revolution. Paris: Flammarion. (1939-1942) 1948-1951 Histoire economique de la France. 2 vols. 2d ed. Paris: Colin. -» Volume 1: Le moyen-dge et I'ancien regime. Volume 2: Les temps modernes: 1789-1914. SUPPLEMENTARY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BECK, EARL R. 1951 Henri See and "The New History." Florida State University Studies No. 4:21-35. KNIGHT, MELVIL M. 1956 Henri See. Pages 107-117 in Architects and Craftsmen in History: Festschrift fur Abbott Pay son Usher. Tubingen (Germany): Mohr. PARKER, HAROLD T. 1942 Henri See. Pages 444-476 in Bernadotte E. Schmitt (editor), Some Historians of Modern Europe: Essays in Historiography. Univ. of Chicago Press.
SEGREGATION Segregation is an institutionalized form of social distance expressed in physical separation. It signifies a convergence of physical and social space and is to be distinguished from other social forms which also structure social distance in spatial terms, as, for example, the elaborate patterns of deference in African societies with sacred kingship or the different levels of seating (reflecting caste status) among Singhalese castes. The latter regulate social relationships between persons in situations of contact; segregation refers primarily to the separation of persons and the avoidance of contact. Systems of segregation vary in the criteria which distinguish the segregated groups, whether biological, cultural, and/or status, and in the situations, or roles, which are segregated. Segregated roles may vary in extensiveness (extreme separation being represented by indirect rule in colonial society), in type (the intimate roles of primary relationships or the more impersonal roles in secondary relationships), and in the relative level of the actors (for example, where equal-status contacts are proscribed but dominant-subordinate contacts are fostered, as in racial segregation, or apartheid, in South Africa). Segregative systems may also be distinguished as compulsory or voluntary, as deliberate or spontaneous, and as influenced posi-
tively by attraction or negatively by disdain. Compulsory segregation involves deliberation and invidious distinction and serves the interests of those who impose it. Although segregation imposes separation of persons and groups, it is by no means the antithesis of societal integration. The segregation of units may be a basis for integration, as in traditional Indian caste society, where a consensual basis for segregation was derived partly from shared religious values. Indeed, segregation may be conceived of as a general, although not a universal, aspect of social organization. It defines the boundaries between groups, locates the groups in the hierarchy, and regulates their interaction. Because of the intimate relationship of segregation to systems of domination, it is often highly resistant to change and readily becomes a focus of political conflict. Sociological approaches. Early sociological concern with segregation derived in part from interest in the processes of social interaction (segregation being conceived of as "dissociative," in terms of a model of "attraction-repulsion" or "associationdissociation") but mainly from ecological studies, under the influence of animal and plant ecologists, geographers, and the theory of social Darwinism. The initial emphasis on the biotic approach stressed the subsocial elements in human society, with the corollary, explicit or implied, that segregation was a natural phenomenon; there was the same implication in the concept of natural areas [see REGION]. By contrast, the cultural approach, which developed in criticism of the biotic, stresses the influence of values on the spatial distribution of urban populations, especially the role of prejudice and discrimination in the segregation of ethnic and racial groups. Sociologists share with social psychologists and political scientists an interest in the psychological consequences of segregation as it affects the processes of prejudice, consensus, and political cleavage. And this interest has been further stimulated by the struggle for desegregation in the United States—a major focus of the movement to secure effective civil rights for Negroes—and by the threat of racial civil war in South Africa, which has a regime of systematic racial and ethnic segregation. Social structural factors Segregation, being an aspect of social structure, varies in its incidence and nature with the type of society. It hardly exists in relatively undifferentiated societies, such as those of the Bushmen; and the term is not really applicable to the divisions
SEGREGATION between kin groups in segmented societies, which constitute separate rather than segregated units, loosely federated in certain situations. Social differentiation. While segregation is associated with social differentiation, there does not appear to be a precise relationship between the two. Segregation may be highly elaborated both in societies where the division of labor is not greatly advanced and in modern industrialized societies. Thus, segregation is a basic principle of organization in the village communities of Indian caste society, where it regulates residence, access to amenities, and contact between the castes and where it receives ritual reinforcement in patterns of avoidance sanctioned by the threat of pollution. It is found in many "preindustrial" cities in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East and in the Muslim cities of north Africa, where ethnic and religious particularism may be manifested in separate quarters of the city as well as in occupational specialization. And it is characteristic of the most industrialized metropolitan cities of North America, in which there is extensive segregation of Negroes in residence, worship, education, and social intercourse. Nor does it seem that progressive industrialization will necessarily dissolve ethnic and religious particularisms that are irrelevant to the industrial process and replace them by distinctions resting on more universal criteria of qualification and achievement. This may be the trend within industry, but there is a continuing relevance of ethnic and religious identification as bases of association in the cities and in the extensive movement of urban populations to the suburbs. Social stratification. The relationship between segregation and rigidity of social structure is equally complex. Segregation is characteristic of societies with complex class systems, although the ecological patterns of class segregation vary and a central city location may distinguish the upper classes in one society, the lower classes in another. There may be extensive segregation of roles in a class system, where residential segregation lays the foundations for segregation in education, religion, and recreation. But the barriers are much more permeable than in caste systems; in fact, in these two systems there is a direct relationship between the rigidity of the system of stratification and the rigidity of the system of segregation. This relationship, however, does not hold for the slave plantations, in which the extreme of social distance was nevertheless compatible with intimate contact. Segregation is one of many forms of institutionalized social distance and not in itself a precise indicator of social structure.
145
Pluralism. Plural societies have an affinity for segregation, especially when the social cleavages between racial, ethnic, or tribal groups are associated with cultural differences, as in the colonial societies of Africa. The policies of the metropolitan powers imply different policies toward segregation. In theory, Africans who acquire Portuguese or French culture may move freely in the circles of the conquerors, acculturation bridging the social cleavages between them. The British theory of indirect rule, by contrast, maintains the separation between the races by a system of parallel institutions, which extends to the courts of law; legal and other dualisms help maintain cultural diversity, and acculturation does not qualify individual Africans to cross the barriers of segregation and racial cleavage. In South Africa, a system of parallel institutions and consequent segregation serve to foster nationalism among the Afrikaans-speaking white population and to segregate racial, ethnic, and tribal groups under the policy of apartheid. Patterns of racial and ethnic segregation Different historical circumstances influence the patterns of segregation between the races. For example, after the conquest of Algiers the French settled inside the depopulated city, whereas in the protectorate of Morocco, which was constituted by treaty with the sultan, they established separate cities adjacent to the Muslim cities (Le Tourneau 1957, pp. 112-113). Segregation is also affected by the extent and nature of administrative regulation. In British and French west Africa, racial segregation was social and customary; in the Belgian Congo and southern Africa, it was legally imposed and sanctioned. In South Africa it is systematized under town plans, which tend to reserve the core of the towns for whites and to move nonwhites to the periphery or beyond or to establish them in satellite towns. Colonial Africa. Whatever the colonial policy, the historical conditions, or the administrative framework, the general pattern in colonial Africa is one of racial segregation, and in east Africa and South Africa it extends also to intermediate groups such as Indians. The generality of racial segregation in colonial Africa flows from the convergence of many different types of social distance, based on race, power, class, and culture. Inevitably, the lower classes on the fringes of urban life (the socalled sous-proletariat} who live in the improvised shanty towns, or bidonvilles, are recruited from the population of the colonized, and the residents of upper-class neighborhoods are the colonizers. Cul-
146
SEGREGATION
tural differences extend racial separation to many institutional spheres. Even in shared institutions (as in the conversion to Christianity), ideologies of domination or sentiments of superiority fuse with cultural and racial differences to create varied and intricate patterns of integration and segregation, including, in extreme cases, reinterpretation of the communion with Christ. Tribal segregation. Tribal segregation in colonial society is less general and more varied in its forms. In the old cities of Africa, uncontrolled residential patterns permitted tribal concentrations. In the new cities, housing policy, control over the influx of migrants, and the demand for housing all affected the possibility of tribal segregation. In some areas it was discouraged by indifference to tribal affiliation in the allocation of housing; in others, though less often, it was the principle which governed the allocation. Sometimes housing policy and social conditions were sufficiently flexible to permit a measure of voluntary tribal segregation. The relations between tribal hinterland and city, tribal composition and relative concentration or dominance of different tribes, extent and organization of industry, and political structure all have a bearing on the incidence of tribal segregation. Cultural differences encourage the spread of tribal segregation into a variety of institutions, as shown for example in the establishment of separate mosques by many tribal groups in Freetown, Sierra Leone (Banton 1957, p. 137). In general, the acquisition by different tribesmen of elements of a common culture in the urban setting and through the schools, as well as their common subordination to the colonial power and the processes of restratification, reduce the relevance of tribal affiliation and provide new bases of association. African independence may have different consequences for racial and tribal segregation. In the case of racial segregation, the policy of Africanization is designed to effect desegregation, at any rate in the more public spheres of life; indeed, it may carry the process to the point of an African imposition of exclusiveness. In the case of tribal segregation, there is the bond of common race to bring tribesmen together, and the cultural differences between the tribes are more readily bridged than those between the races. But under some conditions of social structure, that is, where organization of the tribal unit offers access to power, the political struggle after independence may give enhanced significance to tribal affiliation and association. United States. Segregation in the United States has rested on such varied aspects of pluralism as
race, ethnic background, religion, and culture, or combinations of these, in association with class differences. It is most resistant to change in the case of Negroes. Cultural differences between Negroes and native-born white Americans are not marked. The basis of segregation is the general interaction of lower-class status and invidiously defined racial status. Differences in racial status are institutionalized in the structure and culture of the society, although ambiguously, since this conflicts with the democratic ethos. Persons of low racial status have little access to opportunity for achievement, because of segregation in poor neighborhoods and inferior schools and concentration in manual and unskilled occupations. Conversely, the relatively lower levels of achievement reinforce the depreciation of the Negro's racial status. The mechanisms of this racial segregation vary. In the South, the enactment of laws to enforce segregation was encouraged by the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson (163 U.S. 537, 1896), which held that the provision of separate but equal facilities was not a violation of the right to equal protection of the law under the fourteenth amendment to the constitution. But compulsory segregation did not include racial zoning (in contrast to South Africa), since the Supreme Court refused to accept the doctrine of "separate but equal" as legitimizing residential segregation. In the North, convention, restrictive covenants, discriminatory housing policies, poor wages, and the continued movement of new migrants into low rental areas of established Negro settlement all contributed to a high level of residential segregation, which provided the core for extensive institutional segregation in education, religion, and politics. With the removal of many of the legal supports of racial segregation, pursuant to decisions of the Supreme Court, and despite the official policies of the federal government and a number of states and cities, segregation is still carried forward by various deliberate means, such as the controls applied by boards of realtors, as well as by its own momentum and the consequences of past segregation. Since Negroes were largely excluded from the movement to the suburbs, the central core cities in the great metropolitan areas become increasingly nonwhite as the racially segregated urban populations receive the new Negro and other colored migrants. Ethnic groups. The patterns of ethnic segregation in the United States are similar to those of racial segregation. Foreign migrants establish themselves in central city areas, in zones of transition, and in the interstices of the city, where they
SEGREGATION create "Little Sicilies" or Jewish ghettos or other incapsulated communities, which are often characterized by poverty and social disorganization. In this respect they are very similar to the racially segregated communities; however, the ethnic groups and their settlements dissolve more readily in the environing society under the conditions of immense growth and vastly expanding opportunities experienced in the United States. Cultural differences diminish as the political and economic institutions, the schools, and mass media powerfully shape a common culture. With the passing of time, ethnic background tends to become detached from social class and culture. It still remains relevant for association or exclusion, and ethnic enclaves persist and are tranported to new suburbs. But ethnic segregation becomes less general than racial segregation, less discriminatory, and less extensive in the range of roles affected (being emphasized more in primary than secondary relationships). Some ethnic identities have merged into an upper stratum of Anglo-Saxon and north European American identity. Religious identity— that of Protestant, Roman Catholic, and Jew— subsumes in some respects the ethnic identity, replacing its exclusive particularism with a more general principle of association. Comparison of racial and cultural criteria. Comparison of Negro and Puerto Rican segregation in New York City, as it develops over the years, may provide some measure of the relative emphasis on racial and ethnic background in the integration of groups into North American society; however, interpretation is rendered difficult by an admixture of color in the Puerto Rican migration, and by the very different significance, history, and organization of the two groups in the wider society. Probably the situation of Negroes in the United States is unique, and their former slave status may be as relevant as their racial origin. In England, there are appreciable numbers of colored people who entered the country after World War ii; although they constitute little more than 1 per cent of the population, their presence has created an awareness of a color problem. Since they are of varied cultural background (mainly from India, Pakistan, and the West Indies), comparative analysis may yield some insight into both the role of race and of cultural differences in the exclusion and segregation of minority groups in England. If English prejudice against people of other races is only an expression of a more general xenophobia, and not specifically racial prejudice, as some English sociologists maintain, then it follows that cultural difference should be the crucial
147
variable in the exclusion of strangers. The evidence indicates some residential concentration of immigrant groups, whether colored or not, in different boroughs of London, and some dense clusters of colored groups, but also much dispersion. There is exclusion of colored people in primary relationships, much discrimination in rented accommodations, and some discrimination in employment (Glass I960; Davison 1963; Deakin 1964). But citizenship rights may be fully exercised, regardless of race, and such public amenities as transport are not segregated. The relations between race, culture, and segregation are, no doubt, indeterminate; they vary in different social contexts and historical situations. Segregation is by no means a universal corollary of racial differentiation. Racial difference may be relevant for social stratification, but expressed little, or not at all, in segregation; or its relevance may be indirect, that is, resting on association with class and cultural differences (the seemingly biological description of groups referring to sociocultural distinctions, as in Mexico); or the reality of racial difference may be submerged in a social myth of racial homogeneity, as in Argentina (Beals 1955; Taeuber & Taeuber 1965; Schnore & Evenson 1966). Since racial segregation rests on relatively enduring characteristics, it is likely to be highly persistent, once it becomes established and linked with structures of domination. But even this is not certain. Residential and other forms of segregation by race may rapidly disappear with sharp changes in the structure of power, as is to be anticipated in the independent states of Africa. Ideological bases of segregation After World War 11, movements for racial desegregation were stimulated both by changes in the internal structure of the societies in which they arose and by the changed relationship between white and nonwhite peoples in the world structure of power. The emancipation of colonial peoples is essentially an emancipation of nonwhites from white domination. Concerned with eliminating the racial discrimination they suffer in their own countries, they are affronted by its practice in other countries. Since the distribution of races crosses national boundaries, movements for racial desegregation acquire international significance. It becomes increasingly difficult to justify racial segregation as ideologies of segregation are undermined by a world ethos of universal human rights. Religious doctrines. Ideologies of segregation form around major social values. They may be
148
SEGREGATION
expressed in religious terms. Thus the concept of pollution regulates contact and avoidance in a most extensive range of roles by supernatural sanctions and by sentiments of deep revulsion for defiling contacts. Doctrines of predestination afford justification for controlling level of contact and for discriminating against persons who are not members of the elect; they may also serve for an extensive regulation of roles. Resentment of invidious status under theories of predestination may provoke countertheories which emphasize reversal of status. In some of the African Zionist and messianic movements, it is the black prophet who seeks a "New Jerusalem" on earth for the chosen African people or closes the gates of heaven against the white man. In the racially exclusive religious movement known as the Nation of Islam, American Negroes may find eschatological vindication of their race and a rationale in divine destiny for a policy of territorial separation (Lincoln 1961). Doctrines of racial predestination are not easily maintained in Christian churches, where they are almost universally disavowed. They may reappear, however, in doctrines which enjoin separation, although they abandon the invidious racial distinctions in deference to the world ethos of human equality. In one variant, the existence of separate races is taken as evidence of "divine providence" and of a religious duty to preserve racial separation by avoidance of contacts which might lead to the intermingling of races and loss of racial purity. Natural instinct theory of segregation. Scientific ideologies rest on assumptions as to the nature of man and of human society. The assumed ubiquity of racial segregation is often taken as evidence that it derives from the instinctive nature of man. There are similar implications, though without racial connotation, in the concept of the fight for "turf" as the human counterpart of the animal instinct for "territory." A natural instinct theory of racial segregation may serve as an ideology for compulsory segregation, which is thus conceived as consonant with the true nature of man; or it may serve as a defense against compulsory segregation, since the natural proclivity of races to segregate themselves would render compulsion redundant. Measurement of segregation. The prevalence of racial segregation cannot be doubted, although there is little precise information as to its extent. Segregation may be measured statistically by an index of dissimilarity in the spatial distribution of two groups, or by indexes of segregation, which calculate either the difference between the distri-
bution of one group and all other groups or the deviation from a postulated norm of even distribution. Moreover, an index of segregation may be combined with other measures, such as social rank and urbanization, to yield an urban typology, as in "social area analysis" (Shevsky & Bell 1955). There are difficulties in the use of these measures of segregation. They are relative to the system of area units used, whether blocks or census tracts; they leave out of account the presence of segregated clusters within units, since they are based on the assumed homogeneity of these units; they may be affected by the relative proportion of the segregated group in the total population; and they measure the results of a complex of factors, not only the influence of the racial factor in segregation (Duncan & Duncan 1955, pp. 215-217). Furthermore, they impose the need for surveys to collect the basic data in countries which do not take a census of their populations or do not inquire into racial identity. But they do provide a basis for comparing racial segregation in different societies and for estimating its extent. In the absence of reliable comparative data from countries other than the United States, in which these measures have been widely used, assertions as to the generality and extent of racial segregation rest on impression. Other forms of ideological defense. Other forms of scientific ideology postulate the inevitability of conflict in the contact between peoples of different culture or race and hence the necessity for avoiding contact. Or they assert, as a corollary of the natural instinct theory of segregation, that racially mixed areas are inherently unstable and tend to revert to the segregated state. In this conception, when members of a subordinate race "invade" the residential area of the dominant race, the residential cycle ends in a racially segregated area for the invading group, since the original residents evacuate their homes; thus invasion becomes succession. In capitalist society, the protection of property rights and values may provide an ideological defense against desegregation. Prohibition of racial segregation in the leasing or selling of property may be represented as an infringement or diminution of rights of ownership and desegregation as a threat to property values under an assumption of inevitable depreciation. Refutation of the theoretical assumptions in these ideologies involves the demonstration of contrary cases of stable racial intermingling, of contact without conflict, and of the maintenance, and indeed enhancement, of property values. This type of analysis rejects categorical assumptions as to
SEGREGATION the nature of man and society and focuses on the conditions which give rise to racial segregation or those which favor the intermingling of races or promote desegregation. Segregation and prejudice Desegregation may be effected by revolutionary changes in the structure of the society, as in many parts of Africa, or it may be sought within the existing structure by action against prejudice and discrimination. Segregation is not necessarily associated with prejudice, since it may be maintained by the institutions of society, independently of the attitudes of individuals. But in general, systems of segregation draw support from the prejudices of individuals and indeed foster those prejudices. In situations of systematic racial segregation which permit contact only on a basis of inequality, the routine experience of racial superiority may be expected to intensify sentiments of superiority and sentiments supportive of segregation; these sentiments in turn seek expression in further segregation, so that the levels of both prejudice and segregation are raised by their mutual interaction. Conversely, under certain conditions the experience of contact on a basis of equality may undermine prejudice and weaken the support for segregation. Studies of interracial housing projects in the United States have shown the influence of residential proximity, official policy, and perceived social climate in creating more favorable attitudes (Deutsch & Collins 1951; Wilner et al. 1955). Action programs to promote racial harmony and equality may emphasize desegregation, since racial segregation is mostly overt and public and hence amenable to control by legislation and administrative regulation and since attitudes may be modified by changing the context and experience of race relations. LEO KUPER [Directly related are the entries HOUSING; MINORITIES; PREJUDICE; REGION. Other relevant material may be found in CASTE; ETHNIC GROUPS; SECTS AND CULTS; STATUS, SOCIAL; STRATIFICATION, SOCIAL, article on THE STRUCTURE OF STRATIFICATION SYSTEMS.] BIBLIOGRAPHY
BANTON, MICHAEL 1957 West African City: A Study of Tribal Life in Freetown. Oxford Univ. Press. BEALS, RALPH L. 1955 Indian-Mestizo-White Relations in Spanish America. Pages 412-432 in Conference on Race Relations in World Perspective, Honolulu, 1954, Race Relations in WorZd Perspective: Papers . . . . Edited by Andrew W. Lind. Honolulu: Univ. of Hawaii Press. DAVISON, R. B. 1963 The Distribution of Immigrant Groups in London. Race 5, no. 2:56-59.
149
DEAKIN, NICHOLAS 1964 Residential Segregation in Britain: A Comparative Note. Race 6, no. 1:18-26. DEUTSCH, MORTON; and COLLINS, MARY E. 1951 Interracial Housing: A Psychological Evaluation of a Social Experiment. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press. DRAKE, ST. CLAIR; and CAYTON, HORACE R. (1945) 1962 Black Metropolis: A Study of Negro Life in a Northern City. 2 vols., rev. & enl. New York: Harcourt. DUNCAN, OTIS DUDLEY; CUZZORT, RAY P.; and DUNCAN, BEVERLY 1961 Statistical Geography: Problems in Analyzing Areal Data. New York: Free Press. DUNCAN, OTIS DUDLEY; and DUNCAN, BEVERLY 1955 A Methodological Analysis of Segregation Indexes. American Sociological Review 20:210-217. FREEMAN, LINTON C.; and PILGER, JOHN 1964 Segregation: A JVIicro-measure Based Upon Compactness. Syracuse University, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Residential Segregation Study [1964], October 19. FREEMAN, LINTON C.; and PILGER, JOHN 1965 Segregation: A Micro-measure Based Upon Well-mixedness. Syracuse University, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Residential Segregation Study [1965], February 12. GLASS, RUTH (I960) 1961 London's Newcomers: The West Indian Migrants. Centre for Urban Studies, University College, London, Report No. 1. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. -> First published as Newcomers: The West Indians in London. Chapters 2 and 3 analyze geographical distribution and discrimination in housing. GLAZER, NATHAN; and MOYNIHAN, DANIEL P. 1963 Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and the Irish of New York City. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press. GORDON, MILTON M. 1961 Assimilation in America: Theory and Reality. Dsedalus 90:263-285. GORDON, MILTON M. 1964 Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origin. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. GRIER, GEORGE; and GRIER, EUNICE 1964 Obstacles to Desegregation in America's Urban Areas. Race 6, no. 1:3-17. HODGKIN, THOMAS L. 1956 Nationalism in Colonial Africa. London: Muller. -> Part II, Chapter 1 deals with the new towns of Africa. JOHNSON, CHARLES S. 1943 Patterns of Negro Segregation. New York: Harper. KUPER, LEO; WATTS, HILSTAN; and DAVIES, RONALD L. 1958 Durban: A Study in Racial Ecology. London: Cape; New York: Columbia Univ. Press. -> A study of compulsory segregation in South Africa. LE TOURNEAU, ROGER 1957 Les villes musulmanes de I'Afrique du Nord. Algiers: Maison des Livres. LIEBERSON, STANLEY 1963 Ethnic Patterns in American Cities. New York: Free Press. LINCOLN, CHARLES ERIC 1961 The Black Muslims in America. Boston: Beacon. -» A paperback edition was published in 1962. MCENTIRE, DAVIS 1960 Residence and Race: Final and Comprehensive Report to the Commission on Race and Housing. Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press. OSOFSKY, GILBERT 1966 Harlem: The Making of a Ghetto. New York: Harper. PARK, ROBERT E. (1916-1939) 1952 Human Communities: The City and Human Ecology. Collected Papers, Vol. 2. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press.
1 50
SEIGNIORAL ECONOMY
PARK, ROBERT E.; BURGESS, ERNEST W.; and MCKENZIE, RODERICK D. 1925 The City. Univ. of Chicago Press. POLL, SOLOMON 1962 The Hasidic Community of Williamsburg. New York: Free Press. SCHNORE, LEO F. 1965 The Urban Scene: Human Ecology and Demography. New York: Free Press. SCHNORE, LEO F.; and EVENSON, PHILIP C. 1966 Segregation in Southern Cities. American Journal of Sociology 72:58-67. SHEVSKY, ESHREF; and BELL, WENDELL 1955 Social Area Analysis: Theory, Illustrative Application, and Computational Procedures. Stanford Univ. Press. SJOBERG, GIDEON 1960 The Preindustrial City: Past and Present. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. SOUTHALL, AIDAN (editor) 1961 Social Change in Modern Africa. Oxford Univ. Press. TAEUBER, KARL E.; and TAEUBER, ALMA F. 1965 Negroes in Cities: Residential Segregation and Neighborhood Change. Chicago: Aldine. THEODORSON, GEORGE A. (editor) 1961 Studies in Human Ecology. Evanston, 111.: Row, Peterson. -> The ecological context of segregation. VAN DEN BERGHE, PIERRE L. 1960 Distance Mechanisms of Stratification. Sociology and Social Research 44: 155-164. WILNER, DANIEL M.; WALKLEY, ROSABELLE P.; and COOK, STUART W. 1955 Human Relations in Interracial Housing: A Study of the Contact Hypothesis. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press. WIRTH, Louis 1928 The Ghetto. Univ. of Chicago Press.
SEIGNIORAL ECONOMY See MANORIAL ECONOMY. SELECTION See SCREENING AND SELECTION. SELF CONCEPT Historically, the domain of investigation subsumed under "self concept" by psychologists and sociologists was a major concern of theologians, philosophers, political essayists, playwrights, and novelists. Since differences in defining the domain exist even today, it is hazardous to start with a definition without first preparing ground on which terms of the definition can be built. This task is undertaken here through a glance at the status of the self concept in contemporary psychology and through a brief report of representative conceptions by various writers, noting convergences and differences. With an adequate definition, developmental and experimental research can be reviewed to derive leads for a conception of self that is scientifically based, rather than one that suggests "my word against your word." Current status and historical background Especially since the 1940s, problems related to self concept have surged forth as indispensable
and legitimate topics for scientific study in psychology and sociology. The interest in self can be appreciated better if we consider the years of its relative disuse, and even disrepute, in the mainstream of psychology between 1900 and 1940. These years correspond roughly to the period of dominant concern with asserting the scientific nature of psychology by shying away from any concepts associated with the philosophical origins of psychology. The brave new world of scientism was represented by the models of Wundt and Titchener and by the behaviorism of Watson. The first asserted that the prime task of scientific psychology was the discovery of mental elements and then the laws of their compounding; the second, that the scientific task was a search for elemental reflexes and principles of their linkages. Each model, in its own terminology, advocated its approach as the only way to lay solid foundations for the ultimate explanation of more complicated forms of behavior. Even then, the picture was not entirely monolithic. There were always those in search of unifying, integrating concepts to handle problems of the consistency of the person and the continuity of this consistency over time. The memorable chapter on self by William James (1890) maintained its impact on psychology and social science even during the period in question. James analyzed the self in terms of its constituent parts, as the sum total of what the individual considers himself and his to possess, including his body, his traits, characteristics, abilities, aspirations, family, work, possessions, friends, and other social affiliations. James neatly boiled down the problem of the maintenance of self-esteem into a formula (Selfesteem = Success/Pretensions) that served as the basis of many formulations and much research by psychologists and sociologists. Among his other insights, James anticipated the core of modern formulations on reference groups. He wrote of the individual's "image in the eyes of his own 'set,' which exalts or condemns him as he conforms or not to certain requirements that may not be made of one in another walk of life" [1890, vol. 1, pp. 294-295; see also the biography of JAMES]. Among other influential contributors was James Mark Baldwin, who gave an interactionist account of self development, epitomized in his formulation : "The ego and the alter are . . . born together" ([1895] 1906, p. 338). Some years later, the development of self through social interaction was elaborated by the sociologists Charles H. Cooley (1902) and George Herbert Mead [1913; see also INTERACTION and the biographies of BALDWIN; COOLEY; MEAD].
SELF CONCEPT Of course, even in the first half of the twentieth century, there were the "personalistic" psychologists, such as Mary W. Calkins and Wilhelm Stern, who insisted that self-reference was characteristic of all psychological activity. Such formulations would find an ardent advocate later in Prescott Lecky's Self-consistency (1945). But the experimental mainstream was a psychology that had banished the self and other integrative concepts. [Cf. Airport 1943; see also PERSONALITY: CONTEMPORARY VIEWPOINTS, article on A UNIQUE AND OPEN SYSTEM; and the biography of STERN.] As a result, it never came to grips effectively with problems of human motivation (e.g., Koch 1956) nor with regularities in human behavior on the conceptual level of functioning (Schneirla 1946; 1951). Research results were fragmentary and attempts to put the fragments together proved inconclusive and even contradictory, showing little resemblance to the characteristic consistency of the person as he pursues the satisfaction of his needs for food, sleep, and sex and as he works and plays with his fellows. As a rule, the person searching for food is not guided by hunger alone; he is also guided by what he considers to be proper food, the place where it is located, and the atmosphere where it is eaten. The tired traveler looking for a hotel is not merely concerned that the bed be like his own bed at home or perhaps a bit more comfortable. He is equally, if not more, concerned with the class of the hotel, whether it is on a par with his standing in life, and how his friends, employer, or sweetheart will react when he announces where he is staying. Ordinarily, the search for a sex partner is not guided merely by the urge for any sex object immediately available, who will serve to reduce tension and restore the homeostatic level. The episodes of sexual activity, beginning with the search, are also guided by proving one's worth and status as a man or woman both to oneself and to others. Therefore, the individual's self is involved in more than striving to raise one's prestige, status, or self-esteem. Typically, self becomes involved in the operation of motivational urges, whether the individual is aware of it or not. The pervasive presence of self factors is expressed well by Shoben: "In any case, self-involved behavior seems close to impossible to explain on the basis of a tension-reduction model, and the postulation of self-involvement seems necessary to account for the pursuit of long range goals so typical of human motivation" (1962, p. 771). [See MOTIVATION, article On HUMAN MOTIVATION.] The regulation of behavior by self is not restricted to motivational activity. Self concerns
151
enter as regulating factors into many psychological processes: judging, perceiving, learning, remembering, thinking, planning, and decision making. In performing a task, level of performance is not determined solely by the nature of the problem (difficulty or ease, for example). The goals one has erected for oneself in general, the place of the particular task in one's scheme of goals, and one's standing relative to others on the task all enter the picture and affect one's performance. During his development, the individual comes to stand in established reciprocities with others, as high, low, or equal; friendly or unfriendly; dominant or subordinate. When stabilized, these reciprocities form patterns producing regularity and consistency in the individual's dealings with others. In series of encounters with others, the individual develops self-identity, in various respects, which is reflected in consistency in his dealings with others and with situations from day to day. In different situations, relevant components of the self are aroused, lending to his behavior characteristic modes of reacting to, and coping with, situations. In brief, the growing interest in a self concept reflects the search for integrative concepts, particularly in motivation, where empirical work has tended to be fragmentary. Studying motives separately has fallen short in providing an adequate account of human motivation. The self enters into the operation of human motives as a regulative factor. So, too, self enters into other psychological processes. Involvement of the self in these processes is reflected in the consistency of the person and its continuity from day to day. In fact, self involvement in particular aspects of the kaleidoscopic stimulus world is the basis for the experience of continuity in personal identity. Usages of self concept For reasons mentioned, problems of self or ego came irrevocably to the foreground as a legitimate area of investigation. Yet exactly what the concept covers, its relation to other integrative concepts (e.g., role, ego, personality) are still not crystallized. A convenient summary of different usages is presented in Hall and Lindzey (1957, pp. 467-499). Not including the primarily psychiatric and clinical conceptions in our consideration, a major definitional divergence is represented between those who differentiate between the concept of self and the concept of ego and those who use the concepts of self and ego interchangeably. Ausubel (1952), Chein (1944), Hilgard (1949), Murphy (1947), and Symonds (1951) are among those
152
SELF CONCEPT
Body imagevisual image of I one's appearance C in space
{
self-attitudes Other non-ego>elf-ideals I I involved skills, 5elf-motives f ~ EGO + \ habits, memories, >elf-values and so on
Auditory images of one's name Kinesthetic sensations Visceral tensions Personal memories
= PERSONALITY
Figure 7 Source: Adapted from Ausubel, David P., Ego Development and the Personality Disorders, 1952, Grune & Stratton, Inc. Reproduced by permission.
who propose to use the concepts of self and ego in a differentiated way. Allport (1943), Snygg and Combs (1949), M. Sherif and Cantril (1947) are among those who use the words self and ego interchangeably. Self differentiated from ego. An account of all the possible variations in differentiating the ego concept from the self concept is not within the scope of this article. It will suffice to examine representative ways in which they are differentiated. Murphy's definitions of self and ego in his monumental Personality (1947) provide one example: "Self: The individual as known to the individual" (p. 996); and "Ego: Group of activities concerned with enhancement and defense of the self" (p. 984). Here, "self" is used to mean the object consisting of so many attitudes and feelings in regard to the person himself, and "ego" is used to refer to the associated processes or activities. Ausubel offers still another example. His diagram of the relationship of self, ego, and personality (Figure 1) clarifies his differentiation (1952, p. 13). It may be fair to summarize Ausubel's schema by saying that the self is made up primarily of perceptual components, and ego consists of these and affectively charged conceptual components (selfideals, self-values, etc.). But a clean separation between perceptual and conceptual components does not seem to fit into the ongoing developmental picture. As the child acquires labels and categories of language, "the self becomes less and less a pure perceptual object, and more and more a conceptual trait system" (Murphy 1947, p. 506). Once the child starts acquiring language the body image becomes increasingly invested with value attributions that vary from culture to culture and from class to class (e.g., modesty in exposure, cleanliness, desirable body proportions, proper items to cover and adorn the body). Likewise, in building a self-picture the place of one's name is not restricted to auditory images: as McDougall noted, it soon becomes a handle to which many attributes are tied. Anthropologists have reported
cases in which personal names are changed at important transitions in people's lives. For example, A. R. Radcliffe-Brown (1922, p. 119) reported the change of name of Andamanese girls at the time of first menstruation. Likewise, Rivers reported the case of a Melanesian culture in which "on marriage both man and woman change their names and assume a common name" (1914, p. 347). Self interchangeable with ego. Some authors seem to use either the concept of ego or the concept of self to cover a broad range. For example, Shoben defines "self" as "a relatively stable organization of values that mediates and focuses behavior" (1962, p. 771). George A. Miller defines "ego" as "the individual's conception of himself" (1962, p. 347). In view of this terminological malaise, it might be preferable to discard the labels "self" and "ego," fraught as they are with historical entanglements, and to use new terms not so encumbered. The new term proposed by Allport to replace the self and ego concepts is "proprium" (1961, p. 127). However, contemporary social psychologists, concerned as they are with the development of the personal identity of the individual—its enhancement and defense in social relations—seem to get along in their conceptualization without being concerned over the terminological differentiation between ego and self (Krech, Crutchfield, & Ballachey 1962; Newcomb, Turner, & Converse 1965; Secord & Backman 1964; Sherif & Sherif 1956). A characterization of self concept On the basis of the foregoing considerations and surveys of theoretical and empirical literature, several propositions seem warranted. Self (or ego) is not innate, as are the individual's organic urges—such as hunger and sex— which are subject to homeostatic regulation of the organism. Self (ego) is the product of interaction, from infancy onward, with the individual's physical and social environment. This interaction is associated with novel and familiar sensations: pain, resistance, acceptance, rejection, and gratification. The proposition that self is a developmental forma-
SELF CONCEPT tion is one of the most widely documented generalizations among investigators from the nineteenth century on, despite variations in the specifics of their accounts. There is also agreement that this psychological formation of the human individual is not a unitary structure, appearing full-blown. It develops first as a perceptual system based on the differentiation of one's body and its parts from its surroundings. It becomes progressively a more complex conceptual system, consisting of evaluative categories with associated traits or attributes. New classifications and qualities (e.g., adolescence, old age, acquisition of new interpersonal roles and social status) continue to be incorporated in the system during the life span (cf. Murphy 1947, pp. 489 ff.; Snygg & Combs 1949, pp. 78-79). To emphasize the multifaceted character of the person's identity, William James (1890) analyzed this uniquely human formation in terms of the person's "selves." However, various components of the self formation are interrelated; different components may be mutually supportive or conflicting, depending on the situation. To underscore both the multifaceted nature and interrelated nature of self components, it is preferable to use a generic concept (self) subsuming the components, referring to the latter by terms other than the various "selves." Therefore, the components are referred to as attitudes or self-attitudes, to specify that they pertain to relatedness of self to objects and persons important to the individual. Here, the term "attitude" is used to refer to more or less lasting evaluative categories of the person. (More transitory internal states may be referred to by other terms, such as "set," "expectation," or "bodily urge.") The definition of "attitude" here is similar to that given by Smith, Bruner, and White: "We define an attitude as a predisposition to experience a class of objects in certain ways, with characteristic affect; to be motivated by this class of objects in characteristic ways; and to act with respect to these objects in a characteristic fashion" (1956, p. 33). [See ATTITUDES.] Combining these fundamental points, the characterization of self (ego) is as follows: Self is a developmental formation in the psychological makeup of the individual, consisting of interrelated attitudes that the individual has acquired in relation to his own body and its parts, to his capacities, and to objects, persons, family, groups, social values, goals, and institutions, which define and regulate his relatedness to them in concrete situations and activities.
153
The attitudes that compose the self system are, therefore, the individual's cherished commitments, stands on particular issues, acceptances, rejections, reciprocal expectations (roles) in interpersonal and group relations, identifications with persons or values, and personal goals for the future. When any of these—singly or in varying combination— enter as factors in ongoing psychological activity, owing to their relevance, behavior acquires characteristic directionality (positive or negative), becomes more consistent and selective, and is less bound by the ups and downs of the immediate situation. Ego involvement simply means involvement of such an attitude in ongoing psychological activity. Ego-involved activity is characterized by highly sensitized mobilization of the individual's psychological processes (discrimination, perception, learning, remembering, problem solving, decision making, and so on). Ego-involved activity, revealing aspects of an individual's personal identity, has been demonstrated empirically in many studies since the 1940s. (Note again the terminologically unhappy fact that these studies are almost always presented as studies of ego involvement, not self involvement.) Defining, as they do, the individual's identity relative to objects, persons, groups, and situations around him, these self-attitudes determine the individual's experience as an active agent, principal actor, or executor when they participate in ongoing psychological activity. Therefore, it is not parsimonious to posit separate psychological concepts to account for experience of the person as executor and doer (cf. Ausubel 1952, pp. 41-46). Thus, the unique formation that takes shape as the self or ego of the human person consists of a set of components that define his stabilized bearings in relation to the physical and social surroundings. They define his ties, his reciprocal expectations of his rights and responsibilities, and his motivational—emotional claims relative to objects as well as other persons, groups, and institutions. They define his stands and commitments relative to the social issues that are important to him. All of these components of the individual's self set him apart as a person in diverse ways and capacities with a sense of unique self-identity. The stability of the person's self-identity is, therefore, dependent on the stability of the ties, roles, commitments, and orientations that compose it. They provide anchorages relative to which he gauges his personally felt status, security, and prestige, and his maintenance or gain in position in the social scheme of which he is a part. His experience of success or failure arises relative to
154
SELF CONCEPT
them. Hence, maintenance and continuity of the stability of these anchorages from day to day become matters of utmost importance in the dynamics of his motivational scheme. Disruption of the stable anchorages that define the person's bearings relative to his surroundings arouses tensions, referred to as the state of uncertainty or anxiety, that are distressing or even unbearable. Experimental evidence shows that the loss of stable anchorages in the person's surroundings arouses feelings of uncertainty and insecurity, causing him to flounder about in efforts to restore his sense of personal stability. The experience of loss of his bearings makes an individual more susceptible to conforming to social influences to which he would ordinarily pay less heed (M. Sherif & Harvey 1952). Similarly, disruption of stabilized personal ties, loss of acceptance by groups that he values, or lack of stable ties with others generate intense feelings of aloneness and personal rejection. Communications that advocate points of view divergent from the strong commitments incorporated in the self system arouse dismay, irritation, and tension. The committed person finds such communication more divergent from his stand, more unreasonable, and more obnoxious than does a person who is less committed. Thus, self-attitudes are resistant to communication designed to change them. Formation of self (ego) Based on extensive surveys of research on child development (M. Sherif & Cantril 1947; Murphy 1947), this account notes a sequence of major events marking ego formation. Differences in age of occurrence and forms are to be expected in differing cultural and socioeconomic conditions. Neither early observations of individual children nor modern studies of groups of infants provide evidence for innate self-identity. The infant's behavior is readily attributable to bodily states (hunger or sleep, for example) or the duration of immediate environmental stimulation. In fact, consistent differentiation and localization of the body parts require repeated experiences in localizing stimulation, meeting obstacles arousing unpleasant sensations, and exploring both body parts and environment. The earliest manifestations of self-awareness appear during this "perceptual stage" (Murphy 1947), in which the body is perceived apart from the surroundings. [See INFANCY, article on INFANT DEVELOPMENT; SENSORY AND MOTOR DEVELOPMENT.]
Cases of prolonged isolation in childhood suggest that ego formation beyond the stage of a per-
ceived body depends upon interaction with other persons who are members of a social and linguistic community (cf. Lindesmith & Strauss 1949). This accords with early theoretical accounts and modern formulations based on research conceiving of self as a product of interaction with others (e.g., Wallon 1934; Piaget 1932). Facilitations and resistances, acceptances and punishments by persons who care for the child are landmarks for the developing self. Through such interactions, the child begins to acquire spoken language, at first slowly, then at a rapidly accelerating pace (during the second or third year of life). The acquisition of language is the single event most responsible for producing the consistency in behavior that requires postulation of a self system. [See LANGUAGE, article on LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT.] When the child is able to designate self and others through personal pronouns, a name, or verb forms, even the bodily self is delineated more sharply from its surroundings. Henceforth, the body itself is classified and endowed with attributes (favorable or unfavorable) through interaction on a verbal level. The striking variations in boundaries and properties of body image found in persons of different sex, age, culture, and states of bodily injury led Fisher and Cleveland (1958, p. 367) to postulate that the body image is best conceived as "a representation of attitudes and expectancy systems" related to the body and other persons. [See BODY IMAGE.] Consistency in behavior is greatly enhanced through verbal interaction and conceptual classification, as research findings on the appearance of discriminatory responses by and toward American Negro children show so clearly (Clark & Clark 1947; Horowitz 1944). Very young children responded to skin-color differences but not preferentially. However, in a society systematically discriminating against Negroes, white and Negro children exhibited consistent preferences for light skin color by the age of 5. While not every aspect of linguistic behavior is ego-involving, the child's instrumental mastery of language has general results that apply equally to the formation of categorical and attributive links between self and others (Lewis 1963). It liberates behavior from the total dictation of fluctuation in momentary bodily needs and the physical variations in external stimulation. From extensive research with children and cases of brain damage, Luriia concluded that "adoption of a verbal rule at once modifies the nature of all subsequent reactions . . . the stimulus in question becomes not a mere signal but an item of general information,
SELF CONCEPT and all subsequent reactions depend more on the system it [stimulus] is taken into than on its physical properties" (1961, p. 44, italics in original). The family and other adults in charge of the child's routine exert profound influence through their words and deeds on the nature and quality of the classificatory schemes defining what he is and is not. However, in line with G. H. Mead's theoretical scheme, the research of Piaget (1932) demonstrated that stability in the child's relatedness is attained slowly and, most decisively, in the company of other children. Little children behave consistently in dealings with others, according to rules or dictums handed down by authority figures, but easily lapse from them in the absence of authority. By participating in play with other children, the child has the greater opportunity to grasp notions of reciprocity with others and of mutual adherence to rules governing the give and take. [See DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, article on A THEORY OF DEVELOPMENT.] Thus, a series of experiments and "age-norm" studies (reviewed in Sherif & Sherif 1956) reveal that consistency in competing with others, in cooperating with others, in expressing sympathy at another's distress, in responsibility for self and others, and in setting goals for one's own performance appear gradually as the child participates in social and cooperative forms of play in contrast to earlier side-by-side or parallel play. Slowly—and with confusion—the classificatory schemes defining self and others acquire longer dimensions in time and space. The immediate is located with reference to increasingly greater ranges of past and future (Lewis 1963). Geographical ranges of self-relatedness increase gradually from the perceptual scope of the child ("my house") to more distant and unseen, but conceptualized, places and the people in them. The scope of time, place, and kind of persons included in categories for self and not-self varies enormously, along with their qualitative nature, according to prevailing social, cultural, material, and socioeconomic environments. The common property of self components in socialized members of all societies is the regulation of behavior within bounds of acceptability defined by the particular organizational and value systems of those groups with which the person identifies himself. Consistent evaluations of one class of objects (persons) and differential (sometimes invidious) evaluations of others is evidence of an ego component—an attitude relating self to that stimulus domain. The conception of self components (attitudes) as categorical schemes for evalua-
155
tion, including a latitude for acceptance and a latitude of rejection by the person, has led directly to operational procedures for assessing the person's ego involvement in various respects (Sherif, Sherif, & Nebergall 1965; Sherif, Sherif, & Kent 1967). In addition, all known cultures present periods or stages in human development requiring alteration of the self concept as it is formed at the time. The years of transition from childhood to adulthood and the years of old age are two such periods. These particular transitions are marked by bodily changes that impel a change in self. Self and reference groups or sets Research attempts failing to include explicit environmental factors have yielded inconclusive correlations between the person's self-ratings at two different points in time and subjectively circular accounts of self (Wylie 1961). In analyzing the "presentation of the self" in a variety of social situations, Goffman concluded that the person's characteristic consistency is a "collaborative manufacture" involving social arrangements and supporting performances by people within them (e.g., 1956, p. 253). Even advocates of a "phenomenal self" as determinant of all behavior could not ignore that much personal consistency and many changes in personal identity that occur with age or with taking on occupations and different social status are directly related to stabilities and changes in the social environment. But individuals are differentially selective of their social environments, and modern social systems are extraordinarily complex and changing. A particular individual could develop within varying combinations of groups and institutions with differing values, rates of change, and stability. Owing to his advanced conceptual abilities, man may relate himself to persons and groups not present, spatially or temporally. Therefore, unless the person is a fully integrated member of only one group and unless the social situation is fully structured as to socially desired outcomes, there is a need for concepts relating self to environmental events that may not be contemporaneous or spatially present. One such concept is that of reference groups or sets; these are defined as groups or classifications of people to whom the individual relates himself psychologically or to which he aspires to belong (Sherif & Sherif 19 56; see the 1948 edition). The concept of reference group, linking self components to environmental structures not necessarily present, is a distinctly human concept,
156
SELF CONCEPT
as the student of animal behavior J. P. Scott observed (1953, p. 69). It is unnecessary in studying subhuman behavior. It is probably unnecessary for analysis of self in an isolated, illiterate group. Only in differentiated societies is it possible that groups of actual membership may be anchors for self-identity. From the research viewpoint, the concepts of self as a constellation of attitudes linked with identifiable reference groups and sets provide tools for integrating behavioral (individual) and sociocultural levels of analysis (Sherif 1962). A sharp dichotomy between individualistic and cultural (group) determination of behavior resists both argument and analysis but yields to research evidence that groups and populations have properties related to the development of self-other attitudes; self—other attitudes, in turn, display dimensional and classificatory features not necessarily identical with sociocultural prescriptions, but greatly clarified when related to them. Reference groups and self appraisal. Asked to answer "Who am I?" the person's usual response is his name and social classifications, sometimes modified by adjectives placing him within the category (cf. Bugental & Zelen 1950; Kuhn & McPartland 1954). The social labels are typically exhausted before idiosyncratic responses appear. The psychological import of this rather prosaic finding is vast: Each social category carries a complex of characteristics and positions within it that etch the specifics of a self image whether the individual actually belongs to that category or not. The bulk of the population of the United States, identifying themselves as "middle class," display a constellation of attitudes related to a middle-class position whether their individual socioeconomic levels warrant the designation or not (Centers 1947). Female college students who come from conservative families and, in time, take a liberal college student body as their reference group change their attitudes in diverse respects, not merely in identifying themselves with a particular college. However, those retaining a primary group reference, while classifying themselves as students, do not change at all (Newcomb 1950). Groups, populations, and sets of people live in differing material and social environments that give focus to a complex of social values, setting bounds for the self-radius of persons who classify themselves as "belonging" within them. Thus, in the United States, the conceived range of achievement for self (from minimum to maximum) and the nature of personal goals varies systematically according to socioeconomic level and sociocultural
composition of reference sets; the range of achievement is most similar with respect to certain material possessions uniformly portrayed as success symbols in mass communication (Sherif & Sherif 1964). While upper-class youth are more likely to have high self-esteem than lower-class youth, the largest differences in self-esteem occur between groupings differentiated by both class and distinctive religious—ethnic cultures in the United States. Values cherished by youth in different socioeconomic and religious groupings differ, but there are marked similarities among them that indicate that they are all, nonetheless, members of the same society (Rosenberg 1965). The reference-group concept permits specification of the particular group or set of people on whom the individual depends in appraising himself and others. In complex and changing societies, these people may not be readily identified by socioeconomic classification or geographical location. When the person locates himself within a set or group of people, the relative status of this group in the social organization and his own position within it serve as standards (anchors) for his appraisals of performance by himself and others. In an experiment that served as a model for numerous others, Chapman and Volkmann (1939) showed that one's level of aspiration is anchored in the status of his own reference set relative to other reference sets. University students spontaneously raised or lowered their predictions for self when the group with whom they compared self was respectively "inferior" or "superior" to their own reference sets. When anchored in the person's reference set, self-attitudes exert a stabilizing effect on performance. The relevant experiments have all used special instructions or varied tasks to assess the effects of ego involvement, and the findings hinge on the researcher's prior knowledge of values that are prized by the subjects' reference set (for example, for college students high intelligence, good university records, and contribution to science). The outcome of such experiments has been the repeated demonstration that such manipulations, arousing the person's mettle to prove his worth, result in greater consistency (less variation) of behavior in setting goals for performance, in selfconfidence, in various personal characteristics, in learning, and in forgetting (see Allport 1943; M. Sherif & Cantril 1947). [See REFERENCE GROUPS.] Discrepant group membership. While existence in an interacting group affects the individual's self concerns whether he takes stock of himself on their terms or not, attitudes relating self to others
SELF CONCEPT are most predictable when the group is also the person's reference group. Siegel and Siegel (1957) found that over a period of time a person's attitudes coincided most with the values of groups that were also reference groups for him. A person who lived with a group whose values were at variance with his reference set was affected by it, but his attitudes resembled those of the reference set more closely. Judgments of one's standing (rank) relative to others and of the rank assigned to self by others differ for those who are tied to the immediate group and those whose reference sets are outside of it. A study of small task groups in an isolated military base showed a general tendency to overestimate one's own rank and the rank that others would assign one. As a result, self-ranking and estimated ranking by others were more closely related than either were to actual ranks made by fellow members. However, those whose self-rankings disagreed most with the rank assigned them by others in the group were preponderantly married men with higher military rank and educational level. As a result, they were less tied to the reactions of the work group in rating themselves and tended to use standards from their other reference sets (Reeder, Donohue, & Biblarz 1962). Salience of different groups. "I, who for the time have staked my all on being a psychologist, am mortified if others know much more psychology than I. But I am contented to wallow in the grossest ignorance of Greek. . . . Had I 'pretensions' to be a linguist, it would have been just the reverse" (James 1890, vol. 1, p. 310). The problem of self—reference-group relationship stated succinctly by James still holds the greatest promise for future research. All components of the self are not equal in importance to the individual over time, and their relative importance varies in different situations. For every person, there is some order or hierarchy in the constellation of self values such that the ways, the time, and the relative frequency with which he becomes ego-involved differ systematically from person to person. Differences of this sort between individuals acquire some rational pattern when the hierarchy of their self-values is related to the relative importance of their various reference sets. Adolescence and marginality. The period of adolescence in modern societies may serve as a prototype for study of the problem. During the prolonged and ill-defined transition from childhood to adulthood in Western industrialized societies, the adolescent is betwixt and between ref-
757
erence groups, much like a "marginal man." Lack of stable anchors for self arouses experiences of uncertainty and conflict. Grownups provide few ready-made paths for the transition that fully satisfy the adolescent's growing urges and his desire to prove himself adult. At this same time, he is provoked by the uncertainties of his standing. Scanning his environment for some stable anchor for self-identity, he turns increasingly toward agemate groups and sets. Even though his parents be loved and valued, the result is reduced emphasis on parental capability and overestimation of the worth of age-mate capacities, as Prado (1958) has shown experimentally. Absorption of self-identity within the organizational pattern and values developed in age-mate groups varies with the availability and stability of other reference ties (family, school, community, etc.); however, the adolescent's hierarchy of ego attitudes is closely linked to the values of his informal groups. When these values conflict with adult prescriptions, the defiance of adult standards, including legal violations, is self-justified by measuring oneself relative to the values of the youth group [Sherif & Sherif 1964; see also ADOLESCENCE]. Multiple group membership. Like many adults in multifaceted, complex societies, the adolescent belongs to multiple groups whose values may conflict. The member of multiple groups with contradictory values frequently faces situations of choice in abiding by the values of one reference set at the expense of the other. Still more painfully, he or she may form ego attitudes relative to different reference groups whose simultaneous arousal is bound to produce psychological conflict, uncertainty, and confused search for resolution. Such, for example, is the plight of many women today who conceive of themselves simultaneously as women and mothers in traditional terms and as modern, independent women on a par with men (Seward 1946). Choice situations provide one index of the salience of the individual's self-attitudes. For example, during the crisis over desegregation in Little Rock, Arkansas, ministers faced the choice of speaking out against violence, as ministers of brotherly love, or of remaining silent in keeping with the standards of their segregationist congregations. Only a few of them chose to speak out in congruence with their ministerial self-identity (Campbell & Pettigrew 1959). Stability and change of ego attitudes. Numerous instances of change in ego attitudes have been mentioned in this article. Stability may be at-
158
SELF CONCEPT
tributed in large part to the regularity and continuity of the person's social setting. Yet resistance to change inheres in their formation and functioning as well. Changing attitudes that form part of the person's relatedness to other persons, groups, and values amounts to changing part of the selfidentity, which is the epicenter of experienced personal stability, even though it may not be an integrated harmonious structure. Disturbance of self-attitudes once they are formed is psychologically uncomfortable and even painful. Resistance to change increases in proportion to the degree of personal commitment on the matter in question. When a person is highly involved in the matter in question, he is less likely to change his attitude readily and, when he does, is likely to change less than persons to whom the attitude is of moderate importance. In matters of high ego involvement, the individual is very discriminating in accepting proposals that differ even slightly from the values he has come to cherish as defining the attributes of himself and other persons who count in his eyes; he is prone to reject all those seen as different. Thus, his categorization of ego-involving material reveals broad latitudes of rejection in comparison with the narrow, but cherished, range of acceptance. Attempts to persuade him otherwise are likely to fall within the range that he has already rejected categorically as unlike himself and, therefore, to exert no lasting effects other than, perhaps, to reaffirm the correctness of his self conception. On matters of less consequence, he is more amenable to change and innovation, because he has not committed himself against such a broad range of discrepant values (Sherif, Sherif, & Nebergall 1965; Sherif, Sherif, & Kent 1967). By studying the relative importance of a person's reference groups, their values, and his position within them, the degrees of a person's ego involvement in various respects may eventually become more amenable to research. MUZAFER SHERIF [Directly related are the entries IDENTITY, PSYCHOSOCIAL and PERSONALITY, article on PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT. Other relevant material may be found in ATTITUDES; INFANCY; INTERACTION; LIFE CYCLE; PERSONALITY, article on THE FIELD; REFERENCE GROUPS; SOCIALIZATION.] BIBLIOGRAPHY ALLPORT, GORDON W. 1943 The Ego in Contemporary Psychology. Psychological Review 50:451-478. ALLPORT, GORDON W. 1961 Pattern and Growth in Personality. New York: Holt.
AUSUBEL, DAVID P. 1952 Ego Development and the Personality Disorders. New York: Grune & Stratton. BALDWIN, JAMES M. (1895) 1906 Mental Development in the Child and the Race: Methods and Processes. 3d ed., rev. New York and London: Macmillan. BUGENTAL, JAMES F. T.; and ZELEN, SEYMOUR L. 1950 Investigations Into the "Self-concept." I. The W-A-Y Technique. Journal of Personality 18:483-498. CAMPBELL, ERNEST Q.; and PETTIGREW, THOMAS F. 1959 Racial and Moral Crisis: The Role of the Little Rock Ministers. American Journal of Sociology 64:509-516. CENTERS, RICHARD (1947) 1952 The American Class Structure: A Psychological Analysis. Pages 299-311 in Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, Readings in Social Psychology. Rev. ed. Edited by Guy E. Swanson et al. New York: Holt. CHAPMAN, DWIGHT W.; and VOLKMANN, JOHN A. 1939 A Social Determinant of the Level of Aspiration. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 34:225-238. CHEIN, ISIDOR 1944 The Awareness of Self and the Structure of the Ego. Psychological Review 51:304314. CLARK, KENNETH B.; and CLARK, MAMIE P. 1947 Racial Identification and Preference in Negro Children. Pages 169-178 in Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, Readings in Social Psychology. Edited by Theodore M. Newcomb and Eugene L. Hartley. New York: Holt. COOLEY, CHARLES H. (1902) 1956 Human Nature and the Social Order. Rev. ed. In Charles H. Cooley, Two Major Works: Social Organization and Human Nature and the Social Order. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. -> Each title reprinted with individual title page and pagination. A separate paperback edition was published in 1964 by Schocken. FISHER, SEYMOUP.; and CLEVELAND, SIDNEY E. 1958 Body Image and Personality. Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand. GOFFMAN, ERVING (1956) 1959 The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday. HALL, CALVIN S.; and LINDZEY, GARDNER 1957 Theories of Personality. New York: Wiley; London: Chapman. HILGARD, ERNEST R. 1949 Human Motives and the Concept of the Self. American Psychologist 4:374-382. HOROWITZ, EUGENE L. 1944 Race Attitudes. Pages 139247 in Otto Klineberg (editor), Characteristics of the American Negro. New York: Harper. JAMES, WILLIAM (1890) 1962 The Principles of Psychology. 2 vols. New York: Smith. KOCH, SIGMUND 1956 Behavior as "Intrinsically" Regulated : Work Notes Toward a Pre-theory of Phenomena Called "Motivational." Volume 4, pages 42-130 in Nebraska Symposium on Motivation. Edited by Marshall R. Jones. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press. KRECH, DAVID; CRUTCHFIELD, RICHARD S.; and BELLACHEY, EGERTON L. 1962 Individual in Society: A Textbook of Social Psychology. New York: McGraw-Hill. -» First published in 1948 as Theory and Problems of Social Psychology, by Krech and Crutchfield. KUHN, MANFORD H.; and MCPARTLAND, THOMAS S. 1954 An Empirical Investigation of Self-attitudes. American Sociological Review 19:68-76. LECKY, PRESCOTT (1945) 1951 Self-consistency: A Theory of Personality. Rev. ed. New York: Island Press. LEWIS, MORRIS M. 1963 Language, Thought and Personality in Infancy and Childhood. New York: Basic Books.
SELIGMAN, C. G. LINDESMITH, ALFRED; and STRAUSS, ANSELM 1949 Social Psychology. New York: Dryden. LURIIA, ALEKSANDR R. 1961 The Role of Speech in the Regulation of Normal and Abnormal Behavior. New York: Liveright. MEAD, GEORGE H. 1913 The Social Self. Journal of Philosophy 10:374-380. MILLER, GEORGE A. 1962 Psychology: The Science of Mental Life. New York: Harper. MOUSTAKAS, CLARK (editor) 1956 The Self. New York: Harper. MURPHY, GARDNER 1947 Personality: A Biosocial Approach to Origins and Structure. New York: Harper. NEWCOMB, THEODORE M. 1950 Social Psychology. New York: Dryden. NEWCOMB, THEODORE M.; TURNER, RALPH H.; and CONVERSE, PHILIP E. 1965 Social Psychology: The Study of Human Interaction. New York: Holt. PIAGET, JEAN (1932) 1948 The Moral Judgment of the Child. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. -> First published in French. PRADO, WILLIAM M. 1958 Appraisal of Performance as a Function of the Relative Ego-involvement of Children and Adolescents. Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Oklahoma. -* Summarized in Sherif & Sherif (1964). RADCLIFFE-BROWN, A. R. (1922) 1948 The Andaman Islanders. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. REEDER, LEO G.; DONOHUE, GEORGE A.; and BIBLARZ, ARTURO 1962 Conceptions of Self and Others. Pages 69-78 in Bartlett Stoodley (editor), Society and Self. New York: Free Press. RIVERS, W. H. R. 1914 The History of Melanesian Society. 2 vols. Publication No. 1 of the Percy Sladen Trust Expedition to Melanesia. Cambridge Univ. Press. ROSENBERG, MORRIS 1965 Society and the Adolescent Self-image. Princeton Univ. Press. SCHNEIRLA, T. C. 1946 Problems in the Biopsychology of Social Organization. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 41:385-402. SCHNEIRLA, T. C. 1951 The "Levels" Concept in the Study of Social Organization in Animals. Pages 83— 120 in Conference on Social Psychology at Crossroads, University of Oklahoma, 1950, Social Psychology at the Crossroads. Edited by John H. Rohrer and Muzafer Sherif. New York: Harper. SCOTT, JOHN P. 1953 Implications of Infra-human Social Behavior for Problems of Human Relations. Pages 33—73 in Conference in Social Psychology, University of Oklahoma, 1952, Group Relations at the Crossroads. Edited by Muzafer Sherif and M. O. Wilson. New York: Harper. SECORD, PAUL F.; and BACKMAN, CARL W. 1964 Social Psychology. New York: McGraw-Hill. SEWARD, GEORGENE 1946 Sex and the Social Order. New York: McGraw-Hill. SHERIF, CAROLYN W.; SHERIF, MUZAFER; and NEBERGALL, R. E. 1965 Attitude and Attitude Change: The Social Judgment-Involvement Approach. Philadelphia: Saunders. SHERIF, MUZAFER 1962 The Self and Reference Groups: Meeting Ground of Individual and Group Approaches. New York Academy of Sciences, Annals 96:797-813. SHERIF, MUZAFER; and CANTRIL, HADLEY 1947 The Psychology of Ego-involvements, Social Attitudes and Identifications. New York: Wiley; London: Chapman & Hall.
159
SHERIF, MUZAFER; and HARVEY, O. J. 1952 A Study in Ego Functioning: Elimination of Stable Anchorages in Individual and Group Situations. Sociometry 15: 272-305. SHERIF, MUZAFER; and SHERIF, CAROLYN W. 1956 An Outline of Social Psychology. Rev. ed. New York: Harper. -» First published in 1948 with Muzafer Sherif as the sole author. SHERIF, MUZAFER; and SHERIF, CAROLYN W. 1964 Reference Groups: Exploration Into Conformity and Deviation of Adolescents. New York: Harper. SHERIF, MUZAFER; SHERIF, CAROLYN W.; and KENT, DONALD 1967 Attitude, Ego-involvement and Change. New York: Wiley. SHOBEN, EDWARD J. JR. 1962 Behavioral Aspects of the Self. New York Academy of Sciences, Annals 96:765— 773. SIEGEL, ALBERTA E.; and SIEGEL, SIDNEY 1957 Reference Groups, Membership Groups, and Attitude Change. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 55:360-364. SMITH, M. BREWSTER; BRUNER, JEROME S.; and WHITE, R. W. 1956 Opinions and Personality. New York: Wiley. SNYGG, DONALD; and COMBS, ARTHUR W. 1949 Individual Behavior. New York: Harper. SYMONDS, PERCIVAL M. 1951 The Ego and the Self. New York: Appleton. WALLON, HENRI 1934 Les origines du caractere chez I'enfant. Paris: Boivin. WYLIE, RUTH C. 1961 The Self Concept: A Critical Survey of Pertinent Research Literature. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press.
SELF DETERMINATION, NATIONAL See INTERNATIONAL POLITICS; NATION; NATIONALISM.
SELIGMAN, C. G. Charles Gabriel Seligman (1873-1940) was one of that remarkable group of young biological scientists (among them, W. H. R. Rivers, C. S. Myers, and William McDougall) who, under A. C. Haddon's inspiration, established scientific field work as the basis of professional anthropology in Great Britain during the first quarter of the twentieth century. Seligman's research broke ground for Malinowski's field work in Melanesia between 1914 and 1918 and for Evans-Pritchard's work in the Sudan twenty years later. Seligman drifted into anthropology by chance. Originally trained as a physician, he had embarked on research in medicine when, in 1898, he learned of Haddon's plans for the Cambridge Expedition to the Torres Strait and volunteered to join it. At first Seligman confined himself to medical investigations, but his colleagues soon drew him into their anthropometric and ethnological studies. On
760
SELIGMAN, C. G.
returning to England in 1899, he resumed his medical research until, in 1903, he met a wealthy American businessman, Major Cooke Daniels, and persuaded him to finance the expedition to New Guinea that resulted, inter alia, in The Melanesians of British New Guinea (1910). It was only after this expedition that he finally committed himself to anthropology by accepting the first lectureship in ethnology (in 1913 it became the chair of ethnology) established at the University of London. In 1904 he married Brenda Z. Salaman, who collaborated in all his later field research and in many of his major publications. Her influence on their joint work was important: while Seligman himself had, for example, little interest in the minutiae of kinship custom, his wife, under the influence and instruction of Rivers, became adept in this branch of anthropology and took the responsibility for it. The Seligmans carried out a series of officially sponsored expeditions, to Ceylon in 1907-1908 to study the Veddas (see 1911) and their first expedition to the Sudan in 1909-1910. They made two further trips to the Sudan in 19111912 and 1921-1922. In the intervals between these expeditions, while preparing their results for publication, Seligman continued his pathology researches and received for them, in 1911, the coveted distinction of a fellowship of the Royal College of Physicians, as well as other medical honors. In 1919 he also became a fellow of the Royal Society. Like Haddon and Tylor, whose conception of a "science of culture" he admired, Seligman regarded anthropology as embracing every aspect of the life of the simpler societies (1926). He approached field work in the spirit of a Darwinian natural historian, considering a living society in terms of its geographical and historical setting as well as in terms of its racial composition, cultural make-up, and psychological foundations. Gifted also with a sensitive aesthetic judgment, Seligman built up a choice private collection of early Chinese art, notably of ceramic and bronze ware, and was thus drawn into research on Chinese history and civilization, a subject that was peculiarly congenial to his somewhat reserved temperament. During World War I he joined the Royal Army Medical Corps and was, with Rivers, assigned to the staff of a hospital for victiihs of shell shock. Clinical experience convinced him of the general soundness of Freudian theory, and in later essays he applied psychoanalytical and related theories to the problems of ethnology.
Descriptive ethnology. Two features are characteristic of Seligman's anthropological and ethnological contributions: they are exploratory rather than definitive in aim, and they concentrate on factual data as opposed to theoretical interpretations and generalizations. Seligman's expedition to New Guinea set the pattern for his later ethnological work. Its aim was to establish the distinctive racial, social, and cultural features of the peoples of this region, with a view to their ethnological classification. All available sources were utilized, including the works of travelers, government reports, and notes and memoranda provided by long-resident missionaries and administrators, but the chief emphasis was on information obtained from native informants and eyewitness description. Considering that the field work took less than a year and was carried out either in pidgin English or with the aid of often inadequate interpreters, the results are impressive. Malinowski (1922) paid tribute to the excellence of Seligman's observations. The data were for the most part new to anthropology. Where they were doubtful or defective, this was scrupulously indicated. Though Seligman made no attempt to investigate any subject in the depth achieved by the next generation of ethnographers, he did deal quite exhaustively with some topics (e.g., totemism), and he did not fail to draw penetrating conclusions, as in his elucidation of the powers and authority of chiefs. Seligman's 1910 book remains a "basic and systematic work" on Melanesia (Elkin 1953, p. 47). It covers, in varying detail, every significant facet of tribal life: the geographical setting, racial cornposition, kinship and family structure, chieftainship and rank, property, trade, warfare, morals, magic and religion, material culture, feasts and ceremonies. It contains an important and comprehensive account (contributed by F. R. Barton) of the kula-type trading voyages of the Motu and an outline of Northern Massim culture on which Malinowski, and subsequently Reo Fortune, built. [See OCEANIAN SOCIETY.] The field work that resulted in the two joint works entitled The Veddas (1911) and Pagan Tribes of the Nilotic Sudan (1932) followed the same procedures as those used by Seligman in New Guinea. The Veddas represents a valiant attempt to salvage what could still be found out about the culture and mode of life of the remnants of the aborigines of Ceylon, and it remains a standard work. The results of the Sudan venture, however, turned out to be more important. The three
SELIGMAN, C. G. Sudan expeditions, prepared for with exemplary thoroughness and supported by both the Sudanese government and British learned societies, were pioneer undertakings in every sense. In this huge territory, still barely pacified, living and traveling conditions were arduous. Communication with informants, in Arabic, was difficult; the Seligmans had only a working knowledge of the language and the southern Sudanese often no more than a smattering of it. Nevertheless, the Seligmans opened up an area until then ethnologically uncharted. The works they published between 1911 and 1932 about this research made ethnological history. In particular, it was Seligman's description of the cult of Nyakang and the divine kingship of Shilluk (see 1911) that, as Evans-Pritchard commented, "brought . . . [divine kingship] to the notice of Sir James Frazer and into the main stream of ethnological theory" (1948, p. 1). Pagan Tribes summed up the results of the field research of the Seligmans and other investigators during the twenty years following the first expedition. Seligman espoused the theory that successive waves of pastoral Hamites had, in the distant past, spread via the Horn of Africa westward and southward, mingling with the autochthonous Negro population to produce the Nilotes (Shilluk, Dinka, Nuer, etc.) and Nilo-Hamites (Bari, Lotuko, etc.) and the chain of peoples in the Great Lakes region stretching through the Hima elements (e.g., in Ankole) to the Masai, all distinguished by their greater or lesser adherence to pastoralism (1913). Conjectural as the theory of Hamitic migration may be, the ethnic classification remains valid, as its continued use (e.g., in the Greenberg language classification) testifies. The theory became a cornerstone of Seligman's synoptic review of the peoples and cultures of Africa (1930). These are divided into six major ethnic clusters—the Bushmen and Hottentots, the true Negroes of west Africa, the Hamites (eastern and northern), the Nilo-Hamites and Nilotes, the Bantu, and the Semites. It is a singular feat of compression and still the best over-all introduction to African ethnology. [See AFRICAN SOCIETY, article on SUBSAHARAN AFRICA.]
Historical ethnology. Seligman's concern with historical ethnology grew naturally out of his descriptive studies. It was also a response to the challenge of the extreme diffusionist theories advocated by Elliott Smith and Rivers. Seligman flatly rejected these theories, contrasting them with genuinely historical reconstruction based on geo-
graphical connections and evidence derived from material culture and institutional relationships (1927). Thus, when he himself carefully considered the evidence for the supposed Egyptian origin of divine kingship in Africa, he came to the conclusion that its most characteristic features go back to an "old and widespread Hamitic belief" to which some specifically Egyptian elements only later became attached (1934). [See KINGSHIP.] It was in the pursuit of these and other historical and distributional associations that Seligman undertook his investigations into prehistory (e.g., of Egypt and the Sudan) and his studies of artifacts and objets d'art. Coupled with his passion for Chinese art and civilization, these studies culminated in his joint paper, with H. C. Beck, on Chinese glass (1938). Here Seligman sought to clarify the routes and modes of transmission by which various products and technical skills reached China from western Europe even before the second century B.C. Physical anthropology. The investigations in physical anthropology that formed for Seligman the necessary basis for the organization of cultural and historical data now appear relatively crude. Without such modern techniques as genetic analysis of blood groups, he obtained anthropometric and anthroposcopic data that have only limited validity. Cross-cultural psychology. Seligman's psychological investigations began with the application of sensory discrimination tests to the Veddas; the results were discouraging. Later he became convinced that the psychology of the unconscious was the key to many fundamental problems of anthropology, and in his first presidential address to the Royal Anthropological Institute he stressed "the Dorderland where social anthropology, psychology, and genetics meet in common biological kinship" (1924, p. 13). (He reverted to this theme in his Huxley Memorial Lecture in 1932). He enlisted the aid of field ethnologists, psychoanalysts, orientalists, and a variety of other specialists, as well as laymen, in the pursuit of these inquiries. Malinowski was one of the many who owed his introduction to psychoanalysis to Seligman (Malinowski 1927, preface). Guided by Freud's theory, Seligman produced evidence from many different cultures for the universality of such "type" dreams as those involving the loss of teeth, flying, and raw meat. He found that conventional interpretations of such dreams often implicitly recognized their symbolic nature. He inferred that there is in the unconscious of all
162
SELIGMAN, C. G.
peoples "a proved common store on which fantasy may draw" in the construction of myth and ritual beliefs and even of technical processes (1924, p. 41). His interpretation of magical rites was that they are "symbolic dramatizations" that drain away unconscious anxiety and that are thus comparable to neurotic symptoms. Taking a different perspective, he assembled cross-cultural evidence to test the universality of the stages of individual psychosexual development postulated in Freudian theory. Emphasizing the scanty and conflicting nature of the ethnological data then available, he concluded that they tended to confirm rather than to refute (as Malinowski maintained) the Freudian hypothesis (1932). Also impressed with Jung's extrovertintrovert dichotomy of temperamental types, he applied it in tentative studies of art styles, of the national character of the Japanese, and of psychosis in different cultural settings (1931). He concluded that psychosis was rare in stable primitive societies but tended to emerge as a result of conflicts engendered by contact with European culture, conflicts he connected also with the then incipient nativistic movements now called cargo cults. These studies claimed no more than to demonstrate the significance of psychoanalysis for anthropology at a time when there was a strong reaction in British anthropological circles against such an application of psychoanalytic theories. [See CULTURE AND PERSONALITY.] Just as Seligman rejected all-embracing diffusionist explanations of ethnological connections, so also he was chary of evolutionist constructions of the kind favored by Frazer and L. H. Morgan. With his strong biological bias, he saw living mankind as a single species with common and uniform mental and physical capacities and dispositions but distributed over the globe in racially diverse and culturally varied communities in different phases of historical development. Though Malinowski's functionalism grew up directly under his eyes, and not without his sympathy, he never aligned himself with this movement; he was too much of an empiricist. The task of scientific ethnology, as he saw it, was to approach particular areas and particular problems by as many methods and from as many angles as could serve to reveal useful data and throw light on them. MEYER FORTES [Other relevant material may be found in the biographies of FRAZER; HADDON; MALINOWSKI; RIVERS; TYLOR.]
WORKS BY SELIGMAN
1910
The Melanesians of British New Guinea. Cambridge Univ. Press. 1911 SELIGMAN, C. G.; and SELIGMAN, BRENDA Z. The Veddas. Cambridge Univ. Press. 1913 Some Aspects of the Hamitic Problem in the AngloEgyptian Sudan. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 43:593-705. 1918 SELIGMAN, C. G.; and SELIGMAN, BRENDA Z. The Kababish: A Sudan Arab Tribe. Harvard African Studies 2:105-185. 1924 Anthropology and Psychology: A Study of Some Points of Contact. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 54:13-46. 1926 Anthropology. Volume 1, pages 131-143 in Encyclopaedia Britannica. 13th ed. Chicago: Benton. 1927 [A Book Review of] Psychology and Ethnology, by W. H. R. Rivers. Nature 120:685-687. 1928 The Unconscious in Relation to Anthropology. British Journal of Psychology 18, part 4:373-387. 1929 Temperament, Conflict and Psychosis in a Stoneage Population. British Journal of Medical Psychology 9, part 3:187-202. (1930) 1957 Races of Africa. 3d ed. Oxford Univ. Press. 1931 Japanese Temperament and Character. Japan Society of London, Transactions and Proceedings 28: 124-138. 1932 Anthropological Perspective and Psychological Theory. The Huxley Memorial Lecture. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 62:193-228. 1932 SELIGMAN, C. G.; and SELIGMAN, BRENDA Z. Pagan Tribes of the Nilotic Sudan. London: Routledge. 1934 Egypt and Negro Africa: A Study in Divine Kingship. The Frazer Lecture for 1933. London: Routledge. 1938 SELIGMAN, C. G.; and BECK, H. C. Far Eastern Glass: Some Western Origins. Stockholm, Ostasiatiska samlingarna, Bulletin no. 10:1-64. SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
ELKIN, ADOLPHUS P. 1953 Social Anthropology in Melanesia: A Review of Research. Oxford Univ. Press. EVANS-PRITCHARD, E. E. 1948 The Divine Kingship of the Shilluk of the Nilotic Sudan. Cambridge Univ. Press. FORTES, MEYER 1941 Charles Gabriel Seligman. Man 41, no. 1:1-6. HADDON, A. C. 1934 Appreciation. Pages 1-4 in Essays Presented to C. G. Seligman. Edited by E. E. EvansPritchard et al. London: Routledge. HUNTINGFORD, GEORGE W. B. 1953 The Northern Nilo— Hamites. Ethnographic Survey of Africa, East Central Africa, Part 6. London: International Africa Institute. MALINOWSKI, BRONISLAW (1922) 1960 Argonauts of the Western Pacific: An Account of Native Enterprise and Adventure in the Archipelagoes of Melanesian New Guinea. London School of Economics and Political Science, Studies, No. 65. London: Routledge; New York: Button. -» A paperback edition was published in 1961 by Button. MALINOWSKI, BRONISLAW (1927) 1953 Sex and Repression in Savage Society. London: Routledge; New York: Harcourt. -> A paperback edition was published in 1955 by Meridian. MYERS, C. S. 1941 Charles Gabriel Seligman. Royal Society of London, Obituary Notices of Fellows 3:627646. -» Includes a bibliography of Seligman's works.
SELIGMAN, EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN, EDWIN R. A. Edwin Robert Anderson Seligman (1861-1939), American economist, was editor-in-chief of the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences from 1927 to 1935 and McVickar professor of political economy at Columbia University from 1904 to 1931. He was born in New York City, where his father was a banker prominent in national and international circles. Until the age of 11, Seligman was educated at home, his tutor being Horatio Alger, Jr. From the Columbia Grammar School Seligman entered Columbia College, shortly after his fourteenth birthday, and received his A.B. in 1879. He became proficient in the German, French, Italian, Spanish, Russian, and Dutch languages. After attending the universities at Berlin, Heidelberg, and Paris, in 1882 he began graduate studies in economics at Columbia and, "to have a second arrow in the quiver," also studied law. In 1884 he received both an M.A. and an LL.B., and in 1885, his PH.D. Also in 1885 Seligman was admitted to the New York bar and was appointed lecturer in economics in the newly formed faculty of political science at Columbia University. Three years later he became adjunct professor of political economy; in 1891 he was appointed professor of political economy and finance, a post he held until 1931. He served for many years as chairman of the department of economics. In the 1920s Seligman received honorary doctoral degrees from the universities of Paris and Heidelberg. Seligman's immense energy, wide-ranging interests, and sense of social responsibility led him to participate in the work of academic, governmental, and civic organizations and committees, especially those promoting social reform. He was a member of the Social Reform Club of New York City, the Educational Alliance, the Political Economy Club, Greenwich House (a settlement house), and the Society for Ethical Culture and served as president of the last two organizations and as chairman of the Bureau of Municipal Research. He was secretary of the Committee of Fifteen, whose 1902 report, The Social Evil, revealed the economic links of corruption between prostitution and the New York City police. Seligman was a leader in the founding of the American Economic Association (AEA) and served as its president from 1902 to 1904. He also served a term as president of the National Tax Association, from 1913 to 1915. He helped to establish both the City Club of New York, which has worked for the improvement of civic conditions since its founding in 1892, and the American Association
763
of University Professors (AAUP), in 1915; he was AAUP president from 1919 to 1920. Seligman was an effective champion of academic freedom. He was the chairman of the AEA committee that wrote the first report on this subject in the United States, the occasion being the dismissal of Edward A. Ross from Stanford [see the biography of Ross], and he was also chairman of the AAUP committee that in 1915 wrote the fundamental Report on Academic Freedom. In the field of his specialty, public finance, Seligman was also active: he was a member of special tax commissions of New York State in 1906 and 1930; chairman of the Mayor's Commission on Taxation and Finance, New York City, 1914-1916; expert adviser to the New York State Joint Legislative Tax Committee, 1919-1922; member, with Bruins, Einaudi, and Stamp, of the League of Nations Committee on Economics and Finance, 1922-1923, which produced the report Double Taxation; and, in 1931, consultant to the government of Cuba. When the study of political economy at Columbia became more specialized, Seligman accepted responsibility for the then neglected field of public finance, but he also developed a continuing interest in the history of economic doctrine. This interest led to his giving a course on this subject and to his famous collection of books, pamphlets, and other items on economics, now in the Columbia University library. He was one of the small group of scholars that established economics as a recognized discipline in the United States. Seligman's intellectual influence was wide, several of his books being translated into more than one of the leading languages. It has extended to the present, largely through his contributions to the history of economic thought, reflecting the stimulus he received at Paris, and through the clarity and appropriateness of his conceptual and categorizing contributions. The former achievement is illustrated by his article "On Some Neglected British Economists" (first published in 1903; see [1886-1925] 1925); the latter, by the introductory chapter of The Shifting and Incidence of Taxation (1892), "The Classification of Public Revenues" (see 1895), and his analysis of ability-to-pay and faculty concepts in taxation ( see 1928). More than one present-day treatise, particularly in Europe, refers frequently to Seligman's conceptual and historical contributions. Although Seligman did not entirely escape error in attempting to apply the newly developing price theory to the substantive part of Shifting and Incidence, he did enliven the doctrinal atmosphere with his vigorous approach and equally vigorous coun-
1 64
SEMANTICS AND SEMIOTICS
terthrusts when challenged. His exchanges with Francis Y. Edgeworth were enlightening. Seligman's treatise was a pioneering achievement in its treatment of the history of doctrine and in its arrangement and development of a difficult subject. Seligman's writings on taxation, quite influential in their day, are less cited now, either because the paths he opened up were later explored further by so many, or because the terminology he originated soon passed into common use, or because the reforms he advocated were adopted. Among his useful contributions were his Progressive Taxation in Theory and Practice (1894), The Income Tax (1911), and his writings on the property tax, all of which also embody his desire, arising from the contrast between his American and European training, to build a bridge between the deductive and the historical—comparative schools, with emphasis on the latter, which he felt had been neglected in the United States. Seligman also wrote extensively outside public finance. Some of these contributions were widely accepted for many years, especially The Economic Interpretation of History (1902), which proved influential in developing analysis in this area. Among his interests in applied economics were problems of railroads, unemployment, the fur and jewelry trades, installment selling, agriculture, and resale price maintenance. It was this catholicity of interest, together with an exceptional erudition and a broad acquaintance with scholars of many countries, that enabled Seligman, toward the close of his career, to make one of his most notable contributions, as a chief promoter of, fund raiser for, and editor-in-chief of the English-language Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, to which he also contributed articles and biographies. Seligman, formal in the lecture room, was a man of warm temperament, with an intense personal interest in the material and intellectual welfare of his students. Through them and through his own writings, he opened up the field of public finance in the United States both to scholarship and to measures of reform. CARL S. SHOUP
(1894) 1908 Progressive Taxation in Theory and Practice. 2d ed., rev. & enl. Princeton, NJ.: American Economic Association. (1895) 1928 Essays in Taxation. 10th ed., rev. New York: Macmillan. (1900-1925) 1925 Studies in Public Finance. New York: Macmillan. (1902) 1934 The Economic Interpretation of History. 2d ed., rev. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. -» A paperback edition was published in 1961. (1905) 1929 The Principles of Economics, With Special Reference to American Conditions. 12th ed. New York: Longmans. (1911) 1914 The Income Tax: A Study of the History, Theory, and Practice of Income Taxation at Home and Abroad. 2d ed., rev. & enl. New York: Macmillan. 1926 Social Theory of Fiscal Science. Political Science Quarterly 41:193-218, 354-383. 1927 The Economics of Instalment Selling: A Study in Consumers' Credit, With Special Reference to the Automobile. 2 vols. New York and London: Harper. 1928 Double Taxation and International Fiscal Cooperation. New York: Macmillan. 1929a Autobiography. Volume 2, pages 117-160 in Felix Meiner (editor), Die Volkswirtschaftslehre der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen. Leipzig: Meiner. W29b The Economics of Farm Relief: A Survey of the Agricultural Problem. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. 1930 What Are the Social Sciences? Volume 1, pages 3-7 in Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. New York: Macmillan. 1932 Income Tax. Volume 7, pages 626-639 in Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. New York: Macmillan. 1932 SELIGMAN, EDWIN R. A.; and LOVE, ROBERT A. Price Cutting and Price Maintenance: A Study in Economics. New York and London: Harper. 1934 Public Finance. Volume 12, pages 637-646 in Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. New York: Macmillan. SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
[The Bibliography of] Edwin Robert Anderson Seligman. 1931 Pages 25-43 in Columbia University, Faculty of Political Science, A Bibliography . . . 1880-1930. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. DORFMAN, JOSEPH (editor) 1941 Seligman Correspondence. Political Science Quarterly 56:107-124, 270-286, 392-419, 573-599. DORFMAN, JOSEPH 1946-1959 The Economic Mind in American Civilization. 5 vols. New York: Viking. DORFMAN, JOSEPH 1955 The Department of Economics. Pages 161-206 in Ralph G. Hoxie et al., A History of the Faculty of Political Science, Columbia University. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. Edwin Robert Anderson Seligman, 1861-1939: Addresses Delivered at the Memorial Meeting Held on December the Thirteenth, 1939. 1942 Stamford, Conn.: Overbrook.
[See also INSTALLMENT CREDIT; TAXATION.] WORKS BY SELIGMAN (1886-1925) 1925 Essays in Economics. New York: Macmillan. 1887 Two Chapters on the Mediaeval Guilds of England. Baltimore: American Economic Association. (1892) 1927 The Shifting and Incidence of Taxation. 5th ed., rev. New York: Columbia Univ. Press.
SEMANTICS AND SEMIOTICS Semiotics is the study of sign phenomena. Specialized research into natural human language— the semiotic phenomenon par excellence—constitutes linguistics; within linguistics, semantics is
SEMANTICS AND SEMIOTICS concerned with the conveyance of meaning by the grammatical and lexical devices of a language. According to the theoretical, descriptive, and historical slants of linguistic investigation, semantic problems respectively assume a general, synchronic, or diachronic character. The self-evident systematicity of grammatical phenomena has always been conducive to their relatively reliable semantic analysis. When it comes to the looser domain of vocabulary, however, the obscurity of the underlying structure quickly embroils semantic analysis in some of the more inconclusive epistemological controversies of social science. While vast supplies of raw semantic data repose in dictionaries of various languages, there is no consensus among linguists on a coherent theory in accordance with which this material can be analyzed and compared for purposes of generalization. Definition and components of sign. The key term in semiotics is "sign." By all accounts, a sign must consist of at least (1) a perceptible impact on one of the senses of the "receiver" and (2) a content that is signified. First distinguished by the Stoic philosophers, then recognized in European medieval literature as signans and signatum, these minimal components of the sign have reappeared in modern theory under such labels as signifiant and signifte (Ferdinand de Saussure) or "sign vehicle" and "designatum" (Charles W. Morris). (Under appropriate contextual conditions, the absence of a signans itself functions as a "zero" sign vehicle. It is often utilized in language with great effectiveness.) A particular occurrence of a sign is customarily called a "token," while the class of all occurrences of the sign is called the "type." According to this usage, the total number of words in a text is the number of word tokens, whereas the number of different words in the text is the number of word types. Signs may be classified by the sense on which the sign vehicle impinges: they can be visual, auditory, etc. A sign may then have equivalent sign vehicles in the same or another modality. Full equivalence is illustrated by a plain transposition cipher (based on a novel utilization of the same graphic system) or by a light blinking and a buzzer sounding in response to the same Morse code impulses. The correlation, on the other hand, between written and spoken language is far from one-to-one. Designation and denotation. A crucial issue for most students is the distinction between what particular sign tokens denote, or refer to, and the
165
constant capacity of the sign type to denote, or refer. The former relation has been treated under the heading of "denotation," or reference; the latter has been called "designation," or meaning (in the narrow sense). Thus, the designatum (2a) of a sign type—what the sign designates—can in theory be specified by (2b) the conditions under which, or the "objects" with reference to which, the tokens of the sign would be said to denote in a truthful way. Every sign by definition designates something, but some signs have no real things, or "denotata," to refer to (e.g., unicorn}, and every sign may on occasion be used without denoting (e.g., milk when no actual milk is being referred to) or without denoting truly (e.g., milk used with reference to water). A perceptible discrepancy between what a sign type designates (2a) and the denotatum of one of its tokens (2fr) seems to be involved in such effects as metaphor and irony, as well as in perversions of communication (lying). If the designatum is thought of as the class of denotata for which the sign vehicle is a name, the specification of the designatum can correspondingly be visualized as extensional (by enumeration of the members of the class, i.e., the denotata) or as intensional (by stating the properties shared by all members of the class, and only by them). The ability of living beings to form intensional class concepts—an ability which has not so far been mechanically simulated or abstractly reconstructed—reaches the most extraordinary proportions in man. There is evidence that concept formation proceeds with particular efficiency if there are signs present for which the concepts can become the designata. The theoretical distinction between (2a) designata and (2fo) denotata is also essential for accommodating the fact that something can be a true denotatum of more than one simple sign (e.g., car and vehicle} or of various compound signs (e.g., female sheep — ewe}. "Reductionist" approaches. The minimal account of signs in terms of sign vehicles and designata has been variously enriched; the richer schemes have in turn been subjected to reduction along several lines. Two further factors of the sign, essential in some accounts, such as that of Charles S. Peirce, are (3) the interpreter, or the individual for whom the pairing of a sign vehicle and a designatum functions as a sign, and (4) the interpretant, corresponding to the interpreter's (perhaps unconscious) reaction to a sign. One way of explicating this reaction is to understand "interpretant" as the interpreter's private translation of a sign into other signs. Anticipating the discovery
166
SEMANTICS AND SEMIOTICS
of neurological correlates of "understanding" and similar psychological phenomena, some theorists have apparently identified the interpretant of a sign with its translation into the (still unknown) neurological code. Related in spirit is the effort of experimental psychologists to specify the meaning of a sign in terms of attitudes taken toward it, emotions induced by it, or further signs automatically evoked by it—as displayed, for example, in a semantic differential (Osgood et al. 1957) or a free-association test. Thus, whereas the designatum of a sign was traditionally understood to be given by the verbal definition of the sign, behavioristic psychology has endeavored to bypass the designatum (2a) in favor of the effect of the sign (4), regarding the latter, if not as more accessible to study, then at least as the less objectionable construct. A kindred suspicion of constructs has moved skeptical empiricists—in eighth-century India as in twentieth-century England and America—to reject designata as needless entities and to account for the use of sign tokens (acts of "reference") merely in terms of the sign vehicle (1) and the actual denotatum or "referent" (2b). Such impoverished theories may cover certain "straightforward" uses of natural language and may serve the rationalization of scientific discourse. But an account that fails to treat the designatum as a component of the sign, distinct from both its denotatum and its interpretant, cannot adequately deal with such phenomena as reasoning or humor, and is therefore incommensurate with the complexity and subtlety of human semiotic abilities. In general it should be admitted that the denial of the sui generis nature of communicative activity and the reduction of sign phenomena to some more general kind of behavioral phenomenon have produced no marked success in either theory or research practice. A sign type is not always— perhaps only rarely—correlated with a class of specific stimuli or of overt responses. Nor is a sign token a counterfeit or avowed "substitute" for a "real" thing; it is, at most, a "representative" of the real things for purposes of communication qua communication, and in contrast to the case of other substitutes, the real thing will not do where a sign is required. When we reflect, furthermore, that the denotata of most sign tokens of language are neither "real" nor "things" nor even necessarily existent, it becomes evident that if sign tokens "stand for something," they do so in a way that differs from other modes of substitution. Symbolic and less-than-symbolic signs. A sign with an intensional class for a designatum and without contiguity or similarity between its vehicle
and its denotata is called a symbol. Other, less fully developed forms of sign may be classified as indices, icons, names, signals, and symptoms. A sign is said to be an index rather than a symbol insofar as its sign vehicle is contiguous with its denotatum, or is a physical sample of it (a swatch of cloth as a sign of the color or an onomatopoeic word as a sign for an animal sound). In the case of some indices the contiguity between the sign vehicle and the denotatum is suggestive rather than literal, as in a directional arrow which guides the viewer's eyes toward a target. In general, when a sign vehicle is paired with a denotatum as a matter of necessity, the involuntary, mechanical nature of this connection may be viewed as an abstract analogue of physical contiguity; automatic, nonarbitrary signs are hence said to be merely "symptomatic" rather than fully symbolic. Natural languages have been observed to contain indexlike signs which conventionally direct the listener's attention to a time, a place, a participant in the discourse, or a part of the interlocutor's field of sight. These are studied under the heading of "deictics" or "shifters"; English examples are now, here, I, this. When there is a geometric similarity between a sign vehicle and its denotata, the sign is said to be iconic. Such similarity would be exemplified by a system in which, let us say, large things are signified by long words, small things by short words, or in which plurality of denotata is signified by repetition of the sign vehicle. A realistic painting is a highly iconic sign; in human language the role of iconicity is marginal. A theory of signs which conceives of a designatum as an intensional class must also allow for a more "stunted" type of sign which has an extensional class as its designatum. Such signs are generally called "(proper) names." The individuals, whether one or many, which are truly denoted by a proper name have no common property attributed to them except "answering" to that name. For discourse about signs it is necessary to use signs for referring to signs. For this purpose a sign vehicle is commonly employed as an index of its own sign. In discourse about languages it has long been found useful to discriminate between the use of signs and the mention of signs. A sign employed as a name for itself is commonly said to be used "metalinguistically"; a specialized language for communication about another language (the "object language") is called a "metalanguage." Overlapping semiotic functions. In a particular communicative act a token may at the same
SEMANTICS AND SEMIOTICS time function as a symbol and as a less-thansymbolic sign. Thus, a sign token may trigger, mechanically or conventionally, some action on the part of the receiver; it then functions as a "signal." In many languages, the imperative is a grammatical device for endowing a symbol with signal value, but a complex symbolic sign without special markers (e.g., I am ready) may function secondarily as a signal for some action. Similarly, an interjection of pain, to the extent that it has a coded form in the language (e.g., English ouch vs. German em), is conventionalized and hence symbolic; insofar, however, as it is uttered involuntarily, it is a symptomatic (indexical) sign. Every layman develops considerable skill in synchronizing the "symbolic" analysis of speech with a judgment of voice quality, tempo, and other involuntary aspects of the utterance as symptoms of the speaker's state. Specialists have learned to interpret in depth certain "covert," involuntary statistical properties of speech to which ordinary hearers may not respond even on an unconscious level. Not only do symbolic functions overlap with symptomatic and signaling sign functions, but the sign may, primarily or secondarily, serve altogether noncommunicative functions as well. Superimposed upon linguistic utterances with symbolic value may be aesthetic or magical functions (poetry, incantations). Contrariwise, behavior patterns and artifacts intended for other primary purposes may acquire a signlike aspect: a garment, worn to provide warmth, may by its shape symbolize the wearer's acceptance of, or rebellion against, the conventions of society; an automobile, primarily a means of transport, may by the redness of its color symbolize its user's status as fire chief. The development of general and comparative semiotic research would seem to depend to a large extent on the inclusion of such "mixed" semiotic phenomena. Paradigmatic relations between signs. Two or more signs each or all of which can occur in the same context are said to form a paradigmatic set. Membership in such a set helps to determine the identity of a sign, since the definition of its sign vehicle and its designatum may be formulated in terms of the discrete differences between them and the vehicles and designata of other signs in the same set. Students of language have capitalized on the paradigmatic nature of their material by organizing the description of sign vehicles and designata around those minimal distinctive differences of sound and meaning which contrast one item with another within the total system. In the investigation of vocabulary, this approach has led
167
to the concept of "word fields," i.e., semantically related groups of words, and has yielded a sizable literature since it was initiated in the 1930s by Jost Trier. However, the more populous and amorphous a paradigmatic set of elements, the less certain is the organization of their contrastive features. Hence word-field studies are beset by a strong streak of impressionism, exacerbated by the concentration of research on early stages of languages for which the benefit of native speakers' intuitions cannot be drawn upon. Being different from each other is, of course, only the most general relation between signs in a paradigmatic set. More specific relations are determined by the conditions under which two signs are interchangeable: symmetrically in the case of perfect synonyms, asymmetrically in the case of superordinates and subordinates (e.g., gun-rifle), and at the cost of reversing the truth value of the message in the case of antonyms. The way in which these more specific relations organize a set of terms may be different in various languages. Thus, two languages may have terms for "cattle," the difference between them being that in one of the languages, but not in the other, "cattle" includes "sheep" as a subordinate. Proceeding from their experience with folk classification in the field of kinship, anthropologists (particularly in the United States) have analyzed selected sectors of vocabulary in the form of taxonomies—systems in which all terms are governed by a subordinate-superordinate relation (Conklin 1962). It still remains to be shown whether this descriptive format is easily applicable to lexical domains less closely structured than those dealing with kinship, color, weather, illness, plants, and animals. It is clear, moreover, that studies of lexical systems oversimplify the problem unless they take full account of the omnipresent facts of polysemy, grammatical specialization, and phraseological specialization (discussed below). Meanwhile the introduction of certain nonsymmetrical operations to supplement the traditional algebra of classes promises to reduce some of the counterintuitive excesses of earlier sophisticated nomenclature analysis (Lounsbury 1964). Sign tokens in sequence. The patterning of sequences in which sign tokens may be transmitted ranges between two extremes. At one pole lies the impossibility of predicting a sign's occurrence from a preceding sign; at the other extreme lie systems with a completely predictable sequence, such as the alternation of red and green at an automatic traffic signal. A sign system like human language is vastly more intricate than these models because of two groups of factors: the interde-
168
SEMANTICS AND SEMIOTICS
pendence of paradigmatic and sequential patterning, and the complexity of the sequential patterning itself. The latter is the subject matter of syntax, which was revolutionized in the late 1950s, when it was shown by means of newly developed mathematical tools that the syntactic structure of natural languages had been only vaguely characterized and that its complexity had been seriously underestimated (Chomsky 1957). Several attempts have already been made to develop semantic theories compatible with the new approach to syntax (Katz & Fodor 1963; Weinreich 1966). Compositional effects; class meanings. It is a feature of natural language that signs combined in appropriate ("grammatical") ways yield compound designata; thus the designatum of the phrase shy unicorn includes the properties of unicorns as well as of shy things. Compound signs can be formed which are not only virtually unlimited in complexity but which are capable of being interpreted regardless of whether their denotata are real, or not necessarily real, or even explicitly mythical. In this way languages contribute to the continual expansion of their own universes of discourse. The possibility of constructing a represented world regardless of its actual or conceivable existence is utilized, with different degrees of extravagance, in verbal art. Semantic play through carefully controlled deviations from literal conceivability of the representation is an essential ingredient of literature, especially of modern poetry. Traditionally, only those sign combinations were considered whose semantic effect could be explained as a logical product of the designata. Twentieth-century logicians, with the help of the higher calculus of functions, have accounted for a much greater range of combinatorial semantic effects. Even this more elaborate apparatus, however, does not seem sufficient to account semantically for every type of sign combination in language (Weinreich 1963). The utilization of the same linguistic material in multiple, overlapping semiotic functions is also observed in the case of idioms—compound signs which are not resolved into their constituent designata but function with a simplex designatum of their own. Thus, to pull X's leg has a complex meaning derived by a transparent process from the meanings of pull, leg, and -'s; but when it means "to hoax X playfully," the meanings of the constituents are disregarded. In a rationalized lexicographic system the selection of items to be treated as idioms must be weighed against the "cost" of increasing the number of elementary units in the system and the alternative of specify-
ing additional subsenses for each constituent of an idiom, coupling them with the indication that they evoke each other. The standard patterns of sign compounding in a language are characterized by specialized "slots" (for example, for subjects and for predicates), and the vocabulary items are in turn specialized as to their privileges of occurring in the various "slots." As a result, different word classes (nouns, verbs, etc.) tend to acquire appropriate "class meanings," for instance, the constant use of verbs to represent "action" endows the verb with a concomitant meaning of action. This automatic component, first analyzed systematically in medieval Europe under the heading of consignificatio, or "modes of signifying," exercises so powerful an influence on our mentality that doubts have been voiced whether the semantic implications of the syntactic form obligatory in one's native language can be transcended at all, or at least easily, in thinking. But specific claims about the grip of lexical and syntactic meaning-systems on thinking, advanced particularly by Wilhelm von Humboldt (and popularized in America by Edward Sapir and Benjamin L. Whorf), have turned out to be either unresearchable in their circularity or—in the few instances which permitted experimentation—to be unsubstantiated by the factual evidence. Grammatical specialization. As long as sentences of natural languages were characterized in terms of a small number of "slots," many of the corresponding paradigmatic sets of words were so large as to exclude any hope of their being semantically characterized. With the advent of transformational analysis in the 1950s the specification of the structure of sentences became more articulated. As the kinds of word-classes proliferated, the sizes of the classes shrank in inverse proportion. Seizing on the prospect of utilizing these results, a search was instituted for distinctive semantic features in the words belonging to small grammatical subclasses (e.g., Apresian 1962). Statements of a word's membership in a particular set of small grammatical subclasses were also proposed as substitutes for the more elusive, properly semantic description of the word. Previously, the tendency had been to view the correlation of meanings of words (or submeanings of polysemous words) with grammatical properties as a point on which natural languages deviate from the ideal sign system; now they came to be explored as perhaps the most workable principle for significantly organizing a vocabulary. Correspondingly, there arose the problem of explaining what this universal trait of languages contributes to the effectiveness of communication.
SENIOR, NASSAU WILLIAM
169
Phraseological specialization. Human languages also deviate from the theoretically ideal sign system in that the same sign vehicle can function with different designata in different contexts; thus, white belongs to different paradigmatic sets in the contexts paint, skin, wine, magic. To the extent that some common meaning factor can be extracted, we may speak of several submeanings of a single polysemous word, white. The verb to bank, on the other hand, appears to have completely unrelated designata depending on whether its object is money, a fire, an airplane, or whether it is followed by the preposition on (i.e., "to rely"). Instead of sweeping such effects under the rug, attempts are being made to use them as the foundation for a formal analysis of vocabulary. The most challenging problem is to find ways of classifying and grouping the features of phraseological specialization that appear to be so profoundly specific to individual words. Toward a general semiotics. Although no sign system equals language in the variety and overlapping of semiotic devices employed, it has been instructive to embed the study of natural language in a broader investigation of sign phenomena of all kinds, including substitutes for language (for example, flag codes) and extensions of language (gesture patterns, chemical formalism, etc.). Observation of "mixed" phenomena—behavior and cultural institutions, whose primary purpose is other than communication, utilized for semiotic purposes—has also contributed insights for a general theory of signs. The accomplishments of the research program in general semiotics proposed by Charles S. Peirce and Ferdinand de Saussure have not been spectacular, unless one classifies the achievements of cybernetics under this heading; moreover, such allegedly basic semiotic concepts as the tripartition of the field into syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics have turned out to be of little use in connection with natural sign phenomena. On the other hand, general semiotics has furnished useful tools for comparing human language with animal communication; this may in turn produce new conceptions of the origin of language. URIEL WEINREICH
Structural Lexicology). Pages 141-162 in Problemy strukturnoi lingvistiki. Moscow: Akademiia Nauk SSSR. CHOMSKY, NOAM 1957 Syntactic Structures. The Hague: Mouton. CONKLIN, HAROLD C. 1962 Lexicographical Treatment of Folk Taxonomies. Pages 119-141 in Conference on Lexicography, Indiana University, 1960, Problems in Lexicography. Bloomington, Ind.: The University. -» Published also as Volume 28, no. 2, part 4 of the International Journal of American Linguistics. GIPPER, HELMUT; and SCHWARZ, HANS 1961— Bibliographisches Handbuch zur Sprachinhaltsforschung. Cologne (Germany): Westdeutscher Verlag. IVANOV, V. V. 1961 lazyk v sopostavlenii s drugimi sredstvami peredachi i khraneniia informatsii (Language in Comparison With Other Means of Information Transmission and Storage). Akademiia Nauk SSSR, Institut Nauchnoi Informatsii, Doklady na konferentsii po obrabotke informatsii, mashinnomu perevodu i avtomaticheskomu chteniiu teksta No. 7. KATZ, JERROLD J.; and FODOR, JERRY 1963 The Structure of a Semantic Theory. Language 39, no. 2:170— 210. LOUNSBURY, FLOYD G. 1964 The Structural Analysis of Kinship Semantics. Pages 1073-1093 in International Congress of Linguists, Ninth, Cambridge, Mass., 1962, Proceedings. The Hague: Mouton. MORRIS, CHARLES W. 1938 Foundations of the Theory of Signs. Univ. of Chicago Press. OSGOOD, CHARLES E.; Suci, G. J.; and TANNENBAUM, P. H. (1957) 1961 The Measurement of Meaning. Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press. PEIRCE, CHARLES S. 1932 Collected Papers. Volume 2: Elements of Logic. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. SAUSSURE, FERDINAND DE (1916) 1959 Course in General Linguistics. New York: Philosophical Library. -» First published posthumously, in French. TRIER, JOST 1931 Der deutsche Wortschatz im Sinnbezirk des Verstandes: Die Geschichte eines sprachlichen Feldes. I. Von den Anfangen bis zum Beginn des 13. Jahrhunderts. Heidelberg (Germany): Winter. ULLMANN, STEPHEN (1951) 1959 The Principles of Semantics. 2d ed., rev. Glasgow: Jackson. -> Contains useful summaries of traditional views and a bibliography. WEINREICH, URIEL 1963 On the Semantic Structure of Language. Pages 114-171 in Conference on Language Universals, Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., 1961, Universals of Language. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press. -» Contains a comprehensive bibliography. WEINRICH, URIEL 1966 Explorations in Semantic Theory. Current Trends in Linguistics 3: 395-477.
[See also COMMUNICATION; COMMUNICATION, ANIMAL; KINESICS; LINGUISTICS. Other relevant material may be found in the biographies of BLOOMFIELD; PEIRCE; SAPIR; SAUSSURE; WHORF.]
SENIOR, NASSAU WILLIAM
BIBLIOGRAPHY APRESIAN, lu. D. 1962 O poniatiiakh i metodakh strukturnoi leksikologii (On the Concepts and Methods of
SEMIOTICS See SEMANTICS AND SEMIOTICS.
Nassau William Senior (1790-1864), British economist, was the eldest son of the vicar of Durnford in Wiltshire. He was educated at Eton and at Magdalen College, Oxford. At Oxford he met Richard Whateley (later archbishop of Dublin), a
1 70
SENIOR, NASSAU WILLIAM
rugged opponent of tradition who became Senior's lifelong friend and exerted considerable influence on him. Senior entered Lincoln's Inn in 1813 to read for the bar; in 1817 he became a certified conveyancer and was called to the bar two years later. Although he earned his living by the practice of his profession, the law was by no means his only interest. Senior's childhood and youth had been spent in his father's country parish, which meant that early in his life he had become familiar with the poverty and pauperization of agricultural laborers that had occurred during the Napoleonic wars. This experience made a deep impression on him and was undoubtedly one of the reasons for his enduring interest in economics. In 1823 he became a member of the Political Economy Club, to which he was introduced by James Mill; he was active there in discussions with his fellow economists. Shortly after, in 1825, he became the first holder of the Drummond professorship of political economy at Oxford. During his five-year term he published a number of important short works on economics, starting with an analysis of ambiguous economic terms that was published as an appendix to Whateley's Elements of Logic (Senior 1826). He published some of his lectures, on such subjects as methodology (1827), the theory of money and international trade (1830a), and population and wages (1829; 1830£>). These lectures, together with the others given during his first term in the Drummond chair, were assembled and published as An Outline of the Science of Political Economy in 1836. As soon as they appeared, they established Senior's reputation as an economist. Role in Whig public policy By 1830 Senior was well known to leading Whig politicians; he was invited by Lord Melbourne to investigate the laws relating to trade combinations, and Lord Howick suggested he examine the problems of Ireland. His memorandum on trade combinations was not published, but that on Ireland appeared in 1831 as A Letter to Lord Hoxuick: On a Legal Provision for the Irish Poor, Commutation of Tithes, and a Provision for the Irish Roman Catholic Clergy. In this pamphlet he advocated the transfer of some of the property of the Anglican church to the Roman Catholic church in Ireland, and as a consequence he was forced to resign the chair of political economy at King's College, London, to which he had only quite recently been appointed. For the next ten years Senior was constantly engaged in public affairs. He was chief adviser to the Whig party on economic problems, although
his advice was by no means always followed. A pamphlet he wrote in 1835, On National Property and on the Prospects of the Present Administration and Their Successors, can be regarded as an unofficial manifesto of the more advanced Whigs: it urged, inter alia, the reform of municipal corporations and the admission of dissenters to universities, and again recommended the transfer of some property of the Anglican church to the Roman Catholic church in Ireland. Senior was also a member of several commissions: the Poor Law Inquiry Commission, in 1833; the commission that investigated factory conditions, in 1837; the Royal Commission on the Distress of the Hand-loom Weavers, in 1841; and later, in 1857, the Royal Commission on Popular Education. Each time he was a member of a commission he wrote a substantial part of the commission's report. In his work for the Poor Law Commission, which won great praise, one of his closest collaborators was Edwin Chadwick. With the fall of the Whig administration in 1841, Senior returned to more theoretical economics. In 1847 he was appointed to the Drummond chair of political economy at Oxford for a second five-year term. His intention of organizing his ideas into a treatise on political economy during these years was not to be fulfilled. Only a few of the lectures were published (1847; 1852), but a large part of the unpublished lectures of this period survive in manuscript. They are remarkable for their attack on the hypothetical economic man of Ricardo's imagination (Bowley 1937). In the later years of his life Senior was a keen traveler; he was particularly interested in the revolutionary disturbances of 1848 in France and Italy, where he had numerous friends among the liberals. He also visited Greece, Turkey, Egypt, and Malta. He kept journals of these visits and of those to Ireland, some of which were subsequently published. Senior's wide circle of friends included most of the leading Whigs of his day as well as such intellectuals and writers as Lord Jeffrey, Sidney Herbert, Macaulay, and Thackeray. Among the "philosophical radicals," his closest friends were the Austins and Grotes and, among men with whom he worked, Sir George Cornewall Lewis, Lord Howick, Chadwick, Sir James Stephen, and, of course, Archbishop Whateley. He knew well such French liberals as Alexis de Tocqueville, Guizot, and Faucher, and in Italy he was much appreciated by Cavour. Senior was a Whig rather than a philosophical radical, but his conviction that man has a natural tendency to improve himself, provided unwise institutions do not discourage him, may well have
SENIOR, NASSAU WILLIAM
developed from his association with the disciples of Bentham. It was this view that led to his controversy with Mai thus. Senior's proposals for poorlaw reform included the abolition of outdoor relief to the able-bodied, for he believed this sapped the virtues of thrift and independence and also depressed wages. However, he hoped the destitute sick, the aged, and children would be looked after out of public funds in hospitals, almshouses, and orphanages, not in mixed workhouses. In general, he believed that the government had a duty to intervene whenever it could do good: expediency should determine the occasions, not a priori rules. Contribution to economic theory During his life Senior's activity in the sphere of social and economic reform was more visible than his work on economic theory. His contribution to the latter, however, was considerable. In contrast to his younger and more famous contemporary, J. S. Mill, Senior's approach to Ricardian theory was essentially critical. His analysis of definitions in the appendix to Whateley's Logic (1826) shows how important precision in definition was to him. Concern with rigorous definition led him to make significant changes in the theory of value. Jevons was greatly impressed with this work and considered that he had anticipated the theory of marginal utility in important respects. Senior was clearly influenced by J. B. Say, and in connection with the analysis of degrees of competition in relation to value, he was also influenced by Samuel Bailey. Senior was less successful with the theory of wages than with the theory of value. He realized that the wages-fund theorem was incomplete, since the determinants of the size of the fund had not been explained, but despite much effort he was unable to solve this difficulty. His best-known contribution to economic analysis is his abstinence theory of capital. It emerged from his attempt to find a definition of capital that would make capital coordinate with labor in the explanation of the influence of real costs on value; this was an important step in the process of separating the labor theory of value from orthodox economics. The theory stated in his Outline of the Science of Political Economy (1836) became an integral part of English capital theory. It was accepted by Marshall as well as by Jevons; the former, however, substituted the neutral term "waiting" for "abstinence." The theory also influenced Continental and American economics, In the Outline, Senior fully accepted Ricardo's theory of land rent while observing that the laws of increasing and diminishing returns are not logically symmetrical. He generalized the analysis to
171
cover all cases of factors in fixed supply, including natural abilities, and hinted at the concept of quasi rent. This resulted in difficulties in the identification of factor incomes and the relation of rents to costs. Influenced by the German economist Hermann's review of the Outline, Senior attacked the problem again in the 1847-1852 lectures. He accepted Hermann's view that land and capital are species of the same genus, arguing that they are indistinguishable in practice and that the distinguishing attribute of land is not its scarcity but its immobility (Bowley 1937). These theoretical developments necessarily affected the treatment of capital. In the later lectures capital was defined as "any wealth destined to be used productively," including land. This productive use, i.e., capital accumulation, requires "abstinence" as well as the gifts of nature and industry. Abstinence was explained as "the conduct of a person who either abstains from the unproductive use of what he can command or designedly prefers the production of remote to that of immediate results." Frugality, Senior explained, is the "mere refraining from the use of a commodity," but "providence" is "the employment of labour to produce remote results" (quoted in Bowley 1937, pp. 160161). It must be observed that Senior's distinction between frugality and providence, although apparently similar to the Keynesian distinction between saving and investment, was not made for the purpose of analyzing the level of economic activity. Senior's contributions to the theory of money and international trade are of less interest today than his other analytical work, but they provided a number of useful clarifications and qualifications to the theory of his time. The discussions of scope and method were contained in various published lectures given at the time of his first and second Drummond professorships and in his Outline. His views developed considerably during his life, and the Four Introductory Lectures on Political Economy (1852) are a valuable contribution to the nineteenth-century literature on the subject. MARIAN BOWLEY [For the historical context of Senior's work, see the biographies of MALTHUS; RICARDO; SAY; for discussion of the subsequent development of his ideas, see the biographies of JEVONS; MARSHALL.] WORKS BY SENIOR
1821
Essay on the Application of Capital to Land, With Observations Showing the Impolicy of Any Great Restriction of the Importation of Corn, and That the Bounty of 1680 Did Not Lower the Price of It, by a Fellow of University College, Oxford. Quarterly Review 25:467-504. -» Published anonymously.
172
SENSES: Overview
(1826) 1951 Appendix: On Certain Terms Which Are Peculiarly Liable to Be Used Ambiguously in Political Economy. Pages 227-239 in Nassau W. Senior, An Outline of the Science of Political Economy. New York: Kelley. -> First published as an Appendix to Richard Whateley's Elements of Logic. (1827) 1831 Introductory Lecture on Political Economy. 3d ed. London: Murray. (1828) 1931 Three Lectures on the Transmission of the Precious Metals From Country to Country and the Mercantile Theory of Wealth. Series of Reprints of Scarce Tracts in Economic and Political Science, No. 3. London School of Economics and Political Science. 1829 Two Lectures on Population. With a correspondence between the author and the Rev. T. R. Malthus. London: Saunders. (1830a) 1931 Three Lectures on the Cost of Obtaining Money, and on Some Effects of Private and Government Paper Money. Series of Reprints of Scarce Tracts in Economic and Political Science, No. 5. London School of Economics and Political Science. (1830&) 1959 Three Lectures on the Rate of Wages. With a preface on the causes and remedies of the present disturbances. New York: Kelley. 1831 A Letter to Lord Howick: On a Legal Provision for the Irish Poor, Commutation of Tithes, and a Provision for the Irish Roman Catholic Clergy. London: Murray. 1835 On National Property and on the Prospects of the Present Administration and Their Successors. London: Fellowes. (1836) 1951 An Outline of the Science of Political Economy. New York: Kelley. (1837) 1844 Letters on the Factory Act as It Affects the Cotton Manufacture, Addressed to the Right Honourable President of the Board of Trade. London: Fellowes. 1847 A Lecture on the Production of Wealth. Oxford: Combe. 1852 Four Introductory Lectures on Political Economy. London: Longmans. 1859 A Journal Kept in Turkey and Greece in the Autumn of 1857, and the Beginning of 1858. London: Longmans. Conversations and Journals in Egypt and Malta. London: Low, 1882. Historical and Philosophical Essays. 2 vols. London: Longmans, 1865. Industrial Efficiency and Social Economy. Essays edited by S. Leon Levy. New York: Holt, 1928. Journals, Conversations and Essays Relating to Ireland. London: Longmans, 1868. Journals Kept in France and Italy From 1848 to 1852: With a Sketch of the Revolution of 1848. 2 vols. London: King, 1871. SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY BOWLEY, MARIAN 1937 Nassau Senior and Classical Economics. London: Allen & Unwin. -> Contains a bibliography of Senior's published and unpublished writings. LEVY, S. LEON 1943 Nassau W. Senior: The Prophet of Modern Capitalism. Boston: Humphries. ROBBINS, LIONEL 1952 The Theory of Economic Policy in English Classical Political Economy. London: Mac-
millan.
SCHUMPETER, JOSEPH A. (1954) 1960 History of Economic Analysis. Edited by E. B. Schumpeter. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. TAUSSIG, FRANK W. (1896) 1932 Wages and Capital: An Examination of the Wages Fund Doctrine. London School of Economics and Political Science.
SENSES i. OVERVIEW ii. CENTRAL MECHANISMS
F. A. Mote Ragnar Granit
OVERVIEW
In any consideration of behavior it is important to have knowledge of the senses, for the first step in an organism's adjustment to its environment is sensory stimulation. The behavior of primitive organisms is simple and limited; this is so partly because their receiving mechanisms are of such a nature and so structured that the organisms can sense only gross changes in their restricted environment. Higher forms of life have more numerous, more complex, and more sensitive mechanisms; therefore, it is possible for them to react to more environmental changes as well as to changes of wider range and greater subtlety. At the human level the mechanisms have become so specialized, and the environment is so complex, that to understand much of man's most significant behavior, it is necessary to know about the receptor systems by which he senses and adjusts to his varied and changing world. Classification of senses Although it is popularly believed there are only five senses, there are actually more. No specific number can be stated because it will vary from one listing to another, depending upon the criteria used to classify the senses. A set of criteria often used consists of the kind of subjective experience involved—visual, olfactory, tactile, etc.—the type of stimulus, and the sense organ, or receptor. Table 1 outlines this scheme. The nature of sensory experiences The stimulation of a sense organ results in a unique kind of experience, and the differences in kind are what we identify in speaking of auditory, taste, and other types of sensations. The traditional five senses of sight, hearing, taste, smell, and touch have been defined this way since the time of Aristotle, but it has long been known that these do not make the complete list, since sensations of warmth, cold, heat, and pain—in addition to
SENSES: Overview
173
Table 1 — Scheme for classifying senses Subjective experience
Stimulus
Vision Hearing
Electromagnetic radiations Pressure of sound waves
Taste
Various substances in solution
Smell
Various vaporized materials
Touch
Deformation of skin, mucous membrane, internal organs, etc., by stretching, pulling, and similar stimulation Pressure in excess of that required for touch, distension of internal organs, etc. Contact by stimulus above "physiological zero," radiant heat, elevation of temperature of surrounding medium Contact by stimulus below "physiological zero," lowering of temperature of surrounding medium Various electrical, thermal, mechanical, chemical, and other agents, e.g., electric shock, radiant heat, puncture, some acids, etc. Linear and rotational acceleration, head and body position and movement
Pressure ("deep," i.e., subcutaneous and internal pressure) Warmth
Cold
Pain
Vestibular (equilibrium, labyrinthine)
Kinesthesis (movement "muscle sense")
and
Movement of muscles, tendons, and joints
touch—can be aroused when the skin is stimulated. Even when these are included, the list is still far too short because movement, pressure, fatigue, nausea, and many others that could be named are experienced as sensations just as much as, let us say, taste and sight. In addition to the differences in kind of sensation from one sense to another, there are also differences in quality within each sense. Not only is taste as a class of sensations different from sight, but the taste quality of sweetness is different from that of sourness, and the visual quality of whiteness different from that of other colors. The number of sensations and their variations and combinations is infinite. To order the domain of the sensations, Hermann von Helmholtz introduced the concept of modality, which is denned as the class of sensations, all of which are alike.
Receptor Rods and cones of the retina Hair cells of the organ of Corti of the inner ear Taste cells in taste buds of the tongue Bipolar neurons of olfactory nerve in olfactory epithelium in upper nasal cavity Free nerve endings
Pacinian corpuscles in subcutaneous tissue and internal organs Receptor uncerfain or disputed
Receptor uncertain or disputed
Free nerve endings
Cristae of semicircular canals and otoliths of macula of utricle and sacule (all parts of nonauditory portion of inner ear) Various receptors in muscles, tendons, and joints, e.g., spray-type nerve endings and free nerve endings in muscular tissue and joints, Golgi tendon organs, modified Pacinian corpuscles
Intensity. The basic aspects of sensation are intensity, sensory modality, and sensory quality. First, let us briefly consider sensation intensity. Most sense organs are specialized; that is, they are composed of receptor elements whose threshold of excitability is lower for one form of energy than for any other. This particular type of energy is known as the adequate stimulus. Receptors will react to other stimuli—for example, the application of an electric current or pressure on the eyeball will arouse visual sensations—but the energy required is greater; such stimuli are often referred to as inadequate. Absolute threshold. The minimum amount of the adequate stimulus necessary to excite a sense organ is called the absolute threshold. For some senses the energy required is extremely small; for instance, at the absolute threshold for human vi-
174
SENSES: Overview
sion the rods can respond when they absorb only 6-10 light quanta, and it has been calculated that movements of the eardrum of the order of 10~9 cm. can excite the auditory system. Differential threshold. The senses, however, do more than detect the presence or absence of stimulation; they respond to differences in stimulus magnitude. As the value of the stimulus is increased above the absolute threshold, the sensation experienced becomes more intense—the light becomes brighter and the sound louder. But it is also important to know how much difference there must be so that one light can be seen as brighter than another or what change in sound frequency is required in order to be able to recognize that two tones differ. This is the problem of the differential threshold, defined as the just noticeable difference in stimulation. The size of the differential threshold is a measure of receptor sensitivity; when the just noticeable difference is small, sensitivity is high, when this difference is large, sensitivity is low. Work of Weber and Fechner. E. H. Weber's research in the 1830s and 1840s led him to conclude that the just noticeable difference in stimulus intensities, AI, depends upon the ratio of their magnitudes, that is, AI = Ii/L, and that for a given class of stimuli the ratio is constant. Thus, if a light intensity of 11 units can be discriminated as just noticeably brighter than one of 10 units, then a light intensity must be of 110 units to be discriminated from one of 100 units, and so on—the constant ratio being ^ in this example. Although he knew the value of the ratio varied from one class of stimuli to another, Weber believed it was constant for any given class, a generalization that has usually been found to hold true for only a part of the total range of magnitude for any stimulus class. Gustav Fechner applied Weber's findings about intensities of stimuli to intensities of sensation, assuming that a just noticeable increase in stimulus intensity meant there was a constant increment in sensation intensity. He believed the quantitative relationship between stimulus and sensation was logarithmic, and in 1860 he expressed this in his famous psychophysical law: S = k log I, where S is sensation intensity and I is stimulus intensity (Boring 1942). [A more detailed treatment of thresholds, the relationship between stimulus magnitude and sensation intensity, and the problems and methods involved in their measurement will be found in PSYCHOPHYSICS ; see also the biographies of FECHNER and WEBER, ERNST HEINRICH.] Sensory modalities. Although the importance of sensation intensity has always been recognized, most of the interest in the senses has centered
about the problems of sensory modality and the quality differences within a modality. Our daily experiences seem to provide the answer to the question "What is there about the stimulus, the sense organ, or the nervous system that explains sensory modality?" To common sense it appears self-evident that, although the nervous system transmits neural activity to the brain, where sensory experience occurs, the essential factor that accounts for sensory modality is the stimulussense organ relationship. This determines which experience takes place in the brain. Thus, the color of the grass stimulates the eye, and we have the sensation of greenness; the singing of the bird falls on the ear, and we hear; the skin senses the warmth of the sunshine and the cool of the shade. In order to experience a particular sensation, it is simply a matter of the natural stimulus exciting the appropriate sense organ. However, it is not only the "natural" stimulus that can arouse a given sensation. For example, a blow on the head will evoke visual sensations and make the ears ring; the usual stimulus for dizziness is spinning or rotating the body, but rotating the visual field will have the same effect; a very warm stimulus may be felt as cold when applied to a cold-sensitive spot on the skin—the "paradoxical cold" phenomenon. These examples demonstrate an important fact: no matter how it is excited, whenever a specific sense organ is stimulated, the sensation is always the same. Yet it is not necessary for the sense organ itself to be stimulated in order for its appropriate modality of sensation to be experienced. For instance, when the optic nerve is cut, a flash of light is seen, and after amputation of an arm there may be reports of touch, itching, pain, and other sensations that are felt as coming from the missing hand and fingers. [See BODY IMAGE.] Doctrine of specific nerve energies. If neither a particular stimulus nor stimulation of a particular sense organ is essential, then there must be something about the nervous system that is the necessary factor determining sensory modality. It is this conclusion that Johannes Miiller stated in his doctrine, or law, of specific nerve energies (Boring 1942). It was Miiller's hypothesis that each sensory nerve has its unique "energy," or quality. Miiller's hypothesis declares that sound is sensed because of the unique specific energy of the auditory nerve, smell because of the specific energy of the olfactory nerve, and the other sense modalities because of similar specific energies—and the modalities differ because the specific nerve energies are different. Although no property of sensory nerves has ever been found which supports the specific-energy
SENSES: Overview concept, Miiller's doctrine has been very influential in theory and research upon the senses. It led investigators to look for specialized receptors which, when they activate their sensory nerve, arouse a particular type of sensation [see MULLER, JOHANNES]. Problem of special receptors. For most of the senses an interrelationship can be found which involves an adequate stimulus, a specialized receptor, and a specific modality of sensation. Light stimulates the rods and cones of the retina, and we see; substances stimulate the taste buds of the tongue, and we taste. Relations of this sort can be found for many modalities. However, such information about some senses is uncertain, and our knowledge of how sensations evoked by stimulation of the skin are mediated is an example of this. The skin is not uniformly sensitive but has "spots" of sensitivity that respond to touch, temperature, etc. Under most conditions no temperature is felt at a given cutaneous region; it is at "physiological zero." Upon being stimulated point by point by a stimulus above this zero value, warmth is not felt at all points nor is cold when a stimulus below this value is used; warm and cold sensations are only reported upon stimulation at certain spots, and the number and location of these are different for the two kinds of stimuli. This finding has been interpreted as indicating the existence of a special receptor for warmth and a different one for cold at each temperature-sensitive spot. A similar interpretation has been proposed for touch, one type of receptor to serve for hairy skin and another type for hairless. Because of their number and nearness to pain-sensitive spots, the free nerve endings are considered to mediate pain. Although the free nerve endings usually are not considered to be specialized receptors, when they are appropriately stimulated, touch and temperature will also be sensed (Weddell 1955). The cutaneous senses have sometimes been discussed in terms of a conception of modality which implicitly assumes there must be four morphologically distinct types of receptors. But the fact that all the cutaneous modalities can be evoked by stimulating the free nerve endings casts doubt upon the necessity to assume distinct receptor types. The meaning of cutaneous sensation also requires clarification. "Touch," "warmth," "cold," and "pain" do not designate unique sensations perceived in isolation; such terms refer to the predominant experience aroused by particular stimuli. A stimulus above physiological zero applied to the skin evokes warmth as the primary feeling, but the stimulus is also felt as a touch at a particular location, and it is perceived as having temporal and spatial charac-
175
teristics. This example also illustrates an important phenomenon, that of sensory interaction. The inputs from sensory systems interact at the higher nervous centers and are integrated there so as to give us our perceptions of the environment. [See SKIN SENSES AND KINESTHESIS.]
Sensation quality. To speak of sensation is also to speak of sensation quality; the two are inseparable. Visual sensations are white, or gray, or red, or yellow; a pain is "dull," or "aching," or "throbbing"; and similarly for all the senses. The usual method of investigating sensory quality has been to search for the aspects of the stimulus which correlate with quality and variations in quality. For many of the senses some of the most important correlations are known and the factors involved have been studied for many years. For vision the wave length of the light and color quality are correlated; sound frequency correlates with pitch, and the pattern of overtones with the characteristic timbre of musical instruments and the voice; lightly stroking the skin evokes the touch quality of tickling, and so on. Much of our knowledge about the senses consists of information of this sort, and many of the most important generalizations and theories about the senses, such as the Young-Helmholtz theory of color vision and the place theory of pitch for hearing, are explanations of sensory quality [see HELMHOLTZ]. Receptor-quality correlations. Obviously, before there can be any satisfactory scientific understanding, the receptor and the quality that are involved in the stimulus-quality correlation must be known. For some senses our knowledge about one or the other of these is questionable. In the case of thermal sensitivity the stimulation is temperature above or below physiological zero, and the sensory quality is warmth or cold, but since there is uncertainty about how thermal sensitivity is mediated, little that is conclusive can be said about any correlation. In the case of olfaction there is the opposite difficulty; here there is no question about the receptor, but anywhere from three to nine classes of odor qualities have been proposed. Since agreement has not been reached about the analysis of the qualities, here too no satisfactory stimulus—quality correlation can be established. Localization in the brain. When it became clear that Miiller's specific nerve-energy concept was not tenable, the only reasonable alternative hypothesis seemed to be one which he had considered as a possibility, namely, that when a sense organ is stimulated, its sensory nerve sets up excitation in a particular region in the brain; there is specificity because nerves from different sense organs go to different regions. Specificity does exist in the sense
776
SENSES: Overview
that the optic-nerve radiations terminate in the occipital lobe of the brain, and hence this is the visual center; the auditory nerve ends in the temporal region, and this is the auditory center, and so on. However, although occasionally someone has entertained the possibility of something like them, no "green center," "warm center," or "center" for sweet tastes or flowery odors and the like has been found. Such a conception of specificity is too simple. [See NERVOUS SYSTEM, article on STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF THE BRAIN.]
Methods and findings Within this century the most significant contributions to the understanding of the senses have come from electrophysiological investigations. By appropriate techniques the responses of individual receptors and of single nerve fibers can be studied as the stimuli are varied. Under most conditions of stimulation the electrical changes recorded from a single nerve unit are a series of discharges, all of the same size, and the unit is therefore said to show all-or-none response. As intensity of stimulation is increased or decreased, it is not the magnitude of discharge of the nerve that varies, but its frequency; and when records are taken from several units, it is found that variation in stimulus intensity is also reflected in the number of units responding. The frequency of unit discharge and the number of units excited are considered to be the basic neural correlates of the dimension of sensation intensity. Recent research on the electrophysiology of taste has provided data and information which show that some of the ways of looking upon sensation and sensation quality must be reconsidered. That the taste cell of the taste bud is the receptor for taste has long been known, and although from time to time different classifications of primary taste qualities have been proposed, it was finally agreed that there are four: sour, salty, sweet, and bitter. Most of the taste buds are found in small elevations on the tongue known as papillae. Individual papillae have been found which respond exclusively to salt, to sour, and to sweet, but most are stimulated by substances which evoke more than one quality. Recordings have been made of the electrical activity of single units of the nerves supplying various animal taste buds when these are being stimulated by weak acids, sodium chloride, sugar, quinine, and other substances that evoke the different primary taste qualities in the human subject. Such records show that most units respond to more than one substance, and from one unit to another there is variation in the degree of response to different substances. For example, one
unit might respond to both hydrochloric acid and sodium chloride, but in a different degree to each; another unit might respond to the same concentration of these, but to another degree for each, and in addition it might respond to quinine. A third unit might, again, respond to both the acid and the salt at the same concentration, and to still a different degree for each, and to sucrose as well. Thus, although many units may respond to stimuli for the primary taste qualities, each may have its own response "spectrum," or characteristic pattern of sensitivity. Such findings do not support a simple view of four basic receptor-cell or nerve-unit types corresponding to the four taste qualities. "Sweet," "sour," etc. are probably best considered as descriptive headings for taste qualities, rather than as terms signifying any sort of entity. It appears then that neither the responses of individual cells nor of single neural units determine taste quality—it is the patterning of sensory nerve activity which provides the basis for taste discrimination (Pfaffmann 1962). Electrophysiological methods have been used to investigate the individual receptor elements, the nerve pathways, and the cortical centers for all the senses; information that could have been obtained in no other way has been gathered. By such methods new discoveries have been made which show that some of the traditional views and theories about the senses are too simple and inadequate. [See NERVOUS SYSTEM, article on ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAPHY.l
In the past the senses were studied for the purpose of explaining sensations and their qualities. Now there is less emphasis on this, and the senses are being studied in and for themselves in order to gain knowledge about their properties and their processes. Work undertaken with this new purpose is not only giving us better knowledge of sensations and qualities but it is also giving us a larger view of the senses and the part they play in the behavior of organisms. F. A. MOTE [Directly related are the entries HEARING; PAIN; SKIN SENSES AND KINESTHESIS; TASTE AND SMELL; Vl-
SION. Other relevant material may be found in ATTENTION; NERVOUS SYSTEM, article on STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF THE BRAIN; PSYCHOPHYSICS; and in the biographies of FECHNER; HELMHOLTZ; HERING; MULLER, JOHANNES; WEBER, ERNST HEINRICH; WUNDT.] BIBLIOGRAPHY BORING, EDWIN G. 1942 Sensation and Perception in the History of Experimental Psychology. New York: Appleton.
SENSES: Central Mechanisms GELDARD, FRANK A. 1953 The Human Senses. New York: Wiley. PFAFFMAN, CARL 1962 Sensory Processes and Their Relation to Behavior: Studies on the Sense of Taste as a Model S R System. Volume 4, pages 380-416 in Sigmund Koch (editor), Psychology: A Study of A Science. New York: McGraw-Hill. PIERON, HENRI (1945) 1952 The Sensations: Their Functions, Processes, and Mechanisms. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press; London: Miiller. -» First published as Aux sources de la connaissance: La sensation, guide de vie. SYMPOSIUM ON PRINCIPLES OF SENSORY COMMUNICATION, ENDICOTT HOUSE, 1959 1961 Sensory Communication: Contributions. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press. WEDDELL, G. 1955 Somesthesis and the Chemical Senses. Annual Review of Psychology 6:119-136. II CENTRAL MECHANISMS
Physiology had very little precise information concerning central mechanisms of sensation until the advent of the micromethods of modern neurophysiology. The well-known basic facts concerning specific cortical projection areas for vision, hearing, etc., more properly belong to the conceptual sphere of functional anatomy and pathology. This article will attempt to make some sense out of the less accessible results dealing with the organization of sensory messages and their transmission as revealed by microtechniques in terms of single fibers and individual cells. The central mechanisms of sensation come into operation at the first synapse which the neural message encounters on its way from the sense organ. In the eye and the ear, for instance, this synapse is located in the periphery at the base of the receptors themselves. For afferents leading from receptors in the skin, the synapse is found in the spinal cord and in its upper extension, the medulla oblongata. In the eye the message is twice reorganized before it reaches the optic nerve, at the synapse of the receptor and bipolar cells and at the synapse of the bipolar and ganglion cells. There, some "sharpening" of the information takes place, aided as we shall see, by the mobility of the eye. Skin and muscular afferents are synaptically connected in the spinal cord to elaborate reflex systems that in turn are controlled by internuncial cells (interneurons) run by centripetal circuits that can redirect, inhibit, or facilitate the passage of information. The sense organs whose central mechanisms have been most carefully studied are the eye, the ear, and the muscle spindles. These will be used to illustrate some of the leading principles that have emerged from such work. Let us first consider the extremely high sensitivity of the sense organs. If this sensitivity were
177
always fully utilized and its effect transmitted to the cortex, the higher centers would be at the mercy of an impulse barrage that would depolarize their neurons to a level fatal for organized life. Obviously situations exist in which full sensitivity is needed, as in extreme twilight vision for the eye, or in the minute adjustments of muscle length made by the spindle organs. But the eye must also be able to function in brightest sunlight, and most muscular movements are coarse and would be disturbed by excessive spindle discharges, which as we know, are returned reflexively to the muscles in which these organs are situated. These two examples suffice to show that sensitivity must be regulated. Much of the most important work on central afferent mechanisms has been devoted to the elucidation of both local and distant (or centripetal) controlling mechanisms that act internally on the neurons or receptors themselves. These are distinct from well-known external mechanisms, such as pupillary reflexes and activities of the stapedius and tensor tympani muscles in the middle ear. An important restrictive peripheral mechanism requiring brief mention is the adaptation of the receptors that is expressed in a reduction of impulse frequency as a function of the length of time of stimulation (Adrian 1928). The so-called light and dark adaptation of the retina is a borderline case: there is a peripheral shift from rod, or scotopic, vision based on rhodopsin to cone, or photopic, vision as the level of illumination increases, but neural mechanisms within the retinal center itself are also deeply engaged in the adaptive adjustments of the sensitivity of the eye. The details of their mode of operation are not as well known as one could desire. Their existence, however, is well established by several workers (summarized in Granit 1962). Relays and transmission. At an earlier time, the different synaptic stations traversed by a message were regarded merely as relays, a loosely defined function quite apart from the complications alluded to above. We realize today that afferent messages from different receptors at a relaying neuron may be mixed in different ways by the manner in which their afferent terminals converge and that controlling mechanisms interfere at each station, either to specify, amplify, or partially or wholly block a message. Nevertheless, there is always some relay function involved, in the sense that even a modified impulse message must be transmitted to the next station with some fidelity as to its "quantity." Since impulse frequency (in addition to the number of active cells) is a most important determinant of quantity or intensity, clearly there must be a mechanism for relaying it
178
SENSES: Central Mechanisms
with a good margin of safety. One factor making a relay reasonably reliable is "synaptic density." A relay could be made to transmit with an equal margin of safety without a dense synaptic projection, but in such systems facilitatory or inhibitory controls would be relatively more important in deciding under what circumstances maximum output would be permitted. At each relay, impulse frequency is translated at the cell membrane into miniature synaptic currents which can be recorded (through microelectrodes introduced into the cell and connected to amplifiers) as miniature potentials (see Eccles 1957; 1964). These indicate depolarization when the input is excitatory and the opposite, or hyperpolarization, when the input is inhibitory. Several sense organs have both inhibitory and excitatory afferents, the classical example being the large spindle afferents with reciprocally connected inhibitory and excitatory terminals to the protagonist and antagonist ventral horn cells, respectively. In an excitatory relay of substantial synaptic density, the miniature synaptic currents are in one direction, all depolarizing, and hence will produce a graded change, the depolarizing current, often recordable in terms of electrical potential. Eccles (1957; 1964) calls it the postsynaptic excitatory potential. It will be translated into an impulse discharge. Imitating this process by injecting current through the tip of an intracellular electrode, one finds impulse frequency directly proportional to current strength (Granit et al. 1963). At the next relay these impulses will produce an amount of excitatory current dependent upon the frequency of discharge and the synaptic density. Is this process also directly proportional to impulse frequency? Indirect evidence supports this proposition (see below). The relay function of an afferent neuron lying in the path of the message to the cortex thus consists in translating an impulse barrage into depolarizing current and that once again into an impulse barrage and so on alternately at each subsequent station. Since proportionality is maintained, the message can be transmitted without distortion of the relative order of magnitude. The lemniscal path seems to exhibit the simple relay function described (Mountcastle 1961). The proportionality constants relating depolarizing current strength to impulse frequency are known to vary, and thus if they happened to be large, a sensory effect could be stepped up by amplification; if not, the initial frequency of discharge may be reproduced at the end station in its original version. When more complex functions are considered, the simple picture drawn above of a pure relay
function ceases to be sufficient. Transmission will then be greatly influenced by internuncial cells that "take orders" from elsewhere. A large number of them characteristically fire rapid bursts of impulses when stimulated by a single shock. When tested for their impulse-producing capacity by injected currents, these cells have been proved to possess very large proportionality constants, meaning that very small amounts of current elicit fast frequencies of discharge. Such cells are therefore well suited for "biasing," in the positive or negative direction, the relays upon which they impinge. Specific and diffuse afferents. When a sense organ has to deliver specific information of a more discriminative nature referring to spatial localization or some modality, this information is arranged spatially with considerable precision both at intermediate and at end stations. Topographic differentiation by means of somatotopic afferents is thus a major analytical tool of the physiological organization by which input is differentiated. In vision the physiological maps are particularly precise. The eyes, for instance, are represented by alternate layers in the geniculate body in such a manner as to join corresponding points of the retinal field in identical layers. The information, thus organized, is delivered to a cortical map of great precision. For touch, Woolsey (1952) has worked out detailed cortical charts by the method of evoked potential. Even quality may in some systems be mapped out. This is the case in the cortical area for tonal representation (Tunturi 1950). Examples could be multiplied to show how information on the structure of bodily space is charted in this manner by localized signals. Differentiation by the basic principle of maintaining the topography of sensory impulses from sense organ to cortex is, however, not the only afferent mechanism known. There are also cells which serve diffuse or nonspecific functions. This concept is not easy to define with precision. Perhaps the best way of defining a diffuse afferent system is to call it "a system of cells on each of which afferent fibers of several modalities converge," or if the afferents be of one modality, "cells receiving projections from an extensive section or area of the body." Magoun's (1950) concept of the ascending reticular system is of the former type, in which neurons in the brain stem receive terminals from afferents representing a large number of different modalities, as proved in unit analysis by Moruzzi and his co-workers (Scheibel et al. 1955). Of the other type is the spinothalamic system, whose thalamic neurons have receptive fields which may include one half or the whole of the
SENSES: Central Mechanisms body (Mountcastle 1961). They may, however, have terminals from two modalities (if pain be a modality) because nociceptive stimuli also discharge the cells which are sensitive to mechanical stimulation of the skin. In the retina the giant ganglion cells have branches that collect information across an area with a diameter of maximally 1 mm., representing several hundred thousand receptors, both rods and cones. Within the tactile system of the gracilis nucleus of the dorsal-column afferents, there are separate cells for localized messages and for highly convergent information coming from a large area. What function should be assigned to diffuse systems? Only a partial answer can be given. For the reticular activating system, Starzl, Taylor, and Magoun (1951) suggest (as does the name itself) that it plays the role of keeping the brain alert and active, since somnolence occurs when this portion of the brain stem is removed. Granit (1955), drawing attention to the widespread spontaneous activity of nerve cells, has made two suggestions: (1) that the diffuse sensory input serves an energizing function; that is, it maintains some basic depolarization by random impulses which is necessary for the upkeep of spontaneous activity in the higher centers; and (2) that spontaneous activity in its turn is necessary as a background for the central recognition of inhibition. As we shall see below, inhibition is necessary in discrimination, but it needs a background of central excitation in order to be "informative." In studying intracellularly the afferent input from stretch receptors, we have been able to demonstrate (Granit et al. 1964) that, unless the cell (a motoneuron) is depolarized to some extent, both inhibitory and excitatory effects of stretch tend to be dissipated as sheer noise consisting of miniature potentials at the cell membrane, while in slightly depolarized cells, excitations really excite and inhibitions really inhibit. The final cell. The neurophysiologist whose understanding depends on interpreting "spikes" (impulses) or membrane events (synaptic activation noise, membrane potential) has no experimentally based philosophy as to which, if any, of his indices comes close to the conceptual world of psychology. So far he has done best on spikes and has been tacitly inclined to imagine that unless a cortical cell delivers spikes, it is of but modest interest in the nervous machinery designed for discrimination of one message from another. Yet, while he is recording from the "final cell" in a cortical layer, no neurophysiologist is likely to believe that he is doing anything more than sampling one link in an organization of cortical cells that, ac-
179
cording to the anatomist Ramon y Cajal (1923), consists of a "cortical sector" (a "cone" would have been a more appropriate term) with its top downwards. Within this sector the cells are linked vertically. Physiological research (see below) has recently been able to make valuable use of Ramon's concept. The role of inhibition. Impulse recording made it possible for the first time to assign definite tasks to nervous inhibition in the elaboration of the sensory message. Previously, central inhibition had been measurable only in reflex work, using muscular contraction or secretion as indices. Graded excitation (depolarizing current) has its equivalent antagonist in graded inhibition (hyperpolarizing current), often recordable by the intracellular technique as the "inhibitory postsynaptic potential" (Eccles 1957; 1964). However, most information of interest for the present theme has been obtained in terms of a reduction of impulse frequency. Inhibition within a sensory system achieved functional prominence in the vertebrate retina for the first time when it was shown that the off-discharge at cessation of illumination was preceded by inhibition and easily inhibited by reillumination (Granit & Therman 1935; Hartline 1938). The retina is our most highly developed sense organ, and if natural stimulation of it by light could stop a discharge as well as start it, then surely inhibition is of first importance. The on-off pattern of discharge delivered by the individual optic nerve fibers was later also seen in the auditory system (Bremer 1943). However, in vision its significance is far better understood, apparently because the spatial element of the organ of sight is more accessible to analysis. From the beginning it was held that the on-off units of the retina would blaze the trail of a moving object with a recognizable spike pattern and that, similarly, contours would be emphasized because both regular and small, irregular eye movements light it up with on-off spikes. It has since been shown in precise experiments (Ditchburn 1955) that if the image on the human retina is maintained stationary by appropriate optical arrangements compensating for slight, unavoidable eye movements, then it also tends to fade out. The on-off element, and likewise a smaller number of pure "on" and pure "off" elements, represents a receptive field of convergence together with an analyzer residing in the nervous structure between receptors and the ganglion cell whose message is recorded. The size and organization of the receptive field were first studied, with the aid of small spots of light, by Hartline (1940) in the frog and
180
SENSES: Central Mechanisms
then in the cat (Kuffler 1953), where they were found to be differentiated to the extent that they possess a center that is either "on" or "off." In both cases the surrounding part of the field had the opposite character. In the goldfish the receptive field has also been investigated with respect to wave-length sensitivity, and it has been found that this antagonism between center and periphery with respect to on and off may also be an antagonism in terms of spectral regions of sensitivity. The overlapping mosaic of receptive fields thus forms a dynamic interaction pattern which, transmitted up the optic nerve, can do justice to the infinite variety of form, movement, and color that a moving animal has to interpret and that it ultimately reproduces in the form of a stable world of sight. In this act inhibition is just as vital as excitation. Recurrent inhibition. Recurrent inhibition is another significant and apparently common process in the organization of the sensory (and motor) message because it rejects unwanted components, emphasizes differences of "quantity" within a complex message, and apparently also stabilizes a steady discharge. Its basis is the common occurrence in all centers of recurrent collateral fibers returning directly or across an interneuron to the cell or cell system from which the parent fiber emerged. Most of our knowledge of this process, inasmuch as it consists of precise measurements, derives from cells as different as vertebrate ventral horn cells and the horseshoe crab (Limulus) ommatidia. In the latter case (Hartline & Ratliff 1958) the afferent large axon from each ommatidium sends fibers with inhibitory axo-axonic synapses to adjacent axons. Assume that an image is focused onto some ommatidia with irradiated light unavoidably spreading across surrounding ones. The ommatidia in focus will fire at higher frequencies than those in the surrounds. The recurrent inhibition has proved to be proportional to impulse frequency and hence the focal cells will inhibit those in the neighborhood more than the latter can inhibit them. As a consequence the image will be sharpened by "contrast." Nature has preserved, as it were, the idea of recurrent, or "lateral," inhibition (in Hartline's terminology) through countless ages of phylogenetic development; recurrent fibers are found in most centers, both motor and sensory. In the ventral horn cells (Granit & Renkin 1961), in addition to "motor contrast," a stabilizing effect on the discharge frequency in tonically active cells can be demonstrated. While in the Limulus the mechanism appears to be wholly automatic, in the ventral horn cells it is provided with an internuncial neu-
ron, the so-called Renshaw cell, and hence is facultative (for a summary, see Granit 1963). These cases of recurrent inhibition are the only ones analyzed in detail, but further developments can be expected, since qualitative work has already been done, for instance, in the hippocampus, in the olfactory bulb, and in the gracilis nucleus. Lateral inhibitory effects delimiting the area stimulated have also been described under the heading "surround" or "afferent inhibition" by Mountcastle (1957) and his co-workers. Thus Powell and Mountcastle (1959), recording from the somatic cortical area of the macaque monkey, have found skin fields in which a central nucleus of excitation to touch was surrounded by an inhibitory zone. The mechanism in this case may well be recurrent inhibition improving at each relay definition of locality. Inhibition also apparently plays a decisive role in sharpening up information about quality. In some optic nerve fibers the spectral response in terms of threshold sensitivity appears restricted to, say, the red, green, or blue wave lengths. This is the so-called modulator type of response. The dominator type of response is sensitive across the spectrum. The modulator bands are now generally held to be caused by inhibition sharpening up color specification. Broad and narrow bands of spectral sensitivity have also been recorded from higher visual stations. A recent discussion of the neural mechanisms specifying wave length has been given by Granit (1962). As to specification of tonal quality, Galambos (1954) points out that inhibition in this system also restricts the originally broad sensitivity of the peripheral acoustic mechanism to a narrow band, a process that is likely to take place already within the cochlea. Tonal bands of different width, also depending upon the frequency range which the nerve fibers carry, are thus delivered to both the visual and the auditory cortical area. Centrifugal control. The sense organ in which centrifugal control is best understood is the muscle spindle; this organ is located within a spindle of thin muscles (so-called intrafusal muscle fibers) that are provided with special efferent fibers that can be stimulated both artificially and across natural reflex or supraspinal connections. Under such circumstances the intrafusal muscle fibers contract and thereby stretch the sensory spindle endings, which respond by discharging afferent impulses. There is a large literature in this field (Leksell 1945; Granit 1955) which cannot be reviewed here. Relevant in this connection is the principle of centripetal determination of the level of sen-
SENSES: Central Mechanisms sitivity in terms of spindle length. This is of fundamental importance because from the spindle the afferent impulses run to ventral horn cells, setting up efferent impulses to—among others—the large muscles in which the spindles are located; these muscles in turn are forced to contract until the tension on the sense organ is relieved. Thus, the length at which the muscle operates is determined by centrifugal control of spindle length, an interesting case of a centrally controlled sense organ which at the same time is a motor organ. There is also a considerable literature on the olivo-cochlear Rasmussen bundle of efferent fibers, which exert a direct inhibitory effect that can be recorded both in auditory single fibers and at the cochlea. Both crossed and uncrossed olivo-cochlear fibers exert inhibitory effects, but their significance cannot yet be said to be fully understood. A possibility is that they play a role in binaural localization. (For the relevant literature see Galambos 1956; Fex 1963.) The retina is likewise provided with centrifugal fibers, which is hardly surprising because it is a true nervous center in spite of its peripheral localization, and as pointed out above, centripetal control of nervous centers is common. The scant literature in this field has been summarized by Granit (1962). Cortical analysis. At the level of detail alluded to in this brief review, analyses are restricted to the study of the organ of sight (see Hubel & Wiesel 1959; 1963; Jung & Kornhuber 1961). Hubel and Wiesel have made a thorough investigation of the receptive fields of cortical cells stimulating the eye (of a cat) by small visual objects influencing the firing of single cortical units. The receptive fields in the cortex were found to be organized either with excitatory on- or inhibitory off-centers in the middle, the surrounds being of opposite character (see above for similarly organized retinal receptive fields). The cortical receptive fields are more elongated than the retinal ones, and they are oriented in different directions. The antagonism between center and periphery of the cortical receptive field makes stimuli covering the whole field or diffuse illumination relatively ineffective. The same properties make these fields extremely sensitive to form, size, position, and orientation of the stimulus and likewise sensitive to directional movement of a spot of light across the retina; this is easily understood, considering that a moving spot can traverse elongated fields in different directions. Some units were binocular, others monocular. Recalling that Powell and Mountcastle (1959) had found that tactile cortical regions are colum-
181
nar in shape with similar responses to a microelectrode which apparently penetrates one of Ramon's sectors (see above) from above downward, Hubel and Wiesel (1963) made an analysis of receptive visual fields in a similar manner. They found a number of columns in the visual area in which receptive-field orientation was maintained, suggesting that columns of ordered sequences of field orientation are actually part of the central sensory mechanism, defined, of course, in functional terms. RAGNAR GRANIT [See also NERVOUS SYSTEM, articles on STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF THE BRAIN and ELECTROENCEPH-
ALOGRAPHY. Other relevant material may be found in HEARING; PAIN; PSYCHOLOGY, article on PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY; SKIN SENSES AND KINESTHE-
sis; TASTE AND SMELL; VISION.] BIBLIOGRAPHY
ADRIAN, EDGAR D. (1928) 1934 The Basis of Sensation: The Action of Sense Organs. London: Christophers. BREMER, FREDERIC 1943 Etude oscillographique des reponses sensorielles de 1'aire acoustique corticale chez le chat. Archives Internationales de physiologic 53: 53-103. DITCHBURN, R. W. 1955 Eye-movements in Relation to Retinal Action. Optica acta (London) 1:171-176. ECCLES, JOHN C. 1957 The Physiology of Nerve Cells. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. ECCLES, JOHN C. 1964 The Physiology of Synapses. Berlin: Springer. FEX, J. 1963 Crossed Cochlear Efferents Activated by Sound Through Both Ears. Acta physiologica scandinavica (Stockholm) 59 (Supplement 213) :41 only. GALAMBOS, ROBERT 1954 Neural Mechanisms of Audition. Physiological Reviews 34:497-528. GALAMBOS, ROBERT 1956 Suppression of Auditory Nerve Activity by Stimulation of Efferent Fibers to Cochlea. Journal of Neuro-physiology 19:424-437. GRANIT, RAGNAR 1955 Receptors and Sensory Perception. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. GRANIT, RAGNAR 1962 The Visual Pathway. Pages 535796 in Hugh Davson (editor), The Eye. Volume 2: The Visual Process. New York: Academic Press. GRANIT, RAGNAR 1963 Recurrent Inhibition as a Mechanism of Control. Pages 23-37 in Progress in Brain Research. Volume 1: Brain Mechanisms. Amsterdam and New York: Elsevier. GRANIT, RAGNAR; KELLERTH, J. O.; and WILLIAMS, T. D. 1964 "Adjacent" and "Remote" Postsynaptic Inhibition in Motoneurones Stimulated by Muscle Stretch. Journal of Physiology 174:453-472. GRANIT, RAGNAR; KERNELL, D.; and SHORTESS, G. K. 1963 Quantitative Aspects of Repetitive Firing of Mammalian Motoneurones, Caused by Injected Currents. Journal of Physiology 168:911-931. GRANIT, RAGNAR; and RENKIN, BARBARA 1961 Net Depolarization and Discharge Rate of Motoneurones, as Measured by Recurrent Inhibition. Journal of Physiology 158:461-475. GRANIT, RAGNAR; and THERMAN, P. O. 1935 Excitation and Inhibition in the Retina and in the Optic Nerve. Journal of Physiology 83:359-381.
1 82
SENSORY AND MOTOR DEVELOPMENT
HARTLINE, H. K. 1938 The Response of Single Optic Nerve Fibers of the Vertebrate Eye to Illumination of the Retina. American Journal of Physiology 121:400415. HARTLINE, H. K. 1940 The Receptive Field of the Optic Nerve Fibers. American Journal of Physiology 130: 690-699. HARTLINE, H. K.; and RATLIFF, FLOYD 1958 Spatial Summation of Inhibitory Influences in the Eye of Limulus, and the Mutual Interaction of Receptor Units. Journal of General Physiology 41:1049-1066. HUBEL, D. H.; and WIESEL, T. N. 1959 Receptive Fields of Single Neurones in the Cat's Striate Cortex. Journal of Physiology 148:574-591. HUBEL, D. H.; and WIESEL, T. N. 1963 Shape and Arrangement of Columns in Cat's Striate Cortex. Journal of Physiology 165:559-568. JUNG, RICHARD; and KORNHUBER, HANS (editors) 1961 Neurophysiologie und Psychophysik des visuellen Systems. The Visual System: Neurophysiology and Psychophysics. A symposium. Berlin: Springer. -» Contributions in English, German, and French. KUFFLER, STEPHEN W. 1953 Discharge Patterns and Functional Organization of Mammalian Retina. Journal of Neurophysiology 16:37-68. LAPORTE, Y.; LUNDBERG, A.; and OSCARSSON, O. 1956 Functional Organization of the Dorsal Spino-cerebellar Tract in the Cat. II: Single Fibre Recording in Flechsig's Fasciculus on Electrical Stimulation of Various Peripheral Nerves. Acta physiologica scandinamca (Stockholm) 36:188-203. LEKSELL, L. 1945 Action Potential and Excitatory Effects of Small Ventral Root Fibres to Skeletal Muscle. Acta physiologica scandinavica (Stockholm) 10 (Supplement 31):1-84. MAGOUN, H. W. 1950 Caudal and Cephalic Influences of the Brain Stem Reticular Formation. Physiological Reviews 30:459-474. MOUNTCASTLE, VERNON B. 1957 Modality and Topographic Properties of Single Neurons of Cat's Somatic Sensory Cortex. Journal of Neurophysiology 20:408— 434. MOUNTCASTLE, VERNON B. 1961 Some Functional Properties of the Somatic Afferent System. Pages 403-436 in Symposium on Principles of Sensory Communication, Endicott House, 1959, Sensory Communication. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press. POWELL, T. P.; and MOUNTCASTLE, V. B. 1959 Some Aspects of the Functional Organization of the Cortex of the Postcentral Gyrus of the Monkey: A Correlation of Findings Obtained in a Single Unit Analysis With Cytoarchitecture. Johns Hopkins Hospital Bulletin 105:133-162. RAMON Y CAJAL, S. 1923 Studien iiber die Sehrinde der Katze. Journal fur Psychologic und Neurologic 29: 161-181. SCHEIBEL, M. et al. 1955 Convergence and Interaction of Afferent Impulses on Single Units of Reticular Formation. Journal of Neurophysiology 18:309-331. STARZL, T. E.; TAYLOR, C. W.; and MAGOUN, H. W. 1951 Collateral Afferent Excitation of Reticular Formation of Brain Stem. Journal of Neurophysiology 14:479496. TUNTURI, ARCHIE R. 1950 Physiological Determination of the Arrangement of the Afferent Connections to the Middle Ectosylvian Auditory Area in the Dog. American Journal of Physiology 162:489-502.
WOOLSEY, CLINTON N. 1952 Patterns of Localization in Sensory and Motor Areas of the Cerebral Cortex. Pages 193-206 in Milbank Memorial Fund, The Biology of Mental Health and Disease. New York: Hoeber. -» A discussion of Woolsey's article appears on pages 206-225.
SENSORY AND MOTOR DEVELOPMENT Sensory and motor functions are basic to all behavior. In its simplest form, the stimulusresponse unit of behavior is composed of a receptor (sense organ), neural impulses traveling over afferent, central, and efferent pathways, and some resultant form of motor (muscular) response. The sense organs respond selectively to various stimuli (visual, auditory, olfactory, thermal, tactual, proprioceptive, chemical, and gravitational), and the resulting responses most often involve some form of muscular reaction appropriate to the nature of the stimuli received. Developmentally, the earliest forms of behavior are simple sensorimotor reflexes. With growth, maturation, and differentiation, the senses become more acute, and the muscles become stronger and function more smoothly. At the same time, the central nervous system matures, with its increasingly meaningful accompanying sensory perceptions, and the motor responses become better organized, while many of the reflexes give way to behaviors under voluntary control. During the period of earliest development, when the changes are most rapid, there is a close coordination between structure and function. Gradually the functions become relatively independent of the structures. As the rate of growth slows, the structures differentiate, and the functional processes become increasingly complex; that is, once the basic structures are formed, there is little or no correlation between their normal variations in structural complexity or maturity and the increasing complexity and diversification of motor coordinations, perceptions, and other mental processes. Neural and cortical development. Conel's studies of the postnatal development of the human cerebral cortex (1939-1963) have been well summarized by Eichorn (1963) and by Eichorn and Jones (1958), who also point out that changes in the histologic structure coincide with developmental changes in neural function as expressed in the electroencephalogram. At birth and even at one month the cortex is very immature, with fragile cell processes, no Nissl bodies, and very few neurofibrils. The greatest cortical development occurs
SENSORY AND MOTOR DEVELOPMENT in the primary motor area of the upper trunk, leg, hand, and head, followed in order by primary somesthetic, visual, rhinencephalon (olfactory), and auditory areas, with other parts still very immature. By three months there are marked advances in the number of nerve fibers, both exogenous and associational, with greatest development in the motor area of the hand, frontal eye fields, and striate cortex (Gruner 1962). There is also over this period a rapid advance in myelinization of the neural fibers. This myelinization serves to channel the neural impulses along fibers and to reduce random spread of impulses across neurons. Again, at six months there is marked development, particularly in motor areas controlling the hand and upper trunk, leg, and head, while visual and somesthetic sensory growth is accelerated. Between 6 and 15 months the motor areas of the brain show less marked growth, with the order of maturity being hand, upper trunk, head, and leg. The primary visual area by now is second to the motor, with the visual association areas more developed than the somesthetic association areas. Parallel with these histological changes, Eichorn and Jones (1958) point out that at birth the electrical activity of the cortex is very slow and irregular, with the greatest regularity in the region of the most mature cortical structure. It is possible, however, to induce some rhythmic EEC patterns in the neonate and in the month-old infant, while between one and three months there is a shift of the EEC from random activity to some patterned slow activity in the visual and auditory sensory areas of the brain. Fetal development. We find, too, a definite parallel between early behavior and the neural histology and electrical functions in these early months. The very first actions of the fetus, according to Hooker (1943), are muscular: the rhythmic beating of the heart in the third week of gestation. This, however, is a preneural action of the heart muscle. A response (presumably neural) to stimulation was first observed at eight weeks and consisted of a lateral bending of the neck which moved the head away from a hair touching the area of the cheek. Carmichael (1946) has given an excellent account of this early fetal development. He points out the gradual involvement of the entire body and the appearance of reflexes until, by 26 weeks of gestation, the reflexes necessary to life are usually present. These reflexes include functioning of the respiratory, circulatory, and digestive systems as well as the sense organs that respond to light, sound, touch, body position, and so on.
183
Sensory development Because the infant's repertoire of responses is so limited, it is difficult to obtain exact information about sensory acuities. However, it is possible to observe and record such behaviors as visual regard, pupillary reflexes to light, startle, and changes in activity level to sounds and tactile stimulation. More recently, sensory reactivity has been recorded by observing changes in EEC and in heart rate and by such devices as observing eye nystagmus to moving striped patterns (Eichorn 1963; Fantz & Ordy 1959). It is evident that the intact full-term newborn in some degree sees, hears, and responds to pressure, touch, taste, and change in temperature. There is evidence from his behavior and from the structures of the nervous system that of his various senses, vision is most developed. Vision. Changes in visual acuity during the first month appear to be very slight. As observed in a standard test of infant development, soon after birth the infant will briefly regard a large moving object (such as a person) nearby and directly in his line of vision. A little less often he will regard a small bright red object in motion, when it is held about eight inches above his eyes (Bayley 1933; White, Castle, & Held 1964). At about two weeks his gaze may follow this moving object (a red plastic ring) across his visual field—right to left or the reverse (Bayley 1933). At three weeks his eyes may follow a moving person two or three feet away. At about one month he follows the red ring with up and down eye movements and, a little later, as it is moved slowly in a circle (18 to 24 inches in diameter). At six or seven weeks the infant appears to inspect his surroundings when carried in an upright position, and he turns his eyes toward the red ring at a thirty-degree angle when it is moved into his field of vision from the side. By the fourth month the infant's retina is able to accommodate to objects at varying distances in an almost adult fashion (Haynes, White, & Held 1965). In experimental situations several investigators have found very early evidences of differentiation of visual stimuli. Several studies have shown (Berlyne 1958; Fantz 1958) that infants three to four months of age indicate preference for (that is, spend more time looking at) patterned stimuli as contrasted with plain ones. Fantz and Ordy (1959) have shown that infants under five days of age will look more at black and white patterns than at plain-colored surfaces. Doris and Cooper (1964,
1 84
SENSORY AND MOTOR DEVELOPMENT
p. 456) have reported a clear correlation between age and brightness discrimination among 16 infants 4 to 69 days of age. They tested this by observing nystagmic eye movements to a moving field of black and white stripes. [See PERCEPTION, article On PERCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT; VISION, article On EYE MOVEMENTS.] These findings are in general agreement with the responses to visual stimulation observed in the infant mental scales. Continuing with the Bayley Scale (Bayley 1933), at around two months the baby blinks at the shadow of a hand passed quickly across his eyes, he visually recognizes his mother, and his eyes follow a moving pencil; at two and one-half months he searches with his eyes for a sound, and he regards a one-inch red cube on a table when he is held upright; at three and onehalf months his eyes follow small objects, such as the red ring, a teaspoon, and a ball, as they move across the table before which he is held in a sitting position. A typical four-month-old's occupation is to inspect his own hands; at four and one-half months he regards a pellet one-quarter inch in diameter; at five months he discriminates between strangers and familiar persons (largely visually, it would appear, from the expressive nature of his gaze). This evidence of visual discrimination of patterned objects shows advancement when at twelve months he looks with interest at colored pictures in a book. Many of his behaviors in the second year give evidence of his utilization of visual discriminations as he imitates motions, builds towers of cubes, adjusts round, square, and triangular blocks into their appropriate form-board holes, and goes on to more complex operations. Increasing visual acuity in the first few months of life for premature and full-term infants has been assessed by Brown (1961). Another source of information on visual development comes from the studies of ophthalmologists. Keeney (1951) has tabulated functional development of vision and binocularity for a series of ages from the third fetal month to nine years. Many of his items are identical with, or closely similar to, those already noted. We may add sensitivity to light at the seventh fetal month and a series of visual acuity fractions starting at one year, when visual acuity is about 6/60 with imperfect fusion. At two years it is at least 6/12. At two and one-half years more mature mechanisms of accommodation result in improved acuity. At three years vision is about 6/9, at three and onehalf years fusion capacity is improving, at four years vision is near 6/6. At five years ocular pursuit is inferior to fixation, and at five and one-half
years fusion is well established and accurate. By six to six and one-half years ocular pursuit is accurate, and the average child can discriminate letters and word symbols and begin to read. Thereafter up to the age of nine, ability to tolerate prism vergences develops and continues to increase. [See VISION.] Thus, we see that even though vision is present at birth and, relative to the other senses, advanced, acuity in one aspect or another continues to increase, at least up to nine years. The changes are more rapid at first and become slower with advancing age. The eye is the most highly developed and complex of the sense organs, and we find, accordingly, that the development of visual acuity is a function of several variables, including the simple ones, brightness and hue; patterned vision, which is related to degree of complexity of both qualitative and quantitative variables; and depth discrimination, both monocular and binocular, together with the development of accommodation and convergence. Much remains to be done in clarifying and identifying the developmental aspects of all of these. In the senses generally, and most acutely in vision, the pure sensory aspects of development are confounded with perception and the meaningful and adaptive responses to the stimuli which are presented for the study of sensory discrimination. Hearing. The developmental pattern of auditory acuity is in many ways similar to that of vision. The normal newborn infant responds, by reflex startling, to a sharp, loud clack or the ringing of a bell near his ear (Bayley 1933). Ten days after birth he reacts to the lesser sound of a rattle and at twenty days to the sound of a softly speaking voice. The localization of the source of a sound is incipient in the two-and-a-half-month-old who may be seen to search with his eyes for the bell or rattle when sounded outside his field of vision. By three months his eyes will turn from the bell to the rattle and back, when they are sounded alternately while held eight inches apart in his field of vision. The four-month-old will turn to the right and the left to see the bell which has been rung opposite first one ear and then the other. There is evidence of rapid cortical development in the auditory area of the cortex in the first four months. Normal acuity appears to be well developed by this age (Wever 1949). Further changes in hearing appear to be primarily perceptual. The six- to seven-month-old is interested in producing sound. He bangs his hand or a toy on the highchair and listens. He babbles and repetitiously tries
SENSORY AND MOTOR DEVELOPMENT out syllables. At eight to nine months he listens selectively to familiar words and begins to respond appropriately to simple commands. Auditory acuity varies according to the pitch of the sound (Wever 1949, p. 364). However, this variation in pitch sensitivity appears to be a function of individual differences rather than development in the infant and child. After thirty years there is some decrement in auditory acuities, and this is greater for increasingly higher pitches (Wever 1949; Sommers, Meyer, & Fcnton 1961). [See HEARING.] Tactual and pain sensitivity. There is evidence of increasing sensitivity to pain in the first four days of life (Lipsitt & Levy 1959) and probably for a somewhat longer period of infancy. Schludermann and Zubek (1962) found no changes in pain sensitivity from age 12 through 50, though decrements occurred after that age. The young infant clearly reacts to tactual stimulation. However, skin sensitivity also appears to increase with age. For example, Ghent (1961) studied tactual thresholds in the hands of children 5 to 11 years old and found that sensitivity increased over this age range. She also found a sex difference, with girls showing greater sensitivity and approaching the adult level of sensitivity at an earlier age. [See PAIN; SKIN SENSES AND KINESTHESIS.]
Motor development The development of motor coordinations, evidenced first in simple reflexes, appears to depend on the interactions of muscular response to stimulation, growth and increasing strength of the muscles, and the development of coordination through practice. All of these are interdependent. Practice strengthens the muscles and stimulates their growth. It also promotes learning, for example, through the simultaneous stimulation of visual and muscle senses in the eye-hand coordinations involved in reaching, grasping, and manipulating small objects. In newborn infants these coordinations are seen in such reflex responses as head lifting, various postural adjustments to body position, crawling, and reflex grasping. Soon, between one and two months, we observe playful bursts of activity in the form of arm and leg thrusts. As the muscles grow stronger, the infant is able to hold his head erect, to push his chest up by his arms, to turn from his back to his side at four months, and to sit, at first with support and by six months, alone (momentarily). By three months his hands are no longer tightly fisted, and he holds a small toy with a grasp which is no longer entirely reflex.
185
The six-month-old will reach for a toy with one hand. (Earlier he tends to "close in on" an object, using both hands simultaneously.) He shows early manual coordination in rotating his wrist, in partially using his thumb in opposition to his fingers, in grasping, and in trying to pick up pea-sized pellets. The eight-month-old sits alone steadily, may be starting to crawl or creep, and picks up small objects with complete thumb opposition. By nine months he can get himself into a sitting position and pull to a standing one by his crib rail. The ten-month-old creeps with agility and can often walk with help, sit down, and bring his hands together for games like pat-a-cake. The one-year-old can take a few steps alone. In the next six months he will be able to throw a ball, walk backwards, and walk up and down stairs with help. The two-year-old walks up and down the stairs without holding on, and by three years he jumps from small heights, runs, walks on tiptoe. The four-year-old can walk a line and can hop a few steps on one foot. Individual variability. There are of course, large individual differences in the age at which children become able to do these things, as well as differences in the skill and smoothness of motor coordinations. Motor skills after early infancy are very largely determined by practice. Furthermore, there is great specificity in skills. Evidently each motor function must be practiced in order for it to be performed with skill. Ability to catch a ball cannot be used to predict ability at the high jump or the broad jump. Bayley (195la), for example, found that for ages 4-2,- to 12 years, scores on a battery of ten tests of manual dexterity were unrelated to strength and showed correlations of about .40 with scores on jumping (sum of three tests) and of .28 with scores on balance (sum of five tests). Scores on jumping, balance, and strength tended to correlate with each other at around .30 for most ages. Similarly, Espenschade (1940) found for children of 13 to 17 years no relation between gross and fine motor skills, though similar gross motor activities were moderately related. For example, scores on the dash usually correlated near .60 with those for the broad jump, near .40 with the jump-andreach, and near .40 with the distance throw. Consistency over time. Correlations showing the degree to which scores are consistent over time, on total motor tests, are only moderate in young children. For example, in the Berkeley growth study Bayley (1935) found that correlations of scores at 27 and 30 months with scores at six younger age levels in the first two years are, with two exceptions, below .40. At later ages, between
186
SENSORY AND MOTOR DEVELOPMENT
4 and 12 years, these Berkeley children's scores on the manual dexterity tests again show only moderate consistency over time. Scores on the 1-| year test showed correlations of .29 with scores at 4| years, .50 at 5-| years, .49 at 6|, .55 at 7J, and .49 at 8| years. Espenschade (1940) gave a series of motor tests to 160 children tested at six-month intervals between the ages of 13 and 17 years. She found a fair degree of consistency over a fouryear period for most individual children. Glassow and Kruse (1960) found similar stability in relative scores for girls aged 6 to 14 years, with the running and jumping scores more stable than scores for throwing. Inconsistency in these cases may be attributed to the fact that scores in adolescents tend to be related to the degree of physical maturity and strength. As measured by scores on standard tests of motor abilities, motor skills are seen to increase continuously through infancy and childhood. The increases are greatest in the first 18 months, after which the rate appears to decelerate gradually (Bayley 1951a). Sex differences. There is no sex difference in motor-test scores during the first 12 years (Bayley 1939). However, after this age the girls' scores tend to stabilize while the boys' scores continue to increase (Espenschade 1947). This continued increase in boys' scores is correlated with their continuing growth in strength (Govatos 1959). Furthermore, both strength and scores in gross motor abilities are correlated in boys with their degree of physical maturation (Jones 1944; Clarke & Harrison 1962). Those who are accelerated in puberal development are stronger and more skilled in gross motor coordinations than their more slowly maturing age peers. It is also true that the more muscular boys, with strongly masculine physiques, are stronger than those with less masculine builds (Bayley 1951£>). [See INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES, article on SEX DIFFERENCES.] Specificity. In general, after the first 15 months of age, motor skills evidence much specificity (Bayley 1951£>; Espenschade 1947; Letter 1961). It is evident "also that motor skills are very responsive to practice and training (Clarke & Henry 1961; Clarke & Petersen 1961). This appears to be evident even in the very young (Holt 1960). Within normal limits and the limits of muscular strength, it should be possible to increase specific motor skills considerably through practice. NANCY BAYLEY [See also DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY; INFANCY; SENSES. Related material on child development may
be found in INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT; LANGUAGE, article on LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT; MORAL DEVELOPMENT; PERSONALITY, ALITY DEVELOPMENT.]
article OU
PERSON-
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BAYLEY, NANCY 1933 Mental Growth During the First Three Years: A Developmental Study of Sixty-one Children by Repeated Tests. Genetic Psychology Monographs 14, no. 1. BAYLEY, NANCY 1935 The Development of Motor Abilities During the First Three Years. Washington: Society for Research in Child Development. BAYLEY, NANCY 1939 Mental and Motor Development From Two to Twelve Years. Review of Educational Research 9:18-37, 114-125. BAYLEY, NANCY 195la Development and Maturation. Pages 145-199 in Harry Kelson (editor), Theoretical Foundations of Psychology. Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand. BAYLEY, NANCY 1951& Some Psychological Correlates of Somatic Androgyny. Child Development 22:47-60. BAYLEY, NANCY; and ESPENSCHADE, ANNA 1944 Motor Development From Birth to Maturity. Review of Educational Research 14:381-389. BAYLEY, NANCY; and ESPENSCHADE, ANNA 1950 Motor Development and Decline. Review of Educational Research 20:367-37'4. BERLYNE, D. E. 1958 The Influence of the Albedo and Complexity of Stimuli on Visual Fixation in the Infant. British Journal of Psychology 49:315-318. BROWN, C. A. 1961 The Development of Visual Capacity in the Infant and Young Child. Cerebral Palsy Bulletin 3:364-372. CARMICHAEL, LEONARD (editor) (1946) 1954 Manual of Child Psychology. 2d ed. New York: Wiley. -> See especially pages 60-185, "The Onset and Early Development of Behavior." CLARKE, DAVID H.; and HENRY, FRANKLIN M. 1961 Neuro-motor Specificity and Increased Speed From Strength Development. American Association for Health, Physical Education, and Recreation, Research Quarterly 32:315-325. CLARKE, H. HARRISON; and HARRISON, JAMES C. E. 1962 Differences in Physical and Motor Traits Between Boys of Advanced, Normal and Retarded Maturity. American Association for Health, Physical Education, and Recreation, Research Quarterly 33:13-25. CLARKE, H. HARRISON; and PETERSEN, KAY H. 1961 Contrast of Maturational, Structural, and Strength Characteristics of Athletes and Nonathletes 10 to 15 Years of Age. American Association for Health, Physical Education, and Recreation, Research Quarterly 32:163-176. CONEL, JESSE L. 1939-1963 The Postnatal Development of the Human Cerebral Cortex. 7 vols. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. DORIS, JOHN; and COOPER, LOWELL 1964 Brightness Discrimination in Infancy. American Psychologist 19: 456 only. EICHORN, DOROTHY H. 1963 Biological Correlates of Behavior. Volume 62, pages 4-61 in National Society for the Study of Education, Yearbook. Part 1: Child Psychology. Univ. of Chicago Press. EICHORN, DOROTHY H.; and JONES, HAROLD E. 1958 Maturation and Behavior. Pages 211-248 in Georgene H. Seward and John P. Seward (editors), Current
SEQUENTIAL ANALYSIS Psychological Issues: Essays in Honor of Robert S. Woodworth. New York: Holt. ESPENSCHADE, ANNA 1940 Motor Performance in Adolescence. Society for Research in Child Development, Monographs 5, no. 1. ESPENSCHADE, ANNA 1947 Motor Development. Review of Educational Research 17:354-361. FANTZ, ROBERT L. 1958 Pattern Vision in Young Infants. Psychological Record 8:43-47. FANTZ, ROBERT L.; and ORDY, J. M. 1959 A Visual Acuity Test for Infants Under Six Months of Age. Psychological Record 9:159-164. GHENT, LILA 1961 Developmental Changes in Tactual Thresholds on Dominant and Non-dominant Sides. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology 54:670-673. GLASSOW, RUTH B.; and KRUSE, PAULINE 1960 Motor Performance of Girls Age 6 to 14 Years. American Association for Health, Physical Education, and Recreation, Research Quarterly 31:426-433. GOVATOS, Louis A. 1959 Relationships and Age Differences in Growth Measures and Motor Skills. Child Development 30:333-340. GRUNER, JEAN E. 1962 Histological Study of the Maturation of the Nervous System. Developmental Medicine and Child 'Neurology 4:626-639. HAYNES, HAROLD; WHITE, BURTON L.; and HELD, RICHARD 1965 Visual Accommodation in Human Infants. Science 148:528-530. HOLT, K. S. 1960 Early Motor Development: Posturally Induced Variations. Journal of Pediatrics 57:571-575. HOOKER, DAVENPORT 1943 Reflex Activities in the Human Fetus. Pages 17-28 in Roger Barker, Jacob S. Kounin, and Herbert F. Wright (editors), Child Behavior and Development: A Course of Representative Studies. New York: McGraw-Hill. JONES, HAROLD E. 1944 The Development of Physical Abilities. Volume 43, pages 100-122 in National Society for the Study of Education, Yearbook. Part 1: Adolescence. Univ. of Chicago Press. KEENEY, ARTHUR H. 1951 Chronology of Ophthalmic Development: An Outline Summary of the Anatomical and Functional Development of the Visual Mechanism Before and After Birth. Springfield, 111.: Thomas. LIPSITT, LEWIS P.; and LEVY, NISSIM 1959 Electrotactual Threshold in the Neonate. Child Development 30:547-554. LOTTER, WILLARD S. 1961 Specificity or Generality of Speed of Systematically Related Movements. American Association for Health, Physical Education, and Recreation, Research Quarterly 32:55-62. SCHLUDERMANN, E.; and ZUBEK, JOHN P. 1962 Effect of Age on Pain Sensitivity. Perceptual and Motor Skills 14:295-301. SOMMERS, RONALD K.; MEYER, WILLIAM J.; and FENTON, ANN K. 1961 Pitch Discrimination and Articulation. Journal of Speech and Hearing Research 4:5660. WEVER, ERNEST G. 1949 Theory of Hearing. New York: Wiley. WHITE, BURTON L.; CASTLE, PETER; and HELD, RICHARD 1964 Observations on the Development of Visuallydirected Reaching. Child Development 35:349-364.
SENSORY DEPRIVATION See PERCEPTION, article on PERCEPTUAL DEPRIVATION.
187
SENTIMENTS See ATTITUDES; VALUES. SEPARATION See FAMILY, article on DISORGANIZATION AND DISSOLUTION. SEPARATION OF POWERS See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, article on DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS; FEDERALISM; PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT.
SEQUENTIAL ANALYSIS Sequential analysis is the branch of statistics concerned with investigations in which the decision whether or not to stop at any stage depends on the observations previously made. The motivation for most sequential investigations is that when the ends achieved are measured against the costs incurred (including the cost of making observations), sequential designs are typically more efficient than nonsequential designs; some disadvantages of the sequential approach are discussed later. The term "sequential" is occasionally extended to cover also investigations in which various aspects of the design may be changed according to the observations made. For example, preliminary experience in an experiment may suggest changes in the treatments being compared; in a social survey a small pilot survey may lead to modifications in the design of the main investigation. In this article attention will be restricted mainly to the usual situation in which termination of a single investigation is the point at issue. In a sequential investigation observations must be examined either one by one as they are collected or at certain stages during collection. A sequential procedure might be desirable for various reasons. The investigator might wish to have an up-to-date record at any stage, either for general information or because the appropriate sample size depends on quantities that he can estimate only from the data themselves. Alternatively, he may have no intrinsic interest in the intermediate results but may be able to achieve economy in sample size by taking them into account. Three examples will illustrate these points: (1) An investigator may wish to estimate to within 10 per cent the mean weekly expenditure on tobacco per household. In order to determine the sample size he would need an estimate of the variability of the expenditure from household to house-
188
SEQUENTIAL ANALYSIS
hold, and this might be obtainable only from the survey itself. (2) A physician wishing to compare the effects of two drugs in the treatment of some disease may wish to stop the investigation if at some stage a convincing difference can already be demonstrated using the available data. (3) A manufacturer carrying out inspection of batches of some product may be able to pass most of his batches with little inspection but may carry out further inspection of batches of doubtful quality. A given degree of discrimination between good and bad batches could be achieved in various ways, but a sequential scheme will often be more economical than one in which a sample of constant size is taken from each batch [see QUALITY CONTROL, STATISTICAL for further discussion of such applications]. The most appropriate design and method of analysis of a sequential investigation depend on the purpose of the investigation. The statistical formulation of that purpose may take one of a number of forms, usually either estimation of some quantity to a given degree of precision or testing a hypothesis with given size and given power against a given alternative hypothesis. Economy in number of observations is typically important for sequential design. Some details of particular methods are given in later sections. Sometimes a sequential investigation, although desirable, may not be practicable. To make effective sequential use of observations they must become available without too great a delay. It would not be possible, for example, to do a sequential analysis of the effect of some social or medical policy if this effect could not be assessed until five years had elapsed. In other situations it may be possible to scrutinize the results as they are obtained, but only at very great cost. An example might be a social survey in which data could be collected rather quickly but in which a full analysis would be long and costly. History. An important precursor of the modern theory of sequential analysis was the work done in 1929 by Dodge and Romig (1929-1941) on double sampling schemes. Their problem was to specify sampling inspection schemes that discriminated between batches of good and bad quality. The first stage of sampling would always be used, but the second stage would be used only if the results of the first were equivocal; furthermore, the size of the second sample and the acceptance criteria might depend on the first stage results. Bartky (1943) generalized this idea in his "multiple sampling," which allowed many stages, and his procedure
was very closely related to a particular case of the general theory of sequential analysis that Wald was developing simultaneously. This theory, developed for the testing of military equipment during World War n, is summarized in Wald's book Sequential Analysis (1947). It represents a powerful exploitation of a single concept, the "sequential probability ratio test," which has provided the basis of most subsequent work. Related work proceeding simultaneously in Great Britain is summarized by Barnard (1946). Whereas Wald's theory provided the specification of a sampling scheme satisfying given requirements, Barnard's work was devoted to the converse problem of examining the properties of a given sequential scheme. Barnard drew attention to the close analogy between sequential inspection schemes and games of chance. Indeed, some of the solutions to gaming problems provided by seventeenth-century and eighteenth-century mathematicians are directly applicable to modern sequential schemes. Postwar theoretical development, stimulated primarily by Wald's work, has perhaps outrun practical applications. Many recent workers have apparently felt that the standard sequential theory does not provide answers to the right questions, and a number of new lines of approach have been attempted. Sequential estimation. Suppose that in a large population a proportion, p, of individuals show some characteristic (or are "marked") and that in a random sample of size n the number of marked individuals is X. Then the proportion of marked individuals is X/n. By standard binomial distribution theory, the standard error of X/n is \/p(l — p)/n. The standard error expressed as a proportion of the true value is therefore \/(l — p)/np, and when p is small this will be approximately (np)~*. Now np is the mean value of X = n(X/n}. Intuitively, therefore, one could achieve an approximately constant proportional standard error by choosing a fixed value of X. That is, sampling would be continued until a predetermined number of marked individuals had been found. This is called a "stopping rule." The sample size, n, would be a random variable. If p happened to be very small, n would tend to be very large; an increase in p would tend to cause a decrease in n. This procedure is called "inverse sampling," and its properties were first examined by Haldane (1945). At first sight it seems natural to estimate p by X/n. This estimator is slightly biased under inverse sampling, and some statisticians would use the modified estimator (X — l ) / ( n — 1), which is unbiased. Others feel that X/n is preferable despite
SEQUENTIAL ANALYSIS the bias. In most practical work the difference is negligible. Inverse sampling is one of the simplest methods of sequential estimation. One could define different stopping rules and for any particular stopping rule examine the way in which the precision of X/n varied with p; conversely, one could specify this relationship and ask what stopping rule would satisfy the requirement. If a random variable is normally distributed with mean ^ and variance cr2, a natural requirement might be to estimate /JL with a confidence interval of not greater than a given length at a certain probability level. With samples of fixed size, the length of the confidence interval depends on cr, which is typically unknown. The usual Student t procedure provides intervals of random and unbounded length. Stein (1945) describes a two-sample procedure (with preassigned confidence-interval length) in which the first sample provides an estimate of cr. This estimate then determines the size of the second sample; occasionally a second sample is not needed. This scheme leads naturally to a general approach to sequential estimation. Suppose that, as in inverse sampling, one proceeds in a fully sequential manner, taking one observation at a time, and stops when the desired level of precision is reached. This precision may be determined by customary standard error formulas. Anscombe (1953) showed that in large samples this procedure will indeed yield estimates of the required level of precision. Thus, suppose an investigator wished to estimate the mean number of persons per household in a certain area, with a standard error of 0.1 person, and he had little initial evidence about the variance of household size. He could sample the households until the standard error of the mean, given by the usual formula s/^/n, fell as low as 0.1. A practical difficulty might be that of ensuring that the sampling was random. Sequential hypothesis testing. Suppose that one wishes to test a specific hypothesis, H n , in such a way that if H0 is indeed true it will usually be accepted and that if an alternative hypothesis, H l5 is true H0 will usually be rejected. In the most elementary case HO and HT are simple hypotheses; that is, each specifies completely the probability distribution of the generic random variable, X. Suppose fo(x') and fi(x) are the probabilities (or probability densities) that X takes the value x when H0 and H! are true, respectively. Sequential probability ratio test (SPRT). Wald proposed the following method of sequential hypothesis testing. Independent observations, Xj, are taken sequentially and result in values, xi:. Define
189
two positive constants, A n and A t . At the nth stage, calculate I In
/ 1 \ ^1 / '
fon ~ f o ( * l )
I I ( >%n )
' ' ' fo(*n) '
If fi,,/f,m ^ A 0 , accept H O ; if f 1 n /f n n ^ A l 9 reject H 0 . If A,, < f 1? ,/fon < A-t, take the next observation and repeat the procedure. Wald called this procedure the "sequential probability ratio test" (SPRT). The ratio f,,,/f I I B ) normally called the "likelihood ratio," plays an important part in the Neyman—Pearson theory of hypothesis testing, a fact that probably largely explains Wald's motivation. The likelihood ratio also occurs naturally in Bayesian inference [see BAYESIAN INFERENCE]. Let a be the probability of rejecting H0 when it is true, and let ft be the probability of accepting H0 when H t is true. It can be shown that A 0 ^ /?/(! — a) and Ax ^ (1 - ft} f a and that the SPRT with A0 = ft/(I - a) and A, - (1 - ft}/a will usually have error probabilities a' and ft' rather close to a and ft. (The inequalities arise because sampling usually stops when the bounds A0 and A x are slightly exceeded rather than equaled.) The number of observations, n, required before a decision is reached is a random variable. Wald gave approximate formulas for E 0 (n) and Ei(n), the mean number of observations when H0 or Hl is true. Wald conjectured, and Wald and Wolfowitz (1948) proved, that no other test (sequential or not) having error probabilities equal to a' and ft' can have lower values for either E 0 (n) or Ei(n) than those of the SPRT. As an example, suppose that H0 specifies that the proportion, p, of "marked" individuals in a large population is p0 and that H1 states that p is p^ where p, > p0. At the nth stage, if x marked individuals have been found, the likelihood ratio is
Sampling will continue as long as I
<
using the appropriate formulas for the bounds. Taking logarithms, this inequality is
Po
190
SEQUENTIAL ANALYSIS
or a0 + bn < x < ax + bn, where a () , a t , and £> are functions of p0, p^, a, and (3. The SPRT can thus be performed as a simple graphical procedure, with coordinate axes for x and n and two parallel boundary lines, x = a0 + bn and x = «! + bn (see Figure 1). The successive
Figure 1 — Sequential probability ratio test for binomial sampling
values of X are plotted to form a "sample path," and sampling stops when the sample path crosses either of the boundaries. Graphic solutions with parallel lines are also obtained for the test of the mean of a normal distribution with known variance and for the parameter of a Poisson distribution. The SPRT is clearly a powerful and satisfying procedure in situations where one of two simple
hypotheses is true and where the mean number of observations is an appropriate measure of the sampling effort. Unfortunately, some or all of these conditions may not hold. A continuous range of hypotheses must usually be considered; the hypotheses may not be simple; and the variability of the number of observations, as well as its mean, may be important. Suppose that there is a single parameter, 6, describing the distribution of interest, and further suppose that H0 and H± specify two particular values of 9: 0,, and 6,. For every value of 0, including 00 and 0!, quantities of interest are the probability, L(0), of accepting H0 (called the "operating characteristic" or O.C.) and the average number of observations, E0(n) (called the "average sample number," ASN, rather than the "average sample size," for obvious reasons). Approximate formulas for both these quantities are found in Wald's book (1947). The O.C. is an approximately smooth function between 0 and 1, taking the values L(0 0 ) = 1 - a, L(00 = (B (see Figure 2). The ASN, that is, E«(n), normally has a maximum for a value of 0 between 00 and 6l (see Figure 3). In the binomial problem discussed above, for example, the maximum ASN occurs close to the value p = b, for which, on the average, the sample path tends to move parallel to the boundaries. It is remarkable, though, that in many situations of practical interest this maximum value of the ASN is less than the size of the nonsequential procedure that tests H0 ASN
A
Figure 2 — Typical form of operating characteristic (O.C.)
Figure 3 — Typical form of average sample number curve
SEQUENTIAL ANALYSIS and H! with the same error probabilities as the SPRT. Closed procedures. It can be shown in most cases that an SPRT, although defined for indefinitely large n, must stop some time. Individual sample numbers may, however, be very large and the great variability in sample number from one sample to another may be a serious drawback. Wald suggested that the schemes should be "truncated" by taking the most appropriate decision if a boundary had not been reached after some arbitrary large number of readings. The properties of the SPRT are, however, affected unless the truncation sample size is very high, and a number of authors (Bross 1952; Armitage 1957; Anderson I960; Schneiderman & Armitage 1962) have recently examined closed procedures (that is, procedures with an upper bound to the number of observations) of a radically different type. In general, it seems possible to find closed procedures which are only slightly less efficient than the corresponding SPRT at H0 and H x but which are more efficient in intermediate situations. (For an account of the use of closed procedures in trials of medical treatments, see Armitage 1960.) Frequently the hypotheses to be tested will be composite rather than simple, in that the probability distribution of the observations is not completely specified. For example, in testing the mean of a normal distribution the variance may remain unspecified. Wald's approach to this problem was not altogether satisfactory and recent work (for example, following Cox 1952) has tended to develop analogues of the SPRT using sufficient statistics where possible [see SUFFICIENCY]. A sequential t-test of this type was tabulated by Arnold (see U.S. National Bureau of Standards 1951). The usual approximations to the O.C. and ASN do not apply directly in these situations. Cox (1963) has described a large-sample approach based on maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters. Two-sided tests of hypotheses. In many statistical problems two-sided tests of hypotheses are more appropriate than one-sided tests. In an experiment to compare two treatments, for example, it is customary to specify a null hypothesis that no effective difference exists and to be prepared to reject the hypothesis if differences in either direction are demonstrable. One approach to two-sided sequential tests (used, for example, in the standard sequential t-test) is to allow an alternative composite hypothesis to embrace simple hypotheses on both sides of the null hypothesis. It may be more appropriate to recognize here a three-decision problem, the decisions being to accept the null hypoth-
1 91
esis (that is, to assert no demonstrable difference), to reject it in favor of an alternative in one direction, or to reject it in the other direction. A useful device then is to run simultaneously two separate two-decision procedures, one to test H0 against H! and the other to test H0 against H[ where H: and H( are alternatives on different sides of H0 (see Sobel & Wald 1949). Other approaches. Wald's theory and the sort of developments described above are in the tradition of the Neyman-Pearson theory of hypothesis testing, with its emphasis on risks of accepting or rejecting certain hypotheses when these or other hypotheses are true. This approach is arbitrary in many respects; for example, in the SPRT there is no clear way of choosing values of a. and /3 or of specifying an alternative to a null hypothesis. Much theoretical work is now based on statistical decision theory [see DECISION THEORY; see also Wald 1950]. The aim here is to regard the end product of a statistical analysis as a decision of some sort, to measure the gains or losses that accrue, under various circumstances, when certain decisions are taken, to measure in the same units the cost of making observations, and to choose a rule of procedure that in some sense leads to the highest expectation of gain. Prior probabilities may or may not be attached to various hypotheses. With certain assumptions, the SPRT emerges as an optimal solution for the comparison of two simple hypotheses, but there is no reason to accept it as a general method of sequential analysis. Chernoff (1959) has developed a large-sample theory of the sequential design of experiments for testing composite hypotheses. The aim is to minimize cost in the limiting situation in which costs of wrong decisions far outweigh costs of experimentation. Account is taken of the choice between different types of observation (for example, the use of either of two treatments). A somewhat different approach (for instance, Wetherill 1961) is to stop an investigation as soon as the expected gain achieved by taking a further observation is outweighed by the cost of the observation. The formulation of the problem requires the specification of prior probabilities and its solution involves dynamic programming [see PROGRAMMING]. The recent interest shown in statistical inference by likelihood, with or without prior probabilities, has revealed a conflict between this approach and the more traditional methodology of statistics, involving significance tests and confidence intervals [see LIKELIHOOD]. In the likelihood approach, inferences do not depend on stopping rules. There is, on this view, no need to have a separate theory of estima-
192
SERIAL CORRELATION
tion for inverse sequential sampling or to require that investigations should follow a clearly defined stopping rule before their results can be rigorously interpreted. The effect of all this work is at present hard to assess. The attraction of a global view is undeniable. On the other hand, the specification of prior distributions and losses may be prohibitively difficult in most scientific investigations. A number of workers have studied problems involving progressive changes in experimental conditions. Robbins and Monro (1951) give a method for successive approximation to the value of an independent variable, in a regression equation, corresponding to a specified mean value of the dependent variable. Similar methods for use in stimulusresponse experiments are reviewed by Wetherill (1963). In industrial statistics much attention has been given to the problem of estimating, by a sequence of experiments, the set of operating conditions giving optimal response. This work has been stimulated mainly by G. E. P. Box, whose evolutionary operation is a method by which continuous adjustments to operating conditions can be made [see EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN, article on RESPONSE SURFACES]. P. ARMITAGE [Directly related are the entries ESTIMATION; HYPOTHESIS TESTING; SCREENING AND SELECTION.] BIBLIOGRAPHY
Useful bibliographies and surveys of sequential analysis are given in Jackson I960; Johnson 1961; and Wetherill 1966. Wald 1947 remains an important source book; an elementary exposition of the SPRT, with examples, is contained in Columbia University, Statistical Research Group 1945. Armitage 1960 is concerned with medical applications. Federer 1963 discusses sequential procedures in screening and selection problems. ANDERSON, T. W. 1960 A Modification of the Sequential Probability Ratio Test to Reduce the Sample Size. Annals of Mathematical Statistics 31:165-197. ANSCOMBE, F. J. 1953 Sequential Estimation. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B 15:1-29. -> Contains eight pages of discussion. ARMITAGE, P. , 1957 Restricted Sequential Procedures. Biometrika 44:9-26. ARMITAGE, P. 1960 Sequential Medical Trials. Oxford: Blackwell; Springfield, 111.: Thomas. BARNARD, G. A. 1946 Sequential Tests in Industrial Statistics. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Supplement 8:1-26. -> Contains four pages of discussion. BARTKY, WALTER 1943 Multiple Sampling With Constant Probability. Annals of Mathematical Statistics 14:363-377. BROSS, I. 1952 Sequential Medical Plans. Biometrics 8:188-205. CHERNOFF, HERMAN 1959 Sequential Design of Experiments. Annals of Mathematical Statistics 30:755-770.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, STATISTICAL RESEARCH GROUP 1945 Sequential Analysis of Statistical Data: Applications. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. Cox, D. R. 1952 Sequential Tests for Composite Hypotheses. Cambridge Philosophical Society, Proceedings 48:290-299. Cox, D. R. 1963 Large Sample Sequential Tests for Composite Hypotheses. Sankhyd: The Indian Journal of Statistics 25:5-12. DODGE, HAROLD F.; and ROMIG, HARRY G. (1929-1941) 1959 Sampling Inspection Tables: Single and Double Sampling. 2d ed., rev. & enl. New York: Wiley; London: Chapman. -» This book is a republication of fundamental papers published by the authors in 1929 and in 1941 in the Bell System Technical Journal. FEDERER, WALTER T. 1963 Procedures and Designs Useful for Screening Material in Selection and Allocation, With a Bibliography. Biometrics 19:553-587. HALDANE, J. B. S. 1945 On a Method of Estimating Frequencies. Biometrika 33:222-225. JACKSON, J. EDWARD 1960 Bibliography on Sequential Analysis. Journal of the American Statistical Association 55:561-580. JOHNSON, N. L. 1961 Sequential Analysis: A Survey. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A 124: 372-411. ROBBINS, HERBERT; and MONRO, SUTTON 1951 A Stochastic Approximation Method. Annals of Mathematical Statistics 22:400-407. SCHNEIDERMAN, M. A.; and ARMITAGE, P. 1962 A Family of Closed Sequential Procedures. Biometrika 49: 41-56. SOBEL, MILTON; and WALD, ABRAHAM 1949 A Sequential Decision Procedure for Choosing One of Three Hypotheses Concerning the Unknown Mean of a Normal Distribution. Annals of Mathematical Statistics 20:502-522. STEIN, CHARLES M. 1945 A Two-sample Test for a Linear Hypothesis Whose Power is Independent of the Variance. Annals of Mathematical Statistics 16:243258. U.S. NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS 1951 Tables to Facilitate Sequential t-Tests. Edited by K. J. Arnold. National Bureau of Standards, Applied Mathematics Series, No. 7. Washington: U.S. Department of Commerce. WALD, ABRAHAM 1947 Sequential Analysis. New York: Wiley. WALD, ABRAHAM (1950)1964 Statistical Decision Functions. New York: Wiley. WALD, ABRAHAM; and WOLFOWITZ, J. (1948) 1955 Optimum Character of the Sequential Probability Ratio Test. Pages 521-534 in Abraham Wald, Selected Papers in Statistics and Probability. New York: McGrawHill. -» First published in Volume 19 of the Annals of Mathematical Statistics. WETHERILL, G. B. 1961 Bayesian Sequential Analysis. Biometrika 48:281-292. WETHERILL, G. B. 1963 Sequential Estimation of Quantal Response Curves. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B 25:1-48. -> Contains nine pages of discussion. WETHERILL, G. BARRIE 1966 Sequential Methods in Statistics. New York: Wiley.
SERIAL CORRELATION See TIME SERIES.
SERRA, ANTONIO SERRA, ANTONIO Antonio Serra was an Italian economist born around the middle of the sixteenth century in Cosenza, a city of Calabria then belonging to the Kingdom of Naples. Nothing is known about his life except that he spent some time in a Neapolitan prison, charged—according to different sources—either with forging money or with participating in a conspiracy, headed by his fellow citizen Tommaso Campanella, to overthrow the Spanish government; it was in prison that he wrote his Breve trattato delle cause che possono far abbondare li regni d'oro e d'argento, dove non sono miniere, con applicazione al regno di Napoli (1613; "A Brief Treatise on the Causes That Can Make Gold and Silver Plentiful in Kingdoms Where There Are No Mines, With Application to the Kingdom of Naples"). Serra may have written Breve trattato and dedicated it to the Spanish viceroy in the hope of regaining his freedom. In 1617, while still in prison, he obtained permission to submit to the court his ideas for economic reform; but his plan was not accepted and he was sent back to prison. Serra's work remained practically unknown until Ferdinando Galiani extolled it in one of the footnotes to the 1780 edition of his Delia moneta ([1750] 1915, pp. 344-345). Serra refuted the view expressed by Marc'Antonio de Santis, author of Discorso intorno alii effetti che fa il cambio in regno (1605; "Discourse on the Effects of the Rate of Exchange in the Kingdom"), that the scarcity of money in the Kingdom of Naples was attributable to the high rate of exchange. He used arguments which made him the first to elaborate the view that the rate of exchange is a consequence of the balance of international payments, which alone regulates the international flow of money (Tagliacozzo 1937, p. xxx; Schumpeter 1954, p. 354). Serra had a clear understanding of the balanceof-trade concept as an analytic tool in economic reasoning and was the first to use that tool fully and, on the whole, correctly. [See INTERNATIONAL
193
Serra's book went beyond the immediate implications of its title, explaining the outflow of gold and silver from the Kingdom of Naples and the balance of trade as consequences of the economic conditions of the country. Essentially, the treatise is about the factors on which depend the abundance not of money but of commodities—natural resources, quality of the people, the development of industry and trade, the efficiency of government—the implication being that if the economic process as a whole functions properly, the monetary element will take care of itself and not require any specific therapy. And this argument contains several contributions to the nascent stock of theoretical tools. (Schumpeter 1954, p. 195) Hence, Schumpeter credits Serra "with having been the first to compose a scientific treatise, though an unsystematic one, on Economic Principles and Policy" (ibid.). One of the theoretical tools contained in the Breve trattato (part 1, chapter 3) is the first clear formulation of the law of diminishing returns in agriculture and increasing returns in manufacturing industries [see Tagliacozzo 1937, p. xxxi; see also PRODUCTION]. Serra's realistic, active approach to economic policy—exemplified by his plea for the introduction of new industries in the Kingdom of Naples (see Breve trattato, part 3, chapter 8)—probably struck Galiani ([1750] 1915, pp. 344-345) as an anticipation of his own relativistic, undogmatic, pragmatic, liberal (as opposed to laissez-faire) approach. [See the biography of GALIANI; on Galiani's approach to economic policy, see Tagliacozzo 1937, pp. lii-lv.] This is what caused Friedrich List—the founder of the "infant-industry" argument and a forerunner of the historical school of economics—to say, in a chapter devoted almost entirely to Serra (1841, book 3, chapter 1 in 1856 edition), "Antonio Serra sees the nature of things as it actually exists and not through the spectacles of previous systems or of some one principle which he is determined to advocate and carry out." GIORGIO TAGLIACOZZO
MONETARY ECONOMICS, article On BALANCE OF
PAYMENTS.] In analyzing the component items of the balance of payments, he paid due attention to the invisible items; in this respect he anticipated and surpassed all other seventeenth-century writers, including the overrated Thomas Mun, whose England's Treasure by Forraign Trade was written about fifty years after the Breve trattato and may have been influenced by it (Mazzei 1924, p. 396; Schumpeter 1954, pp. 353-354; Tagliacozzo 1937, pp. xxx—xxxiii).
BIBLIOGRAPHY ARIAS, GINO 1923 II pensiero economico di Antonio Serra. Politica 16:129-146. BENINI, RODOLFO 1892 Sulle dottrine economiche di A. Serra: Appunti critici. Giornale degli economisti Second Series 5:222-248. FORNARI, TOMMASO 1880 Studi sopra Antonio Serra e Marc'Antonio De Santis. Milan: Hoepli. FORNARI, TOMMASO 1882 Delle teorie economiche nelle
provincie napoletane. Milan: Hoepli. GALIANI, FERDINANDO (1750)1915 Delia moneta. Edited by Fausto Nicolini. New ed. Bari: Laterza. -> Serra's
194
SET
work was first mentioned in a footnote to the 1780 edition. GOBBI, ULISSE 1884 La concorrenza ester a e gli antichi cconomisti italiani. Milan: Hoepli. GOBBI, ULISSE 1889 L'economia politico, negli scrittori italiani del sec. XVI-XVII: Studio. Milan: Hoepli. GRAZIANI, AUGUSTO (editor) 1913 Economisti del cinque e seicento. Bari: Laterza. LIST, FRIEDRICH (1841) 1928 The National System of Political Economy. London: Longmans. -» First published in German. MAZZEI, JACOPO 1924 Politica economica internazionale inglese prima di Adamo Smith. Milan: Vita e Pensiero. SANTIS, MARC'ANTONIO DE 1605 Discorso intorno alii effetti che fa il cambio in regno. Naples: Vitale. SCHUMPETER, JOSEPH A. (1954) 1960 History of Economic Analysis. Edited by E. B. Schumpeter. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. SERRA, ANTONIO (1613) 1913 Breve trattato delle cause che possono far abbondare li regni d'oro e d'argento, dove non sono miniere, con applicazione al regno di Napoli. Pages 141-235 in A. Graziani (editor), Economist del cinque e seicento. Bari: Laterza. -> Translated extracts appear on pages 145-167 in Arthur E. Monroe (editor), Early Economic Thought, published in 1924 by Harvard University Press. A full translation, with an introduction by Klaus-Peter Heiss, is projected for publication by the Princeton University Press. TAGLIACOZZO, GIORGIO (editor) 1937 Economisti napoletani dei sec. XVII e XVIII. Bologna: Cappelli. Vm DE MARCO, ANTONIO DE (1891) 1898 Le teorie economiche di Antonio Serra. In Antonio De Viti de Marco, Saggi di economia e finanza. Rome: Giornale degli Economisti.
SET See ATTENTION; RESPONSE SET. SETTLEMENT See CITY; COMMUNITY; NEIGHBORHOOD; VILLAGE. SEX DIFFERENCES See under INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES. SEXUAL BEHAVIOR i. ANIMAL SEXUAL BEHAVIOR n. SOCIAL ASPECTS in. SEXUAL DEVIATION: PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS iv. SEXUAL DEVIATION: SOCIAL ASPECTS v. HOMOSEXUALITY
Charles H. Phoenix Samuel Z. Klausner John Money John H. Gagnon Evelyn Hooker
ANIMAL SEXUAL BEHAVIOR
Animal sexual behavior is but one aspect of the total pattern of reproductive behavior. Sexual be-
havior includes all responses directly associated with genital stimulation and copulation, whether homosexual or heterosexual. Among warm-blooded vertebrates, heterosexual copulation culminates in the transfer of sperm from male to female, with subsequent fertilization of ova and reproduction of the species. Despite its significance for species survival, sexual behavior has received relatively little experimental attention. With few exceptions, sexual behavior in man has not been studied experimentally and is likely to remain generally inaccessible for study by experimentalists for some time to come (Ford & Beach 1951; Lloyd 1964). Careful experimental analysis of animal sexual behavior, especially that of primates, should provide a valuable background of information for understanding the data that exist concerning sexual behavior in man. Many of the forms of sexual behavior described by Kinsey and his associates (Kinsey et al. 1948; 1953) as part of the human sexual behavior repertoire have been observed in a number of other mammalian species. Beach (1949) has suggested that a study not only of the similarities but of the differences in sexual behavior between man and other mammalian species should help in our understanding of how social forces can modify a basic biological drive. In experimental research on sexual behavior, as in research on any other aspect of behavior, the experimentalist seeks to discover and analyze those variables of which behavior is a function. The initial step in the process is the identification of components of sexual behavior and a description of these in relation to the total pattern. It then becomes possible to measure quantitatively the latency, frequency, and duration of each component and thus to assess the effects of the independent variables on specific components of the total sexual behavior pattern. Since there have been many reviews of sexual behavior patterns of a number of insects, fishes, amphibians, reptiles, and birds, the present account is restricted to a discussion of sexual behavior in placental mammals. Detailed descriptions are available of the mating behavior of several laboratory mammals, including the rat, guinea pig, hamster, rabbit, cat, dog, monkey, and chimpanzee, and of farm animals such as the goat, sheep, cow, pig, and horse. Limited descriptions are also available of sexual behavior patterns in normally wild species not generally found in laboratories, such as the chinchilla, porcupine, skunk, mink, fox, and elephant. The accuracy and detail of the descrip-
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: Animal Sexual Behavior tions of the behavior in the last-mentioned species vary widely, however, and further study is needed. Components of sexual behavior Mounting. The most readily identified aspect of animal sexual behavior is the mounting response. It is an essential component of the male mating pattern but frequently occurs in females, especially during estrus. In a successful mating sequence the male mounts the female from the rear. The forelegs are placed on the back or around the sides of the female with the hind legs on the ground. The male may then execute a series of rapid pelvic thrusts. The posture and motion permit the male to insert the erect penis into the female's vagina. Not all mounting, however, is oriented to the rear of the female. The male may mount the side or head of the partner and may or may not execute pelvic thrusts. Mounting by females also shows similar variation. Females of a number of species display mounting behavior only during estrus; but in some species, such as the rat and dog, mounting by females is not restricted to any particular part of the estrous cycle. The mount executed by a female is frequently indistinguishable from that of the male. Thus, the typography of the behavior does not identify the sex of the animal. Mounting occurs between members of the same or opposite sex and across species in some instances. Intromission. Intromission is obviously restricted to the male. To achieve intromission, not only must the male be properly oriented, but the penis must be erect. The detection of intromission is difficult in most species and often requires special conditions of observation. In some species, such as the guinea pig, the rate of pelvic thrusting may be slower during intromission. In the rat, when intromission is not accompanied by ejaculation, the intromission response is usually followed by a vigorous backward lunge and a period during which the male may manipulate the penis with paws and mouth before mounting again. This gross bodily reaction is most frequently used as an index of intromission rather than visualization of penis insertion. Ejaculation. Ejaculation, as in the case of intromission, is not identified directly but is commonly inferred by changes in gross body movement. In the guinea pig, for example, at the moment of ejaculation the flanks of the male are drawn in as in a spasm. The male then dismounts, or the female pulls away, and both male and female clean the genitalia. Ejaculation by the male rat is also accompanied by a drawing in of the flanks. Follow-
195
ing ejaculation the male dismounts much more slowly than he does following intromission, and there ensues a period of relative inactivity. Judging whether or not ejaculation has occurred from observation of gross behavior is particularly difficult in some species, and the presence of sperm or an ejaculatory plug in the vagina is frequently used as confirmatory evidence. Lower components. Not only is mounting the most conspicuous aspect of sexual behavior but together with intromission and ejaculation shows for most species the least variation among the numerous components of the sexual behavior pattern. Wide variation exists from species to species in the so-called lower components of the mating pattern. In general, these lower components appear to produce excitement and readiness to mate in both sexes. The guinea pig displays a mating pattern typical of many species. The following sequence is characteristic: On encountering an estrous female, the male, walking with a characteristic gait, circles the female; he rubs against her flanks, nibbles at the ear, prods the female's mouth area with his nose, licks the genitalia, then approaching from the rear, rubs his nose and lower jaw over the female's back, a response that frequently elicits the lordosis response in the receptive female. These lower components may occur in any order and do not represent a stereotyped sequence of reflexes triggered by the presence of an estrous female. In some instances, especially in experienced individuals, the male may mount the female without any preliminary display and may achieve intromission and ejaculation without manifesting any of the lower components. Lordosis. The one outstanding component of female sexual behavior common to all mammalian species except man is the lordosis response. In the monkey the receptive posture is referred to as a "present." The receptive posture or lordosis consists of a particular stance, with the four legs fixed and a straightening and arching (in some cases) of the back with elevation of the pudendum. In some species the head is thrown backward and the tail is deviated or displaced so as to expose the genitalia. A number of minor species differences exist, but in all species the pattern facilitates both mounting and intromission by the male. The complete pattern of female sexual behavior may include a number of other components in addition to the lordosis response. These additional components vary widely among species. They may precede copulation and may be classed as courtship
196
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: Animal Sexual Behavior
behavior or "foreplay" or precede the onset of full estrous behavior as in the guinea pig and be referred to as proestrous behavior. In some species, such as the cat, estrus may be followed by distinct behavioral responses, termed afterreaction. Factors influencing sexual behavior Accurate description of sexual behavior in natural surroundings and under carefully controlled laboratory conditions, although an essential first step, constitutes but a starting point for the study of the major problems associated with sexual behavior. In experimental investigation, sexual behavior has been found to vary with the species, strain, sex, diet, temperature, illumination, season, age, method of rearing (including age of weaning), nature of housing (including social and isolated conditions), stage in the reproductive cycle, familiarity with the test area (territoriality) and test partner, duration and frequency of tests, dominance relationship, and the general health of the animal. With the exception of masturbation, sexual behavior is a social phenomenon; hence the behavior of each individual of a pair or group constitutes an added stimulus variable not readily controlled in the assessment of sexual behavior. It is frequently convenient to classify the determinants of sexual behavior into a few broad categories. Such categories are usually neither allinclusive nor mutually exclusive but suggest, in a general way, the class of variable emphasized by an investigator or represented in a given research effort. For purposes of presentation we may categorize the variables as genetic, hormonal, sensory and neural, and experiential. Genetic variables. Chromosomal sex is determined at the time of fertilization and depends upon the particular chromosomes contributed by the parents. Many problems of sex determination at the gene level of analysis remain to be solved, but these need not concern us here. Classification of the individual as male or female is usually based on the appearance of the external genitalia. Unfortunately sex classification based on this criterion does not always correspond to chromosomal or gonadal sex, nor does it necessarily correspond to the pattern of sexual behavior displayed by the animal. In addition to these possible inconsistencies, chromosomal sex itself may not be normal, as for example in the case of an individual whose chromosomal pattern is XO and who, accordingly, lacks one of the sex chromosomes. Nevertheless, species differences, strain differences, and sex differences may be changed by varying genetic background. Such knowledge contributes little to our under-
standing of how the genes bring about their effect; but regardless of the mechanisms involved, it is assumed that all organismic variables have a genetic basis (Beach 1947a). Breeding experiments. The genetic material contributed by the parents has been shown to determine the particular pattern of sexual behavior that will be displayed by the individual as an adult. Not only is it possible to breed for high or low levels of sexual behavior, but different modes of inheritance of the various components of sexual behavior have been demonstrated. For example, in a study of two inbred strains of guinea pigs, in which the male of the two strains differed in ejaculation latency and in mounting frequency, Jakway (1959) has shown that ejaculation latency of one strain was dominant and mounting frequency of the second strain was dominant when these were studied in F, and F., hybrid generations and in backcrosses. Differences have also been demonstrated in modes of inheritance of components of female sexual behavior in the guinea pig (Goy & Jakway 1959). It is obvious that sexual behavior need not be inherited as a unitary trait. Although most work on the inheritance of patterns of sexual behavior has been carried out on insects, an increasing amount of work is being done on mammals (Dilger 1962; Goy & Jakway 1962). Hormone variables. Sexual behavior among females of lower mammalian species is characterized by its cyclicity. The display of sexual behavior is referred to as estrus or heat. The period coincides with the presence of mature ovarian follicles and, generally, with changes in the vaginal epithelium. The term estrus is sometimes used to refer to the physiological state of the ovary or condition of the cells in the vagina. The multiple meaning attached to the term is testimony to the close relationship between the physiological state and the behavioral state. Ovulation usually, although not always, accompanies estrus; and thus mating is most likely to occur at a time when fertilization is possible. Among primates, such as the monkey, chimpanzee, and man, the display of sexual behavior is not confined to the period of ovulation but may occur at any point in the cycle (Eayrs & Glass 1962; Young 1941). The decreasing dependency on ovarian hormones has been taken as evidence that animals higher on the phylogenetic scale have through evolution become emancipated from gonadal hormone control of sexual behavior (Beach 1947&). Females and males of some species, such as the marten and deer, are seasonal breeders. Sexual activity among seasonal breeding males is likely to be confined to periods when the females of the
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: Animal Sexual Behavior species are in estrus. Among nonseasonal breeding species, males do not show the cyclic display of sexual behavior characteristic of the females. Correspondingly the level of gonadal hormone in the male does not vary in any cyclic fashion. Gonadectomy and replacement therapy. Perhaps the most compelling evidence of the importance of the gonadal hormones in the display of sexual behavior comes from studies of gonadectomy and replacement therapy. Spaying adult females of subprimate species, with the possible exception of the rabbit, results in the complete and immediate loss of mating behavior. But the injection of estrogen or estrogen and progesterone brings the female into estrus. With appropriate timing and dosage of injected hormone, estrus thus induced may be indistinguishable from that displayed prior to spaying. In primates below man, the effects of spaying are not as conspicuous as in lower mammals, and although the effectiveness of replacement therapy has not been as carefully studied, reports suggest that the dramatic change in behavior observed in lower mammals is not seen in primates. The effects of ovariectomy on human sexual behavior are not fully known, but some sexual behavior is known to persist following the operation. In general, the less conspicuous are the changes in behavior at estrus, the less effective ovariectomy appears to be in eliminating receptivity. Castration of the adult male does not result in complete and immediate loss of sexual behavior as does spaying in the female. The first component of the mating pattern to be lost following castration is the ejaculatory response, and later intromission drops out of the repertoire. There is considerable species variation, but in many species the male may continue to mount and show pelvic thrusts months or years after castration. The decrement in performance is generally greater in rodents and lagomorphs than in carnivores (Beach 1958). Information on the effects of castration in primates is scanty. Present evidence suggests that the prepuberally castrated monkey and ape retain the capacity for erection, and they display the normal mounting pattern (Goy 1964). Little is known of effects of castration on human sexual behavior. Just as there is a gradual diminution of sexual behavior following castration, restoration of the complete pattern of sexual behavior by androgen administration is a gradual process. An increased frequency of mounting is followed by the occurrence of intromission and finally the ejaculatory response is restored. Such, at least, is the case in the lower mammals that have been studied. No
197
quantitative studies exist on the effectiveness of androgen replacement therapy in subhuman primates, and the evidence for man is contradictory. There is no question of the importance of sex hormones for the full expression of sexual behavior in adults of lower mammalian species; however, sex hormone specificity remains somewhat ambiguous. In either sex the heterotypic hormone is not as effective as the homotypic hormone in promoting the display of appropriate sexual behavior. In general, the character of the behavior induced by hormone injection, whether masculine or feminine, is not a property of the hormone itself but depends upon the organization of the sexual behavior mechanisms within the individual. The role of gonadal hormones in differentiation of biological sex has been studied intensively by embryologists over many years (Burns 1961), but the role of these hormones in differentiation of sexual behavior has, until recently, received little attention. It has now been demonstrated that in both the genetic female guinea pig and the rat, testosterone administration during the period of differentiation of the tissues that are to mediate sexual behavior, or what we have called sexual behavior mechanisms, results in permanent suppression of female behavior and in an increase in display of male behavior. In the guinea pig, this period of differentiation is completed prenatally, whereas in the rat the period extends into the early postnatal period. The behavior of genetic female adult rhesus monkeys treated prenatally with testosterone has not been studied, but observation of behavior during the first year of life showed a masculinization of patterns of play behavior and indications of an increase in the frequency of display of male sexual behavior (Phoenix et al. 1959; Young et al. 1964). Further evidence indicating the significance of testosterone in differentiation of tissues mediating the pattern of sexual behavior is provided by the response of rats castrated the day of birth and injected as adults with estrogen and progesterone. These males displayed the complete female estrous response with a lordosis frequency comparable to that of females. Such was not the case when rats were castrated at ten days of age or later. In adulthood the role of testosterone is to activate pre-established patterns of sexual behavior. During the prenatal or early postnatal period the role of testosterone is organizational, in the sense that it differentiates in both genetic males and females a prepotency for the male pattern of sexual behavior (Young et al. 1964). The gonadal hormones are major determinants
198
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: Animal Sexual Behavior
of sexual behavior both as activators and organizers of patterns of sexual behavior. The nongonadal hormones play a less direct role in control of sexual behavior. The pituitary, for example, derives its significance for behavior primarily because it controls gonadal action. Sexual behavior can be induced in hypophysectomized animals by injection of gonadal hormones, but in otherwise intact animals pituitary dysfunction is associated with abnormal reproductive function and sexual behavior. Thyroid activity. Broad species and individual differences exist with respect to the importance of thyroid activity. The thyroid is not crucial to normal sexual behavior in the male guinea pig or rat. The thyroidectomized female rat may mate successfully, but the spayed, thyroidectomized guinea pig exhibits reduced responsiveness to injected estradiol. In the bull, thyroidectomy abolishes all sexual behavior. Present evidence emphasizes species differences, and when thyroid deficiency appears to interfere with normal sexual behavior it most likely does so by altering systemic metabolic function. Sensory variables. The senses serve several functions vital to sexual behavior. They are essential in bringing together the male and female of a given species and in arousing and directing behavior that eventually results in copulation and reproduction. The distance receptors play a major role in locating appropriate sex partners, and all of the senses probably contribute to the arousal and performance of the behavior sequence culminating in insemination. The effects of sensory deprivation in sexual behavior have been studied to a limited extent in the rat, rabbit, and cat. Beach (1951) has concluded that sexual arousal in the male does not depend upon any one sense modality but upon the total pattern of sensory input from the several receptor systems. Generally the female is less dependent upon multiple stimulation for display of adequate sexual behavior. A female deprived of vision, olfaction, and audition may continue to mate successfully, but this is not true of the male. Neural variables. The neural tissues constitute what is presumed to be one of the primary loci of gonadal hormone action controlling behavior. The site of action within the nervous system is not definitely known, but it is assumed to include both spinal cord and brain. Spinal cord. When the cord is transected above the lumbar region in males of species ranging from rat to man, stimulation of the penis still produces erection, ejaculation, and pelvic thrusting. The majority of paraplegics can achieve erection, and some
have had fertile matings. It is obvious, therefore, that at least some of the more reflexive elements of the sexual behavior pattern are organized at the spinal level. Effects of cord transection in the female are not as clear, but whatever fragmentary elements of sexual behavior survive cord transection occur independently of hormonal stimulation. In neither sex is there anything resembling the normal pattern of sexual behavior in preparations with the brain stem sectioned below the level of the hypothalamus. Hypothalamus. Small bilateral and midventral lesions in the hypothalamus of spayed female guinea pigs may eliminate all receptive behavior and mounting despite hormonal injection, which in the spayed unoperated female induces the complete estrous response (Brookhart et al. 1940). In some females with slightly different lesions, receptive behavior is blocked but mounting behavior is unaffected. In still other cases, mounting is eliminated but receptive behavior persists (Goy & Phoenix 1963). In the male guinea pig, hypothalamic lesions may eliminate all sexual behavior. However, some males may continue to mount following the operation. In the absence of testicular atrophy, loss of sexual behavior cannot be attributed to hormonal insufficiency (Brookhart & Dey 1941; Phoenix 1961). Hypothalamic lesions in a number of species, including the rat (Soulairac & Soulairac 1956), rabbit, cat, and ewe, have resulted in comparable loss of sexual behavior. In most of these species, although not yet established for both sexes, one area in or near the hypothalamus controls pituitary function and thus governs sexual behavior indirectly; and a second area exerts direct neural control over sexual behavior. Destruction of the former eliminates sexual behavior by interfering with pituitary-gonadal axis function and therefore with output of gonadal hormone necessary to normal sexual behavior. Destruction of the latter area eliminates sexual behavior by interfering with a primarily neural mechanism (Sawyer 1960). Lesions in the anterior portion of the hypothalamus in spayed female rats and guinea pigs have produced persistent receptivity, or estrus. Such an operation releases the animal, to some extent at least, from gonadal hormone control of sexual behavior and thus produces a condition thought to exist normally in a number of primates, especially man. The operation may be interpreted as removing a neural area that in the normal state inhibits sexual behavior unless stimulated by female hormones (Goy & Phoenix 1963). A number of other lines of evidence implicate
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: Animal Sexual Behavior the hypothalamus as the region of the brain most directly involved in the control and integration of sexual behavior. For example, hypothalamic implants of solid diethylstilbestrol dibutyrate produce in the spayed cat the full display of sexual behavior. Comparable implants in other regions of the brain or in subcutaneous tissue do not produce this effect (Harris et al. 1958). Experiments involving electrical recording from hypothalamic areas in the cat have shown changes in potential associated with estrous reactions, and changes in electroencephalograph activity of the anterior hypothalamus have also been observed in association with mating behavior in the female rabbit (Sawyer 1960). When an electrode is permanently implanted in the hypothalamus of a rat and so wired that pressing a bar delivers a small electrical impulse to the brain area at the electrode tip, rats will repeatedly press the bar, thus obtaining electrical stimulation to the area. Castration abolishes the bar-pressing response by the rat, but the response can be reinstated by injecting the castrate with testosterone (Olds 1958). Such a demonstration tells us little about sexual behavior but implicates the hypothalamus in behavior that is dependent on a gonadal hormone. In a now classic experiment, Kliiver and Bucy (1939) performed bilateral temporal lobectomies on monkeys and reported a broad constellation of behavioral changes, including heightened sexual activity, following the operation. Hyper sexuality was later reported following destruction of the amygdaloid complex and overlying pyriform cortex in lynxes, agoutis, cats, and monkeys. Castration of male cats resulted in elimination of hypersexuality. The lesion is interpreted as having had its effect by removing from inhibition the neuroendocrine mechanisms regulating the display of sexual behavior (Schreiner & Kling 1956). Cerebral cortex. In lower mammals, including the cat, complete removal of the neocortex of the female does not eliminate sexual receptivity, although the quality of the response may suffer. In male rats comparable decortication eliminates all sexual behavior, and these males show no signs of arousal in the presence of an estrous female. Partial decortication in the cat may eliminate successful mating behavior because of loss of sensorymotor integration, but the operation need not interfere with sexual arousal (Beach 1951). In primates the cortex may play a major role in integration of sexual behavior. In general, the more important learning and memory are in sexual performance, the more important the neocortex is likely
199
to be. It is apparent that control of sexual behavior is not vested in any single brain area. The evidence suggests rather that the entire nervous system is involved in the display of the normal pattern of sexual behavior. Experiential variables. Although it has been pointed out that differences in patterns of sexual behavior are associated with differences in genetic background, this does not preclude the importance of experiential factors in determining the particular pattern displayed by the individual. The limits to which experience can modify the behavior pattern are, however, largely determined by genetic factors. In studying the influence of experiential factors on mating behavior, we are indirectly examining the variability allowed by genetic endowment. When males from two inbred strains of guinea pigs were separated from their mothers at the age of 25 days and reared in isolation, they did not display normal mating behavior patterns when tested as adults. For isolation to produce comparable effects in male guinea pigs of a heterogeneous stock, the animals had to be isolated beginning at 10 days of age. The experiment demonstrates the influence of genetic and experiential variables in determining patterns of sexual behavior. It should be noted that not all males even within the inbred strains showed the "isolation effect" and that the relevant variables associated with isolation have not been determined (Valenstein et al. 1955). Isolation of the male rhesus monkey at birth produces drastic effects not only on its sexual behavior but on its entire social behavior repertoire (Harlow & Harlow 1962). However, motherdeprived infants, if given an opportunity to interact with peers, develop essentially normal patterns of sexual behavior. The manner in which peer interaction fosters development of normal sexual behavior remains to be demonstrated. Female guinea pigs and rhesus monkeys reared in isolation also show deficiencies in reproductive behavior. Despite the bizarre social behavior and abnormal sexual behavior displayed by the isolated female rhesus, a number have mated with particularly capable males and have delivered viable young. It should be noted that the behavioral deficiency is not attributable to gonadal hormone deficiency in the isolated monkey or guinea pig. Although the exact nature and extent of the effects of isolation on sexual behavior have not been determined for the male rat, available evidence suggests that the impairment is not as profound as it is in the monkey (Zimbardo 1958). A wide variety of experiences are capable of modifying sexual behavior in addition to the method
200
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: Animal Sexual Behavior
of rearing just discussed. What has been demonstrated is that sexual behavior, in general, is subject to modification just as other aspects of behavior can be modified by varying experience. Thus despite heritability of sexual behavior patterns, dependence on hormonal stimulation, and the spinal reflex contribution to patterns of sexual behavior, the complete pattern can be blocked, enhanced, or modified by social and situational experience. The extent to which it can be modified by experience varies primarily with the species, sex, and age of the individual. CHARLES H. PHOENIX [Other relevant material may be found in GENETICS; INFANCY, article on THE EFFECTS OF EARLY EXPERIENCE; NERVOUS SYSTEM; PSYCHOLOGY, article on COMPARATIVE PSYCHOLOGY; and in the biography of KlNSEY.]
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BEACH, FRANK A. 1947a Evolutionary Changes in the Physiological Control of Mating Behavior in Mammals. Psychological Review 54:297-315. BEACH, FRANK A. 1947& A Review of Physiological and Psychological Studies of Sexual Behavior in Mammals. Physiological Review 27:240-307. BEACH, FRANK A. 1949 A Cross-species Survey of Mammalian Sexual Behavior. Pages 52-78 in Paul H. Hoch and Joseph Zubin (editors), Psychosexual Development in Health and Disease. New York: Grune & Stratton. BEACH, FRANK A. 1951 Instinctive Behavior: Reproductive Activities. Pages 387-434 in S. S. Stevens (editor), Handbook of Experimental Psychology. New York: Wiley. BEACH, FRANK A. 1958 Evolutionary Aspects of Psychoendocrinology. Pages 81-102 in Anne Roe and George Gaylord Simpson (editors), Behavior and Evolution. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. BROOKHART, J. M.; and DEY, F. L. 1941 Reduction of Sexual Behavior in Male Guinea Pigs by Hypothalamic Lesions. American Journal of Physiology 133:551554. BROOKHART, J. M.; DEY, F. L.; and RANSON, S. W. 1940 Failure of Ovarian Hormones to Cause Mating Reactions in Spayed Guinea Pigs With Hypothalamic Lesions. Society for Experimental Biology and Medicine, Proceedings 44:61-64. BURNS, R. K. 1961 Role of Hormones in the Differentiation of Sex. Volume 1, pages 76-158 in William C. Young (editor), Sex and Internal Secretions. 3d ed. Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins. DILGER, WILLIAM C. 1962 Behavior and Genetics. Pages 35-47 in Eugene L. Bliss (editor), Roots of Behavior: Genetics, Instinct, and Socialization in Animal Behavior. New York: Harper. EAYRS, J. T.; and GLASS, A. 1962 The Ovary and Behavior. Volume 2, pages 381-433 in Solly Zuckerman (editor), The Ovary. New York: Academic Press. FORD, CLELLAN S.; and BEACH, FRANK A. 1951 Patterns of Sexual Behavior. New York: Harper. GOY, ROBERT W. 1964 Reproductive Behavior in Mam-
mals. Pages 409-441 in Charles W. Lloyd (editor), Human Reproduction and Sexual Behavior. Philadelphia: Lea & Febiger. GOY, ROBERT W.; and JAKWAY, JACQUELINE S. 1959 The Inheritance of Patterns of Sexual Behaviour in Female Guinea Pigs. Animal Behaviour 7:142—149. GOY, ROBERT W.; and JAKWAY, JACQUELINE S. 1962 Role of Inheritance in Determination of Sexual Behavior Patterns. Pages 96-112 in Eugene L. Bliss (editor), Roots of Behavior: Genetics, Instinct, and Socialization in Animal Behavior. New York: Harper. GOY, ROBERT W.; and PHOENIX, CHARLES H. 1963 Hypothalamic Regulation of Female Sexual Behaviour: Establishment of Behavioural Oestrus in Spayed Guineapigs Following Hypothalamic Lesions. Journal of Reproduction and Fertility 5:23-40. HARLOW, HARRY F.; and HARLOW, MARGARET K. 1962 Social Deprivation in Monkeys. Scientific American 207, Nov.: 136-146. HARRIS, G. W.; MICHAEL, R. P.; and SCOTT, PATRICIA P. 1958 Neurological Site of Action of Stilboestrol in Eliciting Sexual Behaviour. Pages 236-251 in Ciba Foundation, Symposium on the Neurological Basis of Behaviour. Edited by G. E. W. Wolstenholme and C. M. O'Connor. Boston: Little. JAKWAY, JACQUELINE S. 1959 Inheritance of Patterns of Mating Behaviour in the Male Guinea Pig. Animal Behaviour 7:150-162. KINSEY, ALFRED C. et al. 1948 Sexual Behavior in the Human Male. Philadelphia: Saunders. KINSEY, ALFRED C. et al. 1953 Sexual Behavior in the Human Female. Philadelphia: Saunders. KLUVER, H.; and BUCY, P. C. 1939 Preliminary Analysis of Functions of Temporal Lobes in Monkeys. Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry 42:979-1000. LLOYD, CHARLES W. (editor) 1964 Human Reproduction and Sexual Behavior. Philadelphia: Lea & Febiger. OLDS, JAMES 1958 Effects of Hunger and Male Sex Hormone on Self-stimulation of the Brain. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology 51:320324. PHOENIX, CHARLES H. 1961 Hypothalamic Regulation of Sexual Behavior in Male Guinea Pigs. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology 54:72-77. PHOENIX, CHARLES H. et al. 1959 Organizing Action of Prenatally Administered Testosterone Propionate on the Tissues Mediating Mating Behavior in the Female Guinea Pig, Endocrinology 65:369-382. SAWYER, CHARLES H. 1960 Reproductive Behavior. Volume 2, pages 1225-1240 in Handbook of Physiology. Section 1: Neurophysiology. Washington: American Physiological Society. SCHREINER, LEON; and KLING, ARTHUR 1956 Rhinencephalon and Behavior. American Journal of Physiology 184:486-490. SOULAIRAC, A.; and SOULAIRAC, M.-L. 1956 Effets de lesions hypothalamiques sur le comportement sexuel et le tractus genital du rat male. Annales d'endocrinologie 17:731-745. VALENSTEIN, ELLIOT S.; Riss, WALTER; and YOUNG, WILLIAM C. 1955 Experiential and Genetic Factors in the Organization of Sexual Behavior in Male Guinea Pigs. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology 48:307-403. YOUNG, WILLIAM C. 1941 Observations and Experiments . on Mating Behavior in Female Mammals. Quarterly Review of Biology 16:135-156; 311-335.
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: Social Aspects
2 01
also that which society has come to apply to the act (Thomas 1907). In contrast to the social science perspective, the "physicalist tradition" tends to treat sex simply as energy or motive. For example, the studies of Kinsey (a zoologist) and his associates at the Indiana University Institute for Sex Research follow the II tradition of "biological realism"; that is, they focus SOCIAL ASPECTS on the ecology and styles of the physical act. These Social scientific writing on sexual behavior over are by far the most popular scientific studies of the past century falls in three categories: the ecolsex, as measured by sales and published critical ogy and styles of sex as a physical act; the meanreviews. From a physicalist point of view, the preings of the act, in its direct, displaced, or subsumption that all acts engaging the genitals are limated form, to the individual and to society; the alternative ways of tapping the same reservoir of norms and ethical standards that govern the modes physiological energy justifies drawing them under of, occasions for, and designation of participants the same rubric. Thus Kinsey's treatment of alterin, the physical act; and the organizational ar- native "outlets" places greater emphasis on the rangements that implement these norms and standchannels through which energy is released than on ards. It is now commonly accepted that the frethe social context of that energy release. quencies and techniques of sexual behavior vary Social science analyses of sexual behavior are widely among individuals and among religious, primarily concerned with coital acts, both homosexual and heterosexual, which involve a relationclass, ethnic, educational, age, and sex categories ship between human beings and are thus qualiin the same society (Kinsey et al. 1948; 1953); tatively different from other sexual behavior. that its personal meanings are numerous and conMasturbation, nocturnal emissions, and bestiality tradictory (Freud 1893-1895); and that sexual norms and ethical standards contrast sharply from claim social science attention only insofar as they affect either the occurrence of coitus or its meanculture to culture (Mantegazza 1886). ing or become the object of institutional concern. As producers of literature on sexual behavior, According to this view, the energy problem is intersocial scientists are easily outnumbered by physiwoven with that of the social meaning of sexual cians, psychologists, physiologists, theologians, and acts. Freudian theory of the economy of the libido philosophers, among others. The present article, uses the notion of sublimation to designate the rather than restricting itself to studies by social rechanneling of sexual energy into cultural activiscientists, will conceptualize the content of this diverse literature from a social science perspective. ties by shifting the object of cathexis; thus the theory interweaves motivational and meaningful These materials will be examined in terms of aspects. the social meanings of sexual behavior, the way the sexual enters as a component of social roles, the Sexual behavior contains a nonverbal language social norms governing recruitment to these erotithrough which an individual expresses and concized roles, and their articulation with networks veys meanings; sensory exploration and gestures of the noneroticized roles that constitute some outweigh words as sign and symbol vehicles. Removal of clothing beyond the degree necessary for major social institutions. Reference will be made to social organizational arrangements for facilitatcoitus itself exemplifies the significance of tactile communication. Any sexual act may carry several ing or inhibiting enactment of these roles. social and personal meanings. For example, a The social science perspective. Sexual behavior morning erection may express unconscious conparticipates in social action by contributing a motive, or a driving force of that action. Ratzencerns about death rather than sex (Bergler 1950). Ford and Beach (1951) studied sexual behavior hofer (1898), an early theorist of the sociology of between species and across cultures, yet they sex, saw all motives of social contact as modificagranted priority to the physicalist approach by tions of either the instinct of self-preservation or classifying sexual behavior according to modes of the sexual instinct. Moreover, as a component of stimulation of the genitals. A consequence of this social action, sexual behavior is also a way of physical perspective is their tendency to measure expressing and conveying both individual and the cause of sexual behavior in terms of tension social meanings; that is, the meaning is not only reduction and to designate procreation as its printhat which an individual attributes to his act but YOUNG, WILLIAM C.; GOY, ROBERT W.; and PHOENIX, CHARLES H. 1964 Hormones and Sexual Behavior. Science 143:212-218. ZIMBARDO, PHILIP G. 1958 The Effects of Early Avoidance Training and Rearing Conditions Upon the Sexual Behavior of the Male Rat. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology 51: 764—769.
202
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: Social Aspects
cipal social function. The procreative function loses its centrality for a social psychology of human sexual behavior in view of the empirical fact that less than one in a thousand human coital acts results in pregnancy and fewer are intended to do so (Foote 1954). However, for sociology, the part of sexual behavior that is, in fact, procreative becomes significant because of both the demographic consequences and the institutional and organizational arrangements that become necessary for the birth and rearing of offspring (Ellwood 1925). The eroticized role. The higher a species is in the evolutionary scale, the less dependent is its sexual behavior on gonadal hormones and seasonal physiological changes; and in man it comes under control of the cortex of the brain (Ford & Beach 1951), thus introducing the possibility of decisional and normative control. Sexual behavior as a role component, that is, as a component of social action under decisional and normative control, distinguishes human from animal sexuality. In human sexual behavior, the erotic element may be incidental to other motives, such as the desire for a new experience or the desire to escape drudgery (Thomas & Znaniecki [1918-1920] 1958, vol. 2, pp. 1800-1821). A social role—such as that of lover, of prostitute or client, of husband or wife, of young male delinquent or adult fellator (A. J. Reiss 1961)—in which a sexual element is embedded with other social role elements, such as economic or affective exchange or child raising, may be termed an "eroticized role." The eroticized role is part of the whole system of roles constituting the personality, and, in a sense, it eroticizes the entire personality. This is what has been described as a transformation of sexuality into Eros (Marcuse 1955). Sexuality becomes meaningful to the actor, and may be understood by the observer, in the context of these other aspects of the personality. An eroticized social role may be articulated with other roles in the social structure; for example, the role of the prostitute in her relation with a client may be meshed with her relatively nonerotic role in her relation with her madam or other employer. This perspective on role articulation follows Malinowski (1929), who advocated an anthropological perspective that does not treat sex as a mere physiological transaction but studies its implication for lovemaking, its function as the nucleus of the family, the spells and magic that grow up around it, its effects upon, and how it is affected by, the legal system and the economic system.
The variety of sexual meanings is, in part, dependent on other aspects of the role—that is, on other norms, affects, or meanings that define that role or other roles with which it is articulated in a personality or in a society. Kirkendall (1961) described how sex, while it may advance a deep interpersonal relation, may be exploitative as part of a casual relationship. With prostitutes, the relationship itself becomes the instrumental servant of its sexual component. Even in advancing a deep relation, however, sex may assume special meanings associated with the broader meaning of that relationship. Thus sex may be a weapon to destroy, a mode of defense, a bargaining point, or a form of self-assertion; negatively, it may be a form of self-denial (Frank 1954). Components of an eroticized role may be malintegrated. A marriage contracted for social or economic advantages despite sexual incompatibility is a classic instance. Sexual behavior inconsistent with personal ethical standards may engender an internal struggle manifested in guilt feelings. If strains of this type become widespread, social standards may be readjusted (I. L. Reiss 1960). Recruitment to the eroticized role Recruitment of partners to an eroticized role is governed by considerations of personality, social norms, and societal mechanisms of control. Personality variables affect the desire and ability of an individual to seek, as well as his desirability as, a sex-role partner. Physiological or attitudinal disturbances in an individual's response at any stage of the coital act influence recruitment to the eroticized role. In the preparatory stage, an individual must be able to respond to excitation from internal and external psychological stimulation. This requires sensory, intellectual, motor, and glandular contributions to mechanisms of arousal. An individual's attitude toward himself—for example, as reflected in body image—affects his ability to woo another through foreplay and enter intimate relationships (Fisher & Cleveland 1958). An individual must experience impetus to penetrate or desire to be penetrated, want to continue inplay, and, at culmination, experience orgastic peristalsis of genital structures. Much depends upon ability to tolerate regression in the service of the ego (Fried 1960). Disturbances of sexuality are commonly classified in terms of frigidity, low potency, preference for masturbation or for sexual perversion, hypersexuality, and lack of sexual interest (Eisenstein 1956). Special personality groups vary in interest in eroticized roles. Most of the erotic impulse of idiots
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: Social Aspects is directed toward themselves and the remainder to objects of the same sex (Potter 1927). Alcoholics lack sex interest, because, it has been argued, of repressed homosexuality (Levine 1955). The aged tend to lose motivation for coitus (Armstrong 1963). The evaluation of personal characteristics in recruitment is relative to the persons involved; that is, an individual not desirable to one partner may be desirable to another. For example, males generally prefer shorter females, and females generally prefer taller males. Women who want men near their own height, it has been argued, are expressing a need for ascendancy. Similarly, males who seek taller women are said to be seeking to possess the forbidden parent figure (Beigel 1954). Norms of recruitment. Social norms prescribe and proscribe which social types may recruit one another. Havelock Ellis (1910), for example, wrote that in choosing a mate we tend to seek parity of racial and anthropological characteristics together with disparity of secondary sexual characteristics and complementarity of psychic characteristics. Under control of instinct, animals rarely depart from parity of species and disparity of secondary sexual characteristics. Mongrelization may be induced among domesticated animals but is extremely rare among wild animals despite opportunities. Man can, and sometimes does, engage in relations that the more constitutionally directed animals would refuse. Man may disregard species parity and practice bestiality, disregard secondary sexual disparity and practice homosexuality, and disregard psychic complementarity and establish neurotic sex relations. On the other hand, man may refuse relations because of sexual style, the status of the partner, or the beauty of the partner—a parity irrelevant to the animal. For man, the power of the social over biological determinants extends to the very definition of gender. Money et al. (1957) compared the relative influences of the chromosomal sex, gonadal sex, hormonal sex, internal accessory reproductive structures, and external genital morphology on the gender role actually assumed by hermaphrodites, and they found social sex assignment to be the most reliable prognosticator of gender role. Rules for recruitment to coital relations in general parallel, but do not completely overlap with, those governing marital recruitment. Laws of exogamy define the inner social limits for recruitment of a marital partner. These are extensions of the incest taboo, which is a nearly universal taboo, with exceptions only in such cases as the Egyptian royal family, where brother—sister mar-
203
riage was permitted, or among Azande nobles, where father-daughter marriage has been permitted. Laws of endogamy define the outer social limits. These norms have been compared by Westermarck (1889) to the "law of similarity" that keeps animals from pairing across species. In human relations, however, endogamy controls potentially fertile relations within the same species. A number of individuals are virtually precluded from recruitment to eroticized heterosexual roles. This is the case with institutionalized populations in prisons or mental hospitals. Likewise, occupational conditions may separate individuals from the opposite sex. Hobos, being homeless, have less access to women, and thus they tend to frequent the lowest status prostitutes and to practice homosexuality. Social control of eroticized role recruitment contributes to the maintenance of the social structure; if society lacked such controls, random mating could disrupt the familial and economic lines of stratification of a society. Moreover, social control of recruitment may enable one social group to dominate another through its power to allocate sexual occasions and facilities. It may also be an internally integrative device, as it is among celibate monastics. According to Ross (1920), such control is necessary to manage a smoldering antagonism that exists between the sexes as groups. Sexual communication in recruitment. Communication employed for recruitment to the eroticized role parallels the communication of arousal in the sex act. Token arousal announces sexual availability. Erotic communication relies heavily on movement, such as the inviting movements of the dance and the arousing tactile movements during coitus. Odors founded in the natural capryl odors and supplemented at the human level by perfumes act upon the deeper levels of consciousness (Bloch 1907). Cosmetic means of communicating sexual interest include painting and tattooing as well as sexual mutilation. Socially stylized ceremonies of fertility or initiation may announce availability and effect arousal. A few rites, such as subincision, announce sexual availability but reduce sexual enjoyment or arousal potential for the subject (Allen 1949; Westermarck 1889). Verbal communication supplements sensory communication in sexual behavior. Speech is so closely identified with sexuality that in some cultures it is forbidden or restricted between persons who are socially precluded from engaging in sexual relations (Baker 1949). The more intimate a sexual matter, the less the likelihood of communication about it to nonerotic role partners.
204
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: Social Aspects
In many societies, socially structured mores about erotic communication bar young people from arousal and consummatory opportunities. Sexual norms may be learned inferentially by the young or by new social groups, such as immigrants, by observation of behaviors lacking primary erotic meaning, such as forms of dress and of association between the sexes (Klausner 1964). Classified newspaper advertising and a specialized journalism directed to erotica have long been used for the recruitment of both heterosexual and homosexual partners. Deviant subgroups develop private signaling systems to cue a potential partner without revealing themselves to noninitiate spectators. For example, homosexuals may wear peculiar clothing (the definition of which changes from time to time), intersperse their speech with a special argot, or perform certain gestures. They may position themselves to receive such signals by frequenting known haunts. Social control of sexual behavior Society not only exerts control over the recruitment of role partners but also attempts to control the types of sexual behaviors enacted and the occasions for their enactment. Both informal and formal social controls are found. Attitudinal disapproval of individuals' erotic behaviors, which is perhaps the commonest form of control, may be expressed as verbal chastisement, gossip, scandal, humor, or mockery. The Trobriand Islanders, for example, control sexual style by jesting about those who use the "white man's position" for intercourse. A quasi-formal control mechanism is exemplified among the Mondurucu by the gang rape to force a recalcitrant female to submit to male authority (Murphy 1959). Norms also define those behaviors to which it is legitimate to recruit. Early studies of sexual behavior treated cross-cultural comparisons descriptively, presenting various behaviors, sexual art, and technical devices as curiosities (Moll 1912; KrafftEbing 1886; Bloch 1907). These studies did, however, open the way to the study of sexual norms by giving information about criteria for recruitment to eroticized roles in other cultures. Correlations between sexual behavior and the overarching cultural ethos allow inference about the types of sexual behaviors to which recruitment is approved in various cultural situations; that is, recruitment norms vary with the ethos. For example, Sorokin (1956) argued that sexual asceticism is associated with "idealistic societies" and libertarianism with "sensate societies." Taylor (1953) classified histor-
ical periods in Western society as predominantly "matristic" or "patristic." In patristic periods, dominated by a father religion and exemplified by England during the first millennium of the Christian era, people have a horror of homosexuality, sex is generally restricted, and rape and incest increase. In matristic periods, dominated by a mother religion and exemplified by England after the first millennium, people have a horror of incest and are permissive regarding sex. Social control may be exerted by concrete organizational arrangements. Organizations that facilitate recruitment to the sex role also maintain procedures, such as the "sex game," for controlling recruitment and defining types of permitted alliances (e.g., see Cressey 1932). The Nazis, while promoting a policy of sexual abstinence, provided youth camps in which sexual relations took place. Monasteries may debar their inmates from sexual opportunities. Child marriage commits the relationship before the erotic drive appears. The sexes may be physically and, therefore, socially isolated, as in a harem or school. Chaperonage is a way of supervising the young during their meetings. Systems of peer group pressures, such as those exerted by campus sororities or fraternities, encourage socially approved love relationships by subjecting them to ratings by age mates. These controls are more stringent among the upper classes, who have more to lose by a breakdown in the stratification system (Goode 1959). Legal control takes the form of laws against homosexuality, adultery, sodomy, or pederasty— that is, against behaviors that violate rules governing recruitment to the eroticized role. In some jurisdictions, the style of coitus is legally as well as informally directed. In England, the Wolfenden Committee on homosexual offenses and prostitution gathered intelligence about sexual behavior from social scientists and psychiatrists as a basis for legislating on sexual recruitment. They concluded that it is the duty of the law not to concern itself with immorality as such but to confine itself to activities that offend against public order and decency. Thus, they recommended that homosexual relationships between adults by mutual consent and in privacy should not fall within the province of criminal law (Great Britain . . . 1957). Federal legislation in the United States, such as the Mann Act (the so-called "white slave" traffic act) of 1910, is given force through policing activities of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and local police departments. Throughout Anglo-American history,
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: Social Aspects the methods of legal control of sex expression have varied much more than has the accepted doctrine of sexual morality (May 1931; Mueller 1961). Sex education is a form of noncoercive, though formal, control. The medical profession in its efforts to control venereal disease, as well as religious groups in their efforts to maintain their own sexual norms, have been instrumental in founding organizations such as the American Society of Sanitary and Moral Prophylaxis in 1905 and the American Social Hygiene Association in 1912, now the American Social Health Association. This latter association uses education to combat venereal disease, commercialized prostitution, and other conditions associated with sex delinquency among young people. Resistance to social control. Protest against efforts to enforce prevailing sexual mores and to control recruitment to the eroticized role is expressed in individual sexual deviance, the formation of groups of individuals with special sexual needs, and movements to change the prevailing mores. The sex offender uses illegitimate means, such as violence or disregard for the consent of the partner, to recruit to coital or noncoital sexual behaviors, or he recruits without regard to rules denning permitted sexual partners. Generally, these individuals are undersexed rather than oversexed. Freudian theory suggests that some sex offenders may be compensating for feelings of bodily damage or phallic inadequacy, or suffering from castration anxiety (Hammer 1957). Most sex offenders are of average intelligence. Those arrested for incest, however, tend to be older men of subnormal intelligence and antisocial personalities. Apprehended distributors of obscene literature tend to be older, sexually inhibited men of average intelligence who are not hostile. Women are rarely arrested for sexual offenses in American society, except for violating norms regarding public solicitation. The role relations in primarily nonsexual delinquent groups may become eroticized, involving, for instance, group masturbation. Organizations of individuals whose physical status makes it difficult for them to recruit or be recruited to an eroticized role, such as dwarfs or the blind, may oppose prevailing sexual mores, as may those who, though not necessarily handicapped or abnormal in a clinical sense, have sexual requirements that are contrary to the norms. These groups provide evaluational support, facilitate recruitment to the role, and insulate members against the sexual mores of the larger society (Hooker 1956).
205
Social movements concerned with sex have sought revision of sexual standards, of the laws supporting them, and of the means of enforcing them. Corruption in systems of police regulation of prostitution led to the formation of the International Federation for the Abolition of State Regulation of Vice in 1875. The World League for Sexual Reform on a Scientific Basis, perhaps the most extensive such group, was an outgrowth of the Institute for Sexual Science founded by Magnus Hirschfeld in Germany in 1929. It attempted to abolish antisexual taboos, establish a philosophical basis for sexual freedom, and provide education in the form of lectures and clinical advice. The institute was closed by the Nazis, and the world movement collapsed a few years later. Wilhelm Reich, who criticized Hirschfeld for attempting sexual reform within the framework of capitalist society, established the Socialist Society for Sexual Advice and Study in Vienna in 1928 to "defend the rights of children and young people to their natural love." Sex and social institutions The nonerotic components in an eroticized role may link it with a pattern of roles constituting an institution. Historically, eroticized roles have been part of the fabric of economic, political, religious, familial, and other institutions. At certain times, a particular institution, such as the church in Christian society, may exclude the erotic component from its roles and influence its place in the roles of another institution, especially the family. The family. Social movements to reform sexual mores ordinarily protest the family's monopoly of the legitimate eroticized role. The eroticized role is universally legitimated in the family, and in modern Western society it is legitimated only in the family. However, actual behavior is at variance with this official standard. In the Kinsey samples, 50 per cent of the females and 85 per cent of the males with a high school education reported that they had experienced premarital coitus. Nearly half of these females had experienced coitus with a man other than their fiance. Moreover, by the age of forty nearly 26 per cent of the females and 50 per cent of the males had engaged in extramarital coitus. Increasing opportunities for premarital and extramarital coitus accompany the greater mixing of the sexes in the educational, occupational, and social worlds. Legal control of premarital intercourse in American society is generally enforced more strictly in the case of younger participants.
206
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: Social Aspects
Adultery is grounds for divorce in all states. To the extent that coitus takes place outside of marriage the procreative aspect declines in significance. For example, Malinowski (1929) thought that the Trobriand Islanders, who have very permissive sexual mores, did not appreciate the connection between coitus and pregnancy, although it is more likely that, while aware of the connection, they were not much interested in it. Discussions of contraception reveal some tensions aroused concerning nonprocreative coital meanings, since contraceptives are not simply designed to prevent conception but to do so while coitus continues. Sex and religion. Sexual behavior has been interwoven with religion from earliest times. Religion's general concern with fertility involves it in the procreative aspect of sex, and this concern may even become pervasive, as, for example, in the Indian lingam cults. Furthermore, sexual energy itself may play a role in religious worship. Scott (1941) concluded that phallic worship originated in the pleasure associated with coitus and not in any clearly conceived notion that intercourse would produce children. Sex as worshipful, expressive communication with a supraindividual force is illustrated by the activities of temple prostitutes in Babylon. Krafft-Ebing (1886) argued that religion and sex could replace one another, since both display a similar scope and quality of excitement at their peaks and both can degenerate under pathological conditions into cruelty. Religious mystical roles may contain an erotic compound in both the Western and Eastern traditions. On the other hand, the cases of the sacerdotal celibate, the religious hermit, or the penitent abstainer illustrate religious exclusion of the sexual component. Religious considerations affect recruitment to eroticized roles in other institutions. Thus, rules of exogamy and endogamy are generally supported by religious sanctions. Religious sanctification of marriage or the withholding of that sanctification affects the recruitment of coital partners. Moreover, religion may contribute to the isolation of the sexes by separating them in worship and by excluding women from sacred precincts. Religious devotion is negatively associated with participation in nonreligious eroticized roles in the United States. The frequencies for all sexual outlets, except for marital coitus, decrease with increasing devoutness (Kinsey et al. 1948; 1953). This association seems to hold in France as well (Institut Frangais . . . 1960). Sex and the polity. The relation of sexual behavior to the nature of the state and politics has long been of popular concern. The literature on
court ladies and on espionage has described the impact of eroticized roles upon political roles. Sorokin (1956) asserted that sexual overindulgence debilitates the entire society. Krafft-Ebing (1886) saw a two-directional relation, in which, on the one hand, sexual excess undermines the props of society and, on the other hand, the collapse of society produces sexual aberrations. Utopian schemes have included recommendations for control of eroticized roles. Unwin (1940) proposed that, in his new society, Hopousia, there be two kinds of marriage: alpha marriage, which would be monogamous and preceded by prenuptial continence, for those who would achieve, create, and lead, and beta marriage, which may be terminated at will and would not require prenuptial continence, for those who do not aspire to social position. Unwin's thesis is grounded in the concept of energy sublimation. In John Humphrey Noyes' Oneida community, a cooperative colony founded in 1848, extramarital "coitus interruptus" was permitted, on the ground that sex is a way of communicating the meaning of intimate friendship. The acquisition of political power by men usually implies an access to more women. For example, in Bedouin society, a tribal chief is more likely to be polygamous and to retain concubines than is a less powerful member of the tribe. In Europe, royalty as well as the economically powerful have been able to keep mistresses. Conquest has generally implied access to the women of the conquered society, either by rape, by capture, or through the woman's desire to consort with the powerful. Sex and the economy. Sex has a place in the economy both as a marketable commodity and as a component affecting the marketability of nonsexual commodities. Thus economic value can be derived from sexual value. For example, prostitution involves an economic-sexual exchange of this character; the economic exchange ramifies beyond the prostitute and her client to include the pimp who recruits the client, the madam who supplies facilities for the act, and, perhaps, the police who protect all of them from the law. In the case of marriage, the economic-sexual exchange is embedded in a wider set of family and community relations. Sexual role performance consumes facilities, goods, and services, and thus industries emerge around the provision of facilities for recruitment to the eroticized role and for enactment of that role. These range from the provision of meeting places, such as dance halls; the publishing of pornographic, scientific, artistic, and guidance manuals; the supply of pharmaceutical and me-
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: Social Aspects chanical contraceptives; and the letting of places, such as a motel room or brothel, for consummating the sex act. Sexual value may be derivative from economic value as well. For example, sexual jealousy, rather than being an innate emotion, may be related to views of women as property. Jealousy is then an anger aroused when property rights are violated. A norm of premarital chastity may also be related to marketability (Nemecek 1958). Reich (1930), using syncretistic MarxianFreudian "sex-economic" concepts, described an interplay between sexual and economic norms. He reasoned that since psychic structure is created by social structure and the core of psychic structure is the sexual function, sexual function is controlled by social structure. Social structure is constituted by the "modes of production," including the interpersonal relations of production. These relations affect sexual needs, among others. They also influence concepts of life, morals, and philosophy—that is, ideology—and so influence sex norms. Classes standing in different relation to the "modes of production" will differ in their sexual needs and norms. The dominant political minority imposes its ideology in general, and its sexual ideology in particular, on a population. According to this view, the subordinate population thus has sex needs derived from its own class position while being subject to the sexual ideology of another class. It should be noted that Kinsey's findings do not support Reich; Kinsey and others (1953) found little relation between the parental occupational class and the incidence of various sexual behaviors. Research methods Methods of social and psychological research developed in other areas have been used to ascertain frequencies of sexual behaviors as well as social and individual meanings associated with that behavior. Questionnaires (Christensen & Carpenter 1962) and interviews (Kinsey et al. 1948) have both been used to elicit such information. Protecting the anonymity of the respondent and establishing the scientific legitimacy of the interviewer are salient bases for rapport during an interview. To maximize the validity of responses, the interviewer must avoid making the respondent feel guilt, anxiety, or defensiveness. Direct questions should be asked with no defensiveness or apology on the part of the interviewer, and terminology should be adapted to the social-class level of the respondent. The inquiry should begin with matters that do not provoke anxiety, such as age, and then proceed to items which are sexual but for
207
which the individual does not feel responsible; thus the interviewer would ask about spontaneous orgasms before asking about masturbation. The fact that anxiety associated with each type of behavior differs among culture or class groups and between the sexes affects the ordering of the questions. For example, homosexuality is less frightening than masturbation for females in American society, while the reverse is true for males; thus, in interviewing females, questions on homosexuality precede those on masturbation, and the reverse order is used for males. As a practical procedure one might request the age at first orgasm, then ask for its source and, if this is not too anxiety-provoking, trace this source through the years. By asking when he first experienced each type of behavior, the burden of denial is placed upon the interviewee. Kinsey's interviewers severely censured any subject suspected of giving a dishonest history. Kinsey correlated the frequencies of each source of outlet—masturbation; premarital, extramarital, and marital coitus; homosexuality; and animal contacts—with demographic factors such as national origin, marital status, age, education, occupational class, rural or urban residence, religious affiliation, and religious devoutness, among others. Intrapsychic meanings of sexual behavior have been studied by correlating projective test responses with the frequencies of behaviors. The Rorschach test has been used to reveal body image (Fisher & Cleveland 1958), the Thematic Apperception Test to uncover feelings of guilt associated with sex (Leiman & Epstein 1961), and a combination of the Thematic Apperception Test and the HouseTree-Person Test to obtain data about castration feelings or feelings of phallic inadequacy for psychoanalytic interpretation (Hammer 1957). Anthropological field methods, employing observation and informant interviews, have been used to gain information about both the occurrence of behaviors and their meanings (Malinowski 1929). Observational methods supply data on systems of communication and interaction that are necessary for an analysis of the social organization of sexuality (A. J. Reiss 1961). The Human Relations Area Files, containing field reports on many societies, have been used to exploit the advantages of both field observation and correlation methods (Murdock 1949). Attitude questionnaires have been used to obtain information on ideal prescriptive norms, as has content analysis of newspapers, radio, and plays (A. Ellis 1954). The fact that the various sexual behaviors may be ordered along dimensions of greater or lesser intimacy or greater or lesser acceptability has been
208
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: Social Aspects
exploited to construct scales. Podell and Perkins (1957), for example, developed a Guttman scale for ordering types of sexual experience, and Ira Reiss (1964) developed a refined Guttman scale for a study of standards of sexual permissiveness. SAMUEL Z. KLAUSNER [See also FAMILY; MARRIAGE; PROSTITUTION; SEXUAL BEHAVIOR, articles on SEXUAL DEVIATION and on HOMOSEXUALITY; and the biographies of ELLIS; FREUD; MALINOWSKI; REICH; WESTERMARCK.] BIBLIOGRAPHY Primary literary materials as sources of data may be located in several extensive bibliographies: Hayn & Gutendorf 1875 lists references and abstracts of erotica in German; Reade 1936 lists and abstracts English material; and Gay 1861 includes a similar collection of French materials. Ellis & Abarbanel 1961, containing articles and short bibliographies on most topics of interest, is a good introductory resource for secondary materials. ALLEN, CLIFFORD 1949 A Study of Sexual Mutilations. International Journal of Sexology 2:158-161. ARMSTRONG, EUNICE B. 1963 The Possibility of Sexual Happiness in Old Age. Pages 131-137 in Society for the Scientific Study of Sex, Advances in Sex Research. Edited by Hugo G. Beigel. New York: Harper. BAKER, SIDNEY J. 1949 Speech and Sexual Taboos. International Journal of Sexology 3:98—101. BEIGEL, HUGO G. 1954 Body Height in Mate Selection. Journal of Social Psychology 39:257-268. BERGLER, EDMUND 1950 Morning Erections. International Journal of Sexology 3:141—144. BLOCK, IWAN (1907) 1937 The Sexual Life of Our Time. New York: Falstaff. -» First published as Das Sexualleben unserer Zeit in seinen Beziehungen zur modernen Kultur. CHRISTENSEN, HAROLD T.; and CARPENTER, GEORGE R. 1962 Timing Patterns in the Development of Sexual Intimacy: An Attitudinal Report on Three Modern Western Societies. Marriage and Family Living 24: 30-35. CRESSEY, PAUL G. 1932 The Taxi Dance Hall. Univ. of Chicago Press. EISENSTEIN, VICTOR W. (editor) 1956 Neurotic Interaction in Marriage. New York: Basic Books. ELLIS, ALBERT (1954) 1962 The American Sexual Tragedy. 2d ed. New York: Stuart. ELLIS, ALRERT; and ABARBANEL, ALBERT (editors) 1961 The Encyclopedia of Sexual Behavior. 2 vols. New York: H awthorn. ELLIS, HAVELOCK (1910) 1936 Studies in the Psychology of Sex. Volume 4: Sex in Relation to Society. New York: Random House. ELL WOOD, CHARLES A. 1925 The Psychology of Human Society. New York: Appleton. FISHER, SEYMOUR; and CLEVELAND, SIDNEY E. 1958 Body Image Boundaries and Sexual Behavior. Journal of Psychology 45:207-211. FOOTE, NELSON N. 1954 Sex as Play. Social Problems 1:159-163. FORD, CLELLAN S.; and BEACH, FRANK A. 1951 Patterns of Sexual Behavior. New York: Harper. FRANK, LAWRENCE K. 1954 The Psychocultural Approach in Sex Research. SociaZ Problems 1:133-139.
FREUD, SIGMUND (1893-1895) 1955 The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. Volume 2: Studies on Hysteria, by Josef Breuer and Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth. -» First published in German. FRIED, EDRITA 1960 The Ego in Love and Sexuality. New York: Grune. GAY, JULES (1861) 1894-1900 Bibliographic des ouvrages relatifs a I'amour, aux femmes, au manage . . . . 4th ed. 4 vols. Paris: Becour. GOODE, WILLIAM J. 1959 The Theoretical Importance of Love. American Sociological Review 24:38-47. GREAT BRITAIN, COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION (1957) 1963 The Wolfenden Report: Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offenses and Prostitution. New York: Stein & Day. HAMMER, EMMANUEL F. 1957 A Psychoanalytic Hypothesis Concerning Sex Offenders. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Psychopathology 18:177-184. HAYN, HUGO; and GUTENDORF, ALFRED N. (1875) 19121929 Bibliotheca germanorum erotica et curiosa. 9 vols., 3d ed. Munich: Muller. -» Hayn was the sole author of the first edition, published as Bibliotheca germanorum erotica. HOOKER, EVELYN 1956 A Preliminary Analysis of Group Behavior of Homosexuals. Journal of Psychology 42: 217-225. INSTITUT FRANCAIS D'OPINION PUBLIQUE (1960) 1961 Patterns of Sex and Love: A Study of the French Woman and Her Morals. New York: Crown. -> First published in French. KINSEY, ALFRED C. et al. 1948 Sexual Behavior in the Human Male. Philadelphia: Saunders. KINSEY, ALFRED C. et al. 1953 Sexual Behavior in the Human Female. Philadelphia: Saunders. KIRKENDALL, LESTER A. 1961 Premarital Intercourse and Interpersonal Relationships. New York: Julian. KLAUSNER, SAMUEL Z. 1964 Inferential Visibility and Sex Norms in the Middle East. Journal of Social Psychology 63:1-29. KRAFFT-EBING, RICHARD F. VON (1886) 1965 Psychopathia sexualis. New York: Putnam. -» First unexpurgated edition in English; original in Latin. LEIMAN, ALAN H.; and EPSTEIN, SEYMOUR 1961 Thematic Sexual Responses as Related to Sexual Drive and Guilt. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 63:169-175. LEVINE, JACOB 1955 The Sexual Adjustment of Alcoholics: A Clinical Study of a Selected Sample. Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol 16:675-680. MALINOWSKI, BRONISLAW (1929)1962 The Sexual Life of Savages in North-western Melanesia: An Ethnographic Account of Courtship, Marriage, and Family Life Among the Natives of the Trobiiand Islands, British New Guinea. New York: Harcourt. MANTEGAZZA, PAOLO (1886)1935 The Sexual Relations of Mankind. New York: Eugenics Publishing. -> First published in Italian. MARCUSE, HERBERT 1955 Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry Into Freud. Boston: Beacon. MAY, GEOFFREY 1931 Social Control of Sex Expression. New York: Morrow. MEAD, MARGARET 1949 Male and Female: A Study of the Sexes in a Changing World. London: Gollancz; New York: Morrow. MOLL, ALBERT (1912) 1921 Handbuch der Sexualwissenschaften. 2d ed. Leipzig: Vogel.
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: Deviation: Psychological Aspects MONEY, JOHN; HAMPSON, J. G.; and HAMPSON, J. L. 1957 Imprinting and the Establishment of Gender Role. A.M.A. Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry 77:333336. MUELLER, GERHARD 1961 Legal Regulation of Sexual Conduct. Legal Almanac Series, No. 9. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana. MURDOCH, GEORGE P. 1949 The Social Regulation of Sexual Behavior. Pages 256-266 in Paul Hoch and Joseph Zubin (editors), Psychosexual Development in Health and Disease. New York: Grune. MUHPHY, ROBERT F. 1959 Social Structure and Sex Antagonism. Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 15: 89-98. NEME^EK, OTTOKAR 1958 Virginity: Prenuptial Rites and Rituals. New York: Philosophical Library. PODELL, LAWRENCE; and PERKINS, JOHN C. 1957 A Guttman Scale for Sexual Experience: A Methodological Note. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 54:420-422. POTTER, HOWARD W. 1927 An Introductory Study of the Erotic Behavior of Idiots. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 65:497-507. RATZENHOFER, GUSTAV 1898 Die sociologische Erkenntnis. Leipzig: Brockhaus. READE, ROLF S. 1936 Registrum librorum eroticorum . . . . 2 vols. London: Privately printed. REICH, WILHELM (1930) 1945 The Sexual Revolution. 3d ed. New York: Orgone Institute Press. -» First published as Die Sexualitdt im Kulturkampf. REISS, ALBERT J. Jr. 1961 The Social Integration of Queers and Peers. Social Problems 9:102-120. REISS, IRA L. 1960 Premarital Sexual Standards in America. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. REISS, IRA L. 1964 The Scaling of Premarital Sexual Permissiveness. Journal of Marriage and the Family 26:188-198. Ross, EDWARD A. (1920) 1938 Principles of Sociology. 3d ed. New York: Century. SCOTT, GEORGE R. (1941) 1952 Phallic Worship. New York: Mental Health Press. SOROKIN, PITIRIM A. 1956 The American Sex Revolution. Boston: Sargent. TAYLOR, GORDON R. 1953 Sex in History. London: Thames & Hudson. THOMAS, W. I. 1907 Sex and Society: Studies in the Social Psychology of Sex. Univ. of Chicago Press. THOMAS, W. L; and ZNANIECKI, FLORIAN (1918-1920) 1958 The Polish Peasant in Europe and America. 2 vols,, 2d ed. New York: Dover. -> See especially Volume 2, pages 1800-1821, "Sexual Immorality of Girls." UNWIN, JOSEPH D. 1940 Hopousia: Or, the Sexual and Economic Foundations of a New Society. London: Allen & Unwin. WESTERMARCK, EDWARD A. (1889) 1921 The History of Human Marriage. 3 vols., 5th ed. London: Macmillan. Ill SEXUAL DEVIATION: PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS
One premise of psychoanalytic doctrine is that the general developmental process of childhood includes psychosexual development. It may be taken as a general premise of all growth, physical and psychological, that at any one stage of devel-
209
opment the organism's current growth status and future potential is determined by (1) what it began with, (2) what has been added or subtracted in the interim, perhaps irreversibly, and (3) the growth-facilitating or growth-impeding environment that it may meet. Thus, at the moment of conception, growth status and potential is determined by both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the genetic code of information, supplied half by the mother, half by the father, and by the intrauterine environment in which the fertilized egg exists. The intrauterine environment may prove hostile mechanically, metabolically, or because of the invasion of foreign organisms, viruses for example. The embryo itself may be its own enemy, as when a particular developmental phase or system fails, with subsequent deleterious effects on another phase or system. For example, if the testes differentiate imperfectly in a genetic male, then the fetal testicular secretions fail, with the result that the anlagen of the external genital morphology develop as either completely or partially female, depending on the degree of testicular failure. Contrarily, in the case of a genetic female, if the fetal adrenal cortex functions erroneously, so as to produce an excess of androgen in the place of expected cortisone, then the anlagen of the external genitalia will masculinize in their development, even to the point that the genital tubercle becomes a fully formed penis instead of a clitoris. Principle of the critical period Both of the foregoing examples of an error in embryonic sexual development illustrate the principle of the critical period, that is to say, that period in the development of some system or function when the organism passes from a neutral or undifferentiated stage to a differentiated one. It is during this critical period that development is vulnerable to interference and deflection, which, if they occur, will leave a permanent residual in structure or function. The further development of the organism will then in some degree be determined by, or influenced by, the outcome of the critical period. Effects of atypical early experiences. The concept of the critical period applies not only to morphologic and prenatal development, but to behavioral, psychological, and postnatal development as well. In behavioral science, the European animal ethologists were the first to observe that patterns of behavior, including sexual behavior, can be experimentally changed during a critical, developmental learning period, and thenceforth
210
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: Deviation: Psychological Aspects
this deviance becomes relatively fixed. In other words, particular atypical experiences may interfere with or deform the genetic, hormonal, or neural norms of behavioral development otherwise expected. The justly famous experiments of Harlow (see Money 1965a, chapter 7) on the macaque monkey are a case in point. The experimental monkeys showed that opportunity to play with age-mates in early childhood was a developmental prerequisite to the achievement of normal copulatory ability in adolescence. Depriving the infants of childhood play, combined with depriving them of interaction with their mothers by rearing them with dummy mothers made of wire covered with a piece of towel, had particularly adverse effects. Such doubly deprived animals were unable to adapt to the motions of mating and to effect sexual intercourse even when paired with mates selected for experience and gentleness. Those few females in whom pregnancy was finally achieved were incompetent to mother their own young. They neglected and injured them, sometimes cruelly. Other aspects of their behavior, in general, also appeared to be grossly disordered. Another illustrative experiment is that of Birch (1956). Female rats were raised in isolation with a rubber collar or ruff around their necks, which deprived them of the experience of licking themselves or others. They were finally released from their collars to deliver their first litter. Instead of licking the young as they were born, they ate most of them. The surviving 5 per cent were retardedly and improperly retrieved and badly suckled; some were eaten after being carried to the nest. Three survivors of a large litter died of starvation. Their mother had shepherded them under her chin every time they approached her belly to search for a nipple. Experiments in population density with rats have demonstrated yet another way in which behavioral experience, namely crowding, may induce aberrant sexual and social behavior (Calhoun 1962), affecting even the unborn fetuses and their future behavior, presumably via the maternal endocrine system (Keeley 1962). The proper understanding of psychosexual development and of erroneous development in human beings requires focusing attention on experience, behavior, and social interaction during the formative years of childhood. In man, perhaps even more so than in lower species, peculiarities and special features of experience during critical periods may change the expected genetic, hormonal, or neural norms of development.
Hermaphroditism—an example. Probably the most dramatic illustration of this last proposition is to be found in the psychology of hermaphroditism (Money, Hampson, & Hampson 1957; Money 1961). Human hermaphroditism, for which there are several different etiologies, is conventionally defined in terms of a discrepancy between the gonads (ovaries, testes, or, rarely, ovotestes) and the morphology of the external genitalia. Sometimes the discrepancy may be total, as indicated at the beginning of this article, namely, when the gonads are testicular and the external organs are perfectly female (the syndrome of testicular feminization) or when the external organs are perfectly male except for an empty scrotum, the gonads being ovaries and in proper ovarian position (a rare variant of the hyperadrenocortical syndrome of female hermaphroditism). Most commonly in hermaphroditism, however, the discrepancy between gonads and external organs is incomplete, by reason of the fact that the external organs are themselves imperfectly differentiated as either male or female. In this incompleted state of differentiation, the external sex organs of either sex look remarkably similar: the penis with a urinary gutter instead of a tube and with its orifice near the scrotum can easily be confused with an enlarged clitoris, and the incompletely fused scrotum may pass for labia that have improperly begun to fuse. Because confusion is possible and because medical decisions may sometimes differ, it may so happen that two individuals of identical genetic, gonadal, and hormonal diagnosis are assigned to different sexes. Effects of sex assignment. The expected outcome of such sex assignment is that psychosexual differentiation will proceed to take place congruously with assignment and rearing. Ideally, the external organs will have been repaired surgically as early as possible, so as to conform to the assigned sex. The visible, kinesthetic, and tactile body image is a potent fact in a child's own awareness of his or her gender identity, and the visible appearance of sex is, of course, the ultimate criterion for the gender-role expectancies imposed by most of the people who are significant in a child's life. Even with delayed genital repair, it has proved possible for psychosexual differentiation to take place in keeping with assigned sex when genetic, gonadal, and hormonal sex are at variance. Incongruous-looking sex organs militate against psychosexual differentiation appropriate to sex assignment, especially when the incongruity is reinforced by some other source of ambiguity such as paren-
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: Deviation: Psychological Aspects tal lack of conviction as to the way they should be rearing their child or open doubt expressed by age-mates. In some instances, doubt may develop in the child's own mind without any clear retrospective indication of its origin. Ideally, for psychosexual differentiation to be brought to maturity at puberty, assigned sex should not be at variance with hormonal sex and the secondary sexual changes of the body that are hormonally controlled. This ideal can be met in modern endocrinology. Yet, there are occasional untreated cases; among them are cases of hormonal virilization in girls with the hyperadrenocortical syndrome, which is remarkable in view of the intensity of virilization and its early onset before the usual age of puberty. These cases show that the persistence of a feminine psychosexual differentiation is possible despite the hormonal contradiction and its severe handicap to proper adolescent social maturation. Crucial variables. In psychosexual differentiation, the crucial variables, which may in hermaphroditism be independent of one another and may be overridden by the experiential effects of assignment and rearing, are five: (1) chromosomal sex, as determined by actual chromosomal count, (2) gonadal sex, (3) hormonal sex, (4) internal accessory morphologic sex, and (5) external morphologic sex. Psychosexual differentiation itself transcends not only all five of these variables but also the assigned sex in the syndrome of transvestism with transsexualism, which has, therefore, been treated, and not without reasonable success, by surgical, hormonal, and social sex reassignment (Benjamin 1964; Pauly 1965). To have found rare clinical cases in which the five physical variables can be overridden is not, of course, to have proved that the physical variables do not under other circumstances contribute to, or help determine, psychosexual differentiation. What has been proved is not that psychosexual differentiation is always and exclusively a matter of behavioral and experiential life history but that experiences determined by rearing are far more potent than might otherwise have been expected. Harlow's investigations on the macaque demonstrated, on the one hand, the extraordinary power and permanence of the social-experience factor in preventing psychosexual maturity; but they also led him, on the other hand, to conclude that sex differences in normal macaque behavior antedate childhood experience and learning. Harlow observed (1962) that the young male monkeys made more threats toward other monkeys, both male and female, than did the young females.
211
The females' threats, moreover, were reserved primarily for other young females. The young females retreated more often than the males, specifically by adopting the female sexual posture. The young males initiated more play contacts, with playmates of either sex, than did the females; and the males had a monopoly on rough-and-tumble play. With increasing age, the males showed increasing frequency of the male mounting position in their copulatory play. They showed little grooming behavior, which, in adults, is more a characteristic of female than male sexual behavior. The application of Harlow's method of direct observations and systematic experiments on monkeys is restricted in human beings, as compared with clinical case study, by reason of the usual ethical vetoes on experimental manipulation of the lives of human beings and by the customary taboos imposed on sexual play and the expression of sexual interests in childhood. Systematic experimental attempts to study the development of masculinity and femininity have confined themselves to the secondary data of questionnaires or interviews or to the oblique data of free association, projective tests, and play. Although not thoroughly consistent or definitive, the findings show that psychosexual differentiation varies with age and in some degree is related to family and class differences in child-rearing practices and the emotional quality of the relationship between the child and each parent. Sex reassignment. That there is a critical period in psychosexual differentiation, and that it is early in life, is suggested by clinical evidence, again from hermaphroditism, namely in instances of a change of the sex of assignment (Money, Hampson, & Hampson 1956). It is not difficult for a child under a year of age to adjust to a sex reassignment, provided the parents can also adjust. But the older the child—for example, if he is past the age of learning to talk and is becoming acquainted with the verbal and other signals of gender difference—and the further that psychosexual differentiation has progressed without ambiguity, the progressively less likely it is that an imposed sex reassignment will be successfully assimilated. It thus appears that the establishment of a psychosexual identity and gender role roughly parallels the learning of the native language. The critical period, in which the basic essentials are laid down, is ended probably by the kindergarten age. The remaining years of childhood are years of consolidation until the hormonal changes of adolescence bring psychosexual differentiation to its completed expression in both the subjective
212
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: Deviation: Psychological Aspects
and the behavioral aspects of falling in love, courtship, mating, and parenthood. Puberty. Hormonal puberty is temporarily delayed sometimes, and sometimes it never occurs, except for the intervention of hormonal replacement therapy. Without the advent of hormonal puberty, psychosexual differentiation remains to some degree in a state of infantilism. The exact degree varies from individual to individual, for the psychosexual maturation of the teen-ager is equated to a certain extent with social maturation, as is well demonstrated in cases of physical sexual precocity where the body becomes sexually mature as early as age six but the social maturation remains consistent with chronological age and/or degree of social exposure. A few hormonally prepubertal teen-agers are able to overcome the handicap of a sexually unappealing, prepubertal body morphology and to keep up socially with their age-mates. But the task is difficult and the competition harsh, so that the majority lag in social maturation. They retreat, as it were, to a younger age group, waiting for the day when their bodies no longer tell a lie about their ages. If this waiting is too protracted, there may be a permanent scar in social development. Those late pubertal developers who succeed in not lagging in social maturity may even succeed also in appearing to have reached psychosexual maturity, in the sense that they have sexual relations, copulate to the partner's satisfaction, and perhaps get married. But their achievement is, in fact, a simulation, insofar as their proprioceptive erotic sensations and cognitional eroticism in general are not the same as they will be after hormonal treatment has begun. A male, for example, whatever peak of erotic experience he may reach, does not have an orgasm as he will later experience it. He does not have sex dreams incorporating orgasm, wet or dry; he does not have masturbation imagery, or much of an urge to masturbate; and he does not respond with the same frequency or intensity to erotic perceptual stimuli, visual and narrative, as he will after hormonal puberty is induced. Probably he is incapable of experiencing an episode of that very intense concatenation of feeling so little attended to scientifically—namely, falling in love. Failure to develop full normal maturity of psychosexual differentiation after hormonal puberty, natural or induced, may represent one of four types of failure in the growth process, regardless of etiology. One is a simple arrestment of development that had been otherwise normal up to that point. The second is a regression from a once more
advanced level. The third is the introduction of a fault or error in development. The fourth'is a continued persistence of developmental error from an earlier period. In psychosexual differentiation, a persistent error may have had its genesis in faulty differentiation at the outset of childhood or perhaps in regression occurring in a later period of childhood. It is probable that a large proportion of psychosexual pathology in evidence at adolescence does not have its initial origins in postpuberty but represents the persistence of faulty psychosexual differentiation earlier. The fault manifests itself in full only under the influence of hormonal maturation. Conspicuous effeminacy in boys, for example, has been noted from as early as the age of three (Green & Money 1961) and seen to progress from later childhood through puberty to chronic, overt homosexuality (unpublished data). Theories of the life history dynamics of homosexuality have recently been comprehensively reviewed by Pritchard (1962) and by Bieber and his associates (see Society of Medical Psychoanalysts 1962). Whatever the type or timing of developmental error, the responsible or contributing etiologic agent may be, singly or in combination, genetic, gestational, metabolic, nutritional, toxic-infective, traumatic, behavioral-experiential, social-interactional, or otherwise. The cold scientific fact of the matter is that astonishingly little is known of the etiology of psychosexual pathologies. Knowledge of their phenomenology and natural history is greater (Money 1963c), although it is far from complete. Brain mechanisms Current advances are being made in knowledge regarding brain mechanisms mediating sexual behavior. Brain ablation was the earliest experimental technique for such investigation, gains and losses in sexual behavior being related to damaged or removed neural centers and pathways. A newer technique is that of direct electrical stimulation of neural centers and pathways by means of microelectrodes implanted in the brain. The neurophysiology of sex is best understood, even if somewhat simplified, in terms of what MacLean (1962) has delineated as man's three brains: the upper mammalian brain or new cortex; the lower mammalian brain or old cortex, also known as the limbic system; and the reptilian brain, comprising the brainstem reticular system, the midbrain, and the basal ganglia. The limbic cortex attaches to the reptilian brain like a pair of headphones covered by the helmet of the neo-
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: Deviation: Psychological Aspects cortex. In the reptilian brain, the centers of the hypothalamus lie in close proximity to the pituitary gland. The hypothalamic-pituitary axis is of fundamental importance in sex, for it is here that the nervous system and the endocrine system meet— here that neural messages become neurohumoral, and neurohumoral ones become hormonal. It is here that the hypothalamus regulates cyclic functioning of the pituitary gonadotropic hormones, which in turn regulate the hormonal functioning of the gonads. Here then, indirectly, lie some of the dictates of behavior related to the effecting of pregnancy and parenthood. The limbic system also collaborates. Electrode implantation studies. In the ringlike arrangement of structures on each side of the brain that form the limbic system, there is in the upper forward part the septum and below it the amygdala. MacLean, exploring the representation of sexual function in the limbic system of the squirrel monkey by means of implanted electrodes, found that partial sexual functions could be directly activated by stimulation of the septal area. In the adjacent area of the amygdala chewing and salivation were activated, with partial erection occurring after many seconds of stimulation or as a rebound phenomenon after the termination of stimulation. MacLean conjectured that the topographical representation of the head end and the rear end of the body in such close proximity bears some relationship to the intimate interplay of behavior in the oral and sexual spheres. In lower animals, this interplay is in evidence in sexual smelling and in the delivery of the young. In human beings it appears in ordinary love play. Exaggerated and distorted, it appears also in the pathologies of anal-oral and urethral-oral stimulation and in stimulation from smelling, smearing, or ingesting feces or urine. The proximity of representation of all the phylogenetically primeval action systems and their related nonverbal feeling or emotion in the old brain may help to explain other pathologies of sex, such as the association of sexual stimulation with mutilation and attack in masochism and sadism. In some of his experiments, MacLean obtained a relation between seminal discharge and genital scratching, which, unless experimentally interrupted, would become severely self-mutilative (MacLean, Dua, & Denniston 1962). Neurohormonal studies. Another new direction in the neurophysiology of sex lies in neurohormonal research (reviewed by Money 1965b). One approach is to inject a sex hormone into the body and then study its effect on sexual centers in the
213
limbic system and in the hypothalamus and adjacent midbrain nuclei. In one group of rabbit studies, Sawyer and his co-workers (Kawakami & Sawyer 1959) demonstrated the effect of subcutaneously injected sex hormone on electroencephalogram activity, registered from implanted electrodes, relative both to local vaginal stimulation and to sexual response. Olds (1958, p. 683) and Critchlaw, working with male rats experimentally prepared for brain self-stimulation, found that with some electrode placements and certain low electric shock, self-stimulation responses disappeared almost completely after castration and reappeared, progressively, after replacement therapy with testosterone propionate in oil. A second approach in neurohormonal research is to implant hormones directly into sexual centers in and around the hypothalamus. Fisher (1956) used the technique of implanting fluid hormone through a microcannula. By introducing minute amounts of testosterone into the preoptic area of male rats, he obtained rather bizarre combinations of mating and maternal behavior, including nest building and persistent retrieving and grooming of foster litters of young. Harris, Michael, and Scott (1958) used the improved technique of implanting microamounts of solid hormone and were able to induce a state of sustained sexual receptivity in cats, in the absence of genitopelvic estrus. Michael (1961; 1962) used radioactive estrogen and traced its site of action in the brain by making autoradiographs of the sliced brain. The autoradiographic technique further established (Glascock & Michael 1962) that individual neurons in the hypothalamus take up radioactive estrogen that has been given by intramuscular injection. These various implantation neurohormonal experiments have shown that the sex hormones are not clearly sex specific, but often paradoxical in their neurobehavioral effect. Other chemicals may be found capable of producing their effects. The ultimate possible application of this new breakthrough in dealing with psychosexual pathology cannot be foreseen at the present time. A third approach in neurohormonal research is to alter the neural organization of later sexual behavior by injecting hormones into the pregnant mother or newborn animal (guinea pig and rat). The findings of several investigators converge, tentatively indicating that, dependent on species differences in gestational age at birth, there is a critical period around the time of birth when androgen has an organizing effect on neural centers in the hypothalamus. This effect abolishes the pituitary's ability subsequently to produce gonado-
214
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: Deviation: Psychological Aspects
tropins cyclically, as in the female; and it allows mating pattern elements that are chiefly masculine, although they are shared by both sexes, to predominate in childhood. Some dimensions of deviance Androgen as an organizer. Androgen is thus implicated as an active organizer of the sexual control system, both in terms of reproductive cycles and sexual behavior. At a critical period earlier in embryonic life, androgen is an active organizer substance without which the internal anlagen of the female reproductive anatomy persist and the anlagen of the external organs feminize (Jost 1958). Nature's primary impulse, in other words, is to make a female. One conjectures a relationship here with the greater vulnerability of the male to disease and death, which would create an unequal sex ratio except for the fact that 106 males are born to 100 females. One conjectures also a connection with the fact that psychosexual disorders have a higher incidence in men than in women, with some of the psychosexual anomalies, like fetishism, voyeurism, and exhibitionism, being to all intents and purposes unheard of in females. Sex differences in arousal patterns. The higher incidence of psychosexual pathologies in the male may be related to a sex difference in erotic arousal patterns. This difference is manifested in the greater capacity of the male to be aroused erotically and genitopelvically, and to be ready for immediate release, by pictorial and narrative imagery. Such stimuli arouse the female sentimentally to want her lover or husband; but she is dependent on direct tactile stimulation, more than the male, for the arousal of genitopelvic eroticism. There is some evidence in the psychology of hermaphroditism that the male arousal pattern may be neurally organized under the influence of androgen in fetal life. It will be for further research to determine whether the development of psychosexual pathology in the male may be rooted in part in imperfect or faulty neurohormonal organization at this early period. One thing already quite clear in the evidence of hermaphroditism is that a masculine type of arousal pattern is perfectly compatible with entirely feminine cognitive content and imagery of eroticism that parallels the sex of assignment. Arousal stimuli. Perceptual stimulants to sexual arousal and the reproductive cycle vary with the species. The relation between light stimulation and the release of pineal hormones is being newly investigated in the rat. Olfactory stimuli also are
the subject of important new experiments (Parkes & Bruce 1961), which show, after copulation in the mouse, that odors released by the male regulate the establishment of pregnancy in the female. Acuity of the sense of smell in human females (Money 1965ft) is regulated by estrogen and varies with the menstrual cycle. Its relation to other cyclic sexual phenomena or to sexual disorder has not been investigated. Odor may be the agent responsible, in the macaque monkey, for fluctuation in male sexual behavior in rhythm with the female menstrual cycle, as described by Michael and Herbert (1963). In addition to benefiting from the new neurophysiological techniques, contemporary sex research has also benefited from the new techniques in genetics. These techniques have enabled researchers to establish the presence (female) or absence (male) of the sex-chromatin mass (Barr body) in the nucleus of the body's cells and to photograph, measure, and count the actual chromosomes in cells. The relevance of the new findings to the theory of psychosexual pathology has been chiefly negative: gross chromosome defects are not demonstrable in the majority of psychosexual disorders. A partial exception may exist in the case of Klinefelter's syndrome. Affected individuals are phenotypic males with an extra X chromosome. There appears to be an unusually high incidence of psychopathology, including sexual disorders, that develops in association with the syndrome (Money 1963a). Among the sexual disorders are homosexuality and transvestism (Money & Pollitt 1964). Otherwise genetics cannot be directly implicated in psychosexual ambiguity (Money 1963k). Disorders of sexual psychology express themselves in full in adolescence after the advent of hormonal puberty brings erotic functioning to maturity. It is probable that the majority of such disorders have their initial origins in faulty psychosexual differentiation persisting from early childhood. Later error or regression of differentiation are also possible, as is simple arrestment in psychosexual growth. Faults, errors, regression, and arrest of development have, on the one hand, a chronologic origin and, on the other hand, an etiologic origin. The chronologic origin may fall within a critical period, with resultant immutability or refractoriness to change. The etiologic origin may be single or multiple. An etiologic factor may by itself represent only a potential vulnerability to psychosexual disorder, materializing only when in combination
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: Deviation: Social Aspects with another factor or factors. Thus a genetic vulnerability may materialize only when the behavioral environment conspires appropriately. Etiologic considerations include genetic, gestational, metabolic, nutritional, toxic—infective, traumatic, behavioral-experiential, and social-interactional factors. JOHN MONEY [Other relevant material may be found in AFFECTION; DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY; GENETICS; IDENTITY, PSYCHOSOCIAL; INFANCY, article On THE EFFECTS OF EARLY EXPERIENCE; NERVOUS SYSTEM; PSYCHOANALYSIS; SOCIALIZATION.] BIBLIOGRAPHY
BENJAMIN, H. 1964 Nature and Management of Transsexualism: With a Report on Thirty-one Operated Cases. Western Journal of Surgery, Obstetrics and Gynecology 72:105-111. BIRCH, H. G. 1956 Sources of Order in the Maternal Behavior of Animals. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 26:279-284. CALHOUN, JOHN B. 1962 Population Density and Social Pathology. Scientific American 206, Feb.: 139-148. FISHER, ALAN E. 1956 Maternal and Sexual Behavior Induced by Intracranial Chemical Stimulation. Science 124:228-229. GLASCOCK, R. F.; and MICHAEL, R. P. 1962 The Localization of Oestrogen in a Neurological System in the Brain of the Female Cat. Journal of Physiology 163: 38P-39P. GREEN, RICHARD; and MONEY, JOHN 1961 Effeminacy in Prepubertal Boys: Summary of Eleven Cases and Recommendations for Case Management. Pediatrics 27:286-291. HARLOW, HARRY F. 1962 The Heterosexual Affectional System in Monkeys. American Psychologist 17:1—9. HARRIS, G. W.; MICHAEL, R. P.; and SCOTT, P. P. 1958 Neurological Site of Action of Stilboestrol in Eliciting Sexual Behavior. Pages 236-254 in Ciba Foundation, Symposium on the Neurological Basis of Behavior. Edited by G. E. W. Wolstenholme and C. M. O'Connor. Boston: Little. -> Includes two pages of discussion. JOST, ALFRED 1958 Embryonic Sexual Differentiation: Morphology, Physiology, Abnormalities. Pages 15-45 in Howard W. Jones and William W. Scott (editors), Hermaphroditism, Genital Anomalies and Related Endocrine Disorders. Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins. KAWAKAMI, M.; and SAWYER, CHARLES H. 1959 Neuroendocrine Correlates of Changes in Brain Activity Thresholds by Sex Steroids and Pituitary Hormones. Endocrinology 65:652-668. KEELEY, KIM 1962 Prenatal Influence on Behavior of Offspring of Crowded Mice. Science 135:44-45. MACLEAN, PAUL D. 1962 New Findings Relevant to the Evolution of Psychosexual Functions of the Brain. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 135:289-301. MACLEAN, PAUL D.; DUA, S.; and DENNISTON, R. H. 1962 A Mapping of Cerebral Structures Involved in Seminal Discharge and Genital Scratching. American Neurological Association, Transactions 87:136-139. MICHAEL, RICHARD P. 1961 An Investigation of the Sensitivity of Circumscribed Neurological Areas to Hormonal Stimulation by Means of the Application of Oestrogens Directly to the Brain of the Cat. Pages
215
465-480 in International Neurochemical Symposium, Fourth, Varenna, Italy, 1960, Regional Neurochemistry . . . Proceedings. Oxford: Pergamon Press. MICHAEL, RICHARD P. 1962 Estrogen-sensitive Neurons and Sexual Behavior in Female Cats. Science 136: 322-323. MICHAEL, RICHARD P.; and HERBERT, J. 1963 Menstrual Cycle Influences Grooming Behavior and Sexual Activity in the Rhesus Monkey. Science 140:500-501. MONEY, JOHN 1961 Hermaphroditism. Volume 1, pages 472-484 in Albert Ellis and Albert Abarbanel (editors), Encyclopedia of Sexual Behavior. New York: Hawthorn. MONEY, JOHN 1963a Cytogenetic and Psychosexual Incongruities With a Note on Space-Form Blindness. American Journal of Psychiatry 119:820-827. MONEY, JOHN 1963b Factors in the Genesis of Homosexuality. Pages 19-43 in Conference on Community Mental Health Research, yourth, Washington University, St. Louis, 1962, Determinants of Human Sexual Behavior: Proceedings. Springfield, 111.: Thomas. MONEY, JOHN 1963c Psychosexual Development in Man. Volume 5, pages 1678-1709 in Encyclopedia of Mental Health. New York: Watts. MONEY, JOHN (editor) 1965a Sex Research: New Developments. New York: Holt. -» See especially Chapter 7, "The Effect of Rearing Conditions on Behavior," by Harry F. Harlow and M. K. Harlow. MONEY, JOHN 1965fo Influence of Hormones on Sexual Behavior. Annual Review of Medicine 16:67-82. MONEY, JOHN; HAMPSON, J. G.; and HAMPSON, J. L. 1956 Sexual Incongruities and Psychopathology: The Evidence of Human Hermaphroditism. Johns Hopkins Hospital Bulletin 98:43-57. MONEY, JOHN; HAMPSON, J. G.; and HAMPSON, J. L. 1957 Imprinting and the Establishment of Gender Role. A.M.A. Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry 77:333336. MONEY, JOHN; and POLLITT, ERNESTO 1964 Cytogenetic and Psychosexual Ambiguity: Klinefelter's Syndrome and Transvestism Compared. Archives of General Psychiatry 11:589-595. OLDS, JAMES 1958 Self-stimulation Experiments and Differentiated Reward Systems. Pages 671-687 in Herbert H. Jasper et al. (editors), Reticular Formation of the Brain. Boston: Little. PARKES, A. S.; and BRUCE, H. M. 1961 Olfactory Stimuli in Mammalian Reproduction. Science 134:1049-1054. PAULY, IRA B. 1965 Male Psychosexual Inversion: Transsexualism. Archives of General Psychiatry 13:172181. PRITCHARD, MICHAEL 1962 Homosexuality and Genetic Sex. Journal of Mental Science 108:616-623. SOCIETY OF MEDICAL PSYCHOANALYSTS 1962 Homosexuality: A Psychoanalytic Study, by Irving Bieber et al. New York: Basic Books. IV SEXUAL DEVIATION: SOCIAL ASPECTS
Deviance in general, and sexual deviance in particular, presents the scientist with extremely difficult problems of definition and analysis. Sexuality is, perhaps more than any other aspect of human behavior, mingled with moral imperatives, conscious fantasy, and unconscious desires, all of which combine to trouble even most scientific ob-
216
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: Deviation: Social Aspects
servers (Trilling 1950; Rieff 1959). The recognized necessity (not to mention utility) of sexual behavior makes the problem of establishing cutoff points beyond which the interaction of actors, acts, and contexts may be defined as deviant even more obscure than it is in other areas of behavior. The positive functions of the sexual impulse for society have indeed resulted in advocacy, by small minorities to be sure, of behavior that is widely conceived of as immoral, antisocial, or immature. In a discussion of sexual deviance it would be useful to consider cross-cultural data. However, there is a minimum of scientifically comparable data about sexual behavior available, even from European countries (see Kinsey et al. 1953, pp. 95-96 for a list of such research), and a systematic attempt to discuss sexual deviance in non-Western cultures, where only the barest outline of information about sexual behavior is available, would be presumptuous. A useful compilation of the available cross-cultural information has been made by Clellan S. Ford and Frank A. Beach (1951). In this article the cultural focus is mainly the United States; other industrialized Western societies are treated with less precision.
male participation in deviant behavior than female, but both sexes include a relatively large number of taboo violators. In addition, for the relatively short period for which data are available these rates of participation have remained remarkably stable, indicating that they are outgrowths of normal social operation rather than the consequence of upheaval or disorder. There is evidence that although there is a wide distribution of these different forms of sexual behavior, attitudes toward them remain relatively repressive (see Wheeler 1960 and I. Reiss 1960 for attitudes toward premarital coitus). Repressive attitudes can be held even by those who habitually participate in deviant sexual activities, as has been shown by a study of homosexually experienced males (Gebhard et al. 1965, pp. 638-639). In addition, there is some evidence that these attitudes are situation-specific and change over the individual's life cycle; for instance, Robert Bell and Jack Buerkle (1961) found that the attitudes of mothers toward their daughters' having premarital coitus varied with the age of the mother, the age of the daughter, and other factors affecting motherdaughter relationships.
Sexual prohibitions and their violation Sexuality has the curious distinction of being the only biological drive that has been regulated in nearly all its physical manifestations. Although these prohibitions are often attributed to the prudery of the nineteenth century, it is clear that they are of considerably more ancient origin. All the sexual acts that are currently legislated against in the criminal law owe their stigma to the JudaeoChristian religious tradition. These very early prohibitions remain with us today, when, in a very different context and serving other functions, they still operate to shape training for sexual behavior, attitudes toward this behavior in both the self and in others, and the institutional structures that are meant to control it. Although it is possible to find some situation in which any act might be described as deviant, it is very difficult to approximate the universal condemnation of deviant sexuality in any other area of behavior. Particularly impressive is the discrepancy between the system of sexual taboos, as expressed in both the law and individual attitudes, and the corresponding systems of overt behavior. From the survey research on sexual behavior in the United States (see Kinsey et al. 1953, pp. 94-95), it is apparent that violations of widely held taboos against many forms of sexual behavior are frequent. There is a considerable bias toward greater
Sexual learning as a source of deviance Given the strong taboos against most of its manifestations, it is very difficult to determine why so much deviant behavior occurs. However, it is important to point out that although the taboos are strongly expressed, the sanctions are not as strongly invoked. At the social-psychological level the major question seems to be "What are the reasons for the attachment to the prohibitory rules, coupled with the failure to apply sanctions?" Part of this is probably due to the sheer strength of the biological drive. It is important not to assume that all of the variance in sexual behavior is attributable to social and psychological factors, since there is still a general lack of data on the interaction between these elements and the biological substrate. Some of the differences between the overt sexual behavior of males and females may be due to basic hormonal and other biological characteristics as well as to differential socialization practices (Kinsey et al. 1953, chapters 14—18; Money 1961; Young, Goy, & Phoenix 1964). The supreme importance of early childhood experience for sexual development—an insight that we owe to the early work of Freud (1905)—has been amply demonstrated by the work of such researchers as John Money (1961), John and Joan Hampson (1961), Harry Harlow (1959), and Rene Spitz (1949). In the first few years of life, interactions
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: Deviation: Social Aspects between parents and children, predominantly at the nonverbal level, build a basis of sexual capacities on which later verbal learning concerning normative standards of behavior about these capacities is overlaid. Furthermore, the majority of adult-child interaction having impact on the learning of sexual behavior is not conceived of by the adult as having any relevance to the ultimate sexual adjustment of the child. Such adult-child interaction is permitted or even encouraged, provided that its latent sexual content is not explicitly labeled or identified for what it is; as soon as it is so labeled and acknowledged it falls within the purview of one prohibition or another. Because of these learning conditions the child grows up in what has been called a nonlabeled or mislabeled sexual environment (Sears, Maccoby, & Levin 1957, pp. 176-217). It is the ambiguity of early sexual instruction that seems to be important. The setting of the capacities and directions of sexual behavior occurs at an unrecognized and unconscious level, whereas the conscious attitude instruction not only takes place sporadically but frequently is unrelated to the development of the behavioral systems that the attitudes purport to control. One of the functions of language is that of helping the child to order and to control the world; apparently, what happens in the formation of sexual attitudes is that words are not supplied to the child to enable him to label and come to grips with his feelings and desires. In such a context the sexual zone is left to the imagery and fantasy often noted in childhood (and adult) sexuality. Examination of the social structures that control sexual learning after childhood makes apparent the imprecision and vagueness of the connections that exist between behavior on the one hand, and attitudes toward such behavior, on the other. A certain amount of sexual display and exploration occurs during the prepubertal years among members of both sexes, but the significant element is that unless this activity is noted and defined negatively by adults or unless the behavior takes place between an experienced person and a child, there is little impact on the child. In addition, there is not necessarily any organization of sexual learning as a result of these experiences. A child who has had prepubertal experience similar to coitus may be unaware of the connection between this behavior and other sexual activities. During puberty the significance of the genital sexual function becomes more apparent, but young people who become involved in sexual behavior do so in considerable ignorance. In the culture of
217
adolescence the folklore of sexual experience is rife with error and misperception. Males and females get together sexually often as the result of accident, and frequently they do so for nonsexual motives. Because of the strength of the sexual drive and the ambiguous circumstances under which its control is learned, much adult sexual behavior takes place under conditions of mutual misunderstanding. Although there is a transfer of learning from one sexual experience to another, there is rarely a successful dialogue between male and female about such matters of mutual sexual interest. The bulk of sexual communication is gestural and, between persons with some mutual experience, often ritual in character. Forms of sexual deviance Deviance is traditionally conceived of as being antithetical to the values of the larger social system, although it is often thought to have value because punishment of it reinforces conformity. Many sociologists have described deviance as being learned in a socially well-defined initiatory system (for example, the predelinquent subculture or even lower-class society in toW) and maintained in a supportive social setting (for example, the drugaddict community). A primary weakness of such theories of "differential association" (Sutherland & Cressey [1924] 1960, pp. 74-81) or differential identification in the explanation of deviance is that they require an interactional system in which the actor learns the values and techniques of the deviant life. For most sex offenders, and for nearly all classes of sexual behavior that are described as deviant, a prior socially structured learning system apparently does not exist. In addition, the notion that deviant behavior must be maintained through subcultural supportive systems is difficult to apply to the problem of sexual deviance, although in some types of sexual deviance such systems do appear. Sexual deviance seems to be of three general types. The first is situation-specific deviance that is normatively disvalued (or at least not valued positively) but which nonetheless serves generally useful purposes and is so ubiquitous that sanctions are applied to only a minority of those involved. This type of deviance involves no articulated system of social roles. The second type of sexual deviance consists of those forms that have supportive social organizations either for the purpose of gathering sexual partners or clientele together, or for social support in deviance, or for both purposes. Finally, there is a large body of deviance (pedophilia, incest, and so on), which is condemned and
278
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: Deviation: Social Aspects
against which strong sanctions are invoked, that does not seem to be learned in recognizable deviant social structures and that does not have a socially organized performance system. Functional deviance. Masturbation and premarital coitus are primary examples of behavior that is generally defined as deviant but that does not involve the application of sanctions unless the perpetrators are, by some mischance, apprehended or there is some untoward consequence, such as pregnancy or venereal disease. These forms of behavior may be described as "wrong but normal." There is considerable class variation in the incidence and frequency of masturbation and premarital coitus, with the former important among middle-class males and the latter among lower-class males. Solitary masturbation is not against the law; premarital coitus may be, especially if either party is legally a minor, but even so prosecutions are comparatively rare. The perceived utility of masturbation as a male adolescent sexual outlet with few social consequences in comparison to coitus may account for the decreasing stigma attached to it. It seems to be related to other behavior denned by social class and characterizes males who assume middle-class occupational roles (Kinsey et al. 1948, chapter 10). Premarital coitus is culturally valued for males especially within the pro-masculine lower-class culture, accounting for its prevalence and the lack of invoked sanctions (I. Reiss I960; Whyte 1943). Both masturbation and coitus are class-linked and seem to be the most appropriate responses to the impact of the sexual drive after puberty in the male. For females premarital coitus is connected with impending marriage and a love relationship; thus, the behavior is defined as proper in a situation-specific way. Masturbation in females seems to have no class linkages at all. In general these activities have a smaller incidence and a lower frequency among females than among males, possibly because of both hormonal differences and differences in socialization. Deviant subcultures. The second type of deviant sexual behavior is that which involves supportive social structures either for the purpose of entry into the system of behavior or for the maintenance of the individual in the behavior. This type of behavior comprises homosexuality and prostitution. It is only female prostitution that has all the elements of a deviant subculture similar to that of drug addicts or juvenile delinquents (Davis 1961; Kinsey et al. 1948, chapter 10). In this situation the stigma for the sexual behavior is attached to the prostitute, and the legal sanctions for
the behavior are leveled primarily against her, secondarily against the abetting persons (pimps, madams), and exceedingly rarely against the customers or against agents of law enforcement who may condone her activities. Prostitution develops organized forms primarily because of its commercial aspect and because of the character of the enforcement program that is designed to control it. For the most part, recruitment of individuals for homosexual experience does not occur through a social system organized for that purpose. The majority of persons who come to conceive of themselves as homosexual do so on the basis of readying experiences early in life that are linked to secondary reinforcements in puberty. Unfortunately, studies of the etiology of homosexuality have been most unsatisfactory in their attempts to locate the crucial early experiences that are salient (Money 1963). Some etiological studies have focused on biological and especially genetic factors, sometimes mediated through hormonal anomalies. But even though there have been some studies of twins (Kallman 1952; 1963) and some work has been done on hormonal factors (Kinsey 1941), the most persuasive discussions of early factors in the development of a homosexual commitment have been couched in the psychoanalytic tradition or in certain variants of it (Society . . . 1962; Ovesey 1954). The psychoanalytic tradition locates the origins of homosexuality in pathological versions of parentchild relations in which the mother provokes her son's sexual interest and in consequence burdens him with an anxiety about incest with which he cannot deal. As a result his relations with females are blighted because of his fears of paternal revenge for his incest, which remains forever unconsummated. Other explanations in this tradition are less metaphorical in their language but still focus upon seductive mothers, detached fathers, lack of a male figure in the home, and the like. Unfortunately the bulk of the populations who have been the source of the data in these reports have been examined in the course of psychotherapy or other treatment, creating a situation in which pathology and homosexuality are inextricably confounded. Psychological research into homosexuality has also maintained a determined concern with the etiological question and with developing instrumentation that might successfully distinguish between the homosexual and the heterosexual on the basis of either manifest items or latent items that are presumed to be indicators of homosexual commitments (see, for instance, the psychometric indices of masculinity and femininity used by Brown 1958;
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: Deviation: Social Aspects Hooker 1957; 1958; Dean & Richardson 1964; Freimd 1963). During the pubescent years there is a good deal of minor homosexual experimentation that accounts for nearly all of the homosexual activity of the predominantly heterosexual portion of the population. Thus, it can be predicted that about one in three of all males born in the United States will at some time have a homosexual experience to the point of orgasm; however, about 85 per cent of those having such experience will do so only in their adolescent years. Among females the proportion who ever have a homosexual experience will be somewhat smaller, but once again most of them will confine the experience to adolescence (Kinsey et al. 1948; 1953). The factors that distinguish those who go on to adult homosexual commitments from those who experience homosexual acts only as transient parts of adolescent development are still unknown. However, it is known that males often develop strong sexual interests in other males without knowing that there is such a thing as homosexuality. (This process occurs more frequently in specialized sexual interests such as transvestism and fetishism.) The realization of being homosexual occurs in a variety of ways: sometimes through processes of introspection, sometimes through falling in with other homosexuals who act seductively, and sometimes through sexual contacts with other males who finally become defined as homosexual. It is after the point of conscious admission that one is a homosexual—an admission that ranges from the traumatic to the delighted—that the search for sexual partners begins. This search usually requires entry into the world of homosexual bars, development of the argot of homosexual life, and gradual learning of the modes of approach and retreat that are related to the satisfaction of sexual needs. Study of this zone of the homosexual's adjustment is beginning to result in a literature that suggests that adult homosexual commitments are not re-enactments of early pathological relations between parents and children. These studies have begun to outline the processes of adult socialization that are involved in the development of the homosexual commitment. There now also exists a literature on particular aspects of the homosexual life (Hooker 1966; Leznoff & Westly 1956; Achilles 1967). The extant literature is nearly exclusively concerned with the male homosexual; the literature on the lesbian is both scanty and scientifically inadequate. In general, discussions of the lesbian tend to focus on the similarities between male and
219
female homosexuality and to see one as the mirror image of the other—that is, to see male homosexuals as imitations of females and female homosexuals as imitations of males. A more satisfactory view, however, is to see female homosexuality as continuous with normal female sexuality (Simon & Gagnon 1967; Ovesey 1956). Not all homosexuals are regular members of the homosexual community and many of them never involve themselves in this social milieu at all. It is difficult to determine whether or not a more intensive or a more detached relationship to the community is more helpful in the homosexual's personal and social adjustment. The maintenance of female homosexuality occurs more often outside the community context than does homosexuality among males (Simon & Gagnon 1967). The development of homosexual contacts among prisoners in penal institutions is more like an articulated system of introduction to homosexual experience than is homosexual development in the free community. Homosexual behavior in prisons ranges from the careful seduction, in adult male institutions, of a weaker male by an aggressive male (involving money and protection from the latter in exchange for the sexual cooperation of the former, and often leading to "marriage") to the "extended family" systems observed in juvenile female institutions and the homosexual "bringing out" in female penitentiaries (Lindner 1948; Sykes 1958; Halleck & Hersko 1962; Lamberti 1963; Ward & Kassebaum 1965; Giallombardo 1966). The antisocial deviant. The third type of deviant sexual acts to be considered are those most specifically prosecuted by law-enforcement agencies; they involve aggression, youth, close kin relations, and public disturbance (a typology suggested both in Wheeler 1960 and in Indiana University 1965; see pp. 1-13 for the classification of sex offenders). Most of these acts are committed by individuals whose behavior is the result of needs developed outside any subcultural or deviant training ground composed of other persons oriented toward the same behavior. The origins of heterosexual pedophilia, for example, seem to lie in the incapacity of the male to establish any meaningful relationship with an adult female or in many cases a failure to find any sociosexual outlet at any level of psychological involvement. The pedophile resorts to children because the difference in age gives him a sense of power over them as well as the hope that he will meet with an uncritical reception. There is no social support for the act either before or after its occurrence. The individual has the latent capacity to commit the act without any
220
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: Deviation: Social Aspects
social support, and at the intersection of the appropriate forces (aging, alcohol, fatigue, emotional stress) a sexual contact with a child occurs. The model of the behavior that seems to be most useful is that of the releasing mechanism. The pedophile has learned in childhood a certain set of responses that gives him the potential for the act as an adult. Under the appropriate circumstances the potential is realized. Other sexual acts of the third type that have some of the aspects of pedophilia are homosexual pedophilia, exhibitionism, compulsive peeping, and sex offenses involving incest and the use of force. In the cases of peeping, assaultive offenses, and incest there are certain complicating social or cultural factors. Peeping and the use of minimal aggression in sexual relations are not necessarily viewed as abnormal or deviant. The act of peeping is something that many males have performed when confronted by a lighted unshaded window; however, for the impulse to invade and dominate the sexual life of the individual to such an extent that he must seek out windows in which to look suggests that more than a simple heterosexual interest is involved. A certain amount of aggression by males is expected in the process of sexual exploration in Western culture, and it is clear that excessive force is used more frequently than is reported to the agencies of law enforcement. This is predominantly a lower-class phenomenon, but not totally so, since there is evidence for its occurring among college-level males as well (Kirkpatrick & Kanin 1957). There are indications that those college-level males who do use force have certain other characteristics that differentiate them from males who do not use force. The aggressive male is commonly responding to his own needs rather than to the interactional situation in which he is involved. What may be involved is a blunting of the capacity to recognize negative signs displayed by the female, either as a function of the male's specific personality characteristics or as a function of his sexual excitement. Incest. The problem of sexual contact between relatives is confined primarily to father-daughter contacts and to a lesser extent to those between brothers and sisters and between cousins. The last two are usually transitory childhood contacts or those that take place just after puberty, and in the case of brother—sister incest they may be made more complicated by the presence of mental deficiency. Father-daughter contacts are most prevalent in rural, or rural-origin, families. The families in which such contacts occur commonly are extremely disorganized families in which the father
converts the daughter into a source of sexual and often pseudo-marital relations (Kaufman et al. 1954). Mothers in these families retreat from the center of the family life, and only if the daughter is quite young does the mother inform the police. With very young daughters the offense often has elements of pedophilia. Sex-offense rates. A useful point to be made about deviant behavior of this third type is that over long periods of time it represents a relatively stable proportion of all offenses known to the police, of all persons arrested, and of all felons in penal institutions. In addition, the rates per hundred thousand in the population have remained stable for many years. The stability of these rates indicates that disturbed and disorganized families represent a rather constant source of individuals who grow up with strategic weaknesses in their character structures and thus become sexual offenders. The rate of increase in the number of such persons, however, does not exceed the growth rate of the population, indicating that the roots of these kinds of deviant acts are in the family, as the basic unit of social organization, rather than in secondary social structures. As can be seen from the foregoing discussion, the forms of sexual behavior that are approved arise from sources very similar to those from which the forms called deviant arise, and the margins between one and the other are sharp in moral evaluation but vague in fact. The general situation of sexuality in this society may be best described as that of pluralistic ignorance, a condition of noninformation and misinformation that serves to direct (or misdirect) a powerful drive. For the vast majority of deviant sexual acts, negative sanctions are frequently expressed but only sporadically enforced. For a smaller proportion of acts, deviant behavior involves recognizable social organization that serves either as a learning structure or as a performance structure for the development and maintenance of the behavior. Finally, for a very small proportion there seem to be no social structural components to the behavior, either for its development or for its continuation, and its origins seem most likely to be in early familial life, as was explained above. With the general absence of mediating social structures between the original development of sexual capacity in childhood and the performance of sexual roles in adulthood the conditions described above are not surprising. Sexual roles are worked out on an individual basis with a general incapacity to share and reformulate very large portions of the
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: Deviation: Social Aspects sexual experience. Since there is a high premium on silence in sexual matters, there is rarely an opportunity for social checks on deviant impulses, nor does there exist any system by which the behavior of individuals, if it varies from the rigid normative standards, can be examined in terms of the behavior's relevant social and psychological meaning. Of all of the areas of deviant behavior, it is sexual deviance which most strongly maintains its "individualistic" character. JOHN H. GAGNON [See also DEVIANT BEHAVIOR; MENTAL DISORDERS; and the biographies of FREUD; KINSEY.] BIBLIOGRAPHY
ACHILLES, NANCY 1967 The Development of the Homosexual Bar as an Institution. Pages 214-228 in John H. Gagnon and William Simon (editors), Sexual Deviance. New York: Harper. BELL, ROBERT R.; and BUERKLE, JACK V. 1961 Mother and Daughter Attitudes to Premarital Sexual Behavior. Marriage and Family Living 23:390-392. BROWN, DANIEL G. 1958 Inversion and Homosexuality. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 28:424-429. DAVIS, KINGSLEY 1961 Prostitution. Pages 262-288 in Robert K. Merton and Robert A. Nisbet (editors), Contemporary Social Problems. New York: Harcourt. DEAN, ROBERT B.; and RICHARDSON, HAROLD 1964 Analysis of MMPI Profiles of Forty College-educated Overt Male Homosexuals. Journal of Consulting Psychology 28:483-486. EHRMANN, WINSTON 1959 Premarital Dating Behavior. New York: Holt. FORD, CLELLAN S.; and BEACH, FRANK A. 1951 Patterns of Sexual Behavior. New York: Harper. FREUD, SIGMUND (1905) 1953 Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. Volume 7, pages 123-245 in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. -> First published as Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie. FREUND, KURT 1963 A Laboratory Method for Diagnosing Predominance of Homo- or Hetero-erotic Interest in the Male. Behavior Research and Therapy 1:85-93. GAGNON, JOHN H.; and SIMON, WILLIAM (editors) 1967 Sexual Deviance. New York: Harper. GIALLOMBARDO, ROSE 1966 Society of Women: A Study of a Woman's Prison. New York: Wiley. HALLECK, SEYMOUR L.; and HERSKO, MARVIN 1962 Homosexual Behavior in a Correctional Institution for Adolescent Girls. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 32:911-917. HAMPSON, JOHN L.; and HAMPSON, JOAN G. 1961 The Ontogenesis of Sexual Behavior in Man. Pages 14011432 in William C. Young (editor), Sex and Internal Secretions. 3d ed. 2 vols. Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins. HARLOW, HARRY F. 1959 Love in Infant Monkeys. Scientific American 200, no. 6:68—74. HOOKER, EVELYN 1957 The Adjustment of the Male Overt Homosexual. Journal of Projective Techniques 21:18-31. HOOKER, EVELYN 1958 Male Homosexuality in the Rorschach. Journal of Projective Techniques 22:33-54.
221
HOOKER, EVELYN 1966 The Homosexual Community. Pages 354-364 in James O. Palmer and Michael J. Goldstein (editors), Perspectives in Psychopathology. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. INDIANA UNIVERSITY, INSTITUTE FOR SEX RESEARCH 1965 Sex Offenders: An Analysis of Types, by Paul H. Gebhard, J. H. Gagnon, W. B. Pomeroy, and C. V. Christenson. New York: Harper. KALLMAN, FRANZ J. 1952 Comparative Twin Study on the Genetic Aspects of Male Homosexuality. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 115:283-298. KALLMAN, F. J. 1963 Genetic Aspects of Sex Determination and Sexual Maturation Potentials in Man. Pages 5-18 in Conference on Community Mental Health Research, 4th, Washington University, St. Louis, 1962, Determinants of Human Sexual Behavior. Edited by George Winokur. Springfield, 111.: Thomas. KARPMAN, BENJAMIN 1954 The Sexual Offender and His Offenses. New York: Julian Press. KAUFMAN, IRVING; PECK, A. L.; and TAGIURI, C. K. 1954 The Family Constellation and Overt Incestuous Relations Between Father and Daughter. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 24:266-277. KINSEY, ALFRED C. 1941 Criteria for a Hormonal Explanation of the Homosexual. Journal of Clinical Endocrinology 1:424-428. KINSEY, ALFRED C.; POMEROY, W. B.; and MARTIN, C. E. 1948 Sexual Behavior in the Human Male. Philadelphia : S aunders. KINSEY, ALFRED C. et al. 1953 Sexual Behavior in the Human Female. Philadelphia: Saunders. KIRKPATRICK, CLIFFORD; and KANIN, EUGENE 1957 Male Sex Aggression on a University Campus. American Sociological Review 22:52-58. LAMBERTI, ARMAND 1963 A Type of Peer Relationship in a Girls' Training School. Menninger Clinic, Bulletin 27:200-204. LEZNOFF, MAURICE; and WESTLEY, WILLIAM 1953 The Homosexual Community. Social Problems 3:257-263. LINDNER, ROBERT M. 1948 Sexual Behavior in Penal Institutions. Pages 201-215 in Albert Deutsch (editor), Sex Habits of American Men: A Symposium on the Kinsey Report. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: PrenticeHall. MARMOR, JUDD (editor) 1965 Sexual Inversion: The Multiple Roots of Homosexuality. New York: Basic Books. MONEY, JOHN 1961 Sex Hormones and Other Variables in Human Eroticism. Pages 1383-1400 in William C. Young (editor), Sex and Internal Secretions. 2 vols. 3d ed. Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins. MONEY, JOHN 1963 Factors in the Genesis of Homosexuality. Pages 19-43 in Conference on Community Mental Health Research, 4th, Washington University, St. Louis, 1962, Determinants'of Human Sexual Behavior. Edited by George Winokur. Springfield, 111.: Thomas. OVESEY, LIONEL 1954 The Homosexual Conflict: An Adaptational Analysis. Psychiatry 17:243-250. OVESEY, LIONEL 1956 Masculine Aspirations in Women: An Adaptational Analysis. Psychiatry 19:341-351. REISS, ALBERT J. JR. 1960 Sex Offenses: The Marginal Status of the Adolescent. Law and Contemporary Problems 25:309-333. REISS, ALBERT J. JR. 1961 The Social Integration of Queers and Peers. Social Problems 9:102-120. REISS, IRA L. 1960 Premarital Sexual Standards in America. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press.
222
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: Homosexuality
RIEFF, PHILIP 1959 Freud: The Mind of the Moralist. New York: Viking. SEARS, ROBERT R.; MACCOBY, E. E.; and LEVIN, H. 1957 Patterns of Child Rearing. Evanston, 111.: Row, Peterson. SIMON, WILLIAM; and GAGNON, JOHN H. 1967 The Lesbians: A Preliminary Overview. Pages 247-282 in John H. Gagnon and William Simon (editors), Sexual Deviance. New York: Harper. SOCIETY OF MEDICAL PSYCHOANALYSTS 1962 Homosexuality: A Psychoanalytic Study, by Irving Bieber et al. New York: Basic Books. SPITZ, RENE A. 1949 Autoeroticism. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child 3/4:85-120. SUTHERLAND, EDWIN H.; and CRESSEY, DONALD R. (1924) 1960 Principles of Criminology. 6th ed. Philadelphia: Lippincott. -» First published as a textbook under the title Criminology, with Sutherland as the sole author. SYKES, GRESHAM M. 1958 The Society of Captives: A Study of a Maximum Security Prison. Princeton Univ. Press. TRILLING, LIONEL (1950) 1957 The Kinsey Report. Pages 223-242 in Lionel Trilling, The Liberal Imagination. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday. WARD, DAVID A.; and KASSEBAUM, GENE B. 1965 Women's Prison: Sex and Social Structure. Chicago: Aldine. WHEELER, STANTON 1960 Sex Offenses: A Sociological Critique. Lazv and Contemporary Problems 25:258278. WHYTE, WILLIAM F. 1943 A Slum Sex Code. American Journal of Sociology 49:24-31. YOUNG, WILLIAM C. (editor) 1961 Sex and Internal Secretions. 2 vols. 3d ed. Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins. -> Pagination is continuous. YOUNG, WILLIAM C.; GOY, ROBERT W.; and PHOENIX, CHARLES H. 1964 Hormones and Sexual Behavior. Science 143:212-218.
HOMOSEXUALITY
Homosexual practices are among the most ancient manifestations of human sexuality. Abundant evidence for this fact is found in both the religious and the secular literature of the oldest civilizations and in their graphic art as well. Social attitudes in different cultures apparently varied then, as now, from strong condemnation of all homosexual practices to tolerance or permissiveness for some. From the beginning of the Christian era in western Europe ecclesiastical and secular law sought to prevent, control, and eradicate homosexuality by means of severe moral and legal condemnation. By the late nineteenth century, legal penalties were less severe as a result of humanitarian reform, but moral and religious censure had not diminished. That the scientific study of homosexuality began in this period of western European history, and in this cultural climate, is a tribute to the scientific and humanitarian interests of physicians, particularly such pioneers as Richard von Krafft-Ebing,
Sigmund Freud, Havelock Ellis, and Magnus Hirschfeld. Their theories were largely concerned with etiology and were based on clinical observations and influenced by developments in the biological sciences, including evolutionary theory. Although by this time cross-cultural observations of homosexuality were also accumulating, together with the rudiments of a general theory, they had little effect on the mainstream of research, which continued to focus on the etiology of homosexuality among individuals of Western culture. Increased research on homosexuality in Western countries since World War n has been coupled with more open discussion of the subject. Although there is no reliable evidence that the incidence of homosexuality is increasing, some forms of it are more socially visible. In part, this may be accounted for by the publicity given to scientific investigations of homosexuality and to discussions of the controversial social, legal, moral, and mental health issues related to it. Emergent homosexual "communities" in large urban centers and "homophile" organizations openly protesting public policy further contribute to this heightened visibility and increased public awareness. These developments reflect radical changes in the attitudes of the public and of homosexuals, in the social character of homosexuality, and in the volume and focus of scientific research. Homosexuality (homo- derives from the Greek root meaning "same") includes an extraordinary diversity of dyadic relations and of individual mental states and action patterns. The patterns of social organization that develop when homosexuals seek each other out also vary greatly. Because of this diversity, "homosexuality" is an ambiguous term with many meanings. Some investigators, such as Ford and Beach (1951), limit the term to overt sexual relations between individuals of the same sex. For others, notably Kinsey and his associates (1948; 1953), the degree of psychic arousal and the frequency of overt sexual response to individuals of the same or opposite sex determine ratings on a heterosexual-homosexual continuum that ranges from exclusively heterosexual to exclusively homosexual, with several intermediate ratings. Investigators with a clinical perspective (see, for instance, Marmor 1965, p. 4) frequently stress motivational and subjective aspects of erotic preference as criteria for defining persons as homosexual; overt behavior is considered as of secondary importance. In the social perspective of homosexual subcultures, the defining criteria may be shared understanding of sexual preferences for members of one's own sex and participation in social activity
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: Homosexuality centered on the search for, and interaction with, these individuals (Goffman 1963, pp. 143-144). Thus, it is clear that "Who is homosexual?" and "What is homosexuality?" are very complex questions, clarification of which would be a lasting contribution to social science. Research on homosexuality is also of major significance for the light it throws on the relation of social structure and cultural norms to patterns of human sexuality; on the origins, development, and essential features of normal and abnormal personality; on masculinity and femininity; and on social deviance and deviant subcultures. Etiology and determinants In those Western societies that define homosexuality as deviant, there are four major theoretical issues concerning the etiology and determinants of persistent or predominant adult homosexuality. (1) Is the human organism psychosexually neutral at birth, so that learning processes determine homosexual object choice in adults, or are there "inherent sexual predispositions" (Diamond 1965, p. 168) which selectively influence the effects of learning? (2) What is the nature and content of the learning processes by which homosexual object choice develops? Is the appropriate developmental model a deviant role or a personality system with intrapersonal traits, motives, and gender identifications incompatible with the socialsexual capabilities and self-other expectancies of adult relations with the opposite sex? Does positive conditioning of sexual responses to persons of the same sex, or negative conditioning to persons of the opposite sex, or a combination of both, account for homosexuality? (3) Are particular periods in the developmental process, such as early childhood or adolescence, critical for homosexual object choice? (4) Are parent-child relationships in the nuclear family crucial in determining whether an individual becomes homosexual, or are peer relationships in childhood and adolescence, and deviant subcultures in adolescence and early adult life, of equal or possibly greater importance? These four issues are highly controversial and cannot be resolved by the research evidence currently available. A brief historical review of some of the major studies will illustrate differences in theoretical assumptions, in methodological approaches, in findings, and in conclusions, and it will indicate important areas for continued research. Theories of homosexuality. Early theorists stressed the importance of biological predispositions as determinants. Krafft-Ebing (1886) theorized that homosexuality was produced by a
223
dominance of opposite-sex brain centers (female centers in males or vice versa) or that it was a hereditary disease. Freud (1905) postulated constitutional bisexuality as one of the biological predispositions which, together with early learning experiences or fixations, determined homosexual object choice. The major studies of biological predispositions have focused on genetic, chromosomal, and hormonal anomalies or dysfunctions. Comparisons of predominantly homosexual and heterosexual males with respect to chromosomal abnormalities have resulted in negative findings. In several studies, maternal age and birth order of homosexuals in a sibling series were significantly later than in control groups of heterosexual men. The degree of concordance of homosexuality in identical male twins appears to be significantly higher than in fraternal twins (for a review of these studies, see Pare 1965). The evidence is controversial but suggests that genetic mechanisms may be important. Significant progress could be made by replicating the studies of twins, birth order, and maternal age and by an intensified search for genetic determinants. Homosexual object choice in adults is not affected by hormone therapy and differences between the endocrine systems of homosexuals and those of heterosexuals have not been reliably demonstrated (Perloff 1965). As more accurate techniques of measuring hormonal activity develop, continued research may be valuable. A potential contribution of biological factors to human homosexuality is suggested by recent studies of animals, in which the location and functions of sex-specific behavior centers in the brain have been demonstrated (Krafft-Ebing may be vindicated!). Studies at the infrahuman level have also demonstrated that hormones injected prenatally produce effects on adult sexual behavior (for a review of these studies, see Diamond 1965). Thus, specific biological predispositions may be crucial variables, interacting with psychological and cultural variables, especially in producing the highly feminized males and masculinized females often referred to as "inverts." The experiential determinants emphasized by classical psychoanalytic theory are pathogenic parent—child relations and failure to successfully resolve (unconsciously) the vicissitudes of the three basic phases of libidinal and object-relations development in the critical period of infancy and early childhood. Some revisions of psychoanalytic theory reject constitutional or psychological bisexuality and emphasize ego adaptations to environmental difficulties. With few exceptions, however (see, for instance, Thompson 1947; Sullivan
224
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: Homosexuality
1953), pathogenic relations with parents in early childhood are assumed to be the crucial determinants, although individual patterns of behavior are subject to modification during adolescence. (For a review of psychoanalytic theories, see Society of Medical Psychoanalysts 1962, chapter 1.) This theoretical assumption currently relies for empirical support on conflicting and controversial data derived largely from comparing the life histories of adult homosexual and heterosexual males. Freund and Pinkava (1961) carefully tested clearly formulated hypotheses concerning parent-child relations and homosexuality by comparing interview data from male homosexual patients in a psychiatric hospital with similar data from two contrasting matched groups: neurotic heterosexual patients in the same hospital and nonpsychiatric patients. They found no significant differences between these groups with respect to the dominance, control, or decisive influence of either parent in the family. Relations between homosexual sons and their fathers were more "disturbed," a finding tentatively interpreted by the authors as secondary to, rather than a cause of, homosexuality, since the disturbance appeared to be mainly on the son's side of the relationship. Reports of greater conflict between parents of homosexuals signified a lack of tolerance by their sons for marital conflict rather than greater incidence of actual conflict. Bieber and his co-workers (see Society of Medical Psychoanalysts 1962) compared questionnaire data provided by psychoanalysts concerning their homosexual and heterosexual patients. Some differences between patientmother-father, mother-son, and father-son relationships in the contrasting groups were statistically significant. The authors concluded that the chances of becoming homosexual or of developing severe homosexual problems appear to be high for any son who is exposed to the combination of a "close-binding-intimate" mother who dominates and minimizes her husband, and a father who is detached or hostile (p. 172). Schofield (1965) compared interview data obtained from six matched groups: (1) homosexual and pedophiliac prisoners convicted of homosexual offenses, (2) homosexual and heterosexual patients who were in psychiatric treatment, (3) homosexuals and heterosexuals who were neither in treatment nor in prison. The proportion of individuals from disturbed home backgrounds was similar in each matched pair of groups; it was lowest in the nontreatment-prison groups and highest in the patient groups. The proportion of individuals who reported possessive, overprotective, or dominant mothers
and poor or nonexistent relations with fathers in childhood was larger in the combined homosexual groups (pedophiliacs excluded) than in the combined heterosexual groups (p. 105). The evidence from these and many similar studies does not support the assumption that pathological parent—child relations are either necessary or sufficient antecedents or determinants of adult homosexuality. The evidence does indicate, however, that some forms of familial pathology appear to be associated with increased vulnerability of some individuals to homosexual development, and it suggests that psychopathology is more frequently associated with homosexuality in these individuals. Longitudinal studies could now be designed for the testing of hypotheses specific to the differential effects of variable combinations of parent—child relations on the development of adult psychosexual patterns. The potential contribution of such studies is very high. . Empirical evidence that determinants in adolescence are critical for adult homosexuality is fragmentary. The theoretical rationale for this assumption is that one of the major developmental tasks of adolescence is the achievement of a stable psychosexual identity. An extensive body of clinicaltheoretical literature emphasizes the adolescent period as critical for the resolution of intrapsychic psychosexual conflicts originating in infancy or early childhood (Society of Medical Psychoanalysts 1962). Sullivan (1953) stressed very close and intense preadolescent friendships with peers of the same sex as one of the essential conditions for heterosexual development and the separation of lust and intimacy "dynamisms" as one precondition of adult homosexuality. Assuming that the human capacity for homosexual as well as heterosexual response is a basic part of the mammalian heritage, Kinsey and his associates (1948) suggested that cultural pres- ^ " sures and social conditioning may determine the final object choice. That adolescence may be a critical period for males is indicated by (1) the existence of a high positive relation between the early onset of adolescence and frequency of homosexual activity during adolescence and later life (ibid., p. 630) and (2) occurrence of the peak of sexual activity between ages 16 and 20. Among females, however, no consistent relation was found between homosexual activity and early onset of adolescence (Kinsey et al. 1953, p. 462), and the peak of female sexual activity occurs in the late twenties (ibid., p. 759). Group norms and peer relationships in adolescence may determine the relative frequencies of
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: Homosexuality heterosexual and homosexual patterns in adults by affecting their self concepts, sex role expectations and performances, and notions of what constitute the boundaries of permissible behavior. Reiss (1961) found that members of a group of male juvenile delinquents who engaged in sexual acts with adult homosexuals did not define themselves as homosexuals and did not continue homosexual activity as adults. Group norms defined the limits of permissible sexual activity, rules of payment, frequency of contact, and derogatory attitudes toward homosexuality. Conversely, late adolescents or young adults who participate in homosexual cliques or informal homosexual groups may progressively redefine homosexual behavior in positive terms, defining themselves as homosexuals in the process, and thus beginning a homosexual "career" (Hooker 1965a, pp. 90, 101). Adult homosexual roles may be formed by a continuous process of social-sexual learning, from early childhood to adolescent and early adult life. Self-other interactions, including overt sexual activities, in deviant socially marginal pairs or groups of peers of the same sex, may be critical determinants of motives, self concepts, sex role expectations and abilities, and performances that are congruent with deviant and homosexual roles and incongruent with heterosexual roles. At critical choice points in the developmental process or continuously from early childhood, situational and social-structural variables may produce effects influencing adult patterns—for instance, the feminizing effects of older sisters on younger brothers, situationally determined isolation from peers of the same sex in childhood and adolescence, or isolation from peers of the opposite sex in adolescence. From the limited evidence currently available, it is clear that the diverse forms of adult homosexuality are produced by many combinations of variables, including biological, cultural, psychodynamic, structural, and situational. No single class of determinants, whether psychodynamic, cultural, or biological, accounts for all or even one of these diverse forms. The relative importance of each kind of determinant apears to vary greatly from one individual to another. It should be noted, however, that the classification of types of homosexuality with respect to patterns of determinants and characteristic adult features is an important problem for research. It is also clear that many developmental models are required to account for the diversity of developmental sequences leading to confirmed patterns of adult homosexuality. The continued search for determinants may be more
225
productive if pursued in the perspective of development over time, rather than in the traditional perspective of origins or causes. Psychodynamics of adult homosexuality Psychoanalytic theories assume that homosexuality is a symbolic expression of unconscious psychodynamic mechanisms and that in any given case these mechanisms and symbolizations are complex and numerous. Thus, according to Freud (1905), male homosexuality may be a narcissistic search for a love object symbolizing the self; an avoidance and derogation of females induced by unconscious castration anxiety and fear of them, coupled with primary narcissism focused on the male genitals; and an unconsciously incestuous and therefore forbidden attraction to women associated with unconscious castration anxiety and fear of punishment by males. Stronger identification with the mother is symbolically expressed in "feminine" sexual submission to males; that with the father, in "masculine" domination of males. Freud postulated similar complex symbolic expressions of unconscious psychodynamics for female homosexuality; the primary difference between male and female homosexuality, he thought, related to the nature of castration anxiety. However, there is a paucity of theoretical assumptions that differentiate male and female homosexuality with respect to personality dynamics and its correlates (see Romm 1965). Ambivalence, chronic anxiety, intense hostility toward the partner, and longing for love characterize female homosexual relationships, according to Wilbur (1965). Thompson (1947) considered homosexuality in both sexes as a symptom of diverse character problems covertly expressed in homosexual relations (among these problems were fear of the opposite sex, need to defy authority, fear of adult responsibility, and destructiveness of self or others). These theories involve complex patterns of variables that are difficult to state as clear hypotheses. Consequently, the design of an appropriate methodology for testing them presents problems. Research studies have therefore focused on selected aspects of the theories or variables for which clinical impression or theoretical rationale provides justification. Masculinity and femininity. A major focus of research studies on male homosexuality is the complex issue of psychological masculinity-femininity and its relation to gender identification. Terman and Miles (1936), using masculinityfemininity test scores and interview data, compared "passive" male homosexuals (defined by "female" roles in sexual acts) with "actives" (de-
226
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: Homosexuality
fined by "male" roles) and then compared both of these with (presumably) selected groups of heterosexual men and women. The femininity scores of the passives were higher than those of any other male group tested. The masculinity scores of the actives were higher than those of the passives and of a group of regular-army men. These results suggested that individuals in both homosexual groups represented deviations in masculine and feminine identifications, interests, activities, and feelings. Interview data on the passives supported the masculinity-femininity test results. Similar results were obtained on a small sample of active female homosexuals. In subsequent studies of masculinity-femininity, data on sexual practices and preferences are rarely reported, but the evidence from research on other dimensions of male homosexuality indicates that samples of homosexuals usually include many individuals whose preferences and practices are highly variable, as well as those representing the two extremes of active and passive (Society of Medical Psychoanalysts 1962; Hooker 1965£>; Schofield 1960). The distribution of the scores of homosexuals and control groups of heterosexuals on the masculinity-femininity scale of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) indicates that homosexuals are significantly more "feminine" in their responses than heterosexuals. Thus, Doidge and Holtzman (1960, p. 11) found that a group of homosexual men in the Air Force who had been investigated for homosexual offenses scored significantly higher (that is, were more "feminine") than three control groups of predominantly or exclusively heterosexual men. Braaten and Darling (1965, p. 298) found that, while overt homosexual males (including exclusives and bisexuals) and covert homosexuals who were patients in a college clinic did not differ significantly on masculinity-femininity scores, as a total group (overts plus coverts) they scored significantly higher than a control group of equally disturbed, nonhomosexual patients. Although a group of homosexual males who were not in treatment and were apparently functioning effectively in the community scored significantly higher than a control group of heterosexual males on the masculinity-femininity scale of the MMPI and the femininity scale of the California Personality Inventory (CPI), significant differences were not found in scores on various projective measures designed to assess unconscious gender identification (unpublished research by the author). Feminine identification and confused or unstable gender identification in male homosexuals have
also been assessed by the use of content indices in the Rorschach Test and the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT). The interstudy reliability of these indices in differentiating homosexual and heterosexual groups is low (Hooker 1965a; Lindzey 1965). Chang and Block (1960)' using a list of adjectives, derived identification scores from descriptions by male homosexual and heterosexual research subjects of the ideal self, the mother, the father, and their actual selves. The results supported the hypothesis that homosexual males were more strongly identified with the mother and did not identify with the father. Conclusions from these findings must be drawn with caution. Psychological masculinity and femininity are not unitary dimensions of personality but composites of different clusters of interests, attitudes, and feelings. The test measures are also multivariate in character. Thus, high "femininity" scores may indicate ego sensitivity and denial of interest in culturally masculine occupations (Braaten & Darling 1965). Research findings currently available do not provide even roughly sketched outlines of the complex patterns of psychological masculinity-femininity and gender identification in male or female homosexuals. If current measures of these variables are to remain in use, the multivariate character of what is being measured must be taken into account. Also, new and more appropriate methods must be devised for assessing different clusters or profiles of the conscious, unconscious, cultural, and biological components of masculinity, femininity, and gender identification. The selection of samples of research subjects must make allowance for the broad range and diversity of masculine and feminine patterns and the variable combinations of these. Other personality dimensions. The evidence supporting assumptions related to other psychodynamics or personality correlates is equally inconclusive. Bieber and his co-workers (Society of Medical Psychoanalysts 1962) concluded that their findings provide convincing support for the assumption that homosexuality is a specific form of sexual psychopathology: fear of the opposite sex or of heterosexual expression. But none of the evidence, such as fear of injury to the genitals, fear and aversion to female genitalia, or anxiety associated with heterosexual behavior, was specific to the homosexual group. The evidence cited for the conclusion that other psychopathologic processes in personality are secondary but invariably occur in homosexuals is subject to the same limitations. Moreover, the research subjects were patients in psychoanalytic treatment, so that the relation be-
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: Homosexuality tween psychopathology and homosexuality was confounded. Braaten and Darling (1965) found no evidence to support assumptions that homosexuals, as rated by psychiatric interviewers, were more psychopathic, paranoid, or schizoid than a control group of heterosexuals and found no differences in psychopathology as measured by the MMPI. Psychiatric ratings on narcissism and masochism were higher for homosexuals but not specific to them. The significantly higher scores of homosexuals on all clinical scales of the MMPI were interpreted by Doidge and Holtzman (1960) as evidence that homosexuality is a symptom of severe personality disturbance. In a number of studies of male homosexuals who were not in treatment or in disciplinary settings, the results obtained by the use of the MMPI, TAT, Rorschach, and other psychological measures did not justify the conclusion that homosexuality is necessarily and invariably a concomitant or symptom of psychopathology- In many individuals no evidence of psychopathology was found (Hooker 1957; 1965a). Nevertheless, the assumption that a modal pattern of personality structure and psychodynamics characterizes male homosexuals is explicitly stated or is implicit in the methodology used in many research studies. Having been unable to establish any differences between a group of homosexual males and a control group of heterosexuals, either in degree of self-acceptance or in ideal-self descriptions, Chang and Block commented that since "homosexuals and normals are quite obviously rather different sorts of people," their data must be regarded as questionable (1960, p. 309). Nevertheless, the only obvious difference between homosexuals and heterosexuals is in psychosexual object choice. All experienced clinicians and research workers report that the personality differences among individual homosexuals are far more apparent than the similarities. Investigators who include the data on individual differences in their studies have found a great diversity of personality patterns. A singular exception is the finding of Cattell and Morony (1962) that low ego strength, high extroversion, low superego, and a radical social outlook characterize the personality profiles of male homosexuals. They conclude that it is legitimate to speak of the homosexual-personality profile. The inconclusiveness of research on homosexuality is a function of many variables, including differences in investigators, in samples of research subjects and situational settings, in methodology, and in concepts of homosexuality. Lindzey (1965) has demonstrated the significant influence of many of these variables in a study designed to
227
cross-validate objective indices of homosexuality in the TAT and to test the predictive efficiency of clinical methods of diagnosing homosexuality compared with actuarial ones. The limitations of psychological tests in the diagnosis of homosexuality have been documented in many studies. Inferences from these measures and generalizations about the personality characteristics of homosexuals must be made with caution and within the limits set by the characteristics of the research sample, the setting, and the methodology. With few exceptions, studies of the personalities of homosexuals have been stated in terms of dichotomous attributes—psychopathology versus normality, specific sexual psychopathology versus pervasive personality disorder, feminine versus confused identification, feminine versus masculine identification, and other pairs of mutually exclusive variables. Thus, in effect, homosexuality has been •*' treated as a clinical entity. But contemporary personality theories are richly suggestive of dimensions or subsystems of personality that are potentially relevant to psychosexual patterns, and until now, these theories have scarcely been tapped as sources of hypotheses. Some of the effects of a changing climate of public attitudes toward homosexuality and of an increasing freedom to conduct scientific studies of human sexuality in all of its complex psychological, social, and biological aspects are manifested in the small but growing number of behavioral scientists whose interests and competence in personality research are focused on homosexuality. With the cooperation of homosexuals in the "homophile" and larger communities, it is no longer necessary to depend on subjects in clinic or prison settings. With the use of more rigorous criteria in selecting homogeneous samples of subjects and of more appropriate research designs, including cluster and profile analyses, it may be possible to differentiate personality patterns among homosexuals. Also, progress may be achieved in resolving the long-debated issue v'" as to whether some homosexuals differ from their heterosexual counterparts only in sexual object choice or are invariably different in some personality dimensions. Role differentiation and typology The perspectives of the two-sexed heterosexual society have so dominated the study of homosexuality that typologies of homosexual and related roles have been developed only to a very limited extent. Thus, Ferenczi (1914) distinguished between male inverts who have pervasive feminine identifications and assume a passive sexual role
228
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: Homosexuality
and males who assume an active sexual role and are apparently masculine in every respect except sexual object choice. Many theoreticians and empirical investigators (see, for instance, Terman & Miles 1936), while emphasizing the active-passive dichotomy in sex roles and the corresponding masculine-feminine dichotomy in gender identifications, have noted that the patterns of many male homosexuals represent variable combinations and intermediate grades. Recent studies (Schofield I960; Society of Medical Psychoanalysts 1962; Hooker 1965b) have shown that the terms "activity" and "passivity" may be useful in referring to psychological states but are inaccurate and misleading when applied to sex roles and should therefore be discarded. The terms "insertee" and "inserter" (Society of Medical Psychoanalysts 1962) are more accurate and operationally useful equivalents. Studies of the sex-role preferences and practices of male homosexuals indicate that a large proportion of them habitually perform either role, according to their own or their partners' momentary preference. For the majority, consciousness of male identity and of masculinity or femininity appears to show no clear relation to sex roles. Sustained dyadic relations and the shared perspective of male homosexual subcultures appear to increase the flexibility of social-sexual roles and to create the social conditions for the emergence of new solutions to the problems of role differentiation in a one-sex world (Hooker 1965k). Studies of male homosexuality in correctional institutions (Huffman I960; Sykes 1958) suggest that homosexual social-sexual roles are clearly defined by inmate codes. According to these codes, the masculinity of the individual who assumes the inserter role in a homosexual act is not diminished and may even be increased. Within the institution, the role carries no implication that the individual is homosexual. Emotional involvement with a partner appears to be rare. Gratification of needs for power, status, and sexual release is presumably legitimate motivation for assuming the role. Individuals who assume insertee roles occupy social positions of inferior status to which stereotyped attributes of femininity and homosexuality are ascribed. These findings apply only to institutions in which known homosexuals are not segregated from the rest of the prison population. As noted above, the literature of female homosexuality is fragmentary in comparison with that of male homosexuality. Studies of role differentiation have been conducted largely in correctional settings for adolescent girls or prisons for adult
women. In prisons for women a male-female dichotomy in social-sexual roles develops and is sustained with little flexibility or variation (Ward & Kassebaum 1965). The masculine, or "butch," role is characterized by emulation of the male in appearance, mannerism, and aggressiveness in social interaction as well as in sexual relations. The feminine role is identical in the prison and in the larger society, except for the sexual partner. The woman who assumes the masculine role becomes emotionally involved with her feminine role partner and defines herself as homosexual more frequently, and receives sexual gratification less frequently, than her counterpart in the male prison. Whether the clear-cut male-female role differentiation in prison settings is also characteristic of female homosexual patterns in the larger community is unknown. Despite the differences, the similarities of homosexual role differentiation in men's and women's prisons are striking. It appears that individuals in both settings who assume opposite-sex roles are more likely to have been overt homosexuals before entering prison and to continue homosexuality on being released. In studies of correctional settings for adolescent girls, it has been found that the roles assumed in the course of homosexual relationships represent variations of all family roles. The empirical data obtained in the restricted environments of correctional institutions for men and women support a dichotomous typology of homosexual roles in which the male and female social-sexual roles in the larger community are reflected. However, male homosexual role patterns in other cultural settings appear to show extensive variations for which a taxonomy, or system of classification, is urgently needed. Studies of female homosexual role patterns in nonprison settings (several were in progress in 1966) can provide the necessary data for a comparison of variability within and between the sexes. The development of taxonomies of male and female homosexual patterns is a theoretical problem of paramount importance. To be meaningful, such taxonomies must include variations in many dimensions of personality, in sexual and social behavior, and in the social settings or subcultures in which many homosexuals participate. Demographic and cultural variation. In undertaking empirical research on the incidence or demographic distribution of homosexuality in urban industrialized societies, investigators are confronted with two major questions: (1) Who or what is to be counted as homosexual? and (2) How can representative samples be obtained in
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: Homosexuality different social strata of individuals whose behavior is socially, morally, and legally stigmatized? In view of the magnitude of these problems, it is not surprising that few have even attempted to solve them. The most systematic research studies of the incidence and social correlates of homosexuality are those of Kinsey and his associates (1948; 1953), who rejected the counting of homosexuals as an inappropriate and impossible task. Accumulative estimates of incidence were based on the number of individuals brought to orgasm by physical contact with others of the same sex during specified periods. They attempted to collect interview data from samples of equal size, varying in demographic characteristics. The samples (5,300 white males, 5,940 white females) were neither representative of the total population nor randomly selected from it. For white males the estimated incidence was indicated by the following: (1) 37 per cent had at least one overt homosexual experience between the onset of adolescence and old age; (2) 10 per cent were predominantly homosexual for at least three years between the ages of 16 and 55; (3) 4 per cent were solely homosexual after the onset of adolescence. For white females, the estimated incidence was much lower: (1) 13 per cent had at least one overt homosexual experience between adolescence and old age; (2) 28 per cent had covert or overt experience; (3) a half to a third as many females were primarily or exclusively homosexual in any age period. The major findings on the social correlates of homosexual activity for males were that the highest incidence occurred among unskilled and semiskilled workers and the lower white-collar class; among those with high school education and of urban background; and among the less devout or inactive church members. The lowest incidence occurred among the professional and upper whitecollar classes and in the college-educated group. However, the incidence among skilled workers was closer to that among the professional and upper white-collar classes than to that among the lower occupational groups. Those with grade school education displayed a level of homosexual activity intermediate between that of high school- and that of college-educated groups. Homosexual activity in females increased with education, so that the incidence was highest among those with college or postgraduate education; for males, the opposite was true. For both males and females the highest incidence occurred among the less devout or least active in church affiliation. Although the assumptions, methods, and conclu-
229
sions of these studies are highly controversial, their findings are most frequently cited as evidence for a high incidence of homosexuality in the United States. They are also believed (on the basis of rather limited demographic evidence) to support the assumption that cultural differences between social groups determine the unequal distribution of homosexual activity in different segments of society. This assumption also appears to be supported by Schofield's study in England (1960). A group of 127 men who identified themselves as homosexuals to the investigator and were also rated by him as predominantly or exclusively so were interviewed concerning their backgrounds and current social and sexual patterns. The largest proportion of men were in lower occupational levels and the smallest in the professional group, a distribution of men among occupational levels that is similar to the total population's. However, the number of men in nonmanual and artistic occupations and in the professions exceeded chance expectations, and those employed in a technical capacity and manual workers were underrepresented. In educational level attained, the sample was similar to the total population in that the largest number had the statutory minimum of education. However, the number of those with extensive education and high social status was higher than would be expected in a random sample of the total male population. The majority of these men lived in London, to which a large proportion of them had migrated from other urban centers. Active church affiliation was only slightly lower than that of the general population. In a continuation of this study, fifty men were selected who had been neither convicted of homosexual offenses nor involved in therapy of any kind (Schofield 1965). They were compared with an equal number of men in three groups: homosexuals in prison, homosexuals in therapy, and pedophiliacs convicted of offenses against males. On Kinsey ratings, the prison group was predominantly or exclusively homosexual; the patient group included a small number who were equally homosexual and heterosexual or predominantly heterosexual; a quarter of the convicted homosexuals and 60 per cent of the pedophiliacswere either equally homosexual and heterosexual or predominantly heterosexual. In educational achievement, occupational status, earned income, social class, and upward social mobility, the men who were neither in prison nor in therapy ranked highest and the prison groups lowest. The four groups were differentiated not only in their demographic characteristics but also in their patterns of social and
230
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: Homosexuality
sexual relationships. Thus, the men who had not sought treatment or been arrested were better integrated into the larger community both at work and in their leisure time. They also had larger circles of homosexual friends and more long-standing relationships with other men. Only in this group were there substantial numbers of men who maintained a household with another homosexual. They were far less promiscuous than the patient or prison homosexual groups, although the frequency of sexual experience was equally high. It is apparent that comparison of the findings in this British study with those in the Kinsey report has limited meaning. However, some similarities and differences are of interest. In both studies, homosexuals were found in all social classes, educational levels, and occupations. A larger proportion of homosexuals (or of homosexual activity) in all studies took place in urban settings and in lower occupational levels and social classes. In educational achievement, however, the proportion was greater in the middle level (high school) in America and in the lower level (secondary modern school) in England. That in both countries the distributions were skewed toward the lower end of the occupational and social class range may well be accounted for by the fact that individuals in higher levels would not volunteer to be interviewed. The same limitation is relevant to the Kinsey finding that the incidence of homosexual activity is lowest among the most devout religious groups. Moreover, in the English studies the incidence of active religious affiliation did not appear to be significantly lower among homosexual males. In short, whether homosexuals or homosexual activities among males or females are more heavily concentrated in different social strata remains an open question. Whether the social patterns or incidence of those who define themselves as homosexual are different in varied social levels is of equal or possibly even greater importance. Ethnographic accounts. In a survey of studies of sexual behavior in 190 societies, Ford and Beach (1951) found that ethnographic accounts of homosexual activities were available for 76. In 49 of these some forms were condoned, regarded as normal or socially acceptable, and even encouraged for at least some classes of individuals. In some cultures, such as those of the Siberian Chukchee and the Aleutian Koniaga, an institutionalized role of berdache, or shaman, is provided for adult male homosexuals. These men adopt feminine dress, activities, mannerisms, become "wives" of other men, and assume the "female" role in anal inter-
course. Their social status may be high. Male homosexuality in some societies, for instance among the Keraki and Kiwai of New Guinea, is an institutionalized feature of puberty rites. Thus, all males must engage in homosexual practices, either as initiates in the insertee role in anal intercourse or as married or unmarried males who perform the inserter role. Such practices are believed to be essential for male growth and strength. It has also been reported that all men and boys among the Siwans of northeast Africa engage in homosexual practices; married and unmarried males have homosexual and heterosexual liaisons. In 28 of these societies, adult homosexuality was reported to be rare, absent, or only practiced in secret. In all societies (except that of the Sirione in Bolivia) in which homosexuality was said to be rare, specific social pressures were directed against it. Condemnation and penalties ranged from ridicule to threat of death. The unreliability of the estimates of incidence in these societies was apparent. Information concerning female homosexuality was reported for only 17 societies. It appeared highly probable that females were less likely than males to engage in homosexual practices. In view of the small number of societies for which data are currently available and the questionable reliability and meaning of the data in the many studies that report sexual behavior while ignoring its context of culture patterns and social structures, it is apparent that descriptive or explanatory generalizations concerning demographic and cultural variations in homosexuality are precariously based. Whether a majority of societies consider some form of homosexuality normal and socially acceptable is an important issue for continued cross-cultural research. Clearly, some societies not only consider adolescent or childhood homosexuality normal (some evidence suggests an increasing trend in this direction in the United States) but also regard homosexual relations between adult and adolescent males as important, normal, and socially approved alternatives to heterosexual intercourse (Davenport 1965). Subcultures and social organizations. Homosexual communities and subcultures in modern urban centers are collective reactions to legal pressures and social stigma. Whether they are largely created by societal reactions to this form of sexual expression (Becker 1963) or, on the contrary, would develop under any sociolegal conditions is debatable (Schur 1965, p. 86). A central thesis in contemporary theories (Lemert 1951; Becker 1963; Goffman 1963) is that deviant as well as conform-
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: Homosexuality ing behavior is learned in interaction with others and that it cannot be understood without reference to the societal reactions it invokes. Male homosexual collectivities develop on a sizable scale only in modern industrialized societies, which define this form of sexual expression as criminal, pathological, or immoral. In adjusting to this stigmatized status, a large number of homosexuals in social interaction with others who share similar inclinations make it the basis of their social identity and way of life. A larger majority cope with the problems of homosexuality in other ways, whether or not they enter some sector of a homosexual community. Homosexual communities in large cities are made up of constantly changing aggregates of persons who are loosely linked by friendship and sexual interests in an extended and overlapping series of networks. Some network clusters form tightly knit cliques of friends and homosexually "married" pairs, while in others, informal groups or social organizations develop. The structure of the communication, friendship, and sexual network among members of the community is complex. Community gathering places are centers from which information is transmitted concerning social occasions for homosexuals and the attitudes and organized activities of law-enforcement agencies concerning homosexuals. In some sectors of these networks, bars, taverns, or private clubs are informally institutionalized as homosexual territory, although under surveillance of the police, who sometimes exact tribute for their connivance. These settings provide opportunities for the initiation of sexual contact and for an in-group social life. Some are primarily market places for making sexual contacts, while others are predominantly centers of social activity, although arrangements for sexual activity may occur. A standardized and essential feature of interaction in bars, baths, streets, and parks is the expectation that sex can be had without obligation or commitment. Sexuality is separated from affectional and social life and is characterized by promiscuity, instrumentality, and anonymity. In other sectors of the homosexual community, sexuality is integrated in the affectional, personal, and social patterns of individuals who establish relatively stable and long-lasting relationships. Many subcultures develop in large homosexual communities, with a distinctive vernacular, distinctive modes of speech and dress, distinctive values and norms regulating sexual and other forms of conduct, and distinctive patterns of interaction
23 1
with homosexuals and nonhomosexuals. Some individuals may be totally immersed in a homosexual subculture of the community. A wide variety of occupations is created by the demand for services to homosexuals. Male prostitutes, many of whom are homosexuals, constitute one occupation (Reiss 1961; Schur 1965). Entrepreneurs who are homosexual may develop an occupation in arranging social entertainment and large social gatherings for members of a particular homosexual group. Thus, at work and in leisure time, in personal and social life, contact with the larger society may be infrequent. For the majority, however, behavioral, temporal, and spatial separation of the homosexual and heterosexual worlds is required to manage the strategies of passing as heterosexuals at work and in social contact with heterosexuals. In fact, there are many different methods, some of them quite complex, both of participating in the homosexual community without leaving the larger society and of ignoring the larger society altogether. Related to these patterns of integration and separation are the different social levels of homosexual groups. Female homosexual, or lesbian, communities apparently develop on a smaller scale, with informal groups, cliques, and special gathering places. But a formal organization of lesbians and an official publication with national circulation indicate that the collective aspects of female homosexuality have some importance. No empirical studies of these aspects are currently available. Although homophile organizations, whether male or female, constitute and represent a very small minority of the total homosexual population, they achieve social significance by the role they assume in openly protesting the status assigned to homosexuals by the larger society. Empirical studies of, and theoretical inquiry into, homosexual subcultures are very limited (Leznoff & Westley 1956; Hooker 1965a; 1965b). They suggest that commitment to a homosexual identity and career and the stability of that commitment and the career pattern that follows may be determined by entry into the homosexual community and by the ensuing identity transformation and socialization processes. However, the relation between personality and homosexual subculture variables in determining the commitment to, and patterns of, adult homosexuality is complex. For many the stability of the commitment appears to be a function of the interaction of both sets of variables. Probably a majority of those who are committed to an exclusive homosexual pattern have defined themselves as homosexual before they
232
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: Homosexuality
enter the community. In major urban centers, however, it appears unlikely that adult homosexuals are ignorant of, or indifferent to, the community. EVELYN HOOKER [See also PERSONALITY; and the biographies of ELLIS; FREUD.] BIBLIOGRAPHY Reviews of research studies may be found in Marmor 1965; Ruitenbeek 1963; Schofield I960; 1965. Kinsey et al. 1948; 1953 include surveys of earlier work on homosexuality. BECKER, HOWARD S. 1963 Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance. New York: Free Press. BRAATEN, LEIF J.; and DARLING, C. DOUGLAS 1965 Overt and Covert Homosexual Problems Among Male College Students. Genetic Psychology Monographs 71: 269-310. CATTELL, RAYMOND B.; and MORONY, JOHN H. 1962 The Use of the 16 PF in Distinguishing Homosexuals, Normals, and General Criminals. Journal of Consulting Psychology 26:531-540. CHANG, JUDY; and BLOCK, JACK 1960 A Study of Identification in Male Homosexuals. Journal of Consulting Psychology 24:307-310. DAVENPORT, WILLIAM 1965 Sexual Patterns and Their Regulation in a Society of the Southwest Pacific. Pages 164-207 in Conference on Sex and Behavior, Berkeley, California, Sex and Behavior. Edited by Frank A. Beach. New York: Wiley. DIAMOND, MILTON 1965 A Critical Evaluation of the Ontogeny of Human Sexual Behavior. Quarterly Review of Biology 40:147-175. DOIDGE, WILLIAM T.; and HOLTZMAN, WAYNE H. 1960 Implications of Homosexuality Among Air Force Trainees. Journal of Consulting Psychology 24:9-13. FERENCZI, SANDOR (1914) 1963 The Nosology of Male Homosexuality. Pages 3-16 in Hendrik M. Ruitenbeek (editor), The Problem of Homosexuality in Modern Society. New York: Duttoii. -> First published in German. FORD, CLELLAN S.; and BEACH, FRANK A. 1951 Patterns of Sexual Behavior. New York: Harper. FREUD, SIGMUND (1905) 1953 Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. Volume 7, pages 123-245 in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. ~» First published in German. FREUND, K.; and PINKAVA, V. 1961 Homosexuality in Man and Its Association With Parental Relationships. Review of Czechoslovak Medicine 7:32-40. GOFFMAN, ERVING 1963 Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. HOOKER, EVELYN (1957) 1963 The Adjustment of the Male Overt Homosexual. Pages 141-161 in Hendrik M. Ruitenbeek (editor), The Problem of Homosexuality in Modern Society. New York: Dutton. HOOKER, EVELYN 1965a Male Homosexuals and Their "Worlds." Pages 83-107 in Judd Marmor (editor), Sexual Inversion: The Multiple Roots of Homosexuality. New York: Basic Books. HOOKER, EVELYN 1965& An Empirical Study of Some Relations Between Sexual Patterns and Gender Identity in Male Homosexuals. Pages 24-52 in John Money
(editor), Sex Research: New Developments. New York: Holt. HUFFMAN, ARTHUR V. 1960 Sex Deviation in a Prison Community. Journal of Social Therapy 6:170-181. INDIANA UNIVERSITY, INSTITUTE FOR SEX RESEARCH 1965 Sex Offenders: An Analysis of Types, by Paul H. Gebhard, J. H. Gagnon, W. B. Pomeroy, and C. V. Christenson. New York: Harper. KINSEY, ALFRED C. et al. 1948 Sexual Behavior in the Human Male. Philadelphia: Saunders. KINSEY, ALFRED C. et al. 1953 Sexual Behavior in the Human Female. Philadelphia: Saunders. KRAFFT-EBING, RICHARD VON (1886) 1965 Psychopathia sexualis. New York: Putnam. -» First unexpurgated edition in English; original in Latin. LEMERT, EDWIN M. 1951 Social Pathology: A Systematic Approach to the Theory of Sociopathic Behavior. New York: McGraw-Hill. LEZNOFF, MAURICE; and WESTLEY, WILLIAM A. (1956) 1963 The Homosexual Community. Pages 162-174 in Hendrik M. Ruitenbeek (editor), The Problem of Homosexuality in Modern Society. New York: Dutton. LINDZEY, GARDNER 1965 Seer Versus Sign. Journal of Experimental Research in Personality 1:17-27. MARMOR, JUDD (editor) 1965 Sexual Inversion: The Multiple Roots of Homosexuality. New York: Basic Books. OPLER, MARVIN K. 1965 Anthropological and Cross-cultural Aspects of Homosexuality. Pages 108—123 in Judd Marmor (editor), Sexual Inversion: The Multiple Roots of Homosexuality. New York: Basic Books. PARE, C. M. B. 1965 Etiology of Homosexuality: Genetic and Chromosomal Aspects. Pages 70-80 in Judd Marmor (editor), Sexual Inversion: The Multiple Roots of Homosexuality. New York: Basic Books. PERLOFF, WILLIAM H. 1965 Hormones and Homosexuality. Pages 44-69 in Judd Marmor (editor), Sexual Inversion: The Multiple Roots of Homosexuality. New York: Basic Books. REISS, ALBERT J. JR. (1961) 1963 The Social Integration of Queers and Peers. Pages 249-278 in Hendrik M. Ruitenbeek (editor), The Problem of Homosexuality in Modern Society. New York: Dutton. ROMM, MAY E. 1965 Sexuality and Homosexuality in Women. Pages 282-301 in Judd Marmor (editor), Sexual Inversion: The Multiple Roots of Homosexuality. New York: Basic Books. RUITENBEEK, HENDRIK M. (editor) 1963 The Problem of Homosexuality in Modern Society. New York: Dutton. [SCHOFIELD, MICHAEL] 1960 Minority: A Report on the Life of the Male Homosexual in Great Britain, by Gordon Westwood [pseud.]. London: Longmans. SCHOFIELD, MICHAEL 1965 Sociological Aspects of Homosexuality. Boston: Little. SCHUR, EDWIN M. 1965 Crimes Without Victims. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. -» See especially pages 1-11 and 67-119. SOCIETY OF MEDICAL PSYCHOANALYSTS 1962 Homosexuality: A Psychoanalytic Study, by Irving Bieber et al. New York: Basic Books. SULLIVAN, HARRY STACK 1953 The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry. Edited by Helen Swick Perry and Mary Ladd Gawel. New York: Norton. SYKES, GRESHAM M. 1958 The Society of Captives: A Study of a Maximum Security Prison. Princeton Univ. Press.
SHERRINGTON, C. S. TERMAN, LEWIS M.; and MILES, CATHERINE C. 1936 Sex and Personality: Studies in Masculinity and Femininity. New York: McGraw-Hill. THOMPSON, CLARA (1947) 1963 Changing Concepts of Homosexuality in Psychoanalysis. Pages 40-51 in Hendrik M. Ruitenbeek (editor), The Problem of Homosexuality in Modern Society. New York: Button. WARD, DAVID A.; and KASSEBAUM, GENE G. 1965 Women's Prison: Sex and Social Structure. Chicago: Aldine. WILBUR, CORNELIA B. 1965 Clinical Aspects of Female Homosexuality. Pages 268-281 in Judd Marmor (editor), Sexual Inversion: The Multiple Roots of Homosexuality. New York: Basic Books.
SHAMANISM See RELIGIOUS SPECIALISTS.
SHANG YANG Shang Yang (also known as Wei Yang or Kungsun Yang), who died in 338 B.C., was a Chinese political administrator who left his native state of Wei to enter the service of Duke Hsiao of the state of Ch'in. At the time, the feudal hierarchy dominated by the Chou dynasty had degenerated into a struggle for power among feudal principalities, and Duke Hsiao's consuming concern was to build up Ch'in strength and become a leader among the contending states. Although it is questionable whether Shang Yang himself wrote The Book of Lord Shang, which has been ascribed to him, the conception of a state that is presented in this work is very likely similar to his, and it was therefore surely influential in the reforms he instituted to fulfill Duke Hsiao's ambition. "The central idea of the political theory expounded in The Book of Lord Shang is the necessity for creating a strong government; the strength of a government is relative to the weakness of the people and is insured by a strict rule of law" (Duyvendak 1934, p. 16). Power, for Shang Yang, consisted of a large army and a full granary. He was convinced that the maximum strength of the state could be obtained only through state-wide mobilization, and this in turn required a system of effective laws enforced by severe punishment. He succeeded in instituting laws that applied uniformly throughout the state and equally to all classes of people. The laws were codified and made public, and a judiciary was set up that was independent of the administrative offices of the government. In addition, Shang Yang proposed and implemented a new system of land division, based on private ownership, together with a tithing system of taxation. In accordance with the principle of centralized govern-
233
ment, military service was owed only to the state, and all private military action was prohibited. Shang Yang's administrative system was a success. In ten years the state was reputedly rid of lawlessness; it was highly centralized and bureaucratized; and it pursued a victorious policy of foreign war. When the Ch'in state succeeded in subduing all its rivals and reunifying the empire in 221 B.C., the programs initiated by Shang Yang were introduced and extended throughout the empire. Shang Yang did not long survive the death of Duke Hsiao in 338 B.C. His severe and egalitarian laws had aroused much resentment on the part of the nobility and the privileged classes, and they took the first opportunity to turn against him. His attempts first at flight and then at armed resistance failed, and he was put to death. The Book of Lord Shang remains a valuable record of the social and political philosophy of the ancient Chinese school of law in general and of Shang Yang in particular. The "school of law" stressed the importance of government by law, as opposed to the Confucian ideal of government by "moral virtue." Traditional China, dominated by Confucianism, therefore regarded Shang Yang and the other members of the legalist school with suspicion and abhorrence and condemned Shang Yang for having no moral sense or human feeling. Modern China has re-evaluated him more favorably. The ideas and institutions associated with his name now appear to contain a number of elements considered necessary to the modern administration of law and government. In Shang Yang's approach to politics, however, an informed public played no role, nor were there any safeguards against a ruler who wished to substitute his own whims for the welfare of the state. Y. P. MEI [See also CHINESE POLITICAL THOUGHT and the biographies of KAUTILYA; MACHIAVELLI.] BIBLIOGRAPHY
DUYVENDAK, J. J. L. 1934 Shang Yang. Volume 14, pages 15-16 in Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. New York: Macmillan. KUNG-SUN, YANG The Book of Lord Shang. Translated by J. J. L. Duyvendak. Univ. of Chicago Press, 1963.
SHERRINGTON, C. S. Sir Charles Scott Sherrington (1857-1952) made an overwhelming contribution to the foundations of modern neurophysiology through his ex-
234
SHERRINGTON, C. S.
periments and theories on the functioning of the spinal reflexes. Sherrington's importance to the behavioral scientist lies in the fact that he used mainly the methods of behavioral science to pursue his investigations. He studied the behavior of animals after the influence of higher neural centers had been removed surgically by spinal transection. From such behavior he formulated hypotheses about the nature of the nervous system, which he tested by further experiment. Sherrington was born in London, the son of a country doctor. Although his curriculum at school did not include science, he later enrolled as a medical student at St. Thomas's Hospital in London. Before he completed his clinical studies there in 1885 he worked in the physiology school at Cambridge University and he also spent almost a year with Friedrich Goltz and Carl Anton Ewald in Strasbourg. It was in Goltz's laboratory that he saw the reactions of a dog with a high spinal transection. The investigation of such phenomena was to form his major scientific interest until 1935, the date of his retirement from the Waynflete professorship of physiology at Oxford. Although something was known of reflex action in a general way, Sherrington's thorough investigations transformed the study of reflex action into a tool for the understanding of nervous activity. His book The Integrative Action of the Nervous System (1906) summarizes his most important contributions. The problem that Sherrington posed himself was how the truncated nervous system of the spinal animal produces motor reactions that are coordinated both in space and in time when stimuli are applied. He saw that stimulation of motor pathways alone leads to contortions rather than to actions and that the properties possessed by nerve trunks alone are not sufficient to endow the nervous system with the means of achieving the behavior that he observed. To account for the difference in reaction to different stimuli Sherrington had recourse to the notion of an adequate stimulus, or the idea that the function of a receptor is to make available a particular reflex only to specific physical stimuli. Furthermore, Sherrington was struck by the presence of an after-discharge (the tendency for a reaction to persist after the stimulus has been withdrawn), by differences in latency of reaction when stimuli of differing strength are applied, and by the irreversibility of conduction in the reflex arc. To explain these and other discrepancies between the action of nerve trunks and the nature of the connection between stimulus and response, Sherrington postulated the functions of the synapse, the name of which he
coined. This synaptic hypothesis, based almost entirely on behavioral observations, has now been strikingly verified by advances in experimental technique. On the synaptic hypothesis, messages travel from one nerve cell to another across a small gap between the two cells. Thus there is a functional connection between the two cells as distinct from a physical fusion of their membranes. Transmission across this gap is different in kind from transmission along the processes of the nerve cell itself. (It is now known that in the vertebrate nervous system such transmission across the synapse generally occurs by means of diffusion across the gap between the nerve cells—the synaptic cleft— of small amounts of chemical substances, such as acetylcholine.) He used this hypothesis further to account for interactions between reflexes, and he also introduced the notion of the final common path, thus narrowing down the locus at which one reflex inhibits another. He provided a detailed physiological basis for the mechanism of chain reflex, a notion propounded both by Exner and by Jacques Loeb, which is of great importance to behaviorism. It should be stressed that Sherrington, in his more than three hundred publications, made contributions to many fields other than neurophysiology, among them the physiology of blood, the psychology of contrast and flicker, and the functional localization of the motor cortex. He was also one of the early scientists to work on the neural basis of the emotions. His discussion of the JamesLange theory in the seventh chapter of The Integrative Action of the Nervous System is still one of the best in the literature. The excellence of his work won wide recognition, and in 1932 he was awarded the Nobel prize for medicine. Although Sherrington probably contributed more than anyone else to the purely mechanistic understanding of reflexes, he also found it useful to consider them in terms of their purpose, or biological utility. And he was not averse to devoting thought to the more philosophical aspects of the functioning of the nervous system. In his extensive writings on the subject he argued for a Cartesian dualism of body and mind, a position in which Sir John Carew Eccles, another distinguished neurophysiologist, has followed his teacher. In spite of their profound influence on physiology, the details of Sherrington's observations and thoughts have little affected the mainstream of behavioral science. However, the general impact of his work, whether rightly or wrongly, contributed to the vogue for analysis in terms of the reflex or of stimulus—response psychology. J. A. DEUTSCH
SIDGWICK, HENRY [See also NERVOUS SYSTEM, especially the article on STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF THE BRAIN; SENSES; SENSORY AND MOTOR DEVELOPMENT; SKIN SENSES AND KINESTHESIS.] WORKS BY SHERRINGTON (1906) 1948 The Integrative Action of the Nervous System. 2d ed. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. (1925) 1940 The Assaying of Brabantius and Other Verse. 2d ed. Oxford Univ. Press. 1932 CREED, R. S.; DENNY-BROWN, D.; ECCLES, J. C.; LIDDELL, E. G. T.; and SHERRINGTON, C. S. Reflex Activity of the Spinal Cord. Oxford: Clarendon. (1940) 1951 Man on His Nature. 2d ed. Cambridge Univ. Press. -> A paperback edition was published in 1953 by Doubleday. 1946 The Endeavour of Jean Fernel. Cambridge Univ. Press. SUPPLEMENTARY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
COHEN, HENRY 1958 Sherrington: Physiologist, Philosopher and Poet. Springfield, 111.: Thomas; Liverpool Univ. Press. LIDDELL, EDWARD G. T. 1960 The Discovery of Reflexes. Oxford: Clarendon. -> See especially pages 98-143, "Sherrington and His Times."
SIDGWICK, HENRY Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900), English economist, does not have an obvious place in the standard histories of economic or social thought. His name is not associated with any particular theory or policy, and much of his influence was exerted through his teaching and his participation in the affairs of Cambridge University. Sidgwick was born at Skipton in Yorkshire, where his father was an Anglican clergyman and headmaster of the local grammar school. From his earliest years it was clear that Sidgwick was destined for academic success. After attending Rugby, he went to Cambridge and achieved distinction there, both in classics and mathematics. In 1859 he was elected to a fellowship at Trinity College; he remained at Cambridge for the rest of his life. At the beginning of his academic career Sidgwick taught classics, but he was soon drawn into the field of social science and in 1867 exchanged his lectureship in classics for a lectureship in moral sciences (what would now be called social sciences). Much of his intellectual effort as a teacher at Cambridge was directed toward improving the curriculum: he was influential in raising the status of the social sciences, and he helped pave the way for the economics tripos. Thus, he may be regarded as one of the pioneers who facilitated the emergence of the "Cambridge school" of economics. He also furthered the cause of univer-
235
sity education for women (his wife became principal of Newnham College in 1892), and he played a part in the movement for greater religious toleration at the university. His writings ranged over a number of fields: in addition to his early classical studies, he wrote on politics, philosophy, and economics and, more remote from his central concerns, attempted to make research on psychic phenomena (then a particular vogue in England) scientifically respectable. All who came in contact with Sidgwick seem to have agreed about his intellectual and moral stature; Marshall spoke of him as his "spiritual father and mother," and John Neville Keynes described him as the most intellectually gifted man he had ever met. Sidgwick's written contributions to economics are to be found mainly in his Principles of Political Economy (1883). This work is a useful bench mark by which to judge the state of the discipline in the period between J. S. Mill's Principles (1848) and the first edition of Marshall's Principles (1890). The text is primarily a re-exposition of Mill, with traces of the emergent marginalism of Jevons and Marshall. Like Marshall, Sidgwick had a strong desire to emphasize continuity in economic thinking, rather than his own originality. As he put it, "The special aim . . . is to eliminate needless polemics by a guarded restatement of traditional doctrines, with due recognition of the advances made in economic theory by recent writers" ([1883] 1901, p. ix). The book contains some corrections and clarifications of Mill's analysis (for example, the distinction between movements along a demand schedule and shifts from one demand schedule to another, which is so blurred in Mill, is clearly made and explained by Sidgwick), and the influence of Marshall is obvious. The most important sections in Sidgwick's Principles are those dealing with methodology and the analysis of government interference. Sidgwick restated the methodological position, first enunciated within the context of economics by Senior and Mill, whereby the "science" and the "art" of political economy are to be logically differentiated: "The first gives information as to what happens, without pronouncing whether it is good or bad; the second judges that what happens or would happen under certain conditions is the best thing that could happen" (ibid., p. 36). However, Sidgwick (ever a moderate) refused to adopt the extreme position of Cairnes, and later of Robbins, according to which the economist qua economist has no special qualifications in the normative area of his studies. The core of Sidgwick's major contribution is
236
SIEGFRIED, ANDRE
contained in his discussion of the art of political economy (book 3). He was at pains to dissociate economic science from the political doctrines of laissez-faire and suggested various conditions under which state interference in the productive process may become desirable: one important condition is the divergence of private and social benefits. Here Sidgwick's analysis constitutes the prototype of the Marshall-Pigou approach. However, he did not present a general a priori case for government interference whenever this divergence obtains—each situation has to be considered on its own. He stated the case for interference with the distribution of income—necessitated by an unregulated economic system—with much more generality, except for reservations about the possible effects of interference on production. He argued for much greater equality of income, to be achieved by deliberate government fiscal policy, basing his argument on the "general acceptance" of two propositions of Bentham's, which may be summarized as follows: utility increases as wealth increases, but at a decreasing rate. Sidgwick did not make clear the methodological status of these propositions; we are not told whether they are judgments or testable (and tested) hypotheses. Sidgwick's influence on social thought and policy is difficult to assess. Although he expressed grave doubts about the feasibility of a total socialist solution, his rejection of any general theoretical reasons for nonintervention and his emphasis on the need to look at every case individually place him squarely in the English Fabian tradition. BERNARD CORRY [For the historical context of Sidgwick's work, see the biographies of MILL and SENIOR; for discussion of the subsequent development of Sidgwick's ideas, see the biographies of MARSHALL and PIGOU.] WORKS BY (1874) 1901 The Methods Macmillan. (1883) 1901 The Principles New York:- Macmillan. (1891) 1908 The Elements Macmillan.
SIDGWICK of Ethics. 6th ed. London:
of Political Economy. 3d ed. of Politics. 4th ed. London:
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
KEYNES, JOHN NEVILLE 1900 Henry Sidgwick [obituary]. Economic Journal 10:585-591. KEYNES, JOHN NEVILLE (1908) 1963 Henry Sidgwick. Volume 3, pages 757-759 in Robert Palgrave, Palgrave's Dictionary of Political Economy. New York: Macmillan. MARSHALL, ALFRED (1890) 1961 Principles of Economics. 9th ed. 2 vols. New York and London: Macmillan.
MILL, JOHN STUART (1848) 1965 Principles of Political Economy, With Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy. 2 vols. Edited by J. M. Robson. Collected Works, Vols. 2, 3. Univ. of Toronto Press. SIDGWICK, ARTHUR; and SIDGWICK, ELEANOR 1906 Henry Sidgwick: A Memoir. London and New York: Macmillan.
SIEGFRIED, ANDRE Andre Siegfried (1875-1959), French geographer and political scientist, gained world-wide recognition through his development of a new approach to the study of political parties known as geographic de I'opinion politique, or political ecology; through his studies of French political regimes; and through his more general studies of the United States and other countries. Siegfried was born in Le Havre, the son of a wealthy Calvinist Alsatian merchant who served as mayor of Le Havre from 1878 to 1886 and as a member of the Chamber of Deputies from 1885 to 1922. His mother was the daughter of a pastor in the Reformed Church and came from the departement of Ardeche, which Siegfried later chose as the subject of one of his studies in political ecology. His parents liked to entertain, and Siegfried had the opportunity, first in Le Havre and later in Paris, of meeting in his home the political elite of the Third Republic. As a young man, he accompanied his father, who was a passionate traveler and keen observer, on some of his journeys abroad, an experience which was important for his own later efforts to describe and compare foreign countries. His father, as mayor and as a deputy, initiated many social reforms, thereby setting an example for Siegfried's activities in this field. Siegfried's interest in politics led him to run for the National Assembly. He was unsuccessful and decided instead to focus his political interest on the compilation of "a psychological and political geography of France." The first volume, Tableau politique de la France de I'ouest, appeared in 1913, but the series was interrupted by World War I. Siegfried did not return to his geographies of electoral behavior until after World War n. He then published Geographic electorate de FArdeche sous la Hle Republique (1949a) but after that left further studies to his disciples, publishing only his basic ideas on this kind of inquiry. Siegfried served as a professor at the Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques and from 1933 to 1946 held a chair in economic and political geography at the College de France. Apart from his writings his main influence came through his two courses at the
SIEGFRIED, ANDRE College de France, one on the geography of political parties in France and the other on the economic and political geography of the world. In 1942, during the German occupation, he became director of the Musee Social, an institute that his father had founded for the preparation of social legislation. He had had a large part in the establishment of the Universite Populaire de Belleville, one of the earliest institutions for adult education of workingmen. He was also active as a journalist, and through his articles in Figaro during World War ii "he became one of the most effective leaders of public opinion" (Jean Schlumberger in Andre Siegfried 1875-1959 1961). After World War ii he became director of the Institut d'Etudes Politiques in Paris. He was elected to the Academic Frangaise in 1944, the first geographer to be so honored. Before and after World War i, Siegfried traveled in Great Britain, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. "It was an opportunity," he wrote later, "to observe democracy as practiced with the Anglo-Saxon spirit and methods. Instead of the aggressive and somewhat negative individualism of the Latin civilization, I saw political societies based on social cooperation. At bottom it seemed to be a contrast between the Catholic and Protestant state of mind, religion leading to extraordinarily different consequences" (1930, p. vi). This experience reinforced his interest in the political institutions of his own country. Siegfried's studies of foreign countries are comprehensive monographs in the tradition of Tocqueville. Each of them has a central theme: the books on New Zealand (1904) and Canada (1906) are concerned with the formation of new nations and the books on Britain (1931) and the United States (1927) with their changed positions in the world. The books are masterful syntheses of the economic, political, and cultural aspects of large complex societies, always presented with a historical perspective and a geographical foundation. He gave his major attention to class structure, to religious orientations and cleavages, and to race. Since he had more than once visited some of the countries he wrote about, he was able to observe important social changes directly. His wide range of knowledge in economics, political science, and history and his acquaintance with both the Latin and Anglo-Saxon worlds enabled him to make use of cross-cultural comparisons. He did not resist the temptation of putting his impressions of national character, or as he put it, the "souls of nations," into print (1950). These essays, while not free of the generalizations and
237
exaggerations common to most writing of this sort, bring into focus the outstanding traits of each nation and are free of farfetched psychological conjectures. Siegfried's writings on French political life fall into two categories: the historical studies of political regimes from the Third to the Fifth Republic and the ecological studies of political parties or tendencies. The latter include the early study of northwest France (1913) and the later one of Ardeche (1949a). These ecological studies represented a methodological innovation and were the beginning of a school of investigation that has gained adherents in many countries. The observation that each of the major political tendencies in France has its particular strongholds which show a high degree of stability despite changing party labels led Siegfried to the conclusion that it was possible to distinguish regions of political opinion—political climates which correspond to regions in physical geography. The particular climate depends on the varying combinations of several major factors: (1) the social stratification of the regional population—whether it is egalitarian or hierarchic; (2) the religious orientation of the people—whether Roman Catholic or Protestant, and if Catholic, whether or not the political instructions of the priest are followed; (3) the past—that is, memories of important political events that influence political attitudes; (4) the extent to which the population is autochthonous or contains a significant proportion of "strangers" (in-migrants); (5) the geography—that is, the soil, the climate, the altitude, the topography, the settlement patterns, the population density, and the degree of accessibility or isolation of the area. Siegfried's technique consisted essentially, although not exclusively, of comparing successive maps showing election returns by small areas with maps showing the geographic distribution of other factors and in assessing, from their fit, the relative importance of the various factors. For Ardeche, for example, the topographical map gave the best fit. In Ardeche ways of life vary with the altitude; the mountain, the hillside, and the plains communities are distinctly different. The merit of these ecological studies derives from Siegfried's intensive knowledge of the regions as well as from his sense of what is politically relevant. Although he used such formal notions as "the Right" and "the Left," he was careful to state what these mean in terms of immediate goals and general political ideas. Although Siegfried held a chair of political and economic geography, he was not a geographer in the technical sense. The findings of geography and
238
SIGNIFICANCE, TESTS OF
geology were for him data essential to the understanding of society. Nor was he a geographical determinist, although he appreciated the opportunities and limitations which the physical environment offers to human action, particularly for the development of primary industries. The social structure, especially the class structure in the Marxian sense, depends on the use of these opportunities, and the class structure in combination with other factors produces certain political climates. But Siegfried was not a Marxist in his political orientation, or even a socialist. As a scholar, he felt obliged to avoid association with any political party. And yet, he was clearly a republican, a liberal, and a humanist and therefore also a social reformer. While he had sympathy for the Anglo-Saxon style of political life, he regretted the "Americanizing" tendencies in the economic organization of France, the impending decline of the independent entrepreneur, and the replacement of the artisancraftsman by the assembly-line worker. These tendencies, inescapable as they might be, he feared would endanger the dignity and spirituality of man. RUDOLF HEBERLE [See also GEOGRAPHY.] WORKS BY SIEGFRIED (1904) 1914 Democracy in New Zealand. London: Bell. -> First published in French. (1906) 1949 Canada: An International Power. 2d ed. New York: Duell. -» First published as Le Canada: Les deux races. 1913 Tableau politique de la France de I'ouest sous la Troisieme Republique. Paris: Colin. 1927 America Comes of Age: A French Analysis. New York: Harcourt. -» First published in 1927 as Les Etats-Unis d'aujourd'hui. 1930 France: A Study in Nationality. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. ->• Also published in the same year as Tableau des partis en France. 1931 England's Crisis. New York: Harcourt. -» Also published in the same year as La crise britannique au XXe siecle. 1934 Amerique Latine. Paris: Colin. 1937 Une geographic de 1'opinion politique est-elle possible? Nouvelle revue francaise 49:789-802. 1946 La geographic de 1'opinion politique. Atomes 1, no. 4:3-6. 1947 The Mediterranean. New York: Duell. 1949a La geographic electorate de I'Ardeche sous la HIe Republique. Paris: Colin. (1949fc) 1950 African Journey. London: Cape. -> First published as Afrique du Sud: Notes de voyage. (1950) 1952 Nations Have Souls. New York: Putnam. -> First published as L'dme des peuples. 1951 Voyage aux Indes. Paris: Colin. 1952a Geographic politique des cinqs continents. Paris: Passerell.
1952& Mes souvenirs de la Troisieme Republique; Mon pere et son temps: Jules Siegfried, 1836—1922. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. (1954) 1955 America at Mid-century. New York: Harcourt. -> First published as Tableau des Etats-Unis. 1956 De la IIIe a la IVe Republique. Paris: Grasset. 1958 De la IVe a la Ve Republique au jour le jour. Paris: Grasset. SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
Andre Siegfried 1875-1959. 1961 Paris: Imprimerie Foulon. -> A collection of eulogies. See especially the article by Jean Schlumberger.
SIGNIFICANCE, TESTS OF The topic of significance testing is treated in detail in HYPOTHESIS TESTING, a term that is usually regarded as synonymous with "tests of significance," although some statisticians feel that there are important distinctions. The present article describes the basic ideas of significance testing, outlines the most important elementary tests, and reviews problems related to the philosophy and application of significance testing. Significance tests are statistical procedures for examining a hypothesis in the light of observations. Many significance tests are simple and widely used, and have a long history; the idea of significance testing goes back at least to the eighteenth century. There has been much confusion about significance testing, and consequently it has been much misused. Despite their apparent simplicity (and sometimes because of it), significance tests have generated many controversies about meaning and utility. A significance test starts with observations and with a hypothesis about the chance mechanism generating the observations. From the observations a test statistic is formed. Large values of the test statistic (or small values, or both, depending on circumstances) lead to strong skepticism about the hypothesis, whereas other values of the test statistic are held to be in conformance with the hypothesis. Choice of the test statistic usually depends upon the alternatives to the hypothesis under test. Basic ideas As an example of significance testing, suppose that the hypothesis under test, often called the null hypothesis, or H 0 , is that sleep deprivation has no effect on a certain kind of human skill, say arithmetic ability as measured by a particular type of test. Some population must be specified; suppose
SIGNIFICANCE, TESTS OF that it consists of all students at a particular college who are willing to participate in a sleep-deprivation experiment. One hundred students are chosen at random, tested for arithmetic skill, deprived of a night's sleep, and then tested again. For each student the initial test result minus the second test result is regarded as the basic observation, datum, or score. Suppose, for the present, that if the null hypothesis is false, the effect of sleep deprivation is either to increase average score or to decrease it; either direction might hold, so the alternative hypotheses are two-sided. The analyst would, of course, be concerned about possible practice and motivational effects; a helpful device might be the use of a control group that would also be tested twice, but with a normal night's sleep. The effect of practice might be lessened by the presentation of a sequence of tests before the experiment proper begins. Another matter of concern is whether the basic score used, the difference between test results, is more appropriate than the ratio of test results or some other combination of them. For present purposes such issues are not discussed. From the 100 scores a test statistic is then formed. The choice might well be the Student itstatistic, which is the observed average score divided by an estimate of its own variability. Details of the t-statistic are given later. The nub of the significance-testing concept is that if the null hypothesis really is true, then it is unlikely that the Student ^-statistic would be greater than, say, 2.6 in unsigned numerical value. The probability of that event, under the usual— but possibly dangerous—assumptions that the scores behave like statistically independent random variables with the same normal distribution, is about .01, or 1 out of 100. If, on the other hand, the null hypothesis is false, the probability of the event is greater than .01, much greater if sleep deprivation has a large effect. Hence, if a Student ^-statistic greater than 2.6 or less than —2.6 is observed, either the null hypothesis is false, or the null hypothesis is true and an event of small probability has occurred, or something is wrong with the underlying assumptions. If those assumptions seem satisfactory, and if the Student t-statistic is, say, 2.7, most people would prefer to act as if the null hypothesis were false. The cut-off number, 2.6, and the associated probability, .01, are cited for the sake of specific illustration. If 2.6 is replaced by a larger number, the associated probability is smaller; if it is replaced by a smaller number, the probability is larger.
239
In formal significance testing one decides beforehand on the cut-off number. If 2.6 is chosen, then there is a .01 probability of erroneously doubting the null hypothesis when it is in fact true. In the example, 2.6 is called the critical value of the (unsigned) Student t-statistic, and .01 is called the level of significance or (usually synonymously) the size of the test. The level of signifiance, frequently denoted by a, is also called the probability of Type i error, or of error of the first kind; this is the error of falsely doubting the null hypothesis when it is in fact true. In the present context, if the unsigned Student t-statistic turns out to be greater than the critical value, it is often said that the statistic (or the test, or the sample) is statistically significant; this terminology can lead to confusion, as will be described below. From this approach, then, a significance test is a procedure, agreed upon beforehand, that will result in one of two conclusions (or actions, or viewpoints): if the test statistic—here the unsigned Student ^-statistic—-is greater than the critical value, one tends to act as if the null hypothesis is false; otherwise one tends to act in some different way, not necessarily as if the null hypothesis is true but at least as if its falsity is not proved. These two kinds of conclusions or actions are conventionally called, respectively, rejection and acceptance of the null hypothesis. Such nomenclature, with its emotional overtones and its connotations in everyday speech, has led to confusion and needless controversy. The terms "rejection" and "acceptance" should be thought of simply as labels for two kinds of actions or conclusions, the first more appropriate if the null hypothesis is false and the second more appropriate if it is true or at least not known to be false. In the example, rejection and acceptance might correspond to different attitudes toward a theory of sleep or to different recommendations for desirable amounts of sleep. (In some contexts, such as acceptance sampling in industry, the terms "acceptance" and "rejection" may be used literally.) There is further room for confusion in the varying ways that significance testing is described. In the example it would be accurate to say that the hypothesis of no sleep-deprivation effect (on average score) is being tested. But it might also be said, more loosely, that one is testing the effect of sleep deprivation, and this might be misinterpreted to mean that the null hypothesis asserts a positive mean score under sleep deprivation. One reason for this ambiguity is that the null hypothesis is often set up in the hope that it will be rejected. In the comparison of a new medical treatment with an old one, equality of effectiveness might be un-
240
SIGNIFICANCE, TESTS OF
interesting, so only rejection of the null hypothesis of equality would excite the experimenter., especially if he had invented the new treatment. On the other hand, accepting the null hypothesis may itself be very important—for example, in an experiment to test the theory of relativity. Usually, however, there is a basic asymmetry between the null hypothesis and the other hypotheses. The two-decision procedure discussed above is a highly simplified framework for many situations in which significance tests are used. Although there are cases in which the above viewpoint makes direct sense (for example, industrial acceptance sampling, crucial experiments for a scientific theory), most uses of significance tests are different. In these more common uses the analyst computes that level of significance at which the observed test statistic would just lead to rejection of the null hypothesis. In the example, if the observed Student t-statistic were 1.8, the resulting sample level of significance, or observed significance level, would be .075, again under the conventional assumptions listed earlier. From this second viewpoint the observed (or sample) significance level is a measure of rarity or surprise; the smaller the level, the more surprising the result if the null hypothesis is true. Naturally, if the result is very surprising under the null hypothesis, one is likely to conclude that the null hypothesis is false, but it is important to know quantitatively the magnitude of the surprise. The sample level of significance is often called the P-value, and the notation P = .075 (or p = .075) may be used. (For other views on measuring surprise, see Weaver 1948; Good 1956.) Usually a very rough knowledge of the degree of surprise suffices, and various simplifying conventions have come into use. For example, if the observed significance level lies between .05 and .01, some authors say that the sample is statistically significant, while if it is less than .01, they call it highly statistically significant. The adverb "statistically" is often omitted, and this is unfortunate, since statistical significance of a sample bears no necessary relationship to possible subject-matter significance of whatever true departure from the null hypothesis might obtain (see Boring 1919). From one point of view, significance testing is a device for curbing overenthusiasm about apparent effects in the data. For example, if the sleepdeprivation experiment showed a positive effect, an experimenter enthusiastic about a theory of sleep psychology might cry, "Eureka! Sleep deprivation really does have the predicted consequence." After he himself has had a good night's sleep, however, he might compute the appropriate test statistic and see, perhaps, that the observed effect—
or a greater one—could occur with probability .2 under the null hypothesis of no real underlying effect. This would probably dampen his initial enthusiasm and might prevent one of the many premature announcements of discoveries that clutter the literature of some sciences. (The sleep example is solely for illustration; I have no reason to think that experimenters on sleep are anything but cautious in their statistical analyses.) On the other hand, it is easy to be overconservative and throw out an interesting baby with the nonsignificant bath water. Lack of statistical significance at a conventional level does not mean that no real effect is present: it means only that no real effect is clearly seen from the data. That is why it is of the highest importance to look at power and to compute confidence intervals, procedures that will be discussed later. The null hypothesis, despite its name, need not be that the average effect of sleep deprivation is zero. One might test the null hypothesis that the average effect is 10 score units. Or one might test such a null hypothesis as: the average effect of sleep deprivation is not positive; or, again: the average effect lies between —10 and 10 score units. The last two null hypotheses, unlike the previous ones, do not fix the hypothesized average effect at a single value. Standard tests There are a number of popular standard significance tests in the statistical armamentarium. The tests described here include those on means, variances, correlations, proportions, and goodness of fit. Mean. The null hypothesis in a test on means, as in the original example, is that the expected value (mean) of a distribution is some given number, fji0. This hypothesis is to be tested on the basis of a random sample of n observations on the distribution; that is, one considers n independent random variables, each with that same distribution whose mean is of interest. If the variance, or2, of the distribution is known, and if X denotes the sample mean (arithmetic average), a widely useful test statistic is X
(1)
—
fJJQ
cr/Vn
which has mean zero and standard deviation one under the null hypothesis. Often the absolute (unsigned numerical) value of (1) is the test statistic. If the underlying distribution of interest is normal, then (1) is itself normally distributed, with variance one and mean zero (that is, it has a unit normal distribution) under the null hypothesis.
SIGNIFICANCE, TESTS OF Even if the underlying distribution is not normal, (1) has approximately the unit normal distribution under the null hypothesis, provided that n is not too small. In practice cr2 is usually unknown, and an estimator of it, s2, is used instead. The most usual estimator is based on the sum of squared deviations of the observations from X,
1 (x w -x) 2 ], n 1 where the Xi are the observations. (The usual name for s- is "sample variance," and that for s is "sample standard deviation.") Then (1) becomes the Student (or t-) statistic
241
not normally distributed, the unit normal distribution is a good approximation to the null distribution of (4) for n1}n2 large. (If, instead of the null hypothesis ft t = /A, , one wishes to test JJL^ = /*2 + S, where 8 is some given number, one need only replace X1 — X2 in the numerator of (4) with x;-X2-8.) If the variances are not known, and if s2 and sf, are estimators of them, a common test statistic is
(2)
f^° • -=z s/\/n If the Xi are normal, then (3) has as its distribution under the null hypothesis the Student (or £-) distribution with n—1 degrees of freedom (df). If n is large (and often it need not be very large), then in quite general circumstances the distribution of (3) under the null hypothesis is approximately the unit normal distribution. [See DISTRIBUTIONS, STATISTICAL, articles on SPECIAL CONTINUOUS DISTRIBUTIONS and APPROXIMATIONS TO DISTRIBUTIONS.] Two samples. Suppose that the observations form two independent random samples of sizes n a and ?z 2 : Xn, • • • , X1?!i and X 21 , • • • , X 2r , 2 . Here the first subscript denotes the sample (1 or 2), and the second subscript denotes the observation within the sample (1 through r^ or n 2 ). For example, in the sleep-deprivation experiment the first sample might be of male students and the second of female students. The null hypothesis might be that the average effect of sleep deprivation on arithmetic skill is the same for male and female students. Note that this null hypothesis says nothing about the magnitude of the average effect; it says only that the average effect is the same for the two groups. More generally, suppose the null hypothesis is that the two underlying means are equal: ^ = fjL2, where ^ is the expected value of any of the Xu and /x2 that of any of the X 2 i . If the variances are known, say erf and erf, the usual test statistic is /o\ (3)
(4)
where X^ and X2 are the two sample means. If the X's are normally distributed, (4) has the unit normal as null distribution—that is, as its distribution when the null hypothesis holds. Even if the X's are
X2 (5) which, for n^, n2 large, has the unit normal distribution as an approximation to the null distribution. The null distribution is better approximated by a ^-distribution [details can be found in ERRORS, article on EFFECTS OF ERRORS IN STATISTICAL ASSUMPTIONS]. If the variances are unknown but may reasonably be assumed to be equal (
i + n2 — 2 2
where sf, s are defined in terms of (2). If the observations are normally distributed, (6) has as null distribution the t-distribution with n, + n2 - 2 df. This holds approximately, in general, if the X's are mildly nonnormally distributed and if erf and erf, differ somewhat but n1 and n2 are not very different. Paired samples. The two-sample procedure described above should be distinguished from the paired two-sample procedure. The latter might be used if the subjects are fraternal twins of opposite sex, with both members of a sampled pair of twins observed. Then the male and female samples would no longer be independent, since presumably the members of a pair of twins are more nearly alike in most respects than are two random subjects. In this case one would still use Xx — X2 in the numerator of the test statistic, but the denominator would be different from those given above. Although it is not always possible, pairing (more generally, blocking) is often used to increase the power of a test. The underlying idea is to make comparisons within a relatively homogeneous set of experimental units. [See EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN.] [These significance tests, and generalizations of them, are further discussed in HYPOTHESIS TESTING; LINEAR HYPOTHESES, article on ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE; and ERRORS, article on EFFECTS OF ERRORS IN STATISTICAL ASSUMPTIONS.]
242
SIGNIFICANCE, TESTS OF
Variances. The null hypothesis in a test on variances may be that cr2 has the value cr 2 ; then the usual test statistic is s2 as defined in (2), or, more conveniently, (n-l)sVo- 2 .
(7)
Under the null hypothesis, (7) has the chi-square distribution with n — 1 degrees of freedom, provided that the observations are normal, independent, and identically distributed. Unlike the null distributions for the tests on means, the null distribution of (7) is highly sensitive to deviations from normality. In the two-sample case a common null hypothesis is cr2 = erf. The usual test statistic is s\/s\, which, under normality, has as null distribution the Fdistribution with ^ — I and n2 — 1 df. [These tests are discussed further in LINEAR HYPOTHESES, article on ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE; VARIANCES, STATISTICAL STUDY OF.] Correlation. The most common procedure in simple correlation analysis is to test the null hypothesis that the population correlation coefficient is zero, using as test statistic the sample correlation coefficient. Under the assumptions of bivariate normality and a random sample, the null distribution is closely related to a ^-distribution. One can also test the null hypothesis that the population correlation coefficient has some nonzero value, say .55. Special tables or approximate methods are required here [see MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS, articles on CORRELATION]. Proportions. Single sample. The simplest case in the analysis of proportions is that of a sample proportion and the null hypothesis that the corresponding population probability is p0, some given number between 0 and 1. The sample proportion and population probability correspond to some dichotomous property: alive-dead, heads-tails, success-failure. It is convenient to summarize the sample in the form of a simple table
N
n -N
n
where n is the sample size, N the number of sample observations having a stated property, n — N the number not having this property, and N/n the sample proportion. The usual sampling assumptions, which need examination in each application, are that the observations are statistically independent and that each has the same probability of having the stated property. As a result of these assumptions, N has a binomial distribution. The usual test statistic is (8)
N -np0 - Po)
which, for n not too small, has approximately the unit normal distribution under the null hypothesis. The square of this test statistic, again for n not too small and under the null hypothesis, has approximately a chi-square distribution with one df. Notice that (8) is really a special case of (1) if N is regarded as the sum of n independent observations taking values 1 and 0 with probabilities p0 and 1 — po. Two samples. The data may consist of two sample proportions, and the null hypothesis may be that the corresponding population proportions are equal. It is convenient to express such data in terms of a 2 x 2 table like Table 1, where the two samples (of sizes nl+, n2+) correspond to the upper two lines and the bottom and right rims are marginal totals—for example, N1X + N12 = n 1+ . Capital letters denote random variables and lower-case letters nonrandom quantities. The usual assumptions, which must be examined in each application, are that N tl and N21 are independently and binomially distributed. A common test statistic is ~ (N21/712+)
(9)
which, for n's not too small, has approximately the unit normal distribution under the null hypothesis. (Note the great similarity of test statistics (6) and (9), which are related in much the same way as (l)and(8).) If the unsigned value of (9) is the test statistic, one may equivalently consider its square, which is expressible in the simpler form (A7
]\7
-_ V 1 ' 1 1 1 Y 2 2 ^~~^
f-\f\\ ^i())
n
— i \7 A7 ^2 > 121'21/ AT
AT
Under the null hypothesis, and for n's not too small, (10) has approximately a chi-square distribution with one df. Large values of (10) are statistically significant. Chi-square statistics. The above test statistics, in squared form, are special cases of the chi-square test statistic; their null distributions are approxiTable 1 — Summary of two samples for analysis of proportions Number having property Sample 1
Sample 2
Number not having property
Totals
N,,
N,,
n.
N21
N22
n2+
N.,
N.
n++ = n
Totals
SIGNIFICANCE, TESTS OF mately chi-square ones. Such test statistics can generally be thought of in terms of data tabulations of the kind shown above; the statistic is the sum of terms given by the mnemonic expression (observed — "expected")2 "expected" summed over the cells in the body of the table. For example, in the first, very simple table for a sample proportion, there are two cells in the body of the table, with N and n — N observed frequencies in them. The corresponding frequencies expected under the null hypothesis are np(} and n(l — Po). Applying the mnemonic expression gives as the chi-square statistic (N -
- p 0 )] 2
which can readily be shown to equal the square of (8). The one df for the approximate chi-square distribution is sometimes described thus: There are two observed frequencies, but they are restricted in that their sum must be n. Hence, there is one df. Similarly, (10) can be obtained from the table for two proportions by means of the mnemonic expression. In this case the null hypothesis does not completely specify the expected frequencies, so they must be estimated from the data. That is why quotation marks appear around "expected" in the mnemonic. [Further details, and related procedures, including the useful continuity correction, are discussed in COUNTED DATA.] Association for counted data. Suppose that the individuals in a sample of people are cross-classified by hair color and eye color, with perhaps five categories for each attribute. The null hypothesis is that the two attributes are statistically independent. A standard procedure to test for association in this contingency table is another chi-square test, which is based essentially on (10) above. Although the test statistics are the same and have the same approximate null distribution, the power functions are different. [This test and related ones are discussed in COUNTED DATA.] Nonparametric tests. The tests for means, variances, and correlation, discussed above, are closely tied to normality assumptions, or at least to approximate normality. Analogous tests of significance, without the normality restriction, have been devised [these are discussed in NONPARAMETRIC STATISTICS; HYPOTHESIS TESTING].
General approximation. In many cases a test statistic, T, is at hand, but its null distribution is difficult to express in usable form. It is often useful to approximate this null distribution in terms of fjL0 , the expected value of T under the null hypoth-
243
esis, and S, an estimator of the standard deviation of T under the null hypothesis. The approximation takes (T — /u 0 )/S as roughly unit normal under the null hypothesis. This approximation is, intuitively and historically, very important. The first tests of proportions discussed above are special cases of the approximation. Goodness of fit. A number of significance tests are directed to the problem of goodness of fit. In these cases the null hypothesis is that the parent distribution is some specific one, or a member of some specific family. Another problem often classed as one of goodness of fit is that of testing, on the basis of two samples, the hypothesis that two parent populations are the same. [See GOODNESS OF FIT.] Other aspects of significance testing Alternative hypotheses and power. A significance test of a null hypothesis is usually held to make sense only when one has at least a rough idea of the hypotheses that hold if the null hypothesis does not; these are the alternative hypotheses (or alternate hypotheses). In testing that a population mean, IJL, is zero, as in the example at the start of the article, the test is different if one is interested only in positive alternatives (/JL > 0), if one is interested only in negative alternatives (^ < 0), or if interest extends to both positive and negative alternatives. When using such a test statistic as the Student t-statistic, it is important to keep the alternatives in mind. In the sleep-deprivation example the original discussion is appropriate when both positive and negative alternatives are relevant. The null hypothesis is rejected if the test statistic has either a surprisingly large positive value or a surprisingly large negative value. On the other hand, it might be known that sleep deprivation, if it affects arithmetic skill at all, can only make it poorer. This means that the expected average score (where the score is the initial test result minus the result after sleep deprivation) cannot possibly be negative but must be zero or positive. One would then use the so-called right-tail test, rejecting the null hypothesis only if the Student ^-statistic is large. For example, deciding to reject H0 when the statistic is greater than 2.6 leads to a level of significance of .005. Similarly, right-tail P-values would be computed. If the Student statistic observed is 1.8, the right-tail P-value is .037; that is, the probability, under the null hypothesis, of observing a Student statistic 1.8 or larger is .037. There are also left-tail tests and left-tail P-values. For a test considered as a two-action procedure, the power is the probability of (properly) rejecting the null hypothesis when it is false. Power, of
244
SIGNIFICANCE, TESTS OF
course, is a function of the particular alternative hypothesis in question, and power functions have been much studied. The probability of error of Type ii is one minus power; a Type n error is acceptance of the null hypothesis when it is false. By using formulas, approximations, tables, or graphs for power, one can determine sample sizes so as to control both size and power. [See EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN, article on THE DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS.] A common error in using significance tests is to neglect power considerations and to conclude from a sample leading to "acceptance" of the null hypothesis that the null hypothesis holds. If the power of the test is low for relevant alternative hypotheses, then a sample leading to acceptance of H0 is also very likely if those alternatives hold, and the conclusion is therefore unwarranted. Conversely, if the sample is very large, power may be high for alternatives "close to" the null hypothesis; it is important that this be recognized and possibly reacted to by decreasing the level of significance. These points are discussed again later. It is most important to consider the power function of a significance test, even if only crudely and approximately. As Jerzy Neyman wrote, perhaps with a bit of exaggeration, ". . . i f experimenters realized how little is the chance of their experiments discovering what they are intended to discover, then a very substantial proportion of the experiments now in progress would have been abandoned in favour of an increase in size of the remaining experiments, judged more important" (1958, p. 15). [Preferences to Neymans fundamental and pathbreaking contributions to the theory of testing are given in HYPOTHESIS TESTING.] There is, however, another point of view for which significance tests of a null hypothesis may be relevant without consideration of alternative hypotheses and power. An illuminating discussion of this viewpoint is given by Anscombe (1963). Combining significance tests. Sometimes it is desirable to combine two or more significance tests into a single one without reanalyzing the detailed data. For example, one may have from published materials only the sample significance levels of two tests on the same hypothesis or closely related ones. (Discussions of how to do this are given in Mosteller & Bush [1954] 1959, pp. 328-331; and Moses 1956. See also Good 1958.) Of course, a combined analysis of all the data is usually desirable, when that is possible. Preliminary tests of significance. A desired test procedure is often based on an assumption that may be questionable—for example, equality of the
two variances in the two-sample it-test. It has frequently been suggested that a preliminary test of the assumption (as null hypothesis) be made and that the test of primary interest then be carried out only if the assumption is accepted by the preliminary test. If the assumption is rejected, the test of primary interest requires modification. Such a two-step procedure is difficult to analyze and must be carried out with caution. One relevant issue is the effect on the primary test of a given error in the assumption. Another is that the preliminary test may be much more sensitive to errors in other underlying assumptions than is the main significance test. [See ERRORS, article on EFFECTS OF ERRORS IN STATISTICAL ASSUMPTIONS. A dlSCUS-
sion of preliminary significance tests, with references to prior literature, is given in Bancroft 1964. Related material is given in Kitagawa 1963.] Relation to confidence sets and estimation. It often makes sense, although the procedure is not usually described in these terms, to compute appropriate sample significance levels not only for the null hypothesis but also for alternative hypotheses as if—for the moment—each were a null hypothesis. In this way one obtains a measure of how surprising the sample is for both the null and the alternative hypotheses. If parametric values corresponding to those hypotheses not surprising (at a specified level) for the sample are considered together, a confidence region is obtained. [See ESTIMATION, article on CONFIDENCE INTERVALS AND REGIONS.]
In any case, a significance test is typically only one step in a statistical analysis. A test asks, in effect, Is anything other than random variation appearing beyond what is specified by the null hypothesis? Whatever the answer to that question is—but especially if the answer is Yes—it is almost always important to estimate the magnitudes of underlying effects. [See ESTIMATION.] Relation to discriminant analysis. Significance testing, historically and in most presentations, is asymmetrical: control of significance level is more important than control of power. The null hypothesis has a privileged position. This is sometimes reasonable—for example, when the alternative hypotheses are diffuse while the null hypothesis is sharp. In other cases there is no particular reason to call one hypothesis "null" and the other "alternative" and hence no reason for asymmetry in the treatment of the two kinds of error. This symmetric treatment then is much the same as certain parts of the field called discriminant analysis. [See MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS, article AND DISCRIMINATION.!
On CLASSIFICATION
SIGNIFICANCE, TESTS OF Dangers, problems, and criticisms Some dangers and problems of significance testing have already been touched on: failure to consider power, rigid misinterpretation of "accept" and "reject," serious invalidity of assumptions. Further dangers and problems are now discussed, along with related criticisms of significance testing. Nonsignificance is often nonpublic. Negative results are not so likely to reach publication as are positive ones. In most significance-testing situations a negative result is a result that is not statistically significant, and hence one sees in published papers and books many more statistically significant results than might be expected. Many—perhaps most —-statistically nonsignificant results never see publication. The effect of this is to change the interpretation of published significance tests in a way that is hard to analyze quantitatively. Suppose, to take a simple case, that some null hypothesis is investigated independently by a number of experimenters, all testing at the .05 level of significance. Suppose, further, that the null hypothesis is true. Then any one experimenter will have only a 5/100 chance of (misleadingly) finding statistical significance, but the chance that at least one experimenter will find statistical significance is appreciably higher. If, for example, there are six experimenters, a rejection of the null hypothesis by at least one of them will take place with probability .265, that is, more than one time out of four. If papers about experiments are much more likely to be published when a significance test shows a level of .05 (or less) than otherwise, then the nonpublication of nonsignificant results can lead to apparent contradictions and substantive controversy. If the null hypothesis is false, a similar analysis shows that the "power" of published significance tests may be appreciably higher than their nominal power. (Discussions of this problem are given in Sterling 1959; and Tullock 1959.) Complete populations. Another difficulty arises in the use of significance tests (or any other procedures of probabilistic inference) when the data consist of a complete census for the relevant population. For example, suppose that per capita income and per capita dollars spent on new automobiles are examined for the 50 states of the United States in 1964. The formal correlation coefficient may readily be computed and may have utility as a descriptive summary, but it would be highly questionable to use sampling theory of the kind discussed in this article to test the null hypothesis that the population correlation coefficient
245
is zero, or is some other value. The difficulty is much more fundamental than that of nonnormality; it is hard to see how the 50 pairs of numbers can reasonably be regarded as a sample of any kind. Some statisticians believe that permutation tests may often be used meaningfully in such a context, but there is no consensus. [For a definition of permutation tests, see NONPARAMETRIC STATISTICS. Further discussion of this problem, and additional references are given in Hirschi & Selvin 1967, chapter 13. An early article is Woofter 1933.] Target versus sampled populations. Significance tests also share with all other kinds of inference from samples the difficulty that the population sampled from is usually more limited than the broader population for which an inference is desired. In the sleep-deprivation example the sampled population consists of students at a particular college who are willing to be experimental subjects. Presumably one wants to make inferences about a wider population: all students at the college, willing or not; all people of college age; perhaps all people. [See STATISTICS; ERRORS, article on NONSAMPLING ERRORS.] Neglect of power by word play. A fallacious argument is that power and error of the second kind (accepting the null hypothesis when it is false) need not be of concern, since the null hypothesis is never really accepted but is just not rejected. This is arrant playing with words, since a significance test is fatuous unless there is a question with at least two possible answers in the background. Hence, both kinds of probabilities of wrong answers are important to consider. Recall that "accept" and "reject" are token words, each corresponding to a conclusion that is relatively more desirable when one or another true state of affairs obtains. To see in another way why more than Type I error alone must be kept in mind, notice that one can, without any experiment or expense, achieve zero level of significance (no error of the first kind) by never rejecting the null hypothesis. Or one can achieve any desired significance level by using a random device (like dice or a roulette wheel) to decide the issue, without any substantive experiment. Of course, such a procedure is absurd because, in the terminology used here, its power equals its level of significance, whatever alternative hypothesis may hold. Difficulties with significance level. If significance tests are regarded as decision procedures, one criticism of them is based on the arbitrariness of level of significance and the lack of guidance in choosing that level. The usual advice is to examine
246
SIGNIFICANCE, TESTS OF
level of significance and power for various possible sample sizes and experimental designs and then to choose the least expensive design with satisfactory characteristics. But how is one to know what is satisfactory? Some say that if satisfaction cannot be described, then the experimenter has not thought deeply enough about his materials. Others oppose such a viewpoint as overmechanical and inappropriate in scientific inference; they might add that the arbitrariness of size, or something analogous to it, is intrinsic in any inferential process. One cannot make an omelet without deciding how many eggs to break. Unconventional significance levels. Probably the most common significance levels are .05 and .01, and tables of critical values are generally for these levels. But special circumstances may dictate tighter or looser levels. In evaluating the safety of a drug to be used on human beings, one might impose a significance level of .001. In exploratory work, it might be quite reasonable to use levels of .10 or .15 in order to increase power. What is of central importance is to know what one is doing and, in particular, to know the properties of the test that is used. Nonconstant significance levels. For many test situations it is impossible to obtain a sensible test with the same level of significance for all distributions described by a so-called composite null hypothesis. For example, in testing the null hypothesis that a population mean is not positive, the level of significance depends generally on the value of the nonpositive mean; the more it departs from zero, the smaller the probability of Type I error. In such cases the usual approach is to think in terms of the maximum probability of Type i error over all distributions described by the null hypothesis. In the nonpositive mean case, the maximum is typically attained when the mean is zero. Necessarily false null hypotheses. Another criticism of standard significance tests is that in most applications it is known beforehand that the null hypothesis cannot be exactly true. For example, it seems most implausible that sleep deprivation should have literally no effect at all on arithmetic ability. Hence, why bother to test a null hypothesis known at the start to be false? One answer to this criticism can be outlined as follows: A test of the hypothesis that a population mean has a specified value, //,<,, is a simplification. What one really wants to test is whether the mean is near ^i0, as near as makes no substantive difference. For example, if a new psychological therapy raises the cure rate from 51 per cent to 51.1 per cent, then even if one could discover such a small
difference, it might be substantively uninteresting and unimportant. For "reasonable" sample sizes and "reasonable" significance levels, most standard tests have power quite close to the level of significance for alternative hypotheses close to the null hypothesis. When this is so and when, in addition, power is at least moderately large for alternatives interestingly different from the null hypothesis, one is in a satisfactory position, and the criticism of this section is not applicable. The word "reasonable" is in quotation marks above because what is in fact reasonable depends strongly on context. To examine reasonableness it is necessary to inspect, at least roughly, the entire power function. Many misuses of significance testing spring from complete disregard of power. A few authors, notably Hodges and Lehmann (1954), have formalized the argument outlined above by investigating tests of null hypotheses such as the following: The population mean is in the interval (^0 — A, ^o + A), where /JLO is given and A is a given positive number. There are, to be sure, null hypotheses that are not regarded beforehand as surely false. One wellknown example is the null hypothesis that there is no extrasensory effect in a parapsychological experiment. Other examples are found in crucial tests of well-formulated physical theories. Even in these instances the presence of small measurement biases may make interpretation difficult. A minuscule measurement bias, perhaps stemming from the scoring method, in an extensive parapsychological experiment may give a statistically significant result although no real parapsychological effect is present. In such a case the statistical significance may reflect only the measurement bias, and thus much controversy about parapsychology centers about the nature and magnitude of possible measurement biases, including chicanery, unconscious cues, and biases of scoring. A sharp attack on significance testing, along the lines of this section and others, is given by L. J. Savage (1954, chapter 16). Several tests on the same data. Frequently, two or more hypothesis tests are carried out on the same data. Although each test may be at, say, the .05 level of significance, one may ask about the joint behavior of the tests. For example, it may be important to know the probability of Type I error for both of two tests together. When the test statistics are statistically independent, there is no problem; the probability, for example, that at least one of two tests at level .05 will give rise to Type I error is 1 — (.95) 2 = .0975. But in general the tests are statistically dependent, and analogous compu-
SIGNIFICANCE, TESTS OF tations may be difficult. Yet it is important to know, for example, when two tests are positively associated, in the sense that given a Type i error by one, the other is highly likely to have a Type I error. When a moderate to large number of tests are carried out on the same data, there is generally a high probability that a few will show statistical significance even when all the null hypotheses are true. The reason is that although the tests are dependent, they are not completely so, and by making many tests one increases the probability that at least some show statistical significance. [Some -ways of mitigating these problems for special cases are described in LINEAR HYPOTHESES, article on MULTIPLE COMPARISONS.] One-sided versus two-sided tests. There has been much discussion in the social science literature (especially the psychological literature) of when one-sided or two-sided tests should be used. If a one-sided test is performed, with the choice of sidedness made tendentiously after inspection of the data, then the nominal significance level is grossly distorted; in simple cases the actual significance level is twice the nominal one. Suppose that in the sleep-deprivation example the data show an average score that is positive. "Aha," says the investigator, "I will test the null hypothesis with a right-tail test, against positive means as alternatives." Clearly, if he pursues that policy for observed positive average scores and the opposite policy for observed negative average scores, the investigator is unwittingly doing a two-tail test with double the stated significance level. This is an insidious problem because it is usually easy to rationalize a choice of sidedness post hoc, so that the investigator may be fooling both himself and his audience. The same problem occurs in the choice of test statistic in general. If six drugs are compared in their effects on arithmetic skill and only the observations on those two drugs with least and greatest observed effects are chosen for a test statistic, with no account taken of the choice in computing critical values, an apparently statistically significant result may well just reflect random error, in the sense that the true significance level is much higher than the nominal one. [Some methods of dealing with this are described in LINEAR HYPOTHESES, article on MULTIPLE COMPARISONS.] Three-decision procedures. Many writers have worried about what to do after a two-tail test shows statistical significance. One might conclude, for example, that sleep deprivation has an effect on average score, but one wishes to go further and say that it has a positive or a negative effect, de-
247
pending on the sign of the sample average. Yet significance testing, regarded stringently as a twodecision procedure, makes no provision for such conclusions about sign of effect when a two-sided test rejects the null hypothesis. What is really wanted in such a case may well be a t/iree-decision procedure: one either accepts HO, rejects H0 in favor of alternatives on one side, or rejects H0 in favor of alternatives on the other side. There is no reason why such a procedure should not be used, and it is, in effect, often used when the user says that he is carrying out a significance test. A major new consideration with this kind of three-decision procedure is that one now has six, rather than tiuo, kinds of error whose probabilities are relevant; for each possible hypothesis there are two erroneous decisions. In some simple cases symmetry reduces the number of different probabilities from six to three; further, some of the probabilities may be negligibly small, although these are probabilities of particularly serious errors (for a discussion, see Kaiser 1960). A three-decision procedure may often be usefully regarded as a composition of two one-sided tests. [See HYPOTHESIS TESTING.] A variety of other multiple-decision procedures have been considered, generally with the aim of mitigating oversimplification in the significancetesting approach. A common case is that in which one wants to choose the best of several populations, where "best" refers to largest expected value. [A pioneering investigation along this line is Mosteller 1948. See also DECISION THEORY; SCREENING AND SELECTION.] Hypotheses suggested by data. In the course of examining a body of data, the analyst may find that the data themselves suggest one or more kinds of structure, and he may decide to carry out tests of corresponding null hypotheses from the very data that suggested these hypotheses. One difficulty here is statistical dependence (described above) between the tests, but there is a second difficulty, one that appears even if there is only a single significance test. In a sense, this difficulty is just a general form of the post hoc one-sided choice problem. Almost any set of data, of even moderate size and complexity, will show anomalies of some kind when examined carefully, even if the underlying probabilistic structure is wholly random—that is, even if the observations stem from random variables that are independent and identically distributed. By looking carefully enough at random data, one can generally find some anomaly—for example, clustering, runs, cycles—that gives statistical significance at customary levels although no real effect
248
SIGNIFICANCE, TESTS OF
is present. The explanation is that although any particular kind of anomaly will occur in random data with .05 statistical significance just 5 times out of 100, so many kinds of anomalies are possible that at least one will very frequently appear. Thus, use of the same data both to suggest and to test hypotheses is likely to generate misleading statistical significance. Most sets of real data, however, are not completely random, and one does want to explore them, to form hypotheses and to test these same hypotheses. One can sometimes use part of the data for forming hypotheses and the remainder of the data to examine the hypotheses. This is, however, not always feasible, especially if the data are sparse. Alternatively, if further data of the same kind are available, then one can use the earlier data to generate hypotheses and the later data to examine them. Again, this approach is not always possible. As an example, consider one of the earliest instances of significance testing, by Daniel Bernoulli and his son John in 1734, as described by Todhunter ([1865] 1949, sees. 394-397). Astronomers had noticed that the orbital planes of the planets are all close together. Is this closeness more than one might expect if the orbital planes were determined randomly? If so, then presumably there is a physical reason for the closeness. The Bernoullis first attempted to make precise what is meant by randomness; in modern terminology this would be specification of randomness as a null hypothesis. They then computed the probability under randomness that the orbital planes would be as close together as, or closer than, the observed planes. This corresponds to deciding on a test statistic and computing a one-tail P-value. The resulting probability was very small and the existence of a physical cause strongly suggested. [For biographical material on the Bernoullis, see BERNOULLI FAMILY.] Todhunter, in his History, described other early instances of significance testing, the earliest in 1710 by John Arbuthnot on the human sex ratio at birth (the relevant sections in Todhunter [1865] 1949 are 343-348, 617-622, 888, 915, and 987). Significance testing very much like that of the Bernoullis continues; a geophysical example, relating to the surprising degree of land-water antipodality on the earth's surface, has appeared recently (Harrison 1966). The whole topic received a detailed discussion by Keynes ([1921] 1952, chapter 25). Up-to-date descriptions of astronomical theories about the orbital planes of the planets have been given by Struve and Zebergs (1962, chapter 9). Quite aside from the issue of whether it is reasonable to apply probabilistic models to such unique
objects as planetary orbits (or to the 50 states, as in an earlier example), there remains the difficulty that a surprising concatenation was noted in the data, and a null hypothesis and test statistic fashioned around that concatenation were considered. Here there is little or no opportunity to obtain further data (although more planets were discovered after the Bernoullis and, in principle, planetary systems other than our sun's may someday be observable). Yet, in a way, the procedure seems quite reasonable as a means of measuring the surprisingness of the observed closeness of orbital planes. I know of no satisfactory resolution of the methodological difficulties here, except for the banal moral that when testing hypotheses suggested during the exploration of data, one should be particularly cautious about coming to conclusions. (In the Bayesian approach to statistics, the problem described here does not arise, although many statisticians feel that fresh problems are introduced [see BAYESIAN INFERENCE].) An honest attempt at answering the questions, What else would have surprised me? Was I bound to be surprised? is well worthwhile. For example, to have observed planetary orbits symmetrically arranged in such a way that their perpendiculars nearly formed some rays of a three-dimensional asterisk would also have been surprising and might well be allowed for. Difficulties in determining reference set. Some statisticians have been concerned about difficulties in determining the proper underlying reference probabilities for sensibly calculating a P-value. For example, if sample size is random, even with a known distribution, should one compute the P-value as if the realized sample size were known all along, or should one do something else? Sample size can indeed be quite random in some cases; for example, an experimenter may decide to deal with all cases of a rare mental disorder that come to a particular hospital during a two-month period. [Three papers dealing with this kind of problem are Barnard 1947; Cox 1958; and Anscombe 1963. See also LIKELIHOOD.] Random sample sizes occur naturally in that part of statistics called sequential analysis. Many sequential significance testing procedures have been carefully analyzed, although problems of determining reference sets nonetheless continue to exist. [See SEQUENTIAL ANALYSIS.] Optional stopping. Closely related to the discussion of the preceding section is the problem of optional stopping. Suppose that an experimenter with extensive resources and a tendentious cast of mind undertakes a sequence of observations and
SIGNIFICANCE, TESTS OF from time to time carries out a significance test based on the observations at hand. For the usual models and tests, he will, sooner or later, reach statistical significance at any preassigned level, even if the null hypothesis is true. He might then stop taking observations and proclaim the statistical significance as if he had decided the sample size in advance. (The mathematical background of optional stopping is described in Robbins 1952.) For the standard approach to significance testing, such optional stopping is as misleading and reprehensible as the suppression of unwanted observations. Even for an honest experimenter, if the sampling procedure is not firmly established in advance, a desire to have things turn out one way or another may unconsciously influence decisions about when to stop sampling. If the sampling procedure is firmly established in advance, then, at least in principle, characteristics of the significance test can be computed in advance; this is an important part of sequential analysis. Optional stopping is, of course, relevant to modes of statistical analysis other than significance testing. It poses no problem for approaches to statistics that turn only on the observed likelihood, but many statisticians feel that these approaches are subject to other difficulties that are at least equally serious. [See BAYESIAN INFERENCE; LIKELIHOOD.] Simplicity and utility of hypotheses. It is usually the case that a set of data will be more nearly in accord with a complicated hypothesis than with a simpler hypothesis that is a special case of the complicated one. For example, if the complicated hypothesis has several unspecified parameters whereas the simpler one specializes by taking some of the parameters at fixed values, a set of data will nearly always be better fit by the more complicated hypothesis than by the simpler one just because there are more parameters available for fitting: a point is usually farther away from a given line than from a given plane that includes the line; in the polynomial regression context, a linear regression function will almost never fit as well as a quadratic, a quadratic as well as a cubic, and so on. Yet one often prefers a simpler hypothesis to a better-fitting more complicated one. This preference, which undoubtedly has deep psychological roots, poses a perennial problem for the philosophy of science. One way in which the problem is reflected in significance testing is in the traditional use of small significance levels. The null hypothesis is usually simpler than the alternatives, but one may be unwilling to abandon the null hypothesis unless the evidence against it is strong.
249
Hypotheses may be intrinsically comparable in ways other than simplicity. For example, one hypothesis may be more useful than another because it is more closely related to accepted hypotheses for related, but different, kinds of observations. The theory of significance testing, however, takes no explicit account of the simplicity of hypotheses or of other aspects of their utility. A few steps have been made toward incorporating such considerations into statistical theory (see Anderson 1962), but the problem remains open. Importance of significance testing. Significance testing is an important part of statistical theory and practice, but it is only one part, and there are other important ones. Because of the relative simplicity of its structure, significance testing has been overemphasized in some presentations of statistics, and as a result some students come mistakenly to feel that statistics is little else than significance testing. Other approaches to significance testing. This article has been limited to the customary approach to significance testing based on the frequency concept of probability. For other concepts of probability, procedures analogous to significance testing have been considered. [See BAYESIAN INFERENCE. An extensive discussion is given in Edwards et al. 1963.] Anscombe (1963) has argued for a concept of significance testing in which only the null hypothesis, not the alternatives, plays a role. WILLIAM H. KRUSKAL [See also HYPOTHESIS TESTING.] BIBLIOGRAPHY
ANDERSON, T. W. 1962 The Choice of the Degree of a Polynomial Regression as a Multiple Decision Problem. Annals of Mathematical Statistics 33:255-265. ANSCOMBE, F. J. 1963 Tests of Goodness of Fit. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B 25:81-94, BAKAN, DAVID 1966 The Test of Significance in Psychological Research. Psychological Bulletin 66:423-437. BANCROFT, T. A. 1964 Analysis and Inference for Incompletely Specified Models Involving the Use of Preliminary Test(s) of Significance. Biometrics 20: 427-442. BARNARD, G. A. 1947 The Meaning of a Significance Level. Biometrika 34:179-182. BORING, EDWIN G. 1919 Mathematical vs. Scientific Significance. Psychological Bulletin 15:335-338. Cox, DAVID R. 1958 Some Problems Connected With Statistical Inference. Annals of Mathematical Statistics 29:357-372. EDWARDS, WARD; LINDMAN, HAROLD; and SAVAGE, LEONARD J. 1963 Bayesian Statistical Inference for Psychological Research. Psychological Review 70:193— 242. GOOD, I. J. 1956 The Surprise Index for the Multivariate Normal Distribution. Annals of Mathematical Statistics 27:1130-1135.
250
SIMIAND, FRANQOIS
GOOD, I. J. 1958 Significance Tests in Parallel and in Series. Journal of the American Statistical Association 53:799-813. HARRISON, CHRISTOPHER G. A. 1966 Antipodal Location of Continents and Oceans. Science 153:1246-1248. HIRSCHI, TRAVIS; and SELVIN, HANAN C. 1967 Methods in Delinquency Research. New York: Free Press. -> See especially Chapter 13, "Statistical Inference." HODGES, J. L. JR.; and LEHMANN, E. L. 1954 Testing the Approximate Validity of Statistical Hypotheses. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B 16: 261-268. KAISER, HENRY F. 1960 Directional Statistical Decisions. Psychological Review 67:160-167. KEYNES, JOHN MAYNARD (1921) 1952 A Treatise on Probability. London: Macmillan. ->• A paperback edition was published in 1962 by Harper. KITAGAWA, Tosio 1963 Estimation After Preliminary Tests of Significance. University of California Publications in Statistics 3:147—186. MOSES, LINCOLN E. 1956 Statistical Theory and Research Design. Annual Review of Psychology 7:233258. MOSTELLER, FREDERICK 1948 A k-sample Slippage Test for an Extreme Population. Annals of Mathematical Statistics 19:58-65. MOSTELLER, FREDERICK; and BUSH, ROBERT R. (1954) 1959 Selected Quantitative Techniques. Volume 1, pages 289-334 in Gardner Lindzey (editor), Handbook of Social Psychology. Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley. NEYMAN, JERZY 1958 The Use of the Concept of Power in Agricultural Experimentation. Journal of the Indian Society of Agricultural Statistics 9, no. 1:9—17. ROBBINS, HERBERT 1952 Some Aspects of the Sequential Design of Experiments. American Mathematical Society, Bulletin 58:527-535. SAVAGE, LEONARD J. 1954 The Foundations of Statistics. New York: Wiley. STERLING, THEODORE D. 1959 Publication Decisions and Their Possible Effects on Inferences Drawn From Tests of Significance—or Vice Versa. Journal of the American Statistical Association 54:30-34. STRUVE, OTTO; and ZEBERGS, VELTA 1962 Astronomy of the 20th Century. New York: Macmillan. TODHUNTER, ISAAC (1865)1949 A History of the Mathematical Theory of Probability From the Time of Pascal to That of Laplace. New York: Chelsea. TULLOCK, GORDON 1959 Publication Decisions and Tests of Significance: A Comment. Journal of the American Statistical Association 54:593 only. WEAVER, WARREN 1948 Probability, Rarity, Interest, and Surprise. Scientific Monthly 67:390-392. WITTENBORN, J. R. 1952 Critique of Small Sample Statistical Methods in Clinical Psychology. Journal of Clinical Psychology 8:34-37. WOOFTER, T. J. JR. 1933 Common Errors in Sampling. Social Forces 11:521-525.
SIMIAND, FRANCOIS Francois Simiand (1873-1935), French economist and economic historian, was born at Gieres (Isere) to a large family of modest means. Like most members of his family, he became a teacher. At 20, he entered the Ecole Normale Superieure in
Paris, preparing first for his teacher's license and then for his agregation in philosophy. He passed the agregation in 1896 and was then admitted to the Fondation Thiers, newly opened to researchers. At that time Simiand became interested in sociology and attended the courses taught by Emile Durkheim and Lucien Levy-Bruhl. He began work on a dissertation on miners' wages in France, and thenceforth his sociological orientation distinguished much of his work from that of his economist contemporaries. When Simiand was at the Ecole Normale, Parisian students were very much stirred up by the Dreyfus affair. He and his fellow students had several opportunities to hear lectures by the socialists Lucien Herr and Jean Jaures, and like many other Normaliens Simiand came to have a lasting sympathy for socialism. With Herr, Charles Peguy, and Leon Blum he later founded a bookselling and publishing cooperative, the Librairie Georges Bellais, named for one of their friends. Simiand's principal task was to edit a popular series, the Bibliotheque socialiste, and to head a technical program for training personnel for the cooperative. Since he had to earn a living at the same time that he was joining in the battle for socialism, he took a position as librarian at the Ministry of Labor, established in 1906, where he performed the enormous task of providing the documentary resources necessary for the new bureau. At this time Simiand wrote methodological discussions that were violently critical of the historians, particularly of Charles Seignobos. The best example is an article entitled "Methode historique et science sociale," which appeared in the Revue de synthese historique in 1903. Simiand rejected Seignobos' conception of history as a mere collection of political facts isolated from their social and economic context. Even such faithful friends as Paul Mantoux, however, could not accept Simiand's destructive conclusions. Simiand was also at work on his thesis, Le saiaire des ouvriers des mines de charbon en France, which he defended in 1904 and published in a revised version in 1907. It was the forerunner of his later research on wages. With the war of 1914 Simiand began a period of government service. His socialist connections led to his appointment as aide to Albert Thomas, who became undersecretary of state for artillery and munitions in 1915. Simiand continued in government service until 1920. He worked strenuously to organize war production; later he saw to it that the transition from the German to the French regime in Alsace-Lorraine was carried out in such a way that the people of those provinces retained the social gains they had made before 1918.
SIMMEL, GEORG In 1920 Simiand resigned his administrative functions and from then on devoted himself entirely to study and teaching. In 1910 he had been called to the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes as lecturer in the history of economic theory. After 1920 he resumed teaching there, and in 1924 he became chairman of the department of history and economic statistics. At the same time he also taught at the Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, as professor of labor organization and labor unions from 1919 to 1923 and as professor of political economy from 1923 to 1933. In 1932 he succeeded Georges Renard as professor of labor history at the College de France. Simiand's health, already impaired by his work during the war, could not stand the intense pace of his activity. He died at Saint-Raphael (Var) in 1935. This final period, from about 1930 to 1935, was intellectually Simiand's most fruitful one, and his publications were numerous. He published the lectures he gave at the Conservatoire, which clearly show the development of his economic thinking. He also produced works inspired by the world crisis —a set of lectures given at the University of Brussels on long-term economic fluctuations (1932a) and a study of economic development in the United States, in which economic analysis is related to historical factors (1934). Most important, Simiand completed the masterwork to which he had devoted so much of his life, his research on price movements and wages (1932Z?). He prefaced the work by a long methodological introduction, explaining his particular interest in the study of wages. Wages, he asserted, are a social reality, and it was by the use of economics that he hoped to grasp social realities of this kind. Furthermore, wages are an empirical entity: they can be dealt with statistically; they correspond to a real value; they are part of an economic and social complex. Accordingly, wages appear to be made to order as a subject for the kind of scientific investigation advocated by Simiand, namely one that applies the methods of the natural sciences to the social sciences. As he saw the study, the methodological procedures gradually emerged from the study itself and were not established by a conceptual system nor did they follow preconceived ideas. Simiand believed that he had thus found a new method for studying economic facts, but his ideas found no followers, and he remained an isolated figure. CLAUDE FOHLEN [Other relevant material may be found in the biographies Of BLOCK; DURKHEIM; HALBWACHS; LEVAS-
SEUR; LEVY-BRUHL.]
251
WORKS BY SIMIAND Methode historique et science sociale. Revue de synthese historique 6:1-22, 129-157. (1904) 1907 Le salaire des ouvriers des mines de charbon en France: Contributions a la theorie economique du salaire. Paris: Comely. -» An expanded version of Simiand's thesis. 1912 La methods positive en science economique. Paris: Alcan. 1922 Statistique et experience: Remarques de methode. Paris: Riviere. 1930a Cours d'economie politique professe en 1928—1929. Paris: Domat-Montchrestien. 1930b Cours d'economie politique professe en 1929—1930. Paris: Loviton. (1931) 1932 Le salaire, revolution sociale et la monnaie; essai de theorie experimental du salaire: Introduction et etude globale. 3 vols. Paris: Alcan. 1932a Les fluctuations economiques a longue periode et la crise mondiale. Paris: Alcan. 1932& Recherches anciennes et nouvelles sur le mouvement general des prix du XVIe au XIXe siecle. Paris: Domat-Montchrestien. 1932c Cours d'economie politique professe en 1930-1931. Paris: Loviton. 1934 Inflation et stabilisation alternees: Le developpement economique des Etats-Unis (des origines coloniales au temps present*). Paris: Domat-Montchrestien. 1903
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOUGLE, CELESTIN 1936 La methodologie de Frangois Simiand et la sociologie. Annales sociologiques Series A 2:5-28. DAMALAS, BASILE 1943 L'oeuvre scientifique de Frangois Simiand. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. -» See especially the bibliography on pages 267-270. HARSIN, PAUL 1935 Francois Simiand: 1873-1935. Societe Scientifique de Bruxelles, Annales Series D 55: 39-68. LAZARD, MAX 1936 Francois Simiand, 1873-1935: L'homme, I'oeuvre. Paris: Domat-Montchrestien. MORAZE, CHARLES 1942 La legon d'un echec: Essai sur la methode de Frangois Simiand. Melanges d'histoire sociale 1:5-24; 2:22-44.
SIMMEL, GEORG Georg Simmel (1858-1918), German philosopher and sociologist, is still a controversial figure. While some hail him as the founder of modern sociology, others see in him only a brilliant stylist who made no original contribution and failed to develop a systematic theory. It is true that Simmel was no system builder and was often preoccupied with defining approaches—philosophical, historical, or sociological—which he illustrated with his substantive analyses. But these analyses, subtle and full of surprising insights, still delight and stimulate readers, while many of the more systematic works of his contemporaries are no longer read. Life and career. Simmel's life was externally uneventful. He spent most of it in Berlin, his native
252
SIMMEL, GEORG
city; he traveled little; and he experienced neither true poverty nor wealth, neither unanimous rejection nor great success. His predominant preoccupations were intellectual. He was not immediately concerned with the acute social and political problems of his age, and only once did a political event, the outbreak of World War i, move him to deep and emotional concern. His intellectuality was passionate, and he had a strong disdain for everything crude and vulgar, reflecting a kind of spiritual aristocratism. Simmei's father was a Jewish businessman who had become a Roman Catholic; his mother was of Jewish origin but a Lutheran. Simmel, baptized as a Lutheran, later renounced his church membership but retained a philosophical interest in religion. While he was still in school, his father died. His guardian later left him a small fortune, which enabled Simmel to live as a scholar even when he was without a salaried academic position. He studied history, folk psychology, the history of art, and philosophy at the University of Berlin, where he received his doctorate in 1881. His dissertation on the philosophy of Kant gained a prize; the thesis he wrote for his subsequent habilitation also dealt with Kant. He started to lecture as a Privatdozent in 1885 and almost immediately attracted large and enthusiastic audiences. At first he lectured on philosophy and ethics, but soon he began to emphasize certain sociological aspects of his topics and later devoted whole courses to this new subject, which at that time was not being taught by anyone else at his university. However, sociology accounted for only about half of his course offerings. In 1890 Simmel married. His wife, Gertrud, with whom he had one son, was also intellectually inclined and a writer on philosophy. Their home became a meeting place for members of Berlin's intellectual elite. But in his academic career Simmel was long frustrated, apparently because of his Jewish origin, his nonprofessorial brilliance, and his intellectual attitude, which some felt to be destructive. It was 15 years before he even became titular professor, and all attempts to achieve a full professorship failed until, at the age of 56, he was finally called to a chair at the University of Strassburg in 1914. He died there of cancer in the fall of 1918. Influence. Simmel may be remembered today primarily by sociologists, but for him sociology was only one of many interests, and his productive period in this field lasted barely more than one decade. His earliest and his latest works were philosophical. He had a lifelong interest in art, admired and wrote about Rodin, received the young
Rilke in his home, published a book about Goethe, and was a friend of Stefan George. Simmei's bibliography (Gassen & Landmann 1958) lists 31 books (some very short ones), 256 articles, essays, etc. (many published in nonscholarly journals), and about 100 translations of his works into other languages. Thus, Simmel was well known during his lifetime. However, he did not found a "school" in any of his fields of work. In philosophy his reputation did not long survive his death; in the 1920s his work was already overshadowed by existential philosophy. In sociology, Tonnies praised him during his lifetime, Durkheim published one of his essays in L'annee sociologique, and Max Weber, whom he joined in founding the German Sociological Society in 1910, esteemed him and in his own later work utilized some of Simmei's concepts and theses. However, both Durkheim and Weber soon surpassed Simmel in influence and renown, and later only Leopold von Wiese followed the path outlined by Simmel, although even von Wiese coupled his explicit indebtedness with criticism. In the United States, Simmel first became known through early translations, many of them by Albion W. Small, and through the efforts of Park and Burgess (1921) and Spykman (1925). But the impact was not deep. After a period of oblivion, the efforts of Kurt H. Wolff (see The Sociology of Georg Simmel; Simmel 1908a; Wolff 1959) and Rudolph H. Weingartner (1962) have revived some interest in Simmel, but with a few exceptions, such as Coser's book on conflict (1956) and the work of several authors on the three-person group (the triad), Simmei's analyses have not been explicitly followed up by modern sociologists. Simmel himself foresaw this fate when he wrote in his diary that he would leave no spiritual heirs because his heritage would be dispersed and made use of as money is used. And indeed, much of his sociological thought has become common coin without remaining associated with his name. Intellectual ancestors. Simmel was sensitive to the intellectual currents of his time and reflected most of them in his work without identifying himself exclusively with any one of them. His methodology is fashioned according to Kantian principles, but with modifications. He was influenced by Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche, and his philosophy of life—foreshadowing modern existentialism—has noticeable affinities with the work of his friend Husserl and of Bergson. The influence of Dilthey can be found in both Simmei's sociology and his cultural philosophy, notably in his views on differentiation, interaction (Wechselwirkung), and
SIMMEL, GEORG the individual. Spencer, Comte, and Marx were other influences on Simmel's sociology, but he rejected contemporary positivism and social Darwinism, and he was definitely not a Marxist. Thus, the work of Simmel escapes easy classification. Philosophical position. For Simmel, philosophy was not a discipline ranged alongside other disciplines. Philosophy both precedes and follows all special disciplines—as epistemology, on the one hand, and as philosophy of the particular object, on the other. Philosophy, then, is not constituted by and confined to a particular subject matter; it is a distinct mode of treating any given subject matter, characterized by receptiveness to the totality of being and at the same time expressive of a fundamental attitude or world orientation on the part of the philosophizing person. Simmel demonstrated this view by writing on the philosophy of such different objects as money, culture, the sexes, religion, and art. Epistemologically, Simmel held, in the manner of Kant, that all experience of contents is shaped by a priori categories. This view is the basis for his distinction between form and content, which later also became the methodological principle for his sociology. The distinction is clearly analytical. Form is, first of all, a basic organizing principle of perception or modality of experience, which imparts structure to that which in its immediate unity is structureless. Not simply philosophy itself, but also religion and science, are modalities of experience that may be applied alternatively to the same content. Simmel extended this view to history. History is not the exact reproduction of all that has happened and is happening, but a coherent representation of the boundless manifold of human life and its products, created by selective perception and ordering. At first Simmel held this to be true not only for historiography but also for the conscious experience of history; later he modified this view somewhat and found a certain intrinsic coherence in history itself as a process of life. But Simmel did not stipulate any specific selective principle as adequate to the historical mode of perception, and it was this relativism that Troeltsch criticized as excessive historicism. Simmel never worked as a historian in the usual sense, although he had a widely ramified knowledge of history and often drew on it for illustrations, especially in his sociological works—including as sociological his Philosophie des Geldes (1900a). Simmel's philosophies of life and of culture may be considered together as one coherent, substantive theory. Life as a force or principle was for him a
253
process of unbounded continuity, an uninterrupted flowing, a creative movement: life is more-life, as he put it. As a principle, life is the opposite of form and alien to it. But as a concrete process, life can become real only in forms. The individual, the concrete subject of life, is himself a bounded creature, and individual experience gives form to contents, thereby creating the objects of external reality. This process of objectification has two aspects: the perception of objects as external and the production of objects of material and spiritual culture (e.g., law, systems of knowledge, art, religion). Here Simmel talked of life as more-than-life, life becoming real and expressing itself in the creation of objects. These objects he also called "forms," a duplication of terms that may easily cause confusion. As a continuous and creative process, life cannot be contained in finished and static forms (or objects). It must leave and destroy them, but only to crystallize again in new forms. This is the basic antinomy of life, which becomes the tragedy of culture when attention is turned to the fate of the individual in this process. The individual produces objects of culture to maintain his life and develop his potentialities. To this end he must not only utilize the sum total of human products (or objective spirit), but he must also interiorize them and reintegrate them into the stream of his life. But this reintegration of subject and object remains unachievable. The elements of objective spirit, as finished forms dissociated from the stream of life, possess their own dynamic. They become autonomous and develop according to their inner logic, no longer means but ends in themselves. Thus, if man first wanted to know in order to live, some men will later live only to accumulate more knowledge. In the end, man is dominated and enslaved by his own products. The parallel to the dialectic theory of alienation is obvious. But if for Marx alienation can be resolved in a future society, for Simmel the contradiction flowing from the antinomy of life is eternal. Naturally, Marxist critics jumped on this. Thus, in a brilliant critique, Lukacs (1953) accused Simmel of promoting a cynical and complacent adjustment to the status quo by interpreting as eternal a condition of the individual that is characteristic only of imperialism. Simmel's conception of the process of culture is not completely ahistorical. As he noted especially in the Philosophie des Geldes (1900a), social differentiation and the attendant specialization of human activities greatly increase the production of cultural objectifications. Thus, at the same time
254
SIMMEL, GEORG
that specialization makes the full development of personality ever more difficult, there is a steadily growing amount of objective culture to be interiorized if subjective (or personal) culture is to flourish. Accordingly, the discrepancy between objective and subjective culture appears largest in contemporary society, where it has given rise to a struggle not only against obsolete forms, but against form as a principle. The development of individual personality is a concern that links Simmel's philosophy with his sociology. In the latter, he came to a more positive conclusion. While the full realization of individual personality is impeded by the tragedy of culture, it is also promoted by social differentiation and the expansion of social groups, and potentially even by the growth of a money economy. The process of social development. Simmel's theory of social development, although presented in his sociological writings, can be considered apart from his "pure" or "formal" sociology. In viewing this process, Simmel used two distinct points of reference, or approaches. The first, linked to his view of the process of culture, considers social differentiation and group expansion chiefly from the point of view of the effects on individualization. Social differentiation and the quantitative expansion of groups are seen to be closely interrelated. Small groups are more vulnerable and cannot make full use of the energy-saving principle of division of labor; hence their preservation requires greater involvement and effort on the part of each member. With the expansion of groups and increasing differentiation, a lesser involvement is sufficient—and is all that can be demanded, since the consensus in larger groups tends to become segmental. Also, with group expansion the relations between members become impersonal, guided by an order of abstract rules. Thus only a limited and clearly defined contribution comes to be expected of each member, and this results in greater personal freedom. At the same time individuality has a chance to increase: as groups form on the basis of segmental interest and partial involvement, each person tends to belong to a larger number of different groups, and this has an individualizing effect. The development of a money economy contributes to individualization both directly and indirectly, by stimulating the growth of large and purposive groups. Money is the basis of impersonal social relations and permits the substitution of financial for personal obligations. Of all types of obligation, a merely financial one is most compat-
ible with a maximum of personal freedom—although this is, of course, freedom only in the negative sense, or potential freedom, which must be used for personal development. As money makes the individual independent of particular persons and groups, it stimulates the formation of associations for limited and specific purposes and hence contributes to the growth and multiplication of groups with the attendant individualizing effect. Simmel saw a close relationship between the existence of a money economy, rationality, and the growth of natural science. All three are based on the principle of calculation. Rational (i.e., purposive and calculating) action presupposes knowledge of causal relations and hence motivates the search for such knowledge. As a consequence of such pervasive rationalization, emotionalism decreases; this, on the one hand, means a shallower emotional life but, on the other hand, facilitates mutual understanding and conciliation. Simmel's second approach in considering the process of group expansion and social development would today be called functionalist. It derives from the influence of Spencerian evolutionism, which marked Simmel's view on social differentiation as put forth in his first sociological publication (1890). There he stated that the development of organisms is directed by a tendency toward greater efficiency, or as he put it, toward a relative saving of energy. This tendency is, according to Simmel, the characteristic, and positive, consequence of social differentiation, and he took great pains to demonstrate this principle in the growth of various forms of higher social organization—not very convincingly for the modern reader. In fact, Simmel dropped this evolutionary thesis later and did not repeat it in his other sociological works. But he retained the basic principle implied in this thesis —the explanation of certain social forms, processes, and changes by their usefulness. Simmel's functionalism pervades all his sociological work, but it is perhaps most prominent in his treatment of the self-preservation of social groups, where he discussed the conditions for the continuous existence of a group in spite of a constant turnover of members—among these conditions are functional differentiation and formation of specialized organs, symbols, and norms, and formalization or impersonality in the definition of duties and obligations. However, here at least Simmel escaped the danger of organismic reification, which threatens any attempt to explain the rise or persistence of something by its usefulness to the group or social system. In his book on social differen-
SIMMEL, GEORG tiation (1890) he had stated explicitly that the observable tendencies toward group maintenancesuch as group defense mechanisms—are not independent forces inherent in the group as such. Rather, they result from the self-interest of the members in preserving the group, because group solidarity is a necessity for individual life, especially in situations of conflict and strife. By virtue of social-psychological mechanisms, which Simmel only sometimes treated explicitly, the solidarity thus created tends to survive its immediate causes, giving existing groups a greater stability. Relationism and the concept of society. One of Simmel's basic tenets is that all things are to be considered as interdependent, or as functions of each other. This view, referred to as his functionalism, relativism, or, most appropriately, relationism, should be clearly distinguished from his specifically sociological functionalism, which, by contrast, went largely unnoticed until recently. Simmel's relationism derives from his basic philosophical position that reality is essentially movement, continuity, process, and that only the human intellect, fashioned to serve as an instrument for action and not for gaining knowledge for its own sake, tends to perceive reality in terms of structures and substances—solid, fixed phenomena that are amenable to classification, ordering, and calculation. But what is thus commonly regarded as a substance is often essentially a process, a function, an interdependence. This view is most pronounced in Simmel's treatment of money and of society. For Simmel money is not in itself a valuable substance and therefore exchangeable for objects of all sorts; it is, on the contrary, essentially the action of exchange in a concrete form, the material expression of the exchange relationship, a social function become a substance [see INTERACTION, article on SOCIAL INTERACTION]. Simmel similarly rejected the view that society is a substance, an organism, an irreducible real entity. Society is nothing but the sum total of the interactions and interdependencies (the German term Wechselwirkung implies both) between individuals—whose unity in turn is constituted only by the interaction between parts. Understandably, this view of society met with criticism from authors such as Othmar Spann, who resented this dissolution of the social organism and charged Simmel with psychologizing sociology. In fact, Simmel's explicit reference in his definition of society to Kant's treatment of nature may be misleading. But society was for him not merely a psychic phenom-
255
enon, a phenomenon of perception, because its constituents—interactions and interdependencies —are real enough. Only the conception of society as an entity is a matter of perception. The nature of sociology. Simmel's lasting attractiveness as a sociological author may derive from the subtlety of his substantive analyses, but his most important contribution is, nevertheless, usually considered to be his methodology, which gave an independent status to sociology as a special discipline. Simmel rejected sociology as a comprehensive study of all social facts, since as such it would be only a label for numerous special disciplines treating different aspects of the same general object, human life and its products. But if sociology has no concrete object of its own, it nevertheless gains a special object of cognition by isolating analytically the aspect of interaction from the whole of social reality. Interactions are to be analyzed not only where they have crystallized into relatively permanent structures or social institutions, but also on the level of the more transitory interpersonal relations. This emphasis on the subinstitutional, or microsociological, was novel for his time. Simmel was also impatient with the confusion between sociology and the philosophy of history or social philosophy, and he wanted sociology to keep close to observable phenomena, leaving all metaphysical interpretations that transcend objective knowledge to what he later (1917) called "philosophical sociology." However, Simmel did not conceive of sociology in a positivistic fashion, as a science of laws. He had early rejected the use of natural science as a model for the disciplines dealing with man and his creations, and he did not side with the positivists in the hotly debated issue of the idiographic as against the nomothetic character of social science. Rather, he attempted to play down any such distinction by pointing out that both viewpoints are alternative modes of perception. But the search for social laws never appeared promising to him. As early as 1890 he wrote that since a given event may have several and alternative causes, so that it can be produced by varying constellations of factors, it is usually impossible to formulate rules about a lawful association of isolated variables. When he himself described some specific regularity in his substantive analyses he repeatedly pointed out that this was not to be taken as a "law," but only as a descriptive generalization, leaving quite open which causes might produce it under varying conditions. Simmel expressly denied the existence of laws of social
256
SIMMEL, GEORG
development or of history in general and once even suggested that what we now know as natural laws may at some later time be revealed to be superstitions. Lukacs (1953) has charged that this "struggle against law and causality" was the selfdefense of imperialistic philosophy against dialectical materialism and that with it Simmel undermined objective scientific knowledge. Of course, Simmel did not reject the possibility of causal explanation in the realm of human life and its products. But such explanation was for him essentially psychological in nature. Ultimately, the genesis of specific social forms and cultural objectifications must be derived psychologically. In his substantive analyses, Simmel again and again offered psychological explanations for the phenomena he described, both in terms of the conscious motives, interests, or goals of the individuals involved, and in terms of unconscious psychic mechanisms determining the reactions of these individuals. But he did not draw on any systematic psychological theory; rather, his often strikingly sensitive and perceptive explanations seem the result of introspection and conjecture. Formal sociology. In 1890 Simmel defined the subject matter of sociology as consisting of interactions and interrelations, but he did not remain content with this definition. Later, going back to the basic distinction made in his philosophy, he demanded that the forms of interaction be distinguished from their contents and held that only the former constitute sociology's special object of cognition. Still later (1917), this seems to have appeared too restrictive to him, and he conceived of a "general sociology" in addition to formal sociology; but he failed to make its approach clear. The contents of interaction are its motive powers —individual drives, purposes, interests, and so forth. The forms of interaction, or social forms, are not structured real entities (analogous to the forms of culture) but abstract, analytical aspects of social reality. They might best be conceived of as basic structural configurations or structuring principles. Simmel found a justification for this distinction in the seeming independence of forms and contents: the same structural principle can be observed in groups or relations characterized by widely divergent contents, while the same content (interest, purpose) may be found expressed in different forms of social organization. Simmers attempt to explain the concept of social form with a misleading analogy between sociology and geometry and his admitted failure to make his methodological principle quite explicit did much to provoke criticism of his "formal sociol-
ogy." Such criticism was especially directed against the form-content distinction, on the grounds that in social reality the structural details of any concrete group and its particular syndrome of "contents" are inseparably linked. This is true and, incidentally, is quite obvious from Simmel's own analyses. But Simmel expressly distinguished the forms of sociation from their embodiment in special social units. Conceived of as very general, abstract structural principles, or basic modes of interrelationship among social elements, the forms of sociation can indeed be isolated analytically. Structural principles that Simmel himself named are the relation of superordination-subordination; the relation of antagonism (conflict); the division of labor, or relation of functional interdependence; the ingroup-outgroup relation and the related principle of party formation; the principle of representation; the principles of spatial and temporal structuring; and the quantitative dimension. Other structural principles are implied in Simmel's writings, such as the dependence-autonomy dimension, which plays such a crucial role in his analysis of group membership and individuality. The specific task of sociology was for Simmel not the causal explanation of these social forms, but the analysis of their objective meaning. This distinction is analogous to one commonly made in the analysis of forms of culture, such as objects of art and systems of ideas: they possess an objective meaning, which is something distinct from their psychologically explained genesis. The objective meaning (the analogy does not fit completely) of social forms rested for Simmel in their essential characteristics and range of empirical variation, on the one hand, and in their consequences, on the other. His Soziologie (1908&) contains several chapters devoted to the analysis of selected structural principles in these terms. In other chapters he started by focusing on a specific type of group (e.g., secret societies) or class of persons (e.g., the stranger, the poor man, the aristocrat) and proceeded to show how they are characterized and determined by a unique constellation of several of these structural principles. Where Simmel dealt with the essential characteristics of some social form, his writing has a strongly phenomenological flavor. But the inclusion of the consequences or effects of social forms breaks this confinement and links his formal approach with his theory of social development, since he selected for analysis the consequences of given structural configurations either for individualization or for the preservation and functioning of groups. This procedure is obvious not only in the
SIMMEL, GEORG topical chapters on these subjects, but also where he treated specific structural principles (e.g., conflict), special types of relationship, such as marriage, or special types of groups, such as secret societies. Thus his Soziologie, often criticized for being an unsystematic collection of substantive analyses only vaguely connected with his formal approach, really does possess a surprising—if partly implicit—internal coherence. Norms and individual behavior. Simmel occasionally used the term "role" and recognized that social relations are defined by mutual obligations. Yet it would be a mistake to interpret his social forms as structures in the Parsonian sense, i.e., basically normative patterns, or to see the influence of social forms on individual behavior as that of role expectations. When Simmel analyzed individual behavior, he saw it primarily as a result of individual motives and of psychologically mediated reactions to the structure of the situation. He would not have denied that norms also play a part in determining individual behavior, but he paid little attention to them on this level of analysis. This may be due to his often paramount psychological interest and to the fact that he did not conceive of norms as external constraints or impositions. The latter view is made explicit in his Lebensanschauung, or philosophy (1918a), where he maintained that Sollen—a substantivation of the German verb meaning "shall" for which there is no exact translation—is a basic mode of life, a "categorical archphenomenon." Its specific contents, however, are to be derived psychologically and historically. This last view seems connected with the fact that when Simmel argued sociologically, on the group level instead of on the individual level, he paid more explicit attention to norms. And here, the "historical" determination of the content of norms appears to be essentially of a functionalistic nature. In 1890 he had stated that what is "correct behavior" changes with the expansion of the group, and from several examples he used for illustration it becomes clear that the content of a norm, be it law or custom, depends on its social usefulness. Similar examples can be found in his later sociological works. But the whole principle is never explicitly stated as such, and the criterion of usefulness is not denned precisely; sometimes it seems to be goal achievement, sometimes group preservation, and sometimes it is the facilitation of a process of development. Ahistorical nature of formal sociology. One of the major criticisms of Simmel's approach is directed at its ahistorical nature. Of course, Simmel
257
did not deny the historical character of society, which he saw as a continuous process, the present always being shaped by the accumulated past. But it seems that by selecting the forms of interaction for analysis, he defined as the essence of society that which is changeless and ahistorical, thus freezing history into motionless structures by his mode of perception. That he conceived of the forms of sociation as abstract, general principles is undeniable. He used them to describe historical forms of social organization and certain general aspects of social development, but he did not use them to explain social phenomena as stages in a historical process. His focus on basic structural characteristics even made him occasionally describe as permanent some social form or relation that we would recognize as historically relative. This is true, for instance, of his description of sociability as a pure form of sociation, which might be roughly identified as an upper-bourgeois culture pattern, or of his analysis of the characteristics of man and woman, which is in effect largely a generalization of culturally relative sex roles. The question is whether these examples merely point to occasional errors in Simmel's search for truly general ahistorical structuring principles or whether he failed—whether he had to fail—in this effort throughout. For it might be argued that since social reality is always historical in nature, nothing but historical forms can be abstracted from it. If this were true, even Simmel's most general structural principles, like antagonism, superordination, and so forth, would be specific to a certain phase of history and inapplicable in others. Simmel did not think so, which means that as a matter of principle he thought it possible to abstract ahistorical concepts or analytical dimensions from social reality. While the majority of contemporary sociologists would tend to share his view, it is this methodological position which, in the last analysis, defines Simmel as ahistorical in the eyes of modern dialectic theory. RENATE MAYNTZ [For the historical context of Simmel's work, see ALIENATION; CONFLICT, article on SOCIAL ASPECTS; HISTORY, article on THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY;
INTERACTION, article on SOCIAL INTERACTION; SOCIETY; and the biographies of DILTHEY; HUSSERL;
TROELTSCH. For discussion of the subsequent development of his ideas, see COALITIONS, article on COALITION FORMATION; CONFLICT; CROSS PRESSURE;
FAMILY, article on COMPARATIVE STRUCTURE; FASHION; GROUPS, article on THE STUDY OF GROUPS; INTEGRATION, article on CULTURAL INTEGRATION;
258
SIMONDE DE SISMONDI, J. C. L.
INTERACTION, articles on SOCIAL INTERACTION and SOCIAL EXCHANGE; MASS SOCIETY; PRIVACY; PROSTITUTION; TEACHING; and the biographies of LUKACS; SMALL; WIESE.] WORKS BY SIMMEL (1890) 1910 Uber soziale Differenzierung: Soziologische und psychologische Untersuchungen. 3d ed. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. (1892) 1923 Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie: Fine erkenntnis-theoretische Studie. 5th ed. Munich and Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. 1896 Superiority and Subordination as Subject-matter of Sociology. American Journal of Sociology 2:167-189, 392-415. -> Translation of an earlier and much shorter draft of "Uber- und Unterordnung," Chapter 3 of Simmel 1908b. An abridged version of the English translation appeared as "Superiority and Subordination in Social Relationships" in Borgatta and Meyer 1956. 1897-1898 The Persistence of Social Groups. American Journal of Sociology 3:662-698, 829-836; 4:35-60. -> A translation of an earlier and much shorter draft of "Die Selbsterhaltung der sozialen Gruppe," Chapter 8 of Simmel 1908b. An abridged version of the English translation appeared in Borgatta and Meyer 1956. (1900a) 1958 Philosophie des Geldes. 6th ed. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. (1900k) 1924 Money and Freedom. Pages 552-553 in Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess (editors), Introduction to the Science of Sociology. 2d ed. Univ. of Chicago Press. -» A translation of pages 351-352 of Simmel 1900a. 1902 The Number of Members as Determining the Sociological Form of the Group. American Journal of Sociology 8:1-46, 158-196. -» Translation of an earlier and shorter draft of "Die quantitative Bestimmtheit der Gruppe," Chapter 2 of Simmel 1908b. An abridged version of the English translation appeared in Borgatta and Meyer 1956. 1904 The Sociology of Conflict. American Journal of Sociology 9:490-525, 672-689, 798-811. -> A translation of an earlier and much shorter draft of Chapter 4 of Simmel 1908&, entitled "Der Streit." 1906 The Sociology of Secrecy and of Secret Societies. American Journal of Sociology 11:441-498. -» Translation of an earlier and shorter draft of "Das Geheimnis und die geheime Gesellschaft," Chapter 5 of Simmel 1908b. An abridged version of the English translation appeared as "Knowledge About Others and Social Relationships" in Borgatta and Meyer 1956. (1908a) 1955 Conflict and The Web of Group Affiliations. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. -» These essays appeared originally as "Der Streit" and "Die Kreuzung sozialer Kreise" in Simmel 1908&. "Conflict" was translated by Kurt H. Wolff; "The Web of Group Affiliations," by Reinhard Bendix. (1908&) 1958 Soziologie: Untersuchungen uber die Formen der Vergesellschaftung. 4th ed. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. (1908c) 1924 The Sociological Significance of the "Stranger." Pages 322-327 in Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess (editors), Introduction to the Science of Sociology. 2d ed. Univ. of Chicago Press. -» A translation of pages 685-691 of Simmel 1908b. (1908d) 1924 Sociology of the Senses: Visual Interaction. Pages 356-361 in Robert E. Park and Ernest
W. Burgess (editors), Introduction to the Science of Sociology. 2d ed. Univ. of Chicago Press. H> A translation of pages 646-651 of Simmel 1908fc>. (1910) 1964 Hauptprobleme der Philosophie. 8th ed. Berlin: Gruyter. (1917) 1920 Grundfragen der Soziologie (Individuum und Gesellschaft). 2d ed. Berlin and Leipzig: Vereinigung Wissenschaftlicher Verleger; Gruyter. (1918a) 1922 Lebensanschauung: Vier metaphysische Kapitel. 2d ed. Munich and Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. (1918b) 1926 Der Konflikt der modernen Kultur: Ein Vortrag. 3d ed. Munich and Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. Philosophische Kultur: Gesammelte Essais. 3d ed. Potsdam: Kiepenheuer, 1923. -» Contains works first published between 1902 and 1911. The Sociology of Georg Simmel. Edited and translated by Kurt H. Wolff. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1950. -> Contains translations, primarily of excerpts from Simmel 1908b, but also of other items published between 1896 and 1917. SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BORGATTA, EDGAR F.; and MEYER, HENRY J. (editors) 1956 Sociological Theory: Present Day Sociology From the Past. New York: Knopf. -> See especially pages 126-158, 180-226, 364-398 for extracts from translations of Simmel's writings that first appeared in the American Journal of Sociology. COSER, LEWIS A. 1956 The Functions of Social Conflict. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. GASSEN, KURT; and LANDMANN, MICHAEL (editors) 1958 Buch des Dankes an Georg Simmel: Briefe, Erinnerungen, Bibliographie. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. LUKACS, GYORGY (1953) 1954 Die Zerstorung der Vernunft. Berlin: Aufbau. -» First published in Hungarian. PARK, ROBERT E.; and BURGESS, ERNEST W. (editors) (1921) 1924 Introduction to the Science of Sociology. 2d ed. Univ. of Chicago Press. -» Includes a number of translations of Simmel's writings. SPYKMAN, NICHOLAS J. (1925) 1964 The Social Theory of Georg Simmel. New York: Russell. WEINGARTNER, RUDOLPH H. 1962 Experience and Culture: The Philosophy of Georg Simmel. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan Univ. Press. WOLFF, KURT H. (editor) 1959 Georg Simmel, 18581918: A Collection of Essays, With Translations and a Bibliography. Columbus: Ohio State Univ. Press.
SIMONDE DE SISMONDI, J. C. L. Jean Charles Leonard Simonde de Sismondi (1773-1842), historian and economist, was born in Geneva, Switzerland. His father was a Protestant clergyman who had married the daughter of a well-to-do Genevan family. At the age of 16, when Sismondi was a clerk in Eynard's Bank at Lyons, he witnessed the first tremors of the French Revolution. The revolution had repercussions in Geneva, and the family sought refuge in England, returning in 1794 but moving again soon after-
SIMONDE DE SISMONDI, J. C. L. ward to a farm at Pescia, Italy. After his return to Geneva in 1800, Sismondi wrote his Tableau de I'agriculture toscane, which appeared the following year. In 1803 he published his book De la richesse commerciale, as a result of which he was offered the chair of political economy at the University of Vilna, with a salary of 6,000 francs. Sismondi declined the offer, having decided to devote his energies to his great Histoire des republiques italiennes du moyen age, the 16 volumes of which appeared over the period 1809-1818. In 1804/1805, Sismondi accompanied Madame de Stael on her voyage to Italy, along with August Wilhelm von Schlegel and other celebrities who frequented her chateau at Coppet, eight miles northeast of Geneva. In 1807/1808, the same group traveled in Germany and Austria, where the baroness took pleasure in introducing Sismondi to her aristocratic friends. Before long, he began to receive handsome royalties for his history of the Italian republics as well as fees for his numerous articles. The Geneva aristocracy, which had earlier turned its back on Sismondi because, during the Revolution, his father had been seen taking the milk of his cows to market (Fragments . . . , p. 70), now offered him a professorship at the university. Again, Sismondi declined. Unfortunately, a valuable source of information on Sismondi's life and opinions seems to have been lost. It is believed that after his death some of his correspondence was burned by his widow and by the marquess of Bossi, his executor. Sismondi's reputation as a historian and political writer spread rapidly, and during the Hundred Days he had an interview with Napoleon himself, whose constitutional program he defended. After the Restoration, Sismondi resumed work on his history of the Italian republics and, having seen the last volume through the press, threw himself at once into a still vaster project, his Histoire des Fran$ais; by the time of his death in 1842, 29 volumes had appeared, and two more were published posthumously. For the modern student, Sismondi's most important work is his Nouveaux principes d'economie politique (1819). Jettisoning the viewpoint he had adopted earlier in his Richesse commerciale (1803), Sismondi pointed out in his new book that the supporters of the free-trade doctrine were in pursuit of a false prosperity: the laissez-faire policy recommended by Say, Ricardo, Malthus, and McCulloch, and followed by the British government, while increasing material wealth, diminished the amount of enjoyment at the disposal of each individual, and as a result of this policy the
259
wealthy grew wealthier and the poor grew poorer, more dependent, even destitute. The book was translated at once into Italian, but reaction elsewhere in Europe was slow, except in England, where it took a rather unexpected form. There is ample evidence that at the time that Sismondi released his Nouveaux principes, in the spring of 1819, Malthus had been working on his Principles of Political Economy for years, without being sure whether, or when, he was going to be able to finish it. The volume was to have been ready in December 1817 but did not come off the press until April 1820. What speeded up Malthus' work between these two dates was surely the publication of Sismondi's book. A comparison of the two books shows that all of Sismondi's important ideas reappear, sometimes in a slightly different garb, in Malthus' Principles, which contains references both to Sismondi and to John Barton, a young British economist who, working independently, had reached similar conclusions [see the biography of BARTON]. Ricardo read Malthus' work as soon as it was available. He noticed the name of Barton, remembered the correspondence he had previously exchanged with him, and revised his own doctrine in the light of the arguments originally presented by Sismondi and Barton and now by Malthus. This resulted in the addition to Ricardo's Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (see 1817) of the famous 31st chapter "On Machinery" (added in the 1821 edition), in which the author virtually abandoned the free-trade doctrine he had advocated until then. However, Ricardo was not aware of the full significance of his change of mind, for after a meeting he had with Sismondi at Coppet in 1822 he wrote that "after a long battle we each of us, I believe, remained in the same opinion that we commenced the discussion in" (Works, vol. 9, p. 248). Sismondi was respected by men like Ricardo and Barton; but according to Cavour, who made his acquaintance while in Geneva, Sismondi was not a strong debater and could not put up an effective defense against the attacks of men like the economist Antoine E. Cherbuliez. In later years, bourgeois writers usually commented favorably on Sismondi's literary talent, while glossing over his criticism of free-trade doctrine. Socialist writers made use of this criticism, sometimes without giving credit where it was due. Karl Marx, while borrowing copiously from Sismondi's critical analysis of free trade, attacked him as an "economic romanticist." Lenin also attacked Sismondi, and more violently than Marx did. From the perspective of the twentieth century
260
SIMONS, HENRY C.
Sismondi has proved to have been more perceptive than most free-traders and more realistic than most nineteenth-century socialists. G. SOTIROFF
[For the historical context of Sismondis work, see LAISSEZ-FAIRE; and the biographies of MALTHUS; RICARDO ; SAY; for discussion of the subsequent development of Sismondis ideas, see the biography of MARX.] WORKS BY SIMONDE DE SISMONDI 1801 Tableau de I'agriculture toscane. Geneva: Paschoud. 1803 De la richesse commerciale: Ou, principes d'economie politique, appliques a la legislation du commerce. 2 vols. Geneva: Paschoud. (1809-1818) 1815-1818 Histoire des republiques italiennes du moyen age. 2d ed. 16 vols. Paris: Treuttel. (1819) 1951-1953 Nouveaux principes d'economic politique: Ou, de la richesse dans ses rapports avec la population. 3d ed. 2 vols. Geneva: Jeheber. 1821-1844 Histoire des francais. 31 vols. Paris. Fragments de son journal et correspondance. Geneva: Cherbuliez, 1857. Political Economy, and the Philosophy of Government: A Series of Essays. Selected and translated by M. Mignet. London: Chapman, 1847. -> Contains an account of Sismondi's life and writings. SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
AMONN, ALFRED 1945-1949 Simonde de Sismondi als Nation alokonom: Darstellung seiner Lehren mit einer Einfiihrung und Erlauterungen. 2 vols. Bern: Francke. GROSSMANN, HENRYK 1924 Simonde de Sismondi et ses theories economiques (Une nouvelle interpretation de sa pensee). Warsaw: Universitas Liberae Poloniae. LENIN, VLADIMIR I. (1896) 1951 A Characterization of Economic Romanticism: Sismondi and Our Native Sismondists. Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, -> First published as "Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskiia vozreniia Simonda de-Sismondi" in Russkoe bogatstvo. RICARDO, DAVID (1817) 1962 Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. London: Dent; New York: Dutton. -> A paperback edition was published in 1963 by Irwin. RICARDO, DAVID Works. Volumes 6-9. Cambridge Univ. Press, 1951-1952. SALIS, JEAN R. DE 1932 Sismondi, 1773-1842: La vie et I'oeuvre d'un cosmopolite philosophe. Paris: Champion. SOTIROFF, GEORGES 1945 Ricardo und Sismondi: Eine aktuelle Auseinandersetzung iiber Nachkriegswirtschaft vor 120 Jahren. Zurich and New York: Europa.
SIMONS, HENRY C. Henry Calvert Simons (1899-1946), American economist, spent most of his professional career at the University of Chicago, teaching in the department of economics and then becoming the first professor of economics in the law school. He de-
veloped a unified and comprehensive set of principles of economic policy for the United States and applied these principles to the changing problems of his times. Simons called his philosophy libertarian: the essential requirement of a good political and economic order is that it protect, promote, and respond to the free choices of individuals. However, what is distinctive about his philosophy is the combination of this idea with two others: First, a merely negative, "hands-off" policy of government is not sufficient to maintain the free economic order and realize its benefits; the government must undertake certain limited but important affirmative actions. (The title of his first work to gain national attention, "A Positive Program for Laissez-faire," 1934, already conveyed this idea, and it recurs throughout his writing.) Second, equality is a value only a little below freedom. Simons' important writings began to appear in 1933 and 1934, near the bottom of the great depression. The failure of "free enterprise" and laissez-faire had greatly strengthened support for government intervention in economic activity. There were no apparent limits to the character and scope of these interventions, less because of any widespread acceptance of a policy of extensive government control than because of the absence of any principles for distinguishing between controls that were necessary, appropriate, or feasible and those that were not. Simons proposed a set of principles for making this distinction: It is the responsibility of the government to maintain a framework within which a free economy can successfully operate and to do so by means that are general in their application, impersonal, and based on law rather than administrative discretion. But the government should not intervene in the heart of the economic process— in the determination of relative prices and wages and in production and investment decisions. Specifically, Simons emphasized the government's responsibility for maintaining appropriate monetary and competitive conditions. Simons believed that the failure of the government to discharge its responsibility for maintaining reasonable stability in the supply of money had been one of the main causes of the severity of the depression. He was an early leader, among American economists, in advocating monetary expansion, to be achieved by means of budget deficits, as the road to recovery from the depression. But he did not believe that it was sufficient merely to assign to the government the responsibility of using its monetary, fiscal, and debt-management policies
SIMONS, HENRY C. to achieve some vaguely defined goal of economic stability. Reform of the banking system was also necessary, and he urged that the money supply be based on a 100 per cent reserve of government obligations. Also, he argued the case for a statutory rule of monetary policy that would govern the conduct of the monetary authorities. Which of several reasonable rules was chosen was less important than the existence of some objective standard known to the public and binding on the authorities. Simons often argued against what he considered excessively loose, discretionary, and expansionist prescriptions by overenthusiastic advocates of positive fiscal and monetary policy. Yet, the more important fact is that Simons, the champion of free enterprise and nonintervention, did accept and emphasize the responsibility of the government to use its monetary and fiscal policies affirmatively to stabilize the economy. This allowed Simons and his followers to influence policy more than they could have done if they had denied government responsibility. Simons was among the first to stress that if federal tax rates were unchanged, the resulting decline of revenues in recessions and rise of revenues in booms would have a strong stabilizing influence on the economy; that varying the revenue side of the budget might be a more effective fiscal instrument than varying the expenditure side; and that the way in which the government financed its debt would be a significant independent economic factor. These ideas all became important in postwar fiscal thinking and fiscal policy. Thus, Simons' writings made a major contribution to the emergence of a postwar consensus on fiscal and monetary policy in the United States, not only among economists but also among persons in government and in the private economy whose opinions were influential. While Simons believed that monetary stability is a necessary background condition for the effective operation of the free economy, he also felt that competition is the active driving force of the economy. He relied upon competition to organize production efficiently; to promote technological advance and economic growth; to permit high employment without inflation; to provide individuals, as consumers and as sellers of productive services, with the real alternatives that are the essence of freedom; to yield "commutative justice," in the sense of economic rewards proportional to productive contributions; to prevent extreme inequality of power or income; and to minimize the need for government intervention to settle conflicts between private interests. In his early writings Simons seemed to believe
261
that the degree of competition in the United States was far from adequate to serve these purposes, chiefly because corporations had been permitted to grow to excessive size. Later, Simons' view of the problem changed. He came to believe that it was the trend toward monopoly, rather than the degree of monopoly already achieved, that was the great danger. Moreover, the natural force of competition was strong, so strong that private arrangements, unaided by government, could only temporarily and partially suppress it. Therefore, the first requirement was to prevent government from supporting monopoly. In his last writings, including "Some Reflections on Syndicalism" (1944), which became the classic statement of the case against trade unions, Simons argued that unions were the principal threat to the competitive, and therefore free, society. Simons offered no confident remedy, only the hope that awareness of the danger would make it possible to limit the growth of union power before it was too late. The part of his program that Simons elaborated in greatest detail was the tax system. His two longest (although relatively short) works, Personal Income Taxation (1938) and Federal Tax Reform (written in 1943, published 1950), were on this subject. Simons' writing on taxation largely spelled out the implications of a few basic ideas, the one most closely identified with his name being the definition of income, for tax purposes, as the sum of consumption plus the change in the value of net assets owned. Other ideas fundamental to his thinking about taxes were (a) that all taxation is taxation of individuals and must be judged by its effects on individuals; (fo) that the allocation of income to short periods of time, like a year, is arbitrary and causes injustice and inefficiency: and (c) that in taxation, as in other policies, the government should avoid accidental or deliberate interference with the system of relative prices and wages. Rigorous application of these ideas enabled Simons to cut through a great deal of sophisticated argument about such matters as capital gains, gifts and bequests, corporate profits, and tax-exempt securities. Twenty years after his death, the considerations contained in Simons' work were still basic to the continuing effort to rationalize the federal income tax system. It was in his tax proposals that Simons' stress on equality as a social goal found its most immediate expression. Simons did not believe that policy* for reducing inequality should be confined to creation of a progressive tax system, but he did believe that correction of the tax system had to
262
SIMULATION: Individual Behavior
come first. As he said, "There are remarkable opportunities for extending the range of sociali/.ed consumption (medical services, recreation, education, music, drama, etc.) and especially for extending the range of social welfare activities. The prospects in these directions, however, must remain somewhat unattractive as long as the expenditures involved must be covered by the kinds of taxes on which we have relied in the past—that is, so long as what the government gives to the masses with one hand is largely taken away with the other" ([1934] 1948, pp. 68-69). HERBERT STEIN [See also FISCAL POLICY; MONETARY POLICY; TAXATION, article on PERSONAL INCOME TAXES; and the biography of KNIGHT.] WORKS BY SIMONS
(1934) 1948 A Positive Program for Laissez-faire: Some Proposals for a Liberal Economic Policy. Pages 4077 in Henry C. Simons, Economic Policy for a Free Society. Univ. of Chicago Press. 1938 Personal Income Taxation: The Definition of Income as a Problem of Fiscal Policy. Univ. of Chicago Press. (1943) 1950 Federal Tax Reform. Univ. of Chicago Press. -> Written in 1943; published posthumously in 1950. 1944 Some Reflections on Syndicalism. Journal of Political Economy 52:1-25. Economic Policy for a Free Society. Univ. of Chicago Press, 1948. -» Contains writings first published between 1934 and 1945 and a complete bibliography. SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
DAVENPORT, JOHN 1946 The Testament of Henry Simons. University of Chicago Law Review 14:5-14. H» First published in Fortune, in September 1946. DIRECTOR, AARON 1946 Simons on Taxation. University of Chicago Law Review 14:15-20. KATZ, WILBER G. 1946 Economics and the Study of Law: The Contribution of Henry C. Simons. University of Chicago Law Review 14:1-4. LEWIS, H. GREGG 1946 [Obituary of] Henry C. Simons. American Economic Review 36:668-669.
i. INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR n. ECONOMIC PROCESSES in. POLITICAL PROCESSES
Allen Newell and Herbert A. Simon Irma Adelman Charles F. Hermann
INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR
"Simulation" is a term now generally employed to denote an approach to the construction of theories that makes essential use of computers and computer-programming languages. In some appli-
cations simulation techniques are used in investigating formal mathematical theories—for example, stochastic learning theories. In other applications, the theoretical models of the systems that are simulated are essentially nonquantitative and nonnumerical. We may define simulation more specifically as a method for analyzing the behavior of a system by computing its time path for given initial conditions, and given parameter values. The computation is said to "simulate" the system, because it moves forward in time step by step with the movement of the system it is describing. For the purposes of simulation, the system must be specified by laws that define its behavior, during any time interval, in terms of the state it was in at the beginning of that interval. Simulation has always been an important part of the armory of applied mathematics. The introduction of modern computers, however, has so reduced the cost of obtaining numerical solutions to systems of equations that simulation has taken on vastly increased importance as an analytic tool. As a consequence, the relative balance of advantage has shifted from simplifying a theory in order to make it solvable toward retaining complexity in order to increase its accuracy and realism. With simulation and other techniques of numerical analysis, computers permit the study of far more complicated systems than could have been investigated at an earlier time. Simulation with mathematical theories. Consider first the simulation of systems that are described by mathematical models (Newell & Simon 1963a, pp. 368-373). A model consists of a system of equations containing variables, literal constants (often called parameters), and numerical constants. The system of equations may be solved symbolically, by expressing the several variables explicitly in terms of the literal and numerical constants; or the system may be solved numerically, by substituting particular numerical values for the literal constants and then solving the equations for these special cases. For many complex systems of equations, symbolic solutions cannot be obtained, only numerical solutions. The former are clearly preferred when obtainable, for once a symbolic solution has been found, the special cases are readily evaluated by substituting numerical values for the parameters in the solutions instead of in the original equations. To take a highly simplified example, a learning theory might postulate that the rate at which learning occurs is proportional to the amount of material
SIMULATION: Individual Behavior remaining to be learned. If, for simplicity of exposition, we divide time into discrete intervals and define the variable x(f) as the amount of material that has been learned up to the end of the tth time interval, then the theory can be expressed by a simple difference equation: = a[b (1) where a is a literal constant that we can name intelligence for this learning task, and b is a literal constant that represents the total amount to be learned. The symbolic solution to this simple system is well known to be: (2)
-ay,
where £(0) is a literal constant denoting the amount that had already been learned up to the time t = 0. Particular numerical solutions can now be found by assigning numerical values a, b, and x(0) and by solving (2) for x(t) for any desired values of t. Alternatively, numerical solutions— learning curves—for the system can as readily be computed for given a, b, and x(0) directly from equation (1), transferring the x(i) term to the right-hand side and solving successively for x ( l ) , ^(2), #(3), • • - . This latter procedure—solving (1) numerically—would be called simulation. The advantages of simulation as a technique for analyzing dynamic systems are not evident from the excessively simple equation (1). Suppose, however, that a, instead of being a literal constant, designated some function, a [ b , x ( t ) ] , of b and x(t). Only for very special cases could (1) then be solved symbolically to obtain an explicit expression, like (2), for x(t). In general, when we wish to know the time paths of systems expressed by such equations, numerical solution for special cases—that is, simulation—is our main recourse. A great many of the mathematical theories currently used for the study of learning and other individual behavior are probabilistic or stochastic in character. Such theories pose formidable mathematical problems, and explicit symbolic solutions for their equations are seldom obtainable. Unlike a deterministic system, the solution of the equations of a stochastic system does not specify a single time path for the system but assigns a probability distribution to all possible paths of the system. In some cases, certain properties of this probability distribution—certain means and variances —can be obtained symbolically, but the specification of the entire probability distribution can seldom be obtained symbolically. In order to estimate the parameters of the distribution numerically, the
263
system can be simulated by Monte Carlo techniques. That is, random variables can be introduced into the model, and the equations analogous to (1) solved a number of times, each time with different values of the random variables assigned and using the appropriate probabilities. The numerical solutions to (1) will trace out possible paths of the system, and the probability that a particular path will be followed in the simulation will be proportional to its probability under the assumptions of the model. Then, from the numerical results of the Monte Carlo simulation, numerical estimates can be made of the parameters of the probability distribution. [See RANDOM NUMBERS.] Information-processing theories. The greatest use of simulation for the study of individual behavior has involved so-called information-processing theories, which are different in important respects from classical mathematical theories. Simulation has exactly the same relation to information-processing theories as to other formal theories —it is a method for discovering how the system described by the theory will behave, in particular circumstances, over a period of time. However, almost no methods other than simulation exist for investigating information-processing theories. For this reason, a phrase like "simulation of cognitive processes" often refers both to an information-processing theory of cognitive processes and to the investigation of the theory by simulation, in the narrower sense of the term, [See INFORMATION THEORY.] Information-processing theories of individual behavior take the form of computer programs, usually written in programming languages called list-processing languages, especially devised for this purpose. The information-processing theories undertake to explain how a system like the human central nervous system carries out such complex cognitive processes as solving problems, forming concepts, or memorizing. The explanation is sufficiently detailed to predict—by computer simulation —behavior in specific problem situations. That is to say, the theory aims at predicting, not merely some quantitative aspects of behavior (number of errors in a learning situation, for example)., but the actual concrete behaviors and verbal outputs of subjects placed in the very same situation and confronted with the identical task. [See CONCEPT FORMATION; PROBLEM SOLVING.]
A specific example will help make clear exactly what is meant by this. Clarkson (1963) has constructed an information-processing theory to ex-
264
SIMULATION: Individual Behavior
plain how a bank officer selects portfolios of securities for trust funds. The trust officer, who has been told the purpose of the trust and the amount of money available for investment, prepares a list of stocks and bonds that can be bought with this sum. If the computer program is provided (as input) the same information about the purpose of the trust and its size, it will also produce (as output) a list of stocks and bonds. A first test of the program, as a theory, is whether it will pick the same list of companies and the same number of shares in each as the trust officer. In an actual test, for 'example, the program predicted the trust officer would buy 60 shares of General American Transportation, 50 Dow Chemical, 10 IBM, 60 Merck and Company, and 45 Owens-Corning Fiberglas. The trust officer in fact bought 30 Corning Glass, 50 Dow Chemical, 10 IBM, 60 Merck and Company, and 50 Owens-Corning Fiberglas. A second and more severe test of the theory is whether, in reaching its final choices, it goes through the same stages of analysis, weighs the same factors, considers the same alternatives, as the human it is simulating. As one technique for making this kind of test, the human subject is asked to perform the task while thinking aloud, and his stream of verbalizations (protocol) is recorded. The human protocols are then compared with the trace produced by the computer program while it is performing the same task (for an example of this technique, which Clarkson also used, see Newell & Simon 1963&). Omar K. Moore and ScarviaB. Anderson (1954) devised a task that required the subject to "recede" certain symbolic expressions. One problem was to recede L I : (r i — p) • (— r ^ g) into LO: — ( — # • £ > ) . (For purposes of the experiment and of this example, these strings of symbols can be treated as "code messages," whose meaning need not be known. The expression LI may be read "parenthesis r horseshoe minus p parenthesis dot parenthesis minus r horseshoe q parenthesis.") The receding had to be carried out according to certain rules, which were numbered from 1 to 12. At one point in his thinking-aloud protocol, a subject said, "Now I'm looking for a way to get rid of the horseshoe inside the two brackets that appear on the left and right side of the equation. And I don't see it. Yeah, if you apply rule 6 to both sides of the equation, from there I'm going to see if I can apply rule 7." The same receding task, receding LI into LO according to the rules specified by Moore and .Anderson, was given to a program, the General Problem Solver (GPS), expressing an information-
processing theory of human problem solving. One portion of the trace produced by the program read as follows: Goal: Apply rule 7 to LI. Subgoal: Change "horseshoe" to "wedge" in left side of LI. Subgoal: Apply rule 6 to the left side of LI. Result: L4: (—r V —p) • (—r 2 g). Subgoal: Apply rule 7 to L4. Subgoal: Change "horseshoe" to "wedge" in right of L4. Subgoal: Apply rule 6 to right side of L4. Part of the test of the adequacy of GPS as a theory of human problem solving would be to decide how closely the segment of the human protocol reproduced above corresponded to the segment of the computer trace. For example, in the illustrative fragment cited here, both the human subject and GPS went down a blind alley, for rule 7 turned out to be not applicable to the expression receded by rule 6. A theory of human problem solving must predict and explain the mistakes people make, as well as their ability sometimes to achieve solutions. Information-processing theories can also be tested in more orthodox ways than by comparing protocols with traces. A program can be simulated in an experimental design identical with one that has been employed for human subjects. Statistics from the computer runs can be compared with the statistics of the human performance. This is the principal means that has been used to test the Elementary Perceiver and Memorizer (EPAM), an information-processing theory of human rote learning that will be described briefly later (Feigenbaum 1963). By having EPAM learn nonsense syllables by the standard serial anticipation method, at various simulated memory drum speeds and for lists of different lengths, quantitative predictions were made of the shape of the so-called serial position curve (relative numbers of errors during the learning process for different parts of the list of syllables). These predictions showed excellent agreement with the published data from human experiments. In other experiments in the learning of paired nonsense syllables, EPAM predicted quantitatively the effects upon learning rate of such variables as degree of familiarity with the syllables and degree of similarity between syllables. These predictions also corresponded closely with the published data from several experiments. [See FORGETTING and LEARNING, article on VERBAL LEARNING.!
SIMULATION: Individual Behavior In summary, an information-processing theory is expressed as a computer program which, exactly like a system of difference or differential equations, predicts the time path of a system from given initial conditions for particular values of the system parameters. The theory predicts not merely gross quantitative features of behavior but the actual stream of symbolic outputs from the subject. Such theories can be subjected to test in numerous ways; among others, by comparing the behaviors, including the thinking-aloud protocols, of subjects with the computer traces produced by the simulating programs. Evaluation. The examples reveal both some of the strengths and some of the difficulties in the information-processing approach to theory construction and theory testing. On the positive side, the theories are written in languages that are capable of representing stimuli and responses directly and in detail, without an intermediate stage of translation into mathematical form. This has the further advantage of avoiding virtually all problems of stimulus scaling. The stimuli themselves, and not scales representing some of their gross characteristics, serve as inputs to the theory. Although the computer traces produced by the simulations are not in idiomatic English, the comparison of trace with protocol can be handled by relatively unambiguous coding techniques. One of the main difficulties of the approach is closely related to one of its strengths—the detail of its predictions. Since different human subjects do not behave in exactly the same way in identical task situations, a simulation that predicts correctly the detail of behavior of one individual will predict the detail of behavior of others incorrectly. Presumably, a theory of individual behavior should consist of general statements about how human beings behave, rather than statements about how a particular human being behaves. At a minimum we would want to require of a theory that modifications to fit the behaviors of different subjects should change only relatively superficial features of the theory—values of particular parameters, say —and that they not necessitate fundamental reconstruction of the whole simulation program. It remains to be seen how fully this requirement will be met by information-processing theories. Up to the present, only a modest amount of investigation has been made of the possibilities of creating variants of simulation programs to fit different subjects. Generality is needed, too, in another direction. Most of the early simulation programs were constructed to explain human performance in a single
265
task—discovering proofs for theorems in symbolic logic, say, or making moves in chess. It seems unreasonable to suppose that the programs a human uses to solve problems in one task environment are entirely specific to that environment and separate and independent from those he uses for different tasks. The fact that people can be scaled, even roughly, by general intelligence argues against such total specialization of skills and abilities. Hence, an important direction of research is to construct theories that can be applied over a wide range of tasks. An example of such a theory is GPS, already mentioned. GPS can simulate behavior in any problem environment where the task can be symbolized as getting from a given state of affairs to a desired state of affairs. A wide range of problem-solving tasks can be expressed in this format. (To say that GPS can simulate behavior in any such environments means, not that the program will predict human behavior correctly and in detail, but that the program can at least be made to operate and produce a prediction, a trace, in that environment, for comparison with the human behavior.) Thus, GPS has actually been given tasks from about a dozen task environments—for example, discovering proofs for theorems in logic, solving the missionaries-and-cannibals puzzle, and solving trigonometric identities—and there is every reason to suppose it can handle a wide range of others. Levels of explanation. There has been great diversity of opinion in individual psychology as to the appropriate relation between psychological theory and neurophysiology. One extreme of the behaviorist position holds that the laws of psychology should state functional relations between the characteristics of stimulus situations, as the independent variables, and response situations, as the dependent variables, with no reference to intervening variables. A quite different position holds that explanation in psychology should relate behavior to biological mechanisms and that the laws of psychology are essentially reducible to laws of neurophysiology. Information-processing theories represent a position distinct from either of these (Simon & Newell 1964). Unlike the extreme behaviorist theories, they make strong assumptions about the processes in the central nervous system (CNS) that intervene between stimulus and response and endeavor to explain how the stimulus produces the response. On the other hand, the information-processing theories do not describe these intervening processes in terms of neurophysiological mechanisms but postulate much grosser elements: symbol struc-
266
SIMULATION: Individual Behavior
tures and elementary information processes that create and modify such structures and are, in turn, controlled by the structures. Behaviorist theories may be called one-level theories, because they refer only to directly observable phenomena. Neurophysiological theories are two-level theories, for they refer both to behavioral events and underlying chemical and biological mechanisms. Information-processing theories are at least three-level theories, for they postulate elementary information processes to explain behavior, with the suggestion that the elementary information processes can subsequently be explained (in one or more stages of reduction) in chemical and biological terms. [See LEARNING, article on NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL ASPECTS; and NERVOUS SYSTEM.] Elementary information processes and symbol structures play the same role, at this intermediate level of explanation, as that played by chemical reactions, atoms, and molecules in nineteenth-century chemistry. In neither case is it claimed that the phenomena cannot be reduced, at least in principle, to a more microscopic level (neurophysiology in the one case, atomic physics in the other); it is simply more convenient to have a division of labor between psychologists and neurophysiologists (as between chemists and atomic physicists) and to use aggregative theories at the information-processing level as the bridge between them. Some specific theories. The remainder of this article will be devoted to an account of the psychological substance of some current informationprocessing theories of cognition. Because space prohibits a complete survey of such theories, the examples will be restricted to problem solving, serial pattern recognition, and rote memory processes. Theories of other aspects of pattern recognition and concept formation will be omitted (Hunt 1962; Uhr 1966), as will be theories proposing a parallel, rather than serial, organization of cognitive processes (Reitman 1965). The theories to be described are incorporated in a number of separate programs, which have not yet been combined into a single information-processing theory of "the whole cognitive man." Nevertheless, the programs have many similar components, and all incorporate the same basic assumptions about the organization and functioning of the CNS. Hence, the theories are complementary and will be discussed here, not as separate entities, but as components of a theory of cognition (Simon & Newell 1964). The basic assumptions about the organization and functioning of the CNS are these: (1) The CNS contains a memory, which stores
symbols (discriminable patterns) and composite structures made up of symbols. These composite structures include lists (ordered sets of symbols, e.g., the English alphabet) and descriptions (associations between triads of symbols). The relation "black, opposite, white," to be translated "white is the opposite of black," is an example of a description. (2) The CNS performs certain elementary processes on symbols: storing symbols, copying symbols, associating symbols in lists and descriptions, finding symbols on lists and in descriptions, comparing symbols to determine whether they are identical or different. (3) The elementary processes are organized hierarchically into programs, and the CNS incorporates an interpretive process capable of executing such programs—determining at each stage what elementary process will be carried out next. The interpretation is serial (not all informationprocessing theories share this assumption, however), one process being executed at a time. The memory, symbol structures, elementary processes, and interpreters are the informationprocessing mechanisms in terms of which observed human behavior is to be explained. Programs constructed from these mechanisms are used to simulate problem solving, memorizing, serial pattern recognizing, and other performances. Problem-solving processes. A central task of any theory of human problem solving is to explain how people can find their way to solutions while exploring enormous "mazes" of possible alternative paths. It has been calculated that if a chess player were to consider all the possible outcomes of all possible moves, he would have to examine some 10120 paths. In fact he does not do this—obviously he could not, in any event—but conducts a highly selective search among a very much smaller number of possibilities. Available empirical data indicate that a problem solver usually explores well under a hundred paths in this and other problemsolving "mazes." Experiments based on information-processing theories have shown that such selective searches can be accomplished successfully by programs incorporating rules of thumb, or heuristics, for determining which paths in the maze are likely to lead to solutions (Feigenbaum & Feldman 1963, part 1, sees. 2, 3). Some of the heuristics are very specific to a particular task environment. As a person becomes skilled in such an environment, he learns to discriminate features of the situation that have diagnostic value, and he associates with those features responses that may be appropriate in situa-
SIMULATION: Individual Behavior tions of the specified kind. Thus, an important component in specific skills is a "table of connections," stored in memory, associating discriminable features with possibly relevant actions. For example, a chess player learns to notice when the enemy's king is exposed, and he learns to consider certain types of moves (e.g., "checking" moves) whenever he notices this condition. [See ATTENTION.] Much of the behavior of problem solvers in chess-playing and theorem-proving tasks can be explained in terms of simple "feature-noticing" programs and corresponding tables of connections, or associations. But the programs must explain also how these components in memory are organized into effective programs for selective search. These organizing programs are relatively independent of the specific kind of problem to be solved but are applicable instead (in conjunction with the noticing processes and associations) to large classes of task environments. They are general heuristics for problem solving. The central GPS heuristic is an organization of elementary processes for carrying out means-end analysis. These processes operate as follows: the symbolized representations of two situations are compared; one or more differences are noted between them; an operator is selected among those associated with the difference by the table of connections; and the operator is applied to the situation that is to be changed. After the change has been made, a new situation has been created, which can be compared with the goal situation, and the process can then be repeated. Consider, for example, a subject trying to solve one of the Moore-Anderson "receding" problems. In this case, the problem is to change LI: r • (-p 3 g) to LO: (q V p~) • r. The subject begins by saying, "You've got to change the places of the r to the other side and you have to change the . . . minus and horseshoe to wedge, and you've got to reverse the places from p and q to q and p, so let's see. . . . Rule 1 (i.e., A • B -> B • A) is similar to it because you want to change places with the second part. . . ." The means—end chain in this example includes the following: notice the difference in order between the terms of LI and LO; find an operator (rule 1) that changes the order. Another kind of organization, which may be called planning and abstraction, is also evident in problem solving. In planning, some of the detail of the original problem is eliminated (abstracted). A solution is then sought for the simplified problem, using means-end analysis or other processes.
267
If the solution is found for the abstract problem, it provides an outline or plan for the solution of the original problem with the detail reinserted. The programs for means-end analysis and for planning, each time they are activated, produce a "burst" of problem-solving activity directed at a particular subgoal or organization of subgoals. The problem-solving program also contains processes that control and organize these bursts of activity as parts of the total exploratory effort. [See PROBLEM SOLVING.] Rote memory processes. The noticing processes incorporated in the problem-solving theory assume that humans have subprograms for discriminating among symbol structures (e.g., for noticing differences between structures) and programs for elaborating the fineness of these discriminations. They also assume that associations between symbol structures can be stored (e.g., the table of connections between differences and operators). Discrimination and association processes and the structures they employ constitute an important part of the detail of problem-solving activity but are obscured in complex human performances by the higher-level programs that organize and direct search. In simpler human tasks—memorizing materials by rote—the organizing strategies are simpler, and the underlying processes account for most of the behavioral phenomena. It has been possible to provide a fairly simple information-processing explanation for the acquisition of discriminations and associations (Feigenbaum 1963). (Our description follows EPAM, the program for rote learning mentioned above.) In the learning situation, there develops in memory (a) a "sorting net," for discriminating among stimuli and among responses, and (£>) compound symbol structures, stored in the net, that contain a partial representation, or "image," of the stimulus as one component and a partial image of the response as another. When stimuli or responses are highly similar to each other, greater elaboration of the sorting net is required to discriminate among them, and more detail must be stored in the images. A stimulus becomes "familiar" as a result of repeated exposure and consequent elaboration of the sorting net and its stored image. We have already noted that these simple mechanisms have been shown to account, quantitatively as well as qualitatively, for some of the main features of learning rates that have been observed in the laboratory. [See LEARNING, article On DISCRIMINATION LEARNING.]
Recognition of periodic patterns. As an example of an information-processing explanation of
268
SIMULATION: Economic Processes
some of the phenomena of concept formation, we consider how, according to such a theory, human subjects detect and extrapolate periodic patterns —e.g., the letter pattern A B M C D M . . . (Simon & Newell 1964, pp. 293-294). At the core of the explanation is the hypothesis that in performing these tasks humans make use of their ability to detect a small number of basic relations and operations: for example, the relations "same" and "different" between two symbols or symbol structures; the relation "next" on a familiar alphabet; and the operations of finding the difference between and the quotient of a pair of numbers. (These discriminations are not unlike those required as components in problem-solving programs to detect features of symbol structures and differences between them.) With a relatively simple program of these processes, the pattern in a sequence can be detected, the pattern can be described by a symbol structure, and the pattern description can be used by the interpretive process to extrapolate. In the example A B M C D M, the relation "next" is detected in the substring A B C D, and the relation "same" in the M's. These relations are used to describe a three-letter pattern, whose next member is the "next" letter after D, i.e., E. The information-processing theory of serial pattern detection has proved applicable to a wide range of cognitive tasks—including the Thurstone Letter Series Completion Test, symbol analogies tests, and partial reinforcement experiments. [See CONCEPT FORMATION; see also Feldman 1963.] This article has described the use of simulation in constructing and testing theories of individual behavior, with particular reference to nonnumerical information-processing theories that take the form of computer programs. Examples of some of the current theories of problem solving, memorizing, and pattern recognition were described briefly, and the underlying assumptions about the information-processing characteristics of the central nervous system were outlined. Various techniques were illustrated for subjecting information-processing theories to empirical test. ALLEN NEWELL AND HERBERT A. SIMON [Directly related are the entries DECISION MAKING, especially the article on PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS; INFORMATION THEORY; MODELS, MATHEMATICAL; PROBLEM SOLVING. Other relevant material may be found in LEARNING THEORY; MATHEMATICS; NERVOUS SYSTEM; PROGRAMMING; REASONING AND LOGIC;
THINKING.!
BIBLIOGRAPHY
CLARKSON, GEOFFREY P. E. 1963 A Model of the Trust Investment Process. Pages 347-371 in Edward A. Feigenbaum and Julian Feldman (editors), Computers and Thought. New York: McGraw-Hill. FEIGENBAUM, EDWARD A. 1963 The Simulation of Verbal Learning Behavior. Pages 297-309 in Edward A. Feigenbaum and Julian Feldman (editors), Computers and Thought. New York: McGraw-Hill. FEIGENBAUM, EDWARD A.; and FELDMAN, JULIAN (editors) 1963 Computers and Thought. New York: McGrawHill. FELDMAN, JULIAN 1963 Simulation of Behavior in the Binary Choice Experiment. Pages 329-346 in Edward A. Feigenbaum and Julian Feldman (editors), Computers and Thought. New York: McGraw-Hill. GREEN, BERT F. JR. 1963 Digital Computers in Research: An Introduction for Behavioral and Social Scientists. New York: McGraw-Hill. HUNT, EARL B. 1962 Concept Learning: An Information Processing Problem. New York: Wiley. MILLER, GEORGE A.; GALANTER, E.; and PRIBRAM, K. H. 1960 Plans and the Structure of Behavior. New York: Holt. MOORE, OMAR K.; and ANDERSON, SCARVIA B. 1954 Modern Logic and Tasks for Experiments on Problem Solving Behavior. Journal of Psychology 38:151-160. NEWELL, ALLEN; and SIMON, HERBERT A. 1963a Computers in Psychology. Volume 1, pages 361-428 in R. Duncan Luce, Robert Bush, and Eugene Galanter (editors), Handbook of Mathematical Psychology. New York: Wiley. NEWELL, ALLEN; and SIMON, HERBERT A. 1963b GPS, a Program That Simulates Human Thought. Pages 279-293 in Edward A. Feigenbaum and Julian Feldman (editors), Computers and Thought. New York: McGraw-Hill. REITMAN, WALTER R. 1965 Cognition and Thought: An Information-processing Approach. New York: Wiley. SIMON, HERBERT A.; and NEWELL, ALLEN 1964 Information Processing in Computer and Man. American Scientist 52:281-300. UHR, LEONARD (editor) 1966 Pattern Recognition. New York: Wiley.
n ECONOMIC PROCESSES
Simulation is at once one of the most powerful and one of the most misapplied tools of modern economic analysis. "Simulation" of an economic system means the performance of experiments upon an analogue of the economic system and the drawing of inferences concerning the properties of the economic system from the behavior of its analogue. The analogue is an idealization of a generally more complex real system, the essential properties of which are retained in the analogue. While this definition is consistent with the denotation of the word, the connotation of simulation among economists active in the field today is much more restricted. The term "simulation" has been generally reserved for processes using a physical
SIMULATION: Economic Processes or mathematical analogue and requiring a modern high-speed digital or analogue computer for the execution of the experiments. In addition, most economic simulations have involved some stochastic elements, either as an intrinsic feature of the model or as part of the simulation experiment field. Thus, while a pencil-and-paper calculation on a two-person Walrasian economy would, according to the more general definition, constitute a simulation experiment, common usage of the term would require that, to qualify as a simulation, the size of the model must be large enough, or the relationships complex enough, to necessitate the use of a modern computing machine. Even the inclusion of probabilistic elements in the pencil-and-paper game would not suffice, in and of itself, to transform the calculations into a bona fide commonusage simulation. In order to avoid confusion, the term "simulation" will be used hereafter in its more restrictive sense. To clarify the concept of simulation, it might be useful to indicate how the simulation process is related, on the one hand, to the analytic solution of mathematical models of an economy, and on the other, to the construction of mathematical and econometric models of economic systems. The relationship between simulation and econometric and mathematical formulations of economic theories is quite intimate. It is these descriptions of economic processes that constitute the basic inputs into a simulation. After a mathematical or econometric model is translated into language a computing machine can understand, the behavior of the model, as described by the machine output, represents the behavior of the economic system being simulated. The solutions obtained by means of simulation techniques are quite specific. Given a particular set of initial conditions, a particular set of parameters, and the time period over which the model is to be simulated, a single simulation experiment yields a particular numerically specified set of time paths for the endogenous variables (the variables whose values are determined or explained by the model). A variation in one or more of the initial conditions or parameters requires a separate simulation experiment which provides a different set of time paths. Comparisons between the original solution and other solutions obtained under specific variations in assumptions can then be used to infer some of the properties of the relationships between input and output quantities in the system under investigation. In general, only very partial inferences concerning these relationships can be drawn by means of simulation experiments. In
269
addition, the results obtained can be assumed to be valid only for values of the parameters and initial conditions close to those used in the simulation experiments. By contrast, traditional mathematical approaches for studying the implications of 'an economic model produce general solutions by deductive methods. These general solutions describe, in functional form, the manner in which the model relates the endogenous variables to any set of initial conditions and parameters and to time. The models formulated for a simulation experiment must, of course, represent a compromise between "realism" and tractability. Since modern computers enable very large numbers of computations to be performed rapidly, they permit the stepby-step solution of systems that are several orders of magnitude larger and more complicated than those that can be handled by the more conventional techniques. The representation of economic systems to be investigated with the aid of simulation techniques can therefore be much more complex; there are considerably fewer restrictions on the number of equations and on the mathematical forms of the functions that can be utilized. Simulation, therefore, permits greater realism in the extent and nature of the feed-back mechanisms in the stylized representation of the economy contained in the econometric or mathematical model. The impetus for the use of simulation techniques in economics arises from three major sources. First, both theory and casual observation suggest that an adequate description of the dynamic behavior of an economy must involve complex patterns of time dependencies, nonlinearities, and intricate interrelationships among the many variables governing the evolution of economic activity through time. In addition, a realistic economic model will almost certainly require a high degree of disaggregation. Since analytic solutions can be obtained for only very special types of appreciably simplified economic models, simulation techniques, with their vastly greater capacity for complexity, permit the use of more realistic analogues to describe real economic systems. The second driving force behind the use of simulation, one that is not unrelated to the first, arises from the need of social scientists in general and of economists in particular to find morally acceptable and scientifically adequate substitutes for the physical scientist's controlled experiments. To the extent that the analogue used in the simulation represents the relevant properties of the economic system under study, experimentation with the ana-
270
SIMULATION: Economic Processes
logue can be used to infer the results of analogous experiments with the real economy. The effects in the model of specific changes in the values of particular policy instruments (e.g., taxes, interest rates, price level) can be used to draw at least qualitatively valid inferences concerning the probable effects of analogous changes in the real economic system. Much theoretical analysis in economics is aimed at the study of the probable reactions of an economy to specified exogenous changes, but any economic model that can be studied by analytic techniques must of necessity omit so many obviously relevant considerations that little confidence can be placed in the practical value of the results. Since a simulation study can approximate the economy's behavior and structure considerably more closely, simulation experiments can, at least in principle, lead to conditional predictions of much greater operational significance. Finally, the mathematical flexibility of simulation permits the use of this tool to gain insights into many phenomena whose intrinsic nature is not at all obvious. It is often possible, for example, to formulate a very detailed quantitative description of a particular process before its essential nature is sufficiently well understood, to permit the degree of stylization required for a useful theoretical analysis. Studies of the sensitivity of the results to various changes in assumptions can then be used to disentangle the important from the unimportant features of the problem. Past uses of simulation. The earliest applications of simulation approaches to economics employed physical analogues of a hydraulic or electrical variety. Analogue computers permit the solution of more or less complex linear or nonlinear dynamic systems in which time is treated as a continuous variable. They also enable a visual picture to be gained of adjustment processes. On the other hand, they are much slower than digital computers and can introduce distortions into the results because of physical effects, such as "noise" and friction, which have no conscious economic analogue. Subsequent economic simulations have tended to rely primarily on digital computers. As the speed and memory capacity of the computers have improved, the economic systems simulated have become increasingly more complex and more elaborate, and the emphasis in simulation has shifted from use as a mathematical tool for solving systems of equations and understanding economic models to use as a device for forecasting and controlling real economies. In addition, these improvements in computer design have permitted the construction of microanalytic models in which ag-
gregate relationships are built up from specifications concerning the behavioral patterns of a large sample of microeconomic units. As early as 1892, Irving Fisher recommended the use of hydraulic analogies "not only to obtain a clear and analytical picture of the interdependence of the many elements in the causation of prices, but also to employ the mechanism as an instrument of investigation and by it, study some complicated variations which could scarcely be successfully followed without its aid" (1892, p. 44). It was not until 1950, however, that the first hydraulic analogues of economic systems were constructed. Phillips (1950) used machines made of transparent plastic tanks and tubes through which colored water was pumped to depict the Keynesian mechanism of income determination and to indicate how the production, consumption, stocks, and prices of a commodity interact. Electrical analogues were used to study models of inventory determination (Strotz et al. 1957) and to study the business cycle models of Kalecki (Smith & Erdley 1952), Goodwin (Strotz et al. 1953), and others. The shift to the use of digital computers began in the late 1950s. In a simulation study on an IBM 650, Adelman and Adelman (1959) investigated the dynamic properties of the Klein-Goldberger model of the U.S. economy by extrapolating the exogenous variables and solving the system of 25 nonlinear difference equations for a period of one hundred years. In this process no indications were found of oscillatory behavior in the model. The introduction of random disturbances of a reasonable order of magnitude, however, generated cycles that were remarkably similar to those characterizing the U.S. economy. On the basis of their study, they concluded that (1) the Klein-Goldberger equations may represent good approximations to the behavioral relationships in the real economy; and (2) their results are consistent with the hypothesis that the fluctuations experienced in modern highly developed societies are due to random perturbations. Duesenberry, Eckstein, and Fromm (1960) constructed a 14-equation quarterly aggregative econometric model of the U.S. economy. Simulation experiments with this model were used to test the vulnerability of the U.S. economy to depressions and to assess the effectiveness of various automatic stabilizers, such as tax declines, increases in transfer payments, and changes in business savings. A far more detailed and, indeed, the most ambitious macroeconometric simulation effort to date, at least on this side of the iron curtain, is being carried out at the Brookings Institution in Washington, B.C. The simulation is based on a 400-equa-
SIMULATION: Economic Processes tion quarterly econometric model of the U.S. economy constructed by various experts under the auspices of the Social Science Research Council (Duesenberry et al. 1965). The Brookings model has eight production sectors. For each of the nongovernment sectors there are equations describing the determinants of fixed investment intentions, fixed investment realizations, new orders, unfilled orders, inventory investment, production worker employment, nonproduction worker employment, production worker average weekly hours, labor compensation rates per hour, real depreciation, capital consumption allowances, indirect business taxes, rental income, interest income, prices, corporate profits, entrepreneurial income, dividends, retained earnings, and inventory valuation adjustment. The remaining expenditure components of the national product are estimated in 5 consumption equations, 11 equations for nonbusiness construction, and several import and export equations. For government, certain nondefense expenditures, especially at the state and local levels, are treated as endogenous variables, while the rest are taken as exogenous. On the income side of the accounts there is a vast array of additional equations for transfer payments, personal income taxes, and other minor items. The model also includes a demographic sector containing labor force, marriage rate, and household formation variables and a financial sector that analyzes the demand for money, the interest rate term structure, and other monetary variables. Finally, aside from a battery of identities, the model also incorporates two matrices: an input-output matrix that translates constant dollar GNP (gross national product) component demands into constant dollar gross product originating by industry, and a matrix that translates industry prices into implicit deflators for GNP components. The solution to the system is achieved by making use of the model's block recursive structure. First, a block of variables wholly dependent on lagged endogenous variables is solved. Second, an initial simultaneous equation solution is obtained for variables in the "quantity" block (consumption, imports, industry outputs, etc.) using predetermined variables and using prices from the previous period in place of current prices. Third, a simultaneous equation solution is obtained for variables in the "price" block using the predetermined variables and the initial solution from the quantity block. Fourth, the price block solution is used as a new input to the quantity block, and the second and third steps are iterated until each variable changes (from iteration to iteration) by no more
271
than 0.1 per cent. Fifth, the three blocks are solved recursively. Simulation experiments show that the system yields predictions both within and beyond the sample period that lie well within the range of accuracy of other models. Simulation studies have also been undertaken to determine the potential impact of personal-income and excise-tax reductions, of government expenditure increases, and of monetary tightness and ease. Stochastic simulations are also being carried out to ascertain the stability properties of the system. A rather different approach to the estimation of behavioral relationships for the entire socioeconomic system has been developed by Orcutt and his associates (Orcutt et al. 1961). Starting with the observed behavior of microeconomic decision units rather than macroeconomic aggregates, they estimate behavioral relationships for classes of decision units and use these to predict the behavior of the entire system. For this purpose, functions known as operating characteristics are estimated from sample surveys and census data. These functions specify the probabilities of various outcomes, given the values of a set of status variables which indicate the relevant characteristics of the microeconomic units at the start of a period. Their initial simulation experiments were aimed at forecasting demographic behavior. For example, to estimate the number of deaths occurring during a given month, the following procedure was applied: an operating characteristic, (m - m 0 )F 2
F 3 (m),
was specified. Here, Pj(ra) indicates the probability of the death of individual i in month m, Ai(m — ^) is the age of individual i at the start of month m, RI denotes the race of individual i, and Si denotes the sex of individual i. The function Fi is a set of four age-specific mortality tables, one for each race and sex combination, which describe mortality conditions prevailing during the base month ra0 . The function F2 is used to update each of these mortality tables to month m. The function F3 is a cyclic function which accounts for seasonal variations in death rates. This and other operating characteristics were used in a simulation of the evolution of the U.S. population month by month between 1950 and 1960. A representative sample of the U.S. population consisting of approximately 10,000 individuals was constructed. In each month of the calculation a random drawing determined, in accordance with the probabilities specified by the relevant oper-
272
SIMULATION: Economic Processes
ating characteristics, whether each individual in the sample would die, marry, get divorced, or give birth. A regression analysis was then used to compare the actual and predicted demographic changes during the sample period. Close agreement was obtained. This approach is currently being extended to permit analysis of the consumption, saving, and borrowing patterns of U.S. families, the behavior of firms, banks, insurance companies, and labor unions, etc. When all portions of the microanalytic model have been fitted together, simulation runs will be made to explore the consequences of various changes in monetary and fiscal policies. So far, we have discussed simulation experiments for prediction purposes only. However, the potential of simulation as an aid to policy formulation has not been overlooked by development planners in either free-enterprise economies or socialist countries. A microanalytic simulation model has been formulated at the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences in order to guide the management of the production system of the Soviet economy (Cherniak 1963). The model is quite detailed and elaborate. It starts with individual plants at a specific location and ends up with interregional and interindustry tables for the Soviet Union as a whole. In addition, the U.S.S.R. is contemplating the introduction of a 10-step joint man-computer program. The program is to be cyclic, with odd steps being man-operated and even steps being computeroperated. The functions fulfilled by the man-operated steps include the elaboration of the initial basis of the plan, the establishment of the criteria and constraints of the plan, and the evaluation of results. The computer, on the other hand, will perform such tasks as summarizing and balancing the plan, determining optimal solutions to individual models, and simulating the results of planning decisions. This procedure will be tested at a level of aggregation corresponding to an industrial sector of an economic council and will ultimately be extended to the economy as a whole. I have been unable to find any information on the progress of this work more recent than that in Cherniak (1963). To take an example from the nonsocialist countries, a large-scale interdisciplinary simulation effort was undertaken at Harvard University, at the request of President John F. Kennedy, in order to study the engineering and economic development of a river basin in Pakistan. The major recommendations of the report (White House 1964) are currently being implemented by the Pakistani government, with funds supplied by the U.S. Agency for International Development.
In Venezuela a 250-equation dynamic simulation model has been constructed by Holland, in conjunction with the Venezuelan Planning Agency and the University of Venezuela. This model, which is based on experience gained in an earlier simulation of a stylized underdeveloped economy (Holland & Gillespie 1963), is being used in Venezuela to compare, by means of sensitivity studies, the repercussions of alternative government expenditure programs on government revenues and on induced imports, as well as to check the consistency of the projected rate of growth with the rate of investment and the rate of savings. An interesting macroeconomic simulation of the Ecuadorian economy, in which the society has been disaggregated into four social classes, is currently being carried outbyShubik (1966). Monte Carlo studies. The small sample properties of certain statistical estimators cannot be determined using currently available mathematical analysis alone. In such cases simulation methods are extremely useful. By simulating an economic structure (including stochastic elements) whose parameters are known, one generates samples of "observations" of a given sample size. Each sample is then used to estimate the parameters by several estimation methods. For each method, the distribution of the estimates is compared with the true values of the parameters to determine the properties of the estimator for the given sample size. This approach, known as the Monte Carlo sampling method, has frequently been applied by econometricians in studies of the small sample properties of alternative estimators of simultaneous equation models [see SIMULTANEOUS EQUATION ESTIMATION]. Limitations and potential. To a large extent, the very strength of simulation is also its major weakness. As pointed out earlier, any simulation experiment produces no more than a specific numerical case history of the system whose properties are to be investigated. To understand the manner of operation of the system and to disentangle the important effects from the unimportant ones, simulation with different initial conditions and parameters must be undertaken. The results of these sensitivity studies must then be analyzed by the investigator and generalized appropriately. However, if the system is very complex, these tasks may be very difficult indeed. To enable interpretation of results, it is crucial to keep the structure of the simulation model simple and to recognize that, as pointed out in the definition, simulation by no means implies a blind imitation of the actual situation. The simulation model should express
SIMULATION: Economic Processes only the logic of the simulated system together with the elements needed for a fruitful synthesis. Another major problem in the use of simulation is the interaction between theory construction and simulation experiments. In many cases simulation has been used as an alternative to analysis, rather than as a supplementary tool for enriching the realm of what can be investigated by other, more conventional techniques. The inclination to compute rather than think tends to permeate a large number of simulation experiments, in which the investigators tend to be drowned in a mass of output data whose general implications they are unable to analyze. There are, of course, notable exceptions to this phenomenon. In the water-resource project (Dorfman 1964), for example, crude analytic solutions to simplified formulations of a given problem were used to pinpoint the neighborhoods of the solution space in which sensitivity studies to variations in initial conditions and parameters should be undertaken in the more complex over-all system. In another instance, insights gained from a set of simulation experiments were used to formulate theorems which, once the investigator's intuition had been educated by means of the simulation, were proved analytically. Examples of such constructive uses of simulation are unfortunately all too few. Finally, in many practical applications of simulation to policy and prediction problems, insufficient attention is paid to the correspondence between the system simulated and its analogue. As long as the description incorporated in the simulation model appears to be realistic, the equivalence between the real system and its analogue is often taken for granted, and inferences are drawn from the simulation that supposedly apply to the real economy. Clearly, however, the quality of the input data, the correspondence between the behavior of the outputs of the simulation and the behavior of the analogous variables in the real system, and the sensitivity of results to various features of the stylization should all be investigated before inferences concerning the real world are drawn from simulation experiments. In summary, simulation techniques have a tremendous potential for both theoretical analysis and policy-oriented investigations. If a model is chosen that constitutes a reasonable representation of the economic interactions of the real world and that is sufficiently simple in its structure to permit intelligent interpretation of the results at the present state of the art, the simulations can be used to acquire a basic understanding of, and a qualitative feeling for, the reactions of a real economy to vari-
273
ous types of stimuli. The usefulness of the technique will depend crucially, however, upon the validity of the representation of the system to be simulated and upon the quality of the compromise between realism and tractability. Presumably, as the capabilities of both high-speed computers and economists improve, the limitations of simulation will be decreased, and its usefulness for more and more complex problems will be increased. IRMA ADELMAN [For additional treatment of the terminology in this article and other relevant material, see ECONOMETRIC MODELS, AGGREGATE.] BIBLIOGRAPHY
General discussions of the simulation of economic processes can be found in Conference on Computer Simulation 1963; Holland & Gillespie 1963; Orcutt et al. I960; 1961. A comprehensive general bibliography is Shubik 1960. On the application of analogue computers to problems in economic dynamics, see Phillips 1950; 1957; Smith & Erdley 1952; Strotz et al. 1953; 1957. Examples of studies using digital computers are Adelman & Adelman 1959; Cherniak 1963; Dorfman 1964; Duesenberry et al. I960; 1965; Fromm & Taubman 1966; White House 1964. ADELMAN, IRMA; and ADELMAN, FRANK L. (1959) 1965 The Dynamic Properties of the Klein-Goldberger Model. Pages 278-306 in American Economic Association, Readings in Business Cycles. Homewood, 111.: Irwin. -> First published in Volume 27 of Econometrica. CHERNIAK, lu. I. 1963 The Electronic Simulation of Information Systems for Central Planning. Economics of Planning 3:23-40. CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER SIMULATION, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, Los ANGELES, 1961 1963 Symposium on Simulation Models: Methodology and Applications to the Behavioral Sciences. Edited by Austin C. Hoggatt and Frederick E. B alders ton. Cincinnati, Ohio: South-Western Publishing. DORFMAN, ROBERT 1964 Formal Models in the Design of Water Resource Systems. Unpublished manuscript. DUESENBERRY, JAMES S.; ECKSTEIN, OTTO; and FRO.MM, GARY 1960 A Simulation of the United States Economy in Recession. Econometrica 28:749-809. DUESENBERRY, JAMES S. et al. (editors) 1965 The Brookings Quarterly Econometric Model of the United States. Chicago: Rand McNally. FISHER, IRVING (1892) 1961 Mathematical Investigations in the Theory of Value and Prices. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. FROMM, GARY; and TAUBMAN, PAUL 1966 Policy Simulations With an Econometric Model. Unpublished manuscript. HOLLAND, EDWARD P.; and GILLESPIE, ROBERT W. 1963 Experiments on a Simulated Under-developed Economy: Development Plans and Balance-of-payments Policies. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press. ORCUTT, GUY H. et al. 1960 Simulation: A Symposium. American Economic Review 50:893-932. ORCUTT, GUY H. et al. 1961 Microanalysis of Socioeconomic Systems: A Simulation Study. New York: Harper. PHILLIPS, A. W. 1950 Mechanical Models in Economic Dynamics. Economica New Series 17:283-305.
274
SIMULATION: Political Processes
PHILLIPS, A. W. 1957 Stabilisation Policy and the Timeforms of Lagged Responses. Economic Journal 67: 265-277. SHUBIK, MARTIN 1960 Bibliography on Simulation, Gaming, Artificial Intelligence and Allied Topics. Journal of the American Statistical Association 55:736-751. SHUBIK, MARTIN 1966 Simulation of Socio-economic Systems. Part 2: An Aggregative Socio-economic Simulation of a Latin American Country. Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Discussion Paper No. 203. SMITH, O. J. M.; and ERDLEY, H. F. 1952 An Electronic Analogue for an Economic System. Electrical Engineering 71:362-366. STROTZ, R. H.; CALVERT, J. F.; and MOREHOUSE, N. F. 1957 Analogue Computing Techniques Applied to Economics. American Institute of Electrical Engineers, Transactions 70, part 1:557-563. STROTZ, R. H.; MCANULTY, J. C.; and NAINES, J. B. JR. 1953 Goodwin's Nonlinear Theory of the Business Cycle: An Electro-analog Solution. Econometrica 21: 390-411. WHITE HOUSE—[U.S.] DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, PANEL ON WATERLOGGING AND SALINITY IN WEST PAKISTAN 1964 Report on Land and Water Development in the Indus Plain. Washington: Government Printing Office. Ill POLITICAL PROCESSES
A political game or political simulation is a type of model that represents some aspect of politics. The referent, or "reality," represented by a simulation-gaming technique may be some existing, past, or hypothetical system or process. Regardless of the reference system or process depicted in a game or simulation, the model is always a simplification of the total reality. Some political features will be excluded. Those elements of political phenomena incorporated in the model are reduced in complexity. The simplification and selective incorporation of a reference system or process produce the assets of parsimony and manageability as well as the liability of possible distortion. These attributes are, of course, equally applicable to other kinds of models, whether they be verbal, pictorial, or mathematical. Simulations and games differ from other types of models in that their interrelated elements are capable of assuming different values as the simulation or game operates or unfolds. In other words, they contain rules for transforming some of the symbols in the model. For example, a game might begin with the description of a particular situation circulated to players who then are instructed to make responses appropriate for their roles. Initial reactions of some players lead to action by others; they in turn provoke new responses. In this manner not only do situations evolve, but basic changes
also occur in the relationships between the players. When the value of one element in the simulation is changed, related properties can be adjusted accordingly. Because of this ability to handle time and change, Brody has described simulations and games as "operating models" (1963, p. 670). Games versus simulations. To the users of both techniques, the distinctions between games and simulations are still ambiguous, as some current definitions will illustrate. Brody (1963) and Guetzkow and his associates (1963) distinguish between (1) machine, or computer, simulations, (2) man, or manual, games, and (3) mixed, or man-computer, simulations. Generally the "machine" referred to is a digital computer, although some simulations involve other types of calculating equipment. The extension of the term "simulation" to cover those models which are a mixture of man and machine does not occur in other definitions. For example, the concept "simulation" is confined by Pool, Abelson, and Popkin (1965) to models that are completely operated on a computer. Rapoport (1964) defines a simulation as a technique in which both the assessment of the situation and the subsequent decisions are made in accordance with explicit and formal rules. When either assessment or decisions are made by human beings without formal rules, the technique is described as a game. When both assessment and decision are made by men, Rapoport stipulates that the device is a scenario. A different interpretation is given by Shubik, who suggests that a game "is invariably concerned with studying human behavior or teaching individuals" (1964, p. 71). On the other hand, a simulation is designated as the reproduction of a system or organism in which the actual presence of humans is not essential because their behavior is one of the givens of the simulated environment. The necessary involvement of humans in games also appears in the definitions of Thorelli and Graves (1964) and Dawson (1962). In Dawson's conceptualization all operating models are simulations, but only those which introduce human players are games. In these definitions of games and simulations, two distinguishing criteria are recurrent. The techniques are differentiated either by the role specified for human participants or by the role assigned formal rules of change or transformation. When human participation is the distinguishing criterion, a game is described as an operating model in which participants are present and a simulation as a model without players. With rules of transformation as the criterion, the type of model without extensive
SIMULATION: Political Processes use of formal rules is a game and the technique with formal rules for handling change is a simulation. The two distinguishing criteria can be interpreted as opposite poles of a single differentiating property. A model designed with only a limited number of its operating rules explicitly stated requires human players and administrators to define rules as the game proceeds. Conversely, a model designed with the interrelationships between its units specified in formal rules has less use for human decision makers during its operation. Thus, formal rules and human participants are alternative means for establishing the dynamic relationships between a model's units. Given this interpretation, two operational characteristics can be used for separating games and simulations. One definitional approach is to reserve the term "simulation" for models that are completely programmed (i.e., all operations are specified in advance) and that confine the role of humans to the specification of inputs. Alternatively, simulations can be defined as operating models that, although not necessarily excluding human decision makers, involve such complex programmed rules that either computer assistance or a special staff using smaller calculating equipment is required to determine the consequences of the rules. The latter definition of simulation is used in the remainder of this essay. Accordingly, a game is an operating model whose dynamics are primarily determined by participants and game administrators with a minimum of formal rules (i.e., neither computer nor calculation staff). The use of "game" to identify one type of dynamic model necessitates distinguishing political gaming from the theory of games and from "parlor games." Occasionally, game theory and political gaming are applicable to similar political problems. The theory of games, however, is a mathematical approach to conflict situations in which the outcome of play is dependent on the choices of the conflicting parties. To employ game theory, specified conditions must be fulfilled; for example, the players must have knowledge of all their alternatives and be able to assign utilities to each one. Political gaming does not require those conditions, nor does it contain formal solutions to conflict situations. Political gaming also may be confused with "parlor games" designed for entertainment. The two activities can be distinguished by political gaming's instructional or research focus, its greater complexity, and its more elaborate effort to reproduce a political reference system or process.
275
To summarize, political games and simulations are operating models whose properties are substituted for selected aspects of past, present, or hypothetical political phenomena. Although consensus is lacking, many definitions imply that games are operating models in which the pattern of interaction and change between the represented units is made by human participants and administrators as the model is played. In simulations, the interaction and change among elements represented in the model are specified in formal rules of transformation which are frequently programmed on a computer. A proposed operational distinction is that a game becomes a simulation when the specified rules become so detailed as to require a separate calculating staff or a computer. Operating models relevant to politics Development. One origin of political gaming and simulation is the war game used to explore military strategy and tactics. The Kriegsspiel, or war game, was introduced in the German general staff late in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. Before the beginning of World War n both the Germans and the Japanese—and perhaps, the Russians—are reported (Goldhamer & Speier [1959] 1961, p. 71) to have extended some war games from strictly military exercises to operations which included the representation of political features. The current development of simulations and games for the study of politics also has been influenced by the use of operating models in the physical sciences (e.g., the study of aerodynamics in wind tunnels), the availability of electronic computers, and the interest in experimental research throughout the social sciences. The extension of the small-group laboratory studies to include the examination of larger social systems has been a vital contribution. RAND international politics game. The allman game created at the RAND Corporation in the 1950s was one of the earliest post-World War n games conducted in the United States. As the game is described by Goldhamer and Speier (1959), it involves a scenario, a control team, and a group of players who are divided into teams. To establish the setting for the game, the scenario describes the relevant world features that exist at the outset of play. Each team of national policy makers decides on appropriate policy in response to the circumstances described in the scenario. Action taken by a nation is submitted to the control team, which judges its feasibility and plausibility. If the con-
276
SIMULATION: Political Processes
trol team rules that a given policy is realistic, the action is assumed to have occurred. Appropriate teams are notified of the new development. The game evolves as nations respond to the moves of other teams and to the events introduced by the control team (e.g., technological innovations, assassinations, etc.). In addition to the exercises conducted at RAND, this international politics game has provided the basic format for games at various institutions, including the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Bloomfield & Whaley 1965). In contrast to the RAND games, most of the university exercises have been conducted with students for instructional purposes. The problems presented by the game scenarios have ranged from historical events to future hypothetical developments. In some games, teams have represented various branches or departments within the same government rather than different nations. Legislative game. The legislative game was developed by Coleman (1964) to examine collective decision making and bargaining. Although it is an all-man game like the RAND model, the initial conditions of the legislative game are established by a deck of especially designed cards rather than a scenario. Moreover, the game is structured exclusively by rules and the behaviors of players. It does not involve a control team. Six to eleven players assume the role of legislators representing the hypothetical constituencies or regions indicated on randomly assigned cards. These legislators attempt to remain in office by passing issues or bills the voters in their regions favor and by defeating items the voters oppose. In the critical bargaining period which precedes the legislators' vote on each issue, any player may agree to support issues which are not relevant to his constituents in exchange for a vote from another legislator on an issue crucial for his re-election. After the game's eight issues have been passed, defeated, or tabled, the legislators are able to determine whether they will be re-elected for another session. Public opinion game. The public opinion game was designed by Davison (1961) as an instructional device to demonstrate such factors as the development of cross-pressures, the difference between private and public opinion, and the role of both psychological and social forces. Each participant is given the description of an individual whose role the player assumes. The final public opinion of every hypothetical individual is a weighted composite of (1) his private opinion before the issue is discussed, (2) his religious organization's posi-
tion, (3) his secondary organization's position, and (4) his primary group's position. Although the public opinion game is an all-man exercise like both the RAND and legislative games, it contains to a greater degree than the other two models quantitative rules that determine the outcome. The players, in various combinations, are able to choose the positions assumed by each of the elements which influence an individual's final public opinion. Once the positions are taken, however, specific rules indicate what values shall be assigned to each opinion component and how they shall be compiled. If the public opinion game incorporated more determinants of opinion (the author acknowledges many simplifications), the resulting complexity of the rules probably would require a calculation staff or computer, thus transforming the game into a simulation according to the present definition. Inter-Nation Simulation. The man-machine simulation developed by Guetzkow and his associates (1963), Inter-Nation Simulation (INS), is an example of an operating model whose dynamics are so complex that a calculation staff is required. In each of a series of 50-minute to 70-minute periods at least one exchange occurs between the structured calculations and the participants. Participants assume one of several functionally defined roles that are specified for each government. Unlike the RAND game, neither nations nor the positions within them correspond to specific counterparts in world politics. In each simulated nation the decision makers allocate military, consumer, and "basic" resources in pursuit of objectives of their own choosing. After negotiating with other nations or alliances, the decision makers allocate their resources for trade, aid, blockades, war, research and development, defense preparations, and the generation of new resources. Programmed rules are used by the calculation staff to determine the net gain or loss in various types of resources that have resulted from the decisions. The programmed rules also determine whether the actions of the government have maintained the support of the politically relevant parts of their nation. If these elites, symbolically represented in the calculations, are dissatisfied, a revolution or election may establish a new government. The calculated results are returned to each nation, and a new cycle of interactions and decisions is begun. Versions of the Inter-Nation Simulation have been used in various institutions in the United States as well as by the Institute for Behavioral Science in Tokyo, Japan, and University College of London, England.
SIMULATION: Political Processes Benson and TEMPER simulations. The dynamics of INS are created by a combination of participant activity and quantitative rules. By comparison, the operations of the international simulation constructed by Benson (1961) are completely programmed on a computer. Nine major nations and nine tension areas in contemporary world politics are contained in the program. To begin a simulation exercise, the operator supplies the description of the nine major nations along such dimensions as aggressiveness, alliance membership, foreign bases, trade, and geographical location. From these initial inputs the computer determines the nature of the international system, the extent of each nation's interest in various areas, and other necessary indices. The operator then announces an action by one of the major nations against one of the tension areas. Actions are described in terms of the degree of national effort required—from diplomatic protest to total war. From this information the computer program determines the response of each of the other nations. The effects of the initial action and resulting counteractions are then computed for each nation and the international system. With these new characteristics, the operator may specify another action. A much more complex computer simulation of international relations, TEMPER (Technological, Economic, Military and Political Evaluation Routine ), is currently being developed for the Joint War Games Agency of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (1965). Represented in TEMPER is the interaction between political, economic, cultural, and military features of as many as 39 nations, which are selected from 117 nations included in the program. Crisiscom. Whereas the Benson simulation and TEMPER are computer representations of international systems, Crisiscom (Pool & Kessler 1965) depicts the psychological mechanisms in individuals that affect their information processing. In its present form, the decision makers represented in Crisiscom deal with foreign policy, and the computer inputs are messages that concern the interaction between international actors. The policy makers and the material they handle, however, might be adapted for other levels of political decision making. The messages fed into the computer are assessed for affect (attitude or feeling of one actor toward another) and salience (the importance attached to an actor or interaction). Each message is given attention, set aside, or forgotten by the simulated decision maker, according to programmed instructions that reflect psychological observations about
277
the rejection and distortion of information. For example, more attention is given a message that does not contradict previous interpretations. This filtering of communications determines what issues are selected by the policy makers for attention and decision. The filtering program not only influences the process for the selection of issues but also gradually alters the decision maker's affect matrix. The affect matrix represents the decision maker's perception of how each actor feels toward all the other actors in the world. In a test of Crisiscom the kaiser and the tsar were simulated. Both were given identical messages about events in the week prior to the beginning of World War i. At the end of the simulated week the differences in their affect matrices and the events to which they were attending reflected quite plausibly differences between the actual historical figures. Simulmatics election simulation. The Simulmatics Corporation has applied an all-computer simulation to the 1960 and 1964 American presidential elections (Pool et al. 1965). The electorate is represented in the computer by 480 types of voters. Every voter type is identified by a combination of traits that include geographical region, city size, sex, race, socioeconomic status, political party, and religion. For each voter type information is stored on 52 political characteristics, for example, intention to vote, past voting history, and opinions on various political issues. The empirical data for the 52 "issue-clusters" are drawn from national opinion polls conducted during campaigns since 1952. The aggregation of surveys, made possible by the stability of political attitudes in the United States, permits a more detailed representation of voters than is obtained in any single poll. Before the simulation can be applied to a particular election, the operators must decide what characteristics and issues are most salient. Equations or rules of transformation are written to express the impact of the issues on different kinds of voters. In the 1960 campaign, a simulation whose equations applied cross-pressure principles to the voters' religion and party ranked the nonsouthern states according to the size of the Kennedy vote. The simulation's ordering of the states correlated .82 with the actual Kennedy vote. In 1964, the equations introduced into the computer program primarily represented the effects of three "issue-clusters" (civil rights, nuclear responsibility, and social welfare). This time the percentage of the vote in each state obtained by Johnson was estimated, and the correlation with the actual election was .90. Other operating models. The described operating models illustrate various constructions and
278
SIMULATION: Political Processes
procedures but do not form an exhaustive list of those techniques currently used in political inquiry. For example, the Simulmatics project is not the only computer simulation of political elections. McPhee (1961), Coleman (1965), and Abelson and Bernstein (1963) have constructed simulations representing not only the election outcome but also the process by which voters form opinions during the campaign. The last model differs from the others by representing a local community referendum. Other games and simulations range from local politics games (Wood 1964) to games of international balance of power (Kaplan et al. I960); from simulations of disarmament inspection (Singer & Hinomoto 1965) to those of a developing nation (Scott & Lucas 1966). In addition, other operating models not directly concerned with the study of political phenomena are relevant. Abstract games of logic developed by Layman Allen are used in the study of judicial processes at the Yale Law School. Bargaining games, such as those advanced by Thomas Schelling (1961), and the substantial number of business and management simulations (K. Cohen et al. 1964; American Management Association 1961; Thorelli & Graves 1964) have political applications, as do some of the numerous war games (Giffin 1965). Uses of political gaming and simulation The development and operation of a game or simulation demand time, effort, and finances. Moreover, operating models are beset by such difficulties as the question of their political validity. Despite these problems, games and simulations have been considered to be useful techniques in research, instruction, and policy formation. Research. Many of the research attractions of operating models can be summarized in their ability to permit controlled experimentation in politics. In political reality, determination of the effects of a phenomenon can be severely hindered by confounding influences of potentially related events. Through a carefully designed model, an experimenter can isolate a property and its effects by either deleting the competing mechanisms from the model or holding them constant. Not only can a game or simulation be manipulated, but it can also be subjected to situations without the permanent and possibly harmful consequences that a comparable event might create in the real world. This ability of the researcher to control the model permits replications and increased access. To establish a generalized pattern, repeated obser-
vations are required. A simulation or game can be assigned the same set of initial conditions and played over and over again, whereas in its reference system the natural occurrence of a situation might appear infrequently and perhaps only once. Moreover, replications of an operating model may reveal a greater range of alternative responses to a situation than could otherwise be identified. Increased access to the objects of their research also leads students of politics to consider operating models. Players in a political game can be continuously observed; a detailed set of their written and verbal communications can be secured; and they can be asked to respond to interviews, questionnaires, or other test instruments at points selected by the researcher. Computer simulations can be instructed to provide a "print-out" at any specified stage of their operation, thus providing a record for analysis. The diversity of means by which data are readily obtained from such models contrasts with the limited access to the crowded lives of actual policy makers and their often sensitive written materials. In addition to control, replication, and access, gaming and simulation contribute in at least two ways to theory building. First, the construction of a game or a simulation requires the developer to be explicit about the units and relationships that are to exist in his model and presumably in the political reference system it represents. An essential component of the political process which has been ignored in the design of a game is dramatized for the discerning observer. A computer simulation necessitates even more explication of the relationships among the model's components. An incomplete program may terminate abruptly or result in unintelligible output. Thus, in constructing an operating model a relationship between previously unconnected findings may be discovered. Alternatively, a specific gap in knowledge about a political process may be pinpointed, and hypotheses, required by the model, may be advanced to provide an explanation. A second value for theory building results from the operating, or dynamic, quality of games and simulations. Static statements of relationships can be transformed into processes which respond to change without the restrictions imposed by such alternatives as linear regression models. According to Abelson and Bernstein (1963, p. 94), ". . . the static character of statistical models and their reliance on linear assumptions seem to place an upper limit on their potential usefulness. . . . Computer simulation offers a technique for formulating
SIMULATION: Political Processes systemic models, thus promising to meet this need." It should be recognized that these research assets are not shared equally by all political games and simulations. For example, a computer simulation may not generate the range of potential alternatives to a situation provided by a series of games played with policy experts. On the other hand, control and replication are more easily achieved in a programmed computer simulation than in a political game in which players are given considerable latitude in forming their own patterns of interaction. Instruction. Simulations involving human participants and games are being used in graduate and undergraduate instruction as well as in secondary school teaching. Several evaluations of these techniques for college and university teaching have been reported in political science (e.g., Alger 1963; Cohen 1962) and in other fields (e.g., Thorelli & Graves 1964, especially pp. 25-31; Conference on Business Games 1963). One of these reports (Alger 1963, pp. 185-186) summarizes the frequently cited values of a simulation or game as a teaching aid: "(1) It increases student interest and motivation; (2) It serves as a laboratory for student application and testing of knowledge; (3) It provides insight into the decision-maker's predicament; (4) It offers a miniature but rich model that facilitates comprehension of world realities." In contrast to the positive evaluations of users like Alger, a critical assessment of the instructional merits of political gaming and simulation has been offered by Cohen (1962). On the basis of a game he conducted, Cohen questioned (1) whether the game increased motivation among students not already challenged by the course; (2) whether the game stimulated interest in more than a narrow segment of the entire subject matter; (3) whether the game misrepresented or neglected critical features of political reality, thereby distorting the image of political phenomena; and (4) whether a comparable investment by both instructor and students in more conventional modes of learning might have offered a larger increment in education. Systematic educational research has yet to clarify the differing evaluations of games and simulations for instruction. In one educational experiment with a political simulation (Robinson et al. 1966), undergraduate students in each of three courses were divided into two groups controlled for intelligence, grade-point average, and certain personality characteristics. One group augmented its
279
regular course activities by a weekly discussion of relevant case studies. The other group in each course participated in a continuing simulation for an equal amount of time. Although most measures of student interest did not indicate significant differences between the groups, students evinced more interest in the case studies, while attendance was higher in the simulation group. Similarly, no direct and unmediated difference was found between the two groups on either mastery of facts or principles. To date, the limited educational research on gaming in other fields (e.g., Conference on Business Games 1963) also has produced ambiguous results. It may be that the more knowledge students have in the subject area of a model or game, the more complex and detailed it must be to provide a satisfactory learning experience. One instructional use of games and simulations that may prove particularly useful with sophisticated students is to involve them in the construction of a model rather than to simply have them assume the role of players. Policy formation. In some respects the application of games and simulations as adjuncts to policy formation is only an extension of their use for research and instruction. Policy makers have employed games or man-machine simulations as training aids for governmental officials in the same manner as management-training programs have incorporated business games. In the Center for International Studies game at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "questionnaires returned by participants have revealed that responsible officials . . . place a uniformly high value on the special benefits the games provide, particularly in sharpening their perspectives of alternatives that could arise in crisis situations" (Bloomfield & Whaley 1965, p. 866). Simulation and gaming research performed under government contract or with more or less direct policy implications has concerned such issues as the systemic consequences of the proliferation of nuclear weapons (Brody 1963), the impact on political decision making of situational characteristics associated with crisis (Hermann 1965), and the potential role of an international police force at various stages of disarmament (Bloomfield & Whaley 1965). An application of simulation research for political campaigns is reflected in the election simulations conducted under contract to the National Committee of the Democratic Party by the Simulmatics Corporation (Pool et al. 1965). One of the major areas of U.S. government-related
280
SIMULATION-. Political Processes
activity involving operating models is war gaming and its extension to cover relevant political aspects of national security. Public material on these activities, however, is limited. Validity—evaluating correspondence How are the elements of political reality estimated in a way to make their transmission to an operating model accurate? What are the implications of representing political properties by deterministic or stochastic processes? What are the relative advantages of games compared to simula• tions? If humans act as participants, how can the motivations of actual political leaders be reproduced? Underlying most of these questions is the problem of validity. Operating models are by definition representations of an existing or potential system or process. They are constructed for the information they can provide about a selected reference system. If in comparison to the performance of the reference system the simulation or game produces spurious results, the model is of little worth. An estimation of the "goodness of fit" or extent of similarity between an operating model and external criteria is, therefore, the central problem of validity. Different types of criteria or standards can be used for evaluating the correspondence between operating models and their reference system (Hermann 1967). To date, however, the only effort at validity that has been applied to most simulations and games uses no specific criterion of comparison. In this approach, called face validity, the model's realism is based on impressionistic judgments of observers or participants. If participants are used, face validity may concern estimates of their motivation or involvement. Unfortunately, participants can be motivated in a game that incorrectly represents the designated political environment. Furthermore, if the operating model involves the substitution of one property for another, some feature may give the appearance of being quite unreal even though it replicates the performance of the real-world property it replaces. When specific criteria for correspondence are established, model validity may be determined by comparing events, variables and parameters, or hypotheses. In the first case, the product or outcome of the operating model is compared to the actual events it was intended to replicate (e.g., the correlation between the state-by-state election returns in the 1960 U.S. presidential campaign and those projected by the Simulmatics Corporation's model; Pool et al. 1965). The second approach compares the variables and parameters that consti-
tute a model with the real-world properties they are intended to represent (e.g., a current study uses factor analysis of the core variables of a simulation and the quantifiable real-world indices for which the simulation variables have been substituted; validity judgments are made from comparisons of the factors and of the variables that load on each factor; see Chadwick 1966). The third approach to validity compares the statistical results of a number of hypotheses tested in an operating model with comparable tests of the same hypotheses conducted with data drawn from the reference system (e.g., Zinnes 1966). Confirmation of a variety of hypotheses in both the operating model and in the actual political system increases confidence in the model's validity. With the exception of face validity, each of the described validity approaches requires that values for specified properties be determined with precision for both the operating model and its reference system. Not only is this procedure often difficult, but in some instances it may not be appropriate. Imagine a political game designed as an aid for policy making whose purpose is to display as many different alternative outcomes to an initial situation as possible. The fact that the subsequent course of actual events leads to only one of those outcomes —or perhaps, none of them—may not reduce the utility of the exercise for increasing the number of alternatives considered by the policy makers. In other instances, an operating model may be consistent with one of the described validity criteria but remain unsatisfactory for some purposes. One illustration is an election simulation in which the winning political party is decided by a stochastic process. With correct probability settings and frequent elections in the model, the simulation's distribution of party victories would closely approximate election outcomes in the reference system. Despite the apparent event validity, the simulation would be undesirable for instruction in election politics. The naive participant might conclude from his experience with the collapsed campaign process that party victory is determined exclusively by chance. In summary, a variety of validity strategies exist. The appropriate strategy varies from model to model and with the purpose for which the game or simulation was designed. Each operating model must be independently validated. At any given time the confidence in the accuracy with which a game or simulation represents its intended political reference system will be a matter of degree. Evaluation of these operating models for the study of
SIMULTANEOUS EQUATION ESTIMATION politics will depend upon the development and application of procedures for measuring the extent to which each model's purposes are fulfilled. CHARLES F. HERMANN [See also INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS; STRATEGY,] BIBLIOGRAPHY
ABELSON, ROBERT P.; and BERNSTEIN, ALEX 1963 A Computer Simulation Model of Community Referendum Controversies. Public Opinion Quarterly 27:93122. ALGER, CHADWICK F. 1963 Use of the Inter-Nation Simulation in Undergraduate Teaching. Pages 150-189 in Harold Guetzkow et al., Simulation in International Relations: Developments for Research and Teaching. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. AMERICAN MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION 1961 Simulation and Gaming: A Symposium. Report No. 55. New York: The Association. BENSON, OLIVER 1961 A Simple Diplomatic Game. Pages 504-511 in James N. Rosenau (editor), International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory. New York: Free Press. BLOOMFIELD, L. P.; and WHALEY, B. 1965 The PoliticalMilitary Exercise: A Progress Report. Orbis 8:854-870. BRODY, RICHARD A. 1963 Some Systemic Effects of the Spread of Nuclear Weapons Technology: A Study Through Simulation of a Multi-nuclear Future. Journal of Conflict Resolution 7:663-753. CHADWICK, R. W. 1966 Developments in a Partial Theory of International Behavior: A Test and Extension of Inter-Nation Simulation Theory. Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern Univ. COHEN, BERNARD C. 1962 Political Gaming in the Classroom. Journal of Politics 24:367-381. COHEN, KALMAN J. et al. 1964 The Carnegie Tech Management Game: An Experiment in Business Education. Homewood, 111.: Irwin. COLEMAN, JAMES S. 1964 Collective Decisions. Sociological Inquiry 34:166-181. COLEMAN, JAMES S. 1965 The Use of Electronic Computers in the Study of Social Organization. Archives europeennes de sociologie 6:89-107. CONFERENCE ON BUSINESS GAMES, TULANE UNIVERSITY, 1961 1963 Proceedings. Edited by William R. Dill et al. New Orleans, La.: Tulane Univ., School of Business Administration. DAVISON, W. P. 1961 A Public Opinion Game. Public Opinion Quarterly 25:210-220. DAWSON, RICHARD E. 1962 Simulation in the Social Sciences. Pages 1-15 in Harold Guetzkow (editor), Simulation in Social Science: Readings. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. GIFFIN, SIDNEY F. 1965 The Crisis Game: Simulating International Conflict. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday. GOLDHAMER, HERBERT; and SPEIER, HANS
(1959)
281
HERMANN, C. F. 1965 Crises in Foreign Policy Making: A Simulation of International Politics. China Lake, Calif.: U.S. Naval Ordnance Test Station, Contract N123 (60S30) 32779A. HERMANN, C. F. 1967 Validation Problems in Games and Simulations With Special Reference to Models of International Politics. Behavioral Science 12:216233. KAPLAN, MORTON A.; BURNS, ARTHUR L.; and QUANDT, RICHARD E. 1960 Theoretical Analysis of the "Balance of Power." Behavioral Science 5:240-252. MCPHEE, WILLIAM N. (1961) 1963 Note on a Campaign Simulator. Pages 169-183 in William N. McPhee, Formal Theories of Mass Behavior. New York: Free Press. POOL, ITHIEL DE SOLA; and KESSLER, A. 1965 The Kaiser, the Tsar, and the Computer: Information Processing in a Crisis. American Behavioral Scientist 8, no. 9:31-38. POOL, ITHIEL DE SOLA; ABELSON, ROBERT P.; and POPKIN, SAMUEL L. 1965 Candidates, Issues, and Strategies: A Computer Simulation of the 1960 and 1964 Presidential Elections. Rev. ed. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press. RAPOPORT, ANATOL 1964 Strategy and Conscience. New York: Harper. ROBINSON, JAMES A. et al. 1966 Teaching With InterNation Simulation and Case Studies. American Political Science Review 60:53-65. SCHELLING, T. C. 1961 Experimental Games and Bargaining Theory. WorZd Politics 14:47-68. SCOTT, ANDREW M.; and LUCAS, WILLIAM A. 1966 Simulation and National Development. New York: Wiley. SHUBIK, MARTIN 1964 Game Theory and the Study of Social Behavior: An Introductory Exposition. Pages 3-77 in Martin Shubik (editor), Game Theory and Related Approaches to Social Behavior: Selections. New York: Wiley. SINGER, J. DAVID; and HINOMOTO, HIROHIDE 1965 Inspecting for Weapons Production: A Modest Computer Simulation. Journal of Peace Research 1:18-38. THORELLI, HANS B.; and GRAVES, ROBERT L. 1964 International Operations Simulation: With Comments on Design and Use of Management Games. New York: Free Press. WOOD, R. C. 1964 Smith-Massachusetts Institute of Technology Political Game, Documents 1-5. Unpublished manuscript, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science. U.S. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT WAR GAMES AGENCY 1965 TEMPER. Volume 1: Orientation Manual. DDC AD 470 375L. Washington: The Agency. ZINNES, DINA A. 1966 A Comparison of Hostile Behavior of Decision-makers in Simulate and Historical Data. World Politics 18:474-502.
1961
Some Observations on Political Gaming. Pages 498— 503 in James N. Rosenau (editor), International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory. New York: Free Press. GUETZKOW, HAROLD et al. 1963 Simulation in International Relations: Developments for Research and Teaching. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
The distinction between partial and general equilibrium analysis in economic theory is well grounded [see ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM]. Early work in econometrics paid inadequate attention to this distinction and overlooked for many years the possibilities of
282
SIMULTANEOUS EQUATION ESTIMATION
improving statistical estimates of individual economic relationships by embedding them in models of the economy as a whole [see ECONOMETRIC MODELS, AGGREGATE]. The earliest studies in econometrics were concerned with estimating parameters of demand functions, supply functions, production functions, cost functions, and similar tools of economic analysis. The principal statistical procedure used was to estimate the as in the relation
where ati is any other unbiased estimator. Clearly, the properties of being unbiased and best are desirable ones. These properties are defined without reference to sample size. Two related but weaker properties, which are defined for large samples, are consistency and efficiency. An estimator, dt, is consistent if prima!i = a!i, that is, if lim P(\di — a.i\ < e) — 1, r->co
t= E
t = 1, 2, • • • , T,
using the criterion that Y
for any e > 0.
This states that the probability that «» deviates from «j by an amount less than any arbitrarily small e tends to unity as the sample size T tends to infinity. Consider now the class of all consistent estimators that are normally distributed as T-» <». An efficient estimator of «i is a consistent estimator whose asymptotic normal distribution has a smaller variance than any other member of this class. [See ESTIMATION.] Inconsistency of least squares. The choice of estimators, di} such that ELi(2/« ~ ELt0^*)2 is minimized is formally equivalent to the empirical implementation of the condition that E(utxit) = 0, since the first-order condition for a minimum is = 0.
On the one hand, the at are estimated so as to minimize the residual sum of squares. On the other hand, they are estimated so that the residuals are uncorrelated with xlt,- • • , xnt . The possible inconsistency of this method is clearly revealed by the latter criterion, for if it is assumed that the ut are independent of xlt, • • • ,xnt when they actually are not, the estimators will be inconsistent. This is shown by the formula plim
M
where M is the moment matrix whose typical element is YitXitXjt; |M| is the determinant of M; TnUj is Y^tUtXjt; and MH is the j, i cofactor of M. The inconsistency in the estimator is due to the nonvanishing probability limit of muj. In a nonexperimental sample of data, such as that observed as the joint outcome of the uncontrolled simultaneous economic process, we would expect many or all the xit in a problem to be dependent on ut. Identifying restrictions. Since economic models consist of a set of simultaneous equations generating nonexperimental data, the equations of the model must be identified prior to statistical estimation. Unless some restrictions are imposed on
SIMULTANEOUS EQUATION ESTIMATION specific relationships in a linear system of simultaneous equations, every equation may look alike to the statistician faced with the job of estimating the unknown coefficients. The economist must place a priori restrictions, in advance of statistical estimation, on each of the equations in order to identify them. These restrictions may specify that certain coefficients are known in advance — especially that they are zero, for this is equivalent to excluding the associated variable from an economic relation. Other restrictions may specify linear relationships between the different coefficients. Consider the generalization of a single equation,
ut where E(zifut') — 0 for all i and t, to a whole system, i= 1, 2, • • • , n,
1-iPnyjt
where E(z fci it it ) = 0 for all k, i, and t. Every variable enters every equation linearly without restriction, and the statistician has no way of distinguishing one relation from another. Zero restrictions, if imposed, would have the form (3rs = 0 or ypq = 0, for some r, s, p, or q. In many equations, we may be interested in specifying that sums or differences of variables are economically relevant combinations, i.e., that /3rs = ft™ or that (3rv = —ynv or, more generally, that = 0-
The last restriction implies that a homogeneous linear combination of parameters in the rth equation is specified to hold on a priori grounds. The weights ws and vs are known in advance. If general linear restrictions are imposed on the equations of a linear system, we may state the following rule: an equation in a linear system is identified if it is not possible to reproduce by linear combination of some or all of the equations in the system an equation having the same statistical form as the equation being estimated. If the restrictions are of the zero type, a necessary condition for identification of an equation in a linear system of n equations is that the number of variables excluded from that equation be greater than or equal to n — 1. A necessary and sufficient condition is that it is possible to form at least one nonvanishing determinant of order n — 1 out of those coefficients, properly arranged, with which the excluded variables appear in the n— I other equations (Koopmans et al. 1950). Criteria for identifiability are stated here for
283
linear equation systems. A more general treatment in nonlinear systems is given by Fisher (1966). [See STATISTICAL IDENTIFIABILITY.] Alternative estimation methods Assuming that we are dealing with an identified system, let us turn to the problems of estimation. In the system of equations above, the yit are endogenous or dependent variables and are equal in number to the number of equations in the system, n. The ZM are exogenous variables and are assumed to be independent of the disturbances, uit . In one of the basic early papers in simultaneous equation estimation (Mann & Wald 1943), it was shown that large-sample theory would, under fairly general conditions, permit lagged values of endogenous variables to be treated like purely exogenous variables as far as consistency in estimation is concerned. Exogenous and lagged endogenous variables are called predetermined variables. Early econometric studies, for example, that of Tinbergen (1939), were concerned with the estimation of a number of individual relationships in which the possible dependence between variables and disturbances was ignored. These studies stimulated Haavelmo (1943) to analyze the consistency problem, for he noted that the Tinbergen model contained many single-equation least squares estimates of equations that were interrelated in the system Tinbergen was constructing, which was intended to be a theoretical framework describing the economy that generated the observations used. The lack of independence between disturbances and variables can readily be demonstrated. Consider the two-equation system
+ Pi*y*t +
The zkt are by assumption independent of M lf and u2t . Some of the y's are specified to be zero or are otherwise restricted so that the two equations are identified. Suppose we wish to estimate the first equation. To apply least squares to this equation, we would have to select either y^ or yz as the dependent variable. Suppose we select yl and set /3lt equal to unity. We would then compute the least squares regression of ?/, on yz and the zk according to the relation
which incorporates all the identifying restrictions on the y's.
284
SIMULTANEOUS EQUATION ESTIMATION
For this procedure to yield consistent estimators, y2t must be independent of u\t. The question is whether the existence of the second equation has any bearing on the independence of y2t and ult • Multiplying the second equation by w l t and forming expectations, we have
These are recognized as the "normal" equations of single-equation least squares theory and the estimation equation for the residual variance—apart from adjustment for degrees of freedom used in estimating cr2. In a system of simultaneous equations, we wish to estimate the parameters in
From the first equation (with /3U = 1), we have
i = 1, • • • , n. Here we have n linear simultaneous equations in n endogenous and m exogenous variables. The parameters to be estimated are the elements of the n x n coefficient matrix
Combining these two expressions, we obtain
In general, this expression does not vanish, and we find that y«t and ult are not independent. The maximum likelihood method. The maximum likelihood method plays a normative role in the estimation of economic relationships, much like that played by perfect competition in economic theory. This method provides consistent and efficient estimators under fairly general conditions. It rests on specific assumptions, and it may be hard to realize all these assumptions in practice or, indeed, to make all the difficult calculations required for solution of the estimation equations. For the single-equation model, the maximum likelihood method is immediately seen to be equivalent to ordinary least squares estimation for normally distributed disturbances. Let us suppose that ut, • • • , UT are T independent, normally distributed variables. The T-element sample has the probability density function
1
exp l — ^r—- >
uj
xr
exp
/ j
This function will be denoted as L, the likelihood function of the sample, and is seen to depend on the unknown parameters o^ , - • • , « „ and
dlogL da.
E
xit I = 0,
i= 1, dlogL = do-
T^
r = (y«o, and the n x n variance-covariance matrix The variances and covariances are defined by A rule of normalization is applied for each equation, In practice, one element of j^ = (j3 il? • • • , J3in~) in each equation is singled out and assigned a value of unity. The likelihood function for the whole system is
L = mod B
x
exP
p(y,, ••• ,yT EH, V27TO
the n x m coefficient matrix
T
By substitution we can transform this joint density of M] , • • • , UT into a joint density of y^ • • • ,yT, given Xn, • • • , xnl, x ^ 2 , • • • , xn2, • • • , xnT, namely,
1
B=08,,),
n, = 0.
where yt = (ylt, • • • ,ynt), Xt - (zlt, • - • , zmt), |£| is the determinant of Z, and mod |B is the absolute value of the determinant of B (Koopmans et al. 1950). The matrix B enters this expression as the Jacobian of the transformation from the variables ult, • • • ,unt to y-it, • • • , ynt. The problem of maximum likelihood estimation is to maximize L or log L with respect to the elements of B, F, and Z. This is especially difficult compared with the similar problem for single equations shown above, because log L is highly nonlinear in the unknown parameters, a difficult source of nonlinearity coming from the Jacobian expression mod B . Maximizing log L with respect to Z-1, we obtain the maximum likelihood estimator of Z, which is
Z = (B F)M(B F)', where M is the moment matrix of the observations, i.e.,
SIMULTANEOUS EQUATION ESTIMATION
Zii
M
Substitution of Z into the likelihood function yields the concentrated form of the likelihood function log L = Const. + T log mod B -(T/2)log £ , where Const, is a constant. Hence, we seek estimators of B and F that maximize log mod B| — ilog |Z = log mod B
ilog|(B T)M(B
In the single-equation case we minimize the oneelement variance expression, written as a function of the ai • In the simultaneous equation case, we maximize log mod B — % log Z , but this can be shown to be equivalent (Chow 1964) to minimization of Z , subject to the normalization rule
285
would have (3u — 1 and |B = 1. If B is triangular, the system of equations is called a recursive system. We then simply minimize Z with respect to the unknown coefficients; this can be looked upon as a generalized variance minimization, an obvious analogue of least squares applied to a single equation. If, in addition, it can be assumed that Z is diagonal, maximum likelihood estimators become a series of successive single-equation least squares estimators. Since the matrix B is assumed to be triangular, there must be an equation with only one unlagged endogenous variable. This variable (with unit coefficient) is to be regressed on all the predetermined variables in that equation. Next, there will be an equation with one new endogenous variable. This variable is regressed on the preceding endogenous variable and all the predetermined variables in that equation. In the third equation, another new endogenous variable is introduced. It is regressed on the two preceding endogenous variables and all the predetermined variables in that equation, and so on. If Z is not diagonal, a statistically consistent procedure would be to use values of the endogenous variables computed from preceding equations in the triangular array instead of using their actual values. Suppose one equation in the system specifies z/i as a function of certain z's. We would regress yl on these z's and then compute values of y± from the relation
IBJf^B'l = C,
where C is a constant. This normalization is direction normalization, and as long as it is taken into account, scale normalization (such as (3a = 1, cited previously) is arbitrary. Viewed in this way, the method of maximum likelihood applied to a system of equations appears to be a natural generalization of the method of maximum likelihood applied to a single equation, in which case we minimize cr2 subject to a direction-normalization rule. Recursive systems. The concentrated form of the likelihood function shows clearly that a new element is introduced into the estimation process, through the presence of the Jacobian determinant, which makes calculations of the maximizing values of B and F highly nonlinear. It is therefore worthwhile to search for special situations in which estimation methods simplify at least to the point of being based on linear calculations. It is evident that the concentrated form of the likelihood function would lend itself to simpler methods of estimating B and F if B | were a known constant. This would be the case if B were triangular, for then, by a scale normalization, we
where the yl7c are the least squares regression estimators of the y lfc . (Some of the ylfc are zero, as a result of the identifying restrictions imposed prior to computing the regression.) Suppose a second equation in the system specifies y.2 as a function of yl and certain z's. Our next step would be to regress 7/2 on y-L and the included z's and then compute values of y., from the relation
The procedure would be continued until all n equations are estimated. Methods of dealing with recursive systems have been studied extensively by Wold, and a summary appears in Strotz and Wold (1960). A recursive system without a diagonal Z-matrix is found in Barger and Klein (1954). One of the most familiar types of recursive systems studied in econometrics is the cobweb model of demand and supply for agricultural products [see BUSINESS CYCLES, article On MATHEMATICAL MODELS].
286
SIMULTANEOUS EQUATION ESTIMATION
Limited-information maximum likelihood. Another maximum likelihood approach that is widely used is the limited-information maximum likelihood method. It does not hinge on a specific formulation of the model, as do methods for recursive systems; it is a simplified method because it neglects information. As we have seen, identifying restrictions for an equation takes the form of specifying zero values for some parameters or of imposing certain linear relations on some parameters. The term "limited information" refers to the fact that only the restrictions relating to the particular equation (or subset of equations) being estimated are used. Restrictions on other equations in the system are ignored when a particular equation is being estimated. Let us again .consider the linear system
By't
u
These equations make up the structural form of the system and are referred to as structural equations. We denote the reduced form of this system by or
From the reduced form equations select a subset corresponding to the rz, endogenous variables in a particular structural equation, say equation i, which is
The summation limit ml indicates the number of predetermined variables included in this equation; we have excluded all zero elements in ji and indexed the z's accordingly. Form the joint distribution of vlt, • • • , vnit over the sample observations and maximize it with respect to the unknown parameters in the ith structural equation, subject to the restrictions on this equation alone. The restrictions usually take the form
o=
= TO! + 1, • • • , m,
where there are m predetermined variables in the whole system; that is, the yik, k ~ m^ + 1, • • • , m, are specified to be zero. The estimated coefficients, A? > 7iJc > and o-f, obtained from this restricted likelihood maximization are the limited-information estimators. Methods of obtaining these estimators and a study of their properties are given in Anderson and Rubin (1949). Linear regression calculations are all that are needed in this type of estimation, save for the ex-
traction of a characteristic root of a matrix with dimensionality nl x rii. A quickly convergent series of iterations involving matrix multiplication leads to the computation of this root and associated vector. The vector obtained, properly normalized by making one coefficient unity, provides estimates of the ftij. The estimates of the yik are obtained from TCI
= -EA .?=!
k = 1,
where the 77^ are least squares regression coefficients from the reduced form equations. It is significant that both full-information and limited-information maximum likelihood estimators are essentially unchanged no matter which variable is selected to have a unit coefficient in each equation. That is to say, if we divide through an estimated equation by the coefficient of any endogenous variable, we get a set of coefficients that would have been obtained by applying the estimation methods under the specification that the same variable have the unit coefficient. Full-information and limited-information maximum likelihood estimators are invariant under this type of scale normalization. Other estimators are not. Two-stage least squares. The classical method of least squares multiple regression applied to a single equation that is part of a larger simultaneous system is inconsistent by virtue of the fact that some of the "explanatory" variables in the regression (the variables with unknown coefficients) may not be independent of the error variable. If we can "purify" such variables to make them independent of the error terms, we can apply ordinary least squares methods to the transformed variables. The method of two-stage least squares does this for us. Let us return to the equation estimated above by limited information. Choose y-i, say, as the dependent variable, that is, set fi^ equal to unity. In place of y.,t, • • • , ynit, we shall use
as explanatory variables. The yjt are computed values from the least squares regressions of y, on all the z/c in the system (k= 1, • • • , ra). The coefficients 7Tjk are the computed regression coefficients. The regression of y± on y-2, • • • , yni, zl, • • • , zOTj provides a two-stage least squares estimator of the single equation. All the equations of a system may be estimated in this way. This can be seen to be a generalization, to systems with nontriangular Jacobians, of the method suggested previously for recursive models in which the variance—covariance matrix of disturbances is not diagonal.
SIMULTANEOUS EQUATION ESTIMATION We may write the "normal" equations for these least squares estimators as M,?,7
M,v
In this expression vt is the vector of residuals computed from the reduced form regressions of y*t, • • • , ynit on all the zkt . If k — 0, we have ordinary least squares estimators. If k = 1, we have two-stage least squares estimators. If k = 1 + X and X is the smallest root of the determinantal equation - Jfv^f;JMw)| = 0,
-c'
In this notation yt is the vector of computed values (#2*, • • • , ?/v); *t is tne vector (zit, ••• , zmit~);
Zn
b is the estimator of the vector (/3 i2 , • • • , /3 iWl ); and c is the estimator of the vector (yn, • • • , jim^. It should be noted that M^* = Myz* = M.'z*y . It should be further observed that
In this expression the whole vector zt = (zlt, • • • , zTO0> which includes all the predetermined variables in the system, is used for the evaluation of the relevant moment matrices. /j-Class estimators. Theil (1958) and Basmann (1957), independently, were the first to advocate the method of two-stage least squares. Theil suggested a whole system of estimators, called the fc-class. He defined these as the solutions to
M
287
- kM -c'
we have limited-information maximum likelihood estimators. This is a succinct way of showing the relationships between various single-equation methods of estimation. Of these three members of the k-class, ordinary least squares is not consistent; the other two are. Three-stage least squares. Other members of the fc-class could be cited for special discussion, but a more fruitful generalization of Theil's approach to estimation theory lies in the direction of what he and Zellner (see Zellner & Theil 1962) call three-stage least squares. Chow (1964) has shown that three-stage least squares estimators are better viewed as simultaneous two-stage least squares estimators. Let us denote ut as the vector of residuals associated with each equation in a system that has had elements of yit replaced by yit, that is, ut = (u,t, • • • , unt), where
uit = yit + E' ?..#.. 'ijUit + i y Z-< In this formulation 2' means summation over all values of j except j = i, and it is assumed that the iih endogenous variable in the ith equation has a unit coefficient. Some elements of p^ and yik are zero or otherwise restricted for identification. Define Mil
Minimization of Zj with respect to /3i; and yik yields the estimators sought. Thus, we have an extension of the principle of least squares in which the generalized variance is minimized. This is like the principle of maximum likelihood, which also minimizes Z , expressed in terms of the Pn and y ifc , but the direction normalization is different. Theil and Zellner termed their method threestage least squares because they first derived twostage least squares estimators for each single equation in the system. They computed the residual variance for each equation and used these as estimators of the variances of the true (unobserved) random disturbances. They then used Aitken's
288
SIMULTANEOUS EQUATION ESTIMATION
generalized method of least squares (1935) to estimate all the equations in the system simultaneously. Aitken's method applies to systems of equations in which the variance-covariance matrix for disturbances is a general known positive definite matrix. Theil and Zellner used the two-stage estimator of this variance-covariance matrix as though it were known. The advantage of this method is that it is of the full-information variety, making use of restrictions on all the equations of the system. Other methods. If the conditions for identification of a single equation are such that there are just enough restrictions to transform linearly and uniquely the reduced form coefficients into the structural coefficients, an indirect least squares method of estimation can be used. Exact identification under zero-type restrictions would enable one to solve
k = ml + 1, • • • ,m, for a unique set of estimated fin , apart from scale normalization, given a set of estimated TT^. The latter would be determined from least squares estimators of the reduced forms. Since there are nv — 1 of the fin to be determined, the necessary condition for exact identification here is that rii — 1 = m — raj . If there is underidentification, i.e., too few a priori restrictions, structural estimation cannot be completed but unrestricted reduced forms can be estimated by the method of least squares. This is the most information that the econometrician can extract when there is lack of identification. Least squares estimators of the reduced form equations are consistent in the underidentified case, but estimates of the structural parameters cannot be made. Instrumental variables. The early discussion of estimation problems in simultaneous equation models contained, on many occasions, applications of a method known as the method of instrumental variables. In estimating the ith equation of a linear system, i.e.,
31 Pay it + we may choose (n± — 1 ) + m± variables that are independent of uit . These are known as the instrumental set. Naturally, the exogenous variables in the equation (z l f , • • • , z TOii ) are possible members of this set. In addition, we need n^— 1 more instruments from the list of exogenous variables in the system but not in the ith equation. For this problem let these be denoted as x2t, • • • , xnit • Since
E(z, t Mit) = 0, s = 1, • • • , TO!, and E(xrtuit} = 0, r = 2, • • • , n!, we can estimate the unknown parameters from = 0,
+ 2y«
E Pa E /=!
«=1
With a scale-normalization rule, such as fin = 1, we have (n T — 1) + ml linear equations in the same number of unknown coefficients. In exactly identified models there is no problem in picking the xrt, for there will always be exactly n, — 1 z's excluded from the ith equation. The method is then identical with indirect least squares. I f m — ml>n1 — l, i.e., if there are more exogenous variables outside the zth equation than there are endogenous variables minus one, we have overidentification, and the number of possible instrumental variables exceeds the minimum needed. In order to avoid the problem of subjective or arbitrary choice among instruments, we turn to the methods of limited information or two-stage least squares. In fact, it is instructive to consider how the method of two-stage least squares resolves this matter. In place of single variables as instruments, it uses linear combinations of them. The computed values m ^
V~\
n
*.
•//1 — / * ** jTt^kt 5
J
O
?
...
*M
*
•*•'
are the new instruments. We can view the method either as the regression of y^ on y2, • • • , yni, Zi, • • • , zmi or as instrumental-variable estimators with y2t, • • • , ynit, zit, • • • , zmit as the instruments. Both come to the same thing. The method of instrumental variables yields consistent estimators. Subgroup averages. The instrumental-variables method can be applied in different forms. One form was used by Wald (1940) to obtain consistent estimators of a linear relationship between two variables each of which is subject to error. This gives rise to a method that can be used in estimating econometric systems. Wald proposed that the estimator of fi in yt = a + fixt,
where yt and xt are both measured with error, be computed from T
y* Lt 11yt —
. T *=-+!
t=l T
/ * Xt
/ * Xt
t=l
SIMULTANEOUS EQUATION ESTIMATION He proposed ordering the sample in ascending magnitudes of the variable x. From two halves of the sample, we determine two sets of mean values of y and x. The line joining these means will have a slope given by ft. Wald showed the conditions under which these estimates are consistent. This may be called the method of subgroup averages. It is a very simple method, which may readily be applied to equations with more than two parameters. The sample is split into as many groups as there are unknown parameters to be determined in the equation under consideration. If there are three parameters, for example, the sample may be split into thirds and the parameters estimated from y2 = a + /3x2 + yzz , i/s = oi. + j8%3 + yz3 .
The extension to more parameters is obvious. The method of subgroup averages can be shown to be a form of the instrumental-variables method by an appropriate assignment of values to "dummy" instrumental variables. Subgroup averages is a very simple method, and it is consistent, but it is not very efficient. Simultaneous least squares. The simultaneous least squares method, suggested by Brown (1960), minimizes the sum of squares of all reduced form disturbances, subject to the parameter restrictions imposed on the system, i.e., it minimizes
S£i '?*> subject to restrictions. Suppose that the vit are expressed as functions of the observables and parameters, with all restrictions included; then Brown's method minimizes the sum of the elements on the main diagonal of Z r , where Z« is the variancecovariance matrix of reduced form disturbances, whereas full-information maximum likelihood minimizes |ZV|. Brown's method has the desirable property of being a full-information method; it is distribution free; it is consistent; but it has the drawback that its results are not invariant under linear transformations of the variables. This drawback can be removed by expressing the reduced form disturbance in standard units v' =
and minimizing
289
Evaluation of alternative methods The various approaches to estimation of whole systems of simultaneous equations or individual relationships within such systems are consistent except for the single-equation least squares method. If the system is recursive and disturbances are independent between equations, least squares estimators are also consistent. In fact, they are maximum likelihood estimators for normally distributed disturbances. But generally, ordinary least squares estimators are not consistent. They are included in the group of alternatives considered here because they have a time-honored status and because they have minimum variance. In large-sample theory, maximum likelihood estimators of parameters are generally efficient compared with all other estimators. That is why we choose full-information maximum likelihood estimators as norms. They are consistent and efficient. Least squares estimators are minimum-variance estimators if their variances are estimated about estimated (inconsistent) sample means. If their variances are measured about the true, or population, values, it is not certain that they are efficient. Limited-information estimators are less efficient than full-information maximum likelihood estimators. This should be intuitively obvious, since fullinformation estimators make use of more a priori information; it is proved in Klein (1960). Twostage least squares estimators have asymptotically the same variance-covariance matrix as limitedinformation estimators, and three-stage (or simultaneous two-stage) least squares estimators have the same variance-covariance matrix as fullinformation maximum likelihood estimators. Thus, asymptotically the two kinds of limited-information estimators have the same efficiency, and the two kinds of full-information estimators have the same efficiency. The instrumental-variables or subgroupaverages methods are generally inefficient. Of course, the instrumental-variables method can be pushed to the point where it is the same as twostage least squares estimation and can thereby gain efficiency. A desirable aspect of the method of maximum likelihood is that its properties are preserved under a single-valued transformation. Thus, efficient estimators of structural parameters by this method transform into efficient estimators of reduced form parameters. The apparently efficient method of least squares may lose its efficiency under this kind of transformation. In applications of models, we use the reduced form in most cases, not the individual structural equations; therefore the prop-
290
SIMULTANEOUS EQUATION ESTIMATION
erties under conditions of transformation from structural to reduced form equations are of extreme importance. Limited-information methods are a form of maximum likelihood methods. Therefore the properties of limited information are preserved under transformation. To obtain limited-information estimators of the single equation
stage least squares. These consist of a repeated application of least squares regression techniques of calculation, but the first regressions computed are of substantial size. There are as many independent variables in the regression as there are predetermined variables in the system, provided there are enough degrees of freedom. Essentially, the method amounts to the calculation of parameters and computed dependent variables in
'let — Uit, /\
we maximize the joint likelihood of vn, • • • , vnit in m
"
+Vjt>
j = 1 , - • • ,rii,
subject to the restrictions on the ith equation. In this case only the n, reduced forms corresponding to y-it, • • • , ynit are used. It is also possible to simplify calculations, and yet preserve consistency (although at the expense of efficiency), by using fewer than all m predetermined variables in the reduced forms. In this sense the reduced forms of limited-information estimation are not necessarily unique, and the same endogenous variable appearing in different structural equations of a system may not have the same reduced form expression for each equation estimator. There is yet another sense in which we may derive reduced forms for the method of limited information. After each equation of a complete system has been estimated by the method of limited information, we can derive algebraically a set of reduced forms for the whole system. These would, in fact, be the reduced forms used in forecasting, multiplier analysis, and similar applications of systems. The efficiency property noted above for limited and full information has not been proved for systems of this type of reduced forms, but this has been studied in numerical analysis (see below). Ease of computation. Finally we come to an important practical matter in the comparison of the different methods of estimation—relative ease of computation. Naturally, calculations are simpler and smaller in magnitude for single-equation least squares than for any of the other methods except that of subgroup averages. The method of instrumental variables is of similar computational complexity, but for equations with four or more variables it pays to have the advantage of symmetry in the moment matrices, as is the case with singleequation least squares. This is hardly a consideration with modern electronic computing machines, but it is worth consideration if electric desk machines are being used. The next-simplest calculations are those for two-
m v-» ~
yjt — Z-iTTjkZkt , fc=i
A — O
J ~ *•>
. . . • » Wl >
'
'
Only the "forward" part of this calculation by the standard Gauss-Doolittle method need be made in order to obtain the moment matrix of the yjt. In the next stage we compute the regression
Two important computing problems arise in the first stage. In many systems m>T; i.e., there are insufficient degrees of freedom in the sample for evaluation of the reduced forms. We may choose a subset of the zkt, or we may use principal components of the zkt (Kloek & Mennes 1960). Systematic and efficient ways of choosing subsets of the zkt have been developed by taking account of the recursive structure of the model (Fisher 1965). In many economic models ra has been as large as 30 or more, and it is often difficult to make sufficiently accurate evaluation of the reduced form regression equations of this size, given the amount of multicollinearity found in economic data with common trends and cycles. The same procedures used in handling the degrees-of-freedom problem are recommended for getting round the difficulties of multicollinearity. Klein and Nakamura (1962) have shown that multicollinearity problems are less serious in ordinary than in two-stage least squares. They have also shown that these problems increase as we move on to the methods of limitedinformation and then full-information maximum likelihood. Limited-information methods require all the computations of two-stage least squares and, in addition, the extraction of a root of an n T x n^ determinantal equation. The latter calculation can be done in a straightforward manner by iterative matrix multiplication, usually involving fewer than ten iterations. Both limited information and two-stage least squares are extremely well adapted to modern computers and can be managed without much trouble on electric desk machines. Three-stage least squares estimators involve the
SIMULTANEOUS EQUATION ESTIMATION computation of two-stage estimators for each equation of a system, estimation of a variance-covariance matrix of structural disturbances, and simultaneous solution of a linear equation system of the order of all coefficients in the system. This last step may involve a large number of estimating equations for a model of 30 or more structural equations. All the previous methods consist of standard linear matrix operations. The extraction of a characteristic root is the only operation that involves nonlinearities, and the desired root can quickly be found by an iterative process of matrix multiplication. Full-information maximum likelihood methods, however, are quite different. The estimation equations are highly nonlinear. For small systems of two, three, or four equations, estimates have been made without much trouble on large computers (Eisenpress 1962) and on desk machines (Chernoff & Divinsky 1953). The problem of finding the maximum of a function as complicated as the joint likelihood function of a system of 15 to 20 or more equations is, however, formidable. Electronic machine programs have been developed for this purpose. The most standardized sets of full-information maximum likelihood calculations are for systems that are fully linear in both parameters and variables. Single-equation methods require linearity only in unknown parameters, and this is a much weaker restriction. Much progress in computation has been made since the first discussion of these econometric methods of estimation, in 1943, but the problem is far from solved, and there is no simple, push-button computation. This is especially true of full-information maximum likelihood. Efficient programs have recently been developed for calculating full-information maximum likelihood estimates in either linear or nonlinear systems, and these have been applied to models of as many as 15 structural equations, involving more than 60 unknown parameters. Generalization of assumptions. The basis for comparing different estimation methods or for preferring one method over another rests on asymptotic theory. The property of consistency is a largesample property, and the sampling errors used to evaluate efficiency measures are asymptotic formulas. Unfortunately, samples of economic data are frequently not large, especially time series data. The amount of small-sample bias or the small-sample confidence intervals for parameter estimators are not generally known in specific formulas. Constructed numerical experiments, designed according to Monte Carlo methods, have
291
thrown some light on the small-sample properties. These are reported below. Another assumption sometimes made for the basic model is that the error terms are mutually independent. We noted above that successive least squares treatment of equations in recursive systems is identical with maximum likelihood estimation when the variance-covariance matrix of structural disturbances is diagonal. This implies mutual independence among contemporaneous disturbances. In a time series model we usually make another assumption, namely, that E ( u i f u i t ' ' ) = 0,
t ^ t', for all i, }.
The simplest way in which this assumption can be modified is to allow the errors to be related in some linear autoregressive process, such as
i= 1, 2, ••• ,n, where E(e i f e,- r ) = 0 (£ ^ £', for all i, j). In a formal sense joint maximum likelihood estimation of structural parameters and autoregressive coefficients, p i j k , can be laid out in estimation equations, but there are no known instances where these have been solved on a large scale, for the estimation equations are very complicated. For single-equation models or for recursive systems which split into a series of single-equation regressions, the autoregressive parameters of first order have been jointly estimated with structural parameters (Barger & Klein 1954). The principal extensions to larger systems have been in cases where the autoregressive parameters are known a priori. Then it is easy to make known autoregressive transformations of the variables and proceed as in the case of independent disturbances. [See TIME SERIES.] Related to the above two points is the treatment of lagged values of endogenous variables as predetermined variables. The presence of lagged endogenous variables reflects serial correlation among endogenous variables rather than among disturbances. In large samples it can be shown that for purposes of estimation we are justified in treating lagged variables as predetermined, but in small samples we incur bias on this account. Another assumption regarding the disturbances in simultaneous equation systems is that they are mainly due to neglected or unmeasurable variables that affect or disturb each equation of the model. They are regarded as errors in behavior or technology. From a formal mathematical point of view, they could equally well be regarded as a direct error in observation of the normalized dependent variable in each equation, assuming that the system is
292
SIMULTANEOUS EQUATION ESTIMATION
written so that there is a different normalized dependent variable in each equation. There is an implicit assumption that the exogenous variables are measured without error. If we change the model to one in which random errors enter through disturbances to each relation and also through inaccurate observation of each individual variable, we have a more complicated probability scheme, whose estimation properties have not been developed in full generality. This again has been a case for numerical treatment by Monte Carlo methods. The procedures of estimating simultaneous equation models as though errors are mutually independent when they really are not and as though variables are accurately measured when they really are not are specification errors. Other misspecifications of models can occur. For simplicity we assume linearity or, at least, linearity in unknown parameters, but the true model may have a different functional form. Errors may not follow the normal distribution, as we usually assume. [See ERRORS, article on EFFECTS OF ERRORS IN STATISTICAL ASSUMPTIONS.] Full-information methods are sensitive to specification error because they depend on restrictions imposed throughout an entire system. Single-equation methods depend on a smaller set of restrictions. If an investigator has particular interest in just one equation or in a small sector of the economy, he may incur large specification error by making too superficial a study of the parts of the economy that do not particularly interest him. There is much to be said for using single-equation methods (limited information or two-stage least squares) in situations where one does not have the resources to specify the whole economy adequately. There are numerous possibilities for specifying models incorrectly. These probably introduce substantial errors in applied work, but they cannot be studied in full generality for there is no particular way of showing all the misspecifications that can occur. We can, however, construct artificial numerical examples of what we believe to be the major specification errors. These are discussed below. Sampling experiments. The effect on estimation methods of using simplified assumptions that are not fully met in real life often cannot be determined by general mathematical analysis. Econometricians have therefore turned to constructing sampling experiments with large-scale computers to test proposed methods of estimation where (1) the sample is small; and (2) there is specification error in the statement of the model, such as
(a) nonzero parameters assumed to be zero, (b) dependent exogenous variables and errors assumed to be independent, (c) imperfectly measured exogenous variables assumed to be perfectly measured, or (d) serially correlated errors assumed to be not serially correlated. So-called Monte Carlo methods are used to perform the sampling experiments that conceptually underlie sampling error calculations. These sampling experiments are never, in fact, carried out with nonexperimental sources of data, for we cannot relive economic life over and over again; but we can instruct a machine to simulate such an experiment. Consider a single equation to be estimated by different methods, for example,
t ~ 1, 2, • • • , T.
ut,
Fix a. and (3 at, say, 3.0 and 0.5, respectively, and set T = 30. This would correspond to the process = 3.0 +
7/30 =
3.0 +
+
Cgo
+
We also fix the values of the predetermined variables xl}x.2, • • • , x30 once and for all. We set T = 30 to indicate that we are dealing with a 30-element small sample. A sample of 30 annual observations would be the prototype. Employing a source of random numbers scaled to have a realistic standard deviation and a zero mean, we draw a set of random numbers u^ , • • • , u30 . We then instruct a machine to use u± , • • • , w30 and x-i , • • • , xzo to compute yl} • • • , yso from the above formulas. From the samples of data, ylf • • • , y30 and xl} • • • , xzo , we estimate a and /3 by the methods being studied. Let a and ft be the estimated values. We then draw a new set of random numbers, Ui, • • • , uso , and repeat the process, using the same values of xt , • • • , x^ . From many such repetitions, say 100, we have sampling distributions of a and ft. Means of these distributions, when compared with a (= 3.0) and (3 (= 0.5), indicate bias, if any, and standard deviations or root-mean-square values about 3.0 or 0.5 indicate efficiency. From these sampling distributions we may compare different estimators of a and ft. What we have said about this simple type of experiment for a single equation can readily be extended to an entire system: By't + rz't = u't,
t= 1 , 2 , --,T.
In this case we must start with assumed values of B and F. We choose a T-element vector of values
SIMULTANEOUS EQUATION ESTIMATION for each element of zt, the predetermined variables, and repeated T-element vectors of values for each element of ut. The random variables are chosen so that their variance-covariance matrix equals some specified set of values. As in the single-equation case, T = 30 or some likely small-sample value. The zt are often chosen in accordance with the values of predetermined variables used in actual models. In practice, Monte Carlo studies of simultaneous equation models have dealt with small systems having only two, three, or four equations. Two sets of results are of interest from these studies. Estimates of individual elements in B and F can be studied and compared for different estimators; estimates of B~T, the reduced-form coefficients, can be similarly investigated. In addition, we could form some over-all summary statistic, such as standard error of forecast, for different estimators. The simplest Monte Carlo experiments have been made to test for small-sample properties alone; they have not introduced measurement errors, serial correlation of disturbances, or other specification errors. Generally speaking, these studies clearly show the bias in single-equation least squares estimates where some of the "independent" variables in the regression calculation are not independent of the random disturbances. Maximum likelihood estimators (full or limited information) show comparatively small bias. The standard deviations of individual parameter estimators are usually smallest for the single-equation least squares method, but this standard deviation is computed about the biased sample mean. If estimated about the true mean, least squares sometimes does not show up well, indicating that bias outweighs efficiency. Fullinformation maximum likelihood shows up as an efficient method, whether judged in terms of variation about the sample or the true mean. Two-stage least squares estimators appear to have somewhat smaller variance about the true values than do limited-information estimators, and both methods measure up to the efficiency of single-equation least squares methods when variability is measured about the true mean. Asymptotically, limited-information and twostage estimators have the same variance-covariance matrices, and they are both inefficient compared with full-information estimators. The Monte Carlo results for small samples are not surprising, although the particular experiments studied give a slight edge to two-stage estimators. When specification error is introduced, in the form of making an element of F zero in the estimation process when it is actually nonzero in the
293
population, we find that full-information methods are very sensitive. Both limited-information and two-stage estimators perform better than fullinformation maximum likelihood. Two-stage estimators are the best among all methods examined in this situation. Limited-information estimators are very sensitive to intercorrelation among predetermined variables. The principal result for Monte Carlo estimators of reduced form parameters is that transformed single-equation least squares values lose their efficiency properties. Being seriously biased as well, these estimates show a poor over-all rating when used for estimating reduced forms for a system as a whole. Full-information estimators, which are shown in these experiments to be sensitive to specification error, do better in estimating reduced form coefficients than in estimating structural coefficients. Their gain in making use of all the a priori information outweighs the losses due to the misspecification introduced and, in the end, gives them a favorable comparison with ordinary least squares estimators of the reduced form equations that make no use of the a priori information and have no specification error. If a form of specification error is introduced in a Monte Carlo experiment by having common time trends in elements of zt and ut, so that they are not independent as hypothesized, we find that limited-information estimators are as strongly biased as are ordinary least squares values. If time trend is introduced as an additional variable, however, the limited-information method has small bias. When observation errors are imposed on the zt, both least squares and limited-information estimators show little change in bias but increases in sampling errors. In this model, it turns out as before that the superior efficiency of least squares estimators of individual structural parameters does not carry over to the estimators of reduced form parameters. A comprehensive sampling-experiment study of alternative estimators under correctly specified and under misspecified conditions is given in Summers (1965), and Johnston (1963) compares results from several completed Monte Carlo studies. This approach is in its infancy, and further investigations will surely throw new light on the relative merits of different estimation methods. For some years economists were digesting the modern approcah to simultaneous equation estimation introduced by Haavelmo, Mann and Wald, Anderson and Rubin, and Koopmans, Rubin, and Leipnik, and there was a period of little change in
294
SINGLE TAX
this field. Since the development of the two-stage least squares method by Theil, there have been a number of developments. The methods are undergoing interpretation and revision. New estimators are being suggested, and it is likely that many new results will be forthcoming in the next few decades. Wold (1965) has proposed a method based on iterative least squares that recommends itself by its adaptability to modern computers, its consistency, and its capacity to make use of a priori information on all equations simultaneously and to treat some types of nonlinearity with ease. Also, excellent recent books, by Christ (1966), Goldberger (1964), and Malinvaud (1964), greatly aid instruction in this subject. LAWRENCE R. KLEIN [See also LINEAR HYPOTHESES, article on REGRESSION.] BIBLIOGRAPHY
AITKEN, A. C. 1935 On Least Squares and Linear Combination of Observations. Royal Society of Edinburgh, Proceedings 55:42-48. ANDERSON, T. W.; and RUBIN, HERMAN 1949 Estimation of the Parameters of a Single Equation in a Complete System of Stochastic Equations. Annals of Mathematical Statistics 20:46-63. BARGER, HAROLD; and KLEIN, LAWRENCE R. 1954 A Quarterly Model for the United States Economy. Journal of the American Statistical Association 49:413437. BASMANN, R. L. 1957 A Generalized Classical Method of Linear Estimation of Coefficients in a Structural Equation. Econometrica 25:77-83. BROWN, T. M. 1960 Simultaneous Least Squares: A Distribution Free Method of Equation System Structure Estimation. International Economic Review 1: 173-191. CHERNOFF, HERMAN; and DIVINSKY, NATHAN 1953 The Computation of Maximum-likelihood Estimates of Linear Structural Equations. Pages 236-269 in Cowles Commission for Research in Economics, Studies in Econometric Method. Edited by William C. Hood and Tjailing C. Koopmans. New York: Wiley. CHOW, GREGORY C. 1964 A Comparison of Alternative Estimators for Simultaneous Equations. Econometrica 32:532-553. CHRIST, C. F. 1966 Econometric Models and Methods. New York: Wiley. EISENPRESS, HARRY 1962 Note on the Computation of Full-information Maximum-likelihood Estimates of Coefficients of a Simultaneous System. Econometrica 30:343-348. FISHER, FRANKLIN M. 1965 Dynamic Structure and Estimation in Economy-wide Econometric Models. Pages 589-635 in James S. Duesenberry et al., The Brookings Quarterly Econometric Model of the United States. Chicago: Rand McNally. FISHER, FRANKLIN M. 1966 The Identification Problem in Econometrics. New York: McGraw-Hill. GOLDBERGER, ARTHUR S. 1964 Econometric Theory. New York: Wiley.
HAAVELMO, TRYGVE 1943 The Statistical Implications of a System of Simultaneous Equations. Econometrica 11:1-12. JOHNSTON, JOHN 1963 Econometric Methods. New York: McGraw-Hill. KLEIN, LAWRENCE R. 1960 The Efficiency of Estimation in Econometric Models. Pages 216-232 in Ralph W. Pfouts, Essays in Economics and Econometrics: A Volume in Honor of Harold Hotelling. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press. KLEIN, LAWRENCE R.; and NAKAMURA, MITSUGU 1962 Singularity in the Equation Systems of Econometrics: Some Aspects of the Problem of Multicollinearity. International Economic Review 3:274-299. KLOEK, T.; and MENNES, L. B. M. 1960 Simultaneous Equations Estimation Based on Principal Components of Predetermined Variables. Econometrica 28:45-61. KOOPMANS, TJALLING C.; RUBIN, HERMAN; and LEIPNIK, R. B. (1950) 1958 Measuring the Equation Systems of Dynamic Economics. Pages 53-237 in Tj alling C. Koopmans (editor), Statistical Inference in Dynamic Economic Models. Cowles Commission for Research in Economics, Monograph No. 10. New York: Wiley. MALINVAUD, EDMOND (1964) 1966 Statistical Methods of Econometrics. Chicago: Rand McNally. -» First published in French. MANN, H. B.; and WALD, ABRAHAM 1943 On the Statistical Treatment of Linear Stochastic Difference Equations. Econometrica 11:173-220. STROTZ, ROBERT H.; and WOLD, HERMAN 1960 A Triptych on Causal Chain Systems. Econometrica 28:417463. SUMMERS, ROBERT 1965 A Capital Intensive Approach to the Small Sample Properties of Various Simultaneous Equation Estimators. Econometrica 33:1-41. THEIL, HENRI (1958) 1961 Economic Forecasts and Policy. 2d ed., rev. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing. TINBERGEN, JAN 1939 Statistical Testing of Businesscycle Theories. Volume 2: Business Cycles in the United States of America: 1919-1932. Geneva: League of Nations, Economic Intelligence Service. WALD, ABRAHAM 1940 The Fitting of Straight Lines if Both Variables Are Subject to Error. Annals of Mathematical Statistics 11:284-300. WOLD, HERMAN 1965 A Fix-point Theorem With Econometric Background. Arkiv fur Matematik 6:209-240. ZELLNER, ARNOLD; and THEIL, HENRI 1962 Three-stage Least Squares: Simultaneous Estimation of Simultaneous Equations. Econometrica 30:54-78.
SINGLE TAX See TAXATION, article on PROPERTY TAXES; and the biography of GEORGE. SISMONDI, J. C. L. SIMONDE DE See SIMONDE DE SISMONDI, J. C. L. SITUATIONAL TESTS See under PERSONALITY MEASUREMENT.
(7
SIZE DISTRIBUTIONS IN ECONOMICS SIZE DISTRIBUTIONS IN ECONOMICS The size distributions of certain economic and >ocioeconomic variables—incomes, wealth, firms, plants, cities, etc.—display remarkably regular patterns. These patterns, or distribution laws, are usually skew, the most important being the Pareto law [see PARETO, article on CONTRIBUTIONS TO ECONOMICS] and the log-normal, or Gibrat, law (below). Some disagreement about the patterns actually observed still exists. The empirical distributions often approximate the Gibrat law in the middle ranges of the variables and the Pareto law in the upper ranges. The study of size distributions is concerned with explaining why the observed patterns exist and persist. The answer may be found in the conception of the distribution laws as the steady state equilibria of stochastic processes that describe the underlying economic or demographic forces. A steady state equilibrium is a macroscopic condition that results from the balance of a great number of random microscopic movements proceeding in opposite directions. Thus, in a stationary population a constant age structure is maintained by the annual occurrence of approximately constant numbers of births and deaths—the random events par excellence of human life. The steady state explanation is evidently inspired by the example of statistical mechanics in which the macroscopic conditions are heat and pressure and the microscopic random movements are performed by the molecules. Characteristically, the steady state is independent of initial conditions, i.e., the initial size distribution. In economic applications this is important because it means that the pattern determined by certain structural constants tends to be re-established after a disturbance is imposed on the process. This will only be the case, however, if the process leading to the steady state is really ergodic, that is, if the influence of initial conditions on the state of the system becomes negligible after a certain time; and it will be relevant in practice only if this time interval is sufficiently short. The idea that the stable pattern of a distribution might be explained by the interplay of a multitude of small random events was first demonstrated in the case of the normal distribution. The central limit theorem shows that the addition of a great number of small independent random variables yields a variable that is normally distributed, when properly centered and scaled. A stochastic process that leads to a normal distribution is the random walk on a straight line with, for example, a 50 per
295
cent probability each of a step in one direction and a step in the opposite direction. It is only natural that attempts to explain other distribution patterns should have started from this idea. The first extension was to allow the random walk to proceed on a logarithmic scale. The resulting distribution is log-normal on the natural scale and is known as the log-normal or Gibrat distribution. The basic assumption, in economic terms, is that the chance of a certain proportionate growth or shrinkage is independent of the size already reached —the law of proportionate effect. This law was proposed by J. C. Kapteyn, by Francis Gal ton, and, later, by Gibrat (1931). Let size (of towns, firms, incomes) at time t be denoted by Y(t), and let e(t) represent a random variable with a certain distribution. We have
where Y(0) is size at time 0, the initial period. For small time intervals the logarithm of size can be represented as the sum of independent random variables and an initial size which will become negligible as t grows: log Y ( t ) = log Y(0)
6(2)- ••+£(*)•
If the random variables e are identically distributed with mean m and variance cr2, the distribution of logY(f) will be normal with mean mt and variance cr2t. This random walk corresponds to the process of diffusion in physics which is illustrated by the socalled Brownian movement of particles of dust put into a drop of liquid. Since it implies an ever growing variance, the idea of Gibrat is not itself enough to provide an explanation for a stable distribution. There must be a stabilizing influence to offset the tendency of the variance to increase; indeed, a distinguishing feature of the various theories presently to be reviewed lies in the kind of stabilizer they introduce to offset the diffusion. Two interesting cases may be noted here. One possibility is to modify the law of proportionate effect and assume that the chances of growth decline as size increases. This approach has been taken by Kalecki (1945), who assumes a negative correlation between the size and the jump and obtains a Gibrat law with constant variance. Another possibility is to combine the diffusion process of the random walk with a steady inflow of new, small units (firms, cities, incomes). Some units may continue indefinitely to increase in size, but
296
SIZE DISTRIBUTIONS IN ECONOMICS
their weight will be offset by that of a continuous stream of many new, small entrants, so that both the mean and the variance of the distribution will remain constant. This approach, which leads to the Pareto law, has been taken by Simon (1955). Review of various models. Descriptions of various models will illustrate the methods employed. Models differ with regard to the distribution law explained, the field of application (towns, incomes, etc.), and the type of stochastic process used. Champernowne's model. Champernowne (1953) presents a model that explains the Pareto law for the size distribution of incomes. The stochastic process employed is the so-called Markov chain [see MARKOV CHAINS]. The model is based on a matrix of probabilities of transition from one income class to another in a certain interval of time, say a year. The rows are the income classes of one year, the columns the income classes of the next year. The income classes are chosen in such a way that they are equal on the logarithmic scale (for example, incomes from 1 to 10, from 10 to 100, etc.). The probability of a jump from one income class to the next income class in the course of a year is assumed to be independent of the income from which the jump is made (the law of proportionate effect). The number of income earners is constant. The number of income earners in income class s is then determined as follows. The number of incomes in class s at time t + 1 is f(s,t+l)=Zf(s-u,t)p(u), u = -n
where s, u, and t take on integer values, p(w) is the probability of a jump over u intervals (i.e., the transition probability), and the size of the jump is constrained to the range +1, — n. In the steady state equilibrium reached after a sufficiently long time has passed, the action of the transition matrix leaves the distribution unchanged. We then have f(s)=Zf(s-«)p(u),
s > 0,
as t -»oo. This difference equation is solved by putting f(s) = zs. The characteristic equation
has two positive real roots, one of which is unity. To assure that the other root will be between 0 and 1, Champernowne introduces the following stability condition:
The relevant solution is f(s) = bs, 0 < b < 1, which gives the number of incomes in income class s. If the lower bound of this class is the log of the income Y 8 , then the probability of an income exceeding Ys is given by Since s is determined by where h is the class interval and Ymin is the lower boundary of the lowest income class, it follows that logP(Y.)=y-alogY., where the parameters y and a are determined by b, h, and Y min . This is the Pareto law with Pareto coefficient a. Champernowne's stability condition implies that the mathematical expectation of a change in income is negative. This counteracts the diffusion. How can the stability condition be justified on economic grounds? It may be connected with the fact that in this model every income earner who drops out is replaced by a new income earner. Since, in practice, young people have on the average lower and more uniform incomes than old people, the replacement of old income earners by young ones usually means a drop in income. Thus, Champernowne's stability condition, as far as its economic basis is concerned, is very similar to the entry of new, small units that act as a stabilizer in Simon's model. Rutherford's model. Rutherford's model (1955) leads, in his opinion, to the Gibrat law for the size distribution of incomes. Newly entering income earners, assumed to be log-normally distributed at the start, are subject to a random walk and thus to increasing variance during their lifetimes. The process of birth and death of income earners, which is explicitly introduced into the model, acts as the stabilizer. The distribution of total income is obtained by summing the distributions for all age cohorts that contribute survivors, Rutherford's method is to derive the moments of the distribution by integration over time of the moments for the entrance groups. The distribution is built up "synthetically" from the moments, as it were. In the absence of an analytical solution with a definite distribution law, some disagreement remains about the result. Simons model. In Simon's model (1955), which leads to what he calls the Yule distribution, the aggregate growth of firms, cities, or incomes is given a priori. The stochastic process apportions this given increment to various units according to
SIZE DISTRIBUTIONS IN ECONOMICS certain rules, which are weakened forms of the law of proportionate effect and rules of new entry. As a consequence of this procedure, there is no possibility of shrinkage of individual units. The given aggregate emphasizes the interdependence of fortunes of different firms (the gain of one is the loss of another)—-a point that is neglected in other models, such as that of Steindl (1965). On the other hand, the aggregate is, in reality, not given; it is not independent of the action of the firms, which may increase their total market by advertising, product innovation, and so on. The process of apportionment may be described as follows. We may conveniently think of populations of cities, so that f ( n , N) is the frequency of cities with n inhabitants in a total urban population of N; to be realistic, we shall assume that a city exceeds a certain minimum number of inhabitants; n will measure the excess over this minimum, and N will correspondingly be the sum of these excess populations. An additional urban inhabitant is allocated to a new city with a probability a and to an existing city, of any size class, with a probability proportionate to the number of (excess) inhabitants in that size class. Then,
297
Yule distribution asymptotically approaches the Pareto law for large values of n, that is, f ( n ) -* n-^f(1 )F(p + 2) as n -* oo. This model is applicable to cases in which size is measured by a stock, for example, number of employees of a firm. Simon provides an alternative interpretation of it that applies to flows, such as income and turnover of firms. For example, the total flow of income is given, and each dollar is apportioned to existing and new income earners according to the rules given above. Using simulation techniques, Ijiri and Simon (1964) show that the pattern of the Yule distribution persists if serial correlation of the growth of individual firms in different periods is assumed. This finding is important because, in reality, growth is often affected by "constitutional" factors, such as financial resources and research done in the past. The model of Wold and Whittle. Wold and Whittle (1957) present a model of the size distribution of wealth in which stability is provided by the turnover of generations, as in Rutherford's model. On the death of a wealth owner, his fortune is divided among his heirs (in equal parts, as a simplification). The diffusion effect is provided by f(n,N+ 1) ~ f ( n , N ~ ) the growth of wealth of living proprietors, which = J - = L [(n - 1 )f (n - 1, N) - nf(n, N)], proceeds deterministically at compound interest. The model is shown to lead to a Pareto distribution, the Pareto coefficient depending on the number of heirs to an estate and the ratio of the growth rate of capital to the mortality rate of the wealth owners. Steindl's models. Steindl's models (1965, chapWe assume that there is a steady state solution ters 2, 3) are designed to explain the size distriin which the frequencies of all classes of cities bution of firms, but they can equally well be applied change in the same proportion, that is, in which to the size distribution of cities. The distribution laws obtained are, for large sizes, identical with f(n,N+ 1) _ N + 1 for all n. the Pareto law. Like Rutherford's model, Steindl's N f(n, N) models rest on a combination of two stochastic Using this relation and defining a relative frequency processes. One is a birth-and-death process of the of cities as f ( n ) = f ( n , N)/(aN), we obtain from population of cities or firms; the other is a stothe above equations chastic process of the growth of the city or firm itself. f(n^ - f(r, - n; ( i - « ) ( t t - i ) 'W ' ^ l +(l-«)n The way in which the interplay of these two processes brings about the ,Pj,reto law can be ex,( 1 . T( .) _ ' 2- a ' plained in elementary terms. We start with the size distribution of cities. The number of cities can be or, setting I/' ( l - a ) = p , explained by a birth process, if we assume that (n- l ) ( n - 2 ) - - - 2 - 1 cities do not die. Let us assume that new cities are /Yw") — Ci appearing at a constant rate, e, the birth rate of -4- 9A ^) r x - i s cities. The number of cities increases exponentially, ^li ^F^n )L \p T _ ri ^r? and the age distribution of cities at a given moment of time is This expression is the Yule distribution. Using a property of the T-function, it can be shown that the e>0, (1)
298
SIZE DISTRIBUTIONS IN ECONOMICS
where t is age and -R(t) is the number of cities with age in excess of t; in other words, K(t) is the rank of the town aged t + dt, and -R(O) is the total number of towns existing at the moment of time considered. The size of the city—its number of inhabitants—increases, on the average, with age. If the rate of births plus immigration, A, and of deaths plus emigration, (JL, are constant, we obtain an exponential growth function for the size of the city:
historical development is revealed in a cross section of the layers. We can also see how irregularities in the evolution over time will affect the size distribution. If an exceptional spurt of births of new firms occurs at one point of time (after a war, for example), the regression line in plane 1 will be broken and its upper part shifted upward in a parallel fashion. The same thing will happen to the transformed distribution in plane 3. InR
(2)
Eliminating t between eqs. (1) and (2), we get (3)
lnR = -
X—
lnR(0).
This is the Pareto law (if e/(X - / & ) > ! ) , and the Pareto coefficient is seen to be the ratio of the growth rate of the number of cities to the growth rate of a city. This demonstration, which on the face of it is deterministic in character, can be supplemented by a graphical illustration in which the stochastic features are included. In Figure 1 the distribution of cities according to age is plotted in the vertical (In R, t) plane. The abscissa shows the age of the city, and the ordinate shows the log of the rank of the city. Each city is thus represented by a dot, and the regression line fitted to these points represents relation (1 ). In the horizontal (t, In n} plane, we show the exponential growth of cities with age, as in relation (2). Again each city may be represented by a dot showing age and size. The scatter diagram in the horizontal plane may be regarded as a stochastic transformation of the time variable into the size variable. If the size of each city has been found on the scatter diagram, the cities can be reordered according to size; we then obtain, in the third (In R, In 72) plane, the transformed relation (3) between the number of cities (rank) and the size of a city. If firms are studied, we must take into account the death of firms. We might assume that a firm dies when it ceases to have customers. We can imagine that the age distribution in plane 1 of Figure 1 includes the dead firms; they are automatically eliminated in the transformation to size, being transferred to the size class below one. In the exponential relation (1), e must now represent the net rate of growth of the number of firms if the birth of firms is assumed to be a constant ratio of the population. Figure 1 illustrates how the evolution in time of the number of firms (cities) is mapped onto the cross section of sizes. This process may be compared to sedimentation in geology, where a
In n
Figure 1
The complete model for firms may be described as follows. The size of a firm is measured by the number of customers attached to it. This is governed by a birth-and-death process. Let us denote by o(At) a magnitude that is small in comparison with At. There is a chance A At + o(At) of a customer's being acquired and a chance //, At + o(A£) of a customer's being lost in a short period of time, At; multiple births and deaths have a chance of o(At). The probability that a firm has n or more than n customers is given by P(n) = r?(n, t)r(t) dt, Jo
where P ( n , f ) is the probability that a firm of age t has n or more than n customers. The term r(t) is the density of the age distribution of firms, including dead firms; for large t it is the steady state of a renewal process and is given by r(t) = ce~et, where e is the net rate of growth of the firm population and c is a constant. The number of firms with less than one customer, P(0, t) — P(l, t), equals the dead firms. The value of P(n, t) is obtained as the solution of a birth-and-death process for the customers of a firm: P(n, t) = (l - y) ( ( \I^y '
n = 1, 2, • • • ,
where a = g-<*-#>*, a' — ( / a/A)e~ (X -"•>*, and A > p. This expression can be expanded in series and in-
SIZE DISTRIBUTIONS IN ECONOMICS serted in the above integral; this yields, integrating term by term, '-/*' *(-n\(n-l\ \v )\ k ) / j / v=0 00
E
7c=0
j
V + k + fo>
n\ J B ( n , cu + v), '
where o) = e/(X — ft) > 0 and B(rz, w + v) is the Beta integral. Hence,
P(n) v ' If /x/X < 1, we can neglect the terms with *> above a certain value. Thus, if n -» <*> and v has a moderate value, we can use the approximations B(n, a) + v} = n-"-T(a> + i/), B(rz, *0 — rrT(z'); therefore, as n -» °°,
The following features of the solution may be remarked: Since the approximation depends on the value of ft/X, which is the mortality of firms of high age, the smaller the mortality of firms, the greater will be the proportion of the distribution that conforms to Pareto's law. The mean of the distribution will be finite if o> > 1 . This is important in connection with disequilibria, which can arise through changes in X, ju, and e. It can be shown that the Pareto solution applies to the growing firm (X > /JL, the above case) and, in a modified form, to the shrinking firm ( X < / a ) ; but it does not obtain for the stationary firm (X = /x). The above solution for the distribution according to customers can be shown to be valid also for the distribution according to sales, if firms grow mainly by acquiring more customers and not by getting bigger customers. This is often true in retail trade but not in manufacturing. An alternative model assumes the other extreme — that firms grow only by getting bigger orders. This model is based on the theory of collective risk. The capital of the firm, a continuous variable, is subject to sudden jumps at the instant when orders are executed and to a continuing drain of costs, which is represented deterministically by an exponential decline. The steady state solution obtained from this process is, for large values of capital, identical with the Pareto law; for moderate values, the distribution has a mode and represents, albeit with some complications, a modification of the "first law of Laplace," which was proposed by Frechet (1939) for income distributions.
299
Size as a vector. It would be natural to measure the size of a firm by a vector, including employment, output, capital, etc., and apply the steady state concept to the joint distribution of several variables. Regression and correlation coefficients obtained in a cross section could then be regarded, like the Pareto coefficient, as characteristics of the steady state. It may be guessed that the growth of the number of firms will have an influence on these parameters as well. Practically no work has been done in this direction, but it is the only way to clear up the meaning of cross-section data and their relation to time series data and to the theoretical parameters of the underlying stochastic process. The situation in economics is totally unlike that in physics, where the processes are stationary and the ergodic law establishes the identity of time and phase averages. (Only the cosmogony of F. Hoyle, in which the continuous creation of matter offsets the expansion of the universe to establish a steady state of the cosmos, offers a parallel to the growth processes considered above.) The surprise expressed at one time at the difference in estimates of income elasticities from cross-section data and from time series data appears naive in this light because we could only expect them to be equal if the processes generating households, incomes, and consumption were stationary. But the population of households or the population of firms is not stationary. A cross section of firms shows the growth path of the firm through its different stages of evolution; but the number of firms of a given age depends on the past growth of the total number of firms, and this may influence the regression coefficient. Moreover, the growth path is not unique, because there are several processes superimposed upon one another (growth paths depending on age of firm, age of equipment, age of the management, etc.). For example, the short-run and long-run cost curves are inevitably mixed up in a cross section of firms. [See CROSSSECTION ANALYSIS.] How much "stability" and why. The starting point of the theories here reviewed is the stability of distributions, but stability must not be taken literally. The distributions do change in time, but the change is usually slow. The tail of the distribution of firms or, to a lesser extent, of wealth is composed of very old units, and time must pass before it can be affected by, for example, a change in new entry rates or in growth rates of firms. Thus, the reason for the quasi stability of distributions is that the stock of firms, etc., revolves only slowly. Indirectly this also accounts for the quasi stability of the distribution of incomes, because in-
300
SKILL, ACQUISITION OF
come is largely determined by wealth or its equivalent in the form of education. An even more enduring influence on the income distribution is the differentiation of skills and professions, which evolves slowly, as a secular process. The explanations advanced in this article do not exclude the possibility that distribution patterns may change abruptly—for example, as a consequence of taxation, in the case of net incomes; or as a consequence of a big merger movement, in the case of firms. JOSEF STEINDL [Directly related are the entries INCOME DISTRIBUTION, article on SIZE; RANK-SIZE RELATIONS.] BIBLIOGRAPHY
CHAMPERNOWNE, D. G. 1953 A Model of Income Distribution. Economic Journal 63:318-351. FRECHET, MAURICE 1939 Sur les formules de repartition des revenus. International Statistical Institute, Revue 7:32-38. GIBRAT, ROBERT 1931 Les inegalites economiques. Paris: Sirey. IJIRI, Yuji; and SIMON, HERBERT A. 1964 Business Firm Growth and Size. American Economic Review 54:77-89. KALECKI, MICHAEL 1945 On the Gibrat Distribution. Econometrica 13:161-170. MANSFIELD, EDWIN 1962 Entry, Gibrat's Law, Innovation, and the Growth of Firms. American Economic Review 52:1023-1051. RUTHERFORD, R. S. G. 1955 Income Distributions: A New Model. Econometrica 23:277-294. SIMON, HERBERT A. (1955) 1957 On a Class of Skew Distribution Functions. Pages 145-164 in Herbert A. Simon, Models of Man: Social and Rational. New York: Wiley. -> First published in Volume 42 of Biometrika. SIMON, HERBERT A.; and BONINI, CHARLES P. 1958 The Size Distribution of Business Firms. American Economic Review 48:607-617. STEINDL, JOSEF 1965 Random Processes and the Growth of Firms: A Study of the Pareto Law. London: Griffin; New York: Hafner. WOLD, H. O. A.; and WHITTLE, P. 1957 A Model Exploring the Pareto Distribution of Wealth. Econometrica 25:591-595. ZIPF, GEORGE K. 1949 Human Behavior and the Principle of Least Effort: An Introduction to Human Ecology. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.
SKILL, ACQUISITION OF See under LEARNING. SKIN SENSES AND KINESTHESIS The skin senses and kinesthesis (muscle and movement senses) present a difficult problem in sensory physiology—the problem of how information about several energies of the external world are signaled to the brain. Skin receptors are sensitive to thermal and mechanical stimulation, and mechan-
ical stimulation is detected in a variety of ways both by sense organs in cutaneous structures and deep, internal structures such as muscles, tendons, and joints. In varying degrees, deep receptors also detect the state of the tissues or the position of the body and limbs in space. At one time, it was thought that a single skin sense—so-called common sensibility—detected touch, pressure, warmth, cold, and pain. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, the concept of separate sensory modalities developed, based on the presumed existence of histologically distinct sets of sense organs for each cutaneous sense, of some separation of pathways in the spinal cord, and of specific endings in the cerebral cortex (see Boring 1942). The one concrete experimental datum was a spotlike, or punctiform, distribution of sensitivity, determined by exploring the skin millimeter by millimeter with different energies and finding different psychological responses—touch, warmth, cold—from different spots. This punctiform sensitivity seemed to demand specific anatomical endings. The histological specificity—various encapsulations of the neural terminals themselves —described by anatomists seemed to provide a structural correlate for several psychological and physiological findings. However, the search for a histologically distinctive receptor beneath a sensitive spot proved elusive. The minimum demanded is that this receptor be a sense organ that responds differentially or differently to various forms of energy. The traditional view is that a sense organ responds differentially to one energy or to one band of an energy spectrum (e.g., warmth and cold or frequencies of light waves) and analyzes an object in contact with the skin in terms of this energy or band of energy. Such a filter function is traditionally expressed by the concept of adequate stimulus or, better worded, differential sensitivity. Like all filters, the sense organ has a low threshold for one form of energy or for one band of frequencies within a given form of energy. An alternative view holds that sense organs are much alike in their range of sensitivity to a variety of energies but respond differently in some way ("frequency" or "pattern") to each energy, leaving the central nervous system to interpret the different responses and recognize the different energies (Weddell 1961). These points of view are caught in a crosscurrent of contradictory experimental findings. Receptors Since the mid-1950s, the point of view that receptors are alike in their range of sensitivities and
SKIN SENSES AND KINESTHESIS that discrimination of sensations is a joint function of receptor responses and processes in the central nervous system has received considerable support from evidence that there is little morphological differentiation of receptors in hairy skin, although hairy skin indisputably signals different modalities of sensation. While hairless skin (lips, fingertips, etc.) does contain specialized endings, it became gradually accepted, on the basis of Weddell's work (1961), that only two types of endings exist in hairy skin: fibers originating about the roots of hairs and fine, beaded, unmyelinated, or so-called free, nerve endings. Because the same modalities of sensation are experienced from stimulation of hairy and hairless skin, specificity or band-pass characteristics cannot then be attributed to any capsules or discs that are associated with the specialized nerve terminals in hairless skin. Anatomical studies have not disproved the functional specificity of the terminations; whatever specificity exists must, however, be on a subcellular or molecular basis, not visible with the light microscope and conventional stains. Actually, in slight contradiction of Weddell's broad generalization, there are several types of hair receptors having somewhat different discharge properties, but all are receptors for mechanical stimulation (mechanoreceptors). Also, the conspicuously encapsulated organ—the Pacinian corpuscle —-is found in the dermis and subcutaneous tissues. Iggo and Muir (1963) have discovered a morphologically specialized end organ that consists of a thickened epidermis covering several Merkel-type corpuscles, into which penetrate branches of a single thick myelinated axon. This spotlike receptor is also a mechanoreceptor. Deep in the skin and in muscles and tendons, there are encapsulated or otherwise specialized sense organs. Knowledge of sense-organ morphology is in a curious state because certain "classical" formations are now considered artifacts, but at least one new type has been discovered. Another plausible morphologically based generalization, now proved to be invalid, is that all free nerve endings are pain receptors and that their lack of capsule or morphological complexity accounts for the wide variety of energies that can elicit cutaneous pain—namely, mechanical, heat, cold, and chemical stimulation. Pass