International Encyclopedia of the
SOCIAL SCIENCES
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International Encyclopedia of the
SOCIAL SCIENCES
Associate Editors Heinz Eulau, Political Science Lloyd A. Fallers, Anthropology William H. Kruskal, Statistics Gardner Lindzey, Psychology Albert Rees, Economics Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Sociology Edward Shils, Social Thought
Special Editors Elinor G. Barber, Biographies John G. Barley, Applied Psychology Bert F. Hoselitz, Economic Development Clifford T. Morgan, Experimental Psychology Robert H. Strotz, Econometrics
Editorial Staff Marjorie A. Bassett, Economics P. G. Bock, Political Science Robert M. Coen, Econometrics J. M. B. Edwards, Sociology David S. Gochman, Psychology George Lowy, Bibliographies Judith M. Tanur, Statistics Judith M. Treistman, Anthropology
Alvin Johnson HONORARY EDITOR
W Allen Wallis CHAIRMAN, EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD
International Encyclopedia of the SOCIAL SCIENCES D A V I D L . S I L L S EDITOR
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COPYRIGHT © 1968 BY CROWELL COLLIER AND MACMILLAN, INC.
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LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOG NUMBER 68-10023
MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
International Encyclopedia of the SOCIAL SCIENCES
[ C O N T I N U E D ]
SANCTIONS Social control involves the process by which a group perpetuates its culture and system of social relations. In what has become an anthropological locus classicus, Radcliffe-Brown (1934) defined the sanction as a social reaction to a mode of behavior that was thereby approved or disapproved. In his view the concept is of primary significance to sociology because sanctions provide an effective instrument for regulating conduct in conformity with social usage. This formulation, however, seems to obscure a number of important points. RadcliffeBrown's argument clearly implies that the sanction, at least in one of its aspects, has a deterrent function. But if this object is to be achieved, logic demands that the sanction must precede the reaction: the sanction must already be in operation when a breach of norm occurs. It seems preferable therefore to define sanctions in terms of a promise of reward for fulfillment of the norms of behavior that are socially recognized and accepted, or in the liability to suffer the consequences that attend their breach. According to this view, the sanction is thus characterized by a quality of latency that is expressed most clearly, in the case of negative sanctions, in a general belief in the continuing likelihood of the execution of the threat. This implies two further properties of the sanction. A sanction cannot be arbitrary or ad hoc: its existence must be generally known, and it must be regular in its incidence. In fulfilling these conditions, the sanction serves not merely to deter; it also indicates the appropriate steps that may be taken to redress the situation when a norm has been infringed or to express approbation when it has been overfulfilled. The sanction is, of course, a concept of funda-
mental importance in jurisprudence and has played a paramount role in different legal theories. But there seems no good reason why its use should be restricted in this way. The legal sanction, manifested in the form of the penalties, remedies, and modes of redress of the law, represents only one particular means of enforcing conformity to norms and restating their validity when they are breached. Each group and subgroup within a society tends to develop its own distinctive pattern of usages and the means of maintaining them without necessary recourse to the municipal law. Sanctions therefore come to operate within every conceivable set of group relationships: they include not only the organized sanctions of the law but also the gossip of neighbors or the customs regulating norms of production that are spontaneously generated among workers on the factory floor. In small-scale communities, or within segments of a large-scale society, informal sanctions may become more drastic than the penalties provided for in the legal code. Thus the concept of sanctions is not merely of jurisprudential interest; it also has immediate sociological relevance to the analysis of the problem of social control. It will be apparent then that social control is achieved through no single mechanism. On the contrary, different principles and processes will frequently be found working together in any given situation. Accordingly, it is only by specifying the character of the sanctions present in the situation that one can isolate the different elements for analytical purposes and give them their proper weighting. The institution of law represents, of course, one major instrument of social control, and it is most usually marked off from other such agencies by virtue of the fact that its sanctions are
SANCTIONS imposed by politically organized society. As Seagle (1941) has observed, for example, it is the fact that the sanction is applied exclusively by organized political government that distinguishes the sphere of law from the spheres of religion, morals, and custom. The mechanism of sanction. The differentiation of the instruments of social control in stateless and state societies and in peasant communities and bands of hunting and gathering people has provided ground for controversy between jurists and anthropologists and among anthropologists themselves. Although their discussions have not always clarified the nature of law in different types of societies, they have been fruitful in opening up the broader sociological problem of social control. Malinowski's position as a pioneer in this field remains undisputed. Working in an island society that lacked any of the familiar machinery for the enactment, administration, and enforcement of law, Malinowski was led to seek elsewhere for the sources of social cohesion. He came to the conclusion that there was a class of rules "too practical to be backed up by religious sanctions, too burdensome to be left to mere goodwill." This constituted the Trobriand "civil law," the binding character of which lay in the sanctions of reciprocity and systematic incidence (Malinowski 1926). Later critics have pointed out that reciprocity is a concept of such wide generality that it cannot usefully serve to delineate the sphere of law. A curious feature of Malinowski's thinking on these matters is that, despite his emphasis on conflict, he appears not to have appreciated that just as the sanction implies the potential breach of norm, so much of law has to be concerned with what may be called the "pathology" of social relations. The emphasis on reciprocity has been important in deepening our understanding of why rules of behavior are accepted in so many areas of social life without the need to resort to formal mechanisms of redress. The question that remains unanswered is what happens when reciprocity breaks down and breach actually occurs. The point had been raised often enough, but it was left to Llewellyn and Hoebel (1941) in their now classic study of the Cheyenne to repair the defect and put the anthropological study of legal sanctions back on its proper path. In their succinct and expressive phrase, "the law has teeth": their procedure was to show that, even in societies lacking instituted juridical bodies, the investigation of instances of "hitch," dispute, grievance, and trouble led directly into the way in which physical coercion was organized. Pospisil (1958), on the basis of his work among
Kapauku Papuans, has suggested that too great an emphasis has been placed upon physical force in defining the character of the legal sanction, pointing out that cultures exist where physical sanctions are practically lacking. This introduces an unnecessary confusion. The crucial question is not the actual mode of coercion employed but recognition of the legitimate authority in which is vested the power of coercion. Such authority is certainly recognized among the Kapauku, although coercion may frequently be achieved by other than purely physical means. Where, in a society lacking developed forensic institutions, rules of conduct may be enforced through the powers of coercion vested in a legitimate authority, I propose to speak of jural rather than legal sanctions, indicating that here we are in the realm of ius, but not of lex. Jural sanctions. Once the criterion of legitimate coercion is adopted, it becomes apparent that primitive societies, lacking the formal machinery of the law, may yet display a remarkable range of sanctions that can be distinguished as jural. It has sometimes been claimed of many of the simplest societies that their social life is dominated by notions of the supernatural: there is a paucity of rules of law that is the reflex of the comprehensiveness of taboo. Such views, however, do not do justice to the facts. Thus it is reported of the Eskimo, for example, that persistent breach of taboo may be met by a shaman's decree of banishment. More strikingly, it is also reported that recidivist homicides may be dispatched by an individual acting at the request of the local community or with its compliance; this individual does not incur vengeance. Another interesting type of jural sanction was reported by Radcliffe-Brown in the Andaman Islands (1922). There, aggrieved persons were apparently able to vent their spleen by destroying any property they could lay their hands on, but unfortunately there are a number of points touching the operation of the sanction which the sources do not make very clear. It is possible that the Andamanese practice was somewhat similar to the custom of kamara reported from the Gazelle Peninsula of New Britain. Kamara took a number of variant forms, but essentially it was a device whereby a person who had suffered injury could damage or distrain the property of someone of acknowledged influence within the community. This individual was expected then to bring pressure on the offender to make retribution. But in general, within the range of primitive societies, the most common mode of redress for wrong is found to rest on the principle of self-help. In these circumstances, the legal initiative lies in-
SANCTIONS variably with the individual or group against whom a wrong has been committed. Yet the exacting of vengeance is not an arbitrary procedure. It has to be carried out according to certain rules and is undertaken only when morally supported by the community or because, indeed, it has been pressed upon individuals or groups by expressions of public approval or disapproval. The principle of self-help involves a point of considerable importance for the discussion of sanctions. This is what Nadel (1947) has called the social range of offenses, where the kind of sanction provoked depends upon the nature of the social units involved in the offense. Thus, in some societies if adultery or homicide occurs within the local lineage it may be regarded more as a sin than as a legal wrong, calling for ritual expiation rather than the application of jural sanctions. If, however, it involves members of different clans within a larger political unit, the offense may be met by a punitive raid or may have to be compounded by payment of compensation. In other words, it is not enough to regard a given sanction simply as the appropriate response to, or mode of redress for, any particular offense. Rather the sanction has to be viewed as it pertains to the set of social relationships involved in any given situation and at a particular moment in time. Failure to see the sanction in these terms can lead to misconceptions and to misguided hypotheses of an either/or character, as in attempts, for example, to correlate the importance of sorcery with the presence or absence of "superordinate justice" (Whiting 1950). Formulations of this kind pose a false dichotomy; they also miss the point that because each individual is the focus of a number of different social relationships, combining in his person a number of different roles, a variety of sanctions may attach to a single act of behavior. Thus, to take an example from our own society, a member of one of the professions who commits a serious breach of professional etiquette faces the possibility not only of prosecution in the courts, but also of being struck off the roll; he may also find that he has sacrificed his position as chairman of the local literary and philosophical society and that his wife and children have lost the good will of friends and neighbors. In other words, there is in all societies a coincidence of sanctions, some of a jural, some of a mystical or other character, all operating simultaneously toward the goal of achieving social control. Thus the problem that has to be faced is only partly the clear demarcation of one kind of sanction from another; more important is the need to classify and analyze the typical situations in which
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the different kinds of sanctions are provoked or achieve dominance. Analytic examples. Some progress in examining the social context of sanctions has been made by Turner (1957) in an analysis of the conflicts operating within the social system of the Ndembu of Northern Rhodesia. Among the various redressive mechanisms known to the Ndembu are informal arbitration, formal courts under the control of chiefs, and certain kinds of public ritual. Turner has suggested that jural machinery is likely to be invoked when a dispute is conducted in terms of an appeal to common norms, or, alternatively, when the dispute itself involves an appeal to different or opposed norms, but it can still be settled fairly easily because there exists "a common frame of values which organize a society's norms into a hierarchy." There are, however, other kinds of conflict, which have their source in the contradictions inherent in the social structure itself. For example, when the rules of nepotic and adelphic succession both operate within a matrilineal system, they tend to promote faction within local groups. If these conflicts are not effectively sealed off, they may lead to the disruption of the group. For disputes of this kind, usually sparked by the breach of some legal or customary norm, jural sanctions are likely to be inappropriate and ineffectual. A court of law, employing rational techniques of inquiry, hears the arguments of the various parties and on its reading of the evidence proceeds to allocate blame to one or the other of the disputants. Such a procedure cannot "relieve the quarrels so as to preserve the threatened relationships." This explains why it is that among the Ndembu and other peoples of the central African "matrilineal belt" so few cases arising out of disputes within the matrilineage come before the tribal courts. These indeed are the kinds of situations par excellence in which the sanctions associated with accusations of witchcraft and sorcery or the wrath of ancestral spirits are predominant and where group unity can be reaffirmed only by ritual means. So, too, in modern Western society the invocation of legal sanctions may be found inadequate for the handling of certain kinds of domestic disputes. A court of law, by concentrating on husband and wife as right-bearing and duty-bearing units, excludes itself from examining a close and complex relationship in its totality; the less rigid techniques of a marriage guidance council or other similar agency may have to be invoked if reconciliation of the parties is the end to be achieved. With the development of recognized courts, a new and important phase has been reached in the
4
SANCTIONS
eternal task of achieving social control. Once forensic institutions have been established, little comes to escape their purview, and there are few matters that may not be the subject of judicial scrutiny. Yet, perhaps for this very reason, it is important to remember, as the last eximple cited itself suggests, that adjudication ma) cover a range of different procedures. The distiiguishing criteria of a court appear to be that it is capable of enforcing the principle of jurisdiction aid that it is led to the apportionment of liability ty the rational assessment of the evidence and a'guments adduced before it. In many African societi<s, informal hearings before village elders and the letection of the causes of personal and natural misfortune by divination share certain of the characteristics of the judicial process, but clearly it would :>e a mistake to equate them with courts. Similarly, as Gluckman (1962) argues, it seems a mistake t) speak of the institutionalized song duels of the Eskimo as "juridical instruments" even though tiey do serve to settle disputes and restore norrral relations between estranged members of the community. It may be true that the result of the contest is a "judgment" in favor of one of the constants, but, so far as can be gathered from the Iterature, the mode of arriving at that judgment las little in common with a judicial process. Here a lack of clear analytical distinctions can blur the important sociological problem of why in different s)cieties, or in different ranges of relationship with'n the same society, different kinds of sanctions may be invoked for similar kinds of breach of n«rm. Nevertheless, the instanct of the Eskimo song encounter does direct attertion to a variety of sanctions occupying a borderland between the realms of law, morals, and tustom. The literature on the song contest does not nake clear how points are scored in the duel, nor does it indicate what part the spectators play in tlis connection. On the other hand, the fact that the tontestants are obliged to accept the taunts, jibes, aid accusations of their opponents without taking aff:ont suggests parallels with forms of licensed "joiing" familiar in the anthropological literature. There is, for example, the system of clan joking relationships described for the Plateau Tonga of Nortiern Rhodesia. Among the Tonga, the clans are th> only enduring units of social organization, and they are linked in a complex arrangement of jokng partnerships. The Tonga explain these relatiorships by reference to some antagonism between the animals from which the clans derive their names or to some legend of origin. Whenever members of such paired clans
meet, they tease one another and indulge in mutual abuse. Joking of this kind occurs in informal situations, but this, like the Eskimo song contests, which are conducted for pure entertainment, has to be seen as a necessary preparation of the stage, so to speak, for those more serious occasions when culturally licensed abuse may be employed as a public sanction. The jural unit of Tonga society is the matrilineal group, but there are many situations where this group is not free to act without destroying the very principle of lineage unity on which the social structure is built. Those who waste their kin's property or commit incest provide instances of this kind. Their offenses are, in a sense, jural wrongs; but they also touch questions of ultimate social morality. For the protection of the community, the sanction of public castigation and ridicule of the offender by his clan joking partner is invoked (Colson 1953). Institutions embracing the "joking" principle are widespread; and they are not confined to tribal societies. It appears that "youth groups" may perform a similar role in some of the rural communities of present-day Spain and Wales (see Peters 1967). Such groups, which initially establish their "irresponsibility" by playing childish pranks as part of their normal behavior, are on occasion able to express the outraged moral feelings of the community by playing offensive practical jokes on those who have offended but who cannot be readily reached by straightforward legal sanctions. These instances, incidentally, illustrate another important mechanism in the process of social control. This is the principle whereby the enforcement of the sanction is thrust upon a "stranger" to the group; it is used in situations involving the unity of the group rather than the claims of aggrieved individuals. Through the medium of the clan joking partners, or the youth group, who are strangers to the adult community by virtue of their customary infantile behavior, the fiction of group cohesion can be maintained and group norms reaffirmed. Function of integration. The importance of the sanction lies, then, as Radcliffe-Brown noted (1934), in its integrative function. The social system is made up of many different kinds of groupings, frequently based on different principles of social organization and serving different sets of interests. Associated with these groupings and with the different and sometimes conflicting sets of social relationships in which their members are involved, there is a wide range of social sanctions, at the back of which are the organized sanctions of the law, supported by the coercive authority of society. Even in those systems where "legal totali-
SANCTIONS, INTERNATIONAL tarianism" has been carried furthest, it is clear, as Lewin (1947) has documented with reference to South Africa, that social control is not achieved exclusively through the operation of the sanctions of the law. Faced with this problem, certain jurists have been led to postulate a "general habit of obedience" to explain why, everywhere in society, laws are more often obeyed than disobeyed. A sociological approach, on the other hand, would stress that the efficacy of law rests, in the final analysis, on the support it receives from the operation of nonlegal sanctions in the various domains of social life. We can see something of the way this process operates in some analyses of the judicial process in African tribal societies. Barotse judges, for example, had behind them the full power and authority of their nation as well as of the British colonial administration. In the handling of disputes, however, the sanctions of morality and custom and, indeed, the whole normative structure of the society are channeled into the judicial process itself. Litigants and judges alike appeal to, and couch their arguments in terms of, the same body of norms. When a man is condemned, it is usually because he has failed to measure up to the standards of behavior that he himself has invoked in his statements to the court (Gluckman 1955). It is, of course, patent that there are important differences between the judicial processes in African societies and those in modern Western societies. Unfortunately the classic studies of the judicial process in Anglo-American systems have concentrated on judicial reasoning in the upper levels of the juridical hierarchy or upon exposing the nonlegal influences that play upon the mind of the judge. What seems to be required for purposes of significant comparison is the more intensive sociological investigation of courts and other similar bodies at the lower levels of the hierarchy, in the context of the communities within which they operate. Such studies might prove to be very important in illuminating the way in which social norms and sanctions are brought into relationship with the legal system. A. L. EPSTEIN [Directly related are the entries JUDICIAL PROCESS; LAW; POLITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY.] BIBLIOGRAPHY BOHANNAN, PAUL 1957 Justice and Judgment Among the Tiv. Published for the International African Institute. Oxford Univ. Press. COLSON, ELIZABETH (1953) 1962 Clans and the Jokingrelationship Among the Plateau Tonga of Northern Rhodesia. Pages 66-83 in Elizabeth Colson, The Plateau Tonga of Northern Rhodesia. Manchester Univ.
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Press. -> First published in Kroeber Anthropological Society, Papers. GLUCKMAN, MAX 1955 The Judicial Process Among the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia. Manchester Univ. Press; Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. GLUCKMAN, MAX 1962 African Jurisprudence. Advancement of Science 18:439-454. GLUCKMAN, MAX 1965 Politics, Law and Ritual in Tribal Society. Oxford: Blackwell; Chicago: Aldine. HOEBEL, E. ADAMSON 1954 The Law of Primitive Man: A Study in Comparative Legal Dynamics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. LEWIN, JULIUS 1947 Studies in African Native Law. Cape Town: African Bookman; Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press. LLEWELLYN, KARL N.; and HOEBEL, E. A. 1941 The Cheyenne Way: Conflict and Case Law in Primitive Jurisprudence. Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press. MALINOWSKI, BRONISLAW (1926) 1961 Crime and Custom in Savage Society. London: Routledge. -» A paperback edition was published in 1959 by Littlefield. NADEL, SIEGFRIED F. 1947 The Nuba: An Anthropological Study of the Hill Tribes in Kordofan. Oxford Univ. Press. PETERS, E. L. 1967 Group Joking Relationships. Unpublished manuscript. POSPISIL, LEOPOLD 1958 Kapauku Papuans and Their Law. Yale University Publications in Anthropology, No. 54. New Haven: Yale Univ. RADCLIFFE-BROWN, A. R. (1922) 1948 The Andaman Islanders. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. RADCLIFFE-BROWN, A. R. 1934 Social Sanction. Volume 13, pages 531-534 in Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. New York: Macmillan. -» Reprinted in Radcliffe-Brown's Structure and Function in Primitive Society, published by Cohen and West in 1952. SEAGLE, WILLIAM (1941) 1946 The History of Law. 2d ed. New York: Tudor. -» First published as The Quest for Law. TURNER, V. W. 1957 Schism and Continuity in an African Society: A Study of Ndembu Village Life. Manchester Univ. Press. WHITING, BEATRICE B. 1950 Paiute Sorcery. Viking Fund Publications in Anthropology, No. 15. New York: Viking Fund.
SANCTIONS, INTERNATIONAL The term "sanction," in its widest sense, means "any measure taken in support of a social order regulating human behavior" (Kelsen 1957, p. 101). The purpose of a sanction is to bring about a behavior considered to be in conformity with the goals and standards of a society and to prevent that behavior which is inconsistent with these goals and standards. Consequently, in its widest sense, a sanction can have the objective of suppressing and terminating a particular form of undesirable behavior and the objective of deterring or discouraging such behavior in the future. The word "sanction" originated in Roman law, where it meant a penalty imposed upon a person who violates the law. The word continues to be used in this narrow
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SANCTIONS, INTERNATIONAL
sense, particularly in municipal law. In international relations, the term is customarily used in the wider sense. It is sometimes asserted, particularly with reference to Austin's definition of law, that international law is not law because it lacks the sanctions of municipal law. That there is a difference of degree is no doubt true, but what is often not recognized is that municipal law, like international law, is basically dependent upon custom and consent, while international law has sanctions comparable with those of municipal law, though admittedly weaker. The organization of sanctions in support of an international order faces a special difficulty not encountered within the state to anything like the same degree. This is the difficulty of enforcing standards against organized groups which, as states, make exclusive claims on governmental authority and on the loyalty and support of their citizens. Even within the state, constituted authorities experience difficulties in enforcing their decisions against organized groups such as trade unions and component political units, as witness the difficulties experienced by the organs of the federal government of the United States in enforcing their decisions against the states. Experience Customary international law has in the past admitted the right of states to take certain measures of self-help in support of their legal claims if it was not possible to achieve satisfaction by negotiation or third-party settlement. These measures included withdrawal of diplomatic representatives, acts of reprisal such as embargo and pacific blockade, display of force, landing of armed forces for purposes of protection of persons and property, and resort to war. Under agreements concluded to meet particular situations, special guarantees were accorded and the right of intervention admitted, as, for example, in the collective guarantee of Belgian neutrality (1839) and the United States guarantee of Cuban independence (1901). Under the Covenant of the League of Nations, the concept that peace should be maintained by the combined forces of peace-loving states was substituted for the principles of balance of power and self-help. "Resort to war" under denned conditions was prohibited. Provision was made under article 10 for joint guarantee of member states against external aggression and in article 16 for sweeping economic and financial sanctions to be applied "immediately" by every member against any state resorting to war in violation of its obligations under the Covenant. The Covenant provisions were seri-
ously weakened by resolutions adopted by the Assembly in 1921 that were intended to take account of the failure of the League to achieve universality. Military sanctions under the Covenant were optional on recommendation of the Council. No serious consideration was given to the application of the sanctions of article 16 until the mid-1930s. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 was not treated as a resort to war under the Covenant. The Assembly did, however, recommend to members that they withhold recognition of the fruits of Japan's military action, in line with the announced policy of the United States. This constituted a mild form of sanction, which had, however, no observable practical effect. In 1935, however, Italy's military invasion of Ethiopia was recognized by all except a small minority of members as an illegal resort to war, and limited economic and financial sanctions were applied. These were not adequate, however, to achieve the declared objective of frustrating Italy's military action, and leading members of the League were unwilling, for political reasons, to agree to measures that might have been effective. The Charter of the United Nations adopts a different approach to the problem of sanctions. Like the Covenant, its objective is limited to the maintenance of peace; the Charter prohibits any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state "or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations" (art. 2, paragraph 4). The sanctions envisaged, however, are not automatic, being left to the discretion of the Security Council. In cases of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression, it may take decisions requiring members to apply collective measures, including the severance of diplomatic relations, economic and financial nonintercourse, and "action by air, sea or land forces" (art. 42). But the taking of military measures is made dependent on the conclusion of agreements by which members undertake to place forces and facilities at the disposal of the Security Council (art. 43). In addition, a member against whom preventive or enforcement action has been taken may be suspended from "the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership" by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council (art. 5), and a member who has "persistently violated the Principles" contained in the Charter may be expelled in like manner (art. 6). The Charter does not confer upon the General Assembly any explicit powers with respect to the imposition of sanctions. It does give to the Assembly the general authority to discuss and make
SANCTIONS, INTERNATIONAL recommendations with respect to any matter within the scope of the Charter (art. 10). In United Nations practice, the Security Council has largely been prevented from using its powers to apply sanctions—its enforcement powers—by the inability of the permanent members to agree. In the early stages of its handling of the Palestine question (1948) it specifically invoked these powers and threatened to use them. In the Korean case, the Council, in the absence of the Soviet representative, recommended assistance to the Republic of Korea and, under this authorization, members took measures of the kind described in articles 41 and 42. More recently, in dealing with policies of racial discrimination by South Africa, the Security Council, by its resolution of December 4, 1963, called upon members to refrain from shipping arms and munitions to that country so long as it practiced this discrimination, which it found was "seriously disturbing international peace and security." The General Assembly, in the exercise of its broad powers under the Charter, has on numerous occasions recommended to members the adoption of various measures of a coercive nature to bring the conduct of particular states into line with standards set by the Charter, international law, and United Nations resolutions. Examples include such recommended measures as the withdrawal of heads of missions to Spain and its exclusion from UN conferences in order to eliminate the Franco regime (1946); an embargo on the shipment of arms and strategic materials in general to North Korea and Communist China to suppress their aggressive action (1951); and an embargo on export of arms and petroleum products to South Africa to achieve the termination of policies of racial discrimination (1963). The measures recommended by the General Assembly have had a range of purposes extending beyond the maintenance of international peace and security, to the implementation of obligations and policies in respect to self-determination and human rights. Provisions for the application of international sanctions are not limited to the constitutions of global international organizations. The Inter-American Treaty of Mutual Assistance, for example, provides that in case of aggression by an American state, the Organ of Consultation may decide that the other signatory states apply sanctions, including political, economic, financial, and military measures. Decisions may be taken by a vote of two-thirds and are binding, except that no member can be required to use military force against its will. In August 1960, the decision was taken to sever diplomatic relations and partially interrupt
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economic relations with the Dominican Republic because of its aggression against Venezuela. Evaluation Experience with organized international sanctions in support of international order has been limited and does not give much encouragement to those who believe in the efficacy of such arrangements. The League system of sanctions was a system of collective security which rested "upon the proposition that war can be prevented by the deterrent effect of overwhelming power upon states which are too rational to invite certain defeat" (Claude 1964, p. 228). It also assumed that an ethical and legal difference existed between military force used by a state to advance its national interests and the use of force by members of an international organization to restrain a state after it has been adjudged guilty of illegal use of force. This experiment was handicapped from the beginning by the League's lack of universality. The limited economic and financial sanctions imposed against Italy showed that international sanctions were technically feasible. The necessary machinery could be organized and decisions could be taken to permit sanctions to become operative promptly and with substantial impact on the transgressor. Their failure was due to political difficulties—the conflicting interests and purposes of the sanctioning powers and the unwillingness of some states to risk war to make sanctions effective. United Nations experience has not been encouraging either. Sanctions against Franco Spain were applied half-heartedly and were soon terminated. In the Korean case, the measures taken to assist the Republic of Korea and to defeat the aggressive actions of North Korea and Communist China were essentially United States measures dictated by United States policy considerations. The United Nations served as a useful framework to provide legitimacy and as a moderating influence. Measures recommended against South Africa to achieve fuller respect by that member for basic human rights have had little observable effect. What conclusions are to be drawn from this and other experience regarding the role of international sanctions in the implementation of international order? Statesmen and scholars have arrived at a variety of conclusions. One conclusion which appears to be widely held is that the theory of international sanctions, particularly as it involves the use of military force, is fallacious. According to this view, no effective pressure can be applied against a state except by another state, and consequently, an international
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SANCTIONS, INTERNATIONAL
order that depends on that form of pressure is a permanent source of conflict instead of a medium of order. As early as 1787 Hamilton wrote in The Federalist: "In an association where the general authority is confined to the collective bodies of the communities that compose it, every breach of the laws must involve a state of war; and military execution must become the only instrument of civil obedience" (No. 15). Another conclusion that has wide support is that forces of coercion which are effective when applied to individuals are not effective, at least not to the same degree, when applied to states. Even those forms which might be expected to be particularly effective, such as embargoes and blockades, may at least temporarily have the opposite effect. In the case of the economic sanctions against Italy, among the immediate effects was a strengthening of popular support for the regime. A view which is widely held by those who stress national interest as the motivating force in international relations is that international sanctions are unrealistic because they require a willingness to accept general commitments for situations which cannot be foreseen in detail and to carry them out under circumstances where the immediate national interest appears to dictate a different course. Thus, in the case of League sanctions against Italy, France was a reluctant participant because of her primary interest in having Italian support against Germany. Many members of the United Nations were reluctant to press sanctions against Communist China in 1950 and 1951 because of their greater concern at the time with the security of western Europe. A more optimistic and positive view regarding sanctions is that while experience to date may not have been encouraging, a system of organized sanctions in support of law and order is the only alternative to anarchy. Scholars and writers who take this view—Quincy Wright and Myres McDougal are examples—argue that our experience with sanctions as applied to organized groups is not so discouraging as is often contended, that sanctions have been effective in deterring undesirable conduct by states, and that with a fuller appreciation of the extent of the coincidence of particular and general interests in public order, sanctions can be expected to become more effective. Problems and prospects It is obvious that the organization and application of international sanctions in support of international order present difficulties that do not exist to the same degree in the case of sanctions in sup-
port of domestic order. With respect to international legal claims, states generally continue to rely upon good faith and reciprocity of interest in compliance, and upon retaliatory measures when these fail. It is primarily for the maintenance of peace and, to an increasing extent of late, for the implementation of certain human rights that organized sanctions are seriously considered. Much study has been given to the organization and application of collective sanctions to these ends, both by private scholars and by official groups. A group of members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs made a study of international sanctions in the light of the League experience of 1935-1936 (1938). During the period when the United Nations was engaged in supporting collective measures in Korea, the General Assembly, by its Uniting for Peace Resolution of November 3, 1950, established the Collective Measures Committee to study methods which might be used to strengthen international peace and security. In its report, published in 1951, it made detailed recommendations for the organization and application of collective measures (United Nations . . . 1951). The scope of the prohibition of the use or threat of force under the Charter, combined with the lack of any effective provision for the enforcement of legal rights, has led some scholars to take the view that unilateral use of force to secure respect for legal rights is permissible as a sanction consistent with "the Purposes of the United Nations" (Stone 1958, pp. 94-95). Others take the view that the Charter does not permit the individual use of force, without United Nations authorization, except as it can be justified as an exercise of the right of selfdefense in case of an armed attack. There is an extensive scholarly literature dealing particularly with the theory and legal aspects of international sanctions, but research and writing have thus far neglected the more practical aspects of the problem. While scholars have explored the legal, organizational, and administrative problems involved in the establishment and operation of a system of sanctions, and furthermore have analyzed the influence of the international political environment on a system of sanctions, relatively little attention has been given to the effects of sanctions upon the delinquent states as well as upon those states joining in their application. It is too readily assumed that the recalcitrant state can be coerced by material pressures into conforming to a desired mode of conduct or into ceasing an undesirable mode of conduct. We need to know more about the effect of sanctions upon the people of the state that is the object of sanctions, and the
SAPIR, EDWARD: Contributions to Cultural Anthropology processes by which that state, once its resistance is overcome, can be restored to good standing in the international community. Furthermore, while the problem of the unequal effects of sanctions upon those states applying them or expected to apply them is recognized, more study needs to be made of the extent of these inequalities and of procedures by which burdens will be more equally shared. It is clear that reluctance to participate in the application of sanctions has in large measure been due to unequal burdens and risks that states have been asked to assume. LELAND M. GOODRICH [See also ECONOMIC WARFARE; INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION; INTERNATIONAL LAW. Other relevant material may be found under INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION; INTERNATIONAL POLITICS;
WAR.] BIBLIOGRAPHY BRIERLY, J. L. 1931 Sanctions. Grotius Society, Transactions 17:67-82. CLAUDE, INIS L. 1964 Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization. 3d ed. New York: Random House. -* The first edition was published in 1956. GOODRICH, LELAND M.; and SIMONS, ANNE P. 1955 The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security. Washington: Brookings Institution. KELSEN, HANS 1957 Collective Security Under International Law. U.S. Naval War College, International Law Studies, Vol. 49. Washington: Government Printing Office. KUNZ, JOSEF L. 1960 Sanctions in International Law. American Journal of International Law 54:324-347. McDoucAL, MYRES S.; and FELICIANO, FLORENTINO P. 1961 Law and Minimum Worid Public Order: The Legal Regulation of International Coercion. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. NIEMEYER, GERHART 1941 Law Without Force: The Function of Politics in International Law. Princeton Univ. Press. ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1938 International Sanctions: A Report by a Group of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Oxford Univ. Press. STONE, JULIUS (1954) 1959 Legal Controls of International Conflict: A Treatise on the Dynamics of Disputes and War Law. 2d impression, rev., with supplement 1953-1958. New York: Holt. STONE, JULIUS 1958 Aggression and World Order: A Critique of United Nations Theories of Aggression. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. TAUBENFELD, RITA FALK; and TAUBENFELD, HOWARD J. 1964 The "Economic Weapon": The League and The United Nations. American Society of International Law, Proceedings [1964]: 183-205. UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY 1951 Report of the Collective Measures Committee. United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records Sixth Session, Supplement no. 13.
9
SAPIR, EDWARD i. CONTRIBUTIONS TO CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY David G. Mandelbaum ii. CONTRIBUTIONS TO LINGUISTICS Z. S. Harris
CONTRIBUTIONS TO CULTURAL
ANTHROPOLOGY
Edward Sapir (1884-1939) was one of the founders of modern linguistic anthropology, a main contributor to the development of formal descriptive linguistics, a leading figure in cultural anthropology, and a chief stimulator of studies in the relations between personality and culture. His ideas continue to excite lively interest; his writings are widely read; his one book, Language, and a volume of his papers have continuously been reprinted. The range of his ideas is great. They are founded on an extraordinary breadth of knowledge, which Sapir used with incisive power of thought and subtlety of analysis. He wrote poetry, literary essays, and music as well as scholarly works; all his writings are characterized by an unusual felicity of style. Sapir was born in Pomerania (Germany) and was five years old when his family emigrated to the United States. His intellectual gifts were recognized while he was a schoolboy in New York City. He was awarded scholarships to the Horace Mann School and then a Pulitzer fellowship to Columbia College, from which he was graduated in 1904. He went on to do a year of graduate work in Germanics at Columbia, and at that time his interest in language brought him into contact with Franz Boas. He quickly learned from Boas the great potentialities of the anthropological study of language, and from then on his principal work was in linguistic anthropology. [See the biography of BOAS.] In 1910 Sapir went to Ottawa as chief of the division of anthropology in the Geological Survey of Canada. His 15 years in that post gave him fine opportunities for field research and writing, but it was also a period of relative isolation from the main centers of anthropological work. He welcomed the invitation to join the department of anthropology at the University of Chicago, all the more because his wife had died after a long illness. He came to Chicago with his three children in 1925 and remained at the university for six years; his work and his influence flourished there. He was married again, to Jean McClenaghan, and they had two children. In 1931 he accepted a Sterling professorship at Yale and founded the department of anthropology there. His years at Yale were active and productive until he suffered a series of heart
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attacks in 1937, which ended his life two years later. Sapir's primary work was always in the study of language (his achievements in that field are discussed in the second section of this biography). His writings on other subjects, such as culture, society, and personality, were often done in response to a request for an article on a particular topic or as offshoots of his linguistic studies. Yet a good many of them have been major contributions which still command attention. These writings are of three main kinds—ethnological studies of American Indians, essays on general concepts, and papers on personality in culture and society. Ethnological studies. Sapir's ethnological contributions appeared in steady succession from his earliest writings to some that were published posthumously. Many were brief studies of the kind that provide the necessary groundwork for more general formulations, as the account of Takelma religion, or of a Nootka puberty ceremony, or of Sarsi pottery. In some, a large body of data is summarized and underlying principles demonstrated. For example, in "The Social Organization of the West Coast Tribes" (1915) Sapir showed how the idea of social ranking pervaded many aspects of these societies—how the emphases on inherited privileges and on ritual insignia were linked to that prevailing idea. When Robert Lowie wrote an appraisal of Sapir's work long after Sapir's death, he noted that Sapir was one of the very best of ethnographers—able to immerse himself in the phenomena under scrutiny, plumb them to the depths, and present them deftly and incisively (Letters From Edivard Sapir to Robert H. Lowie, p. 10). Sapir's most substantial contribution to ethnological theory is his monograph of 1916, "Time Perspective in Aboriginal American Culture: A Study in Method." A main objective of field research among American Indians at that time was understanding the actual processes of culture change as against the presumed universal processes, which had been postulated by nineteenthcentury evolutionists. In order to understand how American Indian cultures had actually changed, anthropologists had to reconstruct cultural histories. In this monograph Sapir surveyed the methods useful in such reconstructions; he particularly illuminated the use of inferential evidence, such as that from the study of cultural associations, geographic distributions, cultural strata, and from grammatical and lexical analyses. He presented the logical basis for evaluating different kinds of inferential evidence. The arguments are
closely reasoned; supporting evidence is compactly presented; broad concepts are tersely stated. It is a work that requires close study, and generations of graduate students studied it closely because it was for many years one of the major theoretical pieces on American Indian anthropology. Some of these students found that a single paragraph or even a sentence could open fruitful leads for their own research. In recent years, the shift of anthropological attention to peoples in other parts of the world and the development of interest in other theoretical approaches have lessened the importance of this work, but it held a leading place for some forty years. General concepts. Sapir's less technical, more general essays have had a wider audience; they have a way of including some ideas which appear, decades later, to be at the frontiers of thought. Thus, in "Culture, Genuine and Spurious" (1924), Sapir defined the anthropologist's characteristically objective view of a people's way of life and then went on to distinguish genuine and worthy cultures from spurious and morally shoddy ones. He valued those cultures that encourage harmonious and selfsatisfying lives for the people who live by them, whatever the level of technical achievement and efficiency. He decried those life styles, as of some modern industrial and service workers, in which a person finds little relationship or reciprocal gratification among his various roles and pursuits. This thesis, although strange to anthropology, was true to the intellectual temper of the time. Sapir's special touch is found not only in the evidence he selected and the telling way in which he presented it, but even more in the intriguing ideas he mentioned, as it were, in passing. Thus, he commented on the nexus of self and society, on the place of art in a genuine culture, on the cultural pressures generated by political forces. Of this last matter he wrote, "Our national-political units are too small for peace, too large for safety" ([1924] 1949, p. 330). There is a good deal in this essay that belongs to the 1920s, but there is also a good deal that holds interest still. Other essays clarify fundamental concepts and categories. In "The Meaning of Religion" (1928) Sapir took a subject which, in other hands, is often hackneyed; in his, the subject is treated freshly and lucidly, with proper anthropological objectivity and yet with sympathy. Here also he threw off a number of productive ideas, pointing out, for example, that a basic distinction among religions is exemplified by the contrast between Plains and Pueblo Indian practices. The two types tend to differ "according to whether they find the last court of appeal in mat-
SAPIR, EDWARD: Contributions to Cultural Anthropology ters religious, in the social act, or in the private emotional experience" ([1928] 1949, p. 350). The article "Anthropology and Sociology" (1927a) appeared as a chapter in a book on the social sciences and their interrelations. In it Sapir was not at all concerned with separating the two domains or negotiating boundaries between them. He concentrated instead on the ideas that anthropology can contribute toward an understanding of people and behavior. He began by noting that a main error of earlier theorists lay in taking primitive people to be archaic, unchanging prototypes. Sapir expressed the view that has now become accepted, that "we are to be at least as much interested in the many points of accord between primitive and sophisticated types of social organization as in their sensational differences" ([1927a] 1949, p. 336). These similarities, he continued, are not readily apparent from reconstructions of culture histories of American Indian tribes. It is rather from the "stupendous facts" about common human trends that sociologists will in the long run have most to learn from anthropology. The separate historical explanations are little more than a necessary clearing of the ground for a social interpretation; they are not to be mistaken for the interpretation itself. In his "Time Perspective" (1916) Sapir had provided a major theoretical foundation for the work of historical reconstruction, which then preoccupied most American ethnologists. In the article of 1927 he recognized the work he had done in 1916 as only a preliminary step toward the anthropologist's principal tasks. Another development of Sapir's thought appears in several of the articles he wrote for the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences: an emphasis on the relation between individual and society, between personality and culture. This emphasis arose partly because of Sapir's humanist feeling that the proper study of man must include real men and partly because of his realization that formal, nonpersonalized formulations about people can be very misleading unless they are coupled with insights into the real experience and reactions of actual persons. In the article "Group" (1932a), for example, Sapir sketched the essential definition and dimensions of the concept in his clear, succinct way. He outlined three types of classification based on objective observation and three based on subjective engagement of the participant. He noted the bases for group formation and changes, then posed the fundamental question of the bonds that hold together the members of a group. The psychological basis of the group, he observed, must rest on the psychology of specific social relations. Loyal-
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ties to an entire group do not mean that direct relationships between individual and individual have been completely transcended, but rather that the attributes of interpersonal experience have been transferred to the group as a whole. Thus the psychological realities of group participation can best be understood through studies of the actual kinds of understanding and expectation that grow up between two or more human beings when they are brought into significant contact. Culture and personality. Sapir's interest in the interplay of culture and personality dated from the beginning of his anthropological studies. "I remember being rather shocked than pleased," he wrote in a paper of 1938, "when in my student days I came across such statements in J. O. Dorsey's 'Omaha Sociology' as Two Crows denies this'" ([1938] 1949, p. 569). The paper is devoted to an assessment of Two Crows' denial and of what the anthropologist should make of it. Sapir found conventional ethnographic statements inadequate because they were generalized formulas which said little or nothing about variation, conflict, denial, or emotion. Even as a student Sapir recognized that such generalized formulations might be necessary but could not be sufficient for a thorough understanding of behavior. So Dorsey was ahead of his age in recognizing that he was not dealing with an abstracted society or a set of specimens but with a number of human beings who could give themselves the privilege of differing from each other on matters that were, in the conventional anthropological definition, part of the official tribal culture. Sapir was moved to point out the inadequacy of rigidly depersonalized studies in his response of 1917 to A. L. Kroeber's formulation of the concept of the superorganic. In "Do We Need a Superorganic?" he granted that few individuals, as individuals, make a marked impress on social movements, and yet it is always the individual who thinks and acts and dreams and revolts. The difference between social and individual data in behavior studies results from the observer's choice of what to select for systematic notice. Hence it is not valid to draw an abidingly sharp line between the two types of data, since "individual" reactions constantly spill over and give color to "social" reactions (1917, p. 442). This insistence on the significance of the person appears recurrently in Sapir's writings on culture and society. His paper "Speech as a Personality Trait" (1927b) is one instance of this theme; other expressions of it came in a series of papers written in the last decade of his life. In a paper of 1932 he restated the idea that
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the true locus of culture is in the interactions of specific individuals and in the meanings which the participants abstract from these interactions ([1932b] 1949, p. 515). And in an article of 1938 he proposed a research procedure that has only lately been appreciated. Instead of arguing from a supposed objectivity of culture to the problem of individual variation, Sapir recommended that for certain kinds of analyses we should operate as though we knew nothing about culture but were interested in ascertaining what a. set of human beings who are accustomed to live with each other actually think and do in their day-to-day relationships ([1938] 1949, p. 574). This simple discovery procedure, as it turned out, involves complex questions as to when and how it is to be used, but it can also lead to considerable advances in anthropological understanding. As for the interpretation of a particular sequence of behavior as being either social or personal, Sapir's paper of 1934 on this matter shows that the duality of reference is an inevitable part of human experience as well as of the social scientist's method. When one is confronted with familiar circumstances and familiar people, interest is likely to be focused on the individual. With unfamiliar people or situations, in socially distant or casual relations, one's interest is more likely to center on cultural or social observations. Each type of interest "is necessary for the psychic preservation of the individual in an environment which experience makes increasingly complex and unassimilable on its own simple terms" ([1934] 1949, p. 591). Every person must use both frames of reference in his own conduct. In the study of man the anthropologist must also use both, but with explicit awareness of what he is doing, and he must be able to deploy each in ways best suited for analysis and explanation. Sociology and anthropology, Sapir continued, are rooted in the social kind of reference, a kind which perhaps is characteristic of the child's earliest experience with the seemingly irresistible authority and knowledge of his parents. Psychiatry and social psychology proceed more from the personal kind of reference and from the necessity felt to assert oneself significantly. All these are "preliminary disciplines" and provide an invaluable first ordering of research. But sooner or later their obscure opposition of spirit must be transcended for an objectivity which is not merely formal and non-evaluative but which boldly essays to bring every cultural pattern back to the living context from which it has been abstracted in the
first place and, in parallel fashion, to bring every fact of personality formation back to its social matrix. ([1934] 1949, p. 592) For such purposes, the descriptions and classifications of abstracted culture patterns are no longer very relevant, useful as they are to clear the observational ground. The more anthropologists become concerned with interactional meanings and values rather than with segregated traits, Sapir commented, the more a culture seems to take on the characteristics of a personality organization, and the growth of culture is understood in the spirit of the development of a personality. Thus, such ethnological questions as that of clan membership may well become subsidiary to inquiries as to whether a father is in the habit of acting toward his son as an indulgent guide or as a disciplinarian. One result of taking this point of view is that the bizarre or exotic in alien cultures tends to be minimized, while the broad human base on which all culture has developed is revealed more clearly (ibid., pp. 594-595). Anthropologists who appreciate that a culture is not given in a neat package to the child, but is gropingly discovered and assimilated by him, and who can see that a people change their culture with similar groping assimilation, will join with psychologists in phrasing more fruitful questions about culture and behavior ([1932b] 1949, p. 521; [1934] 1949, p. 597). Influence. Sapir taught students of anthropology for only about a dozen years, but his influence on several generations of anthropologists and linguists has been considerable. Hearing him in lectures or discussions could be an exhilarating experience. He was not at all dramatic; his talk was low-keyed and anything but hortatory. But he could give his students glimpses of intellectual vistas the like of which they had neither seen before nor would soon forget. He came to differ with his teacher in anthropology, Franz Boas, on a number of fundamental matters, but Boas always maintained a high respect for Sapir's work. Colleagues and friends of his own generation showed how much they owed to his work by the formal honors they gave him during his life and by the appreciations they wrote after his death at age 56. Parts of his correspondence with two of his friends, Robert H. Lowie and Ruth Benedict, have been published (Lowie & Sapir 1965; Benedict 1959, pp. 45-54, 158-197). These letters between friends contain private banter, trade gossip, and transient comment. But they also tell something of the day-to-day context of Sapir's
SAPIR, EDWARD: Contributions to Linguistics life and work—for example, at one period in Chicago he was teaching as much as fourteen hours a week—and they reflect something of both the warm charm and the occasional friction in his personal relations. The letters to Lowie show Sapir in the course of developing ethnological and linguistic ideas, sometimes surely and swiftly, sometimes haltingly and piecemeal. Those to Ruth Benedict show his sharp insight into the world of poets and poetry, a world seemingly very far removed from the technical universe which he discussed with Lowie but actually interwoven in his personality and his work. In her account of Ruth Benedict's poetry, Margaret Mead has noted that "it was in the vivid, voluminous correspondence with Edward Sapir that her own poetic interest and capacity matured." And in another passage Margaret Mead mentions that among those who benefited most from Sapir's speculations about personality and culture were Ruth Benedict, John Dollard, and herself (Benedict 1959, pp. 90, 209). The memorial volume for him written by some of his students (Language, Culture, and Personality 1941) was reprinted in 1960. In the generation of the students of his students, there is not only quite lively interest in what Sapir had to say, but also a good many who are urging their students to read Sapir. Sapir's death cut short a number of scholarly enterprises, among them the analysis of a large collection of American Indian ethnological data, extensive explorations in Indo-European linguistics, preliminary formulations of linguistic relationships on the largest scale, and extensive ethnological and linguistic notes in Semi tics. Toward the end of his life he turned increasingly to Semitic studies. His father had been a cantor, and he had been raised in the strict tradition of Orthodox Judaism. Although he soon discarded what he felt to be the intolerable restrictions of orthodoxy, he retained his delight in the scholarship and spirit of Judaism. His strong commitment to human rights, opposing all invidious discrimination and oppression, appears in his writing, especially in articles done for general audiences. As the grave world events of the 1930s developed, he participated actively in the defense of these rights. The weight of his scholarly influence is in linguistic anthropology, where the weight of his published contributions also lies. In American Indian ethnology his ideas on method and leads for further research have had notable effect. In the field of culture-personality studies he remains one of the principal pathfinders. For anthropology in gen-
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eral he continues to be a heartening example of how much can be accomplished when a superb mind plays over a wide and richly yielding field. DAVID G. MANDELBAUM [See also ANTHROPOLOGY; COMMUNICATION; CULTURE, article on THE CONCEPT OF CULTURE; INDIANS, NORTH AMERICAN.] BIBLIOGRAPHY The bibliography for this article is combined with the bibliography of the article that follows. II CONTRIBUTIONS TO LINGUISTICS
Sapir was, with Leonard Bloomfield, a founder of formal descriptive linguistics and the distributional method that characterizes it. He developed phonemic theory, the analysis of the sounds of a language according to the pattern of their distribution—that is, the sequence in which sounds occur and are systematized and perceived by the speakers of the language. Phonemic analysis thus recognizes language as behavior resulting from a process of selection. This method of analysis classifies each part of an utterance (sound, morpheme, etc.) on the basis of its environment rather than on the basis of its meaning, phonetic properties, and so forth. The distributional method is important not only because it is self-contained but also because its universe and its terms of reference are so explicit that one can discover all sorts of hidden relations that are observable only as second-order disturbances in the overt distributional system: masked and combined phonemes, neutralized phonemic differences, zeroed morphemes, and the like. To be sure, Sapir did not always formulate aberrant phenomena in distributional terms; he sometimes used formulations drawn from biological processes. While this reduced the incisiveness and generality of the distributional theory he was developing, it did indicate some of the other systemic factors (factors of equilibrium, of dynamics, etc.) that may be required to understand the sources of aberrant phenomena or of the place these phenomena occupy in the descriptive system. These additional factors may even aid ultimately in understanding the source of the system itself. Thus Sapir might say that if, in a given language, a two-vowel sequence never occurs inside a morpheme and only rarely occurs when two morphemes adjoin each other in a word, the language will develop a "protective mechanism" to avoid the two-vowel sequence. Examples of such
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mechanisms are the glottal stop and the French liaison t. Distributional methods came to be widely used in the formulation of linguistic process. Phonemic phenomena were regarded as processes of change (for example, "suppletion," or the replacement of stems in certain word groups, e.g., in am, is, be} that are structural and thus related to the environment in which they occur. Sapir was also one of the originators of the concept of the morphophoneme. The morphophoneme classifies together all those phonemes that replace each other in the paradigm-—that is, the different phonemic shapes that a word or morpheme has as it occurs in different morphemic environments. This concept was also based partly on the speaker's perception of phonemic replacement (Sapir 1933; Sapir & Swadesh 1939). Sapir also did much work in historical and comparative linguistics, tracing the genetic relationships among languages. His interest in pattern and process led him to speak of configurational pressure as a source of change. By configurational pressure he meant that linguistic change (phonemic and morphemic) is influenced by relevant patterns inherent in the language itself. He suggested that configurational pressure is a factor in what he called drift, the process that occurs in a language whose speakers have separated and can no longer imitate ("borrow from") each other, but whose linguistic habits continue in some respects to change in the same way in the separated communities (e.g., Old Norse in Denmark and Iceland). Although this suggestion has not received sufficient study, it does accord with systematizations of linguistic change. In historical linguistics Sapir is particularly noted for a series of intricate analyses of the earliest stages of Indo-European. He based his work partly on the difficult data from Tocharian and partly on the laryngeal hypothesis that reconstructed various laryngeal consonants lost in early Indo-European with consequent changes in neighboring vowels (1937a; 1937b; 1939). Related to this work were his investigations of the similarities and connections of Indo-European to Semitic and other Mediterranean languages. Sapir thought that Indo-European and Semitic might have descended from the same parent stock. Although it was impossible to establish this hypothesis by reconstructions using the accepted comparative method, he could point to many unexpected connections and to a great over-all structural similarity in the earliest stages of both Indo-European and Semitic. Sapir worked with examples of structural simi-
larity in his famous attempt to group the extremely numerous and apparently unrelated families of North American Indian languages into six superfamilies (1929). Most of Sapir's linguistic work (like his ethnological studies) was with American Indians, and his mastery of the data and his analyses of the Indian languages were unequaled. He worked particularly in Navajo, Yana, Nootka, Tlingit, Sarsi, Kutchin, Chinook, Ingalik, Hupa, and Southern Paiute. Z. S. HARRIS [See also LANGUAGE; LINGUISTICS, article on THE FIELD; and the biographies of BLOOMFIELD; SAUSSURE; WHORF.]
WORKS BY SAPIR (1915) 1949 The Social Organization of the West Coast Tribes. Pages 468-487 in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. (1916) 1949 Time Perspective in Aboriginal American Culture: A Study in Method. Pages 389-462 in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press 1917 Do We Need a Superorganic? American Anthropologist New Series 19:441-447. 1921 Language: An Introduction to the Study of Speech. New York: Harcourt. (1924) 1949 Culture, Genuine and Spurious. Pages SOSSSI in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. (1927a) 1949 Anthropology and Sociology. Pages 332345 in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. (1927b) 1949 Speech as a Personality Trait. Pages 533543 in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. (1928) 1949 The Meaning of Religion. Pages 346-356 in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. (1929) 1949 Central and North American Languages. Pages 169-178 in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. (1932a) 1949 Group. Pages 357-364 in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. -> First published in Volume 7 of the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. Sapir also wrote the Encyclopaedia articles "Communication," "Custom," "Dialect," "Fashion," "Language," "Personality," and "Symbolism." (1932&) 1949 Cultural Anthropology and Psychiatry. Pages 509-521 in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. 1933 La realite psychologique des phonemes. Journal de psychologie normale et pathologique 30:247-265. (1934) 1949 The Emergence of the Concept of Personality in a Study of Cultures. Pages 590-597 in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. (1937a) 1949 Hebrew "Helmet": A Loanword and Its Bearing on Indo-European Phonology. Pages 285-288
SARTON, GEORGE in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. (1937b) 1949 [A Book Review of] The Ras Shamra Mythological Texts, by James A. Montgomery and Zellig Harris. Pages 289-293 in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. (1938) 1949 Why Cultural Anthropology Needs the Psychiatrist. Pages 569-577 in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. (1939) 1949 From Sapir's Desk: Indo-European Prevocalic s in Macedonian and The Indo-European Words for "Tear." Pages 294-302 in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. 1939 SAPIR, EDWARD; and SWADESH, MORRIS Nootka Texts: Tales and Ethnological Narratives With Grammatical Notes and Lexical Materials. Philadelphia: Linguistic Society of America. Letters From Edward Sapir to Robert H. Lowie. With an introduction and notes by Robert H. Lowie. Privately published, 1965. Selected Writings of Edward Sapir in Language, Culture, and Personality. Edited by David G, Mandelbaum. Berkeley: University of' California Press, 1949. -» Includes a chronologically arranged bibliography of Sapir's writings, SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BENEDICT, RUTH 1959 An Anthropologist at Work: Writings of Ruth Benedict, by Margaret Mead. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. -> A selection of Benedict's writings, with extensive commentary by Margaret Mead. [Bibliography: Edward Sapir.] 1938 Psychiatry 1:154157. HARRIS, Z. S. 1951 [A Book Review of] Selected Writings of Edward Sapir in Language, Culture, and Personality. Language 27:288-333. Language, Culture, and Personality: Essays in Memory of Edward Sapir. Edited by Leslie A. Spier, A. Irving Hallowell, and Stanley S. Newman. (1941) 1960 Salt Lake City: Univ. of Utah Press. PRESTON, RICHARD J. 1966 Edward Sapir's Anthropology: Style, Structure, and Method. American Anthropologist New Series 68:1105-1128.
SARTON, GEORGE George Sarton, historian of science, was born in Ghent, Belgium, in 1884 and died in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 1956. He married Eleanor Mabel Elwes, an English artist, in 1911; their daughter, May, who became a poet and novelist, was born in 1912. As a youth Sarton wrote romantic poems and essays. At the University of Ghent he studied the natural sciences and mathematics, winning a medal for a chemical memoir in 1908 and completing a doctoral dissertation on Newton's mechanics in 1911. He became increasingly interested in the history and philosophy of science and dedicated the rest
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of his life to establishing the history of science as an independent discipline. In 1912 he founded Isis, a scholarly journal for this new field, and continued to be its editor through 1952. After only five issues, publication was interrupted by World War i, but it was resumed in 1919. Meanwhile Sarton had fled Belgium and moved to the United States in 1915. As a research associate of the Carnegie Institution, from 1918 on, he used Harvard's Widener Library and offered a course in the history of science at Harvard, where he became a professor in 1940. The History of Science Society was formed in the United States in 1924; it provided a professional organization for the new discipline and guaranteed the publication of Isis. Isis has published a continuous series of valuable critical bibliographies; the first 79 of these were prepared by Sarton himself. Osiris was founded in 1936 to accommodate studies that were too long for Isis but too short for separate publication. When Sarton was invited, in 1916, to deliver the Lowell lectures, he chose Leonardo da Vinci as his subject. On this occasion he was struck with how little was known about ancient and medieval science leading up to Leonardo, and he decided that a comprehensive history needed to be written. In 1919 he recovered his notes and a good part of his library, which he had had to abandon in Belgium, and two years later he began to write his Introduction to the History of Science (1927-1948). Ultitimately, Sarton did not take this history beyond the fourteenth century; he realized how much time would be required to handle the fifteenth century on the same scale as the earlier centuries and preferred to spend his remaining years on more limited subjects; for example, he wrote A Guide to the History of Science (1952a), The Appreciation of Ancient and Medieval Science During the Renaissance (1955), and Six Wings: Men of Science in the Renaissance (1957). His aim in writing the history of science was not only to establish and define that field of study but also to show its importance for the philosophy of science and for any positive philosophy. Sarton called science "systematized positive knowledge," picturing it as a living, continually developing organism. He maintained that science is the only cumulative and progressive human activity and that the study of the history of mankind must focus on the history of science; any tolerably complete history of civilization must devote considerable space to explaining scientific progress. He believed that the historian of science has a mission to defend the traditions of science, not because they differ essentially from those of other fields, but
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because "they are all that makes life worth living, they are the nobility and the goodness of life" (1952a, p. 15). For Sarton, science has grown "out of the minds and hearts of living men" (1954, p. 67), and its history is therefore often best written in terms of biography. He did not limit his account to the achievements of outstanding scientists, because he found that a number of smaller discoveries usually contributed to the gradual preparation of major ones. He warned that the history of science must not be confused with the history of scientific method, nor be approached from the economic point of view, which overemphasizes applications. Influenced by Comte and Tannery, Sarton repeatedly emphasized that the history of science is the integration of the histories of the separate sciences, not their summation; it is itself a specialty built on a thorough understanding of the methods of science and of history; it covers ancient, medieval, and modern science; and it requires more than the leisure hours of capable scientists or of scholarly historians. The historian of science must be trained in science; indeed, he should be acquainted with all advancing knowledge, not just scientific and historical material. Moreover, Western science cannot be properly understood without an appreciation of the extent of the influence of Islam on Western civilization, and Sarton learned Arabic in order to comprehend this influence. Sarton's history of science, an all-embracing picture of the impact of scientific progress on mankind and of man's environment on science, tells "not only of the spreading light but also of the contracting darkness" (1952a, p. 11). Sarton saw the history of science as a means of understanding science and making it live—creating a philosophy of science that would have continuing validity. He combated the tendency of scientific studies to supplant humanistic ones. He strove to "humanize" science, to reveal its integration with the other elements of our culture, and to instill in scientists some reverence of the past and some awareness of the relevance of the history of science for science as an ongoing activity. The history of science seemed to him the only possible bridge across a growing abyss. Warm and subtly humorous, Sarton made friends throughout the world. He was tireless in his own work and expected similar patience and critical attitudes from others. Sometimes his genuine humility seemed like self-righteousness (e.g., [1931] 1956, p. 109). His lecture courses were popular, but he had few graduate students.
A new generation of historians of science, while appreciative of Sarton's pioneering service, is reassessing his aims and methods. Present-day emphasis is on the structure and development of scientific ideas rather than on the ideas themselves. Sarton has been described as naive about history (Williams 1960, p. 160) and insufficiently selective in his methods, too lost in pedantic minutiae to appreciate their relevance for the overall development. He has been accused by some of stressing the content of science at the expense of its integration into a complex whole. On the other hand, Sarton's interpretation of the history of science is alleged to be incompatible with the compartmentalism of modern science and to stress the cultural framework and the normative implications of science at the expense of its content (Grmek 1965, pp. 140-143). Grmek questioned whether one man can handle the history of science if it is interpreted as broadly as it was by Sarton, but he admitted that collaborative studies by teams of specialists have gained technical insight at the expense of the kind of synthesis that Sarton provided. Clearly, Sarton's critics are in disagreement. However, the monumental scholarly edifice he erected can become a basis for a revision of the historiography of science. C. DORIS HELLMAN [See also SCIENCE, article on THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE.] WORKS BY SARTON
1927-1948 Introduction to the History of Science. 3 vols. Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins. (1931) 1956 The History of Science and the New Humanism. 3d ed. New York: Braziller. -» A paperback edition was published in 1962 by the Indiana University Press. 1952a A Guide to the History of Science: A First Guide for the Study of the History of Science, With Introductroy Essays on Science and Tradition. New York: Ronald Press. 1952fo A History of Science: Ancient Science Through the Golden Age of Greece. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. 1954 The Old World and the New Humanism. Pages 6368 in Man's Right to Knowledge; First Series: Tradition and Change. New York: Muschel. 1955 The Appreciation of Ancient and Medieval Science During the Renaissance (1450-1600). Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press. 1957 Six Wings: Men of Science in the Renaissance. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press. -> Published posthumously. 1959 A History of Science: Hellenistic Science and Culture in the Last Three Centuries B.C. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. On the History of Science: Essays. Selected and edited by Dorothy Stimson. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1962.
SAUER, CARL O. SUPPLEMENTARY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
AGASSI, JOSEPH 1963 Towards an Historiography of Science. History and Theory, Beiheft 2. The Hague: Mouton. BUCHDAHL, GERD 1965 A Revolution in Historiography of Science. History of Science 4:55-69. The George Sarton Memorial Issue. 1957 Isis 48, part 3. GRMEK, MIRKO D. 1965 Prolegomenes a une histoire generale des sciences. Annales: Economies, societes, civilisations 20:138-146. HELLMAN, C. DORIS 1958 George Sarton: Historian of Science and New Humanist. Science 128:641-644. KUHN, THOMAS S. 1962 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Univ. of Chicago Press. -» A paperback edition was published in 1964. STRELSKY, KATHARINE 1957 Bibliography of the Publications of George Sarton. Isis 48:336-350. WILLIAMS, L. PEARCE 1960 [A Book Review of] A History of Science, Vol. 2, by George Sarton. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 11:159-161.
SAUER, CARL O. Carl O. Sauer, for more than thirty years chairman of the department of geography at the University of California, Berkeley, is one of the most influential figures in twentieth-century geography. The study of cultural geography, especially as it has developed in the United States, owes more to Sauer than to any other man. His concern for the quality of human life in its physical setting, for historical and ecological processes, and for the origins and dispersals of culture traits and complexes that have modified the cultural landscape is in the tradition of German geographical thought, of which Sauer has been a principal interpreter. Born of German ancestry in Warrenton, Missouri, in 1889, he graduated from the local and now defunct Central Wesleyan College in 1908, having earlier studied for a time in a school in Wiirttemberg, Germany, where he had family ties. His attachment to the rural and small-town ways of life and landscape of the Middle West of that period has played an important role in his teaching and writing, and he has frequently returned there for study and reflection. Sauer next studied at the University of Chicago, where the first full-fledged graduate program in geography in the United States had recently been instituted. His PH.D. dissertation, The Geography of the Ozark Highland of Missouri (1920), was acclaimed as a model of regional cultural geography. In 1915 he was appointed to the staff of the new department of geology and geography at the University of Michigan, where in a period of seven years he advanced from the rank of instructor to that of full professor. His work in designing the
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Michigan Land Economic Survey brought him national recognition. He left Ann Arbor in 1923, at the age of 33, to become chairman of the department of geography at Berkeley. Sauer retired from active teaching in 1957, except for occasional graduate seminars and guest lectureships, but his scholarly output has been undiminished. Sauer also served the development of geography outside the university. He played an important role in the early development of land-use mapping in the United States and in the establishment of the U.S. Soil Conservation Service. For a time in the 1930s he was consultant to the President's Science Advisory Board. For many years he served as a member of the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation selection committee, in which capacity he had a unique opportunity to observe and influence a wide range of American scholarship. He has received honorary degrees from Heidelberg University, Syracuse University, and the University of California and medals from the American Geographical Society, the Berlin Geographical Society, and the Swedish Society for Anthropology and Geography. Soon after Sauer came to California, he and many of his students turned their attention to northern Mexico, especially to the historical geography of the settlement of the dry northwestern part. Later he was to concern himself increasingly with tropical Mexico and Central America and, finally, with the Caribbean. Latin America was thus the strategic site for his observation of the interaction between the simpler, peasant cultures and the sustaining earth. Here, where the mark of the past is so deeply imprinted on the land, he found an especially congenial atmosphere for the study of the interplay between habitat and habitant. His careful reconstructions of past Latin American landscapes and economies, based on a combination of archival work and detailed field inspection, are models of historical geography. The Early Spanish Main (1966), an analysis of the Spanish conquest on the islands of the Caribbean and its margins, is their capstone. Several of his publications on Latin American subjects appeared in the University of California monograph series Ibero-American a, which he founded in 1932 with A. L. Kroeber. Sauer's outspoken rejection of environmental "influences" as the focus of geographical inquiry, enunciated in his Morphology of Landscape (1925), was a critical turning point in the development of American academic geography. Instead of the deterministic view that had largely dominated Ameri-
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can geography since the turn of the century, he advocated geographical inquiry into such themes as the man-modified landscape and the origin, spread, limits, and alteration of the elements of that landscape. Holding that all geography is essentially historical, he systematically used any kind of data pertaining to human settlement and activity, and he often found archeological evidence fully as pertinent as written documents. For him the kitchen midden, the colonial archive, the relict plant community or soil profile, and the wisdom of the countryman at work on his hillside garden patch provided information equally relevant to the problems of cultural geography. A recurring theme in Sauer's work is the tremendous importance and antiquity of the domestication of plants and animals. In Agricultural Origins and Dispersals (1952a), he summarized his efforts to locate the principal hearths of domestication and the subsequent routes and extent of* dispersal. Using archeological and ethnographic evidence, Sauer argued that the origins of cultivation must have been in the woodlands rather than in riverine valleys of the world. He made a basic distinction between the agricultural complexes of monsoon Asia and northwestern South America, which are largely dependent on vegetative reproduction by slips and cuttings, and the seed cultures of southwest Asia and of Mexico and Central America. Sauer hypothesized that the earliest form of plant selection involved asexual plant propagation and that it was probably first practiced by the sedentary fishing peoples living around the shallow seas of southeast Asia. The early domestic animals of these peoples were household animals such as the dog, pig, and chicken. Sauer accepted the view that plant selection by seed reproduction came later, and he was influenced by N. I. Vavilov in pointing to China, India, and Ethiopia as Old World centers of seed domestication. He associated herd animals with cereal cultivation and accepted Eduard Harm's theory of a mixed economy in which milking of animals was a culture trait integrally involved in the process and purpose of their domestication, probably for noneconomic ends. His research along these lines has especially attracted the attention of anthropologists and archeologists. Many of his speculations regarding the antiquity of man in the New World, Pleistocene ecology, and the relation of changing sea levels and shore configurations to human occupation sites continue to stimulate new research. Sauer has insisted on the close links of cultural geography with both biology and the earth sciences. He sees man as the ecologic dominant in nature,
intervening more and more decisively to change the balance and nature of organic life. He has, for example, insisted that the problems of increasing world-wide desiccation are caused by agricultural and grazing practices and not by "climate deterioration." He has repeatedly written about the historical processes of biotic destruction and soil depletion as reflections of changing technology and changing attitudes about the earth. Another theme in his writings has been the role of fire, especially of fires set by man, in the modification of the vegetative covering of the earth and the establishment of grasslands. He was the principal organizer of an international symposium held at Princeton in 1955 that focused on "Man's Role in Changing the Face of the Earth" (1956a). Sauer has viewed with misgivings the growing emphasis of some of his colleagues on techniques and tools of analysis that produce quantitative results: he has insisted that the qualities of both human society and the man-made landscape are often other than those that permit quantitative processing (1952b). Leighly has observed that to Sauer the investigation of human beings and their behavior by mechanical processes of organization and computation is as repugnant as the environmental determinism he rejected years earlier (see the introduction by Leighly, to Sauer's Land and Life, p. 6). Human geography, Sauer has said, exists because of the diversification that exists in human ways, and no approach to its questions is more rewarding than that of comparative culture history, soundly based on ecological and geographical principles and concepts. JAMES J. PARSONS [See also DOMESTICATION; ECOLOGY; GEOGRAPHY, especially the articles on CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY and SOCIAL GEOGRAPHY.] WORKS BY SAUER
1920 The Geography of the Ozark Highland of Missouri. Geographic Society of Chicago, Bulletin No. 7. Univ. of Chicago Press. 1925 The Morphology of Landscape. University of California Publications in Geography, Vol. 2, No. 2. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. 1932 The Road to Cibola. Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press. 1935 Aboriginal Population of Northwestern Mexico. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. 1938 Theme of Plant and Animal Destruction in Economic History. Journal of Farm Economics 20:765775. 1941 Foreword to Historical Geography. Association of American Geographers, Annals 31:1-24. 1948a Colima of New Spain in the Sixteenth Century. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.
SAUSSURE, FERDINAND DE 1948& Environment and Culture During the Last Deglaciation. American Philosophical Society, Proceedings 92:65-77. 1950 Grassland Climax, Fire, and Man. Journal of Range Management 3:16-21. 1952a Agricultural Origins and Dispersals. New York: American Geographical Society. 1952& Folkways of Social Science. Pages 100-109 in Minnesota, University of, Social Science Research Center, The Social Sciences at Mid-century. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press. 1956a The Agency of Man on the Earth. Pages 49-69 in International Symposium on Man's Role in Changing the Face of the Earth, Princeton, N.J., 1955, Man's Role in Changing the Face of the Earth. Univ. of Chicago Press. 1956& The Education of a Geographer. Association of American Geographers, Annals 46:287-299. 1957 The End of the Ice Age and Its Witnesses. Geographical Review 47:29-43. 1958 Man in the Ecology of Tropical America. Pages 104-110 in Pacific Science Congress, Ninth, Bangkok, 1957, Proceedings. Volume 20: Special Symposium on Climate, Vegetation, and Rational Land Utilization in the Humid Tropics. Bangkok: The Secretariat. 1962a Homestead and Community on the Middle Border. Landscape: Magazine of Human Geography 12, no. 1:3-7. 1962i> Seashore—Primitive Home of Man? American Philosophical Society, Proceedings. 106:41-47. 1966 The Early Spanish Main. Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press. Land and Life: A Selection from the Writings of Carl Ortwin Sauer. Edited by John Leighly. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1963. SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY HAHN, EDUARD 1896 Die Haustiere und ihre Beziehungen zur Wirtschaft des Menschen: Eine geographische Studie. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. HAHN, EDUARD 1909 Die Entstehung der Pflugkultur. Heidelberg (Germany): Winter. HAHN, EDUARD (1914) 1919 Von der Hacke zum Pflug. 2d ed. Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer.
SAUSSURE, FERDINAND DE Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913), Swiss linguist, was the chief forerunner of structural linguistics. He was born in Geneva, where he received his secondary and university education. He was awarded his doctorate at Leipzig in 1880, taught at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes in Paris from 1881 to 1891, and taught subsequently at Geneva for the remainder of his career. De Saussure's fame rests almost exclusively on two works—his earliest, the Memoire sur le systeme primitif des voyelles dans les langues indoeuropeennes (1879), and the posthumously published Cours de linguistique generale (1916). The Memoire is a brilliant tour de force, whose basic method foreshadows the fundamental structuralist notion of language as an organized system, the
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central doctrine of de Saussure's mature thought. [See LINGUISTICS, article on THE FIELD.] In the Memoire it is boldly hypothesized that certain apparently divergent aspects of the IndoEuropean system of vowel alternations (the socalled ablaut system, which still survives in English in such vowel changes as the present sing, the preterite sang, the past participle simg) can be explained in accordance with the dominant regularities, if one assumes that certain sounds had formerly existed and produced certain effects before being lost. While this theory of lost sounds, subsequently called laryngeals, was admired in de Saussure's lifetime, the absence of any direct evidence for these sounds prevented its acceptance by scholars. After de Saussure's death the main points of his doctrine regarding the Indo-European vowels received confirmation when a newly discovered Indo-European language, cuneiform Hittite, was shown to have an actual laryngeal consonant (h) in almost all the instances that one would expect to find it on the basis of de Saussure's theory. In one variant or another, the laryngeal theory is now accepted by all IndoEuropean scholars. A far wider influence was exercised by the Cours. This work is based on students' notebooks of the three courses in general linguistics given by de Saussure at the University of Geneva in 1907, 1908-1909, and 1910-1911. Two of de Saussure's leading disciples, Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye, utilized these as their chief source in putting together the Cours. Given these circumstances of the book's composition, it is not surprising that an extensive exegetical literature has arisen concerning the true nature of de Saussure's doctrine. Godel (1957) published a considerable number of resumes and direct quotations from the notebooks and other unpublished sources, e.g., de Saussure's class notes and letters. It is quite likely that in some instances "fruitful misunderstandings" of de Saussure's ideas have exerted an influence on the development of European linguistic theory. Language as signs. Language is a system of signs and as such forms the central part of a discipline—semiology—which takes the general study of signs as its subject matter. De Saussure thus anticipated the concept of general semiotics, found in the work of Charles Morris and others [see SEMANTICS AND SEMIOTICS]. The sign has two indissoluble aspects, likened to the two sides of the same paper—the signifier (signifianf) and the signified (signifie"). De Saussure felt the need for the double terminology because of the ambiguity of the word "sign" in common usage, which refers
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both to the relation (between a sign and what it designates) and to the physical sign vehicle. The signifier and the signified are, in thoroughgoing mentalistic fashion, the acoustic image and the concept respectively, not the physical sound and the thing meant. The relation between signifier and signified is arbitrary in the sense that any signifier can, in principle, be connected with any signified. Both of these elements are, abstracted from their functioning in signs, unstructured. Language is thus pure form. Although arbitrary in the sense described above, the sign relation in any particular case is a historically imposed one about which the individual has no choice. It is a social fact that in a given community a particular sequence of sounds is connected with a particular concept. Simply because it is arbitrary, there is no reason to change it once established. One can argue the relative merits of monogamy or polygamy, but there is no rational basis for choosing between boeuf and Ochse as designations for "ox." Because language is arbitrary and because there is no social awareness of its true nature, it is never subject to radical change. From the formal nature of the components of the linguistic sign further important conclusions follow. Thus, in the case of the signifier, it is not the particular physical nature of the sound that counts but merely the fact that one sound is distinct from another. A favorite Saussurean simile likens language to a chess game. If the knight is replaced by a different kind of physical object it makes no difference to the game as long as the object is distinct from the other pieces. But if the rules for moving the knight are modified, then the system of chess has been modified in its very nature. This distinction is one aspect of a central Saussurean dichotomy, that between language (tongue} and speech (parole}. Phonetics in its physical aspect belongs to the latter. Likewise in grammar, we have a network of two types of relations, the syntagmatic, the relation between elements which actually occur together in the chain of speech—e.g., a verb and its object—and the paradigmatic, the relation of a present element to one which is not there but has the potentiality of appearance in place of the one chosen. Thus, in the sentence "Black is a color," "white" is a paradigmatic associate of "black," while "is a" constitutes a syntagmatic relation. The grammar of a language (langue) is the set of these two types of relations: it is a social product, never perfect in the individual but only in the mass of speakers (masse parlante). The way individuals actually construct sentences by using
langue constitutes parole. Within langue it is the position within the system that counts, not the physical realization. Thus a grammatical category may even be signaled by nothing (zero}, provided it has a particular place in a network of relations, e.g., the absence of an ending in the genitive plural of feminine nouns in Czech such as zen ("of women") is significant when it is opposed to the nominative plural, zeny. To be is to be related. Synchronic and diachronic study of language. Another dichotomy of fundamental importance in de Saussure's thought is that between the synchronic study of language as a state and the diachronic study of language as change through time [see LINGUISTICS, article on HISTORICAL LINGUISTICS]. These now current terms are terminological inventions of de Saussure. The insistence on the separation of synchronic and diachronic and the emphasis on synchronic states, not only as worthy autonomous subjects for investigation but even as having a certain priority, were perhaps de Saussure's most revolutionary ideas. Linguistics in its recognizably modern form arose in the early nineteenth century as a historical discipline, and de Saussure was the first to state clearly the viewpoint of modern structuralism—that language studied in a single time plane constitutes a systematic set of relations that can be studied without reference to the historic process by which these have come to be what they are. Thus, to revert to de Saussure's figure of the chess game, the man who has seen the entire game up to a particular point has no advantage over the newly arrived bystander in understanding the existing position. In spite of differences in detail, structuralism in linguistics is fundamentally allied with functionalism in social science generally and is part of the same intellectual movement. In the case of de Saussure, his notion of langue, a social phenomenon imposed on the individual, brings him closest to the social functionalism of Durkheim. Although Durkheim cited language as an ideal example of a social institution, there is apparently no evidence of any direct influence of either man on the other. The posthumous influence of de Saussure's ideas in general linguistics was enormous, particularly on the Continent. His work was most directly continued by the so-called Geneva school, which included among its leading figures Albert Sechehaye, Charles Bally, Robert Godel, and Henri Frei and which sponsored the journal Cahiers Ferdinand de Saussure (from 1941 to the present). The glossematic approach developed by the Danish linguist Louis Hjelmsler was founded on Saussurean con-
SAVIGNY, FRIEDRICH CARL VON cepts. De Saussure exercised a more diffuse influence on the chief European structuralist school, that of Prague, by which he was looked upon as a leading pioneer of structuralism in linguistics. JOSEPH H. GREENBERG WORKS BY SAUSSURE Memoire sur le systeme primitif des voyelles dans les langues indo-europeennes. Leipzig: Teubner. (1916) 1959 Course in General Linguistics. New York: Philosophical Library. -» First published posthumously as Cours de linguistique generale.
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SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BENVENISTE, E. 1962 "Structure" en linguistique. Pages 31-39 in Colloque sur le mot structure, Paris, 1959, Sens et usages du terme structure dans les sciences humaines et sociales. Janua linguarum, Series minor, no. 16. The Hague: Mouton. Cahiers Ferdinand de Saussure. -> Published in Geneva by Droz since 1941. FREI, HENRI 1947 La linguistique saussurienne a Geneve depuis 1939. Word 3:107-109. GODEL, ROBERT 1957 Les sources manuscrites du Cours de linguistique generale de F. de Saussure. Geneva: Droz. WELLS, RULON S. 1947 De Saussure's System of Linguistics. Word 3:1-31.
SAVIGNY, FRIEDRICH CARL VON Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779-1861) was the founder of the older, romantic branch of the German historical school of law. He was born in Frankfurt am Main of an ancient and wealthy noble family from Lorraine, and his selection of an academic career was unusual for a member of his class. He began that career at the University of Marburg in 1800, teaching Roman law, and became professor of Roman law at Landshut in 1808. Two years later, at the suggestion of Wilhelm von Humboldt, he was appointed professor at the newly founded University of Berlin, where for three decades he had a most successful and influential career in legal teaching and research. From 1842 until the German revolution of 1848 he was Prussian minister for the revision of legislation. In the academic year 1802/1803, Savigny gave a lecture on legal methodology at Marburg (see Juristische Methodenlehre), which shows him still poised between rationalistic and historical jurisprudence. (His student Jacob Grimm recorded this lecture.) However, the lecture contains some of the basic principles of his later doctrine, for example, that jurisprudence must be empirical and that it should be a synthesis of historical and systematic treatments of the law. He first applied these early
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theories in Das Recht des Besitzes (see 1803), a treatise that immediately established his reputation as one of the leading professors of civil law. What contemporary legal scholars saw as the particular significance of the treatise was the way Savigny took from the sources of ancient Roman law the leading principles of the law of possession, demonstrating the superiority of the Roman principles over the modifications that this law had undergone in Continental jurisprudence since the Middle Ages. Savigny's famous pamphlet Vom Beruf unserer Zeit fur Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft (1814) was published as an argument against the popular demand for the codification of German civil law on the model of the French and the Austrian codes. The pamphlet established the doctrine and program of the early historical school of law. In this pamphlet, as well as in his introductory essay (1815) to the first volume of the Zeitschrift fur geschichtliche Rechtswissenschaft, founded as the organ of the school in 1815, Savigny outlined a new theory of the creation of law, culminating in a strictly genetic conception and analysis of law. Taking off from the ideas of Montesquieu, Burke, and Justus Moser, he asserted that positive law is not a product of reason. From its true basis, the common beliefs of a particular nation, it develops in a continuous, "organic" process as do a nation's language and customs; it is the result of silent, anonymous, and irrational forces, of an implicit consensus, not of an intentional creative effort. Law is, therefore, of the same nature as custom; it is determined by the whole past of the nation and by its peculiar character (what was later called the Volksgeist), and it cannot be changed arbitrarily by legislation. Instead, Savigny advocated the reform of jurisprudence by means of historical research, holding that a strictly genetic study is the only way to conceive and develop contemporary positive law. While some of Savigny's contemporaries (Thibaut, P. J. A. von Feuerbach, Conner, and especially Hegel and his school) rejected his doctrine, the historical school of jurisprudence dominated German universities for nearly half a century. Its program of historical research, though neither wholly nor rigorously fulfilled, made the history of law a scientific discipline, by basing it on the idea of evolution. Savigny's own chief contribution in this field was his Geschichte des romischen Rechts im Mittelalter (1815-1831), which deals with the history of the sources, the literature, and the teaching of Roman law from the fifth through the fifteenth centuries. It initiated the modern study of medieval jurisprudence and has served ever
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since, corrected in many respects but unequaled, as the standard work on the history of medieval jurisprudence in Europe. Savigny also wrote a number of historical monographs, mainly on ancient Roman law (collected in his Vermischte Schriften ). In the field of legal dogmatics, Savigny's doctrine re-created, by reviving the study of ancient Roman law, a common field of legal study in the individual German states—the "modern Roman law," or Pandects. His most important dogmatic works, System des heutigen romischen Rechts (1840-1849) and Das Obligationenrecht als Theil des heutigen romischen Rechts (1851-1853), show that the theories that he had put forward in 1814 and 1815 about the nature of law had not produced a radical change even in his own legal dogmatics. His early theories had been provoked by his reaction, influenced by romanticism, against the natural law theories of the French Revolution and of liberalism generally. Later, however, he not only retained the fundamental doctrines of the rationalist jurisprudence of the eighteenth century in his dogmatic teaching but actually made these doctrines the backbone of his legal system. Both of Savigny's works are based on fundamental notions of German natural law theory as well as on Kant's legal philosophy. Within the framework of these categories, Savigny transcended Roman law in many respects, adapting it to modern requirements or developing new solutions, many of which have become influential in German and other legal science; for example, his doctrines of contract and corporation, and particularly his system of private international law—which, like the systems of Story and Mancini, counts among the classic theories in this branch of law. WALTER WILHELM [For the historical context of Savigny's work, see CONFLICT OF LAWS; JURISPRUDENCE; LEGAL SYSTEMS, article on CODE LAW SYSTEMS; and the biographies of BURKE; MONTESQUIEU.] WORKS BY SAVIGNY
(1803) 1848 Von Savigny's Treatise on Possession: Or, the Jus Possessionis of the Civil Law. 6th ed. London: Sweet. -> First published as Das Recht des Besitzes. A 7th German edition, enlarged and revised, was published in 1865 by Heyer. (1814) 1840 Vom Beruf unserer Zeit fur Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft. Heidelberg: Mohr. ->• Translated from the 2d edition by A. Hayward and published by Littlewood in 1831 as Of the Vocation of Our Age for Legislation and Jurisprudence. (1815) 1850 Ueber den Zweck der Zeitschrift fur geschichtliche Rechtswissenschaft. Volume 1,-pages 105126 in Friedrich Carl von Savigny, Vermischte
Schriften. Berlin: Veit. -> First published in Volume 1 of Zeitschrift fur geschichtliche Rechtswissenschaft. (1815-1831) 1834-1851 Geschichte des romischen Rechts im Mittelalter. 7 vols. Heidelberg: Mohr. -» Volume 1 was translated by E. Cathcart and published by Black in 1829 as The History of the Roman Law in the Middle Ages. 1840-1849 System des heutigen romischen Rechts. 8 vols. Berlin: Veit. -> Volume 1 was translated in 1867 by William Holloway as System of the Modern Roman Law, published in Madras, India, by Higginbotham. An index volume, edited by O. L. Heuser, was published in 1851. 1851-1853 Das Obligationenrecht als Theil des heutigen romischen Rechts. 2 vols. Berlin: Veit. Juristische Methodenlehre, nach der Ausarbeitung des Jakob Grimm. Edited by Gerhard Wesenberg. Stuttgart: Koehler, 1951. ->• Published posthumously. Vermischte Schriften. 5 vols. Berlin: Veit, 1850. -> Contains works first published between 1800 and 1844. SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
GAGNER, STEN 1960 Studien zur Ideengeschichte der Gesetzgebung. Uppsala, Universitet, Acta universitatis upsaliensis, Studia iuridica upsaliensia, No. 1. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell. -» See especially pages 15-51. GUTZWILLER, MAX 1923 Der Einftuss Savignys auf die Entwicklung des Internationalprivatrechts. Collectanea friburgensia, Vol. 28. Fribourg (Switzerland): Universitats Buchhandlung. KANTOROWICZ, HERMANN 1912 Was ist uns Savigny? Berlin: Heymann. KANTOROWICZ, HERMANN 1934 Savigny, Friedrich Carl von. Volume 13, pages 546-548 in Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. New York: Macmillan. KANTOROWICZ, HERMANN 1937 Savigny and the Historical School of Law. Law Quarterly Review 53:326-343. KOSCHAKER, PAUL (1947) 1966 Europa und das romische Recht. 4th ed. Munich: Beck. KUNKEL, WOLFGANG 1962 Savignys Bedeutung fur die deutsche Rechtswissenschaft und das deutsche Recht. Juristenzeitung 17:457-463. STINTZING, RODERICK VON; and LANDSBERG, ERNST (1910) 1957 Geschichte der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft. Volume 3, part 2: Das 19. Jahrhundert, der Historismus in der Rechtswissenschaft. Aalen (Germany): Scientia Antiquariat. -> See especially pages 186-253 of the text section, and pages 94-110 of the notes. STOLL, ADOLF 1927-1939 Friedrich Karl v. Savigny: Ein Bild seines Lebens mit einer Sammlung seiner Briefe. 3 vols. Berlin: Heymann. WIEACKER, FRANZ 1956 Friedrich Carl von Savigny. Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung fur Rechtsgeschichte Romanistische Abteilung 72:1-38. -> Reprinted on pages 107-143 in Franz Wieacker, Griinder und Bewahrer: Rechtslehrer der neueren deutschen Privatrechtsgeschichte, published by Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1959. WOLF, ERIK (1939) 1963 Grosse Rechtsdenker der deutschen Geistesgeschichte. 4th ed. Tubingen (Germany): Mohr. -> See especially pages 467-542.
SAVING See CONSUMPTION FUNCTION; INTEREST; INVESTMENT.
SAY, JEAN BAPTISTE SAY, JEAN BAPTISTE Jean Baptiste Say (1767-1832) was born in Lyons of a cultivated Protestant merchant family. After a sound education and a two-year stay in England, he joined an insurance company. Say was an enthusiastic supporter of the ideas of the French Revolution and took part as a volunteer in the military campaign of 1792. Bookish and inclined to philosophy, in 1793 he joined the editorial board of a new magazine entitled La decade philosophique litteraire et politique, par une societe de republicains, which took as its motto "Enlightenment and morality are as much needed for preserving the Republic as courage was needed for winning it." He soon became the editor-in-chief of the journal, which announced that its aim was "to keep the public informed on everything new concerning literature, science, agriculture, and the arts." In 1799 Say was appointed a member of the Tribunate, under the Consulate. He took part in a competition arranged by the Institut de France on the subject "By what means and what institutions can morality be established in a people?" His contribution, "Olbie: Ou, essai sur les moyens de reformer les moeurs d'une nation," gave promise of his gifts as a moralist and economist. Following up his thesis that "the first book on morality for the Olbians should be a good Treatise on Political Economy" (Oeuvres diverses, p. 593), he set about composing such a work, inspired to a great extent by the ideas expounded by Adam Smith in his celebrated Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, with which Say had become acquainted as early as 1789. Say's book appeared in 1803 and soon had considerable success. In the meantime, Say's disapproval of the Napoleonic regime led to his dismissal from the Tribunate. He moved to a small town in northern France, Auchy-les-Hesdin, to set up a cotton-spinning plant. He stayed there seven years before he sold out in 1813 and returned to Paris. The fall of the empire and the return of the Bourbons permitted him to resume intellectual activity aimed at the general public. In 1815 he began to teach at the Athenee what was probably the first public course of political economy ever given in France, and in the same year he published his Catechisme d'economie politique. Two years later the government established a chair of industrial economy for him (the term political economy still frightened people) at the Conservatoire des Arts et Metiers. Finally, in 1830, the aged master did become professor of political economy at the College de France, in the first chair of its kind to be established. Meanwhile, he had
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published his Cours complet d'economie politique pratique (1828-1829) in six volumes, a work, as the long subtitle indicates, "designed to teach statesmen, landowners and capitalists, men of learning, agriculturalists, manufacturers, businessmen, and in general all citizens, about political economy." Although it has been alleged that Say was a mere expositor and popularizer of Adam Smith's ideas, he did more than merely transmit these ideas. He did, of course, present the ideas that he borrowed from Smith with typical French order and clarity, and he justly complained of obscurity and confusion in Smith's own statements in The Wealth of Nations. Say wanted to produce what he described as "a work in which sound observations were reduced to general principles that could be accepted by any judicious man; in which those observations and principles were so completed and coordinated as to reinforce one another, so that they could fruitfully be studied at any time and in any place" (1803, p. xlviii in 1860 English edition). And this was not merely an interpretative work: at important points Say showed originality, and he undoubtedly contributed to advancing the science of economics. Philosophical position. In his basic philosophy, Say was strongly influenced by the ideological ambience of his time. Like many of his contemporaries, he was at once deist, liberal, and rationalist. In the realm of scientific and doctrinal convictions, however, he showed little toleration but instead a dogmatism that may have been related to his authoritarian nature. This is one of several ways in which he differed sharply from Adam Smith: he was never touched by doubt. As a disciple of the Encyclopedists, he was an intransigent scientist, even a passionate one, and convinced of the predominant influence of economic phenomena in the life of the whole society. On this point, as in the case of the preponderant role of industrial activity in production as a whole, it may be possible to establish a connection between Say's ideas and certain theories of Karl Marx, and in any event, with those of Saint-Simon and the Saint-Simonians. His belief in economics as a science led Say to try to reconcile his naturalism and his rationalism. He was able to do so because he conceived of the laws of nature as necessarily rational (or providential); in this respect, he was adopting a point of view the physiocrats had developed a half century earlier. But it is noteworthy that Say went on to establish similarities between the science of economics and physiology, transposing the latter from the individual to the social level and preferring a
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biological model of the economy to a purely mechanical one. He was later to be followed on the same track by Alfred Marshall, the great English economist. It should be pointed out, however, that Say's method was never made rigorously explicit. While asserting the sovereignty of facts in scientific matters, he nonetheless interpreted them according to the results that he intended to reach. Thus, he appeared as an "ideologue" to some of his contemporaries. Relationship to Adam Smith. Say deeply admired the work of Adam Smith. Of The Wealth of Nations he said, "Whenever the Inquiry Into the Wealth of Nations is perused with the attention it so well merits, it will be perceived that until the epoch of its publication the science of political economy did not exist" (1803, p. xxxviii in 1860 English edition). But Say was not content merely to repeat or rethink the ideas of his master. He filtered them, clarified them, and at several points went beyond them. He made a more systematic critique of physiocratic ideas, based on an expansion of the concept of productivity and the inclusion of immaterial products among the positive results of economic activity. Say gave greater depth to value theory by introducing the notions of need and utility. As a true precursor of the marginalist school, he noted that the needs of men may be classified according to their urgency in scales of preference, that they give rise to utility, which in turn determines demand. Demand then interacts with supply, which in turn is determined by the cost of production. For Say, however, in contrast to Ricardo, for example, utility is the stronger determining factor in prices; the cost of production enters only as a kind of restrictive condition. There too Say appears to have anticipated Alfred Marshall's well-known theory. It is of interest to see that Say realized perfectly that the explanation of the phenomena of value and price is not to be sought in terms of unilateral causal relationships but in terms of the concept of interdependence. Even more than Adam Smith, Say strongly emphasized that the role of science is primarily one of observation and explanation. Where Smith, following the physiocrats, came forward as a physician for society, Say aimed exclusively at being a naturalist. His Traite professes to be a "simple exposition" of a body of exact knowledge, applicable under all circumstances. Although agriculture still had a predominant position for Smith, it no longer did for Say. To be sure, the half-century separating their work witnessed the entire industrial revolution in Britain, and in France its beginning. Say was in a position
to observe its first manifestations, in the seven years that he devoted to business. Thus he made industry and even commerce as important as agriculture in the total productive activity of society. Major contributions. Say appreciated the importance of the entrepreneur in economic life, a role Smith had neglected to define and which has remained, since Say's time, a permanent feature of economic analysis. This essential actor has functions that are quite distinct from those of the capitalist strictly so called (British authors confused these two conceptions). The entrepreneur, whether he be an industrialist, businessman, or farmer, has a truly strategic position in economic life, in that he is par excellence the intermediary between landowners, capitalists, workers, and consumers. He is also pictured as performing a truly creative function as the organizer responsible for production, striving unceasingly to improve it, especially in the industrial sector. Over a century later, Schumpeter was to take up and perfect this dynamic conception of the role of the true entrepreneur, the creator of new combinations (innovations). Say's development of the theory of the distribution of the social product, deduced from the previous analysis, was a marked advance over current theories. Say coordinated this theory precisely and harmoniously with the theories of exchange and production. The entrepreneur, a buyer of productive services at known prices (the services of men, capital, and lands) and a seller of products at uncertain prices, is thus seen as assuming a set of fundamental functions, as presiding in a way over activity that is both production and distribution. His specific share is the profit, a share that is described as essential, residual, and precarious. This brings us to the very threshold of Walras's grand conception of economic equilibrium. Another of Say's highly original contributions to economic analysis is his famous law of markets, which undoubtedly did more to make its author celebrated than all the rest of his work. This law (cf. Schumpeter in History of Economic Analysis 1954, pp. 615-626) may be interpreted in many different ways. We know its very simple, almost lapidary content: "Products are exchanged for products." This may be taken as meaning that the role of money in the economy is, after all, secondary (the conception of the "monetary veil"). But one may also infer that everyone taking part in an exchange is interested in the prosperity of his partner, whether it be an individual or a nation, a thesis that goes counter to the mercantilist conception that "one gains only what the other loses." Finally, the law may imply a theory of crises, based
SCALING on rejection of the concepts of general overproduction and underconsumption and the assertion of the essentially transitory and limited nature of these imbalances. The remedy is therefore not the limiting of production but its expansion. "Produce, produce, that is the whole thing!" Say concluded, in his Cours complet, that although "there is an excess in certain products, there is a shortage in others." Importance and influence. All in all, it would appear that Say's work, without bearing the marks of really great genius, does give its author an eminent place in the development of economic thought. Say was not entirely an innovator, even in fields where he was not following Adam Smith and did show real originality: on many points he links up to a tradition solidly rooted in France. As Schumpeter remarked judiciously (1954, p. 492): "Say's work is the most important of the links in the chain that leads from Cantillon and Turgot to Walras." He opened up new paths, but later authors followed them with more success than he. This was the case with the members of the marginalist school—Carl Menger, Stanley Jevons, and especially Leon Walras—who were able to employ the notion of utility in a much more precise and scientifically valid manner than their common precursor, Say. (Walras tended to minimize his debt to Say, but it was nevertheless important.) Again, the fine effort at synthesis made by Alfred Marshall and the neoclassical school is not entirely untouched by the teachings of Say. His influence can be traced beyond the general equilibrium school to such essentially modern authors as Schumpeter. It is true that in the eyes of many of our contemporaries Say is seen primarily as the author of the law of markets, one of the favorite butts of Keynesian and Neo-Keynesian criticism, and this "law," interpreted and misinterpreted as it has been, may remain his chief title to fame. But perhaps he will be remembered for his power to build on established intellectual traditions and to stimulate other thinkers: there lay his true merit, which only time will confirm. GAS TON LEDTJC [For the historical context of Say's work, see ECONOMIC THOUGHT, article on PHYSIOCRATIC THOUGHT; and the biographies of SAINT-SIMON; SMITH, ADAM. For discussion of the subsequent development of his ideas, see DEMAND AND SUPPLY; ENTREPRENEURSHIP; UTILITY; and the biographies of JEVONS; MARSHALL; MENGER; SCHUMPETER; WALRAS.] WORKS BY SAY (1803) 1964 A Treatise on Political Economy: Or, the Production, Distribution and Consumption of Wealth.
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New York: Kelley. -» First published as Traite d'economie politique: Ou, simple exposition de la maniere dont se forment, se distribuent, et se consomment les richesses. Translation of extract in text provided by the editors. (1815) 1816 Catechism of Political Economy: Or, Familiar Conversations on the Manner in Which Wealth Is Produced, Distributed, and Consumed in Society. London: Sherwood. -> First published as Catechisme d'economie politique. (1828-1829) 1852 Cours complet d'economie politique pratique. 2 vols. 3d ed., enl. With notes by Horace Say. Paris: Guillaumiri. -» First published in 6 volumes. Translation of extracts in text provided by the editors. Oeuvres diverses. Paris: Guillaumin, 1848. -» Translation of extract in text provided by the editors. SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
GoETZ-GiREY, ROBERT 1966 Croissance et progres a I'origine des societes industrielles. Paris: Montchrestien. SCHUMPETER, JOSEPH A. (1954) 1960 History of Economic Analysis. Edited by E. B. Schumpeter. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. TEILHAC, ERNEST 1927 L'oeuvre economique de JeanBaptiste Say. Paris: Sirey.
SCALE, ECONOMIES OF See ECONOMIES OF SCALE. SCALES OF MEASUREMENT See PSYCHOMETRICS; STATISTICS, DESCRIPTIVE; SCALING. SCALING Measurement of a property involves assignment of numbers to objects as a way of representing that property. The process thus includes both a formal, logical system, e.g., the real number system, and an empirical system, the set of instances of the property. Scale types. An important aspect of measurement is the correspondence between some of the characteristics of the number system involved and some of the relations between instances of the property. The particular set of characteristics of the formal number system that is used determines the type of scale that is obtained. Scale types can most easily be described by the type of transformation that can be applied to a given scale without changing the numerical interpretation of the basic empirical relations. Although there is no limit to the number of scale types that might be devised, only a relatively small number have been found useful. Some of the more important scale types are described here. In ordinal scales the only relevant property of numbers is their order. Numbers are assigned to
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objects so that the order of the numbers corresponds to the order of the objects with respect to the property of interest. Any transformation of a given numerical assignment that preserves order, i.e., any monotonic transformation, would serve as well. An ordinal scale is therefore said to be determined up to a monotonic transformation. Fixed-origin ordinal scales are rarely discussed, but are of some empirical importance in the fields of social psychology and personality, where bipolar attributes are not uncommon. Of relevance in such scales is the fact that numbers have a unique origin. Numbers are assigned not only so that their order corresponds to the order of the objects but also so that the origin of the numerical series corresponds to an empirically meaningful origin or zero point of the property. Any monotonic transformation that does not change the origin leaves the numerical interpretation of the basic relations unchanged. In interval scales, in addition to order, differences between the numbers correspond, in some generalized sense, to the distances or differences between the instances of the property. Interval scales are thus determined up to a linear transformation of the form
y = ax + b, where a is any positive number and b is any number whatsoever. Log interval scales are closely related to the interval scale. In the interval scale, numerical differences correspond to empirical differences; in the log interval scale, numerical ratios correspond to empirical ratios. The transformation characterizing the log interval scale is given by
y = ax*, where a and b are positive. Ratio scales can be described either as those in which the order, the differences, and the ratios of the assigned numbers correspond to the order, differences, and ratios of instances of the property or as those in which order, differences, and origin all receive numerical interpretation. For either description, the ratio scale is determined up to a linear transformation of the form y = ax, where a is positive. Difference scales and ratio scales are related in a way similar to the way that interval and log interval scales are related; in each case one scale is equivalent to the logarithm of the other. In the difference scale, the procedures used to assign numbers serve to fix the order, the differences between numbers, and the unit of measurement. The char-
acterizing transformation is y = x + a. [For a more extensive discussion of scale types, see PSYCHOMETRICS; STATISTICS, DESCRIPTIVE; see also Suppes & Zinnes 1963.] The concept of scale type is important because the type of scale on which a property is measured restricts the kinds of information that can be obtained in an experiment. The scale type therefore limits the kinds of meaningful questions that can be asked regarding the property. Consider the following three questions: Do high-scoring subjects increase in ability more than low-scoring subjects (after some specified treatment)? If the ability is measured on a scale that contains only ordinal information, and if both low and high scorers increase in ability with no overlap in distribution, then the question cannot be answered. The question deals with the relative magnitude of differences (or perhaps ratios), and in a purely ordinal scale the relative magnitude of numerical differences or ratios is meaningless. Is amount of aggression directly proportional to degree of frustration (in some specified situation)? Let A denote amount of aggression and F the degree of frustration. The question then concerns the form of the equation that relates A to F, that is, one asks whether these two variables are functionally related by an equation of the form A — kF, where k is some positive constant. Clearly, an affirmative answer cannot be given unless both A and F are measured on ratio scales. Do college sophomores differ more widely in their attitude toward civil rights than in their attitude toward the Asian policy of the United States? Questions such as this require a scale type ordinarily ignored in physical measurement. Consider the formally equivalent question "Does this set of containers differ more widely in their volume than in their weight?" The question, which does not seem particularly unreasonable in the attitude context, now appears absurd: a difference of x cubic inches is neither more nor less nor equal to a difference of y pounds. The two differences are simply not comparable. However, volume and weight are measured on ratio scales. If they, or the two attitude variables, were measured on difference scales, then a basis for the comparison would exist. Kinds of measurement. So far, scale type has been treated as though it were an inherent part of a given numerical assignment. In one sense, this is correct; each scaling procedure includes a set of rules governing assignment of numbers to instances of the property. The rules limit to varying extents and in varying ways the freedom of the investigator to decide which numbers to assign to the instances
SCALING of the property. The characterization of scale type by admissible transformations is simply a compact way of stating the particular restrictions imposed. But scaling procedures also differ markedly in the quality of information the numbers represent. At one extreme are measurement procedures that rely almost entirely on definition or assumption. An experimenter might simply define the attitude of a subject to be equal to the number of favorable responses he gives to a specified collection of items. Such measurement by fiat has been both useful and common throughout the behavioral sciences. The type of scale resulting from such a procedure is simply a matter of definition or assumption. Although these procedures determine a unique number to be assigned to a given subject, the experimenter may have reasons for wanting to attribute meaning only to the ordinal property of the numerical assignment. Or he may want to attribute meaning to both ordinal and interval properties, thus obtaining an interval scale. Suitable modifications of the definition could therefore result in any of the scale types already described. Obviously, such modifications do not change the empirical basis of the numerical assignment, which, in the present instance, is simply the number of favorable responses to the particular set of items. The usefulness of such defined scales depends heavily on the experience and intuition of the investigator. The scales tend to be exceedingly special. Different investigators, when defining scales in this way for the same attribute, would ordinarily select different, or at best only partially overlapping, sets of items. Because favorable responses depend as much on the nature of the items as on the attitude of the subject, the value assigned to a given subject would clearly be expected to differ from one scale to another. While the scales might be ratio scales by definition, it is unlikely that they would differ from each other only in unit of measurement. The procedures themselves provide no basis for choosing among the many scales of a given attribute that might be defined in this way. Hence, confidence in any one cannot be expected to be great. A somewhat different procedure for obtaining scale properties by definition relies on assumptions made about the distribution of subjects. The investigator might stipulate, for example, that the number of favorable responses to his set of items only serves to order the subjects on the attribute. But he then might go on to assume that his population of subjects is distributed in some specified way on the attribute (ordinarily, the assumption of a normal distribution is made, but other distributions could serve as well). Knowledge of order and
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of the properties of the assumed distribution enables the investigator to increase the level of the scale from ordinal to interval or perhaps even to ratio. But again, the meaning of the interval or ratio properties of the scale is derived only from the definition. There is no limit to the number of base populations that can be defined. And scales simply defined through use of the distribution assumption on one population cannot be expected to match those based on other populations. A more appealing basis for establishing interval or ratio properties is provided by fundamental measurement procedures. In these procedures, the meaning of the properties of the final scale is determined, at least to some extent, by the empirical relations between the observables. Fundamental measurement procedures involve verifiable scientific models or theories, place restrictions on the behavior of the observables, and are subject to empirical test. One possible outcome of an application of a fundamental procedure, of course, is the conclusion that the scale in question does not fit the data, that the theoretical assumptions are not appropriate for that particular situation. Under these circumstances, no scale is obtained. But when the empirical fit of data to the theory is acceptable, the result is a scale whose properties are based to some extent on empirical law rather than arbitrary definition alone. It is with such fundamental measurement procedures in scaling that this article is concerned. Two broad classes of scaling models. The fundamental scaling procedures can be grouped into two broad classes: those concerned with the measurement of stimulus attributes and those concerned primarily with measurement of individual difference or responder attributes. Different models within each class represent alternative rationales for attaining essentially the same objective. The objective itself ordinarily differs between classes. Stimulus models The stimulus models use responses of subjects to stimuli to establish scales for attributes of stimuli. Scale values are assigned only to the stimuli. The subject, or group of subjects, is characterized by the entire scale. Individual or group differences in this context refer to differences between scales, and not to differences in scale values on the attribute. The stimulus models are therefore concerned with psychological attributes of stimuli for subjects or groups of subjects. In the stimulus model, the subject himself acts as a judge or evaluator of the stimuli. His task is a particularized one—he does not simply judge or
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respond to the stimuli per se but, rather, evaluates the stimuli with respect to some specified attribute. Hence, the same set of stimuli can be scaled with respect to several different attributes. A set of statements all designed to reflect an attitude toward some topic might, for example, be scaled with respect to such attributes as degree of favorability toward the topic, relevance, complexity, or intensity. The subject's task in each case is to evaluate the stimuli solely with respect to the attribute of interest. The resulting scale is then indicative of how these particular statements are perceived with respect to the defined attribute by that particular subject or group of subjects. Stimulus models are used to obtain both psychophysical and psychometric scales. The models appropriate for psychometrics are actually a subset of the psychophysical models, but the measurement problem itself differs considerably in the two fields. Measurement in psychophysics has been concerned primarily with determining functional relations between physical variables and the corresponding subjective attributes. The usual experimental strategy holds constant or controls all relevant physical dimensions but one, and then determines how the subjective attribute varies as a function of that single physical variable. The resulting psychophysical magnitude function is thus a relation between two variables that is expected to hold when other physical variables influencing the subjective attribute are fixed or controlled as specified. For example, a psychophysical function for loudness might relate the perceived loudness of 1,000-cycle sinusoidal tones of a given duration to sound energy measured at the ear. Other functions ordinarily are needed for white noise, for clicks, or for tones of another duration or a different frequency. Although each separate function is monotonic for the relevant physical variable, no such simple relation exists relating sound energy to subjective loudness for stimuli that vary on several relevant dimensions. Development of equations specifying the loudness of any stimulus that possesses sound energy would be a great deal more complex. [See HEARING; PSYCHOPHYSICS.] In psychophysics the physical variable determines the set of stimuli to which the results apply. In psychometrics, it is more nearly the reverse. Psychometric scaling begins with the psychological attribute. The procedures are applicable to any set of stimuli possessing the attribute, and the problem is to scale the set of stimuli as it exists. The stimulus set is typically complex, varying with respect to other subjective dimensions and with respect to a host of correlated physical variables. There is, of
course, no single, monotonically related physical correlate. Monotone relations are to be expected only when all but one of the physical correlates are held constant. Complexity of the stimulus set is therefore the chief characteristic distinguishing psychophysical from psychometric scaling problems. Several major consequences of this complexity are listed below. [See PSYCHOMETRICS.] Recognizability of individual stimuli—The subject can often identify psychometric stimuli because of their variation on extraneous attributes. Since he may tend to remember earlier responses to the same stimulus, independent judgments on successive trials cannot routinely be expected. Replication over trials with the same subject is therefore troublesome. Most psychometric scales have been based on groups of subjects, so that the recognition problem is not so severe. Ordinal properties—When there is awareness of a monotonically related physical variable, knowledge of order on the subjective attribute is automatically implied. For the complex stimulus sets of psychometrics, order of the stimuli is typically an unknown that must be determined. Experimental procedures that require prior knowledge of order of the stimuli often then cannot be used. Production techniques—When a physical variable is monotonically related to a psychological attribute, there is ordinarily a procedure for easily generating a virtually continuous set of stimuli that are ordered with respect to the psychological attribute. This in turn makes possible the use of the various production techniques—procedures that require the subject to adjust a variable, i.e., to generate a new stimulus, with specified properties. On the other hand, with psychometric stimuli such production techniques typically cannot be used: the subject cannot on demand paint a painting halfway between two standards in aesthetic quality, write an essay twice as good as a standard, or create a worker whose merit falls between that of two others. Interpolation—A monotonic physical attribute can be used as a basis for interpolation. The stimulus that could be judged greater than a standard 75 per cent of the time can be estimated from data obtained by using other stimuli. In addition, a subset of stimuli can be used to establish the functional relation between the two variables. Given the relation, the scale values of all remaining stimuli can be determined numerically or graphically, without resort to additional experimental observations. Neither technique is available for the complex stimulus sets of psychometrics, the closest approximation of which is the establishment of a scale of
SCALING standards against which new stimuli can be evaluated by direct comparison. The stimulus scaling models can be classified into two types on the basis of the rationale used to obtain scale properties above and beyond order. In the variability models, the discriminability of the stimuli, or the variability of judgment with respect to the stimuli, is used as the basis for deriving the higher-level metric scale properties. In the quantitative judgment models, the additional metric properties are obtained directly from the quantitative aspects of the judgments themselves. Variability models. Perhaps the best-known variability model is that developed by Thurstone (1927). Thurstone's general model begins with a set of elements called discriminal processes. Each element has a value on a postulated, underlying psychological continuum. Presentation of a stimulus to a subject results in arousal of a discriminal process. Different presentations of the same stimulus may arouse different discriminal processes— there is thus no one-to-one relation between the two. Rather, a distribution of discriminal processes is associated with each stimulus. Presentation of a stimulus is equivalent to sampling a discriminal process from the distribution associated with that stimulus. [See CONCEPT FORMATION; LEARNING, article on DISCRIMINATION LEARNING.] In Thurstone's model it is postulated that these distributions (one for each stimulus) are normal with means s; and variances crj. The mean is taken as the scale value of the stimulus. The standard deviation, cr ; , called the discriminal dispersion, is the index of the ambiguity or conf us ability of the stimulus; the smaller the cr,•, the less ambiguous and the more readily discriminable the stimulus. The general model, therefore, provides both location and spread parameters for the stimuli. The conceptual framework of the model is illustrated in Figure 1. We will consider here two particularizations of
the Thurstone model, one developed for comparative judgments and another developed for categorical judgments. The law of comparative judgment. The law of comparative judgment postulates that in any comparison of two stimuli, the psychological difference between the stimuli is indirectly measured by the relative frequency with which the difference is perceived. For example, two stimuli, j and k, are presented to the subject, with instructions to indicate which one appears greater with respect to some designated attribute. Since each stimulus is held to arouse a discriminal process, dj or dk, the subject selects as greater the stimulus which on that occasion arouses the discriminal process having the greater value on the underlying continuum. If the difference d/v — dj > 0, stimulus k is selected; if dk — d; < 0, stimulus j is selected. Exact equality is not allowed. Each paired presentation is formally equivalent to drawing an element from a bivariate normal distribution. An indefinitely large number of such observations generates a distribution of discriminal differences. From a large number of such judgments one can also determine the proportion of times that stimulus k is judged greater than stimulus j. One of the characteristics of the normal distribution that makes it particularly valuable for distribution models of this type is that differences between paired observations drawn from a bivariate normal distribution are normally distributed. The mean of the difference distribution is equal to the difference between the original means, or scale values, s,c —s ; -; the variance is cry + cr| — 2r/7ccr)o-/., where rj7. represents the correlation between the pairs of discriminal processes. If we define pjlc as the probability that stimulus k is judged greater than stimulus j (that is, that dk - d,•> 0) on any given presentation, and define xjk as the unit normal deviate corresponding to p j k , then the general form of the law of comparative judgment for n stimuli is given by the set of equations (1)
Figure I — Distributions on the psychological continuum of discriminal processes associated with four stimuli Source: From Torgerson 1958, p. 157.
29
sk - s} = xi1t V o-f + 0-2 - 2rj/covo-7v,, j,k= 1,2,- • -,n. The quantity xjlt is the (theoretical) observable; the remaining terms are unknowns. Given n stimuli, there are n(n — l)/2 possible equations and, since both the origin and unit are arbitrary, there are 2 ( n — l ) + n ( n — l ) / 2 unknowns. Hence there are always more unknowns than independent equations, and further restrictions on the data are necessary to establish scale values. Three such specializations have been proposed, of which only one, Thurstone's case v, the most restrictive, has been
30
SCALING
found generally useful. In case v, it is assumed that the value under the radical in (1) is constant, i.e., that the distributions of discriminal differences all have the same variance. Then, arbitrarily defining the variance as unity, for convenience, there remain simply the n(n — l)/2 equations (2)
S
•—•
j,k= 1,2, • • -,n.
Efficient procedures for estimating the scale values from these equations are available. The scale obtained is an interval scale, because the unit of measurement must be defined arbitrarily, and a constant can be added to all of the scale values without changing the solution. Furthermore, the interval properties are based on empirical law. Consider any three ordered stimuli, i < j < k, and the three unit normal deviates X a , xj1e, and xik. From (2), since the numerical differences between scale values must add, (S* - Sy) + (Sj - Si) = (Sfc -
Si),
for all i<j
xjk + xn — XM ,
for all i < j < k.
The additivity-of-difference rule can therefore be said to provide the empirical basis for the interval properties of the final scale. Actually, of course, one would not expect (3) to hold exactly for empirical data. Among other things, the obtained proportions on which the deviates are based are only estimates and not population values. A statistical test for the goodness of fit of the model to data has been provided by Mosteller (1951). Graphical and numerical procedures can also be used to aid the investigator in deciding whether the fit is close enough for his purposes even though it does not meet the statistical criterion. Given estimates of the scale values of the stimuli, one can compute the set of theoretical proportions that would fit the estimated scale values perfectly. The discrepancies between these derived proportions and the corresponding observed proportions can then be examined. Alternatively, for any two stimuli, i and j, one can plot the obtained values of xik versus xjk for all values of k. From (2) it is clear that the model requires that the plotted points fall along a straight line with unit slope. [See GOODNESS OF FIT.] The law of categorical judgment. Several additional postulates are used to adapt the general Thurstone model to categorical data and to derive a set of equations relating stimulus values and category boundaries to the relative frequency with which each stimulus is judged to be in each category. In the usual experimental procedures, the
subject is required to rate or sort a set of n stimuli into a fixed number of ordered categories. Graphic rating procedures or arrangement methods can also be used, but these require that the data first be artificially divided into a limited set of ordered categories. Thurstone's general model illustrated in Figure 1 deals with a set of n stimuli and their associated distributions of discriminal processes, with means s;- and standard deviations cr ; . The present extension adds parallel notions dealing with the location of boundaries between adjacent categories. Data are presented in the form of ratings of stimuli on an m + 1 step scale. It is assumed that the psychological continuum is divided by the m category boundaries into m + 1 intervals, which may or may not be equal in extent. In the original version of the model, the boundaries were treated as fixed. We shall follow the more general version that allows the boundary locations to vary from observation to observation. The location of the gth category boundary is treated as a random variable with mean ta and variance o-|. If we assume that these distribution functions are also jointly normal, then precisely the same reasoning that led to (1) leads to the set of mn equations for the general law of categorical judgment: (4)
= 1,2,- • • , w, where ta — sf denotes the difference between the mean location of category boundary g and the mean location of stimulus j . Eq. (4) is again too general to be of more than academic interest. As was true for (1), there are always more unknowns than equations. One common restricted version of the general equation is based on the assumption that the radical is a monotone function of the stimulus standard deviations, a,. This would occur, for example, if both the correlation term and the variances of the category boundaries were constant, or if constant variances or* and independence (rjff = 0) were assumed. If we now let of = J
t iff
— O) <;
— JijgfXj -Y fV
,
7 J
—• l,xi, 1 9 • • • , 17 II,
g = 1,2,- • •, m. Eqs. (5) are formally identical to the equations underlying the "method of successive intervals" (Saffir 1937; Gulliksen 1954), although in the traditional version the assumption of fixed boundaries leads to the interpretation of a} as the standard
SCALING deviation (discriminal dispersion) of stimulus j rather than as a more general spread parameter only monotonically related to a-j. Efficient and practical estimation procedures have been developed for both complete and incomplete data matrices and are discussed in Torgerson (1958). Another common restricted case assumes that the difference distributions all have the same variance. Then, if the unit of measurement is denned so that the value under the radical in (4) is 1, we can write the nm equations, (6)
j = 1,2,- • -, n, g - 1,2,- • -, ra.
Eqs. (6) represent the most restricted version of the law and underlie Attneave's method of graded dichotomies (1949), Garner and Hake's equidiscriminability scaling procedure (1951), and Edwards and Thurstone's method of successive intervals (1952). Note that this version allows a single parameter for both stimuli and category boundaries, whereas the other version allowed a second parameter for the stimuli. The final scale, if achieved, is therefore an equidiscriminability or equiconfusability scale, with properties similar to those of (2) for comparative judgments. The logistic model for choice data. The logistic model is the major alternative to Thurstone's general model for obtaining a scale based on discriminability or variability of judgment. The model was developed for the paired comparison case by Bradley and Terry (1952). Luce's choice axiom (1959) extended the model to choice data in general and gave the procedure a more elegant, axiomatic basis. Luce's version of the model requires, in essence, that the subjects' choices behave in a manner analogous to conditional probabilities. Where S and T are both subsets of a set U and where p(T), the probability of choosing an element of T, is greater than 0, then the formula for the conditional probability of S given T, p(S|T), is p(S n T)/p(T). The interesting property of conditional probability for present purposes is the multiplication rule. Given three subsets, such that R C S C T, p(R|S) . p ( S | T ) = p ( R | T ) . Luce's axiom, for the case where the probability of choosing any element is neither 0 nor 1, is the empirical analogue: (7)
p s (R) • p r ( S ) = p T ( R ) .
That is, the probability that the subject will choose an R-element when presented with the set T is equal to the probability that he will choose an R-
31
element when presented with the set S multiplied by the probability that he will choose an S-element when presented with the set T. An alternative form of the axiom is known as the constant ratio rule (Clarke 1957). Let x and y denote any two stimuli, let p(x,y} denote the probability that stimulus x is chosen when only x and y are presented, and let pK(x) denote the probability that stimulus x is chosen when the subset S is presented. The constant ratio rule states that (8)
where Cxy denotes the constant ratio of the probability of choosing stimulus x to the probability of choosing stimulus y. The rule requires that for any set S containing both stimulus x and stimulus y, the ratio of the probability of choosing stimulus x to that of choosing stimulus y be invariant. For a given pair of stimuli the ratio is constant regardless of either what or how many other stimuli are included in the set from which the choice is made. The complete experiment for evaluating Luce's axiom or the constant ratio rule would therefore require the experimenter to obtain separate estimates of the probability of choosing stimulus x (for all x e T) for every subset of T containing x as a member. When the requirements of the axiom are met, then there exists a iy-scale such that for every subset of stimuli S, (9)
where v(x~) denotes the scale value of stimulus x. From (9) and the constant ratio rule it is also clear that
(10) Given the axiom and the definition, the scale values are determined up to multiplication by a positive constant, i.e., the x>-scale is a ratio scale. It should be noted, however, that the ratio property depends on the particular definition chosen, as well as on the requirements placed on the data by the axiom. The empirical requirements of the choice axiom may limit the scale to determination up to a multiplicative constant and an exponent. Eq. (9), in effect, specifies a particular exponent in the same way that the unit was specified in (2). The axiom places two rather severe restrictions on the data. Consider first the paired comparison case, and let x, y, z denote any three stimuli. Then
32
SCALING
the probability ratios must follow a multiplication rule: ,z) _ p(x,y~) _ p(y,z~)
(11)
Hence, any two probabilities determine the third. It can also be shown that the pairwise probabilities determine all probabilities of choice from larger sets and, in fact, 1 (12)
v^
An adequate test of the model as stated would require evaluation of the extent to which both restrictions are met. The simpler version of the logistic model, as developed by Bradley and Terry, is limited to paired comparison data and, hence, only the first restriction is applicable. Efficient estimating procedures and tests of goodness of fit are available (Bradley & Terry 1952; Bradley 1954). Thurstone's case V and the logistic model. If we consider only the paired comparison situation, then the equation relating scale values to observable proportions for the logistic model can be written simply as
(13)
p(x,y~)
or, equivalently, as v(x)
(14)
Eq. (14) shows that in the i;-scale a simple function of the observable is interpreted as a ratio of scale values. From (11) it is apparent that the metric properties of the z;-scale are based on a multiplication-of-ratios rule, with log interval properties. In Thurstone's case v, the corresponding basis for the metric properties was an additivity-of-differences rule, which yielded an interval scale. Bradley and Terry, as well as Luce, have shown that the logistic model can also be used to generate an interval scale based on additivity of differences. If one defines r(x) = In v(x) and w(x,z/) = r(x} — r ( y ) , then (14) can be written
(15)
In
- r(z/) -
and from (13),
(16)
p (*,i
1
which is a simple form of the logistic function. The logistic function and the normal ogive are markedly similar over most of the empirically in-
teresting range. As a result, a close fit of the data to Thurstone's case v insures a fit to the logistic model that can be only trivially better or worse. For all practical purposes, the values from the r-scale of the logistic model will be linearly related to the scale values from the Thurstone case v model. And both, of course, will be logarithmically related to the x>-scale values. It might be noted that the Thurstone model can also be easily modified to yield a log interval scale similar to the iy-scale of the logistic model. We need only to substitute log normal distributions for normal distributions and subjective ratios for subjective differences. The new scale will be exponentially related to the Thurstone case v scale, and will therefore be related to the x^-scale by a power transformation. In general, any model in which the observable is interpreted as a subjective difference in scale values can be paralleled by one in which the observable is interpreted as a subjective ratio. The difference-based scale will be logarithmically related to the ratio-based scale, and the fit of one model to any given set of data will be precisely matched by the fit of the other, parallel model. Quantitative judgment models. The variability methods require only ordinal judgments by the subject; the higher-level, metric properties of the obtained scales are derived through models relating variability of judgment to subjective differences or ratios. In the quantitative judgment models, the higher-level properties are obtained directly from the subject's judgments. There are two classes of quantitative judgment methods: the difference, or distance, methods and the ratio methods. The difference methods have long been used to develop scales in the social sciences (Thurstone & Chave 1929). Serious application of the ratio methods in the context of social science is more recent (see, for example, the summary of research in Stevens 1966). In the difference methods, the metric properties of the obtained scale depend upon the ability of the subject to evaluate or equate subjective differences. In the ratio methods, the metric properties depend upon his ability to evaluate or equate subjective ratios. Scales obtained from the two types of procedures are not ordinarily linearly related. Difference methods. Difference methods include the methods of equisection, equal-appearing intervals, category rating, and category production. The methods differ from one another in the specific nature of the experimental procedure employed, but they all have the same objective: to obtain a scale in which the differences in numbers assigned to the stimuli directly reflect the corresponding subjective differences between the stimuli.
SCALING In equisection, the subject produces a set of stimuli that divides a given range of the attribute into subjectively equal steps. In equal-appearing intervals and category rating he sorts or rates the stimuli into a given set of subjectively equally spaced steps or categories. In category production, he produces on each trial a stimulus that corresponds to one of a set of equally spaced categories. The usual procedures do not include built-in checks for the adequacy of the assumption that the subject can produce such judgments in an internally consistent manner. The assumption does place empirical restrictions on the behavior of the judgments, however, so appropriate checks are possible. The simplest and most direct check uses the method of bisection. Here, the subject first bisects the interval between two standard stimuli, a and e, to produce a new stimulus, c, halfway beween. He next bisects the interval a-c, producing a stimulus b, and bisects the interval c—e, producing a stimulus d. Finally, he bisects the interval between b and d. If the subject's bisections are made in an internally consistent manner, the stimulus produced by the final bisection between b and d will be equal to c, the stimulus produced by the bisection of a and e. For psychometric stimuli, where production techniques are unavailable, a more or less equivalent procedure involves imbedding a given subset of stimuli in several different larger sets. If the subject's rating or sorting judgments fulfill the requirements of an interval scale, the scale values assigned to the members of the subset will be linearly related across the several experiments. Ratio methods. Ratio methods include the methods of fractionation, constant sum, magnitude and ratio estimation, and magnitude and ratio production. In all of these methods, the subject's task is to adjust stimuli or assign numbers so that the ratios between the numbers correspond to the subjective ratios between the stimuli. In fractionation, the subject adjusts a variable to be equal to 1/k of a standard. In the constant sum method, he divides 100 points between two standards so that the ratio between the assigned points corresponds to the subjective ratio. In the magnitude estimation procedure, his task is to assign numbers so they are proportional to the subjective magnitudes, whereas in the ratio estimation method, he assigns numerical ratios to pairs of stimuli. In the corresponding production procedures, the roles of numbers and stimuli are reversed: the experimenter chooses the numbers and the subject produces the appropriate stimuli or stimulus ratios. Only the constant sum method has a built-in
33
check for adequacy of the basic assumption. But again, appropriate checks of internal consistency are available for the other methods and, in fact, parallel those for the difference methods. Differences versus ratios. The logarithmic, or nearly logarithmic, empirical relationship between difference scales and ratio scales has led to the conjecture that the subject's quantitative judgments are based on a single perceived quantitative relation (Torgerson 1961). According to this argument, when the subject is told to equate differences, he interprets the subjective relation as a difference. When he is told to equate ratios, he interprets the same relation as a ratio. The conjecture receives additional support from the behavior of quantitative judgments when the direction of the attribute is reversed, i.e., when the subject reports on smoothness rather than roughness, or darkness rather than lightness. For difference scales, the attribute and its reverse are linearly, though negatively, related. Stimuli that are separated by equal differences in one direction remain equally different when the direction of judgment is reversed. For the ratio scales, the attribute and its reverse are reciprocally related. Here the equal ratio property is invariant, but differences of course change markedly. The empirical results based on quantitative judgment are thus similar to the formal limitations of the variability methods. Each set of procedures yields scales on which either differences or ratios, but not both, are empirically meaningful. Additional procedures seem necessary to obtain a scale where both relations have an empirical basis. One such procedure has been devised by Cliff (1959). Individual difference models The individual difference, or responder, models use subjects' responses to stimuli as a way of establishing scales for attributes on which the subjects (responders) themselves differ. The models are based upon individual differences; an ultimate aim is to assign scale values to the subjects to represent amount or degree of the attribute possessed by each. Stimuli may also be assigned scale values on a parallel attribute, or they may be assigned parameter values relating them in some more general manner to the attribute of interest. Individual difference models are therefore those in which a response to a stimulus is interpreted as a function of both the scale value of the responder and the parameter values of the stimulus. The relation between the task set for the subject and the attribute continuum differs markedly between the stimulus models and the individual dif-
34
SCALING
ference models. In the stimulus models, the task is a particularized one—the subject evaluates stimuli with respect to the attribute being measured. In the individual difference models, the task itself has no obvious relation to the underlying attribute. In the categorical response methods, the subject simply indicates whether or not (or the extent to which) he agrees with, likes, or can pass a particular item. In the comparative response methods, he indicates which item he agrees with most, or which he prefers. In neither case, however, is the attribute of interest one of agreement or preference. It is, rather, a latent or underlying attribute that serves to explain or account for the variation in the responses of the subjects to the stimulus items. A concrete example might serve to clarify the distinction. Suppose we are given a set of samples of coffee that differ only in the amount of sugar that has been added. The samples are presented, two at a time, to a population of subjects. Each subject chooses the member of each pair that he prefers. If a stimulus model were successfully applied to the data, the result would be a scale of preferability of the samples, ranging from the least preferred to the most preferred for that population of subjects. But if an individual differences model were successfully applied to the data, the result would be a scale of sweetness, with the stimuli ranging from least sweet to most sweet and each subject characterized by a scale value denoting the degree of sweetness that he considers ideal. The subjects' responses do not tell us, of course, that the underlying variable is degree of sweetness. If the coffee samples had varied in strength or in amount of cream added rather than in sweetness, their responses would still have been of exactly the same form. In general, the individual differences models are explicitly concerned solely with the question of whether or not the responses of a given group of subjects to a given set of stimuli can be accounted for by a single underlying attribute. They do not tell one how to select the stimuli in the first place or, given that the stimuli form a scale, how the underlying attribute should be interpreted. Individual differences models can be classified in a number of ways. One important difference, which will be used to organize the remainder of this section, is the distinction between the simple deterministic models and the more elaborate probabilistic models. Deterministic models are developed in terms of the ideal case; there is no provision in the model itself for unsystematic variance. Since the ideal case virtually never occurs, the empirical question is one of the extent to which the ideal approximates the actual behavior of the subjects.
The probabilistic models represent more realistic attempts to account for the behavior of the subjects, provide explicitly for unsystematic variance, and, at least theoretically, lend themselves to statistical evaluation of goodness of fit. Simple deterministic models. Three general models will be considered here: Coombs's distance models for preferential choice data, Guttman's scalogram model for categorical responses to monotone items, and the scalogram models for categorical responses to point items. Distance models. In Coombs's distance models, both subjects and stimuli are represented as points along an underlying, latent continuum. According to the general model, the subject's preferential choices among stimuli are determined by the relative distances of the stimuli from that subject. A stimulus located at the same point as the subject represents his ideal, the one he would prefer above all others. As distance from the subject increases, the desirability of the stimulus to that subject decreases. Subject A thus will prefer stimulus X to stimulus Y when the distance dAB. Scales such as this, which provide not only an order for the elements themselves but also an order for some of the distances between elements, are called ordered metric scales. With suitable modifications (Coombs 1953), the general approach described above can also be applied to data obtained from the "order k\n" and "pick k\ri" methods. In the "order k\n" methods, the subject rank-orders only the first k out of the n stimuli presented to him, and in the "pick k\n" methods, he simply chooses the k out of n stimuli
SCALING he prefers most. Procedures for ordering the stimuli and for locating the subjects in ordered classes are given in Coombs ( 1 953 ) and Torgerson (1958). Monotone and point scalogram models. The scalogram models for categorical data are concerned with subjects and items, where an item is defined as any stimulus or procedure that partitions the set of subjects into two or more mutually exclusive categories. In these models, both subjects and category boundaries can be considered as points on an underlying continuum. The scaling problem is to determine whether the subjects and category boundaries can be positioned along the continuum so that all subjects are located within the appropriate categories of all items. Three types of ideal items are of interest: the monotone multicategory item, the monotone dichotomous item, and the nonmonotone, or point, item. A monotone item divides the underlying continuum into as many segments as there are response categories, with each category corresponding to one and only one segment. The following multicategory item provides an example of the general form: My weight is (a) between 150 and 175 pounds; (fo) 150 pounds or less; (c) 175 pounds or more. Dichotomous monotone items provide only two response alternatives. For example, I weigh over 150 pounds. True _ False __ Different items ordinarily partition the underlying continuum in different places. In general, n monotone items, with a total of m categories in all, partition the underlying continuum into m — n + 1 segments. Guttman's general scalogram procedure (see Stouffer et al. 1950) is a routine for determining whether the n items (a) are monotonic and (b~) can be considered as partitioning the same underlying attribute for the given population of subjects. If so, the final result is, first, a rank order of the item category boundaries on the underlying continuum and, second, the locations of subjects in the segments defined by adjacent category boundaries. The general procedure can be used with any combination of multicategory and dichotomous monotone items. Somewhat simpler procedures are available if all items are dichotomous. Nonmonotone, or point, items also partition the underlying continuum into segments, but not in a one-to-one fashion. An example of one form of nonmonotone item is My weight is between 150 and 175 pounds. True _ False __
35
The positive response to this type of nonmonotone item corresponds to a single segment—in this example, the range from 150 to 175 pounds. But a negative response corresponds to two segments: subjects weighing over 175 pounds and those weighing under 150 pounds both respond negatively. In order to evaluate the scale hypothesis and to obtain an ordinal scale, it is necessary for the segments corresponding to the positive alternatives to overlap. If no overlap occurs, the data contain information sufficient only to locate the subjects into a set of unordered categories. The procedures for uncovering the underlying scale for nonmonotone items are different from, but conceptually similar to, those appropriate for monotone items. An alternative ideal model for nonmonotone items treats the positive category of the item as a point and represents each subject by a segment of the underlying continuum. An example of an item which might fit such a model better would be I weigh about 150 pounds.
Yes No .
Here, subjects might differ with respect to their ideas of the range encompassed by the term "about." Since the two models are formally equivalent— they differ only in the interchange of the role of subject and item—the same analytical routines are applicable. Probabilistic models: the general theory. Most of the models developed for measuring individual difference attributes can be considered within the framework of a single general probabilistic model whose conceptual basis is essentially that of Lazarsfeld's latent structure analysis (1954; see also Stouffer et al. 1950), in which the attribute to be measured is represented formally by an underlying or latent space of one or more dimensions, subjects are represented by points in the latent space, and the stimuli are treated as variables. Stimuli may be psychological test items, attitude statements, rating scales, or, in general, anything that classifies the subjects into two or more exclusive and exhaustive categories. The observations, or manifest data, thus consist of an N by n matrix of the scores of the N subjects on the n stimuli. The stimulus variables are characterized in the general model by the parameters of the equation describing the regression of that variable on the underlyling latent attribute. An important general notion is the principle of local independence. Since each stimulus variable is related to the underlying attribute, the stimulus variables will be related to each other in some fashion. The principle of local independence re-
36
SCALING
quires that the systematic relations among the stimuli be accounted for entirely by the separate relations of each stimulus variable to the underlying attribute. Thus, at any given point in the latent space, the stimuli are all mutually independent. The over-all theory or conceptual framework clearly is completely general. In order to turn it into a testable model—one which places restrictions on the data—additional postulates or conditions are necessary. Three important considerations are the nature of the manifest data required, the nature of the postulated latent attribute, and the form of the regression equation relating the stimulus variables to the latent attribute. A particular model or testable specialization of the general theory depends on making a decision about each of the three. [See LATENT STRUCTURE.] Three levels or types of manifest response data are of major concern here, but obviously others are possible: Dichotomous items—the stimulus variable classifies the subject into one of two categories; ordered classes—the stimulus variable classifies the subject into one of several ordered categories; interval scale—the stimulus variable provides an interval scale value for the subjects. Three restrictive assumptions that can be placed on the postulated latent attribute are the following: the subjects are assumed to be located only at a relatively small number of points or regions in the space; the underlying attribute is assumed to be unidimensional; and the underlying attribute is assumed to be a multidimensional Euclidean space.
Four types of regression equations that relate the stimulus variables to the latent attribute are the various step functions, the linear equation, the normal ogive equation, and the logistic equation. The models also differ in whether or not they provide for or allow variance about the regression line or surface. The distinction here is essentially that made earlier beween deterministic and probabilistic models. The deterministic models for categorical data, which make no provision for extraneous variance, can be considered as limiting cases for certain of the probabilistic versions. Some specializations of the general theory. All of the models described in this section can be treated as specialized instances of general regression theory. In all cases, subjects can be considered as points in an underlying attribute space, stimuli as manifest variables related to the underlying space by a regression equation, and interrelations between manifest variables in terms of their separate relations to the underlying attribute space. The models differ in the kind of data required, the kind of space allowed, the form of the postulated regression equation, and in whether or not explicit provision is made for variance about the postulated regression surface. Table 1 provides a summary of the characteristics of and differences between a number of the more common models. Lazarsfeld's latent class model. In Lazarsfeld's latent class model the stimuli (items) are dichotomous and are scored either as 0 or as 1. The latent space is nominal—subjects are located at discrete
Table 1 — Characteristics of some individual difference models that fall within the general regression approach DETERMINISTIC
General scalogram Observable Dichotomous Ordered classes Interval Latent space Points Unidimensional Multidimensional Regression Step function Linear Normal ogive Logistic Variance about regression
Yes No
Multidimensional Dichoto- extensions mous of scalogram scalogram
PROBABILISTIC
Latent class
Latent profile
Latent distance
Linear
Twofactor
Multiple factor analysis
Normal ogive
Logistic
SCALING points or, equivalently, along arbitrarily ordered intervals of a unidimensional continuum. The regression equation is then a step function, and provision is made for variance about the regression line. If the classes are ordered arbitrarily, the height of the regression line for an item j, over the interval denned by class s, is the average score of the subjects in class s on that item. Since only scores of 0 and 1 are used, the height of the regression line for class s is also the probability that a person in class s will answer item j correctly. This probability is denoted by vjs. The unknowns to be determined are the set of probabilities vjs and the proportion of subjects in each class, ns. The observational information can be expressed by the following set of manifest proportions:
37
1.0
a,- V X < Xj
X > Xj
Figure 2 — Form of item regression or trace line for the latent distance model Source: From Torgerson 1958, p. 375.
the individuals, Lazarsfeld provides the following set of accounting equations:
Pi = the proportion of subjects in the entire sample answering item j positively; +00
Pit — the proportion of subjects answering both item j and item k positively;
/
fi •CO
/ + 00 fj
iu = the proportion answering items j, k, and / positively;
Lazarsfeld has shown that this information can be incorporated into a set of accounting equations, and several procedures have been devised for solving such equations (Green 1951; Anderson 1954). The solutions themselves do not directly indicate the class membership of individual subjects but, rather, give only the proportion of subjects in a class. Additional procedures are needed to assign subjects to classes. Gibsons latent profile model. Gibson's latent profile model (1959), which differs from Lazarsfeld's only in the type of data required, is designed for manifest responses measured on an interval scale. Since the equations for latent profile analysis are formally identical to those of latent class analysis, no new analytical procedures are needed for their solution. Lazarsfeld's continuous models. In Lazarsfeld's continuous models the stimuli are dichotomous items scored either as 0 or as 1, but the latent space is generally assumed to be a unidimensional continuum, although multidimensional extensions have also been suggested. Hence, the several continuous models proposed by Lazarsfeld differ from each other only in the form of the regression line. Where x — the latent variable, fj(x} — the regression of item j on x, and g ( x } = the density function of
•CO
In the latent distance model, the regression, or trace line, for the items j is assumed to be a step function of the form shown in Figure 2. It is assumed that the probability of a response is some constant value (a, — b/) up to a particular point Xj, and at this point it jumps to another value (ttj + bj) and remains constant thereafter. The equation for the regression can be written
(x} = a, — (x) = a, +
for x^ for x>
Each item is thus represented by three parameters : aj , bj , and a break point, Xj . It is a general rule that step-function regression lines provide no metric information about the shape of the underlying distribution of subjects. Any monotonic transformation of the underlying continuum leaves the form of such regression lines unchanged; hence, the final scale is ordinal. Solutions for the latent distance model have been provided by Hays and Borgatta (1954). It is interesting to note that if the parameters a, and bj are both assumed to have values of -| for all items, the latent distance model reduces to Guttman's scalogram model for dichotomous items. Lazarsfeld's linear model assumes that the regression lines can be represented by an equation of the form
38
SCALING
where 0 < f ; (x) ^ 1 for all items over the region of the continuum containing the distribution of subjects. Solutions for the item parameters a; and bj are available (see Torgerson 1958). Spearman s two-factor model. Spearman's twofactor model (1927) differs from Lazarsf eld's linear model only in the form of the manifest data. When it is assumed that the stimulus variables are measured on an interval scale and standardized with a mean of zero and unit variance, then one can write the equation Sij — Cigttjg
' "ij ?
where s iy = score of subject i on stimulus j, cig = score of subject i on the general factor g, ajg = loading of stimulus ; on the general factor, and 6ij represents variance due to unique factors and to error. The regression line can be written simply as fj(x^) = a}x, which differs from Lazarsfeld's linear model only by the lack of an additive constant. Multiple factor analysis. The standard procedures of multiple factor analysis require manifest data on interval scales and differ from Spearman's model by the substitution of a multidimensional latent space for the unidimensional general factor. The basic equation for the score of subject i on stimulus j becomes M Sij
- / jCim Ujm
~T~ "%j ,
m=l
where m — 1, 2, • • •, M is an index for dimensions. The corresponding regression function becomes
[See FACTOR ANALYSIS ; the biography of SPEARMAN.] Normal ogive and logistic models. Normal ogive and logistic models require dichotomous items scored either as 0 or as 1, and assume a unidimensional latent attribute. They differ from the latent distance and linear models in their assumption of regression lines that seem intuitively to be more reasonable, particularly for measuring aptitudes and abilities. Models using the normal ogive trace lines have been developed by Lord (1953) and Tucker (1952). Birnbaum (1957) and Rasch (1960) have worked with the logistic function. WARREN S. TORGERSON [Directly related are the entries LATENT STRUCTURE; MATHEMATICS; PROBABILITY; PSYCHOMETRIC s. Other relevant material may be found in FACTOR ANALYSIS;
the articles listed under MEASUREMENT; PSYCHOPHYSICS; QUANTAL RESPONSE; and in the biographies of FECHNER; SPEARMAN; THURSTONE; WEBER, ERNST HEINRICH.] BIBLIOGRAPHY ANDERSON, T. W. 1954 On Estimation of Parameters in Latent Structure Analysis. Psychometrika 19:1-10. ATTNEAVE, FRED 1949 A Method of Graded Dichotomies for the Scaling of Judgments. Psychological Review 56:334-340. BIRNBAUM, A. (1957) 1958 Probability and Statistics in Item Analysis and Classification Problems. Texas: U.S. Air Force School of Aviation Medicine, Randolph Air Force Base. BRADLEY, RALPH A. 1954 Incomplete Block Rank Analysis: On the Appropriateness of the Model for a Method of Paired Comparisons. Biometrics 10:375390. BRADLEY, RALPH A.; and TERRY, MILTON E. 1952 Rank Analysis of Incomplete Block Designs. I. The Method of Paired Comparisons. Biometrika 39:324-345. CLARKE, FRANK R. 1957 Constant-ratio Rule for Confusion Matrices in Speech Communication. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 29:715-720. CLIFF, NORMAN 1959 Adverbs as Multipliers. Psychological Review 66:27-44. COOMBS, CLYDE H. 1950 Psychological Scaling Without a Unit of Measurement. Psychological Review 57:145— 158. COOMBS, CLYDE H. 1953 Theory and Methods of Social Measurement. Pages 471-535 in Leon Festinger and Daniel Katz (editors), Research Methods in the Behavioral Sciences. New York: Dryden. COOMBS, CLYDE H. 1964 A Theory of Data. New York: Wiley. EDWARDS, ALLEN L.; and THURSTONE, L. L. 1952 An Internal Consistency Check for Scale Values Determined by the Method of Successive Intervals. Psychometrika 17:169-180. GARNER, WENDELL R.; and HAKE, HAROLD W. 1951 The Amount of Information in Absolute Judgments. Psychological Review 58:446-459. GIBSON, W. A. 1959 Three Multivariate Models: Factor Analysis, Latent Structure Analysis, and Latent Profile Analysis. Psychometrika 24:229-252. GREEN, BERT F. JR. 1951 A General Solution for the Latent Class Model of Latent Structure Analysis. Psychometrika 16:151-166. GULLIKSEN, HAROLD 1954 A Least Squares Solution for Successive Intervals Assuming Unequal Standard Deviations. Psychometrika 19:117-139. HAYS, DAVID G.; and BORGATTA, EDGAR F. 1954 An Empirical Comparison of Restricted and General Latent Distance Analysis. Psychometrika 19:271-279. LAZARSFELD, PAUL F. 1954 A Conceptual Introduction to Latent Structure Analysis. Pages 349-387 in Paul F. Lazarsf eld (editor), Mathematical Thinking in the Social Sciences. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. LORD, FREDERIC M. 1953 An Application of Confidence Intervals and of Maximum Likelihood to the Estimation of an Examinee's Ability. Psychometrika 18:5776. LUCE, R. DUNCAN 1959 Individual Choice Behavior: A Theoretical Analysis. New York: Wiley. MOSTELLER, FREDERICK 1951 Remarks on the Method of Paired Comparisons. Part 3: A Test of Significance
SCHELER, MAX for Paired Comparisons When Equal Standard Deviations and Equal Correlations Are Assumed. Psychometrika 16:207-218. RASCH, GEORG W. 1960 Probabilistic Models for Some Intelligence and Attainment Tests. Copenhagen: No publisher listed. SAFFIR, MILTON A. 1937 A Comparative Study of Scales Constructed by Three Psychophysical Methods. Psymetrika 2:179-198. SPEARMAN, CHARLES E. 1927 The Abilities of Man: Their Nature and Measurement. London: Macmillan. STEVENS, S. S. 1966 A Metric for the Social Consensus. Science New Series 151:530-541. STEVENS, S. S.; and GALANTER, E. H. 1957 Ratio Scales and Category Scales for a Dozen Perceptual Continua. Journal of Experimental Psychology 54:377411. STOUFFER, SAMUEL A. et al. 1950 Measurement and Prediction. Studies in Social Psychology in World War II, Vol. 4. Princeton Univ. Press. -» See especially the chapters by Louis Guttman and by Paul F. Lazarsfeld. SUPPES, PATRICK; and ZINNES, JOSEPH L. 1963 Basic Measurement Theory. Volume 1, pages 1-76 in R. Duncan Luce, Robert R. Bush and Eugene Galanter (editors), Handbook of Mathematical Psychology. New York: Wiley. THURSTONE, L. L. 1927 A Law of Comparative Judgment. Psychological Review 34:273-286. THURSTONE, L. L.; and CHAVE, ERNEST I. (1929) 1937 The Measurement of Attitude: A Psychophysical Method and Some Experiments With a Scale for Measuring Attitude Toward the Church. Univ. of Chicago Press. TORGERSON, WARREN S. 1958 Theory and Methods of Scaling. New York: Wiley. TORGERSON, WARREN S. 1961 Distances and Ratios in Psychophysical Scaling. Acta psychologica 19:201205. TUCKER, L. R. 1952 A Level of Proficiency Scale for a Unidimensional Skill. American Psychologist 7:408 only.
SCHELER, MAX Max Scheler (1874-1928), German philosopher and sociologist, was born in Munich. His father came from an upper-middle-class Protestant family which can be traced to the sixteenth century; a number of his forebears had been clergymen and jurists in the city of Coburg. His mother was descended from a Jewish Orthodox family that had been settled in Franconia for many centuries. The clash of religious and cultural traditions in his home may account in part for the strains and tensions in his personality and work. Scheler studied medicine and philosophy at the University of Jena. There, Rudolf Eucken, the Nobel prize-winning idealistic philosopher and defender of Protestant cultural liberalism, was his most prominent teacher. Scheler's early work, beginning with his dissertation at Jena (1899), where
39
he became a Privatdozent in 1901, clearly derived from Eucken. The distinctive aspects of Scheler's thought became apparent only after he moved to the University of Munich in 1907. There he assimilated the phenomenological method: Franz Brentano, who had been Edmund Husserl's teacher, continued to lecture there in Scheler's day, and Scheler was also influenced by Husserl's eminent disciples at the university. Although he was never an "orthodox" phenomenologist, his subsequent philosophizing moved within the orbit of Brentano's and Husserl's thought. [See the biography of HUSSERL.] In 1910 Scheler gave up his connection with the University of Munich and moved to Berlin to live as an academically unattached writer. His first major works were written in this Berlin period. Among his close intellectual companions in those days were Walther Rathenau and Werner Sombart. The outbreak of World War i marked a turning point in Scheler's career. He threw himself with great ardor into the defense of the German cause. The articles and books in which he defended the "German war" with passionately nationalistic fervor brought him to the attention of a wider public than had noticed his more scholarly productions. In 1917 and 1918 he worked at various diplomatic and propagandistic tasks for the German Foreign Office in Geneva and The Hague. During the war years Scheler, despite his intense nationalistic commitment to the "fatherland," moved closer to a Christian position in the realm of ethics, becoming finally a Roman Catholic convert. In 1919 Scheler accepted a call to the chair of philosophy and sociology at the University of Cologne. During the next five years he gradually developed his sociology of knowledge. About 1924 he began slowly to turn away from his previous commitment to Catholicism and eventually left the church. He then began to work on a comprehensive Anthropologie, in which he attempted to expound a kind of vitalistic pantheism that he had come to adopt. But he was not able to develop this new conception fully. He accepted a call from the University of Frankfurt in the beginning of 1928, but he died on May 19, 1928, at the age of 54, before assuming his new post. Quite different strands of thought were woven into the texture of Scheler's thought at different times in his intellectual development. He was ever open to new ideas and did not fear to contradict himself. As a consequence, he failed to achieve a full synthesis of his thought but was able to appeal by virtue of his own intellectual restlessness to the restless young intellectuals of the postwar period.
40
SCHELER, MAX
An erratic man, he was always to be a somewhat disturbing figure to the more settled members of the academic community while he gained considerable influence among younger sociologists and philosophers. Although he did not found a "school," he was a major intellectual pathsetter in pre-Nazi Germany as a social critic and moralist and as a sociologist and philosopher. Since World War n the vogue of phenomenology and existentialism in France has led to vigorous interest there in Scheler's work. In the Anglo-Saxon countries, Scheler was until recently little known, except among scholars interested in the sociology of knowledge or among certain theologians and philosophers. The recent translation of certain of his writings has stimulated wider interest among social scientists. Work in social psychology. Scheler's major contributions to the social sciences lie in the domain of social psychology and the sociology of knowledge. His first major work, Ressentiment (1912), contains a comprehensive phenomenological description of this sentiment as well as an attempt to locate the res sentiment-laden man within the social structure. He developed the notion that certain social roles—the spinster, the mother-in-law, the priest, for example—predispose their occupants to ressentiment, an attitude arising from a sense of impotence in the face of the cumulative repression of feelings of hatred, envy, and desire for revenge. In contrast to Nietzsche, who coined the term, Scheler located the breeding ground of ressentiment in the modern bourgeois and postbourgeois world rather than in Christianity. In The Nature of Sympathy (1913), Scheler presented a detailed description of this feeling state. Here he wedded the phenomenological method to the Pascalian endeavor to outline a "logic of the heart." Scheler attempted to uncover eternal uniformities in feelings and emotions and to show that these, far from being the blind results of mechanistically operating associations, are actually means of knowing which reveal, through their intentionality, the situation of man in the universe and the ethical a prioris of a distinct realm of eternal values. As in much of his later work, Scheler defended the thesis that values exist independently of the men who make the evaluations and justified his resolute opposition to all pragmatist, naturalist, or positivist theories of value. Polemics against such philosophical currents, more especially against Kantianism and Neo-Kantianism, form a major part of Scheler's work. His Formalismus in der Ethik . . . —first published in 1916 but written before the war (Gesammelte Werke, vol. 2)—-contains the most elaborate development
of his anti-Kantian polemics as well as ethical speculations and sociological considerations that anticipate many of his later sociological ideas. On the Eternal in Man (1921) is the fullest exposition of Scheler's religious thought and also contains germs of his later sociological views. The sociology of knowledge. Scheler's contribution to the sociology of knowledge is to be found in his "Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens" (1924), two years later expanded in Die Wissens for men und die Gesellschaft (Gesammelte Werke, vol. 8). He attempted to synthesize a Platonic doctrine of eternal immutability of a world of value essences with a comprehensive relativism. He described how different groups of men have striven, each in its socially and historically limited way, to grasp aspects of the eternal sphere of value essences. The infinite variety of subjective a prioris, the fact that different groups, or periods, or individual types elaborate their own forms of knowledge, meant to Scheler that men are striving to attain the value essences in different ways at different times rather than that the immutability of these very essences is limited. Real factors (such as biological, political, or economic constellations) favor or oppose the actualization of ideal factors (for example, moral, religious, or intellectual values), but they can never determine their content. They can only act as "sluice gates of the spirit." Scheler rejected Comte's "law of three stages" and stressed that religious, metaphysical, and scientific knowledge do not succeed each other in regular progression but rather coexist in every age, rooted though they are in the conditions of life of different groups of men and different human types. Yet Scheler found a grain of truth in Comte's dogmatic assertion that there are stages in human history in the sense that in different periods different substructural elements determine the predominant cultural outlook of the age. At the dawn of history, "blood"—that is, racial and vital factors—chiefly controlled cultural life. After the emergence of the state, political factors moved to the foreground. With the bourgeois age, economic factors have achieved unquestioned predominance. While earlier periods accorded preeminence to religious and metaphysical types of knowledge, the bourgeois age is primarily the age of the scientist. Scheler's world view has a deeply aristocratic cast. The idea of hierarchy is central to it, and the equalitarian tendencies of the modern age were therefore deeply abhorrent to him. His doctrine of moral values is hierarchical: pleasure values, those concerning the pleasant or unpleasant, are inferior to vital values, those promoting well-being and
SCHELER, MAX health, while these are again inferior to spiritual values; the highest values, however, are of a religious or sacred character. To such a hierarchy of values corresponds a hierarchy of men representing them. The saint incarnates the sacred values at the very top of the hierarchy; the genius stands for the spiritual values; the hero stands for the vital values; even in the lowest world, that of pleasure, "artists of consumption" are needed to guide our uncertain taste. To the hierarchy of values and of men embodying them there corresponds a hierarchy of forms of sociation. The lowest form is the simple horde, in which emotional contagion and unconscious imitation constitute the only bond. In the vital community, on the other hand, in the family or tribe as well as in classes or professions, conscious solidarity binds the participants. As against the horde, the social here prevails over the individual; each member can easily be substituted for any other. In the third type of sociation, Tonnies' Gesellschaft, superficial contractual bonds between individuals replace supra-individual goals that are consciously supported. Finally, at the apex of the hierarchy, the Gesamtperson, the "complex collective personality," represents a type of sociation in which a quintessential solidarity binds the members in a community of love. This last form, of which the church and the nation are central examples, is eminently superior to all others; within it alone can the higher values be realized. To posit equality between persons and so to level essential differences of value was, to Scheler, the chief aberration of the modern age. His full-scale attack against the post-Christian world, his rejection of liberalism, altruism, humanitarianism, and democracy can best be understood as resulting from his conviction that the modern world with its leveling tendencies has undermined the objective hierarchy of men and values. His cultural criticism hence proceeds from a profoundly elitist point of view. The modern social scientist will of necessity have to sift Scheler's very real contributions to sociology and social psychology from the antidemocratic ideology in which they are all too often embedded. LEWIS A. COSER [For the historical context of Scheler's work, see KNOWLEDGE, SOCIOLOGY OF; and the biographies of COMTE; HUSSERL; KANT; TONNIES. For discussion of the subsequent influence of Scheler's ideas, see EXPRESSIVE BEHAVIOR; PERCEPTION, article on PERSON PERCEPTION; PERSONALITY, POLITICAL; PHENOMENOLOGY; SYMPATHY AND EMPATHY; and the biography of MANNHEIM.]
41
WORKS BY SCHELER
1899
Beitrdge zur Feststellung der Beziehungen zwischen den logischen und ethischen Prinzipien. Jena: Vopelius. -» Inaugural dissertation, University of Jena. (1912) 1961 Ressentiment. Edited with an introduction by Lewis A. Coser. New York: Free Press. -> First published as Uber Ressentiment und moralisches Werturteil. The second German edition appears on pages 33-147 of Volume 3 of Scheler's Gesammelte Werke under the title "Das Kessentiment im Aufbau der Moralen." (1913) 1954 The Nature of Sympathy. Translated by Peter Heath, with an introduction by Werner Stark. London: Routledge. -> First published as Zur Phdnomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefiihle und von Liebe und Hass. The second German edition was published as Wesen und Formen der Sympathie. (1921) 1961 On the Eternal in Man. Translated by Bernard Noble. New York: Harper. -* First published as Vom Ewigen im Menschen. 1924 Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens. Pages 5—146 in Max Scheler (editor), Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens. Munich and Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. (1927) 1961 Man's Place in Nature. Translated with an introduction by Hans Meyerhoff. New York: Farrar; Boston: Beacon. -> First published in German in Volume 8 of Der Leuchter. (1929) 1958 Philosophical Perspectives. Translated by Oscar A. Haac. Boston: Beacon Press. -» First published as Philosophische Weltanschauung. Gesammelte Werke. Vols. 1—. Bern (Switzerland): Francke, 1954- . -» Thirteen volumes are projected, of which the following have appeared: Volume 2: Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik: Neuer Versuch der Grundlegung eines ethischen Personalismus (1913-1916) 1954. Fourth edition, revised. Volume 3: Vom Umsturz der Werte: Abhandlungen und Aufsdtze (1911-1914) 1955. Fourth edition, revised. Volume 5: Vom Evrigen im Menschen (1921) 1954. Fourth edition, revised. Volume 6: Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre (1923-1924) 1963. Second edition, revised. Volume 8: Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft (1926) 1960. Second edition, revised. Volume 10: Schriften aus dem Nachlass (1933) 1957. Second edition, revised and enlarged. SUPPLEMENTARY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BECKER, HOWARD; and DAHLKE, HELMUT OTTO 1942 Max Scheler's Sociology of Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2:310-322. COSER, LEWIS A.; and HOLDHEIM, WILLIAM W. 1961 Max Scheler: An Introduction. New York: Free Press. DUPUY, MAURICE 1959 La philosophie de Max Scheler: Son evolution et son unite. 2 vols. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. GURVITCH, GEORGES D. (1930) 1949 L'intuitionnisme emotionnel de Max Scheler. Pages 67-152 in Georges Gurvitch, Les tendances actuelles de la philosophic allemande: E. Husserl, M. Scheler, E. Lash, N. Hartmann, M. Heidegger. Paris: Vrin. KANTHACK, KATHARINA 1948 Max Scheler: Zur Krisis der Ehrfurcht. Berlin and Hannover: Minerva. McGiLL, V. J. 1942 Scheler's Theory of Sympathy and Love. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2: 273-291. -» The entire issue is devoted to Scheler.
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SCHIZOPHRENIA
MANNHEIM, KARL (1925) 1952 Sociology of Knowledge From the Standpoint of Modern Phenomenology (Max Scheler). Pages 154-179 in Karl Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. -> Contains a discussion of the differences between Mannheim's and Scheler's approaches to the sociology of knowledge. First published in German. STARK, WERNER 1958 The Sociology of Knowledge: An Essay in Aid of a Deeper Understanding of the History of Ideas. London: Routledge; Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. STAUDE, JOHN R. 1967 Max Scheler: An Intellectual Portrait. New York: Free Press.
SCHIZOPHRENIA Schizophrenia constitutes the core problem of insanity. The conditions subsumed under the heading are among the most devastating to which man is heir, blighting him in the process of development or in the prime years of life and commonly leading to his progressive enclosure in an autistic world beset by delusion, hallucination, and fear of involvement with life and people. Because of the diverse manifestations, courses, and outcomes, schizophrenic reactions elude precise definition and concise description. They may be defined as gross failures to achieve or maintain integrated personality functioning in which a person, unable to cope with problems of living and irreconcilable conflicts, withdraws and seeks solutions by breaking through the confines imposed by the culture's ways of thinking and reasoning and by regressing to a period of childhood when reality gave way to fantasy and when the self and others were not yet clearly distinguished. The condition tends to be self-perpetuating because the patient abandons testing his ideas in terms of how they help master his environment and promote collaborative interaction with others. However, restitutive efforts are usually made because a person cannot achieve an equilibrium as an isolate and because fears of uncontrollable impulses interfere with autistic gratification. Incidence and prevalence. Schizophrenia is among the most common conditions leading to profound incapacitation. Of the daily hospital census in the United States of about 1.4 million patients, approximately one-fourth are hospitalized because of schizophrenia. Although the large majority are discharged within the first year after admission, the average length of stay is 13 years because a sizable number remain in hospitals from adolescence or early adulthood until death from old age or some disease. Incidence and prevalence can be estimated only very roughly because of the
number of schizophrenic patients who are never hospitalized or even diagnosed and because of the vague boundaries of the condition. It has been estimated that between 14 and 20 of every 1,000 children born in the United States will be hospitalized at some time in their lives with an illness diagnosed as schizophrenia. A minimum annual prevalence rate of 290 per 100,000 has been suggested for Western societies (Lemkau & Crocetti 1958). Surveys in New Haven (Hollingshead & Redlich 1958) and in England (Brooke 1959) have shown that both incidence and prevalence are much higher among the lower socioeconomic segments of the population than among the uppermiddle and upper classes. [See MENTAL DISORDERS, article on EPIDEMIOLOGY.] Concepts of schizophrenia The profound divergencies of opinion concerning the nature, etiology, and treatment of schizophrenic conditions reflect differing concepts of the nature of human adaptation and integration more than they reflect divergent findings. Traditionally, psychiatrists have considered that the profound incapacitations of schizophrenic patients and, particularly, the disordered thinking that forms a critical aspect of the condition must be due to some unknown biological impairment—a structural defect of the brain or some hereditary metabolic or toxic factor influencing cerebral functioning. A large majority continues to believe that the high familial incidence indicates a hereditary predisposition that is affected by environmental factors, perhaps through aggravating a metabolic dysfunction. However, others consider schizophrenic reactions as an extreme type of aberrant personality functioning resulting from faulty and distorting child rearing in deviant family environments. The way in which schizophrenia is conceptualized is not simply a matter of academic interest but of vital moment, as it influences the direction of scientific investigations and therapeutic efforts and, as will become apparent, has even profoundly influenced the clinical picture and course of the condition. The conviction that schizophrenia is a disease due to a biological impairment leads to concentration of research in neuropathological, physiological, and biochemical fields and has created therapeutic pessimism. This attitude has often contributed to the neglect of patients and, at times, virtually condemned them to crowded and impersonal institutions that aggravated their autistic withdrawal. Such orientation left little room for the participation of social scientists, other than in studies of the economic and social implications
SCHIZOPHRENIA of a devastating disease. In contrast, the conceptualization of schizophrenia as a type of aberrant personality development has made it possible to consider schizophrenic reactions in the study of how the developmental process can go awry and thus perhaps to clarify critical issues concerning human integration and emotional homeostasis. Investigations of such matters as the role of language in human adaptation, of the family as a critical social institution that mediates between biological and cultural directives and between the individual and society, of the influence of social class on the incidence of mental illness and how it relates to child-rearing practices, of cross-cultural influences on personality development, and of the social and political structure of mental hospitals and the society's system of caring for the ill, and numerous other areas of study become a vital part of the effort to understand, control, and treat schizophrenic reactions. Further, as schizophrenia constitutes one of the dominant unsolved health problems, the training of all physicians as well as of psychiatrists in particular will be affected profoundly by the conceptualization of the problems and the projection of an approach to their solution. Historical considerations. The concept of schizophrenia as a clinical entity derives from Emil Kraepelin's recognition in 1896 of the relationship between three forms of insanity—catatonia, described by K. Kahlbaum in 1863; hebephrenia, described by E. Hecker in 1871; and the deteriorating paranoid psychoses—and his uniting them under the designation "dementia praecox," which B. Morel had used for a type of deteriorating adolescent psychosis. Kraepelin brought a degree of order to psychiatric taxonomy by differentiating dementia praecox from the manic-depressive psychoses. He emphasized the progressive course of dementia starting in youth and envisioned a distinct disease entity for which a specific structural pathology or causative agent would be found. The term "schizophrenia" was introduced by Eugen Bleuler in 1911, because not all sufferers from dementia praecox were youthful and not all became demented; it also served to emphasize the splitting of the psychic functions—the intellectual, affective, and conative—in these patients. Bleuler considered the possibility of a psychological causation but favored a hereditary etiology. He considered that the unknown etiologic agent produced primary symptoms of disturbances in associations, abnormalities of affect, emotional and intellectual ambivalence, and turning from reality to fantasy, as well as autism, whereas such symptoms as delusions, hallucinations, motor disorders, etc., were secondary and
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amenable to psychological treatment. He also stressed the intact capacities for perception, memory, and intellectual functioning that differentiate schizophrenia from the organic and toxic psychoses. In essence, he outlined the critical paradox of schizophrenic conditions: thought disorders form a critical aspect and diagnostic requisite, but the anatomical and physiological capacities for perceiving, thinking, and remembering remain intact. Together with Carl Gustav Jung, Bleuler brought psychoanalytic insights into the study of the psychology of schizophrenia. [See the biographies Of BLEULER; JUNG; KRAEPELIN.] Adolf Meyer's view. For the vast majority of psychiatrists throughout the world, the schizophrenic syndrome has remained essentially unchanged since the publication of Bleuler's monograph (1911), although many have adhered more closely to Kraepelin's concepts of a clear-cut disease entity, as the collected papers of the 1957 World Congress devoted to schizophrenia demonstrate (World Congress . . . 1959). However, Adolf Meyer, the dominant American contemporary of Bleuler, did not consider schizophrenia as an illness but as a reaction type that could be brought on by faulty "habit patterns," including habits of thinking and relating (Meyer 1896-1937). For many years Meyer was almost the only important influence advocating longitudinal dynamic studies of life histories of schizophrenic patients, and he countered the prevailing therapeutic pessimism with his melioristic approach which advocated a type of psychotherapeutic management in a socializing milieu. Meyer is largely responsible for the different perspectives concerning schizophrenia held by many American psychiatrists in contrast to those of their Continental colleagues. [See the biography of MEYER.] Psychoanalysis. Even though Freud had excluded the treatment of schizophrenia from the province of psychoanalysis because he tacitly accepted an organic or toxic etiology and considered that the regression to narcissism prevented formation of a transference relationship, psychoanalysis still made many major contributions to understanding schizophrenic patients and their symptoms. Such concepts as narcissistic fixation and regression, the psychosexual stages of development, infantile sexuality, the withdrawal of cathexes (libidinal investment) from objects, primary process thinking, the interpretation of dreams, the exposition of the defense mechanisms —particularly those of projection and introjection— and of the importance of homosexuality to paranoid states, etc., opened the way for a dynamic under-
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standing of schizophrenic patients and for comprehension of productions that previously had seemed to be the incomprehensible utterances of a diseased mind. Harry Stack Sullivan was among the first analysts who focused attention on the treatment of schizophrenic patients and whose psychoanalytic orientation was greatly modified by work with them. In the process he found need and use for contributions from various behavioral sciences. Sullivan (1924-1933) and his colleague FrommReichmann (1948) were major forces in demonstrating by determined efforts that psychoanalytic therapy could be adapted to the treatment of schizophrenic patients. [See the biography of SULLIVAN.] Clinical descriptions The nature of the disorder varies widely. Most often schizophrenic reactions become manifest in the adolescent or young adult when the impact of sexual drives and the attainment of independence, an identity, and a way of life present critical problems. The young person may gradually and insidiously become increasingly withdrawn, preoccupied, and resistant to direction from others. He may avoid facing problems and relating to others by sleeping through much of the day. Sudden outbursts of irritability or hostility toward family members ward off intrusions. Rumination over personal and philosophical problems increases, and intellectualizations displace commitment and show of emotions. Differentiation from adolescent "identity crises" or other types of adolescent turmoil is difficult, and the future of the youth may hang in the balance. Gradually withdrawal becomes more extreme, indecision paralyzing, and ambivalence of feelings pronounced. Appearance and bodily hygiene may be neglected. Communication becomes vague, missing the mark and leaving the listener puzzled. Feelings of unreality and depersonalization are common. Self-direction is rescinded or paralyzed, allowing drive, impulse, and fantasy to gain increased motivating force. Control of drives and hostilities becomes a major preoccupation, while motivation is sought through interpreting coincidental events and reading meanings into people's expressions and gestures. Then delusional solutions and hallucinated directives are found. Unacceptable feelings and impulses are projected onto others, who become malevolent figures. Hypochondriacal complaints are common and may reflect fears of transformation into the opposite sex. Increasingly the patient lives in an autistic world, gaining a sense of worth or even greatness through fantasy; he is also a prey to delusions of persecution and to terror lest homicidal, suicidal,
or incestuous impulses overwhelm him. In some patients the first serious indication of the psychosis comes in an outbreak of panic over loss of control or over projected dangers. Frequently, when the patient can remain isolated or when he is neglected in an institution, habits and bodily care deteriorate, communications become disorganized and bizarre, and the patient comes to live in a world of delusion and hallucination. He exists in a state of almost living death, a nonparticipant in society and its conventions, virtually beyond the reach of therapeutic intervention. However, such outcomes are not inherent to schizophrenic reactions and need not occur, and with improved treatment they are becoming less common even in large institutions. The course and outcome vary widely and are influenced markedly by the treatment provided. Under average current conditions, approximately two-thirds of hospitalized patients will be discharged within 12 months: about half of these will remain reasonably well, while the remainder will have further serious difficulties and tend to have a downhill course. The outlook is poor for those who cannot be discharged within the first year. However, as less flagrant forms of schizophrenia are now diagnosed more often than formerly and as better treatment opportunities are available to some, the diagnosis need not imply so poor a prognosis. Schizophrenic reactions are most likely to occur in persons who have socialized poorly and who tend to be shy, introspective, somewhat eccentric, and, perhaps, compliantly overconscientious. Still, a fair proportion have not been notably schizoid, and some have been outgoing but impetuous individuals. Lifelong difficulties in socializing and an early progressive withdrawal decrease chances of recovery. Types of schizophrenia. Conventionally, four types of schizophrenia are described. Actually, most patients can be fitted into these types only arbitrarily, showing admixtures of two or more types, with shifts in the dominant symptomatology over time. However, brief outlines of these subgroupings will serve to describe some of the different clinical pictures. Catatonic schizophrenia. In catatonic schizophrenia extremes of violent motor excitement or rigid immobility dominate the picture. Onset is often abrupt. The patient may maintain difficult postures for hours, days, or months and requires complete care. Alternations between extreme excitement and rigidity may occur. Frequently these patients are in the midst of some mystical experience, believing themselves in heaven or hell; they are often immobile and refuse to speak because
SCHIZOPHRENIA they believe any movement or word can produce a universal catastrophe. Although they may appear out of contact, they are aware of and sensitive to their surroundings. The prognosis is more favorable than for other types but unpredictable in the individual case. Chronic catatonic states, once fairly common, are becoming infrequent in modern hospitals. Simple schizophrenia. Simple schizophrenia usually refers to a gradual withdrawal of interest and a progressive decline of responsible behavior with absence of commitment to a definite way of life. The potentialities shown in youth dissipate, and the patient idles about the home or becomes a vagrant, etc. Theoretically, Bleuler's primary symptoms are present with minimal secondary symptoms; however, many patients given this diagnosis are delusional but noncommunicative about their delusions and hallucinations. Hebephrenic schizophrenia. Hebephrenic schizophrenia usually starts in adolescence and progresses rapidly: the patient soon displays silly, impulsive, and disorganized behavior. Delusions and hallucinations are poorly organized and shifting. Speech is often fragmented and almost incomprehensible, marked by frequent intrusions of primary process material. Paranoid schizophrenia. In paranoid schizophrenia delusions of a persecutory type dominate thought and behavior; ideas of reference are common and blend with auditory hallucinations. Megalomanic delusions relate to ideas of being the focus of widespread plots. The later in life the onset, the more likely it is that the delusions will be systematized and the reaction type approach the condition described under paranoid states. [See PARANOID REACTIONS.] Other subcategories. The current official nomenclature includes a schizoaffective type to cover the numerous patients who display an admixture of schizophrenic and manic-depressive symptoms: if these are considered separate entities, such patients would be suffering from both conditions. However, if schizophrenic reactions are regarded as a type of aberrant development leading to failures of personality integration, other such combined diagnoses will be used. Sociopathic youths can also be more or less schizophrenic; hypochondriacal neuroses may shift to psychoses with somatic or hypochondriacal delusions; obsessive patients can decompensate with obsessive thoughts becoming increasingly bizarre and delusional. Further, although the typical schizophrenic reactions are readily diagnosed, there are no clear boundaries that delimit the use of the diagnosis.
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Those who are reluctant to relinquish the concept of schizophrenia as a progressive deteriorating disease seek to distinguish between process and nonprocess schizophrenia or between schizophrenia and schizophreniform conditions (Langfeldt 1933): the patients who recover or who are amenable to psychotherapy, etc., are not considered as true schizophrenics and supposedly can be distinguished by their premorbid behavior, heredity, and symptomatology—a view not widely shared in the United States. The diagnosis of pseudoneurotic schizophrenia (Hoch & Polatin 1949) is used by some psychiatrists to indicate patients with panneurotic symptomatology who are not amenable to psychotherapy because they are really schizophrenic, but others consider these as "borderline" patients whose neurotic symptoms form a defense against personality disorganization. Borderline schizophrenia refers to patients who maintain a tenuous integration with meager defenses against incursions of primitive impulses and strange primary process material into consciousness. Childhood schizophrenia refers to cases occurring before adolescence. It is not clear if cases occurring early in childhood are related to the adult condition. Early infantile autism is a puzzling illness that occurs in the first few years of life; the child begins to display peculiar repetitive behavior and regresses, paying little attention to other persons. Some of these children clearly suffer from brain anomalies or brain damage; others have been raised by unempathic, intellectualizing parents. These conditions cannot be discussed adequately in this section. [See MENTAL DISORDERS, article on CHILDHOOD MENTAL DISORDERS.]
The confusions concerning nomenclature have been presented because the various terms are in common usage but also because they reflect the difficulties and ambiguities in the field. Terms may be used in the literature with a certainty that can be misleading, leaving the inexperienced person— and even the experienced one—feeling ignorant rather than perplexed when he cannot make a clear-cut diagnosis. Concepts of etiology Impairment of brain functioning. The conviction that such profound personality disorganizations, marked by disordered thinking and often progressing to an almost vegetative state of existence, must reflect impairment of brain functioning has led to intensive investigations of post-mortem and biopsy sections of the brain and of every endocrine, toxic, and biochemical factor that might
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conceivably affect cerebral functioning. The erroneous assumption that insulin coma therapy cured schizophrenia led to an upsurge of such studies in the 1930s and 1940s, and currently the meliorating effects of the phenothiazine drugs have provided renewed impetus. Investigators have again and again reported some biochemical factor they consider specific to schizophrenia, and each of these findings has been invalidated sooner or later. A number of these factors have turned out to be related to such things as dietary inadequacies or are concerned with physiological disturbances secondary to chronic emotional disturbances or to prolonged inactivity or some other influence of chronic hospitalization. Neuroanatomical investigations. None of the numerous reports of an abnormality of the brain has been validated. The similarities of the personalities and developmental histories of patients with psychomotor epilepsy and schizophrenia form an interesting lead that is under study. Endocrine investigations. Although the thyroid, pituitary, gonadal, pineal, and adrenal cortical and medullary secretions have all been implicated, no evidence has held up. The intriguing hypothesis that epinephrine undergoes an anomalous breakdown into psychotoxic substances is being pursued (Hoffer 1964), but recent evidence does not bear out the initial enthusiasm. Biochemical investigations. Recently emphasis has been directed to the study of brain amines and indole excretion, and to psychotogenic agents such as LSD-25 and the supposedly psychotogenic extracts of schizophrenic serum. Various theories relating several such factors have been proposed. Intensive work is advancing knowledge of brain chemistry and fosters hope for future discoveries pertinent to schizophrenia, but recent premature enthusiasms indicate a need for more carefully controlled and validated work before publication. [See MENTAL DISORDERS, article on BIOLOGICAL ASPECTS.]
Genetic hypothesis. The high familial incidence of schizophrenia had led to virtual acceptance of the belief that some genetically transmitted factor plays an important role in the etiology of schizophrenia [see MENTAL DISORDERS, article on GENETIC ASPECTS]. It has been primarily the evidence from twin studies that seemed to demand acceptance of a strong hereditary influence. Until very recently all twin studies reported a much higher concordance rate in identical twins than in samesexed fraternal twins or siblings—as high as 86 per cent in identical as against 17 per cent in samesexed fraternal twins. Lately, several investigators
noted puzzling inconsistencies in the data. The only two studies of all twins born within a given span of time rather than of samples of hospitalized patients fail to validate the earlier findings. A survey of all male twins born in Finland between 1930 and 1935 found that none of the 16 schizophrenic patients among the identical twins had a schizophrenic co-twin (Tienari 1963). Studies in Norway of an even larger sample, although still incomplete, indicate that concordance rates for identical twins will not be much higher than for same-sexed siblings (Kringlen 1964). It appears as if the striking results of prior twin studies were due to sampling errors and that this basis for the genetic hypothesis of schizophrenia has been badly shaken. Family environment. A high familial incidence of personality traits or illnesses has often led to erroneous overemphasis of genetic factors. Attention has been directed increasingly to the role of the family environment in producing schizophrenic offspring. Psychoanalytic theory, in considering schizophrenia related to fixations at the oral stage of development, drew attention to failures in the earliest mother-child transactions. As early as 1924, Sullivan emphasized the noxious influence of certain mothers on the development of their schizophrenic sons, both directly and because of their attitudes toward their husbands (1924-1933). Considerable etiologic significance has been given to the "schizophrenogenic mother" who is either aloof, unempathic, and unable to cathect in the child properly or, more typically, cannot establish boundaries between herself and the child, engulfing and controlling a child she needs to complete her life. Studies since 1949 (Lidz et al. 1965) have revealed deficiencies and abnormalities in the total intrafamilial environment. The fathers are frequently just as severely disturbed as the mothers. The family is split by enduring conflict between the parents in which each demolishes the worth of the other to the children, or the family transactions are distorted because one parent acquiesces to the spouse's strange ways of rearing children and patterning the family life. The generation roles within the family are confused in a variety of ways such as parental rivalry with a child or parental dependency upon an immature child, including heterosexual or homosexual incestuous proclivities. Parents fail to adhere to their respective sex-linked roles, either because of homosexual tendencies or through reversing maternal and paternal roles, or because a mother cannot fill an affectional-expressive role or a father an instrumental role. The parent of the same sex as the child who becomes schizophrenic
SCHIZOPHRENIA does not form an adequate model for identification, a situation that is often aggravated because this parent's worth is undercut by the spouse. Communication within the family is always disturbed and often clearly irrational or paralogical. The intrafamilial culture may deviate markedly from that of the society into which the child must eventually emerge. These families teach or indirectly inculcate irrationality, providing a poor foundation in reality testing and for understanding verbal and nonverbal communications outside of the family. The schizophrenic patient's siblings are almost always seriously affected: more are psychotic than are reasonably well-integrated, and with rare exception their occasional "normality" is achieved at the price of serious constriction of the personality. The finding that schizophrenic patients always grow up in seriously disturbed families forms the most consistent lead concerning the etiology of schizophrenia. Essentially similar phenomena have been reported by research groups in many different countries. In conceptualizing how such disturbed family transactions can lead to schizophrenia in an offspring, some investigators focus primarily upon how the disturbed patterns of communication foster the schizophrenic thought disorder. The "double bind" hypothesis (Bateson et al. 1956) notes how the patient is habitually caught in a bind because a parent covertly sends conflicting messages that perplex and paralyze, causing him to be rebuffed whichever way he responds; or he is caught between the opposing needs and demands of his two parents, and satisfying either parent provokes rejection by the other. Various other communication problems have been noted: the ways in which the child is taught to deny or ignore what should be obvious; the distortions of meanings to support a parent's tenuous emotional equilibrium; the fostering of distrust in the utility of verbal communications; the teaching of eccentric or delusional beliefs; the blurring of the system of meanings and constructs by inconsistent reinforcement by parents, etc. (Lidz et al. 1965). The amorphous or fragmented nature of the thinking and communicating of one or both parents has been carefully documented (Wynne & Singer 1963). Studies of the family communication patterns clarify why the patient suffers from a thought disorder and how such resultant impairments in thinking and communicating create profound disturbances in ego functioning. The family disturbances, however, clearly affect the child's development deleteriously in other significant ways. A broader approach to the problem
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takes cognizance of how failures of parental nurturance, particularly the mother's difficulties in relating to the child, interfere with the development of adequate autonomy; how the disturbances in the family structure distort the structuring of the child's personality by improper channeling of drives, through confusing child and parent roles, by creating confusions in sexual identity, by impeding proper resolution of the oedipal situation, etc.; as well as of how parents' failure to transmit adequately basic adaptive or instrumental techniques of the culture, including its system of meanings, impairs ego functioning and socializing capacities (Lidz et al. 1965). The family studies have thus far been largely exploratory, paving the way for the formulation of hypotheses that are now being studied with more rigorous methodology. Although not definitive, they have served to move research concerning the etiology of schizophrenia out of the frustrating whirlpool in which it had been caught. Many puzzling aspects of schizophrenia now seem far more comprehensible. The findings interdigitate with those of other approaches, such as studies of the relationship between social class and incidence of schizophrenia, twin studies, and psychoanalytic concepts of developmental dynamics. The knowledge gained from these studies has also had a marked impact upon therapy, particularly through drawing attention to the need to consider the family as a unit rather than simply to focus upon the individual patient. Therapy Despite the absence of any specific method of treatment, marked changes have taken place in the therapy of schizophrenic patients since 1940. Perhaps the most important change has been the gradual but progressive abandonment of the defeatist attitude concerning schizophrenia that had pervaded most of psychiatry since the mid-nineteenth century. Although debates have waged concerning the value of insulin coma, electroshock, frontal lobotomy, milieu therapy, and various forms of individual and group psychotherapy, psychiatrists and other personnel finding something they could do or try to do became interested in the patients, and the patients responded. It became apparent to increasing numbers of psychiatrists that schizophrenic patients need not follow a downhill course, and that many of the extreme manifestations were products of neglect and virtual abandonment in impersonal institutions. The enormity of the problem of caring for and attempting to treat the masses of institutionalized patients
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has been overwhelming, and adequate treatment for any other than selected patients has had to await reorganizations of hospital systems and the training of the necessary personnel. Therapeutic efforts must be suited to the patient, the facilities available, and the therapist's abilities. Whereas the prognosis for schizophrenic reactions collectively is generally discouraging, the outlook for the individual patient, particularly if treatment begins soon after symptoms appear and intensive care can be provided, may be regarded hopefully. "Organic" treatments. Although insulin coma therapy, introduced in 1933, did much to revive interest in the treatment of schizophrenic patients, it has now been virtually discarded, its apparent efficacy having resulted from the increased attention to patients it required. Electric convulsive treatments are of occasional value as a means of quieting extremely excited patients. Various tranquilizing drugs, particularly the phenothiazines, have largely replaced other "organic" treatments. The phenothiazines serve to lessen anxiety and agitation and probably dimmish distraction by extraneous stimuli and primary process intrusions. Trifluoperazine may be particularly useful in diminishing hallucinations. An array of psychotropic drugs is now available, and opinions differ as to the merits of each. Properly controlled experiments on the relative worth of these medications are extremely difficult to conduct. It seems reasonably certain that many patients can return to or remain in the community largely because of these agents. A major influence of tranquilizing drugs has been indirect; they have helped quiet the wards in mental institutions and provided a means of controlling seriously disturbed patients. This has helped produce great changes in mental hospitals through unlocking doors, permitting patients greater freedom, and allowing the staff time and opportunity to improve the therapeutic milieu. [See MENTAL DISORDERS, TREATMENT OF, article On SOMATIC TREATMENT.]
Milieu therapy. Establishing a suitable therapeutic hospital milieu has altered the prognosis for schizophrenic patients as much as the tranquilizing drugs, but in all except certain select institutions, reorganization had to await the quieting effects of the shock therapies and then the tranquilizers. Milieu therapy seeks to counter schizophrenic patients' tendencies to withdraw; it also fosters socialization, promotes responsibility, and provides retraining in interpersonal relationships. The therapy includes a gamut of measures ranging from discarding restraints; minimizing isolation; giving attentive care and interest; fostering socializing, edu-
cational, and occupational activities; and providing group therapy to holding patient-staff meetings and setting up patient government to provide channels of communication and to encourage responsibility for the self and others. Opening the doors of hospitals has a salutary influence and can markedly change the attitudes of both patients and staff, but some patients who are afraid of their impulsivity, aggressions, or suicidal tendencies feel more secure and can socialize more readily when protected within a limited area until they are ready to assume responsibility for their actions. As schizophrenic patients tend to regress, withdraw, and become passively dependent in institutions, there has been a movement to return such patients to the community as soon as feasible or to attempt to keep them out of hospitals altogether. On the other hand, efforts are often made to promote early hospitalization, for the chances of recovery are greater if treatment starts before symptoms become well established and if the patient can be removed from a pathogenic environment. The paradox revolves around the nature of the treatment a hospital can offer; optimally a hospital should be able to counter regressive tendencies. As yet, relatively few institutions can provide intensive care and treatment that seeks to promote essential personality change rather than mere remission from a psychotic state. Psychotherapy. Establishing a relationship to another person often—perhaps always—provides the impetus and forms the bridge for the schizophrenic patient's return from psychotic withdrawal. The crux of the initial phases of psychotherapeutic work with these patients is the therapist's use of himself to gain the patient's trust and willingness to risk relating again despite the shattering disillusionments of the past. A persistent warm and honest interest by an untrained person may suffice and succeed where a highly trained but intellectualized and uncommitted therapist fails. Schizophrenic patients are usually highly sensitive to pretense, to being used by another person, and to another person's withdrawal in the face of their intense needs or their hostilities. Usually, however, considerable skill and understanding of schizophrenic patients are required. Trust follows upon understanding, understanding requires communication, and the therapist faces the task of establishing communication across barriers imposed by the patient's idiosyncratic language usage, his personalized metaphor, his efforts to conceal and yet convey, the delusions and hallucinatory interruptions, and the projections of the patient's thoughts and feelings onto the therapist, etc. The therapist
SCHIZOPHRENIA must be prepared and able to counter or weather the patient's flights into withdrawal, particularly when the patient feels on the verge of trusting and becoming involved—setbacks that test the therapist's commitment. Bringing a patient out of his psychotic regression and withdrawal can be a very real and rewarding achievement, but something that often occurs without specific psychotherapy; the process is more successful when the therapist is a focal point in a proper therapeutic milieu that counters the patient's regression in many ways than when the emphasis is solely upon the individual psychotherapy. Psychotherapy of schizophrenia usually implies more than bringing the patient out of the psychotic episode or into socially acceptable behavior. It often involves the effort to promote profound personality changes through psychoanalytically oriented interpersonal transactions. Such work with schizophrenic patients differs markedly from the analysis of psychoneurotic patients. It seeks to strengthen ego functioning through fostering a more cohesive identity, firmer boundaries between the self and others, and control of primitive impulses. Treatment almost always includes extensive re-evaluation of parental figures and efforts to modify the sway of sabotaging parental introjects. The intense nature of the transference relationship once it is established, together with the frangibility of the relationship, places great demands upon the therapist. It is a task for highly skilled therapists with specific experience and training in the field and will not be discussed here. The effectiveness of intensive psychotherapy with schizophrenic patients cannot be evaluated in statistical terms: the belief in its value derives from the excellent results obtained with a number of individuals and from the meaningfulness of the material gained in the process. Much depends on the specific therapist as well as on the specific patient. The aims of such work are directed in part toward the future—to increasing knowledge and improving techniques. [See CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY; MENTAL DISORDERS, TREATMENT OF, especially the article on PSYCHOLOGICAL TREATMENT; PSYCHIATRY.]
Family therapy. Recent advances in understanding of the pathology in the schizophrenic's family of origin have brought the family into the therapeutic efforts in a variety of ways. Social workers or psychiatrists have worked with parents individually or in groups to allay their anxiety and guilt; to counter the common tendency of parents to interfere v/ith or disrupt the patient's therapy; to modify the parents' attitudes toward each other as well as toward the patient; and to foster more
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direct and forthright communication. With some families a major effort is made to prevent exclusion of a hospitalized patient and withdrawal of interest in him and in others to help prevent disintegration of the family after the patient has been hospitalized. Conjoint family therapy in which parents and patient or the entire family are seen in group sessions has been found advantageous. The therapist has an opportunity to view directly the nature of the disturbed relationships and communications; the patient may gain a new perception of his parents and an appreciation of their limitations and idiosyncrasies; and other family members may recognize their own roles in provoking or continuing the patient's illness, gain insights concerning the family transactions, and begin to relate differently. Although some psychiatrists consider conjoint family therapy to be the optimal treatment procedure, others use it as an important adjunct to alternative therapeutic measures. Perspective The disagreements between virtually all schools of psychiatry concerning the nature and etiology of schizophrenia have interfered with the presentation of a coherent and cohesive approach to the problem. Although schizophrenia is traditionally considered a disease of unknown etiology, a great deal is now known about the developmental problems and the dynamic psychopathology of these patients and about the family environments that tend to produce them. Man is unique in the degree that his adaptation rests on a lengthy period of dependency upon parental figures during which he must assimilate the instrumental techniques of his culture to implement his inborn adaptive capacities. There are countless chances for misdirection, confusion, and conflict to arise in the process. The very mechanism that permits his inordinate adaptability contains a major vulnerability. He depends upon language and a coherent way of thinking to guide him into the future and on an ability to communicate to enable collaborative interaction. Yet linguistic meanings and a system of logic are not inborn but acquired as a means of problem solving by communication with others and by sorting out life experiences. How correctly meanings are learned and how firmly they become ingrained depend largely on the parental tutors—the consistency of their communications as an aid to problem solving and the emotional relationships between parents and child. There are countless ways in which the enculturation process can go wrong. When a person is caught in insoluble conflicts, when a path into the future is barred, when
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even regression serves little because the persons upon whom one could depend are distrusted or feared, there is still a way. One can alter the perception of his own needs and motives and those of others. One can abandon causal logic, change his internal representation of events, retreat to a period of childhood when reality gave way to fantasy, and cut off movement toward a realistic future; that is, one can become schizophrenic. This path is so clearly open to man, particularly to those who have had confused or confusing guides to follow into adulthood and have received poor foundations in meaning systems and reality testing, or who have actually been trained to irrational ways in childhood, that conditions such as schizophrenia must be expected as anomalies of the human developmental process. The acceptance of such a theory that schizophrenic reactions result from anomalous socialization processes and that the family forms the primary enculturating agency provides numerous guides for research and therapy, and it directs the psychiatrist toward increased collaboration with behavioral scientists. THEODORE LIDZ [Directly related are the entries MENTAL DISORDERS; PSYCHOSIS. Other relevant material may be found in MENTAL DISORDERS, TREATMENT OF; PSYCHIATRY; PSYCHOANALYSIS; and in the biographies of KRAEPELIN; MEYER; SULLIVAN.] BIBLIOGRAPHY ALANEN, Y. O. 1958 The Mothers of Schizophrenic Patients: A Study of the Personality and the MotherChild Relationship of 100 Mothers and the Significance of These Factors in the Pathogenesis of Schizophrenia in Comparison With Heredity. Acta psychiatrica scandinavica 33 (Supplement 124). ARIETI, SILVANO 1955 Interpretation of Schizophrenia. New York: Brunner. -» A readable and cogent presentation of a modern dynamic approach. BATESON, GREGORY et al. 1956 Toward a Theory of Schizophrenia. Behavioral Science 1:251-264. BELLAK, LEOPOLD (editor) 1958 Schizophrenia: A Review of the Syndrome. New York: Logos. -» Reviews work in the field between 1946 and 1956; contains 4,000 references. BLEULER, EUGEN (1911) 1950 Dementia Praecox: Or, the Group of Schizophrenias. New York: International Universities Press. -» Still an outstanding work on the topic. Includes an extensive bibliography to 1950. First published as "Dementia Praecox oder die Gruppe der Schizophrenien" in Aschaffenburg's Handbuch der Psychiatric. BRODY, EUGENE B.; and REDLICH, F. C. (editors) 1952 Psychotherapy With Schizophrenics. New York: International Universities Press. BROOKE, EILEEN M. 1959 National Statistics in the Epidemiology of Mental Illness. Journal of Mental Science 105:893-908. ->• Now called the British Journal of Psychiatry.
CAMERON, NORMAN A. 1938 Reasoning, Regression and Communication in Schizophrenics. Psychological Monographs. Vol. 50, no. 1. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University. -» A classic study of schizophrenic thinking. DELAY, JEAN; DENIKER, P.; and GREEN, A. 1957-1962 Le milieu familial des schizophrenes. 3 parts. Encephale 46:189-232; 49:1-21; 51:5-73. -» Part 1: Position du probleme, 1957. Part 2: Methodes d'approche, 1960. Part 3: Resultats et hypotheses, 1962. FREEMAN, THOMAS; CAMERON, JOHN L.; and McGniE, ANDREW 1958 Chronic Schizophrenia. New York: International Universities Press. FROMM-REICHMANN, FRIEDA 1948 Notes on the Development of Treatment of Schizophrenics by Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy. Psychiatry 11:263-273. HOCH, PAUL; and POLATIN, PHILLIP 1949 Pseudoneurotic Forms of Schizophrenia. Psychiatric Quarterly 23:248-276. HOFFER, ABRAM 1964 The Adrenochrome Theory of Schizophrenia: A Review. Diseases of the Nervous System 25:173-178. HOLLINGSHEAD, AUGUST B.; and REDLICH, F. C. 1958 Social Class and Mental Illness: A Community Study. New York: Wiley. JACKSON, DON D. (editor) 1960 The Etiology of Schizophrenia. New York: Basic Books. -» An excellent collection of papers on various contemporary theories. KASANIN, J. S. (editor) 1944 Language and Thought in Schizophrenia. Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press. -» Brief articles by various authorities that can serve as an introduction to the topic. KRINGLEN, EINAR 1964 Schizophrenia in Male Monozygotic Twins. Acta psychiatrica scandinavica 40 (Supplement 178):1-76. LANGFELDT, G. 1933 Some Points Regarding the Symptomatology and Diagnosis of Schizophrenia. Acta psychiatrica et neurologica scandinavica Supplement 80:7-26. -» Now called Acta psychiatrica scandinavica. LEMKAU, PAUL V.; and CROCETTI, GUIDO M. 1958 Vital Statistics of Schizophrenia. Pages 64-81 in Leopold Bellak (editor), Schizophrenia: A Review of the Syndrome. New York: Logos. LIDZ, THEODORE; FLECK, STEPHEN; and CORNELISON, ALICE R. 1965 Schizophrenia and the Family. New York: International Universities Press. -> Collected papers of an intensive study of the intrafamilial environment of schizophrenic patients. MEYER, ADOLF (1896-1937)1951 Collected Papers. Volume 2: Psychiatry. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. -> For the origins of the genetic-dynamic approach, see the chapters "Dementia Praecox" and "Paranoia" on pages 413-560. REES, W. LINFORD 1957 Physical Characteristics of the Schizophrenic Patient. Pages 1-14 in Derek Richter (editor), Schizophrenia: Somatic Aspects. London: Pergamon. Die Schizophrenic. 1932 Volume 9, special part 5 in Karl Wilmanns (editor), Handbuch der Geisteskrankheiten. Berlin: Springer. -» An authoritative source for the German approach in the Kraepelinian tradition. Contains an outstanding bibliography. SINGER, MARGARET T.; and WYNNE, LYMAN C. 1965a Thought Disorder and Family Relations of Schizophrenics: III. Methodology Using Protective Techniques. Archives of General Psychiatry 12:187—200. SINGER, MARGARET T.; and WYNNE, LYMAN C. 1965& Thought Disorder and Family Relations of Schizo-
SCHLESINGER, KARL phrenics: IV. Results and Implications. Archives of General Psychiatry 12:201-212. SULLIVAN, HARRY STACK (1924-1933) 1962 Schizophrenia as a Human Process. New York: Norton. Symposium international sur la psychotherapie de la schizophrenic. 1957 Acta psychotherapeutica, psychosomatica et orthopaedagogica 5:99-360. SYMPOSIUM ON SCHIZOPHRENIA, SAN FRANCISCO, 1958 1959 Schizophrenia: An Integrated Approach. Edited by Alfred Auerbach. New York: Ronald Press. TIENARI, P. 1963 Psychiatric Illnesses in Identical Twins. Acta psychiatrica scandinavica 39 (Supplement 171). -» The whole supplement is devoted to Tienari's study. WORLD CONGRESS OF PSYCHIATRY, SECOND, ZURICH, 1957 1959 Report. 4 vols. Zurich: Fiissli. WYNNE, LYMAN C.; and SINGER, MARGARET T. 1963 Thought Disorder and Family Relations of Schizophrenics. 2 parts. Archives of General Psychiatry 9: 191-206. -» Part 1: A Research Strategy. Part 2: A Classification of Forms of Thinking.
SCHLESINGER, KARL Karl Schlesinger (1889-1938) was bom in Budapest and died in Vienna, committing suicide on the day Hitler took possession of that city. (He had moved there after Bela Kun's 1919 communist revolution in Hungary.) A wealthy financier and a member of many industrial and financial boards, Schlesinger was one of the very few important contemporary theoretical economists who was not part of the academic world; he never held an academic post but was an active and highly respected member of the Vienna Economic Society. Although his contributions to economics were greatly appreciated in Vienna, his important early work of 1914, Theorie der Geld- und Kreditwirtschaft (see 1914a), was not readily available at the time he moved there; its direct influence upon Viennese monetary theory was less than might have been expected. In his 1914 book Schlesinger made extensive use of some simple mathematics, uncommon at that time in German economic writing, particularly in the field of monetary theory. His interest in mathematics led him to take instruction from A. Wald in the 1930s; he eventually proposed to Wald a problem relating to Walras' production equations. This problem concerned Schlesinger's modification of the Walras-Cassel system of production equations by introducing the notion that all factors of production—not only the scarce ones—have to be considered and that whether a factor is scarce or free depends on the demand functions. This led to Wald's famous work on the determinacy of the Walrasian system. [See ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM.] (Schlesinger acknowledged that Zeuthen had earlier
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suggested a similar modification without, however, following up the matter.) These problems were discussed in Karl Menger's mathematical colloquium under Menger's continuing and stimulating guidance. Schlesinger also contributed to Menger's work on the theory of returns. Schlesinger's Theorie der Geld- und Kreditwirtschaft made him the only immediate follower of Walras, other than Wicksell, to advance Walras' theory of money. Schlesinger stressed that in addition to the indirect utility of money derived from its ability ultimately to provide desired consumers' goods, cash balances also have a direct utility. He introduced a probabilistic approach to monetary theory by distinguishing between fixed and uncertain future due dates for payments; the former offer no choice, while the latter permit the individual to maximize utility by choosing appropriately between holding cash and purchasing goods. He further showed that if the number of transactions increases, it is possible to economize in the relative size of cash balances, although this will not be the case if only the magnitude of transactions increases. Schlesinger derived an excess demand equation for money that is virtually identical with the one commonly ascribed to Keynes. [See MONEY.] He also was probably the first to develop the notion of the equilibrium rate of interest [see INTEREST]. Schlesinger was one of the first economists to expound the purchasing power parity theory. In his pamphlet on the variations in the value of money (1916), he stated the theorem that the parity of a country's currency is determined by the quotient of the domestic and foreign general price levels. The equilibrium rate of exchange can only be changed if foreign borrowings are used to reduce the indebtedness of the bank of issue. In 1931 Schlesinger published a lengthy review of F. Somary's Bankpolitik (see 193la), in which he presented a detailed mathematical analysis of the theory of credit creation by commercial banks, incorporating this theory into the general process of circulation. Assuming there are n equal banks, that deposits require some cash reserve, and that each individual pays partly in cash and partly by check, Schlesinger analyzed the effects of introducing new metal or new bank notes into the system. He traced the path that credit expansion follows until equilibrium is reached and derived formulas for debtors, creditors, and the system as a whole. He also considered the flow of checks back to their starting point. Several of his restrictive assumptions can be relaxed, but the whole approach is an early model for careful, rigorous analysis of monetary operations. [See BANKING.]
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During the international financial crisis of the 1930s Schlesinger proposed that the Austrian government control capital movements, but he was strictly opposed to exchange control as then practiced. Schlesinger's most significant contributions were to monetary theory, but this work was widely neglected, which caused Schumpeter to comment that "in our field first-class performance is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for success" (1954, p. 1082, note 5). More recently, however, he has been given more credit, especially by