International Encyclopedia of the
SOCIAL SCIENCES
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International Encyclopedia of the
SOCIAL SCIENCES
Associate Editors Heinz Eulau, Political Science Lloyd A. Fallers, Anthropology William H. Kruskal, Statistics Gardner Lindzey, Psychology Albert Rees, Economics Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Sociology Edward Shils, Social Thought
Special Editors Elinor G. Barber, Biographies John G. Barley, Applied Psychology Bert F. Hoselitz, Economic Development Clifford T. Morgan, Experimental Psychology Robert H. Strotz, Econometrics
Editorial Staff Marjorie A. Bassett, Economics P. G. Bock, Political Science Robert M. Coen, Econometrics J. M. B. Edwards, Sociology David S. Gochman, Psychology George Lowy, Bibliographies Judith M. Tanur, Statistics Judith M. Treistman, Anthropology
Alvin Johnson HONORARY EDITOR
W Allen Wallis CHAIRMAN, EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD
International Encyclopedia of the SOCIAL SCIENCES D A V I D L . S I L L S EDITOR
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COPYRIGHT © 1968 BY CROWELL COLLIER AND MACMILLAN, INC.
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LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOG NUMBER 68-10023
MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
International Encyclopedia of the SOCIAL SCIENCES
[ C O N T I N U E D ]
SANCTIONS Social control involves the process by which a group perpetuates its culture and system of social relations. In what has become an anthropological locus classicus, Radcliffe-Brown (1934) defined the sanction as a social reaction to a mode of behavior that was thereby approved or disapproved. In his view the concept is of primary significance to sociology because sanctions provide an effective instrument for regulating conduct in conformity with social usage. This formulation, however, seems to obscure a number of important points. RadcliffeBrown's argument clearly implies that the sanction, at least in one of its aspects, has a deterrent function. But if this object is to be achieved, logic demands that the sanction must precede the reaction: the sanction must already be in operation when a breach of norm occurs. It seems preferable therefore to define sanctions in terms of a promise of reward for fulfillment of the norms of behavior that are socially recognized and accepted, or in the liability to suffer the consequences that attend their breach. According to this view, the sanction is thus characterized by a quality of latency that is expressed most clearly, in the case of negative sanctions, in a general belief in the continuing likelihood of the execution of the threat. This implies two further properties of the sanction. A sanction cannot be arbitrary or ad hoc: its existence must be generally known, and it must be regular in its incidence. In fulfilling these conditions, the sanction serves not merely to deter; it also indicates the appropriate steps that may be taken to redress the situation when a norm has been infringed or to express approbation when it has been overfulfilled. The sanction is, of course, a concept of funda-
mental importance in jurisprudence and has played a paramount role in different legal theories. But there seems no good reason why its use should be restricted in this way. The legal sanction, manifested in the form of the penalties, remedies, and modes of redress of the law, represents only one particular means of enforcing conformity to norms and restating their validity when they are breached. Each group and subgroup within a society tends to develop its own distinctive pattern of usages and the means of maintaining them without necessary recourse to the municipal law. Sanctions therefore come to operate within every conceivable set of group relationships: they include not only the organized sanctions of the law but also the gossip of neighbors or the customs regulating norms of production that are spontaneously generated among workers on the factory floor. In small-scale communities, or within segments of a large-scale society, informal sanctions may become more drastic than the penalties provided for in the legal code. Thus the concept of sanctions is not merely of jurisprudential interest; it also has immediate sociological relevance to the analysis of the problem of social control. It will be apparent then that social control is achieved through no single mechanism. On the contrary, different principles and processes will frequently be found working together in any given situation. Accordingly, it is only by specifying the character of the sanctions present in the situation that one can isolate the different elements for analytical purposes and give them their proper weighting. The institution of law represents, of course, one major instrument of social control, and it is most usually marked off from other such agencies by virtue of the fact that its sanctions are
SANCTIONS imposed by politically organized society. As Seagle (1941) has observed, for example, it is the fact that the sanction is applied exclusively by organized political government that distinguishes the sphere of law from the spheres of religion, morals, and custom. The mechanism of sanction. The differentiation of the instruments of social control in stateless and state societies and in peasant communities and bands of hunting and gathering people has provided ground for controversy between jurists and anthropologists and among anthropologists themselves. Although their discussions have not always clarified the nature of law in different types of societies, they have been fruitful in opening up the broader sociological problem of social control. Malinowski's position as a pioneer in this field remains undisputed. Working in an island society that lacked any of the familiar machinery for the enactment, administration, and enforcement of law, Malinowski was led to seek elsewhere for the sources of social cohesion. He came to the conclusion that there was a class of rules "too practical to be backed up by religious sanctions, too burdensome to be left to mere goodwill." This constituted the Trobriand "civil law," the binding character of which lay in the sanctions of reciprocity and systematic incidence (Malinowski 1926). Later critics have pointed out that reciprocity is a concept of such wide generality that it cannot usefully serve to delineate the sphere of law. A curious feature of Malinowski's thinking on these matters is that, despite his emphasis on conflict, he appears not to have appreciated that just as the sanction implies the potential breach of norm, so much of law has to be concerned with what may be called the "pathology" of social relations. The emphasis on reciprocity has been important in deepening our understanding of why rules of behavior are accepted in so many areas of social life without the need to resort to formal mechanisms of redress. The question that remains unanswered is what happens when reciprocity breaks down and breach actually occurs. The point had been raised often enough, but it was left to Llewellyn and Hoebel (1941) in their now classic study of the Cheyenne to repair the defect and put the anthropological study of legal sanctions back on its proper path. In their succinct and expressive phrase, "the law has teeth": their procedure was to show that, even in societies lacking instituted juridical bodies, the investigation of instances of "hitch," dispute, grievance, and trouble led directly into the way in which physical coercion was organized. Pospisil (1958), on the basis of his work among
Kapauku Papuans, has suggested that too great an emphasis has been placed upon physical force in defining the character of the legal sanction, pointing out that cultures exist where physical sanctions are practically lacking. This introduces an unnecessary confusion. The crucial question is not the actual mode of coercion employed but recognition of the legitimate authority in which is vested the power of coercion. Such authority is certainly recognized among the Kapauku, although coercion may frequently be achieved by other than purely physical means. Where, in a society lacking developed forensic institutions, rules of conduct may be enforced through the powers of coercion vested in a legitimate authority, I propose to speak of jural rather than legal sanctions, indicating that here we are in the realm of ius, but not of lex. Jural sanctions. Once the criterion of legitimate coercion is adopted, it becomes apparent that primitive societies, lacking the formal machinery of the law, may yet display a remarkable range of sanctions that can be distinguished as jural. It has sometimes been claimed of many of the simplest societies that their social life is dominated by notions of the supernatural: there is a paucity of rules of law that is the reflex of the comprehensiveness of taboo. Such views, however, do not do justice to the facts. Thus it is reported of the Eskimo, for example, that persistent breach of taboo may be met by a shaman's decree of banishment. More strikingly, it is also reported that recidivist homicides may be dispatched by an individual acting at the request of the local community or with its compliance; this individual does not incur vengeance. Another interesting type of jural sanction was reported by Radcliffe-Brown in the Andaman Islands (1922). There, aggrieved persons were apparently able to vent their spleen by destroying any property they could lay their hands on, but unfortunately there are a number of points touching the operation of the sanction which the sources do not make very clear. It is possible that the Andamanese practice was somewhat similar to the custom of kamara reported from the Gazelle Peninsula of New Britain. Kamara took a number of variant forms, but essentially it was a device whereby a person who had suffered injury could damage or distrain the property of someone of acknowledged influence within the community. This individual was expected then to bring pressure on the offender to make retribution. But in general, within the range of primitive societies, the most common mode of redress for wrong is found to rest on the principle of self-help. In these circumstances, the legal initiative lies in-
SANCTIONS variably with the individual or group against whom a wrong has been committed. Yet the exacting of vengeance is not an arbitrary procedure. It has to be carried out according to certain rules and is undertaken only when morally supported by the community or because, indeed, it has been pressed upon individuals or groups by expressions of public approval or disapproval. The principle of self-help involves a point of considerable importance for the discussion of sanctions. This is what Nadel (1947) has called the social range of offenses, where the kind of sanction provoked depends upon the nature of the social units involved in the offense. Thus, in some societies if adultery or homicide occurs within the local lineage it may be regarded more as a sin than as a legal wrong, calling for ritual expiation rather than the application of jural sanctions. If, however, it involves members of different clans within a larger political unit, the offense may be met by a punitive raid or may have to be compounded by payment of compensation. In other words, it is not enough to regard a given sanction simply as the appropriate response to, or mode of redress for, any particular offense. Rather the sanction has to be viewed as it pertains to the set of social relationships involved in any given situation and at a particular moment in time. Failure to see the sanction in these terms can lead to misconceptions and to misguided hypotheses of an either/or character, as in attempts, for example, to correlate the importance of sorcery with the presence or absence of "superordinate justice" (Whiting 1950). Formulations of this kind pose a false dichotomy; they also miss the point that because each individual is the focus of a number of different social relationships, combining in his person a number of different roles, a variety of sanctions may attach to a single act of behavior. Thus, to take an example from our own society, a member of one of the professions who commits a serious breach of professional etiquette faces the possibility not only of prosecution in the courts, but also of being struck off the roll; he may also find that he has sacrificed his position as chairman of the local literary and philosophical society and that his wife and children have lost the good will of friends and neighbors. In other words, there is in all societies a coincidence of sanctions, some of a jural, some of a mystical or other character, all operating simultaneously toward the goal of achieving social control. Thus the problem that has to be faced is only partly the clear demarcation of one kind of sanction from another; more important is the need to classify and analyze the typical situations in which
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the different kinds of sanctions are provoked or achieve dominance. Analytic examples. Some progress in examining the social context of sanctions has been made by Turner (1957) in an analysis of the conflicts operating within the social system of the Ndembu of Northern Rhodesia. Among the various redressive mechanisms known to the Ndembu are informal arbitration, formal courts under the control of chiefs, and certain kinds of public ritual. Turner has suggested that jural machinery is likely to be invoked when a dispute is conducted in terms of an appeal to common norms, or, alternatively, when the dispute itself involves an appeal to different or opposed norms, but it can still be settled fairly easily because there exists "a common frame of values which organize a society's norms into a hierarchy." There are, however, other kinds of conflict, which have their source in the contradictions inherent in the social structure itself. For example, when the rules of nepotic and adelphic succession both operate within a matrilineal system, they tend to promote faction within local groups. If these conflicts are not effectively sealed off, they may lead to the disruption of the group. For disputes of this kind, usually sparked by the breach of some legal or customary norm, jural sanctions are likely to be inappropriate and ineffectual. A court of law, employing rational techniques of inquiry, hears the arguments of the various parties and on its reading of the evidence proceeds to allocate blame to one or the other of the disputants. Such a procedure cannot "relieve the quarrels so as to preserve the threatened relationships." This explains why it is that among the Ndembu and other peoples of the central African "matrilineal belt" so few cases arising out of disputes within the matrilineage come before the tribal courts. These indeed are the kinds of situations par excellence in which the sanctions associated with accusations of witchcraft and sorcery or the wrath of ancestral spirits are predominant and where group unity can be reaffirmed only by ritual means. So, too, in modern Western society the invocation of legal sanctions may be found inadequate for the handling of certain kinds of domestic disputes. A court of law, by concentrating on husband and wife as right-bearing and duty-bearing units, excludes itself from examining a close and complex relationship in its totality; the less rigid techniques of a marriage guidance council or other similar agency may have to be invoked if reconciliation of the parties is the end to be achieved. With the development of recognized courts, a new and important phase has been reached in the
4
SANCTIONS
eternal task of achieving social control. Once forensic institutions have been established, little comes to escape their purview, and there are few matters that may not be the subject of judicial scrutiny. Yet, perhaps for this very reason, it is important to remember, as the last eximple cited itself suggests, that adjudication ma) cover a range of different procedures. The distiiguishing criteria of a court appear to be that it is capable of enforcing the principle of jurisdiction aid that it is led to the apportionment of liability ty the rational assessment of the evidence and a'guments adduced before it. In many African societi<s, informal hearings before village elders and the letection of the causes of personal and natural misfortune by divination share certain of the characteristics of the judicial process, but clearly it would :>e a mistake to equate them with courts. Similarly, as Gluckman (1962) argues, it seems a mistake t) speak of the institutionalized song duels of the Eskimo as "juridical instruments" even though tiey do serve to settle disputes and restore norrral relations between estranged members of the community. It may be true that the result of the contest is a "judgment" in favor of one of the constants, but, so far as can be gathered from the Iterature, the mode of arriving at that judgment las little in common with a judicial process. Here a lack of clear analytical distinctions can blur the important sociological problem of why in different s)cieties, or in different ranges of relationship with'n the same society, different kinds of sanctions may be invoked for similar kinds of breach of n«rm. Nevertheless, the instanct of the Eskimo song encounter does direct attertion to a variety of sanctions occupying a borderland between the realms of law, morals, and tustom. The literature on the song contest does not nake clear how points are scored in the duel, nor does it indicate what part the spectators play in tlis connection. On the other hand, the fact that the tontestants are obliged to accept the taunts, jibes, aid accusations of their opponents without taking aff:ont suggests parallels with forms of licensed "joiing" familiar in the anthropological literature. There is, for example, the system of clan joking relationships described for the Plateau Tonga of Nortiern Rhodesia. Among the Tonga, the clans are th> only enduring units of social organization, and they are linked in a complex arrangement of jokng partnerships. The Tonga explain these relatiorships by reference to some antagonism between the animals from which the clans derive their names or to some legend of origin. Whenever members of such paired clans
meet, they tease one another and indulge in mutual abuse. Joking of this kind occurs in informal situations, but this, like the Eskimo song contests, which are conducted for pure entertainment, has to be seen as a necessary preparation of the stage, so to speak, for those more serious occasions when culturally licensed abuse may be employed as a public sanction. The jural unit of Tonga society is the matrilineal group, but there are many situations where this group is not free to act without destroying the very principle of lineage unity on which the social structure is built. Those who waste their kin's property or commit incest provide instances of this kind. Their offenses are, in a sense, jural wrongs; but they also touch questions of ultimate social morality. For the protection of the community, the sanction of public castigation and ridicule of the offender by his clan joking partner is invoked (Colson 1953). Institutions embracing the "joking" principle are widespread; and they are not confined to tribal societies. It appears that "youth groups" may perform a similar role in some of the rural communities of present-day Spain and Wales (see Peters 1967). Such groups, which initially establish their "irresponsibility" by playing childish pranks as part of their normal behavior, are on occasion able to express the outraged moral feelings of the community by playing offensive practical jokes on those who have offended but who cannot be readily reached by straightforward legal sanctions. These instances, incidentally, illustrate another important mechanism in the process of social control. This is the principle whereby the enforcement of the sanction is thrust upon a "stranger" to the group; it is used in situations involving the unity of the group rather than the claims of aggrieved individuals. Through the medium of the clan joking partners, or the youth group, who are strangers to the adult community by virtue of their customary infantile behavior, the fiction of group cohesion can be maintained and group norms reaffirmed. Function of integration. The importance of the sanction lies, then, as Radcliffe-Brown noted (1934), in its integrative function. The social system is made up of many different kinds of groupings, frequently based on different principles of social organization and serving different sets of interests. Associated with these groupings and with the different and sometimes conflicting sets of social relationships in which their members are involved, there is a wide range of social sanctions, at the back of which are the organized sanctions of the law, supported by the coercive authority of society. Even in those systems where "legal totali-
SANCTIONS, INTERNATIONAL tarianism" has been carried furthest, it is clear, as Lewin (1947) has documented with reference to South Africa, that social control is not achieved exclusively through the operation of the sanctions of the law. Faced with this problem, certain jurists have been led to postulate a "general habit of obedience" to explain why, everywhere in society, laws are more often obeyed than disobeyed. A sociological approach, on the other hand, would stress that the efficacy of law rests, in the final analysis, on the support it receives from the operation of nonlegal sanctions in the various domains of social life. We can see something of the way this process operates in some analyses of the judicial process in African tribal societies. Barotse judges, for example, had behind them the full power and authority of their nation as well as of the British colonial administration. In the handling of disputes, however, the sanctions of morality and custom and, indeed, the whole normative structure of the society are channeled into the judicial process itself. Litigants and judges alike appeal to, and couch their arguments in terms of, the same body of norms. When a man is condemned, it is usually because he has failed to measure up to the standards of behavior that he himself has invoked in his statements to the court (Gluckman 1955). It is, of course, patent that there are important differences between the judicial processes in African societies and those in modern Western societies. Unfortunately the classic studies of the judicial process in Anglo-American systems have concentrated on judicial reasoning in the upper levels of the juridical hierarchy or upon exposing the nonlegal influences that play upon the mind of the judge. What seems to be required for purposes of significant comparison is the more intensive sociological investigation of courts and other similar bodies at the lower levels of the hierarchy, in the context of the communities within which they operate. Such studies might prove to be very important in illuminating the way in which social norms and sanctions are brought into relationship with the legal system. A. L. EPSTEIN [Directly related are the entries JUDICIAL PROCESS; LAW; POLITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY.] BIBLIOGRAPHY BOHANNAN, PAUL 1957 Justice and Judgment Among the Tiv. Published for the International African Institute. Oxford Univ. Press. COLSON, ELIZABETH (1953) 1962 Clans and the Jokingrelationship Among the Plateau Tonga of Northern Rhodesia. Pages 66-83 in Elizabeth Colson, The Plateau Tonga of Northern Rhodesia. Manchester Univ.
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Press. -> First published in Kroeber Anthropological Society, Papers. GLUCKMAN, MAX 1955 The Judicial Process Among the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia. Manchester Univ. Press; Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. GLUCKMAN, MAX 1962 African Jurisprudence. Advancement of Science 18:439-454. GLUCKMAN, MAX 1965 Politics, Law and Ritual in Tribal Society. Oxford: Blackwell; Chicago: Aldine. HOEBEL, E. ADAMSON 1954 The Law of Primitive Man: A Study in Comparative Legal Dynamics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. LEWIN, JULIUS 1947 Studies in African Native Law. Cape Town: African Bookman; Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press. LLEWELLYN, KARL N.; and HOEBEL, E. A. 1941 The Cheyenne Way: Conflict and Case Law in Primitive Jurisprudence. Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press. MALINOWSKI, BRONISLAW (1926) 1961 Crime and Custom in Savage Society. London: Routledge. -» A paperback edition was published in 1959 by Littlefield. NADEL, SIEGFRIED F. 1947 The Nuba: An Anthropological Study of the Hill Tribes in Kordofan. Oxford Univ. Press. PETERS, E. L. 1967 Group Joking Relationships. Unpublished manuscript. POSPISIL, LEOPOLD 1958 Kapauku Papuans and Their Law. Yale University Publications in Anthropology, No. 54. New Haven: Yale Univ. RADCLIFFE-BROWN, A. R. (1922) 1948 The Andaman Islanders. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. RADCLIFFE-BROWN, A. R. 1934 Social Sanction. Volume 13, pages 531-534 in Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. New York: Macmillan. -» Reprinted in Radcliffe-Brown's Structure and Function in Primitive Society, published by Cohen and West in 1952. SEAGLE, WILLIAM (1941) 1946 The History of Law. 2d ed. New York: Tudor. -» First published as The Quest for Law. TURNER, V. W. 1957 Schism and Continuity in an African Society: A Study of Ndembu Village Life. Manchester Univ. Press. WHITING, BEATRICE B. 1950 Paiute Sorcery. Viking Fund Publications in Anthropology, No. 15. New York: Viking Fund.
SANCTIONS, INTERNATIONAL The term "sanction," in its widest sense, means "any measure taken in support of a social order regulating human behavior" (Kelsen 1957, p. 101). The purpose of a sanction is to bring about a behavior considered to be in conformity with the goals and standards of a society and to prevent that behavior which is inconsistent with these goals and standards. Consequently, in its widest sense, a sanction can have the objective of suppressing and terminating a particular form of undesirable behavior and the objective of deterring or discouraging such behavior in the future. The word "sanction" originated in Roman law, where it meant a penalty imposed upon a person who violates the law. The word continues to be used in this narrow
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SANCTIONS, INTERNATIONAL
sense, particularly in municipal law. In international relations, the term is customarily used in the wider sense. It is sometimes asserted, particularly with reference to Austin's definition of law, that international law is not law because it lacks the sanctions of municipal law. That there is a difference of degree is no doubt true, but what is often not recognized is that municipal law, like international law, is basically dependent upon custom and consent, while international law has sanctions comparable with those of municipal law, though admittedly weaker. The organization of sanctions in support of an international order faces a special difficulty not encountered within the state to anything like the same degree. This is the difficulty of enforcing standards against organized groups which, as states, make exclusive claims on governmental authority and on the loyalty and support of their citizens. Even within the state, constituted authorities experience difficulties in enforcing their decisions against organized groups such as trade unions and component political units, as witness the difficulties experienced by the organs of the federal government of the United States in enforcing their decisions against the states. Experience Customary international law has in the past admitted the right of states to take certain measures of self-help in support of their legal claims if it was not possible to achieve satisfaction by negotiation or third-party settlement. These measures included withdrawal of diplomatic representatives, acts of reprisal such as embargo and pacific blockade, display of force, landing of armed forces for purposes of protection of persons and property, and resort to war. Under agreements concluded to meet particular situations, special guarantees were accorded and the right of intervention admitted, as, for example, in the collective guarantee of Belgian neutrality (1839) and the United States guarantee of Cuban independence (1901). Under the Covenant of the League of Nations, the concept that peace should be maintained by the combined forces of peace-loving states was substituted for the principles of balance of power and self-help. "Resort to war" under denned conditions was prohibited. Provision was made under article 10 for joint guarantee of member states against external aggression and in article 16 for sweeping economic and financial sanctions to be applied "immediately" by every member against any state resorting to war in violation of its obligations under the Covenant. The Covenant provisions were seri-
ously weakened by resolutions adopted by the Assembly in 1921 that were intended to take account of the failure of the League to achieve universality. Military sanctions under the Covenant were optional on recommendation of the Council. No serious consideration was given to the application of the sanctions of article 16 until the mid-1930s. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 was not treated as a resort to war under the Covenant. The Assembly did, however, recommend to members that they withhold recognition of the fruits of Japan's military action, in line with the announced policy of the United States. This constituted a mild form of sanction, which had, however, no observable practical effect. In 1935, however, Italy's military invasion of Ethiopia was recognized by all except a small minority of members as an illegal resort to war, and limited economic and financial sanctions were applied. These were not adequate, however, to achieve the declared objective of frustrating Italy's military action, and leading members of the League were unwilling, for political reasons, to agree to measures that might have been effective. The Charter of the United Nations adopts a different approach to the problem of sanctions. Like the Covenant, its objective is limited to the maintenance of peace; the Charter prohibits any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state "or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations" (art. 2, paragraph 4). The sanctions envisaged, however, are not automatic, being left to the discretion of the Security Council. In cases of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression, it may take decisions requiring members to apply collective measures, including the severance of diplomatic relations, economic and financial nonintercourse, and "action by air, sea or land forces" (art. 42). But the taking of military measures is made dependent on the conclusion of agreements by which members undertake to place forces and facilities at the disposal of the Security Council (art. 43). In addition, a member against whom preventive or enforcement action has been taken may be suspended from "the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership" by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council (art. 5), and a member who has "persistently violated the Principles" contained in the Charter may be expelled in like manner (art. 6). The Charter does not confer upon the General Assembly any explicit powers with respect to the imposition of sanctions. It does give to the Assembly the general authority to discuss and make
SANCTIONS, INTERNATIONAL recommendations with respect to any matter within the scope of the Charter (art. 10). In United Nations practice, the Security Council has largely been prevented from using its powers to apply sanctions—its enforcement powers—by the inability of the permanent members to agree. In the early stages of its handling of the Palestine question (1948) it specifically invoked these powers and threatened to use them. In the Korean case, the Council, in the absence of the Soviet representative, recommended assistance to the Republic of Korea and, under this authorization, members took measures of the kind described in articles 41 and 42. More recently, in dealing with policies of racial discrimination by South Africa, the Security Council, by its resolution of December 4, 1963, called upon members to refrain from shipping arms and munitions to that country so long as it practiced this discrimination, which it found was "seriously disturbing international peace and security." The General Assembly, in the exercise of its broad powers under the Charter, has on numerous occasions recommended to members the adoption of various measures of a coercive nature to bring the conduct of particular states into line with standards set by the Charter, international law, and United Nations resolutions. Examples include such recommended measures as the withdrawal of heads of missions to Spain and its exclusion from UN conferences in order to eliminate the Franco regime (1946); an embargo on the shipment of arms and strategic materials in general to North Korea and Communist China to suppress their aggressive action (1951); and an embargo on export of arms and petroleum products to South Africa to achieve the termination of policies of racial discrimination (1963). The measures recommended by the General Assembly have had a range of purposes extending beyond the maintenance of international peace and security, to the implementation of obligations and policies in respect to self-determination and human rights. Provisions for the application of international sanctions are not limited to the constitutions of global international organizations. The Inter-American Treaty of Mutual Assistance, for example, provides that in case of aggression by an American state, the Organ of Consultation may decide that the other signatory states apply sanctions, including political, economic, financial, and military measures. Decisions may be taken by a vote of two-thirds and are binding, except that no member can be required to use military force against its will. In August 1960, the decision was taken to sever diplomatic relations and partially interrupt
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economic relations with the Dominican Republic because of its aggression against Venezuela. Evaluation Experience with organized international sanctions in support of international order has been limited and does not give much encouragement to those who believe in the efficacy of such arrangements. The League system of sanctions was a system of collective security which rested "upon the proposition that war can be prevented by the deterrent effect of overwhelming power upon states which are too rational to invite certain defeat" (Claude 1964, p. 228). It also assumed that an ethical and legal difference existed between military force used by a state to advance its national interests and the use of force by members of an international organization to restrain a state after it has been adjudged guilty of illegal use of force. This experiment was handicapped from the beginning by the League's lack of universality. The limited economic and financial sanctions imposed against Italy showed that international sanctions were technically feasible. The necessary machinery could be organized and decisions could be taken to permit sanctions to become operative promptly and with substantial impact on the transgressor. Their failure was due to political difficulties—the conflicting interests and purposes of the sanctioning powers and the unwillingness of some states to risk war to make sanctions effective. United Nations experience has not been encouraging either. Sanctions against Franco Spain were applied half-heartedly and were soon terminated. In the Korean case, the measures taken to assist the Republic of Korea and to defeat the aggressive actions of North Korea and Communist China were essentially United States measures dictated by United States policy considerations. The United Nations served as a useful framework to provide legitimacy and as a moderating influence. Measures recommended against South Africa to achieve fuller respect by that member for basic human rights have had little observable effect. What conclusions are to be drawn from this and other experience regarding the role of international sanctions in the implementation of international order? Statesmen and scholars have arrived at a variety of conclusions. One conclusion which appears to be widely held is that the theory of international sanctions, particularly as it involves the use of military force, is fallacious. According to this view, no effective pressure can be applied against a state except by another state, and consequently, an international
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SANCTIONS, INTERNATIONAL
order that depends on that form of pressure is a permanent source of conflict instead of a medium of order. As early as 1787 Hamilton wrote in The Federalist: "In an association where the general authority is confined to the collective bodies of the communities that compose it, every breach of the laws must involve a state of war; and military execution must become the only instrument of civil obedience" (No. 15). Another conclusion that has wide support is that forces of coercion which are effective when applied to individuals are not effective, at least not to the same degree, when applied to states. Even those forms which might be expected to be particularly effective, such as embargoes and blockades, may at least temporarily have the opposite effect. In the case of the economic sanctions against Italy, among the immediate effects was a strengthening of popular support for the regime. A view which is widely held by those who stress national interest as the motivating force in international relations is that international sanctions are unrealistic because they require a willingness to accept general commitments for situations which cannot be foreseen in detail and to carry them out under circumstances where the immediate national interest appears to dictate a different course. Thus, in the case of League sanctions against Italy, France was a reluctant participant because of her primary interest in having Italian support against Germany. Many members of the United Nations were reluctant to press sanctions against Communist China in 1950 and 1951 because of their greater concern at the time with the security of western Europe. A more optimistic and positive view regarding sanctions is that while experience to date may not have been encouraging, a system of organized sanctions in support of law and order is the only alternative to anarchy. Scholars and writers who take this view—Quincy Wright and Myres McDougal are examples—argue that our experience with sanctions as applied to organized groups is not so discouraging as is often contended, that sanctions have been effective in deterring undesirable conduct by states, and that with a fuller appreciation of the extent of the coincidence of particular and general interests in public order, sanctions can be expected to become more effective. Problems and prospects It is obvious that the organization and application of international sanctions in support of international order present difficulties that do not exist to the same degree in the case of sanctions in sup-
port of domestic order. With respect to international legal claims, states generally continue to rely upon good faith and reciprocity of interest in compliance, and upon retaliatory measures when these fail. It is primarily for the maintenance of peace and, to an increasing extent of late, for the implementation of certain human rights that organized sanctions are seriously considered. Much study has been given to the organization and application of collective sanctions to these ends, both by private scholars and by official groups. A group of members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs made a study of international sanctions in the light of the League experience of 1935-1936 (1938). During the period when the United Nations was engaged in supporting collective measures in Korea, the General Assembly, by its Uniting for Peace Resolution of November 3, 1950, established the Collective Measures Committee to study methods which might be used to strengthen international peace and security. In its report, published in 1951, it made detailed recommendations for the organization and application of collective measures (United Nations . . . 1951). The scope of the prohibition of the use or threat of force under the Charter, combined with the lack of any effective provision for the enforcement of legal rights, has led some scholars to take the view that unilateral use of force to secure respect for legal rights is permissible as a sanction consistent with "the Purposes of the United Nations" (Stone 1958, pp. 94-95). Others take the view that the Charter does not permit the individual use of force, without United Nations authorization, except as it can be justified as an exercise of the right of selfdefense in case of an armed attack. There is an extensive scholarly literature dealing particularly with the theory and legal aspects of international sanctions, but research and writing have thus far neglected the more practical aspects of the problem. While scholars have explored the legal, organizational, and administrative problems involved in the establishment and operation of a system of sanctions, and furthermore have analyzed the influence of the international political environment on a system of sanctions, relatively little attention has been given to the effects of sanctions upon the delinquent states as well as upon those states joining in their application. It is too readily assumed that the recalcitrant state can be coerced by material pressures into conforming to a desired mode of conduct or into ceasing an undesirable mode of conduct. We need to know more about the effect of sanctions upon the people of the state that is the object of sanctions, and the
SAPIR, EDWARD: Contributions to Cultural Anthropology processes by which that state, once its resistance is overcome, can be restored to good standing in the international community. Furthermore, while the problem of the unequal effects of sanctions upon those states applying them or expected to apply them is recognized, more study needs to be made of the extent of these inequalities and of procedures by which burdens will be more equally shared. It is clear that reluctance to participate in the application of sanctions has in large measure been due to unequal burdens and risks that states have been asked to assume. LELAND M. GOODRICH [See also ECONOMIC WARFARE; INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION; INTERNATIONAL LAW. Other relevant material may be found under INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION; INTERNATIONAL POLITICS;
WAR.] BIBLIOGRAPHY BRIERLY, J. L. 1931 Sanctions. Grotius Society, Transactions 17:67-82. CLAUDE, INIS L. 1964 Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization. 3d ed. New York: Random House. -* The first edition was published in 1956. GOODRICH, LELAND M.; and SIMONS, ANNE P. 1955 The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security. Washington: Brookings Institution. KELSEN, HANS 1957 Collective Security Under International Law. U.S. Naval War College, International Law Studies, Vol. 49. Washington: Government Printing Office. KUNZ, JOSEF L. 1960 Sanctions in International Law. American Journal of International Law 54:324-347. McDoucAL, MYRES S.; and FELICIANO, FLORENTINO P. 1961 Law and Minimum Worid Public Order: The Legal Regulation of International Coercion. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. NIEMEYER, GERHART 1941 Law Without Force: The Function of Politics in International Law. Princeton Univ. Press. ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1938 International Sanctions: A Report by a Group of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Oxford Univ. Press. STONE, JULIUS (1954) 1959 Legal Controls of International Conflict: A Treatise on the Dynamics of Disputes and War Law. 2d impression, rev., with supplement 1953-1958. New York: Holt. STONE, JULIUS 1958 Aggression and World Order: A Critique of United Nations Theories of Aggression. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. TAUBENFELD, RITA FALK; and TAUBENFELD, HOWARD J. 1964 The "Economic Weapon": The League and The United Nations. American Society of International Law, Proceedings [1964]: 183-205. UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY 1951 Report of the Collective Measures Committee. United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records Sixth Session, Supplement no. 13.
9
SAPIR, EDWARD i. CONTRIBUTIONS TO CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY David G. Mandelbaum ii. CONTRIBUTIONS TO LINGUISTICS Z. S. Harris
CONTRIBUTIONS TO CULTURAL
ANTHROPOLOGY
Edward Sapir (1884-1939) was one of the founders of modern linguistic anthropology, a main contributor to the development of formal descriptive linguistics, a leading figure in cultural anthropology, and a chief stimulator of studies in the relations between personality and culture. His ideas continue to excite lively interest; his writings are widely read; his one book, Language, and a volume of his papers have continuously been reprinted. The range of his ideas is great. They are founded on an extraordinary breadth of knowledge, which Sapir used with incisive power of thought and subtlety of analysis. He wrote poetry, literary essays, and music as well as scholarly works; all his writings are characterized by an unusual felicity of style. Sapir was born in Pomerania (Germany) and was five years old when his family emigrated to the United States. His intellectual gifts were recognized while he was a schoolboy in New York City. He was awarded scholarships to the Horace Mann School and then a Pulitzer fellowship to Columbia College, from which he was graduated in 1904. He went on to do a year of graduate work in Germanics at Columbia, and at that time his interest in language brought him into contact with Franz Boas. He quickly learned from Boas the great potentialities of the anthropological study of language, and from then on his principal work was in linguistic anthropology. [See the biography of BOAS.] In 1910 Sapir went to Ottawa as chief of the division of anthropology in the Geological Survey of Canada. His 15 years in that post gave him fine opportunities for field research and writing, but it was also a period of relative isolation from the main centers of anthropological work. He welcomed the invitation to join the department of anthropology at the University of Chicago, all the more because his wife had died after a long illness. He came to Chicago with his three children in 1925 and remained at the university for six years; his work and his influence flourished there. He was married again, to Jean McClenaghan, and they had two children. In 1931 he accepted a Sterling professorship at Yale and founded the department of anthropology there. His years at Yale were active and productive until he suffered a series of heart
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attacks in 1937, which ended his life two years later. Sapir's primary work was always in the study of language (his achievements in that field are discussed in the second section of this biography). His writings on other subjects, such as culture, society, and personality, were often done in response to a request for an article on a particular topic or as offshoots of his linguistic studies. Yet a good many of them have been major contributions which still command attention. These writings are of three main kinds—ethnological studies of American Indians, essays on general concepts, and papers on personality in culture and society. Ethnological studies. Sapir's ethnological contributions appeared in steady succession from his earliest writings to some that were published posthumously. Many were brief studies of the kind that provide the necessary groundwork for more general formulations, as the account of Takelma religion, or of a Nootka puberty ceremony, or of Sarsi pottery. In some, a large body of data is summarized and underlying principles demonstrated. For example, in "The Social Organization of the West Coast Tribes" (1915) Sapir showed how the idea of social ranking pervaded many aspects of these societies—how the emphases on inherited privileges and on ritual insignia were linked to that prevailing idea. When Robert Lowie wrote an appraisal of Sapir's work long after Sapir's death, he noted that Sapir was one of the very best of ethnographers—able to immerse himself in the phenomena under scrutiny, plumb them to the depths, and present them deftly and incisively (Letters From Edivard Sapir to Robert H. Lowie, p. 10). Sapir's most substantial contribution to ethnological theory is his monograph of 1916, "Time Perspective in Aboriginal American Culture: A Study in Method." A main objective of field research among American Indians at that time was understanding the actual processes of culture change as against the presumed universal processes, which had been postulated by nineteenthcentury evolutionists. In order to understand how American Indian cultures had actually changed, anthropologists had to reconstruct cultural histories. In this monograph Sapir surveyed the methods useful in such reconstructions; he particularly illuminated the use of inferential evidence, such as that from the study of cultural associations, geographic distributions, cultural strata, and from grammatical and lexical analyses. He presented the logical basis for evaluating different kinds of inferential evidence. The arguments are
closely reasoned; supporting evidence is compactly presented; broad concepts are tersely stated. It is a work that requires close study, and generations of graduate students studied it closely because it was for many years one of the major theoretical pieces on American Indian anthropology. Some of these students found that a single paragraph or even a sentence could open fruitful leads for their own research. In recent years, the shift of anthropological attention to peoples in other parts of the world and the development of interest in other theoretical approaches have lessened the importance of this work, but it held a leading place for some forty years. General concepts. Sapir's less technical, more general essays have had a wider audience; they have a way of including some ideas which appear, decades later, to be at the frontiers of thought. Thus, in "Culture, Genuine and Spurious" (1924), Sapir defined the anthropologist's characteristically objective view of a people's way of life and then went on to distinguish genuine and worthy cultures from spurious and morally shoddy ones. He valued those cultures that encourage harmonious and selfsatisfying lives for the people who live by them, whatever the level of technical achievement and efficiency. He decried those life styles, as of some modern industrial and service workers, in which a person finds little relationship or reciprocal gratification among his various roles and pursuits. This thesis, although strange to anthropology, was true to the intellectual temper of the time. Sapir's special touch is found not only in the evidence he selected and the telling way in which he presented it, but even more in the intriguing ideas he mentioned, as it were, in passing. Thus, he commented on the nexus of self and society, on the place of art in a genuine culture, on the cultural pressures generated by political forces. Of this last matter he wrote, "Our national-political units are too small for peace, too large for safety" ([1924] 1949, p. 330). There is a good deal in this essay that belongs to the 1920s, but there is also a good deal that holds interest still. Other essays clarify fundamental concepts and categories. In "The Meaning of Religion" (1928) Sapir took a subject which, in other hands, is often hackneyed; in his, the subject is treated freshly and lucidly, with proper anthropological objectivity and yet with sympathy. Here also he threw off a number of productive ideas, pointing out, for example, that a basic distinction among religions is exemplified by the contrast between Plains and Pueblo Indian practices. The two types tend to differ "according to whether they find the last court of appeal in mat-
SAPIR, EDWARD: Contributions to Cultural Anthropology ters religious, in the social act, or in the private emotional experience" ([1928] 1949, p. 350). The article "Anthropology and Sociology" (1927a) appeared as a chapter in a book on the social sciences and their interrelations. In it Sapir was not at all concerned with separating the two domains or negotiating boundaries between them. He concentrated instead on the ideas that anthropology can contribute toward an understanding of people and behavior. He began by noting that a main error of earlier theorists lay in taking primitive people to be archaic, unchanging prototypes. Sapir expressed the view that has now become accepted, that "we are to be at least as much interested in the many points of accord between primitive and sophisticated types of social organization as in their sensational differences" ([1927a] 1949, p. 336). These similarities, he continued, are not readily apparent from reconstructions of culture histories of American Indian tribes. It is rather from the "stupendous facts" about common human trends that sociologists will in the long run have most to learn from anthropology. The separate historical explanations are little more than a necessary clearing of the ground for a social interpretation; they are not to be mistaken for the interpretation itself. In his "Time Perspective" (1916) Sapir had provided a major theoretical foundation for the work of historical reconstruction, which then preoccupied most American ethnologists. In the article of 1927 he recognized the work he had done in 1916 as only a preliminary step toward the anthropologist's principal tasks. Another development of Sapir's thought appears in several of the articles he wrote for the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences: an emphasis on the relation between individual and society, between personality and culture. This emphasis arose partly because of Sapir's humanist feeling that the proper study of man must include real men and partly because of his realization that formal, nonpersonalized formulations about people can be very misleading unless they are coupled with insights into the real experience and reactions of actual persons. In the article "Group" (1932a), for example, Sapir sketched the essential definition and dimensions of the concept in his clear, succinct way. He outlined three types of classification based on objective observation and three based on subjective engagement of the participant. He noted the bases for group formation and changes, then posed the fundamental question of the bonds that hold together the members of a group. The psychological basis of the group, he observed, must rest on the psychology of specific social relations. Loyal-
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ties to an entire group do not mean that direct relationships between individual and individual have been completely transcended, but rather that the attributes of interpersonal experience have been transferred to the group as a whole. Thus the psychological realities of group participation can best be understood through studies of the actual kinds of understanding and expectation that grow up between two or more human beings when they are brought into significant contact. Culture and personality. Sapir's interest in the interplay of culture and personality dated from the beginning of his anthropological studies. "I remember being rather shocked than pleased," he wrote in a paper of 1938, "when in my student days I came across such statements in J. O. Dorsey's 'Omaha Sociology' as Two Crows denies this'" ([1938] 1949, p. 569). The paper is devoted to an assessment of Two Crows' denial and of what the anthropologist should make of it. Sapir found conventional ethnographic statements inadequate because they were generalized formulas which said little or nothing about variation, conflict, denial, or emotion. Even as a student Sapir recognized that such generalized formulations might be necessary but could not be sufficient for a thorough understanding of behavior. So Dorsey was ahead of his age in recognizing that he was not dealing with an abstracted society or a set of specimens but with a number of human beings who could give themselves the privilege of differing from each other on matters that were, in the conventional anthropological definition, part of the official tribal culture. Sapir was moved to point out the inadequacy of rigidly depersonalized studies in his response of 1917 to A. L. Kroeber's formulation of the concept of the superorganic. In "Do We Need a Superorganic?" he granted that few individuals, as individuals, make a marked impress on social movements, and yet it is always the individual who thinks and acts and dreams and revolts. The difference between social and individual data in behavior studies results from the observer's choice of what to select for systematic notice. Hence it is not valid to draw an abidingly sharp line between the two types of data, since "individual" reactions constantly spill over and give color to "social" reactions (1917, p. 442). This insistence on the significance of the person appears recurrently in Sapir's writings on culture and society. His paper "Speech as a Personality Trait" (1927b) is one instance of this theme; other expressions of it came in a series of papers written in the last decade of his life. In a paper of 1932 he restated the idea that
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the true locus of culture is in the interactions of specific individuals and in the meanings which the participants abstract from these interactions ([1932b] 1949, p. 515). And in an article of 1938 he proposed a research procedure that has only lately been appreciated. Instead of arguing from a supposed objectivity of culture to the problem of individual variation, Sapir recommended that for certain kinds of analyses we should operate as though we knew nothing about culture but were interested in ascertaining what a. set of human beings who are accustomed to live with each other actually think and do in their day-to-day relationships ([1938] 1949, p. 574). This simple discovery procedure, as it turned out, involves complex questions as to when and how it is to be used, but it can also lead to considerable advances in anthropological understanding. As for the interpretation of a particular sequence of behavior as being either social or personal, Sapir's paper of 1934 on this matter shows that the duality of reference is an inevitable part of human experience as well as of the social scientist's method. When one is confronted with familiar circumstances and familiar people, interest is likely to be focused on the individual. With unfamiliar people or situations, in socially distant or casual relations, one's interest is more likely to center on cultural or social observations. Each type of interest "is necessary for the psychic preservation of the individual in an environment which experience makes increasingly complex and unassimilable on its own simple terms" ([1934] 1949, p. 591). Every person must use both frames of reference in his own conduct. In the study of man the anthropologist must also use both, but with explicit awareness of what he is doing, and he must be able to deploy each in ways best suited for analysis and explanation. Sociology and anthropology, Sapir continued, are rooted in the social kind of reference, a kind which perhaps is characteristic of the child's earliest experience with the seemingly irresistible authority and knowledge of his parents. Psychiatry and social psychology proceed more from the personal kind of reference and from the necessity felt to assert oneself significantly. All these are "preliminary disciplines" and provide an invaluable first ordering of research. But sooner or later their obscure opposition of spirit must be transcended for an objectivity which is not merely formal and non-evaluative but which boldly essays to bring every cultural pattern back to the living context from which it has been abstracted in the
first place and, in parallel fashion, to bring every fact of personality formation back to its social matrix. ([1934] 1949, p. 592) For such purposes, the descriptions and classifications of abstracted culture patterns are no longer very relevant, useful as they are to clear the observational ground. The more anthropologists become concerned with interactional meanings and values rather than with segregated traits, Sapir commented, the more a culture seems to take on the characteristics of a personality organization, and the growth of culture is understood in the spirit of the development of a personality. Thus, such ethnological questions as that of clan membership may well become subsidiary to inquiries as to whether a father is in the habit of acting toward his son as an indulgent guide or as a disciplinarian. One result of taking this point of view is that the bizarre or exotic in alien cultures tends to be minimized, while the broad human base on which all culture has developed is revealed more clearly (ibid., pp. 594-595). Anthropologists who appreciate that a culture is not given in a neat package to the child, but is gropingly discovered and assimilated by him, and who can see that a people change their culture with similar groping assimilation, will join with psychologists in phrasing more fruitful questions about culture and behavior ([1932b] 1949, p. 521; [1934] 1949, p. 597). Influence. Sapir taught students of anthropology for only about a dozen years, but his influence on several generations of anthropologists and linguists has been considerable. Hearing him in lectures or discussions could be an exhilarating experience. He was not at all dramatic; his talk was low-keyed and anything but hortatory. But he could give his students glimpses of intellectual vistas the like of which they had neither seen before nor would soon forget. He came to differ with his teacher in anthropology, Franz Boas, on a number of fundamental matters, but Boas always maintained a high respect for Sapir's work. Colleagues and friends of his own generation showed how much they owed to his work by the formal honors they gave him during his life and by the appreciations they wrote after his death at age 56. Parts of his correspondence with two of his friends, Robert H. Lowie and Ruth Benedict, have been published (Lowie & Sapir 1965; Benedict 1959, pp. 45-54, 158-197). These letters between friends contain private banter, trade gossip, and transient comment. But they also tell something of the day-to-day context of Sapir's
SAPIR, EDWARD: Contributions to Linguistics life and work—for example, at one period in Chicago he was teaching as much as fourteen hours a week—and they reflect something of both the warm charm and the occasional friction in his personal relations. The letters to Lowie show Sapir in the course of developing ethnological and linguistic ideas, sometimes surely and swiftly, sometimes haltingly and piecemeal. Those to Ruth Benedict show his sharp insight into the world of poets and poetry, a world seemingly very far removed from the technical universe which he discussed with Lowie but actually interwoven in his personality and his work. In her account of Ruth Benedict's poetry, Margaret Mead has noted that "it was in the vivid, voluminous correspondence with Edward Sapir that her own poetic interest and capacity matured." And in another passage Margaret Mead mentions that among those who benefited most from Sapir's speculations about personality and culture were Ruth Benedict, John Dollard, and herself (Benedict 1959, pp. 90, 209). The memorial volume for him written by some of his students (Language, Culture, and Personality 1941) was reprinted in 1960. In the generation of the students of his students, there is not only quite lively interest in what Sapir had to say, but also a good many who are urging their students to read Sapir. Sapir's death cut short a number of scholarly enterprises, among them the analysis of a large collection of American Indian ethnological data, extensive explorations in Indo-European linguistics, preliminary formulations of linguistic relationships on the largest scale, and extensive ethnological and linguistic notes in Semi tics. Toward the end of his life he turned increasingly to Semitic studies. His father had been a cantor, and he had been raised in the strict tradition of Orthodox Judaism. Although he soon discarded what he felt to be the intolerable restrictions of orthodoxy, he retained his delight in the scholarship and spirit of Judaism. His strong commitment to human rights, opposing all invidious discrimination and oppression, appears in his writing, especially in articles done for general audiences. As the grave world events of the 1930s developed, he participated actively in the defense of these rights. The weight of his scholarly influence is in linguistic anthropology, where the weight of his published contributions also lies. In American Indian ethnology his ideas on method and leads for further research have had notable effect. In the field of culture-personality studies he remains one of the principal pathfinders. For anthropology in gen-
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eral he continues to be a heartening example of how much can be accomplished when a superb mind plays over a wide and richly yielding field. DAVID G. MANDELBAUM [See also ANTHROPOLOGY; COMMUNICATION; CULTURE, article on THE CONCEPT OF CULTURE; INDIANS, NORTH AMERICAN.] BIBLIOGRAPHY The bibliography for this article is combined with the bibliography of the article that follows. II CONTRIBUTIONS TO LINGUISTICS
Sapir was, with Leonard Bloomfield, a founder of formal descriptive linguistics and the distributional method that characterizes it. He developed phonemic theory, the analysis of the sounds of a language according to the pattern of their distribution—that is, the sequence in which sounds occur and are systematized and perceived by the speakers of the language. Phonemic analysis thus recognizes language as behavior resulting from a process of selection. This method of analysis classifies each part of an utterance (sound, morpheme, etc.) on the basis of its environment rather than on the basis of its meaning, phonetic properties, and so forth. The distributional method is important not only because it is self-contained but also because its universe and its terms of reference are so explicit that one can discover all sorts of hidden relations that are observable only as second-order disturbances in the overt distributional system: masked and combined phonemes, neutralized phonemic differences, zeroed morphemes, and the like. To be sure, Sapir did not always formulate aberrant phenomena in distributional terms; he sometimes used formulations drawn from biological processes. While this reduced the incisiveness and generality of the distributional theory he was developing, it did indicate some of the other systemic factors (factors of equilibrium, of dynamics, etc.) that may be required to understand the sources of aberrant phenomena or of the place these phenomena occupy in the descriptive system. These additional factors may even aid ultimately in understanding the source of the system itself. Thus Sapir might say that if, in a given language, a two-vowel sequence never occurs inside a morpheme and only rarely occurs when two morphemes adjoin each other in a word, the language will develop a "protective mechanism" to avoid the two-vowel sequence. Examples of such
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mechanisms are the glottal stop and the French liaison t. Distributional methods came to be widely used in the formulation of linguistic process. Phonemic phenomena were regarded as processes of change (for example, "suppletion," or the replacement of stems in certain word groups, e.g., in am, is, be} that are structural and thus related to the environment in which they occur. Sapir was also one of the originators of the concept of the morphophoneme. The morphophoneme classifies together all those phonemes that replace each other in the paradigm-—that is, the different phonemic shapes that a word or morpheme has as it occurs in different morphemic environments. This concept was also based partly on the speaker's perception of phonemic replacement (Sapir 1933; Sapir & Swadesh 1939). Sapir also did much work in historical and comparative linguistics, tracing the genetic relationships among languages. His interest in pattern and process led him to speak of configurational pressure as a source of change. By configurational pressure he meant that linguistic change (phonemic and morphemic) is influenced by relevant patterns inherent in the language itself. He suggested that configurational pressure is a factor in what he called drift, the process that occurs in a language whose speakers have separated and can no longer imitate ("borrow from") each other, but whose linguistic habits continue in some respects to change in the same way in the separated communities (e.g., Old Norse in Denmark and Iceland). Although this suggestion has not received sufficient study, it does accord with systematizations of linguistic change. In historical linguistics Sapir is particularly noted for a series of intricate analyses of the earliest stages of Indo-European. He based his work partly on the difficult data from Tocharian and partly on the laryngeal hypothesis that reconstructed various laryngeal consonants lost in early Indo-European with consequent changes in neighboring vowels (1937a; 1937b; 1939). Related to this work were his investigations of the similarities and connections of Indo-European to Semitic and other Mediterranean languages. Sapir thought that Indo-European and Semitic might have descended from the same parent stock. Although it was impossible to establish this hypothesis by reconstructions using the accepted comparative method, he could point to many unexpected connections and to a great over-all structural similarity in the earliest stages of both Indo-European and Semitic. Sapir worked with examples of structural simi-
larity in his famous attempt to group the extremely numerous and apparently unrelated families of North American Indian languages into six superfamilies (1929). Most of Sapir's linguistic work (like his ethnological studies) was with American Indians, and his mastery of the data and his analyses of the Indian languages were unequaled. He worked particularly in Navajo, Yana, Nootka, Tlingit, Sarsi, Kutchin, Chinook, Ingalik, Hupa, and Southern Paiute. Z. S. HARRIS [See also LANGUAGE; LINGUISTICS, article on THE FIELD; and the biographies of BLOOMFIELD; SAUSSURE; WHORF.]
WORKS BY SAPIR (1915) 1949 The Social Organization of the West Coast Tribes. Pages 468-487 in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. (1916) 1949 Time Perspective in Aboriginal American Culture: A Study in Method. Pages 389-462 in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press 1917 Do We Need a Superorganic? American Anthropologist New Series 19:441-447. 1921 Language: An Introduction to the Study of Speech. New York: Harcourt. (1924) 1949 Culture, Genuine and Spurious. Pages SOSSSI in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. (1927a) 1949 Anthropology and Sociology. Pages 332345 in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. (1927b) 1949 Speech as a Personality Trait. Pages 533543 in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. (1928) 1949 The Meaning of Religion. Pages 346-356 in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. (1929) 1949 Central and North American Languages. Pages 169-178 in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. (1932a) 1949 Group. Pages 357-364 in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. -> First published in Volume 7 of the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. Sapir also wrote the Encyclopaedia articles "Communication," "Custom," "Dialect," "Fashion," "Language," "Personality," and "Symbolism." (1932&) 1949 Cultural Anthropology and Psychiatry. Pages 509-521 in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. 1933 La realite psychologique des phonemes. Journal de psychologie normale et pathologique 30:247-265. (1934) 1949 The Emergence of the Concept of Personality in a Study of Cultures. Pages 590-597 in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. (1937a) 1949 Hebrew "Helmet": A Loanword and Its Bearing on Indo-European Phonology. Pages 285-288
SARTON, GEORGE in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. (1937b) 1949 [A Book Review of] The Ras Shamra Mythological Texts, by James A. Montgomery and Zellig Harris. Pages 289-293 in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. (1938) 1949 Why Cultural Anthropology Needs the Psychiatrist. Pages 569-577 in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. (1939) 1949 From Sapir's Desk: Indo-European Prevocalic s in Macedonian and The Indo-European Words for "Tear." Pages 294-302 in Selected Writings . . . . Edited by David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. 1939 SAPIR, EDWARD; and SWADESH, MORRIS Nootka Texts: Tales and Ethnological Narratives With Grammatical Notes and Lexical Materials. Philadelphia: Linguistic Society of America. Letters From Edward Sapir to Robert H. Lowie. With an introduction and notes by Robert H. Lowie. Privately published, 1965. Selected Writings of Edward Sapir in Language, Culture, and Personality. Edited by David G, Mandelbaum. Berkeley: University of' California Press, 1949. -» Includes a chronologically arranged bibliography of Sapir's writings, SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BENEDICT, RUTH 1959 An Anthropologist at Work: Writings of Ruth Benedict, by Margaret Mead. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. -> A selection of Benedict's writings, with extensive commentary by Margaret Mead. [Bibliography: Edward Sapir.] 1938 Psychiatry 1:154157. HARRIS, Z. S. 1951 [A Book Review of] Selected Writings of Edward Sapir in Language, Culture, and Personality. Language 27:288-333. Language, Culture, and Personality: Essays in Memory of Edward Sapir. Edited by Leslie A. Spier, A. Irving Hallowell, and Stanley S. Newman. (1941) 1960 Salt Lake City: Univ. of Utah Press. PRESTON, RICHARD J. 1966 Edward Sapir's Anthropology: Style, Structure, and Method. American Anthropologist New Series 68:1105-1128.
SARTON, GEORGE George Sarton, historian of science, was born in Ghent, Belgium, in 1884 and died in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 1956. He married Eleanor Mabel Elwes, an English artist, in 1911; their daughter, May, who became a poet and novelist, was born in 1912. As a youth Sarton wrote romantic poems and essays. At the University of Ghent he studied the natural sciences and mathematics, winning a medal for a chemical memoir in 1908 and completing a doctoral dissertation on Newton's mechanics in 1911. He became increasingly interested in the history and philosophy of science and dedicated the rest
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of his life to establishing the history of science as an independent discipline. In 1912 he founded Isis, a scholarly journal for this new field, and continued to be its editor through 1952. After only five issues, publication was interrupted by World War i, but it was resumed in 1919. Meanwhile Sarton had fled Belgium and moved to the United States in 1915. As a research associate of the Carnegie Institution, from 1918 on, he used Harvard's Widener Library and offered a course in the history of science at Harvard, where he became a professor in 1940. The History of Science Society was formed in the United States in 1924; it provided a professional organization for the new discipline and guaranteed the publication of Isis. Isis has published a continuous series of valuable critical bibliographies; the first 79 of these were prepared by Sarton himself. Osiris was founded in 1936 to accommodate studies that were too long for Isis but too short for separate publication. When Sarton was invited, in 1916, to deliver the Lowell lectures, he chose Leonardo da Vinci as his subject. On this occasion he was struck with how little was known about ancient and medieval science leading up to Leonardo, and he decided that a comprehensive history needed to be written. In 1919 he recovered his notes and a good part of his library, which he had had to abandon in Belgium, and two years later he began to write his Introduction to the History of Science (1927-1948). Ultitimately, Sarton did not take this history beyond the fourteenth century; he realized how much time would be required to handle the fifteenth century on the same scale as the earlier centuries and preferred to spend his remaining years on more limited subjects; for example, he wrote A Guide to the History of Science (1952a), The Appreciation of Ancient and Medieval Science During the Renaissance (1955), and Six Wings: Men of Science in the Renaissance (1957). His aim in writing the history of science was not only to establish and define that field of study but also to show its importance for the philosophy of science and for any positive philosophy. Sarton called science "systematized positive knowledge," picturing it as a living, continually developing organism. He maintained that science is the only cumulative and progressive human activity and that the study of the history of mankind must focus on the history of science; any tolerably complete history of civilization must devote considerable space to explaining scientific progress. He believed that the historian of science has a mission to defend the traditions of science, not because they differ essentially from those of other fields, but
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because "they are all that makes life worth living, they are the nobility and the goodness of life" (1952a, p. 15). For Sarton, science has grown "out of the minds and hearts of living men" (1954, p. 67), and its history is therefore often best written in terms of biography. He did not limit his account to the achievements of outstanding scientists, because he found that a number of smaller discoveries usually contributed to the gradual preparation of major ones. He warned that the history of science must not be confused with the history of scientific method, nor be approached from the economic point of view, which overemphasizes applications. Influenced by Comte and Tannery, Sarton repeatedly emphasized that the history of science is the integration of the histories of the separate sciences, not their summation; it is itself a specialty built on a thorough understanding of the methods of science and of history; it covers ancient, medieval, and modern science; and it requires more than the leisure hours of capable scientists or of scholarly historians. The historian of science must be trained in science; indeed, he should be acquainted with all advancing knowledge, not just scientific and historical material. Moreover, Western science cannot be properly understood without an appreciation of the extent of the influence of Islam on Western civilization, and Sarton learned Arabic in order to comprehend this influence. Sarton's history of science, an all-embracing picture of the impact of scientific progress on mankind and of man's environment on science, tells "not only of the spreading light but also of the contracting darkness" (1952a, p. 11). Sarton saw the history of science as a means of understanding science and making it live—creating a philosophy of science that would have continuing validity. He combated the tendency of scientific studies to supplant humanistic ones. He strove to "humanize" science, to reveal its integration with the other elements of our culture, and to instill in scientists some reverence of the past and some awareness of the relevance of the history of science for science as an ongoing activity. The history of science seemed to him the only possible bridge across a growing abyss. Warm and subtly humorous, Sarton made friends throughout the world. He was tireless in his own work and expected similar patience and critical attitudes from others. Sometimes his genuine humility seemed like self-righteousness (e.g., [1931] 1956, p. 109). His lecture courses were popular, but he had few graduate students.
A new generation of historians of science, while appreciative of Sarton's pioneering service, is reassessing his aims and methods. Present-day emphasis is on the structure and development of scientific ideas rather than on the ideas themselves. Sarton has been described as naive about history (Williams 1960, p. 160) and insufficiently selective in his methods, too lost in pedantic minutiae to appreciate their relevance for the overall development. He has been accused by some of stressing the content of science at the expense of its integration into a complex whole. On the other hand, Sarton's interpretation of the history of science is alleged to be incompatible with the compartmentalism of modern science and to stress the cultural framework and the normative implications of science at the expense of its content (Grmek 1965, pp. 140-143). Grmek questioned whether one man can handle the history of science if it is interpreted as broadly as it was by Sarton, but he admitted that collaborative studies by teams of specialists have gained technical insight at the expense of the kind of synthesis that Sarton provided. Clearly, Sarton's critics are in disagreement. However, the monumental scholarly edifice he erected can become a basis for a revision of the historiography of science. C. DORIS HELLMAN [See also SCIENCE, article on THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE.] WORKS BY SARTON
1927-1948 Introduction to the History of Science. 3 vols. Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins. (1931) 1956 The History of Science and the New Humanism. 3d ed. New York: Braziller. -» A paperback edition was published in 1962 by the Indiana University Press. 1952a A Guide to the History of Science: A First Guide for the Study of the History of Science, With Introductroy Essays on Science and Tradition. New York: Ronald Press. 1952fo A History of Science: Ancient Science Through the Golden Age of Greece. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. 1954 The Old World and the New Humanism. Pages 6368 in Man's Right to Knowledge; First Series: Tradition and Change. New York: Muschel. 1955 The Appreciation of Ancient and Medieval Science During the Renaissance (1450-1600). Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press. 1957 Six Wings: Men of Science in the Renaissance. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press. -> Published posthumously. 1959 A History of Science: Hellenistic Science and Culture in the Last Three Centuries B.C. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. On the History of Science: Essays. Selected and edited by Dorothy Stimson. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1962.
SAUER, CARL O. SUPPLEMENTARY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
AGASSI, JOSEPH 1963 Towards an Historiography of Science. History and Theory, Beiheft 2. The Hague: Mouton. BUCHDAHL, GERD 1965 A Revolution in Historiography of Science. History of Science 4:55-69. The George Sarton Memorial Issue. 1957 Isis 48, part 3. GRMEK, MIRKO D. 1965 Prolegomenes a une histoire generale des sciences. Annales: Economies, societes, civilisations 20:138-146. HELLMAN, C. DORIS 1958 George Sarton: Historian of Science and New Humanist. Science 128:641-644. KUHN, THOMAS S. 1962 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Univ. of Chicago Press. -» A paperback edition was published in 1964. STRELSKY, KATHARINE 1957 Bibliography of the Publications of George Sarton. Isis 48:336-350. WILLIAMS, L. PEARCE 1960 [A Book Review of] A History of Science, Vol. 2, by George Sarton. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 11:159-161.
SAUER, CARL O. Carl O. Sauer, for more than thirty years chairman of the department of geography at the University of California, Berkeley, is one of the most influential figures in twentieth-century geography. The study of cultural geography, especially as it has developed in the United States, owes more to Sauer than to any other man. His concern for the quality of human life in its physical setting, for historical and ecological processes, and for the origins and dispersals of culture traits and complexes that have modified the cultural landscape is in the tradition of German geographical thought, of which Sauer has been a principal interpreter. Born of German ancestry in Warrenton, Missouri, in 1889, he graduated from the local and now defunct Central Wesleyan College in 1908, having earlier studied for a time in a school in Wiirttemberg, Germany, where he had family ties. His attachment to the rural and small-town ways of life and landscape of the Middle West of that period has played an important role in his teaching and writing, and he has frequently returned there for study and reflection. Sauer next studied at the University of Chicago, where the first full-fledged graduate program in geography in the United States had recently been instituted. His PH.D. dissertation, The Geography of the Ozark Highland of Missouri (1920), was acclaimed as a model of regional cultural geography. In 1915 he was appointed to the staff of the new department of geology and geography at the University of Michigan, where in a period of seven years he advanced from the rank of instructor to that of full professor. His work in designing the
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Michigan Land Economic Survey brought him national recognition. He left Ann Arbor in 1923, at the age of 33, to become chairman of the department of geography at Berkeley. Sauer retired from active teaching in 1957, except for occasional graduate seminars and guest lectureships, but his scholarly output has been undiminished. Sauer also served the development of geography outside the university. He played an important role in the early development of land-use mapping in the United States and in the establishment of the U.S. Soil Conservation Service. For a time in the 1930s he was consultant to the President's Science Advisory Board. For many years he served as a member of the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation selection committee, in which capacity he had a unique opportunity to observe and influence a wide range of American scholarship. He has received honorary degrees from Heidelberg University, Syracuse University, and the University of California and medals from the American Geographical Society, the Berlin Geographical Society, and the Swedish Society for Anthropology and Geography. Soon after Sauer came to California, he and many of his students turned their attention to northern Mexico, especially to the historical geography of the settlement of the dry northwestern part. Later he was to concern himself increasingly with tropical Mexico and Central America and, finally, with the Caribbean. Latin America was thus the strategic site for his observation of the interaction between the simpler, peasant cultures and the sustaining earth. Here, where the mark of the past is so deeply imprinted on the land, he found an especially congenial atmosphere for the study of the interplay between habitat and habitant. His careful reconstructions of past Latin American landscapes and economies, based on a combination of archival work and detailed field inspection, are models of historical geography. The Early Spanish Main (1966), an analysis of the Spanish conquest on the islands of the Caribbean and its margins, is their capstone. Several of his publications on Latin American subjects appeared in the University of California monograph series Ibero-American a, which he founded in 1932 with A. L. Kroeber. Sauer's outspoken rejection of environmental "influences" as the focus of geographical inquiry, enunciated in his Morphology of Landscape (1925), was a critical turning point in the development of American academic geography. Instead of the deterministic view that had largely dominated Ameri-
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can geography since the turn of the century, he advocated geographical inquiry into such themes as the man-modified landscape and the origin, spread, limits, and alteration of the elements of that landscape. Holding that all geography is essentially historical, he systematically used any kind of data pertaining to human settlement and activity, and he often found archeological evidence fully as pertinent as written documents. For him the kitchen midden, the colonial archive, the relict plant community or soil profile, and the wisdom of the countryman at work on his hillside garden patch provided information equally relevant to the problems of cultural geography. A recurring theme in Sauer's work is the tremendous importance and antiquity of the domestication of plants and animals. In Agricultural Origins and Dispersals (1952a), he summarized his efforts to locate the principal hearths of domestication and the subsequent routes and extent of* dispersal. Using archeological and ethnographic evidence, Sauer argued that the origins of cultivation must have been in the woodlands rather than in riverine valleys of the world. He made a basic distinction between the agricultural complexes of monsoon Asia and northwestern South America, which are largely dependent on vegetative reproduction by slips and cuttings, and the seed cultures of southwest Asia and of Mexico and Central America. Sauer hypothesized that the earliest form of plant selection involved asexual plant propagation and that it was probably first practiced by the sedentary fishing peoples living around the shallow seas of southeast Asia. The early domestic animals of these peoples were household animals such as the dog, pig, and chicken. Sauer accepted the view that plant selection by seed reproduction came later, and he was influenced by N. I. Vavilov in pointing to China, India, and Ethiopia as Old World centers of seed domestication. He associated herd animals with cereal cultivation and accepted Eduard Harm's theory of a mixed economy in which milking of animals was a culture trait integrally involved in the process and purpose of their domestication, probably for noneconomic ends. His research along these lines has especially attracted the attention of anthropologists and archeologists. Many of his speculations regarding the antiquity of man in the New World, Pleistocene ecology, and the relation of changing sea levels and shore configurations to human occupation sites continue to stimulate new research. Sauer has insisted on the close links of cultural geography with both biology and the earth sciences. He sees man as the ecologic dominant in nature,
intervening more and more decisively to change the balance and nature of organic life. He has, for example, insisted that the problems of increasing world-wide desiccation are caused by agricultural and grazing practices and not by "climate deterioration." He has repeatedly written about the historical processes of biotic destruction and soil depletion as reflections of changing technology and changing attitudes about the earth. Another theme in his writings has been the role of fire, especially of fires set by man, in the modification of the vegetative covering of the earth and the establishment of grasslands. He was the principal organizer of an international symposium held at Princeton in 1955 that focused on "Man's Role in Changing the Face of the Earth" (1956a). Sauer has viewed with misgivings the growing emphasis of some of his colleagues on techniques and tools of analysis that produce quantitative results: he has insisted that the qualities of both human society and the man-made landscape are often other than those that permit quantitative processing (1952b). Leighly has observed that to Sauer the investigation of human beings and their behavior by mechanical processes of organization and computation is as repugnant as the environmental determinism he rejected years earlier (see the introduction by Leighly, to Sauer's Land and Life, p. 6). Human geography, Sauer has said, exists because of the diversification that exists in human ways, and no approach to its questions is more rewarding than that of comparative culture history, soundly based on ecological and geographical principles and concepts. JAMES J. PARSONS [See also DOMESTICATION; ECOLOGY; GEOGRAPHY, especially the articles on CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY and SOCIAL GEOGRAPHY.] WORKS BY SAUER
1920 The Geography of the Ozark Highland of Missouri. Geographic Society of Chicago, Bulletin No. 7. Univ. of Chicago Press. 1925 The Morphology of Landscape. University of California Publications in Geography, Vol. 2, No. 2. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. 1932 The Road to Cibola. Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press. 1935 Aboriginal Population of Northwestern Mexico. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. 1938 Theme of Plant and Animal Destruction in Economic History. Journal of Farm Economics 20:765775. 1941 Foreword to Historical Geography. Association of American Geographers, Annals 31:1-24. 1948a Colima of New Spain in the Sixteenth Century. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.
SAUSSURE, FERDINAND DE 1948& Environment and Culture During the Last Deglaciation. American Philosophical Society, Proceedings 92:65-77. 1950 Grassland Climax, Fire, and Man. Journal of Range Management 3:16-21. 1952a Agricultural Origins and Dispersals. New York: American Geographical Society. 1952& Folkways of Social Science. Pages 100-109 in Minnesota, University of, Social Science Research Center, The Social Sciences at Mid-century. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press. 1956a The Agency of Man on the Earth. Pages 49-69 in International Symposium on Man's Role in Changing the Face of the Earth, Princeton, N.J., 1955, Man's Role in Changing the Face of the Earth. Univ. of Chicago Press. 1956& The Education of a Geographer. Association of American Geographers, Annals 46:287-299. 1957 The End of the Ice Age and Its Witnesses. Geographical Review 47:29-43. 1958 Man in the Ecology of Tropical America. Pages 104-110 in Pacific Science Congress, Ninth, Bangkok, 1957, Proceedings. Volume 20: Special Symposium on Climate, Vegetation, and Rational Land Utilization in the Humid Tropics. Bangkok: The Secretariat. 1962a Homestead and Community on the Middle Border. Landscape: Magazine of Human Geography 12, no. 1:3-7. 1962i> Seashore—Primitive Home of Man? American Philosophical Society, Proceedings. 106:41-47. 1966 The Early Spanish Main. Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press. Land and Life: A Selection from the Writings of Carl Ortwin Sauer. Edited by John Leighly. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1963. SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY HAHN, EDUARD 1896 Die Haustiere und ihre Beziehungen zur Wirtschaft des Menschen: Eine geographische Studie. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. HAHN, EDUARD 1909 Die Entstehung der Pflugkultur. Heidelberg (Germany): Winter. HAHN, EDUARD (1914) 1919 Von der Hacke zum Pflug. 2d ed. Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer.
SAUSSURE, FERDINAND DE Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913), Swiss linguist, was the chief forerunner of structural linguistics. He was born in Geneva, where he received his secondary and university education. He was awarded his doctorate at Leipzig in 1880, taught at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes in Paris from 1881 to 1891, and taught subsequently at Geneva for the remainder of his career. De Saussure's fame rests almost exclusively on two works—his earliest, the Memoire sur le systeme primitif des voyelles dans les langues indoeuropeennes (1879), and the posthumously published Cours de linguistique generale (1916). The Memoire is a brilliant tour de force, whose basic method foreshadows the fundamental structuralist notion of language as an organized system, the
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central doctrine of de Saussure's mature thought. [See LINGUISTICS, article on THE FIELD.] In the Memoire it is boldly hypothesized that certain apparently divergent aspects of the IndoEuropean system of vowel alternations (the socalled ablaut system, which still survives in English in such vowel changes as the present sing, the preterite sang, the past participle simg) can be explained in accordance with the dominant regularities, if one assumes that certain sounds had formerly existed and produced certain effects before being lost. While this theory of lost sounds, subsequently called laryngeals, was admired in de Saussure's lifetime, the absence of any direct evidence for these sounds prevented its acceptance by scholars. After de Saussure's death the main points of his doctrine regarding the Indo-European vowels received confirmation when a newly discovered Indo-European language, cuneiform Hittite, was shown to have an actual laryngeal consonant (h) in almost all the instances that one would expect to find it on the basis of de Saussure's theory. In one variant or another, the laryngeal theory is now accepted by all IndoEuropean scholars. A far wider influence was exercised by the Cours. This work is based on students' notebooks of the three courses in general linguistics given by de Saussure at the University of Geneva in 1907, 1908-1909, and 1910-1911. Two of de Saussure's leading disciples, Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye, utilized these as their chief source in putting together the Cours. Given these circumstances of the book's composition, it is not surprising that an extensive exegetical literature has arisen concerning the true nature of de Saussure's doctrine. Godel (1957) published a considerable number of resumes and direct quotations from the notebooks and other unpublished sources, e.g., de Saussure's class notes and letters. It is quite likely that in some instances "fruitful misunderstandings" of de Saussure's ideas have exerted an influence on the development of European linguistic theory. Language as signs. Language is a system of signs and as such forms the central part of a discipline—semiology—which takes the general study of signs as its subject matter. De Saussure thus anticipated the concept of general semiotics, found in the work of Charles Morris and others [see SEMANTICS AND SEMIOTICS]. The sign has two indissoluble aspects, likened to the two sides of the same paper—the signifier (signifianf) and the signified (signifie"). De Saussure felt the need for the double terminology because of the ambiguity of the word "sign" in common usage, which refers
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both to the relation (between a sign and what it designates) and to the physical sign vehicle. The signifier and the signified are, in thoroughgoing mentalistic fashion, the acoustic image and the concept respectively, not the physical sound and the thing meant. The relation between signifier and signified is arbitrary in the sense that any signifier can, in principle, be connected with any signified. Both of these elements are, abstracted from their functioning in signs, unstructured. Language is thus pure form. Although arbitrary in the sense described above, the sign relation in any particular case is a historically imposed one about which the individual has no choice. It is a social fact that in a given community a particular sequence of sounds is connected with a particular concept. Simply because it is arbitrary, there is no reason to change it once established. One can argue the relative merits of monogamy or polygamy, but there is no rational basis for choosing between boeuf and Ochse as designations for "ox." Because language is arbitrary and because there is no social awareness of its true nature, it is never subject to radical change. From the formal nature of the components of the linguistic sign further important conclusions follow. Thus, in the case of the signifier, it is not the particular physical nature of the sound that counts but merely the fact that one sound is distinct from another. A favorite Saussurean simile likens language to a chess game. If the knight is replaced by a different kind of physical object it makes no difference to the game as long as the object is distinct from the other pieces. But if the rules for moving the knight are modified, then the system of chess has been modified in its very nature. This distinction is one aspect of a central Saussurean dichotomy, that between language (tongue} and speech (parole}. Phonetics in its physical aspect belongs to the latter. Likewise in grammar, we have a network of two types of relations, the syntagmatic, the relation between elements which actually occur together in the chain of speech—e.g., a verb and its object—and the paradigmatic, the relation of a present element to one which is not there but has the potentiality of appearance in place of the one chosen. Thus, in the sentence "Black is a color," "white" is a paradigmatic associate of "black," while "is a" constitutes a syntagmatic relation. The grammar of a language (langue) is the set of these two types of relations: it is a social product, never perfect in the individual but only in the mass of speakers (masse parlante). The way individuals actually construct sentences by using
langue constitutes parole. Within langue it is the position within the system that counts, not the physical realization. Thus a grammatical category may even be signaled by nothing (zero}, provided it has a particular place in a network of relations, e.g., the absence of an ending in the genitive plural of feminine nouns in Czech such as zen ("of women") is significant when it is opposed to the nominative plural, zeny. To be is to be related. Synchronic and diachronic study of language. Another dichotomy of fundamental importance in de Saussure's thought is that between the synchronic study of language as a state and the diachronic study of language as change through time [see LINGUISTICS, article on HISTORICAL LINGUISTICS]. These now current terms are terminological inventions of de Saussure. The insistence on the separation of synchronic and diachronic and the emphasis on synchronic states, not only as worthy autonomous subjects for investigation but even as having a certain priority, were perhaps de Saussure's most revolutionary ideas. Linguistics in its recognizably modern form arose in the early nineteenth century as a historical discipline, and de Saussure was the first to state clearly the viewpoint of modern structuralism—that language studied in a single time plane constitutes a systematic set of relations that can be studied without reference to the historic process by which these have come to be what they are. Thus, to revert to de Saussure's figure of the chess game, the man who has seen the entire game up to a particular point has no advantage over the newly arrived bystander in understanding the existing position. In spite of differences in detail, structuralism in linguistics is fundamentally allied with functionalism in social science generally and is part of the same intellectual movement. In the case of de Saussure, his notion of langue, a social phenomenon imposed on the individual, brings him closest to the social functionalism of Durkheim. Although Durkheim cited language as an ideal example of a social institution, there is apparently no evidence of any direct influence of either man on the other. The posthumous influence of de Saussure's ideas in general linguistics was enormous, particularly on the Continent. His work was most directly continued by the so-called Geneva school, which included among its leading figures Albert Sechehaye, Charles Bally, Robert Godel, and Henri Frei and which sponsored the journal Cahiers Ferdinand de Saussure (from 1941 to the present). The glossematic approach developed by the Danish linguist Louis Hjelmsler was founded on Saussurean con-
SAVIGNY, FRIEDRICH CARL VON cepts. De Saussure exercised a more diffuse influence on the chief European structuralist school, that of Prague, by which he was looked upon as a leading pioneer of structuralism in linguistics. JOSEPH H. GREENBERG WORKS BY SAUSSURE Memoire sur le systeme primitif des voyelles dans les langues indo-europeennes. Leipzig: Teubner. (1916) 1959 Course in General Linguistics. New York: Philosophical Library. -» First published posthumously as Cours de linguistique generale.
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SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BENVENISTE, E. 1962 "Structure" en linguistique. Pages 31-39 in Colloque sur le mot structure, Paris, 1959, Sens et usages du terme structure dans les sciences humaines et sociales. Janua linguarum, Series minor, no. 16. The Hague: Mouton. Cahiers Ferdinand de Saussure. -> Published in Geneva by Droz since 1941. FREI, HENRI 1947 La linguistique saussurienne a Geneve depuis 1939. Word 3:107-109. GODEL, ROBERT 1957 Les sources manuscrites du Cours de linguistique generale de F. de Saussure. Geneva: Droz. WELLS, RULON S. 1947 De Saussure's System of Linguistics. Word 3:1-31.
SAVIGNY, FRIEDRICH CARL VON Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779-1861) was the founder of the older, romantic branch of the German historical school of law. He was born in Frankfurt am Main of an ancient and wealthy noble family from Lorraine, and his selection of an academic career was unusual for a member of his class. He began that career at the University of Marburg in 1800, teaching Roman law, and became professor of Roman law at Landshut in 1808. Two years later, at the suggestion of Wilhelm von Humboldt, he was appointed professor at the newly founded University of Berlin, where for three decades he had a most successful and influential career in legal teaching and research. From 1842 until the German revolution of 1848 he was Prussian minister for the revision of legislation. In the academic year 1802/1803, Savigny gave a lecture on legal methodology at Marburg (see Juristische Methodenlehre), which shows him still poised between rationalistic and historical jurisprudence. (His student Jacob Grimm recorded this lecture.) However, the lecture contains some of the basic principles of his later doctrine, for example, that jurisprudence must be empirical and that it should be a synthesis of historical and systematic treatments of the law. He first applied these early
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theories in Das Recht des Besitzes (see 1803), a treatise that immediately established his reputation as one of the leading professors of civil law. What contemporary legal scholars saw as the particular significance of the treatise was the way Savigny took from the sources of ancient Roman law the leading principles of the law of possession, demonstrating the superiority of the Roman principles over the modifications that this law had undergone in Continental jurisprudence since the Middle Ages. Savigny's famous pamphlet Vom Beruf unserer Zeit fur Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft (1814) was published as an argument against the popular demand for the codification of German civil law on the model of the French and the Austrian codes. The pamphlet established the doctrine and program of the early historical school of law. In this pamphlet, as well as in his introductory essay (1815) to the first volume of the Zeitschrift fur geschichtliche Rechtswissenschaft, founded as the organ of the school in 1815, Savigny outlined a new theory of the creation of law, culminating in a strictly genetic conception and analysis of law. Taking off from the ideas of Montesquieu, Burke, and Justus Moser, he asserted that positive law is not a product of reason. From its true basis, the common beliefs of a particular nation, it develops in a continuous, "organic" process as do a nation's language and customs; it is the result of silent, anonymous, and irrational forces, of an implicit consensus, not of an intentional creative effort. Law is, therefore, of the same nature as custom; it is determined by the whole past of the nation and by its peculiar character (what was later called the Volksgeist), and it cannot be changed arbitrarily by legislation. Instead, Savigny advocated the reform of jurisprudence by means of historical research, holding that a strictly genetic study is the only way to conceive and develop contemporary positive law. While some of Savigny's contemporaries (Thibaut, P. J. A. von Feuerbach, Conner, and especially Hegel and his school) rejected his doctrine, the historical school of jurisprudence dominated German universities for nearly half a century. Its program of historical research, though neither wholly nor rigorously fulfilled, made the history of law a scientific discipline, by basing it on the idea of evolution. Savigny's own chief contribution in this field was his Geschichte des romischen Rechts im Mittelalter (1815-1831), which deals with the history of the sources, the literature, and the teaching of Roman law from the fifth through the fifteenth centuries. It initiated the modern study of medieval jurisprudence and has served ever
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since, corrected in many respects but unequaled, as the standard work on the history of medieval jurisprudence in Europe. Savigny also wrote a number of historical monographs, mainly on ancient Roman law (collected in his Vermischte Schriften ). In the field of legal dogmatics, Savigny's doctrine re-created, by reviving the study of ancient Roman law, a common field of legal study in the individual German states—the "modern Roman law," or Pandects. His most important dogmatic works, System des heutigen romischen Rechts (1840-1849) and Das Obligationenrecht als Theil des heutigen romischen Rechts (1851-1853), show that the theories that he had put forward in 1814 and 1815 about the nature of law had not produced a radical change even in his own legal dogmatics. His early theories had been provoked by his reaction, influenced by romanticism, against the natural law theories of the French Revolution and of liberalism generally. Later, however, he not only retained the fundamental doctrines of the rationalist jurisprudence of the eighteenth century in his dogmatic teaching but actually made these doctrines the backbone of his legal system. Both of Savigny's works are based on fundamental notions of German natural law theory as well as on Kant's legal philosophy. Within the framework of these categories, Savigny transcended Roman law in many respects, adapting it to modern requirements or developing new solutions, many of which have become influential in German and other legal science; for example, his doctrines of contract and corporation, and particularly his system of private international law—which, like the systems of Story and Mancini, counts among the classic theories in this branch of law. WALTER WILHELM [For the historical context of Savigny's work, see CONFLICT OF LAWS; JURISPRUDENCE; LEGAL SYSTEMS, article on CODE LAW SYSTEMS; and the biographies of BURKE; MONTESQUIEU.] WORKS BY SAVIGNY
(1803) 1848 Von Savigny's Treatise on Possession: Or, the Jus Possessionis of the Civil Law. 6th ed. London: Sweet. -> First published as Das Recht des Besitzes. A 7th German edition, enlarged and revised, was published in 1865 by Heyer. (1814) 1840 Vom Beruf unserer Zeit fur Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft. Heidelberg: Mohr. ->• Translated from the 2d edition by A. Hayward and published by Littlewood in 1831 as Of the Vocation of Our Age for Legislation and Jurisprudence. (1815) 1850 Ueber den Zweck der Zeitschrift fur geschichtliche Rechtswissenschaft. Volume 1,-pages 105126 in Friedrich Carl von Savigny, Vermischte
Schriften. Berlin: Veit. -> First published in Volume 1 of Zeitschrift fur geschichtliche Rechtswissenschaft. (1815-1831) 1834-1851 Geschichte des romischen Rechts im Mittelalter. 7 vols. Heidelberg: Mohr. -» Volume 1 was translated by E. Cathcart and published by Black in 1829 as The History of the Roman Law in the Middle Ages. 1840-1849 System des heutigen romischen Rechts. 8 vols. Berlin: Veit. -> Volume 1 was translated in 1867 by William Holloway as System of the Modern Roman Law, published in Madras, India, by Higginbotham. An index volume, edited by O. L. Heuser, was published in 1851. 1851-1853 Das Obligationenrecht als Theil des heutigen romischen Rechts. 2 vols. Berlin: Veit. Juristische Methodenlehre, nach der Ausarbeitung des Jakob Grimm. Edited by Gerhard Wesenberg. Stuttgart: Koehler, 1951. ->• Published posthumously. Vermischte Schriften. 5 vols. Berlin: Veit, 1850. -> Contains works first published between 1800 and 1844. SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
GAGNER, STEN 1960 Studien zur Ideengeschichte der Gesetzgebung. Uppsala, Universitet, Acta universitatis upsaliensis, Studia iuridica upsaliensia, No. 1. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell. -» See especially pages 15-51. GUTZWILLER, MAX 1923 Der Einftuss Savignys auf die Entwicklung des Internationalprivatrechts. Collectanea friburgensia, Vol. 28. Fribourg (Switzerland): Universitats Buchhandlung. KANTOROWICZ, HERMANN 1912 Was ist uns Savigny? Berlin: Heymann. KANTOROWICZ, HERMANN 1934 Savigny, Friedrich Carl von. Volume 13, pages 546-548 in Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. New York: Macmillan. KANTOROWICZ, HERMANN 1937 Savigny and the Historical School of Law. Law Quarterly Review 53:326-343. KOSCHAKER, PAUL (1947) 1966 Europa und das romische Recht. 4th ed. Munich: Beck. KUNKEL, WOLFGANG 1962 Savignys Bedeutung fur die deutsche Rechtswissenschaft und das deutsche Recht. Juristenzeitung 17:457-463. STINTZING, RODERICK VON; and LANDSBERG, ERNST (1910) 1957 Geschichte der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft. Volume 3, part 2: Das 19. Jahrhundert, der Historismus in der Rechtswissenschaft. Aalen (Germany): Scientia Antiquariat. -> See especially pages 186-253 of the text section, and pages 94-110 of the notes. STOLL, ADOLF 1927-1939 Friedrich Karl v. Savigny: Ein Bild seines Lebens mit einer Sammlung seiner Briefe. 3 vols. Berlin: Heymann. WIEACKER, FRANZ 1956 Friedrich Carl von Savigny. Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung fur Rechtsgeschichte Romanistische Abteilung 72:1-38. -> Reprinted on pages 107-143 in Franz Wieacker, Griinder und Bewahrer: Rechtslehrer der neueren deutschen Privatrechtsgeschichte, published by Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1959. WOLF, ERIK (1939) 1963 Grosse Rechtsdenker der deutschen Geistesgeschichte. 4th ed. Tubingen (Germany): Mohr. -> See especially pages 467-542.
SAVING See CONSUMPTION FUNCTION; INTEREST; INVESTMENT.
SAY, JEAN BAPTISTE SAY, JEAN BAPTISTE Jean Baptiste Say (1767-1832) was born in Lyons of a cultivated Protestant merchant family. After a sound education and a two-year stay in England, he joined an insurance company. Say was an enthusiastic supporter of the ideas of the French Revolution and took part as a volunteer in the military campaign of 1792. Bookish and inclined to philosophy, in 1793 he joined the editorial board of a new magazine entitled La decade philosophique litteraire et politique, par une societe de republicains, which took as its motto "Enlightenment and morality are as much needed for preserving the Republic as courage was needed for winning it." He soon became the editor-in-chief of the journal, which announced that its aim was "to keep the public informed on everything new concerning literature, science, agriculture, and the arts." In 1799 Say was appointed a member of the Tribunate, under the Consulate. He took part in a competition arranged by the Institut de France on the subject "By what means and what institutions can morality be established in a people?" His contribution, "Olbie: Ou, essai sur les moyens de reformer les moeurs d'une nation," gave promise of his gifts as a moralist and economist. Following up his thesis that "the first book on morality for the Olbians should be a good Treatise on Political Economy" (Oeuvres diverses, p. 593), he set about composing such a work, inspired to a great extent by the ideas expounded by Adam Smith in his celebrated Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, with which Say had become acquainted as early as 1789. Say's book appeared in 1803 and soon had considerable success. In the meantime, Say's disapproval of the Napoleonic regime led to his dismissal from the Tribunate. He moved to a small town in northern France, Auchy-les-Hesdin, to set up a cotton-spinning plant. He stayed there seven years before he sold out in 1813 and returned to Paris. The fall of the empire and the return of the Bourbons permitted him to resume intellectual activity aimed at the general public. In 1815 he began to teach at the Athenee what was probably the first public course of political economy ever given in France, and in the same year he published his Catechisme d'economie politique. Two years later the government established a chair of industrial economy for him (the term political economy still frightened people) at the Conservatoire des Arts et Metiers. Finally, in 1830, the aged master did become professor of political economy at the College de France, in the first chair of its kind to be established. Meanwhile, he had
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published his Cours complet d'economie politique pratique (1828-1829) in six volumes, a work, as the long subtitle indicates, "designed to teach statesmen, landowners and capitalists, men of learning, agriculturalists, manufacturers, businessmen, and in general all citizens, about political economy." Although it has been alleged that Say was a mere expositor and popularizer of Adam Smith's ideas, he did more than merely transmit these ideas. He did, of course, present the ideas that he borrowed from Smith with typical French order and clarity, and he justly complained of obscurity and confusion in Smith's own statements in The Wealth of Nations. Say wanted to produce what he described as "a work in which sound observations were reduced to general principles that could be accepted by any judicious man; in which those observations and principles were so completed and coordinated as to reinforce one another, so that they could fruitfully be studied at any time and in any place" (1803, p. xlviii in 1860 English edition). And this was not merely an interpretative work: at important points Say showed originality, and he undoubtedly contributed to advancing the science of economics. Philosophical position. In his basic philosophy, Say was strongly influenced by the ideological ambience of his time. Like many of his contemporaries, he was at once deist, liberal, and rationalist. In the realm of scientific and doctrinal convictions, however, he showed little toleration but instead a dogmatism that may have been related to his authoritarian nature. This is one of several ways in which he differed sharply from Adam Smith: he was never touched by doubt. As a disciple of the Encyclopedists, he was an intransigent scientist, even a passionate one, and convinced of the predominant influence of economic phenomena in the life of the whole society. On this point, as in the case of the preponderant role of industrial activity in production as a whole, it may be possible to establish a connection between Say's ideas and certain theories of Karl Marx, and in any event, with those of Saint-Simon and the Saint-Simonians. His belief in economics as a science led Say to try to reconcile his naturalism and his rationalism. He was able to do so because he conceived of the laws of nature as necessarily rational (or providential); in this respect, he was adopting a point of view the physiocrats had developed a half century earlier. But it is noteworthy that Say went on to establish similarities between the science of economics and physiology, transposing the latter from the individual to the social level and preferring a
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biological model of the economy to a purely mechanical one. He was later to be followed on the same track by Alfred Marshall, the great English economist. It should be pointed out, however, that Say's method was never made rigorously explicit. While asserting the sovereignty of facts in scientific matters, he nonetheless interpreted them according to the results that he intended to reach. Thus, he appeared as an "ideologue" to some of his contemporaries. Relationship to Adam Smith. Say deeply admired the work of Adam Smith. Of The Wealth of Nations he said, "Whenever the Inquiry Into the Wealth of Nations is perused with the attention it so well merits, it will be perceived that until the epoch of its publication the science of political economy did not exist" (1803, p. xxxviii in 1860 English edition). But Say was not content merely to repeat or rethink the ideas of his master. He filtered them, clarified them, and at several points went beyond them. He made a more systematic critique of physiocratic ideas, based on an expansion of the concept of productivity and the inclusion of immaterial products among the positive results of economic activity. Say gave greater depth to value theory by introducing the notions of need and utility. As a true precursor of the marginalist school, he noted that the needs of men may be classified according to their urgency in scales of preference, that they give rise to utility, which in turn determines demand. Demand then interacts with supply, which in turn is determined by the cost of production. For Say, however, in contrast to Ricardo, for example, utility is the stronger determining factor in prices; the cost of production enters only as a kind of restrictive condition. There too Say appears to have anticipated Alfred Marshall's well-known theory. It is of interest to see that Say realized perfectly that the explanation of the phenomena of value and price is not to be sought in terms of unilateral causal relationships but in terms of the concept of interdependence. Even more than Adam Smith, Say strongly emphasized that the role of science is primarily one of observation and explanation. Where Smith, following the physiocrats, came forward as a physician for society, Say aimed exclusively at being a naturalist. His Traite professes to be a "simple exposition" of a body of exact knowledge, applicable under all circumstances. Although agriculture still had a predominant position for Smith, it no longer did for Say. To be sure, the half-century separating their work witnessed the entire industrial revolution in Britain, and in France its beginning. Say was in a position
to observe its first manifestations, in the seven years that he devoted to business. Thus he made industry and even commerce as important as agriculture in the total productive activity of society. Major contributions. Say appreciated the importance of the entrepreneur in economic life, a role Smith had neglected to define and which has remained, since Say's time, a permanent feature of economic analysis. This essential actor has functions that are quite distinct from those of the capitalist strictly so called (British authors confused these two conceptions). The entrepreneur, whether he be an industrialist, businessman, or farmer, has a truly strategic position in economic life, in that he is par excellence the intermediary between landowners, capitalists, workers, and consumers. He is also pictured as performing a truly creative function as the organizer responsible for production, striving unceasingly to improve it, especially in the industrial sector. Over a century later, Schumpeter was to take up and perfect this dynamic conception of the role of the true entrepreneur, the creator of new combinations (innovations). Say's development of the theory of the distribution of the social product, deduced from the previous analysis, was a marked advance over current theories. Say coordinated this theory precisely and harmoniously with the theories of exchange and production. The entrepreneur, a buyer of productive services at known prices (the services of men, capital, and lands) and a seller of products at uncertain prices, is thus seen as assuming a set of fundamental functions, as presiding in a way over activity that is both production and distribution. His specific share is the profit, a share that is described as essential, residual, and precarious. This brings us to the very threshold of Walras's grand conception of economic equilibrium. Another of Say's highly original contributions to economic analysis is his famous law of markets, which undoubtedly did more to make its author celebrated than all the rest of his work. This law (cf. Schumpeter in History of Economic Analysis 1954, pp. 615-626) may be interpreted in many different ways. We know its very simple, almost lapidary content: "Products are exchanged for products." This may be taken as meaning that the role of money in the economy is, after all, secondary (the conception of the "monetary veil"). But one may also infer that everyone taking part in an exchange is interested in the prosperity of his partner, whether it be an individual or a nation, a thesis that goes counter to the mercantilist conception that "one gains only what the other loses." Finally, the law may imply a theory of crises, based
SCALING on rejection of the concepts of general overproduction and underconsumption and the assertion of the essentially transitory and limited nature of these imbalances. The remedy is therefore not the limiting of production but its expansion. "Produce, produce, that is the whole thing!" Say concluded, in his Cours complet, that although "there is an excess in certain products, there is a shortage in others." Importance and influence. All in all, it would appear that Say's work, without bearing the marks of really great genius, does give its author an eminent place in the development of economic thought. Say was not entirely an innovator, even in fields where he was not following Adam Smith and did show real originality: on many points he links up to a tradition solidly rooted in France. As Schumpeter remarked judiciously (1954, p. 492): "Say's work is the most important of the links in the chain that leads from Cantillon and Turgot to Walras." He opened up new paths, but later authors followed them with more success than he. This was the case with the members of the marginalist school—Carl Menger, Stanley Jevons, and especially Leon Walras—who were able to employ the notion of utility in a much more precise and scientifically valid manner than their common precursor, Say. (Walras tended to minimize his debt to Say, but it was nevertheless important.) Again, the fine effort at synthesis made by Alfred Marshall and the neoclassical school is not entirely untouched by the teachings of Say. His influence can be traced beyond the general equilibrium school to such essentially modern authors as Schumpeter. It is true that in the eyes of many of our contemporaries Say is seen primarily as the author of the law of markets, one of the favorite butts of Keynesian and Neo-Keynesian criticism, and this "law," interpreted and misinterpreted as it has been, may remain his chief title to fame. But perhaps he will be remembered for his power to build on established intellectual traditions and to stimulate other thinkers: there lay his true merit, which only time will confirm. GAS TON LEDTJC [For the historical context of Say's work, see ECONOMIC THOUGHT, article on PHYSIOCRATIC THOUGHT; and the biographies of SAINT-SIMON; SMITH, ADAM. For discussion of the subsequent development of his ideas, see DEMAND AND SUPPLY; ENTREPRENEURSHIP; UTILITY; and the biographies of JEVONS; MARSHALL; MENGER; SCHUMPETER; WALRAS.] WORKS BY SAY (1803) 1964 A Treatise on Political Economy: Or, the Production, Distribution and Consumption of Wealth.
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New York: Kelley. -» First published as Traite d'economie politique: Ou, simple exposition de la maniere dont se forment, se distribuent, et se consomment les richesses. Translation of extract in text provided by the editors. (1815) 1816 Catechism of Political Economy: Or, Familiar Conversations on the Manner in Which Wealth Is Produced, Distributed, and Consumed in Society. London: Sherwood. -> First published as Catechisme d'economie politique. (1828-1829) 1852 Cours complet d'economie politique pratique. 2 vols. 3d ed., enl. With notes by Horace Say. Paris: Guillaumiri. -» First published in 6 volumes. Translation of extracts in text provided by the editors. Oeuvres diverses. Paris: Guillaumin, 1848. -» Translation of extract in text provided by the editors. SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
GoETZ-GiREY, ROBERT 1966 Croissance et progres a I'origine des societes industrielles. Paris: Montchrestien. SCHUMPETER, JOSEPH A. (1954) 1960 History of Economic Analysis. Edited by E. B. Schumpeter. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. TEILHAC, ERNEST 1927 L'oeuvre economique de JeanBaptiste Say. Paris: Sirey.
SCALE, ECONOMIES OF See ECONOMIES OF SCALE. SCALES OF MEASUREMENT See PSYCHOMETRICS; STATISTICS, DESCRIPTIVE; SCALING. SCALING Measurement of a property involves assignment of numbers to objects as a way of representing that property. The process thus includes both a formal, logical system, e.g., the real number system, and an empirical system, the set of instances of the property. Scale types. An important aspect of measurement is the correspondence between some of the characteristics of the number system involved and some of the relations between instances of the property. The particular set of characteristics of the formal number system that is used determines the type of scale that is obtained. Scale types can most easily be described by the type of transformation that can be applied to a given scale without changing the numerical interpretation of the basic empirical relations. Although there is no limit to the number of scale types that might be devised, only a relatively small number have been found useful. Some of the more important scale types are described here. In ordinal scales the only relevant property of numbers is their order. Numbers are assigned to
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objects so that the order of the numbers corresponds to the order of the objects with respect to the property of interest. Any transformation of a given numerical assignment that preserves order, i.e., any monotonic transformation, would serve as well. An ordinal scale is therefore said to be determined up to a monotonic transformation. Fixed-origin ordinal scales are rarely discussed, but are of some empirical importance in the fields of social psychology and personality, where bipolar attributes are not uncommon. Of relevance in such scales is the fact that numbers have a unique origin. Numbers are assigned not only so that their order corresponds to the order of the objects but also so that the origin of the numerical series corresponds to an empirically meaningful origin or zero point of the property. Any monotonic transformation that does not change the origin leaves the numerical interpretation of the basic relations unchanged. In interval scales, in addition to order, differences between the numbers correspond, in some generalized sense, to the distances or differences between the instances of the property. Interval scales are thus determined up to a linear transformation of the form
y = ax + b, where a is any positive number and b is any number whatsoever. Log interval scales are closely related to the interval scale. In the interval scale, numerical differences correspond to empirical differences; in the log interval scale, numerical ratios correspond to empirical ratios. The transformation characterizing the log interval scale is given by
y = ax*, where a and b are positive. Ratio scales can be described either as those in which the order, the differences, and the ratios of the assigned numbers correspond to the order, differences, and ratios of instances of the property or as those in which order, differences, and origin all receive numerical interpretation. For either description, the ratio scale is determined up to a linear transformation of the form y = ax, where a is positive. Difference scales and ratio scales are related in a way similar to the way that interval and log interval scales are related; in each case one scale is equivalent to the logarithm of the other. In the difference scale, the procedures used to assign numbers serve to fix the order, the differences between numbers, and the unit of measurement. The char-
acterizing transformation is y = x + a. [For a more extensive discussion of scale types, see PSYCHOMETRICS; STATISTICS, DESCRIPTIVE; see also Suppes & Zinnes 1963.] The concept of scale type is important because the type of scale on which a property is measured restricts the kinds of information that can be obtained in an experiment. The scale type therefore limits the kinds of meaningful questions that can be asked regarding the property. Consider the following three questions: Do high-scoring subjects increase in ability more than low-scoring subjects (after some specified treatment)? If the ability is measured on a scale that contains only ordinal information, and if both low and high scorers increase in ability with no overlap in distribution, then the question cannot be answered. The question deals with the relative magnitude of differences (or perhaps ratios), and in a purely ordinal scale the relative magnitude of numerical differences or ratios is meaningless. Is amount of aggression directly proportional to degree of frustration (in some specified situation)? Let A denote amount of aggression and F the degree of frustration. The question then concerns the form of the equation that relates A to F, that is, one asks whether these two variables are functionally related by an equation of the form A — kF, where k is some positive constant. Clearly, an affirmative answer cannot be given unless both A and F are measured on ratio scales. Do college sophomores differ more widely in their attitude toward civil rights than in their attitude toward the Asian policy of the United States? Questions such as this require a scale type ordinarily ignored in physical measurement. Consider the formally equivalent question "Does this set of containers differ more widely in their volume than in their weight?" The question, which does not seem particularly unreasonable in the attitude context, now appears absurd: a difference of x cubic inches is neither more nor less nor equal to a difference of y pounds. The two differences are simply not comparable. However, volume and weight are measured on ratio scales. If they, or the two attitude variables, were measured on difference scales, then a basis for the comparison would exist. Kinds of measurement. So far, scale type has been treated as though it were an inherent part of a given numerical assignment. In one sense, this is correct; each scaling procedure includes a set of rules governing assignment of numbers to instances of the property. The rules limit to varying extents and in varying ways the freedom of the investigator to decide which numbers to assign to the instances
SCALING of the property. The characterization of scale type by admissible transformations is simply a compact way of stating the particular restrictions imposed. But scaling procedures also differ markedly in the quality of information the numbers represent. At one extreme are measurement procedures that rely almost entirely on definition or assumption. An experimenter might simply define the attitude of a subject to be equal to the number of favorable responses he gives to a specified collection of items. Such measurement by fiat has been both useful and common throughout the behavioral sciences. The type of scale resulting from such a procedure is simply a matter of definition or assumption. Although these procedures determine a unique number to be assigned to a given subject, the experimenter may have reasons for wanting to attribute meaning only to the ordinal property of the numerical assignment. Or he may want to attribute meaning to both ordinal and interval properties, thus obtaining an interval scale. Suitable modifications of the definition could therefore result in any of the scale types already described. Obviously, such modifications do not change the empirical basis of the numerical assignment, which, in the present instance, is simply the number of favorable responses to the particular set of items. The usefulness of such defined scales depends heavily on the experience and intuition of the investigator. The scales tend to be exceedingly special. Different investigators, when defining scales in this way for the same attribute, would ordinarily select different, or at best only partially overlapping, sets of items. Because favorable responses depend as much on the nature of the items as on the attitude of the subject, the value assigned to a given subject would clearly be expected to differ from one scale to another. While the scales might be ratio scales by definition, it is unlikely that they would differ from each other only in unit of measurement. The procedures themselves provide no basis for choosing among the many scales of a given attribute that might be defined in this way. Hence, confidence in any one cannot be expected to be great. A somewhat different procedure for obtaining scale properties by definition relies on assumptions made about the distribution of subjects. The investigator might stipulate, for example, that the number of favorable responses to his set of items only serves to order the subjects on the attribute. But he then might go on to assume that his population of subjects is distributed in some specified way on the attribute (ordinarily, the assumption of a normal distribution is made, but other distributions could serve as well). Knowledge of order and
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of the properties of the assumed distribution enables the investigator to increase the level of the scale from ordinal to interval or perhaps even to ratio. But again, the meaning of the interval or ratio properties of the scale is derived only from the definition. There is no limit to the number of base populations that can be defined. And scales simply defined through use of the distribution assumption on one population cannot be expected to match those based on other populations. A more appealing basis for establishing interval or ratio properties is provided by fundamental measurement procedures. In these procedures, the meaning of the properties of the final scale is determined, at least to some extent, by the empirical relations between the observables. Fundamental measurement procedures involve verifiable scientific models or theories, place restrictions on the behavior of the observables, and are subject to empirical test. One possible outcome of an application of a fundamental procedure, of course, is the conclusion that the scale in question does not fit the data, that the theoretical assumptions are not appropriate for that particular situation. Under these circumstances, no scale is obtained. But when the empirical fit of data to the theory is acceptable, the result is a scale whose properties are based to some extent on empirical law rather than arbitrary definition alone. It is with such fundamental measurement procedures in scaling that this article is concerned. Two broad classes of scaling models. The fundamental scaling procedures can be grouped into two broad classes: those concerned with the measurement of stimulus attributes and those concerned primarily with measurement of individual difference or responder attributes. Different models within each class represent alternative rationales for attaining essentially the same objective. The objective itself ordinarily differs between classes. Stimulus models The stimulus models use responses of subjects to stimuli to establish scales for attributes of stimuli. Scale values are assigned only to the stimuli. The subject, or group of subjects, is characterized by the entire scale. Individual or group differences in this context refer to differences between scales, and not to differences in scale values on the attribute. The stimulus models are therefore concerned with psychological attributes of stimuli for subjects or groups of subjects. In the stimulus model, the subject himself acts as a judge or evaluator of the stimuli. His task is a particularized one—he does not simply judge or
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respond to the stimuli per se but, rather, evaluates the stimuli with respect to some specified attribute. Hence, the same set of stimuli can be scaled with respect to several different attributes. A set of statements all designed to reflect an attitude toward some topic might, for example, be scaled with respect to such attributes as degree of favorability toward the topic, relevance, complexity, or intensity. The subject's task in each case is to evaluate the stimuli solely with respect to the attribute of interest. The resulting scale is then indicative of how these particular statements are perceived with respect to the defined attribute by that particular subject or group of subjects. Stimulus models are used to obtain both psychophysical and psychometric scales. The models appropriate for psychometrics are actually a subset of the psychophysical models, but the measurement problem itself differs considerably in the two fields. Measurement in psychophysics has been concerned primarily with determining functional relations between physical variables and the corresponding subjective attributes. The usual experimental strategy holds constant or controls all relevant physical dimensions but one, and then determines how the subjective attribute varies as a function of that single physical variable. The resulting psychophysical magnitude function is thus a relation between two variables that is expected to hold when other physical variables influencing the subjective attribute are fixed or controlled as specified. For example, a psychophysical function for loudness might relate the perceived loudness of 1,000-cycle sinusoidal tones of a given duration to sound energy measured at the ear. Other functions ordinarily are needed for white noise, for clicks, or for tones of another duration or a different frequency. Although each separate function is monotonic for the relevant physical variable, no such simple relation exists relating sound energy to subjective loudness for stimuli that vary on several relevant dimensions. Development of equations specifying the loudness of any stimulus that possesses sound energy would be a great deal more complex. [See HEARING; PSYCHOPHYSICS.] In psychophysics the physical variable determines the set of stimuli to which the results apply. In psychometrics, it is more nearly the reverse. Psychometric scaling begins with the psychological attribute. The procedures are applicable to any set of stimuli possessing the attribute, and the problem is to scale the set of stimuli as it exists. The stimulus set is typically complex, varying with respect to other subjective dimensions and with respect to a host of correlated physical variables. There is, of
course, no single, monotonically related physical correlate. Monotone relations are to be expected only when all but one of the physical correlates are held constant. Complexity of the stimulus set is therefore the chief characteristic distinguishing psychophysical from psychometric scaling problems. Several major consequences of this complexity are listed below. [See PSYCHOMETRICS.] Recognizability of individual stimuli—The subject can often identify psychometric stimuli because of their variation on extraneous attributes. Since he may tend to remember earlier responses to the same stimulus, independent judgments on successive trials cannot routinely be expected. Replication over trials with the same subject is therefore troublesome. Most psychometric scales have been based on groups of subjects, so that the recognition problem is not so severe. Ordinal properties—When there is awareness of a monotonically related physical variable, knowledge of order on the subjective attribute is automatically implied. For the complex stimulus sets of psychometrics, order of the stimuli is typically an unknown that must be determined. Experimental procedures that require prior knowledge of order of the stimuli often then cannot be used. Production techniques—When a physical variable is monotonically related to a psychological attribute, there is ordinarily a procedure for easily generating a virtually continuous set of stimuli that are ordered with respect to the psychological attribute. This in turn makes possible the use of the various production techniques—procedures that require the subject to adjust a variable, i.e., to generate a new stimulus, with specified properties. On the other hand, with psychometric stimuli such production techniques typically cannot be used: the subject cannot on demand paint a painting halfway between two standards in aesthetic quality, write an essay twice as good as a standard, or create a worker whose merit falls between that of two others. Interpolation—A monotonic physical attribute can be used as a basis for interpolation. The stimulus that could be judged greater than a standard 75 per cent of the time can be estimated from data obtained by using other stimuli. In addition, a subset of stimuli can be used to establish the functional relation between the two variables. Given the relation, the scale values of all remaining stimuli can be determined numerically or graphically, without resort to additional experimental observations. Neither technique is available for the complex stimulus sets of psychometrics, the closest approximation of which is the establishment of a scale of
SCALING standards against which new stimuli can be evaluated by direct comparison. The stimulus scaling models can be classified into two types on the basis of the rationale used to obtain scale properties above and beyond order. In the variability models, the discriminability of the stimuli, or the variability of judgment with respect to the stimuli, is used as the basis for deriving the higher-level metric scale properties. In the quantitative judgment models, the additional metric properties are obtained directly from the quantitative aspects of the judgments themselves. Variability models. Perhaps the best-known variability model is that developed by Thurstone (1927). Thurstone's general model begins with a set of elements called discriminal processes. Each element has a value on a postulated, underlying psychological continuum. Presentation of a stimulus to a subject results in arousal of a discriminal process. Different presentations of the same stimulus may arouse different discriminal processes— there is thus no one-to-one relation between the two. Rather, a distribution of discriminal processes is associated with each stimulus. Presentation of a stimulus is equivalent to sampling a discriminal process from the distribution associated with that stimulus. [See CONCEPT FORMATION; LEARNING, article on DISCRIMINATION LEARNING.] In Thurstone's model it is postulated that these distributions (one for each stimulus) are normal with means s; and variances crj. The mean is taken as the scale value of the stimulus. The standard deviation, cr ; , called the discriminal dispersion, is the index of the ambiguity or conf us ability of the stimulus; the smaller the cr,•, the less ambiguous and the more readily discriminable the stimulus. The general model, therefore, provides both location and spread parameters for the stimuli. The conceptual framework of the model is illustrated in Figure 1. We will consider here two particularizations of
the Thurstone model, one developed for comparative judgments and another developed for categorical judgments. The law of comparative judgment. The law of comparative judgment postulates that in any comparison of two stimuli, the psychological difference between the stimuli is indirectly measured by the relative frequency with which the difference is perceived. For example, two stimuli, j and k, are presented to the subject, with instructions to indicate which one appears greater with respect to some designated attribute. Since each stimulus is held to arouse a discriminal process, dj or dk, the subject selects as greater the stimulus which on that occasion arouses the discriminal process having the greater value on the underlying continuum. If the difference d/v — dj > 0, stimulus k is selected; if dk — d; < 0, stimulus j is selected. Exact equality is not allowed. Each paired presentation is formally equivalent to drawing an element from a bivariate normal distribution. An indefinitely large number of such observations generates a distribution of discriminal differences. From a large number of such judgments one can also determine the proportion of times that stimulus k is judged greater than stimulus j. One of the characteristics of the normal distribution that makes it particularly valuable for distribution models of this type is that differences between paired observations drawn from a bivariate normal distribution are normally distributed. The mean of the difference distribution is equal to the difference between the original means, or scale values, s,c —s ; -; the variance is cry + cr| — 2r/7ccr)o-/., where rj7. represents the correlation between the pairs of discriminal processes. If we define pjlc as the probability that stimulus k is judged greater than stimulus j (that is, that dk - d,•> 0) on any given presentation, and define xjk as the unit normal deviate corresponding to p j k , then the general form of the law of comparative judgment for n stimuli is given by the set of equations (1)
Figure I — Distributions on the psychological continuum of discriminal processes associated with four stimuli Source: From Torgerson 1958, p. 157.
29
sk - s} = xi1t V o-f + 0-2 - 2rj/covo-7v,, j,k= 1,2,- • -,n. The quantity xjlt is the (theoretical) observable; the remaining terms are unknowns. Given n stimuli, there are n(n — l)/2 possible equations and, since both the origin and unit are arbitrary, there are 2 ( n — l ) + n ( n — l ) / 2 unknowns. Hence there are always more unknowns than independent equations, and further restrictions on the data are necessary to establish scale values. Three such specializations have been proposed, of which only one, Thurstone's case v, the most restrictive, has been
30
SCALING
found generally useful. In case v, it is assumed that the value under the radical in (1) is constant, i.e., that the distributions of discriminal differences all have the same variance. Then, arbitrarily defining the variance as unity, for convenience, there remain simply the n(n — l)/2 equations (2)
S
•—•
j,k= 1,2, • • -,n.
Efficient procedures for estimating the scale values from these equations are available. The scale obtained is an interval scale, because the unit of measurement must be defined arbitrarily, and a constant can be added to all of the scale values without changing the solution. Furthermore, the interval properties are based on empirical law. Consider any three ordered stimuli, i < j < k, and the three unit normal deviates X a , xj1e, and xik. From (2), since the numerical differences between scale values must add, (S* - Sy) + (Sj - Si) = (Sfc -
Si),
for all i<j
xjk + xn — XM ,
for all i < j < k.
The additivity-of-difference rule can therefore be said to provide the empirical basis for the interval properties of the final scale. Actually, of course, one would not expect (3) to hold exactly for empirical data. Among other things, the obtained proportions on which the deviates are based are only estimates and not population values. A statistical test for the goodness of fit of the model to data has been provided by Mosteller (1951). Graphical and numerical procedures can also be used to aid the investigator in deciding whether the fit is close enough for his purposes even though it does not meet the statistical criterion. Given estimates of the scale values of the stimuli, one can compute the set of theoretical proportions that would fit the estimated scale values perfectly. The discrepancies between these derived proportions and the corresponding observed proportions can then be examined. Alternatively, for any two stimuli, i and j, one can plot the obtained values of xik versus xjk for all values of k. From (2) it is clear that the model requires that the plotted points fall along a straight line with unit slope. [See GOODNESS OF FIT.] The law of categorical judgment. Several additional postulates are used to adapt the general Thurstone model to categorical data and to derive a set of equations relating stimulus values and category boundaries to the relative frequency with which each stimulus is judged to be in each category. In the usual experimental procedures, the
subject is required to rate or sort a set of n stimuli into a fixed number of ordered categories. Graphic rating procedures or arrangement methods can also be used, but these require that the data first be artificially divided into a limited set of ordered categories. Thurstone's general model illustrated in Figure 1 deals with a set of n stimuli and their associated distributions of discriminal processes, with means s;- and standard deviations cr ; . The present extension adds parallel notions dealing with the location of boundaries between adjacent categories. Data are presented in the form of ratings of stimuli on an m + 1 step scale. It is assumed that the psychological continuum is divided by the m category boundaries into m + 1 intervals, which may or may not be equal in extent. In the original version of the model, the boundaries were treated as fixed. We shall follow the more general version that allows the boundary locations to vary from observation to observation. The location of the gth category boundary is treated as a random variable with mean ta and variance o-|. If we assume that these distribution functions are also jointly normal, then precisely the same reasoning that led to (1) leads to the set of mn equations for the general law of categorical judgment: (4)
= 1,2,- • • , w, where ta — sf denotes the difference between the mean location of category boundary g and the mean location of stimulus j . Eq. (4) is again too general to be of more than academic interest. As was true for (1), there are always more unknowns than equations. One common restricted version of the general equation is based on the assumption that the radical is a monotone function of the stimulus standard deviations, a,. This would occur, for example, if both the correlation term and the variances of the category boundaries were constant, or if constant variances or* and independence (rjff = 0) were assumed. If we now let of = J
t iff
— O) <;
— JijgfXj -Y fV
,
7 J
—• l,xi, 1 9 • • • , 17 II,
g = 1,2,- • •, m. Eqs. (5) are formally identical to the equations underlying the "method of successive intervals" (Saffir 1937; Gulliksen 1954), although in the traditional version the assumption of fixed boundaries leads to the interpretation of a} as the standard
SCALING deviation (discriminal dispersion) of stimulus j rather than as a more general spread parameter only monotonically related to a-j. Efficient and practical estimation procedures have been developed for both complete and incomplete data matrices and are discussed in Torgerson (1958). Another common restricted case assumes that the difference distributions all have the same variance. Then, if the unit of measurement is denned so that the value under the radical in (4) is 1, we can write the nm equations, (6)
j = 1,2,- • -, n, g - 1,2,- • -, ra.
Eqs. (6) represent the most restricted version of the law and underlie Attneave's method of graded dichotomies (1949), Garner and Hake's equidiscriminability scaling procedure (1951), and Edwards and Thurstone's method of successive intervals (1952). Note that this version allows a single parameter for both stimuli and category boundaries, whereas the other version allowed a second parameter for the stimuli. The final scale, if achieved, is therefore an equidiscriminability or equiconfusability scale, with properties similar to those of (2) for comparative judgments. The logistic model for choice data. The logistic model is the major alternative to Thurstone's general model for obtaining a scale based on discriminability or variability of judgment. The model was developed for the paired comparison case by Bradley and Terry (1952). Luce's choice axiom (1959) extended the model to choice data in general and gave the procedure a more elegant, axiomatic basis. Luce's version of the model requires, in essence, that the subjects' choices behave in a manner analogous to conditional probabilities. Where S and T are both subsets of a set U and where p(T), the probability of choosing an element of T, is greater than 0, then the formula for the conditional probability of S given T, p(S|T), is p(S n T)/p(T). The interesting property of conditional probability for present purposes is the multiplication rule. Given three subsets, such that R C S C T, p(R|S) . p ( S | T ) = p ( R | T ) . Luce's axiom, for the case where the probability of choosing any element is neither 0 nor 1, is the empirical analogue: (7)
p s (R) • p r ( S ) = p T ( R ) .
That is, the probability that the subject will choose an R-element when presented with the set T is equal to the probability that he will choose an R-
31
element when presented with the set S multiplied by the probability that he will choose an S-element when presented with the set T. An alternative form of the axiom is known as the constant ratio rule (Clarke 1957). Let x and y denote any two stimuli, let p(x,y} denote the probability that stimulus x is chosen when only x and y are presented, and let pK(x) denote the probability that stimulus x is chosen when the subset S is presented. The constant ratio rule states that (8)
where Cxy denotes the constant ratio of the probability of choosing stimulus x to the probability of choosing stimulus y. The rule requires that for any set S containing both stimulus x and stimulus y, the ratio of the probability of choosing stimulus x to that of choosing stimulus y be invariant. For a given pair of stimuli the ratio is constant regardless of either what or how many other stimuli are included in the set from which the choice is made. The complete experiment for evaluating Luce's axiom or the constant ratio rule would therefore require the experimenter to obtain separate estimates of the probability of choosing stimulus x (for all x e T) for every subset of T containing x as a member. When the requirements of the axiom are met, then there exists a iy-scale such that for every subset of stimuli S, (9)
where v(x~) denotes the scale value of stimulus x. From (9) and the constant ratio rule it is also clear that
(10) Given the axiom and the definition, the scale values are determined up to multiplication by a positive constant, i.e., the x>-scale is a ratio scale. It should be noted, however, that the ratio property depends on the particular definition chosen, as well as on the requirements placed on the data by the axiom. The empirical requirements of the choice axiom may limit the scale to determination up to a multiplicative constant and an exponent. Eq. (9), in effect, specifies a particular exponent in the same way that the unit was specified in (2). The axiom places two rather severe restrictions on the data. Consider first the paired comparison case, and let x, y, z denote any three stimuli. Then
32
SCALING
the probability ratios must follow a multiplication rule: ,z) _ p(x,y~) _ p(y,z~)
(11)
Hence, any two probabilities determine the third. It can also be shown that the pairwise probabilities determine all probabilities of choice from larger sets and, in fact, 1 (12)
v^
An adequate test of the model as stated would require evaluation of the extent to which both restrictions are met. The simpler version of the logistic model, as developed by Bradley and Terry, is limited to paired comparison data and, hence, only the first restriction is applicable. Efficient estimating procedures and tests of goodness of fit are available (Bradley & Terry 1952; Bradley 1954). Thurstone's case V and the logistic model. If we consider only the paired comparison situation, then the equation relating scale values to observable proportions for the logistic model can be written simply as
(13)
p(x,y~)
or, equivalently, as v(x)
(14)
Eq. (14) shows that in the i;-scale a simple function of the observable is interpreted as a ratio of scale values. From (11) it is apparent that the metric properties of the z;-scale are based on a multiplication-of-ratios rule, with log interval properties. In Thurstone's case v, the corresponding basis for the metric properties was an additivity-of-differences rule, which yielded an interval scale. Bradley and Terry, as well as Luce, have shown that the logistic model can also be used to generate an interval scale based on additivity of differences. If one defines r(x) = In v(x) and w(x,z/) = r(x} — r ( y ) , then (14) can be written
(15)
In
- r(z/) -
and from (13),
(16)
p (*,i
1
which is a simple form of the logistic function. The logistic function and the normal ogive are markedly similar over most of the empirically in-
teresting range. As a result, a close fit of the data to Thurstone's case v insures a fit to the logistic model that can be only trivially better or worse. For all practical purposes, the values from the r-scale of the logistic model will be linearly related to the scale values from the Thurstone case v model. And both, of course, will be logarithmically related to the x>-scale values. It might be noted that the Thurstone model can also be easily modified to yield a log interval scale similar to the iy-scale of the logistic model. We need only to substitute log normal distributions for normal distributions and subjective ratios for subjective differences. The new scale will be exponentially related to the Thurstone case v scale, and will therefore be related to the x^-scale by a power transformation. In general, any model in which the observable is interpreted as a subjective difference in scale values can be paralleled by one in which the observable is interpreted as a subjective ratio. The difference-based scale will be logarithmically related to the ratio-based scale, and the fit of one model to any given set of data will be precisely matched by the fit of the other, parallel model. Quantitative judgment models. The variability methods require only ordinal judgments by the subject; the higher-level, metric properties of the obtained scales are derived through models relating variability of judgment to subjective differences or ratios. In the quantitative judgment models, the higher-level properties are obtained directly from the subject's judgments. There are two classes of quantitative judgment methods: the difference, or distance, methods and the ratio methods. The difference methods have long been used to develop scales in the social sciences (Thurstone & Chave 1929). Serious application of the ratio methods in the context of social science is more recent (see, for example, the summary of research in Stevens 1966). In the difference methods, the metric properties of the obtained scale depend upon the ability of the subject to evaluate or equate subjective differences. In the ratio methods, the metric properties depend upon his ability to evaluate or equate subjective ratios. Scales obtained from the two types of procedures are not ordinarily linearly related. Difference methods. Difference methods include the methods of equisection, equal-appearing intervals, category rating, and category production. The methods differ from one another in the specific nature of the experimental procedure employed, but they all have the same objective: to obtain a scale in which the differences in numbers assigned to the stimuli directly reflect the corresponding subjective differences between the stimuli.
SCALING In equisection, the subject produces a set of stimuli that divides a given range of the attribute into subjectively equal steps. In equal-appearing intervals and category rating he sorts or rates the stimuli into a given set of subjectively equally spaced steps or categories. In category production, he produces on each trial a stimulus that corresponds to one of a set of equally spaced categories. The usual procedures do not include built-in checks for the adequacy of the assumption that the subject can produce such judgments in an internally consistent manner. The assumption does place empirical restrictions on the behavior of the judgments, however, so appropriate checks are possible. The simplest and most direct check uses the method of bisection. Here, the subject first bisects the interval between two standard stimuli, a and e, to produce a new stimulus, c, halfway beween. He next bisects the interval a-c, producing a stimulus b, and bisects the interval c—e, producing a stimulus d. Finally, he bisects the interval between b and d. If the subject's bisections are made in an internally consistent manner, the stimulus produced by the final bisection between b and d will be equal to c, the stimulus produced by the bisection of a and e. For psychometric stimuli, where production techniques are unavailable, a more or less equivalent procedure involves imbedding a given subset of stimuli in several different larger sets. If the subject's rating or sorting judgments fulfill the requirements of an interval scale, the scale values assigned to the members of the subset will be linearly related across the several experiments. Ratio methods. Ratio methods include the methods of fractionation, constant sum, magnitude and ratio estimation, and magnitude and ratio production. In all of these methods, the subject's task is to adjust stimuli or assign numbers so that the ratios between the numbers correspond to the subjective ratios between the stimuli. In fractionation, the subject adjusts a variable to be equal to 1/k of a standard. In the constant sum method, he divides 100 points between two standards so that the ratio between the assigned points corresponds to the subjective ratio. In the magnitude estimation procedure, his task is to assign numbers so they are proportional to the subjective magnitudes, whereas in the ratio estimation method, he assigns numerical ratios to pairs of stimuli. In the corresponding production procedures, the roles of numbers and stimuli are reversed: the experimenter chooses the numbers and the subject produces the appropriate stimuli or stimulus ratios. Only the constant sum method has a built-in
33
check for adequacy of the basic assumption. But again, appropriate checks of internal consistency are available for the other methods and, in fact, parallel those for the difference methods. Differences versus ratios. The logarithmic, or nearly logarithmic, empirical relationship between difference scales and ratio scales has led to the conjecture that the subject's quantitative judgments are based on a single perceived quantitative relation (Torgerson 1961). According to this argument, when the subject is told to equate differences, he interprets the subjective relation as a difference. When he is told to equate ratios, he interprets the same relation as a ratio. The conjecture receives additional support from the behavior of quantitative judgments when the direction of the attribute is reversed, i.e., when the subject reports on smoothness rather than roughness, or darkness rather than lightness. For difference scales, the attribute and its reverse are linearly, though negatively, related. Stimuli that are separated by equal differences in one direction remain equally different when the direction of judgment is reversed. For the ratio scales, the attribute and its reverse are reciprocally related. Here the equal ratio property is invariant, but differences of course change markedly. The empirical results based on quantitative judgment are thus similar to the formal limitations of the variability methods. Each set of procedures yields scales on which either differences or ratios, but not both, are empirically meaningful. Additional procedures seem necessary to obtain a scale where both relations have an empirical basis. One such procedure has been devised by Cliff (1959). Individual difference models The individual difference, or responder, models use subjects' responses to stimuli as a way of establishing scales for attributes on which the subjects (responders) themselves differ. The models are based upon individual differences; an ultimate aim is to assign scale values to the subjects to represent amount or degree of the attribute possessed by each. Stimuli may also be assigned scale values on a parallel attribute, or they may be assigned parameter values relating them in some more general manner to the attribute of interest. Individual difference models are therefore those in which a response to a stimulus is interpreted as a function of both the scale value of the responder and the parameter values of the stimulus. The relation between the task set for the subject and the attribute continuum differs markedly between the stimulus models and the individual dif-
34
SCALING
ference models. In the stimulus models, the task is a particularized one—the subject evaluates stimuli with respect to the attribute being measured. In the individual difference models, the task itself has no obvious relation to the underlying attribute. In the categorical response methods, the subject simply indicates whether or not (or the extent to which) he agrees with, likes, or can pass a particular item. In the comparative response methods, he indicates which item he agrees with most, or which he prefers. In neither case, however, is the attribute of interest one of agreement or preference. It is, rather, a latent or underlying attribute that serves to explain or account for the variation in the responses of the subjects to the stimulus items. A concrete example might serve to clarify the distinction. Suppose we are given a set of samples of coffee that differ only in the amount of sugar that has been added. The samples are presented, two at a time, to a population of subjects. Each subject chooses the member of each pair that he prefers. If a stimulus model were successfully applied to the data, the result would be a scale of preferability of the samples, ranging from the least preferred to the most preferred for that population of subjects. But if an individual differences model were successfully applied to the data, the result would be a scale of sweetness, with the stimuli ranging from least sweet to most sweet and each subject characterized by a scale value denoting the degree of sweetness that he considers ideal. The subjects' responses do not tell us, of course, that the underlying variable is degree of sweetness. If the coffee samples had varied in strength or in amount of cream added rather than in sweetness, their responses would still have been of exactly the same form. In general, the individual differences models are explicitly concerned solely with the question of whether or not the responses of a given group of subjects to a given set of stimuli can be accounted for by a single underlying attribute. They do not tell one how to select the stimuli in the first place or, given that the stimuli form a scale, how the underlying attribute should be interpreted. Individual differences models can be classified in a number of ways. One important difference, which will be used to organize the remainder of this section, is the distinction between the simple deterministic models and the more elaborate probabilistic models. Deterministic models are developed in terms of the ideal case; there is no provision in the model itself for unsystematic variance. Since the ideal case virtually never occurs, the empirical question is one of the extent to which the ideal approximates the actual behavior of the subjects.
The probabilistic models represent more realistic attempts to account for the behavior of the subjects, provide explicitly for unsystematic variance, and, at least theoretically, lend themselves to statistical evaluation of goodness of fit. Simple deterministic models. Three general models will be considered here: Coombs's distance models for preferential choice data, Guttman's scalogram model for categorical responses to monotone items, and the scalogram models for categorical responses to point items. Distance models. In Coombs's distance models, both subjects and stimuli are represented as points along an underlying, latent continuum. According to the general model, the subject's preferential choices among stimuli are determined by the relative distances of the stimuli from that subject. A stimulus located at the same point as the subject represents his ideal, the one he would prefer above all others. As distance from the subject increases, the desirability of the stimulus to that subject decreases. Subject A thus will prefer stimulus X to stimulus Y when the distance dAB. Scales such as this, which provide not only an order for the elements themselves but also an order for some of the distances between elements, are called ordered metric scales. With suitable modifications (Coombs 1953), the general approach described above can also be applied to data obtained from the "order k\n" and "pick k\ri" methods. In the "order k\n" methods, the subject rank-orders only the first k out of the n stimuli presented to him, and in the "pick k\n" methods, he simply chooses the k out of n stimuli
SCALING he prefers most. Procedures for ordering the stimuli and for locating the subjects in ordered classes are given in Coombs ( 1 953 ) and Torgerson (1958). Monotone and point scalogram models. The scalogram models for categorical data are concerned with subjects and items, where an item is defined as any stimulus or procedure that partitions the set of subjects into two or more mutually exclusive categories. In these models, both subjects and category boundaries can be considered as points on an underlying continuum. The scaling problem is to determine whether the subjects and category boundaries can be positioned along the continuum so that all subjects are located within the appropriate categories of all items. Three types of ideal items are of interest: the monotone multicategory item, the monotone dichotomous item, and the nonmonotone, or point, item. A monotone item divides the underlying continuum into as many segments as there are response categories, with each category corresponding to one and only one segment. The following multicategory item provides an example of the general form: My weight is (a) between 150 and 175 pounds; (fo) 150 pounds or less; (c) 175 pounds or more. Dichotomous monotone items provide only two response alternatives. For example, I weigh over 150 pounds. True _ False __ Different items ordinarily partition the underlying continuum in different places. In general, n monotone items, with a total of m categories in all, partition the underlying continuum into m — n + 1 segments. Guttman's general scalogram procedure (see Stouffer et al. 1950) is a routine for determining whether the n items (a) are monotonic and (b~) can be considered as partitioning the same underlying attribute for the given population of subjects. If so, the final result is, first, a rank order of the item category boundaries on the underlying continuum and, second, the locations of subjects in the segments defined by adjacent category boundaries. The general procedure can be used with any combination of multicategory and dichotomous monotone items. Somewhat simpler procedures are available if all items are dichotomous. Nonmonotone, or point, items also partition the underlying continuum into segments, but not in a one-to-one fashion. An example of one form of nonmonotone item is My weight is between 150 and 175 pounds. True _ False __
35
The positive response to this type of nonmonotone item corresponds to a single segment—in this example, the range from 150 to 175 pounds. But a negative response corresponds to two segments: subjects weighing over 175 pounds and those weighing under 150 pounds both respond negatively. In order to evaluate the scale hypothesis and to obtain an ordinal scale, it is necessary for the segments corresponding to the positive alternatives to overlap. If no overlap occurs, the data contain information sufficient only to locate the subjects into a set of unordered categories. The procedures for uncovering the underlying scale for nonmonotone items are different from, but conceptually similar to, those appropriate for monotone items. An alternative ideal model for nonmonotone items treats the positive category of the item as a point and represents each subject by a segment of the underlying continuum. An example of an item which might fit such a model better would be I weigh about 150 pounds.
Yes No .
Here, subjects might differ with respect to their ideas of the range encompassed by the term "about." Since the two models are formally equivalent— they differ only in the interchange of the role of subject and item—the same analytical routines are applicable. Probabilistic models: the general theory. Most of the models developed for measuring individual difference attributes can be considered within the framework of a single general probabilistic model whose conceptual basis is essentially that of Lazarsfeld's latent structure analysis (1954; see also Stouffer et al. 1950), in which the attribute to be measured is represented formally by an underlying or latent space of one or more dimensions, subjects are represented by points in the latent space, and the stimuli are treated as variables. Stimuli may be psychological test items, attitude statements, rating scales, or, in general, anything that classifies the subjects into two or more exclusive and exhaustive categories. The observations, or manifest data, thus consist of an N by n matrix of the scores of the N subjects on the n stimuli. The stimulus variables are characterized in the general model by the parameters of the equation describing the regression of that variable on the underlyling latent attribute. An important general notion is the principle of local independence. Since each stimulus variable is related to the underlying attribute, the stimulus variables will be related to each other in some fashion. The principle of local independence re-
36
SCALING
quires that the systematic relations among the stimuli be accounted for entirely by the separate relations of each stimulus variable to the underlying attribute. Thus, at any given point in the latent space, the stimuli are all mutually independent. The over-all theory or conceptual framework clearly is completely general. In order to turn it into a testable model—one which places restrictions on the data—additional postulates or conditions are necessary. Three important considerations are the nature of the manifest data required, the nature of the postulated latent attribute, and the form of the regression equation relating the stimulus variables to the latent attribute. A particular model or testable specialization of the general theory depends on making a decision about each of the three. [See LATENT STRUCTURE.] Three levels or types of manifest response data are of major concern here, but obviously others are possible: Dichotomous items—the stimulus variable classifies the subject into one of two categories; ordered classes—the stimulus variable classifies the subject into one of several ordered categories; interval scale—the stimulus variable provides an interval scale value for the subjects. Three restrictive assumptions that can be placed on the postulated latent attribute are the following: the subjects are assumed to be located only at a relatively small number of points or regions in the space; the underlying attribute is assumed to be unidimensional; and the underlying attribute is assumed to be a multidimensional Euclidean space.
Four types of regression equations that relate the stimulus variables to the latent attribute are the various step functions, the linear equation, the normal ogive equation, and the logistic equation. The models also differ in whether or not they provide for or allow variance about the regression line or surface. The distinction here is essentially that made earlier beween deterministic and probabilistic models. The deterministic models for categorical data, which make no provision for extraneous variance, can be considered as limiting cases for certain of the probabilistic versions. Some specializations of the general theory. All of the models described in this section can be treated as specialized instances of general regression theory. In all cases, subjects can be considered as points in an underlying attribute space, stimuli as manifest variables related to the underlying space by a regression equation, and interrelations between manifest variables in terms of their separate relations to the underlying attribute space. The models differ in the kind of data required, the kind of space allowed, the form of the postulated regression equation, and in whether or not explicit provision is made for variance about the postulated regression surface. Table 1 provides a summary of the characteristics of and differences between a number of the more common models. Lazarsfeld's latent class model. In Lazarsfeld's latent class model the stimuli (items) are dichotomous and are scored either as 0 or as 1. The latent space is nominal—subjects are located at discrete
Table 1 — Characteristics of some individual difference models that fall within the general regression approach DETERMINISTIC
General scalogram Observable Dichotomous Ordered classes Interval Latent space Points Unidimensional Multidimensional Regression Step function Linear Normal ogive Logistic Variance about regression
Yes No
Multidimensional Dichoto- extensions mous of scalogram scalogram
PROBABILISTIC
Latent class
Latent profile
Latent distance
Linear
Twofactor
Multiple factor analysis
Normal ogive
Logistic
SCALING points or, equivalently, along arbitrarily ordered intervals of a unidimensional continuum. The regression equation is then a step function, and provision is made for variance about the regression line. If the classes are ordered arbitrarily, the height of the regression line for an item j, over the interval denned by class s, is the average score of the subjects in class s on that item. Since only scores of 0 and 1 are used, the height of the regression line for class s is also the probability that a person in class s will answer item j correctly. This probability is denoted by vjs. The unknowns to be determined are the set of probabilities vjs and the proportion of subjects in each class, ns. The observational information can be expressed by the following set of manifest proportions:
37
1.0
a,- V X < Xj
X > Xj
Figure 2 — Form of item regression or trace line for the latent distance model Source: From Torgerson 1958, p. 375.
the individuals, Lazarsfeld provides the following set of accounting equations:
Pi = the proportion of subjects in the entire sample answering item j positively; +00
Pit — the proportion of subjects answering both item j and item k positively;
/
fi •CO
/ + 00 fj
iu = the proportion answering items j, k, and / positively;
Lazarsfeld has shown that this information can be incorporated into a set of accounting equations, and several procedures have been devised for solving such equations (Green 1951; Anderson 1954). The solutions themselves do not directly indicate the class membership of individual subjects but, rather, give only the proportion of subjects in a class. Additional procedures are needed to assign subjects to classes. Gibsons latent profile model. Gibson's latent profile model (1959), which differs from Lazarsfeld's only in the type of data required, is designed for manifest responses measured on an interval scale. Since the equations for latent profile analysis are formally identical to those of latent class analysis, no new analytical procedures are needed for their solution. Lazarsfeld's continuous models. In Lazarsfeld's continuous models the stimuli are dichotomous items scored either as 0 or as 1, but the latent space is generally assumed to be a unidimensional continuum, although multidimensional extensions have also been suggested. Hence, the several continuous models proposed by Lazarsfeld differ from each other only in the form of the regression line. Where x — the latent variable, fj(x} — the regression of item j on x, and g ( x } = the density function of
•CO
In the latent distance model, the regression, or trace line, for the items j is assumed to be a step function of the form shown in Figure 2. It is assumed that the probability of a response is some constant value (a, — b/) up to a particular point Xj, and at this point it jumps to another value (ttj + bj) and remains constant thereafter. The equation for the regression can be written
(x} = a, — (x) = a, +
for x^ for x>
Each item is thus represented by three parameters : aj , bj , and a break point, Xj . It is a general rule that step-function regression lines provide no metric information about the shape of the underlying distribution of subjects. Any monotonic transformation of the underlying continuum leaves the form of such regression lines unchanged; hence, the final scale is ordinal. Solutions for the latent distance model have been provided by Hays and Borgatta (1954). It is interesting to note that if the parameters a, and bj are both assumed to have values of -| for all items, the latent distance model reduces to Guttman's scalogram model for dichotomous items. Lazarsfeld's linear model assumes that the regression lines can be represented by an equation of the form
38
SCALING
where 0 < f ; (x) ^ 1 for all items over the region of the continuum containing the distribution of subjects. Solutions for the item parameters a; and bj are available (see Torgerson 1958). Spearman s two-factor model. Spearman's twofactor model (1927) differs from Lazarsf eld's linear model only in the form of the manifest data. When it is assumed that the stimulus variables are measured on an interval scale and standardized with a mean of zero and unit variance, then one can write the equation Sij — Cigttjg
' "ij ?
where s iy = score of subject i on stimulus j, cig = score of subject i on the general factor g, ajg = loading of stimulus ; on the general factor, and 6ij represents variance due to unique factors and to error. The regression line can be written simply as fj(x^) = a}x, which differs from Lazarsfeld's linear model only by the lack of an additive constant. Multiple factor analysis. The standard procedures of multiple factor analysis require manifest data on interval scales and differ from Spearman's model by the substitution of a multidimensional latent space for the unidimensional general factor. The basic equation for the score of subject i on stimulus j becomes M Sij
- / jCim Ujm
~T~ "%j ,
m=l
where m — 1, 2, • • •, M is an index for dimensions. The corresponding regression function becomes
[See FACTOR ANALYSIS ; the biography of SPEARMAN.] Normal ogive and logistic models. Normal ogive and logistic models require dichotomous items scored either as 0 or as 1, and assume a unidimensional latent attribute. They differ from the latent distance and linear models in their assumption of regression lines that seem intuitively to be more reasonable, particularly for measuring aptitudes and abilities. Models using the normal ogive trace lines have been developed by Lord (1953) and Tucker (1952). Birnbaum (1957) and Rasch (1960) have worked with the logistic function. WARREN S. TORGERSON [Directly related are the entries LATENT STRUCTURE; MATHEMATICS; PROBABILITY; PSYCHOMETRIC s. Other relevant material may be found in FACTOR ANALYSIS;
the articles listed under MEASUREMENT; PSYCHOPHYSICS; QUANTAL RESPONSE; and in the biographies of FECHNER; SPEARMAN; THURSTONE; WEBER, ERNST HEINRICH.] BIBLIOGRAPHY ANDERSON, T. W. 1954 On Estimation of Parameters in Latent Structure Analysis. Psychometrika 19:1-10. ATTNEAVE, FRED 1949 A Method of Graded Dichotomies for the Scaling of Judgments. Psychological Review 56:334-340. BIRNBAUM, A. (1957) 1958 Probability and Statistics in Item Analysis and Classification Problems. Texas: U.S. Air Force School of Aviation Medicine, Randolph Air Force Base. BRADLEY, RALPH A. 1954 Incomplete Block Rank Analysis: On the Appropriateness of the Model for a Method of Paired Comparisons. Biometrics 10:375390. BRADLEY, RALPH A.; and TERRY, MILTON E. 1952 Rank Analysis of Incomplete Block Designs. I. The Method of Paired Comparisons. Biometrika 39:324-345. CLARKE, FRANK R. 1957 Constant-ratio Rule for Confusion Matrices in Speech Communication. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 29:715-720. CLIFF, NORMAN 1959 Adverbs as Multipliers. Psychological Review 66:27-44. COOMBS, CLYDE H. 1950 Psychological Scaling Without a Unit of Measurement. Psychological Review 57:145— 158. COOMBS, CLYDE H. 1953 Theory and Methods of Social Measurement. Pages 471-535 in Leon Festinger and Daniel Katz (editors), Research Methods in the Behavioral Sciences. New York: Dryden. COOMBS, CLYDE H. 1964 A Theory of Data. New York: Wiley. EDWARDS, ALLEN L.; and THURSTONE, L. L. 1952 An Internal Consistency Check for Scale Values Determined by the Method of Successive Intervals. Psychometrika 17:169-180. GARNER, WENDELL R.; and HAKE, HAROLD W. 1951 The Amount of Information in Absolute Judgments. Psychological Review 58:446-459. GIBSON, W. A. 1959 Three Multivariate Models: Factor Analysis, Latent Structure Analysis, and Latent Profile Analysis. Psychometrika 24:229-252. GREEN, BERT F. JR. 1951 A General Solution for the Latent Class Model of Latent Structure Analysis. Psychometrika 16:151-166. GULLIKSEN, HAROLD 1954 A Least Squares Solution for Successive Intervals Assuming Unequal Standard Deviations. Psychometrika 19:117-139. HAYS, DAVID G.; and BORGATTA, EDGAR F. 1954 An Empirical Comparison of Restricted and General Latent Distance Analysis. Psychometrika 19:271-279. LAZARSFELD, PAUL F. 1954 A Conceptual Introduction to Latent Structure Analysis. Pages 349-387 in Paul F. Lazarsf eld (editor), Mathematical Thinking in the Social Sciences. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. LORD, FREDERIC M. 1953 An Application of Confidence Intervals and of Maximum Likelihood to the Estimation of an Examinee's Ability. Psychometrika 18:5776. LUCE, R. DUNCAN 1959 Individual Choice Behavior: A Theoretical Analysis. New York: Wiley. MOSTELLER, FREDERICK 1951 Remarks on the Method of Paired Comparisons. Part 3: A Test of Significance
SCHELER, MAX for Paired Comparisons When Equal Standard Deviations and Equal Correlations Are Assumed. Psychometrika 16:207-218. RASCH, GEORG W. 1960 Probabilistic Models for Some Intelligence and Attainment Tests. Copenhagen: No publisher listed. SAFFIR, MILTON A. 1937 A Comparative Study of Scales Constructed by Three Psychophysical Methods. Psymetrika 2:179-198. SPEARMAN, CHARLES E. 1927 The Abilities of Man: Their Nature and Measurement. London: Macmillan. STEVENS, S. S. 1966 A Metric for the Social Consensus. Science New Series 151:530-541. STEVENS, S. S.; and GALANTER, E. H. 1957 Ratio Scales and Category Scales for a Dozen Perceptual Continua. Journal of Experimental Psychology 54:377411. STOUFFER, SAMUEL A. et al. 1950 Measurement and Prediction. Studies in Social Psychology in World War II, Vol. 4. Princeton Univ. Press. -» See especially the chapters by Louis Guttman and by Paul F. Lazarsfeld. SUPPES, PATRICK; and ZINNES, JOSEPH L. 1963 Basic Measurement Theory. Volume 1, pages 1-76 in R. Duncan Luce, Robert R. Bush and Eugene Galanter (editors), Handbook of Mathematical Psychology. New York: Wiley. THURSTONE, L. L. 1927 A Law of Comparative Judgment. Psychological Review 34:273-286. THURSTONE, L. L.; and CHAVE, ERNEST I. (1929) 1937 The Measurement of Attitude: A Psychophysical Method and Some Experiments With a Scale for Measuring Attitude Toward the Church. Univ. of Chicago Press. TORGERSON, WARREN S. 1958 Theory and Methods of Scaling. New York: Wiley. TORGERSON, WARREN S. 1961 Distances and Ratios in Psychophysical Scaling. Acta psychologica 19:201205. TUCKER, L. R. 1952 A Level of Proficiency Scale for a Unidimensional Skill. American Psychologist 7:408 only.
SCHELER, MAX Max Scheler (1874-1928), German philosopher and sociologist, was born in Munich. His father came from an upper-middle-class Protestant family which can be traced to the sixteenth century; a number of his forebears had been clergymen and jurists in the city of Coburg. His mother was descended from a Jewish Orthodox family that had been settled in Franconia for many centuries. The clash of religious and cultural traditions in his home may account in part for the strains and tensions in his personality and work. Scheler studied medicine and philosophy at the University of Jena. There, Rudolf Eucken, the Nobel prize-winning idealistic philosopher and defender of Protestant cultural liberalism, was his most prominent teacher. Scheler's early work, beginning with his dissertation at Jena (1899), where
39
he became a Privatdozent in 1901, clearly derived from Eucken. The distinctive aspects of Scheler's thought became apparent only after he moved to the University of Munich in 1907. There he assimilated the phenomenological method: Franz Brentano, who had been Edmund Husserl's teacher, continued to lecture there in Scheler's day, and Scheler was also influenced by Husserl's eminent disciples at the university. Although he was never an "orthodox" phenomenologist, his subsequent philosophizing moved within the orbit of Brentano's and Husserl's thought. [See the biography of HUSSERL.] In 1910 Scheler gave up his connection with the University of Munich and moved to Berlin to live as an academically unattached writer. His first major works were written in this Berlin period. Among his close intellectual companions in those days were Walther Rathenau and Werner Sombart. The outbreak of World War i marked a turning point in Scheler's career. He threw himself with great ardor into the defense of the German cause. The articles and books in which he defended the "German war" with passionately nationalistic fervor brought him to the attention of a wider public than had noticed his more scholarly productions. In 1917 and 1918 he worked at various diplomatic and propagandistic tasks for the German Foreign Office in Geneva and The Hague. During the war years Scheler, despite his intense nationalistic commitment to the "fatherland," moved closer to a Christian position in the realm of ethics, becoming finally a Roman Catholic convert. In 1919 Scheler accepted a call to the chair of philosophy and sociology at the University of Cologne. During the next five years he gradually developed his sociology of knowledge. About 1924 he began slowly to turn away from his previous commitment to Catholicism and eventually left the church. He then began to work on a comprehensive Anthropologie, in which he attempted to expound a kind of vitalistic pantheism that he had come to adopt. But he was not able to develop this new conception fully. He accepted a call from the University of Frankfurt in the beginning of 1928, but he died on May 19, 1928, at the age of 54, before assuming his new post. Quite different strands of thought were woven into the texture of Scheler's thought at different times in his intellectual development. He was ever open to new ideas and did not fear to contradict himself. As a consequence, he failed to achieve a full synthesis of his thought but was able to appeal by virtue of his own intellectual restlessness to the restless young intellectuals of the postwar period.
40
SCHELER, MAX
An erratic man, he was always to be a somewhat disturbing figure to the more settled members of the academic community while he gained considerable influence among younger sociologists and philosophers. Although he did not found a "school," he was a major intellectual pathsetter in pre-Nazi Germany as a social critic and moralist and as a sociologist and philosopher. Since World War n the vogue of phenomenology and existentialism in France has led to vigorous interest there in Scheler's work. In the Anglo-Saxon countries, Scheler was until recently little known, except among scholars interested in the sociology of knowledge or among certain theologians and philosophers. The recent translation of certain of his writings has stimulated wider interest among social scientists. Work in social psychology. Scheler's major contributions to the social sciences lie in the domain of social psychology and the sociology of knowledge. His first major work, Ressentiment (1912), contains a comprehensive phenomenological description of this sentiment as well as an attempt to locate the res sentiment-laden man within the social structure. He developed the notion that certain social roles—the spinster, the mother-in-law, the priest, for example—predispose their occupants to ressentiment, an attitude arising from a sense of impotence in the face of the cumulative repression of feelings of hatred, envy, and desire for revenge. In contrast to Nietzsche, who coined the term, Scheler located the breeding ground of ressentiment in the modern bourgeois and postbourgeois world rather than in Christianity. In The Nature of Sympathy (1913), Scheler presented a detailed description of this feeling state. Here he wedded the phenomenological method to the Pascalian endeavor to outline a "logic of the heart." Scheler attempted to uncover eternal uniformities in feelings and emotions and to show that these, far from being the blind results of mechanistically operating associations, are actually means of knowing which reveal, through their intentionality, the situation of man in the universe and the ethical a prioris of a distinct realm of eternal values. As in much of his later work, Scheler defended the thesis that values exist independently of the men who make the evaluations and justified his resolute opposition to all pragmatist, naturalist, or positivist theories of value. Polemics against such philosophical currents, more especially against Kantianism and Neo-Kantianism, form a major part of Scheler's work. His Formalismus in der Ethik . . . —first published in 1916 but written before the war (Gesammelte Werke, vol. 2)—-contains the most elaborate development
of his anti-Kantian polemics as well as ethical speculations and sociological considerations that anticipate many of his later sociological ideas. On the Eternal in Man (1921) is the fullest exposition of Scheler's religious thought and also contains germs of his later sociological views. The sociology of knowledge. Scheler's contribution to the sociology of knowledge is to be found in his "Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens" (1924), two years later expanded in Die Wissens for men und die Gesellschaft (Gesammelte Werke, vol. 8). He attempted to synthesize a Platonic doctrine of eternal immutability of a world of value essences with a comprehensive relativism. He described how different groups of men have striven, each in its socially and historically limited way, to grasp aspects of the eternal sphere of value essences. The infinite variety of subjective a prioris, the fact that different groups, or periods, or individual types elaborate their own forms of knowledge, meant to Scheler that men are striving to attain the value essences in different ways at different times rather than that the immutability of these very essences is limited. Real factors (such as biological, political, or economic constellations) favor or oppose the actualization of ideal factors (for example, moral, religious, or intellectual values), but they can never determine their content. They can only act as "sluice gates of the spirit." Scheler rejected Comte's "law of three stages" and stressed that religious, metaphysical, and scientific knowledge do not succeed each other in regular progression but rather coexist in every age, rooted though they are in the conditions of life of different groups of men and different human types. Yet Scheler found a grain of truth in Comte's dogmatic assertion that there are stages in human history in the sense that in different periods different substructural elements determine the predominant cultural outlook of the age. At the dawn of history, "blood"—that is, racial and vital factors—chiefly controlled cultural life. After the emergence of the state, political factors moved to the foreground. With the bourgeois age, economic factors have achieved unquestioned predominance. While earlier periods accorded preeminence to religious and metaphysical types of knowledge, the bourgeois age is primarily the age of the scientist. Scheler's world view has a deeply aristocratic cast. The idea of hierarchy is central to it, and the equalitarian tendencies of the modern age were therefore deeply abhorrent to him. His doctrine of moral values is hierarchical: pleasure values, those concerning the pleasant or unpleasant, are inferior to vital values, those promoting well-being and
SCHELER, MAX health, while these are again inferior to spiritual values; the highest values, however, are of a religious or sacred character. To such a hierarchy of values corresponds a hierarchy of men representing them. The saint incarnates the sacred values at the very top of the hierarchy; the genius stands for the spiritual values; the hero stands for the vital values; even in the lowest world, that of pleasure, "artists of consumption" are needed to guide our uncertain taste. To the hierarchy of values and of men embodying them there corresponds a hierarchy of forms of sociation. The lowest form is the simple horde, in which emotional contagion and unconscious imitation constitute the only bond. In the vital community, on the other hand, in the family or tribe as well as in classes or professions, conscious solidarity binds the participants. As against the horde, the social here prevails over the individual; each member can easily be substituted for any other. In the third type of sociation, Tonnies' Gesellschaft, superficial contractual bonds between individuals replace supra-individual goals that are consciously supported. Finally, at the apex of the hierarchy, the Gesamtperson, the "complex collective personality," represents a type of sociation in which a quintessential solidarity binds the members in a community of love. This last form, of which the church and the nation are central examples, is eminently superior to all others; within it alone can the higher values be realized. To posit equality between persons and so to level essential differences of value was, to Scheler, the chief aberration of the modern age. His full-scale attack against the post-Christian world, his rejection of liberalism, altruism, humanitarianism, and democracy can best be understood as resulting from his conviction that the modern world with its leveling tendencies has undermined the objective hierarchy of men and values. His cultural criticism hence proceeds from a profoundly elitist point of view. The modern social scientist will of necessity have to sift Scheler's very real contributions to sociology and social psychology from the antidemocratic ideology in which they are all too often embedded. LEWIS A. COSER [For the historical context of Scheler's work, see KNOWLEDGE, SOCIOLOGY OF; and the biographies of COMTE; HUSSERL; KANT; TONNIES. For discussion of the subsequent influence of Scheler's ideas, see EXPRESSIVE BEHAVIOR; PERCEPTION, article on PERSON PERCEPTION; PERSONALITY, POLITICAL; PHENOMENOLOGY; SYMPATHY AND EMPATHY; and the biography of MANNHEIM.]
41
WORKS BY SCHELER
1899
Beitrdge zur Feststellung der Beziehungen zwischen den logischen und ethischen Prinzipien. Jena: Vopelius. -» Inaugural dissertation, University of Jena. (1912) 1961 Ressentiment. Edited with an introduction by Lewis A. Coser. New York: Free Press. -> First published as Uber Ressentiment und moralisches Werturteil. The second German edition appears on pages 33-147 of Volume 3 of Scheler's Gesammelte Werke under the title "Das Kessentiment im Aufbau der Moralen." (1913) 1954 The Nature of Sympathy. Translated by Peter Heath, with an introduction by Werner Stark. London: Routledge. -> First published as Zur Phdnomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefiihle und von Liebe und Hass. The second German edition was published as Wesen und Formen der Sympathie. (1921) 1961 On the Eternal in Man. Translated by Bernard Noble. New York: Harper. -* First published as Vom Ewigen im Menschen. 1924 Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens. Pages 5—146 in Max Scheler (editor), Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens. Munich and Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. (1927) 1961 Man's Place in Nature. Translated with an introduction by Hans Meyerhoff. New York: Farrar; Boston: Beacon. -> First published in German in Volume 8 of Der Leuchter. (1929) 1958 Philosophical Perspectives. Translated by Oscar A. Haac. Boston: Beacon Press. -» First published as Philosophische Weltanschauung. Gesammelte Werke. Vols. 1—. Bern (Switzerland): Francke, 1954- . -» Thirteen volumes are projected, of which the following have appeared: Volume 2: Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik: Neuer Versuch der Grundlegung eines ethischen Personalismus (1913-1916) 1954. Fourth edition, revised. Volume 3: Vom Umsturz der Werte: Abhandlungen und Aufsdtze (1911-1914) 1955. Fourth edition, revised. Volume 5: Vom Evrigen im Menschen (1921) 1954. Fourth edition, revised. Volume 6: Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre (1923-1924) 1963. Second edition, revised. Volume 8: Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft (1926) 1960. Second edition, revised. Volume 10: Schriften aus dem Nachlass (1933) 1957. Second edition, revised and enlarged. SUPPLEMENTARY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BECKER, HOWARD; and DAHLKE, HELMUT OTTO 1942 Max Scheler's Sociology of Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2:310-322. COSER, LEWIS A.; and HOLDHEIM, WILLIAM W. 1961 Max Scheler: An Introduction. New York: Free Press. DUPUY, MAURICE 1959 La philosophie de Max Scheler: Son evolution et son unite. 2 vols. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. GURVITCH, GEORGES D. (1930) 1949 L'intuitionnisme emotionnel de Max Scheler. Pages 67-152 in Georges Gurvitch, Les tendances actuelles de la philosophic allemande: E. Husserl, M. Scheler, E. Lash, N. Hartmann, M. Heidegger. Paris: Vrin. KANTHACK, KATHARINA 1948 Max Scheler: Zur Krisis der Ehrfurcht. Berlin and Hannover: Minerva. McGiLL, V. J. 1942 Scheler's Theory of Sympathy and Love. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2: 273-291. -» The entire issue is devoted to Scheler.
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SCHIZOPHRENIA
MANNHEIM, KARL (1925) 1952 Sociology of Knowledge From the Standpoint of Modern Phenomenology (Max Scheler). Pages 154-179 in Karl Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. -> Contains a discussion of the differences between Mannheim's and Scheler's approaches to the sociology of knowledge. First published in German. STARK, WERNER 1958 The Sociology of Knowledge: An Essay in Aid of a Deeper Understanding of the History of Ideas. London: Routledge; Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. STAUDE, JOHN R. 1967 Max Scheler: An Intellectual Portrait. New York: Free Press.
SCHIZOPHRENIA Schizophrenia constitutes the core problem of insanity. The conditions subsumed under the heading are among the most devastating to which man is heir, blighting him in the process of development or in the prime years of life and commonly leading to his progressive enclosure in an autistic world beset by delusion, hallucination, and fear of involvement with life and people. Because of the diverse manifestations, courses, and outcomes, schizophrenic reactions elude precise definition and concise description. They may be defined as gross failures to achieve or maintain integrated personality functioning in which a person, unable to cope with problems of living and irreconcilable conflicts, withdraws and seeks solutions by breaking through the confines imposed by the culture's ways of thinking and reasoning and by regressing to a period of childhood when reality gave way to fantasy and when the self and others were not yet clearly distinguished. The condition tends to be self-perpetuating because the patient abandons testing his ideas in terms of how they help master his environment and promote collaborative interaction with others. However, restitutive efforts are usually made because a person cannot achieve an equilibrium as an isolate and because fears of uncontrollable impulses interfere with autistic gratification. Incidence and prevalence. Schizophrenia is among the most common conditions leading to profound incapacitation. Of the daily hospital census in the United States of about 1.4 million patients, approximately one-fourth are hospitalized because of schizophrenia. Although the large majority are discharged within the first year after admission, the average length of stay is 13 years because a sizable number remain in hospitals from adolescence or early adulthood until death from old age or some disease. Incidence and prevalence can be estimated only very roughly because of the
number of schizophrenic patients who are never hospitalized or even diagnosed and because of the vague boundaries of the condition. It has been estimated that between 14 and 20 of every 1,000 children born in the United States will be hospitalized at some time in their lives with an illness diagnosed as schizophrenia. A minimum annual prevalence rate of 290 per 100,000 has been suggested for Western societies (Lemkau & Crocetti 1958). Surveys in New Haven (Hollingshead & Redlich 1958) and in England (Brooke 1959) have shown that both incidence and prevalence are much higher among the lower socioeconomic segments of the population than among the uppermiddle and upper classes. [See MENTAL DISORDERS, article on EPIDEMIOLOGY.] Concepts of schizophrenia The profound divergencies of opinion concerning the nature, etiology, and treatment of schizophrenic conditions reflect differing concepts of the nature of human adaptation and integration more than they reflect divergent findings. Traditionally, psychiatrists have considered that the profound incapacitations of schizophrenic patients and, particularly, the disordered thinking that forms a critical aspect of the condition must be due to some unknown biological impairment—a structural defect of the brain or some hereditary metabolic or toxic factor influencing cerebral functioning. A large majority continues to believe that the high familial incidence indicates a hereditary predisposition that is affected by environmental factors, perhaps through aggravating a metabolic dysfunction. However, others consider schizophrenic reactions as an extreme type of aberrant personality functioning resulting from faulty and distorting child rearing in deviant family environments. The way in which schizophrenia is conceptualized is not simply a matter of academic interest but of vital moment, as it influences the direction of scientific investigations and therapeutic efforts and, as will become apparent, has even profoundly influenced the clinical picture and course of the condition. The conviction that schizophrenia is a disease due to a biological impairment leads to concentration of research in neuropathological, physiological, and biochemical fields and has created therapeutic pessimism. This attitude has often contributed to the neglect of patients and, at times, virtually condemned them to crowded and impersonal institutions that aggravated their autistic withdrawal. Such orientation left little room for the participation of social scientists, other than in studies of the economic and social implications
SCHIZOPHRENIA of a devastating disease. In contrast, the conceptualization of schizophrenia as a type of aberrant personality development has made it possible to consider schizophrenic reactions in the study of how the developmental process can go awry and thus perhaps to clarify critical issues concerning human integration and emotional homeostasis. Investigations of such matters as the role of language in human adaptation, of the family as a critical social institution that mediates between biological and cultural directives and between the individual and society, of the influence of social class on the incidence of mental illness and how it relates to child-rearing practices, of cross-cultural influences on personality development, and of the social and political structure of mental hospitals and the society's system of caring for the ill, and numerous other areas of study become a vital part of the effort to understand, control, and treat schizophrenic reactions. Further, as schizophrenia constitutes one of the dominant unsolved health problems, the training of all physicians as well as of psychiatrists in particular will be affected profoundly by the conceptualization of the problems and the projection of an approach to their solution. Historical considerations. The concept of schizophrenia as a clinical entity derives from Emil Kraepelin's recognition in 1896 of the relationship between three forms of insanity—catatonia, described by K. Kahlbaum in 1863; hebephrenia, described by E. Hecker in 1871; and the deteriorating paranoid psychoses—and his uniting them under the designation "dementia praecox," which B. Morel had used for a type of deteriorating adolescent psychosis. Kraepelin brought a degree of order to psychiatric taxonomy by differentiating dementia praecox from the manic-depressive psychoses. He emphasized the progressive course of dementia starting in youth and envisioned a distinct disease entity for which a specific structural pathology or causative agent would be found. The term "schizophrenia" was introduced by Eugen Bleuler in 1911, because not all sufferers from dementia praecox were youthful and not all became demented; it also served to emphasize the splitting of the psychic functions—the intellectual, affective, and conative—in these patients. Bleuler considered the possibility of a psychological causation but favored a hereditary etiology. He considered that the unknown etiologic agent produced primary symptoms of disturbances in associations, abnormalities of affect, emotional and intellectual ambivalence, and turning from reality to fantasy, as well as autism, whereas such symptoms as delusions, hallucinations, motor disorders, etc., were secondary and
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amenable to psychological treatment. He also stressed the intact capacities for perception, memory, and intellectual functioning that differentiate schizophrenia from the organic and toxic psychoses. In essence, he outlined the critical paradox of schizophrenic conditions: thought disorders form a critical aspect and diagnostic requisite, but the anatomical and physiological capacities for perceiving, thinking, and remembering remain intact. Together with Carl Gustav Jung, Bleuler brought psychoanalytic insights into the study of the psychology of schizophrenia. [See the biographies Of BLEULER; JUNG; KRAEPELIN.] Adolf Meyer's view. For the vast majority of psychiatrists throughout the world, the schizophrenic syndrome has remained essentially unchanged since the publication of Bleuler's monograph (1911), although many have adhered more closely to Kraepelin's concepts of a clear-cut disease entity, as the collected papers of the 1957 World Congress devoted to schizophrenia demonstrate (World Congress . . . 1959). However, Adolf Meyer, the dominant American contemporary of Bleuler, did not consider schizophrenia as an illness but as a reaction type that could be brought on by faulty "habit patterns," including habits of thinking and relating (Meyer 1896-1937). For many years Meyer was almost the only important influence advocating longitudinal dynamic studies of life histories of schizophrenic patients, and he countered the prevailing therapeutic pessimism with his melioristic approach which advocated a type of psychotherapeutic management in a socializing milieu. Meyer is largely responsible for the different perspectives concerning schizophrenia held by many American psychiatrists in contrast to those of their Continental colleagues. [See the biography of MEYER.] Psychoanalysis. Even though Freud had excluded the treatment of schizophrenia from the province of psychoanalysis because he tacitly accepted an organic or toxic etiology and considered that the regression to narcissism prevented formation of a transference relationship, psychoanalysis still made many major contributions to understanding schizophrenic patients and their symptoms. Such concepts as narcissistic fixation and regression, the psychosexual stages of development, infantile sexuality, the withdrawal of cathexes (libidinal investment) from objects, primary process thinking, the interpretation of dreams, the exposition of the defense mechanisms —particularly those of projection and introjection— and of the importance of homosexuality to paranoid states, etc., opened the way for a dynamic under-
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standing of schizophrenic patients and for comprehension of productions that previously had seemed to be the incomprehensible utterances of a diseased mind. Harry Stack Sullivan was among the first analysts who focused attention on the treatment of schizophrenic patients and whose psychoanalytic orientation was greatly modified by work with them. In the process he found need and use for contributions from various behavioral sciences. Sullivan (1924-1933) and his colleague FrommReichmann (1948) were major forces in demonstrating by determined efforts that psychoanalytic therapy could be adapted to the treatment of schizophrenic patients. [See the biography of SULLIVAN.] Clinical descriptions The nature of the disorder varies widely. Most often schizophrenic reactions become manifest in the adolescent or young adult when the impact of sexual drives and the attainment of independence, an identity, and a way of life present critical problems. The young person may gradually and insidiously become increasingly withdrawn, preoccupied, and resistant to direction from others. He may avoid facing problems and relating to others by sleeping through much of the day. Sudden outbursts of irritability or hostility toward family members ward off intrusions. Rumination over personal and philosophical problems increases, and intellectualizations displace commitment and show of emotions. Differentiation from adolescent "identity crises" or other types of adolescent turmoil is difficult, and the future of the youth may hang in the balance. Gradually withdrawal becomes more extreme, indecision paralyzing, and ambivalence of feelings pronounced. Appearance and bodily hygiene may be neglected. Communication becomes vague, missing the mark and leaving the listener puzzled. Feelings of unreality and depersonalization are common. Self-direction is rescinded or paralyzed, allowing drive, impulse, and fantasy to gain increased motivating force. Control of drives and hostilities becomes a major preoccupation, while motivation is sought through interpreting coincidental events and reading meanings into people's expressions and gestures. Then delusional solutions and hallucinated directives are found. Unacceptable feelings and impulses are projected onto others, who become malevolent figures. Hypochondriacal complaints are common and may reflect fears of transformation into the opposite sex. Increasingly the patient lives in an autistic world, gaining a sense of worth or even greatness through fantasy; he is also a prey to delusions of persecution and to terror lest homicidal, suicidal,
or incestuous impulses overwhelm him. In some patients the first serious indication of the psychosis comes in an outbreak of panic over loss of control or over projected dangers. Frequently, when the patient can remain isolated or when he is neglected in an institution, habits and bodily care deteriorate, communications become disorganized and bizarre, and the patient comes to live in a world of delusion and hallucination. He exists in a state of almost living death, a nonparticipant in society and its conventions, virtually beyond the reach of therapeutic intervention. However, such outcomes are not inherent to schizophrenic reactions and need not occur, and with improved treatment they are becoming less common even in large institutions. The course and outcome vary widely and are influenced markedly by the treatment provided. Under average current conditions, approximately two-thirds of hospitalized patients will be discharged within 12 months: about half of these will remain reasonably well, while the remainder will have further serious difficulties and tend to have a downhill course. The outlook is poor for those who cannot be discharged within the first year. However, as less flagrant forms of schizophrenia are now diagnosed more often than formerly and as better treatment opportunities are available to some, the diagnosis need not imply so poor a prognosis. Schizophrenic reactions are most likely to occur in persons who have socialized poorly and who tend to be shy, introspective, somewhat eccentric, and, perhaps, compliantly overconscientious. Still, a fair proportion have not been notably schizoid, and some have been outgoing but impetuous individuals. Lifelong difficulties in socializing and an early progressive withdrawal decrease chances of recovery. Types of schizophrenia. Conventionally, four types of schizophrenia are described. Actually, most patients can be fitted into these types only arbitrarily, showing admixtures of two or more types, with shifts in the dominant symptomatology over time. However, brief outlines of these subgroupings will serve to describe some of the different clinical pictures. Catatonic schizophrenia. In catatonic schizophrenia extremes of violent motor excitement or rigid immobility dominate the picture. Onset is often abrupt. The patient may maintain difficult postures for hours, days, or months and requires complete care. Alternations between extreme excitement and rigidity may occur. Frequently these patients are in the midst of some mystical experience, believing themselves in heaven or hell; they are often immobile and refuse to speak because
SCHIZOPHRENIA they believe any movement or word can produce a universal catastrophe. Although they may appear out of contact, they are aware of and sensitive to their surroundings. The prognosis is more favorable than for other types but unpredictable in the individual case. Chronic catatonic states, once fairly common, are becoming infrequent in modern hospitals. Simple schizophrenia. Simple schizophrenia usually refers to a gradual withdrawal of interest and a progressive decline of responsible behavior with absence of commitment to a definite way of life. The potentialities shown in youth dissipate, and the patient idles about the home or becomes a vagrant, etc. Theoretically, Bleuler's primary symptoms are present with minimal secondary symptoms; however, many patients given this diagnosis are delusional but noncommunicative about their delusions and hallucinations. Hebephrenic schizophrenia. Hebephrenic schizophrenia usually starts in adolescence and progresses rapidly: the patient soon displays silly, impulsive, and disorganized behavior. Delusions and hallucinations are poorly organized and shifting. Speech is often fragmented and almost incomprehensible, marked by frequent intrusions of primary process material. Paranoid schizophrenia. In paranoid schizophrenia delusions of a persecutory type dominate thought and behavior; ideas of reference are common and blend with auditory hallucinations. Megalomanic delusions relate to ideas of being the focus of widespread plots. The later in life the onset, the more likely it is that the delusions will be systematized and the reaction type approach the condition described under paranoid states. [See PARANOID REACTIONS.] Other subcategories. The current official nomenclature includes a schizoaffective type to cover the numerous patients who display an admixture of schizophrenic and manic-depressive symptoms: if these are considered separate entities, such patients would be suffering from both conditions. However, if schizophrenic reactions are regarded as a type of aberrant development leading to failures of personality integration, other such combined diagnoses will be used. Sociopathic youths can also be more or less schizophrenic; hypochondriacal neuroses may shift to psychoses with somatic or hypochondriacal delusions; obsessive patients can decompensate with obsessive thoughts becoming increasingly bizarre and delusional. Further, although the typical schizophrenic reactions are readily diagnosed, there are no clear boundaries that delimit the use of the diagnosis.
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Those who are reluctant to relinquish the concept of schizophrenia as a progressive deteriorating disease seek to distinguish between process and nonprocess schizophrenia or between schizophrenia and schizophreniform conditions (Langfeldt 1933): the patients who recover or who are amenable to psychotherapy, etc., are not considered as true schizophrenics and supposedly can be distinguished by their premorbid behavior, heredity, and symptomatology—a view not widely shared in the United States. The diagnosis of pseudoneurotic schizophrenia (Hoch & Polatin 1949) is used by some psychiatrists to indicate patients with panneurotic symptomatology who are not amenable to psychotherapy because they are really schizophrenic, but others consider these as "borderline" patients whose neurotic symptoms form a defense against personality disorganization. Borderline schizophrenia refers to patients who maintain a tenuous integration with meager defenses against incursions of primitive impulses and strange primary process material into consciousness. Childhood schizophrenia refers to cases occurring before adolescence. It is not clear if cases occurring early in childhood are related to the adult condition. Early infantile autism is a puzzling illness that occurs in the first few years of life; the child begins to display peculiar repetitive behavior and regresses, paying little attention to other persons. Some of these children clearly suffer from brain anomalies or brain damage; others have been raised by unempathic, intellectualizing parents. These conditions cannot be discussed adequately in this section. [See MENTAL DISORDERS, article on CHILDHOOD MENTAL DISORDERS.]
The confusions concerning nomenclature have been presented because the various terms are in common usage but also because they reflect the difficulties and ambiguities in the field. Terms may be used in the literature with a certainty that can be misleading, leaving the inexperienced person— and even the experienced one—feeling ignorant rather than perplexed when he cannot make a clear-cut diagnosis. Concepts of etiology Impairment of brain functioning. The conviction that such profound personality disorganizations, marked by disordered thinking and often progressing to an almost vegetative state of existence, must reflect impairment of brain functioning has led to intensive investigations of post-mortem and biopsy sections of the brain and of every endocrine, toxic, and biochemical factor that might
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conceivably affect cerebral functioning. The erroneous assumption that insulin coma therapy cured schizophrenia led to an upsurge of such studies in the 1930s and 1940s, and currently the meliorating effects of the phenothiazine drugs have provided renewed impetus. Investigators have again and again reported some biochemical factor they consider specific to schizophrenia, and each of these findings has been invalidated sooner or later. A number of these factors have turned out to be related to such things as dietary inadequacies or are concerned with physiological disturbances secondary to chronic emotional disturbances or to prolonged inactivity or some other influence of chronic hospitalization. Neuroanatomical investigations. None of the numerous reports of an abnormality of the brain has been validated. The similarities of the personalities and developmental histories of patients with psychomotor epilepsy and schizophrenia form an interesting lead that is under study. Endocrine investigations. Although the thyroid, pituitary, gonadal, pineal, and adrenal cortical and medullary secretions have all been implicated, no evidence has held up. The intriguing hypothesis that epinephrine undergoes an anomalous breakdown into psychotoxic substances is being pursued (Hoffer 1964), but recent evidence does not bear out the initial enthusiasm. Biochemical investigations. Recently emphasis has been directed to the study of brain amines and indole excretion, and to psychotogenic agents such as LSD-25 and the supposedly psychotogenic extracts of schizophrenic serum. Various theories relating several such factors have been proposed. Intensive work is advancing knowledge of brain chemistry and fosters hope for future discoveries pertinent to schizophrenia, but recent premature enthusiasms indicate a need for more carefully controlled and validated work before publication. [See MENTAL DISORDERS, article on BIOLOGICAL ASPECTS.]
Genetic hypothesis. The high familial incidence of schizophrenia had led to virtual acceptance of the belief that some genetically transmitted factor plays an important role in the etiology of schizophrenia [see MENTAL DISORDERS, article on GENETIC ASPECTS]. It has been primarily the evidence from twin studies that seemed to demand acceptance of a strong hereditary influence. Until very recently all twin studies reported a much higher concordance rate in identical twins than in samesexed fraternal twins or siblings—as high as 86 per cent in identical as against 17 per cent in samesexed fraternal twins. Lately, several investigators
noted puzzling inconsistencies in the data. The only two studies of all twins born within a given span of time rather than of samples of hospitalized patients fail to validate the earlier findings. A survey of all male twins born in Finland between 1930 and 1935 found that none of the 16 schizophrenic patients among the identical twins had a schizophrenic co-twin (Tienari 1963). Studies in Norway of an even larger sample, although still incomplete, indicate that concordance rates for identical twins will not be much higher than for same-sexed siblings (Kringlen 1964). It appears as if the striking results of prior twin studies were due to sampling errors and that this basis for the genetic hypothesis of schizophrenia has been badly shaken. Family environment. A high familial incidence of personality traits or illnesses has often led to erroneous overemphasis of genetic factors. Attention has been directed increasingly to the role of the family environment in producing schizophrenic offspring. Psychoanalytic theory, in considering schizophrenia related to fixations at the oral stage of development, drew attention to failures in the earliest mother-child transactions. As early as 1924, Sullivan emphasized the noxious influence of certain mothers on the development of their schizophrenic sons, both directly and because of their attitudes toward their husbands (1924-1933). Considerable etiologic significance has been given to the "schizophrenogenic mother" who is either aloof, unempathic, and unable to cathect in the child properly or, more typically, cannot establish boundaries between herself and the child, engulfing and controlling a child she needs to complete her life. Studies since 1949 (Lidz et al. 1965) have revealed deficiencies and abnormalities in the total intrafamilial environment. The fathers are frequently just as severely disturbed as the mothers. The family is split by enduring conflict between the parents in which each demolishes the worth of the other to the children, or the family transactions are distorted because one parent acquiesces to the spouse's strange ways of rearing children and patterning the family life. The generation roles within the family are confused in a variety of ways such as parental rivalry with a child or parental dependency upon an immature child, including heterosexual or homosexual incestuous proclivities. Parents fail to adhere to their respective sex-linked roles, either because of homosexual tendencies or through reversing maternal and paternal roles, or because a mother cannot fill an affectional-expressive role or a father an instrumental role. The parent of the same sex as the child who becomes schizophrenic
SCHIZOPHRENIA does not form an adequate model for identification, a situation that is often aggravated because this parent's worth is undercut by the spouse. Communication within the family is always disturbed and often clearly irrational or paralogical. The intrafamilial culture may deviate markedly from that of the society into which the child must eventually emerge. These families teach or indirectly inculcate irrationality, providing a poor foundation in reality testing and for understanding verbal and nonverbal communications outside of the family. The schizophrenic patient's siblings are almost always seriously affected: more are psychotic than are reasonably well-integrated, and with rare exception their occasional "normality" is achieved at the price of serious constriction of the personality. The finding that schizophrenic patients always grow up in seriously disturbed families forms the most consistent lead concerning the etiology of schizophrenia. Essentially similar phenomena have been reported by research groups in many different countries. In conceptualizing how such disturbed family transactions can lead to schizophrenia in an offspring, some investigators focus primarily upon how the disturbed patterns of communication foster the schizophrenic thought disorder. The "double bind" hypothesis (Bateson et al. 1956) notes how the patient is habitually caught in a bind because a parent covertly sends conflicting messages that perplex and paralyze, causing him to be rebuffed whichever way he responds; or he is caught between the opposing needs and demands of his two parents, and satisfying either parent provokes rejection by the other. Various other communication problems have been noted: the ways in which the child is taught to deny or ignore what should be obvious; the distortions of meanings to support a parent's tenuous emotional equilibrium; the fostering of distrust in the utility of verbal communications; the teaching of eccentric or delusional beliefs; the blurring of the system of meanings and constructs by inconsistent reinforcement by parents, etc. (Lidz et al. 1965). The amorphous or fragmented nature of the thinking and communicating of one or both parents has been carefully documented (Wynne & Singer 1963). Studies of the family communication patterns clarify why the patient suffers from a thought disorder and how such resultant impairments in thinking and communicating create profound disturbances in ego functioning. The family disturbances, however, clearly affect the child's development deleteriously in other significant ways. A broader approach to the problem
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takes cognizance of how failures of parental nurturance, particularly the mother's difficulties in relating to the child, interfere with the development of adequate autonomy; how the disturbances in the family structure distort the structuring of the child's personality by improper channeling of drives, through confusing child and parent roles, by creating confusions in sexual identity, by impeding proper resolution of the oedipal situation, etc.; as well as of how parents' failure to transmit adequately basic adaptive or instrumental techniques of the culture, including its system of meanings, impairs ego functioning and socializing capacities (Lidz et al. 1965). The family studies have thus far been largely exploratory, paving the way for the formulation of hypotheses that are now being studied with more rigorous methodology. Although not definitive, they have served to move research concerning the etiology of schizophrenia out of the frustrating whirlpool in which it had been caught. Many puzzling aspects of schizophrenia now seem far more comprehensible. The findings interdigitate with those of other approaches, such as studies of the relationship between social class and incidence of schizophrenia, twin studies, and psychoanalytic concepts of developmental dynamics. The knowledge gained from these studies has also had a marked impact upon therapy, particularly through drawing attention to the need to consider the family as a unit rather than simply to focus upon the individual patient. Therapy Despite the absence of any specific method of treatment, marked changes have taken place in the therapy of schizophrenic patients since 1940. Perhaps the most important change has been the gradual but progressive abandonment of the defeatist attitude concerning schizophrenia that had pervaded most of psychiatry since the mid-nineteenth century. Although debates have waged concerning the value of insulin coma, electroshock, frontal lobotomy, milieu therapy, and various forms of individual and group psychotherapy, psychiatrists and other personnel finding something they could do or try to do became interested in the patients, and the patients responded. It became apparent to increasing numbers of psychiatrists that schizophrenic patients need not follow a downhill course, and that many of the extreme manifestations were products of neglect and virtual abandonment in impersonal institutions. The enormity of the problem of caring for and attempting to treat the masses of institutionalized patients
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has been overwhelming, and adequate treatment for any other than selected patients has had to await reorganizations of hospital systems and the training of the necessary personnel. Therapeutic efforts must be suited to the patient, the facilities available, and the therapist's abilities. Whereas the prognosis for schizophrenic reactions collectively is generally discouraging, the outlook for the individual patient, particularly if treatment begins soon after symptoms appear and intensive care can be provided, may be regarded hopefully. "Organic" treatments. Although insulin coma therapy, introduced in 1933, did much to revive interest in the treatment of schizophrenic patients, it has now been virtually discarded, its apparent efficacy having resulted from the increased attention to patients it required. Electric convulsive treatments are of occasional value as a means of quieting extremely excited patients. Various tranquilizing drugs, particularly the phenothiazines, have largely replaced other "organic" treatments. The phenothiazines serve to lessen anxiety and agitation and probably dimmish distraction by extraneous stimuli and primary process intrusions. Trifluoperazine may be particularly useful in diminishing hallucinations. An array of psychotropic drugs is now available, and opinions differ as to the merits of each. Properly controlled experiments on the relative worth of these medications are extremely difficult to conduct. It seems reasonably certain that many patients can return to or remain in the community largely because of these agents. A major influence of tranquilizing drugs has been indirect; they have helped quiet the wards in mental institutions and provided a means of controlling seriously disturbed patients. This has helped produce great changes in mental hospitals through unlocking doors, permitting patients greater freedom, and allowing the staff time and opportunity to improve the therapeutic milieu. [See MENTAL DISORDERS, TREATMENT OF, article On SOMATIC TREATMENT.]
Milieu therapy. Establishing a suitable therapeutic hospital milieu has altered the prognosis for schizophrenic patients as much as the tranquilizing drugs, but in all except certain select institutions, reorganization had to await the quieting effects of the shock therapies and then the tranquilizers. Milieu therapy seeks to counter schizophrenic patients' tendencies to withdraw; it also fosters socialization, promotes responsibility, and provides retraining in interpersonal relationships. The therapy includes a gamut of measures ranging from discarding restraints; minimizing isolation; giving attentive care and interest; fostering socializing, edu-
cational, and occupational activities; and providing group therapy to holding patient-staff meetings and setting up patient government to provide channels of communication and to encourage responsibility for the self and others. Opening the doors of hospitals has a salutary influence and can markedly change the attitudes of both patients and staff, but some patients who are afraid of their impulsivity, aggressions, or suicidal tendencies feel more secure and can socialize more readily when protected within a limited area until they are ready to assume responsibility for their actions. As schizophrenic patients tend to regress, withdraw, and become passively dependent in institutions, there has been a movement to return such patients to the community as soon as feasible or to attempt to keep them out of hospitals altogether. On the other hand, efforts are often made to promote early hospitalization, for the chances of recovery are greater if treatment starts before symptoms become well established and if the patient can be removed from a pathogenic environment. The paradox revolves around the nature of the treatment a hospital can offer; optimally a hospital should be able to counter regressive tendencies. As yet, relatively few institutions can provide intensive care and treatment that seeks to promote essential personality change rather than mere remission from a psychotic state. Psychotherapy. Establishing a relationship to another person often—perhaps always—provides the impetus and forms the bridge for the schizophrenic patient's return from psychotic withdrawal. The crux of the initial phases of psychotherapeutic work with these patients is the therapist's use of himself to gain the patient's trust and willingness to risk relating again despite the shattering disillusionments of the past. A persistent warm and honest interest by an untrained person may suffice and succeed where a highly trained but intellectualized and uncommitted therapist fails. Schizophrenic patients are usually highly sensitive to pretense, to being used by another person, and to another person's withdrawal in the face of their intense needs or their hostilities. Usually, however, considerable skill and understanding of schizophrenic patients are required. Trust follows upon understanding, understanding requires communication, and the therapist faces the task of establishing communication across barriers imposed by the patient's idiosyncratic language usage, his personalized metaphor, his efforts to conceal and yet convey, the delusions and hallucinatory interruptions, and the projections of the patient's thoughts and feelings onto the therapist, etc. The therapist
SCHIZOPHRENIA must be prepared and able to counter or weather the patient's flights into withdrawal, particularly when the patient feels on the verge of trusting and becoming involved—setbacks that test the therapist's commitment. Bringing a patient out of his psychotic regression and withdrawal can be a very real and rewarding achievement, but something that often occurs without specific psychotherapy; the process is more successful when the therapist is a focal point in a proper therapeutic milieu that counters the patient's regression in many ways than when the emphasis is solely upon the individual psychotherapy. Psychotherapy of schizophrenia usually implies more than bringing the patient out of the psychotic episode or into socially acceptable behavior. It often involves the effort to promote profound personality changes through psychoanalytically oriented interpersonal transactions. Such work with schizophrenic patients differs markedly from the analysis of psychoneurotic patients. It seeks to strengthen ego functioning through fostering a more cohesive identity, firmer boundaries between the self and others, and control of primitive impulses. Treatment almost always includes extensive re-evaluation of parental figures and efforts to modify the sway of sabotaging parental introjects. The intense nature of the transference relationship once it is established, together with the frangibility of the relationship, places great demands upon the therapist. It is a task for highly skilled therapists with specific experience and training in the field and will not be discussed here. The effectiveness of intensive psychotherapy with schizophrenic patients cannot be evaluated in statistical terms: the belief in its value derives from the excellent results obtained with a number of individuals and from the meaningfulness of the material gained in the process. Much depends on the specific therapist as well as on the specific patient. The aims of such work are directed in part toward the future—to increasing knowledge and improving techniques. [See CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY; MENTAL DISORDERS, TREATMENT OF, especially the article on PSYCHOLOGICAL TREATMENT; PSYCHIATRY.]
Family therapy. Recent advances in understanding of the pathology in the schizophrenic's family of origin have brought the family into the therapeutic efforts in a variety of ways. Social workers or psychiatrists have worked with parents individually or in groups to allay their anxiety and guilt; to counter the common tendency of parents to interfere v/ith or disrupt the patient's therapy; to modify the parents' attitudes toward each other as well as toward the patient; and to foster more
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direct and forthright communication. With some families a major effort is made to prevent exclusion of a hospitalized patient and withdrawal of interest in him and in others to help prevent disintegration of the family after the patient has been hospitalized. Conjoint family therapy in which parents and patient or the entire family are seen in group sessions has been found advantageous. The therapist has an opportunity to view directly the nature of the disturbed relationships and communications; the patient may gain a new perception of his parents and an appreciation of their limitations and idiosyncrasies; and other family members may recognize their own roles in provoking or continuing the patient's illness, gain insights concerning the family transactions, and begin to relate differently. Although some psychiatrists consider conjoint family therapy to be the optimal treatment procedure, others use it as an important adjunct to alternative therapeutic measures. Perspective The disagreements between virtually all schools of psychiatry concerning the nature and etiology of schizophrenia have interfered with the presentation of a coherent and cohesive approach to the problem. Although schizophrenia is traditionally considered a disease of unknown etiology, a great deal is now known about the developmental problems and the dynamic psychopathology of these patients and about the family environments that tend to produce them. Man is unique in the degree that his adaptation rests on a lengthy period of dependency upon parental figures during which he must assimilate the instrumental techniques of his culture to implement his inborn adaptive capacities. There are countless chances for misdirection, confusion, and conflict to arise in the process. The very mechanism that permits his inordinate adaptability contains a major vulnerability. He depends upon language and a coherent way of thinking to guide him into the future and on an ability to communicate to enable collaborative interaction. Yet linguistic meanings and a system of logic are not inborn but acquired as a means of problem solving by communication with others and by sorting out life experiences. How correctly meanings are learned and how firmly they become ingrained depend largely on the parental tutors—the consistency of their communications as an aid to problem solving and the emotional relationships between parents and child. There are countless ways in which the enculturation process can go wrong. When a person is caught in insoluble conflicts, when a path into the future is barred, when
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even regression serves little because the persons upon whom one could depend are distrusted or feared, there is still a way. One can alter the perception of his own needs and motives and those of others. One can abandon causal logic, change his internal representation of events, retreat to a period of childhood when reality gave way to fantasy, and cut off movement toward a realistic future; that is, one can become schizophrenic. This path is so clearly open to man, particularly to those who have had confused or confusing guides to follow into adulthood and have received poor foundations in meaning systems and reality testing, or who have actually been trained to irrational ways in childhood, that conditions such as schizophrenia must be expected as anomalies of the human developmental process. The acceptance of such a theory that schizophrenic reactions result from anomalous socialization processes and that the family forms the primary enculturating agency provides numerous guides for research and therapy, and it directs the psychiatrist toward increased collaboration with behavioral scientists. THEODORE LIDZ [Directly related are the entries MENTAL DISORDERS; PSYCHOSIS. Other relevant material may be found in MENTAL DISORDERS, TREATMENT OF; PSYCHIATRY; PSYCHOANALYSIS; and in the biographies of KRAEPELIN; MEYER; SULLIVAN.] BIBLIOGRAPHY ALANEN, Y. O. 1958 The Mothers of Schizophrenic Patients: A Study of the Personality and the MotherChild Relationship of 100 Mothers and the Significance of These Factors in the Pathogenesis of Schizophrenia in Comparison With Heredity. Acta psychiatrica scandinavica 33 (Supplement 124). ARIETI, SILVANO 1955 Interpretation of Schizophrenia. New York: Brunner. -» A readable and cogent presentation of a modern dynamic approach. BATESON, GREGORY et al. 1956 Toward a Theory of Schizophrenia. Behavioral Science 1:251-264. BELLAK, LEOPOLD (editor) 1958 Schizophrenia: A Review of the Syndrome. New York: Logos. -» Reviews work in the field between 1946 and 1956; contains 4,000 references. BLEULER, EUGEN (1911) 1950 Dementia Praecox: Or, the Group of Schizophrenias. New York: International Universities Press. -» Still an outstanding work on the topic. Includes an extensive bibliography to 1950. First published as "Dementia Praecox oder die Gruppe der Schizophrenien" in Aschaffenburg's Handbuch der Psychiatric. BRODY, EUGENE B.; and REDLICH, F. C. (editors) 1952 Psychotherapy With Schizophrenics. New York: International Universities Press. BROOKE, EILEEN M. 1959 National Statistics in the Epidemiology of Mental Illness. Journal of Mental Science 105:893-908. ->• Now called the British Journal of Psychiatry.
CAMERON, NORMAN A. 1938 Reasoning, Regression and Communication in Schizophrenics. Psychological Monographs. Vol. 50, no. 1. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University. -» A classic study of schizophrenic thinking. DELAY, JEAN; DENIKER, P.; and GREEN, A. 1957-1962 Le milieu familial des schizophrenes. 3 parts. Encephale 46:189-232; 49:1-21; 51:5-73. -» Part 1: Position du probleme, 1957. Part 2: Methodes d'approche, 1960. Part 3: Resultats et hypotheses, 1962. FREEMAN, THOMAS; CAMERON, JOHN L.; and McGniE, ANDREW 1958 Chronic Schizophrenia. New York: International Universities Press. FROMM-REICHMANN, FRIEDA 1948 Notes on the Development of Treatment of Schizophrenics by Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy. Psychiatry 11:263-273. HOCH, PAUL; and POLATIN, PHILLIP 1949 Pseudoneurotic Forms of Schizophrenia. Psychiatric Quarterly 23:248-276. HOFFER, ABRAM 1964 The Adrenochrome Theory of Schizophrenia: A Review. Diseases of the Nervous System 25:173-178. HOLLINGSHEAD, AUGUST B.; and REDLICH, F. C. 1958 Social Class and Mental Illness: A Community Study. New York: Wiley. JACKSON, DON D. (editor) 1960 The Etiology of Schizophrenia. New York: Basic Books. -» An excellent collection of papers on various contemporary theories. KASANIN, J. S. (editor) 1944 Language and Thought in Schizophrenia. Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press. -» Brief articles by various authorities that can serve as an introduction to the topic. KRINGLEN, EINAR 1964 Schizophrenia in Male Monozygotic Twins. Acta psychiatrica scandinavica 40 (Supplement 178):1-76. LANGFELDT, G. 1933 Some Points Regarding the Symptomatology and Diagnosis of Schizophrenia. Acta psychiatrica et neurologica scandinavica Supplement 80:7-26. -» Now called Acta psychiatrica scandinavica. LEMKAU, PAUL V.; and CROCETTI, GUIDO M. 1958 Vital Statistics of Schizophrenia. Pages 64-81 in Leopold Bellak (editor), Schizophrenia: A Review of the Syndrome. New York: Logos. LIDZ, THEODORE; FLECK, STEPHEN; and CORNELISON, ALICE R. 1965 Schizophrenia and the Family. New York: International Universities Press. -> Collected papers of an intensive study of the intrafamilial environment of schizophrenic patients. MEYER, ADOLF (1896-1937)1951 Collected Papers. Volume 2: Psychiatry. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. -> For the origins of the genetic-dynamic approach, see the chapters "Dementia Praecox" and "Paranoia" on pages 413-560. REES, W. LINFORD 1957 Physical Characteristics of the Schizophrenic Patient. Pages 1-14 in Derek Richter (editor), Schizophrenia: Somatic Aspects. London: Pergamon. Die Schizophrenic. 1932 Volume 9, special part 5 in Karl Wilmanns (editor), Handbuch der Geisteskrankheiten. Berlin: Springer. -» An authoritative source for the German approach in the Kraepelinian tradition. Contains an outstanding bibliography. SINGER, MARGARET T.; and WYNNE, LYMAN C. 1965a Thought Disorder and Family Relations of Schizophrenics: III. Methodology Using Protective Techniques. Archives of General Psychiatry 12:187—200. SINGER, MARGARET T.; and WYNNE, LYMAN C. 1965& Thought Disorder and Family Relations of Schizo-
SCHLESINGER, KARL phrenics: IV. Results and Implications. Archives of General Psychiatry 12:201-212. SULLIVAN, HARRY STACK (1924-1933) 1962 Schizophrenia as a Human Process. New York: Norton. Symposium international sur la psychotherapie de la schizophrenic. 1957 Acta psychotherapeutica, psychosomatica et orthopaedagogica 5:99-360. SYMPOSIUM ON SCHIZOPHRENIA, SAN FRANCISCO, 1958 1959 Schizophrenia: An Integrated Approach. Edited by Alfred Auerbach. New York: Ronald Press. TIENARI, P. 1963 Psychiatric Illnesses in Identical Twins. Acta psychiatrica scandinavica 39 (Supplement 171). -» The whole supplement is devoted to Tienari's study. WORLD CONGRESS OF PSYCHIATRY, SECOND, ZURICH, 1957 1959 Report. 4 vols. Zurich: Fiissli. WYNNE, LYMAN C.; and SINGER, MARGARET T. 1963 Thought Disorder and Family Relations of Schizophrenics. 2 parts. Archives of General Psychiatry 9: 191-206. -» Part 1: A Research Strategy. Part 2: A Classification of Forms of Thinking.
SCHLESINGER, KARL Karl Schlesinger (1889-1938) was bom in Budapest and died in Vienna, committing suicide on the day Hitler took possession of that city. (He had moved there after Bela Kun's 1919 communist revolution in Hungary.) A wealthy financier and a member of many industrial and financial boards, Schlesinger was one of the very few important contemporary theoretical economists who was not part of the academic world; he never held an academic post but was an active and highly respected member of the Vienna Economic Society. Although his contributions to economics were greatly appreciated in Vienna, his important early work of 1914, Theorie der Geld- und Kreditwirtschaft (see 1914a), was not readily available at the time he moved there; its direct influence upon Viennese monetary theory was less than might have been expected. In his 1914 book Schlesinger made extensive use of some simple mathematics, uncommon at that time in German economic writing, particularly in the field of monetary theory. His interest in mathematics led him to take instruction from A. Wald in the 1930s; he eventually proposed to Wald a problem relating to Walras' production equations. This problem concerned Schlesinger's modification of the Walras-Cassel system of production equations by introducing the notion that all factors of production—not only the scarce ones—have to be considered and that whether a factor is scarce or free depends on the demand functions. This led to Wald's famous work on the determinacy of the Walrasian system. [See ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM.] (Schlesinger acknowledged that Zeuthen had earlier
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suggested a similar modification without, however, following up the matter.) These problems were discussed in Karl Menger's mathematical colloquium under Menger's continuing and stimulating guidance. Schlesinger also contributed to Menger's work on the theory of returns. Schlesinger's Theorie der Geld- und Kreditwirtschaft made him the only immediate follower of Walras, other than Wicksell, to advance Walras' theory of money. Schlesinger stressed that in addition to the indirect utility of money derived from its ability ultimately to provide desired consumers' goods, cash balances also have a direct utility. He introduced a probabilistic approach to monetary theory by distinguishing between fixed and uncertain future due dates for payments; the former offer no choice, while the latter permit the individual to maximize utility by choosing appropriately between holding cash and purchasing goods. He further showed that if the number of transactions increases, it is possible to economize in the relative size of cash balances, although this will not be the case if only the magnitude of transactions increases. Schlesinger derived an excess demand equation for money that is virtually identical with the one commonly ascribed to Keynes. [See MONEY.] He also was probably the first to develop the notion of the equilibrium rate of interest [see INTEREST]. Schlesinger was one of the first economists to expound the purchasing power parity theory. In his pamphlet on the variations in the value of money (1916), he stated the theorem that the parity of a country's currency is determined by the quotient of the domestic and foreign general price levels. The equilibrium rate of exchange can only be changed if foreign borrowings are used to reduce the indebtedness of the bank of issue. In 1931 Schlesinger published a lengthy review of F. Somary's Bankpolitik (see 193la), in which he presented a detailed mathematical analysis of the theory of credit creation by commercial banks, incorporating this theory into the general process of circulation. Assuming there are n equal banks, that deposits require some cash reserve, and that each individual pays partly in cash and partly by check, Schlesinger analyzed the effects of introducing new metal or new bank notes into the system. He traced the path that credit expansion follows until equilibrium is reached and derived formulas for debtors, creditors, and the system as a whole. He also considered the flow of checks back to their starting point. Several of his restrictive assumptions can be relaxed, but the whole approach is an early model for careful, rigorous analysis of monetary operations. [See BANKING.]
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During the international financial crisis of the 1930s Schlesinger proposed that the Austrian government control capital movements, but he was strictly opposed to exchange control as then practiced. Schlesinger's most significant contributions were to monetary theory, but this work was widely neglected, which caused Schumpeter to comment that "in our field first-class performance is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for success" (1954, p. 1082, note 5). More recently, however, he has been given more credit, especially by V. Wagner and D. Patinkin. In addition to his analytical contributions to the numerous discussions about capital theory, business cycles, and general equilibrium theory conducted among economists in Vienna—frequently at odd hours in coffee houses —Schlesinger had important economic insights in which his great experience as a financier and administrator provided a valuable counterweight to his theoretical analysis. Thus, his considerable influence on Viennese economics was far greater than his few publications might indicate. OSKAR MORGENSTERN
[See also the biographies of WALD and WALRAS.] WORKS BY SCHLESINGER
1914a Theorie der Geld- und Kreditwirtschaft. Munich: Duncker & Humblot. (1914b) 1959 Basic Principles of the Money Economy. International Economic Papers 9:20-38. -» This is a partial translation of Theorie der Geld- und Kreditwirtschaft. 1916 Die Veranderungen des Geldwertes im Kriege. Vienna: Manz. 193la [A Book Review of] Bankpolitik, by Felix Somary. Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 66: 1-35. 1931i> Das "Raise!" der franzosischen Goldpolitik. Zeitschrift fur N ationalokonomie 2:387-407. 1935 Uber die Produktionsgleichungen der okonomischen Wertlehre. Ergebnisse eines mathematischen Kolloquiums 6:10-11. 1936 Ein Beitrag zu Mengers "Bemerkungen zu den Ertragsgesetzen." Zeitschrift fur N ationalokonomie 7: 398-400. SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
ELLIS, HOWARD S. 1934 German Monetary Theory, 1905-1933. Harvard Economic Studies, Vol. 44. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. MARGET, ARTHUR W. 1931 Leon Walras and the "Cashbalance Approach" to the Problem of the Value of Money. Journal of Political Economy 39:569-600. PATINKIN, DON (1956) 1965 Money, Interest, and Prices: An Integration of Monetary and Value Theory. 2d ed. New York: Harper. SCHUMPETER, JOSEPH A. (1954) 1960 History of Economic Analysis. Edited by E. B. Schumpeter. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.
WAGNER, VALENTIN F. 1937 Geschichte der Kredittheorien: Eine dogmenkritische Darstellung. Vienna: Springer.
SCHLICK, MORITZ Friedrich Albert Moritz Schlick (1882-1936), philosopher and epistemologist, was born in Berlin. He studied physics at Heidelberg and Lausanne and took his doctorate at Berlin under Max Planck with a dissertation on the physics of light. He then qualified himself for an academic post in philosophy and taught first at Rostock, then Kiel, and finally at Vienna from 1922 to 1936, where he occupied the chair in the philosophy of the inductive sciences, held earlier by Ernst Mach and Ludwig Boltzmann. Schlick became the leading figure of the so-called Vienna circle—a group of thinkers concerned with developing a scientific philosophy in opposition to the prevailing metaphysical orientation of German philosophical thought. After a brief but highly productive period this school was disrupted and scattered, first by Schlick's death on June 22, 1936 (he was murdered by a mentally disturbed former student), and then by the Nazi invasion of Austria in 1938. However, its influence continued and was strongly felt for another two decades, especially in English-speaking countries (where it became known as logical positivism), as a consequence of the emigration of some of its leading members and sympathizers, among them Rudolf Carnap, Hans Reichenbach, and the somewhat less closely connected Karl Popper. Although trained as a physicist and strongly motivated by the desire to bring philosophical clarity to the knowledge of nature and to render philosophy more scientific in method and results, Schlick was sensitive to the whole range of problems of knowledge, human existence, and values. He had a simple, clear style free of all technical jargon, rising on occasion to something like the level of poetry. His first book, Lebensweisheit (1908; "Wisdom of Life"), as the name indicates, was devoted to nonscientific issues, as was his last, Problems of Ethics (1930a), which, while largely an attempt to give an account of ethics from the causalexplanatory point of view, contains many profound observations on life and values. Aside from these two books and a small separately published essay on the meaning of life, Vom Sinn des Lebens (1927), Schlick's contributions to philosophy fall in the fields of the philosophy of science and epistemology.
SCHLICK, MORITZ He did not, however, concern himself with the philosophy of the social sciences; at least he published nothing dealing directly with its special problems (however, see Natur und Kultur). The most important of his ideas pertaining to this area are those that are contained in his ethical writings mentioned above. A few words will be said about them before we turn to his principal contributions dealing with knowledge as such. Moral philosophy Schlick distinguished sharply between cognition and experience. Reality is given to us in experience, but that experience is not itself knowledge. This distinction, between Erlebnis and Erkenntnis ("experience" and "cognition"), which plays so fundamental a role in his theory of knowledge, is no less important in his ethics and Lebensphilosophie. Thus, the moral philosopher seeks only to understand moral phenomena, moral conduct—not to guide or create them. The moralist, wise man, or prophet, on the other hand, is interested in the quality of life itself, seeks to enlighten men with respect to the good life, and thus has a practical, not theoretical, goal. As a moralist, Schlick taught that the good life is the life full, to the highest degree, of activity valued for its own sake. Activities valued in and for themselves are properly called play, and Schlick agreed with Schiller that man is truly man only when he plays. And, as youth is characteristically the time of play, the concept of "youth" is the clue to the meaning of life. Whenever man acts out of the joy in acting, apart from considerations of ends to be achieved, then he is, regardless of his age, youthful in the philosophical sense, and then his life is meaningful. "If we need a rule for life let it be: 'Preserve the spirit of youth!', for it is the meaning of life" (1927, p. 354). As a moral philosopher, Schlick viewed his task as that of explaining moral conduct, i.e., how it comes about that man does what is required of him by society, which is the moral lawgiver making demands upon him to act, even when such conformance might seem contrary to his own desires. Normative ethics—defining "the good," "what ought to be"—he considered as at most a preliminary to ethics. It is not the task or privilege of the moral philosopher to decide what society ought to mean by these terms but only to ascertain what it does mean. But this does not imply that the philosopher docilely accepts as good whatever society holds to be such; his task is to understand and explain norms, not to accept or reject them. Schlick's view was that society deems and calls good that which
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it supposes is beneficial to it—i.e., makes for its happiness—and it demands that its members act accordingly. The ultimate ethical norms, if such there be, are facts in human experience and, precisely because they are ultimate, they neither need nor admit of justification—a senseless requirement but one all too frequently made in the history of ethical thought. Schlick wrote that "even if ethics were a normative science it would not cease because of this to be a science of facts . . ." ([1930a] 1939, p. 21). According to Schlick, in a situation of choice a man selects that goal the idea of which at the time of choice is relatively more pleasure-tinged or less tinged with unpleasant feeling than the alternatives. Thus men can, and often do, knowingly choose goals that are in their realization unpleasant. In the long run, however, the motive pleasure is in turn affected by the realization pleasure in such a way that goals regularly found to be unpleasant upon achievement, whether because of their own nature or because of social sanctions, cease to be attractive. The combined effect of man's natural sympathy and of social sanctions is to make man identify his own happiness with that of his fellow men. Thus arises that close connection between virtue (moral conduct, i.e., altruism) and happiness, which explains why men act morally. Of possible interest to students of society is Schlick's analysis of the concept of "responsibility," which he thought should replace the traditional concept of so-called freedom of the will, a concept that in his view is irrelevant to ethics and based on a series of confusions, namely, between causality (determinism) and compulsion, indeterminism (chance) and freedom. That a man's actions are determined means only that they are predictable, not that they are coerced. " 'Compulsion' occurs where a man is prevented from realizing his natural desires. How could the rule according to which these natural desires arise itself be considered as 'compulsion'?" (ibid., p. 148). Morality and society are both concerned only with who is responsible for the acts they wish to discourage or encourage, and this influence would be impossible if acts were free in the sense of undetermined, i.e., uncaused. Philosophy of science and epistemology Schlick's work in the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of science dominated his scholarly career. It falls into two periods: one culminating in the publication of his chief work, Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre (1918), and another beginning with his move to Vienna in 1922 and ending with his death in 1936.
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Experience and knowledge. The most important single idea of Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre is that the experience of something (Erlebnis} is not the same as the knowledge of it (Erkenntnis). To know something is basically to recognize it, i.e., to find in it something already familiar. Schlick frequently made use of the pair of German terms kennen and erkennen to make this distinction; the former refers to being acquainted with something, the latter to recognizing it as an instance of something else. This recognition ranges from the simplest cases, such as finding a shade to be a certain color, to recognizing in the phenomena of light something governed (described) by the same laws as those governing electrical phenomena. The whole goal of knowledge as theory is to achieve conceptual unification, to discover identity amid diversity. This is a joy in itself, but in addition it gives man the power to master endlessly diverse phenomena with a minimum of basic concepts. Knowledge is correct description, a true statement or judgment. Contrary to the teaching of Kant, our knowledge is not confined to the realm of phenomena, what is sensibly given, but reaches over into the realm of "things-in-themselves," if by this term we refer to what is not phenomenon, not given in experience. For we can make true judgments about what we do not and cannot experience, as well as about what we can. Knowledge is symbolic, not intuitive. Such things-in-themselves are defined not in terms of experienced "content" but implicitly, in terms of their relational properties. To know something about such things is not to intuit their qualities but to be acquainted with the laws that describe their behavior. To be real is not to be simply an object of sensible intuition but rather to occupy a position in time. The moment it is shown that for any object the rules of some particular scientific discipline force us to grant it a definite time and place, its real existence is assured. Thus, the existence and nature of atoms, of fields of force, or of the experiences of other persons are vouched for by the laws that describe them correctly, enabling us to predict and control, not by their entering qualitatively into our experience. Physical space and time are not identical with their sensible (subjective) correlates (visual space is not Euclidean) but are known through the laws that describe them. Considerations of a similar nature were used by Schlick in his polemic against the phenomenalism and "positivism" of such thinkers as Hume, Avenarius, and Mach, whose doctrines he called the "immanence idea" and subjected to sustained and effective criticism.
Analysis and verification. Under the influence of Wittgenstein, with whom he was in close personal contact during his Vienna period, certain aspects of Schlick's thought underwent a gradual but appreciable shift of emphasis. Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy as the activity of clarifying meaning furnished Schlick with a clearer line of demarcation between philosophy and science, or positive knowledge: the former clarifies concepts and analyzes the meaning of statements, determining their experiential truth conditions; the latter seeks to verify them, determine their truth values. Philosophical activity constitutes the necessary precondition of science but does not itself put forth doctrines, does not take the form of a body of knowledge. It consists rather in those sometimes verbal acts by means of which meanings are "shown." The ultimate meanings of words and statements must be found in what is given in experience, in content. The great error of metaphysics has been the effort to express the inexpressible, the content of experience. Here again appears the main theme that knowledge is not mere awareness of the given but concerns its form or structure, which alone is capable of being expressed and communicated. Knowledge describes the relations which hold between the elements of content, their structure, and specifically, the laws connecting them. The meaning of a proposition is given by describing the experiential conditions under which it will be true and those under which it will be false, i.e., the conditions in the given that verify and falsify it. This meaning principle, the verifiability principle, plays the dominant role in the philosophical writings of Schlick's final period. Since all meaningful statements must be verifiable and falsifiable in the given, there are no limits to knowledge, for what transcends possible ascertainment does so by transcending significance itself. It does not follow from the verifiability that only the given exists. This doctrine is itself senseless, as is the opposite view that the given is unreal, mere appearance. "To be real always means to stand in a definite relationship to the given" ([1932] 1959, p. 99). It is in the given that we verify or falsify (strictly, confirm or disconfirm) statements about existence and reality by inferring, from the hypothesis that something exists, that certain experiences will be forthcoming consequent on certain tests or operations and then testing for the truth of these predictions. The laws on the basis of which we make these predictions are the true objects of science. "The subject matter of physics is not sensations but laws. The formulation, used by some positivists, that bodies are only
SCHLICK, MORITZ 'complexes of sensations' is therefore to be rejected. What is correct is only that propositions concerning bodies are transformable into equivalent propositions concerning the occurrence of sensations in accordance with laws" (ibid.., p. 107). Schlick, in keeping with his nontechnical manner of writing, did not always give very precise formulation to the verifiability principle. In general he distinguished between analytic (logical, necessary) and synthetic (empirical, contingent) statements. Only the latter, and not all of them, are propositions in the fullest sense of being verifiable and falsifiable. Analytic statements are limiting cases, necessary truths, not expressing possible states of the world but definitional, "grammatical" decisions or rules. The logical is the purely formal, the a priori; that there are no synthetic a priori truths is a central theme of his polemic against Kant and a view common to the school as a whole. Statements of laws—general hypotheses—not being strictly verifiable, are not genuine, fullfledged propositions but are treated as rules for making predictions, thus as heuristic principles. Since they are not even theoretically verifiable, the question constituting the problem of induction cannot arise, for laws are not propositions (true or false) whose truth values might be inferred from others. Induction is but a methodical kind of guessing about useful rules. The question of whether determinism is true, whether all events are related to others by regularities expressible in laws, is to be distinguished from the question of the nature of causality. The statement that determinism is true is not verifiable or falsifiable and hence is not a genuine proposition. As a guiding principle, however, determinism might be expressed by the precept "Seek causal laws!" A causal law is a formula enabling us to make successful predictions, given certain data. That it holds necessarily (universally), i.e., that determinism is true within a given domain, cannot be finally established or refuted, but we can find good empirical grounds for accepting or rejecting the view in particular cases. Despite his stress on verifiability and falsifiability, Schlick in fact considered all propositions formulated in daily life and science to be hypotheses, at best confirmable or disconfirmable but not strictly verifiable—at least from the point of view of ascertainment, if not of logical theory. The only contingent statements whose truth can be, in the strict sense, established are those that, on the moment of their utterance, report or announce the given (a here-now-thus) in experience. These confirmations (Konstatierungen, as he called them) consti-
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tute the ultimate connections between language and the world, "the unshakeable point of contact between knowledge and reality" ([1934] 1959, p. 226). All testing of other propositions is in terms of the data constituting the referents of these basic propositions, which immediately cease to have meaning when they lose contact with these referents. The propositions actually made use of in science and daily life are "a means of finding one's way among the facts; of arriving at the joy of confirmation . . ." (ibid., p. 226). The pragmatic nature of Schlick's concepts of knowledge and propositions is thus evident. Limits of knowledge. Since knowledge is of laws describing events and since content is incommunicable and cannot be expressed in propositions, we can know the nature of things only in terms of the laws that apply to them, laws that enable us to make successful predictions in the manner described above. The age-old problem of the relation of mind and body finds its solution here. Mind or, better, the mental is what obeys the qualitative laws of psychology; body, matter, or the physical is what obeys the quantitative laws of physics, which, in contrast to the (nonbehavioristic) laws of psychology, are intersensual and intersubjective. The problem of the connection of mind and body is thus the problem of the connection of the languages of psychology and physics. The as yet unestablished but not implausible hypothesis of physicalism (materialism freed of its metaphysical connotations) is that the qualitative aspects of experience (content) are correlated with certain physical, quantitative, measurable properties in such a way that from determination of the latter (brain states, nerve impulses, etc.) universally correct inferences could be made to the former; and in general that a complete description of the world can be made on the basis of physical concepts. If this should be correct, then the mental would be explained by the physical, would in a certain sense be the physical. That this is so we do not know, but the problem is insoluble and senseless if it requires explaining how extended substance, i.e., traditional "body," can interact with unextended substance—"mind." The mental is in any case often extended, for example, a pain can be spread over an area or occupy a place; hence the traditional problem disappears, to be replaced by one concerning the empirically determinable relation between certain kinds of propositions, not kinds of substances. And if solved, it will be solved by scientific experimentation and discovery, not by "philosophical" or metaphysical considerations. The reworking of his central ideas in the manner just illustrated—on the basis of his conception
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of knowledge as symbolic, essentially concerned with communication and expression, and of expression as dealing with form, not content—was the task that confronted Schlick when he was cut down so tragically in the prime of life. DAVID RYNIN [See also CAUSATION; ETHICS, article on ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND SOCIAL STRUCTURES; POSITIVISM; SCIENCE,
article on THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE.] WORKS BY SCHLICK 1908 Lebensweisheit. Munich: Beck. (1917) 1920 Space and Time in Contemporary Physics. Oxford: Clarendon. -» First published in German. (1918) 1925 Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre. 2d ed. Berlin: Springer. 1927 Vom Sinn des Lebens. Sonderdrucke des Symposion, Heft 6. Berlin: Weltkreis-Verlag. (1930a) 1939 Problems of Ethics. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. -» First published in German. A paperback edition was published in 1962 by Dover. (1930Z?) 1959 The Turning Point in Philosophy. Pages 53-59 in A. J. Ayer (editor), Logical Positivism. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. -> First published as "Die Wende der Philosophic" in Volume 1 of Erkenntnis. (1931) 1961-1962 Causality in Contemporary Physics. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 12, no. 47:177-178; no. 48:281-298. -> First published in German. (1932) 1959 Positivism and Realism. Pages 82-107 in A. J. Ayer (editor), Logical Positivism. Glencoe, IllFree Press. -» First published in German in Volume 3 of Erkenntnis. (1934) 1959 The Foundation of Knowledge. Pages 209227 in A. J. Ayer (editor), Logical Positivism. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. -» First published in German in Volume 4 of Erkenntnis. Aphorismen. Edited by Blanche Hardy Schlick. Vienna: Privately published, 1962. -» Published posthumously. Gesammelte Aufsatze: 1926-1936. Vienna: Gerold, 1938. -» Chapters 6, 7, 8, 14, and 15 were written in English. An abridged edition was published in 1948 as Gesetz, Kausalitdt und Wahrscheinlichkeit. Natur und Kultur. Edited by Josef Rauscher. Vienna and Stuttgart: Humboldt, 1952. -> Published posthumously. Philosophy of Nature. New York: Philosophical Library, 1949. -» First published posthumously in German in 1938. SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY FEIGL, HERBERT 1937/1938 Moritz Schlick. Erkenntnis 7:393-419. KRAFT, VICTOR (1950) 1953 The Vienna Circle: The Origin of Neo-positivism; a Chapter in the History of Recent Philosophy. New York: Philosophical Library. ->• First published in German.
SCHMIDT, WILHELM Wilhelm Schmidt was born in 1868 in Horde, Westphalia, and died in 1954 in Fribourg, Switzerland. He joined the Divine Word Missionaries (Societas Verbi Divini, or S.V.D.) in 1883 and
was ordained a priest in 1892. From 1893 to 1895 he studied at the University of Berlin, majoring in Oriental languages; he was appointed professor in the St. Gabriel Mission Seminary at Modling, near Vienna, in 1895 and remained there until 1938. He also taught at the University of Vienna, beginning in 1921, and after he left Austria, he taught at the University of Fribourg from 1939 to 1951. He founded the periodical Anthropos in 1906, was director of the Museo Missionario-Etnologico Lateranense in Rome from 1927 to 1939, and was director of the Anthropos Institut at St. Augustin near Bonn from 1932 to 1950. Early in his career, Schmidt was very interested in linguistic studies, but later he turned increasingly to studies in ethnology and the science of religion. The impetus to his work in these latter fields came from his philosophical, theological, and linguistic training and from the observations made by S.V.D. missionaries, especially in New Guinea and Togo. He was influenced as well by the folklorist Andrew Lang, by the Indologist Leopold von Schroder, and by the ethnologists Friedrich Ratzel, Leo Frobenius, Ernst Grosse, C. N. Starcke, Alfred Vierkandt, Edward Westermarck, Franz Boas, and, above all, by Fritz Graebner and his theories of Kulturkreise. In his studies of the evolution and forms of the family, Schmidt followed Grosse in correlating family types with economic activities. He refined Graebner's theory of Kulturkreise, which differentiated between matrilineal and patrilineal societies, seeking to explain their origins on the basis of subsistence patterns; thus, food planters would be matrilineal in descent and residency rules, while nomads would be patrilineal. He agreed with others, such as Havelock Ellis and Westermarck, in offering psychological explanations for exogamy. Also, his arrangements of traits in Kulturkreise are frequently in accord with functionalist ideas (although he did not want to be associated with "functionalism"—see 1944 for his violent criticism of functionalism). Thus totemism is identified with clan exogamy, in contrast with the consanguineal basis of local exogamy; education is linked to initiation ceremonies, which are usually obligatory for all the young men of the tribe, rather than to secret societies, which often constitute an elite and have special requirements for admission. Schmidt was concerned with the variability of individuals and their relationship to society. He asserted that the individual, even among primitives, exerts an influence on the institutions of his community. In his 12-volume work, Der Ursprung der Gottes-
SCHMIDT, WILHELM idee (1912-1955), he made use of extensive material supporting the theory that the Supreme Being occupied a position so superior (compared with spirits and other beings of religious significance) in the religion of primitive hunters and gatherers that this religion may properly be considered monotheistic. Subsequently, such monotheism persisted especially in nomadic pastoral civilizations, while in the Kulturkreise of the matrilineal agricultural peoples and the more advanced totemic hunting cultures, the figure of the Supreme Being was stifled or supplanted by other religious elements, e.g., fertility cults, ancestor worship, magic. Totemism itself was regarded by Schmidt as essentially social; he particularly stressed its significance for clan exogamy. Although totemism does imply a certain reverence for the totem animal, Schmidt did not consider it a religious phenomenon—an actual animal cult. From the time that Schmidt became familiar with Graebner's concept of Kulturkreise (Graebner believed that he established such Kulturkreise for Oceania, including Australia), this concept exerted an influence on his linguistic work. He tried to show that when Australian languages are classified, different groups coincide with totemistic and matrilineal cultures respectively. Furthermore, he attributed certain linguistic phenomena to economic and social change: thus, he felt that the change to uxorilocal residence and the ownership of land by women might result in the learning of a foreign tongue by the men, and thus contribute to the disintegration of the language. Indeed, Schmidt made an even more comprehensive attempt to relate all aspects of linguistic evolution to general cultural evolution, to explain the former largely in terms of the latter, and to set up parallels between linguistic areas and Kulturkreise. Schmidt's influence was far-reaching, especially in the German- and English-speaking regions of the world, where his journal Anthropos was a repository of field data collected by missionaries around the world. Schmidt was also concerned that his findings have a practical application to colonial policy and missionary practice. Many of his publications, especially those dealing with family and social ethics, were addressed to a public wider than the academic one. JOSEPH HENNINGER [For the historical context of Schmidt's work, see ANTHROPOLOGY; and the biographies of BOAS; ELLIS; FROBENIUS; GRAEBNER; RATZEL; WES TERM ARCK. For discussion of the subsequent development of Schmidt's ideas, see HISTORY, article on CULTURE HISTORY; LINGUISTICS, article on HISTORICAL LINGUISTICS; and the biography of KOPPERS.]
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1906 Die moderne Ethnologie; L'ethnologie moderne. Anthropos 1:134-163, 318-387, 592-643, 950-997. 1908-1910 L'origine de 1'idee de Dieu. Anthropos 3:125162, 336-368, 559-611, 801-836, 1081-1120; 4:207250, 505-524, 1075-1091; 5:231-246. -» A revised German version appeared in book form in 1912 as Volume 1 of Der Ursprung der Gottesidee. 1910 Die Stellung der Pygmaenvolker in der Entwicklungsgeschichte des Menschen. Studien und Forschungen zur Menschen- und Volkerkunde, Vols. 6-7. Stuttgart (Germany): Strecker & Schroder. 1912-1955 Der Ursprung der Gottesidee: Fine historischkritische und positive Studie. 12 vols. Miinster in Westfalen (Germany): Aschendorff. -> A second edition of Volume 1 appeared in 1926. 1924 SCHMIDT, WILHELM; and KOPPERS, WILHELM Volker und Kulturen. Regensburg (Germany): Habbel. (1925) 1964 Familie. Pages 13-42 in Wilhelm Schmidt, Wege der Kulturen: Gesammelte Aufsdtze. Anthropos Institut, Studia, Vol. 20. St. Augustin bei Bonn (Germany): Verlag des Anthropos-Instituts. -» First published in the Handworterbuch der Staatswissenschaften. 1926 Die Sprachfamilien und Sprachenkreise der Erde. Heidelberg (Germany): Winter. (1927) 1946-1949 Rassen und Volker in Vorgeschichte und Geschichte des Abendlandes. 3d ed. 3 vols. Lucerne (Switzerland): Stocker. -> First published as Rasse und Volk. 1930 Handbuch der vergleichenden Religionsgeschichte zum Gebrauch fur Vorlesungen an Universitdten, Seminaren usw. und zum Selbststudium: Ursprung und Werden der Religion. Theorien und Tatsachen. Miinster in Westfalen (Germany): Aschendorff. 1935 The Position of Women With Regard to Property in Primitive Society. American Anthropologist New Series 37:244-256. (1937) 1939 The Culture Historical Metbod of Ethnology: The Scientific Approach to the Racial Question. New York: Fortuny. -> First published as Handbuch der Methode der kultur-historischen Ethnologie. 1937-1942 Das Eigentum auf den dltesten Stufen der Menschheit. 3 vols. Miinster in Westfalen (Germany): Aschendorff. 1944 Untersuchungen zur Methode der Ethnologie. Anthropos 35/36:898-965. 1952 Entstehung der Verwandtschaftssysteme und Heiratsregelungen. Anthropos 47:767-783. 1955 Das Mutterrecht. Anthropos Institut, Studia, Vol. 10. Vienna: Missionsdruckerei St. Gabriel. -» Published posthumously. Wege der Kulturen: Gesammelte Aufsdtze. Anthropos Institut, Studia, Vol. 20. St. Augustin bei Bonn (Germany): Verlag des Anthropos-Instituts, 1964. SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BAUMANN, HERMANN 1958 P. Wilhelm Schmidt und Das Mutterrecht. Anthropos 53:212-228. BORNEMANN, FRITZ. 1954 Verzeichnis der Schriften von P. W. Schmidt, S.V.D. (1868-1954). Anthropos 49: 397-432. BORNEMANN, FRITZ 1956 P. W. Schmidts Studien iiber den Totemismus in Asien und Ozeanien. Anthropos 51:595-734. BORNEMANN, FRITZ 1958 P. W. Schmidts Studien iiber den Totemismus in Afrika. Anthropos 53:945-1003.
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BURGMANN, ARNOLD (1954) 1966 P. W. Schmidt als Linguist. Volume 2, pages 287-328 in Portraits of Linguists: A Biographical Source Book for the History of Western Linguistics, 1746-1963. Edited by Thomas A. Sebeok. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press. -* First published in Volume 49 of Anthropos. Festschrift: Publication d'hommage offerte au P. W. Schmidt. Edited by Wilhelm Koppers. 1928 Vienna: Missionsdruckerei St. Gabriel. HENNINGER, JOSEPH 1956 P. Wilhelm Schmidt, S.V.D. (1868—1954): Eine biographische Skizze. Anthropos 51:19-60. SEMAINE D'ETHNOLOGIE RELIGIEUSE Comptes rendus. -> Proceedings of meetings held between 1912 and 1929; published in 5 volumes between 1913 and 1930.
SCHMITT, CARL Carl Schmitt, German political theorist, was born in 1888 in Plettenberg in Westphalia. He studied law and obtained his habilitation for public law at Strasbourg in 1916. His subsequent academic career was a successful one: he taught at Greifswald from 1921 to 1922; at Bonn from 1922 to 1928; at Berlin from 1928 until early in 1933; at Cologne during the year 1933; and again at Berlin, from the beginning of the academic year 1933/1934 until 1945. Schmitt is an important representative of a school of thought in German public law which, after World War i, turned away from the German tradition of legal positivism and tried to broaden the scientific study of law and legal institutions by introducing into it historical, sociological, and political considerations. Accordingly, his publications cover a wide variety of subjects: the relationship between written law and judicial decision making, the romantic movement in political thinking during the early nineteenth century, and the history of dictatorship as a political idea and as an institution. He developed a systematic theory of constitutional law and made the history of European public law an object of philosophical investigation. He studied particular issues of constitutional, international, and martial law, and he engaged in polemics over the actual political situation in Germany. Schmitt's participation in the antiliberal intellectual and political movement in Germany did not preclude his making significant contributions to political science. Observing the importance of arbitrary decisions both in the process of adjudication and in systematic jurisprudence, he established the concept of Dezisionismus to designate the fact that any legal order is ultimately based on sovereign decisions. These decisions are based not on positive norms but on the ultima ratio of emergency
decrees [see POLITICAL JUSTICE]. Schmitt traced this philosophy back to Hobbes's doctrine that auctoritas non veritas facit legem (laws are based on authority rather than truth), as well as to what he called the political theology of de Maistre, Bonald, Donoso Cortes, and other counterrevolutionary thinkers. Schmitt believed that the decisionistic method of looking for extreme and critical cases would lead to a new concrete way of thinking about the political order and political action (konkretes Ordnungs- und Gestaltungsdenken). However, the decisionistic method became more than an approach to political phenomena: Schmitt's preoccupation with the "extreme cases," as well as with the counterrevolutionary thinkers' pessimistic view of man, led him to convert the decisionistic method into a moral interpretation of politics and history that, in the turbulent situation in German politics between the two world wars, was to serve as a political ideology. Schmitt defined politics as emerging from the friend-foe constellations that challenge the polity to distinguish between allies and enemies; friendfoe constellations arise in the situations in which civil war or war between states has to be considered an immediate possibility. All human groups, whether of economic, religious, or ethnic origin, may enter into extreme conflicts. The state, therefore, is valued because it is the institution which protects its citizens against the enemy within and without. Schmitt considered this defensive and repressive function of the state to be the precondition and the guarantee of all law and order in human affairs. He interpreted the modern history of continental Europe as a development from the absolute state of the eighteenth century, through the neutral state of the nineteenth, to the total state of the twentieth [see TOTALITARIANISM]. This total state would overcome the neutralization of political power and the cleavage between the state and sqciety that had resulted from nineteenth-century liberalism. Liberalism and democracy were, in Schmitt's view, incompatible political principles, and the institutions of parliamentary government, once based on genuine political discussion and on the efficient functioning of public opinion, had, in twentieth-century mass society, lost their raison d'etre and their legitimacy. The Weimar Republic was, according to Schmitt, a distorted version of what he called a parlamentarischer Gesetzgebungsstaat, a distortion which he attributed to the waning of the nation's political homogeneity, which he considered to be caused in turn by the anarchical pluralism of incompatible political forces. Schmitt did not believe that Germany under the Weimar Republic could become
SCHMITT, CARL politically integrated. He therefore defended the National Socialists' seizure of power as a way of regaining the authority necessary to restore substantive justice. Thus he provided the ideological justification of a new German constitution. Based on the defense of national and racial homogeneity (Artgleichheit^), and guided by the principles of leadership and loyalty, Germany should be rebuilt as a threefold totality comprising (1) a bureaucratic apparatus that included the judiciary, (2) a one-party political movement, and (3) a politically neutralized sphere of professional and communal administration ( Selbstverwaltung ). In matters of international law, Schmitt criticized all global constructions of international legal order and defended a European Monroe Doctrine based on German hegemony. He distrusted concepts of international legal order because they could be used to justify imperialism and illegitimate imperialist intervention in the affairs of foreign states. He also deplored political universalism, because it produced a concept of warfare according to which both the enemy's state and its citizens could be prosecuted as criminals (the difference between the enemy and a criminal being blurred). [See INTERNATIONAL CRIMES.] As Germany approached defeat in World War n, Schmitt tried to discover what historical conditions had once enabled the European states to distinguish between an enemy and a criminal and to conduct war as an honorable duel between honorable adversaries. He believed he had found those conditions in a so-called Nomos der Erde, which originally had been shaped by the jus publicum europaeum. Schmitt believed that this Nomos could be found in a special geopolitical order, based on the division of the world into different areas of influence, dominated by the great European powers. These powers would recognize each other as independent sovereignties united by a common civilization of martial law. Schmitt compared his own role under the Nazi regime to that of Benito Cereno in Herman Melville's story, who, after a mutiny on his slave ship had succeeded, served under the victors as a pirate, unable to disentangle himself from a situation in which protection was contingent on obedience. Schmitt's teaching, however, was often very near to the "mutinous" ideology which destroyed the Weimar Republic and helped the Nazi movement gain power. Yet by making the character of enmity, among citizens as well as nations, the crucial theme of systematic jurisprudence and political thinking, Schmitt created a new awareness of important problems. JiJRGEN FlJALKOWSKI
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[For the historical context of Schmitt's work, see CRISIS
GOVERNMENT;
DELEGATION
OF
POWERS;
LEGITIMACY; NATIONAL SOCIALISM. Other related material may be found under JURISPRUDENCE; POLITICAL SCIENCE.] WORKS BY SCHMITT 1912 Gesetz und Urteil. Berlin: Liebmann. (1919) 1925 Politische Romantik. 2d ed. Munich: Duncker & Humblot. (1921) 1928 Die Diktatur: Von den Anfdngen des modernen Souverdnitdtsgedankens bis zum proletarischen Klassenkampf. 2d ed. Munich and Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. (1922) 1934 Politische Theologie. 2d ed. Munich: Duncker & Humblot. (1923) 1961 Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus. 3d ed. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. 1926 Die Kernfrage des Volkerbundes. Berlin: Diimmler. (1927a) 1963 Der Begriff des Politischen. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. 1927& Volksentscheid und Volksbegehren. Berlin: Gruyter. (1928) 1957 Verfassungslehre. 3d ed. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. 1931 Der Hilter der Verfassung. Tubingen: Mohr. 1932 Legalitdt und Legitimitdt. Munich and Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. 1933 Staat, Bewegung, Volk. Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt. 1934a Staatsgefiige und Zusammenbruch des zweiten Reiches: Der Sieg des Burgers iiber den Soldaten. Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt. 1934£> Uber die drei Arten des rechtswissenschaftlichen Denkens. Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt. 1938a Der Leviathan in der Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes. Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt. 1938i> Die Wendung zum diskriminierenden Kriegsbegriff. Munich: Duncker & Humblot. 1939 Volkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung, mil Interventionsverbot fur raumfremde Mdchte. Berlin: Deutscher Rechtsverlag. 1940 Positionen und Begriffe im Kampf mit WeimarGenf-Versailles, 1923-1939. Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt. (1942) 1944 Land und Meer. Leipzig: Reclam. 1950a Donoso Cortes in gesamteuropdischer Interpretation. Cologne: Greven. 1950fo Ex captivitate salus: Erfahrungen der Zeit 1945/47. Cologne: Greven. 1950c Der Nomos der Erde im Volkerrecht des Jus publicum Europaeum. Cologne: Greven. 1963 Theorie des Partisanen: Zwischenbemerkung zum Begriff des Politischen. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsdtze aus den Jahren 1924-1954: Materialien zu einer VerfassungsleJire. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1958. -> Essays originally published between 1924 and 1954, with commentaries by Schmitt on his own earlier articles. SUPPLEMENTARY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BARION, HANS; FORSTHOFF, E.; and WEBER, W. (editors) 1959 Festschrift fur Carl Schmitt zum 70. Geburtstag. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. -» Contains a comprehensive bibliography of Schmitt's works and of works about Schmitt, compiled by Piet Tomissen. FIJALKOWSKI, JURGEN 1958 Die Wendung zum Filhrerstaat: Ideologische Komponenten in der politischen Philosophic Carl Schmitts. Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag.
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FIJALKOWSKI, JURGEN 1965 Das politische Problem der Feindschaft. Politische Vierteljahresschrift 6:105-111. HOFMANN, HASSO 1964 Legitimitdt gegen Legalitdt: Der Weg der politischen Philosophic Carl Schmitts. Neuwied (Germany): Luchterhand. KROCKOW, CHRISTIAN 1958 Die Entscheidung: Eine Untersuchung iiber Ernst Jiinger, Carl Schmitt, Martin Heidegger. Stuttgart: Enke. KRUPA, HANS 1937 Carl Schmitts Theorie des "Politischen," mit einem Verzeichnis der Schriften Carl Schmitts, Leipzig: Hirzel. SCHMIDT, HERMANN 1963 Der Nomosbegriff bei Carl Schmitt. Staat 2:81-108. SCHMITZ, MATHIAS 1965 Die Freund-Feind-Theorie [in der politischen Philosophic] Carl Schmitts. Cologne and Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. SCHNEIDER, PETER 1957 Ausnahmezustand und Norm: Eine Studie zur Rechtslehre von Carl Schmitt. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt. WOHLGEMUTH, HEiNRicH 1933 Das Wesen des Politischen in der heutigen neoromantischen Staatslehre: Ein methodenkritischer Beitrag zu seiner Begriffsbildung. Emmendingen: Dolter.
SCHMOLLER, GUSTAV Gustav Schmoller (1838-1917), German economist, came from a family of Wiirttemberg civil servants, and he began his own career in the financial department of the Wiirttemberg civil service. This experience gave him practical insights into the administration of a territory with a strong cameralist tradition and may have shaped his belief in the close interrelations between the economy and the government. At the University of Tubingen Schmoller studied Staatswissenschaften, a peculiarly German discipline derived from cameralism, which combines public finance, statistics, economics, administrative science, history, and even sociology. Later he became professor of Staatswissenschaften at the universities of Halle, 18641872; Strassburg, 1872-1882; and finally Berlin, 1882-1913. In the early 1860s Schmoller defended the commercial treaty between France and the German Zollverein. Since he was supporting the point of view of the Prussian government against that of Wiirttemberg, he ruined his career in Wiirttemberg but gained favor with the Prussian authorities. In the Wilhelmian period, Schmoller became one of the most ardent Prussian patriots. He was appointed the official historian of Brandenburg and Prussia in 1887, became a member of the Prussian Staatsrat (state council) in 1884, and the representative of the University of Berlin in the Herrenhaus (upper house) in 1889. He was also a member of several academies (Berlin, Munich, St. Petersburg, Copenhagen, Vienna, and Rome) and
the recipient of honorary degrees from Breslau and Heidelberg. As founder and leader of the Verein fur Sozialpolitik, the association of German academic economists, and as editor or coeditor of several series of publications (Staats- und sozialwissenschaftliche Forschungen, from 1879; Jahrbuch fur Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reiche—later known simply as Schmollers Jahrbuch—from 1881; Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preussischen Geschichte, from 1888; and Acta borussica, from 1892) he became one of the first great organizers of research in the social sciences. Thus, he dominated the development of economics and of related social sciences in his country; for several decades, hardly a chair of economics was filled without his approval. He and his followers were called the "younger historical school" because their methodological approach was derived from, but also differed from, the approach of the "older historical school" of Roscher, Hildebrand, and Knies [see ECONOMIC THOUGHT]; they were also called the Kathedersozialisten (most nearly translated as academic socialists) because of their sociopolitical aims and were able to influence contemporary social legislation, since Schmoller was close to many high civil servants and to the crown. In his political activities, Schmoller may be called a conservative social reformer. He was a royalist, favored strong government, and displayed the highest respect for the Prussian civil service; but he was also deeply preoccupied with the "social question," the improvement of the condition of the lower classes. He believed that a variety of means should be used to solve this problem: better education of the working classes; governmental regulation of working conditions; cooperatives; and changes in the law, in institutions, and in the attitudes of the ruling classes. He was hostile both to Manchesterism and to Marxism, but he was open to all kinds of reforms that would produce more "social justice," a concept central to his thinking. Contributions to the social sciences. Schmoller's interests embraced history, applied statistics, economic and social institutions and behavior (including social psychology), social anthropology, geography, demography, the theory and practice of economic and social policy, and even ethics and philosophy, but he regarded himself primarily as an economist. His voluminous Grundriss (19001904), comparable in scope, though not in method, to Alfred Marshall's Principles, assembled pieces of all these social sciences into a great mosaic or panorama of the social world, past and present.
SCHMOLLER, GUSTAV The only thing the work lacked was an analytical framework to hold the pieces together. Although Schmoller often claimed to have such a framework, he was basically eclectic. Schmoller's rejection of analytical theory of the Smith-Ricardo type was of the utmost importance for his own thinking and for the development of economics in Germany under his "regime." He believed classical analysis to be useless or at best of minor importance, since it is applicable only to very small and artificially isolated fragments of the social reality that he wanted to perceive in all its many facets. It is not true, as many have asserted and as the term "historical school" suggests, that he wanted to replace analytical theory with purely historical research, but he was convinced that a genuine theory can only be the final outcome of an immense amount of descriptive work on past as well as present events, institutions, and structures. His conception of theory is the central defect in his thought and accounts for most of the weaknesses in his own works and in those inspired by him. It is difficult to decide whether he was led to this position by his inability to grasp the nature of theory or by his ethical disapproval of liberal economic doctrines, which he scorned as "business economics." Reception of Schmoller. Schmoller's view of theory was attacked in 1883 by the Viennese professor Carl Menger, who wrote a treatise on method in the social sciences, Problems of Economics and Sociology (Untersuchungen iiber die Methode der Socialwissenschaften und der politischen Oekonomie msbesondere). Schmoller replied in his Jahrbuch (1883), and Menger renewed the attack in the pamphlet Die Irrihumer des Historismus in der deutschen Nationalokonomie (1884), "which fairly steamed with wrath and of course elicited rebuttal" (Schumpeter 1954, p. 814). This famous Methodenstreit dominated the economic and social sciences in Germany for at least two generations. There can be little doubt that logically Menger was in a far better position. What he advocated as the appropriate methodology for economics was the use of the partial-equilibrium models that have since become the common method of theorists in most parts of the world. Nevertheless, Schmoller was not entirely wrong when he favored a much broader and more differentiated approach. He wanted to grasp all at once what has since become the object of many different branches of the social sciences. As a consequence, he touched on many important things, but often only superficially and seldom with clear insight about the implications of his observations and judgments. He was attacked
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not only by theoretical economists but also by professional historians, such as Georg von Below (1904). Interestingly enough, both the theorists and the historians had basically the same objections to the Schmollerian type of social science: both missed a coherent and systematic approach. The issue, then, was not simply one of theory against history, but of how research in the social sciences ought best to be done. Although Schmoller often stated that his method alone was an "exact" one, even his friends and students agreed that he wrote without precision. The very qualities of Schmoller's work that were criticized in the academic community won him a broad public audience. He took up many urgent issues of the day, examined them from different points of view, and came to general conclusions that many people could agree with. This made him an effective leader of public discussion and a popular, though not a brilliant, academic lecturer. He was at his best when dealing with those issues of social policy (Sozialpolitik*) that urgently required compromise. In political debates he exhibited a considerable amount of personal commitment and civic courage, fighting against aggressive social conservatism (e.g. Treitschke 1875) as well as against the revolutionary position of Lassalle and Marx and their followers. In these debates he made plain his belief in the necessity of more social justice. However, he did not distinguish clearly between the value judgments he made in political debates and the axioms of his scientific thought. This led to another methodological attack on Schmoller, led by Max Weber and Werner Sombart, to eliminate value judgments from the social sciences (see Weber 1910; Sombart 1910). An appraisal of Schmoller. Given his many weaknesses, one asks what made Schmoller the leader of German social scientists during the Wilhelmian period. Undoubtedly, others were stronger as theorists, as historians, or as sociologists. However, except for Max Weber, who was much younger, no one was quite as universal as Schmoller. Moreover, no one combined so many of the personal qualities of a leader: he was charming but dictatorial; confident in his views but able and willing to accept ideas; basically simple in his thinking but with a broad outlook; fully committed to sharply defined positions but prepared to compromise. Much of his influence appears to derive from his ability to express the leading ideas of his time. He swam with the stream of contemporary opinion, not against it, as is obvious in his views on foreign affairs, on which he had no ideas of his own but shared the nationalistic, imperialistic,
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even chauvinistic outlook of the German elite. When the tide of sentiment and opinion turned, shortly after his death in 1917, his views were quickly outdated, and people began to wonder how he could ever have been the great leader he certainly was. His influence on the development of the social sciences in Germany was, on the whole, rather unfortunate. He is mainly responsible for the neglect of economic theory in Germany between 1870 and 1920, and he can be made indirectly responsible for the extreme reaction that produced the subsequent neglect of economic history in twentieth-century Germany. In his attempt to construct a theory mainly by historical methods, he damaged both theory and history, and hampered their development in Germany for nearly a century. Outside Germany, his influence was never considerable, although American institutional economics was based partly on his ideas. WOLFRAM FISCHER WORKS BY SCHMOLLER
1870
Zur Geschichte der deutschen Kleingeiuerbe im 19. Jahrhundert: Statistische und nationalokonomische Untersuchungen. Halle: Waisenhaus. (1874-1875) 1875 Uber einige Grundfragen des Rechts und der Volkswirthschaft: Ein offenes Sendschreiben an Herrn Professor Dr. Heinrich von Treitschke. Jena: Mauke. -» First published in Volumes 23 and 24 of Jahrbiicher filr Nationalokonomie und Statistik. (1874-1897) 1904 Uber einige Grundfragen der Sozialpolitik und der Volkswirtschaftslehre. 2d ed., enl. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. 1879 Die Strassburger Tucher- und Weberzunft; Urkunden und Darstellungen nebst Regesten und Glossar: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der deutschen Weberei und des deutschen Gewerberechts vom XIII.-XVII. Jahrhundert. Strassburg: Triibner. 1883 Zur Methodologie der Staats- und Sozialwissenschaften. Jahrbuch filr Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reiche 7:975-994. 1897 Wechselnde Theorien und feststehende Wahrheiten im Gebiete der Staats- und Socialwissenschaften und die heutige deutsche Volkswirthschaftslehre. Berlin: Biixenstein. 1898 Umrisse und Untersuchungen zur Verfassungs-, Verwaltungs- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte besonders des preussischen Staates im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. (1900-1904) 1923 Grundriss der allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftslehre. 2d ed. 2 vols. Munich and Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. 1913 Charakterbilder. 2 vols. Munich and Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. -> A collection of biographical essays, including those on Adam Smith, Friedrich List, Adolf Wagner, and Georg F. Knapp. 1918 Die soziale Frage, Klassenbildung, Arbeiterfrage, Klassenkampf. Edited by Luzie Schmoller. Munich and Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. -» Published posthumously. A revised and augmented edition of the
sociological chapters contained in Schmoller's Grundriss der allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftslehre, 1900—1904. 1921 Preussische Verfassungs-, Verwaltungs- und Finanzgeschichte. Berlin: Tagliche Rundschau. -* Published posthumously. 1922 Deutsches Stddtewesen in alterer Zeit. Bonner Staatswissenschaftliche Untersuchungen, No. 3. Bonn and Leipzig: Schroder. -» Published posthumously. Zur Litteraturgeschichte der Staats- und Sozialwissenschaften. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1888. -> A collection of articles dated 1863-1883. Zur Social- und Gewerbepolitik der Gegenwart (Reden und Aufsdtze). Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1890. -> A collection of articles dated 1872-1890. Zwanzig Jahre deutscher Politik (1897-1917): Aufsdtze und Vortrdge. Munich and Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1920. -» Published posthumously. SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BELOW, GEORG VON 1904 Zur Wiirdigung der historischen Schule der Nationalokonomie. Zeitschrift fur Sozialwissenschaft 7:145-185, 787-804. BELOW, GEORG VON 1924 Zur Stellung G. Schmollers in der Geschichte der Nationalokonomie. Schmollers Jahrbuch fur Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reiche 48:315-319. BIERMANN, WILHELM E. (editor) 1922 Briefwechsel zwischen Wilhelm Roscher und Gustav Schmoller. Greifswald: Bamberg. -» Letters dated 1861-1881. BRINKMANN, CARL 1937 Gustav Schmoller und die Volkswirtschaftslehre. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. BRINKMANN, CARL 1953 Gustav Schmoller. Volume 9, pages 135—137 in Handworterbuch der Sozialwissenschaften. Stuttgart: Fischer. EUCKEN, WALTER 1940 Wissenschaft im Stile Schmollers. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 52:468-506. GIDE, CHARLES; and RIST, CHARLES (1909) 1948 A History of Economic Doctrines From the Time of the Physiocrats to the Present Day. 2d English ed. Boston: Heath. -» First published in French. HERBST, JURGEN 1965 The German Historical School in American Scholarship: A Study in the Transfer of Culture. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press. HERKNER, HEINRICH 1924 Zur Stellung G. Schmollers in der Geschichte der Nationalokonomie. Schmollers Jahrbuch fur Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reiche 47:3-10. HINTZE, OTTO 1908 Gustav Schmoller als Historiker. Volume 4, pages 183-191 in Otto Hintze, Historische und politische Aufsdtze. Berlin: Deutsche Biicherei. LANE, FREDERIC C. 1956 Some Heirs of Gustav von Schmoller. Pages 9-39 in Architects and Craftsmen in History: Festschrift fur Abbott Payson Usher. Tubingen: Mohr. MEINECKE, FRIEDRICH 1933 Drei Generationen deutscher Gelehrtenpolitik: Friedrich Theodor Visher.—Gustav Schmoller.—Max Weber. Pages 136-164 in Friedrich Meinecke, Staat und Personlichkeit: Studien. Berlin: Mittler. MELTZEL, C. 1925 Gustav v. Schmoller. Volume 7, pages 251-253 in Handworterbuch der Staatswissenschaften. 4th ed. Jena: Fischer. MENGER, CARL (1883) 1963 Problems of Economics and Sociology (Untersuchungen uber die Methods der Socialwisseuschaften und der politischen Oekonomie insbesondere). Edited with an introduction by Louis Schneider. Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press.
SCHRIEKE, BERTRAM MENGER, CARL 1884 Die Irrthumer des Historismus in der deutschen N ationalokonomie. Vienna: Holder. -» The main attack against Schmoller and the historical school by an economic theorist and the culmination of the Methodenstreit. MITSCHERLICH, WALDEMAR 1936 Die okonomischen Querschnitte Schmollers. Pages 129-149 in Waldemar Mitscherlich, Die Lehre von den beweglichen und starren Begriffen erldutert an der Wirtschaftswissenschaft. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. RITZEL, GERHARD 1950 Schmoller versus Menger: Eine Analyse des Methodenstreits im Hinblick auf den Historismus in der N ationalokonomie. Frankfurt am Main: Enz & Rudolph. SALIN, EDGAR 1924 Zur Stellung G. Schmollers in der Geschichte der Nationalokonomie. Schmollers Jahrbuch fur Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reiche 48:307-314. SCHUMPETER, JOSEPH A. 1926 Gustav v. Schmoller und die Probleme von heute. Schmollers Jahrbuch fur Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reiche 50:337-388. SCHUMPETER, JOSEPH A. (1954) 1960 History of Economic Analysis. Edited by E. B. Schumpeter. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. SOMBART, WERNER 1910 Debatte [Uber die Productivitat der Volkswirtschaft]. Verein fiir Socialpolitik, Schriften 132:563-572. SPIETHOFF, ARTHUR 1924 Zum Abschluss. Schmollers Jahrbuch fiir Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reiche 48:321-324. -> This article summarizes a series of assessments of Schmoller's work. SPIETHOFF, ARTHUR (editor) 1938 Gustav von Schmoller und die deutsche geschichtliche Volkswirtschaftslehre: Festgabe zur hundertsten Wiederkehr seines Geburtstages 24. Juni 1938. Schmollers Jahrbuch fiir Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reiche 62:385-757. TREITSCHKE, HEINRICH G. VON 1875 Der Socialismus und seine Conner: Nebst einem Sendschreiben an Gustav Schmoller. Berlin: Reimer. WEBER, MAX 1910 Debatte [Uber die Productivitat der Volkswirtschaft]. Verein fiir Socialpolitik, Schriften 132:580-585, 603-607.
SCHOOLS See ACADEMIC FREEDOM; ADULT EDUCATION; EDUCATION; EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY; TEACHING; UNIVERSITIES.
SCHRIEKE, BERTRAM When the Dutch anthropologist Bertram Johannes Otto Schrieke (1890—1945) was studying at the University of Leiden, where he finished his studies with a doctor's degree in "languages and literature of the East Indian archipelago," sociology as a discipline was in its infancy in the Netherlands. It was taught only at the University of Amsterdam, where Schrieke attended the lectures of S. R. Steinmetz—through whom he was influ-
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enced by the theories of Max Weber. At Leiden he was a pupil of Snouck Hurgronje, the eminent Islamologist and Arabist; of C. Van Vollenhoven, for adat law; and of other orientalists. His career was to be as diversified as his training. Schrieke was not a theorist. Rather he took exception to existing theories as being too one-sided or too narrow. He held the view that "a culture forms an organic whole, which cannot be split up into different parts as if these components had no relation to each other," an approach not generally shared in the 1920s (Indonesian Sociological Studies, vol. 1, p. 232). As demonstrated by his lifelong work in the social and economic aspects of the history of Indonesia and of Indonesian foreign contacts, Schrieke's forte lay in maintaining a critical attitude toward the generally accepted approaches to these subjects, which relied on archeology and colonial history. In his doctoral thesis, Het boek van Bonang (1916), he analyzed the text of a manuscript, written in Javanese and ascribed to a legendary Muslim saint, which had been in the library of the University of Leiden since the beginning of the seventeenth century. His study of this manuscript, as well as of the early history of the Portuguese and Dutch trade contacts with Indonesia and of the published material on the voyages of Chinese and Arabs in the previous centuries, enabled him to revise the existing theory that the Islamization of the archipelago was the result of penetration pacifique. He came to the conclusion that Islamization, hitherto considered to be primarily the product of trade relations, had been equally influenced by political conflicts and military struggles. In this work he acknowledged his debt to his mentor, G. P. Rouffaer, honorary member of the Royal Institute for Philology, Geography, and Ethnology of the Netherlands Indies at The Hague, whose own work of collecting and comparing source material was an inspiration to Schrieke. Returning later to this problem in parts of a wide-ranging study, "Ruler and Realm in Early Java" (published posthumously, in an English translation only; 1957), Schrieke suggested that it is "impossible to understand the spread of Islam in the archipelago unless one takes into account the antagonism between the Muslim traders and the Portuguese," antagonism which caused the Indonesians to side with the Muslims. During the 1920s, when Schrieke was acting as adviser on native and Arab affairs to the Netherlands Indies government, it was his intention to write a sociological study of the peoples of Sumatra
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based on these ideas. He had written only the first, historical section of the "Prolegomena" to this study (see 1925) when he was called upon to conduct an inquiry into the so-called communist uprisings on the west coast of Sumatra in 1926. In order to explain the success of the communists' tactics, Schrieke incorporated in his report facts relating to the historical background and structure of Minangkabau society and dealt with the impact of the introduction of a money economy. He was thus able to point to the factors in this transitional period which had helped to foster the antigovernment attitude of the population. Here again his natural approach was to gather any relevant data, including the seemingly unimportant and the controversial. In 1955 the parts of his report that deal with the situation underlying the uprisings were published in an English translation, together with the above-mentioned "Prolegomena" and a number of his other publications (Indonesian Sociological Studies, vol. 1). The Fourth Pacific Science Congress, convened at Batavia (now Jakarta) in 1929, afforded Schrieke the opportunity of editing a symposium entitled The Effect of Western Influence on Native Civilisations in the Malay Archipelago, to which his own contribution was "Native Society in the Transformation Period." As director of the Netherlands Indies Department of Education from 1929 to 1933, Schrieke stressed the need for a sociological approach to educational problems. He defended the existing diversified educational system, adapted as it was to serve the needs of a heterogeneous population. He did further field research in applied sociology at the invitation of the Julius Rosenwald Fund, which resulted in Alien Americans (1936). This was an "American Dilemma" avant la lettre: a oneman attempt to study the Negro problem in the United States and to interpret it against the background of other race relations there. Apart from the influence he exerted in sociology and history when he was professor of sociology in the law school at Batavia, from 1924 to 1929, and later at the University of Amsterdam, from 1936 to 1945, Schrieke's ideas can best be traced in the work of J. C. van Leur (1934) and M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofsz (1962). He fostered surveys of research on both Indonesia and the Netherlands Caribbean territories; he also encouraged such surveys in connection with the work of the International Refugee Colonization Society, established in 1938. He also applied his organizational ability as museum director of the 150-year-old Batavian Society of Arts and Letters in 1923 and later, from
1938 to 1945, as director of the ethnological department of the Royal Colonial Institute (now Royal Tropical Institute), Amsterdam. Schrieke died suddenly in London in September 1945 while attending a United Nations conference as a Netherlands government delegate on Indonesian affairs. JOHANNA L. G. FELHOEN KRAAL [See also ASIAN SOCIETY, article on SOUTHEAST ASIA; COLONIALISM; ISLAM; and the biography of SNOUCK HURGRONJE.] WORKS BY SCHRIEKE 1916 Het boek van Eonang. Utrecht: Boer. 1925 Prolegomena tot eene sociologische studie over de volken van Sumatra: Deel I (A. Historisch gedeelte), Schets van de politieke en economische machtsverschuivingen in den Indischen Archipel in de 17de eeuw (Prolegomena to a Sociological Study of the Peoples of Sumatra: Part I [A. Historical Section], Outline of the Shifts in Political and Economic Power in the Indonesian Archipelago in the Seventeenth Century). Tijdscrift voor taal-, land- en volkenkunde 65:90-207. -> For a partial translation, see pages 1-82 of Indonesian Sociological Studies: Selected Writings of B. Schrieke. (1926) 1928 The Evolution of Culture in the Pacific in Relation to the Theories of the "Kultur-Historische" and the "Manchester" Schools of Social Anthropology. Volume 2, pages 2423-2441 in Pacific Science Congress, Third, Tokyo, Proceedings. Tokyo: National Research Council of Japan. 1929 Native Society in the Transformation Period. Pages 237-247 in Bertram Schrieke (editor), The Effect of Western Influence on Native Civilisations in the Malay Archipelago. Batavia (Java): Kolff. 1936 Alien Americans: A Study of Race Relations. New York: Viking. 1938 The Educational System in the Netherlands Indies. Netherlands Indies: Bulletin of the Colonial Institute, Amsterdam 2:14-24. 1948 SCHRIEKE, BERTRAM (editor) Report of the Scientific Work Done in the Netherlands on Behalf of the Dutch Overseas Territories During the Period Between Approximately 1918 and 1943. Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing. ->• Published posthumously. 1957 Ruler and Realm in Early Java. Volume 2, pages 1-267 in Indonesian Sociological Studies: Selected Writings of B. Schrieke. The Hague: Van Hoeve. -»• Published posthumously from Schrieke's Dutch manuscript. Indonesian Sociological Studies: Selected Writings of B. Schrieke. 2 vols. The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1955-1957. -» Contains parts of the 1925 Prolegomena to a Sociological Study of the Peoples of Sumatra, parts of the 1926 report on uprisings on the west coast of Sumatra, and a number of later writings, some previously unpublished. SUPPLEMENTARY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Foreword by the Editors of "Selected Studies on Indonesia by Dutch Scholars." 1957 Volume 2, pages v-vii in Bertram J. O. Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies: Selected Writings of B. Schrieke. The Hague: Van Hoeve.
SCHULTZ, HENRY LEUR, JACOB C. VAN (1934) 1955 On Early Asian Trade. Pages 1-44 in Jacob C. van Leur, Indonesian Trade and Society: Essays in Asian Social and Economic History. The Hague: Van Hoeve. -» First published in Dutch. LINDGREN, ETHEL J. 1948 Bertram Johannes Otto Schrieke: 1890-1945. Man 48:113-117. H> Includes a bibliography on pages 116-117, prepared by Lindgren and her associates. MEILINK-ROELOFSZ, MARIE A. P. 1962 Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago Between 1500 and About 1630. The Hague: Nijhoff.
SCHULTZ, HENRY Henry Schultz (1893-1938), American econometrician, was born in Russian Poland. After attending public schools in New York City and the College of the City of New York, he began his graduate studies at Columbia University in 1916. At Columbia he responded enthusiastically to the influence of Henry L. Moore, but his studies were interrupted by military service in World War i. After the war an army scholarship enabled him to spend the spring and summer terms of 1919 at the London School of Economics and Political Science and at the Galton Laboratory of University College. In London he attended lectures on statistics by A. L. Bowley and Karl Pearson and on economic theory by Edwin Cannan. Once back in the United States, he conducted statistical and economic investigations for, successively, the War Trade Board, the Bureau of the Census, the Bureau of Efficiency, the Institute of Economics, and the Children's Bureau of the United States Department of Labor. His PH.D. thesis, "The Statistical Law of Demand as Illustrated by the Demand for Sugar," was published in 1925, and in 1926 he joined the department of economics at the University of Chicago, where he remained until his death. It was Moore's early investigations into the statistical approximation of Marshallian demand curves (1914; 1917) that had a determining influence on Schultz's career. Under Moore's inspiration, Schultz made intensive studies of the works of those economists—Cournot, Walras, and Pareto -—who had made the most explicit and sophisticated use of mathematics in formulating economic theory. Schultz also studied probability theory and statistics in considerable depth. His years in various statistical and economic research agencies in Washington, 1920 to 1926, no doubt contributed to his sophistication in the use and interpretation of published economic data. When Moore ceased writing in 1929, Schultz was almost the only American economist who com-
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bined a mastery of the theoretical work of Walras and Pareto with an intense interest in empirical studies of demand. He was fully abreast of the revolution in value theory associated with the names of J. R. Hicks and R. G. D. Allen (1934); they also drew their inspiration from Walras and Pareto. Keynesian macroeconomic theory, however, was not of direct significance to Schultz's work, and the lengthy bibliography of his most important book, The Theory and Measurement of Demand (1938, pp. 779-803), contains no reference to Keynes. Schultz published a number of short notes on regression theory and methods and one major article (1930) on the derivation of standard errors of forecast for curves of various types. In Statistical Laws of Demand and Supply (1928), he thoroughly explored the literature on weighted regression—the estimation of a single line or plane of best fit when all variables are subject to error -—and was probably the first to apply such methods to economic data. This book presented supply-anddemand curves for sugar, an internationally traded commodity, and led him to write three articles on methods of measuring the effectiveness of a tariff. His contributions to statistical theory must be regarded as by-products of his intense concern with statistical demand analysis, and the work on the tariff was similarly incidental to his main concern. Schultz also published a number of expository articles on the more general contributions of mathematics and statistics to economic research and in book reviews called attention to significant translations or interpretations of Walras and Pareto and to major works on mathematical economics and statistics. Schultz's lifework is essentially summed up in his monumental 817-page work The Theory and Measurement of Demand (1938). Chapters 1, 18, and 19 together provide an excellent statement of the theory of consumer demand, incorporating the Hicks-Allen and Slutsky extensions of Pareto's basic formulation; Chapters 2 and 3 deal with the logical and theoretical validity of various proposed methods for deriving demand curves from time series and from family-budget data; Chapter 4 contains a statement of the assumptions, methods, and procedures to be used in the empirical section. The empirical section, Chapters 5-17, presents statistical demand analyses for ten major crops along with summary comparisons and interpretations of the results for the various commodities, time periods, and functional forms. Further empirical studies are included in Chapters 18 and 19, on related demands. A fifty-page appendix on ele-
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ments of curve fitting and correlation provides an excellent guide to least-squares regression methods, and there is also an extensive bibliography. In The Theory and Measurement of Demand Schultz emerges as the complete demand analyst of his generation. It would be difficult to point out any other econometric work of large scope written in the 1930s that achieved a better integration of economic theory and statistics with painstaking and realistic attention to institutions, markets, and data. Jan Tinbergen's Statistical Testing of Business-cycle Theories (1938-1939) is one of the few econometric works of the 1930s which would bear comparison with Schultz's masterpiece. While Moore was the first economist in the United States to attempt a creative synthesis of economic theory and statistics as a basis for estimating economic relationships, Schultz achieved a similar creative synthesis at a much higher level of sophistication. Econometricians who have done large-scale empirical investigations, among them Tinbergen, Herman Wold, Richard Stone, Paul Douglas, and Lawrence Klein, have referred to The Theory and Measurement of Demand in terms of the highest respect. Schultz participated in the organizational meeting of the Econometric Society on December 29, 1930, and was active in the affairs of the Society until his death. He was an untiring worker—"his own work day was a 12-hour one or longer, and his work week, 7 days" (H. Gregg Lewis, quoted in Hotelling 1939, p. 101). He appears to have been thoroughly constructive in his relationships with his graduate assistants and colleagues. Several of the students who came under his influence at the University of Chicago (Milton Friedman, Jacob Mosak, Martin Bronfenbrenner, Paul Samuelson, and others) subsequently made outstanding contributions to econometrics and economic theory. KARL A. Fox [For the historical context of Schultz's work, see the biographies of COURNOT; MOORE, HENRY L.; PARETO; WALRAS; for discussion of the subsequent development of Schultz's ideas, see DEMAND AND SUPPLY; ECONOMETRICS.] WORKS BY SCHULTZ The Statistical Measurement of the Elasticity of Demand for Beef. Journal of Farm Economics 6:254— 278. 1925 The Statistical Law of Demand as Illustrated by the Demand for Sugar. Journal of Political Economy 33:481-504, 577-637. 1927a Cost of Production, Supply and Demand, and the Tariff. Journal of Farm Economics 9:192-209. 1924
1927& Theoretical Considerations Relating to Supply. Journal of Political Economy 35:437-464. 1928 Statistical Laws of Demand and Supply With Special Application to Sugar. Univ. of Chicago Press. 1929 Marginal Productivity and the General Pricing Process. Journal of Political Economy 37:505-551. 1930 The Standard Error of a Forecast From a Curve. Journal of the American Statistical Association 25: 139-185. 193la Henry L. Moore's Contribution to the Statistical Law of Demand. Pages 645-661 in Social Science Reseach Council, Committee on Scientific Method in the Social Sciences, Methods in Social Science. Univ. of Chicago Press. 1931& The Italian School of Mathematical Economics. Journal of Political Economy 39:76-85. 1932 Marginal Productivity and the Lausanne School: A Reply [to J. R. Hicks]. Economica 12:285-296. 1933a Frisch on the Measurement of Utility. Journal of Political Economy 41:95-116. 1933b Interrelations of Demand. Journal of Political Economy 41:468-512. 1935 Interrelations of Demand, Price and Income. Journal of Political Economy 43:433-481. 1938 The Theory and Measurement of Demand. Univ. of Chicago Press. 1939 A Misunderstanding in Index-number Theory: The True Koniis Condition on Cost-of-living Index Numbers and Its Limitations. Econometrica 7:1-9. SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY CHICAGO, UNIVERSITY OF, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 1942 Studies in Mathematical Economics and Econometrics: In Memory of Henry Schultz. Edited by Oskar Lange et al. Univ. of Chicago Press. -» Includes a bibliography on pages 32-33. DOUGLAS, PAUL H. 1939 Henry Schultz as Colleague. Econometrica 7:104-106. HICKS, J. R.; and ALLEN, R. G. D. 1934 A Reconsideration of the Theory of Value. Economica New Series 1:52-76. HOTELLING, HAROLD 1939 The Work of Henry Schultz. Econometrica 7:97-103. -» Includes a bibliography of Schultz's works. LINK, GEORGE K. 1942 Henry Schultz: Friend. Pages 3-10 in Chicago, University of, Department of Economics, Studies in Mathematical Economics and Econometrics: In Memory of Henry Schultz. Univ. of Chicago Press. MOORE, HENRY L. 1914 Economic Cycles: Their Law and Cause. New York: Macmillan. MOORE, HENRY L. 1917 Forecasting the Yield and the Price of Cotton. New York: Macmillan. TINBERGEN, JAN 1938-1939 Statistical Testing of Business-cycle Theories. 2 vols. Geneva: League of Nations, Economic Intelligence Service. -> Volume 1: A Method and Its Application to Investment Activity. Volume 2: Business Cycles in the United States of America: 1919-1932. YNTEMA, THEODORE O. 1942 Henry Schultz: His Contributions to Economics and Statistics. Pages 11-17 in Chicago, University of, Department of Economics, Studies in Mathematical Economics and Econometrics: In Memory of Henry Schultz. Univ. of Chicago Press.
SCHUMPETER, JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, JOSEPH A. Joseph Alois Schumpeter (1883-1950) was born in Triesch, Moravia, into a middle-class family. His education at the Theresianum in Vienna was, however, aristocratic, as was the influence of his stepfather, a high-ranking officer in the AustroHungarian army. His extraordinary mind ranged over many fields—classics, history, law, the history of art, sociology, mathematics, and economics. He mastered several of these scholarly fields, but it was in economics that he made important original contributions. Schumpeter's first marriage, to an Englishwoman, took place in 1907; it lasted only a few months and ended ultimately in divorce. His second wife, whom he married in 1925, was an Austrian; she died in childbirth in the same year, and for a long time after her death Schumpeter withdrew from social life. He married again in the United States, in 1937, and was survived for a few years by his widow. Academic career. Schumpeter spent most of his life as an academic. His first position, in 1909, was in Czernowitz (now in the U.S.S.R.). For him this was a somewhat exotic place, and he had a happy time there—including in his activities a duel with the university librarian over the rights of students to have freer access to books. Czernowitz must have provided an intellectually lively atmosphere, since the Austro—Hungarian monarchy seems to have used it as a sort of glamorous exile for its "young Turks." From Czernowitz Schumpeter moved to Graz, in Styria, a provincial capital whose lack of a frontier type of excitement was compensated for by its proximity to Vienna. During his tenure at Graz, Schumpeter visited the United States for the first time, as an exchange professor at Columbia University. After an interlude of political and business activity, he returned, in 1925, to academic life as professor of public finance at the University of Bonn. He remained at Bonn, except for one year in Japan and at Harvard, until 1932. Then, when internal political dissension prevented him from obtaining the chair of economics at Berlin, he went to Harvard. He stayed at Harvard until his death. Schumpeter was elected president of the American Economic Association shortly before his death. He was also a founding member and president of the Econometric Society: although he himself did not become well qualified either in mathematical economics or in econometrics, he enouraged the development of both.
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Nonacademic activities. Schumpeter's forays into nonacademic life were as many-sided as his academic interests. In 1907 he became a junior partner in a law firm in Cairo. In 1918 he was for a brief time a member of the German socialization commission, and in 1919 he became minister of finance in the government of the new Austrian Republic. Both of these governmental positions were offered him despite the fact that he was not a socialist, because of his intellectual and professional qualifications and possibly because of his friendship, dating back to his student days, with Otto Bauer, the famous Austrian Marxist. Later he became president of a small Austrian bank. The Cairo law practice was a success. On the other hand, hardly anyone could have solved Austria's financial problems, given the domestic and international environment; and the same was true of the bank, whose failure was only one of the first in the series of Austrian bank failures that culminated in the collapse of the Creditanstalt. Even before the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, Schumpeter had written "The Crisis of the Tax State" (1918). In this work he anticipated the problems that Austria would face at the end of the war and predicted that political incompetence would vitiate possible solutions to her economic difficulties. The book still has relevance for the making of economic policy: it develops the theme that the state, as guardian of the common interest, is the necessary counterpart of the individual, particularly in a liberal capitalist economy, and it discusses the crucial role of budget and fiscal policy in the well-being of the economy. Schumpeter's interest in public policy continued when he was no longer in a policy-making position. Many of his articles for the Osterreichische Volkswirt and the Deutsche Volkswirt as well as some of his lectures at Bonn and Harvard dealt with such urgent current problems as tax policy, depression policies, and the New Deal; he was convinced that the New Deal was slowing down "natural" recovery. Schumpeter as teacher. Despite all his interest in policy, practical affairs, sociology, and history, Schumpeter's primary love was economics as a scholarly pursuit, and he was anxious to make good training in economics available to students. While in Germany he became involved in discussions of curricular reform, arguing that the training of economists and lawyers should be strictly separated; otherwise neither group would be adequately trained. His lectures at Bonn, ostensibly on public finance, were actually in large part discus-
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sions of Book v of Marshall's Principles and other theoretical topics. At Harvard he taught one of the first modern courses in pure theory. His lectures were never dull; often they were brilliant. But what distinguished Schumpeter's lectures and seminars most was neither their brilliance nor their organization (which occasionally left something to be desired); rather, it was his persistent effort on all occasions, formal or informal, to make it possible for students to work out their own ideas. In nine years of attending his lectures and seminars in Bonn and at Harvard, I remember only two occasions when he talked about his own work and then only at the prodding of his students. He spent much time with his students outside the classroom. In Bonn he frequently went on walks with them, discoursing, interrupting his walk suddenly to jot down an idea. At Harvard he regularly met his students socially. He also circulated a sheet of paper during each lecture on which six students signed up to see him. He was not the kind of teacher who provided his students with clear-cut answers, to the despair of the less-gifted students. But for others this method had a delayed effect that years later would make them sit up and exclaim, "So this is what Schumpeter meant!" The Schumpeterian system Because of Schumpeter's many-sided gifts and the variety of fields to which he contributed, it is difficult to trace his intellectual ancestry. His teachers at the University of Vienna included Friedrich von Wieser, E. von Phillipovich, and E. von Bohm-Bawerk. But among all economists, he had the greatest esteem for Leon Walras, and he thought very highly of English and American economists, particularly F. Y. Edgeworth and John Bates Clark. The similarity of Schumpeter's thought to Marx's has frequently been noted, although Marx's influence on Schumpeter may have been overestimated because of Schumpeter's ability to admire and understand Marx even when he disagreed with him. Schumpeter was more aware than many other theoretical economists, the most notable exception being Marx, that economic reality is only a part of total reality. The division of the economic from the noneconomic was for him purely a matter of scientific convenience. He contributed significantly to the understanding of noneconomic, particularly sociological, phenomena, as in his synthesis, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (1942). If his work lacks the mathematical precision he urged
upon others, this was not the result of unclear thinking but of the complexity (one might almost say the messiness) of the problems he tackled. Any brief characterization of an elaborate and subtle system is necessarily something of a caricature. Bearing this limitation in mind, Schumpeter's vision of the economic process might be summarized as follows: There is only one single historical reality, which consists of unique "events." To understand this reality one must always be aware of its quality of uniqueness. But one must also realize that events are related to each other, not just simultaneously but over time. Simultaneous relationships are the subject of equilibrium theory; intertemporal relationships are the subject of dynamic theory. Both equilibrium theory and dynamic theory are necessary to explain any event at any given moment of time. Statics and dynamics. The essential difference between statics and dynamics—a dichotomy that Schumpeter distinguished from the dichotomy between stationary and evolutionary—is not fully expressed by stating that dynamics involves time and statics does not. For Schumpeter static, or equilibrium, theory deals with processes of adaptation that are found in reality: he believed he could identify particular periods in history in which the economic system was "in the neighborhood of equilibrium." His equilibrium, however, has no normative content; it is not in any sense an ideal state of affairs, a golden age. It follows, therefore, that the dynamics that concerned Schumpeter was not the time sequence of adjustment to some change that had somehow occurred. Rather, he sought to discover what causes the movement away from equilibrium, what is responsible for the destruction of equilibrium. For reasons of scientific convenience, he centered his attention on those disruptions of equilibrium that arise inside the economic system, although he believed that equilibrium can also be disrupted by forces outside the economy, such as wars or natural catastrophes. (While for Marx, and certainly for Lenin, wars arise from the inner contradictions of capitalism, Schumpeter stressed the essentially pacific and constructive nature of capitalism and its evolution.) Business cycles. The distinction between statics and dynamics is fundamental to Schumpeter's ideas on the business cycle. It explains not only why a recession, being an adaptive phenomenon, must follow a boom, but also why a boom requires a different explanation from a recession. It shows
SCHUMPETER, JOSEPH A. both why historical data are needed to arrive at an explanation and how such data are fitted into a general framework and thereby become meaningful. It explains in what sense business cycles are essential to progress: business cycles occur because equilibrium is destroyed by innovations, and the economy must adapt to the destruction before there can be any further innovation. Finally, the distinction accounts for the institutional requirements that must be met if an economy is to remain dynamic. The essential institutional arrangements are two: first, scope for the operation of innovators, the Schumpeterian entrepreneurs; and second, the possibility for innovators to break into the circular flow of the economy, this being achieved through the creation of credit. Credit creation permits the entrepreneur to take resources out of the income stream for productive purposes before he has contributed anything to the income stream. Schumpeter distinguished three types of business cycles, each of whose length depends on the disturbance that brought it about. He named the cycles for pioneers in business cycle theory. The shortest, the Kitchin cycle, is identified with inventory accumulation and decumulation lasting about three years. The medium cycle, of about 8-11 years, usually referred to as the business cycle, he named for Clement Juglar, and he related it to individual innovations, such as new textile machines, dynamos, electric motors, radios, and refrigerators. The long cycle, named for Kondratieff, is caused by the appearance of major innovations, such as railroads or electrification, which cannot be carried through in one "juglar." Thus, long-run trends become part of cyclical phenomena and, indeed, can be understood as the result of shorterrun changes. Schumpeter believed that each cycle consists of four phases. He characterized the recovery and recession phases as adaptive processes, while the upswing and depression phases represent movements away from the neighborhood of equilibrium, caused, respectively, by innovation and by such extrinsic and inessential phenomena as speculation, panics, or poor economic policies. The upswing and recession phases are essential to the capitalist process, but the depression and recovery phases are not. Since the acute social and personal hardships occur in the inessential phases, policy can eliminate them. Development of Schumpeter's system. Beginning in 1908, Schumpeter published a series of books in which he progressively developed these economic theories. His first major book was Das
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Wesen und der Hauptinhalt der theoretischen N ationalokonomie (1908), which was probably conceived during his days as a graduate student and written in Cairo. It was a brilliant statement of general equilibrium theory, making clear both what static theory could explain and what it could not. This was followed in 1912 by The Theory of Economic Development, which contained the first important vision of the "Schumpeterian system"— a term he would have abhorred. The book dealt primarily with dynamics—the entrepreneurial function, the role of the banking system, and the creation of credit. Finally, in Business Cycles (1939), he fleshed out the bones of theory with historical material. Moreover, Business Cycles contains numerous partial mathematical models. Assessment of the system. Schumpeter's detailed discussion of historical data in the context of his theory has, of course, led to criticism of his interpretation of particular facts. Also, it has been suggested that his emphasis on the innovating entrepreneur tends to limit his theory to the past. Schumpeter himself felt that reality fitted his three-cycle schema better than his theory warranted, since nothing in his theory required or even suggested any particular regularity of timing. He also felt that he had accomplished his task if he had adequately explained capitalism from the eighteenth century to the early twentieth century, and he apparently agreed that in the future trustdominated capitalism and planned socialism might make his theory obsolete. Many years later Schumpeter wrote that he was "trying to construct a theoretic model of the process of economic change in time, or perhaps more clearly, to answer the question how the economic system generates the force which incessantly transforms it" (Essays, pp. 158-159). Because of this, and despite his own skepticism about the future relevance of his theory, Schumpeter's approach retains its usefulness in underdeveloped as well as in developed countries, and in socialist as well as in market economies. In order for there to be economic development, the Schumpeterian problem of when to introduce a change, when to introduce an investment, must be solved. There is nothing automatic about the introduction of new investments, and planners, in both market and socialist economies, must think like Schumpeterian entrepreneurs if their plans are to lead to self-sustaining growth. If a theory is understood to be a collection of formulas that can be applied with a minimum of analysis and thought, then Schumpeter's theory is indeed obsolete. But if it is understood to be a
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view of the economy that enables a policy maker to ask pertinent questions and develop appropriate programs of action, then the relevance of Schumpeter's thought to any changing economy cannot be doubted. Other economic writings Schumpeter's contribution to the history of economics, like his contribution to economic theory, developed over many years. The posthumously published History of Economic Analysis (1954) is an elaboration of his much earlier Economic Doctrine and Method (1914). Both are histories of economic theories, which Schumpeter believed develop in the same manner as do theories in the natural sciences. In other words, economic theories, unlike philosophies, are not self-contained and develop over time in a cumulative fashion. The History of Economic Analysis was published from an unfinished manuscript. It is, by any standard, an outstanding intellectual achievement. While it met with detailed criticism (for example, Schumpeter was charged with having been less than fair to the neoclassical economists), it is, of course, impossible to say to what extent these criticisms would have been avoided if Schumpeter had lived to finish the work. Schumpeter also wrote many articles on monetary theory, relating monetary theory to his general view of development. As early as 1917, when it was not common to do so, he discussed money in relation to national income and economic policy. While he was writing a book on monetary theory, Keynes's Treatise on Money appeared. Schumpeter admired the Treatise and insisted that all his students read it, but he felt that its substance required a complete rewriting of his own work. Sociological writings Schumpeter considered from a sociological point of view a variety of phenomena that others had interpreted in mainly economic terms—imperialism, social classes, taxation, socialism, and even the entrepreneur. He attempted to relate economic phenomena to the larger social context. Thus, for example, he rejected the view that economic explanations can adequately account for the phenomenon of imperialism, which is an "atavism" of social structure and of emotional habits of an individualpsychological nature, and he stressed that any explanation of the entrepreneur must include the social and political conditions necessary for him to fulfill his functions. Schumpeter brought together his sociological and economic analyses primarily in Capitalism,
Socialism, and Democracy (1942), a work remarkable for its style as well as for its vision. Essential to his argument is his analysis of Marxian doctrine. Schumpeter did not think that capitalism shows the inherent contradictions that Marx claimed would lead to the immiserization of the masses and to revolution; nor does capitalism per se lead to imperialistic adventures or to wars. But he sympathized with the Marxian idea that the achievements of capitalism, which Marx himself had praised so highly, have their own inherent logic: because capitalism has a historic function to perform, it will come to an end as the function disappears. Socialism is possible, perhaps even inevitable, but what Schumpeter meant by socialism is different from what is commonly understood by the term. Socialism is denned by Schumpeter as "an institutional pattern in which the control over means of production and over production itself is vested with a central authority—or, as we may say, in which, as a matter of principle, the economic affairs of society belong to the public and not to the private sphere" (1942, p. 167). This is quite consistent with the fact that "some freedom of action must be left, and almost any amount of freedom might be left, to the 'men on the spot,' say, the managers of the individual industries or plants" (p. 168). It is noteworthy that the definition does not necessarily include ownership of the means of production. Schumpeter made short shrift of the numerous reasons that have been adduced to prove the approaching collapse of capitalism. He argued that capitalism cannot be even approximately identified with perfect competition and, therefore, to criticize it for monopolistic practices or for temporary recessions misses the point. "Capitalism . . . is by nature a form or method of economic change and not only never is but never can be stationary" (1942, p. 82), and most criticism overlooks this essential fact. The Achilles' heel of capitalism lies elsewhere, namely in its achievements. The very success of capitalism will bring about its doom for two reasons : as societies grow richer, and production and productivity increase spectacularly, the need for further growth and for the specific contribution of the entrepreneur will disappear. Administrators can deal with what will become essentially routine problems, and the desiderata of economic life will shift. At the same time, the successes of capitalism will lead to an increasingly hostile intellectual environment, to a trahison des clercs, in which entrepreneurs will find it increasingly difficult to fulfill
SCHUMPETER, JOSEPH A. their essential function. Schumpeter was also prepared to consider that the process of innovation might itself become more and more routine. He foresaw the eventual triumph of socialism, but he thought its chances for success and indeed its relevance negligible in precisely those situations where most people believed (and still believe) it necessary—to make poor economies grow. Economically, capitalism has performed miracles, and in another fifty to one hundred years it will have created such a powerful productive machine as to eliminate poverty. (Indeed, Schumpeter's own projections—in Chapter 5—have already been far surpassed.) Culturally, capitalism has brought about the spread of a rational and pacific view of the world: "Modern mathematicoexperimental science developed . . . not only along with the social process usually referred to as the Rise of Capitalism, but also outside . . . of scholastic thought and in the face of its contemptuous hostility" (1942, p. 124). The same is true of painting and literature. Schumpeter also discussed the problem of the transition to socialism. The socialism that can work is one that comes "in the fullness of time," when the problem of poverty has been solved by the preceding creation of a powerful productive economy. Schumpeter believed that he and Marx were basically in agreement on this point: Evolution was for him [Marx] the parent of socialism. He was much too strongly imbued with a sense of the inherent logic of things social to believe that revolution can replace any part of the work of evolution. . . . The Marxian revolution therefore differs entirely, in nature and in function, from the revolutions both of the bourgeois radical and of the socialist conspirator. It is essentially revolution in the fullness of time. . . . To say that Marx, stripped of phrases, admits of interpretation in a conservative sense is only saying that he can be taken seriously. (1942, p. 58)
If socialism is built on a powerful productive economy, then the problems of transition will be negligible; if this condition does not obtain, these problems of transition may jeopardize the success of socialism. Schumpeter also considered the rationality of socialist decision making, first discussed by Enrico Barone in 1905, and the human problems involved. .According to Schumpeter, socialism can be run on democratic lines. His definition of democracy may not, however, command general assent—an "institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (p. 269). What will actually
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happen will depend on many accidents as well as on the inherent logic of social (including economic) evolution: ". . . there is little reason to believe that. . . socialism will mean the advent of the civilization of which orthodox socialists dream. It is much more likely to present fascist features. That would be a strange answer to Marx's prayer. But history sometimes indulges in jokes of questionable taste" (p. 375). It is difficult to present Schumpeter's thought in a brief form: its complexity is such that the many pages Schumpeter himself devoted to it are entirely necessary. This complexity might have prevented the development of a Schumpeter school, even if he himself had not actively discouraged its formation. Moreover, it is not easy to locate Schumpeter in a history of economic analysis: although he was an Austrian by birth and training, he was not an "Austrian" economist. He belongs to that recent trend in economics that is characterized by an absence of schools of economic thought, though not of good economists. The economists Schumpeter himself trained will never put reality into the straitjacket of any particular theory; they will be able to use any logical theory while remaining conscious of the variety and uniqueness of the real social and economic problems. WOLFGANG F. STOLPER [See also BUSINESS CYCLES; CAPITALISM; ECONOMIC THOUGHT, article on THE AUSTRIAN SCHOOL; ENTREPRENEURSHIP; and the biographies of BOHMBAWERK; CLARK, JOHN BATES; EDGEWORTH; MARX; WALRAS; WIESER.] WORKS BY SCHUMPETER Das Wesen und der Hauptinhalt der theoretischen N ationalokonomie. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. (1912) 1934 The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry Into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle. Harvard Economic Studies, Vol. 46. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. -» First published as Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung. (1914) 1954 Economic Doctrine and Method: An Historical Sketch. London: Allen & Unwin. -» First published as Epochen der Dogmen- und Methodengeschichte. (1918) 1954 The Crisis of the Tax State. International Economic Papers 4:5-38. -> First published as Die Krise des Steuerstaats. (1919-1927) 1951 Imperialism and Social Classes. New York: Kelley. -» First published as "Zur Soziologie der Imperialismen" (1919) and "Die sozialen Klassen im ethnisch homogenen Milieu" (1927). A paperback edition was published in 1955 by Meridian. 1939 Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process. 2 vols. New .York and London: McGraw-Hill. -» An abridged version was published in 1964. 1908
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(1942) 1950 Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. 3d ed. New York: Harper; London: Allen & Unwin. -» A paperback edition was published by Harper in 1962. (1954) 1964 History of Economic Analysis. Edited by E. B. Schumpeter. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. -» Published posthumously. Aufsdtze zur okonomischen Theorie. Edited by Arthur Spiethoff and Erich Schneider. Tubingen (Germany): Mohr, 1952. Aufsdtze zur Soziologie. Edited by Arthur Spiethoff and Erich Schneider. Tubingen (Germany): Mohr, 1953. Dogmenhistorische und biographische Aufsdtze. Edited by Arthur Spiethoff and Erich Schneider. Tubingen (Germany): Mohr, 1954. Essays. Edited by Richard V. Clemence. Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1951. -> Contains essays first published between 1909 and 1950. Ten Great Economists: From Marx to Keynes. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1951. -» Contains essays first published between 1910 and 1950. A paperback edition was published in 1965. SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY HABERLER, GOTTFRIED 1950 Joseph Alois Schumpeter: 1883-1950. Quarterly Journal of Economics 64:333372. HABERLER, GOTTFRIED 1951 J. A. Schumpeter, 18831950. Pages 24-47 in S. E. Harris (editor), Schumpeter: Social Scientist. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. HARRIS, SEYMOUR E. (editor) 1951 Schumpeter: Social Scientist. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. KESSLER, MARTIN 1961 The Synthetic Vision of Joseph Schumpeter. Review of Politics 23:334-355. SCHUMPETER, ELIZABETH B. 1950 Bibliography of the Writings of Joseph A. Schumpeter. Quarterly Journal of Economics 64:373-384. SMITHIES, A. 1951 Memorial: J. A. Schumpeter, 18831950. Pages 11-23 in S. E. Harris (editor), Schumpeter: Social Scientist. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. SPIETHOFF, ARTHUR 1949 Josef Schumpeter: In Memoriam. Kyklos 3:289-293. -» Dated 1949, but published after Schumpeter's death in 1950. WRIGHT, DAVID McCoRD 1950 Schumpeter and Keynes. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 65, no. 2:185-196.
SCHUTZ, ALFRED Alfred Schutz (1899-1959) was born in Austria, studied at the University of Vienna, and from 1939 until his death lived in New York City, where he was professor of philosophy and sociology at the New School for Social Research. His principal philosophical work consisted of the application of Edmund Husserl's phenomenology to the problems of social reality, while his major methodological contribution was an attempt to relate phenomenological concepts to the sociology of Max Weber. He believed that the cardinal problem for the social sciences is the study of the world of daily life, of the common-sense reality that each individual shares with his fellow men in a taken-for-granted
manner, and both his major intellectual efforts focused on this problem. As Schutz saw it, the task of the phenomenological philosopher concerned with social reality is to uncover, describe, and analyze the essential features of this mundane world; and consequently all of his writings, beginning with The Phenomenology of the Social World (1932), take the reality of everyday life as a point of departure and as a subject for detailed examination. For Schutz, the world of common-sense reality rests on certain basic epistemological presuppositions: that the mundane world exists, that man and his fellows exist in that world, and that man can communicate with Others. In daily life, men take for granted the reality of their experience: they assume, naively, that they share the same world with all other "normal" perceivers; and they assume that were they to change places with Others, they would see the world in essentially the same way the Others do. Upon analysis, it is found that these fundamental presuppositions imply a number of structural characteristics. (1) The "biographical situation" of the individual depends on his particular location in the social world as he himself defines it and as he interprets that location in terms of his previous experiences. The biographical situation is unique to the individual, although it includes typical features he does share with Others. (2) Commonsense man possesses a "stock of knowledge at hand." It includes elements handed down to him by Others, parents and teachers among them, and it is in a typically organized form. This knowledge is accepted without question as generally valid, though it is always potentially questionable. (3) The spatial coordinates of "here and there" are essential features of the social matrix by which the individual locates himself. The individual's own body is the reference point in terms of which he locates himself as "here" and the Other as "there." (4) The "alter ego" is given to the individual as a being like himself in a mundane world. Moreover, the Other exists simultaneously with the self, his thought is grasped in a vivid present, and alter ego's speech and the individual's listening coexist in a relationship that is the essence of intersubjectivity. (5) Ego's world, as an intersubjective social reality, includes alter egos with different temporal and spatial characteristics: predecessors, or those who lived before him and are known to him through report; contemporaries, who share the same temporal world; consociates, or those who are alive at the same time and who also share ego's spatial segment of the world through face-to-
SCHUTZ, ALFRED face relationships; successors, who will live after he dies, including those who will be born only after he is dead. The social world is as much constituted by consciousness of predecessors and successors as it is by contemporaries and consociates. To explain the structural relationships that hold among all of these aspects of social order, a theory of social action is necessary. Schutz distinguished between "action" and "act." Action is understood as purposive conduct projected by the actor; an act is denned as accomplished action. Action has a subjective form as well as an objective form: purposively refraining from doing something is no less action than overtly behaving in one way or another. What is of decisive importance to Schutz's conception of action is his view that action is grounded in the interpretative consciousness of the actor. It is at this point that Schutz turned to Weber, in particular to his conception of interpretative understanding (Verstehen^ and to his postulate of the subjective interpretation of meaning. To understand social action is to grasp the meaning which the actor gives to or bestows upon his action, to comprehend what that action means to him. The "subjective" interpretation of meaning signified for Weber what the actor means by his action, not, as Schutz stressed, some private idiosyncratic and unverifiable domain. In Schutz's adaptation of Weber, subjective interpretation of meaning appears primarily as a fundamental typification of the common-sense world. All men in mundane life, then, practice Verstehen, but there is a distinction between Verstehen (1) as an experiential form of commonsense knowledge, (2) as an epistemological problem, and (3) as a distinctive method of the social sciences. Schutz believed that it was the great merit of such men as Durkheim, Pareto, Marshall, and Veblen, and above all of Weber, to have developed the technique that "consists in replacing the human beings which the social scientist observes as an actor on the social stage by puppets created by himself, in other words, in constructing ideal types of actors" (Collected Papers, vol. 2, p. 17). The social scientist, according to Schutz, proceeds as follows: [He] observes certain events within the social world as caused by human activity and he begins to establish a type of such events. Afterwards he coordinates with these typical acts typical because motives and in-order-to motives which he assumes as invariable in the mind of an imaginary actor. Thus he constructs a personal ideal type, which means the model of an actor whom he imagines gifted with a consciousness. . . . The social scientist places these constructed types in
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a setting which contains all the elements of the situation in the social world relevant for the performance of the typical act under inquiry. Moreover, he associates with him other personal ideal types with motives apt to provoke typical reactions to the first ideal type's typical act. So he arrives at a model of the social world, or better at a reconstruction of it. (ibid., pp. 17-18) Action is never an isolated phenomenon; it has its phenomenological "horizons" of relevance and relatedness to social reality, and it has its "motivation." As already noted, typical acts have two kinds of motives, "in-order-to" motives and "because" motives. The first are explained in terms of the actor's goals and ends; the second, in terms of his background and disposition. The in-order-to motive is "the future state of affairs to be realized by the projected action," and the project itself is determined by the because motive, which in turn is dominated by the past tense. Other people's acts can be fully understood only insofar as their because and in-order-to motives are known, but since this is impossible, it must suffice to know their typical motives, including their reference to typical situations, typical ends, typical means, etc. (ibid., pp. 11-12). The temporal disequilibrium between the two orders of motive suggests a larger problem in the conception of the ego. According to Schutz, the ego cannot seize its own immediacy; it can capture itself only as an object of a reflexive act. Schutz here came close to George H. Mead's distinction between the "I" and "me" aspects of the self. He pointed, however, to a larger implication of the distinction, for man is understood as a being who presents himself to Others, takes his place in the social world, and, finally, knows himself only in a partial and fragmentary way. Such fragmentation is itself a primordial typification of reality. Schutz's philosophical position has significance for the choice of models to be used in the social sciences, and it suggests, in particular, that the use of natural science models is not satisfactory. He believed that the natural and social sciences differ qualitatively: the natural sciences investigate objects that are constructs of the first degree, i.e., objects in the field of the scientific observer; the social sciences are properly concerned with second-degree constructs, i.e., objects that not only are themselves in a world but that also have a world. The human beings who are the central concern of the social scientist are interpreters of their own lives and actions. The task of the social scientist is to comprehend the world of daily life (Lebenswelt) from which these lives derive their significance, and the phenomenological approach
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—its concern with essential structure, with founding relationships, with "sedimentation" of meaning, and with the uncovering of root presuppositions— provides the means by which social science may reconstruct mundane reality. At the same time, the use of Verstehen and of the subjective interpretation of meaning may lead to valid knowledge. Although Schutz's work is profoundly indebted to Husserl and Max Weber, it has affinities with that of other European thinkers, Henri Bergson and Georg Simmel in particular. In the AngloAmerican tradition, Schutz found the thought of Santayana, Whitehead, and James especially congenial. The sociologists who influenced him the most were Cooley, Thomas, and Mead. All these men stressed the activity of the actor and his action in relation to the experiential world. It was Schutz's distinctive achievement to develop these intellectual orientations by centering on the paradigm of action instead of the traditional theme of perception and by approaching both actor and action by way of the typifications of common-sense life. In the last decade, Schutz's work has aroused increasing interest among both philosophers and social scientists in the implications of phenomenology for a humanistic sociology and a theory of man. MAURICE NATANSON [See also KNOWLEDGE, SOCIOLOGY OF; SOCIAL STRUCTURE, article on SOCIAL STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS; VERSTEHEN; and the biographies of COOLEY; HUSSERL; MEAD; SIMMEL; THOMAS; WEBER, MAX.] WORKS BY SCHUTZ (1932) 1967 The Phenomenology of the Social World. Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press. Collected Papers. 3 vols. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1962-1965. -> Volume I : The Problem of Social Reality. Volume 2: Studies in Social Theory. Volume 3: Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy. SUPPLEMENTARY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BERGER, PETER; and LUCKMANN, THOMAS 1966 The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday. GURWITSCH, ARON (1957)1965 The Field of Consciousness. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press. -» First published in French. NATANSON, MAURICE (editor) 1963 Philosophy of the Social Sciences: A Reader. New York: Random House. NATANSON, MAURICE 1966 The Phenomenology of Alfred Schutz. Inquiry 9:147-155. SPIEGELBERG, HERBERT (1960) 1965 The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction. 2d ed. 2 vols. Phaenomenologica, Vols. 5-6. The Hague: Nijhoff. STONIER, ALFRED; and BODE, KARL 1937 A New Approach to the Methodology of the Social Sciences. Economica New Series 4:406-424. ZANER, RICHARD M. 1961 Theory of Intersubjectivity: Alfred Schutz. SociaZ Research 28:71-93.
SCIENCE i. ii. in. iv.
THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE SCIENCE-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS v. SCIENTISTS vi. SCIENTIFIC COMMUNICATION
Thomas S. Kuhn Michael Scriven Bernard Barber Don K. Price Warren O. Hagstrom Norman Kaplan and Norman W. Storer
THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE
As an independent professional discipline, the history of science is a new field still emerging from a long and varied prehistory. Only since 1950, and initially only in the United States, has the majority of even its youngest practitioners been trained for, or committed to, a full-time scholarly career in the field. From their predecessors, most of whom were historians only by avocation and thus derived their goals and values principally from some other field, this younger generation inherits a constellation of sometimes irreconcilable objectives. The resulting tensions, though they have relaxed with increasing maturation of the profession, are still perceptible, particularly in the varied primary audiences to which the literature of the history of science continues to be addressed. Under the circumstances any brief report on development and current state is inevitably more personal and prognostic than for a longer-established profession. Development of the field. Until very recently most of those who wrote the history of science were practicing scientists, sometimes eminent ones. Usually history was for them a by-product of pedagogy. They saw in it, besides intrinsic appeal, a means to elucidate the concepts of their specialty, to establish its tradition, and to attract students. The historical section with which so many technical treatises and monographs still open is contemporary illustration of what was for many centuries the primary form and exclusive source for the history of science. That traditional genre appeared in classical antiquity both in historical sections of technical treatises and in a few independent histories of the most developed ancient sciences, astronomy and mathematics. Similar works—together with a growing body of heroic biography—had a continuous history from the Renaissance through the eighteenth century, when their production was much stimulated by the Enlightenment's vision of science as at once the source and the exemplar of progress. From the last fifty years of that period come the earliest historical studies that are sometimes still used as such, among them the historical narratives embedded in
SCIENCE: The History of Science the technical works of Lagrange (mathematics) as well as the imposing separate treatises by Montucla (mathematics and physical science), Priestley (electricity and optics), and Delambre (astronomy). In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, though alternative approaches had begun to develop, scientists continued to produce both occasional biographies and magistral histories of their own specialties, for example, Kopp (chemistry), Poggendorff (physics), Sachs (botany), Zittel and Geikie (geology), and Klein (mathematics ). A second main historiographic tradition, occasionally indistinguishable from the first, was more explicitly philosophical in its objectives. Early in the seventeenth century Francis Bacon proclaimed the utility of histories of learning to those who would discover the nature and proper use of human reason. Condorcet and Comte are only the most famous of the philosophically inclined writers who, following Bacon's lead, attempted to base normative descriptions of true rationality on historical surveys of Western scientific thought. Before the nineteenth century this tradition remained predominantly programmatic, producing little significant historical research. But then, particularly in the writings of Whewell, Mach, and Duhem, philosophical concerns became a primary motive for creative activity in the history of science, and they have remained important since. Both of these historiographic traditions, particularly when controlled by the textual-critical techniques of nineteenth-century German political history, produced occasional monuments of scholarship, which the contemporary historian ignores at his peril. But they simultaneously reinforced a concept of the field that has today been largely rejected by the nascent profession. The objective of these older histories of science was to clarify and deepen an understanding of contemporary scientific methods or concepts by displaying their evolution. Committed to such goals, the historian characteristically chose a single established science or branch of science—one whose status as sound knowledge could scarcely be doubted—and described when, where, and how the elements that in his day constituted its subject matter and presumptive method had come into being. Observations, laws, or theories which contemporary science had set aside as error or irrelevancy were seldom considered unless they pointed a methodological moral or explained a prolonged period of apparent sterility. Similar selective principles governed discussion of factors external to science. Religion, seen as a hindrance, and technology, seen as an occasional prerequisite to advance in instrumenta-
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tion, were almost the only such factors which received attention. The outcome of this approach has recently been brilliantly parodied by the philosopher Joseph Agassi. Until the early nineteenth century, of course, characteristics very much like these typified most historical writing. The romantics' passion for distant times and places had to combine with the scholarly standards of Biblical criticism before even general historians could be brought to recognize the interest and integrity of value systems other than their own. (The nineteenth century is, for example, the period when the Middle Ages were first observed to have a history.) That transformation of sensibility which most contemporary historians would suppose essential to their field was not, however, at once reflected in the history of science. Though they agreed about nothing else, both the romantic and the scientist-historian continued to view the development of science as a quasi-mechanical march of the intellect, the successive surrender of nature's secrets to sound methods skillfully deployed. Only in this century have historians of science gradually learned to see their subject matter as something different from a chronology of accumulating positive achievement in a technical specialty defined by hindsight. A number of factors contributed to this change. Probably the most important was the influence, beginning in the late nineteenth century, of the history of philosophy. In that field only the most partisan could feel confident of his ability to distinguish positive knowledge from error and superstition. Dealing with ideas that had since lost their appeal, the historian could scarcely escape the force of an injunction which Bertrand RusseJl later phrased succinctly: "In studying a philosopher, the right attitude is neither reverence nor contempt, but first a kind of hypothetical sympathy, until it is 'possible to know what it feels like to believe in his theories." That attitude toward past thinkers came to the history of science from philosophy. Partly it was learned from men like Lange and Cassirer who dealt historically with people or ideas that were also important for scientific development. (Burtt's Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science and Lovejoy's Great Chain of Being were, in this respect, especially influential.) And partly it was learned from a small group of Neo-Kantian epistemologists, particularly Brunschvicg and Meyerson, whose search for quasi-absolute categories of thought in older scientific ideas produced brilliant genetic analyses of concepts which the main tradition in the history of science had misunderstood or dismissed. These lessons were reinforced by another deci-
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sive event in the emergence of the contemporary profession. Almost a century after the Middle Ages had become important to the general historian, Pierre Duhem's search for the sources of modern science disclosed a tradition of medieval physical thought which, in contrast to Aristotle's physics, could not be denied an essential role in the transformation of physical theory that occurred in the seventeenth century. Too many of the elements of Galileo's physics and method were to be found there. But it was not possible, either, to assimilate it quite to Galileo's physics and to that of Newton, leaving the structure of the so-called Scientific Revolution unchanged but extending it greatly in time. The essential novelties of seventeenth-century science would be understood only if medieval science were explored first on its own terms and then as the base from which the "New Science" sprang. More than any other, that challenge has shaped the modern historiography of science. The writings which it has evoked since 1920, particularly those of E. J. Dijksterhuis, Anneliese Maier, and especially Alexandre Koyre, are the models which many contemporaries aim to emulate. In addition, the discovery of medieval science and its Renaissance role has disclosed an area in which the history of science can and must be integrated with more traditional types of history. That task has barely begun, but the pioneering synthesis by Butterfield and the special studies by Panofsky and Frances Yates mark a path which will surely be broadened and followed. A third factor in the formation of the modern historiography of science has been a repeated insistence that the student of scientific development concern himself with positive knowledge as a whole and that general histories of science replace histories of special sciences. Traceable as a program to Bacon, and more particularly to Comte, that demand scarcely influenced scholarly performance before the beginning of this century, when it was forcefully reiterated by the universally venerated Paul Tannery and then put to practice in the monumental researches of George Sarton. Subsequent experience has suggested that the sciences are not, in fact, all of a piece and that even the superhuman erudition required for a general history of science could scarcely tailor their joint evolution to a coherent narrative. But the attempt has been crucial, for it has highlighted the impossibility of attributing to the past the divisions of knowledge embodied in contemporary science curricula. Today, as historians increasingly turn back to the detailed investigation of individual branches of science, they study fields which actually existed
in the periods that concern them, and they do so with an awareness of the state of other sciences at the time. Still more recently, one other set of influences has begun to shape contemporary work in the history of science. Its result is an increased concern, deriving partly from general history and partly from German sociology and Marxist historiography, with the role of nonintellectual, particularly institutional and socioeconomic, factors in scientific development. Unlike the ones discussed above, however, these influences and the works responsive to them have to date scarcely been assimilated by the emerging profession. For all its novelties, the new historiography is still directed predominantly to the evolution of scientific ideas and of the tools (mathematical, observational, and experimental) through which these interact with each other and with nature. Its best practitioners have, like Koyre, usually minimized the importance of nonintellectual aspects of culture to the historical developments they consider. A few have acted as though the obtrusion of economic or institutional considerations into the history of science would be a denial of the integrity of science itself. As a result, there seem at times to be two distinct sorts of history of science, occasionally appearing between the same covers but rarely making firm or fruitful contact. The still dominant form, often called the "internal approach," is concerned with the substance of science as knowledge. Its newer rival, often called the "external approach," is concerned with the activity of scientists as a social group within a larger culture. Putting the two together is perhaps the greatest challenge now faced by the profession, and there are increasing signs of a response. Nevertheless, any survey of the field's present state must unfortunately still treat the two as virtually separate enterprises. Internal history. What are the maxims of the new internal historiography? Insofar as possible (it is never entirely so, nor could history be written if it were), the historian should set aside the science that he knows. His science should be learned from the textbooks and journals of the period he studies, and he should master these and the indigenous traditions they display before grappling with innovators whose discoveries or inventions changed the direction of scientific advance. Dealing with innovators, the historian should try to think as they did. Recognizing that scientists are often famous for results they did not intend, he should ask what problems his subject worked at and how these became problems for him. Recognizing that a historic discovery is rarely
SCIENCE: The History of Science quite the one attributed to its author in later textbooks (pedagogic goals inevitably transform a narrative), the historian should ask what his subject thought he had discovered and what he took the basis of that discovery to be. And in this process of reconstruction the historian should pay particular attention to his subject's apparent errors, not for their own sake but because they reveal far more of the mind at work than do the passages in which a scientist seems to record a result or an argument that modern science still retains. For at least thirty years the attitudes which these maxims are designed to display have increasingly guided the best interpretive scholarship in the history of science, and it is with scholarship of that sort that this article is predominantly concerned. (There are other types, of course, though the distinction is not sharp, and much of the most worthwhile effort of historians of science is devoted to them. But this is not the place to consider work like that of, say, Needham, Neugebauer, and Thorndike, whose indispensable contribution has been to establish and make accessible texts and traditions previously known only through myth.) Nevertheless, the subject matter is immense; there have been few professional historians of science (in 1950 scarcely more than half a dozen in the United States); and their choice of topic has been far from random. There remain vast areas for which not even the basic developmental lines are clear. Probably because of their special prestige, physics, chemistry, and astronomy dominate the historical literature of science. But even in these fields effort has been unevenly distributed, particularly in this century. Because they sought contemporary knowledge in the past, the nineteenth-century scientist-historians compiled surveys which often ranged from antiquity to their own day or close to it. In the twentieth century a few scientists, like Dugas, Jammer, Partington, Truesdell, and Whittaker, have written from a similar viewpoint, and some of their surveys carry the history of special fields close to the present. But few practitioners of the most developed sciences still write histories, and the members of the emerging profession have up to this time been far more systematically and narrowly selective, with a number of unfortunate consequences. The deep and sympathetic immersion in the sources which their work demands virtually prohibits wide-ranging surveys, at least until more of the field has been examined in depth. Starting with a clean slate, as they at least feel they are, this group naturally tries first to establish the early phases of a science's development,
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and few get beyond that point. Besides, until the last few years almost no member of the new group has had sufficient command of the science (particularly mathematics, usually the decisive hurdle) to become a vicarious participant in the more recent research of the technically most developed disciplines. As a result, though the situation is now changing rapidly with the entry both of more and of better-prepared people into the field, the recent literature of the history of science tends to end at the point where the technical source materials cease to be accessible to a man with elementary college scientific training. There are fine studies of mathematics to Leibniz (Boyer, Michel); of astronomy and mechanics to Newton (Clagett, Costabel, Dijksterhuis, Koyre, and Maier), of electricity to Coulomb (Cohen), and of chemistry to Dalton (Boas, Crosland, Daumas, Guerlac, Metzger). But almost no work within the new tradition has as yet been published on the mathematical physical science of the eighteenth century or on any physical science in the nineteenth. For the biological and earth sciences, the literature is even less well developed, partly because only those subspecialties which, like physiology, relate closely to medicine had achieved professional status before the late nineteenth century. There are few of the older surveys by scientists, and the members of the new profession are only now beginning in any number to explore these fields. In biology at least there is prospect of rapid change, but up to this point the only areas much studied are nineteenth-century Darwinism and the anatomy and physiology of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. On the second of these topics, however, the best of the book-length studies (e.g., O'Malley and Singer) deal usually with special problems and persons and thus scarcely display an evolving scientific tradition. The literature on evolution, in the absence of adequate histories of the technical specialties which provided Darwin with both data and problems, is written at a level of philosophical generality which makes it hard to see how his Origin of Species could have been a major achievement, much less an achievement in the sciences. Dupree's model study of the botanist Asa Gray is among the few noteworthy exceptions. As yet the new historiography has not touched the social sciences. In these fields the historical literature, where it exists, has been produced entirely by practitioners of the science concerned, Boring's History of Experimental Psychology being perhaps the outstanding example. Like the older histories of the physical sciences, this literature is
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often indispensable, but as history it shares their limitations. (The situation is typical for relatively new sciences: practitioners in these fields are ordinarily expected to know about the development of their specialties, which thus regularly acquire a quasi-official history; thereafter something very like Gresham's law applies.) This area therefore offers particular opportunities both to the historian of science and, even more, to the general intellectual or social historian, whose background is often especially appropriate to the demands of these fields. The preliminary publications of Stocking on the history of American anthropology provide a particularly fruitful example of the perspective which the general historian can apply to a scientific field whose concepts and vocabulary have only very recently become esoteric. External history. Attempts to set science in a cultural context which might enhance understanding both of its development and of its effects have taken three characteristic forms, of which the oldest is the study of scientific institutions. Bishop Sprat prepared his pioneering history of the Royal Society of London almost before that organization had received its first charter, and there have since been innumerable in-house histories of individual scientific societies. These books are, however, useful principally as source materials for the historian, and only in this century have students of scientific development started to make use of them. Simultaneously they have begun seriously to examine the other types of institutions, particularly educational, which may promote or inhibit scientific advance. As elsewhere in the history of science, most of the literature on institutions deals with the seventeenth century. The best of it is scattered through periodicals (the once standard book-length accounts are regrettably out-of-date) from which it can be retrieved, together with much else concerning the history of science, through the annual "Critical Bibliography" of the journal Isis and through the quarterly Bulletin signaletique of the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris. Guerlac's classic study on the professionalization of French chemistry, Schofield's history of the Lunar Society, and a recent collaborative volume (Taton) on scientific education in France are among the very few works on eighteenth-century scientific institutions. For the nineteenth, only Cardwell's study of England, Dupree's of the United States, and Vucinich's of Russia begin to replace the fragmentary but immensely suggestive remarks scattered, often in footnotes, through the first volume of Merz's History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century.
Intellectual historians have frequently considered the impact of science on various aspects of Western thought, particularly during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. For the period since 1700, however, these studies are peculiarly unsatisfying insofar as they aim to demonstrate the influence, and not merely the prestige, of science. The name of a Bacon, a Newton, or a Darwin is a potent symbol: there are many reasons to invoke it besides recording a substantive debt. And the recognition of isolated conceptual parallels, e.g., between the forces that keep a planet in its orbit and the system of checks and balances in the U.S. constitution, more often demonstrates interpretive ingenuity than the influence of science on other areas of life. No doubt scientific concepts, particularly those of broad scope, do help to change extrascientific ideas. But the analysis of their role in producing this kind of change demands immersion in the literature of science. The older historiography of science does not, by its nature, supply what is needed, and the new historiography is too recent and its products too fragmentary to have had much effect. Though the gap seems small, there is no chasm that more needs bridging than that between the historian of ideas and the historian of science. Fortunately there are a few works to point the way. Among the more recent are Nicolson's pioneering studies of science in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century literature, Westfall's discussion of natural religion, Gillispie's chapter on science in the Enlightenment, and Roger's monumental survey of the role of the life sciences in eighteenth-century French thought. The concern with institutions and that with ideas merge naturally in a third approach to scientific development. This is the study of science in a geographical area too small to permit concentration on the evolution of any particular technical specialty but sufficiently homogeneous to enhance an understanding of science's social role and setting. Of all the types of external history, this is the newest and most revealing, for it calls forth the widest range of historical and sociological experience and skill. The small but rapidly growing literature on science in America (Dupree, Hindle, Shryock) is a prominent example of this approach, and there is promise that current studies of science in the French Revolution may yield similar illumination. Merz, Lilley, and Ben-David point to aspects of the nineteenth century on which much similar effort must be expended. The topic which has, however, evoked the greatest activity and attention is the development of science in seventeenth-century England. Because it has become the
SCIENCE: The History of Science center of vociferous debate both about the origin of modern science and about the nature of the history of science, this literature is an appropriate focus for separate discussion. Here it stands for a type of research: the problems it presents will provide perspective on the relations between the internal and external approaches to the history of science. The Merton thesis. The most visible issue in the debate about seventeenth-century science has been the so-called Merton thesis, really two overlapping theses with distinguishable sources. Both aim ultimately to account for the special productiveness of seventeenth-century science by correlating its novel goals and values—summarized in the program of Bacon and his followers—with other aspects of contemporary society. The first, which owes something to Marxist historiography, emphasizes the extent to which the Baconians hoped to learn from the practical arts and in turn to make science useful. Repeatedly they studied the techniques of contemporary craftsmen—glassmakers, metallurgists, mariners, and the like—and many also devoted at least a portion of their attention to pressing practical problems of the day, e.g., those of navigation, land drainage, and deforestation. The new problems, data, and methods fostered by these novel concerns are, Merton supposes, a principal reason for the substantive transformation experienced by a number of sciences during the seventeenth century. The second thesis points to the same novelties of the period but looks to Puritanism as their primary stimulant. (There need be no conflict. Max Weber, whose pioneering suggestion Merton was investigating, had argued that Puritanism helped to legitimize a concern with technology and the useful arts.) The values of settled Puritan communities—for example, an emphasis upon justification through works and on direct communion with God through nature—are said to have fostered both the concern with science and the empirical, instrumental, and utilitarian tone which characterized it during the seventeenth century. Both of these theses have since been extended and also attacked with vehemence, but no consensus has emerged. (An important confrontation, centering on papers by Hall and de Santillana, appears in the symposium of the Institute for the History of Science edited by Clagett; Zilsei's pioneering paper on William Gilbert can be found in the collection of relevant articles from the Journal of the History of Ideas edited by Wiener and Noland. Most of the rest of the literature, which is voluminous, can be traced through the
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footnotes in a recently published controversy over the work of Christopher Hill.) In this literature the most persistent criticisms are those directed to Merton's definition and application of the label "Puritan," and it now seems clear that no term so narrowly doctrinal in its implications will serve. Difficulties of this sort can surely be eliminated, however, for the Baconian ideology was neither restricted to scientists nor uniformly spread through all classes and areas of Europe. Merton's label may be inadequate, but there is no doubt that the phenomenon he describes did exist. The more significant arguments against his position are the residual ones which derive from the recent transformation in the history of science. Merton's image of the Scientific Revolution, though long-standing, was rapidly being discredited as he wrote, particularly in the role it attributed to the Baconian movement. Participants in the older historiographic tradition did sometimes declare that science as they conceived it owed nothing to economic values or religious doctrine. Nevertheless, Merton's emphases on the importance of manual work, experimentation, and the direct confrontation with nature were familiar and congenial to them. The new generation of historians, in contrast, claims to have shown that the radical sixteenth- and seventeenthcentury revisions of astronomy, mathematics, mechanics, and even optics owed very little to new instruments, experiments, or observations. Galileo's primary method, they argue, was the traditional thought experiment of scholastic science brought to a new perfection. Bacon's naive and ambitious program was an impotent delusion from the start. The attempts to be useful failed consistently; the mountains of data provided by new instruments were of little assistance in the transformation of existing scientific theory. If cultural novelties are required to explain why men like Galileo, Descartes, and Newton were suddenly able to see wellknown phenomena in a new way, those novelties are predominantly intellectual and include Renaissance Neoplatonism, the revival of ancient atomism, and the rediscovery of Archimedes. Such intellectual currents were, however, at least as prevalent and productive in Roman Catholic Italy and France as in Puritan circles in Britain or Holland. And nowhere in Europe, where these currents were stronger among courtiers than among craftsmen, do they display a significant debt to technology. If Merton were right, the new image of the Scientific Revolution would apparently be wrong. In their more detailed and careful versions,
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which include essential qualification, these arguments are entirely convincing, up to a point. The men who transformed scientific theory during the seventeenth century sometimes talked like Baconians, but it has yet to be shown that the ideology which a number of them embraced had a major effect, substantive or methodological, on their central contributions to science. Those contributions are best understood as the result of the internal evolution of a cluster of fields which, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, were pursued with renewed vigor and in a new intellectual milieu. That point, however, can be relevant only to the revision of the Merton thesis, not to its rejection. One aspect of the ferment which historians have regularly labeled "the Scientific Revolution" was a radical programmatic movement centering in England and the Low Countries, though it was also visible for a time in Italy and France. That movement, which even the present form of Merton's argument does make more comprehensible, drastically altered the appeal, the locus, and the nature of much scientific research during the seventeenth century, and the changes have been permanent. Very likely, as contemporary historians argue, none of these novel features played a large role in transforming scientific concepts during the seventeenth century, but historians must learn to deal with them nonetheless. Perhaps the following suggestions, whose more general import will be considered in the next section, may prove helpful. Omitting the biological sciences, for which close ties to medical crafts and institutions dictate a more complex developmental pattern, the main branches of science transformed during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were astronomy, mathematics, mechanics, and optics. It is their development which makes the Scientific Revolution seem a revolution in concepts. Significantly, however, this cluster of fields consists exclusively of classical sciences. Highly developed in antiquity, they found a place in the medieval university curriculum where several of them were significantly further developed. Their seventeenth-century metamorphosis, in which university-based men continued to play a significant role, can reasonably be portrayed as primarily an extension of an ancient and medieval tradition developing in a new conceptual environment. Only occasionally need one have recourse to the Baconian programmatic movement when explaining the transformation of these fields. By the seventeenth century, however, these were not the only areas of intense scientific activity, and the others—among them the study of electricity
and magnetism, of chemistry, and of thermal phenomena—display a different pattern. As sciences, as fields to be scrutinized .systematically for an increased understanding of nature, they were all novelties during the Scientific Revolution. Their main roots were not in the learned university tradition but often in the established crafts, and they were all critically dependent both on the new program of experimentation and on the new instrumentation which craftsmen often helped to introduce. Except occasionally in medical schools, they rarely found a place in universities before the nineteenth century, and they were meanwhile pursued by amateurs loosely clustered around the new scientific societies that were the institutional manifestation of the Scientific Revolution. Obviously these are the fields, together with the new mode of practice they represent, which a revised Merton thesis may help us understand. Unlike that in the classical sciences, research in these fields added little to man's understanding of nature during the seventeenth century, a fact which has made them easy to ignore when evaluating Merton's viewpoint. But the achievements of the late eighteenth and of the nineteenth centuries will not be comprehensible until they are taken fully into account. The Baconian program, if initially barren of conceptual fruits, nevertheless inaugurated a number of the major modern sciences. Internal and external history. Because they underscore distinctions between the earlier and later stages of a science's evolution, these remarks about the Merton thesis illustrate aspects of scientific development recently discussed in a more general way by Kuhn. Early in the development of a new field, he suggests, social needs and values are a major determinant of the problems on which its practitioners concentrate. Also during this period, the concepts they deploy in solving problems are extensively conditioned by contemporary common sense, by a prevailing philosophical tradition, or by the most prestigious contemporary sciences. The new fields which emerged in the seventeenth century and a number of the modern social sciences provide examples. Kuhn argues, however, that the later evolution of a technical specialty is significantly different in ways at least foreshadowed by the development of the classical sciences during the Scientific Revolution. The practitioners of a mature science are men trained in a sophisticated body of traditional theory and of instrumental, mathematical, and verbal technique. As a result, they constitute a special subculture, one whose members are the exclusive audience for, and judges of, each other's work. The problems on which such
SCIENCE: The History of Science specialists work are no longer presented by the external society but by an internal challenge to increase the scope and precision of the fit between existing theory and nature. And the concepts used to resolve these problems are normally close relatives of those supplied by prior training for the specialty. In short, compared with other professional and creative pursuits, the practitioners of a mature science are effectively insulated from the cultural milieu in which they live their extraprofessional lives. That quite special, though still incomplete, insulation is the presumptive reason why the internal approach to the history of science, conceived as autonomous and self-contained, has seemed so nearly successful. To an extent unparalleled in other fields, the development of an individual technical specialty can be understood without going beyond the literature of that specialty and a few of its near neighbors. Only occasionally need the historian take note of a particular concept, problem, or technique which entered the field from outside. Nevertheless, the apparent autonomy of the internal approach is misleading in essentials, and the passion sometimes expended in its defense has obscured important problems. The insulation of a mature scientific community suggested by Kuhn's analysis is an insulation primarily with respect to concepts and secondarily with respect to problem structure. There are, however, other aspects of scientific advance, such as its timing. These do depend critically on the factors emphasized by the external approach to scientific development. Particularly when the sciences are viewed as an interacting group rather than as a collection of specialties, the cumulative effects of external factors can be decisive. Both the attraction of science as a career and the differential appeal of different fields are, for example, significantly conditioned by factors external to science. Furthermore, since progress in one field is sometimes dependent on the prior development of another, differential growth rates may affect an entire evolutionary pattern. Similar considerations, as noted above, play a major role in the inauguration and initial form of new sciences. In addition, a new technology or some other change in the conditions of society may selectively alter the felt importance of a specialty's problems or even create new ones for it. By doing so they may sometimes accelerate the discovery of areas in which an established theory ought to work but does not, thereby hastening its rejection and replacement by a new one. Occasionally, they may even shape the substance of that new theory
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by ensuring that the crisis to which it responds occurs in one problem area rather than another. Or again, through the crucial intermediary of institutional reform, external conditions may create new channels of communication between previously disparate specialties, thus fostering crossfertilization which would otherwise have been absent or long delayed. There are numerous other ways, including direct subsidy, in which the larger culture impinges on scientific development, but the preceding sketch should sufficiently display a direction in which the history of science must now develop. Though the internal and external approaches to the history of science have a sort of natural autonomy, they are, in fact, complementary concerns. Until they are practiced as such, each drawing from the other, important aspects of scientific development are unlikely to be understood. That mode of practice has hardly yet begun, as the response to the Merton thesis indicates, but perhaps the analytic categories it demands are becoming clear. The relevance of the history of science. Turning in conclusion to the question about which judgments must be the most personal of all, one may ask about the potential harvest to be reaped from the work of this new profession. First and foremost will be more and better histories of science. Like any other scholarly discipline, the field's primary responsibility must be to itself. Increasing signs of its selective impact on other enterprises may, however, justify brief analysis. Among the areas to which the history of science relates, the one least likely to be significantly affected is scientific research itself. Advocates of the history of science have occasionally described their field as a rich repository of forgotten ideas and methods, a few of which might well dissolve contemporary scientific dilemmas. When a new concept or theory is successfully deployed in a science, some previously ignored precedent is usually discovered in the earlier literature of the field. It is natural to wonder whether attention to history might not have accelerated the innovation. Almost certainly, however, the answer is no. The quantity of material to be searched, the absence of appropriate indexing categories, and the subtle but usually vast differences between the anticipation and the effective innovation, all combine to suggest that reinvention rather than rediscovery will remain the most efficient source of scientific novelty. The more likely effects of the history of science on the fields it chronicles are indirect, providing increased understanding of the scientific enterprise itself. Though a clearer grasp of the nature of
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scientific development is unlikely to resolve particular puzzles of research, it may well stimulate reconsideration of such matters as science education, administration, and policy. Probably, however, the implicit insights which historical study can produce will first need to be made explicit by the intervention of other disciplines, of which three now seem particularly likely to be effective. Though the intrusion still evokes more heat than light, the philosophy of science is today the field in which the impact of the history of science is most apparent. Feyerabend, Hanson, Hesse, and Kuhn have all recently insisted on the inappropriateness of the traditional philosopher's ideal image of science, and in search of an alternative they have all drawn heavily from history. Following directions pointed by the classic statements of Norman Campbell and Karl Popper (and sometimes also significantly influenced by Ludwig Wittgenstein), they have at least raised problems that the philosophy of science is no longer likely to ignore. The resolution of those problems is for the future, perhaps for the indefinitely distant future. There is as yet no developed and matured "new philosophy" of science. But already the questioning of older stereotypes, mostly positivistic, is proving a stimulus and release to some practitioners of those newer sciences which have most depended upon explicit canons of scientific method in their search for professional identity. A second field in which the history of science is likely to have increasing effect is the sociology of science. Ultimately neither the concerns nor the techniques of that field need be historical. But in the present underdeveloped state of their specialty, sociologists of science can well learn from history something about the shape of the enterprise they investigate. The recent writings of Ben-David, Hagstrom, Merton, and others give evidence that they are doing so. Very likely it will be through sociology that the history of science has its primary impact on science policy and administration. Closely related to the sociology of science (perhaps equivalent to it if the two are properly construed) is a field that, though it scarcely yet exists, is widely described as "the science of science." Its goal, in the words of its leading exponent, Derek Price, is nothing less than "the theoretic analysis of the structure and behavior of science itself," and its techniques are an eclectic combination of the historian's, the sociologist's, and the econometrician's. No one can yet guess to what extent that goal is attainable, but any progress toward it will inevitably and immediately enhance the signifi-
cance both to social scientists and to society of continuing scholarship in the history of science. THOMAS S. KUHN [Other relevant material may be found in the biographies of KOYRE and SARTON.] BIBLIOGRAPHY
AGASSI, JOSEPH 1963 Towards an Historiography of Science. History and Theory, Beiheft 2. The Hague: Mouton. BEN-DAVID, JOSEPH 1960 Scientific Productivity and Academic Organization in Nineteenth-century Medicine. American Sociological Review 25:828-843. BOAS, MARIE 1958 Robert Boyle and Seventeenth-century Chemistry. Cambridge Univ. Press. BOYEE, CARL B. (1939) 1949 The Concepts of the Calculus: A Critical and Historical Discussion of the Derivative and the Integral. New York: Hafner. -> A paperback edition was published in 1959 by Dover as The History of the Calculus and Its Conceptual Development. BUTTERFIELD, HERBERT (1950) 1957 The Origins of Modern Science, 1300-1800. 2d ed., rev. New York: Macmillan. -> A paperback edition was published in 1962 by Collier. CARDWELL, DONALD S. L. 1957 The Organisation of Science in England: A Retrospect. Melbourne and London: Heinemann. CLAGETT, MARSHALL 1959 The Science of Mechanics in the Middle Ages. Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press. COHEN, I. BERNARD 1956 Franklin and Newton: An Inquiry Into Speculative Newtonian Experimental Science and Franklin's Work in Electricity as an Example Thereof. American Philosophical Society, Memoirs, Vol. 43. Philadelphia: The Society. COSTABEL, PIERRE 1960 Leibniz et la dynamique: Les textes de 1692. Paris: Hermann. CROSLAND, MAURICE 1963 The Development of Chemistry in the Eighteenth Century. Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century 24:369-441. DAUMAS, MAURICE 1955 Lavoisier: Theoricien et experimentateur. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. DIJKSTERHUIS, EDWARD J. (1950) 1961 The Mechanization of the World Picture. Oxford: Clarendon. -» First published in Dutch. DUGAS, RENE (1950) 1955 A History of Mechanics. Neuchatel (Switzerland): Editions du Griffon; New York: Central Book. -» First published in French. DUHEM, PIERRE 1906-1913 Etudes sur Leonard de Vinci. 3 vols. Paris: Hermann. DUPREE, A. HUNTER 1957 Science in the Federal Government: A History of Policies and Activities to 1940. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap. DUPREE, A. HUNTER 1959 Asa Gray: 1810-1888. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. FEYERABEND, P. K. 1962 Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism. Pages 28-97 in Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell (editors), Scientific Explanation, Space, and Time. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 3. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press. GILLISPIE, CHARLES C. 1960 The Edge of Objectivity: An Essay in the History of Scientific Ideas. Princeton Univ. Press.
SCIENCE: The Philosophy of Science GUERLAC, HENRY 1959 Some French Antecedents of the Chemical Revolution. Chymia 5:73-112. GUERLAC, HENRY 1961 Lavoisier; the Crucial Year: The Background and Origin of His First Experiments on Combustion in 1772. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press. HAGSTROM, WARREN O. 1965 The Scientific Community. New York: Basic Books. HANSON, NORWOOD R. (1958)1961 Patterns of Discovery: An Inquiry Into the Conceptual Foundations of Science. Cambridge Univ. Press. HESSE, MARY B. 1963 Models and Analogies in Science. London: Sheed & Ward. HILL, CHRISTOPHER 1965 Debate: Puritanism, Capitalism and the Scientific Revolution. Past and Present No. 29:88-97. -> Articles relevant to the debate may also be found in numbers 28, 31, 32, and 33. HINDLE, BROOKE 1956 The Pursuit of Science in Revolutionary America, 1735-1789. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press. INSTITUTE FOR THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN, 1957 1959 Critical Problems in the History of Science: Proceedings. Edited by Marshall Clagett. Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press. JAMMER, MAX 1961 Concepts of Mass in Classical and Modern Physics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 1957 Roots of Scientific Thought: A Cultural Perspective. Edited by Philip P. Wiener and Aaron Noland. New York: Basic Books. -» Selections from the first 18 volumes of the Journal. KOYRE, ALEXANDRE 1939 Etudes galileennes. 3 vols. Actualites scientifiques et industrielles, Nos. 852, 853, and 854. Paris: Hermann. -> Volume 1: A I'aube de la science classique. Volume 2: La loi de la chute des corps: Descartes et Galilee. Volume 3: Galilee et la loi d'inertie. KOYRE, ALEXANDRE 1961 La revolution astronomique: Copernic, Kepler, Borelli. Paris: Hermann. KUHN, THOMAS S. 1962 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Univ. of Chicago Press. -> A paperback edition was published in 1964. LILLEY, S. 1949 Social Aspects of the History of Science. Archives internationales d'histoire des sciences 2:376-443. MAIER, ANNELIESE 1949-1958 Studien zur Naturphilosophie der Spdtscholastik. 5 vols. Rome: Edizioni di "Storia e Letteratura." MERTON, ROBERT K. (1938) 1967 Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth-century England. New York: Fertig. MERTON, ROBERT K. 1957 Priorities in Scientific Discovery: A Chapter in the Sociology of Science. American Sociological Review 22:635-659. METZGER, HELENE 1930 Newton, Stahl, Boerhaave et la doctrine chimique. Paris: Alcan. MEYERSON, EMILE (1908) 1964 Identity and Reality. London: Allen & Unwin. -» First published in French. MICHEL, PAUL-HENRI 1950 De Pythagore a Euclide. Paris: Edition "Les Belles Lettres." NEEDHAM, JOSEPH 1954-1965 Science and Civilisation in China. 4 vols. Cambridge Univ. Press. NEUGEBAUER, OTTO (1951) 1957 The Exact Sciences in Antiquity. 2d ed. Providence, R.I.: Brown Univ. Press. -> A paperback edition was published in 1962 by Harper.
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NICOLSON, MARJORIE H. (1950) 1960 The Breaking of the Circle: Studies in the Effect of the "New Science" Upon Seventeenth-century Poetry. Rev. ed. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. -» A paperback edition was published in 1962. O'MALLEY, CHARLES D. 1964 Andreas Vesalius of Brussels, 1514—1564. Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press. PANOFSKY, ERWIN 1954 Galileo as a Critic of the Arts. The Hague: Nijhoff. PARTINGTON, JAMES R. 1962— A History of Chemistry. New York: St. Martins. -» Volumes 2-4 were published from 1962 to 1964; Volume 1 is in preparation. PRICE, DEREK J. DE SOLLA 1966 The Science of Scientists. Medical Opinion and Review 1:81-97. ROGER, JACQUES 1963 Les sciences de la vie dans la pensee francaise du XVIIIe siecle: La generation des animaux de Descartes a. FEncyclopedie. Paris: Colin. SARTON, GEORGE 1927-1348 Introduction to the History of Science. 3 vols. Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins. SCHOFIELD, ROBERT E. 1963 The Lunar Society of Birmingham: A Social History of Provincial Science and Industry in Eighteenth-century England. Oxford: Clarendon. SHRYOCK, RICHARD H. (1936) 1947 The Development of Modern Medicine. 2d ed. New York: Knopf. SINGER, CHARLES J. 1922 The Discovery of the Circulation of the Blood. London: Bell. STOCKING, GEORGE W. JR. 1966 Franz Boas and the Culture Concept in Historical Perspective. American Anthropologist New Series 68:867-882. TATON, RENE (editor) 1964 Enseignement et diffusion des sciences en France au XVIIIe siecle. Paris: Hermann. THORNDIKE, LYNN (1923-1958) 1959-1964 A History of Magic and Experimental Science. 8 vols. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. TRUESDELL, CLIFFORD A. 1960 The Rational Mechanics of Flexible or Elastic Bodies 1638-1788: Introduction to Leonhardi Euleri Opera omnia Vol. X et XI seriei secundae. Leonhardi Euleri Opera omnia, Ser. 2, Vol. 11, part 2. Turin (Italy): Fussli. VUCINICH, ALEXANDER S. 1963 Science in Russian Culture. Volume 1: A History to 1860. Stanford Univ. Press. WESTFALL, RICHARD S. 1958 Science and Religion in Seventeenth-century England. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. WHITTAKER, EDMUND 1951-1953 A History of the Theories of Aether and Electricity. 2 vols. London: Nelson. -> Volume 1: The Classical Theories. Volume 2: The Modern Theories, 1900-1926. Volume 1 is a revised edition of A History of the Theories of Aether and Electricity From the Age of Descartes to the Close of the Nineteenth Century, published in 1910. A paperback edition was published in 1960 by Harper. YATES, FRANCES A. 1964 Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition. Univ. of Chicago Press. II THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
The general topic of the philosophy of science can be divided into subareas by subject matter: the philosophy of physics, the philosophy of biology, the philosophy of the social sciences, and so
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on. But it may also be divided into discussion of structural problems in science, on the one hand, and substantive problems within specified sciences, on the other. Structural problems are those traditionally associated with such topics as scientific inference, classification, explanation, prediction, measurement, probability, and determinism. Substantive problems arise when a question is asked such as "How can learning theory be axiomatized?" or "How should anxiety be defined?" Substantive problems, as a class, merge gradually into abstract scientific problems, which are properly handled by scientists themselves. The substantive philosophy of science usually requires some professional training in the relevant field, whereas the structural philosophy of science may require only a general scientific education. Both require professional training in philosophy or, to be more specific, in logic, broadly conceived (that is, not only in classical or in symbolic logic). The history of science is also of very great importance to the philosopher of science, for it provides him with more numerous and more diverse examples of conceptual schemes and theories than he could ever find in contemporary science, and such schemes and theories are his raw data. It will be seen, then, that a large part of the philosophy of science stands to scientific theorizing, classifying, and so on, as experimental design stands to scientific experimenting. For the philosophy of science is simply the discussion of general criteria for theories, classifications, and the rest, and is necessary as long as the intuitions or assertions of scientists about what constitutes good procedure are in conflict or might be improved by analysis. Curiously enough, however, many scientists reject the philosophy of science as irrelevant to their own activities, although they constantly talk it and teach it and illustrate its relevance in their work, sometimes under the title "methodology" and sometimes just as advice without a title. It is only the hyperspecialized, rock-ribbed empiricist who can entirely avoid discussing the subject in his scientific work and teaching, and even he usually contradicts himself by espousing operationism as the epitome of empiricism—a rather elementary mistake which would have grave consequences for the validity and utility of his results if he acted on it. Often the antagonism of science to philosophy seems due to a low tolerance of ambiguity, and particularly to insecurity about involvement with the more debatable and less decidable issues of philosophy. This is surely an immature reaction, unless it can be shown that
these issues need not be raised in the teaching and practice of science. This article will provide (a) a brief discussion of those aspects of the structural philosophy of science which have special relevance for the social sciences and (£>) some reference to substantive issues in the philosophy of particular social sciences. In general, these aspects will be intertwined, in order to illustrate the immediate relevance of the structural topics to substantive isues. Main concerns of the philosophy of science. Science has been said to be concerned with observation, description, definition, classification, measurement, experimentation, generalization, explanation, prediction, evaluation, and control of the world. This list is of course much too comprehensive; to be at all useful it has to be narrowed down in the course of examining individual scientific activities (for instance, instead of analyzing description in general, we might ask what kind of describing is scientific, as opposed to poetic). In any case, there are as many (though probably no more) points of view about main topics in the philosophy of science as about main topics in any of the sciences. If the area of dispute sometimes appears greater than it is, this is because when a subtopic in philosophy is settled, it is given a new name and called a science. Philosophy is the mother of sciences and has spawned physics, astronomy, symbolic logic, economics, and psychology, among other subjects. The domain of fundamental and still unresolved conceptual disputes at any time is called philosophy and, of course, bears the cross of conflict. But, perhaps for that very reason, it is a residue that eternally regenerates, is perpetually fertile. The social sciences began with a similar handicap; what was well known about human behavior was called common sense, and only the muddy residue was left for psychology and the other social sciences to clarify. It is no wonder that a subject is difficult and debatable when it is defined to exclude the easy and certain. Because "science" is a term for an activity as well as for a body of knowledge, we ought not to be surprised if it is continuous with the prescientific activities directed to the same ends, and if these, in turn, are an extension of prelinguistic adaptive behavior. This synoptic view of man's cognitive development and current equipment should—and, I believe, does—provide some criteria for good scientific practice. We can begin by applying it to the various procedures connected with scientific concept formation: observation, description, definition, and classification, with meas-
SCIENCE: The Philosophy of Science urement and generalization as closely related activities. Concept clarification. It is now widely accepted in the philosophy of science that we must qualify or reject the traditional idea that the basic data from which the scientist forms his hypotheses and classifications are provided by a faculty of observation which is somehow independent of science. Not only has the attempt by sense-data theorists and phenomenologists to identify these basic data been a total failure, but the failure begins to appear explicable. We have come to see the "observation language"—the nonscientific language in which such basic data were supposed to be reported —as really just a "theory language," with somewhat higher interjudge reliability than more abstract language, yet still subject to perceptual errors in its application and even to pervasive errors caused by infiltration by unnoticed theory. When errors of the latter kind are recognized, we may redescribe our observations or we may retain the old language and simply reinterpret it, perhaps metaphysically. Thus Feyerabend has pointed out (in conversation with the author) that the expression "The sun is rising," although it originally incorporated a false astronomical theory, has been retained as a statement of pure observation. So there is no absolutely basic observation level on which all theory rests and, even more clearly, no sharp distinction between observation and theories. We must think instead of a constant interaction and exchange between observation, which seems immune from correction, and speculative theory. Indeed, the development of new instruments may simply render observable the hitherto unobservable (as when the electron microscope was developed) or the observed mistaken (as when it became possible to measure the curvature of the seemingly flat earth). Does this relativization of the distinction between observation and theory destroy the distinction's utility? Not at all. Indeed, it strengthens our understanding of the hierarchical structure of science as a whole when we realize that observables of the nth level (for instance, in neurophysiology) may include some hypothetical constructs from the (n + l)th level (in this case, individual psychology). What leads us, then, to introduce concepts at a given level? Not just the pressure of their existence on our blank brain. Rather, the preconscious selective effect of certain environmental and internal pressures began the process of concept formation in our ancestors, as in other organisms—a sequence of events that can be summarized as "dis-
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crimination under drive conditions." The preverbal organism comes to react to certain stimulus configurations that represent ingestibles or predators, and it is simply an extension of this process when an interpersonal vocabulary is introduced to refer to these configurations. The psychologist refers to both the preverbal and the verbal stages of this process as concept formation, and although many philosophers prefer to restrict the term to the verbal stage, there is no doubt that the verbal stage develops from the preverbal one, whether or not it becomes qualitatively different in the course of development. [See CONCEPT FORMATION.] Definition. Given the pragmatic view of concept formation outlined above, it is very natural to abandon classical definition theory (in which a definition is a set of logically necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of a term) and to adopt instead an approach based on the notions of indicator and of indicator clusters. The rationale for such an approach may be stated as follows. Within a formal system, such as mathematics or an invented language, we can find examples of classical definitions, but seldom, if ever, can we find them within a natural language or the language of a developing science. The reason for this is simply that natural phenomena are extremely untidy, and a language for referring to them must be flexible enough to accommodate this untidiness if it is to be scientifically useful. For instance, the concepts "subject," "length," "response," "group," "aggression," and "temperature" cannot be given classical definitions (other than trivially circular ones). But we have no serious difficulty in learning or teaching these concepts, which we do by giving paradigm examples, contrasts, and explicitly approximate or conditional definitions. Any paradigm provides us, if it can be successfully analyzed, with a set of sufficient conditions for the application of the term, but it is not possible to insist that paradigms, let alone analysis of them, can never turn out to be erroneous. So the sense in which these conditions are sufficient is still not that of logical sufficiency. It is still more obvious that we often cannot specify any properties that are logically necessary for the application of the concept. We therefore adopt the notion of "weighted indicators," or criteria—that is, properties which are relevant to the application of the term, but in varying degrees. Some of the properties may, in some cases, be virtually necessary; some small groups of them may be sufficient; but these are special cases. The clustering of these properties in property space indicates an entity for which it is useful to have
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a name, but there is typically considerable scatter and no sharp boundary to the cluster (the so-called open texture of concepts). The charm of a concise translation (that is, of a classical definition) is not often provided by the cluster approach, but it does preserve that most valuable feature of classical theory—a reliable verbal response that can be successfully taught. Contrasting and approximating, which are the other procedures involved in specification of meaning, depend on the psychological superiority of discrimination skills over absolute recognition skills and involve no new logical points. At this point, it should be stressed that there are two elements in the theory of definition: the pragmatic and the literal. We have been talking about the limitations of the literal theory of definition as a kind of translation. But there is the independent question of how one can best—that is, most usefully—select the terms that one will mention in the definition, whether it is a translation or a cluster of indicators. A famous answer to this has often been taken as both literal and pragmatic, which makes it nonsensical instead of good pragmatic advice of a limited range of applicability. I refer to operationism (for which see especially Bridgman 1927). There are, of course, some areas where it is to be taken very seriously as advice, and psychology is one of them. (In theoretical physics, contrary to the common impression, it is extremely rare to seek or find operational definitions.) But if operationism is taken as requiring that definitions actually contain nothing but operations, then it is absurd, a category error —and, in addition, it is self-refuting, since the concept of an operation cannot be defined operationally. Definitions should therefore be of such a kind that we can apply some independently determinable criteria to decide when the defined term should be used (we can, if we wish, call the process of determining whether these criteria apply "operations"). But we cannot require that the only content of definitions should be operations, or we find ourselves caught in the dilemma of deciding when we have only one operation and, hence, only one concept. . . and so on. Classification. The traditional requirements for classification also need to be relaxed. Instead of the Aristotelian requirement of exclusive and exhaustive subcategories, we must settle for minimized overlap and maximized coverage, balancing these desiderata against considerations of simplicity and applicability. The development of a scientific classification scheme is essentially a remapping of property space, using a new system of
coordinates or a new projection. Hence, assessment of the scheme's value very much depends, as in the map analogy, on the purposes for which it is intended (which may be as diverse as fast labeling, representation of a new theoretical insight, and easy recall) and very little on the idealized and context-free notion of "cutting Nature at the joints," which was the goal of earlier taxonomists (and which still admirably expresses the feeling inspired by a successful classification scheme). Measurement. The urge to measure is a kind of conditioned reflex among empirically trained scientists, and with some reason. Measurement requires—or, when developed, provides—an intersubjectively reliable procedure for applying the potentially infinite descriptive vocabulary of number. For describing any continuous variable we need such a vocabulary, and for describing many discrete variables it is exceedingly useful because it creates the possibility of applying some mathematical apparatus. But the social scientist all too often assumes that scaling and measuring will make it likely that we can discover useful laws. In fact, many scales disguise the existence of regularities, and many others fail to reveal them. The descriptive utility of a scale must be considered independently of its theoretical fertility, for the two considerations may lead in different directions. The proliferation of scales, like the proliferation of statistical analyses, often merely clogs the channels of communication. There is no magic about numbers per se, and only hard thinking and good fortune, in combination, achieve a worthwhile new scale. The same is true of classification. The cluster concept is peculiarly suited to the needs of statistical scaling and to those of statistical inference in general. [See CLUSTERING; SCALING.] Evaluation. The notion of measurement phases quite gradually into that of evaluation. "Pecking order," "peer-group ranking," and "intelligence quotient" can all, in certain contexts, appear as value-impregnated scales. This is often disputed by those who think "value" is a dirty word. Social scientists are peculiarly susceptible to the charms of the Weberian myth of a value-free social science, which rests on a one-sided interpretation of the distinction between facts and values. In its more defensible form this distinction amounts to the assertion that (a) evaluation depends on establishing certain facts; and (£>) evaluation goes beyond the facts on which it depends. To this it can be objected that evaluation may well result in facts, albeit facts different from those with which it begins. Thus Consumer Reports can often substantiate
SCIENCE: The Philosophy of Science evaluations such as "Brand X is the best dishwasher on the market today" on the basis of performance data plus data about the consumers' wants. And that evaluation, when suitably supported, simply states a fact about Brand X. It is one thing to be cautious about importing dubious value premises into an argument; it is another to suppose that all value premises or conclusions are dubious, "mere matters of opinion." It is not at all dubious that dishwashers should get the dishes clean, that clocks should keep good time, and so on. It may simply be a fact that Brand X of dishwasher excels at its task. Since the evaluation is nothing more than a combination of these facts, it is itself a fact, although it is also an evaluation. Precisely this analysis applies to myriad issues in the social sciences—evaluation of the relative merits of protective tariff barriers and direct subsidies or of different forms of treatment for dysfunctional neurosis, to name only two examples. Of course, there are many other issues where only a relativized answer is possible, since legitimate differences of taste exist (that is, differences where no argument can establish the superiority of any particular taste). But this in no way distinguishes evaluation from theoretical interpretation. It will not do to say that "in principle" these differences can be resolved in the theoretical area when more facts are available, but not in the evaluation area. Not only are there very fundamental disagreements about the function of theory that make this improbable, but additional facts often reduce value disagreement. In any case, relativized answers, which are still value judgments, admit of no disagreement, and therefore do not involve subjectivity. It is simply naive to suppose that fields must, if they are to be regarded as objective, always contain answers to questions of the form "Which is the best X?" Neither mathematics nor engineering has this property, or any corresponding property with respect to "Which is the true solution to X?," where the conditions of X are incompletely specified. As to the final defense of the distinction between fact and value—that a particular choice of ultimate values, or ends, cannot be proved true—three answers apply: (1) No such choice has to be proved true, only relevant. (2) No one has yet produced a demonstrably ultimate value, and it seems clear that the hierarchical model is as inappropriate here as it is in epistemology. (There are no ultimate, or basic, facts, only some that are more reliable than others; and all can—under pressure—be given support by appeal to others.) (3) In the case of moral values, where some need for a single
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answer can be demonstrated, there is a perfectly good way of handling any moral disputes that are likely to arise in the social sciences. This is by appealing to the equality of prima-facie rights— the fundamental axiom of democracy. Justification of this is itself one of the most important tasks of the social sciences and requires contributions from game theory, political science, economics, sociology, and psychology, as well as from the obvious candidate, anthropology. It is the problem of deciding on the best system of sublegal mores—insofar, of course, as any answer is possible. But this type of problem is already familiar: it is an efficiency problem. Indeed, the social sciences have for too long been reticent about pointing out the extent to which it is possible both to give answers to moral problems and to refute some of the current answers to them. For some reason, the sound point that there are many areas of morality where there cannot yet be any proof of the superiority of a particular answer is taken to imply that acting as if any answer were correct is defensible. But of course the only defensible position in such a situation is a compromise or, if possible, a suspension of action. In my opinion, the axiom of equal primafacie rights can be shown to be superior to any alternative, and also to be capable of generating a complete moral system. It achieves both of these ends by being the only such axiom that can be satisfactorily supported, and of course it roughly coincides with the Golden Rule and other basic maxims (details of this line of argument will be found in Scriven 1966). At any rate, it is time that the possibility of this kind of "strategic ethics" was examined by all the strategists who have sprung up to look at other kinds of social interaction in terms of the language of games. In summary, the scientific approach to evaluation necessarily involves both applied science (finding the best solution to a practical problem) and pure science (finding the best estimate, hypothesis, or experimental design). Moreover, the element of evaluation enters into much "straight" measurement—that of intelligence, creativity, and social acceptability, for instance. The reason for this is as simple as the reason for introducing new classifications: we have to order our knowledge if we are to use it efficiently. It follows that the most appropriate kind of order is determined by the use to which that knowledge is to be put. One might put the point paradoxically and say that all science is applied science. The application may be to efficient explanation, accurate prediction, or improvement of the world, but it is still—in one important
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sense—an application. Nor can we assess (that is, evaluate) theories or instruments unless we have some analysis of their proposed use. Data analysis. There are obviously limitations on the memory storage capacity of the human brain that would make it impotent in the face of even a modest amount of data about the path of a projectile or a planet, if these data were presented in discrete form. But if we can find some simple pattern that the data follow, especially if it is a pattern that we are familiar with from some other, preferably visual, experience, then we can handle it quite easily. (The preference for visual models is due to the vastly greater channel capacity of the visual modality; the notion of "handling" involves more than simple recovery, and even that involves more than storage capacity, since it includes look-up and read-out time.) This simple point can be taken as the start for a complete data-processing approach to the aspects of structural philosophy of science that remain to be discussed. It also pervades the parts already discussed, for the introduction of concepts is itself a device to cope with the "buzzing, blooming confusion" of sense experience. Generalizations and laws. The simplest examples of the cognitive condensation described in the preceding section are laws and generalizations. They are so necessary that we are prepared to forgive them a very high degree of inaccuracy if only they will simplify the range of possibilities for us. Contrary to Karl Popper's view, which stresses the equivalence of a law to the denial of counterinstances, the present view suggests that we are rightly very unimpressed by counterinstances in this irregular world, and extremely thankful if we can find a regularity that provides a reasonable approximation over a good range of instances. This is as true in the physical sciences as in the social, for the laws of gases, the laws of motion, gravitation, radiation, and so on, are all merely approximations at best. There are occasional exceptions (for example, the third law of thermodynamics), but the important feature of a law is that it introduces a pattern where none was before. In this sense its truth is its utility, not its lack of error. A great deal has been made in the literature of the fact that a law will support counterfactual inferences while an accidental generalization will not (Nagel 1961, pp. 68-73; compare Strawson 1952, pp. 85, 197, 200). On the present view, all this means is that we think natural laws are true of continuing or pervasive phenomena, i.e., of the nature of things. All other attempts to give logical analyses of the concept of law—for instance,
the view that laws cannot contain reference to particular entities, or must support predictions— seem to me simply arbitrary. Explanation. The task of explanation is the integration of "new" phenomena (whether subjectively or objectively new makes no difference) into the structure of knowledge. Typically, this consists in fitting these phenomena into a pattern with which we are already familiar. But explanation is not simply reduction to the familiar. Indeed, it may involve reducing the familiar to the unfamiliar, as Popper (1963, p. 63) has pointed out. But it must involve reducing the uncomprehended phenomenon to phenomena that are comprehended, and it is hardly surprising if this sometimes increases the sense of familiarity. It has long been argued that the way in which explanation is performed in science always involves subsuming the phenomenon to be explained under a known law [see SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION]. In view of the known deficiencies in our scientific laws, explanation, if this theory were acceptable, would in any case be a rather imprecise affair. But the restriction to laws is too confining, unless one treats the term "law" so loosely that it covers almost any statement except a pure particular. The real danger in this model of explanation—the "deductive" model, as it is usually called—is that it seems to support the view that explanations are closely related to predictions. In contrast, the "pattern" model of explanation, which I prefer, allows for retrospectively applicable patterns as well as for those which can be grasped in advance , of their completion. It happens that this is very important in the behavioral sciences, since there is, and always will be, a real shortage of "two-way" laws (that is, laws that both predict and explain). This has typically been treated by social scientists as a sign of the immaturity of their subject; but in fact it is simply a sign of its nature and is very like the situation in the "messier" areas of the physical sciences, especially engineering. When a bridge fails, or a mob riots, or a patient commits suicide, there are often a number of possible explanations, of which only one "fits the facts." We thus have no difficulty in saying that this one is the explanation, although the facts available before the event were not enough to permit us to tell what would happen. Indeed, it may be that the chances in advance were very strongly against the actual outcome, and that we would therefore have been entitled to make a well-founded scientific prediction of the event's nonoccurrence. It is not helpful to suggest in such cases that we are explaining by deduction from a law. What sort of
SCIENCE: The Philosophy of Science law? That some factors can cause others? That only certain factors cause a certain effect? These are indeed general propositions, but they do not look much like laws of the usual kind, and they do not support any predictions at all. It is not in the least important whether or not we call them laws, but it is important to understand that we often support explanations by appealing to general claims that will not support predictions. Prediction. On the other hand, it is often possible to predict on the basis of laws that do not explain. Any reliable correlation, however little we understand it, will give us a basis for predicting (that is, of course, provided there is temporal separation between the two correlated factors). To be able to predict, we need only to be able to infer that an event must occur at some conveniently remote time in the future. To explain, on the other hand, we have only to show why something occurred, not necessarily that it had to occur. For a long time it was thought that the only way we could be sure to avoid ad hoc explanations was to require that (a) the grounds for the explanation be known to be true and (fo) these same grounds imply only one possible outcome, the event or phenomenon to be explained. But there are many ways in which we can show that a particular explanation is correct in a particular case without having to show that the factors mentioned in the explanation would enable one to infer the explained event. For example, we may demonstrate the presence and operation of a particular cause by exhibiting some clues that uniquely identify its modus operandi. Of course, we may still have reason to believe that there are certain other factors present which, in conjunction with the factors we have identified, would enable us to make a formal inference that the event we have explained was bound to occur. But in many cases we do not know what those other factors are, and we do not know the laws that would make the inference possible. In fact, our belief that we may still be able to make this inference merely indicates that we believe in determinism. It certainly does not prove that a good scientific explanation demonstrates the necessity of what it explains. No doubt it is tempting to remark that a complete explanation would have this property, but even this approach is wrong. In the first place, there are many so-called complete scientific explanations that do not have it. Second, this approach recommends a use of the term "complete explanation" that has the unpromising property of identifying mere subsumption under a generaliza-
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tion as complete explanation. But the genius of Freud, for instance, was not manifested by proving that the "explanation" of obsessive behavior in a particular neurotic was that this behavior was common in neurotics. Rather, he claimed to show a causal connection between certain other factors and obsessive behavior; and a causal connection is neither as strong nor as weak as a high correlation, it is simply quite different. Causes. We are often able to identify causes in the social sciences without being able to give the laws and other factors in conjunction with which they operate to bring about their effects. The basic control group study is a case in point. It may give us excellent grounds for supposing, let us say, that a particular drug accelerates the subjects' rate of response, but it does not tell us what other factors are necessary conditions for this effect. Of course, we know that it is some set of the factors which are present, but we do not know which set. In more complex cases, even though a particular factor does not reliably lead to this effect, we may establish it as the cause simply by elimination of the alternative possible causes, either through their absence or through the presence of clues showing that, although present, they could not have been active this time. Of course, causal explanations are incomplete in the sense that there are always further interesting questions about the phenomenon that we would like answered. But this is also true even when we can subsume the explanation under a law: for instance, we can ask why the law is true. But causal explanations are often complete in the sense that they tell us exactly what we need to know, for our interest in a phenomenon is often very specific. Thus explanation is a context-dependent notion; explanations are devices for filling in our understanding, and the notion of the explanation makes sense only when there is a standard background of knowledge and understanding, as in the normal pedagogical development of an academic subject. Understanding. The key notion behind that of explanation, and hence that of cause, is understanding. It must not be thought of purely as a subjective feeling; the feeling is only something associated with it. The condition of understanding itself is an objectively testable one; in fact, it regularly is tested by examinations, which are supposed to stress the detection of "real understanding," not just rote knowledge. Understanding is integrated, related knowledge; more generally—so that the definition will apply to the understanding possessed by machines, animals, and children— it is the capacity to produce the appropriate re-
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sponse to novel stimuli within a certain range or field. It is a characteristic of tests for understanding that they present the student with new problems, and the possession of understanding is valuable just because it does embody this capacity to handle novelty. Approaching it in this way, we see immediately that the question of how the brain can provide this capacity is of interest not only from a neurophysiological point of view but possibly also as a way of obtaining better insight into the nature of understanding itself. In fact, a remarkable overlap emerges between the requirements of efficient storage and understanding, as it is commonly conceived. Efficient storage, both to economize on storage capacity and to facilitate fast recovery and input, must use mapping, modeling, and simplifying procedures. But these are exactly what we use in the process of trying to understand phenomena, even in the more pragmatic process of trying to improve our classifications, descriptions, and predictions. Thus, to mention one example of how fruitful this conception is, the idea of simplicity, which has often been recognized as a criterion for satisfactory scientific theories, can be seen as equivalent to the familiar notion of economy, not as some mysterious aesthetic requirement. Nor is the whole aim of understanding to be seen as a concession to human weakness; for the most sophisticated and capacious computers we shall ever design will be hard pressed to store even part of the brain's data and will therefore have to employ procedures that economize on storage space. Putting the matter more strongly, a simple map stores an infinity of facts with very little complication in the read-out procedures, in comparison with list storage, and an enormous improvement in speed of readout (that is, of recall); it also handles a quantity of information that would be beyond the capacity of ordinary list storage. (The difference between the use of models and the use of mnemonics is that the model stores an indefinite number of facts, which the mnemonic does not, and the model stores them in a way that is more directly related to truth.) Models, from analogies to axiomatizations, are the key to understanding. [See VERSTEHEN.] Experimentation. The use of applied science for the purpose of controlling reality has its counterpart within the methodology of science itself in the area of experimentation. Thus applied science is to pure science as experimentation is to pure observation. In each case the armory of relevant methods is importantly different: the "purer" subjects are more concerned with understanding and
description; the more applied ones, with causation and manipulation. Indeed, it does not appear possible to give an analysis of "cause" without some reference to manipulation, though a great deal can be said before coming to the irreducible element of intervention or action. [See CAUSATION.] A number of topics have not been discussed here, although they are closely related. For example, the problem of the reduction of one science or theory to another is a combination of a problem about explanation with one about definition. I have also said very little, even implicitly, about the issue of free will versus determinism, and wish only to state that it now seems possible to reconcile the two positions, provided we first make a distinction between predictive and explanatory determinism. In conclusion, I should stress my conviction that there is very little in the social sciences that does not have a parallel in the physical sciences, but it has not been to these parallels that social scientists have turned for paradigms. They have turned instead to the absurdly oversimple paradigms of Newtonian mechanics and astronomy. Even there, the significant fact is that the problem of predicting the motion of pure pointmasses, moving under the sole influence of the very simple force of gravity, passes from the realm where solutions and predictions are possible to the realm where solutions give way to (at best) explications as soon as the number of bodies is increased from two to three. It is surely absurd to imagine that the forces acting on human beings are simpler than those involved in the "three-body problem." And if this is so, then we need a new "methodology of the complex domain," perhaps along the lines indicated above. MICHAEL SCRIVEN [Directly related are the entries CAUSATION; EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN; MODELS, MATHEMATICAL; MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS; POSITIVISM; PREDICTION; PROBABILITY; SCIENCE, article on THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE; SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION; STATISTICS, article on THE FIELD; SYSTEMS ANALYSIS, article OU GENERAL SYSTEMS THEORY; VALUES; VERSTEHEN;
and in the biographies of COHEN; GALTON; HUME; KOYRE; PEARSON; PEIRCE; SCHLICK; WEBER, MAX; YULE.] BIBLIOGRAPHY Contemporary philosophers of science can be roughly classified as either post-positivists (who form the majority) or linguistic analysts. For examples of work by leading post-positivists, see Popper 1934; 1957; Carnap 1950; Reichenbach 1951; Hempel 1952; 1965; Braithwaite 1953; Nagel 1961; Feyerabend 1962; Kemeny & Snell 1962; Suppes & Zinnes 1963. There are many important topics on which
SCIENCE: The Philosophy of Science these authors disagree, but it seems fair to say that among the predecessors they would be prepared to acknoivledge are such founders of modern positivism as Karl Pearson, Moritz Schlick, and Ernst Mach. Other outstanding earlier writers who, although somewhat untypical of the field, have contributed to the philosophy of science in general, not just the post-positivist branch of it, include C. S. Peirce, Max Weber, N. R. Campbell, P. W. Bridgman, and Harold Jeffreys. Works by philosophers of science who use at least some of the methods of the linguistic analysts, even if they would not all classify themselves as such, include, in the study of the physical sciences, Toulmin 1953; Polanyi 1958; in the study of the social sciences, Dray 1957; Winch 1958; Kaplan 1964; Scriven 1966; and, in the field of measurement and probability, Ellis 1966; Hacking 1965. Certain trends in the history of science, particularly in the emphasis, developed in Butterfield 1950 and Kuhn 1962, and by Alexandre Koyre, on autonomous conceptual schemes as units of progress, have influenced the philosophy of science. These trends have in turn been influenced by philosophical works such as Feyerabend 1962; Hesse 1963. Among the extremely valuable contributions to the philosophy of science made by practicing social scientists, special note should be taken of Simon 19471956; Skinner 1953; Meehl 1954; Stevens 1958; Chomsky 1966. Of the general treatises available in 1966, only McEwen 1963 and Kaplan 1964 are concerned principally with the social sciences, although Nagel 1961 and Hempel 1965 deal with them to some extent. Lazarsfeld 1954; Natanson 1963; Braybrooke 1966 are interesting collections that focus exclusively on the social sciences. As an introduction to the philosophical problems of the social sciences, Kaplan 1964 is to be recommended to layman and expert alike, although the work takes an approach somewhat different from that presented in this article. BRAITHWAITE, R. B. 1953 Scientific Explanation: A Study of the Function of Theory, Probability and Law in Science. Cambridge Univ. Press. -» A paperback edition was published in 1960 by Harper. BRAYBROOKE, DAVID (editor) 1966 Philosophical Problems of the Social Sciences. New York: Macmillan. BRIDGMAN, P. W. (1927) 1946 The Logic of Modern Physics. New York: Macmillan. BUTTERFIELD, HERBERT (1950) 1957 The Origins of Modern Science, 1300-1800. 2d ed., rev. New York: Macmillan. -» A paperback edition was published in 1962 by Collier. CAMPBELL, NORMAN R. (1920) 1957 Foundations of Science: The Philosophy of Theory and Experiment. New York: Dover. -> First published as Physics: The Elements. CARNAP, RUDOLF (1950) 1962 The Logical Foundations of Probability. 2d ed. Univ. of Chicago Press. CHOMSKY, NOAM 1966 Cartesian Linguistics: A Chapter in the History of Rationalist Thought. New York: Harper. DRAY, WILLIAM (1957) 1964 Laws and Explanation in History. Oxford Univ. Press. ELLIS, BRIAN 1966 Basic Concepts of Measurement. Cambridge Univ. Press. FEIGL, HERBERT; and SCRIVEN, MICHAEL (editors) 1956 The Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Psychology and Psychoanalysis. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 1. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press. FEYERABEND, P. K. 1962 Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism. Pages 28-97 in Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell (editors), Scientific Explanation, Space, and Time. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 3. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press.
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HACKING, IAN 1965 Logic of Statistical Inference. Cambridge Univ. Press. HEMPEL, CARL G. 1952 Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science. Volume 2, number 7, in International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. Univ. of Chicago Press. HEMPEL, CARL G. 1965 Aspects of Scientific Explanation, and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. New York: Free Press. HESSE, MARY B. 1963 Models and Analogies in Science. London: Sheed & Ward. JEFFREYS, HAROLD (1931) 1957 Scientific Inference. 2d ed. Cambridge Univ. Press. KAPLAN, ABRAHAM 1964 The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science. San Francisco: Chandler. KEMENY, JOHN G.; and SNELL, J. LAURIE 1962 Mathematical Models in the Social Sciences. Boston: Ginn. KUHN, THOMAS S. 1962 Ihe Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Univ. of Chicago Press. -> A paperback edition was published in 1964. LAZARSFELD, PAUL F. (editor) (1954) 1955 Mathematical Thinking in the Social Sciences. 2d ed., rev. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. McEwEN, WILLIAM P. 1963 The Problem of Socialscientific Knowledge. Totowa, N.J.: Bedminster. MEEHL, PAUL E. (1954) 1956 Clinical Versus Statistical Prediction: A Theoretical Analysis and a Review of the Evidence. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press. NAGEL, ERNEST 1961 The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation. New York: Harcourt. NATANSON, MAURICE (editor) 1963 Philosophy of the Social Sciences: A Reader. New York: Random House. POLANYI, MICHAEL 1958 Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-critical Philosophy. Univ. of Chicago Press. POPPER, KARL R. (1934) 1959 The Logic of Scientific Discovery. New York: Basic Books. -» First published as Logik der Forschung. POPPER, KARL R. 1957 The Poverty of Historicism. Boston: Beacon. POPPER, KARL R. 1963 Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knoivledge. New York: Basic Books; London: Routledge. REICHENBACH, HANS (1951) 1959 Probability Methods in Social Science. Pages 121-128 in Daniel Lerner and Harold D. Lasswell (editors), The Policy Sciences: Recent Developments in Scope and Method. Stanford Univ. Press. SCRIVEN, MICHAEL 1956 A Possible Distinction Between Traditional Scientific Disciplines and the Study of Human Behavior. Pages 88-130 in Herbert Feigl and Michael Scriven (editors), The Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Psychology and Psychoanalysis. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 1. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press. SCRIVEN, MICHAEL 1959 Truisms as the Grounds for Historical Explanations. Pages 443-475 in Patrick L. Gardiner (editor), Theories of History. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. SCRIVEN, MICHAEL 1962 Explanations, Predictions and Laws. Pages 170-230 in Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell (editors), Scientific Explanation, Space, and Time. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 3. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press. SCRIVEN, MICHAEL 1965 An Essential Unpredictability in Human Behavior. Pages 411-425 in Benjamin B.
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Wolman and Ernest Nagel (editors), Scientific Psychology: Principles and Approaches. New York: Basic Books. SCRIVEN, MICHAEL 1966 Primary Philosophy. New York: McGraw-Hill. SIMON, HERBERT A. (1947-1956) 1957 Models of Man; Social and Rational: Mathematical Essays on Rational Human Behavior in a Social Setting. New York: Wiley. SKINNER, B. F. (1953) 1964 Science and Human Behavior. New York: Macmillan. STEVENS, S. S. 1958 Problems and Methods of Psychophysics. Psychological Bulletin 55:177-196. STRAWSON, P. F. 1952 Introduction to Logical Theory. London: Methuen; New York: Wiley. SUPPES, PATRICK; and ZINNES, JOSEPH L. 1963 Basic Measurement Theory. Volume 1, pages 1-76 in R. Duncan Luce, Robert R. Bush, and Eugene Galanter (editors), Handbook of Mathematical Psychology. New York: Wiley. TOULMIN, STEPHEN 1953 The Philosophy of Science: An Introduction. London: Hutchinson's University Library. -» A paperback edition was published in 1960 by Harper. WINCH, PETER (1958) 1963 The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy. London: Routledge; New York: Humanities. Ill THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE
If the sociology of knowledge is defined as the part of sociology that studies the nature of and relations between different types of idea systems, on the one side, and the relations between these idea systems and a variety of institutional (or social-structural) and personality factors, on the other, then the sociology of science is one part of the sociology of knowledge. It is the part that specializes in defining the nature of scientific ideas and in describing their relations both to other kinds of ideas (e.g., ideological, philosophical, aesthetic, religious) and to various institutional and personality factors. Parsons (1951, especially chapter 8) has given us what is still the best analytic definition of idea systems in general and their several specialized subtypes, although further analysis and operational specification of his classification are necessary. The sociology of science, as is the case with all sociology, general or special, is primarily interested in the construction of a set of highly generalized, systematic, and relatively exhaustive concepts and propositions of relationship. In this enterprise it uses data from all historical periods and all cultures, since its main concern is not with history as such, but with establishing sociological concepts and propositions. The history of science, although it always should use such explicit sociological concepts and propositions, often does not, preferring
its traditional, less examined, and frequently common-sense ways of treating its materials. In either case, the history of science, both advertently and inadvertently, may be productive of materials or even of new concepts and propositions for the sociology of science, but this is not its essential task. Thus, the sociology of science and the history of science overlap but do not coincide. The sociology of science, finally, is interested both in fundamental scientific ideas themselves and in the application of these fundamental ideas, or of more empirical ideas, to technology. In its study of technology, again, the sociology of science uses both historical and contemporary data, drawn from a variety of cultures, regardless of the original purpose for which these data were collected, so long as they serve its primary goal of constructing a system of analytic concepts and propositions. The social nature of science. One of the basic working assumptions of structural-functional theory in sociology is that man's behavior in society is a response to certain functional problems that he confronts in his nonsocial and social environments. On this assumption, sociology sees man's scientific behavior as his response to the functional problem created by his need to have adequate adjustive knowledge of the physical, biological, and social aspects of the empirical world. Such knowledge is indispensable for some form of adjustment to that world in its three essential and different aspects. Everywhere, as archeology, ethnology, history, and sociology have severally demonstrated, man in society has a certain amount of this scientific knowledge. The amount, of course, varies a great deal among societies. In other words, science, as Malinowski recognized (1916-1941), is a matter of degree, with some societies having only a relatively small amount and others having a great deal more. This, indeed, sets some of the essential problems for the sociology of science. For it is not only the universal occurrence of at least a small amount of scientific knowledge, but also the patterns of variation in the degree of development of such knowledge in different societies, and variations at different stages in the evolution of a single society, that the sociology of science has undertaken to explain. In order to explain the degree of development of science considered as a complex whole, it is necessary to distinguish its component cultural, social, and psychological parts, for each of these can develop at somewhat different rates in different social situations. It is useful to define at least four general components of science as a whole,
SCIENCE: The Sociology of Science each of which has a measure of autonomy: substantive scientific ideas; scientific methodology, including both ideas and instruments; scientific roles; and motivational and reward systems for scientific roles. Let us consider, again because this sets important problems that the sociology of science has been trying to explain, how each of the components varies along certain dimensions. Substantive scientific ideas vary along three dimensions: of generality, or abstractness, as it is also often called; of systematization; and of exhaustiveness for the relevant aspects of the phenomena. We may say that the more abstract, the more systematic, and the more nearly exhaustive a set of substantive scientific ideas is, the greater the degree of its scientific development. Among the interesting problems that the sociology of science tries to explain is the question of why the physical sciences on the whole have developed more rapidly in all three respects than have the biological sciences and why these, in turn, have developed more rapidly than the social sciences. Within each of these broad sectors of science, moreover, further variation in the degree of development of specialized subsciences poses similar problems for explanation. For example, the more rapid recent development of economics than of political science or sociology can be explained, in part, by the greater accessibility of data on price phenomena than of data on people's political and social norms and actual behavior. This greater accessibility is due, in turn, and again in part, to the more pressing felt needs that governments and business firms have for price data. Knowledge about the ideas and instruments (or technology) that make up scientific methodology also varies in its degree of development. It is clear that modern science has made great advances over earlier science in the sophistication of its knowledge about such essential methodological matters as the character of concepts and classifications, the logic of comparison and inference, and the functions of contrived and natural experimentation. Modern science is also at a great advantage over earlier science in the degree of its access to ordering and measuring facilities. Mathematics is, of course, the most important of such facilities, and its development has been of very great moment in the closely related development of all the sciences, although, again, to varying degrees among the several sciences, for interesting sociological reasons. In addition to mathematics, such instruments as thermometers, high-speed electronic computers, and a thousand others have contributed significantly to the advances of the sciences. Both
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the development of these measuring facilities and their adoption by the several sciences are important focuses for research in the sociology of science. Since they may develop sometimes as a direct result of changes in scientific ideas, but also sometimes independently, methodological ideas and instruments have various types of relationships with substantive scientific ideas. When they develop to some extent independently, as in the cases of the telescope or the computer, for example, methodological ideas and instruments may at certain times play the leading part in the development of a whole sector or subsector of science. Or again, it is an important sociological fact about the prospects of the social sciences that their ability to borrow a great deal of the methodological sophistication developed in the other sectors of science is a key asset for their own development. There is also considerable variation among societies in the degree of differentiation and specialization of social roles for engaging in the many types of scientific behavior, in the proportion of members of the society engaged in these roles, in the kinds and amounts of support given to these roles, and in the degree of institutionalization of scientific roles. The sociology of science has been much concerned with these essential problems of the social organization or role component of science, so much so that we shall take them up below, in a separate and detailed discussion. Finally, motivational and reward systems for scientific roles also vary among and within societies. They differ in the type of rewards, in the strength of motivation, and in the degree of diffusion of adequate incentives throughout the population as a whole. Again, we shall consider this matter more fully below. The development of science Viewed in the long perspective, science shows a history of continuity and cumulation from the earliest prehistory of man to the present. However, this history has been marked by quite different rates of development in different times and places. It is this unevenness in its progress, viewed in terms of shorter perspectives, that calls for explanation by the sociology of science. As the sociology of science has itself made progress, a few basic principles of explanation have come to appear sound. One is the principle that no single cultural, social, or psychological factor, such as religion or economic forces, can account for the growth of science as a whole or any of its several components or subsciences. Another such principle
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is that not even any single combination of factors, such as the religious and the economic, or the political and the educational, is sufficient for the tasks of the sociology of science. This is not to say that there are not some combinations of factors more favorable than others for certain kinds of specific development in science, as our discussion of the Protestant ethic will illustrate. There definitely are such favorable combinations, and the sociology of science has improved its ability to discover them by accepting the principle that certain types and rates of development may come from one set of factors (or one set of values of these factors taken as variables) and that other types and rates may come from a different set of factors (or a different set of variables-values). The following discussion will consider some of the major factors that affect the development of science. They exert their influence on science always in combination, and the relative weight of the influence of each may vary in different specific instances. Structural and cultural differentiation. The greater the degree of structural differentiation in a society, that is, of the specialization of roles between the major institutional sectors and within them as well, the more favorable the situation for the development of science. Greater structural differentiation provides the necesary situation not only for a variety of highly specialized scientific roles but also for their highly specialized ancillary and supporting roles in other institutional sectors. Besides role differentiation, differentiation within culture, that is, in the various systems of ideas in society, is also favorable to the development of science. For example, as Charles Gillispie (1960) has shown, the development of what he calls "the edge of objectivity" of scientific ideas has increased as these ideas have progressively been differentiated from moral ideas about man's place in the universe. The more that values, ideologies, aesthetic ideas, and philosophical ideas are distinguished both from one another and from substantive scientific ideas, the easier it is to see the special problems of each and to develop each and all of them. Value systems. Certain values which the modern world tends to take for granted, but which have not existed in many past societies, certainly in nothing like the same degree, are much more favorable to the development of science than are their opposites. The high value the modern world puts on rationality as against traditionalism, on this-worldly activities as against other-worldly activities, on libertarianism as against authoritarianism, on active striving as against passive adapta-
tion to the world, and on equality as against inequality—all these values support the development of the several components of science. Sometimes the support is direct, as in the case of the values of rationality and this-worldly interest, values which are especially powerful in combination, as they are in the modern world. Libertarianism is essential for academic freedom, which is one kind of important foundation for scientific progress. Sometimes the support from values is indirect, as when the value of equality increases the amount of social mobility and thus helps to select better talent for scientific roles. Instrumental needs. Scientific knowledge is power, that is, power to adjust more or less satisfactorily to the nonsocial environment and to the internal and external social environment. Some scientific discovery and technological innovation, then, is a response to immediate instrumental needs for adjustment to what are defined as dangerous and harsh environments. Certainly this must have been an especially large influence on the development of science in the early stages of human society, when every bit of scientific knowledge was of great instrumental importance in a threatening and severe physical and social environment. But even powerful modern industrial societies respond strongly to their instrumental needs for science. Whatever their values in regard to science, they feel an urgent need to use it to strengthen their national defense, promote industrial and agricultural growth, and improve the health of their populations. Some scientists deplore this "exploitation" of science, that is, this encouragement of science "not for science's own sake." But the instrumental needs of even already powerful societies are defined by their citizens as more important under some circumstances than the value considerations that are preferred by scientists and by those who share the values that support science directly. Finally, the nonindustrial or underdeveloped societies of the present also push the acquisition of science for urgent instrumental needs, to cope with "the revolution of rising expectations" in their populations. Economic factors. A variety of economic structures, needs, and resources, often combined with one or more other social factors, have had very large direct and indirect influences on the development of science. There is no blinking this fact, no matter how much some scientists may think it stains the "purity" of science and regardless of whether one thinks some Marxist sociologists of science have exaggerated it. Only a few of the myriad effects of economic activities on science
SCIENCE: The Sociology of Science can be given in illustration here. As Merton has shown (1936; 1939), in the case of seventeenthcentury England, for example, the growing maritime interests, both commercial and naval shipping, were in need of more reliable techniques of navigation. The existing techniques included neither good chronometers nor any sure way of determining longitude at sea. These economic and military-political needs were a direct stimulus, through prizes offered for discoveries and inventions, to basic discoveries in astronomy and on the nature of the spring. Or again, earlier, in sixteenthcentury Europe, economic needs for more powerful methods of pumping water out of mines than were provided by the existing Archimedean screw pumps led to work by Evangelista Torricelli and Vincenzo Viviani on the relations between atmospheric pressure and water level. On the basis of this work, successful suction pumps for industrial use were constructed. But this scientific work also led to the invention of the barometer by Torricelli, to the creation of a vacuum by Otto von Guericke, and to a whole host of scientific experiments and results with the so-called "air pump" by Robert Boyle and his colleagues in the newly founded Royal Society. This example shows how economic needs, science, and technology affect each other in complex and often mutually beneficial ways. In the modern world, both industrial organizations and governments in all societies have provided many kinds of support for science in order to pursue economic interests and needs. Direct support exists in the form of governmental and industrial research laboratories; indirect support is given through tax provisions and other subsidies to both the universities and industry. One of the largest areas of governmental response to economic needs has been agricultural research, which is largely biological research but also includes the physical and social sciences. It should be noted that both "capitalist" and "socialist" societies and both "planning" and "nonplanning" societies have supported science through their responsiveness to the economic interests of special groups in the society and of society as a whole. The desirability of using science to meet economic needs and increase economic resources is no longer anywhere in question among the societies of the modern world. Political structures and needs. Political and economic factors have often tended to be closely combined in their effects on science. Of course, the political factor has also had a great influence on science separately, for example, because of the military needs that governments have had. After the recent history of the part that governments have
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played in the development of atomic science for politico-military needs, this point hardly needs further illustration. But this connection between politico-military needs and science is far from new. Governments have always sought to increase military firepower through the development of science. Research on the nature of metals, on the causes of chemical reactions and explosions, and on the mathematics of the curves of ballistic missiles has been spurred by military needs. Religion. Values and religion are closely connected in every society. A religion that supports modern values, which in turn favor science, is, of course, a strong support for the development of science. This specific connection is what Merton has sought to demonstrate in his analysis of the relations between the complex of values and religious beliefs that constitute the Protestant ethic, on the one hand, and the great development of seventeenth-century English science (1936; 1939). The values and beliefs of the Protestant ethic have now been secularized and diffused to many social milieus other than the ones in which they originally arose. In their secular form they are even more powerful supports for the development of science. The relations between a religion and science are always, it should be carefully noted, complex and at partial cross purposes. Thus, although the general beliefs and values of the liberal forms of Protestant Christianity have been favorable to the development of science, even these liberal elements have sometimes protested against specific scientific discoveries that have apparently contradicted basic doctrines of their own. Thus, as Gillispie (1951) has shown, some liberal Protestants who still held to the Biblical conceptions of miraculous floods and other catastrophes were opposed to the notion of geological uniformitarianism when this new scientific idea was first developed in the early nineteenth century. And, a little later, as Dupree (1959) and Lurie (1960) have suggested, there was the same kind of resistance for a while to Darwin's discovery of uniformities in the development of man and the other animal species. In analyzing the relations between religion and science, the sociology of science treats them both as complex phenomena and looks for specific connections between their specific components. The educational system. The maintenance and development of science is facilitated by an educational system that is sufficiently specialized for, and sympathetic to, the growing science of its time. For example, as we may learn from BenDavid (1960), new educational institutions developed for that purpose played an essential role in
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the development of French science during the early nineteenth century and in Germany a little later. All the modernizing countries of recent times, from Russia to the small and weak African countries, have greatly strengthened their educational systems at all levels because of their desire to improve their science. Before modern times, the universities were not the home of scientific development, which they have since become. As late as "the Great Instauration" of science in seventeenth-century England, the universities were still indifferent or hostile to science, but a variety of other extremely favorable social conditions helped science to flourish. This hostility continued for some time. Now, of course, a university that is hostile or indifferent to science can exist only in a society, or in one of its parts, that is content to remain a scientific backwater. Social stratification system. A system of social stratification that emphasizes the value of equality and that, in fact, realizes a high degree of social mobility for the members of a society seems to be more favorable for the development of science than is the opposite, or closed, type of system. By providing a greater degree of equality for talent, wherever in the society it originates, the open type of system can provide greater resources of talent for manning scientific posts. Of course, if scientific roles are not highly valued, rising talent will go elsewhere, but the two factors in combination—a high value on science and the openness of the channels of social mobility—are very favorable to the development of science. In the modern world, both of these conditions have been realized in ever greater measure in the older industrial societies. And the newly modernizing societies, as Dedijer (1961) has described them, are making great efforts to bring them into being almost overnight. Differentiation of the scientific role In relatively undifferentiated societies, past or contemporary, there are few roles for full-time "intellectuals," as we may roughly characterize all those whose special function is to deal in some kind of idea system. However, as societies become less simple and more structurally differentiated, the role of intellectual enlarges and is occupied by at least a few individuals on a full-time basis and with support from a variety of sources: a religious organization, the political magnates, or inherited wealth. Certainly in Greece by the fifth century B.C., the role of intellectual had emerged and was occupied with great distinction by men who have influenced all subsequent thought—men like Plato and Aristotle. It should be noted, however, that the
ideas with which such intellectuals dealt were relatively much less differentiated than ideas are in the modern world. On the whole, the intellectual still deals alike with religious, scientific, ethical, political, and philosophical ideas; indeed, the term "philosophy" covers all knowledge, all types of ideas. But it is not until the beginnings of the modern world that this further process of differentiation occurs, that is, differentiation between types of ideas, and makes way for the specialized roles dealing wholly or primarily with scientific ideas. This differentiation of the scientific role from other intellectual roles was slow in occurring, even in the modern world. In seventeenth-century England, the new science was still called "the new philosophy." And the oldest scientific society in the United States, founded in 1743 by Benjamin Franklin, among others, was called the American Philosophical Society. So little differentiated was the specialized role of scientist and so few were those who occupied this role, by whatever name and with whatever means of support, that it was not until the nineteenth century that the very term "scientist" was coined (by the Rev. William Whewell, in England in the 1840s). The process of differentiation of the role of scientist went slowly until the middle of the nineteenth century because of the difficulty of finding sources of support for it in the securely established social organizations and arrangements. Beginning in the sixteenth century, newly founded scientific societies provided various necessary facilities and supports for scientists, but only a handful of fulltime jobs. Governments did something more, but still there were very few full-time positions in government museums or research organizations. Some distinguished scientists, men like Franklin and Boyle, supported themselves on inherited or earned wealth. Others worked at nonscientific jobs as well, or alternated between scientific and other activities; such a scientist was Antoine Lavoisier. Very little was done by the universities and colleges of the time; not until the nineteenth century, and in most places only in the latter half of that century, did they open their doors wide to scientists. Full institutionalization was achieved, then, when universities, various governmental organizations, and many industrial firms recognized their great need for science, and established regular and permanent roles and careers for scientists. In addition, a variety of special research institutes, endowed by foundations, trade associations, and other special interest groups, or sometimes operated by private individuals for profit, provided further and ever more specialized jobs for scientists.
SCIENCE: The Sociology of Science The necessity and the legitimacy of the scientific role were increasingly acknowledged. One rough measure of the establishment of the scientific role in the modern world is the quantitative increase in the numbers of those who occupy the role. As Derek Price (1963) has shown, during the last 300 to 400 years there has been an exponential growth rate in the number of scientists in the modern world. Starting from very small numbers, to be sure, the rate of growth is such that there has been a doubling of the number of scientists in something like every 10 to 15 years. Because of the nature of exponential growth rates, the recent increase in the number of scientists has been especially large. Price estimates that about 90 per cent of all the scientists who have ever lived are still alive today. Given this growth rate, as well as other reasons, it is small wonder that the place of science in the modern world is not yet as settled as many would like. There is, unfortunately, no room here to treat some other aspects of the social organization of science. Such matters as patterns of authority, of collaboration, and of careers in scientific work have recently been well studied by Glaser (1964), Hagstrom (1965), and Zuckerman (1965), among others. Motivations and rewards for scientists The mere existence of social roles is not enough for their full institutionalization. Adequate and legitimate motivations in those who occupy the roles, and adequate and legitimate rewards from those who support the roles, must also exist. On the whole, in the modern world, and especially in the societies that modernized early, these motivations and rewards exist in sufficient measure. What little evidence we have on the motives of wrorking scientists indicates that, as in all other social roles, a variety of motives in different combinations is at work. For example, because the role of scientist now provides considerable stability, security, and prestige, many scientists are motivated in some measure to achieve these goals. Also, because specialization in basic scientific research provides considerable autonomy to the working scientist, many are motivated to achieve the independence and self-control that the role makes possible. In future social-psychological research on motivation for the scientific role, it will be desirable to keep in mind both the multiplicity of motives that can engage the competent scientist and the way in which the nature of his role structures certain typical combinations of motives. It would be interesting to establish the precise role
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of much-vaunted "curiosity" in the motivation of scientists. And it would also be desirable to use a typology of different scientific roles, along the lines suggested by Znaniecki (1940), such as theorist, experimenter, synthesizer, and similar functional types, to see if various typical combinations of motives exist in these different scientific specialties. As for rewards, the scientific role is now given satisfactory measures of such rewards as security, prestige, and money income to attract its fair share of the talented members of modern societies. As compared with those in business occupations, scientists tend to be rewarded with relatively more prestige for professional standing and relatively less money income. Among scientists themselves, and among the lay public to a lesser extent, there has developed a very elaborate set of symbolic rewards for differential prestige bestowed for differential achievement in science. The awarding of titles, prizes, medals, offices, and eponymous distinctions symbolizes the existing hierarchy of differential prestige. A Nobel Prize in any of the four scientific fields in which it is granted is only the best-known of the symbols of scientific achievement. The reward of prestige in science is given primarily for originality in scientific discovery, but, since it is sometimes difficult to appraise the degree of originality, sheer productivity may carry off the honors. Like other men in other roles, scientists are deeply concerned about the just distribution of rewards for their activities. Despite the norm of humility that prevails among them and that does influence their behavior, they are motivated to achieve credit for being original, just as businessmen are motivated to receive credit for making a profit. As a result of their concern, as Merton (1957) has so well shown, scientists take pride in priority of discovery and often engage in bitter quarrels over claims to priority. In sum, the role of the scientist is subject, as are all social roles, to a structured set of motivations and rewards, some of which are similar to those in other roles and some of which are different. The scientist is in no sense a "selfless" creature above and beyond the influences of his social role. During the last decade there has occurred the beginning of systematic research on what is called "the image" of the scientist that the public at large and various segments of the whole society, such as youth or the scientists themselves, actually hold. A favorable image of a social role is, of course, an important reward for those who fill it. The evidence accumulated by this research shows, on the whole, that the image of the scientist is a favorable one.
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But as Mead and Metraux (1957-1958) and Beardslee and O'Dowd (1961) have shown in their research, there are some negative tones in the picture—a fear and dislike for some of the characteristics and consequences of the scientific role. In short, there is some ambivalence toward scientists. In certain quarters, this admixture of negative feelings has been much deplored, despite the fact that such feelings probably exist for every social role. Because all social roles probably work at least some negative consequences for some people in some situations, it is Utopian to expect a wholly positive image for scientists or for those who occupy any other social-role category. Communication among scientists Since one essential ingredient in the development of science is the combination of already existing ideas, effective communication among scientists is an indispensable part of scientific activities. One of the important social inventions in the early modern period in science was the creation of local, national, and international societies and journals as means for the speedier and more general communication of scientific work within the community of scientists. In order to "keep up" in any branch of science, that is, to learn about the new ideas he can use to discover still further new ideas, the working scientist now has to spend a valuable part of his time with the professional journals, carefully studying a few and scanning many others. In addition to reading the journals, scientists communicate at the meetings of professional associations, both formally and informally. Here, too, as science has developed, there has been a proliferation of specialized groups to match the specialized journals and the specialized activities they report. And, finally, through informal visits, letters, telephone calls, and preprint mimeographed materials, scientists strive to maintain the effective communication without which their activities would be slowed down and even stopped. In his description of the exponential growth rates for different aspects of science, Price (1963) has also shown that there has been a doubling in the number of scientific journals every 10 to 15 years over the last three or four centuries. Because of this large increase, much of it necessary because of the growth of new scientific specialties, there has been some concern among scientists about the possibility of an excess of information; for some scientists, just "keeping up" has become ever more difficult. In response to this felt difficulty, abstracting services have been created and have multiplied, but still the problem of excessive and inefficient
communication is felt to persist. At the present, therefore, various groups of scientists are trying to codify and computerize the processes of what is called "information retrieval" in science. So far they have not had very great success, partly for reasons suggested below. [See INFORMATION STORAGE AND RETRIEVAL.] The structure and functions of communications processes among scientists present an obvious set of problems for the sociology of science—one on which much remains to be done. One interesting suggestion from general sociological ideas and from the research that has been done by Herbert Menzel (1959) is that scientists themselves sometimes think in terms of too rational a conception of the communication process; that is, they may be expecting too much from the journals and the formal meetings. In addition to these formal, manifest, and planned communication processes in science, there are the informal, latent, and unplanned ones. Scientists cannot always know precisely what they want and merely push a computer button to get it. Often, through "milling around" at meetings, through chance visits, through indirect channels, they get essential information which they can recognize as essential only when they get it. As a journey into emergent novelty, science must use both planned and unplanned patterns of communication. One of the newer and more interesting focuses of research in the sociology of science is the question of the function of each pattern of communication for different scientific needs and the distribution of these patterns among the different social situations in which scientists find themselves. [See DIFFUSION, article on INTERPERSONAL INFLUENCE.]
The processes of scientific discovery In contrast with an individualistic, "heroic" conception of the processes of scientific discovery that has prevailed in some quarters, though less now than formerly, the sociology of science has sought to redress the balance of our understanding of these processes by demonstrating that they have essential social components. Starting with the fact of the cumulative nature of science, sociologists have pointed out that the established body of scientific ideas and methodologies at any given time itself has the most important influence on setting problems for scientists to solve and on providing leads for their solution. This determining effect of the established ideas and methods is the source of the innumerable examples of the pattern of independent multiple discovery in science. Given the prerequisites of a discovery in the established body
SCIENCE: The Sociology of Science of science, it is almost inevitable, as Ogburn (1922) and Merton (1961) have argued and demonstrated from the history of science, that independent multiples will occur. Some discoveries, of course, break somewhat more sharply than others with the fundamental notions of the established science; they have more emergent novelty. These are what Kuhn (1962) has called "scientific revolutions." However, even these are far from ex nihilo. Although cumulative in important measure, they also set new directions for the relevant fields and specialties in science. Recent theory and research in the sociology of science have also qualified the older picture of the processes of scientific discovery as based entirely on foresight, planning, rationality, and ready acceptance. These characteristics certainly can be seen in large measure in most discoveries. But, in addition, in many discoveries there is an admixture of the unplanned, the nonrational or irrational, and the obstructive, contributed by the discoverer himself or by others. These characteristics manifest themselves in the pattern of serendipity in discovery and in the pattern of resistance by scientists themselves to certain scientific discoveries. The serendipity pattern occurs, and in actual research it occurs very often, when the researcher comes by happy chance on something he was not looking for, that is, some anomaly that presents him with the unexpected opportunity to change his preconceptions about his research and make a new discovery (Barber 1952, pp. 203-205). The resistance pattern occurs when the scientist refuses to accept his own or someone else's discovery because of theoretical or methodological preconceptions, the force of superior authority or prestige, or the prejudices of particular schools of thought (Barber & Hirsch 1962, chapter 32). Of course, there has always been some resistance to scientific discoveries on the part of cultural and social institutions outside science. Religion, political and economic interests—indeed, the whole range of social factors that interact with science— have under some conditions opposed one or another scientific idea or requirement, just as they have also supported others. An important task for the sociology of science is to analyze specific sources of acceptance and resistance for specific types of scientific ideas and needs. Science as a social problem Like the relations among any of the parts of society, the relations between science and various other parts of society are often inharmonious, as the participants in these relations see them, or
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dysfunctional, as the objective observer sees them. Thus, sociology can also study science as what it calls, in general, "a social problem." There are two aspects of science as a social problem. In one aspect, science is an activity whose participants feel, in some important measure, angry or hostile to society because their values and needs are not being properly met or respected. For example, scientists resent what they define as unnecessary controls on their work: they complain about insufficient financial support for their preferred types of research; they deplore politically imposed secrecy; and they try to throw off all nationalistic and other parochial limitations on their research and communication activities. However much these frustrations may be necessary in the light of other social needs than those of science, to scientists they are social problems calling for protest and reform. A variety of organized and unorganized means of protest now exist among scientists to cope with these problems. In another aspect, science is a social problem to various social groups who consider some of its consequences harmful to themselves and who therefore want to restrict or even eliminate science. Over both the short run and the long, many of the consequences of science are in fact harmful to various social groups. However unintended in most instances, these harmful consequences raise the issue of the social responsibilities of scientists, who are in part their source. It has come to be seen that responsibility for the harmful social consequences of science belongs not directly with scientists but with the several established social and political processes for handling social problems. It has also come to be seen that scientists can play a variety of useful roles in these social and political processes. If scientists have no absolute responsibility for the troubles they help to bring, neither are they absolved from all concern. A number of social and political arrangements are now being worked out to permit scientists to act as expert advisers on the technical aspects of the social problems they have helped to bring into being or that they can foresee arising out of their activities. BERNARD BARBER [See also DIFFUSION; INNOVATION; KNOWLEDGE, SOCIOLOGY OF; MEDICAL CARE, article on ETHNOMEDICINE; TECHNOLOGY; and the biographies of OGBURN; WEBER, MAX; ZNANIECKL] BIBLIOGRAPHY BARBER, BERNARD 1952 Science and the Social Order. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. -» A paperback edition was published in 1962 by Collier.
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BARBER, BERNARD 1956 Sociology of Science: A Trend Report and Bibliography. Current Sociology 5, no. 2. BARBER, BERNARD; and HIRSCH, WALTER (editors) 1962 The Sociology of Science. New York: Free Press. -> Contains 38 selections and a bibliography. BEARDSLEE, DAVID C.; and O'Dowo, DONALD D. 1961 The College-student Image of the Scientist. Science 133:997-1001. BEN-DAVID, JOSEPH 1960 Scientific Productivity and Academic Organization in Nineteenth-century Medicine. American Sociological Review 25:828-843. DEDIJER, STEVAN 1961 Why Did Daedalus Leave? Science 133:2047-2052. DUPREE, A. HUNTER 1959 Asa Gray: 1810-1888. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. GILLISPIE, CHARLES C. 1951 Genesis and Geology: A Study in the Relations of Scientific Thought, Natural Theology, and Social Opinion in Great Britain, 17901850. Harvard Historical Studies, Vol. 58. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. -» A paperback edition was published in 1959 by Harper. GILLISPIE, CHARLES C. 1960 The Edge of Objectivity: An Essay in the History of Scientific Ideas. Princeton Univ. Press. GLASER, BARNEY G. 1964 Organizational Scientists: Their Professional Careers. Indianapolis, Ind.: BobbsMerrill. HAGSTROM, WARREN O. 1965 The Scientific Community. New York: Basic Books. KUHN, THOMAS S. 1962 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Univ. of Chicago Press. LURIE, EDWARD 1960 Louis Agassiz: A Life in Science. Univ. of Chicago Press. MALINOWSKI, BRONISLAW (1916-1941) 1948 Magic, Science and Religion, and Other Essays. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. -> A paperback edition was published in 1954 by Doubleday. MEAD, MARGARET; and METRAUX, RHODA 1957-1958 Image of the Scientist Among High-school Students. Science 126:384-390, 1200; 127:349-351. MENZEL, HERBERT (1959) 1962 Planned and Unplanned Scientific Communication. Pages 417-441 in Bernard Barber and Walter Hirsch (editors), The Sociology of Science. New York: Free Press. MERTCN, ROBERT K. (1936) 1962 Puritanism, Pietism and Science. Pages 33-66 in Bernard Barber and Walter Hirsch (editors), The Sociology of Science. New ' r ork: Free Press. MERTON, ROBERT K. (1939) 1957 Science and Economy of 17th Century England. Pages 607-627 in Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. -> First published in Volume 3 of Science and Society. MERTON, ROBERT K. 1957 Priorities in Scientific Discovery: A Chapter in the Sociology of Science. American Sociological Review 22:635-659. MERTON, ROBERT K. 1961 Singletons and Multiples in Scientific Discovery. American Philosophical Society, Proceedings 105:470-486. OGBURN, WILLIAM F. (1922)1950 Social Change, With Respect to Culture and Original Nature. New edition with supplementary chapter. New York: Viking. PARSONS, TALCOTT 1951 The Social System. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. PRICE, DEREK J. DE SOLLA 1963 Little Science, Big Science. New York: Columbia Univ. Press.
ZNANIECKI, FLORIAN 1940 The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. ZUCKERMAN, HARRIET A. 1965 Nobel Laureates in the United States: A Sociological Study of Scientific Collaboration. Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia Univ. IV SCIENCE-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS
The spectacular achievements of scientists during World War n not only made science obviously more important as an instrument of national policy but also gave it a role of greater independence and initiative in the economic and political systems of the world. At least since the Enlightenment, it had generally been assumed that the advancement of science would contribute to social and political progress, but the specific role of science, and of scientists, in economic affairs had generally been thought of as subordinate to that of the entrepreneur or manager and, in matters of government policy, to that of the politician and bureaucrat. Especially in the Englishspeaking countries, the way of thinking initiated by Bacon, and re-emphasized by Franklin and Jefferson, assumed that scientific progress would be maintained by the patient accumulation of facts required for the solution of practical problems, and that research should therefore be supported as incidental to particular industrial enterprises or governmental programs or as a by-product of the system of higher education. Among leading scientists, this assumption had come to seem less obviously true in the late nineteenth or early twentieth century, in view of the superior accomplishments in fundamental science of various countries in western Europe. The success of Napoleonic France in creating, under governmental auspices, strong institutions for the support of basic science as well as technology, and the state-encouraged systematic advancement, late in the nineteenth century, of research in the universities and industry of Germany, made British and American scientists begin to doubt that the inductive and applied approach in the laboratory and the complete independence of science from political issues and governmental support were still the best means of advancing science. These doubts were confirmed by the institutional innovations of World War n, which, particularly in the United States, put science in a quite different relation to government. In its military application, it was no longer merely an instrument for the improvement of weapons at the request of military planners; it was a source of independent initiative in the invention of entirely new systems of weapons, to which war planners were forecd to adapt
SCIENCE: Science-Government Relations their strategies and diplomats their systems of international relations. Similarly, industrial research or development was no longer to be undertaken only at the initiative of the individual inventor or supported only on the basis of the calculation of the individual corporation; government planners began to look on it as a possible instrument by which government might foster the growth of the national economy and the solution of major social problems, and local communities became eager to foster it as an incentive to the development of their prosperity. Even more important, political leaders no longer assumed that basic research would be adequately supported as a by-product of the system of industrial enterprise or private education; in the United States, where private universities were most jealous of their independence from political control, the federal government was called on to support, on an unprecedented scale, the basic research carried on in universities and in industrial laboratories. At the same time, scientists and scientific societies began to think of their role in society, not as one of detachment from governmental affairs and not as one of subordination to industrial managers and bureaucrats, but as one of responsibility for the nature of policies and of the institutional system in which science would be fostered and protected. As a result, the relationship of science to government took on a new degree of significance and interest in the eyes of social scientists. Since the fostering of science was to be a deliberate policy of government, the sociologists and psychologists were concerned with the identification of the types of personality and the nature of the educational and social environment that would develop creativity and encourage innovation (Research Conference . . . 1963; Roe 1953). In practical terms, they had to deal with the new systems of communication and computation, the management of laboratories, the relationship of scientists to administrators, and the status of professional and scientific groups in the social and political system (Hill 1964). Since science was considered a potent force for economic growth, economists were led to study the criteria for the allocation of resources for the support of research and development (Nelson 1959). The relation of science and technology to the business cycle, the processes of innovation, and the relationship of business to government in the advancement of technology posed problems quite different from those of either classical or Marxian economics. Students of politics and administration were
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similarly required to consider how far the new techniques of operations research and other methods developed by scientists could go in determining political issues, and what effect they would have on the traditional values and on legal and political processes. These theoretical questions had their practical parallels within government: the relationship of scientific to administrative personnel within the civil service, the status of scientists as advisers to political executives or as participants in political action, and the extent to which representative legislative bodies should organize themselves to deal directly with scientists and with issues concerning the support and application of science (Gilpin & Wright 1964; McCamy 1960). Major areas of concern Problems like those mentioned above had their greatest impact, of course, in the major nations, notably the United States, the United Kingdom, the nations of western Europe, and the Soviet Union, but during the 1950s they also began to be a concern of those interested in the economic and political development of other countries. Let us note three of the major fields in which these new problems arose and then consider their effect on scientific institutions, on governmental institutions, and on the nature of their relationship. Science and military strength. The success of scientists in creating weapons that were not merely improvements on existing weapons systems but entirely beyond the imagination of military planners gave scientists quite a different status in government. Military strength could no longer be measured mainly in terms of mass armies and a system of industrial mobilization for the manufacture of munitions. It depended on the rate of scientific advance and the innovating ability of scientific institutions. Accordingly, a substantial portion of the budgets of major countries came to be devoted to military research and development programs, and scientists and scientific institutions came to have a large share in the control of such programs. As a result, the expenditures for research and development by government increased sharply, both in actual amounts and in proportion to other sources of support. In the United States, for example, total expenditure on research and development in 1940 (public and private) was well under $1 billion, the government share of the total was certainly less than one-fifth, and the military services provided much less than the Department of Agriculture. In 1964 the federal government provided about $15 billion, roughly two-thirds of
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the national total, but spent four-fifths of its funds through private corporations and universities. About $14 billion of the government total was contributed by the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the three agencies whose motive for expenditure was most clearly the strengthening of national power and international prestige (U.S. National Science Foundation, Federal Funds . . .). The newest and most powerful weapons systems have been developed, not in the traditional military laboratories, but in technological institutions directed by civilians. In the United States during World War n, the Office of Scientific Research and Development, a civilian agency within the Executive Office of the President, set up an extensive network of contractual relations with universities and industrial corporations, and the Manhattan District of the Army Engineers, which finally developed the atomic bomb, followed the same general pattern (Hewlett & Anderson 1962). As a result, the postwar structure of weapons research and development was one involving heavy reliance on private institutions by the military services, the Atomic Energy Commission, and (later) the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. In the planning of these programs, considerable influence was exercised by advisory committees representing the private scientific institutions. Their influence was greater in the decisions relating to the support of basic research, but it carried considerable weight even in the development of weapons systems (Price 1954). Scientists in wartime proved to be useful not merely in developing particular weapons but also in devising more effective systems and procedures of tactics and strategy. Operations research applied rigorous and quantitative methods to the solution of problems faced by the military commander, the industrial manager, or the political executive. Such work was organized either within the regular framework of the military services or under the sponsorship of independent research corporations. The flexibility of the contracting method in the United States was shown when the government proceeded to sponsor the creation of private corporations, supported by government funds, for the purpose of assisting governmental authorities in making major decisions on government administration or policy (U.S. Bureau of the Budget 1962). Of these new institutions the RAND Corporation, set up to serve the Air Force, was perhaps the best known, and the techniques that it developed, drawing on the skills of social as well as physical scien-
tists, became important tools for the civilian executives in the Defense Department who sought, in the 1960s, to exercise more effective control over military affairs. [See MILITARY POLICY.] Science and economic growth. Soon after World War n, even those countries committed to the preservation of private economic enterprise had also committed themselves to a policy of maintaining a high degree of employment and fostering economic growth and prosperity. To these countries and others, it was obvious that some of the most dynamic economic growth was taking place in branches of industry which had been stimulated by the advance of technology for military purposes —notably, electronics, aircraft, plastics, and computers. Economists accordingly took note of the extent to which scientific research and technological development, as well as capital investment, contributed to economic growth. Accordingly, one of the principal motives which led governments to support scientific research was the belief that research and technical education were major factors in the increase in productivity (Denison 1962). Even though economists may not agree on the precise percentage of economic growth which may be attributed to technological advance and the improvement in technological and managerial education, the belief in their efficacy has helped to persuade the United States and most nations of western Europe to increase their research and development expenditures in recent years at a much more rapid rate than their gross national product (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 1963, p. 22). In the United States the state governments and local business organizations have been persuaded that federal research subsidies have much to do with the location of new industries in their respective areas, and accordingly the expansion of universities and research laboratories has taken on an importance within the American political system much like that of the traditional forms of public works (such as the improvement of harbors or the building of dams). At the same time, economists have become more skeptical about the extent to which research undertaken for military purposes will have useful byproducts for the civilian economy. In western Europe, where various countries have undertaken to plan the development of the economy, including those sectors carried on by private industry, efforts have been made to develop scientific research as a means of economic growth (Parliamentary and Scientific Conference . . . 1965). The National Economic Development Council of Great Britain and
SCIENCE: Science-Government Relations the Commissariat au Plan of France, for example, have set up special relationships with their respective national organizations for the planning of scientific research expenditures. In the United States, on the other hand, it proved more difficult to build up federal government research and development programs specifically for the purpose of assisting in the development of private industry. The opposition of private business interests restrained the expansion of certain programs of scientific research and technological assistance in the Department of Commerce, for example, even while federal research support was being increased in other fields relating to the private economy, notably in agriculture and natural resources. The apparent influence of science and technology in advancing economic growth led naturally to the hope that science could play an important role in the advancement of the underdeveloped countries. This hope found expression in the programs of the several specialized agencies of the United Nations, notably UNESCO, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the World Health Organization. It became an important element also in the foreign aid and technical assistance programs of various individual nations—notably the United States, which was able to draw on its century of experience in agricultural education and research. [See ECONOMIC GROWTH.] The health sciences. Some of the most striking practical accomplishments of the sciences have been in the fields of medicine and public health, and the medical profession and hospitals accordingly have been involved in the research programs supported by government to a rapidly increasing degree. In the United States the National Institutes of Health (NIH) of the U.S. Public Health Service became during the 1950s the principal supporter of biological and medical sciences, not merely in the United States but throughout the world. American universities were receiving grants for basic research in even larger amounts from the NIH